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COMMENTARY

On Turkey's Missile Defense Strategy: The Four Faces of the S-400 Deal between Turkey and Russia

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Abstract

The S-400 deal signed between Turkey and Russia has sparked an intense debate in the international arena, where harsh criticisms have been leveled against Turkey. This paper explains the reasons behind Turkey's desire to build an elaborate air defense structure, and discuss how and why its successive attempts to reach this objective in collaboration with the allied countries have failed. It highlights the major arguments behind the severe criticisms in the West concerning Turkey's negotiations, first with a Chinese firm, and then with a Russian firm, and how this entire process has become a serious bone of contention between Turkey and the U.S., carrying a risk of a spill over into NATO. It also discusses why and how the severe sanctions threatened to be imposed on Turkish defense industries by the Trump administration will indeed damage the security and the defensive capability not only of Turkey, but also the U.S.

Keywords

Introduction

The S-400 deal signed between Turkey and Russia concerning the sale of four battalions of sophisticated Russian air defense systems, worth 2.5 billion U.S.

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dollars, sparked yet another round of stiff debate in the international arena, where harsh criticisms have been leveled against Turkey mainly from the ranks of its NATO allies.

A number of issues have been raised in these criticisms, extending from whether Turkey needs to spend billions of dollars on buying an air defense system whose effectiveness has not yet been entirely proven across a spectrum of air-borne threats, to how Turkey's longstanding alliance relationship with the U.S. and its status in NATO as a prominent ally might be severely damaged due to the country's increasing degree of rapprochement with Russia, whose foreign and security policies toward the West constitute major challenges for the Alliance and to the rules-based system that has been put in place since the end of the Cold War.[1]

Hence, this paper will, first of all, discuss the fundamental issues that have come to the fore, prior to and during the debate, by focusing particularly on the four faces of the controversial S-400 deal that was signed and sealed between Turkey and Russia. In this context, the paper will first highlight the reasons behind Turkish authorities' desire to build an elaborate air defense structure in the post-Cold War era, and then discuss how and why their successive attempts to reach this objective in collaboration with the allied countries have failed.

Second, the major arguments behind the harsh criticisms leveled against Turkey's negotiations for purchasing an air defense system, first from a Chinese firm, and then a Russian firm, and how this entire process has become a serious bone of contention between Turkey and its NATO allies, in particular the U.S. will be discussed.

Third, the impact of Turkey's acquisition of S-400 from Russia on its medium to long-term objectives to build an effective air defense architecture will be discussed under the shadow of the threatening statements pronounced by leading civil and military figures in the Trump administration, hinting at severe military and economic sanctions to be imposed on Turkey.

Fourth, the positive spin of the intense debate on the S-400 deal that has apparently become a politically motivating factor for Turks, particularly those from the younger generation, toward joining the defense industries sector will be elaborated.

Finally, the paper will conclude with remarks and recommendations with a view to finding a breakthrough in the strained relations between Turkey and its allies that resulted from its decision to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system.

Turkey's Strategic Environment and its Quest for Air Defense Capability

Due to its geographical location in the vicinity of the most volatile regions of the world, the deployment of an advanced air defense system against the threat posed by the missile and aircraft capabilities in the arsenals of a number of surrounding countries has become an urgent necessity for Turkey.[2]

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The existing air defense systems in the country, such as the Stingers, Rapiers and the Hawks, not only have limited ranges (i.e. short and medium), but also limited lifespans. They are aging fast. Turkey's Nike Hercules missiles, which were deployed around the city of Istanbul during the Cold War years, have relatively longer ranges of about 140 km, but they cannot be relied upon any more, and many have been sent to retirement already.

Hence, it wouldn't be wrong to argue that Turkey's airspace is not being protected by proper land-based air defense systems, nor is the vast territory of 783,562 km^2 beneath it, where 82 million Turks live in their homeland.

In lieu of an effective land-based system, Turkey's airspace is patrolled by Turkish Air Force units consisting of F-16 fighter aircraft, which carry air-to-air missiles, as well as early warning (i.e., AWACS) and refueling (Aerial Tanker) aircraft, with a view to achieving active protection against potential missile attacks and violations of Turkish airspace by enemy aircraft. This is by no means an acceptable situation from Turkey's standpoint for two reasons: First, the cutting edge technologies used in the land-based anti-ballistic missile defense systems are far more capable of engaging enemy missiles and aircraft while they are still hundreds of kilometers away from the homeland, and they are also much more reliable in eliminating them before they get dan-

Turkey's desire back in the late 1990s was to have a share in the development of the ballistic missile defense technology, a proposal that was not warmly welcomed by the U.S.

gerously close to the strategic assets in the country. Second, military aircraft in the inventory of the Turkish Air Force, such as F16s, which have to fly much longer hours due to airspace patrolling and protection missions than they would normally do during periods of stable relations with neighbors, run the risk of aging more rapidly as a result of metal fatigue. The excessive stress load on the pilots is also a factor, although a certain proportion of these patrolling missions are being carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which have entered the Turkish Air Force inventory recently.[3] Although the use of drones may reduce the strain on personnel, UAVs are far less effective than a land-based system would be. Turkey is therefore in dire need of deploying a proper air defense structure that would provide consistent coverage all over the country in order to meet the fundamental requirements of being a sovereign state, as well as protecting its population and its territorial integrity in a rather hostile environment.[4]

This issue has long been on the agenda of Turkish politicians, diplomats, and military personnel who have conducted a series of negotiations with their American counterparts since the temporary deployment of the U.S. "Patriot" air defense system in Turkey's southeast during the first Iraq war in 1991.[5] Since then, Turkish authorities have been more than willing to deploy these elaborate air defense systems permanently in Turkey, especially in regions neighboring the Middle East. Despite the extended negotiations, however, no consensus could be found in order to go ahead with a joint project. Turkey's desire back in the late 1990s was to have a share in the development of the ballistic missile defense technology, a proposal that was not warmly welcomed by the U.S.[6]

A similar situation occurred in the triangular relations among Turkey, the U.S. and Israel with respect to cooperation on the development and deployment of the "Arrow-II" air defense system, which has never been realized. While the Americans put the blame on the Israelis as being the ones who did not want to share this new and sensitive technology with Turkey, Israelis pronounced almost exactly the same views regarding the attitude of their American counterparts.[7] All in all, the project was shelved from the perspective of Turkey.[8]

Turkey's quest to develop an elaborate air defense capacity nevertheless continued during the second half of the 2000s, as Ankara widened the scope of potential suppliers to include new countries, such as China, Russia, and NATO allies France and Italy. Turkey issued a call in 2009 for the procurement of a "Long-range Air and Missile Defense System," dubbed T-LORA-MIDS, and collected offers in 2010.[9] The U.S. firms Raytheon and Lockheed Martin responded to the call with Patriots, while the Chinese firm CPMIEC made its offer with FD-2000 (the export version of HQ-9), and the Russian firm Rosoboroneksport offered S-400. Later, the Franco-Italian consortium Eurosam offered SAMP/T.[10]

While the bid was still in the evaluation phase on the side of the Turkish authorities, the year 2010 was also critical in terms of developments in NATO air defense. During the Lisbon summit of the Alliance in November of that year, it was announced that the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) project that the U.S. had been developing for a couple of decades already, would be transformed into a NATO-wide air defense structure, also known as the "Missile Shield". Hence, the debate on Turkey's quest for deploying an elaborate air defense capability took a new turn, with comments and criticisms coming from experts and analysts underlining whether it would be a wise decision for Turkey to spend billions of dollars while there would be a NATO project underway that would soon take care of defending the allies against a spectrum of airborne threats originating from enemy territories.[11]

Two issues that were either overlooked or hardly mentioned during that debate were highly critical from Turkey's perspective. First, if everything went according to plan, it would take about a decade for the "Missile Shield" project to become fully operational, if not longer, meaning that Turkey's airspace would remain unprotected by land-based air defense systems during that period. Second, no one mentioned publicly that even when the "Missile Shield" would become fully operational in the 2020s, large parts of Turkey's eastern and southeastern districts could not be covered and, therefore, would not be protected due to the technical and geographical limitations of the project.[12]

Authorities argued that the gap could be filled, theoretically, and if need be, with a temporary deployment of U.S. Aegis ashore systems in the eastern Mediterranean. This, however, would not be considered a highly convincing argument for a variety of reasons, such as the slow deployment of the Patriots

in Turkey's southeast in 2012 against the threat posed by Syria and their hasty withdrawal a couple of years later.[13]

Turkey's Air Defense Project Becomes a Bone of Contention with Allies

The lack of an effective air defense system in Turkey was felt vividly when Syria plunged into civil war in March 2011, which eventually led, among other things, to a reversal of the then gradually improving bilateral relations between Ankara and Damascus.[14] In response to Syria's shooting down of a Turkish military reconnaissance aircraft in the international airspace of the eastern Mediterranean in June 2012, the issue was brought before the NATO Council. The Council discussed and eventually approved, in December 2012, the deployment of Patriot battalions in Turkey's southeastern cities along the Syrian border, namely Adana, Kahramanmaraş and Gaziantep, as a protective measure against possible attacks coming from Syria again.[15]

The lack of an effective air defense system in Turkey was felt vividly when Syria plunged into civil war in March 2011.

This incident revived the need for taking swift measures for deploying a permanent air defense structure in the country vis-à-vis the growing threat perceived from the ballistic and cruise missile capabilities in the arsenals of its neighboring states. Based on the lessons learned from earlier attempts in the 1990s and 2000s, the prevailing view among Turkish authorities was, this time, to acquire an elaborate air defense capability in such a way that:

- The system would provide an effective air defense shelter for Turkey against the threat of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as military aircraft;

- The first set of batteries could be deployed and become operational within a short span of time after the signing of the purchase agreement;

- The supplier firm would agree to share the technology with Turkey to allow co-production of the system, including its advanced versions in the near future; and

- The price should be affordable.

The Chinese firm CPMIEC, which had offered the FD-2000 (the export version of HQ-9) air defense system, came to the fore with a promise for an early delivery of the batteries as well as a price that was considerably lower than the price of the S-400, the Patriot, and the SAMP/T. Yet most of Turkey's allies in the West, the U.S. in particular, were quick to react harshly to Ankara's pick among the bidders, on the grounds that the Chinese system would not be compatible with the "Missile Shield" that was being erected across Alliance territory, with a major contribution from Turkey with the radar site in the Kürecik village near the city of Malatya in the southeastern part of the country. Critics of Turkey's decision to go ahead with the Chinese firm, from both inside and outside of the country, also argued that the FD-2000 air defense system, if deployed, would seriously jeopardize the integrity of NATO's sensitive command, control, and communication systems as well as its intelligence collecting capability.[16] It was also emphasized in these criticisms that the Chinese firm CPMIEC was subject to sanctions of the U.S.

Turkish political and military authorities tried hard to convince their peers in Western capitals and military headquarters that it would be technically possible to find effective solutions for preventing such scenarios from occurring. Nevertheless, the political climate was not at all conducive for reaching a consensus between the parties. As one high-ranking NATO official once told the author at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, "even though effective measures could be put in place, technically speaking, in order to prevent leakage of sensitive information to the Chinese firm, it would be simply not acceptable for the Alliance, politically speaking, to agree to a Turkish-Chinese deal."[17]

While the Chinese deal was still on the negotiation table, the ever-increasing pressure exerted on Turkey by its allies apparently caused a certain degree of reluctance in Ankara's attitude to finalize the deal, which in turn, caused the Chinese firm to withdraw its offer. This development led to a new round of talks between Turkey and the other contenders to renew their offers, bearing in mind what may have made them fail in the previous round.

This time, the Russian firm Rosoboronexport stood out with its S-400 "Triumf" missile system. Turkish and Russian authorities conducted negotiations, which culminated in the signing of an agreement.

Criticisms voiced by politicians, diplomats, and civil and military experts from the allied countries as well as from within the country, with respect

Some have argued that the S-400 issue increased the possibility that Russia could take advantage of U.S.-Turkey friction to undermine the NATO alliance.

to Turkey's choice of the Russian firm, were no less severe than those pronounced only two years before when the Chinese offer was on the negotiation table. This time, however, some of the allies, the U.S. being at the forefront, went beyond the limits of diplomatic niceties by issuing threatening statements, implying that they would impose severe military and economic sanctions should Turkey finalize the procurement of the Russian air defense system.

The S-400 deal raised a number concerns ranging from the technical aspects of military cooperation within NATO to broader political considerations. Some have argued that the S-400 issue increased the possibility that Russia could take advantage of U.S.-Turkey friction to undermine the NATO alliance.

During a press briefing in May 2018, a State Department spokesperson said, "Under NATO and under the NATO agreement... you're only supposed to buy... weapons and other materiel that are interoperable with other NATO partners. We don't see [an S-400 system from Russia] as being interoperable."[18] In March 2018, Czech General Petr Pavel, who chairs the NATO Military Committee, voiced concerns about the possibility that Russian personnel helping operate a S-400 system in Turkey could gain significant intelligence on NATO assets stationed in the country.[19]

NATO Secretary General has consistently underlined that "decisions on acquisition of military capabilities is a national decision, but what is important for NATO is interoperability, that the different systems can work together."[20]

Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell, who spoke at a foreign relations subcommittee hearing at the U.S. Senate on June 26, 2018, explained that the U.S. would implement sanctions against Turkey through "Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act." Mitchell also said that Ankara's decision to purchase the Russian missiles would lead Washington to cancel further delivery of F-35 stealth fighters.[21]

More recently, the "Unclassified Executive Summary" of the "FY19 NDAA Sec 1282 Report" published by the U.S. Department of Defense on the "Status of the U.S. Relationship with the Republic of Turkey," in its section on the "Impact of Turkey's S-400 Acquisition," states that "the U.S. Government has

made clear to the Turkish Government that purchasing the S-400 would have unavoidable negative consequences for U.S.-Turkey bilateral relations, as well as Turkey's role in NATO, including:

- Potential sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA);

- Risk to Turkish participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program (both aircraft acquisition and industrial workshare);

- Risk to other potential future U.S. arms transfers to Turkey, and risk of losing broader bilateral defense industrial cooperation;

- Reduction in NATO interoperability; and

- Introduction of new vulnerabilities from Turkey's increased dependence on Russia, including sanctioned Russian defense entities, for sophisticated military equipment."[22]

The Report also states that "Turkish acquisition programs that could be affected include but are not limited to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Patriot Air and Missile Defense System, CH-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopter, UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter, and the F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft," and that the U.S. administration would reassess Turkey's continued participation as one of eight partner nations should they continue with their purchase of the S-400.[23]

The severity of these sanctions goes without saying; if imposed on Turkey, they may cause serious damage to Turkey' defensive capacity and operational capabilities, at least in the short to medium term. These risks raise the most important question of all: Who will benefit from such a situation, and who will lose, if and when these sanctions are put in practice? The answer is in the following sections.

Impact of Turkey's Acquisition of S-400 on its Defensive Capacity

The bulk of criticisms in the West against Turkey's S-400 deal with Russia originates mainly from the deal's political implications due to the increasing degree of rapprochement between Turkey, a NATO ally, and Russia, NATO's long-standing archrival in particular in the aftermath of its illegal annexation of Crimea which has been perceived, from the allies' perspective, a signifi-

cant challenge to the Euro-Atlantic security and defense architecture. Critics at home instead question the military implications of the deal, basically on two grounds, one of which is whether the Russian deal would solve Turkey's need for deploying an elaborate air defense system, and the other is whether the whole controversy is worth the risk of being alienated within the NATO alliance, and being exposed to the severe military and economic sanctions of the U.S.[24]

As for the first concern, it would be far-fetched to argue that the purchase of a Russian air defense system, consisting of only four S-400 battalions, no matter how sophisticated they may be, would provide effective deterrence or extensive protection for Turkey against enemy missiles and military aircraft in an actual conflict. Due to the limited number of battalions and the extent of the area each one of them would cover, the system could only operate on "stand alone" mode, and therefore, only the strategic locations of major cities, selected military installations, and critical infrastructure and industrial sites would be protected.[25] Given this possible scenario, once the S-400 system is deployed and became operational, which could be as soon early 2020, then the second concern, which questions whether the whole controversy is worth the risk of facing severe sanctions by the allies, gains currency.

It is not yet certain whether the U.S. will definitely impose the above-cited sanctions as a response to Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 system. But one must bear in mind that the sanctions mentioned here would damage not only Turkey's interests, but also those of the U.S. by way of crippling the defensive capacity and the operational capability of the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole, where Turkey is a major power neighboring one of the most volatile regions of the world.

Therefore, attempting to weaken Turkish military capacity and its economy would only play into the hands of the rivals and the enemies of Turkey, in particular, and of NATO, in general, thereby resulting in a lose-lose situation for both parties within the Alliance.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told journalists, on return from a summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, which was held in Sochi, Russia on February 15, 2019 that the purchase of S-400 was a "done deal."[26] Having heard this from Turkey's top political leader, and also knowing that nearly half of the price of the S-400

battalions has already been paid to the Russians, a reversal in the Turkish government's policy from this point onward would be only remotely possible, if not totally impossible. No sovereign state would logically take such a radical decision.

If political and military authorities in the U.S. have come to the point of discussing the imposition of severe sanctions on Turkey because of the S-400 deal, they should, before everything else, ask themselves how Turkey has come, or rather, has been pushed, to the point of negotiating such a deal with Russia.[27]

Had the U.S. administrations so far agreed to the sale of the Patriot air defense system to Turkey under terms similar to those which some of their other allies have entertained, such as, for instance, the Netherlands and Spain, would Turkish authorities have looked for other suppliers from China or Russia? Most probably not!

Had the U.S. administrations so far agreed to the sale of the Patriot air defense system to Turkey under terms similar to those which some of their other allies have entertained, such as, for instance, the Netherlands and Spain, would Turkish authorities have looked for other suppliers from China or Russia? Most probably not! So, who is to blame for the current deadlock that Turkey and its allies have been experiencing lately because of the S-400 deal with Russia?

Impact of the Debate on Turkey's Quest for Air Defense on the Public

Turkey's missile defense procurement process has frequently made headlines in media outlets both at home and abroad over the last decade, which has indeed done a great deal of service for the country in many ways.

First and foremost, the intense debate has attracted the attention of young pupils from all over the country, sparking a keen interest in defense-related matters. Turkish citizens have also appreciated the value of becoming self-sufficient in this area by investing more in the defense industries sector.

Recently, a growing number of Turkish university students have in mind the goal of joining one of the companies operating in Turkey's defense industries sector, such as Roketsan,[28] Aselsan,[29] and Havelsan.[30] These young Turks constitute the hidden treasure of the country as well as the great potential for the rapid progress of the Turkish economy in the coming decades.

Second, Turkish governments have become much more conscious than ever about the significance of supporting and thus sponsoring domestic research and development projects in the field of defense industries. As an indicator of this acknowledgment, one might cite that the capacity of the Presidency of Defense Industries operating under the auspices of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey[31] has increased many folds, in less than a decade, in terms of skilled human resources, financial assets, and technical capabilities.[32]

At a ceremony at the Turkish Scientific and Technological Research Council's (TÜBİTAK) Defense Industry Research and Development Institute (SAGE) campus in Ankara in October 2018, President Erdoğan stated that "Turkey is moving rapidly on the way to have a say in all fields of defense, aviation and space technologies." He noted "the locality rate in the defense industry [has] increased from 20 percent to 65 percent." President Erdoğan also emphasized that "Turkey will reach the target of an independent and strong country by uninterruptedly continuing its national defense moves that have been initiated in the defense industry."[33]

These two extremely valuable developments alone, which have been taking place in the country almost simultaneously over the past several years, thanks to the reluctance of Turkey's allies to supply sophisticated weapons systems, indeed reflect the extent of change in the mindset of Turkish people from all ranks of society as well as the degree of transformation and determination of the government to become self-reliant in defense procurement matters.

It is hoped that Turkey's friends and allies will take note of this rapid change and the transformation in the country in a timely manner in order to be able draw up win-win scenarios in the alliance relationship that otherwise seem to be tilted toward lose-lose, due to careless speeches in Western capitals and military headquarters about imposing severe sanctions on their "staunch ally" Turkey.

Conclusion

The world is a dangerous place and, unfortunately, it's not likely to get any better in the foreseeable future for countries like Turkey that seek stability and peace in their neighborhoods. Hence, achieving collaboration and cooperation among like-minded states is more important than ever, in the face of threats posed by rival states and non-state actors.

Bearing these in mind, the U.S. and other concerned NATO countries should thoroughly revise their stance vis-à-vis Turkey's desire to build its own elabo-

rate air defense architecture, preferably in close collaboration with them. Such an eventuality would certainly serve the national interest of both Turkey and the NATO allies.

Hence, the U.S. Raytheon-Lockheed Martin consortium and the Franco-Italian Eurosam consortium should both revise and refresh their offers to provide Turkey with an elaborate air defense capability that could be integrated to the Alliance-wide Missile Shield project once it becomes fully operational and then onwards.

Should this be the case, the co-existence of two separate air defense systems deployed on Turkish territory, one of them being the Russian S-400s that would be operational on "stand alone" mode, would not cause security problems for the NATO allies.

Politicians, diplomats, and civil and military experts from the allied countries who have harshly criticized Turkey for purchasing strategic weapons systems from Russia should feel the responsibility to prove that their governments were sincere in their statements suggesting that they would like to be the major supplier of the air defense system that used to be on the mind of Turkish authorities. They should also ask their government officials to act accordingly and swiftly catch up with the time that they unfortunately wasted so far.

