TÜRKİYE ORTADOĞU ÇALIŞMALARI DERGİSİ
Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies

Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi
Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies

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TÜRKİYE ORTADOĞU ÇALIŞMALARI DERGİSİ
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EDİTÖRDEN

Yeni bir sayı ile daha karşınızdayız. Bu sayıda yedi bağımsız makale ve dört kitap tanıtım yazısı bulacaksınız. İ. Aytaç Kadıoğlu'nun kaleme aldığı ilk makale, Suriye İç Savaşı'nı sona erdirmede uluslararası görüşmelerin etkisini ele almaktadır. Bu bağlamda Arap Birliği Barış Planı, Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) barış girişimleri, Cenevre, Viyana ve Astana barış görüşmelerini yakından incelemektedir. Bu detaylı incelemenin sonunda yazar, arabulucuların doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak çatışmalara müdahil aktörler olduklarını ve bu nedenle tarafsız bir siyaset izleyemedikleri sonucuna varmaktadır. Üstelik uluslararası toplum da iç savaşı sona erdirme noktasında ortak bir tavır geliştirememiştir. Dolayısıyla, neredeyse bütün aracılık girişimleri soruna bir çözüm getirememiştir.

İkinci makale Eray Alım tarafından kaleme alınmıştır. Fransız Sosyolog Pierre Bourdieu'nün sembolik güç kavramından yararlanan çalışma, sokak sanatının Filistin kolektif bilincine direniş duygusu aşılamada nasıl etkili bir araç olduğunu göstermektedir. Yazar ayrıca İsrail'in Filistinlilerin yaptığı sokak sanatını engelleme çabalarına da değinmekte ve bunları nasıl güvenlik önemleri ile ele aldığını göstermektedir. Esra Çavuşoğlu'nun kaleme aldığı bir diğer makale ise Katar'ın uluslararası siyasette öncü konumunu ele almaktadır. Yazara göre 1995 ve 2013 arasında hem ekonomik hem de politik düzlemde etkinliğini artıran Katar bu tarihten sonra uluslararası siyasetteki bu gücünü kaybetmeye başlamıştır.

Bu sayıdaki dördüncü makale Türk/Türkmen toplum ve siyasi teşekküllerin Kürt toplulukları ile modern millet ve milliyetçiliğin doğuşuna kadar olan dönemdeki karşılıklı ilişkilerini kimlik temelli bir perspektiften tarihsel olarak incelemektedir. Mustafa Onur Tetik bu incelemesiyle en son Donald Trump'ın gündeme getirdiği "Türkler" ve "Kürtlerin" yüzyıllardır birbirleriyle savaştığı şeklindeki popüler argümanın neden problemli olduğunu kanıtları ile ortaya koymaktadır. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Arap Cephesi'nde görev yapan İttihat ve Terakki Cephesi hükümetinin önde gelen isimlerinin hatıralarını ele alan Can Eyüp Çekiç, son Osmanlıcı düşünceye yakından bakmaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışma, Falih Rıfkı, Cemal Paşa ve Halide Edip'in savaş sonrası anılarında nasıl Osmanlı içindeki Arap ve Türklere ortak bir gelecek tahayyül ettiklerini göstermektedir.

Mısır'da devrim ve karşı devrimi ele alan çalışmasında Ayfer Doğan, 2013 askeri darbesinde dış güçlerin rolünü sorguluyor. Bu bağlamda Doğan, Av-

rupa Birliği, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Körfez monarşilerine yakından bakıyor. Bu incelemenin sonucunda dış aktörlerin Mısır'da demokratik bir geçişe olumlu katkıları olmadığı tespitine varıyor. Ali Bilgenoğlu ve Hikmet Mengüaslan'ın kaleme aldığı son yazı ise tarihsel sosyolojik bir bakışla devrim sonrası Libya örneğinde "demokrasiye geçiş" paradigmasının uygunluğunu sorgulamaktadır.

Bu sayıda Filiz Cicioğlu'nun derlediği Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum – İmkanlar ve Kısıtlılıklar, Ü. Gülsüm Polat'ın kaleme aldığı Türk-Arap İlişkileri: Eski Eyaletler Yeni Komşulara Dönüşürken (1914-1923), Zekeriya Kurşun'un editörlüğünü yaptığı Ortadoğu'yu Kuran İdeolojiler ve son olarak da Hasan Hanefi, Abdulvehab Messiri, Muhammed Abid Cabiri ve Raşid Gannuşi'nin yazılarından oluşan Çağdaş İslam Düşüncesinin Sorunları kitaplarının değerlendirmeleri mevcuttur.

Herkese keyifli okumalar…

EDITOR'S NOTE

We are here again with a new issue. In this issue, you will find seven independent articles and four book reviews. The first article by İ. Aytaç Kadıoğlu addresses the impact of international negotiations in ending the Syrian Civil War. In this context, the Arab League Peace Plan, the United Nations peace initiatives, and the Geneva, Vienna and Astana peace talks are closely examined. At the end of this detailed analysis, the author concludes that mediators are actors involved directly or indirectly in conflicts, and therefore cannot pursue a neutral policy. Moreover, the international community has not developed a common attitude towards ending the civil war. Therefore, almost none of the mediation attempts could achieve a solution for the Syrian civil war.

The second article is written by Eray Alım. Using the symbolic power concept of French Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, the study shows how street art is an effective tool to instill a sense of resistance into the Palestinian collective consciousness. The author also addresses Israel's efforts to block street art by Palestinians and shows how it treats this art with security concerns. Another article written by Esra Çavuşoğlu addresses Qatar's leading position in international politics. According to the author, Qatar, which increased its effectiveness in both economic and political levels between 1995 and 2013, started to lose this power in international politics after this date.

The fourth article in this issue examines the historical relations of the Turkish/Turkmen society and political organizations with Kurdish communities during the times before the birth of modern nation and nationalism from the identity-based perspective. With this analysis, Mustafa Onur Tetik reveals how problematic the popular argument that the "Turks" and "Kurds" have been fighting each other for centuries is. Can Eyüp Çekiç, addresses the memoirs of the leaders of the Union and Progress Party, who served at the Arab Front during the First World War, and takes a close look at the last Ottomanist thought. In this context, the study shows how Falih Rıfkı, Cemal Pasha and Halide Edip imagined a common future for the Arabs and Turks in the Ottoman Empire in their post-war memories.

In her work on the revolution and counterrevolution in Egypt, Ayfer Doğan questions the role of external actors in the 2013 military coup. In this context, Doğan takes a close look at the European Union, the United States and the

Gulf monarchies. At the end of this analysis, she concludes that foreign actors do not have a positive contribution to a democratic transition in Egypt. The last article by Ali Bilgenoğlu and Hikmet Mengüaslan questions the suitability of the "transition to democracy" paradigm in the post-revolution Libya example a historical sociological perspective.

In this issue, readers will also find reviews of the following books: Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum – İmkanlar ve Kısıtlılıklar (Civil Society in the Middle East: Possibilities and Constraints edited by Filiz Cicioğlu), Türk-Arap İlişkileri: Eski Eyaletler Yeni Komşulara Dönüşürken (1914-1923) (Turkish-Arabic Relations: When Old Provinces Transformed into New Neighbours (1914-1923) written by Ü. Gülsüm Polat), Ortadoğu'yu Kuran İdeolojiler (An Alternative Perspective on Analysing the Middle Eastern Politics: Establishing Ideologies for the Middle East edited by Zekeriya Kurşun), and Çağdaş İslam Düşüncesinin Sorunları: Hasan Hanefi, Abdulvehab Messiri, Muhammed Abid Cabiri, Raşid Gannuşi (The Problems of Contemporary Islamic Thought: Hassan Hanafi, Abdel Wahab al- Massiri, Mohammad Abed al-Jabiri, Rached Ghannouchi translated by İslam Özkan).

We wish everyone a pleasant reading…

International Peace Efforts in the Syrian Civil War: The 'Inevitable' Failure?

İ. Aytaç Kadıoğlu*

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to assess international negotiation efforts towards ending the civil war in Syria. Although many peace events have been organised since the beginning of the civil war, the existing literature has paid little attention to the impact of international peace efforts in ending the Syrian war. The article aims to close this gap by assessing major peace efforts between 2011 and 2019; The Arab League Peace Plan, the United Nations peace initiatives, and the Geneva, Vienna and Astana peace talks. It analyses these efforts through official reports and documents published by the UN, US, Republic of Turkey, UN Security Council, and members of peace initiatives. These documents are complemented by newspaper articles showing the official views of the regional and global actors as well as the key agents of the conflict. Therefore, the article reveals the reasons for the failure of these conflict resolution efforts. The Syrian government's reluctance to end the conflict in a non-violent way, the armed groups' dream of territorial gains and regional and global powers' involvement in the conflict prevented the solution of the conflict. It utilises official negotiations and ripeness approaches to investigate the insights and contents of peace efforts. The article argues that the regional and global powers have acted as facilitators instead of mediators in the peace talks. It finds that even though these peace events are viewed as official negotiations, they are only pre-negotiation efforts.

Keywords: Syrian Civil War, Peace Efforts, International Negotiations, Conflict Resolution, United Nations

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Suriye İç Savaşı'nda Uluslararası Barış Görüşmeleri: 'Kaçınılmaz' Başarısızlık Mı?

İ. Aytaç Kadıoğlu[*]

Öz

Bu makalenin amacı, Suriye İç Savaşı'nı sona erdirmede uluslararası görüşmelerin etkisini analiz etmektir. Savaşın başlamasından bugüne çok sayıda barış görüşmesi yapılsa da, mevcut literatürde uluslararası barış görüşmelerinin Suriye savaşını sona erdirmedeki etkisi yeterli düzeyde yer bulmamaktadır. Makale, literatürdeki bu boşluğu 2011-2019 yılları arasındaki temel barış çalışmalarını inceleyerek doldurmayı hedeflemektedir: Arap Birliği Barış Planı, Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) barış girişimleri, Cenevre, Viyana ve Astana barış görüşmeleri. Bu görüşmeler; BM, ABD, Türkiye, BM Güvenlik Konseyi ve barış görüşmeleri sonunda deklare edilen resmi raporlar aracılığıyla analiz edilmektedir. Bölgesel ve uluslararası aktörlerin ve çatışmadaki kilit grupların görüşleri de gazete arşivleri yoluyla incelenmektedir. Bu sayede, çatışma çözümü çalışmalarının başarısız olma nedenleri açığa çıkartılmaktadır. Araştırma, barış çalışmalarını analiz edebilmek için uluslararası görüşmeler ve uygunluk-hazırlık (ripeness) teorik yaklaşımlarından faydalanmaktadır. Makalenin iddiası; bölgesel ve uluslararası güçlerin barış görüşmelerinde tarafsız birer arabulucu yerine yalnızca kolaylaştırıcı görevi gördüğüdür. Makale, şimdiye kadarki barış çalışmaları resmi görüşmeler olarak nitelense de, aslında bu çalışmaların resmi görüşmeleri gerçekleştirebilmek için bir hazırlayıcı, yani ön görüşmeler olduğu sonucuna varmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Suriye İç Savaşı, Barış Çalışmaları, Uluslararası Görüşmeler, Çatışma Çözümü, Birleşmiş Milletler

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1. Introduction

When anti-regime protests began in Arab countries, the concerns of protesters in Middle Eastern and North African countries were similar; authoritarian governments, undemocratic political system, serious human rights issues, income inequality and unemployment. Although these were initially peaceful protests, demonstrations rapidly turned into violent conflicts when they were met with attacks from governments, regime forces, armies and pro-government groups. The peaceful demonstrations in Syria had similar responses by authorities short after its initiation. After protesters called Bashar al-Assad to resign, the torture of arrested students and attacks of security forces on civilians caused the transformation of the unrest to an armed conflict in March 2011.[1] Since then, violence escalated through an initial conflict between moderate opposition groups and the Syrian army, then transformed to a proxy warfare through the use of terrorist groups, rebels and sub-state armed groups, and finally a total war through the direct involvement of regional and global powers. From March 2011 to early 2019, more than 560,000 people were killed, including 230,000 civilians. 5,7 million Syrians left the country and 6,1 million people had to displace internally.[2] Therefore, it is one of the worst humanitarian crises since the end of World War II, which needs to be resolved in a political, non-violent way.

Political efforts to end the Syrian civil war have been initiated shortly after the beginning of the civil war. While the first peace initiative was organised by the Arab League (AL), its failure led to the United Nations (UN) to take action by pushing the Assad regime to a peaceful resolution. Many attempts were organised by states and non-state actors including

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[1]   "Syria: The Story of the Conflict," *BBC*, March 11, 2016, accessed April 22, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868; HRW, "We've Never Seen Such Horror," *Human Rights Watch*, June 1, 2011, accessed April 22, 2017; "With Thousands in Streets, Syria Kills Protesters." *New York Times*, March 26, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/middleeast/26syria.html.

[2]   "Syria Civil War: Fast Facts," *CNN*, October 11, 2019, accessed November 1, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war-fast-facts/index.html; "560,000 Killed in Syria's War According to Updated Death Toll," *Haaretz*, December 10, 2018, accessed January 2, 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/560-000-killed-in-syria-s-war-according-to-updated-death-toll-1.6700244; "Death Tolls," *IamSyria*, accessed September 6, 2019, http://www.iamsyria.org/death-tolls.html.

Russia's peace initiatives between 2012 and 2013, the Group of Friends of the Syrian People formed by France in 2012,[3] the 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement initiated by Iran in 2012, the Riyadh Conference organised by Saudi Arabia in 2015, and efforts initiated by UN envoys Kofi Annan in 2012, Lakhdar Brahimi in 2012, and Staffan de Mistura in 2015.[4] Therefore, peace attempts rapidly became international events through regional and international agents.

Despite various peace attempts in eight years, the existing literature has paid little attention to the influence of peace efforts in ending the civil war. Instead, the literature predominantly focuses on proxy warfare, ethnic and sectarian dimensions of the conflict, refugee issues, and securitisation of the conflict by regional and international powers.[5] The paper asks the following question: What is the influence of international peace efforts towards ending the Syrian civil war? To answer this question, it is crucial to select major peace initiatives. The article utilises international negotiations approach to select peace efforts for the analysis. The existing literature on official negotiations suggests that a negotiation process should bring all conflicting parties together.[6] Following this argument, the article selects peace events which brought conflicting parties, including the Assad regime, to the negotiating table: the AL Peace Plan, the UN peace efforts, Geneva Conferences, Vienna Peace Talks and Astana Talks. In addition to the conflicting parties, these events brought regional and global actors

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[3] "The Second Conference of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People Will Take Place in İstanbul," *MFA*, Ankara: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1.

[4] Magnus Lundgren, "Mediation in Syria: Initiatives, Strategies, and Obstacles, 2011–2016," *Contemporary Security Policy* 37, no.2 (June 2016): 273-288, doi: 10.1080/13523260.2016.1192377.

[5] Ted Galen Carpenter, "Tangled Web: The Syrian Civil War and Its Implications," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 24, no.1 (February 2013): 1-11, doi: 10.1215/10474552-2018988; Alexander De Juan and André Bank, "The Ba'athist Blackout? Selective Goods Provision and Political Violence in the Syrian Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no.1 (January 2015): 91-104, doi: 10.1177/0022343314559437; Reese Erlich, *Inside Syria* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2016): 1-10; Lundgren, "Mediation in Syria," 273-275; İ. Aytaç Kadıoğlu, "Crossing the Border of Life: Is the European Union a Safe Haven for Syrian Refugees? [Yaşamın Sınırını Geçmek: Avrupa Birliği Suriyeli Sığınmacılar İçin Güvenli Bir Liman Mı?]," in *Ortadoğu'da Göç Hareketleri ve Değişen Dinamikler*, eds. Ertan Özensel et al. (Konya: Aybil, 2018), 48.

[6] Daniel Druckman. "Dimensions of International Negotiations: Structures, Processes, and Outcomes," *Group Decision and Negotiation* 6, no.5 (September 1997): 395-420.

together. The article utilises official reports, statements of states and international organisations, and newspaper articles to assess this influence.

The article is structured as follows: The first section discusses international negotiation and ripeness theories to understand how and why conflict resolution efforts in Syria have been failed. The second section explains the background of the Syrian civil war. The third section analyses international peace attempts towards ending the civil war in Syria. The article concludes that political resolution in Syria has depended upon the goals and national interests of regional and global powers which make it very difficult to establish a peace agreement.

2. Theoretical Approaches

For a successful conflict resolution process, peace efforts should embody several different dimensions: not only actors and agents of peace negotiations but also discussions, context and timing of peace negotiations. While the discussions provide an understanding of the insight of the talks, the context reveals under which conditions peace initiatives were achieved and the timing assesses whether the time of these initiatives was right for sustainable peace. The article, therefore, utilises official negotiations and ripeness approaches to understand the root causes of failures of peace efforts.

2.1. Official Negotiations

Official negotiations are formal initiatives, which contain different actors and conditions. The official negotiation literature suggests that these negotiations should include both supporters and opponents of a political resolution, and address political agents' role at the national and global conflict resolution attempts.[7] Further, it is a prerequisite that all conflicting parties should sit at the negotiating table for the success and comprehensiveness of these talks.[8] The Syrian civil war has witnessed

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[7]   Landon E. Hancock, "The Northern Irish Peace Process: From Top to Bottom," *International Studies Review* 10, no.2 (June 2008): 214.

[8]   Richard Jackson, "Successful Negotiation in International Violent Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no.3 (May 2000): 323-343.

several issues with the representativeness of conflicting parties. For example, the Syrian government accused the opposition forces of being terrorists and thus refused to sit at the negotiation table with them. Thus, these assumptions are assessed to comprehend the influence of this condition in the route of international peace efforts.

Furthermore, negotiations have different conditions and classifications in distinctive fields. It is identified as a useful tool for handling disputes, which describes not a single process or one discrete dispute. Instead, it is a foregoing setting of relevant acts including disputants, conditions and decisions.[9] Therefore, it needs a sustainable process to end a violent conflict that pays attention to the demands of all conflicting parties. Fisher and Ury developed a model called 'principled negotiation' focusing on interest and invent choices of conflicting parties for the collective benefit (rather than focusing on people in trouble), and insisted on objective criteria to investigate resolutions.[10] The term 'collective benefit' can have an impact on equality in a decision-making process.

Diplomacy is a crucial dimension of a negotiation process, as it remains the key point of peacemaking action despite the possible change in negotiation efforts from one condition to another. It explains 'track-one' diplomacy that defines problem-solving efforts at the state level through official resolution attempts.[11] Although these diplomatic efforts do not provide an outcome for a political settlement, they can be seen as steps towards the final agreement. According to Fisher, official and informal diplomatic interventions together provide a positive outcome through the complementarity of these conflict resolution efforts.[12] It can add value to negotiations by expanding the agreed points to the grassroots level, which helps reach sustainable peace in some cases, but not in others.[13] This condition provides an understanding of why numerous peace initiatives

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[9]   Ibid.

[10] Roger Fisher and William L. Ury, *Getting to Yes* (London: Business Books, 1996): 14.

[11] Oliver P. Richmond, "Rethinking Conflict Resolution: The Linkage Problematic between 'Track I' and Track II," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 21, no.2, (August 2001): 1-14.

[12] Ronald R. Fisher, "Coordination between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation," *International Negotiation* 11, no.1, (January 2006): 65-89.

[13] Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 no.1, (February 1999): 3-20; Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," *The American Political Science Review* 89, no.3, (September 1995): 681-690.

have not provided a suitable ground for ending violence in Syria for several years.

2.2. Ripeness

There is an idea that certain times are better for beginning negotiations than other times. These certain times embody several different efforts including pre-negotiations, clandestine negotiations, negotiating for a settlement, acquiring endorsement, application and institutionalisation.[14] The framework of ripeness can be used as a predictive tool. However, it is claimed that to demonstrate whether a specific time for negotiation is a ripe moment or not depends on if a conflict has successfully been resolved.[15]

A ripe moment shows a suitable time to reduce tension between the main armed protagonists including states and intractable terrorist groups. This moment has three aspects: a 'hurting stalemate' at which the combatants should feel that the stalemate imposes unacceptable costs to all conflicting parties; the valid interlocutors who could help bring the majority of their followers to establish a peace agreement; and a framework for the route of negotiations to establish an agreement.[16] The ripeness will be assessed through these aspects by analysing whether the Syrian government and opposition groups were ready for a political resolution, the regional and international actors aimed to establish a peace agreement or to control the region, and the frameworks of peace plans were inclusive. Mediators have to explore this moment for resolving conflicts successfully since intervening in a conflict at a non-ripe time may be devastating (e.g. undermining trust or escalating the conflict), as unripe moments cannot be changed to ripe moments by skilful third parties.[17] It means that even though a mediator

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[14]   Adrian Guelke, "Negotiations and Peace Processes," in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, Peace Processes*, eds. John Darby and Roger MacGinty (New York: Macmillan, 2003), 56; Louis Kriesberg, "Timing and the Initiation of De-Escalation Moves," *Negotiation Journal* 3, no.4, (1987): 375-384.

[15]   Eamonn O'Kane, "When Can Conflicts Be Resolved? A Critique of Ripeness," *Civil Wars* 8, no.3-4, (December 2006): 281.

[16]   I. William Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars* (Washington: Brookings, 1995): 1-20.

[17]   Richard Haas, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 139; Landon E. Hancock, "To Act or Wait: A Two-Stage View of Ripeness," *International Studies Perspectives* 2, no.2 (May 2001): 195-205.

is powerful and has an influence on conflicting parties, these conditions may not be sufficient for establishing an agreement as other psychological and motivational factors are also crucial.[18] The moments to intervene in intra-national conflicts are essential for understanding the influence of international negotiations towards ending the Syrian war.

3. The Background of the Syrian Civil War

When the Arab uprisings spread in Syria, the initial protests in early 2011 were against corruption, economic stagnation and oppression of the Syrian government.[19] The peaceful protests turned into violence after the Syrian government tortured and killed numerous protesters in the city of Deraa in March 2011 because the protesters defended the motto of 'the people want the fall of the government'.[20] The Assad administration was accused of ethnic massacres in Telkalakh, Daraya, Damascus and several other cities.[21]

The anti-regime protests escalated into civil war through rebellions against security forces. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was the first insurgency group which was formed by defected Syrian Armed Forces officers in July 2011. The FSA aimed to fight against Syrian security forces for a democratic country, which would only be possible through Assad's removal. After the AL's monitoring mission failed, the war between the Syrian regime forces and opposition groups became more devastating. Then, the UN officially announced that Syria was in a civil war.[22] The rise of Jihadist groups, including al-Nusra front, caused deterioration of the civil war as these groups aimed to control strategic locations, e.g. Taffanoz airbase. Then, the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) Syrian branch the Democratic Union

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[18]   Peter T. Coleman, "Redefining Ripeness: A Social-psychological Perspective," *Peace and Conflict* 3, no.1 (1997): 81-103; Marieke Kleiboer, "Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion," *Journal of Peace Research* 31, no.1 (February 1994): 109-116; Dean G. Pruitt, "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks," *International Negotiation* 2, no.2 (January 1997): 237-250.

[19]   Paul D. Miller, *Getting to Negotiations in Syria: The Shadow of the Future and the Syrian Civil War*, No.PE-126-OSD (California: RAND, 2014).

[20]   De Juan and Bank, "The Ba'athist Blackout," 93.

[21]   Christopher Phillips, "Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria," *Third World Quarterly* 36, no.2, (March 2015): 359-360.

[22]   "UN Envoy Calls for Transitional Government in Syria," *BBC*, June 30, 2012, accessed November 26, 2013, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18650775.

Party/People's Protection Units (PYD/YPG) began to fight against rebel groups, the Syrian army and defected government forces for capturing strategic cities.[23]

The opposition groups declared war on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-ISIL, and by its Arabic acronym DAESH) immediately after its foundation in 2013 which changed the nature of the conflict. Then, the proxy warfare campaign of regional and global powers started. While the US and European countries have officially supported the terrorist group PYD/YPG to fight ISIS, Russia has been backing the Baathist regime. Turkey has supported the FSA and has been against the PYD/YPG since the beginning of the conflict because this group is the Syrian branch of the PKK which killed thousands of civilians and security forces in Turkey.[24] In addition, there have been several fights between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is dominated by the PYD/YPG, FSA and al-Nusra Front in late 2013. This frontline war has continued through the opposition groups to retake Idlib to Azaz towns by March 2014.[25] However, the link between the PYD/YPG and the Syrian government is weak since Kurdish armed groups occupy areas and aim to form an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria.[26]

After the use of armed groups as proxies for a long time, Russia intervened in the war following the official request of Bashar al-Assad's government. The Russian Air Forces organised airstrikes against both ISIS and FSA on September 30, 2015. This made the war more complicated as the US administration began to officially support the YPG. The Obama administration's resupply of the YPG was explained through the US administration's aim to balance Russia's intervention.[27] Together with

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23   İ. Aytaç Kadıoğlu, "Not Our War: Iraq, Iran and Syria's Approaches towards the PKK," *The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development* 9, no.1 (Winter 2019): 44-57.

24   İ. Aytaç Kadıoğlu, "The Oslo Talks: Revealing the Turkish Government's Secret Negotiations with the PKK," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 42, no.10 (2019): 920.

25   Fred H. Lawson, "Syria's Mutating Civil War and Its Impact on Turkey, Iraq and Iran," *International Affairs* 90, no.6 (November 2014): 1355.

26   Hafeez Ulla Khan and Waseem Khan, "Syria: History, The Civil War and Peace Prospects," *Journal of Political Studies* 24, no.2 (December 2017): 564.

27   "U.S. Airstrikes Hit ISIS Targets Inside Syria," *CNN*, September 23, 2014, accessed October 2, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/22/world/meast/u-s-airstrikes-isissyria/ index.html? hpt=hp_t1.

the Iranian support for the Syrian government, Syria, Russia, Iran and Hezbollah formed a very strong coalition against rebel forces.[28]

The Turkish army also directly intervened in the conflict in Jarablus controlled by ISIS, through the operation "Euphrates Shield" as President Erdoğan stated that the operation was against the terrorists 'who threatened our country in northern Syria.'[29] While the PYD/YPG was rapidly controlling the majority of northern Syria, Turkey restricted its aim to push the PYD/YPG in the east of Euphrates River.

Through the organised attacks of the US coalition and Russia, ISIS gradually lost the territories under its control. Then, on December 6, 2017, Vladimir Putin announced that the ISIS was completely defeated.[30] Considering the common goal of the US and Russia on the Syrian civil war was to defeat ISIS, they were expected to leave the country. Seven months later, the Assad government took control of Aleppo, Daraa and Quneitra.[31] Then, in 2019, Turkey operation "Peace Spring" for securing the Turkey-Syria border from terrorist organisations. One week later, Turkey was forced by the US and Russia to stop its operations. After several bilateral meetings, both countries reached an agreement with Turkey on temporary ceasefires and the removal of the PYD/YPG from 440 kilometres of the border. Following the PYD/YPG's thirty kilometres withdrawal from the frontier and move out of the region, Turkish and Russian troops would initiate joint patrolling in the safe zone.[32] Today, the civil war in Syria still maintains even though ISIS has been defeated some time ago. The war

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[28]   "Syria's Army, Allies Plan Offensive against Insurgents in Aleppo," *Reuters*, October 14, 2015, accessed 14, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/10/14/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels-idUKKCN0S71VO20151014.

[29]   "Erdogan Says Syria Operation Aimed at IS Jihadists, Kurdish PYD," *France 24*, August 24, 2016, accessed April 1, 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20160824-erdogan-says-syria-operation-aimed-jihadists-kurdish-pyd.

[30]   "Putin Declares 'Complete Victory' on Both Banks of Euphrates in Syria," *Reuters*, December 6, 2017, accessed January 23, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-syria-putin/putin-declares-complete-victory-on-both-banks-of-euphrates-in-syria-idUSKBN1E027.

[31]   "Rebels in Southern Syria Reach Deal to End Violence," *Al Jazeera*, July 7, 2018, accessed August 20, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/rebels-southern-syria-reach-ceasefire-deal-russia-180706130719825.html.

[32]   "Rusya ile Suriye Mutabakatı," *CNN Türk*, October 22, 2019, accessed October 23, 2019, https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/rusya-ile-suriye-mutabakati-iste-10-maddelik-anlasma.

between the Assad forces and opposition groups continues for the sake of controlling several towns in northern Syria.

4. Peace Negotiations

Peace efforts have been initiated by the regional and global actors since the beginning of the conflict. Five peace initiatives are significant since they brought conflicting parties or their representatives together and recommended conditions to build peace. The AL produced a plan to stop violence and stabilise the country. The UN Plans were initiated by Special Envoys for Syria after the escalation of the conflict. The Geneva, Vienna and Astana talks brought high representatives of the states in the region and great powers together and aimed to force the Syrian government and opposition groups to establish a negotiated settlement through diplomacy. This section analyses the influence of these efforts towards ending the civil war.

4.1. The Arab League Plan

The AL's peace attempt was the first initiative to end the civil war which consisted of two attempts. The first attempt was initiated on November 2, 2011. The AL was successful in bringing the Assad regime and the Syrian National Council (SNC), the representative of the rebel groups, together at the negotiating table. After a series of meetings, the Syrian government agreed to the AL Peace Plan. The plan had five major points: The Syrian army accepted to halt its operations and violence against protesters, the access of the AL and international media channels in Syria was granted, the government agreed to release prisoners who have recently been detained, both sides of the conflict decided to start a dialogue in two weeks, and the government accepted to withdraw military equipment, heavy weapons and tanks from the cities.[33]

Despite the agreement, the opposition groups had concerns about Syria's implementation of the agreed plan. Samir Nashar, who headed the

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[33]   "UN Envoy Calls for Transitional Government in Syria." *BBC,* June 30, 2012, accessed November 26, 2013. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18650775.

opposition group's negotiations with the AL, confirmed this scepticism by saying that they informed the AL's Secretary-General of their concerns implying the Assad government's insufficient credibility to accomplish the agreed points, which had become evident through the recent attacks of Homs.[34]

While the Syrian government accepted the plan on October 30, 2011, it did not trust the mediation of AL Secretary-General al-Arabi by claiming that the initiative was used as Saudi Arabia's and Qatar's proxy effort.[35] The Arab-brokered peace deal was broken by the Syrian government just with four days as the Syrian army killed twenty-three demonstrators. Then the AL suspended Syria's membership on November 12, 2011. Qatar's Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim announced that further political and economic sanctions would be introduced if violence persisted. He also told that they had hope for a confident action to end the war and start an open communication channel for a peaceful resolution.[36]

After the first deal was broken, the AL organised another peace talk in December 2011. These meetings also hosted both the Syrian government and representatives of Syrian opposition parties and resulted in a deal on a few aspects: The Syrian government and opposition forces guaranteed the withdrawal of their forces from the streets and started a peace process between the two sides. In addition, the Syrian government accepted that peaceful protesters would be released, and the AL would send a monitoring group to Syria.[37] This meant that after a one-and-a-half month later, almost the same deal was applied again. Arguably, it could be said that the outcome of the new talk was 'duplication' of the first AL Plan. Besides, the lack of development demonstrated that the Syrian government was reluctant to end violence.

The Monitoring Mission Group (MMG) operated between December 24, 2011, and January 18, 2012. The observers of the MMG were divided into fifteen zones who observed the situation in twenty different cities. The

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34 "Syria 'Violence Defies Peace Deal'," *Al Jazeera*, November 4, 2011, accessed December 4, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/11/201111381935847935.html.

35 Lundgren, "Mediation in Syria," 275.

36 "Arab League to Suspend Syria from Meetings," *Fox News*, November 12, 2011, accessed April 16, 2019, https://www.foxnews.com/world/arab-league-to-suspend-syria-from-meetings.

37 Müjge Küçükkeleş, "Arab League's Syrian Policy," *SETA Policy Brief*, No: 56, (2012): 11.

MMG detected various human rights violations. The report of the MMG proves these violations:

> *In Homs, Idlib and Hama, the Observer Mission witnessed acts of violence being committed against Government forces and civilians that resulted in several deaths and injuries. Examples of those acts include the bombing of a civilian bus, killing eight persons and injuring others, including women and children, and the bombing of a train carrying diesel oil. In another incident in Homs, a police bus was blown up, killing two police officers. A fuel pipeline and some small bridges were also bombed.[38]*

The report also illustrated that the MMG was unsuccessful due to insufficient equipment, the Syrian government's attempts to limit the group's ability to travel and the conflict of ideas among member states with regards to its mission.[39] Thus, the AL peace plans did not end violence and Saudi Arabia withdrew its members of the monitoring committee from Syria and called Russia, China and the regional powers to push the Assad administration for respecting the AL plan. As a result of the lack of success, the AL ended its monitoring mission on January 28, 2012. Hence, the first peacemaking attempt failed without any improvement.

4.2. The UN Plans

The UN organised several peace events to end the civil war in Syria. These events were set up by UN Special Envoys for Syria. Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi organised peace meetings and developed plans on behalf of the UN. The first attempt was initiated by Kofi Annan. The negotiations were organised through the UN Security Council (UNSC) in January and February 2012. The permanent members of the UNSC voted a draft resolution plan to stop the war in Syria. While the US, UK and France aimed to apply the AL plan, Russia and China were against to put pressure on the Syrian government. As a result, Russia and China vetoed the resolution plan and the conflict escalated.[40] The important thing about Annan's mediation was that he talked to the Assad regime and opposition

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[38]   "Report of the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria for the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012," *Arab League*, Report No: 259.12D (2012).

[39]   "Report of the Head of the League," *Arab League*, 6-7.

[40]   Lundgren, "Mediation in Syria," 275-276.

groups to establish long-standing peace. He also met regional actors, namely Turkey, Egypt and Qatar to create a coalition on how to end the conflict. He also met with Assad in Damascus in 2012. In the end, he proposed a six-point plan:

> Commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process; commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations-supervised cessation of armed violence; ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting; intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons; ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists, and; respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully.[41]

After long discussions, a ceasefire was declared in April 2012. The UN sent 300 soldiers to guarantee to proceed with the ceasefire. Nevertheless, both the Assad regime and opposition groups reignited violence and the UN monitoring mission ended in June 2012.[42] Annan's six-point plan was not implemented due to several reasons: the Syrian government refused to implement the plan, the UNSC did not have a consensus, and both the Syrian army and rebel groups escalated the war. Because of the failure of the plan, Annan resigned on August 2, 2012.

After Annan's withdrawal, the UN appointed Lakhdar Brahimi as chief UN mediator, who is a senior Algerian diplomat with experience in Afghanistan, Lebanon and several other conflicts. In line with Annan, Brahimi acted as a mediator between the Syrian government and rebel groups. He worked for a ceasefire in Syria during Eid al-Adha, a major religious celebration for Muslims. Despite Brahimi's great efforts and agreement of the conflicting sides, the deal on ceasefire did not work as both sides blamed each other for the continued violence.[43] He stated that forming a foreign circle was necessary for initiating peace efforts:

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[41] "Text of Annan's Six-Point Peace Plan for Syria," *Reuters*, April 4, 2012, accessed January 1, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-ceasefire/text-of-annans-six-point-peace-plan-for-syria-idUSBRE8330HJ20120404.

[42] UNSCR, *Resolution 2042: Adopted by the Security Council at its 6751st meeting, on 14 April 2012*, S/RES/2042 (2012); UNSCR, *Resolution 2043: Adopted by the Security Council at its 6756th meeting, on 21 April 2012*, S/RES/2043 (2012).

[43] Lakhdar Brahimi, "Syria, A Civil, Sectarian and Proxy War," *Elders*, August 22, 2012, accessed May 8, 2018, https://theelders.org/news/syria-civil-sectarian-and-proxy-war.

> *Only what I call "the outer circle" could perhaps offer the opening needed to start something constructive. The Secretary-General and Kofi (Annan) were very much aware of that even before I arrived on the scene. At the centre of that outer circle is naturally the Security Council. At the centre of the Council is the P5 Group of Permanent Members and the work I initiated with Russia and the United States aimed at promoting unity among Council members, a crucial factor that has so far eluded us.[44]*

He applied a more consultative approach and tried to convince parties against destructive results of conflicting parties. He, therefore, underlined that it was a ripe moment for resolution to all conflicting parties.[45] However, his reconciliation attempts did not avail.

4.3. The Geneva Conferences

The Geneva Conferences are a series of meetings between the Syrian government, opposition parties and several regional and global actors. The conferences were organised between 2012 and 2017, and consisted of four series of events.

The first Geneva Conference was initiated by Kofi Annan on June 20, 2012. The conference hosted the US, UK, Russia, China, Turkey, France, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and EU representatives.[46] Particularly, the attendance of influential people, namely, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, British Foreign Secretary Hague, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, a representative of China, and Annan demonstrated the importance of the meeting. At the end of the conference, Annan announced that the participants agreed on the requirement of a transitional government body which would have strong executive powers and include people from both the Syrian regime and the opposition.[47]

> *Any political settlement must deliver to the people of Syria a transition that offers a perspective for the future that can be shared by all in Syria; establishes clear steps according to a firm timetable towards the realisation of that perspective; can be implemented in a climate of safety*

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44   Brahimi, "Syria, A Civil, Sectarian and Proxy War,".

45   Pruitt, "Ripeness Theory," 240-247.

46   Action Group for Syria, *Final Communique, Arab League*, June 30, 2012.

47   "UN envoy calls for transitional government," *BBC*.

> *for all, stability and calm; is reached rapidly without further bloodshed*
> *and violence and is credible.[48]*

However, these principles did not bring the civil war to an end. Instead of a political transition, the level of violence rapidly increased and a political resolution became more difficult. Two years later, the second Geneva Conference was held on January 22-31, 2014. This time, the conference was initiated by Annan's successor Lakhdar Brahimi. Unlike the UN peace plans, this event was dominated by global powers. The main goal of the conference was to bring the Syrian government and opposition parties together to discuss the implementation of the Final Communique, therefore to discuss conditions for a transitional government.

In terms of the insight of the conference, it started with the question of Assad's future. US Secretary of State John Kerry insisted on the first day of the conference that Assad should not be involved in transitional governments: "There is no way, no way possible, that a man who has led a brutal response to his own people can regain the legitimacy to govern."[49] The conference did not bring an outcome with regards to conditions or perspectives of peace. Brahimi said at the conference:

> *It is not good for Syria that we come back for another round and fall in*
> *the same trap that we have been struggling with this week and most of the*
> *first round. So I think it is better that every side goes back and reflect and*
> *take their responsibility: Do they want this process to take place or not?*
> *I will do the same.[50]*

The second Geneva Conference was unsuccessful also because the Syrian government and opposition groups blamed each other. On the one hand, the government added all opposition forces and even civilians, who were at the negotiating table in Geneva, to the list of terrorist groups. On the other hand, opposition groups blamed the government for reluctance for a transitional government.[51]

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[48]   Ibid.

[49]   "Factbox - What They Said on Syria at Montreux," *Reuters*, January 22, 2014, accessed June 4, 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-syria-crisis-talks-quotes/factbox-what-they-said-on-syria-at-montreux-idUKBREA0L1JI20140122.

[50]   Anne Barnard and Nick Cumming-Bruce, "After Second Round of Syria Talks, No Agreement Even on How to Negotiate," *New York Times*, February 16, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/world/middleeast/after-second-round-of-syria-talks-no-agreement-even-on-how-to-negotiate.html.

[51]   Anne Barnard and Nick Cumming-Bruce, "After Second Round of Syria Talks,".

The third Geneva Conference was organised in January 2016. Again, the UN organised this conference between the Syrian government and opposition forces. However, the beginning of the conference witnessed a room crisis as the Syrian government and opposition groups did not want to sit in the same room. Short after its initiation, the UN envoy Staffan de Mistura announced that he suspended the negotiations with no outcome.[52] Both sides blamed each other at the end of the conference. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov blamed the opposition: "The opposition took a completely unconstructive position and tried to put forward preconditions."[53] In contrast, commanders of opposition forces stated that they had hope for peace. Nevertheless, the failure of the negotiations would convince their international supporters "including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, that it was time to send them more powerful and advanced weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles."[54]

The fourth series of Geneva Talks was organised between February 23 and March 13, 2017. The conference was again organised under the supervision of the UN and between the Syrian government and opposition. While the Assad administration was represented by Syria's UN ambassador, Bashar Jaafari, the opposition forces were represented by the High Negotiation Committee. The talks ended with no concrete outcome due to different expectations. Whilst the opposition forces aimed to reach a political transition, the Syrian government prioritised the counter-terrorism issue in the country. The fourth Geneva Conference did not bring any contribution to peace. It only set an agenda for peace and helped form the foundations of the Astana talks.

4.4. The Vienna Peace Talks

The Vienna Process was another main peace attempt which was initiated on October 23, 2015 and consisted of two rounds of meetings. This was one of

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[52] "Syria Conflict: Ceasefire Agreed, Backed by Russia and Turkey," *BBC World News,* December 29, 2016, accessed December 29, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38460127.

[53] "Syria Crisis Plan: Cessation of Hostilities, Humanitarian Airdrops, Peace Talks Laid Out in Munich," *Russia Today*, February 12, 2016, accessed February 19, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/332211-munich-lavrov-kerry-un-syria.

[54] "Backed by Russian Jets Syrian Army Closes in on Aleppo," *Huffington Post*, February 4, 2016, accessed February 24, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/backed-by-russian-jets-syrian-army-closes-in-on-aleppo_us_56b37778e4b08069c7a63e09.

the biggest peace talks through the participation of the Foreign Ministers of the US, Turkey, Russia and Saudi Arabia. The diplomatic efforts of these members, called the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), helped discuss the future of Syria. The first round of the peace talks hosted twenty countries including the US, UK, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, China, France, Italy and Germany. At the end of the conference, these countries called the Assad regime and opposition groups to start negotiations immediately. The second series of the peace talks were organised in mid-November. The conference organisers declared that the Syrian government and opposition groups should immediately start political talks which will be held under the supervision of the UN starting possibly on January 1, 2016.[55]

After the meeting of anti-government groups including Ahrar al-Sham in Saudi Arabia on December 10, 2015, the groups delivered a declaration about the principles of peace talks with the Assad administration. Assad replied that he would not negotiate with 'foreign terrorists' which caused the failure of the Vienna Talks.[56]

The UNSC unanimously passed the Resolution 2254 endorsing the ISSG's plan for a transitional body, which sets a timetable for official negotiations for a unity government in six months. The UNSC put forward the demands for the route of peacemaking in Syria:

> *Demands that all parties immediately cease any attacks against civilians and civilian objects as such, including attacks against medical facilities and personnel, and any indiscriminate use of weapons, including through shelling and aerial bombardment, welcomes the commitment by the ISSG to press the parties in this regard, and further demands that all parties immediately comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable.[57]*

This resolution demonstrated that the UNSC aimed first to achieve a ceasefire and reduce the level of violence, then to organise multilateral negotiations to establish the post-conflict political environment in Syria. However, it

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[55] "UN Chief Takes Aim at Russia over Syria Military Build-Up," *Middle East Eye*, July 11, 2017, accessed July 30, 2015, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/un-chief-takes-aim-russia-over-syria-military-buildup.

[56] "Syria Conflict: Powers Backing Rivals Meet in Vienna," *BBC World Service*, October 30, 2015, accessed November 1, 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p035yyfl.

[57] UNSCR, *Resolution 2254: Adopted by the Security Council at its 7588th meeting, on 18 December 2015*, S/RES/2254 (2015); italics in original.

did not end the conflict between the warring parties as opposition groups could not agree on who would represent the Syrian opposition.

Furthermore, Obama said that the Vienna Talks were not able to "foresee a situation in which we can end the civil war in Syria while Assad remains in power".[58] This was a signal calling Russia and Iran to stop their support for Assad. One day later, the UN Security Council met to discuss a humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, Chapter 7, which was enabling specific legal authorisation in order to use UN force to stop the war in Syria, failed to be taken in action.[59]

4.5. The Astana Talks

While the second Geneva Conference was not successful in establishing the conditions of peace, opposition forces in Syria organised another peace conference in 2015. The Astana talks consisted of a preliminary meeting and nine rounds of negotiations. The preliminary meeting formed the foundations of the negotiations. The meeting brought together several opposition groups of Syria on May 25-27, 2015 in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Syrian government refused to attend the conference. The conference series continued on October 2-4 with the participation of opposition groups. At the conference, participants agreed to call a general election in 2016 under the control of the international society. The opposition groups asked the host of the conference, President Nursultan Nazarbayev, to act as a mediator in the Syrian civil war.[60]

The first Astana talk was suggested by the Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdoğan. This time, it was not an opposition conference but a coalition meeting between the foreign ministers of Turkey, Russia and Iran on December 20, 2016. Eight days after the beginning of the

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[58] Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada after Bilateral Meeting," *The U.S. White House*, November 19, 2015, accessed November 20, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofice/2015/11/19/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-trudeau-canada-after.

[59] UNSCR, *Resolution 2254.*

[60] "Syrian Opposition Meeting in Astana Makes Tentative Headway in Finding Way forward for Peace Process," *Astana Times*, May 29, 2015, accessed February 8, 2019, https://astanatimes.com/2015/05/syrian-opposition-meeting-in-astana-makes-tentative-headway-in-finding-way-forward-for-peace-process.

conference, Turkey and Russia agreed on a ceasefire in whole Syria as of December 30, 2016. As Turkey objected, the Syrian Democratic Council which represented the Syrian Democratic Forces dominated by the YPG was not invited to the peace initiatives. Likewise, ISIS, al-Nusra Front and the YPG were excluded from the ceasefire agreement. The conference was named the "International Meeting on Syrian Settlement." While the Syrian government was represented by Bashar Jaafari, the opposition groups were represented by the High Negotiations Committee (HNC) which was formed by moderate groups in Syria. The conference was defined as the 'Astana-isation' of the Geneva Talks by Hassan Hassan due to a shift toward the Syrian opposition conducting army operations and away from Syrians with solely political impact. The talks again started on January 23-24 aiming at supporting the UNSC Resolution 2254.[61]

Russia's suggestion was significant in terms of the discussions at the conference, as Russian officials offered a draft paper for the future of Syria, changing from the Syrian Arab Republic to the Republic of Syria. This offer included decentralising authorities and the legislative of federalism, which would strengthen the Parliament as opposed to the presidency and adopts secularism by abolishing Islamic law. The conference ended with an agreement between Turkey, Russia and Iran on setting a monitoring commission to enforce this resolution ceasefire.[62] It was a ripe moment for establishing the foundations of an agreement because the civil war claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and both the Syrian government and opposition forces believed that they were unable to eliminate their enemies through armed struggle. Turkey's and Iran's pressure as regional powers and Russia's role as the representative of the Syrian government increased the reliability of these talks.

The next two rounds aimed to establish confidence-building measures for opposition forces. The document, to set the conditions of joint operational group of Turkey, Russia and Iran, was checked during the two-day meeting.[63] The fourth round brought about a clear outcome. The talks between Iran,

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[61] UNSCR, *Resolution 2254.*

[62] "Sponsors of Syria Talks in Astana Strike Deal to Protect Fragile Ceasefire," *Guardian*, January 24, 2017, accessed January 25, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/24/syria-talks-astana-russia-turkey-iran-ceasefire.

[63] "Latest Syrian Peace Talks in Astana Focus on Humanitarian Issues," Astana Times, November 2, 2017, accessed April 8, 2018, https://astanatimes.com/2017/11/latest-syrian-peace-talks-in-astana-focus-on-humanitarian-issues.

Russia and Turkey led to an agreement to establish four de-escalation zones, consisting of Idlib and rebel-controlled Ghouta, Homs and the Syrian-Jordan border. The operations were agreed to be stopped as of May 6, 2017, which would enable humanitarian aid and the return of civilians to their hometowns.[64] This round, therefore, aimed to achieve prospects for peace at least by establishing a safe zone for civilians. The fifth round of the Astana talks was organised on July 12-15, 2017. Again, the talks were supported by UN Special Envoy de Mistura who argued that this initiative facilitated the reduction of violence.[65] As several groups boycotted the conference, such as the Southern Front and Quneitra Offensive, the only minor ceasefire was declared at the end of the conference.

The following attempt hosted Russia, Turkey and Iran, at which northern governorate of Idlib was also declared a de-escalation zone.[66] The seventh round of the talks addressed the exchange of detainees to reduce the level of tension. The three guarantor states repeated a political solution under the UNSC Resolution 2254.[67] The eighth round of the talks focused on the humanitarian crisis in Eastern Ghouta of Damascus. The conflict in Eastern Ghouta was aimed to be resolved through political efforts at the next resolution initiative. The ninth talks were organised on March 16, 2018, but did not bring an outcome for resolution of the conflict.[68]

5. The 'Inevitable' Failure?

The war in Syria is one of the most devastating conflicts of our time. International negotiation and mediation attempts were organised by the

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[64] "Russia, Turkey and Iran Continue Cooperation on De-escalation Zones in Syria," TASS, June 23, 2017, accessed August 30, 2017, http://tass.com/world/953004.

[65] "Note to Correspondents: Transcript of the Press Conference by the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Stafan de Mistura," *The United Nations,* July 5, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2017-07-05/note-correspondents-transcript-press-conference-un-special.

[66] "6th Astana Process Talks Produce De-escalation Zone Agreement," *Astana Calling*, September 27, 2017, accessed November 11, 2017, https://www.astanacalling.com/6th-astana-process-talks-produce-de-escalation-zone-agreement.

[67] "Latest Syrian Peace Talks," *Astana Times*.

[68] "Ninth Round of Astana-Hosted Syria Talks to Take Place after Syria Truce Guarantor Countries, FMs in Astana – Kazakh Foreign Ministry," *Interfax*, February 13, 2018, accessed March 3, 2018, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?pg=5&id=810002.

UN, UNSC, and regional and global powers of the world. Each peace initiative had different characteristics with regards to actors, demands, insights and outcomes towards ending the civil war in Syria.

In terms of actors, all major peace attempts had different characteristics. While the AL peace plan was a regional effort, the Geneva, Vienna and Astana talks were international peace conferences. The international negotiations literature suggests that a peacemaking effort can only be successful if all conflicting parties sit at the negotiation table.[69] Although each attempt witnessed the Syrian government's claim that they did not negotiate with terrorists, opposition groups were represented at these talks. However, the AL's peace plan was criticised due to Saudi Arabia's attendance at the peace talks because it was viewed as the rival of Syria in the Middle East.

Furthermore, the Geneva conferences and the Vienna peace talks hosted more countries than any other event. Both efforts hosted supporters (Russia and China) and opponents (US, UK, Turkey and other western countries) of the Assad administration, which increased in the possibility of their success. The interest of the international society in the civil war was an important facilitator for hosting disputing sides at the peace talks, but these events were not multilateral negotiations. However, the Astana talks involved only Russia, Turkey, Iran, as well as the Syrian government and opposition groups. It can be said that the influence of peace efforts did not directly depend on actors who participated in these events since the Astana talks did not host western countries.

In terms of the demands for peace, the first aim of all events was to bring violence to an end. The other demands of these events were differing: First, the AL's peace plan suggested establishing a mission group to monitor the situation in Syria. Second, the Geneva conferences aimed to establish a transitional government body and enforce this change to the Syrian government. Third, the Vienna peace talks aimed to persuade the Syrian government and opposition groups for a negotiated settlement. Last, the Astana talks had an objective to close the gap between the Assad regime and rebel groups and create safe zones for civilians. Furthermore, the balance of power in the Middle East also affected the demands of global

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69   Hancock, "The Northern Irish peace process," 214.

powers. On the one hand, Putin's goal was to keep Assad in power as Russia believed that Syria should have been politically under the control of Russia. On the other hand, the western countries insisted on Assad's removal for sustainable peace in Syria. These power balances were witnessed in almost all peace initiatives despite the participation of Western countries (the US, UK, France and Turkey) and Eastern countries (Russia and Iran) in many peace attempts. It can be said that these power relations are reasons for the inevitable failure of these peace events.

