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Terrorist Attacks in Europe and Turkey: Securitization of Turkey in the 8th European Parliament Plenary Debates

Gizem Aliođlu akmak¹, Volkan İşbařaran²

¹Yeditepe University, galioglu@yeditepe.edu.tr,

²Yeditepe University, volkan.isbasaran@yeditepe.edu.tr

Abstract

This article focuses on the discourses of political party groups by analyzing the statements given by the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) about in Turkey the Plenary Sessions about terrorism during the Eight European Parliament. This study argues that during the period between 2014 and 2019, Turkey's otherness has been reinforced and discursively constructed especially by the right-wing populist political party groups. By doing so, we have utilized the Securitization Theory of Copenhagen School as our framework in which security is defined as a product of speech act. The statements from the MEPs were categorized as positive or negative statements. Then, these data were analyzed in detail to see if there are significant differences between the discourses of different political groups in the European Parliament on Turkey.

Keywords: Securitization, Copenhagen School, European Parliament, terrorism, Turkey

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Avrupa ve Türkiye’de Terör Saldırıları: 8. Avrupa Parlamentosu Genel Tartışmalarında Türkiye’nin Güvenlikleştirilmesi

Öz

Bu makale, Avrupa Parlamentosu (MEP) üyelerinin Sekizinci Avrupa Parlamentosu’ndaki terörizmle ilgili Genel Oturumlarda Türkiye hakkındaki açıklamalarını analiz ederek siyasi parti gruplarının söylemlerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışma, 2014-2019 yılları arasında Türkiye’nin ötekiliğinin özellikle sağcı popülist siyasi parti grupları tarafından vurgulandığını ve söylemsel olarak inşa edildiğini savunuyor. Bundan dolayı, güvenliğin bir konuşma eylemi ürünü olarak tanımlandığı Kopenhag Okulu Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi’ni çerçevemiz olarak kullandık. Avrupa Parlamentosu üyelerinin ifadeleri, olumlu ya da olumsuz ifadeler olarak kategorize edildi. Ardından, Avrupa Parlamentosu’ndaki farklı siyasi grupların söylemleri arasında önemli farklılıklar olup olmadığını görmek için bu veriler ayrıntılı olarak analiz edildi.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlikleştirme, Kopenhag Okulu, Avrupa Parlamentosu, terörizm, Türkiye

1. Introduction

The period between 2014 and 2019 was an era where terrorism became one of the central issues for the European Union (EU) and Turkey. The dozens of terrorist attacks in both Turkey and the European Union member states claimed many lives. According to the Global Terrorism Index that published in 2016, “in 2015 Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, and Turkey recorded the most deaths from terrorism in a single year since 2000”. In Turkey - the country with the largest increase in the attacks - the attacks of ISIL, and PKK terrorist organizations claimed many lives. In 2014, terrorist attacks killed 20 people whereas in 2015 claimed 337 lives in Turkey (Global Terrorism Index 2016, 2016). The rise in terrorist attacks and the threat of terrorism led to more debates about terrorism in the European Parliament. In the 7th European Parliament term (2009-2014) there were only 3 debates on terrorism, however, this number increased to 19 in the 8th European Parliament term (2014-2019).

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Scholars who delved in theorizing terrorism propose us different frameworks to understand the historical evolution of the concept. David C. Rapoport, in his 2004 article entitled “Four Waves of Modern Terrorism”, argues that there are four waves of terrorism in history, these are anarchist wave, anti-colonial wave, the new left wave and the religious wave (2004). Anthony N. Celso contributes the theory by claiming that with the rise of the Islamic State and Boko Haram, we are entering a fifth wave called “Jihadist” terrorism in the second half of 2010s (2015). This fifth wave overlaps with the time period of the 8th European Parliament term (2014-19) which is scrutinized in this research.

Also, in this period, Turkey’s accession process to become an EU member came to a halt due to several reasons. In 2005, Turkey and EU began accession negotiations. Until today, 16 chapters are opened whereas one chapter is temporarily closed (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). In 2009, a public survey demonstrated that 55% of the EU citizens were against Turkey’s membership which is the largest opposition to any prospective EU member (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2013, p. 38).

According to Kaya, “the domestic political, societal, legal and cultural changes in Turkey, and the domestic issues within the EU” played a significant role in the transformation of Turkey-EU relations (2018, p. 2). Especially since 2007, the privileged partnership model -which is less than full membership- was suggested to Turkey instead of full membership. Türkeş-Kılıç, in her paper which analyzes the debates in the European Parliament, argues that the arguments supporting the privileged partnership are used by the members of center-right and right-wing political parties (2019, p. 19). In 2016, European Parliament voted to freeze EU accession talks with Turkey (European Parliament, 2016). According to Saatçioğlu, since the European Parliament resolution of July 2017 that suggests suspending the accession negotiations with Turkey, Turkey-EU relations have shifted through a more functional partnership (Saatçioğlu, 2019, p. 2).

Given this political environment, the aim of this research is to analyze how Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) constructed discourse on Turkey during the European Parliament plenary debates related to terrorism. By using Copenhagen School’s securitization theory as a framework, we aim to scrutinize on the statements of MEP’s of the European Parliament and analyze how they constructed Turkey’s identity as a security threat. According to Wæver, the basis of state security is sovereignty, whereas the foundation for societal security is the identity (Wæver, 1995, p. 60). By relying upon his approach, we argue that during a period with a high degree of threat perception due to the extensive terrorist attacks from the Islamist extremist groups, Turkey’s identity as a predominantly Muslim country is more likely to be securitized. By analyzing the statements from different political groups we try to observe whether there is a linkage between the political ideology and securitization of Turkey’s identity. We also argue that right-wing populist political groups who are traditionally opposing culturally different others are more prone to the securitization of Turkey and emphasizing her otherness.

In the first part of the research, the European Parliament and the Political Party Groups are explained. In the second part, terrorist attacks in both the EU and Turkey are summarized. According to Europol, there

has been a surge of terrorist violence in European Union since 2014 (Europol, 2019). While gathering the statistics for the terrorist attacks between 2014 and 2019 in EU and Turkey, only the attacks which have resulted in a minimum of five casualties -excluding the deaths of the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks- are included.

In this research, 1722 debates in the period of “Eight European Parliament” between 2014 elections and 2019 elections are analyzed. To limit the scope of the research to the plenary debates about terrorism, out of these 1722 plenary debates, only the debates which have the word “terror”, “terrorism”, “terrorist” in the title are included. There have been 19 debates which have the word “Terror” in the title, and Turkey has been mentioned by MEPs in 10 of these debates. The research only takes the statements made by MEPs into account since the aim is to analyze the discourse of the Parliament members. The President, Members of Council, Members of Commission are not included because they represent the European Union instead and not Political Party groups. European Parliament’s Plenary Debates website is used for the source of the statements of the MEPs (European Parliament, 2020). For the statements in English, Verbatim reports are used. For statements in other languages, translations in the videos are considered.

After gathering the statements on Turkey, these statements are classified according to most commonly used patterns. For example, statements that imply that “Turkey provides a free passage to immigrants” are classified under the same group. These statements are then later coded as “positive” or “negative” statements. Neutral statements, such as reports or summaries are not included. The statements which emphasize the importance of the cooperation between EU and Turkey, and the condolences given by MEPs to the victims in Turkey are categorized as positive as they symbolize empathy towards Turkey. The statements which accuse, criticize Turkey and focus on “Turkey’s otherness” are classified as negative statements towards Turkey. Next, we conducted discourse analysis, a research technique involves in the analysis of language in a particular context. While analyzing the language, the encircling political, economic, and social circumstances should be taken into

account. Fairclough and Wodak explain the linkage between the context and the discourses as below:

Discourse is not produced without context and cannot be understood without taking context into consideration ... Discourses are always connected to other discourses which were produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and subsequently (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997).

2. Copenhagen School and the Securitization Theory: The Societal Sector

Securitization theory has attracted significant attention since it was first initiated by the so-called 'Copenhagen School' (Leonard & Kaunert, 2011, p. 57). Wæver, in 1995, inducted an alternative understanding to the concept of security by broadening its scope beyond the military threats. According to Wæver, "it is possible that any sector, at any particular time, might be the most important focus for concerns about threats, vulnerabilities, and defense" (1995, p. 49). In other words, no issue is a security problem by nature. They become security concerns when people label them as security issues. Actors such as state officials or communities securitize issues through their speeches and statements. An issue is securitized when it is posited as an existential threat that requires emergency measures and actions outside the normal bounds of the political procedure (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 23-24). The purpose of the securitization studies is to explain "who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions" (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 32). Wæver proposed a reconceptualization of the notion of security by "a duality of state security and societal security" (Wæver, 1995, p. 60). According to him, the foundation of state security is sovereignty; where as the basis for societal security is the identity. In both usages, the main concern is survival. The societal sector is related to all kinds of problems such as immigration, integration, language and culture change and famine that can harm the 'we' feeling of societies. (Akgül-Açıkçeşme, 2011, p. 59).

Wæver stated that this duality emerged as a result of the changing nature of the modern state system in which political authority “dispersed across multiple levels”. The emergence of overlapping authorities and weakened territorial state resulted in the increasing salience of “societal (in) security” (Wæver, 1995, p. 60). Wæver argued that due to the internationalization of Europeanization, significant groups within a society feel threatened. In other words, developments such as European integration, immigration, and loosening restrictions for border controls lead to a perception of threatened identities. As a result of this perceived threat due to internationalization or Europeanization, the existing identities gain strength, thus culture becomes a security issue (Wæver, 1995, p. 60). Türkeş-Kılıç in her paper which examines the securitization of international migration in the European Neighborhood Policy within the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School argues that after the remarkable increase in the number of refugees in 2015, the “refugee crisis” expression is widely used in the statements. Designating the word “crisis” characterizes immigration as a security threat and criminalizes the immigrants. (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2018, p. 16)

Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, in their book published in 1998, discussed the three main approaches that make up the core of the Copenhagen School - securitization, sectoral analysis, and regional security complexes. In their chapter upon the societal sector, they elaborate on whether societal security issues produce regionalizing dynamics. They analyze the linkages between the patterns and regions focusing on the different regions in the world. They underline “the historically conditioned religious suspicion” among Europeans towards the Middle East (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 132).

This article adopts his notion of “societal insecurity” as a framework to analyze the debates on terrorism and the image of Turkey in the 8th European Parliament. We aim to analyze societal insecurity towards Turkey by focusing on discourses of the European Parliament, because, its members are directly elected by the voters in the member states and functions as a forum for political debates (European Parliament, n.d.). Aydın-Düzgüt argues that the discourses of the EU bodies such as the

European Parliament (EP) also should be considered to examine and understand the various junctions of European culture built up in the EU discourse (2015, p. 155).


3. The Fifth Wave of Terrorism and Terrorist Attacks in Europe and in Turkey (2014-2019)

The period between 2014 and 2019 overlaps with the Anthony N. Celso's classification of the "fifth wave of terrorism" which he claims to be Jihadist (2015). The term Jihadist is also adopted by the European states given that the majority of verdicts in the EU Member States concerned jihadist terrorism confirming a trend that started in 2015 (Europol, 2019).

When the terrorist attacks in both the EU and Turkey considered, only the attacks which have resulted in five casualties have been included in this research. In total, 37 incidents are included in the analysis.¹ Indeed, all attacks took place in the EU and Turkey between years 2014 and 2018 with a minimum of five casualties. In total, the deadliest year was 2016 with 748 deaths. With 147 casualties, the deadliest year for EU was 2015, while with 618 casualties; the deadliest year for Turkey was 2016. In total, most attacks were carried out in 2016 where there were 23 attacks in total. Six terrorist organizations were the perpetrators of these attacks.

¹The terrorist deaths are not counted as casualties.

Table 1: Number of terrorist attacks in the EU and Turkey²



3.1. Terrorist Attacks in the European Union

In this research, 10 attacks in EU member countries were included. All of these attacks were Jihadist attacks. Seven of them were made by Jihadist terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. Three of them were made by “Jihadist lone wolves”. Attacks by jihadist terrorists have followed three patterns: indiscriminate killings (London, March and June 2017; and Barcelona, August 2017); attacks on symbols of Western lifestyle (Manchester, May 2017); and attacks on symbols of authority (Paris, February, June and August 2017) (Europol, 2018, p. 5).

² The statistics for the terrorist attacks have been gathered from numerous news articles.

Table 2: List of terrorist attacks in the European Union³

Date	Place	Casualties	Perpetrator
7-9 January 2015	Paris, France	17	Al-Qaeda
13 November 2015	Paris, France	130	Islamic State
22 March 2016	Brussels, Belgium	32	Islamic State
14 July 2016	Nice, France	86	Islamic State
19 December 2016	Berlin, Germany	12	Islamic State
22 March 2017	London, UK	5	Khalid Masood
7 April 2017	Stockholm, Sweden	5	Rakhmat Akilov
22 May 2017	Manchester, UK	22	Salman Abedi
3 June 2017	London, UK	8	Islamic State
16-21 August 2017	Barcelona, Spain	16	Islamic State

3.2. Terrorist Attacks in Turkey

In this research, 27 attacks in Turkey between 2014 and 2019 are included. These attacks were committed by four different terrorist organizations. These are the *Islamic State*, *PKK* and *TAK*⁴ and *FETÖ*⁵. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2017) The majority of the target cities for the terrorist attacks are the big cities in Turkey and provinces in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions (Ocal & Yıldırım, 2010). Islamic State attacks were mostly in metropolitans or the provinces on the border with Syria. Kurdish insurgent groups PKK and TAK committed the majority of terrorist attacks. PKK attacks were in Southeast Turkey while TAK attacks also included metropolitan cities outside Southeast Turkey.

³ The statistics for the terrorist attacks have been gathered from numerous news articles.

⁴ Kurdish separatist groups which aim to create an independent Kurdish state in the Southeast region of Turkey

⁵ A terrorist organization which led a Coup d'état attempt in July 15th 2016

Table 3: List of terrorist attacks in Turkey⁶

Date	Place	Casualties	Perpetrator
5 June 2015	Diyarbakir	5	Islamic State
20 July 2015	şanhurfa	34	Islamic State
19 August 2015	Siirt	8	PKK
6 September 2015	Hakkari	17	PKK
8 September 2015	Igdir	13	PKK
10 October 2015	Ankara	109	Islamic State
12 January 2016	Istanbul	12	Islamic State
13 January 2016	Diyarbakir	6	PKK
17 February 2016	Ankara	29	TAX
18 January-2 October 2016	Kilis	25	Islamic State
13 March 2016	Ankara	38	TAX
31 March 2016	Diyarbakir	7	PKK
7 June 2016	Istanbul	5	TAX
8 June 2016	Mardin	5	TAX
28 June 2016	Istanbul	45	Islamic State
15 July 2016	Istanbul, Ankara	249	FETO
29 July 2016	Hakkari	8	PKK
1 August 2016	Bingol	7	TAX
10 August 2016	Diyarbakir	5	TAX
16 August 2016	Diyarbakir	7	PKK
18 August 2016	Elazig	5	TAX
20 August 2016	Gaziantep	56	Islamic State
26 August 2016	şimak	11	TAX
5 November 2016	Diyarbakir	12	TAX
10 December 2016	Istanbul	46	Islamic State
17 December 2016	Kayseri	15	TAX
1 January 2017	Istanbul	39	Islamic State

⁶ The statistics for the terrorist attacks have been gathered from numerous news articles.

