JDR

Journal *of* Diplomatic Research
Diplomasi Araştırmaları Dergisi

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ABOUT

Journal of Diplomatic Research (JDR) is an international peer-reviewed academic journal published electronically on a biannual basis by the Association for Research on Diplomacy (DARD). Concordantly, JDR is open to all original studies on international relations, political science as well as theoretical, historical and methodological studies on diplomacy.

GOAL AND SCOPE

The goal of JDR is to present to the audience the studies on diplomatic history, diplomacy theories, diplomacy studies with quantitative, qualitative and integrated research methods, military diplomacy as well as other interdisciplinary diplomatic research and book reviews.

In this context, JDR stands as an international peer-reviewed academic journal bringing together scientists analyzing the phenomenon of diplomacy from all perspectives.

Diplomatic history, diplomatic theory and new diplomacy types form the primary area of investigation. Principally, JDR presents to its audience the information and understanding in the framework of:

Structural problematiques of the subject of diplomacy, latest understandings, theories and concepts on diplomacy, traditional research on diplomacy, diplomacy law and history, case studies on diplomatic processes and negotiations, application of various research methods on diplomatic research

TYPES OF ARTICLES

JDR accepts four different types of articles and book reviews. The articles include:

Original/Research Article: It is a scientific research article explaining an original argument, event or behavior from a specific theoretical perspective by using accurate methodologies. It is aimed to justify a general or a specific behavior based on the methods used, i.e. quantitative, qualitative or integrated methods. The primary objective of original articles within the scope of diplomatic research is to use primary data and appropriate methodology. This type of original and research articles is encouraged by the journal.

Review Article: This type of studies intended merely for introductory purposes, present an extensive summary on a specific event, phenomena or field. Following an extensive literature review with the purpose of informing audience on any subject related to diplomacy, these studies evaluate the current status of events, phenomena or the field. These studies research out to a wide audience and form the basis for original/research articles on the same subject.

Case Study: This type of studies involves the analysis of single cases or the comparison of different cases of similar nature intending to explain various outcomes of such a comparison. Case studies with an appropriate method presents to audience different perspectives and contributes theoretically to the field.

Methodological Study: These studies aim to test a specific method used in different disciplines or currently used in other fields of social sciences in the context of this specific field of research. The original methodologies of various fields such as anthropology, statistics, psychology and mathematics can be used in research on diplomacy.

Book Review: This type of studies aims to form a view on newly published books with a potential to contribute greatly to the field literature, identify differences and similarities with previously published books, and fill in the gap in the literature.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

❖ Articles and book reviews submitted to JDR should comply with APA 6 submission guidelines. Endnote or Mendeley APA 6th applications are suitable with the submission guidelines of the JDR. Detailed information on our journal listed below.

❖ The main text should include the following format: 1.5 line spacing, Times New Roman with 11 type size.

❖ Information on the type of the submitted work and the word count should be stated at the top left corner of the main text.

❖ Word counting includes bibliography and appendix: Number of words for submissions are as follows: original/research article 6.000-10.000, review article, 5.000-8.000, case studies 5.000-8.000, methodological studies 6.000-10.000, book reviews 2.000-4.000.

❖ Each paper must include 150 words English and Turkish written abstract and 750 words extended English summary if the paper was written in Turkish language.

❖ References

Authors should comply with the draft of American Psychological Association (APA) publication guideline. Link for APA guideline: www.apastyle.org

❖ Bibliography

Bibliography should include all the sources referenced to in the text. Journal and book titles should be in italic font. Bibliography should be in alphabetical order by author's surname. If reference is given to the same author's different works, a chronological order (most recent work first) should be followed. Page numbers should be provided for periodicals and chapters in edited books.

HAKKINDA

Diplomasi Araştırmaları Dergisi – Journal of Diplomatic Research (JDR), Diplomasi Araştırmaları Derneği (DARD) tarafından elektronik ortamda, yılda iki kez yayınlanan, uluslararası hakemli bir akademik dergidir. Bu bağlamda JDR, uluslararası ilişkiler ve siyaset bilimi başta olmak üzere diplomasi alanına ilişkin kavramsal, teorik, tarihsel ve metodolojik tüm özgün çalışmalara açıktır.

AMAÇ VE KAPSAM

JDR'nin amacı diplomasi tarihi, diplomasi teorileri, nicel, nitel ve karma araştırma yöntemlerini kullanan diplomasi araştırmaları, askeri diplomasi ve diğer interdisipliner diplomatik araştırmalar ile kitap incelemelerini, akademik bir okuyucu kitlesi ile buluşturmayı amaç edinmiştir. Bu bağlamda JDR, kapsamlı bir çerçevede diplomasi olgusunu tüm açılardan inceleyen bilim insanlarının buluştuğu uluslararası hakemli akademik bir dergidir. Diplomasi tarihi, teorisi ve yeni diplomasi türleri odaklı çalışmalar JDR'nin temel inceleme alanını oluşturmaktadır. En temel anlamda JDR, okuyuculara aşağıda belirtilen çerçevede bilgi ve fikir sunmaktadır:

Diplomasi konusunun temel problematikleri, diplomasi üzerine en son fikirler, teoriler ve kavramlar, klasik diplomasi çalışmaları, diplomasi hukuku ve tarihi, diplomatik süreçler ve pazarlıklarla ilgili vak'a analizleri, farklı araştırma metotlarının diplomasi araştırmalarına uygulanması

JDR, yukarıda belirtilen çerçevede tarih, siyaset bilimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, hukuk, iktisat, coğrafya, antropoloji, psikoloji, yöntembilim ve ilgili diğer alanların katkısına açık olup, bu alanların akademisyenlerinin birlikte hazırladığı çalışmalar teşvik edilmektedir.

MAKALE TÜRLERİ

JDR, dört tür makale ve kitap incelemelerini kabul etmektedir. Makale çeşitleri:

Orijinal Makale Çalışması: Özgün bir fikri, olayı ya da davranışı uygun bir metodoloji kullanarak, belirli bir teorik perspektifle açıklayan bilimsel araştırma makalesidir. Nicel, nitel ya da karma yöntemler kullanılarak hazırlanan bu çalışmalarda, kullanılan metoda göre genel ya da spesifik bir davranışın açıklanması amaçlanır. Diplomasi araştırmaları kapsamında orijinal makalelerin, birincil verinin kullanılarak hazırlanması ve uygun bir metodoloji kullanılması öncelikli amaçtır. Dergi kapsamında bu tür orijinal makale çalışmaları teşvik edilmektedir.

İnceleme Makalesi: Bu türden çalışmalar belirli bir olaya, olguya ya da alana giriş mahiyetinde olup, kapsamlı bir özet sunar. Diplomasi konusunu içeren herhangi bir konuda okuyucuyu bilgilendirme amaçlı geniş bir literatür taraması sonrasında, olayın, olgunun ya da alanın halihazırdaki durumu değerlendirilir. Bu türden çalışmalar geniş bir okuyucu kitlesine ulaşır ve o alanda yapılacak orijinal araştırma makaleleri için altyapıyı oluşturur.

Vaka İncelemesi: Bu tür çalışmalar, tek bir vak'ayı ya da birbirine benzer nitelikli iki vak'anın mukayesesini içererek birbirinden farklı sonuçların nasıl meydana geldiğini açıklar. Uygun bir metotla yazılan vak'a incelemeleri, okuyucuya farklı perspektifler sunabileceği gibi, teorik olarak da alana katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Metodolojik Çalışma: Farklı disiplinlere ait ya da halihazırda sosyal bilimlerin diğer alanlarında kullanılan bir metodun, alanda kullanılarak test edilmesi amacıyla hazırlanmış çalışmalardır. Diplomasi araştırmalarında antropoloji, istatistik, psikoloji ve matematik gibi birçok alanın özgün metotları, bu kapsamda kullanılabilir.

Kitap Kritiği: Bu tür çalışmalar, alan literatürüne katkı sağlayacağı umulan kitaplar hakkında fikir belirtmek, alanda kendisinden önceki kitaplarla farklarını, benzerlikleri ve literatürde gördüğü boşluğu açıklamak amacıyla yazılır.

YAZIM KURALLARI

- ❖ JDR'ye, gönderilen makale ve kitap incelemeleri, APA 6 yazım kurallarına uygun olmalıdır. Endnote ya da Mendeley APA 6th uygulamaları JDR'nin kabul ettiği yazım kurallarına uygundur.
- ❖ Gönderilen çalışmalar 1,5 satır aralığı, 11 punto ve Times New Roman yazı karakterinde yazılmalıdır.
- ❖ Gönderilen her bir çalışmanın sol üst köşesine, yukarıda bahsedilen makale türü ve kelime sayısı yazılmalıdır.
- ❖ Kelime sayıları kaynakça ve diğer ekler dahil hesaplanır: orijinal araştırma makalesi 6.000-10.000, inceleme makaleleri, 5.000-8.000, vak'a incelemeleri 5.000-8.000, metodolojik çalışmalar 6.000-10.000, kitap incelemeleri ise 2.000-4.000 kelime aralığında olmalıdır.
- ❖ Her bir çalışma için 150 kelimelik Türkçe ve İngilizce özet, eğer çalışma Türkçe ise 750 kelimelik genişletilmiş İngilizce özet gönderimi gerekmektedir.

Örnek yazım kuralları:

- ❖ Atıflar

Yazarlar, yararlandığı kaynakların atıf yazımında Amerikan Psikoloji Birliği (APA) yayın kılavuzu taslağına uymalıdır. APA Kurallarına aşağıdaki web adresinden ulaşılabilir www.apastyle.org

- ❖ Kaynakça

Kaynakça, metin içinde atıf yapılan kaynakların tamamını içermelidir. Dergi ve kitap isimleri italik olmalıdır. Kaynakça, yazar soyadına göre alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır. Bir yazara ait birden fazla esere atıfta bulunulmuşsa yazarın eserleri, en yakın tarihli olandan en eski tarihli olana doğru kronolojik olarak sıralanmalıdır. Süreli yayınlar ve derleme kitaplardaki makaleler için sayfa numaraları belirtilmelidir.

Editorial Introduction

The Editorial Board and I are proud to present the first issue of the *Journal of Diplomatic Research* (JDR) under the aegis of the Association for Research on Diplomacy (DARD). Due to the clear lack of journals solely focusing on academic research on diplomacy, we aim to bring the opportunity to our academic audience of having access to ethical scholarly work on diplomatic history, diplomacy theories, qualitative and quantitative research, military diplomacy, other interdisciplinary diplomatic research.

We are going through a period in which the academic world is increasingly becoming inter-disciplinary. To this end, along with the prevailing articles on diplomacy, in the proceeding volumes of the JDR we intend to provide space for specific areas of research and reviews of the related scholarships for our writers; and send out a call for papers analyzing the phenomenon of diplomacy from all perspectives. Concordantly, JDR is open to all original studies on international relations, political science as well as theoretical, historical and methodological studies on diplomacy. Moreover, I should add that we are committed to a prompt and coherent review process for every piece of article submitted to JDR.

We believe that already with the first issue of the JDR our readers will gain access to exceptional scholarly work on diplomacy. *Joseph M. Siracusa* and *Laurens J. Visser*'s piece on George W. Bush's decision to go War with Iraq and its implications on U.S. diplomacy is a great opening for a debate on the impact and the ramifications of political leadership in and the national foreign policies of states such as the U.S. on international community in general and international organizations such as the UN in specific. *Tarık Oğuzoğlu* effectively provides a conceptual discussion on the impact of the Russian revisionism on Turkey's foreign policies pertaining to its responses to the post-western international order. *Sertan Akbaba*, in his work presents a theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of personification in political leadership by conducting a case study on Vladimir Putin which provides an invaluable insight on discourses on the matter of transformational leadership. *Alptekin Aslantaş*'s piece on the other hand, offers a thorough analysis of the impact of UN peace operations on the capacity development of the Haitian National Police which can be considered as a significant illustration of the transformational and solid impact of the UN on international peace and security. Last but not least, *Kader Özlem* by focusing on the role and the functioning of public diplomacy concerning Bulgaria's policy on the Balkans during GERB governments, sheds light on the role of educational and cultural instruments in the expansion of the influence area of Bulgaria in strategic regions such as the Balkans.

Last but not least, I would like to take the liberty to thank Prof. Dr. Barış ÖZDAL, the President of DARD who has always been diligent with his support since he and I conceived of the idea of the JDR as one of the most important projects and contributions of DARD. I also would like to extent my gratitude to the Editorial Board for their work so far in helping to initiate the JDR. From them I would like to single out in particular Assist. Prof. Dr. Öner AKGÜL as the first Co-Editor of the JDR for his valuable assistance and support in publishing our first issue; and thank our second Co-Editor, Assist. Prof. Dr. Fatma Zeynep ÖZKURT for all of her hard work to ensure the timely completion of this first issue.

Prof. Dr. Ragıp Kutay KARACA

Chief Editor

George W. Bush, Diplomacy, and Going to War with Iraq, 2001 -2003

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Abstract

In 1991, the United Nations Security Council set up a weapons inspection and disarmament regime of Iraq that remained intact for several years before withering under bureaucracy. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the success and failures of this regime were brought into focus as President George W. Bush established leadership at the United Nations and announced an international war on terror. The U. S. deemed these inspections, together with their contemporary incarnation, as less than satisfactory. The result was an obstinate administration, unrestrained by the end of the Cold War, in pursuit of what they deemed an unacceptable threat. The decision to go to War with Iraq ultimately was driven by Bush's belief that Saddam's intentions as Iraqi leader were far more important than his actual capabilities.

Keywords: Iraqi Wars, Weapons of Mass Destruction, George H. W. Bush, George W. Bush and Saddam Hussein

"Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing how the United States is viewed in the region and around the world…Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy."

James A. Baker III. And Lee H. Hamilton (2006)

Unlike his father, George W. Bush lacked the diplomatic acumen to rank among the great foreign policy presidents of the United States. However, events would dictate that Bush, just like his father, would face a shift in the international order that demanded an unprecedented diplomatic response. It is with just a twist of irony that Bush's legacy can be best found in the lingering effects of his foreign policy decisions, most evident in Iraq. Central to the shifting international order, as understood by the U.S., was the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, exacerbated by sanctions and weapons inspections that had continued for over a decade. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Bush re-evaluated his foreign policy priorities and dramatically altered how the U.S. identified and confronted threats abroad, emphasizing pre-emptive action. Through this new framework, old threats became new again and it was no longer Saddam Hussein's capabilities as Iraq's leader that threatened the U.S., it was a fear of his intentions. Abroad, the international community had an entirely different understanding and evaluation of Saddam Hussein and the threat he posed to international security, thanks to the protracted weapons inspection and disarmament process that had been established by Bush in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. However, with this mixture of new and old policy combined with fear driven analysis, Bush pursued a foreign policy against Iraq that pandered to his home audience at the expense of U.S. diplomacy.

Introduction

Operation Desert Storm was almost over before it began. The campaign to oust Iraq from Kuwait, which had made extensive use of airstrikes and a ground offensive, was declared a success in only a few days. Although the international coalition led by the U.S. had achieved the United Nations Security Council objective of an Iraqi withdrawal, George H. W. Bush was faced with the decision to pursue the retreating Iraqi army or conclude the military intervention altogether, opting for the latter. Both Scowcroft and Bush later rationalized the decision to halt a march on Baghdad by claiming that it had set a precedent for U.S. benevolence in the post- Cold War era. They wrote, "Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies, who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and left again when the job was done." (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998:490), Bush's decision to stop a march on Baghdad had broad support within his administration. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney argued in a press conference not long after the conclusion of hostilities that the decision to pull back was the correct one, explaining, "If you're going to go in and try to topple Saddam Hussein, you have to go into Baghdad. Once you've got Baghdad, it's not clear what you do with it. It's not clear what kind of government you would put in place of the one that's currently there." (Holsti, 2011:20). With the march of time, a different administration, and a higher post in the White House, Cheney would have change of mind.

The military campaign did succeed in checking Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf. However, what remained unchecked was the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction safely tucked away within Iraq. The United Nations Security Council unanimously agreed that in order for Iraq to be restrained from future aggression an ongoing monitoring and verification programme would be established that inventoried and destroyed Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and its weapons manufacturing capabilities. To ensure Iraq complied with the international demand for complete disarmament, sanctions that had been imposed on Iraq for the annexation of Kuwait were allowed to continue

and were dependent on Iraq's disarmament status. Overseeing the disarmament process was the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), under the executive chairmanship of Swedish Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, and reporting to the Security Council. The unprecedented range of UNSCOM's new powers allowed inspectors to "designate for inspection any site, facility, activity, material or other item in Iraq." These inspections, according to the Security Council, "would be conducted unannounced and at short notice," (Security Council resolution 687 [SCR-687], 1991) and included overhead surveillance so that inspectors could more aggressively search for weapons. In return, Iraq was expected to support all UNSCOM and IAEA efforts unconditionally, and only after verification of total disarmament would the Security Council drop sanctions (SCR-687, 1991, paragr. 18). UNSCOM worked alongside the International Atomic Energy Agency, the only other programme that had a weapons verification mechanism in the United Nations, and through both the Security Council maintained authority over Iraq.

UNSCOM weapons inspectors dismantled and destroyed more chemical and biological weapons, and manufacturing facilities, than both the ground offensive and airstrikes throughout Operation Desert Storm combined. Judged by their initial reports, UNSCOM was making headway toward verifying Iraq as completely disarmed. Despite these successes, there were concerns that the weapons inspectors were becoming an enforcement arm of the United Nations Security Council. Mohammed el-Baradei, legal head of the IAEA, recalled that while travelling from one location to another, and glancing around at the bus full of predominantly American specialists, he was struck by the attitude of the inspectors, noting, "they were highly qualified technically, but they had no clue about how to conduct international inspections or, for

that matter, about the nuances of how to behave in different cultures. From their brash conversation, it was clear they believed that, having come to a defeated country, they had free rein to behave as they pleased." (El-Baradei, 2011:23). Hans Blix, who was head of the IAEA, also noticed the difference in UNSCOM and IAEA inspection methods. Agreeing with el-Baradei, Blix added that in some cases inspections were more like intelligence gathering operations.

In one instance, David Kay, an American inspector, uncovered a cache of documents that concerned Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme. It took a standoff in a car park that lasted several hours, where Kay refused to hand over the documents he had found to Iraqi authorities and the Iraqi authorities refused to allow Kay to leave with the documents, before the matter was resolved. The confrontational, and reckless, nature of Kay's approach, a hallmark of the methods employed by UNSCOM, meant that Blix held reservations over the free-for-all information gathering that was being encouraged. After analyzing Kay's documents, Blix concluded that the document's worth was not equal to the hassle of finding them. Blix's concern was that to find the documents you had to rely on intelligence agencies and, for all the problems that had arose, "the documents did not head to any weapons stores or, for that matter, to any weapons at all." (Blix, 2005:26). Nevertheless, both UNSCOM and the IAEA had turned to intelligence agencies for information that might aid weapons inspectors once leads to weapons began to dry up. Although there were benefits with intelligence agencies sharing what they knew about Iraq's weapons programmes, Blix noted, "Gradually, 'sharing' came to mean that the intelligence partners 'shared' all the UNSCOM information they wanted, while information they obtained through

piggybacking might not have been 'shared' with UNSCOM." (Blix, 2005:37). As the intelligence agencies became more entwined with weapons inspections, and progress on verifying Iraq as completely disarmed stalled, it was only a matter of time before Iraq became frustrated by the lack of progress. After all, the sanctions that had been imposed since 1991 were still in full effect.

By 1998, after seven long years of unrelenting sanctions and continuous inspections, there still remained unanswered questions and doubts over the status of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, despite Iraqi objections. In August, Richard Butler, who had replaced Rolf Ekeus as chairman of UNSCOM in 1997, met with Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, to devise a work schedule that satisfactorily addressed the remaining disarmament questions. According to Butler, there was a lack of documentation that verified the unilateral destruction of missile production facilities, the status of chemical munitions, and the movement of prohibited equipment in Iraq. These concerns were in addition to the unresolved status of missing mustard gas shells (Report of the Special Commission 719 [RSC-719], 1998, Annex). However, it was in regards to biological weapons capabilities that Butler was adamant Iraq was refusing to cooperate with UNSCOM, explaining, "The experts recommended that no further verification and/or assessment of Iraq's biological declaration of full, final and complete disclosure be conducted until Iraq commits itself to provide a new and substantive information." According to these experts, "any other approach would be a waste of time." (RSC-719, 1998, paragraph 27). This prompted Aziz to condemn UNSCOM for the refusal to verify that Iraq was disarmed, and subsequently lifting sanctions. According to Aziz, there were only two remaining questions from the weapons inspections. They were

"whether Iraq retained any weapons of mass destruction, including long-range missiles; and whether Iraq retained capabilities for their production." (RSC-719, 1998, paragraph. 34). Aziz's simplification of the remaining weapons inspections objections did not garner support from Butler.

The answer to both of Aziz's questions was an emphatic, no. According to Iraq, UNSCOM had deliberately emphasized minor issues with documentation in order to justify the United Nations Security Council continuing sanctions on Iraq. But, Butler argued that he was "not permitted to make disarmament by declaration," and that without credible evidence provided by Iraq "members of the council would challenge his claim that Iraq had no more proscribed weapons or capabilities."(RSC-719, 1998, paragraph. 54). The purpose of the meeting, stressed Butler, was to implement a work schedule that would lead to the suspension of sanctions providing Iraq cooperated with UNSCOM. Aziz dismissed the plan out of hand, stating simply, "There are no more proscribed weapons and materials in Iraq." According to Aziz, if UNSCOM could not report to the Security Council that Iraq was disarmed by now there was no guarantee that UNSCOM would make that report in the future. Therefore, went on Aziz, Iraq would refuse to cooperate with inspections, referring to the proposed work schedule as useless. (RSC-719, 1998, paragraph. 60). The response from the U.S. was shift and, in December, U.S. officials advised UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors to leave Iraqi immediately before the commencement of the airstrike campaign Operation Desert Fox. The operation was a punishment, dealt out by the U.S., for Iraq breaching the Security Council resolutions demanding unconditional cooperation with weapons inspectors. However, the airstrikes only prompted Aziz to officially announce, on December 19, that Iraq would

not comply with UNSCOM's mission in Iraq any further, eliminating weapons inspections in Iraq (Blix, 2005:35). In response, President Bill Clinton announced that U.S. policy was no longer to contain Iraq, but to replace Saddam Hussein's regime (Pollack, 2002:94).

In January 1999, the United Nations Security Council began an inquiry into the situation in Iraq in order to review all the evidence that had been gathered by UNSCOM and the IAEA from weapons inspections. The inquiry comprised of three panels that evaluated the humanitarian impact of sanctions and addressed the concerns that had emerged in the meeting between Butler and Aziz in 1998. Brazil's Ambassador Celso Amorim headed the inquiry. According to the IAEA, inspections had determined that Iraq's nuclear weapons programme "had been very well funded and was aimed at the development and production of a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, but there was no indications that Iraq had achieved its programme's objective." (United Nations Security Council 356 [UNSC-356], 1999, annex 1, paragr. 14). The IAEA had concluded, based upon the information that had been collected and presented to the United Nations Security Council up until weapons inspectors withdrew from Iraq in 1998, that "there is no indication that Iraq possess nuclear weapons or any meaningful amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material or that Iraq has retained any practical capability (facilities or hardware) for the production of such material." (UNSC-356, 1999, annex 1, paragr.14). Although there were remaining concerns over the lack of documentation that covered specific technical aspects of the Iraqi nuclear programme, the Amorim report concluded that Iraq was disarmed of nuclear weapons capability, and that the IAEA was in a position to move to an ongoing monitoring programme. The UNSCOM findings had been more

problematic. Although UNSCOM inspectors had disarmed Iraq of its verified ballistic weapons capabilities, concerns remained over the status of over fifty warheads and seven missiles that had been unilaterally destroyed without documentation. Similar concerns were expressed over the status of chemical weapons. Over the course of inspections, UNSCOM inspectors had verified and destroyed a significant amount of chemical munitions and production capacity. However, there were still munitions that the Iraqi's had unilaterally destroyed and without record. UNSCOM were also unable to find evidence that explained the discrepancies in financing for chemical weapons during the 1980s, the status of five hundred and fifty artillery shells that had gone missing during the Gulf War in 1991, and military planning for Iraq's VX programme. However, despite the issues surrounding Iraq's chemical weapons programme, the Amorim report concluded that UNSCOM had destroyed and rendered inoperable all declared biological weapons facilities in Iraq. After reviewing all the available information presented by UNSCOM and the IAEA, the Amorim report concluded, "although important elements still have to be resolved, the bulk of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated." (UNSC-356, 1999, paragr. 25). The Amorim report did not, however, vouch for the complete disarmament of Iraq.

It was in Amorim's opinion that weapons inspections in Iraq had reached a "point of impasse," where "further investigation of these issues under the current procedures…might correspond to an apparent diminishing return in recent years." (UNSC-356, 1999, paragr. 25). The weapons inspection programme was based on the belief that Iraq could be disarmed beyond any reasonable doubt, something both the IAEA and UNSCOM believed was not possible, and therefore the programme had to shift

priority to an ongoing monitoring and verification programme that would "attempt to determine that proscribed activities are not being carried out." (UNSC-356, 1999, paragr. 32). In order to do this, the core mission for UNSCOM was reinterpreted, and Amorim concluded, "such a reinforced OMV system, which should include intrusive inspections and investigation of relevant elements of past activities, is viable." (UNSC-356, 1999, paragr. 61). Hans Blix, following the report's findings closely, approved of the revised UNSCOM mission. Blix was satisfied that the nature of UNSCOM inspections had been found ineffective, and that Amorim's report had insisted, "inspection should be effective and could be highly intrusive, but should avoid being unnecessarily confrontational." (Blix, 2005:40). For Blix, then, the Amorim report reinforced United Nations authority over the weapons inspection process.

But there still remained questions over the status of sanctions that had been devised around the objective of verified, and complete, Iraqi disarmament. The U.S. refused outright to support dropping sanctions, arguing that Iraq was still in breach of its Security Council requirements. In an effort to compromise with the members of the United Nations Security Council, and regain some consensus on Iraq, the U.S. spent the end of 1999 negotiating a renewed sanctions resolution. The U.S. agreed to loosen economic sanctions, if Iraq made significant progress on a number of outstanding disarmament tasks that would be determined by the newly established United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the weapons inspection commission that had replaced UNSCOM on the recommendation of the Amorim report (Pollack, 2002:100).. Iraq refused to readmit weapons inspectors under the new conditions, instead, choosing to remain isolated from the international community.

The Evolving United Nations Security Council Consensus

In January 2000, Blix was nominated for the chairmanship of UNMOVIC. Accepting the appointment, Blix reflected on the reasons for leaving retirement to take on another posting in the United Nations explaining that since his tenure as head of the IAEA, and throughout UNSCOM inspections, he believed that the confrontational nature of inspections had become counterproductive and had served only to antagonize Iraq. Blix recalled, "I had heard it many times from inspectors that they thought the IAEA often got more information through a more restrained, professional UN Style." (Blix, 2005:44). Blix had found it difficult to resist applying his preferred style of inspections to UNMOVIC after being asked to take the chairmanship. Alongside Mohamed el-Baradei, who had replaced Blix as head of the IAEA in 1997, the new weapons inspections regime signalled the return of the old United Nations weapons inspectors. And the timing was fortunate. On March 24, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported to the Security Council that there was a humanitarian crisis in Iraq as a result of the ongoing sanctions, and the United Nations Security Council had to find a solution. Annan reminded the Security Council, "the United Nations has always been on the side of the vulnerable and the weak and has always sought to relieve suffering. Yet here we are accused of causing suffering to an entire population." (United Nations Security Council 4120 [UNSC-4120], 2000:2). With the established of UNMOVIC, the return of Blix, and Annan's assessment that the Security Council was partly responsible for the situation in Iraq, the international consensus turned to reconsider its stance over Iraq.

Annan's report served as cover for the permanent members of the Security Council to express their

dissatisfaction with the current sanctions imposed on Iraq. Russia's Ambassador Sergey Lavrov pointed to a double standard in the application of sanctions and complained that states that were attempting to conduct legitimate business with Iraq had found their efforts blocked by other Security Council members for "artificial pretexts." According to Lavrov, some business contracts were placed on hold, while "requests for deliveries of similar goods from other countries are endorsed without any problem." (UNSC-4120, 2000:6). If the administration of sanctions was so ineffective, went the reasoning, it was assumed that they would not be successfully implemented. Furthermore, the unilaterally imposed no-fly zones that were enforced by the U.S. and United Kingdom were a source of antagonism for Iraq.

Lavrov explained that it was "inadmissible to call upon Iraq to cooperate while at the same [time] continuing to bomb Iraqi territory." (UNSC-4120, 2000:6). France's Ambassador Jean-David Levitte agreed with the Russian appraisal of the situation in Iraq. The inconsistency of the Security Council application of Iraqi sanctions was unacceptable, and they could no longer ignore the developing humanitarian crisis. Levitte explained that as a result of sanctions "in the future, the effectiveness and consequences of broad, indiscriminate sanctions that hurt civilian populations exclusively and whose human cost clearly exceeds any political benefits that the Council could expect of them." (UNSC-4120, 2000:16 – 17).

The U.S. remained apart from Russian and French statements. U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham could not believe that the Security Council was suddenly willing to absolve Iraq of its past indiscretions. Cunningham recited a list of resolutions that Iraq had failed to implement, concluding, "Iraq remains a threat." (UNSC-4120, 2000:7). However,

the U.S. assessment of the threat posed by Iraq had already shifted. Cunningham explained that it was not just about Iraqi weapons anymore, and that so long as Saddam Hussein retained leadership in Iraq there would be no cooperation with the Security Council. After all, "Where there has been deprivation in Iraq, the Iraqi regime has been responsible." (UNSC-4120, 2000:8). It was evident that the Security Council had begun to move away from Iraqi sanctions. But, equally, the U.S. had moved closely to considering Saddam Hussein as the source of instability in Iraq, rather than Iraqi capabilities.

Cunningham refused to back down from the commitment to enforce no-fly zones over Iraq, as they were a necessary and successful element of containment. He also dismissed the administrative difficulties some states had raised concerning the application of sanctions. According to Cunningham, it was Iraq that had to change its relationship with the United Nations Security Council, not the other way around. Cunningham insisted that the oil-forfood programme, a sanctions compromise that the U.S. had agreed to when UNMOVIC was created, was a necessary concession. But Cunningham went to great lengths to emphasize that it was the Iraqi government that was failing the Iraqi people, not the international community, explaining, "The United Nations works for the Iraqi people. The Government [of Iraq] does not. Non-governmental organizations work for the Iraqi people. The Government [of Iraq] does not." (UNSC-4120, 2000:10).

Although Cunningham made a cursory effort to stress the importance of the United Nations Security Council consensus against Iraq, the ambassador lacked direct support from the Clinton administration. Kenneth Pollack, a CIA analyst specializing in the Middle East, explained that by the end of the Clinton Administration attention had turned away from the

situation in Iraq. Pollack observed, "By the summer of 2000…The Vice President was campaigning full-time, the president was investing ever more of his time in trying to secure a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement before he left office, and the rest of the government was just trying to prevent its position on Iraq from deteriorating further." (Pollack, 2002:102). Just as the weapons inspections had suffered from institutional fatigue, so too had U.S. attention toward Iraq.

In June, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to continue the oil-for-food programme, the backbone of emergency humanitarian aid to Iraq. However, although the programme was continued some of the permanent members began to explore possibilities for loosening sanctions altogether. China's Ambassador Wang Yingfan was not restrained in expressing China's disappointment with the Security Council, arguing that they were not "entirely satisfied with the resolution that the Council had just adopted…because it does not fully reflect an important element favored by most States members of the Council." (United Nations Security Council 4152 [UNSC-4152], 2000:3). Wang Yingfan stressed, "The humanitarian suffering of Iraqi civilians is, principally, a consequence of the 10 years of sanctions against Iraq." (UNSC-4152, 2000:3). Therefore, the Security Council was responsible for the welfare of the Iraqi people and had to act accordingly.

Despite China's efforts to refocus the Security Council on the humanitarian impact of the sanctions, the oil-for-food programme was again reviewed in December and extended into the New Year. The only alteration was to financial provisions that would streamline funds into the reconstruction of Iraq's oil industry. Even this minor change was enough to prompt Cunningham to warn the Security Council against modifying the economic constraints on Iraq, arguing,

"during the negotiation of this new phase of the programme we have seen numerous Iraqi attempts to avoid, rather than accept, obligations to the international community." (United Nations Security Council 4241 [UNSC-4241], 2000:4). However, it was also clear that for as long as the U.S. remained preoccupied with presidential elections, the administration was unwilling to compromise or even consider any new approaches to Iraq, and sanctions remained in a suspended state. Lavrov, on Russia's behalf, was adamant, in response to Cunningham's indictment of the Iraqi regime, that "a fundamental resolution of the problem of the humanitarian crisis will be impossible as long as sanctions are maintained." (UNSC-4241, 2000:4). With President George W. Bush winning the U.S. election, there was, at least, an opportunity to pursue an alternate solution.

