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DEDICATION

This issue of *Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review* has been dedicated to Şaban Teoman Duralı, one of the most valuable philosophers in Turkey raised in recent years. May he rest in peace.

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Tentatio as Fallenness and Death as Care: Of Dasein's Many Faces in Early and Later Writings

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Abstract: Fallenness in *Sein und Zeit*, is the ontological path one takes to know one's being, to know oneself, which is the penultimate task of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. As he states in Being and Time, being-in-the-world is always fallen, and "Falling" (Verfallen) or "Fallenness" (Verfallensein) continues to be a "definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself. The concept of fallenness is grown from seeds of tentatio, it is one's trial to know oneself and temptation of oneself and possibilities: Being-in-the-world is tempting in oneself. The facticity of existence itself is the facticity of life. Fallen, not by choice, into the world is the effect of thrownness into-the-world. The fallenness is also the openness, to the world, to the possibilities. That is why fallenness is the characteristic of Dasein itself. The trial is not necessarily of the negative connotation, but it is also a tempting possibility. To establish the links between the early-Heideggerian temptations, trials and the later conception openness of fallenness is precisely the main task. One additional path that this paper will take is on the links of tentatio/fallenness and death. Fallenness as an existential character of Dasein, is a trial of the world, with the world; a face of infinite possibility/truth/being. This is what Heidegger calls disclosedness and Care. Being-open (disclosedness) is not complete without the "end" of the

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cycle: death. Thus, openness to death is part of the same onto-logical existence of the Dasein. The kernels of this thought are already to be found in The Phenomenology of Religious Life. In readings of Paul (particularly in Letters to Thessalonians), of Parousia, of openness and calling to death, in spite of death, are already and not yet formulations of being-towards-death. "Is not human life – trial?" – "is not human life death?" or being-towards- death? Death, as not eschatological but as openness, and care is precisely Jan Patocka's reading of Heidegger which I will benefit from. Thus, to find the traces of Dasein's many fa-ces as tentatio and openness in early writings and as fallenness and being-towards-death as Care in later writings will be the overall concern of this paper.

Keywords: Heidegger, dasein, tentatio, Augustine, fallenness, death, philosophy of life and death.

Introduction

A confession is always a confession of guilt. Augustine's con-fessions are of his temptations; of never-ending tentatio that is both temptation and trial that make the base of guilt. Heidegger's readings of Augustine have surely paved the way for his future thought on facticity, fallenness and the Dasein. Augustine's *tenta-tio* as trial and temptation is inspiring Heidegger to ask: *Numquid non tentatio est vita humana*? [Is not human life a trial?]. This trial and temptation are questioning of being, God, and self - *Quaestio mihi factus sum.* Heidegger's idea on fallenness presented to us in *Being and Time* is already and not yet formulated starting from the lectures in *The Phenomenology of Religious Life.* Hence, to uncover the links and references the two books will be read in parallel. The fallenness/ the tentatio will be treated as a face of the Dasein.

Dasein is, however, not only two-faced but a layered experi-ence of many faces. Fallenness of Dasein is also its life experience – its facticity – which is also its experience of its death. The death of the Dasein is also formulated in early lectures and emerge as

openness, acceptance, as trial. There is an implication of being-towards-death in the reading of the letters to Thessalonians, and the *cura* of Augustine. The death as Care is a thread that also reveals itself in *Being and Time*. Therefore, the faces of Dasein are interlinked and always show themselves at once.

1. Faces of Dasein

Phenomenology of Religious Life is concerned with factical existence. This factical life of early lectures is already and not yet a Dasein that comes to light in its full existentiality in *Being and Time*. Dasein; the being-in-the-world first reveals itself to us questioning. The penultimate task of Dasein is to know itself. The questioning of oneself becomes possible through Augustine's tentatio. Only through temptations, one knows himself: *quaestio mihi factus sum.* [I have become a question to myself.].[1] I can answer these questions only through my factical life – my temptations; my fall. These temptations resemble for Heidegger a feeling of falling in *Phenomenology of Religious Life* which is later conceptualized as fallenness-into-the-world in *Being and Time*. This fallenness of *Being and Time* is the existentiality of Dasein itself. Augustine's tentatio is the kernel of fallenness in Heidegger's magnum opus. Heidegger says, "my 'facticity' is the strongest temptation ... in it, I move in a somehow falling manner."[2] Being-in-the-world seems as a fallenness – the anxiety of being-here and being-present emerges for Heidegger as an inauthentic life. Thus, the conceptions of earlier lectures find their echoes in *Being and Time* as fallenness and thrownness into the world.

Augustine states the initial perception of life experience: "already the next moment can make me fall and expose me as someone entirely different."[3] This constant fall – the temptations – open

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[1]   Martin Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 184.

[2]   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 189.

[3]   Augustine, *Confessions*, ed. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), bk. 10.

being for possibility. That possibility also includes the possibility of death, the possibility of *Parousia* and the Christian concern that is felt for Parousia. At the same time, the concern is always for a delightful life that is always backed by the same temptations. This Augustinian concern (*cura*) is echoed as Care [Sorge] in *Being and Time*, in its entirety as solicitude and anxiety. The Care for life it seems will constitute the most existential characteristic of Dasein of all: Dasein's Being reveals itself as care[4] while being-in-the-world is always a being-towards-death. Care and Death come always together, facing both ends at the same. With the anticipation of death, there comes certain freedom; in which Dasein can fully embrace its possibilities, even if inauthentically. The inauthenticity of life is always a possibility of this very authentic freedom-towards-death. Hence Heidegger conceives factical life and later Dasein as multi-faced; faces of it are visible all at once. Fallenness-into-world, Care and being-towards-death, the possibility of tentatio echoed in concern for life and death – these are the existential faces of Dasein. The *Being and Time* does not explicitly refer to Augustine in each connection, inevitably though, they are implied. Heidegger's links remain Platonic, the peculiar dualism and the peculiar existentiality of fallenness are Platonic in their very conception. The heritage and the Heideggerian counterpart will be considered side-by-side, always keeping in mind an earlier reading of Augustine and *Being and Time*.

2. Tentatio and Fallenness

2.1. Temptation and Trial

> Thou abidest in thyself while we are disquieted with trial after trial. Yet unless we wept in thy ears, there would be no hope for us remaining. How does it happen that such sweet fruit is plucked from the bitterness of life, from groans, tears, sighs, and lamentations?[5]

Life, as is, is trial and temptation. *Tentatio*, which Augustine

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[4]   Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2013), 227.

[5]   Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. 4.

uses in Confession signifies both trial and temptation. By temptations, he says, we are tested daily[6] and of these trials and temptations, or rather trials of and by temptations, we do not know which ones we are strong enough to pass. The Lord, for Augustine, does not try us beyond our capacity, which temptations are in and beyond our capacity though, we cannot know. Thus, the question of *tentatio* is also a question of oneself. Augustine says:

> I would therefore confess what I know about myself; I will also confess what I do not know about myself. What I do know of myself, I know from thy enlightening of me; and what I do not know of myself, I will continue not to know until the time when my "darkness is as the noonday" in thy sight.[7]

Confessions are then of guilt – temptations, and of self. Augustine is confessing himself, his life, his questioning. Of types of temptations, the most complex is the temptation of self. Not particularly lust or curiosity(a certain vain and curious longing in the soul, rooted in the same bodily senses, which is cloaked under the name of knowledge and learning)[8], but the temptations are life and of Augustine's life experience. The first form, *concupiscentia carnis* [desire of the flesh] and the second form *concupiscentia oculorum* [desire of the eye] – the superfluous desire for learning seem within the capacity of being-human. The third form, of which Augustine says in Book Ten: [The third kind of temptation has not ceased for me, or can it cease in this whole life?] is the secular ambition - *ambitio saeculi.* Hence, Augustine asks: "*Numquid non tentatio est vita humana super terram sine ullo interstitio*?" [Is not human life on earth a trial without intermission?][9]. Trial and temptation are of life and life itself. *Tentatio* is itself our experience of life.

Heidegger tackles the *tentatio* as factical life experience: it is crucial for him to grasp how "Augustine experiences factical life—

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6   Augustine, *Confessions*, chap. 37.
7   Augustine, *Confessions*, chap. 5.
8   Augustine, *Confessions*, chap. 35.
9   Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. 10.

the *tentatio* [trial, temptation]—in order to understand accordingly to what extent, the one who lives in such saintliness, and on such a level of enactment, is necessarily a burden to himself [10] for "*nemo quod tolerat amat, etsi tolerare amat.*" The trials are the burden to life that continues without ever ceasing: thus, we ask the question: *Numquid non tentatio est vita humana*? [Is not human life a trial?][11] The desire of food and beverage, of lust and curiosity, are all an experience – how life encounters us and how we encounter life. It is how life haunts us, with trial and temptation with there and not yet. The third form of *tentatio* revolves around the self itself – it is to be taken in an authentic way. Here emerges the self-world, the experience of self. However, the self is lost in this *tentatio*, in false happiness.[12] Only the overcoming of temptation can lead to self-revelation and the authentic life as such.

Tota vita—tentatio [The whole life—temptation]. Giving in to the *tentatio*, the *tentatio* itself already resembles a kind of falling for Heidegger. Heidegger speaks of *molestia*[13] as a determinant of *tentatio* and the existence being attached to being-here, the Dasein. The *molestia* is tentatio being a burden, the facticity itself. In *tentatio*, one knows itself and by *tentatio*, one knows the other: "*In tentatione apparet, qualis sit homo*" [In temptation appears what kind of a human being one is] and "*Nescit se homo, nisi in tentatione discat se*" [You do not know a human being unless you have gotten to know him in temptation]. The *tentatio* is a possibility to know oneself by questioning; precisely why it is facticity. *Quaestio mihi factus sum* [I have become a question to myself][14] and the world has become a question to me. Experience life uncovers itself as a possibility to either pass the trial and temptation (a trial of temptation), "grasping the authentic direction of concern of one's own factical Dasein."[15] The *tentatio* is never an event,

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[10]   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 152.
[11]   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 155.
[12]   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 175.
[13]   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 172.
[14]   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 184.
[15]   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 183.

a singular event which one can understand but an experience that hold the many faces of the Dasein. Already here Heidegger alludes the life experience to a kind of falling (which will be the characteristic of the Dasein in *Being and Time*). He says, "My 'facticity' is the strongest temptation ... in it, I move in a somehow falling manner".[16] Failing the test of tentatio is also a falling[17] as well as an openness and experience of possibility. Thus, such openness can only be where there is a question. The questioning of self is tentatio-falling and opening oneself authentically in relation to oneself.[18]

Quaestio mihi factus sum. The *tentatio* is always historical and existential. The experience of self is always here and now; it is always an opening and process in history in which one questions life and experiences life. Heidegger says, "one notices the historical basic meaning of discere [to learn, to get to know], which takes place in concrete, factical, historical self-experience."[19] Tentatio is a specifically historical concept. It concerns life itself, indeed it is a concern for life and self-concern (*cura*)[20]. The tentatio is always an anxiety for life as much as it is a possibility. Being tried; being left open " [dahin "gestellt sein"][21] is also being left open for existence itself, for receiving existence. The questioning of self is possibility and anxiety – it carries the existential character of fallenness of *Being and Time* already. The falling of The *Phenomenology of Religious Life* does not express and reveal the true experiencing of falling; it is a root for future thought of existence; for Dasein. In the next section, the fallenness of *Being and Time* and the links of early and later thought will be discussed. *Tota vita—tentatio*; all life is falling.

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16 Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 189.
17 Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 175.
18 Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 186.
19 Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 206.
20 The question of fallenness, care and death will be further discussed in the next chapter. Heidegger, *Being and Time.* Already here concern for life is interlinked with the same fallenness into life and the openness to death (later, being-towards-death).
21 Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 186.