4. The Analysis of Discourses on Turkey in The 8th European Parliament: The Debates on Terrorism


4.1. Political Groups and Parties in the European Parliament

European Parliament began as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. It is one of the seven institutions of the European Union. European Parliament and Council of the European Union make up the legislative body of the European Union. Since 1979, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are directly elected by EU citizens older than 18 every five years. The parliamentary term between the elections in 2014 and 2019 is called the Eighth European Parliament (European Parliament, 2020). The Members of the European Parliament do not represent their own countries in the European Parliament instead they represent their own supranational political party group. They are not organized by nationality but political affiliation (European Parliament, 2020). Political party groups in the European Parliament have a variety of political positions and ideologies. In the 8th European Parliament, there were 8 political party groups. In addition to these 8 political party groups, there are also Non-Inscribed MEPs. These members sit in the European Parliament independent of a political party group. To form a political group, at least 25 Members are needed.

Table 4: Political Party Groups in the 8th European Parliament

Party Group	Ideology	MEPs
EPP	Conservatism, Christian Democracy, Pro-Europeanism	217
S&D	Social Democracy, Pro-Europeanism	189
ECR	Conservatism, Right-wing Populism, Euroscepticism	74
ALDE	Liberalism, Pro-Europeanism	68
GUE/NGL	Democratic Socialism, Soft Euroscepticism	52
Greens/EFA	Green politics. Minority politics, Pro-Europeanism	51
EFDD	Euroscepticism, Right-wing populism	45
ENF	Nationalism, Euroscepticism, Right-wing populism	37
NI	Independents	18

Table 5: Number of MEPs from each Political Party Group. The colors of the columns represent the official colors of the political party groups.




In the 8th European Parliament period between 2014 and 2019, there have been 1722 plenary debates. Out of the 1722 plenary debates, 19 of them included the word “Terror” in the title.

Table 6: List of all the debates which include the word “Terror” in the title. The debates where Turkey was mentioned are highlighted.

Number	Debate Date	Debate Title
1	28/01/2015	Anti-terrorism measures
2	11/03/2015	Relations between the EU and the League of Arab States and cooperation in countering terrorism
3	25/03/2015	Recent terrorist attacks in Tunisia
4	29/04/2015	Persecution of the Christians around the world, in relation to the killing of students in Kenya by terror group Al-Shabaab
5	19/05/2015	Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing - Information accompanying transfers of funds (debate)
6	08/06/2015	Recent terrorist attacks
7	24/11/2015	Prevention of radicalization and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organizations
8	25/11/2015	Recent terrorist attacks in Paris
9	14/12/2015	Protection of victims of terrorism
10	21/01/2016	Increased terrorism threat
11	12/04/2016	Counterterrorism following the recent terrorist attacks
12	08/06/2016	Improving data sharing and the use of European information systems and databases in the fight against serious transnational crime and terrorism
13	22/06/2016	Preventing radicalization leading to violent extremism and terrorism
14	14/12/2016	Europol data breach on terrorism investigation files
15	15/02/2017	Combating terrorism
16	16/11/2017	Terrorist attacks in Somalia
17	01/03/2018	Cutting the sources of income for Jihadists - targeting the financing of terrorism
18	18/04/2018	Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing
19	11/12/2018	Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on Terrorism

Out of these 19 debates, Turkey was mentioned in 10 debates. In this research, all of the statements made by MEPs about Turkey have been collected. They were categorized into 14 different titles. Later, they were categorized as “positive” and “negative” statements, 2 of them being positive and 12 of them being negative. Out of the 79 statements in total, 13 have been positive and 66 have been negative statements. In percentage, out of the entire statements, %16.5 of them has been positive and %83.5 of them has been negative.

Table 7: Number of positive and negative statements towards Turkey



4.2. Positive Statements

During the debates, positive statements towards Turkey came from MEPs of 4 parties. These parties were center-left/ left-wing parties (S&D and GUE/NGL) and center/center-right parties (ALDE and EPP). Three of those four party groups are Pro-European parties who make up the Commission (S&D, ALDE, and EPP). There were no positive statements from MEPs of Greens/EF, NI and right-wing parties (ECR, EFDD, and ENF). Positive statements were about two themes and first one was about increasing European Union-Turkey cooperation.

For example, PPE member Zver by emphasizing the significance of cooperation with Turkey stated that;

“In an effective fight against terrorism, we need to improve cooperation with third countries, not only with the US and Canada, but also with Turkey, the countries of North Africa and the Middle East.”- Milan Zver (PPE) (European Parliament, 2016)

Another PPE member Zdechovsky points out the need for cooperation with third parties by arguing that;

“Not only within the European Union itself, but also in cooperation with third countries. Connect and work with countries in Africa, work with Turkey, work with other states to fight radicalization, extremism and violence.” - Tomas Zdechovsky (PPE) (European Parliament, 2016)

Even though aforementioned statements classified as positive statements, it should be noted that both statements regard Turkey not as a candidate country but an outsider who belongs to outer circle of the EU. The second theme of the positive statements was the condolences to the victims of terrorist attacks in Turkey. Hadjigeorgiou, a member of GUE/NGL condemns the terrorist attacks in Turkey by stating;

“Madam President, first of all I want to condemn most strongly all the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Europe and Turkey. There can be no excuse for them.” - Takis Hadjigeorgiou (GUE / NGL) (European Parliament, 2018)

Fajon, a member of S&D extends her condolences and messages of solidarity by stating;


“I express my sincere condolences to all the victims, wounded and sympathy with the victims. Not only with those in Belgium, but with everyone in Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and elsewhere.”Tanja Fajon (S&D) (European Parliament, 2016)

Table 8: List of positive statements about Turkey

	GUE/NGL	S&G	Greens/EF	ALDE	EPP	ECR	EDD	ENF	NI	Total
EU should cooperate with Turkey	2	1	-	3	3	-	-	-	-	9
Condolences to victims of terrorism in Turkey	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4
Total	3	2	0	5	3	0	0	0	0	13

Among the 14 positive statements, 9 of them were about *increasing the EU-Turkey cooperation* and 4 of them were *condolences for victims of terrorist attacks in Turkey*.

Table 9: Comparison of numbers of positive statements towards Turkey



4.3. Negative Statements

Except for Greens/EF, there were negative statements about Turkey made by MEPs from every political party group. Out of the 66 negative statements, 48 of these statements, a majority of them, were made by MEPs from Eurosceptic, right-wing party groups, with ECR MEPs making 28 of these statements. These 66 statements fit into 12 categories.

Table 10: List of negative statements about Turkey

		GUE/NGL	S&D	Greens/EF	ALDE	EPP	ECR	EFDD	ENF	NI	Total
1	Turkey ignores Jihadists	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	3
2	Turkey supports Jihadists	2	4	-	-	-	16	-	1	3	26
3	Turkey allows terrorists to pass through her border to Syria and/or EU.	1	2		2	3	1	1			10
4	Turkey should be held accountable	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	-	6
5	There are terrorists of Turkish origin	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
6	Immigration from Turkey should stop								1	2	3
7	Turkey uses Counter-Terrorism as an excuse to repress human rights				1						1
8	Turkey threatens the EU	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
9	Turkey prefers to fight Kurds rather than ISIS	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3
10	Turkey destabilizes Syria	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3
11	Turkey shouldn't be a member of the EU	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	5
12	Turkey shouldn't get funds from the EU	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1		3
	Total	6	6	0	3	3	28	6	7	7	66

Nuttel a member of EFDD group securitize Turkey by arguing as follows;

“We must also deal with the thorny issue of Turkey. It is the same Turkey which turns a blind eye to extremist Muslims hopping over the border to fight in Syria for ISIS. It is the same Turkey which idly stood by and did almost nothing whilst the border town of Kobane was under attack. It is the same Turkey which has received nearly EUR 1 billion from this place in pre-accession funding, and it is the same Turkey that all of the British political parties, except my own, want in the European Union.” Paul Nuttall (EFDD) (European Parliament, 2015)

With his speech he portrays Turkey as country that turned a blind eye to Islamist terrorist organizations. By emphasizing “it is the same Turkey” he expresses that his skepticism towards Turkey is not something new. As Buzan aptly puts, “the historically conditioned religious suspicion among Europeans towards the Middle East” (Buzan et al., 1998: 132) is evident in this speech. In some of these statements, Turkey’s both demographic structure, which is made up by a Muslim majority population and Turkey’s membership application to EU is mentioned. Graaf with the following speech labels Turkey as “backward Muslim country” and securitize Turkey’s identity on the grounds that Muslim faith poses a threat to the survival of Europe.

“What does the European Commission do? She argues for more immigration from Muslim countries, more immigration from backward cultures, more Turkey. Enough is enough! Schengen must stop, immigration must stop, Islamization must stop. Jihadists out, hate preachers out, terrorists out!” Marcel de Graaff (NI) (European Parliament, 2015)

As Buzan states, an issue is securitized when it is posited as an existential threat that requires emergency measures and actions outside the normal bounds of the political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24). Here, by asking the abolishment of the Schengen zone, the MEP demands an action outside the normal procedures and Turkey’s identity is represented as an existential threat to Europe. Theocharous, a member of ECR group portrays Turkey as a “terrorist state” by her following statement;

“Turkey is not at the forefront of the fight against terrorism, because it is itself a state terrorist. And, unfortunately, Turkey is establishing in European territories, namely in the occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus, mosques of fundamentalists and Islamic schools which are the greenhouses of Islamic terrorism and extremism” Eleni Theoharous (ECR) (European Parliament, 2016).

She securitizes Turkey by emphasizing Turkey’s Islamic identity and associating Islam with violence and terrorism. She rejects the idea of EU’s cooperation with Turkey to fight against terrorism as Turkey has been perceived as a significant threat to Europe.

Some statements were followed up by criticisms towards the European Union itself, and these statements were also made by Eurosceptic political party groups. These criticisms included “Turkey should not be a member of the European Union” or “Turkey should not get money from the European Union”. The following statement of Dzhambazki, a member of ECR group clearly shows the skepticism towards Turkey and its identity.

“Sanctions should be imposed on a country that supports terrorism, such as Turkey; a country that uses European funds; a country that organizes trafficking in human beings; a country that finances, organizes and heals ISIS fighters; a country that threatens neighbors like Bulgaria and Greece, transferring dozens of illegal migrants.” Angel Dzhambazki (ECR) (European Parliament, 2015)

Dzhambazki securitizes Turkey by depicting it as “the country finances ISIS”. Despite the fact that Turkey has suffered from ISIS terrorist attacks severely, it is portrayed as a supporter of ISIS due to the historically suspicion towards its identity as the “other” of Europe. In another speech in below, he openly calls Turkey “as a terrorist organization”. He calls the EU to take an action against Turkey by imposing sanctions.

“A number of European leaders continue to recklessly reject the policies that openly fund, organize and cure terrorist organizations such as Turkey... Countries that finance terrorism that treat and train terrorists should not be paid a ransom, as the European Union has done with

Turkey, but membership talks should be discontinued and sanctions imposed. Those who organize it, such as Saudi Arabia, should be punished with commercial sanctions and not being hypocritically traded with them.” Angel Dzhambazki (ECR) (European Parliament, 2016)

Here, the arguments of Copenhagen School help us to understand how the securitization takes place. Turkey is securitized by being presented as an existential threat to Europe and its collective identity and has to be controlled with extraordinary measures. In the following statement, Dzhambazki presents Turkey as “a threat to all countries of Europe”.

“I have to point out that because of territorial losses and oil trade, an Islamic state is already reoriented to the proliferation of drugs and weapons. These goods mainly come via channels from Africa and Asia. We should note the funding of jihadist groups from the Republic of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. We must put in place firm conditions for ending this funding because it is a direct threat to national security for all countries and Members of the European Parliament.” Angel Dzhambazki (ECR) (European Parliament, 2018)

In the aforementioned statement, Turkey, a candidate state of the EU, is presented as Islamic state involves in drug trafficking and supports jihadists together with Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. Here, there is an attempt for constructing a linkage between Turkey’s identity and terrorism.

Some MEPs claim that Turkey functions as a gateway from Europe to Syria for foreign jihadists. The statements on Turkey’s role during the Syrian Civil War included “Turkey destabilizes Syria” and “Turkey prefers to fight Kurds rather than ISIS”. In the following statement, a member of GUE/NGL, Ernst indirectly claims Turkey’s support for Jihadists.

“Turkey prefers to bomb the PKK rather than Da’esh.” Cornelia Ernst (GUE/NGL) (European Parliament, 2016)

Table 11: Comparison of numbers of negative statements towards Turkey





Table 12: Political party groups and the number of positive and negative statements from MEPs



5. Conclusion

In this study, we adopted the Copenhagen School's securitization theory as a framework to analyze the statements of MEP's in the 8th European Parliament towards Turkey. The period of the eighth EU parliament coincides with the period of intense terrorist attacks in Europe and Turkey by jihadist terrorist groups. The attacks in Europe have facilitated the increase in Islamophobia and the construction of Islam and its followers as a security threat. Turkey who has historically been labeled as Europe's "other" is frequently characterized as a threat to European collective identity by referencing the terrorist activities in this period. Even though Turkey has been one of the most significant victims of the terrorist acts, in the European Parliament discourses, it was presented as "a country harboring terrorists and cooperating with the Islamist terrorist groups. As a part of the securitization of Turkey, "taking measures that would not normally be implemented" was requested by the MEPs.

Terminating accession negotiations with Turkey, the abolishment of the Schengen zone, dismissing the financial support to Turkey has been demanded. It is stated that if these measures are not taken, the Islamization of Europe and the backward Islamic culture would dominate Europe. Thus, Turkey and its identity are presented as a major threat to the European collective identity. Turkey, instead of being recognized as a candidate country to the EU has been portrayed as a country that should be avoided to secure Europe. According to the Copenhagen School, securitizing actors make political choices to construct security threats by discourses. Issues that characterizes as security threats become the priority, thus require extraordinary responses. As a result of the securitization, these exceptional measures can easily be justified and gain public support.

