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MAKALELER ARTICLES

EDİTÖRDEN

Değerli Okuyucular,

İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi tarafından yayınlanan, Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences Dergisi, 1983 yılında yayınlanmaya başlamış, o tarihten beri alanında öncü ve seçkin dergilerden biri olma özelliğini sürdürmektedir. Dergimizin ismi yayın hayatına başladığından beri "İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi" iken Ekim 2017 tarihli 57. sayısından itibaren "Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences" olarak değiştirilmiş ve Cilt uygulamasına geçilmiştir. Dergi halen Emerging Sources Citation Index, Ebsco Political Science Complete, TR DİZİN (ULAKBİM) Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Veri Tabanı ve Akademia Sosyal Bilimler İndeksi (ASOS Index) tarafından taranmaktadır.

Dergimizin Cilt 30 Sayı 2, Ekim 2021 tarihli yayınında altı makale yer almaktadır. Bu makalelerden ilki, "Changing the Turkish Constitution: An Institutionalist and Collective Action Perspective" başlıklı Prof. Dr. Hayrettin Özler, Prof. Dr. Alim Yılmaz ve Arş.Gör. Didem Geylani tarafından yazılmış makaledir. Bu çalışmada, statükoya yönelik ifade edilebilir alternatiflerin sağlanmasının yanısıra, siyasi partilerin ve diğer sosyo-politik oluşumların kurumsal değişim için, ortak eylemde bulunmalarının elzem olduğu savunulmuştur. Avrupa-Türkiye ilişkilerindeki tarihsel dönüm noktaları, hükümetlerin ve kamuoyunun Türk anayasasına yönelik değişim talepleri ile AB-Türkiye ilişkileri arasında görünür bir ilişki olduğu ve bu yakınlığın bir sonucu olarak, yapısal değişimi sağlamanın en başarılı yolu olarak izomorfik yaklaşımın etkili olduğu iddia edilmektedir.

"Partisan Journalists on Duty: Political Gnosticism as a Means of Legitimating Quasi-militant Democracy in Crisis-driven Poland" başlıklı ikinci makale, Doç. Dr. Joanna Rak tarafından yazılmıştır. Makale Polonya'da Covid-19 pandemisinin ilk dalgası sırasında uygulanan anti-demokratik önlemleri meşrulaştırma araçlarını ele almaktadır. Çalışma, anti-demokratik eylemleri haklı çıkarmak için kullanılan siyasi gnostisizmin tüm temel bileşenlerinin devlet medyasında ortaya çıkmasının, siyasi yapıdaki anti-demokratik değişimlerin göstergelerinden biri olduğunu göstermektedir.

Bu sayının üçüncü makalesi Doç.Dr. Pelin Sönmez ve Prof. Dr. Özgür Ünal Eriş tarafından yazılmış ve "Securitisation of Migration Revisited: European Union Policies Through Lens of Syrian People Living in Turkey" başlığını taşımaktadır. Çalışmanın temel amacı Soğuk Savaş sonrasında önem kazanan ve 2015 yılında en yüksek noktasına varmadan önce gündeme gelen göç konusunu "inşa edilmiş" sosyal güvensizlik tehdidi olarak sunmaktır. Çalışma devam etmekte olan mülteci krizinden hareketle, güvenlikleştirme teorisini Türkiye'de yaşamakta olan Suriyeli yerleşimci bir örneklem grup ile derinlemesine mülakatlar yoluyla araştırmış ve bu grubun Türkiye'yi seçme nedenlerinin Avrupa'ya ilişkin kültürel güvensizlik algılarıyla ilgili olup olmadığını tespit etmeye çalışmıştır.

Doç.Dr. İsmail Numan Telci ve doktora öğrencisi Tuba Öztürk Horoz tarafından hazırlanan "Competing Policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf: The Cases of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates" başlıklı dördüncü makale, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri ve Katar'ın pek çok noktada benzerlikleri olan, bununla birlikte bölgesel politikalarda önemli farklılıkları olan iki ülke olduğunu vurgulayarak başlamaktadır. Katar ve BAE'nin Müslüman Kardeşler hareketine karşı politikalarının nasıl ve neden önemli farklılıklar gösterdiği, iki ülkenin harekete yönelik politikalarını şekillendiren temel dinamiklerin ne olduğu bu çalışmanın temel araştırma konusudur.

Sayının beşinci makalesi Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Övgü Kalkan Küçüksolak tarafından yazılmış, "The "New Normal" in China's Assertive Power Projection in the South China Sea: Maritime Hybrid Threats " başlıklı makaledir. Çalışma Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin Güney Çin Denizi'ndeki iddialı güç projeksiyonunun giderek bölgede kabul gören bir gerçeklik olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Çalışma, Çin'in deniz hibrit enstrümanlarını iddialı bir şekilde kullanmasının bağlamına ve kümülatif etkilerine ışık tutmayı amaçlarken, güç dengesinin değişen dinamiklerine ilişkin artan uluslararası endişeleri tartışmaktadır.

Altıncı makale, Dr. Mustafa Bölükbaşı tarafından yazılan "A Reassessment of Turkish Party System" başlıklı makaledir. Bu çalışmada Türkiye'de modern siyasi kurumların geçmişinin eski olduğu, ancak 1945'e kadar olan sınırlı rekabet ve sonraki yıllardaki askeri müdahaleler nedeniyle parti sisteminin istikrarlı bir şekilde gelişemediğini vurgulamakta ve 1950'den günümüze Türk parti sistemini nicel yöntemle analiz etmektedir. İlgili parti sayısı ve partilerin göreli büyüklükleri kriterlerini benimseyen çalışma, etkin parti sayısı ve parçalanma gibi farklı göstergeleri kullanmaktadır.

Dergimizin bu sayısına makaleleri ile destek veren yazarlarımıza, hakemlik yapan değerli Hocalarımıza ve Editörler Kurulu üyesi Hocalarımıza teşekkürlerimi sunarken, okuyuculara faydalı olmasını diliyorum.

Prof. Dr. Esra Nemli Çalışkan
Baş-Editör

EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, of Istanbul University is a peer reviewed journal which endeavors to disseminate academic knowledge among scholars, educators, policy makers and other societal stakeholders. With the valuable contributions of the participating authors to date, it has succeeded to take its place among the significant journals that are nominees to play the role of shaping the content of political sciences discipline in Turkey. It is currently indexed in Emerging Sources Citation Index, Ebsco Political Science Complete, Turkish Index of Social Sciences and Humanities (ULAKBİM) and Academia Social Science Index (ASOS Index). Following the change of its title to "Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences" in October 2017, the journal encourages theoretical and empirical articles majorly in the field of political sciences while also inviting substantive research from areas of social, humanities and administrative sciences.

This issue listed as Vol.30 Issue 2, October 2021 includes six articles. The first article which is entitled as "*Changing the Turkish Constitution: An Institutionalist and Collective Action Perspective* " is written by Prof. Ph.D. Hayrettin Özler, Prof. Ph.D. Alim Yılmaz and Res. Ass. Didem Geylani. The authors argue that the supply of expressible alternatives to the status quo, as well as the provision of incentives for political parties and other socio-political formations to participate in collective action for institutional change are essential. They have concluded in favor of isomorphic approach as the most successful means of bringing about structural change.

The second article which is authored by Assoc. Prof. PhD. Joanna Rak is entitled as *"Partisan Journalists on Duty: Political Gnosticism as a Means of Legitimating Quasi-militant Democracy in Crisis-driven Poland"*. This article examines the means of legitimating anti-democratic measures deployed during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic in Poland. The research shows that the occurrence of all essential components of political gnosticism, used to justify anti-democratic actions, in state media is one of the indicators of anti-democratic changes in the political structure.

The third article of this issue is authored by Assoc. Prof. Ph.D. Pelin Sönmez and Prof. Ph.D. Özgür Ünal Eriş and entitled as "*Securitisation of Migration Revisited: European Union Policies Through Lens of Syrian People Living in Turkey*". The main aim of this paper is to present migration as a 'constructed' societal insecurity threat that became substantial after the Cold War before peaking in 2015. This study applies securitization theory to the ongoing refugee crisis through in-depth interviews with a sample of Syrian settlers in Turkey to determine whether their reasons for choosing to stay in Turkey are linked to their perceptions of cultural insecurity in Europe.

The fourth paper which begins by emphasizing that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar are similar in many aspects, including social structure, political life, and religious identity is entitled as "*Competing Policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf: The Cases of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*" and written by Assoc. Prof. Ph.D. İsmail Numan Telci, Ph.D. Student Tuba Öztürk Horoz. Although there are many similarities, there exists a considerable difference in their foreign policies of these countries toward one of the most important regional non-state actors, the Muslim Brotherhood. The study focuses on how the policies of Qatar and the UAE toward the Muslim Brotherhood diverged significantly, particularly in the past two decades.

The next article of this issue which is authored by Ass. Prof. Ph.D. Övgü Kalkan Küçüksolak is entitled as "*The "New Normal" in China's Assertive Power Projection in the South China Sea: Maritime Hybrid Threats* " and starts with emphasizing the People's Republic of China's (PRC) assertive power projection in the South China Sea (SCS) has increasingly become an accepted reality of the region. The study aims to shed light on the context and cumulative effects of China's assertive employment of maritime hybrid instruments while discussing increasing international concerns on the altering dynamics of balance of power.

The sixth and the last article of this issue is entitled as "*A Reassessment of Turkish Party System*" and is written by Ph.D. Mustafa Bölükbaşı. This paper analyzes Turkish party systems from 1950 to the present using the quantitative method. Adopting the criteria of the number of relevant parties and their relative strengths, this study applies different indicators such as the effective number of parties and fragmentation.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the contributing authors in this issue. I highly appreciate the reviewers for their hard efforts and the editorial board members of this journal for their support. While the coronavirus pandemic continues to bring hard times for all of us on the world, I hope science and academic effort will continue to illuminate our lives and again I emphasize my wishes to meet with our readers at more healthy and "normal" times with the next issue.

Prof. Dr. Esra Nemli Çalışkan

Editor-in-Chief

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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Changing the Turkish Constitution: An Institutionalist and Collective Action Perspective

Türkiye Anayasasını Değiştirmek: Kurumsalcı ve Kolektif Eylem Perspektifi

Hayrettin Özler[1] ⓘ, **Alim Yılmaz**[2] ⓘ, **Didem Geylani**[3] ⓘ

Abstract
Understanding change and/or resistance to change is critical in studying institutions. We argue in this paper that the supply of expressible alternatives to the status quo, as well as the provision of incentives for political parties and other socio-political formations to participate in collective action for institutional change, are essential. These can be described as "ideational monopoly" of specific actors or "supreme legitimacy" of established institutions, but the latter can be described as "institutional handicaps" in a problematic way. According to a survey of the literature, institutional transformation follows a largely isomorphic pattern for the most part. In Turkey, it is undeniable that the European Union associated Turkish objectives have been the primary engine of institutional transformation in the country for a long time. Some historical turning moments in Europe-Turkey ties, as well as the associated actions of governments and public opinion towards the Turkish constitution, imply that there is almost a visible correlation between constitutional change and EU-Turkey relations, at least in the short term. As a result of this affinity, we have argued in favor of isomorphic approach as the most successful means of bringing about structural change.

Keywords
Turkish Constitution, EU, Institutionalism, Collective Action, Isomorphic strategies

Öz
Kurumları incelerken değişimi ve/veya değişime karşı direnci anlamak çok önemlidir. Bu çalışmada, statükoya yönelik ifade edilebilir alternatiflerin sağlanmasının yanı sıra, siyasi partilerin ve diğer sosyo-politik oluşumların kurumsal değişim için, ortak eylemde bulunmalarının elzem olduğu savunulmuştur. Bunlar, belirli aktörlerin "düşünsel tekeli" veya yerleşik kurumların "yüksek meşruiyeti" olarak tanımlanabilir, ancak ikincisi sorunlu bir şekilde "kurumsal engeller" olarak anlaşılmaktadır. Literatürde, kurumsal dönüşüm büyük ölçüde eşbiçimli model olarak sunulmaktadır. Türkiye'de Avrupa Birliği vizyonunun uzun süredir kurumsal dönüşümün ana dinamiği olduğu yadsınamaz. Avrupa-Türkiye ilişkilerindeki tarihsel dönüm noktaları, hükümetlerin ve kamuoyunun Türk anayasasına yönelik değişim talepleri ile AB-Türkiye ilişkileri arasında görünür bir ilişki olduğu aşikardır. Bu yakınlığın bir sonucu olarak, yapısal değişimi sağlamanın en başarılı yolu olarak izomorfik yaklaşımın etkili olduğu iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler
Türk Anayasası, AB, Kurumsalcılık, Kolektif Eylem, İzomorfik Stratejiler

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Introduction: The Main Question

Institutions are more than formal-legal arrangements; they are the means of enforcing dominant values and social cohesion, the ways for survival of desired interactions and interdependencies within a polity and thus the main obstacles for change in status quo. To understand change and/or the resistance to change stands paramount in studying institutions beyond description. We argue here that institutional change depends on the supply of expressible alternatives to *status quo* and of incentives for political parties and other socio-political formations to engage in collective action for institutional change. The former can be named problematically as "ideational monopoly" of certain actors or "supreme legitimacy" of established institutions while the latter can be named as "institutional handicaps". The first problem implies that change requires beliefs, understandings, and knowledge which are critical against the material and ideational legitimacy of existing institutions and favorable toward the possibility of new forms of prospective institutions. The second problem implies that change incurs costs due to existing institutional inhibitions and necessitates incentives for collective action to change institutions. A review of literature revealed that institutional change follows mostly an isomorphic pattern. It is obvious that the Europe (not necessarily the European Union) associated Turkish ambitions has been the main driver for institutional change in Turkey. Some historical turning points in Europe-Turkey relations and concomitant actions of governments and public opinion regarding Turkish constitution suggest the existence of some form of correlation between constitutional change an<d EU-Turkey relations. This affinity has led us argue in favor of isomorphic strategies as the most effective means for institutional change. Yet we conclude that the availability and success of isomorphic change requires some in-home dynamics (social, economic, and political) to couple with.

Institutional Explanations for Change

Institutionalism differs from behaviorism in that it defines institutions as social systems that structure social interactions rather than as simple patterns of behavior. When there is a clashing duality between change and permanence, institutions evolve. Institutionalism is defined as the view of institutions as independent or given variables that decide how things will be done. Institutions, on the other hand, have a binary dimension. For example, they can be used for two different forms of rationalization: instrumental and ceremonial (or empirical and normative, see Rothstein, 1996). On the basis of exoteric knowledge, instrumental rationalization refers to a dynamic process of adaptation to satisfy changing needs, interests, and other environmental necessities in a dynamic context. Ceremonial rationalization, on the other hand, means the continuity and longevity of habits, beliefs, symbols, and routines founded on esoteric knowledge that are the results of past processes and circumstances, and as such, are never fully in agreement with the requirements of the current time.

Even though many people are aware of this two-sided nature of institutions, the difference between utilitarian and ceremonial functions is primarily Weblenian. In the Weblenian meaning, the term "instrumental" refers to performance that is founded on notions such as causal reasoning, purposive thoughts, and cause and effect, as well as other concepts. The phrase "ceremonial" refers to authority, social standing, custom,

tradition, and precedent (Klein and Miller, 1996). In other words, institutions are not solely logical structures. They are a combination of both. They are partially created on purpose in order to improve the efficiency, interests, and optimality of interactions, for example, by increasing the number of encounters. Moreover, they emerge unintentionally because people have limited rationality (both in terms of knowledge processing and knowing), are "chosen" by accidental or path dependent events and are a combination of conflicting or collaborating sources of social power, whether moral, economic, or military in nature.

Instrumentalist Arguments

Institutions as instruments serve the purpose of reducing transaction costs, providing incentives for collective or coordinated action, reducing uncertainty, and meeting environmental challenges. According to Williamson organizations and institutions are essential for mutual social transactions as well as constrained conflict. Transaction costs are higher where there is lack or slack of institutionalization, yet contradictorily there is neither transaction cost and nor a patterned change where there is no institution at all (like in a perfect market) Williamson, 1975). Thus, institutions can provide transacting actors (like states, citizens, organizations) with competitive advantage because they rule a certain power-relationships between constituents (Rhodes, 1995:46). By creating institutions, the actors will be able to create moral commitments, predictability, and information accuracy. Yet as routines, habits and self-justifying rules serving to incumbent interests, institutions will increase transaction costs for collective action and thus hindering institutional change.

According to an Olsonian argument, institutions are not supported because of the collective goods (such as legitimacy) they provide to their constituency, but rather because they provide "selective incentives" to the actors, regardless of whether they contribute to the provision of the collective good. It becomes more expensive to take collective action for institutional change as mandatory institutions (and actors) prefer to promote prior acquisitions and the status quo, a state of being we prefer to call as institutional handicap. When it comes to understanding the politics of change in Turkey, it is far more appropriate to concentrate on organized political parties than on constituency expectations. Contrary to this, local support for political parties has been considered because it has an almost direct impact on the party composition following national elections or on the views of political parties following referendums. North (1990), for example, and other representatives of the school of economic institutionalism argue that institutions evolve in response to the will to reduce uncertainty. This straightforward understanding implies that ineffectiveness of institutions will not necessarily result in change because, right or wrong, effective, or ineffective, institutions supply information that strategic players can utilize to make informed decisions. In the pursuit of economic, political, and social transactions, institutions in the face of uncertainty provide a fundamental structure and background for organization and change to take root and flourish. On the general process of change, North believes that organizations - economic, political, and social - behave as agents, and that they adopt new institutions or technologies when they believe that doing so will enable them to better their competitive position (North, 1990 and 2005). Economic institutionalism also suggests that institutions do not change by themselves. Institutional change involves actors (within and outside the incumbent institutions) who facilitate the destabilization, deinstitutionalization and finally re-institutionalization

of existing institutions. That means institutions are not always uniform. Instead, they inhabit different sub-cultures, values and non-conformist individuals who can initiate change in an institution. Organizations being an open system recruit new members, acquire knowledge, and are influenced by change in other organizations that form the larger institutional and organizational system of universe. Within this universe, larger and stronger units are less likely to change as they can dominate and condition their institutional environment. Unless there is a depression, crisis, an exogenous intervention, and/or some other change incentives, institutions will remain intact as latent interests are weak, dispersed and in large number, which make it harder to unite against small number of powerful interests who are advantageous in uniting their resources to prevent change and reform (see, Olson, 1982).

Another institutional argument (isomorphism) put forward is by the DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who argued that most organizations (or units like states) change not to be different but to be alike to others which face similar environmental challenges. The change is not about being different but about being fit for the environment or about being similar to those who are more likely to survive or more likely to change the environmental conditions. This is because of four (but not exhaustive) factors: (1) interaction among units and actors; (2) institutional structures of domination and patterns of coalition; (3) increase in their information load with which units and actors have to contend; and (4) the development of a mutual awareness among actors towards a common enterprise make disparate organizations more similar to one another. Eventually, "organizations may change their goals or develop new practices…but in the long run; organizational actors making rational decisions construct around themselves an environment that constrains their ability to change further in later years" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:148).

According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), there are two types of isomorphism: competitive and institutional. Since they are analytical rather than empirical distinctions, they can both be observed in the same environment. This is because the diversity of units is dependent on the diversity (tolerance) of the environment. The former suggests that in a free environment, where competition, niche change, and fitness are all important features, isomorphism is passionate in a competitive setting. Competition for resources and supporters exists between organizations. In the latter, groups compete more for political power and legitimacy than they do during the former. Three types of institutional isomorphic change are identified by the authors: coercive isomorphism, which arises from political influence and legitimacy concerns; mimetic isomorphism, which arises from standard responses to uncertainty, and normative isomorphism, which is associated with the development of expertise. On the other side, mimetic isomorphism is a result of the uncertainty and ambiguity of the environment, in which firms, rather than innovate, choose the strategy of imitating and modeling other organizations that appear more legitimate or successful than their own. As a final point, because of professionalization, normative isomorphic change takes place, which involves a communal effort to define the conditions and techniques of interactions. Some of the variables that contribute to normative isomorphism include the advancement of education, the professionalization of workers, socialization, and effective communication. Notably, these structurizations of interaction also result in the structurization of incentives supplied by central organizations, as is the case with the EU, which constrain the environment's entry and exit options.

Ceremonial or Normative Arguments

Without changing norms or ceremonial-normative aspects of institutions, institutional change cannot be expected to happen. Institutions, according to the old and normative institutionalism, are to protect a collective good and increase the legitimacy of the procedures, not the interests of the stronger or embedded actors. Stinchcombe (1997: 8) argues that people believe that institutions can provide right kind of answers to problems, and they embody a value that the people also accept. Thus, in the old tradition an institution's defining characteristics is legitimacy.

According to Stinchcombe, market (economic) institution has the logic of appropriateness that is the rules and accepted practices supplemented with the logic of consequentiality (profit). Legitimate market competition allows the destruction of older institutions and their legitimacy through accompanying depression. Without belief in the legitimacy and the value of capitalist institutions, "…we cannot explain why capitalism can first legitimate the horse-and-buggy industry and then legitimate the automobile industry that destroys it, without changing the basic institutions of capitalism" (Stinchcombe, 1997:17). Depressions increase the potential for challenging the legitimacy and value of existing institutions by new and more competitive ones. The old institutionalism defends the view that institutions are not simple formalities or procedural rules; instead, they are means to reason and good sense which are the values in themselves. For instance, secret ballot and confidentiality is essential in voting not because they are values but because they are crucial to assure honest opinions which come with the immunity of the voter. "… [T]he reasons for having things institutionalized and ritualized is that they matter" (Stinchcombe, 1997:10).

More social choice research concedes that the legitimacy of institutions is dependent on the degree to which their values are widely accepted. The status quo presumes worth since "there is no way to discern if a proposed move away from the status quo is desired unless it is agreed upon" (Buchanan, 2004:139). In the absence of clear solutions, when institutions cease to give consensus, public support for new or alternative institutions grows, such as in the case of social movements or reformers who mobilize popular support. In other words, performers follow socially established, publicly known, anticipated, and accepted conventions and practices when acting. Society and state are composed of people who obey rules with specific cultural linkages, including shared codes of meaning and methods of reasoning, and who see themselves as members of a distinct group. Social contact and experience shape identities and rules, which themselves both foundational and regulatory at the same time.

Therefore, change is rarely a planned event, but rather the product of the confluence of several opportunities, values, learning, reflexes, and choices within institution and its environment. For instance, the greater the degree of disjuncture between the institutional values and institutional behaviors and between the values of surrounding society and the behavior of the institution, the more likely will change be (Peters, 1999:33-34). In other words, unless there are emerging values or an exogenously injected values which are presumed to count for more than the existing ones there will be no change. Change may be result of agreement through an internal exchange game or internal disagreement which leads to the intervention of an external player by means of some form of isomorphism.

Part of understanding political development and institutional change is understanding which ideas win (or, in fact, which ideas are in the arena to begin with), why, and with what consequences for whom. The important point is not only where ideas come from or how they cohere or collide but also how they come to be prominent, important, and powerful, even determinative in shaping political behavior and defining political rationality (Lieberman, 2002:700).

Institutional Explanations for Resistance to Constitutional Reform

Institutions survive on their own merits because of the sunken costs invested in them, their information value and the risk of uncertainty that change will bring in the future, the cost of collective action required to engage in the change process, their perceived sacredness (Rothstein, 1996) because they have a long history (not chosen), they are ours and part of collective identity, and so on. The representatives of institutionalist economists, Douglas North (2005:50), for example, admit that "while formal institutions can be changed by fiat, informal institutions evolve in ways that are still far from completely understood and therefore are not typically amenable to deliberate human manipulation". A radical institutionalist perspective suggests that institutions possess a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as "an external and coercive fact" (See, Berger and Luckman, 1967). According to Berger and Luchman (1967:136) the more abstract the institutions are the less likely they are to be modified in accordance with pragmatic exigencies. To change them requires conflict between reality defining experts and practitioners. Experts with privileges, hypocrisy and grandiose pretentions claim to know the ultimate significance of existing institutions.

An institution's very essence is one of permanence. An established institution is less subject to moral evaluation than an emergent institution is (Suchman, 1995:584). Some, for example Olson, would suggest that established institutions are usually protected by small, homogenous, well-organized, powerful interest groups while the primary actors of reform are like a large, ill-organized and latent group (Olson, 1965). Institutions are generally initiated and invested in by powerful elite with vested interests and legitimating ideology which are functional for status quo. Therefore, change in institutions comes when these self-enforcing mechanisms fail or when an external critical incident or actor causes a juncture of discontinuity (Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000; Horton, 2006:33). Otherwise, as Hirschman's (1991) *jeopardy thesis* suggests, every reform proposal will be perceived as endangering previous accomplishments which are believed to be the results of existing institutions. Established interest and pressure groups would resist change since they can easily challenge the legitimacy, credibility, and success of new entrants. An institution relies on a substantive determination, will, and choice of parties who also staff the institution. Institutions may lower transaction costs of interactions yet existing institutions as status quo and our dependence on them raise the transaction cost of adopting new institutions. The reason why the political authority alone cannot achieve democratic reforms is that when they acquire power, they are no longer outsiders and thus they do not want to lose the power and authorities they have gained. Once a rule has been established as an institution, it will not be easily modified due to its information and coordination importance. The existence of an alternative institution does not mean that changing the old institution would be quick or easy, as that would require overcoming the cost of transactions.

> Recognition of this fact reveals a crucial distinction between constitutional *design* and constitutional *reform.* In constitutional design, where there are no effective preexisting rules, all that is relevant is the choice between the rule that generates one set of outcomes and the rule that generates an alternative set. The rule that gives rise to the preferred set of outcomes is to be preferred. But when there is the question of changing an *existing* rule, as is the case in constitutional reform, the rule that generates the most preferred set of outcomes carte blanche is not necessarily dominant (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985:11).

Even when there are opposing views, there are also counterarguments. It is important to first remember that organizations and institutions should not be viewed as hindrances to progress or a static condition in which nothing can be done to improve the state of affairs. The second way in which institutions can help people reduce the difficulties associated with free-riding and prisoner's dilemma issues that are encountered in nearly all collective action situations that foster change is through the means of revolution, reform, law and order, or a favored policy outcome. We used the Commons' and Ayres' perspectives of reasonableness as well as Weblen's serviceability notion, and they have implications for the entirety of which include the concepts of equity, workability, individual and collective welfare (weblen's serviceability) (Klein and Miller, 1996:267). These perspectives conceptualize institutional pragmatism as generating answers to perceived difficulties by accepting ideas as provisional and contextual rather than dogmatic or absolute truths. Institution is an ever-changing state, one that continues to grow. Weir (1995) and Thelen (2003) explain that this evolutionary change happens through bounded innovation (or incremental change) which then leads to layering new systems on top of existing structures (Horton, 2006:33). This sort of institutional evolution is known as a punctuated equilibrium, as proposed by Krasner (1984). Finally, according to Judge (2003:501), institutionalization itself means a process of institutional change without an end point and without a common process.

In contrast, non-institutionalized and non-uniform organizations and governments are not more likely to change than those that are more institutionalized and more uniform. Even if organizations with more fluid structures struggle to implement change in a way that's both orderly and predictable, this may be because of powerful interests and collusive groups that gain from chaotic conditions or believe that maintaining order is more expensive than allowing disorder. We can see disorder manifest in communities that lack enforceable laws and institutions, as well as in cultures whose norms and institutions have not been formed by consensus. The instability and lack of strong coalition governments in Turkey in the early 2000s thwarted implementation of reforms there. In nations where elections are common, governments have difficulty implementing reform ideas because it is difficult to hold them accountable or oblige them to accept responsibility for their party's initiatives and policies. Populist and particularistic policies were common in Turkish politics until the early 2000s, as is shown in the policies implemented by regimes aiming to win reelection. Turkey has powerful incentives to delay making reforms, particularly if the reforms benefit not only them but also a massive and amorphous public.

In Europe, there has been a constant admiration for Turkey's struggle to build a country and nation since the early twentieth century, even if it was practical and short-lived. The country's economic, social, and political institutions have been extensively reformed to ensure compatibility with the EU. One significant contributor to the progress of reforms

in Turkey has been the EU, which has played a crucial role as a standard, facilitator, and even a driving force in Turkey. One of the most effective ways primary change agents use to get secondary groups to resist a new institution is to show its mismatch with established reference points. The EU was successful as long as its goals remained unchanged. The main reasons that support our argument in favor of mimetic change are the instability of competitive politics to make lasting constitutional arrangements and lack of consensual support for constitutional change in Turkey. Thus, European based aspirations and the outsider effect of European demands fill this void.

The Anatomy of Resistance to Constitutional Change in Turkish Polity

The rules and regulations governing political action are often constitutionally or legally rooted (Drewry, 1996:201). The lack of grassroots support in the Turkish constitution formation process has resulted in fragile constitutions (Özipek, 2012:158). While the state of law is under additional global and local pressures to relax the established rules and conventions that restrict individual rights and democratic political participation in "non-democratic" countries, these pressures exist within an existing framework of constrictions. In some less democratic countries, constitutional laws and institutions have been primarily established to define elitist rules and methods for building a nation state.

Since the early 20th century, Turkey's state and nation-building endeavors have focused on Europe, which was seen as the greatest success. However, they did it pragmatically and dynamically. Beginning in 1987, several political, social, and economic reforms were undertaken in Turkey to make the country suitable for European Union membership. The EU has been seen as a role model, a facilitator, and even a force that causes Turkey to embrace reforms that would have been difficult to implement internally due to coordination/information problems and relative financial gains that are acceptable to different political factions. Facts demonstrating an organization's incompatibility with established points of reference are often one of the key strategies that change agents employ to rally secondary groups to combat emerging institutions (Henisz and Zelner, 2005). If the EU aspirations are kept alive, then this reference point is available.

Several historical records may show the power of European aspirations in the progress to institutional change in Turkey. Since an Association Agreement was signed in 1964, and the country was admitted to the Customs Union in 1995, Turkey has maintained a questionable cooperation with the European Union. Since December 1999, Turkey has been recognized as a candidate country for EU membership, and negotiations commenced in October 2005. Significant setbacks have occurred due to Turkey's negotiations with the EU practically came to a halt in June 2018. Many fields such as security, energy, and transportation and trade policies have been collaborating on conversation and collaboration, according to the report of the commission for 2019.