Bush was inaugurated as the 43rd President of the United States in January 2001. Despite the controversial election results that were, in the end, determined by a Supreme Court decision, Bush ended the Democrat occupation of the White House. This also meant the appointment of a new selection of secretaries, advisers, and policymakers. Kenneth Pollack, in a final memo briefing the incoming administration on the status of Iraq, warned that containment of Saddam had eroded, and that there were two choices that had to be made – "to adopt an aggressive policy of regime change to try to get rid of Saddam quickly or undertake a major revamping of the sanctions to try and choke off the smuggling and prevent Saddam from reconstituting his military, especially his hidden WMD programs." (Pollack, 2002:103). Pollack complained that the second option was more difficult because of the lack of consensus in the United Nations Security Council and the unwillingness of other states to match U.S. intentions to confront Iraq.

Initially, Bush did not seem too preoccupied with the threat posed by Saddam hussein, imagined or otherwise. Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his first meeting with Bush in February 2001, recalled that there was there was no sense of urgency regarding Iraq. Blair reflected, "George was set on building a strong right-wing power base in the US, capable of sustaining him through two terms, and was focused especially on education and tax reform." (Blair, 2010:392-393). The only concerns regarding Iraq involved the possibility of reconfiguring sanctions. Richard Haass, who was now Director of Policy and Planning at the State Department, forwarded a plan to impose "smart" sanctions on Iraq, based on research he had conducted with Meghan O'Sullivan at the Brookings Institution. The plan was simple. Smart sanctions allowed a larger range of non-military goods to be imported by Iraq, in exchange for an increased revenue stream from Iraqi exports going into accounts controlled by the United Nations instead of Iraq. The plan was embraced by Secretary of State Colin Powell, and despite skepticism from the rest of the administration, Bush signed off the initiative (Haass, 2009:174-75). Haass noted that the administration understood from the beginning that Iraq was an important foreign policy concern. However, Haass added that what the administration was focused on "when it came to Iraq was…recasting the sanctions regime. There was a directive to look at existing military plans, but this lacked any real intensity at the time. It was more a dusting off of what was there rather than anything new." (Haass, 2009:175). Bush was not inaugurated with a plan to oust Saddam Hussein. In fact,

Bush's initial plans to cut government expenditure meant the Pentagon did not receive the funding that was required for a new generation of weaponry, indicating the administration was not projecting any

urgency in matters of defense. Any advanced plan to confront Iraq included (Mann, 2004:290).

The smart sanctions were put to the test at a United Nations Security Council session in June. Despite receiving support from the U.K. for the revised sanctions, in fact it was the U.K. that tabled the draft resolution, there remained significant opposition from the remaining members of the Security Council. Russia was particularly critical of the proposed changes, and Lavrov argued, "key elements of the United Kingdom draft appear to lead not to easing the very harsh economic situation of Iraq, but rather to tightening the sanctions." (United Nations Security Council 4336 [UNSC-4336], 2001:3). Lavrov explained that by further complicating the list of items that were under sanction, the Security Council was inhibiting, to a greater degree, legitimate trade with Iraq. China agreed with Lavrov's assessment, and Wang Yingfin argued, "Foreign companies should be allowed to invest in Iraq, and countries should be allowed to freely sign service contracts with Iraq." (UNSC-4336, 2001:11). China and Russia agreed that the Security Council was exacerbating and prolonging the humanitarian crisis in Iraq by not relinquishing sanctions.

This time it was the U.K.'s turn to hit back at opposition in the Security Council. Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock argued, "it is our responsibility in the Council to prevent Iraq from posing a threat to its region and, as part of this, to ensure that Iraq is fully and verifiably disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction." (UNSC-4336, 2001:4). Implementing smart sanctions was a step towards streamlining sanctions so that Iraq could not re-arm, and lessening the impact of sanctions on the people of Iraq. Greenstock reminded the Security Council, "we are all aware that Iraq continues to export oil outside the United Nations system to build up illegal revenue with

which it can purchase weapons and other proscribed items." (UNSC-4336, 2001:6). Although Greenstock was reserved in his arguments against Chinese and Russian opposition, Cunningham was not. Cunningham stated simply that smart sanctions were designed to prevent Iraq from acquiring the materials it needed to re-arm. At some point in the future the Security Council might revise those limitations, but only "once there is confidence that they would not be used to rebuild Iraq's weapons of mass destruction or improve its military capabilities." (UNSC-4336, 2001:9). The U.S. remained unconvinced that Iraq was disarmed, and remained committed to imposing sanctions on Iraq until it was. France, however, found itself between the competing interests of the permanent members. Levitte reminded China and Russia that weapon inspectors had been absent from Iraq for two and a half years and their reports were incomplete. However, Levitte argued, "Recovery requires the return of normal economic conditions." (UNSC-4336, 2001:7).

The debate was inconclusive, and as a result the introduction of smart sanctions was delayed. That also meant Bush remained confronted by the lingering problem of Iraq. According to Haass, this was not a bad outcome. Reflecting on the proposed policy initiatives to confront Iraq, including forceful regime change, Haass concluded, "the current and projected situation was not intolerable. Saddam Hussein was a nuisance, not a mortal threat. Trying to oust him, however desirable, did not need to become such a preoccupation that it would come to dominate the administration's foreign policy absent a major new provocation. The United States had more important goals to promote around both the region and the world that would be put in jeopardy were it to get bogged down in Iraq." (Haass, 2009:182). The failure of the U.S. to pressure the United Nations Security Council

into embracing revised sanctions only diminished its authority in both the Security Council and over Iraq.

What was unique about the debate over Iraqi sanctions was that it had been opened to nonmembers of the Security Council, and the majority of the non-Security Council members were overwhelming in support of reducing the severity of sanctions and alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. This support encouraged Iraq's Ambassador al-Qaysi, who complained that Iraq had been antagonised by U.S. airstrikes in early February that destroyed a number of air-defense sites in Iraq (Haass, 2009:173). According to al-Qaysi, Iraq was being unfairly and severely punished. Pointing to the voices both within and outside of the Security Council that sided with abandoning sanctions, al-Qaysi explained, "the faltering of the sanctions regime represents in reality a concrete reflection of the lack of conviction of the majority of the international community." (UNSC-4336, 2001:25). Smart sanctions that had been proposed by the U.S. and U.K. were accused of being a front for Western companies to receive preferential treatment. Al-

Qaysi asked, "Do we have any guarantee that those companies are not going to be fat cats of Western origin and be the only ones allowed to buy Iraqi oil?" (UNSC-4336, 2001:27). However, this was beside the point. Al-Qaysi noted that the Amorim report had concluded that Iraq was disarmed, and warned the U.S. and U.K. that they could not accuse Iraq of reinstating weapons of mass destruction programs without evidence. Even Annan had agreed with Iraq on this point, stating in an earlier report on the situation in Iraqi that it was imperative to "put the burden of proof on any side that alleges that Iraq still has weapons of mass destruction." (UNSC-4336, 2001:28). The result of the open debate within the Security Council was a resounding rejection of the U.S. proposed smart sanctions, and the implemented

oil-for-food program continued without change. Cunningham rued that the Security Council had missed an opportunity to force change in Iraq, declaring that smart sanctions would "have been adopted today save for the threat of a veto" and despite the objections of non-Security Council members. (United Nations Security Council 4344 [UNSC-4344], 2001:3). Although disappointed at the lack of support in the Security Council, Cunningham promised, "We have made considerable progress and have come too close to agreement to concede the field to Baghdad." (UNSC-4344, 2001:3). It would take a greater effort from Washington to force change in the Security Council, let alone Iraq.

A 21st Century Threat

At the turn of the twenty-first century, historian Andrew Bacevich observed, "For members of the young Bush administration charged with responsibility for American statecraft, the future looked rosy indeed." (Bacevich, 2002:225). However, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, irrevocably changed Bush's diplomatic plans. The death of over three thousand American civilians stunned not only the U.S., but reverberated throughout the international community. At the behest of the U.K., the Security Council convened a session on September 12 in order to condemn the terrorist attacks where Greenstock explained, "we all have to understand that this is a global issue, an attack on the whole of modern civilization and an affront to the human spirit. We must all respond globally and show the strength of spirit."(United Nations Security Council 4370 [UNSC-4370], 2001:3). The attacks had renewed solidarity between the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, as Lavrov added that the terrorist attacks reminded every nation of the "the timeliness of the task of joining the efforts of the entire international community in combating

terror, this plague of the twenty first century." (UNSC-4370, 2001:5). Levitte, summarising the collective thoughts of the United Nations Security Council, reminded, "We stand with the United States in deciding upon any action to combat those who resort to terrorism, those who aid them and those who protect them." (UNSC-4370, 2001:7). In fact, the offer from the Security Council to confront terrorism abroad supported the new U.S. war footing. Cunningham, proud of the support from the United Nations Security Council, stated, "we look to all those who stand for peace, justice and security in the world to stand together with the United States to win the war against terrorism. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them. We will bring those responsible to account." (UNSC-4370, 2001:7-8). Of course, the U.S. had to look no further than the U.K. for unwavering and loyal support (Blair, 2010:401).

In the wake of the attacks, the consensus of U.S. intelligence was that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had organised the terrorist attacks. (Hamid& Farrall, 2015). As one of al-Qaeda's main training facilities was located in Afghanistan, and the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan refused to cooperate with the U.S. to hand over Osama bin Laden and destroy the training facility, the U.S. set about achieving those two objectives itself. But, as explained by Phillip Zelikow, the administration "had no plan whatever for ground operations in Afghanistan – none. The plans against Afghanistan, bearing the blustery codename Infinite Resolve, were little different than when the Clinton White House had looked them over after the October 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*.

Central Command (CENTCOM) commander Tommy Franks regarded them as hardly deserving the title 'plan'." (Zelikow, 2011). The administration fell back onto a CIA plan to utilise tribal leaders in a loosely

based Northern Alliance to agitate the Taliban government, and the U.S. pushed forward with its objectives to capture Osama bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda's base in Afghanistan, and expel the Taliban government.

In November, the Taliban government dissolved and the U.S. military commitment was deemed a success. The lack of multilateral assistance, in a positive reinforcement feedback loop, only confirmed the success of U.S. unilateral action. In fact, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld had rebuffed an unprecedented offer from NATO for military assistance in combat missions in Afghanistan, determining such a large coalition as tactically prohibitive (Holsti, 2011:26). By March 2002, the U.S. began a larger operation against the remaining al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan that lead to anti-Taliban tribal leaders consolidating their control across Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan was considered an overall victory when diplomats from several nations negotiated the formation of a new Afghan government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai, a well-educated tribal leader who was the pick of the western governments.

Riding a wave of popularity into 2002 as a decisive wartime president, Bush utilised his State of the Union address to lay the groundwork for the next step in what was regarded as a global war on terror. Referring to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an 'axis of evil' that threatened the peace and security of the world, Bush made it clear that the next step was to confront those threats. According to Zelikow, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and speechwriter Michael Gerson believed the diplomatic aspect of the State of the Union would focus on the "nonnegotiable demands of human dignity," in an effort to describe a world "beyond the war on terror." However, it was clear that it was Iraq that had returned as the primary

concern for the administration (Zelikow, 2011:109). and leaked military planning from the Department of Defense in February 2002 confirmed it. In briefings, Bush had "overwhelmingly emphasized doable operations to defeat Iraqi forces and topple Saddam." (Zelikow, 2011:112). The reconfiguration of strategies to confront Saddam Hussein was inspired by the success of the operations that had toppled Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. More obvious, the plans focused on Saddam Hussein's intentions as leader and how best to depose him.

By June, Bush's stance on Iraq was clear. In a graduation speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Bush suggested, "deterrence could not be relied upon in an age in which rogue states and terrorist groups could acquire weapons of mass destruction," (Haass, 2009:213) a conclusion that was contrary to the advice of Haass and the State Department. Haass noted that the administration was suffering from diverging advice over plans to confront Saddam Hussein, and "those who worked with me on the Policy Planning Staff began to come back from meetings around the government and report that those of their counterparts known for advocating going to war with Iraq appeared too cocky for comfort." (Haass, 2009:213). With the military success in Afghanistan, the Defense Department had earned a reputation for results, unlike the State Department's efforts to confront Saddam Hussein. As the American media reported that a war was being planned, the administration made sure that there were plans for war, lest they be caught unprepared (Mann, 2004:3356). By August 2002, Blair remarked, "at times we would not be sure whether we were driving the agenda or being driven by it." (Blair, 2010:404). But Bush waited to clarify the U.S. position at the United Nations in September.

On September 12, 2002, Bush addressed the United Nations General Assembly for the first time. Kofi Annan set the agenda by listing threats to international peace and security one year on from the terrorist attacks in the U.S. First, Annan gave priority to the ongoing IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Second, he referred to Iraq's continued defiance of Security Council resolutions and the refusal to readmit inspectors. Annan considered the renewal of weapons inspections as an "indispensable first step towards assuring the world that all Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have indeed been eliminated." Third, he stressed the importance of rebuilding Afghanistan in the wake of major military operations. And, fourth, reconciling differences between India and Pakistan after both had newly acquired nuclear weapons (General Assembly 57 [GA-57], 2002:2-3).

Bush's address, however, ignored to a great extent Annan's list and reinforced the observation that the U.S. had committed to confronting Iraq. Bush stated that the "greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies enabling them to kill on a massive scale." (GA-57, 2002:7). According to Bush, Iraq was an outlaw state that continued "to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western Governments." (GA-57, 2002:7). By accusing Iraq of supporting terrorism, Bush had stretched the parameters of the global war on terror to legitimate action against Iraq. In support of the claim that Iraq posed an imminent threat to international peace and security, Bush claimed that intelligence suggested Iraq was in the process of rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction capabilities, a claim that remained unverified because of the lack of international weapons inspectors in Iraq. Bush was convinced that "Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year." (GA-57, 2002:7).

The central purpose of Bush's address was to ignite support for a United Nations sanctioned mission to rectify the situation in Iraq, even suggesting that the United Nations help "build a Government that represents all Iraqis." (GA-57, 2002:8). However, there remained no doubt that the appeal to the United Nations for assistance was a take it or leave it proposition. Finishing his address, Bush promised that "the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable, and a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power." (GA-57, 2002:9). Indeed, Blair had noticed the shift in the U.S. attitude toward Iraq immediately after September 11. Blair recalled:

Saddam had been an unwelcome reminder of battles past, a foe that we had beaten but left in place, to the disgruntlement of many. But he had not been perceived as a threat.

Now it was not so much that the direct threat increased, but he became bound up in the US belief that so shocking had been the attack, so serious had been its implications, that the world had to be remade. Countries whose governments were once disliked but tolerated became, overnight, potential enemies, to be confronted, made to change attitude, or made to change government (Blair, 2010:396).

Having disregarded Annan's list of prominent threats to international peace and security, Bush was clear that there was a strategic shift in the global war on terror, and that it would focus on Iraq (Thompson, 2009:161-62). But, more particular, the strategic shift emphasised Bush's reversal over previous U.S. policy to consider Saddam Hussein's intentions as leader as a higher priority than his capabilities.

On September 17, 2002, the National Security Strategy (NSS) was published, completing the shift to unrestrained U.S. unilateralism. The NSS was clear that the U.S. was prepared to go to great lengths to confront the twenty-first century threat of terrorism. The NSS stressed, "the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first." (The National Security Strategy [NSS], 2002, 15). This left the U.S. with the option of 'preemptive actions' and "to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively." (NSS, 2002:15). The strategy embodied the vision of the world after September 11 that had been encouraged by Condoleezza Rice, a vision that "the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attack were bookends for a transitional period in world history." Zelikow noted that Rice added, "Before the clay is dry again, America and our friends and our allies must move decisively." (Zelikow, 2011:111).

Even before the publication of the National Security Strategy, and Bush's United Nations General Assembly address, it was already understood through diplomatic channels that the U.S. was moving into a militant posture. In July, Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of Britain's Foreign Intelligence Service (MI6), had met with senior U.S. officials in Washington. In a memo from Downing Street on July 23, 2002, Dearlove recorded "a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD." (Haass, 2009:215). And Iraq understood the message clear enough, pre-empting even the publication of the

NSS and readmitting weapons inspectors on September 16, 2002.

The United Nations Security Council spent October negotiating the conditions of the resumed weapons inspections in Iraq. In an effort to promote consensus, the Security Council session was an open debate. Kofi Annan set the agenda by admitting, although the readmission of inspectors to Iraq was welcome, "Iraq has to comply…If Iraq fails to make use of this last chance, and if defiance continues, the Council will have to face its responsibilities."(United Nations Security Council 4625 [UNSC-4625], 2002:4). However, Annan also warned the permanent members of the Security Council, "if you allow yourselves to be divided, the authority and credibility of the organization will undoubtedly suffer." (UNSC-4625, 2002:4). It was hoped that by opening the debate over two days, a broader consensus, and cross section of views, might emerge. A good example was South African Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo who related the mission to disarm Iraq to the same process of disarming South Africa of nuclear weapons in the late 1990s, warning that the 'pre-emptive' position of the U.S. might affect the work of the weapons inspections. Kumalo warned, "it would be tragic if the Council were to prejudge the work of inspectors before they set foot in Iraq." (UNSC-4625, 2002:5). Kumalo reminded the permanent members, "The Security Council represents our collective security concerns and should ultimately be accountable to the entire United Nations." (UNSC-4625, 2002:5).

Contrastingly, Australia's Ambassador John Dauth added his support to the hard-line stance taken by Bush. Dauth agreed with the U.S., "Iraq today poses a clear danger to international security because it has sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction and has a well-established record of using them against its neighbours, and, indeed, against its own people."

(Security Council 4625 [SC-4625], 2002:9). Australia remained convinced that Saddam Hussein maintained his ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction and "in the aftermath of 11 September and, I say with great sadness, the events of 12 October in Bali, the international community must be scrupulous in addressing threats to international security, or face the disastrous consequences." (SC-4625, 2002:10). Australia's support had additional strategic value for Bush. Thanks to the ANZUS treaty, already invoked by Prime Minister John Howard for Australia's contribution of troops to Afghanistan, both the U.K. and now Australia had their interests aligned with the U.S. and were committed to action (Siracusa, 2006:48).

Blix and el-Baradei had also spent October in meetings with U.S. officials in order to detail a proposal for suitable objectives for weapons inspections. Expectations for the inspections varied greatly depending on whom Blix and el-Baradei met in the administration. Cheney was upfront and short with the inspectors. Blix reflected that Cheney told them both that he "in talking about the world at large [always] took the security interests of the United States as his starting point." (Blix, 2005:86). However, Cheney warned that the inspections could not continue indefinitely, and that the U.S. was "ready to discredit inspections in favour of disarmament." (Blix, 2005:86). 90 Cheney's attitude was juxtaposed with Bush, who greeted Blix and el-Baradei warmly and said that the

U.S. had full confidence in the weapons inspectors, promising that the U.S. would "throw its support behind us." (Blix, 2005:86). These bipolar attitudes were not just restricted to the halls of the White House. In the open Security Council debate, it was the U.K that first cast doubt over the weapons inspections process.

Greenstock stressed the importance of an open debate and welcomed the input from nonSecurity Council members. However, "The United Kingdom analysis, backed up by reliable intelligence, indicates that Iraq still possesses chemical and biological materials, has continued to produce them, has sought to weaponize them and has active military plans for the deployment of such weapons." (UNSC-4625, 2002:8). Quoting Prime Minister Tony Blair, Greenstock agreed with the U.S., "the policy of containment isn't any longer working…we know from 11 September that it is sensible to deal with these problems before, not after." (UNSC-4625, 2002:8). United States Ambassador John Negroponte, who had replaced Ambassador John Cunningham, struck a harder line, warning that the United Nations was at risk of becoming irrelevant. Bringing the domestic debate over going to war with Iraq into the United Nations, Negroponte referred to successful legislation just passed through the U.S. Congress that "expressed support for the Administration's diplomatic efforts in the Security Council to ensure that 'Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and non-compliance' and authorized the use of United States armed forces should diplomatic efforts fails." (UNSC-4625, 2002:12). Although Blix and el-Baradei had received the impression of some support for the weapons inspection process when they were in Washington, it was clear from the U.S. stance at the United Nations that that was not the case. Negroponte added a quote from Bush declaring, "Either the Iraqi regime will give up its weapons of mass destruction, or, for the sake of peace, the United States will lead a global coalition to disarm that regime." (UNSC-4625, 2002:12).

Opposing the U.S. and U.K. were the remaining permanent members of the Security Council. Levitte stressed that the "objective is the disarmament of Iraq. This implies the return of the inspectors and the

resumption of monitoring on the ground." (UNSC-4625, 2002:12-13). Both the U.K. and U.S. were presumptuous in assuming that Iraq was a threat that required immediate military action, reminding the two states that "any kind of 'automaticity' in the use of force will profoundly divide us." (UNSC-4625, 2002:13). The Security Council was beginning to understand that the opportunity to restrain the U.S. had long since passed. For the U.K., Blair had decided to back the U.S. to the hilt. Blair later recalled:

I was well aware that ultimately the US would take its own decision in its own interests. But I was also aware that in the new world taking shape around us, Britain and Europe were going to face a much more uncertain future without America…So when they had need of us, were we really going to refuse; or, even worse, hope they succeeded but could do it without us? I reflected and felt the weight of an alliance and its history, not oppressively but insistently, a call to duty, a call to act, a call to be at their side, not distant from it, when they felt imperilled (Blair, 2010:401).

Blair's 'call to duty' ensured Bush was not alone in confronting Iraq.

Weapons inspections resumed after the unanimous approval of resolution 1441 in November, setting a mandate for UNMOVIC and IAEA weapons inspectors. Although the resolution did not include any approval for the use of force, Negroponte was adamant that should Iraq breach any conditions of the resolution there would be no restraining "any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security."(United Nations Security Council 4644 [UNSC-4644], 2002:3). Greenstock was more measured, reassuring the rest of the Security Council that "there is no 'automaticity' in this resolution. If

there is a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion as required by paragraph 12."(UNSC-4644, 2002:5). Such was the attempt by Greenstock to add a layer of moderation to the U.S.'s hard line stance on inspections.

Although France and Russia voted in favour of the resolution, they reiterated that there was no authority under which any member state could act unilaterally to enforce the resolutions. Wang Yangfin confirmed, "the text no longer includes automaticity for authorizing the use of force." (UNSC-4644, 2002:13). But, it was apparent that the permanent members had greatly different interpretations of the very same resolution. Despite this, Blix noted, "the differences in interpretation faded into the background in the general delight that the Council had come together and had come out strong."(Blix, 2005:89). Although there had been compromise, there was no doubt that the resumption of weapons inspections was an important step in ending the stalemate with Iraq. However, it was a minor victory. There was no doubt that the resolution would not have been accepted by Iraq without the threat of armed intervention by the U.S. (Blix, 2005:89). By November 13, Iraq accepted all the conditions of resolution 1441.

Inspecting Iraq

On January 20, 2003, the Security Council held a ministerial level meeting to discuss international terrorism. But the meeting, influenced to a great extent by French opposition to a military attack on Iraq, was later described as an ambush. Powell went into the meeting expecting a discussion concerning terrorism, and instead received a rebuff of U.S. efforts to confront Iraq. (Mann, 2004:350). Germany's Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer explained that he was "greatly concerned that a military strike against

the regime in Baghdad would involve considerable and unpredictable risks for the global fight against terrorism." (United Nations Security Council 4688 [UNSC-4688], 2003:5). The U.S. had made clear that it was prepared to go to war with Iraq as part of the global war on terror, and it was only the U.K. that stood beside the U.S.'s clearly militant posture. Foreign Minister Jack Straw explained the U.K. support for the U.S, adding, "it is the leaders of rogue States who set the example, brutalize their people, celebrate violence, and – worse than that – through their chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, provide a tempting arsenal for terrorists to use." (UNSC-4688, 2003:8). According to Straw, there was no doubt that Iraq threatened the international community and, thus, should be confronted in the war on terror.

Despite the unanimity of the Security Council when it had offered to support the U.S. in a campaign to combat terrorists in Afghanistan, there was little enthusiasm to repeat the endeavour against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Russia's Minister for Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov summed up the general feeling within the Security Council when he warned, "we must be careful not to take unilateral steps that might threaten the unity of the anti-terrorist coalition." (UNSC-4688, 2003:15). However, the U.S. interpreted the mixed response from the ministers at the Security Council as a general underestimation and misinterpretation of the threat the Saddam Hussein posed the international community, something the U.S. could set straight with its intelligence reports. Powell could only add, "we cannot shrink from the responsibilities of dealing with a regime that has gone about the development, the acquiring and the stocking of weapons of mass destruction, that has committed terrorist attacks against its neighbours and against its own people and that has trampled the human rights of its own people

and its neighbours." (UNSC-4688, 2003:18). According to Powell, there was no doubt that Iraq presented a threat to international peace and security under the aegis of the global war on terror, and the U.S. was prepared to confront that threat.

On January 27, Blix and el-Baradei tabled their first reports of the preliminary UNMOVIC and IAEA weapons inspections. Blix began by clarifying that the Amorim report from 1999 was the foundation for the resumption of weapons inspections. After analysing the report, it was clear that its findings did not "contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to a lack of evidence and to inconsistencies, which raise question marks and which must be straightened out if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise." (United Nations Security Council 4692 [UNSC-4692], 2003:5). Therefore, the primary objective of UNMOVIC had been to determine the location of documentation that confirmed the unilateral destruction of weapons. Although Blix admitted that a recent discovery by inspectors of chemical weapon warheads said, by the Iraqi's, to have been overlooked in 1991, could "be the tip of a submerged iceberg," (United Nations Security Council 4692 [UNSC-4692], 2003:5). Iraqi cooperation had been adequate and unobtrusive. However, Blix worried that the Iraqi authorities had not taken the inspections as seriously as they should have, treating the inspectors with a casualness that suggested ignorance toward the situation in the Security Council. Blix's report produced a balanced appraisal of the situation in Iraq from UNMOVIC's perspective. Blix later reflected that it was not up to him to suggest what the Security Council should do in regards to Iraq, as his task was "to render an accurate report. That was what we were asked to provide and could contribute. It was for the Council to assess the

situation and draw conclusions whether there should be continued inspections or war." (Blix, 2005:142). Although he privately hoped that the presentation would shock Iraq into cooperation, and out of "petty bargaining", he did not expect to see "the hawks in Washington and elsewhere would be delighted with the rather harsh balance they found in my update." (Blix, 2005:141-142).

El-Baradei, however, was far more precise with the IAEA's recommendations, bolstered by the Amorim report's findings that the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme was fully decommissioned by 1999. El-Baradei stated that after sixty days of inspections "no prohibited nuclear activities have been identified." (UNSC-4692, 2003:10). Turning to intelligence that suggested Iraq had attempted to import aluminium tubes machined to standards that were suitable for use in uranium enrichment, el- Baradei explained, "from our analysis to date, it appears that the aluminium tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges." (UNSC-4692, 2003:10). More information had to be provided by Security Council members before any other conclusion could be reached. However, where Blix was insistent that he could not tell the Security Council how long inspections would take, el-Baradei was adamant that although inspections would be time-consuming, "we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme." (UNSC-4692, 2003:12). Later, el-Baradei reflected that the U.S. response to his report was surprising, especially with regards to the aluminium tubes that had been flagged by U.S. intelligence.

Despite the IAEA reporting that inspectors had found the aluminium tubes to be for use in Iraq's rocket research, Bush went on to state in his State of the Union address on January 28, only one day after the weapons inspectors gave their reports, that the aluminium tubes were suitable for nuclear weapons production. ElBaradei noted, "There was no mention of the IAEA's contradictory conclusion based on direct verification of the facts in Iraq. Nor did Bush note the differing analysis of the U.S. Department of Energy." (El-Baradei, 2011:61). For all appearances, Bush had made it clear that U.S. intelligence was considered more reliable and accurate than weapons inspections.

As the preliminary reports from weapons inspectors did not produce the immediate results that the U.S. desired, Powell convened a ministerial-level Security Council session in order to present the dossier of intelligence that the U.S. was using as basis for its claims against Iraq. As was apparent from the presentation, the U.S. was adamant Saddam Hussein was involved in terrorism and had concealed his efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction from inspectors. Through intercepted audio from phone calls between Iraqi military officers, reference to satellite images that showed unusual vehicle movement at sites that had been visited by inspectors, and consultation with human intelligence sources, Powell argued that the accusations levelled at Iraq by the U.S. "are not assertions, these are facts." (United Nations Security Council 4701 [UNSC-4701], 2003:7). Further adding to the dossier of U.S. evidence were eye-witness accounts of mobile biological weapons facilities, rendered in illustrations produced by the U.S., that confirmed the belief that Iraq was capable of producing anthrax and botulium toxin. Powell emphasised the lengths Saddam Hussein had gone to hide these technologies from inspectors, claiming, "Call it ingenious or evil genius but the Iraqis deliberately designed their chemical weapons to be inspected. It is infrastructure with a built-in alibi."

19

(UNSC-4701, 2003:10). Ignoring el-Baradei's report that the aluminium tubes were not part of an Iraqi nuclear weapons programme, Powell, instead, stressed that U.S. experts had been certified their use in centrifuge design, and the tubes meant that there was "no indication that Saddam Hussain (sic) has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons programme." (UNSC-4701, 2003:13). However, it was the link to terrorism that Powell believed would dispel scepticism within the Security Council. According to intelligence sources, Iraq was accused of harbouring al-Qaeda member Abu Masab al-Zarqawi in the Northeastern Kurdish regions of Iraq. Although those regions were outside of Baghdad's control, Powell insisted that Saddam Hussein was involved. (UNSC-4701, 2003:15).

Warning the Security Council that they could not ignore the presence of terrorists in Iraq,Powell explained, "Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and Al Qaeda together – enough so that Al Qaeda could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that Al Qaeda could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction." (UNSC-4701, 2003:16).

There was no doubt that the U.S. believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein was determined to use them. It was Saddam Hussein's intentions, as construed by the array of intelligence on Iraq, which seemed to imply his capabilities. Issuing a final warning, Powell stated, "The United States will not, and cannot, run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein (sic) in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option – not in a post 11-september world." (UNSC-4701, 2003:17). Rice was satisfied that the presentation was the accumulation of intelligence that had been personally vetted by

Secretary Powell, and had best presented the U.S. case against Iraq. It was, for the U.S. at least, a "tour de force."(Rice, 2011:200). Despite Powell's efforts, the general consensus throughout the Security Council did not change. For the already persuaded, such as Straw, Powell's presentation was an unnecessary repeat of already established facts, and he chastised the lack of support in the Security Council, arguing, "the international community owes [Powell] its thanks for laying bare the deceit practised by the regime of Saddam Hussein (sic) – and worse, the very great danger which that regime represents." (UNSC-4701, 2003:18). According to Straw, no matter how powerful the inspectors might be, or how good they were, because of the size of Iraq it was impossible to guarantee that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. Resorting to the pre-emptive reasoning of the U.S., Straw reminded the Security Council of the international community's past failures at confronting threats, reminded, "at each stage, good men said, 'Wait. The evil is not big enough to challenge.' Then, before their eyes, the evil became too big to challenge…We owe it to our history, as well as to our future, not to make the same mistake." (UNSC-4701, 2003:20).

For the unpersuaded, however, Powell's presentation did not offer any solid proof. In fact, it was in the opinion of the rest of the Security Council that Powell hand over all his information to the weapons inspectors for verification. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan was convinced that the best way forward would be if "various parties will hand over their information and evidence to (UNMOVIC) and the (IAEA)…through their on-the-spot inspections, that information and evidence can also be evaluated." (UNSC-4701, 2003:18). Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov sided with China's assessment and appealed to the Security Council to immediately "hand over to the

international inspectors any information that can help them discharge their responsible mandate…they alone can say to what extent Iraq is complying with the demands of the Security Council." (UNSC-4701, 2003:21). Foreign Minister Dominque De Villepin suggested that a third solution to the crisis could be found if the Security Council could agree on a permanent structure for the ongoing surveillance of Iraq. De Villepin explained that a coordinated "information processing centre…would supply Mr. Blix and Mr ElBaradei, in real time and in a coordinated way, with all the intelligence resources they might need." (UNSC-4701, 2003:25). Explaining the severity of the dilemma confronting the Security Council, De Villepin added, "with the choice between military intervention and an inspections regime that is inadequate for lack of cooperation on Iraq's part, we must choose to strengthen decisively the means of inspection." (UNSC-4701, 2003:24).

