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## EDİTÖRDEN

Değerli Okuyucular,

İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi tarafından yayınlanan, Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences Dergisi, 1983 yılında yayınlanmaya başlamış, o tarihten beri alanında öncü ve seçkin dergilerden biri olma özelliğini sürdürmektedir. Dergimizin ismi yayın hayatına başladığından beri “İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi” iken Ekim 2017 tarihli 57. sayısından itibaren “Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences” olarak değiştirilmiş ve Cilt uygulamasına geçilmiştir. Dergi halen Emerging Sources Citation Index, Ebsco Political Science Complete, TR DİZİN (ULAKBİM) Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Veri Tabanı ve Akademia Sosyal Bilimler İndeksi (ASOS Index) tarafından taranmaktadır.

Dergimizin Cilt 31 Sayı 1, Mart 2022 tarihli yayınında dokuz makale yer almaktadır. Bu makalelerden ilki, “Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Kimliğinin Oluşumunda Psikopolitik ve Sosyal Psikotarihsel Süreçler” başlıklı, Doç.Dr. Hadiye YILMAZ ODABAŞI ve Prof. Dr. Deniz Ülke ARIBOĞAN tarafından yazılmış makedir. Bu çalışmada, Osmanlı büyük grubunda siyasi, ekonomik, kültürel ve sosyal yaşamda grup üyelerinin temas ve ilişkilerini düzenleyen imparatorluk kurumsal yapı ve örgütlenmesinin, ikili kimlik modelinin gelişimine imkân sağlamış olduğu savunulmuştur. Osmanlı toplumunda sosyal yaşamın iki büyük mekânında -köy ve kentte- tarım, zanaat ve ticaret hayatı; ibadet yerlerinden eğitim kurumlarına kadar vakıf sistemiyle düzenlenen sosyal hayat; pazar, meydan gibi ortak mekânları ile ortak gündelik yaşam kültür ve pratiği büyük oranda dini ve etnik alt kimlikler korunarak kolektifleşmiş, böylece sosyal yapılar/ilişkiler ağıyla kurulan bu örüntüler, çoğul karakterli Osmanlı tebaasının sosyal uyumunu ve kolektif bir Osmanlı üst kimliğinin inşasını mümkün kılmıştır.

“Uygur Meselesinin Güvenlikleştirilmesini Tetikleyen Bir Unsur Olarak Kuşak Yol Projesi” başlıklı ikinci makale, Doç. Dr. Göktürk TÜYSÜZOĞLU ve Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Selim KURT tarafından hazırlanmıştır. Bu çalışmada Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi, sahip olduğu etno-kültürel, dinsel ve tarihsel farklılık ekseninde değerlendirilerek, Çin’in White Paper olarak bilinen ulusal güvenlik belgelerinde, bölgeyi, aşırılıkçılık, ayrılıkçılık ve terör ile ilişkilendirdiği ve Uygurları bir tehdit olarak gördüğü ifade edilmekte ve bu bağlamda, Pekin’in, kendi değerleri, siyasi hedefleri ve gelecek algısıyla uyum içerisinde olmadığını iddia ettiği Uygurları “tehdit” ekseninde güvenlikleştirmekte olduğu belirtilmektedir.

Bu sayının üçüncü makalesi Doç.Dr. Hüsrev TABAK ve Arş. Gör. Dr. Muharrem DOĞAN tarafından yazılmış ve “Türkiye’de Küresel Cinsiyet Eşitliği Normu ve Sendikalar: Yerel İhtilaflılıklar, Rakip Olumlamalar ve Uyumsuz Benimsemeler” başlığını taşımaktadır. Makalenin temel amacı, Türkiye’deki cinsiyet eşitliği üzerine sendikal aktivizm örnek incelemesiyle, yerel ihtilaflılıkların küresel cinsiyet eşitliği normunun yereldeki işleyişine etkilerini araştırmaktır. Ülkemizdeki sendikaların, küresel cinsiyet rejimine ve mekanizmalarına istekli bir şekilde entegre olmuş olmalarına ve emek alanına toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği konusunda kesintisiz bir norm akışı sağlanmış olmasına rağmen, farklı siyasi-kültürel konumlanmalarından hareketle, ilgili norma ilişkin rakip yorumlar sunduğu vurgulanmaktadır.

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Barış ESEN tarafından hazırlanan “Koronavirüs (COVID-19) Salgını Döneminde Toplumsal Kaygı ve Terörizm Riski” başlıklı dördüncü makale, Koronavirüs salgınının, devletler için siyasi, ekonomik, sosyolojik, psikolojik ve güvenlik açısından olumsuz sonuçlar doğurduğunu vurgulayarak pandemi döneminde yaşanan sorunlar nedeniyle devletlerin kapasitelerinin baskı altında kaldığını belirtmekte ve koronavirüs sürecinin terörü nasıl etkilediğini araştırmakta, bu dönemde otoriteye duyulan güven ile terör faaliyetleri arasında bir ilişki olup olmadığı sorusuna yanıt bulmaya çalışmaktadır.

Sayının beşinci makalesi Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Evgeny SEDASHOV ve Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Mert MORAL tarafından yazılmış, “Pandemi Önlemlerinin Kaldırılması Kararları Işığında Covid-19 Verilerinin Güvenilirliği Sorunu” başlıklı makedir. Çalışmada, Covid-19 pandemisi ile mücadelede hükümetler tarafından alınan sert tedbirlerin yetersiz kaldığı yahut başarısız olduğu durumlarda, hükümetler ve ilgili uzmanların aldıkları tedbirlerin başarısını ölçmek için referans alınan hasta ve vefat istatistiklerinin güvenilirliğinin önemli ölçüde azaldığı öne sürülmektedir.

Öğr. Gör. Dr. Giray GERİM tarafından yazılmış olan “Fili Nasıl Tanımlamalı: Yeni Bir Popülizm Kavramsallaştırması Doğru” isimli makale, sayımızın altıncı makalesidir. Bu makede yazar, son yıllarda, fenomenin doğru ve karşılaştırmalı

analizlerini mümkün kılmak amacıyla, popülizmi tanımlamaya ve kavramsallaştırmaya yönelik ciddi sayıda çalışma yapıldığını vurgulayarak, bunlarda iki temel sorun olduğunu belirtmektedir. Bunlardan birincisi, bu çalışmalarda sunulan minimal ve genel tanımların, kavramın içeriğini geniş ölçüde boşalttığı, ikincisi ise araştırmacıların büyük bir kesiminin, popülizmin üzerine yoğunlaştıkları boyutunu fenomenin bütünü varsaydığı ve kavramsallaştırmasını büyük oranda bu varsayım üzerine inşa ettiğidir. Yazar bu sorunları aşmak üzere alternatif yaklaşımlar önermektedir.

Yedinci makale, Dr.Zahide ERDOĞAN, Dr. Öğr.Üyesi Safure CANTÜRK tarafından hazırlanmış ve “İklim-Çatışma-Göç Bağını Anlamak: İklim-Çatışma Bölgelerinden Türkiye’ye Göç” başlığını taşımaktadır. Yazarlar bu çalışmada, gelişmişlik düzeyinden bağımsız olarak tüm ülkelerin iklim değişikliğinin olumsuz sonuçlarından etkilendiğini ve iklim değişikliğinin artık bir kalkınma ve güvenlik sorunu haline geldiğini vurgulamaktadırlar. Makale Afganistan, Pakistan ve Bangladeş’ten Türkiye’ye göçü iklim kaynaklı yerinden edilme verilerine dayanarak Foresight Modelini kullanarak açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

Dr. Dingji Maza KANGDİM, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Cemal YORGANCIOĞLU ve diğerleri tarafından yazılan, “Boko Haram İsyanı’nın Nijerya’ya Etkisi: Çok Sektörlü Bir Analiz” isimli makalede yazarlar, Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisini ve nitel metodolojik yaklaşımı kullanarak, Boko Haram isyanının/ayaklanmasının Kopenhag Güvenlik Araştırmaları Okulu’nun savunucuları tarafından önerildiği gibi çeşitli güvenlik sektörleri ve arenaları üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedirler.

Sayının son makalesi Zeynep Ceren NURATA tarafından hazırlanan “Mesleki Etik Kavramı ve Avukatlık Meslek Etiğine Yönelik Tartışmalar” başlıklı makaledir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, profesyonellik kriterleri arasında kabul edilen meslek etiği konusuna, yaklaşımları açısından farklı mesleki statüde çalışan avukatlar arasında algı ve beklentiler açısından anlamlı bir farklılık olup olmadığını ortaya koymaktır.

Dergimizin bu sayısına makaleleri ile destek veren yazarlarımıza, hakemlik yapan değerli Hocalarımıza ve Editörler Kurulu üyesi Hocalarımıza teşekkürlerimi sunarken, okuyuculara faydalı olmasını diliyorum.

Prof. Dr. Esra Nemli Çalışkan  
**Baş-Editör**

## EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, of Istanbul University is a peer reviewed journal which endeavors to disseminate academic knowledge among scholars, educators, policy makers and other societal stakeholders. With the valuable contributions of the participating authors to date, it has succeeded to take its place among the significant journals that are nominees to play the role of shaping the content of political sciences discipline in Türkiye. It is currently indexed in Emerging Sources Citation Index, Ebsco Political Science Complete, Turkish Index of Social Sciences and Humanities (ULAKBİM) and Academia Social Science Index (ASOS Index). Following the change of its title to “Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences” in October 2017, the journal encourages theoretical and empirical articles majorly in the field of political sciences while also inviting substantive research from areas of social, humanities and administrative sciences.

This issue listed as Vol.31 Issue 1, March 2022 includes nine articles. The first article which is entitled as “Some Psychopolitical and Social Psychohistorical Processes in the Formation of Classical Period Ottoman Identity” is written by Assoc.Prof. Ph.D. Hadiye YILMAZ ODABAŞI and Prof. Ph.D. Deniz Ülke ARIBOĞAN. The basic argument of this paper is that the Ottoman Empire’s institutional structure and organization, which governed the group members’ contacts and connections in political, economic, cultural, and social life, provides a good setting for the formation of the dual identity paradigm. In the two big spaces (urban and rural) of social life in the Ottoman society; commercial and agricultural life; social life organized by the foundation system from places of worship to educational institutions, and; daily life and practices became collectivized to a large extent by preserving religious and ethnic sub-identities via common spaces such as bazaars and squares. Thus, these patterns established through social structures/relationship networks made it possible for the multi-characterized Ottoman subjects to socialize and to build a collective Ottoman upper identity. The second article which is authored by Assoc. Prof. Ph.D. Göktürk TÜYSÜZOĞLU and Assoc. Prof. Ph.D. Selim KURT is entitled as “The Belt Road Project as a Triggering Element of the Securitization of the Uyghur Issue”. The article explains that the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, based on its ethnocultural, religious, and historical diversity is associated with extremism, separatism, and terrorism by China and thus the Uyghurs are recognized as a threat.

The third article of this issue is authored by Assoc. Prof. Ph.D. Hüsrev TABAK and Res. Ass. Ph.D. Muharrem DOĞAN and entitled as “Global Gender Equality Norm and Trade Unions in Türkiye:Local Contestations, Rival Validations, and Discrepant Receptions”. The article starts by stating that gender equality is a global norm, and the existing norm mechanisms attribute to trade unions a stakeholder position globally in norm diffusion and promotion. But in our country, despite that trade unions have been well-integrated into the global gender regime and mechanisms, and despite the existence of an uninterrupted norm flow regarding gender equality to the labour space, the trade unions offer competing interpretations, driven by their differing and even conflicting politico-cultural positioning. The fourth paper which begins by emphasizing that the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has negative consequences for states in terms of political, economic, sociological, psychological and security is entitled as “Terrorism Risk During the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Outbreak Period” and written by Ass. Prof. Ph.D. Bariş ESEN. The study investigates how the COVID-19 process affects terrorism, and tries to answer the question whether there is a relationship between trust in authority and terrorist activities during this period, or not.

The next article of this issue which is authored by Asst. Prof., Ph.D. Evgeny Sedashov and Asst. Prof., Ph.D. Mert Moral is entitled as “The Reliability of COVID-19 Data in the Shadow of Anti-Pandemic Measures’ Cancellation” and starts with emphasizing COVID-19 pandemic necessitates taking measures that may be very costly from an economic standpoint and likely to make the mass public discontent. If an anti-pandemic measures do not achieve expected results, their costs become even harder to justify. The authors argue that, under such circumstances, cancellation of an anti-pandemic regimen would decrease the reliability of health data because rank-in-file policymakers and bureaucrats have incentives to present more optimistic statistics to signal their competence and politicians would further pressure them to report statistics that appear to agree with the cancellation of restrictions and give legitimacy to taking the measures. The sixth article of this issue is entitled as “How to Define the Elephant: Towards a Novel Conceptualization of Populism ” and is written by Lect. Ph.D. Giray GERİM. This paper states that in recent decades, a serious number of studies have been dedicated to define and conceptualize populism in order to enable proper and comparative analyses of the phenomenon. Critically engaging with

the most influential ones, this article ascertains two principal deficiencies in these bodies of work. Firstly, the minimal and generic definitions presented in these studies empty the concept to a broad extent. Secondly, most of the scholars assume the concentrated dimension of populism as the whole of the phenomenon and undertake its conceptualization with this assumption to a large extent. The author suggests alternative approaches to overcome these problems.

Ph.D. Zahide ERDOĞAN and Asst. Prof. Ph.D. Safure CANTÜRK contributes this issue by their article entitled as “Understanding the Climate-Conflict-Migration Nexus: Immigration from Climate-Conflict Zones to Türkiye”. The authors emphasize that regardless of the level of development, all countries are affected by the negative consequences of climate change. Climate change is now being considered as a development and security problem. This paper attempts to explain migration to Türkiye from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh based on climate-induced internal displacement data using the Foresight Model. The paper entitled as “The Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: A Multi-Sectoral Analysis” is the eight article of the issue and written by Ph.D. Dingji Maza KANGDIM, Cemal YORGANCIOĞLU, et al. Using the Regional Security Complex Theory and qualitative methodological approach, this article examines the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the various sectors and arenas of security as proposed by proponents of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Findings of the article suggest that the presence and activities of this terror group have impacted the various arenas of security and have also created direct sub-regional and regional implications in spite of the various counter-measures designed by sub-regional and regional actors to counter the threat posed by the terror group.

The last article of the issue is entitled as “The Concept of Professional Ethics and Debates on Professional Ethics in the Legal Profession: The Case of Ankara” and written by Zeynep Ceren NURATA. The purpose of this study is to determine whether there is a significant difference between lawyers working in different professional status in terms of their approaches to the issue of professional ethics, in terms of perceptions and expectations. The results of the survey were evaluated by considering the Attorneys’ Act, the Code of Professional Conduct, and professional practices.

I would like to thank to the authors who participate in this issue with their valuable papers, the reviewers for their precious effort, the editorial board members of the journal while hoping this issue to be an enjoyable and useful read for all the readers.

Prof. Dr. Esra Nemli Çalışkan

**Editor-in-Chief**

## Some Psychopolitical and Social Psychohistorical Processes in the Formation of Classical Period Ottoman Identity

### Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Kimliğinin Oluşumunda Psikopolitik ve Sosyal Psikotarihsel Süreçler

Hadiye Yılmaz Odabaşı<sup>1</sup> , Deniz Ülke Arıboğan<sup>2</sup> 

#### Abstract

Traditional disputes on pre-modern Ottoman identity mostly revolve around the topic of “Is there a single Ottoman identity or various Ottoman identities?” Some researchers point out that the name “Ottoman” refers to the ruling class. On the other hand, some researchers mention a supra-religious and supra-ethnic unionist consciousness and the existence of an Ottoman identity as an umbrella of sovereignty. The basic argument of this paper is that the Ottoman Empire’s institutional structure and organization, which governed the group members’ contacts and connections in political, economic, cultural, and social life, provides a good setting for the formation of the dual identity paradigm. In the two big spaces of social life in the Ottoman society, commercial and agricultural life, social life organized by the waqf system from places of worship to educational institutions, and daily life and practices became collectivized to a large extent by preserving religious and ethnic sub-identities via common spaces such as bazaars and squares. Thus, these patterns established through social structures/relationship networks made it possible for the multi-characterized Ottoman subjects to socialize and to build a collective Ottoman upper identity. Objective representations such as the Ottoman Greek, the Ottoman Armenian, and the Ottoman Jew can be read as the most concrete indicators of dual identity formations in the Ottoman large group.

#### Keywords

Collective identity, Social identity, Large group, Political psychology, Social psychohistory, Ottoman Empire

#### Öz

Modern dönem öncesi Osmanlı kimliği üzerine yapılan geleneksel tartışmaların başında, “ortak bir Osmanlı kimliği olup olmadığı ya da birden çok Osmanlı kimlikleri mi bulunduğu” gelir. Bazı önde gelen araştırmacılar, Osmanlılık tabirinin yönetici kesimi karşıladığını kaydetmektedir. Bazı araştırmacılar ise dinler ve etnik gruplarüstü birliktenci bir bilinçten, bir egemenlik şemsiyesi olarak Osmanlılık kimliğinin varlığından söz etmektedir. Bu çalışmanın temel tezi, Osmanlı büyük grubunda siyasi, ekonomik, kültürel ve sosyal yaşamda grup üyelerinin temas ve ilişkilerini düzenleyen imparatorluk kurumsal yapı ve örgütlenmesinin, ikili kimlik modelinin gelişimine imkân sağlamış olduğudur. Zira Osmanlı toplumunda sosyal yaşamın iki büyük mekânında tarım, zanaat ve ticaret hayatı; ibadet yerlerinden eğitim kurumlarına kadar vakıf

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sistemiyle düzenlenen sosyal hayat; pazar, meydan gibi ortak mekânları ile ortak gündelik yaşam kültür ve pratiği büyük oranda dini ve etnik alt kimlikler korunarak kolektifleşmiştir. Böylece sosyal yapılar/ilişkiler ağıyla kurulan bu örüntüler, çoğul karakterli Osmanlı tebaasının sosyal uyumunu ve kolektif bir Osmanlı üst kimliğinin inşasını mümkün kılmıştır. Nitekim Osmanlı Rum'u, Osmanlı Ermenisi, Osmanlı Yahudisi gibi objektif temsiller, Osmanlı büyük grubundaki ikili kimlik oluşumlarının en somut göstergeleri olarak okunabilir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler**

Kolektif kimlik, Sosyal/toplumsal kimlik, Büyük grup, Politik psikoloji, Sosyal psikotarih, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu

## An Ontological Examination of Classical Ottoman Identity: Social and Imperial Identity

The fundamental requirements for defining identity are the similarities and contrasts between members of a large group, the allegiance/subordination connection, and, most crucially, a sense of belonging. The sense of belonging, with the most concise expression, is to define himself/herself as a part of a whole, and has been one of the basic needs of human beings as social beings from primitive times to the present. This ensures meeting individuals' needs such as security, support, help, validation of their values, feeling important and necessary, and comfort. (Bilgin, 2008: 123-124). With a sense of belonging, individuals integrate with their social groups in common values and purposes, and concrete expressions of this integration determine social identities. Accordingly, social identity is the individual's representations of self (self-perception), his/her knowledge of the social group/groups he/she belongs to, the part of the self that results from the value and meaningfulness he/she attributes to membership in these groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 33-47), and the part of the self that consists of a group membership (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). In other words, the main determinant of social identities is the group they belong to. The sense of belonging to a more comprehensive group, such as religious, national, or ethnic group, corresponds to collective identity, which is one of the types of social identity. (Taylor, 1997: 179). According to these definitions, humanity has existed in the formation of a large number of natural or constructed ingroups and outgroups – us and them – that have been interdependent and interacted with each other in line with their needs and goals throughout history (Aranson et al., 2012: 496). Thus, it is without a shadow of a doubt that humanity acquired various ascribed and constructed group identities during this process. In that case, since social/collective identity can only be mentioned in the context of belonging to the group, and in order to examine whether Ottoman identity existed in the classical period, first, it is necessary to discuss whether *an Ottoman large group* exists or not.

According to Muzaffer Sherif, a group is “a social unit that consists of people who have a certain status and role relations with each other and that has its own set of values and norms, which at least in important matters concerning the group, regulate the behavior of its members.” (Şerif and Şerif, 1996: 144). Henri Tajfel ve John Turner (2004: 283) define a group “as a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves.” According to Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı (2006: 258), “multiple people interacting with each other, common norms, common goals, the feeling and consciousness of being a group” are necessary conditions for human communities to be considered a group. We will begin to determine whether these necessary conditions existed in Ottoman society by clarifying the largest structure, namely the components of the imperial organization, in which the community we call *the Ottomans* was organized.

The general characteristics of the Empire phenomenon as a political form can be summarized as follows: (Howe, 2002; Ünlü, 2010: 283-243)

a. A dominant sovereign centre and a periphery that is dependent/subjected to it within the boundaries determined by different legal statuses,

b. Large-scale land acquired through conquests,

- c. Unambiguous boundaries which are subject to change at any time
- d. Semi-sanctified ideological discourse that legitimizes imperial domination,
- e. Great military and economic power,
- f. A discourse of sacredness and eternity attributed to the leader/system,
- g. A discourse of universality centered on peace, justice, security or well-being,
- h. Heterogeneous structure based on religious, linguistic, ethnic, cultural etc. diversity,
- i. Sustaining the domination over different elements with military, economic, social and cultural pressure and/or incentives,
- j. Different administrative models (direct and indirect),
- k. Military service and tax liability of the subjects.

The Payitaht (center) of the Ottoman Empire, along with other political entities like provinces and vassal states, were all part of the political framework of this empire type. With the understanding of *Gaza*, the conquests were legitimized on the ground of righteousness. The ideological discourse, which is based on the eternal sublime state, (*Devlet-i aliye-i ebed müddet*) (Genç, 2003: 37) and the ancient law (*kanun-ı kadim*), and shaped by the understanding of the order of the world (*nizam-ı âlem*), enhances the value system that the Ottomans attribute to holiness and eternity. On the other hand, it provided legitimacy to the Imperial system, which was built with the claim of bringing peace and justice (circle of justice) to the whole world. The population of the Ottoman Empire, which had great military and economic power during the classical period, reached 60 million by the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Although it was dominantly a Muslim nation<sup>1</sup>, it contained a religious, ethnic and cultural diversity including communities such as Christian, Jewish, Arab, Greek, Armenian, Vlach, Slavic and Hungarian. Undoubtedly, in the initial phase, there was an element of pressure/coercion in establishing military, economic, social and cultural hegemony over these different elements. However, it is a known fact that the existence of inclusive mechanisms, such as the community/millet system and the *istimâlet* policy, which can become quite flexible from time to time, are the main tenets of the system.<sup>2</sup>

The Ottoman Empire built its insight of administration respectively directly and indirectly. While the direct rule was more prevalent in *miri states* (imperial domains), there were administrative units subject to indirect rule under the name of *salyaneli* (annually taxed) states (such as Egypt, Basra, Baghdad, Abyssinia, Algeria, Tripoli), khanate (such as the Crimean Khanate), sharifate (such as Mecca), voivodship (such as Wallachia, Moldavia, Erdel, Dubrovnik) and *hâkimlik* (some places in Eastern Anatolia) (İnalçık, 2003: 109-111; İpşirli, 2007: 502-505). There are three main types of taxes from Ottoman subjects: *jizya* (from non-Muslims/dhimmis), *avarız* and *mukataa* (most importantly, the tithe (*öşür*) from Muslims and tribute (*haraç*) from the Christians, etc.) (Özvar, 2007: 521-525). Non-Muslim administrators are exempt from tax as well as those who reside in

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1 Mille, millet: Religion. In the hadiths, the word *millet* is mentioned as “innate characteristics, nature (*fitrah*)” besides its meaning (religion) in the Qur’an. (Şentürk, 2005: 64-66).

2 For example, Feridun Emecen explains the spread of the Ottoman Empire and its ability to maintain its power for many years not only with the power of the sword but with the *istimâlet* policy (Emecen, 2018: 19).



Istanbul and serve the Palace (physician, diplomat, etc.) with their entire lineage (Shaw, 2008: 118). In addition to the existence of an extremely strong and organized social division of labour, it is also a fact that there was a very strong bureaucratic structure. Despite their religious, ethnic and sectarian differences, and variations in their rights and obligations, everyone residing in the Ottoman country (more precisely, in the Ottoman realms) is an Ottoman subject. So, can we mention the Ottoman Empire as a group with many subgroups in which there are certain status and role relations in almost every aspect of life in the Ottoman geography? Can it be claimed that the behavior of Ottoman subjects was regulated by a set of values and norms and that group members had the feeling and consciousness of being a group?

The first thing to note is that the Ottoman Empire, as an empire, had a number of administrative qualities that made it distinct from other empires. The existence of indirect and direct forms of administration such as separate political entities in the empire, is one of the factors that create intragroup differences. At first glance, elements such as religion, sect, ethnicity, culture and language, which constitute diversity rather than commonality, seem far from uniting the subjects of the empire as a group. However, whether it was established by military, economic, social, or cultural pressure or incentives, the dominant political authority in the Ottomans, as in other empires, functioned as a large and comprehensive tent under which the subjects gathered. In other words, the interaction networks that made the Ottoman large group of imperial subjects similar and differentiated it from outside groups were produced based on an allegiance relationship. The integration process had initially developed on the basis of an obedience to the sovereign power. However, despite the differences between the communities, there was a social influence and harmony based on subordination to the center, by meeting the needs of security, welfare, support, recognition and approval of common values under the imperial tent.

The main argument of this study is that the social cohesion that developed among the plural Ottoman subjects in the classical period of the Ottoman Empire through patterns established via social structures/relationships networks largely shaped by the central power enabled the construction of a collective Ottoman upper identity. However, it cannot be claimed that this identity is represented at the same level of belonging and identification across all of the state's borders, which were spread across three continents, Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Empires are political structures with functions that extend beyond administering the subjects under their control in the geographies over which they rule. These administrative structures reorganized the lives of the group members not only politically and economically, but also through the empire's specific socio-cultural institutions and the relationships formed around these institutions. While the empire pattern enabled the formation of collective behavior and emotion in the society/group, in-group similarities and differences also occurred spontaneously to a certain extent. One of the common features of empires, the characteristic of *having great military might and economic power* and the function of providing peace, justice, security, and welfare on behalf of group members/subjects, is a driving force in getting out of an *allegiance-centered* similarity/coexistence construct and leading members to have a group belonging. In this respect, the classical period Ottoman society shows the characteristics of a group in which the interaction of millions

of members with various religious, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds, statuses and roles, and relations within/with the center is regulated by legal, customary and traditional values and norms. It should be noted at this point that the integrity, consistency, and continuity formed by mutual interaction and communication, as well as internal processes, is the equivalent of social identity in social theory (Marshall, 2000: 9). To some extent, the members of the Ottoman large group developed the “feeling and awareness of being a group” – albeit at different levels of identification in all in-groups – through the group’s structural components/institutions, joint activities, division of labor, common norms and goals.

### **Collective Ottoman Upper Identity and the Dual Identity Model**

According to social identity theory, *identity formation* takes place in three phases. Individuals/groups first categorize people as “me/us” and “she/he/them” (social categorization/social classification), then they identify themselves within the group they classify as “us” (social identification) and compare *us* with *them* (social comparison). In the categorization stage, similarities and differences are crystallized, and in the next identification stage, the common feelings, thoughts and behaviors of the group are internalized. At the stage where *us* and *them* are compared, satisfaction about being included in the group and self-esteem is increased (Hogg et al., 1995, 260-261). Undoubtedly, the formation of social identities, on the one hand, assimilates and integrates individuals under the umbrella of common values/interests; on the other hand, it causes discrimination, exclusion and sometimes hostility towards those who are alien to them. For this reason, social categorization/classification is a mechanism that forms the basis of both in-group favoritism (bias) and out-group prejudices (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 33-48).

One of the models developed against the conflict and prejudice processes produced by social classification is the common upper identity model, which aims to establish joint participation between categories. (Gartner et al., 1993: 15-22). In this model, previously acquired given identities (religion, ethnicity, etc.) as subgroup identities are re-categorized into a more inclusive common upper group identity (Eniç, 2019: 104). In this framework, varieties are to be gathered under the roof of a new “upper identity”, new criteria should be determined, and a new categorization should be made in order to meet on more common ground. Scientific researches in the pursuit of eliminating mutual prejudices and neutralizing the *us/them* dichotomy through the integration and creation of a new and common upper identity as *us* do not produce very positive results on the theoretical plane. Yet, there are very successful examples in historical practice and we think that the Ottoman classification developed within the imperial system can be mentioned among these practices. In fact, many historical materials testify that the phenomenon of *being an Ottoman* in the classical period is a social identity that meets the requirements of the common upper group identity model used in social psychology (Gaertner et al., 1993: 4-12).

The re-categorization activity, which is a decisive stage in the formation of the common upper identity, becomes quite evident after the conquest of Istanbul, which initiated the Ottoman imperialization process. It is possible to say that Fatih Sultan Mehmet’s

regulations on religious communities after the conquest were a very important step in this sense. Via these legal regulations, which we prefer to conceptualize as *the community system* instead of *the millet system* to distinguish it from the modern regulations in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Muslim dominant group identity and many sub-identities such as Greek, Armenian, and Jewish groups were re-categorized under the Ottoman inclusive tent. At first glance, it is really thought-provoking how possible it is for different religious groups to gather under the same upper identity roof in traditional societies where separation/differentiation and therefore the perception of *the other* is essentially *religion-centered*. However, we believe that identification with upper group identities in traditional societies that were not politicized yet, despite all differences, developed spontaneously as a necessary consequence of socio-economic conditions. As a matter of fact, through the reclassification process, these conditions enabled the Ottoman subgroups to differentiate with some groups (for example, other Christians) despite sharing religious and/or ethnic common ascribed identities, and to identify with some groups (such as the Muslims) with which they did not share the same ascribed identities.

The basic phenomenon that started the reclassification/categorization process in the Ottoman group is the *allegiance* relationship. The commonality/familiarization between different in-groups activated in this way enabled the reduction of religious/ethnic prejudices or at least enabled their control by the central authority - for the Ottoman example - as stated in the *common upper group identity* theory. Another phase that has been very influential in the identification processes of different groups under the Ottoman roof is the construction of a common *other* conception. For both dominant Muslims and non-Muslim groups, the main *other* is European Christians that were not under Ottoman rule. In fact, when the threat of the European Christians as the *other* was apparent, a unified Ottoman large group representation with a common feeling and attitude towards the *other* developed. This was achieved despite the existence of in-group conflicts (within the Muslims, the Jews, and the Armenians etc.) and inter-group (Muslim-Greek, Greek-Jewish, Armenian-Greek, etc.) conflicts.

While the Ottoman organization of communities allowed the subgroup identities to be preserved and expressed by allowing a certain level of freedom, it also brought some important gains. Religious and sectarian differentiation, which is the strongest discriminating element of sub-identities, did not limit the participation of these subgroups in the Ottoman political, economic and social institutions. In this way, interaction based on social cooperation between different groups managed to find a way to flourish and develop. It also contributed to the process of Ottoman subgroups reclassifying themselves into both their subgroup identities and a common upper group, under the umbrella of collective group identity. Through reclassification and the construction of a new collective identity, intra-group biases decreased (Gaertner et al., 1990: 693-700), and positive relations were established between different groups (Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Armenian, Greek, etc.).

Even though the Ottoman Empire is a Turkish empire, it is not exclusively an empire of the Turks. Like all empires, it has a multinational, multi-religious and multilingual structure. In this respect, the dual identity model (Dovidio et al., 2007: 300-330), which is a version of the collective group identity, offers a new and much more explanatory

context for understanding the classical period Ottoman society. Objective representations such as the Ottoman Greek, the Ottoman Armenian, and the Ottoman Jew can be perceived as the most concrete indicators of dual identity formations in the Ottoman group. In the dual identity model, sub-identities are preserved and identification with the common upper identity is ensured. Simultaneous emphasis on both identities reinforces dual identity representation. Many studies show that a strong upper identity is beneficial for both majority and minority group members where subidentities are also strong. In this way, by emphasizing common and different identities at the same time, the level of intergroup bias and prejudice is effectively reduced (Dovidio et al., 2007, 303). In the construction of dual identity, there is an interaction of groups synergistically with the unity of subidentities and upper identity (Hewstone and Brown, 1986: 12-30; Eniç, 2019: 113). In order to maintain this interaction successfully, the social contact environment and the social structure institutions must be organized in accordance with the preservation of sub-identities. Indeed, identity is an expression of integrity, consistency and continuity that is formed not only by internal processes but also by external/environmental/social interactions (Marshall, 2000: 9).