Turkey invalidated the 1964 decree which had frozen the assets of the Greek minority since 1963. Also, a legislative body, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, authorized the individual petition of Turkish people to the ECHR, and for supervision of the human rights advances, a Parliamentary Committee was established. After signing and ratifying the European and UN treaties against torture in 1988, Turkey became the first Muslim-majority country to become a party to those treaties. Furthermore, the 200 capital

punishment verdicts that had been pending review by the National Assembly have not been accepted, thus they cannot be carried out. When new reforms were adopted in 1991, the new reforms allowed publications to use Kurdish language, cancelled Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the Penal Code, and converted the death sentences to 20 years and life sentences to 15 years. A ministry was established to deal particularly with human rights matters in the same year, and this permission was extended to human rights organizations the next year. Even yet, the country has had to deal with the issue of balancing improved human rights with efforts to combat terrorism. An illustration of this paradox can be seen in the Anti-Terror Law issued at the same time. Following the Summit of the Eight in Helsinki in the year 1999, the reform process was reaccelerated, which led to Turkey becoming a candidate country. Despite severe barriers to implementation, significant human rights and freedom changes have occurred since the Helsinki Summit in 2001. Top-down implementation is opposed by those who say it lacks societal dynamics. We disagree, however, because the changes have not been implemented completely, and there are always other spheres of influence opened by statutory entities that are not controlled.

Despite the vote held in September 2010 which will make things easier for a constitutional reform or a new constitution, the political and societal debate on constitutional reform continues. There was a widespread public and political consensus that to facilitate greater democracy, the Turkish Constitution must be modified to provide the freedoms that align with EU standards. As it is widely accepted, the constitution was prepared during the military coup of 1980 and supported by a small group of law academics, many of whom were officers in the coup. A total of four amendments to the 1982 Constitution had been approved through popular vote, two of which occurred under the AKP administration after the 2002 elections (Esen and Gümüşcüoğlu, 2017). Following the September 2010 referendum, Turkish political parties, the Constitutional Court, and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors were reformed, as was the position of an Ombudsman, which was also utilized, while the freedom to use other languages was further and trade union rights were enhanced.

Despite retaining various regulations that restrict free speech through criminal charges and investigations, Turkey protected the freedom of expression. The provisions 301, 318, 288, and 216 of the new Penal Code have been employed in many investigations and prosecutions of people working in the civil society and the public arena, including political figures on both the left and the right. Only in rare instances, and criminal punishment of peaceful individuals for expressing their freedom of expression is a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. And it's important to note that attention must be paid not just to the formal institutions, as many free-thinking writers face the risk of violence and even death at the hands of the rising extreme right youth and nationalist factions. Even while there are several assumptions of defectors within security services and the public that may safeguard the executers and perpetrators of these atrocities, there are still serious uncertainties if this assumption holds true. In 2006, the number of people convicted for stating their point of view increased over the previous year. In 2007, prosecutions increased further. In the last five years, the Ministry of Justice claims that there have been approximately 6,775 people tried under Paragraph 159 and Article 301. There were 745 convicted people. In the large majority of cases, the charges levied

against them under the Criminal Code, as well as the other important articles outlined above, are violations of Article 301, which makes insulting "Turkishness", the Turkish Republic, and the governmental organs and institutions a criminal offense.

A shift in form, style, conditions, and ideas for all occurs because of globalization and Europeanization. While the shift is moving in one direction, it does not happen at the same rate because a few scholars, such as Yansamayan (2016), believe that there is a reverse and forward movement to be defined as Europeanization/de-Europeanization (following 2006). On the other hand, there are other scholars, such as Cebeci (2016), who assert that a dynamic and dialectic Foucauldian counter-conduct analysis is required to comprehend the fluctuations in institutional change in Turkey, and the role of the EU. Despite AKP governmental efforts to favor their own constituencies while engaging in institutional and constitutional reforms favored by the EU, the AKP nevertheless pushed through with reforms in EU-prioritized sectors.

The argument of many scholars, as summarized in a review by Inglehart and Baker (2000), is that freedom of expression renders authoritarian regimes inefficient and costly to operate and produces intra-elite disagreement. The Human Progress Approach says that when economic development has increased individual resources, people have moved away from survival principles and are focusing on their personal values and expressions. On the other hand, it also concedes that progress along a simple, straight path is not always applicable. Developmental states have developed an affluent society, but not always a democracy. Because the government of Turkey was backed by public and electoral support, they were able to continue to curtail some of the essential rights and freedoms while keeping most of the rights and freedoms intact.

A liberal position holds that institutions should strive to do good rather than bad—to help and enhance people—rather than hurt and hinder. A society needs an institutional framework capable of constant absorption of change in order to keep developing. It is a common saying that "as society evolves, new needs arise, new constituents wield power, and new aspects of the political, economic, social, and other realms are required to keep up with the changing times." This is another way of saying that legal-political systems need to be able to deal with the demands for greater freedoms while also maintaining the continuity of the current system. There is a need for an institutional structure that can successfully cope with the transition and accompanying challenges, as well as maintaining a continuing life for itself.

Many different elements and processes all working together make for complex social, political, and economic transformation. As of 2018, the presidential system's coming into full effect has reshaped the presidency and the states' administrations. Concerns were expressed by opponents in the national and European parliament, as well as in civil society and the media, all in protest of the seeming reduction in civil society's multiplicity of views. When the pathways taken by different societies are as unique as this, it will not be possible for different societies to have the same characteristics. Meanwhile, there are several parallels between practically all societies. Anomie or dysfunctions within the social system are responsible for the changes in the system. Institutional infrastructure must be replenished in order to correct dysfunctions. As far as development and modification of ideas and mental models are concerned, the media, colleges, civil society,

and good governance mechanisms are the key ways to accomplish so because they are in place prior to the concept's creation and evolution. Thus, learning and the change of ideas are closely linked because they enable participants to promote change in society and government. The channels they form are good for expressing and emphasizing the desire for change. There are many different current institutions, such as the rule of law, that lay the groundwork for future institutional activities. However, the opinions and beliefs of the general people are formative in shaping government policy decisions. While ideas can be converted into institutional choices and change if structural actors and interests see these ideas acceptable or adoptable, it is important to note that it takes time for structural actors and interests to consider ideas as being viable or acceptable. With governments that do not respect people's free expression and political engagement, carrying out projects of change is difficult in societies that are defined by centralized government, leader-dictated political parties, oligopolistic interest groups, and state-dependent civil society.

Concluding Remarks

Institutionalism holds that leaders who lead the effort to institute change are generally not strong or organized enough to gain entry to the limited decision-making agenda. They aim to amass a broad array of disparate, disorganized interests in order to be able to grab the attention of policy makers. They use propaganda strategies such as manufacturing believable threats in the event that things stay the same, creating joint action incentives that cater to certain interests, and highlighting the benefits of the change they are advocating. Bringing the perimeter to the center therefore indicates a move toward the center. The periphery groups (e.g. municipalities, silent majorities or minorities) are likely to support changes since they can see the benefits to themselves. In Rowan (1982), the authors found that the policies that states, regulatory agencies, and interest groups adopt and keep reflect a balance or consensus between the state and local governments. In contrast to central government institutions, in which government agents aim to integrate growing groups into "the state" apparatus to secure their agreement in support of the status quo or top-down reform efforts, periphery governments see it as important to enlarge "the polity" instead. Generally, the focus of resistance from the bottom to the top is not aimed at altering the essence of the reforms, but rather aimed at decreasing the power and influence of central governments or powerful factions.

Institutionalism emphasizes that institutions are in a constant state of flux, yet fluctuation is also an institutional concept. For an example of institutional transformation, consider nation-state creation or modernization. While there will always be a route to nation-state building and modernization, things don't happen overnight. Even if the shift is completely spontaneous and multifarious, individuals bring order to it by arranging it into understandable patterns. Unless we notice a discernible pattern or trend, we cannot sense any "change in progress." Changing or destroying an institution without recognizing how it was constructed is nearly impossible. The process of changing things is quite similar to the method of building them. Even amid an apparently chaotic shift, one can still see the route and pattern of change that was formed over time.

At the beginning of this paper, we distinguished between the two aspects of institutions, referring to the dichotomy of instrumental/ceremonial. Although the ceremonial aspects

oppose the message of new knowledge and change, they do, in a manner, facilitate it. Experiential facts (the proper performance of instrumental action) necessitate shifts in cognition and emotion (ceremonially empowered behavior) (Klein and Miller, 1996, s.274). For a majority or influential minority of institutional constituents to adopt instrumentally indicated behavior and revise ceremonially warranted concepts and rituals, they must surmount the natural tendencies towards superstition, ignorance, conservatism, dogmatism, and so on. Pretention, by definition, takes the place of reflective thinking. The greater society or other elite/power centers should be convinced by social movements and reformers, adherent for change, by developing arguments that use reasoning, instead of emotion, to achieve their goal. They will also require diverse and plentiful evidence to weaken the legitimacy and legacy of the repressive institutions, as an organization that is widely accepted is seen as having greater legitimacy and a more significant legacy. From an institutionalist point of view, changing any meaning is an isomorphism since evaluating alternatives involves considering their conformance with the institutional context, rather than judging them on their own merits. the reason Turkish institutions are in a constant state of change is due to the push to embrace new requirements in the environment. Isomorphism's success is evidenced by the ties to Europe and the boost it provides to institutional environments. Thus, the integration with Europe and the momentum it grants to institutional environment is an evidence of success of the Isomorphist strategies. The Europe is replacing the established institutions with a new reference point for Turkey.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Partisan Journalists on Duty: Political Gnosticism as a Means of Legitimating Quasi-militant Democracy in Crisis-driven Poland

Joanna Rak[1]

Abstract
Embedded in the theory of political gnosticism and drawing upon a qualitative content analysis of 246 pieces of news released by state media, this article examines a means of legitimating anti-democratic measures deployed during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic in Poland. The research aims to identify and explain the nature and origins of justification frames for quasi-militant democracy. The main argument is that journalists of the most popular state television, TVP Info, used political gnosticism to legitimate quasi-militant democracy. They exploited fears of losing one's life and health to convince citizens that the limitations of civil liberties are germane to survival and development. The research shows that the occurrence of all essential components of political gnosticism, used to justify anti-democratic actions in state media, is one of the indicators of anti-democratic changes in the political structure. It also provides insight regarding the theory of democratic erosion at a level of freedom of the press by offering evidence confirming the counter-democratic nature of quasi-militant democratic consolidation.

Keywords
Partisan journalism, Political gnosticism, Militant democracy, Legitimacy, Coronavirus Crisis, Poland

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Introduction

In 2015, the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, hereafter 'PiS') candidate Andrzej Duda won the Polish presidential election in the second round. Then, as a result of parliamentary elections, for the first time in democratic Poland's history, the winning political party, in this case PiS, achieved a majority in the Sejm and formed a government as a coalition with United Poland (Solidarna Polska) and Agreement (Porozumienie) (Markowski, 2018). These electoral successes prompted a series of far-reaching political and legal changes within the Polish political regime, including dismantling institutional safeguards on the government by hamstringing the Constitutional Tribunal, and then transforming it into an active supporter of the government. Additionally, the courts' judges were subordinated to the government and several restrictions on individual and political rights, the right to assembly, privacy, and the freedom of the press were put into effect. The 2019 parliamentary election resulted in the continuation of the incumbent PiS party-coalition rule and a decline in the quality of democracy (Markowski, 2020). In 2020, using the Covid-19 crisis as a pretext and treating the pandemic as a justification for further anti-democratic activities (Alsarghali, 2020), the government imposed limitations on freedom of assembly, religious expression, and additional movement restrictions. Although the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights, Adam Bodnar found them unconstitutional and illegally implemented, they remained in effect and were enforced. Meanwhile, the limitations of active and passive voting rights, referendum organization, registration and functioning of political parties, naturalization, freedom of the press, legislation on anti-extremism, and restrictions on the independence of the judiciary were the militant democracy measures still in force (Malkopoulou, 2019, 2).

This article argues that the use of anti-democratic measures not to protect but undermine the sovereignty of the Polish political nation was the indicator of quasi-militant democracy. This anti-democratic structure required social legitimacy that must have been generated by the government and its partisan institutions to maintain the created political structure and limit room for dissent against the departure from liberal democracy.

Accordingly, the research focuses on the means of generating social legitimacy by the government's most influential partisan institution. It aims to identify and explain the nature and origins of justification frames for quasi-militant democracy. Those frames are the elements of political gnosticism in TVP Info concerning the Covid-19-driven anti-democratic measures used to justify and account for the drift towards quasi-militant democracy and its consolidation. Militant democracy is a political and legal structure whose aim is to use popularly supported democratic institutions to preserve democracy against those who strive to overturn it from within or those who openly seek to destroy it from the outside (Pfersmann, 2004, 47; Loewenstein, 1937). Thus, it safeguards the sovereignty of a political nation. Nevertheless, under the guise of protecting democracy against its presumed enemies, the limitations of rights and freedoms may allow the ruling class to arbitrarily exclude political competitors from the democratic game, *ipso facto* restricting the democratic nature of the regime. Since there is no principled way of determining what constitutes an enemy of democracy, the enemy cannot be established by democratic means. Instead, the definition of enemies becomes a sovereign exercise of authoritarian power. Militant democracy may be a democratic and constitutional cloak

for authoritarian politics (Invernizzi Accetti & Zuckerman, 2017). This article argues that when a political and legal structure restricts civil liberties not to preserve but to weaken or overturn liberal democracy and undermine the sovereignty of a political nation, a quasi-militant democracy emerges. Thereby, quasi-militant democracy is the opposite of militant democracy with respect to the objectives of anti-democratic measure deployment.

Furthermore, the article argues that the pandemic-driven drift towards quasi-militant democracy and its consolidation were legitimated throughout political gnosticism. The study revolves around a theoretical assumption that the means of legitimating political and legal structures closely adheres to the types of the same structures (Shorten, 2007, 172). It falls into the body of research on political religion as a source of a political regimes' legitimacy. Scholars started applying the term 'political religion' to address these means in the twentieth century, during the rise of two prominent ideologies that came to power, i.e., fascism and communism, and their use to legitimate autocracies (Aron, 2003, 183). They pointed to the sacralization of politics understood as the re-occurrence of the religious dimension in politics. Sacralization shifts modern politics from a more liberal paradigm, which reduces politics to an administration of rules of the free capitalist market, to a metaphysical approach wherein politics aim to come up with final solutions to deal with human fate, the society, and humanity (Shaqiri, 2019, 111).

On the one hand, political religion, called modern political gnosticism, serves to affirm that democratic erosion and nondemocratic regimes are right and morally correct (Payne, 2005, 166). This type of discursive legitimation provides semantic structures that are indicative of anti-democratic tendencies within political regimes. They are necessary, but not sufficient components of nondemocratic systems. On the other hand, political gnosticism may be used to legitimate liberal democracy when it serves to maintain democratic fundamentalism in the state structure (Loewenstein, 1937, 423).

Modern political gnosticism draws upon a classic meaning of ancient gnosis ('knowledge'), its secularization through politicization, and criticism of modernism (Voegelin, 1987, 120). In a narrow sense, political gnosticism is a syncretic religious movement active mainly in the Eastern Mediterranean sphere of late antiquity. The movement made elitists claims of possessing 'knowledge of divine secret' and considered the spiritual core of the human being as taking part in the divine substance. Under certain conditions, this spiritual core can be redeemed by recognizing its true, transmundane character (Riegel, 2007, 62). In a broad sense, political gnosticism is a set of beliefs determining the interpretation of social reality. The creator, distributor, and redistributor of the beliefs considers them 'knowledge or knowing' (Rak, 2017). In this study, political gnosticism is defined as a political cognitive structure whose essential features are the following: splitting people into self and others, messianic visions of thoroughly remodeling society into a utopian dream state, political obscurantism as a mode of dealing with dangerous knowledge and creation of a total enemy, all these features coupled with various strategies of surviving on the historic battlefield. Political gnosticism used to justify and account for anti-democratic actions of the government is a type of political thinking characteristic of nondemocratic regimes.

These observations and theories have motivated the following research questions: How did partisan media subservient to the ruling party and government justify and account

for the illegal implementation of Covid-19 pandemic-related anti-democratic measures? How did they convince Poles to acquiesce to the government? These questions lie at the heart of any attempt to legitimate quasi-militant democracy, i.e., affirming that this political and legal structure is justified, and that is in turn the main subject of this study.

The remainder of the article is organized into three major sections. The first one presents research methods, techniques, and tools. It also delves into the criteria for source selection, a corpus of materials, data gathering, coding, and analysis procedures. The following section discusses research results concerning the characteristics and intensity of political gnosticism in the news broadcasted by state television. The discussion begins with the introduction, drawing general conclusions about the dynamics and configuration of the elements of political gnosticism. Then, it goes into details of individual essential features of the justification frames. The last section makes theoretical sense of the use of political gnosticism to justify and explain Polish drift towards and the consolidation of a quasi-militant democracy.

Materials and Methodological Assumptions for the Research

The study tests the theory-grounded hypothesis that TVP Info used political gnosticism with regard to the Covid-19-driven implementation of anti-democratic measures to justify and explain the drift towards and the consolidation of quasi-militant democracy. TVP Info is a Polish free-to-air television news channel controlled by the state broadcaster, TVP. After the parliamentary election in 2015, PiS passed a media law giving the government direct control over public broadcasting and thus transformed public media into a pro-government propaganda outlet. According to the Institute for Media Monitoring, TVP Info was the most opinion-forming state media in January-March 2020 (IMM, 2020). At the same time, it was the most influential partisan institution in Poland.

To verify the hypothesis, the research applies the source analysis method that draws upon the qualitative content analysis of 246 pieces of news concerning anti-democratic measures. The corpus of news comprises all news released from the detection of Covid-19 for patient zero in Europe (24 January 2020) to 20 May 2020, when some states, including Poland, started lifting restrictions related to the Covid-19 pandemic. Thereby, the study covers the first wave of the pandemic in Poland; the time when the first Covid-19-related restrictions were introduced. As soon as possible, the government must have made an effort to establish the desired patterns of social behavior and gain support for its political decisions to maintain regime stability. Television news programs were a means of primary distribution of semantic structures used by the government to provide information regarding the pandemic threat and convince society to comply with the precautionary measures. Moreover, presidential elections were scheduled for May 2020. During elections, populist politicians are more prone to promote anti-democratic solutions and engage with polarizing discourses against total enemies (Boukala, 2014). It was also a time of increased efforts to generate support for the ruling party's candidate and delegitimize his opponents. A noteworthy point is that legitimacy for any political structure is not inevitable from the outset. Instead, it develops over time, and the selected period allows a researcher to investigate the nature and origins of justification frames for the Covid-19-driven drift towards and the consolidation of a quasi-militant democracy (Gerschewski, 2013, 14).

The iterative process of document analysis includes skimming, thorough examination and interpretation. It combines components of content analysis and thematic analysis. The first step of content analysis involves identification of passages of texts that contain direct references to restrictions of freedom of movement, assembly, and religious worship. The second step entails the organization of information into categories related to the research questions and embedded in the theoretical framework: (QI_1) dividing people into self and others, (QI_2) change of present-day reality into a utopian dream state, (QI_3) political obscurantism as a mode of dealing with dangerous knowledge, (QI_4) creation of a total enemy, and (QI_5) strategies of survival on the historic battlefield. Each feature takes on values that differ in intensity of political gnosticism (Rak, 2017). These qualitative indicators reflect values specific for hard, moderate, and soft political gnosticism (see Table 1). Thematic analysis enables the researcher to pinpoint themes pertinent to specific elements of political gnosticism and assign them appropriate values. Re-reading and re-viewing selected data involves thematic analysis that consists of coding and category construction based on the data's characteristics (Bowen 2009). The coding of the document content is founded on five groups of search terms: (1) for dividing people: self, others, we, they, opponents, opposition, protesters, participants of public gatherings, violators of social norms and law, (2) for change of present-day reality into a utopian dream state: future, change, aspiration, development, advancement, growth, increase, direction, promise, (3) for political obscurantism as a mode of dealing with dangerous knowledge: news, information, knowledge, (4) creation of a total enemy: threat, danger, risk, jeopardy, hazard, and (5) for strategies of survival on the historic battlefield: survival, protection, precautions, norms, sanitary measures, regulations, law, solidarity, community, unity.

Table 1

The Set of Qualitative Indicators of Political Gnosticism

QI_n	The qualitative indicators of political gnosticism	The values of the qualitative indicators (1) low intensity (soft political gnosticism) (2) moderate intensity (moderate political gnosticism) (3) high intensity (hard political gnosticism)
QI_1	Dividing people into self and others	(1) defensive relativization of 'we-insiders' and offensive relativization of 'they-outsiders' (2) melioration of 'we-insiders' and pejorativization of 'they-outsiders' (3) anthropolatrization of 'we-insiders' and vilification of 'they-outsiders'
QI_2	Change of present-day reality into a utopian dream state	(1) nonviolent means or unspecified methods (2) threat (3) physical violence
QI_3	Political obscurantism as a mode of dealing with dangerous knowledge	(1) tabooing dangerous knowledge (2) faking dangerous knowledge (3) exterminating dangerous knowledge
QI_4	Creation of a total enemy	(1) a threat to the stable functioning of the ingroup and the internal world (2) a threat to the material security of the ingroup and the internal world (3) a threat to the ingroup's lives and health and internal world existence
QI_5	Strategies of survival on the historic battlefield	(1) escapism (2) isolation (3) annihilation

Source: Author's own study.

The segregation of people consists in differentiating between 'we-insiders' and 'they-outsiders' (QI_1). The first indicator takes on high value (3) when a communicator considers the ingroup as divine while demonizing the outgroup. Anthropolatrization and vilification entail an extremely positive and negative valuation, respectively. Moderate intensity (2) comes in the form of assigning positive traits to the ingroup and negative ones to the outgroup. Low intensity (1) manifests itself as portraying the ingroup as better than others or not as bad as others while the outgroup as worse or not as good as others.

While the first indicator concerns the semantic creation of present-day reality, the second one (QI_2) depicts what political reality (of a utopian nature) should be created and how to achieve that lofty goal in the future. The intensity of political gnosticism depends on a change variant that provides sense for the activities of the communicator. A homogeneous criterion for the variant distinction is a means of changing unacceptable reality into a utopian state. A high intensity (3) includes the use of active physical violence. The moderate form (2) rests on the use of threat, or passive physical violence. A low intensity (1) emerges through nonviolent means or unspecified methods.

The third indicator relates to political obscurantism as a mode of dealing with dangerous knowledge (QI_3). A communicator purposefully withholds information from dissemination to maintain an existing order or establish a new one. Intrusive information is hence considered detrimental to the transformation of present-day reality into a desired state, as it supports the outgroup, the total enemy, and threatens the ingroup and the integrity of the supposedly 'good' world. The strategy of attacking non-gnostic knowledge determines the intensity of political gnosticism. A high intensity (3) emerges if a communicator displays overt hostility towards dangerous knowledge, which is to be annihilated. A moderate intensity (2) entails presenting non-gnostic knowledge as fake, misleading news. A low intensity (1) is achieved by tabooing non-gnostic knowledge, or rendering certain information unmentionable.

The total enemy's sole objective is allegedly to destroy and deploy violence. Its hostility stems from its inherent essence, and with whom coexistence is impossible because it precludes peace and prosperity. The construction of a total enemy (QI_4) that meets these criteria is the fourth indicator of political gnosticism. The ingroup strives to design, punish, and exterminate a total enemy just because he/she is the source of disturbing insecurity, precludes the transformation of present-day reality, and threatens the ingroup. Total enemies differ in how they threaten the ingroup and the internal world. A high intensity of political gnosticism (3) is when the total enemy becomes a menace to the ingroup's lives, health, and the existence of the internal world. A moderate intensity (2) appears if the total enemy endangers the material security of 'we-insiders' and 'our world.' Material security is violated when people lose material resources, or when public property is damaged. A low intensity (1) emerges when the total enemy jeopardizes the stable functioning of the internal world and those who belong to it.

Finally, political gnosticism may also be typified by strategies of survival on the historic battlefield (QI_5). A desire for self-perpetuation results in strategies pertaining to survival on historic battlefields understood as spaces where good and evil clash. Hard political gnosticism takes the form of annihilation (3), and rests on claiming that non-gnostic resources, either material or non-material, are to be annihilated and condemned

as inconsistent with the native world. Non-gnostic resources are beings, processes, and phenomena that do not belong to the ingroup and are incompatible with its goals. Isolation is a characteristic of a moderate intensity (2). It draws on the separation of the native world from non-gnostic resources. A low intensity (1) takes the form of escapism, or avoidance of being in any relationship with non-gnostic resources. Hard political gnosticism is more actively on the offensive while its moderate and soft forms are defensive.

Data analysis is entrenched by a constant comparative method which rests on an inductive approach taken to identify the political gnosticism-related theoretical properties in the data. A back-and-forth interplay with the data enables the researcher to investigate the codes and concepts. Data is juxtaposed whiles codes are used to structure ideas and identify clustering concepts (Bowen, 2009).

The following parts of the article discuss the dynamics, occurrence, and intensity of political gnosticism in the news at five definitional levels. They introduce how partisan journalists legitimated the illegally implemented Covid-19 pandemic-derived anti-democratic measures. They delve analytically into journalist practices used to convince Poles to become obedient to the government.

Research results and discussion

No later than March, partisan journalists began using political gnosticism to convince the Polish populace to accept and comply with anti-democratic restrictions. It was then that the first case of infection with the virus was detected in Poland and the first wave of the pandemic officially began. The intensity and number of political gnosticism elements were changing. These elements occurred 322 times in March (32 % of all the elements), 44 times in April (4 %), and 648 times in May (64 %) (Table 2). In March, political gnosticism emerged as a reaction to government decisions to impose limitations of civil liberties. TVP Info unreservedly supported the government and justified anti-democratic measures. The state broadcaster's duty was not to prepare society for potential restrictions prior to their imposition but to convince Poles that the already implemented changes were suitable for the situation. The intensity and number of political gnosticism elements were relatively high because of apprehension in regard to expected social contestation over anti-democratic measures. Civil movements opposing democratic erosion, especially the Committee for the Defense of Democracy (CDD) and the Citizens of Poland, which had been established before the pandemic, monitored the activities of the political regime, and planned to launch protests against over-restrictive regulations. Therefore, the government might have expected that protest activity would continue during the pandemic.

Table 2

The Elements of Political Gnosticism in TVP Info News Legitimating Anti-Democratic Measures

QI_n	The intensity of political gnosticism: (1) low, (2) moderate, and (3) high.			
	March 2020	**April 2020**	**May 2020**	**March-May 2020**
QI_1	(1) 0 (2) 8 (3) 62 Total: 70	(1) 0 (2) 1 (3) 7 Total: 8	(1) 0 (2) 8 (3) 87 Total: 95	(1) 0 (2) 17 (3) 156 Total: 173 (17%)
QI_2	(1) 21 (2) 42 (3) 28 Total: 91	(1) 4 (2) 2 (3) 0 Total: 6	(1) 61 (2) 78 (3) 65 Total: 204	(1) 86 (2) 122 (3) 93 Total: 301 (30%)
QI_3	(1) 21 (2) 15 (3) 19 Total: 55	(1) 3 (2) 4 (3) 5 Total: 12	(1) 39 (2) 23 (3) 32 Total: 94	(1) 63 (2) 42 (3) 56 Total: 161 (16%)
QI_4	(1) 29 (2) 12 (3) 33 Total: 74	(1) 4 (2) 3 (3) 3 Total: 10	(1) 48 (2) 45 (3) 71 Total: 164	(1) 81 (2) 60 (3) 107 Total: 248 (24%)
QI_5	(1) 0 (2) 0 (3) 32 Total: 32	(1) 0 (2) 0 (3) 8 Total: 8	(1) 0 (2) 0 (3) 91 Total: 91	(1) 0 (2) 0 (3) 131 Total: 131 (13%)
Total	322 (32%)	44 (4%)	648 (64%)	Total: 1014 (100%)

Source: Author's own study.

A substantial decrease in the number of political gnosticism elements in April was the result of almost complete social compliance with restrictions and acquiescence to government instructions. However, in May, the political gnosticism rate considerably increased and achieved the highest level during the pandemic. The rate increased as more anti-government public gatherings took place. Assemblies steadily increased in numbers and intensity. They were initially prompted by growing unrest regarding the progressive weakening of democratic governance, dissatisfaction with Covid-19-related precautions, and the socio-economic consequences of the pandemic, mainly in the form of unemployment. The state broadcaster took the government's side again. TVP Info made an active and explicit effort to justify and account for the imposition of Covid-19-related limitations while criticizing those who opposed the government.

Dividing People into Self and Others

TVP Info clearly determined differences between 'we-the good' and 'they-the bad.' About 17 % of all manifestations of political gnosticism featured this strategy. Hard gnosticism was dominant, the moderate variant rare, and the soft one did not occur. Accordingly, TVP Info mostly used extreme valuation to define the ingroup and the outgroup. This is demonstrated by the occurrence of firm and uncompromising distinctions. Anthropolatrization of 'we-insiders' and vilification of 'they-outsiders' took the form of two types of division.

A criterion for the first division was an imagined attitude towards adherence to the law. While the ingroup integrated those who respected the limitations of civil liberties imposed by the government, the outgroup consisted of those who did not and supposedly put the lives and health of all people in jeopardy, e.g., opposition members who supported anti-government social initiatives (TVP Info 2020d, 2020q, 2020t). Other news

exacerbated this division by incorporating into the outgroup distributors of fake news and participants of public gatherings considered illegal, including the representatives of the opposition parties and the presidential candidates who were not supported by PiS (i.e., Duda's counter-candidates) (TVP Info, 2020j, 2020l). TVP Info condemned the outgroup actions, such as public gathering held by Duda's counter-candidates during their election campaigns, as fatally dangerous and immoral (TVP Info, 2020l). They were contrary to the law and the government's anthropolatrized aspiration to protect human lives and health.

The other division criterion conjured up attitude towards the crisis itself. The broadcaster utilized police statements that separated the anthropolatrized 'our citizens' from the vilified 'fraudsters.' The latter group was involved in money scams revolving around the fight against the coronavirus, e.g., ostensible 'miracle' medicines, vaccines for the virus, or fake tests to detect infection. Their alleged behavior put lives at risk. They breached the law and violated crucial social norms. The outgroup was juxtaposed with the police that identified and apprehended the perpetrators who did not belong to the category of 'our citizens' despite their indeterminate provenance (TVP Info, 2020f). Such framing of the situation allowed journalists to exclude from the ingroup those people who took advantage of the pandemic for their own benefit. It also legitimated police actions aimed at protecting Poles and maintaining public order on behalf of the government.

Considerably less frequent was moderate political gnosticism. According to TVP Info, the implementation of anti-democratic measures contributed to the general progress of the law-abiding ingroup. Those people supposedly started using new instant messaging clients, participated in video chats, commented on posts on social media, and generally gained from remote learning (TVP Info, 2020e). In turn, the outgroup failed to embrace these opportunities. Journalists attached positive and negative values to the representatives of the two groups on the basis of presumed utilization of new technologies. Interference in the private sphere consisted in determining a catalog of desirable behaviors that allowed closer affiliation with the ingroup. In effect, the broadcaster presented a series of actions deemed acceptable and commendable.