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ARTICLE

Understanding the Distinguishing Features of Post-Westphalian Diplomacy

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Abstract

Diplomacy is traditionally an instrument used by states to develop and sustain peaceful and predictable relations among themselves. This paper discusses the transformation of traditional diplomacy into global diplomacy by referring to modifications in four components of diplomacy: context, rules and norms, channels of communication, and actors and roles. After discussing the historical evolution of diplomacy, this paper argues that diplomacy has transformed in order to adapt itself to the newly emerging conditions of the 21st century. It has become a multi-actor and multi-level network phenomenon. However, this diplomatic transformation has not diluted the traditional sovereignty-based diplomacy. As states maintain their ultimate power and authority in the globalized system, so does state diplomacy.

Keywords

Introduction

Diplomacy depends on the prior existence of human societies with basic needs for security as well as communication. The performance of these basic functions has differed from century to century and from society to society.

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However, diplomacy has always been there, continuously adapting itself to the changing conditions. In this respect, the transformation of the Westphalian system with the end of the Cold War, which set up a completely new international system, resulted in radical impacts on the nature of state sovereignty and sovereignty-based state functions including diplomacy. Global developments since the late 20th century have altered the nature, actors, methods and practices of diplomacy. These changes have their roots in the transformation of the structure of power and authority with the collapse of the bipolar system. Consequently, the centuries-old established diplomatic machine was suddenly confronted with an increase in the numbers of its users and shifts in the functions of the concept itself.

The objective of this article is to discuss the historical evolution of diplomacy through a comparison between pre-Westphalian, Westphalian, and post-Westphalian diplomacy, and to analyze its transformation in the 21st century by focusing on the modifications of four components of diplomacy, i.e. context, rules and norms, channels of communication, and the actors and roles of diplomacy. In exploring this transformation, this article puts forward two arguments. First, diplomacy has become a multi-level and multi-actor network phenomenon in the 21st century. Second, although this transformation has the potential to put an end to the traditional understanding of diplomacy, contrary to expectations, the traces of Westphalian politics and state diplomacy are still substantial.

The Westphalian and Post-Westphalian International Systems

The basis of modern international relations was established by the 1648 Westphalian Peace Treaties, which mark the birth of nation states as the privileged and primary actors, replacing the medieval system of centralized religious authority with a decentralized system of sovereign states as the sole legitimate form of sovereign authority.[1] The Westphalian state-centric system was based on some new principles, including the sovereignty, sovereign independence and equality of the nation states, territorial integrity, the equal rights and obligations of the states, non-intervention in others' domestic affairs, and the conduct of inter-state diplomatic relations through embassies, among many others.[2] Power was at the center of this system to regulate inter-state relations in the absence of any higher systemic authority.

As Michael Vaughan argues, the Westphalian order was important for three reasons.[3] First, it secularized international politics and anchored it on the

tenets of national interests. Second, it introduced the concept of sovereignty and the privileged status of the states without any higher authority standing above them, unless the state voluntarily assents to such an authority. Third, it accepted the states as sovereign supreme authorities within their borders with legitimate authority over all inhabitants living there, and promoted a conception of international society based on the legal equality of the states. Referring to this difference between internal and external sovereignty, domestic politics and foreign policy emerged as two distinct and independent domains for the nation states. Thus, the emergence of similar contrasts, i.e. between national and international, internal politics and foreign policy, world politics and world economics, inside and outside, etc., has become one of the characteristics of the Westphalian system.[4]

States as the basic, principal and sole legitimate actors in the international system continued their privileged status until the late 1980s when state sovereignty and the state-centric Westphalian system had to face the challenges of a newly emerging international order. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Eastern European communist governments, mostly through the nonviolent revolutions of 1989, transformed the international system by altering not only the rules governing superpower conflict but also the norms underpinning the international system.[5] Thus, the end of the Cold War symbolized the end of modern international relations and state-centric ideology along with the weakening of the core state-centered tasks. In this respect, the post-Westphalian international system can be conceived within the framework of three constitutive dynamics.

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First, sovereignty has been eroding in the globalizing and more cosmopolite world. Nation states have become enmeshed in a complex network of global governance including regional and international organizations, trans-national and sub-national entities, multi-national corporations and non-governmental organizations, citizen movements and individuals that emerged as the independent actors with the assumed capacity to compete with states.[6] Thus,

states can no longer hold exclusive sovereignty and have lost the privilege of being the basic and determining actors of power struggles. Their capacities have been restrained by global dynamics which forced states to share their power and sovereignty with all non-state actors.[7]

Second, the scope of international relations has expanded by reaching to new topic areas. Human rights, gender, women, the environment, democratization, population movements and energy politics, among many others, have been integrated into the field,[8] which is no longer confined to the limits of the nation states, inter-state relations and state-centered tasks and topics.

Third, as Richard Haass argues, "international relations becomes two-pronged: not just state-to-state, but between states on the one hand and sub-national and supra-national actors on the other,"[9] along with its derivative impact on contemporary international diplomacy as state-centered conduct.[10]

Overall, in the post-Westphalian international system, as a result of the fragmentation and transformation of sovereignty, the nature of international relations has changed.[11] Its limits have been extended to embrace power and competition not only between states but also between cultures and civilizations.[12] The international system has become much more interdependent, owing to the emerging partnerships between states and non-state actors. Long-lasting contrasts coupled with the sovereignty principle disappeared suddenly. The difference between internal and external sovereignty has lost its validity. The distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy has become more uncertain than ever. Despite all of these changes, the discourse on the weakening of state power and the disappearance of states in the post-Westphalian system is only rhetorical.[13] States continue to be important in a globalized world, although in a different way. Today, states have to open themselves to non-state actors, which has forced the former to recognize and co-exist with the latter in a multi-level and multi-centered structure.[14] As a result, what happened in practice in the post-Westphalian era is that the conduct of certain activities and practices which were previously under the sovereign authorities of the states now take place through coordination and cooperation among a number of different actors. One of the most obvious areas of cooperation is diplomacy.

Diplomacy

One of the most striking impacts of the systemic and state-level transformation of the post-1989 era has become apparent in the field of diplomacy,

which was traditionally supposed to be a state instrument. In a globalized system, diplomacy and diplomatic practices have transformed, along with modifications in state sovereignty and the sovereignty-based functions of states.

Diplomacy is typically understood as a means of implementing the goals and objectives of the foreign policies of the states. Despite this common understanding about diplomacy, its definition has changed over time, which also proves the evolution and transformation of

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diplomacy. Traditionally, diplomacy has been defined from a state-centric perspective until very recently. One of the leading thinkers in this field, Geoff R. Berridge defines diplomacy as "an essentially political activity and, well-resourced and skillful, a major ingredient of power … to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law."[15] In a similar way, Adam Watson defines the concept as a "process of dialogue and negotiations among the states to manage their relations and to reach to their objectives without resorting to force or power."[16] One of the most striking definitions of diplomacy belongs to Sir Harold George Nicolson, who argues that diplomacy is "the management of international relations by negotiation, the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by the ambassadors and envoys, the business or art of the diplomatist."[17] As one of the most symbolic and leading figures on the topic, Henry Kissinger accepts diplomacy as the conduct of relations among states based on compromise rather than on power relations; he argues that the successful and effective implementation of diplomacy is dependent on international law, international institutions and institutionalization.[18] Therefore, it is also important to define diplomacy from an institutional perspective. From this perspective, diplomacy is accepted as a package of rules and routines embedded in the activities, structures and cultures of state institutions as diplomatic actors, which define appropriate behaviors and acceptable norms for the states in their conduct of relations with each other in the international environment.[19]

Referring to the above-mentioned definitions, it is possible to argue that diplomacy has been recognized as a foreign policy tool which emphasizes com-

munication rather than conflict, and compromise rather than competition, to achieve/maintain a peaceful, stable and predictable international system as the eventual objective. In this traditional understanding of diplomacy, diplomatic relations cover relations between states and have been conducted by state diplomats.[20] In line with the traditional interpretation of diplomacy, all diplomatic actors globally share a specific culture, language, operating procedures, norms and standards, and perform similar tasks and duties for their own states. These common characteristics of diplomats make them members of a global trans-national community. Moreover, they have also developed a professional identity shared at the global level by acting within similar institutional frameworks. Consequently, in essence,

> diplomacy has a Janus-faced character with a national side anchored in particular sovereign states and a transnational side anchored in the set of interstate diplomatic principles and rules, trans-national values and identity; trans-nationally shared professional language, norms and behaviors as well as transnationally distributed working methods and standard operating procedures.[21]

The trans-national side of diplomacy was disclosed with the transformation of international relations and the globalization of the international system in the post Westphalian era. Then, the classical definitions of diplomacy became inadequate and were replaced by much more embracing and comprehensive definitions to explain the process of communication in a wider international system. Accordingly, post-Westphalian diplomacy has become a means of global communication and a dialogue mechanism among all systemic actors.[22] The actors conducting diplomacy have proliferated and diversified, as traditional diplomats have been forced to share their diplomatic tasks and duties with others. Diplomatic relations and negotiations have extended greatly by covering relations among all actors, including states, regional and international organizations, civil society actors and international dialog channels.[23] Thus, states and ministries of foreign affairs have lost their exclusivity within the scope of wider diplomatic relations.

As explained by Michael Smith, the changing nature of diplomacy can be acknowledged by referring to three main functions of diplomacy, i.e. representation, communication and negotiation.[24] Accordingly, representation includes such activities as establishing a diplomatic presence in various more

or less institutionalized arenas, and maintaining a focus for the expression of interests or values. Communication includes activities relating to the gathering of information, evaluation and synthesis, and the projection of messages reflecting key interests and values. Negotiation encompasses a spectrum of bargaining and problem-solving activities, and can be carried out in a wide variety of more or less structured arenas. Although these diplomatic functions have been carried out predominantly by the diplomatic services of nation states, in today's globalized system there has been a proliferation of diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic actors that now perform those previously state-based functions of diplomacy.

The Historical Evolution of Diplomacy

Diplomacy is as old as humanity. As a set of practices, rules and procedures enabling regularized interaction and mediation between human collectivities, it has existed since the early days of humankind.[25] However, its form and manner have changed throughout history. It started with early quasi diplomatic practices, con-

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tinued with traditional diplomacy and evolved into the current global diplomacy.[26] This part of the paper will analyze the history of diplomacy under two categories: traditional state-centric and global multi-actor and multi-level diplomacy.

Traditional Diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy mostly refers to two different types of diplomacy, i.e. old and new. 'Old' diplomacy includes practices up until World War I. It was to a great extent bilateral and secret, and was conducted by sovereigns themselves or their representatives. 'New' diplomacy emerged with its new style under the League of Nations system. It was relatively open to the public and conducted to a great extent in multilateral settings. New diplomacy was implemented until the 21st century.

The earliest signs of diplomacy can be found in the second, or possible even in the late fourth millennium BCE when sovereigns sent their messengers endowed with a special status to other sovereigns to prevent wars, cease hos-

tilities, or merely to continue peaceful relations and further economic exchanges.[27] In those earliest periods, diplomatic practices depended on some basic principles, including communication through messengers and merchant caravans, diplomatic immunity, ordinary codes of hospitality, and treaty observance by the related parties. However, the diplomatic activities of the early periods remained rudimentary, mainly because of the slow, challenging, unpredictable and insecure nature of communication.[28]

The first examples of more mature diplomatic practices can be found in the correspondence between the Hittites and Ancient Egyptians, which were later developed further by the Greek city states; these paved the way for the institutional basis of diplomacy. It was the Byzantine Empire that, for the first time, developed diplomacy in institutional terms, introduced the status of diplomats/ambassadors, promoted their training and developed protocol rules. [29]

In the Greek city states of the fourth and fifth centuries, conditions became favorable for a more sophisticated diplomacy with the help of a shared language and a largely common inheritance of culture and religion. The first examples of open diplomacy were experienced there.[30] Diplomacy could gain relative transparency owing to informing the public about the processes of negotiations and the signing of treaties. Moreover, diplomatic immunity became a much more established norm and resident missions began to appear, even if they employed local residents (known as proxenos) as different from today.[31] In this sense, the Greek city state system contributed to the development of diplomacy to a great extent.

The Roman Empire did not use diplomacy as a means of maintaining its supremacy, but rather a means of transacting often very routine business. This may be the reason why diplomacy became a method of managing long-distance legal or commercial business, principally within the Empire, which was to constitute its more important legacy.[32] The Empire did not have central institutions for the conduct of foreign policy or the maintenance of records. No records appear to have been kept, and thus no notion at all developed of a continuing diplomatic relationship with any other entity. However, Rome did contribute to diplomacy from the legal perspective through the development of the first basis of a simple diplomatic law, i.e. the *Code of Justinian*.

In medieval Europe, diplomacy was developed first by Byzantium, which used diplomacy as an art of negotiation, and then by Venice, which intro-

duced new standards of honesty and technical proficiency. The former attributed great importance, sometimes primary importance, to diplomacy. The expansion of Byzantine techniques, its immensely long range and its persistence made it a forerunner of the modern system. Moreover, the close relationship with the latter provided a channel of transmission to the Western world.[33] Most of the Byzantium diplomatic system was based on information-gathering and diplomatic initiatives with the desire to avoid war. The system was directed to divide enemies and embroil them with each other, and thus induce them to undertake the fighting which the Empire wished to avoid. The Byzantine Empire used diplomacy more continuously, employed more of its devices and generally used it to play a more central role in imperial policies than had occurred in any preceding society. Byzantine diplomacy was striking and further developed by the Venice, which systemized what it learned from the Byzantine Empire.

Diplomacy reached a much more mature form at the beginning of the 15th century. The Italian city state system of the fifteenth century provided more favorable conditions for the further development of diplomacy. Then, a more

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modern and permanent type of diplomacy appeared for the first time.[34] The highly competitive group of small city states, each directly bordering each other, were in constant competition and conflict with each other. Moreover, the repeated invasions of their peninsula by foreigners endangered the security of the Italian states. Continuous diplomacy conducted with little fanfare became the only means to ensure stability among the competing states. Consequently, the ad hoc envoys of the early periods were replaced by resident embassies with broad responsibilities. Thus it became possible to set up permanent and continuous diplomatic contact among units, which resulted in better familiarity with the conditions and personalities in the country concerned and fostered continuous negotiations with them. The practices and methods of the Italian system later evolved into the French system, which appeared as the "first fully-developed system of diplomacy and the basis of the modern diplomatic system."[35]

France led diplomacy in the 17th and 18th centuries, which also witnessed the birth of the nation states and the emergence of a state-centric diplomacy which became one of the exclusive privileges of state sovereignty. The first Ministry for Foreign Affairs wat set up under the French system

by Cardinal Richelieu in 1627. The Ministry was authorized to conduct foreign policy and to use diplomacy as its main tool. Thus, all diplomatic activities were centralized under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and conducted in secrecy and continuity via resident embassies. In the French system, the purpose of diplomatic negotiations was "not to trick the other side but, rather, to reconcile states on the basis of a true estimate of their enduring interests."[36] As different from the earlier diplomacy, in the French diplomatic system, ambassadors acquired higher social standing, and gradually became part of a profession which opened the way for the full professionalization of diplomacy in the 20th century. As a result of this professionalization, diplomats recognized that they had a professional identity as well as professional interests that united them as diplomats. Moreover, the multi-lateral conferences of the French system provided the basis for the emergence of multi-lateral diplomacy and conference diplomacy as one of its examples.[37] With this opportunity, common European problems and concerns became the subject of multilateral diplomatic relations[38] which provided an opportunity for the European states to strengthen and stabilize their relations. This method later became established and institutionalized as a means not only for solving common problems but also for sustaining peaceful relations among states.

The French diplomatic system, "best adapted to the conduct of relations between civilized States,"[39] inspired other European countries. Embassies and delegations became more institutionalized all over Europe, and by the end of the nineteenth century, European-style diplomacy had been adopted throughout the world.[40] Based on the achievements of the French model of the 17th and 18th centuries, the 19th century saw the formalization and professionalization of diplomacy.[41] For the first time, diplomacy was institutionalized and recognized as a profession with its own legal status and specified rules of profession provided by the 1814-15 Vienna Congress as well as the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences.[42] In addition, the scope and geography of diplomacy expanded in this period. First, new areas of concern, including human rights and rules of war were included in the focus of diplomacy. Second, as a result of the increasing economic relations of the European states with other continents, European diplomacy extended to non-European territories. The inclusion of non-European states into the existing diplomatic system in the 19th and 20th centuries' foreshadowed the onset of global diplomacy which truly emerged in the 21st century.

In the early 20th century, the French system was modified but not transformed. As the number of states increased, the complexity of the problems confronting them multiplied, the urgency attending them grew, and the operating pace of the French system of bilateral diplomacy became too slow. This was realized during World War I and was demonstrated by the rash of conferences – many of them achieving permanent status – that were hurriedly organized to cope with the crisis. The end of WWI and the establishment of the League of Nations opened a new era for international relations in general and diplomacy in particular. A new diplomacy emerged as the outcome of the new international system which was institutionalized by the League of Nations on the basis of the President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points. Wilson's first principle introduced openness and transparency in diplomatic relations as a reaction to the secrecy of the old diplomacy: "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."[43] In the absence of any secret agreements, a new diplomatic style emerged to involve the public as fully as possible in the conduct of diplomatic negotiations and their specific outcomes.[44] Moreover, the League of Nations provided diplomats with the opportunity to sit and discuss the matters or problems of the period openly and in front of all other representatives. With this opportunity, state diplomats representing their states in those conferences also agreed to replace the bilateral alliances of the past with a universal or semi-universal association of states pledged to comply with a set of general principles embodied in international law, and agreed to the abandonment of power politics or the use of force for settling disputes among the states.[45] Thus, post-WWI diplomacy was successfully institutionalized under the League of Nations system. Summit diplomacy as a means of direct communication between heads of states also gained importance in this period.[46]

The onset of the Cold War after World War II closely wedded diplomacy to grand strategy and was often seen as no more than an extension of war by other means.[47] Cold War diplomacy was restricted to direct diplomatic interactions not only between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the two leading powers of the international system but also between/among their bloc coun-

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tries, i.e. the Western and Eastern blocs led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union respectively. The United Nations, where the multilateral conferences were institutionalized, became the center of diplomacy through the practices of professional state diplomats in secrecy, mostly behind closed doors. Diplomacy was basically a symbolic indicator of the sovereign power of the states. This diplomatic understanding continued until the end of the Cold War when a new world diplomatic system, so-called global diplomacy, started flourishing as the outcome of the political, social, economic and technological developments of the 21st century.

Global Diplomacy

As emphasized above, diplomacy is one of the last bastions of state sovereignty. However, the impacts of the systemic and state-level transformations of the post-Cold War era have led to radical modifications both of state sovereignty and the sovereignty-based functions of the states. Under those conditions, a new diplomatic style, so-called global diplomacy, emerged as a multi-level and multi-actor phenomenon completely different from traditional diplomatic understanding and practices. Global diplomacy has become a transnational process of social relationship realized by an enlarged diplomatic community.

In the highly complicated and extremely unstable post-Cold War period, diplomacy has become "more complicated, fragmented and global"[48] as a result of the emergence of economic, political, social and cultural relations beyond state boundaries. Global diplomacy involves a different set of diplomatic practices than those of the preceding periods.[49] Very basically, it is accessible to and performed by all systemic actors. Moreover, owing to technological progress in the information and communication sectors, it is practiced by diversified means and methods. As opposed to traditional diplomatic practices, global diplomacy is no longer the exclusive practice of sovereign states, governments or their representatives. Rather, an increasing level of interdependency among all systemic actors at all levels and on all topics has exposed governments to pressures coming from various channels of communication. Thus non-state actors, i.e. international/regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, interest groups, the media, think-tanks, academia, social movements and the public have become involved in the once exclusive territory of diplomats.[50]

In their innovative and creative study, Brian Hocking and others show that the transformation of diplomacy can fully be acknowledged by focusing on four components of diplomacy, i.e. context, rules and norms, communication patterns, and actors and roles.[51] As discussed below, the widening, deepening and accelerating of worldwide interconnectedness is influential in each component of diplomacy, which in turn results in the modification of the entire diplomatic understanding.

First, globalization has challenged diplomatic hierarchy[52] and resulted in the emergence of a poly-centric diplomatic space which is no longer exclusively shared by the ministries for foreign affairs, but also by all other governmental representatives as well as non-governmental organizations, including think-tanks, universities, civil society bodies and media which have emerged as new actors in this space. Thus, the contexts of diplomacy have become more diverse and uncertain in a polycentric diplomatic space. Several patterns of diplomacy have emerged in the form of governmental input, from national policy communications and/or intergovernmental organizations through shared diplomatic arenas reflected in multi-layered and private categories, to loose couplings where government input is low.[53] Moreover, these forms of diplomacy have been forced to co-exist, reflecting multiple spaces of authority and legitimacy, multiple diplomatic sites and domains, the more complex nature of diplomacy, and the diversified diplomatic actors involved. Thus, global diplomacy has become a "trans-national process of social relationship realized by an enlarged diplomatic community."[54]

Second, diplomacy is known as a rule-based practice. The roots of diplomatic rules can be found in two different but interrelated sources, i.e. individual national diplomatic communities and the trans-national diplomatic community. While traditional diplomacy was largely shaped by the former, the transformation of diplomacy has challenged its primacy. The changing nature of diplomacy and the conflicting expectations of the diversified actors of 21st century diplomacy have challenged the sovereignty-based rules of diplomacy. Openness, transparency and accountability have become the guiding principles of global diplomacy.[55]

Third, in the 21st century, technological progress has changed the character of diplomacy, requiring advanced information technologies in modern communication. Today's information circulation and its accessibility have changed the dynamics of diplomatic work, requiring instant practices and faster reactions.