Based on our analysis, we claim that there is a correlation between the political positions of the party groups and their statements towards Turkey. Out of the eight political party groups, three of them are the right-wing populist political party groups; ECR, EFDD, and ENF. We argue that right-wing populist political groups who are traditionally

against “culturally different others” are more prone to the securitization of Turkey and emphasizing its otherness. Except for Greens/EFA, MEPs from every political party group made negative statements about Turkey. When the number of statements is considered, except for ALDE, every political party group made more negative statements than positive statements. Right-wing MEPs did not make any positive statements on Turkey. Center-left, center, and center-right MEPs mentioned Turkey less and their statements included both negative and positive statements. EPP made both negative and positive statements, while ALDE was the only political party group that made more positive statements than the negative ones. Greens/EFA MEPs didn’t make any statements related to Turkey. Since Members of the European Parliament are elected directly, we can argue that the European public opinion on Turkey during the period between 2014 and 2019 have been generally negative.

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Review of Regionalization Process of France's Administrative System: An Institutionalisation Issue¹

Galip Emre Yıldırım¹

¹Yeditepe University gemreyildirim@gmail.com

Abstract

The regionalization, that appears as a modern phenomenon, affects the 21st century public administration. Especially in terms of European nation-states. when the regionalization is implemented because of the local demands by the central administration, in the countries that have a centralized administration like France, this regionalization process would have been executed by the own will of the center. This paper aims to examine the sociological dynamics of the regionalization movement in France. In accordance with this, the regionalization in France is addressed under (the) three different topics from the functioning of the State with the regional governments, the relations between center and periphery, and the articulation between the State and society regarding the political participation, democracy and decentralization. In addition, this paper pursues the historical data related to the regional

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formation, sociological and administrative balance among the elected and the elites, and then the statistics created by the data obtained from French interior ministry. Therewith, to be more contented at expressing the French regionalization movement that states a multidimensional process, the comparison with other European States and several examples are presented.

Keywords: Regionalization, France, Relations between center and periphery, Central and local administration

Fransa İdari Sisteminin Bölgeleşme Sürecine Bir Bakış: Kurumlaşma Sorunu

Öz

Modern bir olgu olarak karşımıza çıkan bölgeselleşme, 21. yy kamu idaresini farklı dinamiklerle etkilemektedir. Özellikle Avrupalı Ulus-Devletler açısından, bölgeselleşme yerelden gelen isteklerle merkezî idare tarafından uygulamaya konulurken, Fransa gibi merkezî idari yapıya sahip olan ülkelerde ise bizzat merkezin kendi isteğiyle bu süreç yürütülmüştür. Bu çalışma, Fransa'daki bölgeselleşme hareketinin sosyolojik dinamiklerini incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu doğrultuda, bölge yönetimleri ile birlikte devletin işlevselliği, merkez-yerel ilişkileri ve katılım, demokrasi ve yerelleşme bakımından devlet-toplum arasındaki ilişkiler olmak üzere, Fransa'daki bölgeselleşme, üç ayrı başlık altında ele alınmıştır. Çalışmada, bölge yönetimlerinin oluşmasına ilişkin tarihi verilere, seçilmişler ile atanmışlar arasındaki idari ve sosyolojik dengelere, yerel katılım noktasında ise Fransız İçişleri Bakanlığı'ndan elde edilen verilerle oluşturulmuş istatistiklere yer verilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, çok boyutlu bir süreci ifade eden Fransa'daki bölgeselleşme hareketinin daha rahat anlaşılabilmesi için diğer Avrupa devletleriyle karşılaştırılma yapılmış ve çeşitli örnekler sunulmuştur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Bölgeselleşme, Fransa, Merkez-Yerel İlişkisi, Merkezî ve Yerel İdare

Introduction

Regionalization in France still reflects an incomplete character in a process that has been going on since 1960. The decentralization reforms that began in the 2000s allow regionalization to be established on a constitutional basis. A committee for the reform of local authorities chaired by Former Prime Minister Eduard Balladur highlights the need to further strengthen the regions in France. To do this, a demographic criterion is added: the average population of the regions should be between 3 and 4 million, and the number of regions should therefore be increased from 22 to 15. The Former President, François Hollande, presents, in an op-ed published in the regional press on 3 June 2014, his territorial reform project, which notably foresees a strengthening of the regions, whose number should decrease from 22 to 14 in metropolitan France and whose responsibilities should increase. However, the law (Article 1) replaced the 22 existing metropolitan regions with 13 regions constituted by the addition of regions without changing the departments that make them up on 1st January, 2016. One of the main purposes of this merging project is to reduce administrative expenditure whereas the report published (September 2019) by the Court of Auditors clearly states that the evaluation of the impact of the State's decisions on local finances must be strengthened and the establishment of the "new regions" on 1st January 2016 has gone smoothly but has not, so far, brought any efficiency gains (Cours des comptes, 2019, p.13). This administrative panorama shows the lack of institutionalization at the regional level in France.

In this case, this paper argues that the main reason for the regionalization in France, which represents one of the most considerable changes in French public administration, is an institutional step to generalize the industrialization and urbanization to the whole country rather than democratic or local participation regulator. It is on this basis that the economic aims are hugely implemented at the beginning of French regionalization as well as at its development. At first, the regionalization has been planned to render the economic objectives effective as a public policy. The regional reform that supposedly remains to be carried out

should not exceed the French capital's roles. By preserving common interests, it aims to restructure France by creating regional capitals. These would become real development hubs, taking with them the regional grouping which would be attached to them (Dischamps, 1970, p.179). However, this phenomenon affects the multidimensional reflexes like center-periphery relations, political participation, etc. In this context, the constitutional review of the French local system reflects the new organizational relations between central bureaucracy and departmental government. This is because the regionalization in France has changed the administrative hierarchy in favor of its political development. In the new context, the departments as the historical institutions, became part of the regional organizations which were the new managers of public policy in a particular area determined by the central government and the law.

There are, nevertheless, some institutional problems in the implementation of the regionalization policy for three reasons: the central government would like to be the unique actor of this process by not deeply being affected by the regionalization. This can be interpreted as a result of the traditional French centralism. The second reason stems from the center-periphery relations based on two different elements: On the one hand, some local actors, especially the nominees like prefects, departments' governors, considered the regionalization process as an asymmetrical risk for their status in administrative hierarchy. On the other hand, the weak integration of certain regions such as Corsica could pose a political threat to the unitary state. The recent treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration, signed on January 22nd, 2019, also became a political polemic in France because of the fact that the treaty may consolidate decentralized cooperation among local governments. The last reason is about the political participation of French citizens at regional level. This factor could be an indicator to measure the efficacy of administrative reforms in terms of public opinion.

These factors could help to test the institutional degree of the regionalization process in France. So, what is the relationship between the institutionalization and regionalization processes in France between

1960-2016? In addition, the following three supportive questions can be presented as operationalization of the main research question: How does the regional administration affect the functional structure of the French State? How have the center-periphery relations been formed by this administrative phenomenon? And which elements do the state-society development influence at the point of political participation? This paper seeks to explain the emergence of the regions in the French territorial system with a historical perspective. Then, it examines the administrative and political interaction between the center and local administrations, the decision-making process, the harmony, and issues about the regionalization's path. Lastly, the democratic participation, voter behaviors, the contribution of the regions to French democracy, and public administration will be analyzed from the perspective of the State-society relationship. Finally, 'the regionalization process in France is mostly characterized by under-institutionalization process' is the argument that is put forward as a result of this research.

1. The Regionalization's influences on the Functional Structure of the State

To set out to identify what the regionalization brings on the State functioning in France, the origin of these administrative units will be analyzed towards the decentralization process. French State, mostly considered as the ideal type of the centralism phenomena, is now constitutionally decentralized since the constitutional amendment of 28th March 2003. However, the regional merging in 2016 complicates both regionalization and decentralization processes.

1.1. Regional Administrative Unite

Regionalization refers to a form of decentralization of a State that transfers powers to its regions. In France, the regionalization process officially started in 1954 with the establishment of regional development committees. After that, a governmental decree in 1955 extended the 21 regional economic programs which were to become the administrative unit of the decentralization and regionalization process. These

new institutions have had a crucial role in executing the regional development systematically, legally and in a harmonious manner with the central government. Thus, the many conferences in which the prefect participated actively were organized to discuss the regional development plans (Chevallier, Rangeon, & Sellier, 1982).

In 1964, the central government nominated the regional governor to head these 21 units and established Regional Economic Development Commissions (CODER) to provide sustainability for regional development (Bodiguel, 1966). This administrative organization could have contributed to creating new employment at the campaign, with the help of Interministerial Delegation of Land Planning and Regional Attractiveness (DATAR). In this way, the decrease in the industrial discrepancy between île de France and other regions has become the new politics determined by central administration (Chevallier et al., 1982).

However, the regionalization movement had not acquired any legal position. Therefore, those new regional institutions were the strategic articulation within the context of the relations between center and periphery (Grémion, 1976). To dissolve this legal dualism, Charles de Gaulle insisted on the draft legislation that had been rejected in the referendum of 1969. This draft legislation aimed to assign legal status to the region, by redefining the territorial administration like municipalities, departments, regions, and Overseas Departments and Territories (DOM-TOM). It was also possible to create the other local units by the law. Likewise, the role of the President has become more important vis-à-vis the parliament with the V Republic Constitution of which General de Gaulle influenced the formation (Vernon, 1961).

Despite the fact that the regional units did not have the legal status, the French state needed the new institutions to stabilize industrial development at the local and regional levels. In the light of this, the state has transformed those administrative units founded since the decentralization and regionalization process as part of the public establishment. Thus, the regional units had some administrative particularity related to the local functioning like juridical personality and budget autonomy. But it cannot be said that the public establishments did not have

legal status at the regional level at that time. In order to involve local authorities in the effort to restore public finances, the State is gradually reducing the financial transfers to local authorities. Lisa Passavant-Guion states that “...*this reduction will fall to €11 billion over three years in 2015*” (Passavant-Guion, 2018, p.42). On this point, it can be highlighted that the fiscal decentralization does not always provide the effective governance at the regional level while the administrative one can be a key element that reinforces the powers of regional elites. With an optimistic perspective, it can also serve to have a more democratic and participatory type of local governance on the hand, and to reduce the regional inequalities on the other hand (Hankla, 2009, pp.635-636). France's administration is experiencing both two sides of the decentralization transition.

1.2. From Centralization to the Decentralization

In the period up to 1972, the basis of the regional administrations was laid, but these institutions did not become an effective part of the local authorities and of the administrative system. Between 1945-1973, the population density increased in the big cities as a result of the industrial potential of the French economy. These two elements contributed largely to the political transformation of the State administration. However, between 1974-1982, there was low economic growth and unemployment under the stagnating condition (Villa, Charpin, Raoul, Tréca, & Chaillié, 1978). The rapid industrialization and modernization of the social and economic structure lead to remarkable changes (Oktay, 2003). In French society, the structural transformation extended into many fields like politics, culture, and economy while the administration and bureaucracy as two domains that change slower than the society, entered into a different type of evolution. Durkheim notes that « *plus les sociétés se développent, plus l'État se développe* » (Durkheim, 1899, p.436). Thanks to the historical centralization, state functions become more numerous, penetrate more deeply into all the other social functions that it concentrates and unifies by that very fact (Durkheim, 1899). In this case, from the 1980s, western economic systems accelerated the

liberal transformation to strengthen their position against the politics and government. Liberal economies aimed to decrease state intervention in trade and market. At the same time, they sought to ensure the development of well-structured institutional and economic dynamics under the state guarantees. These processes were executed with difficulty in the centralized state structure when they were successfully adopted in the decentralized directions. From this point of view, the regional units in France have been aiming to improve regional development but the traditional centralism in the administration and its internalization by the society might help to understand why the constitutional review that claimed the regionalization transformation of the territorial government was refused at the end of the referendum of 1969. Political centrality of French state had a large effect on the public choice.

The political system which is organized around the centralized center, is naturally insufficient for democratic participation, local demands, bottom-up policy-making. However, this ironic situation could have been counterbalanced by introducing social and political acts of the government as a result of the top-down policy. This is because centralized systems can produce the necessary tools to operationalize the public policies more effectively (Duran, 1990, 2010). At this point, in 1981, the French government started the decentralization process that will have become a constitutional principle in 2004, by changing the centralized administrative system (Thoenig & Duran, 1996). Thus, the regionalization process was coalesced into the decentralization's acts, especially with the 1982 law on the liberty of the local authorities (municipalities, departments, regions). Hereunder, the regional councils' members will have been elected after 1986, after a transition period. Besides that, it is envisaged that the departments and regions' executive role will transfer to the prefects, high officials, and president of the regional councils.

The transfer of some administrative power that central government possessed on the local authorities is, in theory, a necessary element of the decentralization. However, during this process, the State could implement some administrative mechanisms that prevent the centrifugal

forces and protect the integral functioning of the territorial management. These mechanisms are generally the administrative and financial tutelage ordered by the central bureaucracy. In this case, the decentralization law of 1982 removed the administrative and financial tutelage of the French State on the local entities and provided a new control system about the legality, which is more moderate than the previous mechanisms. This transformation also affected the functioning of the political system in France that had begun to differentiate. This is because the decentralization gives the new decisional competences to the local authorities (Duran, 1993). In order to make the decentralization effective through the financial dimension, in 1988 another law increased the financial power of the local governments and the position of the regional audit chambers become more visible at the regional finance control (Şengül, 2005).

This new system is more effective in order to share power between the center and local governments and to balance the financial resources of these entities. In addition, the regionalization and the decentralization process attribute the more political rights to the Corsican regional council and the cultural and linguistic rights to this island with autonomist aspirations. In 2003, with the regulation based on the regional participation, the regions were composed after an election structured around a two-round system. All of these steps, which have a considerable impact on the French administration system, heralded a new period for decentralization in 2004. In this regard, the first article of the 1958 constitution has been changed as the organization of the state became decentralized and the regions gained legal constitutional status. This structural change reordered the French territorial system so that there would be municipalities, departments, regions, privileged local authorities and overseas department. Thus, in 2006 the local administrative system had become compatible with the European principles determined by the European Charter of Local Self-Government.


As has already been discussed, the local governments must have the autonomous financial mechanisms in order to move independently vis-à-vis the center. These financial resources could be composed

of taxes, local institutions' economic activities and government aid. In 2009, French administration has promoted a new regulation about the fiscal system. This reform decreased the economic independent of the regions. The central government has also taken action in 2016 to reduce the local expenditures by merging the regions. This new administrative division also means the reconfiguration of the territorial system in France.