Therefore, the social structure as a dynamic whole, consisting of people and social institutions in a permanent, perpetual and organized relationship network, functions as a kind of laboratory environment in the formation and configuration of identities (Bottomore, 2000: 119). The structures where the group members experience a collective interaction can prosper the dual identity model as a type of collective upper identity to the extent that it allows the preservation of subgroup identities. This model does not only recognize the differences of the subgroup identities but also ensures the production of an upper category that encompasses all of the identities. Studies show that ethnic minority members who want to preserve the difference and originality of their identities have much more positive feelings towards the majority group if the dual identity model is encouraged in comparison with normal conditions (Glasford and Dovidio, 2011: 1021-1024). This naturally ensures that systems adopting the dual identity model are more peaceful and collaborative when compared to assimilation or separation strategies.

### **Collective Interaction Spaces/Structures and Motivational Functions Shaping the Classical Ottoman Upper Identity**

The institutional structure and organization of the Ottoman Empire, which regulates the contacts and relations of the group members in political, economic, cultural and social life, presents a character suitable for the development of the dual identity model. In the two big spaces (urban and rural) of social life in the Ottoman society, commercial and agricultural life, social life organized by the waqf system from places of worship to educational institutions, and daily life and practices became collectivized to a large extent by preserving religious and ethnic sub-identities via common spaces such as bazaars and squares. Halil İnalçık mentions that in the Ottoman Empire there was “not suppression and supersedence, but a reconciliation and integration” and argues that “Basically, the Ottoman peoples represent an umbrella of sovereignty over religions and regional cultures, and it is possible to talk about an Ottoman identity under the frameworks created by it.” (İnalçık, 2004: 15-17). According to Feridun Emecen (2018: 368), the administrators of the Ottoman Principality adopted the aim of creating a collective social structure together,

not with an understanding of suppression based on racial and religious superiority. This inclusive organization model, which was shaped under the Ottoman rule, strengthened the formation of positive attitudes towards unification/integration within the group while preserving sub-identities, and contributed to the simultaneous identification of the group members with both sub-group and upper group identities. This article primarily focuses on the social and daily life of this organizational network that shaped the Ottoman identity, and the other, stereotypes and shared positive images as the elements of the Ottoman upper identity.

### **Social and everyday life**

The Ottoman central government did not form a unity with the religion, language and culture of the dominant group by dissolving the differences within itself. Instead, it was based on the harmony/balance of different religions, sects and ethnicities on the condition of obedience to the Ottoman dynasty. Although non-Muslims had some administrative autonomy according to the community system, contrary to the traditional narrative, many studies have shown that the Ottoman central authority's effectiveness in the community administration, except for religious rituals, is deeper than it was previously thought. More importantly, these communities were not able to establish central authorities that spanned the entire empire's borders until the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Greene, 2015: 42-45; Emecen, 2018: 374). Apart from simple legal problems, it is seen that both community leaders and non-Muslim people prefer kadi courts instead of community solidarity and subgroup favouritism (Emecen, 1997: 53). Non-Muslims also widely used the Ottoman courts to resolve disputes among themselves and public order incidents originating from the Christians (Üçel-Aybet, 2018: 183). For example, studies have documented that the Greeks referred to these courts as their own and registered their heritage in both the community and the Ottoman courts. The fact that the Ottomans abolished all the restrictions imposed on the Jews by Byzantium and the Jews enjoyed more exemptions in practice while having the same law as the Christians, was effective in applying to kadi courts instead of their own community courts. In summary, these practices in the field of law, on the one hand, positively affected the process of integration and unification of non-Muslims under the Ottoman roof, apart from their communities; on the other hand, this highlighted the existence of a common world in the field of law. Applying to kadi courts when there is an incompatibility and a conflict between the interests/demands of non-Muslim individuals and the general interests of the community points out that the Ottoman central authority also functioned as a kind of social balance in the field of law. In this way, it can be said that non-communal loyalties were formed and a sense of belonging to the Ottoman upper identity based on allegiance was produced.

According to the traditional narrative, one of the dominant understandings is that non-Muslims and Muslims lived in isolated neighborhoods in the Ottoman lands. However, the neighborhoods where both communities lived together were not few (Kütükoğlu, 24). The court records also show that the Muslims and non-Muslims in Ottoman society tended to live at a certain distance from each other; however, there is also a substantial amount of the opposite situation. For example, the Jews, who were tenants in the social complex rooms when they first migrated to Manisa in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, later bought houses in Muslim neighborhoods, and even though it was legally forbidden, they lived

in the houses they rented or bought around the Muradiye Mosque (Emecen, 1997: 62-63). It is also evident that the Muslims and non-Muslims lived together, especially in neighborhoods with high commercial activities (Emecen, 2018: 356). In the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Muslim neighborhoods were generally within the walls, but a century later, they also settled outside the city walls, and the physical borders with non-Muslims largely disappeared (Greene, 2015: 92). Especially after the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the walls separating the neighborhoods where the congregations lived began to disappear due to fires and epidemics (Shaw, 2008: 91). Therefore, a more accurate statement of the situation is that although the Muslims and non-Muslims had a tendency to live in separate neighborhoods, this cannot be generalized.

These groups from different religions shared common spaces, common feelings and concerns in the neighborhoods where they lived together under the roof of the Ottoman Empire. For example, Muslim and non-Muslim people prayed together to get rid of plagues. The presence of prayer rugs in non-Muslim inheritance documents indicates that the cohesion between non-Muslims and Muslims was so high that it facilitated each other's worship (Araz, 2008: 176-177). On the other hand, while participating in non-Muslim celebrations was considered a sign of blasphemy, it is also evident that Muslims participated in various celebrations of non-Muslims (Araz, 2008: 164-166). According to what Fresne Canaye wrote in his travel book, *Le Voyage du Levant* dated 1573, Muslims in Istanbul gave flowers to their Christian neighbors on religious holidays; the Christians would also offer Easter bread to the Muslims on their religious holidays. In fact, Shaykh al-Islam Ebusuud Efendi issued a fatwa stating that there is no harm in accepting Easter bread by the Muslims in accordance with the right of neighborhood (Üçel-Aybet, 2018: 166; Greene, 2015: 170). Non-Muslim subjects were also participating in victory festivities together with the Muslims. During Ramadan nights, the Jews played puppetry with their Muslim neighbors in coffee houses (Üçel-Aybet, 2018: 396). Many bonds were established between the Muslims and the Christians through established practices such as marriage, blood fraternity, baptism, and friendship (Greene, 2015: 95). While it is prohibited for the Muslims and non-Muslims to bathe in the same bath and go to the same barbershop according to the written law, there are many contrary examples to these laws (Araz, 2008: 124).

Another practice that differentiates the sub-groups in the Ottoman written laws was about clothing. Clothing, which is an element of material culture, was one of the means of identification that made symbolic boundaries between individuals and groups clear. Therefore, clothing was one of the indicators of group membership and belonging (Ülgen, 2012: 474). The practice of differentiated clothing, which was also available in Europe and Byzantium, was a result of the search for social transparency, and the establishment of a social system and stability by determining the status of social elements (Faroqhi, 1998: 124). These distinctive outfits do not always carry a hostile intent. In fact, they also mean the approval of groups (Lewis, 2018: 73). Making the difference visible was also reflected in the religious texts, and the communities themselves demanded this separation. For example, Jewish clergy did not tolerate their congregations to dress similarly to those of other religions (Turan, 2005: 254). On the other hand, unlike Medieval Western Europe, it is seen that the rules prohibiting groups from appropriating each other's symbols were

mostly not followed in the Ottoman Empire (Emecen, 2018: 65). For example, while the Muslims had the right to wear green, white, red and yellow clothes, it is known that the Jews wore white turbans and red shoes. Not only the Muslim women but also the Christians and the Jews wore white or colored dresses (And, 2004: 422). The existence of many edicts enacted on the dress code at certain intervals is in fact an indication that these rules were not followed at all. Despite the edicts of the central authority and the efforts of the community leaders to prevent it, the fact that non-Muslims mostly prefer Muslim clothing instead of clothing that symbolizes their community is a strong indication of the existence of a sense of identification and belonging with the Ottoman upper identity. Similarly, despite the rule that non-Muslim buildings should not be built higher than Muslim buildings, it is seen that this was not the case in practice just as the restrictions on building non-Muslim structures next to mosques and riding of horses by non-Muslims (Shaw, 2008: 126; Faroqhi, 1998: 124).

In daily life, Muslim and non-Muslim groups built a common world by sharing similar clothing, home furnishing styles, customs, spoken language and artistic aesthetics under the tent of the Ottoman Empire. For example, the clothes of non-Muslim women are the same as the Muslims in many places. Anatolian and Caucasian Armenians and unmarried Greek girls cover their faces just like Muslim women (Faroqhi, 1998: 125). Petrus Gyllius, who was sent to Istanbul by the Kingdom of France between 1544 and 1547, recorded that in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, the Greeks had nothing left of the old Byzantine traditions and customs, and they had been imitating the Turks in daily life, cuisine, clothing and home decoration. Gyllius also mentions that Greek women in Istanbul wore caftans over long dresses just like the Muslims in their homes (Üçel-Aybet, 2018: 142). The French orientalist Antoine Galland, who was in Istanbul in 1672-1673, also says that non-Muslim young girls cover their faces when going out, and non-Muslim women, like Muslim women, do not usually go out and prefer to look out of the window (Üçel-Aybet, 2018: 195). Kuripecic, one of Ferdinand I's embassy delegation, states that in the Balkans, Greek villagers dress in the same manner as the Muslims, the only difference being the Greeks have long hair (Üçel-Aybet, 2018: 205). Dutch traveller Cornelius de Bruyn records in 1678 that Greek and Jewish women in Izmir, like Muslim women, tied colored handkerchiefs to their headdresses and wore a long white dress that extended to their feet in the street (Üçel-Aybet 251). Apart from clothing, it is seen that many customs were shared by the Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, in rural areas, Armenian men would gather and sit in a room made in a barn, just like the Turks. The village area was divided into two for men and women. There were some common traditions such as drinking coffee when asking for a girl in marriage, betrothal, engagement, wedding ceremonies lasting for an average of three days, henna nights, red veils, parents' refraining themselves from showing their love towards their children in the presence of others and especially in the presence of other adults (Matossian and Villa, 2006: 109, 165).

### **The Ottomans and Europe: Reciprocal Construction of *the Other***

*The other* is alien to *us*; it is different and it has a negative connotation and perception in terms of content. *The other* is in opposition to what is defined as *us* (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Bilgin, 2007: 179). In a long historical process, The Ottomans and Europe became

*the other* reciprocally and this situation played an important role in the formation and strengthening of the collective identity of both big groups. The main reason for this is the existence of the Islam-Christianity dichotomy as the backbone of these identities and the main indicator of their differentiation, and the existence of great competition for limited resources. According to Muzaffer Şerif's (1966: 15) *realistic conflict theory*, intergroup behavior now and in the future depends on the cooperative or competitive nature of group goals. Confrontation and hostility occur in the case of a real or imaginary threat to the security of the group, or conflict of interests with outside groups. This feeling reinforces group identity by increasing solidarity within the group (Brewer, 1979: 315-320). It can be said that the lines "The world consists of three parts; Europe, Asia and Africa, and the Christians live in Europe while the enemies of Europe live in other places." (Yurdusev, 1997: 36) are one of the best descriptions of the situation for Europe. A good indication of *the otherness* of Europe for the Ottomans is that things coming from *Europe/Kafiristan (The land of infidels)* are considered *makruh* (detestable) (İnalçık, 2004: 1049). Until the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the European view of the Ottomans was also similar.

The Ottomans are also infidels from their perspective. Later on, they would be labelled as *barbarians* in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Negative evaluations of the other such as *ignorant and inept* stereotypes (Berkes, 1975: 23), and if we express it in psychoanalytic terminology, *externalized negative images* would be attached to the Ottoman image for Europe in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. How negative was the image of Europe, which was *the other* for the Ottoman Muslim group, for the Ottoman non-Muslims? The Jewish stereotype, widely shared by European Christians, included *immorality, sorcery, and sinister evil*. In Europe, harsh treatments such as attacks, mass murder, and exile against the Jews without separating the elderly, disabled and children, had been going on for centuries. On the other hand, the Jews were forced to convert, and those who did not convert were marked with distinctive symbols and headgears. In addition, the most heavily taxed were the Jewish group. The Jews who were Byzantine subjects were also subjected to the same harsh treatment (Lewis, 2018: 212-213). In the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Portuguese Jew, Samuel Usque, author of *The Consolation for the Tribulations of Israel*, with his following statement "(...) most signal is great Turkey, a broad and spacious sea which God opened with the rod of His mercy. Here the gates of liberty are always open for the observance of Judaism." (Lewis, 2018: 213), exemplifies the common feelings of the Jewish and the Muslim groups against *the common other*. Naturally, the Ottoman central government and Muslim subjects did not have the characteristics of the other for the Jews, who, as Ottoman subjects, attained a level of tolerance, protection and high welfare (Shaw, 2008: 5-15). On the other hand, the Christians were a threat group for them and the Ottoman tent acted as the main shield that alleviated this threat in favour of the Jews. The dissolution of the Ottoman system could lead to the resumption of the Christian attacks against the Jews. Indeed, with its interventions, the Ottoman central government largely prevented its Christian subjects from harming the Jews, unlike in Europe. The Jews were always protected against the attacks by the Christian gangs, oppression of the Armenian nobility, and exclusion from the economic sphere. (Shaw, 2008: 131-133).

The situation was similar for the Ottoman Greeks and the profile defined as *the other* was Catholic Europe. The impact of the fourth Crusade was decisive in the alienation of



the Catholic world and the shaping of the Greek Orthodox identity. Catholic persecution led to the separation of Greek Orthodox from the Catholic Christian identity and increased the level of identification with the Greek Orthodoxy (Greene, 2015: 55). In the early 1500s, the definition of Europe combined with the concept of Frank (Frankoi) was introduced to the Ottoman Empire through the Greeks and resulted in a shared common image of hatred for *the other* (Berkes, 1965: 14). Luigi Bassano, who lived in Istanbul between 1532 and 1540, states that the Greeks did not like the Latins and even preferred their daughters to marry the Turks rather than the Latins (And, 2004: 422). While the Orthodox Church, which was subjected to Catholic persecution for a long time, especially in Crete, Cyprus and the Cyclades, had important privileges in the Ottoman administration, the Greeks reached a better position both within the Ottoman bureaucracy and as subjects (Faroqhi, 1998: 77).

For the Anatolian Armenians, the Ottomans are a *savior* against the Orthodox Byzantium, just as it was for the Jews. Simeon, an Armenian-Pole, gives the following information about the situation of the Armenians in the Byzantine period: “When Istanbul was in the hands of the Greeks, no Armenians were allowed into the city let alone the Armenians settling there. (...) When the Turks took Istanbul, many Armenians settled here (...) In fact, the Turks treated them very well.” (Emecen, 2018: 381). In terms of understanding the attitude of Ottoman Armenians towards European Christians, the attempt to poison Suleiman the Magnificent in Budin in 1541 is noteworthy. Some pro-Habsburg Hungarians offered to cooperate with the Sultan’s cook, Armenian Manuk Karaseferyan, to kill the Sultan, but Karaseferyan preferred to reveal the assassination attempt instead of collaborating with the Christians (Pamukciyan, 2003: 264).

### **Shared positive image and self-esteem hypothesis**

One of the constructive elements of large group identities is the shared repository of positive images/representations. Shared positive images refer to certain elements and experiences that are passed on to new generations under the conscious or unconscious guidance of parents and others. These images reinforce the large group component in individuals’ identities through generalizations, and thus individual identity and large group identity are inextricably intertwined (Volkan, 2007: 55-60). With the storage of shared positive images in the collective memory of the groups, an invisible *us* is built without being aware of it, and a permanent and continuous sense of “we” is produced in the group (Volkan, 2003: 50-65).

*Being strong* is one of the strongest positive images of the Ottoman upper identity shared within the group. Since shared positive images are produced by the interaction of in-group and inter-group processes, it is important whether the image of Ottoman strength is reciprocated, especially in the out-group. For example, the Turkish/Muslim/Ottoman image for Europe has become idiomatic with the phrase “*Fort comme un Turc/Strong as a Turk*”. This image, which is clearly revealed in the notes of European travellers and diplomats, shows that despite many stereotypes, the positive image of *Gran Turco/Great Turk* is reflected in the outgroup. It is the same reason why all the attention of Europe was on the Ottoman Empire in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and that many publications were released for or against the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, more than 1500 books were

published in mostly German but also in Latin, French, English, Italian, Spanish and other European languages between 1522 and 1572 in order to get a better understanding of the Ottoman Empire. While most of these publications include the call for a Crusade against the Ottomans, some of them give information about the origin, history and traditions of the Ottomans (Göyünç, 1999: 314-319). In particular, the life and conquests of Suleiman the Magnificent inspired many literary works, ballets and operas in Europe after the 16<sup>th</sup> century (Renda, 2004: 1121).

The 16<sup>th</sup> century Spanish traveller Pero Tafur also makes the representation of the Ottoman image in Europe visible with the words, “In my opinion, if the Turks decide to march to the west with their soldiers, no one can turn them away from it.” (Kılınç, 2020: 1842). In the same century, the German traveler pastor Salomon Schweigger reflected the same Ottoman image in his words, “First of all, the God is almighty (causa principalis), while the Turks are just an instrument (cause instrumentalis) the God uses this instrument to punish the Christians. (...) I fear that Christendom will never be able to deal with this enemy.” (Kılınç, 2020: 1866). Busbecq, the ambassador of Archduke Ferdinand I of Austria, apart from the image of the *Strong Turk*, also gives information about the historical continuity and violence of the conflict between the two big groups. “You will see how harsh, how strong, how smart, how arrogant, and in the end what a successful soldier, how cultured and good orator the Turk is, the common enemy of the whole Christian world.” (Kumrular, 2016: 36). The statement of French traveller Jean du Mont, who came to Istanbul in 1609, “(...) I seriously respected the genius of this nation.” (Üçel-Aybet, 2018: 118) highlights the reflection of the positive Ottoman image shared in the outer group. In a Protestant pamphlet published in the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, it is remarked that, “For the Christian world, submission and tribute to the mighty [Ottoman] sultan is the best way, we can count on him to rule us with justice and generosity.” (İnalçık, 2004: 1065). Luther also says that in 1530, because of the poor living conditions in Eastern Europe, Christian peasants welcomed the Turks as saviors (İnalçık, 2004: 1074).

People are motivated to have and maintain a positive social identity, and therefore there is an ontological (existential) relationship between social identity and positive image/self-esteem. As a matter of fact, social-collective identities are reinforced by the value and emotional significance attributed to being a member of a group (Tajfel, 1982: 2). Group emotion is the common emotion that a group of people can experience in the context of a particular social identity, namely group empathy (Smith et al., 2007: 435-440). Emotional attachment through identification with the group causes the individual to feel positive feelings about group membership, and thus, self-esteem increases, and the group identity becomes stronger (Tajfel, 1970: 98-99). Shared positive images have an important function in binding the group together by increasing the formation of group feeling (Mackie et al., 2000: 609-615).

In addition, the group’s definitive boundaries and creation of a sense of emotional security, meeting the needs through group membership, and shared emotional connections (positive experience and interaction, shared values) are the other factors that create group feeling (McMillan and Chavis, 1986). Considering the subject of group behavior, the Self-Esteem Hypothesis (Abrams and Hogg, 1988: 320-325) can be applied as the

most functional theory in explaining the formation of group emotion. According to the hypothesis, when group members can positively distinguish their group from *the other* through comparisons, their self-esteem increases. Consequently, identification and attachment with group identity increases as the group bolsters the self-esteem of its members. In the light of these theories, we are of the opinion that the shared positive image of “strength” about the Ottoman Empire was extremely effective in the emotional attachment to the Ottoman upper identity not only in the Muslim group but also in the non-Muslim groups. In the classical period, the Ottoman central government protected all its subjects against the European *other*, the ruling class, and its non-Muslim subjects against inter-communal conflicts with this quality of “strength”.

### Conclusion

Preferring the term “plural societies,” social anthropologist Fredrik Barth describes cultures that are capable of bridging racial divides. Different groups in a plural society present the appearance of economic interdependence and ecological specialization as a means of a unified community. There are no assimilation problems for dominant and non-dominant factions in a pluralistic society. The ability of the dominant group to recognize the basic values of the subgroups and to meet the needs of the groups ensures harmony and integration. Thus, in the plural society, the dual upper identity model can develop and the identification of the group members can be ensured. Based on these theories, it can be concluded that the dominant and subgroups in the classical Ottoman group, which has the characteristics suitable for the definition of a plural society, are integrated under the tent of a dual upper identity.

On the other hand, the Ottoman upper identity, formed with the political, economic and social structure relations unique to the Ottoman Empire, and shaped in accordance with the dual identity model, had a function in reducing the intergroup conflicts. Thus, harmonious relations could be established between subgroups such as the Muslims, the Christians, the Jews, the Armenians and the Greeks. The main motivations that provide this are the security, welfare, recognition and approval of values, and the meeting of needs that the Ottoman upper identity offers to the group members. These motivations led to the reclassification of group members in the classical period, which differentiated non-Muslim subjects from the European Christians for the Muslim group, and the Ottoman Muslims from the European Christians for the non-Muslim subjects.

As one of the classical era’s conventional communities, the Ottoman Empire faced prejudices, discrimination, and grievances resulting from religious differences. However, both the Islamic doctrines and the benefits of Muslim-non-Muslim coexistence, as well as human relations and the techniques employed to develop these relations, allowed the classical Ottoman Empire to construct a collective socio-cultural framework as a system of values and meanings.

The Ottoman higher identity became the character of the system established in the orbit produced by the central authority that functioned as the Sun, much like the Solar System, in which different planets revolve in a common orbit due to the gravitational impact of the Sun.

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## The Belt Road Project as A Triggering Element of the Securitization of the Uyghur Issue

### Uygur Meselesinin Güvenlikleştirilmesini Tetikleyen Bir Unsur Olarak Kuşak Yol Projesi

Göktürk Tuysuzoğlu<sup>1</sup> , Selim Kurt<sup>2</sup>

#### Abstract

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is considered based on its ethnocultural, religious, and historical diversity. In its national security documents, known as the White Paper, China associates the region with extremism, separatism, and terrorism; and thus recognizes the Uyghurs as a threat. At the crossroads of OBOR's (One Belt One Road) three separate land corridors, Xinjiang, which has a crucial place in Beijing's hegemony-building process, is a region regarded critical from a geopolitical and geo-economics perspective. In this context, Beijing securitizes the Uyghurs, with whom China claims that its own values, political goals, and perception of the future are not compatible, from the "threat" point of view. This approach can also be interpreted through the conceptual elements envisaged by the Copenhagen School, such as immigration waves, horizontal and vertical competition, and depopulation.

#### Keywords

China, OBOR, Bingtuan, Copenhagen school, Securitization theory

#### Öz

Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi, sahip olduğu etno-kültürel, dinsel ve tarihsel farklılık ekseninde değerlendirilmektedir. Çin, White Paper olarak bilinen ulusal güvenlik belgelerinde, bölgeyi, aşırılıkçılık, ayrılıkçılık ve terör ile ilişkilendirmekte ve bu anlamda Uygurları bir tehdit olarak görmektedir. Pekin'in hegemonya inşa sürecinde çok önemli bir yeri olan Tek Kuşak Tek Yol Projesi'nin üç ayrı kara koridorunun bağlantı noktası olan Sincan, bu anlamda jeopolitik/jeoekonomik önemi kritik olarak değerlendirilebilecek bir bölgedir. Bu bağlamda, Pekin, kendi değerleri, siyasi hedefleri ve gelecek algısıyla uyum içerisinde olmadığını iddia ettiği Uygurları "tehdit" ekseninde güvenleştirmektedir. Bu süreç, göç dalgaları, yatay ve dikey rekabet ile nüfus azalması gibi Kopenhag Okulu'nun öngördüğü kavramsal unsurlarla da anlamlandırılabilir.

#### Anahtar Kelimeler

Çin, Tek Kuşak Tek Yol Projesi, Bingtuan, Kopenhag Okulu, Güvenleştirme teorisi

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## Introduction

Situated in the west of China, and known to be one of the last two regions incorporated into the country, Xinjiang is known to have much closer relations with Central Asia in historical and socio-cultural terms. Xinjiang, where a considerable number of different ethnic groups, mainly Uyghurs, have coexisted for years, has been firmly connected to the central government through diverse programs implemented by Beijing. The identity-related demands of the Uyghurs are not a new phenomenon. Indeed, even before the declaration of the People's Republic of China (PRC), they made several moves on the way to independence. Today, however, the identity and political demands of Uyghurs are perceived by Beijing as a national security matter of urgency. Based on its national security documents, China sees extremism, separatism, and terrorism as the main predicaments to cope with. Beijing, which considers Muslim Uyghurs to be extremists and separatists by associating them with certain terror groups, regards keeping them under control as one of its primary goals. It is seen at this point that Uyghurs are "securitized" as a threat to national security by giving meaning to them with a "negative" perception. It can be stated that this identity is subject to menaces such as immigration, horizontal and vertical competition, and depopulation within the framework of societal security, which is a sub-sector of the "Securitization" approach developed by the Copenhagen School. The development that puts Xinjiang and the Uyghur issue at the center of international politics is that three different land corridors of the OBOR initiative launched by Beijing start from Xinjiang or connect there. The future of this project, which is of great importance in the process of establishing China's hegemony, is also closely linked to stability in Xinjiang.

In the literature, it is seen that the OBOR Initiative and the issues related to China's Uyghur problem tend to be evaluated separately. It is seen that the initiative is mostly evaluated within the framework of China's foreign policy actions and hegemony building process. Voon and Xu (2020) think that this initiative institutionalizes China's soft power and at the same time reveals Beijing's demand for a multipolar international system. On the other hand, Chan (2017) states that the US opposes the OBOR because it sees it as a very important move that can increase China's global visibility. Zotova and Kolosov (2019), on the other hand, underline that, for the time being, China, with which Russia has shared a critical stance towards Western hegemony and its demand for systemic multipolarity, does not oppose this move, since it is building an event specific to Eurasia. Shakhanova and Garlick (2020) also state that they are working on integrating the Eurasian Economic Union and the OBOR in the medium term. Blanchard and Flint (2017) evaluated the AIIB and Silk Road Fund, which are extensions of the OBOR. When the literature on China's Uyghur problem is examined, Bhattacharya (2003) connects the separatism in the Uyghur region with Chinese nationalism, noting that Chinese nationalism based on Han identity ignores ethnic minorities and points out that this situation triggers separatist movements of minorities. Aslam and Wenjei (2016), who deal with the Uyghur problem within the framework of Confucianism, state that the view of Chinese Cultural Norms on ethnic identity is within the framework of "barbarian minorities" and "civilized Han Chinese". It draws attention to the fact that China's minority problems can be solved by ensuring equality between different ethnic groups in the context of the Confucianism, which approaches the event within the framework of values and behavioral norms rather than material differences. Liu and Peters (2017) states that the ambitious Great Leap West



policy, which the Chinese government initiated in 1999 to develop the western provinces of the country, contributed to the improvement of the economic situation of Han Chinese in the region more than Uyghurs, contrary to expectations. They state that in addition to the investments in question, controlling the intra-regional balances and the migration of Han Chinese to the region can play an important role in solving the problem. Çaksu (2020) states that in order to build a homogeneous cultural structure in China, the Chinese government has followed a policy of oppression and persecution against the Uyghurs, with the help of advanced monitoring technologies. He claims that the main motivations of this policy are largely Islamophobia and the geo-strategical importance of the Uyghur lands. Mukherjee (2010) states that since the Uyghurs are seen as a threat to the stability of the state, China has taken extremely harsh measures against this group. Particularly at this point, he stated that the group's religious belief (i.e. Islam) was targeted as it was in contrast to the nationalist policies that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had followed for many years.

In fact, many studies on the subject focus on the political and economic aspects of the problem. However, the process works mostly as an identity-based dispute within the framework of Uyghur identity. And the most important reason why this conflict is handled more comprehensively and institutionally by the Chinese state is the developments related to the OBOR. It is seen that this issue is overlooked in most of the studies in the field. In this framework, this identity-based conflict has been subjected to content analysis within the framework of Social security, which is the main reference object of the Securitization approach.

In this context, the main question of the study is whether the OBOR triggered the process of securitization of the Uyghurs settled in the Xinjiang region by China. Attempts have been made to better understand this issue by analyzing the practices that mainly target the identity within the framework of Societal Security, which is a sub-sector of the securitization approach, especially after the project came to the agenda. In this context, one of the main constraints of the study is that the military and economic dimensions of the subject are largely excluded due to the use of the societal security sub-sector, which focuses on identity-based reference objects. In addition, since the effect of the OBOR on securitization practices is examined, another constraint is that the study mostly focuses on the time period after the project was officially brought to the agenda. On the other hand, another constraint of the study is the necessity of compiling the evidence on securitization from secondary sources in general, since China has an authoritarian approach.

In this study, first of all, a general overview of the OBOR will be briefly presented. Then, the social, economic, and political outlook of the XUAR will be examined, and the OBOR corridors connected to the region will be elaborated. Finally, the kind of "securitization" practices that have been carried out for Uyghurs to ensure the stability of the region, which is of such critical importance within the scope of OBOR, will be examined within the framework of the conceptual content of the Copenhagen School.

### **General Overview of the One Belt and One Road Initiative**

OBOR, set out as a global infrastructure development move announced by Xi Jinping in Astana in 2013, is seen as an attempt to revitalize the Silk Road. It was anticipated

that more than 60 countries from different geographical regions would take part in this initiative, which will be designed under the control of Beijing and consists of 6 separate land routes called the “Belt,” as well as a maritime transport corridor (Irshad, Xin and Arshad, 2015: 200-207). The move by Xi Jinping and the CCP could also be regarded as an initiative that reflects China’s soft power and highlights the multipolarity approach to which Beijing gives significant importance (Voon and Xu, 2020: 120-131). Beijing is well aware that the country’s soft power capabilities cannot be coordinated by “internal political” initiatives, but by economic factors that have been sustainably consolidated since 1978 (Szekely-Doby, 2018: 277-296). The CCP aims to expand the country’s economic power over a wide geographical area, starting from the regions surrounding it, through infrastructure investments, grant/loan support, and direct and indirect investments.

OBOR aims to create a wide-ranging commercial potential from China to Europe and the Middle East by eliminating physical barriers on the historical Silk Road through various infrastructure projects. Combined with the Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Oceania and East Africa will also be part of this commercial integration. It is stated that this project, which is estimated to have a total cost of 4-8 trillion U.S. dollars, will probably account for at least 60% of the world’s population and 35% of the global economy. In addition, the mentioned trade size under OBOR will account for about 40% of the world’s total trade (Campbell, 2017).

The U.S. does not consider this initiative favorably on the grounds that it could be a critical initiative that would increase China’s global dominance and eliminate the longstanding hegemony of the West (Chan, 2017: 568-590). Washington’s Western partners, on the other hand, seem to be keen to benefit from the commercial and financial advantages offered by Beijing. So, the infrastructure opportunities that will be improved by China will integrate Asia and Europe in terms of commercial and transport possibilities, and a new engine of global growth can be created. Russia, which is a leading political actor in terms of either being part of the three highway routes (belt) to be developed under OBOR, or the transit corridor of the mentioned routes, is not building a barrier against Beijing for now (Zotova and Kolosov, 2019: 306-314). This is mainly due to Russia and China’s criticism of the West and demand for systematic multipolarity, which is also reflected in the U.N. Security Council, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and even the BRICS (Gürcan, 2020: 127-151). Some studies are even being carried out on the possibility of integrating Russia’s initiative of Eurasian Economic Union, which is interpreted as an attempt to build a Moscow-driven regional hegemony in the former Soviet geography, with OBOR in the medium term (Shakhanova and Garlick, 2020: 33-57). Thus, Russia’s accumulation of knowledge, socio-cultural activity, and military capacity regarding Central and West Asia can be combined with China’s financial/commercial influence and technological capacity.

