Ilahiyat Studies

A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies

ISSN: 1309-1786

Volume 10 Number 1 Winter / Spring 2019

Bursa İlahiyat Foundation

IS

ILAHIYAT STUDIES

A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies

www.ilahiyatstudies.org

Volume 10, Number 1, Winter / Spring 2019

Ilahiyat Studies is published in print (ISSN: 1309-1786) and online (e-ISSN: 1309-1719) biannually by Bursa İlahiyat Foundation, Hacılar Mh. Eceler Sk. Sema Apt. No: 6/5, Osmangazi, Bursa-Turkey.

***Aims and Scope**: Ilahiyat Studies* is an international, peer-reviewed multidisciplinary journal dedicated to publishing scholarly articles on all aspects of Islam and the Muslim peoples and on religious studies. Available in print and online, and published twice a year, the journal aims to become one of the leading platforms in the world for new findings and discussions of all fields of Islamic and religious studies.

***Annual Subscription**:* Annual subscription for each volume of two issues (print edition) is ₺130, $100 (US) for institutions; ₺30, $30 (US) for individuals, and ₺20, $20 (US) for students. An institutional subscription to the print edition includes free access to the online for any number of concurrent users across a local area network.

Abstracting & Indexing: *Ilahiyat Studies* is currently indexed in and abstracted by ***Atlas PLUS***, ***Humanities International Index***, ***Humanities Source Ultimate***, ***Index Islamicus***, ***Religious and Theological Abstracts***, ***Scopus***, and ***TR Dizin***.

***Disclaimer**:* The publisher and Editors can not be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this journal; the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editors and publisher.

ILAHIYAT STUDIES

Volume 10, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2019

CONTENTS

FROM THE EDITORS

Greetings,

Welcome back to *Ilahiyat Studies*. The current issue features three articles and two book review essays related to Islamic and religious studies.

The first article, "A Reading in the Applied Ibāḍī *Fiqh* of International Relations: The Directive of Imām al-Ṣalt (d. 275/888) to His Army Concerning Socotra" by Anke Iman Bouzenita, aims to shed some light upon the ethical standards of military campaigns by Omani Ibāḍī Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Khamīs al-Kharūṣī in the 3rd/9th century by presenting an analysis of an historical document by Imām al-Ṣalt. To achieve this goal, Bouzenita examines the Socotra example, its historical background, and the Islamic legal perspective of the Ibāḍī school on international relations in its historical context, focusing particularly on the problem of authenticity and the authorship of the text.

In his article, "On the 'Psychological Dialectic' of al-Ghazālī Regarding Philosophers, or Did Ibn Sīnā Drink Wine?," Mehmet Birgül presents an extensive analysis of al-Ghazālī's complex views on philosophers. Birgül argues that although there are comprehensive studies on the theoretical aspects of the struggle between al-Ghazālī and the philosophers, the topic of "psychological dialectic," which he advances in a way that addresses the common feelings of Muslims, has been overlooked. The purpose of this article then is to have a comprehensive understanding of the content and construction of al-Ghazālī's so-called psychological dialectic.

The final article of this issue, "Contemporary Jewish Anti-Islamism: Jewish Zionism and Jewish Influence in Western Anti-Islamism" by Ömer Kemal Buhari, treats one of the vexing problems of today's

Ilahiyat Studies p-ISSN: 1309-1786 / e-ISSN: 1309-1719
Volume 10 Number 1 Winter / Spring 2019 DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2019.101.187

To cite this article: Ataman, Kemal, and Turgay Gündüz. "From the Editors." *Ilahiyat Studies* 10, no. 1 (2019): 3-4. https://doi.org/10.12730/13091719.2019.101.187

academic, religious, and political circles. The author seems to be convinced that while the current academic literature is interested in proving the existence of Muslim anti-Semitism, there is not enough research that considers the existence of Jewish anti-Islamism. The article aims to fill that gap by investigating the contemporary Jewish anti-Islamism, focusing on Zionism's role in such anti-Islamism by reviewing the existing literature, news media, and online sources.

As always, on behalf of the entire editorial team, we thank our authors and readers for their invaluable contribution and commitment to making *Ilahiyat Studies* a success.

Editors

Kemal Ataman & Turgay Gündüz

Marmara University, Istanbul-Turkey
kemal.ataman@marmara.edu.tr
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5107-8367

Bursa Uludağ University, Bursa-Turkey
tgunduz@uludag.edu.tr
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8019-4009

ARTICLES

A READING IN THE APPLIED IBĀḌĪ *FIQH* OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE DIRECTIVE OF IMĀM AL-ṢALT (D. 275/888) TO HIS ARMY CONCERNING SOCOTRA

Anke Iman Bouzenita

Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat-Oman
bouzenita@squ.edu.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2907-8998

Abstract

The directive of the Omani Ibāḍī Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Khamīs al-Kharūṣī, read out to his army upon their deployment to the island of Socotra, is a document of 3rd/9th century Islamic international law. The local Christian community, being under covenant (*dhimmah*) with the Muslims, had broken their treaty by rebelling against Muslim rule and killing the Imām's governor. This article analyzes the available historical sources and the directive as contained in *Tuḥfat al-aʿyān bi-ṣīrat ahl ʿUmān*, by the 13th/19th-century Omani scholar Imām al-Sālimī. It covers questions of authorship, details surrounding the campaign, and Islamic rules on international relations according to the Ibāḍī school. It provides insight into military organization and administration in al-Ṣalt's imamate and allows an assessment of Muslim-Christian and international relations as well as those between followers of Ibāḍism and other schools. Al-Ṣalt's legacy sets high ethical standards for warfare and anticipates a number of deliberations commonly considered as modern.

Ilahiyat Studies p-ISSN: 1309-1786 / e-ISSN: 1309-1719
Volume 10 Number 1 Winter / Spring 2019 DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2019.101.188

Received: February 2, 2019 *Accepted*: July 31, 2019 *Published*: November 27, 2019

To cite this article: Bouzenita, Anke Iman. "A Reading in the Applied Ibāḍī *Fiqh* of International Relations: The Directive of Imām al-Ṣalt (d. 275/888) to His Army Concerning Socotra." *Ilahiyat Studies* 10, no. 1 (2019): 7-45 https://doi.org/10.12730/13091719.2019.101.188

Key Words: International law, Ibāḍism, Imām al-Ṣalt, Oman, Socotra, *dhimmah*.

Introduction

The letter from Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik al-Kharūṣī to his army concerning Socotra, sometimes referred to as the *ʿahd* (treaty, covenant, or in this particular context, directive), is an important document on the history of Islamic international law and relations in the 3rd/9th century. At the same time, it provides insight into Omani heritage and Ibāḍī readings in the field. While the events leading to the campaign and the legacy are very present as a point of reference in both scholarly and public discourse in contemporary Oman, they may be little known elsewhere in the Islamic world or beyond.

By examining the Socotra example, its historical background, and the Islamic legal (*fiqhī*) perspective of the Ibāḍī school on international relations, this paper attempts to shed some light on the ethical standards of military campaigns implemented in the 3rd/9th century. The article investigates questions of the authenticity and authorship of the letter, explores its historical background, and presents a summary and analysis, with references to chosen *fiqh* compendia of the Ibāḍī school for support and explanation where necessary.

I. Sources and Authorship of the Legacy

The paper focuses on the directive of Imām al-Ṣalt as rendered in the *Tuḥfat al-aʿyān bi-sīrat ahl ʿUmān*[1] of Imām al-Sālimī.[2] This book

---

[1] I used the 1983 edition annotated by Abū Isḥāq Aṭfayyish: Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥumayyid al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfat al-aʿyān bi-sīrat ahl ʿUmān,* ed. Abū Isḥāq Aṭfayyish, reprint (Rūwī, Muscat: al-Maṭābiʿ al-Dhahabiyyah, 1983), 168-184.
Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Yūsuf, Abū Isḥāq Aṭfayyish (1886-1965), from Wādī Mzāb in Algeria, was one of the eminent scholars of the Ibāḍī school. Exiled from Tunisia where he had pursued knowledge and also assumed a political role, he chose to stay in Cairo, where he died. Aṭfayyish mingled with the political figures of his time in Egypt and later on in Oman; he also travelled to Zanzibar and Libya (Nafūsah). He had a scholarly impact via his work writing, editing, and revising manuscripts, as well as on political reform in the Islamic world. Muḥammad ibn Mūsá Bābā ʿAmmī et al., *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah min*

needs to be understood in the light of al-Sālimī's attempts at reforming Omani society during his time and era and his advocacy of the Omani cause internationally, depicting its Islamic heritage and the heritage of the imamate as a societal model. Al-Sālimī's historical sources for the *Tuḥfah* have been partly researched.[3]

With regard to al-Ṣalt's directive to his troops, a letter covering some fifteen pages in the printed edition of the *Tuḥfah*, I have not been able to find it in its complete form in earlier (printed) sources, nor have I been able to find any hint about existing manuscripts that present the letter in its entirety. Although the Socotra case has remained a point of historical and *fiqhī* reference, none of the available printed resources render more than select paragraphs of the letter. The *Tuḥfah* is therefore currently the only available source regarding the letter and it remains the main source of information on the Socotra campaign.[4]

Imām al-Sālimī himself closes his quotation of the letter with the remark, "It was found in the handwriting (*khaṭṭ*) of Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Sulaymān, written in some books that it is on the authority of (*ʿan*) Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb."[5] Al-Sālimī's note on the handwritten manuscript he used leads us to two important scholarly figures pertaining to this topic: Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Sulaymān al-Kindī[6] (d.

---

al-qarn al-awwal al-hijrī ilá l-ʿaṣr al-ḥāḍir: Qism al-Maghrib al-Islāmī (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2000), II, 24-26.

2 Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥumayyid al-Sālimī (1869-1912), born in al-Ḥawqayn, Rustāq, Oman in 1286/1869, was known as an outstanding Omani scholar and reformer who advocated for a return to the imamate system. Among his many works are the *Tuḥfah*, *Ṭalʿat al-shams ʿalá l-alfiyyah* in *uṣūl al-fiqh*, and other works in poetry and *fiqh*; Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Nāṣir and Sulṭān ibn Mubārak al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah min al-qarn al-awwal al-hijrī ilá l-ʿaṣr al-ḥāḍir. Qism al-mashriq* (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2006), 271-273.

3 Sulaymān ibn Saʿīd ibn Ḥabīb al-Kiyūmī, "Maṣādir al-Shaykh al-Sālimī wa-manhajuhū fī l-kitābah al-tārīkhiyyah min khilāl kitābat 'Tuḥfat al-aʿyān bi-sīrat ahl ʿUmān'" (master's thesis, Muscat: Sultan Qaboos University, 2009).

4 ʿAlī ibn Saʿīd al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik al-Kharūṣī* (Muscat: Bayt al-Ghashshām li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tarjamah, 2015), 45.

5 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah,* 183-184.

6 Abū ʿAbd Allāh spent his life "between compiling, *fatāwá*, and *qaḍāʾ*." The *fiqh* compendium *Bayān al-sharʿ*, printed in some 71 volumes, is only one of his

508/1111), author of the *fiqh* compendium *Bayān al-sharʿ*, as a copier; and Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb al-Ruḥaylī, who deserves more detailed attention in this context.[7]

works. The Socotra letter is mentioned among his *āthār*. Nāṣir and al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 371.

7 Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb al-Ruḥaylī, an Omani scholar of Qurashite origins whose grandfather, al-Ruḥayl ibn Sayf, was among the first propagators of the Ibāḍī movement in Baṣra. Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb was among the scholars who gave Imām al-Ṣalt the pledge of allegiance in 237/851. He was the *qāḍī* of Sohar, then the capital of the imamate, during al-Ṣalt's imamate (from 249/863 to his death in 260/874) and is considered an influential figure in the field of Islamic jurisprudence for generations of Ibāḍī scholars to follow. Nāṣir and al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 425-426; Farḥāt ibn ʿAlī al-Jaʿbīrī, *al-Tadwīn al-fiqhī: al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb namūdhajān. Aʿmāl nadwat taṭawwur al-ʿulūm al-fiqhiyyah* (Muscat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyyah, 2002), 17-71; al-Jaʿbīrī, *Shakhṣiyyāt Ibāḍiyyah* (al-Sīb, Oman: Maktabat al-Ḍāmirī li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2010), 83-84. For his scholarly and political role, see Badriyyah bint Muḥammad ibn Shāmis al-Nabhānī, "Āl al-Ruḥayl wa-dawruhum al-siyāsī wa-l-fikrī fī ʿUmān min al-qarn 3h/8m - 4h/10m" (PhD diss., Muscat: Sultan Qaboos University, 2017). On the relation to and importance of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb, see Ismāʿīl ibn Ṣāliḥ ibn Ḥamdān al-Aghbarī, "ʿAhd al-Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik wa-ʿumuquhū l-ḥaḍārī," in *Aʿmāl nadwat taṭawwur al-ʿulūm al-fiqhiyyah fī ʿUmān, al-fiqh al-ḥaḍārī, Fiqh al-ʿumrān* (Muscat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyyah, 2012), 78. Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb asserted that the Qurʾān is created, a teaching commonly ascribed to the Muʿtazilah, but stepped back from this teaching due to pressure from the scholars of his time. Nāṣir and al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 426; see also al-Jaʿbīrī, *al-Tadwīn al-fiqhī*, 41-42). Among his extant and known works are the *Mukhtaṣar min al-Sunnah* (part of an original work that is said to have comprised 70 volumes), and a number of *siyar*; his *sīrah* to the people of Maghreb, a *sīrah* to Aḥmad ibn Sulaymān, the imām of Ḥaḍramawt, a *sīrah* to Abū Ziyād Khalaf ibn ʿAdhrah, and a directive (*ʿahd*) in the name of Imām al-Ṣalt to Ghassān ibn Julayd, when he appointed him as governor of the Hujjār. Nāṣir and al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 426). The appointment letter is to be found in *Tuḥfah* (184-193), without mentioning Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb as an author. Al-Shaybānī lists a *sīrah fī l-siyāsah al-sharʿiyyah* (contained in *al-Siyar wa-l-jawābāt*) under the authorship of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb; Sulṭān ibn Mubārak al-Shaybānī, *Amālī l-turāth: Naẓarāt naqdiyyah wa-qirāʾāt fī jadīd al-turāth al-ʿUmānī makhṭūṭihī wa-maṭbūʿihī* (Muscat: Dhākirat ʿUmān, 2015), I, 46.

The sixth-century Omani scholar Abū Bakr al-Kindī (d. 557/1162)[8], author of *al-Muṣannaf*, quotes a longer part of al-Ṣalt's letter concerning the people of Socotra, on the authority of the 3rd/9th-century work of Abū l-Ḥawwārī, *al-Jāmiʿ*; ("and this is from the words of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb in his *sīrah*"). The excerpt corresponds to the text in the *Tuḥfah*, "And what I advise you to do is to fear Allāh, and not to sell any weapons in Socotra," with minor variations.[9] As a matter of fact, this same excerpt is not to be found in the *Jāmiʿ* of Abū l-Ḥawwārī,[10] although this work has ample material on the dicta of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb. It is available in the *Jāmiʿ* of Muḥammad ibn al-Faḍl Ibn al-Ḥawwārī, of the same era.[11] The same

---

8 Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Mūsá al-Nizwānī al-Kindī (d. 557/1162). He is author of, among other works, the *fiqh* compendium *al-Muṣannaf fī l-adyān wa-l-aḥkām*, and of *Kitāb al-ihtidāʾ*, which is specifically about the division of Omani scholars into the Nizwa and Rustāq factions after the forced abdication of al-Ṣalt; he divided the *Bayān al-sharʿ* of his teacher, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Sulaymān al-Kindī, into chapters and gave it its title. Nāṣir and al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 56. It may therefore be expected that he used the material on Socotra from his teacher as well.

9 *Tuḥfah*, from middle of 181 to end of first paragraph, 182; Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Mūsá al-Nizwānī al-Kindī, *al-Muṣannaf fī l-adyān wa-l-aḥkām* (Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1984), XII, 99-100.

10 Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥawwārī al-Aʿmá Abū l-Ḥawwārī, sometimes referred to as al-Ḥawwārī Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥawwārī; alive in 272/885, probably died early in the 4th/10th century. Based in Nizwā, he is considered the most important among the famous Omani scholars of the 3rd/9th century. He was a student of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb, but mainly of Abū l-Muʾthir al-Ṣalt ibn Khamīs al-Kharūṣī. Among his extant works are the *Jāmiʿ ibn al-Ḥawwārī*, the *Tafsīr khamsmiʾat āyah fī l-aḥkām* (both in print); he also authored *Ziyādāt ʿalá Jāmiʿ ibn Jaʿfar*. Nāṣir and al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 379-380.

11 Al-Faḍl ibn al-Ḥawwārī, *Jāmiʿ al-Faḍl ibn al-Ḥawwārī* (Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1985), III, 207-208. Abū Muḥammad al-Faḍl ibn al-Ḥawwārī al-Sāmī (d. 278/891). He was a student of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb, one of the outstanding Omani scholars of his time, and contemporary to Imām al-Muhannā ibn Jayfar (226-237/841-852) and Imām al-Ṣalt (237-272/852-885). He was involved in the political events that followed the forced abdication of al-Ṣalt; he opposed the newly sworn-in Imām ʿAzzān ibn Tamīm, and was subsequently killed by the Imām's troops near Sohar in 278/891. He is the author of *Kitāb al-jāmiʿ*. Nāṣir and al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 345-346. It could be

longer excerpt of the letter is found in the printed version of *Bayān al-sharʿ*[12], of the 6th/12th century.

This seems to be the only longer excerpt outside of the *Tuḥfah*. Historical works after al-Sālimī usually rely on the information he provides.[13] References to the letter and the case of Socotra exist throughout the Ibāḍī *fiqh* literature.[14]

The contemporary Tunisian Ibāḍī scholar Farḥāt al-Jaʿbīrī discusses the authorship of the letter and alludes to the possibility that it could also have been authored by Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb himself, not by Imām al-Ṣalt. While related *fiqhī* teachings are often rendered on the authority of (*ʿan*) Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb in the primary sources, and some of the contemporary sources refer to the scholar as the author of the letter,[15] access to additional original texts would be necessary in order to definitively assess the question of authorship, as al-Jaʿbīrī states.[16]

As for al-Sālimī's source on the letter for his *Tuḥfah*, it is most likely that he used an independent manuscript that is not accessible to date; whether it was transmitted under the title of a *sīrah* ascribed to Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb (as mentioned in the *Jāmiʿ* of Abū l-

an unintentional misappropriation in the printed version of the *Muṣannaf*, or perhaps al-Faḍl used to be referred to as Abū l-Ḥawwārī as well.

12 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Kindī, *Bayān al-sharʿ* (Salṭanat ʿUmān: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1993), XXIX, 21-22.

13 Al-Baṭṭāshī in his *Salāsil al-dhahab* mentions the Socotran campaign as one of the important events of al-Ṣalt's imamate; he reiterates the hypothesis of an Abyssinian invasion and generally invokes the information available in al-Sālimī's *Tuḥfah*; Muḥammad ibn Shāmis al-Baṭṭāshī, *Salāsil al-dhahab fī l-furūʿ wa-l-fuṣūl* (Oman: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 2002), X, 280. Al-Rawwāḥī's *al-Imāmah wa-l-aʾimmah fī ʿUmān* presents a summary of the events as described in the *Tuḥfah*, written for a general audience rather than for scholars. Sālim ibn Muḥammad ibn Sālim al-Rawwāḥī, *al-Imāmah wa-l-aʾimmah fī ʿUmān* (Muscat: Maktabat al-Ḍāmirī li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2016), 147-151.

14 Apart from the references mentioned above, see Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Bisyawī, *Jāmiʿ Abī l-Ḥasan al-Bisyawī* (Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1984), IV, 147-148.

15 Saʿīd ibn Muḥammad al-Hāshimī, "Qirāʾah fī sīrat al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb ilá ahl al-Maghrib," in *Aʿmāl nadwat taṭawwur al-ʿulūm al-fiqhiyyah*, Muscat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyyah, 2002, 98.

16 Al-Jaʿbīrī, *al-Tadwīn al-fiqhī*, 63.

Ḥawwārī) and copied by Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Kindī may only be answered with the discovery of more manuscripts.

II. The Period: Imām al-Ṣalt and His Imamate

The exceptionally long imamate of al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik al-Kharūṣī (247-272/861-885) is retrospectively considered to be a golden era of just rule and flourishing scholarship in the 3rd/9th century in Oman[17] and is still used as a point of reference – perhaps also under the influence of and in comparison with the events that followed it. Historians mention a devastating storm that hit the country during his imamate, leading to such loss of lives and property that many residents were forced to migrate.[18] Problems emerged at the end of his imamate, either due to his increasing inability to rule the country effectively, as his opponents claimed, or due to the eventual deaths of the eminent scholars of the period and their substitution by people who pursued their own agendas rather than the common welfare, as his supporters maintained.

Whatever the case, increasing criticism forced al-Ṣalt to abdicate in 272/885; he remained at home in self-imposed confinement until his death in 275/888. The event deeply divided both scholars and populace, leading to a tribal war that allowed the Abbasid governor (*wālī*) of Bahrain to intervene, thereby ending the long period of independent Omani rule in 280/893.[19] Scholarly discussions on the forced abdication and events fill entire books, such as *al-Siyar wa-l-jawābāt*.[20]

III. Socotra: The Island, Its Inhabitants, and Historiography

Socotra is an island approximately 480 km long, situated 240 km from the East African coast and some 380 km from the Arabian Peninsula. The island is known in particular for its unique flora and fauna, with a high number of endemic plants and animals. The

---

17 Nāṣir and al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 248.

18 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 163-164.

19 Isam Ali Ahmad al-Rawas, "Early Islamic Oman (ca. - 622/280-893): A political history" (PhD diss., Durham: Durham University, 1990), 299.

20 Sayyidah Ismāʿīl Kāshif, ed. & commentary, *al-Siyar wa-l-jawābāt li-ʿulamāʾ wa-aʾimmat ʿUmān* (Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1986); cf. al-Shaybānī, *Amālī l-turāth*, 122ff.

dragon's blood tree (*Dracaena cinnabari*) has its home here, and the island was known in antiquity as a place to find ambergris.[21]

Being situated at a location of geostrategic importance on the trade routes between Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and India, and at the portal to the Red Sea, control of the island was naturally fought over by various maritime forces, leading to changes in power affiliation and population makeup over the centuries.[22] It may, from this perspective, be comparable to islands like Cyprus or Malta in the Mediterranean, which also changed hands often and played roles in the history of (Islamic) international relations.

There is no indigenous historiography of the island or its inhabitants; its early historiography therefore largely depends on the sources produced by Greek and Arab historians quoting them (see below). It may be remarked that Omani historiography seems not to have occupied itself with the island much.[23]

It is established that the island was in Arab and Muslim hands, with alternating affiliation between Oman and Mahra, prior to the occupation by the Portuguese in 1509, and that this was followed by a period of Islamic rule (the Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra) up to the establishment of the British protectorate in 1866.[24] There is room for ambiguity pertaining to the era of interest to us, the end of the 3rd/9th century, particularly with regard to the population makeup at the advent of al-Ṣalt's campaign and its result.

The question of the makeup of the Socotran population in the time of Imām al-Ṣalt may be analyzed in the light of the available geographic and historiographic works. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, the 6th/12th-century Muslim geographer, states (of his time) that the majority of the population were Christian Arabs. He mentions the presence of Indians, then of Greeks since Alexander the Great, and a Greek population that had embraced Christianity since the time of Jesus while preserving their Greek descent. The Yemeni geographer of the

---

21 See al-Sālimī's description, *Tuḥfah*, 166.

22 See Aḥmad ibn Saʿīd ibn Khamīs al-Anbālī, "Tārīkh jazīrat Suqaṭrá," http://www.soqotra.org/books/ahmedalanbali/historysocotrailand.pdf, accessed September 25, 2017.

23 Sālim ibn Ḥammūd ibn Shāmis al-Siyābī, *ʿUmān ʿabra-l-tārīkh*, 5th ed., (Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 2014), I-II, 317.

24 Al-Anbālī, "Tārīkh jazīrat Suqaṭrá."

4th/10th century and author of the book *Ṣifat jazīrat al-ʿArab*, al-Hamdānī,[25] is quoted as mentioning that the population was of Mahri origin, and that there were ten thousand Christian soldiers. He mentions different versions as to the history of the island:

> They say that Roman people [i.e., Greeks/Byzantines] were cast there by Kisrá, and then tribes from Mahrah joined them, and some of them became Christians with them; while the people of Aden say that there was no Roman [Greek] influx, but the people followed a bishop, and then perished, upon which the Mahrī tribes and some *shurāt* settled there; Islamic *daʿwah* became more intense, the number of *shurāt* increased, and they [the Christian Mahrīs] transgressed against the Muslims and killed them all except ten people; and there is a mosque in a place called al-Sūq.[26]

This could be an exact description of the Socotra events prior to the campaign we describe herein, as the term *shurāt* denotes a division of the Omani imamate's army (see below). Ibāḍī sources describe an Omani presence on the island since the imamate of al-Julandá (132-134/750-752). An often quoted statement in Abū Bakr al-Kindī's *al-Muṣannaf* specifies that if the Muslims have an agreement to take slaves as payment, it is permissible to do so for the first year, and then they should take the equivalent amount in the second year, "as they have all become *ahl al-ṣulḥ wa-l-dhimmah*" "… and we have been informed that al-Julandá ibn Masʿūd concluded a treaty with the people of Socotra (*ṣālaḥa ahl Suqaṭrá ʿalá ruʾūs*), and took them in the first year, and Allāh knows best."[27] Wilkinson takes the stipulation for the second year as proof that attachment of the island to the imamate was achieved peacefully.[28] If the treaty had been concluded at this early stage, it seems that it had

---

[25] Cf. Lisān al-Yaman al-Ḥasan ibn Aḥmad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Hamdānī, *Ṣifat jazīrat al-ʿArab,* ed. Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Akwaʿ al-Ḥawālī (Cairo: Dār al-Āfāq al-ʿArabiyyah, 2001), 93-94.

[26] Shihāb al-Dīn Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī al-Rūmī al-Baghdādī, "Suquṭrá," *Muʿjam al-buldān* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977.) III, 227.

[27] Al-Kindī, *al-Muṣannaf*, XI, 145, cf. al-Kindī, *Bayān al-sharʿ*, LXX, 355; Aḥmad al-ʿUbaydlī, "Ḥamlat al-Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik ʿalá jazīrat Suqaṭrá wa-l-ʿalāqāt al-ʿUmāniyyah al-Mihriyyah," *Nizwá: Majallah faṣliyyah thaqāfiyyah* 13 (January 1998), accessed August 15, 2017, http://www.nizwa.com/pdf/Nizwa-13.pdf; al-Nabhānī, "Āl al-Ruḥayl," 65.

[28] Wilkinson, *Imamate*, 332.

only been broken during the time of Imām al-Ṣalt, some 130 years later, in the events that are the subject of this research.

Daʿwah activity emerging from the Ibāḍī imamate was remarkably vigorous in the 2nd/8th century, as Hāshim points out.[29] Al-Rawas infers that Ibāḍism had first arrived on the island after establishing the first imamate in Ḥaḍramawt and Yemen under the leadership of Imām Yaḥyá Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq al-Kindī (128-129/746-747); this was at the end of the Umayyad caliphate, when many Ibāḍīs were forced to escape to northern Oman and Socotra as this imamate succumbed to Umayyad forces.[30] Al-ʿUbaydlī suggests that the Christians of Socotra were Nestorians (of Greek origin), while the non-Ibāḍī Muslims on Socotra may have belonged to Mahrī tribes. He suggests an Omani-Yemeni competition over Socotra.[31] This rivalry may be asserted regarding a later period, after Socotra split from Oman due to the fall of the imamate and the establishment of Abbasid control toward the end of the 3rd/9th century, but was probably not prominent at the time in question.[32]

The 4th/10th century author al-Masʿūdī states that the island was home to Indian pirates and a danger to existing trade routes. He does not mention any previous Islamic or Arab presence on the island, but seems to focus on the purported Greek origins of the population.[33] However, if al-Masʿūdī's information on the insecurity of trade routes is accurate, Muslim hegemony may have been abolished by the first half of the 4th/10th century, possibly as a result of Christian insurgence on the island and a failure to reestablish Muslim control, either through al-Ṣalt or at a later point.

Based on these (and other) pieces of information, contemporary historians and analysts arrive at different conclusions with regard to the ethnic and religious makeup of the Socotran population at the advent of the Imām's campaign. This may be of importance

---

29 Mahdī Ṭālib Hāshim, *al-Ḥarakah al-Ibāḍiyyah fī l-Mashriq al-ʿArabī*, 2nd ed. (London: Dār al-Ḥikmah, 2003), 224-225.

30 Al-Rawas, "Early Islamic Oman," 272-273.

31 Al-ʿUbaydlī, "Ḥamlat al-Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik ʿalá jazīrat Suqaṭrá."

32 Al-Anbālī, "Tārīkh jazīrat Suqaṭrá," 81-82.

33 Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī al-Masʿūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab wa-maʿādin al-jawhar*, ed. Mufīd Muḥammad Qumayḥah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1986), II, 20-21; see Hāshim, *al-Ḥarakah al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 228.

concerning their respective assessment of another question: namely, whether outside support of the insurgence of the island's Christians (who were under covenant) was involved, and whether or not the campaign was successful.

Our primary source, the author of the *Tuḥfah*, does not mention any details about the islands' inhabitants at the advent of the campaign. He states:

> In his [Imām al-Ṣalt's] days, may Allāh be pleased with him, the Christians committed treason (*khānat al-naṣārá*) and broke the treaty that existed between them and the Muslims; they attacked Socotra and killed the governor of the Imām and some young men with him; and they plundered and looted, took over the country, and seized it by force.[34]

The author does not specify who those Christians were who took over: were they among the *ahl al-dhimmah* on the island (as a breach of covenant is mentioned); or is he referring to external forces, possibly Abyssinians, who used to rule the island prior to the Muslims? The *Tuḥfah's* editor, Aṭfayyish, remarks that the author may not have known the details.[35] The letter contains hints to support both interpretations. Secondary sources therefore differ in their discussion of the events, while it may be noted that the sheer proximity of Socotra to the African mainland seems to suggest outside Abyssinian military intervention to some, even in the absence of historical evidence.

On one hand, expressions like "for the insurgents among the Christians (*li-ahl al-nakth min al-naṣārá*)," "for all of Socotra, the people of peace as well as of war (*ʿalá jamīʿ Suqaṭrá, ahl al-silm minhā wa-ahl al-ḥarb*)," "the people of the covenant who did not break their treaty (*ahl al-ʿahd alladhīna lam yanquḍū ʿahdahum*)," "the insurgent village (*al-qaryah al-nākithah*)," "those who broke their treaty (*al-nāqiḍīna li-ʿahdihim*)," and "those who transgressed against the Muslims through their rebellion (*al-nākithīna ʿalá l-muslimīna bi-baghyihim*)" are indicative of a Christian population on the island who used to be under covenant, with some of them

---

[34] Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 166.

[35] *Ibid.*

breaking their treaty.[36] On the other hand, Aṭfayyish's footnote indicates that the Socotran Christians were aided by an Abyssinian intervention.[37] Another lead to support this theory may be taken from the letter itself: the Imam's order to follow the enemy to the African coastline (*raʾs al-zinj*) if necessary.[38] It alludes to the possibility that the danger emerged from the African mainland, implying Abyssinian intervention.[39]

Al-Ṣalt's order to take with them those Socotran Muslims who wished to leave the island may hint at the expectation that the island would be abandoned by the Muslim forces, so that it would not be safe for Muslims to stay on, for fear of repercussions. The island would therefore become *dār al-ḥarb*, and be subject to new raids from Abyssinian troops, as Hāshim interprets.[40] Some secondary sources mention Abyssinian intervention without any discussion of intrinsic or extrinsic evidence.[41] As al-Riyāmī rightly states, these are mere inferences in the absence of clear-cut evidence.[42]

---

36 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 171, 173, 174; Other historians emphasize this point, e.g., al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 49; al-ʿUbaydlī, *Ḥamlat al-Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik ʿalá jazīrat Suqaṭrá*; cf. also al-Aghbarī, who takes this as a reason to discuss the theme of a "fifth column." Al-Aghbarī, *ʿAhd al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 81, 83.

37 Hāshim, *al-Ḥarakah al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 225.

38 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 182. The place is on today's Somali coastline (Cape Guardafui), about 120 miles from Socotra, and 500 miles from Aden (Hāshim, *al-Ḥarakah al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 227); cf. al-Riyāmī, who suggests that *raʾs al-zinj* is Guardafui [Raʾs Ghafrad Fawi]. Al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 67.

39 "Socotra itself was indefensible from Oman, thus the order from Imām al-Ṣalt to his army to aid those Socotran Muslims who wished to leave, to do so. Such was the degree of involvement of the Abyssinians in the affairs of the island." Al-Rawas, "Early Islamic Oman," 274.

40 Hāshim, *al-Ḥarakah al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 227.

41 Al-Siyābī mentions an outward Christian aggression (*ʿUmān ʿabra l-tārīkh*, 313); Hāshim supports this theory (*al-Ḥarakah al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 66); al-Nabhānī supports the idea of an outside Abyssinian support of the insurgence, but does not produce any evidence ("Āl al-Ruḥayl," 66); al-Aghbarī suggests an insurgence of Abyssinian Christians, while acknowledging the lack of historical evidence (*ʿAhd al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 81).

42 Al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 50.

IV. Date of the Campaign

With regard to the exact date of the campaign, difference of opinion exists in the literature. Al-Sālimī himself does not mention an exact date. Al-Riyāmī discusses the suggestions made: he dismisses 253/867, a date suggested by al-Ḥārthī,[43] as too close to the devastating storm that hit Oman in 251/865 and forced substantial portions of the population to migrate[44], an event that must have strained the state budget so severely as to preclude equipping a military campaign of that dimension. Al-ʿUbaydlī relies on the fact that Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb, as writer of the Imam's letter to his troops, died in 260/882, and posits that the campaign must have taken place before this date. Al-Sālimī himself mentions the event after relating the death of ʿAzzān ibn al-Ṣaqr, that is, after 268/881, if one is to follow the generally chronological outline with which al-Sālimī makes mention of events.[45]

Al-Rawas dates the Socotran insurrection toward the end of al-Ṣalt's rule: "Support for this comes from the call made by the Imam's detractors for him to step down as a result of his failure, itself a symptom of old age and ineptitude, to protect Socotra from its invaders. The most likely time is between 269/882 and 273/886."[46]

If we are to take into consideration the assumed role of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb in writing the letter, and the constraints to the military budget the storm and its aftermath must have had, in the absence of other evidence, we may cautiously date the event between 249/863, the year of Ibn Maḥbūb's investiture as chief *qāḍī*, and 253/867, the year of the storm, in any case well before Ibn Maḥbūb's death in 260/874.

