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BOOK REVIEWS

FROM THE EDITORS

This issue of *Ilahiyat Studies* is a collection of essays representing various fields of Islamic and religious studies. The first article by Tahir Uluç presents a fine analysis of the problem of Plato's theory of forms as it has been received and discussed within the Islamic intellectual history, focusing specifically on al-Suhrawardī's work. Uluç ends his article by raising several questions that make the article even more valuable.

Ibn Khaldūn has been regarded as one of the most influential thinkers of all time that still has relevance to our contemporary situation. In line with this conviction, Ömer Türker concerns himself with the way Ibn Khaldūn strikes a balance between constants and variables by analyzing metaphysical assumptions of Ibn Khaldūn's general theory in his attempt to explain the nature of royal authority.

In his essay, Salih Çift investigates into the situation of the Bektāshī Order in Egypt. The article is a timely contribution to the debates about the nature of beliefs and practices of the Bektāshīs and their social situation in Egypt and elsewhere, for as the author argues the number of works that treat the Bektāshīs objectively is limited.

Muhammed Tarakçı's article introduces us a treatise, authored by an un-known polemicist of the Ottoman period, which tries to refute the views of Christians about the divine nature of Jesus Christ using Biblical accounts. After giving a brief history of Muslim anti-Christian apologetics and polemics Tarakçı presents an English translation along with the Arabic text.

Our book review editor Kadir Gömbeyaz did a great job, again, by carefully selecting the books to be reviewed and the book reviewers, to whom we are thankful for their meticulous work.

Finally, we are pleased to let our readers know that the editorial team is getting stronger and diversified as we welcome the three of the world's leading scholars in their own fields. We would like to

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welcome and thank Professor James W. Morris of Boston College, Professor Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud of University of Technology Malaysia, and Professor Abdulaziz Sachedina of University of Virginia.

We think that this is a full issue and hope that it is fulfilling.

ARTICLES

AL-SUHRAWARDĪ'S CRITIQUE OF IBN SĪNĀ'S REFUTATION OF THE PLATONIC FORMS

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Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya-Turkey

Abstract

Aristotle's denunciation of his long-time teacher Plato's theory of Forms, one of the most essential elements of the latter's metaphysical thought, has resonated throughout the general history of philosophy and in the literature of classical Islamic philosophy. One example of its influence on Islamic thought is the dispute between Ibn Sīnā and al-Suhrawardī on the reality of the Forms. Ibn Sīnā, who, with al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd, was one of the most important figures of Islamic Peripateticism, produced a detailed refutation of the theory of Platonic Forms modeled after Aristotle's. Al-Suhrawardī, founder of the Illuminationist School, the second major Islamic philosophical tradition, revered Plato as an ideal philosopher primarily for his mystical character and intuitionist epistemology, regarding him as the greatest of all philosophers. Al-Suhrawardī owed many of the essential components of his own metaphysical system to Plato. Therefore, he made great intellectual efforts to confute Ibn Sīnā's criticisms of the theory of Platonic Forms using Ibn Sīnā's own philosophy. This article is intended to give an exposition of al-Suhrawardī's efforts.

Key Words: Plato, Aristotle, the theory of Forms, Ibn Sīnā, al-Suhrawardī, philosophical criticism

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Introduction: A Historical Overview

The dispute between Ibn Sīnā and al-Suhrawardī on the ontological nature of the Platonic Forms is intimately related to the problem of universals as it was first set forth by Plato and later criticized by his most important pupil and successor, Aristotle. A detailed account of Plato's concept of universals, which came to be known as the theory of Forms or Ideas, and of the subsequent critique and modification of this concept by Aristotle is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, in what follows, I shall describe the development of the theory in Ancient Greek thought and the objections raised against it in only enough detail to allow the reader to follow the arguments against and for it by Ibn Sīnā and al-Suhrawardī, respectively.

Plato is the father of the question of universals; it is in his dialogues that we find the first arguments for the existence of universals and the first discussion of the difficulties they raise. Plato believed that universals must exist ontologically, to explain the nature of the world, and epistemologically, to explain the nature of our knowledge of it. In addition, he not only proposed a solution to this ontological and epistemological problem but also predicted the objections to his solution.[1]

The universals are employed to think about and refer to the qualities of individual objects and the relations among them. For instance, if we say of two or more objects that each is a table, or is square, or is brown, or is made of iron, we are saying that there is a property common to the objects that may be shared by many others and by which the objects may be classified into kinds. Such classification is not only useful for scientific and other purposes but also necessary because it allows us to experience anything as belonging to kinds. In other words, anything that we perceive is perceived as an object of certain kind, as having certain qualities, and as standing in certain relations to other objects. By extension, though every individual object is unique because it is numerically distinct, its features are general because they recur in other objects.

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[1] A. David Woozley, "Universals," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (ed. Paul Edwards; New York: Macmillan & The Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, repr. 1972), VIII, 194.

There are several approaches and theories describing the nature of universals, including nominalism, resemblance theories, realism, and conceptualism; we, however, shall focus on the last two as the most relevant to our subject. In the history of philosophy, realist and conceptualist theories of universals are opposed because the former holds universals to be extramental and mind-independent, whereas the latter considers them to be mental and mind-dependent. For the realist, universals exist in themselves and would exist even if there were no minds to be aware of them. For the conceptualist, however, universals are purely mental; if there were no minds, there could be no universals.

The two principal versions of realism are those proposed by Plato and Aristotle. Plato is the first not only to have propounded a theory of universals but also to have noted the ontological and epistemological difficulties his theory created. Aristotle, adding new objections to Plato's critique of the theory, postulated his own distinctly different but still realist account. Though Plato and Aristotle were both realists because they granted to universals an existence independent of minds, they disagreed about the status and mode of existence they believed universals to have. Notably, Plato never regarded his theory as a final, fully elaborated, and perfect theory. On the contrary, he modified and refined it throughout his philosophical career. Thus, no one single work contains a full exposition of the theory; he treated it in his dialogues with varying degrees of detail. His theory was first outlined in the *Symposium*, explained fairly fully in the *Republic*, briefly defended in the *Timaeus*, mentioned with respect in the *Philebus*, treated in critical terms in the *Sophist*, and explicitly criticized in the *Parmenides*.[2]

Putting aside the debates about the extent to which the views set forth as those of Socrates in the Platonic dialogues are actually Socrates' and the extent to which Plato used Socrates as the spokesman of his own views, it seems certain that Socrates is the first to have aroused Plato's interest in the question of universals. Additionally, while Socrates did not explicitly hold a theory of universals in the Platonic sense of the term, a point confirmed by Aristotle,[3] Plato

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[2] Gilbert Ryle, "Plato," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, VI, 320-321.

[3] For more information on Aristotle's views about Socrates' role in the origin of the theory, see Gail Fine, *On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 44 ff.

maintained that the philosophical questions Socrates addressed could only be answered through such a theory.

Socrates was primarily concerned with the human virtues, and his aim was to reach a satisfactory definition of the virtue under discussion. He questioned the definitions of beauty, courage, piety, justice, and even virtue. He rejected the definitions offered because he believed that they were too narrow or too wide, but especially because they gave instances of the virtue instead of its essential definition. In other words, Socrates sought the one form that all instances of the virtue had and of which they were the instances. The matters about which Socrates asked questions were limited because his philosophical concerns were chiefly ethical. Plato expanded Socrates' theories and maintained that there must be an essence common to all things of a given kind that would apply not only to abstract virtues, such as justice and courage, but also to natural objects, such as trees, and to artifacts, such as beds and tables.

As mentioned above, Plato himself was the first to recognize the limitations of his theory, the most important of which is suggested by the following question: What type of relationship exists between the universal form and its particular manifestations, and what is the ontological nature of the universal itself? To answer this question, he developed the doctrine known as the Theory of Forms, according to which each universal is a single substance or Form, existing timelessly and independently of any of its particulars and apprehended not by sense but by intellect. The considerations that led Plato to propound such a theory can be summarized as two interrelated concerns: epistemological and metaphysical.

(1) Epistemologically, if knowledge of things is possible in the real sense of the term, this knowledge must be of what is permanent and unchanging. Nevertheless, the physical world falls short of this requirement because all objects in the physical world undergo constant change. This is known as the Heraclitean doctrine of constant flux, which Plato himself acknowledged. To address this condition, he introduced a counterpart of the physical world: a supersensible realm of unchanging stability. He proposed that only with such a realm does knowledge become possible. This realm is the realm of the Forms.[4]

[4] Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1996), 136.

(2) Ontologically, there are many things, yet they are all, in some sense, iterations of the same thing. From this manifest fact of recurrence, Plato derives the conclusion that there are universals apart from and prior to particulars.[5] Thus, it is the Form of the particulars or instances of any certain kind that confers upon them their existence.

Plato's vision of universals as substantial Forms gave rise to a depressing question from both a logical and ontological standpoint. If, for example, the Form of Beauty is not only the perfect pattern of beautiful particulars but is also itself perfectly beautiful, two problems arise: First, there is a clear contradiction because the Form of Beauty in this case is both individual and held to be universal. Second, as Plato realized in the *Parmenides* and as Aristotle repeated, if a Form stands to its particulars as "one over many," and if the Form is an ideal pattern of which the particulars are imperfect copies, an infinite regress is created that is known as the third man argument. This argument can be stated as follows: if the Form is to be predicable of itself and of its particulars, the Form shall require another Form to be beautiful. The second Form of Beauty will be self-predicable and thus call into being a third Form, a fourth, and so on, *ad infinitum*.[6]

As mentioned above, Aristotle is the second, after Plato himself, to have challenged Plato's theory of universals. Aristotle, as opposed to his teacher, proposes that the only true substances are individual objects, such as Socrates and this table. Therefore, universals are not substances existing independently of particulars; on the contrary, they exist only as common elements in particulars.

Aristotle raised a number of objections to Plato's theory, but three of them are of special interest to us because Ibn Sīnā reproduces them, especially the first two, in his own critique of the theory:

(1) The aforementioned infinite regress argument, or third man argument, which he took from Plato.

(2) Duplication of the Forms: Aristotle asserts that by conceiving of the Forms as separate substances, Plato introduced an unnecessary and unhelpful duplication. Aristotle claims that this duplication does not solve the problem of the nature of a set of entities because postu-

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5 John C. Bigelow, "Universals," *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (ed. Edward Craig; London & New York: Routledge, 1998), IX, 541.

6 Russell, *History of Western Philosophy,* 142-143.

lating a second and better set merely repeats this problem at a different level. In short, the problem that holds true of the particulars also holds true of the Forms.

(3) Confusion of the categories of substance and property: Substances are individuals and *possess* properties, but they cannot *be* properties. Plato, however, treated a Form both as an individual substance and as a property by saying that, for example, Beauty is a Beautiful.[7]

1. Ibn Sīnā's Critique of the Platonic Forms

Ibn Sīnā treats the theory of the Forms in two chapters of his *al-Shifāʾ*. In the first chapter, he provides an exposition of two different versions of the theory and an account of its rise in the history of thought from his own perspective. In the second chapter, he critiques and denounces the theory. The philosopher describes the theory of Forms as a result of the confusion that, according to him, occurred during the period in which the philosophical mind proceeded from physics to metaphysics. In moving from sensibles to intelligibles, i.e., from sensible particulars to intelligible universals, the ancient philosophers identified two types of form: (1) the sensible, corruptible form resting in the particulars and (2) the intelligible, eternal, unchanging, immaterial form. As Ibn Sīnā describes it, these philosophers claimed for the immaterial form an existence distinct and independent of the sensible particulars, naming them "ideal entities (*mithālī*)." According to this philosophy, our rational perception of the sensibles depends upon their immaterial forms because the intelligibles are unchanging and incorruptible, and the sensibles are changing and corruptible. Ibn Sīnā claims that Socrates and Plato adopted an extreme version of this doctrine.[8]

Ibn Sīnā also discusses another version of the theory of Forms that posits mathematical entities as the principle of physical beings. This version is distinct from the Pythagorean theory, he says, because the Pythagoreans do not believe numbers to be immaterial, though they view them as the principle of things. The philosophers who adopt

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7 For a detailed analysis of Aristotle's criticisms of the theory, see Fine, *On Ideas*.

8 Ibn Sīnā, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAlī, *Kitâbu'ş-Şifâ: Metafizik* [=*Kitāb al-Shifāʾ: al-Ilāhiyyāt*] (translated into Turkish, with the original text, by Ekrem Demirli & Ömer Türker; Istanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2005), II, 55-56.

this version of the theory of Forms, Ibn Sīnā reports, claim that it is not the Forms but their principles that are immaterial and that these principles are mathematical entities. In contrast, Plato ranks mathematical entities between Forms and physical things. The opposing claim relies on the notion that entities that are immaterial in the mind must also be immaterial in the concrete and *vice-versa*. The physical things come into existence as a result of mathematical entities attaching to matter. It follows that mathematical entities are immaterial in essence, though they are not so insofar as they are attached to matter.[9]

Those philosophers who assert that the principles of physical things are mathematical entities and believe that these entities are intelligible and immaterial formulate their argument as follows: If the physical things are abstracted from matter, nothing is left over but mathematical entities, such as dimension, shape, and number. It is impossible for the principle of a material thing to be material. It ensues that the principle of physical things is mathematical entities.[10]

Ibn Sīnā discards the notion that the Forms or the mathematical entities are immaterial and function as the ontological principles of physical things. In other words, he discards the theory of Forms in brief, identifying what he believes are the errors that underlie the theory in five headings, of which only the first two concern us in this exposition. The first error is the misconception that those forms and mathematical entities that are abstract in the mind are also abstract in reality.[11] The second error is based on a misunderstanding of the concept of unity or identity. The exponents of the theory of Forms, argues Ibn Sīnā, mistook the statement, "The form in the individuals of a species is one" to mean that the form in question is numerically or individually one and resting in all individuals practically. What is, in fact, meant by this word, argues Ibn Sīnā, is that the forms are numerically many, but they are one in terms of species and nature.[12]

After giving an account of Ibn Sīnā's general approach to the theory of Forms, we can proceed to address his objections to the theory. We can reduce these criticisms to three. The first two address the

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9 *Ibid*., 56.

10 *Ibid*., 57.

11 *Ibid*., 59.

12 *Ibid*., 60.

version of the immaterial Forms and the last addresses that of the mathematical entities. In his first criticism, Ibn Sīnā argues that there are no forms other than and distinct from those resting in the sensible particulars. In other words, there are no such things as immaterial Forms or Ideas. In his demonstration of this argument, he tries to establish why it is necessary for those forms to rest in the sensible particulars and goes on to argue for the impossibility of the existence of the immaterial forms. The philosopher demonstrates the first point through the following *reductio ad absurdum* argument: We gain knowledge of the forms from the particulars. If the forms were not to exist in the particulars, we could not perceive them through the senses, imagination, or reason. We, however, do perceive the forms of the particulars through all three media. It follows that the forms exist in the particulars.[13] It should be noted that this argument relies on Aristotle's first and second critiques of the theory as described in the introduction.

To demonstrate his second argument, Ibn Sīnā concedes the existence of the immaterial forms and then asks, "Is the definition and nature of the immaterial forms the same as that of the sensible forms, or is it different?" If the latter is taken to be the case, Ibn Sīnā notes, the immaterial forms would be different from the sensible forms and would therefore require a new argument to establish their existence. Furthermore, until they are proven to exist, any speculations about their eternity and immateriality would be futile and ungrounded.[14]

If the definition and nature of the immaterial and sensible forms is the same, then either the presence of the forms in the particulars is required by the nature of the latter, or the former are attached to the latter by an external cause. In the first case, it is impossible for a form that is abstracted from the particulars, i.e., an immaterial form, to exist, for a thing resting in another thing cannot, by its nature, be separate from it. In the second case, if the immaterial forms occur to the particulars not because of the nature of the latter but because the former are attached to the latter by an external cause and the nature of the latter does not prevent this, the immaterial forms can be material and the material particulars can be immaterial. However, this is contrary to the very theory of Forms, which posits the immaterial

[13] *Ibid*., 62.

[14] *Ibid*., 62-63.

forms as transcending the material particulars.[15]

To summarize, if the species' forms inhere in the particulars by the nature of the latter, it is impossible for the immaterial forms to exist because it is impossible for a thing to be separate from a thing to which it is inherent. If, however, the former are attached to the latter by an external cause, the immaterial forms could not be immaterial because they attach to the material. It follows that it would be impossible for the immaterial forms to exist in either case.

In the second argument, Ibn Sīnā invokes to establish the falsity of the theory of Forms, he contends that if the immaterial and sensible forms are assumed to partake of a common definition and nature, the particulars in which the forms rest either need the immaterial forms or do not need them. If their existence does inherently depend on them, the immaterial forms that are needed will need other forms to exist because it has been agreed that the sensible and immaterial forms share the same nature. This would induce a recess *ad infinitum*, which is false. Thus, it is impossible that the immaterial forms exist.[16]

If the particulars, however, need the immaterial forms not by nature but because of an accident that attaches to them, and if they do not need them when the accident in question fails to attach and therefore do not entail the existence of the immaterial forms, it will result that an accident attaching to a thing might be the cause of that thing which is prior to and independent from it, a case that is impossible. If, instead, the immaterial forms cause the existence of the particulars through the accident in question, this is contradictory, for the accident would be the cause of the sensible form but not that of the immaterial form, though they share the same nature.[17]

However, if the particulars do not need the immaterial forms, the latter are not the cause and principle of the former. The latter in this case are inferior to the former, for the former act as the object of influence and actions, while the latter do not. For example, an abstract human form is incomparable to a living, actual human being.[18]

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15 *Ibid*., 63.

16 *Ibid*.

17 *Ibid*.

18 *Ibid*.

The third criticism Ibn Sīnā levels at the theory of Forms is concerned with the version of the theory, discussed above, that holds the principles of physical things to be mathematical entities. The philosopher's critique of this version comprises two parts. In the first, he rejects the notion, as he does when establishing his hylomorphist theory of physics, that point exists independently of line, line of surface, and surface of natural body. Of most significance in this exposition, however, is his criticism of the doctrine that posits numbers to be the principles of natural things. Ibn Sīnā asserts that if numbers were the principles of natural things, the distinction amongst species would rely on characteristics of lessness and moreness. In this case, the difference between a man and a horse would be reduced to the former being more than the latter. However, because less is perforce involved in more, the horse would be involved in the man, which is obviously false.[19]

2. Al-Suhrawardī's Critique of Ibn Sīnā's Arguments

Before proceeding to the exposition of the answers al-Suhrawardī gives to Ibn Sīnā's criticisms of the theory of Forms, it is necessary to clarify the reason al-Suhrawardī defends this theory and to provide a context for his understanding of it. Al-Suhrawardī believes that the celestial and elemental beings emanate from immaterial lights. These lights are their species forms or "the lords/masters of icons/idols," as he calls them.[20] This belief is but an expression of Plato's theory of Forms.[21] Al-Suhrawardī identifies his concept of the world of lights with Plato's world of Forms by relating that Plato saw the world of lights in one of his mystical visions.[22] Thus, al-Suhrawardī would naturally defend the theory of Forms against Ibn Sīnā's criticisms.[23]

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19 *Ibid*., 64.

20 Abū l-Futūḥ Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā ibn Ḥabash al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq,* in idem., *Majmūʿa-yi Muṣannafāt-i Shaykh-i Ishrāq* (vol. II, ed. Henry Corbin; Tehran: Pizhūhishgāh-i ʿUlūm-i Insānī wa-Muṭālaʿāt-i Farhangī, 1373 HS [1993]), 143.

21 See *Ibid*., 159-160; idem., *Kitāb al-talwīḥāt al-lawḥiyya wa-l-ʿarshiyya*, in idem., *Majmūʿa-yi Muṣannafāt-i Shaykh-i Ishrāq* (vol. I, ed. Henry Corbin; Tehran: Pizhūhishgāh-i ʿUlūm-i Insānī wa-Muṭālaʿāt-i Farhangī, 1373 HS [1993]), 68.

22 Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, 155-156, 162, 255. See also Rifat Okudan, *İşrak Filozofu Sühreverdî Maktûl ve Eserlerindeki Üslup ve Belağat* [*al-Suhrawardī al-*

Though he tries to confute Ibn Sīnā's criticisms, al-Suhrawardī clarifies that the world of lights is not demonstrated by rational proofs; rather, one can only obtain knowledge of its existence and nature by shedding one's body and soaring to that world to behold it firsthand.[24] To emphasize the epistemological value of the spiritual vision and that of the science of light, or the Philosophy of Illumination built on that vision, he compares the vision in question to astronomical observations and the knowledge of lights to the science of astronomy.[25] Al-Suhrawardī believes that, in the end, both sciences depend on the observations of a few people and notes that, in astronomical matters, the Peripatetics rely on the observations of Ptolemy and that Aristotle relies almost solely on the observations of the Babylonians.[26] Al-Suhrawardī further claims that the science of lights is even more reliable than astronomy because its practitioners are pillars of wisdom and prophecy.[27] Thus, for al-Suhrawardī, the theory of Forms is the outcome of a direct vision of Forms and not the result of a confusion that took place during the mind's movement from the particulars to the universals, as Ibn Sīnā claims.

Nevertheless, al-Suhrawardī attempts to produce rational proofs to establish the existence of the lords/masters of icons/idols, or Forms.

Maqtūl, The Philosopher of Illumination, and His Style and Rhetoric in His Writings] (PhD dissertation; Isparta: Süleyman Demirel University, 2001), 111.

[23] For a detailed analysis of al-Suhrawardī's plan of emanation in relation to his doctrine of the lords/masters of idols/icons, see John Walbridge, "The Background to Mullā Ṣadrā's Doctrine of the Platonic Forms," in *Mulla Sadra and Transcendent Philosophy: Islam-West Philosophical Dialogue – The Papers presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra (May 1999, Tehran)* – (Tehran: Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute [SIPRIn], 2001), II, 155 ff.; İsmail Erdoğan, "Platon'un İdeler'ine Bazı İslam Düşünürlerince Yapılan Atıf ve Değerlendirmeler [Some Muslim Thinkers' References to and Assessments of Plato's Ideas]," *Bilimname* IV/1 (2004), 36 ff.; idem., "İşraki Düşüncede Türlerin Efendileri Meselesi [The Lords of Species in Ishrāqī Thought]," *Dinî Araştırmalar* [*Religious Studies*] VIII/23 (2005), 139 ff.

[24] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 13, 161-162; idem., *al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-muṭaraḥāt*, in idem., *Majmūʿā-yi Muṣannafāt-i Shaykh-i Ishrāq*, I, 460; idem., *al-Muqāwamāt*, in idem., *Majmūʿā-yi Muṣannafāt-i Shaykh-i Ishrāq*, I, 190.

[25] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 13.

[26] Al-Suhrawardī, *al-Mashāriʿ*, 460.

[27] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 156.

To achieve this, he identifies the agent that supervises and conducts activities vital to the human body, such as growth and nutrition. For him, it is impossible for these activities to be carried out by the rational soul because they typically occur without the knowledge and cognizance of the rational soul. Thus, these activities must be conducted by the self-subsistent and self-emanating lord of the species. The philosopher asserts that other natural phenomena also occur through the agency of the lords of icons. For example, the attraction of oil to fire occurs through the agency of the lord of the icon responsible for fire and not because of the absence of a vacuum between the two or the attractive power of fire.[28]

Al-Suhrawardī's second argument for the reality of the Forms is built upon a theory that he refers to as the "superior contingency principle."[29] This theory establishes the hierarchical nature of the emanation of beings from the Light of Light within the context of the Illuminative cosmology. Al-Suhrawardī envisions that the most proximate light emanates directly from the Light of Lights, followed by other vertical lights. These emanate from one the other, and from them originate the lords/masters of icons/idols. From these emanate the bodies and souls of the celestial and elemental beings. Therefore, if the elemental beings of the lowest rank exist, the masters of the idols that are situated above them, i.e., the Forms, must have come into existence before them.[30]

The existence of the Forms in this argument relies on the necessity of the hierarchy of emanation. To establish this necessity, or, in other words, to demonstrate the superior contingency principle, al-Suhrawardī presents the following argument: "If a contingent being of lower rank in the hierarchy has come into existence, the contingent being that is ranked higher must have come into existence before it. Thus, if the Light of Lights were to cause, through His aspect of unity, the dark barrier [i.e., the body] that is ranked lowest in the

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[28] Al-Suhrawardī, *al-Mashāriʿ*, 459-460.

[29] For further information on the theory, see Ghulām-Ḥusayn Ibrāhīmī Dīnānī, *Qawāʿid-i Kullī-yi Falsafī dar Falsafa-i Islāmī* (Tehran: Pizhūhishgāh-i ʿUlūm-i Insānī wa-Muṭālaʿāt-i Farhangī, 1381 HS [2001]), I, 33 ff.

[30] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 143. See also Eyüp Bekiryazıcı, *Şihâbeddin Sühreverdî'nin Felsefesinde Ontoloji Problemi* [*The Ontology Problem in the Philosophy of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī*] (PhD dissertation; Erzurum: Atatürk University, 2005), 86.

hierarchy, there would remain no aspect to cause a being ranked higher. If that higher being were assumed to have come into existence, it would imply that an aspect higher than the Light of Lights caused it, which is impossible."[31]

This aspect of al-Suhrawardī's argument appears to be flawed by circularity because the philosopher takes for granted that the aspect in the Light of Lights that causes light is higher than that which causes the body. This claim, however, has not yet been established and is not an obvious truth. In other words, the claim that light precedes the body in the hierarchy of emanation is being demonstrated by treating the same claim as an established truth.

Al-Suhrawardī begins his refutation of Ibn Sīnā's criticisms of the theory of Forms with an exposition of the theory. He first establishes that the exponents of the theory do not understand the Forms in the terms set forth by Ibn Sīnā. As mentioned above, Ibn Sīnā claimed that the second error underlying the rise of the theory of Forms originated in its proponents' misunderstanding of the concept of unity.[32] To counter this claim, al-Suhrawardī declares that the exponents of the theory, whom he praises with titles like "the great people" and "the people of power and insight," do not claim that there is an immaterial intellect responsible for humanity, i.e., a lord of the human icon, that designates the universal form of humanity, as understood by the Peripatetics, and rests in many people. Rather, knowing that that which is numerically one cannot possibly exist in those that are numerically many, they clarify that the lord of the icon for human beings is immaterial and distinct/independent from the human particulars. In addition, al-Suhrawardī goes on to relate, the theory's proponents acknowledge that the universals are purely mental and have no concrete reality.[33]

The following question should then be posed: If the Ideas are the universal forms of the things, and if the Ancient philosophers admit the universals to be purely mental entities, does it not follow that the Peripatetic claim that there are no species forms except those resting in the sensible particulars is true and that the theory of Forms is therefore proved false? For al-Suhrawardī, no such result ensues because

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[31] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 154.

[32] Ibn Sīnā, *Kitâbu'ş-Şifâ: Metafizik*, II, 60.

[33] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 158-160.

the words of the Ancient philosophers are metaphoric, which caused the Peripatetics to misunderstand what the Ancients meant by the term "universal." In other words, the sense in which the Ancients used the term "universal" is different from the meaning the Peripatetics assign to it. For al-Suhrawardī, the "universal man" referred to in the statement, "A universal man resides in the world of intelligibles," is, according to the Ancients, a dominating light having various and interacting rays, the human species in a world of corporeals. In this construction, the dominating light of humanity is universal, but not in the logical sense that it is predicated on many things. Instead, it is universal in the sense that it has equal relation to many particular humans by emanating onto all of them.[34]

Secondly, in contrast to logic's treatment of the universal, the Ancients clarify that this universal has a specified essence and is cognizant of itself. To illustrate the distinction between the Peripatetic and Illuminative notions of the universal, al-Suhrawardī mentions the Ancients' use of the terms "universal sphere" and "particular sphere," noting that the universal sphere encompasses all other spheres, unlike the concept of the universal in logic.[35]

Though he identifies the Ancients' metaphorical language as the primary reason for the Peripatetic misunderstanding of the theory of Forms, al-Suhrawardī mentions several other factors that contributed to this misconception. He claims that the subtleties of the theory have been obscured by linguistic factors, accretions to the theory, the transmitters, and the prejudices of the theory's adversaries.[36]

After furnishing the correct exposition of the theory, correcting the misunderstandings of the Peripatetics, and throwing the reasons behind these misunderstandings into sharper contrast, al-Suhrawardī tasks himself with confuting Ibn Sīnā's criticisms of the theory. As discussed above, Ibn Sīnā's most relevant criticism is founded upon the identity and distinctness of the immaterial and sensible forms. Insofar as these two forms have different natures, the immaterial forms are established as non-existent on the grounds of the nature of the sensible forms. If they are assumed to have the same nature, the immaterial forms cannot exist for two reasons. First, the sensible

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[34] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 160-161; idem., *al-Mashāriʿ*, 463.

[35] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 160-161.

[36] Al-Suhrawardī, *al-Mashāriʿ*, 463-464.

forms are inseparably joined to matter. In this case, the immaterial forms of the same nature are also necessarily joined to matter and cannot be separated from it. This implies that there can be no such things as immaterial forms. Second, if the sensible forms are assumed to depend on and have the same nature as the immaterial forms, the latter in turn must depend on other forms, inducing a recess *ad infinitum*. Ibn Sīnā's criticism of the mathematical entities operates on the same logic. The philosopher infers that because in this world the greater numbers contain the lesser ones, the same is true of Ideal numbers. In brief, Ibn Sīnā's criticism of the theory of Forms depends on the notion that the relationship between the immaterial and sensible forms is either one of identity or one of distinctness.[37]

In response to this criticism, al-Suhrawardī holds that the species' lords/masters of icons/idols, that is, the Forms, are simple and immaterial, while the icons and idols, i.e., the particulars, might be compound and material; the image of a thing need not resemble the thing in all respects.[38] To corroborate this argument, he reiterates that the mental image of humanity is universal, whereas the concrete human being is particular; the universal of humanity is abstract, while the men in the external world are concrete; the universal of humanity is neither corporeal nor substantial, while the concrete man is corporeal and substantial. In short, there are many points of difference between the universal of humanity and the concrete man, but the Peripatetics still acknowledge the former to be the image of the latter. Thus, the notion that the Forms are the image of the sensible particulars, concludes al-Suhrawardī, does not imply that the two must be identical in all respects.[39]

Based on this argument, al-Suhrawardī considers the following argument invoked by the Peripatetics to invalidate the Platonic Forms. He claims that this argument is erroneous because it stems from an incorrect notion of the image of a thing as the same as the thing itself: If the sensible form is not self-subsistent, the immaterial form must

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37 See Dīnānī, *Qawāʿid-i Kullī-yi Falsafī*, I, 171.

38 Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 159; idem., *al-Mashāriʿ*, 461.

39 Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 159; idem., *al-Mashāriʿ*, 228-229. See also Yusuf Ziya Yörükan, *Şihabeddin Sühreverdî ve* Nur Heykelleri [*Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī and His* Hayākil al-Nūr] (translated from Old Turkish into Modern Turkish by Ahmet Kamil Cihan; Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1998), 62.

also be not self-subsistent, and if the immaterial form is self-subsistent, the sensible form must also be self-subsistent. However, the sensible form is not self-subsistent. Therefore, the immaterial forms are likewise not self-subsistent. As a result, the existence of the immaterial forms as distinct from the particulars, i.e., the theory of Forms, is false.[40]

Al-Suhrawardī refutes this argument in the following manner: The Peripatetics say that a substantial entity rests in the mind as an accident. In other words, a thing has both a concrete existence and a mental existence. Thus, it is possible that there might be self-subsisting entities in the world of intelligibles, i.e., the Forms, corresponding to not self-subsistent icons/idols in this world. These icons/idols are effects of the Forms, but they do not have the same character as the Forms. This is the case with the forms of concrete things that rest in the mind but are not self-subsistent.[41]

Al-Suhrawardī argues that the term "form" applies to immaterial and material forms equivocally or by gradation. In other words, the form is predicated on the Ideas and the sensible forms in similar ways, but the Ideas deserve to be called "forms" in a more perfect sense because they are of substantial and immaterial nature. The sensible forms are called "forms" in a less perfect sense because they are neither substance nor immaterial.

To support his argument, al-Suhrawardī mentions the Peripatetic use of the term "existence."[42] He states that although they employ the term existence to refer to both the Necessary Existent and contingent beings, the Peripatetics hold existence to imply Him Himself when employed in association with Him but to designate an accident attached to the contingent beings when used in relation with them. If the Necessary Existent is held to be free from quiddity as distinct from His existence, that is to say, He is necessary solely because He is existent, all other beings, too, shall be free from quiddity because they

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[40] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 92; *al-Mashāriʿ*, 464.