Moreover, the modes of communication have accelerated and diversified with a direct impact on diplomacy. In particular, multi-directional flows of information underpinned by media and social networking have become influential in many areas of state activity, including diplomacy. Thus, the sources of diplomacy and the means of its implementation have proliferated.[56] Technological improvements have also resulted in personal initiatives in diplomacy as a quick and efficient way of dealing with inter-state problems. Progress in communication and transportation has empowered the heads of the governments and ministers of foreign affairs to travel to foreign countries easily and conduct diplomatic relations personally. Consequently, today's diplomatic relations are practiced by politicians as well as professional diplomats.[57]

While official diplomats are disposed to building coalitions among states and base their power on political legitimacy, the new diplomatic actors delve into trans-national advocacy networks and base their power on moral legitimacy.

Fourth, the new international system of the 21st century is characterized by a proliferation of actors and enhanced interdependence among them. Thus, the new diplomatic environment is marked by the recognition of non-state actors not only as consumers of diplomacy but also as producers of diplomacy through diplomatic negotiations. Given the inadequacy of traditional methods for dealing with newly emerging global concerns, it has become a necessity for the ministries of foreign affairs and diplomats to cooperate with other non/governmental institutions and various experts in the field.[58] This cooperation has necessitated acceptance of the role of non-diplomats in diplomatic relations, and the transfer of power from traditional actors to newly-recognized diplomatic actors. In this respect, the emergence of new diplomatic actors along with the traditionally accepted diplomats has forced the latter to share their power with the former and accept changes in their roles.[59] At the same time, the emergence of new actors has influenced the methods of diplomacy. While official diplomats are disposed to building coalitions among states and base their power on political legitimacy, the new diplomatic actors delve into trans-national advocacy networks and base their power on moral legitimacy.[60]

The transformation of these four components of diplomacy has deeply affected diplomacy in the 21st century. However, what has truly changed is the methodology rather than the nature of diplomacy. The traditionally ac-

cepted hierarchical and state-centric diplomatic processes have evolved into a multi-stakeholder and multi-level network system[61] which is much more global, flexible and open. Under these newly emerging conditions, states have recognized the significance of "soft power"[62] in order to achieve their foreign policy aims and objectives. Thus, public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy, as examples of soft power, have appeared as the new diplomatic practices of the 21st century.

Public diplomacy is defined as "efforts by governments to promote their policies and interests abroad by influencing international public opinion through interaction with other polities, forging partnerships with civil societies, and using the media strategically."[63] Another definition of public diplomacy is provided by Paul Sharp who defines it as "the process by which direct relations are pursued with a country's people to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented."[64] Both definitions emphasize the role of ordinary citizens in achieving the desired outcomes. It has been recognized that the public matters more than before; thus public diplomacy has gained a new prominence in the modern era, even if it has always been practiced as a specific means of diplomatic communication.[65] It also must be noted that despite the growing importance of public diplomacy as one of the roles of modern diplomats, it should only be considered as an additional diplomatic function which complements traditional diplomatic activities. On the other hand, cultural diplomacy, "a national policy designed to support the export of representative samples of that nation's culture in order to further the objectives of foreign policy,"[66] forms an important component of public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is also practiced with the intention of influencing the citizens of foreign countries and draws attention to ordinary individuals for the intended foreign policy objectives of the state.

The emergence of individuals and citizens as important actors in the diplomatic practices of the states led to the introduction of a new concept: "Track-Two Diplomacy." The term was first used by Joseph Montville in 1981; he defined it as "unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict."[67] Today, track two diplomacy is commonly defined as "methods of diplomacy outside the formal governmental system – the non-governmental, informal, and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals aimed at de-es-

calating conflict by reducing anger, fear and tension and by improving communication and understanding."[68] Since its introduction, track two diplomacy has been commonly accepted as a complement to track one diplomacy, which basically refers to the official governmental diplomacy at the state-to-state level. In this context, track two diplomacy is not an alternative but a complement to track one diplomacy.

Overall, although diplomacy has transformed significantly in the 21st century, this transformation does not diminish its significance for states and does not mean that diplomacy is no longer needed. On the contrary, in a highly globalized and inter-connected world, the role of diplomacy has become much more crucial. Even if diplomacy has transformed, its scope and actors have diversified and new rules and methods have emerged in diplomatic relations, governmental diplomacy continues to have a crucial role.[69] States still prefer to use traditional diplomatic methods to resolve problems which directly concern their national interests and securities, while preferring global diplomacy to solve the global problems which concern them all and which they are unable to solve unilaterally.

Conclusion

Since the time of the Westphalia Peace Treaties, which represent a turning point in the history of international relations, diplomacy has been used as a foreign policy tool on the part of states to deal with their common concerns at the systemic level. The institutionalization and professionalization of diplomacy as a state-centric practice continued until the early 1990s, prior to which the states could keep their exclusive sovereignty and enjoy the privileges of being the only diplomatic actors in the international system. The early 1990s, on the other hand, were a period of paradigm changes in the ways in which international relations are conducted. The states have been losing their exclusiveness since then, and have been forced to recognize non-state actors and cooperate with them. More seriously, they have lost their monopoly on sovereignty and their exclusive privileges in some of the symbol areas of their sovereign power. Diplomacy is one of them, and has been moving from a being a tool of national foreign policies to a means of international communication and dialogue.

Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has changed considerably. Along with the systemic changes, diplomacy has also transformed and

become more diversified, multi-dimensional, volatile and intensive. However, what has changed so far is the façade of diplomacy. It seems that the basic functions of diplomacy will remain in demand in managing today's highly complex interactions at the national and global levels. So far, states have been able to adapt themselves to the changing conditions and keep their privilege of being the highest authority in managing the relations among all actors of the international system. As states have managed to maintain their persistency and resiliency, governmental diplomacy has also persevered in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world as a critically important instrument for states to conduct their foreign policies.

Along with the systemic changes, diplomacy has also transformed and become more diversified, multi-dimensional, volatile and intensive.

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ARTICLE

Delinking the Migration-Terrorism Nexus: Strategies for the De-Securitization of Migration

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Abstract

The notion of a "migration-terrorism nexus" is gaining political momentum, despite the lack of evidence to support it, and even the existence of evidence to the contrary. This paper, while assessing the validity of the supposed link between terrorism and migration, will seek to show why and how the crackdown on migration and liberties actually create conditions conducive to terrorism. The answer as to why we tend to easily associate migration with terrorism lies in the securitization of migration and asylum, which will be analyzed in this paper. The broader securitizing discourse constructing migration as a security and even a terrorist threat has been shaping migration policy-making for almost three decades. A series of policy practices with a very heavy human cost, such as borderization practices, interception at sea, push-back operations, and the building of fences or walls to stop the refugee influx, which prioritize border security over human lives, show how this securitizing discourse is effective or "successful". The paper argues that the over-securitization of migration has very negative implications for human lives and rights as well as for democracy and liberties. It seeks to make a case for delinking migration and terrorism and for policy strategies that could be pursued to move migration out of the security framework and ultimately desecuritize migration.

Keywords

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Introduction

The "migration-terrorism nexus" is gaining political momentum; an increasing number of policy-makers, scholars and representatives of global media link the recent terrorist attacks in the Global North to the "migration/refugee crisis," particularly following the growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and human mobility after the Arab uprisings.[1] Since the end of the Cold War, but particularly in the aftermath of September 11, the claim that migrants and asylum-seekers pose serious risks to security, national identity, and the way of life of receiving societies, and that through migration terrorists are infiltrating into Europe or the U.S., is insistently repeated and loudly expressed. The increase of mixed flows seeking entry to Europe or the U.S., consisting of irregular migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing poverty, conflict, violence, and environmental degradation, turn migration into a highly politicized issue. The terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and other terrorist attacks in Europe in its aftermath transformed perceptions of security and migration, linking the "terrorism crisis" with the "migration/refugee crisis".[2]

As boats or dinghies carrying refugees and migrants keep sinking and people seeking safety and protection lose their lives, mainstream and radical right-wing political leaders and parties, the media, and the other actors push for border enforcement, detention of asylum-seekers, and the deportation of irregular migrants.[3] These political figures and actors argue that migration is the main reason behind growing crime rates and fundamentalist terrorism, a discourse that serves to accentuate the perceived link between terrorism and migration. One of the main claims is that countries receiving large numbers of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers are more prone to be exposed to terrorist attacks. Another important concern is the possibility of terrorists re-entering Europe through human smuggling networks, which is mainly due to the allegations that two of the suicide bombers in the November 2015 Paris attack entered into Europe among refugees. Even if there is still no significant evidence to support this claim or fear,[4] it has negatively affected public perceptions of irregular migrants and refugees. Moreover, it is possible to observe that these claims are becoming more pervasive among European societies. A Pew Research Centre survey, conducted in ten European countries in Spring 2016, reveals that in eight of the countries more than half of the population believe that "incoming refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country." According to the survey, a median of 59% of the populations in ten countries see a close link between refugee flows and terrorism.[5]

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The populist right, which is on the rise in the world, particularly in Europe, skillfully transforms this perception into fear and increases its votes by claiming that mainstream political parties have so far failed to stop the mixed migration flows. Radical right politicians argue that there is a need for stepping up security measures, putting emphasis on border enforcement and adopting more restrictive immigration policies. The same rhetoric was employed by President Trump in his election campaign. After getting elected, he continued to use anti-immigrant rhetoric and started to pursue a restrictive policy towards migrants and refugees. In January 2017, he issued an executive order introducing a travel ban for the nationals of seven countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen). He claimed to have taken the decision to temporarily block their entry into U.S. territory with a view to protecting American citizens from the terrorist attacks of foreign nationals.[6] Another important promise President Trump made in his election campaign was that he would build a wall at the U.S.-Mexico border to curb irregular migration, and he remains committed to it. Disagreement between the President and the Democrats about the funding of the border wall paved the way for the longest government shut-down in U.S. history.[7] This move by the President places the migration issue at the heart of the political agenda and the gridlock has even reached to a point where President Trump has threatened the Congress that he will declare a national emergency to fund the building of the wall.[8]

Different set of actors construct migration, particularly irregular flows and border crossing offences, as a security issue and increasingly a terrorist threat to national security, national identity, public order and the European or American way of life.

It is not only radical right parties or populist politicians that associate migration with terrorism or recent terrorist attacks however. It is possible to see figures from different parties or movements across the political spectrum expressing similar opinions or voicing similar concerns. Therefore, different set of actors construct migration, particularly irregular flows and border crossing offences, as a security issue and increasingly a terrorist threat to national security, national identity, public order and the European or American way of life.

Given the very negative implications of the over-securitization of migration for human lives, rights and democracy, this paper seeks to make a case for

delinking migration and terrorism. With this goal in mind, the paper, while assessing the validity of the supposed link between terrorism and migration, will seek to show why and how the crackdown on migration and liberties actually creates conditions conducive to terrorism. As will be discussed in the following section, despite the lack of evidence to support a link between migration and terrorism, and even despite the existence of evidence to the contrary, the anti-immigrant discourse associating migration with terrorism and violent extremism is gaining currency. This has to do with the broader securitizing discourse that has been constructing migration as a security and even a terrorist threat for almost three decades. Therefore, after the deconstruction of the migration-terrorism nexus, the securitization of migration will be discussed and problematized. The last section will evaluate to what extent it is possible to desecuritize migration, which entails delinking the migration-terrorism nexus and moving migration out of the security and terrorism context.

Migration-Terrorism Nexus?

If we could assume the existence of a link between terrorism and migration, it is mainly that terrorism leads to more migration, particularly forced migration. A complex set of factors, including violent extremism and terrorist attacks targeting civilians, leads to forced human mobility.[9] This has to do with the changing character of warfare in the post-Cold War period. As Mary Kaldor argues, the new wars are internal conflicts, mainly in less-developed states linked with identity struggles, ethnic differences, processes of state formation and struggle for control over economic assets. These wars are transnational and involve diaspora populations as well as foreign fighters and external powers' troops. Rather than seeking to gain territory, fighting factions aim to control the population through mass killings, ethnic cleansing, violence against civilians, forced displacement and resettlement.[10]

In many cases, population displacement is one of the strategies pursued by terrorist organizations. The higher the lethality of terrorism, the more outward migration is observed. As data reveals, the increase in the number of deaths due to terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan led to an increase in the number of asylum-seekers from these countries in Europe. Counter-terrorism measures or operations also destabilize a region and displace people.[11] Drone strikes against the terror networks in Pakistan and Yemen killed and displaced the local populations.[12] In certain cases, such as the Assad regime in Syria, the civilian population was deliberately targeted to deprive the insurgents of the

logistical support they could get from the inhabitants. In Syria, the majority of the 6.5 million IDPs (internally displaced persons) were displaced by the regime's attacks rather than those of DAESH.[13]

There are certain situations that do link migration and terrorism. Some "professional jihadists" who cannot or are not willing to return to their country of origin, 'migrate' from one theatre of war or conflict to another (e.g. from Afghanistan to Bosnia, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Libya). Some terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin could be seen as "return migrants" and they may get involved in terrorist acts back home. But it has to be acknowledged that they are already radicalized before they leave or return.[14]

One way migrants or asylum-seekers might become entangled with terrorist organizations is through abduction. For instance, DAESH in Libya is abducting transit migrants from Sudan, Eritrea, and West Africa, and, while killing non-Muslims, is sending Muslim migrants to training camps to make them ready for combat.[15] However, DAESH also abducts civilians in regions under its occupation. For instance, it abducted 1,000 children in two Iraqi provinces and Syria in 2015. There are concerns that they could be trained and brainwashed into being suicide bombers.[16] Similarly, Boko Haram abducts civilians, particularly girls and women, imprisons, rapes and forces them to participate in armed attacks, even against their own towns or villages.[17]

There are also those who argue that rather than the incoming migrants or refugees, the focus should be on the members of the second or third generation, i.e. the children of immigrants born and raised in Europe, who have joined terrorist networks. A recent report by Crone, Falkentoft and Tammikko states that EU citizens were behind most of the terrorist attacks committed in 2015 and 2016 in Europe.[18] Therefore, rather than refugees and asylum-seekers, it is the migrant-origin EU citizens who are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by terrorist networks.

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What are the factors behind so-called "home-grown" terrorism? Why are second generation youth more vulnerable to violent extremism? The descendants of immigrants may face

discrimination, and feel discriminated against or marginalized by the society they are living in. They face xenophobic and Islamophobic attitudes and are denied access to certain opportunities because of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. Growing Islamophobia in Europe has the potential to pave the way for extremism.[19] Among the jihadists who joined DAESH in Syria and Iraq there are a number of European citizens, many of whom are second or third generation European Muslims. In their search for identity and meaning they may be radicalized or recruited by terrorist organizations. Resentment against a society unwilling and incapable of integrating and accepting people with migrant backgrounds might motivate some migrants or asylum-seekers, particularly their descendants, to radicalize.[20] By withholding citizenship, by not granting long-term residents the same rights as citizens, by restricting or denying migrants and refugees access to rights and services, states themselves may create a disenchanted community susceptible to radicalization.[21]

Religious terrorism should be understood within the framework of the crisis of the nation-state to accommodate ethnic and religious diversity or divisions. Both the terrorism and refugee "crisis" are in fact indicative of the internal crises of the nation-states.[22] As migrants or their descendants demand inclusion, they pose a challenge to the 'homogenous nation' myth of the nation-states and national identity. Their mobility challenges the fixed borders of the nation-states. Growing terrorism pushes nation-states to social exclusion, restricting mobility, enhancing borders, adopting martial law-type security measures, bypassing democratic procedures and going beyond the limits of liberal democracy. Therefore, rather than a migration or terrorism crisis, it is possible to talk about a crisis of Europe.[23]

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What Europe should be concerned about is not limited to marginalization and should include the radicalization of second-generation youth. Similarly, a growing number of migrants and asylum-seekers are living in Europe without a clear status and with partial or no access to rights, a situation which goes against the founding principles of equality and liberty. The treatment they receive throughout their journeys to Europe, upon arrival and throughout their stay, affects their perceptions about the European way of life and its values, and leads them either to cherish or despise it.

More importantly, it has to be acknowledged that the overwhelming majority of migrants and refugees do not engage in terrorist acts and have nothing

to do with terrorist organizations. Just a few cases make the headlines. Peter Neumann, the Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence in London, stated that among the 600,000 Iraqis and Syrians who arrived in Germany in 2015, only 17 have been investigated for having links to terrorist organizations.[24] According to the Migration Policy Institute, among the 745,000 refugees who resettled in the U.S. from September 11 until 2015, only two have been arrested on terrorism charges. It is not clear whether these two were already linked to terrorist organizations or were recruited after they migrated.[25] In the U.S., out of 85,000 Somali refugees who arrived in 2016, only 36 were suspected to have links to terrorism. An average of 0.2% or less is a clear indication that the fears and efforts to label refugees as terrorists are unfounded.[26]

Sometimes refugee camps could turn into a recruiting ground for militant or terrorist groups, such as certain Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan or Somali refugee camps in Yemen. Living in horrendous conditions in refugee camps for long years due to the protracted refugee crisis could make some refugee youth more prone to radicalization and to violent extremism. Research shows us that not having access to education, not having the right or chance to work and the absence of freedom of movement are the main conditions conducive to radicalization.[27] Radicalization and recruitment by terrorist organizations also become more likely where fighters have access to refugee camps.[28]

In certain cases, militant refugee groups can destabilize a country by engaging in cross-border attacks from the host state's territory or towards it, and sabotage cease-fires. Refugee camps may turn into recruiting grounds for militants and may have strategic importance for the control of food and health supplies. If a state is failed or weak, the presence of refugees may contribute to the further weakening of the state. Refugee warriors may ally themselves with certain political factions in the host state and become part of the internal power struggles.[29] However, these kinds of security implications of forced migration are more serious in the Global South than in the North, and they are entangled with underdevelopment, weak state institutions, and violent conflict.

86% of the world's refugees live in the Global South, in developing countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia.[30] Hosting refugees in overcrowded camps or in make-shift shelters in the Global South is delegated to neighboring states where refugee crises erupt, while the countries in the North fund the refugee relief efforts. Moreover, threat perceptions are not always linked to

the actual numbers of migrants or refugees. In the period between 2001-2005, despite a significant drop from 75% to 54% in the number of asylum applications in North America and Oceania, threat perceptions linked to the arrival of asylum-seekers increased.[31]

Fears about the infiltration of terrorists alongside irregular migrants who cross borders via transnational human smuggling networks, lead political leaders and policy-makers to push for border enforcement. It is possible to talk about a symbiotic relationship between criminality and terrorism. The "crime-terrorism nexus" existed long before the emergence of global terrorist organizations such as DAESH.[32] Terrorist organizations establish links with criminal groups such as drug cartels to fund their operations or purchase arms. As the end of the Cold War led to a fall in state financial support for terrorism, we witnessed the growth of transnational crime and an accentuation of the crime-terrorism nexus.[33] It has been revealed that DAESH had cannabis farms in Albania in 2016 and then started recruiting people from the organized crime networks in the area. It has also been revealed in reports about European recruits to the DAESH that the majority either had criminal records, were known to the police, or had a history of delinquency. A study conducted by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) showed that many European-origin members of DAESH continued to use alcohol and drugs and commit crimes. This also applies to the DAESH members who committed the terrorist attacks in Paris.[34]

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As states adopt restrictive migration policies with a view to protecting their borders, territory and people, and shirk their international protection responsibilities, refugees and migrants arriving in the North through mixed flows are left with no other option but to resort to human smugglers. As there are many transnational criminal networks involved in human smuggling and trafficking, the right-wing populism seizes the opportunity to merge the crime-terrorism nexus with the migration-terrorism nexus to construct asylum-seekers as security threats or terrorists.[35]

In this section, the claims about associating migration with terrorism have been discussed and evaluated. Despite all evidence to the contrary, the link

between migration and terrorism is increasingly and immediately drawn by political actors, in the media and in public debate. The answer as to why we tend to easily associate migration with terrorism lies in the securitization of migration and asylum. In the next section below, securitization in general and the securitization of migration in particular will be discussed in detail.

Critical Security Studies and Securitization

The meaning of security has been taken for granted in traditional IR. Literally, it means being free from threats or, to put it rightly, having guarantee of protection against threats.[36] According to the military understanding of security, which dominated the IR discipline throughout the Cold War era, security is what states strive for. Security studies, as defined by Stephen Walt, is "the study of the threat, use and control of military force."[37] In this understanding, security basically means the survival of the state. Security in this sense is described more in terms of a zero-sum game, i.e. more security for one state means less security for the other.[38] This definition in geopolitical terms reflects the conservative understanding and desire to ensure the permanence of the established order and increase predictability.[39]

Despite its frequent use in the discipline, the meaning of security has remained vague and ambiguous, making security an essentially contested concept.[40] What we experience in the post-Cold War era is a broadening of the definition of security, the enlargement of the security agenda, and the expansion of security questions which present new threats, vulnerabilities, risks and enemies. Issues such as environmental degradation, aid and development, health, migration, and international terrorism became issues dealt with within the field of critical security studies. There

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are different schools of thought, named for their place of origin within the critical security studies field, which have theorized the concept of security. The Aberystwyth or Welsh school is linked with Aberystwyth University, particularly with the work of Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, who associate security with the goal of human emancipation. They focus on the conditions essential for ensuring individual security and for the individual to be free from broader threats such as poverty, political oppression, envi-

ronmental degradation, violence or conflict. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and other scholars linked to the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) introduce a sectoral approach to security and study how the invocation of security affects particular issues. Scholars working at Science Po and connected to the academic journal *Cultures et Conflicts* edited by Didier Bigo developed a sociological approach analyzing the conduct of everyday security practices encompassing policing and border control. The Paris School focuses particularly on how security professionals do security and questions the distinction between internal (policing) and external (military) security.[41]

Buzan from the Copenhagen School of critical security studies provides a sectoral approach to security, which challenges the artificial division between high and low politics issues. Security can be divided into five sectors, each sector having its own referent object(s), namely, military, political, economic, societal and environmental security. The referent object refers to what is to be secured. Traditional approaches to security focus on military threats to the security of the state and therefore the referent object is the state itself.[42] Military security is concerned with the military capabilities of states based on the perceptions of each other's intentions.[43] "Political security is about the organizational stability of social order(s)." Economic security is related to access to the resources that are essential to bolster the power and welfare of the state. Societal security, which is also designated as identity security, is about the protection of patterns such as language and cultural and/or national identity.[44] Environmental security is about the sustenance of environmental resources on which human survival and development depend.[45] In the military sector of security the referent object is the state, while in the political sector, the sovereignty and ideology of the state emerge as the referent object. In the economic sector, the referent objects are the firms or multinational corporations (MNCs) that are threatened by bankruptcy and rivalry, while in societal security it is collective identity such as that of a nation or religion. In the environmental sector, it is the maintenance of the biosphere and survival of the species. This list is not exhaustive, given the fact that different actors can securitize different referent objects.