Stuck in the shadow cast by the debate among the permanent members was Iraq's Ambassador Mohammed Aldouri, who kept his rebuttal short. Aldouri promised the Security Council, "if we had a relationship with Al Qaeda and we believed in that relationship, we would not be ashamed to admit it. We have no relationship with Al Qaeda," (UNSC-4701, 2003:38). and that Powell's presentation was made "to sell the idea of war and aggression against my country, Iraq, without providing any legal, moral or political justification." (UNSC-4701, 2003:38). Aldouri's observation that Powell's presentation was more show than substance was confirmed, albeit at a later date, by Rice, who explained that the U.S. was orchestrating a sense of urgency for operational purposes. Rice went on:

Our sense of urgency was driven by two factors. First, our military forces were approaching levels of mobilization that could not be sustained for very

long…it wasn't possible to stand still, since doing so would leave our forces vulnerable in-theater without sufficient logistical support…Second, the President believed that the only way to avoid war was to put maximum and unified pressure on Saddam. That argued for continued mobilization, not pulling back. (Rice, 2011:201).

Despite the weapons inspections, and despite disagreement within the Security

Council, the U.S. was prepared to confront Iraq.

On February 14, the weapon inspectors gave their second report to the Security Council. Blix remained sceptical that UNMOVIC had had enough time to comprehensively understand the situation in Iraq, contrary to Powell's presentation in early February. But there was considerable progress, the inspectors had managed to cover over four hundred inspections at more than three hundred sites in Iraq, and Blix was adamant that at no point "have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming." (United Nations Security Council 4707 [UNSC-4707], 2003:2). Blix explained that UNMOVIC had an adequate idea of the condition of Iraq's industrial and scientific capacity, and besides the small number of empty chemical munitions that had been found during the initial declaration there had been no further discoveries. However, Blix was hesitant to state that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction, admitting, "One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded." (UNSC-4707, 2003:3). Although, on one hand, UNMOVIC had made progress in destroying ballistic missile systems that breached sanctions, on the other hand, inspectors were unable to verify the status of unilaterally destroyed chemical and biological weapons that were outstanding in the Amorim report. Some experts

suggested that soil tests might help determine possible destruction sites, but Blix insisted more evidence would be required to assess Iraqi compliance. Blix stressed the good relationship between UNMOVIC and intelligence agencies around the world, and he was satisfied to see an increased amount of information passed on to the inspectors. But, Blix warned, "we must recognize that there are limitations and misinterpretations can occur." (UNSC-4707, 2003:5). Referring directly to intelligence in Powell's presentation, Blix noted that some intelligence had led to sites where there were no weapons, or any activity indicating otherwise. In these cases intelligence had been useful for "proving the absence of such items and in some cases the presence of other items – conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass destruction." (UNSC-4707, 2003:6).

Overall, Blix remained unconvinced by Powell's presentation. In his report, Blix had subtly questioned the intelligence that was fundamental to U.S. allegations against Iraq. There was no doubting the importance of Blix's report. Reflecting on the situation as he arrived at the United Nations Security Council chamber, Blix described that he was often mobbed by the media and was smuggled, more often than not, into the building in a car through a garage. According to Blix, "it was as if the decision whether there would be a war in Iraq was to be taken in the next hour in the Council, and as if the inspectors' reports on Iraq's cooperation were like a signal of red or green. Although neither was the case, it was a very important meeting." (Blix, 2005:176). El-Baradei, however, was under no such illusion as to the importance of his report as he detailed IAEA progress in Iraq. Since January, the IAEA had been preoccupied with evaluating U.S. intelligence that

suggested Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from a source in Niger, and in Iraq the inspectors had uncovered a cache of documents concerning past Iraqi nuclear activities at an Iraqi scientist's house. El-Baradei noted, however, that the documents offered no new insight into previous conclusions that had been stated by the IAEA. The documents had been useful in clarifying aspects of Iraq's previous nuclear weapons programme that were already known to inspectors. El-Baradei's conclusion was concise, stating, "we have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq." (UNSC-4707, 2003:9).

In the wake of the weapons inspector's reports, the Security Council once against erupted into disagreement. Blix observed that the debate within the chamber was remarkable because it "seemed like a pitched battle in which the participants had only seven minutes each to send their words and arguments like colourful tracer bullets through the room." (Blix, 2005:178-179). Once again, a ministerial meeting had been convened to consider the reports. Foreign Minister Jack Straw was adamant that UNMOVIC and the IAEA reports were clear that Iraq was in material breach of Security Council resolutions, as there was evidence Iraq was not cooperating with inspectors. The only response that would suffice was for the Security Council to "back a diplomatic process with a credible threat of force and also, if necessary, to be ready to use that threat of force." (UNSC-4707, 2003:18). Powell added to Straw's remarks by arguing that no amount of inspections would diminish the threat posed by Iraq, and that "what we need is immediate, active, unconditional, full cooperation on the part of Iraq. What we need is for Iraq to disarm." (UNSC-4707, 2003:18). To the U.S. it was clear that it was unacceptable for the Security Council to wait for inspections to conclude. Powell went on that

because of the threat of terrorism, the Security Council could not wait "for one of these terrible weapons to show up in one of our cities and wonder where it came from after it has been detonated by Al-Qaeda or somebody else. This is the time to go after this source of this kind of weaponry." (UNSC-4707, 2003:20). This meeting would prove to be Powell's final attempt at securing support in the Security Council, not that Bush believed it was necessary. The final pitch was largely to appease Blair, who was facing his own domestic criticism for supporting the U.S. unconditionally. As he had promised his own party that he would seek United Nations approval before going to war, Powell was doing Blair a favour by patiently waiting around. (Mann, 2004:355).

But, the remaining permanent members of the Security Council were unconvinced. Foreign Minister Tang Jianxuan explained, "China believes that the inspection process is working and that the inspectors should continue to be given the time they need so as to implement resolution 1441 (2002)." (UNSC-4707, 2003:15).   Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov agreed, adding, "we should be guided not by feelings, emotions, sympathies or antipathy with respect to any particular regime. Rather, we should be guided by the actual facts and, on the basis of those facts, should draw our conclusions." (UNSC-4707, 2003:21). However, it was Foreign Minister Dominique De Villepin who objected outright to the use of force. De Villepin argued, "The option of war might seem, on the face of it, to be the swifter but let us not forget that, after the war is won, the peace must be built. And let us not delude ourselves: that will be long and difficult, because it will be necessary to preserve Iraq's unity and to restore stability in a lasting way in a country and region harshly affected by the intrusion of force." (UNSC-4707, 2003:12).   There were no guarantees that a military confrontation with Iraq would produce

a safer world, nor a more stable Iraq, nor even guarantee that Saddam Hussein would no longer be a threat. Accusing the U.S. of acting rashly, De Villepin concluded "that nothing will be done in the Security Council, at any time, in haste, out of a lack of understanding, out of suspicion or out of fear." (UNSC-4707, 2003:13).   The accusation only added to earlier criticism from De Villepin to Powell at the Secretary-General's private luncheon after Powell's presentation in February. It was there that De Villepin chided Powell, saying, "You Americans…do not understand Iraq. This is the land of Haroun al-Rashid. You may be able to destroy it in a month, but it will take you a generation to build peace." (El-Baradei, 2011:61-62).

Resorting to War

On March 7, Blix and el-Baradei gave their final reports to the Security Council, hoping to stress the progress of inspections. The reports would come in the wake of yet another open debate that had been held in the Security Council concerning the situation in Iraq. (United Nations Security Council 4709 [UNSC-4709], 2003, resumption 1). Blix reported that UNMOVIC had been able to satisfactorily perform inspections without notice across Iraq and was being assisted by increased aerial surveillance, both improvements on UNMOVIC's previous inspection capacity. If the Security Council were to give UNMOVIC enough time, even the outstanding issues regarding additional Iraqi documentation and an interviewing process that was not inhibited by the Iraqi security apparatus, could be resolved. Blix, instead, turned his criticism toward intelligence that had served to underpin allegations that Iraq had reconstituted a weapon of mass destruction programme, noting, "intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for

biological weapons." (United Nations Security Council 4714 [UNSC-4714], 2003:3). Indeed, Powell had been adamant that Iraq was hiding biological and chemical weapons manufacturing equipment in trucks. Blix reported, "several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food-testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers of seed-processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities has so far been found." (UNSC-4714, 2003:3). Blix also responded to intelligence claims that Iraq was storing weapons underground, adding, "no underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage have been found so far." (UNSC-4714, 2003:4).

In order to emphasise the progress UNMOVIC had made, Blix reported that Iraq had taken steps to destroy ballistic missiles that had been deemed in breach of Security Council resolutions. He explained, "we are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed." (UNSC-4714, 2003:4). The remaining tasks for UNMOVIC were difficult to finalise but not impossible, and Blix concluded, "It would not take years, nor weeks, but months" to conduct the necessary analysis on the remaining unresolved disarmament tasks. (UNSC-4714, 2003:6). Blix maintained that he was in no position to judge whether Iraq was in material breach of Security Council resolutions. However, he had his own definition of his role as weapons inspector. Recalling a conversation with an American colleague, Blix wrote, "it would have been presumptuous of me to pass such judgment, and he commented 'Hans, they wanted you to be presumptuous.' Well, yes, if it went their way, but not if it had gone the other way!" (Blix, 2005:210). Blix's ambiguity did not provide solace for those opposing armed intervention in the Security Council.

On the other hand, el-Baradei was more direct with the IAEA report. Restating that the IAEA's task was to determine whether Iraq had revived, or attempted to revive, its nuclear weapon programme since inspectors had left, el-Baradei stressed the degradation of Iraq's industrial capacity since the 1980s, when Iraq was known to have a strong industrial base and a fledgling nuclear program. The overall deterioration of Iraq's industrial capacity was "of direct relevance to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapons programme." (UNSC-4714, 2003:6). Much like Blix, el-Baradei was critical of some intelligence claims, reporting that the IAEA had conducted tests on the aluminium tubes that the U.S. had insisted were for use in centrifuges, concluding, "extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use those 81mm tubes for any project other than the reverse-engineering of rockets." (UNSC-4714, 2003:7). Referring to other claims that Iraq had attempted to import high-strength magnets, el-Baradei explained that IAEA experts concluded that the magnets would be unsuitable for use in centrifuge enrichment facilities. Returning to his earlier report that the IAEA was evaluating claims that Iraq had attempted to import uranium from Niger, he concluded that "with the concurrence of outside experts…these documents – which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and the Niger – are, in fact, not authentic." (UNSC-4714, 2003:8). Blix remarked later that the U.S. "in its uncontrolled eagerness to nail Iraq to a continued nuclear weapons program [would] now have to live with Mohamed's revelation and suffer from its own poor quality control of information." (Blix, 2005:211). ElBaradei, however, justified his findings by explaining that "because many of the IAEA inspectors were returning to well trodden ground and familiar faces, the Agency

was correspondingly more confident in its judgments." (El-Baradei, 2011:70). El-Baradei, unlike Blix, was confident that Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons, nor had to capacity to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programme.

Once again, it was ministers who responded to the inspection reports within the Security Council. Powell dismissed the reports outright, claiming, "If Iraq genuinely wanted to disarm, we would not have to be worrying about setting up means of looking for mobile biological units or any units of the kind – they would be presented to us. We would not need an extensive programme to search for underground facilities that we know exist." (UNSC-4714, 2003:14). Powell warned the Security Council that the IAEA had been wrong once before about Iraq's nuclear weapon capabilities, therefore, "we have to be very cautious." (UNSC-4714, 2003:15). Referring to the unresolved disarmament issues prepared by UNMOVIC, Powell remarked that the report still indicated Iraq was a threat. Straw was as dismissive of the inspectors as Powell. The inspections had made no substantial progress since November, and "It defies experience that continuing inspections with no firm end date…will achieve complete disarmament if…Iraq's full and active cooperation is not forthcoming." (UNSC-4714, 2003:26). The only option that remained in order to see the disarmament of Iraq, reminded Straw, was "by backing our diplomacy with the credible use of force." (UNSC-4714, 2003:27). Straw assured the Security Council that a new resolution, co-sponsored by the

U.S. and offered as a diplomatic pause, asked for a deadline for Iraq to comply with Security Council demands. However, there was no indication that a resolution justifying the use of force against Iraq would be supported within the Security Council. Foreign Minister Ivanov and Foreign Minister Tang

openly led the opposition to any resolution that included the use of force to resolve the crisis. According to Russia, weapons inspections were working for the first time in years, and by prematurely ending the inspector's mission the Security Council lost its authority.

The opposition to Bush's unilateral stance toward Iraq was made more tangible when Ivanov asked "What is really in the genuine interest of the world community – continuing the albeit difficult but clearly fruitful results of the inspectors work or resorting to the use of force, which will inevitably result in enormous loss of life and which is fraught with serious and unpredictable consequences for regional and international stability?" (UNSC-4714, 2003:18). Adding to the chorus of opposition, De Villepin added that the weapons inspectors had concluded that Iraq represented less of a threat to the international community than it did in 1991, and, therefore, Iraq was effectively disarmed. The obsession with Saddam Hussein's intentions had clouded the U.S.'s strategic vision. De Villepin addressed Powell directly, and asked, "Is it a question of regime change? Is it a question of fighting terrorism? Is it a question of reshaping the political landscape of the Middle East?" (UNSC-4714, 2003:20). Although France had sympathy for the U.S. and its insecurity in the wake of September 11, on a practical level Iraq had no link to the attacks and there were no guarantees that the world would be a safer place after a military confrontation with Iraq. Under the circumstances, France was left with no choice. De Villepin stated, "As a permanent member of the Security Council France will not allow a resolution to be adopted that authorizes the automatic use of force." (UNSC-4714, 2003:19).

At the conclusion of the meeting, El-Baradei was scathing in his appraisal of the U.S. and U.K. treatment of the weapons inspector's reports.

Referring to the IAEA, el-Baradei explained that they had spent "years in Iraq with sweeping 'anytime, anywhere' authority. We had crisscrossed the country. We had interviewed every nuclear scientist available. We had destroyed equipment, confiscated records, put the remaining nuclear material under IAEA seal, and blown up the nuclear production facilities at Al Atheer. To liken 2003 to 1991 was an act of deliberate distortion." El-Baradei, 2011:73).   In fact, Iraq's ambassador Mohamed Aldouri could only warn the Security Council in his concluding remarks that "war against Iraq will wreak destruction, but it will not unearth any weapons of mass destruction, for one very simple reason: there are no such weapons, except in the imagination of some." (UNSC-4714, 2003:36).

Despite U.S. and U.K. pressure on the weapons inspectors, there was no further support for the U.S. and U.K. position since the failed attempt in late February to secure a resolution that authorized the use of force. For a second time in only a few weeks, the Security Council held another open debate across two days, showing the widespread opposition of United Nations members to a war with Iraq, other than as a last resort. (United Nations Security Council 4717 [UNSC-4717], 2003, resumption 1).   As the Security Council approached March 17, the presumed deadline for the beginning of a ground war in Iraq, members in the Security Council attempted to negotiate a resolution that would place conditions on Iraq and suspend the beginning of conflict. The compromise resolution required Iraq to complete a series of tasks that amounted to an ultimatum for the use of force, should any tasks be outstanding. However, by March 14, the negotiations were over. An informal Security Council session had heard the concessions, but had produced no consensus as "the draft prepared by Chile and five other elected members was withdrawn, the European Union ambassadors met without any

convergence, and a meeting of the five permanent members was cancelled. There was no traction except under the tanks in Kuwait." (Blix, 2005:248).

In the wake of the failure of the Security Council to support the U.S., and in an effort to create a minor coalition despite United Nations opposition, the U.S. and U.K. convened a meeting in Azores, Portugal for allies that did support the use of force, namely the U.S., U.K., and Spain. It was in Azores, as Rice recalled, "we sat rather glumly, realizing that a united international community would not materialize. We would take on Saddam either with a coalition of the willing or not at all." (Rice, 2011:203). Not that this bothered Bush one bit. The statement issued from the meeting was in no way peaceful. Blix noted, as he watched the conference live from New York, that the blame was placed squarely on Saddam Hussein. The leaders "referred to Saddam's defying UN resolutions for twelve years. The responsibility was his. If conflict were to occur, the U.S. and its allies would seek the affirmation of the territorial integrity of Iraq. Any 'military presence' would be temporary." (Blix, 2005:252). The statement from Azores would amount to the final declaration of war against Iraq. On Monday 17, United Nations weapons inspectors were told to withdraw from Iraq ahead of possible armed action.(Kreps, 2011:148).

This was not the first time, nor would it be the last, that the U.S. would act forcefully without express United Nations approval. Rice explained, "From the 1948 Berlin airlift under Truman to the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the coalitions involved were acting without that specific authority." Rice stated, "We believed that both Resolution 1441 and the sixteen before it were more than adequate to express the international community's view that Saddam Hussein was a threat to international peace and security. And, in our view, 'serious consequences' had

to mean something." (Rice, 2011:204). Indeed, even George H. W. Bush had expressed some intention to go to war with Iraq in 1991 without the support of the United Nations. However, in 2003, as the U.S. split from the United Nations with very few allies, Kofi Annan expressed his disappointment at the disunity of the Security Council. Instead of preventing the humanitarian crisis that had developed in Iraq, "the conflict that is clearly about to start can make things worse – perhaps much worse." (United Nations Security Council 4721 [UNSC-4721], 2003:22). The United Nations had to ensure there were provisions in place for responding to the post-conflict conditions that would engulf Iraq.

However, Annan stressed, "under international law, the responsibility for protecting civilians in conflict falls on the belligerents. In any area under military occupation, responsibility for the welfare of the population falls on the occupying Power." (UNSC-4721, 2003:23). Not that the lack of international support mattered for Bush. For Blair, the matter was entirely different, and the wait of the U.S. diplomatic commitment had taken a toll on his domestic support. Blair recalled:

I was about as isolated as it is possible to be in politics. On the one hand, the US were chafing at the bit and essentially I agreed with their basic thrust: Saddam was a threat, he would never cooperate fully with the international community, and the world, not to say Iraq, would be better off with him out of power. My instinct was with them. Our alliance was with them. I had made a commitment after September 11 to be 'shoulder to shoulder'. I was determined to fulfil it. (Blair, 2010:412).

With U.K. support, and amidst United Nations warnings, Bush approved the airstrikes that preceded the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003.

Conclusion

Bush did not so much as decide to go to war with Iraq as allow it to unfold as a consequence of his domestic and diplomatic circumstances. Similar to George H. W. Bush in 1989, from the outset of George W. Bush's administration U.S. foreign policy toward the Persian Gulf remained largely unchanged and a low priority. More important, U.S. foreign policy maintained a degree of support for the status quo. Unlike 1989, this did not include a measured tolerance of Saddam Hussein, but instead focused on his intentions as Iraq's leader. The September 11 terrorist attacks forced Bush into a reactive foreign policy position that led to the early military successes in Afghanistan. But this blend of reactive foreign policy, highlighted threat profiles, and lingering doubts about Saddam Hussein's intentions, led to a conflated and ultimately incorrect conclusion that Saddam Hussein posed a threat to U.S. national security. This diplomatic stance was compounded by Bush's relative inexperience in foreign affairs, relying to a great extent on the dispersal of intelligence across his advisors, to whom he deferred for judgment. The result, as can be seen in the United Nations Security Council, was an obstinate U.S. that was not restrained by the international community in its pursuit of anything considered an unacceptable threat. Bush's belief that Saddam Hussein's *intentions* led to tangible *capabilities* was proof enough for the administration of an unacceptable risk to the U.S. national security.

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Turkey's adjustment to the emerging post-western international order: The Russian connection

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Abstract

Recent years have witnessed revolutionary changes in Turkey's domestic and international policies as the dynamics of the international order have been changing in a post-western fashion. Turkey, a NATO member since 1952 and an EU membership candidate since July 2005, has been experiencing a difficult relationship with its traditional allies and partners within the western international community over the last decade. This article seeks to analyze the dynamics of Turkey's response to the emerging post-western international order within the framework of Turkey's domestic environment and foreign policy. Of special importance in this regard is the impact that the so-called Russian revisionism/resurgence has had on Turkey's choices. To what extent and in which ways have the dynamics of Russia's challenge to western primacy in global politics constituted a role model for Turkey? What are the similarities and differences between Russian and Turkish efforts to adapt to the emerging post-western international order?

Keywords

Post-western international order, Turkey, Russia, Russian revisionism, Turkish revisionism

Introduction

Turkey, a NATO member since 1952 and an EU membership candidate since July 2005, has been experiencing a difficult relationship with its traditional western allies and partners over the last decade. Simultaneously, Turkey's relations with non-western rising powers have begun to improve, in particular with China and Russia. Turkey has also demonstrated a strong foreign policy agency in the Middle East, especially since the onset of the Arab Spring. This article seeks to analyze the nature of Turkey's international relations, as the dynamics of the international order have been changing in a post-western fashion. Of special importance in this regard is the impact that the so-called Russian revisionism/resurgence has had on Turkey's choices. To what extent and in which ways have the dynamics of Russia's challenge to western primacy in global politics constituted a role model for Turkey? What are the similarities and differences between Russian and Turkish efforts to adapt to the emerging post-western international order?

It is against such a background that the article first offers a conceptual discussion of how non-western powers respond to the primacy of western powers in global politics and chart their ways in the emerging world order. Then, an attempt will be made at demonstrating the key characteristics of the emerging order and the special role of post-Soviet Russia during this process. Afterwards, the article examines the key features of Turkey's adjustment to the emerging post-western world order, particularly since 2002 when the Justice and Development Party (AKParty) came to power. The conclusion summarizes the key findings of the research as well as highlighting the limits of Russian revisionism on Turkish revisionism.

A Conceptual/Theoretical Discussion

Recent years have seen a spectacular expansion of the literature on how established powers should respond to rising powers, particularly in the context of US-China relations (Gill and Schreer 2018, pp.155-170; Friedberg 2018, pp. 7-64; Harding 2015, pp. 95-122). Generally speaking established powers can alternative adopt containment, accommodation and engagement/socialization strategies vis-vis emerging powers.

Containment strategy suggests that established powers view rising powers as potential threats to their interests and try to do everything possible to help contain their increasing influence both in their regions and globally. The supporters of the *accommodation* strategy do on the other hand argue that the United States would do well to recognize the irreversible rise of China, treat China as a regional and potential superpower, and increase great power cooperation with China with a view to finding solutions to the existing security problems in such a way that would satisfy the concerns of both. The ones who tend to believe in the promises of *engagement/socialization* strategy interpret China's rise positively and hope that improving trade relations with China and acquiescing to China's efforts to get richer would gradually culminate with China's transformation into a liberal democratic polity as well as China acting as a responsible stakeholder.

On the other hand, looking at the issue from the perspective of rising powers, three strategies stand out. *Balancing* strategy suggests that rising powers would view the existing system problematical and illegitimate in its current form and try to do whatever it takes to ensure that their national interests are taken into account more convincingly (He 2012, pp. 154-191). Because they view the existing system as unjust and threatening their interests, they would either internally try to improve their material power

capabilities or externally join forces with other rising powers should their individual capabilities fall short. Rising powers might either establish formal collective defense organizations and pledge to come to their aid militarily, viz. hard balancing, or coordinate their cooperation informally within the existing or to-be-created institutional platforms, viz. soft balancing (Abb 2018, pp. 275-296; Paul 2005, pp. 46-71).

Spoiling strategy assumes that rising powers would intentionally try to spoil the smooth functioning of existing international organizations with a view to ensuring that established powers do no longer benefit from them as they used to do till now. They can either use their veto powers, to the extent it is possible, or resort to other actions available. Spoiling strategy can be considered the first stage before moving to the soft-balancing strategy.

Finally, *co-optation* strategy seems to be predicated on the assumption that rising powers would continue to view the existing international organizations as both legitimate and instrumental in terms of achieving their national interests. A strong effort to 'own' existing organizations would likely provide them with an opportunity to help transform them from within in line with their national priorities and preferences. Their cooptation might stem from either their sincere adoption of the constitutive norms of existing organizations or the instrumental reasoning that should they 'own' them their ability to help transform them from within would increase (Oguzlu 2013, pp. 774-796).

The post-western international order

Since the early years of the twenty-first century the center of gravity of international politics has gradually shifted from the Transatlantic region to the Pacific/Indo-Pacific region. As the primacy of western actors in international politics has come under strong challenges with the growing power capabilities of non-western powers, the ideational and normative underpinnings of the US-led liberal international order have also increasingly been contested (Ikenberry 2017, pp. 2-9). This transformation seems to have accelerated following the financial crisis in 2008, which primarily engulfed the United States and many EU members.

Since the early 1990s till 2008, the United States, in partnership with its European allies within NATO and the European Union, used to call shots in international politics. This period was defined by many as the heyday of the so-called liberal international order. Not only the liberal order of the Cold War era gradually expanded to former communist countries in central and Eastern Europe, but also the immense material power capabilities at the disposal of the United States allowed her to pursue primacist strategies all around the world.

Even though the 9/11 attacks on the US homeland dented the image of the United States as the omnipotent global hegemon and criticisms of the American approach on the global war on terror intensified following the US occupation of Iraq, it was primarily following the financial crisis in late 2000s that a sense of decline has begun to perpetuate in the West (Duncanbe and Dunne 2018, pp. 25-42).

The retrenchment and leading from behind strategies of the Obama administration suggested that the United States does no longer want to play the role of global hegemon with all the responsibilities attached. The 'America first' strategy of the Trump administration, despite all its fundamental differences from Obama's strategy, continued this trend in American thinking (Stokes 2018, pp. 133-159; Peterson 2018, pp. 28-44). Growing number of Americans seem now to believe that the United States is a global power in decline and

would do well to focus its attention on fixing the problems at home.

Similar to the United States, the European Union has also been in a crisis mood over the last decade. The weakening of the EU integration process in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the failure of traditional right and left parties across the continent to provide long-term solutions to the daily problems of Europeans, the growing Russian geopolitical assertiveness in the east, the worsening migration challenge to the south and the intensification of non-traditional security challenges in the heart of the continent seem to have resulted in the strengthening of populist, illiberal, anti-globalist, anti-integrationist and anti-migrant political parties and movements across the continent (Delcour 2018, pp. 109-121; Smith and Youngs 2018, pp. 45-56). All these developments denote that the strong support that European countries have been giving to the liberal international order can no longer be taken for granted (Dworkin and Leonard 2018). The election of Trump to White House and his never-ending questioning of the liberal roots of the postwar international order have added further insult to the injury.

Simultaneously Russia has been going through a geopolitical revival over the last decade no matter how costly this process has proved to be in terms of economic and political consequences. The Russian military involvements in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014 and Syria in 2015 all attest to the fact Russia strongly contests the geopolitical primacy of liberal western powers in global politics (Romanova 2018, pp. 76-91).

Likewise, China has intensified its efforts to become the regional hegemon in East Asia. The 'hide your capabilities and bide your time' strategy of the post-Mao era seems has already given way to a more

assertive China dream since 2012 when Xi Jinping ascended to power (Chung 2016, pp. 47-59). Where China's efforts to solidify its global presence within existing institutional platforms failed to yield positive results, Chinese leadership have begun to pay more attention to creating alternative institutional platforms at regional and global levels. China's increasing material capabilities seem to have also emboldened the Chinese leadership to more confidently propagate its global vision of international relations and development (Mazaar, Heath and Vallas 2018; Breslin 2018, pp. 57-75).

Since 2008, the values of multiculturalism, openness, tolerance and universal human rights have increasingly become contested all over the world. The morality of universal cosmopolitanism has gradually given way to the morality of relative communitarianism as the rising non-western powers, primarily China and Russia, have increasingly offered non-western conceptualizations of international political order. Non-interference in states' internal affairs, primacy of state sovereignty, realpolitik foreign policy understanding, authoritarian leadership, strengthening strong national identities, state-led capitalism, sphere of influence mentality, multipolarism in global governance, primacy of great powers in international relations, mercantilist trade practices, investing in military power capabilities, increasing use of economic power instruments in the name of securing geopolitical gains, questioning the principle of responsibility to protect are some of the points that Russian and Chinese leaderships have been vehemently prioritizing over the last decade (Wilson 2018; Lo 2008).

The last decade has also witnessed the rise of populist and illiberal political movements in key western countries. The criticism of liberal democratic practices from within has severely hollowed out the

attractiveness of the liberal world order across the globe (Fukuyama 2014). As the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom and Donald Trump's election to presidency in the United States demonstrate, the forces of illiberalism, populism, protectionism and xenophobia have also gained ground in key western countries.

The last decade has also witnessed the replacement of long-term identity based alliance relationships with short-term, pragmatic and issue-oriented strategic partnerships. One of the best examples in this regard is Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria. In today's world, countries of different value orientations, geographical locations, power capabilities and threat perceptions are no longer bound to define each other categorically as enemies or friends. The notion of 'frenemy' has already become an identity signifier in interstate relations.

In today's international order the ideological polarization between opposing power blocks is not as sharp and rigid as it was during the Cold War era. The interconnectedness between liberal western powers and illiberal authoritarian powers are much higher than it was between the western capitalist and eastern communist countries during the Cold war era.

What about the role of Russia in the emergence of post-western international order?

The Codes of Russian Revisionism

Since President Putin came to power in late 1990s, Russia has witnessed a national revival. Having an imperial legacy in the background and acting as one of the two superpowers of the Cold War era, it is quite natural and understandable that Russia wants to leave the troubled years of the 1990s behind and put a serious claim to global power status in the emerging century (Kotkin 2016, pp.2-9). Recently, Russia has come under international limelight once again

following its support to ethnic separatists in Georgia, annexation of Crimea into its territory, the support that it gives to the separatist groups in the eastern part of Ukraine and its military involvement in Syria on the side of Assad's regime. Hardly a day passes without Russia being criticized by western circles of pursuing aggressive, assertive and neo-imperial policies in its near-abroad. It is for sure that Putin's Russia has been at odds with Western powers in terms of the constitutive norms of the emerging world order (Allison 2017, pp. 519-543). What kind of a world order does Russia envisage and what factors motivate Russia's strategies and policies abroad?

Putin's Russia has been extremely aghast at the primacy of western actors in world politics and therefore has been striving to help bring into existence a multipolar world order in which Russia plays a decisive role. Neither the established powers of the West nor the rising powers of the East should take Russia's cooperation for granted (Larson and Shevchenko 2010, pp. 63-95). Despite the growing strategic rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing in recent years, one not should jump to the conclusion that Russia would act as a fiddle to China whenever its relations with western actors deteriorate. In the best of circumstances China appears to be a trump card for Russia in its dealings with Western powers. The closer Russia comes to China, the stronger the Russian message that Russia is not without alternatives. Active Russian agency in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICSs should be read as Russia's growing determination to soft-balance against the West (Ferguson 2012, pp. 197-122).

Russian leaders believe that Russia's historical legacy, immense military power capabilities, rich natural resources and huge landmass provide her the ability help bring into existence a Russia-friendly regional

and global order. It is a strong Russian conviction that rather than treating Russia as a defeated power and imposing a peace settlement on it, similar to what victorious western powers did to Germany in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, western powers should have contributed to Russia's incorporation into the emerging security order in post-Cold War Europe, similar to how post-Napoleon France had been incorporated into the Concert of Europe in 1815.

Despite some counterfactual arguments, it seems that the West promised not to enlarge NATO eastwards in return for Russia's acquiescence to Germany's unification and its eventual accession to NATO (Shifrinson 2016, pp. 7-44). However, this is not what has transpired. Therefore, a strong feeling of disillusionment, containment, and encirclement reigns in today's Russia. The Yeltsin era during the 1990s did not witness a serious breach in Russia's relations with the West mainly because Russia was weak and the then ruling elites saw westernization as the only route to modernization and development.

In order to voice its strong criticism against western aggrandizement, Russia needed to recover from its economic malaise under the strong leadership of President Putin. The improving Russian economy and the growing need of western powers to seek Russia's help in responding to the geopolitical challenges in the post 9/11 era seem to have emboldened Russian leaders to openly question the legitimacy of the liberal Western order.

Russia turned out to be vehemently against the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and some Central Asian republics. From Russia's perspective these revolutionary movements were masterminded by western circles and carried out by local agents. Seen from Moscow, promotion of democratic values in

Russia's near abroad cannot be seen isolated from the geopolitical competition between Russia and the West. This appears to be the main reason why Russia fought against Georgia in August 2008 and strongly opposed Ukraine's incorporation into the West through the signing of an Association agreement with the European Union in late 2013, as well as Ukraine's eventual accession to NATO (German 2017, pp. 291-308).

In Russian thinking, western security institutions, most notably NATO, should not be the main regional platforms in which questions of European security are discussed. As President Putin argued back in 2007 in Munich, absent the Cold War era confrontation between Washington and Moscow, NATO should have already replaced by new institutional arrangements concerning European security.