2.2. Falling into Life

> Being-in-the-world is tempting in oneself.[22]

> ...is there not a least some Platonism in the Verfallen?[23]

Heidegger's Verfallen or Abfall is reminiscent of Augustine's work as well as lectures on Augustine:

> An omnes hoc [vita beata] volunt, sed quoniam caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem, ut non faciant quod volunt, cadunt in id quod valent eoque contenti sunt...? (or do all men desire this [the happy life], but because the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, so that they do not do what they wish, they fall into what they are able to do, resting content with that...?)[24]

The *cadere* of Augustine, however, signifies the Fall; and Heidegger's although having similar connotations is more than falling. Heidegger rejects the understanding of falling as a form of a movement from concord to discord but rather a fall is existence itself. The *tentatio* of the *Phenomenology of Religious Life* is the preliminary form of Verfallen. Indulging in self – taking oneself to be important "is a falling, since the human being, according to its significance, is a "nothingness" before God."[25] It is the question of "what am I" – my factical existence which is filled with the tendency to bring-to-a-fall.[26] The tentatio, as already mentioned signifies that fall as a factical life experience which is the "attitudinal, falling, relationally indifferent, self-sufficient concern for significance."[27] The falling is being itself, in literal words, it is the fall in which one is; the (in)authentic question of being. The fallenness of *Being and Time*, however, is a profound existential characteristic of the Dasein. Verfallen signifies a fall; moreover, a collapsing

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22   Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 177.
23   Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
24   Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. 10.
25   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 175.
26   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 206.
27   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 11.

– falling down into something. Its existential characteristic is more than a questioning of life but an experience of life that is signified by a fallenness, thrownness into the world. Although the *tentatio* already implied some existentially into the phenomenon of trial and temptation – it was "not yet" a fallenness. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger characterizes the phenomenon of falling as an existential mode of being-in-the-world.[28] Living in the world, experiencing factical life is always a falling. A thrownness into the world; a questioning of the world is the utmost being-self and being-with-others. This is how Heidegger formulates the everydayness of life – a fall each and every day. This everydayness of falling equates with a mode of being that inauthentic in the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*:

> Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the 'world'. "Fallenness" into the 'world' means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Through the Interpretation of falling, what we have called the "inauthenticity" of Dasein may now be defined more precisely.[29]

The fallenness into being is thus inauthentic; as opposed to an authentic existence (although it could also be an authentic face; a conscious relational being). The distinction arises then between an authentic and inauthentic life experience. Derrida views this as "within the grammar and lexicon of metaphysics [...] revolving around one fundamental axis: that which separates the authentic from the inauthentic and . . . primordial from fallen temporality."[30] Dicenso also agrees, mirroring Derrida; the distinction of authentic and fallen existence which signifies a (neo-Platonian) dualism is essentially metaphysical.[31] The metaphysical layering of

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[28] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 221.

[29] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 220.

[30] Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 63.

[31] James DiCenso, "Heidegger's Hermeneutic of Fallenness," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* LVI, no. 4 (1988): 667.

life experience then is also a characteristic of fallenness; and this characteristic is two-fold: fallenness-into-the-world is inauthentic because the fall is first of Dasein from a "higher" experience of life and secondly because the experienced fallenness of Being is an everyday being-in-the-world. Being is always disclosed to such falling – hence the ontological being is always concerned with falling and always falling itself. *Tota vita—tentatio*; all life is falling.

It seems that similar to the description of life as temptation and trial without cessation, being-in-the-world is characterized by a constant falling in *Being and Time*. Falling is not an intrinsic Dasein but a face of it[32] – a characteristic of how it reveals itself to us. The interconnectedness of falling – the temptation is how everyday life is; a basic layer of Being. Fallenness is also characterized by tranquilization[33]. The tranquillizing effect of fallenness is superficial (as was the *tentatio*) and alienate one from Dasein; however, at the same time, force Dasein into a different mode of Dasein (inauthenticity) which Dasein exists in "being entangled in itself."[34] The non-Being as a mode of Being is what Dasein subscribes to for us; how we live and experience life itself. The Dasein is itself tempted to fall; hence, the falling of losing self; constantly enhanced by itself and reproducing the falling by a tempting tranquillity. This is why Heidegger says that Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting [versucherisch][35] and:

> When Dasein, tranquillized, and 'understanding' everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along towards an alienation [Entfremdung] in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. Falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating.[36]

It already reveals itself to us how tentatio was only a layer of falling; that fallenness is a whole different mode of existence in its

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[32] As definite existential characteristics, these are not present-at-hand in Dasein, but help to make up its Being. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 219.

[33] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 222.

[34] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 223.

[35] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 221.

[36] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 222.

existential nature. Heidegger summarizes the depth of fallenness as such: "the phenomena we have pointed out-temptation, tranquillizing, alienation and self-entangling (entanglement)-characterize the specific kind of Being which belongs to fall. This 'movement' of Dasein in its own Being, we call its "downward plunge" [Absturz]".[37] Such is the factical existence of Dasein; the being-present-at-hand; concerned with being-in-the-world. Dasein is fallen only because it is concerned with being-in-world; it problematizes being and cares about being. Authentic existence is then only a modified inauthentic being, as care for which the Dasein is fallen.

3. Death and Care

3.1 *Cura* and Openness to Death

Augustine's *cura* inspires the care [sorge] of *Being and Time*, however, *cura* in *Phenomenology of Religious Life* is translated as a concern. Care and concern both shall signify one and same, however, the anxiety aspect of tentatio might prove "concern" to be a better fit for earlier lectures, while the care of *Being and Time* signifies anxiety as a different interlinked face of Being. The *cura* of earlier texts is the surface of Sorge of the magnum opus of Heidegger. Derrida says, "Heidegger, following the tradition of the *cura* but without naming Plato, evokes nothing more than the solicitude of the Vulgate, Seneca, and the *merimna* of the Stoics which, however, like the Platonic *meletē*, also signifies care, concern, and solicitude".[38] The solicitude of being-in-the world carries with itself the anxiety of being-here and in earlier lectures, Heidegger speaks of *curare* as the basic character of the factical life.[39] The concern is always for a happy life. The concern for life is interdependent, or rather in Heidegger's words relational; it alters in the historical-factical experiences of life. The concern for life is fear and desire ("*adversa in prosperis timeo*" [in prosperity I

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[37]   Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 223.
[38]   Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death: Religion and Postmodernism*, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 12.
[39]   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 151.

fear adversity]); it is historical because it is factical; in my tempta-tions also emerges a concern for power; for validation of others – such is the life that Augustine calls a *misera vita* in which these communal-worldly contexts of experience are thoroughly domi-nated by such a *curare*.[40] The *curare* does not only have negative connotations. The *curare* also lets oneself into life:

> It (curare)...leads into the significance of the world, delightful, curi-ous self-significance. In this, the "wherein," whereinto, itself has a pull [fortziehend]. The letting-go is now itself led; it only keeps alive the direction in general – "further," "more" – but it leads into the world, and indeed into the historical facticity; therewith, the latter undergoes a shrinking and "finally opens up" ["geht letztlich auf "].)[41]

One already can see the link of *cura* and *tentatio*. *Cura* as a characteristic of factical experience operates along with tempta-tion; it exists as concern for a happy life; for delight where tentatio lies.[42] The happy life; or the concern for it is also of temptations which are themselves delights of life. The *cura* – the desire – is al-ways beside temptation.

The desire places one into an awaiting (hence a historical awaiting)[43] – it also signifies a certain uncertainty. *Cura* itself is also the anxiety of the unknown in face of God, of an uncertain future. Heidegger speaks of such awaiting in the letters to Thessa-lonians – in the context of Parousia. Fritsch says, "If the *parousia* is not interpreted as expecting the Messiah every day, but as in-creasing the anguish in standing alone before God, Christian life, as opposed to "late Judaism", articulates the primacy of enactment over the expectation of an event."[44] *Parousia* then signifies here a kind of anxiety, as well as the expectation that is historical and

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[40] Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 171.

[41] Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 190.

[42] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 205.

[43] Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 130.

[44] Matthias Fritsch, "Cura et Casus: Heidegger and Augustine on the Care of the Self," in *The Influence of Augustine on Heidegger: The Emergence of an Augusti-nian Phenomenology*, ed. Craig J. N. de Paulo (Lewinston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), 17.

eternal. For Paul, and his *cura*, still expected *Parousia*, even before his death.[45] The expectation of *parousia* though is not a blind awaiting but a conscious desire for it. Paul says: you know exactly that he will come.[46] This expectation is embodied in a certain *cura* – in desire for the coming. The endless expectation along with desire signifies the same insecurity of *tentatio* – the constant falling of the factical life experience. *Parousia* is the most characteristic element of the Christian life – the worldly life, factical existence of an insecure being. The being-here of Christianity, the knowledge of *Parousia* is a preliminary conception of being-towards-death. The same anxiety and care are already visible in the Letter to Thessalonians. For Heidegger, Paul views the Thessalonians as Entschlafenen – those who have passed away.[47] That who is not Christian is unprepared for death, not guided on how to die and the why. The facticity of Christian life awaits both coming of the Christ along with coming for death; his death is meaningful and expected: the way in which God resurrected Christ, so too will he bring the dead to him along with Christ.[48] The uncertainty of Christian life then is powered by desire towards the facticity of the end. Heidegger says, "The uncertainty can become great, for instance those "who have passed away": what will become of us? The dead in Christ!"[49] Death is connoted with reunification with Christ; the concern for a happy life is always a concern for death.

3.2 Care and Being-towards-Death

> [T]hose who practice philosophy in the right way are in training for dying and they fear death least of all men.[50]

Being is always a being-towards-death. In *Being and Time*, the links of death and care are central to the Dasein. The Dasein is always existential as are all its faces. Care [Sorge] emerges in *Being*

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[45] Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 81.
[46] Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 72.
[47] Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 98.
[48] Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 81.
[49] Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 98.
[50] Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

and Time as one face/possibility of Dasein: "as one of Dasein's possibilities of Being, anxiety-together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it-provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein's primordial totality of Being. Dasein's Being reveals itself as care.[51] Care is an ontological element of Being explanation of which Heidegger undertakes as his task. Heidegger openly states that apart from thrownness-into-the-world; the factical existence is always embodied in concern; that being itself gives meaning to the "care".[52]

The concern (*cura*) of Augustine, is replaced by the term Care – it consists of both concern [Besorgen] and solicitude [Fursorge]. It embraces the characteristics of Being – it signifies the care for oneself, for the Other, etc., it is not only existential but also co-existential. Care already is Dasein; not an added characteristic of it but rather, being-in-the-world already signifies care. The other characteristics of Dasein may come *a posteriori*, however, care is already existentially a priori; it already lies in and "before" factical life.[53] Establishing being-in-the-world as Care, Heidegger must uncover the underlying link of the end of life- Death, "dying" he says, always signifies Dasein's being-towards-death.[54] To grasp being-towards-death, one needs to understand fully the being-here. The phenomenon of care, then, seems to be the basis for Death. This concern linked to dying is inevitably Platonic – is not Dasein itself Platonic? Derrida likens this link to one in *Phaedo* of Plato:

> ....as the attentive anticipation of death, the care brought to bear upon dying, the meditation on the best way to receive, give or give oneself death, the experience of a vigil over the possibility of death, and over the possibility of death as impossibility. That very idea, namely, this meletē or epimeleia that one can rightly translate by "care" or "solicitude," opens the vein-and begins the vigil, - within

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[51]   Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 227.
[52]   Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 237.
[53]   Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 238.
[54]   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 291.

which will be inscribed the Sorge ("care") in the sense Heidegger confers on it in Being and Time.[55]

Cura as solicitude evokes precisely this being-towards-death, readiness for death and the care for it. Life itself, the Dasein is always care and always a being-towards-death. The self is always ready, and this Platonic link can be visible from the Dialogues:

> The truth rather is that the soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily taint [in other words Socrates describes this separation of the invisible soul, this secreting of the self by means of which the soul retreats from the visible body to assemble itself within itself, in order to be next to itself within its interior invisibility separation and invisibility indeed being the criteria for secrecy], having never voluntarily 'during life had connexion with the body, which she is ever avoiding (*pheugou*sa), herself gathered in herself (*synethroismene hautis eis heauten*) [whenever Levinas refers to the Phaedo, as he often does in his different texts on death, he underlines this assembling of the soul upon itself as the moment when the self identifies with itself in its relation to death], and making such abstraction her perpetual study (*hate meletosa aei touto*)-all this means that she has been a true disciple of philosophy (*he orthus philosophousa*) and therefore has in fact been always practising how to die without complaint (*kai to onti tethnanai meletosa rhadios*). For is not such a life the practice of death (*melete thanatou*)?[56]

A solicitude in face of death is precisely this manifestation of *cura*; of care and concern for life – the desire for it and the aversion of its end. The soul, the "immortality" of it (such as in Phaedo) is that which accepts death; keeps vigil for it, awaiting! This awaiting is the same awaiting of Thessalonians; of redemptive death; of delight. *Meletē thanatou* is what care assembles itself in.