1.3. Fusion of the regional governments

The regionalization process, which started in 1964, is still continuing to develop. The central government applies many reform programs about the administrative system to make it institutional and rational. For example, in 2015, a new law aims to reconstruct the territorial system (loi Notre of 7 August 2015) (Long, 2015). This new regulation aims to rationalize the competences and therefore the expenditure of local authorities. On one hand, this new regulation intends to render the decentralization process more institutionalized and rationalized through relations between the center and local actors. On the other, it angles more competence to the regional units. However, Saoudi remarks a paradox that the region's current loss of competence seems to go hand in hand with the loss of its autonomous fiscal capacity, which is both a symbol of political power and of the legitimacy of the regions (Saoudi, 2017).

In this case, there is a breaking point over the regionalization in France. The 22 regions, which were established at the beginning of that process, were restructured into 13 regions (as the map below shows, source: <https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Media/MI/Images/Actualites/carte-election-13-regions-apres-2>). The main purpose of such an administrative action is determined as decreasing the economic gap among the regions. In addition, it can be said that the French government envisages to strengthen financial control and to improve public expenditure management and control. By 2020, this merging project will have been set up for the departmental system too. The administrative merging has not been applied at the regional level, but before that, the merging program was executed in order to decrease the number



of communes (Tellier, 2017). In France there are more than 35, 000 communes. But this project has not succeeded in the new structure envisaged for the small municipalities for many reasons. The main reason for the failure is that the local politicians did not want to give up their political rights and it can be seen that the people who live there reacted democratically against this project (Ashford, 1982). Even if the same criticisms still exist about the regional merging process, the government executes it more effectively.

As can be seen, French regionalization signifies a complicated process. This is because the administrative influences of this act show that there is a multivariable process. When the regionalization allows for the

reconstruction of the local system and the state functioning and its efficacy, it affects the relations between center-periphery and state-society too. Now, it would be better to analyze these relations that influence on the sociological dynamics in French society.

2. The center-periphery relations through regionalization

French regionalization has been affecting the administrative reports at local level while the European Union integration has also ongoing impacts on this process. It poses a direct challenge to the relations among local system's actors, more precisely between the officers of departments and regional governor. It reflects the multiplication of the administrative elites that indicates emerging of the new relationships between the elected actors and them (Bottomer, 1982). So, new relational issues at local level should be considered.

2.1. The “centrifugation” at the governmental level

It can be argued that the social and political movements, which are against the center's action, are interpreted as the centrifuge act in an administration system that functions centrally. In this context, French centralization is historically and culturally based on I. François and Louis XIV periods when the departmental system is derived from the French revolution (Elias, 1990). Furthermore, the political balance appeared among the local institutions and the center leans on the 19th century. From this century, the role and the function of French administration would be “centralizator” (Grémion, 1976). It should also be noted that in a centralized country such as France, even if some political and administrative issues exist between the center and local administrations like technical and equipment supports of the central government, management problems of the French-administered territories outside Europe, these reactions would not be considered as centrifuge movements. With the exception of the regionalist movement of Corsica, the French periphery seems now well-integrated to the center after the decolonization process of 1960s. Double jobbing (*cumul des mandats* in French) and the French pluralistic constitutional regime (Aron, 1965) have ma-

for implications with representativity possibilities of the local actors at center (Şengül, 2012).

2.2. European Union

In theory, the French local entities dispose the political and financial autonomy provided by The European Charter of Local Self-Government whereas, in practice, traditional centralization based on cultural, social, political and economic dynamics does not allow that they could take initiative independently from the center. For example, in the Alsace region, which was belatedly integrated into the French territorial system, the voter behavior tendencies considerably concentrate on the right parties. This political attitude of the Alsatians does not reflect the cultural elements but it can be explained by the political and especially, economic dimensions. This is because the Alsace is one of the richest regions in France with its industrial potential. At the same time, even if European Union, which is described as the Union of Nation-State, constructs a new political and administration horizon over the members, in Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy, the periphery began to introduce into a centrifugal process, by influencing factors of regionalization. In this case, the center has to attribute more competence to the local entities to handle the situation or to ensure consensus based on the administrative interests. For example, in 1997, the Constitutional review in Portugal provided more financial initiatives to the regional administrations to stabilize relations. Besides, in Belgium, Spain and Italy in which the center of these countries had lately accomplished their centralization, the peripheral powers could find to create the resistance mechanisms against the center (CDLR, 1998; Marcou, 1999).

In France, most of the studies made about the regionalization insist on the fact that this process began in 1964. The administrative reforms executed by the *Ancien régime*, the departmental system of French revolution, Napoleonic centralization and the regionalization of Gaullist administration demonstrate in what way, and to what extent, the State metamorphosis took place. So, from the 1960s, the central administration formed by de Gaulle has handled the regionalization process as a

government policy and a state political action. As already noted, the main reason for this transformation could be divided into two categories: the internal dynamics and the external ones (Thomas, 1995). As the internal elements, during the Second World War, the V Republic government aimed to revive the declined institutions of IV Republic (Merle, 1987). In this context, it must be necessary to reestablish the territorial system, to reduce the economic imbalance among the regions and to balance the presidential power by the local administrations. The external causes are that French government tried to integrate their institutions to European Economic Community and to adapt the structural transformation at the economic, political and administrative level. Thus, it can be said that these internal and external phenomena are closely related to this regionalization process. However, like the European development, that transformation is executed despite the reaction even if it is almost decisive. The regionalization in France is functioned by the stable and strong will of administrative policy, despite the peripheral reaction (Birnbaum, 2011). If this regionalization process could be analyzed by considering the public policies elaborated with the regional elites, it can be understood how well-centralized French State become decentralized today (Pasquier, 2003).

2.3. Administrative elites and elected ones

From the second half of the 20th century, the regional movement that is effective through the policies of V. Republic began to change the administrative system as well as the relations between the elites who are responsible at local level. In this case, Pierre Grémion, the French sociologist examined the dynamics of French administration system, in his book named "*Peripheral Power*", carried out many sociological investigations with the administrators in the main departments and the administrators in the peripheral departments in order to understand the conflictual relations between them. At that moment, the duties of the regional units, which could not obtain the legal status were assumed by departments' *chef-lieu*. In practice, the prefects of these departments managed the regionalization mission and they were organizing the ap-

pointments with the administrators' participation to discuss this project, as already said. As Grémion noted, the prefects of main departments began to reinforce their executive power at regional level. In contrast, the peripheral forces resisted these demands. The peripheral reaction focuses on the acquisition of the regional prefectural status by the departmental prefects. For this, the periphery uses two arguments based on equality and equity. Those arguments insist on the illegitimacy of the regions that are derived from the departments (Grémion, 1976). Thus, such a situation could cause administrative dichotomy and the formation of ill-structured regions. This is because the prefect assumes the executive role of the government as well as protecting the general interest of the area where he is in charge. However, Grémion underlines that the determination of the main department among the others in a region will normally provide some privilege to the administrator of this zone. Regionalization continues to develop via these units (Grémion, 1976).

During the same years, it can be seen that there was a complicated relationship between the mayors and prefects or the sub-prefects. In this system, the prefects of the centralized administration demanded the harmonic functioning of the municipalities. On this matter, in the book of Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg, they examined the relationship between actors and system, "*a good prefect knows to listen to the mayors and a good mayor convinces the prefect*" (Crozier & Friedberg 1977, p.254). Here, the person who takes the initiative is the mayor and when he carries out this initiative, the prefect must be convinced about the project that will provide the necessities of the public service. Furthermore, these relations are also so fragile. On this issue, the feedback and the outcomes obtained from the policies concern the mayors and the prefects too. Thus, the relations between these two authorities are fragile, thin and dependent on each other. The dependent structure also prevents the independent movement of the actors. The coordination and the integration among the institutions play a key role in the decision-making-process and its application. The financial problems of the municipalities and the centralized structure of the administrative system limit explicitly the actions of the elected organs at local

level. Therefore, the prefects had a more advantageous position than the elected ones in terms of the deconcentration power. Nevertheless, decentralization process reduces the administrative dependency of the mayors to the prefects while regionalization one scales down the regional inequalities.

The deconcentration power brings closer the institutional links between local authorities and the State. The municipal units need competences in terms of qualification, help, equipment and technical provided by the central government. On this point, the cross-regulation model put forward by Crozier and Thoenig offers here a useful perspective in deciphering the complexified relationships among local elected representatives and civil servants in the administration. The central government's technicians have more technical expertise in construction, maintenance and repairs than the elected officials. As a result, "... *the mayor is largely dependent on local government officials...*" (Crozier & Thoenig, 1975, p.9). The decentralization issue obviously arises from the moment that the big urban cities are now able to contribute to the development of the less urbanized zones in terms of technical equipment which means they no longer need central government support.

2.4. The relations between the department and the region

Today, these relations between those two institutions tend to change in favor of regions. Here, the regionalization policies of the center made the regional units more important than the departments. The institutional structure of the regions continues to develop with the support of central bureaucracy while the departments begin to become sub-actors in this process. It can be argued that the importance of the departments, which has been in existence since 1789 and are the principal actor of the territorial system, has visibly reduced and then similar phenomena also affect Italian administration. On this point, there is one question: "When the European Union as an inclusive organization tend to regionalize the European States, could they be affected themselves by that regionalization process?" The response to the question must focus on the economic causes rather than local demands. As already mentioned,

in France, regionalization is started as a growth model in economy in order to ensure an industrial balance across the country. In Italy, regionalization is also shaped by the economic elements as well as the local demands, which exist historically. In 2008, the European debt crises that created a fiscal pressure upon Italian administration influenced the regionalization in Italy. Because of the crises, Italy decided to transfer some departmental competences to regions and to municipalities for the purpose of reducing the public expenses/financing (Acteurs Publics, 2015a) (Acteurs Publics, 2015b). The experiences gained from regionalization created the important transformation for French administration when they caused radical news at the institutional level in Spain and in Italy (Mény, 1985). The increase in local participation and of financial autonomy and the aiming of the economic growth from the local level shows us that the EU supports the regionalization process, especially for economic reasons.

Now what must go back to France as an example is the reducing of departmental competencies which is still a big issue of discussion among politicians. For example, in 2016, in the 86th French Departmental Congress, the President of the Senate Gérard Larcher, criticized the actual situation about the departmental power and proposed that State reinforces their competences, by referring to 72nd article of the Constitution. So, the initiatives taken by the center about regionalization aim to centralize regionalization by considering the development of those organization and the administrative reforms (Pasquier, 2003). Here, the aim of the center is particularly important, because it can be still argued that the regions do not effectively work yet. When the State predicts the functioning of the departments dependently above the regions, the position of the departments is still protected traditionally by the elected and nominated organs at that level. The failed referendum, which was organized at the beginning of the regionalization process also proves this. In France where the centralization is interiorized culturally, politically and administratively, even if the regionalization idea is supported by the governors, the reforms that are still executed show us that the centralization process is not achieved.

Additionally, the particular schools from which the nominated elites graduate, is another issue to be discussed in view of the elected-nominated relations. Jack Hayward, the French political scientist, notes that the nominated ones tend still to protect the centralized architecture of the State and to produce public policies in line with this (Hayward, 1981). The discussion is centered on the existence of the symbolic schools like National School of Administration (ENA, also a Grand School) and the Grande Ecole. In this context, some intellectuals defend their existence for their administrative quality while others want to abolish these schools in order to democratize access to the administration (Vernet & Sapin, 2016). So, regionalization certainly creates new challenges for administrators, but there is no similar evidence when the participation rates of individuals are considered.

3. Political Participation and the Relationship between the State and Society through Regionalization

The low participation rates in regional elections even poses the legitimacy problem for those who are elected. Even if the first regional elections of 1986 have recorded a relative high percentage of participation, the results of the last four ones explicitly underlined the arising legitimacy risk as can be observed in the graphics below. Dupoirier rightly poses this question after the fourth regional elections held in 2004; “*can one speak in France of a regionalization of regional elections?*” (Dupoirier, 2004, p.571). These elections have a particular result in favor of the Socialist party that obtained the right to govern 21 of the 22 metropolitan regions. So, ruling at the regional level develops into a fundamental challenge for this party owing to the fact that the new administrative division, which is the regional fusion, would be interpreted as a political strategy of the Socialist government under Hollande presidency after losing political space at the end of the regional elections of 2010. Political ambition of actors exceeds the participation rates at regional position.

3.1 Regional Participation


It can be already pointed out that regionalization, which is revealed by the demand of the center, had started regional development, new areas for job opportunities in order to diminish the unemployment and economics reasons, like effective use of resources. This process started for economic and administrative reasons, created different political dynamics between the bureaucrats themselves as well as between the bureaucrats and the elected representatives on the level of administration of department. On that point, new dynamics of political participation have also come up as a second stage just after the 1982 reform. Since the end of the 1960s and 1970s, the inefficiency of the political participation system and traditional democratic forms in France have been criticized by De Gaulle as well. Besides, it was important to convince the people for the regional executions of the center government in order to ensure its legitimacy (Mény, 1985).

On behalf of the execution of the participation mechanism, it has been decided that the member of the council and regional parliament would be elected for six years through the general voting right in 1986 and the two-round system of proportional counting of preference votes in 2004. The general and local elections in 1986 took place in the same period and some changes on the political stability in terms of relation between left and right wing have happened (Martin, 1986). It could be shown that the rise of the far-right and, also the fall of the rate of none-participants in comparison with the general elections in 1981 and 1986 as examples. In 2015, after the unification of the regions, the number of the representatives has been redefined through the regional and departmental elections law (legifrance.gouv.fr, 2016).

Low political participation in regional elections comes up as a noteworthy factor. Such that, the participation rate in 1986 could not be reached nowadays. The data as shown in graphic 1 clearly shows the low political participation between 1986-2015 (data.gouv.fr, 2016). That low sense of political participation is not just a case for regional elections. Also, during departmental elections, especially for the last three periods, it can be seen that the participation rates stuck at approx-

imately 50%. For example, in the latest departmental election, in 2015, the valid electoral ratio on the second round was calculated at 55% (interieur.gouv.fr, 2016).


Figure 1: 1986-2015 Participation ratio about the regional elections in France (%)



Data source: French Interior ministry

On the other hand, as shown in graphic 2, although the participation rates for the presidential election which is considered more national and more inclusive are higher than the local elections, the participation rate for the latest presidential election in 2017 at the first round is 77,5% and the latter at the second round is 74.5% (interieur.gouv.fr, 2016). Even though the rate of participation for the presidential election is higher than the other elections, there is nearly 25% absence of participation. When the other statistical data is evaluated, it can be seen that in the presidential election in 2012, there was 46 million electorates, but 9.4 million electorates chose not to vote and 700.000 votes were invalid at the first round. On the second round, 9 million voters chose not to vote and 2 million votes were invalid (interieur.gouv.fr, 2020).

