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Editorial

Raising the Anchor: Turkish Journal of Diaspora Studies

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Definitions Matter

As part of a book project on Diaspora Representation Systems (2018), I visited diaspora deputies and senators in the French Parliament. In our conversations, representatives' opinions on the diaspora showed mixed feelings toward Turkish people in Europe, particularly in France. Their definition of diaspora did not fit well when I referred to Turkish people in Europe as a diasporic community. Representatives often called them immigrants, not a diaspora. Part of the reason there was a crisis of definition was because diaspora, for the representatives, meant something more political and historical than immigrants. The latter often referred to temporariness more than permanency, even though Turkish people have been settled in Europe for over a century.

Parallel to this, I also interviewed Turkish parliamentarians, whose background had emigrant roots and that had dedicated their service to be the voice of Turkish people who live abroad. Some of those representatives were also uneasy with defining Turkish people living abroad as a diaspora because of the deep connotation of the concept directed at Jewish people and Armenians (Anaz, 2018). So for them, Turks should be conceptualized differently than those of commonly known (politicized) diasporic groups. As the reader will find in this issue and the forthcoming issues, there is actually more than one way to define diaspora. The underlining point here becomes then that definitions matter. From a French perspective, the status of diaspora differed from what migrants meant for the French policy makers, while Turkish representatives remained uncomfortable with the usage of the term diaspora, which could ultimately lead to the politicization of Turkish people in Europe.

Thus, the Turkish Journal of Diaspora Studies (TJDS), as a new and dynamic meeting place for diaspora and migration studies, aims to bring theoretical and practical streams together to form a platform wherein every aspect of diaspora can be discussed and examined. Today's challenges for diasporic communities are not only conceptual and ideological, but also mundane and visceral. These challenges include day-to-day encounters of diaspora and events that are as recent as global epidemics, in the case of Covid-19, and the centuries-long geopolitical fractures, as in the case of two great wars and regional conflicts during and after the Cold War.

In other words, diaspora today face various versions of political, geographical, cultural, and economic challenges. Without marginalizing any conceptualization, alternative ways of looking at diasporic communities can find place in this journal. This, we believe, is a much needed initiative.

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Debating Diaspora Beyond National Borders

As a part of the modern nation-state system, millions of people's territorial bonding has changed, as many moved from one place to another for different economic, social, political, or environmental reasons. This reality made states either a receiving or sending country, as well as both. People, who migrated from one country to another, are acknowledged as the main subject in both countries. Today, it is beyond question that all states are either a host to at least one diasporic group or a sender of one. In other words, beyond formal territorial boundaries, there are groups of transnational communities that exist and their socio-cultural, political, economic, and educational rights have become a subject of national diaspora politics and gradually increasing internationally debated policies. In this context, TJDS wishes to establish a venue through which scholars investigate states' consideration of debating diaspora internationally, beyond assimilation and nationalization policies. Whether one accepts it or not, in all states diasporic communities exist and they exist in and beyond the nation-system of the modern time. Thus again, this journal wants to further the extraterritoriality of nationhood discussions in a scholarly fashion.

Why Launch?

TJDS, in its full capacity, aims to bring these scholarly inquiries together and form a platform to discuss topics that involve diaspora and migration issues from different angles and from around the world by attracting not only scholars of the discipline, but also government experts and practitioners. By doing this, TJDS aims to connect theory with practice, national with transnational, borders with mainland, and perceptions with realities. Naturally the journal's quest is interdisciplinary, political, geographical, cultural, and historical. As Robin Cohen highlights (in this issue), diaspora existed before the state, so such inquiry into the subject needs to go beyond our modern time and place.

Related to the earlier aim, TJDS also seeks to put more emphasis on non-western diaspora approaches and conceptualizations, especially when addressing the diaspora issues of our time. We strongly believe that such advocacy is needed and fructiferous considering the relatively one-way movement of migration and the contentious nature of diaspora issues in the West. Thus, differently situated lenses may bring balanced perspectives to the topic. Of course, this is not to say that studies wrought in the West should be discarded. Contrary to this, we strongly believe that a deepened search for answers is a necessity, in order to put the world of the diaspora in a much better place and to make diasporic policies much more humanist.

Diaspora Studies in Turkey

Diaspora studies have gained noticeable interest at the international level since it was recognized as a separate topic from immigration in the last quarter of the 20th century. However, it has not gained a sufficient level of inquiry in the Turkish academic community. Unfortunately, the field of diaspora is still understood as a sub-area within the migration discipline and confined to evaluation in the context of the elements and approaches of this discipline. This may be derived from the general negative connotations in people's minds on the concept of "diaspora," which is often understood in the narrowest sense.

While diaspora studies were previously evaluated in the fields of anthropology and sociology, they have gradually gained an interdisciplinary dimension, where different disciplines, such as international relations, politics, economics, development, and security work together. Similar to the international trend, diaspora studies in Turkey were slow to establish a main current on its own in Turkish universities and other related institutions. It is a recent effort that diaspora studies have found a place in privately run think-tanks and university institutions in Turkey, but not yet at a satisfactory level. However, in international literature, diaspora studies have relatively established a respected position especially, through the works of prominent theoreticians some of whom include: (Tölölyan, 1991), (Cohen, 1997), (Vertovec, 1999), (Safran, 1991), (Sheffer, 2003), (Baumann, 2000), and (Guveli, 2015).

Parallel with the recent increase in the number of state institutions working for the Turkish diaspora, there is an upward trend in research centers in universities and foundations that focus on contributing to the diaspora. Burgeoning literature in diaspora studies in Turkey has been supported with the studies of academicians such as: (Kaya, 2014) (Akcapar & Aksel, 2017) (Durmaz, 2017) (Ulusoy, 2017), and (Zirh, 2008).

The existing trend in the field of diaspora studies in international literature can easily be observed in Turkish literature in which different diasporas are examined under the lens of history, politics, international relations, psychology, education, security, economics, and other important disciplines. In Turkish diaspora literature, there is an intense academic interest in topics such as identity and belonging, the role of the diaspora in international relations, Turkey's diaspora politics, security, and development.

Although diaspora studies are a relatively new area of study in Turkey, there has been a significant increase in the number of master's and doctoral theses, as well as other academic studies, such as articles and reports. For instance, up until 2009, only 4 doctoral dissertations were written on the field of diaspora; 17 more doctoral dissertations were added to this number in the last 10 years.[1] The total number of master theses was 49 in 2021 and it is impressive that 24 of them have been conducted in the last 2 years. The content of these studies reflects a significant variety. In theses and other academic studies, not only the Turkish diaspora but also other important diasporas such as Jewish, Circassian, Tatar, Azerbaijan, and Palestine have been studied with their different aspects and points of importance.

Today, within the framework of the theoretical approaches of the aforementioned academicians and the practical studies of national and international organizations, diaspora -in its broadest sense and most dynamic nature- can be defined as immigrant communities that exist beyond their homeland and whose economic, social, and political ties extend beyond state borders. We also acknowledge that, with the effects of globalization and the ease of communication and transportation, migration movements continue to occur and the existence of diasporas has become more evident. Thus, this situation innately necessitates the consideration of all aspects of the diaspora issue, especially the concept itself.

Finally, the Turkish Journal of Diaspora Studies, by launching a specialized journal on the

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[1] Council of Higher Education, National Thesis Centre, accessed on 16.02.2021 retrieved from the site https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezSorguSonucYeni.jsp

topic, will give new momentum to diaspora studies and create an academic form through which it will bring theory and practice together to discuss diasporic and migration issues. In this sense, TJDS also aspires to be a venue that produces high-standard publications and a pool for the latest developments in the field. It is our hope that this unique, topic-related journal in Turkey will be an important podium for all stakeholders in the field.

Concluding Remarks

In this inaugural issue, we have included great articles that incorporate different aspects of diaspora topics. Mehmet Özkan discusses an unconceptualized population in Turkey, Afro-Turks and their possible contribution to Turkey's foreign policies in Africa. Istvan Egresi and Voicu Bodocan examine diaspora direct investments and the motivations behind such movement of capital to the homeland in the case of the Romanian diaspora. Burcu Degirmen-Dysart writes about the evolution of the politics of the Russian diaspora and how compatriots have become an indispensable part of the Russian world since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hayati Ünlü, in his paper, examines the Gulf diaspora in India through a social movement perspective and how the Indian diaspora has been remade during the Modi administration. Mehmet Köse, on the other hand, attempts to redraw the borders of the Turkish diaspora from its formation, historical continuum, and migrant labors' perspectives.

To give this inaugural issue more eminence, we have included interviews with scholars who are well established in the field. The interviews were conducted to answer four main questions that aimed to address the conceptual borders of the diaspora, states' diaspora policies, the impacts of globalization on the diaspora, and new study areas in diaspora studies. Interviewees gave their opinion on the questions however they wished to address. Responses followed no specific format and referee procedures were not applied. Thus, some of the responses include references at the end and some do not, some are short and others are longer. However, they are evenly rich and valuable in their own right.

TJDS also gives special importance and consideration to book reviews. For the readers of TJDS, internationally recognized and in-depth analytical books are given priority. When possible, books written in languages other than English and Turkish will be examined and reviewed. The journal pays particular attention to their existence and genuine contribution to the literature on diaspora. For this reason, TJDS seeks contributors who wish to enhance this aspect from all around the world. In this inaugural issue, we publish four book reviews from the leading scholars in this field, highlighting their immense influence on diaspora studies.

Seizing this opportunity and on behalf of TJDS, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude and appreciation for all of the responses and the effort given by the interviewees. I hope that this inaugural issue of TJDS will fulfill what is expected from an academic journal and become fruitful in contributing to the field in a most valuable way in its long journey. A greater effort is our part; discretion and contribution remain on international students of diaspora studies.

Acknowledgement

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Emergence of Afro-Turks in Turkish Politics

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Emergence of Afro-Turks in Turkish Politics

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Abstract

Since the mid-2000s, Turkey's almost forgotten and invisible Africa-rooted Turkish citizens, the Afro-Turks, have come to the surface. Because of their small number, they have never been conspicuous before. However, since 2003, with Turkey's opening to Africa policy, they have become much more discernable in the Turkish public sphere with festivals and activities. Ankara has also officially supported their activities financially and technically. This article argues that there is a strong link between their emergence as an ethnic minority in Turkey and Ankara's assertive Africa policy to deepen relations with the continent. The case of Afro-Turks indicates that when foreign policy inclination is matched with domestic policy, even a tiny minority can become more discernable and visible in the political arena.

Keywords

Turkey, Africa, Afro-Turks, Foreign Policy, African Diaspora

Introduction

The curious case of Afro-Turks as a newly visible ethnic identity in Turkey represents an interesting way of emerging identity in a country where ethnicity has always been subject to a contentious debate. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, everything related to ethnic identity, other than *Turkishness*, has been ignored and not recognized by the state (Cagaptay, 2006; Karpat, 1959). This was simply part of the overall nation-building process in Turkey. However, the end of the cold war and subsequent developments in Turkish politics opened a discussion on the nature/founding elements of the Turkish state and its different identity claims, which were to be incorporated into the state. Since 2002, the Turkish state has followed a different path toward ethnic identities, although due to the realities of PKK terrorism Turkish society is still very sensitive.

This study is an investigation on how Turkey's foreign policy inclination can contribute to easy recognition of domestic ethnic identity, such as the Afro-Turks. It is argued that there is a direct link between the rise of Afro-Turks as a new ethnic identity in Turkey and Ankara's assertive foreign policy toward Africa since 1998, along with Turkey's own domestic democratic transformation.[1] This article is neither an anthropological nor a sociological one, however it aims to contribute to a better contextualization of Afro-Turks both in Turkish society and Turkish foreign policy. Afro-Turks are people of African ancestry who arrived today's Turkey in late 19th

[1] Cankurtaran asks rightly the question why not to include Afro-Turks in Turkish foreign policy discourse. This article should even be seen as a response to her request. Cankurtaran (2018).

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and early 20th century and now fully incorporated into Turkish culture by way of living, however they are discernable only by their color. They have become more visible at many levels in Turkey since 2005 and received considerable support from society and the government. Considering Turkey's political history, if Afro-Turks tried to claim their identity in a different time period, for example in 1980s or even 1990s, such a move would have probably created a backlash rather than support from both the state and overall society.[2]

Foreign–Domestic Policy Alignment: Context for the Rise of Afro-Turks

Theoretically, how a small ethnic minority becomes visible, peacefully in a society is not a well-studied subject. Although, there are many studies on how immigrants integrate into society with all the difficulties involved (Kilbride, 2014; Alba & Foner, 2015), an already small ethnic minority becoming visible has not been the topic of many studies. Big ethnic groups, in terms of population, are usually more visible in all societies; and if their rights are denied, they may resort to seeking their political demands by other means, either through a political party or violence. The visibility of Afro-Turks is an interesting case because they are not only small in numbers but also integrated into all cultural elements of Turkish society. They do not have a political demand per se; rather their interest has been mostly cultural revival, culture protection, and cultural recognition at best.

In the literature, it is argued that small ethnic groups may be more visible and easily accepted by overall society only if their struggle or collective projects were undertaken as a means of potentially enriching national narratives of belonging. As Derderian (2004, p.19) argues, "rather than threatening to undermine the unity of nation, efforts to make ethnic minority experiences visible can help to reinforce the ties between the nation and its newest members." Given the fact that ethnic minorities' experience of going public is by no means a smooth and unobstructed process, conceptually, this article argues that the visibility of a small ethnic minority may be easier if the state has a special foreign policy inclination toward an area where the majority of that ethnic group originated from. With Turkey's opening to Africa policy since the 2000s, the invisible ethnic group of Afro-Turks began to take their experiences and aspirations beyond the confines of their community by focusing on cultural elements. Their demand for cultural revival has been well received by the Turkish state as both it has fostered national unity rather than creating a danger and coincided with an assertive African opening. What seems novel in the rise of Afro-Turks is this specific time period that they asked for a recognition and revival in Turkish society.

As many argue, both Turkish foreign policy and Turkey's domestic politics underwent a huge change in the 2000s. These changes do not always happen concurrently. Whenever there is convergence between domestic and foreign policy, the result is likely to happen very

[2] Of course, the fact that the Afro-Turks never claimed an open identity in 1980s or in 1990s, we never know how the state would have reacted. However, considering the political stubbornness to accept differences at state level in those years, one should easily assume that the state was likely to crash them, if such a claim would have existed before. For a relatively similar experience was the experience of the "becoming visible" of North Africans in France. Despite their struggle since 1940s, until 1980s they have faced huge difficulties. See Derderian (2004).

successfully. Turkey's Africa policy has been one of the rare areas where the all actors converged for only one aim: to foster relations with Africa. The Turkish state took the lead in the process, civil society organizations paved the way, and state agencies like Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), Turkish Maarif Foundation (Akgun & Özkan, 2020) and Red Crescent (Kizilay), and Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) have deepened the relations (Özkan, 2014). Turkish business associations have made Turkey-Africa relations sustainable as they created a situation whereby both sides are destined to gain.

As Turkey deepens relations with the continent, all of a sudden, a new community in Turkey, Afro-Turks, captured the attention of the overall public and both national and international media. Afro-Turks' relatively easy acceptance by all segments of society and state apparatus was not a mere coincidence. It was a perfect timing, because both the foreign policy inclination of Turkey with domestic policy orientation was helpful for the visibility of Afro-Turks.

There were basically three factors that contributed to facilitating rapid ascendance of Afro-Turks to public debate without any negative connotation: Turkey's opening to Africa, democratic opening within Turkey, and the increasing number of African immigrants in cities, like Istanbul, as a result of Turkey becoming a destination country for immigrants.

New Turkish foreign policy toward Africa is the first facilitating reason for the emergence of Afro-Turks. In the Turkish political agenda, Africa did not feature much until the 2000s. Initially Turkey prepared an African Opening Plan in 1998, however, it was not possible to implement that plan due to political instability in Turkey's domestic politics and the economic crisis of 2000-2001. When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power in 2002, a new Turkish government pushed for an assertive Africa policy. Turkey announced the year 2005 as "the year of Africa", and hosted the first ever Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit from August 18-21, 2008, in Istanbul with the participation of representatives from fifty African countries (Özkan & Akgun, 2010). In recent years, the Turkish government's interest in the African continent has expanded into the domains of security, humanitarian assistance, and economic relations. The nation's active involvement in Somalia, in particular, has received attention from across the continent and has contributed to the consolidation of Turkey's position in Africa. Thus far, closer economic cooperation, coupled with relatively large amounts of development aid and humanitarian assistance, has formed the basis of this new approach. Ankara opened 29 new embassies on the continent, which makes a total of 42 embassies and trade has increased fourth-fold since 2002 (Siradag, 2013; Tepeciklioglu, 2012; Özkan, 2016, 2012, 2013). As a result of new foreign policy discourse toward Africa in Turkish politics, perhaps for the first time seriously since the establishment of the Republic, Afro-Turks easily became visible and got acceptance from overall Turkish society (Miftah, 2017).

Turkey's domestic transformation and deepening democracy in the 2000s should be seen as the second element to explain the visibility of Afro-Turks. The most prominent discussion of "New Turkey" among the newly rising elite in Turkey is that they refer a type of new national identity for Turkey and a new type of national belonging. Although the search for identity in Turkey dates back to the late period of the Ottoman Empire, it was Ataturk who in the 1920s drew a national map to define the essentials of the modern Turkey today. From time to time, Ataturk's

legacy has been challenged by Islamists, nationalists, and even in some circles of secularists. In the 1970s, Turkey experienced a political rift between political and ideological factions that undermined national compromise and integration. In the early 1980s, then President Ozal started the liberalization process in the economy and began integrating Turkey into the global market. Ozal's policies have changed the sociological dynamics of Turkey as the newly emerging business elite from Anatolia started to emerge. Dubbed Anatolian Tigers, this new emerging/rising middle-to-upper class has established the socio-economic foundation of today's AK Party. Under Erdogan's leadership, Turkey has transformed at many levels. In the early 2000s, the European Union process played a catalyst role in transforming Turkey domestically, the economy flourished, and a new foreign policy was put in place to expand Turkish influence both in the region and on other continents.

In the 2000s, Turkey had a different approach to solve the decades long Kurdish issue (Anaz & Özkan, 2021), and started to talk about Alleviate people's problems within the country. Turkey as a state transformed, so did the people's approach to different issues. It was in this period that Afro-Turks came to the public spotlight and received attention from both the public and the media. Many saw the phenomena of Afro-Turks as adding richness to Turkey and needed to be protected, rather than a negative development. In the past, any identity claim based on ethnicity reminded many Turks of the Kurdish issue with a negative connotation. In the course of time, nobody saw the emergence of Afro-Turks as a danger to Turkish identity or unity.[3] This greatly facilitated their slow landing into the Turkish public spotlight. Although one should emphasize here that Afro-Turks have never been seen openly as a danger for two reasons. First, they have never claimed an exclusivist identity like Kurds in the past; second, their small number in Turkey has not prompted such a danger in politics nor in society at large. When Afro-Turks demanded cultural recognition, they did so without politicizing their demand by focusing on only cultural aspects and without threatening the unity of the nation.

Turkish society is not a racist country *per se*, however the fact that there had been few Africans in Turkey as students or immigrants, Turks have always been curious about interacting and knowing these "black people". As one African academic living in Turkey observed, this was mostly emanated from an intention to know an unknown in Turkey, rather than fear or discrimination.[4] One should note, that rising number of African immigrants in Turkey has made recognition and acceptance of Afro-Turks easy in the overall public.

In terms of immigration, Turkey has been mainly perceived as an emigration country, but recently Turkey has been frequently described as transit country (Fait, 2013, p.25) for many people from Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Especially since the conflict in Syria began, Turkey has become a destination country for immigrants. As of 2020, Turkey hosts close to 3.7 million refugees from Syria, and almost all opposition leaders in Egypt, Iraq, and other conflicting

[3] This can be drawn with the support of Turkey openly to these communities. In the past, such an open support would not have been imaginable.

[4] Kieran E. Uchehara, an African (Nigerian) academic working for years in Turkey, says, "I would attribute the negative behavior of Turkish society to black Africans in Turkey as lack of awareness. One of the phrases I have heard most often in Turkey "Hepimiz insaniz" meaning "we are all human" and I think that most people in Turkey actually follow that motto. Therefore, I do not think it is a racist behavior because there is no judgment attached to the starring at black Africans in Turkey. It is just curiosity and/or admiration". See Uchehara No Date).

countries in the Middle East have made Istanbul their home. While these Middle Eastern dimensions can be explained by the developments in the region, there has been an unnoticed development in Turkey: African immigrants. Less than ten years ago, it was rare to encounter an African immigrant seeking to establish a life in Turkey, but this has changed rapidly. There are Somalis in Konya, Kayseri, Ankara, and other small cities mostly brought by the state, and many Kenyans, Nigerians, Senegalese (De Clerck , 2013), and others from different African countries designated Turkey as their destination country. Some of them are in Turkey for trade, some for dreaming to be a successful soccer player (Budel, 2013), and some are dreaming to travel to Europe. Whatever their reasons are, it is a fact that they are now living in Turkey, making African immigrants more visible in public life. This contributes to the normalization of the lives of Africans in Turkey in public perception, while Turkey is pushing for better relations with African countries. It has been acknowledged that since the late 1980s – early 1990s, a growing number of people from diverse sub-Saharan African countries have arrived in Turkey (Brewer & Yukseker, 2006, p.6), but the total population of Africans never reached a significant level. Today it is estimated that there are around 33,000-35,000 African immigrants living in Istanbul, excluding temporary visitors (Saul, 2013, p.89). Although there is no direct link between the rise of Afro-Turks and African immigration in Turkey, the visibility of more African immigrants in Turkey has contributed indirectly to the "normalization" of seeing "black" people in the public sphere.

There are also more than two thousand African students in various cities in Turkey studying with Turkish Scholarships at all levels (Daily Sabah, 2017). Both the African immigrants and students have made a huge contribution in changing public perception in Turkey about Africa. Although, the impact and perception of Africans may differ depending on the city, context, and conditions, whether they are students or immigrants; their mere visibility in society has contributed to the overall perception of Africans in Turkey, which in turn, indirectly supported the demands of Afro-Turks.

As Fait (2013, p.26) argues, due to the increasing number of African immigrants, the link between foreign policies and decision-making in Turkey about migrants' policies has already merged in a way that is mutually supportive. Growing trade and humanitarian and political policies with Africa will, and has already included a renewed discussion on the conditions of asylum and residence for African migrants in Turkey (Baird, 2011), leading to the creation of a sustainable migration policy. This is definitely the result of Turkey's official free-visa policy with all possible countries, and a new direction in Turkish foreign policy towards Africa to become more open and keener to develop partnerships with the continent.

Africa has become so normalized in Turkey that since 2015, there is even an African Entertainment Award (AEA) in Turkey, organized mostly by Ugandan Africans. African embassies support this event and their initiatives aim to foster relations between Turkey and Africa, contribute to the betterment and 'normalization' of Africans in Turkey. The AEA mentions that their "mission for the African entertainment awards in Turkey is to promote our strong African heritage, culture, and presence in Turkey." In their understanding, they "honor, promote, and advertise our African individuals and African owned businesses in Turkey and Turkish businesses and Turkish individuals that also patronize and support Africans in Turkey" (http://aeaturkey.com 2020).

Since Turkey announced 2015 as the "Year of Africa", to further improve Africa in Turkish perception, the Turkish government began to organize events to celebrate the 25th of May as Africa Day on the occasion of the foundation of the African Union. The main aim is to organize conferences, activities in social and cultural fields with a view to raise awareness, and to develop relations with African countries. Each year this celebration has gained more than symbolic value. In 2016, under the auspices of First Lady Emine Erdoğan, the "Africa Handicraft Market" was inaugurated in three historical mansions designated as "African Houses" in Hamamönü, Ankara on May 25, 2016 (Aydogan, 2016). The purpose of this project is to market the handicrafts of African women in Turkey and return the income in order to contribute to their family budgets. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry website (2016), this is also in line with "the targets of 'Agenda 2063' of the African Union for strengthening women and youth in Africa, constitutes a good example of the support provided by Turkey to the socio-economic development efforts of the African peoples through the contributions and support of the Turkish Embassies in the continent."

Emergence of Afro-Turks in Turkey

Apart from overall developments at the political level, in recent years, there have been a few developments that have led to the visibility of Turks of African origin in Turkish society. In 2005, a marble worker from Ayvalık/Balıkesir, Turkey, Mustafa Olpak, whose maternal family originates from Kenya, published a book entitled "*Kenya-Crete-İstanbul: Human Biographies from the Slave Coast*", detailing his family history from enslavement in Africa to integrating into modern Turkey in the twentieth century. Its publication opened the door to a new discussion about the history of people of African descent in modern Turkey. In the beginning of November 2006, Mustafa Olpak founded the Africans Culture and Solidarity Society. In February 2007, a documentary on Ottoman Slavery was broadcast by TRT (Turkish State Radio and Television), utilizing his book as a source and inspiration. During the production process of this documentary Mustafa Olpak was one of the greatest supporters of the producer, Gül Muyan. In 2008, the History Foundation (Tarih Vakfi) in Istanbul and UNESCO cooperated and supported an oral history project with the aim of collecting information from Turkish citizens of African descent above the age of 70 living along the Aegean coast of Turkey. The results of the project have been published as "Voices from a Silent Past" (Kayacan, 2008). In the same vein, to contribute to the visibility of Afro-Turks, in 2010, Photographers Ahmet Polat and Erik Vroons (2010), published a photo book of Afro-Turks, documenting the pictures of Turks of African descent living in the region of Izmir. The book's pictures open the doors to the inner worlds of Afro-Turks to the wider public.

The history of Afro-Turks is related to slave history in the Ottoman Empire (Ferguson & Toledano, 2007). Most of them were the descendants of the African slaves during the Ottoman Empire period. Their roots in slavery are not too distant, considering that slave trade only ended in the beginning of 20th century in Turkey. After a decree issued in 1857 by Ottoman Sultan Abdulmecid, the slave trade was abolished, but the Ottoman Empire did not completely leave the freed slaves to face their destiny alone. Ottoman bureaucracy had a grand plan for them. According to Ottoman archives, the empire provided more than 1,500 Afro-Turk families each with a house, furniture, two oxen, and some money (Hatemi, 2014). The government saw

property ownership as the key to making Afro-Turks feel welcome in Turkish lands.

This is necessitated by the fact that the ancestors of African Turks who are still unknown and invisible to many in Turkish society were transported to today's Turkey during the Ottoman period as slaves. Thus, in order to be able to comprehend the efforts of the African Turks to attain visibility their past needs to be investigated. However, what is known is that Afro-Turks originated from many different countries, including Niger, Egypt, Kenya, and Sudan. In the Ottoman Empire, most of them lived in Western Anatolia, especially in Ayvalik in the Northern Aegean region; in Izmir, or in a village near popular tourist destination called Bodrum in western Turkey. Later on, some other Afro-Turks came from Crete following the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923. They settled on the Aegean coast, mainly around İzmir. Afro-Turks in Ayvalik say that their ancestors from Crete spoke Greek when they came to Turkey and learned Turkish later. However, as Durugonul (2013, p.1402; 2003, p.281) argues "there is a lack of information on the history of the communities of people of African descent" in Turkey and "in order to be able to obtain sociological, anthropological, and archaeological information on the history of African Turks research should be undertaken".

Afro-Turks have gained more recognition from Turkish society and government in the last two decades. They are the descendants of the black citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Afro-Turks have Turkish names; over time they adopted Turkish traditions, culture, and now practice Islam as their religion. Afro-Turks also insist that they belong to Anatolia as much as other peoples. They speak the local dialect, wear traditional Turkish clothes, and are usually well integrated into the local Turkish cultural life. In an interview, Olpak says that "We have been living in this region for at least 150 years and we don't have any other homeland" (Guzeldere, 2010).

Based on recent estimates, there are roughly 5,000 Afro-Turks inside Turkey (Elibol, 2015),[5] but nobody keeps tract of their actual number, therefore some media outlets claim that their number is around 800,000 (Yurtcu, 2005). In terms of the socio-economic situation of Afro-Turks, one can say that there are very few Afro-Turks who have been to university or who hold prestigious positions in politics, sports, culture, or private industry. That is why there are few role models for the younger generation.

Afro-Turks constitute part of the overall African Diaspora in Turkey today. In this context, studying the African Diaspora in Turkey is of particular importance in order to be able to clarify the place of Ottoman and Turkish Republican history within world history and its position within the system of global relations. Hereby, the place of the African Diaspora in Turkey within the African Diaspora in the world and its importance would be demonstrated. However, sources about the African Diaspora in Turkey are scarce. Sources on the lives of people of African origin after the abolition of slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey are very limited as well. Therefore, neither sources on the past, nor on the present of African Turks in the region of Antalya are available. Consequently, the only way to illuminate their situation in Turkey seems to be assembling pieces of information.

Despite the lack of extensive research and information about Afro-Turks, they have

[5] The late president of Africans Culture and Solidarity Society Mustafa Olpak argues that there are 2000 Afro-Turks living in Turkey, only few in Istanbul. See Binicewicz (2016).

contributed significantly to Turkish culture and arts, despite their small number. The famous Turkish singers Esmeray Diriker and Melis Sokmen are both descendants of Afro-Turks. Top model, Tugce Guder; singer, Ibrahim Sirin; Melis and Cenk Sokmen; and the ex-boss of the Turkish Football Federation, Hadi Turkmen are also few to mention among famous Afro-Turks in Turkey. While Turkish society knows these people, nobody focused on their ancestors, and many people even initially thought that they are not from Turkey. For example, when Turkish top model Tugce Guder appeared on TV, many people compared her to Naomi Campbell, very few though that she was Turkish. With her fluent Turkish, many people were surprised and learned that there are Afro-Turks living in the Aegean and Mediterranean regions of Turkey.

Although Afro-Turks have integrated into Turkish society as a whole over the years, their process was out of public sight. Naturally, with the passing of the older generation, they have started to lose the few connections they have to their past. Only a few of the elderly members of the community remember their past and there are very few written records of their traditions. New oral history projects are attempting to revitalize their almost forgotten traditions. For example, the Istanbul-based History Foundation ran a project titled, "*Voices from a Silent Past: An Oral History Study on the Past and Present of being an 'Afro-Turk'*" to re-write the history and experiences of Afro-Turks in Turkey (Salman, 2008). Among the many findings in this research, what stands out is that they have not been discriminated against because of their color or ethnicity (Kayacan, 2008, p.41) as some people claimed (Love, 2016; Zalewski, 2012); and most of the time they are called "Pele", or "Esmeray". The case of Esmeray Diriker is not only interesting but also very important, as she is remembered mainly for her 1977 hit, Gel Tezkere Gel (Discharge Letter to Come) even today, which talks about the homesickness felt by Turkish soldiers during their mandatory military service. Many segments of Turkish society loved Esmeray just for this song. While Esmeray was born in Istanbul in 1949, her ancestors are reportedly of Moroccan origin (Binicewicz, 2016).

In recent years, visibility of Afro-Turks has been expanded to the political arena. In the 2018 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey, the People's Democratic Party (HDP) officials presented Yalcin Yanik as one of their candidates in Izmir (Kamer, 2018). Yanik is an Afro-Turk with extensive experience in Afro-Turk civil society organizations and is a leatherworker in Izmir. Similarly, another Afro-Turk from Selcuk, Izmir, sought to be a candidate for MP from the IYI Party in Izmir but failed to enter the party list (*Vaziyet* 2018). However, the following year, he ran as a Democrat Party (*NTV*, 2019) mayoral candidate for Selcuk in the province of Izmir and finished the race in the third place.

Calf Festival as a Symbol of Visibility and Identity Builder

Since the mid-2000s, Olpak has worked with local political support to organize an African festival in Izmir and surrounding villages, modeled after the Calf Festival (Dana Bayramı), celebrated by the emancipated African community of Izmir in the late Ottoman period. In the past, it was considered a festival that was against Islam, therefore was subjected to attempted bans by Ottoman authorities in the 1890s, before being forced underground and stopped in the early twentieth century. The Calf Festival is now the symbol and the centerpiece of the rise of Afro-Turks.

The Afro-Turk traditional feast has been celebrated again since 2007 in Izmir. This feast called the "Calf Feast" was celebrated from 1880's until the end of the 1920's according to different sources. The leaders of the Afro-Turkish community would collect money to buy a calf and the calf would be sacrificed the first Saturday of May otherwise disasters would occur. The feast was celebrated for three weeks in past times but today is celebrated during one weekend in May with support of the above-mentioned association in order to revitalize one of the oldest Afro-Turk traditions. Each year this popular festival has attracted both international and national media attention. As the Festival became a huge success, Olpak became the informal leader of the emerging Afro-Turk community, raising their profile and publicly discussing the history of slavery in Turkey for the first time.

As Ferguson and Kayagil (2016) explain in his obituary, Olpak worked until his death in November 2016 to build support for the Afro-Turk community and attempted to hold meetings with politicians from any party or background who were willing to work with him and support his cause, despite the fact that his own political views were rooted in the labor movement (Ferguson, 2013). He, on many occasions, expressed his frustrations with politicians who did not taken him seriously or treated him contemptuously. Olpak's ideological closeness to Turkey's main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), did not provide much support for his endeavor, despite the fact that the places where most Afro-Turks live, has always had a strong electoral base for the CHP. As part of his frustration, in 2010, Olpak told the local media in Izmir that if Erdogan's AK Party is serious about giving real support to the cause of the Afro-Turks, he would ask the members of his association, numbering around 1,500 at that time, to wear an AK Party pin and support the party's democratic reform initiative (*Hurriyet*, 2010). Olpak was very careful not politicizing his association. While his ideological inclination kept him far from the AK Party, and close to the CHP; interestingly, it was the AK Party government that had been pushing for an African opening since 2002 in Turkish foreign policy and recognizing the existence and the need of Afro-Turks.

We do not know the basic reason, however, perhaps as a result of Olpak's ideological inclination, neither he nor his association has never openly announced their support for Turkey's Africa opening, except his above-mentioned conditional statement. It is clear that that Afro-Turks have been one of clearest winners as a result of Turkey's Africa opening, bringing them wide-range recognition among Turkish society and creating awareness that there are forgotten ethnic groups within Turkish society. Less than two decades ago, before Turkey's opening to Africa started, it would have been unimaginable that Afro-Turks would receive so much attention, both at the social and state level in Turkey. The mere opening to Africa policy created an environment where issues related to Africa could be discussed with interest and attention.

Since 2009, the Turkish Ministry of Culture has continued to support the Calf Festival as part of Turkey's cultural diversity for preservation along with local municipalities in Izmir (Olpak, 2013, p.136). In attendance at the first festival in 2007, there was representation from Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, as well as Sheila Warren from the US African Diaspora department as Obama's special representative (Kayhan, 2013, p.19). Similarly, the visibility of Afro-Turks in the Turkish social and cultural scene is part of Turkey's reconciliation with its own Ottoman past, acceptance of multi-ethnicity, and religiosity in today's Turkey; and therefore, state institutions and the public, without any prejudice, easily accept Afro-Turks.

Turkey's Ministry of Culture's official support for Afro-Turks' cultural activities is an extension of Ankara's opening to Africa policy. Official state support for activities and visibility of Afro-Turks in Turkey connects Ankara's opening to Africa in foreign affairs with the acceptance of Turkey's African citizens ethnically in domestic politics. Ankara could not follow a policy of neglecting the cultural demand of its own African citizens while it is focusing on Africa in the last decade and supporting hundreds of developmental and cultural projects in Africa through various state institutions.

Conclusion

The community of Afro-Turks as a new ethnic minority in Turkey is now much more organized than they were in previous years. They are also much more visible and known to Turkish society compared to a decade ago. This certainly indicates Turkey's important transformation as a state and its policies toward ethnic minorities. Today, Afro-Turks may constitute a tiny minority of the population, however that does not make them insignificant. From culture to politics, their discernibility is rising, thanks to Turkey's opening to Africa and the domestic transformation of the country.

The Mustafa Olpak's foundation of the Africans Culture and Solidarity Society and the demand for Afro-Turks' cultural recognition coincided with the increasing Turkish interest in Africa at the political, economic, and cultural levels. This perfect timing helped to vindicate and preserve the Afro-Turk community's traditions and memoir by bringing them into public space. If there were not an opening to Africa policy, such initiatives would not have been that visible at the social level and not likely to be acceptable at the state level. Olpak's leadership was also very creative in the way he utilized press coverage to their benefit. The visibility of Afro-Turks is likely to stay in the spotlight after his unexpected death in November 2016. Today, Afro-Turks are an already known minority experiencing a renewal of their traditions and running for positions on different political parties' tickets. The Turkish government continues to support the Calf Festival and value their search for their roots. The emergence of Afro-Turks in the Turkish public sphere matches perfectly with Ankara's intention to deepen relations with Africa. Although so far, the issue of Afro-Turks has not been utilized in the policy discourse toward Africa, as Afro-Turks make an inroad into Turkish society with more visibility, they are likely to be a factor in Ankara's future Africa policy. The case of Afro-Turks demonstrates that when a foreign policy inclination is matched with domestic policy, even a tiny minority can become more discernable.

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Diaspora FDI: Why do Returning Migrants Invest in Their Home Countries and What are the Main Difficulties They Face? The Case of Romania

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Diaspora FDI: Why do Returning Migrants Invest in Their Home Countries and What are the Main Difficulties They Face? The Case of Romania

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Abstract

Migrants play a significant role in increasing economic links between their home and adoptive countries. They contribute to increasing trade and increasing capital flows between the respective countries in the form of remittances and direct investment. In the context of Romania, only a trickle of this capital flow is in the form of direct investment, although diaspora direct investment (DDI) may represent a more desirable form for the state than remittances. The purpose of this study is two-fold. On one hand, it aims at investigating why Romanians from the diaspora invest in their homeland and, on the other hand, it seeks to understand why the number of diaspora investors is still so low. The study is based on qualitative content analysis of newspaper articles featuring interviews with diaspora entrepreneurs. We found that decisions to return and invest in Romania were motivated by both push (homesickness, lack of economic opportunities in the adoptive countries, the need for a new challenge, and patriotism) and pull factors (business opportunities and beautiful, attractive places in Romania). The main constraining factors were found to be excessive bureaucracy, people's mentality, shortage of labor, and other adverse economic conditions. While the findings of this study confirm some of the results posted by previous studies, they also propose some motivations for DDI that were not captured by other works on the subject.

Keywords

Diaspora Direct Investment, Foreign Direct Investment, Diaspora, Romania

Introduction

Since the 1990s, relations between states and immigrants have undergone important transformations (Délano & Gamlen, 2014). Migrants play a significant role in increasing economic links between their home and adoptive countries (Bahar, 2020). They contribute to increasing trade (Bahar, 2020) and increasing capital flows between the respective countries in the form of remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI). Javorcik et al., (2011) argued that there is a clear link between FDI, remittances, and migrant networks.

Most studies dealing with economic links between the diaspora and the country of origin

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focus on remittances, which they consider to be the main economic contribution of diaspora to the country of origin (Topxhiu & Xhelili, 2016; Vaaler, 2013). Remittances could help with economic growth in the home countries (Ceesay et al., 2019; Mansoor & Quillin, 2007) and can significantly increase income, consumption, and investment, especially among households with lower incomes (Bahar, 2020). Remittances can also reduce the level of poverty (Ceesay et al., 2019; Mansoor & Quillin, 2007) and could play a significant role in the economic, political, and social development of developing countries (Topxhiu & Xhelili, 2016). Finally, immigrant remittances enhance access to capital for entrepreneurs in the home country (Vaaler, 2013) and provide an important source of external financing (Topxhiu & Xhelili, 2016).