Derrida goes even further as to say that "this concern for death, this awakening that keeps vigil over death, this conscience

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[55] Derrida, *The Gift of Death: Religion and Postmodernism*, 12.
[56] Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, 435. For comments, see Derrida, *The Gift of Death: Religion and Postmodernism*, 14.

that looks death in the face is another name for freedom."[57] Heidegger's Dasein makes the link of freedom and the tentatio; a life that is temptation, that is a possibility, the Dasein that receives the existence is free.[58] The concern of life – the concern of being-towards-death emerges then as freedom – as being left open; being open to existence. A similar phenomenon of Care and Death is visible in Jan Patočka, a student of Heidegger who views Western philosophy as Care of the Soul. He says, in *Heretical Essays*:

> Another important moment: The Platonic philosopher triumphs over death in the sense that he doesn't run from it, he looks it straight in the face. His philosophy is mete thanatou, concern for death; the concern of the soul is inseparable from the concern for death which becomes authentic concern (prava') for life; (eternal) life is born from this event of looking death in the face, from the triumph (premozenf) over death (perhaps it is nothing but this "triumph"). Yet when that is combined with the relation to the Good, with the identification with the Good and with deliverance from the demonic and the orgiastic, it signifies the reign of responsibility and, along with it, of freedom. The soul is absolutely free, it chooses its own destiny.[59]

For Patočka, freedom is precisely this triumph over death. For Heidegger, one might say it is freedom-towards-death; the acceptance of possibility(*tentatio*) and life(care).

The anxiety in face of death is manifested in the Being-in-the-world.[60] Such anxiety, facticity of life and falling are the very characteristics of "being-towards-the-end"[61]; the freeing acceptance of the end and the constitutive faces of Death. The fascinating co-existential faces of Dasein are thus clearer. The lines between them blurred, they exist as being-in-the-world. The temptations of every day, the fallenness is already a being-towards-death. It exists as awaiting; however, its fallenness-into-the-world can only signify

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57   Derrida, *The Gift of Death: Religion and Postmodernism*, 15.
58   Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 186.
59   Jan Patočka and James Dodd, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), 115.
60   Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 251.
61   Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 251.

an inauthentic life and an inauthentic being-towards-death. Just as the "the experience of a vigil over the possibility of death, and over the possibility of death as impossibility"; the inauthenticity itself is a possibility of authenticity.[62] The authentic being-to-wards-death perhaps is not only an awaiting but concern –antici-pation that is co-existential with receiving death itself. Such care is also in ties with freedom; with freedom-towards-death. Antici-pation, and an acceptance (*Parousia*?) of death. Rather than aver-sion, an affirmation of its actuality. Anticipation of death and a freedom-towards-death in face of giving oneself death – such is an authentic being-towards-death. The *tentatio* - the fallenness; the *cura*, concern – and Care come together in face of non-being, in face of Death. All faces of Dasein exist to form in(authentic) exist-ence and anticipate Death. *Numquid non tentatio est vita humana*? – Is not human life being-towards-death?

Conclusion

There are multiple yet intersecting paths this paper has taken. Augustine's tentatio, particular in the reading of Heidegger has been re-read and constituted as a characteristic of factical life in its openness and possibility, in its concern for life itself. The exis-tentiality of tentatio, although already visible is formulated fully in *Being and Time*. The echo of tentatio is heard from fallenness-into-the-world, which is an existential face of Dasein – the every-dayness in which the tempting nature of being is manifested. The fallenness-into-the-world carries the same, if not more weight as the *tentatio* – questioning, possibility and concern. Visible at once, the co-existentiality of Dasein's characteristics have become clear precisely in the link of fallenness and concern. The *cura* (concern) of Augustine is powered by a desire for a happy life which must also mean death and anticipation of it. The concern for life is al-ways a concern for death just as being-in-the-world and dying is always a being-towards-death. Care as another existential charac-teristic of Dasein, is the care of life as well as care for anticipation

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[62]   Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 259.

of death. The Platonic *meletē thanatou* has been re-read and struc-tured as care and death as one. This anticipation, acceptance of death culminates in freedom: freedom-towards-death. Concern and anxiety for Parousia have been replaced with the same inau-thentic anxiety in face of death and alternatively in an authentic, freeing Care for Death. Temptations of Augustine and concern for happy life have at once become a Dasein – fallen, caring, possibly free and always mortal.

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Understanding the Language of God with the Language of the Universe: A Physico-Theological Approach [*]

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Abstract: When we say that we understand the language of God with the language of the universe, we mean that we can understand the language of God with the language of the universe and in other ways as well. Therefore, what we really want to say is that when we look at the event from our own point of view, that is, from our own factuality, we must necessarily understand the universe in order to understand the language of God, and for us to understand it can only be possible by understanding the language of the universe. We will present this with some examples. At the same time, we will talk about some styles of understanding in the history of philosophy. Since understanding the language of God is also understanding the language of religion, we will try to briefly show how the language of God or the language of the universe is understood through the language of religion, how this is wrong in Judaism, Christianity, especially in the idea of medieval Christian priests and a number of styles of understanding in the Islamic world.

Keywords: Language of God, language of the universe, religious language, religion, science, philosophy, understanding.

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First of all, we would like to start by explaining what the title of this article means. The title actually reflects the summary of what we want to say. Here we aim to reveal the meaning of the expression "understanding the language of God with the language of the universe". First, we want to start by saying what this expression does not mean.[1] Now we need to avoid the first misunderstanding by specifically stating that we do not mean the saying "the language of God is equal to the language of the universe". What we want to say here is that it is not implied that the language of God and the language of the universe, or rather the language marked by the phenomenon of the universe within our boundaries of knowledge and perception, are the same things. Because it is impossible for us to talk about the possibility of seeing God and the universe in the same factual way unless we can fully draw the boundaries of this universe and clarify the aspects that are closed to us.[2] Secondly, we are also not establishing a proposition such as "Let us understand the language of God with the language of the universe", which would be an incomplete statement. Because, as we mentioned, we are saying that the real language of God is the language of the universe. In other words, a person who cannot understand the universe cannot understand the language of God.[3]

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1   The doctrine of showing what something does not mean first, and then determining what is true is the dialectical method of Socrates. So, we started our discourse by taking an example the Socratic dialectical method as a principle. This method is put forward in *Theaetetus* in the best manner. Here, Socrates performs the job of giving birth to knowledge about what the right information is in the end by refuting the definitions of knowledge of those he is facing one by one through negation. See Plato, *Theaetetus*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, vol. IV (London: Oxford University Press, 1892).

2   Xenophanes was the first philosopher to see God and the universe or nature in the same factual way. Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fregmente der Versokratier: Griechisch und Deutsch* (Berlin: Weidmann'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1954), B26-9.

3   Here we need to refer to Spinoza because he expresses that God and nature represent the same things, that nature is nothing but the appearances of God. According to Spinoza, God has an infinite number of attributes, but he has given us only two of them, the power to perceive the mind and the matter. Therefore, man can understand and interpret only these two of the infinite qualities of

In particular, we are not reducing the scope of the language of religion here to only the heavenly religions in the sense that we understand, that is, the language of religion here refers to the formation of a language that arises with a religious reference. Especially in Greece, where philosophy originated, there is an understanding of mythology that arose, for example, just before a philosophy. When we look at the history of religions, in this and similar understandings of mythology, again, especially in the primitive times of people, such things appear more as animalism. Primitive understandings of religion, which are assumed to have arisen as a result of attributing events to certain spirits, also have significance from the point of view of the language of religion. Again, in the mythological period, people tried to question the causes of certain events in the universe, and therefore they came up with religion in the classical sense. The primitive understanding of religion evolved into polytheistic religions over time, and when people completed their mental evolution, they switched to monotheistic religion.[4] The heavenly religions are more authoritarian and have attempted to explain the causes of events to people with a reference that speaks from above or takes its source from beyond nature.[5]

God, so that he can understand only the side of God's language about us. Since the other qualities of God are qualities that fall outside the limits of our perception, we do not have the ability to understand and comprehend them. See Benedict Spinoza, *Ethic Demonstrated in Geometrical Order*, trans. William Hale White (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1883), I.

[4] Here, of course, we strongly disagree with Dawkins' idea that the result of the religious evolution, the transition from primitive religions to polytheistic beliefs and from there to the monotheistic religion, is to arrive at atheism by reducing one more God. Because the author is not talking about the rational process of completion of human minds, but about the involvement of man in the positivist process with biological completion. Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (London: Bantam Press, 2006), II.

[5] Of course, in order for the language of religion to be understood well, it must first be well known what the concept of God means. Then we will have to refer to an objective being marked by the concept of God. However, since the God of religions is transcendent to the world, he will not find a place for himself in the world. If we say it like Wittgenstein, "God does not reveal himself in the world". Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. Charles Kay Ogden (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 6.432.

The emergence of philosophy arose in a way opposed to mythology, that is, the understanding of religion at that time, while the later understanding of the universe or the way of reading the universe was always based on understanding how God created the universe. In the early periods, despite the attempt of mythology to describe events in a purely religious language by expressing supernatural forces,[6] the first natural philosophers were interested in how the universe came into existence, especially the problem of *arche*, that is, what is the main source of the universe, and opposed to mythology, which was seen as a religious formation before them. They have adopted an understanding of God through the movement of the universe and how the universe came into existence.[7] They adopted an *arche* concept and called this *arche* as God. In other words, the universe is a way of reading that can occur with the existence of a single principle. From here, for example, based on Thales' statement that everything is made of water and everywhere is full of spirits, when we read the connection between the two, we can understand that the whole universe consists of the same things, that is, the principle that creates the whole universe is the same principle.[8] We can do such a religious language reading, but when we look at the later periods, we see that

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[6] Hesiod's *Theogony* stands as a work that aims not to give a theological situation, namely a philosophical explanation of the world based on one or more natural things, but to give a religious explanation based on certain people. Hesiod, *Theogony*, trans. Alexander William Mair, *The Poems and Fragments* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), 114-6.

[7] Seneca, based on ancient Greek philosophy, states that it is possible to find out how nature studies enlighten people and what kind of personal nature is thanks to these studies. He says that religion destroys the darkness inside a person and brings him to light, while philosophy and science correct misconceptions in people. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Natural Questions*, trans. Harry M. Hine (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), I.2.

[8] The first philosophical formation that Thales brought science to the face of mythological explanations about the universe deserves to be called natural philosophy. Although the idea that the first principle of the universe is water and that it represents the soul seems to be the effect of mythology, it should be referred to as a primitive experiment of the fact that God is in the same factual structure as the universe. The idea of Thales that every place is full of spirits implies that we can recognize God for natural reasons all over the universe. For

people gradually began to read and understand the way they read the universe as science.