Figure 2: 2002-2017 Participation ratio about the Presidential Election (%)



Data source: French Interior ministry

3.2 Participation Issue


Low political participation is not just an issue for France. This kind of tendency is known in other European countries as well. According to research conducted, for the last two decades, the absence of participation is around 14% in European Union countries. The absence of political participation of Eastern European countries was explained by some classical theories, which see the continued effects of the hegemonic power of Soviet Union and because of that democracy, election, and vote have not yet become a tradition or ritual; but yet it should be however pointed out why that phenomenon is also common in other European countries. In that purpose, at least for understanding the case of France, Anne Muxel's work is emphasized, which questions the factors of participation like education level, socio-economic status and other social factors. In this point, it can be said that the low sense of political participation is a new model of participation. Likewise, even though voting is still a common part of politics, it is the oldest model of representative democracy. Hence, because of the relatively institutional structure decadence of the politics and individualization of voter's expectations, the right *not-to-vote* has gained its legitimacy. Besides this, the forms of direct political participation like demonstration and meeting right, manifestations, marches and petition have become more

frequent. Thus, the tendency of low political participation carries personal as well as collective reasons (Muxel, 2007). Here, the reason that I emphasize, the right *not-to-vote* is precisely because voting in France is not an obligation, but just a civil duty.

3.3 Effects of Election System on Participation and State-Society Relation

In parallel to all those reasons, the two-round election system in France could influence especially regional low participation. From 2004, these two round systems have been applied to the regional election, thus the balance between left and right wing has changed. According to this, it can be seen that until 2004, in three elections, right wing parties achieved electoral success, but then, after the two-round system was introduced for regional election from 2004, left wing parties have achieved much more success at regional council (See below graphic 3). But it should be said that the regional election which took place in 2015 was an exception. On the first tour, far-right wing has achieved success, because of it on the second-round votes, those in general vote for left wing had to vote for right wing in order to pressurize far-right wing. Therefore, the unification of the regions after 2015, the balance between left and right has changed and the ideological tendency, which defends the autonomy of Corsica, has come up as a stronger new factor. In consequence, while the left wing won five regions of 13, right wing has won seven regions and the autonomist party has won Corsica (interieur.gouv.fr, 2020). It can be said that the consequences of regional administration reforms bring new dynamics to French politics.

Figure 3: The Righth-Left Political Balance between the regional presidents



Data source: French Interior Ministry

The Socialist party has lost some seats because of those new dynamics, which emerged with the regional reforms. In order to stop losing votes, the Socialist party has carried out new reforms. According to this, the double jobbing, which provides that elected officials could hold several mandates, has been limited by law. For instance, in the past, the president of a district municipality could have been assigned for a job in provincial administration; a senator or council member could have held office at European Parliament. But now, from 2017, the *cumul des mandats* in regional and legislative administration will be restricted for the elected. It means that the regional actors will not have chance to represent their political interests at the European level anymore. On the other hand, the public opinion considers that if the elected holds more than one administration duty, this could hinder one of his duties. Thus, for French public opinion, it is important to discuss if holding several mandates is ethical or not, especially for mayors.

4. Conclusion

Regionalization, which is historically a complex process, needs to be evolving in a more institutionally structure. Despite several legislative reforms, France seems unable to modernize its constitutional principle of “free administration of local governments” which would allow for a different organization and management of the state. The new administrative division of 2016 for the regions demonstrates the

uncertainty surrounding the regional construction even if the regionalization politics, which started for economic reasons at first place, is now a new factor between local and center administration through democratic values, such as political participation. The limitations of the *cumul des mandats* would have negative representative consequences for the regionalization of France.

According to the center-periphery relationship, there are some different dynamics between elected and appointed. Therefore, it was a rough process for center and center-periphery relation to add the regions as a part of administration system. Particularly provincial administrations, which have historical profundity, became like an institutional resistance weld. This tendency of resistance to regionalization was also shown in French society with its rejection of Charles De Gaulle's referendum for regionalization. But as previously noted, the Gaullist French center has continued the regionalization process. Regionalization as a part of the localization movement, is developing, carrying more institutional identity and gaining more power, but yet there is something lacking in case of its budget and finance. Decentralization reforms, including the 2004 laws on regionalization, have not been able to correct the imbalances in budget, expertise and resources that hamper the French regions. Because, the central government still has a dominant role on the distribution of the fiscal incomes. This stems from the asymmetrical position of the state in administrative matters. It could have political impacts on voter behavior that French electorate takes into account the presidential elections more important than the other ones.

In the perspective of the relation between the administration and society, low political participation has had some negative effects on democratic culture; however, it is also new behavior from voters. On that point, for those who live in Western European countries in which individualization was an important step and also for those who live in a twenty-first century neo-liberal economic system, some opinions consider that the right *not-to-vote* is a political attitude. As demonstrated in the graphics, the number of absent voters for the presidential election is up to 18-25% but for the regional elections, it is up to 50%. From this

point, it could be argued that regionalization and regional administration are not yet very important for voters. That issue could cause some inefficiency for the legitimacy of regionalization and the acceptance of public policies by society. The French regionalization can be considered politically, institutionally and financially fragile.

Consequently, regionalization in France, which was started by the Gaullist administration with V. Republic, can be treated as a fundamental transformation, still incomplete, for the traditional state centralism. From 1982, the localization movement was continued with regionalization, and with those movements, economics, educational and cultural acquisitions have been won. Between 1982-2016, the period, which was called first, second and third localization movement (*Acte I-II-III de la décentralisation*), regional administrations have obtained their constitutional status through the principle of localization. According to all of those elements, it can be predictable that the French center administration could become more decentralist and territory administrations could continue their localizations. For the participation point, low political participation for regional election can be prevented by giving more power to regional administration. At the end of this article, it can be argued that the regionalization in France reflects a limited and incomplete view. In order to overcome this problem, the French administration needs to attribute a more institutional character which could promote the effectiveness of public action to the regionalization process.

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The First and the Only Option: The War Analysis of Bush's Personality and Decision Making Process of Iraq War

Edanur Önel¹

¹Yeditepe University, edanur.onel@yeditepe.edu.tr

Abstract

On March 17, George W. Bush declared an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein. In his words, he asked from Saddam to give up from Baghdad and he gave 48 hours to Saddam Hussein and his two sons in order to leave Iraq. He added the confrontation will be resulted with military conflict. On March 2003, a surprise invasion was started to Iraq by the US-led coalition. Investigating backstage of the war decision is important because Iraq War was the most important hard power policy of the US since the Vietnam War. While the paper has no intention to analyze the Iraq War in detail, it mostly deals with decision-making process of the invasion by focusing on Bush's personality. The paper uses Leadership Trait Analysis as strategy in order to measure George W. Bush's conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits to explore whether these traits lead the US to the war. Within this context, conceptual complexity, self-confidence and hard power discourse were analyzed through content analysis in QDA software program. While the analysis

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finds out that after September 11, Bush had low conceptual complexity and high self-confidence in along with increasing hard power discourse, Hermann's (2005) openness to information model was applied. The paper concludes that when self-confidence is higher than conceptual complexity, the leaders tend to be closed to information and they make decisions according to their images and truths.

Keywords: Foreign Policy Analysis, Iraq War, George W. Bush, Leadership Trait Analysis, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, Hermann

İlk ve Tek Seçenek: Savaş

Bush'un Karakter Analizi ve Irak Savaşı'nın Karar Alma Süreci

66

Öz

17 Mart tarihinde, George W. Bush Saddam Hüseyin'e bir ulti-matom verdi. Sözlerinde Saddam'dan Bağdat'ı teslim etmesini ve iki oğlula birlikte Bağdat'ı 48 saat içerisinde terk etmesini istiyordu. Ayrıca, herhangi bir meydan okumanın da askeri bir çatışmayla sonuçlanacağını eklemiştir. Mart 2003'te ise Amerika Birleşik Devletleri önderliğindeki koalisyon güçleri tarafından sürpriz bir işgal başlatıldı. Savaş kararının arka planını incelemek önem teşkil etmektedir çünkü Irak Savaşı, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Vietnam Savaşından sonra izlediği en önemli askeri güç politikası sayılmaktadır. Bu çalışma Irak Savaşını detaylıca incelemekten ziyade, George W. Bush'un karakterine yoğunlaşarak savaşın karar alma süreci ile ilgilenmektedir. Makale, Lider Kişilik Analizi (LTA) stratejisi aracılığıyla Bush'un bilişsel kapasitesini ve özgüvenini ölçerek, bu özelliklerin ne derecede Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ni savaşa götüren etkenler olduğunu ortaya çıkarma eğilimindedir. Bu bağlamda, bilişsel kapasite, özgüven ve sert güç söylemleri içerik analizi metodu ile QDA yazılım programında incelenmiştir. Yapılan analizde Bush'un özellikle 11 Eylül sonrası bilişsel kapasitesinde azalma, özgüven özelliğinde ve sert güç söyleminde artma tespit edilmiş olup, Hermann'ın (2005) yeni bilgiye açıklık modeli uygulanmıştır. Ç-

lıřma, 6zgüven skorunun biliřsel kapasiteden yüksek olduęunda, liderlerin yeni bilgiye kapalı olması ve kararlarını kendi yarattıkları imajlara ve doęrulara göre verdikleri tartışmasıyla sonuçlandırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dıř Politika Analizi, Irak Savařı, George W. Bush, Lider Kiřilik Analizi, Biliřsel Kapasite, Özgüven, Hermann

1. Introduction

On September 11, nineteen terrorists who are members of Al-Qaeda launched an attack to World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. The attacks resulted with nearly 3000 casualties including terrorists and over 10 billion U.S \$ damage. There is no doubt that the attacks were completely shocking and devastating for the US, which is considered as the superpower of the world politics. After one month, the US government decided to start an invasion to Afghanistan. The other crucial turning point was the starting meetings over Iraq between Bush administration and Defense Secretary. On November 27, Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld met in order to discuss the possible operation plan to Iraq, which was named OPLAN 1003-98 Unlikely to Afghanistan, there was no concrete evidence for Iraq and Saddam's network with Al-Qaeda that makes possible military operation acceptable in the eye of the US public and international community.

When it comes to 2002, President Bush started to seek the ways, which enable him to justify an operation to Iraq. He imaged Iraq as the axis of evil and accused Saddam administration to have and hide weapons of mass destruction. He also added Iraq should not have WMDs or biological weapons, otherwise, the US strictly will not allow them to have these weapons. After one year from the terrorist attacks, President Bush started to give official signs of any possible militaristic operation to Iraq in his speech on the United Nations meeting. The NATO allies on the other side had no consensus about invasion of Iraq, while the US and the UK insisted on a militaristic operation, countries such as France and Germany demanded to seek policies, which indicate diplomacy or audit for weapons. Meanwhile, Saddam administration completely denied the claims of presence of the weapons of mass destruction or biological weapons within Iraq borders.

Resolution 1441 of the United Nations Security Council was accepted by the Iraqi government in 2002. Following acceptance of the resolution, a committee started inspections in Iraq and they reported that there is no adequate evidence for Iraq's WMDs and nuclear program. However, then secretary of state of the US Colin Powell claimed

that Iraq is hiding the weapons in his United Nations speech. He also provided several “evidences” which show Iraq’s network with Al-Qae-da. Afterwards of these negotiations, countries such as the UK, Poland, Spain and Denmark and the US started to preparations for the invasion in 2003. Furthermore, President Bush mentioned Iraq in his public speech and he gave 48 hours of duration for Saddam to leave from Baghdad. On March 2003, General Tommy Franks announced the invasion to Iraq with the ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ code name.

After one day from the invasion, the conducted public opinion surveys showed that 76% of the Americans support the operation on Iraq. There is no doubt that Bush’s role in mobilizing the masses was a significant turning point during the decision-making process of the invasion. Furthermore, he is marked as one of the pro-active presidents in American history, which can take public support for the hard power policy. In the decision making process of Iraqi War, President Bush’s personality and character have important effect as much as state-level decisions. In other words, personality, perceptions, beliefs or images of Bush have important effect in making decision of one of the significant wars in current world history and reshaping regional/international balances in international relations.

As Erişen (2012) indicates, examining psychological qualities of the leaders can provide insights about the foreign policy decision-making, thus analyzing personality holds crucial place in the foreign policy analysis because leader’s success intensely related with their personalities. Correspondingly, examining Bush’s personality is important in the analysis of Iraq War because of several reasons. First, Iraqi War is one of the important events that took place after September 11 under the justification of war on terror. In other words, the war is associated with efforts to prevent religious-motivated terrorism in the world. There is no doubt this justification is mentioned by Bush many times in his speeches. Secondly, although the war gained public opinion through Bush’s mobilization efforts in the first phase, it is understood that Bush’s and his administration’s choice about the war had many misperceptions and miscalculations which provide a broader perspective on misperception

studies in foreign policy analysis. At least but not last, the war was described as Bush's personal issue which was started by his father in first Gulf War that needed to finish.

This paper aims to investigate one of the crucial events of current world politics Iraqi War by analyzing Bush's personality. Within this context, the paper benefits from Hermann's leadership trait analysis. In this direction, the data provided from American Rhetoric website which includes Bush's public speeches, interviews, press conferences and announcements from 2000 (Presidential nomination victory speech) to 2020 in pdf and mp3 files. By analyzing traits of Bush between the periods of pre-September 11 and pre-Iraq War, the paper aims to answer the question of 'How President Bush's traits shaped the decision of Iraq War?'. In order to provide an answer to this question, I use content analysis as the method. Furthermore, one of the biggest purposes of the study is to show the changes in Bush's traits to foreign policy analysis literature by providing a comprehensive perspective.

2. Theoretical Framework

Image is described as under the complex and difficult circumstances, decision-makers seek the ways, which enable them to simplify the complexities. These created images help decision makers to solve the problems in the chaotic environment. The images, which are created in accordance with the individuals' needs affect their perceptions, beliefs, worldviews, even their decisions for war and peace (Erişen, 2015). Leaders, who create these images in order to explain the meaning of the circumstances and their environments in the first phase, believe that their images are real and they want to make them acceptable to other people. When the decision-makers feel under the pressure, they use these images to get rid of the stress. In some cases, the leaders behave in accordance with the images which they create, therefore images might call as reasons/motivated reasoning rather than reality.

Images are the necessary tools for decision makers in order to solve the complexities during decision-making and decision-practicing processes. While there are lots of information that leader needed to know

or learn, images ease evaluating process of this information. On the other side images might be both positive and negative. In Iraq War, Bush's images on Saddam can be categorized as negative/enemy images. In the pre-war period, Bush imaged Saddam as enemy or evil, furthermore he had great efforts to prove the reality of his images to international community as well as his allies. He also imaged the invasion as war on terror in order to rationalize his policies. He not only organized self-image process but also he used the media as an effective tool in order to make his Saddam and Iraq's images reliable.