However, in the long-term, reliance on remittances could have negative effects. For example, very often, remittances are used to buy imported goods (Constantin et al., 2011). Topxhiu and Xhelili (2016) also argued that the dependence of national economies on remittances could contribute to inflation. For these reasons, Ceesay et al. (2019) recommend that recipients of remittances invest the money to start their own businesses. In fact, Nielsen and Riddle (2010) have argued that diaspora investments go beyond remittances. Similarly, Saxenian (2005) and Khanna (2007) urged diaspora members to invest in a business in their home country rather than send remittances.

There are very few studies that investigate Diaspora Direct Investment (DDI) as a special type of FDI, although this may represent a more desirable form for the state than remittances. Much of the extant literature on DDI refers to, what we could call, "old diasporas", such as the Jewish (Aharoni, 1966), the Chinese (Gao, 2005; Yeung, 2000), the Indian (Wei & Balasubramanyam, 2006) and the Armenian (Hergnyan & Makaryan, 2006) diasporas. There are much fewer studies about "newer diasporas" such as the ones that resulted following the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and, to our knowledge, so far, no study has investigated the motivations of Romanians living in the diaspora to invest in their home country, even though the Romanian diaspora is one of the largest when compared to the population of the home country.

After the fall of communism, Romania entered the global competition to attract FDI. Foreign direct investments were encouraged for their promise to stimulate economic growth (Neuhaus, 2005; cited in Egresi, 2010), and, in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, for their role in the economic, political, and social transformation of the region by "creating deep systemic changes in the fabric of post-socialist lives and geographies" (Pickles & Smith, 2005, p. 28). Authorities assumed that FDI would play a positive role in the country's development by bringing in investment capital and jobs (Dicken, 2011).

According to the definition put forward by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2003), FDI refers to the situation in which an investor residing in a country acquires at least ten percent of the ordinary shares or voting powers of an enterprise situated in a different country. Unlike foreign portfolio investment, in the case of foreign direct investment, the investor has total control of the business even when he does not own the entire company (Jermakowicz, 1995).

Until 2004, FDI flows to Romania remained low, especially when compared to other countries in Central Europe. FDI flows started to pick up once it became clear that Romania would join the European Union. Thus, in 2004, Romania received US$3 billion in FDI (130%

over the 2003 level). Annual FDI inflow continued to grow until 2008 (almost US$6 billion, a 100% increase over 2003) after which, due to the world economic crisis, it started to decrease, declining to US$2.4 billion in 2014 (Anghel, 2020). After this year, they started to grow again, reaching US$5.3 billion in 2019 (Anghel, 2020).

There are no official statistics showing what percentage of total FDI inflows in Romania is, in fact, DDI. Based on anecdotal evidence, we argue that it is very small. Therefore, the purpose of this study is two-fold. On one hand, it aims to investigate why Romanians from the diaspora invest in their home country ("What motivates Romanians to return and start a business?") and, on the other hand, it seeks to understand why the number of diaspora investors is still so low ("What are the main challenges diaspora investors are facing when opening a business in Romania?"). While there is no scarcity of studies on what motivates foreign direct investments, very few studies approached this subject from the perspective of diaspora investments (Honig et al., 2010). Moreover, most of these studies are descriptive (Nkongolo-Bakenda & Chrysostome, 2013) and tend to focus on only one factor (Minoian & Freinkman, 2005). Thus, we believe, a study on this subject is necessary to fill in the gap.

This study is structured as follows. In the next section, we will shortly review the extant literature on diaspora, FDI, DDI as well as on the motivation for international investment, focusing on those theories which, we believe, are more relevant for the particular situation discussed in this study. Following this, we will discuss the methods we used to gather data and information. In the fourth section we will present our findings. Finally, in the last section, we will summarize the main findings emphasizing the main contributions of this research and its theoretical implications.

Literature Review

Diaspora

Often related to Jews, Irish, or Armenians, diaspora is a generic term that refers to a certain identity category, whose geographical connotation is separate from the place of origin. Most of the time, the labels associated with it had a tendency to homogenize (Kenny, 2013) and were correlated with negative events, which triggered the traumatic separation between homeland and expatriates and between them at destination. The factors that caused emigration and the formation of diasporas have varied over time, and there are multiple theories, from Revenstein's Laws of Migration (1885) or Lee's Push and Pull model (1966) to that of contemporary social media.

If the traditional definitions of the diaspora focused on the idea of building new identity communities based on the connection with homeland (Mavroudi, 2019) or on the common geographical origin, since the 1980s they have acquired a different connotation in the social sciences. In most cases, they included the immigrant category or that of different ethnic communities in foreign countries, while others imposed diaspora membership criteria such as solidarity, collective memory, and the connections with the country of origin.

Geographers, along with other social scientists, have tried to study how those involved in migration communicate and adapt with both the destination society and the original

country. Immigrants often cultivate a special relationship with the community they come from, in the form of "hometown transnationalism" (Lacroix, 2019). Besides the emotional nature of this transnationalism, this process is based also on the transfer of remittances, not only economically, but also socially, culturally, or politically. They send, in addition to money, ideas, identities, behaviors, social capital, i.e., what Levitt (1998) called social remittances and political remittances (Müller-Funk, 2020).

This process of movement influenced the level and the manner of communication with the country of origin and with other communities in the country of destination in a nuanced way. Communication was difficult in the past; however, it became very efficient in the conditions of social media, creating new possibilities for developing the consciousness and engagement of the "digital diaspora" (Nedelcu, 2020) and even "extra-territorial nation-building" (Shin, 2019) or long-distance nationalism (Mavroudi, 2020). The level of communication with homeland communities and social relations in the diaspora may influence the level of remittances.

In the case of Romania, the Romanian diaspora had a poor intra-community communication during the communist period due to the political police. If in the past, the Romanian diaspora from Western Europe and North America was mobilized and coagulated around various organizations, such as the World Union of Free Romanians, now this task was claimed by the consular offices and governmental agencies, such as "Departamentul pentru Românii de Pretutindeni" ("The Department for Diaspora Romanians").

Foreign Direct Investment Motivation

It is beyond the scope of this study to include an exhaustive review on FDI motivation (for an extensive literature review on FDI, see Egresi, 2010). Instead, we believe that it is more useful to review only those theories and those studies that could be connected to Diaspora FDI. Already by the 1970s, it was established that companies have to overcome many problems when deciding to expand outside their country of origin. They have to compete with domestic companies and, when operating in unknown markets, they are at a disadvantage because they are not familiar with local traditions and customs or with the country's legislative and regulatory conditions (Hymer, 1976; among many others). In order to outweigh these costs, these companies must possess certain advantages, such as large size, the capacity to generate economies of scale, important market power and marketing skills, technical expertise or access to cheaper sources of finance (Hymer, 1976).

Buckley and Casson (1976) also noted that not only geographical distance but also the existence of dissimilar environments (for example, different social and economic conditions and/or different languages) can lead to an increase in communication costs. Thus, it is not surprising that, in order to reduce risks, most foreign direct investors prefer those countries and those locations that are characterized by very similar environments to the one they know.

Investment environments in Central and Eastern Europe were considered particularly challenging, especially in the 1990s, due to their unpredictability (Marinov et al., 2003). Given the risk perception, most investors were guided by non-economic factors (such as the human and cultural similarity factor between their country and the host country) rather than by economic factors (the company's ownership advantages) when searching for a location for their

investment (Altzinger, 1998; Bandelj, 2002; Gao, 2005; Johansen et al., 2000; Lu, 2012; Meyer, 1998; Paas & Scannell, 2001; and others).

This trend confirms the validity of the internationalization theory, which stated that foreign direct investments are often motivated by historical and cultural ties between home and host countries rather than by economic efficiency (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). For example, Egresi and Kara (2015b) have shown that, in the Balkan Peninsula, those countries that are, culturally, the most similar to Turkey received the most investments from this country. These were the three states with Muslim majorities (Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and two countries with significant Muslim and Turkish minorities (Macedonia and Bulgaria). Egresi and Kara (2015a) have also pointed out that, within Romania, Turkish investments are concentrated in the counties situated east and south of the Carpathian Mountains, which, historically, were part of the Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia and were strongly connected to the Ottoman Empire until the 19th century. Similarly, Hungarian investments in Romania are heavily concentrated in counties with a significant Hungarian population (Egresi, 2010).

Diaspora and FDI

The literature on Diaspora FDI is very scarce. Flisi & Murat (2011) argued that social, cultural, and institutional differences between countries could act as barriers to FDI. However, the existence of migrant communities could smooth international economic transactions by building links between their home and adoptive countries (Bahar, 2020; Gao, 2003; Tong, 2005; Buch et al., 2006; Murat & Pistoresi, 2009; Nkongolo-Bakenda & Chrysostome, 2013) and by influencing politics and economic policies in both countries (Bahar, 2020; Constant & Zimmermann, 2016). Constant & Zimmermann (2016) and Nielsen & Riddle (2007) also suggest that, should members of the diaspora decide to invest in their home country they would benefit from the advantage of having better information about the local market. Indeed, most direct investors in China are actually ethnic Chinese residing abroad (Yeung, 2000; Gao, 2005). They decided to investment in China not only because of the shared culture but also because of the existence of historically developed social and business networks (guangxi) (Lu, 2012).

The study by Roman and Strat (2018) shows that Romanian migrants to EU countries can act as "ambassadors" of the Romanian economy and contribute to the flow of FDI from their adoptive country to Romania. The findings of the study have shown that there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between the number of Romanian immigrants in a certain country and the number of FDI firms from that country in Romania, even when controlling for several variables (similar results were reported by Mihi-Ramirez et al. (2019)). These findings confirm Constant and Zimmermann's (2016) observation that members of the Diaspora can play an important role in the promotion of host country investments in their home countries.

DDI could be very beneficial for the home country for several reasons, among which we could mention (Debass & Ardovino, 2009):

- The diaspora entrepreneur brings his skills and experience;
- Technology and knowhow transfer;
- Diaspora investors are less averse to political risks and economic shocks than other foreign

investors

- By their very presence, diaspora investors can attract non-resident FDI (see also Nkongolo-Bakenda & Chrysostome, 2013);
- DDI can smooth out issues between countries.

Motivations for DDI

In terms of motivations for DDI, most theories do not distinguish between DDI and other types of FDI and assume that investments are largely driven by financial motivations. However, as we have seen earlier, some theories on FDI also included cultural similarity as a factor that could guide the direction of FDI. Besides financial motivations, a few studies have argued that emotions should also be included among the factors that motivate FDI (Van de Laar & de Neubourg, 2006). Indeed, already in the 1960s, Aharoni (1966) showed that members of the Jewish diaspora who invest in Israel are motivated not only by profit but also by the psychological ties they have with Israel, their homeland. Similarly, Beal et al. (2005) and Riddle & Brinkerhoff (2011) found that altruism and moral convictions are also important determinants for DDI, whereas Gillespie et al. (1999) mention altruism and perceived ethnic advantage. By altruism, researchers have understood a strong sense of duty to invest in their home country (Nielsen & Riddle, 2010) as well as patriotism and other social and emotional factors – such as compassion for their family members or their countrymen (Graham, 2014).

Other researchers have argued that few diaspora investors are really guided by altruism when deciding to invest in their homeland (Graham, 2014). For example, a study in the Republic of Georgia, using data from a survey that included 174 foreign-owned companies has found no evidence that diaspora-owned firms are more likely to engage in socially-responsible, pro-development behaviors than other foreign-owned or controlled firms (Graham, 2014). In fact, some researchers argue that diaspora investors could have a more or less hidden agenda. For example, some may invest to acquire social status or for political gains (Aharoni, 1966; Nielsen & Riddle, 2010).

Elo and Jokela (2015) argued that the factors that may influence a member of the diaspora to invest in his home country are: nationality, gender, education, necessity, available alternative in life, level of prosperity, and family setting, whereas Nkongolo-Bakenda and Chrysostome (2013) found that DDI depends on the level of altruistic motivation, the need for social recognition, entrepreneurial opportunities, as well friendliness and receptivity of the home country and friendliness of the host country. Further, Fernhaber et a. (2009) and Nkongolo-Bakenda et al. (2010) opined that international experience could be an important motivator for the entrepreneur to invest in their homeland (Fernhaber et al., 2009; Nkongolo-Bakenda et al., 2010). Members of the diaspora can more easily identify business opportunities in their home countries (Graham, 2014) and identify products or services from host countries that could be used to take advantage of these opportunities (Fernhaber et al., 2009; Nkongolo-Bakenda et al., 2010). Finally, to synthesize all this information on the motivators of DDI, Nielsen and Riddle (2007) distinguish between three sets of motivations that guided DDI: financial, social, and emotional.

Constraining factors for DDI

Besides factors that motivate diaspora entrepreneurs to invest in their homeland, researchers have also identified a number constraining factors which may negatively influence their decision to invest. Among these, in an African context, Okpara & Wynn, (2007) mention: lack of (access to) financial resources, too little management experience, poverty of the environment, inadequate laws and regulations, adverse economic conditions, lack of infrastructure, corruption, and weak demand for products and services.

Another study by Newland and Tanaka (2010), found the following constraining factors for DDI: weak economy, weak governance, corruption, public institutions that are not functioning very well, no adequate access to finance, unfavorable perception of entrepreneurship, and insufficient human and social capital.

Data and Methods

This study is based on qualitative content analysis from newspaper articles. Newspapers, journals, and specialized websites sometimes publish interviews with Romanian entrepreneurs. We used Google's search engine to look for relevant articles using the Romanian words for "diaspora" and "investment" as key words. Sometimes the site we visited recommended similar articles published by the same media or an associated one. This research method is rarely used in FDI studies, although it could be a reliable and relevant method (see Egresi, 2018), especially when it is difficult to get data and information through other methods. The main disadvantage when using interviews published from different sources is that each participant answers a different set of questions. Unlike the structured or semi-structured interviews that we would normally use to collect primary data, interviews found in secondary sources could be considered unstructured.

In the end, we analyzed a number of 53 cases (addendum 1). Most of the diaspora entrepreneurs spent a long time away from their homeland, 20 returning after 10 or more years spent abroad (12 out of the 20 spent 15 years or longer away from their homeland) (addendum 2). The entrepreneurs lived in many countries (most in the United Kingdom, Italy, USA and Germany) and started their business in Romania between 1996 and 2019 (most in the last five years). They generally invested between a few thousand and a few hundred thousand of euros (with the largest investment being 60 million euro). The great majority of the entrepreneurs had experience in the domain of investment (as either workers or students); however, only two out of the 53 had entrepreneurial experience abroad.

Findings

Motivation to Return and Invest

We found that decisions to return were motivated by both push and pull factors.

Push factors:

1. Homesickness and missing family, friends, and familiar places

Most Romanians have left their country for better economic opportunities, but they have

never intended to stay in their new country forever. Their plan was to stay for only as long as they needed to save enough money and, then, return home. Often, they had to stay longer than initially expected. Table 1 shows that 20 migrants featured in the case studies have spent more than 10 years and 12 even more than 15 years abroad. Even after so much time, some could not adapt to the host society (Case 24; Case 8), which they have never perceived to be their "home". This is how one Romanian returnee expressed his feelings about this issue:

"We had money, everything seemed perfect, but we both knew that something was missing. We didn't feel like it [our adoptive country] was 'home'. Years passed by; meanwhile, we had a little son, but the feeling of being uprooted was growing inside us." (Case 32)

Many realized after many years of living among foreigners that they understand Romania better than their adoptive country (Case 33) and that Romania is not such a bad country after all. This is how another disillusioned émigré, who failed to integrate into the host society after many years of living there, vented his frustration:

"Money, health, and any other wealth have no power, no value over time. The years went by, and, unfortunately, I was forced to spend the most beautiful years among foreigners to make a decent living and help my family. Nothing compares, in this life, with the attention one gets from the loved ones, shared love, and time spent together. Thus, I decided to return home, to my holy Maramureș land, because, I'll tell you honestly, in my travels, I have seen neither place more beautiful than Maramureș nor such good and warm people." (Case 49)

They perceive their time spent far from their country as a sacrifice they had to make to have a better life or to help their families, but they do not want their children to have to go through the same hardships:

"After Brexit, we decided to go back home and start a business. We wanted a child very much; we now have a little girl and, when she turned one or so, we returned home. We really wanted for her to live in her own country, not among foreigners. Since we are back home, we are lucky to have our parents babysit our daughter from morning till night as we are busy with our business all the time." (Case 28)

Some felt alienated by an environment, they thought, was hostile towards foreigners:

"I left [Romania] together with my husband shortly after graduating from high school because back then [we thought] there were better chances for us to have a good living abroad. However, one does not have a better life abroad either as one could face many problems there as well; people are treating you bad and act like you don't matter when, for whatever reason, you can no longer work. In the first years, it was difficult for me to fit in; I didn't speak Italian for a good while because 80% of all employees [at my workplace] were Romanians." (Case 10)

Other migrants could not stand being separated from their families, which they missed more than anything else. One migrant explained why he decided to return after many years spent abroad: "*Everything was rosy [in the adoptive country] but what I was missing was my family*" (Case 21). To be with their family, some were willing to sacrifice a flourishing economic situation and settle for a simple lifestyle. For example, one such successful migrant returned to Romania to be with his wife and children who could not adapt to the lifestyle in the United Kingdom even though in London he was making up to 10,000 British Pounds per month

managing a restaurant. He is content with his little business in Romania and is not considering moving back to London (Case 8).

2. Fewer economic opportunities in the adoptive countries

The 2009 financial crisis has impacted many companies that employed Romanian migrants. As these companies struggled to stay afloat, workers were unemployed for long periods (Case 12). Once they realized they could not find any work, many Romanians decided to return home and, after finding out that jobs were scarce in Romania as well, start a business (Case 40).

Many migrants discovered that life was not easy in the adoptive country and that they had to work very hard to make ends meet and send money home to their families. One investor from the diaspora explained that he decided to return to Romania "because one can't just work for 12 hours a day […] for years" (Case 51). Another investor featured in the case studies described the sacrifices Romanians from the diaspora have to make in order to save money:

"I know Romanians [in the adoptive country] who commute every day, two hours in the morning and two hours in the evening, after eight hours of work. One could pay as much as 2500 euro for rent. Thus, I don't know how much money Romanians make, but they have a harder life there than in their home country. Perhaps a job in Romania is not paying as well as in [the adoptive country], but the quality of life is far better. [In Romania] one can meet friends, have a drink, communicate. There [in the adoptive country], everyone is focused only on making money". (Case 21)

Growing tired with the hard work and the sacrifices, Romanians decide to return and invest their hard-earned money in a business that would give them something to do in their country because, in spite of the long time spent in the West, and despite the numerous jobs they had there, they could not find their place:

"Abroad, I went through a lot of hardship. […] I decided to return because I couldn't find my balance and always missed everything. I told myself that if I only have bread and onions to eat, I better return to my country. If I made it in a country where I didn't speak the language and had no legal right to residence or work, I must be able to succeed in my own country […]". (Case 19)

3. Needed a new challenge

Not all of those who decided to return did so out of disappointment with their lives in the diaspora. On the contrary, many Romanians managed to achieve a good quality of life. They had good jobs, nice homes and enjoyed the company of their family and friends. However, they wanted "something of their own" (Case 22), they wanted to do something that would have an impact (Case 24), both being easier to achieve in Romania than in the adoptive countries. For example, after 12 years spent in the United States, a Romanian émigré decided to return home. The main reason, according to him, was that after having been successful abroad, he felt challenged to show that he could also be successful in his own country:

"Everything was nice there, but I felt that it wasn't mine. Hence the idea of returning home […]. Between the longing for the native and the adoptive country, I chose the latter". (Case 16)

Another investor from the diaspora gave a very similar explanation for his decision to return:

“We wanted to show that one can have a healthy business without the usual tricks. It is our ambition to achieve something in our homeland, for our people”. (Case 18)

4. Patriotism

Many Romanians returned to invest in their home country motivated by patriotic ideas. After so many years spent abroad, they decided to return to their homeland and do something that would be of help to their country (Case 32, among others). For example, this is how one Romanian returnee explained his decision to invest in his native country:

“I had some money saved and felt like I needed to do something for my country. My family is here, my friends are here, and, after all, it is Romanian blood flowing through my body.” (Case 35)

Another investor was motivated by the same thoughts when he decided to use the money he saved abroad to start a business in Romania:

“I would really love to stay in my country and bring my contribution to the development of Romania. I think there is a lot to do here.” (Case 45)

As a matter of fact, some Romanians featured in the case studies left their country with the understanding that they will return after a few years to apply what they learned abroad to the benefit of their country. For example, at the end of her education in an Asian country, a young Romanian felt it was her duty to return to her country and apply what she had learned. She clearly stated that she never intended to stay, only wanted the experience of a new culture, a new language, and new people. She thought that the knowledge she gained while studying abroad would benefit Romania (Case 29). Another Romanian who returned home after studying abroad for a few years had a similar discourse:

“While in college, I kept thinking about designing and developing a Romanian brand. […]. Among many spiritual motivations, there was one that was as pragmatic as it could get: Romania has a tradition in the cosmetics industry” (Case 20).

Others reasoned that it was their patriotic duty to return and work for the development of their country:

“I no longer want to go and work in [my adoptive country], to know that I am paid by them. I want to work in my country, where I can speak my language, where I have my parents, my roots; this is my motivation [for staying in Romania]. I could go back and make 3000 euro a month, but here [in Romania], I know that I am achieving something and that I am leaving something behind; I can teach my daughter, my daughter loves lavender. These things are important to my soul. They are the ones that motivate me. And the money comes after them.” (Case 51)

As we can see, money can motivate people to leave their country, but once they save enough to make a decent living, other factors become more important.

Pull factors:

Besides the push factors which determined Romanian migrants to reconsider their plans to live abroad, our analysis of texts published in the Romanian media revealed that there were also pull factors that attracted them back to Romania.

1. More business opportunities in Romania

While other countries offered Romanian migrants better job opportunities, allowing them to have a decent living, many of these migrants admitted in the cases studied that, when thinking to start a business of their own, the Romanian market was much more attractive to them due to its greater potential for development (Cases 26, 30, 41, & 53). One entrepreneur opined that Romania is one of the countries in which it is easier to be successful as an entrepreneur than in any other European country (Case 18). Another Romanian of German ethnicity who left his native country in the 1980s as a child decided to return after 22 years because he noticed that there were more business opportunities in this country than in Western Europe. This is how he explained why he became an entrepreneur in his native country and not in his adoptive country:

"I've always been very attached to Romania, although I don't really know why. As a child, I always missed my native country and, when I realized that the market here is less developed, especially in the construction sector, I decided [to return] and to become a real estate developer [here]" (Case 53).

While living and working in their adoptive country, Romanians often came across new business ideas or business models that were not yet known in their native country and, thus, could have an excellent potential for success (for example, Case 23). One such entrepreneur from the diaspora asked himself before deciding to invest in Romania:

"Why not try to implement this concept in Romania? Why not adopt a different approach from the one generally employed by supermarkets? Given my experience [with the industry] in Ireland, I already knew the suppliers I could collaborate with". (Case 14)

In a similar vein, two entrepreneurs (husband and wife), during a vacation in Romania, noticed that all restaurants in their hometown looked alike and that there was a market for a traditional Spanish restaurant (Case 15). They realized that this was their opportunity to return home and start a business. They were well-integrated in Spain and, prior to this discovery, they did not see any reason to return:

"Our life was there and we had not thought about returning [to Romania] because we had not wanted to abandon everything and start from scratch" (Case 15).

Other Romanian migrants decided to return when their family insisted that they start a business together (Case 43) or at the urging of their former employers (Case 44) or acquaintances (Case 48) [in the adoptive country] who were looking for a business partner in Romania. Finally, there were also those who lived and worked abroad for a few years and, during this time, they invested their savings in Romania (generally in real estate). As their investments turned out to be successful, they realized that Romania has great potential and that they could start a new life in Romania as entrepreneurs (Case 50).

2. Beautiful places and warm people

Many Romanian migrants visit their native country very often, generally during holidays. Their main purpose is to meet with family and friends, but many also travel across the country or spend their vacation in a Romanian resort. While doing this, they often realize that places and people in Romania compare positively to what they have seen in other countries during their travels. One case study presents a Romanian entrepreneur who, after living and working in Italy

for 20 years, decided to return to Romania and invest in a Bed & Breakfast in a picturesque area of Northern Dobrudja. According to her interview, she and her Italian husband have visited the area several times before, finally deciding to leave Italy and settle there because they fell in love with the Danube Delta. They say they love everything this place is about: nature, simple life, and tradition (Case 12):

"Good life, I felt, comes with shallowness. We enjoyed our time in Italy, this beautiful country that everybody knows; however, once we arrived in Dobrudja, we found the simplicity and goodness of people which has taken us in." (Case 12)

Challenges Faced

Most Romanian migrants who returned to start a business complained of four main issues: bureaucracy, people's mentality in Romania, shortage of labor, and adverse economic conditions.

1. Bureaucracy

Starting a business in Romania is more difficult than in other European countries due to bureaucracy. As one entrepreneur from the diaspora observed, Romania is a "bureaucratic inferno, although things improved 100 times since 1992" (the year when the entrepreneur left Romania) (Case 6).

Most of these aspiring entrepreneurs returned to Romania after having lived for many years in their adoptive countries, where they got used to do things differently. When they decided to start a business in Romania, they realized that:

"Here [in Romania], it is a lot more difficult to fight everyone and the system. The start-up is hard, there is a lot of paperwork to fill out, all kinds of obstacles [thrown at you], but we said we should try". (Case 32)

Many believe that the state asks potential entrepreneurs for too much paperwork in order to be issued a permit (for example, Case 23) and are quick to point out that starting a business is much easier in their adoptive country. For example, one returning migrant lamented over his experience trying to register a company in Romania:

"[…] Unfortunately, bureaucracy can eat you alive in Romania. I've got a bag full of documents [regarding our business]. In England it is not like this. They don't ask you for so much paperwork. Not as much as in Romania." (Case 28)

Some even feel that the bureaucratic system in Romania is outright hostile towards entrepreneurs:

"During the first months [back in Romania], we felt like foreigners in our own country. If you want to open a restaurant in Spain, you go to the city hall to submit your project in order to get a license. Once you have done this, the city hall does the rest. There [in Spain], you don't worry about inspections. Here, instead of focusing on what I need to do to serve the customers, I need to worry about keeping all paperwork in order so that I don't get fined. The first month after I opened [the restaurant] I was fined three times, and this can affect your morale a lot […]" (Case 15)

Having to spend so much time and energy on keeping all paperwork in order, entrepreneurs from the diaspora complain, takes from their ability to focus on what is more important, the

development of their company. This could be best illustrated by quoting one such migrant returnee who lamented over the rigidity of the Romanian bureaucratic system:

"Local authorities seemed rigid to us, not market-oriented [...]. Sometimes we wish not to have so many accounting documents to fill out, print, sign, archive because [to do these tasks] we waste precious time and energy resources which we could, otherwise, utilize to build our business in an even more harmonious way". (Case 52)

The main problem is that local authorities are more oriented towards punishing the business owners when they make mistakes and less oriented towards preventing and correcting those mistakes: "I don't think anyone wants to break the law but, as the situation is today, it is very easy to break the law as the laws and the [business owner's] obligations are not very clear" (Case 52).

In conclusion, not only that the state does nothing to support entrepreneurs, but it also does everything to amplify the biggest enemy of wannabe entrepreneurs: fear of failure (Case 40). Moreover, frequent changes of the legislation make the business environment in Romania very unpredictable (Cases 40 & 48).

2. People's mentality

When trying to implement a business idea, aspiring entrepreneurs need to not only wrestle with the vagaries of the bureaucratic system but also to overcome the mentality of their compatriots:

"The main obstacle faced was people's mentality. When you come to the market with a new idea, it is difficult to convince other people to join your project. However, as soon as [they hear that] you offer quality products, they open to your innovative ideas" (Case 14)

On one hand, the new business ideas, models, or concepts these diaspora entrepreneurs bring to the Romanian market may constitute their competitive advantage over local companies, as they may not have any competitors. On the other hand, being so new, Romanian customers may be reluctant to try their products at first. For example, opening a fancy restaurant serving foreign dishes in a place with a limited ex-pat population is always a gamble. One Romanian returnee who opened a traditional Spanish restaurant reported on the difficulties his business went through. He explained that local people were not familiar with foreign dishes and could not understand why traditional Romanian dishes were missing from the menu. When the owner explained that the restaurant was specialized in Spanish cuisine, the customers were quick to show their disappointment (Case 15).

Another entrepreneur who pioneered a new concept of senior care for Romania also worried about how Romanians will perceive his product. He opined that:

"There needs to be a change of mentality concerning the way senior citizens are treated, what they deserve after a lifetime of work, what options they have for care at their age. And our project is intended to set an example in this sense, an alternative to what exists (or not) today in senior care in Romania". (Case 16)

Sometimes the problem is implementing international values in human resources management, as many employees in Romania do not have the same work ethic as in Western

Europe (Case 17) or finding serious, trustable suppliers. This is how a Romanian migrant returnee expressed his dissatisfaction with the issue: "You have an initial meeting, everything works out fine, everyone is happy, yet, when you try to follow up, they don't answer your phone or react very slowly" (Case 23)

3. Shortage of labor

Another major problem many diaspora entrepreneurs mentioned was the difficulty finding and keeping good employees (Case 17, among others). One entrepreneur featured in the case studies explained:

"[It was] difficult to find good workers. In the first week after the opening, we had three workers on probation, but none stayed because they did not wish to work and learn the trade" (Case 10)

Some even claimed that labor shortage has become the biggest problem for entrepreneurs in Romania, even more than of bureaucracy:

"Oh, my! [Labor shortage] is the biggest problem. Before it was bureaucracy, with state institutions mistreating aspiring entrepreneurs. This is now long past. I am glad we've grown up from this perspective and understood that the private sector must be stimulated and encouraged, but we have a labor problem. Unfortunately, many left for other countries, especially qualified labor" (Case 27).

The situation is somewhat ironic as many Romanians left their country with the understanding that they will work hard in their adoptive country, save money, and then return to invest in a business in Romania, only to find out that there is no one left in Romania to work for them. Everyone is abroad chasing the same dream. One such entrepreneur who returned from Western Europe in the 1990s to invest in agriculture decried the situation his business is facing:

"I can no longer find workers. I have the latest generation machinery (when I think about how hard I had to work to buy the first tractor …). Now I have tractors worth millions of euros, set with the latest technology, and no one to work on them. […]. It breaks my heart!" (Case 27).

Another returnee entrepreneur explains why it is so difficult to find workers and what solution she found for the problem:

"You may not believe me, but here in the countryside, I can't find the labor I need. I cannot find people to help me. Here in Romania, people receive social benefits. So why get dirty in the field [when they can just stay at home and be paid by the government], although I don't mind getting dirty in the field myself. I am not that kind of a business owner. I am the first one to work in the field. [When I realized that it is so difficult to find help] I decided to do whatever it takes to be independent. I can drive the tractor; I can do everything myself. My dream is to become autonomous, to maintain my lavender [field] properly" (Case 51)

Indeed, if they want to survive, entrepreneurs need to be inventive and look for workers in non-traditional places:

"[…] the real problem is recruiting full-time employees for the stores. The solution that we found was recruiting among students, part-time, which satisfies us for the moment. I shall underline

here that this is our most difficult task: to find personnel. Our retention rate is very high but only after they have worked for us for three months …" (Case 52)

4. Adverse economic conditions

Some entrepreneurs from the Romanian diaspora also faced difficulties maintaining a portfolio of customers (Case 17), finding providers for services, such as IT applications (Case 23), or finding the right suppliers for their businesses. For example, an entrepreneur who had the idea to open a non-traditional gourmet meat shop realized that it was not easy to find the right-sized suppliers of beef:

"In Romania, beef producers are either too small, which risks affecting the steady flow of deliveries, or too big, which could affect quality. Therefore, we had a hard time finding midsized farmers to collaborate with" (Case 14)

Other challenges the Romanian diaspora entrepreneurs had to face were high rents (Case 23) and a lack of business financing. A Romanian returnee who used the money he saved while working in Western Europe to invest in agriculture explained that banks in Romania are not willing to take any risk. Banks started financing farmers only in 2007, the first year when farmers received subsidies (Case 27):

"[In other countries], if you go to a bank with a project, they don't ask you to use your house as collateral. There is nothing like this. If the bank agreed to finance your project, it means that they do it because your project is good; they will not ask for collaterals on top of collaterals. In our country, even today, unfortunately, most banks finance collaterals [not projects]" (Case 27).

Conclusion and Discussions

The purpose of this study was to understand what motivates members of the diaspora to invest in their homeland and what are the main constraints for DDI. Based on a number of 53 interviews with Romanian entrepreneurs, published in mass-media, we found that the motivation for DDI is much more complex than what most FDI theories claim, confirming earlier results by Elo & Riddle (2016). The literature often does not take into account that diaspora investment is heterogeneous including motivation due to the fact different actors have different motivations as a means for various ends (Elo & Riddle, 2016). Thus, while, similar to Nielsen & Riddle (2007), we found that DDI are motivated by both economic and non-economic factors, we also showed that motivation is represented by both push and pull factors and that push factors (those that diaspora members use to determine to leave their host country) are no less important than pull factors.

Following Graham (2012) and others, we found that emotional motivation is very important in explaining DDI and that, along with other socio-cultural factors, play a role in DDI motivation that is at least as important as profit maximization (argument that was made earlier by Rana & Elo, 2017; Siwale & Hack-Polay, 2018; and Terrazzas, 2010). Among these emotional motivations, we found altruism to be the most important, especially the "sense of duty" aspect (supporting earlier comments made by Van de Laar & De Neubourg (2006). Also, the results of our study build on previous findings by Lin & Tao (2012) in which patriotism and the need to be close to family were shown to be important motivators for DDI. Sometimes the main motivation

was as simple as the need to return to their countries (see also Cohen, 2008) or the necessity to provide themselves with an income while back in their home countries (see, also, Elo & Riddle, 2016).

Diaspora entrepreneurs also have to overcome a number of barriers which may be the reason for the small number of diaspora entrepreneurs. For example, many businesses have difficulties finding workers, which is contrary to Egresi's (2007) findings almost 15 years ago that the main motivation to invest in Romania was to take advantage of the cheap and qualified labor force. Other important constraints were bureaucracy, people's mentality, and adverse economic conditions (such as high rents, difficulty finding suppliers or providers of certain services and shortage of business financing). These are not very different from findings of other studies undertaken in other geographical contexts (Newland & Tanaka, 2010; Okpara & Wynn, 2007).

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Addenda

Addendum 1: List of newspaper articles analyzed

1. Niţu, F. (2020). Afaceri de la zero: Narcis Pintea a investit 80.000 de euro într-un atelier de brânzeturi în satul natal din judeţul Cluj şi produce artisanal după modelul elveţian. Ziarul Financiar, 19 August.
2. Vasiliu, A.E. (2020a). Afaceri de la zero: Tânărul care a studiat în patru oraşe europene diferite şi a mizat tot pe România pentru afacerea sa. Ziarul Financiar, 30 May.

3. Vasiliu, A.E. (2020b). Afaceri de la zero: Așa da: O tânără din România a pus în țara sa bazele unei afaceri alături de o prietenă, dup ace s-a inspirit din experiența sa ca angajat în Londra. Ziarul Financiar, 28 June.
4. Nitu, F. (2019a). Afaceri de la zero: Roxana Parjol s-a intors la Cluj dupa 15 ani petrecuti in stainatate si produce inghetata moleculara sub brandul L'Albero dei sogni. Ziarul Financiar, 7 July.
5. Nitu, F. (2019b). Afaceri de la zero: Adriana si Adrian Gheorghiu s-au intors din Canada si au investit peste 200.000 de euro pentru a preda cursuri de yoga corporatistilor din Bucuresti. Ziarul Financiar, 20 august.
6. Botea, R. (2018). Dan Vulpe, repatriate roman dupa 20 de ani in Canada: Suntem o natiune sub asediu, doar ca de data aceasta nu ne mai asediaza turcii sau rusii, ci noi insine. Romania – un infern birocratic. Ziarul Financiar, 23 November.
7. Nitu, F. (2008). O familie s-a intors din Italia pentru a-si dezvolta propria afacere in satul natal din Salaj. Ziarul Financiar, 20 November.
8. Slamnoiu, C. (?). A lasat un job foarte bun in Anglia pentru a creste struti in Romania: cat castiga atunci si cat castiga acum? Adevarul
9. Panaete, M. (2015). A lucrat in Franta si Elvetia sa stranga bani pentru un start-up. Ziarul Financiar, 4 April.
10. Mirea, C. (2015). A lucrat 12 ani in Italia, iar acum are propriul restaurant in capitala. Ziarul Financiar, 10 January.
11. Cosmobeauty Who's Who (2020). Adriana Fagarasian, fondator SkinMedic Beauty Clinic, clinica de elita pentru servicii de estetica. Cosmobeauty
12. Toma, A. (2020). Povestea romancei care a trait doua decenii in Italia si s-a intors in tara impreuna cu sotul Italian si cu cei doi copii pentru a le arata tuturor frumusetea Dobrogei. Cum s-a nascut raiul de la Complex Turistic Varvara. Life, 10 May.
13. Anonymous (n.d.). Ioana Joca-Pohl – Dupa Gard Retreat "O, tu sura preafrumoasa". Repatriot.ro
14. Niculas, M. (2018). Maine, 1 august, se deschide un magazine nou nout de vanzare cu amanuntul in mall-ul Prima Shops din Oradea. Credite IMM, 31 July
15. Enasescu, A. (2020). Dupa 13 ani in Madrid, doi ieseni s-au intors acasa si au adus cu ei secretele bucatariei spaniole. Pressone, 1 february.
16. Tanase, M. (2019). Dupa 12 ani de viata in SUA si o cariera in top management, Dan Doroftei s-a intors in Romania si construieste cel mai mare centru de lux dedicate varstnicilor. Life, 19 December.
17. Anonymous (n.d.). De la journalist in Statele Unite, la patron de agentie de publicitate in Bucuresti. Repatriot.
18. Voiculescu, L. (2020). Romanul care a renuntat la afacerea din Londra si s-a intors acasa, intr-un sat din Calarasi, sa creasca vaci Angus. Republica, 31 January.
19. Loznianu, L. (2020). Cum e "La Artar", visul de la tara al unei romance plecate in strainatate. Republica, 29 January.
20. Anonymous (n.d.). Ruxandra Antohe, o tanara antreprenoare romanca cu studii in strainatate, s-a intors in Romania pentru a creea produse cosmetice de ultima generatie, la preturi accesibile. Repatriot
21. Stoica, D. (2019). Roman revenit in tara din strainatate: "Se traieste bine si acasa, doar ca domina negativismul". Rotalianul, 24 August.
22. Anonymous (n.d.). Ligia Stanciu, o antreprenoare din Bucuresti, s-a intors acasa dupa aproape 15 petrecuti in Italia. Repatriot
23. Iurcu, V. (2019). Au lasat Elvetia ca sa deschida o cafenea pentru parinti la Cluj. Start-up, 17 July.
24. Ambrinoc, I. (2009). Eu am decis sa nu mai fug. Am dat Londra pe Bucuresti si acum sunt fericit. Republica, 12 July.
25. Anonymous (2019). Coffee & Business Oradea. USFA
26. Anonymous (2019). Camelia Veteleanu, antreprenoarea care a fondat gradinitele Le Carousel. Femei in Afaceri, 2 April.
27. Anonymous (2019). Vasile Pamfil, antreprenorul care a renuntat la Olanda pentru a demonstra ca se poate face agricultura profitabila si in Romania. Wall Street Journal, 9 June.
28. Anonymous (2018). Targu-Neamt: "La Nea Ion Macelaru" – o afacere de familie si de succes. Mesagerul, 30 November.
29. Dorobantu, B. (2018). Inspiratie de la mii de kilometric distanta. Forbes, 30 April.