And then, for example, Judaism and later Christianity as a follower of it emerged,[9] especially the Christian's approach to science and the universal realities revealed by scientists created a religion-science or science-philosophy conflict. In particular, when we look at the medieval Christian world, there was a Platonist reading, a Ptolemaic universe and cosmology reading in the Scholastic and earlier Patristic period.[10] Since the members of religion do not have a certain cosmology of their own, they felt the need to perceive the scientific theories given and put forward by this cosmology as religion and consolidate religion with them and present them to people.[11] It should be noted here that we cannot perceive the universe through religion. In other words, we believe that the universe can never be perceived through religion because through religion we can only know the main examples in the universe that are transmitted by religion for certain modeling purposes. What the language of religion is trying to imply to us

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Thales, see Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans. John Alexander Smith, *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. III, ed. W. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), I.5.

9   For a good assessment of the theological understanding of the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic religions, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). Again, for Maimonides (Mūsā ibn Maimūn), one of the most important philosophers of Jewish thought, the problem of how the holy books should be understood is not only grammatical but also theological character. Moses Maimonides, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), I.

10 Ptolemy's understanding of the universe took its origin from Aristotle's views on physics. Therefore, Aristotle even stands at the center of the fixed worldview. As the greatest commentator of Aristotle, Averroes does not only claim that the world is motionless based on Aristotle, but also bases it on the verses of the Qur'an. Averroes, *al-Kashf an Manāhij al-Adilla fī Aqāid al-Milla*, ed. Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsa al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, 1998), V.

11 Plato's famous dialogue about the coming of the universe, *Timaeus*, deeply influenced both Ancient and Medieval thought. Members of the heavenly religions treated this work as a holy bible because they found traces of expressions similar to the creation narrative in their religion in this work. Plato, *Timaeus*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, vol. III. For the importance of this work of Plato in the Islamic world and also for the comparison of the Arabic and French translations of the work. see Fahrettin Olguner, *Batı ve İslam Dünyasında Eflâtun'un Timaios'u* (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1990).

through these examples is that we, as intelligent people, take lessons from events. Otherwise, religious discourses do not aspire to become a scientific language. Therefore, there is no need for the language of religion to understand the language of God, even the language of religion is not the language of God, but the language of meaning that symbolizes Divine discourse.[12]

When we read the universe through these examples, if the language of the universe and the language of God are the same, then we are reading the language of God incorrectly. If we read a verse about how the first man came into existence, and then perceive an example hundreds of thousands of years later as if it were an event that happened at the same time, in the same place and time, we would be completely misreading the language of God here. Therefore, we need to read the universe first, and then read God as a result of the universe.[13] How should we understand the

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[12] The idea that the language of religion is not the language of reality, but a symbolic style of expression, is one of the main arguments of the Islamic philosophical tradition. From the point of view of al-Fārābī, the language of religion is the language in which people are told about reality by symbolizing it. The language of reality is the language of the intellect, that is, metaphysics, which gives the universe the principle. The being that is at the highest limit of the whole universe and is superior in degree, the First Heaven, is activated by the influence of this Absolute Mind. See al-Fārābī, *Risāla fī al-'Aql*, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1983), 35-6. Again, Averroes argues that the things described in religion are expressed only in rhetorical language and that the language of reality is the demonstration, that is, logic. In this context, Averroes expresses that verses that do not seem reasonable should be interpreted. Averroes, *Faṣl al-Maāl fī Mā bayn al-Ḥikma wa ash-Sharī'a min al-Ittiṣāl*, ed. Muḥammad 'Ammāra (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1983), II.

[13] Here, it is seen that there is a deep gap between the dominant understanding of the divine religions regarding the *ex nihilo*, that is, the creation of existence out of nothing, and the evolutionist understanding of the view that existence comes into existence gradually and continuously. The idea of creating out of nothing is a problem that concerns not only people but the entire world of existence. Today, evolutionary biology research and, accordingly, developments in science such as anthropology and paleontology explain the formation stages of living things to us. Although the idea of evolution in existence has been defended since ancient times, studies on the theory of evolution in the Islamic world have come a long way. In this sense, we should mention al-Naẓẓām, al-Jāḥiẓ, Ibn Miskwaih, Ibn al-Haytham and Ibn Khaldūn. As an example of the impact of environmental factors on the species, al-Jāḥiẓ mentions biological and psycho-

expression in the Qur'an such as "Travel in the land and see how He originated creation"? If we understand how the universe came into being, what things it consists of, and how it was formed by doing some research on it, and we evaluate the universe as a sign of God, we understand the language of God.[14] If we cannot understand the universe and decipher the language of the universe, then we will never be able to decipher creation. Religion gives us only a certain part of our creation as an example and leaves the rest to us. If we assume that everything is made of water or living things are made of earth, based only on this example, when we assume that people exist from the ground, we try to perceive Adam as a tree that ends in a garden.[15] Because the earth or water

logical factors such as food, climate, shelter, etc. For him, these factors also influenced the species' difficult struggle to survive. In a changing environment, some of the characteristics of these vital values are also changing. In the process of changing successive generations, organisms adapt better to the environment. Their life is in the way that their characters are passed down through the generations and have the change in reproduction. Thus, al-Jāḥiẓ based his theory on the idea of changing used and unused organs on the adaptation of animals to environmental factors. al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān*, ed. 'Abd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1996), IV, 1. Ibn Khaldūn identified five categories of beings as inanimate, plant, animal, human and angel. He says that each category contains various levels within itself, so an entity at the top level of a subcategory can turn into an entity at the bottom level of the category above it. He argues that the ape, the highest being in the category of animals, could evolve into a primitive man. Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldūn*, ed. Étienne Marc Quatremère (Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān, 1992), I, 1.6.

[14] Studies on the universe constitute one of the oldest problem areas of science and philosophy. The classical understanding of the final universe was replaced by the causal universe understanding with Newton's discovery of the gravitational laws, and then the current cosmic design became valid with the subatomic physics research after the splitting of the atom. It is an indisputable fact that quantum theory is a huge step forward in understanding the universe. With the work of physicists such as Maxwell, Planck, Einstein and Schrödinger, we stepped into the phenomenal side of the universe. On the development of quantum and relativity theory, see Albert Einstein & Leopold Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics, from Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960).

[15] The first studies on the formation of living beings belong to Anaximander and Empedocles. In particular, Anaximander claimed that land-dwelling creatures evolved from sea creatures and that the ancestors of humans were water-dwelling creatures. This view remains valid even today See Diels & Kranz, *Die Fregmente der Versokratier*, A30. Aristotle was the first person to establish the

is the element that is meant for existence. In other words, since it is assumed that existence occurs from elements such as earth, water, air, fire in the old world, we should know that it is meant to be explained to people that everything is made up of an element and that element is made up of other things as an example. For this reason, there have been many discussions on the language of the universe, whether it is mathematics or physics.

Now, the language of the universe is mathematics, especially the Pythagorean understanding of the universe[16] and later the Euclidean understanding,[17] da Vinci and Galileo's discourses that the

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science of biology and to classify living things by researching them for the first time. However, although Aristotle's approaches to reproduction foresee some changes, his acceptance of the existence of the vegetative soul in the entire universe and his placing the idea of teleology at the origin of existence created a barrier in front of the views of these two philosophers. See Aristotle, *Historia Animalium*, trans. D. Wentworth Thompson, *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. IV, ed. John Alexander Smith & W. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), VIII.1. Studies conducted in the modern period have settled on the thesis that man is descended from the same ancestor rather than descended from apes. It is possible that we can find the first step of this in Darwin's work. Evolutionary biology states that the human race has definitely evolved from a common ancestor with other living things to our time, and it proves this through the age of fossils. The transition from ape to human, which was specially mentioned in the Islamic world, left its place in the concept of common ancestor at this stage. As Aristotle predicted, species evolution or transition between species does not seem possible. See Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1909).

[16] The Pythagoreans stated that the essence of everything in the universe is numbers, and therefore beings are represented by numbers, and they claimed that there is a mathematical harmony among beings and that this can be revealed with music. According to them, mathematics and music are the laws of divine harmony in the souls of beings. See Eduard Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, trans. Sarah Frances Alleyne & Evelyn Abbott (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1886), 50-1.

[17] The success of Euclid's *Elements* in mathematics made it possible to do science on this mathematics in the following periods. In this respect, Euclidean geometry is a very valid mathematical understanding even today. See Euclid, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, trans. Thomas Little Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 3 vols. Many studies have been carried out in the West and East on the *Elements* of Euclid. The most important of these works is Tusi's explanation of both Euclid's and Ptolemy's mathematical works. See Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Taḥrīr Uṣūl al-Handasa wa al-Ḥisāb*, ed. İhsan Fazlıoğlu (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2012).

language of the universe is mathematics,[18] assumes that those who cannot comprehend mathematics cannot understand how the universe came into existence. Apart from these theses, there are also philosophers such as Bacon, who argue that physics is the language of the universe and that nothing can be understood without understanding physics.[19] But it should be seen as much more accurate that the language of the universe is mathematics. Because especially Galileo's studies show us that the physical laws in the universe, that is, the laws of nature and the laws of the human mind are born of the same thing and say the same things. Galileo thus solved one of the ancient problems of philosophy, the problem of being and becoming, on a mathematical plane. Galileo stated here that the laws of nature and the principles of mathematics coincide with each other and that nature can be understood mathematically. Therefore, a person can rationally identify the laws of nature and mathematical laws with each other. Thus, we can say that each law of nature is built on a mathematical harmony.

In this sense, we can see that the language of religion is advancing in a common direction with the language of the universe. However, we are faced with the following problem from the Mid-

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[18] Saying that the universe was written in a mathematical language, Galileo observed the universe by discovering the telescope, Galileo, when applying mathematics to experimental physics used the standard mathematical methods of his time. His solution and proofs were based on the *rate theory* found in the fifth book of Euclid's *Elements*. This theory was accepted until the death of Galileo, after which it left its place to the algebraic methods of Descartes. See Galileo Galilei, *Two New Sciences*, trans. Stillman Drake (Toronto: Wall & Emerson, 1989).

[19] Bacon focused on logic rather than mathematics and exhibited the first efforts to break with Scholastic thought and understanding of science. He said that Aristotle's logic is a product of imagination, so that man should turn his face to nature. Bacon sees the criterion of truth in knowledge only in utility. According to him, nature is a real force that can be managed and directed in accordance with human purpose. For this purpose, he defends the reconstruction of the previous knowledge on the grounds that it does not provide anything for progress. See Francis Bacon, *The New Organon*, ed. Lisa Jardine & Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

dle Ages: Now, when we apply the current language of the universe, that is, the language of science, to religion, or rather to the interpretation of religion, will we be able to accept to change the realities that we accept upon the change of cosmology? Ptolemaic cosmology was active especially in the Ancient and Middle Ages, and Ptolemy had an understanding that the universe was geocentric and that the sun revolved around the earth along with other planets.[20] After this view gave its place to the heliocentric understanding with the works of Copernicus and Kepler,[21] scientists were exposed to fierce opposition from Christian priests who interpreted Christianity through this paradigm. Because when a person turns a cosmology reading into dogma and interprets religion with it, he will have to assume that he will never be able to change the language of religion by turning it into a dogma, and he will be completely out of reality, that is, scientific and universal. With the collapse of the Ptolemaic cosmology, which the church accepted as universal in the West, the church members, who saw that Christianity had no branch to hold, punished the philosophers and scientists who defended these views.

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[20] Ptolemy, who is an astronomer, mathematician and geographer, continued the Greek view that the earth was at the center of the universe and calculated the movements of the planets. Ptolemy presented a geocentric understanding of astronomy and cosmology in his *Almagest*. This understanding is widely accepted not only in the West but also in the East. The *Almagest* has been translated and annotated many times in the West and East. The work, which had a great impact on the Islamic world as well, became the main source of all Muslim scientists' astronomy studies. See Claudius Ptolemaeus, *Ptolemy's Almagest*, trans. Gerald James Toomer (London: Duckworth, 1984), I-II. Trying to make a further study of the Almagest in the Islamic world, al-Bīrūnī prepared celestial charts regarding the positions of celestial bodies and argued that the earth was not static but movable. See Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī, *al-Qāmūs al-Mas'ūdī fī al-Hay'a wa an-Nujūm*, ed. Sayyid Ḥasan Bārānī (Hyderabad: Dāirat al-M'ārif al-'Uthmāniyya, 1954-6), 3 vols.