Unlike the developed western economies which are built on the capitalist values, Russian economy very much relies on the export of commodities in a semi-closed economy, such as gas and oil. The idea that capitalist economic modernization would eventually culminate in political liberalization and democratization does not strike a sympathetic chord with Russia. Russia seems to have adopted a mercantilist economic model in which many economic activities are closely regulated and monitored by the state and economic power is a means to state's political and strategic influence at home and abroad.

Unlike the western powers where post-modern ways of arranging state-society relations have taken deep roots and where issues of security mostly concerns low-politics issues, Russia, mostly owing to its multicultural character, offers an example of traditional nation-states where national sovereignty,

state survival and territorial integrity are still the most important security issues (Snetkov 2012, pp.521-542).

Russia defines itself as a 'sovereign democracy' and abhors western attempts at preaching the virtues of liberal democracy and universal human rights (Makarychev 2008, pp. 49-62). From a Russian perspective, historical experiences, geopolitical realities and cultural values tend to produce different conceptualizations of democracy across the globe. Putting the idea of universal human rights at the center of global politics and authorizing the United Nations or other regional security organizations to help organize multinational peace operations in conflict-riven places contradicts Russia's state-oriented security and diplomatic culture. Russian uneasiness with such multilateral UN-led operations can be seen in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011. The Russian position on the Syrian crisis also reveals that the principle of not interfering with states' internal affairs, no matter how severe the internal conditions are, still colors Russia's international behaviors. Russian rulers do not want to see that the principle of 'responsibility to protect' drive international involvement in conflict-riven places. There are no universally-agreed human rights and the use of force in the name of 'responsibility to protect' would only mask western imperial designs (Baranovsky and Mateiko 2016. 49-69).

Recent years have also witnessed that President Putin has been vociferously arguing in favor of the revival of Russian nationalism imbued with distinctive legacies of communism and Orthodox Christianity. Ascribing a messianic mission to Russia, Russian leaders wish to resurrect the defunct Russian empire in new clothes that acts as the protector of traditional Christian values against the challenges stemming from the post-modern/post-religion societies in the West

and religious fundamentalism in the East and South (Curanovic 2015).

Moreover, it is also believed that the Russian society is built on the primacy of patriarchal and traditional communal values instead of self-regarding individualistic morality. Russian society evinces a predisposition to communitarian ethics over individualistic or cosmopolitan ethics. That is to say that the meaning of life of an ordinary Russian emanates from his/her belonging to the larger Russian community in which common societal values take priority over individual quest for happiness and well-being.

Russia's approach to the liberal world order is informed, among others, by the historical dynamics of its relations with the western international community (Shlapentokh 2007; Kaempf 2010, pp. 313-340). On one hand exists a strong pro-western tradition in Russian culture and history, according to which the road to modernity and development goes through Russia's acceptance of western values and practices. On the other hand a strong resistance to the West also exists in Russian history, whose most exemplary manifestation took place during the Cold War era. Here Russia is defined as the anti-thesis of the West and its liberal values. Finally, the so-called Eurasian school of thought sits somewhere in the middle of these two polar positions (Laruelle 2008). According to Eurasianism, Russia is both a European and Asian country at the same time and Russia's historical mission is to unite the diverse communities in the Eurasian region under Russia's moral and political leadership. Russia is the geopolitical hegemon of the Eurasian region and without strong Russian leadership neither Russia nor other Eurasian communities would be in a position to restrain western and eastern encroachments. Given Russia's foreign and security polices over the last decade, one could confidently

argue that Eurasianism has already become the dominant geopolitical school of thought in Russia (Marozova 2009, pp. 667-686).

Russian elites are very much obsessed with the idea that Russia is legitimately entitled to have an equal standing with the West, if not superior than the West. As westerners question Russia's great power status and continue to lecture Russians on the superiority of western values and Russia's shortcomings, Russia tends to define itself in opposition to the West. The victories against Napoleon's France and Hitler's Germany in the past have been increasingly instrumentalized by Putin's administration in its efforts to redefine Russian national identity in the emerging century (March 2012, pp. 401-425).

Deciphering the codes of Turkish revisionism

Turkey came into existence as a western-style sovereign nation state after the war of independence between 1919 and 1923 and the founding fathers of the new republic wanted to build the new state on the basis of anti-Ottomanism in many respects. Multi-culturalist, universalist, multi-religious and multi ethnic character of the Empire were replaced by secular Turkish nationalism (Danforth 2016, pp. 5-27).

Foreign policy practices of the Republic since 1923 till the end of the Cold War mostly reflected Kemalist priorities of westernism and secularism. 'The peace at home peace in the world' motto captures this mentality well, thereby Turkey eschewed adventurist policies abroad with a view to maintaining its territorial security against external threats as well as channeling its limited capabilities to internal challenges of economic development and creating a harmonious society in the image of western values.

During the long Republican era, Turkish foreign policy was mostly pro-western and status-quo oriented

in that Turkey defined its international position within the western international community by aligning its interests and values with those of the western world. Neither its efforts to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and the oil-rich Middle Eastern states in times of crises with western powers nor occasional outburst for neutrality or third worldism prevented Turkey from maintaining its western orientation and valuing its membership in key western international organizations, such as NATO (Oguzlu 2003, pp. 285-299).

The so-called Eurasianist school of thought remained marginal throughout the long Cold War years. The ones, who argued in favor of Eurasianism, particularly from the left, limited their imaginations to socialist modernization process at home while maintaining a pro-Soviet foreign policy abroad. They were exteremely secularist and vehemently questioned Turkey's so-called satellite status within the western camp. To them pursuing a predominantly western oriented foreign policy would amount to the abrogation of Ataturk's true legacy of wholly independent Turkey (Akcali and Perincek 2009, pp. 550-569).

Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey's foreign policy activism has spectacularly increased. Yet, rather than an intersubjectively shared new geopolitical imagination, the loosing of the Cold War era constraints and the changing dynamics of the international system appear to have determined this outcome more decisively. The idea that Turkey constituted the best role model for the countries that gained their independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave additional impetus to Turkey's efforts to improve its relations with many countries located in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Balkans. However, rather than Turkey offering these countries any alternative roadmap outside its westernization

path, its goal was re-emphasize its western/European identity by indirectly contributing to the promotion of western/European norms onto these areas. This also implies that the neo-Ottomanist arguments during the 1990s, mostly identified with former President Turgut Ozal, were in synch with Turkey's decades-long westernization process. Stated somewhat differently, the apparently neo-Ottomanist spirit behind Turkish foreign policy activism during the 1990s was mostly defined in economic, cultural and social terms rather than strategic, political and military.

Despite occasional crises in Turkey's relations with western powers, particularly owing to the developments taking place in the larger Middle East region, Turkey has nevertheless adopted a pro-western foreign policy mentality till late 2000s (Oguzlu 2011, pp. 981-998). A shift towards soft-Eurasianism in the second half of the 2000s did not radically change Turkey's pro-western orientation (Onis and Yilmaz 2009, pp. 7-24). The increasing reforms at home in the name of fulfilling the EU membership criteria, the ongoing commitment to NATO membership, Turkey's participation in the Greater Middle eastern Imitative as a democracy partner, the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies in the name of development and economic growth, the adoption of mostly liberal and soft-power oriented foreign policies in the Middle East and the growing determination to de-securitize Turkey's extremely securitized relations with its neighbors should all be seen as examples of Turkey's efforts to help underline its place within the western international community alongside the cooptation strategy (Oguzlu 2010-2011, pp. 657-683).

During this time period, mostly corresponding to years between 1991 and 2008, the West preserved its privileged position in Turkey's geopolitical imagination despite Ankara's growing efforts to improve its strategic and economic relations with

Russia, China, Iran, Syria and many other non-western countries. The idea that Turkey should join forces with such non-western powers in order help bring into existence a new international or regional order that would fundamentally problematize the legitimacy of the Western international order was not as powerful as it was going to be in the following years.

The revisionist tone in Turkish foreign policy has become more conspicuous since 2008, under the guise of a more assertive neo-Ottomanism (Tuysuzoglu 2014, pp. 85-104). The key difference between the neo-Ottomanism of the former President Turgut Ozal and then Prime Minister Davutoglu is that while the former defined Turkey's international activism in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire as part of Turkey's decades-long westernization process and ascribed Turkey an indirect role in the socialization of the newly independent states to the constitutive norms and rules of the western international society, the latter prioritized defining Turkey as a central country that should have both a strong degree of international agency and a particular global/regional vision whereby Turkey's goal should be to help transform the countries located in the post-Ottoman geography in the image of its interests and values.

While the neo-Ottomanism of Ozal was mostly defined in cultural, economic and social dimensions prioritizing Turkey's western secular identity, Davutoglu's neo-Ottomanism has been more a political and strategic Project than a social and cultural one (Torbakov 2017, pp. 125-145). To Davutoglu's version of neo-Ottomanism, Turkey should not only redefine its national identity on the basis of a synthesis between ethnic Turkishness and Islamic religion but also own the legacy of the former Ottoman Empire and contribute to the solution of many security and political problems in its regional environment as a responsible global/regional power (Ozkan 2014, pp.

119-140). Questioning the strong influence of extra-regional powers in the Middle East, Turkey has begun to argue that problems of the region should be solved by the people of the region with the development of regional consciousness. To this vision, Turkey, similar to Russia and China, should be treated as a global/regional power being entitled to its sphere of influence. The oft-repeated mantra that the world is bigger than five well epitomizes the spirit of Turkish revisionism.

Following its second consecutive electoral victory in the parliamentary elections held in the summer of 2007 and the election of Abdullah Gul to presidency despite all roadblocks, AKParty rulers seem to have felt a strong degree of self-confidence to set in motion an identity based transformation process at home and abroad. When the cooling of relations with the European Union combined with the growing differences with the United States, the end result happened to be Turkey's continuous search for strategic autonomy. The years since 2008 have witnessed a strong dose of employing normative and moral considerations in Turkish foreign policy practices, particularly in the Middle East (Dal 2015, pp. 421-433). Since the onset of the Arab Spring, Turkey's number one foreign policy goal in the Middle East has been to help bring into existence a new regional order with Turkey playing the leading role in the strengthening of representative democracy and regionalism. Playing the order instituter role went hand in hand with Turkey's determination to help erase the imprint of external actors in the region and replace it with the rise of new power blocks that would align their interest with those of AKParty-ruled Turkey.

When the American willingness to outsource security responsibilities to regional players combined with the relative absence of non-western global actors in the

Middle Eastern theater, it was not difficult for Turkish rulers to clamor for regional leadership and aggressively pursue an order-creator role to its south, at least by the time Russia decided to get involved in the Syrian civil war militarily. It was during this period that Turkey's efforts to facilitate the solution of regional problems in the Middle East increased. Turkey also actively supported the ouster of Assad from power in Syria. It has increasingly built its diplomatic engagements across the globe on humanitarian grounds and pursued a responsible global actor role by coordinating its policies with other like-minded rising powers within the framework of such regional groupings as MIKTA and MINT. It also signed up to China's One Belt One Road initiative and expressed its determination to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Economic Union as a full member. These are all examples of soft-balancing in Turkish foreign policy.

The strong revisionist tone in Turkish foreign policy has begun to soften since 2015 onwards as it has increasingly become clear that its hard and soft power capabilities would not allow Turkey to play an order-instituter role in the Middle East (Keyman 2016). On one hand Turkey has continued to suffer from an expectations-capability gap. On the other one, the growing assertiveness of other players in the Middle East, particularly Russia and Iran, has curtailed Turkey's maneuvering capability (Oguzlu 2016, pp. 58-67). Turkey's growing exposure to security challenges emanating from the ongoing civil wars in Iraq and Syria has also led to the revival of the old security-first mentality in that the preservation of Turkey's territorial integrity and cohesion of the Turkish society have now become the main preoccupation of Turkey's rulers. The coup attempt of the FETO-affiliated members of Turkish military in

the summer of 2016 has also aggravated Turkey's security concerns.

In Lieu of Conclusion: The limits of Russian connection in Turkish revisionism

Turkish-Russian cooperation in political, economic and strategic realms has intensified over the last decade (Onis and Yilmaz 2015). Similar to Russia, Turkey also comes from an imperial legacy in that pursuing an imperial geopolitical vision occupied Turkey's political agenda from time to time. Similar to Russian security elites, Turkey's ruling elites have increasingly redefined Turkey in an imperial fashion in that Turkey deserves to have its sphere of influence in the post-Ottoman geographies. The primacy of state elites in defining national preferences, security interests and the strategies to be adopted to deal with them in a top-down fashion is common to both countries. State is deemed sacred and omnipotent in both societies. Defining national interests and security policies from the perspective of state is a practice shared by both.

Both societies are conservative in which traditional societal, political and cultural values should be preserved against liberal, post-modern and hedonistic western values. State and society are defined as constitutive of each other. If policies being adopted in the name of strengthening liberal democratic transformation were to imperil the cohesive and harmonious nature of the society, then such policies should be abandoned immediately. It is no wonder that in both countries a mixture of ethnic nationalism and religious conservatism has growingly shaped national identities in recent years.

Ruling elites in both countries tend to interpret strong western support to further liberalization and democratization in their neighborhood as part of larger geopolitical designs concocted in western capitals to

contain growing Russian and Turkish geopolitical influence. Just as Russia has been extremely against the so-called color revolutions in the post-Soviet geography, Turkey has also adopted a skeptical attitude towards western attempts at regime change in the post-Ottoman geography. Turkey's ruling elites interpreted the Gezi-parki protests in the summer of 2013 as a western ploy against the ruling government and therefore adopted sharp measures to suppress them.

Their common perception of exclusion from the West seems also to have brought Turkey and Russia much closer to each other in recent times (Morozov and Rumelili 2012, pp. 28-48; Hill and Taspinar 2006, pp. 81-92). Both societies seem to provide a fertile ground for strong and charismatic leaders to flourish. Holding strong executive powers in their hands, mobilizing their societies behind national grandeur, defining their nation as living organisms that need wealth, power and space to exist and survive, claiming to represent the national will against the corrupted elites detached from the society, offering simple and mostly emotional solutions to the complex and multifaceted problems of their societies in a globalizing and shrinking world, are common leadership traits of both Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A strong personal chemistry also exists between them and they met each other numerous times in recent past.

Both Moscow and Ankara appear also to share in common that the US-led liberal international order has long been in terminal decline and the emerging international order should be defined in a multipolar fashion whereby non-western powers are in a much better position to determine its constitutive rules and norms. Claims to cosmopolitan morality and universal human rights are under strong criticism in both countries.

Despite such commonalities between them, it would be wrong to suggest that Russian and Turkish revisionism are of the same ilk. While Russia is a former super power trying to reclaim its status back by challenging the primacy of liberal world order and wants to play in the league of great powers, Turkey is a rising middle power trying to find its ways in the uncharted territories of the emerging twenty-first century. While Russia mostly defines its national and foreign policy identity in opposition to the west, Turkey's decades-long institutional relationship with western powers still continues to shape Turkey's constraints and opportunities decisively.

Turkey's revisionism seems to have elements of both soft-balancing and cooptation while Russian revisionism comes much closer to spoiling and oscillates between hard and soft balancing. Turkey has not proven that it is a revolutionary state aiming at the radical overhaul of the liberal international order through spoiling or hard balancing strategies. Provided that the liberal international order reflects the existing balance of power in today's world more convincingly, Turkey would likely opt for the current liberal order (Langan 2016). While Turkish rulers have gone to great lengths to have Turkey's international identity recognized as 'virtuous', 'humanitarian' and 'responsible' power, one does not see similar efforts on the part of Russian rulers.

In this sense, there is a stark contrast between Turkish and Russian revisionism. For example, while Putin's Russia has been giving all kind of support to pro-Russian illiberal and populist movements across Europe in the hope of driving wedges within the transatlantic alliance, Turkey still sees NATO as vital to the materialization of its national security interests and actively contributes to the transformation of the alliance from within. Russian spoiling has nothing to share in common with Turkish cooptation in this regard.

As part of its soft-balancing strategy, Turkish rulers do now increasingly voice the view that the world is bigger than five and Turkey's efforts to develop cordial and pragmatic relations with non-western rising powers should prooceed full steam. Signing up to Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, showing interest in developing joint projects with China within the framework of the One-Belt-One-Road initiative, contributing to global and regional governance initiatives, such MIKTA and MINT, buying S-400 missile defense system from Russia, establishing military bases in faraway regions, such as Qatar and Somalia, are all noteworthy examples in this regard. The gradual erosion in the relative weight of western powers in international politics and the concomitant rise in the influence of non-western powers appear to have increased Turkey's maneuvering capability and bargaining power in its foreign policy. Yet, this does in no way amount to a strong Turkish revisionism evincing hard balancing or spoiling character.

As a final note, it should be admitted that while Turkey still values NATO very much and defines membership in EU as a long-term state interest, Russia appears to approach Turkey from an instrumental perspective in that helping drive wedges among NATO allies, in this case particularly between Turkey and the United States, would likely increase its bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States.

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Personalization in Political Leadership: An Analysis of Vladimir Putin[1]

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Abstract

For many years, the argument persists that we have entered a leader's era. Political leadership has taken pole position in political and social life when compared with political parties or their ideologies. Whether Presidentialization or Prime Ministerial Predominance, the personification rests on a single individual, portrait, or dominant figure solemnly embraced by the masses. Such a political emergence has been witnessed in numerous countries and has recently gained the attention of political science researchers. At this point, the aim of this study is to understand how personification has come to be so prevalent in political and social life and how political leaders both motivate and inspire their people to represent their beloved countries. To answer this question, the transformational leadership theory is scrutinized within the case of Vladimir Putin. The evaluation of this theory rests on its main assumption, which is posed as a leadership model shaped around a personalized charismatic leader. This is tested via a discourse analysis of Vladimir Putin.

Keywords Transformational Leadership, Personification, Political leadership, Leader effects, Vladimir Putin.

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Introduction

Political parties are both indispensable and necessary organizations for political life and democracy. However, in this sense, more important is the balanced weight of the ruling parties or the parties in power. However, over recent years, the leadership of political parties has often become more important than the party itself—regardless of whether they are in or out of office. A kind of "personalization of politics" is haunting the world with dominant political figures occupying the political arena. Burns (1978) argued long ago that "the personality cult—a cult of devils as well as heroes—thrives in both east and west" (p.1). It is important to determine precisely where party cohesion stands in today's politics, and whether party importance has decreased. Numerous portraits adorn the offices of political leaders around the world. This makes one question the emergence of leader-centered politics, which could be said to be more closely related to a personalization of politics than a party ideology or program. Such a political personalization extends to many world leaders. To give a few examples, we only need to look at Xi Jinping, for instance, who announced himself as "president for life" with a constitutional amendment. We can also look at Vladimir Putin, who switched office with Dmitri Medvedev to gain another two terms of office as President. In addition, we can examine the transition from Presidential system to Parliamentary in Armenia for the sake of shifting power from the President to the Prime Ministry for the benefit of Serzh Sargsyan, although the outcome did not meet the expectation, or vice versa, such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan's power grab in Turkey.

Although this list can be extended further, the major point to focus on is how this environment shapes the acts of the leaders regardless of the presidential or parliamentary system. Also, how do they affect one another in such an environment? According to Blondel (1987), "it is the environment that proposes, suggests, and even dictates" (p.18) the act of the leader pushing the leaders into a particular direction. Personalization in autocratic systems is not a new matter, but in a democratic one, it has certainly become an important issue to investigate. Whether it is called "presidentialization" (Dowding, 2013), "prime ministerial dominance" (Heffernan, 2003) or "chief executive empowerment" (Johansson & Tallberg, 2010), we are witnessing an era of individual politicians becoming the most prominent figures, even more so than their parties or ideologies.

One of the most important examples of this personal control or domination can be said to remain in the Russian Federation. Although the current situation is summarized by scholars as "post-modern authoritarianism" (Pomerantsev, 2015), "electoral authoritarianism" (Ross 2011; White, 2013), "semi-authoritarianism" (Ottoway, 2003), or whether this status is casting out democracy in Russia, one thing is clear that Vladimir Putin has managed to transform the country, even at the expense of dismantling the checks and balances, while still retaining high levels of approval from the masses. Taking hard measures and steps, he has managed to reform the country, especially in economy and infrastructure. As a result, he has become a figure associated with the state. For instance, "if there's Putin—there's Russia, if there's no Putin—there's no Russia," states a Russian government official named Vyacheslav Volodin (October 23, 2014). Most of the people in Russia share this thought and remain united behind his leadership. For Manin (1997), this is about "traditional party democracy has been replaced by audience democracy, which is based on a more direct connection between the political leaders and the general public" (p.219).

Whether this is called "the leadership challenge" (Kouzes & Pooner, 1987), "visionary leadership" (Sashkin, 1988), "new leadership" (Bryman, 1992), or "charismatic leadership," (Bass & Avoloi, 1993), the key point is to understand how today's leadership examples display their politics in and out of their respective countries. Vladimir Putin has been in power for more than fifteen years and has transformed the Russian Federation. This existence is tested via a discourse analysis of Vladimir Putin to understand his personalized politics both inside Russia and abroad. Hence, it is important to understand how Putin has transformed his country via his personal control in nearly every area of social, economic, and political life. This is important in understanding that the characteristics of the transformational leadership theory explain the acts of Putin's leadership, such as his advocating of a strong reform for his people, as well as his reputation for being a risk taker. The methodology of the study rests on a brief theoretical discussion of the transformational leadership theory, and how Putin fits into being a Transformational leader, which is evaluated via the discourse analysis of the political rhetoric of Putin, who is clearly a good rhetorician, as demonstrated by his ability to convince his followers in the name of what the defends. His success relies on his sincere communication with the people, inspiring them to favor what is best for the Russian Federation.

To achieve this certainly requires the proficiency of a good rhetorician. As Butler and Spivak emphasize (2007), "speech acts uttered by a political leader function like the public performance of a national anthem" (p.62). This is crucial in the realm of convincing the electorate and transforming them into followers. By the same token, the followers become so subject to the leader and to his narrative that this positions an identity for the masses to embrace.

Transformational Leadership Theory

In presidential systems, the leaders are directly elected and do not share their popular authority and, as a result, have a far greater chance of personalizing their leadership rather than in parliamentary systems. This does not mean that there is no way to personalize politics in parliamentary systems. What is meant by political personalization is a ''process in which the political weights of the individual actor in the political process increase over time while the centrality of the political group (party) declines'' (Rahat & Sheafer, 2007:65). For instance, in the case of Europe, we see Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, or Viktor Orban in Hungary, both pf whom all personalize their politics by presenting themselves as 'Europe's Savior,' regardless of whether they are in government or not. However, in presidential systems, leaders, due to their popular legitimacy and as the sole representative of the executive, may claim to represent the will of the people on their own.

This is—what Bass (1997) argued leadership to be— a "morally uplift" or as "visionary change agents" (p.131). In the field of leadership, Burns' book entitled "Leadership," gained considerable popularity, subsequently opening up a debate on Transformational and Transactional leadership models and how to understand these concepts upon leadership in politics. According to Burns (1978), this is a leadership approach that causes change in individuals and social systems, as well as a valuable and positive change in the followers. This brings us, firstly, to the inclusion of connecting followers and a sense of identity, and self to the mission; secondly, to redesign their perceptions and values; and finally, to challenge the status quo and alter the political environment.

Burns mostly concentrates on morality with the inquiry of how it leads to motivation. For Burns (1978), it is about "the hierarchy of needs, the structure of values and stages of moral development" (p.428). This is to build a common ground of awareness and consciousness in the words of Burns, that "leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality" (p.20). As witnessed in the case of Russia—as an emerging democracy—there is Vladimir Putin, who has been supported by a far-reaching electorate for quite some time, on which Putin makes use of the moral in his political discourse. In this sense, Putin's political behavior centers around his political style, distinguishing him from ordinary executives (Prime Ministers, Presidents), making him a leader; in this case, a transformational one. As Burns puts it, "all leaders are actual or potential power holders, but not all power holders are leaders" (1978:18). Hence, the nature of transformational leadership rests on re-creating or re-narrating the ideal; that is, to re-write the current and future prospects of the people, and a country in which every individual finds him or herself attached. In light of the above, it is worth exploring the factors causing this commitment to rise, and why people engage in Transformational leaders—not just as electorates, but also as followers. In response to these questions, Bernard M. Bass argues that understanding the success of this type of leadership is based on the fulfillment of the components making up transformational leadership.

Besides Burns, Brass has contributed substantially to the literature and has carried on the leadership debate to understand the components that constitute transformational leadership. Transformational leaders are those who "stimulate and inspire their followers in both achieving extraordinary outcomes and, in the process, develop their own leadership capacity" (Bass

& Riggio, 2006:3). His findings are valuable to understanding this leadership model as, through this study, I have looked at how Putin makes a good example ofa transformational leader. Bass identifies four important components of transformational leadership: *idealized influence*, *inspirational motivation*, *intellectual stimulation,* and *individualized consideration*. I have applied these components to Vladimir Putin to understand how and why he must be considered a transformationalist leader.

Idealized influence is about the leader's presence via his/her charisma. Leaders generally display trust and conviction and have a strong ability to gather the masses around a shared purpose. Bass (1997) acknowledges this as "they are admired as role models generating pride" (p.133). The importance of this component is that it converts the electors to followers, in which they both embrace and emulate the leaders with high levels of trust, respect, and understanding. In turn, the leaders build a strong leadership image in the imagining of the followers. And even in times of crisis, this image is not shattered, but deeply embraced. The charisma of the leader guarantees that any problem or crisis faced by the population is to be overcome. In the leader, the followers find themselves—a kind of self-discovery through both pride and sacrifice. The personality the leader possesses and the way he/she interacts with the followers inspires them, which, in turn, makes it easy for the followers to identify with the leader. This brings the case to the other component of transformational leadership—inspirational motivation.

Goleman et al. (2002) argue that "great leadership works through emotions" (p.3). Inspirational motivation includes how the leaders encourage the people by telling them what needs to be done for the

well-being of the nation as a whole. In doing so, the leader articulates a vision for the future, thereby inspiring the followers by giving (new) meanings to projects while also challenging the status-quo. For Goleman et al. (2002), this is about the leader's way of communicating with their followers; that is, how they "speak from their heart and offer a measure of re-assurance and certainty of conviction about the direction in which they are being led" (p.29). At this point, the leader becomes a road-map—someone who encompasses the dreams, beliefs, hopes, values, etc. shared by the followers. In turn, the leader creates a sense of unity with great passion and enthusiasm—both moral and national—as these leaders are more connected to the people. The success of this lies in the leader's capacity "to frame and deliver a message that resonates with their follower's emotional reality and sense of purpose …" (Goleman et al., 2002:9).

Intellectual stimulation is about how leaders encourage the people; that is, the way they stimulate their followers. According to Avolio and Bass (2002), this is "to be innovative and creative by questioning assumptions, reframing problems, and approaching old situations in new ways" (p.2). There are a variety of ways to stimulate followers; for example, by exchanging solutions, questioning, encouraging voicing issues, helping to interpret issues, or modelling new ways of thinking (See Bass, 1998; McDermott, 2003). At this point, it is important to focus on how leaders create emotional experiences that develop a bond with the followers together and boost their performance. For Hernandez Baeza et al. (2009), this is about "the charisma of the leader, who fosters a positive team climate" (p.515). By developing such an atmosphere, the leader directly locates political situations in emotional contexts.

Individualized consideration is the good communication the leader establishes with the followers as a coach, a mentor, or even a teacher. In creating this environment, the leader establishes a bridge between him and his followers. This bond is further strengthened by the leader's past experiences—good or bad confrontations—and in lecturing on how to overcome them for the benefit of all. According to Bass and Steidlmeier (1999), "followers are treated as ends not just means" (p.185). The leader is deeply concerned with the needs and expectations of the followers, and respects them empathetically. At this point, the leader is aware of not being able to overcome the necessary changes alone.

Burns (2003) argues that "transformational change flows not so much from the work of a great man who single-handedly makes history, but from the collective achievement of a great people. While leadership by individuals is necessary at every stage, beginning with the first spark that awakens people's hopes" (p.240). As introduced by Bass (1985), the abovementioned components of transformational leadership are important to understanding how leaders act in a political sense so that discourse becomes irrevocable for the followers. This is about the "self-concept, which is a composite of our identities, like a member of a nation, a group, etc." (Bass & Riggio, 2006:38). This mode of politics, led by transformationalist leaders, creates an identity in which the individual commits themselves. According to Bass and Avolio (1994), the leader constructs a culture of "leaders who build such cultures and articulate them to followers typically exhibit a sense of vision and empower others to take greater responsibility for achieving the vision. Such leaders facilitate and teach followers" (p.542-43). In turn, they become the mentors of their respective people. Bass and Riggio notice that, when narrating the political culture, the leaders must follow some aspects. This is about understanding and respecting the past, returning to it for inspiration,

instruction, and identification of past objectives, principles, and strategies…" (p.115).

Starting with the 2000s, Putin has had a strong influence in transforming Russia. He certainly identifies himself with the state, and mostly with the strength of Russia, which he has acquired as a result of his leadership. I will continue this paper by clarifying how the transformation of the Russian Federation has come to be under the highly-personalized leadership of Putin. In doing so, I have analyzed much of his discourse to understand how the components of transformationalist leadership help us understand the substance of this type of leadership.

Personalization of Politics under Vladimir Putin

Transformational leadership in presidential systems gives the individual actor a far greater chance of personalizing their leadership. However, this type of leadership cannot be limited only to presidential systems. On the other hand, President Vladimir Putin, although shifted from Presidency to Prime Minister, his personalization has continuously proceeded, no matter which post he remained in. His strongman leadership was felt even when he was Prime Minister when he declared war on Chechnya in 1999. This event was evaluated as a polishing factor for Putin's charisma. Shortly after, Putin would become the President of the Federation.

In his first speech, V. Putin clearly stated that, "the state will stand firm to protect freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of the mass media, and property rights—those fundamental elements of a civilized society" (Millennium Speech, December 31, 1999). Although Putin stated the credits of democracy,

his term as Prime Minister developed in the opposite. Hence, Putin has developed what Hansen (2011) puts forth as "*gosudarstrennost*" meaning loyalty to the state. Putin executes this power with his inner circle, whom he has an infinite trust; namely, the *Siloviki*[2] (power men) and the only thing Putin expects is loyalty. In 2013, Vladimir Putin clearly demonstrated this as "there should be patriotically-minded people at the head of state information resources" (Speech at the annual news conference, 2013). Or, for example, in a further speech, Putin argues (2000) "from the very beginning, Russia was created as a super-centralized state. Being a super-centralized state is practically laid down in its genetic code, its traditions, and the mentality of its people" (cf. Gevorkyan et al., 2000:167-8). For Putin, whether the issue concerns advancing democracy, improving the economy, or protecting the state, all can be improved with a strong state under the leadership of a strong leader, and thus, personifying himself with the state.

Putin calls himself the "servant of the people and subject of the law" (cf. Fish, 2017:70). Putin did not inherit his strict strongman rule, but he created one in due course. For Putin, it was on New Year's Eve when Boris N. Yeltsin announced his resignation and named V.V. Putin his successor (who was then the prime minister), and this became the country's acting President till the forthcoming Presidency elections. It was a turning point, not just for Putin, but for the whole country, when Yeltsin handed over the power to the new President.

It could be said that obtaining the rule of the Russian Federation was a piece of cake for Putin. Even before Putin received office as President (while still Prime

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[2] The concept is known to be the people who belong to the inner circle of Vladmir Putin—a group of current and former intelligence officers from the Federal Security Service (FSB), formerly known as KGB, the Ministry of Interior, or military. See, Andrei Illarionov. (2009). "The

Siloviki in Charge" *Journal of Democracy*, 20 (2): 69-72. A study exerts that "people with a security background fill 77% of Russia's top 1,016 governmental Positions." See, Olga Kryshtanovskaya & Stephen White. (2003). "Putin's Militocracy" *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 19 (4) pp.289-306.

Minister), a process of rehabilitation of Russia had started, and nobody other than Putin himself was to write down the prescription for progress and development.