30. Neferu, A. (2018). Doi antreprenori romani fac milioane de euro punand robotii informatici la treaba. New Money, 21 June.
31. Anonymous (n.d.). Oana si Remus Feldman au pornit cu un picior in Germania si unul in Romania. Repatriot.
32. Anonymous (n.d.). O familie s-a intors din Italia pentru a-si dezvolta propria afacere in satul natal in Salaj. Repatriot.
33. Voicu, S. (2018). Impact hub: Povestea tinerei care a renuntat la o cariera in Franta pentru a deschide afaceri in Romania. Digi 24, 28 January.
34. Anonymous (2018). Cafea servita la Oradea ca in Anglia. Bihor.ro, 17 April.
35. Anonymos (n.d.). Tineri cu spirit antreprenorial se intorc acasa. Repatriot.
36. Dobreanu, C. (2015). Un business cu "sanatate": Antrenamente, nutritive si coaching – ingredient ideale ale unei afaceri iesite din tipare. Forbes, 26 April.
37. Anonymous (n.d.). Radu Zavate s-a intors din Londra si a creat alaturi de fratele sau geaman brandul Zavate. Repatriot.
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39. Anonymous (n.d.). Alexandru Dumitru: Intoarcerea in Romania via Berlin si California. Repatriot.
40. Anonymous (n.d.). Cosmin Caradima: Antreprenorul constantean care a inconjurat lumea si acum detine o agentie de publicitate in mediul digital din Romania. Repatriot.
41. Anonymous (n.d.). Adrian Vodislas si PadelMania. Repatriot.
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Addendum 2. Main characteristics of the 53 cases

Case #	Country in which (s)he lived	Time spent abroad	Year of invest. in Romania	Place of invest. in Romania	Amount of initial invest.	Economic domain of invest.	Has experience in the domain of investment?	Ent-repre-neurial expe-rience abroad?
1.	A number of countries among which Switzerland		2019	Cluj County	80,000 euro	Different types of cheese	Yes (studied cheese making and worked in cheese factories abroad)	no
2.	Belgium, Austria, Denmark		2018		40,000 euro	Design office specialized in visualization of data	Yes (worked in this area abroad)	no
3.	UK			online	5000 euro	Selling wallpaper	Yes (worked for the same American wallpaper brand in London)	no
4.	Italy	15 years	2018	Cluj-Napoca	20,000 euro	Ice cream	Yes (took chef, pastry chef and ice-cream making courses in Italy and Switzerland and worked as a restaurant chef in Italy)	No
5.	Canada		2016	Bucharest	200,000 euro	Yoga studio	Yes (took yoga courses while living abroad)	No
6.	Canada	20 years	2012					

7.	Italy	15 years	2014	Salaj County	150,000 euro	Manufacturing and selling products made of lavender	No	No
8.	Israel & UK	20 years		Dambovita County	4200 euro	Ostrich farm	No	No
9.	France & Switzerland	Less than a year		Western Carpathian (Apuseni) Mountains	5000 euro	Manufactures different types of jams and syrups	No	No
10.	Italy	12 years	2013	Bucharest	30,000 euro	Restaurant	Yes (worked in restaurants in Italy)	No
11.	Italy	16 years		Brasov		Beauty clinic	Yes (studied this business model in Italy	No
12.	Italy	20 years	2019	Tulcea County		Tourism (B & B)	No	No
13.	UK (Scotland)		2017	Alba County		tourism	No	No
14.	UK (Northern Ireland)	10 years	2018	Oradea	30,000 euro	Selling quality meats, “ready to eat” & “ready to cook”	Yes (worked in Northern Ireland as a butcher and in retail)	No

15.	Spain	13 years		Iasi	35,000 euro	Restaurant	No	No
16.	USA	12 years	2016	Bucharest	60 million euro	Senior care	Yes (worked in health care and senior care in the USA)	No
17.	USA			Bucharest		Advertising agency	Somewhat (worked as journalist)	No
18.	UK		2015	Calarasi County	Over 1 million euro	Agriculture	No (worked in construction)	Yes (had a const-ruction com-pany in Lon-don)
19.	A number of countries (most time in Spain and Sweden)	15 years	2016	Dambovita County	1 million lei	Tourism (mini-resort	No	No
20.	Germany, USA					cosmetics	No	No
21.	Ireland	12 years				Manufact. & selling windows and doors	yes	yes
22.	Italy	15 years	2013	Bucharest		Restaurant	Experience as sommelier and learned Italian recipes.	No

23.	Switzerland	8 years	2019	Cluj-Napoca	33,000 euro	Coffee shop	No	No
24.	UK	7 years		Bucharest		Financial consulting	Yes (worked in an investment bank)	No
25.	UK		2019	Oradea		Coffee shop	No	No
26.	France			Bucharest		kindergarten	No	No
27.	The Netherlands	2 years	1996	Bistrita-Nasaud County		Agriculture + gas station + retail	No	No
28.	UK (England)	8 years		Neamt County	200,000 euro	Butchery	No	No
29.	South Korea	5 years		Bucharest		Education sector	No	No
30.	France	15 years				Robotic Process Automation	Yes (worked in IT)	No

31.	Spain, Austria, Germany					Eco-clothing for babies	No	No
32.	Italy	18 years		Salaj County		lavender	No	No
33.	France & Switzerland	2 years				Business incubator	Somewhat (worked in banking)	No
34.	UK			Oradea		Coffee shop	Yes (managed a coffee shop)	No
35.	UK	6 years		Oradea		Barber shop	Yes	No
36.	UK				20,000 euro	Fitness studio	Yes	Yes
37.	UK	1 year				menswear	Yes	No
38.	Germany	14 years	2014	Bucharest		Sport therapy	Yes (studied sport science)	No

39.	USA & Germany	6 years		Doftana Valley		restaurant		No
40.	Cruise lines + Spain	3 years (in Spain)		Bucharest		Advertising agency	Somewhat (worked as human resources consultant and business developer)	No
41.	USA & UK			Bucharest		Padel club (mix between tennis and squash)	Yes (played tennis professionally and worked as financial consultant)	No
42.	USA			Cluj-Napoca		Software company	Yes (worked as software engineer)	No
43.	Italy			Zarnesti (Brasov County)		Restaurant	Yes (managed a restaurant)	No
44.	Ireland	10 years		Timisoara	300,000 euro	IT industry	Yes (worked in the IT industry)	No
45.	Several countries but mostly in the UK	6 years	2016	Bucharest		Beauty salon	No	No
46.	France, Poland, Germany	10 years	2011	Buzau County		Slow food/slow tourism	No	No

47.	Italy			Arges County		Tourism	No	No
48.	Germany & Italy			Bucharest		Collecting mushrooms and truffles	No	No
49.				Maramures		Tourism (B & B)	No	No
50.	Cruise lines		2004	Bucharest	800,000 euro	Restaurant & real estate	Yes	No
51.	France	15 years		Ileanda (Salaj County)		Lavender	Yes (learned about lavender in Southern France)	No
52.	France		2013	Bucharest	200,000 euro	Bakeries	No	No
53.	Germany	22 years	2005	Cluj-Napoca, Brasov, Sibiu	2 million euro	Real estate, construction of apartments	Yes (worked in construction)	No

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The Politics of Russian 'Diaspora': From Compatriots to a Russian World

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Abstract

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left twenty-five million ethnic Russians living outside the contemporary borders of the Russian Federation, the country's ruling elite have undertaken increasing efforts over time to formulate policies on "compatriots", regardless of whether this population has conceived of themselves as such. Drawing on political speeches, official policy documents, and scholarly literature, this paper seeks to illustrate how the Kremlin's understanding of the boundaries and meaning of national identity has driven its diaspora politics. More precisely, I argue that the contextualization of Russian diaspora is constituted and constrained by the vision of national identity that the Kremlin endorses over other competing visions of Russian identity, since diaspora is primarily defined in reference to *the* nation. Moreover, my research highlights that the Russia's interaction with Europe and the West plays a key role in the process of constituting its identity. This interaction, in turn, influences how the Russian authorities formulate diaspora policies in the former Soviet states. Finally, I suggest that the Kremlin's instrumentalization of compatriots serves as a domestic goal by promoting national unity around a vision of national identity that it endorses.

Keywords

Russian Diaspora, Post-Soviet Russia, Compatriots, Russian World, Putin

Introduction

What drives Russia's diaspora policies in the post-Soviet states? Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union left twenty-five million ethnic Russians living outside the contemporary borders of the Russian Federation, Russia's ruling circles have undertaken increasing efforts over time to formulate policies regarding this population. In the context of uncertainty surrounding the status of the Russians in the newly established post-Soviet states, Russia's political elite redefined the country as the homeland of ethnic Russians as well as those with "a cultural and historical 'link' to Russia" (Pilkington & Flynn, 2006, pp. 56–57). As the Kremlin employed this broad definition of nationhood to claim responsibility to protect its "compatriots" living abroad in the neighboring countries, early scholarly literature explored the potential outcomes of such diaspora policies for regional stability (King & Melvin, 1999; Kolstoe, 1995; Melvin, 1995; Shlapentokh et al., 1994; Zevelev, 2001). Yet the rhetoric of compatriot protection did not translate largely into action under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. Only after Vladimir Putin's reelection to the presidency in

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2004, did diaspora politics begin to constitute a central place in Russia's foreign policy. Against this background, more recent scholarship has focused on how the country's foreign policy has evolved to instrumentalize its compatriots in the post-Soviet states to assert regional leadership (Grigas, 2016; Laruelle, 2015; Pieper, 2020; Saari, 2014; Suslov, 2018). Of those studies, however, only a few have devoted particular attention to identity politics in explaining the evolution of Russia's diaspora policies (Laruelle, 2015; Shevel, 2011; Suslov, 2018; Zevelev, 2014). This paper aims to complement this literature by examining how Russian identity formation has figured in the development of its foreign policy practices towards the compatriots in the neighboring states throughout the past two decades.

My work proposes that Russia's diaspora policies are shaped to a great extent by domestic debates about national identity. More precisely, I argue that the contextualization of the Russian diaspora is constituted and constrained by the Kremlin's understanding of the boundaries and meaning of national identity.[1] Therefore, the vision of national identity that the Russian authorities have endorsed over other competing visions has profoundly affected the formation and development of its diaspora in the post-Soviet states, since diaspora is primarily defined in reference to *the* nation. Second, my work claims that Russian policies towards the diaspora are particularly influenced by how the country perceives itself in relation to Europe and the West. In other words, I assert that Russia's interaction with these actors has played a key role in the process of constructing its vision of national identity, which, in turn, has affected how the Kremlin has formulated its diaspora policies in the neighboring states. Lastly, in addition to the above arguments, I argue that Russia's diaspora-related foreign policy practices may assist the authorities by strengthening public support for their particular vision of identity inside the country. As such, the Kremlin's instrumentalization of its diaspora in post-Soviet states has served a domestic purpose by developing national unity around the regime's vision of Russian identity.

While my research assesses the formation and development of Russia's compatriot policies within the context of the evolution of its national identity, it devotes a special attention to Russia's war in Georgia in 2008 and its annexation of Crimea in 2014 under the presidencies of Dmitriy Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, respectively. These two events specifically demonstrate how Russia's understanding of its position vis-à-vis Europe and the West has influenced its leaders' diaspora-related policies. Methodologically, I rely on political speeches, official policy documents, and scholarly literature to substantiate the arguments laid out above. In this vein, any quotes used for illustrative purposes from Russian presidents' statements are selected to best demonstrate how the Kremlin's understanding of national identity has shaped its policies towards the compatriots. By highlighting domestic sources of Russian foreign policy making, this paper also offers an explanation as to why and when state diaspora policies undergo transformation.

In the rest of the article, I first provide an overview of post-Soviet Russian diaspora studies and outline my own theoretical framework. The following sections examine the evolution of Russia's policies towards its compatriots in tandem with the development of Russian national identity as promoted by the Kremlin in the past two decades. In conclusion, I summarize and discuss the findings of my research.

The Russian 'Diaspora' and Identity Politics

The study of the Russian diaspora in the post-Soviet states grew as a significant avenue of research throughout the 1990s. Most studies at this time tended to focus on how Russian communities historically had come to settle in the newly established states, their current situation as well as the citizenship, minority, and the language policies of the states that they lived in, and Russia's policies regarding these communities, any domestic factors that shaped such policies, any probability of regional instability (Chinn & Kaiser, 1996; King & Melvin, 1999; Kolstoe, 1995; Shlapentokh et al., 1994; Zevelev, 2001). Alternatively, some other studies focused on identity relations, how the formation of national identities in these post-Soviet states would affect the Russian communities, and whether these communities that found themselves suddenly living outside the new Russian state would develop a distinctive identity, integrate and assimilate, or emigrate (Laitin, 1999; Melvin, 1995). Yet, by the end of the 1990s, more studies began to question the appropriateness of employing the term "diaspora" to describe Russian communities in post-Soviet states, noting that Russians living abroad had actually been cut off from their homeland as a result of receding state borders rather than involuntary dispersion and that they developed varying attitudes towards the homeland among themselves (Kosmarskaya, 364 C.E.; Pilkington & Flynn, 2006; Smith, 1999).[2]

Whether or not Russian communities living abroad constitutes a diaspora in the conventional sense of the term notwithstanding, Rogers Brubaker's (2005) proposition to conceive of diaspora "as a category of practice" laid the ground for much of the following literature. In essence, this line of thinking treats diaspora "as a way of formulating the identities and loyalties of a population" (2005, p. 5). Then, the obvious question arises: Who does such formulating on behalf of a given population? Building upon this insight, here I focus on how Russia's political elite has sought to invent a diaspora with references to "compatriots" regardless of whether Russian communities in the former Soviet republics have conceived of themselves as such. Even though I pay particular attention to Russia's position vis-à-vis Europe and the West in explaining its diaspora policies, my primary aim is not to provide a geopolitical perspective.

At the same time, some recent studies have offered in-depth geopolitical analyses of Russia's policies towards compatriots. For instance, Agnia Grigas (2016) explains that the Putin regime has instrumentalized its diaspora abroad with the purpose of reimperializing the post-Soviet states. Her work identifies a set of diaspora policies that have served as the Kremlin's primary means to achieve this end, including soft power tools, passportization, and annexation of territories where the compatriots settled. Similarly, Moritz Pieper (2020) discusses how the Kremlin's pretextual use of protecting the compatriots served to revise territorial boundaries as its relations with the West deteriorated, focusing on Russian political discourse concerning humanitarian responsibility during the Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Mikhail Suslov (2018) alternatively sheds light on the evolution of geopolitical thinking, surveying how the "Russian World" concept has been connected to the idea of "sphere of influence" in the past two decades.

Exploring a different perspective than geopolitics, this article examines the link between the formation of Russian identity and the development of its diaspora policies. To that end, my analysis delves into Russia's interaction with Europe and the West, with the purpose of

investigating how such interactions have shaped the process of constituting its identity. Prior discussions of diaspora have sometimes focused on this issue. For instance, Igor Zevelev (2008, 2014) suggests that the country's diaspora-related policies mirror its struggle to define nationhood, while explaining further how Russia's understanding of the West has affected its search for identity by means of foreign policy practices. Alternatively, Oxana Shevel (2011) argues that the ambiguous definition of "compatriots" in the law assists to solve Russia's identity question, albeit without actually defining group boundaries. Therefore, this enables the Kremlin to pursue a wide array of policies abroad. Marlene Laruelle (2015) shows how the narrative of "Russia as a divided nation" has been used lately by the Kremlin to prioritize a cultural model of nationhood over the territorial one, highlighting that this narrative has been the only nationalist rhetoric incorporated into Russia's compatriot policies in the post-Soviet era. Somewhat similarly, Erika Harris (2020) discusses how the Kremlin's efforts to designate itself as a kin-state facilitated the construction of Russian nationhood in ethno-cultural and linguistic terms, pointing to the connection between Russia's interference in neighboring states on compatriots' behalf and its unfinished, nation-building project. Yet all these studies, even though they center on national identity, fall short of defining its content explicitly.

Aiming to complement this existing body of scholarship, the paper offers an analysis that explains how Russian identity-formation has interacted with the Kremlin's approach to diaspora-related policies in the past two decades. In doing so, my analysis builds on a framework of identity developed by Abdelal et al. (2009). This framework captures the meaning of identity by breaking it down into four parts: Constitutive norms which refer to the membership rules and appropriate behavior in a group; social purposes which point to the goals that group members seek to achieve; relational comparisons which indicate how group members view themselves vis-à-vis outgroups; and cognitive models which describe how members conceive their group's place in the world.

The above framework provides analytical clarity in my efforts to demonstrate how the Kremlin's understanding of the boundaries and meaning of Russian identity has shaped its approach to the diaspora since the early 2000s. It also assists me in illustrating how Russia's interactions with Europe and the West has played a key role in the development of its national identity. By following this framework, the rest of the paper analyzes the evolution of Russian identity during two periods – between 2000 and 2009 and between 2010 and 2018 –, broadly reflecting the shift in its content as promoted by the Kremlin. In doing so, I seek to explain the evolution of Russia's policies towards its compatriots in the post-Soviet states.

The Construction and Cultivation of Loyal Compatriots, 2000-2009

Once Vladimir Putin came to power after President Boris Yeltsin's unexpected resignation on New Year's Eve 1999, the fierce political competition within Russia to define the essence of and the rules for inclusion in nation that surrounded the post-Soviet period began to wane. Although many scholars neglected the ideational aspect of the Putin rule in early years, a few discerned how the regime had co-opted different strands of Russian political thinking in its quest to form a national unity (Evans, 2008; Laruelle, 2009; Verkhovskii & Pain, 2015). In fact, Putin's intention to develop a Russian idea manifested itself even before he became president. In a newspaper

article published in late 1999, Putin designated a set of values – namely, "patriotism", "great-powerness", "state-centeredness", and "social solidarity" – as the basis of national unity, although he was simultaneously unequivocal about his opposition to an official ideology organized by state. Moreover, he called such values as "the traditional values of Russians (*rossiyan*)" (Putin, 1999), even though they were evidently elements of ethnic Russian (*russkiy*) culture (Kolstø, 2016, p. 19).

Acceptance of ethnic Russian culture as a criterion for belonging to the nation is accompanied by speaking Russian. The centrality of Russian culture and language in the Kremlin's vision of national identity, however, does not mean that cultural and linguistic diversity of non-Russian groups remain unrecognized. But, rather, it is indicative of hierarchical organization in which state privileges traditions of ethnic Russians at the expense of all other groups, as opposed to any civic notion of nationhood. Ethnic and cultural identities aside, inclusion in the nation is further conditioned upon remaining steadfastly loyal to the authorities. This expectation of loyalty is linked to a common past, with the Kremlin recurrently referring to the state's historical role in the lives of its people (Putin, 1999; Surkov, 2009). Though political allegiance does not define what it means to be Russian alone, it nevertheless, along with the cultural and linguistic markers of Russianness, establishes who would be included in the nation.

Moreover, the regime's appeals to the cultural essence and common past of the nation become even more explicit when the Kremlin formulates its identity in relation to external politics. The ways in which the Russian authorities use historical narratives of imperial and Soviet past tend to envision a national identity with Russia as being a great power and regional hegemon (Putin, 1999, 2005). Not only are these narratives important for consolidating Russians around distinct beliefs, but they also assist to justify the Kremlin's claim of a privileged position in the post-Soviet space as the heir of the Russian empire and Soviet state. Indeed, in official political statements, references to Russia's historically special role became more common especially in reaction to the West's increasing influence in the region. To put it different, with the color revolutions toppling the political leaders favored by the Kremlin in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004, Russia's relationship with Europe transformed. As opposed to its claim that Russia belongs to the civilization of Europe in early 2000s, the Kremlin began to emphasize its "civilizational distinctness". According to the rhetoric of "sovereign democracy", for example, Russia could not simply follow Western models of development as its "historic, geography, and other particularities" entail it to find its specific path (Putin, 2005; Surkov, 2009). Conveniently, this line of thinking assisted to oppose Western liberal ideas in domestic politics (Putin, 2006, 2007), while the nation purportedly develop its particular democratic model in accordance with its own traditions. However, it also led to a more assertive foreign policy in the post-Soviet space through a historical narrative of a common history and culture (Putin, 2005), which was further emphasized in response to NATO's prospect of inclusion Georgia and Ukraine discussed in Bucharest in April 2008 (A. P. Tsygankov, 2016). Perhaps more important for the discussion here, with the Kremlin embarking upon a path to assert its leadership position in Eurasia, its diaspora came to be contextualized in a different way than in the 1990s.

As the new Russian Federation under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin undertook nation-building efforts in civic terms (Tolz, 2001), its relation to those who found themselves overnight left behind in the post-Soviet states tended to be inclusive in definition. Referring

to this population as "compatriots abroad", the Federal Law "On the State Policy of the Russian Federation Concerning Compatriots Abroad" of May 1999 defined them as those "who were born in one state, are residing and having resided in it" and "who share a common language, history, cultural heritage, traditions and customs", as well as "their direct descendants", with the exception of "descendants of persons who belong to the titular nations of foreign states" (*Federal Law No. 99-FZ*, n.d.). This definition of compatriot is seemingly vague in explaining who is included in and excluded from the Russian diaspora. For instance, by not clarifying what forms a common language, history, and culture, the law falls short of precisely identifying who belongs to the diaspora. In the end, as Oxana Shevel notes, "anyone from ethnic Russians to all former Soviet citizens" essentially can be categorized as a compatriot (Shevel, 2011, p. 193).

This vague definition of what it means to be a compatriot began to acquire more specificity when Vladimir Putin assumed the Russian presidency. In his 2001 speech at the First World Congress of Russian Compatriots, Putin expressed that embrace of the Russian language and culture (*russkaya kul'tura*) constitutes the essence of the diaspora. Along with ethnic Russians, those who left Russia at the time of the Soviet Union came to be defined as compatriots as long as they self-identify spiritually as one by "speak[ing], think[ing], and … feel[ing] in Russian" (Putin, 2001). This line of thinking also manifested itself when an official foreign policy document in 2006 defined the diaspora along the lines of Russian language, culture, and spiritual unity with the country (as cited in Shevel, 2011, p. 194). What is perhaps more striking, Putin (2001), for the first time in the above-mentioned speech, appealed to a Russian World (*Russkiy Mir*) that exists "beyond the boundaries of Russia and even far beyond the boundaries of Russian ethnos". At the same time, this notion of the Russian World corresponding to the linguistic and cultural essence of the diaspora was reformulated in the second decade of the 2000s in a way that would better promote political ambitions of the Russian leadership in the realm of foreign policy.

While ethnic Russians and culturally Russified persons – aside from the citizens of Russian Federation – were thus implied to form the core of the Russian diaspora (Byford, 2012; Grigas, 2016; Shevel, 2011; Ziegler, 2006); their loyalty to the Russian state came to be considered essential to the identity of compatriots. As an extension of the concept of "sovereign democracy" gaining a foothold in the regime's rhetoric, the Russian diaspora was encouraged to form closer connections to the Russian state by way of organizational structures, while being simultaneously invented (Suslov, 2018, p. 338). Importantly, moreover, this diaspora strategy aimed to assert Russia's leadership in the post-Soviet states – which it views as its sphere of influence – against the West's political, economic, and military advances. As such, a number of organizations sprung up to coordinate relations between presumably loyal compatriots abroad and the Russian state after the mid-2000s. For instance, the World Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots was set up to strengthen communication between the Russian authorities and the diaspora (*VKSRS*, n.d.). The Russian World Foundation was initiated by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science in order to "reconnect the Russian community abroad with their homeland, forging new and stronger links through cultural and social programs". Tellingly, those programs assist to "enhance and encourage the appreciation of Russian language, heritage, and culture" (*Fond "Russkiy Mir,"* n.d.). In a similar vein, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (*Rossotrudnichestvo*), which lies within

the domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, works with compatriots to protect their rights as well as promotes cultural and educational relations (*Rossotrudnichestvo*, n.d.). In parallel to forging the loyalty of the diaspora to the Russian state and its culture by way of organizational consolidation, official foreign policy documents began to involve more content about the Kremlin's commitment to defend the rights of compatriots abroad and to preserve their ethnic and cultural identity and connection to Russia (*The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, 2008).

Perhaps most importantly, this regime-backed political project of inventing and cultivating a loyal diaspora came to serve as a primary means to restore Russian identity as a great power and a regional hegemon. As noted above, following the Kremlin's embracement of the "sovereign democracy" concept, Russia pursued a more assertive foreign policy in its post-Soviet neighborhood. For instance, presumably in reaction to the West's growing influence in Georgia, then-president Dmitriy Medvedev sent Russian troops to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008 when the opportunity arose. Even though neither ethnic Russians nor native Russian speakers were present in South Ossetia according to a 1989 census (as cited in Grigas, 2016, p. 42), the Kremlin justified its military intervention with a narrative of compatriot protection (Medvedev, 2008), since a large share of Abkhazs and Ossetians obtained a Russian passport following a new citizenship law passed in 2002 (as cited in Grigas, 2016, p. 83). This narrative of defending the rights of Russian compatriots in South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not aim to reimagine the relationship between the peoples of these regions and Russia as the homeland; but, rather, it intended to feed Russia's great power aspiration by restoring its regional leadership where it claims "privileged interests". Important for this discussion, Russians consistently chose restoration or preservation of the country's superpower status on the world stage as one of their primary expectations from the president, according to public opinion polls conducted in 1996-2012 (Levada Center, 2013, p. 107). In a way, Medvedev's decision to use military force in Georgia conformed to this expectation.

In addition to asserting its great power identity, Russia's 2008 war with Georgia assisted the Kremlin to advance its civilizational discourse. As Valentina Feklyunina highlights, throughout the conflict, the Russian authorities framed the pro-Western government of Georgia as being "motivated by 'Russophobia'"(March, 2011, p. 193). By "demand[ing] that the Georgian government respect the Russian government, its people *and its values*" (March, 2011, p. 200), In this way, Medvedev was able to promote a vision of Russianness inside the country along ethno-cultural lines. At the same time, the emphasis on Russian values led the authorities to counterpose Russia's civilizational distinctiveness to Western communities, even though Russia was still imagined a part of Europe.[3] In the end, this political discourse revealed itself to resonate with the identity aspirations of Russian society, garnering profound public support for Medvedev and Putin (The Levada Center, 2015). These events subsequently set a course for Russia's identity development as a "state-civilization" in the 2010s. As we will see below, the Kremlin's policies towards its diaspora played a crucial role in constituting and endorsing this identity.

Compatriots in the Making of a Russian World, 2010-2018

Faced with challenges from opposition forces after the fraudulent parliamentary elections of 2011 and in the run-up to the presidential elections of 2012 in which Putin ran for a third term, the Kremlin embarked upon reformulating Russian national idea, with the goal of consolidating public support for the regime. As introduced by Putin (2012) in a newspaper article published as a part of his election campaign, this vision of national identity stresses Russia's distinctive civilizational values as the essence of the nation, while emphasizing the centrality of the state in the historical development of Russian identity. More precisely, Putin claimed that Russia has historically developed as a "state-civilization", while insisting that the "Russian people have confirmed their choice [to be a multi-ethnic civilization] time and again during their thousand-year history". Importantly, he maintained, "the Russian people (*russkiy narod*) and Russian culture (*russkaya kul'tura*) are the linchpin that binds this unique civilization together". In his speech to the Valdai Club a year later, Putin (2013) similarly stressed that "Russia … as a state-civilization reinforced by the Russian people, Russian language, Russian culture, Russian Orthodox church, and the country's other traditional religions".

In this respect, with Putin's return to the presidency, ethnic Russian customs, traditions, and language – in other words, civilizational values – have been unequivocally elevated to define the boundaries and meaning of national identity. Accordingly, regardless of whether a group of people are ethnically Russian, their commitment to "preserving the dominance of Russian culture" is considered sufficient to being included in the nation (Putin, 2012). As discussed earlier, this vision of domestic identity is not novel. However, what has subsequently shifted is the increasing weight and visibility of ethnicity in its content. By referring to ethnic Russians as state-forming people, Putin especially endorsed this ethno-cultural vision of nation. Not only does the regime's emphasis on ethnic Russians affirm their privileged position in nation, but it also highlights once again that minority groups are accepted as long as they uphold Russian values.

What is, moreover, interesting is that traditional values that Putin defined as the essence of Russian nation have now been reformulated as conservative values in the wake of 2011-2012 popular protests. For instance, at his Address to the Federal Assembly, Putin (2013) argued for a "conservative position", stressing that "[the] destruction of traditional values … not only leads to negative consequences for society, but is also essentially anti-democratic, since it …. runs counter to the will of the majority". Following this, he positioned Russia as a force "defending traditional values which have constituted the spiritual and moral foundation of civilization of every nation's for thousands of years". More importantly, this framing assisted the Kremlin to depict anti-regime protesters as a liberal minority – as well as agents of Western governments –, disrespecting the majority's traditional way of life.[4] At the same time, such a comparison laid the foundation of Russia's political rhetoric towards the West.

As noted earlier, Russia's view of itself in relation to the West has undergone a transformation over the last two decades. Even though official statements continue to acknowledge Russia's Europeanness,[5] there has been a growing emphasize on Russia's own distinctive civilizational values.[6] This has been evidenced most particularly in the political discourse of the regime contrasting Russia's conservative values to Western liberal values. For instance, at the Valdai

Club meeting of 2013, Putin (2013) stated that "we can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that form the basis of Western civilization. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious and even sexual". Along these lines, Putin presented Russia as being committed to preserving religious and moral values against the expansion of the West's liberal order (Makarychev & Yatsyk, 2017; A. Tsygankov, 2016). More importantly, when Russia annexed Crimea in the wake of popular protests in 2013-2014 – which had toppled the pro-Russian president of Ukraine –, this discourse formed the basis of a "Russian World" identity-claim. To put it differently, Russia's claim of civilizational distinctiveness revealed itself even further in the "Russian World" project.

In this regard, the "Russian World" concept has evolved from highlighting organizational consolidation of loyal compatriots around Russian state to legitimizing Russia's interference in neighboring countries with the purpose of defending its compatriots' *way of life* during Putin's third presidency. What the Kremlin saw as a threat to its compatriots were not only nationalists and Russophobes sponsored by foreign governments to depose the Ukrainian government, but also growing efforts of the West to contain Russia in the post-Soviet region.[7] Putin (2014c) summed up this sentiment by stating that "at threat were our compatriots, Russian people (*russkiye lyudi*), and people of other nationalities, their language, history, culture and legal rights". He then clarified that "when I speak of Russian people and Russian-speaking citizens I am referring to those who consider themselves part of the broad Russian world, they may not necessarily be ethnic Russians, but they consider themselves Russian people (*russkim chelovekom*)". Hence, this assertation suggests that the criteria for belonging to the Russian World is rather cultural, echoing the Kremlin's evolving vision of particular domestic identity. The idea of the Russian World as a cultural community had recently appeared in Russia's amended compatriots law of 2010 which listed those "living outside the border of the Russian Federation who made a free choice in favor of spiritual and cultural connection with Russia and who usually belong to people which have historically lived on the territory of the Russian Federation" as compatriots (as cited in Shevel, 2011, p. 192). More importantly, by defining compatriots along cultural and linguistic lines, the Russian authorities created room to maneuver in determining who could be argued to be part of the Russian World.

Yet this seemingly inclusive essence of the Russian World does not mean to downplay the preeminence of ethnic Russians among others. Even when Putin (2012) emphasized the cultural boundaries of the Russian diaspora, he referred to the unifying role of ethnic Russians in explaining why they "have never formed ethnic diasporas anywhere". More strikingly, in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea, ethnic Russians were unequivocally acknowledged as the backbone of the Kremlin's compatriot project. Important to note here is that Russians made up fifty-eight percent of the Crimean population, followed by Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars at twenty-four percent and twelve percent respectively, according to census data from 2001 (State Statistic Committee of Ukraine, 2001). Therefore, Putin (2014a) stated that "millions of Russians (*russkikh*) went to bed in one country and woke up abroad, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in the former Union republics, while the Russian nation (*russkiy narod*) became one of the biggest – if not the biggest – divided nations in the world". In a way, this divided-nation rhetoric assisted "positioning of Russia as an ethnic 'homeland'" (Harris, 2020, p. 3; Teper, 2016).

What is, moreover, remarkable is Putin's use of historical narratives to emphasize the Orthodox Christian and Slavic essence of Russian nation. While expressing the importance of Crimea for Russians, Putin (2014a), for instance, underlined that "this is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus".[8] In the same vein, he described Kyiv as "the mother of Russian cities", while invoking ancient Rus as a shared history of Slavic people. The same understanding subsequently led him to suggest that "Russian and Ukrainians are one people". All this considered, it becomes evident that Russia imagines itself as the leader of a Russian World, that is "a Slavic, Russian-speaking, [and] Orthodox Christian civilization" (Grigas, 2016, p. 93).

At the same time, Russia's claim to be the leader of a historic Russian World perpetuates its influence over the territories that Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union once ruled. In fact, the Kremlin has referenced to Russian World with a historical narrative, when legitimizing its interference in the former Soviet states and reclaiming its regional hegemon status. Even in eastern Ukraine where Russia did not openly intervene in the ongoing military conflict there, the Kremlin invoked the imperial past to highlight its "privileged interest" in these territories, while discussing the protection of the rights and interest of local Russians (*russkikh*) and Russian speakers (Putin, 2014b). Additionally, the Russian authorities frequently called Sevastopol as a historically Russian city, while clarifying why they cannot allow NATO's expansion to this land (Putin, 2014c). As some scholars have highlighted, the Russian regime has deliberately associated identity concerns with perceived external threats in a quest to solidify domestic support. In turn, not only did a sizable portion of Russians show support for Russia's right to defend Russian speakers in Crime and Eastern Ukraine (cited in Taylor, 2014), but they also saw Russia's annexation of Crimea as a means to restore its super power status and reassert its regional leadership (The Levada Center, 2016). As seen in the case of Georgia, the Kremlin's identity appeals raised strong domestic support, with Putin's approval rating reaching above eighty percent following Russia's annexation of Crimea (The Levada Center, n.d.).

Conclusion

This article has sought to address a simple, yet important question: What drives Russia's policies towards its compatriots living in the post-Soviet states? I have acknowledged that such question comes with a caveat that those who are broadly defined as compatriots by the Russian authorities might not consider themselves as such. In this respect, I have argued that the politics of Russian diaspora has been profoundly shaped by the Kremlin's understanding of the boundaries and meaning of what constitutes the Russian nation. This article, moreover, has claimed that the Kremlin's understanding of itself vis-à-vis Europe and the West has played a crucial role in the process of constructing Russian national identity. Finally, I have asserted that Russia's engagement in the politics of diaspora has functioned to consolidate society around the Kremlin's preferred vision of identity. In order to support these claims, I have employed an analytical framework that has enabled me to trace shifts in Russian identity as endorsed by the regime by dissecting its content. Concurrently, I have traced the development of Russian diaspora policies towards its neighboring states in the last two decades.

Following Putin's rise to power, Russia's struggle to find its post-Soviet identity came to be addressed along cultural and linguistic markers. Not only did this vision of national identity allude to the preeminence of ethnic Russian values over other groups, it also established loyalty to the authorities as a criterion for inclusion within the nation. Even though the Kremlin has asserted that Russia belongs to European civilization, the West's advances in the post-Soviet space led it to reassess their relationship. Soon thereafter, the Russian authorities embarked upon a path to construct and cultivate loyal compatriots in neighboring states by means of organizational structures. In parallel to the development of Russian identity, the Kremlin emphasized the cultural and linguistic essence of its diaspora. Therefore, when an opportunity presented itself in 2008, the Russian authorities invoked alleged Russophobia as a pretext for defending its compatriots in Georgia. The Russian leadership garnered strong domestic backing, as the struggle to protect its compatriots became associated with Russia's assertation of its great power status and regional leadership. However, Russia's popular protests of 2011-2012 and Ukraine's pro-Western revolution of 2014 have generated significant challenges for the Russian authorities. In its bid to solidify pro-regime support, the Russian authorities began to reformulate Russian idea. Not only did this evolving course of Russian identity development explicitly assert the privileged status of ethnic Russian over minority groups, but it also positioned Russia as the defender of traditional values against decaying Western political liberalism. When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, such shifts in identity content were reflected in the "Russian World" concept. Therefore, the Kremlin's narrative regarding its right to protect primarily ethnic Russian compatriots in Ukraine assisted Russia's claim to be a leader of a distinct civilization that extends beyond its national territories.

In summary, my research has showed that even though the contours of Russian identity as promoted by the Kremlin have remained essentially unchanged, the relative weight of ethnic content within it has significantly increased over time. Similarly, the Russian authorities have placed a growing emphasize on Russia's civilizational distinctiveness since the second half of the 2000s, even though they continued to highlight Russia's Europeanness. In this respect, the Kremlin's evolving understanding of Russian nationhood has driven its diaspora policies towards the neighboring states, while "compatriots abroad" have simultaneously assisted the Russian leadership to domestically promote its own vision of the nation.

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Notes

[1] On the relationship between diasporic identity and national identity, see (Barabantseva & Sutherland, 2011; Brubaker, 2005; Hall, 1990).

[2] On the definition of diaspora, see (Brubaker, 2005).

[3] This idea draws on (Verkhovskii & Pain, 2015, p. 3).

[4] See videos of pro-Putin rallies on February 4 and February 23, 2012 which are available on YouTube.

[5] For instance, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2013) states that "the Euro-Atlantic which, besides geography, economy and history, have common deep-rooted civilizational ties with Russia". Also, see (Lavrov, 2018)

[6] For an in-dept discussion on this topic, see (Linde, 2016).

[7] At a Conference of Russian Ambassadors, Putin (2014c) stated that "we clearly had no right to abandon the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol to the mercy of nationalist and radical militants; we could not allow our access to the Black Sea to be significantly limited; we could not allow NATO forces to eventually come to the land of Crimea and Sevastopol".

[8] Also, see (Putin, 2014d).

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Boundaries of the Turkish Diaspora

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Boundaries of the Turkish Diaspora

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Abstract

This article briefly investigates the evolution of Turkish diaspora over the course of history and pays particular attention to major diaspora formation approaches. Then, the focuses on the Turkish Diaspora within which, before all else, emigration and changing borders are considered major components for diaspora formation. This paper also demonstrates that the history of Turkish emigrant communities began in the 19th century during the Ottoman era and dramatically increased after WWII, during the Turkish Republic era. This study, in particular, focuses on autochthonous aspects of the Turkish diaspora, which came into existence as a result of the Ottoman State's territorial losses.

Keywords

Diaspora, Turkish Diaspora, Autochthonous Diaspora, Migrant Diaspora

Introduction

Diaspora discourse in Turkish public opinion has transformed from having a negative connotation into a positive one that acknowledges the complexities embedded within the communities living outside the Turkish State borders. Although the concept of the Turkish Diaspora is widely used by scholars, politicians, bureaucrats, and the media, they hardly concur on the same definition. The boundaries of the Turkish diaspora, for this very reason, vary in different discourses. Turkish communities in Western European countries, North America, and Australia can be considered the main body of the Turkish Diaspora. The Turkish Diaspora widened with later emigration waves to the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Recent literature, although limited, deepened and expanded the Turkish diaspora by adding long-term native communities living in countries that formerly belonged to the Ottoman State.

The dispersion and historical background of Turkish communities outside the territorial borders of the Turkish State clearly reflect the complexities and a variety of perspectives on the borders of the Turkish Diaspora. In this framework, this study seeks explanations about the formation of diaspora by looking into the historical trajectories of emigrations and analyzing the contribution changing state borders have on diaspora formation.

While investigating the formation of the Turkish diaspora over time, it does so under two main categories: through emigration of people and through geopolitical changes. First, peoples' movement, as in most cases, from homeland to new lands for a variety of reasons, discussed in later sections, pave the way for understanding the Turkish diaspora, from the last centuries of Ottoman State through to the Turkish Republic. Second, changes in borders due to the shrinking boundaries of the weakening Ottoman State in the last two centuries, left some parts of the

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millet as minorities. Millet is defined as religious community irrespective of ethnicity during the Ottoman time, and Aktürk claims that there is clear evidence that the concept of the Turkish nation is inherited from the Muslim Millet (Aktürk, 2009).