V. The *Qaṣīdah* and Its Author

The *Tuḥfah* now propounds the reason for al-Ṣalt's intervention:

---

43 Saʿīd ibn Ḥamad ibn Sulaymān al-Ḥārithī, "Muqaddimah," in Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥārithī and Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥumayyid al-Sālimī, *al-Yusrá fī inqādh jazīrat Suqaṭrá* (Muscat: Maktabat al-Ḍāmirī li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1992), 2.

44 See al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 41-42.

45 *Ibid*., 51-52.

46 Al-Rawas, "Early Islamic Oman," 274-275.

"A woman from the people of Socotra named al-Zahrāʾ[47] wrote to the Imām, may Allāh be pleased with him, a *qaṣīdah*, mentioning to him what the Christians had done in Socotra, complaining about their injustice, and asking him for assistance against them."[48] It may be this background to the Socotra campaign, a Muslim woman's call for help in the face of non-Muslim aggression, as well as the immediate reaction, that led to its comparison to the Abbasid caliph al-Muʿtaṣim's campaign on ʿAmūriyyah in 223/838.[49] Cases involving the fate of Muslim women under military invasion or rule by non-Muslims and the scholars' empathy for them are not unusual in *fiqh* literature.[50]

The *qaṣīdah* describes the fate of the Muslim people of Socotra, particularly the women, after the Christian takeover – justice has been replaced by injustice and the Muslim call to prayer by church bells; women are being enslaved and raped – and dramatically culminates in a personal call to the Imām:

> What is wrong with al-Ṣalt who happily sleeps at night, while there are women in Socotra at risk of being violated?
> Men! Rescue every Muslim woman, even if you have to crawl on your chins and knees,

---

47 Al-Sālimī does not offer details on the origins of the author of the *qaṣīdah*, and ample difference of opinion exists in the literature. According to al-Shaqṣiyyah, her name is Fāṭimah bint Ḥamad ibn Khalfān ibn Ḥumayd al-Jahḍamiyyah, raised in Samad al-Shaʾn, a village in Wilāyat al-Muḍaybī, al-Sharqiyyah, Oman. She went to Socotra with her father to visit their relative, the governor of Socotra, al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad al-Jahḍamī al-Samadī, when the events took place; Badriyyah bint Ḥamad al-Shaqṣiyyah, *al-Sīrah al-zakiyyah li-l-marʾah al-Ibāḍiyyah* (Muscat: Maktabat al-Jīl al-Wāʿid, 2014), 72; Sulṭān ibn Mubārak al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-nisāʾ al-Ibāḍiyyāt: qism al-mashriq* (al-Sīb, Oman: Maktabat al-Sayyid Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad, 2001), 17.

48 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 166-167.

49 On the comparison to ʿAmūriyyah, see also al-Shaqṣiyyah, *al-Sīrah al-zakiyyah*, 72; al-Ḥārithī, *al-Yusrá*, 2 & 6-7; see also al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 48-49, and Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Bār, "Yawm al-Muʿtaṣim fī ʿAmūriyyah wa-yawm al-Ṣalt fī Suqaṭrá," *Star Times* (2 June 2009), http://www.startimes.com/?t=17172523, accessed August 8, 2017.

50 See Anke Iman Bouzenita, *The Political Legacy of Abd al-Raḥmān al-Awzāʿī*, (Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Malaysia, 2008), 17-20.

> Until the pillar of religion is re-erected, and Allāh makes the adherents of injustice and mistrust vanish.
> Then the supplication of Zahrāʾ will come true after debauchery, and the *sunnah* of the books will live again.[51]

Al-Sālimī does not specify how this letter reached the Imām; some sources suggest that she threw it into the sea and it miraculously reached him through a fisherman who found it; as al-Nadābī has pointed out, the function of this story may be to ascribe miracles (*karāmāt*) to al-Ṣalt.[52]

Setting aside the veracity of this story as the reason for dispatching an armada of 101 ships to Socotra, considering the importance of the ongoing trade at the time, one may suppose that secure methods of communication between this outpost of the Omani imamate and its center must have been established.[53]

VI. Results of the Campaign

In an afterword to the *qaṣīdah*, al-Sālimī states:

> So the Imām gathered his troops, and equipped the ships, and appointed in charge of them Muḥammad ibn ʿAshīrah and Saʿīd ibn Shamlāl, and if anything happens to [one of] them, the survivor takes the place of the other; if something happens to both, we appoint in their place Ḥāzim[54] ibn Hammām, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn Yazīd, and ʿUmar ibn Tamīm. And he wrote them a letter, explaining in it what they were supposed to do and what to leave, and it is said that the ships gathered for this campaign were one hundred and one. So they set off for them, and Allāh granted them victory against them: they captured the land and defeated the enemies, and returned victorious

---

51 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 168.

52 Nāṣir al-Nadābī, "Imāmat al-Imām al-ʿUmānī al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik al-Kharūṣī," Public lecture held at Markaz Dār al-Qurʾān, al-Sīb, Oman, date unknown, video published 8 February 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSo43_R-2nc. While al-Ḥārthī (*al-Yusrá,* 7-8) supports this version, other authors, like al-Aghbarī, underline that the real *karāmah* in this story is that the Imām dispatched his troops to reinvest Islamic rule and order, and that there is no need for additional stories to emphasize this. Al-Aghbarī, *ʿAbd al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 85.

53 Cf. al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 52.

54 In al-Kindī's version, this is "Khāzim." Al-Kindī, *Bayān al-sharʿ*, LVII, 181.

and with glad tidings, because Allāh stands by those who stand by Him.[55]

The number of ships dispatched by al-Ṣalt is remarkable, and is an indication of the military power of the imamate. There is no historical information on the military strength of al-Ṣalt's state; but reports exist about his predecessor, Imām al-Muhannā ibn Jayfar (226-237/840-851), who had at his command three hundred ships equipped for warfare, and in the town of Nizwa (*Nizwá*), then capital of the imamate, eight or nine thousand mounts, in addition to ten thousand soldiers. The fleet had already been developed during the rule of Imām Ghassān (d. 207/822).[56] The possible impact of the tropical storm (which devastated large areas of the country) on the military capability of the imamate at this point of time should be taken into consideration for an assessment.[57] Al-Riyāmī suggests that the campaign was launched from Sohar (*Ṣuḥār*), given this Omani coastal town's importance at the time.[58]

It is striking that al-Sālimī refers to the campaign as "successful" in that control over the island had been reasserted by the Imām and his troops. Apart from the *Tuḥfah* and those authors subscribing to its main assumptions, there is no extant historical evidence regarding the campaign or its aftermath, once it landed on the island.[59] While we have already quoted some details of the letter that may have anticipated an unsuccessful outcome of the campaign, indicators in some Omani primary sources support the theory that the campaign may indeed have been unsuccessful.

The earliest available trace of this reproach against al-Ṣalt (that the Christians took the island away from him and broke their treaty, and that he did not defeat them), may be the one found in the *sīrah* of Ibn Abī Rūḥ, one of the students of Ibn al-Ḥawwārī, who lived in the 3rd/9th century.[60] *Kitāb al-ihtidā'* mentions as one of the opponents' arguments that Socotra "was taken away from him" and that he was

---

55 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 168.

56 See al-Aghbarī, *ʿAhd al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 79.

57 Al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 51.

58 *Ibid.*, 54.

59 Al-Nadābī, "Imāmat al-Imām al-ʿUmānī al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik al-Kharūṣī."

60 Al-Shaybānī, *Amālī l-turāth*, 127.

unable to protect it.[61] The *Bayān al-sharʿ* mentions as one of the arguments forwarded by those who forced al-Ṣalt into abdication that "he did not rescue the people of Socotra and did not restore their right from those who transgressed against them."[62] Sulṭān al-Shaybānī, a contemporary expert on Omani manuscripts and heritage, asserts that the case is subject to difference of opinion among the authors of Omani *siyar*.[63]

Evidence that fighting must have taken a substantial toll is to be found in *Bayān al-sharʿ*, where al-Kindī mentions in the chapter on the missing person (*al-mafqūd*), that Khāzim ibn Hammām and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (who had been appointed as substitutes in charge of the campaign, as the letter postulates) had been killed, and that whoever was known to have been on their ship may be considered missing.[64]

VII. An Introductory Note on the Treatment of *Ahl al-dhimmah* in al-Ṣalt's Imamate

Al-Sālimī's *Tuḥfah*, our main historical source for the Socotra campaign and the Imām's letter, also preserved al-Ṣalt's lengthy advice to the newly appointed governor of Rustaq (*al-Rustāq*), Ghassān ibn Julayd.[65] This advice is an additional resource in understanding the main theme of the letter, the treatment of non-Muslims living under Islamic covenant, *ahl al-dhimmah*, and the relationship with them in the particular case of insurgence. Amongst the details on *zakāh* eligibility and collection, there is some advice on the treatment of *ahl al-dhimmah* (and non-Ibāḍī Muslims) in the text; it is to be expected that the policy with regard to *ahl al-dhimmah* was the same throughout the realm of his influence, inclusive of Socotra, prior to the insurgence. It may therefore help to elucidate

---

61 Al-Kindī, *Kitāb al-ibtidāʾ wa-l-muntakhab min sīrat al-Rasūl (a.s.s.) wa-aʾimmat wa-ʿulamāʾ ʿUmān*, ed. Sayyidah Ismāʿīl Kāshif (Salṭanat ʿUmān: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1985), 51; see also al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 77.

62 Al-Kindī, *Bayān al-sharʿ*, LXVIII, 399; cf. al-Nabhānī, "Āl al-Ruḥayl," 67-68.

63 Al-Shaybānī, *Amālī l-turāth*, 127. The contemporary *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah* follows the interpretation of a successful campaign: "Al-Ṣalt has become famous for liberating Socotra from the hands of the Christians and regaining it from them." Nāṣir and al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 249.

64 Al-Kindī, *Bayān al-sharʿ*, LVII, 181; cf. al-Nabhānī, "Āl al-Ruḥayl," 67.

65 Or "Khulayd," see al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 184.

Muslim-Christian relations in al-Ṣalt's imamate at the time. The letter stipulates that *jizyah* is to be taken at the end of every month,[66] according to the following pattern: the rich pay four *dirham* a month per head; the moderately affluent pay two *dirham* a month per head; while children, the poor, the elderly, women, and male and female slaves do not pay at all. The Imām implements a policy of distinguishing between Muslims and non-Muslims in outer appearance that was commonplace at the time throughout the Islamic world.[67] He adds that *dhimmī*s are not to buy male or female slaves from Muslims, but in case this has already taken place, they shall be asked to sell them to Muslims – probably for fear of proselytization or exposing the secrets of Muslims. On whatever a *dhimmī* buys from a Muslim he must pay a 10% tax (*ʿushr*) on it, and *zakāh* has to be paid on cattle bought from Muslims. Al-Ṣalt asked his governor to be strict with regard to people who follow divergent opinions, clearly identified by him as Qadariyyah, Muʿtazilah, Khawārij, and Murjiʾah; these are not to call to their ideas in public.[68]

The *Jāmiʿ* of Ibn al-Ḥawwārī, a student of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb, reiterates the same orders (consistent with the orders of Imām al-Ṣalt in his appointment letter) on the appropriate behavior of *ahl al-dhimmah*.[69] Importantly, Abū l-Ḥawwārī emphasizes that *jizyah* is only to be taken from people of the covenant if the Muslims are able to protect them from injustice.[70]

The Ibāḍī *fiqh* literature specifies exactly what constitutes a breach of treaty, or the *dhimmah* covenant, very often with reference to Socotra as a precedent case. We may infer from this that the events of Socotra were well established in the collective memory of scholars. Many of these references are made on the authority of (*ʿan*) Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb, which may serve to emphasize his importance in relation to the event.

The consensus of the literature is that if the non-Muslims under

---

66 This seems to be the particular interpretation of the Imām, as *jizyah* is usually collected after one lunar year (*ḥawl*).

67 Cf. al-Rawas, "Early Islamic Oman," 270.

68 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 192.

69 Al-Faḍl Ibn al-Ḥawwārī, *Jāmiʿ al-Faḍl*, III, 202-204.

70 Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥawwārī, *Jāmiʿ Abī l-Ḥawwārī* (Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1985), II, 36.

covenant commit an aggression, assault, or attack, the state of war returns regarding them; that is, they have thereby broken their treaty.[71] Both Muslims and non-Muslims under covenant are bound by their first treaty.[72] A transgression could consist of assisting military

---

[71] To draw more extensively on the Ibāḍī *fiqh* heritage, the following excerpts from the *Kitāb al-muḥārabah* of Bashīr ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb (alive in 273/886), may illustrate the point further. For Bashīr ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb see Nāṣir and al-Shaybānī, *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 70-71:

The Messenger of Allāh (pbuh) also established the *sunnah* that "the lowest of the Muslims gives an *amān* (here: guaranty of security for life and possessions) binding for all of them," and all of the Muslims, the free person, the slave, male and female, have to allow this; and there is no *ṣulḥ bi-l-muwādaʿah* [ending of war through treaty] between the Muslims and the people of war without the latter deferentially succumbing to the former, through deferment, humbleness, and submission to the rule of Allāh, by paying *jizyah* while being deferential, unless there is strong fear among the Muslims that they prevail over the Muslims due to their great numbers and [the Muslims] fear their [non-Muslims] power. And Allāh, may He be exalted, says: "*Do not faint, and do not grieve, for you will overcome if you are true believers*." (Q 3:139). And if there is a treaty (*ʿahd*) and *ṣulḥ* between them, it is incumbent upon the Muslims to abide by it; be it limited in time or not; and it is not allowed for any of the Muslims to impose more on them than has been specified in their treaty (*ṣulḥ*); and there is no *ṣulḥ* that contains any display of a call to disbelief, or of honoring it, in *dār al-Islām*. If the disbelievers in *dār al-Islām* transgress aggressively, this is considered a breach of their treaty from their side, and [the state of] war will return regarding them. Abdulrahman al-Sālimī and Wilferd Madelung, eds., *Early Ibāḍī Literature: Abu l-Mundhir Bashīr ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb:* Kitāb al-Raṣf fī l-tawḥīd, Kitāb al-muḥārabah *and* Sīra, vol. 75 of *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, ed. Florian C. Reiter (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2011), 36-37.

[72] *Bayān al-sharʿ* specifies, on the authority of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb:

> And from the book, in the answer of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb, may Allāh have mercy on him, about the Christians of Socotra and the treaty (*ṣulḥ*), can they terminate this *ṣulḥ*, or can the Muslims terminate it? He said, "Neither of the two groups can terminate it; they are both bound by their first treaty (*ṣulḥ*). They have to deduct, depending on the number of heads, who has the means for it; not the poor, nor the old, children, and women ..." al-Kindī, *Bayān al-sharʿ*, LXX, 355.

The 4th/10th century *faqīh* al-Bisyawī refers to the Socotra event in his *Jāmiʿ* within the discussion of buying slaves from *ahl al-ḥarb*:

aggression by a third party[73] or assaulting Muslim women.

VIII. Al-Sālimī's Text: The Letter and Its Interpretation

The following relies on the translation and interpretation of chosen excerpts of the letter. Al-Siyābī in his *ʿUmān ʿabra l-tārīkh* appraises the letter, as it contains thirty-five verses from the Qurʾān and the contents of more than one hundred prophetic hadīths, and does not leave unanswered any *fiqh* ruling concerning warfare.[74] I have chosen not to translate the Qurʾānic references due to the space limitations of this paper.

A. The Letter of Imām al-Ṣalt to His Army

The letter starts, after the proclamation of faith, with a general reminder of many aspects of Islamic rules and ethics, particularly those that may often be neglected in warfare:

> Repent to Allāh for the wrongdoings of the past, and be virtuous in what is left [of your lives] in that which pleases Him. Safeguard your religion, and do not sell your religion for your own or the worldly matters of others. Stay away from whatever is doubtful. Abstain from prohibited desires; lower your gaze lest you fall into illicit sexual relations; protect your intimate parts from what is prohibited (*ḥarām*), and keep your hands and tongues away from the lives, possessions, and honor of people, if you have no legal claim thereupon. Avoid bearing false witness, prohibited food and drink, bad companionship, and flattering the enemy; and return entrusted

> ... and it is not permissible to take the slaves of those who have taken *amān* with him; as it has already been said about the Christians of Socotra and the treaty (*ṣulḥ*) they were under; that neither they nor the Muslims can break the contract, and that they are all of them still under the first contract, and that [*jizyah* is levied] per head, from those who are affluent, [but] not from the poor, nor the elderly, nor children, nor women. Al-Bisyawī, *Jāmiʿ Abī l-Ḥasan al-Bisyawī*, IV, 147-148.

[73] "If the people under covenant (*ahl al-ʿahd*) assist *ahl al-ḥarb* in fighting against the Muslims, they have thereby broken their treaty": Khamīs ibn Saʿīd ibn ʿAlī ibn Masʿūd al-Shaqṣī, *Manhaj al-ṭālibīn wa-balāgh al-rāghibīn*, ed. Muḥammad Kamāl al-Dīn Imām (Muscat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyyah, 2011), X, 318.

[74] Al-Siyābī, *ʿUmān ʿabra-l-tārīkh*, 315.

goods to their owners.[75]

He also reminds them not to lie or to break a promise, and to perform prayer in its best form and with humility. He calls upon them to understand and accept the provisions (orders) that Allah has given, and not to falter in their obedience to Him for any reason, be it inclination or laziness, as this is a prerequisite for His assistance and victory over the enemy.[76]

The Imām informs his soldiers, whom he addresses as "*yā maʿshar al-shurāt wa-l-mudāfaʿah*," thereby referring to various divisions of the army,[77] of the authority of the people in charge over them as well as "all the people of Socotra, the people of peace and war (*ahl al-silm wa-l-ḥarb*)." Authority includes the collection of *zakāh* and *jizyah*, concluding treaties (*muṣālaḥah* and *musālamah*), and waging war on Christians who break their treaty with Muslims (*ahl al-nakth min al-naṣārá*) or on polytheists who attack Muslims, whether during travel or residence. Authority also entails jurisdiction; the distribution of one third of *ṣadaqāt*;[78] enabling women, when

---

75 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 170.

76 *Ibid.*, 171.

77 *Ibid.* The term *shārī* originally goes back to the Qurʾān 9:3, whereas the theme has a particular connotation in the Ibāḍī legacy; al-Rawas, "Early Islamic Oman," 144-145.; see also Amr Ennami, *Studies in Ibadhism (al-Ibāḍiyah)* (Muscat: Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, 2008), 339-340. From the imamate of al-Julandá ibn Masʿūd, the *shurāt*, a particularly motivated volunteer section of the army, were organized in groups of from 200 to 400 people under a tribal leader, overseen by a fully trained Baṣrī scholar. Wilkinson, *Imamate*, 183-185; al-ʿUbaydlī, *Ḥamlat al-Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik ʿalá jazīrat Suqaṭrá*; al-Rawas, "Early Islamic Oman," 179; The term *mudāfaʿah* (defenders) refers to a particular division of the army.

78 The term *ṣadaqāt* is usually used synonymously for *zakāh*; it seems to have been the interpretation of the Imām to distribute one-third of the *zakāh* among the poor people on the island, while two-thirds are to be brought back to him (cf. *Tuḥfah,* 180, where the same stipulation is made). This seems to be the particular interpretation of the Imām in terms of warfare and may be understood as his *ijtihād*. *Zakāh* money is to be distributed, according to the Qurʾān 9:60, among eight categories of recipients. The Imām does not mention the other categories of recipients, probably as these are already known and not applicable to the situation at hand. He therefore focuses on the one-third that ought to be distributed among the poor (*al-fuqarāʾ*). Along the same lines, al-Ṣalt's letter to

they cannot rely on their own guardians, to marry according to their wishes with a dowry of no less than four *dirham*s; guardianship over orphans and missing persons in financial matters; levying *zakāh* on the wealth of orphans; and implementing the right of maintenance for women.

In his letter, al-Ṣalt emphasizes the need to listen to and obey the two appointed leaders, Muḥammad ibn ʿAshīrah and Saʿīd ibn Shamlāl.[79] The authority of these military leaders is comprehensive and comparable to that of a governor. No mention of these military leaders is found in the biographical literature.[80] An ʿAshīrah ibn ʿAbd Allāh is mentioned as governor of Samāʾil during the rule of Imām Ghassān; it is, however, not verifiable if this is one and the same person.[81] It is striking that their tribal affiliation, although well known, is not mentioned, and this may be neither coincidence nor neglect. It may have been deliberately not mentioned so as to overcome any form of tribalism during the campaign.

Important to note here is that the letter is addressed to all the troops, not to the military leaders alone. This speaks to a high degree of transparency as well as to intentionality in creating a sense of a common destiny and shared responsibility: simple soldiers are thereby asked to take responsibility for their own and their leaders' actions.[82] The practice of appointing substitutes for the military leaders should they be killed or incapacitated is an important part of military strategy and goes back to the Prophet's practice at the battle of Mūtah in 8/629. On another level, it reveals that the Socotra campaign was a major event with an expected high toll among the troops.

The Imām explicitly calls upon his soldiers to consult and support their appointed leaders and to uphold the highest of ethics, even

---

the newly appointed *wālī* of Sohar (in *Tuḥfah*, 184ff.) specifies *zakāh* collection and mentions the distribution of one-third among the poor (see *Tuḥfah*, 190ff.); the distributors (*suʿāh*) are not to count their sustenance from that third, which indeed hints at another category mentioned in the Qurʾān, *al-ʿāmilīn ʿalayhā*: those in charge of collecting and distributing *zakāh*.

79 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 171-172.

80 Al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 54.

81 *Ibid.*

82 *Ibid.*, 57.

amongst themselves, in order to strengthen their solidarity. He points out the importance of abiding by the Islamic rules of brotherhood and solidarity, so as to be granted success and victory from Allah. With regard to military tactics, al-Ṣalt asks the troops to take care that the steersmen do not to let their boats disperse too far away from each other, and not to precede one another, so that they stay within calling reach: a vitally important command, given the number of boats and the limited means of communication at the time.

Once they reach the island, they are to discuss and consult among themselves, and hope that Allah does not let them unite in misguidance. Following the principle of consultation or *shūrá*, one of the basic distinctions of the Islamic political system, is a recurrent theme in this letter. Instead of instilling in his soldiers' lust for revenge, or activating stereotypical dehumanizing imagery of the enemy, which throughout the history of humankind has remained a rather common means to direct soldiers against their adversaries, the Imām expresses a distinctively Islamic approach:

> And convey to them, through your messengers, that they are safe (*āminūn*) as regards their lives, and women and children, and possessions, and that you abide by the prior covenant between them and the Muslims, through treaty (*ʿahd*), *dhimmah*, and *jizyah*, and that these will neither be broken nor changed. And ask them to bring you their *jizyah*.[83]

It seems to be the analysis of al-Ṣalt, either based on previous information or due to his political and strategic analysis, that some, but not all, of the Christians in Socotra have broken their treaty with the Muslims. He therefore builds on reminding the community of *ahl al-dhimmah* of their covenant with the Muslims, whereby the *jizyah* is a symbol of submission to Islamic rule; hence, he insists that *jizyah* must be brought to the army. To restore the security of Islamic rule is therefore the aim of the military envoy, rather than taking revenge for the events.

He further asks the troops to send to the insurgents people of their choice, and to choose from among the best and most trustworthy

[83] Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 174.

Muslims[84] two representatives, or if they cannot find two who meet the conditions, only one, and "ask them to convey to the insurgents, on my behalf and on yours, to enter Islam, perform prayers and pay *zakāh*, to respect the rights of Allah,[85] and abstain from disobeying Him; if they accept this, it is the better choice, and will erase whatever they have committed before."[86]

The order to choose two (or even one) trustworthy Muslims from the local population to be sent as negotiators to the insurgents may throw some light on the ethnic and religious demographics of the island's inhabitants; this order would only make sense if the local Muslims, who are supposedly and on the basis of the above-mentioned terminological distinction not affiliated with the Ibāḍī school, shared a language and/or ethnic background with the insurgent Christians, thereby facilitating negotiations. The key to understand this order may be that both Christians and non-Ibāḍī Muslims have Mahrī origins, as mentioned earlier.

In case they do not accept the offer to become Muslim, the insurgents are to be asked to repent, to return to their first covenant with the Muslims, and to release any Muslim women still in their hands. They are to be given a specified time limit for this. The Imām emphasizes that the Muslim envoys are not to marry from among the insurgents until all of the enslaved Muslim women are released. Those of the insurgent non-Muslims (*ahl al-ḥarb*) who submit, repent, and release the Muslim womenfolk are not to be killed; womenfolk and children are not to be enslaved, nor possessions taken; it is not permissible to betray them, whether in the short or long term. However, the troops are to make sure that these people do not evade and convince their fellow insurgents to follow their ways. *Jizyah* is to be taken from those people. *Jizyah* is not accepted, however, from those who want to send it, staying in their homes, without repenting their deeds. Those who do surrender are to be safe

---

[84] The term used here is *ahl al-ṣalāh*, "people of the prayer;" it is synonymously used with *ahl al-qiblah* in Ibāḍī terminology to designate Muslims of other schools.

[85] Under *ḥaqq Allāh*, as compared to *ḥaqq al-ʿibād*, fall those rights that target the general welfare, such as prescribed penalties (*ḥudūd*), *zakāh*, and expiations (*kaffārāt*); Majmūʿah min al-bāḥithīn, *Muʿjam muṣṭalaḥāt al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 2nd ed. (Salṭanat ʿUmān: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyyah, 2012), I, 266.

[86] Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 174.

in the captivity of the Muslims, with appropriate treatment in terms of food and drink, until they reach the *wālī* of the Muslims. This stipulation implies that legal action will be taken for the preceding rebellion.[87]

In case they refuse both options (accepting Islam or repenting from their deeds and returning to their initial covenant with the Muslims), and this refusal is established by two, or even one trustworthy person from among the Muslims (*ahl al-ṣalāh*) whose integrity in conveying information is trusted, al-Ṣalt orders his followers to fight them, inclusive of the permission to employ cunning ruses and to enslave women and those children born to them during the period in which the treaty was breached. Those born during the time of the treaty are not to be enslaved. He later stipulates that, in case of doubt about their time of birth, they are not to be enslaved.[88]

The pages of the letter that follow are filled with rulings concerning war booty. The Imām first emphasizes that no part of the booty, be it small or large, neither thread nor needle, is permissible for use; he underlines that it is prohibited (*ḥarām*) to have sexual

---

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] *Ibid.*, 179. The same ruling resonates in Ibāḍī *fiqh* compendia, such as Bashīr ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb's *Kitāb al-muḥārabah*: "As to those who commit aggression (*al-muḥāribūn*) after they had already entered peace and were under treaty, whosoever is born of their children during their state of breaking the treaty and annulling their *dhimmah* status is enslaved, regardless of whether they are Arabs or not; as for those who were born during the time of the covenant, they are not to be enslaved." Al-Sālimī, *Early Ibāḍī Literature*, 38. Cf. al-Shaqṣī's *Manhaj al-ṭālibīn*: "Whosoever from *ahl al-dhimmah* breaks their treaty, their blood is permissible, and their wealth is booty, their women and children who were born after the treaty was broken are enslaved." (V, 98).

Al-Kindī explicitly refers to Socotra in his *al-Muṣannaf*:

> Case Study. Abū ʿAbd Allāh, to Ghassān, about the women of the people of Socotra who broke their treaty: If a woman from them says, "I did not fight, and did not break any treaty," is it permissible to enslave women for the offenses committed by men? Yes, it is permissible to enslave their women, when they [the men] have waged war. Enslavement concerns women and those born after breaking the treaty, even if they have not waged war. This has been established in the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (pbuh). Al-Kindī, *al-Muṣannaf*, XI, 154.

intercourse with captured women (*sabāyā*); that embezzling from war booty is a shameful act and will be punished by hellfire.[89] Once the booty is sold, one fifth (*khums*)[90] is to be withheld by the people in charge of this, Muḥammad ibn ʿAshīrah, and Saʿīd ibn Shamlān, and in case something happens to them, Ḥāzim ibn Hammām, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn Yazīd, and ʿUmar ibn Tamīm would replace them. He reiterates mention of the people in charge as if to erase any doubt regarding their comprehensive authority. Captured women and children are to be brought to the Imām and not sold. During this time, they are to be sustained from the *khums*.[91]

At a later stage in the letter, he again refers to the distribution of booty: nothing may be kept of weapons, food, cattle or furniture, be it little or much: whatever cannot be carried is to be sold by Muḥammad ibn ʿAshīrah and Saʿīd ibn Shamlāl; the *khums* of it is to be sent to the Imām, while the remaining four-fifths are to be distributed in equal shares among those who participated in the war.[92] It is noteworthy that the letter does not refer to the discussion common in *fiqh* compendia on the shares for infantrymen versus cavalrymen; this is not an issue particular to the Ibāḍī school;[93] rather, it is more likely that the letter does not discuss it because al-Ṣalt's army did not rely on horses in this battle.

A distinctive feature in these orders is that, although the war booty is collected, whatever cannot be transported back to Oman is to be sold, the *khums* deducted, and equal shares of the remaining four-fifths allotted among the soldiers who partake in warfare. The Imām exempts captured women and children from this. They are not to be sold and obviously are not part of the soldiers' shares; sexual

---

89 For a discussion of defalcation from war booty (*ghulūl*) see Jumayyil ibn Khamīs al-Saʿdī, *Qāmūs al-sharīʿah al-ḥāwī ṭuruqahā al-wasīʿah: mawsūʿah ḍakhmah taḍumm tisʿīn juzʾan fī mukhtalaf funūn al-sharīʿah muqābalatan ʿalá makhṭūṭātihā* (Muscat: Maktabat al-Jīl al-Wāʿid, 2015), LXXXIX, 308.

90 *Khums*, one-fifth of the war booty, is to be allotted to *bayt al-māl* (the state treasury), to be distributed among specified groups: see Q 8:41.

91 "*min māl Allāh min al-ghanāʾim*" (al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 176); "*min māl Allāh min al-maghānim*" (al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 179).

92 *Ibid.*

93 Cf. al-Shaqṣī, who mentions a distribution of two shares to the cavalryman and one to the infantryman (*Manhaj al-ṭālibīn*, V, 95); see also the discussion in al-Saʿdī, *Qāmūs al-sharīʿah*, LXXXIX, 293-299.

intercourse with these women is prohibited. Generally referred to as *sabāyā*, the overall tenor of the *fiqh* compendia (of all schools) is that intercourse with captured women is permissible under certain conditions, among which that they are allotted in a soldier's share.[94] It seems to be the Imām's *ijtihād* to exempt women and children from the soldiers' shares.[95] Given the circumstances that triggered the campaign, in which Muslim women were captured, enslaved, and raped by the Christian insurgents, it seems that al-Ṣalt wants to emphasize the distinctively more ethical dimension of Islamic warfare in this regard.

In case of doubt concerning the insurgents' refusal of both options (Islam or repentance and surrender), no cunning ruses or killing are to be carried out, and no captives or booty are to be taken. Interestingly, the case of doubt is established through the witnesses: "If neither two men nor one of the Muslims whom you trust is available as a messenger to inform them of evidence against them and transmit their answer..."[96] This point is mentioned repeatedly, just as the three choices of Islam, repentance and return to the former treaty, or fighting are reiterated several times, as if to ascertain that the message reaches all of the soldiers involved.

---

[94] Anke Bouzenita, *ʿAbdarraḥmān al-Auzāʿī – ein Rechtsgelehrter des 2. Jahrhunderts d.H. und sein Beitrag zu den Siyar. Erarbeitet auf der Grundlage des k. ar-Radd ʿalā siyar al-Auzāʿī*, Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, Band 240 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001), 218-220.

[95] There is, however, an ambiguity in the letter; where it states on p. 179, "and whoever makes booty and womenfolk fall into his hands, he shall fear Allāh and not have intercourse with them, until he sells them and retains their price," whereas the previous order was that women and children in captivity are not to be sold, but sent to the Imām. The focus on the prohibition of intercourse is persistent, however. It is hoped that this ambiguity may be resolved through an analysis of the manuscript, should it be found. Al-Bisyawī specifies:

> And it was said that ʿUmar told his son: "Do not commit adultery, and do not have intercourse with a (captive women) from the booty, as it is not allowed for a man to have intercourse with a woman until she has been allotted to him in his share, and not before her womb is proven empty, and he teaches her the great ablution (*ghusl*) from the greater ritual impurity and he teaches her prayer and shaving her private parts (*ḥalq al-ʿānah*) after her conversion to Islam.'" *Jāmiʿ*, IV, 149.

[96] Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 176.

B. Fighting as the Last Resort

One of the most striking elements of this letter may be that, although the Imām dispatches his troops in great numbers to restore the island of Socotra to Islamic rule upon a breach of treaty and insurgence on the part of some Christian *dhimmī*, he still advises his troops to take the same steps that are taken during a military campaign to open a territory to Islam, rather than to wage a campaign of punishment or retribution: namely, to call them to Islam, and if they refuse, they are to pay the *jizyah* and thereby succumb to Islamic rule, and only to fight them when those two options are forfeited.[97] As the insurgents had already been under covenant and broke it, and the island of Socotra was legally under Islamic rule, al-Ṣalt could have advised his soldiers to fight, kill, and punish. In his legacy, military combat is definitely described as the last resort, and the Imām is adamant about seeing all the Islamic ethical standards of warfare applied if fighting were deemed necessary.

The strict adherence to giving these options of Islam, *dhimmah*, or fighting is pervasive in the *fiqh* literature of the Ibāḍī school.[98] Al-Kindī, author of *al-Muṣannaf*, refers to the Socotra case in his chapter on the people of the covenant, their treaty, breach of treaty, and the legal rules for both cases, in the dictum of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb, the content of which is identical with al-Ṣalt's legacy. Upon a breach of treaty, *ahl al-ḥarb* are first asked to embrace Islam; in case they decline, they are asked to return to the terms of treaty; in case they refuse, it is permissible to fight them, their lives and possessions are permissible, and those of their children born after breaking the treaty may be enslaved.[99] The same terms of *jizyah* are reiterated, again on the authority of Muḥammad ibn Mahbūb.[100]

---

97 Farḥāt al-Jaʿbīrī also draws a parallel to the sermons of Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq and his military leader, Abū Ḥamzah al-Shārī, which specify the Ibāḍī "law of jihād for the sake of Allāh," and this was implemented in all of their combats. al-Jaʿbīrī, *al-Tadwīn al-fiqhī*, 63.

98 Striking is the emphasis on the necessity for the call to Islam prior to any military action, be it against *mushrikūn* (polytheists), *murtaddūn* (renegades) or *bughāt* (rebels); cf. *Jāmiʿ Abī l-Ḥawwārī*, I, 78ff., and more particularly, *Jāmiʿ al-Faḍl Ibn al-Ḥawwārī*, II, 127-138.

99 Al-Kindī, *al-Muṣannaf*, XI, 150-157.

100 *Ibid.*, 153.