In terms of the insights and outcomes, the AL peace plan was organised before the start of the proxy warfare campaign when the level of violence was relatively low. However, there was a trust issue on the Assad government's side. As Assad thought that the monitoring group was a proxy initiative of Saudi Arabia, he did not support the activities of the group. This led to the failure of the monitoring mission's goal to maintain the ceasefire in several different towns. Particularly, the lack of trust between Assad and the monitoring group prevented a successful outcome. The reason for the trust issue was the Assad regime's accusation that the monitoring group acted as a proxy for Saudi Arabia and thus was not neutral. The Geneva conferences again were used to force Assad to resign and discuss the post-conflict system for Syria rather than to establish a suitable environment for multilateral negotiations. Particularly, the first two conferences envisaged a transitional government but the negotiations ended with no result. The other two conferences witnessed discussions on different demands. While the opposition forces aimed to achieve a political transition, the Syrian government focused on counter-terrorism in the country. The difference between the goals of parties prevented progress.

The insight of the Vienna peace talks clearly demonstrated that they were not official negotiations. Instead, they were organised as pre-negotiation attempts of official negotiations between the Assad administration and opposition. The Vienna talks were a facilitator for initiating negotiations between the Assad regime and opposition forces. The talks provided a suitable environment for discussion and close the gap between conflicting parties for building peace. Therefore, at the end of each conference, the leaders of twenty states called on both sides to come to the negotiation table. It could be concluded that all countries attending these talks aimed to act as mediators. The third-party consultation, however, is only possible

through the consent of conflicting sides. The legitimacy and representation of the participants in the talks were in question since the beginning of the conflict that resulted in the failure of this event.

The Astana talks were more successful as four de-escalation zones were declared for civilians during the conference.[70] However, the Syrian government was still refusing to negotiate with its enemies. When the level of violence rapidly increased and both sides lost numerous militants, these moments were not viewed as ripe moments for resolution by both sides. The Syrian government did not have the intention to resolve the conflict in a non-violent way which was another reason for the inevitable failure of the peace attempts. While the government declared that opposition groups were either national or foreign terrorists, opposition forces aimed to make sure the ending of the Assad regime and re-establishing Syria. Later, talks at Astana hosted Iranian, Russian and Turkish presidents which strengthened the reliability of the talks as three important powers of the region aimed to resolve the conflict. The outcome of these talks is arguably related to their timing. After several years of the high-intensity conflict, all conflicting parties started to think that the conflict could only be ended through political efforts.

Considering the actors, demands of parties, insights and outcomes of the civil war, the article has found that despite acting as mediators, none of the countries who organised or attended peace talks were mediators. Instead, they acted as facilitators to bring conflicting parties together. The only mediation activities were organised by UN Special Envoys Annan and de Mistura. Although they did not bring about an outcome for the resolution of the conflict, they helped de-escalate the conflict temporarily through short-term ceasefires. While the conflict rapidly deteriorated through the deadly attacks of ISIS, YPG and other groups as well as the Syrian regime, the reluctance of regional and global powers to fully cooperate prevented political resolution.

6. Conclusion

The article has argued that the peace efforts in Syria have begun shortly after the start of the civil war. It has revealed that these talks were only pre-

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[70]   "Russia, Turkey and Iran," *TASS*.

negotiation attempts, but not official negotiations. A negotiation process should not only bring the conflicting parties together, but should also provide them with a suitable environment to discuss their demands and requirements. None of these events provided this environment. Instead, the states, some of which were neither geographically nor politically bounded by the conflict, forced warring parties to a political resolution whose conditions were not discussed or determined by conflicting parties.

The article has found that it has been very difficult for regional and global powers to be neutral mediators as they are either directly or indirectly involved in the civil war. The neutrality of these countries has always been in question. Even though political resolution attempts were initiated by western or eastern countries, their reluctance to put pressure on the Syrian government prevented a political solution. While there was a consensus between the western countries that Assad must leave, the eastern countries aimed to keep Assad in charge which would secure their control in the region. The proxy warfare in Syria also prevented a peace agreement as each state supported different sub-state armed groups through financial, medical and military support as well as training. Most international peace talks witnessed these developments, but international society lacked cooperation to stop violence in Syria.

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The Art of Resistance in the Palestinian Struggle Against Israel

Eray Alım[*]

Abstract

This manuscript aims to assess Palestinian street art's effectiveness as a resistance tool and political instrument in the struggle waged against Israel. It concludes by employing Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power that Palestinian street art is an effective instrument on account of its ability to instill in Palestinian collective consciousness as a sense of resistance. By utilizing Mouffe's definition of politics as being a constant struggle between hegemonic and counter hegemonic forces, this work also holds that street art serves Palestinians as a means to reaffirm their political existence and develop an alternative political imagination against the Israeli-imposed reality. This manuscript also broaches the oft-discussed issue of visual diversity in Palestinian street art scene and concludes that eclectic content may serve as a contributive force, if the counter hegemonic character of Palestinian street art is adhered to.

Keywords: Street Art, Palestine, Israel, Resistance, Politics

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İsrail'e Dönük Filistin Mücadelesinde Direniş Sanatı

Eray Alım[*]

Öz

Bu makale İsrail'e karşı yürütülen mücadelede Filistin sokak sanatının bir direniş unsuru ve siyasi enstrüman olarak etkisini değerlendirmektedir. Bourdieu'nün sembolik güç kavramından yararlanılarak, sokak sanatının Filistin kolektif bilincine direniş duygusu aşılamada etkili bir araç olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Ayrıca Mouffe'un, siyaseti, hegemonik ve karşı hegemonik güçler arasında bir mücadele olarak tanımlamasından hareketle, sokak sanatının Filistinlilere siyasi olarak var olduklarını yineleme ve İsrail'in empoze ettiği gerçekliğe karşı alternatif bir politik tahayyül ortaya koymada etkin bir enstrüman olarak hizmet ettiği belirtilmektedir. Bu makalede sıklıkla tartışılan bir konu olan görsel çeşitlilik mevzusu da ele alınmakta ve eklektik içeriğin, Filistin sanatının karşı-hegemonik karakterine uyumlu olduğu sürece katkı sağlayabileceği savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sokak Sanatı, Filistin, İsrail, Direniş, Politika

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1. Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the longest protracted conflicts in the world. It rests on a dispute arising from competing claims by two nations over the same piece of land. The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine in 1947 and Israel's declaration of independence in following year set the stage for the beginning of a serious territorial dispute. This dispute also set Israel on a collision course with its Arab neighbours, thus generating broader geopolitical consequences. Although the Arab-Israeli conflict has significantly subsided mostly due to Israel's signing of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the Israeli-Palestinian problem continues, with Palestinians having to endure Israel's occupation of the West Bank and blockade of the Gaza Strip. The unresolved territorial problem provides a breeding ground for clashes and skirmishes between the two sides, indicating the unsustainability of the Israeli-imposed status quo. Nevertheless, Israel has been persistent in maintaining it, which is most evident in its annexation policy in the West Bank, which undermines the prospect for a two-state solution.[1]

Despite facing considerable difficulties in the face of a more powerful opponent, Palestinians have shown a remarkable degree of resilience in their determination to subvert the Israeli-imposed order and restore their sovereignty. Over the course of years, they have employed various means of resistance and methods of struggle in the pursuit of claiming their inherent rights on the historic Palestinian land. These included armed resistance, civil disobedience and attempts to internationally isolate Israel. During their struggle, Palestinians have come to acknowledge the importance of

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[1] Numerous officials and experts have expressed this concern including U.S policymakers. See, for example: Nathan Thrall, *The Only Language They Understand: Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2017, Kindle Edition), 3047-3071. U.S leaders also occasionally called for the necessity of the creation of "a viable Palestinian state". Husam Mohamad, "President George W. Bush's Legacy on the Israeli-Palestinian "Peace Process"", *Journal of International and Area Studies* 22, no. 1 (2015): 83. Cognizant of the fragile status quo, U.S policymakers such as those served in the George H. W. Bush administration engaged in "evenhanded" diplomatic initiatives to help realize a sovereign Palestinian state. Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (Updated and Expanded)* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Kindle Edition, 2014), 771. The reason for highlighting these points is to emphasize that, being Israel's staunchest allies, U.S policymakers are aware of the necessity of Palestinians having their own sovereign state, which is a telling indictor of the unsustainability of the status quo.

creating and spreading awareness about life under occupation, and this has required representing their grievances in a way that both local and international actors get a clear understanding of their circumstances. To this end, they have engaged in the practice of constructing visual illustrations, through which to communicate their experiences under the Israeli-enforced politico-military system. Since the First Intifada, creating visual depictions to describe and reflect upon various aspects of the Palestinian problem has become a common exercise.[2]

If one were to embark upon an analysis of this exercise, one would need to place a special emphasis on street art, as it has a central place in Palestinian resistance and serves as a key instrument in Palestinian civic and political activism. As will be detailed in this work, street art's main utility lies in its functionality as a medium through which Palestinians reiterate their commitment to bring an end to the occupation. By filling the public space with counter hegemonic visual narratives, Palestinians convey to the Israeli authorities their tenacity and perseverance towards their rights and aspirations. Among its functions, street art acts as a force multiplier for Palestinians, since artworks depicting Palestinian cause serve to stimulate collective emotions and imbue Palestinians with a feeling of togetherness. Especially historically meaningful symbols and icons suffusing street artworks instill in Palestinians a feeling of resistance as well as a determination of struggle. Over the course of more than three decades, street art has remained an indispensable element of Palestinian

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[2]   Intifada denotes two mass-scale Palestinian uprisings against Israel. Although the protest movements began spontaneously, they morphed into unprecedented revolts and lasted several years until they fizzled out. The First Intifada, symbolized by the use of rocks by Palestinians, began in 1987 after Israeli security forces' killing of four Palestinian youth and lasted until the time of the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993. The Second Intifada occurred as a result of Ariel Sharon's visit to Temple Mount in 2000. The visit set off waves of Palestinian protests on the grounds that Sharon's visit signalled Israel's intention to seize Temple Mount, which also houses the Al-Aqsa mosque. The Second Intifada, organized by Hamas, withered away following the death of Palestinian National Authority leader Yasser Arafat in 2004. Although both events involved violent scenes, the Second Intifada singled itself out due to the use of methods such as suicide bombings and armed resistance. Given this background, the prospect of the emergence of a third Intifada constitutes a significant risk. The elimination of this risk, though, is fraught with difficulties given the persistence of Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Lee Williams, "Intifada: What Is It - and What Does a Third Uprising Mean for the Region?". *The Independent*, October 9, 2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/what-exactly-is-an-infitada-a6688091.html.

resistance as well as an influential instrument to reaffirm Palestinians' political existence.

This work seeks to outline the main characteristics of Palestinian street art through an assessment of its effectiveness in two thematic contexts. It examines street art's function as a tool of resistance and as a political instrument in the Palestinian struggle against Israel. By focusing on visuals created by different Palestinian groups as well as international artists, this article also addresses how visual diversity within the Palestinian street art scene influences street art's effectiveness. Taking street art as a site of analysis requires an evaluation of artworks associated with the Palestinian culture of resistance. This shall be done through the method of visual case study. Visual case selection has been made on the basis of visuals' explanatory potential to reflect upon and elucidate Palestinian life under occupation. The 12 graffiti images chosen to this end also include pictures produced by foreign artists, the purpose being to provide an empirical context for a discussion on the utility of international contribution to Palestinian visual resistance. Conceptually, Pierre Bourdieu's notion of symbolic power and Chantal Mouffe's definition of politics as being a struggle between hegemonic and counter hegemonic forces will be employed to establish the required complementarity between art, resistance and politics. This article starts by offering a brief historical overview of art in Palestine and then moves on to analyzing Palestinian street art in relation to resistance, politics and visual diversity.

2. Art in Palestine: A Historical Background

The roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lie in the late 19th century, which witnessed the first attempts to create a Jewish state on the historical land of Palestine. The ideological underpinning of this political project was Zionism, whose adherents considered it essential to secure a national land for Jews.[3] Despite traumatic episodes experienced by Jews such as the

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[3]   Zionism originated as a modern secular movement at the end of the 19th century, with the First Zionist Congress, held in 1897, marking the beginning of the movement. Although a controversial term due to its alleged discriminatory character vis-à-vis Palestinians, the label "Zionism" was adapted by Jews themselves, evident in the name of "Zionist Congress". From the outset, Zionism was in tension with competing ideological approaches espoused by Jews of religious background. Although both

pogroms of the early 20th century, in the eyes of the early Zionist leaders, security-related reasons were subordinate to the overall of objective of holding together the Jewish nation. Historian Zeev Sternhell argues that, as Zionist leaders "saw it, Zionism was an operation to rescue the nation and not an operation to rescue Jews as individuals. For them, the quantitative aspect was always secondary."[4] Despite prioritizing the qualitative dimension of preserving the essence of the Jewish nation, the process initiated by Zionist leaders to establish a Jewish homeland paved the way for the influx of Jews into historic Palestine, which received more than half a million immigrants between 1882 and 1948.[5] With this inflow, social and demographic makeup of Palestine underwent significant changes, which also signaled the prospect of the political division of the country along ethnic lines.

In the course of realizing the Zionist project of creating a nation-state, one of the first attempts by the new authorities was to build a Jewish art scene, which was geared towards the goal of strengthening national spirit.[6] The broad objective was to represent the territorial space in a way that would reinforce the Zionist political imagination. This imagination manifested itself in places like Jerusalem, where, for example, architectural decorations were undertaken in accordance with political as well as visual/aesthetic requirements. The use of "stone cladding", for instance, was oriented towards the goal of preserving and projecting Jerusalem's holiness.[7] And this was tied into the political objective of laying greater claim on the city. As Weizman notes, "When the city itself is perceived to be holy, and when

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religious and secular Jews converged on the goal of strengthening Jewish presence in Palestine, they diverged on the ideological motif of their struggle. Whereas secular Zionists' purpose was to establish a secular nation-state on Palestinian land, "pre-Zionist" Jewish population was "deeply hostile to the notion of secular Jewish autonomy in the Holy Land, which, according to religious doctrine, would be redeemed only through divine intervention in the messianic age." Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, Trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), 16-17.

[4]   Zeev Sternhell, *Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State*, trans. David Maisel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 51.

[5]   Gilbert Achar, *The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives* (London, Saqi Books, 2010), 18.

[6]   Dalia Manor, *Art in Zion: The Genesis of Modern National Art in Jewish Palestine* (London: Routledge, 2005), 1.

[7]   Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2007), 28-32.

its boundaries are flexibly redrawn to suit ever-changing political aims, holiness inevitably become a planning issue."[8] As will be discussed below, attempts were also made for the construction of meaningful symbols in order to achieve favorable visualizations of the newly-settled territories.

An analysis of the motivation of new settlers in constructing visual depictions requires stressing that it mostly had to do with "ethnographic as well as imperialist mentality."[9] For instance, following their invasion of new lands and defeat of enemies, Roman, Egyptian and Assyrian empires sought to portray and convey a triumphant image of themselves through the creation of reliefs and epigraphs.[10] The practice of producing visual illustrations for a similar purpose was also adopted by modern political units. Including totalitarian movements, they employed, along with paintings, techniques such as cinema and photography in their attempts to conduct mass propaganda and construct favorable visual narratives of themselves.[11] The overall purpose was to create depictions of political landscapes, which they sought to dominate, in a way that reflected their own imaginations and aspirations. Art in its various forms, then, served as a potent communicative medium for modern political authorities.

As a product of modernity, Zionist ideology employed a similar set of practices in Palestine in the early 20th century. During this period, the fifth Zionist Congress, organized in 1901, marked the first attempt to create a Jewish national art. Although some intellectuals present in the Congress rebuffed the idea of creating a Jewish art, "the Jewish thinker and writer Martin Buber" argued that the objective could be achieved, but on the condition that a Jewish national homeland is secured.[12] This perspective was in line with the vision of Boris Schatz, who would come to play a pivotal role in the entrenchment and growth of Jewish art in historic Palestine. Subsequently, with the start of Jewish migration to Palestine,

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8   Weizman, *Hollow Land,* 33.

9   Michael J. Shapiro, *Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject* (London: Routledge, 2004), 174.

10   David D. Perlmutter, "Photojournalism and Foreign Affairs," *Orbis* 49, no. 1 (2005): 112.

11   Perlmutter, "Photojournalism and Foreign Affairs," 113; Shapiro, *Methods and Nations*, 135.

12   Manor, *Art in Zion*, 1-2.

adherents of Zionism set out to design an institutional structure for the growth and development of an artistic life in their would be homeland.

The most important development during this period was the establishment of the Bezalel School of Arts and Crafts in Jerusalem in 1906. Its founder Boris Schatz had been hailed by art historians for laying the groundwork for art to flourish "in a country which was barren, desolate and primitive."[13] The negative depiction of Palestine through the use of adjectives such as "primitive" can be argued to be aimed at generating the perception that this barren land had to be developed, which, among other things, would necessitate the creation and promotion of a Jewish national art. Given this objective, for art historians, the creation of an institution like Bezalel was "the realisation of a dream or a utopia."[14] In view of the importance of setting up an art foundation in Palestine, spear headers of the Zionist movement provided the wherewithal for Jewish national art to take root and flourish. A clear indication of this is that Belazel "was founded and funded by the Zionist Organisation" [15]

As opposed to the negative depiction of Palestine, there was a vibrant social existence, which, among various indicators, was evident in the cultural atmosphere that informed Palestinian artistic life. A brief glimpse into the historical trajectory of Palestinian art would show that the art movement in the country was initially under the influence of Arab Christian iconography, which dominated the art scene until the late 19th century. During this period, religious themes were the central features in Palestinian art, but visual elements representing local Arab culture had also been present in paintings.[16]

Following their seizure of Palestine, when Ottoman authorities set out to install Greek-church patriarchs with the aim of transforming Arab churches in accordance with their own vision, Palestinians countered this move by Arabizing their icons. This was an attempt at preserving their

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[13]   Ibid., 3.

[14]   Ibid.

[15]   Ibid.

[16]   Joseph Massad, "Permission to Paint: Palestinian Art and the Colonial Encounter," *Art of Journal* 66, no. 3 (2007): 128.

indigenous iconography and resisting the hybridization of their culture.[17] In the following period, when Palestinian art took on a more secular style, which characterized the period from late 19th century to 1948, artists such as Nicola Saig, Khalid Halabi and Mubarak Sa'ed left their imprint on the art scene with their impressive paintings.[18] During this phase, Palestinian art was also represented in the Jerusalem art fair called the First National Arab Fair by the Palestinian artist Zulfa el-Sa'di.[19] Regarding the thematic focus of Palestinian artworks, paintings mostly revolved around issues related to "identity, memory, location, and resistance."[20] Artworks depicting Palestinian life also included a repertoire of "politically potent icons like the cactus and metaphors such as Palestine as motherland."[21] With their embodiment of emblematic symbols, paintings pre-1948 provide an insight into the indigenous Palestinian cultural and political existence.

As well as attesting to the existence of a Palestinian life prior to the Nakba, art activity in historic Palestine is indicative of Palestinians' sensitivity in preserving the cultural fabric of their society. Despite this sensitivity, cultural and artistic life in Palestine faced a formidable challenge in 1948, when a mass exodus known as the Nakba took place. Among the traumatic consequences of the Nakba was the loss of a cultural terrain for Palestinians.[22] Due to forced displacement, artists were compelled to move to places such as Beirut, where some of them strove to perform art in refugee camps, under highly impractical conditions.[23] Palestinian art faced another setback with Israel's winning of the Six Day War in 1967 and seizure of the West Bank and Gaza. This marked the beginning of significant practical difficulties for Palestinian artists and cultural enthusiasts due to Israel's implementation

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[17]   Ibid., 128.

[18]   Miri Gal-Ezer, "The Third Space? From Modern Art Gallery to Modern Museum in Umm El-Fahem," in *Memory and Ethnicity: Ethnic Museums in Israel and the Diaspora,* ed. Emanuela Trevisan Semi, Dario Miccoli and Tudor Parfitt (New Castle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 125.

[19]   Gal-Ezer, "The Third Space?," 125.

[20]   Rhonda A. Saad, "Palestinian Art: From 1850 to the Present by Kamal Boullata," *The Arab Studies Journal* 18, no. 1 (2010): 331.

[21]   Ibid.

[22]   Kamal Boullata, "Art under Siege," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 4 (2004): 71.

[23]   Kamal Boullata, "Artists Re-Member Palestine in Beirut," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 4 (2003): 25-30.

of strict censorship practices. Restrictive measures included banning paintings bearing the colors of Palestinian flag,[24] closing down galleries and arresting artists.[25] Art exhibitions were closely monitored by Israeli authorities, who came to view them "as emblematic of a collective national identity and crucibles of defiant resistance to occupation."[26]

3. Street Art as an Instrument of Resistance

As the above account shows, Palestinian art holds a mirror to the political history of Palestine in general. Street art has joined the aforementioned historical context as a new artistic endeavor, whose main importance lies in its ability to serve Palestinians as an instrument of resistance against Israel. As emphasized above, due to the discomfort felt towards Palestinian artworks, Israeli authorities resorted to restrictive measures such as censorship and prohibition of exhibitions. Street art was subjected to a similar treatment, since it proved to be an effective communication apparatus especially during the First Intifada, enabling Palestinians to disseminate their messages under heavy security measures.[27] During this period, graffiti "became a way to organize protests, strikes, and rallies; to affirm allegiances; to warn against collaboration; and finally, to demarcate political boundaries."[28] To deter Palestinians from engaging in street art, Israeli security forces "used fines, imprisonment, and forced local youth to erase graffiti."[29] In the following period, Israeli police engaged in activities such as teaming up with local Palestinian collaborators to remove the graffiti works it had considered troubling, mostly due to their evocation of the Nakba.[30]

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[24]   Ashley Toenjes, "This Wall Speaks: Graffiti and Transnational Networks in Palestine," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 61 (2015): 57.

[25]   Boullata, "Art Under Siege," 72.

[26]   Ibid.

[27]   Toenjes, "This Wall Speaks," 56.

[28]   Craig Larkin, "Jerusalem's Separation Wall and Global Message Board: Graffiti, Murals, and the Art of Sumud," *The Arab Studies Journal* 22, no. 1 (Special Issue: Cultures of Resistance, 2014): 149.

[29]   Larkin, "Jerusalem's Separation Wall and Global Message Board," 149.

[30]   Gawan Mac Greigair, "Nazareth's Mystery Mural as an Emblem of Palestinian Resistance," *Al Araby*, November 2, 2107, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2017/11/13/nazareths-mystery-mural-as-an-emblem-of-palestinian-resistance.

The resort to such measures begs the question that despite enjoying overwhelming superiority in hard-power capabilities vis-à-vis Palestinians, what drives Israel into a security-oriented approach towards Palestinian street art. As this work maintains, the recourse to heavy-handed measures by Israeli authorities attests to their recognition of the potential of street art to empower Palestinian resistance. Given that power is a fungible concept and that it may be as much material as immaterial, balance of power between Israel and Palestine presents a more complex picture than generally assumed. Cognizant of this complexity, Israeli authorities see a troubling aspect in artistic illustrations because of their ability to provoke a sense of struggle among Palestinians and stimulate alternative political imaginations.

Indeed, whether it is a simple drawing or an exquisite painting, artistic expressions can be highly influential instruments due to the "symbolic power" they possess.[31] Bourdieu defines symbolic power as "an almost magical power, which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force, by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization."[32] This definition aptly captures street art's potential in the context of Palestinian resistance, since, viewed through Bourdieu's lens, it has played an instrumental role in galvanizing the anti-occupation sentiment and acted as a catalyst for Palestinian mobilization. This was especially evident when there was no "national media, political assembly, or other elements of self-determination" and "graffiti was a way for Palestinians to transgress the censors and express political messages."[33] During this period, graffiti images helped bolster Palestinian unity, and given their proven effectiveness, they have gradually become an inherent part of Palestinian discourse of resistance. According to De Certeau, "The credibility of a discourse is what first makes believers act in accord with it. It therefore produces practitioners. To make people believe is to make them act."[34] Viewed through this lens, due to the impact they leave on collective consciousness, visual discourses also have the potential to make people act in accordance with the messages they aim to spread. Palestinian graffiti

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[31] Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991), 166.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Toenjes, "This Wall Speaks," 57.

[34] Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 148.

images attest to the validity of this hypothesis, since, as will be elaborated below, they have acted as an effective medium to unite Palestinians around the same cause, while also helping them defy Israel's "cognitive imperialism."[35]

In occupied Palestine, Israel has sought to achieve its cognitive imperialist objectives through "a visual language that was used to blur the facts of occupation and sustain territorial claims of expansion."[36] The growth of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has been accomplished through the visual transformation of the territorial landscape, which required projecting the settlements as "organic parts" of Israeli territories.[37] The policy of designing the landscape based on the goal of expanding Israeli settlements led to the deterioration of Palestinian life, which is evident in the transition from occupation to cantonization and finally to separation.[38]

Figure-1: A mural of Leila Khaled on the Separation Wall
Image taken from: https://i.pinimg.com/originals/1c/da/3e/1cda3e9e4ae66257857007fcd108e53d.jpg

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[35]   Shapiro, *Methods and Nations*, 29.

[36]   Weizman, *Hollow Land*, 26.

[37]   Ibid.

[38]   Samer Alatout, "Walls As Technologies of Government: The Double Construction of Geographies of Peace and Conflict in Israeli Politics, 2002–Present," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 99, no. 5 (2009): 956-68.

Despite such unfavorable developments, Palestinians have proven resilient in their determination to continue resistance, for which street art has been an essential instrument. Palestinian visual acts involve attempts to undermine occupation by painting murals suffused with symbolically powerful images in public space. One of the most expressive graffiti images sketched on the walls in Palestine is a well-known image of the Palestinian militant Leila Khaled. Khaled is known as a "heroine and iconic figure"[39] in Palestinian tradition of resistance. To counter Israel's attempts to portray Palestinian popular figures as terrorists, Palestinians have popularized one of Khaled's most remarkable images in their graffiti works. Khaled's image in Figure-1 indicates a facial expression that exudes hope and optimism and also "rejects the terrorist label."[40] Although her smiling face can be construed as a sign of hope aimed for Palestinians, the image does not omit her militant self, which is signified by the keffiyeh and gun and is clearly aimed at Israel.

Figure-2: A mural depicting a resistance scene in Palestine
Image taken from: https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2019/Mar-15/478895-gaza-border-protests-called-off-after-israel-air-raids-organizers.ashx

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[39]   Laleh Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 20.

[40]   Rebecca Gould, "The Materiality of Resistance: Israel's Apartheid Wall in an Age of Globalization," *Social Text 118* 32, no. 1 (2014): 15.

The Palestinian street art scene also features murals that depict the resisting Palestinian subject in the form of using a slingshot, burning tires or making a V-sign. Portraying these acts in a graffiti form, Figure-2 provides a powerful snapshot of Palestinian defiance and evidently conveys the message that circumstances necessitate resistance. As the acts depicted in Figure-2 represent gestures of resistance that are deeply rooted in the Palestinian struggle, such graffiti works also serve to refresh memories of liberation struggle.

Figure-3: A hand on barbed wire image from Gaza
Image taken from: https://loralucero.wordpress.com/2012/12/18/#jp-carousel-1428

Hand on barbed wire image is another symbolically effective illustration portraying Palestinian life under occupation. Israel's restriction of Palestinians' movement through the erection of barbed wire fences is often countered by Palestinians tearing down such barriers. The graffiti in Figure-3 illustrates this resistance act. Such graffiti images imbue Palestinian collective consciousness with a sense of togetherness, as they represent the common sentiment felt towards occupation. Perhaps the unifying function of street art in this context is best described by Baudrillard, who defines

"graffiti signatures as "totemic" […] symbols of group belonging and sentiment."[41] From this perspective, graffiti images must be understood as devices that contribute to the emotional-motivational unity of Palestinians, despite the physical-territorial disunity that afflict their lives.

"There's no voice greater than the voice of the intifada"
Figure-4: The keffiyeh-clad woman
Image taken from: https://electronicintifada.net/content/taking-back-palestines-streets-exclusive-interview-underground-jerusalem-graffiti-artist

Unity is most needed when acts of resistance are undertaken, and during such acts, graffiti is utilized as a tool to re-emphasize the existence of the defiant Palestinian subject. This is performed through Palestinian groups' imprinting of images of disobedience in public space. A case in point is an act that was held in 2012. During the act, Palestinians painted a keffiyeh-clad woman image "on the doors and walls of governmental buildings as well as the doorways of Israeli houses" in West Jerusalem and cities such as Haifa and Jaffa.[42] A text accompanying the image, which reads "There's

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41 Ibid., 149.

42 Maath Musleh, "Taking Back Palestine's Streets: Exclusive Interview with Underground Jerusalem Graffiti Artist," *Electronic Intifada*, August 29, 2012,

no voice greater than the voice of the intifada" epitomizes the gist of the resistance that defined the visual campaign. The sporadic use of visuals that convey disobedience has the functional effectiveness of demonstrating to Israel the persistence of the Palestinian struggle.

As Israel holds overwhelming superiority in material capabilities, breaking Palestinians' will through dominance in power and making them accept the reality of occupation carry utmost importance. In the face of this, symbolically powerful images stimulate a sense of Palestinianness that rejects subordination. The functional importance of the above-shown iconic images lies in that they reflect outward into the lives of Palestinians and help produce practitioners of resistance. As emphasized by a Palestinian artist: "If you live in a conflict zone, anything can be used as a weapon […] It's not killing, but it raises awareness. It's part of the fight."[43] Through their engagement with street art, Palestinians acquire a means of revealing their commitment to overturning the status quo. Feelings of disobedience are often expressed by Palestinians such as Hassan Al-Abedi, a 55-year-old Palestinian farmer, who aimed his anger at the Israeli government by saying that "you will not break the Palestinians' will, you will never break our will, never, never."[44] Street art is essentially an effective means of illustrating this decisiveness.

4. Street Art as a Political Tool

For a thorough assessment of Palestinian street art, its functionality as a political instrument also requires an analysis. Political history of Palestine can be described as a history of struggle waged through artworks and visual symbols. Following their migration to historic Palestine, Zionists sought to overcome the feeling of strangeness in their new land by redefining "in Jewish consciousness the meaning of 'being in the place' in contrast to the sense of displacement in the diaspora."[45] And art contributed to the process

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https://electronicintifada.net/content/taking-back-palestines-streets-exclusive-interview-underground-jerusalem-graffiti-artist.

43   Hannah Jannol, "Banksy in the West Bank: Whose Art Is It Anyway?," *The Jewish News of Northern California*, July 13, 2018, https://www.jweekly.com/2018/07/13/banksy-in-the-west-bank-whose-art-is-it-anyway/.

44   "Palestinians to Netanyahu: You Will Never Break Our Will," *The Jerusalem Post*, September 11, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Palestinians-to-Netanyahu-You-will-never-break-our-will-601398.

45   Manor, *Art in Zion*, 125.

of creating meaningful representations with a constellation of symbols associated with Jewish tradition. For example, Yaakov Stark's mural known as "the First Monumental Zionist Work of Art", located in Jerusalem's Ades Synagogue, served as a source of inspiration for "Zionism's visual language", since it is laden with historically meaningful signs and symbols such as "the Hebrew letters, the Star of David, the menorah, the flora of the land of Israel, the symbols of the Israelite tribes [and] the zodiac."[46] Of these symbols, the Star of David and the menorah became the emblems of the new nation and Jewish sovereignty respectively.[47] Stark's mural was followed by other artworks that contained a "repertoire of emblematic, idyllic and often non-specific images of the country as produced by Jewish artists in Palestine during the 1920s."[48] Attempts at constructing meaningful illustrations contributed to the constitution of the symbolic foundation of the soon to be established State of Israel.

Figure-5: A mural bearing the key symbol
Image taken from: https://www.richardsilverstein.com/2018/01/21/case-palestinian-return/

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[46] Nir Hasson, "'First Monumental Zionist Work of Art' Uncovered in Jerusalem," *Haaretz*, October 15, 2012, https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-reviving-the-first-monumental-zionist-artwork-1.5192847.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Manor, *Art in Zion*, 125.

Given this background, Palestinians' attempts to build their own visual vocabulary must be viewed as an endeavor that is aimed at undermining Zionism's political imagination. Indeed, visual and textual elements populating Palestinian settings carry strong political overtones such that they reflect a determination to assert the Palestinian subject's political existence in connection with the broad goal of establishing a sovereign Palestinian statehood. Visual messages designed to convey Palestinian aspirations primarily stress Palestinians' dedication to recover their inherent rights over the historic land of Palestine. This is revealingly demonstrated by the key symbol. As well as signifying Palestinian uprootedness, this symbol is also representative of Palestinians' determination to acquire the right of return. As the right of return has been has been one of the most contentious issues between the Israeli and Palestinian sides, through their consistent use of the key symbol in their visuals, Palestinians continue to remind Israel that they remain steadfast in their commitment to reclaiming their land.

Figure-6: The Handala image
Image taken from: https://972mag.com/the-palestinian-dilemma-between-ideology-and-reality/56131/

An equally powerful visual is the Handala image, created by the late Palestinian artist Naji al-Ali.[49] The image depicts a disgruntled barefooted

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[49] Al-Ali's own story is a poignant portrayal of Palestinian uprootedness. Born in 1937, al-Ali was forced out of Palestine in 1948 and then ended up in a Lebanese refugee camp. With the help of the Palestinian author Ghassan Kanafani, al-Ali began to develop a career as a cartoonist and worked for various journals and newspapers in

boy with his hands clasped behind his back and poignantly illustrates a child's sorrow occasioned by displacement. As stated by Al-Ali, the image reflects his own story, since he was forced to leave Palestine at the age of ten, like numerous other Palestinian children.[50] As well as visually depicting Palestinian displacement, Handala also signifies Palestinian aspiration for justice. As Masalha stresses, "Handhala became a powerful icon of Palestine and the symbol of Palestinian refugee struggle for justice, return and liberation."[51]

Figure-7: A mural bearing the images of the Palestinian flag, the key symbol and the Dome of the Rock
Image taken from: https://loralucero.wordpress.com/2012/12/18/#jp-carousel-1428

Beirut and Kuwait. Moving back and forth between Lebanon and the Gulf during the Lebanese civil war, al-Ali finally ended up in London, where he was killed by unknown assailants in 1987. With a career spanning over three decades, al-Ali left an impressive collection of work of more than forty thousand cartoons. Al-Ali's most famous image Handala, as he describes it, is a "condensation of the pain, longing, and love experienced by millions of Palestinians and Arabs in the late twentieth century." Sune Haugbolle, "Naji Al-Ali and the Iconography of Arab Secularism," in *Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric of the Image*, ed. Christiane Gruber and Sune Haugbolle, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 231-32.

50   Nur Masalha, "Naji al-Ali, Edward Said and Civil Liberation Theology in Palestine," *Holy Land Studies* 11, no. 2 (2012): 127-28.

51   Ibid., 128.

Palestinian graffiti works also contain other iconic symbols such as the Palestinian flag and the Dome of the Rock. These symbols, along with the key symbol, highlight and reflect on the Palestinian experience of the Nakba. The picture in Figure-7, painted on the 64th anniversary of the Nakba,[52] provides a perspective into Palestinian political imagination, which is primarily predicated on the achievement of Palestinian rights and sovereignty over Jerusalem and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. In the picture, these aspirations are indicated by the Dome of the Rock and flag images respectively. Appearing in the background, the eye gazing at the scene conveys the message that Palestinians still recall the memories that had once defined their lives and decades-long displacement has not affected their goal of reclaiming their historical rights.

The above graffiti works furnish an insight into the symbolic spectrum associated with Palestinian political aspirations. Viewing Israel as an exclusionary sovereign power that has caused geographical fragmentation of Palestine, Palestinian anti-occupation struggle aims to establish the Palestinian subject's political existence in an inclusionary sovereign space. During this struggle, Palestinians equip themselves with instruments of street art to increase the awareness-creating potential of their political messages.[53] The visual space, therefore, provides Palestinians with a medium through which to articulate their aspirations.

Visual or otherwise, the overall Palestinian struggle rests essentially on undoing the hegemonic system which Israel has been seeking to consolidate in Palestine. Faced with the danger of the perpetuation of an occupation regime, the counter hegemonic struggle waged by Palestinians embodies within itself a strong political dimension, since, as Mouffe argues with reference to Gramsci, "Politics is always about the establishment, the reproduction, or the deconstruction of a hegemony, one that is always in relation to a potentially counter-hegemonic order."[54] But, the fulfillment of counter hegemonic aspirations requires a collective effort by human

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[52]   "Daily life in Gaza – in Pictures," *The Guardian*, June 8, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2012/jun/08/daily-life-gaza-in-pictures.

[53]   Rich Wiles, "Palestinian Graffiti: 'Tagging' Resistance," *Al Jazeera*, November 26, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/palestinian-graffiti-tagging-resistance-2013112015849368961.html.

[54]   Chantal Mouffe et al., "Every Form of Art Has a Political Dimension," *Grey Room* 2 (2001): 99.

subjects. In her analysis of Gramsci's insights on how collectivity operates, Mouffe notes that "an historical act can only be performed by "collective man", and this presupposes the attainment of a "cultural-social" unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogenous aims, are welded together."[55] This remark is illustrative of Gramsci's conceptualization of social existence, which is premised on the notion of "grouping which is that of all the social elements which share the same mode of thinking and acting."[56] A product of this social reality, according to Gramsci, is "conformism" in the sense that "'one is always mass-man or collective man.'"[57]

With that being said, since politics is ever present in settings populated by humans, any attempt by collective man to construct a hegemonic order is bound to provoke counter hegemonic tendencies, the reason being that "you can never have a complete, absolute, inclusive hegemony."[58] Seen through the micropolitical prism of Deleuze and Guattari, totalizing forces are destined to failure, because "There is always something that flows or flees, that escapes […] the overcoding machine: things that are attributed to a "change in values," the youth, women, the mad, etc."[59] In this view, there are always pattern-defying and unruly human subjects within entrenched power structures. In Deleuze's thinking, Palestinians also figure in the category of the insubordinate subject,[60] which Deleuze "might elsewhere term a 'line of flight' – a mode of acting against the dominant system."[61]

Palestinians' attempt to undermine the Israeli-imposed dominant system and inscribe their existence on a new political terrain informed by their own aspirations attests to the counter egemonic character of their struggle.

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[55]   Chantal Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory,* ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 191.

[56]   Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York, International Publishers, 1971), 324.

[57]   Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," 186.

[58]   Mouffe, "Every Form of Art Has a Political Dimension," 99.

[59]   Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (London, Continuum, 2012), 216.

[60]   Gilles Deleuze, "Stones," *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995,* ed. David Lapoujade (New York, Semiotext(e), 2007), 338-40.

[61]   Kathryn Medien, "Palestine in Deleuze," *Theory, Culture & Society* 36, no. 5 (2019): 13.

The importance of artworks during this struggle is evidently clear, since, as the iconic symbols rooted in Palestinian street art tradition demonstrate, the visual space in occupied Palestine provides a medium for the process of meaning creation associated with Palestinian political imagination. Hence, in the overall struggle Palestinians have been waging against Israel, street artworks are best understood as "political artifacts,"[62] rather than as descriptive illustrations. It is also important to emphasize that Palestinian street art demonstrates the meaningless to discuss as to whether a piece of artwork is political or non-political. As Mouffe emphasizes,

> One cannot make a distinction between political art and non-political art, because every form of artistic practice either contributes to the reproduction of the given common sense – and in that sense is political – or contributes to the deconstruction or critique of it. Every form of art has a political dimension.[63]

In Palestinian context, given that street art's overarching aim is to highlight Palestinian political aspirations and demands, the above-shown images serve as telling examples that demonstrate the inherent relationship between art and politics. Through street art, Palestinians essentially politicize the question of what it means to be living as a sovereignty-lacking nation. But street art also provides a means for presenting an alternative vision, one that is based on the collective indigenous existence of Palestinians.

5. Visual Diversity in the Palestinian Street Art Scene

Despite street art's proven effectiveness in the Palestinian anti-occupation struggle, it exhibits a remarkable degree of diversity in Palestinian settings. Due to ideological differences among Palestinian factions, street art scene is often populated by competing visual representations. Expectedly, signs and symbols suffusing street artworks reflect artists and groups' own politico-ideological orientations. For example, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which is a secular left-wing group and whose street art bears images of "workers, citizens and fighters,"[64] often

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[62]   Editorial Board, "Visual Culture and Remembering the Forgotten," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 61 (2015): 4.

[63]   Mouffe, "Every Form of Art Has a Political Dimension," 99.

[64]   Charles Tripp, *The Power and the People: Paths of Resistance in the Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 266.

use the image of Leila Khaled in their visuals. Moreover, the messages of PFLP often read "We salute the women of the intifada – PFLP."[65]

Such messages are directed against conservative Palestinian movements that seek to promote religion-based gender stereotypes. For example, the message "Morals or else. . . –Hamas"[66] indicates a religiously oriented discourse in street art, which is also manifest in religious groups' use of "Islamic symbols" and "Qur'anic quotations"[67] in their visuals. To counter such representations, secular groups design and promote visual messages that portray Palestine as a nation rather than a religious community. For example, a graffito created by the Palestine Communist Party reads "Let the churches and mosques embrace each other in national unity."[68] Such messages aim to emphasize the need to leave aside religious differences in the broad struggle of liberating Palestine. Furthermore, street art also furnishes rival political groups with a means to show their opposition to Palestinian Authority or to call for a national unity government between competing groups such as Hamas and Fatah. Examples include messages such as "Is this the government you elected?" or "Yes to National Unity."[69]

Street artists have a common goal of contributing to the Palestinian liberation struggle by creating images that encourage Palestinians to maintain hope and resistance. But their depiction of Palestinian reality is informed by their own cultural-ideological formations. This leads to the creation of visuals that often clash with those created by other groups. And this is indicative of a deeper issue, which is the existence of internal schisms within the Palestinian collective body, an issue that undercuts the effectiveness of the Palestinian struggle. Graffiti works and textual elements accompanying them are simply illustrative of the existing intra-Palestinian rivalries.

Street art in Palestine also draws support from international artists, for whom the erection of the Separation Wall in the West Bank presented an

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[65] Julie Peteet, "The Writing on the Walls: The Graffiti of the Intifada," *Cultural Anthropology* 11, no. 2 (1996): 154.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Tripp, *The Power and the People*, 265.

[68] Peteet, "The Writing on the Walls," 154.

[69] Larkin, "Jerusalem's Separation Wall and Global Message Board," 152.

opportunity to show their solidarity with Palestinians. Of all the foreign artists appearing in the Palestinian street art scene, British street artist Banksy merits special emphasis, as his aesthetic murals on the Separation Wall have attracted considerable international attention due to wide press coverage.[70] Despite the international spotlight afforded to Banksy's works, they did not always resonate well with the local population, with some expressing their displeasure at "his aestheticization of their suffering."[71]

Figure-8: A Banksy mural on the Separation Wall
Image taken from: https://www.plastikmagazine.com/interview/banksy

For example, as recounted by Banksy, an old Palestinian man expressed displeasure at his picturesque murals on the Separation Wall by saying that "We don't want [the wall] to be beautiful. We hate this wall, go home."[72] Some local artists have also taken a negative view of attempts to beatify the Separation Wall. As one artist put it,

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[70]   William Parry, *Against the Wall: Art of Resistance in Palestine* (Chicago, Lawrence Hill Books, 2010), 6.

[71]   Gould, "The Materiality of Resistance," 6.

[72]   Parry, *Against the Wall*, 10.

> *I don't draw on the wall. I'm against anybody drawing (on it). [...] For me and for my ideas the Separation Wall is a very ugly wall, with a very ugly colour, it's a military colour. For us to draw, to put paint, and to put colour we will make the Wall different, we will make the Wall beautiful. It is not our job to make the Wall beautiful.*[73]

Moreover, as Parry reports, some of Banksy's graffiti attracted angry reactions, such as when he drew a rat holding a slingshot with the aim of depicting an image of resistance.[74] A similar reaction occurred, when Banksy painted an Israeli soldier checking the identity papers of a donkey. Although Banksy's intention was evidently to deride Israel's strict security measures, Palestinians took these two murals as an affront. These cases show how attempts at solidarity may backfire in the street art scene, when foreign artists are unaware of local sensitives.

Figure-9: Two murals painted by Banksy in the West Bank
Images taken from: Parry, Against the Wall, 51; https://www.jweekly.com/2018/07/13/banksy-in-the-west-bank-whose-art-is-it-anyway/

The participation of foreign artists in the Palestinian street art scene begs the overall question of whether their works make the intended positive contribution to the Palestinian cause. If viewed in a positive light, foreign artists' presence in Palestine leads to a beneficial visual diversity, through which to appeal to audiences from different cultural backgrounds. Reaching out to greater number of people and raising their awareness about the Palestinian issue may potentially facilitate for Palestinians

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73   Hugh Lovatt, "From National Resistance to Global Movement – An Intro to Palestinian Graffiti (PHOTOS)," *Your Middle East*, March 3, 2015, https://yourmiddleast. com/2015/03/03/from-national-resistance-to-global-movement-ae-an-intro-to-palestinian-graffiti-photos/.

74   Parry, *Against the Wall*, 51.

the process of finding networks of support internationally.[75] As Ashley reminds, "during the first and second intifadas, [Palestinians] have turned toward transnational networks to try to find external powers that will help them challenge the occupation."[76] Given this fact, one can plausibly argue that visuals that find resonance beyond Palestine would afford Palestinians stronger connection with the outside world. As an acknowledgement of this, some locals have expressed a positive view of the Separation Wall's transformation into an attractive graffiti site. As stressed by a Jerusalemite Palestinian "The battle against the occupation has shifted from committees to media sites. The images of the [separation] wall often speak louder than politicians' voices."[77]

One may also present a skeptical view regarding foreign artists' participation in the Palestinian street art scene. Analyzing Palestinian street art from the viewpoint of content and style, Gould describes the essence of Palestinian street art as being "allegorical and opaque", an example being the above-shown Leila Khaled's image (see Figure-1).[78] "[B]rutal realities" Palestinians face in their everyday lives, in Gould's view, do not figure in the works of international artists, "who address a global Anglophone audience."[79] Relatedly, analogies drawn with scenes such as "the Warsaw Ghetto and the Berlin Wall" are said to find little echo in Palestinian circles.[80] Although depictions created by foreign artists may attract more international attention than those by their local peers, aesthetic considerations are of secondary importance to the Palestinian artists, who are mainly concerned with providing visual support to the Palestinian struggle.

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[75]   Larkin, "Jerusalem's Separation Wall and Global Message Board," 144.

[76]   Toenjes, "This Wall Speaks," 58.

[77]   Larkin, "Jerusalem's Separation Wall and Global Message Board," 141.

[78]   Gould, "The Materiality of Resistance," 14-15.

[79]   Ibid., 14.

[80]   Ibid., 13-14.

Figure-10: A mural painted by Lushsux on the Seperation Wall
Image taken from: https://www.trtworld.com/mea/protest-art-is-graffiti-on-the-west-bank-wall-losing-its-meaning--11931

Related to this discussion, some authors argue that works produced by foreign artists may even create an adverse impact on the effectiveness of Palestinian visual resistance. Referring to the Separation Wall's becoming of a popular street art site, Larkin, for example, asserts that "While the highly publicized work of graffiti artists such as Banksy, Blu, and Sam engage a global audience and provide a subversive snapshot of local realities, they may in some ways obscure the complexity of everyday Palestinian responses to the wall."[81] Irrelevant content found in the works of foreign artists lends support to those who are wary of outside participation. For example, some Palestinians think that the Separation Wall "had become a symbolic space for a stream of passing visitors in which to act out their fantasies, aesthetic and political."[82]

A case in point is the Australian artist Lushsux, who attracted criticism due to the thematic irrelevance of his works, which contain images of popular figures such as Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton and Mark Zuckerberg. A "Bethlehem resident Khader Jacaman" reacted to Lushsux's murals by saying that "there was "no relationship" between the art depicting Clinton

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[81]   Larkin, "Jerusalem's Separation Wall and Global Message Board," 145.

[82]   Tripp, *The Power and the People*, 279.

and Trump and the Palestinian cause."[83] As a result of such graffiti pictures, sites such as the Separation Wall "risks becoming a street art gallery rather than actually politicising what it is about", as put by a British tourist visiting the site.[84]

Figure-11: A Palestinian mural bearing the images of Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King
Image taken from: https://loralucero.wordpress.com/2012/12/18/gaza-street-art-rocks/#jp-carousel-1428

Although irrelevant murals risk decontextualizing the meaning of Palestinian street art, symbolic localization could also create problems of its own. In response to views suggesting a more localized form of street art in Palestine, Jones convincingly argues that "particularizing the struggles of Palestine/Israel is part of the Zionist myth to justify settler colonialism."[85]

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83 Ben Said, "Protest Art: Is Graffiti on the West Bank Wall Losing Its Meaning?," *TRT World*, November 4, 2017, https://www.trtworld.com/mea/protest-art-is-graffiti-on-the-west-bank-wall-losing-its-meaning--11931.

84 Ibid.

85 Toenjes, "This Wall Speaks," 65.

This view may help explain why some Palestinian artists integrated the images of world-renowned civil rights leaders into their works. The graffiti shown in Figure-11 is an example of this. The portrayal of a classroom that features a teacher explaining to her students Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King, is evidently an attempt by the Palestinian street artist to portray the Palestinian struggle as part of a broader freedom struggle. In a related vein, the fact that Palestinian intellectuals often draw analogies between Israel and other oppressive regimes (such as the pre-1994 South Africa) also demonstrates an inclination to broaden the analytical context, the purpose being to expose Israel's discriminatory treatment of Palestinians.[86] It can thus be maintained that isolating the Palestine issue in the visual realm by excluding international elements is a suboptimal strategy, if the objective is to highlight Israel's apartheid-like characteristic. Provided that external visual elements, whether incorporated by local or international artists, capture relevant commonalities between Palestine and other communities, they may help create a fruitful symbiosis in support of the Palestinian liberation narrative.

6. Conclusion

This manuscript has assessed the effectiveness of street art in the context of Palestinian struggle against Israel. I have shown in this work that art and politics in the history of Palestine are intrinsically related, with a discussion of how adherents of Zionism laid the institutional basis for the growth of an indigenous Jewish art in Palestine. Furthermore, I have illustrated that Israel has attempted to impede Palestinian artistic activity through security measures and sought to cultivate an image of the newly-settled territorial space in accordance with its own political vision. The counter hegemonic struggle waged by Palestinians through street art was argued to be a reaction against the Israeli-imposed politico-military reality.

Through a visual analysis of emblematic graffiti images that have been produced by Palestinian artists, I have shown that Palestinian images serve as a galvanizing force for the anti-occupation struggle. This was elaborated through an analysis of visuals such as the keffiyeh-clad woman and hand

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[86]   Ari Shavit, "An Interview with Edward Said," *Politics and Culture* 3 (2000), https://politicsandculture.org/2010/08/10/an-interview-with-edward-said-2/.

on barbed wire graffiti images, which symbolize Palestinian determination to fight against occupation. Images with symbolic power, a concept borrowed from Bourdieu, were argued to be an effective instrument in provoking collective emotions, evoking a feeling of struggle and therefore in producing practitioners of resistance. Overall, street art was shown to be an empowering instrument due to its ability to instill in Palestinian collective consciousness a determination of resistance.

Secondly, street art's utility also lies in its ability to assist Palestinians in their bid to seek their inherent rights and political agency. This was discussed with reference to Palestinians' attempts to construct their own symbolic vocabulary through their incorporation of historically meaningful images in their artworks. To exemplify the point, the key symbol, Handala image and visuals bearing the Palestinian flag and the Dome of the Rock were analyzed. The fact that street artworks help politicize the question of Palestinian reality demonstrates the complementary relationship between art and politics. In articulating the point, two points were emphasized through a Mouffean prism: every artwork embodies within itself a political dimension and politics is a struggle between hegemonic and counter hegemonic forces. Seen through this prism, Palestinian street art's political character is evident, since it serves to contribute to the deconstruction of a hegemonic politico-military order, to reaffirm Palestinians' political existence and to project an alternative political imagination against the Israeli-enforced reality.