The broadcaster avoided using defensive relativization of 'we-insiders' and offensive relativization of 'they-outsiders.' The groups were considered incomparable and deprived of any common features, which contributed to a strong polarization of Poles. The lack of soft political gnosticism against the background of its harder forms revealed a reluctance to soften rigid divisions. The divisions provided instructions for the ingroup's desirable behavior in public and private spheres. The instructions stated that good citizens should have stayed home, focused on self-development or entertainment, avoided participating in protests and engaging in anti-government initiatives. They shaped the perception of properly fulfilled political roles.

Change of Present-day Reality into a Utopian State

This future-oriented feature was the most significant component of political gnosticism due to its largest share in the news (30 %). The introduction of anti-democratic measures was shown as a necessary stage in the development of the political and legal structure. Although TVP Info offered a wide range of ideas to change the political reality, threat-

based moderate political gnosticism prevailed. As the broadcaster informed the public, the government was ready and willing to resort to active physical violence to meet its goals. Slightly less frequent were the soft and hard variants. The former involved nonviolent and unspecified methods, which might have been replaced with force. The latter included active physical violence. Importantly, hard political gnosticism did not occur in April, when social obedience to the Covid-19-related law was at its highest level. At that time, threats were sufficiently preventive, and active physical violence was considered unnecessary. The highest rates in May stemmed from the need to show the strategies of dealing with participants of anti-government public gatherings, including those held by Duda's counter-candidates.

The public broadcaster, fulfilling the goals of the repressive state, disseminated the National Police Chief's guidelines. The police, an officially apolitical institution, actively supported the government during the pandemic and their actions fit into the model of partisan policing. The police announced that 20,000 officers, supported by paramilitary officers, soldiers, and city guards, would enforce order in Polish cities (TVP Info, 2020f). This would generate a much larger number of patrols on the streets to control and check how the provisions of government regulations were observed. The police would repress those who disregarded the limitations established by the law, use prevention, and educate offenders (TVP Info, 2020i). Police officers called on people to report all violations. TVP Info promoted attitudes of absolute obedience and compliance with restrictions resulting from quasi-militant democracy consolidation. In a utopian state depicted by journalists, the rules determined by the government were absolutely respected. The way to achieve this goal was typical of hard political gnosticism since it involved force against Poles whose behavior infringed state regulations.

TVP Info reported that the President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Health presented a vision of a pandemic-free Poland. The way to protect Polish citizens' lives and health was to limit civil liberties such as freedom of assembly (TVP Info, 2020k, 2020m, 2020n). Anti-democratic measures were understood as an efficient means of fighting the pandemic. The Minister of Health appealed to Polish citizens to take responsibility for 'loved ones, neighbors, and everyone we meet' (TVP Info, 2020s). In a time of crisis, responsibility rested on upholding the law and making sure others do so as well, which might have been considered as informing against offenders (TVP Info, 2020i). The threats of violence and punishment for failure to comply with the restrictions were indicative of moderate political gnosticism.

Soft political gnosticism also served to define plans for the future. The Prime Minister referred to the possible influence of the after-pandemic global crisis on Poland. He compared the economic situation in Poland with Great Britain to show that the former was in a more advantageous position thanks to its government. Therefore, anti-democratic measures imposed by the government were adequately selected and efficient. As TVP Info broadcasted, the government aimed at a significantly lower economic slump in Poland and sought to curb the possible surge in unemployment. The Prime Minister imprecisely outlined the means to achieve these goals: 'to do everything possible as part of our anti-crisis shield' (TVP Info, 2020a). The lack of references to violent methods indicated the low intensity of political gnosticism. Simultaneously, however, the lack of developed

ideas for achieving the assumed goals became apparent. The use of violent solutions could not be ruled out in the face of declarations to employ all possible means.

The original use of soft political gnosticism emerged in the President's objection to the regionalization of Poland. As the President stated, 'only a state as strong as Poland could efficiently fight the pandemic,' which was 'a lesson for the future' (TVP Info, 2020b). Andrzej Duda aimed to strengthen state power as 'an indiscrete entity' (TVP Info, 2020b). On the one hand, media tried to actively create the impression of looming success towards the end of the pandemic. On the other, they were promising future security and prosperity. The President did not assume the use of force as necessary in order to alter the existing reality, yet his vision of the future left little room for alternatives. Therefore, any threat to this idyllic future could be met with a violent push-back.

TVP Info supported the government's plans for the future. Journalists espoused the vision of Poland as a strong state free of widespread coronavirus infections and as doing significantly better economically than other European states. Poles were supposed to respect the rules and restrictions implemented by the government. Common repression, police prevention, education, civil obedience, denunciatory activities, preventing state regionalization, limitation of civil liberties, the imposition of 'anti-crisis shields,' and 'doing everything we [the government] can' (TVP Info, 2020b) were considered appropriate means to achieve the lofty goal of a perfect future state. An extensive catalog of measures, including active physical violence, testified to the government's unwavering pursuit of this path.

Political Obscurantism as a Mode of Dealing with Dangerous Knowledge

Sixteen percent of political gnosticism elements served the broadcaster to tackle dangerous knowledge. TVP Info solely distributed information that reinforced government policy. Journalists used strategies of tabooing, faking, and exterminating. The exact choice of strategy was dictated by the sense of danger that any inimical narrative posed to TVP Info's own discursive creation.

A form of hard political gnosticism was deployed against hostile communicators. The Prime Minister declared 'a war against the pandemic of fake news and misinformation' since this 'pandemic might have accelerated the development of the Covid-19 pandemic' (TVP Info, 2020m). The end result was that any narrative that was incompatible with the state's was rendered 'fake news' and hence banished from the public media sphere.

The announcements of the imposition of anti-democratic measures contained neither substantive justification for nor explanation of particular restrictions (TVP Info, 2020q). The Minister of Health criticized Great Britain for not limiting the freedom of assembly and thus contributing to the spread of the coronavirus. His assertion was that such limitations were absolutely critical and necessary (TVP Info, 2020h). Moreover, TVP Info described the state successes in combating the pandemic by quoting supporters praising anti-democratic measures (TVP Info, 2020n). These measures were treated as a non-alternative source of Poland's efficiency in the fight against the pandemic. TVP Info tabooed any counterarguments and thus applied soft political gnosticism.

TVP Info appealed to opposition groups to 'stop distributing harmful fake news' (TVP Info, 2020k). The use of moderate political gnosticism consisted in treating the information

distributed by the opposition as false and hostile. According to the Minister of the Interior and Administration, restrictions stemmed from the epidemic threat rather than the will to restrict civil rights (TVP Info, 2020r). He used moderate political gnosticism by rejecting opinions incongruous with state narration. Any counterarguments were treated as fake news misleading society. No substantive discussion followed that supposition.

Moderate political gnosticism also occurred in news about protest policing. As TVP Info emphasized, participants of illegal gatherings were detained because they attacked and wounded police officers. In contrast to whatever the participants maintained and the independent media showed, the police were free from blame. Nevertheless, apart from this brief comment, the broadcaster ignored the other side's viewpoints on the current affairs (TVP Info, 2020o, 2020p). Journalists avoided delving into narrations inconsistent with their own interpretation of clashes between the police and protesters. These narrations were rejected as fake news produced to slander the police engaged in law enforcement.

As TVP Info indicated, verified information on coronavirus was available on official government profiles in social media and on websites with the domain gov.pl. This is evidence of an attempt to monopolize information distribution channels and, at the same time, exclude other sources, which is a form of soft political gnosticism. The broadcaster drew on the Prime Minister's appeal to Poles to be careful when searching for information because 'one false message can lead to many unpleasant events, to the tragedy of other people' (TVP Info, 2020m) and warned that, 'even a photograph may have dire consequences. An innocent photo that is misleading can lead to panic; such a snowball effect may be hard to stop' (TVP Info, 2020m). Therefore, other sources of information than those approved by the government put Polish citizens at risk.

Strategies for using this type of political gnosticism showed that journalists created a particular image of Poland and actively prevented its modification by alternate information channels. The emergence of hard political gnosticism revealed a sense of danger allegedly posed by other information centers. The defense-by-attack mechanism was applied. Furthermore, the broadcaster discredited political opponents to lower their credibility. In turn, keeping information silent was a symptom of a sense of relative control over the distribution of news and its impact on the audience.

Creation of a Total Enemy

The creation of a total enemy was the second most significant feature of political gnosticism (24 % of all expressions). Hard gnosticism dominated since enemies were shown as a threat to human lives, health, and internal world existence. However, enemies also threatened the stable functioning of the ingroup, Poland, and, to a lower extent, Poles' material security.

Hard political gnosticism prevailed in information materials pertaining to anti-government public gatherings. According to the broadcaster, their participants endangered themselves and Poles due to the very act of participating against the law (TVP Info, 2020o). They were considered criminals. Protesters used physical violence against the police, failed to keep social distance, and did not wear face masks (TVP Info, 2020l). Activists were presented as the most dangerous total enemy. They constituted the largest group resisting the government.

TVP Info also used hard political gnosticism to make Tomasz Grodzki, Marshal of the Senate of the Republic of Poland, a total enemy. The broadcaster claimed that Grodzki jeopardized the lives and health of senators and foreigners present at the Senate building by calling a meeting of the Senate. Although one of the people who were often at the Senate reported to the Marshal that he was feeling unwell and would undergo a coronavirus test, Grodzki did not change his decision (TVP Info, 2020g). By putting human lives and health at risk, the enemy threatened a community of mutually caring citizens.

According to state narration, the opposition popularized dangerous methods of bypassing the law. TVP Info quoted a member of the Civic Platform who recommended that the Church should have organized a second Christmas carol to provide people with the opportunity to receive Holy Communion and thus ease the consequences of restrictions on religious worship (TVP Info, 2020k). The editorial comment emphasized that this violation of restrictions would have put human lives and health in peril. Using hard political gnosticism, journalists exposed the supposedly hostile intentions of the opposition. A disregard for human life fueled ideas of bypassing state-imposed regulations, such as the ban on church gatherings.

Moderate political gnosticism occurred in news about illegal public gatherings. Their participants were enemies that damaged public property, including police cars (TVP Info, 2020c). These violations were deliberately aimed at the material security of Poles.

The ruling party used soft political gnosticism to present the CDD as a total enemy. The CDD is a civic organization that speaks against limitations on democracy, the rule of law, and civil liberties. The organization built a tent town called 'Freedom' next to the Sejm building. This makeshift space served as a haven for those who protested against the violations of democracy. In a statement for TVP Info, a member of the PiS contemptuously referred to the town as an 'encampment' and expressed his 'bewilderment' that activists 'occupied' the place despite the pandemic. He considered the haven as a threat due to 'sanitary,' 'moral,' and 'ethical reasons' (TVP Info, 2020l) and underlined that 'particularistic-political demonstration' was immoral while other people were fighting for their lives. Another member of the PiS supported this view and indicated that the CDD acted at variance with those fighting for the common good. As journalists underlined, CDD activists opposed anti-democratic measures and breached restrictions. Thereby, the enemy threatened the stable functioning of the ingroup that complied with the new rules. Moreover, the parliamentary opposition also endangered the stable functioning of the state and Polish citizens by disseminating fake news that allegedly instigated anxiety and panic. This is a manifestation of soft political gnosticism since the enemy of the people is presented as a source of turmoil and confusion.

TVP Info legitimated the deployment of anti-democratic measures by introducing the following enemies: the opposition, Marshal of the Senate of the Republic of Poland hailing from the opposition, and civic organizations opposing democratic erosion. The way these edifices were presented was a sign of a lack of will to negotiate and cooperate. TVP Info did not create any external enemies, rather, all total enemies came from Poland, its own political structure. It generated a sense of fear and the need to be alert in the face of a ubiquitous internal threat.

Strategies of Survival on the Historic Battlefield

The strategies of Poland's survival on the historic battlefield focused on the implementation of anti-democratic measures and strict adherence to them. This feature's share in political gnosticism manifestations was the lowest and amounted to 13 %. TVP Info only used an offensive strategy in the form of hard gnosticism. Defensive strategies of escapism and isolation did not occur. The configuration of the feature's values showed that the broadcaster maintained a confrontational stance throughout the pandemic.

As the broadcaster presented it, anti-democratic measures served to save human lives and health (TVP Info, 2020q). First, Poland combated the pandemic more efficiently than other European states just because of these measures. Second, the success in the struggle against the pandemic resulted from an almost complete lack of deviations from restrictions. The government armed the police with the right to interpret the law and decide whether citizens observed it. The police sought to maintain public order. Therefore, every violation was punished with repression and fines (TVP Info, 2020c). TVP Info provided examples of repression starting from adolescents (16-18 years old) who illegally met and, as a result, were fined or brought to justice thanks to exemplary civic responsibility in the guise of crime reporting. In turn, protesters who broke the law by gathering and injured police officers that secured the events were detained. Thereby, journalists stressed that anti-democratic measures had to be strictly observed, and even the smallest violations were severely punished. There was also a call for vigilance and fighting the enemy by means of cooperation with the police.

By drawing upon the Prime Minister's statements, the broadcaster pointed out that Poles demanded further restrictions on freedom of speech. Some 'citizens sent private messages on Facebook' to the Prime Minister to 'ask for punishing people for distributing fake news' (TVP Info, 2020k). Other citizens suggested that the opposition should have been punished for sharing information leading to anxiety and panic (TVP Info, 2020k). Showing support for anti-democratic measures, journalists legitimated the state narration. Accordingly, the general society appreciated the state media's contribution to combating the coronavirus and its undesired social consequences.

TVP Info treated the confrontational methods of fining and repressing as the only efficient means of suppressing those who did not respect the limitations put on civil liberties. The self-perpetuation of the political system and Poles depended on fearful obedience and absolute compliance.

Conclusions

As the analysis confirms, all the distinctive elements of political gnosticism occurred in their hard forms in the news that justified and accounted for the implementation of anti-democratic measures during the Covid-19 pandemic. The number and the intensity of political gnosticism elements depended on the intensity of expected and real social opposition to the government and anti-democratic measures. The greater the apprehension with regard to social resistance, the more numerous and harder political gnosticism elements were used to legitimate government narration and discard contentious subject matter. Since social contestation over democratic erosion had emerged due to prior

anti-democratic measures before the pandemic, journalists expected its re-occurrence in March. They legitimated the measures immediately after their imposition by hard political gnosticism. The high intensity of political gnosticism served to discourage protests. In April, the indicators of political gnosticism dropped since the government had taken all measures to ensure that there was no actual state of emergency in order to hold presidential elections. TVP Info undertook to create a picture of a pandemic situation controlled by the government. It was so safe that elections could be organized without risking Poles' lives and health, and the government was prepared to meet organizational challenges.

In May, the number of political gnosticism elements grew along with an increase in real social opposition to the upcoming elections that re-emerged after the April lockdown. Although presidential elections were scheduled for May 2020, the voting planned for the first round did not take place. It was in the ruling party's interest to have these elections in May because as the economic situation worsened, the incumbent president Duda lost support, and the chances of his re-election decreased. At the same time, Bodnar was in favor of postponing the election date. He argued that holding elections on time would endanger Poles' health and lives. Moreover, while the ban on public assemblies was in force, only the ruling president could run an election campaign because the gatherings organized by him did not fall under the category of public assemblies within the meaning of the act amended during PiS's term of office. Finally, it was impossible to collect the required 100,000 signatures under the candidacy in a pandemic situation. The elections were passed against the Constitution and the rules of the Sejm. They could not be equal, universal, and secret. There was no regulation guaranteeing that all eligible voters would receive ballots and eliminating the possibility of illegal voting for others. The mechanisms for controlling the fairness of the elections were not provided. TVP Info displaced the counterarguments of the supporters of postponing the elections from the discourse and excluded them from the community of Poles.

This research contributes to Carlo Invernizzi Accetti's and Ian Zuckerman's (2017) theory of quasi-militant democracy by offering empirical evidence that sheds light on the counter-democratic nature of the deployment of Covid-19-related limitations. It confirms that the restrictions of civil freedoms, most of all the freedom of assembly and universal suffrage, provided the ruling with a means to exclude political competitors from the democratic game arbitrarily and thus limit the democratic nature of the regime instead of protecting democracy against its presumptive enemies. The process of defining total enemies was a sovereign exercise of authoritarian power due to a lack of a well-defined method of determining what constitutes an enemy of democracy. All those who actively opposed the consolidation of the quasi-militant democracy were classified as enemies. Accordingly, the study suggests that combining the current studies on militant democracy with the political gnosticism theory provides researchers with conceptual and theoretical tools to explore the political discourse used to generate social support for changes in political regimes.

This study has demonstrated how the semantic structures of political gnosticism worked as justification frames and legitimated anti-democratic measures. It has enriched our understanding of the nature and origins of generating social support for quasi-militant

democracy during the Covid-19 pandemic in Poland through the partisan media. The analysis confirms that freedom of the press was limited since the plurality of views was insufficient and partisan journalists acted as loyal and active government supporters. The article also makes a theoretical contribution to the theory of nondemocratic regimes by formulating an explanatory model. It shows that the occurrence of all essential components of political gnosticism, used to justify anti-democratic actions, in state media is one of the indicators of anti-democratic changes in the political system and serves to legitimate them (Maier, 2007). It helps us understand the ways of thinking, which tend to solidify a very particular way of dealing with opponents (e.g., if we treat someone as an enemy, we do not think about a scenario where we cooperate with them). By recognizing the dominant ways of political thinking, analysts can predict the pool of scenarios that appear during the following waves and after the Covid-19 pandemic. Accordingly, the study shows that state media kept responding to threats to the vital interests of the government by increasing the number of elements and the intensity of political gnosis and thereby legitimating further anti-democratic actions. There were no signs of balancing between liberal democracy and quasi-militant democracy or heading towards the former. The main goal was to generate the highest possible social support for the consolidation of the created political and legal structure.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Securitisation of Migration Revisited: European Union Policies Through the Lens of Syrian Refugees Living in Turkey

Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesine Yeni Bir Bakış: Türkiye'de Yaşayan Suriyeli Mültecilerin Gözünden Avrupa Birliği Politikaları

Pelin Sönmez[1] ⓘ, Özgür Ünal Eriş[2] ⓘ

Abstract

The main aim of this study is to present migration as a 'constructed' societal insecurity threat that became substantial after the Cold War before peaking in 2015. This study applies securitization theory to the ongoing refugee crisis through in-depth interviews with a sample of Syrian settlers in Turkey to determine whether their reasons for choosing to stay in Turkey are linked to their perceptions of cultural insecurity in Europe. The interviews were made in November and December 2019 in Gaziantep, Antakya and İstanbul where most of the Syrian refugees are located. In that sense, the link between the securitisation theory and the interviews made in Turkey attempts to shed light on the awareness of Syrian refugees regarding the fact that the European Union (EU) has tried to create a culturally homogenous society and any kind of difference interfering in this homogeneity can be seen as a threat.

Keywords
European Union, securitisation of migration, Syrian refugees, speech analysis, populist parties

Öz

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Soğuk Savaş sonrasında önem kazanan ve 2015 yılında en yüksek noktasına varmadan önce gündeme gelen göç konusunu "inşa edilmiş" sosyal güvensizlik tehdidi olarak sunmaktır. Çalışma devam etmekte olan mülteci krizinden hareketle, güvenlikleştirme teorisini Türkiye'de yaşamakta olan Suriyeli yerleşimci bir örneklem grup ile derinlemesine mülakatlar yoluyla araştırmış ve bu grubun Türkiye'yi seçme nedenlerin Avrupa'ya ilişkin kültürel güvensizlik algılarıyla ilgili olup olmadığını tespit etmeye çalışmıştır. Çalışma kapsamında geliştirilen mülakatlar Kasım ve Aralık 2019 tarihlerinde yürütülmüş ve Suriyeli mülteci nüfusunun en yoğun olduğu Gaziantep, Antakya ve İstanbul illerinde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda güvenlikleştirme teorisi ve Türkiye'de gerçekleştirilen mülakatlar arasındaki bağın, Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) kültürel manada homojen bir toplum yaratma çabası ve bu homojenliğe müdahale eden her türlü farklılığın bir tehdit olarak görülebilmesi durumunu akılda tutarak, Suriyeli mültecilerdeki bilincin açığa çıkması için bir ışık tutmasına çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler
Avrupa Birliği, göçün güvenlikleştirilmesi, Suriyeli mülteciler, konuşma analizi, popülist partiler

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New security threats: securitization of migration

After the end of the Cold War the understanding of both security communities and security threats changed, mainly from an exclusive stress on *territorial* security to a much greater stress on *societies* 'security. This made concepts like identity and culture even more relevant. States need independence to survive whereas, for societies, survival is determined by *identity and culture*. Consequently, processes that undermine, disrupt, or weaken a society's identity led to *societal insecurity*, particularly when a society defines a given change, development, or potentiality as a threat to its survival as a community. An insecure society does not resort to military action; rather, it turns to processes that strengthen and juxtapose 'us' versus 'them'. As a result, issues connected with migration become an important security threat because migrants are considered outsiders to a community that was previously created by shared culture and identity.

The connection between societal security and socio-cultural security was elaborated in detail by pioneers of the Copenhagen School of security, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998), in their book 'Security: ANew Framework for Analysis'. They point to identity as the organizing concept in societal security (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998).That is, societal identity within a security community does not exist peacefully; rather, it has inner tensions and conflicts, which provoke a willingness to defend itself against internal or external threats. This leads to migration and migrant communities being perceived as a security threat to the identity of the receiving state for two reasons (Stivachtis, 2008: 4). First, cultures and norms in a community differ in how they define who belongs to or can be admitted into their community. Because a violation of these norms by a culturally different migrant community is often regarded as threatening basic values, it is perceived as a threat to security. Therefore, the state in question may fail to structure a well-functioning integration policy because its society is reluctant to take refugees for a long-term stay. Second, the question of how and why some migrant communities are perceived as threats to the identity of the receiving state also involves how migrants decide to deal with the host community (Stivachtis, 2008: 4). Some groups of migrants who do not seek to integrate reject the rules, norms, and laws of the society they live in. They may become deviant with high crime rates, live in closed ethnic neighborhoods, and if they are Muslim, call for the use of Sharia law in Europe and wearing of the hijab, which conflicts with European values (Johnson, 2011).Thus we can say that the failure for a successful integration policy may be the result of attitudes of both sides; the receiving state and society and the refugees.

While the boundary between 'them' and 'us' may change, the division is necessary to preserve the society's identity. From the society's viewpoint, especially Muslim migrants are different. This religiously and culturally different group has constituted the main 'other' in Europe's past. European identity was not formed by Islam but predominantly by the relationship to Islam (Bartoszewicz, 2015: 38). From that relationship, Europe has developed a 'collective identity'[1] and the ability to orchestrate action within a security community. As migrants become more visible and more substantial in numbers, the homogenous security community that was meant to be created by the EU becomes more

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1 Jacques Derrida evaluates collective identity in terms of forming 'them' before 'us'. According to this argument, differentiation determines collective identity while the social bond as a unifying factor can only be constructed by defining an outer space (Derrida, 1992).

vulnerable to cracks and malfunctions. Thus, a security threat to the EU could lead to the fragmentation of a carefully integrated security community and destroy Europe as a project.

In reality, however, migrants may not reflect an existential threat to the receiving states; instead, particular social groups within them may successfully frame migrants as a 'security problem'. This is the core of the *securitization* perspective of Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998). They argue that a security complex has three main elements: a reference point (the threatened element that needs to survive), the securitizing actor (the element that presents a topic as a security threat because it supposedly threatens the reference point), and the functional actors (who affect the dynamics of the sector). Jef Huysmans contributes by identifying three kinds of security threat referent objects: internal security, cultural identity, and the welfare state. In the case of internal security, the core is the internal market and, as a corollary, the free movement of people. Cultural identity and the welfare state become more relevant as referent objects in the securitization of migration. In addition to seeing migration and migrants as security threats to the collective identity of their security community, the citizens of the host country do not want to share the social and economic rights of the welfare state with migrants. They see migrants as freeriding from welfare state benefits and therefore harming it. This provokes welfare chauvinism whereby migrants are seen as threatening both the host society's cultural homogeneity and its welfare state (Huysmans, 2006: 78;Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde,1998: 46-47).

The securitizing actor, the power holder, may use securitization to gain control over any issue; hence, securitization can be based not only on a real existential threat but also on *a perceived* threat (Waever, 1995: 54).Thus, declaring something to be a security issue becomes a political choice (Weaver, 1995: 65). For Weaver and his colleagues, there are no security issues but 'securitized' issues; that is, socially constructed phenomena through securitizing speech acts. State representatives usually say in their speeches that security is about survival. If there is an existential threat against a designated referent object, there is also a security matter for which extraordinary measures are needed (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 21-24). This is accepted as such by the 'audience' of the speech act, the electorate.

Societal insecurity triggered by migration manifests itself in the political radicalization of societies. This is evidenced by the rising popularity of anti-establishment (populist) parties as societies start voting for political forces that securitize migration and even use nationalism, xenophobia, and racism in their speech acts (Huysmans, 1995: 72-73).

However, the fact that securitisation theory links the concepts of cultural and societal security to growing racist tendencies among some politicians and political parties has also led to its criticism. Among the prominent critics to this theory, we can cite Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit's(2020) article published in the Journal titled Security Dialogue. They are particularly critical of securitisation theory's focus on white Western superiority that privileges Europe as the apex of civilization and the fact that must be protected from (excessive) securitization with a risk of 'regression' to a lower level of civilization or a fully uncivilized 'state of nature'. For them, securitization theory's racism is also evident in its methodology, which examines securitizing speech acts to defend this (European, civilized) 'normal politics'.(Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 12-14)

Apart from criticisms to the Copenhagen school of securitisation there are two more schools: Welsh School of Critical Security Studies and Paris School of Security Studies. .

Welsh School of critical security studies was promoted by scholars such as Ken Booth, Richard Wyn Jones and Andrew Linklater based at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Welsh school scholars reject the statism and scientism of the traditional studies and furthermore they reconceptualize the security studies. By paying attention to Individual human beings, ethnic groups, nations, and the whole global community of humankind they focus on the alternative actors of the security issues Even though international structure is presented as an anarchical order, critical scholars believe that security and cooperation is possible though actors other than the state itself . (Booth, 1999, 5-6; 2004: 260) This complex nature of the security also promotes the inclusion of the other threats in addition to the military oriented threats. In that sense it can be said to have common points with Copenhagen school of securitisation because it also treats migration as a security threat; but it is far from analyzing speeches of politicians and their perceptions which is in fact the main issue of analysis in this article.

Another school of security studies that similarly tries to integrate other disciplines in the study of security and conflict is the Paris School, with Didier Bigo as its most prominent representative. The Paris School aims to analyze security issues by using conceptual and operational tools from the realms of international relations, sociology, and criminology. It continues the Copenhagen School of securitisation and adds to the analysis of securitization processes based on speech acts and on the significance of security practices with the help of sociological approaches (Langwald, 2021).

The Paris School also reanalyzes the role of the state arguing that nowadays the state does not have the same authority as before. The Paris School focuses on the newly emerged transnational network of security professionals; professionals or experts of security. Bigo claims that this field follows specific rules of the game that presupposes a particular mode of socialization or habitus on the parts of these professionals. The habitus also plays a central role in shaping securitization processes but is not strongly defined along the lines of national borders(Bigo, 2002)

Securitization of Migration in European Politics

When societal security concerns escalate to the point of securitization, migration becomes the fulcrum of the political agenda. Migration, particularly irregular migration, has always been an important – but not the most important – problem on the political agendas of European leaders, at both national and EU level. The situation changed dramatically in 2015when nearly two million migrants arrived at Europe. When the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, pledged to provide refuge to anyone seeking protection from violence and war abroad[2] and the number of refugee applicationspeaked, the outcome was the decreasing number of votes for her party Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the increasing number of votes for the radical right party Alternative

2   Although Merkel had been somewhat critical of refugees after 2011, she changed her policy in 2015, when she used a motivational slogan for opening Germany's doors to refugees by saying "Wirschaffen das'- meaning 'We can do it'. She used it by justifying that Germany is a major power to support refugees economically, as well as having the capacity to protect and maintain European heritage politically by remaining loyal to universal human rights.

für Deutschland (AfD) in the 2017 election. The AfD entered the national parliament with 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 election to become the third largest party. Opposition to Merkel's refugee policies kept the party together and won its votes as it argued that the integration of migrants and refugees was the biggest threat facing Europe.

Indeed, the leading AfD had been making extremist statements both before and during the 2017 election campaign (Dennison and Pardijs, 2016: 17). For example, the party's leader since September 2017, Alexander Gauland, has talked of fighting an 'invasion of foreigners' and declared that 'Islam is alien to German society'. During a post-election press conference, he claimed that 'One million people – foreigners – being brought into this country are taking away a piece of this country, and we as the AfD don't want that ... We say we don't want to lose Germany to an invasion of foreigners from a different culture'. Gauland has also remarked that 'Islam is not a religion like Catholicism or Protestantism. Intellectually, Islam is always linked to the overthrow of the state. Therefore, the Islamization of Germany poses a threat' (Kaya and Tecmen, 2019: 7).

Since it entered the parliament, the party has been using posters on every possible occasion against Muslims, who are generally dehumanized and portrayed as a foreign army of refugees invading Europe taking incentive to destroy its culture. For instance, the AfD's Bavaria branch opened their election campaign for the Autumn 2019 state elections with posters portraying white school children and advocating that schools should be 'Islamfrei' (free of Islam) (Jegić, 2018: 37). Indeed, AfD significantly increased its votes in the state election in Saxony in September 2019 with 31.9% to become the second party after the CDU. This shows that the party's anti-migrant and anti-Islam rhetoric was helping to increase its electoral support. Through the statements of its leaders and slogans it could be seen that AfD rested its votes on the differences between the German society and the incoming migrants and that this was seen as a threat. The cultural, ethnic, and religious otherness of these migrants, crucial to societal security, made migration securitized.

More parties in Europe securitized migration in their speeches and presented it as a security threat. In France, the Front National is the main political force opposing the 'quiet conquest' by Muslim migrants. Its growing electoral support made its leader, Marine Le Pen, one of the leading candidates in France's presidential elections. The United Kingdom Independence Party, with 17 percent of the vote, had its leader Nigel Farage (MEP) ferociously campaigning for Brexit as the only means of securing the UK's borders against the inflow of migrants, especially from other EU countries. In Italy, the Northern League (Lega Nord) preserved nearly 20 percent of the vote in the last elections. Its leader, Matteo Salvini, has a 33-percent approval rating, securing him a position as a rising political star.