The *sīrah* of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb to the people of the Maghrib has an extensive discussion on the necessity to call every adversary to Islam before taking up any military action:

> The same applies to the polytheists, if the Muslims raid them, regardless of whether they are under *dhimmah* and covenant or not; so if they [the Muslims] enter their territory, they must neither kill, nor enslave, nor take spoils of war before they call them to Islam. If they called them, and they rejected the call, it is permissible to fight them, to enslave their children, and to take their possessions as spoils.[101]

The Imām also gives advice for the organization of warfare: the positioning and formation of lines and flanks, the possibility of setting up an ambush, and how to keep motivation high.[102] The motto of the soldiers should be "There is no deity but Allāh, and Muḥammad is His messenger; rule belongs only to Allāh, and no authority is due to whoever does not govern by what Allāh has revealed, in dissolution, disassociation and separation from all the enemies of Allāh."[103] With his reference to *barāʾah* (disavowal, disassociation), he uses themes of particular importance for the Ibāḍī school.[104]

Although no explicit reference is made to Ibāḍī teachings in the letter other than what can be inferred through the particular terminology, such as the above-mentioned focus on dissolution and disassociation (here: *khulʿan wa-barāʾatʿan*; usually *al-walāyah wa-l-barāʾah*: loyalty and disavowal), the letter mentions the Muslims in Oman as being in charge on the island:

---

[101] Kāshif, *al-Siyar wa-l-jawābāt*, 251; The part on warfare in this *sīrah* is not identical with the Imām's legacy.

[102] Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 177.

[103] *Ibid.*, 178.

[104] For reasons of space restrictions, I will not discuss the concept in this paper. For an explanation of the Ibāḍī system of *walāyah* and *barāʾah* see Ennami, *Studies in Ibadhism,* 286-309. Of the many Orientalist works on the topic, see Valerie J. Hoffman, "Ibāḍī Scholars on Association and Dissociation, from the 10th to the 21st Century," in *Ibāḍī Jurisprudence. Origins, Developments and Cases: Studies on Ibadism and Oman*, Barbara Michalak-Pikulska and Reinhard Eisener, eds., vol. 6 of *Studies on Ibadism and Oman*, Abdulrahman Al Salimi and Heinz Gaube, eds., 185-193; Yohei Kondo, "Ibāḍī Discussions on Conversion and Commitment," *Muslim World* 105, no. 2 (2015), 224-235, https://doi.org/10.1111/muwo.12093.

> If they (the army) reach them (the insurgents), they shall call them to Islam and to accept it; if they respond, it is accepted from them; and if they dislike it, they shall call them to be true to their covenant and return from insurgence to the rule of the Qurʾān and the rule of its people, the Muslims in Oman.[105]

The letter contains at least one particularly Omani phrase: "and say, as your brothers have said: 'Even if they beat us until we reach *al-Ghāf* in Oman, until we know that truth is with us, and falsehood with them, and that they are Satan's party, while you are the party of the Merciful'."[106] The saying may have been a proverb or a commonly shared reference in the third century; it could have been the name of a place at the time, or simply a reference to a typical and culturally significant species of Omani flora, the *ghāf* tree (*Prosopis cineraria*).

C. Nobody is Left Behind

Subsequently, the letter discusses a topic of high social importance for any traumatized society that has just overcome a state of civil war, military intervention, or occupation. The Imām specifies that children already born of or to be born of the Muslim women enslaved by the enemy are Muslims like their mothers and do not follow their fathers (in descent or religion), even if the fathers enter or return under the covenant with the Muslims.[107]

The first important message is that children born under these circumstances – wherein their mothers have been enslaved and probably raped – are considered to be part of the Muslim community. This detail in a public address to the soldiers is highly significant, as it emphasizes societal solidarity with these women and their innocent children and is intended to remove the social stigma from them. Interestingly, neither contemporary nor later treatises on war-related topics raise this particular issue with a comparable openness. Al-Ṣalt's order in this regard can only be described as exceptionally farsighted. At the same time the Imām does not lose sight of the fate of potential female prisoners of war, for he explicitly prohibits sexual relations with them. The measures he recommends are intended to restore

---

105 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 176-177.

106 *Ibid.,* 178.

107 *Ibid.*, 179.

internal peace and coherence to a society in the aftermath of civil war.

The letter further stipulates that, should any of the enslaved Muslim women have apostatized from Islam, she is to be forcefully returned to it.[108] With regard to the rule on apostasy (*irtidād*), the Ibāḍī school, like the majority Sunnī schools, but unlike the Ḥanafī school, does not appear to differentiate between male and female apostates in terms of punishment.[109] The mentioned "forceful return" to Islam seems to be the Imām's *ijtihād* with regard to these women, whom he deems to have been forced into Christianity by enslavement.

The Imām continues with the description of other prohibitions during warfare that are reminiscent of the Sunnah of the Prophet and of Abū Bakr's orders to the military leaders who entered Syria:

> If war rages between them and you, do not kill a small child, nor an old man or a woman, other than an old man or a woman who assisted [the enemy] in fighting. Do not mutilate whomever you have killed during warfare, as the Messenger of Allāh, may peace be upon him, prohibited mutilation.[110]

It can clearly be inferred from the letter that al-Ṣalt considers Socotra as *dār al-Islām*; after ordering his troops to distribute one-third of the collected *zakāh* money among the poor on the island according to their discretion and return the remaining two-thirds to him, he emphasizes, "It is my firm point of view that this is your position in the village, as the governors of the Muslims had already settled there before you."[111] Another point indicating this is that he orders his troops to perform the "unshortened" complete prayer

---

[108] *Ibid.*

[109] See al-Kindī, *al-Muṣannaf*, XI, 189ff., and al-Saʿdī, *Qāmūs al-sharīʿah*, XC, 12ff.

[110] Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 179-180. Compare the stipulations in Bashīr ibn Muḥammad's *Kitāb al-muḥārabah*:

> The Messenger of Allāh (pbuh) has established the *sunnah* that "war takes place only after the call to Islam," and he "forbade defalcation" and "mutilation," as well as "killing the aged man, women, and children," and the messengers of the people of war and whosoever came to the Muslims from them with *amān*, as long as their messenger and whoever does not have a covenant (*ʿahd*) with them does not annul the *amān* by aggression (al-Sālimī, *Early Ibāḍī Literature*, 36).

[111] Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 180.

while they are "in the village," meaning in a settlement, while they should pray the combined and shortened prayers (*jamʿ* and *qaṣr*) once they "leave the village" by a distance of two *farsakh*. Again, the Imām's *ijtihād* has been incorporated here, as it is the teaching of the *madhhab* that two *farsakh* or 12 km is the minimum distance for shortening the obligatory prayers (which becomes the basic rule [*ʿazīmah*], while combining the prayers is optional [*rukhṣah*]). Al-Ṣalt orders both, most likely due to the rather unsettled circumstances typical of warfare.[112]

Al-Ṣalt then expounds on the details of performing prayers during wartime (*ṣalāt al-ḥarb*),[113] and again reminds his soldiers of the general Islamic ethics of warfare: "I advise you to fear Allāh, and do not sell any weapons in Socotra;[114] do not drink *nabīdh*, and none of you shall approach any woman without marriage, do not insult each other, and let not your meetings be engaged in senseless distraction, amusement, jest, or lying." Al-Ṣalt gives explicit permission to the leaders of the expedition, whom he names again, individually, to cut ties with those soldiers who are evidentially involved in any of these crimes, or who have inflicted harm on any Muslim or associated themselves with any of their enemies. These are to be ousted from the army and refused financial assistance; their weapons are to be confiscated. Even in this case, repentance is possible and will be accepted, upon which they are to be alimented, but decisions (about individual cases) will be taken upon their return to the Imām.[115] The responsibility of the Imām to investigate any transgression against lives or property on behalf of his army is emphasized in the *fiqh*

---

[112] It ought to be noted that the letter uses the terms *al-ʿishāʾ* and *al-ʿatmah* in discussing the combination of two prayers (al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 180); this may be a mistake in the letter or its printed version, as both terms are used synonymously to designate the last prayer. It should have been *al-maghrib* and *al-ʿishāʾ* or *al-maghrib* and *al-ʿatmah* instead. For the rules of *ṣalāt al-safar* in the Ibāḍī school, see *Muʿjam muṣṭalaḥāt al-Ibāḍiyyah*, I, 446.

[113] Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 180; See also Abū Muḥammad ibn Jaʿfar al-Izkawī, *al-Jāmiʿ*, ed. ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿĀmir (Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth wa-l-Shuʿūn al-Islāmiyyah, 1981), II, 365.

[114] On the sale of weapons in enemy territory see also al-Saʿdī, *Qāmūs al-sharīʿah*, LXXXVIII, 420ff.

[115] Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 181.

literature.[116] Obviously, as is evident from the recommended interaction with the repenting insurgents, army leaders do not have the authority to implement *ḥudūd* or even *taʿzīr* punishments during times of warfare, because any related decision will be taken by the Imām. This may be commensurate with the limited authority of the *wālī* that is apparent from al-Ṣalt's previously mentioned letter to the governor of Rustaq,[117] and constitutes further evidence of the centralized style of governance on the part of the Imām.

Al-Ṣalt also concedes that any Muslim (*min ahl al-ṣalāh*) man, woman, or child from the people of Socotra who wishes to come to the "lands of the Muslims" – and he obviously refers to Oman – may do so. There is no discrimination with regard to *madhhab* affiliation. The same applies to children of the *shurāt* and those (non-Muslims) who assisted the Muslims. They are to be transported and supported from the state treasury *(māl Allāh*; here: *al-khums*) until they reach the land of the Muslims "... because that territory (*dār*) is not suitable for them after war has been waged between us and them [the enemy]."[118] This insightful decision takes the loss of rulership over the island into account; in al-Ṣalt's calculations, Socotra may revert to *dār al-ḥarb* after the campaign.

With regard to (Muslims') marrying Christian women from the people of Socotra, al-Ṣalt emphasizes that only those women of the Christians under covenant who read the Gospel may be married; the same restriction applies to the consumption of slaughtered animals and food, while the Muslims must not marry women of the insurgents (*ahl al-ḥarb*), whether they read the Gospel or not.[119]

In his *Kitāb min al-sunnah mukhtaṣarah*, Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb, the writer (and probably author) of this letter, mentions that marrying the free women of *ahl al-kitāb* is discouraged (*makrūh*), due to its prohibition by ʿUmar.[120] He probably refers to the case of

---

116 See al-Kindī, *al-Muṣannaf*, III, 140ff.

117 Hāshim, *al-Ḥarakah al-Ibāḍiyyah*, 221; this also corresponds to Muḥammad ibn Mahbūb's view in *al-Siyar wa-l-jawābāt*, 239.

118 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 182.

119 *Ibid.*, 182.

120 Sulaymān ibn Ibrāhīm Bābzīz al-Warjalānī, *al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb al-Ruḥaylī, ḥayātuhū wa-āthāruhū (t. 260 AH)* [Commentary on *Abwāb min al-*

Ḥudhayfah, whom ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb had asked to divorce the Jewish woman he had married in al-Madāʾin. The author adds, "The marriage of female slaves from *ahl al-kitāb* is prohibited (*ḥarām*)."[121]

Generally, the prohibition is vocalized with regard to marrying a *kitābiyyah* who does not live under Islamic rule, with differences of opinion among the Ibāḍī scholars.[122] It is therefore interesting that the distinction focused on here is the level of religiosity subsequent to the condition of being under covenant; this seems to be the particular interpretation of al-Ṣalt. Interesting also is the lack of differentiation between slaughtered animals and other food.[123]

Al-Ṣalt continues:

> Whatever is doubtful to you and you do not find the answer to it in narrations (*athar*), in the Qurʾān (*Kitāb*) or Sunnah, or in this letter, abstain from making a decision about it until you submit it to me, Allāh willing. If the matter between you and your enemy extends to the African coastline (*raʾs al-zinj*), take it out there; and if the matter between them and you has been decided, do not violate your agreement, Allāh willing. Should the matter not be decided up to Tabramah, then take it as far as Tabramah,[124] Allāh willing. I hope that you will have enough food to last you until then, Allāh willing.
>
> Do not differ in your opinions, whether in peace or war; and your consent shall be one, and your anger one, your friend and foe should be one, all the same, as is your blood.[125]

He ends his advice with a prolonged supplication for their success.

---

sunnah mukhtaṣarah] (Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 2009), 234.

121 Al-Warjalānī, *al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb al-Ruḥaylī*, 234.

122 Al-Aghbarī, *ʿAhd al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 93.

123 Al-Saʿdī in his *Qāmūs al-sharīʿah* mentions the same distinction: meat slaughtered by *ahl al-kitāb* may be consumed if they read the Gospels (XXXV, 82-83). As opposed to this, Bashīr ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb states, "… and Allāh has permitted to eat the slaughtered animals from *Ahl al-kitāb*, and to marry the chaste of their women (*muḥṣanāt*), and prohibited the same from the *Majūs*." Al-Sālimī, *Early Ibāḍī Literature*, 37.

124 Tabramah could be the name of a town called Barmah on the East African coast, see al-Riyāmī, *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt*, 67.

125 Al-Sālimī, *Tuḥfah*, 182.

Conclusions and Implications

The letter of Imām al-Ṣalt is a unique document on international relations in the 3rd/9th century, from several perspectives. It sheds light on the *fiqh* rulings of relations with people under covenant in the particular case of their transgression and breach of a treaty. Warfare is portrayed as the last resort after all other possibilities have been exhausted, even in a highly emotionally sensitive situation. Even then, ethical standards are to be rigorously observed. The letter does not invoke any form of stereotypical denigration of the enemy, as this adversary may, through repentance and conversion, eventually become part of the Muslim community.

The messages of the letter seem to anticipate many rather modern deliberations. The focus on the fate of women under occupation, the need to liberate them from their oppressors, and the acceptance of their children, most likely conceived as a consequence of rape, as part of the Muslim community, are groundbreaking measures intended to restore peace and harmony within the society. At the same time, the order to respect the dignity of female non-Muslim prisoners by not allowing them to be subjected to a comparable fate is unusually farsighted and in contrast to the common practices of conquering armies worldwide.

Moreover, the letter gives insight into the military organization of the army in al-Ṣalt's imamate: demanding a high level of Islamic ethical standards from the soldiers, imbuing them with the spirit of individual and communal responsibility, as well as imposing a great degree of transparency. Decisions are to be taken through mutual consultation. Transgression against the rules is expressly forbidden, and the high ethical standard set by Imām al-Ṣalt means that what might pass for a minor offense in other contexts would constitutes a transgression here; nevertheless, the perpetrator always has an option to return to the fold of the community through repentance.

The letter is reminiscent of the rulings of Islamic law found in any *fiqh* compendium, with some Ibāḍī interpretations and Omani particularities. It also allows an assessment of the relations between Ibāḍī Muslims and those following other legal schools in the 3rd/9th century, wherein no discrimination affecting rights and duties is found.

The historical details with regard to some of the circumstances of the campaign will remain at least partly unknown unless new sources on the period are uncovered; nevertheless, it has been possible to reconstruct, through the letter and its stipulations, the general spirit of the age and the region with regard to Muslim-Christian and international relations. On a final note, the survival of the dicta of the letter, on the authority of Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb, in the *fiqh* books of the Ibāḍī school asserts the scholar's importance and role in al-Ṣalt's imamate.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to my colleagues and postgraduate students at the department of Islamic Sciences, College of Education, Sultan Qaboos University, for their interest and willingness to discuss many details of this paper with me. I am also indebted to Dr. ʿAlī al-Riyāmī, Dept. of History, SQU, for a copy of his book, and to Dr. Nāṣir al-Nadābī, expert at the Ministry of Education, Sultanate of Oman, for his valuable advice on some historical aspects of the topic.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

al-Aghbarī, Ismāʿīl ibn Ṣāliḥ ibn Ḥamdān. "ʿAhd al-Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik wa-ʿumuquhū l-ḥaḍārī." In *Aʿmāl nadwat taṭawwur al-ʿulūm al-fiqhiyyah fī ʿUmān. Al-Fiqh al-ḥaḍārī, fiqh al-ʿumrān,* 73-104. Muscat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyyah, 2012.

al-Bār, Muḥammad ʿAlī. "Yawm al-Muʿtaṣim fī ʿAmūriyyah wa-yawm al-Ṣalt fī Suqaṭrá," *Star Times*, 02.06.2009. http://www.startimes.com/?t=17172523. Accessed August 8, 2017.

al-Anbālī, Aḥmad ibn Saʿīd ibn Khamīs. "Tārīkh jazīrat Suqaṭrá." n.p., n.d. http://www.soqotra.org/books/ahmedalanbali/historysocotrailand.pdf. Accessed September 25, 2017.

Bābā ʿAmmī, Muḥammad ibn Mūsá, Ibrāhīm ibn Bakīr Bahāz, Muṣṭafá ibn Ṣāliḥ Bājū, and Muṣṭafá ibn Muḥammad Sharīfī. *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah min al-qarn*

al-awwal al-hijrī ilá l-ʿaṣr al-ḥāḍir: Qism al-maghrib al-Islāmī. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2000.

al-Baṭṭāshī, Muḥammad ibn Shāmis. *Salāsil al-dhahab fī l-furūʿ wa-l-fuṣūl*. Salṭanat ʿUmān: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 2002.

al-Bisyawī, Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī. *Jāmiʿ Abī l-Ḥasan al-Bisyawī*. Salṭanat ʿUmān: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1984.

Bouzenita, Anke. *ʿAbdarraḥmān al-Auzāʿī – ein Rechtsgelehrter des 2. Jahrhunderts d.H. und sein Beitrag zu den Siyar. Erarbeitet auf der Grundlage des k. ar-Raddʿalá siyar al-Auzāʿī*. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, Band 240. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001.

———. *The Political Legacy of Abd al-Raḥmān al-Awzāʿī*. Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Malaysia, 2008.

Ennami, Amr. *Studies in Ibadhism (al-Ibāḍiyah)*. Muscat: Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, 2008.

al-Ḥamawī, Shihāb al-Dīn Yāqūt al-Rūmī al-Baghdādī. *Muʿjam al-buldān*. 5 vols. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977.

al-Hamdānī, Lisān al-Yaman al-Ḥasan ibn Aḥmad ibn Yaʿqūb. *Ṣifat jazīrat al-ʿArab*. Edited by Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Akwaʿ al-Ḥawālī. Cairo: Dār al-Āfāq al-ʿArabiyyah, 2001.

al-Ḥārthī, Saʿīd ibn Ḥamad ibn Sulaymān. "Muqaddimah." In *al-Yusrá fī inqādh jazīrat Suqaṭrá*, by Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh and Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥumayd al-Sālimī, 1-3. Muscat: Maktabat al-Ḍāmirī li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1992.

Hāshim, Mahdī Ṭālib. *al-Ḥarakah al-Ibāḍiyyah fī l-mashriq al-ʿArabī*. 2nd ed. London: Dār al-Ḥikmah, 2003.

al-Hāshimī, Saʿīd ibn Muḥammad. "Qirāʾah fī sīrat al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb ilá ahl al-Maghrib." In *Aʿmāl nadwat taṭawwur al-ʿulūm al-fiqhiyyah*, 95-111. Muscat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyyah, 2002.

Hoffman, Valerie J. "Ibāḍī Scholars on Association and Dissociation, from the 10th to the 21st Century." In *Ibāḍī Jurisprudence: Origins, Developments and Cases,* edited by Barbara Michalak-Pikulska and Reinhard Eisener, vol. 6 of *Studies on Ibadism and Oman*, edited by Abdulrahman Al Salimi and Heinz Gaube, 185-193. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2015.

Ibn al-Ḥawwārī, al-Faḍl. *Jāmiʿ al-Faḍl ibn al-Ḥawwārī*. Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1985.

Ibn al-Ḥawwārī, Muḥammad. *Jāmiʿ Abī l-Ḥawwārī*. Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1985.

al-Izkawī, Abū Muḥammad ibn Jaʿfar. *al-Jāmiʿ*. Edited by ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿĀmir. Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyyah, 1981.

al-Jaʿbīrī, Farḥāt ibn ʿAlī. "Al-Tadwīn al-fiqhī: al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb namūdhajan." In *Aʿmāl nadwat taṭawwur al-ʿulūm al-fiqhiyyah,* 17-71. Muscat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyyah, 2002.

———. *Shakhṣiyyāt Ibāḍiyyah*. al-Sīb, Oman: Maktabat al-Ḍāmirī li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2010.

Kāshif, Sayyidah Ismāʿīl, ed. *al-Siyar wa-l-jawābāt li-ʿulamāʾ wa-aʾimmat ʿUmān*. Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1986.

al-Kindī, Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Mūsá al-Nizwānī. *Al-Muṣannaf fī l-adyān wa-l-aḥkām*. 42 vols. Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1984.

———. *Kitāb al-ihtidāʾ wa-l-muntakhab min sīrat al-Rasūl (a.ṣ.s.) wa-aʾimmat wa-ʿulamāʾ ʿUmān*. Edited by Sayyidah Ismāʿīl Kāshif. Salṭanat ʿUmān: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1985.

al-Kindī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. *Bayān al-sharʿ*. 71 vols. Salṭanat ʿUmān: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 1993.

al-Kiyūmī, Sulaymān ibn Saʿīd ibn Ḥabīb. "Maṣādir al-Shaykh al-Sālimī wa-manhajuhū fī l-kitābah al-tārīkhiyyah min khilāl kitābat 'Tuḥfat al-aʿyān bi-sīrat ahl ʿUmān'." Master's thesis, Muscat: Sultan Qaboos University, 2009.

Kondo, Yohei. "Ibāḍī Discussions on Conversion and Commitment." *Muslim World* 105, no. 2 (2015): 224-235. https://doi.org/10.1111/muwo.12093.

Majmūʿah min al-bāḥithīn. *Muʿjam muṣṭalaḥāt al-Ibāḍiyyah*. 2 vols. 2nd ed. Salṭanat ʿUmān: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyyah, 2012.

al-Masʿūdī, Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī. *Murūj al-dhahab wa-maʿādin al-jawhar*. 4 vols. Introduction and commentary by Mufīd Muḥammad Qumayḥah. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1986.

al-Nabhānī, Badriyyah bint Muḥammad ibn Shāmis. "Āl al-Ruḥayl wa-dawruhum al-siyāsī wa-l-fikrī fī ʿUmān min al-qarn 3h/8m - 4H/10M." PhD Diss., Muscat: Sultan Qaboos University, 2017.

al-Nadābī, Nāṣir. "Imāmat al-Imām al-ʿUmānī al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik al-Kharūṣī." Public lecture held at Markaz Dār al-Qurʾān, al-Sīb, Oman. Video published Feb 8, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSo43_R-2nc.

Nāṣir, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, and Ṣulṭān ibn Mubārak al-Shaybānī. *Muʿjam aʿlām al-Ibāḍiyyah min al-qarn al-awwal al-hijrī ilā l-ʿaṣr al-ḥāḍir: Qism al-mashriq*. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2006.

al-Rawas, Isam Ali Ahmad. "Early Islamic Oman (ca. -622/280-893): A Political History." PhD diss., Durham: Durham University, 1990.

al-Rawwāḥī, Sālim ibn Muḥammad ibn Sālim. *al-Imāmah wa-l-aʾimmah fī ʿUmān*. Muscat: Maktabat al-Ḍāmirī li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2016.

al-Riyāmī, ʿAlī ibn Saʿīd. *Qaḍiyyat ʿazl al-Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik al-Kharūṣī*. Muscat: Bayt al-Ghashshām li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tarjamah, 2015.

al-Saʿdī, Jumayyil ibn Khamīs. *Qāmūs al-sharīʿah al-ḥāwī ṭuruqahā al-wasīʿah: mawsūʿah ḍakhmah taḍumm tisʿīn juzʾan fī mukhtalaf funūn al-sharīʿah muqābalat*^{an} *ʿalá makhṭūṭātihā*. 90 vols. Muscat: Maktabat al-Jīl al-Wāʿid, 2015.

al-Sālimī, Abdulrahman and Wilferd Madelung, eds. *Early Ibāḍī Literature: Abu l-Mundhir Bashīr ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb:* Kitāb al-Raṣf fī l-tawḥīd*,* Kitāb al-muḥārabah *and* Sīra. Vol. 75 of *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*. Edited by Florian C. Reiter. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2011.

al-Sālimī, Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥumayyid. *Tuḥfat al-aʿyān bi-sīrat ahl ʿUmān*. 2 vols. Edited by Abū Isḥāq Aṭfayyish. Rūwī, Muscat: al-Maṭābiʿ al-Dhahabiyyah, 1983.

al-Shaqṣī, Khamīs ibn Saʿīd ibn ʿAlī ibn Masʿūd. *Manhaj al-ṭālibīn wa-balāgh al-rāghibīn*. 10 vols. in 5 vols. Edited and commented by Muḥammad Kamāl al-Dīn Imām. Muscat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Dīniyyah, 2011.

al-Shaqṣiyyah, Badriyyah bint Ḥamad. *al-Sīrah al-zakiyyah li-l-marʾah al-Ibāḍiyyah*. Muscat: Maktabat al-Jīl al-Wāʿid, 2014.

al-Shaybānī, Sulṭān ibn Mubārak. *Muʿjam aʿlām al-nisāʾ al-Ibāḍiyyāt (qism al-mashriq)*. al-Sīb, Oman: Maktabat al-Sayyid Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad, 2001.

———. *Amālī l-turāth. Naẓarāt naqdiyyah wa-qirāʾāt fī jadīd al-turāth al-ʿUmānī makhṭūṭihī wa-maṭbūʿihī*. Muscat: Dhākirat ʿUmān, 2015.

al-Siyābī, Sālim ibn Ḥammūd ibn Shāmis. *ʿUmān ʿabra-l-tārīkh*. 2 vols. 5th ed. Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth wa-l-Thaqāfah, 2014.

al-ʿUbaydlī, Aḥmad. "Ḥamlat al-Imām al-Ṣalt ibn Mālik ʿalá jazīrat Suqaṭrá wa-l-ʿalāqāt al-ʿUmāniyyah al-Mihriyyah." *Nizwá: Majallah faṣliyyah thaqāfiyyah* 13 (January 1998), 96-102.

al-Warjalānī, Sulaymān ibn Ibrāhīm Bābzīz. *al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Maḥbūb al-Ruḥaylī, ḥayātuhū wa-āthāruhū (t. 260 AH)* [Commentary on *Abwāb min al-sunnah mukhtaṣarah*]. Muscat: Wizārat al-Turāth al-Qawmī wa-l-Thaqāfah, 2009.

ON THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL DIALECTIC" OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ REGARDING PHILOSOPHERS, OR DID IBN SĪNĀ DRINK WINE?

Mehmet Birgül

Bursa Uludağ University, Bursa-Turkey
mfbirgul@uludag.edu.tr
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9404-6266

Abstract

Al-Ghazālī, one of the most influential figures in the history of Islamic thought, criticized the prominent religious paradigms of his day. In this regard, his settling of accounts with philosophers from whom he benefitted in terms of methodology is particularly significant and consists of three stages: first, the identification; then, the description; and finally, the judgment of the philosophers by means of dialectic criticism. There are comprehensive studies on the theoretical aspects of this struggle between al-Ghazālī and the philosophers; nevertheless, his psychological dialectic, which he advances in a manner that addresses the common feelings of Muslims, is often overlooked. This paper examines al-Ghazālī's allegation that Ibn Sīnā used to drink wine, since it is one of the most impressive examples of the conception that al-Ghazālī tried to establish regarding philosophers and philosophy by showing how weak the relationship is between philosophers and Islam. The objective is to obtain a deeper view of the content and construction of al-Ghazālī's psychological dialectic.

Ilahiyat Studies p-ISSN: 1309-1786 / e-ISSN: 1309-1719
Volume 10 Number 1 Winter / Spring 2019 DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2019.101.189

Received: June 2, 2019 *Accepted*: September 13, 2019 *Published*: November 27, 2019

To cite this article: Birgül, Mehmet. "On the 'Psychological Dialectic' of al-Ghazālī Regarding Philosophers, or Did Ibn Sīnā Drink Wine?" *Ilahiyat Studies* 10, no. 1 (2019): 47-97. https://doi.org/10.12730/13091719.2019.101.189

Key Words : Islamic philosophy, tradition of incoherence (*tahāfut*), al-Ghazālī, Ibn Sīnā, Avicenna.

Introduction

Al-Ghazālī (b. 448/1053, d. 505/1111) has been one of the most competent authorities in the Sunnī tradition since his lifetime and particularly during the Seljukian and Ottoman eras. Even today, al-Ghazālī is the principal reference for the ranks of preachers and religious scholars who are influential with the public, especially in relation to Sufism.

When the world of Islam underwent the process of colonization in the 19th century, it truly confronted the modern West, and this confrontation brought along intellectual depression and inquiries; due to his abovementioned characteristics, al-Ghazālī was, not surprisingly, one of the central figures in this period. The issue became even more prominent since "technology," "science," and, evidently, "philosophy" were the most important problems in the modern era with regard to religious essences and the inseminated values of Islam. Indeed, in terms of the relationship between intellect and revelation (*al-ʿaql* and *al-waḥy*), al-Ghazālī advanced a severe and profound criticism of the philosophical and scientific tradition of his time; his critical perspective, which takes shape particularly in *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* (*The Incoherence of the Philosophers*), created a strong tradition that has extended from his time to our day. As indicated above, al-Ghazālī is still the main reference for current responses generated by today's scholars and preachers, who form the conception of Islam among the public and who often represent the conventional Sunnī paradigm with regard to "philosophical thought" or the "position of scientific knowledge."

On the other hand, the authority of al-Ghazālī does not merely consist in his scientific competence. His struggle with the philosophers is not limited to theoretical aspects. Indeed, he opted to show his foes as sinners and even hypocrites who are not at all pious and who do not abide by the commandments and prohibitions of Islam in the eyes of devout Muslim consciousness. We will call this attitude the "psychological dialectic."

The theoretical criticisms of al-Ghazālī have been influential in intellectual circles; *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* became one of the essential references that nourished Sunnī kalām against the Mashshāʾī philosophy for centuries. Nevertheless, the physics and metaphysics discussed in *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* have evidently become rather meaningless in the Muslim world, which has been confronted by the modern West. However, the primarily negative core of al-Ghazālī's comments about "philosophy" and "philosophers" survives in a strong manner, particularly among conservative Muslims.

This paper analyzes the "psychological dialectic" with the case of Ibn Sīnā, since we think that the example is capable of explaining how al-Ghazālī still influences assessments of "philosophical thought" and "philosopher" among the average scholars and the public.

I.

Al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl (*Deliverance from Error*) deserves closer attention with regard to this theme, since it is one of the last works by al-Ghazālī and includes extensive autobiographical information. *Deliverance* shows that there are two aspects of the struggle between al-Ghazālī and the philosophers. The first one is a theoretical dialectic and consists of two stages: recognition and cognition, and al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifah* (*Aims of the Philosophers*) corresponds to the first aspect. The second aspect is advanced in *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*, where the theoretical criticism actually becomes apparent. The methodological similarity between al-Ghazālī and modern orientalism is striking, as it functions in recognition, definition, and transformation, although this similarity is irrelevant for the subject of this paper; indeed, such a similarity deserves a separate, comprehensive analysis.

In any case, a closer look at the introduction of *al-Munqidh* reveals certain problems. For example, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifah*, which belongs to the stage of recognition, is an almost literal Arabic translation of *Dānishnāma-ʾi ʿAlāʾī* written by Ibn Sīnā in Persian; nonetheless, al-Ghazālī tries to present this work as if it belongs entirely to him. Therefore, another significant problem appears. In fact, al-Ghazālī explains his purpose in writing the *Maqāṣid* as an ordered and concise introduction to the sciences of the philosophers. However, there is a mystery in need of clarification as to why al-Ghazālī – at the cost of a kind of plagiarism of Ibn Sīnā – took the

pain of writing a work to explain the knowledge/sciences of the philosophers, instead of the clear, comprehensible, systematic, and even popular texts such as *al-Najāt* or *ʿUyūn al-ḥikmah* of Ibn Sīnā.

Maqāṣid al-falāsifah of al-Ghazālī was probably grounded in his notes on the *Dānishnāma-ʾi ʿAlāʾī* of Ibn Sīnā and the work was therefore not original; nevertheless, the originality of *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*, which corresponds to the second stage and which is constructed with a systematic dialectic, is unquestionable. Indeed, al-Ghazālī evidently attained a certain success by demonstrating that certain essential judgments of Mashshāʾī metaphysics, which he considers controversial in Islamic faith, are not apodeictical; in other words, the judgements are not based on conclusive evidence or, at least, al-Ghazālī obtained such a status in the history of Islamic thought. By means of this work, the point of view that positions religion in terms of philosophy, an approach often observed in al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, was damaged, and al-Ghazālī paved the way for the possibility of positioning philosophy according to religion in a persuasive manner. However, despite all its glory, is this powerful theoretical dialectic sufficient on its own to explain the profound influence of al-Ghazālī's criticism of the philosophers for centuries?

Certainly, a serious philosophical education is required to read and comprehend *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*. Consequently, it is highly difficult to assert that even the medium and lower group of preachers, who are particularly influential with the common people, let alone the common people, evaluated and eventually refused the content of Mashshāʾī metaphysics and its position in relation to Islam after duly analyzing and understanding *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*.

Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī seems to be very successful in ensuring that the words "philosophy" and particularly "philosopher" are understood as almost non-Islamic or even anti-Islamic among average Sunnī scholars, preachers, and the public. If his theoretical dialectic is not sufficient to explain the secret of this achievement, where else should we look for the correct answer?

To answer the above question, it is necessary to pay attention to the third stage that is inherent in the introduction by al-Ghazālī, although it is not directly mentioned: first, recognition and comprehension; second, criticism through the theoretical dialectic; and finally, definition and introduction. The first two stages, as indicated above, require a certain level of philosophical knowledge

and accordingly address the upper intellectual classes. The final stage in turn particularly addresses the common people with weak theoretical thinking and education.

The style of struggle referred to here as a "psychological dialectic" comes to light at the stage of "definition and introduction." In *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*, al-Ghazālī examines a total of twenty carefully chosen problems: he shows the refutability of the philosophers' assertions through his theoretical dialectic and puts them into a dismissible position due to their lack of reasonable certitude. In the end, al-Ghazālī demonstrates that the arguments of the philosophers that contradict the explicit statements in revelation – such as the issue of *istiwā'* – definitely lack the capacity to lead to an elucidation (*ta'wīl*) of the dogmas. Thus, al-Ghazālī locates himself in a position from which he definitely determines the position of the philosophers with regard to Islam and considers the philosophers to be outside of Islam by declaring them unbelievers (*takfīr*) regarding three metaphysical issues.

At this point, it is worth noting that the excommunication or *takfīr* of philosophers by al-Ghazālī consists of two layers: faith-related excommunication, which becomes possible by means of theoretical dialectic, essentially comprises the quality of an explanation and legitimization with regard to the intellectual class. On the other hand, al-Ghazālī is not content with a faith-related excommunication of philosophers: he also sees and shows them as being outside of Islam in terms of their acts and deeds.