[21] Copernicus made a great revolution in astronomy by replacing the geocentric cosmology concept before him with a heliocentric understanding. He rejected the view of his predecessors, that the earth is fixed and, in the center, and became the founder of modern astronomy with the new understanding he brought. See Nicolaus Copernicus, *On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres*, trans. Charles Glenn Wallis (New York: Prometheus Books, 1995).

Similar events are experienced in the Islamic world. For example, commentators have likewise adopted the understanding that the earth does not rotate, even that it is flat, and that the sun revolves around the earth.[22] When you make such a thing a basis of belief, that is, when you make the current scientific reality a dogma and interpret religion with it, your understanding of religion will have to remain constant when scientific reality changes, so that no validity of your religion will remain universal in the world. The sectarian debates and scientific debates, especially in the medieval Christian world, reveal this. Scholars who espouse these views, such as Copernicus and Newton, are priests. These scientists wanted to understand the universe and to understand the language of God based on the understanding of the universe.[23] Otherwise, it was out of the question for these people to have an enmity with the church. But because the results of the researches were against the church or the understanding of religion at that time, the clergy pushed these people out of religion and anathematized them. So, when you understand the language of the universe to understand the language of God, you perceive a certain part of the language of God. When that reality changes, you will have to begin to understand the language of God in another way, but this should be an understanding of universal reality rather than a blind understanding.

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[22] Just as the interpretations of the Bible in the West were always made in accordance with the Ptolemaic astronomy, this understanding also played an important role in the interpretation of cosmological verses in the Islamic world. Almost all of the commentators agreed that the earth is a flat and immobile object, based on the verse about making the ground a bed. We would like to suffice here by giving only the example of al-Rāzī. See. Fakr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Bahiyya, 1938), II, 102.

[23] Newton's discovery of the law of gravity is considered one of the most important discoveries of natural science. Newton explained his philosophy of nature by building on mathematical principles. See Isaac Newton, *The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, trans. Andrew Motte (London: Benjamin Motte, 1729), 2 vols. Newton also never gave up his belief in mysterious beings, prophecies and the Bible throughout his life. He already has an attempt at commentary on the Bible. Newton, *Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel and the Apocalypse of St. John*, (New York: Feather Trail Press, 2009).

As a result, we can say that it does not seem possible to design an understanding of the universe through religion itself. Because such an understanding will conclude that will leave the universe completely out. Because religion asks people to turn to the universe and make an effort to understand and make sense of it. Therefore, there is a necessary parallel between understanding the language of the universe and understanding the language of God.

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Industrial Education: A Philosophical Evaluation of the Background of the Evolving Situation from the Education of Morality to the Morality of Education [*]

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Abstract: The main problem of this text is as follows: While identifying the status of education systems related to moral education with the title of industrial education, the situation is identified through the problems of the morality of education or moral education. Then, a proposal on the education of morality is made through the system evaluation. This point is for the purpose of the text. These problems are dealt with by using an in-depth and holistic evaluation method together with description and identification. The text primarily focuses on the founding meaning through which time manifests. Because education is both built by this meaning and fulfills a task that perpetuates it. As a part of an entirety/ground reflecting the spirit of the time, education carries/overflows its nuclei and aims. The expression "industrial education" is crucial in that it expresses both its

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[*] The "morals of education" in the title is an identification of the de facto situation. Industrial education is the definition of this identification. "Education of morals", on the other hand, is a proposal. It is a proposal of something different from industrial education. This is an environment-building offer of societies with different contexts. In addition, industrial education refers to the process of a "transformation" and "change" from the education of morality to the morality of education. Although there is no detail on this subject in the text, this is the meaning of the title.

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roots, the entirety to which it belongs, and the network of values it has. Here, the term industrial refers to the ground in question, and industrial education refers to the educational understanding of that ground. It is unthinkable that the network of values (morality is one of them) it possesses is contrary to the whole in question. In the text, the identification of this situation is described through the "ethics of education". This process that humanity has experienced is new. Therefore, industrial education should be interpreted with its conceptual network. Thus, concepts such as "environment", "context", "transformation", "change" have been redefined. This is essential to make sense of the situation. It identifies that the final solutions sought can be possible not with the "morals of education" but with the "education of morals". This means proposing a reinstallation of the system/environment.

Keywords: Industrial education, morals of education, education of morals, capitalism, transformation, change, environment, context.

Introduction

In this text, I have made an effort to define, describe and evaluate the phenomenon of industrial education. I showed this through the relationship between education and morality. In this way, while describing a new situation in the text, I benefited from the oldest issues of humanity, so that the difference in the course of the relationship between them could be seen. Both the education-ethics relationship and their position in the systems help to understand this issue.

All the historical experience in education shows us that morality, as a philosophical, political, and social issue, has been an important issue of education and training. Morality has existed in this network of relations, sometimes as a founding (purpose) and sometimes as a secondary issue (instrument). The ground on which the mentioned issue develops has certain spirit and carrier

elements. In other words, what determines the quality and direction of this relationship today is this ground that carries the spirit of the time, and all other partners (politics, education, law, science, etc.) appear as carriers and reflections of this ground.

The emphasis on "industrial" used in the expression of industrial education has been preferred because it essentially defines this system/entirety/ground. Every country in the world has its education system, but they are all different aspects of the same *system. Instead of education systems, there is the educational understanding of the system or the education of the system.* The ground/system proposes education as a program and plan that will achieve its goals and objectives. In other words, although there are different philosophical views on education, almost all of them reinforce and perpetuate that basic ground today. In this respect, they are also the carriers of the ideologies developed on the ground.[1]

So, what is this ground/entirety and how should it be portrayed? In line with this question, first, the ground on which the relationship between education and morality develops is considered, and the problem is dealt with in the context of the means-end. The meaning of making education and morality a means or an end to each other has been sought in the "entirety/ground", which is assumed to be a "part" of education itself, rather than educational philosophies and its aims. In this case, the relationship between education and morality has to be formed within a (systemic) whole, of which education is also a part. The main/constitutive element of this entirety is the economy today, and this text is formed by placing it in the context of the carrier and manifestation of its values.

Eventually, education, together with being a carrier partner

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[1] For ideological dimensions and philosophies, see Gerald L. Gutek, *Eğitime Felsefi ve İdeolojik Yaklaşımlar*, trans. Nesrin Kale (Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi, 2001); Kemal Bakır, *Eğitim Felsefesi* (Ankara: Pegem Akademi Yayıncılık, 2019); Mustafa Cihan and Zafer Yılmaz, eds., *Eğitim Felsefesi* (Ankara: Pegem Akademi Yayıncılık, 2021).

of the entirety that provides its formation in the modern era, still lives with the moral(s) inherent in this entirety. As such, it already dominates the world widely. The carrier and constructing elements of the dominant understanding of education do not go independently of the basic values that make it up while moving to communities and societies with other "contexts" other than places where they were born and raised. The text reveals both the quality of this education, the entirety/ground (system) in which education is formed, and the formation of morality, which is one of the partners of education, in what is being formed in this relationship. In other words, the text reveals the mandatory conditions of what is desired and applied, what is targeted, and what is acquired.

However, in the text, the situation in which education can be made a tool for morality is not ignored, and although a direct proposal is not made on this subject, because it is the subject of another study due to the limitation of the subject, the current situation has been assessed. The meaning attributed to education determines its purpose. Therefore, in the text, while it is questioned how much education can serve to establish the desired morality by making it a mediator, the morality of the status quo is also revealed. On the other hand, as the main finding in the text, it is claimed that the moral understandings of the hole/system/ground in which education is formed are already acquired by the students in an inherent way to the education processes. If there is another type of morality proposed, this morality has to either take the risk of conflict with the moral types inherent in the aforementioned entirety/system/ground, that is, education or it has to adapt to them. In the text, these basic claims are discussed. It is hoped that new horizons will be opened by creating a new discussion ground on the ground/entirety/system on which the actual situation is formed and manifested through various means (philosophies, values, goals, institutions, etc.).

What is the Problem?

The main question is: On this ground, is education a tool for

morality or is morality a tool for education? What is sought or what is the actual situation?

The answers to these two questions are different. Accordingly, besides the philosophy on which education is based, it has distant-general-specific aims. Additionally, there is an actual situation. Should morality serve these basic purposes of education (of course, gaining moral behavior is also mentioned there)? If so, different types of morality have to be harmonized with these aims of education in this context. From this point of view, the problem has to be identified differently.

On the other hand, if morality is the main axis in this process, primarily, an understanding of morality should be established, and education should be transformed into a carrier with its philosophy, plan-programs, and objectives at all stages. Moreover, the whole education system -together with the other partners of the entirety of which it is a part- should be designed as a system in which morality is sought, questioned, experienced, organized, and therefore the predicted or accepted morality is accepted as the axis. If the moral types sought and desired to be established -which are mentioned in the text- are not responsibility ethics but others, they already exist and are made visible to the partners of the schooling process as a partner of the system, and they are acquired through various methods and tools. The relationship between education and morality should first be discussed on this ground.

Framework

Theoretical Framework

First, the education system in Turkey is evaluated. However, this system has serious similarities and targets with other systems in the world. It is not difficult to find these similarities, from its "theoria" and philosophy to its epistemological formation, from its main purpose to its specific goals. However, education today has two different visibilities, theoretically and practically, although it is less in the West and more common in non-Western countries.

This is primarily the visibility on the surface. Because beyond these, there is a basic ground on which education is based. The difference in appearance is primarily because non-Western societies consist of a rupture, not a continuity of the relationship between their *context*s and *environment*s. The situation that determines the relationship between morality and education is primarily and especially the ground on which education rests, and this foundation is a founding and decisive ground everywhere.[2] In this respect, current education systems both grow on this ground and fulfill a task that perpetuates this ground. These efforts in education, which are constantly reviewed theoretically and practically and renewed from time to time, should be seen as an effort to keep up with the aforementioned basic ground. Nevertheless, a fundamental problem arises concerning education, pointing to this background: What is education and its purpose? It seems that while education has a meaning that we define and experience while answering this question, it also has a meaning that is known to the whole in which it is included. The substantive definition and purpose should be sought together with this last one. Otherwise, while theoretical evaluations on education and morality, requests and proposals for implementation, and even the situation in practice did not work in determining the situation, the applicability of the proposals to be made at the same time often creates conflicting situations.

What then is the position of morality concerning this situation? This question is important because the connection and coherence of education with the ground that I have pointed out can be read through the answers to this question or its traces can be followed. Is purpose sought or desired through morality compatible with the actual situation? If there is an incompatibility in general, what could be the reasons? Do the moral attitudes that are compatible with the basic ground on which education is granted, that is, "really" intended, manifest in people through education?

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[2]   The Big Picture is the same everywhere. Dennis Littky and Samantha Garabelle, *The Big Picture: Education Is Everyone's Business* (Virginia: ASCD Press, 2004).

Contrary to the moral attitudes, stances, and behaviors that are intended to be built through education, the results give clues about the position of morality in this relationship. In this case, we identify which type of morality emerges in this relationship and turns it into a behavior. Now let us create the conceptual framework that will complete this theoretical framework.