3. Review of Literature

International politics is consisted of various actors whose relations are quite complicated. In order to ease the analysis, international relations scholars have used different level of analysis, which were indicated as international level, state level and individual level by Waltz. After the Cold War, foreign policy analysis has attracted many scholars' attention in order to bring rational explanations to foreign policies of the states by using these levels of analysis. Furthermore, scholars of foreign policy analysis have benefited from multifactorial and multilevel researches while conducting a study however, in the first phase the researches in the FPA literature were limited with mostly state and system level of analysis by neglecting psychological characteristics of the individuals.

Examining foreign policy decisions and attitudes without considering leader/individual level may provide inaccurate information to the researcher. Remarkable numbers of studies have shown that foreign policy decisions are closely related with personality of the leader. By analyzing personality of the leader provide many evidences about his/her beliefs, perceptions, worldview etc. therefore, personality enables researcher to interpret next possible move of the states. According to Erişen (2015), personality has two types of effect during the foreign policy decision-making process: first, it reacts the leader's persona by exploring his/her perception and worldview; secondly, it provides perceptual and cognitional information about how a leader can benefit from his/her team and the organizational design.

Analyzing the leader holds significant place in the political psychology literature within foreign policy decision-making process. As Levy (2013) argues influence of the leader's desires and fears play significant role in decision-making process. In terms of cognitive view, these desires and emotions may create "motivated biases," or motivated reasoning, which is triggered by the leaders' emotional needs, by their desire to remain self-esteem, and by their interests—diplomatic, political, organizational, or personal. As Levy (2013) indicates, motivated reasoning provides to rationalize policies that support one's interests and emotional needs. Similar to Levy's statements, there is consensus about Bush's motivated reasoning enabled him to justify his hard-power policy towards Iraq by projecting the invasion as democratization of Iraq, war on terrorism or saving Iraqis from the authoritarian cruel leader.

There are remarkable number of studies which indicate that examining personality is a useful tool in analyzing foreign policy decision making in terms of providing predictions and clear explanations. Smith (2013) underlines that ideology and personal characteristics of the leader may intensely affect the way in which information is evaluated, therefore personality of the leader naturally affects the decisional outputs in foreign affairs. Besides ideology, cognition is another significant factor to perception, and the way in which a leader perceives the world, herself/himself or his/her enemy is crucial to explaining why some decisions are taken and others bypassed (Jervis, 1976). Furthermore, Margaret Hermann (1980) argues that by analyzing idiosyncrasies, features and personality traits, interpretations towards foreign policy decision-making process might be made because these explanations help to create a clear picture of likely personal behavior.

Regarding to the Iraq War, analysis of Bush's personality heavily relies on biographical studies in the foreign policy analysis literature. According to Lieberfeld (2005) Bush had personal motives for invasion of Iraq, he considered Saddam Hussein as a deadly rival which his family engaged in a war with him since first Gulf War. Correspondingly, "going to war with Iraq may have enhanced the younger Bush's sense of his own virility, given his sensitivity to the fact that his father had

been publicly labeled a wimp” (Lieberfeld, 2005; p. 14). Furthermore, Immelman (2002) uses Millon’s personological model in order to analyze Bush’s political personality. He concludes that “George W. Bush’s major personality-based leadership strengths are the important political skills of charisma and interpersonality — a personable, confident, socially responsive, outgoing tendency that will enable him to connect with critical constituencies, mobilize popular support, and retain a following and his self-confidence in the face of adversity” (Immelman, 2002; p. 19)

Besides biographical analysis of Bush, many studies have been conducted in order to explore President Bush’s operational code. Dyson (2010) as one of the scholars who commonly use operational code analysis finds out that George W. Bush’s distinctive characteristics and decision style prepared required circumstances for the hastily decision for invasion to Iraq. He concludes that President Bush’s individual personality had a significant effect on decisions which were made on the foreign affairs.

Renshon (2008) argues that Bush’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs have significant changes between the different times of his political life. He observed that there are statistically significant changes in two operational code features: “Nature of the Political Universe and Realization of Political Values” changed along with Bush’s role changed from candidate to president (Renshon, 2008). He concludes that September 11 as a traumatic event causes these changes in Bush’s operational code.

While many strategies have been used by foreign policy analysts, leadership traits analysis of Hermann is commonly used one among them. Hermann defines the leadership style as “the ways in which leaders relate to those around them – whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders – and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions” (Hermann, 2005, p. 181).

According to Breuning (2007), Leadership Trait Analysis provides necessary information about the leader’s personal features, which are

related with foreign policy decision making through set of questions. These questions have been used by many FPA scholars to predict decision-makers' attitudes and behaviors in the literature. Furthermore, methodologically strong characteristics of the LTA have provided foreign policy scholars the tool which they need to find out answer for significant theoretical questions, for instance why there is difference among leaders and their tendency to follow risky policies.

Foreign policy analysis scholars have long discussed and empirically observed that, among the seven leadership traits, cognitive complexity has a critical effect on decision-makers' information processing and their reactions to environmental factors. For instance, Schafer et al. (2010) observed that George W. Bush's conceptual complexity score is higher than the other presidents such as Carter, Clinton, or G. H. W. Bush. However they argue that using the words 'maybe, possibly, perhaps' might not mean that Bush is a complex thinker, these words might be also related with confusion, his uncertain feelings, or some doubts about the issue. In addition to this, the study underlines that Bush's conceptual complexity does not necessarily mean that this feature has an effect on foreign policy decisions (might be related with domestic issues).

The other study which was conducted by Shannon and Keller (2007), finds out that Bush's conceptual complexity score is relatively low from Clinton and the other world leaders' average by analyzing George W. Bush's 74 interview responses. Correspondingly, Yang (2010) argues that George W. Bush's low-complexity score also indicates that the way of his information processing is heavily relies on black and white. He is also more tend to describe the contextual factors and the environment in certain terms by intensely stereotyping the concepts or terms. On the other side, Preston and Hermann (2004) interpret that relatively low score of conceptual complexity leads President Bush to being intensely depend on the inner circle of the advisory group who are like-minded advisors during the foreign policy decision-making process.

In the foreign policy analysis literature, investigating conceptual complexity among personality traits holds significant place due to its

intense effect on foreign policy decisions. While high conceptual complexity is associated with high level of openness and being open to the new information, Breuning (2007) argues that low conceptual complexity might be associated with more aggressive state behavior, including less tendency on diplomacy and high tendency to take action in foreign policies. He observed that George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair who corporate during the Iraq invasion in 2003, both had low conceptual complexity. At least but not last, Dille (2000) observed that while conceptual complexity of Reagan changes in accordance with the contextual factors, George W. Bush's conceptual complexity remains low and it does not change from one event to another.

In the literature, one of the studies, which analyzes President Bush's traits before and after September 11 belongs to Schuring (2018), she argues that George W. Bush's traits remained approximately same except 'in-group bias' and 'distrust towards others'. She observed that George Bush become more biased towards his group after September 11 and his distrust to others score relatively increased compare to the pre-September 11 period. In the literature of foreign policy analysis, leaders whose scores are high in distrust to others and in-group bias traits, are more likely to be closed to information. Moreover, these leaders are more tend to make the decision according to their own concepts, beliefs or experiences (Hermann, 2005).

By considering these studies and strategies, which are mentioned above, the following hypotheses are designed in order to analyze George W. Bush's leadership traits analysis between the years 2000 and 2003 (till beginning of the Iraq War. The reason behind the determination of these periods is to show how Bush's traits changed and lead him to make decision of invasion to Iraq.

H1: Decrease in conceptual complexity trait of Bush after September 11 eased decision of Iraq war.

H2: Increase in self-confidence trait of Bush after September 11 eased decision of Iraq War.

4. Conceptualization and Operationalization

For the first hypothesis, Hermann (2005) defines conceptual complexity as “the degree of differentiation which an individual shows in describing or discussing other people, places, policies, ideas, or things” (Hermann, 2005; p. 22). Through this trait, I assume that Bush’s conceptual complexity decreased after September 11 terrorist attacks, and he made more certain categorizations. For instance, he labelled the countries, which he thinks they have bond with Al-Qaeda as enemies, he categorized the countries, which condemned the attacks and announced that they are with the US in this war on terror as allies or friends. I conceptualize the second concept of the first hypothesis: decision of Iraq War as his mentions or implications, which include hard-power policies towards Iraq during his speeches (the UN meeting). The first concept of the second hypothesis, self-confidence is described as “Self-confidence indicates one’s sense of self-importance, an individual’s image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the environment” (Hermann, 2005; p. 20), on the other side, the dependent variable’s conceptualization might be considered as same with the first hypothesis.

For the operationalization of the concepts within the hypotheses, Hermann (2005) makes clear distinctions. She argues that when a leader’s cognitive traits are analyzed, the researcher should avoid of focusing on too narrow time period, because it might provide misinformation or miscalculations about the traits. Secondly, she discusses that LTA should be analyzed at least fifty interviews/resources which include minimum one hundred words. In this context, both traits in the hypotheses might be analyzed through interviews, responses or speeches which were performed by George W. Bush. In order to measure conceptual complexity, the words such as “approximately, possibility, trend, and for example” (high conceptual complexity) or with the words: “absolutely, without a doubt, certainly and irreversible” (low conceptual complexity) may help us (Hermann, 2005; p.22). Self-confidence can be measured through the words such as “my,” “myself,” “I,” “me”,and “mine” rather than we, ours, our plan etc.” (Hermann, 2005; p.20).The second concept of the both hypotheses can be measured through the interviews or speeches of

Bush as well such as threatening, ultimatum to Iraq etc. Therefore, for this variable, I try to interpret the decision of Iraq war with the discourse which includes hard power words such as: 'army, strike, operation, security, enemy'. Furthermore, because the decision related with Iraq, I also add 'Iraq' into the analyzed words. At least but not last, the other counting word will be 'weapons'. The reason why I add this word into the analysis is George W. Bush accused Iraqi government to have or hide WMDs and biological weapons, therefore in the decision making process, I assume that he might mentioned 'weapon' word in his discourse intensely. To conclude, in order to measure hard-power discourse of President Bush, these following seven words will be analyzed: 'army, strike, operation, security, enemy, Iraq, weapon'.

5. Method

In order to measure President Bush's conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits, 'at-a-distance method' is used within content analysis by using QDA software program. According to Schafer and Walker (2006) psychological traits of a leader can be analyzed from a distance because of inability to official access to the leader. While I have no any official evidence and access to Bush, I use this method in order to interpret his conceptual complexity, self-confidence traits and hard-power discourse.

6. Data Collection

The data, which measures President Bush's conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits, is collected from American Rhetoric.com (see detailed list of the speeches in Appendix A). It covers public speeches, interviews, responses in press conferences or in radio programs of George W. Bush from December 13, 2000 presidential nomination victory speech to 2020 in script and audio versions. However, in order to measure my hypotheses, I use three phases:

First phase: From December 13, 2000-, presidential nomination victory speech to September 11, 2001- Remarks on WTC Attacks at Booker T. Elementary School

Second phase: From 11 September 2001- Remarks on WTC Attacks at Booker T. Elementary School to January 8, 2002- No Child Left Behind Act Signing Address

Third phase: From January 8, 2002- No Child Left Behind Act Signing Address to 17 March 2003- Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein Address to the Nation

While the first phase includes seven speeches, the second phase covers 15 and the third phase is formed by 12 scripts. In the third phase, 3 speeches of Bush were excluded because their script versions were not available (only audio form). Unit of the content analysis is word counting by looking at the frequencies of the words (see the codebook in Appendix B). Furthermore, during the collection of the data, some sentences were excluded from the collected scripts. For instance, during the Bush's visit to workers, the sentences of workers, or during a press conference, sentences of the journalists were excluded.

7. Data Analysis

In order to analyze George W. Bush's conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits, three phases were investigated separately. As it is mentioned above, "absolutely, without a doubt, certainly and irreversible" words were coded under conceptual complexity trait in accordance with Hermann's (2005) manual. On the other side, "my, myself, I, me and mine" words were counted and coded in order to measure Bush's self-confidence trait.

For conceptual complexity, the word 'absolutely' is used by Bush for the one time, without doubt/there is no doubt words were used two times. 'Certainly' word has the highest ranking among other coded words with six times. Furthermore, certainly word, which indicate completely opposite meaning from his self-confidence, were excluded for instance, "Many people are finding that the more they know about stem cell research, the less certain they are about the right ethical and moral conclusions". When self-confidence trait was analyzed in the first phase, it is observed that frequencies of 'my' is 73, 'myself' is 0, 'I' 141, 'me' is 23 and 'mine' is 2. Furthermore, for this step, it is also

observed that Bush intensely uses 'my administration' instead of 'we' which might increase more his self-confidence.

In the second phase, the words of conceptual complexity "absolutely, without a doubt, certainly and irreversible" were counted. According to counting, frequencies of 'absolutely' is 2, 'without doubt/no doubt' is 3, 'certainly' is 9, 'irreversible' is 0. About conceptual complexity, besides certainly words, some of the words such as 'it is certain' were also coded under conceptual complexity. In the analysis of self-confidence in the second phase, the frequencies of 'my' is 70, 'myself' is 2, 'I' is 238, 'me' is 19 and 'mine' is 0.

In the last phase, while the word 'absolutely' was not used by George W. Bush, the frequencies of the words 'without doubt/there is no doubt' are 6, 'certainly/it is certain' is 10 and 'irreversible' is 0. When self-confidence trait words were analyzed, it is observed that the frequencies of 'my' is 77, 'myself' and 'mine' are 0, 'I' is 257, and 'me' is 13. When all of these three phases were analyzed, frequencies of the conceptual complexity's and self-confidence's words turned into percentage in order to provide more clear numbers in comparison of the phases.

In order to analyze the dependent variable of two hypothesis, decision of Iraq War 'army, strike, operation, security, enemy, Iraq, weapon' words counted. In the first phase the frequencies of army, strike, enemy, Iraq words are 0, operation is 1, security is 18 however, none of them is included under hard power discourse because while he mentions security, he refers to Medicare social and health security. The frequency of weapon word is 2. In the second phase which includes September 11 terrorist attacks, frequencies of army is 1, strike is 11, operation is 3, security is 25, enemy is 17, Iraq is 6, weapon is 28. In the last phase, the frequencies of army are 2, strike is 10, operation is 10, security is 106, enemy is 9, Iraq is 220, weapon is 125. For the first insight, I assume that President Bush made Iraq war decision in the last phase, between the years 2002 and 2003, rather than post-September 11 period.