In 1999, Putin stated that "Soviet communism was a road to a blind alley, which is far away from the mainstream of civilization" (Millennium Speech, December 31, 1999). This quote exhibits his vision of a fresh start for the country under his upcoming Presidency. As he stated, "the mechanical copying of other nations experience will not guarantee success either, every country—Russia included—has to search for its own way of renewal" (Millennium Speech, December 31, 1999). Also, in his millennium manifesto, Putin emphasized the need for "a successful Russian resurgence, an effective economy, a strong state, and a consolidation of a national idea" was mandatory, and the only man able to accomplish this was him. As Yeltsin (1999) pointed out at his resignation speech, "Russia should enter the new millennium with new politicians, new faces, and new, smart, and energetic people" (Yeltsin, Resignation Speech, 1999), thus indicating the then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

Putin's leadership started to build momentum through his strongman persona in which he represents the 'man of the people.' The ground for his persona to flourish was encapsulated by the huge steps he took in transforming the state. After years of instability, Putin's first objective was to repair the economy. In doing so, Putin re-established a partial state control over the oil industry, which is a vital sector of the Russian economy, in addition to fixing the banking system. All these steps drew the attention of the capital—Moscow, which, to a certain degree, moved back to the country. The economic recovery brought many improvements to other sectors, such as education, health, housing, etc. Russia's gross national product per capita increased from 1.330.751 $ in 1999 to 8.759.036 $ in 2016 (See, The World Bank). All these reforms gained the support of millions of Russians, and the President had begun to prove himself by receiving new names, such as "The Holy Father," "Hero," "The Unique Man," and "The Outstanding Personality." In parallel to these developments and the positive atmosphere, with the rise of living conditions, Putin became a reformist for the country, and the developments opened the way for Putin to become a super-president with wide-ranging popular support.

In fact, throughout the years, he has become something above the party, along with his ideology; however, some may argue, such as the United Russia Party (Yedinaya Rossiya), that Putin's ideology lacks coherence. It is no secret that Putin has ever been close to the party. While leading the party during his Prime ministry, Putin did not even become a member of it. As an outcome, the party is generally considered a "party of power," a catch-all-party, or even a "hegemonic party" (Gumuscu, 2013). It is mostly handled in a political centralist manner with a nationalist and conservative flavor. This position is a combination of anti-liberal traditionalism with patriotism, with the aim to unite all sections of the society. It could be fair to describe Putin the same way, though Putin needs no ideology or political motivation to prove himself for that matter—his leadership challenge, which is characterized by his personality, serve this purpose. Putin fits into the definition of a charismatic leader, and more importantly, his ability in presenting and re-presenting a vision for the masses to embrace. For Weber (1978), "charisma is a certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural superhuman powers, or at least,

specifically exceptional powers or qualities" (pp.241-242). In the case of Putin, this is about his sincerity, aiming to accomplish the best for the Russian people. This is about the inspiration he possesses as a leader, not an ordinary executive, whether as the President or Prime Minister of Russia.

This is certainly about the leadership character he puts forth: a self-aggrandizing, dominant, aggressive, impetuous personality dominating the political arena. Once defining himself "The biggest nationalist in Russia—that's me. Russia is my whole life." In fact, in Russia, leaders have had always a prominent role in politics. However, what makes Putin different is the way he has become a political hardliner in slow-motion, within what can be called a "hybrid democracy" Zakaria (1997) and Diamond (2002) defined his leadership to be somewhere between democracy and autocracy, due to the criticisms of democratic deficit and, perhaps more importantly, Putin's role in transforming Russia into a complete new system.   For Glassman (1975), this is about the charisma, in that "personal charisma is the perfect example of an irrational consent relationship between the leader and the led. Each individual within the charismatizing group feels a special personal relationship with the leader—even if he has never met the leader" (p.57). A leader often well-defined as praiseworthy, Putin is defined as "the father of the nation, the source of inspiration, the one lighting the path into a bright future; strong, powerful, and rather autocratic" (Berdy, 2018).

In his annual address to the federal assembly back in 2003, Putin argues that "during all of its times of weakness … Russia was invariably confronted with a threat of disintegration" (cf. Donaldson & Nogee, 2002:341). Putin marks the difficult times Russia had and continues to have. And for Putin, it is his mission to protect Russia from both interior and exterior threats. As he argues, "they could keep what they had already stolen, but now they have to play clean, pay taxes, make investments, and stay out of politics." This is a clear warning from Putin, not just for his political rivals but also to the capitalist nations. Putin promised to exclude any individual or group who cheated the Russian Federation. In light of this discourse, he declares "the norm of the international community and the modern world is tough competition … nobody is eager to help us. We have to fight for our place under the economic sun" (cf. Tsygankov, 2006:130). These were clear signs of warning from Putin towards the "oligarchs" that needed to be eliminated if he wanted to consolidate his power.

As he has asserted several times, "democracy cannot be exported from one country to another, like you cannot export revolutions or ideology." (V. Putin, Speech, September 18, 2005). In Putin's view, democracy must be a creation of a society's advance with its own distinction. For Putin, the more the state remains strong, the more it forms a democracy. As Putin further emphasized in many speeches, "we are a free nation and our place in the modern world will be defined only by how successful and strong we are" (Putin, Annual address to the nation, April 25, 2005). As demonstrated by the aforementioned quotes, Putin's assertiveness reflects his strong-man persona. Leaving no room for weakness, such as "the moment we display weakness or spinelessness, our losses will be immeasurably greater" (ibid). It is clear that Putin has no patience for weakness, as he and the state have become one body. In delivering a public speech, he argues that, "for us, the state and its institutions and structures have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and the people. For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly to fight against. Quite the contrary, it is the source and

guarantor of order, the initiator and the main driving force of any change" (V. Putin, Millennium Speech, December 31, 1999). From the previous quote, it is clear that Putin identifies himself with the state. In that sense, the more the Presidency—meaning himself—gains strength, the stronger the state will become. In order to secure this strength, Putin altered the functioning of the state, which he termed the "power vertical" concept. This meant grasping more power from other institutions, not all of which exist within the state, as the primary goal is not only about the executive and legislative control, but rather, to seize authority over the civil society via the mass media. The power vertical concept marked a re-institutionalization of the Presidency, or to put it differently, a process of de-institutionalization (Kolesnikov, 2018) of other institutions, thus making the Presidency the only functioning institution in control of everything in the Russian Federation. Under the Russian constitution, the Presidency has far-reaching powers, such as assigning and dismissing ministers, vetoing right to legislation acts, calling on referenda, dismissing the parliament, etc. However, Putin managed to extend these powers with amendments; for example, Putin pulled back power to the center by appointing super-governors to the seven regions in order to control them directly from Moscow, while he also reshaped the Federation Council (the Senate). The members of the Council—formerly elected regional governors—were replaced with nominated members by Putin himself.

Although not becoming an official party member (due to his Presidency), Putin worked hard for the achievement of the United Russia party. The success of the party was important, and its presence in the Duma is valuable to dominate the Parliament and to act according to the interests of the President. As Putin stated, "If the people vote for United Russia, it means that a clear majority of the people put their trust in me, and, in turn, that means I will have the moral right to hold those in the Duma and the cabinet responsible for the implementation of the tasks that have been set today" (Public Speech, November 14, 2007).

These transformations lead to a single individual representing the state with a self-presentation style. Putin emphasized this back in 1999 when he said, "fruitful and creative work which our country needs so badly today is impossible in a split and internally-disintegrated society; a society where the main social sections and political forces have different basic values and fundamental ideological orientations" (Millennium Speech, December 31, 1999). His ambition regarding the function of the state rests in this speech made well before his Presidency, when he intended to amass all the institutions of the state within a single body; namely, the Presidency. In this way, Putin believes the state will be a success by representing the society, which varies due to political and social values. For Putin, it is to blend all the divergences under a single shelter, and that is a state-oriented narrative. In his 2004 inauguration speech after taking the oath, Putin emphasized that, "Now I would like to stress the main idea of the oath and say: the President's obligations to look after the state and faithfully serve the people will henceforward be sacred to me, and will be above all else, as before" (Putin Inauguration Speech, May 7, 2004).

Putin has a strong oratory in convincing the followers to commit to a shared vision. He remains a strong public speaker, and certainly controls any political or social debate in Russia. This is called "idealized influence" and is an important component of transformational leadership. Putin is particularly admired for acting as a role-model, and hence, is trusted by the masses. For Putin, this is about laying down the idealized influence, which is to combine his

strong leadership image with a collective sense of mission. No matter if the debate is centered on loss, trauma, hate, pride, joy, anger, or sadness, he manages to put these together with strength.

For Foxall (2013), this is about Putin's "highly masculinized political narrative" (p.151). The political environment he tries to create, requires attention, as his departure is laying down a narrative for the respective nation. With the beginning of the 2000s, when Vladimir Putin came to power, his leitmotif was to win back the glory of the state and people via rescuing Russia from the Soviet trauma (dissolution) as he emphasized in the following quote: "...the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself" (Annual address to the Federal Assembly, April 25, 2005). For Putin, this was a promise to re-establish the glory Russia once owned in the international arena. During this speech, he made references to the Tsarist era, and at certain points, also to the Soviet. His identity project mainly rests on a combination of the Orthodox Church and patriotism. It is interesting to analyze how Putin re-narrates the nation and locates himself as the very great symbol of the national will. For instance, Putin states "…patriotism is a source of the courage, staunchness, and strength of our people. If we lose patriotism and national pride and dignity, which are connected with it, we will lose ourselves as a nation capable of great achievements" (Millennium Speech, December 31, 1999). Putin calls himself a patriot, and often references his love for his country. In the above quotation, he illustrates the importance of patriotism for the integrity of the society, stressing the lack of it to be very hazardous for all.

The success of this narrative lies behind the full control of the mass media, through which the population receive information that is allowed, or at least censored by the Kremlin. His political journey rests on the ambition to become not merely a political persona, but rather an everlasting icon. Moreover, Putin knows how to blend facts into narratives, or at least make use of every event as an instance to strengthen the narrative in the first place. As he emphasizes, "we need to develop respect for our history, despite all of its flaws and love for the motherland. We need to pay the utmost attention to our common moral values and consolidate Russian society on this basis. I think that this is an absolute priority." For Laqueur (2014), Putin's vision for the Russian Federation rests on "the triad" of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality (p.71). Despite agreeing on the first two, the third element should, in my view, be replaced by patriotism.

As soon as he came to power, Putin established close ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and began to blend Orthodoxy into his political discourse, thereby supporting the Church more than any other leader in Russian history. The reason for aligning too closely to the church is that Putin believes an important part of Russian identity rests in the Orthodox belief and thinking. Coyor (2015) defines this vision as "to sacralize the Russian national identity" and "to strengthen the Russian state based upon a theologically-informed vision of Russian exceptionalism."

On the other hand, Dugin summarizes this alliance by arguing that "Moscow is the capital of an essentially new state: not national, but imperial, soteriological, eschatological, and apocalyptical" (2014:12). In laying down this political vision, Putin's expectation is loyalty to this project. The second component of the triad remains Putin's autocracy. This is a combination

of Putin's dominant personality and the excessive powers given to the President of the Russian Federation with the constitution accepted in 1993. It is clear that Putin has emasculated the checks and balances in the name of restoring a cohesively working state. He made great use of "rally around the flag" (Rogov & Ananyev, 2018:150), building every issue around the discourse of Russian survival.

In his latest inauguration, Putin stated that "we all remember well that, for more than a thousand years of history, Russia has often faced epochs of turmoil and trials, and has always revived as a phoenix, reaching heights that others could not" (May 7, 2018). Before Putin, the Russian people were fed up with the weakening of the state after having faced painful experiences during the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, many cannot comprehend Putin's power-hungry behavior in negative terms, and hence, evaluate it as the strengthening of the state. According to Pipes (2004) "precisely because Putin has re-instated Russia's traditional model of government: an autocratic state" (p.15). The third component remains Putin's patriotic discourse. As he once stated, "I was a pure and utterly successful product of Soviet patriotic education" (Putin, 2000). Much of his personality built during his career serving the Soviet Union reveals his loyal personality. It is clear that Putin wants to extend the patriotic feeling to all Russians. As a multi-ethnic society, Putin refrains from using nationalist slogans, but is patriotic when describing his love for the country.

Putin makes great use of patriotic, and to some degree, nationalistic sentiments, which drive his intellectual stimulation. According to Bass and Steidlmeier (1999), intellectual stimulation rests as an important aspect of Transformationalist leadership. In Putin's case, this is closer to an instinctive rather than intellectual stimulation. As for Putin, he transforms

and combines most of the political issues with a religious well-being rhetoric, stimulating the soul of his followers with a synthesis in a patriotic and religious way. At this point, Putin confronted harsh criticism for violating secularism, as he makes wide use of religious terminology in the public discourse. For instance, when interviewed by *Time Magazine*, as the person of the year, Putin states, "First and foremost, we should be governed by common sense. But common sense should be based on moral principles first. And it is not possible today to have morality separated from religious values…" (Interview, 2007). Like the previous quote, Putin tends to speak from the heart to instil a team spirit in his followers by penetrating into their beliefs, values, and morals. For instance, in an interview, Putin states, "I am the wealthiest man, not just in Europe, but in the whole world. I collect emotions" (Interview, 2016).

In doing this, Putin challenges the status quo, which is to approach (old) issues in new ways, offering tactics like loading responsibility to the followers to stand up against everything coming across the national will, and to carry on their political struggle. As Putin argues, "we will not allow the past to drag us down and stop us from moving ahead" (Interview, 2005). Blaming the Soviet-era mistakes for today's failures, the narrative he pushes mostly includes a blame-shifting discourse. For instance, in scapegoating the oligarchs, Putin was "… determined to steal and remove capital and who did not link their future to that of the country; the place where they earned their money" (Putin Speech, September 19, 2013). Or, for other economic reasons, Putin has often blamed the west for a plot, and once compared Russia to a bear, when he argued, "they will always try to put it on a chain, as soon as they succeed in doing so they will tear out its fangs and claws. That would leave it nothing but a stuffed animal" (Putin Speech,

December 18, 2014). For Putin, no matter what kind of disaster Russia faces, they are all foreign plots created by outside forces; namely, the western powers with the help of their inside collaborators. For Putin, it is always the western countries who stab Russia in the back, trying to contain and weaken Russia, via mostly 'economic wars.'

Another point is the way Putin establishes a vision for the future for Russia. The way he inspires the people is built on a strong image for the present and future. In building this, his first pace is to slam and disregard the past, and to become the respective father of the country. Putin phrases the Soviet era as to be a "mistaken," one.

In 2012, Putin made it clear in stating that "…Russia did not begin in 1917, or even in 1991, but, rather, that we have a common, continuous history spanning over 1,000 years, and we must rely on it to find inner strength and purpose in our national development." (Address to the Federal Assembly, December 12, 2012). His perception of the history of the nation lies far beyond the establishment of the modern nation-state. In the transformational leadership theory, motivating the followers to do more than they can, and even more than they can imagine, remains very important. As a result, the leaders put forth challenging expectations to make the followers more committed. They push to inspire the masses via motivating them with even utopic or exaggerative dreams. However, for Putin, his vision mostly meets reality. And that is mostly about convincing the followers that the state is struggling with the inside and outside threats to serve the Russian people.

Individualized consideration is the last component of transformational leadership. In Putin's case, this rests on his vision, strategy, and finally, his behavior. The vision he pushes is no different from that of the Russian people, as success lies where the vision is shared by the people, not on behalf of them. His strategy is to make the vision become a reality, and the only way for Putin is to exhibit an authoritarian style of management, which is the main reason why he demonstrates masculinity and his combative personality.

Finally, Putin's behavior comes to play an important role, as becoming highly people-oriented is to make the people think of him as to be one of them. He knows how to drive the emotions of the masses. He doesn't even need to control his emotions; whether anger, hate, or arrogance, the people will always find him sincere. Further, Putin does not sell people irrelevant issues, while ignoring the real ones. He doesn't approach the people as electorates but rather as followers. His intention is to make his followers believe that they are all on the same boat, and their mission is to work together for the well-being of the country. He believes that his high discipline and loyal character makes him a role model to the Russian people, as he once stated, "We have travelled a great and difficult road together, believing in ourselves and our strength and ability. We have strengthened our country and returned our dignity as a great nation. The world has seen a Russia risen anew, and this is the result of our people's hard work and our common effort, to which everyone has made their personal contribution" (V. Putin, Inauguration Speech, May 7, 2012). This vision is all about loving Russia, working for Russia, and not betraying Russia, which sums up V. Putin's patriotism.

Conclusion

The personalization of politics is becoming more prominent in international relations than ever before. The decline of party politics and the deepening of mutual interdependence among states requires more

attention on how sole individuals re-shape and re-make policies that not only affect their beloved countries, but also others. In this case, the personal character of the politician, together with the statehood, becomes nested as a single body. In the case of Russia, the sole decision-maker in most of the issues is clearly Vladimir Putin. His ambition to make Russia strong again motivates both himself and his followers. In this paper, I have shown that the personalization of politics, and Putin's success, lies in his transformational leadership character.

Putin's leadership style becoming prominent around the world, in which the leadership performance is only about a leader's personal character. More importantly, Putin makes his followers adhere to this personality rather than to ideology or party. Becoming the sole representative of the people, his speech and acts suit him as the father figure of the nation; that is, to understand the way Putin is embraced as a leader, rather than a mere politician. His rhetoric plays an important role in both motivating and stimulating the masses around his cause, both of which are important elements of Transformationalist leadership.

Throughout his leadership, Russia began to show signs of development. This success is related with Vladimir Putin's personal character, who forms a good example of handling and influencing politics with a combination of assertiveness, responsiveness, and competence, all of which make up his "strong man" persona. Putin's assertiveness lies in the strong and charismatic style he portrays in front of the public. His discourse runs directly to the people, thanks to his communication skills, which also allow him to infuse what he believes is of utmost importance for the Russian people. In the name of convincing his followers, he puts forth a very confident type of responsiveness to every issue by eliminating the oppositional voices in the name of survival for benefit of the all. Re-narrating the Russian Federation alongside his personal character, what Vladimir Putin has managed so far is to promise both economic and political stability within the country plus Russian greatness abroad.

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BM Barışı Koruma Operasyonları'nın Yerel Polis Kapasitesinin Geliştirilmesine Etkisinin Analizi: Haiti Örneği

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Abstract

United Nations (UN) expedited its efforts principally for ceasing conflicts; ensuring and keeping sustainable peace in the aftermath of the global devastation arisen after the World War II. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is fundamentally responsible for ensuring international peace and security, decided to benefit from peacekeeping forces recently in cases where the peace and security are compromised or threatened. Within this framework; the UN intervened for the first time in 1993 on the purpose of ceasing long lasting political uncertainty and social class conflicts in Haiti and endeavored to build up absolute peace through a range of follow-up and complementary Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs). The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which is the longest-serving PKO in Haiti, was established in 2004. This new Mission has also undertaken the task of restructuring and increasing the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP), unlike the traditional PKO which only oversees the implementation of the ceasefire agreements. In this study; the comparative variation of the committed crime rates and the number of policemen in Haiti over the years were discussed and the role and effect of MINUSTAH on the capacity development of the Haitian National Police were analyzed.

Keywords United Nations, Peace Keeping Operations, MINUSTAH, Haitian National Police, Haiti.

Öz

Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) 2. Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından ortaya çıkan küresel boyuttaki yıkım sonrası öncelikli olarak çatışmaların önlenmesi, sürdürülebilir barışın sağlanması ve korunması çabalarına hız vermiştir. Uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin sağlanmasında temel sorumluluk sahibi olan Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi (BMGK), son dönemde barış ve güvenliğin bozulduğu veya tehdit edildiği hallerde ağırlıklı olarak barışı koruma kuvvetlerinin kullanılmasına karar vermiştir. Bu kapsamda BM, Haiti'de yıllar boyunca devam eden siyasal belirsizlik ve sınıf çatışmasına son vererek bozulan istikrarı yeniden sağlamak amacıyla ilk olarak 1993'de müdahalede bulunmuş, birbirinin devamı ve tamamlayıcısı niteliğinde bir dizi Barışı Koruma Operasyonları (BKO) ile nihai barışı tesis etmeye çalışmıştır. Haiti'de görevlendirilen en uzun süreli operasyon olan BM Haiti İstikrar Misyonu (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti/MINUSTAH) ise 2004'de kurulmuştur. Bu yeni Misyon, sadece ateşkes anlaşmalarının uygulanmasının denetimini üstlenen geleneksel BKO'ndan farklı olarak, Haiti Ulusal Polisi'nin (Haitian National Police/HNP) yeniden yapılandırılması ve kapasitesinin artırılması görevini de üstlenmiştir. Bu çalışmada, Haiti'de işlenen suç oranlarının ve polis sayısının yıllar içindeki gelişimi karşılaştırmalı olarak ele alınarak MINUSTAH'ın, Haiti Ulusal Polisi'nin kapasitesinin geliştirilmesindeki rolü ve etkisi analiz edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler, Barış Koruma Operasyonları, MINUSTAH, Haiti Ulusal Polisi, Haiti.

Giriş

Literatürde genel kabul gördüğü üzere uluslararası barış ve istikrarın korunması konusunda uzun yıllar sonucunda elde edilen kazanımların kalıcı olması, uluslararası örgütlerin başarılı çalışmalarına bağlıdır. 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrası dünya barışı ve güvenliğini kalıcı hale getirme görevi ise günümüzde 193 üyesi olan Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) tarafından yürütülmektedir. İlk BM Barışı Koruma Operasyonu (BMBKO) 1948'de İsrail Devleti'nin kurulmasının ardından Arap-İsrail Ateşkes Anlaşması'nın denetlenmesi amacıyla kurulmuştur. Zaman içinde salt BM askeri gözlemcilerinin ateşkes anlaşmalarının izlenmesi görevi olmaktan çıkarak asker, polis ve sivillerden oluşan, görev alınan devletteki anayasal kurumların yeniden inşası ve kapasitelerinin geliştirilmesi faaliyetlerini de içeren karmaşık bir yapıya evrilmiştir. Bu yeni yapısıyla BMBKO, uluslararası güven ve istikrarın sağlanmasında sıkça başvurulan önemli ve etkili bir argüman haline gelmiştir.

Ancak teoride başarılı şekilde devam ettiği kabul edilen BKO'nun pratikte başarılı bir yöntem olup olmadığı son dönemde sıklıkla tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu durum, başarı durumunun sorgulanmasına ve başarı ölçütlerinin belirlenmesi çabalarına neden olmuştur. BKO'nun başarılı olup olmadığı değerlendirilirken araştırmacıların dikkate alması gereken temel ölçüt, BM Güvenlik Konseyi (BMGK) tarafından oluşturulan BKO Yetki Belgesi'nde (*Mandate*) yer alan görevlerin gerçek anlamda yerine getirilip getirilmediği ve misyonun kuruluş aşamasında hedeflenen amaçlara ulaşılıp ulaşılmadığının tespiti olmalıdır. Fakat bu tespit yapılırken, yetki belgelerinin teorik bir yazılı belge olduğu ve uygulama aşamasında öngörülmeyen birçok engelin bulunduğu dikkate alınmalıdır.

Ayrıca çatışmasızlık ortamının sağlanması, silahsızlanmanın yerine getirilmesi, anayasal kurumların kapasitesinin artırılması ve etkinliklerinin belirli seviyeye ulaştırılmasının uzun vadeli uluslararası çaba gerektirdiği de göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır. Müdahale edilen bölgedeki politik durumun öngörülememesinin BKO'nun başarısını doğrudan etkileyen bir faktör olduğunu da unutmamak gerekmektedir. Yukarıda belirtilen nedenlerle BKO'nun neye göre başarılı sayılacağına dair açık ve anlaşılır sistematik ölçütlerin bulunmaması her bir operasyonun kendi özelinde incelenerek analiz edilmesini gerekli kılmıştır.

Uygulamaya bakıldığında BMBKO, BM Kurucu Antlaşması'nda açıkça yer almamakla birlikte son 60 yılda uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin korunmasının en önemli araçlarından biri olarak ortaya çıkmıştır (Öncü, 2006: 31-57). Uluslararası toplumun son yıllarda edindiği deneyim, BM'nin barış ve istikrar ortamını güçlendirecek altyapı oluşturma çabalarına odaklanmasına neden olmuştur. Kalıcı barışın ancak sosyal adaletin geliştirilmesi, insan haklarına saygılı ve demokratik yönetimlerin iş başına gelmesi ve devletlerin ekonomik olarak kalkınmalarına yardımcı olarak elde edilebileceği görülmektedir. Bu amaçla dünyanın çeşitli coğrafyalarında bugüne kadar 58 tanesi tamamlanmış, 13 tanesi devam eden toplam 71 BMBKO görevlendirilmiştir (UN, Past Peacekeeping Operations, 2018).

1697'de Fransa tarafından sömürgeleştirilen Haiti ise 1804'te dünya tarihindeki tek başarılı köle ayaklanmasıyla bağımsızlığını kazanmış, ancak bağımsızlık sonrası bir türlü sona erdirilemeyen politik ve ekonomik problemler sebebiyle istenen düzeyde ilerleme sağlayamamıştır. Nüfusunun yaklaşık %59'u günlük 2$'ın altında milli gelire sahip olan Haiti günümüzde Batı Yarımkürenin en fakir devleti olarak bilinmekte (The World Bank, World

Development Indicators), 2018 yılı BM İnsani Gelişmişlik Endeksi'ne göre 189 devlet içerisinde 168. sırada bulunmaktadır (UNDP, Human Development Index, 2018).

Tarihsel açıdan bakıldığında Haiti'deki çatışmaların etnik köken ya da inanç farklılığından değil, sömürge döneminde ortaya çıkan ve bağımsızlık sonrası da büyüyerek devam eden sosyal ve ekonomik statü farkından kaynaklandığı görülmektedir (Alexandre, 2012: 19). Bu durum, Haiti'nin günümüzde bile sürekli iç savaş, kargaşa ve politik istikrarsızlık yaşamasının temel nedenidir. 1970-2003 arasında hükümetin 66 defa el değiştirmesi ise Haiti'de politik belirsizliğin boyutunu net bir şekilde göstermekte ve neden etkin kurumsal iyileştirmelerin yapılamadığını açıklamaktadır.

1990'da yapılan ülke tarihinin ilk serbest ve adil seçiminde Jean Bertrand Aristide Devlet Başkanı seçilmiş, fakat seçimden sadece 8 ay sonra askeri darbe ile görevden uzaklaştırılmıştır. 3 yıl süren askeri rejim döneminde binlerce insan öldürülmüş, on binlerce insan da başkentten kırsal bölgelere, Dominik Cumhuriyeti'ne ve ABD'ye kaçmıştır (Mobekk, 2000: 30-40). Uluslararası toplum ve özellikle ABD, krizin Haiti sınırlarının ötesine taşması ile birlikte harekete geçmiş ve krizi sonlandırmak üzere farklı diplomatik yöntemlere başvurmuştur.

Haiti Krizi'nde gösterilen diplomatik çabaların sonuçsuz kalması üzerine Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi (BMGK), kalıcı istikrarı tesis etmek amacıyla uluslararası BKO görevlendirmeye karar vermiştir. Haiti'de kurulan BKO'lar, 1993-2001 arası Operasyonlar ve 2004 sonrası Operasyonlar olmak üzere iki grupta incelenebilir. İlk grupta yer alan BKO'lar, ülkede demokratik siyasi ortamın yeniden tesisi, polis teşkilatının kurulması, güvenlik ve istikrarın sağlanmasına odaklanmıştır. 2004'de

seçilen demokratik hükümetin devrilmesi sonrası görevlendirilen BKO'lar ise ikinci grupta yer almakta olup yukarıdaki görevlerin yanı sıra polis kapasitesinin artırılması, adli ve ceza sisteminin etkinleştirilmesi görevlerini de yüklenmişlerdir (Alexandre, 2012: 65). Haiti'de BM tarafından görevlendirilen BKO'lar ve görev süreleri şöyledir:

- Haiti Uluslararası Sivil Misyonu (*International Civilian Mission in Haiti*/MICIVIH), Şubat 1993-Eylül 1993. (Çok uluslu güce BM katkısı şeklinde)

- BM Haiti Misyonu (*United Nations Mission in Haiti*/UNMIH), Eylül 1993-Haziran 1996.

- BM Haiti Destek Misyonu (*United Nations Support Mission in Haiti*/UNSMIH), Haziran 1996-Temmuz 1997.

- BM Haiti Geçiş Misyonu (*United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti*/UNTMIH), Temmuz 1997-Kasım 1997.

- BM Haiti Sivil Polis Misyonu (*United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti*/MIPONUH), Kasım 1997-Mart 2000.

- BM Haiti İstikrar Misyonu (*United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*/MINUSTAH, 2004-2017 (UNDP, Human Development Index, 2018).

- BM Haiti Adalet Destek Misyonu (*United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti*/MINUJUSTH), Ekim 2017- Ekim 2019.

- BM Haiti Birleşik Ofisi (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti /BINUH), Ekim 2019-Devam ediyor. (United Nations [UN], Past Peacekeeping Operations, 2018).

Yukarıda aktardığımız sayısal bilgilerden de anlaşıldığı üzere BM, 1993'den 2000'e kadar 5 değişik BKO ile Haiti'deki güvenlik ve istikrar sorununu çözmeye çalışmıştır. Ancak yaklaşık 200 yıllık çalkantılı siyaset tarihi boyunca istikrarın sağlanamadığı ülkede, ortalama ömrü 1,5 yıldan kısa olan BKO ile sonuca ulaşmanın mümkün olamayacağı açıktır. Kısa süreli BKO ile sonuç alınamamasının ardından 2000-2004 yılları arasında BM'nin Haiti'den tamamen çekilmesi sebebiyle elde edilen sınırlı kazanımlar da ortadan kalkmıştır. Kısa süreli çözüm çabalarının yetersiz kalması üzerine BMGK, Haiti'nin nihai istikrara kavuşturulabilmesi amacıyla 2004-2017 arası 13 yıl sürecek yeni bir operasyon olan MINUSTAH'a görev vermiştir. 2017 yılında MINUSTAH'ın yerine kurulan MINUJUSTH, asker ve polis sayısında kayda değer indirime giderek Haiti Ulusal Polisi'nin gelişimine katkıyı sürdürmek, adli sistemin ve insan haklarının güçlendirilmesini sağlamak ile Haiti halkının normal hayatına dönmesini sağlama görevlerini üstlenmiştir.

2019 yılının Ekim ayında politik misyon olarak kurulan, bünyesinde asker ve polis bulundurmayan BINUH ise Haiti'de 2004'den bu yana kalıcı istikrarı sağlamak üzere görev alan ve 15 yıl süren barışı koruma operasyonlarının ardından istikrar, güvenlik, hukuk ve insan hakları konularında elde edilen kazanımların desteklenmesi amacıyla kurulmuştur (UN, BMGK, 2019 tarih ve 2476 Sayılı Kararı, 2019).

Bu bağlamda çalışmamızın ana konusu 2004'de kurulan ve kesintisiz 13 yıl süren MINUSTAH'ın, Haiti'de kalıcı istikrarın sağlanması ve Haiti Ulusal Polisi'nin kurumsal kapasitesinin artırılması yönündeki çabalarının analizidir.

BM Haiti İstikrar Misyonu (*United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*/MINUSTAH)

Haiti'nin 2000 yılından sonraki dönemi, bağımsızlığın elde edildiği 1804'den bu yana olduğu gibi istikrarsızlık ve şiddet olayları ile anılmaktadır. Bu dönemde Başkan Jean-Bertrand Aristide'yi politik olarak destekleyen gruplar ile karşıt gruplar bir türlü sona erdirilemeyen çatışma halindedir. HNP ise kapasite olarak yetersiz, eğitimsiz ve politik grupların etkisi altındadır. Aynı zamanda yakalama, gözaltına alma ve devriye gibi temel güvenlik faaliyetleri yürütmekten uzak durumdadır. Merkezi hükümetin de asayiş ve istikrarı sağlayacak gücü bulunmaması sebebiyle ülkenin birçok bölgesinde toplumsal düzeni sağlamak için silahlı illegal gruplarından destek alınmaktadır. Bu sebeple ülkede tam bir kargaşa, çatışma ortamı ve istikrarsızlık durumu hâkimdir (Mobekk, 2000: 65).

Şiddetin sona erdirilebilmesi amacıyla ilk olarak Karayip Topluluğu (*Caribbean Community*/CARIMOR) çatışmanın taraflarıyla görüşerek, 31 Ocak 2004 tarihinde Öncelikli Aksiyon Planı (*Prior Action Plan*) önermiştir. Planın uygulanması ile ilgili çalışma ise "6'lı Grup" (*Group of Six*) olarak bilinen Kanada, Fransa, ABD, Avrupa Birliği (AB), Amerika Devletler Topluluğu ve Bahama tarafından ortaya konmuştur (Mobekk, 2000: 25). Ancak planın uygulanması mümkün olmamış, aksine hükümet yanlısı HNP üyeleri ve silahlı gruplar muhalefet üzerindeki baskıyı artırmış, bu baskılar ise muhalefet cephesini daha da genişletmiştir. Sonuçta 2004 yılı Şubat ayında başlayan silahlı ayaklanmalar ülkenin tamamına yayılmış, 29 Şubat 2004 tarihinde Haiti'nin demokratik yöntemlerle seçilmiş ilk Başkanı olarak kabul edilen Aristide ülkeyi terk etmek zorunda kalmıştır (Documents Sgreports, 2004).