Lastly, as elaborated in this article, while there is a visual struggle against Israel, there is usually a parallel struggle underway among competing Palestinian groups with regards to whose illustrations should represent the Palestinian cause. By showing how political groups' (such as PFLP and Hamas') imbue their visuals with elements related to religion, gender and equality, the importance of cultural-ideological elements in Palestinian street art was emphasized. The content-wise diversity is important in that it is reflective of the absence of unity among Palestinian political factions. Palestinians also receive support from international artists, who seek to portray Palestinian life under occupation from their own artistic perspectives. Despite the positive contribution international artists try to make, as discussed with reference to Banksy, their depictions of the implications of occupation for Palestinians could run up against local sensitives. Cold reception given by Palestinians to Banksy's graffiti bearing animal images is indicative of this.

Furthermore, foreign artists' graffiti pictures that bear no relevance to the Palestinian issue (such as the murals of popular figures) risk diluting the meaning of street art in Palestine. Opinions differ as to whether the internationalization of the visual scene weakens the effectiveness of Palestinian street art. As sought to be explained in this work with reference to certain images, Palestinians have proved adept at weaponizing street art by virtue of their skillful utilization of visuals and Arabic texts that project disobedience. Iconic signs and symbols associated with the Palestinian culture of resistance are effective tools in demonstrating the existence of the defiant Palestinian subject, which is of bedrock importance to the Palestinian struggle. With that being said, Palestinian visual resistance acquires greater effectiveness, if the content of street art is inclusive of international symbols such as the images of Mandela and Gandhi, since this helps generate the impression that Palestinians are a part of the global liberation struggle. Visual references to figures and events symbolizing liberation struggles serve to reinforce the belief that what Palestinians have been experiencing is not unique and like other victimized communities, they can also prevail in the liberation struggle they have been waging.

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From Rise to Crisis: The Qatari Leadership

Esra Çavuşoğlu[*]

Abstract

Qatar, a young and tiny Gulf State, realized a remarkable transformation through an immense economic development between 1995 and 2013, and emerged as an active and influential actor at the international stage, receiving worldwide attention and scholarly interests. However, in the post-Arab Spring context, Qatar became the linchpin of a regional crisis as a consequence of the emerging political clash among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States. This paper analyzes Qatar's distinctive policies throughout its rise (1995-2013) and the recent period of the regional crisis within the framework of leadership conception. It is argued that the leadership factor played a key role in transforming both the auspicious circumstances of the previous term and the challenging circumstances of the recent term into great advantages to promote Qatar's autonomy. Through this perspective, it is aimed to address why and how Qatar differs from other small Gulf States, and how this affected Qatar's emerging as a rising power and as a major party to the regional crisis.

Keywords: Qatar, Persian Gulf, Middle East, GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), Gulf Crisis

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Yükselişten Krize Katar'ın Liderliği

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Öz

Oldukça yeni ve küçük bir devlet olan Katar, 1995-2013 periyodunda büyük bir ekonomik büyüme paralelinde gerçekleştirdiği dönüşüm sonucunda aktif ve etkin bir aktör olarak uluslararası arenaya katılarak dikkatleri üzerine çekmiş ve akademik çalışmaların ilgi odağı haline gelmiştir. Ne var ki "Arap Baharı" sonrası bağlamda Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi (KİK) ülkeleri arasında ortaya çıkan siyasi çatışma sonucu Katar'ın adı bölgesel bir krizi ifade eder hale gelmiştir. Bu makale Katar'ın hem 1995-2013 yükseliş döneminde hem de halen devam eden kriz döneminde, kendine özgü politikalarını liderlik konsepti çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Bu çalışma liderlik faktörünün yükseliş döneminin oldukça elverişli şartlarının olduğu kadar kriz döneminin zorlu şartlarının da Katar'ın ilerlemesi yolunda önemli avantajlara dönüştürülmüş olmasında anahtar rol oynadığını iddia etmektedir. Bu yaklaşımla, Katar'ın neden ve ne şekilde diğer küçük Körfez ülkelerinden farklılaştığı ve bunun etkin bir uluslararası aktör olarak yükselmesi ve de bölgesel krizin ana tarafı haline gelmesi üzerindeki etkileri ortaya konmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Katar, Basra Körfezi, Ortadoğu, KİK (Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi), Körfez Krizi

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1. Introduction

Qatar has emerged perhaps as the most controversial Gulf State in the last decades becoming a central focus in changing geopolitical dynamics of the Persian Gulf in particular and the Middle East in general. While Qatar was at the focus of international attention as the rising power of the Gulf, its rise was going to be dramatically challenged by several obstructions conducted by neighbors in the post-Arab Spring era, in which regional power balances have shifted from regional integration to regional conflict. The post-Arab Spring era has introduced the toughest conflict among GCC states as a result of the political clash between the status quo and change that emerged in the Arabian Gulf. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab Emirates (UAE) led bloc has adopted two embargos on Qatar to prevent Qatar from pursuing independent policies, which are conflicting with and challenging the regional status quo. The first embargo was carried out in 2014 against Qatar for eight months, imposing change on certain policies, however was resolved by Qatar's reconciliation. The second one, launched in May 2017 with a multilayered blockade imposed on Qatar resulted in the so-called Qatar or Gulf Crisis within the ongoing stalemate in the third year. Eventually, the name of Qatar, which was representing prosperity and glory, has become the name of the regional crisis.

This paper argues that the leadership has been the key factor playing crucial role in both Qatar's transformation and crisis management through a distinctive, independent and strategic roadmap. In the first part of this paper, the first phase (1995-2013) as the period of Qatar's phenomenal transformation is analyzed based on its distinctive policies and achievements leading Qatar to upgrade to an internationally influential state. Subsequently, in the next phase (2013-), Qatar's policies and approaches towards the ongoing embargo are assessed in the framework of the political conflict emerged in the post-Arab Spring period in the Gulf. In both parts, Qatar's policies and approaches are analyzed within the framework of the leadership conception as the central determinant. The definition of the political leadership as an historical and universal phenomenon is made in broad terms depending on the political culture and system, within relation to power at core.[1] As the power of leadership in

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[1]   Jean Blondel, *Political Leadership Towards a General Analysis* (London: Sage Publications, 1987); Robert C. Tucker, *Politics as Leadership* (Columbia MO:

monarchies similar to Qatar, where leaders can exercise absolute power, is much less restricted by the institutional structure than that of democracies, the impact of leadership is quite significant in a change or conflict. Therefore, since a political process in autocratic regimes develop rather as a product of a leader`s initiative in a less complicated institutional structure and procedure, the leadership efficiency matters significantly.

Political leadership is a dynamic and multidimensional conception in which historical, geographical, social, institutional, and structural factors are taken into account besides the traits and personality of a leader. This conception enables the comparison between individual leaderships in Qatar as well as between Qatari leadership and other Gulf countries' leadership both sharing historical, geographical, systemic and political similarities. Several basic principles are defined for an effective or good[2] political leadership and leadership categories include strong, wise, charismatic, intellectual, pragmatic, revolutionary, democratic etc. Mascuili, Molchaov, and Knight sum up important aspects for an effective leadership in three key factors; strategic, tactical and innovative adaptation.[3] Similarly, the methodological approach by Andrea K. Grove defines strategies as independent variables that explain the ability of a leader to achieve successful outcomes when structural or environmental clauses enforce the conditions in both foreign and domestic policies.[4] With this perspective, the leadership conception - applied to Qatar's success - focuses on the strategies used in foreign and domestic policies demonstrating leadership skills such as strategic thinking, consistency with vision and strategic road map to explain Qatar's success rather than personality traits of leaders. In this article, the role of leadership is examined considering Qatar's exceptionalism, which helps us to understand why and how Qatar has differed from other small Gulf States emerging as the rising state and then becoming the victimized state of the region. Leaderships of two particular emirs; the former Emir Sheikh

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University of Missouri Press, 1995); Joseph Mascuilli, Milkhail A. Molchaov, and W. Andy Knight, "Political Leadership in the Context," *Ashgate Research Companion to Political Leadership*, (January, 2009): 2-26.

[2]   Joseph Nye defines good leadership based on the ability to achieve results. See Joseph Nye, *The Powers to Lead* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[3]   Mascuilli et al., "Political Leadership," 4-14.

[4]   Andrea K. Grove, *Political Leadership in Foreign Policy Manipulating Support Across Borders* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5-11.

Hamad bin Khalifah Al-Thani, whose vision and policies remarkably promoted and transformed Qatar to an internationally influential state and the current Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, who has pursued Qatar's strategic interests despite the blockade with a remarkable success in the crisis management, lie in the scope of this article.

2. Qatar's Distinctive Policies and Transformation

Three main, concurrent, and interconnected successful policies; a visionary, proactive and autonomous foreign policy, strategy of branding Qatar, and political stability and modernization determined Qatari exceptionalism and Qatar's emergence as an active and influential state in the 1995-2013 period. As this term started and ended simultaneously with the beginning and end of the rule of the former Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifah Al-Thani (1995-2013), the policies and outcomes of Qatar's transformation were developed and achieved under his leadership.

Sheikh Hamad became emir in 1995 by undertaking a bloodless coup against his father, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani, and ruled until he unprecedentedly handed his rule over his son, Tamim b. Hamad Al-Thani, in 2013. Hamad had gained leadership skills and power with substantial state experience before he took over in 1995. After graduating from the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, he became the major general of the Qatari army in 1972, where he rapidly gained power and was called a 'hero'. In 1977, he was appointed heir as he gained the trust of family members due to successful work. During the cabinet reshuffle in 1989, Hamad put many of his allies into key positions in the cabinet. This was considered the starting of a coup, and was followed by another cabinet reshuffle in 1992, which granted Hamad further power consolidation. When he started to rule, he was ready and determined to govern Qatar with new aspirations and policies both inside and outside the country. First, he accelerated the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) production that had been started by his father in the early 90s, by massive investments through the state-owned company Qatar Petroleum in cooperation with international oil companies. Qatar started exporting LNG in 1997, and a new era started in Qatar's history bringing a massive economic development that gave Emir Hamad a great fortune to achieve his high goals.

2.1. Visionary, Pro-Active, and Autonomous Foreign Policy

Qatar remarkably adopted a more independent and pro-active foreign policy by the mid 90's under the rule of Sheikh Hamad, which enabled a foreign policy based on new and broader interests and goals. In this way, Qatar acquired a new profile as an active international actor beyond what could be expected from a tiny state located in a region, in which balances of power are set by the competition of regional and global hegemonic powers.

Two significant elements, a diplomatic mastership and balancing strategy, were essential in the sustainability of Qatar's pursuit of proactive and independent foreign policy. In fact, diplomacy along with the balancing strategy has historically been among the principle assets of Qatari foreign relations in a region of never-ending power struggles.[5] Based on traditional diplomatic skills, a remarkable balancing strategy was employed with a quite pragmatic approach in foreign policy under Sheikh Hamad. Qatar strategically used advantages such as its economic power and natural gas resources as leverage in diplomacy for achieving a balance between powers.[6] Wright remarks that Qatar achieved a truly independent foreign policy and a global diplomatic role beyond the tradition of hedging in the Gulf by using its political-economic leverage as the global LNG supplier, and showing a clear shift away from the norm of traditional diplomacy within the GCC.[7] Qatar, by pursuing an independent foreign policy, could succeed to diversify its security agreements among regional and extra-regional powers. The achievement of a relatively independent and autonomous foreign policy went along with the achievement of a considerably proactive foreign policy, which usually is not a characteristic of a small and young state. This reveals visionary foreign policy goals pursued with a quite strategic approach.

The international mediating role Qatar has assumed in the last twenty years is the most prominent practice displaying the country's visionary and proactive foreign policy, which contributed substantially to its international

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[5] Allen J. Fromherz, *Qatar: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 33.

[6] Steven Wright, "Foreign Policies with International Reach the Case of Qatar," in *The Transformation of the Gulf Politics, Economics and the Global Order*, ed. David Held and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen (London: Routledge, 2011), 303-4.

[7] Ibid., 303-6.

reputation. Qatar involved in many conflict resolution initiatives as a peace broker in Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and Iraq, including several other regional conflicts by running a remarkable backchannel diplomacy. Especially Qatar's mediation in the Lebanon conflict in 2008, its most famous success, granted the country great credibility. Sheikh Hamad and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim along with his delegation achieved an agreement to establish a long-lasting peace between Hezbollah and other parties, whereby the Arab League, the UN, and France had previously failed to resolve the conflict. As a result of numerous mediation initiatives, Qatar proved a diplomatic mastership, and became a brand state in mediating, which was not the case for other small Gulf States. Qatar's proficiency and credibility in mediating attracted demands of regional actors such as South Cyprus, who requested Qatar's involvement to resolve the long-standing Cyprus conflict.[8] Qatar's reputation as an international peace broker became a phenomenon that was even reflected in pop culture, as the American TV series 'Veep' depicted Qatar as the mediator in a China related conflict in 2016.[9] The motivation behind Qatar's will to get involved in international mediation is explained in several aspects such as increasing influence, gaining value, assuming regional leadership as a prominent player at the international stage, granting access to leaders and channels of communication, and spreading ideas to help enhance personal status.[10]

Qatar's Iran policy was a significant example of an independent and autonomous foreign policy in which the balancing strategy was extensively employed. Iran, as an historic regional power with a great geopolitical importance in Middle East politics, has been a strategic partner of Qatar on geographic, historic, and energy related grounds. Qatar and Iran have developed cooperative relationships based on mutual economic and strategic interests that were mainly linked to their shared 'North Field/ South Pars' natural gas field, the largest non-associated field in the

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[8] David Roberts, "Qatari Mediation," accessed May 25, 2016, https://www.academia.edu/336597/Qatari_Mediation.

[9] Peter Kovessy, "We are counting on your leadership Ban Ki-moon Tells Qatar's Emir," *Doha News*, May 22, 2016, https://dohanews.co/counting-leadership-ban-ki-moon-tells-qatars-emir/.

[10] Roberts, "Qatari Mediation," 8-16; Mehran Kamrava, *Qatar Small State Big Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 93-5; Wright, "Foreign Policies," 305.

world. Qatar's strategic relationship with Iran was indeed challenging to its strategic alliances with both regional and global hegemonic powers, especially Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Despite Qatar's security dependence on the US, who adopted an anti-Iranian policy since the Iranian revolution, and Qatar's close partnership with the regional leader, the KSA, who has been the major rival of Iran, Qatar could manage to develop close and strategic relations with Iran based on the balancing strategy. This equipped Qatar with a reasonable autonomy against Saudi hegemony and the ability to maneuver between the US and Iran.[11]

Qatar's cultivating of relations with Israel was also a significant indication of autonomy, pragmatism, and strategic approach to foreign policy. An Israeli trade office was established in Qatar in 1996 following Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres' Doha visit, and Qatar became the first GCC State granting Israel de facto recognition.[12] Historically considered, while showing genuine and great interest in the Palestinian cause, Qatar did not hesitate to develop relations with Israel openly unlike other Gulf States during the rule of Sheikh Hamad.[13]

2.2. A Brand State

A great branding campaign was implemented in several fields including foreign policy. As such, branding Qatar in international mediating as a diplomatic force presents an example. The branding campaign was initiated along with the building of a new international profile of Qatar during Sheikh Hamad's reign.[14] The new profile or image of Qatar that was designed and strategically built in multiple areas contains two main missions. One is to demonstrate that Qatar is a benevolent and humanitarian state promoting universal values such as peace, human rights, equality, and altruism. The other is to demonstrate that Qatar is a pro-modernist state catching up with the highest technology to meet the latest standards in the fields such as

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[11]   Kamrava, *Qatar*, 72-5.

[12]   Wright, "Foreign Policies," 300.

[13]   Uzi Rabi, "Qatar's Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms," *Middle East Journal* 63, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 448-9.

[14]   Wright, "Foreign Policies," 309.

education, health and sports in line with cultural codes indicating "Qatari high modernism."[15]

Qatar's benevolence is actually attributed to its traditional background. Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed Al-Thani (1825-1913), the founder of Qatar, described Qatar in a poem he wrote as a shelter for the homeless (*Kaaba lil Madiyoum*). Hereby, he made an analogy between the Kaaba, the Muslims' Holy House that embraces all people regardless of socio-economic status, color, and ethnicity, and Qatar for hosting people, who sought refuge from persecution in the nineteenth century. Today, the modern Qatari state has provided protection for numerous people, who were exiled due to political reasons, committing to this traditional mission. Besides the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Hamas leaders, Yusuf Al-Karadavi and Khaled Mishaal, Qatar has hosted a variety of profiles of exiled people from different regional and ideological backgrounds such as the controversial Indian artist M.F. Hussain, former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al Hadithi, former Chechen leader Zalimkhan Yandarbiyev, Osama bin Laden's son Omar, and many of Saddam Hussain's family members including his wife Sajida Khayrallah, controversial Islamic preachers including the Canadian Bilal Philips and the American Wagy Ghoneim, Muawiya Wuld Sid Ahmed Taya, former Mauritanian president and his family, Abbasi Madani, former leader of Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, prominent Libyan cleric Ali Al Sallabi, and former Palestinian Knesset member Azmi Bishara.[16]

While Qatar's hospitality was used as a foreign policy strategy providing Qatar leverage against other regimes,[17] the variety of the profiles belonging to different political and ethnic backgrounds that Qatar has hosted, indicates an implication of branding Qatar as a benevolent state advocating universal values such as promoting human rights and peace as seen in the peace negotiations. Indeed, Qatar is one of the states involved in humanitarian diplomacy with its active use of humanitarian and development assistance that reach more than 25 countries.[18]

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[15] Kamrava, *Qatar*, 153-6.

[16] David Roberts, "Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?," *Middle East Policy* XXI, no. 3 (Fall, 2014): 90; Fromherz, *Qatar*, 90.

[17] Fromherz, *Qatar*, 90.

[18] Antonio De Lauri, "Humanitarian Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda," *Michelsen Institute CMI Brief*, no. 4 (2018): 1-4.

The Al-Jazeera news network is one of the major brands of Qatar, and has had a great impact on Qatar's regional influence and worldwide reputation. Established in 1996 by Sheikh Hamad and unlike other Arabic state sponsored channels, Al-Jazeera has obtained a broadcasting quality and advocated freedom of speech especially for people under oppression. In 2006, Al-Jazeera International (in English) was launched, and became an alternative to big international media channels such as CNN or BBC. Al-Jazeera's critical broadcast rapidly helped Qatar to exert influence in the Middle East by rising political awareness in Arab societies. In the beginning of the Arab Spring, Al-Jazeera played a critical role in spreading ideas throughout the Middle East, and informing both regional and international audiences of the revolutions. In fact, Al-Jazeera has been considered a soft power tool providing Qatar with a comparative advantage over its neighbors in exerting influence, branding, and profile-building.

Qatar's involvement in hosting major international sports events such as the 2006 Asian Games, IAAF World Indoor Championships, and the successful bid of hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, have also contributed to its international reputation. Major Qatari brands such as Qatar Airways that launched in 1997 and emerged as an international brand in competition with European and American firms such as the Qatar Foundation, a great entrepreneurship in education and culture, and Qatar's grand museums that are significant examples of Qatar's branding emphasizing the pro-modernization profile of Qatar constructed in cultural and technologic realms at the global level.

Another field, in which Qatar has emerged as an international actor, is finance. The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) established in 2005 manages Qatar's Sovereign Wealth Funds' global investments. The majority of investments were made in major European firms such as Porsche with 10%, Volkswagen Group, Siemens, Deutsche Bank, London Stock Exchange with 24%, Barclays and Harrods, Total, GDF Suez, France Telekom, and a 10% share in OMX, the Nordic Stock Exchange in Stockholm, are among Qatari investments along several others in New York and Washington.[19] A substantial stake of Qatar's investments is made

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[19]   Tarek Cherkaoui, "Qatar's Public Diplomacy, International Broadcasting and the Gulf Crisis," *Rising Powers Quarterly* 3, no 3 (December 2018): 132-3.

in the Middle East as foreign aid in many countries like Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Eritrea, Indonesia are crucial for development projects in infrastructure, health, energy and communication.[20] Foreign investments have provided Qatar with substantial gravity in foreign policy, diplomacy, regional influence, and in branding Qatar.

2.3. Domestic Achievements

Qatar realized a remarkable transformation at domestic level through two major and concurrent achievements under Sheikh Hamad. The first one is the rapid economic and social development and modernization towards a knowledge-based economy. Qatar's economic growth went in parallel with its growth as a LNG exporter that started in 1997, and so Qatar became the world's largest LNG exporter by 2006. The LNG business granted Qatar enormous wealth with the highest growth rate in its Gross Domestic Product among the GCC and countries with large economies like China, Singapore, and Norway between 2000-2011.[21] Qatar accomplished a rapid and great modernization project along with economic growth building on its cultural heritage and identity. While Qatar was adapting to globalization through modernization, Qatari high modernization was created with formations of its own designs and interpretations of Qatari culture that are mainly rooted in Islamic and Arabian Gulf traditions. This innovative approach was reflected in the life style ranging from architecture to arts in rebuilding Qatar.

The other equally significant achievement at the domestic level was the achievement of Qatar's political stability. While Qatar's political system was remaining the same, namely an autocratic monarchy, which was even strengthened, the state power and political stability have been consolidated upon the achievement of a state-society alliance. The state, which consists of the ruling family, reinforced relations with the society by including major tribes into state mechanisms and granting them shares in terms of profit and participation. Kamrava explains how new established institutions, mostly state-owned corporations, have functioned significantly in restructuring

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20   Roberts "Qatari Mediation," 8-20; Kamrava, *Qatar*, 97-9.
21   Ibrahim Ibrahim and Frank Harrigan, "Qatar's economy: Past, present and future," *QScience Connect*, no. 1 (January 2012).

state-society relations by rearranging the distribution of power and wealth among influential families and effective merchant groups.[22] The fact that Qatar's indigenous population is very small provided advantageous conditions in restructuring state-society relations for the Qatari government. As a result, the achievement of a powerful and politically robust state with a wealthy society promoted Qatari nationalism and pride.

2.3.1. Qatari Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood

Qatar's religious orientation adheres to the Wahhabi creed that follows the Hanbali school of thought of Sunni Islam. The provenance of Qatar's Wahhabism rooted in the fact that the Al-Thanis, the ruling family of Qatar, immigrated to Qatar in the 17th century from the town of Ushayqir in the Najd province of Saudi Arabia, where the founder of Wahhabism, Imam Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhabi's tribe resided.[23] This affinity of creed constituted a special tie between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and proved essential in their historic kinship. The Qatar National Mosque, opened in 2011, was named after Mohammad bin Abdel-Wahhab to show the loyalty of Qatar to the roots of the nation's creed.

However, Qatari interpretation of Wahhabism demonstrates substantial differences from Saudi Wahhabism. It has traditionally followed a more moderate line than Saudi Wahhabism. Especially during the 1990's, liberalism spread in the society. For instance, women rights in Qatar were much more advanced than in Saudi Arabia, which is one of the concrete indicators of Qatar's moderation. Saudi women just recently obtained the right of driving, while Qatari women already had driving and travel rights without needing approval of a male guardian as well as they hold equal public presence with men unlike Saudi women. Similarly, the right to vote was recently granted to Saudi women for the first time in the municipal elections of 2015, while in Qatar, women can vote and candidate in elections since the 1997. In 1998, female participation in municipal elections was 47%. The percentage of Qatari women in the total workforce is with 51.8% the highest in the Gulf. Several outstanding profiles have

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22 Kamrava, *Qatar*, 149-52.

23 Yousof Ibrahim Al-Abdulla, *A Study of Qatari-British Relations 1914-1945 (*Doha: Orient Publishing, 1985), 15.

represented Qatari women at high level positions such as Sheikha Moza, the Chairperson of the Qatar Foundation, the wife of Sheikh Hamad, who has an outstanding profile representing modern Qatari women with her fashionable hijab style and her international connections.[24] Alya bint Ahmed Al-Thani, the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the UN, the fifth President of Qatar University (2003-2015), Prof. Sheikha Abdulla Al-Misnad and the Chairperson of the Qatar Museums, Sheikha Mayassa bint Hamad Al-Thani, the daughter of Sheikh Hamad are other famous examples of women empowerment.

There is a substantial link between Qatar's distinctive interpretation of Wahhabism and Qatar's historical relations with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organization. Qatar's affinity with the MB dates back to the time of British hegemony. In the early 1950's, Muslim Brotherhood teachers had come to Qatar to start informal teachings, and later got involved in the institutionalization of national education. MB scholars who were leading members of the organization like Yusuf Al-Karadawi and Hasan Al-Banna and their friends were very influential in Qatar's education and bureaucratic systems throughout the state formation.[25] Personal affinities came along with ideological affinity, and the MB ideology had a significant impact on the state of Qatar with political and social implications. Sheikh Qaradawi, the founder and dean of the Sharia Faculty of the Qatar University, was quite influential in Islamic theology as well as Islamic law, and his teachings had great impact on shaping the country's religious identity and education.[26] Therefore the MB-inspired approach, defined as moderate political Islam, reshaped Qatar's religious and ideological identity differing from Saudi Wahhabism. Moreover, this approach adopted by Sheikh Hamad was an effective factor in Qatar's achievement of modernization. According to Andrew Hommand, the mosque of Abdel-Wahhab opened by Skeikh Hamad in Doha "represented a challenge to Saudi Arabia for implying that Qatar's moderated Wahhabism – its Salafi-Brotherhood hybrid – is

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[24]   "Moza Bint Nasser" accessed May 23, 2019, http://www.mozabintnasser.qa/en/Pages/ MozabintNasser/Biography.aspx.

[25]   See Roberts, "Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood," Kamrava, *Qatar*, xiii-xiv.

[26]   David H. Warren, "Qatari Support for the Muslim Brotherhood is More Than Just Realpolitik, It has a Long Personal History," *The Maydan*, July 12, 2017, https://www. themaydan.com/2017/07/qatari-support-muslim-brotherhood-just-realpolitik-long-personal-history/.

the true representative of Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab's message as a "renewer" (mujaddid) of the faith."[27] Qatar's affiliation with the MB had also major impact on Qatar's distinctive foreign policy and in Sheikh Hamad's regional power projection through the MB and other MB-linked groups like the Hamas.

2.4. Assessment of the Leadership in a Transforming Qatar

Qatar's phenomenal transformation from a tiny unpopular Gulf monarchy into a modern, politically robust, and internationally influential state exceeding its small size and population, historical, and geopolitical limits, brought about a relative state power that it never had before. The state power Qatar gained at the international stage is widely referred to as 'soft power' in the literature. Kamrava defines the kind of power that Qatar obtained as *subtle power* distinct from hard, soft, and smart power types.[28] His definition of subtle power indicates the role of agency rather than size and institutional capacity of the state, as he explains: "More specifically, subtle power emerges not so much as a result of a confluence of institutional and structural forces, but instead a product of deliberate decisions and carefully choices made by policymakers."[29] This conception indicates that centralized decision-making mechanisms of Qatar's political system lacking in institutional tradition and democracy is actually advantageous for providing the ruler with much more agility to pursue great aspirations. Thus, such power projection can be pursued through less complicated procedures of policy making and implementing by the centralized authority depending on the leadership aspects. This is the core of how leadership as an independent variable can vitally matter in such political systems. Therefore, Qatar's transformation was accomplished due to leadership success that merged central political power with maintaining consistency in key leadership aspects that significantly matter in transforming state assets into the state power. The key leadership aspects as main determinants of success can be briefly defined as wide vision and strategic thinking.

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27 Andrew Hammond, "Qatar's Leadership Transition: Like Father Like Son," *European Council of Foreign Relations*, no. 95 (February 2014): 4.

28 Kamrava, *Qatar*, 53-68.

29 Ibid., 65.

Projecting high aspirations and goals for his country at domestic, regional, and global levels is a clear indication of Sheikh Hamad's wide vision. Through such a wide vision, he shaped and developed distinctive foreign and domestic policies to initiate reconstruction of Qatar through economic and social development and rapid modernization, in parallel to the construction of a new international profile of Qatar based on strategic thinking. Pursuing great ambitions in international conflict mediation and international investment, using Al-Jazeera along several other branding campaigns that all together built a new international profile of Qatar in consistency, is overall the product of a remarkable vision of the ruler of a tiny and young state. The strategic approach adopted in pursuing such assertive policies towards high goals on the new road map and resulted with the success and sustainability is the significant indicator of the strategic thinking ability of the ruler. The key strategy used by Sheikh Hamad was the balancing strategy as Kamrava remarks.[30] A multilevel balancing strategy was employed between the state and society, tradition and modern, and between the powers in foreign relations in Qatar's autonomous path.

3. Qatar under Attack in the Post-Arab Spring Context

3.1. Political Clash in the Gulf

Qatar's spectacular rise has been exposed to a great obstruction of the dramatic changes in regional political dynamics in the wake of the Arab Spring. Arab uprisings in 2011 spread throughout the Middle East with a domino effect including the Gulf, particularly Bahrain and Oman. It created great fear for the regimes of Gulf States, and regime security became the central matter in the emergence of the political clash between GCC States, which were divided into two blocs with different approaches towards regime security in the post-Arab Spring period. The KSA - United Arab Emirates (UAE) - Bahrain bloc has adopted the policy of safeguarding the regional status quo to secure their regimes against the Iranian regime, the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups like Hamas representing political Islam that has been perceived as a great threat. The rising popularity of moderate political Islam among Middle Eastern societies, inspired by Turkey's

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[30] See Kamrava, *Qatar*, 133-7.

ruling Islamic oriented Justice and Development Party that proved being politically and economically successful, made Gulf Monarchies fear for their regimes security, and prompted them to fight it by using their financial powers. Therefore, the first democratically elected government of Egypt, government of the Freedom and the Justice Party founded by the MB, was overturned by a military coup that was supported financially and politically by the KSA. The KSA and the UAE started to impose oppressive measures against the MB that has been at the very center of the threat perception of political Islam undermining the legitimacy of Gulf regimes. The other bloc, without alliance, consisted of Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman whose regime security approaches did not have the same threat perceptions against these groups for different reasons.

Qatar did not define political Islam as a source of threat for its regime unlike the Saudi led bloc because of its ideological preferences[31] and its reliance on political stability. On the contrary, Qatar supported popular movements in the Middle East against the dictatorships for democratic change, the MB in Egypt, Al-Nahda in Tunisia, Hamas in Palestine and the oppositions in Libya and Syria. Based on the historical Qatar-MB alliance as explained above, Qatar ideologically and politically favored the MB, and did not see it as a threat. Moreover, MB members in and outside Qatar were already allied with the Qatari state. Qatar's relatively benign and stable autocratic regime has not been threatened by a serious opposition or uprising during and after the Arab Spring except rare individual and symbolic criticisms.

Although Qatar's power projection in the region did not succeed along with the failure of Arab uprisings, except Tunisia, Qatar has pursued similar independent foreign policy approaches in the post-Arab Spring era. It has continued to hold close relations with the MB, while keeping distance to the military government in Egypt. It has also continued its support to the opposition in Syria and Libya, and maintained relations with Iran. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and the UAE officially designated the MB as a terrorist group in 2014. The Saudi government banned the Saudi branch of the MB from operating in the Kingdom, and in 2015 ordered the removal of books authored by MB scholars from the schools. The conflict between the policies of Qatar and the KSA-BAE-Bahrain bloc resulted in a political

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[31]   See Hammond, "Qatar's Leadership," 4-5; Roberts, "Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood."

clash emerged in the Gulf in the post-Arab Spring context. Qatar, whose regional power projection was a challenge to the Saudi-UAE led regional status quo, was seen as a threat backing "terrorist" groups, and has thus been put at the target. Consequently, Qatar found itself in the middle of anti-Qatar campaigns and was exposed to two subsequent embargos launched by the regional status quo powers. The aim was to deter Qatar from pursuing its policies by accusing the country for supporting terrorism in the first phase, and then to punish it with isolation and the imposition of an unproportioned embargo.

This obstruction, which Qatar was confronted with on the way of rising, coincided with the beginning of the term of the new emir, Sheikh Tamim, who took over after his father Sheikh Hamad in 2013. Sheikh Tamim, a Sandhurst graduate, joined Qatar's Armed Forces, and was appointed heir in 2003. He underwent a leadership training through which he had gained remarkable military and political experience as the Deputy Commander in Chief of Armed Forces as well as the chair of a number of state institutions such as the Supreme Education Council, Supreme Council of Health, Supreme Council of Environment, Natural Reserves, and several others. He had proved his success with the military involvement in Libya in the overthrow of Qaddafi. However, the timing of his father's passing the rule onto him, while he was young enough and able to rule, was controversial regarding changing dynamics in the regional political landscape. Sheikh Hamad's unexpected decision in such a critical time has been interpreted as a maneuver to prevent the Qatari government of being accused for backing Islamists, as a result of the failure of the regional policies that Qatar pursued in Egypt and Syria under his leadership that has changed Qatar's leadership profile.[32]

In March 2014, the KSA, the UAE, and Bahrain initiated a boycott on Qatar by withdrawing their ambassadors from Doha and cutting diplomatic relations in an unprecedented way. In return, Qatar avoided reciprocating and did not withdraw Qatari ambassadors from these neighboring countries. Instead, the Qatari leadership under Sheikh Tamim made a remarkable effort towards promoting dialogue and maintaining relations with these states during eight months of the crisis.

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[32]   Hammond, "Qatar's Leadership," 7-8.

Although relations turned to the normal in the end, the 2014 crisis was actually signaling a deepening of the political division in the Gulf that paved the way to the dissolution of the GCC based on the clash of ideologies, interests, and preferences. Both sides, the KSA-UAE-Bahrain bloc and Qatar, continued with their clashing regional policies. In October 2014, the KSA launched an oil price war against Iran and its ally Russia by increasing the oil production in order to decrease prices. Oil prices experienced a sharp fall from the monthly peak of $112 pro barrel to the lowest point falling under $35 pro barrel in February 2016. The Saudi launched oil war had effect even on Gulf States' economies including the KSA itself. It added economic disadvantages to challenging geopolitical circumstances, and the new Emir had to urge restrictive measures such as budget cut. The anti-Qatar campaign was expanded including the accusation of Qatar with bribery in obtaining the bid to host the FIFA World Cup 2022. The UAE, in rivalry with Qatar for hosting this event, launched media campaigns to preclude Qatar's bid.[33]

After the new Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz took office in 2015, he adopted a flexible policy towards the MB decreasing tensions. However, the regional tension and polarization against Iran was re-escalated following the Iran Nuclear Deal. The deal, promising a gradual normalization after decades of hostility and sanctions, met great opposition from the status-quo powers, namely the KSA and Israel[34] while it was welcomed and supported by Qatar.[35] Iran reemerged as the greatest threat and became the central matter in the regional political rift. Although the GCC's anti-Iranian campaign was resulted with some fluctuations in Qatar-Iran relations in the aftermath, the essential friendship remained through mutual approaches avoiding conflict.[36] The KSA-UAE coalition started a war in Yemen in 2015 against the Houthis, which were perceived as Iranian proxies. So the war aimed to weaken Iranian influence in the region. Qatar had to join the

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33   Cherkaoui, "Qatar's Public Diplomacy," 138-9.

34   Mehran Kamrava, "Hierarchy and Stability in the Middle East Regional Order," *International Studies Journal*, 14, no. 4 (Spring, 2018): 11-4.

35   Mehran Kamrava, "Iran-Qatar Relations," in *Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours*, ed. Gawdat Bagdat, Anoushiravan Ehtehami, and Neil Qulliam (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 178.

36   Ibid., 168.

coalition initially but with a limited involvement, and remained within this coalition until being expelled by the KSA on the course of the Gulf crisis.[37]

3.2. Eruption of the Qatar Crisis

The new US administration under Donald Trump, who won the 2016 presidential elections, provided great support for the power projection of the regional status quo. President Trump immediately positioned himself on the side of Israel, and strengthened the US alliance with the KSA-UAE bloc whose interests and security policies have aligned with that of Israel in the regional status quo framework that is mainly based on the hostility towards Iran and the MB.[38] In fact, Trump immediately announced his anti-Iran policy, declaring Iran as the greatest enemy demonstrating a sharp U-turn from Obama's stance and denying the Nuclear Deal. It meant a great revival for KSA-US relations, which had deteriorated recently under Obama, and the US emerged as the biggest power backing the KSA-UAE coalition. Trump's first overseas trip to the Middle East that was pictured with the symbolic pose of Trump, the Saudi King Salman, and the Egyptian leader Sisi holding the globe together was a clear hint at the implications of a new regional order. Just within a couple of weeks, the KSA, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt announced that they severed ties with Qatar, and launched an air, land, and sea blockade accusing Qatar of fomenting regional unrest, supporting terrorism and getting too close to Iran, what has triggered off the ongoing Gulf crisis. Kuwait and Oman have adopted neutral positions.

In the same time, Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the young son of the Saudi King, was appointed crown prince replacing his cousin, Mohammed bin Nayef, who was the first-in-line to succeed the king. MbS was granted power as the de facto ruler of KSA, which was the result of his commitment to American authorities with whom he had made contact through the support

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[37]　"Qatar was Obliged to Join Saudi Coalition in Yemen," *Middle East Monitor*, July 19, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170719-qatar-was-obliged-to-join-saudi-coalition-in-yemen/.

[38]　See Adam Entous, "Donald Trumps's New World Order," *The New Yorker*, June 18, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/donald-trumps-new-world-order.

of Emirati Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ).[39] Therefore, the Qatar blockade was carried out in the framework of recently shaped power trajectory led by the empowered Saudi authority and backed by the Trump's America. In the aftermath of the eruption of the crisis, Trump made a statement to blame Qatar for supporting terrorism indicating his position in supporting the blockade to punish Qatar although other US authorities such as the Foreign Secretary and the Pentagon presented contrary attitudes towards the blockade. The President's son in law and advisor for the Middle East region, Jared Kushner's close friendship with both crown princes of the KSA and the UAE was an important factor in his alliance with the KSA-UAE bloc.[40]

In the following days of the blockade, Qatar was requested 13 demands, which were undermining Qatar's sovereignty and incompatible with the principles of international law.[41] Curbing diplomatic ties with Iran, severing all ties with "terrorist organizations" like the MB, the Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda, shutting down Al-Jazeera, and immediately terminating the Turkish military presence were among the 13 demands, which were expected to be met within ten days in order to lift the blockade. However, Qatar did not compromise upon any of the impositions that all meant to breach Qatari sovereignty including the abandoning of own policies. The stalemated and unreasonable blockade from land, the border between the KSA and Qatar, sea and air routes, which were all closed to Qatari transportation and trade, caused devastating economic and social challenges for Qatar. The Qataris have been exposed to severe conditions of food shortage, travel ban, deportation, and family separation imposed by their neighbor countries.[42] The blockade created considerably serious emergency for the security of Qatar as Saudi forces were deployed on the Qatar-Saudi border. A military attack aiming to overthrow the regime in Qatar was a possibility. Overall, the embargo was aiming to force Qatar to change direction in independent and pro-active foreign policy and branding, which have

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[39]   Ibid.

[40]   Ibid.

[41]   Richard Falk, "The Gulf Crisis Reassessed," *Foreign Policy Journal*, March 14, 2018, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2018/03/14/the-gulf-crisis-reassessed/.

[42]   See Tamara Kharroub, "Understanding of the Humanitarian Costs of the Blockade," in *The GCC Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality,* ed. Zeina Hazzam and Imad Harb (Washington DC: Arab Center, 2018), 91-9.

been strategically cultivated since the mid 1990's. In response, the Qatari government did reciprocate neither with an aggressive discourse nor by launching restrictions. For instance, Qatar did not stop supplying LNG to the UAE despite the embargo[43] proving its capability of keeping rationality within a strategic approach.

The crisis hit Qatar substantially, however, it hit the GCC too, considerably damaging the regional unity and solidarity, which had been achieved mainly through socio-economic integration in decades. The political conflict and division in the GCC resulting in the most serious crisis has caused the GCC to lose ground and relevance as an institution able to function in conflict resolution and in being a platform of shared interests and unity.[44] The blockade of Qatar was launched against the principles of the GCC Common Market signed in 2007 that called for the free flow people, goods, and capital between member states. The blockade thus undermined the Common Market.[45] The 2017 GCC Summit, the first one after the eruption of the Gulf Crisis, could not bring Gulf leaders together except for the Qatari Emir and the hosting leader, the Kuwaiti Emir. The Saudi and Emirati crown princes formed a bilateral KSA-UAE cooperation agreement instead of reviving the GCC, and announced that they would develop a new political and military alliance, which meant the deepening of the division in the declining unity of the GCC.

Following the initial period of shock, Qatar quickly adopted a strategic approach to transform challenging circumstances into the advantages. The emergency situation arising with food shortage and national security urged Qatar to empower its state capacity in two ways; to diversify its economy and security relations and to improve its energy capacity. Qatar improved its trade relations with regional allies such as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan,

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[43]   Qatar's LNG supply to the UAE through the Dolphin pipeline has been integral for the UAE's energy security while major Qatari LNG exports are delivered beyond Gulf countries. See Gabriel Collins, "Anti-Qatar Embargo Grinds Toward Strategic Failure," in *The GCC Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality,* ed. Zeina Hazzam and Imad Harb (Washington DC: Arab Center, 2018), 61-4.

[44]   Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Missed Opportunities and Failed Integration in the GCC," in *The GCC Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality,* ed. Zeina Hazzam and Imad Harb (Washington DC: Arab Center, 2018), 54-6.

[45]   Abdullah Babood, "The International Implications of the GCC Stalemate," in *The GCC Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality,* ed. Zeina Hazzam and Imad Harb (Washington DC: Arab Center, 2018), 112.

and quickly secured food supplies. The Turkish government immediately issued fast-tracking deployments of several troops to the Tarik bin Ziyad military base in Qatar, in the second day of the blockade.[46] The Qatar Emiri Armed Forces (QEAF) improved their capacity by restructuring and advancing naval, land, and air forces through joint exercises and trainings with the US, British, and French military forces. Qatar has also expanded the defense cooperation with the US through the enlarging the American base in Qatar.[47] Hence, Qatar has strategically embarked on advancing its security capacity within a diversified security system.

3.3. Confidence and Strategic Steps

Having completed a year by overcoming the challenges under the blockade, Qatar has entered a new phase in which it gained confidence and strength in pursuing an independent path outside the regional hegemony and status quo despite the continuity of the embargo. Qatar successfully managed to transform grave conditions of the siege into opportunities to strengthen its capacity based on the strategic use of advantages and leverage under Sheikh Tamim's leadership. Significant steps were taken that showed the increased confidence of Qatar in the fields of energy, economy, and autonomous foreign policy in the new phase. For instance, on May 27, 2018, Qatar gave the order to ban KSA-UAE-Bahrain-Egypt products on Qatari markets, which indicates that Qatar has achieved trade security and is no longer depended on the neighbors.

Qatar, being aware of its advantages such as hosting an American military base, occupying the leading position in the LNG export and having substantial investments in European countries, has strategically used these advantages not only for overcoming the blockade but also for reinforcing relations. Hosting the largest American overseas air base, Al-Udeid, with about 11.000 personnel and a very strategic position and facilities, has provided Qatar with a significant diplomatic leverage to neutralize Trump's political biases against itself. Qatar has strategically sought to expand the

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[46] Baabood, "The International Implications," 113.

[47] ACW Research Team, "Qatar's Military Response to the National Emergency," *The GCC Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality,* ed. Zeina Hazzam and Imad Harb (Washington DC: Arab Center, 2018), 77.

level of cooperation with the US through arms purchase and investments. As the largest LNG supplier to many European and Asian countries, Qatar's worldwide relations have played a considerable role in reinforcing its sovereignty and reaffirming the importance of its security and stability in the international arena. Qatar announced a strategic decision to increase LNG production by 20% in order to enlarge its exporting capacity and with it the Qatari impact on global energy markets.[48] Qatar's purchase of arms and large investments in European countries such as the UK, Germany and France, have gained the support of these countries against the blockade. This indicates that Qatar has obtained an inevitable position due to its energy power and financial and commercial capacities in the West despite the quartet's anti-Qatar lobbying efforts and media campaigns launched in the US and Europe. Likewise, Qatar-Russia s considerably strengthened through military and economic cooperation and Russia's political support for Qatar in the blockade.

The developments related to the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2, 2018, leaving MbS and his government in trouble, urged the Saudi government to present an ostensibly softened approach towards Qatar in order to fix its highly damaged image and to appease growing international criticism. King Salman invited the Qatari Emir to the 2018 GCC Summit in December. Emir Tamim's refusal of the Saudi invitation to attend the summit was significantly strategic, namely not to let the KSA government to use Qatar's attendance to recover its heavily damaged international credibility and to demonstrate Qatar's contravention to the GCC, which was an individually driven institution and no longer relevant for regional unity. Consequently, the Emir did also not attend the next summit in December 2019, which was a reaction to the continuing blockade imposing 13 demands.

Qatar's surprising decision to leave the OPEC by January 2019 due to invest in the LNG field was a clear indication of Qatar's refusal of Saudi hegemony, which shaped regional energy affairs within the OPEC. However, this decision has broader strategic implications for Qatar's future plans in terms of energy investments and cooperation beyond regional borders.[49]

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[48]   Collins, "Anti-Qatar Embargo," 63-4.

[49]   Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Why is Qatar Leaving Opec," *New York Times*, December 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/opinion/qatar-leaving-opec-saudi-arabia-blockade-failure.html.

Qatar's investment of $500 million in Lebanese government bonds was also a very strategic move to exert influence by filling the vacuum left by the declining Saudi influence in Lebanon.[50] Besides Lebanon, Qatar's continuing pro-active involvement in the Middle East with generous investments in Palestine, Sudan, and Iraq has challenged the KSA-UAE led status quo in the region. Emir Tamim's Iran visit during the US-Iran tension following the assassination of General Qassem Souleimani in January 2020 was also significant in demonstrating Qatar's consistency in pursuing an independent foreign policy by showing support for the regional ally as well as assuming the role of a mediator between the parties.

3.4. An Assessment of Qatari Leadership in the Crisis

These strategic steps show that Qatar has grown stronger and more confident under the embargo based on a successful crisis management and an active international profile with impact on the regional balance of power. It indicates the continuity of the trend adopted in Qatar's transformation under Sheikh Tamim's leadership. Sheikh Tamim's determination has been essential in pursuing Qatar's independent path despite challenging circumstances, as he stated in a speech: "We don't live on the edge of life, lost without direction, and we are not answerable to anyone or wait for anyone for instructions. Qatar is known for its independent behavior now and those who deal with us know we have our own visions."[51] Sheikh Tamim's remarkable success in crisis management led Qatar to overcome the crisis strongly and confidently. As a result, Sheikh Tamim has not only guaranteed the survival of Qatar but also managed to keep intact the country's transformation by strengthening state capacity and pursuing independent foreign policy. Therefore, the success of Hamad's leadership must not be underestimated compared to the phenomenal success of his father.

The success of Sheikh Tamim's leadership proved that the leadership conception of Qatar was already consolidated and sustainable enough to

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[50]   Giorgio Cafiero, "Qatar Challenges Saudi Influence in Lebanon," *Al-Monitor*, January 24, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/01/qatar-challenge-saudi-influence-lebanon-tamim.html.

[51]   Hammond, "Qatar's Leadership," 6.

be transferred to the new leader, who had gained the same vision and could pursue Qatar's independent path. From this perspective, Sheikh Hamad's early retirement can be the result of the likelihood that he wanted to give his son an opportunity for in-power training by granting him support and consultancy while maintaining remote control when he was still healthy. These factors however would not have played an effective role if they had not met matching leadership skills of Sheikh Hamad.

4. Conclusion

Qatar realized a sharp transition from the context of the rising period to the context of the ongoing crisis period in parallel with dramatically changing regional and geopolitical balances. Nevertheless, Qatar has preserved its political and economic stability and distinctive policies; with having goals and strategies remained intact. Qatar's success overall highlights the impact of such a strong and effective leadership conception that was shaped by Sheikh Hamad and inherited to Sheikh Tamim. Sheikh Hamad transformed Qatar from a tiny state to a popular state and the world's largest LNG supplier. Sheikh Tamim, while having advantages of running an already established successful system, has been challenged with greater disadvantages to maintain power in the face of dramatically changing regional dynamics and the brutal conditions of isolation.

The political conflict emerged in the Gulf in the wake of the Arab Spring between the status quo and change, which was the result of a regional rift. The hostility of the neighbors led Qatar to adhere more firmly to own policies and interests instead of making compromise. Consequently, the embargo resulted in the opposite of what had been intended. First of all, by imposing such an embargo on Qatar, the blockading quartet could not achieve the goal of making Qatar surrender or weaken. On the contrary, embargo conditions forced Qatar to grow stronger politically, militarily and economically, and the crisis has resulted in the increase in Qatar's confidence, political stability and national solidarity. The ongoing blockade could not change the preferences of Qatar's autonomous foreign policy, on the contrary, contributed to Qatar's further improvement of the relations with Iran and other regional actors like Turkey and Pakistan. Qatar has kept its support for the MB and Hamas, and maintained its Al-Jazeera

broadcasting. Qatar is still an active and influential international actor in several fields from finance to diplomacy. Therefore, the embargo imposed on Qatar is considered a total strategic failure.[52]

Qatar today is still seen as a brand state of international mediating, a financial hub, and a strategic destination in the global map hosting hundreds of international events a year. It can be presumed that Qatar will continue to follow its strategic road map under the leadership of Sheikh Tamim in medium and long terms, while the regional conflict will continue to deepen the political rift towards dissolution of the GCC and the destruction of regional unity.

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52   Collins, "Anti-Qatar Embargo," 59-69.

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"Nomads" and "Mountaineers": A Historical Survey of Turk/Turkmen – Kurd Interrelations

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Abstract

Following Turkey's recent military operation in Syria (Operation Peace Spring), "Turks" and "Kurds" have widely been dichotomized by the Western media outlets and political circles. US President Donald Trump even claimed that "Turks" and "Kurds" have been fighting for hundreds of years, and that they are "natural enemies." However, the complex historical relationship of "Turks" and "Kurds," as a loosely connected social totality prior to the age of nationalism, refutes such sloppy and feeble contentions. This work presents an identity-driven historical survey of Turkish/Turkmen societies' and polities' interrelations with Kurdish collectivities until the emergence of modern nationhood and nationalism. In doing so, this article provides an ideational and narrational context feeding the Turkish government's contemporary relationship with the Kurds of the Middle East. The major complication in journalistic and academic literature is rooted in the lack or omission of historical background informing current policy choices influenced by how relevant actors historically perceive each other. Today's incidents and facts such as the "solution process," "village guard system" or different Kurdish collectivities' positions between Iran and Turkey are sometimes akin to precedent events in history. This work aims to make a holistic contribution to fill this gap and to provide a succinct historical overview of interrelations.