Historical and Conceptual Background

Lately, diaspora has become a popular term to describe a nation's trans-border communities, however it is not the only term to describe this concept. Transnational communities, migrant communities, minorities, or kin societies are some major terms employed to define similar communities. All of these concepts are, more or less, related to the nation-state paradigm, which has prevailed throughout the international political system over last two centuries. The recent surge in globalization also has transborder, trans-state communities a major component of international political systems. In this sense, the concept of diaspora is very much related to nation, state, and the global political system. The definition of the nation and people of the state draw the framework for transnational communities. By looking into the usage of diaspora throughout history and by considering changes in the global political system, it is possible to categorize the development of diaspora, as a concept, into three periods.

In the first period, during the Greek pre-classical era, diaspora was first used to describe Athenian settlements around Asia Minor and the Mediterranean Sea. Population increases and limited resources led people to seek new settlements, arable lands, natural resources, and trade opportunities. These new Athenian settlements around Asia Minor and the Mediterranean Sea kept social, cultural, and economic ties with the mainland. (Osborne, 2009; Dufoix, 2008; Cohen, 2008). The next usage of the term is more related to religious communities, beginning with Jewish communities living as minorities. Christian literature also touches on the discourse to define Christians dispersed throughout Roman Empire as diaspora, until the Empire embraced Christianity and they were no longer prosecuted. Towards the end of the Middle Ages, Protestant and Catholic minorities within Catholic and Protestant majorities, respectively, also were called diaspora (Ages, 1973; Dufoix, 2008; Baumann, 2000). Throughout the Middle Ages, diaspora overwhelmingly referred to religious communities. In the same period as Islam's ascendance, the status of Muslim minorities under non-Muslim rulers was also discussed in Islamic Literature. A majority of Muslim scholars advised that if Muslims could freely live and practice their religion as minority under a non-Muslim majority, that land could still be considered Dar-al Islam (Albrecht, 2018; Özel, 2012), and they would still be considered to be within the Muslim nation, regardless of territorial sovereignty. In the opposite situation, where Muslims were not free or not allowed to live according to their religion, they were urged to migrate, as it was seen by the practice (Sunna) of the Prophet Muhammed. It is likely that this paradigmatic distinction led to the absence of the use of the diaspora concept in Muslim Literature during the Middle Ages.

Third period began with the invention of the territorial state in the 17th century, followed by the nationalization of the state starting with the 18th century and laid the groundwork for current diaspora discourse. Multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-linguistic empires turned into nationalized states that successfully or not aimed to homogenize society by imposing a single language and identity. Changes in the formation of the global political system and the triumph of the modern nation system, led to a renewed surge in diaspora discourse, as

well as the expansion of the term. Territorial states, societies, and human movements gained new sociological and political meaning (Kurubaş, 2017). Ethnic/cultural/religious/linguistic minorities, trans-border communities, trans-nation people, refugees, emigrants, migrants, labor migrants, expatriates, expellees, and diasporas also emerged as the outsiders of nation states. This brought about territorial particularities, in which the boundaries of modern states began not to coincide with the boundaries of the new nations (Kurubaş, 2017). The re(de)territorialization process and a dramatic increase in international migration played a vital role in increasing in the number of these kinds of communities throughout the world.

The concept of diaspora evolved with socio-political changes and expanded its characterization. The usage of the term began to increase in the early twentieth century with increasing academic and political interest. Practicality led to the use of the term diaspora as replacement for all others (Tölölyan, 2012; Vertovec, 2006; Clifford, 1994). The complexities and diversities in historical and societal experiences are also reflected in the definitions of the diaspora concept. Diaspora conceptualization is not even close to having an agreed upon parameter any time soon, as Grossman states in his article, in which he challenges the diaspora concept, through almost 200 cited articles defining diasporas between 1976 and 2017 (Grossman, 2018). Based on this selected literature Grossman identifies "6 core attributes": transnationalism, community, dispersal and immigration, outside the homeland, homeland orientation, and group identity. However, these 6 criteria are only the ones that remained above the 50 % threshold out of the 32 criteria that were identified in different concepts.

The proliferation and variety of concepts reflect the distinctions in diaspora experiences. Each diaspora may have a distinct formation closely related to the nation building process. But each diaspora's experience may reflect similarities with other diasporas in some ways. Inductive definitions of the concept of diaspora, whose main focus is the Jewish diaspora, may lead to narrow conceptualizations, which leaves many other diaspora communities out of scope. Many concepts developed by scholars of Jewish identity reflect their own readings of the Jewish diaspora experience. To conceptualize one's own experience is not wrong, but to claim an ideal status and benchmarking position is not right. Forceful expulsion from the homeland was considered vital part of diaspora conceptualization by leading (mostly Jewish) scholars (Safran, 1991; Tölölyan, 2012). Although, the involuntary movement of the people is common for the formation of diasporic communities including modern cases, voluntary movement is also dominating factor, as in the case of Jewish people's migration to Alexandria and other developed cities known in the literature (Ages, 1973). On the other hand, in the modern Israeli state era, close to 1 million people left for other countries with no coercion (Solomon, 2017). With the dramatic increase in international migration, attempts to define diaspora also multiplied during the twentieth century, in which nation states and borders became more apparent. The motivation of international migration varied, including trade, job opportunity, economic prosperity, education, political, or religious reasons. The proliferation of causes for international migration caused coercive emigration to drop off from most diaspora definitions (Sheffer, 2003; Miller, Haas, & Castles, 2013; Dufoix, 2008; Vertovec, 1997; Butler, 2001).

Most diaspora concepts understand that diasporas are formed by the movement of people across borders. Changing borders are considered to be another major way that diasporas have formed, particularly after the dissolution of multi-ethnic, multi-nation, multi-cultural, and

multi-religious empires. The dissolution of multi-religious/cultural/ethnic empires and the rise of nationalized states left many people around Europe and the globe stranded as others/minorities in the new nation states. With Treaty of Versailles, the German Empire lost 7 million of its German people to new nation states (Harriman, 1973), which was conceptualized as "accidental diasporas" by Brubaker. Brubaker's "accidental diasporas" and Laitin's "beached diaspora" conceptualize the communities who have ties to the nation but were left outside the territorial borders of the German and Russian states after the dissolution of the German Empire and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Laitin, 1998; Brubaker, 2000). This conceptualization could be attributed to most multi-ethnic/religious/nation/cultural states who left the political scene and led the flourishing of many nation-states. Similarly, millions of people are socio-culturally tied to the people of Turkey yet remained within other nation states throughout the last two centuries, which largely ended with the Treaty Lausanne in 1923. The Turkish Republic inherited, as such, diaspora communities from its multi-nation empire Ottoman State predecessor. I prefer to call this type of diaspora *autochthonous diaspora,* since they were or became native to their place of residence. The communities defined as autochthonous are considered native residents of their countries and in this way, they are differentiated from recently migrated diasporas.

The question of the Turkish Diaspora

The concept of the Turkish diaspora began to gain ground with increasing emigration and settlement in the West in the post-WWI era. Early literature on Turkish emigration in this period did not employ the concept of diaspora, instead it used migrant community to describe these settlements (Abadan-Unat, 2017; Gitmez, 2019; Martin, 2019). The attribution of the diaspora concept to Turkish migrant communities appeared in the literature a quarter century after the post-WWII emigration and was mostly linked with labor migration (Cohen, 2008; Safran, 1991; (Aydın, 2016)). The Turkish Diaspora concept was expanded in recent literature by adding "co-ethnics" that remained outside the borders of the dissolved Ottoman State and "kin-state" relations (Aksel, 2014; Okyay, 2015). The complexity and ambiguity of the question of the Turkish Diaspora is reflected in the literature. Where to draw the line between migrant, minority, and diaspora community, as well as how diaspora are formed, being member of the diaspora, and continuation of being part of the diaspora are a few of the many questions that remain today.

Although there has been an increase in the use of the term Turkish Diaspora, there are also ambiguities involved with this usage. The blurring comes from misreading the semantic meaning and grounding definition of the diaspora concept, developed mainly by the Jewish experience, as mentioned earlier. Semantically, the Turkish Language Society (TDK- Türk Dil Kurumu) prefers to define the term diaspora as *kopuntu* (fragment), breaking from motherland. TDK additionally, conceptualizes diaspora in reference to Jewish people who live outside their homeland and national and religious minorities living outside their homeland. Because of this definition, the Turkish Diaspora as a concept, does not reflect a holistic picture of the actual Turkish Diaspora.

This definition mainly disregards previous cross border movements, which goes back to last centuries of the Ottoman State. Furthermore, almost none of the literature studies address

the communities that were part of the Turk/Islam millet but remained outside the borders of the modern Turkish Republic, despite the fact that some of these communities were the subject of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Turkish guest labor migration played a vital role in the building and institutionalization of the Turkish diaspora. Another critical issue with conceptualizing the boundaries of the Turkish Diaspora simply as the mobility of people, disregards the impact of the border changes and nation-state formations, which also created trans-border/trans-national communities. This research, thus, contends that the movement of borders and the movement of people have formed the Turkish Diaspora through the separation of people. The movement of the people, Turkish migration, will be analyzed in two periods: from the early 19th century in the Ottoman State period to the 1950's and the post WWII in the Republic period. The changes in the borders that resulted in the creation of diaspora will be investigated under the concept of autochthonous diaspora.

Formation of Emigrant Diaspora

Migration waves of people with Turkish/Muslim identity began in the early 19th century in the Ottoman Empire and continued through to the modern day in Turkey. The density of the waves was volatile due to home and host country policies, as well as regional and global political upheavals. It should be highlighted that the demography and profile of migrants in the Ottoman State and Turkish Republic period reflect opposing pictures. Migration during the late Ottoman time was mostly destined for the American continents, while there were small number of migrations to Europe. On the other side, during the Turkish Republic period, mass migration was bound for Europe, mainly Germany. The emigrant profile was also opposite in these two periods. Ottoman emigrants to the Americas were mainly unskilled workers and mostly non-Muslims, while the Republican period migrants were, relatively speaking, educated and white collar, especially in the first decades. Emigrants to Europe during the Ottoman era were mainly for the purpose of education and training, but during the Turkish Republic time were low-skilled workers. Socio-economic and socio-cultural groups prevailed and the migrants showed distinct pictures in these two periods.

Migration from the Early 19th century to the 1950's

The push and pull factors are important to highlight in order to understand the migration from the Ottoman State to the American continent in the last century of the Ottoman State. During the last century of the Ottoman State, migrations occurred for economic, cultural, political, and geopolitical reasons. While wars, economic hardships, and political situations were the major push factors for emigration from the Ottoman State. Industrialization and economic developments in North America and agricultural opportunities in South America were important pull factors in the selection of countries for migration (Karpat, 1985). Most emigrations from the Ottoman State occurred from the Levant region and the Balkans. Emigration from within current Turkish borders did not occur in large numbers. Emigration from Levant was caused by famine/poverty and inter-sectarian conflict, as well as population increases in the region because of incoming migration from other regions and lack of economic capacity to feed this population (Baycar, 2016). Pioneering emigrants belonged to low-income level groups followed by high

income groups. The economic prosperity of the first migrants motivated the latter groups. Most emigrants were Christian citizens of the Ottoman state. Some Muslims also joined this journey to avoid compulsory military service (Genç & Bozkurt, 2010).

The total migration to South and North America from the Ottoman State between 1860 and 1914 was about 1.2 million. Of these migrants, 600,000 from Levant, 450,000 from Albania, Macedonia, Thrace, and Western Anatolia, with the rest from other Anatolian regions (Karpat, 1985).Among all these ethnic and cultural groups, there were 22,085 registered as Turkish by the American immigration authorities between 1900-1925 (Bali, 2004). The number of Anatolian Muslims that joined the American migration was small and they mostly resided in industrial cities like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Massachusetts (Halman, 1980).

Low participation of Muslims in this emigration process was because of public policy and perception. The Ottoman State's policy was to prevent the Muslim population from diminishing within the country. Continuous wars and the need for manpower had major impact on participation in migration. Muslim citizens' emigration to non-Muslim countries might have caused the Islamic Khalifah to have negative image, so that was considered another factor to explain Muslim people's low emigration rates (Dinçer, 2013). In 1888, the Ottoman government forbade non-professional migrants from leaving the country based on the news they were in a vulnerable situation in the Americas (Dinçer, 2013). Protestant missionaries' activities to convert Muslims, poor treatment of Muslim citizens, and having to change their names to hide themselves were the reasons for this decision. Upon these developments, the government made the decision to provide financial support for those who wanted to return, but there was not too much interest in accepting this offer (Ekinci, 2008). The involvement of the Ottoman State in WWI alongside Germany worsened the situation. Muslims and Turks were included in the "enemy alien" group, lost their free environment, and faced the risk of losing their jobs (Acehan, 2009).

With the demise of the Ottoman State, most of the Ottoman emigrants left for America and other countries. They lost their ties with the Ottoman State and Turkish Republic and became the diaspora of newly established independent states or mandated nations of occupying powers. This also applies to the Armenian and Greek nations who initially migrated from today's Turkish borders and joined their ethno-cultural relatives in the new nation-states. Ethno-cultural ties played critical role in the new diasporic identity. They became the diaspora of Armenia, Greece, Syria, Lebanon, or Albania. Muslim Turkish, Kurdish, and some other Muslim ethnic groups became the citizens of the newly established Turkey.

Although there was not a large number of Anatolian Muslims, more than half of them returned to their homeland before and after World War I. Some returned to the country with financial and logistic support provided by the government. Turkish migrants could not successfully establish a sustainable community in their hostland. A number of factors may explain the failure to establish a community: (1) a low population level comprised of mostly of single people without their families with them, (2) the inability to establish community institutions, (3) the aim to return home after saving enough capital to buy land or establish business. (Akgün, 2000; Ekinci, 2008).

Overall migration to the Americas did not lead to the establishment of a strong community. However, pioneering Turkish diaspora institutions were established by members of the community and descendants of these first migrants. Even with this small population, the American Muslim Turkish community succeeded in initiating a Turkish Journal and charity organizations to support the Ottoman State during WWI (Acehan, 2015). They continued to raise funding during the Turkish Liberation War and transferred a quite substantial amount of money to Turkey (Acehan, 2015). The Turkish Welfare Association (Osmanlı/Türk Teavün Cemiyeti), Protecting Children (Himaye-i Etfal), Red Crescent (Kızılay), and the Turkish Cultural Union (Türk Hars Birliği) are well known organizations (Akın, 2004; Acehan, 2015; Çelik B. , 2008). Some community organizations established in the early 1920s-30s are still active among the Turkish diaspora in the USA, such as the Türk Hars Birliği.

During the last century of the Ottoman State, the main motivation for immigration to Europe was education and training (including internships and vocational trainings). During the last half century of the Ottoman State and many students were sent to Germany, France, and other European countries. The Ottoman State sent students on scholarships to Europe to get tertiary education (Kulaç & Özgür, 2017). To develop the capacity for industrialization, they planned to send 10,000 young people between the age of 12-18 to Germany, but this plan was only partially implemented because of WWI. Also during WWI, different ministries sent apprentices for vocational training (Toprak, 1981).

Migration for education to Europe did not result in strong communities during the late Ottoman Empire, mainly because most of them were either trainees or university students. Their study was sponsored by the State and they were expected to go back to their homeland and contribute to the industrialization of the homeland. However, the population of Turkish community in Germany reached 12,000 in the early 20th century, working in Mercedes, Bosch, etc. (Çelik, 2009). Close political relations between Germany and the Ottoman State also encouraged the establishment of the Turkish-German Friendship Society with branches in major German cities (Çelik, 2009).

The Post-WWI era witnessed new migration policies by western countries, in particular the USA; free migration was abandoned and tight policies were introduced to control the demography. New visa rules and quotas for migration were introduced in the early decades of the 20th century. Changes in how migrants were accepted had a negative impact on Turkish emigration to the USA. The total number of migrations from Turkey was 2,081 between 1930-1949 (HomelandSecurity, 2011). Two World Wars in the first half of 20th century, the rise of nationalist states, and the concentration on building nation states also had an impact on Turkish emigration. However, it should be noted here, this period witnessed many population transfers and exchanges around the world, including Greece-Bulgaria, Turkey-Greece, and Germany-Poland. So, Turkish emigration was very limited between 1920-1950.

Though emigration came to standstill in the 1930's, irregular migration from Mardin to Beirut was an exception. They used informal routes through the Hatay province. The economic, social, and political situation in the region pushed people to migrate. Language and job opportunities in Beirut pulled most Mardinians. Arabic speaking citizens of Turkey from Mardin survived in Beirut for over 90 years, through unrest and civil wars. They are concentrated in 5

quarters of Beirut with estimated population of 30,000. Most of them have already obtained Lebanese citizenship and remained in close contact with Turkey. In recent years, community institutions organized Turkish language courses for younger generations and they are able to vote in Turkish elections with increased turnover (Algan, 2018; Nas, 2017; Özdemirci, 2017).

Post-1950 Migrations

After the Second World War (WWII) migration policies and international migration saw new changes and directions. Western countries loosened the restrictive migration policies of the interwar period and allowed new migrants, but with controlling regulations. In this period, Western European countries turned into immigrant destinations from being sources of emigration, to the USA and Australia as well. Over a century, the migration profile of western countries has changed due to population losses to the new world and wars, including declining population growth and increasing demand for labor power. Post-WWII rebuilding efforts in Europe and big economies' need for skilled labor migration attracted Southern European as well as Turkish migrants to these new destinations (Börtücene, 1967; Gökdere, 1978). Economic growth in western countries was major pull factor; Germany's GDP grew from 74 billion DM in 1950 to 240 billion DM in 1961. That growth trend projected the need for another 2 million in the labor force until 1970 (Börtücene, 1967).

In the same period, economic hardships and political instability in Turkey were major push factor for the growing population. Economically, 2.3% growth in agriculture and 0.4% growth in industry were not so promising in their ability to absorb the growing active labor force (SBB, 2015). The Turkish population increased from 13 million in 1927 to 27 million in 1960 through immigration from Balkan countries and high birth rates (Gökdere, 1978; İçduygu, Erder, & Gençkaya, 2014). Almost half of this 27 million population belonged to the active labor force and 75% of it was in agriculture, while 1.5 million was jobless (Pehlivanoğlu, 1967).

The demand in the labor market in Western Europe and the immigration policies to attract skilled professionals in North America triggered Turkish migration in the 1950s. Engineers, medical doctors, and professionals began to migrate in 1956, followed by workers in 1957, through individual and private initiatives (Kurtuluş, 1999; Mortan & Sarfati, 2011; Unat, 2017). Brain and labor migration started in the same period. Furthermore, governments embraced non-professional labor migration as a policy and signed bilateral agreements with Germany (1961), Austria (1964), Belgium (1964), Holland (19654), France (1965), Sweden (1967), and Australia (1967) to send Turkish labor migrants to these countries. Although there was no agreement, direct and secondary migration to Switzerland, Norway, and Denmark also occurred.

Western European countries allowed official labor migration until the mid-1970s, by that time the Turkish population in the West reached over a million, overwhelmingly to Germany (DB, 1973). Compared to the 6,700 Turkish population in Germany in 1960 (Unat, 2017), this mass migration was critical in paving the ground for the creation of the Turkish diaspora over a decade. Temporary emigration at the beginning turned into long-term residence through the second decade and migrants remained in their countries of residence for a longer period (Gitmez, 2019). With the changing of the migrant profile from temporary guest workers into long-term migrants, the community of Turkish residents gradually built up.

Although most European countries stopped official migration during the early 1970s with the economic crisis, the Turkish population in Western Europe continued to grow through family reunification, unofficial migration, and asylum seekers. After migration from Turkey with the motivation of family reunification, the composition of the Turkish diaspora shifted from a male dominant worker population to a more gender balanced Turkish population with children. This happened by being able to bring their families from Turkey. When the second generation became of marriage age, they preferred to choose their spouse from Turkey, mostly in the second generation but less so in the third generation. Newborn children to Turkish families also played critical role in the population of Turkish diaspora. 195,000 children were born in Germany alone between 1961-1976 (YİS, 1976).

Irregular migration and asylum seeking were also in practice after the mid-1970s. There were only 809 asylum applications to West Germany in 1976 but it went up to 57,913 in 1980. Disorder and the 1980 military coup triggered political asylum seekers destined for Western European countries. Two out of five migrants were asylum seekers between 1980-2000 (İçduygu, Erder, & Gençkaya, 2014). Although some of these people met the criteria of political migrant, some used asylum seeking to migrate without meeting the criteria.

The 1980s were interestingly difficult for the Turkish migrant community in Europe. Host countries such as Germany openly embraced policies aimed at reducing the number of foreigners (İçduygu, Erder, & Gençkaya, 2014; Martin, 1991). Some influential German intellectuals (initiated by Theodor Schmidt-Kaler) publicly warned of the risk of foreign cultures and foreign languages undermining German identity, soul, and Christian culture (Circle, 1982). These years witness a significant increase in racist attacks towards Turkish migrants.

In the same period, a military coup in Turkey had a critical impact on Turkish migration. The military government asked western governments to impose visas for Turkish citizens to control outflow of people (T24, 2021).The military government also tried to convince host governments to take state responsibility for religious and cultural education away from community organizations. Interestingly, while the military government attempted to exert its power over the nation beyond its territorial borders, at the same time, it also initiated some political lobbying activities that used diaspora communities.

While economic stagnation in the West changed the policies of western governments toward migration, on the other hand, the oil boom in the Middle East opened new doors for Turkish migrants. This was second major labor-motivated Turkish migration movement in the post-WWII period. Beginning with Libya, Turkish construction companies were awarded contracts in the region, which also catalyzed labor exports to these countries. Libya was followed by Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries. Turkey signed bilateral labor agreements with Libya (1975), Jordan (1982), Qatar (1986), and Kuwait (2008). 400,000 Turkish workers went to Middle Eastern countries between 1970-1986 (Gül, 1992). In the 1990s, official labor emigration was overwhelmingly destined to Middle Eastern countries (DPT, 1994). Although most went as contracted labor, the service sector also followed. Starting with the first Gulf War, conflicts and internal wars interrupted Turkish migration. However, due to the contract bounded nature of Middle Eastern migration, it did not result in building a diaspora community as seen in western bound migration.

Despite the policies implemented by host countries and increasing barriers to migration and family union, the Turkish migrant community continued to grow in western countries. Along with labor workers in the Middle East, the Turkish migrant community passed 3 million in the early 1990s. Turkish migrants in western countries showed a new direction in this period; interest in gaining host country citizenship, this reassured the creation of Turkish diaspora community. Turkey also responded by changing the citizenship act and allowed dual citizenship. According to the Federal German Statistics department, only 14,500 Turks received German citizenship between 1972-1990, this figure went up to 410,000 between 1990-2000 (DİYİH, 2015).

The third wave of Turkish Migration came with end of Cold War. Although Turkish construction companies began to take up some contracts in Russia based on bilateral agreements just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the independence of 14 new republics, Turkish businesses, workers, civil society activists, and students poured into the newly independent countries. This new destination widened from the Balkan countries to the far east of Central Asia. 153,000 workers were officially sent to these countries, although most went independently between 1989-2007 (İçduygu, Erder, & Gençkaya, 2014). The Turkish migrant community seeded in this region, though it is not comparable with the first wave in size. The profile of the community may be composed of small and medium enterprises, civil societies, students, and mixed marriages.

The fourth destination, albeit nascent, began with the African Opening policy by the Turkish government in the new millennium. The Turkish community is slowly increasing in Africa, alongside the diplomatic presence of the country. The number of Turkish Embassies increased from 12 to 42 in Africa and Turkish Airlines began to fly 60 destinations in Africa. The African Opening policy encouraged small, medium, and large enterprises, as well as civil society organizations and both skilled and unskilled workers set foot in the continent. Investment by Turkish companies reached 6 billion USD.

After half a century since the beginning of mass migration in 1950s, Turkish communities spread around the world and built community institutions. Migration formed the Turkish diaspora overwhelmingly concentrated in western countries including North America and Oceania. Post-Soviet, Middle East, and African countries harboring Turkish migrant communities are dotted in different parts of the world in small numbers.

Movement of Borders: Autochthonous Turkish Diaspora

Turkish Diaspora literature rarely includes the autochthonous Turkish diaspora. I believe this is caused by transferring diaspora concepts from other experiences, without further assessing and looking into the history of the formation of the Turkish nation and its trans-border communities. When the Ottoman State began to withdraw from its territories in the 18th century, the trans-border part of the Turk/Islam millet was created; in most cases their rights mentioned in bilateral and multilateral agreements. The end of multi-nation Ottoman State and the creation of new states with a new nation idea enforced the “other” status of the diminishing Islam/Turk

population outside of the new Turkish Republic[1].

The rush to build nations and create homogenous societies led to mass deportations, cleansing, and in some cases exchange of populations. 1.8 million Muslim Crimeans left their land between 1783-1922 (Akgündüz, 1998), up to 2 million north Caucasian Muslim people were expelled, (Güngör, 2006) and 2 million left Balkans between 1878 and 1913 (Karpat, 2010), gradually towards modern day boundaries of Turkey. A smaller group of people from North Africa migrated to Ottoman territory after their lands became occupied by European countries. Whether they directly lived under the Ottoman State or not, under the occupation or threat by foreign forces, Muslim communities in these regions found safety by migrating to Ottoman lands. People who lived directly under Ottoman rule with a shared culture and values understandably choose to migrate to the borders of Ottoman State (Karpat, 2010). However, despite mass migration of these people, some of their neighbors, relatives, and compatriots chose not to leave their native land, remained as minority, and continued to maintain close contact with relatives in Turkey and preserved their culture and identity.

Both the Ottoman government and the Ankara TBMM government entered negotiations bilaterally or multilaterally to protect the rights of the remaining millet within non-Muslim majority states. The first its kind, the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (*Kuchuk Kainarji*), in 1773 included an article that explicitly mentions the right of the Tartar Muslim nation and their nativity, signed between the Ottoman State and Russia. The minority status and the rights of Western Thrace's Muslim Turkish community have been built up through conflicts and a series of agreements. After the independence of Greece, the 1830 London Protocol, the 1881 Treaty of Istanbul, the 1913 Treaty of Athens, the 1920 Greece Treaty of Sevres, and the 1923 treaty of Lausanne gave the responsibility to observe the rights of minorities, which was applied to the Ottoman and Turkish Republic to maintain its responsibility for the Muslim minority under the Greek control. Each agreement, with varying articles and details, mentions the cultural, religious, social, educational, economic, and civic rights of the Muslim communities. It was signed by the host government and the Ottoman and Turkish governments. The sovereignty was also shared in the appointment of the head of the Muslim community through these agreements. Turkey, as the successor state of Ottoman state, has authority to approve shortlisted Baş Mufti by Greek authorities. This is an important point, to the extent that sovereignty crosses the territoriality.

The Muslim/Turkish community in Bulgaria was the subject of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, the 1908 and 1913 Istanbul conventions, and the 1925 friendship agreement. Political rights, representation, economic rights, religious freedom, and protection of private and waqf properties were defined in the treaty of Berlin. Subsequent agreements and their application to domestic regulations, reiterated the rights of the Muslim/Turkish community as well as the relationship with the authorities in Istanbul. The Kars and Moscow agreements regarding the Muslim people of Batum/Acara, which was signed by the Parliamentary Government of Ankara, also have similar articles for the rights of Muslim communities and guarantee authority to Turkey.

[1] This discussion could indeed be extended with the literature on Ottomanism, Islamism, and nationalism debates in the late Ottoman Empire, which are mainly about how the Ottoman ruling elites have turned to Islamism, after the loss of Balkan territories, and then nationalism based on Sunni Muslim identity, with the rise of Itthihad Terakki, but I leave this to further studies.

As a result, the last centuries of geopolitical upheavals and border changes led to the creation of a Turkish autochthonous diaspora. These communities are very much linked with the socio-cultural identity of the Turkish Nation. State boundaries were erected and respected, but the socio-cultural and ethno-linguistic ties survived and built trans-border spaces. The few aforementioned autochthonous diaspora community examples are the most known Turkish cases. Two World Wars and the subsequent Cold War, as well as the political priorities of governments interrupted contact between these communities until the 1990s. Most countries embrace more of a cooperative approach, eased the tension, and deemed these communities as catalyst for economic, cultural, and political relations between countries.

Concluding Remarks

Diasporas globally, and in particular case the Turkey's diaspora, are increasing their weight in academic discourse, policy circles, and the wider public agenda. The imposition of territorial states and the long struggle to create a nation embedded with that territorial state, ironically led to the proliferation of nations beyond borders, trans-nations, and diasporas. This was the latest phase of the usage of the diaspora concept, which dispersed dramatically compared to two previous usages during the time of city states and the Middle Ages. The twentieth century witnessed hundreds of hyphenated diasporas; Irish Diaspora, German Diaspora, Palestinian Diaspora, Moroccan Diaspora, Colombian Diaspora, Nigerian Diaspora, Japan Diaspora, Pakistani Diaspora, Lebanese diaspora, and so forth. They all have distinct experiences in most cases, but a lot of commonalities too, and are all very much linked to their states' history of nation building.

Borrowing from major diaspora literature, I categorized the formation of Turkish diaspora in two major subsets: international migrations that created migrant diaspora and geopolitical changes that formed autochthonous diaspora. While the Turkish migrant diaspora has continued to extend its boundaries since the 19th century, the autochthonous diaspora is static and has even diminished, in some cases, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. It is also worth mentioning, that migrating autochthonous diaspora members sometimes join Turkish migrant diaspora communities in the diaspora, such as Western Thrace Muslim Turks in Germany and Australia, as well as Muslim Turks from Bulgaria in different European countries or Caucasian and Crimean Tatar Turks in USA.

This article traces the concept of the Turkish diaspora back to the late Ottoman period to understand the boundaries of the Turkish Diaspora. The future studies should further offer clarifications on the concept and boundaries of the Turkish Diaspora to contribute to long overlooked but nascent Turkish diaspora studies.

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Bir Sosyal Hareket Olarak Hindistan Diasporası: Körfez Ülkeleri Örneği

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Bir Sosyal Hareket Olarak Hindistan Diasporası: Körfez Ülkeleri Örneği

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Özet

Bu çalışmada Hindistan'ın Körfez diasporası bir sosyal hareket perspektifinden incelenmiştir. Çalışmanın amacı, Modi döneminde Körfez diasporasının nasıl yeniden inşa edildiğini analiz etmektir. 1970'lerde büyük petrol rezervleri sayesinde kalkınmaya başlayan Basra Körfezi'ndeki Arap ülkeleri, modern bir devlet kapasitesine sahip olmak adına yoğun bir işgücüne ihtiyaç duymuşlardır. İhtiyaç duyulan göçmen işçi kapasitesi ise Hindistan'dan tedarik edilmiş, Basra Körfezi ve Güney Asya ekseni dünyanın en büyük göç koridorlarından biri haline gelmiştir. Göçmen işçileri hem Körfez ekonomilerini canlandırmış hem de Hindistan ekonomisinin bel kemiği haline gelmiştir. Ancak göçmen işçilerinin diaspora kimlikleri sınırlı bir düzeyde gelişmiştir. Bunun aksine Modi döneminde yeni diaspora stratejisiyle diaspora kimliği tıpkı bir sosyal hareket gibi yeniden inşa edilmiştir. Son zamanlarda, sosyal hareket teorisi diaspora çalışmalarında sıklıkla kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Özellikle de diaspora kimliğinin yeniden inşası, siyasal süreç teorisi ve çekişmeci teori aracılığıyla analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu çalışmada da bu iki yaklaşım üzerinden yeni bir model önerilmiş ve Hindistan'ın Körfez diasporasındaki değişim makro, mezo ve mikro dinamikler bağlamında incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda öncelikle bir sosyal hareket olarak diasporalar teorik olarak tartışılacaktır. Ardından Hindistan'ın Körfez'deki diasporasının ortaya çıkışı, gelişimi ve içeriği tarihsel olarak incelenecektir. Bir diğer bölümde önerilen model aracılığıyla Modi döneminde diasporanın stratejik olarak nasıl yeniden inşa edildiği tartışılacaktır. Sonuç bölümünde ise ortaya çıkan yeni Covid-19 salgınının diaspora siyasetine verdiği zarar ve yükselen eğilimler değerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Hindistan, Körfez Diasporası, Sosyal Hareketler, Değişim

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The Indian Diaspora as a Social Movement: The Case of the Gulf Countries

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Extended Abstract

The origins of the Indian diaspora date back to the 19th century. In the 1970s, the Indian diaspora started to migrate to the Gulf countries for the first time. Indian immigrants have been seen as a catalyst for economic development and recovery in Gulf countries and migration to the region has increased rapidly. Remittances transferred by the diaspora to their families in India have become more and more important for the country's economy and the Indian state has gradually tried to develop diaspora policies in this direction. The geographical, cultural, and historical proximity of the Arabian Peninsula to India has made the region a suitable place for Indians. For this reason, immigrants from all over India have been able to migrate and settle in Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. As migration has grown exponentially with the economies of the Gulf countries, labor numbers have steadily increased. South Asian workers did not claim political rights and did not interfere with political and cultural spheres in the Gulf countries therefore have not posed a threat to the power and authority of the ruling elites in the Gulf and helped consolidate their power. As a result, the Indian diaspora today in the Gulf has reached 8.5 million, making up more than 70 percent of the total workforce and a quarter of the total Indian diaspora.

In the study, the Indian diaspora is analyzed theoretically from the perspective of social movements. In diasporas as a social movement, identity and identity discourses are at the center of the imagination of the diaspora community. The social movement theory, which focuses on the possibility of social change through the political and social mobility of the masses, is based on the fact that it is possible to reconstruct the diaspora socially through the mobilization of communities residing in different geographies. It has been argued that the reconstruction of diaspora consciousness can be achieved through changing political environments, actors and organizations. In this context, the design process of diasporas, which are handled in a similar way to the emergence and development of social movements, are generally examined with two different approaches used in the analysis of social mobilization: the political process theory and the contentious theory. The rebuilding of the Indian diaspora is evaluated on 3 criteria and 11 indicators in the context of these two mainstream theories. While the criteria are listed in terms of macro, meso and micro; all criteria are discussed over different indicators. For example, while macro criteria are analyzed with the indicators of regional politics, foreign and economic policies, and foreign relations; the meso criteria are analyzed in the context of governments, the nature of regimes, openness of systems, existing laws and policies, and state capacity. In addition, micro criteria are evaluated on individuals and groups, ideology and resource mobilization indicators.

The Indian diaspora as a social movement was re-strategized in the Modi period. Since its first year in power in 2014, the Hindu nationalist Modi administration centered diaspora politics in terms of social, political, economic, and human capital and diaspora politics has

been ideologically reoriented. In this context, a political and diplomatic initiative has also been organized in the Gulf countries, where more than a quarter of the Indian diaspora are located. In the context of the strategic rebuilding of the diaspora, the processes and contexts in terms of all macro, meso and micro dynamics have been well managed and the Indian immigrant community could be mobilized from the perspective of social movement. For example, variables such as international conjuncture, the rise of nationalism and economic needs could be used in the construction of the diaspora. This new strategy has been found to be very important, particularly for India's economic interests. However, the strategy is at great risk with the Covid-19 pandemic as noted in the conclusion of the article. Until today, no problem in diaspora politics has come close to the damage caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. The Modi administration, which faced a great diaspora crisis with the pandemic, fell into an impasse at first. While it is practically impossible for 8.5 million immigrants, who constitute the world's largest diaspora community, to return to India; there has been a critical dilemma between some of them being readmitted to their countries and continuing to remain there. Similarly, returning migrants futures' and what they can do in the country has raised a completely different question mark. The Modi government has been under an intense criticism campaign regarding both the internal and external migrant crisis, but has gradually tried to produce economic, diplomatic and institutional solutions to the problem. The message that Prime Minister Modi, who has been meeting with Gulf leaders, wanted to convey to the public was that he was a follower of the welfare of the immigrants and the situation was under control. However, the most striking issue concerning the diaspora during the epidemic process was the exacerbation of mutual nationalist feelings. Therefore, just as the epidemic process has revealed the need for a comprehensive migration management system in India and the Gulf countries, it may also lead to new strategic steps for the diaspora.

Giriş

Basra Körfezi'nde bulunan Arap Devletleri 1930'larda topraklarında büyük petrol rezervleri keşfetmişler ve 1950'li yıllarda yavaş yavaş ekonomik kalkınma adımlarını atmaya başlamışlardır. 1970'li yıllara gelindiğinde Körfez ülkeleri, zenginliklerini arttırarak dünyanın başlıca petrol ihraç eden ülkeleri haline gelmişlerdir. Bununla birlikte bu ülkeler, küçük nüfusları ve düşük yoğunluklu işgücü kapasiteleriyle ekonomik kalkınma noktasında seviye atlamakta zorlanmışlar ve karşılaştıkları zorluğun üstesinden gelebilmek adına dışarıdan işgücü ithal etmek zorunda kalmışlardır. Bu doğrultuda "Körfez Patlaması" olarak hatırlanan tarihsel süreçle yüksek işsizlik oranlarıyla karşı karşıya kalmış olan Hindistan'dan yoğun bir işçi göçü Körfez ülkelerine akmış ve hem Hindistan işsizlik oranları düşmüş hem de Körfez ekonomilerinin en temel eksiği giderilmeye çalışılmıştır (Abraham, 2012).

Hindistan'dan Körfez'e giden göçmen işçiler, ilk başlarda Kerala eyaletindeki Müslümanlardan oluşmuşken, zamanla Hindistan'ın önce diğer güney eyaletlerinden sonra da kuzey eyaletlerinden göçmenler nüfusu arttırmıştır. Son yıllarda 8,5 milyon gibi bir rakama ulaşan Hindistanlı göçmenler, yıllar içerisinde bir taraftan Körfez ülkelerini modern devletler haline getirirken, diğer taraftan da Hindistan ekonomisinin uzun yıllar bel kemiği vazifesi gören havale yoluyla döviz girişinin asli unsurları haline gelmişlerdir. Daha çok düşük vasıflı işçilerden oluşan göçmenler, önemli kitleler haline gelmelerine rağmen, herhangi bir siyasal talep içerisine

girmemişlerdir. Bu sebepler de hem Körfez ülkeleri için önemli bir tehdit teşkil etmemişler hem de Hindistan-Körfez göç koridoru dünyanın en önde gelen koridorlarından biri haline gelerek bölgeler arası ilişkilerin en temel bileşenleri haline gelmişlerdir (Chanda ve Gupta, 2018).

Hindistan ekonomisi için özel bir konuma sahip olmalarına rağmen, göçmen işçiler uzun yıllar bir diaspora çerçevesinde ele alınmamış ve siyaseten daha büyük kazanımlar sağlayabilecekleri Hindistan siyaset yapıcıları tarafından düşünülememiştir. Ancak ülkenin 1990'larda yavaş yavaş serbest piyasa ekonomisine geçişiyle birlikte farkına varılan diasporanın stratejik mahiyeti, özellikle Modi dönemiyle hem dış hem de ekonomik politikaların yavaş yavaş merkezine yerleştirilmeye başlamıştır. Kongre Partisi sonrası 2014 seçimlerinde iktidara gelen Narenda Modi öncülüğündeki Hindistan Halk Partisi (BJP), ekonomik liberalleşmeyi merkeze alan yeni ekonomik vizyonu ve aynı doğrultuda geleneksel çizginin ötesinde çok boyutlu dış politikasıyla ülkenin yumuşak gücüne de fazlasıyla önem vermiş ve bu kapasitenin arttırılması adına diaspora siyasetini yeniden ele almak gerektiğinin farkına varmıştır. Bu doğrultuda özelde Körfez diasporasını genelde ise tüm Hindistan diasporasını daha medeniyetsel bir okumayla yeniden inşa etmeye çalışan Hindu milliyetçisi Modi yönetimi, devletin tüm olanaklarını kullanarak resmi ve gayri resmi kurumlar aracılığıyla yeni bir diaspora stratejisi geliştirmiştir (Pradhan ve Mohapatra, 2020).