EU'S Securitization and Externalization of Migration Management

The scholarly literature on securitization further introduced different approaches, namely 'practice' or 'tool' approaches. These have generally been represented through the policies of the EU in their writings. As already stated before, the representative of the French School of Security Studies, Didier Bigo, for example, developed an approach that refers to practices rather than discoursesin securitization research. Bigo(2002), emphasizes the importance of practices in such processes while the securitization done by practices reveals itself in the migration issue. However, his writings lack a precise definition of securitizing practices (Léonard, 2010: 235). Balzacq, on the other hand, adopts the tool approach by explaining the transformation of security tools into securitizing instruments (Balzacq, 2008: 78). He implies that securitizing practices can be defined in EU activities by conveying the idea that asylum-seekers and migrants poses a security threat to the EU (Léonard, 2010: 237).

For Balzacq, securitization theory does not need the assent of an identifiable audience. To understand this, the focus should be on the functions and implications of the policy instruments that are used to solve a public problem(Balzacq, 2008: 75). In his tool approach, the relationship between words and instruments is indeterminate. Instruments have 'latent developments' that generate unforeseen effects in most cases (Balzacq, 2008: 78).Securitizing tools are generally free from any accountability: most of the time, their existence is unquestioned while securitization instruments reconfigure public action. Here, the aim of a securitization instrument is to address issues identified as threats. Balzacq uses the concept of terrorism to show the implications of policy instruments. For him, the EU's policies on counterterrorism transform security tools into securitizing instruments. This change affects the politics and governing modes of EU counterterrorism. He gives the example of Eurodac (the EU asylum fingerprint database) and supports his argument by pointing out that the EU's counter-terrorism strategy creates a productive ground to widening Eurodac's scope (Balzacq, 2008: 80, 76, 88).

Regarding EU policies, migration today is a phenomenon to be securitized with the help of various tools and practices, such as data gathering, information sharing, and cooperation activities like enhanced training for border staff of member states. The EU is either widening the scope of some agencies or introducing new structures to securitize migration in their policies. We use the term 'symptoms' to explain the EU's tools and practices in five categories: Eurodac as a securitizing tool born out of the Dublin

Convention; EU visa policy and readmission agreements; Frontex, with its tasks and operations; the hotspot approach; activation of the European Border and Coast Agency and return operations.

In 2013, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was introduced through several EU directives and the Dublin III Regulation. According to the latter, border countries are responsible for any asylum-seeker entering the Schengen area. However, this rule broke down completely after the wave of arrivals across European borders in 2015, when Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia took the drastic measure of erecting new fences along their borders. This shifted migration flows to neighboring countries, which closed the 'Balkan route 'and caused the deaths of thousands of migrants at Europe's external borders (Neimann and Zaun, 2018: 4). In 2016, the EU Commission responded by proposing an extension of Eurodac, which increases the securitization of migration. The proposal extends Eurodac's scope to irregularly staying third-country nationals by, for example, lowering the age of taking fingerprints to 6 years old, storing and comparing all three categories of data, and retaining fingerprint data for illegally staying third-country nationals or third–country nationals who have crossed an external border irregularly and who do not claim asylum for 5 years [Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council COM (2016) 272 final]. According to the proposal, Eurodac will also use other biometric identifiers, such as facial recognition and the collection of digital photos, to counter the challenges faced by some member states[COM (2016) 272 final].The Commission defined the effect of this proposal as 'allowing Member States to track secondary movements and better identify people with no right to stay in the EU' in its Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration [COM (2019) 126 final].

The coordination of visa policy and the coordination and facilitation of readmission agreements reflect the EU's internal and external policies whereby EU visa policy has already helped facilitate negotiations on readmission and the visa suspension mechanism. These can be considered as a symptom of the securitization of migration. Huysmans, for example, describes them as the restrictive and control-oriented imperatives that drive European migration policy. For him, the EU's restrictive migration policy indirectly supports expressions of welfare chauvinism while supporting the phenomena of cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing factor. This feeds into the politicization of immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees as an illegitimate presence and scapegoats (Huysmans, 2000: 770). Such a restriction can clearly be observed in Commission reports addressing the chain of migration management and its efforts to increase return rates to decrease the incentives for irregular migration and secondary movements. Here, one concrete tool is the readmission agreements signed with third countries to control the flow of irregular migrants. The 2019 report especially welcomes the agreement reached between the European Parliament and the Council on the reform of the Visa Code, while also referring the possibility of adopting restrictive visa measures against non-cooperative third countries on readmission [COM(2019) 126 final].

Some scholars have pointed out the reality of the politicization of migration and its presentation as a security threat, as instrumentalized in Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member

States of the EU (Léonard, 2010: 232).Others describe Frontex as a logical continuation of integration and free movement doctrine of the EU. That is, it is not the outcome of securitization but rather a sign of its failure. However, for our analysis, we will focus on the first view (Neal, 2009: 344).

According to the first view, Frontex reflects the securitization of migration via its tasks. Starting with the joint operations task, it uses securitizing practices because they are generally operated by a team, including a group with semi-military status, which causes 'semi-militarization' of border controls, thereby securitizing migration flows. Joint operations are also securitizing practices due to their extraordinary character. The task of assistance training of national border guards reinforces the idea that the EU's external borders are under threat from irregular migration and need to be protected using sophisticated technological means(Léonard, 2010: 240, 241).In conducting its risk analysis task, Frontex often presents itself as an 'intelligence-driven organization'. The use of this concept rather than more neutral concepts, such as 'data' or 'information', contributes to securitizing asylum and migration in the EU. Lastly, the task of providing technical and operational assistance to EU member states when needed at external borders implies that migration flows can be so threatening that some countries cannot cope despite the existing cooperation mechanisms. This perception led EU member states to form regular RABIT training events (Léonard, 2010: 242, 244). The rationale is that the EU's external borders are facing continuous threat, as explained above. In temporary RABIT operations, such as Joint Operation RABIT 2010, the Greek Government asked Brussels to assist Greece in controlling its land border with Turkey for an 'exceptional mass inflow of irregular immigrants'. However, Operation RABIT 2010 was presented as evidence of effective 'European solidarity' (Carrera and Guild, 2010: 5).

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA) was activated in 2016to prevent irregular migration through border controls, fighting against human trafficking and smuggling. Compared with Frontex, this new Agency has improved sources, an enlarged mandate, and greater independence vis-à-vis Member States (Neimann and Zaun, 2018: 10). The EBCGA is also said to have more responsibility for contacting third countries. It can reach agreements with them to share expertise and assist on border management. As seen in the Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration [COM (2018) 250 final], an agreement between the EBGCA and Albania was signed on 12 February 2018. This enables EBGCA to provide assistance in external border management and swiftly deploy teams on Albanian territory in case of a sudden shift in migratory flows [COM (2018) 250 final]. This enables more control-oriented migration governance with third countries and expand the securitization of the migration issue beyond the EU's borders.

The hotspot approach is another symptom of the securitization of migration. The EU originally introduced this in response to the 2015 migration crisis. It aimed to support the Member States in question by deploying Migration Management Support Teams. Implemented first in Italy and Greece, the hotspot approach aims to provide organized and increased registration, identification, fingerprinting, debriefing, and return operations for asylum seekers (Neimann and Zaun, 2018: 5). The Support Teams should process asylum applications as quickly as possible. The work this approach presents, requires group study

and coordination between Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, European Asylum Support Office, and the EU member state facing a migratory pressure at its borders [COM(2015) 240 final].

Through detailed analysis of new approaches to the securitization of migration, it is inevitable to see an increased securitization of migration through EU policies and co-ordination mechanisms. The policies and tools explained above, has started to see refugees as a security threat that needs immediate action to be tackled on its borders. Added to the already analyzed Copenhagen school of securitisation we can say that EU migration and asylum policy is indeed formulated with a securitizing logic and when these policies are implemented, they serve to further the securitization of migration.

Field Research Analysis

Method

This section presents the analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with Syrians residing in Turkey. The primary aim of the interviews was to find out the participants' opinions and attitudes regarding the security discourse depicted by European countries and the EU's migration policies, and to observe their opinions and attitudes on the securitization of this issue. The interviews were conducted in areas with many Syrian residents, namely İstanbul (547,000 people), Gaziantep (441,000 people), and Hatay (428,000 people). Seven interviews were conducted in İstanbul on 14 December 2019, five were conducted in Gaziantep on 22 October, and six were conducted in Hatay on 21 October 2019, resulting in a total of eighteen interviews. Ten participants were females and eight were males, with heterogeneous education backgrounds, ranging from primary, associate, undergraduate, graduate, and doctorate degrees. Participants had come from various parts of Syria, including İdlib, Homs, Damascus, Cerablus, and Aleppo. They had lived in urban and rural areas of those residences. The interviews were conducted by the aid of an Arabic translator to ensure effective communication with the participants. However, based upon the language proficiencies of some participants, interviews were sometimes conducted in Turkish or English.[3]

The participants were all at least eighteen years old and residing in Turkey for the last three years. In the interviews, it is observed that the participants had started to generate a decent level of integration into Turkish society through language (basic level) and socialization. This influenced their perception of Europe and the securitization of migration.

Because of our specific focus on the securitization of migration, the interview questions were categorized to learn the participants' perceptions regarding this issue:

- Questions regarding attitudes towards migration to Europe

- Questions regarding securitization and welfare chauvinism

- Questions regarding securitization and cultural security perception

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3   NGOs in Turkey, such as İmra Association and Shafak Organization, and experts from the Development Agencies of Gaziantep and Hatay, who work actively on migration and migrants, helped to find suitable contacts for immigration.

- Questions regarding securitization and migrant's social security perception

- Questions regarding securitizing action and securitization tools

- Questions about leaders assumed to be 'securitization leaders' and the perception of their discourse

Regarding questions about the participants' migration attitudes to Europe, it was important to understand whether each participant's intention to reside in Turkey had a forced or voluntary basis. It was expected that participants would explain their case in terms of their own environment, namely relatives, friends, connections, networks,etc. The questions on securitization and welfare chauvinism were intended to uncover how these terms wereperceivedby migrants, particularly the idea of offering welfare services only to the citizens of EU member states (Mandacı and Özerim, 2013:115). To analyze questions devoted to securitization and cultural security perception, tools which explore cultural assets including religion oriented, language oriented, customs oriented roots of European societies have been asked to participants in order to reveal their perception (Mandacı and Özerim, 2013: 119).The questions on securitization and migrants' social security perceptions focused on social serenity in Europe and its relationship with migrants, along with the participants' opinions on the EU's role in defending migrant rights. The questions on securitization action and securitization tools asked for participants' perceptions of Frontex activities generated by Balzacq's securitization tool. This included questions to measure participants' attitudes towards EU policies and tools on visa policy or the EU Trust Fund. Finally, questions about the 'securitization actor' discourse, introduced by the Copenhagen School, aimed to uncover participants' perceptions about speeches given by senior EU officials and European leaders that particularly focused on immigrants.

Major Findings and Analysis

Participants in Gaziantep and Hatay highlighted the role of cultural security perception in preferring Turkey as a migration destination. For participants in İstanbul, however, the ease of finding a job was the major determining factor. Participants in Gaziantep and Hatay suggested that Turkey's Muslim culture, similar traditions, and proximity to Syria were all primary reasons for their migration decisions. Especially for participants with daughters, cultural and religious values and proximity were more important. In addition, participants generally did not wish to live in Europe because of their cultural security perception, specifically the risk of being seen as a threat in Europe because of their different religion and culture. This finding was very conspicuous. Because it showed the participants' *own cultural threat perceptions.* They were aware that if they had chosen to live in EU by maintaining their culture and religious values, they would not be comfortable because the homogeneous EU countries' citizens would see them as a threat. This threat perception was based on two sources: 1. They had been following the headlines in several EU countries, especially Germany, France and Italy and were aware of the statements of populist politicians 2. They had been hearing about the discomfort experienced by their relatives and friends who migrated to these countries. This perception was the same for all participants, including different educational backgrounds, as exemplified by the following statements:

İbrahim (39), Academic

"Actually, there was an opportunity to go to Germany. Especially my area of expertise is in high demand in Germany, so I had different opportunities. I have friends there too. However, I preferred to stay here. I prefer to reside in a Muslim country. I can say that the situation that we are in now is the same as the one in Syria in religious and cultural terms. I can feel the same as if I am residing in Aleppo. My friends in Europe have experienced anxiety because of hijab.[4]."

Muhammed (30), Sales Representative

"Here in Turkey, we feel just the same as if we are in Syria, but for our relatives living in Europe, it is different. They are having problems in finding halal food. They have daughters aged 12-13 and they are having problems when their daughters must wear a hijab. They are afraid that their children will adopt the traditions of Germans as we do not approve when a boy of 14-15 years old hangs out with girls and girls spend time with boys outside until late at night. I can understand why they think that way because we also applied to go to Germany and when the German government insisted that my mother and my wife should give pictures with their ears uncovered, we did not accept that and did not complete the application. And now my relatives feel excluded in Germany because they do not share the same religion, values and traditions with the Germans "

Ahmed AbiMurabi, (30), Physical Therapist

"Syrians living in Germany feel so different culturally that, instead of getting integrated into German society, they prefer to live with Turks in Germany, who are culturally and religiously closer."

Muhammed (35), PhD in Finance

"I don't want my children to grow up in a Western environment, so I prefer to stay in Turkey, go to a Gulf country, or go back to Syria. Cultural differences may only cause problems, so we do not want our children to grow up in the European culture. We want them to grow up in an Islamic culture. Germany, for example, might only be seen as a station: you get experience, certificates, formal documents, citizenship, and then continue your life. Culturally, it is very different for Syrians; I would not consider living there."

The chart below shows the distribution of answers to the question exploring the reasons for preferring to stay in Turkey instead of going to Europe.

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
4 A hijab is a head scarf that some Muslim women wear in public.

Regarding advantages, the participants listed several reasons as advantages of residing in Europe based on their perceptions of own relatives and friends already living there. They stated that Europe is very advantageous in terms of providing facilities to teach the host country's language, providing opportunities for migrants to continue their education, and/or finding a job. Once you are integrated, European countries do not differentiate regarding welfare distribution. In describing the life of their relatives residing in Europe, participants used the word 'comfortable', which often reflected the social welfare level. In addition, several participants mentioned personal freedom, through the sentence 'nobody interferes with the others'. In contrast, participants noted that these advantages were very limited in Turkey. For example, according to them, the Turkish government does not usually provide language lessons; it is very hard to get equivalency for diplomas received in Syria; and it is very difficult to find a good job.

Usame (32), Sales Representative

"When you go to Europe, you have time to learn the language. Here, however, it is more difficult. You must learn the language and work at the same time. There, they provide you certain conditions to learn the language for several years, and then you continue with the job that you desire. This is an advantage. I have a friend in Germany. He received a Google software certificate. He works in a big company. He had gone unofficially. Another friend of mine went to France officially. Now he works in the United Nations office."

Zeynep (45), Law School Graduate

"Most of our relatives who went to Europe are studying. Some are getting their bachelor's degree, and some are doing their master's. And they will stay there after they finish. This is good because we tend to have lots of children and Europe helps families who have been living there and have become already integrated."

İbrahim (39), Academic

"I already have a PhD from my university in Syria, so when I came to Turkey, I did not feel the need to try to go to Europe because I thought I would have similar conditions as I had in Syria because of my qualifications. But now I see that this is not the case. As it is getting more and more difficult each day here to find a decent job, I also started to think about trying my chance in Europe because I know that, especially in Germany, you have a chance if you want to further your studies or if you are already qualified."

Hiba (32, Housewife) supported İbrahim's arguments. Her brother, who is a mathematics teacher, could not find a job in Turkey. However, after moving to Germany, he learned German, found a job, started a master's degree, and took along his family as well.

Nevertheless, the question remains: Are these Syrians 'happy' in the host countries? Do they feel discrimination? According to *Hilfa (35, Teacher)*, German Chancellor Angela Merkel in fact does not want any more Syrian refugees than the country needs. As Hilfa put it, "Syrians always leave their influence in society, so their culture and religion might become a distinctive feature in the host country and might be seen as a threat. I have read about Angela Merkel changing her positive attitude towards Syrian refugees after she suffered a loss in the elections in 2017 and lost many of her electorates' support to the racist party AfD. She had to pay attention to her electorates 'perceptions." *Ahmed Abu Arabi (27, Physiotherapist)* had the same opinion. He distinguished between the public and the politicians. "Politicians are more pragmatic; they may see Syrians as a benefit for the economy, but the public is more emotional and they see refugees as threats, both to

their economy and to their security, as they might be terrorists. That is why they started to vote for the racist parties."[5]

Semar (41), School Teacher

"As you know, as they(Europeans) even care tremendously about animal rights. I believe they should care (more) for humans. To have radicalism is normal because it even exists in Turkey. For example, yesterday I was reading the comments on Facebook about a Syrian, and I found the comments very conservative. Eventually, the citizens of the host country believe that the refugees share benefits with them, and they are not happy about it. This dissatisfaction grows when these refugees are also different culturally and religiously. So, when the previous Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, refers to migrants as a 'tsunami', and I think this is an analogy made because of the tsunami's destructive effects on a country, I believe he is right."

The chart below shows the distribution of perceptions of Syrian settlers in Turkey about rising populism in Europe. This chart is important also to show the link between rising populism and the perception of migrants as a security threat.

Reasons for rising power of populist, anti-immigrant parties in Europe?

Despite the increasing perception of migrants and refugees as security threats, there are refugees living and working in Europe. The participants felt thatthose political preferences are involved when certain governments accept Syrians as refugees 'as Europe is ageing and there is a high need for qualified Syrians':

Muhammed (35), PhD in Finance

"Why is Germany accepting refugees? Because Germany needs the work force coming from immigrants. Sweden and Germany are attracting people for economic reasons. As you can see, they accept Syrians only according to their qualifications. I don't call that supporting human rights as advocated by Merkel many times. I call that the opportunism of a politician who wants to take advantage of hardworking Syrian people. They call themselves democratic and support democratic movements in other countries. I do not believe that. If they were democratic, they would be more insistent on helping Syrians get their democratic regime. Instead, they indirectly help Assad consolidate his power, which leads to more migration from Syria, and that leads to more qualified people for their labor needs. The rest can go back to Syria or back to Turkey."

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5   An example of this can be seen in the German national elections in September 2017. As Merkel started to show her support for refugees, there was a reaction, especially in conservative parts of Germany, and increase in votes for a radical party, Alternative für Deutschland (Afd).

Indeed, the statement of Muhammed regarding this issue was backed by a study of Federal Office for Migration and Refugees which found that almost 35 percent of refugees who had arrived in Germany in 2015 had a job by October 2018, compared with 20 percent the previous year. Herbert Bruecker of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) commented on this finding as: "More than 50 percent of the refugees are working in skilled jobs, which usually require vocational training certificates or higher certificates. A combination of favorable labor market conditions, language programs and job placement initiatives are helping refugees land jobs. This flood of human capital is occurring at a crucial time for the economy in Germany with an aging population and low unemployment level. Since the 1970s, Germany's birth rate has declined quite dramatically, at the same time, average life expectancy has been going up. Without immigration, the potential number of workers in Germany would decline by 40% by 2060. With net immigration of about 400,000 people each year, we can keep this figure just about stable. (https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/6/20/germany-welcomed-refugees-now-its-reaping-the-economic-benefits, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-needs-immigrants-to-stay-competitive-economist/a-51158216)

While supporting the opportunism of Europeans mentioned by *Muhammed*, *Ranim (33, Mechanical Institute Graduate)* also noted the securitization of some migrants. As they are of 'no use' to the host country, they are considered a threat and lack the appropriate living conditions for human dignity.

> "Germany currently takes advantage of youngsters and people with higher education. The life of uneducated people in Europe is harder. People who have low education have gone back to Aleppo because in Europe they lived in camps in harsh conditions; they lived in *ghettos*. They said, 'Instead of living under stress, I would like to reside in my own country and, if needed, I can die in my country."

The chart below shows the perceptions of Syrian settlers in Turkey regarding the attitude of Europeans towards migrants:

If you had to designate an adjective for the EU's position against migrants, what would you choose?

Thus, the perceptions of the participants we talked are of the opinion that while young and educated Syrians are seen as beneficial, low educated and older ones are seen as a threat. As the main reason why, the Syrians are fleeing to Europe is because of the serious human rights violations and threats to their life and well-being in their own country, this

Main problems Syrian refugees face in the EU

İbrahim (39, Academic) explained why he lacked belief in Europe's democratic values.

"The road to democracy and the welfare of the Syrians will improve by finding the roots of the problems that led these people to migrate. These people had wanted democracy and human rights and were suppressed. Instead of hearing the Syrians' call for democracy, Europe is helping the reconstruction of some of the hospitals in Syria, which ultimately consolidates the current regime. How is that protecting democracy, human rights, and the security of people whose lives are in danger?"

Ruba (27) uses the phrase "protecting stability" in analyzing the EU's attitude towards refugees:

"For Europe, the stability of its own welfare is more important than democracy."

Although questions regarding the meaning, scope, and function of securitization tools of the EU were asked directly, the participants did not have enough information about them. For example, none of the participants have not heard any information about Frontex or the EU Trust Fund. However, even though they are not aware of these institutions, they predicted that those institutions function to protect Europe from terrorists or to prevent immigrants entering Europe. That is, they are institutions that support the security of EU borders and member state citizens.

Conclusion

As the EU's periphery becomes unstable, the EU has become more conscious about possible security threats emanating from its neighborhoods. This consciousness turned into more concrete actions as the EU was faced with an immense flow of refugees fleeing from chaos and instability in Syria. This ongoing threat to the welfare security community characteristics of the EU became the focus of both mainstream and radical parties' statements, manifestos, and politicians' speeches. Indeed, this new security threat was so relevant that it became the focus of populist parties, which started to increase their support from electorates who have become highly skeptical about incoming refugees. This reality was already explained by the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School, promoted by Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde. Increasing migration not only influenced the statements and speeches of politicians as the EU also developed new policies and institutions to protect itself from these new risks. Thierry Balzacq and Didier Bigo offer a detailed analysis of these policies and institutions.

In this study, we examined the perceptions of a sample of Syrian settlers living in Turkey. While the study drew mainly on securitization theory, it also considered analyses of policies and institutional practices. The participants clearly preferred to stay in Turkey, mainly due to their cultural and religious similarity with Turkish people. They had the perspective that they would have problems living in the EU as they would be seen as a threat by average citizens. They had been developing this perception of threat both through their exposure to statements of politicians found in traditional media and social media means and through realities of cultural and social insecurities experienced by their families and friends already living in Europe. They were also aware of the pragmatic reasons why European countries accept certain categories of refugees and migrants, namely the reality of an aging Europe in need of young, qualified people has pushed Europe's political leaders to make decisions regarding refugee applications.

In conclusion, we can acknowledge the increasing realism in the EU's attitude towards refugees. Although it was formed and promoted as a security community of shared values, the EU became a fortress when threats put at risk those values that comprise its security community. This creates an irony, however: those who apply to the EU as refugees and are rejected are seeking protection of their basic rights, such as the right to live and the right to live in safety and dignity – the very values that security community of the EU is made up of and that Europeans are proud of.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Competing Policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf: The Cases of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates

Körfez'de Müslüman Kardeşler'e Karşı Çatışan Politikalar: Katar ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri Örnekleri

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Abstract

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar are similar in many aspects, including social structure, political life, and religious identity. However, there exists a considerable difference in their foreign policies toward one of the most important regional non-state actors, the Muslim Brotherhood. Since its independence in 1971, Qatar has developed strong relations with the Muslim Brotherhood organization. On the other hand, some of the Gulf countries, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, have remained skeptical toward having good relations with the movement. Particularly, after the Arab revolutions of 2011, the Emirati leadership pursued an anti-Muslim Brotherhood policy together with other regional allies. During this period, Qatar was under severe criticism as a consequence of its support for the Muslim Brotherhood movement. This distinction might be observed comprehensively in practice, yet it has not been adequately examined in a historical and ideological context. There is a lack of studies on the core determinants of Qatar and the UAE's policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood. In light of this gap in literature, this work seeks to clarify why these two countries have such diverging policies toward the movement. Therefore, this study focuses on how the policies of Qatar and the UAE toward the Muslim Brotherhood diverged significantly, particularly in the past two decades.

Keywords

Foreign policy, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Muslim Brotherhood, Gulf

Öz

Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri (BAE) ve Katar pek çok noktada benzerliklere sahip olmakla birlikte bölgesel politikalarda önemli farklılıkları olan iki ülkedir. Bu farklılıklar arasında en belirgin olanı iki ülkenin bölgenin en geniş toplumsal tabana sahip hareketlerinden olan Müslüman Kardeşlere yönelik politikalarıdır. Müslüman Kardeşler hareketiyle olumlu ilişkileri bulunan Katar, bu politikayı bağımsızlığını kazandığı 1970'li yıllardan bu yana sürdürmektedir. Doha yönetiminin Müslüman Kardeşlere desteği özellikle 2011 yılındaki Arap devrimleri sonrasında artmıştır. Buna karşın BAE, Bahreyn ve Suudi Arabistan gibi Körfez ülkeleri Müslüman Kardeşler hareketinin siyasi bir aktör olmasını engellemeye çalışmış ve hareketin Ortadoğu genelinde siyasi ve sosyal süreçlerden dışlanmasına yönelik politika yürütmüştür. Aralarındaki farklılıklar pratikte kapsamlı bir şekilde gözlemlenebilse de tarihsel arka planıyla ve ideolojik bağlamda yeterli derecede incelenmemiştir. Bu nedenle Katar ve BAE'nin Müslüman Kardeşlere yönelik politikasının dinamiklerini inceleyen çalışmaların literatüre katkısı olacağı düşünülmektedir. Buradan hareketle bu çalışma söz konusu iki ülkenin Müslüman Kardeşler hareketine yönelik politikalarının neden farklılaştığını tarihsel bir perspektifle ele almaktadır. Katar ve BAE'nin Müslüman Kardeşler hareketine karşı politikalarının nasıl ve neden önemli farklılar gösterdiği, iki ülkenin harekete yönelik politikalarını şekillendiren temel dinamiklerin ne olduğu bu çalışmanın temel araştırma konusudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Dış Politika, Katar, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Müslüman Kardeşler, Körfez

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Introduction

Since its establishment in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement has become one of the most important social organizations throughout the Middle East. Despite the policies of repression implemented against the organization by some of the countries in the region, particularly by Egypt, the movement continued its activities and became a transnational grassroots organization. While the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to play a role in the Egyptian political landscape during the Hosni Mubarak era, the organization became one of most important political actors in the country in the period following the Arab revolutions that began in 2010 in Tunisia. The political instability of the Egyptian revolution tempted the MB leadership to enter the political scene in the country. Therefore, the organization became a political actor after years of experience as a civil society movement (Pargeter, 2016).

In the early stages of revolutionary transformation in Egypt, the movement did not have a clear vision with regard to its role in the political landscape. It was founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928 as an NGO for helping poor people and supporting education. It mainly used the discourse of "Da'wa," which means "invitation," urging people to obey Islamic principles and to establish a political and economic order governed by Islam. In the formation of the MB movement's ideology, the idea of Islamic reform put forward by innovative figures such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida were influential (Zollner, 2009). The prominent emphasis of the movement was protecting Islamic values against rising socialist and nationalist ideologies as well as Zionist activities the effects thereof. The movement in the course of time increased its political effectiveness, starting from Egypt and spreading to other countries. The MB opened representative offices in Jordan (1946), in Syria (1937), in Lebanon (1936), and in many other Muslim countries in a short time. It also established a hierarchical structure and was linked to armed-forced like Hamas, which has been fighting in the Palestinian conflict since 1987 (Wickham, 2013). After Egypt signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1979, execution and prison sentences were given to members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the organization was divided into many groups, such as Takfir wal-Hijra, Jihad al-Islami, and Jamaat-e-Islami. Despite being effective in the Syrian uprising in 1982, it lost great power after the Hama Massacre in Syria (Pargeter, 2013). Still, the movement contributed to the development of political Islamic thought and pioneered the establishment of almost all political Islamic movements. It also put an emphasis on social reform and social justice issues, such as the right to a living wage, adequate education, and satisfactory social services (Wickham, 2013).

However, with widespread popular support, the MB constituted a serious potential for political leadership in the post-revolutionary era. This was not limited to Egypt. Supporters of the MB were further motivated when the organization rose to leadership positions in Egypt. These developments caused disturbance for regional actors that were traditionally supportive of the political status quo. The possibility of Ikhwan's contribution to regional political transformation made a great impact on the opposing camp to reconsider their policies toward the organization (Dihstelhoff & Lohse, 2020). In the aftermath of the revolution of 2011, a member of Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammad Morsi, was elected as president in Egypt. As the organization now became the strongest political actor in the

country, some of the autocratic regimes in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, worried that sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood might initiate similar uprisings in their countries. However, there was a different kind of reaction as well. It was observed that the leading countries in the region adopted two different approaches in this period. While countries like Qatar and Turkey encouraged regional transformation and supported the MB movement, countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia supported the political status quo and worked to prevent the movement from consolidating power in the region (Lynch, 2016). These different approaches created tension among Gulf countries, which had been in close cooperation for many years under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Thus, the reason why specifically these two countries with very similar regimes, Qatar and the UAE, differ in their MB policies has emerged as an important research question.

These differences became more visible following the election of MB member Mohammed Morsi as the president of Egypt. While Qatar supported the Morsi government, the UAE and Saudi Arabia worked hard to remove him from power (Kirkpatrick, 2015). Riyadh and Abu Dhabi provided political and financial support to the military coup that took place on July 3, 2013, which toppled the first democratically elected president of Egypt, Mohammad Morsi. The MB's removal from power was warmly welcome by the UAE and Saudi Arabia (Telci and Rakipoğlu, 2018). In the following period, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh started a region-wide initiative to demonize the MB (Mason, 2018). The most serious step in this regard was its declaration as a terrorist organization. Another initiative of the UAE and Saudi Arabia was to target countries that supported the MB organization - namely Qatar and Turkey. This further highlighted the division between the UAE and Qatar with regards to their political approach toward the MB. Finally, as the two countries have become active foreign policy players in the Middle East, there has been increasing interest to study the foreign policy choices of Doha and Abu Dhabi (Ulrichsen, 2012; Roberts, 2017).

In recent years, the main dynamics that shaped Qatar and the UAE's policies toward the MB are closely related to the Arab revolutions of 2011. As the organization aimed to become an active policy player, the positions of Qatar and the UAE took different turns toward the movement. While Qatar chose to stand by the MB in the hope that this would strengthen Qatar's regional influence, the UAE thought otherwise. The UAE considered the rise of the MB as a political actor as a direct threat to its regime. This differing threat perception toward the MB was the main determinant of the diverging policy choices of Qatar and the UAE toward the organization (Roberts, 2017).