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"Göçebeler" ve "Dağlılar": Türk/Türkmen – Kürt İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Bir İncelemesi

Mustafa Onur Tetik[*]

Öz

Türkiye'nin Suriye'de YPG'ye karşı başlattığı Barış Pınarı Operasyonu'yla beraber "Türkler" ve "Kürtler," Batı medyası ve siyasi çevreler tarafından yaygın bir şekilde ve söylemsel olarak iki karşıt grup olarak tasvir edildi. Amerikan Başkanı Donald Trump, "Türkler" ve "Kürtlerin" yüzyıllardır birbirleriyle savaştığını ve bundan dolayı "doğal düşmanlar" olduklarını bile iddia etti. Ancak milliyetçilik çağı öncesinde gevşek bağlarla bağlı birer sosyal bütünsellik olan "Türkler" ve "Kürtlerin" karmaşık tarihsel ilişkileri bu tarz temelsiz ve zayıf iddiaları çürütmektedir. Bu çalışma Türk/Türkmen toplum ve siyasi teşekküllerin Kürt toplulukları ile modern millet ve milliyetçiliğin doğuşuna kadar olan dönemdeki karşılıklı ilişkilerini kimlik temelli bir perspektiften tarihsel olarak incelemektedir. Böylece bu makale, Türk hükümetinin Türkiye'nin içerisindeki ve dışarısındaki Kürtler ile olan ilişkilerini besleyen fikri ve söylemsel bağlamı ortaya koymaktadır. Güncel basın ve akademik literatürdeki büyük problem, ilgili aktörlerin birbirlerini algılama biçimleri ile mevcut siyasi tercihlerini besleyen tarihsel arka plan bilgisinin göz ardı edilmesidir. "Çözüm süreci," "koruculuk sistemi" ya da farklı Kürt grupların İran ve Türkiye arasında konumlanması gibi bugünün olgu ve olayları bazen tarihte daha önce gerçekleşmiş olaylara benzemektedir. Bu çalışma bahsedilen boşluğu doldurmaya bütüncül bir katkı için karşılıklı ilişkilerin tarihsel bir hülasasını ortaya koyacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk-Kürt İlişkileri, Kürt Kimliği, Türk Milli Devleti, Tarihsel Analiz, Düşünsel Bağlam

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1. Introduction

When Turkey launched military operation against YPG forces (Syrian offshoot of the PKK that is designated as terrorist organization by the US, the EU, Turkey and others) in Syria in October 2019, US President Donald Trump, claiming that Turks and Kurds as "natural enemies" have been fighting for hundreds of years, ordered the withdrawal of US troops and declared that the US did not have any desire to be involved in such a historical conflict. Although, this assertion was widely deemed false or distorted, the hegemonic narrative in the Western media has still kept dichotomizing Turks and Kurds as deadly enemies. When the lack of nuanced knowledge on Turkey's historical relations with different Kurdish groups couples with the political anti-Trump wave and the US bureaucracy's firm pro-Kurdish disposition, an oversimplified, hyperbolic and conflictive narrative dominates the media and political landscape throughout the world.

This work presents an identity-driven historical survey of Turkish/ Turkmen societies' and polities'[1] interrelations with Kurdish collectivities until the emergence of modern nationhood and nationalism. In doing so, this article provides an ideational and narrational context feeding Turkey's contemporary relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, Syrian Kurds and its own citizens of Kurdish descent. It also provides a historical background on the role played by Kurdish groups in rivalry between regional powers. The major complication in journalistic and academic literature regarding Turkey's overall relations with Kurds is the lack or omission of historical background information about how relevant political actors historically perceive each other, which influences current policy choices. Today's incidents and facts such as the "solution process", "village guard system" *(korucu sistemi)* or different Kurdish collectivities' positioning between Iran and Turkey are sometimes akin to precedent events in history. This work aims to be a holistic contribution to fill this gap by providing a succinct historical overview of interrelations.

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[1] All pre-modern governing political entities are called "polities" throughout the article instead of state since they were not "states" as we understand the "state" in the modern form. The concept of "polity" is a broader term than the state and covers various forms of governing political entities.

David Campbell fairly argues that "identity is an inescapable dimension of being. Nobody could be without it".[2] The main "inescapable" collective political identity which relates socio-political groups to one another has been national identity since the rise of nation-states. The historical events and interrelations preceded the modernization era and cannot be read through the framework of national identities and inter-"national" relations as we know them today. Such a reading disregards the historicity and contextuality of past phenomena and causes an anachronism problem. That being said, the parallels between phenomena of the past and present are not deniable. The historical trajectory and conditions of pre-national cultural groups which happened to be the nucleus of modern nations and their self-narratives still feed contemporary politics. The modern character or constructedness of nations and national identities does not mean that they were invented *ex nihilo*. The invented practices of national identity form a continuity with a constructed past compatible with present dynamics.[3] Therefore, the article makes analogies between political developments of the past and present and demonstrates the examples of historiographical instrumentalizations in national identity narratives throughout the text.

One of the main problems with today's analyses on Kurdish affairs in general is the surmise of a historically coherent Kurdish identity which is taken as a unitary actor. However, "most of these components of Kurdish national identity are deeply fragmented."[4] This fragmentation is not only related to competing Kurdish political organizations or bodies but also to cultural, linguistic and historical divergences. Having said that, the existence of Kurds as a sociological-ethnic totality that have been loosely tied to each other is historically undeniable albeit the modern Turkish nation-state's ethnic and historical "blindness" towards them. Modern Turkish national identity is also not a static condition but a fluid image stemming from the universe of Turkey's alternative identities.[5] Turkey's complicated historical relationship with Kurds is both an internal and external matter at the same

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[2]   David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 8.

[3]   Mehmet Karataş, *Modernlik Küreselleşme ve Türkiye'nin Kimlikler Evreni* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2020), 174.

[4]   Jaffer Sheyholislami, *Kurdish Identity, Discourse, and New Media* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 47.

[5]   Karataş, *Modernlik Küreselleşme*.

time, thus the theoretical inside-outside border of international relations can hardly work for the case. Moreover, it is important to reiterate here that this work is not a sociological history of Turkmen and Kurdish peasants' interrelations but an attempt of a historical/institutional analysis of Turkmen/Turkish polities' interrelations with Kurdish collective groupings until the nation-state period, namely until the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.

2. The Early Encounter: Between Confrontation and Cooperation

Even though the ethno-genesis process of Kurds is dated thousands years back in the same geography where they still dominantly reside in our times, they failed to establish notable historical polities due to various geographical constrains. Accordingly, they lived in a close liaison with West Asian peoples and thus their history intermingled with the historical trajectory of neighboring peoples and polities.[6] Nominal submission to Persian, Arab and Turkic dynasty ruled governmental bodies, alongside the assertion of local autonomy was the enduring pattern of Kurdish political life.[7] Today, in parallel with these historical circumstances, Kurds mainly live under the legal authority of Arab, Persian and Turkish majority countries[8] with various forms of cultural recognition or political autonomy. İsmail Beşikçi[9] accounts for this contemporary disunited political condition of Kurdish population scattered between different Middle Eastern nation-states by claiming that "Kurdistan is an international colony."[10] This is roughly the common position of (especially the left-wing) today's Kurdish ethno-nationalists.

Kurdish historiography and some scholars base the socio-political roots of Kurds on the ancient Median Empire and attribute Kurdishness to some

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[6]   M.S. Lazarev and Ş. X. Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi* (İstanbul: Avesta, 2013), 9-11.

[7]   David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013), 21.

[8]   Farideh Koohi-Kamali, *The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 27.

[9]   A Turkish scholar who defends an independent Kurdish ethno-national state and is considered as 'Ziya Gökalp of the Kurds' by the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.

[10]   İsmail Beşikçi, *Uluslararası Sömürge Kürdistan* (İstanbul: İsmail Beşikçi Vakfı Yayınları, 2013).

medieval[11] polities like the Ayyubids or Marwanids whose proto-national characters are disputed. The Kurdistan Regional Government's history textbooks portray Kurdistan as an ancient country and claim that the supposed ancient Kurdish groups (e.g. Lulubis and Gutians) established the first Kurdish state more than 4,000 years ago.[12] In Kurdish ethno-nationalist narratives claiming ethnic purity of Kurds, they are deemed as the indigenous grandchildren of Aryan people whose history in today's Kurdish inhabited regions is stretched as far back as 60.000 years.[13] Besides, some researchers regard Kurds as a Turani/Turkic/Asiatic ethnic group.[14] Discovering supposed "Turkish roots" for the Kurds is welcomed by the Turkey's official establishment that fits well for the homogenous nation narrative of the Turkish nation.[15] Nevertheless, the contemporary position of the Turkish nation-state has replaced this discourse with a more religiously dominated narrative. It does no longer maintain this ethno-cultural homogeneity narrative.[16]

There has been scarcity of traceable independent Kurdish polities in historical continuum. Kurds have overwhelmingly held a mountaineer, (semi-)nomadic and tribal socio-political form of life. This political form was generally a territorial and economic unit based on real or putative common descent and kinship.[17] Hence, a researcher may unpack the interrelations of Kurds as a fragmented social totality with the historical polities that they have belonged to instead of analyzing it as a history of inter-state/polity relations. Likewise, Turkish Kurds' contemporary

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[11] Sheyholishami, *Kurdish Identity*, 48; David Neil Mackenzie, "The Origins of Kurdish," *Transactions of the Philological Society* 60, (1961): 69.

[12] Sherko Kirmanj, "Kurdish History Textbooks: Building a Nation-State within a Nation-State," *Middle East Journal* 68, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 372.

[13] Konrad Hirschler, "Defining the Nation: Kurdish Historiography in Turkey in the 1990s," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 3 (2001): 152.

[14] Ali Tayyar Önder, *Türkiye'nin Etnik Yapısı: Halkımızın Kökenleri ve Gerçekler* (Ankara: Kripto Basın Yayın, 2011).

[15] Christopher Houston, ""Set aside from the pen and cut off from the foot:" Imagining the Ottoman Empire and Kurdistan," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 2 (2007): 401.

[16] Şener Aktürk, "One nation under Allah? Islamic multiculturalism, Muslim nationalism and Turkey's reforms for Kurds, Alevis, and non-Muslims," *Turkish Studies*, 19, No. 4 (2018).

[17] Martin Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State* (New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992), 51.

relations with the Republic of Turkey cannot be analyzed as an inter-polity affair but a sub-national matter. Kurdistan as a geographical term has never had clear-cut frontiers which has been used in accordance with the demographic mobility of the Kurds. The name of Kurdistan was used by the Seljuk-Turkmen/Oghuz dynasty in the 12th century for the first time in history. It used to be a signifier of a geographical area and a governmental unit[18] without political connotations.[19] Today, the usage of "Kurdistan" indicating any space on the political map of Turkey is a matter of political friction, censorship and a reason for political outrage from the Turkish nationalist perspective.

The Turkmen mercenaries/troops of the Arabic-Islamic caliphate quelled some Kurdish tribal rebellions in the 9th century. Some Turkmen/Oghuz warriors raided residential areas around Kurdish-inhabited lands before Turkmens massively began to flux into the Anatolian Peninsula.[20] The Abbasid caliphs sometimes used Kurdish tribes against Turkmen warriors' political tutelage and autonomous noble families. When Seljuk Turkmens begun to spread their military presence within the territories of the Arabic-Islamic caliphate in the 11th century, some Kurdish tribes which were deployed as frontier guards on behalf of the caliphate clashed with Turkmens. An Arab-ruled state's deployment of Kurdish irregulars against Turkmen/Turkish incursions as "frontier guards" can be traced presently in Hafez and Bashar Assad's taking advantage of the PKK/YPG against the presumed "Turkish threat."[21] David MacDowall states that "it took over a century for Turkmen and Kurdish tribes to establish a *modus vivendi*."[22] Nevertheless, Seljuk Turkmens were mostly able to capture Kurdish populated areas and then, they started to recruit people among Kurdish tribes for their military campaigns.[23]

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[18]   Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 31.; McDowall, *A Modern History*, 6.

[19]   Hakan Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 26-27.

[20]   Mustafa Alican, "Selçuklu-Mervani İlişkileri," *Turkish Studies - International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic* 8 no.11 (Fall 2013), 1-15.

[21]   Özlem Kayhan Pusane, "Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu: Arap Baharı ile Değişen Yurtiçi ve Bölgesel Dinamikler," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 11, no. 41 (2014), 124.

[22]   McDowall, *A Modern History*, 22.

[23]   Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 31, 45-49; McDowall, *A Modern History*, 22.

Such rebellions or fights are sometimes discursively employed as part of the historiography of the supposed eternal struggle of Kurds on their way to independence. The Kurdish "myth of resistance seeks to establish a narrative of eternal opposition to foreign rule. The struggle for national liberation and the future establishment of a nation-state is thereby represented as the result of a teleological historical development."[24] Kurdish ethno-nationalist historiography emphasizes wars and sometimes promotes historical enmities against neighboring peoples in order to distinguish Kurds from them, which helps construct a separate national identity. However, it is necessary to note that neither Turkmen forces nor Kurdish tribes of the Arabic-Islamic caliphate era aimed "national" ends in these battles because "their identity was based on family ties, ethnic cultural tradition and Islam."[25] Most Kurdish tribes ignored the name "Kurd" and affiliated themselves with their tribes.[26]

Nomadic Turkmen warriors/dynasties and Kurdish tribes had also fought together against common rivals. Some Kurdish tribes joined the army of Ayyubids and Saladin, whose army were predominantly composed of Turkmen warriors, in their fight against the Crusaders.[27] The relations of Turkmens and Kurdish tribes had not always been troublesome under the Arabic-Islamic caliphate. Nomadic Turkmen warriors had harmonious relations with Kurdish tribes. Some Kurdish tribal battalions joined Seljuk Turkmen military campaign against the Byzantines in the 1071 Battle of Manzikert. Especially the Kurdish Marwanids helped Sultan Alparslan who led the Turkmens in the war.[28] The Battle of Manzikert and the fight against the Crusaders have been very instrumental for Islamic Turkish national identity narratives. These events are not portrayed as an only ethnic Turks/Turkmens' victory or struggle in contemporary discourses, but they are also attributed to Kurds and other ethnicities constituting the Turkish nation to promote a sense of historical belonging to the Republic of Turkey.

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[24] Hirschler, *Defining the Nation*, 153.

[25] McDowall, *A Modern History*, 23.

[26] Hassan Arfa, *The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 7; Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables*, 27.

[27] Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 64-67.

[28] Altan Tan, *Kürt Sorunu: Ya Tam Kardeşlik Ya Hep Birlikte Kölelik* (İstanbul: Timaş, 2015), 67-68.

This battle was a turning point in the history of Anatolia and Turkmen-Kurd relations. After this war, the irrevocable Turkmen influence and population flux have started to penetrate into the Anatolian peninsula and the Kurdish enclaves. Roughly a thousand-year sovereignty of Turkmen/Turkish origin polities over these territories with episodic disruptions like the Mongol and Crusader invasions, was established. The Manzikert Battle in 1071 also marked the end of the local autonomy of Kurdish tribes since Seljuk Turkmens administered Kurdish populated areas with Turkmen officers.[29] Seljuk-Turkmen control over Kurdish-populated areas established a relatively stable order and cooperation between Turkmen and Kurdish groups for the most part until the invasion of Mongols who they mostly fought. The military campaigns of Mongols during the 13th century wreaked havoc on the Kurdish tribal structure.[30] Turkmen and Kurdish warriors have played significant role in the spread of Seljuk-Turkmen sovereignty over the Anatolian peninsula in the 12th century.[31] Starting by the end of the 11th century, the relatively small Turkmen polities/dynasties like the Artuqids, the Beylik of Dilmaç, the Inalids, Karakoyunlus and Akkoyunlus had also ruled and culturally influenced the lands (before and after infamous Mongol and Timurid incursions) where Kurds had traditionally lived.[32]

3. The Ottoman Umbrella and Sunni Margraves

Starting in the 16th century, Kurdish tribes and their lands were partitioned between Sunni Ottoman Turkmens and Iranian-Azerbaijani Turkmen Shia Safavid dynasty and its successors. "Throughout history, Kurdish tribes had lived in the peripheries of strong empires such as the Sasanian and the Byzantine, and developed their skills in dealing with the surrounding states. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman-Safavid confrontation made the Kurds realize their importance for the two

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[29]   McDowall, *A Modern History*, 23.

[30]   Hakan Özoğlu, "State-tribe relations: Kurdish tribalism in the 16th and 17th century Ottoman empire," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 23, no. 1 (1996), 11.

[31]   Bekir Biçer, "Ortaçağda Kürtler ve Türkler," *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies* 6, no. 6 (2013), 231-261.

[32]   Metin Heper, *The State and Kurds in Turkey The Question of Assimilation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 53; Tan, *Kürt Sorunu*, 68-70.

empires."[33] After the fall of Akkoyunlu Turkmen-ruled polity, the Safavids had started to dominate Kurdish-populated lands until the Ottoman Turks shifted their attention to south and eastern borders. Even though a few Kurdish tribes and notable figures were affiliated with the Safavids, most of the Kurds, as Sunni Muslims, had fought against Shia Safavids alongside the Sunni Ottoman state.[34] Kurdish ideological or tribal groups' political and military maneuvers between Turkey and Iran still have top priority in Turkish-Iranian relations.

The Battle of Chaldiran between the Ottomans and Safavids in 1514 was another pivotal event in the history of the relations of Kurdish tribes and Turkmen polities since most of the Kurdish population had started to become a part of the Ottoman Empire which is followed by the Republic in a continuum. Besides, there were also perpetual frontier-wars between Iranian polities and Ottomans over Kurdish inhabited lands until the foundation of the Republic of Turkey and occasional local rebellions of some Kurdish emirates. By seeking Ottoman protection, the twenty-five Kurdish chieftains had announced their loyalty to the Ottoman-Turkmen Sultan. They requested an Ottoman governor for the region to lead the Kurds in the military campaigns against Safavids instead of a local Kurdish figure. This was also to avoid a potential Kurdish inter-tribal conflict for leadership.[35] Nevertheless, even though most of the Kurdish tribes stayed loyal to Ottoman rule, sometimes, some of them switched their loyalty between the two medieval powers.[36] Today, we observe the partition of spheres of influence between Turkey and Iran over the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Recently, "while the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) received Turkish backing, the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) relied on Iran's support."[37] These cooperations are mainly enforced by geopolitical necessities which demonstrate historical continuity to some extent in the region.

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[33] Özoğlu, *State-tribe relations*, 26.

[34] Michael Eppel, "The Demise of the Kurdish Emirates: The Impact of Ottoman Reforms and International Relations on Kurdistan during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 2 (2008), 239; Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 81-89; McDowall, *A Modern History*, 23-32.

[35] Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh*, 143; Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 42; Özoğlu, *State-tribe relations*, 14; Tan, *Kürt Sorunu*, 74.

[36] Özoğlu, *State-tribe relations*, 15.

[37] Hüseyin Alptekin, "Is the spring finally coming to the Turkey-PUK relations?," *The New Turkey*, (January 14, 2019). Available at: https://thenewturkey.org/is-the-spring-finally-coming-to-the-turkey-puk-relations

This voluntary submission of Kurdish chieftains to the Ottoman Empire[38] is still a matter of controversy for Kurdish ethno-nationalism. On the one hand, according to some Kurdish ethno-nationalist accounts, this submission or agreement marks the beginning of supposed Turkish colonial rule in Kurdistan. They accuse Idris-i Bitlisi, a Kurdish scholar and mediator between the Ottoman Empire and Kurdish tribes in this agreement, of being a traitor of the Kurdish cause and collaborator of so-called Turkish colonialism. On the other hand, conservative Kurdish nationalists like Altan Tan defend Idris-i Bitlisi and this agreement. To him, the treaty and Ottoman-Kurdish cooperation prevented potential Turkification and Shiization of "Kurdistan" under the sovereignty of the Turkmen Safavid Empire.[39]

The Ottoman Empire reorganized the land regime and provincial governance in the Kurdish-majority areas.[40] Unlikely to the Safavids and Akkoyunlus who eliminated many Kurdish chieftains and appointed their own men as governors,[41] the Ottomans consolidated the traditional Kurdish ruling stratum in their attempt to re-establish their faded authority over the fragmented Kurdish tribes.[42] Even some Kurdish tribes were created by the Ottoman state itself[43] which "eventually paved the way for the formation of stronger Kurdish leadership whose authority depended considerably upon the state's patronage."[44] The Ottomans' policy towards the Kurds was to "revive, unite, and, to the extent feasible, let them rule themselves."[45] The Empire ruled the region in cooperation with semi-autonomous local emirates instead of inflicting its centralist governance by creating a formalized quasi-feudal system, which occasionally caused conflicts of power-sharing between the central Ottoman government and Kurdish emirates.[46] The Empire had granted semi-autonomy and the right

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[38] The 1514 Amasya Agreement: Şakir Epözdemir, *1514 Amasya Antlaşması: Kürt Osmanlı İttifakı ve Mevlana İdris-i Bitlisi*, (İstanbul: Peri Yayınları, 2005).

[39] Tan, *Kürt Sorunu*, 83-84.

[40] Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 81-89; Tan, *Kürt Sorunu*, 80-82.

[41] Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh*, 140; Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 37.

[42] Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables*, 53,64.

[43] Özoğlu, *State-tribe relations*, 19.

[44] Özoğlu, *State-tribe relations*, 24.

[45] Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 38.

[46] McDowall, *A Modern History*, 23-32.

of hereditary succession to Kurdish tribes.[47] It employed them as a sort of margraves along the Safavid border in order to isolate the ideological Shia influence over the Anatolian heterodox *Kizilbash* Turkmens. Famous Turkish traveler *Evliya Çelebi*, who lived in lands controlled by Ottomans in the 17th century, stated that it would have been easier for Iranians to invade Ottoman lands if there was not a "Kurdistan wall" that kept them away.[48] There was an open symbiotic relationship between Kurdish tribes and the Ottoman-Turkmen Empire. "Highly fragmented and vulnerable Kurdish tribes needed the Ottoman state as much as the Ottoman state needed them."[49] Today, we observe that even though Turkey and Iran share the same interest of opposing a potential Kurdish independent state next to their borders, the Turkish state sometimes cooperates with the "Sunni" Kurdistan Region of Iraq to counterbalance Iranian influence over the "Shia" Iraqi central government.[50]

The Kurdish emirates were confederacies of a number of tribes both nomadic and settled, and of nontribal groups who speak different dialects,[51] which possessed many of the characteristics of a state,[52] and thus were supra-tribal governmental units/semi-polities. The Turkmen-Ottoman dynasty had peacefully ruled Kurdish populated areas via its agreement with the local Kurdish emirates that sought Ottoman protection and recognition for their local authority. They were virtually free in their internal affairs.[53] This policy choice cemented the power of local ruling families. The administrative organization as it was introduced in 1515 was to remain in force, with only minor changes, until the beginning of the modernization era in the 19th century, along with rare and exceptional Kurdish discontents.[54] The semi-polities (they were "semi" because they

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[47] Michael G. Lortz, "*Willing to Face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces - the Peshmerga - From the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq*" (MA Dissertation, The Florida State University, 2005), 3.

[48] Mehmet Akbaş, "Evliya Çelebi'nin Gözüyle Kürtler ve Kürdistan," *Artuklu Akademi* 2, no. 1 (2015), 46.

[49] Özoğlu, *State-tribe relations*, 14.

[50] Ergin Güneş, "Şii Jeopolitiğinde Türkiye ve İran'ın Güç Mücadelesi," Ankara *Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 74, no. 1 (2019), 69-70.

[51] Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables*, 46.

[52] Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh*, 80.

[53] Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables*, 48-49.

[54] Tan, *Kürt Sorunu*, 85; Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh*, 144.

were also administrative units for the Ottoman imperial statecraft) of Kurdish emirates heavily depended on the Pax-Ottomana in the region in order to restore and maintain their authority over the tribes. This provided a buffer zone for centuries between the Ottoman and Iranian-Azerbaijani states in favour of Ottoman-Turkmen Empire.

4. Weakening Centre and Local Rebellions

In the beginning of the 19th century, the political power of the Ottoman-Turkmen state started to diminish. Western powers and the Russian Empire were weakening the Ottoman Empire with consecutive wars. The internal deterioration and external pressures prompted an authority vacuum within the Empire that has been a stimulus for local Kurdish emirates and chieftains to broaden their administrative autonomy because they believed that they had no need for an external sponsor.[55] Some Kurdish emirates had begun to establish political-military ties with external powers like Russia at the expense of the Ottoman state and politically benefited from Ottoman-Iran rivalry as a de facto buffer zone.[56] Mir Muhammed's Soran Emirate in Rewanduz and Bedirhan Bey's Cizre-Bohtan Emirate had commenced rebellions against Ottoman rule in different times during the first half of the 19th century and ephemerally subjugated certain areas held by other fellow Kurdish tribes.[57] Yezdansher, a Kurdish notable and an Ottoman local official, also initiated a rebellion against the Ottoman authority in 1855 with its Kurdish irregulars in cooperation with the Russian Empire,[58] which is quelled by Ottomans thanks to the help of the British Empire which was ally against the Russians then.

However, these feudal/tribal rebellions and pursuit of a greater autonomy had not displayed a national character yet.[59] They were reactions to modernizing and centralizing administrative reconfigurations of the Ottoman Empire like the declaration of Tanzimat reforms in 1839. There

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[55] McDowall, *A Modern History*, 38.

[56] Fatih Ünal, "II. Meşrutiyet Ulusçuluk ve Kürt Ayrılıkçı Hareketi," Doğu Batı 46, no. 2 (2008), 69-106; Eppel, *The Demise of the Kurdish Emirates*, 246; Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 117-130; McDowall, *A Modern History*, 39.

[57] McDowall, *A Modern History*, 42-47.

[58] Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856)*, (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 360-377.

[59] Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 117-130.

was a power conflict between local notables and the modernizing imperial authority.[60] The modernization project breached the agreement and relative harmony between Kurdish emirates and the imperial centre, which was run by the traditional, mediaeval institutions, dated back to 1515.[61] Ottoman elites had started to overhaul the Empire, which was crippled because of the power vacuum caused by the wholesale removal of local hereditary rulers.[62] The Empire gradually, deliberately and militarily abolished and fully integrated the emirates into the Ottoman system[63] on the course of implementing administrative reforms[64] and turned Kurdish emirates into Ottoman provinces.[65] The elimination of Kurdish emirates wiped out potential polities that would have possibly become the nucleus of modern Kurdish nation-statehood, and perpetuated the traditional tribal social formation.[66]

Some of the main root causes of dissidents among Kurdish emirates and tribes: (1) The military conscription for all Ottoman citizens. (2) Levying more taxes and sending them to the imperial bureaucratic center. (3) Corrupted government officials. (4) Reconfiguration of administrative structure in the region. (5) The establishment of local assemblies that enable non-Muslims (thus more non-Kurds) to participate in decision making. (6) Transferring the tax-collection warrant from local Kurdish notables to the central bureaucracy and thus reducing power of local notables and chieftains via modernization/centralization.[67] The Ottoman state enforced sedentarization of Kurdish tribes by coercion or mediation as part of centralization process since Western-type of modernization necessitated

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60 Cabir Doğan, *Cizre ve Botan Emiri Bedirhan Bey (1802-1869)* (PhD Thesis, Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi, 2010); Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean*, 362; Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh*, 94; Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables*, 60; Ahmet Vedat Koçal, "Osmanlı-Türkiye Modernleşmesinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Temelleri ve Aktörleri Bağlamında Türk-Kürt İkileminin Doğuşu ve Kaynakları," *Tarihte Türkler ve Kürtler Uluslar arası Sempozyumu* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014), 7; Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 43; Hüseyin Yayman, *Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011), 31.

61 Tan, *Kürt Sorunu*, 86-87.

62 McDowall, *A Modern History*, 41, 63.

63 Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables*, 54.

64 Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh*, 133.

65 Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 42.

66 Eppel, *The Demise of the Kurdish Emirates*.

67 Tan, *Kürt Sorunu*, 87; Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean*, 360-361; Sinan Hakan, *Osmanlı arşiv belgelerinde Kürtler ve Kürt direnişleri*, 1817-1867 (İstanbul: Doz, 2007), 120-121.

"a shift from indirect to direct rule with the elimination and incorporation of local intermediaries."[68] Besides, the treaty of Berlin (1878) signed by the Ottoman Empire, whereby European powers had specifically called for a protected status for the Armenian community, perceived by Kurdish local notables as a stepping stone towards the emergence of an independent Armenian state on Kurdish populated lands and thus as a threat against the Kurds, which was another motivation for the Kurdish dissidents.[69]

Nevertheless, another failed rebellion led by Sheikh Ubeydullah,[70] which took advantage of the power vacuum caused by the Russo-Ottoman war in 1877-78, has been widely marked as the pioneer Kurdish nationalist insurrection and the birth of Kurdish nationalism.[71] The emergence of religious figures like Sheikh Ubeydullah as political notables relied on the power vacuum caused by the eradication of the emirates system.[72] The Iranian-Turkmen Qajar elites believed that Sheikh Ubeydullah enjoyed a tacit Ottoman approval for his incursion into their lands.[73] However, the aim and motives of Sheikh Ubeydullah and his comrades' trans-tribal disobedience are still controversial since the movement did not have well-defined political goals[74] and seemed to strive according to Sheikh Ubeydullah's demand for greater control in the region.[75] The evidence

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68 Yonca Köksal, "Coercion and Mediation: Centralization and Sedentarization of Tribes in the Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 1, (May 2006), 469.

69 McDowall, *A Modern History*, 56-57.

70 A religious man who uses religious networks and spiritual authority against the Ottoman and Qajar (A Turkic Iranian dynasty) states in 1880-1881 as a response to the imperial modernizing and centralizing reforms.

71 Kamal Soleimani, "Islamic revivalism and Kurdish nationalism in Sheikh Ubeydullah's poetic oeuvre," *Kurdish Studies* 4, no. 1 (2016); Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), 1-7; Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables*, 76; Sabri Ateş, "In the name of Caliph and Nation: The Sheikh Ubeidullah Rebellion of 1880-1881," *Iranian Studies* 47, no. 5 (2014), 735-798; Djene Rhys Bajalan, "Princes, Pashas, and Patriots: The Kurdish Intelligentsia, the Ottoman Empire and the National Question (1908-1914)," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 2 (2016), 140-157.

72 Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh*; Eppel, *The Demise of the Kurdish Emirates*.

73 McDowall, *A Modern History*, 83.

74 Hakan Özoğlu, "Nationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman and Early Republican Era," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, no. 3 (2001), 387-392.

75 Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables*, 76.

for a national struggle is hardly conclusive.[76] Even though the rebellion had some nationalist undertones, "nationalism was not the medium which brought the participants together."[77] Moreover, these rebellions were mostly devoid of mass support and thus the Ottomans suppressed them with relative ease.[78]

In the following years, the Ottoman Empire established the *Hamidiya Cavalries*, a Kurdish irregular military force authorized by Sultan Abdulhamid II. He furnished them partly with the tax-collection right in order to counterweight the emerging Armenian threat backed by Russian ambitions which was also perceived as a threat by Kurds and re-integrate them into the Ottoman system.[79] These were not cross-tribal forces but mostly were formed in accordance with tribal affiliations which reinforced military might and prestige of certain tribes over others.[80] Researchers generally underscored the parallelism between Hamidiya Cavalries and the Village Guard System (*Koruculuk Sistemi*) of the Republic of Turkey, which is still actively used against PKK's violence.[81] The system aims at forming mainly Kurdish civilian militias besides Turkish police forces and military to counterweight the PKK's social influence and minimize its terrorist activities. Abdulhamid II also attempted to re-incorporate Kurdish notables to the Empire with educational means like *Ashiret Mektepleri* (imperial tribal schools) and Pan-Islamist official ideology.[82] The present Kurdish ethno-nationalist perspective argues that there is a functional resemblance (supposed cultural assimilation of Kurds) between these schools and the contemporary Regional Boarding Schools (*Yatılı Bölge Okulları* – YİBO) of the Turkish Republic. Moreover, Islamic Turkish national identity

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[76] McDowall, *A Modern History*, 53.

[77] Ateş, *In the name of Caliph*, 794.

[78] Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 43.

[79] Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh*, 185-186; Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 161; McDowall, *A Modern History*, 57-63.

[80] Lortz, *Willing to Face Death*, 6-7.

[81] Metin Argunhan, *Hamidiye Alayları ile Koruculuk İlişkisi* (Masters Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2009); Evren Balta, Murat Yüksel and Yasemin Acar, *Geçici Köy Koruculuğu Sistemi ve Çözüm Süreci*, Süreç Araştırma Merkezi Raporu (2015); Mehmet Seyman Önder, *Korucular*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015).

[82] Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 47-48; Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 157-160; Yayman, *Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu*, 31.

discourses use the universal ideology of Islam a nationally unifying tool. This policy is deemed a pejorative and assimilationist approach by some Kurdish ethno-nationalist accounts including some Islamists.[83]

Notwithstanding these developments, the abolishment of Kurdish tribal principalities was not reverted by Abdulhamid II. The Hamidiya Cavalries consisting of loyal Kurdish tribes rebranded as the *Ashiret Alaylari* (Tribal Regiments) by the Young Turks after the fall of Abdulhamid II and were deployed in different fronts and rebellions throughout the Empire.[84] Besides, the Ottoman Empire and Kurdish tribes did joint incursions into the cities of Qajars' Iran like Urumiye, Sawj and Bulaq during the first decade of the 20th century. They held those places for a short span of time until British and Russian joint action to make the Ottomans withdraw troops in 1911-1912.[85] The Sunni Ottoman Empire cooperated with the Kurds of Iran/Azerbaijan against the Shi'a Qajar government.[86]

5. The National Revival or Distribution of Power

The ethno-national self-awareness among educated and urbanized Kurdish elites and local notables had become conspicuous in the beginning of the 20th century.[87] The idea of a Kurdish homeland within or without the Empire had started to spread among the Kurds via journals, religious networks, associations and political parties. "Although between 1878 and 1913 Kurdish elites increasingly envisaged the Kurdish community as a 'nation'", "the Kurdish movement in the late Ottoman period was neither homogeneous in terms of its ideological outlook nor in an organizational sense."[88] Some influential Kurdish political figures affiliated themselves with the Turkish national identity and took part in the process of building the sense of Turkishness as many other important Ottoman elites from

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[83] Mücahit Bilici, *Hamal Kürt: Türk İslamı ve Kürt Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2017).

[84] McDowall, *A Modern History*, 57-63.

[85] McDowall, *A Modern History*, 83-84.

[86] Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 165-170.

[87] Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables*, 77.

[88] Djene Rhys Bajalan, "Kurdish Responses to Imperial Decline: The Kurdish Movement and the End of Ottoman Rule in the Balkans (1878 to 1913)," *Kurdish Studies* 7, no. 1 (2019), 53.

different ethnic backgrounds immigrated from the Caucasus and Balkans to the Imperial centre. Likewise, today, a significant number of Kurds identify themselves with the Turkish national identity along with their self-awareness of ethnic Kurdishness. Contemporary Kurdish ethno-nationalisms in Turkey, despite the existence of ethnic self-awareness and some incoherent claims of various groups, has not developed a lucid set of political demands yet.[89]

Many Kurdish nationalists "during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century also maintained a deep commitment to the continuation of the Ottoman state."[90] The educated and urbanized strata of Kurds was mainly supporting the Young Turks in their pursuit of constitutional monarchy.[91] However, ethno-nationalist Kurds were disturbed by the centralizing policies of the Young Turks after the fall of Abdulhamid II.[92] "Kurdish revolts in the 19th century and the nationalist activities of Kurdish clubs in early 20th century cannot be labelled as nationalist movements but rather as representing a backlash of Kurds towards the Ottoman reforms."[93]

The restoration of the 1876 constitution and the re-opening of the imperial parliament with a multi-party system in 1908 pushed by the Committee of Union and Progress (also commonly referred to as the Young Turk movement) had sometimes exacerbated the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Kurdish local notables. Kurdish local religious figures and semi-feudal chieftains were not happy with the modernization and further centralization due to allegedly "atheistic" and un-Islamic character of the new regime and losing their feudal privileges.[94] Kurdish religious orders and figures had been "vehicles of resistance against the centralization of the Ottoman state and means of identity formation" between 1878 and

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[89]   Karataş, *Modernlik Küreselleşme*, 193.

[90]   Bajalan, *Kurdish Responses to Imperial Decline*, 60.

[91]   Janet Klein, Kurdish nationalists and non-nationalist Kurdists: rethinking minority nationalism and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1909, *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no. 1 (2007), 135–153; Bajalan, *Kurdish Responses to Imperial Decline*, 61; Tan, *Kürt Sorunu*, 107.

[92]   Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 171.

[93]   Rahman Dağ, "Ottoman Reforms and Kurdish Reactions in the19th Century," *Nübihar Akademi* 1, No. 2, 52.

[94]   Tan, *Kürt Sorunu*, 110-111.

1924.[95] Moreover, the conscription of non-Muslims and the good relations of the Young Turks with Armenians in the first years of their hegemony had intimidated Kurdish locals.[96] The imminent collapse of the Imperial center prompted some Kurdish notables to take precautions against the potential "Christian" Armenian dominance over their lands by the assistance of European powers.[97] Hence, some local sheikhs and tribes pushed for a greater regional autonomy for the Kurdish populated areas within the Empire during the first two decades of the 20th century, which were more or less successfully quelled by the Ottoman statecraft.[98]

The Kurdish demand for a greater autonomy comprised more national tones than precedent discontents. In the beginning of the 20th century, there were demands for adopting the Kurdish language in official affairs and education and a vision for a Kurdish homeland which had apparent ethno-national aspirations along with strong religious leitmotivs.[99] Some dissident Kurdish tribes and political figures cooperated with Armenian groups and the Russian Empire to achieve such goals before the WWI. However, the Ottoman government and Kurdish irregulars mostly allied against Armenians and the Russian Empire during the Great War. Kurds provided a substantial manpower to the Ottoman army since the Muslim identity counted for many of Kurds[100] and "did not take the First World War as an opportunity to bolster nationalist feelings amongst their kinsmen vis-à-vis the Turks."[101] Moreover, the majority of Kurdish notables had been well aware of European Christian powers' high possibility of allying with local Christians against Muslim Kurds.[102] Their nationalism was a cultural one which remained Ottomanist politically.[103] "While some elements within Ottoman Kurdish society evidently regarded the collapse

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[95]   Hakan Yavuz,. "Five stages of the construction of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 7, No. 3 (2001), 2.

[96]   Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 175-176.

[97]   Bajalan, *Kurdish Responses to Imperial Decline*, 59-60.

[98]   McDowall, *A Modern History*, 87-101.

[99]   Ibid., 123-126.

[100] Fatih Ünal, *II. Meşrutiyet Ulusçuluk.*; McDowall, *A Modern History*.

[101] Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 55.

[102] Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh*, 229.

[103] Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 55.

of Ottoman control in Europe as being a potential opportunity for Kurdish emancipation from "Turkish" rule, others, including most significantly those at the forefront of the Kurdish movement, regarded the Kurds' interests as being inextricably linked to the fate of the Ottoman polity as a whole."[104] Presently, even the "separatist" PKK, ostensibly, refrains from demanding an independent Kurdish nation-state separated from Turkey[105] because the majority of the Kurdish public affiliates itself with the Republic of Turkey and does not desire a secession.

The secularist/modernist committee of Union and Progress, which had been holding the power in the imperial centre after 1908-1909, had to make concessions from the modernization program. The committee revived the old-fashion government-tribe/religious collaboration and played the Islamic fraternity card in order to prevent or minimize Kurdish discontent. By 1918, Kurdish and Turkmen populated areas of Iran and Azerbaijan were under the military control of the Ottoman state with the aid of some Kurdish irregulars even though the Turkish army withdrew after the declaration of the Armistice of Mudros (30 October 1918) and the defeat of the Central Powers became clear.[106] Yet the British occupation of today's Iraq occasionally challenged by some Kurdish tribes put a significant number of Kurds under British control which culminated in the demarcation of the contemporary Turkey-Iraq border which divided the majority of Kurds into politically separate territories.[107] The Kurdish population's scattered condition between different countries endures until today.

6. Conclusion

Nation and national identity are not ahistorical concepts. Employing concepts like "Kurds" and "Turks" might be a misnomer if these social totalities are referred to as a whole, especially for the events prior to the modern age. We can hardly speak of a historical coherent totality of the "Kurds" and "Turks/Turkmens" and their "fights" or "enmity" as if there

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[104] Bajalan, *Kurdish Responses to Imperial Decline*, 68.

[105] Karataş, *Modernlik Küreselleşme*, 253.

[106] Lazarev and Mihoyan, *Kürdistan Tarihi*, 195-196.

[107] McDowall, *A Modern History*, 101-109.

have been institutionalized "inter-national relations" between the two sides. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that historical experiences and shared past nourished contemporary socio-political conditions. This historicity was not predicated on the consistent interrelations of two monolithic and sealed entities or identities. Kurdish and Turkmen social "groupings" and polities had a complex and intertwined past influencing and resembling contemporary developments as shown in this work. The article recapitulated these intricate interrelations and provided a historical overview in order to address the prevalent oversimplified narrations of these interrelations.

As Hakan Özoğlu argues,[108] we cannot talk about a general ethno-political disposition and nationalist designs among Kurds until the end of the Great War and the crystallization of the Ottoman Empire's imminent demise. Likewise, predominantly, a national self-perception in an ethnic sense did not exist among Turkmens until the 20th century. During the Ottoman modernization era in the 19th century, Turkish elites (not necessarily ethnically Turkmen), which constitute the main demographic body of the Empire, preferred to construct a non-ethnic national identity like the cosmopolitan Ottoman or Islamic identity rather than an exclusive ethnic one. "The Ottomans did not make resort to ethnic management strategies towards the Kurds because of the absence of the very notion of ethnicity in their intellectual baggage but a religious one."[109] Turkmen and Kurdish groups did have intra-ethnic disagreements as much as inter-ethnic conflicts and thus, ethnicity or national identity was not the medium of political relations of the time. Turkmen and Kurdish tribes had co-existed relatively in harmony for centuries under Turkmen-ruled polities, alongside occasional rivalries and conflicts.[110]

The Ottoman state culturally had a salient Turkish character, however, since it had defined itself as a Muslim polity, the main determinant of foreign policy choices did not rely on a Turkish national self-perception until the rise of modern nationalism, especially within the first decade of the 20th century. Since Turkmen-crown polities of the Seljuks and Ottomans sometimes had perceived the powerful Turkmen tribes as

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[108] Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables*.

[109] Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 43.

[110] Biçer, *Ortaçağda Kürtler*, 250.

dangerous for their reign, they appointed some Kurdish chieftains as local administrators.[111] However, even though the renown Turkologue Jean-Paul Roux argues that Turkmens and Kurds have been close to each other historically and culturally,[112] employing a national framework to apprehend and analyze the interrelations of Turkmen polities and Kurdish people would hardly work since the socio-political relations of the period were taken place within a tribal and inter-dynasty framework. Therefore, historiographical dichotomization of Turks and Kurds within a national narrative and discursively constructing them as arch-enemies to each other would not reflect historic facts. Instead, it could be a rhetorical arsenal for discursive Kurdish nation-building process in which Turks are situated as the constitutive "other" through third parties' political and media platforms.

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[111] Heper, *The State and Kurds*, 22.
[112] Biçer, *Ortaçağda Kürtler*, 257.

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Ottomanism at its Final Gasp: Memoirs of the Ottomans on Duty in Arab Provinces during World War I

Can Eyüp Çekiç[*]

Abstract

This study aims to expose the ways in which leading officials of the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP) interpreted, internalized, and questioned the conditions of their mission in Arab lands during World War I (WWI). It builds on the memoirs of Falih Rıfkı, aide-de-camp of Commander-in-Chief Cemal Pasha, and Halide Edip, an ardent supporter of the social and educational reforms of the CUP government. Both written after the war, these memoirs reflect not only nostalgia and regret but also the complicated relationship between Turkish officials and Arabs on the eve of their breakup from one another as citizens of the Ottoman State. The study also questions the orthodox argument that the Turkist and anti-Arabic ideology of the CUP government in general and Cemal Pasha's wartime crusade against Arab nationalists in particular triggered the emergence of Arab nationalism. By contemplating the memoirs of CUP members in Arab lands, this study argues that Falih Rıfkı, Cemal Pasha, and Halide Edip tried to understand the region and its people in order to create a mutual future for Turks and Arabs within the Ottoman Empire.

Keywords: Cemal Pasha, Falih Rıfkı, Halide Edip, the Committee of Union and Progress, Arab Nationalism

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Son Nefesinde Osmanlıcılık: Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Arap Vilayetlerinde Görev Yapan Osmanlıların Hatıraları

Can Eyüp Çekiç[*]

Öz

Bu makale, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Arap Cephesi'nde görev yapan İttihat ve Terakki Cephesi hükümetinin önde gelen sorumlularının, bu görevlerini nasıl içselleştirdiklerini, sorguladıklarını ve yorumladıklarını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, Falih Rıfkı'nın ve emir eri bulunduğu Başkumandan Cemal Paşa'nın ve İTC hükümetinin topluma ve eğitime yönelik reformlarının sıkı bir taraftarı olan Halide Edip'in hatıralarına dayanmaktadır. Her biri savaştan sonra kaleme alınan bu hatıralar, özlem ve pişmanlık hislerinin yanında, birbirlerinden Osmanlı Devleti vatandaşları olarak ayrılmak üzere olan Araplar ve Türkler arasındaki çetrefilli ilişkiyi göz önüne sermektedir. Bununla birlikte makale, genel olarak İTC idaresinin Türkçü ve Arap karşıtı ideolojisinin ve özelde savaş sırasında Cemal Paşa'nın Arap milliyetçiliğine karşı başlattığı mücadelenin, Arap milliyetçiliğinin doğuşunda başat rol oynadığına dair geleneksel düşünceyi de sorgulamaktadır. Bu çalışma, Arap topraklarında bulunan İTC üyelerinin hatıralarına dayanarak, Falih Rıfkı, Cemal Paşa ve Halide Edip'in, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Türkler ve Araplara ait ortak bir gelecek inşa etmek amacıyla bölgeyi ve halkını anlamaya gayret ettiklerini ileri sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Cemal Paşa, Falih Rıfkı, Halide Edip, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Arap Milliyetçiliği

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1. Introduction

The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) deprived the Ottoman Empire of the majority of Rumelia, once the stronghold of the Ottoman holy war against the Christian rule, which had given the state its leading position in the Muslim world. Following the Tanzimat reforms, the region became even more significant in showing the success of Ottoman modernization as it had been more developed than any other part of the Empire in terms of commerce and agriculture. The loss of Rumelia, or Western Thrace, encouraged the warmongers, who claimed that it was only by joining the war that the Ottomans could change their ill fortune. Hoping to reclaim its losses, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers against Russia, England, and France, the leading contenders for Ottoman territories, on condition that the first Ottoman offensive should be against British Egypt.[1]

While nation-states divided Western Thrace among themselves, "the Arab provinces proved to be the last stand of the Ottoman state as a modern multi-ethnic empire."[2] During the Great War, the Arab region became the object of meticulous concerns of the Committee of Union and Progress government and witnessed efforts to keep the remaining Ottoman lands intact. CUP officials encountered revolts or 'betrayals' throughout the Arab lands and used violent methods to cope with insurgents. Arab provinces witnessed most of these questionable measures, including the Armenian massacre, which left their marks in the modern history of the region. Furthermore, these were the last phases in which the supranational Ottomanist ideology was tested and evaluated as the principal policy of the state, according to the state's new geographical definition. That is to say, in the context of wartime measures, the Ottoman administration and its officials regenerated the ideological stance of the state, and tried to redefine the new contract between the state and its Arab subjects.

This paper aims to analyze the final ideological agenda adopted by the Ottoman elite to keep the remaining part of the state intact by drawing on the memoirs of two Turkish intellectuals and the head of the Ottoman army

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[1] Sean McMeekin, *The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923* (London: Penguin, 2016), 127.

[2] Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 793.

in the region. Both authors were sent from the center to Syria and Lebanon as part of the Ottoman military mission, in order to protect them from the British forces and to help the Arabs to internalize their re-defined position within the reconfigured policy of the state toward its non-Turkish citizens.

These memoirs belong to Falih Rıfkı, one of the prominent authors later in the Republican Era, Cemal Pasha, one of the three leaders of the CUP regime, and Halide Edip, the so-called "Jeanne d'Arc of modern Turkey". Assigned to put into practice a very complex and vague ideology, these individuals expressed the image of Arabs in the eyes of the central cadre of the CUP regime. Although the two intellectuals, Falih Rıfkı and Halide Edip, were not organically linked to the regime, they were among those who supplied the regime with ideas about the ways in which Ottoman modernization had to be implemented. Reflecting the contemporary western orientalist view, they considered the life in Arab lands as a direct sign of the decadence of the Empire. The Arabs, regardless of their role in the current political situation, were identified and represented as the decadent half of the Empire. Nevertheless, Falih Rıfkı's memoirs, for instance, reveal a dualist view. While his image of the Arab people fit into orientalist conceptions, he confessed the fact that the level of prosperity in the region was much higher than in Anatolia. This dualist view, which portrays Arab lands as more prosperous than Anatolia but also more decadent, is one of the issues that I will try to analyze here.

Both memoirs were produced years after the Ottoman mission in Arab lands. Cemal Pasha's memoirs were published in 1920, as an apology not only for his role in the crimes of the CUP regime during the war, but also for his military decisions, which failed to defend the Southern front. Halide Edip's memoirs were written for an English audience in order to draw their attention to the Muslim cause, which was under great pressure of the victorious Western imperialism following WWI. Lastly, Falih Rıfkı's *Zeytindağı* was written nearly two decades after his first memoirs of the war, *Ateş ve Güneş*, when the author had left behind Ottoman ideals long ago.

Although both were written on different concerns for different audiences, and even in different languages, these texts provide different views on the Arab world and reflect complex and elaborate interpretations of the Ottoman intellectuals and CUP members. Cemal Pasha's military and

political explanations, Halide Edip's observations on of the West's cultural impact on the Arab region, and Falih Rıfkı's comparisons between the social structures in the region and in Anatolia overlap one another, and help to construct a multidimensional narrative of the Ottoman mission in Arab lands during WWI.

Moreover, these authors' representation of the Arab world in their memoirs reflects the roles that were assigned by the regime to the Arabs and Turks in the Empire after the Balkan Wars. These roles were about to define the future of the Turks and the Arabs within the Empire. Both officials believed that the two nations would not be able to survive western imperialism and the Great War without the help of each other. However, Arabs did not have the means to struggle against these powerful Western forces. Accordingly, the role of Turks was defined as helping Arab nation to regain its power to implement modernization in Arab provinces.[3] Makdisi pictures this relationship as the evolution of the Empire's patrimonial responsibility, which was developed in the Hamidian regime, into the patrimonial role of the Turkish nation led by the CUP regime.[4]

Considering the fact that it is impossible to read the history of Arab nationalism without referring to late Ottoman history, the arguments on the origins of Arab nationalism can be reviewed according to the political decisions taken by both the Hamidian and CUP administrations. The impact of CUP politics and ideology on the emergence of Arab nationalism has been a very critical historiographical question when examining the motives behind the Arab revolt and following events in the region. Changing political conditions throughout the twentieth century had determined the historical approach to the relationship between the late Ottoman Empire and its Arabic subjects. Therefore, any further analysis on the relationship between Ottoman politics and the emergence of Arab nationalism, whether on the micro or the macro level, needs particular consideration of the historical background.

There has been a tension between historical research and historical accounts of Arabs on their revolt against the Ottoman state. In many cases,

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[3]   Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, transliterated by Behçet Cemal (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1996), 220-30.

[4]   Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 792-96.

historians have helped Arab nations to construct their national identity, and to embellish this identity with a national Arab historiography. In these accounts, the politics and the identity of the CUP government have been used as an excuse for the Arabs cooperating with Western powers against a Muslim empire and the caliph. In this sense, the CUP's so-called Turkish identity, its centralistic policies, and its 'accommodation' of Zionism have been considered as the prominent failures of the government to keep its Arab subjects under Ottoman rule.[5]

Nevertheless, recent studies have been deconstructing the dominant historical approaches by directly questioning its premises about the origins of Arab nationalism. In his article on the manifestation of Arab discontent with the Ottoman government prior to WWI, Mahmoud Haddad states that the Turkification policies that provoked Arab nationalism were implemented in the beginning of the reign of Abdulhamid II, when the sultan ordered that Turkish must replace Arabic in the new institutions of administration and education.[6]

For Haddad, Arab nationalism took shape "not as a reaction to Ottomanism, but as a reaction to the possibility of its disappearance."[7] Were the CUP leaders in general and Cemal Pasha in particular against Ottomanist ideology? Did they replace the supranational foundation of Tanzimat ideals, including fair representation in government, with Turkish nationalism? Dealing with these questions, this paper owes much to Ernest Dawn's analysis of the identity of CUP members, the quality of their so-called Turkification policies, and their modernization projects within the region. Dawn mentions the error of the historians of the older generation in exaggerating Turkish nationalism within the CUP. For him, the CUP had members from diverse political affiliations, and the policy of the party was mainly pro-Ottoman and modernist. The party's role in the political transformation was in line with Ottomanism and modernism, which had

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[5]   For instance, see, Zeine N. Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Caravan, 1973).