Conceptual Framework

Current political systems in the modern era are commonly in the form of nation-states. Although the forms of government differ, these political structures shape all the elements that make up their systems according to this basic form. In that context, it is possible to say that different societies around the world have built their national education. Nevertheless, there is a groundwork that brings them closer to each other and prepares an environment for them to compete with similar scales and measurements. Educational philosophies and systems are formed under the influence of this ground. Today, there are widespread education systems in the world. They are systems that are consistent within themselves at a certain level, have a clear purpose and objectives, and propose and implement them in line with certain programs and plans. It is possible to describe the situation, as it is commonly known, in this way. However, the matter does not end here. The education system, which is depicted as a system with its partners, is a part and carrier of a larger system in which it is a part. He arbitrates it. For this reason, there is the education of the system rather than education systems. In other words, it is more correct to say that there is a system/entirety/ground first and its education system. If we call the system an entirety/a whole, the parts that make it up must carry and reflect both the theory of the system, such as philosophy and purpose, as well as individual manifestations of this philosophy and purpose in all its applications. In this respect, the parts both carry the entirety and give it continuity. Education cannot be free from this, and its very existence depends on it.

Education lives by fulfilling many functions, primarily scien-

tific-technical, as a lever that facilitates the employment of individual people, for the whole system and then for its partners. It has such an image all over the world today. In this state, it cannot be spread around the world only thanks to the philosophies it possesses. The texts dealing with education, which we can cite as the founder -and even these are manifestations of the aforementioned basic ground- point to an agent who builds and carries them. For there can be no existence of an act without an agent. The epistemological ground surrounding and constructing education is primarily under the influence of this agent. For this reason, some concepts are needed to describe the situation. These are the concepts that make our issue more coherent and understandable. They are "environment", "context", "transformation" and "change". Of course, there are others such as "individual", "ground", while it is possible to make sense of them in their context, the previous ones contribute significantly to the understanding of the claim in the text.

Environment refers to the spirit and manifestations of the present time lived in. Even though they have different backgrounds and experiences, I call the environment the situation that allows both communities and societies to live in the same period and resemble each other. The existence of such a situation indicates a situation that societies are exposed to, and this exposure has an effect that makes them similar to each other. *Context* refers to historical streaming that flows from the past to the future, encompassing people and societies with a common past and story. *Context* surrounds the *environment*. If the *environment* is the present tense, *context* defines a situation from the past to the future, including the present. Accordingly, the *context* expresses the streaming in which all the meaning from the past, especially the mental structures, customs and traditions, identities, and personalities, is carried from the past to the future. A person is born in that meaning and acquires his personality. The expression "man is born in an environment" means that he was born in a meaning. To be human means to already be a (historical) context being. It

has a meaning in this context. We can compare it to the following: Let us take a river as an example. A river rises and flows in a particular geographical setting. If it is a very long river, it passes through different climatic zones and topographies. It has to pass through earth conditions with different soil structures. The river is an earth partner with these qualities. However, any place and time of the river denote its presence. The events that took place there and at that time are both the presence of that part of the river and the present of other elements flowing in the river. Along with these, the presence of that part of the river has a past. Water, everything that flows with water, has a past. They flow with the past. While the situation that appears in any part of the river creates the *environment* of that river, the past from which everything flows from the bed that the *environment* flows through to what it carries, the present where the *environment* is located, and the future where it will go constitute the *context*.

Man is just like this river. He is both the river itself and the being that flows in it. He is the river itself, for it is man himself who flows through time. He is human as a species. He flows in it because each person is in the meaning that was built in the time before him. Therefore, a person is born in a certain *environment*. He finds the environment ready and continues, consumes, or changes it by contributing to it over time. All *environments*, however, flow through a particular *context*.

Environments are all states in which people are born. However, not every *environment* is set up by its *context*. Sometimes, some environments may be *environments* created by *contexts* completely different from theirs. History provides many examples of this. Today, almost every *environment* in the world is more or less under the influence of a western-centered imagination and action. Although some intellectuals such as Toulmin have evaluated that the political and intellectual superiority of the West has come to an end,[3] the influence of nearly 250 years of experience

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[3]   Stephen Toulmin, *Kozmopolis: Modernite'nin Gizli Gündemi*, trans. Hüsamettin Arslan (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 2002).

can't disappear completely. A dominant environment brings soci-eties, whose *contexts* are very different from each other, into a habit of contemplation and action that homogenizes on many is-sues. It is possible to state that non-Western societies either di-rectly[4] or indirectly, under this influence, lined up their environ-ments to keep up with it. That is why today's *environment* also means something that is formed in this dominant *environment* ra-ther than an *environment* built on the context of each society. Com-munities and societies with very different *contexts* breathe the air of the same *environment*. In this respect, it is necessary to state that today, a unique experience has been experienced in terms of its prevalence and depth compared to its counterparts in history.[5] To create the meaning of the mobility that emerges as a result of these two basic situations, it is necessary to draw attention to two other concepts. These are *transformation* and *change*.

Before explaining these, it is important to establish a frame-work for the concepts of *community* and *society*: People live in communities. In other words, living in a community is a necessity of life. Being a society is a matter of definition, and as a result, they establish political unions with and on these definitions. To become a community, it is necessary to be subject to certain natural pro-cesses and to have certain meanings formed on them. It is possible to see that the meanings that can form a unity with one or all of the issues such as ancestry, belief, geography, history, etc. are es-tablished. It is also possible for people to become a society after they become a community. Becoming a society indicates being built almost entirely around a meaning. Society is a union of com-munities defined politically. In that case, while the community is a natural state that develops in the historical flow, society is an artificial, constructed meaning. While tribes and clans can be given as examples to communities, broader meanings such as

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4   Serge Latouche, *Dünyanın Batılılaşması*, trans. Temel Keşoğlu (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1993); Philip G. Altbach and Gail P. Kelly, *Sömürgecilik ve Eğitim*, trans. İbrahim Kalın (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1991).

5   Ahmet Kesgin, *Endüstriyel Siyaset ve Ahlâk* (Ankara: Maarif Mektepleri, 2019).

French, Chinese and Arab can be given to societies. This meaning, especially the modern period state and society thought, can exist even more widely and distinctly together with ideologies. Both communities and societies are the unity of many elements that make up them. These elements are also partners that bring communities or societies together. In addition to these, societies manifest with various aspects such as political, economic, moral and social, etc. Their visibility in history is through them. There are such manifestations of the contexts in which societies flow. These sometimes come to the fore as the main visible feature of societies. While its basic "character" remains the same, the prominent element may differ. Society is a phenomenon that manifests itself as the unity of different issues and elements. The concepts of *transformation* and *change* can become meaningful after this point. Because while communities have more distant histories, almost hereditary relationships, societies are not. The society is built, and when one of the communities establishes a more prominent dominance in terms of ideas and de facto, the said community is sometimes formed to include other elements as a society. In time, with the emergence of another community, the conception and description of society can undergo transformation or change.

Accordingly, *transformation* is the process of differentiation that occurs when the main element that becomes evident in the manifestation of society, in other words, the influence of the carrier element that shapes its appearance, is replaced by another element that creates that society. The fact that a quality that makes up a society and stays behind comes to the fore over time, which means that it becomes more prominent as a more recognized and defined quality, is the differentiation experienced by societies. There is no fundamental difference here. While the base remains the same, one of the pillars formed on that base leaves its place to another one standing behind it and makes its visibility possible with a new element.

Change, on the other hand, refers to the differentiation, even the metamorphosis, experienced when one of the societies with

different *contexts* seriously influences the other. In this respect, the founding agent of the *environment* we live in today is the modern West, especially Western Europe. Societies with different contexts in the world are under the influence of this environment either directly or indirectly. This experience is new and while the West has built it with its historical dynamics, it has an important superiority and influence on the earth today with another partner (economy) embedded in the characteristics of those societies. For this reason, I express the situation he lived in as per his historical experience as a *transformation*. I use the concept of *change* to express the situation experienced by non-Western societies. Because they mostly live the time/environment with new experiences that they are unfamiliar within their context. Education has to be embodied with this new process and at the same time, it is the carrier of it. The text is constructed with this theoretical and conceptual framework. Let us now consider the issue by placing it in the education-ethics context in Turkey.

What is the Purpose of Education? How Can Morality Be Compatible with This Purpose?

First, let us start with a basic question that relates to the actual situation in education and especially concerns parents: When children are sent to schools, are they basically expected to mature as "better" people or to have "a career in which they can be successful throughout their lives"? Although there are many interlocutors of this question who are undoubtedly partners of the system, let us look for the answer through parents. Focusing on the main tendencies and actions of the parents, it can be asked which of their children's school-related acts are they more interested in? Are the main issues they focus on the situation and outcomes related to the mental development and actions of children? In which situations do situations to improve behavior motivate families? For example, how much are they interested in the course grades in the primary school report cards, especially the behavior grades on the right? The answers to these questions, as can be expected, show that the main question is focused on "having a profession

that can be successful". The situation of other partners in education does not present a different situation. When the main question above is made specific to them, the answers that can be given are equivalent to the answers given here both for the actual situation and with the theoretical background.

So, the main issue here lies in the reality of the existence purpose of education. Beyond the aims of the Turkish National Education organizational law, education as a system today is a part of a system larger than itself and has to be compatible with it. The truth of this entirety gives it its philosophy, social base, goals, intentions, demands, and proposals. While education is primarily created by this system of which it is a part, then it fulfills the task of ensuring the continuity of the said entirety (system). Morality or any other element is a part of this system and must carry it. The system must have a morality compatible with it, if a new proposal is to be made, it must first be compatible with the entire system. Otherwise, it has to stay out or have adaptation problems. In that case, it can be said that today the education system, that is, the understanding of the education of the system, has both a moral code and an idea, and it is already taught to students. Because in this case, if education is to carry the system that built it and perpetuate it, it will have to exclude any partner who is not in harmony with it, or it will have to give it only as an acculturation/information tool.

The conceptualization of *industrial education* is proposed to describe exactly this problem. Let us further concretize this concept with some of its salient elements in order to present here a partial framework for a more detailed study on this subject.

This conceptualization was created primarily in terms of referring to the whole of which the current educations in the world are a part. Today, education contributes to the basic purpose and movement as a part of that system/whole/entirety with almost all of its elements, from its philosophical foundations, its conceptual networks to the purpose it performs and the social and institutional structures and forms it is organized in. On the other hand,

by being a part of the education system, people seem to both demand this basic purpose and already acquire the qualities and behaviors that come with it. This situation is gained to students in an institutionalized manner with educational processes and conditions. Morality does not mean anything more than being a carrier part of this process, even if it is not the founder. I define this new education system as *industrial education. Industrial education* is also the name of a system of values and is a type of education that has values inherent in our time. It carries and reflects the values of the whole to which it belongs. Therefore, it can be said that it is the education of the system rather than the education system. The education system exists as a result and part of the system that surrounds it, and it is an organ that perpetuates it.

If the aims of the training(s) cannot be independent of the entirety in question, what is the fundamental/actual purpose of the existence of industrial training? Because the laws, principles, and values inherent in that existence are the cores of education and it enables every person who is subject to it to acquire them in the process. Whatever content proposal is made -it may be against the spirit of the system- those contents have to come into harmony with this basic trajectory eventually. Otherwise, it is not easy for industrial education to evolve in a direction contrary to '*the ground*' in which it formed. So, what does this mean now?

No educational system in the world today can exist independently of the *environment* of the time in which it is. Although societies with different *contexts* live in the world, today's *environment* has a very widespread and comprehensive effect, very different from its counterparts in history. Today, the color and the set of habits (values) of a western-origin acquis can be seen in almost all dimensions of life, from the theory of knowledge to the habits occurring in the street. When the founding agent of the *environment* in the western experience, it is possible to determine that people carry out their existence with these values in almost every field, from those who struggle to survive in the environment to the very few people who 85% of the world's gross product. This

environment started to become more visible in the 19th century when the rural population in the west fell behind the urban population, and it evolved into a more widespread harmony in non-western societies, for example in Turkey, from the last quarter of the 20th century. Because this situation was primarily the manifestation of the new urban structure and habits, which attracted large world populations to the city. In this new situation, the element that started to come to the fore as the main founding feature in the relations between people is "homo-economicus". The new economic man, as the core of the emergence of the market economy society, has taken its place in all layers of life more prominently than in all times in the 20th century. In that case, it has been started to produce values that will keep up with the new and founding elements of the time, from education to law, from science to art, from politics to agriculture and animal husbandry, as a part of production processes. At this point, it should be noted that symbols, values and ideas based on new economic aspects, and habits visibly find, for example, partners in morality.