[41] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 92-99. See also Yörükan, "Şeyh Suhreverdi'nin Felsefesi [The Philosophy of al-Shaykh al-Suhrawardī]," (translated from Old Turkish to Modern Turkish by Mustafa Bulut), *Hikmet Yurdu: Düşünce Yorum Sosyal Bilimler Araştırma Dergisi* [*Hikmet Yurdu: A Research Journal on Thought, Interpretation, Social Sciences*] III/5 (January-June 2010), 426 ff.

[42] Al-Suhrawardī, *Kitāb al-talwīḥāt*, 13.

are also existent. However, if He is necessary through an accident, this first implies Him to be compound, which is impossible. Secondly, we must ask if the Necessary Existent possesses that accident by Himself or through another. In the first case, He would only possess it by existing. Thus, other beings could also have the same accident and thereby become necessary. In the second case, He would be necessary by means of a cause, an obviously false result. However, it is impossible for the Necessary Existent to be necessary on the grounds that He is uncaused; He is uncaused because He is necessary, not necessary because He is uncaused. Thus, His necessity cannot be established by negating His causedness.[43]

As has been demonstrated, al-Suhrawardī aims Ibn Sīnā's own weapon at Ibn Sīnā himself, anticipating the following response from his adversary to deal the final deadly blow: "The necessity of the Necessary Existent is the perfection and intensity of His existence. Just as one thing is blacker than another through the perfection in its essential blackness and not through something superadded to blackness, the existence of the Necessary Existence is distinguished from the existence of the contingents through its intensity and perfection." Upon receiving the expected response, al-Suhrawardī concludes, "Just as the Necessary Existent is made necessary by His Essence as other beings are made contingent by their essences, the Ideas, by the same token, are made immaterial and substantial by their essences, while the sensible forms are made material and dependent on the substantial."[44]

Al-Suhrawardī directs another criticism at the Peripatetics from the same perspective: Ibn Sīnā argues that the motions of the celestial spheres are not caused by such motives as wrath and passion, but by their desire to resemble their separate intellects, their principles of emanation.[45] With this argument, claims al-Suhrawardī, the

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[43] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 93-94. For the equivocal application of the term "existence" to the Necessary Existent and the contingent beings, see al-Suhrawardī, *al-Mashāriʿ*, 223. See also Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Mufassir-i ʿĀlam-i Ghurbat wa-Shahīd-i Ṭarīq-i Maʿrifat," in Ḥasan Sayyid ʿArab (ed.), *Muntakhabī az Maqālāt-i Fārsī dar bāra-yi Shaykh-i Ishrāq Suhrawardī* (Tehran: Shafīʿī, 1378 HS [2000]), 140-141.

[44] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 94.

[45] Ibn Sīnā, *İşaretler ve Tembihler* [=*al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīḥāt*] (translated into Turkish by Ali Durusoy, Muhittin Macit, and Ekrem Demirli; Istanbul: Litera Ya-

Peripatetics admit the reality of the theory of Forms. Saying that the motions of the celestial spheres resemble those of their intellects is the same as saying that the beings in the world of corporeals resemble their Forms. The Peripatetics, however, reject the latter while they accept the former, which is a clear contradiction.[46]

Conclusion

Though al-Suhrawardī regards himself as a philosopher and his endeavor as philosophical, neither his understanding of the philosopher's task nor his conception of philosophy fully overlap with common perceptions of philosophers and philosophy. He treats philosophy as speculative and intuitive. He is not engaging in philosophy that depends on and attaches importance only to rational reasoning but in philosophy that, though it also attaches importance to the rational enterprise, draws primarily on mystical experience and vision. He therefore classifies philosophers into three essential categories: the philosophers who are well versed in both speculative and intuitive philosophy, those who are well versed in intuitive philosophy alone, and those who are well versed in speculative philosophy alone.[47] He seems to situate Plato and himself in the first group, the verified Sufis in the second, and Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā in the third.[48]

What underlies this categorization which clearly works against the speculative philosophers is al-Suhrawardī's conviction that speculation and rational reasoning alone cannot yield knowledge of the truth but must be accompanied by and substantiated with intuition, i.e., mystical experience. He maintains that one can separate himself from his body by weakening his bodily aspects and strengthening his spiritual aspects through a long and painful process of purgative and spiritual exercises. This can enable one to glimpse and eventually see a full vision of the metaphysical world, a feat achieved by the "divine philosophers (*mutaʾallih*)," [49] "the detached ones (*mujarrad*)," and

yıncılık, 2005), 146-147; idem., *al-Najāt fī l-manṭiq wa-l-ilāhiyyāt* (edited by ʿAbd al-Rahmān ʿUmayra; Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1992), II, 120.

46 Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 176-177.

47 *Ibid*., 11-12.

48 Mahmut Kaya, "İşrâkıyye [Ishrāqiyya]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], XXIII, 435.

49 Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 12; idem., *al-Mashāriʿ*, 503.

"the people of spiritual vision (*ahl al-mushāhada*)."[50] He claims that Hermes, Plato, Zarathustra, and King Kaykhosrow experienced this vision,[51] that he himself relinquished Peripatetic philosophy as a result of a similar experience,[52] and that the *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* is the fruit of such an experience.[53]

However, the following question arises at this point: From what epistemological perspective does al-Suhrawardī find the Peripatetic philosophy inadequate and criticize it? Furthermore, as a result of this criticism, how does he transform the Peripatetic philosophy into an instrument supporting the Illuminative philosophy? Briefly, the positive knowledge of metaphysical truths, which could be understood to be that of the world of lights or the Forms, al-Suhrawardī argues, can be acquired only through mystical experience and spiritual vision, not through speculative reasoning. Nevertheless, he cannot prove by means of mystical vision to one with no mystical vision, for instance, a Peripatetic, that reason is inadequate and its conclusions are mistaken in the metaphysical realm – a logical rule that al-Suhrawardī himself also acknowledges.[54] He, however, seems to believe that he can effectively demonstrate to the Peripatetics that they cannot deny the existence of the Forms without falling into clear self-contradiction.

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[50] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 155. See also Yörükan, *Şihabeddin Sühreverdî ve* Nur Heykelleri, 55-56, 58, 68 ff.

[51] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 156; idem., *Kitāb al-talwīḥāt*, 112-113.

[52] Al-Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, 156.

[53] *Ibid*., 259.

[54] *Ibid*., 42.

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Pizhūhishgāh-i ʿUlūm-i Insānī wa-Muṭālaʿāt-i Farhangī, 1373 HS [1993]), I, 1-121.

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THE NATURE OF ROYAL AUTHORITY (*MULK*) IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTINUITY AND MUTABILITY IN IBN KHALDŪN'S THOUGHT

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Abstract

The basic claim of Ibn Khaldūn in his *Muqaddima* is that there must be a theoretical frame that corresponds to facts about state and society *qua* they are state and society to make a correct analysis about a given state and society. What Ibn Khaldūn's theory of royal authority (*mulk*) provides is an accurate analysis of state and society as they exist. Accordingly the conceptual frame analyzes the essence of civilization and the accidental changes in a royal authority and state that occur at any time and space that do not change the essence of them. But the premises about the nature and the essence can be determined according to their matters, not to their reasonable consistencies of accuracy and fallacy. Ibn Khaldūn, thus, balances the constants and variables. In this article, after analyzing Ibn Khaldūn's theory of royal authority in its own philosophical context, I discuss the metaphysical assumptions of this theory.

Key Words: Ibn Khaldūn, royal authority (*mulk*), *ʿaṣabiyya*, *maṣlaḥa*

Ibn Khaldūn is one of the most studied Muslim thinkers, and modern academic research has focused on different aspects of him. Many researchers have written articles and books on his ideas about phi-

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losophy, politics, society, economy, and the history of science.[1] Among those, writers such as Muḥsin Mahdī, Ahmet Arslan, ʿAlī al-Wardī, and Tahsin Görgün aim to establish the philosophical foundations of his political thought in relation to philosophers including Aristotle, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Writers such as Syed Farid Alatas, Aziz Al-Azmeh, M. Umer Chapra, Laroussi Amri, Johann P. Arnason, Dieter Weiss, Recep Şentürk, and Tahsin Görgün discuss the modernity of Ibn Khaldūn's theories on state and society and whether they are reproduced. Among those attempts to refer to Ibn Khaldūn's thought, Syed Farid Alatas considers the economical and political analysis of Islam in general and Asian societies in particular, and Recep Şentürk examines an alternative sociology of civilizations.[2] We can add to these names writers who compare Ibn Khaldūn's thoughts to the ideas of the pioneers of the modern social and political thought, including Karl Marx and Max Weber.[3] As Muḥsin Mahdī and Tahsin Görgün stress, philosophical theories, as in the works of al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, serve as a medium or tool by which Ibn Khaldūn expresses his ideas, but they also constitute the base for his social and political theories.[4] Ibn Khaldūn's social and political theory is a successful application of the metaphysics of Ibn Sīnā to the social level, using thinkers such as al-

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1 For a short sketch of these studies, see Cengiz Tomar, "İbn Haldûn: Literatür [Ibn Khaldūn: Literature]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], XX, 8-12.

2 Syed Farid Alatas, "A Khaldunian Exemplar for a Historical Sociology for the South," *Current Sociology* LIV/3 (2006), 397-411; idem., "A Khaldunian Perspective on the Dynamics of Asiatic Societies," *Comparative Civilizations Review* 29 (1993), 29-51.

3 For a study that conveys this, see articles by Muhammad Dhaouadi, Recep Şentürk, Syed Farid Alatas, Faruk Yaslıçimen, Lütfi Sunar, Tahsin Görgün, and M. Umer Chapra that discuss the modernity of Ibn Khaldūn, see *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi* [*Turkish Journal of Islamic Studies*] 16 (*İbn Haldun Özel Sayısı II* [*Special Issue: Ibn Khaldūn II*]) (2006).

4 Muhsin Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldûn's Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science of Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 63-131; Ahmet Arslan, *İbn Haldûn'un İlim ve Fikir Dünyası* [*Ibn Khaldūn's World of Thought*] (Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 1997), 437-452; Tahsin Görgün, "İbn Haldûn: Görüşleri [Ibn Khaldūn: His Ideas]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], XIX, 543-555.

Ghazālī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. We can discuss the necessary assumptions of a modern social and political theory produced from classical Islamic thought, depending on Ibn Khaldūn's theory of royal authority (*mulk*). After analyzing Ibn Khaldūn's theory of royal authority in its own philosophical context, I discuss the metaphysical assumptions of this theory.

A. The Theory of Royal Authority

Ibn Khaldūn bases his social theory on several concepts, including Bedouin life (*badāwa*), settled life (*ḥaḍāra*), group feeling (*ʿaṣabiyya*), royal authority, and state, some of which can be considered to be the goals of others. By doing so, he aims to create a philosophical science that takes society as a subject and to determine universal rules to correctly and comprehensively analyze social facts. Ibn Khaldūn utilizes the peripatetic theory of matter-form. The basic reason for him to use this theory is to find necessary and possible situations defined at the material level, not the mental level. By starting from definite and unchangeable characters in human beings as actors in society, he thus tries to reach the necessary consequences of the human nature in material necessity. To follow such necessities, Ibn Khaldūn takes the peripatetics' definition of human as the base. Accordingly, man is a "rational animal." In this definition, "animal" indicates the near genus of man, while "rational" indicates the differentia that distinguish man from other animals that share the near genus. Both qualities are attributes of man inasmuch as he is man, and they do not change according to individuals, societies, time, and space. When Ibn Khaldūn talks about human nature, he means the quiddity of man, which essentially comprises the attributes of life and reflection. This nature or quiddity has common qualities in all animals inasmuch as they are animals. The most important of these qualities are feeding and defense, which are necessary for survival. While feeding is a direct necessity for animals, the need for defense occurs as a consequence of the quality of attack, which is also a direct necessity for animals. Ibn Khaldūn establishes these qualities as the final reason for the creation of communities constituted by humans. When stating that "the need for feeding and defense is the cause for the human communities to be formed," he means that these two situations are the final cause of society. Humans come together to reach this final cause, and "unity" happens among individuals. Therefore, *ʿumrān* is

the general name of the communities shaped by humans who come together and unite.

After meeting the needs of feeding and defense, man continues to be a social being, as this is the continuous need of man and his everlasting goal, although that goal may be contrary to the particular goals of specific men. Living together is a natural quality of man, and it is the meaning of the statement "man is civilized by nature." In social terms, something that is natural is something that is necessary for the human species in general. This necessity does not require that man maintains an autonomous existence, that is, he does not require additional elements to fulfill that necessity.

Another element is required to maintain the unity between individuals to protect the endurance of the social being, and Ibn Khaldūn calls it "group feeling" (*ʿaṣabiyya*). Group feeling, which we can understand as the "spirit of collaboration" in its broadest sense, allows the fulfillment of protection and defense in an organized manner. The function of group feeling becomes apparent when considering the condition of "offense," which causes the need for defense. Although offense, or the effort to seize others' commodities (*muṭālaba*), is one reason to form society, leading to a human condition called defense, it is not a situation that changes human beings and continues to exist. Offense, or *muṭālaba*, is thus found in any human community with its derivatives, protection, and defense. A human community formed to defend itself from outside attacks always has an offensive power directed against the outside. The conditions of offense and defense are not only outward-oriented situations in which two or more communities are assumed if they are considered at the social level. Conversely, as in feeding, because both offense and defense occur at the individual level, these conditions occur inside a given community rather than between communities. The direct consequences of feeding and offense, in particular, happen inside the community. As a result of the need for feeding, arts, occupations, and multiple livelihoods emerge within the society, while the weapons industry and armaments emerge as a result of the character of offense and the need for defense. The group feeling is a nominal meaning that helps activate the defensive and offensive powers in the social level, not the individual, because private armament cannot meet the society's need for defense.

Ibn Khaldūn compares society and group feeling to the temperament of natural things. In natural things, elements that come together to form temperaments must be dominant over one another. The unity of disposition cannot be fulfilled when all elements are equal. As in the group feeling, one or several human elements must be dominant (*ghālib*) over others to form a truly united community.[5] Although the relationship between dominance and group feeling seems to be a mutual necessitating (*talāzum*) relationship at first glance, group feeling comes before dominance by essence and is the material cause of dominance. Group feeling, while acting as a form in relation to human communities, thus acts as a matter in relation to dominance; a community clarifies group feeling early, once the form of dominance becomes clear. In the thought of Ibn Khaldūn, the term that changes group feeling to a political term and provides the movement from social to political theory is dominance. A presidency that combines the meanings of hegemony and leadership, sometimes called "*suʾūda*," only happens with dominance.[6]

The basic function of presidency is to control the powers of offense and extravagance and to govern a society so that it is closer to true unity, according to certain goals; we can call this form a "society" to distinguish it from the previous discussion. However, Ibn Khaldūn uses the word "*raʾīs*," meaning a ruler who does not have sanctioned power. A president thus has followers but does not have the power to force them to act on demand. Moreover, presidency is the source of dominance, and it bears a deficient hegemonic power. A presidency denotes a situation in which an administration is not fully established with all necessary requirements. If the ability to apply demands forcefully is added to the definition of presidency, then royal authority emerges. Presidency thus corresponds to the matter of the nature of royal authority which is common among all governors, while "forcefully applying demands" corresponds to the differentia of royal authority. Royal authority is a type of administration that is one more degree privatized and more specific than presidency. Ibn Khaldūn uses the word "*mulk*" to mean "an authority which prevents the extravagance among people to meet wholly the need for defense and

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5 Ibn Khaldūn, Abū Zayd ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad, *Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn* (ed. Darwīsh al-Juwaydī; 2nd edn., Ṣaydā, Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 1996), 124.

6 *Ibid*.

has the power of dominance, energy, and sanction over people"
(فيكون ذلك الوازع واحدا منهم يكون له عليهم الغلبة و السلطان و اليد القاهرة حتى لا يصل احد الى غيره بعدوان و هذا هو معنى الملك.)[7]

Because the source of the existence of this authority is the power of anger and offense, its main function is "to prevent the extravagance among people." There must be an energy that provides the force for this function. Force leads to the second function of royal authority: to make royal wishes be enacted by force. Using this definition, royal authority realizes a situation that is potentially included in the conditions of anger, offense, protection, assembly, *ʿaṣabiyya*, and leadership; royal authority is thus the goal of the human soul and *ʿaṣabiyya*. The possessor of *ʿaṣabiyya*, when he reaches a certain point, enforces the *suʿūda* and government, and afterwards, subjugation and coercion. When he achieves the subjugation and coercion, there is no new goal to achieve; the goal is only to protect the status quo (و أما الملك فهو التغلب و الحكم بالقهر).[8] If the royal authority formation process is carefully observed, then maintaining royal authority also means protecting the existence of humans and their communities. According to Ibn Khaldūn, royal authority is thus the natural character of man, and its fulfillment is not related to human choice. Conversely, in certain processes, the existence of society reaches the necessary level of royal authority and maintains it.[9] This is why royal authority is the final form of human gathering. The term "royal authority" in all its stages corresponds to the concept of state in all its stages and constitutes the most advanced form of *ʿumrān* (civilization).

Ibn Khaldūn states that royal authority is founded on two bases: The first is *shawq* (the power of enforcement) and *ʿaṣabiyya*. The concrete sign of this first base is an army. The second base is the commodity that provides for the maintenance of things needed by the army and royal authority, which can be called a treasury.[10] In this case, the matter of royal authority corresponds to all things governed by the possessor of royal authority. All material and spiritual beings

7 *Ibid*., 47.

8 *Ibid*., 30.

9 *Ibid*., 139, 189.

10 *Ibid*., 269.

that can be regarded as part of the army and treasury constitute a matter of royal authority. In this context, royal authority belongs to the private or corporate personality over which there are no higher governing powers; he collects taxes, sends envoys, establishes borders, and has ultimate coercive power. If *ʿaṣabiyya* fails to provide some of these issues, the essence of royal authority is not accomplished.[11] The mentioned cases indicate the *ʿaṣabiyya*'s sphere of influence that is possessed by the royal authority. The possessor of royal authority only governs liable people who are his followers and whose taxes are collected in the land whose borders are protected by him. In this context, while the state and royal authority constitute the form of the civilization, citizens, cities, and other elements constitute the matter of the civilization.[12] The state and royal authority are those things that protect the civilization, and it is not possible for them to be separated from its matter. Whereas without civilization, the state and royal authority cannot be imagined, a civilization without a state and royal authority cannot exist (*mutaʿadhdhir*) because of human nature.[13] From this point, royal authority is thus a relative term because forceful sovereignty, which is the nature of royal authority, is a continuous quality for governing a person or group. Forceful sovereignty is something that exists between the governor and those who are governed, and its meaning is realized using these two elements. Maintaining royal authority does not mean maintaining one of the two sides, but both. While maintaining society is connected to maintaining the royal authority or state, maintaining the state or royal authority is also connected to maintaining society. To maintain the civilization, there should be an element related to both royal authority and the matter of royal authority that protects them.

To discover this element, Ibn Khaldūn again starts from the theory of matter and form. According to this theory, generation and corruption in bodies (*kawn* and *fasād*) involve re-gaining different and new forms. If one form corresponds to the essence of the thing, the thing that loses its unity of form changes into something else. The changed form, as it continues to be itself if it experiences an accident and not a changed essence, becomes subject to a movement that occurs in its quality, quantity, or another accidental category. This movement con-

11 *Ibid*., 175-176.

12 *Ibid*., 343.

13 *Ibid*., 349.

tains an accidental form or change in shape. If we consider civilization as a quiddity made of matter and form, the form that provides its species' unity is its royal authority. However, coercion and subjugation, which comprise the essence of royal authority, are consequences of the animal power of anger; therefore, royal authority in its pure form leads to arbitrary tyranny. This case becomes concrete when the royal authority is "forcing people in accordance with their wishes and mostly to the works above their abilities," in the words of Ibn Khaldūn, which corrupts the civilization in the short or long term, depending on the given conditions. Using forceful power, which provides for the continuation of government to the personal benefit of one side, prevents both the continuation of cases coming from the form (as benefits change depending on people or groups) and the maintenance of the form's existence, destroying the matter that carries the form. The nature of royal authority, as it leads to chaos and death, is inclined to destroy itself.[14] This case sometimes causes the destruction of the government of a certain ruler with royal authority (the personal state) or the whole body of the state with the *ʿaṣabiyya*, which is the protector of the royal authority (the universal state); this is the real reason for the destruction of the civilization.[15] The nature of royal authority is thus not suitable for the long term in its pure form, and there must be an element that maintains and protects the relationship between the matter and form of a civilization. This element, according to Ibn Khaldūn, is political law, that is, the affairs of both sides forming the nature of the civilization are considered and subject to general acceptance. The state, if it lacks such laws, cannot be considered functional or completely sovereign (a real state).[16]

In this context, Ibn Khaldūn's analysis about continuing the civilization is based on two terms: *maṣlaḥa* and law. Ibn Khaldūn uses the concept *maṣlaḥa* as the opposite of a person or group's goals (*gharaḍ*) and wishes (*shahwa*). In this regard, *maṣlaḥa* means social benefits that maintain a civilization. The rules created to achieve these benefits and prevent obstacles that eliminate these benefits constitute laws. As *maṣlaḥa* and law are additional cases to the nature of royal authority, Ibn Khaldūn calls those royal authorities that lack *maṣlaḥa*s and law (and govern people according to their own wishes

[14] *Ibid*., 177.

[15] *Ibid*., 349.

[16] *Ibid*., 177.

and goals) "natural royal authority." He distinguishes those royal authorities that govern people in accordance with rules created to achieve the *maṣlaḥa*s and prevent obstacles using the principle that determines the *maṣlaḥa*. Ibn Khaldūn's *maṣlaḥa* division is particularly dependent on the classification of knowledge and science made by later theologians and philosophers and follows his observations on the source of knowledge in the last section of the *Muqaddima*. Accordingly, if *maṣlaḥa* are worldly *maṣlaḥa*s, created by absolute intellect without concerning religious recommendations (and the rules are based on these *maṣlaḥa*s), then this constitutes political royal authority. This royal authority seeks to govern people in accordance with "reasonable thinking." If *maṣlaḥa*s are eschatological and worldly *maṣlaḥa*s are subordinate to and determined by eschatological ones, then the government is considered to be a caliphate. This royal authority seeks to govern people according to "religious thinking." Contrary to political royal authority, a caliphate denotes determining worldly cases according to the eschatological *maṣlaḥa*s in the eye of the Ruler; it basically involves being the viceroy of the Ruler in protecting both worldly and religious life.[17]

Ibn Khaldūn's analysis on the nature of royal authority indicates that there are two basic conditions to completely establish this nature. The first is that the external factor with enforcement power has the quality of compulsion. The second is that compulsion and enforcements are applied for laws made in accordance with worldly *maṣlaḥa*s or worldly-eschatological *maṣlaḥa*s. A third condition can be added to these two conditions, which Ibn Khaldūn mentions when he analyzes the period of the first four caliphs. There is neither any power of enforcement to achieve benefits and prevent obstacles nor any conscientious sanctions that allow the inclusion of outside agents. The sanctioning power that forces person to obey the *maṣlaḥa*s must be other factors beside the person.[18] In such a case, the first condition of royal authority, i.e., the condition that allows a

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17 *Ibid*., 178.

18 The nature of royal authority did not achieve its complete form at the time of the first caliphs because, during that period, enforcement was religious (*waḍʿī*) and everyone had the power of enforcement. However, after the time of Muʿāwiya, the *ʿaṣabiyya* was directed to royal authority, the religious enforcement weakened and "the *sulṭānī*" and "the *ʿaṣbānī*" enforcements were needed. See *Ibid*., 196.

presidency to change into a royal authority, fails, and the laws actually become recommendations such that they are no longer orders. This condition shows that the state and royal authority are not equal. All royal authorities are states, but not all states are royal authorities. There was not a fully established royal authority in the first period of Islam, although there was a real state. Ibn Khaldūn contends that this is an exception in human history and that royal authority and states are equal if such exceptions are not considered. According to Ibn Khaldūn, our general experiments in human relations indicate that men obey laws not voluntarily but rather because of the lawmakers' commands and prosecutions, except in certain periods (such as in the times of the first caliphs). A government that lacks one of these three qualities is a government in which the nature of royal authority does not occur to perfection; instead, it is in the process of seeking perfection. These three qualities shape the essence and nature of royal authority, which has these qualities *qua* it is itself.

The concept of a royal authority with these qualities presumes that social and political processes are conflictive by nature. Those who are the possessors or bearers of the royal authority are those who are successful in their conflict processes, thanks to their *ʿaṣabiyya*. In this case, the direct consequence achieved by the royal authority is the hegemony of the bearers of royal authority over others. If we call "the hegemony" the power, the first and most important thing that royal authority gives to the bearers is the power. At the beginning of the possession of royal authority for subjugating others, power is a collective capacity and success between conflicting powers of the *ʿaṣabiyya*. However, this is contrary to assumptions in modern theories that perceive power as collective capacity and success. This does not depend on a balance between social and political relations, yet it depends on the continuity of conflict itself. The leader who possesses royal authority is inclined to take control of the power and discharge the *ʿaṣabiyya* in progress. After discharging the *ʿaṣabiyya* that allows the acquisition of royal authority, the royal authority exists in one person. This case that Ibn Khaldūn calls *infirād* is the "zero sum" in the words of today's sociologists and is the peak of the asymmetry that has been the basic quality of royal authority since it emerged. However, *infirād* does not allow monopolization, as the nature of royal authority requires mutual relativity between the bearers. When the royal authority achieves the level of *infirād*, the power of the bearer of royal authority represents a kind of relation to the

"effectuated" *ʿaṣabiyya* that occurs as long as bearer of royal authority has the ability to control others. Although this effectuated *ʿaṣabiyya* serves the will of and benefits the possessor of royal authority because the *ʿaṣabiyya* benefits are related to him, the possessor of royal authority himself "does fulfill their wishes" because his benefits are related to the effectuated *ʿaṣabiyya*. While this connection between bearer of royal authority and new *ʿaṣabiyya* strengthens, the power to achieve his own goal weakens, despite the powers of control or opposition. When control weakens, the power is divided between the possessors of royal authority. In every case, the power has the character of an unequal capacity to achieve the sources that both the bearers and all parts of the community consider valuable. The basic element of the power that emerges as a requirement of the nature of royal authority is to achieve a wish or goal. In short, power, according to the thought of Ibn Khaldūn, is a power directed toward a goal. The bearer of the power is either an individual who has taken the control of the royal authority or a group of individuals who have come together for certain purposes. Critical decisions and the ability to control capital are the consequences of royal authority and power. There must be observable conflict for royal authority and power to gain existence. At that stage, the authority for "citizens to fulfill the demands of the person who possesses the royal authority or the governing group" is an authority by force and a consequence of the power's essence. For a royal authority that depends on the *ʿaṣabiyya* before the creation of the effectuated *ʿaṣabiyya*, the authority of the possessor of royal authority over citizens is a derivative of the possessor's power. The authority of the possessor of royal authority over his own *ʿaṣabiyya* is not a derivative of royal authority in this stage. Because the royal authority is not completely held by one person before the effectuated *ʿaṣabiyya* emerges, the members of the founding *ʿaṣabiyya* claim the right to royal authority and power. This claim is legal if the process of the forming royal authority is considered because the source of the legality "in terms of holding the right in royal authority and power" is the power that fights and wins, and the fighting members of the *ʿaṣabiyya* share this power.

Conversely, in order for royal authority to be a correlation between the ruler and the ruled, and to depend on common benefits for survival, observable conflicts must be annihilated; then, the existence of the royal authority and power will be maintained. In this case, the royal authority and power cease to exist as much as the forceful sanc-

tions serve the benefits of an individual or a group. The bearer or bearers of the power maintain their existence if they make their personal or group benefits become part of the social benefits. With the help of laws, this situation allows the royal authority to assume the form of society in its real meaning by changing the bad, offensive side of power and royal authority into a good and cooperative character. Society and royal authority become a complete body that contains both matter and form, which deeply affects the civilization's borders and how the power and authority are shared. The quiddity comprising the matter and form receives some qualities that are free from the bearers of the power and authority. These qualities exceed even the goal and will of the person who controls the royal authority. The mentioned qualities are structural needs that arise with conscious or unconscious acts of a person or a group in the society. Similar cases include almost all spiritual beings that become the focus of the knowledge of civilization when Ibn Khaldūn calls them accidents added to the royal authority *qua* its essence. These cases necessitated by form are the hardest ones to explain because they occur in a civilization because of agents in that civilization. These convey the individual and social contributions of the bearers, and they convey most elements that constitute the matter of the civilization. A solution requires both distinctively analyzing the attributes of the matter and form and distinguishing the subjected limitations and situations required because the form can be found in a specific matter.

The actual unification of the social being and royal authority, achieved through laws dependent on benefits, is an additional case to be considered, and it involves privatization (unlike the previous cases); this case is also relevant for the bearers of power and authority. In this case, the royal authority is given to grant benefits. Although the benefit-granting degree differs among individuals with royal authority, this case adds to the natural goal of the royal authority certain volitional goals that aim to maintain the civilization. It replaces offense with defense, conflict with calmness, coercion with compassion, relative wildness with closeness, rudeness with elegance, and nuisance with peace. An important result of this situation is an increase in the number of bearers of authority, i.e., power by "controlling" and authority by "meeting the demands of someone else or a group." This numerical expansion can happen with the help of either civil institutions or actual institutionalized cases. The institutions, defined according to their benefits and necessarily gaining an existence

free from the bearers of royal authority (to maintain the nature of royal authority), acquire a systemic character and limit the power of the possessor of royal authority because they bear the nature of royal authority in their essence. Because they commonly fulfill their demands by force, they function as "controllers" of royal authority within certain limits. While the institutions represent the actualization of benefits, the authority is shared between those who determine, apply, and control the benefits. The power dramatically loses its function as a source of authority, and the knowledge, application, and control of benefits constitute a source of authority. Private and corporate rights are determined according to the benefits and laws, not the capacity of the force and its control. The legitimacy of power as a sustainable case in a political or religious royal authority, compared with a natural royal authority, is bound by laws and benefits, and it is explained in the framework of the notion of justice.

Ibn Khaldūn sees this stage as one in which the characters of man are more visible, not because he is animal, but instead because he is a rational and reflective being. According to him, the qualities by which man maintains his existence as man are good qualities (*khilāl al-khayr*). Good qualities are complementary of the honor (*majd*) that is an extension of the *ʿaṣabiyya*. Because royal authority is the goal of *ʿaṣabiyya*, royal authority is also the goal of *ʿaṣabiyya*'s complementary qualities and extensions. Without good qualities, the nature of royal authority always stays imperfect, even if royal authority is realized.[19] These qualities are realized by obeying the individual, and social benefits and virtues (*faḍīla*) emerge. If these qualities are abandoned, the possessors of royal authority, power, and authority start to lose their ranks. The realization of the nature of the royal authority changes the offense and *muṭālaba*, which cause the *ʿaṣabiyya* to gain its royal authority into defense and self-protection in the process. If luxury, peace, and prosperity, which emerge with the perfection of royal authority, are not balanced with virtues, they will demolish the bases of royal authority that are the form of the civilization; with a new *ʿaṣabiyya*, the foundation of a new royal authority begins.

Observations made so far show that, according to Ibn Khaldūn, there is no sociological form of royal authority and power. When the concept of royal authority is considered in its pure state in the pro-

[19] *Ibid*., 133-135.

cess that Ibn Khaldūn calls "natural royal authority," the theory of royal authority turns into a theory that explains dynasties. Royal authority in its pure state inclines toward the *infirād* by nature and requires power to be collected in one person. The changes to royal authority in the process and its two basic stages indicate that this theory is not unique to dynasties. One can understand the *ʿaṣabiyya* as providing social solidarity and the *infirād* as the centralization of power. The situation of "fulfilling the demands by force" that forms the nature of the royal authority and the changes that the power and authority undergo in the two stages are situations that can happen in every kind of regime. Ibn Khaldūn distinguishes terms such as *ʿaṣabiyya,* royal authority, hegemony, benefit, and law, all of which are the framework of the royal authority theory as terms that require mutual relativity (*taḍāyuf*) and whose realization degrees differ in some cases, although their definitions do not change. The human conditions indicated by these terms emerge at the social level and require each other, and these terms can only be understood in reference to each other. Conversely, realizing these situations at the social level has no form or quantity in the last instance. Anyone who analyzes the social structure in any society, before analyzing the forms and quantities of spiritual beings, must first state the existence of their meanings or definitions. This theory depends on the concept of power as a necessary consequence of the animal desires of man. In contrast, by relating the maintenance of power to the virtues that balance animal desires, the final perfection of power occurs in the concept of justice. Furthermore, the virtues required by Ibn Khaldūn to maintain both power and the state are seen as human conditions created by limiting the existence of the material beings of state and society. The form of social and political elements is necessarily in a position to produce its own virtues. These virtues arise because man is a rational being. They are not moral values that are tools to reach the metaphysical realities or requirements of God's orders. They are universal principles that are the result of the material being, and according to this definition, they are required for the creation of a social structure.