OBOR has been built not only by establishing a network of bilateral and multilateral relations, but also in the context of the institutional structures laid out by Beijing. The first of these is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which was established in 2013. This initiative, which will provide financial resources for infrastructure investments to be made under OBOR, thus aims to help regional integration and development. Established with a capital of \$ 100 billion, the bank’s biggest partner is China. Beijing has

a 26.63% voting power on decisions made by the bank's board of directors (Lichtenstein, 2018). Another corporate initiative highlighted under the OBOR is the Silk Road Fund. Announced by Xi in 2014, this fund is an initiative independent of the AIIB and other Chinese banks and is also not considered under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This initiative, which has been put forward to meet the needs of the business considered within the scope of the project, is independent of infrastructure investments. China has projected the size of the fund as approximately \$ 40 billion. (Blanchard and Flint, 2017: 223-245).

The essential criticism directed at Beijing under the OBOR is that credits and loans given to countries considered within the scope of the project can cause these countries to become dependent on China in the long run. This is called a "debt trap," claiming that China also makes the countries involved in OBOR financially dependent on itself (Lai, Lin and Sidaway, 2020: 109-124). This approach assumes that this dependency will start with economic factors, which are considered as infrastructure elements, and will eventually evolve into the superstructure, that is, political dependency. It is expected that the actors located on the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road route and the Central and West Asian countries surrounding China will be incorporated into this dependence in the medium term if they do not appropriately deal with China's credit/loan initiative under OBOR. In this context, Sri Lanka's transfer of Hambantota port to China in exchange for its debts to Beijing can be given as an example (Jones and Hameiri, 2020).

### **The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Connected Commercial Corridors Under OBOR**

#### **The Social, Economic, and Political Outlook of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region**

XUAR, which covers one-sixth of China's territory and lies in the northwest, is also the last part of the territory to be annexed to China (1949). Although it is the largest administrative zone in terms of territory, Xinjiang's economic development level is significantly behind the regions in the east and south of China. Nevertheless, the region's GDP has increased at an annual rate of 8.3% since 1952 (1.22 trillion Yuan as of 2019). China has invested 2.35 trillion Yuan (according to 2019 figures) for the region's economic development since the region was incorporated into Beijing (Xinhua, 2019). It can be stated that these investments are mainly centered on industrial steps focused on transport (land routes, railways, high-speed trains, and airlines) networks, energy, and mining, in order to connect the region to the rest of the country. It is also known that Xinjiang, which had an annual export of \$ 20 billion as of 2018, has still not reached the average Chinese export level. One of the main focuses of the CCP on Xinjiang is to reduce the poverty rate in the region. The CCP reports that between 2014 and 2018, 2.3 million people were living above the poverty line in Xinjiang. It even states that the poverty rate has fallen from 19.4% to 6.1%, underlining that all this is a result of Beijing's development efforts in the region (Xinhua, 2019).

Xinjiang is recognized as the "Far West," adjacent to Central Asia. Even the Tarim Basin, where Kashgar is located and constitutes the south of Xinjiang, is considered to

be included in Central Asia for its historical and socio-cultural background (Karasar, 2002). Geographically, the north of Xinjiang seems to be more integrated with Beijing in social, economic, and political terms, while the Kashgar-based Tarim Basin is less closely aligned with Beijing. This is probably because the Uyghurs, who are known as the region's local inhabitants and are still the most populous ethnic group in Xinjiang, are predominantly settled in the Tarim Basin (Toops, 2000: 155-170). Indeed, while the northern part (Dzungaria), where Urumqi is located, which is also the administrative center of Xinjiang, is a dense and rapidly developing region of Han Chinese, this is not the case for the Uyghur-dominated Tarim Basin. There is no doubt that this is due to China encouraging Han immigration towards Dzungaria and increasing investment in industry, infrastructure, and services in this region, where the Hans are starting to constitute the majority (Joniak-Lüthi, 2015: 428-445). The Uyghurs, known as the local people of Xinjiang, have been regarded as “mistrusting” and unreliable by China, which they have struggled with for centuries and do not aspire to be a part of. The fact that Uyghurs do not consider themselves Chinese and are different from Beijing in both socio-cultural, historical, and political terms has also fuelled their unrest (Roberts, 2009: 361-381). Uyghurs have long lived in the Tarim Basin throughout history, and still, stand out with their presence in this region. It can be stated, however, that Uyghurs are in the minority compared to the Han people in northern Xinjiang and especially in Urumqi (Howell and Fan, 2011: 119-139).

The fundamental security threat facing the country is described in the Chinese national security documents, also referred to as the White Paper, with separatism, extremism, and terrorism (CGTN, 2019). In this context, we see that China is uneasy about its territorial integrity and is concerned that the threat may arise from ethnic/religious tendencies. Beijing even states that actors/states aiming at hurting China's position as a global power can favor attempts to eliminate China's territorial integrity. The concepts of extremism, separatism, and terrorism are the central apparatuses that Beijing mainly uses when it comes to the case of Xinjiang, since the region has a multi-ethnic structure, and different religious groups also exist in different parts of Xinjiang. The people of Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Mongol (Oirat), Hui, Tajik, and Han origin are the main groups of society in the region (Kozhirova, Khazmuratova and Marmontova, 2016: 72-80). Although a considerable Han population has been placed in the region with planned immigration programs (especially in Urumqi and its surroundings in the North and Dzungaria in general), the Uyghurs, whose relations with the Chinese administration are often pretty tense, are the most populated ethnic group in the region. Indeed, about 12 million of the region's population are of Uyghur origin (Xinhua, 2020). Nevertheless, as we mentioned earlier, Uyghurs are mostly concentrated in the Tarim Basin, south of Xinjiang. They have attempted a few times to establish an independent state in Xinjiang in the past. As well as the Yettishar Khanate in the 19th century, some formations such as the First East Turkestan Republic (Islamic Republic of East Turkestan) between 1933 and 1934, the East Turkestan Republic between 1944 and 1949, which was abolished during the establishment of the current Chinese administration, are considered a reflection of this situation (Ke, 2018). Added to this, Uyghurs are not the only ethnic group in the region who have been uncomfortable with Chinese rule. It is well known that the Kazakh population living in the north of Xinjiang, in particular, often expresses complaints regarding China and also seeks support from Kazakhstan in this regard (Eurasianet, 2021).

Especially since the mid-1990s, we see that various organizations connected with Uyghurs have been associated with “separatism” and “terrorism” by Beijing. The terrorist actions in certain parts of China, especially in Xinjiang (specifically Urumqi), have been commonly referred to as separatist organizations integrated into the Uyghur identity by the CCP since the second half of the 1990s. The East Turkestan Independence Movement, which holds many organizations/civic initiatives, is the most prominent in this respect (Evans, 2017). In this structure, which is considered an umbrella organization, there are also different initiatives such as the East Turkestan National Awakening Movement and the East Turkistan Government in exile, headquartered in Washington (Kashgarian, 2020).

However, another issue that the CCP regards as being identical to the Uyghur identity is the religion-based organizations that are considered in the context of “extremism” according to the Chinese National Security documents. In fact, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, known by its acronym ETIM and stated as being linked to Al-Qaeda, and the extension of this movement, the East Turkestan Islamic Party, is considered in this manner (Lee, 2015: 85-99). Beijing’s main argument is that these organizations have contact with radical movements based in Afghanistan and the Fergana Valley, and that Al Qaeda aims to move radical terrorist actions to Xinjiang. The East Turkestan Islamic Party, formerly known as ETIM, has also been recognized as a “terrorist organization” by the United Nations (U.N., 2011). The fact that China regards Uyghurs as a pro-ETIM, pro-extremist group in general, creates discontent among Uyghurs. From this point of view, all the difficulties faced by Uyghurs, especially regarding socio-cultural and economic factors, could be submerged in the issue of radical terror.

Beijing is now trying to make Xinjiang the terminal point of OBOR, and in this sense, to integrate the region into the industrialized centers through investments. In Xinjiang, which is of such great importance, the possible threats that are likely to harm OBOR must be suppressed or destroyed while they are yet to be born. It is assumed in this regard that attempts are being made to bring discomfort to the Uyghurs, who are at the center of the initiative, from Beijing, insignificant and suppressed by the hands of a comprehensive program (Chung, 2018: 185-201). In order to eliminate the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities’ transnational ties to Central Asia, Beijing cooperates with these countries under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This cooperation has also become the basic principles of the SCO based on the fight against separatism, extremism, and terrorism (Yuan, 2010: 855-869). Thus, China’s main objective is to ensure the support or neutrality of the Central Asian countries (even Russia) which are now facing similar challenges (especially extremism) in their territories, regarding the policies pursued in Xinjiang.

One of the factors that makes Xinjiang so critical for China is the region’s energy potential. The region accounts for more than 20% of China’s total energy reserves, taking into account fossil fuels such as natural gas, oil, and coal. We should also note that Beijing’s investments in the region’s energy reserves have steadily increased in recent years and have not yet reached their full potential. Xinjiang is also considered the most critical region in China in terms of “renewable resources,” consisting of wind, thermal and solar energy production. Reaching a total electric power generation capacity of 35.83 million kWh, the region is a major contributor to the country’s goal of generating carbon-

free energy. Electric power production from wind and solar energy has increased by 135% as of 2021 compared to 2015. The amount of electricity projected to be transferred from Xinjiang to other parts of the country is expected to reach 110 billion kWh by 2022. Moreover, 27 billion kWh of this amount is expected to be produced from renewable energy sources (Evvind, 2021). As for hydropower production, we should state that the region ranks fourth in China. When it comes to fossil fuels, Xinjiang ranks first in the country, accounting for 38% of coal production, 21.5% of oil production, and 23.3% of natural gas. Both the Dzungaria (Karamay), Tarim (Aksu), and Turpan-Hami basins are rich in fossil fuels. The oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors account for about 60% of the region's economy; and the region has a large reserve that has still not been discovered (Overton, 2016). Oil and natural gas in Xinjiang are transported through West-East pipelines to regions where China's industrial centers are located. The Lunnan-Shanghai, Khorgas-Gansu-Guangzhou (Guangdong), and Khorgos-Fuzhou (Fujian) pipelines are critically important in this sense. The Central Asia-China Natural Gas Pipeline, which connects to Xinjiang, specifically through Khorgos, from Central Asia (Kazakhstan), is being integrated into Khorgos-based projects. There are also other projects that would deliver reserves in the Tarim Basin to Sichuan and from there to Shanghai (Wang, 2016). The stability and security in Xinjiang, which is of such a critical role in energy reserves, is regarded by the CCP as an actual national security problem.

China has implemented a management model in Xinjiang, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (also known as Bingtuan). This came into force in 1954 during the Mao era and is a paramilitary structure that aims to ensure the security of the region as well as its development. Bingtuan, which has built a number of medium-sized cities, towns, villages, and farms in the region, also keeps administrative control in these places that it established. This administrative structuring, headquartered in Urumqi, serves 2.6 million people today (Zhu and Blachford, 2016: 25-40). The main reason for forming Bingtuan was to encourage development in an underdeveloped and remote region, promoting social stability and peace, ensuring border security. This structure also provides many public services such as education, health, and transportation to the public in the cities and towns it manages. Bingtuan, which conducts its economic activities under the name China Xinjiang Group, maintains direct contact with the central government in Beijing and manages the cities and towns under its own responsibility (it has built ten cities until now) independently of the regional government in Xinjiang. This organization, consisting of 14 divisions and 185 regiments which also function in the military sense, is widespread throughout Xinjiang. In addition to Urumqi and Kashgar, cities such as Hotan, Kumul, Aksu, Bayangolin, Sanci, Bortala, Karamay (West and East), Tarbagatay, and Altay are the cities where these 14 divisions are based (Zhu and Blachford, 2016: 10-13).

### **Commercial Corridors Integrated into OBOR and Xinjiang**

Three of the commercial corridors considered under OBOR are directly connected to Xinjiang. Xinjiang is actually the main terminal point where commercial corridors extending into northeastern and southeastern China reach before opening up to Central and Western Asia. The first of the commercial corridors set out under OBOR is the "New Eurasian Land Bridge." Stretching parallel from the south to the previously built

Eurasian Land Bridge, this line is an initiative that is projected to extend from China to Kazakhstan, and from there to Russia, reaching Rotterdam in the Netherlands. It will run along a distance of 11,870 km from the Port of Lianyungang in Jiangsu Province in northeastern China to Rotterdam. This line, which will reach Altyntkol railway station in Kazakhstan from Khorgos, located in Xinjiang in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, on the border with Kazakhstan, is also an extension of the Jinghe-Yining-Khorgos Railway (Hoh, 2019: 241-276). The Jinghe-Yining-Khorgos Railway also connects Urumqi with the New Eurasian land corridor and Central Asia. Within the scope of this initiative, Khorgos is structured as a commercial hub and is described as a “Special Economic Area” where trade and purchasing can be performed without a visa. We should also note here that Khorgos has become a “dry port” for commercial goods, and a “Special Economic Area” has been built on both sides of the border (the name of the town resting on the Kazakhstan side is also Khorgos) (Ruehl, 2019). Passenger transportation has also started on this line from Urumqi to Nur-Sultan (Astana) since 2017. It is evident that the transition from Central Asia to Europe as part of the new Eurasian Corridor will be from the territory of Russia based on the Caspian Sea. But it is also anticipated in the medium term that an alternative line that would extend from Kazakhstan to the South Caucasus and from there to Turkey and the Balkans will be considered first. China’s particular interest in the Marmaray immersed tube tunnel under the Bosphorus is closely related to the effort to create an integrated transport alternative to OBOR, also called the “Iron Silk Road” (Kulaksız, 2019: 48-64).

The second transport route on Beijing’s agenda within the framework of OBOR is known as the China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor (CCAWEK). Up to 22-23 countries are anticipated to take part in this initiative, which will reach Europe, starting from Xinjiang, passing through Central Asia, the South Caucasus, the Middle East, Turkey, and the Balkans. Countries among those expected to be at the forefront under CCAWEK are Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, and Turkey. The control and operation of this route, also called the Middle Corridor, is much more complicated than the other two initiatives of Xinjiang origin (Guo and Fidan, 2018). Although Central Asian countries other than Turkmenistan cooperate with China under the SCO, they attach importance to not being seen as politically dependent on Beijing in terms of the trade/economic dependence that will be built under the OBOR. On the other hand, relations with Turkey have always become tense because of the policies implemented in Xinjiang towards Uyghurs. Also, especially religious extremism and terrorist activities in the Fergana Valley jeopardize the commercial corridor that China will build under OBOR (Haiquan, 2017: 129-147).

Turkey is an essential partner for China with its investment in initiatives to promote transport and logistics opportunities. In this sense, Marmaray will be an important transfer point in the operation of the Middle Corridor (Kulaksız, 2019: 57-60). The Chinese company COSCO has purchased a 67% stake of the Port of Piraeus in Greece, making a substantial effort to integrate CCAWEK and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative (CGTN, 2019). China is also taking steps to develop oil and gas fields in Iran. The construction of the Tehran-Mashhad railway and the Tehran-Qum-Isfahan high-speed railway line is being carried out by Chinese companies. China is also investing

in developing the transport and energy infrastructures of Central Asian countries. The Central Asia-China Natural Gas Pipeline, one of the strategic elements of CCAWEC, was also realized through Chinese investments in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Highway networks that are under construction in the region and connect the mentioned countries, as well as investments in the oil refinery in Kara-Balta in Kyrgyzstan, should also be considered within the scope of OBOR (Hart, 2016). In November 2019, a freight train belonging to China Railways passed through this corridor for the first time. Although this route, which departs from Xian and reaches Prague in 18 days by passing through Xinjiang, has significantly shortened the distance, considerable investment is still needed on this path.

The last transportation corridor centered in Xinjiang is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It can even be stated that this corridor is the route on which the most work is done within the steps taken under the Project. CPEC, whose infrastructure projects have been carried out since 2013, is an initiative whose total cost is expected to be \$ 62 billion. However, it is also likely that this expense will increase (Xinhua, 2019). With major investments in Pakistan's transport and energy infrastructure, highway, railway, and pipeline construction processes are being integrated on a route from Xinjiang to Gwadar port on the coast of the Arabian Sea. China intends to bypass Central Asia by this route, which will connect to Kashgar, south of Xinjiang, and transfer its own exported goods to the Arabian Sea via this route. Beijing also aims to bring some of the oil and natural gas from the Middle East and East Africa to Xinjiang without passing through the Strait of Malacca, thanks to pipelines that will be built on this route. In this way, Xinjiang, mainly Kashgar (Tarim Basin), will also turn into an energy hub (Schwemlein, 2019: 3-12).

This route was firstly used with the arrival of the first Chinese cargo to Gwadar in 2016. However, it still remains incomplete. We understand that Beijing made Kashgar, which it sees as the starting point of this route, a "special trade zone" in 2010, when OBOR had not yet been officially declared. Kashgar is located at the connection point at Xinjiang of the Karakoram Highway (it is connected from this point to China National Highway No. G314), which is regarded as the main route of the CPEC (Chen, Joseph and Tariq, 2018: 61-69). Indeed, we know that the Karakoram Highway has also been modernized under the CPEC and that Gwadar is the last stop of this route connecting Kashgar to Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore, the most important cities of Pakistan. We also see that Beijing is also developing the Karachi-Peshawar Railway in Pakistan so that faster trains use this line, and this line connects to the southern Xinjiang Railway in Kashgar. That is, this railway system is being developed parallel to Karakoram Highway (Devonshire-Ellis, 2020). The South Xinjiang Railway, completed in December 1999, connects Kashgar to other cities in the Tarim Basin (Yarkand, Yecheng, and Hotan) via the Kashgar-Hotan connection, and then to Urumqi and east of China. The railway, which starts from Pakistan and reaches Kashgar via Khunjerab Pass, is connected from Kashgar to Xinjiang and then from Turpan to other parts of China via the Lanzhou-Xinjiang network and Gansu. Given that Kashgar is also connected to Kyrgyzstan via the Torugart Pass by another transport corridor, other than the CPEC (Toops, 2016: 352-360), the region's significance is more explicitly understood.



## Securitization Approach and Societal Security

### Securitization Approach

Security is generally considered based on national security, from a realist and liberal perspective. Yet, national security has neither been fully framed nor provided for within the scope of a state. The alternative route to a broader security concept requires the threats even outside of the military ones to be included in the security agenda as well (Waever, 1995: 49-51). In this context, securitization theorists suggest that, unlike the traditional understanding, the security agenda should also be opened up to different threats. Within this framework, they have tried to build a new and more radical understanding of security work by securitizing non-military threats along with military ones (Buzan et al., 1998: 4). Buzan has expanded the debate on security that he initiated from the military field to political, economic, environmental, and social sectors. This argument obviously suggests that security starts from the military field but is also increasingly shifting towards these new sectors (Waever, 1995:52).

Securitization theorists point out that there are three fundamental elements in an act of securitization. The first is the “reference object”, which is the subject of securitization. The second is the “securitizing actor”, which expresses security as a verbal action; and the third is the “functional actors”, which have a significant impact on the appearance of the security image through their actions (Balzacq, 2005:178).

To the question “what makes something really a security problem?”, Waever answers that the events that threaten the sovereignty and independence of a state and deprive it of the capacity for self-government are a security problem. For this reason, such a threat should be responded to by exerting maximum effort (Waever, 1995:54). The unique nature of these mentioned threats provides justification for the use of extraordinary measures to deal with them. Implementing security plays a key role in legitimizing the use of force, but more generally this practice opens up a space for the state to take action or take alternative measures for the sake of combating existential threats (Buzan et al., 1998: 21-22).

The right to call a development a security problem is a privileged choice granted to the state and its elites. In other words, an issue simply turns into a security problem when the state elites declare it in this manner. Benefiting from the language theory, Waever states that security is a verbal action, responding to the question “what is security?” As a verbal action, the security itself does not indicate a real situation; in fact, its verbalization creates it (Waever, 1995: 54-55. and Balzacq, 2005: 176-177). On the other hand, the identification of something as an existential threat to any reference object is not adequate for securitization, and this is defined as an “attempt to securitize”. An issue is only being securitized when the audience agrees that is the case (Buzan et al., 1998: 24-25).

In this respect, there are three essential components of securitization: The threat leading towards the existence of an object; putting the threat on the political agenda of the state through a “verbal action” process by the political elites and demanding urgent measures to deal with it; and the approval of taking urgent measures by accepting the threat to the existence (Akgül Açıkmışe, 2011: 61).

According to the Copenhagen School theorists, there is no reason to define a situation in terms of security if this is not a security issue. In this sense, it is not likely that an

issue can be overcome politically just by calling it a security matter; on the contrary, the only potential way to deal with this problem is to avoid using this expression (Wæver, 1995: 56). For this reason, the School gives reasons to identify and solve problems through routine political processes, excluding them from being a security issue. The School recommends that security be limited to issues related to the survival of the state, while other issues should not be securitized and resolved only by debating them in routine political processes (Bilgin, 2010: 83). At this point, this concept, which has been introduced into the terminology of security by the Copenhagen School and is also referred to as “deseuritization”, can be characterized as the anti-thesis of securitization. In fact, according to the securitization theorists, the classification or securitization of an issue as a security issue is considered to be a failure of the normal political process. Deseuritization, on the other hand, is where an issue that was once considered a threat is a threat no longer. In this way, the extraordinary measures required to eliminate the threat are nullified, paving the way for the normalization of the issue and its resolution through negotiations in the political process (McDonald, 2008: 6 and Sandıklı and Emeklier, 2012: 54).

### **Societal Security**

The most common issues that are considered as a threat to societal security are summarized by Wæver (2008: 158-159) and Buzan et al. (1998: 121) as follows:

1. Migration – The people of X are invaded by the people of Y, or lose their characteristics because of that people; so the community of X will probably not exist as before, because others will eventually constitute the population. The identity of X gradually differs due to the change in the structure of the population (such as the migration of the Chinese to Tibet, the Russians to Latvia).
2. Horizontal competition – Even if there is still the ‘X’ people living in a country, the way of life of the people of ‘X’ will ultimately change due to the prominent cultural and linguistic influences of the neighboring culture of ‘Y’ (for example, Canada’s fear of being Americanized).
3. Vertical competition - People will stop seeing themselves as X, because there is either an integration project (for example, Yugoslavia, the EU), or a separatist-“regionalist” project (for example, Quebec, Catalan, Kurdish). These projects force them to move towards more broad or narrowed identities. (...)
4. Another probable fourth issue is the depopulation due to plague, war, famine, natural disaster, or genocide policies.

The issue of “migration” and migrants, which are considered to be among the most challenging matters that pose a threat to societal security, are always thought to be elements that disrupt the normal course of life in political and economic discussions and everyday conversations. In addition, migrants and refugees are not simply considered as elements that disrupt the ordinary life of a large number of people but are also seen as a factor that endangers the collective lifestyle of a human community. For this reason, security studies present the issue of migration as a threat to societal security (Huysmans, 2006: 45-46). There are two reasons for securitization regarding migration; the first one is mostly related to the external borders of a country and is related to the fact that migrants are not admitted to the country or are not allowed to settle down due to the fact that they bring terrorism and crime with them. The second reason is mostly related to internal borders and is based on the belief that migrants will pose a threat to the peace and stability of a country in the long run. Therefore, it is envisaged that they are not given equal

citizenship rights with the citizens of the country. As a whole, migrants are presented as a threat to public order, peaceful coexistence, the well-being of the state system, the labor market, and cultural identity (Banai and Kreide, 2017: 907).

Another threat category, “horizontal competition”, is that social groups with prominent cultural structures exert influence on the culture of the weak; which can be seen also in the case of the reconstruction of the cultural structures of the occupied enemy societies by the victorious states (such as the Americanization of Japan and Germany). In addition, “horizontal competition” can also be used to eliminate the “cultural barriers” used as a tool in modern trade policy. In this context, while importing states put cultural values at the forefront to justify the protectionism they support, exporters try to weaken local cultural values in order to eliminate this opportunity (Waever, 2008: 160).

“Vertical competition”, on the other hand, is probably a threat category that is being implemented more intentionally compared to other ones. It is mainly based on integration or separatism projects implemented within a state. In this context, integration projects aimed at creating a common culture to embody a state, seek to control some or all of the mechanisms of cultural recreation such as schools, churches, and language rights. However, minorities may lose their ability to recreate their own culture if there is excessive integration pressure exerted on the different ethnic and linguistic groups living in the country within the framework of this project. This, in turn, may push them to implement separatist projects. “Vertical competition” has two dimensions. First, the threat to the minority group is more abstract, it is related to transformation, and people begin to think of themselves as something else. Second, political decisions taken to prevent the recreation of a culture (such as migration, bureaucratic practices) influence the identity of the minority group, and the targeted cultural identity is deprived of the opportunity to control the institutions necessary for recreation (Waever, 2008: 161. and Buzan et al., 1998: 122).

Another issue that is considered a threat to societal security, “depopulation”, hurts the continuity of identity by threatening the existence of the human factor, which is the backbone of culture. However, policies that are largely led by the desire to eliminate an identity or group through some means, such as ethnic cleansing, are more often the subject of societal security (Waever, 2008: 159-160).

On the other hand, the reference objects whose existence is threatened by the above four elements and whose existence is defined within the scope of the societal sector are “identity”, “religion”, and “gender” in general. Maybe the most important one among these reference objects is “identity”. Since identities are constantly changing and are not long-lasting and objective, defending an identity is a controversial issue indeed. Nevertheless, once an identity is securitized, it is as if something that has existed since the very beginning and has long been built is being defended. The fact that national identity is at the heart of political authority makes national identity more effective and significant than other identities. Thus, national identity can be more easily securitized and turn into a position that can include all other identities in the case of any conflict (Waever, 2008: 155-156).

Another reference object within the scope of societal security is “religion”. Religious communities are important self-continuing self-identities and groups. Since they also

have institutional structures, encompassing formalized authority and rule-making, they can be a reference object for societal security. When a real conflict occurs due to threats to a belief system, a process just like that seen in social and military security issues, where groups will act with ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality, protect their members from the threat of their enemies, and be concerned about the cohesion of the social group, also begins to happen in this sphere of religion. But only working on the dynamics of societal security in this way will cause us to distance ourselves from the core of the situation, as it will reduce religion to the community and exclude the dimension of faith. Because religion is not only related to the formation of social groups, but also of faith communities, it has a religious aspect as well, and therefore it is necessary to deal with both dimensions equally (Waever, 2008: 165-167). Religious identity is often identified with some official or semi-official leader who claims to be able to speak for the religious community. In many cases, however, there is no generally accepted strict hierarchy within these groups. Therefore, some local groups can make their own appeals on behalf of all Muslims and take security action against the West or their local collaborators. Large religious communities differ in formalized and generally accepted authority schemes. (Buzan et al., 1998: 124).

Another reference object on the agenda of societal security is “gender”. In order for gender to be included within the scope of societal security, it is necessary to take action to uphold ‘we’, defined by the concept of gender. But that does not mean that men are trying to eliminate the category of women, both physically and socially. It can be mentioned that the issue is securitized in terms of gender in these two cases as follows: Firstly, sexuality is made the center of excessive securitization by including other types of sexuality, such as homosexuality, into this category. Secondly, men and women are built with gender roles that compete with each other, and this is the case in which what is threatened is being a woman or non-dominant states of masculinity (Waever, 2008: 168-169).

### **Securitization of the Uyghur Issue**

Okur (2017: 51-52) states that the “Middle Corridor” stands out among the pillars within the framework of the Belt Road Project, which China initiated in order to establish an intensive transportation infrastructure that will allow the transportation between Asia-Europe-Middle East-Africa to be carried out by land for economic and strategic purposes. It draws attention that this corridor, which passes through Xinjiang and is densely populated with Turkish and Muslim populations, brings China’s relations with the Turkic world and the Uyghurs<sup>1</sup> to the agenda. In this context, he points out that the identity characteristics of the middle corridor in question are among the parameters to be considered in terms of establishing a long-term and stable cooperation, and in this context, the issue of the future of the Uyghur Turks gains importance.

At this point, it can be stated that the CCP has been trying to securitize the issue by identifying the separatism, extremism, and terrorism that are listed as the primary security

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1 The Uyghurs are Turkic people, predominantly Muslim, who are concentrated almost entirely in the province of Xinjiang (Fuller, 2016: 10). For other sources on the fact that Uyghurs are of Turkish origin, see Uyghur Human Rights Project, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and the Uyghurs of East Turkestan (also known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or XUAR, People’s Republic of China),” Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 5., Amnesty International, “Uyghur Ethnic Identity Under Threat in China,” 2009, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA17/010/2009/en/>, p. 1. and Kunal Mukherjee, “The Uyghur Question in Contemporary China,” *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2010, p. 425.

concerns faced by China in the Chinese National Security Documents<sup>2</sup>, also referred to as the White Paper, with the Uyghurs. It seems that the CCP is directly targeting the Uyghur identity in its securitization efforts. Therefore, it is evident that the main referent object which is under threat is “identity.” It is seen that after the announcement of the project in 2013, Chinese government has implemented projects aimed at the local people’s religion and culture, which are considered inseparable components of identity. One of the most important projects in this regard is the lockdown of the region’s inhabitants into camps called “re-education camps.” Zenz (2018: 105) stated that according to the aforementioned state media reports, the re-education camp activities targeting the Uyghur population started at the end of 2013 and were institutionalized over time. At this point, it is more than a coincidence that the very ambitious OBOR and the establishment of the training camps targeting the Uyghurs in the region occurred simultaneously. Zenz (2018:106) noted that since the inception of Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road Initiative” in late 2013, maintaining stability in this volatile region has become an even greater priority. He also drew attention to the fact that the region’s becoming a “core” within the framework of the OBOR coincided with the peaking of the resistance actions in the region. Chinese President Xi Jinping responded to these terrorist acts by calling for “walls made of copper and steel” and “nets spread from the earth to the sky” to catch and control terrorists. In late August 2016, Chen Quanguo, the region’s new Communist Party Secretary, embarked on a massive human and technological securitization move that turned the region into one of the most heavily fortified and policed districts in the world.<sup>3</sup> And within the framework of these measures, re-education camps have also started to become widespread. (Zenz, 2018:106).

From the spring of 2017, the Xinjiang administration began to detain about 5% to 15% of the Muslim population in Xinjiang, the majority of whom are residents and males in the south of the region. In order to accommodate these detainees, Xinjiang administrative and Bingtuan settlement authorities went out to tender to build high walls, locked cells surrounded by barbed wire and guard towers, locked corridors, and to construct and equip dozens of large concentration camps secured with video surveillance systems (Millward and Peterson, 2020: 6). NGOs and newspapers reveal that the mass detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang re-education camps began in March or early April 2017. The former camp employees and “re-education” instructors explained the conditions in the camps, stating especially the existence of political indoctrination, Chinese language learning, forcing the Uyghurs to get away from religion and culture, overcrowded rooms, beating, physical and psychological torture, rape, and forced sterilization. In addition, reports regarding the camps claim that during this period, the belief in Islam and its cultural heritage were significantly harmed in Xinjiang (Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2020: 3).

2 Please see Govt. White Papers, “II. National Defense Policy,” 2021, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194485.htm>., Govt. White Papers, “Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang,” 2021, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_8013442.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_8013442.htm). and Govt. White Papers, “The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang,” 2021, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_8011005.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_8011005.htm).

3 For detailed information on the security measures and military measures that Chen implemented in Xinjiang, please see. Adrian Zenz, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang”, *China Brief*, Vol. 17, No.12, 2017, pp. 4-6.

In addition, a conference was held in Newcastle in October 2014 with the participation of ethnic conflict experts from the region. In addition to the reasons for the escalation of violence especially since 2014, it was discussed how these events were related to the increasing state securitization since the Urumqi rebellion in 2009. The conference concluded that a broad state securitization was designed in the form of demographic securitization (immigration of Han Chinese to the region and ethnic displacement), linguistic securitization (imposition of Chinese in education) and religious securitization (suppression of Islamic practices), as well as measures including the deployment of increased numbers of soldiers and public security personnel in the region (Finley, 2019: 2).

It can be seen that after the announcement of the project by the Chinese government, pressure against the people of the region have exponentially increased, especially targeting identity, and the region have been subjected to practices that can lead to forcing people to migrate and even to carry out genocide. In this respect, we decided that the situation faced by the Uyghurs, the inhabitants of the region, should be analyzed within the framework of societal security, which is one of the sub-sectors of the Securitization Theory developed by the Copenhagen School and is based on identity, religion, and gender as referent objects, and immigration, horizontal competition, vertical competition and depopulation as potential threats.