The economy has taken its place as the central founding element and value of this new process. In this respect, economic relations have become an important element that carries time through new people by getting rid of their past habits. The "economy", which developed with the intellectual acquis and scientific identity, and then the abstractions reduced to the developing mathematical formulas, is actually carried by many tools. In fact, while economic activity was an ordinary partner or part of social relations in the past, the economy stands out as the axis source of activity and values in the new process. It should also be noted that this is represented by the concept of economics, which I would like to draw attention to as the subject of another study, rather than the concept of economy. In other words, while the economy, as it was common in the past, stood out as the economy of subsistence and need, it can be defined as the economy of appetite in the new situation. It sits on an "absolutely insatiable human ground". The thing that provides the basic rhythm of the appetite economy is

that the masses settled in the cities have to live individually with the fear of hunger. However, in the past, "hunger" was not an individual problem, but rather a problem of social life units as "scarcity". Because communities, not people, suffered from hunger.[6] The *community* does not leave a single person to starvation. Or such a notion is alien to communities. This fundamental mental and vital *change* and *transformation* has a high impact on today's people. The theoretical and actual situation is based on this. So today, economic activity and "values" have a serious impact on the world. All other values either take positions according to this new axis and main value system, or social realities with different contexts take over the situation preemptively (with crises or depressions). In this new world, the system that creates a brand new value system according to its acquis and rhythm and spreads over the ideas and values about the economy is called capitalism.[7] According to the new situation that emerged with it, all other ancient virtues were either ensured to comply with its basic values or remained in the past. Education systems and their partners have not been formed independently of this but have been structured in line with its institutionalization and needs. Of course, it has to carry its basic values and introduce them to its followers. So, what are these core values?

If the world in which humanity exists today has a carrier meaning, it can be said that the economy (in its actual and theoretical form) primarily has the most important indicators pointing to this meaning. Therefore, the above question must first and foremost be interpreted concerning the economy.

The most fundamental value of economic activity is "interest".

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[6]   Karl Polanyi, *Büyük Dönüşüm: Çağımızın Siyasal ve Ekonomik Kökenleri*, trans. Ayşe Buğra (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986).

[7]   For details, see Peter L. Berger, *The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions About Prosperity, Equality and Liberty* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Claude Jessua, *Kapitalizm*, trans. Işık Ergüden (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2005); Jack Goody, *Kapitalizm ve Modernlik*, trans. İhsan Durdu (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2008); Immanuel Wallerstein, *Tarihsel Kapitalizm ve Kapitalist Uygarlık*, trans. Necmiye Alpay (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2006); Max Weber, *Protestan Ahlâkı ve Kapitalizmin Ruhu*, trans. Zeynep Gürata (İstanbul: Ayraç Yayınları, 1999).

After the interest becomes the central value, the surrounding values that can accompany it in almost every field begin to form. According to this, while environmental values such as utility in morality, egocentric in social relations, opportunistic in competition, jealousy in the education process, insecure in the management process depending on the situation, therefore in distrust of each other and tend to evolve into oppression, psychological and philosophical depths about them can be the source of legitimacy.[8] For example, it is sufficient to focus on utility, which is a moral value.

The phenomenon of benefit and harm is primarily an economic phenomenon. It can be seen as a moral consequence for a person to do things that will benefit or harm himself and others. In other words, as a result of any moral attitude or behavior, a person can be harmed or benefited. However, morality mostly includes virtues that mature by thinking about good and bad. People can benefit or harm because of their good and bad behaviors. This is a result and the result is evaluated economically about morality. In this case, the subject of benefit-utility becomes a form of morality by being articulated with economic activity. It is seen that when it comes to the interest, the facts of benefit/benefit-harm turn into moral forms. The socialization of this transformation or change is with the new economic and political individual.

For the *new (secular) individual[9]* who has been detached from their *context*(s) and *transformed/changed* into a citizen by the modern state and built by deepening philosophically. The new (secular) individual, who was detached from his/her context and transformed/changed into a citizen by the modern state and built by deepening philosophically, has already opened up space for himself and started to carry the process as the most valuable carrier value of the process by creating new ties. The process in which

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8   For details, see Ahmet Kesgin, "Modern Dünyanın Eğitimi: Erdemden Değere," *III. Uluslararası Değerler Eğitimi Kongresi*, ed. Hasan Meydan (Zonguldak: Bülent Ecevit Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2018), 3-20.

9   Ahmet Kesgin, "Felsefî, Siyasî/Politik ve İktisadî/Ekonomik Bir Kurgunun Gerçekliğe Dönüşüm Serencamı: Birey," *2. Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler ve Eğitim Araştırmaları Sempozyumu* (Konya: Palet Yayınları, 2018), 318-29.

success is sought and rewarded in the educational process and as a result does not offer and does nothing but build the individual by tearing them apart from the environment. For this reason, the main output that comes to the fore by deepening with the new individual cannot be anything other than value and interest. All over the world, the new urban life, employment opportunities, career acquisition processes, fear of starvation, manufactured goods and their economic values remaining online among very few people further deepen the injustice that already exists worldwide in the exercise of the possibilities and power of the new financial capitalism. These values are deepened by forcing the masses to reach the top of the pyramid continuously. Although self-actualization is at the top of the pyramid, at the core of the matter are the evolved basic values formed in line with the needs and appetites of the new individual.[10] Industrial education is responsible for bringing the values inherent in the process to individuals, as well as being a legitimate carrier of this process. As with everything else, the integration of education into the economy in this new system makes it a conduit to it. In this case, education is a tool that gives students (new individuals) the values of the (new) economy. In addition to industrial education, this is another element that makes education a part of the system to which it belongs.

Along with all these, the "belief and idea of progress" determines the direction of the movement.[11] This belief and opinion is another distinctive feature of industrial education. This movement manifests itself in all areas of life. Going forward is now a morally fundamental aspect, as it is in all respects. It is almost believed to move forward in a good way. It is possible to compare this belief in progress to flying an airplane or riding a bicycle. They must constantly move forward to stay standing up. When

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[10]   Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (1943): 370-96.

[11]   For the idea of progress, seeJohn Andrew Bernstein, "Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress," *Studies in Burke and His Time* 19, no. 2 (1978): 99-118; Robert Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 1980).

stopped, they either fall or need a strut. For this reason, it is necessary to constantly move forward. After all, this situation also shows itself in industrial education. Education, with its new content, is essentially a "lever" that enables "individuals" to acquire it in the new time. So, more important than the question of how moral education -in this case, which moral question is also important- is taught in industrial education? how does education make students, who are one of its most important partners, acquire these values as the carrier and producer of this new situation? In this context, rather than what is taught, what is acquired should be revealed.

In this case, the following identification is appropriate: In this new process, industrial education is already making people acquire it with the moral types inherent in it. The moral types inherent in this new situation are hedonism, utilitarianism, or duty morality, which has taken pleasure, utility, or duty as the main issue. In addition, this issue is not an achievement built by education alone.

In this new process, which has become more widespread since the industrialization period, it is more important to answer the question of which morality it fulfills, which is compatible with the aforementioned whole, rather than what morality is intended to be given through industrial education. This is what is aimed to be done here. This also makes it easier to focus on the processes of what moral type is acquired, not on which type of morality is taught. So what is the fundamental meaning of this new process, and what does industrial education do in conveying and constructing this fundamental meaning? Following these questions, the following answer can be given to the basic question posed at the beginning of the text:

The process in today's world is not an experience manifested by the "education of moral", but a process that embodies the "ethics of education". In fact, this second statement should now be arranged as follows: There is a process that includes the "ethics of

industrial education". Accordingly, industrial education has a purpose of existence and a meaning formed in this way. This meaning reflects the whole, including this type of education. Here, the playmaker is not morality, but the purpose and meaning of the whole in question, which industrial education also carries. It also takes its basic meaning from the new economy. Morality itself and its education are used as tools for this new situation.

Societies living in different "contexts" are trying to keep up with this new process through education. They will either harmonize their unique qualities such as morality, which causes these differences to become clear, with this new "environment" (the meaning about the entirety), or make the "values" inherent in the whole system, which comes with education and which consists of the carrier values of the "environment", their "character" as well. Otherwise, the bike will stall or the plane will crash.

If "education of morals" is to be searched for, first of all, an agreement must be reached on which morality this morality is, and then a new "environment" should be built with a brand new philosophy, purpose, and a pattern of proposals in which that morality can be acquired. As can be seen, this situation becomes evident as a brand new offer for education. Is it possible? If every society had experienced its transformation by remaining loyal to its context, not a single *environment* like today, but many different *environments* could have emerged. However, from its epistemological ground to values, the world today lives in the same environment built under the hegemony of a single agent. This is one of the main reasons for the rhythmic crises experienced by those with different contexts.

Conclusion

The time we live in undoubtedly manifests itself through various means. Education is one of these tools. In addition to the philosophies on which education is based, its specific-general-distant goals, its actual situation can also indicate many things. Moral education is one of the important problems of the education pool.

Along with its philosophy and education, morality is one of the oldest issues of humanity. While the founding element, that is, the structuring of education, is sometimes arranged to acquire morality in its relationship with education, today it has been reduced to an instrumental partners' status.

This new situation is directly related to the position of education. Even when focusing on education alone, much can be said about the *entirety/ground* behind this position. Education about the core values of the time we live in and what their carrier elements provide serious visibility. Here, moral education has a place in the field as long as it can serve the *entirety/ground* that provides this position to education.

However, there are various types of morality, and some of them have already taken their place as part of the system as a whole. This place sometimes comes in line with the tools and goals used by education, and sometimes it opens up areas for itself with other partners of the system - philosophy, sciences, law, economy, etc. However, the situation is slightly different for moral types that cannot be directly compatible with the "environment" that the system builds and because they have different "contexts". Either it is harmonized with the moral types inherent in the system, various virtues can be mediated for this, or it has to be excluded.

In this case, morality itself, as an independent matter, can become the key to the system, where education is made a means for it, all other partners are reduced to a secondary position. To propose such a position to morality means to reconstruct and build the "environment". However, what this means is the restructuring of education from head to toe and enabling each of the partners in the system to be instrumental in this issue. This is not the same thing as morality in the current school situation involving all play partners, or even creating moral issues about every subject. The main issue meant here is to propose a new system. It means placing morality at the center of the system. It can be said that humanity has made incredible progress in many areas in the last two centuries, but it has also seen the bloodiest and most widespread wars

in history. Today, people are rapidly moving towards a world where the environment in which they live is left breathless. These and similar situations show that human civilization is experiencing a serious moral crisis. For this reason, it seems essential from all times to establish an environment of relations in which morality can become a constituent element.

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Entelekya Logico-Metaphyscal Review

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Abdurrahman Aliy, *Felsefenin Tanrısı: Felsefi Teolojiye Giriş [The God of Philosophy: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology]* (İstanbul: Pinhan Yayıncılık, 2020), 129 pp.

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God has been one of the most fundamental subjects of both philosophy and theology. As it can be seen when we look at the history of thought, while God was a central issue in some periods, sometimes it lost its value. But this issue has always preserved its eternity. Abdurrahman Aliy has prepared a very concise and fruitful book, *The God of Philosophy: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology*, that introduces a theology that takes philosophy as a method, that is, philosophical theology, in today's world where there are intense thoughts that criticize the possibility of talking about God, both philosophically and religiously.

In his introductory article titled *Subject and Method*, Aliy first examines whether the philosophy of religion studies should be

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done in the theology or philosophy department. More importantly, it draws attention to the problems of how the philosophy of religion is made and how it should be done. It touches on some problems related to the philosophy of religion.