B. The Metaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Royal Authority

Ibn Khaldūn's theory of royal authority depends on the five principles of classical Islamic metaphysics, as seen in Ibn Sīnā. The first principle is that the existence of man consists of the soul and the

body. The second is that all bodies consist of matter and form, and the difference among bodies is due to new forms of matter. The third is the distinction between essence and existence, which Ibn Sīnā developed to explain the relationship between unity and multitude. The fourth is the Aristotelian principle of teleology. According to this principle, everything that exists has a final purpose, and everything is in movement to fulfill its purpose. The fifth principle is the general consequence of these principles: everything's perfection is included in its definition, and anything can reach its perfection as much as its definition allows. Ibn Khaldūn's success is his ability to apply these principles to the social level, which constitutes the focus of the knowledge of civilization, in accordance with the hierarchy of the philosophical sciences. He offers two statements that precede this application: the first is about the method of being and the second is about the scope of being.

First, Ibn Khaldūn is aware that there is no complete overlap between the philosophical sciences, which are divided into theoretical and practical sciences and the scope of being, which these main divisions are supposed to examine. Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā divide beings into those who exist by human will and those exist without human will, and they consider the philosophical sciences. The things that exist with humans are assigned to the practical sciences, including morality, home management, and politics. These sciences have two sides: theoretical and practical. In the theoretical aspect, the universal rules about the examined subjects are stated and investigated, while the volitional acts that should be performed or prevented are stated and investigated in the practical aspect. Although the theoretical side is accepted as a part of the practical sciences, it is actually included in the theoretical sciences.[20] According to Ibn Khaldūn, as a practical science, politics seems to examine the human communities shaped by human individuals that come together. If examined more closely, however, the case is not so, as the situation of being about something is completely different from examining that thing, as it is that thing.

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[20] For further information, see al-Fārābī, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭarkhān, *Kitâbu'l-Burhân* [*Kitāb al-Burhān*] (translated into Turkish by Ömer Türker and Ömer Mahir Alper; Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2008), 48-51; Ibn Sīnā, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAlī, *Kitâbu'ş-Şifâ: Mantığa Giriş* [=*Kitāb al-Shifāʾ: al-Madkhal*] (translated into Turkish by Ömer Türker; Istanbul: Litera Yayınları, 2006), 5-9.

The science of politics considers how human communities should be governed. In this case, politics, which is a practical science, considers society because it is subject to governments, not because it is a society. The same applies to the science of rhetoric, which is a sub-branch of the art of logic and "consists of convincing talks that make people accept a view or deny it."[21] Ibn Khaldūn states that there is a methodological difference between the science of civilization, politics, and rhetoric because the science of civilization addresses statements and analysis, while the other two are both nominative sciences. Ibn Khaldūn implicitly observes that the social being not only unexamined by sciences of politics and rhetoric in its pure form but also not explored by them. He must therefore prove the existence of the social being, which is the focus of the science of civilization.

Ibn Khaldūn bases the existence of society on the traditional definition of the Muslim philosophers about man. According to this definition, man is "a rational animal." This definition constitutes the foundation of the theory of civilization and royal authority. While animalness is the source of man's needs, which come from a human individual and his acts directed to meet these needs, rationality is the source of his moral, political, and social values. This principle changes into a strong explanatory frame when combined with the other assumptions mentioned above. Accordingly, the definition indicates human nature's requirements do not change, although its subject and qualities change according to individuals or societies. Following the Avicennian tradition of functionalizing definitions, Ibn Khaldūn determines the nature and goal of man according to this definition. Ibn Sīnā, in "metaphysizing" the concept of essence and existence, which was a logical division in the Aristotelian tradition, distinguished between the requirements of existence and essence. He re-interpreted the principles of causality and purpose. Ibn Khaldūn, following Ibn Sīnā, sees the definition of man as the essence of man, i.e., an unchangeable self and personality. As this essence gains its existence in the external world, the genus and differentia in the definition (animal

[21] For a detailed analysis of Ibn Khaldūn's views on this subject, see Ahmet Arslan, *İbn Haldûn'un İlim ve Fikir Dünyası*, 81-83; Şenol Korkut, "İbn Haldûn'un 'es-Siyâsetü'l-medeniyye' Teorisini Eleştirisi [Ibn Khaldūn's Critique of the Theory of 'al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya']," *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi* [*Turkish Journal of Islamic Studies*] 15 (*İbn Haldun Özel Sayısı I* [*Special Issue: Ibn Khaldūn I*]) (2006), 115-140.

and rational) become the matter and form of man. Although it is impossible for matter and form to exist without each other or be separated in the outside world, they have their own requirements. As mentioned above, the requirements of matter cause the social being to emerge in human communities, whereas the requirements of form reveal the cases related to civilization *qua* civilization. The theory of matter and form suggests that the requirements of form occur and are shaped according to matter. The matter and form of anything determine its goal and the limits of its perfection. A wheat germ contains its transformation, first to a wheat seed, then to a wheat ear and finally to a fully grown wheat kernel. These stages are the goal of this germ and the perfections it can reach. These perfections are the limits of its essence, and it is impossible for it to exceed these limits. A careful reader may notice that all observations about the spiritual cases of civilization are made according to these principles. Just like all perfections of a wheat germ are potentially included in itself, all perfections of human communities are included in the matter and form of man. These perfections are the goal both of man as individual, if material conditions allow, and of human communities. All things strive for perfection as long as their matter, and the causes and conditions that move their matter allow for it. Likewise, societies strive for perfection, which is also included in the definition of man. Although the necessary requirements for matter are a sort of perfection, the final requirement of the species is realizing all requirements of its form. The final perfection of a society is realizing the rational power of man, which means realizing the requirements of his soul as an abstract being as much as possible. Ibn Khaldūn places laws, sciences, and arts that depend on benefits at the end of the developmental stages of royal authority, which arises from his interpretation of man's social experiment in line with its definition.[22] Just as a germ completes its perfection by becoming a grown ear, civilization achieves its goal and leaves its place to another civilization after becoming as grown as its matter allows. Ibn Khaldūn's idea of history is thus circular, not progressive. Ibn Khaldūn does not say that all perfections potentially included in the human soul can be realized fully in a society. Howev-

[22] Ibn Khaldūn's observations about the perfection of the human species lead him to contradict himself in evaluating theology and philosophy. He loses his temper when evaluating the relationship between theology and philosophy, yet he is confident in evaluating other cases of royal authority.

er, he is aware that matter is the only tool to perfect the soul, even though it is passive. He thus thinks that natural borders surround a society and state like they surround individuals. The natural borders determine the amount of perfection of the human species that can occur in a society. Because natural borders are changeable, the observations about a given state or society should depend on the experimental data about that state or society. Even if an analysis of the relationship between the matter and form of a civilization provides information about the general cases that might emerge in all civilizations or a theoretical frame about the civilization, the knowledge about the specific qualities and quantities of these cases and their theoretical frame can only be achieved with an experimental search.

Conclusion

The conclusion from the above remarks is thus: In the mind of Ibn Khaldūn, there is a theoretical frame abstracted from time and space, in accordance with the theory of essence about the social being. He assumes that the conceptual frame that presents the nature of civilization analyzes its essence. He also assumes that the accidental changes in a royal authority and state that occur at any time and space do not change the essence of them. To be content with the theoretical frame means falling into the case for which Ibn Khaldūn criticizes philosophers. The most creative aspect of Ibn Khaldūn's readings of philosophy is his transference of metaphysics' explanatory power to social theory, knowing that the general concepts (*al-umūr al-ʿāmma*) should be specified according to some items. Ibn Khaldūn thus materializes the pure logical explanations about the possible, necessary, and impossible for human communities. This situation allows him to form a relevant theoretical frame about human nature, society, and even a meta-time. This theoretical frame can only be functionalized with experimental data about a given society. Ibn Khaldūn states the possibility, necessity, and impossibility of the premises depending on their matter. If the genus, distinction, class, and quantity of the potential cases of a thing are known, then the impossible, possible, and necessary qualities of that thing can also be known. Observations

about a specific civilization can thus only be determined according to its matter.[23]

On the one hand, that he depends on the nature and the essence, on the other, that he thinks that the premises about the nature and the essence can be determined according to their matters, not their reasonable consistencies of accuracy and fallacy, gives Ibn Khaldūn the possibility of making the social being a subject of science and balancing the constants and variables. The basic claim of Ibn Khaldūn in his *Muqaddima* is that there must be a theoretical frame that corresponds to facts about state and society *qua* they are state and society to make a correct analysis about a given state and society. What Ibn Khaldūn's theory of royal authority provides is an accurate analysis of state and society as they exist. When the theoretical frame that allows this analysis is abstracted from Ibn Khaldūn's philosophical assumptions, it does not lose its power to state and depict facts. Determining and depicting facts are only possible with the questions that come before the philosophical assumptions. Even if we accept that the theory comes before the observation, we can understand this as a correlation between the questions and the things known because of the questions, as in the *Kitāb al-Burhān* of Ibn Sīnā.[24] In this case, the theory loses its analytical power and basic claims because the concepts of nature, essence, and goal, as Ibn Khaldūn uses them, are closed to progressivism and evolutionism. His theory differs from the modern social progressive and evolutionist theories. This is the essentialist side of the theory. If we deny the distinction between soul and body, most of Ibn Khaldūn's remarks in the spiritual cases of civilization lose their importance and become simple observations. Ibn Khaldūn explains the social virtues that occur in society, the sciences, the arts, and situations, including magic, prophecy, dream, and revelation, according to this principle.

Thanks to its essentialist and dualist characters, the science of civilization depends on the metaphysical traditions of Islam. This theory has the possibility of alternative thinking, as its dualistic side depends

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[23] For Ibn Khaldūn's views on the basic concepts of metaphysics, see Ömer Türker, "The Perception of Rational Sciences in the *Muqaddimah*: Ibn Khaldūn's Individual Aptitudes Theory," *Asian Journal of Social Science* XXXVI/3-4 (*Special Focus: Ibn Khaldun*) (2008), 471-472.

[24] Ibn Sīnā, *Kitâbu'ş-Şifâ: II. Analitikler* [=*Kitāb al-Shifā': al-Burhān*] (translated into Turkish by Ömer Türker; Istanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2006), 201-209.

on the assumption that the soul is an intellectual substance. It might be possible to re-interpret the concept of essence while considering the modern criticisms of essentialism. However, if we abandon the existence of the soul and its being an intellectual substance, it is impossible to keep in touch with the post-Ghazālian philosophy, theology, and mysticism of Islam, of which Ibn Khaldūn is a successor.

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OPPOSITION TO THE BEKTĀSHĪ ORDER IN EGYPT

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Abstract

Since its appearance on the stage of history, the Bektāshī Order has been subject to criticisms, whose level and quality changes due to circumstances, from various societies throughout the world because of the Order's beliefs and practices. The representatives of the Bektāshī Order in Egypt, where it has continued its activities for years, have been occasionally exposed to attacks from opponents in the region. The scarcity of texts produced before the 19th century, however, does not allow for objective commentary on those publications that condemn the Bektāshī Order. However, after 1826, the year when the Bektāshī Order was banned throughout the Ottoman lands, it became exceedingly difficult to find anything related to the early publications. In this article, activities against the Bektāshī Order that were carried out in Egypt for approximately five centuries, and some important claims that were included in the relevant publications are chronologically evaluated. In this regard, it is observed that some works referenced in this paper were actually extensions of the publications generated in Anatolia at that time. The Bektāshī Order, from its initial appearance on the stage of history forward, was equalized by certain movements, such as the Anatolian Alevism, which did not present a homogeneous structure in terms of its beliefs and practices. This situation resulted in observations and comments being made about the Order that were based on sweeping and erroneous judgments that ultimately led to negative and opposing attitudes regarding the Bektāshī Order. The fact that the Bektāshī Order "could not express itself directly and the way it should be" because it was comprised of a group of people who were of non-Arabic origin, such as Turks and Albani-

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ans, and, as a group, it did not reach out to the masses, has allowed for criticisms and accusations based on unsupported and fallacious claims.

Key Words: Bektāshī Order, Egypt, Egyptian Bektāshī Order, the opposition to Bektāshī Order

Introduction

After the emergence of the Sufi orders and especially from the time of Mamlūks onward, Egypt became one of the most important centers of Sufi thought.[1] With the help of government officials and combined with other supporting conditions since the 15th century, the Bektāshī Order began to manifest itself in the area where mystics easily maintained their activities. There were, however, some unusual problems. The stories narrated about the events between Kaygusuz Abdal (d. 848/1444?), who was the first representative of the Order after he and his disciples came to Egypt, and the governor of Cairo at the time,[2] bear important clues about the possibilities granted to this pioneer of the Bektāshīs.[3] Moreover, both old and new sources which offer information about the historical development of Sufi thought in Egypt and about the Ottoman period in particular often mention the Bektāshī Order among those Sufi orders that were founded in the period of the Ottoman rule in Egypt.[4] Some of these sources present the *Qaṣr al-ʿaynī*, which is the first active Bektāshī Order in Egypt, as

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1 Donald P. Little, "The Nature of *Khānqāhs*, *Ribāṭs*, and *Zāwiyas* under the Mamlūks," in Wael B. Hallaq and Donald P. Little (eds.), *Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 91-105; Th. Emil Homerin, "Sufis and their Detractors in Mamluk Egypt: A Survey of Protagonists and Institutional Settings," in Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke (eds.), *Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies & Polemics* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 1999), 225-248.

2 For example, see Aḥmad Sirrī Dede Baba, *al-Risāla al-Aḥmadiyya fī tārīkh al-ṭarīqa al-Bektāshiyya* (4th edn., Cairo: Maṭbaʿat ʿAbduh & Anwar Aḥmad, 1959), 37-38.

3 See Leonor Fernandes, "Some Aspects of the *Zāwiya* in Egypt at the Eve of the Ottoman Conquest," *Annales Islamologiques* 19 (1983), 9-17.

4 For example, see Tawfīq al-Ṭawīl, *al-Taṣawwuf fī Miṣr ibbāna l-ʿaṣr al-ʿUthmānī* (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 1988), I, 77; Muḥammad Ṣabrī Muḥammad Yūsuf, *Dawr al-mutaṣawwifa fī tārīkh Miṣr fī l-ʿaṣr al-ʿUthmānī (1517-1798 M)* (Bilbīs: Dār al-Ṭaqwā, 1994), 43.

one of the most important *dargāh*s (dervish lodges) of Ottoman Cairo.[5]

It is known that the Bektāshīs maintained their life in Egypt without problems after the Ottomans took over, a situation that is similar to the time of the Mamlūks.[6] In accordance with that, there are a great number of signs that indicate that, more so than at any other time in their history, the Bektāshīs were well received and treated with gracious hospitality during the reign of Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha of Kavala (d. 1849)[7] and, particularly, under the rule of Khedive Ismāʿīl Pasha (d. 1895)[8] and Farouk I (d. 1965).[9] There was, during this time, however, a short period when the Bektāshī Order was banned by Sultan Maḥmūd II in 1826.[10]

The Bektāshī Order lost one of its most important advocates on Egyptian lands when the monarchy was terminated by nationalist army officers in 1952. Furthermore, difficult times ensued for the dervishes as a result of the direct and indirect pressures of the new regime. Compounding these pressures the land on the Muqaṭṭam

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5 See Awliyāʾ Chalabī, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi: Mısır, Sudan, Habeş (1672-1680)* [*Sayāḥat-nāma of Awliyāʾ Chalabī: Miṣr, Sūdān, Ḥabash (1672-1680)*] (vol. X, Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1938), 246-247; Muḥammad Ṣabrī, *Dawr al-mutaṣawwifa,* 61. In the same source, it is stated that Qalandarīs, who have generally similar beliefs and practices to those of the Bektāshīs, are among the important Sufi groups in the Ottoman period, see, 65-66.

6 Sources on the Egyptian Bektāshī Order, especially Awliyāʾ Chalabī, state that this judgment is at least not inaccurate.

7 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

8 For his life and time, see ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Rāfiʿī, *ʿAṣr Ismāʿīl* (3rd edn., Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1982), II, 56-71; Ḥusayn Kafāfī, *al-Khidīwī Ismāʿīl wa-maʿshūqatuh[ū] Miṣr* (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 1994).

9 For his life, see William Stadiem, *Too Rich: The High Life and Tragic Death of King Farouk* (New York: Carroll & Graf Pub., 1991).

10 For the support given to the Bektāshīs at the time of Khedive Ismāʿīl Pasha see Frederick William Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2000), 416-417; Rıza Nur, "Kaygusuz Abdal, Gaybi Bey, Kahire Bektaşi Tekyesinde Bir Manüskırı [Kaygusuz Abdal, Ghaybī Beg, A Manuscript in the Bektāshī Tekke of Cairo]," *Türk Bilig Revüsü (Revue de Turcologie)* II/1 (1935), 77-98.

mountain, which contained their tekkes, was then taken from them.[11] A couple of remaining disciples who were living there were sent to the United States by the sheikh who realized that things were not going well.[12] Finally, the story of the Bektāshī Order came to an end in the area when the last Bektāshī of Egypt, Aḥmad Sirrī Baba, died in 1963.

This article aims at chronologically evaluating the activities of the opposition of the Bektāshī Order in Egypt over the course of five centuries and particularly the publications produced in this context, which include some major claims about this Sufi order.

The Overall View

The historical information we have about the Egyptian Bektāshī Order before the 19th century does not allow us to provide clear descriptions about the content and the quality of the publications against this Sufi order. The fact that it was not easy to act against the Bektāshī Order in the Ottoman lands due to its past relations with the army until its prohibition, along with Jannisaries, in 1826, serves as the main reason for the scarcity of sources pre-nineteenth century.

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[11] The last Bektāshī sheikh in Egypt, Aḥmad Sirrī Baba's struggle for the foundations that were taken from the Order is very interesting. For copies of his letters, which were written for the return of the foundations and the reimbursement of his salary which was paid to him and then cut after a while, see MS the Library of the Leiden University, Or. 14385. Each copy of the letters that Aḥmad Sirrī Baba wrote to the statesmen for return of the foundations can be found in his own past belongings. Several documents written by Aḥmad Sirrī Baba, including records (*kunyas*) of the followers of the tekke, the records of the famous visitors, and the catalog of the tekke library were donated to the Library of Leiden University by Frederick de Jong, who had coincidentally (?) found them. For a description of these items, see Jan Just Witkam, *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts in the Library of Leiden and Other Collections in the Netherlands: Fascicule 5* (Leiden: E. J. Brill & Leiden University Press, 1989), 473-479. In the period mentioned, all foundations under the reign of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt were nationalized. See Hilal Görgün, "Mısır [Egypt]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], XXIX, 579.

[12] For his work, which also includes the memoirs of Rajab Baba, one of the disciples of Aḥmad Sirrī Baba was sent to the U.S. and served for many years in the Bektāshī tekke that opened in Detroit; see Rexhebi (Rajab) Ferdi Baba, *Misticizma Islame dhe Bektashizma* [*Islamic Mysticism and Bektāshism*] (Tirana, Shtypshkronja Sindikalisti, 1995).

However, although the Order was not well known by the local public from its beginning, and it did not spread much in the area,[13] during some periods in Egypt, there were some activities, though limited, against the Bektāshīs and, thus, against the Bektāshī Order, and some anti-Bektāshī publications produced can be found.

Although Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha of Kavala and his successors attempted to govern Egypt as an independent state, thus setting themselves free from the Ottomans in the political sense, the publications against the Bektāshī Order in Istanbul, especially after 1826, had their effect in Egypt, which was not different from any province of the Empire in the cultural sense. In this regard, there are some clues, though scarce, showing that several publications against the Bektāshī Order by some groups found echoes in Egypt after the Bektāshī Order was banned in the Ottoman lands. The Bektāshīs began their activities soon after. Given their related fields, some works that are thought to be proper examples of the Bektāshī story are discussed herein.

The Translation of *Kāshif al-asrār*

A work that is in the Old Manuscripts Library of Cairo (Dār al-Wathāʾiq al-Qawmiyya) and that is apparently written by two different scribes appears to be one of the oldest examples produced in the region in opposition to the Bektāshī Order. The text is the Arabic translation of *Kāshif al-asrār wa-dāfiʿ al-ashrār* (Istanbul 1290 H [1873-1874?]), a work written by Khoja Isḥāq Efendī (1801-1892)[14] and published in Istanbul just before the former's writing time, criticizes

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[13] Today, the situation in Egypt is not much different from previous times. Along with scarce academic studies (for example, see Hudā Darwīsh, "al-Manhaj al-ṣūfī li-l-ṭarīqa al-Bektāshiyya wa-taʾthīruhū ʿalā l-sulṭa al-ḥākima fī Turkiyā," *Majallat Kulliyyat al-ādāb* [November 2001], 1-71), save some exceptional data that can be found in the memoir literature (see, for example, Esmat Dawestashy [ʿIṣmat Dāwistāshī], *al-Ramla al-bayḍāʾ (Dhikrayāt Sakandarī): al-Juzʾ al-awwal (1943-1963)* (al-Iskandariyya: Catalogue 77, 2004), it is not possible to refer to any study that thoroughly addresses this topic.

[14] For more information about Isḥāq Efendī, see Meḥmed Surayyā, *Sijill-i ʿUthmānī* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), I, 329; Bursali Meḥmed Ṭāhir, *ʿUthmānlī Muʾalliflari* [*Ottoman Authors*] (Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-i ʿĀmira, 1333 H [1915]), I, 247-248; Mustafa Kara, "İshak Efendi, Harputlu [Isḥāq Efendī of Kharbūṭ]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], XXII, 531.

the Bektāshī Order. We assume that it is a relatively well-known source for national and international researchers who are professionally interested in the Bektāshī Order and for curious readers who are interested in the field. Accordingly, in this article, we provide only introductory information on the translation, skipping the content of *Kāshif al-asrār* and its Arabic translation.[15]

According to the last page of one of the two copies located in the library of Cairo, the original text was prepared in 1293 H [1876] and the second copy was completed in the month Rajab of 1306 H [1889]. While the first copy, which consists of 58 folios, is recorded in the library as *Risāla fī l-radd ʿalā l-Bektāshiyya wa-bayān madhabihim*,[16] the other one is classified under the title *al-Radd ʿalā ṭāʾifat al-Bektāshiyya* and consists of 68 folios.[17] According to the record found therein, the name of the scribe is Muḥammad ibn ʿAẓmī al-Maghribī al-Jazāʾirlī. He indicates that the book he had copied was written in 1293 H [1876]. The translator does not, however, explain that the work is actually a translation of some other original work. Judging from that, it can be concluded that the scribe, Muḥammad ibn ʿAẓmī al-Jazāʾirlī, is not aware of this issue, or he chose to be silent about it. On the other hand, the reasons the translator, whose life and affiliation are not (unfortunately) subject to any data, initiated this translation remains obscure. Another point that should be considered is why the first translation was not, or could not be, published, although its first translation was completed three years after the publication of the original *Kāshif al-asrār* in 1290 H [1873-1874]. Additionally, there is not any information located in the sources about the Bektāshī Order, suggesting that the translation was not known in the time that it was completed. On the other hand, the question whether

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[15] When criticizing some beliefs and practices of the Bektāshīs, Khoja Isḥāq Efendī chose to depend on examples of his personal experience, rather than on objective criteria. This situation caused him to, for the most part, abandon objectivity in his work. For detailed information on the content and the features of *Kāshif al-asrār* see Salih Çift, "1826 Sonrasında Bektâşilik ve Bu Alanla İlgili Yayın Faaliyetleri [The Bektāshī Order after 1826 and Their Literary Activities]," *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* [*The Review of the Faculty of Theology, Uludağ University*] XII/I (2003), 259 ff.

[16] MS Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 177, *ʿAqāʾid, Taymūr*. In the dimension of 21.5 x 14.5, the work is recorded under the microfilm number 9721.

[17] MS Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 31, *Kalām, al-Niḥal al-Islāmiyya*. In the dimension of 20 x 14, the work is recorded under the microfilm number 7677.

this translation was completed on commission or was the product of someone's desire who was aware of the issue requires further examination. Furthermore, none of the opposing publications described herein mention this work, nor are there any citations of it by Egyptian Bektāshīs who wrote on the Bektāshī Order, such as Aḥmad Sirrī Baba.

Binbir Ḥadīth: The Bektāshī Order in the Eyes of an Ottoman Bureaucrat

To the best knowledge of this author, the first text that was written and published in Egypt against the Bektāshī Order was authored by Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg (d. 1897), the statesman, lawyer, and writer.[18] Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg, who worked for many years as head-clerk of Ghāzī Aḥmad Mukhtār Pasha (d. 1919) after serving in several ranks of the Ottoman Army, remained in Egypt with the Ottoman Army during his commission (Turkish High Commissionary) between 1885-1896, criticized the Bektāshī Order in his work titled *Binbir Ḥadīth* [*One Thousand and One Ḥadīth*], which was written and published in Egypt during his commission.[19] The aim of the work was to compile and write commentaries on some selected traditions from al-Suyūṭī's *al-Jāmiʿ al-saghīr*. Prepared in Turkish, the work was published twice in Cairo, in 1901 and 1909.

In his work, Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg, as he interprets the prophetic tradition number 892, changes the subject to the conflict between Shīʿa and Ahl al-sunna. He then moves to the Bektāshī Order and begins to enumerate his criticisms, denying the claims that Bektāshīs are actually Jaʿfarīs. The following excerpt succinctly summarizes his opinions on the Bektāshī Order:

"… the other group knows nothing. If their reality is searched, it can

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[18] For Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg and his work, see *Binbir Ḥadīth* [*One Thousand and One Ḥadīth*] (Cairo: Jarīda Maṭbaʿasi, 1325 H [1909]), 1-10; idem. *Başımıza Gelenler* [*What Happened to Us*] (modernized version by M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ; Istanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, n.d.), I, 25-29, 45-46; Ali Akyıldız, "Mehmed Ârif Bey [Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (*DİA*) [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], XXVIII, 443.

[19] See Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg, *Binbir Ḥadīth,* 401-415. In a later work, *Başımıza Gelenler,* Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg repeats similar ideas on the issue in the same harsh wording, see III, 785-787.

be seen that they are followers of a particular path, which consists of Christianity, Freemasonry, Shīʿism, Imāmism, Ibāḥism and Islam." [20]

Like many of the opponents of the Bektāshī Order who will follow him, Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg accepts this Sufi order as a current or movement that consists of several elements collected from different sources, rather than considering it as an original movement. Providing detailed explanations about the similarities between the Order and Christianity as he claims, the author specifically emphasizes the interpretation of the concept of the trinity in Bektāshī thought, a concept that, in his mind, was surely taken from Christianity. Similarly, he talks about the relationship between the Bektāshī Order and Freemasonry, stating that both group adhere to and engage in some common rituals.[21] As he expresses his opinions, he gradually increases his tone of criticism and finally contends that the only connection of the Bektāshīs to Islam is restricted to their burials in the Muslim graveyard.[22] Feeling the need to support his words with his own experiences, he explains that certain crowded groups that he encountered as he worked in several parts of Anatolia, particularly including Dersim and Erzincan, share similar beliefs and practices with the Bektāshīs, and, therefore, he gives detailed information about these groups.[23]

According to his explanations, either deliberately or because of his lack of knowledge about the subject, Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg equalizes certain groups, one of which is the Anatolian Alevism. This is not a homogeneous structure either in beliefs or practices, nor is it akin to the Bektāshī Order, which is different from these other groups in almost all aspects. However, it must be acknowledged that the samples he provides in this context are surprisingly similar to the ones identified in the above-mentioned *Kāshif al-asrār*. Thus, it is evident that most of the details he purports as facts with his occasional exaggerated expressions are in need of correction. Accordingly, a contemporary Bektāshī, Aḥmad Rifqī (Sakalli Rifqī) (d. 1935), objected to the claims made by Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg and the relevant examples given by him. To refute these claims, Aḥmad Rifqī gave his word that he would dedicate the second volume of his work to the real history,

[20] Meḥmed ʿĀrif Beg, *Binbir Ḥadīth,* 402.

[21] *Ibid*., 403.

[22] *Ibid*., 404.

[23] *Ibid*., 406 ff.

ādāb, and *arkān* (practices) of the Bektāshī Order[24] and he kept his promise.[25]

Opponents in the Modern Period

Contrary to previous times, beginning in the first half of the 20th century, it became possible to access and examine information about the activities against the Bektāshī Order in Egypt and the relevant publications. While not abundant in numbers, the content of these publications are, for the most part, generally similar to one another. The publications generally focus on topics such as the history of the Bektāshī Order, the attitudes of the Bektāshīs with respect to theological issues, the practices of the Sufi, the historical development of the Bektāshī Order in Egypt, the activities of the Bektāshī tekke in the Muqaṭṭam mountain in Cairo, the relations of the followers of the tekke with the family of Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha of Kavala, with other courtiers and with contemporary bureaucrats.

In this regard, the first text to be addressed, due to the popularity of its author both in the Ottoman history of politics and the Arab world, is included in a work titled *Ḥāḍir al-ʿālam al-Islāmī* 1352 H [1933]), which was published in Cairo and written by the famous Lebanese thinker Amīr Shakīb Arslān (d. 1950),[26] who originally be-

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[24] See Aḥmad Rifqī, *Bektāshī Sirri I* [*Bektāshī Secret I*] (Istanbul: ʿAṣr Maṭbaʿasi, 1325 H [1907]), 157.

[25] Aḥmad Rifqī, *Bektāshī Sirri II* [*Bektāshī Secret II*] (Istanbul: Manẓūma-i Afkār Maṭbaʿasi, 1328 H. [1910]).

[26] In the words of Aḥmad al-Sharabāsī, "the *amīr al-bayān* (the prince of rhetoric) who wants to be more Ottoman than Ottomans," Amīr Shakīb Arslān was born into a Druze family in Shuwayfa village of Lebanon, in 1869. His father was a low-degree local official. The Arslān family was regarded as the noblest of the Druze clans in Jabal Lebanon. At the turn of the 20th century, some family members became officials, some became diplomats, members of parliament, and men of letters. After leaving the Druze identity and turning to Sunnī Islam, Shakīb's family became famous in the Arab-Ottoman party. His older brother Naṣīb (d. 1927) appeared in the literature and participated in the Arab protest movement against the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittiḥād wa-Taraqqī Jamʿiyyati). His brother, ʿĀdil Beg, after graduating from Faculty of Letters in Istanbul, became the district governor of Shūf in 1914-1916 and a member of the Ottoman parliament from 1916 to 1918. He joined the liberation movement of the Syrians against the French in 1925 to 1926. He became the minister of the first independent government of Syria from 1946 to 1949 and died in 1954. For detailed infor-

longed to a Druze family, though he and his clan changed to Sunnism after the writing. In his study, dedicating a short chapter to the Bektāshī Order, the author introduces the Order with negative comments and criticisms. The expressions and descriptions Amīr Shakīb Arslān uses when he discusses the beliefs of the Bektāshīs are quite harsh. Accordingly, Arslān claims that the Bektāshīs share the beliefs of "Alevis in the Kurdish lands and ʿAlī-ilāhīs" and are, therefore, not any different from them. According to Arslān, even though they claim otherwise, the Bektāshīs are not Sunnīs, because they read Faḍl Allāh Ḥurūfī's (d. 796/1394)[27] *Jāwidān*.[28] As in all studies written against the Bektāshīs, the starting point of Amīr Shakīb's criticisms is that the Bektāshīs read *Jāwidān,* which is the main source of Ḥurūfism.[29]

A contemporary of Amīr Shakīb Arslān, the Sheikh of al-Azhar Ḥasanayn Muḥammad Makhlūf (1890-1990)[30] at the time, released a

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mation about his life, see William L. Cleveland, *Batı'ya Karşı İslam, Şekip Arslan'ın Mücadelesi* [=*Islam against the West: Shakīb Arslān and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism*] (translated into Turkish by Selahattin Ayaz; Istanbul: Yöneliş Yayınları, 1991). For his memoirs see Amīr Shakīb Arslān (as Emir Şekip Arslan), *İttihatçı Bir Arap Aydınının Anıları* [*Sīrat Amīr Shakīb Arslān*] (translated into Turkish by Halit Özkan; Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2005).