Table 1: George W. Bush's conceptual complexity and self-confidence scores by percentage

PHASES	<i>Conceptual complexity</i>	<i>Self-confidence</i>	<i>Hard-power discourse</i>
<i>Phase 1</i>	% 0.05	% 1.15	% 0.02
<i>Phase 2</i>	% 0.06	% 1.4	% 0.43
<i>Phase 3</i>	% 0.07	% 1.9	% 1.6

Although it is recognized that there has been little room for possibility of change in the leadership traits of a leader, I believe that contextual factors might trigger the changes within their characteristics. Correspondingly, Van Esch and Swinkels (2015) argue that the scores in traits of some leaders might be more changeable, due to this change, a leader's leadership style might not remain same through the time. By considering this feature of LTA, these little changes among traits between the phases were the expected outcome (I did not assume major changes within Bush's traits).

When Table 1 is analyzed, conceptual complexity of George W. Bush increased from .05 to .07. By considering the words of 'low conceptual complexity' were analyzed, it means that George Bush uses the words of low conceptual complexity more through the phases. In other words, President Bush uses more low conceptual complexity words between the years January 8, 2002 and March 17, 2003 compare to the years between 2000 and 2002. On the other side, self-confidence score of President Bush from December 2000 to September 11, 2001 increases gradually between the time period of 11 September 2001 - January 2002 and January 2002- March 17, 2003.

When hard power discourse was analyzed, there is significant increase in hard-power discourse after second phase which covers September 11 terrorist attacks. However, when their frequencies are considered, it is observed that George W. Bush uses hard power discourse in the third phase approximately five times more than the second phase (frequencies of hard power words: second phase 91, third phase 482). To conclude, from the content analysis, it is observed that George W.

Bush's low conceptual complexity discourse and self-confidence trait increased gradually with his hard power discourse from 2000 to March 17, 2003 speech - Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein.

8. Discussion

While leaders whose conceptual complexity is low highly associated with trusting their intuition and they are more tend to choose the option, which presents itself first. Moreover, these leaders evaluate the information according to their stereotypes and categorizations. Correspondingly, leaders who have high self-confidence are less likely to seek more information or less likely to evaluate different options during the foreign policy decision-making process. Following Hermann's (2005) footsteps, she argues that conceptual complexity and self-confidence are intensely interrelated items, which are linked with openness to information.

Table 2: Hermann's Rules for Determining Openness to Information

Scores on Conceptual Complexity & Self-confidence	Openness to Contextual Information
Conceptual Complexity > Self-Confidence	Open
Self-Confidence > Conceptual Complexity	Closed
Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence both high	Open
Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence both low	Closed

While my analysis indicated that President Bush's self-confidence is higher than his conceptual complexity in the third phase, I can interpret that during decision-making process Bush was closed to information. Similarly, Hermann (2005) describes these leaders as follows.

“Such leaders are fairly unresponsive or insensitive to cues from the environment. Instead, they reinterpret the environment to fit their view of the world. Moreover, they are not above using coercive or devious tactics to ensure that their views are adopted by a group. Indeed, they are highly active on behalf of their cause, eagerly pursuing options they believe will succeed. These leaders are more likely to organize the

decision-making process in a hierarchical manner in order to maintain control over the nature of the decision”.

Hermann, 2005; p.18

To sum, by considering the outcome of the content analysis, I assume that while Bush's conceptual complexity decreases, self-confidence increases during the third phase. Correspondingly his hard power discourses also increased from 2000 to 2003. Therefore, I assume that low conceptual complexity and high self-confidence lead to Bush's closeness to information and possible alternatives. He made the decision of Iraq War, which is considered as a mistake by both Bush administration and the US public later.

I believe that through this analysis, I could explain the decision-making process of invasion to Iraq by focusing on openness to information in addition to conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits. In other words, openness to information might be considered as the last piece of my puzzle, which tries to view decision-making process of Iraq War.

9. Conclusion

There is little doubt that September 11 terrorist attacks to World Trade Center and Pentagon might be considered as a milestone, which has changed world politics in significant manner. Afterwards the attacks, which had nearly 3000 casualties, American foreign policy has radically changed. American foreign policy not only changed in terms of priorities and goals but also Bush and his administration started to follow more aggressive and expansionist policies in foreign affairs. One of the significant decisions that indicate aggressiveness of the US foreign policy was certainly Iraq War. Remarkable number of studies have proved that role of President Bush cannot be underestimated during the decision-making process of the invasion. The way of his justification the invasion and his ability to mobilize the media and public opinion enabled him to make the decision the most important war in current American history since the Vietnam War.

There are increasing number of studies that focus on individual level in foreign policy analysis literature and analyzing George W. Bush's personality took many researches' attention. While various strategies has been used by foreign policy researchers, leadership traits analysis is one of the most common methods which provides detailed information through its seven items. This study also used LTA and tried to provide insights about George W. Bush's conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits by considering his power discourse in order to analyze the decision making process of Iraq War through content analysis. In this direction, the years between 2000 and 2003 are divided into three different phases. While the first phase starts with his first presidential nomination victory speech in 2002 to 11 September 2001, the second phase was analyzed from September 2001 to January 2002. The last phase covers the years between 2002 and 17 March 2003 (his ultimatum to Saddam Hussein).

As result of conducted content analysis of these three phases, it is observed that President Bush's low conceptual complexity score increased between the years 2002 and 17 March 2003 compare to the other phases. Furthermore, it is detected that Bush's self-confidence traits gradually increased through the three phases. When George Bush's hard power discourse is examined, the analysis proved that after September 11, his words related with hard power increased, hence it reaches peak point between the years 2002 and 17 March 2003 among all the phases. When I found out that between the years 2002 and 17 March 2003 George W. Bush's conceptual complexity decreases and his self-confidence increases, I added Hermann's openness to information model into the analysis. I conclude that, during the third phase, his openness to information trait diminished and by doing so, he made invasion decision more easily because perhaps he did not evaluate other options or possibilities. In other words, as Hermann (2005) argues leaders whose self-confidence traits are higher than their conceptual complexity, they tend to choose the first option according to their stereotypes. To sum, because of his low conceptual complexity and high self-confidence, George W. Bush closed himself to more options, and he chose the first and the only option that came to his mind: the war.

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APPENDIX A (Analyzed list of George W. Bush's speeches)

First Phase (13 December 2000 - 11 September 2001)

13 December 2000	Presidential Nomination Victory Speech
20 January 2001	First Presidential Inaugural Address
22 January 2001	White House Staff Swearing In Ceremony Address
29 January 2001	Faith Based Initiatives Executive Order Signing Speech
01 February 2001	First National Prayer Breakfast Address
27 February 2001	Joint Session of Congress Address
09 August 2001	Stem Cell Research Address to the Nation

Second Phase (11 September 2001- 8 January 2002)

11 September 2001	Remarks on WTC Attacks at Booker T. Elementary School
11 September 2001	Remarks on the WTC Attacks at Barksdale AFB
11 September 2001	Address to the Nation on the WTC Attacks
14 September 2001	Bullhorn Address to Ground Zero Workers
14 September 2001	9/11 Prayer and Remembrance Ceremony Address
15 September 2001	First Radio Address Post 9/11
17 September 2001	Address at the Islamic Center of Washington, D.C
20 September 2001	Post 9/11 Address to a Joint Session of Congress
07 October 2001	Operation Enduring Freedom Address to the Nation
11 October 2001	Pentagon Memorial Ceremony Address
11 October 2001	Prime Time News Conference on War on Terrorism
26 October 2001	USA Patriot Act Signing Address
10 November 2001	First Address to the United Nations General Assembly

APPENDIX B (CODEBOOK of the Content Analysis)

Codes (Conceptual Complexity)	Examples
Absolutely	I am absolutely determined, absolutely determined to rout terrorism out where it exists and bring them to justice.
Without a doubt/ there is no doubt	And Iraq’s state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons.
Certainly/it is certain	This nation respects and trusts our military, and we are confident in your victories to come. This war will take many turns we cannot predict. Yet I am certain of this
Irreversible	
Codes (Self-confidence)	Examples
My	As a symbol of America’s resolve, my administration will work with Congress
Myself	Baby boomers such as myself, were used to getting caught in a quagmire of Vietnam where politics made decisions more than the military sometimes
I	I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty.
Me	I ask the House and Senate to join me in the next bold steps to serve our fellow citizens.
Mine	And that’s why two administrations -- mine and President Clinton’s
Codes (Hard Power Discourse)	Examples
Army	With all in the United States Army, you will stand between your fellow citizens and grave danger.
Strike	Military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world
Operation	I’ve talked to many countries that are interested in making sure that the post-operations Afghanistan is one that is stable, and one that doesn’t become yet again a haven for terrorist criminals.
Security	Our security will require transforming the military you will lead.
Enemy	The man and women of our Armed Forces have delivered a message now clear to every enemy of the United States
Iraq	Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.
Weapon	By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.

The Important Question: Why and How Croatia Got Acceptance Whilst Serbia and Bosnia Denied By EU

M. Furkan Durmaz¹

¹Turkish-German University, furkan.durmaz@yeditepe.edu.tr

Abstract

As it known, Balkan countries have always been in an important position for the EU. Especially with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the EU has introduced its policies to these countries and provided economic and social assistance for them. Thanks to these aids, most countries have converged to the EU. However, at this point, the different policies pursued by the countries and the countries that support or do not support the countries have played an important role in the EU membership process. The point that is especially taken into consideration here is that although most of the Western Balkan countries have started their EU membership processes in the same period, some of them became successful at this point while others have failed. Particularly in this process, the concept of Europeanization and the European identity become effective. This situation is examined in this study in terms of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. This study tries to answer the question of why and how Croatia got acceptance whilst Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina denied by EU. To examine this question, Europeanization and European identity will be crucial.

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Önemli Soru: Sırbistan ve Bosna AB Tarafından Reddedilirken Hırvatistan Neden ve Nasıl Kabul Edildi?

Öz

Bilindiği üzere Balkan ülkeleri her zaman AB için önemli bir konumda olmuşlardır. Özellikle Yugoslavya'nın dağılmasıyla Avrupa Birliği kendi politikalarını bu ülkelere tanıtmış ve onlara ekonomik ve sosyal yardım sağlamıştır. Bu yardımlar sayesinde çoğu ülke AB'ye yaklaşmıştır. Ancak bu noktada, ülkelerin ve ülkeleri destekleyen veya desteklemeyen ülkelerin izlediği farklı politikalar AB üyelik sürecinde önemli rol oynamıştır. Burada dikkate alınan nokta, Batı Balkan ülkelerinin çoğu aynı dönemde AB üyelik süreçlerine başlamış olsa da, bazıları bu noktada başarılı olurken, diğerleri başarısız olmuştur. Özellikle bu süreçte Avrupalılaştırma kavramı ve Avrupa kimliği etkili olmaktadır. Bu durum bu çalışmada, Sırbistan, Bosna-Hersek ve Hırvatistan açısından incelenmiştir. Ancak bu noktada, ülkelerin ve ülkeleri destekleyen veya desteklemeyen ülkelerin izlediği farklı politikalar, AB üyelik sürecinde önemli rol oynamıştır. Burada özellikle dikkate alınan nokta, Batı Balkan ülkelerinin çoğu aynı dönemde AB üyelik süreçlerine başlamış olsa da, bazıları bu noktada başarılı olurken, diğerleri başarısız olmuştur. Özellikle bu süreçte Avrupalılaştırma kavramı ve Avrupa kimliği etkili olmaktadır. Bu durum bu çalışmada Sırbistan, Bosna-Hersek ve Hırvatistan açısından incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma, Sırbistan ve Bosna-Hersek AB tarafından reddedilirken Hırvatistan'ın neden ve nasıl kabul edildiği sorusunu yanıtlamaya çalışır. Bu soruyu incelemek için Avrupalılaştırma ve Avrupa kimliği çok önemli olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Hırvatistan, Sırbistan, Bosna Hersek, Avrupalılaştırma, Avrupa Kimliği

1. Introduction

European Union (EU) has an impact on many countries concerning many policy areas. Since the establishment of the EU, it has tried to integrate other countries to European norms and rules. The idea of a united Europe started in 1957 with the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). After that, this community began to change its structure and name. When the historical background of the evolution of the EU is examined step by step, communities which are established into the European system are crucial. For example, the ECSC transformed to European Economic Community (EEC), and EEC was reconstructed as EU. In these changes, there is one common feature for the EU. This feature is concept of member states. EU aggregated 28 members with the membership of Croatia. This situation is named the last enlargement for it. It experienced six enlargement processes until this time. The most critical enlargement actualized in 2004 for the Union. With this situation, Central-Eastern European states joined the EU. The central policy of the Union about member states started to change, and the importance of Balkans increased for it. 2004 and 2007 enlargements were problematic because states which joined the EU had problems economic and political. These countries had also trouble regarding *acquis communautaire*. For such reasons, these enlargements were criticized by many people. For understanding the situation of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia, enlargements which actualized in 2004 and 2007 should be examined. Locations of Balkans are essential for the EU because Balkans provide the connection with the East for Europe (Akçay, 2016). For this reason, strategy of the Union about Balkans always remain on the agenda. In this sense, the importance of Western Balkans states which is composed of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia increased. (Şahin, 2013).

This article tries to explain the circumstances of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia about membership to the EU. Croatia became a member of the Union in July 2013. Serbia and Bosnia couldn't gain the status of membership yet. Serbia took the status of the candidate in 2012 (European Commission, 2018). Bosnia applied to EU for full membership in 2016

(European Commission, 2018). There are differences between these countries with regards to being members of Union, for this reason, the primary question of this study will explain why and how Croatia got acceptance whilst Serbia and Bosnia denied by EU.

For examining this question, constructivism will be used as a theoretical framework. Particularly norms and culture will be the two main concepts to answer the research question. This article consists of three main parts. First, the importance of Balkan States for the EU will be discussed. In the second part, the application process of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia will be explained one by one. In the third part, the research question of this essay will be analyzed to understand the reasons behind the rejection of Serbia and Bosnia by EU.

Identity is considered as integration, not decomposition in construction. It is aimed that the peoples of Europe feel themselves belonging to the Union and thus to form their interests and actions on this basis. After the creation of the identity, it was determined to determine the interests for the good of this identity and put it into action in the practical field. Constructivism therefore differs from power-based approaches such as realism. It refers to a process of international relations where norms and order are at the forefront instead of power. It handles this process with the contribution of non-state actors. At this point, the fact that the how the concept of European identity affects these countries in terms of membership to the EU will be examined in this article.

2. The Importance of Balkan States for the EU

Balkans is a strategic region for EU. When Balkan region is examined in terms of history, the dissolution of Yugoslavia is a topic which should be investigated. Balkans created some concepts in people minds like war and conflict. For example, the Kosovo problem between Serbia and Kosovo, nationalism between Croatia and Slovenia created ideas about Balkans in 1980s. In the 1980s the impact of communism started to decrease in Balkans and democratization process began. For this reason the interest of Union fronted to Balkan region. In 1999 EU started Stabilization and Association process with Balkans (Munter, 2018). Ac-

tually as a location Balkan region has significance for Union because, the problems which will actualize in Balkan region like internal conflicts can spread to Europe. After dissolution of Yugoslavia, EU started to make some policies for Balkan region.