The "psychological dialectic" appears in this second layer. Whenever al-Ghazālī mentions philosophers, he repeats that the philosophers do not abide by the commandments and prohibitions of sharī'ah; according to him, this indifference is due to their peculiar conception of "religion" and "prophethood" in light of their metaphysics. This description, which will be discussed below in a more comprehensive manner and which is repeated on numerous occasions, can be summarized as follows: The philosophers believe that they attain "wisdom" not through imitation but through their own reason. Their sciences and disciplines, such as mathematics, physics, and metaphysics, and above all logic, both lead to and nourish this misleading self-confidence of the philosophers. Indeed, sciences that are methodological, such as logic, or that are based on exact argumentation, such as mathematics, steer the philosophers towards

the misconception that they also possess exact knowledge in metaphysics. Accordingly, philosophers are convinced that sharīʿah, which is postulated by the prophets to restrain the common people and to prevent people from engaging in conflicts and murders because ambitions and desires are the origin of evil, are not binding on the philosophers. Indeed, philosophers think that they attain truth in apodeictical terms, beyond the addresses of the prophets to the common people. Therefore, even if an expert in philosophy appears to be Muslim to the outer world, in other words, even if he worships, reads the Qurʾān and praises the sharīʿah, he cannot refrain from committing major sins (*fisq*). Indeed, a man of philosophy has not internalized the commandments and prohibitions of sharīʿah, and he appears to be Muslim only for the sake of his social status and safety.

However, it is easy to determine that the above arguments by al-Ghazālī are not based on theoretical thinking. In fact, the theoretical dialectic, which demonstrates the theoretical incoherence or contradictions with Islam in the metaphysics of al-Fārābī or Ibn Sīnā, is evidently related to a field that is entirely different from issues such as abandoning *ṣalāh* or drinking wine. Nevertheless, the "psychological dialectic" of al-Ghazālī is a process of "introduction" that merely consists of the generalization of – uncertain – individual examples and an eloquent account of a judgment that is grounded (or that is allegedly grounded) on al-Ghazālī's observations and that is therefore taken for granted by the addressee. In fact, the manner of the introduction, which is based on an abandonment of worship, drinking or adultery, can be easily adapted to any group or class, unlike theoretical criticism.

Nonetheless, this utterly confident description by al-Ghazālī has a weak point: How many philosophers had al-Ghazālī actually met and known so intimately that he witnessed their major sins? Moreover, when he asked about their attitude, who among them responded that sharīʿah is not binding for the philosophers but only for the common people? Who are these so-called "philosophers" that take the pain of caring about rituals and praising Islam to maintain their individual safety and status but who dare make such risky confessions to the renowned master of Niẓāmiyyah Madrasah of Baghdād? Moreover, what is the proportion of such philosophers who confess their hypocrisy and which school are they from?

Consequently, the value of al-Ghazālī's demonstration of the philosophers' hidden blasphemy is equal to the confidence in his honesty: in the Muslim world, these demonstrations became widespread to the extent of al-Ghazālī's reputation. However, al-Ghazālī is evidently not the inventor of such a demonstration. In fact, the accusing of opponents of underestimating the commandments of the sharīʿah and committing major sins (*fisq*) has been a common method since the early period of Ahl al-ḥadīth and, above all, since the Ḥanbalīs. As is well known, the victims of criticism and accreditation (*al-jarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl*) books and individual refutations vary greatly and include al-Imām Abū Ḥanīfah or even the Muʿtazilī leaders, who are charged with alcoholism.[1] The Ḥanbalī records about how al-Ashʿarī did not perform the *ṣalāh* or how he performed it without ablution are one of the most significant examples of how to discredit opponents through the disclosure of their alleged sins.[2]

---

1 For a good example of a defamation of al-Imām Abū Ḥanīfah through *qīl wa-qāl* (gossip), see Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muslim Ibn Qutaybah al-Dīnawarī, *Taʾwīl mukhtalif al-ḥādīth*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Aṣfar (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1999), 62-65.

2 In his work on al-Ashʿarī, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Yazdād al-Ahwāzī (d. 446/1055) writes the following: "I heard about Abū Sahl ibn al-Ṣābūnī al-Nīsābūrī – in Damascus in 393; (besides) I heard about Abū Usāmah Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Harawī al-Muqrī (narrating) through him (Abū Sahl) – in 395; they said: 'I heard al-Imām al-Faqīh Ibn Abī Sahl al-Suʿlūkī saying thus in Nishapur: 'Sometimes I used to meet al-Ashʿarī and write something from him. I came to him (again) on a Friday; we'd just performed afternoon *ṣalāh* [*ṣallaynā l-ʿaṣr*]. I saw him urinating through a door ajar. Once he was done, he came near us and asked, 'Did you perform afternoon *ṣalāh*?' 'Yes,' I replied. Then he stood up and performed *ṣalāh* without prior ablution. Thereupon I left his place and burnt all I had written of him. I never returned to him (ever again)." Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Yazdād al-Ahwāzī, "Mathālib Ibn Abī Bishr," in Michel Allard, ed., "Un Pamphlet Contre al-Aš'arī," *Bulletin d'études orientales* 23 (1970), 161. In the same work, Abū l-Faḍl ibn al-Baqqāl cites Abū ʿAlī ibn Jāmīʿ as follows: "I was a friend of al-Ashʿarī for about twenty years, but I never saw him performing *ṣalāh*. On a day of Eid, I accompanied him until the *ṣalāh* area in Baṣrah; (on our way) we were passing by a derelict when he went in and urinated. He came out without touching his hand [he didn't clean]. I said, 'What will you use for ablution? On the way, there is nobody with water or anything cool (for ablution).' 'No,' he replied, 'you cannot spoil a feast day with mere urination (I don't need ablution).' When we arrived at the place *of ṣalāh*, he

Therefore, the "psychological dialectic" of al-Ghazālī, originally an Ashʿarī, cannot be considered a genuine form of demonstration; nevertheless, it is impossible to deny the profound influence of such a discourse among the common people. In addition, according to available records, young al-Ghazālī was familiar with this kind of a struggle and combat.[3]

---

performed his prayer without ablution. Abū ʿAlī ibn Jāmiʿ said, 'As we came back, I left him and burnt whatever I had written of him; I never returned to him and entered the service of someone else.' This Abū ʿAlī ibn Jāmiʿ was among the virtuous men of Basrah." Ibid., 159. Therefore, the *gossip* by al-Ahwāzī – in the form of authentic reports – attains the status of clear evidence. Nevertheless, any reader may note how much the accuracy of the narrative is affected by the contradiction that one continues to be a disciple of someone for twenty years even though one never sees him performing the *ṣalāh* and that one abandons his master upon witnessing al-Ashʿarī performing the *ṣalāh* without ablution on the morning of an Eid.

[3] In his early work, *al-Mankhūl*, al-Ghazālī writes the following about al-Imām Abū Ḥanīfah in a chapter called "Evaluation on *mujtahid*s by Companions, Followers, and others:" "As for Abū Ḥanifah, he was not a *mujtahid* since he could not speak Arabic. His words, 'Even if he threw (the Mount) Abū Qubays' are the proof of this. He did not know ḥadīths either; this is why he tended to accept weaker ḥadīths and refuse authentic ones. He was not a *faqīh* either; he probably and inappropriately pretended to be clever, as his references of style (demonstrate). Hereby (determination) becomes apparent through abuse of his views, about which we will provide a chapter at the end of the book;" Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *al-Mankhūl min taʿlīqāt al-uṣūl*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Haytū, 3rd ed. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), 471. The Abū Qubays issue, which al-Ghazālī mentions, is actually as follows: al-Imām Abū Ḥanīfah was asked to give his opinion on a person who threw a piece of a rock at the head of another person and killed him; thereupon, he indicated that no retaliation was applicable, adding, "Even if he threw Abū Qubays." In this phrase attributed to al-Imām al-Aʿẓam, there is "bā'" as *ḥarf al-jarr* before the word "Abū," and therefore the word should be "Abī" instead of "Abū." Allegedly, al-Imām made this mistake due to his incompetence in Arabic. Ahl al-ḥadīth harped on this ambiguous report and has often quoted this anecdotal story to humiliate al-Imām Abū Ḥanīfah. Accordingly, Ibn Qutaybah quotes the same incident when he attacks al-Imām Abū Ḥanīfah; see Ibn Qutaybah, *Taʾwīl mukhtalif al-ḥādīth*, 134. The passage where al-Ghazālī, at the end of his book, tries to demonstrate that al-Imām Abū Ḥanīfah "violated, was

Certainly, this dialectic is not logical but literally "psychological." Moreover, this "psychological dialectic" is presented in every work of al-Ghazālī whenever he mentions philosophers: it is presented so ingeniously and repeated so implicitly that it has attained an influence that is still extant today. In fact, the general influence of this "psychological dialectic" has been much stronger than the influence of *Tahāfut al-falāsifah,* which is a truly first-class philosophical work.

II.

Now, we can start a comprehensive examination of the passage in *al-Munqidh* by al-Ghazālī, since we consider this passage to be the best example of the mentioned "psychological dialectic" of al-Ghazālī.

In the beginning of the text that is cited below, al-Ghazālī narrates that he resumed teaching after a decade of seclusion because he observed the corruption and distortion of faith with regard to the essence and truth of prophethood and the deeds postulated by the same. Having returned from seclusion as an enlightened man, al-Ghazālī analyzes the reasons for the distortion of faith and the weakness in reasoned faith among the public and associates this degradation with four fundamental reasons. The distortion of faith is caused by:

(1) Those who are lost in the science of philosophy

(2) Those who are lost on the path of Sufism

(3) Those who are members of *Taʿlīmiyyah*

(4) Behaviors of the so-called *ʿulamāʾ* among the public

Al-Ghazālī assures us that the above determinations are not theoretical but that they are the results of his observations and experiences regarding people. He actually emphasizes that if one does not fulfil the requirements of his faith, then he, in fact, has no faith. Accordingly, al-Ghazālī quotes certain conversations with persons who are allegedly lost in earthly matters despite their claim to having faith in the afterlife:

---

confused, and distorted sharīʿah" (pp. 500-504) is not included here since it is too long.

> Later on, I examined people one by one, asking them about their doubts about those who err in obedience to sharīʿah and analyzing their creed and secret. I asked one, "Why do you err against sharīʿah? If you do not prepare for the afterlife and enjoy this world at the expense of the afterlife even though you believe in the latter, this is mere foolishness! Indeed, you cannot spend one at the expense of two; why do you waste endless days for the sake of numbered ones? If you don't believe, then you are an unbeliever! You don't disclose in order to look fine and seem honorable by mentioning faith and sharīʿah; think, however, about the reason for your secret blasphemy behind your apparent or inapparent daring by asking yourself."[4]

Thus, the investigation by al-Ghazālī is significantly important. On what grounds do allegedly Muslim persons cover and even legitimize their insincerities? At this stage, al-Ghazālī picks five persons among those who he talks to in person to represent the classes that point to the essential reasons behind the secret blasphemy, in line with the four reasons indicated above.

(1) For some of the people, it is not necessary to abide by religious commandments and prohibitions since they observe the scholars who know the religion as well as anyone; they drink wine, do not perform the *ṣalāh* and sink into *ḥarām*.

(2) Some of the people assert that they have a good grasp of Sufism and that they have attained a position where worship is no longer necessary.

(3) Some of the people who deviated from the path of Sufism have begun to claim that all is nonobligatory [*ibāḥah*].

(4) Ismāʿīlīs, in turn, are *Taʿlīmiyyah* or *Aṣḥāb al-taʿlīm*, and they imitate their leader; they fulfil the commandments and prohibitions of the innocent Imām.

(5) Some other people consider themselves free of the restrictions of sharīʿah on the grounds that they are familiar with philosophical knowledge and do not need to imitate others.[5]

---

[4] Al-Ghazālī, *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl wa-l-mūṣil ilá dhī l-ʿizzah wa-l-jalāl*, ed. Jamīl Ṣalībā and Kāmil ʿAyyād (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1967), 118.

[5] *Ibid*., 118-119.

As stated above, al-Ghazālī mentions five persons who correspond to the four groups that, for him, are the sources of weakness in faith. Indeed, the third and fourth persons above have opted for Sufism; accordingly, they represent the deviation caused by the second source, namely, those people involved in Sufism.

Another significant issue is that al-Ghazālī reverses the order of reasons behind the weakness in faith when he talks about the persons that he met. In advance, we see the person who corresponds to the fourth and last group, namely, the person who does not refrain from *ḥarām* since scholars commit sins as well; then, we meet two men who abandon the commandments of sharīʿah under the pretext of Sufism; later on, al-Ghazālī observes an Ismāʿīlī (Bāṭinī) and finally those persons who are sunk in sin because of philosophy.

Following the response by the Ismāʿīlī, the last person is the one who is subject to weakness in faith due to his occupation with philosophy and who does not obey the commandments and prohibitions of sharīʿah. Interestingly, al-Ghazālī does not show the words of (1) the person who asserts that he attained a position in Sufism where worship is no longer necessary and (2) the person who deviates from the path of Sufism and sinks into *ibāḥah*, even though he mentions them as examples of the reasons for weakness in faith due to Sufism. Instead, al-Ghazālī contents himself with one phrase each to describe their situation. The words of the witless, who is lax in the fulfilment of religious commandments following the pertness of *ʿulamāʾ*, and those of the Bāṭinī, each constitute one concise sentence. However, al-Ghazālī allows the anonymous philosopher to talk for much longer and in a much more detailed manner than the others and comprehensively comments on the philosopher. Presumably, al-Ghazālī reversed the order and let the philosopher talk as the last person to make way for his long explanation of the philosopher.

Al-Ghazālī asks how a person who does not refrain from sins despite his alleged faith in Islam, in other words, a person who does not practice his belief, can continue sinning even though he believes in a painful punishment for such sins. In his response, the philosopher says:

> I am not practicing this (religion) through imitation. I studied the science of philosophy and comprehended the truth of prophethood. The essence (of prophethood) originates from wisdom and interest;

> the purpose of worship (commanded by him) is to prevent and restrict common people from conflict, combat, and lust. However, I am not among the common people to be included under the obligations (of sharīʿah). I am among the people of wisdom; therefore, I am subject to wisdom. I have a good grasp of wisdom and do not need imitation in this respect![6]

Al-Ghazālī transforms the foregoing into perfect grounds for disclosing the hypocrisy of the inner world philosophers and advances his argument through the even more allegedly interesting conversations between the two:

> (Now) this is the final destination of the faith of those who study the philosophy of *ilāhiyyūn* [Mashshāʾīs]; this he learns from the books of Ibn Sīnā and Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī. They are among those who use Islam only for appearances. Sometimes you may see one of them reading Qurʾān, present among the congregation for *ṣalāh*, or praising sharīʿah. Nonetheless, he does not abandon drinking wine (*khamr*) and various major sins (*fisq*)! When he is asked, "Why do you perform *ṣalāh* if prophethood is not precise (*saḥīḥ*)?" he replies, "In order to train the body, respect the tradition of our public, and protect my family!" Sometimes, he says, "Sharīʿah is precise and correct, and prophethood is true!" Then, when asked, "Why then do you drink wine (*khamr*)?" he replied, "(The Prophet) forbade drinking wine (*khamr*) because it leads to hostility and enmity. Thanks to (my) wisdom, I am protected from this; my aim (in drinking) is to sharpen my intelligence." In fact, Ibn Sīnā mentioned (this) in his will and wrote that he made an agreement with Allāh on this and that in order to honor the provisions of sharīʿah, not to be at fault in religious worship and "to drink (*shurb*) for treatment and recovery and not for pleasure." His final destination with regard to purity of faith and commitment to worship is the exception of drinking wine (*khamr*) for health purposes. Here is the faith of those from whom some claim faith. A community is misled because of them; the weakness of objections against them increased the deception (among the deceived). Indeed – as we explained before – (their opponents) objected to them through combat against the

---

6 *Ibid*., 119.

sciences under their possession (sciences that provide exact knowledge), such as geometry, logic, and others.[7]

A perfect example of the "psychological dialectic" by al-Ghazālī against philosophy is clearly observed in the above passage. The consequences of this conversation are easy enough for everyone to comprehend; the passage is a disclosure of the hypocrisy of the philosophers who do not actually have faith in God and who consider themselves superior to and free from sharīʿah. Certainly, it is impossible to assert the complete absence of such persons among philosophers in those days. Nevertheless, if we generalize the test of "sincerity" that is – righteously – applied by al-Ghazālī to philosophers, it becomes inevitable to question whether the "hidden blasphemy" and "hypocrisy" that al-Ghazālī observes among philosophers arises from the nature of philosophy – and therefore, philosophical thought – particularly in consideration of the fact that Sufism, as al-Ghazālī indicates in person, can yield similar consequences.

III.

The first question to answer at this point is exactly when did the conversation with the philosopher take place? According to the introduction by al-Ghazālī in *al-Munqidh*, the conversation must have taken place during the time when he observed faith-related laxness among people and when he identified the four reasons behind the weakness in faith, following almost a decade of seclusion after he left his post as the Madrasah scholar in Baghdād.[8]

However, this introduction actually includes certain strange contradictions. In a chapter that addresses philosophy in *al-Munqidh*, al-Ghazālī clearly indicates that he began to study philosophy when he was a scholar at the Niẓāmiyyah Madrasah in Baghdād where he lectured three hundred disciples. Displaying a significant effort, al-Ghazālī set about learning the philosophical sciences through books: he learned the sciences of the philosophers in a most comprehensive manner without any teacher or master in less than two years and only when he was not writing or lecturing; then, he contemplated these

---

7 *Ibid*., 119-120.

8 *Ibid*., 118-119.

disciplines for about a year.[9] Since it is impossible to criticize philosophers without knowledge about the disciplines of philosophy, he must have written *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* following this busy schedule of study. In such a case, however, the passage about the hidden blasphemy of the philosophers in the very beginning of *Tahāfut*, which is almost identical to that in *al-Munqidh*, as well as the relevant conversations and determinations,[10] must have been written or carried out before al-Ghazālī left Baghdād for seclusion: in other words, almost a decade before the date that is indicated in *al-Munqidh*.

This contradiction in terms of dates can be explained by the assumption that al-Ghazālī may have had conversations with other philosophers and in the same context during his time in Baghdād. However, such a well-intentioned estimate is also subject to the same question: Why would a philosopher who takes such great pains to perform *ṣalāh* together with the congregation, reading the Qurʾān, and praising Islam and the Prophet for the safety of life and property, disclose and narrate the secret blasphemy in his heart to the head scholar of Niẓāmiyyah in Baghdād, the stronghold of Ahl al-sunnah?

All aside, the inconsistency in the dates in the presentation of al-Ghazālī is unfortunately too evident to be explained through such reasoning. From the *Jawāhir al-Qurʾān*, one of the latest works of al-Ghazālī, we get the impression that he was very close to "philosophers" in his youth, long before writing *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*, and we can see that he had a similar insight about them in a very early period and in a manner very different from his introduction in *al-Munqidh*:

> As we have observed on several occasions, the groups who consider themselves very (clever and) competent – even though they aren't – are confused by the wordings (of Qurʾānic verses) and have certain sparks of objection (in their mind) about them, and they imagined

---

9 *Ibid*., 74-75.

10 "Then again, I saw a group who considered themselves superior to their peers and equals through quicker comprehension and stronger intelligence. They abandon duties imposed by Islam about worshipping and insulted religious maxims such as the obligation of *ṣalāh* and avoidance of the forbidden; they disdain the deeds of subjects and restrictions ordered by sharīʿah ..." Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Egypt: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1966), 59.

> things that contradict (apparent aspects of) Qurʾānic verses. As a result, their faith with regard to religion became corrupted. This (fact) led them to secretly deny resurrection, heaven and hell, and return to Allāh after death. They disclosed this denial only in the depths of their selves, and their bridles and bonds of piety were loosened and lost. They continued to seek earthly things, sink into *ḥarām*, and adopt lust; they focused on seats and assets as well as earthly pleasures. They undervalued pious people and considered them ignorant ... All this was because the gaze of their mind was stuck on the forms and phenomena of things and could not grasp the spirit and truth of things. Consequently, since they could not comprehend the equilibrium between the phenomenal world and the divine world, the apparent aspects of problems (about wordings of Qurʾānic verses) looked contradictory to them; thus, they went astray and led others astray. They neither understood anything of the world of souls as elites nor could have faith in the invisible, like common people. In the end, their acute mind exhausted them. Indeed, an innocent is closer to salvation than a trimmed mind and incomplete reason (like theirs). We were not far from this (position). We had practiced such heresies for a while because of evil friends and our relationship with them until Allāh, in the end, drew us away from their outcry and protected us against their mistakes ...[11]

A careful examination of the above text shows that the only difference between the description above and al-Ghazālī's descriptions of the philosophers in *al-Munqidh* and *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* is the word "philosophers." Therefore, the determinations of al-Ghazālī regarding the philosophers, that is, that they abide by Islam only in appearance and that they consider themselves free from the bonds of sharīʿah thanks to their alleged wisdom through their superior minds, are most likely associated with the relationships that young al-Ghazālī had with philosophers, who he eventually described as evil friends, even though the content of such relationships is completely unknown.[12]

---

[11] Al-Ghazālī, *Jawāhir al-Qurʾān*, ed. Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā al-Qabbānī, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-ʿUlūm, 1990), 60-61.

[12] For an elaborate analysis of the relationship of al-Ghazālī with philosophy circles in his youth, see Frank Griffel, *al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 25-31, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.001.0001.

In the end, the following question springs to mind: Why does al-Ghazālī date his meeting with and contemplation on philosophy to a much later period, namely, during his post as the head scholar at Niẓāmiyyah Madrasah in Baghdād? A reasonable explanation is that al-Ghazālī wanted to demonstrate his relationship with the philosophers as being shorter and more recent than they actually were for the fear of reactions from the conservative circles. Nevertheless, this view means accusing al-Ghazālī of concealing the truth to maintain his position.

In any case, al-Ghazālī's negative approach to the philosophers' conception of religion seems to have begun after he met certain anonymous philosophers in person, became friends with them and was influenced by them. Even though the identity of these persons is completely unknown, they were definitely not al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, considering the time and date. Therefore, al-Ghazālī's firm conviction regarding the "hidden blasphemy" of philosophers cannot be the sins that he observed in person in the religious life of Ibn Sīnā or al-Fārābī. On the contrary, his friendship with some anonymous persons, who apparently read and studied the works of these two philosophers, led al-Ghazālī to determine certain faults in their religious practices and finally convinced him about their "hidden blasphemy of philosophers" in an irrevocable manner.

The problem, however, has yet to be eliminated. Indeed, there is a difference between the analyses of Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī on "religion" and "prophethood" and the interpretations of these analyses – which may evidently contradict each other. Therefore, in the eyes of al-Ghazālī, the point is not the "hidden blasphemy of philosophers" in general but the hypocrisy of some anonymous philosophers who were known to him. It is worth noting that similar contradictions also apply regarding mystic or rational disciplines such as Sufism and Kalām, respectively, and the ideas of a Sufi or a Kalām scholar may be taken as extreme by eventual interpreters. The same applies to religious practices as well: various sinners may emerge among the followers of a Sufi or Kalām master after one or more generations. Therefore, serious study is required to determine who should be accused based on which circumstances and what evidence. Nevertheless, the "psychological dialectic" of al-Ghazālī does not allow for such objections and opts for a general accusation.

IV.

The above-cited text in *al-Munqidh* by al-Ghazālī is a perfect example of his "psychological dialectic." He presents the context so ingeniously that when the reasoning, which comprises the conversation within the passage and which is blended with wonderful equilibrium, is considered as a whole without being broken into its elements, the "hidden blasphemy" of the philosophers actually seems to be proven.

To attain a complete understanding of what al-Ghazālī does here, it is necessary to pay attention to how disturbing is the reply of the addressed philosopher for a sincere Muslim. Indeed, al-Ghazālī's presentation comprises three abhorrent aspects blended into one another:

(1) First, we have a person who does not have faith because he thinks himself superior to the Prophet; certainly, no one likes to see his faith and the Prophet, to whom he adheres, undervalued, and refused.

(2) On the other hand, this man of philosophy is a hypocrite who present himself as a Muslim – for the sake of interests such as social status and the safety of his life and property – even though he actually has no faith at all; evidently, no one likes to be deceived.

(3) Finally, the essential reason for the hypocrisy would truly hurt a Muslim heart: The philosopher does not take the commandments of Islam into account on the grounds that such commandments are for the common people, whereas he is "smart" and superior; indeed, no one likes to be considered weak-minded and defamed.

As we can see, al-Ghazālī appears to speak thus on purpose to attract the reactions of Muslims – particularly the common people – against the philosophers, just as al-Ahwāzī (d. 446/1055) did against al-Ashʿarī. However, al-Ghazālī is distinguished from the rude style of al-Ahwāzī through his eloquence, as he ascribes the words that reveal the truth about philosophers by an anonymous philosopher to a great philosopher, namely, Ibn Sīnā – who al-Ghazālī identifies as his archenemy. Thus, al-Ghazālī creates the illusion that the statements by the anonymous philosopher that arouse the rightful hatred of believers are synonymous with the words of Ibn Sīnā. Consequently, the feeling of hatred that arises from the quoted conversation with the hypocrite philosopher is directly transferred to Ibn Sīnā and made his.

The power of al-Ghazālī's "psychological dialectic" lies in the construction of this connection, which requires a very careful examination.

The account of al-Ghazālī flows in four stages that are truly combined with one another in a perfect manner.

(1) First, the "truth about philosophers," which al-Ghazālī already knows in an exact manner, is expressed through the words of a philosopher in person. In a sense, we see the projection of the way of thinking which, according to al-Ghazālī, previously stirred him to write the *Aims of the Philosophers*: Above all, it is necessary to understand and advance the perspective and thesis of the opponents in a correct and explicit manner. Accordingly, al-Ghazālī does not present his personal observations or evaluations; instead, he transmits the viewpoint of the philosophers through one of them. The point to consider here is that al-Ghazālī is a completely passive questioner: He asks a philosopher why he does not act in line with what he says he believes and listens to his essential judgment. The explanation of the inner world of the philosopher is transmitted without any addition or deletion, and al-Ghazālī expects us to believe this exactitude.

Nonetheless, al-Ghazālī prevents us from inquiring into the accuracy of this quote, since he cites the words of an anonymous philosopher. Evidently, al-Ghazālī knows that according to logic, a nonquestionable judgment, except an axiom, means nothing but a presumption if it is accepted as true in advance. Since a man is an imperfect being, we should understand how or to what extent the anonymous philosopher, who provides al-Ghazālī with answers to confess his hypocrisy, understood or followed al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, the two philosophers who – reasonably enough – we do not come across in the works of al-Ghazālī. Is it not truly possible that this anonymous philosopher possibly misunderstood or misinterpreted al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā in line with his personal desires or interests? As a result, how are we expected not to have any doubts about the extent to which this anonymous philosopher represents the philosophers?

Al-Ghazālī seems to say, "I know the inner truth about the philosophers, for I came together with them, asked them questions, and here are their answers." Accordingly, as indicated above, the accuracy of this demonstration equals confidence in al-Ghazālī as a person. Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī is, after all, just another human

being who may react in an emotional way, and he may have exaggerated, overlooked or misunderstood something, or his memory may have even been misled.

(2) Right after the response by the anonymous philosopher, al-Ghazālī leaves his passive position and begins speaking. He proceeds from the stage of recognition to the stage of introduction. His first sentence about the response is very important in this regard: "*(Now) this is the final destination of the faith of those who study the philosophy of ilāhiyyūn* [*Mashshāʾīs*]*; this he learns from the books of Ibn Sīnā and Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*."

Thus, the original connection between the anonymous philosopher and Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī is expressed in the second stage; this is an implicit statement about the doubt that occurs in the mind of the reader regarding the demonstration in the first stage. In other words, there is some information, albeit uncertain, about the identity of the philosopher who is only known by al-Ghazālī and who is completely unknown to us. This philosopher is a person who learns from the books of Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī that he is superior to sharīʿah, which is for common people. In this case, the anonymous philosopher relates not his opinion but the view of the two great Mashshāʾī philosophers. Thus, as the anonymous interviewee of al-Ghazālī retreats into background and is thrown out of focus, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, the two renowned philosophers whose ideas are available in their respective books, come to the forefront.

We can, however, address another question to al-Ghazālī at this stage. If the philosopher who believes that he is free from the sharīʿah imposed by the prophethood on the common people attained this conviction through the works of Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī, should not al-Ghazālī show us an exact quote? Which book of Ibn Sīnā or al-Fārābī includes the phrases cited by the anonymous philosopher or expressions in the same sense?

(3) Certainly, the speech of al-Ghazālī never contemplates this question. He makes a very smart turn and instead of pointing out the exact references from Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī, he returns to the beginning and describes the response of the anonymous philosopher in an even sharper style. Nevertheless, the subject of this second description is not the anonymous philosopher known to al-Ghazālī, but "them," namely, the philosophers who refer to Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī. Thanks to this leap, there is no more distinction between the

anonymous philosopher and al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā; consequently, it becomes possible to ascribe the hidden blasphemy, confessed by the anonymous philosopher, to al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.

Indeed, al-Ghazālī lays stress on a single point in his description: the philosophers do not actually believe in Islam; instead, they maintain their individual and social status by pretending to be Muslim and even attract sympathy. The voice of al-Ghazālī, which directly addresses the reader and deliberately uses the second-person singular for a higher impact, takes on a serious tone of warning: "They are among those who use Islam only for appearances. Sometimes you may see one of them reading Qurʾān, present among the congregation for *ṣalāh*, or praising sharīʿah. Nonetheless, he does not abandon drinking wine (*khamr*) and various major sins (*fisq*)!"

As indicated above, we return to the beginning. Now, the problem from the beginning is before us once again: How can we prove that a philosopher, who, despite not being actually a Muslim, manifests himself as Muslim, takes the pains to worship and even praise sharīʿah, is not a sincere Muslim – beyond his confessions to al-Ghazālī? More importantly, if a reader of al-Ghazālī occasionally sees one of these persons among the congregation for *ṣalāh* or sees them reading the Qurʾān and praising sharīʿah, what is the need for all these determinations and close examinations by al-Ghazālī?

Certainly, we have to intervene in al-Ghazālī's speech to be able to ask him these questions; however, he speaks so fast by means of the premise about the "hypocrisy of philosophers," which is reinforced through repetition and definitely accepted, that it is almost impossible to disrupt the reasoning in his text.

It is necessary to pay particular attention to why al-Ghazālī especially mentions "drinking wine (*khamr*)" to comprehend the key point. Why does not al-Ghazālī content himself with saying that "he wouldn't abandon various major sins" but primarily mentions "drinking wine (*khamr*)"? Indeed, drinking wine is one of the various major sins; thus, what is the use of mentioning this sin in a separate manner? If al-Ghazālī aims at narrating the situation of the philosophers, why does he mention the particular (drinking wine [*khamr*]) before the universal (*fisq*/major sin)? In addition, why does al-Ghazālī mention only drinking wine among all the other major sins such as adultery, homicide, theft, etc.?

Considering the text, it is easily observable that al-Ghazālī chose the example of "drinking wine (*khamr*)" on purpose; indeed, drinking wine (*khamr*) is the only linking element that constitutes the connection between the anonymous philosopher and Ibn Sīnā.

Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī ingeniously and surreptitiously builds a dialectic flow to complete his link with the persuasion about the hypocrisy of the philosophers. Before us is a philosopher who performs *ṣalāh* together with the congregation, reads Qurʾān, and praises sharīʿah. First comes question one: "Why do you perform *ṣalāh* if prophethood is not precise (*saḥīḥ*)?" This question makes sense only in case the prejudgment, which al-Ghazālī continuously repeats since the beginning, namely, the hypocrisy of the philosophers, is deemed correct. Otherwise, how can a person be asked why he performs *ṣalāh* even though he does not believe in prophethood, while he performs religious rituals and expresses his obedience to sharīʿah, if he is not a philosopher?

According to dialectic reasoning, which is based on a yes-no, two answers can be given to this question, namely, by accepting or refusing the precision/rightfulness of prophethood. The first response to this essential question is nothing but a confirmation of prejudgment: "In order to train the body, respect the tradition of our public, and protect my family!" In brief, the philosopher confesses that he actually refuses the authenticity of prophethood and that he continues worshipping and lauding sharīʿah for his social safety.

Our repeated question, however, is still unanswered. More precisely, why and how does a person who performs *ṣalāh* with the congregation and praises sharīʿah for the purposes of disguise confess his hypocrisy to al-Ghazālī? This is why the anonymous philosopher should express the opposite to his response when he confesses his secret blasphemy to answer the question in our minds as to why his hypocrisy should be exhibited once again. Thus, the situation of the philosopher, who does not directly confess his hypocrisy, is unearthed by means of another indirect question. Here, we hear the second response. Upon hearing the question, "Why do you perform *ṣalāh* if prophethood is not precise (*saḥīḥ*)?" the philosopher sometimes – when he wants to conceal himself – replies as follows: "Sharīʿah is precise and prophethood is true!" This response refuses the prejudgment of al-Ghazālī as the negative aspect

of the dialectic setup, and the philosopher clearly pronounces his faith. Well, can such a clear admission save the philosopher?

Under normal circumstances, an interrogation should come to an end when the interrogee admits that he is a Muslim and that he performs worship; nevertheless, al-Ghazālī makes use of "drinking wine" to ask the crucial second question to disclose the hypocrisy, despite the apparent response of the philosopher. "If you believe in the certitude of sharīʿah and the truth of prophethood, why then do you drink wine (*khamr*)?" Al-Ghazālī does not ask, "Why do you commit major sins?;" instead, he exploits the particular element, namely, wine (*khamr*), which he highlights in his general demonstration through prioritization.

The philosopher's reply, once again, is nothing but an acknowledgement of the prejudgment of al-Ghazālī: "(The Prophet) forbade drinking wine (*khamr*) because it leads to hostility and enmity. Thanks to (my) wisdom, I am protected from this; my aim (in drinking) is to sharpen my intelligence."

As all roads lead to Rome, we are once again back to the beginning. Indeed, there is no difference between these statements and the first answer of the philosopher, except for the use of the particular concepts such as "drinking wine" and the general concepts such as "major sin." Consequently, it does not matter whether the philosophers perform rituals, declare their faith, or even praise or revile prophethood and sharīʿah. Al-Ghazālī is so convinced about the hidden blasphemy of the philosophers that his questioning of them always leads to the same conclusion.

(4) Now, we are at the final stage of the account. As the hidden blasphemy of philosophers is demonstrated through the anonymous philosopher, we are capable of passing a judgment on Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī, the two references of the anonymous philosopher. Nevertheless, this capability does not emerge in an expected way. Al-Ghazālī does not refer to any text where, having attained wisdom through their reason, Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī consider themselves superior to the sharīʿah that is stipulated by the Prophet to restrain the common people. In fact, there is no such text. Neither al-Fārābī nor Ibn Sīnā ever uttered the words of the anonymous philosopher of al-Ghazālī. However, al-Ghazālī manifests the equivalence between the origin and the product by means of discovering a serious connection

between the statement of the anonymous philosopher about "drinking wine" and a phrase by Ibn Sīnā in his *Risālat al-ʿahd*:

> When asked, "Why then do you drink wine (*khamr*)?" he replied, "(The Prophet) forbade drinking wine (*khamr*) because it leads to hostility and enmity. Thanks to (my) wisdom, I am protected from this; my aim (in drinking) is to sharpen my intelligence." In fact, Ibn Sīnā mentioned (this) in his will and wrote that he made an agreement with Allāh on this and that in order to honor the provisions of sharīʿah, not to be at fault in religious worship and "to drink (*shurb*) for treatment and recovery and not for pleasure." His final destination with regard to purity of faith and commitment to worship is the exception of drinking wine (*khamr*) for health purposes.[13]

Indeed, the foregoing narration includes a significant distortion. The question by al-Ghazālī and the reply by the anonymous philosopher include the word *khamr*, namely, "wine that leads to intoxication." Nevertheless, the sentence quoted by al-Ghazālī from Ibn Sīnā only includes the word لا يشرب (*lā yashrab*), namely, "doesn't drink."