27 For Faḍl Allāh Ḥurūfī and Ḥurūfism see Fatih Usluer, *Hurufilik: İlk Elden Kaynaklarla Doğuşundan İtibaren* [*Ḥurūfism: From its Emergence through First-Hand Sources*] (Istanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2009).

28 Amīr Shakīb Arslān, *Ḥāḍir al-ʿālam al-Islāmī* (expanded version of the Arabic translation of Lothrop Stoddard's *The New World of Islam* which was translated into Arabic by ʿAjjāj Nuwayhiḍ; vol. II: Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya ʿĪsā el-Bābī al-Ḥalabī wa-Shurakāʾuhū, 1352 H [1933]), 349-350.

29 The connection between the Bektāshīs and the Ḥurūfīs has always been a discussion point. Aḥmād Rifʿat Efendī, as one who belongs to the Order, denies the claims in his work on the Bektāshī Order: "Therefore, Bektāshīs are not Ḥurūfīs and Ḥurūfīs are not Bektāshīs. It is possible that Ḥurūfīs penetrated Bektāshīs and gave them the book titled *Jāwidān* to corrupt them. However, in our time, it is said there is not any Bektāshī who knows the meaning of *Jāwidān* and practices it)." See Sayyid Aḥmad Rifʿat Efendī, *Mirʾāt al-maqāṣid fī dafʿ al-mafāsid* (Istanbul: Ibrāhīm Efendī Maṭbaʿasi, 1293 H [1876-1877?]), 231.

30 Ḥasanayn Muḥammad Makhlūf al-ʿAdawī (1890-1990) served as the *muftī* of Egypt between 1946-1950 and 1952-1954. Rather close to the Salafī approach, Makhlūf has many published works. He was the head of the institution that issued the *fatwā* on the abolition of foundations in Egypt according to article 180, which was issued in 1952, just after the Revolution. For his life and *iftāʾ* activities, see Fāṭima Maḥjūb, *al-Mawsūʿa al-dhahabiyya li-l-ʿulūm al-Islāmiyya* (Cairo:

fatwā on the Shīʿī sects issued on Dhū l-ḥijja 1368/August 1949 which included the Bektāshī Order among the sects and leveled harsh criticisms against the Order.[31] In the *fatwā*, after he provides general information about the history of Bektāshism, he deals with the issue of the Bektāshī Order in Egypt and contends that it was the Albanian-born Kaygusuz Abdal who originally brought the Order to Egypt.[32] Later, the author provides information about Meḥmed Luṭfī Baba (d. 1944),[33] who served there just before the last sheikh of the *dargāh*, Aḥmad Sirrī Baba, and states that he passed his position on to Aḥmad Sirrī Baba in accordance with official notice (*iʿlām-i sharʿī*), dated 1354 H [1936]. He also mentions that the information he presents about the Bektāshī Order is based on Aḥmad Sirrī Baba's *al-Risāla al-Aḥmadiyya,* published in 1939. Commenting that the Bektāshī Order's own declarations, traditions, and actions reveal its adherence to one of the extreme branches of Imāmī Shīʿa, Makhlūf says that the followers of the Order created many bad innovations (*bidʿa*) that have nothing to do with the religion of Islam, and furthermore, they follow Bāṭinī Ismāʿīlīs with respect to other issues as well. Makhlūf is of the opinion that "the seven cycles concept," which they base on the issue of *walāya*, is one of the obvious products of the interaction between these groups. With respect to this issue, Makhlūf claims that, along with their sanctification of the fourteen "maʿsūm-i pāk" [four-

Dār al-Ghad al-ʿArabī, n.d.), XIV, 136-142. The fact that he was awarded the "Service to Islam" by the Saudi Government in 1983 may be strongly related to his relation with the Salafī thought.

31 The relevant *fatwā* can be found at http://www.islamic.council.gov.eg and http://www.alazhr.org (01/12/2011), the official websites of the institutions in Egypt. Additionally, see *Fatāwā dār al-iftāʾ li-muddat miʾatⁱ ʿāmⁱⁿ,* mawḍūʿ: 679.

32 One of the examples that shows that the Egyptian people are ignorant about the Bektāshīs and to what, one need only consider the inaccurate information in the *fatwā* issued by Makhlūf, an educated one who attempted to issue a *fatwā* against the Order. Judging from the fact that the two previous sheikhs were Albanians, or had relations to the Albanian origin of the Khedive family, he assumes that all sheikhs who served in the Bektāshī *dargāh*s in Egypt are also Albanians. This mistake can be observed in other texts that were written against the Bektāshī Order.

33 Meḥmed Luṭfī Baba is the sheikh of Aḥmad Sirrī Baba, who is the last master of the Bektāshī tekke in the Muqaṭṭam mountain. Having served in the tekke for a long time, he contributed to the acceptance of the tekke and the Bektāshī Order in Egypt. For a biography of Meḥmed Luṭfī Baba, see Aḥmad Sirrī Baba, *al-Risāla al-Aḥmadiyya,* 12-16, 18-22.

teen pure infallibles], who are not from Ahl al-bayt, the fact that they bless fire and offer prays for the *sirāj* (candle) are among the elements that cannot be found in other Sufi orders. To Makhlūf, most of the customs the followers of the Bektāshī Order have been adopting have nothing to do with religion. Furthermore, he argues that their beliefs and practices of *ʿāshūrāʾ* and mourning are *bidaʿ* (innovations) as well and that their claim that they belong to Ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa is, accordingly, wrong.

The section at the end of his statement shows why Ḥasanayn Muḥammad Makhlūf, as one who occupies the highest place in the religious bureaucracy of Egypt, needed to offer such an explanation:

> I think that it would be wrong for the Egyptian State, which has been the protector of the call to God and the Sunna of his Messenger from the time of the collapse of the Shīʿī Fāṭimid State and the foundation of the Sunnī Ayyūbī State to these days, to officially acknowledge such a movement (Bektāshī Order). Hence, the Turkish historians state that this movement supported *ibāḥism* and was prohibited by the Ottoman Sultan Maḥmūd II… Due to all these reasons, I reckon that their request should not be positively met.

As it appears from the words of Ḥasanayn Muḥammad Makhlūf, the main reason behind this *fatwā* is the inconvenience of the situation that the Bektāshī Order were officially recognized by the Mashīkhat Ṭuruq al-Ṣūfiyya, which is responsible for controlling the activities of the Sufi orders in Egypt.[34] Although they were in close

[34] For the process of the official recognition of the Bektāshīs in Egypt, see Frederick de Jong, "Aspects of the Political Involvement of Sufi Orders in Twentieth Century Egypt (1907-1970), an Exploratory Stock-Taking," in idem. (ed.), *Sufi Orders in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Egypt and the Middle East* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995), 172. After Farouk I dismissed Aḥmad Murād al-Bakrī from the position of Sheikh Mashāyikh Ṭuruq al-Ṣūfiyya and replaced him with Aḥmad al-Ṣāwī al-ʿImrānī in 1946, there were not any important changes in the official status of the Bektāshī Order in Egypt. At the time of the presidency of Aḥmad al-Ṣāwī, the sheikh of the Muqaṭṭam Bektāshī tekke, Aḥmad Sirrī Baba and, thus, the Bektāshī order were officially being recognized. This is because he was attending all official meetings, as an equal to other leaders under Sufi orders, and under the protection of Sheikh al-Mashāyikh, according to the directions of Farouk the King. This gesture of Farouk the King was important as it showed support for Aḥmad Sirrī Babā. This case also reveals the connection between the Bektāshī Order and the Palace. Many courtiers were already followers or lovers of the Order. Accord-

relations with the courtiers, they represented a Sufi order that was not officially recognized by the state until that time. Being responsible for regulating the issues related to the Sufi orders and superintending them, there are two reasons behind the Mashīkhat's official recognition of the Bektāshī Order. First, in this period, Aḥmad Sirrī Baba, the sheikh of the Bektāshī tekke in Muqaṭṭam, was elected as the leader of all the Bektāshīs in the world in a meeting in Cairo held in January of 1949, where some of the main representatives of the Bektāshī Order were in attendance.[35] As may be assumed, the second reason is because of King Farouk's close relationship with the tekke and its sheikh and the privileges provided to the Bektāshīs because of this relationship. Therefore, as the head of al-Azhar, which had the authority to adjudicate the religious problems in Egypt at the time, Mashīkhāt must have felt the need to write and publish such a text that is inundated with deceptive and fallacious information about the thoughts and the history of the Bektāshī Order. This is because he wanted to show the public that neither he nor the institution he presides over approves of the situation.[36]

Another study against Bektāshism in recent times in Egypt deals with the problem of the relationship between Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha of Kavala, the Egyptian royal family, and the Bektāshī Order. The long article, which was based primarily on groundless announcements and subjective comments, is titled "Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha min wijhat naẓar[in] ʿUthmāniyya[tin]" and was written by Muḥammad al-Sayyid al-Daghīm when he was a researcher at the SOAS in the U.K. In 10-17.11.2005, al-Daghīm also presented a long summary of this text at a large scale symposium held in Cairo and Alexandria and titled "Muʿtamar ʿan

ing to the narrations, the relationship between Farouk the King and Aḥmad Sirrī was because of Farouk I's "miraculous" recovery from a child illnessness, the recovery of which was attributed to Aḥmad Sirrī. For this same reason, Farouk the King made considerable donations to the tekke. According to another rumor, the reason was that Farouk I used Aḥmad Sirrī's tekke as a meeting place for his love affairs. See, *Ibid*., 171. The information Jong offers is without any reference and seems to be based on disinformation produced by Gamal Abdel Nasser and his group, in an effort to defame the previous monarchy.

35 *Ibid*., 178.

36 Another personality who was, like Ḥasanayn Muḥammad Makhlūf, appointed as the sheikh of al-Azhar and published an article against the Bektāshī Order during the same period is ʿAbd al-Majīd Salīm al-Bishrī. His opinions do not differ from those of Makhlūf's.

Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha," which was organized to commemorate the bicentennial of Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha of Kavala's accession in Egypt.[37]

Al-Daghīm's study is based primarily on Bektāshī Order's relation to Bāṭinism, and it aims at deciphering the connections between Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha of Kavala along with his descendants and the movement and criticizing it from this point. Putting forth a very ironic thesis in the study, al-Daghīm considers the Bektāshī Order a branch of Bāṭinism, as he connects it to Fāṭimids (ʿUbaydīs, in the author's words) who ruled the near region, where they claimed Egypt as their capital for some time. In his opinion, since the Kavalali dynasty took over the government in Egypt, Bektāshīs' real objective was to transform the region into a new center, to attack the Sunnī Ottoman State and to demolish the Caliphate.

Tracing the problem back to the establishment of the cave in which Kaygusuz Abdal first settled at the foot of the Muqaṭṭam mountain, the author points to its use for similar purposes during the reign of the Fāṭimid King al-Muʿizz li-Dīn Allāh (d. 365/975). Later, the sheikh of the *zāwiya* Niʿmat Allāh al-Ḥusaynī (Niʿmat Allāh-i Walī), who came to Egypt in 820/1417, remained there. In 905/1499, his disciple, Nūr al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ījī, re-created the place. According to him, Albanian-born Kaygusuz Abdal settled the cave, called Kahf al-Sūdān in 761/1359. When he died in 818/1415, he was buried there.

According to the author, the easiest way to determine how distant Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha was from Sunnī Islam is to see that, instead of Muslims, Pasha appointed Jews, Christians, etc. to several positions when he governed Egypt.[38] Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha's struggle with Wahhābīs (the Sunnī Saudis, in his words) and his rebellion against

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[37] As I concluded that neither text was published, I will refer to the author's website. See http://www.dr-mahmoud.com/content/view/244/39/ (01.12.2011).

[38] It is known that Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha of Kavala was quite tolerant towards the followers of Abrahamic religions. In this regard, although there are many indications about this fact, I confine myself to state that not only Catholic nuns, but also Jesuits and Franciscans, settled in Cairo for the first time in the 1830s and freely engaged in their activities. See Gilbert Sinoué, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa: Son Firavun* [*Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha of Kavala: the Last Pharaoh, =Le Dernier Pharaoh*] (translated into Turkish by Ali Cevat Akkoyunlu; Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999), 180-181. This case should be accepted as evidence that he was not an enemy of Islam, but that he adopted the same political attitudes of the Ottoman palace towards several religious groups, an attitude that he also adheres to.

the Ottoman state must be evaluated in this regard. To him, this rebellion gave way to the French and English invasions, which happened soon thereafter.

It seems that al-Daghīm's knowledge about the history and the culture of Bektāshī Order is very insufficient. In the following pages of his study, he comes up with very bizarre explanations that never seen before and he could not provide with any source to support his claims. Perhaps the strangest of these claims is best presented in the following: After they emptied their tekke in Muqaṭṭam and moved to the Maʿādī district in 1957, due to the order of the government, the Bektāshīs intensely maintained their secret activities; they founded schools and institutions, made connections with the Ismāʿīlī Agha Khan organization, took financial support from the Iranian Embassy in Egypt for their publications. Finally, many *ahl al-bidʿa* groups such as Nuṣayrīs in Syria contributed to them.

Moreover, advancing the connection between the Bektāshī Order and the Janissaries, the author discusses the activities of the Janissaries against the Ottoman sultans throughout history as he explains how sinister the Bektāshī organization is. According to al-Daghīm, behind all of the Janissaries' rebellions against the state that occurred throughout the Ottoman history are the Bektāshīs. Furthermore, he contends that the Bektāshīs collaborated with the Jews, that they found the Committee of Union and Progress and that they made contact with the Freemasonry organizations. In all of these claims, al-Daghīm is intent on proving that the Bektāshī Order, since its emergence, is a movement that has been acting against the Ottoman State and that Meḥmed ʿAlī Pasha and his descendants who had relationships with the Bektāshīs had the same agenda.

The reason that I selected a study that has no scientific grounding at all, and one that was written totally in a speculative form and from an emotional perspective, is because it is one of the anti-Bektāshī Order publications in Egypt. I did not evaluate the study as a scientifically and historically valuable text.[39]

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[39] Al-Daghīm's inaccurate information and exaggerated explanation has affected people who do not know the nature of the topic. Thus, on one of the websites broadcast for the Christian community in the area, the information on the Bektāshī Order was quoted from al-Daghīm's article. See http://www.coptichistory.org/new_page_7412.htm (30/05/2010).

The Bektāshī Order from the Salafī Perspective

Other opinions on the history of tafsīr, many of which resemble the previous ones, were expressed in *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufassirūn* written by Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī (1915-1977),[40] who was previously a professor at the University of al-Azhar and then appointed Minister of Foundations of Egypt in 1975. According to al-Dhahabī, the Bektāshīs do not differ from the Ismāʿīlīs/Bāṭinīs in their approach to the Qurʾān and its interpretation, because in his mind, the Bektāshīs are the Bāṭinīs of the modern period, similar to the Alevi Kurds, Bahāʾīs, Bābīs, and Qāḍiyānīs. The author states that the Bektāshīs could have been found in Egypt until recent times; however, the new government expelled them from Egypt after the 1952 revolution because of their mischief and trouble.[41] Nevertheless, Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī remains silent on what the accusation of "mischief and trouble" entails.

As he enumerates his criticisms against the Bektāshīs, he presents a wealth of inaccurate information, and by so doing, he unintentionally confesses a truth that is mostly unspoken. That is, the end of the adventure of the Bektāshī Order in Egypt is the consequence of the new official ideology's perspective of the public, rather than a consequence of the wrong, unethical acts and declarations of the Bektāshīs, as claimed.[42] Hence, it is known that the new government, which has strong bias against any non-Arab origin groups, shows the same attitude to any person or group that is known to have been close to the Palace at the time of the monarchy. It is already an established fact that the relatively moderate attitude of the revolutionists toward the *ṭarīqa*s in general is the result of a policy that promotes and supports the political agenda.[43] During the given period, the claim that the head of the Muqaṭṭam Bektāshī Tekke, Aḥmad Sirrī

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[40] For the life of Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī see Muṣṭafā Muḥammad al-Dhahabī, "Tarjamat al-shahīd al-Dhahabī" in Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufassirūn* (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2005), I, 5-8.

[41] Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufassirūn* (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2005), II, 222.

[42] In the words of Bedri Noyan, who is the holder of one of the claims see Bedri Noyan (Dedebaba), *Bütün Yönleriyle Bektâşîlik ve Alevîlik* [*Bektāshism and Alevism in All Aspects*] (vol. 5, Ankara: Ardıç Yayınları, 2002), 233.

[43] See de Jong, "Opposition to Sufism in Twentieth-Century Egypt (1900-1970): A Preliminary Survey," in *Islamic Mysticism Contested*, 319-320.

Baba, is a Bāṭinī seems an attempt to find an acceptable reason for persecuting him, and thus the Bektāshīs, in the eyes of public. The fact that Aḥmad Sirrī Baba is Albanian, not Arab, and that he had very close relations with the Palace in the previous period is the main reason why the leader of the 23 July 1952 revolution in Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and his group treated Baba so roughly. During this the same period, other non-Arab sheikhs were subjected to similar treatment.[44]

Last, I will deal with ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAbd al-Khāliq's opinions, who was born in one of the suburbs of Cairo, Manūfiyya, in 1939, and who struggles to spread his Salafī thoughts, especially in al-Kuwait, after his graduation from one of the universities in Medina/Saudi Arabia. While his opinions are not actually different from the abovementioned stances, one of the points that distinguishes him from the others is that, when he expressed his thoughts on the Bektāshī Order, he referred to *al-Risāla al-Aḥmadiyya fī tārīkh ṭarīqat al-Bektāshiyya* by Aḥmad Sirrī Baba, an Arabic work that is among one of the rare studies in the Arab world written by an insider on the Bektāshī Order. The author, after quoting Aḥmad Sirrī Baba's words on the history, philosophy, and practices of the Bektāshī Order, offers his own remarks and closes the topic with the following question:

> How could followers of a Sufi Order that accepts the Shīʿī belief, manage to shelter and hide their true ideas for a long time, in such countries as Turkey and Egypt, whose populations are mostly Sunnī Muslims?

As a Salafī propagandist and opponent of not only the Bektāshī Order in particular, but also of Sufi thought and Sufi orders in general, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAbd al-Khāliq answers the question in a sweeping way, stating that "In fact, all Sufis hide their Bāṭinī beliefs behind their appearances."[45]

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[44] The followers of the Demirdāshiyya Order, which was active in Egypt at the same time and represented by the Turkish-origin Sufis, were treated similarly. In addition, the branch of the Naqshbandiyya Order represented by Najm al-Dīn al-Kurdī was in the same situation. See de Jong "Aspects of the Political Involvement of Sufi Orders," 176-178.

[45] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAbd al-Khāliq, *al-Fikr al-ṣūfī fī ḍawʾ al-kitāb wa-l-sunna* (3rd edn., al-Kuwait: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1986), 233 ff. Remarks similar to those in this book have been repeated in many studies about the Arab world. Due to the

Conclusion

Although the materials in opposition to the Bektāshī Order in Egypt and about its effects in the publication world are not abundant, the data presented herein are sufficient to determine the main characters of the anti-Order campaign that is directed against the Bektāshīs in the region. Accordingly, considering the contents and the qualities of the anti-Bektāshī publications in Egypt, the following statements can be made:

1. The anti-Bektāshī texts written in a given area are substantially based on publications that were produced in the capital of the Ottoman State, although there are some exceptions.

2. Since its appearance on the stage of history, the fact that the Bektāshī Order was treated as identical with certain movements such as Anatolian Alevism, which does not represent any homogeneous structure either in belief or in practice, has resulted in inaccurate observations that depend on sweeping judgments. This is why such erroneous remarks such as those mentioned herein have been frequently repeated. Hence, it happens that even many authorities make uniformed statements based on clichés and prejudices because they lack any comprehensive knowledge about who the Bektāshīs really are. This observation can be generalized to all anti-Bektāshī publications about the Bektāshī Order, not just those published in Egypt.

3. The fact that the Bektāshīs did not "truly present themselves" seems to be another reason for criticisms and accusations that are based on groundless claims. This is because they did not, or could not, get out of a private community that generally consisted of non-Arabic origin people, mainly Turks and Albanians.[46] Accordingly,

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authors' ignorance about the Order, some of the writers struggle when presenting the problem using very exaggerated sentences. More precisely, they try to persuade their audiences to adopt their perspectives, which are based on, distorted declarations. In one of those claims, it is said that the Bektāshī Order was spread through Egypt with the support of Khedive Ismāʿīl and his family, and even opened its doors to Christians. I will not go deep into the accusations made by the author as he is ignorant enough to claim that the Bektāshīs regard ʿAlī as God. See Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Raʾūf al-Qāsim, *al-Kashf ʿan ḥaqīqat al-ṣūfiyya li-awwal marra fī l-tārīkh* (Amman: al-Maktaba al-Islāmiyya, 1992), 789-790.

[46] It can be seen that this statement is not just a claim, given that sheikhs of the Bektāshī tekkes in Egypt since the beginning, came from Anatolia and the Bal-

intellectuals of the Arab world have based their views about Bektāshism on second-hand sources and rumors, as these scholars typically do not speak or understand Turkish, the original language in this scope. For this and other similar reasons, it should be noted that comments made in the region regarding the Bektāshī Order are quite removed from objectivity.

4. It is a known fact that those who adopt the Salafī thought are not only excessively intolerant of the Bektāshī Order but of the entire Sufi organism. As a Sufi order, some beliefs and practices of the Bektāshī Order, which resemble those of Shīʿa, seem to be the main factor for the growing harsh criticisms of the Salafī stance.

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kans, if the records of Aḥmad Sirrī Baba, who is the last representative of the Bektāshī Order in Egypt, are taken into consideration. For these records, see Aḥmad Sirrī Baba, *al-Risāla al-Aḥmadiyya*, 27-28.

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ISKANDAR IBN AḤMAD'S EPISTLE IN REFUTATION OF CHRISTIANS*

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Abstract

This paper introduces the short epistle written by Iskandar ibn Aḥmad as an anti-Christian polemic. Iskandar identifies himself as "a philosopher from Trabzon," a city in the north-east of modern Turkey. No information about him is available other than this detail. The author of the polemic attempts to confute the basic Christian idea that Jesus Christ is God using biblical verses. As he refers to biblical verses accurately and in Greek (transliterated into the Arabic alphabet), one can be sure that he is very familiar with the New Testament. In addition to the biblical verses, he also uses logical arguments and Qurʾānic verses to show that Jesus Christ is only a human being. This paper starts with a brief history of Muslim anti-Christian apologetics and polemics in the Ottoman Empire and succinct information about Iskandar ibn Aḥmad's epistle. Then, the paper provides the English translation and Arabic text of the epistle. Because the epistle is a unique copy, it is not possible for us to illustrate the differences among copies of the text. However, the footnotes provide biblical and Qurʾānic references, transliteration of the Greek biblical verses, and the author's mistakes in the usage of Arabic languages.

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Introduction

For centuries, Jews and Christians lived in peace as nationalities (*millet* in Ottoman Turkish/*milla* in Arabic) under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, apart from several polemical tracts (*raddiyya*),[1] neither Muslims nor Jews or Christians felt it necessary to write religious polemics and defenses to show the superiority of their own religions until the later periods of the Ottoman Empire. However, this peaceful environment was damaged during the period of the Ottoman Empire's decline with the introduction of missionary activities within the Empire. As missionaries who came to Ottoman lands to spread Christianity began to write and distribute to the Muslim people texts opposing Islam, Muslim writers felt inclined to write replies to these texts.[2] That polemics and defenses of the Ottoman Empire were written in opposition to Christians during the final periods of the Empire strengthens this belief.

Many polemics and defenses that oppose Christianity were written as a reaction to the missionary activities. Here, we will only make

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[1] Sabine Schmidtke and Camilla Adang, "Aḥmad b. Muṣṭafā Ṭāshkubrīzāde's (d. 968/1561) Polemical Tract against Judaism," *al-Qantara* XXIX/1 (2008), 79-113; Schmidtke, "Epistle forcing the Jews [to admit their error] with regard to what they contend about the Torah, by dialectical reasoning (*Risālat ilzām al-yahūd fīmā zaʿamū fī l-tawrāt min qibal ʿilm al-kalām*) by al-Salām ʿAbd al-ʿAllām: A critical edition," in Camilla Adang and Sabine Schmidtke (eds.), *Contacts and Controversies between Muslims, Jews and Christians in the Ottoman Empire and Pre-Modern Iran* (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag in Kommission, 2010), 73-82; Adang, "Guided to Islam by the Torah: The *Risāla al-hādiya* by ʿAbd al-Salām al-Muhtadī al-Muḥammadī," in *Contacts and Controversies*, 57-72.

[2] See Maḥmūd Asʿad Saydishahrī, "Allah'ın Kelamı ve Allah'ın Kelimesi İkileminde Hz. İsa [Jesus in the Dilemma of *Kalām Allāh* versus *Kalimat Allāh*] (=Mudāfaʿa: Kalimat Allāh Taʿālā'ya Dā'ir Khuṭba: I [Apology: Sermon on the Kalimat Allāh]" (translated from Old Turkish into modern Turkish by Muhammet Tarakçı), *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* [*The Review of the Faculty of Theology, Uludağ University*] VII/7 (1998), 740-741.

note of several.[3]

In his text entitled *Risāla-i Islāmiyya*, Ibrāhīm Mutafarriqa (d. 1160/1747), a former Christian priest who converted to Islam, notes the reasons for becoming a Muslim along with the prophecies of Muḥammad in the Bible.[4]

Ḥājī ʿAbd Allāh al-Patrījī (d. 1303/1886) wrote his book, *Īḍāḥ al-marām fī kashf al-ẓalām,* to warn Muslims against Christian propaganda. He makes note of the differences between the Gospels and the Qurʾān regarding the cross, and claims that the Gospels are corrupted. Al-Patrījī also handles subjects such as the Trinity and the prophecies of Muḥammad in the Gospels.[5]

Khoja Isḥāq of Kharbūṭ (d. 1310/1892) also wrote a book entitled *Shams al-ḥaqīqa* as a response to the missionaries. In this book, he discusses the corruption of the Torah and the Gospels, the cross, the godhood of Jesus, and the prophecies of Muḥammad. Seventy-two difficult questions for Christians were included at the end of the book. Khoja Isḥāq attempted to respond to Christian missionaries in another work entitled *Ḍiyāʾ al-qulūb*. After making note of the conflicts in the Gospels starting with the narratives regarding the genealogy of Jesus Christ, Khoja Isḥāq comes to the conclusion that the Gospels are corrupted. He also attempts to prove the falsity of the Christian belief of the Trinity through the use of quotations from the Gospels.

In his work entitled, *Nūr al-hudā li-man istahdā*, Sirrī Pasha (d. 1313/1895) defended the idea that Muslims should learn about Chris-

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3 For more information on Muslim apologetics and polemics against Christianity in the late Ottoman period, see Mehmet Aydın, *Müslümanların Hıristiyanlığa Karşı Yazdığı Reddiyeler ve Tartışma Konuları* [*Muslim Polemics against Christianity and the Controversial Issues*] (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1989), 99-110.

4 See Mahmud Esad Coşan, Risâle-i İslâmiyye*: Matbaacı İbrahim-i Müteferrika ve* Risâle-i İslâmiyye *Adlı Eserinin Tenkitli Metni* [Risāla-i Islāmiyya: *Ibrāhīm Mutafarriqa, the Printer, and the Critical Edition of His* Risāla-i Islāmiyya] (Istanbul: Server İletişim, 2010).

5 For more information about Ḥājī ʿAbd Allāh al-Patrījī and his apology against Christianity, see İsmail Taşpınar, *Hacı Abdullah Petrici'nin Hıristiyanlık Eleştirisi* [*Ḥājī ʿAbd Allāh al-Patrījī's Polemic against Christianity*] (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2008).

tianity as a defense against Christian missionaries, and especially, attempted to confute the Christian idea that Jesus is God.

Perhaps the most important name in tradition of the Muslim polemics against Christianity during the Ottoman period is Aḥmad Midḥat Efendī (d. 1329/1911) due to the in-depth works that he wrote after forty years of labor.[6] Four of his works on this topic are quite important: *Mudāfaʿa* (Apology), *Mudāfaʿaya Muqābala ve Muqābalaya Mudāfaʿa* (The Reply to the Apology and The Apology to the Reply), *Mudāfaʿa 3* (Apology, vol. 3) and lastly *Bashāʾir-i Ṣidq-i Nubuwwat-i Muḥammadiyya* (Prophecies that show the accuracy of the prophethood of Muḥammad). Aḥmad Midḥat Efendī states that he wrote these works as a response to the missionaries who wrote to attack Islam.[7] Thus, his works should be regarded not as attacks, but rather, as defenses. In fact, the subtitle of his first work, entitled *Mudāfaʿa* clarifies his aim: it is "written in response to those who invite Muslims to Christianity." Aḥmad Midḥat Efendī handles widely different subjects, such as the emergence of Christianity, Paul, the spread of Christianity by sword after Constantine, the negative effects of Christian clergymen on Christianity, the Trinity, original sin, and Christian morals.[8]

Apart from these works, it is known that authors such as Aḥmad Kamāl, ʿAbd al-Aḥad Dāvūd, and Ḥasan Ṣabrī also wrote works to defend Islam and warn Muslims against the claims and activities of Christian missionaries. In addition, many articles were published about or against Christianity in journals of the era, such as *Sabīl al-*

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6 Aḥmad Midḥat Efendī, *Tārīkh-i Adyān* (Istanbul: Ḥurriyyet Maṭbaʿasi, 1329 H [1911]), I, 11.

7 Aḥmad Midḥat Efendī, *Mudāfaʿa* (Istanbul: Tarjumān-i Ḥaqīqat Maṭbaʿasi, 1300 H [1883]), 8-9.

8 In his MA thesis, Yaşa Yumak attempted to determine the place and importance of Aḥmad Midḥat Efendī in terms of anti-Christian polemics in the Islamic tradition, see Yaşa Yumak, *İslâm-Hıristiyan Polemiği Açısından Ahmed Midhat Efendi* [*Aḥmad Midḥat Efendī in the tradition of anti-Christian Polemics*] (MA thesis; Istanbul: Marmara University, 2001). See also Elif Karayel, *Dinler Tarihi Açısından Ahmed Mithat Efendi* [*Aḥmad Midḥat Efendī in the Science of History of Religions*] (MA thesis; Istanbul: Marmara University, 2002), 11-19, 61-81.

rashād.[9]

About the Epistle

This epistle is a unique copy of a treatise on the refutation of Christian dogma about the divinity of Christ that is written by an otherwise unknown author named Iskandar ibn Aḥmad. The author introduces himself as a philosopher from Trabzon. The treatise was recorded as number 261 at the collection of Lala İsmail at the Süleymaniye Library (Istanbul, Turkey). The treatise is written in Arabic and consists of 27 small sized leaves. There is neither any other copy of this treatise nor any other book by the same author in any of the libraries in Turkey. Additionaly, no information exists regarding the background of the writer or the date of the treatise. As stated above, as Muslim apologies such as these appeared during the decline of the Ottoman Empire as a reaction to Christian missionary activities, one can assume that this work was written during the nineteenth century.

The author of the treatise first states that Christians undoubtedly believe in the validity of their own religion, which, in fact, is false in all aspects, both intellectually and in terms of texts. Christians do not heed the intellectually correct arguments and the textual miraculous proofs of Muslims. Hence, the author's reason for writing this treatise is to rebut Christian beliefs through the use of the Bible. In other words, the method employed by Iskandar ibn Aḥmad throughout the treatise is as follows: narration of the Bible story in Greek using the Ottoman alphabet; translation of the story; explanation of the story in a manner that maintains that Jesus Christ is not God but a human being; and lastly, confirmation through verses from the Qurʾān.