[6]   Mahmoud Haddad, "The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26, no. 2 (May 1994): 202.

[7]   Ibid., 217.

emerged as early as the introduction of the Tanzimat reforms in the first half of the nineteenth century.[8]

The memoirs of Cemal Pasha, Falih Rıfkı, and Halide Edip support Dawn's arguments in two ways. First, all of these memoirs expose the stringent efforts of the individuals in the CUP cadre to rescue the Empire, which was in great peril. In the days of fierce conflict during WWI, all of them managed to produce meticulous projects for the future of the empire and faithfully performed every single task they had been assigned to. Doubtlessly, these memoirs document the efforts of the CUP cadre to keep the Ottoman state out of difficulties that could arise from ethnic loyalties. Second, these personal accounts display the fact that implementing modern reforms was fundamental, not only for these individuals but for the headquarters of the CUP and Enver Pasha, who sent these individuals to accomplish specific missions, either political or educational.

The perceptions of these individuals about Arabs reflect a certain official and cultural discourse. Their role in Arab provinces needs to be elaborated regarding the role of Arabs and Turks in the Empire and their attitudes vis-à-vis each other. Their personal impressions of the Arabs as well as of the everyday life; customs, behaviors, religious zeal, and gender relations in Arab lands are considered here for providing critical evidence on the subject. It should also be noted that these memoirs helped the Republican discourse to generate a discourse on the Arabs and their world, and contributed to modern Turks' ambiguous perceptions of their former compatriots.

2. Strangers in Arab Lands

Cemal Pasha, the head of the fourth army in Syria, asked Falih Rıfkı, a young journalist in a daily newspaper, to join his cause, which was mainly to liberate Egypt from the British yoke. During WWI, Falih Rıfkı served as aide-de-camp to the Pasha and the chief of the political and administrative department in Ottoman army headquarters in Jerusalem. He was responsible

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[8]   C. Ernest Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 18-20.

for public relations and popularizing the acts and deeds of Cemal Pasha in the region.[9]

Falih Rıfkı published his memoirs about his service in the Ottoman military during the war in November 1918, weeks after the armistice. *Ateş ve Güneş* narrates the military and administrative story of the Ottoman Fourth Army under Cemal Pasha during WWI. This first edition in Ottoman-Turkish was followed by *Zeytindağı*, fourteen years later in Latinized Turkish, when the idea of an Ottoman nation had already been deemed delusional. Although the contents of both versions are identical regarding the criticism against military operations and the CUP cadre, the critical tone in the emphasis of geography and people in *Zeytindağı* is more noticeable.[10] The boldness in the tone of *Zeytindağı* derived from the didactical responsibility felt by the first generation of the republic to explain to younger generations "what went wrong" during the final days of the Empire.

Zeytindağı, named after the hill that hosted the military quarters of Cemal Pasha in Jerusalem, is one of the most significant literary works in Turkish language on the Ottoman cause in the Arab region during WWI. Its significance not only stems from the fact that the book reflects the perspectives of an officer from the inner circle, but also from certain literary techniques that were used to create a political narrative. The account in *Zeytindağı* is constructed within the sequence of certain events that are vital to understand the policies of war against both the British forces and the Arab nationalists. Second, it reflects an Ottoman-Turkish writer's feelings about Arabs and their world. Third, written in the heyday of the republican ideology, these memoirs are crucial given that they present an attempt to construct a witness account of the Ottoman mission, when the Ottoman option was still on the table.

In that sense, Falih Rıfkı's personal portrayal of the region and its people generates many discussions and may help us to materialize the recent arguments about the origins of modern Turkish perceptions of Arabs, one of which was represented by Makdisi on Ottoman and Turkish orientalism.

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9   M. Talha Çiçek, "Myth of the Unionist Triumvirate: the Formation of the CUP Factions and their impact in Syria during the Great War," in *Syria in World War I: Politics, Economy and Society*, ed. M. Talha Çiçek (New York: Routledge, 2015), 23.

10   Funda Selçuk Şirin, "Bir Gazeteci ve Aydın Olarak Falih Rıfkı Atay (1893-1971)," *Vakanüvis* 2, no. 2 (Fall 2017), 260-61.

Zeytindağı is helpful in distinguishing the perception of the self and the other, not prominently in terms of the studies of the encounters between the orient and the occident.[11] Primarily, it offers an account of the encounters between the Arab and Turkish nationalisms, when the Turks were looking forward to their finest hour.

On 1 August 1914, celebrating the agreement between the CUP administration and Germany, Falih Rıfkı wrote that the Empire was "facing the sun."[12] When he was called to join the Ottoman mission in Jerusalem, he immediately departed from Istanbul, fearing not to arrive on time to see the re-conquest of Egypt. He thought that Enver Pasha himself entered the war on behalf of the Germans, and feared that he would not make it on time to see their victory.[13] Falih Rıfkı found Cemal Pasha deciding the fate of Arab nationalists from Nablus in his office in the military headquarters, Jerusalem. Before housing Ottoman officers, the building belonged to the Germans. It was on top of one of the hills, called *Cebel ez-Zeytun*, dominating the cityscape. From the office windows, one can see the panorama of Palestine, the Jordan River, the Dead Sea, and Old Jerusalem:

> *I am on top of the Zeytindağı, looking at the Dead Sea and the Greek Mountains. Far away, there is the whole left shore of the Red Sea, Hejaz and Yemen. When I turn my head, the Dome of Kamame is catching my eyes. This is Palestine. At the lower part, there are Lebanon and Syria; standing on one direction to the Suez Canal, on the other to the Persian Gulf; deserts, cities; and upon all, there is our flag. I am an offspring of this great empire.[14]*

These verses of self-importance are rather reflecting the amazement of a young Ottoman realizing his spatial disorientedness resulting from his national and ideological identity than expressions of national pride. In the age of nation-states, most citizens of empires, who traveled to dissimilar regions under the same flag have felt the same disorientedness.[15] This

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[11]   Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," 5-7.

[12]   Falih Rıfkı, "Karanlık Önünde," *Tanin*, 1 August 1914.

[13]   Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Zeytindağı* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1970), 32-3.

[14]   Ibid., 36.

[15]   See, Christoph Herzog and Raoul Motika, "Orientalism 'alla Turca': Late 19th / Early 20th Century Ottoman Voyages into the Muslim 'Outback'," New Series: Ottoman Travels and Travel Accounts from an Earlier Age of Globalization, *Die Welt des Islams* 40, no. 2 (July 2000): 139-95.

difficulty was not unique to Ottoman individuals; also different groups, parties, ethnicities in the Empire tried to interpret their positions and those of others in the society or on the map. Multiple identities of an individual, as a citizen of an empire, were precipitously becoming complicated and volatile. In 1914, after the loss of the Balkans, Falih Rıfkı, a Roumelian Turk, made similar comments of disorientedness about Anatolia. In 1914, he claimed that the place did not feel intact with diverse languages and identities living together.[16] The idea of a homeland was already intangible for young Ottomans. Therefore, the first reflections of the writer on Arab lands echoed his first impressions of Anatolia after the loss of the Balkans, the real homeland of most of the CUP cadre.

The text reflects the perplexity of a young Ottoman as he felt that these were the last days of the Empire not because these lands would be surrendered to the enemy, but due to the incongruity between the portrait of the Empire and its legitimacy. These were the days, when the lands of a country were nothing but dots on the map. The Ottoman geography, its Middle Eastern section, is depicted as a historical being in *Zeytindağı*. For the young Ottoman who catches the train with enthusiasm in Istanbul, the view from the hill in Jerusalem suggests the feeling of the end, the decadence. This is the illustration of a moment of awakening.

The legitimacy of Ottoman rule in the region is one of the significant issues that were mentioned in *Zeytindağı*. In the beginning, Falih Rıfkı welcomed the idea of a Turkish-Arab Empire. Interestingly enough, he argued that Turkish nationalism would contribute to the erosion of Islamic-Ottoman mentality among the Turkish intelligentsia, and pave the way for a federation between Turks and Arabs.[17] He believed that "political authority can be maintained in the region, which mainly consisted of Muslims."[18]

Falih Rıfkı first went to Jerusalem as a citizen of the country that held the holy lands under control. Nevertheless, it seems that later on, he questioned whether the Turks ever managed to take part in the history of civilization,

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[16] Tanıl Bora, *Cereyanlar: Türkiye'de Siyasi İdeolojiler*, 4th edition (Istanbul: İletişim, 2017), 245.

[17] Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya* (Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş, 1969), 245.

[18] Ozan Kuyumcuoğlu, "Geç Osmanlı'dan Erken Cumhuriyet'e Siyasal Seçkinlerin Suriye'ye Bakışı: Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın ve Falih Rıfkı Atay Örnekleri," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 16, no. 64 (2019): 112.

a significant chapter of which had taken place in this region, where Cemal Pasha pitched his garrison on. This major question also characterizes the writer's judgment on the general framework of the relationship between Turks and the residents of the region, the Arabs, despite the connection of the Turks to the land. Moreover, the author announces the end of the idea of the Empire. It seems that Turks had always been strangers in Arab lands:

> *Naked Jesus was a carpenter's pupil in Nazareth. However, when he passed over Zeytindağı, he himself had his own donkey that he rode. We are tenants in Jerusalem. Not only is the Turkish paper (currency) not valid farther than Aleppo, but also Turkish and the Turk. As much as Florence, Jerusalem was not ours. We stroll like tourists on the streets.*[19]

'We' does not signify the citizens of the Ottoman Empire anymore. It refers the Turks that were alienated even from the lands that gave the Ottomans their legitimacy to rule the Muslim world four centuries. Falih Rıfkı represents the transition of a Turkish intellectual from being a member of the Ottoman society into becoming a simple Turk. Nevertheless, this is not an idea derived from the nationalism in progress among the Turks at that time led by CUP ideologues. It is more like a confession of the historical failure of the idea of an Ottoman Empire. The author implies that there had never been an Ottoman Empire, at least not as an integral political, social or cultural entity.

The position of Falih Rıfkı in Jerusalem as a tourist represented this failure of integrity. Following these first expressions, which were displaying the irrelevance of Ottoman rule in the region, the whole mission of Turks in WWI on Arab lands was no longer a source of enthusiasm. The memory of the day when young Ottoman Falih Rıfkı caught the train in Haydarpaşa immediately turned into a tourist expedition in which he suspected the validity of an Ottoman nation. This is not an analysis deriving from the unstable political environment during WWI. It indicates the doom of a greater historical ideology, which he and his comrades submitted themselves to glorify without hesitation. The idea of the Empire had failed. The Ottoman state represented neither political power nor a pioneer of modernization in the region.

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[19]   Atay, *Zeytindağı*, 36.

The idea of Ottomanism had already been questioned since the failure of the Hamidian regime in reinstalling the parliament after it was shut down in 1878. Critics of the sultan for his reluctance to proclaim consultative and representative institutions were not only the Young Turks. Also, many Arab intellectuals, like Rafiq Bey al-'Azm, mainly binding their arguments to religious principles, demanded democracy, *meşveret*.[20] Falih Rıfkı points out the failure of constitutional ideals promised by the CUP cadre in 1908. Agreeing with the idea of the demise of Ottomanist ideology, he further announces the end of its heir, a democratic empire in which every member of the society would be represented. For him, the discourse of the CUP regime was modernization under Turkish leadership. Conducting the reforms, Turks would operate as the signal tower in the new empire:

> *We were forcing ourselves without depending on reality but on the sense of history. It was obligatory that the whole of Anatolia should be reconstructed; cities, towns, houses and farms should be rich; Turks to be westernized; and only then should we run over from Aleppo to the Red Sea with the population, the technique, and the capital.[21]*

The failure of the CUP agenda owes much to its bold attempt to change the nineteenth century supranational policies of the state in favor of the principle of political guidance of an ethnic group, the Turks. There are several reasons for the failure of CUP plans in Arab lands. First, it was the image of the Turks in the area. Even though many families, which adhered to Arab nationalism, were originally Turkish including the famous 'Azm family of Syria. Nothing Turkish was popular in the region. One cannot notice the footsteps of Turkish administration even in the urban space. Falih Rıfkı admitted: "the most beautiful building of Jerusalem belongs to the Germans, the second also belongs to them, the greatest belongs to the Russians, all others belong to the English, the French, and to other nations."[22]

Even though, Anatolia and Arab lands stand side by side on the map, there is no interaction between them. Furthermore, there was a disparity between Anatolia and Arab lands. The CUP ideology hoped to modernize the new

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[20] Caesar E. Farah, *Arabs and Ottomans: A Checkered Relationship* (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2002), 9-19.

[21] Atay, *Zeytindağı*, 38.

[22] Ibid.

Ottoman mainland, Anatolia, and to spread this achievement to the Arab region. Nevertheless, Arab lands and cities were incomparably richer than the ones in Anatolia. The author's perception of the history of Ottoman expansion in the region displays the ways in which the Turks, coming from the barren highlands of Anatolia, were amazed when they approached the magnificent Arab cities. He states: "When we pass over Anatolia and ring the doors of Aleppo, we begin to see the crowds and prosperity. Aleppo was a great city, Damascus was a great city, Beirut was a great city and Jerusalem was a great city. And all were foreign to us."[23]

Third, the region was unknown to the Ottoman cadre. Ottoman officials were strangers and they were ignorant toward Arab lands. They had no clue about the political formation in the region, the struggle, and balance between the tribes or ethnic groups. Falih Rıfkı regretted that even the westerners; the British, the Russians or the Italians had a better understanding about the region and its people. For him, "among those British, Russians, Italians and the Ottomans, the ones that had the least information and understanding on the issues concerning Syria, Palestine, and Hejaz, were the Ottomans who were allegedly the possessors of these lands."[24]

Moreover, although the CUP cadre believed that the Turks and Arabs, the last remaining prominent elements of the Empire especially after the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), shared a collective history and religion, Arabs and their lands were mysterious to Turks as much as they were to Europeans. Being aware of that foreignness, Falih Rıfkı regards the Turkish elite in the region as the occupying force, and describes the feeling of exoticism through their eyes as for instance when saying, "…women are belly dancing on camels, and spears are adorned by furs, the whole African fantasia."[25]

Such phantasmagorical depictions are typical devices, through which the European orientalist literature constructs the Arab world that makes the unintelligible and the exotic 'other,' intelligible. They provide Western discourse with cultural references according to which the Western world constructs itself as superior to its eastern opposite. In Falih Rıfkı's account, literary devices that were dedicated to make the Arab world intelligible were used to exaggerate the ontological differences between Turks and Arabs.

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[23]   Ibid., 38-9.

[24]   Ibid., 42.

[25]   Ibid.

Nevertheless, the main motive in his depictions is not prominently to display the Turks as superior to the Arabs. The main framework in *Zeytindağı* does not represent or configure the Turkish nationalistic approach that was produced by the CUP. Therefore, Rıfkı's memoirs cannot be regarded as a source to represent growing nationalistic feelings of the Turks as the ultimate reason for the emergence of Arab nationalism. Falih Rıfkı used the Orientalistic approach not in order to degrade Arabs and their world but to picture the despair in which the Ottoman officials in the region found themselves. The Turks in the region were desperate in terms of their knowledge about Arabs. The author bemoaned the desolation of the Turks in the Arab world given that Europeans were exerting influence on the region more and more, for example by introducing Western-oriented facilities from education to finance. The relationship between Turks and Arabs during WWI was not different from the general outline of that growing political and cultural unfamiliarity between the last remaining nations of the Ottoman Empire.

Within this framework, Cemal's regime in Syria during the war indicated not only the military measures that were taken in order to struggle against the occupying forces. It also operated as a power mechanism against Arab nationalists, who were struggling to convince the native Arabs that Ottoman rule was doomed. Until the end of the war, the CUP regime under Cemal Pasha tried hard to eliminate objections coming from local Arab leaders. The dominant historiographical tendencies have depicted these efforts as main motives behind the emergence of Arab nationalism, particularly in Syria. Disregarding the terms and impact of opposition within the Arabs, Cemal Pasha has been presented as a scapegoat for leaving Arabs no choice but to rise against their state. Being 'a very ambitious and despotic man', the reign of terror at the hands of the Pasha has been regarded as the reason of Arab nationalist urges.[26]

Falih Rıfkı, in his description of the executions of nationalist Arab leaders in Syria, tries to contemplate the main motives of the Pasha. This description also needs to be assessed according to the above-mentioned ontological resistance that Turks and the CUP regime encountered from Arabs in the region. The author opposed the idea that there was a dispute between Cemal

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[26] Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, 101-2.

Pasha and other members of the CUP triumvirate (Enver and Talat Pashas), concerning the former's policies in the region against Arab nationalists. The main and only reason of the disagreement was the fact that Enver and Talat wanted the decisions of the military court in the region, which were made by Cemal, to be consulted with the ministry of defense in Istanbul. Nevertheless, both Falih Rıfkı and Cemal Pasha himself, were perplexed about their feelings for those who were executed. Clearly, Falih Rıfkı ideologically praises the CUP for being the most ruthless enemy of the protagonists of ethnic separation, and simply links the executions led by Cemal Pasha to the raison d'être of not only the ruling party but also the Ottoman state. Although being ideologically devout to the centralist paradigm, Ottoman officials were somehow sympathetic to the Arabs who were executed. Falih Rıfkı tries to expose that these executions were heartbreaking also for Cemal Pasha as follows:

> *A beautiful lady in black garments and her child greeted Cemal Pasha as he climbed down the stairs of his mansion in Beirut. The kid threw a bouquet of flowers to Pasha's feet and begged him to forgive his father. I saw the commander trying to hide his tears. Because, that woman in black, on the way back home, was going to see his beloved husband's dead cold body in the corner of the square.[27]*

Not only were the Ottoman officials sorry for the executed but they also respected these young nationalists. The writer clearly represents those who were executed as idealist and brave: "Those who were hanged in Beirut were mostly young nationalists. They walked from the dungeon to the rope, brave and hardnosed, by chanting the Arab anthem."[28]

The ambivalence between political measures and personal sympathy stems firstly from the fact that Falih Rıfkı wrote *Zeytindağı* in 1930s, when the republican cadre announced nationalism as one of the pillars of the regime. Needless to say, the intellectual milieu was suitable to discuss the stories of ethnic groups within the Ottoman Empire apart except Kurds or Armenians being anathema to the republican ideology of the time. Therefore, reading history retrospectively, the author's sympathy for Arab nationalists is highly understandable. In this sense, although Ottoman officials were equally alarmed about nationalist urges among Arab subjects, those

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[27]   Atay, *Zeytindağı*, 50.

[28]   Ibid., 47.

who were executed, were seen as the victims of these perilous times. The Ottoman cadre was still unsure about the seriousness of the Arab nationalist movement. They still seem unconvinced about the means of an Arab nationalism. Maybe this was due to the belief that they did not expect Muslim citizens to yearn for an independent Arab state, and to separate themselves from the lands of the caliph. Finally, and most vital for the aims of this paper, the imbalance between the measures taken and the sympathetic narrative can be evaluated as reflection of the abovementioned feeling of unfamiliarity among those, who came from the center to the region and encountered a world that was far different from what they had expected.

3. Defending Sacred Lands

Cemal Pasha's *Hatırat* (memoirs) was published in 1920, immediately after the Pasha was sentenced to death in absentia by a special martial court in Istanbul, which was under the rule of allied occupation following the Ottoman defeat.[29] The court held him responsible for the executions of Arab nationalist leaders during his rule in the region. First and foremost, *Hatırat* aimed to justify the acts and deeds of Cemal Pasha during the war. Although the apologetic character of his memoirs is obvious, many recent publications have offered several witness accounts in favor of the Pasha's intentions.

As opposed to the tyrannical image of the Pasha presented by several historians, who have partially linked the rise of Arab nationalism to the executions of young Arabs during the Pasha's tenure in the region, Dotan Halevy states that "his actions were guided by a well-thought-out military logic, which in turn emanated from a broad perspective of the war's conduct."[30] Talha Çiçek points out the fact that before his service during WWI, Cemal Pasha was appointed to Adana and Istanbul as governor to restore order after internal crisis in each region, and that he was known as

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[29] Eliezer Tauber, "From Young Turks to Modern Turkey: the Story of Hüseyin Aziz Akyürek (Aziz Bey), the Last Director of the Ottoman General Security Service," *Middle Eastern Studies* 55, no. 1 (2019): 37.

[30] Dotan Halevy, "The Rear Side of the Front: Gaza and Its People in World War I," *Journal of Levantine Studies* 5, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 39.

"a man of order" around the CUP circles.[31] Nazan Maksudyan remarks the ways, in which the Pasha reflected his Ottomanist ideas of unity as early as during his mission in Adana in 1909.[32] Yücel Güçlü calls attention to the Pasha's vision for the future of the Empire as he quotes the pasha's public speech in Adana on August 23, 1909. Similar to his later speech to an Arab audience during WWI, he earlier suggested to the victims of ethnic tension in Adana to forget the past, as he told them:

> *Let us now try to recover ourselves and show that we are capable of whatsoever waits for us. All eyes are fixed on Adana. We have to be worth of this attention. I want that everybody works. I want that all runaway victims get under shelter here in a month. We all will work, without any distinction, to rebuild Adana to give its former look. I promise, on my part, that I will give all my support, and I will do my utmost to help you in this task; and for our duty to be accomplished as it should be, I only tell you this: gentlemen, be united! I do not want to hear Armenian, Greek, Arab, Israelite. You are all brothers; you must help each other.[33]*

His memoirs include a very detailed report of his reign in the Arab lands. They not only intended to defend the Pasha from charges against him on the executions of Arab leaders but also to answer the criticisms about his responsibility in the defeat against the British. For him, the war was lost due to the 'betrayal' of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, even though the Pasha had taken all the measures for defeating the British on the battleground. Sharif Hussein had to be blamed for the decisive victory of colonial powers in the region following WWI, as the Pasha was writing down his memoirs. According to him:

> *Sharif's betrayal deprived us of this happy result (the victory) and by separating two brother Muslim nations, Arab and Turk, from each other; it doomed the first to British and French domination and prompted the latter to start a desperate struggle against its most cruel enemies.[34]*

Hatırat was written in order to expose his extensive military and administrative effort as the commander in chief in the region. Therefore, it

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[31]   Çiçek, "Myth of the Unionist Triumvirate," 15.

[32]   Nazan Maksudyan, "1909 Adana Olayları Ertesinde Cemal Bey'in Adana Valiliği ve Osmanlıcılık İdeali," *Toplumsal Tarih* 174, (June 2008), 22-8.

[33]   Yücel Güçlü, *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909: Cemal Paşa and Beyond* (Maryland: Hamilton Books, 2018), 304.

[34]   Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, 149.

mentions not only military concerns but also the public works in the region. Moreover, the Pasha's impression of Arabs does not seem to be affected by the 'betrayal' of the Sharif. He frequently praises the Arab nation, and clearly notices their loyalty to the Ottoman regime until the end and their usefulness to his service. For that reason, Mesut Uyar states that "even the ardent separatist nationalists continued to fight for the Ottoman cause."[35]

Cemal Pasha displayed the Canal Campaigns against the British forces in Egypt as evidence for the close collaboration between two nations, and the Arabs' loyalty to the Empire and the Caliphate. The solidarity on the battlefield augmented the faith in victory among the troops.[36] He confirmed that the idea of an Arab nationalism was far away at the beginning of 1915, the date for the first Canal Campaign. According to the Pasha: "…there had been no attempt of desertion or sign of betrayal among the transport corps, which were mainly consisting of Syrians and Palestinians."[37] Salim Tamari interprets this comradeship as the creation of a new synthesis made of Arabs and Turks and acceleration of the process of integration of two peoples into a common future.[38]

After returning from the first expeditionary campaign, Cemal Pasha moved his headquarter from the heart of Damascus to the hills of Jerusalem, and dedicated himself to the preparations for the second campaign. At the time, the main prerequisite for the success of any campaign in the region was the support from the main Arab amirs, Sharif Hussein, Amir Ibn Rashid and Ibn Suud. Cemal Pasha did not seem to have a problem with the powers of Arab amirs in general, and he did not think of their power to be challenging his authority. Moreover, in his memoirs, he praised the last two amirs for their help to the cause.

Problems emerged with Sharif Hussein after Cemal Pasha demanded the assistance of the Sharif and his sons on the field. Regarding Ottoman centralist policies that were intensified under the CUP regime, especially

[35]   Mesut Uyar, "Ottoman Arab Officers between Nationalism and Loyalty during the First World War," *War in History* 20, no. 4 (2013), 541.

[36]   Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, 162-3.

[37]   Ibid., 171.

[38]   Salim Tamari, "Muhammad Kurd Ali and the Syrian-Palestinian Intelligentsia in the Ottoman Campaign against Arab Separatism," in *Syria in World War I: Politics, Economy and Society*, ed. M. Talha Çiçek (New York: Routledge, 2015), 45.

during the war, traditional rights and autonomous power of the Sharif of Mecca were at stake. Due to technological developments, mostly with the construction of the Hejaz Railroad, Sharif Hussein had lost most of his traditional administrative role in the region. Moreover, according to the new code of provincial administration, *Vilayetname* of 1913, the autonomous administrative status of Hejaz mostly became obsolete.[39] After the war was announced, the British openly sought an alliance with Hussein and his sons, Abdallah and Faisal, promising an 'independent' Arab state. The terms and objectives of Arab nationalism were established during these negotiations between the British and the Sharif.[40] Nevertheless, the Sharif had to gain popular support. He needed to generate a discourse and a language of Arab nationalism to a certain extent, as he was now in position of collaborating with the Christian 'infidels' against the Muslim Caliphate.[41] In that sense, the struggle between the Sharif and the Pasha was not only based on military issues but also on political propaganda. *Hatırat* per se is part of that struggle. Although it was produced after the war and is highly biased as part of Cemal Pasha's attempt to justify his actions, it provided many hints about the outlines of the political struggle between the Pasha and the Sharif.

Hatırat includes a detailed report about the Sharif's practices in order to answer the accusations against the Pasha, who was blamed for causing the Arab Revolt as a result of his ruthless administration in the region. According to his memoirs, only with the revolt in June 1916, had Cemal Pasha realized that he was being fooled by the Sharif for a long time. During his negotiations with McMahon, Sharif Hussein hindered the Pasha and the central government from getting suspicious about any of his goals. While the Sharif was making his final requests to the British in January 1916, he was hosting Enver and Cemal Pasha in Mecca, flattering them precious presents.[42]

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[39] Mary C. Wilson, "The Hashemites, The Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 207-11.

[40] William Ochsenwald, "Ironic Origins: Arab Nationalism in the Hijaz, 1882-1914," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 189.

[41] Wilson, "The Hashemites," 213.

[42] Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, 261.

Meanwhile, Cemal Pasha was trying to reply the Sharif's repeated requests of an official recognition of permanency of his family's rule in Hejaz, and a general amnesty for those who were imprisoned by the Pasha for being Arab separatists. Cemal Pasha deemed the first request as unnecessary and not of primary importance especially in consideration of the ongoing war. He also denied the second request due to the great contemporary concerns for national security. However, he had never suspected the Sharif's agenda.

After the First Canal Campaign, Cemal Pasha busied himself for a while with the separatist ideas that proliferated among Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals. Arrestment and execution of Arab nationalist leaders in Syria were mainly undertaken in April 1916. Several Arab notables were hung at the principal squares of Beirut and Damascus or were imprisoned.[43] The Pasha dismissed the petitions for forgiving the notables. He believed that: "Public opinion would accuse a state that forgives traitors and what follows is that others attempt treason and the religion and the state would fail."[44]

Nevertheless, Arab nationalists in the Syrian Congress, which was established after the war, were mostly not in the picture before. Many of them were loyal to Ottomanists until the end of WWI.[45] For Cemal Pasha, these executions should be understandable considering the contemporary situation in the region, which was "contaminated by the propaganda of the British and the French." He believed, because of his harsh response to the insurgence, colonialist plans were delayed until the end of the war. His policies did not rely on fears of an Arab Revolt, rather they were based on fears of decentralization at the hands of colonial powers, which he believed supported Arab nationalists.[46] He was "sure that the reason for not having a revolt in Syria until the end of the war, two and a half years after Sharif Hussein declared his independence, was because of the executions that were carried out in April 1916."[47]

Cemal Pasha claimed that he had never been against the idea of Arabs speaking their own language and having some rights regarding their

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[43] Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, 102.

[44] Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, 263.

[45] Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," 15.

[46] M. Talha Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria: Cemal Pasha's Governorate During World War I, 1914-17* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 46.

[47] Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, 266.

domestic affairs.[48] His words addressing an audience, which consisted of important Arab notables in the region, in the first days of his service, represent his political ideas about the relationship between two nations, the Turks and the Arabs, during and after World Warn I. For the Pasha, if these two nations would be separated from each other, they would be doomed to suffer. Cemal Pasha "created a new patriotism, bringing together Turks and Arabs."[49] Decorating his ideas with a religious framework, he defended the idea that any future conflict between these two major elements of Islamic world would cause Islam to be powerless and finally be attacked by the infidels. Needless to say, he was after creating the ideological backbone of his rule in the region as a CUP official and constituting his excuses for the executions. He assured his audience that:

> *Turkism is not an enemy of Arabism, but its brother, its inseparable fellow. Turkish youth desires Arabs to be developed and to have their own rights...Do not believe the propaganda of those creatures, who sold their souls to the foreigners, who try every trick and conspiracy to invade Arab lands.[50]*

Accordingly, during his service in the region, Cemal Pasha had been very careful in his relations with prominent Arab notables. He established face-to-face contacts with certain local leaders, and avoided interfering in their domestic affairs. First, he maintained close relations with Selim al-Atraché, the Druze leader, to secure his rule from the dissent of Druzes in Syria.[51] Second, he tried to obtain the support of the Arab ulema and muftis of Beirut and Damascus.[52] Third, he claimed the support of Arab "opinion makers" by arranging an expedition for a group of writers, journalists, and religious scholars from the Syrian provinces to visit the Dardanelles front in order to convince them to the great competence of the Ottoman army.[53] For him, the reason behind his failure was his trust for the support of the Reformists (*Islahiyyun*). Their 'betrayal' was disclosed by the Pasha's intelligence service, which managed to acquire the correspondence

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[48]   Ibid., 211.

[49]   Tamari, "Muhammad Kurd Ali," 41.

[50]   Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, 220-1.

[51]   Ibid., 226.

[52]   Ibid., 234-5.

[53]   Tamari, "Muhammad Kurd Ali," 36.

between party leaders. Victims of the 1916 executions were mainly among those who were involved in the party, *Hizb al-Markaziyah*, the political heart of resistance against the centralist policies of the CUP regime in the region.

Cemal Pasha's *Hatırat* is not only based on the Pasha's evaluation of the war against the enemy. It not only contains his perspectives on and excuses for the Arab Revolt and its victims, but also his allegations against Sharif Hussein of Mecca. It exposes the fact that the Ottoman mission in WWI was not only composed of the struggle on the battlefield or reestablishing national security. Cemal Pasha, the army commander, was the main individual responsible for the whole region during one of the most troubling periods for the Ottoman state throughout its history. Even though the Pasha was completely busy with the Canal Campaign against British forces and regarding security issues in the region, he was also very ambitious beyond these issues. Being one of the three leaders of the CUP regime, Cemal Pasha extended the scope of his activities, much more than he was expected.

Presence of the army required extensive physical arrangements in the region in order to fulfill every need at the camps. Nevertheless, not every infrastructural development and public work was connected to military requirements. Measures taken to sustain the quality of everyday lives of the people in the region, like restoring and constructing motor roads and railroads, Cemal Pasha's service in the region brought about an era of extensive public improvements in major Arab cities, even though the enemy was at the gates. Boulevards, public gardens, city clubs were built, what did not only improve the appearances of cities but also transformed the character of urban life. Furthermore, in the midst of the war, a successful Swiss architect, Max Zürcher, was invited to make plans for the improvement of cities and the restoration of buildings.[54] Projects were prepared for Jerusalem, Damascus, Beirut, and Aleppo. Drinking water facilities and irrigation systems for agriculture were installed. Even a report on the ancient sites of Syria and Palestine was commissioned. Moreover, an orphanage was opened for a thousand Armenian children who had lost their families during the forced migration of 1915. A school for agriculture (*Tanail Ziraat Mektebi*) was opened in the Beqaa Valley, and became famous among the Arabs. Primary schools for girls were opened

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[54] Cemal Paşa, *Hatırat*, 331.

in Beirut and Damascus. Finally, Halide Edip was invited to establish a college for girls in Beirut, called *Dar-ül Nassırat*, which seemed to have made the Pasha very proud as he learned that some families took their children from the American College for Girls in Beirut to register them at *Dar-ül Nassırat*.[55]

Considering *Hatırat* as a document reflecting Cemal Pasha's endeavor to defend him against allegations, the Pasha first divides Arabs into two groups, the traitor and the loyal. By doing that, he tried to prove that he is not an enemy to the Arab Nation, but to the traitors, who, he was sure, collaborated with Western powers. Second, he tried to expose that he had taken every measure to protect the locals from the damage of war. Third, he expressed how much he had done for modernizing the region despite war conditions. In fact, *Hatırat* exposed how complicated and intensive, and not only consisting of military issues, the four-year long mission of the Pasha had been. Moreover, the account depicted the extensive effort, the caliber of faith and the modern vision of an Ottoman official, even in the last days of the Empire. This vision was not limited with daily politics or the battlefield. Nonetheless, taking everything into account, it is apparent that this CUP officer's mentality was far from understanding the daily life and political objectives of Arabs, similar to most other CUP officers in the Arab world, as Falih Rıfkı put it. The imaginary role that Cemal Pasha ascribed to Arabs and Turks in the future of the Empire coincided with the emergence of Arab Nationalism. Nevertheless, until the very end, many Arabs believed in the viability of the Empire. Cemal's vision still found Arab followers even after the collapse of the southern front. Furthermore, some Arab officials continued to serve the Turkish cause to prevent allied expansion in Anatolia.[56]

4. Halide Edip's Mission Civilisatrice

At the beginning of the year 1916, Falih Rıfkı brought a letter from Cemal Pasha to Halide Edip, inviting her to Syria to re-organize the educational

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[55]   Ibid., 334; Hasan Kayalı, "Wartime Regional and Imperial Integration of Greater Syria During World War I," in *The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation: Bilâd al-Shâm From the 18th to the 20th Century*, ed. Thomas Philipp and Birgit Schäbler (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1998), 297.

[56]   Uyar, "Ottoman Arab Officers," 542-3.

facilities in the region. At that time, Edip was already a prominent member of a nationalist organization called Turkish Hearth (*Türk Ocağı*) writing about daily politics and educational matters in the daily *Tanin*. Furthermore, due to her reformist ideas about education, she was given the responsibility of reforming girls' schools in Istanbul.

In the summer of 1916, Halide Edip left Istanbul for Syria. This was the first time for the author, who was in her thirties, to see lands beyond Izmit, a city close to the Ottoman capital. Similar to Falih Rıfkı, she also felt estranged in space and time as they traveled in the Syrian desert. Inside the car, historian Behçet Bey told her "the trail we followed was crossed by Moses and Selim the Grim." Halide Edip stated that she felt nothing as she "was utterly disconnected with the past and the future: as (she) was as insignificant and as nameless as one single grain of sand among the myriads."[57]

She finally met with Cemal Pasha, and together they decided how to start an educational reform in Arab provinces. Edip was responsible for educational reform as well as for the reorganization of schools in the region.[58] In fact, an educational reform was already made in the region by mostly Catholic French institutions. Cemal Pasha wished to replace the French as "he had seen the strong inclination of the Arabs toward the French, based on the educational efforts of the French, and he was desirous of copying their methods in a less religious and more liberal sense."[59] He wished to reclaim the support of Syrians, and cleanse the cultural impact of France in the region by appointing Halide Edip to redesign mass education.[60]

Cemal Pasha seemed to be aware of the fact that traditional facilities of education were unproductive in imposing the modern ideology of the Ottoman state. Instead, the traditional approach in education helped widen the gap between the state and its citizens to the benefit of French colonialism. Modern education was created to inform, organize, and control the citizens in contemporary Europe and the Pasha was aware of it. Halide Edip, on the other hand, became aware of the situation of the French schools in the

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57 Halide Edip, *Memoirs of Halide Edip* (London: The Century Co, 1926), 418.

58 Çiçek, "Myth of the Unionist Triumvirate," 23.

59 Halide Edip, *Memoirs*, 400.

60 Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, 184.

region not as bright as to set an example for modern Ottoman institutions. For her, in these schools "the learning was limited and very much used as an apparatus of political propaganda for the French."[61] Within two weeks, Edip finalized her report concluding:

> *Beirut, Lebanon, and Damascus should unite and establish one common normal school and college. Beirut should be the place for the school. Each of these provinces should have a model primary school with six grades to prepare students for the college and the normal school. Turkish, Arabic, and French should be the three languages taught.*[62]

Halide Edip's ideas are generally similar to those of Cemal Pasha on the ways in which Arabs and Turks establish a unity and an alliance in order to survive the fall or demise of the Ottoman Empire. Education was seen as the most prominent issue to teach these two nations how to cooperate. Halide Edip and Cemal Pasha represented their duty as to help the Arab nation to understand the "evil intentions" of Westerners, and to acknowledge that Arabs had, geographically and economically, "more common ties and interests with the Turks than with the foreigners."[63] Furthermore, the Turks would assist the Arabs "to develop a national spirit."[64]

During her tenure in Cemal Pasha's administration, Halide Edip also served as the editor and writer of *Musavver Çöl*, a bimonthly journal, which appeared in Beersheba as part of and in order to promote modern initiatives taken by Cemal Pasha. Beersheba was a little district, which was founded in the beginning of the 20th century in order to ameliorate the living conditions of the Bedouin population in the region.[65] Similarly, *Musavver Çöl* was part of the civilizing mission aimed to "enlighten" Arabs in the desert. Learning about the journal, Yusuf Akçura congratulated the publishers as being "among the vanguards of those, who aim to succeed an honorary, humanitarian, and therefore sacred mission, which is to civilize

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61   Halide Edip, *Memoirs*, 401.

62   Ibid., 402.

63   Ibid.

64   Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria*, 186.

65   David Kushner, "The Musavver Çöl: An Ottoman Journal in Beersheba at the End of World War I," in *Perspectives on Ottoman Studies: Papers from the 18th Symposium of the International Committee of Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Studies (CIEPO)*, ed. Ekrem Causevic, Nenad Moacanin, and Vjeran Kursar (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010), 168.

the desert."[66] Second, *Musavver Çöl* aimed "to bring to its readers, both Turks and Arabs, the message of the Ottoman leadership and instill in them feelings of patriotism and sacrifice at this critical moment in the Empire's history, when it was fighting for its very survival."[67] *Musavver Çöl* aimed to promote a union between Turks and Arabs, and frequently warned its readers against the calamities of Western colonialism. Years later, Halide Edip evoked many of these ideas in her *memoirs* assessing the future of Arab and Turkish nations and how to fight Western hegemony.

Her appointment was understandable as she was anxious to fight against the cultural and educational hegemony of the West in Beirut and Syria. One day she visited the Maronite patriarch in the end of her mission in the region. The patriarch was clearly supporting French domination. During the meeting, she thought that "once the artificial difference of the Moslem and Christian Arab is removed (a feeling nursed and created the most by Western powers in the East), all Arabs, including the Maronites, will unite.[68]

After a long journey, Edip and fifty female teachers in her company were able to launch education in the old French college, *Der-Nassira* (Ladies of Nazareth), in Beirut, in January 1917. Other teachers in her team were selected from her own pupils, who had modernized the *evkaf* schools in Istanbul under the CUP administration. There were some two hundred applicants for a place of twenty in the entrance examinations. The applicants were from Lebanon, Beirut, and Damascus. The questions were mostly about the Arab geography, its language and culture. Seeing the exam questions, the Arab inspector of public instruction, Jasir Efendi, told Edip while laughing that if she were an Arab, she would be accused of Arab nationalism and sent to the court in Aliye. Halide Edip seemed very surprised as she found out that most of the girls, coming mostly from French schools, "knew nothing about the country they lived in and despised their own language as inferior to French."[69] The education of Arabic became the most important mission in the new school.

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[66] Gülsüm Polat, "I. Dünya Savaşında İngiliz ve Türk Propaganda Gazetelerinin Etkinliği Üzerine bir Değerlendirme (*el-Hakika* ve *Musavver Çöl*)," *OTAM* 36 (Fall 2014), 146.

[67] Kushner, "The Musavver Çöl," 169.

[68] Halide Edip, *Memoirs*, 457.

[69] Ibid., 440.

Der-Nassira seems to have aroused considerable interest among Arab women in the region. An empty desk, especially in sewing and language classes, was in high demand. The school was offering Arabic, Turkish, and French classes. Moreover, fashionable uniforms were ordered, manifesting the modern, secular, and Western character of the college.

By November 1917, the Ottoman frontline was destroyed by the British and only then Halide Edip became concerned about the future of her work in the region. Nevertheless, until she was able to talk to Cemal Pasha, she had never thought that the region would fall to the British forces. Asked by the Pasha if she and her companions wanted to leave for home, she responded "…the honor of Turkish women demanded that they should stay till they were officially authorized to leave the schools."[70]

Only from this moment on Edip started to follow the news from the front. Realizing that the situation was worse than she thought, she at least wanted to continue education until the last moment when she became unable to provide the necessary material conditions for the schools. She received the promise from the chief of supplies of taking necessary provisions enough for four more months. In February 1918, Edip asked the leading Americans in Beirut to take the orphanage under the protection of the Red Cross. On the fourth of March, she was able to leave Syria for Istanbul in relief. She was not only concerned for the future of the schools that she run in the region, but also was in agony regarding the future of her country. By the armistice, which was signed in Moudros in October 1918, the Ottoman Empire was no more. The government was leaving Arabs alone with their fate of falling prey to Western colonialism. As Palestine became a British Protectorate, Syria and Lebanon turned into a French Mandate.

5. Conclusion

Studies on how Arab nationalism proliferated under the CUP government have focused on the latter's growing pan-Turkist inclinations especially after the Balkan Wars. The CUP regime has been repeatedly condemned by renowned scholars of Arab nationalism for prompting Arab citizens of the Empire to separate their ways with the Ottoman Empire. George Antonius'

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[70] Ibid., 460.

and Zeine Zeine's arguments are examples of this narrative. In general, they believe that Cemal Pasha's regime in Arab lands left Arabs no choice but to collaborate with European powers in order to protect themselves from the calamities that were created by centralist policies of Istanbul. For them, executions of Arab nationalists on orders of Cemal Pasha without any evident reason, precipitated the separation between Arabs and the Ottoman central government.

In this study, I have analyzed three memoirs that were written by prominent Ottoman officials after the war in order to challenge the orthodox argument that is based on the responsibility of the CUP cadre for the emergence of Arab nationalism. Memoirs of Cemal Pasha, Falih Rıfkı, and Halide Edip reveal these officials' faith in restoring the contract between Arabs and the Ottoman center against Western colonialism. Being neither nationalist fanatics nor defenders of the status quo, they seem to be convinced of the requirements of modern social and everyday life. Although their interpretations of the Arabs and the future of the Ottoman rule differ from one another, they advocated for reforms in the region even during the climax of war.

Written by Falih Rıfkı, a future supporter of the secularist policies of the republican regime, which followed the fall of the Ottoman State, *Zeytindağı* gives a general picture of the regime, criticizes both Arabs and Turks for the result. It emphasizes the cultural and political boundaries between the two nations. Nevertheless, Rıfkı does not refrain from confirming that Arab nationalism during the war was not very popular in the region, and there was still a great collaboration between Arab and Turkish citizens of the Empire. *Zeytindağı* reflects the republican consideration of the contested relationship between Turks and Arabs. However, different from the dominant republican narrative that defames Arabs as "traitors", and holds them responsible for the collapse of the Arab front, it denies a general conflict between the two people.

Cemal Pasha, one of the CUP, writes his memoirs to justify his rule over the region, which has been considered an era of tyranny by most historians. He is also aware of the fact that his regime was not only consisting of the struggle on the battlefield against the British. He claims that the execution of Arab leaders was necessary because they were traitors both to their country and to their own people. He represents these measures as

part of his desire to keep Arab lands in peace, even though there was a violent war against the infidel going on, very close to the Arab heartland. Accordingly, he believes that both Arabs and Turks should collaborate in order to maintain the well-being of the Empire, and thus of their nations. For him, both nations were dependent on each other in order to survive. To expose his and his party's intentions about the future of the country, and to emphasize the crucial position of Arabs in the future of the Empire, Cemal Pasha tried to modernize the region and installed many public projects. He was hoping to convince Arab elites, who wanted the region to benefit from modernity. Written immediately after he was accused of war crimes, his memoirs consisted of the Pasha's defense for each of his actions in the region. Many other independent witness accounts of the acts and deeds of Cemal Pasha, such as of Muhammad Kurd Ali and Sheik al-Shukairi, support his claims.

Halide Edip, a prominent supporter of Turkish independence and the most popular female author of her time in Turkey, was responsible for one of the most prominent pillars of Cemal Pasha's modernization attempts, namely the education of the Arab children. The aim was to educate Arabs according to modern principles, and to inform them about the culture, the history, and the language of their own nation. It was believed that as these children recognized their affinities with their Turkish co-citizens, they would be more loyal to Turks, and to the Empire instead of Western powers. Even though, Edip's memoirs were published to address English readers a decade after her tenure in Beirut and Syria, it was far from apologetic. She continued to advocate Muslim resistance against the snowballing pressure of Western imperialism following WWI, and regretted the lost chance of unity between Turks and Arabs.

Historical narratives have suggested that the bond between Arabs and Turks weakened during the CUP regime, and finally fell apart under Cemal Pasha's reign in the region. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of these Turkish officials while planning the future of how Arabs and the Turks would establish their mutual fate, indicates that the relationship between the two nations was still intact until the collapse of the Empire. Although there were cultural and political boundaries between CUP officials and Arabs during WWI, they worked tenaciously with faith in the Ottoman nation, which mainly consisted of Turks and Arabs, until the very end of the war.

The idea of an Arab nation during the war was still far from challenging the popularity of the idea of an Ottoman nation, especially having the Western enemy nearby.

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Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt: The Role of External Actors

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Abstract

In 2013, Egypt's first democratically elected president Mohammed Morsi was overthrown by a military coup. Since then the country has undergone serious setbacks in terms of democracy, individual freedoms, and social justice. Egypt's failed revolution and the military coup could not be thought independently from the role of external actors - either directly or indirectly involved in this process. Despite their political rhetoric emphasizing democracy promotion and political reforms, both the US and the EU failed to pursue consistent and contributory policies in promoting democratic transition in Egypt out of fear that the electoral victory of Islamist groups would harm their interests in the region. On the other hand, the Gulf Monarchies played a pivotal role in the entrenchment of the military rule by providing financial and political support to the military-backed government as a shield against the democratically elected government in Egypt. This article investigates how the policies adopted by Egypt's key allies, the European Union, the US and the Gulf Monarchies, impacted the trajectory of Egypt's political transition in the face of the January 25 revolution and 2013 military coup. The main thesis of the article is that the policies pursued by external actors created a political environment unfavorable for democratic change in Egypt.

Keywords: Egypt, External Actors, Political Transition, Authoritarianism, Military Regime

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Mısır'da Devrim ve Karşı Devrim: Dış Aktörlerin Rolü

Ayfer Erdoğan[*]

Öz

Mısır'ın demokratik yollarla seçilen ilk Cumhurbaşkanı Muhammed Mursi 2013'te askeri darbe sonucu devrildi. O tarihten bu yana, ülkede demokrasi, bireysel özgürlükler ve sosyal adalet alanlarında ciddi gerileme yaşandı. Mısır'ın siyasi geçiş süreci ve ülkede gerçekleşen askeri darbe doğrudan veya dolaylı bir şekilde bu süreçte yer alan dış aktörlerin rolünden bağımsız olarak düşünülemez. Demokrasi ve siyasi reformlara vurgu yapan söylemlerine karşın, hem ABD hem de Avrupa Birliği İslamcı grupların bölgedeki çıkarlarına zarar vereceği korkusuyla, Mısır'da demokrasiye geçişin teşvik edilmesi konusunda tutarlı ve katkı sağlayıcı politikalar izleyemedi. Diğer yandan, Körfez monarşileri Mısır'da demokratik bir şekilde seçilmiş rejime karşı bir kalkan olarak askeri rejime finansal ve siyasi destek vererek askeri yönetimin güçlendirilmesinde önemli rol oynamıştır. Bu makale Mısır'ın müttefiklerinin, diğer bir deyişle, Avrupa Birliği, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Körfez monarşilerinin 25 Ocak Devrimi ve 2013 askeri darbe karşısında izledikleri politikaların Mısır'ın siyasi geçiş sürecini nasıl etkilediğini incelemektedir. Makalenin ana tezi, dış aktörlerin izledikleri politikaların Mısır'da demokratik değişime olanak tanımayan siyasi bir ortam oluşturduğudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır, Dış Aktörler, Siyasi Geçiş, Otoriterizm, Askeri Rejim

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1. Introduction

Global politics are increasingly marked by interdependence among states and international socialization and so is democratic transition. In the third wave of democracy, democratic diffusion was prevalent among the countries that shared geographical proximity as well as political and cultural ties. The change in politics towards political liberalization and in economy towards free market in several parts of the developing world clearly illustrates that transitioning countries were both influenced by their neighboring states as well as the Western countries, which set an important example to them. Global and regional political forces and economic powers along with international organizations do play a critical role in enabling or precluding a smooth democratic transition. Particularly from 1980s onwards, the successful transitions experience of Eastern European states drew much attention to the role of external actors and external-internal linkages of democratization as an explanatory variable in the transition of the post-authoritarian states. As domestic developments could not be separated from external factors, a thorough understanding of democratic transition or democratic regression in a certain country requires an analysis of the role that external actors play in facilitating or hindering democratization.

Most of the literature on external influence on democratization has focused on how leverage and linkage contributed to the democratic transition of post-communist states in Eastern Europe and their successful integration into Western-dominated institutions such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the recent wave of uprisings and regime changes in the MENA region is contrary to the examples presented in the existing literature. In the MENA region, states that have undergone regime change in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings neither benefited from the so-called "democracy promotion" of the United States (US) nor from the conditionality often used by the EU as an attempt to bring democratic change in its Eastern borders. Egypt is particularly important in that regard as external actors played a role in overturning short-lived democratic experience in the country. The prospects of democratic transition in Egypt apparently came to an end in 2013 with the military positioning itself as the only decisive political force. Despite divergence in their interests, the EU, the US and the Gulf Monarchies either remained

silent in the face of the removal of an elected president or openly backed the military regime in their political rhetoric and policies. This political stance proved that their foreign policy interests prioritized security and stability rather than democracy in the region, which led to bitter sentiments among Egyptians towards the West, and raised suspicions in the Egyptian society about the legitimacy of those actors promoting democracy.