It can be argued that existential threats and vulnerabilities do not exist objectively but emerge as a result of self-referential practice. Security has its roots in the speech act in language theory, according to which, saying something is doing something. This has moral, political or legal consequences depending on the context, as the context gives meaning to the act. Security could be un-

derstood as a particular rhetorical or grammatical structure: defining phrases such as "existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out," appear in the particular dialects of different sectors.[46]

It is not possible to ignore security, since it is an authorizing word which contributes to the construction of social life. Security practices organize the social life to eliminate the threats and insecurities to which social life owes its very existence. Security issues become 'security issues' through securitization. Security, according to the Copenhagen School, is a political and relational concept, which helps us to understand "how human collectivities relate to each other in terms of threats and vulnerabilities."[47] The construction of the political community is dependent on the definition of threats. Security is about ethico-political choice about a certain order. Restating security as a thick signifier enables us to see how "security" expresses a particular way of organizing life. Therefore, it is not "an entirely objective matter of military force calculation" and it should be questioned in order to unveil what kind of political order is secured.[48] Through this approach, the security agenda is also constructed in search for a meaning of security. The signifier 'security' gains a performative role in ordering social relations into security relations.

The Copenhagen School's conceptualization of security is based on Carl Schmitt's definition of the "political". In Schmitt's work, the friend/foe distinction is at the heart of his concept of the "political". Schmitt argues that a political community would cease to exist without a friend-foe distinction. Securitization challenges the neutral political sphere that liberalism has established. It stands against the pursuit of liberal politics and ongoing process of rationalization by means of calling for immediate action against an existential threat in order to constitute a new political regime. Schmitt's political realism is against "the liberal neutral state". It represents a critique of liberal parliamentarism and democratic procedures.[49] The "political" in this regime is based on particularism and passion against universalism and reason. In this regime there is no universal ground, and thus conflict between the self and the enemy cannot be reconciled through reasoning.[50] Socially agreed-upon rules are left aside while social and political life are reconstituted based on the decision of the political authority, or rather the judgements of the sovereign, ready and courageous enough to face the enemy or the existential threat. Therefore, securitization introduces "exceptionalism" and "decisionism" to political life by activating what could be termed as Schmittian politics[51] or, according to Huysmans, "the logic of political realism," which is "a technique of government" using the

fear of violent death to reorder social relations. "Decisionism" reduces the state to the decision, not based on reason and deliberation.[52] In decisionism political life is "an act of free will, personified in authentic, passionate leadership," which unites the people with the leaders. Fear of the enemy would require a bold decision to eliminate the imminent threat by the (dictatorial) leader that would unite the people to the political community.[53]

The securitizing agent or actor, by claiming something to be or labelling something as a security threat, defends dealing with the threat to eliminate it with extraordinary means, breaking or bypassing the rules,[54] levying extra taxes, limiting certain liberties, or channeling resources to certain specific tasks. In democratic politics, political decisions are implemented in accordance with strict procedural rules, which takes time and are subject to deliberation, dissent and revision. Securitization challenges democratic procedures by means of institutionalizing speed or limiting public or judicial review on bureaucratic processes. Therefore, the politics of securitization is undemocratic.[55] When an issue is securitized, the government can impose laws or restrictions on individual liberties which otherwise would face opposition. The presence of an enemy hierarchically organizes human activities and privileges certain ones for the sake of the survival of the state and nation.[56] The constructed enemy poses a threat, which creates an emergency and disrupts the routine or procedural policy-making and implementation. An emergency requires an exceptional response. Legitimizing actions for extra-ordinary procedures by using security rhetoric leads to the institutionalization of the emergency procedure and the formation of black security boxes in the political process. A "move from liberal democratic to exceptional politics" takes place when the possibility of war becomes the utmost priority of the state.[57]

The political agencies that act on behalf of the referent objects cannot securitize an issue alone. They present the issues to the audience in the political arena and get their approval.[58] This means that those who have positions of power – whose voice is accepted as legitimate – and who make decisions about security within the grammatically structured field of security, do not have absolute power. Political agencies gain credibility and assert their position through imposing certainty and making the order they are acting in more meaningful and understandable.

Securitization of Migration and Asylum

The migrant has emerged as the "anchoring point of securitarian policies" and has been at the heart of fears about security and identity from the 1990s

onwards.[59] There have been two important junctures in the securitization of migration, i.e. the presentation of migrants and asylum-seekers as existential threats. Following the end of the Cold War, political actors began to frame the migration issue in terms of security; in the aftermath of September 11 with the "war against terrorism," the migration-terrorism nexus was created.[60]

With the end of the Cold War, when asylum applications in the North spiked, EU member states responded by changing their national legislation to restrict the number of asylum applications and access to refugee status. During the Cold War years, the refugee movements could be used as ideological tools in proxy wars, as refugees were instrumental in anti-communist propaganda. From the 1990s onwards, the refugees lost their ideological or geopolitical value and refugee movements came to be seen as an international threat rather than an issue to be dealt with by individual states.[61] Some analysts started to portray refugees as bringing instability into the host state, from the poorer, underdeveloped parts of the world to developed countries. Kaplan (1996) argued that forced mass migration could carry misery, crime, and destruction. Simultaneously, the EU bureaucracy formed an internal security field in which it categorizes and deals with issues such as labor migration, forced migration, drug trafficking, organized crime and border control. The threat perception of infiltration by communists during the Cold War years was transformed into a fear of the penetration of Islamic fundamentalism into Western societies in the post-Cold War era. Since the 1990s, migration and asylum have been constructed as "existential threats" to the state.[62] Some analysts describe refugee movements not only as a threat to the sovereignty of the state but also to international peace and security.[63]

As migration transgresses borders, migrants pose a challenge to state sovereignty. Borders are markers of identity, both national and political. The challenges posed by migratory crossings to state sovereignty allowed for the linking of irregular migration with different types of crime, organized, petty or financial, drug trafficking or terrorism.[64] Alongside the securitization of irregular migration and labelling of asylum-seekers as "illegal" or "bogus" in the European context, the international refugee regime went through a significant transformation from the 1990s onwards.[65] This transformation consists of the shift from durable to temporary solutions

As migration transgresses borders, migrants pose a challenge to state sovereignty. Borders are markers of identity, both national and political.

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and from protection to containment, the establishment of a temporary protection regime through a restrictive interpretation of the 1951 Convention, declaring certain countries to be "safe," delegating the responsibility of international protection to countries neighboring refugee crises, funding the containment of refugee crises where they occur, if necessary undertaking military interventions to prevent mass exodus from conflict zones, and shifting responsibility for processing asylum claims to transit countries.[66]

The transformation of the international refugee regime within the post-Cold War context is related to the replacement of the bipolar friend-foe relationship, on which securitization was based during the Cold War, with the unipolar "cosmos-chaos" divide, which delineates the EU, NATO or the Global North from the turbulent ex-communist states and Global South.[67] The NATO and EU enlargements could be seen as attempts to enlarge the cosmos and bring stability to chaotic Eastern Europe first and later on to the Southern Mediterranean.

The securitization of migration and asylum gained new momentum after September 11 within the context of the "war against terrorism". Until the Terrorism Act of 2000 was passed in the UK, the main focus of terrorism legislation in the UK was the conflict in Northern Ireland and Irish terrorism. With this new legislation, the UK defined the terrorist threat to be international in nature.[68] Following September 11, the international character of terrorism has been accentuated.

Terrorism could be defined as a "political communication strategy for psychological mass manipulation" seeking to influence and intimidate governments and public opinion. Terrorism is basically "psychological warfare."[69] Terrorism affects the security of both the state and individuals, and it intends to instill fear in the population. This enables the sovereign state to exert more control over the population and legitimizes its moves to protect the population from terrorism. Therefore, the state can use the fear as an "asset". That is what the U.S. as the sole superpower did and other states followed suit. Like security, insecurity is also politically and socially constructed, that is what has happened through the "war on terrorism". In the aftermath of September 11, it was not necessary for states to explicitly define asylum or migration as a security threat. As the issue was already well-integrated into the policy frameworks related with policing and defense, it became easy to transfer security concerns from terrorism to migration and asylum.[70] This allowed states to prioritize national security interests, while downplaying their humanitarian

obligations. States could detain asylum-seekers who are then forced to live in detention centers in prison-like conditions for long years.[71]

Frances Webber describes the process of criminalizing immigrants and asylum-seekers in Europe as "crimes of arrival". Mere arrival has become a criminal act for which people may be detained, and in fact imprisoned.

> When people are subjected to continued fingerprinting, when they are locked up, when they are restrained by body belts and leg shackles and thirteen feet of tape, or forcibly injected with sedatives to keep them quiet as they are bundled on the aircraft, it seems reasonable to ask: what have they done? The answer is that they have tried to come to Western Europe, to seek asylum, or to live here with their families, or to work here, and the whole panoply of modern politics, with its associated rhetoric, is applied against them.[72]

In the post-September 11 context, we see depictions of migrants as "barbarian hordes" seeking to destroy Western civilization overlapping with depictions of terrorists trying to destroy Western states. The EU's securitizing rhetoric, like that of right-wing populism, portrays migratory flows as "barbarians at the gates," a "barbarian invasion," and even "barbarian warfare" threatening the EU.[73] Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the 2017 Malta congress of the European People's Party argued that the EU's refugee policies during and after 2015 helped terrorists, and stated that "migration turned out to be the Trojan horse of terrorism." This speech came one week after a new law came into force in Hungary, requiring the detention of asylum-seekers in camps while their applications are processed.[74]

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The radical right parties and leaders are very successful in agenda setting and placing migration high on the political agenda of European states. It is however not solely the radical right actors that associate migration with terrorism or recent terrorist attacks in Europe. It is possible to see conservative, social democratic, liberal or left-wing political figures using a securitizing rhetoric. In Germany, Christian Social Union and Bavarian Finance Minister

Markus Söder saw a link between the November 2015 attacks in Paris and the refugee influx to Europe. Sahra Wagenknecht, a German left-wing politician, economist and author, argued that due to growing migration poor Germans may have to compete for accessing food.[75] A leading German feminist Alice Schwarzer, following the sexual assaults on New Year's Eve in Cologne in 2015-16, argued that "Young men of Arab or North African descent are playing war in the middle of Cologne," which became possible due, according to Schwarzer, to "misplaced toleration" and "failed immigration" in Germany.[76]

Within this securitizing discourse migrants are portrayed as dangerous or constructed as threats so that "we" can be made secure. A series of policy practices such as the temporary reintroduction of border controls in the Schengen area, the building of fences or walls to stop the refugee influx, and border policing or push-back operations in the Mediterranean that have led to the drowning of migrants and refugees, show how this securitizing discourse is effective or "successful".[77] This goes against democratic politics, as some are provided with security at the expense of others' security, breaching the principle of equality.[78] In the documentary, "The Other Traveler" by Pieter Boeles, Emeritus Professor of Migration Law, one of the members of the research team, Tamara Last, collecting data on the deaths at the border, shares what an Afghan man told her in Lesbos: "They are your borders, it's you they are defending;" they [the migrants/refugees] are dying for you."[79] As result of the securitization of migration, the security, well-being and even lives of migrants and refugees are at risk. The European and American people, in whose name the securitizing acts are done, are not feeling more secure either. Securitization, rather than eradicating threats as it promises, breeds more insecurity and fear.

Securitization is the Problem, Not the Solution

The securitization of irregular and forced migration has reached to the point that it can be described as over-securitization, which creates more threats where there were none, while putting the lives of migrants and refugee protection at risk. It is time we consider whether this is the best way to deal with migration problems and provide security. Why should we give up securitizing migration and asylum?

First and foremost, it does not work. When the September 11 attacks took place, al-Qaeda had 300 *mujahedeen* in Afghanistan. In the 15 years of "war on terrorism" al-Qaeda and its successor terrorist organizations and most

recently DAESH have recruited thousands of militants. 30,000 foreign fighters from 100 countries joined the war in Syria. In 2001, there were a handful of training camps in Afghanistan; in 2014 and 2015 DAESH took entire provinces in Iraq and Syria under its control and claimed to be a state, challenging the borders and sovereignty of many countries in a region extending from Nigeria to Afghanistan and the Philippines. In 15 years-time, in 61,000 terrorist attacks 140,000 people have died and we feel nowhere safe on earth any longer.[80] The war on terrorism, or securitization of international terrorism, did not make us more secure.

Following September 11, the link between terrorism and asylum-seekers were accentuated more and more, even if none of the committers of the attack were asylum-seekers. It is not clear why asylum-seekers are deemed to be more prone to commit terrorist acts as compared to a country's nationals. Moreover, terrorists do not enter a country only through the asylum system or as migrants, actually they tend to enter through other ways, with business, tourist or student visas.[81]

It was the two decades of EU policy-making and borderization practices aimed at restricting migration that led to the construction of the so-called "Mediterranean migration crisis".[82] Borderization practices, interception at sea, and similar push-back operations prioritizing border security over human lives would not stop people fleeing persecution and generalized violence. The British poet Warsan Shire in her poem "Home" states that "you have to understand, that no one puts their children in a boat unless the water is safer than the land."[83] Despite the non-arrival regime in the North, many people fleeing poverty and persecution take enormous risks to cross the borders. Economic globalization facilitating the flow of capital, goods and cultural globalization facilitating the dissemination of ideas and values are the main reason behind this urge to migrate. As Castles argues, growing inequality between the North and South, growing instability in the South, and the cultural attraction of the Northern lifestyles are among the main factors that lead to voluntary and forced human mobility.[84] The impact of neoliberalization, the removal of control over multinational corporations and social safeguards in the Global South, enhance inequalities and create incentives for migration. New military humanism, as Noam Chomsky calls it, exacerbates the problems.[85] Following military intervention in the name of the protection of human rights or civilians, a political and economic system in line with the interests of the North is imposed on those countries.

These interventions create fertile ground for local conflicts, terrorism and forced migration.[86] As long as local and global disparities exist and they are exacerbated by global processes of inclusion and exclusion such as border controls, deportations and detentions will not stem the tide of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers. Moreover, linked with restrictive migration policies, human trafficking and smuggling becomes a "high yield low risk" business and part and parcel of the globalization process.[87]

Through border enforcement, a new form of state sovereignty is being constructed. A new form of sovereignty with flexible rather than fixed and even expanding or shifting borders is taking shape. In a way, sovereignty becomes deterritorialized. Borders are "spatially and temporally produced" through state practices such as policing. As states seek to protect their order and borders they also yield violence. As criminological research shows there is a "symbiotic relationship" between policing and terrorism. Strict policing measures against terrorism limiting civil liberties have the potential to alienate individuals or groups seeking safety and protection.[88] Refugees seeking international protection are increasingly exposed to borderization practices and policing efforts and are now portrayed as posing a threat to national security. As crime and national security issues are increasingly intertwined, the border between internal and external becomes blurred and national security issues spill over into internal policing domains.[89] In this process, law enforcement and border enforcement come to overlap and border policing becomes a high politics issue. As a result, policing functions extend beyond national territory toward the neighboring and sending countries as well as transit zones, particularly to detention centers in other countries. For instance, the border policing functions of the Australian Federal Police extends beyond Australia to Indonesia.[90] Within this context, forced migration is no longer seen as a humanitarian issue but a security threat. This turns refugees into the target of policing activities against transnational organized crime (human smuggling).[91]

Second, the securitization of migration is self-defeating and counter-productive. Restricting and regulating migration as a measure against terrorist attacks or threats is increasingly used. However, the securitization of migration to curb irregular migration leads to an increase in irregular migration. Moreover, it hurts "bona fide migrants and legal foreign residents more than mala fide terrorists" by strengthening xenophobic attitudes. Many refugees and asylum-seekers become victims of racist attacks. The

arson attacks in asylum centers in Europe could also be defined as acts of terrorism. In 2015, there were 900 xenophobic incidents in Germany.[92] Data from Germany's Federal Criminal Police Agency show that refugee centers throughout Germany suffered near daily attacks in the first nine months of 2017 (211 attacks plus 15 additional attacks until October 23).[93]

The securitization of forced migration in public discourse and academic works in the last two decades has turned into a "self-fulfilling prophecy". Exclusionist and restrictive measures, racial profiling, and prioritizing security at the expense of human rights lead to growing political tension among communities. It is highly unlikely that forced migrants running away from war, conflict, situations of generalized violence, or persecution would choose to attack a country that provides them with international protection, safety and a chance for a new start. They use their energies in building up their lives from scratch and are more interested in bringing up their children in a secure environment far away from violent extremism. However, "panic politics" leads to feelings of anxiety

> **The securitization of forced migration in public discourse and academic works in the last two decades has turned into a "self-fulfilling prophecy".**

and rage against the receiving state and society, and alienates the migrant populations and newly arriving migrants.[94] Marginalized or alienated communities, particularly youth deprived of rights to education and empowerment will pose new security threats.[95]

Joshua Seidman-Zager argues that within the UK context, the association of refugees with terrorism in public discourse did not lead to an increase in human security, but rather to an increase in the host society's fears of asylum-seekers and refugees. Therefore, the securitization of refugees is "self-defeating".[96] One of the fundamental aspects of security, particularly human security, is "freedom from fear". A much broader definition of human security also includes "freedom from want," extending the concept to issues such as the right to education, health, protection from poverty, etc.[97] As a result of securitization, rather than an increasing sense of security, fears of terrorism and along with it of asylum-seekers have increased.[98] If securitization and heightened security measures do not reduce but rather lead to increasing fears, this poses a threat to human security. Migration control as a counter-terrorism measure, which is used to control a country's citizens, might in turn hurt them, rather than making them feel more secure.[99]

Third, fueling anti-immigrant or refugee sentiment detracts attention from real priorities. Many DAESH militants are returning back to their countries, and their rehabilitation is an important issue. The formulation of better integration or harmonization policies and models for newly arriving migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees is another priority so that migrants and their children will not be vulnerable to extremist propaganda.[100]

Fourth, the securitization of migration hurts the very values that we want to protect. Over-securitization undermines the basic premises of liberal democracy and strengthens authoritarian tendencies. If individuals compromise their freedom in return for invasive security measures, this could not be considered a positive development.[101] As Webber rightly states: "In the name of the defense of our way of life and our enlightenment values from attack by terrorists or by poor migrants, that way of life is being destroyed by creeping authoritarianism, and those values – amongst which the most important is the universality of human rights – betrayed."[102] Therefore, it is actually the citizens of the receiving countries that should challenge the curbing of the rights and freedoms of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers. Citizens of liberal democracies will have to acknowledge the fact that it is their freedoms that will eventually be limited by counter-terrorism measures.[103] They will have to make a decision to stick to democratic norms and principles of equality and inclusion, or abandon them in search for more security. [104]

Desecuritization of Migration: The Way Forward?

If the securitization of migration creates more problems than it promises to resolve, we have to ask ourselves: "Do we have to "associate the good life with policies nurturing insecurity towards strangers?"[105] If the answer is no then we have to search for ways of desecuritizing migration and asylum.

Desecuritization hitherto has been "undertheorized". Furthermore, efforts to conceptualize it to date have been "unsystematic or even contradictory".[106] Desecuritization simply means taking issues out of the security frame, not phrasing them as security issues, and moving them into the public sphere, i.e. back into the sphere of "normal politics".[107] Briefly, it is a move from "panic politics" to "normal politics".[108]

Both Huysmans and Aradau argue that desecuritization represents an ethico-political choice in organizing the political. It is a "political strategy" offering an alternative basis for political community[109] against a move away from democratic politics to exceptional politics. Desecuritization, like

securitization, also constitutes a speech act, offering an alternative viewpoint or way to deal with migration, diversity or other issues.[110] Desecuritization, however, cannot take place by merely uttering the phrase "I hereby declare this issue to no longer be a threat." Desecuritization cannot materialize simply when the members of the political community agree not to "speak security," as securitization does not occur when the word "security" is uttered. Therefore, desecuritization is "performative".[111]

Desecuritization requires choice, which is as highly political as securitization. If securitization is a political choice, moving away from this choice and moving issues to the public sphere to be genuinely debated and negotiated is also a political choice. With choices comes responsibility. Therefore, we have to display "a morally committed agency". This is why, rather than advocating a strategy of desecuritization valid for all times and places, the Copenhagen School puts emphasis on the unique contexts which require actors to make choices.[112]

Here, how desecuritization can be successful in a securitized environment is the key question. Cherishing diversity is essential. However, it would not be sufficient for the desecuritization of the migration issue. The migration issue cannot be desecuritized through multicultural policies alone either.[113] Certain cases, such as the case of Greece, show that if the securitization of an issue is successful and if the public starts to perceive that issue as a security threat, it becomes quite difficult to desecuritize it. Over two decades Greece, which had been defined as a country of emigration, went through a migration transition and became a country of immigration. Alongside a growing migrant population, the securitization of migration framed the migration issue as a "cultural and personal security threat". In the early 2000s the political elites sought to desecuritize the migration issue, which means that rather than criminalizing migrants the emphasis turned to integrating migrants. The ambiguous stance of the politicians, emphasizing both the social inclusion of documented migrants and the need to expel undocumented migrants, was the reason behind the failure to "move the issue off the security agenda" and "return the issue to its former status."[114] A move away from "panic politics" requires consistent political leaders with the will to redefine the issue outside of the security framework. Desecuritization, however, does not take place only when the dominant elite discourse and policies are changed. In the Greek case, one has to take the newly emerging conditions of increasing fear and uncertainties into consideration, such as the 2007-8 financial crisis and the influx of refugees from 2015 onwards.[115] More

importantly, for desecuritization a "genuinely open or progressive debate" is necessary.[116] As some forms of political deliberation may serve to further securitize the issue by operating as a platform for exclusionary ideas about the "other," "progressive" debate is essential.