What is striking in the anti-Christian polemical text *al-Radd ʿalā l-Naṣārā*, from the Ottoman period, is that it provides biblical sentenc-

[9] For more information on the articles about or against Christianity in the journal *Sabīl al-rashād,* see Aslı Kahraman, *1912-1925 Yılları Arasında Sebilürreşad Dergisi'nde Yayınlanan Hıristiyanlıkla İlgili Makaleler ve Tahlilleri* [*The Papers concerning Christianity Published in* Sabīl al-rashād *between 1912-1925 and Their Analysis*] (MA thesis; Adana: Çukurova University, 2009); Hilal Esen, *Sebîlürreşad'da Öteki Dinlerle İlgili Yazıların Değerlendirilmesi* [*A Study on the Papers concerning Other Religions in* Sabīl al-rashād] (MA thesis; Sakarya: Sakarya University, 2008).

es in Greek (using the Ottoman alphabet). It can be concluded that the author is familiar with Greek and the New Testament. However, because some Persian translation appears underneath the words of the citations in Greek from the Bible, we are led to doubt this conclusion. Did the author know Greek and add these Persian translations for the reader? Or did he receive help from someone who knew Greek? As a third possibility, could a scribe have added these translations to the text? These questions are left unanswered because we have no information about the author's life and no other copy of the epistle.

Another striking feature of Iskandar ibn Aḥmad's polemical text is that citations from the Bible are used to rebut Christian beliefs. According to Iskandar, sections of the Bible that Christians believe prove the godhood of Jesus are far from accomplishing this proof. Indeed many sentences in the Bible depict Jesus not as a god but as a human being and these sections are in accordance with the teachings of the Qurʾān. Conversely, our author approaches the Bible story about the raising of Jesus from the dead with some suspicion. Hence, it can be assumed that Iskandar ibn Aḥmad believes that falsification exists in *some* parts of the Bible. Christians have also interpreted some sections of the Bible inaccurately, which has thus led to further falsifications.

Iskandar ibn Aḥmad is not the only polemicist author who used sentences from the Bible to rebut predominant Christian doctrines. Centuries ago, al-Ghazālī used the same method in his book, *al-Radd al-jamīl li-ilāhiiyyat ʿĪsā bi-ṣarīḥ al-Injīl*. Other similarities exist between the texts of Iskandar ibn Aḥmad and al-Ghazālī. Both texts accepted or assumed the validity of the biblical text and claimed that Christians interpreted it inaccurately. Each of the two polemical texts viewed the refutation of the godhood of Jesus as the central problem. Neither text mentioned predominant anti-Christian Muslim polemic topics, such as the cross, the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, original sin, and redemption. Al-Ghazālī took into account the miracles of Jesus Christ; however, he concluded that these miracles are not sufficient to prove the godhood of Jesus. Conversely, Iskandar ibn Aḥmad approached the portions of the Bible that describe the miracles of Jesus Christ with suspicion. In opposition to al-Ghazālī, Iskandar ibn Aḥmad supported citations from the Bible with verses from the Qurʾān.

Citations from the Bible by Muslims often contain mistakes and omissions, especially in earlier polemical texts. That the citations from the Bible in Iskandar ibn Aḥmad's treatise that are first provided in Ottoman alphabet in Greek and then in translation are exact quotations is an important feature of the treatise.

An Epistle in Refutation of Christians[1]

by Iskandar ibn Aḥmad, the Philosopher of Trabzon

Praise be to Allah. There is nothing whatever like unto Him. He is the One Who heareth and seeth (all things). He is the judge. No associate has He. He hath power over all things. He is the one, has taken neither a wife nor a son. Allah is He on whom all depend. He is neither Father nor Son.[2] There is none like unto Him. He is the creator who created the heavens and the earth. Then, he began the creation of man from clay and made his progeny from a quintessence of despised fluid. So, blessed be to Allah, the best to create! He is the wise, who breathed into him of His spirit and gives life to him, then causes him to die, then brings him to life with a new creation. He is full of honor, who said "throw into Hell every contumacious Rejecter (of God)!" Peace be upon Muḥammad of Quraysh, of Mecca, the most honored one, the master of the prophets and the messengers, the illiterate, the prophet of the cherisher of the worlds. Peace be upon all of his family, companions, and successors.

Then, because Christian infidels believed in the authenticity of their religion, which is false in all aspects, both rationally and in terms of texts, alleging that it is true according to their false claim and do not heed our intellectually correct arguments and textual miraculous proofs, this poor slave (of Allah), Iskandar ibn Aḥmad, the philosopher of Trabzon, wanted, with Allah's Help, to make them abide by the Bible.

It is said in the first chapter in the beginning of the Gospel that "en archē ēn o logos kai o logos ēn pros ton theon kai theos ēn o logos," that is, "in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."[3] Considering that the Gospel said that the Word is God, the infidels are using this verse as evidence and saying that now that Jesus is the word of God, he is God either because he is word, for he descended in it and heralded it, or because he is God. However, this conception is not so because the word "kai" in the

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1 رسالة فى رد الملة النصرانية بالإنجيل من قبل علم الكلام (An Epistle in the refutation of the Christian religion through the Gospel and the science of *kalām*)

2 Literally, "He neither begets nor is born." (Q 112:3).

3 John 1:1.

sentence "kai theos ēn o logos" is a conjunction (*al-wāw al-ʿāṭifa*/the conjunction "*wa*"), and if it is read as "theos," it means "God" in their language. Conversely if it is read as "thios," it means "magnificent," "grand," "glorious," and "artful." This second sense is appropriate here, not the first. It reads that the word is magnificent, grand, glorious, and artful. The infidels are making a mistake and saying that "كثَؤس اين او لوغوس" (the word is God). This statement is not true because there would have to be many gods if the word were a god. Therefore, the antecedent (*lāzim*) is null, and the consequent (*malzūm*) is also null. The antecedent is null because if it were true, everything to which the word of God is suitable to apply would have to be a god. Then, Yaḥyā (bpuh) (John the Baptist) would be a god, for the Almighty Allah said, "O Zakariyyā! We give thee good news of a son: His name shall be Yaḥyā."[4] Also, the snake of Moses would have to be a god, for Allah says, "(Allah) said, throw it, O Moses! So he cast it down, and lo! It was a serpent, gliding."[5] He also says, "(And remember) when the angels said: O Mary! Lo! Allah giveth thee glad tidings of a word from Him, whose name is the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary."[6] In addition, that everything for which the word of God is suitable to apply must be a god is obviously void. As to the consequent, when something is placed and appears that it is void, this consequent is also void. Therefore, Jesus is not said to be a god, considering that he is the word of God. It is the necessary consequence (*maṭlūb*). This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "O People of the Book! Commit no excesses in your religion: Nor say of Allah aught but the truth. Christ Jesus the son of Mary was (no more than) a Messenger of Allah, and His Word, which He bestowed on Mary and a Spirit from Him."[7]

It is written in the second chapter of the Gospel of Matthew that "otan de elthē o uios tou anthrōpou en tē doxē autou kai pantes oi angeloi met autou." This [quote] means "when the Son of man shall come in his glory and all the holy angels with him."[8] Jesus (pbuh) declared explicitly that he is a son of man, not a son of God, and he is

4 Q 19:7.

5 Q 20:19-20.

6 Q 3:45.

7 Q 4:171.

8 Matthew 25:31.

created and is neither eternal nor self-subsistent (*wājib al-wujūd*), for being self-subsistent by himself means that he is self-existent from all of his sides. This idea means that none of his attributes changes. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "They say: 'Allah hath begotten a son.' Glory be to him. Nay, to Him belongs all that is in the heavens and on earth: everything renders worship to Him."[9]

It is written in the fourth [Gospel] that "ēdē de tēs eortēs mesousēs anebē o iēsous eis to ieron kai edidasken. kai ethaumazon oi ioudaioi legontes pōs outos grammata oiden mē memathēkōs. apekrithē oun autois o iēsous kai eipen ē emē didachē ouk estin emē alla tou pempsantos me. ean tis thelē to thelēma autou poiein gnōsetai peri tēs didachēs poteron ek tou theou estin ē egō ap emautou lalō. o aph eautou lalōn tēn doxan tēn idian zētei o de zētōn tēn doxan tou pempsantos auton outos alēthēs estin kai adikia en autō ouk estin." This [segment] means that "Now, about the midst of the feast, Jesus went up into the temple, and taught. And the Jews marveled, saying, How knoweth this man letters, having never learned? Jesus answered them and said, my doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me. If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself. He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory: but he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him."[10] Jesus (pbuh) declared that he is not God, saying, "my doctrine is not mine, but His that sent me." Then, Jesus is not God. He also said, "Whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." In this sentence, Jesus (pbuh) showed the greatness of the Almighty God and his lowliness in regard to the Almighty God. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "It is not (possible) that a man, to whom is given the book, and wisdom, and the prophethood, should say to people: be ye my worshippers rather than Allah's."[11] This meaning is apparent among the people and in the custom. Whenever people hold a command in high esteem, they say that this command is not from them, but from the administrator. In doing so, they show their lowliness and the greatness of the administrator.

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9 Q 2:116.

10 John 7:14-18.

11 Q 3:79.

It is written in the fourth chapter of the Gospel of Matthew that "kardias autōn ina mē pisteusantes sōthōsin. oi de epi tēs petras oi otan akousōsin meta charas dechontai ton logon kai outoi rizan ouk echousin oi pros kairon pisteuousin kai en kairō peirasmou aphistantai. to de eis tas akanthas peson outoi eisin oi akousantes kai upo merimnōn kai ploutou kai ēdonōn tou biou poreuomenoi sumpnigontai kai ou telesphorousin. to de en tē kalē gē outoi eisin oitines en kardia kalē kai agathē akousantes ton logon katechousin kai karpophorousin."[12] This [passage] means, "he spake by this parable: A sower went out to sow his seed: and as he sowed, some fell by the way-side; and it was trodden down, and the fowls of the air devoured it. And some fell upon a rock; and as soon as it was sprung up, it withered away because it lacked moisture. And some fell among thorns; and the thorns sprang up with it, and choked it. And other [seeds] fell on good ground, and sprang up, and brought forth fruit a hundredfold. [And when he had said these things, he cried, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.] And his disciples asked him, saying, what might this parable be? And he said: [Now the parable is this.] The seed is the word of God. Those by the way-side are they that hear; then cometh the devil, and taketh away the word out of their hearts, lest they should believe and be saved. They on the rock are they who, when they hear, receive the word with joy; and these have no root, which, for a while, believe, and in time of temptation, fall away. And that which fell among thorns are they who, when they have heard, go forth, and are choked with cares and riches and pleasures of this life, and bring no fruit to perfection. However, those on the good ground are they who, in an honest and good heart, having heard the word, keep it, and bring forth fruit with patience."[13] This [quote] negates the idea that the word of God is God and attests that the word of God is not an attribution that is exclusive to Jesus, but can be applied to many. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "By His Command doth He send the spirit (of inspiration) to any of His servants He pleases."[14] The word of God and the person of God are not identical, for the word is different from the speaker be-

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[12] Kata Loukan 8:12-15.

[13] This story appears in the fourth chapter of the Gospel of Mark, not of Matthew. However, the details in the story seem to correspond much more closely to the Gospel of Luke (8:4-15. See also Mark 4:2-20; Matthew 13:3-23).

[14] Q 40:15.

cause he (Jesus) likened the word to the seed and the speaker to the sower. Then, if Jesus (pbuh) were a god simply because he is the word of God, it would be necessary that everything to which the word of god is suitable to apply would also be a god, so there would have to be many gods. Therefore, the antecedent is obviously null, and the consequent is also null. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "If there were, in the heavens and the earth, other gods in addition to Allah, then verily, both (the heavens and the earth) had been disordered."[15] As to the consequent, when something is placed and appears that it is impossible and invalid, this consequent is also void and impossible. It is the necessary consequence.

It is written in the fourteenth chapter of the Gospel of John that "ean agapate me tas entolas tas emas tērēsate. kai egō erōtēsō ton patera kai allon paraklēton dōsei umin ina menē meth umōn eis ton aiōna to pneuma tēs alētheias." This [passage] means, "If ye love me, keep my commandments. And I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another paraklaytos that he may abide with you forever; he is the spirit of truth."[16] This passage indicates that the word "father" means "the guide" and "the educator," not "the pater [one who has child or children]," for when it is used absolutely, it is known among all creatures that it means "the guide" and "the educator." If Jesus, one of the created beings, were a god, it would be necessary that every individual is also a god. Therefore, the antecedent is null, and the consequent is also null. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "They have taken as lords beside Allah their rabbis and their monks and the Messiah son of Mary, when they were bidden to worship only One God. There is no God but He. Be He glorified from all that they ascribe as partner (unto Him)!"[17] This idea also indicates that Jesus (pbuh) is a created being, not eternal, for whoever demands is necessarily a needy, created, and possible (*mumkin*) being. Whoever is created and possible is not eternal. The Almighty God, conversely, is an eternal and self-subsisting being. Therefore, Jesus (pbuh) is not self-subsisting and not God. It is the necessary consequence. Jesus' statement that "he shall give you another paraklaytos" indicates Aḥmad, for he describes him as the spirit of truth, and this is the greatest attribute, namely, Aḥmad. This idea is compatible with a

15 Q 21:22.

16 John 14:15-16.

17 Q 9:31.

Qurʾānic verse: "[Jesus, son of Mary said:] O Children of Israel! Lo! I am the messenger of Allah unto you, confirming that which was (revealed) before me in the Torah, and bringing good tidings of a messenger who cometh after me, whose name is Aḥmad."[18] The limitation of "another" in Jesus' statement about "another paraklaytos" dismisses the words of the infidels, who say that "paraklaytos" is Jesus. [This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "Those who follow the messenger, the unlettered Prophet, whom they find mentioned in the Torah and the Gospel (which are) with them."[19]].

It is written in the same chapter that "ei ēgapate me echarēte an oti eipon poreuomai pros ton patera oti o patēr mou meizōn mou estin." This [sentence] means, "If ye loved me, ye would rejoice because I said, I go unto the Father: for my Father is greater than I."[20] It appears that Jesus is lesser and lower than God, and his nobleness is due to his connection with the Almighty God. There is no doubt that the lesser and the lower one cannot be identified with the greatest. If it were so,[21] the greatest would number two. If Jesus were a god, there would be two gods. Then, the antecedent is obviously null, so the consequent is also null. This idea compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "Allah has said: take not (for worship) two gods: for he is just one Allah."[22] He also declared that he is the servant (*ʿabd*) of God. Because Jesus is the lesser and not the Almighty God, he is not but the slave of God, for every created being is the servant of God, and the Almighty God is sovereign, creator, eternal, ruler, mighty, generous. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "Christ disdaineth not to serve and worship Allah, nor do the angels who are near to Him."[23]

It is written in the same chapter that "o de paraklētos to pneuma to agion o pempsei o patēr en tō onomati mou ekeinos umas didaxei panta kai upomnēsei umas panta a eipon umin." This [quote] means, "But the paraklaytos, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things and bring all things to

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18 Q 61:6.

19 Q 7:157.

20 John 14:28.

21 If the lesser and lower one could be identified with the greatest.

22 Q 16:51.

23 Q 4:172.

your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you."[24] This [quote] indicates the blessed coming of Muḥammad (pbuh), for the word "paraklaytos" means "the discoverer of the hidden things." In addition, Jesus described him as the Holy Ghost. It is the greatest attribute, the meaning of which is Aḥmad. Moreover, Jesus said, "in my name," namely, as a prophet. He is no one but Muḥammad (pbuh). This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "It is He who has sent His messenger with guidance and the religion of truth, to proclaim it over all religion: and enough is Allah for a Witness. Muḥammad is the messenger of Allah."[25]

It is written in the Gospel that "egō eimi ē ampelos ē alēthinē kai o patēr mou o geōrgos estin. pan klēma en emoi mē pheron karpon airei auto kai pan to karpon pheron kathairei auto ina pleiona karpon pherē." This [quote] means, "I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman. Every branch in me that beareth not fruit he taketh away: and every branch that beareth fruit, he purgeth it, that it may bring forth more fruit."[26] This [idea] signifies that Jesus' aim is to show who his maker, creator, and educator is, and to show that he, Jesus, is a being who was created. Every creature is produced (*ḥādith*) and needy. Whatever is needy and produced is neither eternal nor self-subsisting. Then, Jesus is not a God because the Almighty God is eternal and self-subsisting. It is the necessary consequence.

It is written in the Gospel that "patera mou kai patera umōn kai theon mou kai theon umōn." This [quote] means, "my Father and your Father, and my God, and your God."[27] This [quote] indicates that when Jesus said, "my father and your father, my God and your God," his intention for the word "father" was "the guide" and "the instructor." If his intention for the word "father" were "the pater [one who has child or children]," he would not say "your father." This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "They surely disbelieve who say: Lo! Allah is the Christ, son of Mary. The Christ (himself) said: O Children of Israel, worship Allah, my Lord and your Lord. Lo! Whoever ascribeth partners unto Allah, for him Allah hath forbidden Paradise.

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[24] John 14:26.

[25] Q 48:28-29.

[26] John 15:1-2.

[27] John 20:17.

His abode is the Fire. For evil-doers there will be no helpers."[28] If Jesus were the son of God simply because he said "my father," the apostles would be the sons of God and gods because Jesus also said "your father." Therefore, the antecedent is obviously null, so the consequent is also null. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "It is not befitting to (the majesty of) Allah that He should beget a son. Glory be to him! When He decreeth a thing, He saith unto it only: Be! And it is."[29] This [quote] also indicates Jesus' being servant, for everyone who adopts a god must be His servant. It is the necessary consequence. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "It is Allah who is my Lord and your Lord; then, worship Him. That is a straight path."[30]

It is written in the Gospel that "sumpherei umin ina egō apelthō ean gar egō mē apelthō o paraklētos ouk eleusetai pros umas... otan de elthē ekeinos to pneuma tēs alētheias odēgēsei umas eis pasan tēn alētheian ou gar lalēsei aph eautou all osa an akousē lalēsei kai ta erchomena anangelei umin. ekeinos eme doxasei." This [quote] means, "It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the paraklaytos will not come unto you... When he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth: for he shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak: and he will show you things to come. He shall glorify me."[31] This [quote] indicates that Jesus told his apostles the good news of the blessed coming of Muḥammad, the prophet of God. Jesus declared the superiority of Muḥammad (pbuh) over himself, saying, "It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the paraklaytos will not come unto you… When he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth." Jesus appeared to have said, "Because you will not get every profit from me, it would be better that I should go away from you, and he, the Spirit of truth, should come. He has superiority and profits more than me in order that you may benefit from him more than me," while saying that "he will guide you into all truth." This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "O Prophet! Truly We have sent thee as a witness and a bringer of good tidings and a warner. And as a summoner unto Allah by His permission, and as a lamp that giveth

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[28] Q 5:72.

[29] Q 19:35.

[30] Q 3:51.

[31] John 16:7, 13-14.

light. And give the believers the good news that they shall have a great grace from Allah."[32] Jesus encouraged people to believe in him, accept him, and believe in the Holy Qurʾān, saying, "He is the Spirit of truth. He shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak," namely, [he shall speak] from the Almighty God, and it is the Qurʾān. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "Nor doth he speak of (his own) desire. It is naught but revelation sent down to him."[33] Jesus also encouraged people to accept him and believe in what he said because of the truth that he spoke: "He shall glorify me." This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "O ye who believe! Believe in Allah and His Messenger and the scripture which He hath sent to His messenger."[34]

It is written in the Gospel that "ēlei ēlei lema sabachthanei tout estin thee mou thee mou inati me enkatelipes." It means "Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani? That is to say, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"[35] This [quote] indicates that Jesus (pbuh) declared explicitly and clearly his enslavement, weakness, and desire for mercy, aid, and recourse from the Almighty Allah, for " الی الی لم سبحتنی" is an Arabic expression, and it means "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" As there is no letter "h" in the Christian alphabet, it was dropped, and the expression "الی الی" remained [instead of إلهی إلهی]. This rectification is evident in the explanation that Jesus gave shortly afterwards, saying, "tout estin" that is, "thee mou thee mou," which means "My God, my God," as in language of the Christians, "thee mou thee mou" means "My God, my God." The unbelievers do not deny this meaning, for when the Jews wanted to kill Jesus, and when he cried, scared, prayed, and shouted loudly, he said in the Gospel, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "Certainly they disbelieve who say: Surely, Allah is the Christ, son of Mary. Say: Who then can do aught against Allah, if He had willed to destroy the Christ, son of Mary, and his mother and everyone on earth?"[36] Therefore, Jesus showed clearly his enslavement and weakness. This idea is compati-

32 Q 33:45-47.

33 Q 53:3-4.

34 Q 4:136.

35 Matthew 27:46; Mark 15:34.

36 Q 5:17.

ble with a Qurʾānic verse: "He said: I am indeed a servant of Allah: He hath given me the Scripture and hath appointed me a Prophet."[37] (Jesus also showed that) he needs, wishes, and expects aid, help, and mercy from God, like other human beings. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "O ye men. It is ye who have need of Allah: but Allah is the One free of all wants, worthy of all praise."[38] Everyone who is needy is produced (*ḥādith*), and nobody who is produced is eternal or a god, but created and the servant of the creator. However, the almighty God is eternal and self-existent. Then, Jesus is not a god, but created one like all the other creatures. This idea is compatible with a Qurʾānic verse: "Lo! The likeness of Jesus before Allah is as that of Adam. He created him of dust, and then, He said unto him: Be! And he is."[39]

Many justifications and evidences like these exist in the Gospel. However, these are enough to nullify the divinity of Jesus, prove that he is a servant of God, prove the blessed coming of Muḥammad (pbuh), and prove that he is the messenger and the prophet of God.

The rest of the Gospel contains stories, legends, and miracles, most of which are attributed to Jesus by the tongues of the apostles. These stories are not stories about the mighty God like those of the Holy Qurʾān. Whoever knows about the Qurʾānic verses, its eloquences and its pureness knows and believes that it is the word of God and prodigious. No one nor all of the individuals, from the human beings to the jinns, can produce the like of the Qurʾān, as the mighty God said, "Say: Verily, though mankind and the Jinn should assemble to produce the like of this Qurʾān, they could not produce the like thereof, though they were helpers one of another."[40]

Among such stories is the following: "archōn eis elthōn prosekunei autō legōn oti ē thugatēr mou arti eteleutēsen alla elthōn epithes tēn cheira sou ep autēn kai zēsetai. kai egertheis o iēsous ēkolouthēsen autō kai oi mathētai autou. kai idou gunē aimorroousa dōdeka etē proselthousa opisthen ēpsato tou kraspedou tou imatiou autou. elegen gar en eautē ean monon apsōmai tou imatiou autou sōthēsomai. o de iēsous epistrapheis kai idōn autēn eipen tharsei

[37] Q 19:30.

[38] Q 35:15.

[39] Q 3:59.

[40] Q 17:88.

thugater ē pistis sou sesōken se kai esōthē ē gunē apo tēs ōras ekeinēs. kai elthōn o iēsous eis tēn oikian tou archontos kai idōn tous aulētas kai ton ochlon thoruboumenon. legei autois anachōreite ou gar apethanen to korasion alla katheudei kai kategelōn autou. ote de exeblēthē o ochlos eiselthōn ekratēsen tēs cheiros autēs kai ēgerthē to korasion. kai exēlthen ē phēmē autē eis olēn tēn gēn ekeinēn."

This [section] means, "While he spake these things unto them, behold, there came a certain ruler, and he worshipped him, saying, 'My daughter is even now dead: but come and lay thy hand upon her, and she shall live.' And Jesus arose and followed him, and so did his disciples. And behold, a woman, who was diseased with an issue of blood twelve years, came behind him, and touched the hem of his garment: For she said within herself, 'If I may but touch his garment, I shall be whole.' However, Jesus turned him about, and when he saw her, he said, 'Daughter, [be of good comfort,] thy faith hath made thee whole.' And the woman was made whole from that hour. And when Jesus came into the ruler's house, and saw the minstrels and the people making a noise, he said unto them, 'Give place: for the maid is not dead, but sleepeth.' And they laughed him to scorn. However, when the people were put forth, he went in and took her by the hand, and the maid arose. And the fame hereof went abroad into all that land."[41]

Allah knows best.

[41] Matthew 9:18-26; Mark 5:22-43; Luke 8:41-56.

رسالة فى الرد على النصارى[1]

لإسكندر ابن أحمد فيلسوف الدرابزونى[2]

الحمد لله الذى ليس كمثله شيء و هو السميع البصير، الحاكم الذى لا شريك له و هو على كل شيء قدير، الواحد الذى لم يتخذ صاحبة و لا ولدا، الصمد الذى لم يلد و لم يولد و لم يكن له كفوا أحد، الخالق الذى خلق السموات و الأرض ثم بدأ خلق الإنسان من طين ثم جعل نسله من سلالة من ماء مهين فتبارك الله أحسن الخالقين، الحكيم الذى نفخ فيه من روحه فيحييه ثم يميته ثم بخلق جديد يحييه، الكريم الذي قال "و أزلفت الجنة للمتقين غير بعيد"، القهار الذى قال "ألقيا فى جهنم كل كفار عنيد". و الصلوة على أشرف الخلق سيد الأنبياء و المرسلين محمد القريشى المكى الأمى رسول رب العالمين و على آله و أصحابه و خلفائه أجمعين.

أما بعد، لما كانت الكفرة النصرانية معتقدين على حقية دينهم الباطلة[3] من كل الوجوه عقلا و نقلا بأنها حق على زعم فاسدهم[4] و لا ينظرون حججنا العقلية الصحيحة و لا البراهين النقلية المعجزة، أراد هذا العبد الفقير إسكندر ابن أحمد فيلسوف الدرابزونى[5] بعون الله تبارك و تعالى أن ألزمها[6] بالإنجيل.

و قال إن فى الصحاح[7] الأول فى ابتداء الإنجيل قوله: "انارشى اين او لوغوس كئو لوغوس اين بزستون ثؤن كثؤس إين أو لوغوس."[8] يعنى "الكلام فى الأزل و الكلام عند الله و الكلام إله."[9] يأخذ الكفرة هذا القول و

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1 رسالة فى رد الملة النصرانية بالإنجيل من قبل علم الكلام

2 الفيلسوف الطرابزونى or فيلسوف الطرابزون

3 الباطل

4 زعمهم الفاسد or على زعم فاسد.

5 الفيلسوف الطرابزونى or فيلسوف الطرابزون

6 ألزمهم

7 الإصحاح

8 en archē ēn o logos kai o logos ēn pros ton theon kai theos ēn o logos (Kata Iannen 1:1).

9 John 1:1.

يجعلون[10] حجة و يقولون لما كان عيسى كلام الله كان إلها. أما كونه كلاما فلأنه كان واقعا فيه و مبشرا به. و أما كونه إلها فلما قال فى الإنجيل و الكلام إله. و ليس كذلك لأن لفظ الكاف "ثؤس" فى "كثؤس اين أو لوغوس" فى موضع الواو العاطفة و "ثَؤس" بفتح الثاء بمعنى لفظة الله على لسانهم و "ثِؤس" بكسر الثاء فى لغتهم العظيم و الجليل و المجيد و البديع فههنا هو المعنى الثانى لا الأول أي "كثِؤس اين او لوغوس" بالكسر بمعنى "و الكلام عظيم أو مجيد أو جليل أو بديع". و الكفرة يغلطون و يقولون "كثَؤس اين او لوغوس" بالفتح بمعنى "و الكلام إله". و ليس كذلك لأنه لو كان الكلام إلها يلزم أن يكون آلهة كثيرة. فاللازم باطل و الملزوم مثله. أما بطلان اللازم فلأنه حينئذ يلزم أن يكون كل ما صدق عليه أنه كلام الله أن يكون إلها فيكون على هذا التقدير يحيى عليه السلام إلها لأنه قال الله تبارك و تعالى آية: "يا زكريا إنا نبشرك بغلام اسمه يحيى."[11] و أيضا أن يكون ثعبان موسى إلها. لأنه قال الله تبارك و تعالى آية: "قال ألقها يا موسى فألقاها فإذا هي حية تسعى."[12] كما قال: "يا مريم إن الله يبشرك بكلمة منه اسمه المسيح عيسى ابن مريم."[13] و غير ذلك مما يصدق عليه أنه كلام الله أن يكون إلها و هو باطل بالبداهة. و أما الملزوم فلأنه إذا وضع الشيء و لزم منه باطل يكون ذلك الموضوع أيضا باطلا. فإذًا لا يكون عيسى إلها على تقدير كونه كلام الله و هو المطلوب. و هذا موافق بآية كريمة: "يا أهل الكتاب لا تغلوا فى دينكم و لا تقولوا على الله إلا الحق إنما المسيح عيسى ابن مريم رسول الله و كلمته ألقيها[14] إلى مريم و روح منه."[15]

و أما فى الصحاح[16] الثانى قتا ماتثؤن فى قوله: "ابن أو كريوس أوتان الثى أوا اى سوس أو أوس تو آنثروبو انت ذوكس أفتو كبا نتس آيئ آنكلى

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10 يجعلونه

11 Q 19:7.

12 Q 20:19-20.

13 Q 3:45.

14 ألقاها

15 Q 4:171.

16 الإصحاح

متافتو."[17] يعنى "إذا جاء عيسى ابن البشر على شهرته و معه كل الملائكة المقدسة."[18] أظهر عيسى عليه السلام صريحا بأنه ابن البشر و ليس بابن الله و كونه حادثا و ليس بقديم و واجب الوجود لأن واجب الوجود لذاته واجب الوجود من جميع جهاته بمعنى لا يتغير[19] صفة من صفاته. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "و قالوا اتخذ الله ولدا سبحانه بل له ما فى السموات و الأرض كل له قانتون."[20]

و أما فى الرابع فى قوله: "تيس ا اورتيس مسوسس آنوى اواى اى سوس استواى ارون كاذى ذاسك كاثاو ماذون ااى او ذئ لغون تس بوس اوتوس غراما تا اذمى مماثقوس آبقرث اون آفتيس اواى اى سوس كا بن اامى ذذاشى اوكستى ايمى آلاتو بمبسانتوسمه اان تس ثل تو ثليما آفتو باين ينوسته برتس ذذاخيش بو ترون اكتو ثؤاست اى اغو آبمافتو لا لواو آفآفتولا لون تن ذوقسان تن اى ذيبا زتى اوذ زيتون تن ذوقسان تو بمسانتوس آفتون اوتوس آلشس است كآذى كيا انافتو اوكست."[21] يعنى "فى وسط الصوم اطلع عيسى على المنبر و وعظ و عجبوا[22] اليهود حيث قالوا إنه ما قرأ حرفا من أحد. و أجابهم عيسى و قال لهم: موعظتى ليست منى بل ممن أرسلنى. و من يطلب إرادته يفهم من موعظة هل هي من عند الله أو أنا أتكلم من تلقاء نفسى. من يكلم[23] من تلقاء نفسه يطلب اختياره الخاص. و من يطلب مراد

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17 otan de elthē o uios tou anthrōpou en tē doxē autou kai pantes oi angeloi met autou (Kata Matthaion 25:31).

18 Matthew 25:31.

19 لا تتغير

20 Q 2:116.

21 ēdē de tēs eortēs mesousēs anebē o iēsous eis to ieron kai edidasken. kai ethaumazon oi ioudaioi legontes pōs outos grammata oiden mē memathēkōs. apekrithē oun autois o iēsous kai eipen ē emē didachē ouk estin emē alla tou pempsantos me. ean tis thelē to thelēma autou poiein gnōsetai peri tēs didachēs poteron ek tou theou estin ē egō ap emautou lalō. o aph eautou lalōn tēn doxan tēn idian zētei o de zētōn tēn doxan tou pempsantos auton outos alēthēs estin kai adikia en autō ouk estin (Kata Iannen 7:14-18).

22 عجب

23 يتكلم

من أرسله هو صادق و ليس عنده ظلم."[24] أظهر عيسى عليه السلام أنه غير الله حيث قال "موعظتى ليست منى بل ممن أرسلنى"، فإذًا يكون عيسى غير الله. و قال أيضا "هل هي من عند الله أو أنا أتكلم من تلقاء نفسى" ففيه عيسى عليه السلام أظهر عظمة الله تبارك و تعالى و دناءة ذاته بالنسبة إلى الله تبارك و تعالى. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "ما كان لبشر أن يؤتيه الله الكتاب و الحكم و النبوة ثم يقول للناس كونوا عبادا لى من دون الله."[25] و هذا المعنى ظاهر بين الناس و فى العرف إذا أرادوا تعظيم أمر قالوا إن هذا الأمر ليس منى بل أمر الأمير و يظهرون دناءتهم و عظمة الأمير.