The most riveting question in that period was specifically as to why the UAE took such a rigid position against the MB movement. On the other hand, the underlying motives behind Qatar's intense support to the extent of jeopardizing its affairs with its neighbors are an issue of concern as well. From this point of view, this study will primarily examine the attitudes of the two countries toward the MB against a historical backdrop and will then discuss the internal and external determinants steering the MB policies of Doha and Abu Dhabi. Additionally, the study will analyze how the MB policies of these two countries took place at the level of action and discourse and which actors came to the fore in the process.

Nasser's Crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and the "Exodus"

Following its establishment in 1928, the MB became one of the most vibrant civil society organizations in Egypt. Since its establishment, the MB has not refrained from political opposition to Egyptian governments. The movement opposed the alliance agreement between Egypt and Britain in 1936 and organized demonstrations protesting the decision of the Wafd Party and Britain. First, they decided to participate directly in the 1941 elections. The violent reaction they received from the Egyptian government began in 1948 following the assassination of the then-Prime Minister of Egypt Mahmoud El Nokrashy by a Muslim Brotherhood member (Arı and Koç, 2014). However, during the political transformation in Egypt in the 1950s, the organization experienced a difficult period as it had major divergences with the new administration led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Free Officers' coup in 1952 had made a great impact on the movement's political existence and activities in Egypt (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). The Muslim Brotherhood provided support to Nasser in carrying out the coup; however, the relationship between Nasser and the movement became tense following Nasser's rise into power in the country.

The disagreement between the MB and the Nasser administration deepened rapidly. The assassination attempt against Nasser on 26 October 1954 was a turning point in this regard. The ideological and political gap between Nasser and the MB appeared to be based on Islamism versus Arab nationalism, and the increasing political influence of the MB challenged Nasser, who aimed to establish unity for all Arabs and was addressing the Arab nation while the MB, with their discourse of "Da'wa," was reaching out to all Muslims and wanted Egypt to become an Islamic state governed by Islamic principles. Nasser, hence, started the biggest crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt's history, ordering the arrest of thousands of its members, many of whom were given long prison sentences while some of the leading members were sentenced to death (Pargeter, 2016; Wickham, 2013). With the increasing political pressure on the movement, thousands of MB members migrated to the Gulf region, which was in the process of development thanks to the newly discovered oil and gas reserves.

A final development during the period was particularly decisive in the MB members' decision to migrate to the Gulf region. This was the execution of Sayyid Qutb, a leading intellectual member of the MB. This significantly affected the other members of the organization and forced them, out of fear of execution, to relocate to Gulf. During this period, while some MB members migrated to Saudi Arabia, others preferred to relocate to other Gulf countries. Specifically, Qatar and the UAE opened their gates to the members of the MB organization. This process further accelerated after these two countries gained independence in 1971. The main purpose of these countries accepting members of the MB was to benefit from their experience in numerous fields, such as civil society, religious services, politics, and, most importantly, education (Alnogaidan, 2011). While Gulf countries were widely illiterate at the time, they were strict believers in Islam. The two most important services that MB members would provide were educational and religious services (Al Mansouri, 2012; Roberts, 2014). As a result, following their resettlement in the Gulf region, MB members widely dominated the intellectual sphere in these countries in a range of scholarly activities. In the establishment of their national education systems, both Qatar and the UAE were in need of a wide range of service providers. For this

reason, they opened positions for educated professionals and academics. Therefore, many MB members found positions in Qatar and the UAE and started to form a new diaspora (Freer, 2018).

Various dynamics played a role in the decision of the MB members to resettle in these two Gulf countries. The first was the socio-cultural similarity between Egypt and the Gulf region with regards to religion, ideological stance, and language. The second was the economic opportunities in the Gulf region. Following the discovery of oil and gas, Gulf countries started to establish themselves as economic powerhouses in the region. This attracted the attention of the MB members, who were under heavy domestic pressure. Another dynamic was the urgent need for qualified staff in the fields of education and other service sectors in Qatar and the UAE (Al Mansouri, 2012; Wickham, 2013; Roberts, 2017). This encouraged many members of the MB in Egypt to migrate and fill these positions in Gulf countries.

This process of migration from Egypt to the Gulf coincided with the emergence of the region as an economic hot spot. Following their independence in 1971, Qatar and the UAE garnered huge revenues from their oil and gas reserves, making themselves more attractive not only for regional but also for global powers. These two countries transformed this economic wealth into investment to support the institutionalization process of their state structures (Miller, 2016). During this process, the MB played a significant role in the state formation of both Qatar and the UAE, with particular support in sectors such as education, religious services, and civil society (Freer, 2018). Therefore, it can be argued that the MB was heavily involved in the state-building process of both countries, making the organization a crucial part of the social and political structure in the Gulf countries for many years.

Finally, one of the main reasons why Gulf states welcomed Muslim Brotherhood members was the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Even though the migration had started much earlier, the revolution in Iran became a source of ideological concern for Gulf states, and they choose to side with the Muslim Brotherhood ideology rather than the expansionist Shia ideology. While the Iranian threat against Gulf countries continued, the countries also started to worry about the motivations of the MB domestically and regionally. As the movement gained popular support and sided with organizations like Hamas, the perception of certain Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, toward the MB changed. This became more obvious in the post-2011 period, where these three countries decided to designate MB as a terrorist organization.

The Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE: Its Rise and Fall

As argued above, the Free Officers' coup in 1952 was a turning point for the MB organization in Egypt. Following the rift between the movement and the Nasser administration, many members decided to move abroad to escape the oppressive policies of Cairo (Zollner, 2007; Al Mansouri, 2012). While the initial destination for Ikhwan members was Saudi Arabia, many of them migrated to the UAE and Qatar as well. These two countries, however, were unable to utilize their oil resources at full capacity during the 1950s and 1960s, and therefore, many members of the MB chose to stay in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi leadership also aimed to transform the country into a modern state and

decided to benefit from the Muslim Brotherhood's educated and experienced members for that reason. Although Islamic movements regained strength after the defeat in 1967, they continued to face severe oppression in Egypt. Attractive opportunities in newly established and developing Gulf countries encouraged the members of the MB to settle in these countries, and they found important job opportunities as well as civil society activities, especially concerning youth and religion (Obaid, 2020: 116: Pargeter, 2013).

Some of the MB members from Egypt, such as Abdul Badi Saqr, decided to settle in Dubai where they established their own schools under the name of "Madrasat Al Iman". During this period, Emirati Sheikh Abdullah bin Al Mahmoud was the director of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments in the United Arab Emirates. An Egyptian teacher, Abdel Wedud Al Shalbi, also actively supported the activities of the movement. Therefore, the members of the MB in Emirates consisted of a group of teachers coming from Qatar or Egypt and Emirati citizens who had returned to their country after studying abroad, including in Egypt (Al Otaybi, 2012).

In 1974, the movement was institutionalized under the name of "*Cam'iyyat Al Islah vat Tawcih Al Ectimai*" (The Reform and Social Orientation Community). Various scholars such as Sultan bin Kayed al-Qasimi, Muhammed bin Abdullah al-Aglan, Abdurrahman al-Bikr, Muhammed Hasan Raqit Aal Ali, Hasan al-Doqqi, and Said Abdullah Harib al-Mehiri were key figures who were considered to be the founding fathers of the MB organization in the UAE. Sultan bin Kayed al-Qasimi was elected as the chairman of the organization (Al Otaybi, 2012).

The members of the MB who came to the UAE during that period aimed to protect their institutionalized structure by establishing in 1974 a new local organization, called the Islah Movement. The organization would expeditiously become one of the most powerful civilian and political actors in the country. The Islah Movement, which was active in student societies of universities, also had a profound influence in the Ministry of Education of the UAE. The Egyptian MB members, who had social, religious, and linguistic similarities with the UAE society, attempted to encourage the Emirati citizens to join the movement by instrumentalizing various tools.[1] Furthermore, the movement strove to expand its ideology to broader communities and began publishing the Al-Islah magazine in 1978. During this period, some members of the movement participated in local radio and television programs to promote their ideology (Freer, 2018).

At the time, many of the activities of the MB were approved and supported by the UAE leadership, and the movement was even allowed to participate in the political sphere. The movement organized public activities and took part in the first government of the UAE in 1971 by obtaining one ministerial position. Said Abdullah Selman, who was from Ras Al Khaimah and was one of the founding members of the Islah Movement,

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[1] Many UAE citizens, who sympathized the MB movement at the time, kept their distance to the movement in the following years. The UAE citizens, who have close relations with the MB especially in line with the increasing restrictive policies of the UAE government, cut their relations with the movement by supporting the policies of their own governments. Many young citizens of the UAE, who were members of the movement, declared their loyalty to their governments and reported to their governments the ideological structure and strategic objectives of the movement. A comprehensive interview was held on December 14, 2018 in Malacca, Malaysia, with a UAE citizen, who was a former member of the MB and works currently in Al-Ayn Municipality.

served as the Minister of Housing in that government. Another prominent figure of the Islah Movement, Muhammed Bin Abdurrahman al-Bikr, served as the Minister of Islamic Affairs and Foundations in the 1977 government. Finally, another member of Islah, Said Selman, was appointed as the Minister of Education in 1979 (Ulrichsen, 2017).

The movement particularly played a significant role in the educational activities of the UAE from 1977. The members of the MB showed a substantial presence in the education sector during this period, and this situation continued until 1983. It might be observed that the MB movement had a serious presence not only in the ministry but also in primary and secondary schools, universities, and student societies at the time. In those years, the "Sisters" – members of the MB in girls' schools across the UAE -served actively in student societies and organized events (Al Mansouri, 2012).

The increasing infiltration of the Islah Movement into the social sphere through summer schools, religious education, scout camps, and other social events aimed at the UAE's youth caused a disturbance for the Abu Dhabi administration. As Friday sermons delivered by MB members became increasingly political, the Emirati leadership decided to take a bold step against the organization. The Minister of Education Said Selman and Minister of Justice Mohammed Bin Abdurrahman al-Bikr, who were both members of the MB, were dismissed in 1983 (Alnogaidan, 2011). Said Selman was also dismissed from his position as the chancellor of the UAE University. After these developments, the activities of the MB movement began to be restricted in most fields, particularly in the judicial and educational systems.

Following the appointment of Abdullah Omran Taryam as the Minister of Education, the influence of the MB movement began to decrease in the education sector. With a new and more liberal approach to education in mind, the new minister ordered modern dress in schools in 1979 and introduced various courses such as English in 1988 and dance and music in 1989, which substantially contradicted the curriculum developed by the Islah ideology. Following these developments, the movement started to protest decisions of the new minister, and the rift between the movement and the government further deepened (Alnogaidan, 2011).

The Al-Islah magazine was one of the platforms where dissension between the Islah Movement and UAE administration were revealed to the public. In an article published in the Al-Islah magazine on March 5, 1979, the Administrative Council of the Islah Movement reported that they disapproved of some of the decisions taken by the UAE leadership. The article also suggested that the oil revenues should be spent on religious services and that extravagance must be avoided (Al Mansouri, 2012). In another article published in July 1980, the director of Dubai TV was targeted. While the letter harshly criticized the director, it also called for his resignation because of his alleged involvement in corruption (Alnogaidan, 2011).

The Al-Islah magazine became more rigid toward the end of the 1980s. In addition to being a media outlet providing social messages, the magazine also began to be perceived as political opposition. Throughout 1987, the journal heavily criticized the decisions taken by Ahmed Humaid Al Tayer, who was then the Minister of Education. Another decisive moment for the increasing divergence between the Islah Movement and the government

was the decision of the Ministry of Education to remove members of Islah from the board responsible for preparing the educational curriculum. The organization heavily criticized this move in several articles in the Al-Islah magazine in 1988 (Al Mansouri, 2012).

The Chairman of the Islah Movement, Mohammad al-Mansouri, also made comments and criticized the Minister of Education for dismissing Islah members from the committee at the ministry (Al Yadiwi, 2006). Al-Mansouri also used a religious discourse to criticize the Minister of Education. On a number of occasions, he publicly cursed the Minister of Education, Al Tayer. In response, Al Tayer accused al-Mansouri for illegally preaching in mosques and asked authorities to ban him from delivering sermons (Ulrichsen, 2017).

Until these disagreements, the Islah movement had exerted serious influence over the social and political spheres in the UAE, particularly in the higher education system and related institutions. They controlled student societies and organized events that gathered students from all levels. Fearing the loss of their privileged positions in the education sector, they reacted strongly against the government's new attitude, which aimed to exclude the members of Islah from this sector. The movement considered these policies as a direct threat to its existence. As the division between the movement and the government deepened, the intensity of the Emirati leadership's response also changed (Alnogaidan, 2011). Abu Dhabi started to consider that the Islah movement had begun to pose a serious threat to the country. After this message was made known to the organization through different mechanisms, the movement decided to take new action. The board of the Islah Movement convened in mid-1989 and announced that it would no longer continue its activities as it did before (Alnogaidan, 2011). It was, however, too late to make such a decision. The UAE government had already started to take steps aimed at stopping the activities of the organization in the country.

The first serious move of the UAE administration toward the MB was the suspension of Al-Islah magazine. The magazine was banned from publishing from November 1988 to April 1989. Even though this ban was lifted in mid-1989, the magazine continued publication with completely different coverage. It no longer touched upon political matters but rather focused on culture, ethics, and religion. With the decreasing importance of the Al-Islah magazine, the movement also lost its effectiveness in the social and political life in the UAE (Al Mansouri, 2012).

Rising "Hand in Hand": The Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar

After the 1950s, the wave of immigration continued and the Qatari branch of the movement was finally established. The organization was popular particularly among the youth and Qataris who had returned to their homeland after studying in Egyptian universities. This did not include Al-Azhar, as there were not any known figures that taught or held administrative position at the university. However, it was the case that some students might have been influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's leading intellectuals who did not have formal affiliation with the university. The interaction between Qatar and Egypt further intensified with the increasing number of Qataris studying in Egypt and expatriates, particularly teachers, education professionals, and religious clerics, who had moved from Egypt to Qatar. Thanks to this interaction, the MB movement found sociological support and ground in Qatar. Due to this popular support, the movement

started to publish a magazine called "Al Ummah Al-Qatariyya". The magazine continued publication until 1999 and published a total of 72 volumes until the movement decided to stop publication the same year (Freer, 2018).

In line with the attitude of the Qatari branch of the MB, Al Ummah Al-Qatariyya magazine refrained from criticizing the Qatari administration. While the magazine largely focused on Islamic guidance, it also published articles on social, political, military, and financial issues (Freer, 2018). The magazine touched at the same time upon regional and international politics as it repetitively published stories about the threat posed by Israel toward Muslim countries in the Middle East.[2] Apart from the magazine, the MB's existence in Qatar was also related to three influential figures in the movement: Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Jasim Sultan, and Abdel Baky Sakr. They and many other influential figures left Egypt for Qatar in the 1960s (Roberts, 2014).

Following Yusuf al-Qaradawi's arrival in Qatar in 1961, the MB movement started to be more active in the social, religious, and political spheres of the country. During his studies at Al-Azhar University, al-Qaradawi played an important role as a student society leader and came to the fore among the MB members during his period in the late 1940s and early 50s (Freer, 2018). Following his graduation, al-Qaradawi became one of the most influential and respected figures in the organization.

When the Egyptian regime increased pressure on the MB movement, al-Qaradawi left the country and resettled in Qatar. After his arrival, he was appointed as the head of the religious organization in 1961 and later given Qatari citizenship in 1969. Qaradawi supported the establishment of Qatar's education system and initiated the foundation of the Faculty of Theology at Qatar University in 1977. He later became the head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, with its head office located in Doha. All these institutions played a major role in the education of the Qatari elites who later became leading figures in the country's social and political life (Warren, 2021).

During those years, al-Qaradawi was offered a head position at the MB organization in Egypt. However, he refused the offer and decided to continue his engagements in Qatar. Meanwhile, al-Qaradawi continued to participate in the organization's international meetings as a representative of Qatar. Although al-Qaradawi did not have major initiatives within the MB organization, he continued to be considered as one of the most senior and respected figures of the movement. During those years, Qaradawi developed close relations with Al Thani, Qatar's ruling family. His relatively moderate views[3] were warmly welcomed by the ruling elites in Qatar, where a strict form of Salafism was not accepted. This has led Qatar to have a different kind of religious and social structure that is more liberal compared to other Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia (Roberts, 2014). Qaradawi's close relationship with the Qatari leadership continued in the new millennium as well. In 2004, the Qatari Emir supported the establishment of the International Union of Islamic Scholars, with al-Qaradawi at its head. Qaradawi became one of the most

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2   Al Ummah Al Qatariyye Journal Archive, https://archive.org/download/Mqumm

3   About what we mean with moderate view of him "his opinions about takfir – declaring someone non-Muslim- and democracy. He also disagrees with Sayyid Qutb on the concept of "Al Jaheliyya". Also see: "Yusuf al-Qaradawi: "Last Words About Sayyid Qutb", https://bre.is/9dKQKjWo; Mehna Al Houbeyl, "Scholar Qaradawi and His Methodology About Moderate Islam", https://bre.is/tDmyv4kp.

well-known Islamic scholars with his TV program Sharia and Life, broadcasted on Qatari network Al Jazeera (Cherribi, 2017). The show is said to have attracted around 35 million weekly viewers.

Another important person that stands out in the foundation and institutionalization of the MB movement in Qatar is Jassim Bin Sultan, the founding member of the movement in the country. Jassim Bin Sultan was one of many Qatari students who went to Egypt in 1973 for higher education. During his studies in Egypt, Jassim Bin Sultan joined the MB, as it was the universities where the movement was the most active across the country (Freer, 2018). During this period, Bin Sultan was influenced by the books of leading intellectuals of the movement such as Said Hawwa (a member of the Syrian MB), Sayyid Qutb, and Fathi Yakan (Al Wahidi, 2012). After returning to Qatar, Bin Sultan played a major role in establishing the MB movement in the country. Lastly, Abdel Baky Sakr was also an important figure in the MB's rise in Qatar. Following his arrival in Qatar in 1954, Sakr served as the head of Qatar's education bureau and director of Qatar's National Library (Freer, 2018). His major contribution to the MB in Qatar was his efforts to help bring scores of members from Egypt to Qatar. Teachers, students, clerics, and civil society activists resettled in Qatar thanks to the efforts of Sakr (Roberts, 2014). Abdel Muaz al-Sattar, who was a close aide of Hasan al-Banna, also came to Qatar in the 1950s and played a major role in the establishment of the Qatari education system (Akkaya and Al Rantisi, 2015). Hence, Qatar was a newly established country with an undeveloped education system, particularly in higher education. These experienced Muslim Brotherhood members were quite effective in establishing the higher education system in Qatar as well as contributing to the other sectors of state building, such as public administration.

Crisis in the Muslim Brotherhood and the UAE Relations: Post-1994 Era

One of the turning points in the relations between the MB and the UAE was Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's visit to the Gulf region in 1994. During his visit, President Mubarak warned the Gulf States about the increasing power and impact of the MB and called on the UAE administration to get the growing influence of the movement under control. After his visit, the UAE government became more concerned about the security of its regime and took steps to prevent the MB organization from having more influence in the Emirati political structure. In line with this policy, the UAE government dismissed the board of directors of the Islah Movement in 1994. The UAE administration also closed the head office of the movement in Dubai and ordered it to be moved to the Ras al Khaimah Emirate. The Ministry of Social Services was given authority over all branches of the Islah Movement. The Sheikh of Ras Al Khaimah, Sakr al-Qasimi was displeased with the decisions as he had sympathy for the movement (Freer, 2018). The Abu Dhabi leadership attempted to arrest the Chairman of the Islah Movement, Muhammad al-Mansouri, in 1996. This move was criticized by the Ras Al Khaimah leadership and created tension between the two emirates. In the following period, the decision to arrest al-Mansouri was cancelled, and the movement continued its limited activities in the Ras Al Khaimah Emirate from 1996 to 2006 (Alnogaidan, 2011).

The strict attitude toward the MB continued in the 2000s, and as of 2003, more than 100

people working for the Ministry of Education had been transferred to other ministries and positions. After 2003, the MB movement tried to continue its engagements in the country by holding negotiations with the Abu Dhabi leadership. These efforts, however, were unsuccessful, not producing any positive results for the organization, and the pressure further intensified until 2006. The UAE government continued to dismiss teachers, lecturers, and other education professionals who were MB members. The organization criticized these moves through international news outlets as well as protests inside the country (Alnogaidan, 2011). This opposition led the UAE leadership to toughen its stance against the movement. Abu Dhabi no longer considered the MB as a civil organization but rather as a serious threat to the regime. Actions of the MB were perceived as an intervention to the domestic affairs of the UAE, and the movement was accused of threatening the stability of the regime. The UAE even claimed that the movement had an armed branch (Hakala, 2012).

In the early 2000s, the UAE government started to claim that the MB movement was an extremist organization which would bring radicalization to the country. Abu Dhabi also began supporting other religious and social groups that could be considered as alternatives to the MB. These movements included Sufi groups known to have a moderate understanding of Islam. A leading figure in this regard was Hisham Kabbani, a Sufi Sheikh of Lebanese origin. Emirati leadership continuously promoted such figures and tried to establish a network of political Sufism. Another Sufi figure in this regard was Yemeni Ali al-Jifri, who founded the "Tabah Foundation" with the financial support of Abu Dhabi. In addition to its domestic activities, the Tabah Foundation also worked to promote political Sufism in cooperation with international organizations under a liberal and secular Islamic agenda (Amir, 2017).

Despite the claims of the Emirati government, the Islah Movement continued to present itself as a civil society organization that aimed to provide educational and religious services in the country. However, this did not prevent Abu Dhabi from increasing the pressure on the organization in the following years, particularly with the start of the Arab revolutions in 2010 in Tunisia (Milton-Edwards, 2016). This policy led to the arrest of the Islah Movement's leader, Sultan bin Kayed al-Qasimi, who is also the cousin of the Emir of the Ras al-Khaimah Emirate, on 20 April 2012. It was later announced that al-Qasimi was put under house arrest without any charges against him (Kerr, 2012).

A New Period for the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar: Post-1999 Era

In 1999, the Qatari branch of the MB organization decided to terminate its activities in the country. The decision was announced by the leading figure of the movement in the country, Jassim Bin Sultan. In his statement, Bin Sultan stated that the Qatari administration had neither requested nor created pressure for the closure of the organization and that the decision to suspend activity was taken by the organization itself (Freer, 2018). One of the key figures in this decision was Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who served as a bridge between the movement and the Qatari state (Commins, 2012).

It can be argued that with the establishment of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, Qatari support for the movement became institutional and there was no longer a need for an umbrella organization to represent the MB. As the head of the International

Union of Muslim Scholars, al-Qaradawi would promote the interest of the MB at the government level. The organization continued to serve as an important venue for MB members operating in Qatar. Due to Qaradawi's close relationship with the Qatari ruling class, the MB movement could carry out any Islamic and scientific activity both inside and outside the country. The Qatari government provided financial and logistic support to the MB organization to expand the reach of the movement to wider geographies (Kamrava, 2013; Roberts, 2014; Warren, 2017).

Another possible factor behind the MB's termination of its activities in Qatar is related to regional politics. Several Gulf countries, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain had a hostile attitude toward the MB organization due to disagreements between the governments of these countries and the MB movement. Therefore, they considered Qatar's close relationship with the movement as a threat to their regional policies. Given the UAE's harsh stance against the movement and the ideological differences between Saudi Arabia and the MB, Qatar was forced to reconsider its policies toward the movement. Finally, by terminating the activities of the MB, Qatar aimed to avoid potential tension with other Gulf neighbors.

Although the activities of the movement in Qatar were restricted, the government maintained its positive attitude toward the MB. The MB movement never conflicted ideologically with the leadership in Qatar (Warren, 2017). In return, members of the organization received support from the Doha government for their activities both at home and abroad (Khlebnikov, 2015). In 1999, it was decided to shut the official branch of the MB in Qatar following the meetings between the MB and the Qatari leadership. Even though this decision was a highly critical development, there are no clear reasons as to why.[4] It can be argued that both parties refrained from harming each other by publicly declaring their relationship as they feared the aggressive policies of the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Doha continued to open its gates to the members of the movement repressed by other countries. It was argued that the partial presence of the MB in Qatar was now slightly on the same page with the political authority in Qatar. Also, David B. Roberts stated that one of the main reasons why the MB is not a threat to Qatari leadership is that because there is a "strong ruler-ruled political bargain" in Qatar. Qatari rulers took joint action through dialogue with MB members in their country, and the MB in turn did not harshly criticize Qatari policies publicly. That means, there is an unwritten rule in the nature of their relationship, which requires both parties to refrain from causing harm to each other's image as well as positions in regional politics (Roberts, 2014; Esad, 2017; Trager, 2017).

The Diverging Position of Qatar and the UAE toward the Muslim Brotherhood

The turning point in Qatar and the UAE's policies toward the MB was the Arab revolutions that started in late 2010 in Tunisia. In the aftermath of the revolutionary uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, it became clear that the MB would become the leading political power in the regional political landscape. While the rise of the MB was perceived as a direct threat by the Emirati leadership, the Qatari

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4   Despite number of interviews with the MB members, the authors could not verify the exact motivation of this decision.

administration would support this process as Doha had close cooperation with the MB movement. This scenario would contribute to Qatar's regional influence. In this context, Qatar had supported the revolutionary process in the Arab world in the hope that the MB would come to governmental positions. On the other hand, the UAE administration took a counter-revolutionary position because it believed that these revolutionary uprisings would strengthen the MB (Roberts, 2017). The MB's ties with Hamas and its good relations with Turkey and Iran are also considered as the dynamics that determine the UAE's position toward the organization.

This was observed in the case of Egypt. Following the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power on February 18, 2011, the MB started to become a central actor in the revolution. The most influential figure of the organization, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, led the Friday prayer in Tahrir Square as a symbol of the revolutionary victory by the masses, including hundreds of thousands of MB members. In his speech, Qaradawi emphasized that he supported the Arab revolutions and called for the termination of oppressive regimes across the region. Al Jazeera Channel had an important impact in delivering the news from squares to the whole world and supporting the Arab spring in each country (Cherribi, 2017). In the following period, Qatar's political and financial support to the MB movement in Egypt continued. This support further increased following the election of Mohammed Morsi, a member of the MB member, as president (Khatib, 2013).

On the other hand, during this process, the UAE followed a completely contrasting policy with Qatar. The Emirati leadership was cautious toward Egypt and careful in its steps. The UAE toughened its stance against the MB both in its domestic and foreign policies (Almezaini K., 2018). Following a letter signed by 133 UAE citizens on March 6, 2011 calling for political reforms in the country, the Emirati leadership intensified the pressure on the MB. Although only a small number of the signatories to the letter were members of the MB, the UAE government interpreted the act as an attempt to overthrow the regime. The Emirati government started to target members of the Islah movement and ordered the arrest of 60 people in 2012 and 64 in 2013 (Freer, 2015). The investigations were conducted by the Dubai Chief of Police, Dahi Bin Khalfan, who said that the MB was the biggest threat to the security of the region (Kerr & Khalaf, 2012).

In 2013, the Emirati leadership also provided the biggest support to the military coup in Egypt that toppled President Mohammad Morsi, who was a member of the MB organization. In the process leading to the coup, the UAE supported the media channels providing coverage against the Morsi administration. The UAE also provided financial support for disinformation campaigns to damage Morsi's credibility in the eyes of the Egyptians. The UAE encouraged activists from all opposition groups, especially from Seculars and Salafis to form a political group, to start a movement against Morsi. That is how the Tamarod was established, which led the protests aimed at toppling Morsi. The protests eventually led the military to take over the democratically elected regime in the country. The UAE leadership was among the first countries that celebrated Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the leader of the military coup (Telci, 2017).

Following the coup, the UAE continued to put pressure on the MB organization at the regional level. Abu Dhabi's main aim was to keep the organization away from political life not only in Egypt but also in all countries in the wider Middle East. The UAE

administration provided economic and political support to the Sisi regime in exchange for Cairo's heavy-handed policies toward the MB. The UAE administration, which declared the movement as a terrorist organization, also put pressure on other countries to follow suit. The commission established under the instruction of the UAE leadership banned all activities of the movement inside and outside the country and declared the Islah Movement a terrorist organization (Cavusoglu, 2020). Meanwhile, Qatar opened its doors to members of the MB who were subjected to pressure in Egypt. In this regard, many prominent members of the MB, who were initially given positions of power under the Morsi government, came to Qatar. This exodus was similar to the one that occurred six decades ago, when members of the MB left Egypt due to political pressure.

A final blow to the Qatari-Emirati relationship came in the summer of 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain inflicted a political and economic blockade against Qatar. These countries criticized Qatar's support for the MB and its close relationship with Iran and Turkey. These countries even published a list for Qatar to comply with, which included the termination of Qatar's support to the MB, the closing down of the Al Jazeera channel, and the freezing of its relationship with Iran (Wintour, 2017; Telci and Horoz, 2018). It is argued that with its hostile attitude toward the MB, the UAE risked its relations with the Qatari administration. This clearly shows how important the MB was for both Qatar and the UAE. Today, even in the face of the UAE's vigilant preemptive measures against the organization internally and externally, the Brotherhood in the UAE has not been wholly eradicated, and it continues to influence narrow circles in the UAE society (Freer, 2018).

Table 3

Comparison of the Muslim Brotherhood Policies of the UAE and Qatar

The MB Policy of Qatar		The MB Policy of the UAE	
Domestic Policy	**Foreign Policy**	**Domestic Policy**	**Foreign Policy**
Members of the MB were welcomed since the 1950s.	The Arab revolution process that allowed the MB to gain influence in regional politics was strongly supported.	Members of the MB were welcome from the 1950s until the 1990s.	The UAE did not support the process of Arab revolutions. In particular, Abu Dhabi tried to prevent the MB's rise to power.
The leading figure of the MB, Youssef al-Qaradawi was granted Qatari citizenship. The Qatari government supported his activities. Qaradawi contributed to the positive image of the MB in the Middle East.	In the case of Egypt, the Qatari administration provided diplomatic and finance support to President Mohammad Morsi, a leading figure of the MB (Roberts, 2014).	The UAE government even supported the establishment of a local branch of the MB organization in the country. The Islah Movement was established in 1974. This support continued until 1979.	In the case of Egypt, the UAE took the lead in toppling the MB government led by Morsi. Abu Dhabi also supported military coup of July 3, 2013.
The government allowed the establishment of the MB local branch. This organization continued its activities until 1999.	In the case of Tunisia, Qatar supported the Al-Nahda Movement, which is affiliated with the MB.	In 1979, the UAE started to consider MB as a strong social and political actor in the country. Abu Dhabi initiated some steps against the movement.	The UAE leadership initiated an international campaign to globally designate the MB as a terrorist organization.