The political will by the external actors to use leverage or linkage in their relationship to states in transition should be taken as an important variable in analyzing how external influence could facilitate or inhibit democratic change. To this end, this article investigates the policies adopted by the EU, the US and the Gulf States vis-à-vis Egypt both prior to and following the January 25 uprisings and argues that external influence beclouded Egypt's path to democratization. The article is divided into three sections. The following section offers a theoretical debate on the external influence on democratic transition, and provides insight into the lessons learned from former democratic transition experiences. The third section analyzes the shift in US foreign policy towards the MENA region since the office of President Bush, and investigates the impact of US and EU foreign policy making on Egypt's transition following the January 25 uprisings. Finally, the fourth section examines the relationship between the Gulf Monarchies and Egypt under Mubarak and its aftermath, and looks at how the financial and political support provided by the Gulf Monarchies -Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates- to counter-revolutionary forces in Egypt enabled the restoration of authoritarianism, and undermined Egyptians' aspirations for freedom and democracy. The last section concludes with a brief summary of the impact of external influence on the trajectory of Egypt's political transition.

2. External Influence on Democratic Transition

External influence on democratic transition often takes place in two ways; (1) leverage emerges when a state or a group of states use(s) political, economic or military power to foster or reverse democratic transition in a country, (2) linkage exists when civil society actors, political movements and institutions in a country are tied to those of democratic countries or

Western led multilateral institutions.[1] Leverage can be exerted in several ways such as democratic conditionality, military intervention, diplomatic pressure and economic integrations or sanctions. Individual states or regional or international organizations could impose conditionality to facilitate democratic transition of post-authoritarian states by offering them "carrots" in exchange for their protection of democracy such as free trade or market access and membership in regional or international organizations. On the other hand, this conditionality also includes "sticks" to a country in transition in the case of non-compliance to desired progress in building democratic institutions such as the threat of sanctions, terminating membership to international institutions or financial support.

Based on rational calculations of costs and benefits, states transitioning from authoritarianism determine their positions, and often comply with the demands of the international community. The rather smooth and speedy transition of former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe to democracy and market economy was thanks to the conditionality imposed by the EU. Almost three decades in retrospect, it became evident that these states successfully became members of the EU after having made progress in building democratic institutions in line with its requirements upon which they were granted several tangible benefits. In addition to this top-down approach, international actors might choose to bypass the government in office and change the domestic equilibrium in favor of democratic reformists by increasing the bargaining power of certain domestic actors vis a vis their non-democratic opposition and government. Democracy assistance programs and democracy promotion aid by the West aiming to empower non-governmental organizations represent a bottom-up approach. In both cases conditionality is shaped by a logic of consequence based on the magnitude of costs and rewards as well as the deterrence of threats and the credibility of promises.[2]

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[1]   Steven Levitsky, and Lucan A. Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (July 2005): 21-23. doi:10.1353/jod.2005.0048.

[2]   Michael McFaul, Amichai Magen, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Transitions," Concept Paper, *Stanford University Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law* (2008): 8-9. https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/res/Evaluating_ International_ Influences_-_ Transitions_-_Concept_ Paper. pdf.

Linkage between external agents and domestic actors also largely influence the trajectory of transition to democracy. The interconnectedness between states through economic, social, cultural, religious and geopolitical ties as well as transnational organizations is an important form of external influence. Stronger ties between a country in transition and democratic states are hypothesized to contribute to democratic transition whereas weak political, economic, and institutional ties with democratic states are assumed to limit prospects for a democratic outcome. In that regard, those countries that are geographically close to the West and share political and economic ties have managed to integrate into political, economic and security communities created by Western states. On the other hand, countries that have geographical proximity and closer political, economic, social and security ties to authoritarian regimes are more likely to revert to some form of authoritarianism.

Linkage could occur either through deliberate decision-making by the country's government and political elite, based on cost-benefit calculation or through processes of social learning and embedded rationalism, or what constructivists refer to as "international socialization".[3] International socialization concerns the diffusion of ideas and movements across societies, which facilitate developing democratic behavior in a society. Once the society and the elites view democratic states as legitimate actors and sympathize with those states, the idea of democracy is more likely to be embraced by the society and democracy as a form of governance is more likely to diffuse among transitioning states. Negative linkage occurs when economic, political, institutional and social ties between a country and external actors or integration into some international or regional organizations stifle democratic transition. For instance, the Soviet Union dominated economic and security institutions such as the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which helped to consolidate authoritarian tendencies in Communist satellite regimes of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

In the light of these theoretical debates, the following two sections investigate how Egypt's key political and economic allies influenced the trajectory of Egypt's political transition, and helped to reinforce the rule of counter-revolutionary forces linked to the *ancien regime* in Egypt.

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[3]   McFaul et al.*,* "Evaluating International Influences," 9.

3. Western Actors' Response to Egyptian Uprisings and its Aftermath

Egypt is a pivotal Arab state for both the EU and the US given its geopolitical location, great demographics, military strength and political influence in the MENA region. It neighbors Israel and controls the Rafah gate, which makes Egypt a critical actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Egypt is also the controller of the Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea. In addition, historically, it has acted as an agent for mobilization of Arab societies with its leading role in promoting several social and religious movements such as Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, the trajectory of Egypt's political transition has been of utmost significance to external actors given that the developments taking place in Egypt are likely to have diffusion effect in the region.

The US stands as Egypt's long-standing ally in political, economic and military terms. For many decades, the American-Egyptian alliance was based on providing security and stability in the region. The US has various interests in maintaining this alliance such as retaining the Arab-Israeli peace, cooperation with Egypt against Islamic militancy and instability, particularly on the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, which have been critical areas of cooperation for Israeli security. The military and financial aid to Egypt was justified by successive US administrations as an investment to regional stability, and aimed primarily at cooperating with the military and maintaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.[4]

The post-Cold War order led to a new understanding of US foreign policy makers, who began to view that democracy promotion would be key to ensuring American security interests as well as economic growth. The fall of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe offered the US a wide range of opportunities in terms of ideological penetration and expansion of free market economies. Thus, the US foreign policy conduct was mainly based on three pillars; democracy promotion, support for free market economy, and national security cooperation. In line with this understanding, the US institutionalized its democracy promotion

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[4]   Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: Background and US Relations," *Congressional Research Service,* September 2, 2009, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf.

mechanisms, and created a democracy promotion budget to fund several programs such as USAID, the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The US National Strategy of 1995 stated:

> *Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies… The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.*[5]

This new thinking in US foreign policy under the Clinton administration (1992-2000) gained a new momentum when George Bush came into power. In the post-9/11 attacks, American democracy promotion efforts and the Western emphasis on political reform intensified particularly in the Arab world. The threat of global terrorism shifted Western actors' stance to authoritarian backlash in the region. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush regime came up with a democracy promotion agenda given the understanding that the growth of terrorism stemmed from unfavorable conditions accompanied with authoritarian rule and poor economic policies. Thus, any struggle to fight against terrorism would require promoting democracy, political freedoms, and coping with economic and social challenges that arise from poverty, inequality and injustice.[6] Former President George W. Bush called for a counter-terrorism strategy that would foster progress in economic, social and political fields across the region. In 2003, Bush stated that "As long as freedom and democracy do not flourish in the Middle East, that region will remain stagnant, resentful and violent – and serve as an exporter of violence and terror to free nations."[7] In line with the democracy promotion agenda, the US initiated

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[5] The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington DC.: The White House, 1995), 2, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/research/nss.pdf.

[6] Philippe Droz Vincent, "The Security Sector in Egypt: Management, Coercion and External Alliance Under the Dynamics of Change," in *The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization, The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East,* ed. Laura Guazzone, and Daniela Pioppi (UK: Ithaca Press, 2009), 241-242.; Marina Ottoway, and Julia Choucair-Vizoso, *Beyond Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World* (Washington DC: United Book Press, 2008), 1-5.

[7] The White House (Office of the Press Secretary), "Fact Sheet: President Bush Calls for a Forward Strategy of Freedom to Promote Democracy in the Middle East," November 6, 2013, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-11.html.

various programs that aimed at building bilateral cooperation with Egypt, empowering the Egyptian civil society, and promoting democracy such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI).

Until 2005, the Bush administration pressured the Mubarak regime for political reforms and transparent elections. The American pressure for individual freedoms and democracy in Egypt was influential in forcing the Mubarak regime to initiate some political openings to respond to the Bush administration's urge for change. With US support for reforms in Egypt, a new public space emerged that enabled Egyptian civil society and opposition groups to flourish. To this end, the Mubarak regime took some steps such as establishing the National Council for Human Rights abrogating state security courts and initiating dialogue with opponents.[8] In 2005, Mubarak amended Article 76 of the constitution and for the first time multicandidate presidential elections were held in Egypt. Although the constitutional amendments consolidated the NDP's monopoly over politics, political liberalization in this period led to an unprecedented level of civic activism as well as to the emergence of opposition movements such as the Kefaya and April 6 Movements.

At times, the Bush administration did not refrain from resorting to negative conditionality, and threatened the Egyptian government when it repressed opposition forces. For instance, in 2002, President Bush threatened to block 130 million US dollars of economic aid to Egypt unless a liberal opponent, the American-Egyptian sociologist Saad Edin Ibrahim, who had been jailed after his involvement in independent monitoring of the elections in 2000 was released. Similarly, in 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice cancelled her planned visit to Cairo after the arrest of Ayman Nour, a widely reputed liberal opponent.

While on the state level, Egypt remained committed to its strategic alliance with the US, there existed a huge gap between the regime and the society. The Egyptian-American alliance lacked any broad-based public support but rather depended on elite bargain in Egypt. The Egyptian society deeply resented the Mubarak regime's subservience to US interests and security

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agenda in the region. Particularly, after 9/11, the American agenda of the "global war on terror" and the invasion of Iraq led many intellectuals and the society at large to criticize the regime's inability to draw its course of action independently from the US, and base it instead on Egyptian national interests in the region.[9] More importantly, the Mubarak regime's policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its closing of the Rafah gate, and the regime's lack of cooperation with the Hamas government were problematic to most Egyptians, particularly to Islamist groups, who considered these policies to be against Egyptian sovereignty. To this end, numerous demonstrations were held to manifest public opposition against the Egyptian regime's submission to US pressure.

On the other hand, in their political rhetoric both the US and the EU called for the Mubarak regime to implement some political reforms that would improve human rights and individual freedoms in Egypt. Nevertheless, while retaining emphasis on democratic reforms, they failed to pursue consistent and tangible policies in promoting democratization in Egypt. In that respect, it is important to note that a number of regional developments in the years leading to the uprisings were critical in prompting rethinking for US foreign policy makers.

From 2005 onwards, the US gradually abandoned its democracy-promotion agenda in the MENA region, which could be accounted for by a number of political developments. In Egypt, political reforms and judicial supervision over parliamentary elections gave an unprecedented power to the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliament after the 2005 legislative elections. Similarly, the democracy promotion agenda of the Bush regime gave power to Shiites backed by militias in the Iraqi parliament and political Islamists in local elections in Saudi Arabia in 2005. In Lebanon, the 2005 general elections were an electoral momentum for Hezbollah, while Hamas gained electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections.[10] More recently, in 2012, a year after the ouster of longtime dictator Moammar Qaddafi, the US diplomatic

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[9]   Vincent, "The Security Sector in Egypt," 236.

[10]   When Hamas was elected to power in one of the freest elections the region, the US didn't recognize the result. Thus, it reflected a democracy-Islamist dilemma in which the US deviated from its democracy rhetoric when Islamist groups rose to power. Emiliano Allesandri, Oz Hassan, and Ted Reinert, "US Democracy Promotion from Bush to Obama," *EUSpring,* Working Paper 1 (April 2015), http://aei.pitt.edu/64170/1/us_dem _promo ti on_april15.pdf. ; Vincent, "The Security Sector in Egypt," 242.

mission was attacked by members of the Islamist militant group Ansar Al-Sharia in Benghazi, resulting in the death of four Americans including the US ambassador to Libya.[11] These developments marked a significant turning point in the American democracy promotion and freedom agenda. The Western policy orientation in the Middle East confronted a democracy-stability dilemma; while the former was supposed to promote Western values and bring about more predictable governments with broad-public support, and the latter was regarded as a more direct and likely outcome of supporting the existing military-backed autocrats in the region.

With the rise of Islamist movements on the political stage from 2005 onwards, the US administration began to diminish its support for democratization significantly, and avoided making reference to derailing human rights and democracy in Egypt. In a similar vein, the European Union avoided any mention of constitutional amendments that marked regression in terms of individual rights and civil liberties in its Action Plan adopted in 2007.[12] Hence, democracy promotion has been rather cosmetical in US and EU foreign policy agendas, which prioritized maintaining stability in the secular pro-Western Arab authoritarian regimes instead of a genuine desire for democratic change.

Western governments found their security interests in advancing their relationships with secular-minded autocrats aligned with the West due to their vested interests in the region. These interests included ensuring the security of oil supplies and energy corridors containing Islamic fundamentalism and Israel's security. In line with this rationale, the US and the EU supported the Mubarak regime for decades as they were concerned with security issues linked to the Islamic empowerment in Egypt. Fearing an Islamist takeover, they gave precedence to relations with the ruling

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11 Anup Kaphle, "Timeline: How the Benghazi Attacks Played out," *Washington Post*, June 17, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/timeline-how-the-benghazi-attack-played-out/2014/ 06/17/a5 c34e90-f62c-11e3-a3a5-42be35 962a52_story.html

12 The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan for Egypt mentioned only the need to "strengthen participation in political life including the promotion of public awareness and participation in elections" and "to exchange experience in the field of elections and jointly develop cooperation in areas of shared interest including through providing assistance on registering electors and capacity building". See European Union External Action Service, "European Neighborhood Policy- EU/Egypt Action Plan," 2007, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.

authoritarian elite rather than non-state actors to promote civic activism and democracy.

The Mubarak regime served the security interests of the US and Israel in many ways. First, the dominant role of the military and the successive presidents with a military background blocked all channels for Islamist groups to take an active role in politics. US policymakers relied on the presence of a secular and military-backed government in Egypt for the security interests of Israel. To this end, maintaining the Mubarak regime was particularly important for the US to ensure the Egyptian regime's compliance to the Camp David Treaty. To illustrate, in 2005 Egypt and Israel agreed on deploying Egyptian border guards along the border with Israel as it withdrew from the territory. Thus, with the agreement Egypt was held accountable for the border security and prevention of arms supplies to the Gaza Strip. In addition, Egypt imposed an economic blockade on the Gaza Strip in an attempt to topple the Hamas-led government, which would evidently serve Israeli security and political interests. Second, the Mubarak regime aligned itself with the US position on the global war on terrorism. The two countries cooperated extensively in military operations and intelligence gathering, which was vital to American military interventions across the region. Third, through its cooperation with the military-backed regimes, the US would ensure its naval access to the Suez Canal for its wider geopolitical interests in the region.[13]

To preserve those vested interests, the US administration set aside its freedom agenda and instead of promoting democratic reforms it gave precedence to closer cooperation with the Mubarak regime and other pro-Western Arab autocrats in the region. From 2005 elections onwards, though the US officially condemned some selected cases of human rights violations, the Bush regime maintained its silence in the face of the Mubarak regime's suppression of activists and opposition groups. Likewise, Egypt's 2007 constitutional amendments, which severely restricted political freedoms in the country did not receive much reaction from the Bush administration. Sean McCornack, the then-US State Department spokesman, claimed that the general trend was positive while referring to the substance of the amendments as a domestic political event that the US government should

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[13]   Brad Plummer, "The U.S. gives Egypt $1.5 Billion a year in Aid. Here is What it Does," *Washington Post*, July 9, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/07/09/ the-u-s-gives-egypt-1-5-billion-a-year-in-aid-heres-what-it-does/.

not engage in.[14] By early 2007, as Thomas Carothers put it, the American democracy promotion agenda in the Middle East was effectively over giving its way to accepting and embracing useful autocrats.[15]

Egypt's strategic position in the Middle East and the vitality of the Camp David Treaty have enabled a guarantee of an annual average of 2 billion dollars in military aid as well as around 450 million dollars economic aid for four decades making Egypt the second largest recipient of US aid after Israel in the region and the third globally.[16] Military aid has come in the form of arms supply and military training for Egyptian officers in US war colleges. Since the late 1970s, US policymakers have argued that military aid served as an important tool to provide stability and promote US interests in the region. Despite rising authoritarianism in Egypt particularly following the 2005 elections, the EU and the US carried on renewing their financial aid without imposing any negative or positive conditionality. Given that the Mubarak regime relied on a single party rule backed by the military, the US aid, mostly benefited the military elite and ruling NDP circles. As aptly put by Larry Diamond, by conferring crucial economic resources and security assistance to Arab autocrats, the US military aid served just like oil, another form of rents authoritarian regimes used for survival.[17]

After Obama took office in 2009, the US foreign policy shifted towards a more realist approach towards the MENA region, specifically in ensuring US interests at the first place, therefore, the US turned to its traditional policy of depending on Arab strongmen.[18] Similar to the Bush administration,

14   Andrew Exum, and Zack Synder, "Democracy Demotion in Egypt: Is the United States a Willing Accomplice?," *Washington Institute Policy Analysis* 1212, March 23, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/democracy-demotion-in-egypt-is-the-united-states-a-willing-accomplice.

15   Thomas Carothers, *US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 7, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_promotion _after _bush_final.pdf.

16   Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: The January 25 Revolution and Implications for US Foreign Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, February 11, 2011, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d6f4dc5c.pdf.

17   Larry Diamond, "Why Are There No Arab Democracies?," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 1 (January 2010): 101, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0150.

18   Francis Fukuyama, "What Became of the Freedom Agenda?," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 10, 2010, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703630404575053710666766720.

Obama chose to cooperate with Arab autocrats in the war on terrorism at the expense of those regimes' restriction of political freedoms. Though the Obama administration viewed promoting democracy as a prerequisite for the creation of more stable societies, it tended to give precedence to cooperation with dictatorships and short-term US national security interests over fostering democratization. Obama pursued a well-balanced approach. While restraining from any project of a democracy transplanted by the US, he was supportive of opposition movements with democratic ideals in the Middle East. Indeed, a few months prior to the Arab uprisings, in his five-page memorandum called "Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa," Obama noted that progress toward political reform and openness in the MENA lagged behind other regions and in some cases stalled and highlighted that the US regional and international credibility would be undermined if it was perceived as supporting repressive regimes and neglecting the rights and aspirations of citizens.[19]

Without the US playing a role, the Arab Spring protests which first broke out in Tunisia in late December 2010 ended up with the deposition of President Ben Ali. The US-Tunisian relationship was of a low priority, and it was mainly centered around counter-terrorism and struggling with Islamist extremist movements. Therefore, once protests broke out in Tunisia, the Obama administration chose to remain neutral and urged caution. However, when the protests spread over Egypt, the Obama administration found itself in a position to make a strategic decision; either they would side with the demonstrators and their aspirations for freedom and democracy, or would openly back the old status quo, which would tarnish the US image as well as its regional and international credibility.

The US acted rather cautiously and reactively in response to regime changes in the Arab world. The US administration chose to side with protest movements in the Arab countries, where protests were so massive in size and public pressure was so high that authoritarian regimes would evidently not survive on their own internal dynamics. In other countries, where protest movements did not create a compelling force for the regime to resign or respond harshly or supporting the protest movements would

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[19]   Ryan Lizza, "The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy," *The New Yorker,* May 2, 2011, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist.

endanger alliance with a strategic partner (as was the case with Bahrain), the US chose to remain silent and stay loyal to its strategic allies. The Obama administration supported the regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya while remaining indifferent to the suppression of protest movements in Bahrain along with Saudi Arabia's attempts to quell the revolt in the country.[20] In Morocco, the US response was to support top-down reforms and constitutional referendum promised by King Mohamed VI, a strategic and longtime ally of the US. In retrospect, it became evident that the US response to Arab Spring protests was characterized by pragmatic concerns.

In Egypt, the first Obama administration watched the course of events as they unfolded and abstained from supporting Mubarak's ouster until it was all but certain. Following the elections in Egypt, despite severe opposition from the US Congress, the Obama administration chose to recognize the Brotherhood as a legitimate political actor while urging the Morsi-led government to respect Egypt's Peace Treaty with Israel and basic democratic norms.[21] Once he became president, Morsi assured that he would abide by the peace treaty with Israel. However, despite this assurance, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power was seen as a threat to many Western actors. Back in 2012 when the Brotherhood won the first free elections in Egypt, it was speculated that the revolutions in the Arab world were hijacked by Islamists, and the electoral success of Islamists in these countries led many scholars to suggest that an Islamist winter replaced the Arab Spring.[22]

For most Western actors, it was not the question of whether the Brotherhood would exclude the seculars from the democratic processes and divert from democracy but whether Egypt under the Brotherhood would pursue foreign policies that would jeopardize Western interests and shift the balance of power in the MENA region. The Brotherhood's political agenda was

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20 Allesandri et. al., "US Democracy Promotion from Bush to Obama," 15.

21 Thomas Carothers, and Nathan Brown, "Recalibrating U.S. Policy in Egypt," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 2, 2013, http://carnegieendowment. org/2013/05/02/recalibrating-u.s.-policy-in-egypt-pub-51691.

22 Michael J. Totten, David Schenker, and Hussain Abdul-Hussain, "Arab Spring or Islamist Winter? Three Views," *World Affairs* 174, no. 5 (January/ February 2012): 23- 42.; Rabah Ghezali, "Arab Spring, Islamist Winter?," *Huffington Post*, January 18, 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabah-ghezali/arab-spring-islamist-wint_b _1212794.html.; "Editorial: From Arab Spring to Islamist Winter," *The Washington Times*, October 25, 2011, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/25/from-arab-spring-to-islamist-winter/.

different from the military-backed Mubarak regime and the Sisi regime in that the group had a distinct conception of Egypt implying that would be independent from the West and be a regional power that could expand its influence beyond the country's borders. In addition, being a transnational organization with offshoots and grassroots support across the Middle East, its political power and domestic policies could have had a diffusion effect and overturned the regional balance of power in favor of Brotherhood branches in the region, which was a central concern to the West and the Gulf Monarchies.

The ideological stance of the Brotherhood as well as its political agenda before the Arab uprisings had been worrisome to most authorities in the West. The group's 2007 platform stated that women and non-Muslims should not be able to run for presidential elections. Besides, the party platform granted a body of religious scholars a formal role to review the draft constitution in accordance with Sharia and to advise the parliament and the president, similar to the system found in the Islamic Republic of Iran.[23] Although these controversial provisions were dropped in 2011 party platform, Morsi and other senior leaders continually expressed their views opposed to the election of women and non-Muslims to senior posts.[24] Morsi was an ardent supporter of Sharia (or Islamic law), which he evidently referred to in his campaign trails, where he stated "The Koran is our constitution, and Sharia is our guide."[25] In addition, by the time Arab uprisings broke out, the organization had been heavily dominated by conservative senior leaders and the small group of young reformers, who aimed to transform it into a more inclusive and democratic organization, were alienated and expelled from the Brotherhood. On the eve of the uprisings, the organization's senior cadres were made up of the ideologues, who were reluctant to make serious concessions to liberals and non-Muslims groups.

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[23] Khalil Al-Anani, "Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party: To Be or Not to Be Independent," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 1, 2011, http://carnegieendowment. org/sada/44324.

[24] Ibid.

[25] David Kirkpatrick, "In Egypt Race, Battle is joined on Islam's Role," *New York Times,* April 23, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/world/middleeast/in-egypt-mor si-escalates-battle-over-islams-role.html.

Soon after the ouster of Mubarak, Brotherhood leaders promised not to run for presidential elections and not to compete for more than one third of the seats in the parliament. It was at this juncture that the US administration declared that all opposition groups including the Brotherhood would be involved in the dialogue and represented in the new government.[26] Despite its initial pledge, the Brotherhood nominated candidate in the first presidential election and heavily dominated the seats in the parliament. Moreover, after three decades of peace treaty with Israel, Morsi quickly moved to formally establish close ties with Hamas, which was seen as a precarious move by Western actors. The Brotherhood's domination of the seats in the parliament and attempts to shape the new constitution in line with Islamic ideals severely polarized the political scene in Egypt. More importantly, Morsi passed the November Decree to grant himself impunity from potential court appeals against any laws or decrees he declared until the ratification of the new constitution. Such moves were perceived as the Brotherhood's attempt to monopolize power in the new political system. Worse still, under Morsi, Copts were reported to have faced numerous violent attacks on their homes, businesses, and churches, and Morsi was accused of turning a blind eye on the perpetrators.[27]

Meanwhile, the US administration's policy on Egypt could be characterized by impassivity at its best. The US administration underlined the vitality of reaching out to the Muslim Brotherhood and their political engagement, yet it did not have a concrete framework in pushing the Brotherhood towards democratic reforms and improvement in individual liberties. Apart from some symbolic gestures, the Obama administration chose to largely remain silent and indifferent to political unrest in the country, the harassment of Christian Copts as well as secular-revolutionary activists and the jailing of civil society activists. The US administration under Obama also turned a blind eye on the resignation of the secular members from the assembly as a reaction to the fast handled constitution and the wide scale protests immediately after the referendum leading to the new constitution's ratification.

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26   "Clinton Cautiously Welcomes Muslim Brotherhood Talks," *The Economic Times*, February 6, 2011, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/clinton-cautiously-welcomes-muslim-brotherhood-talks/articleshow/7437374.cms.

27   Anne R. Pierce, "US Partnership with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its Effect on Civil Society and Human Rights," *Society* 51, no. 1 (2014): 68-86.

The Obama administration prioritized US-Egyptian relations on the economic and security front, and focused more on the economic situation in Egypt and the regional security. As it had been the case for several decades, the US favored regional stability over change in the region. To this end, the US did not provide financial leverage to Egypt contingent on the transition to a civilian government and the drafting of a democratic constitution in Egypt as it was the case during the Eastern European states' transition after the fall of communism. Instead, in 2012 when the Egyptian government was in urgent need of massive financial aid, the US administration linked financial support to cooperation with the International Monetary Fund rather than with progress in democratization.[28]

In 2012, Egypt's political forces mostly consisting of the FJP and al-Nour party members demanded that the Egyptian government should revise the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty and Israel's onslaught in the Gaza Strip.[29] Another political move in this direction was made by former President Morsi's advisor Mohamed Esmat Seif al-Dawla, who repeatedly pleaded for the amendment of some articles of the Camp David Treaty arguing that they limited Egypt's freedoms and sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula.[30] These political moves were perceived as alarming developments by the US administration whose real concern was to maintain the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Hence, on the eve of the political crisis in the months leading to the coup in Egypt, the American position was shaped by a security-first approach. While on the surface, the US seemed to support democracy and the elected government in Egypt, its main priority was indeed to bring the pro-US old regime forces back to the political stage and win back its sphere of influence in Egypt. In the light of a review of dozens of US federal government documents, an Aljazeera report revealed that the US government had funded senior Egyptian opposition figures and activists, who instigated unrest and demanded the toppling of the freely elected president.[31] The report further stated:

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[28]   Ibid.

[29]   Ahmed Eleiba, "Egypt's Political Forces Call on Morsi to Freeze all relations with Israel," *Ahram Online,* November 17, 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/58366/ Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-political-forces-call-on-Morsi-to-freeze-al.aspx.

[30]   "Egypt's Morsi's Advisor Repeats Calls for Camp David Amendment," *Ahram Online,* October 4, 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/54836/Egypt/ Politics-/Egypts-Morsis-advisor-repeats-calls-for-Camp-David.aspx.

[31]   Emad Makey, "Exclusive: US Bankrolled Anti-Morsi Activists," *Aljazeera*, July 10, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/07/2013710113522489801.html.

> *Activists bankrolled by the programme include an exiled Egyptian police officer who plotted the violent overthrow of the Morsi government, an anti-Islamist politician who advocated closing mosques and dragging preachers out by force, as well as a coterie of opposition politicians who pushed for the ouster of the country's first democratically elected leader, government documents show.[32]*

When Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood government were deposed by the military coup in 2013, the US administration avoided using the term "coup" to describe the events that left around a thousand people dead and more than a thousand wounded. This was particularly essential for the US to be able to carry on providing military and economic aid to Egypt since the Foreign Assistance Act passed in 1961 clearly stated that no financial assistance could be made to any country whose elected head of government is overthrown by a military coup or decree.[33] Hence, the US administration made a strategic decision while condemning the bloody crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood yet refraining from designating the military's forced removal of Morsi as a military coup. The deposition of Morsi and the rise of the military regime addressed the US political and security interests considerably given that the military with its pro-Western agenda has proved to be a reliable strategic ally for several decades.

The US administration decided to suspend military aid to Egypt and the delivery of major weapon systems several months after the coup albeit reluctantly. It adopted a cautious wait-and-see approach and found a rupture with the military risky for US security interests.[34] The decision to suspend military aid came only after Egyptian security forces killed more than 800 people on a single day while dispersing a sit-in protesting Morsi's removal from power at the Raba'a Square in Cairo in August 2013. The Raba'a massacre has been one of the world's largest one-day killings in recent history. The cycle of state violence has continued to escalate since this tragic incident. The day after the incident, President Obama made it clear that the US could not continue its cooperation with Egypt as usual in the face of the deaths of civilians and rights being rolled back.[35]

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[32]   Ibid.

[33]   Plummer, "The U.S. gives Egypt $1.5 Billion a year in Aid."

[34]   Amy Hawthorne, "What's Happening with Suspended Military Aid for Egypt? Part 1," *Atlantic Council*, October 16, 2014, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-s-happening-with-suspended-military-aid-for-egypt-part-i/.

[35]   Ibid.

The US Congress conditioned the provision of military aid on the improvement of human rights and democratic transition to civilian government in 2012. However, those restrictions were waived and the delivery of weapons and military aid resumed shortly after despite severe degradation in Egypt's human rights records and lack of investigation for security forces, which were accountable for mass killings.[36] A similar inconsistent policy was witnessed under the Trump administration as the US government decided on the partial suspension of military aid to Egypt in 2017 over concerns as to Egypt's bleak records in human rights. The military aid to Egypt was resumed only a year after although no change was observed regarding the military regime's dealing with NGOs, press, journalists and opposition groups.[37]

Despite the intensified crackdown on Brotherhood members along with severe restrictions imposed on civil society organizations, the US has not taken any substantial punitive measures against the military backed government of Egypt. Oddly enough, in November 2013, when human rights violations came to a head, in his high level visit to Egypt, Secretary of State John Kerry announced that Egypt was on the right path to democracy.[38] From the current political landscape, it is evident that Egypt is likely to continue to receive US military and economic aid regardless of its undemocratic practices.

The pro-military position following the coup was not limited to the US. In a similar pattern, the EU failed to criticize the military's actions even when there was media pressure to do so. For decades, under the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the Union's main priorities were to open up export markets, to control illegal migration flowing from North African countries and to share information and intelligence on counter-terrorism. Despite the political rhetoric emphasizing democratic reforms, the EU aid allocated to democracy promotion made up a small fraction of the total EU

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36   Human Rights Watch, "US: Don't Green Light Egypt's Repression," April 9, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/09/us-dont-green-light-egypts-repression.

37   "US lifts Suspension of US $195 Million in Military Aid to Egypt," *Mada Masr*, July 25, 2018, https://madamasr.com/en/2018/07/25/news/u/us-lifts-suspension-of-195-million-in-military-aid-to-egypt/.

38   Micheal R. Gordon, "Egyptians Following Right Path," *New York Times*, November 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/world/middleeast/kerry-egypt-visit.html.

foreign aid to Egypt (it was € 1.2 billion from 1996 to 2006).[39] Much of the EU foreign aid to Egypt was assigned to economic reform and it bode well for the liberalization of the Egyptian economy. As for the security basket, the EU allocated a large sum of funds to keep illegal migration flow from the Southern Mediterranean region under control. Nonetheless, though conditionality clauses were inserted in the association agreements within the Euro-med partnership program, they were not activated and no EU aid was suspended in the cases of apparent human right violations and repression in the period under Mubarak.

Just like the US, the EU chose to ignore the Egyptian regime's bleak records in democracy and human rights as long as the authoritarian regime acted as a shield against the rise of radical Islam and ensured regional stability. Eventually, in the face of the military coup and numerous massacres in the aftermath, the European Union did not define the military intervention to oust the elected president forcefully as a coup and failed to clearly condemn mass arrests of Brotherhood members and acts of violence inflicted on them. Catherine Ashton, the foreign policy chief of the EU, paid a visit to Sisi and announced the EU's support for his government's June 30 road map.[40] This tacit support to the interim government by the EU and the Union's reluctance to suspend EU aid to Egypt provided the military backed government with the much-needed legitimacy it had been looking for.

From the perspective of Arab public opinion, the US administration's rhetoric about democracy promotion in the Middle East suffers from a lack of credibility and legitimacy in the region for several reasons. In the turn of the new millennium, the American interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 under the banner of democracy promotion were marred by serious violations in human rights including arbitrary arrests and the torturing of suspected citizens. Particularly, a series of human rights violations committed against detainees in the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq drew wide-scale reactions.[41] The US intervention in these

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[39]   Selim, *The International Dimensions of Democratization in Egypt*, 93.

[40]   Alastair Sloan, "Is the EU legitimizing Sisi's Coup?," *Aljazeera*, April 20, 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/eu-legitimising-sisi-coup-egypt-20144161181767834.html.

[41]   Maha Hilal, "Abu Ghraib: The Legacy of Torture in the War on Terror," *Aljazeera*, October 1, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/abu-ghraib-legacy-torture-war-terror-170928154012053.html.

countries was followed by erosion of state authority, the rise of violent non-state actors and a dramatic increase in violence and unrest. More recently, American indirect involvement in Libya and the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen were of no use other than empowering corrupt, oppressive, and undemocratic forces.

On the other hand, the US refused to recognize the Hamas government as a legitimate political force despite being freely elected in 2006. This decision was simply because Hamas did not hold the American point of view on the settlement of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict. The credibility of American democracy discourse was also challenged by the successive US administrations' unresponsiveness to authoritarian practices of the Gulf monarchies. These double standards pursued by the US in its foreign policy toward the MENA region raised serious suspicions among Arab publics as to its promotion of democracy in the Arab world. The Arab publics were convinced that the US would support democracy in the Arab World only if elections brought those groups that would serve American political and security interests into power. According to the Arab Barometer in post-2011, Egyptians and Tunisians considered American influence on their countries overwhelmingly negative and foreign influence as an obstacle to reform.[42]

In consequence, the Arab countries swept by the uprisings of 2011 have poor linkage to the democratic countries of the West. Given the lack of an Arab democracy on the eve of the Arab uprisings, they also had no model to aspire to in the region. In addition, in terms of leverage, international actors have been reluctant to provide the kind of financial and political support that was so helpful in promoting or facilitating political and economic reforms once implemented in Eastern Europe. Western actors have been ambivalent about Egypt's political transition in 2012. Owing to their security and political concerns arising from the rise of the Brotherhood into power, they focused primarily on whether transitions in the region would change the status quo and hamper Western interests in the region. They undergirded a policy of providing financial aid and political support to the military institution, which had a shared security agenda with the West and

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[42]   Mathilde Dugit-Gros, "Foreign Influence in the Middle East: Changes in Perceptions and Expectations," *Arab Reform Initiative*, September 10, 2015, https://www.arab-reform.net/en/no de/763.

provided to be a reliable partner fulfilling Western strategic interests along with Israeli security. To this end, they chose to carry on renewing financial aid or arms supplies to Egypt, and to return to "business as usual" despite increasing authoritarianism and the ongoing domestic crackdown under the military rule.

4. The Gulf Monarchies and the Egyptian Uprisings

Traditionally, Egypt enjoyed good relations with the Gulf States. Under Mubarak, mutual relations were close between different heads of states, and they had several economic and political interests in common. In the region's balance of power, with the backing of the US, Egypt and the Gulf Monarchies made up an important strategic alliance, or a united Sunni coalition which lasted for several decades up to the Egyptian revolution in 2011. Egypt had also been among the top recipients of economic aid from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). For the Gulf Monarchies, the Arab Spring meant the shaking of the strategic foundation that determined the course of Saudi regional policy since the Islamic revolution in Iran. The wave of protest movements leading to the fall of long-standing autocrats created fear among the ruling monarchs, who viewed democracy as an existential threat to the political stability of the Gulf Monarchies. Therefore, from the inception of the uprisings, the Gulf Monarchies fervently supported Mubarak regime vis-à-vis revolutionary political forces.

The Saudi Kingdom was shattered by the quick downfall of Mubarak in early 2011. Mubarak was a longtime ally of the Kingdom and the alliance between Egypt and the Gulf States peaked in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait with Egypt sending its troops to defend Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War. The Saudi Kingdom was even more appalled when President Obama demanded that Mubarak step down. The kingdom perceived this move as an American betrayal, which could have worrisome implications for the Gulf Monarchies. They condemned the Obama administration for having abandoned its strong ally. In addition, Saudi media remained critical of the Obama administration, and blamed it for being unreliable and hostile to the kingdom.[43]

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[43] Daniel Byman, "Saudi Arabia is a Partner, Not a Friend," *The Atlantic,* September 30, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/saudi-arabia-obama-al-qaeda-terrorism/502343/.

The ouster of Mubarak opened a new chapter in Egypt's relationship with the Gulf Monarchies. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power following their electoral victory in the first free and fair elections of the country further strained relations between Egypt and the Gulf Monarchies, with the exception of Qatar. The hostile attitudes of the Gulf Monarchies towards the Muslim Brotherhood manifested in the cut of financial aid to Egypt by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 2012 when Morsi rose to power. The financial aid to Egypt was resumed only after the removal of Morsi and the Brotherhood-led government.

A number of reasons lied behind Saudi hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood. First, political power of the Brotherhood was viewed as a threat by the Gulf Monarchies as the Brotherhood had several offshoots in the region and their electoral victory set an example for them. The Muslim Brotherhood branches in the region gained unprecedented public support and sought to take over political role in their respective countries. In addition, the Brotherhood's rise to power caused suspicion among the Gulf Monarchies as to their intention to bring down governments across the region and export the revolution beyond Egypt. Hence, the Gulf Monarchies, except Qatar, quickly moved to contain the spread of mass protests demanding democracy in the MENA region. In order to assuage those fears, President Morsi, immediately after his inauguration as the President of Egypt stated that Egypt did not have any ambitions of spreading the revolution to other Arab countries.[44] Second, the Muslim Brotherhood came to be seen as representing both democracy and Islam and the group challenged the Saudi Kingdom's claim to be the sole protector of Islam. Besides, the model provided by the Brotherhood in which democracy could go hand in hand with Islamism was a lethal blend that would erode the Kingdom's legitimacy over the long haul. The Brotherhood had the potential to successfully export its model to the rest of the region.

Under Mubarak, Egypt was an ally and a fervent supporter of the anti-Iran alliance, however, under Morsi, Egypt began to give signs of alignment with Iran in line with the dominant public opinion. Once Mubarak stepped down, Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic

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[44]   Fouad El-Auwad, "Egypt, Gulf States Strengthen Their Ties," *Deutsche Welle*, August 25, 2012, http://www.dw.com/en/egypt-gulf-states-strengthen-their-ties/a-16193917.

of Iran, hailed the revolution as "Islamic awakening", and embraced the Brotherhood as both a legitimate actor and a close ally to Iran. Moreover, historically it could not be denied that Brotherhood ideas were central to the ideological foundations of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and it was Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who translated the works of Sayyid Qutb, one of the founding thinkers of the Brotherhood, into Persian. Morsi displayed the Brotherhood's intimacy with Iran by paying a visit to the country during the Non-Aligned Movement Summit only two months after his election.[45] This visit was a milestone in the two countries' relations given that Iran and Egypt had not had diplomatic ties since 1979 when Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel.

On the other hand, the Brotherhood's alignment with Iran posed a threat to the West and the Gulf Monarchies both ideologically and geopolitically tilting the balance of power in the region in favor of Iran, which was a central reason why the West turned against the Brotherhood.[46] Different from Mubarak, Morsi attempted to pursue diversified foreign policy targeting to reach out to the whole region instead of building ties solely with the Gulf Monarchies. Morsi proposed that Arab States, Turkey and Iran should build closer relations based on communication, negotiation, cooperation rather than isolation and confrontation.[47] Even this view was a menace itself to the Saudi Kingdom whose primary foreign policy was built on isolating Iran from regional politics of the Middle East and the Gulf Region.

The electoral victory gained by the Brotherhood was not the only threat perceived by the Gulf Monarchies. The electoral success of the Salafi al-Nour party which won almost a quarter of seats in the first free elections in Egypt raised concerns among the monarchies as to the future of their own

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[45]   Nicholas Dot-Pouillard, "Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood: The Best of Enemies?," *Middle East Eye*, May 20, 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-and-muslim-brotherhood-best-enemies-2061107490.

[46]   Daniela Huber, "US and EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion since the Arab Spring: Rethinking its Content, Targets and Instruments," *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 48, no. 3 (September 2013): 48, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2013.787827.

[47]   Paul Salem, "Morsi Moves to Rebuild Egypt's Mideast Leadership Role," *Carnegie Middle East Center*, October 5, 2012, http://carnegie-mec.org/2012/10/05/morsi-moves-to-rebuild-egypt-s-mideast-leadership-role-pub-49620.

Salafi community. The monarchies were agitated by the fact that Salafists in the Gulf region could be inspired by their Egyptian counterparts and be critical of the ruling family. After all, Salafists in Egypt and Tunisia had not been politically active and adopted political quietism prohibiting participation in politics and uprisings against their ruler prior to the Arab uprisings. The changing conjuncture in the region with the embracement of democracy and widespread grassroots support to democratic processes led to a new thinking on the side of Salafists in that democracy and Islam could be compatible. Some Salafi Saudis had already raised their discontent toward the monarchy and began demanding political representation in a democratically elected parliament.[48] Thus, this new ideology enabling the coexistence of Islam and democracy would pose a serious threat to the legitimacy of the Gulf Monarchies unless it had been contained.

It came as no surprise when Saudi Arabia together with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates politically and financially supported the counter-revolutionary forces in Egypt to contain the spread of democracy wave in the region. The United Arab Emirates is speculated to have donated funds to the Tamarod movement, a civil campaign that collected signatures and called for mass protests across the country to overthrow Egypt's elected president.[49] Above all, the Gulf Monarchies publicly celebrated the July 2013 coup and Sisi's roadmap announcement and a year after the coup, they declared the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots as terrorist organizations. Last but not the least, as a survival kit to the military, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait provided a combined aid package of 12 billion dollars to the military-backed government immediately after the military-backed power shift.[50] This aid package was four times as much as the military and economic aid received from the US and the EU combined. With this move, the Gulf Monarchies, except Qatar,

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[48]   Gregory F. Gause, "Kings for All Seasons: How the Middle East's Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring," *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper*, no. 8 (September 2013): 29.

[49]   Louisa Loveluck, "Egypt's Military Rise to Power 'Partly Bankrolled by Emirates' Audio Recording Suggests," *Telegraph,* March 2, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/   egypt/11445060/Egypts-military-rise-to-power-partly-bankrolled-by-Emirates-audio-recording-suggests.html.

[50]   David Hearst, "Why Saudi Arabia is Taking a Risk by backing the Egyptian Coup?," *The Guardian*, August 20, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/20/saudi-arabia-coup-egypt.

clearly demonstrated their political will to sabotage any emerging move in the direction of democracy in Egypt and, at whatever costs it would be, to protect the status quo by supporting old regime forces to maintain the regional balance of power.

5. Conclusion

On many fronts, transition from authoritarianism in Egypt has been a challenging and tumultuous process. External influence on Egypt's short-lived democratic transition not only failed to foster the democratic outcome but also hampered democratic opening and helped restore authoritarianism. Unlike their political willingness to use leverage and linkage to integrate post-communist states of Eastern Europe, both the EU and the US pursued inconsistent policy towards Egypt during its turbulent transition. Western foreign policy formulation was based on preserving the existing structure and balance of power in the region to maintain Western interests. Hence, far from using leverage to facilitate democratic transition in Egypt, Western actors remained reluctant to advocate and advance political reforms in favor of democracy lest elections bring Islamists to power and eventually lead to diversion from the status quo. They pursued paradoxical and often self-contradictory policies vis-à-vis Egypt. While retaining emphasis on democracy in their political discourse, Western governments neither imposed conditionality to carry on providing financial aid nor placed sanctions on Egypt over the coup. The lack of a committed and consistent Western response to the military coup enabled the entrenchment of an authoritarian order in post-revolution Egypt, and raised suspicions among the Arab publics as to the sincerity of the West in respecting and supporting peoples' free will.

The Gulf Monarchies, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait supported Mubarak, their long-standing ally, in the face of the uprisings and acted promptly to contain the spread of pro-democracy movements that engulfed the Arab world. Their first and foremost priority was to preserve the status quo, and keep Egypt in the Sunni coalition to create counterweight to the Iranian alliance at all costs. To these Gulf Monarchies, democratic change in Egypt would benefit the Muslim Brotherhood representing an Islamist democracy, which they perceived as a great menace to the

continuation of their monarchies. The group ideologically presented a new alternative to the Gulf Monarchies combining Islam and democracy, and Saudi Arabia feared that this new political blend would challenge its domestic legitimacy and the entire basis of its regional supremacy. Therefore, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the first to declare their support to the military coup, and rushed to assist the new regime with a generous aid package. Today, Egypt's heavy dependence on Saudi financial assistance precludes the free exercise of its domestic and foreign policies. In addition, the financial aid strengthens the military's hand against revolutionary forces.

As a consequence, the external support to the military-backed regime, be it economic, political or military, has thwarted prospects for democratization in Egypt. Western actors and the Gulf Monarchies put their weight behind the military, which would otherwise have had a harder time coping with the country's mounting economic, security, and political challenges. The implicit and explicit support received from the West and the Gulf Monarchies gained the military regime legitimacy it had craved for, and convinced generals that they would save their face irrespective of the ferocity of the massacres they carried out against civilians. Given that those generals came to an understanding that they could easily get away with human rights abuses without paying any price, they are likely to carry on their undemocratic political practices and inhumane treatment of civilians and activists.

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A Historical Sociology Perspective on the Legacy of State Formation and Dynamics of Arab Revolts in Libya: From Elusive Authority of Qadhafi to Masses Craving for Democracy

Ali Bilgenoğlu[*] & Hikmet Mengüaslan[**]

Abstract

This study aims to question the appropriateness of the "transition to democracy" paradigm in the Arab Revolts context with a specific focus on Libya. Arguing that the real problem lies at the meta-theoretical level, the assumptions and the empirical incongruities of democratization and post-democratization perspectives will be elaborated. With historical and social-minded analysis, the political developments in Libya will be approached with a historical sociology perspective complemented by the political economy of regime security. The interaction within the state-society complex in the framework of a complex relationship with regional/international level dynamics will be given a specific focus and unlike deterministic-teleological and reductionist democratization/post-democratization perspectives, the following question will be tackled: What happened politically in Libya in the course of the Arab Revolts?

Keywords: Historical Sociology, Democratization/post-democratization, Authoritarianism, Arab Revolts, Libya

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Libya'da Arap İsyanlarnın Dinamikleri ve Devlet Oluşumu Mirasına Tarihsel Sosyolojik Bir Bakış: Kaddafi'nin Güvenilmez Otoritesinden Demokrasi Arayan Kitlelere

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Öz

Bu çalışma Arap İsyanları bağlamında Libya'ya odaklanarak "demokrasiye geçiş" paradigmasının uygunluğunu sorgulamayı amaçlamaktadır. Asıl problemin meta-teorik düzeyde yer aldığı tartışılarak, demokratikleşme ve demokratikleşme sonrası yaklaşımlarının varsayımları ve ampirik uyuşmazlıkları incelenecektir. Tarihsel ve sosyal odaklı bir analiz ile Libya'daki siyasi gelişmeler rejim güvenliğinin politik ekonomisi ile desteklenen tarihsel sosyolojik bir yaklaşımla ele alınacaktır. Bölgesel/uluslararası dinamiklerin karmaşık ilişkisi çerçevesinde devlet-toplum bileşiğinin etkileşimine özellikle odaklanılacak ve deterministik-teleolojik ve indirgemeci demokratikleşme/demokratikleşme sonrası yaklaşımlarının aksine, "Arap İsyanlarına giden süreçte Libya'da siyasi açıdan neler oldu" sorusunun cevabı araştırılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tarihsel Sosyoloji, Demokratikleşme/Demokratikleşme Sonrası, Otoriterlik, Arap İsyanları, Libya

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1. Introduction

The conceptualizations "democratization" and "transition to democracy" have been among highly debated concepts in International Relations (IR) theory and Middle Eastern Studies (MES). It has attracted considerable interest from academic and political circles. It is not surprising that the MENA (Middle East and North African) region hosted various types of regimes from authoritarian monarchies to socialist republics. The implications of such an interest manifest itself in the foci and methods of the analysis of democracy, although "democracy" is not on the eye of the beholder.[1] In this respect, this study, aims to scrutinize the existing conceptions of democracy and conceptualization of "transition to democracy." The focus of the study, which elaborates on the deficiencies of existing conceptualizations, consists in the reappraisal of Libyan revolts on the course of the Arab Revolts through the perspective of historical sociology and political economy of regime security.

There are various arguments in the literature on democracy/democratization. It has taken its modern concept shape according to experiences of Western societies, and might also sound like a cultural instrument, which is inappropriate for MENA societies due to the prevalence of Islamic culture and particular socio-cultures. The problem, however, lies with the tendency of identifying certain pre-conditions for democracy rather than with cultural differences. The relationship between democratic rule and economic development, the existence of civil society, and liberalization[2] is complex. Yet, it is assumed that there will be a linear transition to democracy when one or two conditions are provided. The existing analyses either focus on structural causes or solely look for the internal dynamics for the explanation. Empirical examples disprove such an assumption, as political movements -liberalization/democratization- can be found from time to time in the region. There are arguments against conceiving of Islam

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[1]   Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, "Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab Liberalization and Democratization," in *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World. Vol.1: Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 3.

[2]   Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no.1 (2002).

as misappropriate to democracy and liberalization.[3] Esposito and Piscatori point to the consultation (shura) in the Islamic way of governing, which to some extent resembles participation and consultation in democracy.[4]

The same applies to the framework of "transition to democracy." It conceives of any departure from autocratic, monarchical rule as a move towards democratization. Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that authoritarian structures have demonstrated high resilience in the region, which becomes a serious challenge to "transition to democracy." In this respect, the study discusses that such teleological-determinist and reductionist approaches result in misleading analyses considering the region where various social forces dynamically interact in both domestic and regional/global levels.[5]

In order to overcome deficient methods of analysis and conceptualizations, the study asserts that the historical sociology perspective can contribute to build a holistic framework. Such a framework which is sensitized to the interaction of social forces at domestic and regional/international level provides a more explanatory approach.

The political process in Libya becomes significant to inquire the applicability of pre-determined frameworks. Furthermore, the analysis of uprisings turning into civil war is a severe test to observe the implications of interaction between dynamics at the domestic and regional/international level. The framework elaborates on what was politically happening in the Libyan case within the context of the Arab Revolts. For this purpose, the study prioritizes the political economy of regime security and inquires the interaction between both intra- and inter-state actors during the revolts. It examines the processes of state-building and the political-economic basis of institutionalization. While reviewing the implications of "transition to democracy" for IR theory and MES, the study examines through a historical sociology perspective, what happened politically in the Libyan case on the course of the Arab Revolts.

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[3]   Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz, "Democratization Theory and the 'Arab Spring'," *Journal of Democracy* 24, no.2 (2013): 17.

[4]   Juan L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," *Middle East Journal* 45, no. 3 (1991):434.

[5]   Raymond Hinnebusch, "Historical Sociology and the Arab Uprising," *Mediterranean Politics* 19, no. 1 (2014a).

The following section categorizes the approaches to democratization and post-democratization while inquiring their basic notions. Against these arguments, in the third section, the possible contributions of the historical sociology perspective are discussed. The fourth section examines political processes in Libya and the dynamics of uprisings through the historical sociology perspective.