و أما فى الصحاح[26] الرابع قتا ماتثؤن قوله: "ابن اوكر قرديباس آفتون انامى بستوسانتس سوثوسن اذاستن بتراس ااوتان آقوسوسن متاس خاراس ذخونته تونلوغون كاوت ريزان اوكخوسن اسبروشكرون بستو وسن كانكر وبر ان مو آفستانته توذاس تاس آقانثس بسون اوت اسن اى آقوسانتس كا بومرمنون كبلوتو كا ذون تووىؤ بوروومنى سن بنغوند كآوته الفثروس توذاستن اغائن ين اوت ائسن آيتنس انقرذ آقالن كآغاثن اقوسانتس تونلوغون قته خوسن كقربوفوروس."[27] يعنى "قال المولى تمثيل هذا خرج الحراث أن[28] يزرع البذر و فى حين زراعته منه ما سقط على الطريق وفنا[29] تحت الأقدام و أكله الطيور السماوية. و منه ما سقط على الحجر فيبس من حيث لا يوجد نشو و نما.[30] و منه ما سقط على الشوك فغرقه الشوك لتماثل طبايعها.[31] و

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[24] John 7:14-18.

[25] Q 3:79.

[26] الإصحاح

[27] kardias autōn ina mē pisteusantes sōthōsin. oi de epi tēs petras oi otan akousōsin meta charas dechontai ton logon kai outoi rizan ouk echousin oi pros kairon pisteuousin kai en kairō peirasmou aphistantai. to de eis tas akanthas peson outoi eisin oi akousantes kai upo merimnōn kai ploutou kai ēdonōn tou biou poreuomenoi sumpnigontai kai ou telesphorousin. to de en tē kalē gē outoi eisin oitines en kardia kalē kai agathē akousantes ton logon katechousin kai karpophorousin (Kata Loukan 8:12-15)

[28] فنى

[29] لأن

[30] It is an Persian expression, the Arabic equivalent of which is النمو.

[31] طبائعها

الآخر سقط على الأرض الخالص و حفظته و جعلت أكله[32] مائة أمثال. و سأله الحواريون قالوا له "ما هذا التمثيل؟" و أجابهم و قال البذر كلام الله. و ما هو على الطريق كان[33] السامعون حتى يجيء الشيطان و يخرج ذلك الكلام عن قلوبهم لأن لا يعتقدون و يفلحون.[34] و ما على الحجر هو الذى[35] يستمعون ذلك الكلام و يأخذون بالسرور و لما لم تكن لهم عروق يعتقدونه فى قليل الوقت و إذا أصابهم زحمة يتركونه. و ما هو بين الشوك هو[36] السامعون الذين بالأشغال و الغناء و غرور المال يمشون و يغرقون و لا يفلحون. و ما هو على الأرض الخالص السامعون بالقلب الصافى الخالص ذلك الكلام و يحفظونه و يجعلون[37] أكلا بالصبر."[38] هذا سلب لكون كلام الله إلها و إثبات بأن كلام الله لا ينحصر صدقه على عيسى عليه السلام فقط، بل يصدق على كثير. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "يلقى الروح من أمره على من يشاء من عباده."[39] و ليس كلام الله عين ذات الله إذ الكلام غير المتكلم لأنه شبه الكلام بالبذر و المتكلم بالحراث. فإذا لو كان عيسى عليه السلام إلها على تقدير كونه كلام الله، لزم أن يكون كل ما صدق عليه أنه كلام الله أيضا إلها، فحينئذ لزم آلهة متعددة. فاللازم باطل بالبداهة فالملزوم مثله. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "لو كان فيهما آلهة إلا الله لفسدتا."[40] و أما الملزوم لأنه إذا وضع الشيء و لزم منه محال أو باطل كان ذلك الملزوم أيضا باطلا و محالا و هو المطلوب.

و أما فى الصحاح[41] الرابع عشر قتا اؤآنن قوله: "اآن آغا باتمه تاس انتولاس تاس اماس ترساته كاغواروتسوتون باتراكآلون باراقليتون ذوسى

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32 أكلته

33 هم

34 لئلا يعتقدوا و يفلحوا

35 هم الذين

36 هم

37 يجعلونه

38 Luke 8:4-15; Mark 4: 2-20; Matthew 13:3-23.

39 Q 40:15.

40 Q 21:22.

41 الإصحاح

ايمن انامنى مثمون استون ااونا توبتومايتس الشاس."[42] يعنى "إن تحبونى احفظوا وصاياىَ و أنا أطلب من الأب فيعطيكم باراقليتون آخَر حتى يبقى لكم إلى الأبد و هو روح الحق."[43] دال على أن لفظ الأب بمعنى المهدى و المربى و ليس بمعنى الوالد لأنه قال من الأب مطلقا و هو مشترك بين جميع الخلق بمعنى المهدى و المربى. و لو كان عيسى و هو فرد من أفراد الخلق إلها لزم أن يكون جميع الأفراد أيضا إلها. فاللازم بالباطل[44] و الملزوم مثله. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "اتخذوا أحبارهم و رهبانهم أربابا من دون الله و المسيح ابن مريم و ما أمروا إلا ليعبدوا إلها واحدا لا إله إلا هو سبحانه عما يشركون."[45] و أيضا دال على أن عيسى عليه السلام حادث و ليس بقديم لأن كل طالب مفتقر بالضرورة و حادث و ممكن، و كل واحد منهما ليس بقديم. و لكن الله تبارك و تعالى قديم و واجب الوجود. فإذا عيسى عليه السلام ليس بواجب الوجود و ليس بإله و هو المطلوب. و أما قوله "فيعطيكم باراقليتون آخَر" دال على أحمد لأنه وصفه بروح الحق و هو أزيد الأوصاف و هو أحمد. و هذا القول موافق بآية كريمة: "يا بنى إسرائل إنى رسول الله إليكم مصدقا لما بين يدي من التوراة و مبشرا برسول يأتى من بعدي اسمه أحمد."[46] و أما قيد "الآخَر" فى قوله باراقليتون آخَر، دفع قول الكفرة التى[47] يقولون إن باراقليتوس هو عيسى. [و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "الذين يتبعون الرسول النبي الأمي الذي يجدونه مكتوبا عندهم في التوراة و الإنجيل."[48]]

و أما فى الصحاح[49] المذكور قوله: "اى آغاباتمه اخارته آن اوت ايبون بورووومه بورستون باترا اوت اوباترمو ميزون است."[50] يعنى "إن تحبونى

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42 ean agapate me tas entolas tas emas tērēsate. kai egō erōtēsō ton patera kai allon paraklēton dōsei umin ina menē meth umōn eis ton aiōna to pneuma tēs alētheias (Kata Iannen 14:15-17).

43 John 14:15-17.

44 باطل بالبداهة or باطل

45 Q 9:31.

46 Q 61:6.

47 الذين

48 Q 7:157.

49 الإصحاح

تفرحوا لأجل الذى قلت، أذهب إلى الأب لأن الأب أكبر منى."[51] أظهر أن عيسى عليه السلام أصغر و أدنى من الله تعالى و أن رفعته بوصوله إلى الله تبارك تعالى. و لا شك أن الأدنى و الأصغر غير الأكبر، فإذا يكون اثنين. فلو كان عيسى إلها لزم أن يكون إلهين اثنين. و اللازم باطل بالضرورة و الملزوم مثله. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "و قال الله لا تتخذوا إلهين اثنين إنما هو إله واحد."[52] و أظهر أيضا كونه عبد الله لأنه لما كان عيسى أصغر و غيرا من الله تبارك و تعالى و حينئذ ما يكون عيسى إلا عبد الله لأن كل مخلوقات[53] عبد الله و الله تعالى سلطان خالق قديم و ملك قدير كريم. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "لن يستنكف المسيح أن يكون عبدا لله و لا الملائكة المقربون."[54]

و أما فى تلك الصحاح[55] قوله: "اوذ باراقليتوس توبنوما تآييئون او بمسى او باتر ان تو اونوماتموا اكنوس ذذاكسى بانتا آابون ايمن."[56] يعنى"أما باراقليتوس هو روح القدس الذى يرسله الأب على اسمى هو يعلمكم كل ما قلت لكم."[57] دال على القدوم المبارك لمحمد صلوات الله عليه لأن معنى باراقليتوس كاشف الخفيات ثم وصفه بروح القدس و هو أزيد الأوصاف بمعنى أحمد. ثم قال "باسمى" يعنى بمعنى النبوة. و هذا ليس إلا محمد رسول الله صلوات الله عليه. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "هو الذى أرسل رسوله بالهدى و دين الحق ليظهره على الدين كله و كفى بالله شهيدا محمد رسول الله."[58]

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50 ei ēgapate me echarēte an oti eipon poreuomai pros ton patera oti o patēr mou meizōn mou estin (Kata Iannen 14:28).

51 John 14:28.

52 Q 16:51.

53 المخلوقات

54 Q 4:172.

55 الإصحاح

56 o de paraklētos to pneuma to agion o pempsei o patēr en tō onomati mou ekeinos umas didaxei panta kai upomnēsei umas panta a eipon umin (Kata Iannen 14:26).

57 John 14:26.

58 Q 48:28-29.

و أما فی الإنجیل قوله: "اغو امه آنبلوس کاوباتر مواوبئورغوس است بان قلما انمی می فرین قربون اری آفتون کبان تون قربون فرون قثری آفتوانا بلئون قربون فری."[59] یعنی "أنا الکرم و الأب الغراس کل زبیر منی لا یأتی ثمرة یقطعه و کل ما یأتی ثمرة یربیه لأن یجعل ثمره زیادة."[60] دال علی أن غرض عیسی علیه السلام إظهار صانعه و خالقه و مربیه و کون عیسی مصنوعا و مخلوقا. و لکن کل المخلوق و المصنوع حادث و مفتقر و کل مفتقر و حادث لیس بقدیم و لا واجب الوجود بذاته. فإذا عیسی علیه السلام لا یکون إلها لأن الله تبارك و تعالی قدیم و واجب الوجود بذاته و هو المطلوب.

و أما فی الإنجیل قوله: "کباتر مو کباتر ایمونی کثئوسمو کثئوس امون."[61] یعنی "أبی و أبیکم و إلهی و إلهکم."[62] دال علی ان مراد عیسی علیه السلام من الأب المهدی و المربی، حیث قال "أبی و أبیکم و إلهی و إلهکم". فلو کان مراده من الأب الوالد، ما یقول "أبیکم". و هو موافق بآیة کریمة: "لقد کفر الذین قالوا إن الله هو المسیح ابن مریم و قال المسیح یا بنی إسرائیل اعبدوا الله ربی و ربکم إنه من یشرك بالله فقد حرم الله علیه الجنة و مأویه النار و ما للظالمین من أنصار."[63] فإذا لو کان عیسی ابن الله و إلها علی تقدیر قوله "أبی"، لزم أن یکون الحواریون أیضا ابناء الله و آلهة لأنه قال "و أبیکم". فاللازم باطل بالبداهة و الملزوم مثله. و هو موافق بآیة کریمة: "ما کان الله أن یتخذ من ولد سبحانه إذا قضی أمرا فإنما یقول له کن فیکون."[64] و أیضا دال علی عبودیة عیسی لأن کل من کان له إله، لا بد و أن یکون عبد الله و هو

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59 egō eimi ē ampelos ē alēthinē kai o patēr mou o geōrgos estin. pan klēma en emoi mē pheron karpon airei auto kai pan to karpon pheron kathairei auto ina pleiona karpon pherē (Kata Iannen 15:1-2).

60 John 15:1-2.

61 patera mou kai patera umōn kai theon mou kai theon umōn (Kata Iannen 20:17).

62 John 20:17.

63 Q 5:72.

64 Q 19:35.

المطلوب. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "إن الله ربى و ربكم فاعبدوه هذا صراط مستقيم."[65]

و أما فى الإنجيل قوله: "سنفرايمن انا اغو آبلثوا آن غار اغو مى آبلثو او باراقليتوس اوكلفسته بورست اماس اوتان دالث اكنوس تو بنوما تس آلثياس اوذييس اماس اس باسان تن آلثيان اوغار لالس آفافتو آلوسان آقوسى لالس كتا ارخومنا آناكلى امن اكنوس امن ذوق ساس."[66] يعنى "نافع لكم أن أنطلق أنا عنكم لأنه إن لم أنطلق أنا عنكم لم يأت باراقليتوس لكم و أما إذا جاء من هو روح الصدق يرشدكم إلى كل الصداقة إذ لا يتكلم عن تلقاء نفسه بل كما سمعه يتكلم و ما سيجئ ينبهكم و هو يشهرنى."[67] دال على أن عيسى عليه السلام بشّر الحواريين و النصارى بالقدوم المبارك لمحمد رسول الله و أظهر رجحان محمد عليه السلام على نفسه، حيث قال عيسى عليه السلام "نافع لكم أن أنطلق أنا عنكم لأنه إن لم أنطلق أنا عنكم لا يأت باراقليتوس لكم و أما إذا جاء من هو روح الصدق يرشدكم إلى كل الصداقة" كأنه قال لمّا لم تنتفعوا منى كل نفع، ينبغى أن أذهب أنا عنكم و أن يأتي من هو روح الصدق الذى له رجحان و نفع أكثر منى حتى تنتفعوا عنه[68] أكثر نفع، حيث قال "يرشدكم إلى كل الصداقة". و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "يا أيها النبي إنا أرسلناك شاهدا و مبشرا و نذيرا و داعيا إلى الله بإذنه و سراجا منيرا و بشر المؤمنين بأن لهم من الله فضلا كبيرا."[69] و أوصاهم بأن يؤمنوا به و يصدقوه و يعتقدوا القرآن المجيد، حيث قال "هو روح الصدق و لا يتكلم عن تلقاء نفسه بل يتكلم كما سمعه"، أي من حضرة الحق تبارك و تعالى و هو القرآن. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "و ما ينطق عن الهوى إن هو إلا وحي يوحى."[70] و

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65 Q 3:51.

66 sumpherei umin ina egō apelthō ean gar egō mē apelthō o paraklētos ouk eleusetai pros umas... otan de elthē ekeinos to pneuma tēs alētheias odēgēsei umas eis pasan tēn alētheian ou gar lalēsei aph eautou all osa an akousē lalēsei kai ta erchomena anangelei umin. ekeinos eme doxasei (Kata Iannen 16:7, 13-14).

67 John 16:7, 13-14.

68 منه

69 Q 33:45-47.

70 Q 53:3-4.

أيضا أن يصدقوه و يعتقدونه[71] بما يقول لأجل حقيقة عيسى عليه السلام قال "و هو يشهرنى". و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "يا أيها الذين آمنوا آمنوا بالله و رسوله و الكتاب الذي نزل على رسوله."[72]

و أما فى الإنجيل قوله: "الى الى لم سبحتنى تو تست ثامو ثامو انات م ان قتلبس."[73] يعنى "إلهى إلهى لم سبحتنى."[74] دال على أن عيسى عليه السلام صريحا و واضحا أظهر عبوديته و عجزه، و كونه طالبا من الله تبارك و تعالى رحمة و مددا و استعانة لأن "الى الى لم سبحتنى" كلام عربي، يعنى "إلهى إلهى لم سبحتنى" بمعنى "لم فرغت عنى." و لما لم يكن فى حروف النصارى هاء أسقطوا الهاء و بقي "الى الى". و هذا التصحيح ظاهر بتفسيره الذى فسره عيسى عليه السلام على عقبه فقال "توتست"، بمعنى يعنى و "ثامو ثامو"، بمعنى "إلهى إلهى" فإن لفظ "ثامو ثامو" فى لغة النصارى بمعنى "إلهى إلهى". و هذا المعنى لا ينكره الكفرة حيث قال فى الإنجيل إذا أراد اليهود أن يقتلوا عيسى بكى و فزع و تضرع و نادى بالصوت الشديد "الى الى لم سبحتنى". و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "لقد كفر الذين قالوا إن الله هو المسيح ابن مريم قل فمن يملك من الله شيئا إن أراد أن يهلك المسيح ابن مريم و أمه و من فى الأرض جميعا."[75] فإذا فيه عيسى عليه السلام أظهر صريحا عبوديته و عجزه. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "قال إنى عبد الله آتانى الكتاب و جعلنى نبيا."[76] و كونه مفتقرا و طالبا و راجيا من الله تبارك و تعالى استعانة و مددا و رحمة كسائر الناس. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: يا أيها الناس أنتم الفقراء إلى الله و الله هو الغني الحميد.[77] و كل مفتقر حادث و كل حادث ليس بقديم و إله، بل مخلوق و عبد الخالق. و لكن الله تبارك و تعالى قديم و واجب الوجود.

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71 يعتقدوا

72 Q 4:136.

73 ēlei ēlei lema sabachthanei tout estin thee mou thee mou inati me enkatelipes (Kata Matthaion 27:46; Kata Markon 15:34).

74 Matthew 27:46; Mark 15:34.

75 Q 5:17.

76 Q 19:30.

77 Q 35:15.

فإذا عيسى ليس بإله بل مخلوق كسائر المخلوقات. و هو موافق بآية كريمة: "إن مثل عيسى عند الله كمثل آدم خلقه من تراب ثم قال له كن فيكون."[78]

و مثل هذا[79] الحجج و البراهين كثير فى الإنجيل لكن فى سلب ألوهية عيسى و إثبات كونه عبد الله و إثبات القدوم المبارك لحضرة محمد رسول الله عليه السلام و كونه نبيا و رسول الله يكفى هذا المقدار. و أما سائر الإنجيل أكثره حكايات و مناقب و معجزات عيسى عليه السلام عن أفواه الحواريين و ليست حكايات عن حضرة الله تبارك و تعالى كالقرآن المجيد الذى كل من يقرأ و يطلع على آياته و بلاغاته و فصاحاته يعلم و يعتقد بأنه كلام الله و معجز و ليس لأحد و لا لكل الأفراد من الإنس و الجن قدرة أن يجعلوا مثله كما قال الله تبارك و تعالى: "قل لإن اجتمعت الإنس و الجن على أن يأتوا بمثل هذا القرآن لا يأتون بمثله و لو كان بعضهم لبعض ظهيرا."[80]

و أما من تلك الحكايات فى الإنجيل أحدها هذا الصحاح:[81] "توكرو اكنو ارخون تس الثون توا اى سوبورس كنى افتولغون اوتي ا ثغاتر موآرت اتلفسن الا الثون ابتس تن شرا سوا ابافتين كزستن كايرثس اواى سوس اقولوثسن افتوكاى ماثته آفتو كا ذوينى آمورموروؤسا ذوذقا ات برو سلثو سا اوبستن ابساتو تو قرابذو تو اماتئو آفتو الين غار انآفتى اآن مونون آبسومه تو اماتئوا افتو س ثوم اوذ اى اسوس ابس ترافس كا ذو آفتن ابن ثارس ثغاتر اى بستسو سسو كنسه كا سوث اينى ابوتس اوراس اكنس كالثون اوا ايسوس استن اكيا توآرخوندوس كا ذون توس اوليتوس كثون اوخلون ثوربوومنون ليئ آفتيس اناخورته او غار ابثانن توقوراسئون آلاقا ثوذ كقاتيلون آفتو اوتذ اكسولث او اوخلوس اسلثون اكراتسن تس شروس آفتس كا يرث تو قوراسئون كاكسلثن افمى آفتساس اولن تن ين اكنن."[82]

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78 Q 3:59.

79 هذه

80 Q 17:88.

81 الإصحاح

82 archōn eis elthōn prosekunei autō legōn oti ē thugatēr mou arti eteleutēsen alla elthōn epithes tēn cheira sou ep autēn kai zēsetai. kai egertheis o iēsous

يعنى فى تلك الزمان جاء حاكم عند عيسى و تضرع و قال له بنتى الآن ماتت و لكن أنت تعال و تضع يدك عليها و يحييها[83]. و قام عيسى و اتبعه و معه الحواريون. و فى عقبه جاءت امرأة كانت تجرى[84] دمها اثني عشر سنة و مست طرف ثوبه و قالت فى نفسها إن لمسنى ثوبه يشفينى. و رجع عيسى و نظرها[85] و قال بنتى اعلم[86] أن اعتقادك يشفيك. و صحت المرأة فى ذلك الزمان. و لما جاء عيسى فى بيت الحاكم و رأى أهل بيته و الجمعية[87] كلهم تبكون،[88] قال لهم اخرجوا إذ ما ماتت الجارية بل جالسة و يسخرونه. و لما خرجوا، دخل عيسى و أخذ بيدها و قامت الجارية. و انتشرت تلك المعجزة فى ذلك الأرض كلها.[89]

و الله أعلم.

ēkolouthēsen autō kai oi mathētai autou. kai idou gunē aimorroousa dōdeka etē proselthousa opisthen ēpsato tou kraspedou tou imatiou autou. elegen gar en eautē ean monon apsōmai tou imatiou autou sōthēsomai. o de iēsous epistrapheis kai idōn autēn eipen tharsei thugater ē pistis sou sesōken se kai esōthē ē gunē apo tēs ōras ekeinēs. kai elthōn o iēsous eis tēn oikian tou archontos kai idōn tous aulētas kai ton ochlon thoruboumenon. legei autois anachōreite ou gar apethanen to korasion alla katheudei kai kategelōn autou. ote de exeblēthē o ochlos eiselthōn ekratēsen tēs cheiros autēs kai ēgerthē to korasion. kai exēlthen ē phēmē autē eis olēn tēn gēn ekeinēn (Kata Matthaion 9:18-26).

83 إن ابنتى الآن ماتت لكن تعال و ضع يدك عليها فتحيا

84 يجرى

85 إليها

86 اعلمى

87 الجماعة

88 يبكون

89 Matthew 9:18-26; Mark 5:22-43; Luke 8:41-56.

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ESSAY REVIEWS

An Important Collection of New Studies on the Shīʿa

An Essay Review of Fortresses of the Intellect: Ismaili and Other Islamic Studies in Honour of Farhad Daftary

by Omar Alí-de-Unzaga (ed.)

Y. Tzvi Langermann

An Essay Review of In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century

by Peter Adamson (ed.)

Jules Janssens

AN IMPORTANT COLLECTION OF NEW STUDIES ON THE SHĪʿA

An Essay Review of ***Fortresses of the Intellect: Ismaili and Other Islamic Studies in Honour of Farhad Daftary***, edited by Omar Alí-de-Unzaga, (London & New York: I. B. Tauris in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2011), xvii + 600 pp, ISBN: 978-1-84885-626-4; €17.50 (hb)

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This huge volume of nearly six-hundred pages, published by I. B. Tauris in collaboration with The Institute of Ismaili Studies (New York & London, 2011) and edited by Omar Alí-de-Unzaga, comprises two essays about the honoree (a biography and a bibliography) and twenty studies that are published in his honor. The volume is subtitled "Ismaili and other Islamic Studies." Though the papers do all have an Islamic, usually Shīʿī, connection, they nonetheless range very widely over different subject matters (philosophy, religious sects, poetry, history, and more), languages (Arabic, Persian, and Turkish texts), time periods (early medieval period through the eighteenth century), lengths (from six to sixty pages), and approaches. Such thematic and literary diversity goes against the grain of current sensibilities, which are unforgiving of any deviation from "thematic unity." I, for one, very much welcome a volume of this sort, where the only standards are relevance to the many fields of study of interest to the honoree and, of course, the quality of the scholarship. Indeed, it would be a great advantage to scholars, especially those who take upon themselves to publish volumes of essays, to be relieved of the need to demonstrate "thematic unity," and to be allowed to concentrate instead on quality alone, as the editor has done for this book.

The opening essay is a "biographical sketch" of the honoree written by the editor, Omar Alí-de-Unzaga. Covering more than thirty pages, it is considerably longer than similar essays that I have seen in other Festschrift's. The close examination of Daftary's interesting and

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productive life is very rewarding, casting light on intellectual, cultural, and political events of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, as they impacted on Daftary in Iran and in various European countries in which he has lived.

The first study is a very well-written piece by M. A. Amir-Moezzi, "Persian, the Other Sacred Language of Islam," which surveys the controversial use, and eventual sacralization of, Persian in Islamic religious life, especially in prayer as well as in the translation of and commentary on the Qurʾān. It is followed by Hamid Algar's "Sunni Claims to Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq." Algar covers this interesting phenomenon over a millennium, from the earliest claims that Jaʿfar accepted the Sunnī notion of the four rāshīdūn, down to the latest attempts, in Egypt and Iran mainly, at rapprochement (*taqrīb*) between the two major schools of Islamic law, Sunnī and Shīʿī.

In the third contribution, Paul Walker and Wilferd Madelung continue their very fruitful collaboration in the publication of Shīʿite philosophical texts. Their project this time is "The *Kitāb al-rusūm wa-l-izdiwāj wa-l-tartīb* attributed to ʿAbdān (d. 286/899)," ʿAbdān being the earliest pre-Fāṭimid Ismāʿīlī author, and a productive one at that. However, the *Kitāb al-Rusūm* is one of only two writings of his that are known to be extant. ʿAbdān betrays no trace of the Neoplatonic philosophy that later dominated Ismāʿīlī theology. Instead, he draws upon seemingly Pythagorean traditions. One fundamental belief is that all things other than God exist in pairs of opposites. This doctrine precisely is taught by the *Midrash Temura*, an ancient Hebrew text that this reviewer has written about recently; there must be some source common to both writings. Towards the end of the *Kitāb al-Rusūm*, heptads, another favorite Pythagorean theme, are discussed as well. Though he clearly has wide-ranging, if not very deep, acquaintance with the scientific scholarship of his day, ʿAbdān rejects any rational proof for the existence of God, which he believed must be learned instead by *taʿlīm*, instruction, and *iktisāb*, acquisition; he is then an early *taʿlīmī*, one of the groups later severely criticized by al-Ghazālī. The edition and translation are preceded by a magnificent introduction that covers, crisply and concisely, the main developments in philosophical theology and the Ismāʿīlī responses to them, from ʿAbdān to al-Ṭūsī.

Patricia Crone ("Abū Tammām on the Mubayyiḍa") critically examines the description of the Mubayyiḍa sect in the heresiography of

Abū Tammām (the publication of which is another collaboration between Madelung and Walker). She opines that the possession of this text, written by an Ismāʿīlī missionary active in the first half of the ninth century, allows us to discard other, later accounts of the sect. However, Abū Tammām's essay is shown to be composed of three different sections; only the middle section is Abū Tammām's first-hand report. The first and third are drawn from different, indeed contradictory, sources. Crone is characteristically straightforward, clear, and confident in her analysis. I tend more to favor the conservative approach. For example, Crone says that the inclusion of Abū Muslim in the list of divine incarnations is probably a mistake. One reason for thinking so is that with the addition of Abū Muslim, there would be eight divine incarnations, not seven, as one might expect. However, is it so certain that the sect embraced heptads, that a written report can be tampered with? Does not the number eight (if arithmology is relevant here) also have merits of its own in some religious traditions?

In "The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ: Between al-Kindī and al-Fārābī," Abbas Hamdani returns to a subject that he has written much about, the dating of the *Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ*. As the title indicates, Hamdani places their time of composition between the times of al-Kindī and al-Fārābī, that is, roughly, sometime between 850 and 950. Hamdani here spells out his methodology, or, rather, his claim: that all of the ideas found in the *Rasāʾil* can be placed within the "time layer" defined by the two great philosophers mentioned in the title of his paper. In this essay, he limits himself to illustrating his claim with some issues of philosophical theology. I have no fixed opinion about the dating of the *Rasāʾil*, but I am slightly uneasy with Hamdani's methodology. It seems to me that the narrative of a simple, linear development of ideas that can be marked by the "times" of outstanding philosophers is an oversimplification. Ideas that become central to the discourse of a certain culture at a particular time can often be found to have been in circulation earlier, and also to have lived on beyond that "time."

Some of the particulars of Hamdani's arguments can also be questioned. For example, he claims that the Ikhwān tried to disguise their identity by making seemingly contradictory statements. Therefore, in "their concept of numerology," heptads are important, but they oppose the "superstitious" use of the number seven. The distinction is unclear; a few examples might have clarified it. A few pages later,

Hamdani states that the emanation doctrine of the Ikhwān, which serves (inter alia) to put some distance between God and the evil experienced on Earth, is "typically the Ismāʿīlī theme of beginning and return." I think that the two are quite different. Emanation does serve to distance the deity from the material world, but emanation closes in on itself in a circle in which humanity, standing at the end of the chain of emanation, is also the closest to the source or origin. Hamdani provides a very rich bibliography; he does, however, tend to cite scholarship of preceding generations (which is fine), but not all important recent research. In particular, he does not engage the widely cited and authoritative work of Joel L. Kraemer on Abū Ḥayyān (see, in particular, his *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam*), an important source whose the reliability of which Hamdani consistently rejects.

In the article that follows, another established scholar of the Ikhwān returns to a topic she has broached in earlier studies. Carmela Baffioni's "*Ibdāʿ*, Divine Imperative and Prophecy in the *Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ*," attempts to show, by means of a comparison of closely related passages found in different rasāʾil, that the authors of the *Rasāʾil* adumbrate ideas that later became central to Ismāʿīlī thought. The differences between the passages, as well as the differences between the *Rasāʾil* and al-Sijistānī and al-Kirmānī, attest to a debate within Ismāʿīlī or "para-Ismāʿīlī" circles, a debate as yet unsettled at the end of the tenth century. The thesis is certainly tenable, and perhaps even promising. However, I confess to a difficulty in following all of Baffioni's arguments. Moreover, some of her translations and formulations appear infelicitous to this reviewer. Here are a few examples: at the bottom of p. 214, Baffioni renders *baʿd lam yakun* as "from nothing." This is imprecise; the phrase cited means "after it was not," or "after it did not exist." When Arabic writers wish to emphasize "from nothing," ex nihilo, they will say *min lā shayʾ*. A few lines later, near the top of p. 215, Baffioni writes: "According to the Ikhwān, God is coexistent with His creation, as is clarified by comparison with the number one ..." I am not sure that "coexistent" is the proper term here. In note 9 (last line on p. 223), it would be better to say "not to create would have been contrary to God's knowledge [that the world would be created]" rather than "contrary to science."

One more correction seems in order, but it is a correction to the edition used by Baffioni, rather than to her translation. On p. 219, she

quotes from *Jāmiʿat al-jāmiʿa*, ed. ʿĀrif Tāmir, pp. 202-203, and the final sentence reads: "Many people who did not possess knowledge of the spiritual entities have thought that the existing (beings) belong to God only (*laysat illā li-llāh*) ... and [so] the body (*al-jism*) and that whose place is earth ..." This makes little sense to me as a philosophical statement, and it certainly does not fit the context. However, if we correct *li-llāh* to *Allāh* – that is, if we assume that the editor or printer has left out the initial *alif* – then the statement makes perfect sense and is a fitting conclusion to the argument. It then says, "Many people who did not possess knowledge of the spiritual entities have thought that the existing beings are nothing but God – be He exalted and glorified – and the body (*al-jism*) and that whose place is earth ..." In other words, these people deny the existence of spiritual entities, for whose existence the author has been pleading in the preceding discussion, maintaining that nothing exists other than God and the material world.

The aspects highlighted by István Hajnal in "Some Aspects of the External Relations of the Qarāmiṭa in Baḥrayn" are mostly commercial. Punning upon an unfortunate idea from our own time, Hajnal characterizes the guiding policy of the Qarmaṭians as "peace for privileges" – mostly commercial privileges, access to ports and markets, duties on shipping, and protection money from hajj caravans. To be sure, the Qarmaṭians had considerable military power, largely due to their Arab allies, and there were outbursts ("intermezzo" as Hajnal calls them) of messianic fervor, but for the most part, commercial considerations were paramount. The very same thinking lay behind the Qarmaṭians' siding with the ʿAbbāsids against the Fāṭimids, but, then without the backing of the Bedouin, they suffered defeat. Hamid Haji's "A Distinguished Slav Eunuch of the Early Fāṭimid Period: al-Ustādh Jawdhar," is a straightforward biography, based in large measure on the *sīra* written by the eunuch's private secretary. Haji highlights the intimate friendship and loyal service of Jawdhar to the Fāṭimid rulers in North Africa.

Ismail K. Poonawala follows with the first of two articles in the volume that focus on al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, "Al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān and his Refutation of Ibn Qutayba." Poonawala begins by arguing that, contrary to what one finds in some of the literature, it was not the Qāḍī but his father who became an Imāmī, and that the Qāḍī received a formal Shīʿī education. He follows with a discussion of Ibn Qutayba,

seeking to establish, in particular, that Ibn Qutayba was active in the restoration of the Sunnism set in place by al-Mutawakkil. His great literary talents served a definite religious and political agenda. Finally, Poonawala reviews some of the legal questions that are taken up in the Qāḍī's *radd*, the only one of several works of this genre ascribed to the Qāḍī that survives. Poonawala certainly knows the material extremely well from the inside, and his erudition is impressive, but his partisanship disturbs this reader somewhat. For example, Poonawala, in a move apparently designed to help the Qāḍī, impugns Ibn Qutayba's honesty. Even if one source (al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī) does accuse Ibn Qutayba of lying, adducing materials of this sort gives the article a polemical tone.