Desecuritization, to be successful, has to offer an alternative way of organizing social relations based on the principle of equality, accommodating diversity and opening up channels for different voices, particularly of those who have been silenced or rendered vulnerable, to be expressed and heard. For this to occur, "dangerous others" have to be considered as "legitimate" participants in dialogue. Therefore, the principle of equality should guide the desecuritization process, where women should not be viewed as women but equal citizens and migrants not as migrants but workers with equal rights.[117]

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Balibar argues that emancipation has to be defined with reference to universal values or already existing constitutional rights, which means that the struggle for emancipation has to show that there is a contradiction between the officially declared principles and what is actually happening.[118] Emancipation entails the struggle of those integral parts of the political community against the state's securitizing or discriminatory practices. Those who are not members of the political community cannot pursue an emancipatory strategy. Those who are waging an emancipatory struggle have to come up with ways to link the "other(s)" to the political community. This is possible through a "strategy of dis-identification from securitizing institutional practices such as the anti-war "not in my/our name" movement. The desecuritization of migration requires developing a new solidarity with migrants such as the "no one is illegal initiative" or fighting against extraordinary measures such as deportation, detention camps or push-back operations.[119]

Desecuritization, though not impossible, is practically quite difficult as the discussion above reveals. Still, there are different strategies that could be followed. A deconstructivist desecuritization strategy requires fragmentation of the "unified cultural alien" into many shifting identities. Roe suggests the

option of "moderate securitization" or the management of securitization, which means the establishment of deliberative institutions or mechanisms that would reduce the need for emergency politics. Reconstructionist strategy, suggested by Matti Jutila, puts emphasis on the reconstruction of identity in order to change how one sees the other.[120]

A desecuritization strategy could involve prioritizing individuals as referent objects, rather than states, by emphasizing the human security concept, which includes both the physical and psychological well-being of individuals, and the humanitarian obligations of the state to refugees.[121] The desecuritization of forced migration would not only mean the reinstitution of asylum but also ensuring better protection for refugees and asylum-seekers.[122] Therefore, we would be able to provide protection for, and not from, refugees. The Welsh School puts forward an alternative to state-centered security based on the concept of emancipation. Emancipation could be defined as security at the individual level: the absence of hunger, fear or poverty. However, the Welsh School's reconceptualization of security amounts to replacing one referent object with another, rather than providing us with the means to desecuritize an already securitized issue.[123]

Hansen identifies four forms of desecuritization. The first form is that of *change through stabilization*. In this form, despite successful desecuritization, the conflict looms in the background. Desecuritization may take the form of loosening of the friend-foe division as was the case with the end of the Cold War, when the evil Soviet Empire was no longer seen as an enemy.[124] A case of successful desecuritization could also be found within the context of the Cold War during the détente period, when Western bloc countries and institutions sought to convince the Eastern bloc political elites that political change is possible through political dialogue, which led to the onset of Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process. This constitutes an example of the *change through stabilization* type of desecuritization. Desecuritization achieved during the détente period was a slow process. A key point is that the actors involved recognized each other as legitimate parties and opted to move away from the securitizing logic.[125]

In the case of *replacement*, which is the second form of desecuritization, when an issue is desecuritized and moved out of the security context, another issue that is securitized would replace it. *Rearticulation* is the third form of desecuritization; it entails a fundamental redefinition and therefore transformation of the identity and interests of the actors involved. One

important example is the way in which Gorbachev recast the Cold War rivalry and East-West (friend-foe) divisions and relations. Actors who once viewed each other as enemies may opt for collaboration and negotiation rather than conflict. In this case rearticulation was voluntary, but there are other cases of involuntary rearticulation, such as the EU putting pressure on candidate states for further democratization or protecting minority rights through desecuritization, which reveals that there are power dynamics involved in the process of rearticulation.[126] One last form of desecuritization in Hansen's terms is *silencing*. While the speech-act is constitutive of securitization, the silencing of security speech might be considered desecuritization.[127] This however does not resolve the issue, but rather postpones it.

Different issues might require different desecuritization strategies. However, a certain set of preferences can still be identified, such as a preference for politics over violence, inclusion over exclusion, and deliberation over emergency security measures. As Aradau argues, desecuritization entails making a decision about the type of policies we want. Presumably, desirable policies would be ones linked with democracy or further democratization, more freedom, inclusivity, transparency, and accountability.[128] Huysmans suggests that desecuritization entails "a more pluralistic understanding of the political," which would allow the production of security knowledge in a more pluralistic political context, or alternative understandings of the political. Desecuritization would mean not considering the friend-enemy dichotomy as the basis of political unity. Therefore, it means seeking alternative approaches to political community and what constitutes it.[129] Arendt's idea of politics is not based on a friend-foe distinction, but on the ability of members of the political community to engage in debate as equals and act to create a common political realm. Reconstitution of the public sphere would also require the involvement of a much more diverse and wider range of actors than the actors involved in securitization.[130]

Within this logic, the desecuritization of migration entails not seeing or defining migrants and asylum-seekers as existential threats. Desecuritization questions the "validity of security knowledge" in understanding migration and asylum.[131] It is a call to see security issues from a much broader perspective, which would allow us to better understand global, transnational and local political, socio-economic and cultural dynamics at play.

Rather than portraying irregular migration as an invasion, the focus could turn to the very experience of irregular migrants, the harsh conditions

and local and global inequalities that make them set out on a dangerous journey to their destinations, the transformation of welfare regimes that increase the demand for migrant labor, the structural dependence of certain sectors on migrant labor, the ageing of the population in the North, etc. Remembering that migration and asylum were not securitized in the 1950s and 1960s might provide us with certain insights, even if the dynamics at play are quite different and more complex. When Europe needed migrant labor for its growing economy, asylum-seekers had practical and ideological value. Therefore, labor migration could be regulated in accordance with the requirements of the labor market. Refugees could be perceived as human beings with rights, and therefore from a human rights perspective.[132]

The securitization of migration becomes possible when it can capitalize on everyday fears, such as the fear of growing crime rates with growing migration. For desecuritization to be successful it has to establish itself in everydayness.[133] Huysmans suggests the "sociology of everydayness" as a starting point which contextualizes issues or events in a wider social, economic and political context.

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Migrant riots could be understood and analyzed with reference to the deterioration of the living conditions of migrants, their segregation in ghettos, their growing unemployment, the discrimination they face in everyday life, etc. Contextualizing migration-related issues would serve to humanize migrants and show that they have concerns, desires and goals similar to those of the members of the receiving society.[134] Desecuritization in this way could actually lead to a state of security for all.[135]

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ARTICLE

Contextualizing Peace-Building Environments from a Sustainability Perspective: Findings of a Pilot Study in North Macedonia

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Abstract

Sustainability constitutes a key element of peace, which denotes not only the absence of war but also the presence of social conditions and capacity that enable the attainment of development outcomes in areas vital to basic human needs. Under this premise, this study explores how and which areas of sustainability may contribute to efforts to establish lasting peace in conflict-affected, fragile settings. It draws upon the framework of "circles of sustainability" to provide a preliminary trends analysis of the peace-building environment in North Macedonia. We have cross-referenced relevant policy documents with the public opinion of the citizens. The results obtained from this method yielded both similarities and differences, such as the fact that the economy was ranked second in both policy documents and public opinion. Differences emerged with regard to the prioritization of ecological and cultural aspects, with policy documents privileging ecology and public opinion heavily focusing on cultural factors. In light of the latest manifestations of cultural tensions during the referendum process on changing the country's name, it becomes both an urgent and challenging task for policy-makers to consider which cultural aspects are important to the public and how they can be addressed.

Keywords

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Introduction*

Sustainability implies a lasting capacity within society that enables the satisfaction of its current and future needs without jeopardizing life support systems on Earth.[1] Its relationship with peace is recognized in the contemporary peace-building policy agenda, which was formally introduced by the United Nations (UN) in the early 1990s as part of the world body's efforts to "identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict."[2] In this strategic approach, peace is conceptualized as opposed to conflict which may take a violent form, especially when the basic human needs of society (e.g. physical safety, food security, access to regular income, freedom from oppression and discrimination) go unmet by governing authorities.[3] The specific experiences of many "post-conflict" countries also point to the fact that the formal end of armed clashes through political settlements does not necessarily indicate transition to durable peace.[4] It has been documented by development agencies that countries where citizens remain vulnerable to economic, political and environmental shocks (e.g. financial crises, military takeovers and disasters) due to weak or corrupt governance and public service delivery systems are prone to repeated cycles of violence.[5] Consequently, it has become a widely-shared consensus in international policy circles that lasting peace requires longer-term engagement with the development of self-sustainable structures and mechanisms that have the potential to support the capacity of society to manage its internal tensions and cope with external challenges.[6]

The inclusion of a sustainability perspective within peace-related policy frameworks in the international arena represents an understanding that sustainability refers to an ongoing process. It entails strengthening society's structures and relationships that allow for a more effective management of natural, human, and institutional resources. In this process, producing domestic assessments of sustainability may help identify potential vulnerabilities, and consequently contribute to the taking of preventive measures against their potential or actual "adverse impacts on social and natural systems that are fully focused on people's needs."[7]

This paper aims to offer a preliminary trend analysis of sustainability in a conflict-affected, fragile setting. It reports on a pilot study undertaken in North Macedonia, which has experienced an inter-ethnic peace-building process since the signing of the internationally brokered Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in 2001. The study was conducted between July 2015 and December 2016 and sought to address two basic questions: (1) How does sustainability appear in the official policy documents the Macedonian state authorities have produced to consolidate peace in the post-Ohrid era? and (2) How does it appear in people's perceptions? The analysis of both policy documents and citizen attitudes draws upon the concept of "circles of sustainability," which Scerri and James developed as an integrated analytical model to examine sustainability as an overarching social condition that has economic, political, ecological and cultural aspects.[8]

The case of North Macedonia is both interesting and relevant to the objective of understanding the contextual dynamics of the planning and implementation of internationally promoted peace-building frameworks for at least two major reasons. Firstly, North Macedonia, which, despite differing from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo in terms of the timing and intensity of ethnic conflict and the degree of international involvement, illustrates the basic

> **The case of North Macedonia is both interesting and relevant to the objective of understanding the contextual dynamics of the planning and implementation of internationally promoted peace-building frameworks.**

parameters and inherent limits of the international community's approach to conflict transformation: i.e., sustainable peace-building through democratic state-building. Prior work by Susan Woodward, for instance, suggests that varieties of state-building processes have come into existence in the Balkans because of the diverging treatment towards the states that emerged from the former Yugoslavia. Woodward asserts that the model of independent states in the cases of BiH, Macedonia and Kosovo "was drafted by outsiders, either U.S. government lawyers (from the State Department and the National Security Council) or U.S. and EU diplomats" who did not write the required foundational documents in the countries' native languages. In fact, according to Woodward, "they were not even translated into local languages at the time and [are] in some provisions, not even translatable."[9] The aim of these externally drafted constitutions was solely "to end wars between parties (three in

Bosnia and Herzegovina, two in Kosovo and two in Macedonia)" and accept the sovereignty claims of the favored parties while also enforcing a fait accompli of minority rights on the rest of the populations.[10] Disregarding the ethnic and cultural nuances of the region, problems of ethnic divisions were merely shoved aside during the state-building process, resulting in three states that have been struggling to reach sustainable societal harmony.

Secondly, despite its seemingly multicultural democracy, North Macedonia has continued to be affected by turbulent politics ranging from corruption scandals to the contested conclusion of the almost three-decade long name-dispute with Greece. It has also been plagued by ethnic and cultural divides that have run even deeper in the post-Ohrid era.[11] Given the potential effects of this state of affairs on the fragile conditions of peace in the country, (and elsewhere, such as BiH, where there has been increasing emphasis on ethnicity as once again reflected in the results of the recent elections,[12] and Kosovo, where talks of a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo may reignite deep-seated ethnic disputes),[13] it becomes fair to ask: To what extent can cultural and ethnic tensions be excluded from the formal processes of creating and maintaining the types of social systems and relationships that are conducive to the sustainable management of resources? We would like to note that it is our intention to conduct similar research in the future in BiH and Kosovo, which appear to have common structural and institutional foundations.

The paper begins with a brief discussion of sustainability as a means of peace and elaborates on the "circles of sustainability" concept. Using the "circles of sustainability" framework, the next section provides an analysis of the relevant policy documents and social attitudes on sustainability in North Macedonia. Our findings demonstrate a sharp contrast between the understandings of sustainability by the survey respondents and Macedonian policy planners. The policy implications of these findings will be discussed in the conclusion.

Social Sustainability as a Means for Durable Peace

Identifying and assessing the conditions of durable peace has been a key area of interest for both researchers and policy planners since Johan Galtung's seminal work on negative and positive peace.[14] The distinction Galtung made between the two states of peace originates from the recognition that violence may take different forms and it cannot be equated with the "material manifestation of coercion" because the threat of violence as a "mechanism of social control" remains "latent in social relations."[15] In other words, the absence of

direct or personal violence (i.e. negative peace) does not necessarily denote peace, because structural and indirect or cultural manifestations of violence (such as social injustices and inequalities) undermine its durability. A similar point has also been taken up by other researchers, who, by drawing attention to different types of inequalities, such as those relating to income distribution[16] and access to resources by cultural groups,[17] have sought to shed light on the dynamics of social and political stability.

Galtung's conceptualization of peace as a relational phenomenon has guided the UN's policy of peacebuilding introduced in the post-Cold War era with the objective of addressing the "root causes of conflict."[18] In this policy framework, durable peace associated with conflict transformation is conditioned on the presence of institutions, structures and relationships that enable societies to meet their basic

Galtung's conceptualization of peace as a relational phenomenon has guided the UN's policy of peacebuilding introduced in the post-Cold War era with the objective of addressing the "root causes of conflict."

development needs and improve the quality of life of their members in an equitable and inclusive manner.[19] A more recent example of the recognition that society's sustainability capacity and peace mutually reinforce each other is the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, which identifies the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies as one of the key components of the UN's *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs):

> …The new Agenda recognizes the need to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice and that are based on respect for human rights (including the right to development), on effective rule of law and good governance at all levels and on transparent, effective and accountable institutions.[20]

Yet sustainability, which is about improving long-term human wellbeing, entails making choices as to which needs should be prioritized and how they should be pursued to promote social peace and prosperity.[21] The concept of "circles of sustainability"[22] may provide a helpful tool to investigate the requirements of sustainability that are dependent on subjective concerns and judgments. It aims to combine the analysis of both top-down policy planning processes and bottom-up community attitudes through use of a comprehensive "social life questionnaire". In this methodological model, sustainability

The concept of "circles of sustainability" may provide a helpful tool to investigate the requirements of sustainability that are dependent on subjective concerns and judgments.

is taken as a social condition that is shaped by different forms of social relations, practice and meaning across four conceptual domains: politics, economy, ecology and culture.[23] By treating sustainability as the "social" element that constitutes an overall category of enquiry, the "circles of sustainability" approach aims to investigate the ways in which humans live and relate to each other and the environment, and highlight the prevailing objectives and ambitions at both the policy-making and community levels.[24] Political, economic, ecological and cultural characteristics all interact with each other within specific social contexts, and this integrated approach may help clarify the relationships between issues in different domains.[25] This is done by dividing the four domains into seven subdomains which give a coherent and meaningful sense of the social through outlining themes for each domain, as shown below.[26]

Domains of Sustainability as a Social Phenomenon

Ecology	*Politics*
- Materials and Energy	- Organization and Governance
- Water and Air	- Law and Justice
- Flora and Fauna	- Communication and Critique
- Habitat and Settlements	- Representation and Negotiation
- Built-Form and Transport	- Security and Accord
- Embodiment and Sustenance	- Dialogue and Reconciliation
- Emission and Waste	- Ethics and Accountability
Economics	*Culture*
- Production and Resourcing	- Identity and Engagement
- Exchange and Transfer	- Creativity and Recreation
- Accounting and Regulation	- Memory and Projection
- Consumption and Use	- Beliefs and Meaning
- Labour and Welfare	- Gender and Generations
- Technology and Infrastructure	- Enquiry and Learning
- Wealth and Distribution	- Wellbeing and Health

Surveying policy documents to contextualize official discourses of sustainability, and mapping out community perceptions of sustainability are the two

main components of the "circles of sustainability" approach we have incorporated into our study that aims to deliver a snapshot of North Macedonia's sustainability by bringing together analyses of relevant policy frameworks and community attitudes. We have used NVIVO (a qualitative data analysis software) to review the above domain themes in the policy documents Macedonian authorities have produced, and a "social life questionnaire" for capturing community attitudes. The questionnaire, composed of 50 questions (10 demographic questions and 10 for each of the four domains), was administered in Skopje and Tetovo. It was available in both paper and online versions and in Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish and English languages.

An Overview of the Peacebuilding Process in North Macedonia

Before outlining North Macedonia's sustainability profile, it would be worth providing some brief information on the background of the peacebuilding process in the country. North Macedonia was the only constituent part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to gain independence without war. However, preexisting tensions between Slav Macedonians and ethnic Albanians escalated in the period post-independence from former Yugoslavia, particularly following the intensification of the armed clashes between separatist Albanians and the Serbian security forces in Kosovo in 1998, and NATO's military intervention a year later.[27] For many Macedonian Albanians, who, according to the 1994 census, comprised about 23% of the population,[28] the state structure was based on unfair institutional arrangements. For instance, the constitution designated Macedonian Orthodox Christianity as the state religion and Macedonian as the only official language of the country, while prohibiting the use of Albanian in parliament and higher education.[29] In addition, Albanians were underrepresented in local government, law enforcement and security institutions, and subject to systematic discrimination in day-to-day life.[30] While Albanians felt that they were treated as second-class citizens, Slav Macedonians feared that the Albanians' long-term objective was secession and even the creation of a "Greater Albania" through uniting with their co-nationals in the region.[31]

The mounting tensions, fueled by a widely-shared sense of exclusion and victimhood, escalated further in March 2001 when the newly formed paramilitary organization, the National Liberation Army (NLA), embarked on a rebellion in the largely Albanian-populated Northwestern part of the country. Clashes with the Macedonian army led to the displacement of more than

150,000 people – around 7% of the country's population.[32] Compared to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which fought for independence from Serbia, the NLA had limited political objectives and achieved most of them through the internationally-brokered Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) signed in August the same year.[33] The OFA granted Albanian language an official status in municipalities where it is spoken by at least 20% of the population, stipulated its use in education and parliament, and introduced proportional ethnic representation in public administration and the formation of a power-sharing arrangement to better integrate Albanians and other ethnic minorities into a unitary state structure in exchange for the cessation of violence by all parties.[34] The OFA also assigned a disarmament and stabilization role to NATO, which deployed a small force of 3,500 troops to collect the weapons of rebels. The following year, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), founded by Ali Ahmeti, the NLA's political leader, joined the coalition led by the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), successor to the League of Communists of Macedonia. The inclusion of the DUI in the government met strong opposition from some ethnic Macedonians who viewed it as a dangerous concession to Albanian "rebels" and "terrorists."[35] The 2006 parliamentary elections resulted in the victory of the conservative-nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO DPMNE) which chose the second largest Albanian party, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), as its coalition partner. Nikola Gruevski's VMRO and Ahmeti's DUI formed a coalition shortly after the snap elections in June 2008 and dominated the country's politics until the December 2016 elections.

Even though the country has managed to avert renewed violence since the signing of the OFA, it has not been free from inter-ethnic tensions, political scandals, widespread corruption and weakness in the rule of law.

Even though the country has managed to avert renewed violence since the signing of the OFA, it has not been free from inter-ethnic tensions, political scandals, widespread corruption and weakness in the rule of law. For instance, the storming of the Parliament by VMRO DPMNE supporters in protest against the election of ethnic Albanian MP Talat Xhaferi, a former guerrilla, as speaker of the Parliament, made the world news in April 2017. Images showing SDSM leader Zoran Zaev, who report-

edly agreed to the recognition of a country-wide official status to the Albanian language as a precondition for the formation of a coalition, covered in blood, came as a shock for NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and other European leaders.[36] The attacks were indeed the latest in a prolonged political crisis facing the country since early 2015, when Zaev released recordings of phone conversations, which appeared to reveal that former prime minister Gruevski's government was illegally surveilling more than 20,000 citizens, including journalists, academics, civil society personnel and even members of its own government. Through mediation from the EU, a special prosecutor was mandated by the parliament to launch an investigation into the allegations of spying and corruption.