MINUSTAH işte bu siyasi atmosferde, Haiti geçici hükümetini desteklemek ve kurumların görevlerini rahatça yürütebileceği istikrar ortamını sağlamak üzere BMGK'nin 1542 Sayılı Kararı ile 30 Nisan 2004

tarihinde kurulmuştur. Önceki BKO'ların benzer görevlerine ek olarak güvenlik sektörü reformunu desteklemek, insan haklarını korumak, seçimlerin yapılmasını organize etmek ve desteklemek yetki belgesinde verilen görevler arasındadır. Ancak MINUSTAH'ın önceliği siyasi istikrarsızlık yüzünden ortaya çıkan ayaklanmaların yol açtığı insan hakları ihlallerine engel olarak devlet otoritesini tesis etmek olmuştur. BMGK kararının üçüncü bölümünde ülkedeki insan hakları durumunun izlenip rapor edilmesi, kayıp şahısların etkin şekilde araştırılması ve insan hakları ihlallerinin cezasız kalmasına son verilmesi açıkça belirtilmiştir. Yukarıda sayılan görevlerin yerine getirilmesi amacıyla 1622 polis ve 6500 askerden oluşan MINUSTAH 1 Haziran 2004 tarihinde Haiti'de göreve başlamıştır (Secretary-General's Reports, S/RES/1542, 2004).

MINUSTAH'ın yukarıda sayılan görevleri yerine getirmek ve kalıcı istikrarın tesisini sağlamak üzere kuruluş aşamasında 41 farklı ülkeden toplam 7406 asker ve polis almıştır. Coğrafi yakınlık sebebiyle ABD, Kanada, Brezilya, Arjantin, Şili, Peru ve Uruguay askeri anlamda misyonun temelini oluşturmuştur. Yine bu aşamada en fazla polis katkısı yapan ülkeler, misyonda Fransızcanın resmi dil olması sebebiyle Kanada ve Fransa olmuştur. Çevik Kuvvet Polisi olarak ise Pakistan ve Nepal önemli katkıda bulunmuştur (Documents, Troop and Police Contributors, 2004).

2017'de misyon kapanana kadar 42 farklı devlet misyona personel göndermeyi sürdürmüştür. Aradan geçen 13 yılda Fransa gibi bazı ülkeler katkı sayısını minimuma indirmiş, bazı ülkeler de önemli oranda katkı vermeye devam etmiştir. Özellikle Çevik Kuvvet sağlayan ülkelere Bangladeş, Hindistan ve Ürdün'ün önemli katkı sağladığı tespit edilmiştir. Ancak genel olarak refah seviyesi yüksek olan kalkınmış devletlerin personel sayısının göreli olarak

azaldığı, bunların yerini az kalkınmış ya da kalkınmakta olan devletlerin görevlilerinin aldığı görülmüştür. Avrupa'dan katılan personel sayısı ise ciddi oranda gerilemiştir (Documents, Troop and Police Contributors, 2017).

Haiti Ulusal Polisi (*Haitian National Police*/HNP)

1804'de bağımsızlığını ilan eden Haiti'nin tarih boyunca düzenli bir polis gücü olmamış, iç güvenlik hizmeti, Haiti ordusuna bağlı birimler tarafından yerine getirilmiştir. Ülkede asayiş ve istikrar ortamını sağlayacak, politik etki ve baskılardan bağımsız bir polis teşkilatı oluşturmak öncelikli görevler arasında yer almıştır. Bu sebeple BMGK'nin 1994 tarih ve 940 Sayılı Kararı ile BKO'ya; bağımsız yeni bir polis teşkilatının kurulması konusunda Haiti hükümetine yardım etme, devam eden diğer BKO'lara da bu yeni polis gücünün profesyonelleşmesine destek olma görevi verilmiştir (UN, BMGK, 1994 tarih ve 940 Sayılı Kararı, 1994).

Bu kapsamda HNP'nin temelini oluşturan Geçici Halk Güvenlik Gücü (*Interim Peoples' Security Force*/IPSF) 1994'de kurulmuştur. 3000 kişiden oluşturulan bu ilk düzenli polis gücü, sadece insan hakları konusunda eğitimin verilebildiği 6 günlük kurs sonunda göreve başlamıştır. Ancak IPSF görevlileri ülkedeki çatışmaların sebebi ve tarafı olması sebebiyle halk tarafından güven duyulmayan ve dağıtılması istenen Haiti Ordusu (*Armed Forces of Haiti*/FADH) üyeleri arasından seçilmiştir. Daha başlangıçta halk tarafından tarafsızlığı konusunda kuşku duyulan IPSF'nin faaliyetlerini izlemek ve rapor etmek için görevlendirilen 800 kadar BM Polisi (*United Nations Police*/UNPOL), telsiz, araç ve telefon gibi temel donanımları bile temin edilemeyen bu yeni gücün görevini yerine getiremediğini tespit etmiştir. Dolayısıyla IPSF'nin suçla etkin mücadele etmesi mümkün olamamış, bu aşamada ulusal polisin

yapması gereken, yakalama, gözaltına alma, ifade alma gibi polislik faaliyetleri UNPOL tarafından yerine getirilmiştir. Bu gelişmeler ışığında 23 Aralık 1994 tarihinde HNP'nin kurulması ile ilgili karar Başkan Aristide tarafından onaylanmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/S/1995/46, 1995).

Şubat 1995'de Polis Akademisi açılmış ve ilk 375 aday 4 aylık eğitime alınmış, Mart ayında ise yeni 375 kişilik bir gruba daha eğitim verilmesi planlanmıştır. İlk etapta 7000 olarak planlanan HNP sayısına ulaşana kadar, 3000 kişiden oluşan ve hemen hiç eğitimi olmayan IPSF'nin göreve devam etmesi planlanmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/1995/305, 1995). Zaten düzenli şekilde maaş alamayan, bu yeni polis gücünün göreve başlamasıyla da işsiz kalacağı anlaşılan profesyonellikten uzak ve polis eğitimi konusunda yetersiz olan IPSF mensupları, daha önce sınırlı olarak yerine getirdikleri asayiş ve istikrarı sağlama konusundaki görevlerini tamamen savsaklamaya başlamıştır.

İlk iki grubun mezun olmasıyla HNP göreve başlamış, planlandığı gibi HNP sayısı arttıkça IPSF'nin görevli sayısı oransal olarak azaltılmaya başlamıştır. HNP'nin maksimum 7.000 olarak planlanan sayıya ulaşması mevcut kapasite ile kısa vadede sağlanamayacağından ABD, HNP mensuplarını kendi ülkesine taşıyarak eğitimlerin hızlandırılmasını sağlamaya çalışmıştır. Bu çabaların katkısıyla Şubat 1996'da HNP sayısının 6000 olması hedeflenmiş (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/1995/614, 1995). Ancak Haiti hükümetinin ekonomik durumu ve polis maaşlarının ödenmesinde oluşacak güçlükler sebebiyle sayı 5.000 olarak revize edilmiştir (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/1995/922, 1995). Burada üzerinde durulması gereken husus, uluslararası toplumun Haiti'de istikrarı ve barış ortamını yeniden sağlamak için yaptığı planlamalarda yerel kapasiteyi yeterince hesaba katmadığı gerçeğidir. Ancak tüm bu zorluklara karşın, Polis

Akademisinin kurulmasının üzerinden henüz 2 sene geçmeden Aralık 1995'de IPSF, görevini HNP'ye devrederek tamamen dağıtılmıştır.

Şubat 1996'da planlanan sayıya ulaşan HNP için asıl sorun, teşkilatın genç ve deneyimsiz polislerden oluşması, kıdemli ve rütbeli personel sayısının sınırlı olmasıdır. Aslında Haiti halkı tarafından olumlu karşılanan ve güven duyulan bu yeni güç, tüm polis teşkilatlarında gerekli bulunan hiyerarşik komuta kontrol zincirine sahip olmadığından disiplinsiz davranışlar sergilemiş ve orantısız güç kullanmıştır. Durumun UNPOL görevlileri tarafından düzenli rapor edilmesine rağmen sorunu ele alacak etkin bir mekanizma ise bulunamamıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/1996/416, 1996). Yaptıkları disiplinsiz davranışların karşılığında herhangi bir yaptırım görmeyen, sınırlı eğitime sahip olan ve kargaşa kültüründen gelen bu görevlilerin daha çok disiplinsiz davranış sergilemesi ve insan hakları ihlali yapması da sürpriz olmamıştır.

Tüm bu sorunların etkisiyle 1996'da Haiti'de adi suçlarda önemli oranda artış yaşanmıştır. Özellikle Haiti tarihinde daha önce hiç yaşanmamış para için insan kaçırma olayları görülmeye başlanmış, silah kullanımı yaygınlaşmış, uyuşturucu trafiği artmış ve bununla birlikte HNP arasında görevi kötüye kullanma ve insan hakları ihlalleri artmaya başlamıştır. Elbette genç, deneyimsiz ve donanımsız bu yeni polis gücünün, bir kısmı politik motivasyonlu silahlı çetelerle ve eski ordu mensupları ile etkin mücadele etmesi beklenmemiştir (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/1996/813, 1996). Ancak bütün olumsuzluklara rağmen polis-halk ilişkileri konusunda ilerleme sağlanmış, ilk defa görevini kötüye kullandığı tespit edilen 77 polis meslekten atılmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/1997/244, 1997). Bu durum, HNP tarihinde yukarıda belirtilen disiplinsiz davranışların yaptırımının olmadığı algısını

tersine çeviren önemli bir adım olmuştur. Çok ciddi problemleri olmasına rağmen yeni bir polis teşkilatının kurulması başarılmış, sınırlı da olsa eğitilmesi sağlanmış ve en önemlisi disiplinle hareket etmesi gereken polis gücünün disiplin mekanizmaları harekete geçirilebilmiştir.

Tüm bu kazanımların kalıcı olabilmesi, ülkede asayişin ve politik istikrarın sağlanması ve uluslararası toplumun katkılarının uzun vadeli ve koordineli olmasına bağlıdır. Hâlbuki Haiti'de uluslararası toplum maalesef beklenen şekilde organize olamamış ve uzun vadeli planlar hayata geçirilememiştir. Ülkede yaklaşan Başkanlık seçimleri ve yoksulluk sebebiyle politik istikrarsızlık ve güvensizlik zirveye ulaşmıştır. HNP'nin asayişi kontrol altında tutabilmesinin mümkün olmadığı açıkça görülmesine rağmen BMGK, ülkede yaklaşık 1 yıldır görevli olan BKO UNSMIH yerine bu kez sadece 5 ay görev yapacak UNTMIH'i görevlendirmiştir. Ağustos-Kasım 1997 arasında görev yapan bu yeni misyonun, polisin profesyonelleşmesine katkıda bulunarak toplumsal olaylara müdahale ve Başkanlık Sarayı'nın korunması gibi spesifik konularda eğitmesi planlanmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/1997/832, 1997). Ancak sadece 5 aylığına görev alan misyon personelinin uzun soluklu proje ve hedeflere odaklanması ve kendisine yüklenen çok ciddi görevleri yerine getirmesi beklenmemiştir.

Kasım 1997'de bu kez BM'nin bir diğer misyonu MIPONUH, Haiti'de görev almıştır. Uluslararası toplumun çabalarının yeterli derecede koordine edilememesi ve ülkedeki sorunun tam olarak anlaşılamaması bu kısa vadeli geçici çözümlere sebep olmuştur. Tüm iyi niyetli çabalara rağmen ülkede istikrarın sağlanması ise görev süresi oldukça sınırlı BKO'lar ile mümkün olamamıştır.

Bu süreçte Başkan Rene Preval, 1998 Ocak itibariyle 6.726 kişiye ulaşan HNP'nin ülke güvenliğine katkısı için takdirlerini iletmiş, görev alan polis gücünün uluslararası toplumun katkısına ve UNPOL'ün tavsiye ve yardımına bağımlılığının azaldığını belirtmiştir. Ancak gerçek hiç de Başkanın açıkladığı gibi değildir. Zira sadece 5 ay görev verilen UNTMIH, polis sayısını nicelik olarak artırabilmesine karşın polis kapasitesinin geliştirilmesi yönünde hiçbir çalışma yapamamıştır. HNP görevlilerinin insan hakları ihlalleri, delil temin etmedeki başarısızlığı, eskiden olduğu gibi bazı politik gruplara yakınlaşması ve uyuşturucu trafiğine karışan polis sayısındaki artış bu döneme ait temel kaygılar arasındadır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/1998/144, 1998).

Tüm bu kaygılara rağmen HNP'nin 5 yıl içinde katettiği aşama, organizasyon, etkinlik ve güvenilirlik açısından pozitif görülmüştür (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2000/150, 2000).

Özellikle MIPONUH'un görev süresince HNP, asayişin sağlanmasında önemli ilerleme göstermiş, daha önce hiç olmadığı kadar halk desteği sağlamış ancak tüm çabalara karşın etkili bir polis gücü haline getirilememiştir. İyi bir polis gücünde olması gereken tecrübe, profesyonellik, nitelik ve kaynaklara sahip olamamıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/1999/181, 1999).

Her ne kadar HNP'nin kısa sürede kapasite artırımı ve eğitiminin oransal olarak iyileştiği düşünülse de özellikle gözaltı sırasında orantısız güç kullanımı konusunda ciddi eleştiriler almaya devam etmiştir. Araç, ekipman ve kaynak sıkıntısı sebebiyle başkent dışındaki etkisi ve gücü de oldukça sınırlı kalmıştır. MIPONUH'un HNP hakkındaki olumlu raporlarının aksine suç türlerinde kaygı verici artışlar yaşanmıştır. 1998 Temmuz ayında uluslararası uzmanların Birleşmiş Milletler Kalkınma Programı'na (*United*

Nations Development Programme/UNDP) sunduğu rapor belki de bu tarihe kadar HNP hakkında yapılan en gerçekçi değerlendirme olmuştur. Rapora göre *"HNP'nin kurulması ve geliştirilmesi için yapılan işler olağanüstüdür, ancak HNP kurumsal olarak kırılgan durumdadır ve kurumun gelişmesi sağlanamazsa çökmesi muhtemeldir."* (UN, BMGK*, undocs.org/ S/1998/796, 1998).

2000 yılının Mart ayında bu dönemin son BKO'su olan MIPONUH'un süresi dolmuş ve yeni sivil bir misyon olan Uluslararası Sivil Destek Misyonu'na (*International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti*/MICAH) görevi devrederek ülkeden ayrılmıştır. Böylece BM'nin 1993-2000 döneminde devam eden ülkedeki etkinliği sona ermiştir. 2004'de BM'nin MINUSTAH BKO ile geri dönüşüne kadar HNP, uluslararası toplumun kontrolünden çıkmış, yaklaşık 4 yıl süren denetimsizlik döneminde elde edilen gelişim ve kazanımlar gerilemiş, HNP ülkedeki politik kamplaşmadan etkilenmiş ve hızla profesyonellikten uzaklaşmıştır. Bu denetimsizlik sonucunda HNP personeli başta uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı olmak üzere birçok suça ve yolsuzluğa karışmıştır (UN, BMGK*, undocs.org/ S/2000/150, 2000).

Haiti'de istikrarı sağlamak için BMGK tarafından kısa sürelerle görevlendirilen ve 2000'de ülkeden ayrılan ilk grup BKO'larından sonra 30 Nisan 2004 tarih ve 1542 Sayılı BMGK Kararı ile 13 yıl boyunca görev alacak ikinci grup BKO MINUSTAH kurulmuştur. MINUSTAH'ın Yetki Belgesine göre BM polisine, ilk olarak ülkedeki geçici hükümeti destekleyerek güvenliğin sağlanması, demokratik seçimlerin yapılabileceği politik ortamın tesis edilmesi ve HNP'nin kapasitesinin artırılması konusunda yardımcı olma görevi verilmiştir. (UN, BMGK*, unscr.com/en/resolutions/154, 2004).

MINUSTAH'ın görev almasına yol açacak 2004 olayları öncesinde ülke genelinde 8.5 milyon olan nüfus için polis sayısı yaklaşık 5.000 kişidir. Sadece temel güvenlik görevlerinin yerine getirilebilmesi için her 800 kişiye 1 polis düşecek şekilde polis sayısının 10.000 olmasının gerektiği hesaplanmıştır. Ancak görüldüğü üzere 2004 olayları başladığında polis hem nitelikli personel hem lojistik hem de mali kaynaklar bakımından oldukça yetersiz durumdadır. Ayrıca polis, gruplara ayrılarak politize olmuş, rüşvet olayları ve görevin kötüye kullanılması sorunları yıllar içinde artmıştır. Karıştığı taciz, tecavüz ve uyuşturucu suçları polisin vatandaş gözündeki imajını da olumsuz etkilemiştir (UN, BMGK*, undocs.org/ S/2004/300, 2004). Olaylarla birlikte polis teşkilatı tamamen çökmüş, polis sayısı 2500'e gerilemiştir. Çoğu karakol yakılmış, tahrip edilmiş, ekipman, kayıtlar ve arşiv çalınmış ya da yok edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla polis teşkilatının eğitimine başlanması, yeniden yapılanması, donanım ve nitelikli personelin artırılması misyonun öncelikli hedefleri arasında yer almıştır. Polis sayısının 2004 olayları öncesindeki 5.000'e ulaşması için en az 2 yıl, 10.000'e ulaşması için ise en az 4 yıl gerektiği öngörülmüştür (UN, BMGK*, undocs.org/ S/2004/300, 2004).

MINUSTAH bu şartlar altında göreve başlarken beklenti, ülkede kalıcı istikrar ve güven ortamını sağlayamayan önceki BMBKO'lardan daha etkin tedbirler alması ve bu tedbirlerin kalıcı olması yönünde olmuştur. Bu sebepledir ki BMGK, MINUSTAH'a kendisinden önceki misyonların hiçbirisine verilmeyen personel, bütçe ve yetkileri sağlamıştır. Daha önce BM BKO'da görevlendirilen az sayıdaki uluslararası polisin aksine, yeni misyon için UNPOL sayısı 1.622 olarak belirlenmiştir. Güvenliği sağlamak HNP'nin görevi olmakla birlikte, UNPOL devriye ve toplumsal olaylarda yerel polise destek ve yardımcı olmuş, özellikle de eğitim

programları ile HNP'yi uluslararası standartlara taşıyacak çalışmalara başlamıştır. HNP ile 24 saat esasına göre eşgüdümlü şekilde görev yapılarak, yerel polisin performansı takip ve rapor edilmeye başlanmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/S/RES/1542, 2004). UNPOL görevlileri, HNP'nin Genel Müdürlüğü'nde, il ve ilçe birimlerinde karar verme mekanizmalarında yer almaya başlamıştır. HNP sayısı Ağustos 2004 itibariyle 3.567'yi bulmuş, ancak ülkede güvenliği sağlayacak sayının oldukça gerisinde kalmıştır. BKO polisleri ilk defa HNP'nin seçimi ve değerlendirilmesi sürecine katkı vermeye başlamıştır. HNP, eğiticilerin eğitimi faaliyetlerine dâhil edilmiş, ayrıca kadına şiddet konusunda da farkındalık eğitimleri yapılmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2004/698, 2004).

BKO tarafından yürütülen tüm bu faaliyetler, BM'nin Haiti krizini kesinlikle sonuçlandırmaya niyetli ve kararlı olduğunu göstermiştir.

Ancak BM'nin krizi sonlandırma konusundaki karar ve çabasının önündeki en büyük engel ülkedeki politik belirsizlik olmuştur. Eski Başkan Aristide yandaşlarının başlattığı gösterilerde 2004 Ekim ayında 13 HNP görevlisinin de dahil olduğu 60 kişi öldürülmüştür. Bu olaylar göstermektedir ki Haiti krizi uluslararası toplumun düşündüğünden daha karmaşık ve çözümü bilinen yöntemlerle kolaylıkla sağlanamayacak boyuttadır. Dolayısıyla yeni bir yapılanma ve yeni metotlar kullanılmalıdır. Bu sebeple başkent Port-au-Prince'de koordinasyonu sağlayacak ve hızlı kararlar verecek MINUSTAH/HNP ortak Harekât Merkezi kurulmuş ve ilk kez UNPOL, BM askeri ve HNP ortak operasyonlar yapmaya başlamıştır. Ülkenin içinde bulunduğu şiddet sarmalı kırılmadan, halkın anayasal kurumlara güven duyması sağlanmadan, istikrar ve güven ortamı oluşturulmadan diğer alanlarda çalışmaya başlanmasının boşa harcanan zaman ve

emek olacağı anlaşılmıştır. Bu sebeple MINUSTAH, kapasite artırımı ve eğitim konularını bir süreliğine askıya alarak HNP'ye sadece operasyon desteği sağlamıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2004/908, 2004).

2005'de MINUSTAH, HNP'yi görev başında izleme, görevle ilgili tavsiyelerde bulunma ve ihtiyaç halinde yardım etme faaliyetlerini yürüteceği programı (co-location) tanıtmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2005/124, 2005). Bu yılın sonunda yapılması planlanan seçimlerle ilgili gerginlik, HNP'nin güvenliği sağlamasının önündeki en büyük engel olmuştur. Sayı ve nicelik olarak istenen seviyede olmayan ve bir kısmı silahlı gruplarla ilişkide bulunan HNP, başkentte hızla yükselen insan kaçırma suçları ile mücadele edememiştir. Örneğin Şubat 2005'de başkentte silahlı grupların cezaevini basıp 493 tutukluyu kaçırması, HNP ve MINUSTAH'ın son yıllarda yaptığı tüm başarılı operasyonları boşa çıkarmış ve uluslararası topluma da Haiti'de istikrarı sağlamanın kolay olmadığını göstermiştir. MINUSTAH, HNP ile birlikte silahlı çetelerin merkezi olan Cite Soleil bölgesinde silahlı gruplara yönelik operasyon ve uygulamaları artırmış, 4 BM askerinin öldüğü operasyonlarda HNP listesinde bulunan 9 çete lideri öldürülmüştür. Takip eden 1 yılda 45 HNP öldürülmüş, polise karşı şiddetin artması HNP'nin de aynı şekilde karşılık vermesine sebep olmuş, seçimlerle ilgili gösterilerde HNP en az 5 vatandaşı öldürmüştür (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2005/313, 2005). Ülkedeki şiddet sarmalını göstermesi açısından bu sayılar önemlidir. Zira HNP ilk kurulduğu yıllarda polis olmak için başvuranların sayısı, polise karşı şiddet olaylarının artmasıyla düşmeye başlamıştır.

Mart 2005'de "Haiti Ulusal Polis Stratejik Gelişim Planı 2004-2008 (*Haiti National Police Strategic Development Plan 2004-2008*)" kabul edilmiş olup bu

plan HNP için dönüm noktalarından birisidir. Zira tarihinde ilk defa HNP'nin organizasyon yapısı tanımlanmış ve rütbeler için eğitim ve deneyim kıstasları belirlenmiştir. Buna bağlı olarak "co-location programı" hayata geçirilmiş 415 UNPOL, HNP'yi görev başında takip etmeye başlamıştır. Ayrıca HNP adaylarının seçim ve eğitilmesi sürecinde UNPOL katkısının artırılması planlanmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2005/313, 2005). HNP ve MINUSTAH'ın tüm çabalarına karşın başkentte insan kaçırma ve adi suçlarda artış trendi devam etmiştir. MINUSTAH'ın Cite Soleil'de faaliyetleri artarken yürüttüğü operasyonlar sonucunda tanınmış çete liderinin yanı sıra birçok sivil de hayatını kaybetmiştir. Bu dönemde mezun olanlarla birlikte HNP'ye 1.546 görevli daha katılmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2005/313, 2005).

2006'ya gelindiğinde HNP'nin haber alma ve bilgi toplama konusundaki eksikliğini gidermeye yönelik çalışmalara başlanmıştır. Zira silahlı organize grupları Haiti özelinde bilinen polisiye önlemlerle etkisiz hale getirmenin neredeyse imkânsız olduğu görülmüştür. Bu sebeple MINUSTAH eski BKO misyonlarından farklı olarak BM tarihinde ilk kez haber alma faaliyetleri için yeni bir yapı oluşturmuştur (Walter, 2009: 805-835). Bu yeni yapı ile silahlı gruplar ve faaliyetleri ile ilgili istihbarat toplanmaya ve elde edile bilgilerin operasyonel anlamda kullanılmasına başlanmıştır.

Bu dönemde "co-location" programının uygulanmasının yaygınlaştırılması ile HNP faaliyetleri, ülke genelinde bulunan 50'ye yakın karakoldan 22'sinde UNPOL tarafından kontrol edilmeye başlanmıştır. İlk defa fiilen kaç HNP'nin çalıştığı ile ilgili çalışma başlatılmış, 4.492 HNP ve silah numaraları kayıt altına alınmıştır. Kayıt altına alınan polislere 1 yıllık sertifika verilerek, her yıl performansa göre sertifika süresi uzatılma uygulaması

başlatılmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2006/60, 2006). Bu faaliyet HNP tarihinde önemli bir dönem noktası olmuştur. Zira aslında Ocak 2006 tarihine kadar ülkede kaç HNP'nin görevli olduğu bilgisine Haiti hükümeti bile sahip olamamıştır. Aybaşlarında HNP olarak görev aldığını söyleyen kişiler maaş almak için ilgili birimlere müracaat etmiş, HNP merkezinde ise özellikle başkent dışında kimin hangi karakolda görev yaptığını gösterir sağlıklı veriler tutulamamıştır. MINUSTAH işte bu şartlar altında HNP'nin kapasite artırımını sağlamaya çalışmış ve gerekli eğitimleri planlamıştır.

MINUSTAH'ın görev aldığı 2004'den 2006 sonuna kadar geçen sürede ülkede güvenlik göreli olarak iyileşmeye başlamıştır. Ancak insan kaçırma olaylarının önüne geçilememesi, silahlı çeteler arasındaki çatışmaların sonlandırılamaması, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığının kontrol edilememesi, 2004'de yaşanan krize sebep olan faktörlerin ortadan kalkmadığını ve HNP'nin güvenliği sağlamak için hala çok yetersiz olduğunu göstermiştir. Ancak tüm olumsuzluklara rağmen kayıt altına alınan polis sayısı 5.783'e, "co-location" yapılan karakol sayısı ise 28'e ulaşmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2006/592, 2006).

2006 sonuna gelindiğinde, silahlı çetelerin MINUSTAH'IN faaliyetlerinden duyduğu rahatsızlık açıkça görülmeye başlamıştır. HNP ve MINUSTAH'a karşı şiddet olayları artmış, silahlı çeteler HNP karakollarına saldırmaya başlamış, devam eden olaylarda 6 sivil hayatını kaybetmiş, en az 80 kişi yaralanmıştır. HNP, karakollara yapılan silahlı baskınlara karşılık olarak silahlı grupların kalesi sayılan Cite Soleil Bölgesi'ne UNPOL desteği olmadan 3 yıldan sonra ilk defa kendi başına girebilmiştir. Ancak birkaç gün sonra, bölgede polisle işbirliği yaptığı iddiasıyla öldürülen şahısların cesetleri bulunmuştur. Bu durum bölgede yaşayan

insanların hala silahlı çetelerin baskısı ve tehdidi altında olduğunu gösteren önemli bir gelişme olmuştur. Kasım ayında görevden dönen 2 MINUSTAH askeri ve 7 HNP öldürülmüş, devam eden şiddet MINUSTAH'ın asker ve polis sayısını artırmasını da beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu kapsamda ülkede görevlendirilen UNPOL sayısı 1951'i bulmuş, kayıt altına alınan HNP sayısı ise 8070'e ulaşmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2006/1003, 2006). HNP Reform Planı güncellenmiş ve polis sayısının senede 1.500 artarak 2011 sonuna kadar 14.000 olması öngörülmüştür (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2006/1003, 2006).

2007 başında HNP ve MINUSTAH ortak operasyonlarında 850 çete üyesinin yakalanması güvenlik güçlerinin operasyonel kapasitesinin arttığını ve ülkede asayiş konusunda nispi bir iyileşme olduğunu göstermiştir. Ancak MINUSTAH tarafından yapılan değerlendirmeye göre ülkede kalıcı istikrarın sağlanabilmesinin önünde 3 temel engel bulunmaktadır: Birinci ve en önemlisi sosyo-ekonomik bölünmüşlük ve yüksek işsizlik oranı, ikincisi yeniden ortaya çıkan ve ülke geneline yayılan silahlı şiddet olayları ve sonuncusu ise ülke tarihinin en kronik problemlerinden olan silah ve uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı olmuştur (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2007/503, 2007).

2008'e gelindiğinde güvenlik durumunda iyileşmeler görülmekle birlikte daha önceleri ülke gündeminde olmayan insan kaçırma suçlarında ciddi artış gözlenmiştir. Elbette bu durum açıkça ülkede ekonomik seviyenin gerilemesinin bir sonucu olup, hayat pahalılığı sebebiyle hükümet karşıtı gösteriler de başlamıştır. Ülkede istikrarın sağlanmasının önünde en büyük engellerden birisi olarak görülen ve HNP'nin ilk çekirdek yapısını oluşturan eski ordu mensuplarının yeniden topluma entegrasyonu konusunda bu dönemde ciddi kazanımlar sağlanmıştır.

Zira eski askerlerin silahlarını bırakarak politik grupların yanında yer alması, ülkedeki çatışmaların en önemli sebepleri arasında yer almıştır UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/200/202, 2008).

Uzun dönem Başbakan atanamaması yüzünden başlayan siyasi kriz temel gıda ürünlerindeki hızlı yükselişten kaynaklanan ekonomik kriz ile birleşince ülke, yeni bir protesto gösterileri dizisine şahitlik etmiştir. 2008 Nisan ayında barışçıl olarak başlayan gösteriler, başkentte hükümet karşıtı şiddet olaylarına dönüşmüş, ölü sayısının tam olarak tespit edilemediği olaylar sonunda halk, Başkanlık sarayına girmeye çalışmış, HNP ve MINUSTAH'ın ortak çabasıyla olaylar güçlükle kontrol altına alınmıştır. Bu kriz ortamında insan kaçırma suçlarında ciddi oranda artış gözlenmiş, bu fiili durum insan kaçırma olaylarının yükseliş trendi HNP bünyesinde kurulan "İnsan Kaçırma Suçları Birimine" verilen destekle aşılmaya çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca INTERPOL'den de bu suçların soruşturulması konusunda teknik destek alınmış, şüpheliler yakalanmaya çalışılmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2009/439, 2009).

Ülkede istikrar ve güven ortamı az da olsa sağlanmaya başlamışken 2008'de meydana gelen 4 büyük fırtına sonrası 1.000'e yakın vatandaşın canını kaybetmesi, milyonlarca dolarlık ürünün yok olması ve yüzbinlerce insanın sokakta kalması ülkeyi yeni bir istikrarsızlık sarmalına sürüklemiştir. Nisan ayında temel mallardaki fiyat artışları sebebiyle gösteriler başlamış ve hükümetin güvenoyu alamaması neticesinde yeni bir politik kriz ortaya çıkmıştır (Pace ve Luzincort, 2018). 2008'de neredeyse ayda ortalama 30 sayısına ulaşan insan kaçırma suçları 2009'un başlarından itibaren ayda 7'ye kadar gerilemiş, bu sayı HNP'nin başarılı operasyonları ile MINUSTAH asker ve polisinin devriye sayısını artırmasına bağlanmıştır. HNP sayısının 9.247'ye ulaşması da elbette ki polisin görünürlüğü ve etkinliğini artırarak suçlular üzerinde

caydırıcı olmuştur. Ancak ekonomik zorluklar, kasırgaların sebep olduğu kayıplar ve devam eden seçim programı yüzünden ülke yeni bir şiddet dalgasına sürüklenmiştir (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2009/129, 2009).

Şekil 1. 2004-2017 HNP Sayısının Değişimi

2009 HNP için farklı açıdan bir dönüm noktası olmuş, zira kendi içinde disiplin ve denetim mekanizması çalıştırılmaya başlanmıştır. Mart 2009 itibariyle 5.378 soruşturma dosyası açılmış, 1009 dosya karar için Disiplin Kurulu'na gönderilmiştir. Söz konusu soruşturmalar HNP'nin profesyonelleşme ve hesap verebilirlik anlayışını geliştirmeye başladığına işaret etmiştir. HNP'nin yıllar içinde gösterdiği gelişme göz ardı edilmemekle birlikte, henüz uluslararası toplumun yardımı olmadan güvenliği sağlama kapasitesinin olmadığı anlaşılmıştır. Bu sebeple MINUSTAH, Ağustos 2009 itibariyle 9.715 sayısına ulaşan HNP'ye yaklaşan seçimler öncesi HNP'nin bu konudaki kapasitesini artırmak amacıyla toplumsal olay eğitimleri vermeye başlamıştır. Zira Nisan 2008'de yaşanan gelişmeler, toplumsal olaylar ve gösterilerle ilgili HNP'nin daha çok hazırlık yapmasının zorunlu olduğu gerçeğini ortaya çıkarmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2009/439, 2009).