The second article is a piece of meticulous scholarship by Daniel de Smet, "The *Risāla al-Mudhhiba* Attributed to al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān: Important Evidence for the Adoption of Neoplatonism by Fatimid Ismailism at the Time of al-Muʿizz?" *Al-Risāla al-mudhhiba* has been published four times – this fact itself is a discovery of de Smet – and it is a classic example of the problematics involved in working with a text whose manuscripts are largely inaccessible, and which has been printed in several unreliable additions. De Smet's summation is worth quoting (p. 315): "... Ismaili works in general, and those transmitted by the Syrian Nizārīs in particular, have undergone substantial modification over the centuries ... Modern editions of them are often less reliable than the manuscripts themselves: the inadvertent actions of editors, their lack of philological rigor, numerous misreadings, and typographical errors all have contributed to the dissemination of phantom texts on which scholars, lacking access to the manuscripts, have built their learned theories." After sorting out the various versions, de Smet concludes that the *Risāla* is likely the work of someone in the entourage of al-Muʿizz (r. 341-365/953-975). Written as a collection of rambling questions and answers, it is difficult to extract from it a coherent doctrine. Nonetheless, there are a number of interesting, and puzzling, references that suggest that some Neoplatonic notions may have entered Ismāʿīlī thought before the contribution of the "Persian school" and the synthesis of Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. ca. 411/1021).

Next are two articles on philosophical poetry in Persian. The first, by Alice C. Hunsberger, "Cosmos into Verse," opens with a brief survey of philosophical poetry in general, and then provides a closer

study of two examples. The first example is a poem, supplied with a commentary by the poet himself, Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī, a disciple of a disciple of Ibn Sīnā. The second is by Nāṣir-i Khusraw, one of the more important Ismāʿīlī writers; here, Hunsberger provides a translation of selected verses as well. Hermann Landolt, with his usual attention to detail, contributes "Early Evidence for the Reception of Nāṣir-i Khusraw's Poetry in Sufism: ʿAyn al-Quḍāt's Letter on the Taʿlīmīs." Though some of the *mathnawī*s attributed to Nāṣir-i Khusraw may have "perhaps more to do with the Sufi reception of Nāṣir-i Khusraw than with the man himself," there is evidence "that he was at some point in his life touched by Sufism." Verses from Nāṣir-i Khusraw were later cited by ʿAyn al-Quḍāt, particularly in the seventy-fifth of his letters (referring to the edition of Munzaei), a bold document in which ʿAyn al-Quḍāt distanced himself from both the Nizārīs and the Sunnī Seljūq authorities (and likely paid for this with his life). Finally, Landolt offers a translation of *Qaṣīda* no. 106 by Nāṣir-i Khusraw.

The translation reveals, not surprisingly, a rich and occasionally surprising storehouse of ideas. Two examples must suffice. In verse 21, the person selected to be the paragon of wisdom is none other than Qusṭā bin Lūqā. That tenth-century Christian polymath is well known to historians of Arabic science and philosophy, but I would not have expected to see him serve as a cultural icon for an eleventh-century Persian Ismāʿīlī. (Was his name selected for reasons of rhyme or meter? I have not seen the original, and anyway, I know nothing about Persian poetry.) Another issue perhaps worth exploring in more depth is the role of the rotating millstone (*falak* or celestial orb?), grinding "cereal" for our, that is, humanity's, sake (verses 10—15). But the *falāsifa* ask, do the heavens rotate for our sake? Maimonides gives this question serious consideration in his *Guide of the Perplexed*, III, 13, and comes up, so it seems, with a negative answer – a negative answer that holds as true for religious thought as it does for Aristotle. (The notes to Munk's French translation are still the best guide to this difficult chapter.)

Delia Cortese ("A Dream Come True: Empowerment Through Dreams Reflecting Fatimid-Sulayhid Relations") analyzes two "dreams" of ʿAlī al-Ṣulayḥī, the founder of the Yemeni dynasty that bears his name; I put the word in quotation marks because what is of interest to Cortese is not the actual dream (we may never know if or what al-Ṣulayḥī really dreamt) but the literary expression given to it.

Two different versions of the dream narrative are preserved in the manuscript, and they both clearly indicate that al-Ṣulayḥī and his offspring enjoy the blessing of the Fāṭimid caliph. Cortese sees the dream narratives as "clearly legitimizing in purpose and ideological in nature." (p. 391) Specifically, it is said to be a late Ṭayyibī reconstruction, when the Ṭayyibī's were hard pressed to defend their legitimacy. As they were the successors of the Ṣulayḥids, the divine choice of the latter as revealed in the "dream" would serve that purpose well.

In his "From the 'Moses of Reason' to the 'Khiḍr of the Resurrection': The Oxymoronic Transcendent in Shahrastānī's *Majlis-i maktūb … dar Khwārazm*," Leonard Lewisohn finds distinct Ismāʿīlī terminology in al-Shahrastānī's allegory of Moses and Khiḍr. That fact must be established in order to "definitely resolve" (p. 405) the outstanding question of the presence of Ismāʿīlī beliefs in al-Shahrastānī's thought, or the lack thereof. However, in order to account for all of the details in al-Shahrastānī's "portrayal of Khiḍr's strange apophatic theology," one must appeal to the Persian Sufi tradition; Lewisohn adduces the sources and draws the connections. Finally, Lewisohn moves on to the poetry of Shelly and the insights of Carl Jung and Henri Corbin. Shelly, in particular, is relevant, not only for treating the same themes of ineffable, esoteric knowledge accessible only to the immortals who function beyond space and time (with Ahasureus the Wandering Jew taking the place of Khiḍr), but also because of Shelly's personal study of Greek, Jewish, and Persian literature that treats of these themes.

Lewisohn has written a stimulating and wide-ranging essay, to which I can offer only a few minor but, hopefully helpful, comments. The first concerns one of the "oxymora" that al-Shahrastānī utilizes in order to illustrate what Lewisohn calls "the Realm of the Oxymoronic Transcendent," an angel, half of which is fire and half is ice. Lewisohn adds that the particular coincidenta oppositorum of fire and water is commonplace in mystical literature, especially that of Spanish Catholicism. In fact, it has much wider, and much more ancient applications. In ancient Jewish exegesis of Exodus 9:23, cited already by Rashi in the eleventh century, the hail that rained down on Egypt in the seventh plague was said to be a mixture of fire and water, that made peace with each other in order to carry out the divine command. From a mystical perspective, we may refer to the vision recorded in chapter fourteen of I Enoch, where the hero sees a house

made of hailstones and snow and surrounded with fire; then, upon entering it, he senses it to be hot as fire and cold as snow.

Looking now from a philosophical point of view, I am struck by the connection between temporality and causality. According to the schemes described by Lewisohn, the realm of Moses is under time, and so also is the realm of "causes of consequences." By contrast, the realm of Khiḍr is above time; there is no past, present, and future, and so, therefore, also no causality. To be sure, causality has generally been connected to temporality; if event *a* is usually or always followed in time by event *b*, event *a* will often be called the cause of event *b*. However, did not Islamic thinkers entertain other views? Did not Ibn Sīnā, for example, emphasize the logical connection rather than the temporal that defines the cause? Was not God the cause of the cosmos even for those who felt that the two were co-eternal? So, then, did the philosophically *au courant* al-Sharastānī deploy a more popular notion of causality for the sake of his allegory?

There are still some important manuscripts in private hands, and in remote villages. A discovery by S. Jalal Badakhchani of a collection poems while traveling in Khurāsān back in 1964 led to the research project, the results of which are summarized in his essay, "Poems of the Resurrection: Ḥasan-i Maḥmūd-i Kātib and his *Dīwān-i Qāʾimiyyāt*." Ḥasan was a close associate of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, and his poems on the "resurrection," meaning essentially a spiritual transformation to be effected by the Qāʾim, "remain the most extensive and contemporary interpretation to survive up to our time." The following piece, C. Edmund Bosworth's "Further Notes on Turkish Names in Abū'l-Faḍl Bayhaqī's *Tārīkh-i Masʿūdī*," re-investigates a topic studied by the author previously; this time he can avail himself of additional *Hilfsmittel*. Not being a turcologist, I cannot say anything about the content of the study, other than to note Bosworth's generously acknowledgment of the aid of the recently published Onomasticon of László Rásonyi as well as his consultations with Professor Peter B. Golden on just about every name studied in the paper. Iraj Asfar, in a very brief note of five pages, reports on another manuscript in private hands, titled "A Book List from a Seventh/Thirteenth Century Manuscript Found in Bāmyān."

Carole Hillenbrand's piece ("What's in a Name? Tughtegin – 'the Minister of the Antichrist'?") is also quite short, but she manages to underscore a number of interesting points concerning the killing, and

scalping, of Gervase, the Crusader ruler of Tiberias, by Tughtegin, the Turkish commander in Damascus. The most detailed, and probably most reliable, account is given by the Christian chronicler Albert of Aachen. Muslim writers avoid the gory details, not simply out of embarrassment, but also because the local Muslim populations were themselves frightened by their Turkish rulers. Moreover, the display of the scalp as a totem (that is what is "in the name" of Tughtegin), as well as the use of the skull as a drinking cup, both indicate that inner Asian customs and rituals persisted longer than is usually thought to have been the case.

In an essay that pays more attention to the theory and history of historical writing than most of the other offerings in this volume, Andrew J. Newman ("Safavids and 'Subalterns': The Reclaiming of Voices") searches for the unheard voices in the latter half of the Ṣafavid period. His main sources are reports of agitation that was economically motivated and most especially, of popular Sufi movements among the 'subaltern,' that is, simply speaking, the masses. He acknowledges that the reports come mostly from hostile sources, in particular, court-sponsored anti-Sufi literature. Nonetheless, he does show that these lower-class elements (Newman does not use this term, but I see no reason to shy away from it), were, as he phrased it elsewhere, "forsaking the ... authority claimed by orthodox elements to seek solace and meaning in a more direct, immanent, and intimate relationship with the divine."

The final essay, by Robert Gleave ("Compromise and Conciliation in the Akhbārī-Uṣūlī Dispute: Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī's Assessment of ʿAbd Allāh al-Samāhījī") deals, as the title indicates, with the efforts of al-Baḥrānī (d. 1186/1772) to mitigate the dispute between the Akhbārī's and the Uṣūlī's. The latter are also referred to as *mujtahid*'s, as their acceptance of the legal tool of *ijtihād* constitutes the key difference between the two schools. Al-Samāhījī (d. 1135/1772) compiled a list of forty or so differences; al-Baḥrānī felt that al-Samāhījī's work fueled internecine conflict among Shīʿites and provided as well ammunition to Sunnī polemics as well. Gleave presents an explanatory commentary, followed by a translation from one of al-Baḥrānī's books, "The Najafī Pearls."

Daftary's immense contribution to scholarship is well known and widely acknowledged. This collection of interesting and new scholarship is a fitting tribute to the man and his accomplishments.

An Essay Review of ***In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century***, edited by Peter Adamson, (Warburg Institute Colloquia, 16), (London: The Warburg Institute & Turin: Nino Aragno Editore, 2011), 288 pp., ISBN: 978-0-85481-154-0, £60.00 (pb)

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This volume concludes a series of three books devoted to Arabic philosophy. The first volume, published in 2007, addressed the sources and the reception of classical Arabic philosophy, and the second volume considered Arabic philosophy in the fourth/tenth century.[1] It is immediately striking that the eleventh century, which, in line with the project, undoubtedly had to be qualified as the age of Ibn Sīnā, has been skipped. At first sight, there seems to be little philosophy during this time besides Ibn Sīnā himself and his so-called immediate disciples. Among the latter, however, one detects important differences in the way they address their master's legacy. Moreover, the eleventh century is the period in which Ibn Sīnā's philosophy entered Ashʿarite theology, perhaps already in al-Juwaynī's thought and certainly in al-Ghazālī's. Much of what comes to the fore in the present volume results from or has some basis in these facts. Let me add that in Muslim Andalusia during this century, one finds such a major thinker as Ibn Ḥazm, who, although above all a theologian, considered philosophical ideas and, inter alia, refers to al-Kindī. Hence, it is regrettable that no attention has been paid to

[1] See Peter Adamson (ed.), *Classical Arabic Philosophy: Sources and Reception*, respectively *In the Age of al-Fārābī: Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth Century* (Warburg Institute Colloquia, 11; resp. 12), (London: The Warburg Institute & Turin: Nino Aragno Editore, 2007; resp. 2008).

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this period. This said, the project as such has offered many new perspectives regarding classical Arabic philosophy, and the present volume is no exception. In particular, this volume shows the vivacity of philosophy, especially in Ibn Sīnā's view, in the twelfth century. As Peter Adamson, the editor, states in the introduction, the twelfth century may be characterized as a second formative period.

The volume contains no less than thirteen contributions. The first two, by Dimitri Gutas and N. Peter Joosse, consider ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī. The first of these examines the autobiography that appears at the end of the *Kitāb al-naṣīḥatayn*. Based on the text as preserved in the unique manuscript (MS Bursa, Bursa Yazma ve Eski Basma Eserler Library, Hüseyin Çelebi, 823), Gutas offers a translation of the most significant passages together with a profound analysis. He shows how vivid philosophy was at the time of ʿAbd al-Laṭīf and how the latter became increasingly disappointed by Ibn Sīnā's philosophy. Moreover, he stresses that ʿAbd al-Laṭīf regarded al-Ghazālī as a philosopher and follower of Ibn Sīnā. Finally, he emphasizes that for ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, authentic philosophy, as distinguished from Ibn Sīnā's, is in no way a source of deprivation; on the contrary, it is essentially the desire to imitate God – the *omoioosis théoo* of classical Greek thought. Of particular importance is Gutas' demonstration of how ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's autobiography (autobiographies) is (are) inspired by Ibn Sīnā's. In this respect, I wonder whether the evocation of a certain al-Nāʾilī (as an incompetent teacher of his youth) in the autobiography, as given in Ibn Abī ʿUṣaybiʿa, is not a conscious deformation of al-Nātilī, who was the ungifted teacher of the young Ibn Sīnā in logic. As for Joosse, he notes that ʿAbd al-Laṭīf never described himself as a physician and that Ibn al-Qifṭī stressed that he had no knowledge of medicine. Joosse provides evidence that ʿAbd al-Laṭīf was probably never a practicing physician but was only theoretically interested in the science of medicine, especially epistemological questions related to medicine. He also shows the presence of many medical topoi in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's *Kitāb al-naṣīḥatayn*. Let me note that if ʿAbd al-Laṭīf preferred theoretical to practical medicine, in all likelihood, he was influenced by Ibn Sīnā. This may also be the case with his understanding of 'experience.'

In the third chapter, Frank Griffel considers three authors who represent three directions in the reception of Ibn Sīnā's thought: al-Lawkarī (d. after 503/1109), al-Ghazālī, and Abū l-Barakāt al-

Baghdādī (d. ca. 560/1165). The first is a representative of orthodox Avicennism, the second represents a kalām critique of Avicennism, and the third represents a criticism of Avicennism independent of *kalām*. Regarding al-Lawkarī, Griffel notes that, despite his dependence on Ibn Sīnā, he offers a metaphysical project and a theological project that are different from the latter's and that have been inspired by Bahmanyār. However, one has the impression that this affirmation is largely based on what al-Lawkarī says in the introduction to the third part of his *Bayān* as well as on a survey of the basic structure of that section. However, a more detailed analysis reveals that al-Lawkarī, in contrast to Bahmanyār, remains faithful to the basic opinions of Ibn Sīnā.[2] As for al-Ghazālī, Griffel insists that he adopted elements of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy and that he studied his works closely as well as those of other philosophers, such as al-Fārābī and Miskawayh. As I have shown in several studies, al-Ghazālī's use of many Avicennian texts is obvious. Hence, I can only agree with Griffel's well-nuanced position. However, I cannot see how the reading of the *Maqāṣid* can prepare students for the study of the *Tahāfut*, as Griffel claims, (p. 55) because some differences exist in the basic vocabulary (the *Maqāṣid* being mainly based on the *Dānesh-Nāmeh* and the *Tahāfut* on the *Shifāʾ*). Finally, with respect to Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Griffel detects, on the one hand, a strong commitment to the Aristotelian tradition in his division of the sciences and, on the other hand, a radical rupture with that tradition as far as his teachings are concerned. He emphasizes Abū l-Barakāt's notion of *iʿtibār* (rendered 'careful consideration' by Griffel). Griffel believes that this notion is at least partly a conscious response to al-Ghazālī's accusation of *taqlīd* against the *falāsifa*. This is an interesting observation, but it is clearly in need of further investigation (as is the question of Abū l-Barakāt's possible knowledge of Ghazālian works).

In the following chapter, Ayman Shihadeh systematically examines the difficult issue of the exact status of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid*. After giving a serious *status quaestionis*, he critically addresses the MS Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, Ar. 5328, which was

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[2] See my "al-Lawkarī's Reception of Ibn Sīnā's Ilāhiyyāt," in Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (eds), *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Receptions of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, (Scientia Graeco-Arabica, 7), (Berlin & Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 2-26.

catalogued by Arthur Arberry as a copy of al-Qazwīnī's *Ḥikmat al-ʿayn*. Based on the style of *naskh* in which the text was copied, Shihadeh estimates that the manuscript probably originated from sixth/twelfth century Syria or Iraq. Although the style may offer a significant indication, a final judgment regarding the dating is not possible without physical examination of the manuscript (as Shihadeh himself recognizes). However, Shihadeh indisputably shows that the manuscript is a copy of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid*, although it lacks the preface, the general introduction to the logical section, and the reference to the *Tahāfut* at the end. Shihadeh offers arguments in favor of the idea that these were conscious omissions to decontextualize the text. According to Shihadeh, the omission of the preface in the Latin translation must be perceived from a similar perspective. But what proves that the Latin translator(s) disposed of the *Tahāfut* or other Ghazālian writings? As for the Arabic manuscript, why is it preserved in a single copy? If someone wanted to decontextualize al-Ghazālī's text, would he not have made many copies and distributed them extensively? Let me note, moreover, that the two cases of so-called non-commitment to philosophy on the side of al-Ghazālī – at the end of the logical section, where he says that he has reported and rendered comprehensible the topics of logic, and at the beginning of the metaphysical section, where he refers to 'their' custom of treating physics before metaphysics – are, in my view, not very convincing. The former of the two can be understood as suggesting that al-Ghazālī has provided a basic survey of logic without including personal remarks (which could stem even from a philosopher), whereas the latter is clearly dependent on Ibn Sīnā's general Preface to the *Dānesh-Nāmeh*, where he states that, contrary to the usual way, he will allow the exposé of metaphysics to precede that of physics (hence, the word 'their' in the *Maqāṣid* could refer to 'traditional philosophers'). This does not mean that I claim that al-Ghazālī was secretly a philosopher. In my view, at the time he wrote the work (and I continue to believe that this was when he was a young scholar in the school of al-Juwaynī), he was attracted to philosophy and wrote this student's thesis (being a member of a *kalām*-school, of course, he did keep a minimum distance). However, I admit that more research is needed to settle the true nature and dating of the *Maqāṣid* more definitely. This chapter provides an important impulse for further research, not least by its discovery of a 'new' manuscript.

Of a completely different nature is the fifth contribution, in which Sylvie Nony investigates Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī's theory of the void and the possibility of motion in it. She notes the mathematical approach of physical motion in Abū l-Barakāt (although not as far as Newton's) and indicates Philoponus as the ultimate source of inspiration. Moreover, Nony insists that for Abū l-Barakāt, the measure or the form of an object does not influence its speed, and she points out the particular role that natural inclination plays for him in the acceleration of a free-falling body. Finally, she notes the major difference between Ibn Sīnā's notion of inclination, *mayl*, and that of Abū l-Barakāt. This is a most interesting paper that places Abū l-Barakāt's innovative ideas in historical context and avoids anachronisms. Nevertheless, one wonders whether some tensions – of which Nony is clearly aware – may be more significant than is suggested by this paper.

The next two contributions deal with al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191). In the first, Heidrun Eichner explains al-Suhrawardī's well-known notion of 'knowledge by presence' (*ʿilm ḥuḍūrī*) in the context of contemporary critical appropriations of Ibn Sīnā's epistemology. Among the latter, the great Ashʿarite theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) figures preeminently. Eichner shows that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (in his *al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī l-ḥikma* and his *al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqiyya*) criticizes Ibn Sīnā for failing to explain how awareness leads to intellection and discusses *inter alia* his notion of *idrāk* ('apprehension,' according to Eichner's translation). As to al-Suhrawardī, Eichner insists that he derived his concept of 'knowledge by presence' from an 'Aristotelian' epistemology, which, in his view, provides a unified theory that includes apperception as well as perception and apprehension of external things. Of major importance is Eichner's observation that the term *ḥuḍūr* forms part of the 'peripatetic' theory as al-Suhrawardī portrays it, as a function of an increasing abstraction from matter; in his Illuminationist epistemology, in contrast, it is replaced by the term *ẓuhūr*, which is a function of luminosity. Also significant is her observation that al-Suhrawardī accepts Ibn Sīnā's system of the internal senses, but much more than the latter concentrates on the relationships between soul and body and animal and rational soul. All of these observations are undoubtedly valuable and at least worthy of attention, but one wonders what the 'exact' relevance of Fakhr al-Dīn's theory is for the theory of al-Suhrawardī. As far as I can see, they both certainly deal in

a critical way with Ibn Sīnā's epistemology, but it is obvious that they do so in quite different ways. Let me add that an unfortunate mistake occurs in the translation of the quotation on p. 127 under point (1). It is evident that one must read, 'This is the case when he [i.e., Ibn Sīnā] explains the fact that the Creator is intellect, intellecting, and intellected *does not* [add] require a multiplicity in His self.'[3] Jaris Kaukua, in his turn, concentrates on the way in which al-Suhrawardī uses Ibn Sīnā's concept of self-awareness. He convincingly shows that this usage occurs in a critical way, partly by way of fusion with the concept of self-awareness in the Plotinus Arabus. Contrary to Ibn Sīnā, al-Suhrawardī conceives of God's self-awareness in the same sense as that of humans, although he accepts a difference in degree – namely, a degree of luminosity. To substantiate his view, Kaukua highlights passages from book 2 of al-Suhrawardī's major writing, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*. Although Kaukua is familiar with the translation by Walbridge and Ziai, he prefers to offer his own translation.[4] Unfortunately, he introduces a mistake by omitting the negation involved in the Arabic *lā yaghful*[u] on p. 146 (quotation in § 114) when he translates, "Nothing that has a self of which it is unaware is dusky," whereas Walbridge and Ziai say, "Nothing that has an essence of which it is *not* (my emphasis) unconscious is dusky" in full accordance with the Arabic. On other occasions, one would have expected a more profound correction, as, for example, on p. 152 (quotation in § 137). The Arabic expression *takhaṣṣuṣuhā bi-nūr al-nūr* (a scribal error for *al-anwār*?) is rendered by Kaukua as 'the fact that it is being particularized by being the Light of Lights,' which constitutes a slight rewording of Walbridge-Ziai's "its particularization as the Light of Light [*sic*]," but the preposition '*bi*' is rendered in both cases in an unusual way. With Corbin, I would read "its

[3] I had no access to the Beirut 1990 edition, but in the anonymous edition, reprinted at Qum 1411 H, p. 324, the negation *lā* is clearly present. Moreover, from the doctrinal point of view, it is undoubtable that it is required given Ibn Sīnā's emphasis on the unity of the divine essence.

[4] See al-Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination: A New Critical Edition of the Text of* Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (*with English Translation, Notes, Commentary, and Introduction* by John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai), (Islamic Translation Series), (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1999).

particularization through the Light of Lights."[5]

Despite being prominent in the title of the volume, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) is only discussed in two contributions. In the first, Deborah Black addresses his doctrine of sensation. She underlines Averroes' adherence to the intentionality thesis (related to the Aristotelian 'logos' doctrine, based on *De Anima*, II, 12, 424 a 28) during his lifetime. However, Black points out important changes between his (earlier) epitomes and his (later) middle and longer commentaries regarding the foundations and implications of that thesis. In this respect, Black remarks that the 'contraries principle' (i.e., the capacity to be affected simultaneously by contraries) occupies a crucial place in the interpretation of the epitomes but loses much of its significance in the later commentaries. However, a new aporia arises, namely that of the 'sensus agens,' the agent sense. This is a rich and stimulating study, but one wonders whether Ibn Rushd always had direct access to Aristotle's text or, on the contrary, was exclusively dependent on commentaries like those by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Ibn Bājja. The second contribution concerns a metaphysical issue, the idea of substantial form. Matteo di Giovanni clarifies that Ibn Rushd defends a holistic interpretation of Aristotle's hylemorphism. Accepting a unity of species and form (expressed in different ways), Ibn Rushd adheres to the idea that part of the species picks out part of the form. Let me stress that di Giovanni judiciously notes that Ibn Rushd has sometimes been (mis)led by the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; that he, contrary to Ibn Sīnā, does not accept that body, considered a corporeal form, is also a substantial form; that he considers the elements 'dimidiate' forms in the composite substance (thereby making 'matter' a label for levels of form); and that he, contrary to Aquinas, does not conceive flesh and bones as the 'matter' of man. In his conclusion, di Giovanni, with due prudence, finally argues that there is no necessary connection between the compositional nature of substantial form and the more radical thesis of the plurality of forms. This last remark is not devoid of interest, but it is clearly in need of further elaboration. One can

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[5] Shihâboddîn Yaḥya Sohravardî, Shaykh al-Ishrâq, *Le livre de la sagesse orientale [Kitâb Ḥikmat al-Ishrâq]: Commentaires de Qoṭboddîn Shîrâzî et de Mollâ Ṣadrâ Shîrâzî* (Traduction et notes par Henri Corbin, établies et introduites par Christian Jambet (Islam spirituel); (Folio Essais), Lagrasse: Verdier, 1986), 119-120: "sa particularisation par la Lumière des Lumières."

only hope that the author will address this point more systematically in a subsequent publication.

In the tenth contribution, Tanelli Kukkonen pays detailed attention to Ibn Ṭufayl's psychology. According to Kukkonen, Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* is a 'Bildungsroman,' which contains faculty psychology as an essential building block and offers an extended meditation on the microcosm-macrocosm metaphor. Regarding Ibn Ṭufayl's conception of the 'spirit' (*rūḥ*), it is noted that its seat is specified, from an explicitly cardiocentric perspective, as the heart, and it enters only (by way of emanation, which seems limited to animate beings but is said to have effects on the level of elements) in suitably prepared matter, even if it is due to the dispensation of a divine spirit. Furthermore, it is noted that it possesses unity in both the numerical and the specific senses; that the animal spirit is the form of the hylemorphic composite living being (the body being merely instrumental); and that the more complex this form is, the more alive it is (this better fits the Avicennian than the Fārābian line of emanation, as does the idea that every single thing shares in the attribute of createdness). As for the human soul, it reveals itself to be a separate, immaterial substance that is destined to eternal life (based on Aristotle's *ergon* argument in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which had been elaborated by Miskawayh). It is worthwhile to add that Kukkonen detects in Ibn Ṭufayl the will to puzzle out the true meaning of Galen's teaching. This is a well-balanced study. Let me just note that the intermediary state of some souls in the hereafter may have been inspired by Ibn Sīnā (see, for example, his *Metaphysics*, IX, 7). However, which works of Ibn Sīnā were effectively disposed of by Ibn Ṭufayl remains to be determined and remains a major desideratum for study (similar and intimately related to the reception of Ibn Sīnā's works in Andalusia, especially in Muslim Andalusia).

The last three contributions address three special topics. The first, commonly elaborated by Resianne Fontaine and Steven Harvey, concentrates on Ibn Daud's *Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah*, *the Exalted Faith*, published in 1161 (hence, before the emergence of Averroism in Jewish thought). Ibn Daud conceived the book as an introduction for novice philosophers, and he sought to establish harmony between tradition and 'true philosophy,' the best representatives of which were al-Fārābī and, above all, Ibn Sīnā. Remarkably, Ibn Daud

is the first Jewish author to systematically introduce the notion of 'Necessary Existent,' in the discussion of God's existence and unity. Thus, he shows great concern with sound reasoning, in line with Aristotle and the Muslim *falāsifa*. The authors believe that Ibn Sīnā constituted his major source of inspiration with respect to the notion of the 'Necessary Existent' (used primarily in a causal sense) and the metaphysical proof for God's existence (based on the distinction between necessary and possible being). The authors also stress that Ibn Daud used the Avicennian idea of an intermediary creation for his own purpose, the establishment of human freedom. Unfortunately, they do not specify to which Avicennian texts Ibn Daud had access. In a final section, they provide a brief survey of the (limited) reception of Ibn Daud's thought in later Jewish philosophy. The second of these contributions is about philosophical Sufism. In this chapter, Anna Akasoy examines the reception of and the opposition to Andalusian Sufism. She begins with a *fatwā* by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) against Ibn Tūmart (d. 524/1130), in which he suggests that both Ibn Tūmart and Ibn Sabʿīn (d. 669/1270) deny God's attributes insofar as they share with Ibn Sīnā the notion of 'absolute existence' (*wujūd muṭlaq*). In what follows (using other writings of Ibn Taymiyya), Akasoy attempts to explain how Ibn Taymiyya arrived at this judgment, emphasizing the inclusion of Ibn Sabʿīn, who, linked with Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), is considered by Ibn Taymiyya an exponent of a philosophical Sufism that maintained the doctrine of the unity of being and subscribed to the concept of *aʿyān thābita* (not translated by the author, but meaning something like 'established beings'). However, she concludes that no definite answer is available and that the precise relationship between *falsafa* and *taṣawwuf* among these 'Sufi philosophers' requires further research. Given that none of the Sufis concerned seems to have characterized himself as a 'philosopher,' Akasoy brings in evidence from (mainly fourteenth-century) biographical sources (concerning Ibn Sabʿīn and ʿAfīf al-Dīn al-Tilimsānī [d. 690/1291]) that this description, in all likelihood, originated in a polemical context in a later period. She concludes that three ways can be distinguished in which philosophy and mysticism were combined: (1) a combination of philosophical theory, ascetic practice, and Sufi doctrines (al-Ghazālī as portrayed by al-Subkī); (2) a coherent esoteric neoplatonic philosophy with Shīʿite undertones (inspired by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ with Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī as mediators); and (3) use of the terminology and/or

concepts of Ibn Sīnā's metaphysics, particularly in connection with being (in this respect, the author evokes the above-mentioned problem of the presence of Ibn Sīnā's works in the Muslim West). Akasoy sketches an important issue and brings in many interesting materials. However, most of these materials concern the thirteenth century. In a volume devoted to the twelfth century, it would have been more appropriate to examine the possible presence of philosophical elements in Ibn ʿArabī's thought, which largely forms the basis of Andalusian Sufism. Nevertheless, her contribution has great relevance. This is also the case with the last contribution, by Gregor Schwarb. It offers a detailed survey of twelfth-century Muʿtazilism, both in the Islamic world (Sunnī, Shīʿite, and Zaydī) and the Jewish world. It is overwhelmingly an historical study. Unfortunately, little is said about the specific doctrines involved. From a philosophical point of view, the most significant remark concerns Ibn al-Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī's (d. 536/1141) *Tuḥfa* as a strong reaction against the spectacular ascendancy of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy. Also philosophically interesting are indications of the influence of some of these Muʿtazilite thinkers on later scholars, such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.

Let me conclude by saying that despite possible minor criticisms, the present book offers many new materials and provides scholars who are interested in medieval Arabic thought (as well as Jewish and Latin thought) many insights as well as many indications for further research. It is worthy of attention and forms a nice closure to a series of three volumes devoted to different periods of Arabic thought. I can only express my admiration and gratitude toward Peter Adamson, who not only organized three colloquia but also edited the three volumes (related to the colloquia, but not limited to the presentations given).