In May 2018, Gruevski was found guilty of abusing his powers over the purchase of a luxury vehicle.[37] Shortly after the Appeal Court's verdict later in October, which confirmed his two-year imprisonment, Gruevski fled to Hungary where he announced he had been granted political asylum by PM Viktor Orban, well-known for his staunch opposition to asylum.[38] A more recent example of the country's vulnerabilities may be seen in the escalating tensions during the name-change referendum as part of the Prespa Agreement concluded in June 2018 to resolve a long-standing dispute with neighboring Greece and pave the way for North Macedonia's membership in NATO and the EU.[39] While supported by ethnic Albanians, the deal received strong criticism from both the Macedonian and Greek opposition, highlighting lingering national sentiments in the region. Indeed, Macedonians who opposed the agreement linked their ethnic and cultural identity to the name 'Macedonia'. From their perspective, by agreeing to the name change imposed by Athens and Brussels, Zaev had humiliated the country. President Ivanov, for instance, described the deal as "historical suicide" and called for voters to boycott the referendum.[40]

Data Gathering and Presentation

The data for this pilot study was extracted from two kinds of sources: policy documents and reports in the framework of sustainability, and surveys conducted by Macedonian residents in 4 different languages (Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish and English). In order to combine top-down and bottom-up approaches, 64 policy documents/reports on sustainability available in English and 296 survey responses were used for the empirical evaluation of this study.

The data pool for the survey demonstrates a satisfactory gender ratio (47.1% female and 52.9% male), while there appears to be a gap in education levels, age and economic well-being. More than half of the survey participants indicated that they have bachelor degrees or higher academic qualifications. Approximately 65% of the participants were between the age groups of 20-29 and 30-39. Most participants also seemed to be comfortable with their financial situation; 52% of respondents indicated that they were "comfortable" and 34% chose the "well-off" option.

The following section clarifies the details on how the raw data was processed. Before explicating the details of the data and its results, the authors would like to emphasize that we are not testing any hypothesis in this analysis and are aware that it is not a representative sampling. Rather, our study is a preliminary trend analysis conducted for illustrative purposes only. The findings should therefore be considered as suggestive. We are planning to extend the research with a nationally representative sampling in the future.

For the aggregation of our data pool we used snowball sampling. This helped us find other participants during field research. ATLAS.ti's word cruncher was used to extract the count of words that were mentioned within the text of the documents. These raw word counts were added up manually for each domain of the circle of sustainability. Synonyms and related words were considered when adding words to these domains. For instance, "clean water," "water," and "drinking water" are all part of the water and air pillar of "ecology". Through this method, a simple content analysis of the policy documents was processed.

We compared the content of policy documents to that of the survey responses by identifying how much importance is focused on an issue. We also hand coded the survey responses by classifying each response after the demographic questions into two general categories of "significant" or "insignificant" issues.

Significant for

- "Strongly Agree" and "Agree"
- "Passionately Concerned," "Very Concerned" and "Concerned"

Insignificant for

- "Strongly Disagree" and "Disagree"
- "Not at All Concerned" and "Not Concerned"

From this data, we can gather that "culture" appears as the most important aspect of sustainability for the participants.

	Survey	Policy Documents
Ecology	1,501 (24.06%)	23,120 (40.65%)
Politics	1,496 (23.98%)	9,534 (16.76%)
Economics	1,553 (24.89%)	17,526 (30.82%)
Culture	1,689 (27.07%)	6,683 (11.75%)

Table 1: Emphasis on each circle of sustainability in the survey and policy documents

Findings

The findings of this pilot study reveal a sharp contrast between the understandings and requirements of sustainability held by the survey respondents and the country's policy planners. While "culture" is the most important aspect for participants, "ecology" was the most mentioned element of sustainability in policy documents, with "culture"-related content mentioned the least. "Politics" is relatively similar in both, ranking at 3 in policy documents and 4 in survey responses. "Ecology" and "politics" rank higher in the policy documents, but "politics" has a relative similar ranking for both the survey and policy documents (ranking fourth and third respectively). For both the survey responses and the policy documents, "economics" and "ecology" are ranked closely to each other (second and third respectively for the survey and second and first respectively for the policy documents). This relative closeness in rank is also illustrated in the content of the policy documents.

The findings of this pilot study reveal a sharp contrast between the understandings and requirements of sustainability held by the survey respondents and the country's policy planners.

One possible explanation for "culture"-related concepts to be less relevant in policy documents might be a rationalization by the country's policy-makers and bureaucrats that including cultural issues in strategic frameworks could inflame inter-ethnic tensions, which can easily turn into violent confrontation. In February 2011, for instance, around 100 ethnic Macedonians and Albanians were involved in clashes at the fortress in Skopje over the con-

struction of a museum-church that resulted in the injury of eight people, including two police officers.[41] The killing of five Macedonians in 2012, and the sentencing of the Albanian defendants to life imprisonment for "terrorism" two years later triggered a wave of violent protests in the capital.[42] Furthermore, a police operation in ethnically mixed-Kumonovo in May 2015 left eight members of the security forces and fourteen Albanians, including former liberation fighters from Kosovo, dead.[43] The timing of the offensive, just days before the opposition's planned anti-government demonstrations in protest of the wiretapping revelations raised concerns among local and foreign political analysts.[44] Johannes Hahn, the EU's enlargement commissioner, was quoted in the media as stating that the violent event "cannot and should not distract from the very serious internal political situation" and it "should not be used to introduce a further complexity by injecting ethnic tensions into the situation."[45]

An alternative explanation for the lesser emphasis on culture in the policy documents might be that the country's electoral politics makes transformative policy interventions in the area of culture too politically costly. The OFA, which ended the armed conflict in 2001, introduced proportional representation and power-sharing to generate sustained peace through facilitating the representation of minority groups in the political and institutional realm. The power-sharing model, designed to reconcile the Macedonian position on maintaining a unitary state structure with Albanian demands for greater exercise of parliamentary influence,[46] institutionalized ethnicity as the basis of the country's governmental and institutional structuring. Indeed, the governments (including those formed before the OFA) in North Macedonia have always been ethnic coalitions made up of a large Macedonian party and a minor Albanian party.[47] The introduction of proportional representation and power-sharing has only formalized this system, which gives the country's politicians little incentive to respond to the cultural demands of all Macedonian citizens. Hence, the policy focus on the overarching ecological, economic and political issues rather than cultural factors may be understood as a manifestation of the country's elites' tendency to keep culture as an exclusive area to use for political gains at the ballot box.

On the other hand, the public, according to the survey results, is concerned with the survival of their cultural beliefs and values. In a historically divided society with a recent experience of violent conflict such as North Macedonia this may not come as a surprising development. The majority Slav Macedo-

nians who dominate state power tend to view the society as Macedonian in cultural terms, whereas the minority Albanians who emphasize the multi-cultural character of the society mostly live in the Northwest parts of the country.[48] Even in mixed areas such as Skopje or Kumanovo, Albanians and Slav Macedonians have maintained almost entirely segregated social and economic relations, living in different villages or urban quarters.[49] Due to the religious divide between Islam and Orthodox Christianity, inter-marriage is also a rare event.[50] The 2001 violence represents the clash of these two, completely different visions of the society.[51] As evidenced by the persistence of ethnic political parties, the inability of ruling coalitions to pursue strategies around issues that cut across ethnic differences, incidents of ethnically motivated violence, and the lack of political will to address past human rights violations, North Macedonia has been "far from [an] integrated society."[52]

Considering the developments in North Macedonia since the wiretapping scandal, the survey questions assigned to each circle are especially indicative of society's sentiments. One of the main problems that the leaked conversations brought back to the surface was the ethnic tensions that the OFA had sought to mitigate. The implementation of the OFA was modelled through ethnic power-sharing between the two biggest Macedonian and Albanian parties, VRMO-DPMNE and DUI, that had governed the country for almost a decade since 2008. However, rather than using the OFA as a strategic guideline to develop the foundations of a multi-ethnic society, the two parties "turned the agreement into an instrument for seizing state resources and expanding their patronage networks," which are difficult to dismantle.[53] At the same time, the power-sharing model provided the coalition partners with a scapegoat for the setbacks that citizens encountered.[54]

In addition to revealing large-scale illegal surveillance and abuse of power by the Gruevski government, the wiretap recordings also contained some denigrating conversations between VMRO officials about ethnic Albanians that posed a serious political challenge to Ahmeti, whose years of coalition partnership with Gruevski had already significantly shattered his "old rebel credibility" and claim to promote community interests.[55] It appears that Zaev's SDSM, which increased its seats from 34 to 49 at the December 2016 elections, attracted at least twice as many Albanian votes as the DUI.[56] VMRO and DUI, which tended to use the ethnic makeup of the country to generate political power and leverage, were the two biggest losing parties in the elections.[57] In addition to the DUI, which won 10 seats, three other Albanian par-

ties gained representation in the parliament – with the newly formed BESA Movement receiving 5, the Alliance of Albanians 3, and the Democratic Party of Albanians 2. As noted earlier, except for 2006-8, the ruling coalitions were formed between the Macedonian and Albanian parties that won the majority of the votes from their constituencies. During the 2014 elections, the VMRO had the majority of the parliamentary seats (61 out of 120) and its inclusion of the DUI was rather a procedural decision.[58] Even though they had fewer seats, the "Albanian camp" had better bargaining power and chance to push their agenda as their support was crucial for the formation of a new coalition led by the VMRO or SDSM.[59]

Shortly before Gruevski received a mandate to form a government from President Ivanov in January 2017, the DUI initiated a platform with the BESA Movement and DPA and encouraged the adoption of a series of demands as preconditions for the formation of a government. These demands put little emphasis on tackling corruption and the rule of law weaknesses that underlie North Macedonia's deep-rooted political crisis, and were largely focused on essentially difficult-to-accept ethnicity-based preconditions such as the extension of the official status of Albanian across the country and the start of talks to change the flag and national anthem.[60] In making these demands, Ahmeti had sought to promote the idea that VMRO and SDSM have the same attitude toward Albanians and ensure the return of Albanian votes during the 2017 elections.[61]

As a result, it is essential to briefly consider how the exploitation of ethnic tensions, along with the facts of the political scandals, may have affected the public's perceptions of the government and their responsibility for sustainability. To start with attitudes on cultural safety, half of the respondents (51%) feel either "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the safety of communities and freedom of cultural expression in their locality, while 19% of the respondents fall on the opposite end of the spectrum. Even though it is difficult to identify the ethnic breakdown of survey respondents, as some of the participants completed the English version, the share of negative responses, somewhat close to the ratio of the Macedonian Albanians in the population, may reflect the minority Albanians' safety concerns due to these rising tensions. However, the survey results, regardless of participants' ethnic background, indicate that there are mixed-to-positive feelings toward ethnic and cultural freedom. Over three fourths of the respondents (79%) feel that people living in their locality are free to celebrate their own rituals and commemorations publicly. While

there is a significant consensus that ethnic minorities can practice their traditions freely, it does not mean that those specific minorities agree on this statement. Since our survey did not ask for ethnic identity beforehand, there is no means of proving that ethnic traditions are satisfyingly practiced. Future research may add ethnicity as a controlling variable and highlight these ethnical and cultural relations more precisely. Currently, even official documents make reference to culture only minutely.

Cross-referencing with the government documents, only 11.75% of the content is comprised of the circle of culture (See Figure 1), the lowest out of all within the documents. This somewhat reinforces the idea that ethnicity and culture are merely touched on to avert criticism towards corruption and authoritarianism. From another perspective it can also reinforce the idea that the ethnic matters of society were never formally considered as an aspect to improve upon, which might suggest that the majority Macedonian party was still deeply discriminating toward Albanians.

On a side note, the results suggesting that culture is less emphasized in governmental documents could be explained by North Macedonia's vulnerability to external pressure, specifically from the EU, which it aspires to join in the years ahead. Given the fact that North Macedonia's NATO accession process is on its way to being finalized, as more than half of the members, including Turkey,[62] have ratified the accession treaty,[63] and that the EU has announced that the prospect of accession talks will be opened no later than October 2019,[64] North Macedonian government documents would naturally be inclined to highlight aspects that do not display issues of ethnic tension. Any implication in formal policy frameworks of ethnic dissonance within Macedonian society is likely to slow down or even halt the accession processes for both international organizations, as it may be used as a reference point for requiring additional governance reforms. Such a reaction from the EU could be discerned during the Kumonovo incident mentioned above.

The survey results also exhibit a consensus that the Macedonian state institutions are deeply flawed. This is illustrated by the 83% of the respondents who felt "concerned," "very concerned," or "passionately concerned" about the corruption of local institutions, and a meagre proportion of agreement (12%) on the government's capacity to make decisions and laws that are good for their lo-

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cal lives. This feeling of public distrust in the country's politicians and insti-
tutions is not exclusive to ethnicity, which was only used by the governing
authorities to create a smokescreen that diverts attention from more pressing
issues such as unemployment, which reached 31% in 2012 and regressed to
22% in 2017, or the fact that around a quarter of the population lives under
the poverty line.[65] Additionally, there is little hope among the public that they
can influence the authorities surrounding them: 34% of respondents believe
this is possible, while 27% disagree. These responses display an uncertainty
and split in society's level of trust toward state institutions and authorities.
In relation to the government documents, the circle of politics seems less of
a concern, only constituting 17% of the total content. The lack of concern
about stable institutions or a solid judiciary system could be credited to the
system that the prior majority parties have set up.

When it comes to the economic aspects of sustainability, the circle of eco-
nomics is the second-highest out of all the content of the policy documents
(30.82%). Looking at the content of the gathered documents, matters per-
taining to North Macedonia's economy appear to be one of the most import-
ant priorities of the government. The policy emphasis on economic issues
notwithstanding, the survey responses suggest that the public is highly con-
cerned about matters of living standards or slumps in the local economy. For
instance, around two-thirds of respondents (67%) do not believe that wealth
is distributed widely enough in their locality so that all can enjoy a good
standard of living. Furthermore, a significant majority of the participants
(79%) are, to various extents, concerned about a slump in the local economy.
However, despite this negative outlook most of the respondents (70%) agree
that economic growth can be compatible with environment sustainability,
suggesting that the respondents do not think of this relationship as binary.
This is also relevant to the environmental sensibility of the public as discussed
below. Yet, trust in local or governmental institutions to mitigate economic
fluctuations are at very low levels. Considering the corruption scandals, these
negative public attitudes are not surprising at all.

Last but not least, ecology also displays significant disparities between the
public and the government. In terms of participants' satisfaction with the
environment they live in, positive responses (45%) outweigh negative ones
(23%). However, only 21% of the participants expressed confidence in the
ability of experts to find a solution to environmental problems, suggesting
that citizens' reported levels of satisfaction with the environment might just

be based on personal attachment, not because governments and experts are effective at managing ecological and environmental issues. This pattern is also reflected in participants' views on the role of their surrounding environment in their identity, with 41% feeling that their identity is bound to the local natural environment and landscape in which they live.

Regarding data collection locations, we would like to note that we have chosen only Skopje, the nation's capital and biggest city, where Macedonians form the majority of the population, and the Northwestern city of Tetovo, mainly populated by ethnic Albanians. The ethnic composition of the cities and the status of the respective dominant communities may have impacted the respondents' perceptions about the weight of the cultural factors that were highlighted. Furthermore, using only two big cities could also explain why the respondents identified themselves as financially comfortable. People who are financially comfortable may be inclined to emphasize societal or "high-political" issues. The financial background of the respondents may become a limiting factor for the data when considering the possibility of the extent to which the responses of people living in rural places may differ from those of city-dwellers. At first thought, rural locations' responses would most likely differ in the areas of "environment" and "economy". Considering the scale of towns and villages, and their relative lack of urban infrastructure, some basic needs such as transport or access to electricity could be much more essential to survey respondents. Conversely, due to lower average incomes and the opportunity to grow basic produce for nourishment, most respondents would not assign as much significance to general economic issues such as growth or unemployment as city-dwellers might.

Another characteristic of the data collected is the fact that the resulting percentages of the circles are not drastically different from each other. This could be indicative of how the public perceives each circle as a fundamental component of the complete whole of the concept of sustainability. That is to say, each circle should be equal parts of a whole. Naturally, given its capabilities, each state can only show so much attention to each circle through specific policies. Our results suggest that the North Macedonian state seems to significantly favor one over the other, specifically ecology (40.65%) and economy (30.82%) over the others. While there are certainly going to be differences in each area, concerns may arise when an area of sustainability such as culture is primarily neglected in the content of policy documents (11.75%). As Luc Rychler points out, sustainable peace not only requires "the absence of vio-

lence" but also "the elimination of unacceptable political, economic and cultural forms of discrimination." Sustainability in North Macedonia can only become potent if the core of issues is tackled in a more comprehensive and integrated manner. Considering the historical background of the conflict in North Macedonia and the way in which ethnic issues have been addressed, much like in BiH and Kosovo, the limited attention given to culture in the policy documents is noteworthy. Nevertheless, as this is a pilot study designed to provide a preliminary trends analysis, further research may need to be undertaken, not just in North Macedonia, but also in similarly "peace-rebuilt" Balkan countries, in order to reach more decisive conclusions.

Notwithstanding such limitations, the study should provide further insight for policy-makers, for instance, with regard to the interaction between geographical context and the construction of identity and how these factors can have implications for the policy level. As noted earlier, ecology is the most mentioned circle within the policy documents, and culture is the least. The emphasis in the survey on the cultural aspects of sustainability and the respondents' perceptions of the relevance of the landscape to identity, on the other hand, draws attention to the point that outcomes in one circle are linked to processes in another. Interdependencies between circles require policies that are designed from a holistic perspective. In the context of ecological sustainability, for instance, the consideration and integration of local meanings, understandings and relations into policy frameworks may provide a useful guideline for policy planners in their efforts to better respond to the development needs of the community and improve its members' quality of life.

Conclusion

In this paper, we took sustainability as the center of our contextualized analysis of North Macedonia, which has been undergoing a peacebuilding process since the short-lived violent conflict in 2001. Our analytical approach, based on the "circles of sustainability" concept, sought to demonstrate how sustainability appears in policy documents and people's perceptions. By ranking each "circle of sustainability" for policy documents and survey responses through number of mentions and "significance" scales respectively. By juxtaposing the bottom and the upper echelons of the Macedonian political spectrum, we have concluded that the circle of "culture" is the most significant aspect for the survey participants, while the circle of "ecology" is the most important for policy documents. However, there is an alignment in ranking for the circle of "economics" which is ranked in second place for both the surveys and poli-

cy documents. Due to North Macedonia's economic and political handicaps, both the government and the people seem to be concerned on a similar scale.

However, it is difficult to say the same thing about the circle of culture, which is addressed in our survey but ranks lowest in the policy documents. Moreover, deducing from our survey responses, a majority of participants do not encounter ethnic and cultural discrimination, leading us to deduce that ethnic and cultural tensions, which were perceived by only a minority of the public according to our respondents, may have been incited by the earlier governing authorities. On the other hand, recent political developments such as the Prespa Agreement and the subsequent September 30th referendum indicate that bilateral relations are still heavily affected by ethnic and cultural factors. Under these circumstances, our study has merely touched the tip of the iceberg of the ethnic and cultural dynamics that pervade political life in the Balkans. With that being said, future analysis could introduce ethnicity to the survey responses, allowing the research to control for ethnic background, clarifying which ethnic groups perceive there to be ethnic strife. Such studies could also make use of integrated models of sustainability with the top-down/bottom-up approach applied in this research as basis for other cases, such as BiH's new internal politics or the direction of the Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue.

Perhaps most disturbingly, despite being the fuel of conflict in North Macedonia and the Balkans in general, ethnic and cultural factors are largely neglected in the policy documents. There are significant differences between the public's and government's perceptions of circles such as "ecology" or "culture," each ranking differently in survey responses and policy documents. Considering the region's historically fraught background in terms of ethnicity and culture, it may be advisable for policy planners to take into account the public's perceptions toward culture as revealed in this study. By encouraging future research to focus on the cultural- and identity-based aspects of sustainability, a more comprehensive understanding of ethnic tensions and their legitimate sources may also be established.

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ARTICLE

Humanitarian NGOs: Motivations, Challenges and Contributions to Turkish Foreign Policy

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Abstract

This study focusses on Turkish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) carrying out humanitarian assistance abroad. Particular attention is given to their motivations, challenges and contributions to Turkish foreign policy (TFP). Being a product of a larger research project dealing with Turkish humanitarian NGOs (HNGOs), this paper's findings are derived from a bulk of datasets consisting of interviews, observations, and other printed/on-line materials published by these humanitarian NGOs. The primary data used in the article is compiled from more than 25 semi-structured interviews with people who work for Turkish NGOs. What are the main reasons and motivations of these organizations to engage in humanitarian aid activities? What kinds of problems and challenges do they face while carrying out humanitarian aid? What do they think of TFP and to what extent do they affect TFP? If they do, in which ways? Such questions are the central questions this article seeks to address. While verifying some of them, the main findings challenge some of the conventional assumptions about Turkish NGOs and their activities, motivations, challenges and contribution to TFP.

Keywords

Introduction

This article deals with Turkish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) carrying out humanitarian and development aid around the world. Particular

Foreign aid has always been an important tool of soft power for states to generate influence over other states and communities.

attention is given to their motivations, the challenges they face and their contributions to Turkish foreign policy (TFP). This theme reflects a global trend in the field of development and humanitarian aid. Advances in communication and transportation technologies and increasing financial capabilities have transformed the abilities of non-state actors, making them relevant in different contexts within International Relations and other related literature.[1] Foreign aid (both humanitarian and development aid) is no exception, and the balance between state and non-state actors in this field has shifted over the last 20 years. Until the nineteenth century, humanitarianism was viewed as a branch of religious, political and medical sciences and the practice was dominated by church and state.[2] Yet, the very definition of humanitarianism and the practice of humanitarian aid, as well as the actors in this area have changed significantly. Today a significant share of emergency relief, humanitarian aid, and development assistance is raised by/from private sources, and allocated by non-governmental actors, mostly by NGOs.[3] Thus, the area is not exclusively dominated by states anymore and what we can call 'private aid' allocated by individuals, companies, corporations, foundations, NGOs, and community-based organizations merits more systemic analysis.