Ocak 2010'da meydana gelen yıkıcı deprem, resmi rakamlara göre 222.750 kişinin hayatın kaybetmesine ve 1.5 milyon insanın evsiz kalmasına sebep olmuştur. Bu nedenle 2010 Şubat ayında yapılması planlanan seçimler ertelenmek zorunda kalmış, ülke bir kez daha hem siyasi hem de ekonomik olarak belirsizlik ortamına sürüklenmiştir. Zaten kapasite olarak sınırlı olan HNP 77 kayıp vermiş, çoğu karakol ve hizmet binası yıkılmıştır. Ülkede deprem öncesi güvenliği tehdit eden faktörlere, deprem sonrası evlerini kaybedip kamplara sığınan 1 milyondan fazla kişinin güvenliğinin sağlanması da eklenmiştir. Kamplarda taciz ve tecavüz olayları başlamış, HNP'nin çok zor şartlar altında yakaladığı çete liderlerinin de aralarında bulunduğu 5.409 tutuklu cezaevinden firar etmiştir. Bu olağanüstü şartlarda güvenliği sağlamak için HNP ve UNPOL 24 saat devriye görevine başlamış, 2 büyük deprem kampında görev almıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2010/200, 2010).

Şekil 2. 2004-2017 UNPOL Sayısının Değişimi

2010 Depremi ülkede yaşanan güven ve istikrarsızlık ortamına yeni problemler eklemiş, başta deprem sonrası oluşturulan kamplarda olmak üzere ülke genelinde suç türlerinin hemen hepsinde artış

görülmüştür. 2010 sonu itibariyle kurulan deprem kampı sayısı yaklaşık 1.300 olup HNP'nin mevcut personel sayısı ile kamplarda suçları denetleme ve önleme şansı bulunmamıştır. Bu açığı kapatmak için MINUSTAH, UNPOL sayısını 1351'e, Çevik Kuvvet sayısını (*Formed Police Unit*/FPU) 2.940'a yükseltmiştir. HNP tüm olumsuz koşullara rağmen depremde cezaevinden kaçan 5.409 kişiden 629'unu yakalamayı başarmıştır. Deprem sonrası HNP'nin en fazla karşılaştığı sorun deprem kamplarında kalan, eşlerini ve babalarını kaybeden, toplumdaki diğer gruplara göre daha çok suça maruz kalan savunmasız durumdaki kadın ve çocuklar olmuştur. Zira kamplarda taciz ve tecavüz olaylarını kontrol altına almak mümkün olamamış, suçun mağdurları güvenlik güçlerine ulaşma ve şikâyetçi olma imkânını bulamamıştır. Durumun kontrol altına alınabilmesini temin amacıyla UNPOL, özellikle kamplarda yaşanan taciz ve tecavüz suçları ile mücadele amacıyla HNP'ye eğitim vermiştir (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2010/246, 2010).

2011'de başarılı bir şekilde yapılan Başkanlık seçimleri sonucunda ülkede siyasi gerginlik ve politik gösteriler sona ermiştir. 2010 depreminin de etkisiyle halkın hayatını devam ettirecek faaliyetlerle ilgilendiği, siyasetten ve politik taraf olmaktan çekindiği bir döneme girdiğini söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. Ancak deprem sonrası diğer tüm suç türlerinde artış trendi de devam etmiştir. Burada üzerinde durulması gereken önemli husus, HNP'nin daha fazla devriye yapması, halkla iç içe olması ve bunun sonucunda polise intikal eden suç ihbarının artmış olabileceğidir. Zira HNP sayısı 2011 itibariyle 10,000'e ulaşmıştır. Kamplarda sıklıkla yaşanan tecavüz olaylarını takip için HNP, veri bankası oluşturmuş ve 3 yıllık bir plan geliştirmiştir (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2011/540, 2011). Bu olumlu gelişmeler üzerine MINUSTAH ilk defa ülkeden

ayrılmayı ve personel sayısını azaltmayı planlamaya başlamıştır. Bu planlama HNP'nin ülkede güvenliği tek başına sağlayabileceği varsayımına dayanmıştır.

2012 HNP'nin daha çok devriye yapabildiği, kamplarda daha görünür olduğu ve kapasitesini artırdığı bir dönem olmuştur. HNP'nin reformu ve güçlendirilmesi için yeni bir yol haritası anlamına gelecek Haiti Ulusal Polis Kalkınma Planı 2012-2016 (*HNP Development Plan 2012-2016*) hazırlanmıştır. Plan kapsamında HNP sayısı 10.106'ya ulaşmış, 138 polis disiplinsizlik sebebiyle görevden uzaklaştırılmış, her yıl 1200 yeni HNP alınarak 2016 sonu itibariyle HNP sayısı 15.000 olacak şekilde revize edilmiştir. HNP, en fazla suç işlenen 7 yüksek riskli kampta 24 saat görev yapmaya başlamıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2012/128, 2012). Bu süreçte eski askerlerin ordunun tekrar kurulması için yaptığı gösteriler, silahlı grupların işlediği cinayet, insan kaçırma ve soygunlar güvenliği ve istikrarı bozucu faktörler olmaya devam etmiştir (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2012/678, 2012).

2013'de hayat pahalılığı, yiyecek kıtlığı ve temel ihtiyaçların karşılanması amacıyla yapılan toplumsal gösteri sayısı 3 kat artmıştır. Her ne kadar HNP 55 insan kaçırma şüphelisini ve en az 58 uyuşturucu kaçakçısını yakalamış olsa da hala tek başına ülkede güvenliği sağlayacak kapasiteye bu dönemde ulaşamamıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2013/139, 2013). 2013 ikinci yarısında suçlarda azalma görülmeye başlamış ve HNP insan kaçırmayla ilgili 42 kişiyi daha yakalayarak suçla mücadeledeki başarısını perçinlemiştir. Bu gelişmeler MINUSTAH'ın BM polis sayısını azaltma yönündeki çalışmalarını hızlandırmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2013/493, 2013).

2014 yerel seçimlerin yapılamaması yüzünden artan gösterilerle başlamış, ancak kayıt altına alınan

suçlardaki düşüş trendi devam etmiştir. Örneğin cinayet suçlarındaki 5 yıllık artış trendi tersine dönmüştür. Suçların azalmasında 2010 depreminden beri kamplarda kalanların sayısının %10'lara gerilemesi de etkili olmuştur. Kadına karşı şiddet ve tecavüz suçları ile ilgili 283 HNP'ye 5 günlük özel eğitim verilmiştir (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2014/162, 2014). MINUSTAH'ın kapatılması ya da başka bir isimle politik misyon olarak görev yapması konusunda BMGK'ye de tavsiyede bulunulmuştur. Bu gelişmeler, MINUSTAH'ın yakın gelecekte HNP'nin ülkede güvenliği sağlayabileceği konusunda ilk kez olumlu düşünmeye başladığını göstermektedir. 2014 ikinci yarısında ise cinayet suçlarında artış trendi başlamıştır. Her ne kadar toplumsal olaylara müdahalede MINUSTAH desteği alınmış olsa da HNP'nin gösterilerde sergilediği performansta gelişme izlenmiştir. UNPOL bu kapsamda polis karakollarında HNP'ye işbaşı eğitim ve desteğe devam etmiştir. HNP suçla mücadele ve toplumsal olaylara müdahalede başarı gösterse de polisin hala 2/3'ü başkentte görevli olup ülkenin geri kalanında bu rakam oldukça düşük kalmıştır. 2014 sonunda 1.000 kişiye düşen polis sayısı 1,15 olup, planlanan 2,22 seviyesinin çok altında kalmıştır. 2011'den 2014'e kadar UNPOL sayısı %42 düşmüş ve HNP sayısı %18,7 artmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2014/617, 2014).

2015'de yapılan Başkanlık seçimleri yaklaşırken ülkede tarih boyunca süregelen politik çatışma ve belirsizliklerin sebep olduğu gerginlik bir kez daha ortaya çıkmıştır. Seçimler sebebiyle toplumsal olay sayısında önemli artış yaşanmış, ancak önceki seçim dönemlerine göre bu gösterilerde daha az şiddet olayı gözlemlenmiştir. Bunun sebebinin seçim döneminde MINUSTAH asker ve polisinin HNP'ye verdiği operasyon desteği olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. 2015 aynı zamanda 2012-2016 HNP

Kalkınma Planının uygulanmasında elde edilen kazanımların sorgulandığı bir yıl olmuştur. Planın uygulama döneminin sona ermesine 16 aylık süre kalmışken, tamamlanması öngörülen 70 aktiviteden sadece 8 tanesi tamamlanabilmiştir. Bunlar:

- HNP araç bakım ve mekanik atölyesinin güçlendirilmesi,
- Croix-des-buket Hapishanesi'nin inşa edilip donatılması,
- Ulusal düzeyde ilk yardım eğitimlerinin verilmesi,
- HNP Genel Müdürlüğü'nde Kriz İzleme ve Değerlendirme Ofisi kurulması,
- Delmas 2 Karakolu'nun inşa edilip donatılması,
- HNP personel seçim kriterlerinin belirlenmesi ve seçim ofisi kurulması,
- 6 HNP karakolunun geliştirilmesi için UNPOL destekli ekipler kurulması,
- İnsan Kaçırma Suçu ile Mücadele Birimi'nin güçlendirilmesi.

Görüldüğü gibi tamamlanan 8 projeden 7'si kapasite artırımı, eğitim ve kurumsal yapının iyileştirilmesi değil HNP'nin fiziksel ortamının ve ekipmanlarının iyileştirilmesi şeklinde gelişmiştir. Sadece 1 proje doğrudan HNP'nin ihtiyaç duyulan bir alanda kapasitesinin geliştirilmesi ile ilgilidir. Bunun dışında 2012-2016 HNP Kalkınma Planı'nda yer alan projelerin 40 tanesi bitmeye yakın seviyeye gelmiş, geri kalan 22 tanesi ise henüz başlangıç aşamasında kalmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2015/667, 2015).

Görüldüğü üzere HNP Kalkınma Planı, belirlenen ölçüde uygulanamamıştır. Buna rağmen 2015'de yeni Başkanın seçilmesiyle yumuşayan politik ortam

sebebiyle MINUSTAH'ın ülkeden gönderilmesi gerekliliği konusu gündeme gelmiştir. MINUSTAH'ın ülkeden çekilip güvenliği tamamen yerel polise bırakmasının planlandığı bu dönemde HNP'nin genel durumuna bakıldığında:

- HNP'nin toplam gücü 11.900 polise çıkmış ve 20 yıl önce kurulan Polis Okulu her dönemde 1.500 personel yetiştirecek kapasiteye ulaşmıştır.

- Önceden 2/3'ü başkent Port au Prince'de görev yapan HNP'nin 2015 itibariyle %40'ı başkent dışında konuşlandırılmıştır. Bu durum güvenlik ve istikrarın ülke genelinde sağlanabilmesi açısından önemli bir gelişme olmuştur. Zira daha önceden HNP'nin çok büyük bir bölümü başkentte görev almakta ülkenin geri kalanında herhangi bir güvenlik gücü ve dolayısıyla suç önlenmesi ile ilgili tedbirler söz konusu olmamıştır.

- HNP lojistik, araç, silah, cephane ve iletişim yönetimi konularında eğitim almıştır.

- Toplumsal olaylara müdahale konusunda 640 personel özel eğitim almıştır.

- Toplam HNP gücünün 7.418'i güvenlik soruşturmasından geçirilmiştir.

- HNP, polisler hakkındaki şikâyetleri daha etkin şekilde denetlemiş, 2015' 33 polis insan hakları ihlalleri sebebiyle işten atılmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2015/667, 2015).

2016 yılı da Başkanlık seçimlerinin politik atmosferinde başlamıştır. Bu dönemde 600 üzerinde toplumsal olay meydana gelmiş, HNP'nin toplumsal olaylarda orantısız şiddet uyguladığı ve insan hakları ihlalleri yaptığı gözlenmiştir. Ancak 2016 33 HNP'nin öldürülmesi ile HNP tarihinde en dramatik yıl olarak

tarihe geçmiş, bu sayı 2006 yılından bu yana görülen en fazla kayıp olmuştur (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2017/223, 2017). HNP'nin 20 yıl içindeki kazanımlarının daha da ileriye taşınabilmesi amacıyla 2017-2021 Planı hazırlıkları başlamıştır. Bu plana göre uluslararası toplum kapasite artırımı, ileri ve özel eğitimler (olay yeri inceleme, uyuşturucu ve silah kaçakçılığı, cinsel saldırı suçları, istihbarat toplama, toplumsal olaylara müdahale vb.) ve toplum destekli polis yaklaşımı konusuna odaklanacaktır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2016/225, 2016).

Şekil 3. 2004-2017 HNP/Nüfus Oranı (Bindelik oranda)

Şekil 3'de görüldüğü gibi HNP sayısı 2017 yılı Şubat ayında 14.000 olmuş ve polis-vatandaş oranı binde 1,3'e taşımıştır. Uluslararası oranın binde 2,2 olduğu düşünüldüğünde MINUSTAH'ın 13 yıllık kapasite artırımı çabaları sonucunda HNP'nin hala güvenliği tek başına sağlaması için gerekli sayısının yarısına ulaşabildiği anlaşılmaktadır. Ancak 2004'de polis-vatandaş oranının 0,27, 2012'de 0,98 olduğu göz önüne alındığında HNP'nin 13 yıl içindeki kapasite

artırım hızının %500'den daha fazla olduğu görülmektedir. Sayısal olarak ciddi oranda iyileştirme sağlanmış olmasına karşın HNP hala ülkedeki 570 yerleşim biriminin sadece 261'inde örgütlenme sağlayabilmiştir. Bu durum ülkenin yarısından fazlasında polisin ulaşılabilir olmadığına, suç ve suçluya müdahale edemediğine ve suçların istatistiklere geçmediğine işaret etmektedir (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2016/753, 2016).

2017 yılı Şubat ayında Başkan Jovenel Moise'in seçimle iş başına gelmesi ile birlikte ülkede politik belirsizlik ortadan kalkmıştır. HNP 14.000'e ulaşan sayısı ile sorunsuz bir seçim ortamının sağlanması, kamu düzenini sağlanması ve suçun önlenmesi konusunda iyi bir performans sergilemiştir (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2017/22735, 2017). Ancak 2004'den bu yana sağladığı önemli ilerlemeye rağmen HNP ülkede güvenlikten sorumlu tek kurum olarak, uluslararası polisin desteği olmadan kalıcı istikrarı tehdit eden faktörlerle etkin şekilde mücadele edecek kapasiteyi inşa etmek zorunda kalmıştır.

Bu sebeple MINUSTAH sonrası kurulacak yeni Misyon (MINIJUSTH) iki sene içerisinde sadece teknik becerisi olan 295 UNPOL ile polis kapasitesinin güçlendirilmesi konusunda çalışmaya devam etmiş ve 2017-2021 HNP Stratejik Kalkınma Planını (*HNP Strategic Development Plan*) hazırlamıştır. MINUSTAH BKO kapanırken HNP 15,000 sayısına ulaşmış, 570 yerleşim biriminden 262'sinde teşkilatlanmayı başarmıştır (UN, BMGK, undocs.org/ S/2017/604, 2017).

Haiti Suç İstatistikleri ve HNP Sayısı ile İlişkisi

1995'de BM gözetiminde kurulan HNP'nin 2017'ye gelindiğinde suç ve suçlularla mücadelesi ile kapasite artırımının suç üzerindeki etkisinin anlaşılabilmesi için suç istatistiklerinin incelenmesi faydalı olacaktır. Yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi Haiti genelinde polisin

sayıca yetersiz, eğitimsiz ve donanımsız olması, sağlıklı veri toplama imkânının bulunmaması, polisin ülke genelinde dağılımının yetersiz olması, vatandaşın polise güven duymaması vb. sebeplerle suç sayılarının tam olarak istatistiklere yansımadığı bilinmektedir. Buna karşın Misyonun son 5 yılında tutulan suç istatistiklerinin geçmiş dönemlere oranla daha sağlıklı olacağı değerlendirilerek son 5 yılın verileri baz alınmıştır. Şekil 4-5-6-7 ve 8'de yer alan sayılar ve en fazla işlenen 5 adet suç türü, 2013-2017 yılları arasında MINUSTAH ve son kurulan MINUJUSTH misyonlarından BMGK'ya gönderilen Yarıyıl Raporları (*Bi-annual Reports)* üzerinden incelenerek tarafımızca oluşturulmuştur (MINUSTAH Police, Bi-Annual Report, January 2013/December 2017, 2013-2017).

Şekil 4. 2013-2017 Dönemi'nde Haiti'de İşlenen Cinayet Suçunun Yıllık Değişimi.

Haiti genelinde işlenen cinayet suçun 5 yıllık değişimi analiz edildiğinde %13 yani düşük pozitif bir korelasyon (ilişki) olduğu görülmüştür. Bir başka ifadeyle 5 yıl içinde toplamda cinayet suç oranının %13 arttığı görülürken cinayet suçunun anlamlı oranda değişmediği anlaşılmaktadır. Polis sayısının yıllar içinde arttığı ve son 5 yıl içindeki artış oranının %22 olduğu göz önüne alındığında polis sayısındaki

artışın cinayet suçunun azaltılmasında etkisinin sınırlı olduğu tespit edilmektedir. Normal şartlarda polis sayısı artarken cinayet suçunun da aynı oranda olmasa bile azalması beklenmektedir. Haiti genelinde işlenen cinayet suçu en düşük 2013 en yüksek ise 2014'de görülmüştür. 2015 ve 2016 yıllarında aynı seviyede devam ederek 2017'de düşmeye başlamıştır. 2010'da Haiti'de meydana gelen yıkıcı deprem sonrası insanların dayanışma göstererek hayatta kalma mücadelesine odaklandığı ve bu dönemde cinayet suçlarının azaldığı değerlendirilmektedir. 2014'den itibaren ise seçimlerle ilgili başlayan politik belirsizlik ve kargaşa ortamında cinayet suçlarının artmaya başladığı ve 2015 ile 2016 yıllarında aynı oranda işlenmeye devam ettiği, Başkanlık seçimlerinin başarıyla sonuçlanması ve polisin adi suçlarla etkin şekilde mücadeleye başlaması ile birlikte 2017 itibariyle düşüşe geçtiği görülmektedir.

suçunun azaltılmasında anlamlı düzeyde etkili olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Ancak bu suç türünün toplumsal olaylar esnasında görüldüğü, politik çatışmaların engellendiği dönemlerde düşüşe geçmesinin normal olduğu ve artan polis sayısı ile doğrudan ilişkisinin olmayabileceği de değerlendirilmelidir. Haiti genelinde işlenen linç suçu en düşük 2017'de görülürken en yüksek 2014'de görülmüştür. Yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi linç olayları çoğunlukla politik gösteriler ve toplumsal olaylarda işlenen bir suç olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. 2014'de yapılması planlanan seçimlerin bir türlü yapılamayarak sürekli ertelenmesi sebebiyle toplumsal gösterilerin sayısı ve şiddeti artmış, buna bağlı olarak linç olaylarında da artış gözlenmiştir. 2015 yılı Şubat ayında Başkanlık seçiminin başarıyla sonuçlanması üzerine ülkedeki politik gerginlik azalmaya başlamış ve 2017 itibariyle en düşük seviyeye gerilemiştir.

Şekil 5. 2013-2017 Dönemi'nde Haiti'de İşlenen Linç Suçunun Yıllık Değişimi.

Şekil 6. 2013-2017 Dönemi'nde Haiti'de İşlenen İnsan Kaçırma Suçunun Yıllık Değişimi.

Haiti genelinde işlenen linç suçunun yıllık değişimi analiz edildiğinde %48 oranında orta negatif bir korelasyon (ilişki) olduğu görülmüştür. Yani 5 yıl içinde linç suçunun anlamlı oranda düştüğü tespit edilmiştir. Polis sayısının yıllar içinde artarak devam ettiği göz önüne alındığında bu sayıdaki artışın linç

Haiti genelinde işlenen insan kaçırma suçun yıllık değişimi analiz edildiğinde %53 oranında orta negatif bir korelasyon (ilişki) olduğu görülmüştür. Bir başka ifadeyle 5 yıl içinde insan kaçırma suçunun anlamlı oranda düştüğü anlaşılmaktadır. Polis sayısının yıllar

içinde artarak devam ettiği göz önüne alındığında polis sayısındaki artışın insan kaçırma suçunun azaltılmasında anlamlı bir etkisinin olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Zira insan kaçırma suçu Haiti tarihinde sıklıkla görülen bir suç türü olmamış, 1996'da ilk kez ülke gündemine giren bu suç türü hızla yayılmıştır. Özellikle deprem ve ekonomik kriz dönemlerinde gıda fiyatlarının fahiş şekilde dalgalandığı zamanlarda zirve yapmış, kolay yoldan varlıklı insanların kaçırılıp karşılığında maddi kazanç sağlanması şeklinde devam etmiştir. 2008'de ülkeyi vuran 4 farklı ve büyük çaptaki fırtına sonrası gıda fiyatlarının artması, hükümetin açlıkla mücadele edememesi sebebiyle sıklıkla görülmüştür. 2010'daki büyük deprem sonrası ise özellikle başkentte insan kaçırma suçlarının artması sürpriz olmamıştır. 2013 sonrası döneme bakıldığında ise en yüksek sayıya 2014'de ulaşmış 2015'de sert bir düşüş görülerek aynı eğilim 2017'de MINUSTAH kapanana kadar devam etmiştir. Bir önceki paragrafta da yer aldığı gibi 2014'de yapılması planlanan seçimlerin bir türlü yapılamaması ve sürekli ertelenmesi sebebiyle ülkede ortaya çıkan yoksulluk ve ekonomik kriz sebebiyle insanlar geçim sıkıntısı yaşamaya başlamış, politik belirsizlik ve güvensizlik ortamında fırsat bulan silahlı çeteler insan kaçırarak maddi menfaat temin etmeye başlamıştır. 2015 yılı Şubat ayında Başkanlık seçiminin başarıyla sonuçlanması üzerine polis tüm enerjisini UNPOL desteği ile adi suçlarla mücadeleye vermiş, polisin görünürlüğünün artması ile 2015 ve sonrasında bu suç türü ile mücadelede ciddi oranda yol alınmıştır.

**Şekil 7.** 2013-2017 Dönemi'nde Haiti'de İşlenen Tecavüz Suçunun Yıllık Değişimi.

Haiti genelinde işlenen tecavüz suçun yıllık değişimi analiz edildiğinde %58'lik pozitif bir korelasyon (ilişki) olduğu görülmüştür. Bir başka ifadeyle 5 yıl içinde tecavüz suçunun anlamlı oranda arttığı anlaşılmaktadır. Polis sayısının yıllar içinde artarak devam ettiği göz önüne alındığında polis sayısındaki artışın tecavüz suçunun azaltılmasında etkisinin sınırlı olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Haiti tarihinde tecavüz olayları sıklıkla görülen ve çok önemsenmeyen bir suç türü olarak görülmüş, hatta kimi bölgelerde kültürün bir parçası olarak suç olarak değerlendirilmemiştir. İlginç bir biçimde 2004'de MINUSTAH kurulduğunda HNP'nin bile tecavüz olaylarına karıştığı tespit edilmiştir. 2010'daki deprem sonrası çoğunluğu kadın ve çocuklardan oluşan yaklaşık 1 milyon insanın deprem kamplarında konaklamaya mecbur kalması sebebiyle tecavüz olaylarında patlama meydana gelmiştir. Ancak 2011'de HNP bünyesinde tecavüz olaylarıyla ilgili veri bankası oluşturularak 3 yıllık plan yapılması ve 2014'de aralarında kadınların da olduğu 283 HNP'ye 5 günlük eğitim verilmesi ile birlikte bu suç türünün kayda alınmasında önemli mesafe alınmıştır. Son 5 yıllık dönemde Haiti genelinde işlenen tecavüz suçu en düşük 2013'de, en yüksek ise 2015'de görülmüştür. Ancak polis sayısındaki artış, polisin bu tür suçunda

78

eğitiminin ve farkındalığının artırılması, kadın polislerin suç mağdurları ile doğrudan temas kurması, polisin başkent dışındaki kırsal bölgelerde de etkin şekilde görev alması ile birlikte tecavüz suçunun eskisinden daha düzenli kayıt altına alındığını değerlendirmek gerekmektedir.

Şekil 8. 2013-2017 Dönemi'nde Haiti'de İşlenen Toplumsal Olayların Yıllık Değişimi.

Haiti genelinde meydana gelen toplumsal olayların yıllık değişimi analiz edildiğinde %74'lük yüksek negatif bir korelasyon (ilişki) olduğu görülmüştür. Bir başka ifadeyle toplumsal olayların 5 yıl içinde anlamlı oranda azaldığı anlaşılmaktadır. Polis sayısının yıllar içinde artarak devam ettiği göz önüne alındığında polis sayısındaki artışın toplumsal olayların azaltılmasında kuvvetli bir etkisinin olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Ancak toplumsal olayların ülkedeki politik belirsizlik, ekonomik kriz ve doğal afetler sonrasında artış gösterdiği gözden kaçırılmamalıdır. Haiti genelinde 2010'dekibüyük depremden beri ertelenen seçimler ve yoksulluk sebebiyle toplumsal olayların sayısı 2014'de zirve yapmış, 2015 seçiminden sonra Devlet Başkanının seçilmesi ile en düşük seviyeye gerilemiştir.


Şekil 9. 2013-2017 Dönemi'nde Haiti'de İşlenen Toplam Suç Sayısının Yıllık Değişimi.

Haiti genelinde işlenen toplam suç sayısı yıllık değişimi analiz edildiğinde %43'lük orta derecede negatif bir korelasyon (ilişki) olduğu görülmüştür. Bir başka ifadeyle Haiti'de MINUSTAH'ın son 5 senesinde toplam suç oranlarının azaldığı anlaşılmaktadır. Önceki bölümlerde de yer verildiği üzere 2013'den itibaren seçimlerin yapılamaması sebebiyle toplam suçlarda da 2014'de zirve görülmüş, politik belirsizlik ve kısmen ekonomik problemlerin üstesinden gelinmesiyle suç oranları 2017'ye kadar kademeli olarak gerilemiştir.

Sonuç

BM, geleneksel barışı koruma operasyonlarında sürdürülen ateşkesi izleme ve rapor etme faaliyetlerini son yıllarda genişleterek, yerel polis güçlerinin yeniden yapılandırılması ve kapasitesinin artırılması görevini de yerine getirmeye başlamıştır. Bu yeni konseptin en geniş anlamda uygulandığı Barışı Koruma Operasyonu, 2004'de kurulan ve 2017'de sona eren MINUSTAH misyonu olmuştur. Yetki Belgesi'nde misyona yüklenen görevlerden en önemlilerinden birisi 1995'de kurulan HNP'nin yeniden yapılandırılması, eğitilmesi ve faaliyetlerinin izlenerek kapasitesinin artırılmasıdır.

Şekil 10. 2013-2017 Dönemi'nde Haiti'de (HNPx10) Sayısı İle Suç Sayısının Değişimi.

MINUSTAH'ın 2004'de yaklaşık 2.500 olan polis sayısını 2017'de sonunda 14.000'e ulaştırması küçümsenmemesi gereken bir kapasite artışı olarak görülmüştür. Ancak Haiti'de tarih boyunca devam eden politik belirsizlikler, sosyo-ekonomik çatışmalar ve sık sık meydana gelen doğal afetler sebebiyle yerel polisin kazanımları kesintiye uğramış, beklenen düzeyde iyileştirme gerçekleşememiştir. Sayı olarak 13 yılda %500'den fazla büyüyen HNP'nin kurumsal kültür oluşturmasının profesyonelleşme ve nitelik açısından aynı oranda gelişemediği görülmüştür.

Şekil 11. 2013-2017 Dönemi'nde Haiti'de İşlenen 5 Büyük Suç Türü

Haiti genelinde suç sayılarının tam olarak istatistiklere yansımadığı ise bilinmektedir. Bu sebeple çalışmada MINUSTAH BKO'nun son 5 yılında tutulan suç istatistiklerinin geçmiş dönemlere oranla daha sağlıklı

olacağı tespit edilmiş ve işlenen suç türleri beş kategoriye ayrılarak incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda:

- 2014 yılının en fazla suç işlenen yıl olduğu anlaşılmıştır.

- Cinayet suçunun yıllar içinde anlamlı oranda değişmediği, HNP sayısındaki artışın cinayet suçunun azaltılmasında etkisinin sınırlı olduğu, bu suç türünün 2014'de yapılması planlanan seçimlerle ilgili başlayan politik belirsizlik ve kargaşa ortamında artmaya başladığı, 2015 ve 2016 yıllarında aynı oranda işlenmeye devam ettiği, 2015'de Başkanlık seçimlerinin başarıyla sonuçlanması ve polisin adi suçlarla mücadeleye odaklanması ile birlikte 2017 itibariyle düşüşe geçtiği tespit edilmiştir.

- Linç suçunun yıllar içinde büyük oranda azaldığı, HNP sayısındaki artışın linç suçunun azaltılmasında anlamlı düzeyde etkisinin olduğu, bu suç türünün toplumsal olaylar esnasında görüldüğü, politik çatışmaların engellendiği dönemlerde düşüşe geçmesinin normal olduğu, 2014'de yapılması planlanan seçimlerin bir türlü yapılamaması ve sürekli ertelenmesi sebebiyle toplumsal gösterilerin sayısı ve şiddetinin arttığı ve buna bağlı olarak linç olaylarında da artış gözlendiği görülmüştür. 2015 yılının Şubat ayında Başkanlık seçiminin başarıyla sonuçlanması üzerine ülkedeki politik gerginliğin azaldığı ve 2017 itibariyle bu suç türünün en düşük seviyeye gerilediği belirlenmiştir.

- İnsan kaçırma suçunun büyük oranda düştüğü, HNP sayısındaki artışın insan kaçırma suçunun azaltılmasında anlamlı bir etkisinin olduğu tespit edilmiştir. 2008'de

80

ülkeyi vuran 4 farklı ve büyük çaptaki fırtına sonrası gıda fiyatlarının artması, hükümetin açlıkla mücadele edememesi sebebiyle oluşan ekonomik kriz sırasında insan kaçırma suçunun sıklıkla görülmeye başlandığı, 2010'daki büyük deprem sonrasında ise katlanarak arttığı görülmüştür. 2014'de yapılması planlanan seçimlerin bir türlü yapılamaması ve sürekli ertelenmesi yüzünden ülkede ortaya çıkan yoksulluk ve ekonomik bunalım sebebiyle zirveye çıktığı, 2015 yılının Şubat ayında Başkanlık seçiminin başarıyla sonuçlanması üzerine ciddi oranda azaldığı anlaşılmıştır.

- Tecavüz suçunun büyük oranda arttığı, HNP sayısındaki artışın tecavüz suçunun azaltılmasında etkisinin sınırlı olduğu, 2010'daki deprem sonrası çoğunluğu kadın ve çocuklardan oluşan yaklaşık 1 milyon insanın deprem kamplarında konaklamaya mecbur kalması sebebiyle tecavüz olaylarında patlama meydana geldiği, polisin eğitimlerinin artırılması ile bu suç türünün kayda alınmasının etkinleştirildiği, son 5 yıllık dönemde en fazla 2015'de görüldüğü, bunun sebebinin de bu tarihten sonra kadın polislerin suç mağdurları ile doğrudan temas kurması ve polisin başkent dışındaki kırsal bölgelerde de etkin şekilde görev alması olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

- Toplumsal olayların büyük oranda azaldığı, HNP sayısındaki artışın toplumsal olayların azaltılmasında kuvvetli bir etkisinin olduğu, toplumsal olayların ülkedeki politik belirsizlik, ekonomik kriz ve doğal afetler sonrasında artış gösterdiği, Haiti genelinde 2010'daki büyük depremden beri ertelenen seçimler ve yoksulluk sebebiyle toplumsal

olayların 2014'de zirve yaptığı ve 2015'de Devlet Başkanı'nın seçilmesi ile en düşük seviyeye gerilediği belirlenmiştir.

- Toplam suç oranlarının azaldığı, 2013'den itibaren seçimlerin yapılamaması sebebiyle toplam suçlarda da 2014'de zirvenin görüldüğü, politik belirsizlik ve kısmen ekonomik problemlerin üstesinden gelinmesiyle toplam suç oranlarının 2017'ye kadar kademeli olarak azaldığı görülmüştür.