BOOK REVIEWS

The Poetics of Iblīs: Narrative Theology in the Qurʾān
by Whitney S. Bodman

Andrew Rippin

A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and Them Beyond Orientalism
by Arshin Adib-Moghaddam

Coeli Fitzpatrick

The Qurʾān in Context: Historical and Literary Investigations into the Qurʾānic Milieu
edited by Angelika Neuwirth, Nicolai Sinai, and Michael Marx

Thomas Hoffmann

Moral Agents and their Deserts: The Character of Muʿtazilite Ethics
by Sophia Vasalou

Abdessamad Belhaj

The Poetics of Iblīs: Narrative Theology in the Qurʾān, by Whitney S. Bodman, (Harvard Theological Studies, 62), (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Theological Studies, Harvard Divinity School: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2011), xii + 311 pp., ISBN: 978-0-674-06241-2, $25.00 (pb)

To engage in the delineation of a "narrative theology" of evil as it is found in the world presumes that a discussion of evil is communicated most easily and profoundly through stories. For Whitney Bodman, narrative has the ability to capture "the tragic dimensions of life, the ambiguities of fate, the confusion of flawed characters, noble intentions with ruinous outcomes." (p. 1) The problem of evil, he suggests, cannot be resolved into a dualistic vision of the struggle between the divine and the human because that "belies the truth of human experience;" (p. 1) such a perspective is the realm of normative dogmatic theology and lacks the insights that narratology can provide.

In chapter two of this work Bodman explores the challenges of approaching the Qurʾān as a literary text and the theoretical bases on which that must be conducted. He points out that Iblīs, but not Shayṭān, is a character in the series of stories that mention him in the Qurʾān. Shayṭān, for Bodman, is bereft of narrative interest, for he is an "actor" only, having no shifting personality as the story progresses; characters, on the other hand (Bodman here uses a distinction derived from Mieke Bal's work on narratology) have distinctive human characteristics and carry themselves with human demeanor (regardless of whether they are human or not).

The heart of Bodman's work is the analysis of the seven accounts of Iblīs found scattered throughout the Qurʾān. His interpretations are intentionally conducted in isolation from one another with the goal of deriving the insights from each one separately, contrary to usual approaches which attempt to resolve the narratives into one coherent whole. However, he first explores (in chapter 3) the mythic background of the figure of Iblīs through a range of "logical parallels" that provide narrative explanations for the existence and nature of evil. The purpose of doing so is to "discern alternative meanings and implications of specific elements" (p. 59) when it comes to the analysis of the Qurʾānic narratives. Bodman isolates the combat myth

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(the dualistic struggle between good and evil and the emergence of apocalyptic thinking), the heavenly prosecutor myth (as when Satan argues with God concerning Job), the watcher myth (as associated with the guardian angels), the famous fallen angel myth, and the myth of sibling rivalry (as with Cain and Abel). These five typologies set the framework for the examination of the Qurʾānic stories. Bodman thus argues that he has positioned himself to stay alert to repetition, twists, and new strains of thought therein.

The analysis of the Iblīs narratives in *sūra*s *Ṭā-Hā*, *al-Kahf*, *al-Ḥijr*, *Ṣād*, *al-Isrāʾ*, *al-Aʿrāf*, and *al-Baqara* is undertaken within the context of each *sūra* as a whole and follows the development of the overall narrative in which Iblīs finds his place, ranging from short renderings in a single verse to full narrative expositions stretching over a paragraph or more. The stories show Iblīs sometimes being incidental to other narratives and more an actor than character (especially in *sūra*s *Ṭā-Hā* and *al-Baqara*) and, on other occasions, embodying various of the mythic versions as in *sūrat Ṣād*'s use of the heavenly prosecutor and *sūra*s *al-Isrāʾ* and *al-Aʿrāf*'s resonances with the combat myth. *Sūrat al-Ḥijr* is of special interest because it appears to develop the sibling rivalry myth in Iblīs' "coherent" argument as to why God should not entrust matters to Adam and his own sense of injustice at this affront.

The challenge in this book that Bodman deals with at the outset is the notion of "tragedy" itself. For Muslims, Bodman indicates, Iblīs cannot be viewed as a tragic figure: "Iblīs becomes a tragic figure once we grant him some justification for his refusal to bow down to Adam and his refusal of God's direct command." (p. 24) This is "tragic" because that was the right thing to do; yet it was also the wrong thing to do. Such a theology is more at home in Christianity in which the redemption through the crucifixion of Jesus blends the human and the divine in what is viewed as the ultimate tragedy. So, this reading of the character of Iblīs appears to be a Christian one. That, for Bodman, is not an outcome to be resisted: in fact, on the theoretical grounds of reader-reception theory, he argues that it must be that way for him as a reader. That others who do not share his initial perspective might then see the narrative of Iblīs in a new way because of his reading is to be wished for; in Bodman's terms, the readings are hoped to be within the range of "possible readings" with which some readers will resonate. However, he also suggests that

such ideas can be found in Muslim writing (beyond those of Sufis as was previously explored in Peter Awn's classic 1983 study, *Satan's Tragedy and Redemption: Iblīs in Sufi Psychology*) where the implications of the Qurʾānic narratives are explored. Bodman draws attention to the role of Iblīs in four works of modern fiction written by Muḥammad Iqbāl, Naguib Mahfouz, Nawal el-Saadawi, and Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, and finds the tragic figure emerging, especially in the latter three, as these writers face the challenges of the contemporary world in their own narratives. What is uncovered is a Qurʾān that is not univocal, which might be taken to suggest that the text itself is conveying a sense of the tragic by its inability to provide a simple, singular answer to the dilemma of the existence of evil.

Overall, this is a well-written and interesting work. It goes well beyond what most academic work on the Qurʾān does in its level of theological engagement. Bodman finds confirmation of his view of "the tragic dilemma" of human existence – tragedy being "the courage to choose, and the possibility, perhaps even the inevitability, to make the wrong choice for the right reasons." (p. 265) He is, however, fully open, and he expresses himself without condescension, in finding that "there is a certain reasonableness to Iblīs' discreet accusation" against God but that this is "an unacceptable conclusion for a Muslim." (p. 264) Further, "[w]hile most Muslims may deny that the Islamic tradition countenances any concept of tragedy, the human condition dictates otherwise." That there may be another answer that is neither the normative theological absolutism that Bodman associates with Islam, nor the tragic vision that he considers a part of the journey through the "reefs of human existence," is not entertained. Still, as a textual study and an experiment in hermeneutical reflection, the book is well worth close attention.

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A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and Them Beyond Orientalism, by Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), xvii + 338 pp., ISBN: 978-1-84904-097-6, £30 (hb)

Since the publication of Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* in 1993, the idea of a "clash regime" or "clash mentality" – that is, the idea that civilizations (which Huntington understands as defined and unproblematically fixed) are engaged in inevitable ideological clashes – has been either taken seriously in circles of foreign policy or, alternately, critiqued vehemently. Fully appreciating his predecessors Foucault and Edward Said's idea that discourse precedes history, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam's (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London) book *A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and Them Beyond Orientalism* steps back from the debate itself to offer a metahistorical critique of the clash regime and how it has come to have such a central place in twentieth-century discourse. Adib-Moghaddam notes how the idea of the clash regime is so central to our thinking that even some critics of Huntington's theory find themselves wrapped up in its binary oppositions and reinforcing its very foundations. In other words, for some readers, Huntington is taken as wrong not because he postulates the existence of distinct "civilizations," but because he claims that they are "clashing." It is precisely the history of these postulated divisions between civilizations – either viewed as Manichean or not – that Adib-Moghaddam aims to examine. His method is to proceed more or less chronologically, but also through multiple disciplines where the clash regime has found its most fertile ground, namely history, religion, and philosophy. In this sense, his study takes us far beyond a mere description of the history of the clash regime to an examination of the ideological positions that have allowed its production in the first place.

Adib-Moghaddam's exploration of the historical trajectories of the clash regime acknowledge its tremendous influence on Western relations with its "others" (primarily but not always limited to "Islam") and its almost infallible ability to muster support for armed conflict. His goal in the first part of the book is to address the question of where the binary thinking about tension between conceptions of

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"self" and "other" come from. This kind of inquiry into the self-other binary leads to the question about whether or not the very discipline of history as an authoritative discipline is itself always already engaged in narrating such differences between us and them. For example, in Herodotus' writing of the history of the Greek city states' conflict with the 'barbarian' Persians, the heroism of the former is contrasted with the cruelty and chaos of the latter. Although this initial framework by the "Father of History" does not mean the inevitable lack of any speck of "objectivity" on the part of his successors, one can still make the case that history is "born in myth and *out of political considerations*." (my emphasis; 33), and this will apply to historians on any side. Indeed from western antiquity onward, the discipline of history is dependent on the construction of a lesser, barbarous other to contrast to western civilization. These types of historical examples from antiquity that note divisions into "good" and "evil," "civilized" and "barbarian" provide a deep well from which contemporary adherents to the clash regime are able to draw their "evidence" that the clash is inevitable because "it has always existed." Adib-Moghaddam's task is not to show that these historical divisions are true or false, but to show that evidence of their existence in historical documents is not evidence of its inevitability in human relations, indeed the clash is "exactly non-existent outside of such discourses suggesting it."

Perhaps the most well-known critic of Huntington's work is the late Edward Said, and Adib-Moghaddam recognizes the importance of Said's voice in giving lie to the ideology of the clash regime. Said's work is held up to a serious critique in this work, but critical comments about Said come from an author who clearly respects Said *and,* perhaps even more importantly, understands him. To state it briefly, some of what is raised as problematic from Said's *Orientalism* is his focus on the colonial period as the formative one with respect to a European creating of "the Orient." This focus on European power as the formative power in creating the Orient does not allow for the existence of an Orient which was at the same time narrating itself as well as accessing to and appealing to its own vast historical epochs. To put this in another way, the discourse of Orientalism as recounted by Said is not true enough to Foucault's analysis of power, which for Foucault was not only understood in terms of domination, but also in terms of challenging oppressive and repressive institutions. In Said's Orientalism, power is always one directional

and top-down, and t4his leads to a certain understanding of history that does not have room for alternate narratives of resistance until a certain historical moment, namely the post-colonial one.

Although he is writing a metahistory, Adib-Moghaddam constructs his metahistory by first engaging in a scrutiny of microhistories. In other words, he looks to historical moments in history, religion, and philosophy in order to see how the clash regime is continually re-inscribed in order to function in the service of particular historical and political projects. So the "martyrdom movement" in Muslim Spain, the Christian Crusades for the Holy land, the colonial period, etc. are all individual historical movements in which it is not so much "The West" versus "The East" or "Christianity" versus "Islam" but conflicts between precise political or ideological agendas which were always specific in their details. Yet in order to legitimate their aims and muster enthusiasm for their conflicts, such movements invoked variations of the discourse of the clash regime repeatedly. Although always generally belligerent and almost always accompanied by calls for war, this invoking of the "other" as different and threatening involves something more permanent in the colonial period in the Middle East: the continuous struggle until the other is annihilated.

Adib-Moghaddam's work is particularly helpful in his – albeit brief – sketching out of some of the philosophical ideas that are interesting either for the way in which they contributed to a clash mentality, or did not. He reads Classical philosophers of Islam and finds in the Fārābian/Avicennian tradition no trace of the kind of carving out an exclusive "Muslim" identity or a Muslim access to knowledge as being above and against the "West." This formation of a Muslim identity set against the Western other will come, but it comes quite late upon the scene, after modern European philosophers had already forged a relationship between knowledge and power that emphasized their non-Oriental identity. Furthermore, when it does come, it does not do so out of any philosophical tradition –even post-Classical philosophical traditions. As it is initially conceived, Muslim identity can never exist without the presence of the Christians and Jews, because Islam sees itself as a continuation – even perfection – of them. So Adib-Moghaddam notes that even the most polemical refutations of Christian beliefs from the Classical period of Islam do not attempt to undermine the prophecy of Jesus, and refer to him in respectful terms. Islamic opposition to the "People of the Book" was

theological, not existential. It could not afford to be so, given that its own genealogy leads straight back to the prophet Abraham.

When Adib-Moghaddam looks at the contemporary period, he does so with particular attention to the field of contemporary International Relations, a field that helps serve the nation state as its chief discipline of legitimation. In a shift from the explicit jingoism of the colonial period, the Western nation state manages to promote itself (and its values, defined as both western and superior) using the vocabulary from international relations, primarily that of international law, thus giving itself a veil of legitimacy. War is waged by western nations (primarily by the United States), in order to have an "ordering effect" on other nations, that is, to retain their hegemony over developing and underdeveloped nation states. This makes the clash regime in the contemporary period particularly pernicious, because legalistic code words mask the hysteria against the non-Western other and give that hysteria a veneer of legitimacy. In order to illustrate some of these points, Adib-Moghaddam takes the reader through some of the academic and political discourse that has supported the "War on Terror" and its use both of racial profiling and the U.S. Justice Department's legal definitions of the people caught up in that war.

Of course, one might expect that if western discourse about its (predominantly) Muslim "other" will mutate, so will the response from the discourses of Islam. Adib-Moghaddam carefully delineates differences in what could be termed "Islamic" responses to the clash regime prior to the nineteenth century and contemporary Islamisms, which negate previous understandings of Islamic conceptions of its "others" which at least acknowledged a shared past with Christianity and Judaism. In fact, he notes that these neo-Islamic discourses do not engage intellectually with their own past traditions. As a consequence, the authoritative voices from the Islamic legal traditions are easily ignored, and prohibitions against things such as killing civilians do not factor into considerations of how or when it is appropriate to wage war.

This is a book worth reading and re-reading. Readers are taken on an eloquent and thorough tour through intellectual history of the past two thousand years that illuminates the road leading to ourselves and our current situation, where we continue to swim in the discourse of the clash regime. Yet in a way that is reminiscent of Said, who I will

argue was perpetually optimistic (often quoting Gramsci: "Pessimism of the intellect; optimism of the will."), Adib-Moghaddam does not hopelessly condemn us to our narrow ideological swimming pool. His book offers some of the tools we will need to get out.

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***The Qurʾān in Context: Historical and Literary Investigations into the Qurʾānic Milieu*,** edited by Angelika Neuwirth, Nicolai Sinai, and Michael Marx, (Texts and Studies of the Qurʾān: 6) (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2011), vii + 864 pp., ISBN: 978-90-04-21101-8, $67 (pb)

This voluminous anthology, comprising one introductory chapter and twenty-seven essays, is devoted to Qurʾānic studies. It emerged from a conference in Berlin in 2004 and a summer academy in 2007 conceived and led by Angelika Neuwirth, Nicolai Sinai, and Michael Marx, all scholars specializing in Qurʾānic studies. The organizers reappear as editors and contributors to this publication. It comes as no surprise, then that *The Qurʾān in Context* reflects the general outlook of the 'Berlin school' (Sinai has since taken a position at Oxford University), whose main instigator is associated with the work of professor Angelika Neuwirth. In addition to the majority of scholars with a German academic background, this perspective implies an emphasis on Late Antiquity and the emergence of the Qurʾān within this broad and multifaceted regional, chronological, and religious framework. Indeed, the twelve essays in the first part of the volume, titled *The Qurʾan's Historical Context*, "address various general aspects of the Qurʾān's political, economic, linguistic, and cultural context." (p. 17) This includes archaeological, theological, and literary aspects. The now-obsolete opinion that the Qurʾān emerged in splendid Arab isolation is definitively abandoned in favor of a Qurʾān emerging and acting as a dynamic force-field in continuity (and polemics) with late antique milieus, texts, and discourses. Within this framework, the term 'Qurʾān' becomes the common denominator of both the chronological-dialectical processes of the three factors (Prophet, revelation, and community) as well as the edited and canonized text corpus, crystallizing into the post-ʿUthmānic and diacritical Qurʾānic *muṣḥaf*. Neuwirth and her affiliated peers tend to place special emphasis on the diachronic trajectories of the Qurʾānic text, especially its self-reflexive intertextual relations with and appropriations of Jewish, Christian, and Arab-pagan traditions. Despite this emphasis on agency, dynamics, intertextuality, and fluidity, there is also an insistence on a close reading of the text, a reading inspired by *Litteraturwissenschaft* and Biblical studies. This is also indicated in the subtitle of the anthology. This literary approach seems particular-

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ly preoccupied with intelligible local and global semantic and formal patterns and coherencies. This emphasis on close reading unfolds in the second part of the book, *Contextualizing the Qurʾan*, which comprises a number of articles devoted to the editorial and transmission-related history of the Qurʾān. It should perhaps be said that the close readings in the volume never venture into the type of imaginative flights that we often find in literary criticism or theological writings. The philological and historicist commitments of the contributors are severe headmasters that keep the essays within strict bounds. For those of us who would look for a Qurʾān beyond context, as a piece of text that is able to define and create its own context, as it were, we encounter more imaginative and experiential passages and hypotheses, especially in the essays dealing with inter- and intratextuality. Although these complex approaches bypass and sometimes challenge certain Islamic doctrines and verities, no one (except perhaps Jan Retsö, who presents a theory claiming Qurʾānic Arabic to be a specimen of a specific sacred language register prevalent on the Arab peninsula) in this volume subscribes to the more or less revisionist hypotheses that have been part and parcel of modern Qurʾānic studies, not least German Qurʾānic studies. We think, for instance, of Günther Lüling's ideas of a Christian *Ur-Koran* already proposed in the mid-1970s and, more recently, of Christoph Luxenberg's ideas of a Syriac-Aramaic reconstruction of an ostensible 'original' Qurʾānic text. The theories of John Wansbrough and John Burton are also addressed and countered in the volume (most thoroughly by Gregor Schoeler). Instead of silencing these revisionists to death, however, their ideas are often recycled as thought provoking and worthy of critical engagement. Despite the flaws and tendencies of, for instance, Wansbrough and Luxenberg's studies, their ideas seem to have invigorated a sound interest in the literary set-up of the Qurʾān and Islam's relations to Syriac Christianity.

It would certainly be unfair to present the twenty-seven essays as mere replicas of the Berlin school. One should perhaps conceive of the essays as exhibiting a theoretical and methodological family resemblance to the approaches characterized above. The following essays are in the first historical part of the book. Norbert Nebes analyzes the political conflicts between Sasanian Iran and Axum as played out in South Arabian Ḥimyar prior to the advent of Muḥammad. Special attention is devoted to the story of the 'martyrs of Najrān.' Barbara Finster's article is a translation of a German article

from 1996 and provides an exemplary overview of the studies of antique and late antique Arabia. Given that the original article is from 1996, it does not do full justice to the field as it has developed since then, but it provides a good starting point for novices. Mikhail D. Bukharin takes up the neo-classic discussion about the economic foundation of Mecca and the city's position in the caravan networks and incense trade. Harald Suerman provides one of the shorter articles about Islam – and perceptions of Islam – in light of Jewish and Christian sources. Stefan Heidemann provides an exemplary article on the trial-and-error-like development of coin imagery and texts in early Islam, including a thorough refutation of the revisionist theories recently presented by Volker Popp. The article also discusses the 'the bar/globe on a pole on steps' motif found on many early Islamic coins (and on the famous Jordanian Madaba mosaic, which embellishes the cover of the paperback edition). The remaining essays of part one focus on linguistic and literary issues. Ernst Axel Knauf investigates the varieties and developments of Arabic from 200 CE - 600 CE. Peter Stein's contribution is a translation of a four-year-old German article that analyses pre-Islamic epigraphic evidence, concluding that a widespread but sporadic literacy, mostly upheld by specially trained scribes, existed prior to the advent of Muḥammad. Jan Retsö's contribution has been presented above. Tilman Seidensticker engages the pre-Islamic *labbayka/talbiya* formular and counters the ultra-skeptical conclusions of Gerald Hawting and John Wansbrough regarding the usefulness and authenticity of both pre-Islamic and Islamic sources. Seidensticker's contribution is a translation of a five-year-old German article. Isabel Toral-Niehoff investigates the Christian community in the late antique Lakhmid territory of Iraq, proposing that the Lakhmids' Arab identity may have influenced the identity constructions of the early Islamic community. Kirill Dmitriev calls attention to pre-Islamic Christian Arabic poetry and how the role it may have played as a thematic repository for the later Qurʾānic text. Agnes Imhof concludes part one with a literary analysis of a 'transitional' (between the pre-Islamic and Islamic eras) Muslim poet and how his poetry may have been influenced by early Qurʾānic and Islamic priorities.

The second part continues the philological thrust of part one but opens up more literary investigations. Nicolai Sinai critically surveys the various studies devoted to the chronology of verses and *sura*s, especially the master's thesis of Theodor Nöldeke, and argues in fa-

vor of a processual, intratextual, and textual understanding of the Qurʾānic text. Nora K. Schmid forwards some preliminary considerations of the usefulness of quantitative text analysis. Although we can endorse quantitative text analysis, which has become even more potent after the digitalization of the Qurʾān, it is a pity that she does not exploit more recent studies, such as those by Arne Ambros. Islam Dayeh struggles with the age-old contention that the Qurʾān is a fragmentary and literarily incoherent text. Through close reading and intratextual analyses (Dayeh uses the term intertextual, but it is, strictly speaking, intratextual because it refers to the Qurʾān's (re)reading of itself), Dayeh concludes that the *sura*s at hand constitute a "clear sense of character and unity." (p. 493) Angelika Neuwirth, in her usual magisterial style, probes the Qurʾān's intertextual traces and renegotiations of the Christian version of the Abrahamic figure. Neuwirth contributes yet another intertextual reading, this time focusing on the Psalms. Michael Marx is also intertextually committed, but his analysis revolves around the most important individual female Qurʾānic figure, Mary, and her plausible Christian traces and reconfigurations. Recent Qurʾān translator Hartmut Bobzin takes up the thorny question of what 'prophet,' *nabī*, and 'seal of the prophets' could mean. Bobzin concludes that the term displays a strong typological connection with the figure of Moses. Gabriel Said Reynolds, who has also published two recent volumes about the Qurʾān's context, contributes a very short essay on the intricate passage on Sarah's laughter and suggests certain Syriac Christian intertextualities. Unlike the other contributors, Reimund Leicht does not take a semi-narrative passage as his point of departure but focuses on a legal passage, the Qurʾānic commandments of writing down loan agreements (Q 2:282). Leicht compares rabbinical law but cautions readers not to overestimate Jewish influence, and he calls attention to neglected Greek document traditions. François de Blois argues for a Jewish-Christian (i.e., Nazorean) context for the Qurʾān and Muḥammad, describing the latter as a "plausible figure located in a historical vacuum." (p. 620) Stefan Wild directly addresses the (in)famous Luxenberg thesis about the virgins of paradise (*ḥūr, ḥūrīn*). Wild refutes the thesis, but he also counters the *ad hominem* refutations that have been directed against Luxenberg. Walid Saleh also contests Luxenberg's virgin thesis and suggests a possible Greek inspiration instead, namely the hedonistic life of the Gods on Olympus rather than Late Antique ascetic Christian ideals. Saleh's article is a spirited

attack on the etymological fixation that has been a significant part of modern Western studies of the Qurʾān. Saleh stresses that the "*meaning of a word is derived from its linguistic medium, and that holds true even for 'borrowed' words.*" (p. 662) Although Saleh's examples of tendentious and downright erroneous 'etymologitis' are well-argued, I think it would be too radical to discard etymological considerations as such because comparative etymologies can reveal broad cross-linguistic and cross-regional semantic patterns and trends that are part of the Qurʾān's complex context. Thomas Bauer updates the relevance of pre-Islamic Arabic poetry vis-à-vis the Qurʾān and proposes a strategy of looking for "negative intertextuality," striking Qurʾānic silences or "avoidance of certain features, that has just as formative an influence on the shape of the text as would be the reverse." (p. 706) This reminds us of Robert Brunchvig's article on "Simple negative remarks on the vocabulary of the Qurʾān" (org. 1956) as a viable approach. Gregor Schoeler provides a critical reexamination of John Burton and John Wansbrough's conflicting theses about the redaction history of the Qurʾānic text. Schoeler provides what could be called a neo-traditionalist conclusion, which gives credence to the traditional Muslim position of an ʿUthmānic compilation and redaction. The final contribution comes from Omar Hamdan and investigates the introduction of a standard system of reading signs for proper pronunciation, which took place around 703 CE – 705 CE.

These contributions are subsumed by an introductory chapter written by Nicolai Sinai and Angelika Neuwirth. This introduction presents a rather pessimistic diagnosis of Qurʾānic studies as a discipline in "disarray" (the word stems from Fred Donner). The comparison with Biblical and Classical studies is relevant and heuristic, but it is also unfair to judge Western Qurʾānic studies according to the standards of these two time-honored disciplines. It is somewhat of a coquettish statement, and we think that it is proved wrong by the sheer number of high-quality contributions (and the number of new young scholars) in this publication. In a footnote (p. 15) added to the 2011 paperback edition, Sinai and Neuwirth admit that the "field as a whole has become pleasantly dynamic since the publication of the present volume," and they call attention to the work of Gabriel Said Reynolds, Patricia Crone, and Behnam Sadeghi. Although Qurʾānic studies continues to be marred by certain polemical and almost conspiratorial trends (e.g., Luxenberg and the German *Inārah*-group),

the field is at a very promising phase – not only in Western academia but also in the Muslim academic world, especially Turkey and Iran. If we take *The Qurʾān in Context* as symptomatic, it seems as if Qurʾānic studies is moving toward a neo-traditionalist position (also on the rise in ḥadīth studies), in which scholars' notions of the Qurʾān's historicity and intelligibility overlap with more traditional Muslim viewpoints and sensibilities.

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Moral Agents and their Deserts: The Character of Muʿtazilite Ethics, by Sophia Vasalou (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), xiii + 252 pp., ISBN: 978-0-691-13145-0, $42 (hb)

The purpose of this book is to discuss the problem of the desert, *istiḥqāq,* in the views of the Baṣran Muʿtazilites from a philosophical perspective. To unfold the complexity of the issue, the author frequently shifts between *kalām*, Muslim legal theory, and modern ethics. She does not focus on the significance of the desert in Islamic thought. Instead, using a continental philosophical style, she engages in a philosophical discussion of the problem of a person's entitlement to punishment. Often, Muʿtazilite ethics is a vehicle for insights on moral agency, worthiness, and reward.

The author develops her conversation with Muʿtazilite ethics in six chapters. In a brief and scattered opening chapter, she reminds us of the Muʿtazilite principles. In the second chapter, she brings into focus the theological character of Muʿtazilite ethics. A considerable part of this chapter reads like an introductory chapter, with a review of literature on the topic. In the third chapter, she leaves the realm of *kalām* for that of legal theory in quest of Muʿtazilite materials on the desert problem. In particular, she is interested in the notion of *ḥuqūq* as it manifests the ambiguity of desert and rights. Chapter four explores causality in moral actions, and chapter five investigates the durability of punishment. Thus, the author returns to *kalām* to expand her discussion of human agency and divine reward. This leads her to examine Muʿtazilite ontology and its explanation of moral identity. However, she returns to Islamic law to address notions of legal status, *aḥkām*. Finally, in chapter six, she concludes with a study of reward in Muʿtazilite eschatology and ontology. Thus, she is compelled to elaborate on Muʿtazilite views of accidents and identity. The author adds an Appendix that contains an English translation of the section on "the Promise and the threat" from *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* by Mānkdīm Shashdīw (d. 425/1034). Her plan is not linear and seems rather to be instigated by her Muʿtazilite partners in dialogue.

The book builds on G. Hourani's scholarship on Muʿtazilite ethics to fill a gap in the research on the Muʿtazilite understanding of the

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desert issue. In particular, it offers "closer analytic attention to the conceptual structure of the texts." (p. 36) At this level, the book is extremely interesting. It is probably for this scrutiny that the book received The 2009 Albert Hourani Book Award by the Middle East Studies Association for the year's most notable book in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. However, the book has little impact on our understanding of Muʿtazilite ethics.

With regard to the author's approach, she explicitly claims the line of "*Principia Ethica*" of G. E. Moore. Although she uses Moore's philosophical tradition to carefully scrutinize Muʿtazilite concepts, she does not justify her theoretical framework or the relevance of modern ethics to Muʿtazilite tenets. Most specialists of medieval Islamic thought would assert that it is a vain task to pose modern ethical questions to medieval Muslim theologians. To be fair, the author acknowledges several times the intricacies of such a task. However, she enjoys her philosophical dialogue with the Muʿtazilites, and she does not justify the examination of the chosen authors, periods, or concepts. Her Muʿtazilite material seems to be secondary to her adherence to Moore's analytic philosophy.

In dealing with such a topic, one would expect a discussion of Greek ethics and its Muslim interpretations as a prelude to the examination of Muʿtazilite ethics. As a consequence of using modern ethics, there is a bit of confusion in the book. In shifting between Muʿtazilite and modern, the author uses a dialogical method. However, some parts of her writing sound like a monologue. Indeed, the author displays esthetics and artistic devices in several passages that are written as variations or ballads, not wholly devoid of interest but irrelevant to the topic. Further, she frequently refers to common sense to elucidate ethical problems, in accordance with Moore's ethics. This makes her book pleasant but fairly convenient. Common sense is a changing notion and does not have the same meaning in Muʿtazilite and modern ethics. At times, the author is unable to find the bridge out of continental philosophy to return to Muʿtazilite ethics or *vice-versa*.

The book's major finding is the significance of divine agency in Muʿtazilite ethics and theology. (p. 179) The author observes that divine presence in space is a persistent Muʿtazilite idea. The author is almost disappointed to see that God occupies such a significant place in this school. That said, she is correct that the divine is decisive in

Muʿtazilite ethics, in which God explains the continuation of desert and the preservation of identity across time and justifies punishment. These findings hardly surprise the reader and seem tautological because *kalām* is not, after all, a discourse about human agency but about divine essence, attributes, and acts.

In her philosophical discussions of the Muʿtazilites, the author begs the question of whether *kalām* is a systematic ethics or a set of debates on ethical principles. In other words, can a modern ethical systematic approach compensate for a structurally missing ethical system in *kalām*? One must acknowledge with the author that there is some consistency in Muʿtazilite ethics. Although the author sheds light on this consistency, the reader is simply unable to identify systematic answers to specific moral questions in Muʿtazilite ethics. Therefore, with reference to the moral issues of modern times, which is apparently the main motivation for writing this book, the author leaves her readers puzzled. She draws excessively on the implications and interpretations of the Muʿtazilites.

This is a risky task. On the one hand, her sober analysis of philosophical implications in Muʿtazilite ethics largely convinces the reader. On the other hand, the author does not take us far in the study of proper Muʿtazilite ethics. Overall, the book is excellent reading for an audience with a background in modern ethics as well as in Muʿtazilite ethics and theology. The reader must have a sense of the conversation between philosophy and theology; otherwise, he or she would not be easily persuaded to engage in dialogue about the desert when the author does not attempt to answer the open questions she poses. In short, this book is an invitation to an agreeable conversation on Muʿtazilite ethics.

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All papers should have an introductory section in which the objectives and methodology of the article are explained and a final section, which summarizes the main points, discussed and the conclusions reached.

Manuscripts should be typed double-spaced on one side of the A4 only. Tables, graphs and figures should be on separate pages. All submissions should be in MS-Word (97-2003, 2007 or higher) format. Leave margins of at least 4 cm on top, bottom, and sides.

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Eichner, Heidrun, "Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics: From Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā al-Shīrāzī", *Medioevo* 32 (2007), 139-197.

Buckley, J. Jacobsen and Albrile, Ezio, "Mandaean Religion", (trans. from Italian by Paul Ellis), *Encyclopedia of Religion: Second Edition*, (editor in chief: Lindsay Jones; USA: Thomson Gale, 2005), VIII, 5634-5640.

Book

Kātib Chalabī, Ḥājī Khalīfa Muṣṭafā ibn ʿAbd Allāh, *Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn*, 2 vols., (eds. M. Şerefeddin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge; Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941-1943).

Michot, Yahya M., *Ibn Sīnā: Lettre au Vizir Abū Saʿd: Editio princeps d'après le manuscrit de Bursa, traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et lexique* (Beirut: al-Burāq, 2000).

Book Chapter

Janssens, Jules, "The Reception of Avicenna's *Physics* in the Latin Middle Ages" in I. Vrolijk and J. P. Hogendijk (eds.), *O ye Gentlemen: Arabic Studies on Science and Literary Culture in honour of Remke Kruk* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2007), 55-64.

Online Citation

Rudolph, Kurt, "Mandaeans: ii. The Mandaean Religion", *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Online Edition, 20 January 2010, available at www.iranica.com/articles/mandaeans-2-religion

Page references to works referred to in the text should take the following form: (Touraine, 1995: 9-10). The verses of the Qurʾān should be referred to as follows: Q 2:23; Q 17:108; the references from the Old and New Testament should carry chapter name and number, and verse number.

Text and references must follow the format outlined in The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition.

Arabic words should be transliterated according the style used by the Library of Congress.

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