Al-Ghazālī, then, alters Ibn Sīnā's phrase in a peremptory but underhanded manner: "His final destination with regard to purity of faith and commitment to worship is the exception of drinking wine (*khamr*) for health purposes." Al-Ghazālī apparently repeats the phrase by Ibn Sīnā; nonetheless, the object of the word *shurb* in the text of Ibn Sīnā is altered by a direct intervention because al-Ghazālī fabricates that *khamr* is what "is drunk only for treatment and recovery."

Then, did Ibn Sīnā actually drink wine?

V.

Before answering whether Ibn Sīnā actually drank wine, we have to clarify the following matter: Given our knowledge about the life and personality of al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs Abū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā, we know that he enjoyed wealth and riches during his childhood and youth. Ibn Sīnā was raised in a wealthy family, educated by tutors, and obtained a post at the court at an early age, because he was a physician. Given such a lifestyle, Ibn Sīnā was clearly used to riches and even luxury.

[13] Al-Ghazālī, *al-Munqidh*, 119-120.

The statements of witnesses to his life indicate that Ibn Sīnā had a habit of wearing good clothing and consuming high-quality food and drink; indeed, his disciple ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Jūzjānī indicates that al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs was keen on sexuality and took certain aphrodisiacs that eventually led to his terminal illness.[14]

Ibn Sīnā clearly did not lead an ascetic life like Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, who lived on one dirham per day as a night watchman. Instead, the life of Ibn Sīnā is similar to the luxurious and pompous life of al-Ghazālī before his departure from Baghdād and his seclusion and orientation towards Sufism. However, the life standards and lifestyle of Ibn Sīnā are a problem regarding his ascetism and piety, and this problem has nothing to do with the claims that he drank wine (*khamr*) – and even the claims asserting that sharīʿah is for the common people and not for elite like him. This second problem is the point to concentrate on.

Al-Ghazālī claims that Ibn Sīnā drank wine (*khamr*) and that even when he repented and reconciled with Allāh, he made wine (*khamr*) an exception on the condition of "recovery and treatment." In the eyes of al-Ghazālī, such discourse means an underestimation of sharīʿah and a denial of the essence of prophethood and, therefore, a "hidden blasphemy." Certainly, al-Ghazālī may be considered rightful by a Muslim consciousness in this respect. In fact, the use of alcoholic beverages – only to the extent that the use is actually required and until recovery – because of the risk of dying of thirst or starving or even for treatment by certain expert and pious Muslim physicians in the absence of another available medication, has been debated among Muslim jurists. Nevertheless, if no such necessity is in question, a person who thinks that alcoholic drinks are permissible – even by considering himself above the commandments of the religion – is clearly subject to his sensual desire. In case a person who

[14] Indeed, there is another significant allegation about this famous tendency of Ibn Sīnā towards sexuality. Accordingly, the records available at al-Jūzjānī that Ibn Sīnā did not quit sexual intercourse even during his terminal illness with a cramp are distorted in some ways. Therefore, the introduction of Ibn Sīnā as a lascivious man is a description that is made on purpose. For a convincing and illustrative article on the issue, see Joep Lameer, "İbn Sîna'nın Şehveti [Avicenna's Concupiscence]," trans. Serdar Cihan Güleç, *Kutadgubilig* 30 (2016), 1047-1059. I would like to express my gratitude to M. Cüneyt Kaya, a dear colleague who informed me about this paper.

says that he drinks wine (*khamr*) for the sake of health, treatment, and keeping his mind alive is asked why he does not seek a remedy and clarity of mind through *ḥalāl* drinks, it is easy to demonstrate that the point of the person is to actually abide by the lustful desires of the self.

Therefore, does Ibn Sīnā actually drink wine (*khamr*) and expressly confess this under certain pretexts? It is necessary to examine the only concrete evidence, namely, the short quotation by al-Ghazālī from Ibn Sīnā, to find an answer to this question.

Prior to an examination of this text, however, there is another problem to be underlined. Despite its presentation by al-Ghazālī, *Risālat al-ʿahd* is not a text of repentance that Ibn Sīnā wrote by himself. This is why *Risālat al-ʿahd*, which is a kind of philosophical oath or text of ratification or oath similar to Hippocratic oath, includes the pronoun هما, which means "those two;" indeed, they are the tutor who promises to Allāh and disciple of this tutor.[15] Therefore, it is worth noting that the account by al-Ghazālī where, knowingly or unknowingly, Ibn Sīnā is shown as a wine addict before eventually repenting for the drinking – except for the purposes of health and recovery – is untrue as well.

Nonetheless, if we examine the *Risālat al-ʿahd* by Ibn Sīnā, we can see that the phrase reported by al-Ghazālī is true. The link established by al-Ghazālī, however, turns out to be misleading, since it clearly includes perversion, given the entirety of the passage where this clause can be found. The exact passage by Ibn Sīnā reads as follows:

> As for flavors, they will be used for the rehabilitation of nature (disposition), the sustainability of an individual or species – and reminding this is done on purpose – and the intelligible self to be the administrator – and administration. Indeed, the power of lust invites one to flavors; then, the intelligible self becomes subject to them, which creates nuisances (about the continuation of an individual and species) and excuses for it. However, the intelligible self must play a trick (about pleasures) to the extent that it does not make the status of

[15] Mahmut Kaya, "İbn Sînâ'nın Filozof Yemini: Ibn Sînâ and the Philosopher's Oath," in *Uluslararası İbn Sînâ Sempozyumu: Bildiriler II* [*International Ibn Sina Symposium Papers II*], ed. Mehmet Mazak and Nevzat Özkaya (Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A. Ş. Yayınları, 2008), 156.

> certain pleasure an ordinary thing about the self for its own personality. The same applies to affairs regarding prevailing and gaining reputation. As for drinks, he will forbid their consumption for fun and may drink them for recovery, treatment or reinforcement. As for the things heard ...[16]

As we can see, Ibn Sīnā does not talk about intoxicating wine but rather about a beverage without alcohol, which corresponds to *meşrubat* (i.e. drinks; *mashrūb* in Arabic) in modern Turkish. The word *al-mashrūb* (المشروب) in the text is in a singular form; nevertheless, the article that signifies the kind provides the general meaning to include the type of beverage.

In fact, upon reading the entire passage above, anyone familiar with Mashshāʾī terminology can easily understand that Ibn Sīnā is not talking about drinking wine but all beverages – in the broad sense – which have a taste, whether salty or sweet. Here, Ibn Sīnā means nourishment through the sustainability of the individual and sexuality through the sustainability of the species. These characteristics, which humans have in common with animals and plants, are necessary for direct, that is, individual, and indirect, namely, species continuation of the biological structure of human beings, who have an earthly existence.

According to Ibn Sīnā, the impulses of eating, drinking, and reproduction, which are naturally accompanied by sensual pleasures according to divine wisdom, steer the intelligible self towards bodily pleasures; nevertheless, the intelligible self should not abide by lust, but the other way around. Lust, which is a faculty of our self, calls the intelligible self that guides and drives human will to eating, drinking, and sexuality. Obeying these instincts, the intelligible self accepts the invitation of the power of lust since the self comprehends the reasons in line with wisdom, such as the maintenance of health, preservation of balance of the body, and ensuring the continuity of human species. Nevertheless, the charm of flavors bears the risk of making the bodily pleasures central over the course of time and transforming the reasons arising from divine wisdom into pretexts. Thus, man is directed towards eating, drinking, and having sex for the sake of

---

[16] Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā, "Risālat al-ʿahd," in *Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil*, ed. Muḥyī al-Dīn Ṣabrī al-Kurdī (Egypt: Maṭbaʿat Kurdistān al-ʿIlmiyyah, AH 1328), 207.

pleasure and control becomes out of the question. Then, one should taste these flavors according to the purposes of creation and not for pleasure, in other words, reason and should not surrender to lust. For this purpose, the intelligible self should deceive its impulses and be able to move at least certain flavors away from its character on the condition of maintaining balance. Apparently, Ibn Sīnā uses "to deceive" here as an ascetism supported by theory.

Therefore, Ibn Sīnā indicates in a very clear and comprehensible manner that one has to promise Allāh to eat, drink, and have sex only to the extent that such behavior complies with divine wisdom, displays minimum frequency to preserve the individual and the species, and above all, does not make pleasures the essential purpose of one's deeds.

Moreover, Ibn Sīnā writes as follows in the *Risālat al-ʿahd*, just after the abovementioned passage: "Then, he shall not lapse in respect for the rules of sharīʿah and divine laws and in the performance of physical worship." How should the abovementioned words by Ibn Sīnā, who is well aware of the Qurʾānic verse that describes alcoholic drink (*khamr*) as one of the tricks used by Satan to deceive man, be interpreted?

VI.

There is one possible objection here: Let us suppose that al-Ghazālī was wrong to use the passage by Ibn Sīnā in *Risālat al-ʿahd* regarding the consumption of wine by this philosopher as evidence and that this is a question of a misunderstanding/incorrect description. Nevertheless, is it not the case that the judgment of al-Ghazālī is confirmed, since there are expressions in other references about the fact that Ibn Sīnā underestimated the sharīʿah and continued drinking wine?

To respond to such an objection, we will examine the essential biographical source of Ibn Sīnā. This is his autobiography, which Ibn Sīnā had his disciple al-Jūzjānī write, and which the latter completed after the demise of his tutor.

The autobiography, which Ibn Sīnā had a disciple partly write, includes two occasions on which Ibn Sīnā drank *sharāb*. The first event is recounted by Ibn Sīnā himself, while the second is recounted by al-Jūzjānī, who wrote the autobiography under guidance of Ibn Sīnā before completing it after the death of the latter. Regarding the

first occasion, Ibn Sīnā talks about the period when he learned the science of medicine:

> ... I was also interested in *fiqh* and had debates about it; I was sixteen back then. For the next one and a half years, I completely concentrated on science and reading and resumed reading all aspects of logic and philosophy. For this period (of one and a half years), I never slept for an entire night and did nothing else during the day. I got some pages in front of me and identified the syllogistic premises in each proof I analyzed as well as the layout (of these premises) and their possible conclusions. I took into account the conditions of the premises (of problems I studied) until I was certain about the correctness of the relevant problem. Because of the problems that surprised me and (for which) I could not (comprehend) the middle term of the syllogism, I often went to the mosque, performed *ṣalāh* and begged the Creator of All (*al-Mubdiʾ*) so that He would make the closed open and the difficult easy for me. At night, I came back home and got my oil lamp ready; I used it to read and write. Once sleep got the better of me or I felt weakness in my mind, I set my sight on drinking a glass of "*sharāb*" – in order to gather my strength – before resuming my study. Once I fell asleep, I had dreams about the essences of related problems; numerous issues have been revealed to me in my sleep.[17]

Indeed, Ibn Sīnā uses the word *sharāb* (الشراب) in a very explicit and unhesitating manner. However, if we understand *sharāb* of Ibn Sīnā as *khamr* like al-Ghazālī did, then three problems emerge. First, as Ibn Sīnā recounts, he is just a boy of seventeen at the time. This is a strange and odd situation involving a young prodigy from an upper-class family in those days. This leads to the inevitable question of how back in those days and in a reputable family, the consumption of

---

[17] William E. Gohlman, ed. and trans., *The Life of Ibn Sina: A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974), 28, 30. Besides, M. Cüneyt Kaya published a meticulous translation of the autobiography based on its earliest available copy (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Library, Nadir Eserler MS 4755, 308r-317v); see Abū ʿUbayd ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Muḥammad al-Jūzjānī, "Büyük Üstat [İbn Sînâ'nın] –Allah ona rahmet etsin– *Sergüzeşt* Olarak Bilinen Hayatı, Kitaplarının Listesi, [Yaşadığı] Hallerin ve Hayat Hikâyesinin Anlatımı," trans. M. Cüneyt Kaya, www.academia.edu/37630881/Ibn_Sînânın_Hayatı_Sîretüş-Şeyhir-reîs_Autobiography_of_Ibn Sina_, accessed May 25, 2019.

wine (*khamr*) by a boy of 17.5 years can be understood and how Ibn Sīnā himself can comfortably talk about this incident. Second, it would be very odd for a young man who frequents the mosque at night, performs the *salāt al-ḥājah* and begs Allah to find a solution to the problems he cannot solve or understand, and then attains a spiritual guide in his dreams to drink wine (*khamr*) – even though it is strictly forbidden by Islam. The third question is directly related to wine: anyone familiar with intoxication knows that wine and other alcoholic beverages do not revitalize a tired mind; on the contrary, they perplex thoughts and intoxicate. The cost of relief and joy through alcohol is oblivion, numbness of consciousness, and a blackout. Therefore, how can Ibn Sīnā obtain assistance from alcohol to revitalize his mind during his studies of very difficult and abstract issues?

Then again, how can we explain the statement by Ibn Sīnā that he drank *sharāb* at such an early age? Indeed, the text explains itself: Ibn Sīnā, who initially informs us that he is interested in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) and who even participates in debates about *fiqh*, is evidently aware of the provisions regarding wine (*khamr)*. Then, it is easier to see what Ibn Sīnā meant by the word *sharāb* if we determine which *fiqh* he adhered to.

In the very beginning of his autobiography, Ibn Sīnā talks about Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Nātilī, his tutor of logic and philosophical disciplines: "Before he arrived, I busied myself with Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and frequented Ismāʿīl al-Zāhid; I was among those who asked the best questions. As jurists (*faqīh*) usually do, I became very familiar with ways of questioning and objection against the responder."[18] As we can see, Ibn Sīnā set out on his journey in science through *fiqh*, led by Ismāʿīl al-Zāhid, one of the prominent Ḥanafī *faqīh*s of the time. Evidently, Ibn Sīnā, who obtained a well-grounded religious education since his childhood and who particularly studied *fiqh*, knew very well that according to the Qurʾān, *khamr* is among the tricks used by Satan to mislead man. Therefore, by the word *sharāb*, Ibn Sīnā only means a beverage-like date juice (*nabīdh*), which is made of various fruits and cereals, including must (*şıra* in modern Turkish) and *boza*, and which among the four madhhabs are considered *ḥalāl* only by the Ḥanafī.

[18] Gohlman, *The Life of Ibn Sina*, 20.

As a matter of fact, an interesting and significant reference confirms the abovementioned fact. In a chapter on Ibn Sīnā in his *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikmah*, al-Bayhaqī (d. 556/1169) repeats the autobiography of Ibn Sīnā – albeit in third-person singular – except for occasional interferences where the author speaks himself. In this passage, al-Bayhaqī clarifies that the word *sharāb* in the original text is actually *nabīdh*, staying in total compliance with the autobiography: "When sleep got the better of him or he worried about weakness in his nature, he drank a glass of *nabīdh*." Following this quotation, al-Bayhāqī steps in and, leaving aside the autobiographical text, writes the following phrase in person: "Plato and similar ancient philosophers were devotees. However, Abū ʿAlī amended their *sunnah* and manners; he was fond of drinking wine (*khamr*) and relieving his lustful faculties. His followers abided by him in major sins and addictedness."[19]

Here, we have the same problem once again: The text by Ibn Sīnā, and not any other third person, includes no statement that he drank wine (*khamr*) and considered this *ḥalāl*; it is impossible to accuse him of such a confession, except for the confusion due to the word *sharāb* being used synonymously with *nabīdh*. Even al-Bayhaqī, who does not actually like Ibn Sīnā, mentions *nabīdh* as he quotes the autobiographical text; it is only after this quotation that al-Bayhaqī accuses Ibn Sīnā of deviating from the devout path of the ancient philosophers, drinking *khamr* and being fond of sexuality. Therefore, there is no confession by Ibn Sīnā; instead, we have an accusation – the truth of which should definitely be questioned by al-Bayhāqī, given the influence of the propaganda regarding the sinner and wine-addict Ibn Sīnā – probably after the lifetime of al-Ghazālī (448/1053-505/1111). Indeed, al-Bayhāqī apparently aims to clear the names of Plato and other ancient philosophers by introducing Ibn Sīnā as the first-ever philosopher to leave ascetism for alcoholic drink (*khamr*) and the major sins to mislead his followers.

VII.

Certainly, a careful consideration of this the problem of *nabīdh* is much more important than meets the eye. Indeed, al-Imām Abū

[19] Abū l-Ḥasan Ẓahīr al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Zayd ibn Muḥammad al-Bayhaqī, *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikmah,* ed. Muḥammad Shafīʿ (Lahore: Panjab University Oriental Publications, AH 1351 [1935]), 41.

Ḥanīfah and, evidently, the Ḥanafīs were subject to severe accusations for the issues on which they split away from three other madhhabs based on Ahl al-ḥadīth; for example, they were accused of "accepting a new sharīʿah" for applying the method of *Murjiʾah* or *istiḥsān* (a preference for the most convenable provision at the expense of the *qiyās*) since they did not consider the deed as part of the faith. Likewise, the Ḥanafī school is the only madhhab to accept drinking the *nabīdh* as permissible, whereas the same is considered *ḥarām* and found in dissolute persons by Ahl al-ḥadīth. Consequently, during the fourth and fifth centuries AH, when madhhab conflicts were at their peak, the problem of the *nabīdh* constitutes an important chapter in the attacks against the Ḥanafī in the form of heavy criticism and even defamation. Therefore, it is very understandable that Ibn Sīnā, as a Ḥanafī, uses the word *sharāb* in the sense of *nabīdh* – in line with the traditions of his time and region; on the other hand, a refusal to accept the accusation of drinking *khamr* against him means, unfortunately and even today, a defense of the Ḥanafī school.

However, a more attentive observation of Ḥanafī references to Islamic jurisprudence shows that the statement in *Risālat al-ʿahd* by Ibn Sīnā is repeated in an identical way but in a jurisprudence-related form. Therefore, the phrase by Ibn Sīnā that "as for drinks (*mashrūb*), he will forbid partaking in them for fun but maybe drink them for health, treatment, and gathering his strength" is a very "Ḥanafī" sentence.

For instance, al-Marghīnānī (511/1117-593/1197) writes as follows in his *al-Hidāyah*: "*al-Mukhtaṣar* reads: Each *nabīdh* of date and raisin is *ḥalāl* if it is boiled at a minimum level despite being tangy or if the consumer is convinced it is not intoxicating and it is consumed without dance or music (*min ghayr lahw*^{in} *wa-lā ṭarab*^{in}). This is how it is considered by Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Yūsuf – may Allāh rest the souls of both. It is, however, *ḥarām* according to Muḥammad and al-Shāfiʿī – may Allāh rest the souls of both."[20] The terminological similarity between the sentence patterns of Ibn Sīnā and al-Marghīnānī is very clear, primarily because they both indicate the word *lahw* for drinking *sharāb* and *nabīdh*. In addition, there is

[20] Abū l-Ḥasan Burhān al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr al-Marghīnānī, *al-Hidāyah sharḥ Bidāyat al-mubtadī*, ed. Ṭalāl Yūsuf (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1995), IV, 396.

another interesting expression, namely, "... convinced it is not intoxicating." Indeed, drinks such as *nabīdh*, must and *boza* evidently provide the mind with some comfort, and this is what Ibn Sīnā means by "eliminating mental fatigue." Nevertheless, Ḥanafīs leave the decision to the person who drinks the *nabīdh*, finding the "conviction it is not intoxicating" sufficient. The condition of not drinking *nabīdh* for fun and pleasure grounds this characteristic of the *nabīdh*.

In any case, it is also necessary to note the difference between the *fatwá* of *ḥalāl* for must-like drinks – which become alcoholic – and *fatwá* for the prevention of drinking for fun to avoid evil (*sadd al-dharā'iʿ*). A similar provision is in place for squeezed grape juice, which is the raw material for wine (*khamr*):

> When the squeezed grape juice is boiled until its two-thirds evaporated, it is *ḥalāl* despite being tangy. This is how it is for Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Yūsuf – may Allāh rest the souls of both. According to [al-Imām] Muḥammad, Mālik, and al-Shāfiʿī – may Allāh rest their souls – it is *ḥarām*. This dispute is about drinking in the sense of devotion; as for drinking for the sake of fun/play (*lahw*), it is not considered *ḥalāl* by anyone.[21]

Here again, we see the word *lahw*, which corresponds to meaningless and sinful play/fun and which is also used by Ibn Sīnā; moreover, there is an interesting correlation between the denotation of this act through the expression "in the sense of devotion" by al-Imām al-Marghīnānī and through the phrase "for health and treatment" by Ibn Sīnā.

Consequently, by means of his statement in *Risālat al-ʿahd*, Ibn Sīnā actually orders *sharāb*, in other words, *nabīdh*, to be drunk in compliance with Ḥanafī jurisprudence!

Certainly, the confusion with respect to *sharāb* and *nabīdh* is too significant to be underestimated. Another example of this interesting confusion is observable in the meticulous inquiry by Dimitri Gutas into the madhhab of Ibn Sīnā:

> The indirect evidence – the indications, that is, that Avicenna, by elimination, could not have been anything but Ḥanafī – is equally unambiguous. First, it appears absolutely clear that he belonged to

[21] *Ibid*., IV, 397.

> none of the other three Sunnī *maḏhab*s. Positive proof of that is the fact that he and his associates not only drank wine but also exhibited no compunction in openly stating it. Both the act itself and its mention could only have taken place in an environment where there was no official or even unofficial disapproval of it, and this could have taken place only in a Ḥanafī environment. It is sufficient to refer here to the explicit mention of this act in a source that is contemporary and roughly collocal with Avicenna, the *Ṣiwān al-ḥikmah*, where it is said of Abū Sulaymān al-Siğistānī that "although drinking wine is a controversial subject, he would partake of it on the grounds that he belonged to the Ḥanafī rite."[22]

The above reasoning by Gutas is definitely correct and based on primary evidence. Nonetheless, since Gutas makes use of the English translation of *The Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-ḥikmah*,[23] he paves the way for another serious confusion by overlooking the fact that the word *wine* in the English edition corresponds to *khamr* in Arabic. Considering Gutas's statement, it is as if only the Ḥanafī consider drinking wine (*khamr*) permissible; accordingly, as if the comfort and ease of statements about Ibn Sīnā's drinking of wine (*khamr*) prove that he is a Ḥanafī.

However, the original text reads exactly as follows:

كان قديم الدرس للفقه أيام الشبيهة متمسكا بطريقة العفاف والسداد وكان يتناول من الشراب المختلف فيه تناولا على أنه حنفي المذهب.[24]

The exact translation of the foregoing is as follows: "From of old, he had classes of Islamic jurisprudence on certain days, as he followed the path of chastity and righteousness. During the class, he used to drink various kinds of *sharāb*, for he was of Ḥanafī school."

The meaning of the above passage, which is the first phrase in the chapter on the biography of al-Sijistānī, is clear: al-Sijistānī is a Ḥanafī

---

[22] Dimitri Gutas, "Avicenna's *Maḏhab* with an Appendix on the Question of His Date of Birth," *Quaderni di Studi Arabi* 5/6 (1987-1988), 331.

[23] D. M. Dunlop, ed., *The* Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-ḥikmah *of Abū Sulaimān as-Sijistānī: Arabic Text, Introduction, and Indices* (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1979), lines 2850-51, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110806823.

[24] Abū Sulaymān Muḥammad ibn Ṭāhir ibn Bahrām al-Sijistānī, *Ṣiwān al-ḥikmah wa-thalāth rasā'il*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Bunyād-i Farhang-i Īrān, 1974), 311.

jurisprudent who is also a man of chastity and righteousness and who abides by religious commandments and prohibitions. Accordingly, his habitude of drinking various kinds of *sharāb* – even during classes – cannot be found strange since he is from the Ḥanafī school.

Presumably, there were several accusations back then of al-Sijistānī as well for being light and drinking *sharāb*, and this is why the phrase above is included; this must be the reason for the careful statement that he lectured on Islamic jurisprudence "as he followed the path of chastity and righteousness." As emphasized before, other madhhabs of Islamic jurisprudence, and the Ḥanbalī school above all, made extreme accusations since, for them, there was no difference between drinking *nabīdh* and *khamr*, and since they had absolute faith in the accuracy of their opinion.

In any case, since there is no dispute between all madhhabs of Islamic jurisprudence, including Ḥanafī, about the fact that the consumption of wine (*khamr*), which is clearly described in Qurʾān as a "Satanic smear," is *ḥarām*, this text explicitly demonstrates that back then, the word *sharāb* was employed synonymously with *nabīdh*, which was seen as permissible in Ḥanafī eyes. This is why, even though the evidence and reasoning by Gutas is correct, the problem about what Ibn Sīnā actually drank remains unsolved, since the word *sharāb* in translated into English as "wine" – which actually corresponds to *khamr*.

In fact, the venerable Turkish translator of Gutas's article has added the following explanation in the footnotes for clarification:

> The autobiography of Ibn Sīnā and referential texts about Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī, to which Gutas refers about the problem of "wine/act of drinking," actually use the word *sharāb* and not *khamr*, which is clearly declared *ḥarām* in the Qurʾān through a strong maxim. Although Gutas chooses to correspond this word with wine in the sense of *khamr*, it seems inappropriate to translate the word as wine in the sense of *khamr*. Indeed, as is known, the Ḥanafī stipulated various provisions with respect to drinks made of raisin, dried date, barley, millet, honey, etc., except for grape-based *khamr*, depending on their time of immersion, whether they are boiled, the time of boiling, stages of foaming and becoming alcoholic, or being pure or mixed. According to Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Yūsuf, it is not *ḥarām* or should not be forbidden to partake certain drinks in the abovementioned group on the condition of not getting drunk. In this

> regard, drinking *sharāb* and not *khamr* by Ibn Sīnā may be construed as evidence of his adherence to the Ḥanafī madhhab.[25]

Moreover, it would be incorrect to assume that the problem of *sharāb/nabīdh* constituted a problem only for Ibn Sīnā. In the beginnings of his *Muqaddimah*, Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) writes about the mistakes of historians; accordingly, he criticizes the reports that Hārūn al-Rashīd used to set up assemblies and drink wine (*khamr*), saying the following: "al-Rashīd exclusively drank date juice (*nabīdh*) in line with the practice of Ahl al-ʿIrāq madhhab. Their *fatwá*s about this issue are renowned. As for (his drinking of) wine (*khamr*), there is no way of accusing him of this deed or reciting groundless reports about this act."[26] Needless to say, Ibn Khaldūn means the Ḥanafī school with the expression "Ahl al-ʿIrāq."

The second mention of *sharāb* in the autobiography of Ibn Sīnā, this time in the part written by al-Jūzjānī, clarifies the situation even further. On this occasion, al-Jūzjānī describes an account that he witnessed to show the genius of Ibn Sīnā: Al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs wrote a work on logic called *al-Mukhtaṣar al-asghar fī l-manṭiq* – which he would eventually add to the beginning of *Deliverance* – during his sojourn in Gorgan. A copy of this work reached Shīrāz, whereupon certain scholars in the city examined the book before writing several questions about some disputable issues and sending them to Ibn Sīnā by means of Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī. On a hot summer afternoon, Abū l-Qāsim meets Ibn Sīnā and presents him with the pamphlet of questions. In a noisy environment where everyone is talking to one another, Ibn Sīnā analyzes the questions and asks al-Jūzjānī for paper. The latter prepares and brings fifty pages. Al-Jūzjānī describes what happened next:

> We performed night *ṣalāh*; he got his candle ready and ordered *sharāb*. He told me and his brother to sit down and to drink *sharāb;* then, (he) started responding to the mentioned questions. He was writing and drinking until midnight. Once I and his brother were overcome by sleep, he told us to leave. In the morning, he called for me through his messenger; when I arrived (near him), he was on a

---

[25] See footnote 28 by M. Cüneyt Kaya, in *İbn Sînâ'nın Mirası* by Dimitri Gutas, comp. and trans. M. Cüneyt Kaya (Istanbul: Klasik, 2004), 23.

[26] Abū Zayd Walī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn*, ed. Aḥmad al-Zuʿbī (Beirut: Dār al-Arqam, n.d.), 50.

> prayer rug, and the five fascicles (fifty pages) were in front of him. He said, "Take these to al-Shaykh Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī and say to him, 'I wrote in a hurry so the messenger would not be late.' When I handed the pages to him, he was astonished and sent a messenger to the scholars (of Shīrāz) to inform them. This incident went down in history among the public![27]

Once again, we face a personal testimony about Ibn Sīnā's drinking *sharāb*. However, just a brief reflection makes it apparent that the *sharāb* in this report is very unlikely to mean *khamr*. How can Ibn Sīnā, who performs night *ṣalāh* together with the congregation, drink *khamr* until the morning and write a text of fifty pages about the particulars of logic – even more, questions that were asked of him about his own work? If we look closely, it is not just "a glass of" but continuous drinking; indeed, it is very difficult to identify *sharāb* as *khamr* for a person who is even slightly aware of the effects of alcohol. In addition, because al-Jūzjānī finds Ibn Sīnā on a prayer rug just after the morning *ṣalāh*, this is the clearest evidence that the author does not mean *khamr* by *sharāb*. Indeed, it is not at all reasonable to imagine this regarding a person who performs the night prayer together with the congregation, who bends his elbow until the morning while he writes for almost the entire morning about the weightiest theoretical problems and who then moves on to the morning *ṣalāh*. However, if the word *sharāb* is comprehended as *nabīdh*, all problems are solved, just like they are solved with al-Sijistānī.

On the other hand, we need to remember the deserved reputation of Ibn Sīnā in the history of the world as a physician. Therefore, it is very illustrative to determine in which sense he uses the word *sharāb*. Let us leave aside the chapters about *sharāb* in the famous *The Canon of Medicine* where he mentions dozens of kinds. For example, in his *Risālah fī daf^c al-maḍārr al-kulliyyah* on sanitation, Ibn Sīnā explains the points to consider and the common mistakes as to the preservation of human health; after talking about the weather, temperateness of the climate and nutrition, he proceeds to talk about *sharāb*:

> As for *sharāb*, its temperateness is, likewise, similar to aspects indicated [about foods]. *Sharāb* is used in the sense of water,

[27] Gohlman, *The Life of Ibn Sina*, 80.

intoxicating [drink] and *rubūb*[28] and fruit juices. What we mean here is "water" and the last one [about *rubūb* and fruit juices].[29]

Therefore, what prevents us from comprehending and accepting that Ibn Sīnā uses *sharāb* in the sense of *nabīdh* because he already declares using the word in three meanings in technical terms?

In addition, the attitude of al-Ghazālī towards philosophers in the person of Ibn Sīnā includes another, hitherto unmentioned contradiction. Let us assume that Ibn Sīnā is a wine (*khamr*) addict and that the purity of his faith cannot go beyond allowing him to drink wine (*khamr*) for the sake of health and treatment. Accordingly, he would evidently be accused of underestimating sharīʿah. In such a case, al-Ghazālī or any of us would be fair and just accuse anyone who has committed the same deed. However, is this the case here?

Siyāsatnāmah, written in Persian by Niẓām al-mulk, who discovered and patronized al-Ghazālī and who appointed him the head scholar of the Niẓāmiyyah of Baghdād, includes an interesting point on the topic of wine (*khamr*). The title of part fifteen reads as follows: "On attention to verbal orders given under insobriety and sobriety." It is clearly inappropriate for a sultan to give sudden orders without thinking when he is "drunk;" accordingly, it is normal for Niẓām al-mulk to indicate his warnings about the matter. Why then does the famous vizier not express a total refusal and warning against intoxicating drinks?

In consideration of the title and content of chapter thirty in the *Siyāsatnāmah*, it is easy to understand why Niẓām al-mulk contents himself with warnings about orders given during insobriety and remains silent on the avoidance of drinking in general: "On gathering of an assembly of *sharāb* and fulfilment of conditions in every affair." In this passage, *sharāb* is clearly used in the other sense, namely, *khamr*. Indeed, this chapter includes explanations about the "wine assemblies" of the sultan, recommendations on manners, and even

---

[28] *Rubūb* is the plural form of word *rubb* and means the cooking of squeezed grape juice in such a manner that only a very small amount or one-third is wasted. Two of the abovementioned quotations from al-Marghīnānī already show that this was the "*nabīdh*," namely, date juice, which was considered *ḥalāl* by Ḥanafīs.

[29] Ibn Sīnā, *Risālah fī daf*ʿ *al-maḍārr al-kulliyyah* (Istanbul: Nuruosmaniye Library of Manuscripts, MS 4894), 308v.

warnings regarding the ways of supplying snacks by Niẓām al-mulk. Moreover, this passage is entirely about drinking for "fun and play" with no mention of making an exception for "health and treatment."

Given that al-Ghazālī was very close to Niẓām al-mulk, can we assume that he had read *Siyāsatnāmah* or even that he was already familiar with the text during the process of writing? We do not know. However, if so, how can we evaluate the way that Niẓām al-mulk handles wine in the sense of *khamr*, which he mentions as comfortably and carelessly as Ibn Sīnā, considering the perspective of al-Ghazālī in *al-Munqidh* – a perspective that is highly appreciated by Niẓām al-mulk? If al-Ghazālī was shown the abovementioned passages of *Siyāsatnāmah*, would he assert that they definitely included a "hidden blasphemy"? Alternatively, would Niẓām al-mulk be exempt from the aggression against Ibn Sīnā, since the vizier is a Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī?

VIII.

There is one more significant question to be answered: As al-Ghazālī was more than capable of analyzing and noticing all these problems, why does he not content himself with theoretical criticism, and why does he insist on seeing and showing Ibn Sīnā as a wine-addict sinner, taking advantage of the equivocal use of *sharāb*?

Al-Ghazālī observed several weaknesses in some persons who introduced themselves as philosophers; accordingly, these observations play a part in leading him to such a verdict. This explanation, however, is not sufficient to explain al-Ghazālī's fierce hatred of the "philosophers." If this were the only reason, a similar hatred of his should have been directed at persons who adhered to Sufism or at various Kalām madhhabs, who showed the same weaknesses. Al-Ghazālī, however, never attacks Sufism or proposes its prohibition because of the Sufis who claim sharīʿah is not binding for them because of their spiritual superiority. His radical rage is directed exclusively at philosophers.

Therefore, we need other explanations; in this regard, the abovementioned incident told by al-Jūzjānī constitutes interesting and significant grounds for thinking about this problem. According to al-Jūzjānī, the response of Ibn Sīnā to the relevant questions through the work of fifty pages written in a single short summer night went down

in "history" among the public; in other words, it was an astonishing achievement that became very famous and popular.