Until 2005 there was external relationship between EU and Balkans but after 2005 Balkans were included enlargement strategy of Union (Karluk, 2015). After this situation enlargement process for Balkans started and the EU started to work on integrating Balkan countries into the union. In this point, the concept of integration became crucial to understand relations between EU and Balkan states. According to Alijevic integration means that protecting peace in member state (Alijevic, 2012). The strategy of EU is trying to provide peace in Balkans. Also there are crucial economic and political relations between Balkans and Europe. For this reason EU is not just neighbor for Balkans but also it is a partner for Europe (Gyamfi et al., 2016.).

Balkans became part of EU. The interest of Union about Balkans started after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The important event for Balkans for EU was Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 (Gyamfi et al., 2016.). With this Summit the future of Balkan states gained effectualness.

2.1. Serbia

Serbia is an important country for Balkans. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia gravitates to Europe. The relations between Serbia and the Union started in the 2000s (Akçay, 2016). After the fall of Sloban Miletovic's regime, Serbia started to focus on the EU. (European Court of Auditors, 2014). In 2003 the image of Serbia in the eyes of EU changed due to the assassination of Zoran Djindjic who was Prime Minister of Serbia (Economides & James, 2015). EU initiated the stabilization and association process in 1999. The desire of this situation provided peace and democracy in Balkans (Karluk, 2015). In 2008 EU was signed stabilization and association agreement with Serbia. With this agreement, the relations between the Union and Serbia were getting better. Serbia took some instigation from the EU about Kosovo issue and war criminals. (European Court of Auditors, 2014). Serbia obtained

significant success in EU way. In 2009 Serbia deserved free travel in the Schengen area. 2009 was an important date because Serbia gained both visa liberation and applied EU (The Delegation of the European Union to The Republic of Serbia, n.d.). In 2011, two arrestments were crucial for Serbia. First one was on 26 May when Ratko Mladic who is Bosnian Serb war criminal was arrested (BBC News, 2011). The second one was on 20 July. Goran Hadzic who was the last Yugoslav war jail-breaker was arrested (The Guardian, 2011). These issues prompted to new relations between Serbia and EU. On 12 October 2011 Commission presented a positive opinion about Serbia and it proposed that Serbia should take the status of the candidate (European Council Council of The European Union, n.d.). Serbia started to progress in the way of the EU. The European Council asserted Serbia as EU candidate country. In 2013 the European Council initiated accession negotiations with Serbia (Council of The European Union, 2014). The first intergovernmental conference which indicated Serbia's accession negotiations actualized in 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Serbia, n.d.). After 2014 Serbia has continued to be integrated into the EU.

2.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) has experienced great troubles throughout its history and it became distanced from Europe due to these troubles (Koeth, 2012). Wars determined future of BIH. Bosnia stayed isolated because of wars until 1995 Dayton Agreement. The relations between EU and BIH started in 1992. EU started to give humanitarian aid to BIH after Dayton Agreement (Akçay, 2017). With this aids BIH started to affiliate EU. In 2003 BIH was accepted as potential candidate country in EU (Commission, 2003). BIH has remarkable features which separate BIH from other countries in terms of its political structure. For this reason BIH has different structure for EU. When historical background of BIH is investigated, another important date was 2012. In this date EU and BIH started High Level Dialogue which aims to assist for EU accession process in terms of their responsibilities (Delegation of The European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012). BIH

tried to implement responsibilities which were determined by EU but there were some problems in terms of these responsibilities. For example there were three promoter communities which are determined as Bosnians, Croats and Serbians in constitution of BIH. According to this constitution, apart from these three ethnic groups, other groups cannot be elected to high level public service (Akçay, 2017). EU requested changes in this article but according to progressive report of commission about BIH, this demand didn't actualize (European Commission, 2016). In contrary to this some improvements came true in BIH according to 2016 Commission report but these improvements were not enough for membership. There are still absences in terms of political and economic criteria for BIH. For this reason Bosnia and Herzegovina is waiting as a potential candidate country.

2.3. Croatia

Croatia is the last country to join the EU. When relations between Croatia and EU are examined, there was wavy relationship between EU and Croatia. Croatia experienced many wars and conflicts like other Balkan countries. These conflicts and wars created political and economic problems in Croatia. In 2001 the stabilization and association agreement was signed between Union and Croatia. In 2003 Croatia applied for membership (Ott, 2006). In 2005, accession negotiations started for Croatia (Toygür & Atak, 2009). Croatia tried to be integrated to *acquis communautaire*. The role of Iva Sanader who was prime minister of Croatia in 2003 was crucial regarding EU. After Sanader came to head of government, the relations with EU were established and discrimination to Serbs finished (Altun, 2013). In accession process the important expectation of Union was that assisting to International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by Croatia in the topic of arresting General Ante Gotovina (Schimmelfennig, 2011). The positive report which was offered by ICTY chief prosecutor to EU, the negotiations between Croatia and Union started in 2005 (Republic of Croatia Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, n.d.). The important mission for Croatia was adapting Croatia's laws with *acquis*. In 2011

member states of EU took a decision about closing accession negotiations of Croatia (European Commission, 2011). Croatia became member to EU in 2013 thus EU aggregated 28 member states. Consequently, Croatia became successful. With this enlargement EU established relationship with Croatia which is different country in terms of its structure. In other words a country which has different social norms joined the EU (Altun, 2013).

3. The Important Question: Why and How Croatia Got Acceptance Whilst Serbia and Bosnia Denied by EU

As a supranational organization, the EU continues its political initiatives to expand its impact on the continent. Limited reformist efforts in the western Balkan countries on the European continent are likely to be slow and the transformation process is slow. In addition to the institutions and social reflexes shaped by socialism, this descriptive and classifying effect of ethnic identities continues in terms of Balkans. As mentioned above Balkan region is important for EU in terms of its location. For this reason EU has made many policies for Balkan states. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia the importance of Balkans increased and many Balkan countries started to endeavour for accession to EU. Especially with joining of Croatia to EU, many Balkan countries became more hopeful about joining to the EU. In this part success of Croatia in EU membership and failures of Serbia and Bosnia in EU way will be examined.

Actually the accession process to EU bases on some features like norms. For this reason the theory of constructivism has an impact in the membership process of EU. Firstly when the constructivism is investigated, norms which are determined as proper behavior for identity is a focal point for constructivism. (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The main purpose of EU in accession process is creating European identity for candidate countries. For this reason the accession process of candidate countries progress regarding European identity. For this essay the membership of Croatia and the failures of Serbia and Bosnia in EU way is an important because these topics will be explained in terms of their identities, norms and religions thanks to constructivism.

Firstly relations between Serbia and EU can be described as problematic because of Kosovo problem (Akçay, 2017). Without Kosovo problem, there are many problems which affect accession process of Serbia. For example executive, rule of law, corruption, organized crimes, freedom of expression, economy and foreign policy are problematic topics for Serbia. (Russell, 2018). When the accession process of Serbia is examined, it is possible to say that, Serbia couldn't be successful. For understanding situation of Serbia in EU regarding constructivism, Europeanization and euroscepticism should be the main point. In Serbia nationalism is crucial for politics. For this reason many political parties support priority of nation instead of priority of EU (Sağiroğlu, 2017). The concept of identity came up in this situation. Serbia moves away from EU due to nationalism. In accordance with these information, Serbia should be integrated to European norms for membership and she should complete all criteria of EU. The main argument of Serbia's accession can be described as creating European identity. The topic of failure of Serbia in European way emphasizes that Serbia stayed far from EU because Europeanization didn't progress and Euroscepticism started in public. For this reason Serbia couldn't be successful like Croatia in accession process and she couldn't find enough support from other European states.

Secondly BIH is a different country for EU because of religion. When demographic features of BIH are investigated, it is possible to say that majority of people in BIH is Muslim. The accession process is slow for BIH. As it's known, there are some criteria for being member of EU. BIH failed about completing these criteria because after Dayton Agreement, solution for political instability couldn't be found (Ağca, 2010). This situation can be explained as main problem. Also there are some problems in minority rights, economic and political situations (European Commission, 2018). The main barrier for BIH in accession process is political problems but nationalism is other important factor for BIH. The relations between BIH and EU can associated with self-interests. In other words membership doesn't provide any interest for BIH (Uğurkan, 2015). This situation initiated Euroscepticism in BIH. It can

be said that, some factors like nationalism and identity affect the position of BIH in EU. That is to say, the concept of identity and nationalism may create failure for BIH. According to citizens, the problems of BIH can't be solved with EU. For this reason these situations explain the failure of BIH in EU (Turčilo, 2013).

Lastly Croatia is a member of EU. There are differences between Croatia and other Balkan countries in terms of Europeanization. Actually during the accession process Croatia started to improve its economy and social structure (Hahn, 2013). Indeed the most important thing which affect the accession of Croatia to EU is Europeanization. According to Croatia, Europe can be described as political and cultural home (Subotic, 2011). That is to say the Europeanization patterns occurred in Croatia before the membership. In this part it should be emphasized that, the effect of Germany for accession of Croatia bases on historical partnership. In 1991 Germany supported to separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia. Croatia started to close Europe because the support of Germany created trust. Consequently, Croatia followed successful policies for EU. After separation from Yugoslavia, it tried to establish relations with Europe thanks to Germany. The European identity came up in Croatia and it affected people life. For this reason Croatia is different from Serbia and BIH in terms of accession process.

4. Conclusion

As a conclusion, Balkans has importance for EU. After dissolution of Yugoslavia, EU followed some policies about Balkans and it tried to integrate these countries to EU. In this essay the success of Croatia and the failure of Serbia and BIH was examined. In the light of this investigation, it can be said that every states followed different policies for EU and EU has different idea about these states. In this study the reasons of failure of Serbia and BIH and the success of Croatia was explained.

In this sense, it can be said that the concept of Europeanization in terms of identity is important because Croatia feels itself as European for this reason, it tried to integrate European norms. That is to say, when the situation of Croatia in terms of Europeanization is examined, suc-

cess of the Croatia bases on its identity. Since Croatia feels intensely on European identity, they have easily advanced the Europeanization process. At this point, it has been easy for Croatia that has internalized European norms and values to become a member of the EU. Also public opinion affected this situation. In contrary to this in Serbia and BIH, situation is different. The incomplete process of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of the EU in particular is due to the fact that these countries do not fully realize the concept of Europeanization. They failed in this process, especially since these countries did not realize their policies and norms and rules at the same level with the EU, and because they did not fully integrate and internalize the norms into their communities. In short, the success of Croatia bases on identity which is about constructivism. So, at this point, the creation of European identity has been effective in the candidacy processes of the countries and the EU accession processes. In this context, Croatia, which has established its European identity well, has been successful in the EU process, unlike Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is to say, Croatia, which has completed a Europeanization process based on certain stages with the fulfillment of the conditions given by the EU, has been successful in the membership process. At this point, Croatia, with the support of other countries existing in the EU, has easily completed this process. On the contrary, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are in a problematic situation with EU rules and norms, have still not succeeded in the membership process. Due to this incompatibility, these two countries, which could not complete the Europeanization process successfully, remained far from the EU. The main conclusion reached at this point was the success of the Croatia, who integrates European identity well, and the failure of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were further away in that period.

In general, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, which could not meet the requirements of Europeanization, remained away from the membership path. Particularly in this process, the integration of European rules and norms is an important point for membership. In this case, the situation of creating European identity in countries is an ac-

celerating factor of this integration. In other words, a country that has established its European identity well completes the Europeanization process rapidly and reaches membership faster. It can be said in the light of this information that Croatia has completed this process rapidly and a European identity has been established in the society. This situation occurred with the integration. However, the fact that the same situation did not happen in Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina kept these two countries away from membership.

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1. Dergiye gönderilen makalelerin daha önce yayımlanmış ya da başka bir dergide yayımlanmak üzere değerlendirme aşamasına girmiş olmaması gerekmektedir. Dergide sadece Türkçe ve İngilizce makalelere yer verilmektedir.
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Makaleler, açıkça tanımlanmış ve numaralanmış şekilde bölünmelidir. Alt başlıklar 1.1. (sonra 1.1.1., 1.1.2., ...), 1.2., vs. (özet, bölüm numaralarına dahil değildir) şeklinde numaralandırılır. Bu numaralandırma metin içi atıflar için de gereklidir: sadece 'metin' referans gösterilemez. Herhangi bir alt konu kısa başlıkla verilebilir. Her başlık kendisine ait farklı satırda yer almalıdır.

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 - 2,5 cm sol, üst, sağ ve alt kenar boşlukları kullanılmalıdır.
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- Makaleler Times New Roman karakterinde 12 punto olarak yazılmalıdır. Aşağıda belirtilenler dışında:
 - Makalenin ana başlığı ortalanmış ve 14 punto, kalın font kullanılarak yazılmalıdır.
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4. Birinci sayfa şunları içermelidir:

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- Anahtar kelimeler.

5. Atıf yapılmayan eserler kaynakçada kullanılmamalıdır. Atıf yapılan kaynak yayınlanmış veya yayınlanmak için kabul edilmiş olmalıdır. Bütün atıflar metin içinde kullanılmalıdır (dipnotlarda değil) ve aşağıdaki örneklerdeki gibi olmalıdır:

- ... Romer'da (1989) olduğu gibi, ölçeye göre artan gelirler sergilenmiştir.
- ... Pagano (1993) tarafında geliştirilen...
- ... bu teknik, son araştırmalarda (Choong ve diğerleri, 2010; Azman-Saini ve diğerleri, 2010; Kyaw ve Macdonald 2009) şunun için...

Kaynakçadaki eserler, çalışmanın ilk yazarının soyadına göre sıralanmalıdır. Birden fazla yazarlı yayınlarda, ilk yazar aynı kişiye ikinci, üçüncü vb. diğer yazarların soyadları dikkate alınmalıdır. Aynı yazara ait yayınlara tarih sırasına göre sıralanmalıdır.

6. Denklemler yeni bir satırda, birbirini izleyen numaralarla, sağ kenara hizalanmış parantez içinde sayı kullanılarak verilmelidir.
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8. Şekiller bütün örneklemeleri içerir (örneğin; grafikler, haritalar, tablolar, fotoğraflar, çizimler vb.). Şekiller, “Şekil” olarak etiketlenmeli ve şeklin altında sola hizalı, numaralandırılmalı ve hepsi italik olmalıdır. Altyazı ve/veya gösterge girdisi, kullanılan figürün ve/veya sembolün kısa bir açıklaması etiketten sonra, sola hizalı olmalıdır.
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