Modi'nin yeni diaspora stratejisi, iç politikada olduğu gibi kimliksel unsurları bünyesinde barındırmıştır. Diasporayı stratejik çıkarlar kadar kimliksel unsurlar üzerinden okumak ise diaspora toplumunun sosyal olarak yeniden inşasıyla ilgili bir sürece karşılık gelmektedir. Nitekim diaspora çalışmalarında literatürün son örnekleri, diaspora topluluklarına yükselen kimlikler üzerinden bir sosyal hareket perspektifinden bakmayı içermiştir. Bu bağlamda nasıl bir sosyal hareket, belli sosyal, ekonomik, kurumsal ve psikolojik dinamiklerle tabandan yukarıya inşa ediliyor ve sosyal değişim arzusu gerçekleştiriliyorsa, benzer şekilde kitlelerin benzer mobilizasyon araçlarıyla güdülenmesi ve arzu edilen yöne doğru kolektif eylem biçimleri oluşturularak da yeni bir diaspora kimliğinin inşası mümkün olabilmektedir. Bu açıdan Modi dönemi yeni diaspora stratejisine de bir sosyal hareket perspektifinden yaklaşmanın düşünüldüğü çalışmada, öncelikle teorik olarak bir sosyal olarak diasporanın içeriği tartışılacaktır. Ardından Hindistan'ın Körfez diasporasının tarihsel olarak ortaya çıkışı, gelişim süreci ve içeriği ele alınacak ve bir sonraki bölümde de Modi döneminde uygulamaya konmaya çalışılan yeni diaspora stratejisi önerilen model üzerinden sosyal hareket perspektifinden analiz edilmeye çalışılacaktır. Sonuç bölümünde ise diaspora politikalarına büyük darbe vuran Covid-19 süreci ve ortaya çıkabilecek muhtemel eğilimler tartışılacaktır.

Sosyal Hareket Olarak Diasporalar

Diaspora kavramının herkes tarafından kabul görmüş belirli bir tanımı yokken; literatür, diasporanın belli kurucu unsurları üzerinden ilerleyebilmiştir. Bu kurucu unsurlar bu çerçevede daha çok zorla yerinden edilme ya da konjonktürel bir yer değiştirme, travmatik bir süreç ve de ortaya çıkan bir vatan siyasetiyle ilgili gelişmiştir. Sonuçta kökeni itibariyle varlıksal gücünü başka coğrafyadan alan ve farklı coğrafyalara dağılmış bir nüfus söz konusudur. Sürekli ilerleyen diaspora literatüründeki son çalışmalar ise, ortak fikir ve kolektif kimlikler temelinde bir siyasi vatan meselesi etrafında stratejik olarak mobilize edilen bir diaspora olma sürecine

vurgu yapmaya çalışmıştır. Başka bir deyişle diasporaların da belli bir inşa süreciyle yeniden üretiminin mümkün olabileceği üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu noktada diasporanın oluşumunda nesnel koşullar kadar öznel yorumların da büyük önem arz ettiği kabul edilmiştir. Diğer bir ifadeyle diaspora topluluğunun tahayyülünün merkezine kimlik ve kimliksel söylemlerin oturduğu gözlemlenebilmiştir.

Diasporanın kimliksel söylem ve süreçlerle sosyal değişim üzerinden yeniden düşünülebileceği tartışmaları, sosyal hareket teorisini diaspora çalışmalarına dahil etmiştir denilebilir. Kitlelerin siyasal ve sosyal hareketliliği yoluyla sosyal değişimin gerçekleşebileceğini merkeze alan sosyal hareket teorisi, farklı coğrafyalarda ikamet eden topluluklarının mobilizasyonu yoluyla da diasporanın sosyal olarak yeniden inşasının mümkün olabileceği üzerinden hareket etmiştir. Burada değişen siyasi çevreler, aktörler ve organizasyonlar aracılığıyla diaspora bilincinin yeniden inşasının sağlanabileceği savunulmuştur. Bu yöntem, diasporaların ulus-ötesi politika ve süreçlerin aktörleri olarak analiz edilmesine bir yanıt olarak ortaya çıkmışken; özellikle diasporaların uluslararası ilişkilerdeki rolüne ilişkin önemli bir teorik katkı sunmuştur. Bu çerçevede göçmen toplulukların sadece sınırları aşıp farklı coğrafyalara dağılmalarıyla kimliklerin siyasalaşmasının açıklanamayacağı iddia edilmiş ve diasporaların oluşumunun merkezinde yer alan "ulus-ötesi bir hayali topluluğun" (Quinsaat, 2019) sosyal yapısına dikkatler çekilmiştir. Bir başka ifadeyle göçmen toplulukların sosyo-politik mühendislik yoluyla siyasi girişimciler tarafından söylemsel ve çerçeveleme süreçleri aracılığıyla diaspora haline getirildikleri savunulmuştur (Quinsaat, 2019).

Sosyal hareketlerin ortaya çıkışı ve gelişimine benzer şekilde ele alınan diasporaların dizayn süreci, genellikle sosyal mobilizasyonların analizinde başvurulan iki farklı yaklaşım üzerinden ele alınmıştır. Bu yaklaşımlardan birincisi siyasal süreç teorisiyken; diğeri çekişmeci teoridir. Kolektif davranış çalışmalarına benzer şekilde siyasal süreç teorisi, bir sosyal hareketin sonraki yörüngeleriyle birlikte gelişme olasılığının dış ve iç değişkenlere bağlı olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Genellikle siyasi fırsat yapıları olarak adlandırılan dış değişkenler, siyasi elitlerin parti bağlarını ve ittifaklarını, mevcut yasaları ve politikaları, rejim türünü ve devletler arasındaki ilişkileri içermektedir. İç değişkenler ise, kolektif kimlik, ideoloji, finansal kaynaklar, liderlik ve organizasyon yapısı gibi unsurları kapsamaktadır (Kriesi, 2004; Bauböck, 2010). Sosyal hareketlerin yükselişinde önem arz eden protesto koşulları ve belirleyicilerine odaklanan siyasal süreç teorisi, mevcut değişkenleri sonuçlara bağlayan mekanizma ve süreçleri yakalamaya çalışan çekişmeci teori ile desteklenmiştir. Çekişmeci bir sosyo-politik atmosferi inşa için fırsat veya tehdit yapıları oluşturmak, çevresel konulara atıfta bulunmak ve de ilişkisel mekanizmaları kullanmak gibi farklı parametrelere başvuran çekişmeci teori, tüm parametrelerde de sosyali yeniden üretme ve tanımlamayı hedeflemiştir (McAdam, Tarrow ve Tilly, 2001; Whittier, 1997).

Siyasal süreç teorisinin dış değişkenler ayağına diaspora perspektifinden bakılacak olursa, burada grupların ve bireylerin belirli iddialarda bulunma, kaynakları mobilize etme ve sonuçları şekillendirme gibi beklentilerinin mobilizasyonun ortaya çıktığı siyasi ortama bağlı olduğu kabul edilmektedir. Siyasal bağlam bu kadar önemliyken; sosyal hareketlerin ortaya çıkması ve büyümesi için önem arz eden kabaca dört kriterin altı çizilmiştir: kurumsallaşmış siyasi sistemin görece açıklığı, tipik olarak bir idareyi destekleyen geniş elit grupların istikrarı, elit müttefiklerin varlığı ve devletin baskı kapasitesi ve eğilimi. Bu kriterler örneklere göre değiştirilebilecekken, burada önemli olan farklı siyasal bağlamlar arasında ortaya çıkan farklı

kriterleri tespit edebilmektedir (Jasper 2012; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 2011). Başka bir deyişle diasporanın anavatanındaki siyasi bağlam ile ev sahibi ülkedeki siyasi bağlam ayrı ayrı önem arz etmekteyken; iki ülke siyasi ilişkileri üzerinden ortaya çıkan dış siyasal bağlam da farklı etkide bulunabilmektedir. Örneğin bireysel ülkeler bağlamında siyasal ortam analiz edileceğinde, ülkelerdeki mevcut hükümetler, rejimlerin doğası, devlet kapasitesi, mevcut yasa ve uygulamalar diaspora aktivizmini etkileyebilecekken; ülkelerin birbirleriyle ilişkileri üzerinden gelişen siyasal ortam açısından da dış politikalar, devletler arası ilişkiler ve karşılıklı ihtiyaçlar da diasporanın aktivizm kapasitesine etki edebilecektir. Tabi mevcut siyasal bağlamdaki kurumsal değişiklikler ya da dış politika davranışlarındaki değişimler de yine diasporanın davranışsal yeteneğini etkileyebileceği literatürde tartışılmıştır (Bolzman, 2011; Byman, 2001; Fair, 2005).

Siyasi fırsat yapısının bu özellikleri, sosyal hareket ve diaspora araştırmalarında paradigmatik olmaya devam etmekteyken; bununla birlikte devlet merkezli teorik yaklaşımların, yalnızca kurumsal ve politika çeşitliliğini yakaladığı ve ulus ötesi diaspora siyaseti üzerindeki etkilerini ıskalayabildiği de gözlemlenmiştir. Dolayısıyla yapılara odaklanmanın tek başına diaspora oluşumunu açıklayamayacak oluşu, siyasal süreç teorisinde iç değişkenleri de gündeme getirmiştir. Burada da diaspora aktivizmine etki edebilecek unsurlar, birey ve gruplar arası ilişkilerden, maddi kaynaklara ve geniş toplumsal desteğe kadar unsurları kapsamaktadır. Bu çerçevede daha çok ön plana çıkan kriterler de kaynak mobilizasyonu, siyasal liderler ve sosyal elitlerin politika ve davranışları, başvurulan ideolojiler ve de farklı gruplar arası ortaya çıkabilecek rekabet ilişkileriyle ilgili gelişmiştir. Kaynakların mobilize edilmesi, hem devletleri diasporaya doğru hem de diasporanın kendi vatanlarına doğru sermaye akışına karşılık gelmekteyken; diaspora unsurları milliyetçilik, liberalizm, sadakat ve vatana bağlılık gibi ideolojik unsurlar tarafından motive edilebilmektedir (Piven ve Cloward, 1979; Shain, 1994). Diğer yandan politik girişimciler, ortak kültür, ulusal tarih, etnik kimlik gibi stratejik söylem ve çerçeveleri üzerinden kolektif kimliği besleyebilmekteyken; diaspora elitleri de benzer şekilde ulusal bağlılık ya da marjinalleşme gibi stratejik ve duygusal söylem ve çerçeveler üzerinden diaspora içi bir teşvik edici rol üstlenebilmektedir. Ayrıca ilhamını anavatandaki siyasal farklılıklardan alan diaspora içi siyasal bölünmelerde de rekabet unsuru yine bir iç etken olarak değerlendirilebilmektedir (Polletta ve Jasper, 2001; Anderson, 1992; Boccagni, 2010).

Siyasal süreç teorisinin eksikliğini kapatmayı hedefleyen ve diasporaların gelişme ve sonuçlarına yönelik değişken tabanlı açıklamalara odaklanan çekişme teorisi, çekişme odağıyla ilgili olarak iç ve dış siyasal bağlamların yetersiz olabileceğini vurgulamıştır. Çekişmeyi daha iyi analiz edebilmek adına da iç ve dış siyasal bağlamların yanında, çekişmenin bileşenleri olabilecek sosyal aktörlerin analizinin gerekliliğini vurgulamıştır. Bu bağlamda üç farklı mekanizma üzerinden hareket eden çekişme teorisi, söz konusu mekanizmaları fırsat ve tehditler, çevresel unsurlar ve de ilişkisel mekanizmalar üzerinden sıralamıştır. Siyasal elitlerin güncel politik gelişmeler üzerinden kolektif kimliği motive ve mobilize edebilmek amacıyla fırsat yapılarını kullanması ve tehdit algıları inşa etmesi diaspora aktivizmi açısından önemli görülmektedir. Yine siyasal elitlerin nüfus artışı ya da sınırlı kaynakların tükenmesi gibi çevresel koşullara vurgu yaparak diaspora siyasetine ivme kazandırabilmektedir (Whittier, 1997). Örneğin kuşaksal süreçlerle ilgili olarak diasporanın devamlılığı sadece iş ve personel açısından değil, kolektif kimliğin zaman içerisinde içselleştirilmesi yoluyla da sağlanabilmektedir. Benzer devamlılık, sonraki nesillerin öncekilerin deneyimlerinden öğrenerek hareketin nesiller arasında yeniden

tanımlanmasıyla da sağlanabilmektedir. Son olarak diasporanın yeniden üretimi siyasi görev ya da faaliyetler gibi ilişkisel mekanizmalar aracılığıyla birbirleriyle kurdukları bağlantılar üzerinden de gelişebilmektedir (Karpathakis, 1999; Miller, 2011).

Tablo 1. Körfez'deki hint diasporasının sosyal mobilizasyonu için model önerisi

Kriterler	Göstergeler
Makro Dinamikler	1-Bölgesel siyaset, 2-Dış ve ekonomik politikalar, 3-Dış ilişkiler
Mezo Dinamikler	1-Hükümetler, 2-Rejimlerin doğası, 3-Sistemlerin açıklığı, 4-Mevcut yasa ve politikalar 5-Devlet kapasitesi
Mikro Dinamikler	1-Bireyler ve Gruplar 2-İdeoloji 3-Kaynak Mobilizasyonu

Bu teorik çerçevenin ardından, Hindistan'ın Körfez'deki diasporasının incelendiği çalışmada daha çok siyasal süreç teorisi üzerinden ilerlenecektir. Siyasal bağlam ve bu bağlamın değişimi merkeze alınarak, diaspora topluluğunun yeniden stratejikleştirilmesi siyasal ortamın hem dış hem de iç değişkenleri aracılığıyla analiz edilmeye çalışılacaktır. Ancak burada siyasal bağlamlar, sadece iç ve dış etkenler olarak değil, çatışma teorisinin kimi unsurları da eklenerek makro, mezo ve mikro seviyede ele alınmaya çalışılacaktır. Bu doğrultuda da diasporanın yeniden inşasını içeren makro dinamikler açısından mevcut Güney Asya ve Ortadoğu siyasetleri, Hindistan ve Körfez ülkeleri dış ve ekonomi politikaları, karşılıklı dış ilişkiler ve bu kapsamdaki teşvik ve sınırlamalar gösterge olarak kabul edilecekken; mevcut hükümet, rejimlerin doğası, sistemlerin açıklığı, mevcut yasa ve politikalar ve devlet kapasitesi ise mezo dinamiklerin göstergeleri olarak analiz edilecektir. Diaspora aktivizmini sürekli yeniden canlandıran mikro dinamikler ise, birey ve gruplar, kaynak mobilizasyonu, ideoloji ve kolektif kimlikler üzerinden değerlendirilecektir. Tüm diaspora ilişkileri sürecini sekteye uğratan, hatta tüm kazanımları tehlikeye atan bağlam değişimiyle ilgili olarak Covid-19 süreci tartışılacaktır. Ayrıca diaspora kolektif hareket sürecine büyük bir darbe vuran Covid-19 salgınının etkileri de sonuç bölümünde tartışılacaktır.

Körfez'de Hindistan Diasporasının Ortaya Çıkış ve Gelişimi

Hint diasporasının tarihi, Hindistan'ın ticaret bağlantılarıyla yakından bağlantılıdır ve İndus Vadisi Uygarlığı'nın eski Mezopotamya ve Mısır ile ticaret yaptığı yaklaşık dört bin yıl öncesine

kadar geri götürülebilir. Bu bölgelerdeki küçük tüccar topluluklar, modern Hint diasporasının öncüleri olarak görülmektedir. 15. yüzyılda ise yine ticaret aracılığıyla Batı'da Zanzibar ve Mısır'dan, Arap Yarımadası'nda Yemen ve Umman'a ve de Uzak Doğu'da Arakan ve Malacca'ya kadar Hint Okyanusu kenarı Hint diasporasının geliştiği bir eksene karşılık gelmiştir (Onk, 2007).

Modern anlamda Hint diasporasının kökleri ise, Avrupalı güçlerin Asya'daki iddialarını pekiştirdiği 19. yüzyılda sömürgeciliğin yükselişiyle ortaya çıkmıştır. Bugün Fiji nüfusunun yüzde 42'sini oluşturan Hindistan diasporası, ilk olarak 1879'da şeker tarlalarında çalışmak üzere sözleşmeli olarak ülkeye götürülmüş ve aynı yıllarda benzer şekilde Pencaplı Hintli inşaat işçileri, Doğu Afrika Demiryolunu günümüz Kenya, Uganda ve Tanzanya boyunca döşemek için kullanılmışlardır (Onk, 2007).

Hindistan'ın bağımsızlığını kazandığı 20. yüzyıla bakıldığında, yurtdışında yaşayan ve çalışan yeni bir Hindistanlı neslinin ön plana çıktığı görülmektedir. Çok sayıda Hintli, 1940' ve 50'lerde savaş sonrası işçi yokluğu gidermek için Batı Avrupa'ya taşınmıştır. Yine 1960'lar yeni bir Hintli dalgasının, özellikle Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne göçüne tanık olmuştur. Hindistan'ın sosyalist hükümetine uyum sağlayamayan ve niteliklerine göre yeterli iş bulamayan Hintli mühendisler ve girişimciler ABD'ye gitmişlerdir. Aynı on yıl, Pencap'ta artan şiddetten kaçmak için binlerce Pencaplı'nın Kanada'ya taşındığı gözlemlenmiştir. Goa'nın 1961'de Hindistan Birliği'ne katılmasının ardından çok sayıda Goalı Portekiz'e taşınmıştır. 1970'lerde ayrıca Hintlilerin zulümden kaçmak için Uganda'dan Avrupa ve ABD'ye göçüne tanık olunmuştur. Hindistanlıların Ortadoğu'daki Körfez ülkelerine göç etme tarihleri de ülkenin güney eyaletlerinden binlerce vatandaşın petrol sektöründe orta ve düşük seviyeli işleri üstlenmeye gittiği 1970'li yıllara denk düşmüştür (Pande, 2013).

Hindistan ekonomisinin yavaş yavaş liberalleştiği ve ödemeler dengesi ve mali aksaklık yaşadığı döneme denk gelen Hindistanlıların Körfez göçü, Hindistan'ın ilk defa diaspora siyasetine yönelik akıl yürütmeye başladığı döneme de öncülük etmektedir. Ekonomik krizi atlatma ve ekonomik kalkınma için bir katalizör olarak görülmeye başlayan diaspora için yavaş yavaş yatırım yapılmaya başlanmıştır. Arap Yarımadası'nın Hindistan'a coğrafi, kültürel ve tarihsel yakınlığı ise bölgeyi Hintliler için uygun bir yer haline getirmiştir. Nitekim Hint alt kıtasının Arap ülkeleriyle derin ilişkilerinin kökenleri uzun yıllar öncesine dayanan medeniyetsel bir geçmişe dayanmaktadır. Hint astronomisi, rakam bilimi ve Ayurveda sağlık sistemi gibi parametreler Arap halklarının her zaman alt kıtaya olan ilgisini arttırmışken; birçok Hintli tüccarın da yakınlık itibariyle ticaret ve yatırım için Arap yarımadasını tercih ettiği bilinmekteydi. Bu nedenle Hindistan'ın dört bir yanından gelen göçmenler, Suudi Arabistan, BAE, Katar, Bahreyn, Umman ve Kuveyt gibi Körfez ülkelerine göç edebilmiş ve yerleşebilmiştir (Rahman, 2009).

Hintli göçmenlerin Körfez bölgesine göç etmelerinin temel sebebi ise bölgenin yükselen işgücü talebine cevap vermekle ilgili olmuştur. 1970'li yıllarda Körfez ekonomilerinin petrol aracılığıyla katlanarak istikrarlı bir şekilde büyümesi ve bölge ülkelerinin düşük bir yerel işgücü kapasitesine sahip olmaları büyümeyi devam ettirebilmek adına işgücü ithalatına başlamalarına neden olmuştur. Bu doğrultuda yabancı işçileri davet etme politikasını başlatan Körfez ülkeleri, Güney Asyalı işçilerin düşük vasıflı işleri kabul etmeye hazır olmaları nedeniyle, başta Hindistan

olmak üzere birçok Güney Asya ülkesinden işçileri işgücü gereksinimlerini karşılamak için ülkelerine kabul etmiştir. Söz konusu göç, Körfez ülkelerinin ekonomilerini katlanarak büyüttükçe, işçi rakamları da düzenli olarak artmıştır (Rahman, 1999). Güney Asyalı işçilerin siyasi haklar talep etmemeleri ve Körfez ülkelerinin siyasi ve kültürel alanlarına müdahale etmemeleri ise, Körfez'deki yönetici elitlerin güç ve otoritelerine tehdit teşkil etmemiş ve iktidarlarının konsolide olmasına yardımcı olmuştur (Naufal, 2015). Buna karşılık, Körfez rejimleri de hem vasıflı hem de vasıfsız işçi göçmenlerinin ülke ekonomilerindeki inşaat, petrol ve diğer nitelikli sektörlerinin temel bileşeni olmalarına izin vermiştir. Bu karşılıklı çıkar ilişkilerin sonucu olarak ise, Hindistan diasporası 8,5 milyon kapasitesine (Tablo-3) ulaşarak hem toplam işgücünün yüzde 70'inin hem de toplam Hint diasporasının dörtte birinden fazlasını teşkil etmiştir.

Tablo 2. Körfez'de göçmeni bulunan güney asya ülkeleri ve göçmen sayıları

Ülkeler	Göçmen Mevcudu	Yüzde (%)
Hindistan	8,904,781	31.5
Bangladeş	3,103,607	11.0
Pakistan	3,065,435	10.8
Sri Lanka	726,331	2.5
Nepal	665,441	2.3
Afganistan	448,806	1.6
G. Asya Toplam Göçmen Sayısı	16,914,201	60
G. Asya Dışı Toplam Göçmen Sayısı	11,224,371	40
Körfez Bölgesindeki Toplam Göçmen Sayısı	28,138,572	100

Kaynak: *BM Uluslararası Göçmen Raporu, 2019*

Tablo-2'de net bir şekilde görülebildiği üzere Körfez'e olan işçi göçünün düzenli olarak arttığı Covid-19 öncesi dönem baz alındığında, bölgedeki göçmen sayısının yüzde 60'ını Güney Asyalı göçmenlerin teşkil ettiği görülebilecekken; Güney Asyalı göçmenlerin de yarısından fazlasını Hindistanlı göçmenler oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda 2017'de neredeyse 9 milyona karşılık gelen Hindistanlı göçmenler, Körfez bölgesinde bulunan yabancı uyrukluların neredeyse üçte birini temsil etmişlerdir.[1] Körfez ülkelerindeki vatandaş olmayan işçilerin yüzdesi sırasıyla 1975'te yüzde 22,9'dan 2002'de yüzde 38,5'e ve 2017'de yüzde 51'e çıkmışken; yarısının yabancıların oluşturduğu bir toplumda Hindistanlı göçmenler üzerine diaspora çalışmasının yapılması oldukça doğal bir sonuç olarak görülebilir.

[1] Hindistanlı göçmenlerin 2017 ve 2018 arası sayılarının düşüşü diğer bölümde yapısal sorunlar bağlamında açıklanacaktır.

Tablo 3. Ülkelere göre körfez'de bulunan hindistanlı göçmenler

Ülke	Yerleşik Olmayan Hindistanlılar	Hindistan Menşeli Kişi Sayısı	Denizaşırı Hindistanlılar
Bahreyn	312,918	3,257	316,175
Kuveyt	928,421	1,482	929,903
Umman	688,226	919	689,145
Katar	691,539	500	692,039
Suudi Arabistan	2,812,408	2,160	2,814,568
Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri	3,100,000	4,586	3,104,586
Toplam	8,533,512	12,904	8,546,416

Kaynak: *Hindistan Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2018*

Hindistanlı göçmenlerin Körfez ülkelerindeki dağılımına bakıldığı zaman ise, Tablo-3'te görülebileceği üzere en fazla göç ettikleri ülkeler Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri ve Suudi Arabistan ülkeleri olmuştur. Kuveyt, Katar, Umman gibi ülkelerde de azımsanmayacak bir orana sahip olan Hindistanlılar, çoğunlukla göçmen statüsünde olmakla beraber, çok az sayıda vatandaşlığa kabul edildikleri görülmektedir. Bu durum da kamu sektöründeki yüksek ücretli memuriyetler için daha çok vatandaşlarını tercih eden Körfez ülkeleri göz önüne alındığında, tüm Güney Asyalı göçmenler gibi Hindistanlıların da daha çok düşük vasıflı işlerde istihdam edildiğini göstermektedir. Yine de 1970'li yıllardan bu yana bölgeye akın eden Hinidstanlıların, eğitim ve tıp gibi orta sınıf mesleklerde de yerini alabildiği araştırmalara yansıyabilmiştir. Öte yandan Hindistan'dan eyaletlere göre göç edenlerin fotoğrafına bakıldığında ise, 2000'li yıllara gelene kadar Güney Hindistan eyaletlerinin daha fazla göçmen göndermiş olduğu görülmekteyken; son yıllarda ülkenin Kuzey eyaletlerinden gelenlerin de sayısının arttığı tespit edilebilmektedir. Bu çerçevede ülkenin güneyinde bulunan Kerala eyaletin ilk baştan bu yana en fazla göçmen gönderen eyalet olduğu söylenebilecekken; son yıllarda Uttar Pradeş ve Bihar gibi kuzey eyaletlerinin de yavaş yavaş söz sahibi oldukları dile getirilebilir (Hindistan Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2017).

Modi Dönemi ve Diasporanın Yeniden İnşa Edilmesi

Üzerinde güneşin hiç batmadığı bir diaspora imparatorluğuna sahip olmakla övünen Hindistan için Modi dönemi, ülke dışında bulunan Hindistan diasporasının yeniden ele alınarak daha fazla stratejikleştirildiği bir döneme karşılık gelmiştir. Hindu milliyetçisi Modi yönetimi 2014 yılında iktidara geldiği ilk yıldan itibaren diaspora siyasetini sosyal, politik, ekonomik ve beşeri sermaye açısından merkeze almış ve ideolojik yaklaşmıştır. Bu bağlamda Hint diasporasının dörtte birinden fazlasının bulunduğu Körfez ülkeleri ise ayrıca politik ve diplomatik bir açılıma tabi tutulmuştur. Diasporanın stratejik açıdan yeniden inşası bağlamında ele almayı tasarladığımız tüm makro, mezo ve mikro dinamikler bakımından da süreç ve bağlamlar iyi yönetilmiş ve göç etmiş olan Hindistanlı göçmen topluluğu sosyal hareket perspektifinden mobilize edilebilmiştir.

İlk olarak diasporayı harekete geçiren makro dinamikler üzerinden gidilirse, çeşitli

parametreler aracılığıyla hem Güney Asya siyasetinin yükselişi hem de yükselen Güney Asya'nın Ortadoğu siyasetiyle giderek daha fazla angaje olması trendi aracılığıyla bölgesel siyasetlerin jeopolitik açıdan yeniden değer kazanmasından başlanabilir. Bu bağlamda her şeyden önce Çin'in uluslararası politikada yükselişi, ortaya koymuş olduğu Kuşak-Yol Projesi ve bu girişim kapsamında geliştirmiş olduğu ülkeler arası yeni ilişkiler bölgeler arası davranış kurallarının yeniden tartışılmasına yol açmıştır. Çin'in yeni dış politik aktivizmi ve yatırımlarıyla Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldivler gibi ülkelerle geliştirdiği yeni ilişkiler, başta ABD olmak üzere Hindistan, Japonya ve Avustralya gibi ülkeleri rahatsız etmiş ve Çin karşıtı bir gündemi yavaş yavaş hayata geçirmeye başlamışlardır. Bu kapsamda hem Güney Asya coğrafyası hem de bölgeden Avrupa'ya uzanan Batı Asya bölgesi her geçen gün büyüyen jeopolitik bir rekabet alanı haline gelmiştir (Rai, 2018). Çin'in aktivizminin diğer bir alanı olan donanma kapasitesini arttırma ve güçlü bir deniz gücüyle okyanus siyasetinde etki alanını geliştirme politikası, benzer şekilde bu politikadan rahatsız olan ülkeleri Hint-Pasifik vizyonu ya da QUAD ittifakı gibi gündemlerde buluşturmuş ve Pasifik Okyanusu'ndan Hint Okyanusu'na, Umman Denizi'nden Basra Körfezi ve Kızıldeniz'e kadar Batı Asya coğrafyasındaki tüm su, liman ve deniz gücü siyasetini alevlendirmiştir. Bu çerçevede Hint Okyanusu'nun en önden gelen aktörlerinden biri olan Hindistan için de söz konusu kuşaktaki etkinliğini arttırmak bir taraftan kendi bölge ülkeleriyle diğer taraftan Batı Asya ülkeleriyle ilişkilerini geliştirmekle yakından ilişkili görülmüştür (Choong, 2019). Diasporayı kullanmak da burada önemli opsiyonlardan birine karşılık gelebilmiştir.

Bölgesel siyaset gündeminin uygunluğunun yanında, Hindistan'ın Modi döneminde takip etmeye başladığı yeni dış politika ve ekonomi çerçevesi de diaspora siyasetiyle oldukça uyumlu bir görüntü vermiştir. Sol eğilimli Kongre Partisi sonrası iktidara neo-liberal bir ekonomi vizyonuyla gelen Modi yönetimi, bir taraftan son hızla küresel ekonomiye entegre olarak ekonomik liberalleşme yoluna girmiş, diğer taraftan da bu gündeme uygun başta kendi komşuları olmak üzere işbirliği siyaseti üzerinden katman katman Uzak Doğu'dan Afrika'ya, Avrupa'dan Latin Amerika'ya kadar dünyanın tüm bölgeleri üzerine çok boyutlu bir dış politika takip etmeye çalışmıştır (Hall, 2015). Her ne kadar kendi bölgesinde Pakistan ya da Asya siyasetinde Çin ile büyük bir çıkar çatışmalarına girmiş olsa da, yine de Modi yönetimi kimi zaman kültürel yakınlık kimi zaman da stratejik çıkarlar üzerinden dış politik aktivizmine devam etmeye çalışmıştır. Bu çerçevede Batı Asya da Hindistan'ın ilişkilerini geliştirmede önem verdiği ve bölgesel bir strateji geliştirdiği bölgelerden birine karşılık gelmiştir. Üç saç ayağı üzerine oturtmaya çalıştığı Batı Asya politikasında Hindistan, bir taraftan İran ile Çebahar Limanı gibi stratejik çıkarlar üzerinden, bir taraftan İsrail ile İslam karşıtlığı gibi ideolojik yakınlık üzerinden ilişkilerini geliştirmeye çalışmışken; diğer taraftan da enerji ve diaspora siyaseti üzerinden Körfez ülkeleriyle ilişkilerde yeni bir döneme imza atmaya çalışmıştır (Chatterjee, 2019). Türkiye'nin diğer ülkeler kadar öncelenmediği Modi yönetiminin Batı Asya stratejisinde, Körfez'deki diaspora topluluğu yumuşak gücün en önde gelen enstrümanı olarak görülmeye başlamıştır.

Hindistan Batı Asya stratejisini uygulamaya koydukça, başta Körfez ülkeleriyle ilişkileri de tarihinin altın çağını yaşamaya başlamıştır. Önceleri özellikle Keşmir meselesi gibi Hindistan'ın Müslüman dünyanın tepkisini çeken sorunları nedeniyle Pakistan'ın yanında durulmuş ve Hindistan'a tepki olarak fazla yaklaşılmamıştır. Özellikle de İslam İşbirliği Örgütü, bu tepkinin örgütlü bir cevaba dönüştüğü platform olarak kullanılmıştır. Ancak özellikle Trump döneminde

Körfez ülkelerine "Ilımlı İslam" modelinin liderliği profili çizilmek istendiğinden, Hindistan ve Körfez arası gelişebilecek ilişkiler hem iki tarafın kendi bölgeleri dışında etkili dış politika takip ettikleri imajını güçlendirmiş hem de medeniyetler arası diyalogun bir sembolü olarak pazarlanmıştır (Ünlü, 2019). Diğer yandan Modi döneminde zaten Hindistan'dan Körfez ülkelerine göç eden sayısı en üst seviyeye ulaşmışken; Körfez ülkelerinin kalkınmasından böylesine önemli bir işlev gören Hindistan'a da başta Suudi Arabistan ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri tarafından büyük yatırımlar yapılmıştır. Modi'nin her iki ülkeye ziyaretleriyle iyice pekişen işbirliği mantığı, Körfez yönetimlerinin Modi'ye şeref madalyaları vermeleriyle daha samimi ve güçlü bir boyuta yükseltilmiştir. Bu açıdan ilk defa enerji ve ticari ilişkilere ek olarak Güvenlik konusunda da kapsamlı işbirliklerine gidilmiş, ama özellikle Hindistan tarafı insan kaynakları üzerinden diasporanın yaşadığı sorunlara önem vermenin farkına varmıştır (Sharma ve Mehta, 2020).

Diaspora aktivizmini motive eden makro dinamiklerin yanında, daha çok aktörlerin kendi karakteristikleri üzerinden ortaya çıkan mezo dinamiklere bakılacak olursa, her şeyden önce rejimlerin doğasıyla ilgili olarak normal şartlarda demokrasiden çok uzak mutlak monarşi yönetimine sahip Körfez ülkelerinde farklı bir toplumun kimlik bilincinin gelişmesine izin verilmesi rejimin doğasına aykırıdır. Nitekim sosyal olarak açık ancak siyasal olarak kapalı bir topluma karşılık gelen Körfez ülkelerinde, bir taraftan göçmenlere en vasıfsız işler verilip her türlü çalışma hakkı görmezden gelinmiş, diğer taraftan hiçbir vatandaşlık hakkı verilmeyerek ikili bir toplumun ortaya çıkması önlenememiştir (Chaturvedi, 2005). Ancak toplumlar arası böylesine dikey bir yaşam farkının ortaya çıkması neredeyse toplumların yarısının göçmenler tarafından oluşturulan ülkelerde her zaman sokağı repertuarında barındıran bir sosyal hareket riski barındırmaktadır. Bu açıdan belki de Körfez ülkelerinin Hindistan ile geliştirdikleri ilişkiler anavatan siyaseti üzerinden bir kontrol mekanizması inşası olarak da düşünülmüş olabilir. Diğer yandan konjonktürel olarak Hindistan ile gelişen ilişkiler ve karşılıklı ülke siyasetlerine yapılan pozitif katkı da olumsuz bir sosyal dalganın yükselmesini de engelleyici bir faktör olarak ortaya çıkmış olabilir (Pradhan, 2010).

Ülke Müslüman ve Dalitler başta olmak üzere birçok sosyal kesimin yüksek derecede şiddet ve dışlamaya maruz kaldığı yönünden eleştirilse de, dünyanın en çeşitli toplumu olarak dünyanın en büyük demokrasisine sahip olan Hinidstan açısından bir mezo analize hükümetler üzerinden gidilebilir. Nitekim Körfez diasporasına yönelik politika değişimi neredeyse tamamen Hindu milliyetçisi Modi yönetimiyle ilgili gelişmiştir. Modi yönetimi her ne kadar ikinci dönem iktidarını elde ettiği 2019 seçimlerine doğru iyice Hindu milliyetçisi bir çizgiye kaymış olsa da, birinci dönemi olan 2014 yılı seçimleri sonrası daha çok ekonomik değişim üzerinden kalkınmacı bir gündeme sahipti. "Gucarat Modeli" olarak bilinen Eyalet Başbakanı olduğu Gucarat'ta yakalamış olduğu gelişme modelini tüm ülkeye yaymayı vaat eden Modi, 2014 sonrası hızlı bir yapısal reform sürecine girmiş ve uluslararası sermayeyi Hindistan'a çekebilmek adına her türlü adımı atmaya gayret göstermiştir (Schöttli ve Pauli, 2016). Böyle olunca da gerek Körfez sermayesinin yatırım potansiyeli gerekse de Körfez'de bulunan Hint diasporasının para transferi Modi yönetiminin politikalarıyla birebir uyumluluk taşımıştır (Mishra, 2016).

Hükümetlerle ilgili olarak mevcut yasa ve politikalar da diaspora siyasetinde mobilize edici teşvik ya da sınırlamalara karşılık gelebilmiştir. Bu bağlamda sınırlayıcı bir özelliğe sahip olsa da diaspora topluluğunu ortak bir problem üzerinden mobilize eden insan hakları ihlalleri olmuştur.

Hint diasporasının Körfez'deki tarihi çoğunluğunu düşük vasıflı işçilerden oluştuğu için aynı zaman da bir şikâyetler tarihidir de. Bu açıdan kötü yaşam ve barınma koşullarından, maaşların ödenmemesi ya da hiç izin verilmemesi gibi yıllar içerisinde birçok sorun kalıtsallaşmıştır. Bu şekilde işçi hakları, sosyal güvenlik hakları ve refah mekanizmalarıyla ilgili olarak tamamen güvencesiz bir konumda bulunan diaspora üyelerinin durumu, çağdaş kölelikle eşleştirilerek yeni tip sömürü modeli olarak da tartışılmıştır. Kafala Sistemi[2] olarak bilinen ülkedeki göçmenlerin çalışma sisteminin de bu duruma büyük katkı sağladığı tartışılmaktadır (Roper ve Barria, 2014). Diğer yandan bölgedeki diaspora algı ve politikasını geliştiren Modi yönetiminin Körfez stratejisinin en önde gelen aracı göçmen işçiler olunca, diaspora bilincini daha geliştirecek olan teşvikler de karşılıklı ülke ilişkilerinden ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu doğrultuda özellikle Körfez ülkelerine yapmış olduğu ziyaretlerde en önemli gündemlerden biri hep diasporanın refahı olmuş ve bu yönde kurumsal çerçeveyi geliştirecek çok sayıda resmi adım atılması sağlanmıştır. Bu doğrultuda her şeyden önce Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nda diaspora işlerini yönetecek olan bir birim kuran Modi yönetimi, diasporanın refahını koruma ve arttırıcı çok sayıda program geliştirmiştir. Örneğin sömürü riski altında olabilecek kişilere yardımcı olabilmek adına Hint İşçi Kaynak Merkezi kurulmuşken; yine işçi refahını hedefleyen Topluluk Refah Fonları da tasarlanmıştır. Bu ve benzeri önlemler ise reformları gerçekleştirmeyi amaçlayan mutabakat zaptlarıyla tamamlanmıştır. Tüm bu karşılıklı olumlu ve olumsuz uygulamalar ise diaspora bilincinin gelişme motivasyonu olarak değerlendirilebilecektir (Singh, 2020).