Foreign aid has always been an important tool of soft power for states to generate influence over other states and communities. There are substantial differences in principles, mandates and priorities for allocating development and humanitarian aid from country to country. These differences gain even more significance when it comes to private domains. Private flows in global development finance, which include private investment, private philanthropy, and remittances, have significantly increased over the last decades. It is now equivalent to over a quarter of all official development assistance (ODA).[4] According to OECD data, net private grants doubled from $14,822.6 million in 2005 to $35,550.6 million in 2015. Private flows are not just created by private entities, but are also allocated by them. For instance, most of the money (more than 60 percent), which equals over half of the estimated private development assistance, is channeled through NGOs. In a similar way, the ODA channeled through private entities has tripled in the same period, rising from $3,768.3 million in 2005 to $14,481.2 million in 2015. This amount is equal to roughly 20 percent of total bilateral ODA.[5] Private donations funding humanitarian action and allocations made by NGOs in order to cope with

humanitarian crises have become more vital given the fact that public funding for international development and humanitarian assistance has continually decreased and become even more contested in recent years. Yet, even though there is a large literature on bilateral and multilateral foreign aid, there is little about the development and humanitarian aid raised and allocated by NGOs based in Turkey.[6]

In addition to increasing interest in non-state actors at the global level, the role and effects of non-state actors in TFP have increased, which is a parallel development to the processes of deepening and broadening of TFP. Over the last fifteen years, Turkey's growing regional power capacity and global visibility have perhaps manifested most notably in the field of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian aid has become a natural component of Turkey's position in the international arena. As of 2016, more than 60 percent of the Turkish ODA was reported as humanitarian aid. These figures have placed Turkey at the top of the list of the world's most generous countries. Again, as humanitarian and development aid became an important tool in the TFP tool-box, Turkish NGOs functioning in this area have become important non-state actors for TFP. In Turkey, humanitarian aid efforts are usually carried out through collaborative arrangements between the Turkish government, official/semi-official institutions and faith-based charities or foundations. There are several studies that fundamentally focus on Turkish aid practice in different contexts[7] and the role of official/semi-official institutions such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA),[8] the Turkey Diyanet Foundation, Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), and Turkish Airlines (THY). However, there are very few systemic studies that deal with Turkish NGOs carrying out humanitarian and development assistance. Motivated by this gap in the literature, this article draws on a broad set of data acquired from semi-structured interviews with people working for Turkish NGOs to analyze their respective motivations, interests, challenges and contributions to TFP. To this end, the article first looks at the concept of private aid, and the practice of private humanitarian aid in general. Later it connects that discussion to Turkish aid practices. Finally, it presents its empirical analysis of the Turkish NGOs facilitating humanitarian aid by drawing on the data collected from interviews and other primary sources to explain their motivations, challenges and contribution to TFP.

Private Humanitarian Aid

The overall global aid structure has remained stable and simple for a very long time: a few developed countries with the help of several multilateral institutions as the main intermediaries have dominated the field (see the left-hand side of Figure 1 below).

A Simple depiction of the aid Architecture

The reality of intermediating actors in development and humanitarian assistance

Figure 1: Change in Aid Architecture[9]

However, the general trends in aid flows suggest that the simple aid architecture has been changing fast and becoming very complex and contested (the right-hand side of Figure 1 above). It is contested because of the emerging donor phenomenon. Emerging donors have brought many different sets of norms and practices into the aid architecture relying on their own development agencies, and different sets of multilateral organizations' norms and practices. As a result, there are more multilateral agencies, and a more diverse set of interests, rules and norms governing the practice in the field. Most aid is now allocated on a bilateral basis. In addition to structural changes, non-state actors and private aid have grown into something prominent in the realm of development assistance, making the structure more complex than it has ever been. Today, thousands of international, national and local NGOs, big and small private entities, foundations, and individuals are part of the global aid structure. This is a relatively new phenomenon in the global aid architecture.[10]

Alongside the increasing number of actors providing assistance and substantial changes in the aid structure, the volume of humanitarian assistance in particular has also increased significantly since the end of the Cold War. This can be seen from Table 1 below. Humanitarian aid is key to facilitating a return to daily life for people affected by various types of crisis and a preventive measure to address emergency issues. The definition and scope of interventions are based on several principles and constraints. While the principles governing

humanitarian assistance (humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence and accountability) remain constant, the actors, scope and content of the assistance vary across a number of different cases. It can be viewed from the data that humanitarian aid has risen notably faster than

Humanitarian aid is key to facilitating a return to daily life for people affected by various types of crisis and a preventive measure to address emergency issues.

any other ODA input, with the proportion of total aid almost doubling from 6 percent in 2006 to 11 percent in 2016 (See the figure on the left-hand side of Table 1). According to the OECD data, total humanitarian aid accounted for more than $23 billion in 2017. What is important here is that the share of humanitarian aid in total development assistance is increasing every year for almost every donor. This situation, among other reasons, mainly derives from the fact that people in countries such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Palestine, Myanmar and South Sudan, have been long in need of urgent and prolonged humanitarian assistance.

However, today, it is difficult for states to deal with major crises in various parts of the world. Here, humanitarian assistance provided by private sources with increasing amounts play an important role by offsetting the inadequacy of official humanitarian assistance.[11] Non-state or private funding and allocation is therefore growing in importance.[12] The funding from all private donors – individuals, trusts, foundations and corporations – has been rising over the last decade, reaching over $40 million in 2016 (See Figure 2).

For development and humanitarian aid, many terms are used interchangeably to refer to private development assistance, including international private giving, international philanthropy, voluntary giving, private development aid, and private development cooperation. As such, private development assistance includes flows of private finance channeled through NGOs, foundations and corporate philanthropic activities along with other private flows such as direct investments and remittances. Humanitarian assistance from both official and private funds reaches people in need via multiple channels and transaction chains. Civil Society Organizations (COSs) are one kind of body through which humanitarian aid is raised and allocated or distributed. According to the terminology used by OECD, CSOs can be defined to include all non-market and non-state organizations. However, among these, NGOs play a vital role, and that role increases as their capacity increases, thanks to advances in communication and transportation technologies.

Figure 2: Net Private Grants 2004-2016

Source: OECD, DAC Stat.

Private funding and allocation from and through individuals, trusts and foundations, and companies and corporations are valued not just because of their sheer volume. These types of funding bring speed, flexibility and reliability into the field as they come with less earmarking and a longer time frame than funding from institutional or state donors. In general, it is believed that NGOs may provide better-targeted aid than official donors since the allocation of NGO aid is less distorted by the commercial and political mandates of state agencies, notably the promotion of exports and the formation of political alliances.[13] NGOs often reach areas that are forgotten or left behind by government agencies. In some cases, governments do not recognize certain marginalized groups, or even render them illegal, while civil society groups reach and support them.[14] Today most of the donor governments appear to share the view that NGOs have an important role to play in aid.[15] Therefore, there is a global trend towards strengthening and encouraging NGOs in allocating both private and official development assistance. Figure 3 shows the official flows channeled to and through NGOs by OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. Even though, in practice, aid from official flows is still the most important part of the aid structure at the international level, and is still widely allocated through bilateral or multilateral organizations as Figure 3 shows, development assistance channeled to and

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through CSOs has become an important factor in the development aid field. From official flows, a vast amount (nearly 60 percent or more) goes to multilateral agencies (primarily UN agencies) in the first instance, while NGOs receive around 20 percent of the total.[16] The majority of the amount going through NGOs goes to international NGOs. Thus, national and local NGOs get a small share of those official flows.

Figure 3: Share of ODA to and through CSOs by DAC Members, 2015.[17] The value at each bar represents the share of aid to and through non-governmental organizations (%).

However, when it comes to private humanitarian aid, the vast majority of funding not only goes to and through NGOs, but is raised and allocated by national and local NGOs. Another important difference between official flows channeled to and through NGOs and private flows channeled through NGOs is the fact that official funds are channeled through NGOs and other private bodies to implement donor-initiated projects while private flows go to the NGO-initiated or private body-initiated projects. For instance, according to OECD data, in 2016, DAC members reported 12 percent of their ODA as aid through CSOs, and only 2 percent as aid to CSOs, i.e. aid for programs initiated by the CSOs themselves.[18]

Turkey as a Humanitarian State

Foreign aid plays an important role in the implementation of foreign policy and in the development of bilateral cooperation between countries. As such, it is a vital instrument that provides classical diplomacy with new opportunities in economic, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. Since the early 1950s, a group of developed countries has dominated the field of humanitarian assistance. The interest of developed countries in development aid has increased every year. In the 1950s, the U.S. and France were the leading countries, while

Australia, Austria, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland joined the club in the 1960s, followed by Portugal and Spain in the 1970s. In the 1990s, Greece and Turkey, and in recent years, China, South Korea, India, Brazil and Mexico have been actively involved in development assistance activities.

Turkey's growing contributions are in line with broader trends reflecting the transformation of the world economy. The structure of foreign aid has undergone a transformation in line with the ascendance of emerging powers to prominent roles in global governance. In this regard, Turkey's growing visibility in this field, first and foremost, is another indicator of the emerging donor phenomenon.[19] Turkey merits study as one of the major emerging donors.[20]

Among emerging donors, Turkey is an important provider for several reasons. Development aid has two aspects: assistance received, and assistance provided. Turkey was a receiving country until the early 2000s. Thus, its transformation from an aid recipient to a major donor country is a very recent happening. In its transition to becoming a provider, Turkey's first foreign aid program was launched in June 1985 with an aid package of 10 million to the Sahel countries. At the height of the collapse of the Soviet Union from the mid and late 1980s until the late 1990s, Turkey operationalized its foreign aid policies to support its foreign policy objectives in the Caucasus and Central Asia.[21] Turkey's humanitarian and development assistance was quite minimal until 2002. Since then, Turkey has made its way to becoming a major player in the field. From 2002 to 2017, aid volumes rose from $67 million to $3 billion with a nearly sixteen-fold increase as depicted in Figure 4 (See also the figure at the right-hand side of Table 1).


Figure 4: Turkey's Development and Humanitarian Aid (1997-2007)

Source: TIKA

When we look at Turkey's bilateral aid, its main component has long been humanitarian aid. Turkey's emergency and humanitarian aid fund was around $3.2 billion in 2015, $6.4 billion in 2016, and surpassed $8 billion in 2017, corresponding to 0.85 **The rate of increase in Turkey's humanitarian assistance is tremendous. Turkey became the largest provider of humanitarian assistance in 2018 according to data gathered from OECD.**

percent of the country's national dividend. With these numbers, Turkey is leading the world in humanitarian aid.[22] This increase not only stems from a growing economy and a more international outlook, but also is due to a series of disasters on its doorstep, first and foremost the Syrian crisis. In the recent years, Turkey provided the largest share of its bilateral development co-operation to Syria, Somalia, Kyrgyzstan, Albania and Afghanistan. For almost all of these major crises, Turkey is among the top providers of humanitarian assistance.

Aid type	hist: humanitarian aid grants														
Fund flows	Net Disbursements														
Amount type	Constant Prices														
Unit	US Dollar, Millions, 2016														
Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Donor															
DAC Countries, Total	5,466.70	5,962.81	8,027.16	7,291.74	6,570.55	8,770.12	8,786.20	9,284.39	8,988.96	7,970.30	9,881.62	12,247.61	13,400.63	14,374.92	15,256.23
Canada	136.05	143.90	181.41	230.47	251.98	315.91	308.26	405.35	330.58	386.85	460.95	546.49	654.02	492.47	612.88
France	36.16	19.84	28.33	47.12	31.03	19.02	32.85	77.05	70.78	54.49	35.07	42.44	36.36	153.10	66.43
Germany	181.46	199.00	327.11	364.50	256.27	262.19	325.35	297.10	368.47	364.24	509.64	753.31	813.94	2,025.48	2,364.83
Japan	29.92	621.15	512.84	189.84	100.76	241.13	223.29	490.09	715.84	502.01	760.89	792.82	1,212.44	771.68	734.95
Sweden	228.74	216.89	278.46	304.68	283.17	321.25	355.48	351.54	398.02	363.73	362.68	487.98	377.84	463.01	461.19
UK	605.92	487.17	575.18	732.45	408.74	564.37	704.14	548.31	639.78	605.55	1,161.44	1,547.33	1,750.39	1,753.56	1,860.44
United States	3,183.59	3,103.63	4,108.32	3,550.71	3,426.68	4,917.98	4,875.47	5,350.22	4,617.87	4,156.90	4,922.84	6,124.90	6,220.84	6,286.21	6,612.12
Non-DAC Countries, Total	2.50	51.69	179.91	113.63	38.77	23.50	42.09	197.49	208.76	819.22	1,375.51	2,594.64	3,199.99	6,360.84	8,359.08
Turkey	2.50	51.69	179.91	113.63	38.77	23.50	42.09	114.23	208.76	819.10	1,288.63	2,041.75	2,662.95	5,865.80	8,063.18

Table 1: Humanitarian Aid (2003-2017)

Source: OECD, DAC Stat.

The rate of increase in Turkey's humanitarian assistance is tremendous. As shown in Figure 5, Turkey became the largest provider of humanitarian assistance in 2018 according to data gathered from OECD. Turkey is also well ahead of any other country in terms of the GDP-to-humanitarian-aid-giving ratio. As a matter of fact, Turkey has been the most generous country in the

world since 2016. According to recent reports on foreign aid, Turkey is the largest emerging aid donor (the largest non-Western and non-DAC country) and has been the most charitable nation three years in a row since 2016.[23]


Figure 5: The Most Generous Donor (2017)

Source: TIKA, www.tika.gov.tr

Over the last decade, instruments such as public diplomacy, peace operations, economic interdependence, mediation, and cultural diplomacy, and foreign aid have dramatically expanded in TFP rhetoric and practice. However, Turkey has wittingly made humanitarian aid a defining feature of its foreign policy.[24] This has paved the way for a more institutionalized Turkish foreign aid structure, making it more sustainable and more reliable. For Turkey, humanitarian aid is an instrument of expanding its influence and position as a global actor.[25] Turkey's mission in providing development and humanitarian assistance as a regional power is to expand its regional and global influence by carrying out its due responsibilities toward particular geographies and the people of those geographies. In this sense, it is not surprising to see that its aid efforts have been characterized as a historical, cultural and ideological mission.[26] Turkey's aid goes to the Balkans and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. At the global level, Turkey has initiated a number of global activities, such as hosting the first World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul on May 23-24, 2016, and initiating a network among the national societies of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries to establish a joint humanitarian aid platform in Istanbul to strengthen cooperation, all of which indicate Turkey's high profile in the field. As such, Turkey is conducting a "humanitarian foreign policy" in which a group of governmental bodies such as TIKA, AFAD, Kızılay, YTB and THY, collaborate and coordinate with civilian entities, firms, foundations and NGOs.

Figure 6: Turkey's Humanitarian Relief Aid (2004-2017)

Source: TIKA, www.tika.gov.tr

In this respect, Turkey offers a new model of foreign aid, a multitrack approach that promotes a greater involvement of non-state actors and resolute and fast implementation.[27] In this sense, Turkey's model of humanitarian relief efforts heavily relies on non-state actors, especially NGOs.[28] NGOs do not just cooperate and coordinate a "humanitarian approach" through a targeted foreign aid program, they also raise and polish Turkey's humanitarian power brand.

Turkey offers a new model of foreign aid, a multitrack approach that promotes a greater involvement of non-state actors and resolute and fast implementation.

Turkish Humanitarian NGOs

When it comes to development and humanitarian aid, the role of non-state actors has increased significantly over the last decades. Thousands of NGOs and private foundations work tirelessly to deal with humanitarian and development issues arising particularly in wars, conflicts and crisis situations. They operate in different geographies for different reasons and with different motivations, facing different sets of challenges. Figure 7 shows the trends at a global level with the increasing rate of grants by NGOs.

Figure 7: Grants by Private Agencies and NGOs (2000-2017, $ million)

Source: OECD, DAC Stat.

Turkish NGOs are part of this global trend and their activities and accomplishments have increased in the last decade. However, in comparison to global trends, the development and humanitarian aid provided by Turkish NGOs is still relatively very small. There are several reasons for that and we will address some of them in the following sections. Even though their share is small compared to global trends, from Figure 8, we can see that Turkish NGOs have become important actors in Turkish development and humanitarian aid. 2005 is the year when Turkish NGOs activities began to be reported in TIKA Official Development Reports. Before 2005, we do not have any available/reliable data. The development assistance made by Turkish Civil Society Organizations since 2005 shows a continuous increase. In this context, the amount of assistance provided by Turkish NGOs from their own resources amounted to $56.7 million in 2005, while the amount reached $707 million in 2017. From its humble beginnings, the contribution of Turkish NGOs to Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy has increased 12-fold, and it should be noted that these are locally raised funds. The projects realized by Turkish NGOs over the years have been primarily imple-

Turkish NGOs have been involved in humanitarian activities in more than 100 countries around the world, facilitating in many different sectors from training/education and health to water well drilling.

mented within the scope of education, health, water and water hygiene, social services and shelter, food supplies and emergency humanitarian aid of all kinds. Turkish NGOs have been involved in humanitarian activities in more than 100 countries around the world, facilitating in many different sectors from training/education and health to water well drilling. What is important here is that they have established an important know-how and institutional capacity over the last decade, allowing them to lead even more comprehensive humanitarian projects in the future on behalf of Turkish civil society.

**Figure 8:** Aid Given by Turkish NGOs (2005-2017)

Source: TIKA, www.tika.gov.tr

Turkish NGOs are recognized by the Turkish government as an important humanitarian and development aid instrument. Therefore, there is significant interaction between official state actors and non-state actors in the field of development and humanitarian aid. As Turkey improved its profile in humanitarian assistance, Turkish NGOs also started to play a vital role. Some studies even suggest that there is a high level of parallelism, if not complementarity, exhibited by the state and Turkish NGOs.[29] Indeed, the aid structure in Turkey is a mechanism where state, semi-state and non-state actors collaborate and cooperate in the business of humanitarian aid. Therefore, Turkish NGOs providing humanitarian aid merit more rigorous study. To this end, we brought together data acquired from 25 semi-structured interviews with people work-

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ing for Turkish NGOs to analyze their motivations, interests, challenges and contributions to TFP. The rest of the article mainly draws on this data.

Motivations

In the semi-structured interviews, we had a specifically designed part to gather information about the main motivations, interests or drivers of the activities in humanitarian aid. To this end, we posed several questions with rank order scaling options. Among the questions in this part, one was "what is the main driver of providing aid to a particular region/ or country?" with five options: humanitarian and altruistic sentiments, operational limits, religious motivations, national sentiments and financial incentives.

**Figure 9:** Motivations of providing aid

Interviewees were asked to rank these options from 1-5, 1 being the most important driver, and 5 the least important driver of their activities. The general view about Turkish NGOs is that they are ideologically and religiously motivated since most of these organizations depend on religious grassroots. However, the results (see Figure 8) show that humanitarian and altruistic sentiments rather than religious motivations are the most important drivers of their activities. From the results of the statistical factor analysis on the data, we can argue that religion is, however, a more important factor than national sentiments (national sentiments were explained as Turkey's due responsibilities toward Ottoman geographies, or Turkic relatives in other geographies, while religious motivations refer to Islamic solidarity and *ummah* understanding; these explanations were provided before the interviewees answered the question). The survey shows us that operational limits (whether the activities can be done or not) come as one of the important drivers (more than religious of national sentiments), while humanitarian and altruistic sentiments are the most influential driver for the humanitarian aid activities. These findings challenge conventional assumptions about the role of religion in Turkish NGOs' motivations. However, when we compare our findings from the questions with rank order scaling and open-ended questions, there appears a nuance, which fundamentally derives from the fact that there are three common themes among almost all Turkish NGOs, which we can detect from our notes from the interviews: a) Muslim/Islamic solidarity, b) Ottoman legacy or responsibilities toward the Ottoman lands, and c) the representation of Turkey. Without exception, all of the interviewees mentioned/underlined these themes while answering open-ended questions. These findings suggest that Turkish aid agencies are indeed driven by humanitarian altruistic reasons, yet they also care about Islamic solidarity, the representation of Turkey, and Ottoman legacies, and they reflect these sentiments within their activities.

The second question in the interview is designed to gather information about motivations, interests and drivers. It states, "Which factors, and to what extent, affect the scope of your humanitarian aid activities?" with a ranking option from 1-4, 1 being the most and 4 the least. The factors were the need of the people, the aid recipient country, Turkey's priorities, and institutional priorities. The results derived from the answers to this question actually verify the results of the earlier question mentioned above. All the respondents identified the need of the people as the top

priority while listing institutional priorities as the least important factor. However, this question reveals also that the name/profile of the country (which country they are providing the humanitarian aid) plays an important role in the decision to grant the humanitarian aid. In a similar vein, Turkey's priorities are considered in making humanitarian aid decisions. This is a very important finding, because it shows us that people carrying out humanitarian aid for these NGOs delicately consider Turkey's priorities, as set by the government and shared through official statements and speeches. That is also reflected in the open-ended questions.

Challenges

In the semi-structured interviews, participants were asked about the most important limiting factors for their humanitarian aid activities, with a rank order scaling option from 1-5, 1 being the most 5 the least limiting factor.