Sonuç olarak 2004'de 1542 sayılı BMGK kararı ile kurulan MINUSTAH misyonu, 2017'de 2350 sayılı BMGK kararı ile görevini MINUJUSTH misyonuna bırakarak Haiti'den ayrılmıştır. Devam eden 13 yıllık görevi boyunca MINUSTAH, HNP'in kurumsal kapasitesini artırmaya yönelik çalışmalarda bulunmuş, HNP'nin 13 yıl boyunca artan sayısına rağmen gerek kalıcı istikrarın sağlanmasında gerekse suç oranlarının azaltılmasında kendisinden beklenen başarıya ulaşamadığı tespit edilmiştir.

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The Place of Public Diplomacy in Bulgaria's Balkans Policy During the GERB Governments

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Abstract

Balkans has a strategic importance for Bulgaria. Bulgaria, which has historical and demographic ties with the region have tried to expand its influence area in the Balkans during the GERB governments. For this reason, Bulgaria has benefitted from the Public Diplomacy in the scopes of education and culture. Besides, the passport of Bulgaria, that gained power and prestige after the EU membership of the country has become the most important cultural instrument towards the region. In this study, the place of Public Diplomacy in the Bulgaria's Balkans Policy during the GERB governments was analyzed.

Keywords: Bulgaria, Balkans, Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, GERB.

Öz

Balkanlar Bulgaristan için stratejik bir öneme sahiptir. Bölgeyle tarihsel ve demografik bağlara sahip olan Bulgaristan, GERB hükümetleri döneminde Balkanlar'daki nüfuz alanını genişletmeye çalışmıştır. Bu sebeple kültür ve eğitim alanlarında kamu diplomasisinden önemli ölçüde yararlanmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra 2007'deki AB üyeliğinin ardından güç ve prestij kazanan Bulgaristan pasaportu ülkenin bölgeye yönelik en önemli kültür aracı haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada, GERB hükümetleri döneminde Bulgaristan'ın Balkanlar politikasında Kamu Diplomasisi'nin yeri analiz edilmiştir

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bulgaristan, Balkanlar, Diplomasi, Kamu Diplomasisi, GERB

Introduction: Content and Methodology

The weakness of Classical Diplomacy's sense in foreign policy in fulfilling the requirements, triggered the emergence of new types of diplomacy. The changes that emerged in international arena have accelerated this process. Public Diplomacy, as one of the new types of diplomacy, has gained popularity due to innovations in mass media, interdependence, unbearable costs of wars and changes in the nature of power due to the phenomenon of globalization. Although Public Diplomacy gained a meaning that substitutes the concept of soft power, it has experienced an expansion of geographical area and content especially in the post-Cold War era. In this period, Public Diplomacy, which was no longer an instrument of foreign policy that applied by only large states, also has become a frequently used tool for medium and small states.

Following the dismissal of communist leader Todor Zhivkov on November 10, 1989, and especially with the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) there have occurred radical changes in Bulgarian foreign policy. Alongside the problems with the neighboring countries, the disintegration process that took place in the Balkans in the 1990's, drove the Sofia administration toward the Euro-Atlantic institutions in their foreign policy. Thus, Bulgaria became a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 and the European Union (EU) in 2007 under the influence of conjunctural convenience. In addition to this, to create new areas of influence in the region has become inevitable for Bulgaria, as an important political force in the Balkans. The realization of this depends on the effective use of Public Diplomacy. Relatives and cognates of Bulgaria that are found in the mass population of the region has been an important component of this policy.

The aim of this study is to determine the place of Public Diplomacy in Bulgaria's policy towards the Balkans during the governmental term established by the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) Party between 2009-2019. The main reasons for examining this period are the fact that GERB has been in continuous power except for the period of May 2013-October 2014, and it has been observed that Public Diplomacy compared to previous Bulgarian governments has been tried to be implemented more effectively. Moreover, for about 30 years after Zhivkov, there was no stable power in Bulgarian political life until 2009-2019. It is also assumed that Bulgaria, which aims to expand its regional influence in the Balkans, should benefit from Public Diplomacy. Consequently, the aim of this study was to find out the dimension and instruments of Public Diplomacy in Bulgarian foreign policy. In this context, the analytical structure of the study, in which qualitative data analysis is used, consists of three parts. In the first part, Public Diplomacy is explained conceptually and in the second part, the Balkans and Public Diplomacy in Bulgarian foreign policy are mentioned. In the third part of the study Bulgaria's Public Diplomacy practices were analyzed.

Conceptual Perspective: Public Diplomacy

Public Diplomacy, which emerged as an important type of diplomacy within the discipline of International Relations (IR) in the post-Cold War period, is increasing its popularity day by day with the effect of developments in communication technologies. The concept of Public Diplomacy, put forward by Edmund Gillion in 1965 in response to the negative connotation evoked by the concept of "Propaganda", has been used over time to meet the United States of America (USA)'s international

publications, information and cultural activities (Özdal, 2018: s. 61). Although its entry into the IR literature corresponds to the Cold War period, it has a rich historical background in terms of finding a field of application as an instrument of foreign policy. Setting up a library in Alexandria by The Ptolemaic Dynasty, as an invitation for the children of the 'friend' kings to Rome about education during the Roman Republic, and foundation of the *Alliance Francaise* in 1883 to correct the image of France, which was defeated during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, issues can be put forward as examples within this context (Özdal, 2018: 62).

Although it is difficult to make a clear definition of Public Diplomacy itself, it can be stated that there is a consensus on its aims and instruments. In its simplest form, Public Diplomacy can be defined as the process by which a state tries to influence the people and elite of another country within the framework of its own political and ideological ideas. In the words of Hans N. Tuch, Public Diplomacy is *"a process of communication with foreign people, which aims to express the ideas and ideals of the nation, its institutions and culture, as well as the national aims and current policies of a government"* (Tuch, 1990: 3). The aim of Public Diplomacy, which is based on the activities outside the scope of traditional diplomacy, is to create public opinion in favor of itself in foreign countries mainly for national goals and interests. The instruments used to achieve this include a wide range of international publications, foreign journalists and academics, cultural activities, student exchange programs and scholarships, systematic visits, conferences and publications (Potter, 2002: 46).

Although the theoretical and application centered development of Public Diplomacy was more focused on the USA due to the unique atmosphere and ideological competition environment of the Cold War period, it expanded geographically after the end of the Cold War period and was transformed in terms of its content. Yet in the post-1991 period, while globalization gained a dominant character, increased interdependence, actor diversity in IR, high costs of wars and developments in mass media triggered the emergence of alternative types of classical diplomacy. In other words, the fact that Public Diplomacy began to become popular in the post-Cold War period is directly related to the structure of the international system it brought along. According to Joseph S. Nye, in this period, the transformed power turned from being capital-centered to information-centered and soft power became more important (Nye, 1990: 164-167).

Within this framework, it draws attention a process where knowledge is at the center of power. Therefore, the function of the process of collecting information about the target population, which is the main stage of *listening*, emerges before the implementation of Public Diplomacy. In addition to *listening*, the function of Public Diplomacy is to become an international *advocacy* of the target public's thinking, to monitor *cultural diplomacy* using cultural resources, to follow *exchange diplomacy* through student exchange programs or cultural interaction instruments, and to target public communication with *international news broadcasting* concerning its functioning can be approached under 5 groups (Cull, 2009: 18-22). As it is a parallel activity, Cull includes *psychological warfare* in this classification (Cull, 2009: 22-23).

In addition to the function of Public Diplomacy, it is seen that its field is expanding geographically. Such that, in the post-Cold War era, Public Diplomacy was not only a matter of large states, but also became an area of interest for regional powers and even small-scale states. Furthermore, a series of innovations in

Public Diplomacy have emerged with the new conjuncture in the international arena. In terms of actors, as well as the state, non-state elements have become the subject of Public Diplomacy, a process in which new technological instruments (satellite, internet, mobile phones) are used, the concept of soft power comes into prominence and national brand creation and horizontal relationship building are essential (Özdal, 2018: 63). To sum up, the new Public Diplomacy gained popularity in the context of functionality, geographic expansion and the transformation process it underwent, and because of its breadth, it had its own types of sub-diplomacy. Educational diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, tourism diplomacy, religious diplomacy, and more issues emerged as a result of the breadth of extent.

The Balkans in Bulgarian Foreign Policy during the Post-Cold War Era and Necessity for Public Diplomacy

Following the dismissal of communist leader Todor Zhivkov on November 10, 1989, structural changes have taken place in Bulgaria. Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov, who succeeded Zhivkov, tried to improve the country's image in the international arena. As a result of the Gorbachev policies, the leader of the USSR, hints that change in the structure of the international system would take place were taken into consideration by the Bulgarian decision-makers. With the end of the Cold War period, Bulgaria faced a series of problems in the foreign policy. In addition to the country's ethnic and political problems, the Yugoslavia-based disintegration process in the Balkans posed geopolitical risks for the Sofia administration. During this period, Bulgaria, having deteriorated relations with Turkey because of Zhivkov's regime attempts to assimilate the Turkish minority, and with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, it was deprived of a big power in international

politics. As a result of these developments, Bulgaria faced foreign policy challenges in the early 1990s.

On the other hand, these risks included opportunities in oneself. In the words of Zhelyu Zhelev, the first President of Bulgaria of the transition to democracy, "for the first time, Bulgaria has had the opportunity to guarantee its security and national independence in the face of regional and global developments (Özlem, 2019: 169)." Yet, even though Bulgaria is considered as a small-scale state at the level of international system, it has had the opportunity to become an active actor of the Balkans regional sub-system. In this context, it is seen that Zhelev has put forward good neighborhood relations, finding solutions to the problems in the Balkans and the integration of the country with Europe as the new period objective of Bulgaria's foreign policy (Zhelev, 2008:73).

When looked at the issue from the application point, 345.960 ethnic Turks had to migrate to Turkey in 1989 because of the assimilation policies of Zhivkov regime. Immediately after the forced migration to Turkey, Bulgaria tried to end that crisis period in their relations with Ankara. By the signing of the *Treaty of Friendship*, *Good Neighboring, Cooperation and Security* in 1992, bilateral relations were put into a new framework and developed rapidly during the 1990's. Bulgaria, to have the confidence of Turkey, allowed political activities of the *Movement for Rights and Freedoms*, the majority of which were constituted by the ethnic Turks, in that period. This initiative of Bulgaria also aimed to extinguish the international image that was damaged due to assimilation attempts between the years of 1984 and 1989. On the other hand, as seen in the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, the bloody disintegration process of Yugoslavia has created a regional mobility. Moreover, the issue of Yugoslavia had frightening consequences for Bulgaria, which experienced ethnic

problems a few years before due to Turkish minority. Yugoslavia crisis carried risk for all countries in Balkans because of its potential to create instability at regional level. That is why Bulgarian decision-makers tried to follow a constructive policy. In this context, Bulgaria has gained the trust of NATO and the EU as it has set out to cooperate with the Euro-Atlantic institutions in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and especially the Kosovo crisis. Therefore, Zhelev's emphasis on the integration process with Western and European institutions in particular has shown itself in the new term. The pro-Western Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) party, which came to power in 1997, has made progress in membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions, and continued by Tsar Simeon II, who came to power in 2001, a sign of a new era in Bulgarian foreign policy (Baeva, 2012: 170, 177-178). Consequently, Bulgaria became a NATO member in March 2004 and EU member in January 2007 due to under the influence of conjunctural convenience brought by NATO's and EU's enlargement strategies (Özlem, 2019: 172-178).

While Bulgaria's foreign policy, which is outlined above, was followed in the post-Cold War period in the 1990's to improve bilateral relations with neighbors and to establish regional peace, it is noteworthy that the first 10-year period of the 2000's was focused on Euro-Atlantic membership. Thus, the GERB party, that came to power in 2009, aims to maintain good neighboring relations and to become a regional power in the Balkans so the issue of gaining respectability in the Euro-Atlantic institutions has become more evident. However, it should be noted that with the effective return of the Russian Federation

(RF) to the international system under leadership of Vladimir Putin, the Sofia administration faced difficulties in implementing its objectives in the field. Russia's historical ties to Bulgaria, the Slav-Orthodox denominator, the sympathy of the Bulgarian people to Russia and Russia's influence on bureaucratic authorities in Bulgaria due to its connections from the USSR period, led to the Sofia administration being labeled as the "Trojan Horse"[3] of Russia within NATO and the EU.

The practical reflections of Bulgaria's foreign policy, which is a simplified equation from the theoretical point of view, during the GERB governments, created complex image. Yet, for Bulgaria, which is a member of the EU and NATO while tries to pursue a policy of balance between the West and Russia, the sustainability of this situation is controversial. Furthermore, Bulgaria does not determine the network of relations between major powers in terms of qualitative and quantitative power elements; as can be seen in the example of the South Stream project, it is directly affected by this process. Therefore, the dysfunction in the general picture drove Bulgaria towards the Balkans and the idea of becoming a regional power became distinct. Although, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov was emphasizing in his discourse (*24Chasa*, 27.08.2016) that they follow a foreign policy towards good relations with all neighbors also there has been a covert agreement in the Bulgarian public opinion that Sofia should focus on the Balkans again (www.eiri.bg).

Within this framework, emerges the debate that arises on how Bulgaria will become a political, economic, military and cultural center of power. From a political

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[3] The statement was rejected by the Bulgarian Prime Minister. For details: "Boiko Borisov: Balgariya Ne e Troyanskiyat Kon na Russiya v NATO", *Trud*, 01.03.2019. For a study on this subject see also: Raimond

Detrez, "Balgariya v ES – 'Çernata Ovtsa' ili 'Troyanskiyat Kon' na ES?", *Balkanite Prez Vtoroto Desetiletie na XXI Vek*, ed. Aleksandır Kostov, Paradigma, Sofiya, 2015, pp. 144-163.

perspective, it can be asserted that Bulgaria became an important force in the Balkans and increased its prestige with the effective use of classical diplomacy during the GERB governments. During this period, Bulgaria developed its relations with its neighbors and tried to expand its political influence over the Western Balkan states by taking advantage of EU membership. The situation of the Sofia administration is very favorable for the area of political influence among the other 4 EU member states. Greece's problems with Albania and (North) Macedonia prevent it from being effective in the region whereas Romania stands out from Western Balkan issues. Croatia and Slovenia are identifying themselves as Central European countries rather than Balkan states. Those created an available area in favor of Bulgaria. Sofia administration has sought to fulfill the responsibilities of the EU for the Western Balkans. For instance, Bulgaria was actively involved in the Berlin Process, which was initiated in Germany in 2014 because the EU enlargement was stalled in the Western Balkans. Bulgaria has also been a catalyst in the Quadrilateral Meetings with Serbia, Greece and Romania.

Economically, Bulgaria is far from being a regional power in the Balkans. Since 2018, Bulgaria has a foreign trade volume of 67 billion dollars (www.mi.government.bg). Turkey, Greece and Romania are regional scale commercial partners, although Bulgaria is behind the three actors. Besides that, Bulgaria ranks last in terms of the EU's average income per capita. Although there was a relative increase in public welfare during the GERB governments, the main problems of the Bulgarian economy such as bribery, corruption and lack of infrastructure prevent it from being an economic power. For this reason, Borisov, who tries to attract foreign investments to his country, frequently uses the discourse of cooperation in the fields of energy,

tourism and transportation in the Balkans. However, it is difficult to say that it is successful in the fields of energy and tourism. Having lost a significant part of its domestic market to Greece in terms of tourism, Bulgaria has lost its position as a transit country also in terms of energy policies, as can be seen in the old-Nabucco, South Stream and TANAP projects. Hence, it can be stated that Bulgaria does not constitute an economic regional power in the Balkans.

It can be said that the situation in the military field is similar to the economy. The state became a NATO member in 2004 and has a total of 33,000 military personnel. Despite its shrinking and professionalizing army structure, it has unmodified military vehicles and inventories. The efforts of Air Force aircraft to be composed of Russian MiG-28's and to be replaced by US-made F-16 Block 70's have not been realized despite its NATO membership. Also the buying of the S-400 air defense systems by Turkey from Russia and the initiations of the negotiations in Serbia has caused concern to the Bulgarian public (Özlem, 2019: 221-222; *ClubZ*, 1.11.2019). According to Global Firepower's ranking military forces in 2019, the Balkan countries, when Turkey was ranked 9th, Greece 28th, Romania 40th, Bulgaria was able to get only at the 49th place (www.globalfirepower.com). Although other Balkan countries have lagged behind Bulgaria, the Sofia administration is currently far from being a military force in the Balkans, but as a member of NATO, it has the potential to serve as a model for other Balkan countries. As can be seen, although Bulgaria is a political regional power in the Balkans, is not the same case in economic and military fields. However, culturally, Bulgaria's status as a regional power is being determined by the effectiveness of Public Diplomacy.

Bulgarian Public Diplomacy and Its Functionality in Balkans

Bulgaria's ability to become an effective power in the Balkans regional sub-system, rather than economic and military elements, is directly proportional to its political and cultural activities. Although the military and economic power elements are possible in the medium and long term, short-term effects are possible through the political maneuvers of Sofia's administration. Under the effect of this situation, Public Diplomacy creates a wide area for Bulgarian decision-makers. However, in order to determine the importance of this area, it is necessary to state the reasons for the meaning of the region from the Bulgarian perspective. Firstly, considering the geographical location of Bulgaria, the Balkans' identity is more prominent than the Black Sea and European ones. Secondly, in the pre-Ottoman period, the Bulgarians established two great kingdoms in the region and from the historical perspective they are an inseparable part of the region. Thirdly, the Balkans is a field of political, economic, military and cultural rivalry between global and regional actors. Fourthly, Bulgaria's cognate and related community found in the Balkans forms its demographic ties in the region (Özlem, 2018: 231-232). For these reasons, the Balkans are a vital area of interest for Bulgaria.

In the light of the above-mentioned parameters, while the geographical and historical situation provides a static ground for Bulgaria, the fact that being a multidimensional competition area of the region plays a dynamic role in shaping of the current equation. In this framework, apart from the implementation of traditional diplomacy, demographic ties for the Sofia create a favorable space for Public Diplomacy. There is a dual classification of "Bulgarian Citizens" and "Historical Bulgarian communities of Bulgarian origin" in Bulgaria's "National Strategy Document for

Bulgarian National Historical Communities Abroad and Bulgarian Citizens Abroad" dated 23.07.2014 adopted by the Bulgarian Council of Ministers. It is seen that all of the historical Bulgarian communities in the second class are located in the Balkans except Russia, Moldova and Ukraine (www.strategy.bg). In other words, in the regional equation, Bulgaria is more likely to achieve effective results in the short term by benefiting from cognates and related communities with Public Diplomacy.

When looking at the population of cognates and related communities of the target group of Bulgarian Public Diplomacy on a Balkan scale, at the varying population rates there is a demographic link in all neighboring countries. In terms of numerical distribution, according to official data in the 2011 census, 18,543 people in Serbia and 7,336 people in Romania identified themselves as Bulgarians. In 2002, while 1,417 people were recorded as Bulgarian in North Macedonia, only around 450 ethnic Bulgarians were living in Turkey. However, according to the Bulgarian public opinion, around 50,000 Bulgarians live in Albania as well (*Mediapool*, 14.10.2017) in spite of their being just a few thousands in fact. In addition to this, due to cultural and linguistic ties, there are Macedonians and Torbeshes in North Macedonia and the Goranis in Kosovo.

In terms of Bulgarian Public Diplomacy institutions, the activities of the State Agency for Foreign Bulgarians (ДАБЧ-АВА), the Institute for Culture of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and BNR Radio Bulgaria, as well as the Bulgarian Ministry of Science and Education (MSE), come into prominence. The Association of Bulgarian Schools Abroad (АБУЧ-ABSA) can also be mentioned as a non-state actor. The State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad, which is primarily concerned with the issue, was established in 1992 as a unit operating under the Council of

Ministers. As a coordination unit for the implementation of the state policy towards the Bulgarians in the world, ABA has strategic duties such as to protect the Bulgarian ethno-cultural area abroad, to ensure Bulgarian unity and to establish the Bulgarian lobby abroad (www.aba.government.bg/). ABA operates in a broad geographical area, and has the authority to issue the Bulgarian descent certificate, which is the basis for citizenship applications.

On the other hand, the Institute for Culture (*Darzhaven Vestnik*, 19.06.2012) established in 2012 within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serves to support the fulfillment of the priorities of Bulgarian foreign policy through the usage of cultural diplomacy and to become an integrated part of international cultural relations. The Institute aims to create a positive image of Bulgaria and to carry out activities in order to expand the country's cultural presence abroad (http://www.culture-mfa.bg/). In other words, the Institute for Culture is an important instrument of Bulgarian Public Diplomacy. The Bulgarian National Radio (BNR), contributes to the Bulgarian Public Diplomacy as an international media body, and broadcasts in nine foreign languages except Bulgarian. The radio, established in 1935, in the languages it broadcasts mostly transmits news about Bulgaria (www.bnr.bg/radiobulgaria). Apart from this, even though there are news in English in the Bulgarian news portals, it is not possible to evaluate them under the scope of Public Diplomacy. Language courses given to a limited number of foreign students by the Bulgarian Government and the abroad activities of the Bulgarian Ministry of Science and Education are noteworthy. In the meantime, ABSA is another institution in the field of education. ABSA, established in 2007, is committed to expanding the Bulgarian language and culture abroad and assisting the educational activities of Bulgarian schools abroad

(www.abgschool.org). ABSA, defining its identity as a non-governmental, independent and voluntary association, is an integral component of Public Diplomacy with its activities.

Among the 5 classes categorized above in terms of the functionality of Public Diplomacy, it is observed that Bulgaria has significant potential in the Balkans. This potential is manifested in the context of cognate and related communities, while it is far from being directed to the majority population group of other neighboring countries. The fact that the institutions of Bulgarian Public Diplomacy are also focused on the Bulgarian population abroad strengthens this aspect. As a matter of fact, the Sofia administration is sensitive to the issues of its citizens in the region, but conveys their demands to the addressing states. For instance, Bulgaria (Özlem, 2018: 246; https://www.isac-fund.org) which transmits to the Belgrade administration the right of education in the mother tongue of the Bulgarian minority in Serbia, communicates with the cognates and related communities through its diplomats. This also means that Bulgaria does not remain reckless towards its cognates. This situation is not unique for just GERB governments, it is qualified as Bulgaria's state policy. Therefore, although the first and second stages of Public Diplomacy, *listening* and *advocacy*, are fulfilled, it can be said that this situation carries the traces of classical diplomacy.

When the educational activities are examined as *exchange diplomacy*, it is seen that two aspects come to the fore in the studies. The first one is the scholarships granted by the Bulgarian government, and the second is the Bulgarian Ministry of Science and Education's activities to teach Bulgarian for Bulgarians living abroad. In addition, Bulgarian language scholarships granted by the Bulgarian government can be stated with in this context (See at:

www.slav.uni-sofia.bg/index.php/summer-seminar). In more details, there is a scholarship program for Bulgarian cognates from North Macedonia, Serbia, Romania, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine, which has been systematically provided by the Bulgarian government since 1993 via ABA. While the scholarship process was carried out in coordination with the MSE, its scope was expanded over time. The program, which was implemented with 400 students, reached up to 2.000 students during the GERB governments and the scholarship grants was increased over the years (*Dnevnik*, 25.03.2015). For example, the monthly scholarship grant was increased from 105 Leva in 2015 to 240 Leva since 2019 (*Offnews*, 28.12.2018). Within the scope of the scholarship program, students from North Macedonia are given a quota of up to 150 people, while young people belonging to historical Bulgarian minorities abroad are expected to remain connected to their homeland.

On the other hand, draws attention the Sunday School (*Nedelni Uchilishta*) programs for the Bulgarian population living abroad, an initiative of the Ministry of Science and Education of Bulgaria launched in 2013 with a Decision of the Council of Ministers, and financed by the Bulgarian government (See at: https://www.mon.bg/bg/174). The geographic area of this practice, which coincided with the period of GERB party being in power, was the US, RF, China, Spain, Germany, UK, France, Morocco, etc. and Greece was the only country from the Balkans to be included in the program (https://www.mon.bg/upload/21039/zap2709_2110 20 19_nedelni-uchilishta.pdf). The same situation is observed in ABSA activities as a non-governmental organization. The ABSA, which is complementary to the work of the MSE, includes only Greece from the Balkans. As it can be seen, both the scholarship program and the Sunday Schools, constitute the educational dimension of Bulgaria's Public Diplomacy in the Balkans. Finally, even though the number is symbolic, the summer language courses scholarships granted by the Bulgarian Government and the usage of the EU's Erasmus program may also be included in the exchange/educational diplomacy.

Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) and Bulgarian News Agency (BTA) stand out in terms of international news broadcasting. Among all these, except for the Bulgarian BTA, while broadcasting only in English generally it reports the developments in Bulgaria. Therefore, apart from being an official state news agency, it does not assume any function that can be considered within the scope of Public Diplomacy. Against this background, considering the BNR's publications, other than Bulgarian, Bulgaria-based news are transmitted in 9 languages. The concerned languages include Turkish, Serbian, Albanian and Greek constitute the Balkan dimension. While only Romanian is lacking from the languages of the region, it is understood that the traditional argument of Bulgaria is that Macedonian language is not different from Bulgarian. BNR's reporting the news only about Bulgaria is a deficiency in terms of international news broadcasting. However, broadcasting by using the languages of the countries of the region is an indication of a limited effect. Otherwise, there is no international broadcasting organization in Bulgaria such as Russia Today, Al Jazeera, Deutsche Welle, BBC and etc., that broadcasts the news of the country in question in the language of the country in the form of TV or internet journalism.

Finally, when examining the functionality of Bulgaria's Public Diplomacy in the context of cultural diplomacy, it is faced with a broad spectrum. First of all, it is important to note that there are no international brands that are identified with Bulgaria such as are Coca-Cola, Sony, Mercedes, Ikea, Panda, Nestle and

so on, which can be evaluated in the context of Public Diplomacy. Instead of this, the subjects that may be identified under Bulgarian brand or cultural diplomacy are mostly handcrafted traditional products, folklore dance and traditional national clothes (Kaneva, 2011:1). Besides, Bulgaria does not have any series or films that may be used as soft power elements.

The Insitute for Culture, an affiliate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is an important institution in Bulgaria's Public Diplomacy, carries out international scientific and cultural activities, but its geographical focus is on the Western world rather than on the Balkans. Activities include cinemas, photo exhibitions, commemoration meetings and other cultural issues. The same situation is manifested in terms of the external relations of the Ministry of Culture. In the context of its abroad activities, the Insitute for Culture, operating under the Ministry, are active in 10 European capitals (http://mc.government.bg/) Among these capitals, the only one located in the Balkans is Skopje. This shows that North Macedonia has a more privileged place in the cultural diplomacy of Bulgaria compared to other Balkan countries. Even though cultural diplomacy was tried to be developed with these institutions during the GERB governments, it can be argued that due to the wide geography targeted, the influence power in the Balkans was kept to a minimum.

On the other hand, it is observed that the Bulgarian passport is the most effective instrument in the Balkans among the Bulgarian cultural diplomacy. The Bulgarian passport gained strength and prestige after the country's EU membership in 2007, and has been particularly attractive among Bulgarian and related communities in the Western Balkans. In addition to the blockage of the Western Balkan countries' EU membership, and the economic problems in these

countries, increased the demand for Bulgarian passports. Such that, as a result of these economic problems in the mentioned countries, the Balkan nations want to go to the EU countries without a visa and to settle there, having a Bulgarian passport. Therefore, in addition to the symbolic historical Bulgarian minorities living in North Macedonia, Serbia and Albania, the proportion of having a Bulgarian passport between Torbesh and Gorani people, which Bulgarians consider to be a cognate of Bulgarians but having little in common except linguistic similarity, has increased (*www.haberler.com*, 22.03.2012). Tens of thousands of Macedonians appear to become Bulgarian citizens by identifying themselves as Bulgarians (*DW Bulgariya*, 06.12.2012; *Mediapool*, 14.12.2017) this situation arose from time to time among Muslim Albanians as well (*France24*, 09.07.2017).

The issue of how the Balkan people get their Bulgarian passport is based on the Bulgarian Citizenship Law. According to the article 15/1 of the Citizenship Law of Bulgaria (www.lex.bg), individuals who receive the "Bulgarian descent" certificate may become citizens of Bulgaria in a privileged way. The "Bulgarian descent" certificate is given by ABA. Within this scope, ABA, which gives Bulgarian descent certificates to hundreds of thousands of people, also fulfills Bulgarian state policy. Yet, in the 1990's, the policy of issuing Bulgarian passports to Macedonians began to spread throughout the Western Balkans along with the GERB government. Considering Bulgaria's passport policy objectives, it appears that a number of reasons are effective. The first one, Bulgaria wants to gain a demographic power in the Balkans and spread Bulgarian culture in the region. The second is to seek a solution to the Bulgarian demographic crisis, albeit in the short term. The third is to ensure that the people to whom they gave citizenship acquire national

minority status (as seen in the example of Albania in 2017) in their country of residence. The fourth, its aim is to establish a close dialogue with these national minorities and to use it as a political instrument against these states. It should be emphasized that the stated aims mostly focus on the historical geography of the Greater Bulgaria Idea. The increasing political influence of Bulgaria in the Balkans, especially during the GERB governments, has led to the conviction that among the peoples of the region, the Greater Bulgaria is intended to be established.

However, a bribery scandal occurred in 2018 regarding the issuance of Bulgarian descendency documents by ABA. While it was seen that the members of the ABA were providing income in return for the issuance of these documents, and this development caused great damage to the image of the institution. As a result of the reactions of the Bulgarian diaspora and the public opinion even the closure of ABA came to Borisov's agenda (*DW Bulgariya*, 22.01.2019) but the decision could not be taken due to the opposition of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) and the Patriotic Union. Essentially, ABA is Bulgaria's main expertise institute in dealing with Bulgarians in foreign countries. Although this scandal overshadows other activities of the institution, it is understood that it will not be easy to close it because of other missions performed by ABA. In fact, ABA acts as a bridge between Bulgaria and the associations, schools, churches and other cultural institutions in the abroad countries where the Bulgarians are living. In this sense, ABA is in direct contact with more than 1000 associations outside Bulgaria and more than 300 Bulgarian schools located outside Bulgaria (*BNR*, 19.05.2018) and cooperates with a total of 105 associations, church foundations and schools from the Balkans (www.aba.government.bg). On the other hand, the fact

that the ABA budget consisted of only 900.000 Leva since 2018, reflects the contrast between the breadth and functionality of the field. It can be argued that this situation triggered the bribery scandal process. To sum up, apart from the student scholarships program coordinated by the MSE and ABA, the most active field is the issuance of the Bulgarian descent certificate for the achievement of the above-mentioned objectives. Yet, it can be stated that this activity has the highest impact coefficient.

Conclusion

According to the findings of the study, it is seen that Public Diplomacy is not only an area of activity specific to large-scale states but it has beacome also of interest for medium and small-scale states. In the post-Zhivkov period, Bulgaria started to form instruments of Public Diplomacy and established ABA as a specialist organization in addition to the activities carried out under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture, and the MSE.

The qualitative and quantitative power elements owned by Bulgaria, it has been an obstacle to carry out Public Diplomacy on a global scale. While developing policies aimed at Bulgarian citizens and historical Bulgarian minorities living abroad, the Balkans was the main focus into becoming a regional political force. For this reason, Bulgaria has adopted a pro-active policy during the GERB governments, focusing on Public Diplomacy alongside the traditional diplomacy in the implementation of the Balkans policy. The target population for the pursuit of this policy is the symbolic number of Bulgarian minorities and communities with linguistic affinity with the Bulgarians in the Balkans.

It is seen that during the period of GERB, Bulgaria benefited from all stages of the 5 groups which were mentioned from a functional point of view in the

implementation of Public Diplomacy in the Balkans. Bulgaria, by taking advantage of the classical diplomacy in *listening* and *advocacy*, Student Scholarship Program, Sunday Schools, the activities of Institute for Culture and Radio Bulgaria's (BNR) broadcasts in regional languages focused on Bulgaria, were the other points of application. It can be stated that the impact coefficient of the student scholarship program and the Sunday Schools is more evident than the others. However, even though Bulgaria does not have a global brand in terms of *cultural diplomacy* and carries out this process with more traditional issues, the country's prestigious passport after EU membership has become the most effective cultural

instrument in the Balkans. By increasing its demographic power in the Balkans through this method, Bulgaria provides a political advantage to the countries of the region by providing legal status to its citizens. Finally, it is seen that North Macedonia has a privileged place in Bulgaria's Public Diplomacy in the Balkans. The Scholarship Programs, Sunday Schools, Institute for Culture and passport procedures show that North Macedonia is the main focus of Bulgarian Public Diplomacy in the region, and is prominent in comparison to other Balkan countries. Summarizing, it can be stated that Bulgaria tried to make the best of Public Diplomacy in its policy towards the Balkans during the GERB governments.

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