2. Analyzing the Democratization/Post-democratization Approaches

The scrutiny of the "transition to democracy" framework entails inquiry of the basic notions in democratization and post-democratization perspectives. As evident from their names, democratization and post-democratization perspectives examine the political processes especially in "developing" and "third-world" societies. The nature of political regimes in these societies has become an object of study through the waves of democratization, and both perspectives develop their frameworks to inquire the causal factors relevant to democracy.

The democratization literature primarily concentrates on the conditions conducive/preventive to democracy. To comprehend the democratization process and to search for the obstacles, constraints, failures of human agency, Burnell discusses that it is necessary to look for the causes that facilitate democracy.[6] It is an epitome of the preconditions approach; that is, the relation between the increase in income per capita and the enthusiasm for democracy it creates. An interesting statistical fact is that there is a strong tendency for democracy to be associated with national wealth, and democratization to be associated with economic liberalization; however, it has two main limitations: it says nothing about causation, and it says nothing about exceptional cases.[7] Another tendency is the ranking according to the level of democracy, which is calculated through certain conditions. Schlumberger, in this respect, questions the validity of the

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[6]   Peter Burnell, "Arrivals and departures: A preliminary classification of democratic failures and their explanation," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 36, no. 3 (1998): 9.

[7]   Ian McLean, "Democratization and economic liberalization: Which is the chicken and which is the egg?" *Democratization* 1, no. 1 (1994): 38.

Freedom House Index. He points out that the arbitrariness of the variables included in the calculation as they are decontextualized from their social, institutional, and cultural settings. However, it does not take into account the process and distinguish qualitatively between democratic and non-democratic regimes.[8]

Contrary to the democratization perspective, the post-democratization approach denotes going beyond the conditions for democracy. However, it seems to turn into a version of the transition in reverse.[9] Instead of transition towards democratization, the analytical focus here is the resilience of authoritarianism in these societies. It is the question of how regimes could stay in power. Such a focus renders essential the political instruments such as repression, co-optation, and economic instruments such as patrimonial relations between regime and selected groups. Bellin underlines some factors that lead to the resilience of authoritarian regimes, such as rentier economy, international support network, low level of institutionalization of coercive apparatus, low level of popular mobilization.[10] According to Ehteshami, ideology, patrimonial relations, and repressive power are the factors that mostly brought forward in analyses concentrated on the robustness of authoritarianism in the MENA region.[11] Valbjorn argues that the significant part of the post-democratization paradigm applies a regime focused analysis and does not pay attention to societal dynamics.[12] The post-democratization perspective, therefore, seems to fail to overcome the reductionist tendencies in the democratization literature.

Once the political processes unfold contrary to expectations, and the paradigms fell short of satisfying the analytical purposes, criticisms turn to meta-theoretical foundations. Assessing the obstacles of democratization,

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[8]   Oliver Schlumberger, "The Arab Middle East and the question of democratization: Some critical remarks," *Democratization* 7, no. 4 (2000): 124.

[9]   Morten Valbjorn, "Three Ways of Revisiting the (post-)Democratization Debate After the Arab Uprisings," *Mediterranean Politics* 19, no. 1 (2014): 157.

[10]   Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 128-129.

[11]   Anoushiravan Ehteshami et al., "Authoritarian Resilience and International Linkages in Iran and Syria," in *Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran*, ed. Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012), 222-223.

[12]   Valbjorn, "Three Ways of Revisiting the (post-)Democratization Debate," 158.

Cavatorta categorizes the perspective as structure-led and agency-led. For Cavatorta, while structure-led explanations generally focus on international factors, rentierism, and Islamic political culture, agency-led explanations underline the role of the ruling elite and Islamist movements.[13] Such categorization demonstrates that abstraction of structural and agential dynamics from each other limits the explanatory capacities of the analysis while undertheorizing the interaction between structure and agent. On the same account, Valbjorn and Bank point out the meta-theoretical problems in democratization and post-democratization perspectives. For them, the problems in these perspectives are two-fold: first, they are blind to the actual continuity in the apparent changes and second to the actual changes in the apparent continuity.[14]

The Euro-centric nature of the conceptualization also attracts criticism; however, the cultural relativism cannot be an answer. As Sadiki discusses, the limits drawn by the Orientalism-Occidentalism debate could not provide progressive paths for explanatory frameworks. The missing of a robust dialogue within debate in question culminates in the consolidation of ethnocentric perspectives. Instead, Sadiki proposes that there should be a fluid paradigm that enables incorporating the historical and social peculiarities of the Middle East in order to escape from the imposition of the singularity of truth.[15]

In such a context, the arguments of Thomas Carothers in his valuable article entitled "The End of Transition Paradigm" become quite significant for the reappraisal of these perspectives. He identifies five core assumptions that demonstrate the inherent problems leading to incongruence with empirical examples. First, considering any movement from authoritarianism as a move to democracy is not acceptable. Second, proposing a set of sequences for the democratization process is virtually unnecessary and deterministic. Third, the influence of elections is overemphasized. Fourth is ignoring the effects of structural and peculiar factors upon the process, and the

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[13] Francesco Cavatorta, "The Middle East and North Africa," In *Routledge Handbook of Democratization*, ed. Jeffrey Haynes (New York: Routledge, 2011): 83-86.

[14] Morten Valbjorn and Andre Bank, "Examining the 'Post' in Post- Democratization: The Future of Middle Eastern Political Rule through Lenses of the Past," *Middle East Critique* 19, no. 3 (2010): 187-188.

[15] Larbi Sadiki, "Libya's Arab Spring: The Long Road from Revolution to Democracy," *International Studies* 49, no. 3&4 (2012): 287-288.

last is not paying the necessary attention to the fact that not all states are functioning effectively.[16] The critical review of basic notions in these perspectives indicates that attempts to revise the conceptions of democracy, authoritarianism, and transitory processes would not contribute as much as expected. In this context, the study elaborates on building a historical sociology framework that can help overcome these meta-theoretical deficiencies in the following section.

3. Possible Contributions of the Historical Sociology Perspective

Social reality is an open system, which entails an interactive approach for conceptualizing causal relations between events. "Transition to democracy" as a pre-determined framework culminates in empirical misfits. It is related to the ideological nature of scientific analysis. Once epistemological and methodological notions are inquired, imposing a pre-determined framework indicates the empirical incongruence and misleading conclusions for the complexity of social reality.

The study argues for considering Arab Uprisings as a watershed which has caused shifts in state-society complexes in MENA. These shifts, through a non-deterministic approach, should be considered a call for change.[17] It will provide a broader perspective to understand the role played by different factors in political-economic structures. The acknowledgment of complexity, however, does not mean that political processes cannot be analyzed scientifically. It points out a method for conceiving causal relations while prioritizing historical-social articulation of state-institutions, the political-economic basis of society, and the interaction between domestic, regional/international structures. The main question becomes what is happening politically?[18]

What is identifying the conjunction of events is crucial to causal relations – the Humean notion of causality. It attributes causality to the events in conjunction. Bhaskar underlines the inadequacy of such a position in

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[16] Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm."

[17] Morten Valbjorn, "Upgrading Post-democratization Studies: Examining a Re-politicized Arab World in a Transition to Somewhere," *Middle East Critique* 21, no. 1 (2012): 31.

[18] Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," 18.

attributing causality. Furthermore, such causality leads to a direct shift from explanation to prediction, which cannot be the case when actual social events happen in open systems under the influence of various social forces, dynamics, and mechanisms.[19] It is related to the understanding of theory. The pre-determined frameworks assume, with a positivist scientific understanding, a reality that can be separated from its context, waiting outside to be discovered as if there is a linear relationship between cause and effect emanating from the conjunction of events. As such a conception is argued to be misleading; it underestimates the complexity of the multiply determined nature of social reality.[20] Therefore, a theory of social events should acknowledge the historical and social. Historical refers to acknowledging the influence of inherited structures and forces, while social refers to the interaction between structural and agential dynamics.[21] At the same time, it should acknowledge the complex nature of causality and the diversity of social forces. It can be argued that looking at the failure of the approaches mentioned above as lacking congruity with the empirical domain; the Arab Revolts can be argued to contribute both to democratization and resilience of authoritarianism paradigms.[22] However, since both perspectives are fixated on a simplistic authoritarian-democratic dichotomy, which resulted in the omission of the complex nature of political regimes and the struggle among social forces shaping them, it is not surprising. To comprehend the complexity of reality and interaction of various dynamics, Tilly underlines the process (democratization/de-democratization) as an analytical focus which does not have a teleological ending point and incorporates the interaction, the contingency of events and results, the struggle between forces and their capacity of adjustment in the process.[23]

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[19]   Roy Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 55-56.

[20]   Milja Kurki and Colin Wight, "International Relations and Social Science," in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 20-23.

[21]   Kurki and Wight, "International Relations and Social Science," 25.

[22]   Raymond Hinnebusch, "Towards a Historical Sociology of the Arab Uprising: Beyond Democratization and Post-Democratization," in *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring Rethinking Democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (New York, Routledge, 2014b), 39-40; Valbjorn, "Three Ways of Revisiting the (post-)Democratization Debate," 158-159.

[23]   Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 22-24.

The understanding of theory is also relevant to the agent-structure problem in social sciences. Wight underlines the importance of structural and historical explanations.[24] Since all explanations, either structural or agential, have the unthematized features of structural or agential explanations, they alone are not enough to comprehend the complex nature of reality and multi-level causality. Nevertheless, as Anderson asserts that the American perspective in the Middle East is ahistorical;[25] the first step should be the incorporation of the process of the structures, in other words, highlighting the structural implications.

To Hobson, it is illuminating to present as inherited from past is; therefore, an approach should not take the present as natural, immutable, and reified.[26] After the modernization theory and the experiences of developed countries do not provide expected outcomes, the focus shifted to the historical analysis of developing societies, while the obstacles of democratization were argued to be located in the transition to modernity and problems related to nation-building.[27]

Hinnebusch discusses that historical sociology posits the co-constitution of inter/transnational and the state levels.[28] He highlights the influence of war-making over the state (derived from the European example of state-building), which should be complemented with a political economy perspective. The MENA region, concerning super-power penetration, offers the implications of geopolitical structures. Second, historical sociology enables us to eschew teleological assumptions such as democracy as the endpoint, which is a result of the struggle of social forces and dynamics. The political processes do not unfold linearly.

Third, from a historical sociology perspective, there is no dichotomy of democracy-authoritarianism, rather an expectation of variegated regimes

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[24] Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[25] Lisa Anderson, "Searching Where the Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle East," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, (2006): 192.

[26] John M. Hobson, "What's at stake in 'bringing historical sociology back into international relations'? Transcending 'chronofetishism' and 'tempocentrism' in international relations" in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. Stephen. Hobden and John M. Hobson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5-9.

[27] Raymond Hinnebusch, "Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory, and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique," *Democratization* 13, (2006): 377.

[28] Hinnebusch, "Historical Sociology," 137-138.

along two poles. It results misleadingly in considering any movement from authoritarianism to democracy as a model. While these two concepts are closely related to each other, since they define different outlooks, they should be identified clearly. Political democratization refers basically to the participation and representation, while political liberalization is related to the expansion of public space through the recognition and protection of political and civil rights.[29] Such a position might provide a broader perspective, and Saouli points to the influence of state formation over the emergence of contentious politics. His approach is significant in the sense that democracy is only one of the possibilities that can emerge out of the interaction of various dynamics in society.[30] Fourth, there is no theoretical imposition in historical sociology, rather the historical-structural articulation of the historical-social agent. In this context, as Schlumberger underlines the weaknesses of transition the democracy paradigm, to look for laws of democratization could not capture complex political processes.[31]

By comprehending political developments in the region, the historical sociology perspective looks at state formation and building processes. The state formation-building processes, rather than cultural and regional factors, provide essential insights into the historical-structural articulation of political processes.[32]

Anderson asserts that the emergence of state institutions differs from the European example. They show varying autonomy within state-society complexes. The underlying reasons are two-fold; firstly, the boundaries of the states are incongruent with actual boundaries. Secondly, the state formation process did not benefit all social groups equally, and the influence of domestic political and economic competition has been as effective as the international developments upon the state formation process.[33] The point

29   Brynen, Korany and Noble, "Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives," 3-4.

30   Adham Saouli, "Back to the future: the Arab uprisings and state (re)formation in the Arab world," *Democratization* Vol. 22, no.2 (2015): 316.

31   Oliver Schlumberger, "Dancing with Wolves: Dilemmas of Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Contexts" in *Democratization and Development*, ed. Dietrich Jung (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2006), 43.

32   Lisa Anderson, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no.1 (1991): 2-3.

33   Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," *Comparative Politics* 20, no.1 (1987): 6

is to acknowledge the linkage between international and domestic.[34] State-society complexes are both constituted by and constitute the international/global structures.[35] States operate in enabling and constraining domestic and international environments.[36] At this point, the interaction between social dynamics, actors, and the economic, political, and social structure come to the front. To the influence of international over the outcomes, Schlumberger argues that Western policies toward the region do not favor democracy. Instead they lead to the consolidation of authoritarian regimes' repressive actions.[37] Ritter also points to the nature of values like being Western and its manipulation by the regimes as a discursive instrument, which makes it even harder to demand democracy.[38] The nature of interaction at the regional level should not be underestimated as it was a factor that played a role on the course of events during the uprisings.

Since the state formation processes in the region mostly resulted in the difficulty to ensure the legitimacy of authority via consensus and participation,[39] regimes had to apply for repression and co-optation of opposition and the selective alliance of ethnic, tribal and familial identities. It proves the necessity of looking at the state formation process, which is a process of contestation between different groups that are included and excluded. Nevertheless, contentious politics are necessary but not a sufficient condition for political change.[40] Democratization and post-democratization approaches are criticized for being thin. They overlook the deep political economy infrastructure and the social forces that give substance to and drive changes in political institutions.[41] When considering

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[34] Hobson, "What's at stake in 'bringing historical sociology back into international relations'? Transcending 'chronofetishism' and 'tempocentrism' in international relations," 16-17.

[35] Ibid., 21.

[36] John M. Hobson, *The state and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 223-228.

[37] Schlumberger, "Dancing with Wolves," 39.

[38] Daniel Ritter, *The Iron Cage of Liberalism International Politics and Unarmed Revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 207.

[39] Anderson, "The State in the Middle East," 12-13.

[40] Saouli, "Back to the future," 320-321.

[41] Hinnebusch, "Towards a Historical Sociology of the Arab Uprising," 44.

the institutional approaches, Schlumberger draws attention to neo-patrimonial ties.[42] Therefore, within a historical perspective to the state formation process, the relation between state and social groups (civil society, political and economic interest groups, and identities) should be considered without underestimating the underlying dynamics. The historical sociology perspective, in this respect, requires complementation via integrating the structure and agency, as Hobden underlines a multi-level of causality.[43] Sorensen points on the infeasibility of democratization laws and futile efforts to draw an absolute relationship between certain preconditions and democratization-democracy, which is undoubtedly ruling out the agential power in the processes.[44] Hinnebusch acknowledges that historical sociology does not provide an analysis of agential dynamics.[45] To overcome the lack of agency, ideas, and discourse in the historical sociology approach, the integration of the political economy of regime security can be complementary.

4. What Happened Politically in Modern Libya?

The political processes that brought in the revolts must be searched in the articulation of state institutions in Libya. The policies of the Libyan regime had been decisive.[46] The political-economic basis of Libya has been transformed under the impact of globalization/neoliberalization, and crony capitalism has become one of the main features of the state-society complex.[47] Such a transformation undermined the legitimacy of the regime, which is conceptualized as the "democracy of bread" by Sadiki. It means that demands for democracy are traded for the material interests

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[42]   Schlumberger, "The Arab Middle East," 115.

[43]   Stephen Hobden, "Historical Sociology: back to the future of international relations," in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. Stephen. Hobden and John M. Hobson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 43.

[44]   Georg Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World* (3rd ed, Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 2007), 32-33.

[45]   Hinnebusch, "Historical Sociology," 140.

[46]   Frederic Volpi, "Explaining (and re-explaining) political change in the Middle East during the Arab Spring: trajectories of democratization and of authoritarianism in the Maghreb," *Democratization* 20, no.6 (2013): 979.

[47]   Hinnebusch, "Towards a Historical Sociology of the Arab Uprising," 46.

through distributive mechanisms.[48] The course of events that culminated in the context for revolts, in this respect, becomes intimately related to the transformation of political-economic structures. The processes of political transformation entail the examination of Qadhafi's revolution in September 1, 1969 and the pre-revolutionary structures.

The context of Libyan independence incorporates colonial powers and socio-political resistance. After the Italian withdrawal in the post-WWII era, British and French influence started to be felt,[49] and thanks to the Sanussi movement, dominant in the social sphere,[50] King Idris (1950) succeeded in recognition of the autonomy of Benghazi, with the cooperation of Britain in 1949. However, the legitimacy of the new regime met serious problems in centralizing the authority because of the federative structure,[51] which directly resulted from the tribal nature of Libya and oppositional attitude adopted by most of the tribes.[52] Among the other issues exacerbating the already weak legitimacy of the king was a non-participatory and non-transparent state-building process. Income distribution was not equal; corruption and bribery were prevalent, especially after the discovery of oil in 1959,[53] the share of people from increasing oil revenues did not rise as expected.[54] Besides, the king adopted a pro-western attitude during the Cold War and formed a parallel military power along with the army.[55]

The ideational conditions which ushered in the rise of Qadhafi as a political leader and the military coup toppling the monarchy should be looked at the regional figure, the leader of Egypt Gamal Abdul Nasser and his promotion

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[48] Larbi Sadiki, "Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization," I*nternational Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, no.1 (2000): 79.

[49] Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 713; Dirk Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya* (2nd ed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 24-30.

[50] Ahmet Kavas, "Senussiyye Tarikatı," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* 21, Vol. 36 (2000), 536-538.

[51] Türkkaya Ataöv, *Afrika Ulusal Kurtuluş Mücadeleleri* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1975), 107.

[52] Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 61-69.

[53] Daniel Yergin, *Petrol* (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1999), 611-612.

[54] Gustave E. Grunebaum, İslamiyet Vol. III (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), 228.

[55] Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of Modern Middle East* (London: Routledge, 2004), 54; Grunebaum, İslamiyet, 229.

of Arab nationalism. The political resistance against colonial powers and the political rhetoric of independence contributed to the formation of the social base for the revolution in Libya. Then young Qadhafi started his political career as "primus inter pares" and his power was derived from a charismatic leadership.[56] Colonel Qadhafi toppled the Sanussi monarchy rule with a military coup led by the Free Unionist Officers (FUO). Following the coup, the oil production was nationalized. It was a significant move in that it provided the revolutionary regime with the economic base necessary for the implementation of revolutionary policies, although it also culminated in Libya's becoming a pariah state.

Qadhafi envisioned a model of state and society when he declared Jamahiriya with a slogan "freedom, socialism and unity" and toppled the monarchy of Al-Sanussi. His model was a mixture of liberalism, Arab nationalism, and socialism. The religion, on the other hand, held an instrumental role in the ideological framework of Qadhafi. In the first years of revolution, the Islamist groups were not purged, yet transformed into a functional position for the socialist order in Qadhafi's model.[57]

In 1973, at Zuwara speech, Qadhafi declared the People's Revolution, as stated in the Green Book. Until the "Green Book," the ideological and revolutionary fervor did not emerge clearly.[58] State structures were transformed in 1977; the "Proclamation of People's Power" was constitutionally solidified.

The articulation of state institutions in Libya can be conceived of forming around the distributive and security functions. Although the new system could be thought of as a form of direct democracy, two particular institutions emerged in these processes: People's Congresses (legislative purposes) and People's Committees (executive purposes). The basis of power, on the other hand, remained in the hands of Revolutionary Committees (for the protection of revolution), which had no basis in the constitution. It was a privileged security organ. It can be argued that through these processes,

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[56]   Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 77.

[57]   Azzedine Layachi, "Islam and Politics in North Africa," in *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics,* ed. Juan L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 355-356.

[58]   Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 94.

the revolutionary Libyan state acquired two separate and competing political sectors: *Revolutionary Sector,* on the one hand, which was for the mobilization of masses and protection of the revolution. It was constituted with those who were close to Qadhafi, and laws did not regulate it. The *Ruling Sector*, on the other, was the core of Jamahiriya consisting of People's Congress and People's Committees, which were regulated by laws and promulgated by the General People's Congress.[59]

The executive and legislative organs had no constitutional basis in Jamahiriya as the slogans of the revolution- freedom, socialism, and unity- had no constitutional basis.[60] Looking at Qadhafi's perspective, the state-building and institutions reflected his family-tribe-state ranking. For him, family comes before state, which is defined as artificial political, economic, and sometimes military system and undoubtedly political, economic, or military factors tying several families into one.[61]

The reconstruction of the revolutionary Libyan state and smashing state institutions created limited space for civil society and political participation. The "Green Book" actually referred to the consultation as a governance, not including representation and reducing the opposition to the regime itself.[62] It is essential to state that the processes of institutionalization in Qadhafi's model inherited essential features from the political regime of the Sanussi monarchy. While political pluralism was not allowed and the election for the revolutionary leadership was seen unnecessary,[63] political structures in Libya turned into repressive and exclusionary ones.

It is indicated in the ideological framework of the Green Book that Qadhafi had an elusive conception of democracy. Although he concluded that it was genuine democracy in Libya, he also acknowledges that the strongest

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[59]   Amal S. M. Obeidi, "Political Elites in Libya since 1969," in *Libya since 1969: Kaddafi's Revolution Revisited*, ed. Dirk Vandewalle (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2008), 109.

[60]   Hanspeter Mattes, "Formal and Informal Authority in Libya since 1969," in *Libya since 1969: Kaddafi's Revolution Revisited*, ed. Dirk Vandewalle (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2008), 55-56.

[61]   M. Al-Kaddafi, *Green Book*, 101-102.

[62]   Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya,* 102-103.

[63]   Mattes, "Formal and Informal," 57.

always rules and the stronger party is the ruling in society.[64] What he had in mind, however, was closer to the subordination of masses to his regime. In this regard, Qadhafi emphasized the importance of loyalty and obedience for the state's survival:

> *The more the families of a tribe feud and become fanatical, the more the tribe is threatened. The family is threatened when its individual members feud and pursue only their personal interests. Similarly, if the tribes of a nation quarrel and pursue only their own interests, then the nation is undermined.[65]*

The economic basis of the Libyan model, on the other hand, was thought as a socialist economic order in the second part of the Green Book. It not only criticized the existing economic orders but also attempted to provide an instrumentalist Islamic interpretation of socialism. Along with wage labor, this model touched upon the rights of workers, ownership, and income; the role of the traders was abolished. Private businesses were closed and the economic base of the ulama was aimed to be undermined.[66] For Qadhafi, the only way to end the processes of domination and exploitation was to ensure that everyone gets their equal share from the production.

Furthermore, in the Green Book's second part, private property was aimed to be transferred to collective ownership:

> *The aspiration of the new socialist society is to create a society which is happy because it is free. This can only be achieved by satisfying man's material and spiritual needs, and that, in turn, comes about through the liberation of these needs from the control of the others. Everyone has the right to beneficially utilize it by working, farming or pasturing as long as he and his heirs live on it- to satisfy their needs, but without employing others with or without a wage.[67]*

Income was conceived as both a kind and a source of exploitation; therefore, the termination of income was crucial in getting rid of all kinds of exploitation. Yet, acknowledging the difficulty of this process, Qadhafi emphasized the institutionalization of the socialist mode of production: "Society will become fully productive; the material needs of society will be

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64   Obeidi, "Political Elites," 111.

65   Al-Kaddafi, *Green Book*, 109.

66   Ibid., 57-58.

67   Ibid., 70-71.

met"[68] and the need for currency would be ended.[69] Indeed, this step was to do away with private trading.[70] In the "Green Book", man's basic needs were defined as house, income, and a vehicle, the others such as renting a house and hiring vehicles can be seen as instruments of domination[71] which were abolished thanks to the revolution.[72] The banking system was ceased to be used as an intermediary institution, became a repository of surplus funds.[73] However, the penetration of the regime into the economic sector did not stop at that point. In 1981, General People's Congress announced that it assumed import, export and distribution functions. Private enterprise was largely replaced with the centrally-commanded economy.[74]

The Revolutionary Council, being directly responsible to Qadhafi, started to dominate the political life along with the economic sector. They could judge and sentence whomever they wanted; they were very powerful.[75]

Regarding the security and enforcement, Free Unionist Officers played a vital role in the army and had great privileges to protect the regime, and the bureaucracy was mostly dependent on Qadhafi. Qadhafi's security considerations motivated the elections of the governors.[76] The reforms after the revolution enabled the regime to widely penetrate various domains of society while undermining the formation of an autonomous economic base. The various segments in society became dependent on the regime without having an outlet to raise their political demands.

Still, Qadhafi did not underestimate the relationship between the social base of inequality and political opposition:

> *To view the minority as political and economic substrata is dictatorial and unjust.[77] Contemporary national liberation movements will not come*

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[68] Ibid., 84.

[69] Ibid., 83-84.

[70] Mattes, "Formal and Informal," 66.

[71] Al-Kaddafi, *Green Book*, 68-69.

[72] Ronald B. St. John, "The Libyan Economy in Transition Opportunities and Challenges," in *Libya since 1969: Kaddafi's Revolution Revisited*, ed. Dirk Vandewalle (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 129.

[73] Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 105-107.

[74] St. John, "The Libyan Economy," 130.

[75] Mattes, "Formal and Informal," 67-68.

[76] Ibid., 64-65.

[77] Al-Kaddafi, *Green Book*, 146.

> *to an end before every group is liberated from the domination of another group.*[78]

The oil revenues became quite essential in the containment and subordination of any reactionary responses from the society. The oil-booms in the 1970s notably contributed to the repressive capacities of the regime. Altunışık argues that the political and social structures in Libya were transformed profoundly through the distributive mechanisms of the state; however, these processes resulted in the consolidation of tribal, regional, and family affiliations.[79] In Libya, political elites were formed according to the regime's needs; temporary elites were created.[80] Any formation of the political-social group, the union must take permission from the Ministry of Interior. Those who did not conform to the September Revolution's principles were not licensed. Likewise, the institutional basis of the state reduced the influence of tribes. Qadhafi saw the tribes, parties, classes, sects as dictatorial instruments of power. However, tribes were not negated as a whole, only seen as blood relations and in a social way:[81] "The tribe is a natural social umbrella for social security".[82] In return for loyalty, tribes were provided with material incentives. Within the framework of the supreme authority of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), there was a selective alliance with tribes.[83] The regime was founded on a narrow-based constituency and hinged upon the loyalty of certain tribes along with security institutions. It was the populist and distributive policies that ensured political quiescence.[84] The regime's grip to power and its politically structured institutions, organizations, and political groups were intimately related. Among the methods used, there were outright repression, physical liquidation and revitalization of tribal structure in society through political reforms.[85]

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[78] Ibid., 92.

[79] Meliha B. Altunışık, "Rentier State Theory and the Arab Uprisings: An Appraisal," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 11, no.42 (2014): 79.

[80] Obeidi, "Political Elites," 105.

[81] Mattes, "Formal and Informal," 71.

[82] Al-Kaddafi, *Green Book*, 108.

[83] Ronald B. St. John, "Libya's Authoritarian Tradition," in *Modern Middle East Authoritarianism Roots, Ramifications, and Crisis*, ed. Noureddine Jebnoun, M. Kia and M. Kirk (New York: Routledge, 2013), 127-131.

[84] Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 95.

[85] Mattes, "Formal and Informal," 55.

Although the revolutionary Libyan regime managed to consolidate its power upon society and directed the political processes without confronting any domestic opposition, the implications of the international/regional context upon the political processes in Libya started to become essential throughout the 1980s. The fluctuations in oil prices directly affected the performance of the etatist economic model, which demonstrates its weaknesses.

Furthermore, the sanctions regime imposed upon Libya because of its involvement in terrorist activities and Libya's international pariah status had severe ramifications for the society. Regionally, the military failure in Chad demonstrated the limits of Libya's capacities. All these developments contributed to accumulating domestic discontent and made it more difficult for the regime to contain opposition. The halts in distributive mechanisms and the increasing inequality were the main driving factors behind the discontent.[86]

The actions taken by the regime, in such a context, indicated the complexity of political processes. Although consolidated through distributive mechanisms and subordinated opposition, the regime could not manage total autonomy from society. Furthermore, the attempts of liberalization acquired a specific form in the face of the problems for the regime. There were three main challenges for the regime; first, new institutions for regulation and transparency; second, reforming the distributive function of the state, introduction of the market and competitive forces; third, containment of whatever the results of these reforms.[87] The reform policies, however, did not go beyond the economic sector.

There were two attempts of economic liberalization (*infitah*) one in 1987-1990 and after 1990; however, the attempts of liberalization did not create inclusionary and democratic political processes. These attempts aimed transparency, decline in state subsidies, and incorporation of private sector initiatives to the market in order to overcome adverse effects of the stagnant and inefficient command-style economy. The diversification of economic sectors and creating a competitive environment for Foreign Direct Investment were important to attract finance.[88]

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[86]   Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 144.

[87]   Ibid., 160.

[88]   St. John, "The Libyan Economy," 127.

Revolution within revolution signaled an attempt to create an economic liberalization letting private capital and labor becoming partners in collectives; the Import Substitution Industrialization strategy was reversed. Furthermore, in 1988, the Ministry of Mass Mobilization and Revolutionary Leadership were created to limit the role of the RC.[89] Concerning political and civil rights, the General People's Congress adopted the "Great Green Charter of Human Rights". Although it provided some social rights and freedoms, there was still lacking a sound framework for political and civil rights. In this context, the domestic opposition was tried to be contained by the selective curtailment of RC's functions.[90] RC's functions were decreased, and the Ministry of Mass Mobilization was created for charging corruption. Great Green Charter was influential in the sense of reversing the arbitrariness of the revolutionary decade. For instance, private property was protected again, and the independence of the judiciary was ensured. However, it was made powerless because of the article that unless it harmed the public interest.[91]

The main reason behind these reforms was the containment of domestic discontent and satisfying the international finance capital, along with alleviating the harms of intensified international political isolation during the 1980s.[92] The reforms in Libya only remained as cosmetic changes. An independent civil society was not allowed to flourish. In a sense, it was entrenched authoritarianism. The failed attempt to introduce market economy concerned many privileged in patronage and close with the regime,[93] which ended up with limiting the enthusiasm for reforms.

There were domestic as well as international factors behind the failure of these attempts. The main reason for the crisis was that the distributive state conflicted with the West.[94] Altunışık argues that the first important factor was the inappropriate international environment, which limited the choices

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[89]   Ibid., 131.

[90]   Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 138-141.

[91]   Ibid., 142.

[92]   St. John, "The Libyan Economy," 131-132.

[93]   Ibid., 135.

[94]   Leila S. Talani, *The Arab Spring in the Global Political Economy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 225.

before the regime.[95] Secondly, it was the increasing density of domestic criticisms because of the deteriorating economic conditions. The economic sector in the late 1990s was highly inefficient, highly corrupted; money was spent on keeping coalitions loyal, lucrative, and extravagant projects with no developmental return were pursued. It is dramatic in the sense that the reforms determined the state's role in the economy directly affecting the legitimacy of the regime, patronage relations, and its survival. In other words, the success of reforms required the institutions that were smashed during the revolution. Therefore, after the 1990s, the reforms aimed to take the burden off from public-institutions, to manage the decline in state employment, to have success in the decentralization of authority (from GPC to local), yet ended up with increases in the price of commodities,[96] which revealed that the Green Book ideology could not be implemented any more without providing the oil for wheels.

Such an economic condition was the outlook when it came to the 2000s. The economy was still ailing; employment was still provided mostly by the public sector, and hydrocarbon revenues constituted a vast amount of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The years between 2003 and 2011 demonstrated that the economic and political reforms should complement each other. However, the political-security concerns were still driving the economic reforms. After 2003, the conditions were more auspicious than the 1970s and 1980s, when there was will to reform.[97] The main obstacle before realizing the reforms was the institutional capacity, smashed during the revolution, along with the lukewarm efforts of the regime fearing to lose its grip to power.[98] Nevertheless, the 2000s were significant in the sense that relations between the Libyan regime and the international community showed progress.

The relations started to change when Qadhafi gave up its support for terrorist movements. The Iraqi invasion in 2003 and the 9/11 Terrorists Attacks to the Twin Towers were significant international factors in this change. The possibility of cooperation against terrorism contributed to the rehabilitation of Libya's relations with the international system.[99]

[95]   Meliha B. Altunışık, "A Rentier State's Response to Oil Crisis: Economic Reform Policies in Libya," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 18, no.4 (1996): 55.

[96]   Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 188.

[97]   Ibid., 189-190.

[98]   Altunışık, "A Rentier State's Response," 56.

[99]   Ritter, *The Iron Cage of Liberalism*, 193.

Noueihed and Warren underline that rehabilitation in relations manifested itself in the economic sector. In 2007, the Libyan regime signed agreements on oil.[100] The changing international conditions facilitated the actions taken by the regime. Vandewalle argues that the rehabilitation of the internationally isolated position of Libya along with the US's harsh stance, however, helped the regime consolidating its power on society and strengthened the regime's capacity and legitimacy to repress opposition.[101]

4.1. The Dynamics of the Revolts in Libya

The framework of the study underlines the historical articulation of state institutions in the context of domestic and regional/international dynamics as decisive in the course of revolts in Libya. A look at the state-society complex in Libya before the uprisings demonstrates that tribal and familial relations consolidated because of the repressive and exclusionary political processes. Qadhafi's family members managed even the opposition to the regime in the form of the loyal opposition. Qadhafi's son Saif al-Islam became the leading figure in the course of Libya's globalization and rehabilitation into the international system. [102] According to Joffe, the role of Saif al-Islam as loyal opposition contributed to the growing sense of regime's losing grip on power,[103] while the Islamist opposition was contained.[104] The only option for the Libyan opposition was to organize abroad, which in 2005 formed a loose coalition of opposition groups under the National Libyan Opposition. Although it tried to coalesce in a meeting in London, the result was the "Declaration of National Consensus," which called for a return to constitutional legitimacy, creation of a transitional government, prosecution of all who are guilty against humanity. Nevertheless, the regime reacted indifferently regarding political contestation, which demonstrates the concern of Qadhafi on control of direct democracy.[105]

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[100] Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-revolution and the Making of a New Era* (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 165.

[101] Dirk Vandewalle, "Libya's Revolution in Perspective: 1969–2000," in *Libya since 1969: Kaddafi's Revolution Revisited*, ed. Dirk Vandewalle (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2008), 37; George Joffe, "The Arab Spring in North Africa: origins and prospects," *The Journal of North African Studies* 16, no.4 (2011): 513.

[102] Sadiki, "Libya's Arab Spring," 300.

[103] Joffe, "The Arab Spring in," 523.

[104] St. John, "Libya's Authoritarian," 134.

[105] Ibid., 133.

While the repressive policies of the regime after the war against terror lost a social basis, the public support to the regime against foreign powers diminished in time and paved the way for uprisings in Libya.[106] The reasons underlying the quick transformation of protests into the uprisings, however, were three-fold: first was the because of the position of the military against the uprisings. The fragmented response of the military in Libya can be conceptualized as they had high interests and high restraints for engaging militarily on the civilians. For there were two units in the military, the elite units which were well-armed, equipped, and paid, and they were close to Qadhafi, while the regular army units was not paid well and constituted by lower strata. Furthermore, the tribal nature of society reflected itself in the army positions. Lastly, rather than merit, the loyalty of the personnel was appraised.[107] The military units were kept depoliticized by promotions and rotations and military procurement. Although military procurement was declined after the 1980s, it continued to be an outlet for public sector employment,[108] which resulted in lacking identity in the military. The reaction of military forces in Libya had a striking influence on the course of uprisings. Taylor argues that military regimes became the arbiter of social unrest in Libya.[109] It would be illuminating to mention that Libyan society (especially tribes) and security forces demonstrated fragmented responses, directly resulted from the patrimonial relations between the regime and social groups.

The second factor was related to repressive policies of the regime and consolidated economic inequalities that had divisive implications in society. The articulation of state institutions could not manage the inclusion of politicized masses. In the beginning, the protests enchanted the economic problems in Libya; however, the influence of the political structure, which prevented contestation and participation, on protest's transformation into civil war could not be ignored. The social structure of Libya formed along tribal lines rather than bureaucratic-institutional ones

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[106]   The fact that increasing prices of food and energy contributed to the intensity of uprisings should not be underestimated. Joffe, "The Arab Spring in," 509.

[107]   William C. Taylor, *Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East Analysis from Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2014), 158

[108]   Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 145.

[109]   Taylor, *Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings*, 23.

accelerated this process. It should not be forgotten that state institutions smashed during the revolution and marginalized groups due to repressive political actions of the regime primarily constituted the uprising turning out to be anti-Qadhafi movement.

The international/regional position on the uprisings constitutes the third factor. The swift transformation of protests into violent clashing between regime and opposition forces demonstrated that ensuring the containment of social instability was beyond the capacity of the regime. The international position of the Libyan regime, which is in crisis with the West for a long time, contributed to the legitimacy of intervention. The intervention was decided upon humanitarian purposes and supported by the League of Arab States (LAS) as well. It is known that the respect for state borders and non-intervention are among the commonly accepted norms of LAS. However, the context (the strategic interaction along with sectarian identities and power relations), most of the time, determined the course of reactions. For instance, the Libya case was an excellent example of the internalization of Western values such as humanitarian intervention by LAS.[110] The conditions, considering the motivation of regional and international powers, can be argued to be conducive to international intervention. Qadhafi's harsh stance against the protests and showing no mercy while repressing the uprisings were crucial for the authorization of Security Council Resolution 1973, passed on 17 March 2011, to use military force primarily to protect civilian lives. Even though both regional and international legitimacy were provided in a short time,[111] it can be argued that it was US, British and French-led mission;[112] nevertheless, along with the violent nature of uprising in Libya, Engelbrekt and Vagnsson[113] argue that the economic and energy dimensions of the Libyan intervention should not be underestimated.[114]

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[110] Avraham Sela, "The Vicissitudes of the Arab States System: From its Emergence to the Arab Spring," *India Quarterly* 73, no. 2 (2017):164-165.

[111] Kjell Engelbrekt and Charlotte Wagnsson, "Introduction," in *The NATO Intervention in Libya Lessons learned from the campaign,* ed. Kjell Engelbrekt and Marcus Mohlin (New York: Routledge, 2013), 6.

[112] Noueihed and Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring*, 182.

[113] Engelbrekt and Wagnsson, "Introduction," 3-5.

[114] Libya has 2 percent of world output, fifth-largest in the world, of oil reserves and 0.7 percent of natural gas reserves which is mostly 85 percent, sold to the European markets.

5. Conclusion

The study underlines the contributions of a historical sociology perspective to account for the political processes in Libya. It is asserted that imposing a pre-determined framework as in the democratization/robustness of authoritarianism could not capture the complexity of protests turning into a civil war.

Instead of transitory frameworks, the study elaborates on asking what happened politically in Libya in order to understand the political-economic basis of the Libyan state-society complex. The articulation of state institutions in a repressive and exclusionary manner had been decisive in the undermining of the Qadhafi regime. Hinnebusch draws attention to the political-economic nature of transition in Middle East countries, which created crony capitalism.[115] The tribal and patrimonial relations contributed to the conflicts after the fall of the regime. The structural organization of the Libyan state has been crucial in the unfolding of civil war.[116] The democracy of bread ensures the ruling bargain between state-society, which gives legitimacy to the governance in Sadiki's words. It demonstrates that democracy demands in the sense of political participation are traded for material interests via the distributive function of the state.[117] Schlumberger shows how the arbitrary implementation of the legal framework marginalizing excluded groups increased the inequality within the society, which can be argued to push the masses to the violent uprising as an only way to voice their demands.[118]

With regards to a healthy and legitimate formation of authority in Libya, the intervention was just a step in the process; after Qadhafi was killed by the rebel groups, the attempts to build governance in Libya reflected the legacies of the ancien regime again. The tribal nature of the Libyan society poses another obstacle after toppling the state authority. Moreover, whether the contestation between fragmented social groups in Libya

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[115]   Hinnebusch, "Towards a Historical Sociology of the Arab Uprising," 46.

[116]   Joffe, "The Arab Spring in," 507.

[117]   Sadiki, "Popular Uprisings," 79.

[118]   Oliver Schlumberger, "Structural Reform, Economic Order, and Development: Patrimonial Capitalism," *Review of International Political Economy* 15, no.4 (2008): 634

results in a comprehensive political formation will be seen in time if the problems such as struggle over sharing oil revenues and the para-military formations filled up the power vacuum after the civil war could be solved fairly. In the face of the conflictual international/regional backdrop, the domestic issues pose certain obstacles before the political movements in Libya. It has a heterogeneous society; the tribal nature of Libyan society largely determines the course of events in Libya[119] and the tribes, which can be argued to be non-political and non-ideological, and civil society organizations can help build the state.[120]

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[119] Taylor, *Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings*, 9.

[120] Ibrahim Fraihat, *Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 211-212.

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Kitap İncelemesi / Book Review

Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum – İmkanlar ve Kısıtlılıklar

Editör: Filiz Cicioğlu, Ankara: Kadim Yayınları, 2019, 534 sayfa

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Değerlendiren: Kevser Aktaş[*]

Sivil toplum kavramı kapsamı ve niteliği üzerinde birçok tartışma olması sebebiyle literatürde farklı tanımlara sahiptir. Bu kavramın çoğunlukla modern devlet/toplum yapısı ve demokratikleşme ile birlikte gelişim göstermesi demokratik olmayan ülkelerde sivil toplumun da var olamayacağı veya gelişemeyeceği gibi ön kabullere neden olmaktadır. Ortadoğu gibi genel anlamda Batının demokrasi standartlarına uymayan bir bölgede sivil toplum konusunu ele almak bu nedenle hem zor hem de dikkate değerdir. 2010'da başlayan ve etkileri günümüze kadar gelen Arap isyanları sürecinin de gösterdiği gibi sivil toplum-sivil alan ülkeleri dönüştürmekte, bölgesel ve küresel politikaları etkileme konusunda oldukça etkili olabilmektedir. Ancak bu noktada Ortadoğu'da sivil toplumun gelişiminin nasıl olduğu, gerçekten "sivil toplum" olarak tanımlanacak bir alanın olup olmadığı gibi sorularla karşılaşılmaktadır.

Mezkûr sorulara cevap vermeye aday olabilecek "Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum- İmkanlar ve Kısıtlılıklar" adlı kitabın ilk baskısı Ekim 2019'da Kadim Yayınları tarafından yayımlanmıştır. Kitabın temel hedefi, seçilen 14 Ortadoğu ülkesinde sivil toplumun gelişim süreçlerini incelemek olarak açıklanmıştır.[1] Küreselleşmenin de etkisiyle birlikte gerek ülkelerin kendi

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[1]   *Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum-İmkanlar ve Kısıtlılıklar*, ed. Filiz Cicioğlu, Ankara: Kadim Yayınları, 2019, 1.

içlerinde yaşanan hadiselerde gerek uluslararası ilişkilerde sivil toplum konusu giderek önem kazanmaktadır. Ortadoğu gibi önemli bir nüfusa sahip, kendine özgü siyasi, sosyal dinamikleri içerisinde barındıran bir bölgede de sivil toplum konusu göz ardı edilemeyecek bir öneme sahiptir. Bu kitap da Ortadoğu'yu Batılı bir kavram olan sivil toplum kalıplarına sokmaya çalışmadan, Ortadoğu merkezli bir gözle ve sivil toplumun geniş anlamıyla toplumsal hareketler ve ülkelerdeki sosyal yapı üzerindeki etkisini ortaya koyma çabasındadır. Kitabı okunmaya ve incelenmeye değer kılan tarafı da burada ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Kitapta farklı yazarlar tarafından kaleme alınmış 15 bölüm bulunmaktadır ve kitaba toplamda 18 yazar katkı vermiştir. Kitap "Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum İmkânı" adlı, konuya ilişkin genel bir çerçeve çizen bölümle başlamakta, sonraki 14 bölümde ise sivil toplum konusu ülkeler bazında ele alınmaktadır. Kitabın editörü Filiz Cicioğlu Sakarya Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler bölümünde Dr. Öğretim Üyesi olarak sivil toplum ve Avrupa Birliği gibi konulardaki çalışmalarını sürdürmektedir. Kitaba katkı veren yazarlar ise sivil toplum konusunu inceledikleri ülkeler üzerine çalışmalarını sürdürmektedir ve ilgili ülkelerin uzmanı/uzman adaylarıdır. Yazarların ülkeler hakkındaki bilgi birikimi, sivil toplum konusuna daha geniş bir perspektiften bakabilmeyi mümkün kılmıştır. Bu incelemede öncelikle kitapta yer alan bölümlerin kısaca özetlerine yer verilecek, daha sonra ise kitap hakkında genel bir değerlendirme yapılacaktır.

"Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum İmkânı" başlıklı ilk bölüm Neslihan Akbulut Arıkan tarafından ele alınmış ve Batı gözünden Doğu'nun nasıl yorumlandığı ve bu yorumdaki oryantalist ön kabullere değinilmiştir. Buna göre; Batı'nın Doğu'yu kendi penceresinden yorumlaması bu coğrafyada demokrasinin yoksunluğu ya da yetersizliği ve sivil toplumun imkânsızlığı gibi faktörlerin önceden verili olarak kabul edilmesine neden olmaktadır. İkinci bölüm olan "Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum"da Filiz Cicioğlu, tarihi bir perspektif sunarak Türkiye'de sivil toplumun gelişimini Osmanlı dönemine kadar dayandırmıştır. Bölümde ilgi çeken nokta yaygın kanının aksine Osmanlı'nın "monolitik" bir toplum olmadığı ve sivil toplumun Osmanlı'da önemli bir yer edindiği olmuştur.

Müberra Dinler tarafından kaleme alınan "İran'da Sivil Toplum" makalesi ise kitabın üçüncü bölümünü teşkil etmektedir. Bu bölümde köklü bir tarihe sahip olan İran'da sivil toplumun öncüsü sayılabilecek birçok olu-

şumun mevcut olduğu bilgisiyle beraber İran tarihindeki önemli kırılma noktalarında sivil toplumun rolüne değinilmiştir. Ünal Tüysüz'ün yazdığı "Cezayir'de Sivil Toplumun Gelişimi ve Konumu" isimli dördüncü bölüm otoriter bir ülkede sivil toplumun niteliklerini tanımlamaktadır. Bölümün iddiasına göre Cezayir'de sivil toplum yaklaşık olarak 11 yıl süren kanlı iç savaşın etkisiyle şekillenmekte ya da şekillenememektedir.

"İsrail'in Siyaset ve Toplum Yapısında Sivil Toplumun Rolü" başlıklı bölüm Haydar Oruç tarafından yazılmıştır. Bu bölümde öne çıkan durum İsrail'in STK'lara güvenlik ekseninde yaklaşan devlet yapısına rağmen STK'ların sayısının oldukça fazla olduğudur. Ancak yazarın iddiasına göre[2] bu sayı fazlalığına rağmen İsrail yönetimi Filistinli Arapların haklarının savunuculuğunu yapan STK'lar ile devletin kendi değerleri doğrultusunda hareket edenler arasında ikircikli bir politika izlemektedir. Bu durum da İsrail'deki STK'ların özgürlüğünü sorgulatan bir durumdur. Kitabın altıncı bölümü Ahmet Arda Şensoy ve Mehmet Rakipoğlu tarafından ele alınmıştır. "Suriye'de Sivil Toplum veya Sivil Toplumun İmkânsızlığı" başlığını taşıyan bölüm Suriye'de Esed rejimi ile sivil toplumun imkânsızlığı üzerine bir değerlendirmede bulunmaktadır. SSCB'ye yakın bir rejim olarak Suriye'de sivil toplum genellikle sendikalar çerçevesinde ve rejim kontrolünde var olagelmiştir. 2011 sonrası iç savaşta ise bu durum değişmiştir.

Yemen'de sivil toplum konusu ise "Yemen'in Dönüşümü ve Sivil Toplum" başlığıyla Ülkü Çiçek tarafından kaleme alınmıştır. Bu bölümde Yemen'in içerisinde bulunduğu siyasal istikrarsızlık ve iç çekişmelerin sivil toplumun gelişimi önündeki en büyük engel olduğundan söz edilmiştir. Mehmet Can Palancı'nın kitaba "Körfez Arap Ülkelerinde Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları" başlıklı makalesiyle katkı sağladığı sekizinci bölüm ise Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Bahreyn, Katar, Kuveyt ve Suudi Arabistan'da sivil toplumu incelemektedir. Bölümde bu ülkelere dair genel bir tablo çizildikten sonra Körfez ülkelerinde modern dönemde ve tarihsel olarak STK'ların mevcut olduğu iddia edilmiştir.

Ortadoğu'nun bir diğer önemli ülkesi olan Irak'ta sivil toplumun gelişimi ise "Irak'ta Sivil Toplum Kurumlarının Yapısal Özellikleri ve Tarihi

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[2]   Haydar Oruç, "İsrail'in Siyaset ve Toplum Yapısında Sivil Toplumun Rolü", ed. Filiz Cicioğlu, *Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum-İmkanlar ve Kısıtlılıklar*, Ankara: Kadim Yayınları, 2019, 158.

Arka Planı" başlığıyla Rumeysa Ayverdi ve Nurbanu Bulgur tarafından incelenmiştir. Bölümün iddiasına göre diğer otoriter devletlerde olduğu gibi Irak'ta da sivil toplum kendisine gelişme alanı bulamamış ancak 2003 STK'ların nitelikleri açısından değilse de nicelikleri açısından bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Yeşim Bayram'ın kaleme aldığı "Fas Sivil Toplumunda Tarihsel Dönüşüm" bölümü Fas'ta tarihsel anlamda bir sivil toplumdan söz edilebileceğini ve demokratikleşmeyle sivil toplumun bu ülkede paralel bir biçimde ilerlediğini iddia etmektedir.

On birinci bölümde Ayşenur Hazar'ın "Mısır'da STK'ların Gelişimi ve Konumu başlıklı çalışması yer almaktadır. Hazar'a göre Mısır'da STK'lar otoriter yönetimin baskısı altında kendilerine alan açmaya çalışmaktadır.[3] Ayşe Selcan Özdemirci Cinal, "Ne Devletle Ne Devletsiz: Lübnan'da Sivil Toplum Meselesi" başlığı altında Ortadoğu'nun siyasi ve etnik olarak oldukça karmaşık ülkelerinden biri olan Lübnan'da sivil toplumun gelişimini incelemiştir. Bu bölümde de tarihsel bir inceleme yapılarak sivil toplumun Lübnan'da Batı'dakinden oldukça farklı bir işlevi olduğu çalışmanın öne çıkan sonuçlarından biridir.

Rumeysa Köktaş'a ait olan "Tunus'ta ve Türkiye-Tunus İlişkilerinde Sivil Toplumun Rolü" başlıklı bölümde Tunus açısından sivil toplumun önemli bir yerinin olduğuna ve modernleşme politikalarıyla paralel olarak ilerlediğine vurgu yapılmıştır. Kitabın son bölümünü ise Mustafa Fatih Yavuz ve Fatma Zehra Toçoğlu'nun birlikte yazdıkları "Tarihi ve Siyasi Perspektiften Filistin'de Sivil Toplum" adlı çalışma oluşturmaktadır. Bu bölümde işgal altında bir ülke olarak Filistin'de sivil toplumun mümkün olup olamayacağı tartışmalarına yer verilmiş ve varılan sonuç; Filistin'de demokratik değerlerden ziyade güvenliğin öncelendiği ve sivil toplumun gelişiminin güvenlik kaygısı altında şekillendiği olmuştur.