Figure 10: Challenges for NGOs

From the answers to this question, security appears as the most important challenge. Given the fact that Turkish NGOs are working directly in volatile and dangerous environments in distributing emergency relief, it is an expected answer. Bureaucracy comes next, while financial problems, human capital related challenges and logistical limits follow. However, from the open-ended questions part, coordination appears to be anoth-

er important issue, mentioned by almost every participant. Coordination involves vertical and horizontal coordination steps. Vertical coordination means coordination between/among Turkish NGOs. Naturally, the activities of these NGOs significantly overlap both in terms of geography and sectors. Every NGO, except for a very few, does the same type of activities. There is very little specialization in activities among Turkish NGOs. In addition, these NGOs tacitly compete against each other in many cases, due to the fact that they represent different grassroots or communities. This leads to a significant number of duplications which limit the economic scale of their activities. Although not a reliable solution, the only available mechanism to overcome duplication and mismanagement is a personal relationship between NGOs' representatives and workers.

Horizontal coordination refers to coordination efforts between state institutions like AFAD, TIKA, Kızılay and Turkish NGOs carrying out humanitarian aid. When it comes to Syria and efforts to address the Syrian refugee crisis, Kızılay is officially responsible for coordinating these activities, and NGOs are duly responsible to inform and be guided by Kızılay. There is, however, not enough empirical evidence showing how and to what extent this coordination works. Nonetheless, the majority of the participants in our interviews did not prefer a coordination mechanism via state authorities, arguing that it would limit their independence and impartiality. They argued such a mechanism would politicize the Turkish NGOs' activities in humanitarian aid and render them disregarded. Nonetheless, coordination is a problem that has to be addressed in the short and medium terms.

Human capital is another important challenge of the Turkish NGOs. As the nature of their activities involves humanitarian relief, NGOs heavily rely on volunteers. This leads to at least two types of problems: a) inadequate numbers of volunteers, and b) lack of training; most of the volunteers do not possess the required skills and training for working on the ground. We asked the NGOs whether they provide vocational training for their volunteers; the majority of them said no, or not enough.

> As the nature of their activities involves humanitarian relief, NGOs heavily rely on volunteers. This leads to at least two types of problems: a) inadequate numbers of volunteers, and b) lack of training.

Numbers of Professionals

37%

63%

- <19
- 20-39
- 40-59
- >60

Figure 11: Human Capital

According to the data we acquired during our interviews, the NGOs' professional human capital is very limited. 40 percent of the 25 Turkish NGOs which offer humanitarian relief programs have fewer than 20 professional (paid and permanent) workers, which include board members, managers, accountants, office secretaries and other lower level staff. Interestingly, the rest have more than 60 such professional workers. More than 70 percent of NGOs work with more than 150 volunteers for their operations on the ground. Some of them recognized the lack of human capital. It is our understanding from the interviews that they do not pay due attention to this issue. We infer the number of volunteers to be enough as the scale of the activity is small for the time being. When the scale increases, they generally rely on local NGOs in the countries where they provide aid. However, almost all of them understand the importance of training and capacity-building efforts, and they accept that the state has a vital, irreplaceable role to play here. Several participants underlined the importance of raising the interest of young people in voluntary activities through special courses during primary and secondary education in Turkey. They also suggested that there should be higher level courses on NGOs in the curriculum of social sciences at Turkish Universities and special programs for NGOs at the master and doctorate level. These interpretations indicate an increased awareness of the importance of capacity-building and human capital. During our interviews with the Disaster and Emergency Man-

agement Authority (AFAD) officials, they revealed that they have provided capacity-building programs for NGOs in the past and they are planning to do more with the help of International Organizations in the near future.

Financial Problems are the most enduring and important challenges for the Turkish NGOs. In terms of economy of scale, funding resources, and accountability, Turkish NGOs have a long way to go. As Turkey's economy has grown, NGOs' funding resources have also grown, yet they are still not sustainable and remain time- and event-dependent, while their resources rely heavily on domestic donations. Donations increase during special periods such as Ramadan and Eid al-adha (Feast of Sacrifice). However, these types of donations are subject to

> As Turkey's economy has grown, NGOs' funding resources have also grown, yet they are still not sustainable and remain time- and event-dependent, while their resources rely heavily on domestic donations.

special activities like distributing food for fast breaking or Eid-meat. Even though Turkish NGOs reach millions of people worldwide, such activities become contested from time to time. In addition to special periods on the calendar, Turkish NGOs launch humanitarian aid campaigns during crisis situations such as the ones occurring in Somalia, Syria, Myanmar, Pakistan, Afghanistan or the Philippines. Here one of the main problems is that many Turkish NGOs have a core support base due to their constituency, which generally consists of a small community. However, this limits their actions, forcing them to focus only on one crisis at a time. In an era of a growing number of simultaneously acute humanitarian crises, that limitation is a vital one that can only be overcome by a larger donation and funding base.

Figure 12: Financial Limits

The bilateral and multilateral funds originate from developed countries, private entities, individuals, and multilateral organizations are the biggest sources

of funds to international NGOs. They also rely on their own fundraising campaigns. Nonetheless, Turkish NGOs principally rely on funds and donations while receiving little from the conventional project base funding schemes of multilateral organizations for NGOs. That may increase their independence, yet it certainly curtails their economy of scale. As seen in Figure 11 above, Turkish NGOs raise more than 90 percent of their financial resources from their own domestic fundraising capacities. During interviews, participants overly emphasized that they do not see this as a problem because funds from developed countries and multilateral institutions are project-based and come with particular conditions attached. However, the conventional examples and importance of bigger funds for creating a larger impact on the ground is obvious, and Turkish NGOs have to adopt project base humanitarian activities, which would also introduce accountability. Accountability is one of the most important problem for Turkish NGOs. They tend to be responsible to their own constituency for their actions, yet we have witnessed several fraud and mismanagement allegations in the field. Turkish NGOs are in a better shape compared to their peers in developed countries in terms of administrative costs. On average, they spend 7 percent or less on administrative operations. However, we think that this phenomenon hugely intersects with the fact that their professional human capital is very limited.

Institutionalism/professionalism is another and well-averred problem among Turkish NGOs carrying out humanitarian aid programs. When we look at institutional design, many of the Turkish NGOs undertaking humanitarian aid missions are Islamic-oriented grassroots organizations established for the purpose of charity and supported by pious people. Therefore, there is an ideological similarity between the ruling AK Party, and Turkish NGOs relying upon Islamic grassroots movements. Even though they are independent, some of the NGOs in Turkey, due to their ideological links with the governing party, are characterized as GONGOs, (government-sponsored non-governmental organizations).[30] As can be seen from figure 11 above, according to our data derived from the interviews, they use little or no public funds, and when we asked why they did not, they underlined their independence. Even though there are similarities in terms of ideology and constituencies between the ruling government and Turkish NGOs, there are substantial differences when it comes to policy implications. This suggests that the majority of Turkish NGOs initiating substantial outcomes in the field of humanitarian aid are aware of the importance of independence as civil society entities.

Besides their lack of financial sustainability, these NGOs are very young. Some of them were established in the 1990s, (like IHH 1992, Deniz Feneri 1992, Yeryüzü Doktorları 2000); the majority were established in the 2000s. In this sense, the majority of Turkish NGOs are relatively very new civil society entities. Therefore, they still lack institutional consolidation and sustainability. In addition, many of the NGOs' workers, even among the highest level of managers, actually have other full-time jobs and do humanitarian aid work on a part-time base. Very few Turkish NGOs have a board of management relying on a professional division of labor. Many lack conventional managerial divisions such as CEO, COO and organizational planning. That constitutes a huge gap in terms of professionalism in the field. However, there are very good examples in terms of professionalism, and there is a fast-adaptation process through socialization and social learning among Turkish NGOs. This is likely to bring more professionalism in the near future.

Developed countries carry out most of their projects, programs and technical cooperation in recipient countries through NGOs. However, the support provided to Turkish NGOs by public institutions and organizations in Turkey remains limited. In addition, except for some exceptional foundations, the understanding of institutional cooperation between NGOs and the public has not yet been achieved. Turkish NGOs have incredible advantages in addressing emergency humanitarian crises. Yet the full potential of NGOs cannot be realized in terms of developmental and humanitarian assistance until they are supported by the public through capacity-increasing trainings.

Contributions to TFP

Foreign aid decisions are not taken in a vacuum. There are a number of factors and actors effecting it. In the Turkish case, state entities such as the Presidency, the current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, himself and related AK Party officials along with the foreign ministry are the most important actors. Under that upper level state body, there are several other state entities functioning at the lower level, such as related bodies from different ministries, TIKA, Diyanet, AFAD, Foreign Trade Directories, and the Turkish General Staff. TIKA functions as the coordination agency between different state entities at different levels. Public discourse and public opinion are also important drivers in making humanitarian aid decisions. Along with the public, non-state actors such as foundations, NGOs, private entities, business associations, and labor unions play an important role. These actors have a variety of different views about the nature and practice of humanitarian aid, including where

to provide, how to provide and what to provide. All of these different views affect each other in an environment where events at the international level continuously unfold. Along with the understanding and practice of other international actors such as states and organizations, crises, wars, and natural and manmade disasters have substantial ramifications for the humanitarian aid decisions taken at the domestic level. From that complex calculus, which is reflected in Figure 12 below, a foreign aid decision is constructed.

Figure 13: Actors effecting Humanitarian Aid policy

The role of non-state actors is recognized in the foreign policy literature.[31] Yet this role is generally characterized as primarily discursive in nature when it comes to humanitarian aid policies.[32] However, we think that at least in three areas, Turkish NGOs carrying out humanitarian aid make practical contributions to TFP.

Branding Turkey, Public Diplomacy, and Soft Power

Even though there is very limited literature on the interaction between nation branding, soft-power, public diplomacy, and foreign aid, they are significantly interconnected.[33] Both official development aid at the state level and development and humanitarian aid at the civil society level have a direct effect on Turkey's image as a regional and humanitarian power. All of the activities of Turkish NGOs are perceived as "Turkey's helping hand" even though they do not officially represent the country. Turkish

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NGOs use badges with Turkish flag along with their logos. In our interviews, we asked interviewees whether they feel that they represent Turkey: all of them without exception said yes. They said, "We provide aid abroad thanks to the donations coming from our nation, and we provide aid on the behalf of this nation and the Turkish people. Everyone knows that it comes from Turkey independent of who we are."[34] Or they said, "Sometimes there were rifts between states, and state bodies could not freely go to places where we can go. But, even in such places, when we work and provide humanitarian aid, no one says thank *you*, everyone says thanks to Turkey. Therefore, we represent Turkey every time we are on the ground."[35]

Turkey has kept its position as being one of the largest aid providing countries, and the largest humanitarian aid providing donor with respect to national income. Especially, the increase in relief aid provided by Turkey (official and private flows) since 2004 is a showcase for Turkey's profile in the realm of humanitarian assistance. Turkey has launched several relief efforts from Syria to Somalia and from Myanmar to Bangladesh and the Philippines. In some instances, Turkey's assistance is purely motivated by humanitarian considerations. Yet, like many other middle powers, Turkey also tries to find a niche diplomacy area[36] in its foreign aid programs by focusing on carefully selected individual countries and regions.[37] Turkey as a middle power willingly makes humanitarian and development aid a niche diplomacy area by branding itself as a humanitarian/virtuous power.[38] Turkish NGOs execute humanitarian aid campaigns that yield public diplomacy outcomes,[39] and those activities support Turkey's soft power in recipient geographies and increase Turkey's nation branding efforts to be known as a "humanitarian power." Turkish NGOs are quite probably one of the biggest contributors to that notion in TFP.

Awareness of Local Factors and Experience towards Geographies

A second important foreign policy contribution by Turkish NGOs is that they bring local knowledge and awareness back to foreign policy practices. NGO volunteers and staff work in very different and very difficult environments, and they bring back awareness of local factors and first-hand experiences from little-known geographies. Foreign missions are generally not able to contact local populations due to security issues, whereas people working for NGOs are always on the ground with locals. Their interaction yields several useful insights. This critical information, if it is allowed to be shared, is very valuable in terms of foreign policy planning and im-

plementation. During our interviews, we heard a number of stories that illustrated such cases. However, when we asked whether they have channels to share their practical experiences with the foreign policy decision makers, the answer was generally "not really" or "partly" through personal relations. Officials at TIKA and AFAD noted that from time to time they gather NGOs in conferences or workshops, or they request reports of their activities to take their views on several issues.

New Alignments and New Tools and Scopes

Breaking with the traditional inward-looking approach, Turkey has expanded its foreign policy ambitions beyond its immediate neighborhood. With a combination of new ideational, political and economic alignments, Turkey has become an important player in regional and global affairs. While Turkey's relations with the U.S., EU and NATO have maintained their traditional importance, Turkey has initiated serious political openings toward the Middle East, the Balkans and Africa, while deepening relations with Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Russia. Especially on the African continent, in the Far East Asia and Latin America, Turkey's efforts at the state and non-state levels can be regarded as South-South cooperation, which is a new horizon for traditional TFP. Turkey's humanitarian aid policy can be read as a new expression of a new foreign policy outlook with numbers of new dynamics, tools and scopes.[40] All of Turkey's missions and capabilities, including state apparatuses from the military to the Turkish Red Crescent, from the Ministry of Economics to TIKA, from Diyanet to Turkish Airlines, along with Turkish civil society are on the ground for the purpose of increasing Turkey's foreign policy influence through development and humanitarian aid. As a rising power, Turkey has been clearly seeking to use foreign aid in its quest to become a regional power by establishing linkages beyond its immediate geography. The cohesion and cooperation in the formation and implementation of foreign policy between different foreign policy actors is a very new phenomenon for traditional TFP that paves the way for Turkey's reorientation with a broader international outlook. NGOs' efforts and coordination contribute greatly to this new outlook. In this sense, Turkish NGOs are an important factor in writing Turkey's new story in recent decades. Although not reflected in the literature, numbers of Turkish NGOs have done spectacular things, primarily in terms of emergency humanitarian assistance, education and health care.

Conclusion

In the foreign aid (both humanitarian and development aid) area, one of the important global trends at least for the last 20 years is that the balance between state and non-state actors has shifted in favor of the latter. Private aid and non-state actors have grown in prominence in the development aid field. Especially, humanitarian aid channeled to and through NGOs has become a truly global trend. Turkey is no exception to these developments. Indeed, when it comes to Turkey, humanitarian aid and NGOs are even more important.

In parallel with Turkey's economic growth and increasing foreign policy ambitions, Turkey's contribution to humanitarian and development aid has significantly increased, which has allowed Turkey to deepen its ties with different countries in different regions. In more than 150 countries from Afghanistan to Haiti, Turkey continues to provide development and humanitarian assistance for the purpose of enhancing its bilateral economic, commercial, technical, social, and cultural relations. Within this context, humanitarian aid has become one of Turkey's most important forms of aid. Turkey has steadfastly addressed various crises, atrocities and natural disasters in countries including Somalia and Syria, and has extended its helping hand to other regions. Turkey's way of implementing and allocating aid reside in the collaborative relationship between the government, official/semi-official institutions and faith-based charities and NGOs. Therefore, Turkish NGOs have become more active and important as humanitarian and development aid has emerged as a significant tool in the TFP tool-box.

This study draws on a broad set of data acquired from semi-structured interviews with people working for Turkish NGOs to analyze their respective motivations, interests, challenges and contribution to TFP. From that comprehensive study, we can assess that conventional assumptions about the role of religion in Turkish NGOs' motivations is not verified. While Turkish NGOs use a rhetorical attachment to Islamic solidarity, Ottoman legacy or Turkish identity, the first and foremost motivation behind their humanitarian aid activities is humanitarianism/altruism. Human capital, institutionalization and professionalism, financial limits, along with security and bureaucratic drawbacks are the common challenges faced by Turkish NGOs. In addition to these challenges, both vertical and horizontal coordination is an important issue slowing down NGOs, which they cannot solve alone without state

assistance. When it comes to contributions to foreign policy practice, we think that at least in three areas, Turkish NGOs carrying out humanitarian aid make a practical contribution to TFP: 1) branding Turkey, public diplomacy, and soft power; 2) awareness of local factors and experience toward geographies; 3) new alignments and new tools and scopes. Their activities in humanitarian assistance have directly and indirectly contributed to TFP in these areas.

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BOOK REVIEW

Russia-EU Relations and the Common Neighborhood: Coercion vs. Authority

By Irina Busygina

Irina Busygina, who currently works in the Department of Applied Politics at National Research University Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, studies comparative politics, regional politics, Russian foreign policy and EU-Russia relations. Her recent book is an exceptional one in terms of both her analysis of forms of power and power relations in global politics. Also, the application of this theoretical analysis to Russia-EU relations in the context of a common neighborhood makes it a novel one. The structure of the book provides an easy-reading framework as the first chapter gives the necessary theoretical background to the readers. Thus, it facilitates an understanding of the next four chapters on the formation and main practices of the EU and Russian foreign policy. The last four chapters distinguish four cases by focusing on the common neighborhood countries as an area of competition between Russia and the EU.

As major powers of international relations, the EU and Russia adopt different modes of behavior in their foreign policies. According to Busygina, both actors are not status quo powers, which means that the ultimate borders of these entities are not clear. However, they differ in the application of their foreign policies. The EU employs the *power of authority* while Russia employs the *power of coercion*. In David Lake's formulation, countries using relational authority construct their relations over three pillars: legitimacy, voluntariness and commitments. On this basis, the subordinate surrenders its freedom to a certain amount in exchange for a political order that is created and maintained by the superordinate. However, countries using coercive authority prefer either to use force or the threat of force, which also includes the use of economic sanctions.

Busygina, unfolding her theoretical framework, proves that using coercion in Russia's foreign policy is quite optimal since state-building and nation-building followed the market reforms of the Yeltsin era. Russia, differing itself as a *sovereign democracy* from other democracies, determined an oppositional stand against the West (the U.S. and the EU). Thus, Russia became the only global defender of conservative values, which embraces service (*sluzhenie*) to higher goals as its main purpose rather than consumption. Although these assumptions of the Russian ruling elite do not correspond to Russian reality, the author states that they were enough to obtain necessary public support for Russia's coercive foreign policy maneuvers in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), Eastern Ukraine (since 2014) and recently in Syria since September 2015.

The EU, as an unconventional power, has a multilateral authority system which necessitates sharing authority across an institutionalized, hierarchically-structured set of actors. Decision-making by consensus gives each member veto power and places constraints on foreign policy. Busygina, in this respect, refers to the EU's structural limitations in taking tangible external action against Russian ambitions in Caucasus, Ukraine and so on. However, the EU prefers relational power in its foreign relations, especially in the case of close neighborhood countries, through mechanisms such as the Black Sea Synergy, the Middle East Process, the Northern Dimension, the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. The existence of Russia as the former leader of the socialist camp worried Eastern European countries and made it easier for the EU to launch authority-type Europeanization. Following the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, the conditionality principle acquired special importance as the Union got closer to Russian borders and target countries felt Russian coercive power within earshot. Moreover, new members joined the Union with the fifth enlargement, implementing intensive pressure within the Union to have special relations with the Eastern neighbors. Thus, the ENP (European Neighborhood Policy) was launched after the 2004 enlargement to export good governance, democratic governance and decentralization to countries in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus, Middle East and North Africa. However, targeting this large geographic area and its many countries made it clear that this move was not for enlargement but rather for a double-edge sword of a prize. Furthermore, Busygina states that the basic rationale behind the EU's concern here was to gain greater security without paying a heavy price after 2004's unprecedented enlargement.

Eventually from March 2014 onwards, EU-Russia relations were based on mutual coercion since Russia annexed Crimea, located in the area of the Common Neighborhood (CN) of both powers. CN, consisting of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, emerged as an area of competition to which both powers needed access in terms of their economic relations and their value in forming a coalition to reach great power status. However, once more the 'desired future' presented by Russia and the EU are incompatible. The EU aims to attract these countries by offering them economic and political cooperation without the 'golden carrot' of membership. Thus, the EU expects instability during the first phase of Europeanization and stability in the aftermath.

On the contrary, Russia expects assurances of 'eternal love' from CN countries and follows a policy of 'managed instability' in case eternal love is not forthcoming. In order to bring a target country in line, Russia's ruling elite can apply many instruments, ranging from providing financial support or imposing trade embargos, to energy supply interruptions, manipulation using pricing policy, leveraging existing energy debts, creating new energy debts, and hostile takeovers of companies.

Busygina, making her work distinct from others, states that authority cannot be a response to coercion, while coercion can be a response to authority, at least in the short run. In fact, she believes that this is a competition between two rival narratives. For her, the EU's relational authority cannot be an answer to Russia's coercive power and this is proven by the annexation of Crimea, changing the rules of the competition radically.

After bringing forward the theoretical framework and the stance of the EU and Russia in their foreign policies, the author devotes the next four chapters to four country cases: Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, and Turkey.

Belarus seems an exceptional case among CN countries as a country free from major crisis with Russia. However, the author maintains that this is not something given, but only an imitation of relational authority. The country is bound by economic, military and energy relations with Russia and the EU has almost no *points of entry* due to Russian influence. Georgia and Ukraine, which are exposed to direct Russian military intervention in their territories and even lost South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea respectively, experienced coercion as their main means of interaction with Russia. The possibility that color revolutions would create a domino effect in CN directed Russia to ap-

ply coercion against the EU's relational power initiatives such as signing the AAs. Especially in the case of Ukraine, for Russia there is no such strategically important country perhaps within the whole post-Soviet space due to energy transfer lines and the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea.

Turkey differs from the other countries in the study. Thanks to its territorial size, key geographic location, and economic and military capabilities, both Russia and the EU are aware of their limits in attempting to establish authority type relations with Turkey. That is why Russia pursues a selective use of coercion, while Turkey defines EU membership as its final goal, although both the EU and Turkish leaders are very well aware of its impracticability. Nevertheless, the unique position of the country between the EU and Russia gives it the chance to play between them.

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John Smith, The Book Title, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100.

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Title of Book Reviews

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