Dissolution of the Qatar branch of the MB in 1999.	Following the designation of the MB as a terrorist organization by the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Qatar opened its doors to members of the organization.	The UAE administration toughened its stance against the MB movement in 1989.	The UAE initiated the 2017 blockade on Qatar by accusing it of supporting the MB.
The Qatari government continued to support the MB through different mechanisms and instruments such as Al Jazeera.	The UAE and Saudi Arabia requested Qatar to expel Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Doha rejected.	The Arab revolutions were a turning point in the UAE's relationship with the MB. Some members were detained in the UAE.	The UAE initiated a regional campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups that have some level of activity in Middle Eastern countries. Muslim Brotherhood affiliate groups in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Jordan were subjected to UAE-led pressure.
	In 2017, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt inflicted a political blockade on Qatar and asked Doha to suspend all support to the organization. Qatar rejected and continued its support.	The military coup on July 3, 2013, against Mohammad Morsi was supported by the UAE. Following the coup, Abu Dhabi declared MB as a terrorist organization.	The UAE also tried to put pressure on the governments, like Turkey, that have positive relations with the Muslim Brotherhood or its affiliates.

Conclusion

The history of the MB organization in the Gulf region has been increasingly discussed in academic circles, especially the role and the influence of the movement in the region. As the largest civil society organization, with millions of sympathizers, throughout the Middle East, the MB became a source of concern for countries that aim to sustain the regional status quo. These countries feared that the movement could trigger a region-wide transformation that would eventually bring the MB into the political leadership in many countries. While this argument was supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, countries like Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait largely ignored it. This diverging understanding of the MB has become even more rigid in the post-Arab revolutions period.

Gulf countries followed almost identical policies toward the movement throughout the 1950s and 60s as the movement made significant contributions to social, religious, and educational activities in these countries. Both the UAE and Qatar welcomed scores of MB members who left Egypt for asylum. The first reason for this was the need for professionals in different sectors who could contribute to the establishment of an education system in both countries. As the two countries gained independence in 1971, their need for professionals further increased, and they wanted to benefit from the experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood members from Egypt. Therefore, members of the movement played a major role in the establishment of the education system and related institutions in these two countries. The second reason for Egyptian MB members to move to the Gulf was the

social and cultural similarities, such as religion and language.

This, however, started to change in the 1980s and continued throughout the 90s. Since then, there have been diverging approaches by Gulf countries toward the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar considered the MB movement as an important instrument for exerting influence in the wider Middle East region. Therefore, the Doha administration's approach toward the MB can be considered as a long-term investment. This investment had the potential to bring serious gains in regional politics. The short-lived Morsi administration in Egypt was a good example of such gains although Qatar could not benefit from the situation due to the counter-revolutionary initiative led by the United Arab Emirates. However, Qatar continues to consider the Muslim Brotherhood movement as part of its multi-faceted policy in the region.

Another reason for Qatar's positive attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood movement is that the movement made positive contributions to Qatar's post-independence state formation process. Qatar gained its independence in 1971, and in many fields ranging from education to public administration and from healthcare to religious activities, the members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement who migrated to the country from Egypt made certain contributions. These interactions helped maintain the positive perception of the movement in Qatar and the continued support of the Qatari administration to the Muslim Brotherhood movement. This situation continued during the Arab revolutions in 2011, and Qatar continued to support the movement in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, where the Muslim Brotherhood movement was effective, so much so that the situation caused serious crises in the relations between Qatar and the two countries against the Muslim Brotherhood movement, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

On the other hand, the United Arab Emirates strives against the MB movement, which it considers as the most vital threat to its domestic and foreign policy because of the movement's wide popular base. This has not always been the case historically. Having gained independence, the UAE also hosted many Muslim Brotherhood members and allowed members of the movement to serve in the country's public institutions. While the situation remained the same until the 1990s, the UAE's Muslim Brotherhood policy began to change particularly after 1994. The MB movement's gradual increase of effectiveness in the social sphere and its widening popular base in the region, particularly in Egypt, played a role in this change. The UAE administrations assessed that the Muslim Brotherhood movement could turn from a civilian movement into a political power and thus into a threat to the regime. This situation turned out to be a de facto aspect of the period following the 2011 Arab revolutions. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood movement to ruling positions after the revolution in Egypt forced the UAE into an open war against the movement. The UAE provided political and financial support to the coup aiming to remove Mohammed Morsi from power and also carried out diplomatic initiatives in the following period to facilitate the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization throughout the region.

Different Muslim Brotherhood policies caused serious deteriorations in UAE-Qatar relations. Under the leadership of the UAE, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt launched a political and economic blockade against Qatar in 2017, in which Qatar's support to the Muslim Brotherhood movement was cited as one of the main reasons. In

the following period, Qatar maintained its support for the Muslim Brotherhood while the UAE also continued to oppose the movement. Although the blockade came to an end as a result of other regional and global developments at the beginning of 2021, the diverging policies of Qatar and the UAE against the Muslim Brotherhood have continued.

Finally, as this study reveals, although the UAE and Qatar have similar power projections, capacities, and common cultural values, their policies toward the Muslim Brotherhood differ significantly. The most important reason for this divergence is that while the UAE considers the MB as a threat, the movement constitutes an important foreign policy instrument for Qatar. Moreover, while the Qatari leadership has been loyal to the historical contributions of the Muslim Brotherhood in the construction of the Qatari state, the Emirati leadership pursued political interests at the expense of its once friendly relations with the MB.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

The "New Normal" in China's Assertive Power Projection in the South China Sea: Maritime Hybrid Threats

Çin'in Güney Çin Denizi'nde Uyguladığı Israrcı Güç Projeksiyonuyla Ortaya Çıkan "Yeni Normal": Denizdeki Hibrid Tehditler

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Abstract
The People's Republic of China's (PRC) assertive power projection in the South China Sea (SCS) and its consequences in the form of hybrid threats have increasingly become an accepted reality of the region. China has gradually constructed this "new normal" or "fait accompli" under the framework of its assertive policies which have generated geostrategic repercussions both in the regional and global landscape. Despite the fact that most of the recent studies particularly address China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or regional politics, a holistic assessment of China's assertive behavior requires a concentrated focus on China's employment of maritime hybrid instruments in the service of its declarative, demonstrative and coercive actions. Rather than engaging in open military confrontation in the SCS dispute, China skillfully synchronizes the military, political, economic, cyber and information sources of power in different operational domains to influence, intimidate and coerce the competing claimants. Furthermore, with a structural approach, the impact of China's employment of assertive maritime hybrid instruments go beyond regional level to have possible repercussions on the future of global-level power shifts. The current conditions of China's growing material power, its will to use hybrid instruments, and increasing vulnerabilities and lack of a coordinated response seem to reinforce a breeding ground for future assertiveness and a possible shift in the balance of power. However, in the long-term it would not be surprising to see stiffened counter efforts to disrupt its initiatives on a global landscape. Therefore, this study aims to shed light on the context and cumulative effects of China's assertive employment of maritime hybrid instruments while discussing increasing international concerns on the altering dynamics of balance of power.

Keywords
China's Assertiveness, Maritime Hybrid Threats, Little Blue Men, Underwater Cable Strategy, Maritime Security

Öz
Çin'in Güney Çin Denizi'nde (GÇD) uyguladığı ısrarcı güç projeksiyonu ve ortaya çıkardığı hibrid tehditler bölgenin "yeni normali" haline gelmekte ve gerek bölgesel, gerekse küresel anlamda önemli jeostratejik sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Halihazırda literatürdeki pekçok çalışma Çin'in Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Projesi'ne odaklanmaktaysa da Çin'in ısrarcı politikalarının bütüncül bir şekilde değerlendirilebilmesi için sözkonusu devletin deniz alanında bildirimsel, ortaya koyucu ve zorlayıcı nitelikte kullandığı hibrid enstrümanların tartışılması gerekmektedir. GÇD'de açık bir askeri çatışmaya girmekten kaçınan Çin'in askeri, siyasi, ekonomik, siber ve bilgi kaynaklı güç enstrümanlarını kullanarak farklı operasyonel alanlar üzerinden rakiplerini etkilemeye, sindirmeye ve zorlamaya çalıştığı görülmektedir. Çin'in büyüyen gücü ve hibrid enstrümanları uygulama iradesine karşılık artan kırılganlıklar ile koordineli karşılık verilmesi eksikliği önümüzdeki dönemde söz konusu gücün daha fazla ısrarcı politikalar uygulamasına ve güç dengesinde bir kayma yaşanmasına zemin hazırlayabilecektir. Diğer taraftan, küresel düzlemde uzun dönemli düşünüldüğünde, Çin'in politika uygulamalarının önüne geçilebilmesi kapsamında sertleşen karşı politikaları görmek sürpriz olmayacaktır. Tüm bu unsurlar ışığında bu çalışma, Çin'in ısrarcı güç projeksiyonunu bütüncül bir şekilde analiz etmek amacıyla hibrid deniz enstrümanlarının içeriğine ve kümülatif etkilerine ışık tutmakta ve güç dengelerinin olası değişimi kapsamında yükselen uluslarası endişeleri tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler
Çin'in Israrcı Politika Uygulamaları, Deniz Alanında Hibrid Tehditler, Küçük Mavi Adamlar, Sualtı Kablo Stratejisi, Deniz Güvenliği

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Introduction

In recent years, hybrid threats have increasingly become a significant element of global security environment. While unpredictability and fusion of instruments become buzzwords for the transforming security environment, hybrid threats offer the perpetrator a wide spectrum of opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities and chance of synchronization among variety of instruments of power. Understanding the dynamics and the utility of hybrid threats under the context of states foreign policy issues requires a deeper perspective on variety of cases to be able to capture the scope and the prospects of diverse hybrid components. In that regard, China's employment of maritime hybrid instruments under the fabric of declarative, demonstrative and coercive actions deserve an in-depth research to be able to discuss on the implications of China's assertive power projection in the region. Since China's employment of hybrid instruments systematically alter the regional dynamics as well as reshape the "new normal" in the maritime periphery, then security calculations need to recognize the patterns and the cumulative effects of hybrid instruments on a regional and global politics.

Security analyst Frank Hoffman characterizes hybrid threats as those "simultaneously and adaptively employ a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battlespace to obtain desired political objectives" (Hoffman, 2009). In parallel to growing uncertainty of the geography of the battlespace, growing number of cases reveal the rise of hybrid threats in a proliferating number of areas that ranges from critical undersea infrastructure to cyber campaigns. The utility of diverse elements of hybrid campaigns allows states to stay below the threshold of open military conflict as well as to minimize external interference. Particularly, external interference is a controversial issue on the face of rising Chinese power both in the regional and global context where as the course of the SCS dispute represents a critical hotspot to contain China in the region. In fact, China's employment of hybrid instruments to thwart external interference do not necessarily seem surprising given the debates of a peaceful rise or dissatisfied-revolutionary power on the projects and ambitions of China. Obviously, China's structuring of hybrid instruments in a historical process and their systematic conduct through the codes of coercive gradualism render it more interesting to be able to gain new insights on the SCS dispute.

While most of the recent studies in the literature particularly focus on China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or regional politics regarding the SCS dispute, the utility of maritime hybrid instruments in the service of China's declarative, demonstrative and coercive actions under its assertive behavior fall short of a comprehensive analysis. Since the BRI represents one side of the China's assertive power projection[1] with incentives and challenges on a global and regional scale, the utilization of hybrid instruments in the maritime theatre depicts the other side of the picture. Therefore, a meaningful assessment of China's imprecise policy framework under the features of an assertive behavior requires a systematic study on the underlying dynamics of its diversified policy instruments that

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1   The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) component of the China's BRI project has generated discussions on the issues of the future of China's growing maritime economy and port investments in the region. Amid the rising concerns on the regional security, some have argued that BRI can take form of a predatory economics through unsustainable debt levels where as China's port investments may turn into a forward military base for its growing blue-water navy (Gerstel, 2018, p.12; Gong, 2020, p.41).

serve to strengthen its growing clout. In this regard, this study seeks to present a holistic assessment of China's assertive policy conduct with a special focus on the utilization of maritime hybrid instruments.

The Chinese Case

The rising power of the region China considers SCS among its "core national interests"[2] and employs hybrid maritime means to advance its security objectives in the region. In parallel to its growing position in the international arena, China's presence and assertive actions accelerate and its strategic instruments diversify in the SCS. China strives to maximize its power with an assertive conduct and hence employs hybrid maritime means which go beyond the routine statecraft instruments yet designed to stay below the elements associated with direct military conflict.

Under the imprecise label of assertiveness, it is possible to read China's actions both in its search for security in the region and quest for global power competition. While defensive realists evaluate China's maximization of power in its search for security in the region, offensive realists concentrate on China's pursuit of a hegemony position in the region which can have geostrategic repercussions on a global scale in the long run. Under the perspective of offensive realists' historical claim which holds the narrative that rising power usually transforms into a revisionist power (as in the previous cases of Japan and Nazi Germany) (Bjällstrand, 2014, p.8), China's maximization and utilization of different power instruments can be expected to serve for a shift in the balance of power. In this vein, China's policy implications have crucially echoed in the US to generate Rebalance Strategy to Asia under the term of former President Barack Obama. With a view to undermine China's potential regional hegemony, the US pledged to "play a larger and long-term role in shaping the region and its future" (The White House, 2011) under this strategy. During his presidency, Barack Obama concentrated on shoring up relations with the SCS disputants and followed a tougher line against China to contain the rising power on the SCS area (Sevastopulo, Dyer, & Mitchell, 2016). While Obama's successor President Trump has built his fluctuating policy on the aspects of preventing China from establishing new, illiberal spheres of influence (Dahiya, 2021), this policy seems to be stiffened by the current President Biden who ensured that the US will prevent China to become the most powerful country in the world (Renshaw, Shalal, & Martina, 2021). Since the US has signalized its aim to secure its global dominant position by countering the challenges in the region, then it will not be wrong to claim that a longstanding and unresolved SCS dispute under the threat of external intervention will be instrumental to tame the rising China. By acknowledging this challenge of global power competition, Chinese leadership strives hard to remain below the threshold of open military conflict and opts for a third way to ensure incremental gains in the SCS dispute. Within this competition analysts will notice that China is not the sole power who employs hybrid instruments in its strategic calculus. Despite the fact that big powers such as Russia and the US also utilize hybrid instruments to pursue a set of national objectives, this study presents a focused case study analysis of China's policies to discuss on the employment of maritime hybrid instruments as a conventional national asset in its assertive power projection.

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2   In some of the semi-official declarations by the Chinese policymakers, the SCS issues are evaluated among the "core national interests", together with Tibet and Taiwan issues (Casarini, 2017).

According to Fravel (2011), a state can pursue cooperation, escalation or delay to manage its claims in a territorial dispute. In the Chinese case, the conduct of delaying strategy involves active policy implications which go beyond maintaining existing claims to gradually expand its maritime territories in the region without engaging in open military conflict. In this gray-zone, China considers the SCS dispute on a bilateral basis both to avoid external interference and to limit the ability of the claimants to respond. Rather than directly confronting the adversaries on the conventional military conflict, China maintains an assertive behavior through the employment of declarative and demonstrative actions whereas its coercive moves manifest a greater degree of gradual steps to reinforce its interests in the region. In that vein, China's graduated use of diverse instruments of scientific surveys, land reclamation projects, little blue men, cyber instruments and underwater cable strategy imply crucial security, sovereignty, economic and political repercussions for the claimant states which have significant vulnerabilities and insufficient means to counter integrated Chinese policy in the absence of a coherent and coordinated efforts among themselves.

Scientific Surveys and Land Reclamation Projects

China has undertaken substantial actions to increase its civilian presence and military infrastructure construction in the SCS. As a manifestation of its demonstrative actions, it has initiated scientific surveys together with intensified patrolling activities on the maritime areas which constantly expanded beyond disputed islands to encompass larger maritime spaces with huge sea resources. China's growing ambition and capacity to unilaterally administer the disputed areas in the SCS is also crystallized in its substantial program of land reclamation in the Spratly archipelago in the last decade.

From the 1970's on China's declarative actions in the form of official statements for sovereignty claims and its increasing number of scientific surveys that expand beyond the Paracel Archipelago Sea Area as demonstrative actions have become a significant feature of its assertive behavior in the region (Fravel, 2011, p.293; Chubb, 2021, p.102). While China constantly expanded its areas of scientific surveys and patrolling activities, it still did not refrain from using force such as in the cases of Paracel (1974) and Spratly Islands (1988) against the Vietnamese forces in the SCS. However, after the clashes, China turned back to its delaying strategy and continued to focus on consolidating its position in the area. In that respect, it is possible to claim that under the framework of its delaying strategy, China continued to conduct its assertive and expansionary policies through the pursuit of coercive gradualism which involves the utilization of coercive instruments in a synchronized and integrated fashion to advance its position by incremental steps (Pierce, Douds, & Marra, 2015, p.51). In that vein, China has gradually and incrementally synchronized the instruments of scientific surveys and land reclamation projects with the coercive instruments of power to alter the status quo in the region. While China does not refrain from resorting to coercive actions such as cutting of cables of Vietnamese oil survey ship which is claimed to be located within the Vietnamese EEZ (BBC News, 2011), its verbal assertion that labels its action as "completely justified" (Watts, 2011) clearly demonstrates its determination to impose punishment in cases of controversies. It is possible to claim that China's assertiveness privileges coercive instruments, as it is also seen in the maritime militia, that are designed to deter disputants from taking action and to thwart other claimants' presence in the region.

Amid the maritime disputes in the SCS, China's actions in the region have been evaluated as an example of hybrid threats by a variety of sources such as the European Parliament (EP) briefing (2015). According to the briefing, China utilizes its economic and military pressure and combines it with the land reclamation projects in the Spratly in pursuit of its strategic objectives in the region. Since China historically preferred to prevent the SCS disputes from being considered as a multilateral issue and evaluates it under the framework of bilateral relations with the claimants[3], EP's consideration of China's moves under the framework of hybrid threats can be viewed from a degree of anxiety and suspicion its actions have generated in the international arena and as a signal of possible pressure China can face in the long run.

The land reclamation projects in the Spratly serves to strengthen China's grip in the SCS without open military confrontation with the other claimants. It is possible to claim that by using cabbage strategy as it is codified in the geopolitical lexicon, it encircles the area, blocks the entry or exit of any other country's forces and converts the area into a military base. China has also employed the cabbage strategy against the Philippines to prevent it from strengthening its military infrastructure on Thitu Island. China has deployed swarming fleets of fishing vessels, which will be discussed in more detail under the section of "little blue men", around Thitu Island to intimidate troops and to deny access to the disputed areas (Chorn & Sato, 2019). While the utilization of these non-conventional tactics gradually increase China's power in the name of its security and national interest, they inevitably raise tension due to growing concerns on the regional dynamics and the possibility of a system-level shift in the global balance of power. Since avoiding military conflict does not constitute the only determinant factor in the disputes, then unacceptable Chinese hybrid tactics can serve to reinforce future options to balance China's efforts on a global level.

The Little Blue Men

As it is also illustrated in the Thitu Island case, China uses number of instruments that range from military buildup in the artificial islands to the employment of its maritime militias known as "little blue men" in the maritime theatre to enforce its maximalist claims in the region. According to the US Department of Defense's (2018) Annual Report to Congress, People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) forms one of the paramilitary forces of Chinese military leadership that encompasses the reserve forces of civilians available for mobilization.

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3   In 2002, China and ASEAN countries have agreed upon confidence-building measures in the non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DoC). However, due to China's will to settle issues bilaterally and existing differences between the parties, little progress has been reached to realize the DoC (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.).

THEATER COMMANDS	SERVICES & SUPPORT FORCES	SCHOOLS	PARAMILITARY FORCES	
Eastern Theater	PLA Army	Academy of Military Science	People's Armed Police	People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia*
Southern Theater	PLA Navy	National Defense University	China Coast Guard	*These forces can fall under both civilian and PLA command.
Western Theater	PLA Air Force	National University of Defense Technology		
Northern Theater	PLA Rocket Force			
Central Theater	PLA Strategic Support Force			
	PLA Joint Logistics Support Force			

Table. Part of the China's Military Leadership
Source: US Department of Defense (2018)

China's armed forces includes three major units with maritime subcomponents. While the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)) stands as the world's largest navy, the People's Armed Police increasingly leads the China's Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) forces that includes China Coast Guard; and the Militia involves PAFMM which acts as a Third Sea Force[4] (Erickson, 2017a). China's militia encompasses an armed mass organization of mobilizable personnel who both support China's armed forces in its operational role and continue their daily economic activities in their civilian life. The militia organization has been formed at grassroots level of Chinese society since units are organized at towns, villages, urban sub-districts and enterprises[5] (Erickson & Kennedy, 2016, p.1). Historically, grassroots type organization was influential both in the political mobilization of society in maritime domain and in responding to emergencies across the sea (Erickson & Kennedy, 2016, p.4). Therefore, despite the recent discussions on the instruments of hybrid threats in the maritime security environment, the PAFMM, has a long history dating back to the Cold War period which is deeply rooted on the basis of grassroots organization. So, since its long history prove the extent of its institutional structure, then it becomes a necessity to grasp the historical development of the PAFMM to be able to understand the scope of the Chinese maritime hybrid instruments more clearly today.

The establishment of the PAFMM can be read in parallel to the foundation of the PRC in 1949. After that time with a view to consolidate its power and to defend the coastal waters from the nationalist forces that have retreated to Taiwan and other coastal islands, the PRC have transformed fisherman and nautical laborers into a national maritime militia. In addition to the nationalist threat which has employed an irregular warfare at sea, other factors such as the collectivization of coastal fisheries and the influence of "Young School" understanding that emphasizes coastal defense with light and inexpensive vessels and weapons that will shoo away the naval powers, also contributed to the formation and the development of Chinese maritime militia (Holmes, 2018).

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4   As it is mentioned in the China Maritime Report, the militia is not technically a direct subcomponent of the PLA. Under this ambiguity, China keeps a third sea force that is subject to the command of PLA but under low profile with a freedom to enjoy civilian liberties (Kennedy & Erickson, 2017).

5   China's militia includes two major subcomponents of an "ordinary" reserve force and a "primary" force. Maritime militia units take place within the primary force, and in support of China's navy and coast guard efforts growing number of elite units are trained and deployed on operations which encompass the tasks of monitoring, displaying presence in front of, or opposing foreign actors (Erickson & Kennedy, 2015).

Throughout the institutionalization process of the maritime militia, the Chinese Communist Party has promoted a state-level funding and the Bureau of Aquatic Products has played an active role in the organization of local fisheries, identification of critical targets and formulation of fishing policy (Grossman, 2020). In its transformation to a coherent national force, the presence of former PLAN officers in the Bureau of Aquatic Products proved to be vital in military training and carrying out the operations in the PRC coastal waters. Especially from the 1970's on, the maritime militia proved to be influential at "people's war at sea" by significantly contributing to the Battle of Paracel Islands and supporting the operations of the Chinese Coast Guard (Jahangir, 2020).

It is possible to claim that the geostrategic and economic dynamics of the region have also contributed to the increasing usage of hybrid instruments as part of a Chinese campaign of safeguarding its national interests at sea. While the marine resources of the region highly contribute to Chinese food market and its export figures, the SCS stands as a critical gateway for trade and energy transportation worth of 30 percentage of global maritime oil trade and $4.8 trillion of international trade passing through the area each year (Wood, 2020). With its unlimited sea resources and busiest maritime sea lanes in the world, SCS offers profound advantages especially on the themes of Chinese economic growth, access to critical waterways and the strategic leverage at both regional and global power struggle with the US. Therefore, the economic and geo-strategic factors highlight the vitality of the maritime area and the incentives for the Chinese leadership to dominate it.

Under this framework, China has accelerated the usage and institutionalization of hybrid instruments through the development of joint military-civilian land and sea border management system (Information Office of the State Council, 2000). As it is reflected in its Defense Paper in 2000, China has especially underlined the significance of sharing of responsibilities between the military and civilian authorities for its frontier defense. This vision is further reinforced both through the introduction of Military-Civilian Fusion concept as one of the key ambitions of Chinese strategic thinking (Jash, 2020, p.44), and realization of an increasingly routine role of the maritime militia in its support for maritime sovereignty enforcement in the following years. With respect to the 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020) which emphasizes the significance of integrating military and civilian development as well as giving priority to the mobilization of forces for maritime operations, it is not a surprise to see that that the number of maritime militia has significantly grown in proportion to outdated infantry militia units (Erickson, 2017b).

According to the Article 36 of the China Military Service Law (1984) which is revised in 1988, PAFMM is not a part of Chinese maritime law enforcement but a military auxiliary. However, since the functions of the PAFMM go beyond surveillance, maritime transportation, search and rescue to involve enforcement of China's sovereignty claims, then the role of PAFMM becomes more critical under China's assertive policies (Luo & Panter, 2021, p. 12). Through its advanced electronic equipments that encompass communication systems, satellite navigation and radar, maritime militia supplements the critical PLAN structure, gathers maritime intelligence and provides logistic support to Chinese warships (Kraska & Monti, 2015). PAFMM's transforming structure turns into one of the most significant components of the Chinese strategy of coercive gradualism in

exerting its interests over the region. In this regard, PAFMM's fishing fleet is undertaking a wide spectrum of tasks to include intimidating other claimants, enforcing China's unilateral fishing ban, harassing foreign fishermen in their traditional fishing grounds and playing a significant role in kinetic engagements (Bhatia, 2018, p.25). The maritime militia is used to challenge foreign coast guard and navies which is vividly seen in the high-profile coercive tasks of the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009, the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012 and the blockade of Second Thomas Shoal in 2014 (Nguyen & Thanh, 2019).

What is striking in the Chinese case is that, under the framework of a long-term state policy, Chinese decision-makers have developed an organizational structure which is entitled to use hybrid instruments with a sovereignty-support function. Despite the fact that the organization has a long way to reach a high level of coordination and interoperability (Luo & Panter, 2021, p. 15), present picture still shows the extent of a world's largest fishing fleet with an institutional structure that has been formed as a result of a determined and assertive state policy. Chinese development of the civilian elements as the vital parts of its hybrid maritime instruments not only reflects its patient and permanent strategic thinking but also recalls the understanding of Sun Tzu's strategy of defeating the enemy without fighting. Since fishing boats shall be protected according to the regulation under the law of naval warfare (Korkmaz, 2020), China avoids risk of involving in an open confrontation with other territorial stakeholders under the umbrella of civilian structures. Therefore, while the little blue men significantly contribute to China's power projection in the region on the one hand, its assertive presence and aggressive actions can be increasingly seen as destabilizing and provocative under the context of regional security on the other hand.

Cyber Instruments

The Chinese case of assertiveness covers diverse elements of policy instruments across the spectrum of military, political, economic, cyber and information sources of power. China orchestrates variety of policy assets under different operational domains to maximize its power while significantly generating geostrategic repercussions in the maritime theatre. In this regard, cyber domain occupies a significant place in its coercive actions to disrupt critical infrastructure and to influence range of events in the SCS dispute. Chinese coercive efforts to establish Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zones in the SCS increasingly manifest an emphasis on the utilization of cyber means to disrupt communications and GPS localization in times of conflict (Baezner, 2018, p.4). In addition to this, variety of reports indicate an increasing usage of cyber kits by the Chinese groups to target government or private institutions that are linked to the SCS issue. While the cyber domain provides the opportunities of difficulty of attribution for the perpetrators, increasing number of reports and claims against Chinese cyber groups reveal the seriousness of the situation and intensifying complaints on Chinese aggression.

According to the Cyber Power National Index 2020, China has ranked as the second "Most Comprehensive Cyber Power" after the US (Voo, et.al.). China is listed among the high-ranking countries with its high levels of both capability and intent (China has especially achieved the highest score for intent) to use cyber power to achieve its

national objectives (Voo, et.al., p.14). Cyber power constitutes one of the most significant components of national capability and as it is also mentioned in the report, state-backed cyber actors are becoming one of the greatest threats to national security (Voo, et.al., p.IV). Since operational domains increasingly become interconnected and interdependent, numerous examples show the extent Chinese groups - which are thought to be state-sponsored- embark on cyber attack campaigns to serve for China's maritime claims in the SCS.

Cyber instruments are increasingly forming the crucial part of Chinese assertiveness in the SCS. With an integrated manner, while China utilizes a militia of fishermen in the physical domain, it capitalizes on sophisticated cyber groups in the cyber domain to sustain different range of campaigns to support its ambitions. According to the FireEye Report 2015, territorial disputes in the SCS stand as one of the most significant determinants in the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors' actions in the region. According to the Report, in times of growing tensions in the region APT actors intensify their actions and concentrate on targeting governments and militaries with spear-phishing emails and malware to steal intelligence especially on the strategic issues of the SCS disputes (p.12). In another report by the Centre for Security Studies, increasing frequency of malicious cyber activities with respect to territorial disputes in the SCS is examined and it is stressed that while numerous regional actors such as Vietnamese with significant capabilities and influence are involved in cyber-activities, the majority of actors originate from China (Baezner, 2018, p.4). Among the prominent APT examples, Chinese cyber group *APT40*'s targeted attacks on shipbuilding, maritime, and engineering entities, as well as government and academic institutions within countries bordering the SCS (Hlavek, 2020) and the usage of spear-phishing emails by the *Numbered Panda*, which is believed to be linked with PLA, with an aim to spy on journalists, officials and defense industries in the region can be given (Baezner, 2018, p.8).

The impacts of cyber attacks are not limited to economic or intelligence assets only but rather go beyond to reach society in a broader scale to render hybrid campaigns to be more multi-dimensional and influential. It is a question of issue that whether there should be a definite time period for hybrid campaigns but given the conditions of long-lasting disputes, hybrid campaigns can continue in parallel to ongoing disputes by integrating various aspects of military, economic, technical and social impacts. In that respect, the social effects of cyber attacks in response to increasing tension or part of ongoing disputes also need to be considered among the repercussions of the maritime hybrid campaigns. For instance, the Cyber Report has highlighted the emerging cyber pattern in terms of a retaliatory move on the basis of maritime clashes, since the denial of access to an area to fishermen has triggered website defacement and DDoS attacks by the patriotic hacker groups. While the attacks by hacker groups solidify tensions in the region, their aims include defending national interest, ridiculing the opponent, weakening trust on government and generating fear in the targeted society (Baezner, 2018, p.12-13).