There is an important point to consider at this stage: Ibn Sīnā wrote a work of logic in Gorgan in northeastern Iran; his book was reviewed in Shīrāz in south Iran by the *ʿulamāʾ*, including the *qāḍī*, and their questions were communicated to Ibn Sīnā. The locations of these cities can be checked on a map of Iran. This event is a good example of how rapidly and seriously the works of Ibn Sīnā had spread at the time and what a great impact they made on the *ʿulamāʾ* and intellectual circles.[30]

Here, we have a portrait of Ibn Sīnā as a genius who can write a work overnight, who is famous among the *ʿulamāʾ* and the public for his genius, and whose work reaches everywhere in a short time. Indeed, Ibn Sīnā maintained his image as a kind of "Luqmān al-Ḥakīm" in Turkish, Persian, and even Arabic literature, despite the attacks by al-Ghazālī and his followers: he continued living as a hero in folk stories – where he occasionally performed miracles – named after him.[31]

Despite all such *takfīr* and defamations, the influence of Ibn Sīnā on the senior *ʿulamāʾ* remained intact: his system continued to dominate Ottoman madrasahs in the fields of metaphysics, physics,

---

[30] For the extraordinary influence of Ibn Sīnā, see Dimitri Gutas, "The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000 — ca. 1350," in *Avicenna and His Heritage: Acts of the International Colloquium, Leuven-Louvain-La-Neuve, September 8-11 1999*, ed. Jules Janssens and Daniel de Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 81-97.

[31] For a classical reference on this problem, see the chapter titled "İbn Sinâ Folklorları ve Bazı Parçalar" that consists of a total of five papers within the compilation called *Büyük Türk Filozof ve Tıb Üstadı İbni Sina: Şahsiyeti ve Eserleri Hakkında Tetkikler* published by Türk Tarih Kurumu [Turkish Historical Society] for the first time in 1937, and particularly the paper entitled "Şark Folklorunda İbn Sinâ Hakkında Yaşayan ve Kaybolan Efsaneler" by A. Süheyl Ünver (pp. 577- 607). Also see Cahit Öztelli, "Halk Hikâyelerinde İbni Sîna," *Türk Dili Araştırmaları Yıllığı - Belleten* 16 (1968), 213-219. *Hikāya-ʾi Abū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā*, published on various occasions in Egypt and Istanbul, and the story about Ibn Sīnā in the renowned *Mukhayyalāt-i ʿAzīz Efendī* comprises echoes of the representations of Ibn Sīnā in our classical literature, particularly among the common people.

cosmology, and logic until modernity, and this ongoing influence may help us imagine his extraordinary influence in earlier periods.

We can mention another interesting example in this regard. Abū l-Baqāʾ al-Kafawī (d. 1094/1684), a renowned Ottoman scholar, writes the following about "reason" in his famous *al-Kulliyyāt*:

> Intellects vary in degrees because of "the nature on which Allāh creates men," as is unanimously accepted by the intellectual. (As a matter of fact), the intellect of our Prophet (pbuh) is definitely not identical with the intellect of other prophets. According to some, the intellect of Ibn Sīnā is superior to most; it is reported that he used to eat two small vessels of salt every morning and evening.[32]

A late classical Ottoman scholar, and also a *qāḍī*, describes the superior intellect and mentions the Prophet Muḥammad among the prophets, just before mentioning Ibn Sīnā, who used to take two scales of salt every morning and evening because of his superiority in intellect; this example reflects the ongoing profound reputation of al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs. This epic image of Ibn Sīnā provides the balance after the heavy blows of the theoretical and particularly "psychological dialectic" of al-Ghazālī. If it had not been for the opposition of al-Ghazālī, it is hard to imagine how highly Ibn Sīnā would be respected.

Thus, it becomes comprehensible why al-Ghazālī, maybe rightfully in his own way, started to attack Ibn Sīnā in such an extreme manner. It is easy to imagine how strong an opponent Ibn Sīnā was, given that – like al-Ghazālī – his works were neither casual nor one-dimensional; rather, he provided a project for man in the context of intellect and revelation. In fact, Ibn Sīnā wanted to construct a paradigm that would blend Kalām and Sufism around the center of philosophy; the project of al-Ghazālī, on the other hand, sought to blend Kalām and philosophy, with Sufism in the center.

Therefore, the problem with Ibn Sīnā is not the lack of piety; on the contrary, he is too pious. If Ibn Sīnā had built a system that preserves the independence of philosophy and does not interfere with the domain of religion as much as possible, as did al-Fārābī, he

---

[32] Abū l-Baqāʾ Ayyūb ibn Mūsá al-Kafawī, *al-Kulliyyāt: Muʿjam fī l-muṣṭalaḥāt wa-l-furūq al-lughawiyyah*, ed. ʿAdnān Darwīsh and Muḥammad al-Miṣrī, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risālah, 2011), 521.

probably would not be subjected to such a negative reaction. Ibn Sīnā, however, wrote an entirely philosophical exegesis for some Qur'ān chapters and verses, including al-Fātiḥah and the verse about light; explained the benefits of visiting the tombs of holy persons in a philosophical manner; and advanced a philosophical analysis about the virtues and necessity of *ṣalāh*, prayer, and *dhikr*. Ibn Sīnā wrote – still-influential – philosophical works on the demonstration of necessary existent (*ithbāt al-wājib*) and the essence and demonstration of prophethood and, more dangerously, he included in his doctrinal philosophy some significant issues, such as the circumstances of afterlife or even Sufi subjects such as the seats of the wise; all these efforts caused significant unease, particularly among Kalām experts. Indeed, all these activities mean the melting of Kalām and Sufism into philosophy, and they reveal how "dangerous" the philosophical system of Ibn Sīnā is with regard to the conception of religion that he proposes to the Muslim world.

In this case, it is inevitable for al-Ghazālī to activate the philosophical dialect examined here and to disclose the "hidden blasphemy of philosophers," in which he apparently and strictly believes since the very beginning.

Today, however, the conception of religion proposed by Ibn Sīnā poses no more risks; therefore, the time has come and even passed to reconsider the criticism of philosophers by al-Ghazālī once again from a calmer perspective after a thousand years. Did we, then, attain a sufficient level to carry out such an evaluation and to apply the principle of "avoiding imitation and attaining verification," as al-Ghazālī always warns?

IX.

Apparently, it is not easy to give an affirmative answer to this question, given the ongoing influence of the psychological dialect in *al-Munqidh* by al-Ghazālī on not only common people or preachers but also on Turkish academic circles.

As a simple but essential example, let us remember the paper called "Was al-Ghazālī right to declare philosophers as unbelievers?" by Mahmut Kaya, one of the significant founding figures in the philosophy of Islam in the Turkish academy. After a concise and elaborate evaluation of three problems subject to *takfīr*, Mahmut Kaya responds to this question with insight, saying that "therefore, it

is impossible with regard to the three mentioned problems to claim the existence of evidence that will show al-Ghazālī rightful in his insistence on the *takfīr* of philosophers. As indicated above, his approach toward philosophers in these issues is political rather than religious."[33]

Thus, at first glance, we finally arrive at the point already indicated by Averroes some eight centuries ago. Indeed, an inquiry into the theoretical dialectic of al-Ghazālī against the philosophers is necessary to determine whether this dialectic had the content to justify the attempt to expel al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā from Islam. In case it is concluded that al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, who are considered the principal representatives of philosophers, are within the sphere of Islam, then it will become possible to reassess philosophy and philosophical thought, and therefore science, and their potential beyond the modern impositions of today's intellectual Muslim world.

Nevertheless, we should also note that at this stage it is obligatory to overcome the barriers established by the "psychological dialectic" of al-Ghazālī, particularly considering its influence on the common people. Indeed, the Muslim world, which has become ahistorical because of its imitation of the West and which suffers under the heavy pressure of modernity, cannot attain independence or generate new solutions for humankind unless the connection between the mentality that considers "philosophy" synonymous with an abjuration of religion and the perspective that restricts "knowledge" (*ʿilm*) by Qurʾānic exegesis, ḥadīth, and Islamic jurisprudence is duly questioned.

Nonetheless, a few years before his abovementioned words, Mahmut Kaya released a brief analysis and an entire translation text of the *Risālat al-ʿahd* on the occasion of another international symposium. The mentioned translation called the "Philosopher's Oath by Ibn Sīnā" by Mahmut Kaya begins as follows: "Besides, the statement that 'they shall partake in alcoholic drinks not for joy but for health, treatment, and recovery' (article 7) has been subject to severe criticism and even mockery of al-Ghazālī." Indeed, the

[33] Kaya, "Gazzalî Filozofları Tekfir Etmekte Haklı mıydı?" in *900. Vefat Yılında Uluslararası Gazzālî Sempozyumu: Milletlerarası Tartışmalı İlmî Toplantı*, ed. İlyas Çelebi (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2012), 50.

translator, who accepts the introduction of al-Ghazālī in *al-Munqidh* regardless of the text available in front of him, translates the relevant passage of the text as follows: "*They shall partake in alcoholic drinks not for joy but for health, treatment, and recovery*."[34]

This paper has already sufficiently indicated the fallacy of this translation, which lacks any grounds except for the substitution of the word *al-mashrūb* by *khamr* by al-Ghazālī. Unfortunately, however, the translation of *Risālat al-ʿahd* by Mahmut Kaya, one of the founding fathers of philosophy of Islam in Turkey, is often quoted and used in Turkish academic circles despite the above discussed mistake that introduces Ibn Sīnā exactly in the manner desired by al-Ghazālī.[35]

Let us assume that you only open the *İslam Felsefesi Sözlüğü* [*Dictionary of Islamic Philosophy*] in Turkish and begin reading *Risālat al-ʿahd* under the title of "İbn Sînâ'nın Filozof Yemini [Philosopher's Oath by Ibn Sīnā]," which is added just after the credits and titles and even before the preface to pay respect to Ibn Sīnā. As you proceed in a spiritual and even pious atmosphere, you turn the page and come across the following statement: "They shall partake in alcoholic drinks not for joy, but for health, treatment, and recovery."[36] Any faithful Muslim who reads this text will inevitably think that Ibn Sīnā and all the philosophers, or anyone related to, interested in or sympathetic to philosophy, or even anyone with a positive attitude towards the word "philosophy," are by no means pious.

Another striking example of the ineliminable mark of al-Ghazālī's "psychological dialectic" is observable in the most common Turkish translation of the autobiography of Ibn Sīnā, in the passage where the

---

[34] Kaya, "İbn Sinâ'nın Filozof Yemini," 156.

[35] However, the translation of *Risālat al-ʿahd*, edited by Mehmet Ali Aynî in 1937, is much more accurate, despite being slightly difficult to understand today; if only Mahmut Kaya examined this translation. For the translation, see Mehmet Ali Aynî, "İbn Sinâ'da Tasavvuf," in *Büyük Türk Filozof ve Tıb Üstadı İbni Sina: Şahsiyeti ve Eserleri Hakkında Tetkikler*, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014), 194-197. Aynî – accurately – translates the phrase in which al-Ghazālī accuses Ibn Sīnā of drinking wine as follows: "As for drinks (*mashrūb*), the promiser (*muʿāhid*) shall drink them not to kill time but for recovery (*tashaffī*), treatment, and gathering his strength (*taqawwī*)."

[36] Mehmet Vural, *İslâm Felsefesi Sözlüğü* (Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2016), 6.

abovementioned word *sharāb* is used. Ibn Sīnā says, "whenever I felt drowsy or weak, I drank a glass of wine, and went on reading."[37] Aware of the oddness of the text, the translators add the following footnote to the word "wine" (*sharāb*): "This word, which is *sharāb* also in Arabic, may look suitable for translation as '[soft] drink' at first glance; however, in his *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, al-Ghazālī indicates that Ibn Sīnā actually means wine."

Apparently, the eloquence of al-Ghazālī continues to influence perceptions despite the explicit distortion. The words of Ibn Sīnā are interpreted through an accusation by al-Ghazālī. Indeed, the translators should have contented themselves with reflecting the literal meaning of the text. Thus, a translation that disregards the conditioning by al-Ghazālī and "may look suitable ... at first glance" would have definitely preserved the original and true meaning.

Another striking example is the article entitled "İbn Sina'nın Hayatı, Eserleri ve Düşünce Sistemi Üzerine [On Life, Works, and System of Thinking of Ibn Sīnā]," prepared by Mesut Okumuş and added to the beginning of *eş-Şeyhu'r-Reis İbn-i Sînâ* [*al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs: Ibn Sīnā*], an important book of fifteen articles recently published by the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs. The article provides structured information on the biography of Ibn Sīnā and includes a passage under the title "Dinî Yaşantısı [His Religious Life]" where two problems are discussed: First, is Ibn Sīnā Shīʿī or Sunnī? Second, how pious was Ibn Sīnā in his daily practices?

Following certain serious and appropriate evaluations, Okumuş adds:

> Most evidence shows Ibn Sīnā was a pious man and a sincere Muslim in his individual life. Reportedly, advice by the philosopher in his letter to Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr is thought to reflect this fact ... "Bear in mind that *ṣalāh* is the most beautiful of all acts, fasting is the most perfect and virtuous among worship, alms is the most useful among favors, toleration and patience are the purest of all secrets and ways of living, while hypocrisy is the most erroneous and void of all

[37] Ibn Sīnā, *Risâleler*, trans. Alparslan Açıkgenç and M. Hayri Kırbaşoğlu (Ankara: Kitâbiyât Yayınları, 2004), 13.

attitudes."[38] In the same letter, the philosopher recommends consuming drinks not for joy and pleasure but for health and treatment. Ibn Sīnā uses the same expressions in his *Risālah fī l-ʿahd* where he presents his promises to Allāh; in this work, he promises in the presence of Allāh not to consume drinks except for health and treatment."[39]

It is indeed very sad to see such a contradictory conclusion, of which the writer is perhaps not entirely conscious, in a serious biographical compilation on Ibn Sīnā that is highly regarded considering both its official publisher (TDİB/Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey) and content.

At first, the author informs the reader in an accurate and prudent manner that based on available evidence, Ibn Sīnā led a pious life in obedience to religious commandments and prohibitions. Certainly, one of the most significant pieces of evidence about this conviction is Ibn Sīnā's meetings and correspondence with Abū Saʿīd Abū l-Khayr, the well-known ascetic and Sufi of the time. As is appropriately noted, Ibn Sīnā thinks and states in written form that *ṣalāh*, fasting, and alms are the most valuable deeds and – interestingly enough – that hypocrisy is the greatest fallacy.

While we are thus convinced about the piety of Ibn Sīnā in his life practices, the author argues that in the same letter, Ibn Sīnā recommends "consuming (alcoholic drink) not for joy and pleasure, but only for treatment and health." Once again, the word *sharāb* is transformed into "drink," which is understood as an "alcoholic drink."

Nevertheless, the mentioned letter by Ibn Sīnā includes no such expression, implication, or even a word.[40] Why? What is the point of

---

[38] Ibn Sīnā, "Maktūb Abī Saʿīd ilá l-Shaykh wa-jawābuh," in *Rasāʾil İbn Sīnā: İbn Sînâ Risâleleri*, ed. Hilmi Ziya Ülken (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1953), II, 38.

[39] Mesut Okumuş, "İbn Sinâ'nın Hayatı, Eserleri ve Düşünce Sistemi Üzerine," in *eş-Şeyhu'r-Reis İbn-i Sînâ*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2015), 30-31.

[40] The quotation by the author from the letter of Ibn Sīnā is available in his references. However, as we said before, the same letter by Ibn Sīnā includes no such statement that "he recommends drinking alcohol not for joy and amusement but only for health and treatment." Nevertheless, upon observing the reference for the Arabic translation of the letter, namely, *Rasāʾil Ibn Sīnā* published by

mentioning exceptional situations that permit the drinking of alcoholic drinks in such a letter that Ibn Sīnā apparently put to paper in a sincere manner and that praised the pious ways of living?

Therefore, why did Okumuş produce a (actually nonexistent) proof about the consumption of alcoholic drink by Ibn Sīnā? The answer can be found in the following phrase: "Ibn Sīnā uses the same expressions in his *Risālah fī l-ʿahd* where he presents his promises to Allāh; in this work, he undertakes in presence of Allāh not to consume drinks except for health and treatment." As we can see, the author is so obsessed with the famous statement in *Risālat al-ʿahd*, which is falsified by al-Ghazālī to create evidence for the consumption of wine by Ibn Sīnā, that he creates the illusion of the existence of the same expressions in the abovementioned letter of Ibn Sīnā – even though they are not there.

The problem here is the same as that of the Turkish translators of Ibn Sīnā's autobiography. It is worth noting once again that *Risālat al-ʿahd* is not a text of repentance and that the phrase distorted by al-Ghazālī does not include the word *khamr*. However, mostly due to al-Ghazālī, the information that Ibn Sīnā drank wine, even conditioned by his repentance with the exception of "health and recovery," has become so widespread that this report has penetrated into almost all descriptions and conceptions of Ibn Sīnā through the direct association with the words "philosophy" and "philosopher." Therein lies the weakness of the biography prepared by Mehmet Okumuş. Indeed, scientific studies may tolerate inattention to some extent; nevertheless, the information and impression provided to readers through a biography that is published in thousands of copies and assured by an official institution is truly challenging.

Hilmi Ziya Ülken under İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları in 1953, we came across such distorted and misread passages that we examined the original version of the letter in the fear that Mesut Okumuş could be right. This letter is available in foil no. 247 of manuscript compilation no. "Nuruosmaniye 044894" that includes 144 books and pamphlets by Ibn Sīnā. Accordingly, the original version comprises no such statement and gives no indication of such an implication. I would like to express my gratitude to my young colleague Maruf Toprak for his assistance in the provision and analysis of the copy of the mentioned manuscript.

Consequently, the conclusion remains almost unchanged since what al-Ghazālī did in *al-Munqidh*: A sincere Muslim with an interest in and sympathy for philosophy learns that the predilections of Ibn Sīnā for wine addiction and consumption of alcohol are "proof positive." At this stage, it is not difficult for the reader to comprehend the relation between this addiction of Ibn Sīnā and his philosopher identity – and therefore philosophy.

Conclusion

Al-Ghazālī is certainly one of the greatest geniuses of the Muslim world. Accordingly, it is not surprising to see that his system of religious thinking, created with extraordinary hard work and sincerity, has maintained its influence and inherent authority for centuries. Once again, we should note that during the first confrontations with colonialism of the modern West, the "conception of religion" that held the Muslim community together was substantially established under the influence of al-Ghazālī. This being the case, it is meaningful that the first generation of orientalists, who served as a branch of colonialism, concentrated on al-Ghazālī and pointed him out as the target for the underdevelopment of the Muslim world, together with, interestingly, the Turkish rule. Indeed, whether al-Ghazālī played a part in the disruption of philosophical and scientific progress in the Muslim world is another point for debate; on the other hand, he is definitely one of the greatest obstacles to the Westernization and modernization of the Muslim world – in other words, its fall under the domination of the Western paradigm.

The most important outcome of this fact is that any criticism against al-Ghazālī in the Muslim world includes double-sided and severe risks. On the one hand, the necessity to preserve tradition and find a solution for the depressions of the modern world doubles the difficulty of settling accounts with al-Ghazālī. Nevertheless, it is evidently obligatory to attain or at least draw some near-certain conclusions today. First, the intentional orientalist allegations that al-Ghazālī caused the exclusion of philosophy and science in the Muslim world have profound and calculated weaknesses. Neither Averroes nor al-Ghazālī are truly the persons introduced and described by Ernst Renan. In addition, recent significant studies have advanced that philosophical thought and science had somehow

continued in the Muslim world even after the criticisms of al-Ghazālī.[41]

Nevertheless, an intellectual or a political approach is not sufficient either to actually face al-Ghazālī. Unfortunately, it is often overlooked that his system and authority do not consist of his theoretical criticisms or analyses. The "psychological dialectic" of al-Ghazālī was created for its own era and probably led to an influence and side effects beyond his imagination; however, such an influence is still extant and decisive regarding not only the conception of "religion" but also of "philosophy" and "science" among, above all, the common people.

In this modest paper, we concentrated on *al-Munqidh* to examine an example of the "psychological dialectic" carried out by al-Ghazālī to discredit Ibn Sīnā. Al-Ghazālī condemns the conception of religion among philosophers and even accuses them of a kind of hypocrisy by means of a phrase that he decontextualizes and even distorts himself. A closer look, however, shows that this is not the case.

On the other hand, it is truly sad to see distinguished experts who wrote the biography of Ibn Sīnā and refused the *takfīr* of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā in theoretical terms or at least respected his personality as a faithful Muslim, take al-Ghazālī's description of Ibn Sīnā as the *sharāb* (wine) addict for granted.

If Muslim societies, which keep losing strength in the face of the seductive effects of modernity and the major political and cultural crises caused by the colonialist powers, want to succeed in the preservation of their self and provide universal suggestions for the salvation of mankind, then they evidently have to overcome al-Ghazālī's psychological dialectic – not only in theory – to establish a more solid conception of "philosophy" and "science."

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

[41] For a greatly informative reference on the problem, see Griffel, *al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

al-Ahwāzī, Abū ʿAlī Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Yazdād. "Mathālib Ibn Abī Bishr," 151-165. In Michel Allard, "Un Pamphlet Contre al-Aš'arī." *Bulletin d'études orientales* 23 (1970), 129-165.

Aynî, Mehmet Ali. "İbn Sinâ'da Tasavvuf." In *Büyük Türk Filozof ve Tıb Üstadı İbni Sina: Şahsiyeti ve Eserleri Hakkında Tetkikler*, 94-197. 3rd ed. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014.

al-Bayhaqī, Abū l-Ḥasan Ẓahīr al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Zayd ibn Muḥammad. *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikmah*. Edited by Muḥammad Shafīʿ. Lahore: Panjab University Oriental Publications, AH 1351 [1935].

Dunlop, D. M. ed. *The* Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-ḥikmah *of Abū Sulaimān as-Sijistānī: Arabic Text, Introduction, and Indices*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110806823.

al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad. *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*. Edited by Sulaymān Dunyā. Egypt: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1966.

_____. *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl wa-l-mūṣil ilá dhī l-ʿizzah wa-l-jalāl*. Edited by Jamīl Ṣalībā and Kāmil ʿAyyād. Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1967.

_____. *Jawāhir al-Qurʾān*. Edited by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā al-Qabbānī. 3rd ed. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-ʿUlūm, 1990.

_____. *al-Mankhūl min taʿlīqāt al-uṣūl*. Edited by Muḥammad Ḥasan Haytū. 3rd ed. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1998.

Gohlman, William E., ed. and trans. *The Life of Ibn Sina: A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974.

Griffel, Frank. *al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.001.0001.

Gutas, Dimitri. "Avicenna's *Maḍhab* with an Appendix on the Question of His Date of Birth," *Quaderni di Studi Arabi* 5/6 (1987-1988): 323-336.

_____. "The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000 — ca. 1350." In *Avicenna and His Heritage: Acts of the International Colloquium, Leuven-Louvain-La-Neuve, September 8-11 1999*, edited by Jules Janssens and Daniel de Smet, 81-97. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002.

Ibn Khaldūn, Abū Zayd Walī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad. *Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn*. Edited by Aḥmad al-Zuʿbī. Beirut: Dār al-Arqam, n.d.

Ibn Qutaybah, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muslim al-Dīnawarī. *Taʾwīl mukhtalif al-ḥādīth*. Edited by Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Aṣfar. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1999.

Ibn Sīnā, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAlī. "Maktūb Abī Saʿīd ilá l-Shaykh wa-jawābuh." In *Rasāʾil İbn Sīnā: İbn Sînâ Risâleleri*, edited by Hilmi Ziya

Ülken, II, 37-39. Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1953.

_____. *Risālah fī daf' al-maḍārr al-kullīyyah*. Istanbul: Nuruosmaniye Library of Manuscripts, MS 4894, fols. 307v-316v.

_____. "Risālat al-'ahd." In *Majmū'at al-rasā'il*, 204-208, edited by Muḥyī al-Dīn Ṣabrī al-Kurdī. Egypt: Maṭba'at Kurdistān al-'Ilmiyyah, AH 1328.

_____. *Risâleler*. Translated by Alparslan Açıkgenç and M. Hayri Kırbaşoğlu. Ankara: Kitâbiyât Yayınları, 2004.

al-Jūzjānī, Abū 'Ubayd 'Abd al-Wāḥid ibn Muḥammad. "Büyük Üstat [İbn Sînâ'nın] – Allah ona rahmet etsin– *Sergüzeşt* Olarak Bilinen Hayatı, Kitaplarının Listesi, [Yaşadığı] Hallerin ve Hayat Hikâyesinin Anlatımı." Translated by M. Cüneyt Kaya. www.academia.edu/37630881/Ibn_Sînânın_Hayatı_Sîretüş-Şeyhir-reîs_Autobiography_of_Ibn Sina_. Accessed May 25, 2019.

al-Kafawī, Abū l-Baqā' Ayyūb ibn Mūsá. *al-Kulliyyāt: Mu'jam fī l-muṣṭalaḥāt wa-l-furūq al-lughawiyyah*. Edited by 'Adnān Darwīsh and Muḥammad al-Miṣrī. 2nd ed. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risālah, 2011.

Kaya, M. Cüneyt, comp. and trans. *İbn Sînâ'nın Mirası* by Dimitri Gutas. Istanbul: Klasik, 2004.

Kaya, Mahmut. "İbn Sînâ'nın Filozof Yemini: Ibn Sînâ and the Philosopher's Oath." In *Uluslararası İbn Sînâ Sempozyumu: Bildiriler II* [*International Ibn Sina Symposium Papers II*], edited by Mehmet Mazak and Nevzat Özkaya, 155-160. Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A. Ş. Yayınları, 2008.

_____. "Gazzalî Filozofları Tekfir Etmekte Haklı mıydı?" In *900. Vefat Yılında Uluslararası Gazzālî Sempozyumu: Milletlerarası Tartışmalı İlmî Toplantı*, edited by İlyas Çelebi, 43-51. Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2012.

Lameer, Joep. "İbn Sîna'nın Şehveti [Avicenna's Concupiscence]." Translated by Serdar Cihan Güleç. *Kutadgubilig* 30 (2016): 1047-1059.

al-Marghīnānī, Abū l-Ḥasan Burhān al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Abī Bakr. *al-Hidāyah sharḥ Bidāyat al-mubtadī*. 4 vols. in 2 vols. Edited by Ṭalāl Yūsuf. Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī, 1995.

al-Sijistānī, Abū Sulaymān Muḥammad ibn Ṭāhir ibn Bahrām. *Ṣiwān al-ḥikmah wa-thalāth rasā'il*. Edited by 'Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Bunyād-i Farhang-i Īrān, 1974.

Okumuş, Mesut. "İbn Sinâ'nın Hayatı, Eserleri ve Düşünce Sistemi Üzerine." In *eş-Şeyhu'r-Reis İbn-i Sînâ*, 17-43. 2nd ed. Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2015.

Öztelli, Cahit. "Halk Hikâyelerinde İbni Sîna." *Türk Dili Araştırmaları Yıllığı - Belleten* 16 (1968): 213-219.

Ünver, A. Süheyl. "Şark Folklorunda İbn Sinâ Hakkında Yaşayan ve Kaybolan Efsaneler." In *Büyük Türk Filozof ve Tıb Üstadı İbni Sina: Şahsiyeti ve Eserleri Hakkında Tetkikler*, 577-607. 3rd ed. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014.

Vural, Mehmet. *İslâm Felsefesi Sözlüğü*. Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2016.

CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ANTI-ISLAMISM: JEWISH ZIONISM AND JEWISH INFLUENCE IN WESTERN ANTI-ISLAMISM

Ömer Kemal Buhari

Independent Researcher, Istanbul-Turkey
omerkemal@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2970-6985

Abstract

The present academic literature hosts volumes of information on Muslim anti-Semitism, while Jewish anti-Islamism is hardly mentioned. With the aim of filling this scholarly gap, the article deals with contemporary Jewish anti-Islamism, principally focusing on Zionism's role in such anti-Islamism, by delving into the existing literature, news media, and online sources. Since the very birth of Zionism, Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims and, finally, Islam itself have primarily been seen as "obstacles" to Zionist goals. The "chosenness," "promised lands," and "messianism" doctrines at the core of Zionism have led to the antagonization of the aforementioned. There appears to be a blatant overlap between anti-Islamism and Jewish voices in the media, the entertainment sector, popular bookshops, foundations, academia, think-tanks and the virtual world. Finally, pro-Israel influences in the West have catalyzed negativity about Islam and Muslims and propagated wars through lobbying activities. Jewish anti-Islamism is real and needs further scholarly investigation.

Ilahiyat Studies p-ISSN: 1309-1786 / e-ISSN: 1309-1719
Volume 10 Number 1 Winter / Spring 2019 DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2019.101.190

Received: July 09, 2019 *Accepted*: November 06, 2019 *Published*: November 27, 2019

To cite this article: Buhari, Ömer Kemal. "Contemporary Jewish Anti-Islamism: Jewish Zionism and Jewish Influence in Western Anti-Islamism." *Ilahiyat Studies* 10, no. 1 (2019): 99-120. https://doi.org/10.12730/13091719.2019.101.190

Key Words: Anti-Islamism, Islamophobia, Jewish anti-Islamism, Zionist anti-Islamism, Zionism, Judaism

Introduction

There are a number of reasons for the controversial nature of the phenomenon of Jewish anti-Islamism. One reason is the relatively peaceful coexistence of Jews and Muslims throughout history. During the medieval period, Jews lived under Christian and Islamic rules in different regions. In general, it is maintained by a number of historians that while the Christian experience has not been very propitious for Jews, they have experienced more prosperity under Muslim rule. Some historians also denote such periods of prosperity as the "golden age of Jews." Others understand the issue as a matter of survival, as asserted by the Jewish scholar Goitein (1958, 162): "It was Islam which saved the Jewish people." Another reason is the expectation of empathy from a group of fellow humans who have experienced the negative consequences of discrimination and hostility for many centuries. Finally, the theological alikeness between both religions makes the phenomenon particularly curious. Perhaps these and other reasons have given existence to historical Jewish figures who are sympathetic to Islam, as asserted by Lewis in his "The Pro-Islamic Jews" (1968). Nevertheless, it is possible to observe that such figures' friendly presence has become less visible among Jews in contemporary times. There appears to be a blatant overlap between anti-Islamism and Jewish/pro-Israel voices in the media, the entertainment sector, popular bookshops, foundations, academia, think-tanks and the virtual world. However, contrary to the abundant literature on "Islamic/Muslim anti-Semitism," the number of scholarly works on "Jewish" or "Zionist anti-Islamism" is relatively scarce. Aked (2015) makes the following observation in this regard:

> Despite a wealth of empirical evidence, from overlapping board memberships among think tanks, to examples of Islamophobic tropes in pro-Israel propaganda, little scholarly attention has been paid to the overlap between Islamophobia and Zionism.

In his analysis of hostilities between world religions, Sloterdijk (2009, 48) finds Jewish anti-Islamism to be "faint and presumably little-examined." Indeed, the literature contains a very limited number of works dedicated to understanding the phenomenon. Accordingly,

the main objective of this article is to investigate whether there is any evidence for the existence of "Jewish anti-Islamism." The dearth of scholarly literature on the subject is a compelling reason to investigate the manifestations of the phenomenon in alternative information sources such as reports from organizations, newspaper articles, and online sources that nonetheless report real events and meet scholarly standards.

I. Theory and Praxis: Core Doctrines of Jewish Zionism and Anti-Islamism

Emerging in the nineteenth century within the post-Enlightenment secular environment of European nationalism (Hertzberg 1997, 15), Zionism was a prevalent ideology among freshly emancipated Jews who were in the midst of the process of rebuilding their identity in line with newly emerging conditions. Zionism's primary goal was to build a state for Jews in Palestine, which was achieved in 1948, thirty-one years after the British occupation of Jerusalem and the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and sixty-eight years after the first wave of Jewish settlers in the 1880s. Zionism is regarded by some as the most significant cornerstone in modern Jewish history. Maier (1988, 663) claims that "up until the hegemony of the Zionist movement, it has not been suitable at all to speak of 'Judaism,' since the definitions of Judaism have significantly differed in individual directions." Gorny (2003, 477) analogously argues that "during the past two generations, Zionism became the greatest collective achievement of the Jewish people throughout their history." For Gorny (2003, 481), "Zionism was a pluralistic movement that, based on consensus, succeeded in concentrating within itself various and conflicting ideological currents and political groups: religious and secular, political and practical, socialist and middle-class, liberal and totalitarian." Whereas support for Zionism is much lower among diasporic Jews, a recent poll conducted by the Herzl Center (Harkov, 2016) proclaimed that ninety percent of Jews in Israel identify themselves as Zionists.

Having established the significance of Zionism for Judaism, the following connections might be inferred between the movement's core doctrines and anti-Islamism. According to three core doctrines of Zionism, which are claimed to have been derived from Jewish scriptures, (I) Jews are the "chosen people" by God; (II) The lands between the Nile and Euphrates rivers, symbolized in the Israeli flag

with two blue lines, are promised by God to Jews; (III) In order for the Messiah to come, Jews must establish a Jewish state in Palestine that is empty of gentiles. Although the first and second doctrines are common and largely unquestioned among Zionists, the third doctrine is criticized by some who argue that redemption can only occur with the appearance of the Messiah himself.

The following points can be deduced about the relationship between these three items and anti-Islamism. (I) Various interpretations are provided for the concept of "chosenness." Briefly, there are two contrasting views. In the first, Jews are considered to have a special position among other people in terms of responsibility, and in the second, Jews are considered to have an ontological/biological superiority over other people. At first sight, it appears that while the first interpretation does not necessarily lead to anti-Islamic consequences, it is the second interpretation that causes hubris and antagonism. Nevertheless, both of these interpretations give birth to the belief of "Jewish exceptionalism." Both assert that God regards Jews in a special and exceptional way. This leads to the logical conclusion that others, including Muslims, are "unchosen" and only secondary in the divine hierarchy and plan. Accordingly, these others' beliefs, rights, and destinies become less significant. It is a striking point in this regard that from the beginning, the Zionist ideologues have not reserved any significant place for a discussion of the consequences of the Jewish restoration for the Palestinian people. For instance, Hertzberg's *The Zionist Idea*, a standard collection of Zionist writings, utilizes the designation "Palestinian" mainly to refer to the Jews in Palestine. Herzl even employs dehumanizing and utterly aggressive language by comparing the native populations in Palestine to "bears" and suggests "organiz[ing] a great and cheerful hunt, gather[ing] the beasts together and throw[ing] a melinite bomb into their midst" to get rid of them (Herzl 1920, 23).