### **Referent Object: Identity**

Security is about identity as well as how communities and individuals identify themselves as members of a community (Buzan et al., 1998: 119). Identity is the central concept in the societal sector. If any community defines a development or potential situation as a threat to its own existence, it means that societal insecurity is present. The concept is not defined based on nations. Societal security is defined as large and self-sustaining identity groups that can self-generate independently of the state. What these groups are, depends on time and space from an empirical point of view. These groups are mostly national in present-day Europe, but in other regions they may also be religious or ethnic groups. Therefore, the concept of societal security can also be interpreted as “identity security” (Waever, 2008: 155 and Buzan et al., 1998: 119).

Historically, Xinjiang is a transit point for transportation between Asia and Europe. The so-called Silk Road, which connects the ancient civilizations of East and West, passes through these vast lands. This geographical location has led Xinjiang to turn into a place where diverse peoples and cultures coexist and integrate (Aslam and Wenjie, 2016: 46-47).

According to contemporary Uyghur intellectuals, the idea of Uyghur nationalism or Turkish nationalism<sup>4</sup> came up immediately after the Manchu’s conquest of East Turkestan

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<sup>4</sup> Although, many scientists, as well as some organizations, define Uyghurs as Turks by ethnicity today; the Chinese government, on its website “White Papers of Government,” with the title “I. Xinjiang Has Long Been an Inseparable Part of Chinese Territory,” under the title “The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang,” asserts that Uyghurs are not descendants of Turks, and that the Uyghur ethnic group emerged as a result of a long process of immigration and ethnic integration. Claiming that the ancestors of the Uyghurs were the Ougour people who lived on the Mongol Plateau during the Sui and Tang dynasties, it states that historically, in order to resist the oppression and enslavement actions of the Turks, the Ougour people united with some Tiele tribes to make the Ougour tribal alliance. See. Govt.

in 1759. Leading Uyghur poets and writers of the period developed literature of public opposition to protest Manchu oppression (Bhattacharya, 2003: 361-362). The first demands for independence can be traced back to an uprising started by a tribal chieftain named Yakub Bey in 1865. Although he was eventually defeated in 1877, it could be said that his 12-year reign formed the basis of the Uyghur independence movement, based on religion and ethnicity. Furthermore, Uyghurs have gained experience in state-building twice in the past, including the “East Turkestan Turkish-Islamic Republic” between 1931 and 1934 and the “East Turkestan Republic” between 1944-1949. It can essentially be argued here that these short-lived experiences generated a kind of pre-national identity (Bhattacharya, 2003: 362).

Rudelson (1994: 291-292) claimed that the redefinition of the Uyghurs, whose numbers today reach about 12 million and make up the majority of Xinjiang, began in 1931 when Chinese policymakers tried to manipulate the dominance of Uyghur identity at the eastern Xinjiang oasis of Hami, and to drag the region into ethnic turmoil. The violence caused by this disturbance made the local Uyghur population confront the Han Chinese and the Tungans (also known as Chinese Muslims or Hui). This ethnic violence has paved the way for a resurgence of Uyghur identity. With the help of Soviet advisers, Chinese government officials calmed the inter-ethnic tension by applying a Soviet ethnic classification and policy similar to that used in Soviet Central Asia, giving each ethnic group political rights that are equivalent to minority status. Furthermore, at the end of this process, the oasis inhabitants of Xinjiang began to be identified as Uyghurs. This new definition created a clear distinction between Turks or modern-day Uyghurs, Tungans, and Han Chinese, ultimately making Uyghurs the largest nationality in Xinjiang. In this context, it can be stated that the official recognition of ethnic minorities and the autonomous regions system – emphasizing harmony between a region and a specific population – reveal even the distinctive characteristics of the Uyghurs. As a result, it can be argued that the CCP’s minority policy and the Minzu Regional Autonomy actually allowed Uyghurs to think of Xinjiang as their “own” territory, rather than solidifying Chinese nation-building (Guerif, 2010: 21-22).

When the repressive atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution began to fade in the 1980s, Uyghur opposition to Chinese rule became increasingly nationalist. Many Uyghur intellectuals living outside have claimed that their counterparts living in China are reluctant to write about their own history and culture for fear of persecution. Furthermore, the fact that the Uyghurs do not speak Chinese has significantly fuelled the hostility that many Han Chinese feel towards them. Memories of the repression of the Cultural Revolution, in which all kinds of diversity were severely restricted and thus all kinds of pluralism were limited, are still strong (Mukherjee, 2010: 427).

The rise in Uyghur nationalism during the post-Cold War period is also noteworthy. Uyghur nationalism not only stems from their own ethnic identity, but is also reinforced by the practices of the Chinese state, whose government policy is increasingly shaped by nationalism. Just like Tibet, Xinjiang appears to be an ethnic minority movement

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White Papers, “I. Xinjiang Has Long Been an Inseparable Part of Chinese Territory,” 2019, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2019-03/19/content\\_74587184.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2019-03/19/content_74587184.htm). For similar claims on this issue, see. Govt. Whip Papers, “II. Xinjiang Has Never Been “East Turkistan,”” 2019, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2019-07/22/content\\_75017212.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2019-07/22/content_75017212.htm).

striving for identity and the right to self-determination. Unlike Tibet, Xinjiang is a more complicated minority issue because of its links to broader Islamic identity matters in Central and Western Asia. This Islamic aspect and ethnic consciousness seem like combined to create an atmosphere of ethnoreligious conflict in Xinjiang (Bhattacharya, 2003: 357-358).

Separatism in Xinjiang deteriorated after September 11, when the war on international terrorism infected the region and allowed the Chinese to blur the distinction between separatism and terrorism. Although the Chinese government rarely referred to terrorism as a secondary factor in 2001, it reframed the Uyghur separatism struggle as the fight against global terrorism, especially after the September 11 attacks. Labeling the Uyghurs as a terrorist threat within the framework of the logic of combating global terrorism has transformed the relationship between the state and the Uyghurs. At this point, while separatists can be considered as a dissatisfied or problematic mass due to their current situation, terrorists must be suppressed, destroyed and/or kept under control as a variable threat to the whole society and humanity. At this point, the process of exclusion of Uyghurs from Chinese society started with the Urumqi rebellion in 2009, and with this event, the state started to see them as potential terrorists or terrorist sympathizers. In this context, when China launched its own war on terrorism in 2014 and Jinping called for “terrorists to be chased like rats in the streets”, the process of ostracizing and humiliating Uyghurs began (Finley, 2019: 14 and Topal, 2021:5).

Xinjiang signifies a contention between an ethnic minority and a Han nationalist majority. And this contention is perceived by Beijing as an unambiguous security threat to the Chinese state. In this context, Bhattacharya (2003: 358) claimed that China is trying to devitalize the Uyghur identity, compared to the greater Chinese identity, in a way that is compatible with the declared goals of national unity and security. Over the years, Uyghurs’ attempts to make their grievances heard and peacefully exercise their most basic human rights have been met with repression by the Chinese government. The refusal of legitimate channels to express their grievances and discontent in this way has encouraged people who have not been involved in the activities of the political opposition to take part in these activities, thereby causing a considerable rise in violence (Mukherjee, 2010: p. 427).

### **Threats: Immigration, Horizontal Competition, Vertical Competition, and Depopulation**

In the societal security framework, immigration, horizontal competition, vertical competition, and depopulation are considered as possible threats to the referent object. In this regard, in the following part of the study, we tried to analyze the risks arising from these threats to the “identity,” which we identified as a referent object in the example of Xinjiang.

#### **Immigration**

Immigration, which Waever (2008: 158-159) defines as, “The people of X are invaded by the people of Y or lose their characteristics because of that people; the community of X will not exist as before, because others will make up the population. The identity X becomes varied due to the change in the structure of the population (such as the immigration of the Chinese to Tibet, the Russian to Latvia)”, appears to become an important threat



category in the case of Xinjiang. The threat of migration is a valid dynamic mostly within the same region and in neighboring regions (Buzan et al., 1998: 125). In this context, it can be said that the threat of immigration, which is an important factor in the emergence of the Xinjiang problem, stemmed from the migration of Han Chinese and Uyghurs living in the same region, the former to the lands where the latter lived. The migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang has a long historical background.<sup>5</sup>

Because of this immigration, the Han population increased by about 32 percent from 1990 to 2000, while the Uyghur population rose only about half that rate. In 1949, 94 percent of East Turkestan's 4.2 million population was non-Han people. However, the population census in 2000 indicates that more than 40 percent of the province's population of 18.4 million at that time was Han, and this figure does not include a large number of migrant workers, military and security personnel, or Bingtuan members. The population density during this period shifted from the traditional Uyghur areas of the Southern Tarim Basin to the north, and to more "Hanificated" areas along the existing railways (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2006: 9).

During the first three decades of communist rule, many Han immigrants coming to Xinjiang were motivated by the obligation to "be a volunteer" for state-organized campaigns, as well as political ideals and developmental discourses. The main focus of this early immigration was not economic profit. But, in terms of immigration, the late 1980s marked a significant break from the past. Immigration as a gain-driven effort began to dominate, but it was also implemented as a strategy to avoid the one-child policy or to stay away from domestic disputes (Joniak-Lüthi, 2013: 157).

5 Demographic figures dating back to the 19th century confirm that the Uyghur population in East Turkestan constituted a majority in the early periods. For example, population census records in 1887 indicate that 1,132,000 of the total population of 1,238,583 in East Turkestan's three most densely populated areas were Uyghurs. See. Uyghur Human Rights Project, "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and the Uyghurs of East Turkestan (also known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or XUAR, People's Republic of China)," Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 19. However, after 1821, the Qing dynasty began to encourage mass "Han immigration" to Xinjiang to fortify the region's border defense. The Uyghurs were forced to migrate from southern Xinjiang to Ili in the north, and the Han and Hui people were also prompted to migrate from inland areas to Xinjiang on the grounds of promoting production and social adaptation in Xinjiang. After the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the Uyghur rebels in Xinjiang declared their independence in October 1933, but Xinjiang was eventually turned into one of the autonomous regions under the PRC in October 1955. See. Aslam F. and Wenjie, Y., "Confucian Philosophy and Chinese Ethnic Minority Policy: A Case Study of Xinjiang," *Journal of Historical Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2016, p. 47. In 1949, when the PRC was founded, the Han population of Xinjiang accounted for just over six percent (291,000) of the total population of 4,333,400. Turkic-speaking farmers and the inhabitants of the Oasis, called Uyghur, accounted for about 75% (3,291,100) of Xinjiang's population at that time. See. Joniak-Lüthi A., "Han Migration to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Between State Schemes and Migrants' Strategies," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, Special Issue: Mobility and Identity in Central Asia*, No. 138, 2013, p. 157. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, especially after the dispute between China and the Soviet Union, the Chinese government actively placed Han Chinese in border provinces such as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Heilongjiang to fortify the border as much as possible due to the possible threat from the Soviets. Han migrants were sent to join the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), also called Bingtuan, which the central government directly administered. In addition to joining Bingtuan, skilled Han immigrants also moved and strategically placed in the area to develop Xinjiang's infrastructure, especially natural resource extraction industries such as oil, and gas. By the end of the 1990s, Han Chinese were making up 95% of the technical workers in the oil exploration program in the Taklamakan Desert. In short, immigration to Xinjiang was encouraged by the central government on such grounds as supporting the newly established administrative unit and taking charge within the administration. In other words, it is possible to state that the main organizer of immigration is the Chinese government on paramilitary or political grounds. See. Howell, A. and Fan, C.C., "Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2011, p. 120.

In the 1990s, net immigration to Xinjiang increased from 0.4% to 2.4%, making Xinjiang one of the most important routes for migrant workers after Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong. As a developing industrial base, with its large construction projects, Xinjiang has provided employment opportunities for a large number of Han migrant workers who first settled in the industrial belt to the north of the Tengri Tagh/Tianshan Mountains and began to move into southern Xinjiang in the last decade (Joniak-Lüthi, 2013: 167-168). The mass immigration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang has been encouraged by Beijing for decades, on grounds such as calming local unrest and developing the economically underdeveloped region, which has rich mineral and oil resources (Grieger, 2014: 2).

Since the 1980s, the spatial pattern of immigration in China appears to have been dominated from rural to urban areas and from western and central to eastern provinces. In this sense, immigration rates continued to be high, and Xinjiang, which ranked fourth after Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong in terms of net inter-provincial immigration for the period of 1985-1995, became one of the most dynamic regions in China. This atmosphere triggered ethnic conflict between the newcomers (Han Chinese) and the region's local population (Uyghurs). The clashes between Han and Uyghurs intensified, and casualties were also reported in these conflicts. In June 2009, ethnic tension centered on the streets of Urumqi, where Uyghurs and Han Chinese clashed, turned into one of the bloodiest clashes in Xinjiang since 1949. Many observers believe that these clashes possibly arose from the intense Han immigration to the region, which was perceived by many Uyghurs as having an adverse impact on their livelihood and way of life. This claim, in fact, is not unfounded. The proportion of Han Chinese in Xinjiang increased dramatically from 6.7% (220,000) to 40% (8.4 million) between 1949 and 2008. This marks the most extensive demographic change that has occurred in a major region since the founding of the PRC. It is entirely expected that such movements of immigration, which occur in a short time, should cause disputes between newcomers and hosts (Howell and Fan, 2011: 122).

On the other hand, some Uyghurs migrated out of the region for reasons such as their worsening living conditions and the reopening of the borders, and these movements generally took place in three waves. The first immigration wave occurred following the Communists' takeover of Xinjiang in late 1949, mainly involving Uyghur political leaders and intellectuals who fled to Turkey via India. The second wave was a reaction to the difficulties caused by the Great Leap Forward in 1962, when more than 60,000 Uyghurs migrated from China to the USSR. The last major immigration was triggered by the reopening of borders for trade in the late 1980s, during the post-Mao Reform Era (Guerif, 2010: 5). Alongside this, poor Uyghur villagers have been encouraged to migrate to the south of China to earn a living as migrant workers in labor-intensive factories since 2006. On the one hand, Han immigration to the region is promoted; and on the other hand, a policy is implemented to make Uyghurs, the native people of the region, migrate out of the region. As a result of all these population policies, the 2010 population census indicates that the number of Han Chinese (41%) in the region at that time was nearly equal to the number of Uyghurs (43%). This demographic change has exacerbated ethnic tensions in the region (Grieger, 2014: 2).

According to the results of the 7th National Population Census conducted in 2020, the

population of the Han ethnic group out of the total population of Xinjiang was 10,920,098 people, accounting for 42.24 percent of the total population, while the population of ethnic minorities was 14,932,247 people, accounting for 57.76 of the total population. The population of the Uyghur ethnic group was 11,624,257, which accounts for 44.96% of the total population of the region and 77.85% of the ethnic minority. When compared to 2010, the ethnic minorities in Xinjiang increased by 1,865,061 people, reaching a rise of 14.27%. The population of Uyghurs in the region increased by 1,623 million, a growth of 16.2 percent. On the other hand, the population of the Han increased by 2.174 million, including 1.948 million people who migrated from other provinces, indicating a significant number of Han immigration to the region (Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Toronto, 2021).

One of the most important reasons for the Urumqi rebellion that broke out in Xinjiang in 2009 and the acts of violence, especially by the state, at the beginning of 2010 was the immigration of Han Chinese to the region where the Uyghurs constituted the majority. The increase in the Han population in the region from 6 percent to 40 percent in the last fifty years has significantly increased the fear of assimilation among the Uyghurs and endangers the Uyghurs group identity (Topal, 2021: 6). It is also seen that this Han immigration has created a dual ethnic composition structure. While the majority of the Han people concentrated around Urumqi in the north are much better off economically, most of the Uyghurs around Kashgar, located south of Xinjiang, live in relatively poor conditions. The unequal circumstances between the North and South, created mainly by immigration, produce great discontent among Uyghurs, further escalating ethnic tensions and, in particular, leading securitization of the Uyghur identity in order to protect itself against the influx of Hans into the region (Bhattacharya, 2003: 368).

### **Horizontal Competition**

It can be argued that horizontal competition, which Waever (2008: 158-159) describes as, "Although the X people still live there, the way of life of the X people will change due to the prominent cultural and linguistic influences of the neighboring culture Y (for example, Canada is cautious of being Americanized)," is one of the threat categories that is effective in the securitization of the Xinjiang issue. Horizontal competition can occur at all levels, and it is seen that minorities within a state are particularly concerned about the negative effects of the dominant culture on their identities (Buzan et al., 1998: 125). It is quite obvious that the Uyghurs residing in the Xinjiang region have a similar concern.

According to traditional Chinese cultural norms, ethnic identity is based on the distinction between "barbaric" minorities and "civilized" Han people. The old Chinese considered Chinese culture to be "the most advanced civilization in the world, which would sooner or later affect the surrounding Barbarians as well." This approach points to the fact that those who are involved in the cultural circle of Chinese civilization become members of this civilized world through the "Han" culture, which is at the heart of this culture. Those who are uncivilized remain barbarians who need to be "educated" (Aslam and Wenjie, 2016: 41).

As a reflection, Confucianism suggests that diverse minorities be blended in unified adaptation and live together peacefully in mutual respect and dependence. The dominant framework that Confucian scholars deal with the minority problem is the Yi-Xia doctrine

(Xia means Han Chinese, while Yi means Barbarians, foreigners, or minorities). Confucian obedience involves minority groups adhering to Confucian norms, maintaining unity and proper relations. The peaceful coexistence of minorities is only possible if they follow the principles or norms of the “Xia” (Aslam and Wenjie, 2016: 41-42).

In this context, it can be stated that China, on the way to national unity and political integration, is trying to pursue assimilative policies that not only try to include local identities in the Chinese identity, but also allow local identities face the danger of extinction. This assimilation policy, which is the fundamental principle of China’s approach towards minorities, also reflects the continuity of the Chinese imperial policy. Chinese imperial policy is based on the conceptualization of the Chinese state not as a nation but as a civilization (Bhattacharya, 2003: 362-363).

Beijing considers that the stability of Xinjiang depends on the integration of Uyghurs within China’s extensive family of nationalities. From the Chinese authorities’ perspective, integration refers to the political, cultural, social, and economic structuring of a much larger state in which minorities maintain their own culture and identity but are influenced by the majority and do not seek secession (Liu and Peters, 2017: 268). But the Uyghurs began to feel that their culture was under threat from the Chinese because of Beijing’s statements that the Old City of Kashgar -The Uyghur cultural center- would be demolished and replaced with a new city. They are also concerned about restrictions imposed on the use of the Uyghur language in schools and encouraging Muslim state employees to abandon fasting during Ramadan. Uyghurs perceive these measures as government repression and methods of eliminating Muslim culture (Israeli, 2010: 92).

In the example of Xinjiang, it can be stated that the Chinese government is targeting elements such as language, religion, and ethnicity, which are the most important components of identity. In this context, according to Amnesty International (2009: 2), Chinese authorities are pursuing a language policy that seems to make the school system in Xinjiang “bilingual,” but in fact, to make Chinese the only language of education.<sup>6</sup> This policy began in the 1990s when the Uyghur language became no longer the language of education in universities. By 2002, the largest university in Xinjiang stopped teaching in Uyghur, and a bilingual education policy, Mandarin, was introduced as the main language of education in primary, secondary, and high schools, and the Uyghur language was declared to be unable to keep up with the 21st century. In line with this new policy, many Uyghur teachers lost their jobs to Han teachers on the grounds that they had failed Mandarin proficiency exams (Grieger, 2014: 2).

2016 was a turning point for China’s securitization initiatives. Within the framework of the anti-terrorism law of December 2015, many aspects of the social life, cultural activities and religion of the Uyghurs were defined as security issues, causing them to

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6 Especially the practice called “Xinjiang classes” can be said to be an extremely crucial step in putting this bilingualism into practice. The establishment of “Xinjiang classes” in 12 Chinese cities in 1997 provided a new model for compulsory Chinese language education and making the Uyghur language marginalized. “Xinjiang classes” is a practice aimed at getting the most successful minority students in East Turkestan out of their cultural environment and enrolling them in classes with Chinese education in high schools in major cities in the inner parts of China. Wang Lequan, Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, also confirmed that the main objective of the “Xinjiang classes” is not academic preparation, but “political education.” For more information, see Uyghur Human Rights Project, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and the Uyghurs of East Turkestan (also known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or XUAR, People’s Republic of China),” Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 18.

conceptualize them as terrorists, radicals, and extremists. With the implementation of this policy, state repression and surveillance activities against the Uyghurs became legal within the framework of the fight against terrorism because the law in question was an important step in the securitization of the issue by expanding the powers of the Chinese government authorities to take extraordinary measures against such communities (Topal, 2021: 7).

Also, one of the most critical aspects of the Chinese oppression of the Uyghur identity is that it targets Islam. Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, the Chinese government has imposed restrictions on the religious rights of the Muslim population in Xinjiang, banned certain religious practices in the holy month of Ramadan, demolished and closed mosques,<sup>7</sup> and increased official controls on Muslim clerics in the region (Bhattacharya, 2003: 370-371). Local authorities exercise strict control over mosques and clergy by interfering with the appointment of local imams, deploying police inside and outside mosques, and closely monitoring all religious activities. All government employees in Xinjiang, including teachers, police officers, and civil servants, risk losing their jobs if they engage in religious activities. Chinese authorities also put many obstacles in the way of Uyghurs trying to travel to Mecca to perform the Hajj rites, which is mandatory for all Muslims. Moreover, those under 18 are not allowed to enter mosques or receive any religious education, and many young Uyghurs fear they would be expelled from school if they entered a mosque or were spotted praying at home (Amnesty International, 2009: 3). It seems clear that the Chinese government has imposed strict restrictions on the religious freedom of residents in the region. Restrictions on the practice of Islam in Xinjiang also undermine Uyghur identity, as Islam is a fundamental part of Uyghur culture and life (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2006: 22).

The new trial program promoting interethnic marriages was launched in August 2014 in the Qiemo district, on the grounds of alleviating ethnic tensions with the help of financial incentives. Under this program, newly married couples of different ethnicities are granted an annual cash payment of 10,000 yuan (about 1250 euros) for five years, as well as subsidies for housing, health, and education. Furthermore, it is aimed to limit the size of the Uyghur family by making the one-child policy mandatory with a new family planning policy that is projected to be implemented for South Xinjiang. Thus, it aims to end the rule that urban Uyghurs are allowed to have two and rural Uyghurs have three children (Grieger, 2014: 2).

The oppression faced by Uyghurs has been a continuous phenomenon for a long time. Starting in 2009 and gaining momentum from early 2017, it is reported that Chinese authorities have detained a considerable number of Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslim

7 There are numerous reliable reports that the historic and sacred sites of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang have been destroyed. In a recent survey conducted on 533 mosques across Xinjiang using satellite imagery, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) found that 31.9% of these mosques were destroyed, 32.8% were damaged, and only 35.3% were free of damage. If we generalize this data to all mosques in Xinjiang, it can be estimated that about 16,000 mosques have been damaged or destroyed since 2017, and 8,450 may also have been completely destroyed. It is seen that, especially since 2017, not only mosques, but also 30% of other sacred sites (including mausoleums, cemeteries, and places of pilgrimage) have been destroyed, and 27.8% have been damaged in some way. For more information, see Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity in Xinjiang? Applying the Legal Tests, 2020, pp. 5-6.

minorities in Xinjiang in so-called “radicalization” and “re-education” camps.<sup>8</sup> The mentioned campaign is claimed to cover the extermination of Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities, arbitrary detentions, forced transfers, torture, forced castrating, and enslavement (Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2020: 7). It is noted that Xinjiang detention camps operate at various levels, from reform school to prison, and more than a million people are in custody.<sup>9</sup> But it is not known precisely how many people have been staying in the camps or how many detainees have been imprisoned (Millward and Peterson, 2020: 6). Although the PRC has officially declared that the purpose of this program is “poverty alleviation”,<sup>10</sup> the claim that the activities of detention and working of detainees in these camps have been carried out voluntarily does not seem reasonable, and in some cases, this may even mean the use of slave labour (Millward and Peterson, 2020: 4).

The fact that more than a million Uyghurs and Muslims of other ethnic groups have been imprisoned in “re-education” camps, that at least 80,000 people were transferred from Xinjiang to different parts of the country between 2017 and 2019 to work in factories, and that up to 16,000 mosques were closed in the region are concrete examples of the assimilation policies of the Chinese government towards Uyghurs. Similarly, practices such as cultural destruction, transfer of workers to re-education centers and different parts of the country also prove that there is a systematic “attack” against Uyghurs and other citizens of Muslim origin (Asia Pacific Centre for the responsibility to protect, 2020: 4).

Although they live in the “Uyghur Autonomous Region,” Uyghurs have little say in administrative decisions that determine their fate. This, to some extent, bears some

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8 The Chinese government claims to have established the camps, which it describes as educational and training centers, to save the perpetrators of petty crimes or those who have been against the law and increase the effectiveness of terrorism and extremism from becoming victims of terrorism and extremism, and to eliminate terrorist activities without letting them be flourished, and now divides the people who are located in the centers and whom it qualifies as trainees into three groups. 1. Persons who are encouraged, coerced, or consented to take part in terrorist or extremist activities, and those involved in terrorist or extremist activities in the circumstances not severe enough to be considered a crime. 2. Persons who are encouraged, coerced or consented to take part in terrorist or extremist activities, or persons who have been involved in terrorist or extremist activities that pose a real danger but do not cause any harm in practice, whose personal flaw is not severe, who confess their crimes and regret their past actions, and the ones who can therefore be exempt from punishment and are willing to obey the law and receive an education. 3. Persons convicted of terrorist or extremist crimes and sentenced to prison and, who are still considered to pose a potential threat to society after serving their sentences, and who are determined by the courts to be educated in the centers in accordance with the law. See. Govt. White Papers, “V. Giving Top Priority to a Preventive Counterterrorism Approach,” 2021, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2019-03/19/content\\_74587141.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2019-03/19/content_74587141.htm).

9 Human rights groups report that at least a million people are imprisoned in the camps called as “re-education” centers. Reports published by the Chinese government indicate that 1.3 million people living in Xinjiang receive a “vocational training” program every year for six years. On the other hand, it is not known exactly how many of those who were reeducated were sent to specially built camps, or whether any of them received education again. However, about eight million of the region’s total population of 22 million is estimated to have received the program. See. BBC, “Xinjiang: China Defends ‘Education’ Camps”, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-54195325>.

10 The Chinese national security documents, also called the White Paper, uphold these training camps. In this document, it is stated that “a group of professional centers has been established to prevent recurring terrorist incidents, eliminate the root of religious extremism, help trainees get a better education and acquire professional skills, enable them to find jobs and increase their income, and above all, to offer systematic education and training in response to a number of urgent needs to maintain social stability and long-term peace in Xinjiang.” and the reason for the establishment of these camps has been tried to be elaborated. For more information, see Govt. Whip Papers, “I. Urgent Needs for Education and Training,” 2019, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2019-08/19/content\\_75114403.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2019-08/19/content_75114403.htm).

resemblance to the circumstances in other regions of the highly centralized Chinese state, but Uyghurs regard their own situation as even worse, due to its nature of identity as well. One of the best examples in this regard is the banning of even Uyghur non-governmental organizations in the region (Fuller and Starr, 2003: 19).

As a horizontal competition, one of the threat categories defined by societal security points out that the minorities' fear of being assimilated into a broader cultural category, wherever they are located, is also a social reality for Uyghurs. This fear has grown even further because of China's practices mentioned above. Especially after the OBOR announced in 2013, the opening of so-called re-education camps, which have gained momentum since 2017, and the fact that more than 8 million people have been trained in these camps so far, and considering the activities in the camps, are the main factors that further raise the fear of assimilation among Uyghurs. Therefore, Uyghurs have a feeling of deep distrust towards China's discourse of a multi-ethnic society and are especially afraid of being assimilated into the world of Han Chinese. For this reason, they see themselves as the ones fighting to protect themselves from the forces that they believe will destroy their homeland, language, culture, and traditions. They think that being assimilated in a cultural, religious, and linguistic sense will mean them the same as dying, so they take the course of securitization to better protect their identity against the Chinese cultural pressure (Fuller and Starr, 2003: 20).

### **Vertical Competition**

Waever (2008: 158-159) describes the vertical competition as, "people will stop seeing themselves as X, because there is either an integration project (for example Yugoslavia, the EU) or a separatist project (for example, Quebec, Catalonia, etc.). These projects get them closer to wider or narrower identities (...)," and this can be considered among the threats that lead to the securitization of the Xinjiang issue.

Vertical competition manifests itself intensely both in political integration and separatist projects. It can even be seen when a separatist and an integration project coexist (Buzan et al., 1998: 124). Buzan et al. (1998: 135) argue that even if China does not disintegrate like the Soviet Union, it will be shaped by the vertical competition caused by the struggle between different ethnic layers within the country. One of these layers is undoubtedly the Uyghurs, the indigenous people of the Xinjiang. And, undoubtedly, the Xinjiang issue is fundamentally a secessionist project. It seeks separatism in order to get rid of the influence of the Chinese supremacist identity, which it perceives as a threat. And there is a long history of Xinjiang's aspiration to secede from China. In this sense, it can be stated that China's ambition to control Xinjiang on the grounds of ensuring national defense was raised as a result of the two independence movements led by the Uyghurs in the 1900s. Both independence attempts were somewhat linked to the Soviet Union, and one of them was even directly supported by the Soviet government. During the 1920s, due to the diplomatic initiatives taken by the region's designated ruler, Yang Zengxin, together with the geographical isolation of Xinjiang from the rest of China, strong trade links were established between the region and the Soviet Union. Also, during this time, significant cultural ties were established with the USSR and the Turkic peoples living within its borders, which lifted the isolation and barriers between Xinjiang and the Soviets. In

addition to the end of the isolation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the ongoing separation with the rest of China, both culturally and geographically, has led to dissatisfaction with the ruling Kuomintang Party and their assimilation policies. All these factors have further bolstered separatist tendencies in the region, leading to increased hostility between the Uyghurs and the Chinese state (Fuller, 2016: 12-13).

These separatist tendencies have also been recognized by China and have always been an issue of concern. This has led to acting with mistrust towards the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In this context, the Chinese side has claimed that separatists and religious extremists in and outside China, who embraced the theories of “Pan-Turkism” and “Pan-Islamism”, spread the discourse that the Uyghurs were the absolute “masters” of the region. It is also stated that the separatists claim that Xinjiang’s ethnic culture is not identical to Chinese culture, and that Islam is the only religion practiced by ethnic groups in Xinjiang. It has also been claimed that all ethnic groups who speak Turkic language and believe in Islam are encouraged to take part in the creation of the theocratic state called “East Turkestan” (Govt. White Papers, 2019). In this sense, China has claimed that from the early 20th century to the late 1940s, “East Turkestan” forces promoted and spread the ideas of “Pan-Turkism,” “Pan-Islamism,” and violence and terror in order to divide and control Xinjiang. The above-mentioned separatist actions are also based mainly on these views and ideas that have been historically shaped (Govt. White Papers, 2019). The Chinese side argues that the separatists, acting based on these ideas, led to many rebellions in Xinjiang at the early 1950s, calling on the Uyghurs to “unite under the flag with the moon and the star to create an Islamic Republic.” The riots in Ili and Tacheng on the Sino-Russian border in the 1960s and the riot of the “East Turkistan People’s Revolutionary Party,” and the armed rebellion of the Gang of Ahongnof in southern Xinjiang are considered among these rebellions. It is also claimed that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, religious extremism further penetrated Xinjiang and soon blended with terrorism, fueling social unrest and seriously undermining stability and security (Govt. White Papers, 2019). The Chinese government notes that especially after the September 11 attacks in the United States, “East Turkestan” forces in and outside China tried to establish an independent “East Turkestan” state through “Jihad” (holy war) and increased their cooperation in this direction. At this point, Chinese authorities assert that Uyghur separatists are using ethnic identity and religious belief to incite religious fanaticism, spread religious extremism, and encourage ordinary people to participate in violent and terrorist activities. The state officials also claim that they indoctrinate people with “Jihad” and encourage them to “die for their faith to go to heaven.” It is pointed out that the followers of these movements have then turned into extremists and terrorists who kill innocent people mercilessly (Govt. White Papers, 2019).

The globalization trend that spread all over the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union has had a significant impact on the ethnoreligious interactions of Uyghurs with the outside world. The dissolution of the Soviet Union by tracing ethnic lines, and the Turkic states becoming independent, also fueled nationalist aspirations among Uyghurs. This led the Uyghurs to highlight certain religious-cultural differences as a way of achieving symbolic, spatial and social separation from the Han Chinese (Aslam and Wenjie, 2016: 50).