Quest for Underwater Domination

The underwater domain of the world oceans and seas becomes more important through the increasing dependencies on seabed hydrocarbon resources, rare earth metals and the

critical function of the underwater cable systems and pipelines. Undersea cables play a vital role in transmission of internet, data and telephone traffic since 400 of them carry %98 of international data and telephone traffic globally (Fouquet, 2021). In that respect, underwater cable systems can become an issue of hybrid maritime campaigns since any disruption in the underwater cable systems can trigger greater risks and threats both in maritime and other domains.

With a view to gain an upper hand in this strategic area, China has accelerated its efforts to install and use undersea cables in the SCS. Since fiber optic cables are faster and stable as compared to satellite systems, Chinese 4G fibre-optic cable stations replaced satellite stations in the Spratyl Islands with a view to consolidate Chinese control and capabilities in the region (Huang, 2017). The strategic role of the underwater cable systems is not only limited to the SCS region but goes further to strengthen the impact of the BRI at a more global level (Kania, 2016). In that respect, China's Digital Silk Road (DSR) stands as one of the most critical objectives of the BRI. With a view to connect Belt and Road countries, China's 7500 mile undersea "PEACE Cable", which is expected to reach Marseille in the last quarter of 2021 also symbolizes the extent of Chinese future-oriented efforts and ambitions on the issue of underwater sea cables (Fouquet, 2021). While most of the underwater cables owned by the US companies today, the pace and the scope of the Chinese companies can challenge US dominance in the future since China's share in the underwater cable system is expected to rise from %11.4 in 2019 to %20 between the years 2025-2030 (Fouquet, 2021). Since a Chinese officer has characterized undersea cable as a battlefield where information can be obtained (Starks, 2020), then Chinese digital attempts increasingly become an issue of concern under the topics of sabotage, surveillance and espionage activities. Especially the US draws attention to the risks of espionage activities that can be carried out by the Chinese enterprises which supply sensitive communication equipments. As one of a consequence of growing concerns with regard to Chinese companies, the Pacific island of Nauru has rejected Chinese proposals for construction of undersea cables mostly on the basis of security concerns (Barrett, 2021).

Map. Peace Cable
Source: Telegeography (2021)

Underwater cables can become a target for not only an espionage or surveillance activities but they can also be attacked with an intention to disrupt the flow of information. Despite the huge transformation in the nature of communication technologies, it is possible to see examples of attacks against communication infrastructures within a history. For instance, during the First World War after declaring war on Germany, Britain has cut German undersea telegraph cables except the one that was under its own control (Ghiasy & Krishnamurthy, 2020, p.8). Today, despite their growing significance, underwater sea cables are largely owned by the private companies and they are vulnerable to attacks even by the unsophisticated vessels and equipments. In that vein, Taiwan argues on the issue of cable insecurity with a focus on the scenarios that include the consequences of Chinese damaging or corrupting the underwater cables (Everington, 2019).

Given the anxiety about China's underwater actions and projects, it will not be wrong to claim that its underwater cable strategy is evaluated under the threat of its coercive actions especially by the other claimants in the SCS dispute. Due to China's assertive conduct and increasing range of demonstrative and coercive actions in the region, its underwater cable initiatives are perceived under the options of coercive strategies which can involve the options to block or interfere with the transmission of information in times of crisis to punish the adversaries.

Responses to Chinese Assertiveness

China skillfully synchronizes the military, political, economic, cyber and information sources of power in different operational domains to influence, intimidate and coerce the claimants in the SCS disputes while remaining below the threshold of military escalation. In response to Chinese assertiveness in the SCS, claimants both utilize national assets and engage in increasing degree of cooperation with powerful states in the region to balance and to counter Chinese assertiveness which nevertheless seem insufficient to prevent China's assertive actions in the region.

The neighboring states of the SCS employ variety of administrative, legal and operational means to thwart Chinese expansion and to protect their national interests in the region. The spectrum of responses include but not limited to Malaysia's approach to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by claiming waters beyond the 200-kilometer limit of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the northern part of the SCS to ward off China's extension to Luconia Shoals (Singh, 2020). Indonesia has deployed warships and a submarine in the waters off the Natuna Islands to counter encroachment by the Chinese fishing vessels and coast guard ships. In response to the incident in which the Chinese ship has rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing vessel, Vietnam has sent a diplomatic note to the UN to protest China (Singh, 2020). As it is seen in various cases and especially in the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the Philippines and China, China disregards the protests of claimants or simply rejects the PCA ruling, which was in favor of the Philippines, given the fact that the international response is not coherent and sufficient enough to pressure China to scale back its expansion (Bhatia, 2018, p.26).

Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia have taken collective diplomatic action under the ASEAN in 2020 to recognize the UN Convention on the Law of the

SEA (UNCLOS) as the basis for resolving disputes and these states continue to hold multilateral joint exercises and receive security assistance from the US against the Chinese assertiveness (Burgess, 2020). However, since they feared the uncoordinated US effort might provoke China into escalation beyond their ability to control, they refrain from deepening the relations with the US and continue to take individual steps to counter Chinese maneuvers (Chang, 2021). In that framework, despite growing Chinese assertiveness and the anxiety it creates in the region, it is still not possible to talk about a unity among the ASEAN countries or a firm, persistent stand by the regional countries.

Due to the factors such as vulnerabilities in economic and cyber domains, China's increasing military and economic power and the impact of the last COVID-19 epidemic, the efforts of the claimants fall short of effectively responding to Chinese actions. On the issue of cyber security since there is no coordinated effort put in place by the ASEAN, the region continues to remain vulnerable to cyber attacks by the Chinese hackers (Jamal, 2020). In economic terms, while China has strengthened its relationships with Cambodia and Laos through the BRI, it has achieved a highest growth rate of %13 in trade with the ASEAN countries between the years 2005-2015 (Das, 2017). Since China has become one of the most significant players in the exports and tourism sector of the ASEAN countries, the degree of dependencies between claimants and China has elevated to a strategic issue of concern in the SCS dispute. Having these economic vulnerabilities in mind, China did not refrain to utilize this asset in its SCS policy and sent coercive messages both to the claimants such as Vietnam and the foreign investors on military and economic terms to dissuade oil drilling projects in the SCS region (Kuok, 2019, p.6). In addition to this, the approach by the West toward the internal affairs of the regional countries is influential in their delicate policy toward China. The examples include West's approach toward Thailand regarding its military coup in 2014 and Myanmar on the issue of its Rohingya minority and military coup in 2021 (Chang, 2021). As it is seen in these policy actions, in parallel to China's growing power and diversification of its instruments, increasing vulnerabilities of claimants prevent them to formulate coherent and determined policy responses against China which in turn further contribute to increasing assertiveness of this rising power. In the absence of a serious response, this vicious circle seems to encourage China more to utilize hybrid instruments to reinforce its assertiveness in the region.

Despite the lack of a credible multilateral response against Chinese assertiveness in the SCS region, imprecise Chinese power still cannot escape from the rising concerns on the content and the scope of its ambitions. In this regard, China's launch of a Smile Diplomacy proved insufficient to convince international community on the benign and peaceful nature of its power due to the factors of China's reluctance to finalize the Code of Conduct, disregards for international norms and the rising concerns on the implications of its hybrid instruments. In addition to the concerns of the US and the SCS claimants, the European External Action Service of the EU has labeled China as a 'systemic rival' in its 2020 Fact Sheet by placing a special emphasis on a shift from economic partnership. As a result of this shift in approach, the general trend can entail the need to define red lines and to actively cooperate against the Chinese policy options to be able to protect the status quo in a global power competition.

Conclusion

In an interdependent and complex security framework, hybrid threats increasingly become a feature of maritime operational domain through a synchronization of variety of instruments. With many stakeholders from different operational domains and few clearly drawn boundaries, maritime domain has become a theatre of clandestine hybrid campaigns that have targeted to exploit the vulnerabilities as well as to dismantle the ability of the opponent. As a theatre of disputed maritime operations, the SCS region becomes a critical hot-spot both through conflicting territorial claims and employment of maritime hybrid instruments. In this respect, China's actions both in the SCS and in a broader maritime theatre draw international attention due to its intensified assertiveness that encompass the instruments of hybrid campaigns.

China successfully orchestrates military, political, economic, cyber and information sources of power in different operational domains with a view to pursue its national interests in the SCS geography. In that vein, while China continues to enrich its land reclamation projects in the Spratly to realize its sovereignty claims, its maritime militia strengthen its structure and facilities to carry out the mission of sovereignty enforcement. Especially in times of maritime disputes, cyber domain increasingly becomes a theatre of operations for the Chinese groups to target government or private institutions that are linked to the SCS issues. However, since China assertively employs variety of hybrid instruments to prosecute its power in the SCS, its broader projects such as underwater cable construction initiatives cannot escape from being perceived as a potential Chinese national asset that can be coercively utilized in the future hybrid campaigns.

Under the fog of ambiguities regarding the characteristics of maritime hybrid threats, the definition of Chinese hybrid instruments and maneuvers seem to be remained as a matter of concern on the international security environment. In this gray-zone, it is also the fact that China's long-lasting trend of assertiveness and disregard for the disputants' protests seem to be encouraged by the lack of a coordinated response and increasing vulnerabilities among the claimants of the SCS. However, while China's new normal or fait accompli can serve for its security in the region, the reaction it creates under the concern of altering dynamics of balance of power can produce a more coordinated and efficient response on a global level in the long-run. Therefore, since the factors of China's increasing military and economic power, claimants vulnerabilities in economic and cyber domains, the lack of a precise definition and understanding on hybrid threats and instruments can serve to maximize China's assertive power projection at the first hand, the system-level concerns on a global landscape can serve to operationalize counter efforts to disrupt Chinese initiatives at the last stage.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

A Reassessment of the Turkish Party System

Türk Parti Sistemi Üzerine Bir Yeniden Değerlendirme

Mustafa Bölükbaşı[1]

Abstract

Modern political institutions have a long history in Turkey but because of limited competition until 1945 and military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, the party system has not developed consistently. Moreover, the electoral system, particularly the 10% electoral threshold applied after 1980, directly affected the Turkish party system. Having been interrupted by non-democratic forces and attempted to be formed via political engineering, the development of Turkish political parties and party systems has not been linear. In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the Turkish party system. However, since most studies were based on inadequate empirical data and limited to the 1990s and the 2000s, they have generally focused on the predominant party system and failed to critically review discussions on party systems. This paper analyzes Turkish party systems from 1950 to the present using the quantitative method. Adopting the criteria of the number of relevant parties and their relative strengths, this study applies different indicators such as the effective number of parties and fragmentation. This paper argues that Turkey has experienced four main different forms of party systems since 1950: a two-party system (1950-1960 and 2002), a two and a half party system (1960-1980), a moderate multiparty system with a balance among parties (1991-1999), and a moderate multiparty system with one dominant party (1983-1987, and 2007-2018).

Keywords

Party systems, Political parties, Turkish party system, the effective number of parties, the typologies of party systems

Öz

Türkiye'de modern siyasi kurumların geçmişi eskidir ancak 1945'e kadar olan sınırlı rekabet ve 1960, 1971, 1980 ve 1997'deki askeri müdahaleler nedeniyle parti sistemi istikrarlı bir şekilde gelişememiştir. Ayrıca seçim sistemi, özellikle 1980 sonrasında uygulanan %10'luk seçim barajı, Türk parti sistemini doğrudan etkilemiştir. Demokratik olmayan güçler tarafından kesintiye uğratılan ve siyasi mühendislik ile oluşturulmaya çalışılan Türk siyasi partilerinin ve parti sisteminin gelişimi doğrusal olmamıştır. Son yıllarda, Türk parti sistemi üzerine artan sayıda bir literatür bulunmaktadır. Ancak, çoğu çalışma yetersiz ampirik veriye dayandığından ve 1990'lar ve 2000'lerle sınırlı olduğundan, genellikle hakim parti sistemine odaklanmış ve parti sistemlerine ilişkin tartışmaları eleştirel olarak gözden geçirememiştir. Bu makale 1950'den günümüze Türk parti sistemini nicel yöntemle analiz etmektedir. İlgili parti sayısı ve partilerin göreli büyüklükleri kriterlerini benimseyen bu çalışma, etkin parti sayısı ve parçalanma gibi farklı göstergeleri kullanmaktadır. Bu makale, Türkiye'nin 1950'den beri dört temel parti sistemi biçimini deneyimlediğini öne sürmektedir: iki partili sistem (1950-1960 ve 2002), iki buçuk partili sistem (1960-1980), partiler arasında dengenin olduğu ılımlı çok partili sistem (1991-1999) ve hakim partinin bulunduğu ılımlı çok partili sistem (1983-1987 ve 2007-2018).

Anahtar Kelimeler

Parti sistemleri, Siyasi partiler, Türk parti sistemi, Etkin parti sayısı, Parti sistemleri tipolojileri

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Introduction

Compared to many new democracies, the institutionalization of political parties in Turkey is relatively high (Özbudun, 2000, p. 73). Modern political institutions have a long history in Turkey but because of limited competition until 1945 and military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, the party system has not developed consistently.[1] To illustrate, military elites banned all political parties after the 1980 coup and ruled the country without any formal party for about three years. The Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People's Party) – the longest-lasting party in the present-day political arena and the party which has the prestige of having been formed by Atatürk – could only reopen in 1992. Moreover, the electoral system, particularly the 10% electoral threshold applied after 1980, directly affected the Turkish party system.[2] Since it was interrupted by non-democratic forces and attempted to be formed via political engineering, the development of Turkish political parties and party systems has not been linear.

In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the Turkish party system (Çarkoğlu, 1998; Özbudun, 2000; Sayarı, 2002; Sayarı, 2007; Çarkoğlu, 2011; Gümüşçü, 2013; Ayan-Musil, 2015; Sayarı, 2016; Arslantaş, Arslantaş, & Kaiser, 2020). However, since most studies were based on inadequate empirical data and limited to the 1990s and the 2000s, they have generally focused on the predominant party system and failed to critically review discussions on party systems. Although Arslantaş and Arslantaş (2020) have analyzed the Turkish party system in detail by adopting a Sartorian approach, they could not distinguish different periods and categorized the whole period between 1961 and 2002 as "polarised pluralism".

This paper examines the characteristics of the Turkish party system by making a comparison between different periods based on the number of relevant parties and their relative strengths. Relying on the data of nineteen general elections between 1950 and 2018, this paper investigates the evolution of the Turkish party system since the establishment of the multi-party system. Based on Siaroff's typology (2000), this paper argues that Turkey has experienced four main different types of party systems since 1950: a two-party system (1950-1960 and 2002), a two and a half party system (1960-1980), a moderate multiparty system with a balance among parties (1991-1999), and a moderate multiparty system with one dominant party (1983-1987, and 2007-2018).

The Typologies of Party Systems and the Effective Number of Parties

The rise of comparative political analysis from the 1950s has opened the way for debates on party systems to be developed. The simplest and perhaps the most reasonable way of classifying different party systems is to determine how many parties are effective in a particular political system. Duverger was one of the researchers who used the criterion of the number of political parties to develop typologies: two-party systems and multi-party systems. Duverger also claimed that there was a correlation between election systems and party systems. According to him, the simple majority, single ballot system leads to a two-party system, whereas a two-round majority system and proportional representation lead to a multi-party system (Duverger, 1964). This traditional classification was also used

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1   For the history of military interventions in Turkey, see, (Karpat, 1988), (Hale, 1994).

2   For electoral systems in Turkey, see, (Hale, 1980), (Cop, 2017).

for more general comparison in political science. It was assumed that two-party systems produced "stable and consensual" democracies, while multi-party systems produced "unstable and conflictual" democracies (Mair, 2002, p. 89).

The number of parties has been the basis of almost all studies on the party system since Duverger. In addition to the number of parties, other criteria have also been taken into account such as the competitiveness of opposition (Dahl, 1966), the relative size of parties (Blondel, 1968), likelihood of single-party majorities, and distribution of minority party strengths (Rokkan, 1968), the ideological distance between parties (Sartori, 2005), the degrees of institutionalization (Mainwaring, 1999) and structures of competition (Mair, 2002).

Duverger's distinction between two-party systems and multi-party systems was fundamental. Nevertheless, it failed to differentiate between different types of multi-party systems. Thus, later studies attempted to disaggregate multi-party systems. Blondel's classification based on the relative size of parties is one of the first attempts to go beyond simple counting. According to the average share of the vote two major parties won in the elections between 1945 and 1966, Blondel divides Western democracies into four groups. Two-party systems are those in which this is more than 90% and the difference of vote between two major parties is remarkably small. Systems where it is 75-80% are called three-party or two and a half party systems as they generally have one smaller party along with two major parties. Blondel also disaggregates multi-party systems. Multi-party systems with a dominant party are those in which two major parties gain about 60% of votes but one of them obtains at least 40% of the electorate and generally gains about twice as many votes as the second party. On the other hand, genuine multi-party systems do not have a dominant party and three or four parties are equally well placed to form coalitions (Blondel, 1968).

Sartori's typology, on the other hand, is based on the number of parties, but rather than counting all parties in the parliament, he counts only relevant parties. He argues that "a party qualifies for relevance whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition of the governing-oriented parties" (Sartori, 2005, p. 108). In other words, parties are relevant only if they have either *coalition* or *blackmail* potential and alter the direction of the competition (Wolinetz, 2006, p. 57). The direction of party competition is determined by the ideological distance among parties. Thus, Sartori combines the criterion of the number of relevant parties with the criterion of ideological distance among parties, which is the *sine qua non* for his attempt to disaggregate multi-party systems.

Sartori first separates systems into "one-party lump" and "multiparty lump". The first group includes one-party systems where only one party is allowed to exist, hegemonic party systems where other parties are permitted to exist only as second class, and predominant-party systems where other parties exist as legal and legitimate competitors but the same party continuously (for four consecutive legislatures at least) manages to win the absolute majority of seats in the parliament. Sartori states that "the predominant-party system actually is a more-than-one party system in which rotation does not occur in fact" (Sartori, 2005, p. 173). The multiparty lump, on the other hand, consists of two-party systems, moderate pluralism, polarized pluralism, and atomized systems. Two-

party systems are characterized by the competition between two major parties with similar strengths, having the chance to form a single-party government, and the rotation in power. Thus, the difference of seats between two major parties is the main factor to determine whether the system is predominant or two-party. Moderate (limited) pluralism contains between three and five parties, none of which attain an absolute majority of seats. The system is moderate in the sense that it lacks anti-system (extremist) parties. Consequently, there is a relatively small ideological distance among parties, and the direction of competition is centripetal. Polarized (extreme) pluralism, on the contrary, has more than five or six parties including anti-system parties. The main features of polarized pluralism are the existence of bilateral oppositions, the high ideological distance among parties, the low degree of consensus, and centrifugal competition. Compared to moderate pluralism, polarized pluralism is not only fragmented but also ideologically polarized. Finally, atomized systems are those in which the level of fragmentation reaches such a point that the number of parties makes almost no difference since no party has any noticeable effect on any other party.

With Sartori's typology, it seemed that there was nothing left to say about party systems. Political systems, however, have seen significant developments since the 1970s that provoked a reconsideration of party systems. There has been a tendency particularly in advanced democracies towards the change in the organizational structures of parties[3] (Panebianco, 1988), the decrease in partisan identification (Dalton, 2000), the growth of electoral volatility and political fragmentation (Dalton, Mcallister, & Wattenberg, 2000), the decline of party membership (Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012), the growth of green parties (Mair, 1997), the rise of populist radical right parties (Mudde, 2014), and the increase in the number of new parties (Emanuele & Chiaramonte, 2016).

Moreover, the discriminating power of Sartori's typologies has clearly been reduced because as a general phenomenon, two-party systems and polarized pluralism have shrunk while moderate pluralism has begun to take on greater prominence (Mair, 2002). While Sartori's work is one of the most influential typologies in the classification of party systems, it fails to disaggregate overloaded moderate pluralism. As the ideological distances among parties and the presence/absence of extremist parties are the main factors to determine whether the pluralism is limited or polarized, his study has little to offer for quantitative analyzes. Blondel's model of the relative size of parties, on the other hand, is very useful since it not only distinguishes different types of multiparty systems but also considers the potential balancing role within two-party systems of smaller or half parties (Wolinetz, 2006, pp. 55-6). However, one of the weaknesses of Blondel's classification is that it fails to consider the effect of electoral institutions on the disproportionality between the vote distribution and the seat distribution because it is based on vote-shares, not seat-shares. Nevertheless, as noted by Golosov (2011, p. 541) "modified versions of Blondel's taxonomy remain widespread".

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3   The organizational structures of political parties have changed over time with the universal suffrage, the diversification of working-class composition, the professionalization of political communication and the deemphasis of the *classe gardée*. The literature on political parties defines different models such as cadre party and mass party (Duverger, 1964), party of individual representation and party of democratic integration (Neumann, 1956), catch-all party (Kircheimer, 1966), cartel party (Katz & Mair, 1995), electoral-professional party (Panebianco, 1988), and business-firm party (Hopkin & Paolucci, 1999).

Siaroff's work (2000) is one of the most detailed classifications built on Blondel's typology. His classification is based on the seat-shares and the relative size of parties, but also takes into consideration the patterns of government formation (Golosov, 2011, p. 542). Siaroff (2000, p. 69) uses four quantitative measures to classify European party systems:

1) the mean number of parties with at least 3 percent of the seats (P3%S);

2) the mean two-party seat concentration (2PSC);

3) the medium seat ratio between the first and second party (SR1:2);

4) and the medium seat ratio between the second and third party (SR2:3).

Based on these criteria, Siaroff develops an eightfold classification. Along with two-party systems, he disaggregates moderate and extreme multiparty systems in detail.

Two-party systems are those in which the P3%S value is around 2 but always less than 3, the mean 2PSC is at least 95% and naturally, one party wins the majority of seats (ENPP: 1.92). Moderate multiparty systems or two-and-a-half party systems are characterized by a mean P3%S of 3 to 5, a mean 2PSC of between 80 and 95 percent, a median SR1:2 below 1.6, and a median SR2:3 of 1.8 or more (ENPP: 2.56). That is, the gap between the second and third parties is wider than the gap between the first and second parties. Consequently, one of the two largest parties tends to have the majority of seats. Moderate multiparty systems with one dominant party are those in which the mean P3%S is 3 to 5, and the median SR 1:2 is 1.6 or more (ENPP: 2.95). The dominant party is considerably stronger than the other parties and is likely to gain the majority of seats. Moderate multiparty systems with two main parties differ from those systems in that neither of the two main parties has the majority of the seats (ENPP: 3.17). Moderate multiparty systems with a balance among the parties are the systems where the mean P3%S is 3 to 5, the median SR 1:2 is below 1.6, and the median SR2:3 is below 1.8 (ENPP: 3.69). In other words, there is no big gap between the first and the third parties. Extreme multiparty systems with one dominant party are identified with a mean P3%S of more than 5, and a median SR 1:2 of 1.6 or more, which means that the dominant party is unlikely to have a majority of the seats (ENPP: 3.96). Extreme multiparty systems with two main parties are characterized by a mean P3%S of more than 5, a median SR1:2 below 1.6, and a median SR2:3 of 1.8 or more (ENPP: 4.41). These systems are also likely to have a median 2PSC of 55 to 75 percent. Lastly, extreme multiparty systems with a balance among the parties refer to a mean P3%S of more than 5, a median SR 1:2 below 1.6, and a median SR2:3 below 1.8 (ENPP: 5.56).

Despite being complicated, given the diversity of categories, Siaroff's classification is best developed (Golosov, 2011, p. 542). As noted by Wolinetz (2006, p. 58), Siaroff successfully disaggregates multi-party systems, particularly moderate pluralism. However, his eightfold classification lacks the predominant party system. Thus, Siaroff (2003) later reexamines party systems by taking into account the predominant party system and defines four main categories as follows: One-party predominant systems are those in which the median SR 1:2 is at least 1.8 and the same party permanently manages to have at least 51 percent of the seats. Two-party systems are those in which rotation occurs between two main parties which gain more than 95 percent of the seats. Multiparty

systems are those in which larger parties get less than 80 percent of seats and no party gains a dominant share. Finally, two-and-a-half-party systems are those in which larger parties win 80 to 95 percent of the seats and no party achieves the majority of the seats.

These studies reviewed here indicate that the number of parties, as well as the relative size of parties, are important in the classification of party systems. Thus, one should focus on how fragmented a parliament is to distinguish party systems because the seat distribution between parties has a direct impact on party systems, particularly on government formation. The number of parties taking into account their relative size was best calculated by the Laakso-Taagepera (1979) index. As it produces values (the effective number of parties) that can be viewed in the familiar context of the number of parties, the Laakso-Taagepera index has a great advantage (Lijphart, Bowman, & Hazan, 1999, p. 31). For example, when there are two equally strong parties, the effective number of parties (ENP) is exactly two, which means a two-party system. If one party's strength is much greater than the other, the ENP is lower than two, which indicates that it is no longer a two-party system but moving towards a predominant party system. If there is a more competitive system where multiple parties have the potential to alter the direction of the competition, the ENP is more than three. Finally, when two major parties get almost all votes but neither of them can achieve the majority of seats, the ENP is likely to be around 2.5, which means a two and a half party system. The ENP also falls close to Sartori's number of relevant parties because it represents in a sense the number of parties that have the coalition potential.

Nevertheless, the ENP is not perfect as it has difficulties detecting predominant party systems. For instance, when the seat distribution is 0.45, 0.43, 0.11, 0.1, it clearly tends to be a two and a half party system and the ENP is around 2.5 as a result. When the seat distribution is 0.6, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, it is certainly a predominant party system, but the ENP is exactly 2.5, which inaccurately indicates a two and a half party system again. To overcome this problem, Taagepera (1999) suggests a supplementary indicator (), which is the inverse of the largest share. A value of < 2 always refers to an absolute majority.

The Turkish Party System between 1950 and 2018

The history of political parties in Turkey can be traced back to the Second Constitutional Era (1908-1918) in the Ottoman Empire. That period saw the emergence of political parties established for political competition. However, the competition between parties was generally based on an intra-elite competition due to the lack of mass support (Sayarı, 2012, p. 183). Thus, parties in that era can be defined as "elite parties". Elite parties emerged in proto-democratic societies with restricted suffrage in the nineteenth century and were characterized by a small cadre of individuals with high socioeconomic status, the absence of extra-parliamentary organizations, the lack of mass support, and loose coordination between party members (Neumann, 1956; Duverger, 1964; Krouwel, 2006).

The period from the establishment of the Republic to the end of World War II (1923 – 1945) was characterized by a non-competitive regime. It was a single-party era ruled by the CHP without any oppositional party. As opposed to socialist or conservative parties in England or Germany in the early twentieth century, the CHP did not rely on a specific social class rather it was supposed to be a reflection of society's political will. The party's

conception of society was based on the corporatist idea that the society was classless, fused, and an organic whole. The CHP aimed more at building a modern nation through economic development and cultural policies than simply at representing the constituency. Therefore, when the multiparty system was adopted in 1946, the CHP could not easily get used to canvassing while the Demokrat Parti (DP, Democrat Party) was very successful at political propaganda especially on religion. The DP, which was first a faction of the CHP in the mid 1940s, came to power in 1950 and had the majority of seats for ten years.

In terms of the social origins of representatives between the CHP and the DP, there were clear differences. For example, as opposed to the CHP, the DP had fewer representatives from military/civil bureaucracy (Zürcher, 2017, p. 223). Thus, it was seen as a conflict between bureaucratic/secularist/statist forces and democratic/religious/anti-statist forces or between "the center" and "the periphery" (Mardin, 1973). Nevertheless, it was again an intra-elite competition. That is, it was far from being a political expression of the economic contradiction between social classes. Social cleavages started to play an important role only by the 1970s as a result of rapid modernization (Çarkoğlu, 1998, p. 546).

The electoral system used in Turkey in the 1950s, which was the simple majority system with party lists in multi-member districts, inevitably produced a two-party system.[4] The number of parties in parliament was three in 1950 and 1954, and four in 1957 though the average two-party vote (the DP + the CHP) was above 90%. Although "the system displayed the characteristics of the typical two-party system" (Özbudun, 2000, p. 74), the alternation in government, which is a fundamental component of the two-party system, could not be achieved. Since the electoral system produced great disproportionality, other than the DP, political parties in the parliament had no impact on policy outputs. For example, in three consecutive elections, the DP gained an average of 54% of votes but 82.6% of seats. As a consequence, the effective number of parliamentary parties during the 1950s was lower than two. Therefore, it was argued that the party system in the 1950s was somewhere between a two-party and a predominant party system (Sayarı, 2002, p. 12).

The simple majority system has never been used since the 1950s. Following the 1960 *coup d'état*, the system of proportional representation with the *d'Hondt* method was adopted and that has characterized the electoral system in Turkey. Table 1 shows the electoral systems used throughout Turkish political history since 1950.

Table 1
Electoral Systems Used in Turkey

Election	Electoral System
May 1950	the simple majority system with party list
May 1954	the simple majority system with party list
Oct. 1957	the simple majority system with party list
Oct. 1961	the proportional representation system with constituency-level threshold
Oct. 1965	the national remainder system
Oct. 1969	the proportional representation system without electoral threshold
Oct. 1973	the proportional representation system without electoral threshold

4   For the relationship between the electoral system and the party system in Turkey, see (Arslantaş, Arslantaş, & Kaiser, 2020).

Jun. 1977	the proportional representation system without electoral threshold
Nov. 1983	the proportional representation system with constituency-level threshold and 10% national threshold
Nov. 1987	the proportional representation system with quota and double electoral threshold
Oct. 1991	the proportional representation system with quota and double electoral threshold
Dec. 1995	the proportional representation system with 10% national threshold
Apr. 1999	the proportional representation system with 10% national threshold
Nov. 2002	the proportional representation system with 10% national threshold
Jul. 2007	the proportional representation system with 10% national threshold
Jun. 2011	the proportional representation system with 10% national threshold
Jun. 2015	the proportional representation system with 10% national threshold
Nov. 2015	the proportional representation system with 10% national threshold
Jun. 2018	the presidential system with pre-election alliances and 10% national threshold

The proportional representation system and the struggle for the inheritance of the DP closed by the *coup d'état* immediately produced fragmentation and even led to a hung parliament in the 1961 election. The number of parties gaining parliamentary seats was four in 1961, six in 1965, and eight in 1969. In 1965, the national reminder electoral system, a variant of the proportional representation that produced much less disproportion, was applied. In this way, for the first time, the far-left Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP, Turkish Workers Party), entered the parliament by gaining 3.1% of seats. Moreover, the number of parties winning at least three percent of the filled seats rose to five in 1965. Nevertheless, the parliament was dominated by two big parties during the 1960s; the CHP on the center-left and the Adalet Partisi (AP, Justice Party), the successor of the DP, on the center-right, although the average share of two-party seats decreased to around 80%. Other parties were very small and only one or two of them had some coalition/blackmail potential as "a half party". Similarly, the mean score for the effective number of parliamentary parties was 2.7. However, at least for a limited period, the AP was in a strong position having the majority of both votes and seats in 1965 and the majority of seats in 1969. In the late 1960s a predominant party system was likely to have emerged, but the AP could not maintain its hold on the right-wing electorate (Ayan-Musil, 2015, p. 6). The pro-Islamist Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP, National Salvation Party) and the nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP, Nationalist Action Party) each played their part in fragmentation. For example, parliamentary fragmentation (*PFRG*) rose from 0.57 in 1969 to 0.70 in 1973.