Diaspora siyasetine en az devletin karakteri kadar izin veren mezo dinamik devlet kapasitesi tartışmalarıdır. Körfez ülkelerinde yeterli sosyal sermaye olsaydı, mevcut devlet kapasite düzeylerine ulaşabilmek adına Güney Asyalı işgücü ihtiyacına hiçbir zaman ihtiyacı olmazdı. Bu açıdan Güney Asyalı işgücü sayesinde Körfez ülkelerinin kabile krallıklarından modern devletlere dönüşebildikleri bu açıdan oldukça kritik bir tartışma konusudur. Bu kadar yoğun bir diaspora topluluğunu kontrol edebilmek de bir kapasite meselesi olduğu için, ikili ilişkilerdeki ticaret, enerji ve diaspora konularına güvenlik meselelerinin de eklenmesi tesadüfi değildir (Ansari, 2005). Bu bağlamda daha çok diaspora bağlamında ele alınan ülkeler arası çeşitlenen ilişkiler, güvenlik meselelerini sadece karşı taraf tarafından aranan şüphelileri iade etme anlaşmasından ziyade, daha kapsamlı bir mahiyete sahip olabilmiştir. Şüphesiz burada yoğun diaspora nüfusunun rolü çok büyük olmuştur. Benzer şekilde Hindistan devlet kapasitesiyle ilgili en tartışmalı nokta ekonomik kapasiteyle ilgiliyken; diaspora hem kendi para transferiyle hem de diasporanın yoğunluğu dolayısıyla Körfez ülkelerinden sağlanan yatırımlar dolayısıyla Hindistan ekonomik kalkınmasına ciddi katkılarda bulunabilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda Hint diasporasının hem anavatan hem de misafir ülke devlet kapasitelerine yapmış olduğu katkılar, diasporalaşma süreciyle ilgili tehdit algılarını azaltmış ve teşvik edici olabilmiştir (Mishra, 2016).

Son olarak diaspora inşasının daha çok iç bileşen ve bağlamlarla ilgili olan mikro dinamiklere yöneldiğimiz zaman, ilk olarak burada birey ve gruplar bağlamında diaspora

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[2] Kafala Sistemi: Körfez'e çalışmak için gelen göçmen işçilerin kendilerini getiren şirketle yaptıkları sözleşmeyle ilgilidir. Bu sözleşmeye göre, çalışmak için kendisini bölgeye getiren şirketle sözleşme yapan işçi, başka bir şirketle anlaşma yapamıyor ve tamamen şirketin tutsağı haline geliyor. Ülkesine geri dönmesi bile, pasaportuna şirketin el koyması nedeniyle kendi inisiyatifinden çıkıyor.

sürecinin büyük bir kaynak ve sermayeyi ilgilendiriyor olmasının bazı sonuçlarından bahsedilebilir. Örneğin Kafala Sistemi çerçevesinde öncülük eden kişi veya şirketlerin önemli gelirler elde etmesi göçmen akışının uzun yıllardır devam edebilmesi sonucunu doğurmuştur. Her ne kadar devletler arası diaspora refahının sağlanması adına çeşitli kurumsal mekanizmalar kurulmuş olsa da, yine de çok sayıda hak ihlali ortaya çıkabilmiş, ancak sömürü de devam edebilmiştir (Damir-Geilsdorf ve Pelican, 2019). Diğer yandan yine kaynaklarla ilgili olarak Hindistan'daki siyasal iktidar çekişmelerinin diaspora toplumuna yansıdığı da görülebilmiştir. Hindistan Halk Partisi (BJP)'en Kongre Partisi'ne Sol partilerden eyalet partilerine birçok siyasal oluşum, diaspora kaynaklarını kendi siyasetlerini finanse edebilmek için kullanmayı hedefleyebilmiştir. Bu açıdan farklı siyasal partiler diaspora toplumu içerisinde kendi liderlerini yetiştirmek isteyebilmiş ve çeşitli açık ya da zımni örgütlenme çabası içerisine girebilmiştir. Yine ülkedeki muhalif partiler, benzer amaçlarla diaspora toplumunun dikkatini çekebilmek adına diasporanın ihtiyaçlarını farklı siyasal ya da kurumsal platformlarda dile getirebilmişlerdir. Diaspora toplumunun iç siyasette bir rekabet alanı olmasıyla ilgili tüm bu gelişmeler, dolaylı olarak diaspora bilincinin gelişmesini pozitif yönde etkileyebilmiştir (Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, 2014).

İç siyasal rekabetin diğer bir yansıması, diaspora toplumunda ideolojilerin etkin olabilmesiyle ilgilidir. Hindistan'da şuan Hindutva olarak anılan Hindu milliyetçiliği ideolojisi siyasetin merkezine oturmuş durumdadır. Ülke siyaseti Hindutva ideolojisi üzerinde hem toplumsal açıdan ikiye bölünmüş durumdadır hem de bu bölünme ülkenin kurumlarına da nüksetmiş durumdadır. Ülkede toplumu böylesine ikiye bölen güçlü bir ideolojinin diaspora toplumuna da yansıması kaçınılmazken; özellikle Hindu milliyetçisi partiler, Ulusal Gönüllüler Organizasyonu (RSS) ve Dünya Hindu Konseyi (VHP) gibi örgütlerin ağları aracılığıyla diaspora toplumuna etki edebilmeye çalışmaktadır. Özellikle Hindu milliyetçiliğini bir medeniyet tasavvuru şeklinde yorumlayarak her bir Hindu'yu ortak bir toplumun parçası olarak yorumlamak diasporayı etkilemede oldukça işlevsel olabilmiştir (Kinnvall ve Svensson, 2010). Bu kapsamda Hindu milliyetçisi Modi yönetimi de 2014'te daha iktidara gelir gelmez uygulamaya koyduğu ilk icraatlarından biri Vatandaşlık Yasası'nı değiştirmek olmuştur. Dünyada bulunan her bir Hindu'nun Hindistan'ın doğal vatandaşı olduğu üzerinden hareket eden yasa değişikliği, dünya genelinde ülke vatandaşı olmayan tüm Hindularla bir bağ kurabilmenin yöntemi olarak tasarlanmıştır (Sharma, 2014). Doğrudan diasporayı hedef alan bu tür düzenlemelerin yanında, Hindu milliyetçiliği karşıtı ya da bölgesel ideolojiler de diaspora üzerinde etkili olabilmiştir. Nitekim uzun yıllar Körfez'de bulunan en yoğun topluluğun Kerala eyaleti sakinlerinden oluşması, Keralalık üzerinden yatırımlardaki önceliği kendi eyaletlerine yapılması fikrini de teşvik edebilmiştir. Ancak ister bölgeselcilik ister medeniyetçilik üzerinden olsun, tüm bu ideolojiler diasporanın ülkesiyle bağının kopmasına engel olmuş ve bilincinin daha da gelişmesine yardımcı olmuştur (Kerala Migration Survey, 2014).

Son olarak tek tek bireylerden gruplara ve tüm diaspora davranışının gelişiminde büyük önem arz eden kaynakların mobilizasyonu mikro dinamiğine bakacak olursa, belki de Hint diasporasının bir dizayn sürecine tabi tutulmasının en önde gelen sebebinin burada yattığı söylenebilir: Havalenin siyasallaşması. Siyasal havaleler, gelişmekte olan birçok ekonominin önemli gelir kaynaklarından biri olagelmişken; dünyanın en büyük havale alıcısı olan Hindistan için GSYİH'nın büyümesi ve göçmen ailelerinin iyileştirilmiş koşullarda yaşamasında önemli

bir katkıda bulunmuştur (Abraham, 2012). 2018'de 79 milyar dolar ile dünyanın en çok havale alan ülkesi olan Hindistan, Suudi Arabistan'dan 11,2 milyar dolar, Kuveyt'ten 4,6 milyar, Katar'dan 4,1 milyar, Umman'dan 3,3 milyar ve BAE'den 13,8 milyar dolar havale geliri elde etmiştir. 1970 Petrol Krizi'nden bu yana diaspora havaleleri özellikle Kerala gibi yüksek göç alan devletlerin ekonomilerinin bel kemiği işlevi görmüştür. Buna ek olarak, diasporanın ülkeye gidip gelebilmeleriyle sosyal havalenin rolü de önemli derecede artmıştır. Netice itibariyle Körfez diasporasının anavatana geri dönen birikimleri Hindistan toplumunun gelişmesinde önemli bir rol üstlenmişken, özellikle Modi döneminde yeni ekonomi politikasıyla uyumlu bir şekilde diasporaya daha büyük yatırımlar gerektiğinin farkına varılmasını sağlamıştır (World Bank, 2019).

Sonuç

1970'lerden bu yana Körfez Bölgesi'ne sürekli göç eden Hindistanlı göçmenler, hiçbir zaman anavatanlarından kopmamış, aksine geride bıraktıkları çevreleriyle ilişkilerini hep sürdürmüşlerdir. Bu ilişki yıllarca ülke ekonomisinin önemli döviz girdilerinden biri olagelmiş, ancak meseleye Modi dönemine kadar stratejik bir perspektiften yaklaşılmamıştır. Modi döneminde dünyanın en büyük diasporası unvanını taşıyan Hindistan diasporasına yönelik ciddi politikalar üretilmeye başlanmış ve Körfez'de bulunan diaspora toplumu da en fazla öncelenen diaspora ayağına karşılık gelmiştir. Hindu milliyetçisi Modi yönetiminin medeniyet perspektifli dış politikasının da büyük payı olan yeni diaspora stratejisi, benzer şekilde ekonomik liberalleşmeyi merkeze alıp küresel ekonomiye tam entegrasyonu hedefleyen yeni ekonomi politikasıyla da oldukça uyumlu görülmüştür. Çalışmada incelenen makro, mezo ve mikro dinamikler bağlamında iç ve dış siyasal bağlamlar açısından da diasporasını sosyal olarak yeniden mobilize edebilen ve aynı zamanda Körfez bölgesindeki ülkelerle ilişkilerde bir altın çağa karşılık gelen yeni diaspora stratejisi, sorunsuz bir şekilde ilerlerken, hiç beklenmedik makro-sosyolojik bir hadiseyle büyük bir darbe yemiştir: Covid-19 Salgını.

Körfez diasporası bugüne kadar ekonomik durgunluk, dalgalanan petrol fiyatları, Arap milliyetçiliği ve Körfez işgücü politikalarındaki değişiklikler gibi pek çok sorunla karşılaşmış ve birçok geri dönüş dalgası tehdidi ortaya çıkabilmiştir. Ancak bugüne kadar ki hiçbir problem Covid-19 Salgını'nın yol açmış olduğu tahribata yaklaşamamıştır. Salgın, Hindistan'da büyük bir sağlık krizinin yanında, özellikle sokağa çıkma yasağı kararlarıyla büyük bir ekonomik ve insani krizi de tetiklemiştir. Özellikle ülke içerisinde işsiz kalan ve kendi bölgelerine dönme arzusu taşıyan göçmen işçiler büyük bir dramı ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Tarihin en büyük göçmen işçi krizini ülke içerisinde yaşayan Hindistan'a kötü bir haber de sınırların ötesindeki göçmen işçilerden gelecekti. Daha salgının başında büyük bir kapatmayla karşı karşıya kalan Körfez diasporası, bir taraftan işsiz kalmış bir taraftan ödemeler konusunda büyük sıkıntılar yaşamış bir taraftan da barındıkları mekânlar itibariyle sosyal mesafeye uygun olmayan şartlar nedeniyle büyük bir tehditle karşı karşıya kalmıştır (Trigunayat, 2020).

Salgınla birlikte büyük bir diaspora kriziyle karşı karşıya kalan Modi yönetimi, ilk etapta büyük bir çıkmaz içerisine düşmüştür. Neredeyse dünyanın en büyük diaspora topluluğunu teşkil eden 8,5 milyon göçmenin Hindistan'a geri dönmesi pratikte imkansızken; en azından bir kısmının ülkelerine geri kabul etmekle orada kalmaya devam etmeleri arasında kritik bir ikilem

yaşanmıştır. Geri dönme durumu diasporanın gücü ve kapasitesini azaltabilecekken; geri kabul etmeme durumu ise ülkeye bugüne kadar büyük fayda sağlayan diasporayla ilgilenmeme algısını ortaya çıkarabilecek olduğundan çekinilmiştir. Benzer şekilde geri dönen göçmenlerin ülkedeki ne yapabilecekleriyle ilgili gelecekleri sorunuysa bambaşka bir soru işareti ortaya çıkarmıştır. Çünkü zaten ülkenin en büyük sorunu işsizlikken ve salgın sürecinde bu sorun daha büyük bir mesele haline gelmişken; ülke içerisinde devam eden iç göçmen krizine bir de dış göçmen krizi eklenilmesi konusunda korkulmuştur (Laskar, 2020).

Hem iç hem de dış göçmen krizi konusunda yoğun bir eleştiri kampanyası altında kalan Modi hükümeti ise soruna yavaş yavaş ekonomik, diplomatik, kurumsal çözümler üretmeye çalışmıştır. Her şeyden önce Körfez liderleriyle yoğun bir görüşme trafiği başlatan Başbakan Modi'nin kamuoyuna sürekli vermek istediği mesaj göçmenlerin refahının takipçisi olduğu ve durumun kontrol altında olduğu olmuştur. Bu açıdan karşılık temaslarla kargo uçuşları üzerinden gıda ve ilaç malzemeleri konusunda acil ihtiyaçlar tedarik edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu tedarikin sürekli takibi için ise diaspora işleriyle ilgilenen Dışişleri ve Sağlık Bakanlıkları bünyesindeki tüm ilgili birimler harekete geçirilmişken; Hindistan Doktorlar Kulübü ve Dernekleri gibi birçok sivil toplum organizasyonu da desteğe dahil olmuştur. Hatta ülkenin bölgedeki iş dünyası açısından en büyük şirketi olan Abu Dabi merkezli Lulu Grup, çalışanları için hem işyeri ve barınaklarda her türlü temizlik önlemini almış hem de her türlü tıbbi ve danışmanlık hizmetiyle katkı sunmaya çalışmıştır (Taneja, 2020).

Salgın sürecinde diaspora sürecini ilgilendiren en dikkat çekici konu ise karşılıklı milliyetçi duyguların alevlenmesi olmuştur. Salgın süreci, ekonomileri petrole bağımlı olan Körfez ülkeleri için petrol talebinin yüzde 25-30 bandında azalmasıyla büyük bir krizin doğmasına neden olmuştur. Bu durum ise zaten nüveleri daha önceki yıllara uzanan göçmen karşıtı ve emeğin ulusallaştırılması hareketine ivme kazandırmıştır. Misafir ülkede artan bu milliyetçi dalga diaspora için bir tehdide karşılık gelmekteyken, benzer şekilde diaspora içerisinde de milliyetçi söylemlerin yükseldiği gözlemlenebilmiştir. Hindistan'da zaten İslam karşıtı Hindu milliyetçisi bir iktidar siyasetin merkezine oturmuşken, iktidarla iç içe bir ilişkiye sahip olan diaspora grupları arasında İslamofobik fikirlerin yükselmesi birlikte gelişmiştir. Özellikle de salgın sürecinde Hindistan'da "Korona Cihad" başlığı altında virüs kapmış olan Müslümanların salgının yayılması amacıyla toplum içerisinde bilerek dolaştığı iddiaları diaspora topluluğuna da yansımıştır (Shanta, 2020). Bu durum zaten ikili bir toplum üzerinden ayrışmış Körfez ülkelerinde sosyal mobilizasyonla ilgili bir güvenlik önlemi ihtiyacını akıllara getirebilmektedir. Ancak diğer yandan diasporanın kendi içerisindeki dayanışmayı da motive edebileceği aşikardır. Dolayısıyla salgın süreci, Hindistan ve Körfez ülkeleri için nasıl kapsamlı bir göç yönetim sistemi ihtiyacını ortaya çıkarmışsa, aynı şekilde diaspora açısından da yeni stratejik adımların atılmasına neden olabilir.

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Interview

Abdi Hersi

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Interview

Abdi Hersi

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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fit the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. Within the literature on diasporas, there are disagreements as to whether the term diaspora should be applied narrowly, to mean communities that have experienced forced migration, or more broadly to include any overseas populations. I believe that the proliferation of the usage of the term "Diaspora" is a result of the divergence of motivations and causes of mobility including both the forced and voluntary migration of people. Whilst I agree that socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities form a diasporic identity, it is also the case that the size of a community and its visibility in the public sphere of the host community is an important factor in this identity formation. Using Somalis who migrated over half a century to the Middle East, Europe and North America as a case study, one comes to the conclusion that they have not referred themselves to Diaspora until the sheer size of their numbers substantially increased. Other parallel examples can be drawn from the Somali people who migrated to the US and Europe who initially referred themselves as new refugees. So, the length of time the community spends in a location is also another determinant factor of Diasporic identity formation.

Q2. *States are increasing their efforts all around the world for diaspora engagement; however, they still lack in giving efforts in internationally debated policies. This does not mean that states do not have diaspora policies of their own but we don't see the diasporic issues discussed among states perhaps due to political and socio-cultural sensibility. Is it possible for states to consider debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies?*

A2. There is now an increasing interest in this subject globally. Diaspora communities and migrant organisations are now considered to be an important stakeholder in the development and prosperity of both their places of origin and host countries. The Global Compact for Migration (GCM) underlines the importance of consulting diaspora communities and seeking their contributions and input into the development of safe, regular and orderly migration. Both

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Cluster 4 of the Global Compact for Migration Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda stress the contributions of the diaspora to all dimensions of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) including sending remittances and transfer of knowledge and skills to their respective regions and member states. The debates and discussions have now shifted beyond assimilation and nationalisation policies.

Q3. *Since the world entered into the nation-state system, territorial states have not been able to contain nations, rather led to increasing diasporas. So how do globalized nations and governance impact territorial state and diaspora relations?*

A3. The nation-state, sovereignty, nationalism and having control over a territory is important. However, advancement in telecommunications and transportation technology and the internet, make movement/mobility at an unprecedented level. These levels of movements with the sheer diversity of individuals involved have blurred the boundaries of nation-states. Consequently, this has changed how individuals identify themselves. For example, today, you can no longer assume an American to be a blonde hair, blue-eyed, white Anglo Saxon background person. We also see new forms of identity such as cosmopolitanism with universal focus taking root.

Q4. *In general, diaspora studies are not at their peak values. A small number of scholars dedicate their time to diaspora issues. For those who are eager to study this subject, what are the fundamental approaches to studying the concept of diaspora? Why is it important to study and how do you see where diaspora studies are heading to or need to go?*

A4. Fundamentally, it is important to study the concept and discourse of Diaspora from a holistic perspective. Multiple actors play a role and influence in this process and it involves a country of origin and destination countries culture, faith, age, gender, etc. Most research on Diaspora is focused on one or another of these interlinked variables. This then means there is an understanding that Diaspora identity and belonging take place in a complex web of challenges/issues. In the post-national discourse, one must integrate into Diaspora study not only the nation-state at the centre but culture, society, government, politics, and the economics of an individual nation and one must insert these components into an increased regional, continental, hemispheric, and global perspective narrative.

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Interview

Ayhan Kaya

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Interview

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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fit the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. I think the increasing circulation of the term "diaspora" in social sciences as well as in everyday life partly springs from the fact that religion has lately become an explanatory factor in understanding the socio-economic, political and psychological dynamics behind the act of migration. Religion has become more important for some social groups, especially migrants and refugees who live away from their homelands. Such groups try to find different shields to protect themselves against the perils of globalisation. To that effect, stories of migration are embedded in religious texts, and they offer various narratives into which migrants can insert their own migration stories to rationalise their act of migration. In reading and listening to the stories of those who have inhabited their religious tradition before them, migrants may discern the sacred in their own journeys and experiences. The stories of the exile for Jews and Christians, of migration for Muslims are paradigmatic in this sense. The stories of migration are also depicted in other religions as well such as Hinduism. The experience of being in exile provides the context within which other stories of migration were formulated, including those of Abraham uprooting his family, leaving his home city of Ur and living as a nomad; Moses and the people of Israel leaving Egypt for the Promised Land; Joseph being sold into slavery and traveling as a slave to Egypt; Ruth and Naomi arriving from Moab as refugees from famine; and Mohammad's journey from Macca to Medina.

The story of Abraham has been used together with the story of Ulysses in Migration Studies and Diaspora Studies to describe the difference between modern diasporas and old diasporas. The term 'diaspora' is derived from the Greek verb *sperio* (to sow, to scatter) and the preposition *dia* (through, apart). For Greeks, the term referred to migration and colonisation, whereas for Jews, Africans, Palestinians and Armenians the same term acquired a more unfortunate, brutal and traumatic dispersion through scattering. Yet, the contemporary notion of diaspora is not limited only with Jewish, Greek, Palestinian and Armenian dispersive experiences; rather it describes a larger domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest worker,

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exile community and ethnic community. The primary difference between the old and modern form of diasporas lies in their changing will to go back to the 'holy land', or homeland. In this sense, the old diasporas resemble the story of *Ulysses* while the modern ones have been like that of *Abraham*. After the Trojan war, Ulysses encountered many problems on the way back to Ithaca. Although he had many obstacles during his journey, he was determined to go back home. Conversely, the experience of the modern labour diasporas resembles the prophet Abraham's biblical journey. In the first part of the Bible, it is written that Abraham, upon the request of God, had to journey with his people to find a new home in the unknown, and he never went back to the place he left behind. The analogy of Ulysses and Abraham originally belongs to the philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas. In explaining the attempt of conventional philosophy to seek the knowledge about the 'Other', Levinas stated that the history of philosophy has been like the story of Ulysses who 'through all his wanderings only returns to his native island'. He preferred the story of Abraham to that of Ulysses. Conventional philosophy has always sought to return to familiar ground of 'being', 'truth' and 'the same', Levinas' endeavour was to take it elsewhere. He proposed that philosophy should accept that we do not, cannot and should not know the Other, rather than seeking knowledge of it.

Coming back to the original question, I think one of the reasons behind the proliferation of the usage of the term diaspora has something to do with the religionization and culturalisation of social-economic and Political phenomena in the age of globalisation…

Q2. *States are increasing their efforts all around the world for diaspora engagement; however, they still lack in giving efforts in internationally debated policies. This does not mean that states do not have diaspora policies of their own but we don't see the diasporic issues discussed among states perhaps due to political and socio-cultural sensibility. Is it possible for states to consider debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies?*

A2. I believe that multiple allegiance of diasporic subjects is a fact, and that is the reality which needs to be recognized by the migrant sending states and receiving states. My studies on the Turkish-origin migrants and their descendants in Europe so far have revealed that Turkish-origin residents in Europe want both the Turkish state and their countries of residence to grant dual citizenship rights, sometimes even multiple citizenship rights, driven from their physical, mental and symbolic allegiance to each country, culture, and state.

Rainer Bauböck (2007) classifies diasporic citizens in three distinct categories: multiple nationals, denizens and ethnizens. Multiple nationals are formally recognized as citizens by two or more independent countries tolerating, or even actively promoting, dual citizenship. This is an indication of the normative and institutional change in attitudes towards transnationalism. The term 'denizenship' refers to a special legal status of longterm resident foreign nationals who enjoy most of the civil liberties and social welfare rights of resident citizens, often including rights to family reunification, some protection from deportation and voting rights in local elections, as well as quasi-entitlements to naturalization. Denizenship is a status of residential quasi-citizenship combined with external formal citizenship granted by the sending country. Denizenship is often considered a step in the process of migrant integration in the receiving country. It is therefore rarely regarded as a mode of transnational diasporic citizenship. Finally,

'ethnizenship' is the converse of denizenship, in a way that creates an external quasi-citizenship for individuals who are neither citizens nor residents of the country granting that status. It is generally granted to minorities on the basis of ethnic descent and perceived as common ethnicity with an external kin state. States such as Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia have recently adopted laws that introduce quasi-citizenship for minorities of co-ethnic descent living abroad, in order to provide them with certain benefits including financial support for maintaining a minority culture and language, privileged admission to the territory or labour market of the kin state, and in some cases, facilitation of naturalization.

Multiple nationals' special status must be recognized by relevant states if these states want to enjoy the financial, political, economic, cultural and social contributions to their countries by those citizens. Otherwise, those multiple nationals tend to resent towards those countries that do not officially recognize their socio-economic, political and psychological reality based on multiple forms of belonging. This kind of resentment mostly result in cutting off the linkages with such states that do not officially recognize their reality. For instance, Aiwa Ong calls diasporic Chinese subjects 'multiple passport holders', 'multicultural manager with flexible capital', 'astronauts' shuttling across borders on business and 'parachute kids', who are 'dropped off in another country by parents on the trans-Pacific business commute'. The states that are actors in this game are expected to grant flexible citizenship, transnational citizenship, or diasporic citizenship, to such multiple nationals if they want to compete more effectively in the global economy.

Turkish origin migrants and their descendants in Europe also want to enjoy the right to dual, or multiple, citizenship in their countries of origin and of settlement. It is now apparent that the cross-border life of transmigrants of Turkish origin is the most important determinant of tolerance of dual citizenship within Turkey as well as in their countries of residence. However, nowadays, the current state of political affairs between Turkey and the European Union Member States indicates that those multiple citizenship rights are at risk due to the escalation of polarizing attempts between the two sides in the age of populism.

Q3. *Since the world entered into the nation-state system, territorial states have not been able to contain nations, rather led to increasing diasporas. So how do globalized nations and governance impact territorial state and diaspora relations?*

A3. The more global the world becomes the more nation-states want to have diasporic subjects away from home and to instrumentalize them in obtaining their international objectives. Sometimes homeland states tend to politically and economically instrumentalize their diasporic communities to put pressure on the state actors of the receiving states. The polemics between the Turkish state actors and the Dutch state actors in 2017 is a good example in this sense. President Erdoğan's statements regarding the members of the Turkish diaspora to be more active in public space is also another indication of the instrumentalization of diasporic individuals in obtaining national objectives in international politics. Sometimes, receiving states such as Germany may instrumentalize these transnational and diasporic communities to make an impact on their homeland, Turkey. For instance, Germany aims to set up a social, economic, cultural, and sometimes even political, bridge between the two sides by instrumentalizing the hybrid cultures

of German-Turkish youngsters competent in both languages and cultures.

Sometimes, there might be other cases which are peculiar with the existence of kinship communities living in the neighbouring country. Hungarian minority in Romania, Silesian minority in Poland, Turkish minority in Greece, and many others are such examples. Mainstream political parties and the others in Romania often blame the Hungarian minority of having dual loyalty, being anti-Romanian and irredentist.

Hence, in both cases, one could argue that the legacy of nation-states still continues. Nations-states are still the leading actors in international relations. Global technologies of communication and transportation make it possible for them to have a strong impact on their diasporic communities. This is not only the case for the migrant sending states, but also for the migrant receiving states that are sometimes capable of instrumentalizing their immigrant populations as a leverage to make impact on the political, economic, social and cultural spheres of their homelands.

Q4. *In general, diaspora studies are not at their peak values. A small number of scholars dedicate their time to diaspora issues. For those who are eager to study this subject, what are the fundamental approaches to studying the concept of diaspora? Why is it important to study and how do you see where diaspora studies are heading to or need to go?*

A4. I can answer this question by quoting my PhD supervisor, Professor Steven Vertovec. Back in 1997, Steven [had] already made an important intervention in social sciences by classifying three different approaches to the notion of modern diaspora. This intervention is, I think, still relevant today. Young scholars can follow one of these paths which mostly originate from anthropology and sociology. The first standpoint regards diaspora as a *social form*. Daniel Boyarin, Jonathan Boyarin and William Safran are the representatives of this path. Diaspora as a social form refers to the transnational communities whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states. The second approach conceives diaspora as a *type of consciousness* which emerges by means of transnational networks. James Clifford, Stuart Hall, Homi Bhabha, Paul Gilroy, and Robin Cohen have followed this path in their writings. This approach departs from W. E. B. Du Bois' notion of 'double consciousness', and refers to individuals' awareness of being simultaneously 'home away from home' or 'here and there'. The third path is the understanding, which regards diaspora as a *mode of cultural construction and expression*. Paul Gilroy, Stuart Hall, Steven Vertovec and many others have followed this path. This approach emphasises the flow of constructed styles and identities among diasporic people.

Diaspora Studies is a rich venue that is linked with Migration Studies, Refugee Studies, Citizenship Studies, Trasnationalism Studies, Nationalism Studies, and Ethnic Studies. Young scholars will have to go through the main texts written by Diaspora Studies scholars in order to understand the philosophical, ethical and scientific opening that they may offer in extending our horizon…

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Interview

Dániel Gazsó

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Interview

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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fit the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. The term diaspora does not have a single definition. However, this is not uncommon in the social sciences. Anthropologists do not provide a unique definition for culture, neither do sociologists for society, nor do scholars on nationalism studies for nation. The concept of diaspora started to be used in an increasingly broader sense in the 1960s–70s, as a result of which its original religious-meaning content has now been extended to refer to almost all kinds of dispersed communities. This approach is well expressed in the open, and now a classic definition stated by Walker Connor, according to which a diaspora is "that segment of a people living outside the homeland." Khachig Tölölyan—considered one of the precursors of new diaspora studies—explained this shift in the meaning of the concept of diaspora through several events. Firstly, he mentions the Afro-American civil rights movement known as Black Power, which provided a new conceptual framework to people of color living in the United States. Partly as a result of the achievements of this movement, the designation 'Black' was replaced by the term 'Afro-American' and finally, 'African diaspora.' The second decisive event in Tölölyan's explication was the political lobbying provided by the Jews living in the United States to Israel during the six-day war in June 1967. This support policy of the Jewish diaspora started a process that Tölölyan calls "re-diasporization of ethnicity." Following the six-day war—ending with Israel's victory—and upon seeing the achievements of the Jewish movement, the leaders of the different ethnic communities living in the United States (Greeks, Armenians, Irish, Cubans, etc.) formulated more and more commitments urging for mutual assistance between ethnically related communities living all over the world—now called diasporas—and their kin-state. Thirdly, Tölölyan highlights the approval of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 in the United States, which banished the ethnicity and nationality based quota system. The approval and the social support for the so called Hart–Celler Act was a confirmation of the fact that the general opinion regarding immigration had changed radically in the United States. In general,

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the melting pot theory had been replaced by the idea of multiculturalism, which paved the way for unfolding the organizational life of the diasporas. Finally, Tölölyan highlights the change of focus in the scholarly world toward identity, ethnic differences and cultural diversity, which led to the creation of brand new and multidisciplinary branches of science such as diaspora studies. These events, among others, have contributed to the popularization of the term diaspora and the expansion of its meaning.

The problem with assigning such a broad semantic field to the concept of diaspora is that the category becomes stretched to the point of uselessness—as Rogers Brubaker pointed out: "If everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so. The term loses its discriminating power—its ability to pick out phenomena, to make distinctions. The universalization of diaspora, paradoxically, means the disappearance of diaspora." Scholars in this field with the aim to overcome this problem and avoid conceptual confusion have established certain criteria which allow us to distinguish diaspora of migratory origin from other types of macro-communities, such as the so called autochthonous national minorities. This task is closely related to the emerging tendency toward typology construction, which consists of modelling diaspora communities based on some observed characteristics. It is neither a unique method nor a novelty, since typology construction has always been of great importance in the field of social sciences. Within diaspora studies, one of the mainly accepted criteria to identify different types of diaspora is the manner of social integration, i.e. the quality of the relation of diaspora communities with the society surrounding them. A milestone in the scientific foundation of this topic is John A. Armstrong's distinction between proletarian diaspora (i.e. communities of migratory origin that live in a marginal and disadvantaged position on the periphery of their new home) and mobilized diaspora (which have achieved a distinguished social status for themselves, thus they are able to mobilize the economy or even the foreign relations of the host-state). Another, also widespread pattern of diaspora typologies is the feature of the mass migration, which gave the opportunity for the development of the studied communities. According to this, there is a distinction between diasporas formed by voluntary or economic migration, on the one hand, and by forced or political migration, on the other. The concept of victim diaspora—mentioned in the above question—has been used to determine the latter type by several authors, among them Robin Cohen, generally known for his five-component typology, which distinguishes victim, labor, imperial, trade and deterritorialized diasporas. This tendency toward typology construction provides general overviews on research topics and comparative analysis, however, sometime it can be misleading. Typologies within diaspora studies tend to ignore the dynamic and often controversial feature of diasporic life. They highlight the differences between ideal types of diaspora as much as they lose sight of the diversity within the same dispersed community. For example, focusing on the feature of migration, we see that almost every diaspora of the present has developed through migration waves, which occurred in different times and for different reasons. Therefore, to categorize an entire community into a victim diaspora type provides a false image of reality.

In short, the clarification of the conceptual framework for diaspora studies is a necessary and urgent task. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we must seek a closed definition of diaspora looking for static group characteristics, or create typologies by comparing and generalizing specific cases. Instead, we should provide interpretive explanations of the sociopolitical

processes that shape the diaspora, namely migration, social integration, cultural assimilation, ethnic boundary maintenance and homeland orientation. The conceptualization of diaspora must begin with a rethinking of these increasingly important processes.

Q2. *States are increasing their efforts all around the world for diaspora engagement; however, they still lack in giving efforts in internationally debated policies. This does not mean that states do not have diaspora policies of their own but we don't see the diasporic issues discussed among states perhaps due to political and socio-cultural sensibility. Is it possible for states to consider debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies?*

A2. Governments seem to pay more and more attention to strengthening ties with co-national communities living abroad. To appreciate this, it is enough to take a look at the number of governmental institutions responsible for diaspora-related issues, which have increased dramatically in the last decades. While at the beginning of 1980 there were only a handful of such institutions, at present, over half of all states in the United Nations have established at least one of these. Nevertheless, despite the rapid proliferation of kin-state activism, diaspora issues are very rarely discussed at the international level, and if so, it is usually about conflict management, rather than exchanging experiences. Indeed, this deficiency can be explained by the sensibility of the matter, however, the main question is why did diaspora issues become so delicate. To answer this question, we need to focus on regional and national specifics and their historical aspect, rather than global comparisons and generalizations. Although there are some seemingly similar diaspora practices adopted almost all over the world—such as the ethnic preferential naturalization—they cannot be considered under the same category without taking into account the differences in the sociopolitical context and historical background. Indeed, dual citizenship does not mean the same in Eastern Europe as it does in the West, where the term citizenship is often used interchangeably with the term nationality.

Regarding Central and Eastern Europe, diaspora policies in this region, in one way or another, are related to the national question, i.e. the question of the proper relation between the territorial borders of the state and the imagined limits of the nation. This question has become a central feature of political life mainly because of the historical background of the current states. On the one hand, during the development process of modern nation-states in the 18th and 19th centuries, the national forms in Central and Eastern Europe had developed within the great and vast, ethnically heterogeneous Habsburg, Ottoman and Romanov empires. Thus, the political units radically diverged from the cultural units in this region. Nation-states in most cases were formed by the struggles of nations—often determined by a commonly shared ethnicity, culture and language—to establish their own political and territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, in addition to this cultural nation approach to national belonging, during the 20th century, the political space of the region was reconfigured twice. Firstly, in the aftermath of World War I, through the disintegration of the above mentioned multinational empires and the creation of new states. Secondly, due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia following the end of the Cold War. Thereby, millions of people became minorities living in territories detached from their national homeland. If we add to this finding the historical legacy of international tensions and conflicting relations between the states, it

further complicates the situation of the national minorities and kin-state activism. These historical and political circumstances explain why kin-state policies in Central and Eastern Europe are so tightly tied to the national question. Moreover, it suggests that diaspora policies cannot be treated separately from all these matters, because diaspora engagement practices in this region have actually evolved from the policies targeted primarily toward autochthonous co-national minorities formed as a result of 20th century border changes and state dissolutions.

A generally accepted model to study the national question and its consequences in Central and Eastern Europe has been provided by Rogers Brubaker. This model consists of a dynamic triadic nexus relationship, which involves three distinct and often mutually antagonistic elements: the "external national homeland" (in international law called kin-state); the "nationalizing state" (also called host-state) and the "national minority." Brubaker—following Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social fields—conceives of each of these three constitutive elements as parts of an interdependent relational nexus, not as fixed entities or static conditions, but rather in terms of dynamic political fields of competitive actors. This triadic nexus model is applicable to research issues related to both types of co-national communities, the autochthonous national minorities, as well as the diaspora communities of migratory origin, and it helps to capture specific cases—such as the Hungarian diaspora policies—in their complexity. Nevertheless, Brubaker's triadic model should be augmented with at least one additional element, namely the international organizations, which play a decisive controlling and regulating role in ethnopolitical conflicts. In order to maintain the *status quo*, international organizations—such as the UN, the EU and the NATO—seek to avoid the radicalization of the opposing political positions: the separatism in the case of national minorities; the irredentism in the case of kin-states; and the extreme nationalization, i.e. the forced social homogenization or cultural assimilation in the case of the host-states.

Although this regulating role of the above mentioned organizations has developed significantly in recent decades, an international framework for kin-state's responsibility related to minority protection has yet to emerge. Therefore, the legal and social affairs related to diaspora communities dispersed around the world are still primarily discussed at the local level. In general, this absence of debating diaspora issues internationally is due to the fact that in the broader field of minority protection, the controversy between individual rights and collective rights still remains at large. In other words, while on the international scene the language of individual rights is spoken, the kin-states think of collective rights.

Q3. *Since the world entered into the nation-state system, territorial states have not been able to contain nations, rather led to increasing diasporas. So how do globalized nations and governance impact territorial state and diaspora relations?*

A3. Following the end of the Cold War, the processes of globalization, or to use Arjun Appadurai's term, the "global cultural flows" mean the end of the age of nation-states in the eyes of many. The ever-growing network of diaspora communities reaching across state borders, as the most conspicuous outcome of these processes, only supports this assumption. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the sum of the globalization will create a homogeneous and transnational world in which the national aspirations of the state authorities become insignificant. Experiences

seem to indicate that national identities and the policies that target and construct them constitute the basis of self-identification and world order up to this day. The increasingly intense symbolic and pragmatic presence of kin-states in the organizational life of diasporas confirms rather than refutes what Benedict Anderson claimed almost forty years ago: "The reality is quite plain: the 'end of the era of nationalism,' so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time." Of course, this does not mean that national aspirations are present in the same form as they were in the early period of the birth of modern nation-states. Nationalisms—just like other ideologies, public cultures and political religions—are constantly changing, they are continuously adapting to the new social, political, economic and cultural circumstances. Diaspora policies of increasing priority are the most striking manifestations of a new kind of governments' national aspirations, which globally spread in the 21st century. In short, there are no globalized nations, only diaspora communities with a cross-border network of relations, closely tied or even depending on their kin-state.

Q4. *In general, diaspora studies are not at their peak values. A small number of scholars dedicate their time to diaspora issues. For those who are eager to study this subject, what are the fundamental approaches to studying the concept of diaspora? Why is it important to study and how do you see where diaspora studies are heading to or need to go?*

A4. Diaspora studies is a multidisciplinary field *par excellence*. Its practitioners need to combine the theories and methods of different social sciences to gain a holistic picture of the sociopolitical processes that shape the diaspora, and thus make comprehensive interpretations of the communities studied and the policies that target and construct them. However—just like other relatively new multidisciplinary fields of social sciences—diaspora studies also has grown from a pre-existing, broader field of science, in this case from minority studies, whose theoretical and methodological bases are rooted largely in nationalism studies. What Benedict Anderson and Eric J. Hobsbawm—just to mention a few classics from the latter area—asserted about nations also holds true for diaspora. The latter can also be described as "imagined political community," and viewed as a dual phenomenon "constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people." In brief, the fundamental approaches toward diaspora stem from the modern scientific perspectives on minority and nation.

Regarding the specific subjects of diaspora studies, the main aim of this new field—as I stated above—is to provide interpretive explanations of the sociopolitical processes that shape diaspora communities, rather than to search static group characteristics. These processes that constitute the subject of diaspora studies—including migration, social integration, cultural assimilation, ethnic boundary maintenance and homeland orientation—are of increasing importance today. Diaspora studies focusing these areas may help to understand, on the one hand, that the cultural assimilation is not absolutely necessary for the social integration of communities formed by immigration waves; and, on the other hand, that the avoidance of cultural assimilation, i.e. the institutionalization of diasporic life for maintaining ethical boundaries does not necessarily lead to the formation of opposing social groups. This knowledge is essential for the peaceful management of potential conflicts arising from the encounter of different cultures.