In response, China launched a mass propaganda campaign against separatism in 2000, following a series of pro-independence terrorist attacks. Accordingly, state media



reported that thousands of officials had been tasked to go from door to door in nearby villages of the far western city of Kashgar, warning residents not to support separatism or illegal religious activities. These warnings may be reflected in China's fears about the Islamist influence flowing from Central Asia and the impact of neighboring countries on separatism in the region, especially the influence of those in exile in Turkey, where Uyghurs have ethnic and linguistic bonds (Mukherjee, 2010: 428).

The increase in pressure on Uyghurs, primarily due to re-education camp-like practices, has triggered a surge of nationalism, causing growing concern in Beijing about "separatist" problems (Mukherjee, 2010: 428). Since Chinese authorities believe that pan-Turkist and Islamist groups have made an intensive effort to create a spirit of resistance among Xinjiang's Uyghurs, they also claim that they are right to act with suspicion towards separatist tendencies in the region (Fuller and Starr, 2003: 29). At this point, it can be stated that China's concerns that foreigners would challenge the country's territorial integrity in relation to the Uyghur issue have laid the groundwork for the securitization of the Xinjiang problem by China because of vertical competition.

### **Depopulation**

Another issue considered by Waever (2008: 158-159) as a threat to societal security is "depopulation." Waever describes this as, "a possible fourth issue is the decline of the population due to plague, war, starvation, natural disaster, or genocide policies."

Among the incidents that caused depopulation and listed by Waever; genocide, in particular, can be said to have been influential in the Xinjiang issue. Genocide does not only mean exterminating a particular race through conscious policies. If any of the five acts contained in the second article of the UN Convention "Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" occur, it is stated that the crime of genocide has already been committed. The first is the murder of members of a group. The second is to cause serious physical or mental harm to members of a group. The third is to damage the living conditions by anticipating in advance that it would lead to the complete or partial physical extermination of a group. The fourth is to take measures to prevent births within a group. The fifth is the forced transfer of the children of a group to another one (United Nations, n.d.).

Although the Uyghur case does not directly meet the criteria for "the murder of members of a group," which is mentioned in the first article of the UN Genocide Convention; it is witnessed that the Chinese government has already arrested people without any concrete grounds, and has even executed some of them. In this context, Amnesty International has claimed that over the past six years, tens of thousands of people have been detained for investigation, hundreds and possibly even thousands have been charged or convicted under the Penal Code, and many Uyghurs have also been sentenced to death for committing crimes of "separatism" or "terrorism." It also notes that Uyghurs are, almost without exception, the only ethnic group in the PRC whose members have been executed for political crimes (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2006: 15).

Another criterion that proves a genocide act, "taking measures to prevent births within a group," is the case in Xinjiang. Considering the case of Xinjiang, it is claimed that there are important and reliable reports that Uyghurs and other Turkish minorities have been subjected to forced sterilizations, birth control, and abortions. The evidence supported by

official government records indicates that between 2015 and 2018, there was a significant decrease in birth rates predominantly in Uyghur provinces, even a near-zero birth rate was targeted in particular Uyghur regions, and a major campaign was conducted in Xinjiang to neuter women or insert intrauterine devices, and a significant increase in the number of women with “menopause” in the region.<sup>11</sup> This evidence strongly shows that measures “aimed at preventing childbirth” have been imposed within the group (Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2020: 15).

Another type of genocide, which is stated in the Convention as “damaging the living conditions by anticipating in advance that it would lead to the complete or partial physical extermination of a group,” can also be noticed in the example of Xinjiang. There is clear evidence that there is an intention to “change the way of life” of the Uyghur in Xinjiang. As mentioned in detail in the previous parts, the physical destruction of cultural and religious areas, the prohibition of cultural and religious traditions, and the “re-education” of the region’s people to ensure that they are assimilated culturally may be given as examples in this regard. The statements in public by Chinese officials, including Xi himself, associating religious extremism (mainly defined as including Uyghur culture and Islam) with a disease or a virus that requires “painful, intrusive treatment” are also strong evidence of their intent to eliminate local people. The concept of “re-education” used in the camps in Xinjiang seems to be based on the intention of “transforming” Uyghurs rather than physically exterminating them. The Chinese expression “transformation through education” (jiaoyu zhuanhua) is used for the re-education performed in Xinjiang. Another claim regarding the structure and intent of the “re-education” camps also controversially suggests that the Chinese government’s primary goal is not to destroy the Uyghur group physically or biologically, but to transform them into a group that fits into the mainstream and accepted Chinese social identity. However, considering these measures related to the destruction of the cultural and religious assets of Uyghurs, practices of birth control and forced transfer, as well as “re-education” and “transformation,” anyone can argue that the deliberate intention of physical destruction can also be considered within this whole transformation framework (Asia Pacific Centre for the responsibility to protect, 2020: 17).

Additionally, it is also seen that decisions have been taken by international organizations and various states, especially the UN, to characterize all these practices, sometimes as attempted genocide, sometimes as direct genocide. In this context, the issue of China’s practices against Uyghurs was on the agenda at the 46th session of the UN Human

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11 While a one-child policy is being implemented in China, ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, including Uyghurs, are allowed to have up to three children. However, the Chinese government has begun to take drastic measures against the population in Xinjiang since 2017, when millions of Uyghurs were claimed to have been sent to concentration camps; and these measures include a strict family planning policy. Therefore, between 2017 and 2018, the birth rate in Xinjiang decreased from 15.8 per 1000 people to 10.7 per 1000 people. While the Chinese government has been desperately trying to increase birth rates across the country, official government documents indicate that castration rates in the region have risen to 243 per 100,000 people. This rate is enormously higher than the average of 33 per 100,000 people across the entire country. Besides, between 2016 and 2018, the use of IUD birth control devices across China decreased, while in Xinjiang, the rate of use of these devices increased to 963 per 100,000 people. Uyghur women who left the Xinjiang region said they were forced into birth control and sterilization. See. ANI News, “China not scrapping birth caps entirely due to strictly enforced family planning policies in Xinjiang: Expert,” 2021, <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/china-not-scrapping-birth-caps-entirely-due-to-strictly-enforced-family-planning-policies-in-xinjiang-expert20210602081045/>.

Rights Council between February 23 and March 19, 2021, called “China’s Genocide of Uyghurs and Other Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China.” In this context, the Jubilee Campaign, a non-governmental organization in special consultation with the UN Human Rights Council, called the Council’s attention to assessments with the growing global consensus that China’s inhumane persecution of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region overlaps with the internationally recognized definition of “genocide.” It has been noted in the report that the most common human rights violations suffered by Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang include arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, physical torture, coercive persuasion, sterilization, forced abortion, and infant killing. Despite China’s claims of “fake news” and “unsubstantiated allegations,” the report also states that extensive investigations have been conducted by international human rights and religious freedom organizations confirming the existence of such a genocide campaign, and that there are strong indications that China’s campaign against Uyghurs could be called genocide (United Nations, 2021: 2).

This report also states that the U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo made a public statement on January 19, 2021, where he officially defined China’s persecution of Uyghurs and other minorities not only as genocide, but also as a crime against humanity, and that Pompeo believes that this genocide still continues and that there have been attempts to systematically exterminate the Uyghurs by the Chinese party-state (United Nations, 2021: 2).

A series of meetings took place in October 2020, with the participation of academics, NGOs, and survivors of persecution in Xinjiang by the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of Canada’s House of Commons, lasting a total of two days and 12 hours. It is stated in the summit’s final declaration that the Subcommittee has acknowledged that the CCP conducted human rights atrocities against Uyghurs and Muslims of Turkic origin and expressed concern that, if it allowed this to go unpunished, a dangerous “precedent” could be set, which would open up the door for other countries to believe that they could violate human rights and act against human dignity without punishment (United Nations, 2021: 2).

Particularly at the Subcommittee meetings both in 2018 and 2020, the Chinese persecution was first condemned and then stated that it was convinced that the CCP’s activities are considered genocide by the Convention on “Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” The Subcommittee also stated that “the Canadian government is responsible not only for punishing the crime of genocide, but also for preventing the crime of genocide” (United Nations, 2021: 3).

In the UK, the initiative to characterize China’s practices in Xinjiang as genocide has been brought up to the agenda by a proposed law on trade deals submitted by David Alton, Michael Forsyth, and Andrew Adonis. In this context, the amendment on the genocide aims to hold China responsible for its acts of genocide. A firm supporter of this arrangement, Lord Alton stated explicitly on his website that he was terrified to constantly hear the testimony of Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang regarding China’s activities of forced labor, mass surveillance, enslavement, birth prevention, and

torture. Lord Alton noted that “genocide must even not be allowed to be mentioned” and claimed that the Parliament of the United Kingdom had the opportunity to take a stand against the genocidal persecution of Uyghurs by accepting the proposed amendment. However, on 19 January 2021, the article on genocide was rejected in the House of Commons by 308 votes against 319, in other words, by just a slim margin of 11 votes (United Nations, 2021: 3).

## **Conclusion**

Relations between the Chinese and the Uyghurs, dates back to ancient times. This relationship has generally been dominated by competition and conflict. The region has always attracted the close attention of the Chinese central government, both because it is located on historic trade routes and because it serves as the critical gateway to Central Asia. At this point, the OBOR, a global infrastructure advancement and development initiative announced by Xi in Astana at 2013 as an attempt to revitalize the former Silk Road, has significantly altered the fate of the region and thereby the Uyghurs, the region’s local inhabitants. This change can only be better understood by considering that 3 of the commercial corridors under OBOR are directly connected to Xinjiang.

This particular advantage has led to a further increase in the Chinese central government’s interest in the region, especially resulting in an intensification of Chinese oppression of the Uyghurs, who make up the majority. The Chinese administration has largely benefited from the global consciousness of terrorism following the September 11 attacks in legitimizing its oppression at the region. In this sense, the Chinese government has tried to securitize the issue by identifying the political demands of the Uyghurs with terrorism rhetoric such as separatism and extremism.

The identity of the region’s people has been targeted considerably and assimilated at this point. The population structure of the region has been changed in favor of Han Chinese with immigration in the historical process. There have been attempts to erode the Uyghur people’s identity by targeting mainly the language and religion, which are considered the inseparable parts of identity. Furthermore, Uyghurs, whose ties to nearby Central Asian Republics and Turkey, with which are ethnically and linguistically close, increased considerably. Nevertheless, these ties were oppressed by the Chinese government on the grounds that they had separatist goals. And eventually, they were also subjected to various methods of genocide defined by the UN, such as controlling the birth rates of the region’s people, forcing them to change their way of life.

Although it has historical roots, it can be said that the securitization approach for the Uyghur identity, which has started to become visible especially since the mid-2000s, became more widespread and organized with the OBOR. The most important indicator of this situation is undoubtedly the structures under the name of re-education camps, which were put into practice in Xinjiang on the same date as the announcement of the project, in 2013. About 8 million people in the region have allegedly been “trained” in these camps so far, and it is not known precisely how many people are currently living in these camps. It is claimed that people have been subjected to various practices of intimidation and assimilation under the name of “re-education”. Undoubtedly, by targeting the components of Uyghur identity in these camps, it is aimed to assimilate the collective Uyghur identity

into the larger Chinese identity. Thus, it is aimed to eliminate the historical separatist tendencies in the Xinjiang region, which is one of the most important pillars of OBOR. It is seen that there are attempts to secure the survival of the ambitious OBOR, one of the most important economic pillars of Chinese hegemony. For this reason, since 2013, when the project was officially announced, the Uyghur identity has been made the subject of securitization in a more intense and organized way.

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## Global Gender Equality Norm and Trade Unions in Turkey: Local Contestations, Rival Validations, and Discrepant Receptions

### Türkiye’de Küresel Cinsiyet Eşitliği Normu ve Sendikalar: Yerel İhtilaflılıklar, Rakip Olumlamalar ve Uyumsuz Benimsemeler

Hüsrev Tabak<sup>1</sup> , Muharrem Doğan<sup>2</sup> 

#### Abstract

Gender equality is a global norm, and the existing norm mechanisms attribute to trade unions globally a stakeholder position in norm diffusion and promotion. This is well-articulated in the official documents and the institutions within the United Nations (UN) equality regime that collaborates with both the local and the international unions accordingly. Complementarily, local trade unions collaborate with the UN bodies and international trade unions in the diffusion of gender equality to their localities. Nevertheless, this multi-layered process is disrupted by local contestations, with bold consequences for the proper functioning of the equality norms. This paper is a scrutiny on the practice of the contestation on and the interruption of the functioning of the gender equality norm, with a particular focus on trade unions in Turkey. In the country, despite that trade unions have been well-integrated into the global gender regime and mechanisms; therefore, despite the existence of an uninterrupted norm flow regarding gender equality to the labour space, the trade unions offer competing interpretations, driven by their differing and even conflicting politico-cultural positioning. Within the paper, this process of interruption and its consequences for the broader functioning of the norm within the country have been thoroughly elaborated. Regarding the source of data in the research, we conducted semi-structured interviews with the union representatives, and we also extensively used the unions’ own publications and documentations.

#### Keywords

Gender equality, Global norm regimes, Norm diffusion, Norm contestation, Trade unions

#### Öz

Cinsiyet eşitliği küresel bir normdur ve mevcut norm mekanizmaları, küresel olarak sendikalara norm yayılımı ve teşvikinde bir paydaş konumu atfeder. Bu, Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) cinsiyet eşitliği rejimi kapsamındaki resmî belgelerde ve yerel ve uluslararası sendikalarla iş birliği yapan BM Sistemine bağlı kuruluşlarca açıkça ifade edilmektedir. Bunu destekler şekilde, yerel sendikalar da toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliğinin kendi yerelliklerinde de yaygınlaşması ve benimsenmesi hususunda BM organları ve uluslararası sendikalarla iş birliği yaparlar. Bununla birlikte, bu çok aşamalı ve birbirini destekler şekilde ilerleyen cinsiyet eşitliği normunun yayılımı süreci yerel ihtilaflar ve çekişmeler sebebiyle akamete uğramaktadır. Bu makale, Türkiye’deki cinsiyet eşitliği üzerine sendikal aktivizm örnek incelemesiyle, yerel ihtilaflılıkların küresel cinsiyet

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eşitliği normunun yereldeki işleyişine ilişkin etkilerini araştırmaktadır. Öyle ki ülkede sendikalar küresel cinsiyet rejimine ve mekanizmalarına istekli bir şekilde entegre olmuş olmalarına ve bu nedenle, emek alanına toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği konusunda kesintisiz bir norm akışının sağlanmış olmasına rağmen, sendikalar, farklı ve hatta çatışan siyasi-kültürel konumlanmalarından hareketle, ilgili norma ilişkin rakip yorumlar sunmaktadırlar. Çalışma da bu rakip anlatıların norm benimseme süreci için sonuçlarını sorgulamaktadır. Çalışma kapsamındaki veri toplama sürecinde ülkedeki önde gelen sendika federasyonlarının kadın birimleri temsilcileriyle yapılandırılmış görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiş, ayrıca sendikaların kendi yayınlarından ve dokümanlarından da yoğun bir şekilde faydalanılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler**

Cinsiyet eşitliği, Küresel norm rejimleri, Norm yayılımı, Norm ihtilafılığı, Sendikalar, Türkiye

## Introduction

Norms are contested settings (Wiener, 2007). Their emergence is far from being a product of harmonious and accordant relations. Entrepreneurs fight for making their value-added ideas get institutionalised through global or regional governance processes. Their reception and validation are as well conflictual – actors globally do not readily show consent on what makes an idea universal or globally binding, they even antirepreneurially put their own counter norms into circulation (Bloomfield, 2015; Acharya 2013). Relatedly, norms are not stable settings (Krook & True, 2012; Engelkamp & Glaab, 2015). They are often transformed in the very process of circulation, the meanings they attain become determined by contextual validity factors, and this culminates in the norm promoting and norm receiving actors' coming to attribute different meanings to norms (Wiener, 2004, 2007; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018; Tabak, 2021). This discrepancy would become a case both in global normative discussions and in intra-local communications for validation during localisation (Acharya, 2004; Tabak, Erdoğan & Bodur-Ün, 2022).

For the former, the international governance bodies produced regulatory frameworks to prevent such an occurrence thus to increase the clarity of the meanings and prescriptions the norms they promote. However, the institutional capabilities and efforts of the international community often become disrupted by the local validation processes. Relatedly, for the latter case, the discrepancy is due to the presence of diverse and rival cognitive priors and is observable from the very beginning of norm reception. Accordingly, as soon as a norm becomes a subject of discussion in a locality or in the context of a locality (this latter may be taking place in a global/transnational argumentation), the meanings the norm-in-discussion evokes are reflected on by various actors, driven by their own cognitive priors, cultural attributions, or position in local/local or local/global power struggle (Sanholtz, 2007; Acharya, 2013; Wunderlich, 2013; Krook & True, 2012). Even actors with a shared identity may employ different interpretations in (in)validating the norm-in-discussion (March & Olsen, 2004). Norms, therefore, go through a contestation and are subject to validity or invalidity framings (interpretations) by diverse and competing actors.

The global gender equality regime is a prime example of observing the contestations on the meanings and discrepancies in the reception of norms. Despite the global institutional consensus on the validity of gender equality, there still exist globe-wide contestations on the equality norm (Merry, 2006; Verloo, 2007; Lombardo et al., 2009; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018; Bodur-Ün, 2019; Tabak, Erdoğan & Bodur-Ün, 2022). The contestation is due to the meanings that the gender equality norm evokes for cultures globally and as well as to the global diffusion mechanisms – it is often criticized for imposing a supposedly universal cultural interpretation and language of gender roles and for forcefully replacing the existent local gender norms. The contestations have led to the states' discursively stretching and bending the meaning of gender equality or to the sub-state groups' nationally and transnationally resisting against the imposition of gender equality. Even the ones adopting gender equality, however, shared some of these critiques or during validating the equality norm, as a practice of localisation, redefined the *gender* or *equality* with reference to local historico-cultural narrations. Gender equality, therefore, often came to be encompassing different meanings for different actors in the receiving locality.

This is what we observe in the three major Turkish trade unions' (TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ, DİSK) implementing gender equality norms (also see Tabak, Erdoğan & Doğan, 2022). While all of them have long adopted gender equality and institutionalised it through official documents and programmes, they frame gender and equality differently, and the meanings they attribute to gender equality therefore to its prescriptions differ and are contestant to each other. This discrepancy in norm receptions stems from the local contestations and rival validatory involvements present within the Turkish society and political circles. These unions' membership to and close relations with international union activism platforms, which act as complementary mechanisms for the diffusion of gender equality to the country, do not change the taking place of the discrepant receptions.

Considering that global gender equality regime attributes to trade unions globally a stakeholder position in norm diffusion and promotion, this paper, in the example of the local trade unions in Turkey, elaborates the dynamics and consequences of the disruption of norm diffusion and adoption by local contestations. Regarding the source of data in the research, we conducted semi-structured interviews with the union representatives, and we also extensively used the unions' own publications and documentations. As part of the former, we conducted face-to-face interviews with the heads of the women's committees of all three union confederations (TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK, HAK-İŞ) – since all our interviewees have been principally responsible for overseeing the women and gender policies of their respective unions, the information they gave provided us with a deep insight and understanding regarding the norm reception dynamics within each union. In each interview, we asked all the interviewees the following questions: 'What do they understand from gender equality?', 'Whether they pursue the global gender agenda or share the global perspective on gender?', 'Whether and how do they implement gender equality within their own unions?', 'What do they think of governmental approach to gender issues?', 'How do they maintain relations with the ITUC, the ETUC and the TUAC on gender equality?', and 'How do they understand other/rival union confederations' gender policies?'. Regarding the latter form of data collection, we extensively made use of the publications of the unions – the items we studied include periodical magazines and journals, leaflets, annual reports and press communications. Some of these were given to us by our interviewees in each union, while others were already accessible online at the unions' websites.

### **Global Gender Equality Regime and Trade Unions**

Gender equality is a global norm and embodies various standards for ensuring gender mainstreaming, women empowerment, elimination of discrimination against women, gender-balanced decision making or state responsibility for gender-based violence, and stereotyping (Kardam, 2004; Ferree & Tipp, 2006; Joachim, 2007; Krook & True, 2010; Zwingel, 2012). It has been institutionalized through a myriad of international, regional, national and transnational governance processes with the participation of both governmental and non-governmental agencies. There are several governance bodies closely observing, monitoring, and reporting its implementation and violation. In the making of it, the non-governmental sector, academic and intellectual epistemic communities, and activist and advocacy networks have been well-integrated into the

discussions upon which a language of gender equality is jointly produced and put into circulation globally. Upon this, we now witness that almost all regional and global institutions and myriad of transnational organisations have built a gender agenda and adopted a gender-sensitive motivation in global communications (Meyer & Prügl, 1999; Elgstrom, 2000; Walby, 2005; Van der Vleuten et al., 2014).

One of the key domains gender equality prompted widespread discussions on has been the labour markets and, in relation to this, the trade union activism. This is because the labour markets have happened to be formed around a huge gender gap, making women persistently falling into a disadvantaged position and relatedly making defending their rights a litmus test for the relevance and weight of gender equality norm. Such issues have been addressed by the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979), the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies (1985), and the Beijing Declaration (1995), key texts constituting the core building block of the global gender equality regime. The vigour of the labour market as a domain where gender inequality is sustained and equally fought against effectively has become more vocally articulated following the Beijing Declaration and when all UN bodies and affiliated institutions –including the ones dealing with the organisation and overseeing of the labour markets such as ILO, World Bank, IMF, UNDP, and OECD– integrated gender mainstreaming into their programmes and policies. All these documents underscore the role of trade unions in gender equality, and the listed institutions collaborate with trade unions as part of their gender mainstreaming efforts globally.

The CEDAW Committee, for instance, made it clear in its recommendations that states are compelled to ensure that “trade unions, which may not be subject directly to obligations under the CEDAW Convention, do not discriminate against women and respect the principles contained in articles 7 and 8” and relatedly requested from “trade unions” worldwide to “demonstrate their commitment to the principle of gender equality in their constitutions” and in the composition of their executive boards (CEDAW/C/1997/II/5; also see United Nations, 1979). The Nairobi document (United Nations, 1985) underlined that the participation of women to the “decision-making and management... [in] trade unions... on an equal footing with men is of crucial importance” (paragraph 117), “[m]easures based on legislation and trade union action should... [avoid] the tendency towards the feminization of part-time, temporary and seasonal work” (paragraph 135), and the “vocational training programmes... dealing with... trade unions and work associations should stress the importance of equal opportunity for women at all levels of work and work-related activities” (paragraphs 170, 128). The Beijing Platform for Action (United Nations, 1995), confirmingly, urged trade unions to develop and implement education programmes and vocational trainings for women and girls (paragraph 82), run campaigns for eliminating sexual harassment in workplace (paragraph 126), monitor and report discriminatory employer practices (paragraph 178), work on raising awareness for and eliminating stereotyped gender roles within the family and at workplace (paragraph 180), take action for creating “a critical mass of women leaders, executives and managers in strategic decision-making positions” (paragraphs 192, 184, 195), and build programmes for strengthening “solidarity among women through information, education and sensitization activities” (paragraph 194).

The CEDAW, the Nairobi and the Beijing documents all attribute a stakeholder role to trade unions in the actualisation of gender equality globally. Due to this, the organisations within the UN system include gender equality as a primary subject of interaction and cooperation in their work with trade unions globally. The ILO, for instance, works closely with trade unions worldwide to ensure that gender equality and the ILO conventions featuring gender and equality are given adequate concern by and are guiding the campaigns of the trade unions. The ILO country offices organise joint activities and maintain a close relationship with local trade unions in mainstreaming gender equality within both the unions and the labour market. The ILO even organised global surveys on the role of trade unions in promoting gender equality and published reports in the form of ‘resource kits’ to provide “information, guidelines and examples to assist and enhance the efforts of trade unions” (ICFTU, 1999; 2000). This latter was done in collaboration with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) – took the name of International Trade Union Confederation, ITUC, in 2006. In another example, the OECD utilises the TUAC (Trade Union Advisory Committee) in reaching to trade unions. The TUAC is formed to represent the interest of labourers and trade unions at the G20 level and functions as an intermediary structure mediating trade union responses at the Labour 20 (L20), a joint meeting convened with the initiation of the TUAC and the ITUC. The L20 brings together trade unions from the OECD countries, and gender equality represents an essential policy reference in its advocacy. L20 often articulates the necessity of working for reducing the gender pay gap and for increasing women’s participation in the labour market (L20, 2017; 2018).

The international and regional trade union federations also join the global effort to mainstream gender equality and involve in diffusing equality norms to national trade unions globally. Among these trade union confederations, the ITUC and the ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) conduct exemplary practices of union activism, and both have a strong commitment to gender equality. Accordingly, the ICFTU (ITUC) readily welcomed the Beijing Platform for Action’s attributing roles to trade unions in gender mainstreaming and showed a cheerful endorsement to them – in fact, the ITUC even “lobbied hard to improve the draft texts” of the declaration (ICFTU, 2000, 3). In relation to this, the ITUC closely followed and participated in the UN’s follow-up sessions and review meetings on Beijing Platform for Action including the Beijing +5 (2000), Beijing +10 (2005), Beijing +15 (2010), Beijing +20 (2015) (ITUC, 2010b). Moreover, the ITUC has conducted surveys on women workers and unions “to assess what unions themselves have done to implement the Platform for Action” (ICFTU, 1999), published manuals for guiding and assisting trade unions in incorporating a gender perspective in trade union works, and published a resolution on gender equality defending “the full integration of gender perspectives in trade union decision-making, policies and activities” (ITUC, 2008; ITUC, 2010a, paragraph 15).

As part of the resolution, the ITUC also introduced an action programme involving references to planned actions such as promoting the access of women trade unionists to “education in all areas of trade union work at the national and international levels” (paragraph 16e), taking “affirmative action and other corrective measures as necessary to further strengthen women’s involvement in trade union decision-making, policies

and activities... and taking measures [targeting the affiliates of the ITUC] in the case of non-compliance” (paragraphs 16g, 16l), making “every possible effort to secure the application of the... CEDAW” (paragraph 16t), and promoting “the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action... in particular Section F on women and the economy, at national, regional and international levels and ensur[ing] effective trade union input and participation at follow up meetings” (ITUC, 2010a, paragraph 16u).

The norm promotion and diffusion functions of the ITUC are evident in the above-given resolution. A similar role is adopted by the ETUC, as seen in the ‘ETUC Charter on Gender Mainstreaming in Trade Unions’ published in 2007. The charter relatedly states that the ETUC and the affiliated trade unions “confirm their commitment to pursue gender equality... therefore adopt a gender mainstreaming approach as an indispensable and integral element of all their actions and activities” (article 1). In the charter, moreover, the ETUC affiliates are asked to mainstream gender equality in collective bargaining through “inviting, supporting and training women to participate in collective bargaining committees and negotiation teams” (article 3b), to gather “data on women’s participation and representation in trade unions at all levels” (article 4a), to take measures to deal with the “persistent lack of women in positions of decision-making in trade unions” (article 4b), to assess “the developments in female membership and the reduction of representation gap” (article 4c), and to “commit themselves to clearly earmark adequate budgets and support for women and gender equality policies” (ETUC, 2007a, article 5). The ETUC also conducted surveys, prepared manuals and initiated action programmes for guiding affiliated trade unions in implementing gender mainstreaming and equality (ETUC, 2007b; 2012).

In short, gender equality diffuses to national trade unions through several mechanisms. International conventions encourage national governments to create necessary legal frameworks and ground, and certain institutions and committees monitor state performances. Upon this ground, international organisations in collaboration with international trade unions, work with national trade unions to *teach* them how to mainstream gender equality within both trade union structures and the broader labour market. By the same token, the international trade union confederations both contribute to the global norm building efforts and equally function as a mechanism for norm diffusion hence act as teachers of norms and provide a social environment for affiliated trade unions to get socialised into gender equality and mainstreaming. Nevertheless, despite the joint efforts by international organisations and international trade unions, there appear discrepancies in the reception of gender equality, something generated by local contestations on gender equality.

## **Trade Unions and Discrepant Forms of Norm Reception in Turkey**

### **Gender Equality and Trade Unions in Turkey**

The norm diffusion research often draws attention to the determinacy of the cultural match and cognitive priors in the taking place of successful norm reception and adoption. The gender equality’s diffusion to Turkey represents a confirming case – the successful reception of the norm in the country has been facilitated by women-favouring and

Western-oriented modernisation project the Kemalist governments pursued all along (also called state feminism) (Çakırca, 2013). It is accordingly often articulated that Turkey's ratifying the CEDAW (1986) was an expected development. Accordingly, being part of an international convention on women was thought "to be the 'proper' line of conduct to be followed by a state where... official state ideology had loudly articulated a discourse on women's equality with men and their right to be free from sex-based discrimination" and where the state had a "long-existing commitment to gender equality on the basis of the Republic's secular and modernist orientation" (Acar, 2000, 205; see also Çakırca, 2013; Mello & Strausz, 2011). The ratification, however, was not as smooth as portrayed; it was accompanied by severe politico-cultural contestations regarding the content and the causes of gender inequalities in the country (Güneş-Ayata & Doğangün, 2017).

The Kemalist political elites utilised gender equality as an instrument to achieve external confirmation of the validity of the country's modernisation and secularisation project, while the conservative block saw it as a means by which a fight targeting the traditional norms and roles represented by the Ottomans and Islam is fought through Western gender norms (Kardam, 2011; Bodur-Ün, 2019). These conceptions of the gender equality norm led to the creation of rival narrations regarding the content and the role of gender equality. The secularist interpretation was challenged by the conservatives within this scope (Tabak, Erdoğan & Doğan, 2022).

It was suggested by conservatives that gender equality does not necessarily denote a political project for eliminating the historical and religious gender values in the country and that equality norm rather confirms the historical values the Ottoman and Islamic civilisation championed regarding gender. This is the ground the conservatives, as a practice of localisation<sup>1</sup>, reframed gender equality as a norm evoking gender justice and securing the gender equality's fitting to the local cultural context (Bodur-Ün, 2019). Gender justice, as a locally reinterpreted version of gender equality, thus is presented as compromising the global values with the traditional (mostly Islamic) values in the country regarding gender. Gender justice is in search of a balance between social and familial roles for women and advocates gender equality's becoming more responsive to diverse women experiences, which include various forms of inequalities on one hand, and on the other they are rooted in the differences in nature (fitrat) between men and women (Yabancı, 2016). So, justice argument defends that equality in rights for women may still be secured through continuing adhering to traditional roles attributed to sexes. And this is the reason, gender justice is considered as part of an effort to adopt the global gender equality norms in the local context, as the defenders of the justice norm are also fond of the global gender regime (Bodur-Ün, 2019; Tabak, Erdoğan & Bodur-Ün, 2022).

Nevertheless, these rival positions of gender equality and gender justice have also had effects in the labour market and in the occurrence of discrepancy in the trade unions' interpreting and adopting the gender equality norm. Accordingly, although all three major Turkish trade union confederations in Turkey (TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ, DİSK) are the followers of gender equality norm and have been campaigning for it all along, the way

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<sup>1</sup> It should be emphasized here that gender justice is discussed in this article as a localization practice, as those working for achieving gender justice see their efforts as a local reconstruction of gender equality. Therefore, gender justice should be considered as a localized version of gender equality rather than an exclusionary local norm in competition with gender equality (Tabak, Erdoğan & Doğan, 2022).



they comprehend it differs. TÜRK-İŞ (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, 1952), as the largest union confederation in the country, has historically embraced and championed the official ideology and the official discourses on women emancipation in the country. HAK-İŞ (Confederation of Righteous Trade Unions, 1976), known for its pro-Islamist alignment and traditionalist agenda in gender issues, on the other hand, has historically had close ties with religiously motivated politico-cultural groups and comprehended gender roles accordingly. DİSK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions, 1967), however, is a left-wing oriented union confederation, strongly values women emancipation, and sees traditionalist agendas as hindering gender equality. Therefore, the mentioned politico-social orientations almost definitively shape these unions' cognitive framings and cultural validation parameters concerning the implementation of gender equality – this is the case albeit their adherence to global gender equality regime and having close relations with the ILO, the ITUC, or the ETUC.

### **TÜRK-İŞ and Gender Equality**

TÜRK-İŞ has historically defended the official ideology of the state – it has particularly championed progressive secularism and equally Kemalist nationalism. It was this leaning of the union that provided to gender equality a swift entrance into the union's policy agenda. This is because, the secularism discussions have long involved a bold reference to women emancipation and empowerment in the country, and so did TÜRK-İŞ in approaching to the subject all along. Moreover, as a validatory reference, by the union, Atatürk has been articulated to be the role model to be followed in thinking of and implementing gender equality since he had shown sensitivity to the women's having a voice along with men in political, social or economic spheres of activity in the country (TÜRK-İŞ Dergisi, 2011a). It is emphasized within this scope that the union works for further disseminating the women rights and liberties towards all layers of the society, for enhancing the equality discourses when gender issues are concerned, and relatedly for eliminating the disadvantages women face in participating to labour force and union activism (TÜRK-İŞ Dergisi, 2010; 2011b; 2016a).