Yukarıda hakkında kısaca bilgi verilmeye çalışılan kitap, Ortadoğu ile sivil toplum kavramını bir araya getirmesi nedeniyle değerli bir çalışmadır. Bu alanda Türkçe literatür incelendiğinde Ferhad İbrahim ve Heidi Wedel tarafından derlenip 1997 yılında Türkçe'ye çevrilen "Ortadoğu'da Sivil

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[3]   Ayşenur Hazar, "Mısır'da STK'ların Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Konumu", (Ed.Filiz Cicioğlu), *Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum-İmkanlar ve Kısıtlılıklar*, Ankara: Kadim Yayınları, 2019, 400-401.

Toplumun Sorunları"[4] dışında bir çalışma karşımıza çıkmamaktadır. Bu kitabın da sivil toplum açısından yalnızca beş Ortadoğu ülkesini incelediği göz önünde bulundurulursa "Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum: İmkanlar ve Kısıtlılıklar" kitabı literatürdeki boşluğu doldurmaya önemli bir aday olarak gözükmektedir.

Yalnızca Türkçe literatür açısından değil İngilizce açısından da kitap benzerlerinin aksine kapsam ve içerik olarak daha geniş bir alanı kapsamaktadır. Örneğin Augustus Richard Norton editörlüğünde 1994'te yayınlanan "Civil Society in the Middle East" adlı kitap yedi Ortadoğu ülkesini ele almakta ve sivil toplum konusunu daha dar bir alanda incelemektedir.[5] Amr Hamzawy editörlüğünde 2003 yılında yayınlanan "Civil Society in the Middle East" adlı kitap ise Ortadoğu'da sivil toplum üzerine verdiği genel bilgi dışında spesifik olarak yalnızca iki ülkede sivil toplum konusunu incelemiştir.[6]

Bu anlamda aynı konudaki çalışmalarla kıyaslandığında "Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplum- İmkanlar ve Kısıtlılıklar" adlı kitabın önemi daha iyi anlaşılmaktadır. Zira kitapta Türkiye de dâhil olmak üzere 14 Ortadoğu ülkesi sivil toplum açısından ele alınarak kapsamlı bir çalışmaya gidilmiştir. Kitabın kapsamının yanı sıra sivil toplum kavramını geniş anlamı ve oryantalist bakış açısından sıyrılarak ele alması da çalışmayı değerli kılan bir diğer etmendir. Ayrıca kitabın birçok bölümünde Türkiye'nin o ülke ile olan ilişkisinde sivil toplumun rolü ile ilgili kısımlara yer verilerek Türk dış politikası hakkındaki literatüre de sivil toplum açısından katkı sağlanmıştır.

Kitapta karşı karşıya kalınan problemlerden bahsetmek gerekirse ilk olarak teknik bir problemden konu açılabilir. Kitabın içerdiği bölümlerin bir standarda sahip olmaması, her bölümde farklı konu başlıkları ve temalara değinilmesi kitabın bütünlüğü açısından problem oluşturmaktadır. Önsöz kısmında editör bu problemin incelenen ülkelerin farklı dinamiklere ve tarihsel süreçlere sebep olmasından kaynaklandığını belirtmiştir. Ancak bölümlerin yazarları sivil toplum konusuna farklı pencerelerden yaklaşmış

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4   Ferhad İbrahim ve Heidi Wedel, *Ortadoğu'da Sivil Toplumun Sorunları* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007)

5   August Richard Norton, *ed., Civil Society in the Middle East,* (Leiden: Brill, 1994)

6   Amr Hamzawy, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East,* (Berlin: Verlag Hans Schiler, 2003)

ve kimi bölümler genel olarak sivil toplum alanından bahsederken kimileri STK'ları inceleme alanı olarak almıştır. Ülkelerin farklılıklarından kaynaklanan anlatım korunmakla birlikte en azından ele alınan konularla ilgili bir standardizasyona gidilmesi kitabın daha tutarlı bir hale gelmesine katkı sağlayabilirdi.

Diğer bir problem konusu ise sivil toplum konusunun Ortadoğu ülkelerinde Batılı anlamıyla karşılık bulamaması nedeniyle yazıların bazı bölümlerde yer yer siyasi tarih anlatısına dönüşmesidir. Bu nedenle sivil toplum temasına bağlı kalarak tarihsel bir anlatı yerine daha betimleyici bir dil kullanmak kitabın bütünlüğüne ve niteliğine katkı sağlayabilirdi. Tüm bunların yanı sıra kitap hem literatürdeki boşluğu doldurması hem de Ortadoğu'da fazla incelenen bir konu olmayan "sivil toplum" meselesini incelemesiyle kıymetli ve okumaya değerdir. Bu inceleme hem Ortadoğu'da yaşanan olayların arkasında sivil toplumun rolünün ne olduğu hem de yaşanan olayların sivil toplumu nasıl etkileyip dönüştüreceğini anlamak konusunda özellikle Ortadoğu çalışanlara farklı bir bakış açısı sunacaktır.

Kitap İncelemesi / Book Review

Türk-Arap İlişkileri: Eski Eyaletler Yeni Komşulara Dönüşürken (1914-1923)

Ü. Gülsüm Polat, İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2019, 362 sayfa

Değerlendiren: Fatma Zehra Fatsa[*]

Türk-Arap İlişkileri Eski Eyaletler Yeni Komşulara Dönüşürken (1914-1923) adlı eser Doç. Dr. Ü. Gülsüm Polat tarafından yaklaşık altı yıl süren bir hazırlık sonucunda 362 sayfalık bir çalışma olarak Aralık 2019'da Kronik Kitap tarafından basılmıştır.

Ü. Gülsüm Polat'ın bu eseri, 1914-1923 yılları arasındaki Osmanlı/Türk-Arap ilişkileri hakkında kapsamlı bir çalışma ortaya koyarak literatürde kendine yer bulmuştur. Bu çalışma, Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e geçiş sürecindeki Arap Yarımadası'ndaki siyasi erkler ile Türk siyasi erkleri arasındaki ilişkileri konu almaktadır. Şerif Hüseyin İsyanı'ndan sonra bölgedeki değişim, Avrupa ülkelerinin bölgedeki işbirliği çabaları ve Osmanlı'nın bölgedeki karışıklığa göstermiş olduğu askeri ve siyasi refleksler incelenmiş, Türk-Arap ilişkilerine yansımaları ele alınmıştır.

Kitap iki bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm "Çatışma ve İttifak", ikinci bölüm ise "İsyan, İşbirliği ve Mücadele: Suriye-Irak ve Arap Yarımadası"dır. Yazar birinci bölüme geçmeden önce I. Dünya Savaşı öncesinde ortaya çıkmış ve I. Dünya Savaşı içerisinde de hızla yayılmış olan Arap milliyetçiliğinden bahsetmektedir. Savaş arifesinde başlayan

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ve bozulan ittifaklara da yer veren yazar, I. Dünya Savaşı'nın Arap Yarımadası'ndaki yerleşik aktörlerin dış aktörlerle nasıl işbirliği içerisinde olduklarına değinmektedir.

Birinci bölüm "Çatışma ve İttifak", iki alt başlık ve bu iki alt başlığın içerisinde de birden fazla başlıkla ele alınmıştır. İlk alt başlıkta, "I. Dünya Savaşı; Hicaz ve Necid'de Yol Ayrımında Çatışma ve İttifaklar" konusu üzerinde durulmaktadır. Yazar, burada ilk olarak Osmanlı Devleti'nin I. Dünya Savaşı'na girmesinden sonra İngilizlerin Arap Yarımadası'nın neredeyse her bölgesini etkileyecek askeri ve siyasi girişimler içerisinde olduklarına yer vermekte ve bu girişimlerin başlangıç noktasının Osmanlı hâkimiyetindeki Basra'nın işgali olduğunu söylemektedir (s.73). Ayrıca Osmanlı'nın ilan ettiği Cihad-ı Ekber (Osmanlı Devleti'nin İslami propagandası) ile savaşta dini bir iddianın ortaya atıldığını ve böylece İngilizlerin çözmesi gereken başka bir meselenin ortaya çıktığını belirtmektedir. İngilizler için bundan sonraki sürecin Türklere karşı Arap desteğini sağlayabilmek olduğunu söyleyen yazar, bu bağlamda İngilizlerin Arap Yarımadası'nın önemli liderleri olan İbnu's-Suud, İbnü'r-Reşid, İmam Yahya ve Seyyid İdrisi ile olan görüşmelerine yer vermektedir.

Birinci bölüm içerisinde Şerif Hüseyin İsyanı'na değinen yazar, Osmanlı kaynaklarında bu isyanın "Fesat Hadisesi", Arap ve Batı kaynaklarında ise "Büyük Arap İsyanı" olarak nitelendirildiğini söylemektedir. Mark Skyes, Lord Kitchener, McMahon gibi isimlerin isyanı gerçekleştirebilecek isim olarak Şerif Hüseyin'i işaret ettiklerini belirten yazar bu noktadan itibaren Şerif Hüseyin ve oğulları ile isyan için yapılan görüşmeleri ve yazılan mektupları aktarmaktadır.

5 Haziran 1916 tarihinde İngilizlerin silah, cephane ve para yardımıyla Medine'de isyanı başlatan Şerif Hüseyin, İttihat ve Terakki'nin İslam'ın başına gelmiş en büyük tehlike olduğu fikrini yaymıştır. Bu hâkimiyetin Arap Yarımadası'nda son bulması gerektiğini söylemiş ve isyanını meşrulaştırmaya çalışmıştır. Böylece halkı Mekke'de kurulan yeni saltanata bağlı olmaya çağırdığını belirten yazar bu noktada Fahrettin Paşa'nın Medine savunmasındaki rolüne de yer vermiştir.

İsyanın başlamasından sonra Arap Yarımadası'ndaki gelişmeleri yazarın, İbnu's-Suud ve İbnü'r-Reşid arasındaki ilişkiler, Faysal'ın Suriye Krallığı düşüncesi, Fransa ve Rusya'nın isyan karşısında sergiledikleri tutum, Şerif

Hüseyin'in unvan tartışması ve buna gösterilen tepkiler olarak incelediği görülmektedir. Kasım 1917 tarihinde Filistin topraklarında bir Yahudi Devleti'nin kurulmasını destekleyen Balfour Deklarasyonu'nun Şerif Hüseyin'in gücünü kıran bir gelişme olduğunu söyleyen yazar, Büyük Arap Krallığı fikrinin sonunu getirecek olan bu gelişmenin bundan sonraki barış görüşmelerinde güvensiz bir ortam oluşturacağını da belirtmektedir (s. 157).

Yazar, birinci bölümün ikinci alt başlığını "I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Arap Yarımadası'nın Güneyi: İsyan, İşbirliği ve Mücadele" olarak ele almıştır. Bu başlık altında Kuzey Yemen (Asir), Güney Yemen ve Kızıldeniz Adaları'nın durumunu inceleyen yazar, Yemen'de iki önemli aktör olan San'a merkezli Zeydi İmam Yahya ve Asir merkezli Seyyid İdrisi'nin işbirliği konusunda birbirinden farklı tutum içerisinde olduklarına değinmektedir. İmam Yahya savaş öncesinde Türklerle imzaladıkları Dean Antlaşması'na bağlı kalıp sadakatini gösterirken Seyyid İdrisi ise 30 Nisan 1915 tarihinde İngilizlerle bir işbirliği antlaşması imzalamıştır.

Kitabın ikinci bölümü "İsyan, İşbirliği ve Mücadele: Suriye-Irak ve Arap Yarımadası" başlığı altında ele alınmıştır. İkinci bölüm dört alt başlıktan oluşmakta ve ilk bölümde de olduğu gibi bu alt başlıklar da kendi içinde birden fazla başlığı barındırmaktadır. İlk alt başlık, "Anadolu'da Millî Mücadele Suriye ve Irak'ta Karmaşa: Belirleyici Faktörler"dir. Yazar ilk olarak bu başlık altında 1918-1923 yılları arasında Doğu ile ilişkiler bağlamında Türk dış politikasının ana karakteristiğini incelemektedir. Mondros Mütarekesi'nden sonra Osmanlı Devleti'nin yıkılış süreci ve sonrasında Anadolu'da oluşan milli devletin başlangıcını ele alan yazar, savaş sonrası Arap Yarımadası'nda önemli değişiklikler içeren 15 Eylül 1919 tarihli Suriye İtilafnamesi, 18-26 Nisan 1920 tarihli San-Remo Konferansı ve kararları, 12-30 Mart 1921 tarihleri arasında Kahire Konferansı ve kararları üzerinde durmaktadır. Mustafa Kemal'in Suriye ve Irak'ın bağımsızlığı için silahlı mücadelenin kendi öz kaynaklarıyla yönetilmesi düşüncesine ve Talat Paşa ile yaptığı yazışmalarındaki konfederasyon fikrine değinen yazar, 23 Nisan 1920'de TBMM'nin açılmasından sonra dış ilişkilerin bizzat Mustafa Kemal ve TBMM tarafından yürütüldüğünü söylemektedir. Bolşevizm ve onunla bağlantılı Panislamik/Bolşevik hareketlerin savaş sonrası ilişkilerdeki etkisine de değinen yazar, Bolşeviklerin "başka bir ulusu ezen hiçbir ulus özgür

olamaz" söyleminin Millî Mücadele için önemli bir söylem olarak kabul edildiğini belirtmekte ve bu bağlamda Hilafet Hareketi'nin Türk-Arap ilişkilerinde en etkili unsurlardan biri olduğu üzerinde durmaktadır. Türk-Arap ilişkilerinin şekillenmesinde Bolşevizm, Milletçilik, Panislamizm gibi kavramların yanında İttihat ve Terakki düşüncesinin de önemli bir rol oynadığını söyleyen yazar, Millî Mücadele'nin bir İttihatçı hareketi olarak anlaşılmasını engellemek için Mustafa Kemal'in İttihatçı liderlerle olan ilişkilerinde oldukça dikkatli olduğunu ve dış politikasını akılcılık üzerine temellendirdiğini ifade etmektedir (s. 210-211).

İkinci alt başlık, "Eski Eyaletler Yeni Komşulara Dönüşürken Devamlılık ve Kopuşlar"dır. Yazar burada ilk olarak, savaş sonrası Suriye'nin durumunu ve 24 Temmuz 1922'de Milletler Cemiyeti onayıyla Suriye'de Fransız mandası kabul edildikten sonra Suriye topraklarının nasıl ayrı idari birimlere ayrıldığını ele almaktadır. Bu noktada Şerif Hüseyin ve Emir Faysal'ın aktörlüğü üzerinden çalışmasına devam eden yazar, Paris Barış Konferansı ve Faysal'ın Suriye'deki Krallığı'nın sona erdirilip Irak Krallığı'na geçiş sürecine değinmektedir. Savaş sonrasında oluşan yeni sınırlar içinde Faysal'ın krallığının Irak'ın kuzeyindeki Kürt bölgeler ve Şiiler arasında ortaya çıkardığı tartışmalara yer veren yazar, Irak'taki bu sürecin Türk-Arap ilişkilerinde geçişkenliğe sebep olsa da İngiltere'nin Irak'taki hareket alanını genişlettiğini belirtmektedir (s. 223).

Yazar bu bölümde ayrıca Suriye ve Irak'ta kurulan işgal karşıtı cemiyetlerin İstanbul Hükümeti ile olan iletişimlerine ve Büyük Suriye olarak adlandırılan Lübnan ve Filistin'i de içine alan bölgelerdeki mücadelelerine yer vermekte ve sınırı oluşturan bir diğer önemli aktör olan aşiretlerin mobilizasyonuna da değinmektedir. Yazar, Türkiye ve Suriye-Irak bölgesindeki işgal karşıtı girişimler içerisinde 1919 Aralık'ta başlayan ve 1920 ortalarına kadar devam eden Deyr-i Zor ve Telafer olaylarında milliyetçi cemiyetlerin önemli rol oynadığını belirtmektedir (s. 247). Son olarak 1921 Londra Konferansı'na değinen yazar, Ankara Hükümeti'nin konferansa çağırılıp Faysal'ın çağırılmamasını sınırda iletişim içindeyken diplomasi de ayrı düştükleri şeklinde yorumlamaktadır.

Üçüncü alt başlık, "Arap Yarımadası ile İlişkiler; Necid, Hicaz ve Yemen"dir. Yazar bu bölümde Millî Mücadele bittikten sonra Şerif Hüseyin'in kendisini halife ilan etmesi üzerine Necid Emiri İbnu's-Suud'un savaş açmasını ve 1926'da İbnu's-Suud'un Hicaz Kralı ilan edilerek sınırlarını

nasıl genişlettiğini ele almaktadır. İbnu's-Suud'un Arap Yarımadası'nda sınırlarını genişletebilmesinin İngilizlerden aldığı para, silah, cephane yardımı sayesinde olduğunu söyleyen yazar (s. 283), Arap milliyetçiliğinde önemli bir aktör olan Şerif Hüseyin'in, İngiltere'nin desteğini çekmesiyle tarih sahnesindeki rolünün böylece bittiğini belirtmektedir. Yazar son olarak Millî Mücadele sürecinde Osmanlı'nın uzak eyaleti olan Yemen üzerinde durmaktadır. Mondros Ateşkes Antlaşması imzalandıktan sonra Osmanlı birliklerinin en yakın İtilaf kuvvetlerine teslim olmasının istenmesi üzerine Yemen Valisi Mahmud Nedim Bey'in mücadelesine değinen yazar, İngilizlerin Yemen'e nüfuz etmesini engellemekte Mahmud Nedim Bey'in önemli rolü olduğunu ifade etmektedir. İmam Yahya'nın Ankara Hükümeti ile kurduğu bağlantılarda da Mahmud Nedim Bey'in etkisinin görüldüğünü ve iki taraf için de Yemen'de bağımsız bir iradenin varlığının temenni edildiğini eklemektedir.

Dördüncü alt başlık, "Türk Arap İlişkilerinde İddia ve İrtibatın Belirleyicisi Olarak Lozan Konferansı ve Kararları"dır. Türk Heyeti'nin Lozan'a birçok önemli başlıkla gittiğini söyleyen yazar (s. 310), Irak ve Suriye sınırı konularının heyetin önceliğini oluşturan iki konu olduğunun altını çizmekte ve Türk tarafı için Misak-ı Milli'nin vazgeçilmez bir parçası olan Musul'un, konferansta en çok tartışılan konu olduğunu ve hatta konferansın ertelenmesine sebep olduğunu belirtmektedir. Musul sorununun çözümü için görüşmeler yapıldığına değinen yazar, ilk özel görüşmenin Lord Curzon ve İsmet Paşa arasında 26 Kasım 1922 tarihinde yapıldığını, ikinci görüşme için Rıza Nur ve Lord Curzon'un bir araya geldiğini ancak bu görüşmeden de ilk görüşmede olduğu gibi Türk tarafı adına olumlu bir sonuç çıkmadığını ifade etmektedir. Türklerin Musul için plebisit (halk oylaması) talebinin İngilizler tarafından reddedilip konunun Millet Cemiyeti'ne taşınma süreci, 24 Temmuz 1923 Lozan Antlaşması, 17 Aralık 1925 Türkiye-Rusya Antlaşması ve 5 Aralık 1926 Ankara Antlaşması yazarın bu bölümde değindiği diğer konulardır. Son olarak Lozan'da Arap coğrafyasına dair üzerinde durulan diğer meselelerin sağlık sorunları, demiryolları ve Fahrettin Paşa tarafından Medine'den götürülen kutsal emanetler meselesi olduğunu belirten yazar çalışmasını burada noktalamaktadır.

Çalışmayı alanındaki çalışmalardan farklı kılan belli bir dönem aralığında (1914-1923) Türk-Arap ilişkilerini etkileyen ve şekillendiren kilit noktalara

değinmesidir. Osmanlı'dan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne geçiş sürecindeki Türk-Arap ilişkilerinin ve bunun sonucunda ilişkilerde ortaya çıkan devamlılık ve kopuşların ayrıntılı olarak ele alınması, eserin akademik literatürdeki bu eksikliği tamamlamasına katkı sunmaktadır. Osmanlı arşivlerinin yanı sıra İngiliz arşiv ve kütüphanelerinin de kullanılması eserin oluşumunun ciddi bir kaynak taramasına dayandığını göstermektedir. Konu başlıklarının dağılımı ve olayların kronolojik aktarımı okuyucunun eseri okurken olayları daha rahat anlayabilmesini sağlamaktadır. Yazarın da sonuç kısmında belirttiği gibi bu çalışmada, olayların ortaya çıkmasında ve alınan kararlarda ekonominin etkisine değinilmemiştir. Eserin asıl amacı 1914-1923 yılları arasındaki Türk-Arap ilişkilerindeki çatışma, ittifak ve işbirliklerini ele almak olduğu için iktisadi yapının ele alınmaması ciddi bir eksiklik göstermemektedir.

Kitap İncelemesi / Book Review

Ortadoğu'ya Bakışta Alternatif Bir Perspektif Olarak Kimlik ve İdeolojiler:

Ortadoğu'yu Kuran İdeolojiler, Editör: Zekeriya Kurşun, İstanbul: Vadi Yayınları, 2019, 356 sayfa

Değerlendiren: Mehmet Akif Koç[*]

Ortadoğu tarihi, ilgili literatürde çoğunlukla siyasi hadiseler ve kronolojik süreçler üzerinden ele alınır. Bu açıdan, Ortadoğu Çalışmaları okuyucuları ve araştırmacıları için artık başucu kaynakları haline gelmiş olan (ve bir kısmı Türkçeye de çevrilen) eserler, genel olarak kronolojik veya kavramsal bir çerçeveye sahiptir.[1] Bu çalışmaların yanı sıra sosyolojik veya ekonomik perspektifle bölgeyi inceleyen eserler de son dönemde sıklıkla okuyucuya sunulmuş durumdadır.[2]

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[1] Bu kapsamda şu kitaplar, diğerlerine nazaran daha fazla dikkat çekmektedir: William L. Cleveland & Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 6th Edition, New York: Routledge, 2018; James L. Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East: A History*, 5th Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2020; Peter Mansfield, *A History of the Middle East*, 5th Edition, New York: Penguin Books, 2013; Ilan Pappé, *The Modern Middle East: A Social and Cultural History*, 3rd Edition, New York: Routledge, 2014

[2] Bir kısmı Türkçeye de çevrilmiş olan söz konusu türdeki bazı kitaplar için bkz. - Roger Owen & Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1998; Youssef M. Choueiri, *A Companion to the History of the Middle East*, Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2005; Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*, California: Stanford University Press, 2010; Danyel Reiche & Tamir Sorek, *Sport, Politics and Society in the Middle East*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Bunun la birlikte, Ortadoğu gibi tarihi çatışmacı iç/dış dinamiklerle şekillenen ve kimliklerin iç içe geçmiş olduğu bir coğrafyayı, bölgedeki hâkim ideolojiler üzerinden okumak düşüncesi başlı başına ilgi çekicidir.[3] Editörlüğünü, Ortadoğu tarihi ve modern dönemi üzerine yaptığı çalışmalarla tanınan Prof. Dr. Zekeriya Kurşun'un yaptığı *Ortadoğu'yu Kuran İdeolojiler* kitabı, bölgeyi modern dönemde şekillenen ideolojiler bağlamında ele alması ve mukayeseli bir perspektif kullanması itibariyle, Türkçe literatürde bu sahada telif edilmiş oldukça az sayıdaki çalışma arasında yerini aldı.[4]

Giriş bölümü haricinde toplam sekiz başlık altında sekiz ayrı ideolojiyi inceleyen kitapta, çoğunluğu genç akademisyenlerce hazırlanan şu bölümler yer almaktadır:

i) İslamcılık

ii) Arap Milliyetçiliği

iii) Türk Milliyetçiliği

iv) İran Milliyetçiliği

v) Kürt Milliyetçiliği

vi) Sol Hareketler (Baas, Nasırcılık ve diğerleri)

vii) Siyonizm

viii) Feminizm

Geçmişte ve günümüzde "*İslamcılık*" düşüncesinin doğuşu ve alt kollarının incelendiği ilk bölüm, İslam ile İslamcılık arasındaki farklılığa dair kayda değer bir tespitle başlıyor: "İslamcılık akımı ve söylemi, İslam'ın bizzat kendisi ile ilgili bir arayıştan daha çok, son iki yüz yılda Batı ile yaşanan dengesiz rekabet koşullarında ortaya çıkmış siyaset öncelikli bir anlayışı temsil eder" (s.15). Kitabın "Sol Hareketler" ile birlikte en uzun bölümü olan bu kısımda, İslamcılığın 19. yüzyıla uzanan tarihi arka planının yanı

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[3]   Bu başlıkta iki önemli çalışma için bkz. Robert D. Lee, *Religion and Politics in the Middle East: Identity, Ideology, Institutions, and Attitudes*, 2nd Edition, New York: Westview Press, 2018.

[4]   Türkçe telif edilmiş (yine Vadi Yayınları tarafından yayınlanan) kayda değer ve güncel bir benzeri çalışma için bkz. Necmettin Doğan (Ed.), *Ortadoğu'da Çatışma ve İdeolojiler*, İstanbul: Vadi Yayınları, 2017.

sıra Türkiye tecrübesine de yer verilmekte; bilahare Mısır, Filistin, Suriye, Tunus ve diğer belli başlı bölge ülkelerindeki İslami hareketlerin gelişimi üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu bölümün bir özelliği de İran merkezli Şii İslamcılık ve militan İslamcılığa da değinmesi ve nihayetinde İslamcılık ideolojisini bütüncül bir perspektifle ele almasıdır. Bununla birlikte el-Kaide, IŞİD ve türevlerine ideolojik düzlemde yeterince yer verildiğini söylemek güçtür. İlaveten, bu kapsamlı bölümde, İslamcılığın 21.yüzyılda geçirmekte olduğu dönüşüm ve özellikle demokratikleşme/çoğulculuk ekseninde gelişen yeni bir kavrayış olarak, Post-İslamcılık tartışmaları[5] bağlamında bu ideolojinin ele alınmamış olması bir eksiklik olarak göze çarpmaktadır.

"Arap Milliyetçiliği" bölümü, doyurucu 19. yüzyıl kültürel milliyetçilik faaliyetleri arka planının üzerine, I. Dünya Savaşı döneminde Osmanlı Devleti aleyhtarı girişimlerin yanı sıra modern dönem gelişmelerini de tartışmakta; bu meyanda Suriye, Lübnan, Irak ve Mısır başta olmak üzere Arap ülkelerinde müstakil olarak gelişen milliyetçilik akımlarının bilhassa mahalli kökenlerine dair dikkate değer detaylar sunmaktadır. Bu bölümde ilgi çekici bir husus da bilhassa Suriye-Lübnan coğrafyasındaki Hristiyan din ve kültür adamlarının (Butros el Bustânî, Nazif el-Yazıcı, Faris eş-Şidyak, Corci Zeydan, Şibli Şumeyyil, Necib Azurî vd), 19. yüzyılda Arap milliyetçiliğinin doğuşundaki (*en-Nahda*) son derece kritik rolüdür. Bu bölümde yer alan bir diğer önemli tespit de başta Nasırcılık olmak üzere Arap Milliyetçiliğinin, Soğuk Savaş döneminde cari uluslararası konjonktür çerçevesinde, Batı emperyalizmi karşısında kendisini yelpazenin solunda konumlandırarak sosyalist ideolojiyle iş birliğine gittiğinin ortaya konmasıdır (s.118).

"Türk Milliyetçiliği"nin tarihsel ve güncel boyutuyla ele alındığı bölüm ise Osmanlı Devleti içinde gelişen Türk milliyetçisi mütefekkir ve akımların yanı sıra imparatorluk dışından gelen oldukça önemli bir Türkçü aşıya da müstakil ehemmiyet vermektedir. Bu bağlamda, Suriye-Lübnan

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[5] Post-İslamcılık bahsinde, Türkçeye de çevrilmiş olan önemli bir kaynak ve bu satırların yazarının söz konusu kitaba ilişkin incelemesi için bkz. Mehmet Akif Koç, Book Review – "Asef Bayat (ed.), Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam, (New York: Oxford University Press), 2013", *al-Sharq Research*, 13 September 2019, https://research.sharqforum.org/2019/09/13/asef-bayat-ed-post-islamism-the-changing-faces-of-political-islam-new-york-oxford-university-press/

Hristiyanlarının 19. yüzyılda gelişen Arap Milliyetçiliği içindeki lokomotif rolüne benzer şekilde; İtil-Ural Havzası ve Türkistan kökenli Türkçü düşünür ve aktivistlerin Osmanlı'da gelişen Türk milliyetçiliği akımıyla olan etkileşiminin özellikle üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu düşünürler arasında bilhassa İsmail Gaspıralı, Yusuf Akçura, Ayaz İshakî, Abdurauf Fıtrat gibi şahsiyetler dikkat çekmektedir. Devamında, Cumhuriyet'in ilk dönemindeki milliyetçi uygulamalar ve bilahare Türk siyasi hayatında milliyetçiliğin etkisi tartışılmaktadır.

Müstakil bir başlık ayrılan "*İran Milliyetçiliği*" bahsinde, Youssef Choueiri'nin tasnifi takip edilerek üçlü bir analiz yapılmaktadır: i) Laik milliyetçilik, ii) hanedan milliyetçiliği, iii) muhafazakâr milliyetçilik. Ancak bu ayrıma rağmen, modern İran milliyetçiliğinin oluşumunda etkin olan kültürel dinamikler arasında dini saiklerin yanı sıra, adet ve geleneklere dayanan kültürün de rolü olduğu savunulan bölümde, şu dinamiklerin belirleyici etkisine atıf yapılmaktadır: Farsçanın etkisi, Şiilik, toprak ve coğrafya, milli tarih yazımı, yabancı işgal/hakimiyet dönemi, Oryantalist çalışmalar, arkeolojik çalışmaların etkisi, Firdevsî'nin Şâhnâmesi, Avesta ve Zerdüştî kültür. Bu dinamikler arasında, laik milliyetçilik ve hanedan milliyetçiliğinin kadim İran tarihi ve kültürünün yanı sıra Farsçaya yaptığı vurgu, 1979 Devrimi sonrasında güç kazanan muhafazakâr milliyetçilik döneminde yerini, Şiilik üzerinden geliştirilen bir İranlılık kimliğine bırakmaktadır. Bu bölümde dikkate değer bir vurgu da halihazırda çeşitli muhafazakâr milliyetçi çevrelerde dillendirilen, "Türklerin Neo-Osmanlıcılık ve Arapların Vahhabiliğine karşı Neo-Safevî anlayışın tesis edilmesi" görüşüdür (ss. 189-190).

Milliyetçilikler bahsinin son halkası olan "Kürt Milliyetçiliği" bölümü ise bölgenin dört önemli devletine bölünmüş halde yaşayan ve I. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında kendi devletini kuramayan Kürtlerdeki milli uyanışın tarihi ve güncel boyutunu işlemektedir. Bu bağlamda önemli bir tespit, farklı ülkelerde yaşamalarından dolayı Kürtlerin yekpare bir milliyetçilik geliştirememesi ve hâkim çoğunluk olan Türk, İran ve Arap toplumlarının milliyetçilik anlayışlarından önemli ölçüde etkilenmiş olmasıdır (ss.193-194). Bu bağlamda bir diğer ilgi çekici husus da İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin dört kurucu üyesinden ikisinin Kürt olması (Abdullah Cevdet ve İshak Sukutî), 1902'de Paris'te yapılan Jön Türk Kongresi'ne önde gelen Kürt aşiretlerin de temsilci göndermesidir. Keza, Cumhuriyet'in ilk

döneminde İslamcı akımlarla ittifak eden Kürt milliyetçiliğinin tasfiyesi de bu bölümde ele alınan önemli başlıklardan biridir.

"Sol Hareketler" bölümü, Osmanlı'nın son döneminden itibaren sol/sosyalist düşüncenin Ortadoğu'ya girmesiyle başlayıp, Soğuk Savaş'ın sonuna kadar bölge ülkelerinde bir şekilde etkili olan sol hareketlere odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Milliyetçi Arap Sosyalizmi başlığı altında Suriye ve Irak'taki Baas ideolojisi, tafsilatlı ve mukayeseli olarak tartışılmakta, bilhassa Mısır'da Nasır dönemi uygulamalarıyla birlikte milliyetçilik ile sosyalizmin iç içe geçmesinin üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu kısımda, Libya'da Kaddafi'nin cemâhiriye (kitlelerin devleti) adını verdiği kendine özgü otoriter rejiminin yanı sıra İran'daki Sovyet nüfuz sahası ve Tudeh Partisi tecrübesi de ayrıca işlenmektedir.

"Siyonizm" bölümü ise dünyadaki diğer milliyetçilik akımları gibi Fransız Devrimi'nden yakından etkilenen ve asırlarca sahip olduğu dini kimliğinden bir ölçüde sıyrılarak, kendi toprağa-ırka dayalı milliyetçilik anlayışını kurmaya odaklanan Yahudi diasporası içinde, farklı ülkelerde gelişen milliyetçi yaklaşımları incelemektedir. Ardından Filistin'e göç ve 1948'de İsrail Devleti'nin kurulmasıyla birlikte Siyonizm'in devletleşmesi ve İsrail toplumu içinde sol-milliyetçi-dindar kesimlerin güç mücadelesi, bu bölümün ele aldığı diğer başlıklardır. Bu bahiste, Theodor Herzl'in 1896'da kavramsallaştırdığı *Der Judenstaat*'ın, alışılagelenin aksine "Yahudi Devleti" yerine "Yahudilerin Devleti" olarak Türkçeleştirilmesi yönündeki tartışma kayda değer bir katkı olarak dikkat çekmektedir (ss. 308-309).

Kitabın ana gövdesine ilaveten, tamamlayıcı ve bütüncül bakış sunan bir diğer bölümü "Feminizm" üzerine kaleme alınan son makaledir. Küresel Feminist hareketin doğup gelişmesi ve akabinde Ortadoğu'ya yansımalarının izah edildiği bu bölümde Türkiye, İran ve Mısır örnekleri üzerinden bölgesel Feminizm okumaları yapılmakta; bu noktada özellikle İslami Feminizm tartışmaları üzerinde durularak, bu ilgi çekici sentezin bölgeselliği vurgulanmaktadır.

Netice itibariyle, siyasi tarih ve kronolojik anlatılar dışında alternatif bir perspektifle Ortadoğu'yu anlamlandırmaya çalışan bu kıymetli çalışma, dini, milli ve sınıfsal ideolojiler ekseninde bölgeyi yeniden ele almayı önermektedir. Kapsamlı şekilde kaleme alınan ve zaman zaman şaşırtıcı

detaylarla zenginleştirilen bu kimlik ve ideoloji temelli eser; Ortadoğu okuyucuları ve öğrencileri için, giriş bölümünde değinilen İngilizce/Türkçe literatürdeki klasik tarih, siyaset ve sosyoloji kaynaklarının yanında yer almayı hak edecek kıymette bir başvuru kaynağı olmayı vâdetmektedir.

Kitap İncelemesi / Book Review

Çağdaş İslam Düşüncesinin Sorunları: Hasan Hanefi, Abdulvehab Messiri, Muhammed Abid Cabiri, Raşid Gannuşi

Çev. İslam Özkan, 1. Baskı, İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2017, 144 sayfa

Değerlendiren: Ayşenur Hazar[*]

İslam topluluklarının entelektüel ve fikri üretiminde 1960'lı yıllar, yeni bir dil ve paradigma açısından kurucu nitelikte görülür. Nitekim çağdaş Arap düşüncesine dair eserlerin birçoğunda 1967 Arap-İsrail Savaşı bir sınır çizgisi mukabilindedir. Filistin topraklarının işgali, İsrail devletinin kuruluşu ve Arap-İsrail savaşlarında alınan yenilgilerle birlikte sömürge-sonrası Arap devletlerinin nominal bir özgürlükte sınırlı kalan uygulamaları derin bir hayal kırıklığı, öfke ve hınca yol açtığı gibi entelektüel üretimde daha incelmiş bir eleştiriyi de dolaşıma sokmuştur. Bu bağlamda hakkı teslim edilmesi gereken dört Arap düşünürün yazılarından derlenen *Çağdaş İslam Düşüncesinin Sorunları* başlıklı eser, literatüre önemli bir katkı sağlar niteliktedir. İslam Özkan'ın çevirisini üstendiği eserde, Hasan Hanefi'nin "Yeni Medeniyet Projesi Geçmiş, Şimdi ve Gelecek", "Direniş Kültürü", "Kültür, Siyaset ve Medya" ile "Liberalizm Mısır'da Başarılı Olamadı" başlıklı dört; Muhammed Abid Cabiri'nin "Liberalizm Fas'ta Başarılı Oldu" başlıklı bir; Abdulvehab Messiri'nin "İdeoloji ve Söze Dair" ile "Yeni İslami Söylemin Yapı Taşları" başlıklı iki; Raşid Gannuşi'nin "İslam ve Laiklik" ile "İslam ne zaman çözüm olur?" başlıklı iki yazısı olmak üzere toplamda dokuz makale yer almaktadır.

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Eserde ilk olarak Mısırlı düşünür Hasan Hanefi'nin Arap-İslam medeniyeti projesini üç tarihsel düzlemde analiz ettiği "Yeni Medeniyet Projesi Geçmiş, Şimdi ve Gelecek" başlıklı makalesine yer verilir. Medeniyet projesinin geçmişine dair değerlendirmelerinde Hanefi, İslami ilimlerin teşekkülünün tamamlandığı ve İslam medeniyetinin bilim, sanat ve düşünce medeniyetine dönüştüğü ilk beş yüz yıllık süreci yaratıcılığın zirvesi olarak yorumlar ve düşüşü Gazali'nin "akli ilimlere saldırısı", Eşariliğin iktidar ideolojisine dönüşmesi ve tasavvufun yükselişi ile başlatır. Medeniyet projesinin şimdisini ise son iki yüz yıllık süreçte yaşanılanlar üzerinden izah eder. Hanefi'ye göre, ezilmişlik, geri kalmışlık, emperyalizm ve hegemonya gibi iç ve dış meydan okumaların hakim olduğu bu süreçte medeniyet projesinin hedefleri ıslahatçı, liberal ve laik düşünce kalemleri tarafından yeniden belirlenmiş; fakat teorideki çoğulculuk zamanla korunamayıp Selefilik ve laiklik gibi iki uçta kutuplaşmıştır. Hanefi, medeniyet projesini çıkmaza sokan bu kutuplaşmanın giderilmesini gelecek hedeflerine önceler ve buradan hareketle bugünün özgür dünyasını kuşatacak yeni bir tevhid projesi ile yeryüzündeki bütün ilahları dışlayan bir özgürlük teorisi oluşturulmasını önerir.

Hanefi, muhtemelen Filistin'deki ikinci intifada sürecinde kaleme aldığı "Direniş Kültürü" başlıklı makalesi ile bahsini ettiği özgürlük teorisine kaynaklık edecek direniş kültürünü irdeler. "İç ve dış düşmanlara teslimiyet yerine direniş kültürü üzerine bina edilmiş, halk hareketlerini canlandıracak, toplulukları dinamize edecek ulusal bir kültürün yeniden yapılandırılması mümkün müdür?" (s. 60) sorusu ile öncelikle direniş felsefesinin imkanını sorgulayan Hanefi, müspet bir cevap için iki yol önerir: Arap acziyetinin nedenlerini kavramak ve direnişin kadim kültürdeki yerini tespit etmek. Hanefi, Arap acziyetinin nedenlerini Arap-İsrail savaşlarının yenilgisinin oluşturduğu kompleks, Arap rejimlerinin meşruiyet tesisinde dışa olan bağımlılığı, halkın siyasi katılımdan uzak kalması, Araplar arasındaki dayanışmanın zayıflaması ve siyasi hayalin olmayışı şeklinde sıralar. Direnişin kadim kültürdeki yerini ise farklı ekol ve düşünce sistemleri arasında bir karşılaştırmaya giderek tespit eder. Bu bağlamda Eşari ve hulul yanlısı uluhiyet anlayışlarını, Murcie ve Mutezile'deki amel-iman ilişkisini, Sünni piramidal dünya tasavvuru ile Şia'nın yatay dünya tasavvurunu, nassın literal yorumu ile vakıayı nassa önceleyen yorumu karşılaştıran Hanefi, karşılaştırmaların ikinci öğesinin lehine bir tavır alarak kadim kültürel mi-

rasın direniş ve devrim için gerekli tüm dinamikleri içerdiğini vurgular ve entelektüelleri "düşünce silahıyla" fiili direnişe destek olmaya davet eder.

Hanefi, direniş ve özgürleşme için kültüre atfettiği rolü, "Kültür, Siyaset ve Medya" başlıklı yazısı ile biraz daha somutlaştırır. "Bizim ulusal bilincimizde siyaset kültürdür, kültür de siyaset" (s. 112) söylemi ile kültür ve siyasetin ayrılmazlığını savunan Hanefi, düşünsel kaygılar ile siyasi kaygılar arasında bir fark olmadığını vurgulayarak meseleyi medya ile ilişkilendirir. Hanefi'ye göre Arap/İslam coğrafyasındaki sorunların çözümünde gerekli olan ulusal diyalog ve mutabakatın sağlanması için medya kritik bir öneme sahiptir ve kültürle siyaseti kendi bünyesinde toplamayı başaran ve düşünsel kaygıları ulusal kaygılarla harmanlamayı becerebilen entelektüeller eliyle ikinci bir Arap/İslam uyanışını başlatabilir.

Hanefi'nin "Liberalizm Mısır'da Başarılı Olamadı," ve Faslı Muhammed Abid el-Cabiri'nin "Liberalizm Fas'ta Başarılı Oldu" başlıklı yazıları ise iki düşünür arasında 1980'li yıllarda İslam-laiklik, liberalizm, gelenek ve modernlik gibi konular üzerinden dönen tartışmanın kısa bir bölümünü oluşturur. Liberalizmin Mısır'daki serüvenini analiz eden Hanefi'ye göre liberalizm Mısır'da modern ulus devletin kurulması, bağımsız milli ruhun oluşturulması ve milli devrimlerin yapılmasına öncülük etse de kendine ait olmayan topraklara ekilmişçesine kök salamamış ve muhalefetin boğulması, partilerin yolsuzluğu, azınlığın çoğunluğa tahakkümü ve sermayenin yönetime engel olması gibi unsurlarla özdeşleşerek hızla zıddına dönüşmüştür. Böylelikle, liberalizmin Mısır'da başarısız olduğunu ilan etmiş olan Hanefi, başarısızlığın faturasını -onu imkansız kılacak tarihsel nedenler olarak nitelendirdiği- Eşariliğin iktidar anlayışı ile sufi teslimiyet anlayışına keser. Hanefi'ye cevap niteliğinde yazdığı yazısında Cabiri, aynı tarihsel nedenlerin varlığına rağmen liberalizmin Fas'ta başarılı olduğunu vurgular ve neden olarak Fas'ta selefilikle modernlik arasında keskin bir çatışmanın yaşanmamış olmasını gösterir. Cabiri, liberalizmin İslam dünyasındaki genel başarısızlığına dair tespitlerinde ise Hanefi ile ters düşer. Mağrip'in liberal tecrübeyi Eşari ideolojinin egemenliği altında yaşamış olduğuna dikkat çeken Cabiri, herhangi bir mezhep ya da dinin istibdadın kaynağı olamayacağını savunur. Cabiri'ye göre, başarısızlığın asıl nedeni dışarıdan kaynaklı yayılmacı emperyalizmdir. Nitekim "emperyalist Avrupa'nın müdahalesi olmasaydı, Mısır'da Muhammet Ali'nin reformlarının akıbeti farklı olduğu gibi liberal tecrübenin mecrası da farklı

olurdu. Bu farklı akıbet de muhtemelen Eşari mezhebiyle birlikte gerçekleşecekti" (s. 57).

Mısırlı düşünür Abdulvehab Messiri ideolojilerin Arap halkları tarihindeki akıbetindense bizzat ideoloji sözcüğünü tartışmaya açar. "İdeoloji ve Söze Dair" başlıklı yazısında Messiri, isim merkezli Hint-Avrupa dillerine ait bir kelime olarak ideolojinin fiil merkezli bir dil olan Arapça ile uyuşmadığına dikkat çeker ve kullanılmamasını öğütler. Çünkü düşüncenin yaşayan pratik ve bilinçle ilişkisi açısından ideoloji sözcüğü Araplara dair vakıayı gözlemlemede ve eyleme dönüştürmede yetersiz kalır. Bu bağlamda Arap dilinin fiil ile düşünmeyi öncelediğini vurgulayan Messiri, alternatif olarak ise "kale" (dedi) kelimesini ve türevlerini önerir. Nitekim Messiri'ye göre kale (dedi) ve türevleri "düşünme ve açıklama sürecinden neşet eden geniş insani bir faaliyete işaret etmektedir" (s. 88). Böylelikle Messiri, Müslüman yaratıcılığının merkezine Arap dilini yerleştirmiş olur.

Messiri, bir diğer makalesi "Yeni İslami Söylemin Yapı Taşları" ile bu kez yeni İslami söylemin niteliklerini ele alır. Messiri, 1960'ların ortalarına tarihlendirdiği yeni İslami söylemi, emperyalizm ve modernleşme tecrübesine cevap olarak 19. yüzyılda ortaya çıkan İslami söylemden Batı'ya yönelik tavrı üzerinden ayırır. Messiri'ye göre ilk ıslah çağrısında bulunanlar Batı medeniyetinin farklı bir aşamasına şahit olduklarından Batı'ya yönelik müspet bir algı içerisinde olup uyarlamacı ve ilerlemeciydi. Oysa yeni İslami söylemin taşıyıcıları, Batı medeniyetinin krizi ve eleştirisinin netleştiği bir aşamanın tanıkları olarak daha eleştirel ve üretken olmuşlardır. Messiri, bu ayırıcı vasfın yanında yeni İslami söylemin birçok özelliğini sıralar. Messiri'ye göre yeni İslami söylem, özür dileyici veya savunmacı olmayıp Batılı sistemler ile eleştirel bir etkileşim içine girer ve vakıanın ortaya çıkardığı sorunlar karşısında hazır cevaplar ile yetinmez; Batı'nın evrenselliğini reddettiği gibi sosyal bilimlerin de evrensel olduğunu düşünmez; ayrıca Batılı sözcüklerin içeriklerinin sadece dilsel olmadığının farkındadır.

Tunuslu düşünür ve siyasetçi Raşid Gannuşi ise "İslam ve Laiklik" ile "İslam ne zaman çözüm olur?" başlıklı yazılarıyla çağdaş İslam düşüncesinin en tartışmalı konularından birini ele alır. İslam-laiklik ilişkisine dair analizlerinde Gannuşi laikliğin esasında Batı'da krallar ve din adamları arasındaki kadim çatışmanın oluşturduğu sorunlar karşısında aklı tüm vesayetlerden özgürleştirmek ve önündeki engelleri kaldırmak için sunulan

bir dizi pratik çözümü temsil ettiğini belirtir ve siyasi alanla dini alanı ayıran bu tür (kısmi) laikliğin İslam'daki ibadetler ve muamelat ayrımı ile uyumlu olduğunu savunur. İslam tarihinde devletin tarafsızlığı ve din özgürlüğü açısından Avrupa'nın çok ötesinde bir tecrübenin yaşanmış olmasını da bu ayrıma bağlar. Bununla birlikte Gannuşi, laiklik meselesinin bugünün dünyası açısından rahatsız edici tarafını da göz ardı etmez. Gannuşi'ye göre laiklik, başlangıcındaki akıl özgürlüğü ve dinle devleti birbirinden ayırma noktasındaki pratik çözümü aşarak dini yok sayan felsefi bir düşünüş haline gelmiş ve kutsalı her türlü siyasi/toplumsal faaliyetten uzaklaştıran kapsamlı laiklik seviyesine ulaşmıştır. Laikliğin Batı'da pratik bir çözüm olarak ortaya çıktıktan sonra bu pratikliği aşan radikal bir felsefeye dönüşmesi, Gannuşi'yi bir çözüm olarak İslam'ın tatbikinde daha temkinli olmaya yönlendirir ve "İslam ne zaman çözüm olur?" sorusu üzerinden görüşlerini detaylandırır. Gannuşi'ye göre tarihsel tecrübe, "çözüm İslamdır" gibi kutsal bir slogana sahip olmanın iktidara gelmek için yeterli olmadığını İslamcılara göstermiştir. Zira siyasi alanda rekabet eden herkes sloganıyla değil, insanlara gösterdiği ilgi ve sevgiyle değerlendirilir. Dolayısıyla İslam'ın ne zaman çözüm olabileceği, İslami hareketin birtakım sorunların çözümü konusunda gösterdiği çaba ile ilişkilidir. Bu bağlamda çözümü için çaba gerektiren başlıca sorunlar, İslam toplumlarına yönelik uluslararası saldırılar, ümmetin bölünmesi, istibdad, yolsuzluk ve dışlayıcılıktır.

Çağdaş İslam düşüncesinin dört farklı temsilcisinin İslam toplulukları ve düşüncesine dair analizlerine yer verildiği eserin, Türk okuyucuyu İslam toplumlarının sorunları ve çözüm yolları konusunda farklı bakış açıları ile tanıştırması veya okuyucunun aşinalığını artırması değerli bir katkıdır. Düşünce tarihine karşılaştırmalı bir perspektiften ilgi duyan okuyucular için diğer üç düşünüre göre eserleri ve düşünceleri ülkemizde daha az bilinen Abdulvehab Messiri'ye eserde yer verilmesi bu katkıyı daha da anlamlı kılabilir. Bununla birlikte fark edilir bazı eksikliklere de değinmek gerekir. Öncelikle seçilen yazıların asıl yayın tarihi ve mecrası bilgisine yer verilmemesi anlam-bağlam ilişkisi açısından okuyucuyu yorabilir. Yazının kaleme alındığı tarihin bilinmesi ilgili tarihsel bağlama dair olgu ve söylemler hakkında da fikir verebileceğinden yazarın meramı da daha kolay anlaşılacaktır. Nitekim Hasan Hanefi'nin muhtemelen Filistin'deki ikinci intifada sürecinde kaleme aldığı "Direniş Kültürü" başlıklı yazısındaki sert ve talepkar dil ancak böyle bir ön bilginin ışığında anlamlandırılabilir. Bu-

nunla bağlantılı olabilecek bir diğer sorun, seçilen yazıların akademik makale ve gazete köşe yazısı gibi nitelik ve üslup açısından eşdeğer olmayan türlerde olmasıdır. Bu okuyucuyu tartışmanın ağırlığı ve akışından koparabileceği gibi yazarların hedef kitlesindeki çeşitliliği de düzleştirebilir. Yine Hanefi'den örnek vermek gerekirse, Hanefi yazılarının halk, entelektüeller ve akademisyenler gibi farklı muhataplara göre kaleme alındığını belirtir. Son olarak üzerinde durulması gereken bir diğer eksiklik, seçilen yazar ve yazılara dair açıklayıcı bir bilgi notu veya editoryal bir takdimin olmamasıdır. Şüphesiz derlemeye konu yazar ve yazıların neden seçildiğine dair bir bilgi okuyucunun işini daha da kolaylaştıracaktır.

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Chicago Atıf ve Kaynakça Yazım Kuralları

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Tek yazarlı,

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(Not: Kitap ismi her üç durumda italik yazılacak; dipnotta yayın yeri, yayınevi ve yayın yılı parantez içinde olacak diğerlerinde parantez kullanılmayacak, sayfa numarası dipnot ve dipnot tekrarında yazılacak ama kaynakçada yazılmayacak)

Dört ve fazla yazarlı,

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(Not: Dipnotta başvurulan kaynağın sayfa numaralarını belirtin. Kaynakçada ise tüm makalenin sayfa aralığını belirtin, yayın (dergi) adı italik yazılacak)

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Not: Atıf veya kaynakça yazımında herhangi bir sorunla karşılaşılması durumunda The Chicago Manuel of Style'ın http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-1.html linkindeki web sayfasındaki veriler esas alınmalıdır.

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