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Interview

Karim H. Karim

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Interview

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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fit the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. I agree with the expansion of the application of the term beyond "victim diasporas." The initial concept was applied in ancient Greece more neutrally to geographic dispersals of groups. There is a sociological problem of making the concept too wide, but I am generally in favour of inclusivity.

Q2. *States are increasing their efforts all around the world for diaspora engagement; however, they still lack in giving efforts in internationally debated policies. This does not mean that states do not have diaspora policies of their own but we don't see the diasporic issues discussed among states perhaps due to political and socio-cultural sensibility. Is it possible for states to consider debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies?*

A2. Groups within diasporas may become an oppositional force to ruling governments and establishments in the territorial state. On the other hand, greater exchange of ideas, technology and finances are facilitated between diasporas and homelands.

Q4. *In general, diaspora studies are not at their peak values. A small number of scholars dedicate their time to diaspora issues. For those who are eager to study this subject, what are the fundamental approaches to studying the concept of diaspora? Why is it important to study and how do you see where diaspora studies are heading to or need to go?*

A4. It is important to study diasporas because they number in the tens of millions and have a tangible economic, social and cultural impact on almost all parts of the world. The dominant ("naturalized") conceptual template to studying society is the territorialized state. Therefore, there is conceptual resistance to studying diasporas, which are seen as anomalous within this framework. Human beings have been migrating across the globe for tens of thousands of years. The study of diaspora needs to embrace this fundamental fact which legitimizes it as an essential part of research on human society.

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Interview

Pål Kolstø

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Interview

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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fit the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. The historical prototype of a diaspora is of course the Jews in the "dispersion" after the Second Jewish war. With the Jewish defeat in that war in 135 they were no longer allowed to live in Palestine, and were "dispersed" all over the Mediterranean world and further afield. It is true that also prior to that momentous event there had been permanent Jewish communities outside Palestine, but we nevertheless associate Jewish diaspora-ness with a people deprived of a homeland. Also some other diasporas conform to this understanding, for instance, the Polish diaspora in (primarily) Western Europe in the period between the eradication of the Polish-Lithuanian state in 1795 and the resurrection of modern Poland in 1919.

Later on, the concept of a diaspora has been expanded and taken on new meanings. In most cases, we use the concept of a diaspora today as referring to groups of people living *outside* their "homeland". Hence, they *do* have "their own" state, but they do not "belong" to it politically (as subjects or citizens), only ethnically or culturally[1]. In that expanded sense we can refer to a Chinese diaspora in southeast Asia, an Armenian diaspora in the Middle East, France, and North America, a Lebanese diaspora in Africa, an Indian diaspora in East Africa and the Caribbean, and so on and so forth. These diaspora members have either moved out of "their" ethnic homeland of their own volition in search of work and a better livelihood, fled from persecution, been moved there as indentured laborers, or for some other reason.

Finally, the concept of a diaspora is used also in the third sense, about people who have not moved at all but happen to live outside their homeland because the political borders have moved over them. This is the case with Hungarians living outside Hungary but within the borders of the

[1] I use quotation marks here and many other places in this article to indicate a certain distancing from these terms, meaning that I do not necessarily subscribe to the content which some readers might give them. To claim that a certain group "belongs" to a state could conceivably be construed as if other groups living there have less claim to "ownership" in that state, an inference which I am not prepared to draw.

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former Habsburg Hungary, Turkish minorities in the Balkans (former subjects of the Ottoman Empire), and Russians who live outside the Russian Federation but within the former USSR.

With regard to the Russians, this means that today we can talk about two different Russian diasporas: 1. The "old" Russian diaspora: those who conform to the second variety described above, meaning those who fled from Russia after the October revolution and have later been replenished by new waves of migrations – including some two million after the fall of communism. 2. The "new" Russian diaspora, who live in states just across the border of the Russian Federation (or at least not very far away, such as in one of the Central Asian republics.) David Laitin has referred to them as a "beached" diaspora, analogous to stranded whales who have ended up on the shore when the sea has receded.

All of these meanings of diaspora, in my view, have both a political and a cultural dimension. The cultural dimension is obvious: the diaspora members hold on to the language, culture, memories, mores, and traditions of the (dominant) culture of their homeland, which they continue to identify with. (Some don't, in particular in the second or third generation, but then they are no longer members of the diaspora in any meaningful sense of the word). The political dimension is also crucial, but also more controversial. It is a constitutive element also in the case of the first, original variety of diaspora, in the shape of an absence, in the dream about restoring the lost state: The Jews in medieval Europe continued to remember the homeland they were expelled from ("Next year in Jerusalem"), and for more than a century thousands of Poles struggled to reestablish "their" state, something which they eventually succeeded in doing.

However, even though the political concept of a homeland is an integral part of the definition of a diaspora, not all people lacking a national homeland will be regarded as a diaspora. Poles, who in the 19th century, continued to live within historical territory of the old Polish settlements to the south of the Baltic Sea were not regarded as a diaspora. The concept of a diaspora, of course, always includes also a *geographical* dimension: only those Poles who had left this region would be members of a Polish diaspora. Similarly, only ethnic Kurds living in Western Europe or elsewhere outside the Middle East today will be considered a diaspora", while those who live in eastern Turkey or northern Iraq will not.

Also in the second variety of diasporians, the political link to the "old" homeland – what Rogers Brubaker calls "the external national homeland[2]" – is implicitly a part of the very definition of diaspora. Among those migrants who have left their home country and have no longer any political attachment to the old country it does not make sense to use the concept of diaspora. For instance, in the last decades of the 19th century and the first decades of 20th century, hundreds of thousands of Norwegians migrated to the United States, but their descendants today, even those who continue to celebrate the Norwegian National day (17 May), eat a Norwegian national dish for Christmas (lutefisk), and so on, with extremely few exceptions, are so well integrated into American society that their Norwegianness is purely historical and symbolical. In fact, it does not even make sense to regard them as a "national minority": they are full-fledged Americans.

In other instances, diasporians of the second variety *do* retain political links to their

2 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism reframed, Cambridge: Cambridge University press 1996

external homeland, links that can be, and have been, activated when the political situation "at home" has changed. Thus, for instance, considerable numbers of Balts, Armenians, and Croats from North America and Western Europe returned to their historic homelands after the fall of communism when their nation-state was reestablished (as was the case with the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians), or was established for the first time (Armenians and Croats). Some of them contributed constructively – both with their skills and their money – to building countries ravaged by decades of communist mismanagement while others injected unwholesome doses of radical nationalism into the body politic of the new or newly reestablished state.

In the third variety– the "beached" diasporas – the political dimension is even more salient – but also more contentious. When the diasporians live just outside the borders of the external national homeland – such as in interwar Hungary and Germany, and in today's Russia –the question of *irredentism* can arise, that is, a demand to have the territories which they inhabit (re) included into the external homeland. Such irredentist programs are of course highly destabilizing in any political setting. Therefore, even though I highly respect David Laitin as a scholar and have read his book *Identity in formation*:[3] several times, I think the concept of a "beached" of diasporas must be regarded as deleterious. This metaphor suggests that the diaspora members are "suffocating" for lack of air when they are no longer in their right "element".

And I will pursue this point further and insist that even the concept of a "new diaspora" is problematical. The words we use are not innocuous; they carry with them political overtones, indeed, sometimes implicit political programs. This I did not fully understand when I wrote my book *Russians in the former Soviet republics (*1995*)* which I had first given the title "The new Russian diaspora", (a title which was used for other books and brochures published at the same time). Luckily, the publisher's reviewer of my manuscript objected to it and suggested the more neutral title which I ended up with[4].

As long as we call the members of a national group living outside the historical homeland "a diaspora" our perspective is precisely viewing them from this external national homeland, and we see them as "naturally belonging" to that state in one way or another. Such a linkage can be benevolent or malevolent: As long as the engagement of the external national homeland in the life of "its" diaspora is restricted to support for the national culture, such as for instance the promotion of the German language via the Goethe institute in other countries, I see no problems with that. But in some national discourses, references to "our diaspora" legitimizes also active interference in the domestic affairs of the nation-states in which these diasporians reside. The sinister diaspora policy of the Nazi German state, luckily, is an extreme exception, but also the Hungarian diaspora policy – certainly in the interwar period but also to some degree after the fall of communism – has had some worrying elements of meddling in the internal affairs of

[3] David Laitin, *Identity in formation: the Russian speaking populations in the near abroad*, Ithaca New York, Cornell University Press

[4] Pål Kolstø, *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics*, Hurst & co/Indiana University Press, London/Bloomington, 1995. However, I admit to having relapsed to using the term "new diaspora", in my 1996 article in *Ethnic and racial studies*, Pål Kolstø, 'the new Russian Diaspora – an identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet republics', *Ethnic And Racial Studies,* 19, 3.

neighboring states.

Does this mean that ethnic communities not belonging to the dominant majority in a nation-state should be left to their own devices, or more precisely, to the mercy the political authorities in that state? No, this is not a necessary inference we must draw. The term “national minorities” designates cultural groups with specific rights and is a concept used in international law, such as in the UN “Declaration on Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities” from 1992 and the Council of Europe “Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities” (FCNM) from 1998. The major advantage of using the term “national minority” over “diaspora” is that the group in question is viewed from the perspective of the country they live in and not from the one they have lived in or their forebears have lived in. This is not even something which has to be explained or spelled out. It is implicit in the very term itself: a group cannot be a minority in any other state than the one in which it resides.

If an ethnic group seeks protection and support, (which may or may not be forthcoming), from an external national homeland, then that national minority will be programmed to see themselves as belonging to that state. Conversely, as soon as they are regarded and treated citizens of the state in which they reside, they have a right to expect not only equal treatment with other citizens of that state as individuals, but also protection of their culture. (At the same time, I will emphasize that the members of a national minority should have the right not only to retain and uphold their separate identities, but also to relinquish it if they should so desire. Enforced segregation is just as reprehensible as enforced assimilation).

To clarify: I am not saying that we should stop using the word “diaspora” altogether as a “politically incorrect” term. There are contexts in which it would be quite natural and appropriate to use it, in particular when we are discussing the relationship between a cultural group and the state where the majority of their ethnic kin reside. However, I think we would be well advised to try and avoid it as a general, default description of these groups, as if their diaspora-ness is their most important and defining characteristic.

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Interview

Abdirashid Ismail

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Interview

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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fit the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. As an analytic concept, diaspora is one of the contested phenomena in the field of immigration studies. Indeed, the term has been associated with the expulsion of Jewish from Palestine by the Babylonians in the late 6th century BC. These forced migrants' descendants were scattered in different parts of the world and were originally connoted as diaspora. However, since the second half of the last century, diaspora started losing its original meaning. The term was deployed to describe significantly different groups of people living in the migration/ minority context. Scholars of modern diaspora, in addition to Jewish and other traditional Diasporas, scrutinized the experience of other minority groups, including the economic and political practices of the Turkish, Africans and East Europeans in Western Europe, Latinos in the USA, as well as Indians and Philippines in the Middle East, to name just a few. These groups are considered actors connecting their host countries to their homelands. In this understanding, the victimhood, as a key factor in the diaspora formation, is weaned. As William Safran noted, since the second half of the past century, the term 'diaspora' has been transformed from a name for a specific group to a common name for several categories of people. Here he draws a parallel with the term 'ghetto', as it changed from a name for a particular geographical location (Jewish area of Venice) to a name for all urban areas populated by least-privileged sections of the society.

To develop an analytic framework for the concept, social scientists fashioned working definitions for the concept, while others developed typologies describing what the term modern diaspora stands for. In addition to expanding the concept beyond the expulsion and victimhood frame, several other factors generate the divide among scholars regarding how to conceptualize the diaspora. One aspect relates to the dimension at which the concept is looked at. For instance, some analysts approach the phenomenon from the hostland perspective, such as integrating and inclusion of immigrants to the host society. Conversely, others listed typologies that describe the diaspora in which the homeland is the main reference point.

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Although these definitions and typologies of diaspora sharpened our conceptual understanding of the term and are in one way or another adopted in the literature, the extensive conceptual proliferation of the term is yet to produce an analytically consensual definition of the diaspora in the field of immigration. It has been accurately noted that in all these proliferations of the concept, there are three core elements for the understanding diaspora, namely: dispersions in hostlands; orientation to a homeland; and self-awareness of group identity (or boundary-maintenance, as some calls it) in the hostland.

Having said that, in practice, I lean towards definitions that focus on diasporic practices and projects rather than those that consider diaspora as a specific actual entity.

Q2. *States are increasing their efforts all around the world for diaspora engagement; however, they still lack in giving efforts in internationally debated policies. This does not mean that states do not have diaspora policies of their own but we don't see the diasporic issues discussed among states perhaps due to political and socio-cultural sensibility. Is it possible for states to consider debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies?*

A2. The diaspora's two core characteristics are 1) they are dispersed into different political domains (host-lands), and 2) they are collectively oriented into other political domains (homelands). Furthermore, globalization and technological advances extensively increased the interconnection and interdependence of these political domains (host-lands and homelands). In that context, diaspora became a sword with two edges for both host-lands and homelands. In both domains, diaspora may pose challenges and/or generate opportunities. In the host-land, they could develop parallel lives and create security concerns, but they can also be a vital carrier of national interests in the international arenas. For the homelands, diaspora can generate internal instability and contribute to civil conflicts. Still, they are also a source of enormous financial, human, and social capital and may form a strategic political player internally and externally. In short, there might be real incentives for both homelands and host-lands states to mobilize diaspora for their political, economic, and social interests internationally. I can think of the daughter of today's Somali mother in Tukey will be a Turkish-Somali mother tomorrow. Therefore, the diaspora's loyalty is vital for both states, but yes, I think, instead of competing strategies, states would benefit more from cooperation strategies.

Q3. *Since the world entered into the nation-state system, territorial states have not been able to contain nations, rather led to increasing diasporas. So how do globalized nations and governance impact territorial state and diaspora relations?*

A3. There is no doubt that globalization shapes the nation-state's nature; however, I am not a proponent of the argument that globalization is sweepingly wiping the nation-state as the main actor in the international arenas. As globalization weakens some aspects of the nation-state, it strengthens some other elements of the nation-state. For instance, globalization generates opportunities for terrorism to thrive and thus undermine the state. On the other hand, to ensure its citizens' security, the state is obliged to improve its capabilities to challenge the impact of globalization on terrorism. Again, globalization generates incentives for capital and goods

to flow internationally and people to migrate in to escape insecurities and search for better lives. However, research findings show that these same globalization forces have stimulated the protectionist voices and contributed to the eventual rise of right-wing populist parties in the West. Therefore, I think the relationship between globalization and the nation-state, on the one hand, and the nation-state and diaspora, on the other, is not linear.

Q4. *In general, diaspora studies are not at their peak values. A small number of scholars dedicate their time to diaspora issues. For those who are eager to study this subject, what are the fundamental approaches to studying the concept of diaspora? Why is it important to study and how do you see where diaspora studies are heading to or need to go?*

A4. Again, the core characteristics of the diaspora have implications on the methodological approach of studying the phenomenon. A central concern relates to the role of the nation-state in the analysis. For example, together, dispersion in host-lands and orientation to a homeland generates the need for theoretically and empirically a method that may comprehend diasporic practices across state borders. Therefore, research on diaspora needs new methodological tools that could realize beyond nation-state borders. Thus, methodological nationalism is unsuitable for understanding diaspora. There is a growing significant and growing research interest in transnational migration. I consider diaspora studies as part of this scholarship. Besides, transnational migration scholars are devoting efforts to dealing with methodological challenges of studying the ties, networks, and practices that transcend national borders. Valentina Mazzucato's 'Simultaneous Matched Sample' method is one of those efforts. I think diaspora studies would benefit from these efforts.

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Interview

Besim Can Zırh

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Interview

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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fit the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. In her article published in 2001, Kim Butler says "it is increasingly rare to live and die on the land of our ancient forebears."[1] This basic fact is the reality of the 20th century, especially after the new waves of international migration that emerged in the wake of the Second World War. However, human mobility is not a new phenomenon in our history. As Saskia Sassen discusses in her book *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (2008), we have always been on the move for various reasons. Let me remind you that "Central Asia" is a significant reference in explaining who we are as "Turks" here in Anatolia in the Turkish national histography, as also portrayed in Nazım Himet's well-known poem, *Invitation* (circa 1940s): "Like the head of a mare riding at full gallop out of far Asia to the Mediterranean, this land is ours!" What is new about human mobility is more about the terrain through which we move, which became globally nationalized after the Second World War. We became citizens of particular nation-states, which are accepted as legitimately sovereign over a piece of land and representative of a group of people: We.

As this fixation among states, territories, and human groups emerged, nationality became the only reference point in defining our belonging. If you are a member of a particular nation, you cannot hold a second membership with another one. I am not talking about citizenship, obviously. The emergence of nation-states inevitably transformed "geography" into mutually exclusive "homelands." I don't argue that national belongings are the only form of being a member of a particular group. Ethnic and religious identities have always had and still have a significant role in defining who we are, but national borders have emerged as the only reference point in understanding human mobility in this new age: customs, passports, immigration quotas, the Schengen Agreement. Here, an ironic note: Some of those people who fled from Bulgaria to

[1] Kim Butler, "Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse", *Diaspora* 19, no. 2 (2001): 214.

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Turkey in 1989 due to increasing political pressures due to their identity started reclaiming their citizenship from Bulgaria when the country became a member of the EU in 2007. Is this about changing their ethnic-religious identity or basically about having access to the right of freedom of movement throughout a new territory – the Schengen Area?

In brief, "diaspora" is a concept that historically refers to a very specific group of people on the move, but this does not mean that all human groups on the move are necessarily diasporas. Colin Palmer, for instance, problematizes the usage of "African diaspora" popularized during the 1990s and questions what we need to understand by this concept. If we need to understand anyone who originated from the continent, then "all of humanity may be considered as a part of the African diaspora."[2] Of course, this is an ironic comment, but this irony indicates that we need to be, theoretically and methodologically, clear in the understanding of such social phenomena.

Going back to the origin, the Greek term "diaspora" etymologically builds upon two words: speiro, "to sow", and dia, "over". Early usage of the term referred to the general concept of migration within the frame of colonial demographic relocations of certain human groups, specifically the deportation of the Aegean population after the Peloponnesian War. Afterwards, with the expatriation of Jews from the Middle East following the demolition of Jerusalem in 586 BC and 70 BC, the term gained a religious connotation that specifically made reference to being exiled. This is an important nuance. Not all human groups on the move are diasporas; rather, only those who are forced to move in relation to their differences that are considered by the power elites, for some reason, to be unassimilable and menacing to their authority. In that sense, the notion of *shibboleth* is worth recalling.

For instance, in his book *The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean* (2006), Engseng Ho studies the Hadhrami Yemeni, who originated from the settlement of Tarim and sailed all over the Indian Ocean, ranging from Arabia to India and Southeast Asia, over the past five hundred years. They left gravestones all over that area; hence, even today it is possible to trace their footsteps and find tiny human groups identifying themselves with this location as their place of origin. This is similar to the Horosan reference for Alevis. However, I don't think that it is possible to regard the Hadhrami Yemeni as a group similar to the Jews in reference to the concept of diaspora.

Thus, we need to come back to the question of definition. How can we operationalize the concept of diaspora to be able to study this phenomenon? If we understand the concept as covering any human group on the move, then it becomes an "empty signifier" and loses its analytical power for us.

It is true, as Robin Cohen argues, that there is a kind of effective affinity between diasporization and globalization. We have gone through major transformations regarding the fixation among states, territories, and human groups since the end of the 1980s and various phenomena emerged or became visible during this period. In the wake of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (until the 9/11), "globalization" was the main concept for addressing all these phenomena that were difficult to study with some other conceptions formed in the age of

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[2] Colin A. Palmer, "Defining and Studying the Modern African Diaspora", *American Historical Association Perspectives* 36, no. 6 (1998): 22-25.

nationalism. Accordingly, "diaspora" functioned to cover any human groups on the move, but this was an attempt to fill the theoretical void and understand the newly emerging phenomena behind national conceptions, and it would not last long.

Scholars such as Steven Vertovec[3] and Robin Cohen tried to expand on the concept of diaspora by designating new subcategories of diasporas. For instance, Vertovec introduces three forms of diaspora: (a) *social forms* (classical diaspora communities like Jews or Armenians; having experienced victimization and alienation corresponding to traumatic displacement, this form of community establishes institutional social networks on the basis of ethnic myths of common origin between/among other compatriot communities in diverse host-lands); (b) *a type of consciousness* (having awareness of being multi-local, such as Euro-Turks); and (c) *a mode of culture* (creolization in relation to globalization as the flow of cultural objects, images, and meanings). Cohen classifies the concept of diaspora into five new categories: *victim diaspora* (Jews, the Irish, and Armenians), *labor diaspora* (Turkish immigration to Western Europe), *merchant diaspora* (historical Chinese or Indian communities), *imperial diaspora* (related to colonial histories, such as the Dutch community in Africa), and *homeland diaspora* (referring to actual or imaginary homelands such as those of the Zionists and the Sikhs).[4] Later, some new categorizations were introduced, such as "failed diaspora" for Somalians or "dying diaspora" for the Irish.

However, I don't see any point in naming immigrant communities diaspora and I do agree with Thomas Faist, who concludes that instead of stretching the term "diaspora" beyond its limits, it is more meaningful to speak of a segmented and transnationalized socio-cultural space, characterized by syncretistic identities and populated by various ethnic, national, religious, and subcultural groups.[5]

Q2. *States are increasing their efforts all around the world for diaspora engagement; however, they still lack in giving efforts in internationally debated policies. This does not mean that states do not have diaspora policies of their own but we don't see the diasporic issues discussed among states perhaps due to political and socio-cultural sensibility. Is it possible for states to consider debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies?*

A2. I am not sure if it is true. If you consider that the Ottoman Empire tried to keep an eye on its subjects that emigrated from Syria to Argentina at the end of the 19th century or that Czarist Russia attempted to put a ban on socialist journals published in the Yiddish language by the Jewish diaspora in the USA at the beginning of the 20th century, or that the American government closely monitored German immigrants during the First World War and forced Japanese immigrants into detention camps during the Second World War – diasporic communities, and

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[3] Steven Vertovec, "Three Meaning of 'Diaspora', Exemplified among South Asian Religions", Working Paper (1999): 1.

[4] Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 1997).

[5] Thomas Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000): 235

especially those that intend to engage in politics, have always been of great interest to sending and receiving states.

Let me give you another very clear and more recent example. In three massive gatherings organized in Germany (February 2008 in Cologne, March 2011 in Düsseldorf, and May 2014 in Cologne), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan addressed Turkish immigrants living in Europe with the maxim of "integrate but not assimilate." On the surface, this maxim sounds like a homeland-originated parental attitude, which is very common for many other sending states, simply because immigrants keep sending remittances only if they preserve their feeling of belonging to the homeland. However, in this case, Mr. Erdoğan, as the leader of Turkey, also introduced some policies to support Turkish immigrants in Europe "not to be assimilated." Thereafter, since the second half of the 2010s, we have witnessed certain controversies between Turkey and some European countries under the leadership of Germany regarding the activities of the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DİTİB). I think this tension looks likely to continue if you consider the recent January 2021 case about Belgium planning to deport a Turkish imam.

In this sense, it is a complicated question of who can stand for or speak for a diaspora community, especially if the community is not a diaspora but merely an immigrant group, as is the case for Turkish immigrants in Europe.

Q3. *Since the world entered into the nation-state system, territorial states have not been able to contain nations, rather led to increasing diasporas. So how do globalized nations and governance impact territorial state and diaspora relations?*

A3. I tried to touch on this question briefly above. I understand the contemporary "refugee crisis" as a symptom of the crisis of the global territorial regime established in the wake of the Second World War. If we consider global migration flows, it is obvious that what I call "buffer zonification" is happening all over the world. Let's consider the notion of "Fortress Europe". There are gates that enable you to access this fortress, but there are also ditches that leave some others outside. If the Schengen Agreement can be considered as the gate to Europe, then we can understand FRONTEX as the ditch of this fortress. If you try to map Europe not by counting gates (Schengen) but rather by measuring ditches (FRONTEX), then you will see that vast geographical areas (including highly technologized new border-controlling systems installed on the border between Georgia and Armenia, the walls built by Turkey on the Syrian border and by Greece on the Turkish border, and the holding camps in North Africa from Morocco to Libya) have already turned into buffer zones of Fortress Europe.

Or, if you consider the very recent phenomenon known as "Migrant Caravans", which first emerged in Latin America in 2017 as a direct outcome of climate change and its effect on agricultural production, it is obvious that we need to find a new way of thinking about the notion of territoriality beyond the categories of nationhood.

In this sense, as the main global line has shifted from lying between the West (First World) and East (Second World) to lying between the Global North and South, and as global inequalities have intensified, countries located along this fault line, such as Turkey or Mexico, have been facing challenges in coping with the mobility pressures from the South, and, therefore, they have

been gradually becoming a kind of buffer zone between the Global North and South.

In the midst of these territorial ambiguities, diaspora appears as a very specific category bridging gaps in national territorial systems. In his recent book, *The Transnationalized Social Question Migration and the Politics of Social Inequalities in the Twenty-First Century* (2018), Thomas Faist attempts to build a very interesting framework to understand international population movements in this new age. According to him, the act of migration became a strategy to cope with various social and economic problems. If you are not comfortable where you are located, then *exit* may be an option for you to overcome these problems. Of course, this is not a costless choice. Depending on your personal qualifications, you might have different options, ranging from skilled immigration schemes (as a seasonal agricultural worker or as a programmer) to a boat crossing the Mediterranean Sea.

I think that immigrant communities all over the world will develop certain diaspora abilities in the coming decades as a response to the crisis of the global territorial regime. The relatively new area of interest in migration studies that emerged in the early 2000s to build a link between international population movements and socio-economic development is an indicator of this process.

Q4. *In general, diaspora studies are not at their peak values. A small number of scholars dedicate their time to diaspora issues. For those who are eager to study this subject, what are the fundamental approaches to studying the concept of diaspora? Why is it important to study and how do you see where diaspora studies are heading to or need to go?*

A4. As I said, diaspora communities or immigrant communities will gradually develop diaspora abilities and it will be increasingly important to understand many other issues regarding the crisis of the global territorial regime. In this sense, it is important to develop a clear understanding of the border-crossing movements of these communities for all of us who are studying migration. As far as I understand, some nation-states, including Turkey, have also realized the importance of such communities (originating from their territory yet currently living in another territory) and began to introduce some new diaspora-making policies, such as those addressing the rights of expat voting citizens since the 2010s. However, it is still too early to draw any conclusion about the possible outcomes of these policies. If I were to go back to my own desk, it would be important to develop a new understanding of diaspora communities beyond what is known as "methodological nationalism" in the literature. Instead of taking nation-states as the only unit of analysis, we need to find new ways of thinking about the place-making of immigrant communities on the basis of their border-crossing movements in our research imaginaries.

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Interview

Elizabeth Mavroudi

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Interview

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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fit the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. Since Brubaker's (2005) much cited paper on the proliferation of the word diaspora, there has been much debate on the notion of diaspora and what exactly it does and does not encompass. There are those who view diasporas more in terms of distinct ethno-national communities spread out through space but who are tied somehow to a homeland and to one another through shared consciousness, identities, imagined communities, and collective memories. However, more poststructural views of diaspora, influenced by cultural theorists such as Stuart Hall and James Clifford, view diasporas in more flexible ways and will unravel the ways in which migrants construct and practice their identities and lives 'here' and 'there', 'on the move' and as within and across boundaries in grounded and situated ways. I have certainly been influenced more by the latter in my thinking and also by work of scholars, such as Homi Bhabha (1994), Yasemin N. Soysal (2000), Edward Said (2000), Pnina Werbner (2004), and Floya Anthias (1998). Within Geography, I have been influenced by the work of Alison Blunt (2007), Claire Dwyer (2000), Caitríona Ní Laoire (2003), Divya Tolia Kelly (2004), Sean Carter (2003), Elaine Ho, Mark Boyle and Brenda Yeoh (individually but also see their joint paper in 2015 e.g.) and Anastasia Christou (2011) amongst many others who argue for a nuanced approach to diaspora which takes into account the myriad intersectionalities which have an impact on how those in diaspora operate through time and space and in relation to place. Rather than making assumptions about diasporic lives and identities, or trying to fit people into typologies and classifications, I and these authors believe that it is important to listen to the voices and experiences of those who see themselves as being part of a diaspora and who may e.g. have complicated or ambivalent relationships with homeland(s). This body of work challenges any simplistic understandings that one might have around identity making and stresses the need to dismantle essentialist notions of identity and belonging whilst at the same time paying attention to power inequalities and relations within and between groups. I have written, as have others about the idea of diaspora as process (Mavroudi 2007; Morawska 2011; Houston and Wright 2003); I have taken such

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a dynamic notion and have extended it to discuss and in relation to performative timespace (Mavroudi 2019) as I believe this can help us strike a balance between more open-ended notions of diaspora which stress fluidity and hybridity and the reality of the limitations that many in diaspora also face. Living and feeling in-between is not necessarily easy and it is important to pay attention to the embodied, emotional and material aspects of such lives and identities. Finally, for me and other who write about diaspora, the notion itself is potentially a celebratory one which reminds us of the need to transgress essentialism, borders and boundaries, even as we also recognise that they still continue to exist and to constrain. By using diaspora to discuss migrant experiences we are paying explicit attention to all these processes and issues: we are recognising the importance of the sometimes uneasy juxtaposition between here, there, past, present, future, time, space, and place which jostle for position in people's lives and have to be actively and sometimes strategically negotiated.

Q2. *States are increasing their efforts all around the world for diaspora engagement; however, they still lack in giving efforts in internationally debated policies. This does not mean that states do not have diaspora policies of their own but we don't see the diasporic issues discussed among states perhaps due to political and socio-cultural sensibility. Is it possible for states to consider debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies?*

A2. Yes, sending states have pursued their own diaspora strategies, often as a means to reap socio-economic and political benefits from those who are in diaspora, for example through remittances, voting and investment. They have gone from seeing those who emigrate as traitors to their homeland to loyal members of the extra territorial state. They often make assumptions around diasporic obligations to the homeland based around sometimes quite narrow notions of ethno-national identity i.e., they assume that people will want to contribute and help their homeland because they are from there originally and feel part of this ethno-nationally constructed nation. However, in reality, research has shown that there are complex ways to be and feel in diaspora and that sending and receiving states shouldn't make simplistic assumptions around national belonging, integration and assimilation (see e.g. Mavroudi and Holt 2015 on the relationships between nationalism and schooling in relation to this). The same applies to receiving states who have equated migration with development and see diaspora strategies and diasporic involvement with their homelands as a way to increase development there. However, again, this makes assumptions around loyalty to homeland(s) and feelings of belonging towards them - work I have done, e.g., on the Greek diaspora in Australia has demonstrated that although they feel connected to Greece emotionally and culturally, they do not necessarily wish to help it economically (see Mavroudi 2017).

What is arguably needed is more co-operation between states and a realisation that people live within and across borders to varying degrees and in different ways. People can and do negotiate belonging to multiple nations, regions, places, and so forth. People may therefore want to contribute in multiple contexts or may struggle to contribute in any contexts. What is paramount, however, is that receiving states enable people to live and work to their full capacity and skill level so that issues such as brain waste are avoided. There is a need also to go beyond simplistic assumptions around assimilation, integration and protectionist nationalization and to

recognise not only the diversity which exists but also the very real hardships that many migrants continue to face because of how they are positioned in the labour market as well as socially and politically in the host countries as well as issues such as prejudice and intolerance. A more nuanced conversation around migrants and those in diaspora is needed, one which recognises this diversity but also pays attention to the ways in which people still construct more narrowly defined and potentially exclusionary nationalism and national identity (Mavroudi 2010a; Mavroudi 2020).

Q3. *Since the world entered into the nation-state system, territorial states have not been able to contain nations, rather led to increasing diasporas. So how do globalized nations and governance impact territorial state and diaspora relations?*

A3. States need to respect the wishes of groups who wish to realise self-determination and engage in dialogue with them to understand why they seek this. However, the reality is that this is a difficult process, not least because those seeking self-determination may themselves not be united and because there is a lack of political will to allow it. There may be fears of violence, instability and fragmentation but states should not oppress those who wish to govern more autonomously. It may be, e.g., that desires for self-determination are driven by feelings of past and present suffering and injustices so if these are addressed, this can pave the way potentially for living together in diversity, whilst respecting differences, rather than living apart in ever more fragmented national units (see e.g. Mavroudi 2010b). There needs to be a move away from states which imagine themselves are somehow homogenous or even in majority-minority terms, as this potentially ignores complexities of belonging on the ground. Unfortunately, although self-determination can be seen as a positive and empowering idea, it does also potentially serve to divide and encourage nation-building around more narrow ethno-national and religious notions of nationalism. This does not encourage people to live together but rather, separates them: it also creates problems in terms of immigration because if people perceive their state as homogenous, they may not want others coming in. However, if people are going to live together in larger states, in which there are multiple and complex identities and in which the nation is imagined and performed in inclusive ways, then people need to feel like they belong there. They should not have to choose allegiances or citizenship. The reality is that societies and cultures are mixed and complex and this is not just the result of more recent migration. However, in addition, by viewing states and nationalism as diverse and inclusive, we pave the way to manage and encourage encounters in positive ways in which people feel valued and included, have a voice and are not subject to racism, discrimination, or prejudice. This is an ideal scenario, for sure, but one that we need to work towards. The world is divided into a nation-state system and we are blinded by methodological nationalism as Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) reminded us; however, we can ensure that nationalism is constructed and enacted in positive and inclusionary ways and not based around narrow interpretations of culture, language, history, identity and religion. This goes for states, but also for diasporas too, and there are those within diasporic groups who have resorted to constructing more extreme and exclusionary notions of national identity in order to try and achieve unity, control and/or self-determination (Conversi 2012; Carter 2003). This also relates to issues of representation, tensions and power relations: who is representing what, for whom, and what are the consequences of this for diasporas and sending/receiving contexts (see

e.g. Godin and Doná 2016 on young people in diaspora and online representations).

Q4. *In general, diaspora studies are not at their peak values. A small number of scholars dedicate their time to diaspora issues. For those who are eager to study this subject, what are the fundamental approaches to studying the concept of diaspora? Why is it important to study and how do you see where diaspora studies are heading to or need to go?*

A4. I would say that although the field of diaspora studies is quite small and within geography, it is even smaller, I am heartened by the increasing interest in it by scholars and by states. Diaspora, as a word, is more in use by the media, and the public has perhaps a growing appreciation of it. Having said that, I think it's necessary to see diaspora studies as interdisciplinary not just in the sense that many scholars of different disciplines study diaspora in their own ways but that we need more interactions between such scholars. There are many scholars working in the field of diaspora politics, diaspora mobilisation and diaspora strategies as well as in the field of diasporic identities and belonging. I would like to see more work using a more joined up approach to diaspora whereby all aspects of diasporic lives are considered, not just one facet for example, and across scales and spaces. A good example of recent work which does this is Vathi and Burrell (2020).

There is interesting research coming out which stresses how those in diaspora can negotiate national belongings, but also realise that they are connected to wider groups of people beyond their own diaspora. They are then using such connections to make political claims in transnational ways, which are aimed at dealing with wider issues of human rights and injustices which although may be based around specific causes, are also linked to a wider need to create a better world (see e.g. Blachnicka-Ciacek 2018 and Salih et al 2020). In general, there is a need for more research, conceptualisation, and uses of diaspora to help create positive social and political change. This can be seen for example in the work of Ho et al (2015), who call for a feminist ethics of care within diaspora studies and diaspora strategies in particular, in which uneven relationships between people and countries are interrogated and there is a commitment to social and political justice in the relationships and interactions across scales and spaces. A large part of this is also a recognition of past injustices, (dis)connections and oppressions which continue to have an impact on current lives and identities, as the work of Gilroy (1991), Upadhyay (2013), and Ndhlovu (2016) amongst others has demonstrated, and which governments need to be aware of and address (Dickinson 2012), such colonial/postcolonial collisions. More recent work also examines this from an LGBT+ perspective (see Rouhani 2019; Koegler 2020; Dhoest 2020 and Sandal 2020 e.g.) and this stresses the need to examine sub-groups within diasporas and webs of interactions in which they are positioned. This is also important because of the ways in which sending countries attempt to try and monitor, control and shape those they see as 'their' diasporas and can lead to in/exclusions, intimidation and fear (see e.g. Baser and Ozturk 2020; Moss 2018 and Tsourapas 2020). We need to continue with work on generational and other differences in diaspora - it is important to demonstrate how diasporas are diverse and what their interactions are with others within Global North and Global South contexts (see e.g. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2020). There is a need also for more research which focuses on diaspora in different contexts, beyond the Anglo and euro centric powers, written by scholars from these places (and

which is arguably made available in different languages) but which is analytically as well as empirically rich. This is definitely happening but more is needed.

Diaspora studies needs to continue its commitment to transgressing borders and boundaries by ensuring that as many voices are heard as possible: from the academic, the policy maker, to third plus generations to younger generations, rich, poor, women, men children, LGBT+, connected and disconnected to one other and to other places and people, paying attention to intersectionalities and how people are positioned. Finally, and as research is increasingly stressing (see e.g., Ponzanesi 2020), it is necessary to further examine online-offline interactions and the ways in which material and virtual worlds collide and intersect within people's lives.

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Interview

Martin Baumann

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Interview

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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fit the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. Victim diasporas are still around and it is the enduring collective memory of people who had been persecuted who perpetuate exactly such a recollection. As for my conceptualisation of diaspora, please see an article of mine attach (Baumann, 2000). And yes, numerous articles since the mid-1990s are around and continue to discuss concepts of diaspora.

Q2. *States are increasing their efforts all around the world for diaspora engagement; however, they still lack in giving efforts in internationally debated policies. This does not mean that states do not have diaspora policies of their own but we don't see the diasporic issues discussed among states perhaps due to political and socio-cultural sensibility. Is it possible for states to consider debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies?*

A2. I agree to your observation, in particular as various states view diaspora communities with suspicion. And yes, it is possible for a state debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies in concepts such as multiculturalism and moderate secularism (see Tariq Modood) and participatory parity (see Nancy Fraser 2018). The idea of such approaches is to enable a participation of diaspora groups in the social, economic and political resources of a society.

Q3. *Since the world entered into the nation-state system, territorial states have not been able to contain nations, rather led to increasing diasporas. So how do globalized nations and governance impact territorial state and diaspora relations?*

A3. To complicate a question to answer this in a few sentences. You might refer to expositions by Steven Vertovec, Rainer Blauböck, Peggy Levitt and other with regard to these multiple-entangled question.

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Q4. *In general, diaspora studies are not at their peak values. A small number of scholars dedicate their time to diaspora issues. For those who are eager to study this subject, what are the fundamental approaches to studying the concept of diaspora? Why is it important to study and how do you see where diaspora studies are heading to or need to go?*

A4. Diaspora studies are of interest as these transcend the nation state and points to inter- and transnational connections of parts of a nation-state's population. Diasporas can be both conservative or highly innovative in nature. On the conservative site, a diaspora community might preserve language, habits, customs and religious expressions which have been changed in later decades in the country of origin (see the example of German or Swiss people in South America, settling there in the 19th century). On the innovative site, due to a lack of religious control by authorities, diasporas are laboratories of cultural and religious changes, changes which much slower take place in the country of religion in subsequent years.

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Interview

Robin Cohen

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Interview

Robin Cohen
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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fit the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. I argue in *Global diasporas: an Introduction* (2008) that it is important to avoid a formal definition of diaspora and deliberately use the expression 'common features' to signify that not every diaspora will exhibit every feature listed, nor will they be present to the same degree over time and in all settings. I analogize the following features as the main 'strands' that go into the making of a 'diasporic rope'.