For TÜRK-İŞ, gender inequality in Turkey is generated by the dominance of masculinity in decision-making structures, the conservative structure of the society, and the discriminatory perspective prevalent among the society. This perspective confines the roles of women to 'mothers' and 'wives' and the role of men to breadwinners –traditional gender roles–, eventually making the social status, education and career of women negligible (TÜRK-İŞ Dergisi, 2016b, 60-66). Such a viewpoint plays a "definitive role" for women and men "in choosing professions, benefiting from social opportunities, accessing resources, representation in politics/unions and participation in decision-making mechanisms" (TÜRK-İŞ Dergisi, 2016a, 78). It is again this perspective that makes the legal efforts to establish equality get undermined and weakened. For TÜRK-İŞ, the legal struggles for equality require changing the belief and mentality "of 'we are not equal' present within the society" (TÜRK-İŞ Dergisi, 2010, 17-19; 2012a, 137). For this mentality change to take place, TÜRK-İŞ underlines the necessity of the organising trainings on gender equality and introducing gender equality courses in all stages of education (TÜRK-İŞ Dergisi, 2012a; 2018; 2019) – as it is the gender equality that will ensure "the women's equal participation to education, employment, economy and all areas of the society" (TÜRK-İŞ Dergisi, 2012b, 81).

The union has been spending efforts to educate and empower women as part of a specific programme since the early 1980s, starting with the opening of a Women Workers Bureau in May 1981. The establishment of the bureau “was assisted, upon the request of TÜRK-İŞ, by the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO), with which TÜRK-İŞ runs joint works at the time” – the bureau has long proved that it is “worthy of the Atatürk’s Republic and has all along aimed to work in line with his principles and reforms” (TÜRK-İŞ, pers.comm., February 12, 2020). Since the establishment of the Women Workers Bureau, “training seminars, congresses, conferences, symposiums etc. have been provided... to female/male worker/manager members in different provinces... [and] several resolutions were introduced in the General Assemblies... to ensure gender equality in working life” (TÜRK-İŞ, pers.comm., February 12, 2020). Moreover, TÜRK-İŞ, starting from 1993, launched complementary offices on women in each member trade unions, formed a Union Academy with curriculum formulated with reference to gender equality (TÜRK-İŞ Dergisi, 2012c), pays attention to gender balance in recruitments, runs projects for increasing unionisation of women workers, and applies quota in managerial roles for women workers. The latter, however, is the case only in a number of member unions such as the Türk-Gıda Sen as there are no women managers in TÜRK-İŞ head office (Özkuzukıran, 2008).

Since TÜRK-İŞ is the largest union in the country and the one representing the Turkish unions and workers internationally, the governments, including the AKP, have had to form positive relations with it. In return, in order not to lose its dominant position and influence in union activism in the country, TÜRK-İŞ also had to establish constructive relations with the governments, including the AKP. Nonetheless, TÜRK-İŞ also highly criticized the privatisation policies of the governments, the widespread practices of the utilisation of subcontracted workers, the abolition of the Ministry of Women and Family Affairs (it was replaced with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies), the Family and Dynamic Population Structure Protection Plan (2015), the policies supporting the integrity of the family at the expense of making child marriages legal (or even encouraging them) or of whitewashing child abuse and rapes (TÜRK-İŞ Dergisi, 2011b; 2016a). TÜRK-İŞ, moreover, runs campaigns for making nurseries and childcare facilities at the workplace more accessible, for increasing the women’s access to education and professional training, for encouraging designing workplaces and working conditions women-friendly, and for eliminating the gender-based wage gap. TÜRK-İŞ also campaigns against sexual harassment and mobbing at work-place, the sexist legal frameworks, and irregular and flexible works (TÜRK-İŞ, pers.comm., February 12, 2020).

TÜRK-İŞ is a proud member of the ETUC, the ITUC, and the TUAC, as stated in its constitution. The ILO also comes forth as a key international partner. As the largest union in Turkey, for these international organisations, TÜRK-İŞ is of vital importance, and they always include TÜRK-İŞ in their projects targeting the labour problems in the country. In return, TÜRK-İŞ closely follows these organisations and campaigns in the country for the adoption of their resolutions, including the ones related to gender equality. Despite sharing an agenda with the international bodies, TÜRK-İŞ also shows discomfort from specific proposals made by them regarding gender equality. For instance, TÜRK-İŞ holds that the legislations introduced during the EU accession period that encourages flexible

work, which is also defended by the ETUC, may be harmful to the workers in Turkey. Here, TÜRK-İŞ draws attention to “contextual factors” and argues that the legislative changes imposed during the EU harmonization process rule out the country’s social, cultural, economic, or geographic conditions; as, while the flexible work in the EU is facilitating the participation of women to labour force, in Turkey flexible and irregular jobs jeopardize their legal gains and rights. The patriarchal mentality in the country, accordingly, lead the flexible works to be used as means for excluding the women workers from the labour force or exploitation of their labour – and also flexible jobs make women deprived of social security and union rights. For TÜRK-İŞ, therefore, the cultural contexts should be taken into consideration in translating international agreements into national legislation (TÜRK-İŞ, pers.comm., February 12, 2020).

### HAK-İŞ and Gender Equality

HAK-İŞ was founded in 1976 and the union refers to the value of nativity (*yerellik*), nationalness (*millilik*), spirituality (*manevilik*), law and justice in empowering labour movement. The union also has a bold reference to democracy and liberties in campaigning. Their merging of traditionalist and progressive discourses defined the union’s both political alignment and gender perspective. Accordingly, the union has readily supported the AKP’s broader political agenda (of initially liberalism and later traditionalism) and followed its gender policies from the very beginning (Duran & Yildirim, 2005). The union, following the AKP’s traditionalist approach, thus incorporated a locally-interpreted gender perspective to their activism.

For HAK-İŞ, gender equality is a subject related to the place of women in society, on the one hand, and to the nature (*fitrat*) of women on the other – this is the reason, HAK-İŞ built its entire programme and discourse on gender equality on the following mottos: *empowered women, empowered society* and *difference in nature (fitrat), equality in rights*. The first motto refers to that empowering women is necessary for achieving a democratic, modern and empowered society. The society here, however, is thought to be formed around both local and universal values – while its universality is related to the country’s integration to the global agendas on women empowerment, its locality derives from Turkey’s civilizational heritage that envisages a decent place to women in society. With reference to this, Fatma Zengin of HAK-İŞ states that

We persistently endeavour to extract new union values from our historical genes and build our future with our historical [civilizational] accumulation, against the efforts with ideological deviations of breaking us from our history. For this purpose, I invite our women to be more active in union organisation to build the future together (HAK-İŞ, 2019c).

Upon this, for HAK-İŞ, the woman in society is a subject directly related to motherhood, making women-empowerment a case for empowering the family, as historical values may suggest. As our interviewee from HAK-İŞ confirmingly stated;

protecting the family requires establishing harmony between women’s work-life and home life and regulating the working conditions of the woman by taking into account the requirements of family life (HAK-İŞ, pers.comm., February 07, 2020).

Therefore, in thinking about the place of women in the labour market, for HAK-İŞ, the work-family balance of women comes before their labour productivity; thus the

family- and work-life must be designed in complementarity to each other, other than as a conflictual duality (HAK-İŞ, 2019a). This is suggested to be a necessary choice because the responsibilities women bear in family and those in working life create a conflicting duality for women and force them to choose either to ignore family or to become excluded from the labour market. The *balance* is the only way, to HAK-İŞ, to “provide the women with equal access to political, economic and social rights and [at the same time to] protect the family structure” (HAK-İŞ, 2019a).

The motto of “*difference in nature, equality in rights*” refers to the union’s efforts to “remov[ing] the barriers before the women’s access to equal opportunities and contibut[ing] to *justice* between sexes” (emphasis added) (HAK-İŞ, 2019c). Here, the union assumes that the idea of gender equality should be able to account also for biological differences between men and women – other than merely suggesting a socially constructed role division, thus championing gender-neutrality. Saying so, the union suggests that the nature-based differences between sexes prevent women to more readily enter to the labour force, and to achieve equality in this thus to facilitate women’s access to more extensive opportunities, the women’s nature-imposed needs such as ‘maternity leave, breastfeeding break, child care’ should be put at the centre of gender equality argumentations. This perspective is also coined as gender justice – a modified version of gender equality. The government as well prefers *justice* other than *equality*, and the approach of HAK-İŞ here is in line with that of the government. Nonetheless, the union prefers to present the *difference in nature, equality in rights* as a third way, in order not to confront the gender equality advocates and also not to be seen as aligned with the government against other unions (HAK-İŞ, pers.comm., February 07, 2020).

Based on these two mottos, for HAK-İŞ, gender inequalities or gender injustices in the labour market are produced by the incomplementarily designed work and family life (HAK-İŞ, 2017b). This incomplementarity, for instance, causes women to suffer from irregular and long working hours, night shifts, transportation problems, and absence of childcare and elderly-care facilities. It, moreover, results in discriminations, such as not being treated fairly in the distribution of duties, getting dismissed first in times of economic crisis, being paid low wages, being deprived of necessary vocational training or being discouraged regarding participating union activities (here the unions are seen as appealing to men than women). To overcome this, HAK-İŞ underlines the necessity of a cognitive transformation regarding cultural codes, traditions, and persistent patterns of practices.

Driven by such positioning, HAK-İŞ developed various policies and strategies within the scope of gender equality. As part of ensuring intra-union gender equality, the following provision is included to the union constitution in 2007: ‘[HAK-İŞ] make[s] efforts to increase the role and status of women in society’. Concomitantly, in the same year, a women committee was established and began providing training on gender-bias and equality to the union staff and members and sending women representatives to international missions within ITUC and ETUC. In its 13<sup>th</sup> Ordinary General Assembly (2015), HAK-İŞ agreed on ensuring equal opportunities for men and women within the union (and labour market). In the same year, HAK-İŞ published a ‘women strategy document’ and identified the necessary strategies to be followed in mainstreaming gender

equality both within and without the union. The strategies include, for instance, (i) increasing the number of female members by at least 50 per cent by 2023, (ii) increasing the number of women in management and representation bodies, (iii) improving the women committees in the member-unions, (iv) adding women-oriented provisions to collective bargaining agreements, (v) adopting a bottom-up approach in identifying the needs, expectations and demands of women workers and in developing women-oriented policies, and (vi) improving the international roles and responsibilities the union upholds in gender issues (HAK-İŞ, 2015). The Committee also published a manual on gender equality for the use of the sub-committees of the member unions (HAK-İŞ, 2017a). In the implementation of such strategies, as our interviewee from HAK-İŞ stated,

the union appointed women managers to positions such as the finance director, the office of press and public relations, the office of international relations, and the women committee directory; it intentionally sends women representatives to international meetings, places a women member to the collective bargaining committee, oversees the coordinatively working of the women commissions in member unions, and a member union, Hizmet-İŞ, now allocates seats in management to women based on the women membership ratio within the union – the current ratio is 23 per cent (HAK-İŞ, pers.comm., February 07, 2020).

With regard to the labour market, HAK-İŞ cooperates with national and international governmental and non-governmental organisations in running projects such as ‘documenting women-friendly workplaces’ (in cooperation with the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services) and ‘more and better jobs for women: women’s empowerment through decent work in Turkey’ (with the ILO), and prepares reports for and lobbies with the government for the introduction of Work and Family Life Reconciliation policies, or campaigns for increasing women participation to politics, thus encourages women to claim leadership positions in local and national government (HAK-İŞ, 2014; 2017c; 2017d). The government officials including the president, the first lady, and ministers regularly join HAK-İŞ’s programmes on women and deliver speeches, publicly declare support, and make the government bodies and pro-government NGOs to run projects with HAK-İŞ jointly. In return, HAK-İŞ has been boldly supporting the government’s policies on women, equality and justice – for particularly the latter, HAK-İŞ embraces the discourses produced by government-supported NGOs on gender justice. Having done so, HAK-İŞ also urges the government to fulfil its responsibilities arising from the CEDAW (HAK-İŞ, 2019b).

The duality in HAK-İŞ’s approach to gender equality is evident also in the union’s relations with international organisations. Accordingly, HAK-İŞ embraces the procedures and principles on gender produced both by the UN bodies and international/regional unions such as the ITUC and the ETUC, and the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC). HAK-İŞ is a member of and sends women representatives to the Economic and Social Council, the EU-Turkey Joint Consultative Committee, the ILO, the ITUC, or the ETUC – the women committee members of HAK-İŞ have also been selected for international duties such as Pan-European Regional Council (PERC) Youth Committee Presidency, ETUC Women Committee Vice Presidency, and PERC Women Committee Board of Directors (HAK-İŞ, 2017a). In the meantime, HAK-İŞ has been participating in the OIC’s works on gender equality. The OIC, confirming the global agenda on gender, makes regular references to discrimination, equal opportunities, protecting the family,

empowering women, preventing violence, and women's participation in decision-making mechanisms. At the same time, the OIC embraces a religious sensitivity perspective and puts an additional emphasis on issues including Islamophobia targeting Muslim women and women nature in its approach to gender equality. HAK-İŞ welcomes the OIC's adhering to the global gender agenda and equally taking a religious standpoint (women nature), which constitute the two building blocks of the union's gender perspective. Owing to this, HAK-İŞ eagerly involves in the OIC's efforts on gender equality both discursively and practically (HAK-İŞ, 2017a).

### **DİSK and Gender Equality**

DİSK is a political leftist union and unfolding and overcoming the exploitation of women labour constitutes the basis of its gender equality programmes and planning. DİSK's position in gender equality is in line with the Marxist-Feminist discourses, therefore principally denounces the exploitation of women labour under capitalism and women's oppression under patriarchy through expulsive (traditional) maternal, marital and domestic roles forced onto women (Yılmaz, 2014). For DİSK, capitalism and the patriarchal system deepen the inequality between men and women, leading to the women's double exploitation both at work and in their social and domestic roles (DİSK' in Sesi, 2016). Accordingly, "women are exposed to discrimination due to their gender in work-life [and] seen as an army of cheap and reserve labour to be employed in precarious jobs and informal sectors" (DİSK/Genel-iş Sendikası, n. d.). On the other hand, "in the society, the primary duty of women is seen as being 'a good mother, a good wife'... making women's participation to work-life come secondary and their labour worthless" – this in return forces "women to work in informal sectors for a low wage under irregular and precarious working conditions" (DİSK/Genel-iş Sendikası, n. d.).

From this comes DİSK's critique targeting neoliberal policies. Accordingly, to DİSK, the neoliberal policies implemented after 1980, while not increasing the participation in employment of unskilled women workers, for skilled women, they created limited employment opportunities and invisible barriers in accessing to top managerial positions (the glass ceiling) – this resulted in sex-based segregations in labour through defining occupations and jobs as 'women's work' and 'men's work' or though creating differences in wages, as women do not receive equal pay even though they produce the same value as men (DİSK/Genel-iş Sendikası, n. d.). This is accompanied by the maternal roles' – imposed on women within the family such as cooking, cleaning, laundry, dishwashing, ironing, child and elderly care – making women's labour invisible and creating obstacles in participating employment (DİSK/Genel-iş Sendikası, 2017). The current government's conservative and traditionalist policies on women, to DİSK, furthered this outcome – as the government encourages women not to refrain from "being around the house, however successful her working life is" and to give birth to *at least* three children (The Guardian, 2016), they exclude women from both public sphere and labour force in the guise of valuing motherhood and through marginalizing the feminine being, body, identity (DİSK/Genel-iş Sendikası, 2016).

As a means to overcome this dual (capitalist and patriarchal) oppression and exploitation and to ensure gender equality, DİSK embraces the motto of "we will not be

a slave to the family, nor will be a servant to capitalism” (DİSK, 2015a). Based on this understanding and positioning, DİSK developed various policies and strategies within the scope of gender equality.

As part of ensuring intra-union gender equality, DİSK issued decisions in its general assembly on gender-based problems and on the struggle for women’s rights since 1991 (following the union’s re-establishment) – for instance, it was expressed in the 13<sup>th</sup> General Assembly’s final guidance document that “the union stands against all kinds of discrimination and will advocate equality between men and women in all areas of life” and work for increasing women’s unionisation (DİSK, 2008). In 2004, a women committee was established to oversee gender equality and women’s rights struggles and activities and to work for eliminating the reasons preventing women from participating in union activities. Moreover, DİSK makes sure women members are present in collective bargaining negotiations and take initiative (DİSK, pers.comm. 1, February 07, 2020), provides trainings on gender equality and women occupational health and safety to the union staff and members (DİSK, 2015c), organises annual women conferences (DİSK, 2015c), publishes pamphlets and periodicals with special issues on gender and women, and runs intra-union campaigns for making women more visible in higher managerial levers within the member unions (DİSK, 2009). The latter effort is necessary, as DİSK comes forth as the only union confederation in the country with a woman president.

With regard to the labour market and governmental politics, DİSK often urges the government to extract and replace sexist legal provisions (DİSK, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c), requests child and elderly care facilities and health services to be provided as a free public service (DİSK, 2015b), demands domestic labour to be covered by social security and social insurance system, runs campaigns on ‘equal pay for equal work’, campaigns for maternity leave to be increased to at least six months after birth, and demands the textbooks and materials to be cleared from sexist references at every stage of the education and the introduction of courses on gender at schools (DİSK, 2009). Moreover, it campaigns against the irregular and subcontracting works, the limits imposed on the number of women workers required to open nurseries and childcare facilities at the workplace, and legal frameworks such as Family and Dynamic Population Structure Protection Plan (2015) and Work and Family Life Reconciliation policies (DİSK, 2015a).

DİSK is in close cooperation with the ILO, participates in the L20 conferences (DİSK, 2017b), maintains close relations with the ITUC and the ETUC, and declares public support to CEDAW Convention and Istanbul Convention. The ITUC and the ETUC are particularly necessary for DİSK as DİSK utilises the ground for cooperation with these two internationally acting union bodies to expand the trade union rights and freedoms and to strengthen the unionisation in multinational companies operating in Turkey (DİSK, 2017a). Together with them, DİSK organizes joint training, research, and publishing activities. DİSK sees that for achieving class solidarity at both national and international levels and to collectively defend the workers’ rights, the ILO norms, including the gender equality, should be fully adopted and employed as they would increase women’s participation into labour force, reduce the wage gap, eliminate the disadvantages the women face regarding social security, and end the violence and harassment women face in the workplace and at home (DİSK, 2019).

There are, however, certain points DİSK's understanding of gender equality differs from the international mainstream perspectives and implementations. DİSK and the global agenda have differing priorities stemming from the contextual differences. As one of our interviewees stated:

We attend the meetings of the ILO, the ITUC or the ETUC all the time... [and see that] we have significant differences with Europe. In this sense, we are behind Europe, and we have more urgent priorities... [for example,] in 2009, I participated in a workshop of ETUC on gender equality. They encouraged flexible work, which came to be a widespread practice in Europe, and they suggested that it would also be a helpful practice [in Turkey]. However, this is not suitable for Turkey as it would cause for women in Turkey a decline in wages and social insurances, and may confine women to the home. The truth is, they are ahead of us in the field of human rights, and they may benefit from this, but we cannot (DİSK, pers.comm. 2, February 07, 2020)

From this follows DİSK's standing against the family- and work-life reconciliation practices in the country – as aforementioned. Having seen that HAK-İŞ is favouring such a practice, there occurs a clear contestation between the two unions here. There are, however, other contestations manifesting themselves in the unions' approach to gender justice and relatedly to the nature vs nurture arguments in gender roles. For the former discussion, DİSK thinks that the justice argument may be problematic. This is because, due to a “bold reference in gender justice to religious norms”, it may evoke “the superiority of men”, may justify “domestic violence”, may validate “confining women to home”, and may “exclude women from the public sphere” (DİSK, pers.comm. 2, February 07, 2020). For the former discussion, DİSK holds that “[t]he concept of gender refers to social roles shaped by societal, cultural and historical structures, [and is] distinct from biological differences between men and women. When we look at the sexes from a biological point of view, the inequalities between men and women becomes blurred” (DİSK/Genel-iş Sendikası, 2016, 7). For the latter discussion, to DİSK, the oppression women experiences are not caused by nature (*fitrat*), but rather by the society-wide justifications for discrimination (DİSK, 2015b). In line with this, DİSK argues that “the biologically-defined roles attributed to women further and justify the discriminatory practices women face”, which also constitute the ground for the emergence of gender inequalities – therefore, the gender justice arguments involve specific characteristics that may make the gender equality null and void (DİSK, pers.comm. 1, February 07, 2020). Finally, for DİSK, both TÜRK-İŞ and HAK-İŞ “mostly act together with the state”, therefore, weaken the unionized struggle for women's rights in the country (DİSK, pers.comm. 2, February 07, 2020).

### **In Lieu of a Conclusion**

Gender equality diffuses to local trade unions (the stakeholders in the actualisation of gender equality in the labour markets) through several mechanisms, and we saw the functioning of all of them in the Turkish case. The union confederations adhere to the global gender equality regime and collaborate with the UN bodies, the international union confederations and the local governmental and/or nongovernmental sector on the advancement of gender equality in the country. There, therefore, is an uninterrupted norm flow regarding gender equality to the country. Nevertheless, the contestations on and the



rival validations of the content and the meaning of gender equality in the country create discrepancies in the unions' norm reception and hinder the norm's proper functioning.

Accordingly, in the reception of gender equality by TÜRK-İŞ, the equality norm has been validated through underlining its fit to the Kemalist projects of women emancipation and empowerment, and relatedly through denouncing the conservative structure of the society and the traditional gender roles attributed to women within it. The gender equality norm, therefore, came to be the ground, with which TÜRK-İŞ campaigned for changing the paternalistic and patriarchal belief, mentality, and practices in the country, and specifically within the labour market. DİSK, on the other hand, validated the necessity of adopting gender equality through laying a bold emphasis on the exploitation of women labour under capitalism in the country. DİSK, similar to TÜRK-İŞ, utilised gender equality as a legitimate institutional ground also to challenge the detrimental effects of patriarchal maternal, marital and domestic roles culturally imposed on women. HAK-İŞ, while underlining the necessity for the country of integrating the global agendas on women empowerment into policy priorities, persistently campaigned for making gender equality also a ground the biologically-defined roles between men and women can be harmonized. To HAK-İŞ, this is due to the fact that the nature-based differences between sexes make women face disadvantages in the labour market, and to be able to institutionally deal with this, it is essential for the equality norm to account for both socially constructed and equally naturally imposed gender roles.

While all of these unions are fully committed to the equality norm, they offer competing interpretations, driven by their differing and even conflicting politico-cultural positioning, on sexes and gender roles within the society. HAK-İŞ, for instance, offers a religiously justified cultural interpretation of biology-driven gender roles, TÜRK-İŞ and DİSK rather make a bold reference to the socially constructed character of gender thus defend a secular positioning against the religiously motivated biology-driven roles argumentations. Neither the secular positioning on equality has a singular manifestation – while to TÜRK-İŞ, gender equality confirms and adds on the Kemalist conception of state-sponsored women emancipation, DİSK rather sees it as an anti-capitalist standing for emancipating women from exploitation within both society and labour market. Furthermore, for DİSK, the Kemalist emancipatory discourse alone cannot secure equality within the labour market and, equally, the biology-driven role conceptions would only worsen the existing inequalities women face.

To conclude, the discrepancy in gender equality's reception and validation, no doubt, hinders the norm's proper functioning in the country and is one of the reasons why the governments remain hesitant in furthering the efforts for the actualisation of gender equality.

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## Terrorism Risk During the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Outbreak Period

### Koronavirüs (COVID-19) Salgını Döneminde Toplumsal Kaygı ve Terörizm Riski

Bariş Esen<sup>1</sup>

#### Abstract

The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, causes negative consequences for states in terms of political, economic, sociological, psychological and security. Due to the problems that have occurred during the pandemic period, the capacities of states are under pressure. Terrorist organizations aim to put pressure on governments in line with their political objectives by creating anxiety, fear, and panic on the civilian population with their attacks. This study investigates how the COVID-19 process affects terrorism, and tries to answer the question whether there is a relationship between trust in authority and terrorist activities during this period, or not. Just as states were unprepared for terrorism, they were also caught unprepared for the pandemic. The responses of some states to COVID-19 may further broaden public concern and create conditions that are favorable to terrorism. According to the study, it is explicit that this anxiety environment created by COVID-19 is regarded as an opportunity by terrorist organizations, and it is also obvious that the concern among the population is used and led by terrorist organizations. Curfews and travel restrictions also create mitigating conditions for the terrorist threats in most parts of the world during the COVID-19 pandemic.

#### Keywords

COVID-19, Pandemic, Terrorism, Security, Social Anxiety

#### Öz

Koronavirüs (COVID-19) salgını, devletler için siyasi, ekonomik, sosyolojik, psikolojik ve güvenlik açısından olumsuz sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Pandemi döneminde yaşanan sorunlar nedeniyle devletlerin kapasiteleri baskı altında kalmaktadır. Terör örgütleri, saldırıları ile sivil halk üzerinde endişe, korku ve panik yaratarak siyasi hedefleri doğrultusunda hükümetlere karşı baskı kurmayı amaçlamaktadırlar. Bu makale, COVID-19 sürecinin terörü nasıl etkilediğini araştırmakta ve bu dönemde otoriteye duyulan güven ile terör faaliyetleri arasında bir ilişki olup olmadığı sorusuna yanıt bulmaya çalışmaktadır. Devletler nasıl teröre hazırlıksız yakalandıysa, salgına da hazırlıksız yakalanmışlardır. Bazı devletlerin COVID-19'a karşı mücadelede aldığı önlemler, kamuoyundaki endişeleri daha da artırabilir ve terörizme elverişli koşullar yaratabilir. Çalışmaya göre, COVID-19'un yarattığı kaygı ortamının terör örgütleri tarafından bir fırsat olarak görüldüğü ve halk arasındaki kaygının terör örgütleri tarafından kullanılarak yönlendirildiği de aşikardır. Sokağa çıkma yasakları ve seyahat kısıtlamaları ise COVID-19 salgını sırasında dünyanın birçok yerinde terör tehditleri için hafifletici koşullar da yaratabilmektedir.

#### Anahtar Kelimeler

COVID-19, Pandemi, Terörizm, Güvenlik, Sosyal Kaygı

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## Introduction

The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has had unprecedented effects on public health, social welfare, economics, and social psychologies around the world. COVID-19 has been the most severe pandemic in the world since the Spanish flu pandemic between 1918 and 1920, which killed about 50 million people. COVID-19 was declared as a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on March 19, 2020 (WHO, 2020).

COVID-19 challenges state capacities in many ways. State capacity is defined as the institutionalised capability of a state to implement policies that deliver benefits and services to households and firms (Besley & Done, 2022). Government's capacity to make decisions and implement policies plays a pivotal role in strengthening disaster preparedness and improving institutional quality in response to crises (Mao, 2021: 318). Empirical tests using data on epidemic outbreaks in 146 countries since 1995 and on the COVID-19 global pandemic show that state capacity reduces the number of epidemics and enhances the government's response through effective policymaking (Guillen, 2021).

In addition to the economic, social and political consequences of the pandemic, health concerns raised the anxiety in societies to the highest level. There is a social fear on the grounds that COVID-19 is a fatal disease, and there is no available treatment. This fear, combined with the uncertainty about the course of the pandemic, increases people's anxiety. Uncertainty makes it difficult to make decisions about human behaviors. In conditions where individual and social anxiety is high, people can behave irrationally.

The effects and consequences of the pandemic are similar to those that occur after natural disasters. A decline in government capacity due to epidemics and natural disasters can increase the perception of insecurity in the society. Terrorist organizations follow a strategy that will accelerate social anxiety in times of disasters and crises. The strategy to deepen anxiety can manifest itself through tactics such as undermining public trust in the government, creating distrust of the authorities, targeting a particular group, and calling its members to acts of violence (Comerford, 2020: 86-88). Terrorist organizations try to offer their ideologies as a remedy against the anger, fear, and panic caused by the pandemic. Social turmoil, uncertainty, and the global concern caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are seen by terrorist organizations as an opportunity to spread their messages and propaganda. In a period of uncertainty and fear that occurred with the COVID-19 pandemic, terrorists integrate the virus into their propaganda. Terrorist organizations also aim to win the hearts of people as these organizations try to demonstrate their ability to respond effectively to the large-scale crisis instead of governments.

This article examines how terrorist organizations use the environment of unrest and insecurity that occurred during the pandemic period. It is being investigated how the COVID-19 process affects terrorism, whether there is a relationship between trust in governments and authority and terrorist activities during this period. In the study, the public statements of terrorist organizations and the reports of the official institutions affiliated to the United Nations and independent research organizations were used. In addition, the reports evaluating global terrorist activities and current reports of survey companies are included in the study.

The study is limited to 2020, when the pandemic emerged and affected the world. Therefore, terrorist activities may actually decrease or increase during the period when

the pandemic continues. The economic problems caused by the shaking of trust in governments and the COVID-19 pandemic can create a dangerous structure that terrorist organizations can benefit from. Besides the short-term consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic that causes global effects, there will be political, geopolitical, social, and economic consequences in the medium and long term. Before examining the relationship between social anxiety and terrorism that arise due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it would be appropriate to touch on the concept of terrorism.

### **Concept of Terrorism**

There are many different perspectives on the definition of terrorism. The definition may differ according to the political view of the statement maker. Alex Peter Schmid has compiled a total of 109 different academic definitions of terrorism (Schmid, 2011). Terrorism emerges as a result of the violent activation of ideas and movements that already exist or are created artificially for a specific purpose. It refers to a state of action that causes great fear and frustration in individuals. Terrorism, on the other hand, is the case of adopting organized, systematic, and continuous acts of violence as a method to change the current situation illegally for political purposes.

Terrorism activity is used to give a message to the targeted community or the world (Waldron, 2004). Although the ultimate goal of terrorism is political, terrorist organizations often justify their actions not only for political purposes, but with universal truths. There is no common definition of terrorism, and definitions of who a terrorist is and who a freedom fighter is are also quite complex. Groups that some societies describe as terrorists can be freedom fighters of another society (Victoroff, 2005). In this study, intentional acts of violence or threats used by non-state actors to achieve political goals against civilians or those who do not participate in the war are considered terrorism (Stepanova, 2008: 12).

Terrorism, which can also be described as the weapon of the weak, is seen as a tool implemented by a smaller number of groups and that may cause the greater part of society to be terrified (Howes, 2011). Terrorism is not just about killing innocent people. It threatens the economies of countries, weakens democratic institutions, and causes instability in their environment (Tilly, 2004). The costs of terrorism can be incurred in a way that harms military, economic or national morale. Terrorist organizations aim to put pressure on governments by creating fear, anxiety, and panic on the civilian population.

### **Terrorist Conspiracy Theories About COVID-19**

Terrorist organizations redesign existing facts and combine them with conspiracy theories to intensify hatred towards specific groups. Terrorist groups produce conspiracy theories about the origin of COVID-19 and use social media to spread these theories. Xenophobic rhetoric reinforces racist, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic, and anti-immigrant social psychology during the pandemic period.

The origin of the virus is linked through conspiracy theories to some governments with hidden agendas, hostile religious groups and ethnic minorities, global corporations or some famous rich. Facebook CEO, Mark Zuckerberg and Microsoft founder, Bill Gates are among the people mentioned in the conspiracy theories about the virus. Famous

investor George Soros and businessman Jacob Rothschild have also been accused in conspiracy theories. Posts using accusations such as Soros virus, Israel virus, CIA virus, and Bill Gates virus are shared on social media (COVID-19 conspiracies, 2020: 1-7). The claim that 5G technology used in communication causes the virus to spread easily is one of these conspiracy theories.

There are many unfounded rumors that the pandemic is spreading by the minorities in the society. In particular, far-right terrorist organizations blame Jews, minorities, and foreigners for the pandemic. As in the plague pandemic between 1348 and 1351 in Europe, Jews are targeted also in this pandemic. Some far-right groups are increasing hostility against Asians, claiming that they willingly spread COVID-19 (Williams, 2020). There are fake rumors that COVID-19 was spread by Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh or by Jews in the USA. These lies put the social cohesion carefully developed by a number of organizations and state institutions at risk (Rosand, Khalid & Lilla, 2020).