(II) The second doctrine, which assumes God's promise of Palestinian lands to Jews, is closely connected to the first doctrine. If the Jews have a God-given right to live in Palestine (and eventually in the rest of the "promised lands"), others, who mainly happen to be Muslims, must be evacuated. Pinsker and Herzl accordingly preached the total evacuation of gentiles from Palestine (Hertzberg 1997, 16). As early as 1930, Magnes empathetically predicted the long-term moral consequences of the establishment of the Jewish state:

> Palestine is holy to the Jew in that his attitude toward this Land is necessarily different from his attitude toward any other land. He may have to live in other lands upon the support of bayonets, but that may well be something which he, as a Jew, cannot help. But when he goes voluntarily as a Jew to repeople his own Jewish Homeland, it is by an act of will, of faith, of free choice, and he should not either will or believe in or want a Jewish Home that can be maintained in the long run only against the violent opposition of the Arab and Moslem peoples. The fact is that they are here in their overwhelming numbers in this part of the world, and whereas it may have been in accord with Israelitic needs in the time of Joshua to conquer the land and maintain their position in it with the sword, that is not in accord with the desire of plain Jews or with the long ethical tradition of Judaism that has not ceased developing to this day. (Hertzberg 1997, 449)

In this regard, it has historically been maintained that:

> For many Zionists, beginning with Herzl, the only realistic solution lay in transfer. From 1880 to 1920, some entertained prospect of Jews and Arabs coexisting in peace. But increasingly after 1920, and more emphatically after 1929, for the vast majority a denouement of conflict appeared inescapable. Following the outbreak of 1936, no mainstream leader was able to conceive of future coexistence and peace without a clear physical separation between the two peoples — achievable only by way of transfer and expulsion. (Morris 1999, 139)

(III) The third doctrine, which is also denoted as "self-redemption," assumes the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine with a majority of Jews so that the Messiah appears. It was noted above that this can only succeed if Palestinian inhabitants are "evacuated." In this regard, Pappe and other "New Historians" have pointed out the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians during the establishment of Israel. In fact, since its foundation, the territories of Israel have continuously been expanding to the detriment of the Palestinians. Another less well-articulated issue in this regard is the Zionist project of "rebuilding the Temple." Referring to the project, Aviner posits (Halsell 2003, 88) that "the Temple is the top of the pyramid." Accordingly, the al-Aqṣá Mosque, which is one of the holiest locations for Muslims, must be destroyed so that the "Third Temple" can be rebuilt at its place. In Hertzberg's collection of Zionist ideas, there is no mention of this issue. However, Shahak (2008, 128)

calls it a "growing movement." It has historically been maintained that:

> Regarding the attacks on *al-Aqsa* Mosque during the period 1967–1990, 40 attacks were carried out against it. Neither the peace settlement nor the Oslo Accords were instrumental in stopping these attacks. So during the period 1993–1998, 72 attacks were recorded, indicating a rise in the intensity of the fierce campaign against one of Islam's holiest sites. During the period 21/8/2008–21/8/2009, they totaled 43 attacks. (Saleh 2012, 25)

The Israel-Palestine conflict, ongoing since 1948 and perhaps the most contested issue in international world politics, is an historical stage where the intimate relationship between Zionism and anti-Islamism becomes tangible. The accounts and scholarly narratives of what happened prior to, during, and in the aftermath of 1948 and of how to give meaning to these happenings vehemently differ from each other, and due to spatial limitations, it is not possible to juxtapose and evaluate the current perspectives in this article in a satisfactory way. However, the following might be stated about the general frameworks of the contrasting narratives and arguments.

According to Zionist accounts, Jews have suffered from anti-Semitism everywhere. Hence, they had moral justification for and an obligation to establish a homeland (Herzl 1896, 9). Being part of the Diaspora meant being dependent in "material, political, spiritual, cultural and intellectual" terms, and it was necessary for Jews to break with this dependence (Hertzberg 1997, 607-618). This homeland had to be established in the Holy Lands because God promised it to and even ordered that it be given to the chosen people in the Bible (Hertzberg 1997, 105). The ancestors of Jews were the real owners of these lands (Goldenberg 2007, 241), and as a secular justification, Palestine was proclaimed "a land without people for people without land" (Zangwill 1901, 15). The Jewish restoration to the Holy Lands was considered comparable to the Western discovery of the New World (Hess 1918, 149). When Israel was established, the Palestinian rulers themselves ordered their people to abandon their homes (Morris 1990, 5). Throughout the entire conflict, Israel has solely been interested in self-defense, while Palestinians and surrounding Arab states have been the aggressors. Crimes against humanity, civilian killings, massacres and terrorist attacks have been committed by Arabs (Dershowitz 2003).

Critics emphasize, on the other hand, several points to indicate that Zionist arguments are not justifiable. Zionism is based on a series of myths (Rose 2004). The thesis of Israeli exceptionalism is unjustifiable (Shahid Alam 2009). The narrative of the promised lands is theologically untenable (Burge 2013). Anti-Semitism in the West and Russia cannot be a justification for seizing the lands of Palestinians, which are not located in the West or Russia. Jewish suffering is being capitalized on, distorted, and misused for the aim of exploiting it (Finkelstein 2000, 2005). "[M]uch of the Zionist public discourse [has] proceeded as if Palestine were a *terra nullius*" (Prior 1999, 180), yet, "[n]o matter how backward, uncivilized, and silent they were, the Palestinian Arabs *were* on the land" (Said 1980, 9). Today's problem is the need to recognize the fact that Palestinians also have the right of national self-determination (Chomsky 1999, 300-301). Racism, violence, terrorism, and territorial expansion are characteristics of the Zionist settler-state (Sayegh 1965, 21-39). Israel conducted a planned and systematic ethnic cleansing of Palestinian people during the establishment of Israel in 1948 (Pappe 2006). Pro-Zionist scholarship produces fraudulent views on the issue (Said 1988). To conclude, "[i]n sheer numerical terms, in brute numbers of bodies and property destroyed, there is absolutely nothing to compare between what Zionism has done to Palestinians and what, in retaliation, Palestinians have done to Zionists" (Said 1980, x).

In sum, the three core doctrines of Zionism prove to be in line with anti-Islamic antagonism in terms of their theological premises, theoretical implications, short-term and long-term goals, and implementation into the reality of historical events. As will be elucidated below, considering Muslims' solidarity with Palestine, it is a useful policy for Zionists to fuel anti-Islamism in terms of realpolitik. Calculating events that would provoke a negative reaction from the world community as well as the evacuation of millions of people from Palestine and the destruction of al-Aqṣá is only imaginable if Islam is vilified and Muslims are dehumanized. In this case, the question that must be asked is whether there is any evidence to link Zionism with anti-Islamism.

II. Evidence: The "Overlap"

As stated in the introduction, unlike "Muslim anti-Semitism," "Jewish anti-Islamism" is not a social phenomenon that is frequently investigated by scholars. Despite some recent findings on the subject,

Jewish anti-Islamism has long been regarded as an "anti-Semitic conspiracy theory." However, certain scholars have pointed to the "overlap" between Jewish Zionism and anti-Islamism. For instance, according to Kalmar and Ramadan (2016, 367), there is a disproportionate correlation between contemporary pro-Israel and Jewish figures and anti-Islamism:

> On the other hand, the pro-Israel camp provides some of the most vocal proponents of Islamophobia. The authors of "works" on *dhimmitude* and of websites that "unmask" double loyalty and double talk among Muslims are disproportionately, though not entirely, supporters of Israel and typically Jewish.

Aked's (2015) remarks similarly point to the strategical nexus between Zionism and anti-Islamism:

> On a more structural level, racialisation of Palestinian suffering under Israel's occupation, discrimination and war crimes, also allows them to be dehumanised in the eyes of large sections of the world's media. It functions to devalue Palestinian lives and render them expendable. In fact the demonisation of an imagined and universally savage Muslim enemy enables right-wing Zionists to rationalise almost anything - including the slaughter by Israel, last summer, of 500 children in Gaza, by gesturing towards racist tropes of sly and yet simultaneously irrational Muslims who love death more than their own children and deliberately employ them as human shields. The discourse of "radicalization" and "Islamic extremism" offer pseudo-scholarly theories with which to globalise and explain away through ideology the specific political factors and socio-economic context fuelling violence in Palestine. Thus in Zionism and Islamophobia, we find two sets of ideas which are not synonymous and cannot be reduced to one another but are often fostered in the same environments. The connection is a marriage of convenience born of a coincidence of interests - and a particularly a toxic combination.

In fact, among Muslims, there has long been a notion of systematic anti-Arab and anti-Islamic propaganda by Hollywood, which is historically known to be a foundation of Eastern European Jewish entrepreneurs (Gabler 1989). Aside from newspaper articles (Stein 2008), several high-caliber Hollywood figures, including Marlon Brando, Mel Gibson, Gary Oldman, and Oliver Stone, have made supportive remarks on Jewish control over Hollywood. In 1999, Atia argued in *al-Ahrām* that Hollywood advanced anti-Muslim interests,

since "Jews [...] invented and remain in charge of Hollywood" (Chidester 2004, 14; cf. Cohn-Sherbok, Chryssides, and Hasan 2019, 222). Nonetheless, such claims have usually been categorized as "Muslim anti-Semitic conspiracy theories" (Perry and Schweitzer 2012, 213). A scholarly elaboration of Hollywood's negative portrayal of Arabs and Muslims was finally realized in 2001 (Shaheen 2001), yet it lacked reference to the Jewish founders and current Jewish control over Hollywood that appears to be a politically tabooized issue leading to anti-Semitism allegations.

Notwithstanding the fact that it was made in a postcolonial framework, Said's critique of Zionist scholar Lewis in *Orientalism* and *Covering Islam* might be regarded as an early scholarly observation of a correlation between Zionism and anti-Islamism (Said 1997, 149; 2003, 316, 318). It should be noted here that Huntington's controversial "clash of civilizations" thesis, which is regarded by scholars as the declaration of the new enemy after the Cold War period, was first introduced by Lewis (1990, 56), who thus appears to have made a heavy contribution to anti-Islamic antagonism. Giving the impression of being an ambivalent and intersubjective text, Lewis' "The Roots of Muslim Rage" is historically the first piece that announces a "clash of civilizations" between "us – the Judeo-Christian West" and "them – Islam," which, as a zero-sum game, is again in perfect accordance with the Zionist realpolitik.

Although the case of Lewis might be regarded as an early example in this regard, the ties between Jewish Zionism and anti-Islamism were not solidly established until recently. In fact, some (CST 2011) have even suggested dismissing alleged ties as merely a "conspiracy theory." Nevertheless, the pioneering "Fear, Inc." report of the Center for American Progress (CAP 2011) discovered concrete financial ties between the donors and ideologues of anti-Islamism, which was a breakthrough in the field. Although neither the initial report nor the follow-up (CAP 2015) referred to the keyword "Zionism." evidence can be found that three foundations with organic ties to Israel were among the so-called "top seven funders of Islamophobia."[1] Together with the Fairbrook Foundation, four of them were reported to have

1 These are the "Newton D. & Rochelle F. Becker Foundation," "Russell Berrie Foundation," and "Anchorage Charitable Fund and William Rosenwald Family Fund."

also donated to Israel-related causes, which, for Aked (2015), signifies an "undeniable overlap." Building on their effort, Bulkin and Nevel (2014) published four well-sourced articles of investigative character about how the "Jewish Establishment" or "Pro-Israel forces" have been fueling anti-Islamism on several occasions. Bulkin and Nevel criticized the CAP report, specifically for "failing to make a connection between Islamophobia and Israel" and included further Israel-related actors, such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), in the cardinal list of anti-Islamists. Bulkin and Nevel had a particular significance since, as the founding members of "Jews Against Islamophobia Coalition (JAIC)," together with other Jewish groups, such as "Jewish Voices for Peace (JVP)" and "Jews Against Anti-Muslim Racism (JAAMR)," they constructed solid evidence for the existence of Jewish figures who were aware of the phenomenon of Jewish anti-Islamism and were taking initiative against it. Aked (2015), in this regard, makes a further political separation between "liberal" Zionists and "right-wing" Zionists, arguing that much of the problem is caused by the latter. Other significant contributions were made by JAAMR, Jews SAY NO!, and Jewish Voice for Peace-New York City (JVP-NYC) in a report disclosing more than two million dollars of support given from the Jewish Communal Fund of the UJA-Federation of New York to six anti-Muslim hate groups between the years 2013 and 2017 (JAAMR, Jews SAY NO!, and JVP-NYC 2018).

There are further points of intersection between Zionism and anti-Islamism that become manifested in "isolated" instances. A considerable number of anti-Islamists in the West are observed to be Jews or pro-Israelites. David Yerushalmi, a Hasidic Jewish attorney, is regarded as the architect of the so-called "anti-Sharīʿah laws" in the United States of America (ADL 2012). Pushing the unsupported premise that Muslims were attempting to introduce Sharīʿah in the United States, Yerushalmi caused mass hysteria in US society that had direct, anti-Islamic consequences. Most significantly, anti-Sharīʿah campaigns have been a golden opportunity for anti-Islamists to spread anti-Islamic images and discourses in society, particularly in terms of the status of women in Islam. Referred to as a "solution to a nonexistent problem" by many, anti-Sharīʿah laws were introduced by twenty-six states in the United States of America.

Another well-known anti-Islamist with ties to Israel is David Joel Horowitz, who coauthored *Islamophobia: Thought Crime of the Totalitarian Future* with Robert Spencer and is the founder-president

of the David Horowitz Freedom Center. Arguing in his work that "Islamophobia" is a coinage of the Muslim Brotherhood used to stigmatize critical views about Islam, Horowitz launched the "Jew Hatred on Campus" campaign in 2015 through his Horowitz Freedom Center, where he accused various Muslim groups in the United States of "Jew hatred." According to Horowitz, American campuses with their left-leaning, multicultural, and politically correct ideology are "probably as important as a domestic supporter of Islamic terror as the mosques" (David Horowitz Freedom Center 2015). It appears from his doublespeak strategy that for Horowitz, the concepts of "Islamophobia/anti-Islamism" and "anti-Semitism/Jew-hatred" are weapons of an ideological battle more than they are social phenomena.

Daniel Pipes, the founder-president of the Middle East Forum sponsors a number of projects, including Campus Watch, Islamist Watch, the Legal Project, the Israel Victory Project, the Washington Project, and Jihad Intel. According to the description on its homepage, the Middle East Forum claims to "promote American interests in the Middle East, protect Western values from Middle Eastern threats [...]; focus on ways to defeat radical Islam; work for Palestinian acceptance of Israel; develop strategies that contain Iran; [...] emphasize the danger of lawful Islamism; [and] protect the freedoms of anti-Islamist authors, and activists [...]."Together with the Horowitz foundation, Pipes' Middle East Forum also financially contributed to the legal expenses of Dutch anti-Islamist Geert Wilders after he faced charges for comparing the Qurʾān to Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.

The self-contradictory attitude is evident in the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and American Jewish Committee (AJC), which claim to combat anti-Semitism and "all forms of bigotry," as these organizations have been shown to fuel anti-Islamism on several occasions (AMP 2014; 2016). The anti-Islamic movie titled "Obsession: Radical Islam's War against the West" has been distributed by the *New York Times,* and Safi (2011) pointed to the film's Israeli ties. In 2012, anti-Islamic banners were hung by Geller's "American Freedom Defense Initiative" at various places in American cities, calling on people to defend "civilized" Israel against the "savage" Muslims (BBC 2012; cf. Davidson 2011, 93). A German right-wing news site by the name of "Politically Incorrect" has been observed to be one of the major channels of anti-Islamic

dissemination for German-speaking audiences (Bayraklı and Hafez 2016, 188), and the website's guidelines describe its position as "pro-American," "pro-Israel," and "against the Islamization of Europe." Meetings of the anti-Islamic right-wing movement PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) are attended by Israeli speakers who exclaim "I see here no Nazis. [...] The real Nazis are inside Islam's mentality" (Brenner 2015). Robinson (aka Laxley-Lennon), a leader of PEGIDA UK, which is the movement's branch in the United Kingdom, shared a picture of himself on social media holding a rifle and standing next to Israeli soldiers on an Israeli tank in the occupied Golan Heights (Hooper 2016). Breivik, the perpetrator of the Utoya and Oslo terror attacks, employed the anti-Islamic "Eurabia" thesis of the Israeli Bat Ye'or (aka Gisèle Littman) in his manifesto (Breivik 2011). It has been reported (Abunimah 2011) that several commentators in Israel's mainstream media and Internet forums expressed understanding for Breivik's motives. These examples can easily be added to: further examples include Henryk Broder (2013), Ralph Giordano (1991), Oriana Fallaci (2002), Sam Harris (2014), Pamela Geller (2012), Leon de Winter (Schneiders 2015, 12), Babu Suseelan (Musaji 2012) and Bill Maher (Norton 2013). The so-called "native Islamophobes," such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Irshad Manji, Nonie Darwish, Wafa Sultan and Brigitte Gabriel, can also be added to the list (Sheehi, 2011, 91-94). Almost all of these figures can be revealed to be both anti-Islamic and pro-Israel. There are also points of intersection on the Internet where pro-Israel and anti-Islamic content collides (Oboler 2013, 23-24). These separate events, considered together, lend gravity to the thesis of a collective Jewish-Zionist project to fuel anti-Islamism in contemporary times.

These figures, who seek to influence public opinion, frequently employ derogatory and accusatory language towards Islam and Muslims, spread anti-Islamic hatred and conspiracy theories to incite anti-Islamic feelings and arouse panic and anxiety in various societies. It appears from their words and actions that for pro-Israel anti-Islamists, Muslims and Israel are in a zero-sum game, which explains these figures' persistent pro-Israel and anti-Islamic bias. Common elements in their narratives include calls to defend the "civilized and victimized Israel, ally of the West and its values," against "a violent and aggressive majority of Muslims" within "the Judeo-Christian West versus Islam" mind map; a cynical and derogatory choice of vocabulary apropos Islam; distortion of Islamic

concepts for propaganda purposes; alarmism and anxiety; the denial of Islam's religious character and the equating of Islam to a political and fanatical ideology; and hypocrisy in pointing to Muslim anti-Semitism while also engaging in blatant forms of religious discrimination.

To summarize, until the CAP report was released, the ties between Zionism and anti-Islamism, though manifesting in certain public spheres, remained as narratives of postcolonialist scholarship or unproven public notions. By analyzing financial ties between the "Islamophobia network" and Israel-related causes, a number of scholars have established the alleged ties in quantitative terms. In addition, a significant number of anti-Islamic public figures are Jews or prove to have ties to Israel. Therefore, it appears that the theory of a cooperative, Zionist, anti-Islamic antagonism is not to be dismissed as a "conspiracy theory."

III. Lobbies and Alliances: Jewish Influence in Western Anti-Islamism

The designation "Judeo-Christian Western civilization" has acquired common usage in the contemporary West. However, it should not be forgotten that the standard narrative of Western historiography embraced Judaism as a pillar only after the defeat of national-socialist Germany. Throughout the Middle Ages, Christians regarded Jews as the "internal enemies" and Muslims as the "external enemies," and the two were linked to each other through their "evil" (Arjana 2015, 13, 26). The attribution of "Judeo-Christian" in its contemporary sense was first used in the twentieth century and became more common after the Second World War.[2] It is thought provoking that the concept cannot be found in the writings of Western Christian thinkers before the twentieth century, since Judaism did not "miraculously" appear in the West after the Second World War. However, in the postwar West, a Judeo-Christian political alliance was established, and it persists in the twenty-first century.

2 The term "Judeo-Christian" is used first in the nineteenth century referring to Jewish converts into Christianity. The contemporary political usage of it goes back to 1935, the beginning of the Second World War, where it was a "unifying slogan to rally Christians and Jews together for the aid of European Jews" (Kurian 2015: 203).

Pointing to 9/11 and its accelerative effect upon the narrative of the "Judeo-Christian West," Marranci (2004, 106) argues that "after September 11th, the myth of a Europe founded on Judeo-Christian values has been reinforced by marking the differences between Islam and the West." This grand narrative that builds on the aforementioned early work of Lewis has been the justification of numerous figures for their anti-Islamic words and actions (cf. Schneiders 2015, 15).

Various Jewish groups are known to exert a considerable amount of political influence within Western societies, particularly in the United States. Referred to as the "Israel lobby," these groups have been playing a significant role in Western politics. Some Jewish figures vehemently oppose the idea of there being an Israeli lobby (Foxman 2007), while others (Khodr 2001; Dershowitz 2017) verify its existence. Meanwhile, some scholars (King 2016) claim that the lobby is also strong and influent in the European context. Two Al Jazeera documentaries on the issue, titled "the Lobby" (2017) and "the Lobby – USA" (2018), in which undercover journalists secretly filmed various agents of the lobby, give us an idea of the extensive network Israel controls in the United Kingdom and United States. The Israel lobby has also been a key player in determining the foreign policy of the United States, especially in the Middle Eastern region. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006, 32) claim that the policies of the United States in the Middle East have negative consequences for the US but positive consequences for Israel. The United States provides almost endless financial, intelligence, diplomatic, and military support, making "America's support for Israel [...], in short, unique." Mearsheimer and Walt provide evidence for the role of Israel and the lobby in the United States' wars in the Middle East (2006, 53, 59-60), as well as for the support of the lobby from so-called "Christian Zionists" (2006, 40).[3] The links between Israel and neo-conservatives, who have played a major role in the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, corroborate this perspective (Sniegoski 2008, 11-23).

Apart from the aforementioned findings, ADL and AJC, together with the Simon Wiesenthal Center, opposed the building of a Muslim

[3] The relationship between Jewish and Christian Zionists is of utmost importance for the focus of this paper. However, due to its extensive scope, the relationship should be the focus of additional research. The researcher also deals with this subject in an upcoming publication titled "(Fr-)enemies: Anti-Semitism and Anti-Islamism in Christian Zionism."

community center (Park51) in New York through the anti-Islamic hate campaign launched by two Zionist anti-Islamists, Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller (Swaim 2012, 287). Another prominent member of the Jewish lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has also been reported to have fueled anti-Islamism on several occasions. Well-known anti-Islamists such as Steven Emerson, Nina Rosenwald, Sheldon Adelson, Daniel Pipes, and Frank Gaffney have donated to AIPAC, were financially supported by the organization or appeared as speakers at the organization's summits (Gharib 2016; cf. Santos 2014, 614).

Furthermore, particular alliances have been observed between some of the European far-right organizations and Israel, which has caught the attention of several media outlets (Tharoor 2018; Baer 2019; Sofuoglu 2019; Baroud and Rubeo 2019; Alterman 2019). The Spanish Vox, the AfD in Germany, nationalist leaders in Central Europe and the Lega Nord in Italy are some examples. While perhaps surprising at first sight, the alliances between Israel and formerly anti-Semitic actors in Europe have several reasonable causes. Perhaps most importantly, the European far-right perceives an imminent threat towards its identity because of Muslim immigrants, which makes Muslims the common enemy and Israel "the lesser of two evils" in their eyes (cf. Camus 2013, 108). Another reason appears to be the quest of far-right organizations for legitimacy by distancing themselves from accusations of anti-Semitism by befriending Israelis. Seen from the Israeli perspective, having allies in various countries and handing over the role of "enemy" to another actor are politically desirable outcomes.

In short, Jewish-Zionist and pro-Israel actors have been exerting considerable influence within Western politics to defend the interests of Israel, and their efforts include providing financial and political support to anti-Islamists, allying with anti-Islamic actors in Western politics, and pushing for military aggressions against Muslims in numerous countries.

Conclusion

A theoretical insight into the core doctrines of Zionism, which are chosenness, promised lands, and messianism, suggests that Islam and Muslims pose an obstacle to the ultimate goals of Zionism. It does not seem possible that the Zionist agenda of evacuating Palestinians from

"Zion" and destroying the al-Aqṣá mosque could be implemented without the propaganda effects of anti-Islamism. Hence, it appears to be a strategical move that Zionists are catalyzing anti-Islamic feelings in global terms. Evidence in the "overlap" section is self-evident insofar as numerous Jewish public figures in various spheres of life are directly connected to anti-Islamic propaganda and actions. Finally, allied with the so-called Christian Zionists, Jewish Zionists have been relatively active and successful in stimulating the United States of America and its allies to enter into wars in the Middle Eastern region, the casualties of which, mostly Muslim civilians, are expressed in millions.

To conclude, data gathered from the literature, news media and online sources reveal that "Jewish anti-Islamism," with its latent and manifest forms, is a vehement and minacious reality of the contemporary world, and much scholarly work is needed to establish a solid framework for this subject.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper is extracted from my doctorate dissertation entitled "Root Causes of Western Anti-Islamic Antagonism: Judaism, Christianity and the Secular" (PhD Dissertation, International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur/Malaysia, 2019). I am thankful to my PhD supervisor Prof. Tan Sri Dr. Mohd. Kamal Hassan for his guidance of the dissertation thesis.

REFERENCES

Abunimah, Ali. 2011. "Islamophobia, Zionism and the Norway Massacre." *Al-Jazeera*, August 2. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/2011829164395822.html. Accessed June 27, 2019.

ADL (Anti-Defamation League). 2012. "David Yerushalmi: A Driving Force Behind Anti-Sharia Efforts in the U.S." *ADL Web Site*, January 13, 2012. https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/civil-rights/david-yerushalmi-2012-1-11-v1.pdf. Accessed June 27, 2019.

Aked, Hilary. 2015. "The undeniable overlap: Right-wing Zionism and Islamophobia," *OpenDemocracy*, September 29, 2015. https://www.opendemocracy.net/mirrorracisms/hilary-aked/undeniable-overlap-right-wing-zionism-and-islamophobia. Accessed June 23, 2019.

Alterman, Eric. 2019. "Benjamin Netanyahu, best friend of the far right," *Le Monde diplomatique*, September, 2019. https://mondediplo.com/2019/09/13 netanyahu. Accessed October 20, 2019.

AMP (American Muslims for Palestine). 2014. "The Anti-Defamation League: Protector of civil rights or silencer of free speech?" American Muslims for Palestine website. https://www.ampalestine.org/sites/default/files/attachment/2016/03/ADLbooklet.updated2014.pdf. Accessed June 22, 2019.

———. 2016. "Zionist Islamophobe Network Exposed: The truth behind America's 'terror' experts." American Muslims for Palestine website. http://www.ampalestine.org/sites/default/files/attachment/2016/02/ZionistIslamophobeNetwork.pdf. Accessed June 27, 2019.

Arjana, Sophia Rose. 2015. *Muslims in the Western Imagination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199324927.001.0001.

Baer, Alejandro. 2019. "The Rise of Spain's Pro-Israel, Far-Right Party." *Tablet,* May 2, 2019. https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/284204/spains-pro-israel-far-right-party. Accessed October 20, 2019.

Baroud, Ramzy, and Romana Rubeo. 2019. "Hating Muslims, loving Zionists: Israel as a far-right model." *Al Jazeera*, March 29. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/hating-muslims-loving-zionists-israel-model-190322145619468.html. Accessed October 20, 2019.

Bayraklı, Enes, and Farid Hafez. 2015. *European Islamophobia Report 2015*. Ankara: Seta, 2016.

BBC News. 2012. "Pro-Israel 'Defeat Jihad' ads to hit New York subway." *BBC News,* September 20. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19665225. Accessed June 21, 2019.

Breivik, Anders Behring. 2011. "2083: A European Declaration of Independence," *Internet Archive*, 2011. https://archive.org/details/2083_A_European_Declaration_of_Independence. Accessed June 28, 2019.

Brenner, Yermi. 2015. "Why Are Jews Supporting a German Right-Wing Movement?" *Forward*, February 10. https://forward.com/news/214230/why-are-jews-supporting-a-german-right-wing-moveme/. Accessed June 20, 2019.

Broder, Henryk M. 2013. "Inzwischen bin ich Hardcore-Zionist." *Jüdische Allgemeine*, April 11. https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/politik/inzwischen-bin-ich-hardcore-zionist/. Accessed June 27, 2019.

Bulkin, Elly, and Donna Nevel. 2014. *Islamophobia & Israel*. New York: Route Books.

Burge, Gary M. 2013. *Whose Land? Whose Promise? What Christians Are Not Being Told about Israel and the Palestinians*. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press.

Camus, Jean-Yves. 2013. "The European extreme right and religious extremism." In *Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe*, edited by Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins, 107-121. Oxon: Routledge.

CAP (Center for American Progress). 2011. "Fear Inc. The Roots of Islamophobia Network in America." https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf. Accessed June 27, 2019.

———. 2015. "Fear. Inc. 2.0: The Islamophobia Network's Efforts to Manufacture Hate in America." *CAP Web Site*, 2015. https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/FearInc-report2.11.pdf. Accessed June 27, 2019.

Chidester, David. 2004. *Authentic Fakes. Religion and American Popular Culture*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

Chomsky, Noam. 1999. *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians*. London: Pluto Press.

Cohn-Sherbok, Dan. 1996. *Modern Judaism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230372467.

Cohn-Sherbok, Dan. 2019. George Chryssides and Usama Hasan. *People of the Book: An Interfaith Dialogue about How Jews, Christians and Muslims Understand Their Sacred Scriptures*. London and Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.

CST. 2011. "Zionism and Islamophobia." CST, Protecting Our Jewish Community (blog), February 17. https://cst.org.uk/news/blog/2011/02/17/zionism-and-islamophobia. Accessed June 28, 2019.

David Horowitz Freedom Center. 2015. "David Horowitz Speaks About the 'Jew Hatred on Campus' Campaign." *Jew Hatred on Campus Web Site*, 2015. http://archive.jewhatredoncampus.org/news/david-horowitz-speaks-about-jew-hatred-campus-campaign.html. Accessed October 18, 2019.

Davidson, Lawrence. 2011. "Islamophobia, the Israel Lobby and American Paranoia: Letter from America." *Holy Land Studies* 10 (1): 87-95. https://doi.org/10.3366/hls.2011.0005.

Dershowitz, Alan. 2003. *The Case for Israel*. Hoboken: Wiley.

———. 2017. "It is Our Right to Influence and Control America with the Media: Dershowitz." *The European Union Times*, March 12. https://www.eutimes.net/2017/03/it-is-our-right-to-influence-and-control-america-with-the-media-dershowitz/. Accessed June 22, 2019.

Fallaci, Oriana. 2002. "Io. Oriana Fallaci trovo vergognoso..." *Corriere della Sera*, April 12,. https://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Cronache/2002/04_Aprile/12/fallaci.shtml. Accessed June 19, 2019.

Finkelstein, Norman G. 2000. *The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering*. London and New York: Verso.

———. 2005. *Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History*. Berkeley. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Foxman, Abraham H. 2007. *The Deadliest Lies: The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Gabler, Neal. 1989. *How The Jews Invented Hollywood: An Empire of Their Own*. Toronto: Anchor Books.

Geller, Pamela. 2012. "The Washington Times: The Pamela Geller Interview in full." *Geller Report*, June 27. https://gellerreport.com/2012/06/the-washington-times-the-pamela-geller-interview-in-full.html/. Accessed June 15, 2019.

Gharib, Ali. 2016. "How AIPAC Mainstreams Anti-Muslim Hate." *The Nation*, March 9. https://www.thenation.com/article/emerson-aipac-islmophobia/. Accessed October 21, 2019.

Giordano, Ralph. 1991. *Israel, um Himmels willen, Israel*. Köln: KiWi.

Goitein, Shlomo Dov. 1958. "Muhammad's Inspiration by Judaism." *Journal of Jewish Studies* 9 (3-4): 144-162. https://doi.org/10.18647/377/JJS-1958.

Goldenberg, Robert. 2007. *The Origins of Judaism from Canaan to the Rise of Islam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818790.

Gorny, Yosef. 2003. "Judaism and Zionism." In *The Blackwell Companion to Judaism*, edited by Jacob Neusner and Alan J. Avery-Peck, 477-494. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470758014.ch26.

Halsell, Grace. 2003. *Tanrı'yı Kıyamete Zorlamak*. Translated by Mustafa Acar and Hüsnü Özmen. Ankara: Kim Yayınları.

Harris, Sam. 2014. "#2 Why Don't I Criticize Israel?" samharris.org (blog). July 27. https://samharris.org/podcasts/why-dont-i-criticize-israel/. Accessed June 28, 2019.

Harkov, Lahav. 2016. "90% of Israeli Jews call themselves Zionists. Herzl Day poll finds." *The Jerusalem Post*, May 19. https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/90-percent-of-Israeli-Jews-call-themselves-Zionists-Herzl-Day-poll-finds-454347. Accessed June 27, 2019.

Hertzberg, Arthur. 1997. *The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader*. Philadelphia & Jerusalem: The Jewish Publication Society.

Hess, Moses. 1918. *Rome and Jerusalem: A Study in Jewish Nationalism*. Translated by Meyer Waxman. New York: Bloch Publishing Company.

Herzl, Theodor. 1920, 1896. *Der Judenstaat: Versuch einer modernen Lösung der Judenfrage*. Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag.

Hooper, Simon. 2016. "Gun-Toting British Anti-Muslim Activist Poses on Israeli Tank." *Mint Press News*, November 11. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/gun-toting-british-anti-muslim-activist-poses-israeli-tank. Accessed June 27, 2019.

JAAMR (Jews Against Anti-Muslim Racism), Jews SAY NO!, and JVP-NYC (Jewish Voice for Peace-New York City. 2018. "The Shame of the UJA-Federation of New York: How its Jewish Communal Fund Supports Anti-Muslim Hate Groups," November 28. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58c44a5d1b10e3fe89e2756c/t/5bfd61d8032be46a2c1e7d24/1543332316405/Defunding+Islamophobia+report+Nov.+28.pdf. Accessed October 22, 2019).

Kalmar, Ivan, and Tariq Ramadan. 2016. "Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Historical and Contemporary Connections and Parallels." In *The Routledge Handbook of Muslim – Jewish Relations*, edited by Josef Meri, 351-372. New York and London: Routledge.

Khodr, Mohamed. 2011. "Sharon to Peres: We Control America." *Media Monitors Network*, November 20. https://www.mediamonitors.net/sharon-to-peres-we-control-america/. Accessed June 21, 2019.

King, Elvira. 2016. *The Pro-Israel Lobby in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Christian Zionism in the European Union*. New York: I.B. Tauris. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350989160.

Kurian, George. 2015. *A Quick Look at Christian History: A Chronological Timeline Through the Centuries*. Eugene: Harvest House Publishers.

Lewis, Bernard. 1968. "The Pro-Islamic Jews." *Judaism: A Quarterly Journal of Jewish Life and Thought* 17 (4): 391-404.

———. 1987. *Semites and Antisemites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice*. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company.

———. 1990. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." *The Atlantic Monthly* 266 (3): 47-60.

Maier, Johann. 1988. *Das Judentum: Von der biblischen Zeit bis zur Moderne*. München: Gondromi.

Marranci, Gabriele. 2002. "Multiculturalism. Islam and the Clash of Civilizations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia." *Culture and Religion* 5 (1): 105-117. https://doi.org/10.1080/0143830042000200373.

Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt. 2006. "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy." *Middle East Policy* 13 (3): 29-87. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2006.00260.x.

Morris, Benny. 1990. *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1999. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict. 1881-1999*. New York: Random House.

Musaji, Sheila. 2012. "Babu Suseelan, the Hindu face of AFDI/SION," *The American Muslim*, October 4. http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/babu-suseelan. Accessed June 20, 2019.