In his first chapter called *Four Concepts from the History of Philosophy*, Aliy deals with the concepts of religion, theology, natural theology and philosophy of religion in a philosophy-centered manner. Scientifically, he draws attention to the fact that these four concepts are independent research areas. In the chapter, he summarizes how the four concepts in question have been understood in the history of philosophy, in chronological order.

In the First Chapter, Aliy first deals with the concept of *religion*. He points out that a common definition of religion cannot be made. He examines the origins of the word "Religion" in different languages and aims to show how difficult it is to come up with a superior concept that will include all religions. He aims to show the changes in the perception of "religion" by conveying the religious perceptions of various philosophers from the Middle Ages to the 20th century.

The title of *Theology* first reaches a definition based on the origin of theology. It makes a distinction between mythical theology, philosophical theology and religious theology, and deals with this distinction through the main thinkers or ideas, starting from Ancient Greece.

In the title of *Natural Theology*, he starts from the distinction between natural theology and supernatural religious theology. It defines natural theology, as in the previous two titles, it deals with the basic thoughts of philosophers in chronological terms.

The title of *Philosophy of Religion* reveals the connection of this field as a discipline with natural theology discussions. It shows how the philosophy of religion, which was not considered as a separate discipline, in the beginning, underwent a meaning change through thinkers.

In Chapter Two, entitled *The Possibility of Philosophical Theology*, Aliy questions what philosophical theology is, its relationship with religious theology, and the possibility of philosophical theology. For this purpose, he divides the Second Chapter into titles: "Philosophical Theology: Philosophy or Theology?"; "Philosophy and Theology: Relationship or Conflict?"; "Is Philosophical Theology Possible?".

Philosophical Theology: Philosophy? Theology? In its title, Aliy first explains theology based on the origin of the word, and then through the thoughts of Plato and Aristotle. He then makes definitions by adding the concepts of "natural" and "philosophy" to theology. He draws attention to the fact that God is one of the most fundamental subjects of both religion and philosophy and begins to examine philosophical theology in more detail. He says that philosophical theology consists of two groups of words: *Philosophy* and *talking about God*. He points out that there is tension between these two groups.

Philosophy and Theology: Relationship or Conflict? In its title, it talks about how the relationship between philosophy and theology is, taking into account the concepts of philosophy and theology. In particular, it conveys the attitudes of 20th-century thinkers towards philosophical theology.

Is Philosophical Theology Possible? In the third title, Aliy, refers to the tension between philosophy and theology, based on the conceptual analysis of philosophical theology. Aliy says that this tension is very important in terms of the possibility of philosophical theology. Because the way we make sense of this tension will show how philosophical theology will progress. At this point, Aliy deals with some forms of thinking such as dialectic and negative theology, questions the consistency of these thoughts and evaluates the possibility of philosophical theology within this framework.

In Chapter Three, *Are Faith, Theology, and Philosophy Talking About the Same God*, Aliy questions the possibility of talking about God. Examines aspects of faith and religious and philosophical

theology in speaking about God. As in Chapter Two, he divides the text into subheadings: *The One Subject of Philosophical Theology: Talking About God?*; *Talking About God: Should We Be Silent?*; *God of Faith, Theology, Philosophy: Is the Difference in God or Speech*?

In this chapter, Aliy draws attention to how important an issue God has been since the beginning of philosophy. Expressing that the origins of philosophical theology are in Ancient Greece and discussing this situation in more detail in the last part of the book, Aliy states that what reveals philosophical theology; argues that there is an ultimate reality and that this reality can be reached by philosophy. According to Aliy, although the center of thought sometimes changes, God has always been a topic of discussion. For example, the concept of God was discussed in metaphysics in ancient times, in the light and determination of revelation in the Middle Ages, and philosophical understanding in the New Age. He gives examples not only in his historical adventure but also from contemporary thinkers and currents of thought. It examines currents of thought such as practical atheism or nihilism. He says that these movements bring up the issues of not believing in God, forgetting Him, and living as if he does not exist. For this reason, according to Aliy, it means that the questioning of religion or philosophy about God should be philosophically re-examined and emphasized.

Aliy, who attaches special importance to philosophical theology in this respect, also points out that in the post-metaphysical period, very sharp criticisms were made of the philosophical doctrine of God. According to him, the focus of criticism is that the questions about God and the Divine in classical metaphysical discussions are empty and meaningless. According to Aliy, this is basically a speech problem.

Aliy, in *Talking About God: Should We Be Silent*, primarily refers to the relationship between everyday language and religious language. He states that the words we use when thinking about or addressing God are not very different from everyday language.

However, he says that our language in daily life is full of contradictory expressions and we do not see this as a problem. However, he states that we cannot reach this linguistic comfort in daily life in the religious field. According to Aliy, at this point, he encounters two big problems: What is the possibility of talking about God? What should be the language of speaking about God within the framework of this possibility?

Before answering these questions, Aliy mentions some criticisms of religion. These are psychological, epistemic and logical criticisms. Aliy draws attention to the logical criticisms of religion in terms of being a direct subject of philosophical theology and laying the groundwork for the discussion of the possibility of talking about God. Because, according to Aliy, logically, critics of religion argue that religious expressions are contradictory with each other. That's why they see faith as paradoxical. Seeing religion as a paradoxical field means that religion is not a talkable field. In this direction, Aliy, quoting from Brümmer, mentions three limits to talking about God:

a. Religious boundaries: We can talk about God in awe in front of him, within the knowledge of religion.

b. Epistemological boundaries: The limits of our knowledge of God determine the limits of our talk about him.

c. Semantic limits: It is inevitable for all words used in the context of faith to undergo semantic shifts. We talk about God in everyday language, but on the other hand, we say that their meanings are very different.

According to Aliy, in the context of the possibility of talking about God, semantic boundaries concern us the most. There are also three views on what constitutes semantic boundaries: *the infinite qualitative difference between God and humans, the analogy between God and humans, the metaphorical language we use when talking about God.*

Aliy analyzes and interprets these three approaches. In this direction, it questions where the difference between the god of faith, religious theology and philosophical theology comes from.

Is the God of faith and philosophy different? Or does such a controversy arise because they use different forms of expression when talking about God? Ali argues that both disciplines initially started from the God of Faith but differed from each other in terms of method.

Towards the end of the third chapter, he mentions the importance of religious reason through the concepts of *idololatrie* and *iconoclasmus* and emphasizes the importance of philosophical reason or philosophical theology in understanding and speaking God.

Aliy emphasizes that talking about God is closely related to the discussion of the personality of the god. For this reason, the third chapter called the *Personality of God Debate*examines the question of whether God is understood as a person. He states that the issue of the personality of God has always been discussed in religions and philosophy, and especially Christian theology is dominant in this regard.

Aliy draws attention to the fact that the basis of the personality of God is the relationship between God and his creations. Because, according to him, while emphasizing the transcendence of God, on the other hand, he is in a relationship with the world he created; creates a dichotomy between the creator and the created. In attempting to respond to this duality, some ideas have envisioned God as a person. They thought that God, who gives orders and imposes prohibitions, should be only one person. This approach laid the groundwork for anthropomorphism. Although this issue was highly debated both in the Middle Ages and in the modern period, philosophical theology has always been distant from personification.

At the end of the chapter, Aliy deals with four of the ideas that are put forward to establish the relationship between God and the finite world: *monism*, *dualism*, *pantheism* and *creation*. He examines these thoughts and makes criticisms in line with the purpose of the work.

In the last chapter called *Philosophical Theology in Antiquity*, Aliy deals with examples of philosophical theology in Ancient Greek thought. Because, according to Aliy, religious thought plays a big role at the beginning of philosophical thought. While ancient Greek thought came to terms with the Greek religion, philosophical-theological questions came to the fore.

In the mentioned showdown, Aliy primarily addresses the problem of unity and origin (*arche*). He cites the answers given to the questions of origin and unity of religious/mythological thinking with examples from the narratives of Homer and Heseidos. Afterward, he turns his gaze to philosophy, which is based on reason. He says that the answer to the Arche problem is now sought through reason, and follows the traces of philosophical theology, starting with the pre-Socratic thinkers.

Drawing attention to thinkers such as Thales, Heraclitus, and Xenophon, he draws attention to the fact that arche, the first cause or origin, is not a dead material element, but is described as divine. From this point of view, Aliy argues that perhaps the first problem of philosophy, the problem of arche, lays the groundwork for philosophical theology.

After the pre-Socratic thinkers, Aliy deals with philosophical theology in the context of Plato's and Aristotle's thoughts. He examines Plato's understanding of God and *ideas*, saying that with Plato, a more systematic and clear-cut theology began to be put forward. He emphasizes the importance of Aristotle in terms of philosophical theology with a quote from Gadamer: "The teaching of God is the pinnacle of Aristotelian philosophy." He points out that Aristotle's naming of the divine as "first philosophy" or *proto sophia* opens the door to philosophical theology. Explaining Aristotle's unmoved mover (proton kinoun akineton) understanding, he emphasizes Aristotle's effects on both religious theology and philosophical theology. At the end of the work, he concludes his work by addressing the problems related to Aristotle's concept of God.

To appreciate the value of Aliy's work and to understand the

importance of the work, we need to grasp the thought of our age well. Today, when everything is tried to be overcome, talking about God is seen as a rather meaningless and unnecessary occupation. Saying that metaphysics cannot be a science because it is not based on experience, Kant made it difficult to talk about God through reason. Many later thinkers also went this way and said that it is not necessary to talk about God but to remain silent. This critical attitude has not only disabled the possibility of religious theology but also led to the thought that philosophy and theology cannot come together. However, it is inevitable that philosophy and religion, which permeate every aspect of life, encounter each other. Treating belief and reason as two completely independent fields causes many problems. The belief that cannot be associated with reason easily makes the individual aggressive, incompatible, and uncompromising. For this reason, some points need to be grasped rationally.

At this point, Aliy's book questions the possibility of a philosophy-based theology that comprehends the cultural and social problems of the age, respond to the needs of individuals and society and is based on reason rather than dogmatic. As Aliy states in the title "Subject-Method", it offers a theoretical introduction to philosophical theology, which aims to talk about God and does not do it based on revelation. He builds a religious understanding based on people, against the thoughts that shut us down by saying that people should be silent about metaphysical issues.

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Author Guidelines

1. **Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review** publishes studies on the Classical Aristotelian Logic, Metaphysics and Rational Psychology and Theology; in addition, other classical, modern and contemporary studies related to the Aristotelian tradition. Submissions are accepted in English but submissions in other languages are decided by Editorial Board.

2. Book reviews sent to **Entelekya** are expected appropriate to the publication policies of the journal. Book reviews written in languages other than English will never be accepted. As to translations into English, they can be published when related to Aristotelianism.

3. All papers must contain an abstract of 150 words and at least 5 keywords in English. When the submission language is different, both abstract and keywords should be in English only.

4. Papers should not exceed 5000 words, with a double space interlining, with margins, left 4.5, up 4,5, down 3,5 and right 4,5 cm. In papers, it should be made use of Times New Roman 11 points. Pictures or graphics in the papers should be sent separately as png or jpg file, maximum 10x20 cm in size.

5. Annotation and reference system of the journal has been described the Chicago Manual of Style, 16th Edition. Henceforth, in manuscripts to send to the journal, it will be used.

Style Sheet

A. BOOK OR A PART OF BOOK

One Author

[1] Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 50.

[2] Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 51.

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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), I, 23.

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[1] Alfarabi, *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, trans. Muhsin Mahdi (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 45.

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[1] Amos Bertolacci, "On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle's Metaphysics," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005), 250.

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C. OTHER FORMS

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[1] İlyas Altuner, "Being and Intellect: Theory of Demonstration in Aristotle and al-Fārābī by A. Tekin," *Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review* 2, no. 1 (2018), 68.

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