Organizations exaggerate these conspiracy theories for purposes such as controlling world politics or generating income through the sale of vaccines and medicines (Egypt's Official Fatwa-Issuing, 2020). These conspiracy theories undermine the public's trust in official authorities. At the same time, the put forward conspiracy theories lead not to comply with the measures taken against the virus and to create distrust against vaccination. In 2007, it was claimed that polio vaccines were made to spread AIDS and sterilize Muslims. After these conspiracy theories, thousands of people in Pakistan refused to be vaccinated and attacked healthcare workers (Reardon, 2011).

In the propaganda of terrorist organizations, it is claimed that the virus was intentionally spread by China or the USA. Terrorist organizations call for revenge by referring to crimes allegedly committed against Muslims in their messages. The al-Shabab group linked to Al Qaeda in Somalia claims that the virus was spread by the crusaders invading the country and the countries that supported them (Harper, 2020). Al-Shabab blames and targets the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for the spread of the virus, while demanding the expulsion of all foreign powers in the country.

Some terrorist organizations also consider COVID-19 to be a divine punishment that harms the countries they see as enemies. Some organizations view COVID-19 as a divine punishment that originated in China for the mistreatment of Uighur Muslims. Some organizations claim that when the virus began to affect the United States, Americans were divinely punished for their persecution of Muslims. A poster of the terrorist organization ISIS claims that the pandemic destroyed the crusaders' economy. COVID-19 is described as a manifestation of the divine will that hits the enemies, especially the USA, in the ISIS publication *Al-Naba* (How extremist groups, 2020: 3).

ISIS and al-Qaeda related groups claim that the virus is the "smallest soldier of God" who punishes the infidels who harm Muslims (Meek, 2020). The terrorist organization ISIS draws attention to the deaths caused by the pandemic on its propaganda sites, claiming that this eliminates the false perception that the United States is strong and invincible. Al-Shabab, linked to al-Qaeda, also states that COVID-19 reveals the weakness of countries that claim to be superpowers such as the USA, France, Italy, Germany, and the UK. Al Qaeda announces that the crisis is an opportunity to call people to jihad in God's way and revolt against tyrants like the USA (Burke, 2020).



In its six-page advice on COVID-19, al-Qaeda claims that the spread of the pandemic in the Muslim world was due to moral corruption in these countries. On the other hand, ISIS demands from its members to spread the virus in the Shiite-populated areas in southern Iraq. ISIS newspaper interprets the high incidents of COVID-19 in Iran as a mistake of the Shia faith and a punishment given as a virus by God (Egypt's Official Fatwa-Issuing, 2020).

### **Security, Freedom and COVID-19**

During the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a concern about democracy and freedoms. Many countries have to postpone and cancel parliamentary meetings due to the pandemic. Some governments easily ban protests from the opposition while using the pandemic as an opportunity to increase their power. The prohibition of public meetings is one of the main restrictions experienced in the COVID-19 period. Terrorist organizations can use quarantine measures and restrictions on freedoms as propaganda materials.

While some terrorist organizations react to the measures taken against the pandemic, they pretend that these measures are taken against them. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram organization suggests that COVID-19 measures are a new part of the war against Islam. Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau condemns pandemic measures such as the closure of mosques and the suspension of pilgrimage and umrah visits to Mecca (Campbell, 2020).

Strict security measures against the virus have resulted in the curtailment of civil liberties in some countries. Restriction of freedoms means an increase in the power and authority of the state. Many studies show that the failure to respect fundamental rights can increase tensions between authorities and citizens. Quarantine decisions, lockdowns, and restrictions on freedom due to COVID-19 can further increase the reaction against the authority (COVID-19 and Its Impact, 2020). For this reason, the decisions taken by states should be implemented in a way that affects personal freedoms to a minimum.

Technology used to address some of limitations, including by automating the processing of test results or symptom reports and by use of smartphone capabilities to identify and notify contacts instantaneously who are at risk of infection (Braithwaite, Callender, Bullock & AldridgeIn, 2020: 607). South Korea, the government tracks the movements of people who are tested positive and publishes location data anonymously on a public website. Citizens in South Korea must show a QR code to enter churches, restaurants and entertainment venues (Kim & Mah, 2020). China has developed a color-coded health monitoring system that tracks millions of people through Alipay. In China, citizens have to show a health code in almost all public places, including subways, markets and workplaces. It is required to show a QR code about your health in order to enter shopping malls and government offices in Turkey as well. These monitoring tools, which are temporarily used in the fight against the disease, may become permanent after the pandemic. There are concerns that states may become more authoritarian and a world away from democracy after the pandemic and quarantine measures are over.

In order to reduce the social risk and anxiety related to virus carriers, artificial intelligence applications and mobile tracking programs related to travel are put into use. These measures can also improve the monitoring capabilities of states wishing to monitor

terrorist groups. Flight recording elements, such as API and PNR, developed with the aim of combating terrorism, are also used as a tool against the pandemic in many countries. The measures taken against COVID-19 can significantly improve the security capacities of governments in the long term.

### **COVID-19 and Online Risks**

When evaluating the interaction of the COVID-19 pandemic and terrorism, it is necessary to look at the short-term, medium-term, and long-term consequences. Terrorist organizations are getting prepared for the post-pandemic with propaganda and recruitment activities. Terrorist organizations use the internet and social media extensively as part of their recruitment activities. Terrorist organizations also fuel social anxiety and fear through social media.

Posts containing pro-ISIS messages on the pandemic on Facebook and Twitter have been viewed nearly half a million times (Colliver & King, 2020:18). ISIS uses the paid advertising system to highlight its own messages among social media posts about COVID-19. More than one million posts regarding the pandemic within the Telegram network contain violent elements that praise terrorism and make minority groups hostile (Comerford, 2020: 86-88).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of people have become unemployed in many countries, and millions of students have been deprived of education. In this period, in addition to working from home, education turned into online with the closure of schools. Young people are more vulnerable to the propaganda of terrorist organizations, as they spend more time online as a result of lack of job opportunities and schools being closed. Online education provides terrorist groups with new opportunities to communicate with potential members through various social platforms. Terrorist organizations direct their own propaganda to these students through uncontrolled websites. Studies show that unemployed and extremist students are more likely to attack with chemical and biological weapons. Jobless and student extremists were each roughly 15 times as likely to pursue chemical and biological weapons relative to employed violent extremists (Guarrieri & Meisel, 2019).

### **Combating Terrorism During the Pandemic Period**

Pandemics are considered among national threats and risks in many countries, such as the USA, China and the UK before COVID-19 (Pantucci, 2000). Despite this, many developed countries have remained insufficient to respond to the pandemic. The COVID-19 crisis reveals the lack of health systems and response mechanisms of countries. In many countries, responses to traditional security concerns are faster and stronger than responses to the pandemic. The number of people who lost their lives in the pandemic due to the deficiencies in the health system has reached incomparably high numbers with those who lost their lives in terrorist attacks. The number of people who lost their lives in the US September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks is approximately 3.000 people. In December 2020, the number of Americans who died in one day due to COVID-19 exceeded 3.000. The total number of deaths related to COVID-19 in the UK exceeded 67.000 in December 2020. This figure is approximately 20 times more than the total number of people who died as a result of terrorism in the UK from 1970 to 2017 (Malik, 2020).

Governments are also concerned that the virus could be spread by terrorists. In the United States, former Deputy Minister of Justice Jeffrey Rosen announced that those who intentionally spread COVID-19 would be prosecuted under federal terrorism laws (Gerstein, 2020). The US Department of Homeland Security also warns that terrorists could benefit from the pandemic. The US Department of Homeland Security's statement warns that terrorists may try to exploit public concerns about the spread of COVID-19 (Mallin & Margolin, 2020).

In some publications of the terrorist organization ISIS, it is suggested that security forces are busy and weak due to the COVID-19 outbreak and that this situation should be used as an advantage. It is claimed in ISIS media that the pandemic caused chaos, and it is claimed that a security vacuum has arisen in the states. ISIS claims that the Egyptian army has weakened due to the lack of support from its Western allies due to COVID-19, and the organization targets the Egyptian army for attack (Reframing Islamic State, 2020: 28). It is stated that the operations and military training of the army have decreased due to the pandemic, and this is an advantage. The terrorist organization ISIS takes advantage of the disorder caused by the pandemic and gives instructions to attack the weakened states.

There is also a process of concern and awareness in states regarding pandemic and terrorist connections. Countries do not want to send their troops to areas where the disease is likely to spread. In fact, countries are recalling their soldiers they sent to other countries in order to provide security in the fight against global terrorism. International cooperation and education activities against terrorism have been stopped or reduced due to COVID-19. This situation seriously affects the counterterrorism power of countries with weak security capacities. Counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel region in Africa are adversely affected by the COVID-19 outbreak. Governments in the region are supported by approximately 14,000 UN peacekeepers to combat terrorism. Soldiers from 13 different European countries who support governments such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger can return to their countries for their own needs during the COVID-19 period (Coleman, 2020). The US Africa Command has cancelled two major exercises with African allies. Some members of the coalition forces formed against ISIS have announced that they will withdraw troops from Iraq due to fear of the spread of COVID-19. Most coalition members, including France and Spain, declare that they will suspend the training of Iraqi soldiers and return to their countries due to the risk of contamination.

The COVID-19 pandemic is causing policymakers and the public in all countries to quickly reorder their priorities. While health issues for governments rise to the top of the list, the fight against terrorism is being taken to the background. While health problems come to the fore as a national security priority, countries prefer spending on health sector instead of military. Governments are delegating their military capacity to assistance to strengthen public health operations. This situation makes countries more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

States were allocating more resources to the fight against terrorism and other threats than the pandemic before COVID-19. This balance is likely to change, given the pervasive impact of COVID-19 compared to terrorism. This may undermine efforts to combat terrorism. Decisions to prevent a new pandemic can make it difficult for security officials to maintain the attention and budget they need.

## **Public Relations of Terrorist Organizations During the COVID-19 Period**

COVID-19 poses a greater threat to sovereign states than terrorist organizations. As a result of budgetary pressure, states need to allocate their limited resources to protect society against the virus. States may fail to solve the problem in the short term with existing organizational models and may fail to fulfill their responsibilities to their people. Dealing with the pandemic is not just a medical mobilization, it is a serious public order activity.

Terrorist organizations can act to strengthen public relations during the pandemic period. These organizations claim that they can provide health services during the pandemic in the absence of official institutions. Terrorist organizations present themselves as a responsible political actor through such services. Some of these organizations provide aid, such as food and clothing to the public in addition to health services during the pandemic period. Terrorist groups are trying to gain the trust of people with basic needs and food aid.

The COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity to promote the idea that in crises, terrorist organizations can replace and fulfill the role of official government. When weak governments in Africa and the Middle East cannot provide sufficient support for their people against the pandemic, terrorist organizations try to seize this opportunity. For example, the Al-Shabab organization in Somalia claims to have treated COVID-19 in a center it established (Al-Shabab sets up, 2020). After focusing on the health sector, states should allocate post-pandemic resources to economically weak regions. Otherwise, terrorist groups may provoke people living in areas with insufficient government services against the state. As states try to deal with Covid-19, terrorist organizations can seek opportunities to exploit fears, increase anxiety, and mobilize their supporters.

## **Terrorism During the Pandemic**

It may be necessary to look a little longer to assess whether COVID-19 has mitigated terrorist attacks. Despite the media's focus on COVID-19, most terrorist organizations have not abandoned their own attack plans. The terrorist organization ISIS carried out attacks in Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Egypt, Niger, Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria, and the Philippines in March and April (Kruglanski, Rohan, Molly & Anne: 2020). It can be stated that the number of terrorist attacks decreased during the pandemic period that continued throughout 2020. However, considering the figures for 5 years, the number of terrorist attacks has decreased after the peak in 2014 due to ISIS.

The report of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) reveals that terrorist organizations are trying to take advantage of the COVID-19 outbreak to expand their activities and jeopardize the credibility of governments. In the report of UNICRI, it is stated that terrorists may want to spread the virus by going to the places where the enemy religious and racial minorities live (Stop the Virus Disinformation, 2020: 10). One of the biggest concerns is the potential attacks of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006: 205). Some terrorist organizations intentionally encourage their members to spread COVID-19 and use it as an indirect biological weapon. The fatwas of terrorist organizations, ISIS and Al Qaeda calling on their members who caught in COVID-19 to act as "biological bombs"

are published. In these calls, members of the terrorist organization are requested to spread the disease among the enemies of the organization (Stop the Virus Disinformation, 2020: 11). The PKK compels its infected members to be suicide bombers like other similar terrorist organizations do (Gemici, 2020).

The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) has published its 2020 Global Terrorism report, which examines terrorist movements in the world and the effects of terrorism on countries. According to the report, there was a 15 percent decrease in terrorist attacks in 2019 compared to the previous year. Decline in terrorist attacks since 2014 reaches 59% (Global Terrorism Index, 2020: 4). According to the report, the number of people who lost their lives from terrorism in the last 5 years in the world has decreased. During the COVID-19 period, especially in Africa, Nigeria, and Chad Boko Haram's terrorist attacks increased, while attacks linked to the terrorist organization ISIS were observed in Mozambique (Global Terrorism Index, 2020: 2). The total number of terrorist attacks recorded in Nigeria in the first six months of 2020 is more than the total of attacks recorded in 2019. In September 2020, ISIS made an important gain regarding the claim to establish a caliphate in the country by seizing a strategic port in the north of Mozambique. According to the 2021 Europol report on the Terrorism situation in the EU, there were 57 terrorist attempts in the EU in 2020, compared to 55 in 2019. A total of 449 arrests on suspicion of terrorist offences were reported to Europol in 2020. This number was significantly lower than the one in 2019. It is unclear whether this drop is due to reduced terrorist activities or is a result of diminished operational capacities of law enforcement due to the Covid-19 pandemic (Terrorism in the EU: 2021). The pandemic had a significant impact on levels of conflict and violence. The level of civil unrest rose in 2020, fuelled in large part by responses to government's measure designed to stop the spread of the coronavirus. Over 5,000 pandemic-related violent events were recorded between January 2020 and April 2021. In the past year, 87 countries recorded an improvement in peacefulness, while 73 countries recorded a deterioration. Three countries recorded no change in their overall score (Global Peace Index: 2011)

COVID-19 could play a role in mitigating the terrorist threat in the short term. It is considered that the pandemic can reduce the desire of terrorists to act and to launch an attack. The economic problems caused by COVID-19 have probably deprived many terrorist organizations of their source of income. Terrorist organizations may have more difficulty in finding resources such as money and weapons while planning an attack during the pandemic period. However, as governments focus on the pandemic, terrorist organizations can take advantage of this situation and access new funding sources. The failure of governments to counter COVID-19 leads to a decrease in confidence in the financial system, which in some countries causes cash outflow from the banking system. These unrecorded financial resources can be exploited and used by terrorist organizations (The impact of the COVID-19, 2020: 2).

Terrorist organizations can find support for their activities by manipulating humanitarian campaigns (COVID-19-Related, 2020: 10). In the period of COVID-19, there is a risk that terrorist organizations exploit people's goodwill and aid distributed. Terrorist organizations have been trying to benefit from every disaster that has occurred in Indonesia for the last two decades. It is stated that protective equipment and aid donations

for healthcare workers can be seized by organizations that support ISIS in Indonesia (IPAC Short Briefing, 2020).

The US-led anti-ISIS coalition reports that it has provided \$ 1.2 million of supplies to hospitals and prisons in Hasakah and Shaddadi, which are under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces in northern Syria, to be used against the COVID-19 outbreak. The US Department of Defense is planning a total of \$ 200 million in arms and equipment assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces (U.S. Central Command, 2020). Turkey considers the SDF's core component YPG as a terrorist group, inseparable from the PKK. The PKK has also been designated as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the U.S. and the EU.

The COVID-19 pandemic also creates mitigating conditions for the terrorist threat in most parts of the world. If terrorist organization leaders cannot protect their members against COVID-19, if they are unable to provide care to members of the organization who are sick, these members may turn against the terrorist organization, and the organization may dissolve (COVID-19 and Its Impact, 2020). In the period of COVID-19, terrorists can get sick and need health care like everyone else. In some regions, resources transferred to terrorist organizations in proxy wars may decrease during the pandemic period. As a precaution to the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries close their borders to foreigners. International travel restrictions and increased border security are hampering the movement of terrorist actors, including foreign terrorist fighters. Curfews and travel restrictions within the country make it difficult for terrorists planning attacks. Curfews and quarantines prevent terrorists from moving, recruiting, and raising money (Eleventh report, 2020).

The supply chain, which has been disrupted by the pandemic, also negatively affects terrorist organizations. Disruption of global, regional, and national supply chains makes it difficult for terrorist groups to access food, medicine, Money, and weapons (Eleventh report, 2020). Physical distance measures are applied in almost every country in the world. The lack of crowds in social life makes the bomb attacks carried out by terrorist organizations much more ineffective. While the measures taken to combat the virus prevent the crowds from gathering in the squares, this reduces the number of potential targets for terrorists. Therefore, measures are being increased against terrorist organizations that want to target hospitals and markets (COVID-19 and Its Impact, 2020).

Media has become an indispensable tool for terrorist groups in order to raise social anxiety and fear (Pfefferbaum, 2003: 177). Violent groups have less coverage due to the greater focus of the media on COVID-19. Media focus on COVID-19 during the pandemic may deter terrorist organizations from attacking (Davis, 2020). One of the most important goals of terrorism is to instill fear in society. However, if any terrorist attack does not attract attention in the society and does not come to the social agenda, there is no point in carrying out this attack for terrorists.

States that have been successful against the COVID-19 pandemic and adopt asymmetric methods as strategies can see the pandemic as an opportunity to contain terrorist organizations (Özcan, 2020: 94). 809 terrorists were killed in the internal security operations carried out by the Turkish army against the PKK in 2020. Participation in the

terrorist organization PKK has reached the lowest level in history. The number of terrorists participating in the organization, which was over 5,000 per year in 2014, decreased to 130 in 2019 and 52 in 2020 (Gemici & Boztepe, 2020).

### **Social Anxiety and Terrorism During the Pandemic**

Besides its social, political, and economic consequences, the COVID-19 pandemic is fundamentally a health crisis. There is a high level of anxiety about this health crisis as it directly threatens people's lives. The spread of the virus from China to the whole world in a short time, its lethal nature and the unpreparedness of the health systems of the states for such a pandemic resulted in the combination of anxiety, fear, and panic in societies. A new study published in the *Lancet*, a medical journal, attempts to quantify the impact of COVID-19 on mental health. The authors estimate that cases of depression rose by 53m globally as a consequence of the pandemic, 28% above pre-pandemic levels; cases of anxiety increased by 76m, a 26% rise (COVID-19 Mental, 2021).

The great social changes experienced can cause one to feel insecure. People may feel weaker if they think they don't have the resources to remove uncertainty. Anxiety is even higher in people who feel weak and helpless. People want to reduce or manage uncertainty, and this can lead to thoughts about extremism, or even extremism (Hogg, Kruglanski & Bos, 2013). According to the uncertainty-identity theory, along with the insecurity experienced, uncertainty can motivate people to identify with different groups. In this period of uncertainty, the behavior of extremist groups can become attractive to people. In times of uncertainty and anxiety, people can identify with different groups with strong and directive leadership (Hogg, 2014).

People are motivated to reduce uncertainty about their lives. For people, decreasing uncertainty means removing anxiety about their own lives. In situations of high uncertainty, anger, and social anxiety, extremist views may find more support among people (Hogg, 2014). Anxiety about one's own eventual death may also be one of the factors contributing to supporting terrorism under favorable conditions (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). People who are members of terrorist organizations can reduce the uncertainty in their lives with their group identity. Under conditions of uncertainty, people can try to identify with such extremist groups (Hogg, 2014: 339).

The uncertainty and chaos caused by COVID 19 are widely exploited by terrorist organizations. These groups are trying to use people's concerns such as loss of freedom due to COVID-19. The terrorist organization ISIS is aware of the negative impact of the pandemic on social anxiety and draws attention to this. In *Al-Naba*, the media organ of ISIS, it is pointed out that the fear of virus infection affects its enemies more than the virus itself (Contending with ISIS, 2020). During this period, terrorist organizations follow tactics such as complain, react with crime and violence. The intense social anxiety caused by the COVID-19 crisis has been used by terrorist organizations around the world to spread hatred, conspiracy theories, and anti-government sentiments to incite new attacks (Report of the Secretary-General, 2020: 125).

### **Economic Anxiety During the Pandemic**

The economic difficulties experienced as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic are compared with the 1929 World Depression. The economic recession in 2020 caused sharp

declines in employment, similar to the Great Depression. While the Great Depression continued for about 4 years, the economic contraction in 2020 returned to growth in 2021 (Wheelock, 2020). With the economy shrinking due to the pandemic, people are becoming more anxious about the future while becoming unemployed. In addition, people feel lonely and weak during lockdowns. Terrorist organizations exploit the sense of belonging to a community in order to make these unemployed people feel safe (Kruglanski, et al., 2020: 122) Terrorist organizations provoke acts of violence against the authority by using the reactions of people with their economic difficulties.

The pandemic affects socially low income groups more negatively. Millions of people working with low wages in the service sector around the world have become unemployed. These people in economic difficulties are more open to the propaganda of terrorist organizations. People who are unemployed, without income and therefore angry with the state become potential members of terrorist organizations. Low class people tend to belong to one group more than others. Therefore, people with low income may choose to join a group to reduce uncertainty in their lives (Reid & Hogg, 2005). When people become members of a group or acquire a group identity in an environment of uncertainty such as an pandemic, their anxiety in their minds may decrease (Jonas, 2014). According to the uncertainty-identity theory, people can identify with groups with distinctive attitudes and behaviors. Groups can change the attitudes, beliefs, norms, and behaviors of their new members (Hogg, 1993).

The new conditions created by the pandemic create economic uncertainty. Uncertainty is a situation that increases anxiety in social life and economy. Surveys conducted during the pandemic period reveal that the biggest social concern is experienced in the economy. The majority of people living in developed and developing countries do not expect the economies to recover quickly when the COVID-19 quarantine process ends. The majority of people in 10 of the 15 countries participating in the global survey conducted by the Ipsos company with 29 thousand people in April 2020, do not think that the economy will recover quickly when the pandemic is over (Many think it's, 2020).

Turkish people see the economy as the biggest problem in the pandemic process. A research on this subject was published by Ipsos in October 2020. According to Ipsos' survey, the rate of those who are afraid of being unemployed is 94% in the lower income group. According to the research, the ratio of those in the upper income group who are afraid of being unemployed is 70% in Turkey (Toplumun Büyük Çoğunluğu, 2020). Konsensüs Research survey conducted in November 2020 showed that 46.5% of respondents view unemployment as the biggest problem in Turkey. In the research, terrorism ranks fourth in the list of problems with 22.7%. (Türkiye Gündem Araştırması-51, 2020: 87). ANAR made a survey in May 2020 that included the question "Except Covid-19 what is the most important problem in Turkey?". 77.6% of the people participating in this survey conducted by the company gave economy as the answer. In ANAR's research, the rate of those who call the same question terror and security the most important problem after COVID 19 remains at the rate of 3.7% (Korona Virüsü Salgını, 2020: 16). With the pandemic, economic concerns are at a high level in countries, while the terror concern in the society decreases to much lower levels.



## Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic is increasing social anxiety and undermining the public's trust in its inadequate state against the disease. Outbreaks cannot trigger a conflict in society on their own. However, the conditions created by pandemics and the way states respond can cause anxiety, unrest, and violence in society. Terrorist organizations increase anxiety in times of crisis, and as a result, the public may question the legitimacy of the government. For this reason, governments must establish mechanisms to keep people in the system by reducing the economic effects of the pandemic. If governments provide adequate social and economic supports in addition to health services against the pandemic, people can be prevented from excluding themselves from the system and turning to radicalization. Terrorist organizations target certain groups, especially minorities and foreigners, in times of crisis and incite violence. Since terrorist organizations use conspiracy theories in this process, it is very important for the administrations to communicate the correct information to the public.

Terrorists are trying to include the virus in their agenda and are trying to take advantage of the pandemic. However, in the long run, it is already difficult to assess what kind of impact COVID-19 has on the intensity of terrorism around the world. It will be useful to carry out new studies on this subject in the upcoming years because this study is limited to 2020. While trying to understand the terrorist threat in the period of COVID-19, it is necessary to consider both the exacerbating and mitigating conditions of the pandemic. For example, in the Ebola pandemic between 2014 and 2015, it was observed that social and political violence increased in West African countries (Wood and Thorin Wright, 2020). Although there was an increase in ISIS activities in Syria and Iraq during the COVID-19 period, it may be wrong to directly associate the fluctuations in terrorist activities with COVID-19. This kind of analysis can cause confusion between causation and correlation. In addition, another security concern that comes up with COVID-19 is bioterrorism. Following the devastating economic and social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, terrorist organizations' interest in biological and chemical weapons may increase.

States should consider that while dealing with the pandemic in the short term, the society may be adversely affected in the long term due to economic and social difficulties. The economic problems that arise with the pandemic can provide an environment that terrorist organizations can use in the upcoming periods. Economic crises, social polarization, loss of trust in authority, anxiety, and uncertainties offer terrorist organizations wide opportunities in the long run. Some countries have had to reduce their counter-terrorism operations during the pandemic period due to decreasing budgets and changing priorities. It is considered that terrorists will try to take advantage of this security gap. Risks may increase due to reduced operations in conflict zones where the fight against international terrorism is carried out.

Sometimes terrorist organizations declare a ceasefire in times of disaster. In such periods, indirect negotiations are held between governments and organizations. There is a possibility that similar negotiations between governments and organizations to contain the spread of COVID-19. With an optimistic point of view, at the end of the negotiations, a compromise can be reached in conflicts that last for years. For example, the tsunami

disaster in December 2004 accelerated the process that led the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement to peace. The Free Aceh Movement suffered military, social, and economic difficulties after the tsunami in which approximately 200 thousand people lost their lives. After the pressure on delivering aid to the region in a healthy way, the Free Aceh Movement preferred to negotiate instead of conflict. Free Aceh Movement supported aid efforts with the unilateral ceasefire announced after the tsunami (Schiff, 2013). For international cooperation against COVID-19, existing conflicts between states should also be suspended. If peace efforts increase and conflicts can be prevented, states can concentrate on the pandemic and fight against terrorist organizations that try to take advantage of this environment. In this way, the social anxiety that has increased with the pandemic may not experience terror anxiety.

Just as states were unprepared for terrorism, they were also caught unprepared for the pandemic. The responses of some states to COVID-19 may further broaden public concern and create conditions favorable to terrorism. Governments should lift strict measures that limit their freedoms against COVID-19 after the pandemic. Decisions such as continuing to use mobile surveillance methods or continuing to restrict freedoms after the pandemic can reduce trust in the state. A perception about the authoritarian structure of the state can create a social environment where terrorist organizations can be fed.

Just as terrorism is a major and immediate concern for society, COVID-19 is similarly a social concern. Moreover, while the social anxiety caused by terror remained limited to the area where the attack took place, the anxiety that came with the pandemic spread all over the world. Therefore, just as terror creates a social trauma, the pandemic creates a social trauma in the same way. However, the solution is more difficult as the problem is not limited to a single region and spreads to the whole world. Countries' non-cooperative behavior against a common threat, especially health equipment and vaccines, creates global uncertainty and security gap. This leads to the widespread international exploitation of COVID-19 by terrorist organizations. Global efforts are also required to solve the pandemic, as the problem is global. While international solidarity against the pandemic gains importance, the collaborations made in this period can both prepare a ground for efforts to combat global terrorism in the future and reduce social concerns.

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## The Reliability of COVID-19 Data in the Shadow of Anti-Pandemic Measures' Cancellation

### Pandemi Önlemlerinin Kaldırılması Kararları Işığında Covid-19 Verilerinin Güvenilirliği Sorunu

Evgeny Sedashov<sup>1</sup> , Mert Moral<sup>2</sup> 

#### Abstract

COVID-19 pandemic necessitates taking measures that may be very costly from an economic standpoint and likely to make the mass public discontent. If an anti-pandemic regimen does not accomplish its goals, its costs become even harder to justify. We argue that, under such circumstances, cancellation of an anti-pandemic regimen would decrease the reliability of health data because rank-in-file policymakers and bureaucrats have incentives to present more optimistic statistics to signal their competence and politicians would further pressure them to report statistics that appear to agree with the cancellation of restrictions and give legitimacy to taking the measures. Our empirical analyses suggest that closeness to the restrictions' cancellation date is associated with lower reliability of COVID-19 daily cumulative cases and deaths data. Being robust to several sensitivity and robustness checks, this finding is alarming from the perspective of representative democracy and for those who have to survive in these turbulent times.

#### Keywords

COVID-19 pandemic, Pandemic restrictions, Data manipulation, Populism, Comparative politics

#### Öz

Covid-19 pandemisi, dünyanın dört bir yanındaki hükümetleri oldukça önemli ekonomik ve sosyal sonuçları olan tedbirler almaya itmiştir. Alınan bu oldukça sert tedbirlerin pandemiyle mücadele hususunda yetersiz kaldığı yahut başarısız olduğu durumlarda, bu tedbirler en başta ekonomik olmak üzere toplumun çeşitli kesimleri üzerindeki ağır maliyetleri kamuoyu nezdinde tepkiyle karşılanabilmektedir. Çalışmamızda bu gibi durumlarda, hükümetler ve ilgili uzmanların aldıkları tedbirlerin başarısını ölçmek için referans aldığımız hasta ve vefat istatistiklerinin güvenilirliğinin önemli ölçüde azaldığı öne sürülmektedir. Zira, alınan bu sert tedbirlerin başarısız olması durumunda, seçilmişler bunların meşruluğunu ve olumlu sonuçlarını gösterecek, daha iyimser istatistikler yayımlanmasını talep etme temayülünde olacak ve ilgili istatistiklerin hazırlanmasından sorumlu uzman ve bürokratlar üzerlerinde çeşitli baskılar kuracaklardır. Nitekim, betimsel ve ampirik tahliller tam kapanma uygulamasının sona ermesinin öncesinde toplam vefat ve hasta sayılarına dair istatistiklerin daha az güvenilir hala geldiğini göstermektedir. Çalışmamızın eklerinde yer verilen alternatif model, ölçüt ve analizler de bu sonuçları destekler niteliktedir. Bu açıdan, çalışmamızın sonuçları gerek temsili demokrasi gerekse de pandemi süresince hayatlarını bu istatistiklere göre idame ettirmeye çalışan vatandaşlar için oldukça kaygı vericidir.

#### Anahtar Kelimeler

Covid-19, Pandemiyle mücadele önlemleri, Veri manipülasyonu, Popülizm, Karşılaştırmalı siyaset

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## Introduction

It has been more than a year since the first reports of COVID-19 appeared in media outlets. As the pandemic has unfolded, governments around the globe were forced to make difficult decisions to alleviate major public health crises. The resulting anti-pandemic measures have varied from the cancellation of public events, school closings, and stay-at-home requirements to restrictions on international travel and many other policies constraining our daily lives (Thomas Hale et al., 2020b). One unifying feature of all those measures is their economic cost. Any enterprise that somehow involves in-person interactions was affected, and many people lost their income and jobs as a result. In the US alone, unemployment peaked at 14.7% in April 2020 before returning to a more acceptable, but still higher-than-average 6.7% (Falk, Romero, Nicchitta, & Nyhof, 2020), while the real GDP is projected to contract by 5.6% (Seliski, 2020). In the world, 92.9% of economies are expected to be in a state of recession as of 2020, while the global GDP is expected to shrink by about 4% (World Bank, 2021). In short, governments have been caught between the Scylla of health-related consequences of COVID-19 and the Charybdis of economic downturn brought about by their attempts to constrain the disease. Under such circumstances, the longer a government maintains a strict anti-pandemic regimen, the higher is its potential political cost.

This short paper aims to provide a theoretical discussion and empirical investigation of the relationship between the cancellation of anti-pandemic measures and the manipulation of the pandemic statistics. We propose two main reasons why the cancellation of restrictions may cause less reliable data reporting in the days immediately preceding such cancellation. Firstly, rank-in-file policy administrators have incentives to present more optimistic statistics mainly because they would like to signal their competence and improve their post-pandemic careers. Secondly, politicians would like to give legitimacy to the policy cancellation and, therefore, may induce reporting of statistics that are in agreement with the public's perception that things are getting better.