Norton, Ben. 2013. "Bill Maher. Worse than Glenn Beck." *Counterpunch*, June 21. http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/21/bill-maher-worsethan-glenn-beck/. Accessed June 27, 2019.

Neusner, Jacob, and Alan J. Avery-Peck. 2000. *The Blackwell Companion to Judaism*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Oboler, Andre. 2013. *Islamophobia on the Internet: The growth of online hate targeting Muslims*. Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute.

Pappe, Ilan. 2006. *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*. Oxford: OneWorld Publications.

Perry, Marvin, and Frederick M. Schweitzer. 2002. *Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Prior, Michael. 1999. *Zionism and the State of Israel: A Moral Inquiry*. London and New York: Routledge.

Rose, John. 2004. *The Myths of Zionism*. London: Pluto Press.

Safi, Omid. 2011. "Who Put Hate in My Sunday Paper?: Uncovering the Israeli Republican-Evangelical Networks behind the "Obsession" DVD." In *Muslims and Jews in America: Commonalities. Contentions and Complexities*, edited by Reza Aslan and Aaron J. Hahn Tapper, 21-32. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230119048_3.

Said, Edward. 1980. *The Question of Palestine*. New York: Random House.

———. 1988. *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*. New York: Verso.

———. 1997. *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See The Rest of the World*. New York: Vintage Books.

———. 2003. *Orientalism*. London: Penguin Books.

Saleh, Mohsen Mohammed. 2012. *The Suffering of Jerusalem and the Holy Sites under the Israeli Occupation*. Translated by Salma Al-Houry. Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations.

Santos, Gabriel. 2014. "Islamophobia." In *Race and Racism in the United States: An Encyclopedia of the American Mosaic*, edited by Charles Gallagher and Cameron D. Lippard, 613-614. Santa Barbara: Greenwood.

Sayegh, Fayez A. 1965. *Zionist Colonialism in Palestine*. Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center.

Schneiders, Thorsten Gerald. 2015. *Wegbereiter der modernen Islamfeindlichkeit: Eine Analyse der Argumentationen so genannter Islamkritiker*. Wiesbaden: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07974-1.

Shahak, Israel. 2008. *Jewish History, Jewish Religion*. London: Pluto Press.

Shaheen, Jack G. 2001. *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People*. New York: Olive Branch Press.

Shahid Alam, M. 2009. *Israeli Exceptionalism: The Destabilizing Logic of Zionism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230101371.

Sheehi, Stephen. 2011. *Islamophobia: The Ideological Campaign against Muslims*. Atlanta: Clarity Process.

Sloterdijk, Peter. 2009. *God's Zeal: The Battle of the Three Monotheisms*. Translated by Wieland Hoban. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Sniegoski, Stephen J. 2008. *The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East and the National Interest of Israel*. Norfolk: Enigma.

Sofuoglu, Murat. 2019. "Israel's dance with far-right movements across the world," *TRT World*, March 5. https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/israel-s-dance-with-far-right-movements-across-the-world-24677. Accessed October 20, 2019.

Stein, Joel. 2008. "Who runs Hollywood? C'mon," *Los Angeles Times,* December 19. http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/19/opinion/oe-stein19. Accessed June 23, 2019.

Swaim, Lawrence. 2012. *The Death of Judeo-Christianity: Religious Aggression and Systemic Evil in the Modern World*. Winchester: Circle Books.

Tharoor, Ishaan. 2018. "Israel strengthens its ties with the West's far right," *The Washington Post*, December 12. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/12/12/israel-strengthens-its-ties-with-wests-far-right/. Accessed October 20, 2019.

Zangwill, Israel. 1901. *The Commercial Future of Palestine: Debate at the Article Club*. London: Greenberg & Co.

BOOK REVIEWS

Islamic Law in Theory: Studies on Jurisprudence in Honor of Bernard Weiss, edited by A. Kevin Reinhart and Robert Gleave

Felicitas Opwis

The Qurʾān and The Bible: Text and Commentary, by Gabriel Said Reynolds

Merve Palanci

Islamic Law in Theory: Studies on Jurisprudence in Honor of Bernard Weiss, edited by A. Kevin Reinhart and Robert Gleave, with an Appreciation by Peter Sluglett (Leiden: Brill, 2014), xx + 370 pp., ISBN: 978-90-04-26519-6, €157.00USD $194.00 (hb)

This volume, celebrating Bernard Weiss and his seminal contributions to the study of Islamic jurisprudence, came out of a conference in Alta, Utah, in 2008. It contains a list of Weiss' publications as well as personal appreciation to the honoree by Peter Sluglett. The editors, Reinhart and Gleave, are to be commended for arranging the thirteen essays in a manner that gives the whole project intellectual coherence and depth without sacrificing the authors' varied research perspectives toward Islamic legal theory. They divided the contributions into four interrelated sections: Law and Reason, Law and Religion, Law and Language, and Law: Diversity and Authority, acknowledging that there is of course overlap and some chapters fit into more than one section.

As a Festschrift in honor of Bernard Weiss, the individual authors see themselves working in his intellectual legacy. In *The Spirit of Islamic Law*, Weiss (1998, 171) says "it was the toilsome task of the jurist to read the mind of God to the best of his ability." The authors of this edited volume bring to the fore how pre-modern jurists accomplished this task, attending to the intellectual environments in which they operated, and to which ends they translated the will of God into human conduct. The contributions, while uneven in quality, nevertheless highlight that the articulation of Islamic jurisprudence is closely intertwined with theological debates over the nature of God, with competing notions of authority in interpreting the divine law, and with different conceptions of how language relates to legal conduct. The chapters in this volume show in particular the deep impact that the engagement with Muʿtazilī thought leaves on all areas of Islamic jurisprudence. Intellectual historians of Islamic law will find in this book a rich mine of textual studies on the diversity of legal thought of the middle period of Islam.

Ilahiyat Studies p-ISSN: 1309-1786 / e-ISSN: 1309-1719
Volume 10 Number 1 Winter / Spring 2019 DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2019.101.191

To cite this article: Opwis, Felicitas. "*Islamic Law in Theory: Studies on Jurisprudence in Honor of Bernard Weiss*, edited by A. Kevin Reinhart and Robert Gleave." *Ilahiyat Studies* 10, no. 1 (2019): 123-128. https://doi.org/10.12730/13091719.2019.101.191

In the first chapter on "Law and Reason", Ahmed El Shamsy complicates the common understanding of the dichotomy of ethical theories, with objectivist Muʿtazilī-Ḥanafīs on one side and subjectivist (or voluntarist) Ashʿarī-Shāfiʿīs on the other. Drawing on hitherto unstudied sources of two 4th/10th century Shāfiʿīs, al-Khaffāf (fl. first half of 4th/10th) and al-Qaffāl al-Shāshī (d. 365/976), El Shamsy shows that the ethical theory of these two jurists had close affinity to their Muʿtazilī contemporaries. They likewise espouse that the sacred law is rational and promotes human benefit (*maṣlaḥah*), thus arguing in favor of jurists' ability to extend God's law to unprecedented circumstances by means of analogical reasoning (*qiyās*). El Shamsy also confirms Opwis' earlier findings[1] that in practice *maṣlaḥah* had no role to play in law-finding. Al-Qaffāl, like the Muʿtazilīs al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980) and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), only argues that the ultimate cause of God's law is intelligible, not the specific benefit of revealed rulings. Hence, he did not envision a specific *maṣlaḥah* to be used as *ratio legis* in analogy. The Muʿtazilī influence on Shāfiʿī jurisprudents is also documented by Éric Chaumont (chapter 2), who convincingly disperses the myth that the Shāfiʿī jurist al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083) was influenced by Ḥanbalī traditionalism. His detailed analysis shows that traditionalists were no interlocutors to al-Shīrāzī. Rather, what George Makdisi and Henri Laoust classified as traditionalist thought in al-Shīrāzī's legal doctrine has in fact more of an affinity to Muʿtazilī views. Chaumont suggests that this explains why traditionalists of later times, such as Ibn Qayyim, are said to be promoting Muʿtazilī ideas. Perhaps, a re-evaluation of traditionalism as an intellectual current in jurisprudence is called for.

Despite the eventual decline of Muʿtazilism as an active player in the sphere of law, their intellectual impact on Sunnī jurisprudence persisted. The rejection of analogy (*qiyās*) by the Muʿtazilī al-Naẓẓām (d. ca. 221/836) makes itself felt for centuries. A. Kevin Reinhart (chapter 5) highlights his influence on debates on rituals (*ʿibādāt*) and whether analogy is possible in light of their apparent non-rationality. He traces how jurists from the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th century reconciled (or not) the non-rationality of rituals with their positions on the rationality of the divine law. Somewhat counterintuitively, it is the Ḥanafī school of law that restricts the use of *qiyās* to extend God's law in the area of *ʿibādāt*, including expiations, *ḥudūd* punishments,

[1] Cf. Felicitas Opwis, Maṣlaḥa *and the Purpose of the Law: Islamic Discourse on Legal Change from the 4th/10th to 8th/14th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 16-41.

numerically fixed rulings (*maqādīr*), and legal license (*rukhaṣ*). Christian Lange (chapter 6) similarly points out how jurists' conception of the rationality and non-rationality of law influence their definition of expiations (*kaffārāt*) and whether and to which extent *qiyās* can be employed to find legal solutions for novel circumstances in areas like sin and expiation. Lange skillfully teases out the theological underpinnings of debates over the status of the grave sinner among Ashʿarī and Māturīdī scholars. At stake, ultimately, is the all-encompassing nature of the divine law. Does the revealed law cover all of human conduct, irrespective of changing circumstances, or are some areas, namely those for which no tangible rationale can be discerned, restricted to the legal assessment expressed in the authoritative texts?

The debate about extending the sacred law to new circumstances intersects with discussions over who has the authority to determine the correct ruling in a particular situation. Mohammad Fadel (chapter 4) focuses on the debate over the ethical implications of obligatory *taqlīd* when *mujtahid*s come to different *ijtihād*ic conclusions. He traces various solutions presented to such a scenario, which range from the *muqallid*'s free choice, to weighing the strength of *ijtihād*, to evaluating the social standing of the *mujtahid*. In all solutions, it is the lay person who has control over or autonomy in his/her legal fate. The *muqallid*'s pick among options, thus, shapes the legal landscape. Yet, such autonomy in deciding the legal outcome may be limited by real-life practicalities. Examining documents of the Shāfiʿī court of the Dakhla oasis in Egypt from 1579 to 1937, Rudolph Peters (chapter 12) suggests that much of the *madhhab* diversity found in these documents is not, as often assumed, the result of people's forum-shopping to get a favorable ruling, but rather driven by practical considerations, such as temporary vacancy of the local Shāfiʿī judgeship or a visit from a higher-ranking Ḥanafī court official who is asked to adjudicate a case.

That the private person is part of shaping legal doctrine and the development of Islamic law is also the subject matter of Jonathan Brockopp's article (chapter 5). He reads Saḥnūn's (d. 240/854) *Mudawwanah*, a formative work of the Mālikī school, as a text composed outside the radius of courts and judges, and, hence, without much consideration for legal practice. The *Mudawwanah*, according to Brockopp, is a text that does not aim at training lawyers,

judges or practitioners of law, but that sees the study of law as a road to piety and grace. The tension between personal piety and juristic authority is addressed in Raquel Ukeles' study (chapter 7) on how medieval jurists respond to popular devotional practices. Taking the *ṣalāt al-raghāʾib* as example, she presents the debates between Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1263) and Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245) over innovation (*bidʿah*), showing how jurists creatively balanced their roles as preservers of the primacy of the sacred texts and as authoritative leaders of society attuned to popular sentiment and need. The role of jurists as leaders of society, so widely accepted for the later middle period of Islam, has however, not always been undisputed. Frank Vogel (chapter 13), re-reading al-Māwardī's (d. 450/1058) *al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyyah*, illustrates the way that al-Māwardī successfully delineates the powers of the political and legal arena to establish a constitutional theory in which jurists and their legal concepts and categories are the ultimate force to legitimize as well as constrain government. In al-Māwardī's work, *siyāsah* is successfully subordinated to *fiqh*.

The theme of interpretive authority also comes through in Joseph Lowry's study (chapter 11) which investigates the post-modern qualities of consensus (*ijmāʿ*), *ijtihād*, and interpretive communities. The notion that all *mujtahid*s are correct and the expanding legal disagreement that follows therefrom is diametrically opposed to the urge for consensus. Lowry presents the strategies used by 5th/11th and 6th/12th century jurisprudents to reduce the normative pluralism resulting from *ijtihād*. Rather than emphasizing the sacred texts as highest authority, they succeed in their efforts by making the interpretive community of the jurists, in the form of consensus, the arbiter of interpretive uncertainties. While in Sunnī circles, it is the community of jurists who have interpretive authority, Robert Gleave's analysis (chapter 9) of early Imāmī conceptions of literal meaning and interpretation shows a different picture. It is through linguistic analysis of meaning, literal and metaphorical, that the divine law is understood. Although lacking a uniform conception of "literal meaning," early Shīʿī jurists commonly agreed that meaning is inherent in a word and that it may differ from the way the speaker employs the word in a particular speech act. The diverse interpretations of the revealed law among even the Prophet's Companions leaves understanding the intended meaning of divine speech with *imām*s, who, through their special linguistics

knowledge, have interpretive authority to unveil the intended meaning otherwise inaccessible to the lay person.

Finding the divine in language is the subject of Paul Powers' study (chapter 8). Muslims debated the relationship of God's addressed speech (*khiṭāb*) with its legal assessment (*ḥukm*), and how it translates to human legal conduct. Powers differentiates between two basic approaches, foundationalist and formalist. The former holds that actions are given their intended meaning in the process of action, resulting in a tendency toward using subjective criteria, such as intention (*niyyah*), to determine the legal validity of acts. Whereas formalists, agreeing that actions are namable with words, focus on the actual verbal pronouncement to determine legal effects, disregarding the speaker's intention. How linguistic conceptions shape jurists' understanding of law is also demonstrated by Wolfhart Heinrichs (chapter 10), who presents the semantic categories that structure Ibn Rushd's *Bidāyat al-mujtahid*. Looking at the chapter on lost property (*luqaṭah*), Heinrichs illustrates the way in which linguistic categories of actor, action, and acted upon shape the author's analysis of legal acts. Structuring legal texts according to semantic entities also opens space in the text for explaining how legal differences come about.

All in all, *Islamic Law in Theory* is a valuable addition to the study of Islamic jurisprudence, a work worthy of recommendation to colleagues and students alike. Yet, as with many edited volumes, challenges persist. For one, a uniform citation style would have been desirable. There is no apparent reason why Fadel's chapter has references to *supra* notes when other authors use shortened title citation. The quality and focus of individual chapters is unfortunately rather uneven. A firm editorial hand should have assisted authors in cutting unnecessary digressions and repetitions, avoiding chronological jumps or bringing an author's main arguments into focus, so that the reader is not left questioning the point of a chapter and how it fits into studies on Islamic legal theory. Despite the diverse research perspectives displayed in this volume by exemplary scholars, this reviewer is puzzled by the lone French-language chapter of Éric Chaumont and the single female scholar represented (Raquel Ukeles) in a volume with thirteen contributors.

REFERENCES

Weiss, Bernard G. 1998. *The Spirit of Islamic Law*. Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press.

Opwis, Felicitas. 2010. Maṣlaḥa *and the Purpose of the Law: Islamic Discourse on Legal Change from the 4th/10th to 8th/14th Century*. Leiden: Brill.

Felicitas Opwis

Georgetown University – Washington D.C. -USA
fmo2@georgetown.edu

The Qurʾān and The Bible: Text and Commentary, by Gabriel Said Reynolds; Qurʾān translation by Ali Quli Qarai (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), xiii + 1032 pp., ISBN-13: 978-0300181326, $40.00 (hb)

Reynolds begins his sizable work entitled *The Qurʾān and The Bible*, which is apparently an output of significant long-term research, with preliminary remarks on the Old Testament's inclusion in the Christian Bible by the Early Church fathers and makes a comparison with early and later Islamic approaches to the Bible. According to the author, in the beginning period of Islam, the Bible could theoretically have been considered an authoritative scripture, inferring from such verses as Q 10:94 and Q 5:47, but then falsification *(taḥrīf)* allegations against the Bible became the prevailing conception among Muslims in other verses such as Q 2:42, 59, 79; 3:71, 187; 4:46; 5:13; 7:162 (p. 1).

Unlike other comparison works between the Bible and the Qurʾān, Reynolds makes his work proceed according to the Qurʾānic order, as this method is thought to be beneficial for readers to comprehend the structure and content of the Qurʾān. *The Qur'ān and The Bible* is composed of two main parts: English translation of verses and footnotes. The author uses the Qurʾān translation by Ali Quli Qarai and qualifies it one of the best Qurʾān translations, as it portrays the Qurʾānic meanings according to traditional Islamic understandings (p. 7), and he refers to other translations when necessary. The Qurʾān verses are accompanied by extensive footnotes from the author. At the end of the book, there is a selective primary and secondary bibliography, the length of which easily proves the work's comprehensive nature. However, primary Islamic sources are far fewer in number in the bibliography than non-Islamic sources. A well-classified index of the Qurʾān and a separate index of citations of biblical verses are the other high-level characteristics of the work.

Ilahiyat Studies p-ISSN: 1309-1786 / e-ISSN: 1309-1719
Volume 10 Number 1 Winter / Spring 2019 DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2019.101.192

To cite this article: Palancı, Merve. "*The Qurʾān and The Bible: Text and Commentary*, by Gabriel Said Reynolds." *Ilahiyat Studies* 10, no. 1 (2019): 129-136. https://doi.org/10.12730/13091719.2019.101.192

In terms of the content of the book, one must note the author's elaboration on his conviction that the Qurʾān is an original work in literary and religious terms and that Qurʾānic content heavily depends on its audience having knowledge of the Bible and the biblical traditions of the time in which it was composed by its "author(s)." It is fair to say that Reynolds's postulate that the Qurʾān was written by an "author/authors" is notably present throughout the work. The absence of direct quotations in the Qurʾān of Jewish and Christian scriptures and texts is presented as the basic sign of orally transmitted Biblical knowledge. Accordingly, it is stated that "'the author' of the Qurʾān would have heard only descriptions or paraphrases of such texts rendered into Arabic orally, most likely from some form of the Semitic language known as Aramaic." (p. 3). Thus, the author diverges from some of the traditional non-Muslim approaches that are known for attributing to the Qurʾān a pagan background (p. 17).

In the following chapters, Reynolds provides explanations about the method, structure, and scope of his work as well as the earlier scholarship of others on the Qurʾān and the Bible under separate headings. He classifies the book as "a reference work and an argument about the importance of a 'contextual' reading of the Qurʾān" (p. 4). His rather skeptical stance towards the Islamic tradition, consisting of narrations of occasions of revelation, and his method, which can be characterized by a departure from the chronological reading of the Qurʾān and by eliminating narrations on the Prophet's life span, seem the most problematic aspects of the book when recent scholarship proving the contrast is taken into consideration. He insists on the functionality of reading the Qurʾān in its own context, an era known as late antiquity, in contrast with N. Sinai's counterargument of "the Qurʾān as Process" and Angelika Neuwirth's and J. Witztum's way of handling the Qurʾān in terms of inner Qurʾānic chronology (p. 18). To this end, the author describes his method as "Qurʾanist" (p. 5), which explicitly parallels the *sola scriptura* motto. However, Reynolds uses Biblical material that can be dated after the Qurʾān, paving the way for anachronism.[1]

[1] Some of these works are *Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer*, *The Targum of Pseudo Jonathan*, and *Exodus Rabbah*. While discrediting almost all of the Islamic narrations on occasions of revelations on the grounds that they were probably composed after

Likewise, he acts with suspicion towards the consultation of pre-Islamic, *Jāhilī* poetry in the Qurʾān interpretation, as he seems convinced that the Qurʾānic vocabulary reflects the post-*Jāhilī* period; in other words, pre-Islamic poetry was composed in a much later period than the Qurʾān, according to Reynolds. He grounds this approach in Nöldeke's well-known work, *History of the Qurʾān*, and Taha Husayn's arguments about the fact that although the most famous pre-Islamic poets are allegedly from different tribes, no evidence of dialect varieties is available in the related literature. To this end, Reynold follows Nöldeke's arguments on poetry by Umayyah ibn Abī l-Ṣalt, some of which can be thought of as genuine, while some passages in his poems were probably composed later (p. 5). However, this argument seems too inductive to lead sound conclusions, and it rules out the possibility that the poets of that time could have been using a common literary vocabulary that was more homogeneous and separate from the dialect of common inhabitants uttering dialectical expressions in their everyday communication.

In Reynolds' work, the Qurʾān's originality lies in the nature of its relationship with biblical traditions, and, appreciating that an understanding of this is only possible by handling the Qurʾān within its own historical context, Reynolds chooses to disregard certain medieval traditions and exegesis works in examining Qurʾānic meanings. In this direction, he mostly refers to two classical works within the Qurʾānic interpretation literature. These are English translations of *Asbāb nuzūl al-Qurʾān* by al-Wāḥidī (d. 468/1076) and the well-known tafsīr, *Tafsīr al-Jalālayn*.

In the concluding section of his work, Reynolds emphasizes that the Qurʾān's relationship with Christian tradition, specifically with the writings of the Syriac Christian fathers, is much more notable than its allusions to the Jewish tradition. He occasionally prefers utilizing Syriac literature for explaining Qurʾānic content (p. 10) instead of following the usual path of other Western scholars who often handle the Qurʾān within the framework of the Hebrew Bible and the Jewish sources pursuant to their assumptions on the relation between the Prophet's biography and his encounters with the Jews dwelling in Medina. To this end, especially in Sūrah 12, Reynolds mostly refers to

---

the revelation of the Qurʾān, the author embraces a rather optimistic approach to the dating of these works. See p. 9.

the work titled *The Syriac Milieu of the Qurʾān* by Joseph Witztum, attaching a Syriac background to content of the Qurʾān, particularly in the protagonists of the stories about Abraham and Ishmael, Cain and Abel, and Joseph. For instance, with regard to Q 12:74-75, the commentary he provides is as follows:

> By having the brothers declare here that the one in whose bag the goblet is found "shall give himself over" (that is become a slave or prisoner) the Qurʾān differs from the declaration of the brothers in Genesis 44:9, where the brothers recommend death for the guilty party. This reflects how Syriac Christian authors sought to reconcile Genesis 44:9 with the following verse..." (p. 18).

The vocabulary of the Qurʾān is another main point on which the author focuses. Reynolds does not track the etymological root of each religious term in the Qurʾān. Instead, mostly inspired by the prominent work by Arthur Jeffery titled *Foreign Vocabulary of the Qurʾān*, Reynolds classifies philological evidence systematically to enlarge the Qurʾān's cultural environment to its greatest extent, pointing out a number of loan words in the Qurʾān's spectrum and emphasizing Palestinian Aramaic's superiority to Syriac[2] in the vocabulary of the Qurʾān.

In his conclusion, Reynolds emphasizes five main inferences of his work. One of these is the special relationship between the Qurʾān and Christian tradition. To put it simply, the Qurʾān is in conversation with Christian sources more than it is with the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament, yet there are certain cases in which the Qurʾān develops its themes from the Old Testament. The author states the following:

> This is evident with the Qurʾān's account of God's commanding the angels to bow before Adam, and the devil's refusal to do so, a tradition prominent in the Christian tradition (where Adam – before the Fall – is a prototype of Christ) and largely avoided in Jewish tradition. It is also seen in the accounts of the Companions of the

[2] Aramaic is classified as "Lingua Franca of the late antique near east" by Emran Iqbal El-Badawi. El Badawi explains Islam as "a response to disunity of Aramaic churches." As per his remarks, "the articulator as well as the audience of the Qurʾān were monotheistic in origin, probably bilingual, culturally sophisticated and accustomed to the theological debates that raged between the Aramaic speaking churches." El-Badawi, *The Qurʾān and the Aramaic Gospel Traditions* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

Cave or *Dhū l-Qarnayn* (the two-horned man) in the Qurʾān 18 related to Christian legends of the sleepers of Ephesus and Alexander, respectively (p.19).

Another inference he points out is that the intertextual characters and themes that the Qurʾān echoes are usually in parallel with Christian accounts of the related theme, such as the Qurʾānic narrative portraying Abel as "a willing and passive sacrifice" (Q 5:28), the existence of a wolf(s) in the account of Joseph (Q 12:13), and the way in which the Qurʾān describes Israelites as "killers of prophets." (pp. 12-15).

Maxims, metaphors, and phrases in some verses are thought to be other signs of the intimate relationship between the Qurʾān and Bible. The author exemplifies this with "the needle's eye" maxim in Q 7:40 and the same usage in the Synoptic Gospels, where Jesus uses the metaphor of the camel and the eye of the needle to clarify that it will be difficult for the rich to enter Heaven.[3] On the other hand, the Qurʾān applies this metaphor to those refusing signs from God.[4] It is fair to say that the author also unnecessarily associates some of the phrases and principles in the Qurʾān, which may well be classified as common ethical and conscientious truths across all times and beliefs, with Biblical tradition, although they are too general to pertain to any Semitic religion. For example, with reference to verses such as "giving alms secretly" (Q 2:274) (p. 105), "kindness to orphans" (Q 2:177) (p. 81), "no soul will be of any avail to another soul" (Q 82:19) (p. 892), Reynolds struggles to attach a biblical background to the related verses and to thus imply that the Qurʾān takes all of its subject

[3] Matt. 19:23-24; Mark 10:25, Luke 18:25

[4] Expounding upon such instances, the author points out phrases like "walking humbly on the earth." Cf. Matt. 5:4; heaven as a "tillage," which is similar Matt. 13:23; "tasting death" like in Matt. 16:28; Joh 8:52; and the parable of foolish virgins, which shows similarity with Matt. 25:1-13. In setting off these examples, Reynolds also highlights the Qurʾān's particular interest in "preaching Christians;" accordingly, Jews are the community punished by God because of their wrongdoings, and they have been cursed because of this. In contrast, the position of Christians notably differs, and while the Qurʾān admonishes Christians to remember message of Jesus, they are the people whose fate is yet to be determined with regards to the Qurʾān's content. p.24.

principles from Biblical tradition. This point may well be defined as the weakest part of Reynolds' work.

Additionally, there are some idioms that are likely to be cultural terms rather than theological ones, and Reynolds also does not hesitate to ground such Qurʾānic verses in Biblical tradition. Q 2:187, describing a "white streak and dark streak (thread)," is no exception to this. The author argues that a tradition in Mishnah Berakhot explaining the Shema prayer time with "blue and white wool" constitutes a basis for the Qurʾānic usage of the phrase (p. 83). However, this approach seemingly rules out the fact that cultural proximities inevitably lead to common linguistic terms and expressions that are not necessarily theological all the time.

Likewise, some of the metaphors and parables in the Qurʾān are occasionally presented as intertextual expressions by the author, though there is no sound reason for doing so. To illustrate, Q 2:264, 265 articulates the following parable: "Their parable is that of a rock covered with soil: a downpour strikes it…if it is not a downpour that strikes it then a shower, and God watches what you do." These two verses, along with preceding three, are associated with Luke 8:8, which compares believers to a crop that grows abundantly.

The other theme seen in Reynolds' work is the Qurʾān's hallmark theological and prophetological discourse, which clearly deviates from the Biblical tradition. For example, in such discourse, Noah, who does not speak in the Old Testament narrative, transforms into "a preacher of theological righteousness" in the Qurʾān, and this makes him an early prototype for the Prophet Muḥammad. Likewise, as the Qurʾānic verses proclaiming the dictate to "obey God and the Messenger" do not have an equivalence in the Bible; this is also classified as a variation between the former and latter sources (pp.13-14).

The author also includes very valuable statements on the language of the Qurʾān. While he does stress the importance of the scholarship on the Qurʾān's historical context in the Near East in late antiquity, he states quite frankly that "there is no reason to assume that the Arabic of the Qurʾān is the fully developed Classical Arabic of medieval grammarians" (p.14). To support this assertion, he refers to the Qurʾān itself (Q 46:12), thus adhering to his Qurʾānist method.

With regard to Reynolds' statements, in some cases, the Qurʾān departs from the biblical account of the intertextual theme "to

develop a certain symbolism," and in other cases, the Qurʾān "seems to be following a legendary adaptation of a biblical account" (this seems to be case with the story of Haman, who presumably ends up in Egypt because of a minor error in the details of the ancient Ahiqar legend). Reynolds concludes that some "confusions" in the Qurʾānic account of Mary, the name Azar, etc.[5] illustrate the orally transmitted biblical knowledge at the time in which the Qurʾān came into being (p.15). In this vein, it is worth remembering El-Badawi's counterarguments:

> [T]he outright conflation of Mary the mother of Christ (Q 5:17) on the one hand with Mary the daughter of Amram (ʿimrān; Q 66:12) or sister of Aaron (Q 19:28) on the other, and [...] should not immediately be viewed as contradictions, but rather a "creative tension" imposed on the reader by the text […] —at least not until systematically and methodologically proven otherwise. The point is that such a dexterous command of Biblical and post-Biblical literature as a whole, and such strong volition on the part of the Qur'ān's authorship, is central to our understanding of its dogmatic rearticulation of the Aramaic Gospels Tradition (El-Badawi 2014, 9).

In conclusion, the intertextuality between the Qurʾān and Biblical tradition is an irrefutable phenomenon. The classic non-Muslim perspective on this basic feature of the Qurʾān, which the Qurʾān itself never disclaims such a reliance upon, has always existed within the framework of a "mission" to portray the Qurʾān as an unoriginal work. However, Reynolds's book generally underlines as much as possible the novel characteristics that the Qurʾān exhibits in its usage of Biblical material. In this vein, Reynolds's work deserves deep praise, despite the exceptional sections where the Qurʾān is unnecessarily associated with Biblical tradition. The wide range of references used within Reynolds's book is another of its outstanding qualifications, making it a reference work for other future literature.

On the other hand, as stated above, the author applies a methodology that is clearly questionable. While Reynolds is skeptical about early Islamic sources on the grounds that they are not

---

[5] For a comprehensive study on the Qurʾānic narratives and characters that are still equivocal between Muslim and non-Muslim apologetics, see Mustafa Öztürk, *Kur'an Kıssalarının Mahiyeti*, İstanbul: Kuramer, 2017.

authentic, he does not trace material back to Christian primary sources such as Biblical narratives, and he also disregards the fact that there exists a close relationship between the Old Testament and Canaan civilization. In other words, no religion is created out of nothing.

Additionally, the foreign vocabulary of the Qurʾān should be accepted as part of a common memory of Semitic religions, and Reynolds's emphasis on the Qurʾān's loanwords from Biblical tradition may well be enrichened by the statements of El-Badawi:

> It demonstrates how the Qur'ān via the agency of late antique *lingua franca* of the Near East—Aramaic—selectively challenged or re-appropriated, and therefore took up the "dogmatic re-articulation" of language and imagery coming from the Aramaic Gospel Traditions, in order to fit the idiom and religious temperament of a heterogeneous, sectarian Arabian audience (El-Badawi 2014, 5).

REFERENCES

El-Badawi, Emran Iqbal. 2014. *The Qur'ān and the Aramaic Gospel Traditions*. New York: Routledge.

Öztürk, Mustafa. 2017. *Kur'an Kıssalarının Mahiyeti*. İstanbul: Kuramer Yayınları.

Merve Palanci

Kırklareli University, Kırklareli-Turkey
merveepalanci@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0257-1830

ILAHIYAT STUDIES
A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies
www.ilahiyatstudies.org
Volume 10, Number 1, Winter / Spring 2019

GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The papers submitted to *Ilahiyat Studies* should make some noticeable contribution to Islamic and religious studies. The papers will be held to imply that it contains original unpublished work and is not being submitted for publication elsewhere.

Since *Ilahiyat Studies* sends all papers for review, a copy should be submitted in a form suitable for sending anonymously to the reviewers. Manuscripts are evaluated by anonymous peer review, therefore, authors must remove all identifying information from their texts. Authors should refer to themselves in the text and citations in the third person. For example, instead of writing "I argue (Nasr 2007)…." write "Nasr (1997) argues…"

All submissions are assessed by referees, but the Editorial board reserves the right to decide what articles will be published.

Unsolicited book reviews may not be published.

Full name(s) of author(s) must be listed, along with university or professional affiliation, address, city, state, country, phone/fax number(s), and email address where you can be reached. Provide a two-sentence biography that we can use in your article. Current information only.

All papers must include an abstract of no more 150 words.

It is strongly advised that the length of the article should not exceed 12.000 words. Book reviews and conference reports must not exceed 1500 words. All pages should be numbered consecutively.

All papers should have an introductory section in which the objectives and methodology of the article are explained and a final section, which summarizes the main points, discussed and the conclusions reached.

Manuscripts should be typed double-spaced on one side of the A4 only. Tables, graphs and figures should be on separate pages. All submissions should be in MS-Word (2003, 2007 or higher) format. Leave margins of at least 4 cm on top, bottom, and sides.

Text and references must follow the format outlined in ***Ilahiyat Studies Style Sheet***, available at www.ilahiyatstudies.org, the homepage of the journal.

A CSL citation style file for *Ilahiyat Studies* is also available at: https://www.zotero.org/styles/ilahiyat-studies, ready for use with CSL-compliant citation managers such as Mendeley ar Zotero.

A reference list must be included at the end of the manuscript in the following style:

Journal Article & *Entry*

Eichner, Heidrun. "Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics: From Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā al-Shīrāzī." *Medioevo* 32 (2007): 139-197.

Aydınlı, Abdullah. "Ebû Zer el-Gıfârî." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*, X, 266-269.

Book

Kātib Chalabī, Ḥājī Khalīfa Muṣṭafā ibn ʿAbd Allāh. *Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn*. 2 vols. Edited by M. Şerefeddin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge. Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941-1943.

Michot, Yahya M. *Ibn Sīnā: Lettre au Vizir Abū Saʿd: Editio princeps d'après le manuscrit de Bursa, traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et lexique.* Beirut: al-Burāq, 2000.

Book Chapter

Janssens, Jules. "The Reception of Avicenna's *Physics* in the Latin Middle Ages." In *O ye Gentlemen*: *Arabic Studies on Science and Literary Culture in honour of Remke Kruk,* edited by I. Vrolijk and J. P. Hogendijk, 55-64. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

Online Citation

Frank, Richard. "Elements in the Development of the Teaching of al-Ashʿarī." *Le Muséon*: *Revue D'Études Orientales* 104 (1991), 141-190. https://doi.org/10.2143/MUS.104.1.2006086.

Page references to works referred to in the text should take the following form: (Touraine 1995, 9-10). The verses of the Qurʾān should be referred to as follows: Q 2:23; Q 17:108; the references from the Old and New Testament should carry chapter name and number, and verse number.

Arabic words should be transliterated according the style used by the Library of Congress, as shown in the *Ilahiyat Studies Style Sheet*.

İlahiyat Studies

A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies

ISSN: 1309-1786

Volume 10 Number 1 Winter / Spring 2019

Contents

ISSN: 1309-1786

13091786201910 1