During the 1970s, the party system in Turkey experienced a process with high fragmentation, ideological polarization, and electoral volatility (Özbudun, 2000, p. 74). The 1973 and 1977 elections produced hung parliaments. The average two-party vote decreased to 71%. Although the CHP won both elections, the level of competition between the CHP and the AP was very high. Because of the ideological polarization, nearly all right-wing parties were coalition partners. However, governments were weak and short-lived. The voting behavior in the election of 1977 indicated that people voted for a single-party government. Although there were still four parties winning at least three

percent of the filled seats like in 1973, the CHP and the AP became stronger. To illustrate, the share of the two-party seat increased to 89%. Yet, it was a hung parliament. Economic crisis and political violence also contributed to increasing political instability. Thus, Sayarı noted that in the late 1970s, the Turkish party system gradually turned to polarized pluralism (2002, p. 15). This system ended with the 1980 military coup. From a broader perspective, it is also possible to define the period between two military interventions (1960-1980, 5 elections) as a two-and-a-half party system.

One of the main outputs of the 1980 military intervention on the party system was the closure of all existing political parties and the introduction of a 10% national electoral threshold and high constituency thresholds. Although two centrist parties dominated the 1960s and 1970s, the fragmentation of the right, which contributed to political instability, became increasingly evident in the late 1970s. Thus, to ensure political stability, the military regime aimed at "transforming the party system into a more manageable two- or three-party system" with electoral engineering (Özbudun, 2000, p. 75). By political bans and interventions on electoral institutions, it was expected that parliamentary majorities would more easily be achieved and that extremist groups such as pro-Islamist and pro-Kurdish parties would be prevented from having seats in the parliament. Consequently, the system produced a manufactured majority as well as great disproportionality. To illustrate, although the Anavatan Partisi (ANAP, Motherland Party) could win only 36.3% of the votes in the 1987 general election, it achieved 64.8% of the seats in the parliament.

However, this interim period did not last long and in the 1990s, despite the high electoral threshold, the number of parties in parliament rapidly increased and this led to coalition governments. Two-party seats steadily decreased and dropped under 50% in 1999. The seat gap not only between the largest party and the second largest party and but also between the second largest party and the third-largest party diminished. Likewise, the level of fragmentation rose and the mean score for the effective number of parliamentary parties reached 4.28. All of this indicated a multiparty system with a balance among the parties.

The fragmentation in the 1990s was mainly related to the weakening of center-right and center-left tendencies (Özbudun, 2000, p. 78). After the banning of the two traditional centrist parties by the 1980 military coup, in the 1990s new parties emerged to inherit these traditional parties' grassroots. This resulted in fierce competition on the center-right between the ANAP and the Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP, True Path Party), and on the center-left between the CHP and the Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP, Democratic Left Party). In other words, the main competition was not inter-blocs but intra-blocs. While the centrist parties became weaker, the extremist parties became stronger and played important roles during the 1990s (Sayarı, 2002, p. 19). To illustrate, in 1995 the pro-Islamist Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party) became the big partner of the coalition government by gaining 21.4% of the votes and in 1999 the nationalist MHP won 18% of votes and joined the coalition government. The percentage of votes that the pro-Kurdish Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP, People's Democracy Party) gained also increased but because of the national threshold, the HADEP could not get any seats in parliament. The controversy between the center and the periphery culminated in the overthrown of the RP by a postmodern coup. Finally, the 2001 economic crisis intensified political instability. Thus, in the early 2000s,

there was huge dissatisfaction against existing political actors. For example, according to a survey conducted by the Türkiye Sosyal, Ekonomik ve Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı (TÜSES, Turkish Economic Social and Political Research Foundation) in 1998, 52% of the voters stated that they did not trust politicians (Erder, 1999).

However, in the 2000s, the party system radically transformed from coalition governments into single-party majorities, from moderate pluralism into a predominant party system, from a highly fragmented structure into a more stable structure. The 2002 electoral earthquake left all parliamentary parties at the threshold and changed the party system dramatically. The electoral volatility rose to the highest level (50.2%) in Turkish political history (Sayarı, 2007, p. 200). After 2007, a multiparty system with a dominant party was established. Except for the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party), in Turkey since the 1950s only three parties, the DP, the AP, and the ANAP, have managed to form a single-party majority government. Ranking first in all general elections, the AKP has been one of the most powerful parties in Turkish political history. In the 2010s, the AKP, which successfully mobilized the center-right and pro-Islamists constituency, reached a voting potential of 45%-55%. The electoral threshold led to the votes being collected in larger parties and the electoral volatility has decreased. Table 2 summarizes election results between 1950 and 2018 in Turkey.

Table 2

Key Election Indicators between 1950 and 2018

Election	P3%S	N∞	2PVC	2PSC	SR1:2	SR2:3	PFRG	ENPP
May 1950	2	1.17	94.8	99.6	6.03	69.0	0.25	1.33
May 1954	2	1.08	93.5	98.7	16.23	6.2	0.13	1.15
Oct. 1957	2	1.44	90.0	98.7	2.38	44.5	0.43	1.76
Oct. 1961	4	2.60	71.5	73.6	1.09	2.9	0.69	3.26
Oct. 1965	5	1.88	81.6	83.1	1.79	4.3	0.62	2.62
Oct. 1969	3	1.76	74.0	88.7	1.79	9.5	0.57	2.35
Oct. 1973	4	2.43	63.1	74.2	1.24	3.3	0.70	3.32
Jun. 1977	4	2.11	78.3	89.3	1.13	7.9	0.60	2.47
Nov. 1983	3	1.89	75.6	82.2	1.80	1.6	0.60	2.52
Nov. 1987	3	1.54	61.1	86.9	2.95	1.7	0.51	2.05
Oct. 1991	4	2.53	51.0	65.1	1.55	1.3	0.72	3.58
Dec. 1995	5	3.48	41.0	52.7	1.20	1.0	0.77	4.40
Apr. 1999	5	4.04	40.2	48.2	1.1	1.2	0.79	4.87
Nov. 2002	2	1.52	53.7	98.4	2.0	n/a	0.46	1.85
Jul. 2007	3	1.61	67.5	82.4	3.0	1.6	0.56	2.26
Jun. 2011	3	1.68	75.8	84.0	2.4	2.5	0.58	2.36
Jun. 2015	4	2.13	65.8	70.9	2.0	1.7	0.68	3.13
Nov. 2015	4	1.74	74.8	82.0	2.4	2.3	0.59	2.45
Jun. 2018	5	2.03	65.2	73.5	2.0	2.2	0.67	3.07

Finally, Table 3 presents Turkish party systems according to Siaroff's typology. There are four different types of party systems that emerged between 1950 and 2018. Party competition in Turkey resulted in a two-party system in the 1950s, a two and a half party system in the 1960s and 1970s, a moderate multiparty system with a balance among parties in the 1990s, and a moderate multiparty system with one dominant party in the

1980s and after 2002. Like in the 1950s, the 2002 election also brought in a two-party system.

Table 3
Party Systems in Turkey between 1950 and 2018

Election	Party System
May 1950	Two-party system
May 1954	Two-party system
Oct. 1957	Two-party system
Oct. 1961	Two and a half party system
Oct. 1965	Two and a half party system
Oct. 1969	Two and a half party system
Oct. 1973	Two and a half party system
Jun. 1977	Two and a half party system
Nov. 1983	Moderate multiparty system with one dominant party
Nov. 1987	Moderate multiparty system with one dominant party
Oct. 1991	Moderate multiparty system with a balance among the parties
Dec. 1995	Moderate multiparty system with a balance among the parties
Apr. 1999	Moderate multiparty system with a balance among the parties
Nov. 2002	Two-party system
Jul. 2007	Moderate multiparty system with one dominant party
Jun. 2011	Moderate multiparty system with one dominant party
Jun. 2015	Moderate multiparty system with one dominant party
Nov. 2015	Moderate multiparty system with one dominant party
Jun. 2018	Moderate multiparty system with one dominant party

Conclusion

The aim of the present research was to examine the Turkish party system from 1950 to the present using the quantitative method. Adopting the criteria of the number of relevant parties and their relative strengths, this study has applied different indicators such as the effective number of parties and fragmentation. This paper has identified four distinct forms of party systems since 1950 in Turkey: a two-party system (1950-1960 and 2002), a two and a half party system (1960-1980), a moderate multiparty system with a balance among parties (1991-1999), and a moderate multiparty system with one dominant party (1983-1987, and 2007-2018).

As Duverger mentioned , there seems to be a correlation between the electoral system, particularly the electoral threshold, and the number of parties in the parliament. According to the Parliamentary Election Laws (no.2839) enacted in 1983, political parties which do not obtain more than 10% of all of the valid votes in Turkey are not permitted to enter parliament. The reduction of the number of parties in parliament after 1983 indicates that the electoral threshold has a huge impact on the party system. To illustrate, the average number of parties in parliament reduced from 5.1 between 1950 and 1977 (8 elections) to 3.7 between 1983 and 2011 (8 elections).

However, this cannot fully explain everything because the average number of parties in parliament fluctuated even after 1983, in such a way that, in all three elections in the 1990s, five political parties exceeded the electoral threshold. Since nearly two-thirds of the voters preferred right-wing parties in each election, the system may evolve into a

predominant party system if only a powerful center-right party can unify the right-wing constituency by eliminating potential right-wing rivals to capture the center and as a consequence reach 50% of the votes. In Turkey, only after periods of deep political and economic crisis, parties that   mobilized right-wing constituencies were able to achieve a majority. The DP came to power after the war, the AP formed a single-party government after the tragic overthrown of DP by military intervention, and the ANAP had the majority after a period of long political and economic instabilities that resulted in the military intervention. Finally, a series of political and economic complications such as the rise of the Kurdish political movement, the intensification of the *Kulturkampf*[5] between pro-Islamist and pro-Republican, the overthrown of the RP by a postmodern coup, and the 2001 economic crises provided proper conditions for the AKP. However, among the parties , only the AKP has been successful at having the majority in more than three elections.

The last five elections in Turkey produced a moderate multiparty system with one dominant party or, in Sartorian terms, a predominant party system. Will the dominant party maintain its power or will   a more fragmented system emerge? The answer depends on the intensity of competition on the center-right, the newly formed parties' performances, and possible changes in electoral institutions.

In sum, notwithstanding its limitations, this paper contributes to recent debates concerning party systems. It establishes a quantitative framework for separating different party systems in Turkey. Further research, using a comparative perspective, could shed more light on party system changes.

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5   For a discussion on the concept in the context of the constitutional referendum in 2010, see (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012).

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AMAÇ KAPSAM

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, siyaset bilimi, kamu yönetimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, alanlarında uluslararası ve disiplinlerarası makaleler yayınlamaktadır. Dergi, aşağıda belirtilen konuları kapsamak ile birlikte sadece bu konular ile kısıtlı değildir:

- Siyaset biliminin tüm alt disiplinleri, siyaset teorisi, siyaset felsefesi, politik davranış, siyasi kurumlar ve siyasi tarih
- Kamu yönetiminin tüm alt disiplinleri,
- Uluslararası ilişkiler ile ilgili tüm konular: uluslararası hukuk, iktisat, etik, strateji, felsefe, kültür, çevre, güvenlik, terör, bölgesel çalışmalar, küreselleşme ve diğer konular,

Dergi, yukarıda adı geçen disiplinlerin çeşitli yönlerini inceleyen, İngilizce yazılmış araştırma esaslı makalelerin yanında teorik ve kavramsal makaleleri yayınlamaktadır. Ayrıca, dergi uluslararası alandaki akademisyenlerin konuk editörlüğünde çeşitli temalar ile ilgili özel sayılar yayınlamaktadır.

EDİTORYAL POLİTİKALAR VE HAKEM SÜRECİ

Yayın Politikası

Dergiye yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen makalelerin içeriği derginin amaç ve kapsamı ile uyumlu olmalıdır. Dergi, orijinal araştırma niteliğindeki yazıları yayınlamaya öncelik vermektedir. Genel İlkeler Daha önce yayınlanmamış ya da yayınlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Ön değerlendirmeyi geçen yazılar iThenticate intihal tarama programından geçirilir. İntihal incelemesinden sonra, uygun makaleler Editör tarafından orijinaliteleri, metodolojileri, makalede ele alınan konunun önemi ve derginin kapsamına uygunluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Bilimsel toplantılarda sunulan özet bildiriler, makalede belirtilmesi koşulu ile kaynak olarak kabul edilir. Editör, gönderilen makale biçimsel esaslara uygun ise, gelen yazıyı yurtiçinden ve /veya yurtdışından en az iki hakemin değerlendirmesine sunar, hakemler gerek gördüğü takdirde yazıda istenen değişiklikler yazarlar tarafından yapıldıktan sonra yayınlanmasına onay verir. Makale yayınlanmak üzere Dergiye gönderildikten sonra yazarlardan hiçbirinin ismi, tüm yazarların yazılı izni olmadan yazar listesinden silinemez ve yeni bir isim yazar olarak eklenemez ve yazar sırası değiştirilemez. Yayına kabul edilmeyen makale, resim ve fotoğraflar yazarlara geri gönderilmez. Yayınlanan yazı ve resimlerin tüm hakları Dergiye aittir.

Telif Hakkında

Yazarlar dergide yayınlanan çalışmalarının telif hakkına sahiptirler ve çalışmaları Creative Commons Atıf-GayrıTicari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) olarak lisanslıdır. CC BY-NC 4.0 lisansı, eserin ticari kullanım dışında her boyut ve formatta paylaşılmasına, kopyalanmasına, çoğaltılmasına ve orijinal esere uygun şekilde atıfta bulunmak kaydıyla yeniden düzenleme, dönüştürme ve eserin üzerine inşa etme dâhil adapte edilmesine izin verir.

Açık Erişim İlkesi

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, tüm içeriği okura ya da okurun dahil olduğu kuruma ücretsiz olarak sunulur. Okurlar, ticari amaç haricinde, yayıncı ya da yazardan izin almadan dergi makalelerinin tam metnini okuyabilir, indirebilir, kopyalayabilir, arayabilir ve link sağlayabilir.

İşlemleme Ücreti

Derginin tüm giderleri İstanbul Üniversitesi tarafından karşılanmaktadır. Dergide makale yayını ve makale süreçlerinin yürütülmesi ücrete tabi değildir. Dergiye gönderilen ya da yayın için kabul edilen makaleler için işlemleme ücreti ya da gönderim ücreti alınmaz.

Hakem Süreci

Daha önce yayınlanmamış ya da yayınlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Gönderilen ve ön kontrolü geçen makaleler iThenticate yazılımı kullanılarak intihal için taranır. İntihal kontrolünden sonra, uygun olan makaleler baş editör tarafından orijinallik, metodoloji, işlenen konunun önemi ve dergi kapsamı ile uyumluluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar.

Seçilen makaleler en az iki ulusal/uluslararası hakeme değerlendirmeye gönderilir; yayın kararı, hakemlerin talepleri doğrultusunda yazarların gerçekleştirdiği düzenlemelerin ve hakem sürecinin sonrasında baş editör tarafından verilir.

Hakemlerin değerlendirmeleri objektif olmalıdır. Hakem süreci sırasında hakemlerin aşağıdaki hususları dikkate alarak değerlendirmelerini yapmaları beklenir.

- Makale yeni ve önemli bir bilgi içeriyor mu?
- Öz, makalenin içeriğini net ve düzgün bir şekilde tanımlıyor mu?
- Yöntem bütünlüklü ve anlaşılır şekilde tanımlanmış mı?
- Yapılan yorum ve varılan sonuçlar bulgularla kanıtlanıyor mu?
- Alandaki diğer çalışmalara yeterli referans verilmiş mi?
- Dil kalitesi yeterli mi?

Hakemler, gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlana kadar gizli kalmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdırlar. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir.

Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir.

YAYIN ETİĞİ VE İLKELER

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, yayın etiğinde en yüksek standartlara bağlıdır ve Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA) ve World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) tarafından yayınlanan etik yayıncılık ilkelerini benimser; Principles of Transparency

and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing başlığı altında ifade edilen ilkeler için adres: https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-andbest-practice-scholarly-publishing Gönderilen tüm makaleler orijinal, yayınlanmamış ve başka bir dergide değerlendirme sürecinde olmamalıdır. Her bir makale editörlerden biri ve en az iki hakem tarafından çift kör değerlendirmeden geçirilir. İntihal, duplikasyon, sahte yazarlık/inkar edilen yazarlık, araştrma/veri fabrikasyonu, makale dilimleme, dilimleyerek yayın, telif hakları ihlali ve çıkar çatışmasının gizlenmesi, etik dışı davranışlar olarak kabul edilir. Kabul edilen etik standartlara uygun olmayan tüm makaleler yayından çıkarılır. Buna yayından sonra tespit edilen olası kuraldışı, uygunsuzluklar içeren makaleler de dahildir.

Araştırma Etiği

Dergi araştırma etiğinde en yüksek standartları gözetir ve aşağıda tanımlanan uluslararası araştırma etiği ilkelerini benimser. Makalelerin etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. - Araştırmanın tasarlanması, tasarımın gözden geçirilmesi ve araştırmanın yürütülmesinde, bütünlük, kalite ve şeffaflık ilkeleri sağlanmalıdır.

- Araştırma ekibi ve katılımcılar, araştırmanın amacı, yöntemleri ve öngörülen olası kullanımları; araştırmaya katılımın gerektirdikleri ve varsa riskleri hakkında tam olarak bilgilendirilmelidir.
- Araştırma katılımcılarının sağladığı bilgilerin gizliliği ve yanıt verenlerin gizliliği sağlanmalıdır. Araştırma katılımcıların özerkliğini ve saygınlığını koruyacak şekilde tasarlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma katılımcıları gönüllü olarak araştırmada yer almalı, herhangi bir zorlama altında olmamalıdırlar. - Katılımcıların zarar görmesinden kaçınılmalıdır. Araştırma, katılımcıları riske sokmayacak şekilde planlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma bağımsızlığıyla ilgili açık ve net olunmalı; çıkar çatışması varsa belirtilmelidir.
- Deneysel çalışmalarda, araştırmaya katılmaya karar veren katılımcıların yazılı bilgilendirilmiş onayı alınmalıdır. Çocukların ve vesayet altındakilerin veya tasdiklenmiş akıl hastalığı bulunanların yasal vasisinin onayı alınmalıdır.
- Çalışma herhangi bir kurum ya da kuruluşta gerçekleştirilecekse bu kurum ya da kuruluştan çalışma yapılacağına dair onay alınmalıdır.
- İnsan öğesi bulunan çalışmalarda, "yöntem" bölümünde katılımcılardan "bilgilendirilmiş onam" alındığının ve çalışmanın yapıldığı kurumdan etik kurul onayı alındığı belirtilmesi gerekir.

Yazarların Sorumluluğu

Makalelerin bilimsel ve etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. Yazar makalenin orijinal olduğu, daha önce başka bir yerde yayınlanmadığı ve başka bir yerde, başka bir dilde yayınlanmak üzere değerlendirmede olmadığı konusunda teminat sağlamalıdır. Uygulamadaki telif kanunları ve anlaşmaları gözetilmelidir. Telife bağlı materyaller (örneğin tablolar, şekiller veya büyük alıntılar) gerekli izin ve teşekkürle kullanılmalıdır. Başka yazarların, katkıda bulunanların çalışmaları ya da yararlanılan kaynaklar uygun biçimde kullanılmalı ve referanslarda belirtilmelidir. Gönderilen makalede tüm yazarların akademik ve bilimsel olarak doğrudan katkısı olmalıdır, bu bağlamda "yazar" yayınlanan bir araştırmanın kavramsallaştırılmasına ve dizaynına, verilerin elde edilmesine, analizine ya da yorumlanmasına belirgin katkı yapan, yazının yazılması ya da bunun içerik açısından eleştirel biçimde gözden geçirilmesinde görev yapan birisi olarak görülür. Yazar

olabilmenin diğer koşulları ise, makaledeki çalışmayı planlamak veya icra etmek ve / veya revize etmektir. Fon sağlanması, veri toplanması ya da araştırma grubunun genel süpervizyonu tek başına yazarlık hakkı kazandırmaz. Yazar olarak gösterilen tüm bireyler sayılan tüm ölçütleri karşılamalıdır ve yukarıdaki ölçütleri karşılayan her birey yazar olarak gösterilebilir. Yazarların isim sıralaması ortak verilen bir karar olmalıdır. Tüm yazarlar yazar sıralamasını Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu'nda imzalı olarak belirtmek zorundadırlar. Yazarlık için yeterli ölçütleri karşılamayan ancak çalışmaya katkısı olan tüm bireyler "teşekkür / bilgiler" kısmında sıralanmalıdır. Bunlara örnek olarak ise sadece teknik destek sağlayan, yazıma yardımcı olan ya da sadece genel bir destek sağlayan, finansal ve materyal desteği sunan kişiler verilebilir. Bütün yazarlar, araştırmanın sonuçlarını ya da bilimsel değerlendirmeyi etkileyebilme potansiyeli olan finansal ilişkiler, çıkar çatışması ve çıkar rekabetini beyan etmelidirler. Bir yazar kendi yayınlanmış yazısında belirgin bir hata ya da yanlışlık tespit ederse, bu yanlışlıklara ilişkin düzeltme ya da geri çekme için editör ile hemen temasa geçme ve işbirliği yapma sorumluluğunu taşır.

Editör ve Hakem Sorumlulukları

Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar. Gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalacağını garanti eder. Baş editör içerik ve yayının toplam kalitesinden sorumludur. Gereğinde hata sayfası yayınlamalı ya da düzeltme yapmalıdır. Baş editör; yazarlar, editörler ve hakemler arasında çıkar çatışmasına izin vermez. Hakem atama konusunda tam yetkiye sahiptir ve Dergide yayınlanacak makalelerle ilgili nihai kararı vermekle yükümlüdür.

Hakemlerin araştırmayla ilgili, yazarlarla ve/veya araştırmanın finansal destekçileriyle çıkar çatışmaları olmamalıdır. Değerlendirmelerinin sonucunda tarafsız bir yargıya varmalıdırlar. Gönderilmiş yazılara ilişkin tüm bilginin gizli tutulmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdırlar. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir. Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir. Bazı durumlarda editörün kararıyla, ilgili hakemlerin makaleye ait yorumları aynı makaleyi yorumlayan diğer hakemlere gönderilerek hakemlerin bu süreçte aydınlatılması sağlanabilir.

YAZILARIN HAZIRLANMASI

Dil

Dergide İngilizce dilinde makaleler yayınlanır.

Yazıların Hazırlanması ve Yazım Kuralları

Aksi belirtilmedikçe gönderilen yazılarla ilgili tüm yazışmalar ilk yazarla yapılacaktır. Makale gönderimi online olarak ve http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr üzerinden yapılmalıdır. Gönderilen yazılar, yazının yayınlanmak üzere gönderildiğini ifade eden, makale türünü belirten ve makaleyle ilgili detayları içeren (bkz: Son Kontrol Listesi) bir mektup; yazının elektronik formunu içeren Microsoft

Word 2003 ve üzerindeki versiyonları ile yazılmış elektronik dosya ve tüm yazarların imzaladığı Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu eklenerek gönderilmelidir.

1. Çalışmalar, A4 boyutundaki kağıdın bir yüzüne, üst, alt, sağ ve sol taraftan 2,5 cm. boşluk bırakılarak, 10 punto Times New Roman harf karakterleriyle ve 1,5 satır aralık ölçüsü ile ve iki yana yaslı olarak hazırlanmalıdır. Paragraf başlarında tab tuşu kullanılmalıdır. Metin içinde yer alan tablo ve şemalarda ise tek satır aralığı kullanılmalıdır.

2. Metnin başlığı küçük harf, koyu renk, Times New Roman yazı tipi, 12 punto olarak sayfanın ortasında yer almalıdır.

3. Metin yazarına ait bilgiler başlıktan sonra bir satır atlanarak, Times New Roman yazı tipi, 10 punto ve tek satır aralığı kullanılarak sayfanın soluna yazılacaktır. Yazarın adı küçük harfle, soyadı büyük harfle belirtildikten sonra bir alt satıra unvanı, çalıştığı kurum ve e-posta adresi yazılacaktır.

4. Giriş bölümünden önce 200-250 kelimelik çalışmanın kapsamını, amacını, ulaşılan sonuçları ve kullanılan yöntemi kaydeden makale dilinde ve ingilizce öz ile 600-800 kelimelik İngilizce genişletilmiş özet yer almalıdır. Çalışmanın İngilizce başlığı İngilizce özün üzerinde yer almalıdır. İngilizce ve makale dilinde özlerin altında çalışmanın içeriğini temsil eden, makale dilinde 3-5 adet, İngilizce adet anahtar kelime yer almalıdır. Makale İngilizce ise İngilizce genişletilmiş özet istenmez.

5. Çalışmaların başlıca şu unsurları içermesi gerekmektedir: Makale dilinde başlık, öz ve anahtar kelimeler; İngilizce başlık öz ve anahtar kelimeler; İngilizce genişletilmiş özet (makale İngilizce ise İngilizce genişletilmiş özet istenmez), ana metin bölümleri, son notlar ve kaynaklar.

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- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
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Kitap

a) Türkçe Kitap
Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8.bs). Ankara: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

b) Türkçeye Çevrilmiş Kitap

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b) Book Translated into Turkish

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* [Mindsets] (A. Kotil, Trans.). İstanbul, Turkey: İletişim Yayınları.

c) Edited Book

Ören, T., Üney, T., & Çölkesen, R. (Eds.). (2006). *Türkiye bilişim ansiklopedisi* [Turkish Encyclopedia of Informatics]. İstanbul, Turkey: Papatya Yayıncılık.

d) Turkish Book with Multiple Authors

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y., & Sever, H. (2002). T*ürkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme* [Performance evaluation in Turkish search engines]. Ankara, Turkey: Total Bilişim.

e) Book in English

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation.* New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

f) Chapter in an Edited Book

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

g) Chapter in an Edited Book in Turkish

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi [Organization culture: Its functions, elements and importance in leadership and business management]. In M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi* [Organization sociology] (pp. 233–263). Bursa, Turkey: Dora Basım Yayın.

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American Psychological Association. (2009). *Publication manual of the American psychological association* (6th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.

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a) Turkish Article

Mutlu, B., & Savaşer, S. (2007). Çocuğu ameliyat sonrası yoğun bakımda olan ebeveynlerde stres nedenleri ve azaltma girişimleri [Source and intervention reduction of stress for parents whose children are in intensive care unit after surgery]. *Istanbul University Florence Nightingale Journal of Nursing, 15*(60), 179–182.

b) English Article

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society, 10*(2), 149–173. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002

c) Journal Article with DOI and More Than Seven Authors

Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine, 372,* 2087–2096. http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184

d) Journal Article from Web, without DOI

Sidani, S. (2003). Enhancing the evaluation of nursing care effectiveness. *Canadian Journal of Nursing Research, 35*(3), 26–38. Retrieved from http://cjnr.mcgill.ca

e) Journal Article wih DOI

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly, 27,* 261–278. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0731713 1003765910

f) Advance Online Publication

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology.* Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867

g) Article in a Magazine

Henry, W. A., III. (1990, April 9). Making the grade in today's schools. *Time, 135,* 28–31.

Doctoral Dissertation, Master's Thesis, Presentation, Proceeding

a) Dissertation/Thesis from a Commercial Database

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9943436)

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Yaylalı-Yıldız, B. (2014). *University campuses as places of potential publicness: Exploring the politicals, social and cultural practices in Ege University* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from Retrieved from: http://library.iyte.edu.tr/tr/hizli-erisim/iyte-tez-portali

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Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/ yayinlar /phd/ickapak.html

d) Dissertation/Thesis abstracted in Dissertations Abstracts International

Appelbaum, L. G. (2005). Three studies of human information processing: Texture amplification, motion representation, and figure-ground segregation. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineering, 65*(10), 5428.

e) Symposium Contribution

Krinsky-McHale, S. J., Zigman, W. B., & Silverman, W. (2012, August). Are neuropsychiatric symptoms markers of prodromal Alzheimer's disease in adults with Down syndrome? In W. B. Zigman (Chair), *Predictors of mild cognitive impairment, dementia, and mortality in adults with Down syndrome.* Symposium conducted at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

f) Conference Paper Abstract Retrieved Online

Liu, S. (2005, May). *Defending against business crises with the help of intelligent agent based early warning solutions.* Paper presented at the Seventh International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, Miami, FL. Abstract retrieved from http://www.iceis.org/iceis2005/ abstracts_2005.htm

g) Conference Paper - In Regularly Published Proceedings and Retrieved Online

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105,* 12593–12598. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105

h) Proceeding in Book Form

Parsons, O. A., Pryzwansky, W. B., Weinstein, D. J., & Wiens, A. N. (1995). Taxonomy for psychology. In J. N. Reich, H. Sands, & A. N. Wiens (Eds.), *Education and training beyond the doctoral degree: Proceedings of the American Psychological Association National Conference on Postdoctoral Education and Training in Psychology* (pp. 45–50). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

i) Paper Presentation

Nguyen, C. A. (2012, August). *Humor and deception in advertising: When laughter may not be the best medicine.* Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

Other Sources

a) Newspaper Article

Browne, R. (2010, March 21). This brainless patient is no dummy. *Sydney Morning Herald, 45.*

b) Newspaper Article with no Author

New drug appears to sharply cut risk of death from heart failure. (1993, July 15). *The Washington Post,* p. A12.

c) Web Page/Blog Post

Bordwell, D. (2013, June 18). David Koepp: Making the world movie-sized [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/page/27/

d) Online Encyclopedia/Dictionary

Ignition. (1989). In *Oxford English online dictionary* (2nd ed.). Retrieved from http://dictionary.oed.com

Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.). *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.* Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/

e) Podcast

Dunning, B. (Producer). (2011, January 12). *in Fact: Conspiracy theories* [Video podcast]. Retrieved from http://itunes.apple.com/

f) Single Episode in a Television Series

Egan, D. (Writer), & Alexander, J. (Director). (2005). Failure to communicate. [Television series episode]. In D. Shore (Executive producer), *House;* New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

g) Music

Fuchs, G. (2004). Light the menorah. On *Eight nights of Hanukkah* [CD]. Brick, NJ: Kid Kosher.

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