Common features of a diaspora
Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions;
alternatively or additionally, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions;
a collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, suffering and achievements;
an idealization of the real or imagined ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation;

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the frequent development of a return movement to the homeland that gains collective approbation even if many in the group are satisfied with only a vicarious relationship or intermittent visits to the homeland;
a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, the transmission of a common cultural and religious heritage and the belief in a common fate;
a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group;
a sense of empathy and co-responsibility with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement even where home has become more vestigial; and
the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism.

I have no problem with the extension of the original group of 'victim diasporas' and identify other types, such as, labour, imperial, trade and deterritorialized diasporas. This can (and has) been extended further by other writers. Obviously, this proliferation can continue to the point of absurdity when, for example, the newly fashionable word is applied to any identifiable social group or minority.

Q2. *States are increasing their efforts all around the world for diaspora engagement; however, they still lack in giving efforts in internationally debated policies. This does not mean that states do not have diaspora policies of their own but we don't see the diasporic issues discussed among states perhaps due to political and socio-cultural sensibility. Is it possible for states to consider debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies?*

A2. There is little likelihood that states collectively will discuss diaspora policies, but many states are actively looking at how other states engage 'their' diasporas and seek to emulate what are seen as successful policies. I put the word 'their' in inverted commas to indicate that many states, and some scholars, imagine that diasporas 'belong' to states. This is not true. Many diasporas existed before particular states came into existence and, in any case, most diasporas will resist being seen, in any simple way, as an arm of particular states.

Q3. *Since the world entered into the nation-state system, territorial states have not been able to contain nations, rather led to increasing diasporas. So how do globalized nations and governance impact territorial state and diaspora relations?*

A3. As my answer to question 2 indicates, I see many diasporas as existing before the nation-state system (most states are post-Second Word War inventions). Diasporas live uneasily alongside states and may outlive states. In other words, nation-states and diasporas should be seen as separate forms of social affiliation, which sometimes overlap and intermesh, but not always. I concur with the implication of your question – namely that nation-states are not the only or the best way of managing diversity. Too great an assertion of nationalism will lead, and has led, to more diasporas.

Q4. *In general, diaspora studies are not at their peak values. A small number of scholars dedicate their time to diaspora issues. For those who are eager to study this subject, what are the fundamental approaches to studying the concept of diaspora? Why is it important to study and how do you see where diaspora studies are heading to or need to go?*

A4. As an older scholar, I see this somewhat differently than the question implies. When I started in the field, there was no such thing as 'diaspora studies', although there were studies of individual diasporas. Now there are many dedicated courses and a number of journals explicitly using the title 'diaspora studies'. The main tendency in the last few years has been to explore the subjective dimensions of diasporic identification – how diaspora is experienced, performed, enacted, even created. The *Routledge Handbook of Diaspora Studies* (eds. Robin Cohen and Carolin Fischer). published in 2019 has a good selection of subjective accounts of diaspora, in addition to earlier perspectives.

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Interview

Simone A. James Alexander

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Interview

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Q1. *The concept of diaspora is used to define almost any community who has a distinct identity tied with an imagined or territorialized nation outside the resident country. Nationalization of the concept of "victim" diaspora seems no longer prevailing but communities beyond the territory of a nation generally fill the picture. Migration or exile is not the only cause to form diasporic communities. To some studies, socially, culturally, religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and/or geopolitically amalgamated communities are also deemed to form diaspora. Having said that, what do you think about the impact of the proliferation of the usage on the conceptualization of diaspora? And/or, how would you conceptualize diaspora?*

A1. The proliferation of the practices of diaspora runs parallel to transnational encounters and exchanges. While displacements and dispersals remain foundational to the formation of diasporas and diasporic communities, migrations and migratory experiences have resulted in the continued evolution of the concept of diaspora to suit the needs and demands of ever-changing im/migrant communities. This flexibility and adaptability of diaspora accommodate the exchange of goods and services, for example, remittances, the transfer of funds by migrants to their home countries, which has become one of the largest financial inflows to these receiving countries. Gustavo Segura, a consultant of the Office of International Organization for Migration Regional Office for Central America, North America and the Caribbean, reminds us, "Remittances in the Caribbean [is] more than just money."[1] Alongside economic transnational practices, participation in transnational political activities is integral to the theorization of diaspora. Hence, migratory flows are not only limited to movements and migrations of individuals (the exchange of ideas), but also encompass the flow of money between home and host countries. These migratory experiences transcend national borders and boundaries.

In my most recent book, *African Diasporic Women's Narrative: Politics of Resistance, Survival, and Citizenship*,[2] I argue that transnational ties engender diaspora and diasporic relations, resulting in the obvious challenge to ideas of fixity and fixedness and the embrace of flexible (diasporic and transnational) identities, or "flexible citizenship," what Aihwa Ong refers to as the "flexibility [derived from] social and geographical positioning."[3] Responding to global migratory flows of people and resources, Ong's coinage, "flexible citizenship" underscores the need for a reconfiguration and reconceptualization of the definition of citizenship to accurately and adequately reflect transnational exchanges and movements. Thus, diaspora is not conceptualized in terms of permanent settlement. Opposing the regulation of the flow of information, resources, and people, flexible or diasporic citizenship gives rise to multiple sites of belonging, multiple conceptualizations of home/spaces. This expansive and inclusive refashioning of diaspora engenders borderless communities that are inclusive of the state. For

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example, the sizable Haitian diaspora in the United States has resulted in its categorization, or more poignantly, its amalgamation, as the eleventh department, otherwise referred to as the "floating homeland," an extension of the existing ten departments in the home country, Haiti. Due to the impact and influence of diasporic communities, many nations are reimagined as inclusive of their diasporas.

The configuration of the floating homeland lends voice to the complex reality of navigating and belonging to multiples spaces/places. This ability to be in circulation in multiple spaces takes on literal and figurative characteristics. Fittingly, Guyanese poet, Grace Nichols, reminds us that the sense of journey, whether real or imagined, is always in one's imagination.[4] Although Nichols specifically references Caribbean people, these journeys that place on an existential level in the imaginary, facilitate diaspora identity and consciousness. My conceptualization of diaspora is both real and imagined, not limited to geography or physicality. While home and host countries manifest as specific locales and destinations, diaspora also evokes the imaginary; functions as an imaginative space engendered through myths, memories, cultural practices, and rituals.[5] In other words, these communities are bound to their original geographical locations by a common vision, memory and myth about their homeland. Drawing on Benedict Anderson's concept of imagined community in which he calls attention to the sense of communion individuals of the smallest nation share in spite of never having met, I draw a parallel with Morrison's concept of the "neighborhood" in which she suggests that there exists an unspoken kinship, to underscore transnational alliances between communities. The theme of movement and migration is central, intrinsic to the work/field of diaspora.

Q2. *States are increasing their efforts all around the world for diaspora engagement; however, they still lack in giving efforts in internationally debated policies. This does not mean that states do not have diaspora policies of their own but we don't see the diasporic issues discussed among states perhaps due to political and socio-cultural sensibility. Is it possible for states to consider debating diaspora internationally beyond assimilation or nationalization policies?*

A2. It comes as no surprise that states are increasing their efforts for diaspora engagement as these participating states realize the invaluable contributions that diaspora makes to their ongoing development. As mentioned earlier, remittances that established a socio-spatial relationship between sending states and diasporas are important, often accountable for over 21% of some countries GDP.[6] A case in point, the Caribbean countries which Gustavo Segura dubbed "primarily receiving countries of remittance," are heavily reliant on remittances.[7] This heavy reliance equally speaks of heavy dependence on the host countries, tipping the scale or balance in favor of the latter. While these exchanges are paradigmatic of the globalizing effort, globalization does not operate equally across the globe. Filmmaker's Stephanie Black searing documentary, *Life and Debt* in which she exposes the exploitative politics and policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other aid organizations, that proved detrimental to the Jamaican economy, comes to mind. The structural adjustments—analogous to neocolonialism, that Jamaica, and by extension other dependent countries, was required to make compromised its sovereignty. Consequently, many scholars and theorists have argued that globalization promotes and incorporates in its agenda continued dependency, rendering

precarious countless lives and livelihoods. Along these lines, it is fair to conclude that the policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank target remittances, whether directly or indirectly, that aid in reducing poverty in receiving states. Suffice it to say, this is the extent (or the most documented evidence) of the sending states' engagement.[8]

We bear witness to diaspora engagement in the areas of science, technology, entrepreneurship, medicine, and engineering. However, I would argue that for the most part, this engagement is lopsided as countries involved in strengthening the workforce of the receiving country (namely the United States) by sending migrants as guest workers are disadvantaged, resulting in a brain drain of those sending countries, and economic and political gains to the receiving countries.[9] Embedded in this narrative of engagement is forced loyalty, of both the individual migrant and the sending country, to America, which can stymie efforts to remain connected to the politics back home; the attendant result is endorsing being embedded in American politics. Some may argue that there exist policies to counter this brain-drain, but I have not encountered any significant data to assess the success of this counter discourse. Immigrant roots of many nationals or citizens are part of the national narrative, yet the paucity that characterizes their inclusion, or lack thereof, in this narrative, is cause for pause, for the discourse often does not move beyond assimilation or national policies and politics.

How do we regulate these diaspora engagements to benefit equally or at least fairly, receiving and sending countries? How do we avoid exploitation of the so-called "lesser" countries? What kinds of regulatory practices must be put in place to ensure shared governance, to keep in focus the original purpose of diaspora engagements—that were initially sought in the name of shared culture? Coordination and engagement of the states and its migrants and diaspora groups abroad are paramount, i.e. better coordination and cohesion between state and non-state (or multiple-state, multiple-passport holders) actors. There is also a fervent need for regional and geo-political cooperation and coordination, a necessity to bridge the gap between the formal and informal economy. The remittances are categorized within the informal sector as are the migrants characterized as members of the informal economy, and therefore are subjected to marginalization and invisibility. Thus, it is incumbent that we do not rely exclusively on empirical discourse but rather integrate grassroots (non-state) practices and involvement as a viable form of diaspora engagement.

Q3. *Since the world entered into the nation-state system, territorial states have not been able to contain nations, rather led to increasing diasporas. So how do globalized nations and governance impact on territorial state and diaspora relations?*

A3. This question requires contextualization to address the various forms and formations of diaspora and the impetus for these diaspora, such as victim diaspora, labor diaspora. My response to the previous question about global diaspora engagement and the ability and willingness of the state to engage the diaspora beyond assimilationist and nationalist politics attend to some relevant issues, namely the negative effects of globalization, brain drain, the limitations placed on the engagement with domestic policy, the paucity of diasporic relations if the home state's national interest threatens the host state. As articulated, diasporas are important as they aid in the construction and development of nation-states. Diasporas should be inclusive of voluntary

and forced migration; consequently, people migrate in search of better opportunities so as to ameliorate their socio-economic condition. In many instances, the deplorable living conditions at home, in the home country, is exacerbated by the imposition of foreign policies, in the likes of the IMF and the IDB. In the promotion of globalization and implementation of state policies on diasporic communities, state representatives or actors endorse policies that are inherently biased and consequently, benefit the "greater" countries, while disenfranchising the "lesser" countries. This interaction between state and non-state actors is imbalanced; subsequently there should be a call for a more balanced agenda premised on shared governance. As I demonstrated earlier, we witness the racialization and politicization of certain policies that affect specific countries disproportionately. For example, while the Cuban diaspora in the United States is welcomed, granted citizenship with relative ease, the same treatment is not meted out to the Haitian diaspora that is ostracized and regarded as second-class citizens. So we witness the drawing of borders within the diaspora that engenders the politics of un/belonging. Thus, one can surmise that Haitian migrants, members of the "victim" diaspora, endure a double victimization of sorts. Both diasporas (Cuban and Haitian) are the result of "forced migration," despite the U.S. immigration policies that frame diaspora differently leading to the inclusion and exclusion of different population groups, and as a consequence the articulation of different approaches of strategies regarding diasporic populations. In this highly-charged politicization of certain diasporas, the contribution to the nation-state of these marginalized groups are overlooked.

Q4. *In general, diaspora studies are not at their peak values. A small number of scholars dedicate their time to diaspora issues. For those who are eager to study this subject, what are the fundamental approaches to studying the concept of diaspora? Why is it important to study and how do you see where diaspora studies are heading to or need to go?*

A4. I'm not sure what barometer is used to measure "peak values" of diaspora studies. In short, it is difficult to conceptualize when the peak is attained or what constitutes "peak values" of diaspora. Notwithstanding, I would say that diaspora studies is a burgeoning field that is determined and constantly re-defined by the ever-changing dynamic of immigrant communities and the steady influx of migrants. A significant number of scholars are invested in the field of migration and diaspora studies which is vast and wide-ranging, as there are several diasporas beyond the ones, African/Caribbean diaspora, inclusive of the Indo-Caribbean Diaspora, I am invested in. Whereas I see globalization as a one-dimensional enterprise where "greater" countries exploit the resources of smaller, lesser developed countries, diasporic or transnational relations allow for a more equal participation and exchange of ideas and goods. The nation-states should capitalize on this unique opportunity, the distinctive interstitial space that diaspora inhabits, for I believe that the diasporic community has and plays a unique role in bridging cultural and political differences and fostering international and transnational ties and relationships; its in-betweenness, its hyphenated subject position permits diasporic subjects the privilege of being emotionally invested in both the home and host countries. To this end, the state should not occupy the role of sole actor and should encourage global diasporic participation. Attentive to the needs and demands of different diasporas, we need to develop strategies and policies to target different migrants differently, to meet them on their own turf, so to speak, in order to encourage full civic participation. Diaspora, as I have documented, is an extension of the homeland and the

non-state actors or ambassadors promote the homeland's national interest and are in a unique position to influence the foreign policies of the host countries. With an ever-changing world, with the emergence of a borderless and boundaryless world of free movement of persons, goods, capital and services, diaspora engagement is inevitable. Moreover, diasporas primarily function as agents of positive change, bridging cultural and political differences between host country and home country.

Notes

[1] https://rosanjose.iom.int/SITE/en/blog/remittances-caribbean-more-just-money?page=2

[2] *African Diasporic Women's Narrative: The Politics of Survival and Citizenship*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014.

[3] Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.

[4] Nichols made this pronouncement while offering commentary on her film documentary of her book, *I Is a Long Memoried Woman*.

[5] For a more detailed discussion, see *African Diasporic Women's Narrative: The Politics of Survival and Citizenship*.

[6] Citing the World Bank, Segura cites that that the remittances received by Haiti, the Caribbean country most dependent on remittances, account for 21.1% of the country's GDP. https://rosanjose.iom.int/SITE/en/blog/remittances-caribbean-more-just-money#:~:text=The%20Caribbean%20countries%20are%20primarily,Haiti%20(USD%201.9%20billion).

[7] Ibid.

[8] Uncoincidentally, the IMF and World Bank are owned and directed by governments of member nation. "The People's Republic of China, . . . the most populous state on earth, is a member, as is the world's largest industrial power, the United States." https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm

[9] Much of my analysis here is limited to the Caribbean and its diasporas, primarily in the United States.

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Book Review

Birsen Aybüke Evranos

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Book Review

Alan Gamlen, **Human Geopolitics: States, Emigrants, and the Rise of Diaspora Institutions**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, 352 pp., $93 (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-19-883349-9

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Even though the concepts of migrant and migration have existed for many years, they have received more attention and been considered more problematic since the end of the Cold War, because of its connection to globalization and mass migration flux. Given the growth of transnational migration caused by these and other phenomena, states found themselves in a position that required taking action about migrants. They did this by creating new official diaspora engagement institutions. Alan Gamlen's book, *Human Geopolitics: States, Emigrants, and the Rise of Diaspora Institutions*, goes into detail about how and why there has been a rise in the number of diaspora institutions since the 1990s and their impact on geopolitics and international relations.

By defining diaspora institutions as "formal state offices dedicated to emigrants and their descendants" (p. 9), Gamlen excludes provincial or other level institutions, and diaspora NGOs from his analysis. The main question that the book tries to answer is what explains the rise of diaspora institutions and how they are changing the rules of world politics (p. 4-5). According to Gamlen's assessment, there are three phases to the global rise of diaspora institutions and each one has its own particularities. The first phase, covering the time from after World War II to the 1990s, has reference to a few countries that experienced regime shocks such as decolonization and democratization. These countries tried to bring together emigrants as part of a nation-building process. The second one, from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s, involves member countries in regional organizations, such as the European Union. Accordingly, they created their own diaspora institutions to have control over labor migration and to distinguish irregular migrants. The final phase, which is the most important according to Gamlen, started in 2005 with the support of international organizations such as the United Nations, epistemic communities, think thanks. This phase is still ongoing, and it comprises numerous countries experienced a rise in the number of diaspora institutions. Consequently, 118 out of 193 United Nations member states, had at least one diaspora institution by 2015 (p. 9).

Based on these three phases, the main argument of Gamlen's book is that the "global spread of diaspora institutions is a particular kind of socially scripted action" (p. 15). According to Gamlen, two hypotheses exist to explain why there has been a rise of diaspora institutions: tapping and embracing (p. 9). The tapping hypothesis is based on a realist and nationalist

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approach, which focuses states' security and foreign policy interests. Countries that embrace this approach, see diaspora institutions as investment instruments to achieve their purposes. On the other hand, according to the embracing hypothesis, states establish diaspora institutions to embrace their emigrant citizens to seek national unity (p. 10). Gamlen argues that these two hypotheses might explain the first two phases of the rise in diaspora institutions, but not the third one. Instead, world polity theory, world society theory, and the study of Epistemic Communities better illuminate the underlying reasons for the rise of diaspora institutions since 2005 (p. 184).

The book is organized into eleven chapters that chronologically explain the historical development of diaspora institutions. Throughout Chapters 3, 4, and 5, Gamlen focuses on the first phase that witnessed the formation of diaspora institutions in accordance with exile ingathering and labor export strategies. In the subsequent two chapters, the book explores the second phase and gives examples of countries that are a member of regional organizations, such as the European Union and the African Union. Then, in Chapters 8, 9, and 10, Gamlen arrives at the third phase and examines the global rise of diaspora institutions as a policy diffusion created by Kofi Annan's project and some professional experts, whom he calls the epistemic community of migration optimists, to orchestrate a migration regime. In the final chapter, Gamlen summarizes his argumentations presented in the book and highlights his contribution to the field. He also expands horizons for future studies by presenting new questions. Throughout the book, Gamlen applies his methodology, which involves both quantitative and qualitative methods, and presents the data collected and classified. The quantitative data serves to exhibit the rise in the number of diaspora institutions, and the qualitative data gathers information from many countries to show the underlying reasons for the rise in the number of diaspora institutions through multiple factors. This collected data is presented at the end of the book in an exhaustive appendix, which provides a full list of diaspora institutions that are analyzed in the study, including the sources.

In general, the book is very well organized to prove a point, that the rise of diaspora institutions is all about human geopolitics, namely, "a kind of geopolitics involving a strategic competition over people but not over territory" (p. 6). With the growth of transnational migration, especially since 2005, diaspora institutions emerged all over the globe by a decentralized and internationally supported process to manage global migration. Nonetheless, the book does not bring light to why there are still many countries without any diaspora institutions. If the diaspora institution has become an international norm since 2005, as the book suggested, why have all countries not reacted accordingly? Still, the book provides a different point of view to evaluate transnational migration, which is traditionally studied by sociologists.

Methodologically, applying multiple methods, i.e., quantitative, and qualitative, strengthens the book in terms of proving its arguments. Also, formal statements that are collected from the author's interviews, give insights to the quantitative data. Having said that, frequently giving references to the interviews, the relevant legal citations, and the diaspora institution names disrupts the chain of thought and sometimes makes it hard to follow the chronology. The introduction of new concepts such as *human geopolitics, safety valve labor export,* and *exile in-gathering* provides a better comprehension of diaspora related topics.

The book, trying place itself as a reference book in the field, does not give much reference

to the existing literature. Diaspora studies is an extensive field, but the reader does not see an academic debate over subjects or theories mentioned in the book. Furthermore, some related topics are only mentioned briefly. For example, citing Tsourapas, Gamlen speaks about authoritarian emigrant states in the concluding chapter, but transnational authoritarianism implemented by diaspora institutions is worth considering and could be discussed more. There could be a stand-alone chapter treating security related issues concerning diaspora institutions. Finally, there are some countries' diaspora institutions that Gamlen frequently dwells on. It is understandable because they are usual suspects like Mexico, India, Israel, and the Philippines. However, there is a little explanation or analysis on countries considered to be developed. This could raise some questions such as, are diaspora institutions more important for developing or underdeveloped countries or are developed countries diaspora institutions more relevant to the main argument.

All in all, the book is well balanced to show the advantages and disadvantages of diaspora institutions. Throughout the book the author reveals the benefits of diaspora institutions and in the concluding part, he is not very optimistic about them. This juxtaposition gives a more realistic point of view, considering the increasing number closed border policies. Hence, it is a beneficial reference book for both public servants and social sciences scholars.

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Book Review

Muhammet Mustafa İyi

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Book Review

Gabriel Sheffer, **Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, xiii+290 pp., $44.99, ISBN 9780521811378

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Throughout history, individual and mass migrations have taken place. Diasporas emerged from these migrations as people of same ethnic group settle in the host country. Entering the 21st century, it is evident that there are many diasporas throughout the world and there has been a development in this field in the literature. Gabriel Sheffer's book "Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad" which was first published in 2003, is one of the important books that deals with the concept of diaspora. The book consists of 10 chapters. These chapters are, in order, Introduction; Diasporism and Diaspora in History; A Collective Portrait of Contemporary Diasporas; Diasporas in Numbers; The Making, Development, and Unmaking of Diasporas; Stateless and State-Linked Diasporas; Trans-state Networks and Politics; Diasporas, the Nation-State, and Regional Integration; Loyalty, and the last chapter is Diasporas at Home Abroad. In his book, Gabriel Sheffer describes how people who live abroad somehow try to develop special ties with their homeland, and also try to experience the feeling of being at home even when abroad (p. XIII). Sheffer describes these human communities as "diaspora" (p. 10); the structural, organizational, and behavioral characteristics of these "diasporic" (p. 11) communities and the noticeable and visible state of all these characteristics as "diasporism" (p. 12). In addition, Sheffer discusses the concept of diaspora along with ethnic-national concepts, since these communities come together due to the identity of the same nation. (p. 10). In this vein, Sheffer's main thesis is that the diaspora is not an imaginary or invented community, but rather an organized, concrete entity that tries to experience the feeling of being at home while abroad by continuing relationships with the homeland. To support this thesis, he tries to prove that diaspora is not a modern concept by giving different examples throughout history.

Sheffer makes some classifications about diasporas according to connections with home and hostland, according to its historical existence and according to the activities of the diasporas. He categorizes diasporas depending on their connection with the homeland as *stateless* or *state-linked* (p. 148). He categorizes according to historical existence, *ancient (historical)* or *modern*. And lastly, he categorizes them according to the activities of the diaspora as *incipient*, *dormant* or *active*. Sheffer states that in all diaspora types, voluntary or forced migration is a common feature, and the migration event has an important effect on making a diaspora possible (p. 83). Diasporas also apply different strategies according to their relationship with the hostland and homeland as *assimilationist* (p. 162), *integrationist* (p. 163), *communalist* (p. 164), *autonomist* (p. 169), *irredentist* (p. 170), or *separatist* (p. 170). According to Sheffer, in general, state-linked

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diasporas adopt the communalist strategy to establish relationships with the hostland on diplomatic, economic, social, and political grounds. Hereby, state-linked diaspora establishes legal institutions in the hostland to reach a safe and respectable position in that land.

Sheffer repeatedly states that we are in a "post-nationalist world order", even so, national belonging is essential in the formation of diasporas, and paradoxically stateless diasporas struggle to establish an independent national state (p. 209). Sheffer's claims that we are in a post-nationalism era; that diasporas are formed by ethno-national belongings; and that stateless diasporas strive to establish an independent nation, may cause a conceptual contrast in the reader's mind. Although Sheffer was aware that these claims were paradoxical, he continued to argue his statement.

Sheffer argues that diasporas, in general, are not a threat to the homeland or hostland. According to Sheffer, only some activities of stateless diasporas may be described as harmful to the hostland or homeland (p. 245). However, looking at some examples in the book, especially those from the history, shows that the nation-building intentions of some diasporas may be a threat to the homeland. Even so, Sheffer thinks that diasporas will not be harmful to the hostland. Sheffer maintains his optimistic approach, but he is clearly aware that stateless diasporas could produce some negative outcomes, such as terrorism. Moreover, he is aware that terrorism is only the tip of iceberg and these diasporas use many different methods in their attempts through resources such as money, weapons, warriors, and military intelligence (p. 159). For Sheffer, the solution to some negative effects of stateless diasporas is that the homeland should fulfill the demands of the stateless diaspora at a basic level. This basic level means that the homeland should help the stateless diaspora to establish an independent state, so newly state linked diaspora will no longer be a threat to the homeland (p. 160). However, Sheffer's these claims create another contradiction in the book.

According to Sheffer, diasporas will play an important role in future social and political arrangements at global and regional levels (p. 217). He emphasizes that diasporas will contribute to peace at local, regional, and global levels and will assume a compromise role between the homeland and hostland (p. 258). He also believes that in the post-national world order, diasporas will act as a bridge that prepares the ground for a peaceful economic, commercial, and cultural flow (p. 83, 201). In addition to this belief, he even claims that diasporas will differ from the agenda, interests, and needs of the homeland in the long run, so that over time they can continue without the support of the homeland, and even that diasporas will come to a new inter-state threshold: a federation of autonomous entities. (p. 248). Since today's world is still dominated by the idea of nation, Sheffer's claim about autonomous entities is uncertain. However, only time will tell how possible this uncertainty will be.

Sheffer strengthens his thesis by explaining the basic arguments he sets out in his book through many different recent and historical examples. Many of the topics discussed and defended in the book are supported by concrete examples. The most obvious example of this is that diaspora is not a new phenomenon, but rather an enduring concept that has existed throughout history. In his book, Sheffer focuses on, "historical state-linked diasporas" such as Jewish, Greek, Chinese, and Armenian diasporas that emerged in antiquity or during the Middle Ages and became linked to nation-states that were created in much later periods (p.

75). Sheffer emphasizes that this concept has been neglected until recently and it has come back to the agenda with the spread of transportation, communication, and globalization, and he insists that the historical depth of the concept should not be ignored. By drawing the reader's attention to this point, he examines the concept of diaspora, in detail, in different categories, and makes important contributions to the literature on this topic. In addition, the fact that Sheffer investigates this concept from examples of many different countries and diasporas, allows him to create generalizations about diasporas by revealing common features of diaspora.

Diasporic communities are in a position that both effects and is affected by the political practices of the hostland, the manipulative attitudes of the homeland, and the political impact of regional events. However, diasporas develop transnational identities and bilateral belongings. The diaspora community, rather than an assimilating or integrating, seems to have developed a new form of identity and belonging and is even required to do so. This causes diasporic communities to develop a new collective form (community), that is neither fully dependent on the homeland, nor the hostland. Political tensions that may arise between the hostland and homeland will not only cause intense cultural differences between the homeland and the diaspora, but also create a basis for political turmoil between the hostland and the diaspora. For example, different diasporas in Western Europe benefit from the hostland's values in their practical and relations with Islam. This is evidence of the beginning of cultural differentiation. Also based on this, we can say that in the long term, Islam will be integrated in these regions. In another example, the public sphere of legal institutions that are considered to be nationalist creates isolation due to political tensions between European countries and homeland. This could lay the groundwork for political turmoil and dissociation in these countries.

Diasporas have the opportunity to undertake important roles at local, regional, and global levels and regulate the relations between their homeland and hostland. However, Sheffer claims if diasporas are suppressed due to regional and political tension between two countries, this may lead the diasporas to establish a new administrative formation that is independent from the influence of the hostland and homeland. The main thesis of Sheffer book is to demonstrate that, first, ethno-national diasporas are not a modern phenomenon, second, diasporas are neither imagined nor invented communities, and lastly, that ethno-national diasporas will be the precursors of globalized political systems in the world of the twenty-first century (p. 257-258).

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Book Review

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Book Review

Robin Cohen and Nicholas Van Hear, **Refugia: Radical Solutions to Mass Displacement**, Routledge, London and New York, 2019, 148 pp., $46.95, ISBN 9781138601567

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Migration is an ancient phenomenon intertwined with human history. Numerous factors such as war, famine, and climate changes, in addition to individual and sometimes social reasons, are factors that push people to migrate. Today, one of the most important factors that contribute to a large number of migrations is people who are forcibly displaced due to their ethnic identity, religion, or political stance. Robin Cohen and Nicholas Van Hear, in their book entitled *"Refugia***:** *Radical Solutions to Mass Displacement,"* seek a different way of addressing the problems caused by mass displacement. In the book, an innovative social theory is put forward, as well as the known analytical studies of social sciences. Fictional aspects of the book allow the reader to associate it with the utopian literary genre. The concept of *Refugia* that gave the book its name is a transnational form of government organized by and for refugees and displaced persons (p. xi). The book, which consists of six different chapters, deals with the ideas of political and social theory presented in context in the first part. Here, the idea of *Refugia* is grounded by expressing the contradictory aspects of today's nation-state understanding in general. In other chapters, the idea of *Refugia* and its components are explained with definitions. The methodology that works here is generally in the form of explaining current situations and making future projections for the problems caused by these situations. For example, in the fourth part of the book, after explaining the current meaning of "transnational communities" and the communication between diasporas and their homelands, predictions about how to transform into a new form of transnational government are shared. The functioning of *Refugias* is mentioned in the fifth chapter of the book and summary and criticisms are given in the last chapter.

The idea of *Refugia*, as theorized by Cohen and Van Hear, is not based on ethnicity, nationalism, or religion (p. 4). From this point of view, the book presents a vision of the future where *Refugians* build a new form of government that is not based on identity politics, and that is democratic, self-sufficient, and forward-looking. The second part of the book points out why *Refugias* are needed in the current functioning of nation states. In this section, some criticism is directed toward the historical process of the formation of nation-states. Cohen and Van Hear suggest that nation-states should be viewed as a purely ideological and political project that has never been fully realized and has always been contested (p.15). Rather than arguing that

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nation-states should be abolished in general, they demonstrate that there are now different ways in which power is organized. In the same chapter of the book, they refer to identities, group identities, the state that identities come to the forefront in the construction processes and that nation-states are no longer assumed, unique, or a natural situation. Accordingly, identities have become individually selectable. Socially constructed group identities are formed by shared experiences, shared pains and successes, and ultimately by collective efforts for a future together. The elements that constitute social identity and forms of belonging exist less with national and ethnic loyalty, and more with the interaction that comes with the contact with each other in daily life. From this point of view, the formation processes of identities contain vitality and can be transformed. On the other hand, various ethnic groups among forcibly displaced people have built a collective social identity with the horrors of war, the trauma of displacement, the suffering of the journey, the struggle for survival, and the collective pains they experienced. This process is far from ethnically based identity construction (p. 22). Cohen and Van Hear define *Refugia* as one of the component units of *refugium*. Refugia is formed by refugium, archipelago, and ecotones. Accordingly, archipelago and common areas called ecotones are beyond the territorial state idea. From Here, *Refugians,* as a whole, can work to maximize their bargaining power with nation-states and international organizations (p. 59). According to Cohen and Van Hear, social identities are freed from the cage of national identities. Therefore, it is possible for individuals, who continue to preserve their roots in the diaspora and integrate into an existing nation-state, to declare themselves *Refugians* (p. 32).

The book mentions many transnational political and economic initiatives created by refugees that can be considered as a prelude to *Refugia*. Transnational money transfers, house building, and self-management initiatives, especially among refugees, make it likely that transnational forms of governance like *Refugia* will emerge. The authors pointed out that the idea of *Refugia*, which they describe throughout the book, may be limited due to the limited scope and success of initiatives of transnational governance experienced so far. However, the authors consider that even these limited efforts make gains for the forcibly displaced. In *Refugia*, presentation and representation styles are introduced, in addition to the management styles that exist in some ethnic-national groups and diasporas, which are valid for all refugees. The authors summarize the management approach they propose in the last part of the book. Also, criticisms and objections to *Refugia* are included in this section. Accordingly, Refugia embraces utopian thinking and undertakes individual or collective responsibilities that are in which nation-states are burdened by displaced people. The utilitarian utopianism mentioned here is the good society; in other words, it advocates the emergence of an ideal society that has characteristics such as horizontal democracy, tolerance, equality, and transparency. At this point, the book also emphasizes that a rational ground should be prepared on the way to *Refugia*, through taking into account the continuity of the nation-state, the number of displaced people, and the current international refugee regime.

The main aim of the *Refugia* idea is to create a new form of transnational government. In doing so, the authors consider how to resolve displacement. Accordingly, *Refugia* will be led by an international virtual assembly. *Refugians* will have the responsibility to pay taxes to both the nation-state they live in and *Refugia*. Also, this situation is expected to reveal a new identity. The authors admit that this is based on utopian ideals. According to the authors, utopian thinking

offers, at least, the opportunity to imagine such a management approach and a society that lives in this way. This idea outlined in the book may lead to further work in the future by nurturing initiatives on transnational governance that already exists. Today's changing conditions such as global epidemics and pandemics have brought nation-states and extreme security policies back to the agenda. At the same time, the international refugee regimes currently in place and the position of refugees raise questions about the applicability of the *Refugia* idea.

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Book Review

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
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Book Review

Michel S. Laguerre, **Parliament and Diaspora in Europe**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY, 2013, xxv+182 pp., $68.61, (e-book) ISBN: 978-1-137-28060-2

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All throughout the existence of humanity, there has been perpetual movement and displacement of people. Some leave their own countries for various reasons related to education, business, political, and climatic changes to become permanent residents in their host countries over time. These groups of people are defined as diaspora. The preservation of language, religion, and culture that these people inherit from their homeland is dependent upon the bond that the homeland can establish with its diaspora. These ties can disappear or they can be strengthened and continued with the policies implemented. One of the policies created to keep the bonds of the diaspora strong is a representation system for the diaspora in the parliament. This phenomenon is on the agenda of many countries in the world today and continues to spread. (Laguerre, 2016, 2017) In 2012, only about 13 countries offered the opportunity to represent their diaspora, today this number has increased to 18.

Michel S. Laguerre, in his book titled "*Parliament and Diaspora in Europe,*" conveys to the reader the issue of representation in the parliament, which is important for making the diaspora visible and protecting its connection with the homeland. In the book, the author discusses the transnational policy process of diaspora representation in the parliament in Croatia, France, and Italy, and how each of them works. The book was written in 2013 and consists of the following chapters; "Introduction: A Parliament Reflective of the Nation and Its Diaspora", "Parliament and Diaspora", "Italy: Diaspora Parliamentary Representation", "France: Diaspora Parliamentary Representation", "Croatia: Diaspora Parliamentary Representation", "The Cosmonational Politics of Diaspora Parliamentary Representation," and "Conclusion: Parliament of the Cosmonation."

The main factors that have prevented the implementation of diaspora parliamentary representation are lack of rapid communication and transportation, ideological structure of the period, inability to be sure of the loyalty of the supranational representatives, and taxation. It is still not a common practice for many countries (p.19). Giving the diaspora the right to representation is a situation that can be associated with the countries' migration and diaspora policies. For instance, despite about 7 million Turkish citizens living abroad, a party representing the interests of the diaspora that consists of representatives from the diaspora has not yet been established in Turkey's Parliament. For this reason, the author provides the reader

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the opportunity to make a comparison with examples from three different countries. In these three examples the practice is relatively institutionalized and they have commonalities and differences in diaspora representation.

Among the countries considered, France offers the opportunity to make an analytical distinction between colonial and diaspora parliamentary representation due to its former colonial and overseas territories. The transformation of Italy from a country of emigration to a country of immigration and the fact that it was the first to implement representation of the diaspora in the Parliament, both in the House of Representatives and the Senate, highlight Italy in this regard. Croatia has a single-wing parliament and some diasporic practices that are the subject of discussion between political parties. These characteristics separate Croatia from France and Italy (p. xii).

According to Laguerre, state institutions turn into "cosmonational" structures in the process of diaspora representation in the parliament. A cosmonation is a cross-border and cultural collective structure that transcends territorial boundaries and is formed in cooperation with diaspora and homeland residents (p. xiii). The definition has an inclusive connotation in terms of expressing transnational ties that transcend the official borders of the state. Practical applications of the "cosmonationalism" concept, which Laguarre added to the literature, gains importance every day.

The diaspora's involvement in collective governance becomes evident with dual citizenship and voting, which are the building blocks of diaspora representation (p. 6). According to Laguerre, cosmonational dual citizenship is not a transnational extension of the classic form of citizenship. Cosmonational citizenship is a bundle of rights and obligations of the population in the homeland and in the diaspora (p. 8). There are still countries today that are reluctant to grant dual citizenship because of the idea that it reduces loyalty to the homeland. In this way, representation of the diaspora is blocked, and policies are made that do not meet the diaspora's expectations due to lack of representation. However, as stated by the author, citizenship is a must for representation of the diaspora.

Representation of the diaspora in the parliament began to be implemented in France in 1948, in Italy in 2006, and in Croatia in 1995 (p. xviii). One of the most important problems in diaspora representation in all three countries was the representation of the diaspora without being subject to taxes. While paying taxes represents loyalty to the homeland for opponents in the Italian Parliament (p. 18), those who advocate diaspora representation claim that remittances from the diaspora to the homeland can be a substitute for tax in terms of developing the country's economy (p. 33). It seems that although the author supports the cosmonational approach, he is unable to explicitly confront the opposing ideas to defend the diaspora. Another prominent view in the author's narrative gives the reader the chance to form their own opinion on the subject by including the thoughts of the supporters and opponents of the diaspora.

The author also mentions some of the difficulties experienced by representatives who represent the diaspora. Diaspora representatives often travel during the election campaign to learn the opinions of the voters and this is of great importance. However, election campaign rules are different in each country, and the representatives are responsible for obeying all those rules (p. 25). In diaspora election campaigns, the security of the candidates, the capacity of

the homeland to follow the elections, transparency, and criminal proceedings are among the issues that raise concerns in terms of legal limitations. In the case of Italy, the immunity of a representative is valid only on Italian territory (p. 37). These trips, which can be the homeland's lobbying activities, include the opportunity to develop foreign relations along with the representation of the diaspora. For this reason, travel arrangements should be organized in favor of both the visited state and the diaspora.

The transformation of the national structure into a cosmonatinal structure over time contributes to the strengthening of the ethnic identity of the diaspora, the development of inter-country relations, and the transition to a global dimension. In addition to representation, naming a certain date of the year as a diaspora day/week has an effect that glorifies the cosmonation. The author claims the goal of the day is to connect the diaspora to the homeland, make the diaspora visible to the public, and show respect for diaspora's contribution to the culture, economy, and the spread of its population abroad (p. 129). Also, devoting a special day to diaspora is an indication of the importance given to diaspora. Activities held in the homeland during diaspora days strengthen the bond between diaspora members and the homeland. Although not everyone agrees with diaspora representation, parliamentary representation is one of the most important policies that can be implemented to make the diaspora visible and protect their language, culture, and religion.

This book is an important resource for politicians as well as academics, as it is an issue that needs to be considered, along with discussions on citizenship and diaspora geopolitics. However, it needs to be updated. Students of diaspora studies may want to consider examining the author's more recent works on the subject. Laguerre, since 2013, has also published two more books on diaspora, namely *The Multisite Nation: Crossborder Organizations, Transfrontier Infrastructure* (2016), and *Global Digital Public Sphere and The Postdiaspora Condition: Crossborder Social Protection, Transnational Schooling, and Extraterritorial Human Security* (2017). Through Laguarre's trilogy on diaspora representation systems, students of the subject are able to orient themselves and know where to seek information for a conceptual beginning. Yet, the subfield still remains open to further examination and exploration in the concept of cosmonationalism, human geopolitics, and overseas electoral participation.

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