We test these expectations by employing the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker data (Thomas Hale et al., 2020a) and find evidence of manipulation in cumulative cases and deaths data in the days preceding the cancellation of restrictions. Because democratic governance and the relationship between the representatives and the represented rest on responsibility, accountability, and congruence, we also assess whether the expected effect of policy cancellation on the reliability of COVID-19 reporting is conditioned by the type of political regime. Finally, we check whether the reliability of COVID-19 reporting in the days preceding the cancellation of restrictions differs across populist and non-populist governments.

Following a discussion of our theoretical framework informed by the social psychology and political science literature in the next section, we present our research design and empirical findings. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings from the perspective of representative democracy.

### **Cancellation of Anti-Pandemic Measures and the Reliability of Reporting**

Like any other policy decision, the cancellation of anti-pandemic measures creates behavioral incentives for various actors. In this study, we are interested in the behavior



of two groups of actors. The first group consists of political elites who make the ultimate decisions of when to introduce an anti-pandemic regimen, how strict the regimen should be, and when to cancel the restrictions. The second group is made up of rank-in-file bureaucrats who are responsible for the implementation of the anti-pandemic regimen introduced by politicians. In the following subsection, we consider how the incentives of both these two groups of actors may lead to disincentives for correctly reporting COVID-19 statistics before the cancellation of restrictions.

### **Bureaucratic Misreporting**

In this subsection, we are going to assume a career-motivated bureaucrat (policy administrator) –i.e., the bureaucrat is always motivated to perform actions that bolster their chances of future promotions. The COVID-19 pandemic presents a unique challenge for rank-in-file policy administrators, but also a unique opportunity. If an administrator can demonstrate their efficiency under such conditions, this efficiency will likely translate into promotion opportunities once the pandemic disappears.

How can such circumstances lead to data manipulations? An administrator would like to signal their competence by showing a reduction in COVID-19 cases and deaths in their area of responsibility because their future promotions significantly depend on these two performance indicators. To give a practical example, one can imagine the head of a certain municipality who would like to rise in ranks by showing that their municipality implemented restrictions more strictly than did the neighboring municipalities. By presenting case and death counts that are more in accordance with the policy expectations, the head of the municipality can bolster their chances of future promotions.

Making matters worse, misreporting itself can become an epidemic-like phenomenon. If an administrator starts to present manipulated statistics with the hope of improving their post-pandemic career prospects, to avoid looking incompetent other administrators may be pushed to “cook” the statistics too. This would remind the reader of the well-known prisoners’ dilemma. The outcome when all officials present correct data is preferable for the public, but each administrator has individual incentives to present a more favorable picture as a way of improving their future promotion chances.

### **Legitimacy of Policy Cancellation**

Before we consider how the cancellation of anti-pandemic measures influences politicians’ incentives regarding health data reporting, let us first consider the cancellation of anti-pandemic measures from the perspective of citizens. We have already mentioned that anti-pandemic measures are often highly costly from an economic standpoint. The key question, therefore, concerns the conditions under which these costs would be perceived by the public as justifiable.

Generally speaking, at the moment of policy cancellation there are three possible scenarios: the epidemiological situation may be worse than that before the introduction of the policy, the epidemiological situation may be the same as before, and the epidemiological situation may be better than before the introduction of the policy. All three scenarios have corresponding counterfactuals that citizens can employ as evaluative tools.

To keep the discussion concise, we assign each counterfactual a label and then refer to the label in the following discussion. If the statistics are worse than those before the

introduction of restrictions, there is only one counterfactual (A1) that corresponds to the avoidance of an economic downturn caused by the restrictions. In other words, if the policy did nothing to improve the health statistics (e.g., the numbers of new cases and/or deaths), the associated economic costs would be perceived by the public as unnecessary, therefore increasing the political costs of the policy.

If there was no substantive change in the state of the epidemiology, there are two counterfactuals: the situation would have stayed the same even without the policy (counterfactual B1) or become worse without the policy (counterfactual B2). One may be inclined to think that there is a third plausible counterfactual that corresponds to the epidemiological situation improving without the policy. However, this counterfactual contradicts the very basic logic of pandemic fighting; it also requires a very high degree of optimism which is unlikely to emerge under pandemic circumstances. Due to these reasons, we do not consider the improvement scenario as a plausible counterfactual here.

Finally, if the state of the epidemiology had substantially improved, there are three counterfactuals: the situation would have become worse without the policy (counterfactual C1), the situation would have stayed the same without the policy (counterfactual C2), and the situation would have improved on its own without the policy (counterfactual C3). In this context, the main question of interest is which of those counterfactuals citizens would perceive as the most probable.

Social psychology literature provides us with several useful insights concerning citizens' counterfactual reasoning. Roese (1994) defines two general groups of counterfactuals: *upward* counterfactuals are "those that describe alternatives that are better than what actually happened," while *downward* counterfactuals "describe alternatives that are worse than reality". We employ this framework and divide the counterfactuals accordingly: A1, B1, and C3 are upward counterfactuals because they are centered around the feeling of regret for the policy introduction (i.e., "if the policy had not been introduced, things would have still been the same, but the economy would not have been in shamble") while B2, C1, and C2 are downward counterfactuals because they are focused on how things would have been even worse without the policy. Therefore, our task is to determine which type of counterfactual reasoning, upward or downward, citizens are more likely to employ in the environment shaped by COVID-19.

The most important pandemic-related factor that can affect citizens' counterfactual thinking is distress: people feel anxious due to health concerns and uncertain about their future (Galea, Merchant, & Lurie, 2020; Shevlin et al., 2020; Swami, George Horne, & Furnham, 2021; Tull et al., 2020). Under such conditions, psychological defense mechanisms are activated to avoid other sources of stress. Upward counterfactual reasoning, on the other hand, is well-known to cause greater distress (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Gilbar & Hevroni, 2007; Lecci, Okun, & Karoly, 1994). Therefore, psychological defense mechanisms push people to avoid engaging in upward counterfactual reasoning because it can cause additional distress.

How can this framework help explain politicians' calculus related to policy cancellation? First, upward counterfactuals are known to be associated with harsher evaluations of decisions and decision-makers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, &

Ritov, 1997). Politicians, therefore, stand to lose quite a lot if citizens primarily rely on upward counterfactuals in their evaluation of politicians' actions such as the introduction of stay-at-home policies. Second, when the policy does not prevent the worsening of the state of the pandemic, we would observe only an upward counterfactual. Third, the remaining scenarios have both upward and downward counterfactuals, and people under the stress of the pandemic will be more inclined to use downward counterfactual reasoning. However, the upward counterfactual B1 is much more plausible than the upward counterfactual C3 simply because an expectation about the improvement of the situation without any policy interventions requires a very high degree of optimism. Therefore, politicians have multiple incentives to present the outcome of the policy in accordance with the improvement scenario in order to avoid citizens' discontent caused by upward counterfactual reasoning.

To summarize, our arguments point to a high degree of potential for data manipulation before the cancellation of restrictions. On the one hand, career bureaucrats motivated by post-pandemic promotion opportunities have incentives to report optimistic statistics to signal their competence and efficiency. On the other hand, politicians also have incentives to present more optimistic statistics to avoid potential punishment from citizens and to improve their reelection chances. Hence, our main hypothesis is as follows:

*The closer the restrictions' cancellation date, the lower the reliability of COVID-19 reported data.*

The arguments above rest on the assumption that neither career bureaucrats nor politicians are constrained in their decision-making calculations. In fact, another discipline, political science, provides us with a list of several important factors that are likely to constrain the actions of political and bureaucratic actors: democratic accountability, and checks and balances. Shvetsova et al., (2020) find that a political regime does indeed condition governments' anti-pandemic policies: democratic and decentralized countries show a faster and stronger response to the pandemic. Likewise, Frey, Chen, and Presidente (2020) show that democracies were more successful than autocratic ones at reducing mobility without imposing as stringent lockdowns. In another study examining only the EU-member countries, UK, Switzerland, France, and the UK, Toshkov, Carroll, and Yeşilkağıt (2021), on the other hand, show that countries with higher democracy scores were slower in adopting school closure and national lockdown policies (approximated as the natural log of the number of confirmed cases). Although the findings are contradictory, a similar conditioning mechanism might be in play for policy cancellation, too: as liberal democracies restrict career bureaucrats and politicians in their powers to manipulate health statistics by higher state capacity, well-functioning institutions, a well-informed citizenry, free media, freedom of expression, low levels of press-party parallelism, a strong opposition, and strong civil society organizations. Consequently, we hypothesize that:

*The negative effect of the anti-pandemic policy cancellation on the reliability of COVID-19 statistics will be more pronounced in nondemocratic regimes.*

A government's level of populism constitutes another important political dimension pertaining to the anti-pandemic response. Populism was famously coined by Mudde as a "thin-centered ideology" (2007, p. 23), which "considers society to be ultimately

separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (2004, p. 543). Here, we define populist leaders as those who “adopt a certain style of behavior, discursive frame, or [the above mentioned] thin ideology... in which everyday citizens are framed as in need of regaining control over the political institutions that were meant to serve them, institutions which are felt to be corrupted by elites to serve the interests of the opulent minority, the Other, the few hegemony near and far” (Gagnon et al., 2018, pp. xi-xii). Such antagonism between the ‘pure people’ and ‘corrupt elites,’ the anti-elitist discourse of populist leaders (also see: Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Rooduijn, 2019), as well as populist party supporters’ higher levels of distrust in elites (including the experts, e.g., Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017) manifest themselves in how populist leaders have framed the COVID-19 pandemic, and how rapidly they have responded to it. For instance, Kavakli (2020) argues that populist and right-wing governments implemented fewer counter-measures at the onset of the pandemic. Some populist leaders (e.g., Trump and Bolsonaro) even dismissed health and policy experts’ recommendations for the ‘interest’ of the public. Since populist ideology rests on the “people vs. corrupt elite” premise (Mudde, 2007), populist governments must constantly show that they are on the people’s side, especially given the high political and economic costs of the anti-pandemic measures we explained above. This, in turn, implies populist leaders’ heightened desire to demonstrate the effectiveness of the few -but necessary- policies they make and the legitimacy of their cancellation. Therefore, we expect that:

*The negative effect of the anti-pandemic policy cancellation on the reliability of COVID-19 statistics will be more pronounced in countries with populist governments.*

## **Data and Research Design**

### **Dependent Variable**

For our dependent variable, we need a good measure of the reliability of COVID-19 data. The so-called Newcomb-Benford Law (Benford, 1938; Newcomb, 1881), or the NBL for short, describes the distribution of the leading digits of numbers that occur in various social and natural phenomena. From an intuitive standpoint, the digits (from 1 to 9) should have the same probability of occupying the leading position in a number. For instance, one can generate a sequence from 1 to 1 billion in any computational software and observe that digits from 1 to 9 indeed come out as equiprobable. However, the NBL demonstrates that many naturally occurring phenomena do not follow this pattern: 1 is the most frequent leading digit with a probability of 0.3, 2 is the second most frequent leading digit with a probability of 0.18, and so on until 9, which is the least frequent leading digit with a probability of 0.04.

The first digits of many physical constants and population statistics are well-approximated by the NBL, as well as many numbers associated with other diseases than COVID-19 (Sambridge, Hrvoje Tkalcic, & Jackson, 2010). Naturally, the NBL has long been used as a fraud and data manipulation detection tool. For example, it has been used to detect election (Mebane, 2006, 2008), scientific and accounting fraud (Grammatikos & Papanikolaou, 2021; Varian, 1972). Not surprisingly, the NBL has also been employed

to detect manipulations with COVID-19 statistics in recent research as well (Anran Wei & Vellwock, 2020; Sambridge & Jackson, 2020; Wei & Vellwock, 2020).

Our use of the NBL in this paper is slightly more complicated than it is in previous applications because we would like to track how the reliability of data varies over time and shortly before policy cancellation. With this aim, we generate the appropriate measure in several steps. Firstly, for each country included in the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker dataset (Thomas Hale et al., 2020a) we check the date when the first case/death was detected. Secondly, we calculate a quality-of-fit statistic to estimate the difference between the observed cases and deaths data and the NBL. In doing so, we exclude the first 30 observations for each country since the probabilities of observing the digits with fewer observations will deviate from those predicted by the NBL to a great extent. Such deviations should however be lower when there are more observations. Hence, in the case of non-fraudulent reporting, we should observe a negative deviation trend over time –i.e., when countries report more daily statistics. After the 30th day since the detection of the first case/death, we start by calculating a quality-of-fit statistic for the first 31 days, then we do the same for the first 32 days, and so on. What this statistic provides us is essentially a time- sensitive measure of the data reliability, which is what we need for testing our hypotheses.

As our reliability measure, we employ a modified version of Pearson's  $\chi^2$ <sup>1</sup> to measure the deviation of the observed data from the NBL. The statistic is calculated with the following formula:

$$\chi^2 = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^9 (\tilde{p}_i - p_i)^2}{p_i}$$

, where  $\tilde{p}_i$  is the observed proportion of the digit  $i$  in the data, and  $p_i$  is the proportion of the digit  $i$  expected by the NBL.<sup>2</sup> We calculate this quality-of-fit statistic for cumulative daily cases, ( $\Delta$ ) daily cases, cumulative daily deaths, and ( $\Delta$ ) daily deaths, resulting in a total of four dependent variables.

### Independent Variables and Control Variables

Our empirical investigation focuses on the cancellation of the stay-at-home policy. The reasons for this choice are twofold. First, the stay-at-home policy is one of the toughest anti-pandemic measures and has been documented to cause extreme stress among citizens (Tull et al., 2020). Hamadani et al. (2020) document the increased level of depression and anxiety among Bangladeshi mothers after the introduction of the stay-at-home policy; the rise in the levels of emotional and physical violence was also reported. Second, the stay-at-home policy is one of the costliest anti-pandemic measures from both political and, as stated above, economic standpoints. Even though scholars now mostly agree that the stay-at-home order is an effective anti-pandemic policy (Doyle et al., 2020), citizens tend to feel its costs more acutely than its effects, especially those who lost jobs and income

1 We report the results for an alternative quality-of-fit statistic,  $D = \sum_{i=1}^9 |\tilde{p}_i - p_i|$  in Table A.9 in the online appendices. The models employing this alternative measure show essentially the same findings.

2 The standard  $\chi^2$  formula includes the total number of observations  $N$ :  $\chi^2 = N \frac{\sum_{i=1}^9 (\tilde{p}_i - p_i)^2}{p_i}$ . Since our independent variable is the number of days before policy cancellation, including  $N$  into the quality-of-fit statistic creates a mechanical effect. To avoid this, we removed  $N$  from the formula.

as a result. Due to these reasons, we believe that our theoretical arguments are the most applicable to the stay-at-home policy.

To construct our independent variable, we count the number of days until the cancellation of the stay-at-home requirement. In the absence of data manipulation, we would expect a negative relationship between this variable, which, for instance, scores -30 for 30 days before and 0 on the cancellation day of the policy, and the degree of deviation from the NBL. This is because, as noted in the previous section, with the growing number of available data points the distribution of cases/deaths should become closer to the NBL (i.e., we should observe convergence in distribution to the NBL) (Miller & Nigrini, 2008), and an increase in our independent variable corresponds to a larger number of available data points. If we observe a positive relationship, however, our main hypothesis is likely to be true.

Our control variables include the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (Inklaar, de Jong, Bolt, & van Zanden, 2018), log of total population (World Bank, 2019), and the revised autocracy-democracy measure (Polity2) from the Polity project (Marshall & Gurr, 2020). All data are coded from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2020) and we inform the list of control variables by previous research (Adiguzel, Cansunar, & Corekcioglu, 2020) on the reliability of COVID-19 reporting.

## **Analyses and Results**


### **Descriptive Evidence**

We start our analyses by discussing some descriptive evidence for our arguments. Some countries have already started admitting incorrect reporting of COVID-19 statistics. Russia, for example, has recently officially confirmed that reported death tolls were incorrect (Agence France-Press, 2020). However, such admissions cannot conclusively establish the effect of anti-pandemic policy cancellation on COVID-19 data reliability. After all, some countries may always report skewed numbers, and such reporting is not specifically driven by any policy cancellation considerations.

To provide more relevant evidence, we thus turn to our data and demonstrate the basic relationship between days before cancellation of the stay-at-home order and estimated chi-squared statistics for two countries, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. One can see from the scatterplots in Figure 1 that the numbers of cumulative cases reported by the UK appear to be truthful since the chi-squared statistic becomes smaller as the policy cancellation day approaches while the reliability of COVID-19 cumulative cases data in Saudi Arabia appears to diminish as the policy cancellation day becomes closer. The evidence for daily new cases is more mixed. In the UK, the data reliability seems to diminish between the 30 and 11 days preceding the cancellation, but after then the trend reverses and reporting becomes more truthful. In Saudi Arabia, the trend is similar to the one for cumulative cases. This observation points to the possible conditioning effect we discussed earlier: since the UK is an established democracy with well-functioning checks and balances and a free media environment, opportunities for data manipulations are more limited than in Saudi Arabia, one of the most authoritarian countries in the world. We now turn to the regression methods and test our expectations more systematically.

## Regression Analyses

Our sample consists of all countries that have introduced and canceled the stay-at-home order at least once and with total cumulative cases of no less than 10,000.<sup>3</sup> Given our measure of data reliability, we restrict our attention to the stay-at-home orders for at least 30 days and discard the window of the first 30 days after the introduction of a policy and examine all other days preceding the cancellation in our empirical analyses. Therefore, for all country-policy pairs, the minimum value of the independent variable is -30 and the maximum value is 0.<sup>4 5</sup>



*Figure 1.* # of Days before Policy Cancellation and the Reliability of COVID-19 Data, UK and Saudi Arabia

Due to the construction of our dependent variable, there is an obvious autocorrelation, which renders OLS inappropriate. Since we have multiple country panels, the most appropriate statistical tool for analyzing the data is Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors (Prais & Winsten, 1954).<sup>6</sup> We also follow the recommendation of Beck and Katz (1995) and employ the AR1 autocorrelation structure to correct our standard errors.<sup>7</sup>

3 We provide the full list of country-policy pairs in Table A.1 of the online appendices.

4 Because the policy duration –i.e., the number of days between the coming into force and cancellation of the stay-at-home policy– varies between 1 (Uruguay, cancelled on August 25, 2020) and 629 days (Canada, cancelled on December 3, 2021) and several other systematic (e.g., seasonality, shorter policies being less effective) and unsystematic factors affect our dependent variable especially for longer policy periods, we focus on policies that were in force for at least 30 days and to the last month of the policy period and country-days with at least 10,000 recorded cumulative cases.

5 We also ran our models for an extended set of countries that maintained the policy for at least 15 days and used a 15-day window. The estimates presented in Table A.4 of the online appendices are substantively the same.

6 All models were estimated with Stata's `xtpsc` command.

7 See Table A.10 in the online appendices for the fixed-effects GLS regression estimates.

Table 1

*Days before Policy Cancellation and the COVID-19 Data Reliability*

	<b>Cumulative Cases</b>	<b>Daily New Cases</b>	<b>Cumulative Deaths</b>	<b>Daily New Deaths</b>
Days before Cancellation	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Polity2	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.000)	0.024*** (0.002)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Population (log)	0.116*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.175*** (0.017)	-0.099*** (0.004)
GDPpc (log)	-0.019*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.001)	-0.078*** (0.013)	-0.079*** (0.002)
Constant	-1.103*** (0.069)	0.103 (0.090)	4.460*** (0.404)	2.658*** (0.069)
N	4973	4973	4973	4973
R <sup>2</sup>	0.171	0.128	0.211	0.201

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

We present the results in Table 1. Each of the four columns corresponds to a specific measure of the dependent variable.<sup>8</sup> For the cumulative cases and deaths data we find evidence of data manipulation: as the policy cancellation date approaches, the distribution of reported data becomes more and more dissimilar from the expected NBL distribution. In other words, the relationship becomes positive, whereas it should have been negative in the case of truthful reporting, as we pointed out in the previous section.

We do not find the same statistically significant positive relationship for the daily new cases and the daily new deaths data. We suspect this discrepancy across the models with different dependent variables has something to do with the public's attention to different types of COVID-19 statistics. To assess its plausibility, we compared Google search statistics for the term "total coronavirus cases" against the terms "daily new coronavirus cases" and "daily coronavirus cases." The term "total coronavirus cases" turns out to be a vastly more popular search: between January 3, 2020, and December 19, 2021. Its popularity always exceeds that of the "daily new coronavirus cases" and substantially exceeds the popularity of the "daily coronavirus cases." For deaths, this

<sup>8</sup> See Tables A.5-A.8 in the online appendices for the estimates from alternative model specifications.






Figure 2. Effect of the # of Days before Policy Cancellation on the Reliability of COVID-19 Data

comparison, however, gives a more mixed result, with terms changing their relative popularity across different periods of the pandemic.

To provide a more substantive illustration of our findings, we plot out-of-sample predictions in Figure 2. For cumulative cases and deaths, we observe a positive relationship between our independent variable and predicted  $\chi^2$  scores corroborating the results from Table 1. In reference to Figure 1 presenting descriptive evidence based on a comparison of a democratic and a non-democratic country, the predicted scores in Figure 2 show that cumulative case and death counts significantly depart from what we would expect if there were no data manipulation and misreporting. Moreover, as we expected, the deviation of the observed data from the NBL increases with higher temporal proximity to the cancellation date of the stay-at-home policies.

Table 2

Conditioning Effect of Democracy on COVID-19 Cases Reporting

	Cumulative, Democracies	Cumulative, Non-democracies	Daily New, Democracies	Daily New, Non-democracies
Days before Cancellation	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Population (log)	-0.093*** (0.006)	0.377*** (0.011)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.012** (0.006)
GDPpc (log)	-0.101*** (0.002)	0.045*** (0.006)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.027*** (0.005)
Constant	3.061*** (0.082)	-6.092*** (0.228)	0.020 (0.048)	0.139 (0.137)
N	3149	1824	3149	1824
R <sup>2</sup>	0.337	0.203	0.120	0.155

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

We test our first conditional hypothesis for cumulative and daily new cases by splitting our sample into two subsamples:<sup>9</sup> all countries with a Polity score equal to or higher than 6 are considered democracies, and the rest are nondemocracies.<sup>10</sup> The estimates are presented in Table 2, which do not show robust support for our expectations. The positive relationship we would expect to observe in the case of data manipulation holds for cumulative cases in both democracies and nondemocracies. Therefore, we conclude that the political regime does not exhibit any strong conditioning role for this statistical indicator. On the other hand, the findings for the daily new cases reveal the expected conditioning effect, as reporting in nondemocracies appears to be untruthful. In line with our expectations, higher state capacity, better functioning institutions and informed citizenry, higher media freedom and freedom of expression, lower press-party parallelism, and stronger oppositions and civil society seem to contribute to democracies' reporting of truthful data on the number of COVID-19 cases.

Next, we proceed to assess whether the relationship between the restrictions' cancellation and the COVID-19 data reliability is conditioned by populism. Given its larger geographical and temporal scope than other cross-national datasets on populism and that it provides researchers with both party- and country-level measures that are comparable across time and space, we employ the V-Party dataset (Lührmann et al., 2020) to identify the populist parties and create a variable that marks whether a populist party holds the power in a specific country. To code our independent variable, we first identified incumbent parties as those that were either single governing parties or senior partners of governing coalitions in the most recent elections. Then, we coded incumbent parties as populist or not based on their most recent V-Party populism index score. If a party's score exceeds the global (i.e., all countries and parties) mean plus one standard deviation, we coded it as populist.<sup>11</sup>

The findings are presented in Table 3. Relying on the split-sample design once again, we do observe the conditioning effect of populism on the relationship between days before cancellation and data reliability for both cumulative and daily new cases.<sup>12</sup> For cumulative cases, however, the evidence of data manipulation is present for non-populist governments, but not for populist governments. This is quite an intriguing finding. Given their common dismissal of expert recommendations and portrayal of themselves as the champion of the 'pure people,' one would expect populist governments to be the ones "cooking up" the COVID-19 numbers.

Yet, there is a plausible explanation. As noted above, Kavakli (2020) shows that populist governments had introduced fewer counter-measures at the onset of the pandemic. This lagged reaction to the health crisis quickly worsened its scope, so when

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9 This is mathematically equivalent to interacting all independent variables in the model equation with the binary variable we use for splitting the sample --i.e., democracy and populist incumbent party indicators in Tables 2 and 3.

10 The findings for deaths are presented in Table A.2 of the online appendices.

11 The values of V-Party indices are comparable over time and across space, which allows us to use the global distribution as the benchmark. Consequently, 19.1% of all and 18.4% of all incumbent governments in dataset are coded as populist. Given the other coding rules explained above, the countries with populist governments in our sample are as follows: Barbados, Cuba, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Hungary, Malta, Mongolia, Palestine, Poland, Serbia, Seychelles, Ukraine, and Venezuela.

12 The estimates for cumulative and daily deaths are presented in Table A.3 of the online appendices.

populist governments finally introduced the necessary restrictions, the situation had already become dire. Under such circumstances, restrictions led to easily observable improvements, and there was no need to “cook up” the numbers to present the measures as effective. Indeed, non-populist governments appear to provide truthful data for daily new cases, as the insignificant coefficient of the days before cancellation variable suggests.

Table 3

*Conditioning Effect of Populism on COVID-19 Cases Reporting*

	Cumulative, Pop = 0	Cumulative, Pop = 1	Daily New, Pop = 0	Daily New, Pop = 1
Days before Cancellation	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
Population (log)	0.140*** (0.003)	-0.220*** (0.010)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.072*** (0.011)
GDPpc (log)	-0.028*** (0.007)	0.061*** (0.007)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.062*** (0.021)
Constant	-1.403*** (0.073)	3.451*** (0.196)	0.062 (0.074)	0.799*** (0.355)
N	4320	585	4320	585
R <sup>2</sup>	0.171	0.540	0.158	0.128

Standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we examined how the cancellation of anti-pandemic measures affects the reliability of COVID-19 data. We argue that the incentives of both rank-in-file policy administrators and politicians lead to skewed reporting shortly before the cancellation of imposed restrictions on citizens' daily lives. Employing a very comprehensive sample that includes all countries that have introduced a stay-at-home policy between January 2020 and December 2021 and introducing an innovative measure of data reliability that allows for a time-series analysis of the effect of the cancellation of the stay-at-home policy on data manipulation, our empirical analyses suggest that this expectation finds support for cumulative deaths and case statistics, but not for daily new cases and deaths.

We argue that the institutional and social context in which the political and bureaucratic actors operate may condition the way such incentives affect data reliability. To assess this possibility, we estimated two additional sets of regression analyses, where temporal proximity to the cancellation of the examined stay-at-home policies was conditioned by whether the country was a democracy and whether the incumbent was populist. Our expectations were that, thanks to higher state capacity, better functioning institutions and informed citizenry, higher media freedom and freedom of expression, lower press-party parallelism, and stronger oppositions and civil society, democracies would be less likely, whereas, with their delayed policy responses at the early stages and common anti-elite rhetoric and dismissal of health experts' policy recommendations, populist governments would be more likely to manipulate pandemic data. The empirical analyses, however, show mixed findings. While our expectation about the democracy's mediating effect finds empirical support for daily new cases, populist countries seem to not have manipulated pandemic data. Consequently, the empirical evidence in the previous section as well as in the robustness checks presented in appendices suggests a deleterious effect of anti-

pandemic measures' cancellation on the reliability of official COVID-19 data.

Our paper points to several possible directions for future research. Firstly, we discuss the possibility that varying public attention to different types of COVID-19 statistics may induce varying data manipulation strategies. We provide some preliminary evidence for this idea, but a rigorous research design is required to test it. Secondly, one can assess whether the “toughness” of the policy matters for data reliability. For instance, the stay-at-home order is undoubtedly a much harder pill for the public to swallow than the closure of public venues or the cancellation of public events. We have good reasons to suspect that for some easier-to-bear policies the effect of our independent variable will be negative, implying better data reporting practices. Moreover, our examination is limited to data manipulation at a time when all governments experienced significant difficulties in collecting reliable data. Admittedly, our empirical models, however, rely not only on few and dichotomous measures of country-level differences but also lack important potential confounders that are likely to explain a significant portion of the variance in data reporting practices. Consequently, we hope further research will test the validity of our findings by also considering pre-pandemic levels of potential country-level confounders.

Despite such limitations of our study, we believe our findings are quite alarming from the perspective of representative democracy. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that pandemic-related information can be manipulated in order to portray anti-pandemic policies as more effective than they actually are. We do not find that democracies are conclusively better in preventing such misinformation, although democracies seem to report daily new cases and deaths truthfully –the same cannot be said about nondemocracies. Taken together, our findings thus point to the necessity of establishing better domestic and international accountability mechanisms that can prevent such misreporting from occurring in the future.

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## Online Appendix

Table A.1  
Data Description

Country	Policy Cancellation Date	Days b/f Cancellation	Polity2	Population (log)	GDPpc (log)
Afghanistan	26aug2020	30	-1	17.43108	7.565
Algeria	20oct2021	30	2	17.5586	9.498
Australia	29may2020	30	10	17.03408	10.71
Australia	11jan2021	30	10	17.03408	10.71
Australia	22oct2021	30	10	17.03408	10.71
Austria	01may2020	16	10	15.99559	10.715
Austria	16may2021	30	10	15.99559	10.715
Azerbaijan	28sep2021	30	-7	16.11231	9.635
Bahrain	23aug2020	30	-10	14.26623	10.591
Bangladesh	15jul2021	30	-6	18.89912	8.086
Belarus	17aug2021	30	-7	16.06526	9.84
Belgium	08jun2020	30	8	16.25106	10.59
Belgium	30jul2021	30	8	16.25106	10.59
Bolivia	05jan2021	30	7	16.245	8.719
Bolivia	28sep2021	30	7	16.245	8.719
Bosnia and Herzegovina	21may2020	30	0	15.01666	9.266
Bosnia and Herzegovina	27may2021	30	0	15.01666	9.266
Botswana	05oct2021	30	8	14.62827	9.617
Bulgaria	31may2020	30	9	15.76487	9.796
Burkina Faso	10sep2020	30	6	16.79874	7.353
Burkina Faso	30may2021	4	6	16.79874	7.353
Cambodia	21dec2020	30	-4	16.60359	8.104
Canada	03dec2021	30	10	17.42802	10.668
Central African Republic	24nov2020	30	6	15.35589	6.428
Central African Republic	20apr2021	30	6	15.35589	6.428
Central African Republic	21sep2021	19	6	15.35589	6.428
Chile	01oct2021	30	10	16.74559	9.973
China	02sep2020	30	-7	21.05453	9.419
Cote d'Ivoire	27jul2020	30	4	17.03715	8.206
Cote d'Ivoire	31aug2021	30	4	17.03715	8.206
Croatia	07sep2020	30	9	15.22391	9.982
Cuba	03jul2020	30	-5	16.24368	8.973
Cuba	01oct2020	21	-5	16.24368	8.973
Cuba	23nov2021	30	-5	16.24368	8.973
Cyprus	27jul2021	30	10	13.98885	10.186
Czech Republic	01jun2020	30	9	16.17879	10.345
Czech Republic	12apr2021	30	9	16.17879	10.345
Democratic Republic of Congo	27oct2020	30	-3	18.24714	6.729

Country	Policy Cancellation Date	Days b/f Cancellation	Polit y2	Population (log)	GDPpc (log)
Denmark	21oct2020	30	10	15.57293	10.718
Denmark	21may2021	30	10	15.57293	10.718
Djibouti	17may2020	25	3	13.77356	8.13
Ecuador	14sep2020	30	5	16.65367	9.263
Ecuador	01sep2021	30	5	16.65367	9.263
Egypt	22mar2021	30	-4	18.40479	9.344
Egypt	07jun2021	30	-4	18.40479	9.344
El Salvador	09mar2021	30	8	15.67505	9.028
Estonia	18may2020	20	9	14.09381	10.172
Estonia	09may2021	29	9	14.09381	10.172
Eswatini	24nov2020	30	-9	13.94319	8.941
Eswatini	10dec2021	30	-9	13.94319	8.941
Ethiopia	27oct2020	30	1	18.50892	7.414
Finland	01jun2020	30	10	15.52353	10.554
Finland	01nov2021	30	10	15.52353	10.554
France	22jun2020	30	9	18.02001	10.565
France	20jun2021	30	9	18.02001	10.565
Gambia	22jul2020	30	4	14.63973	7.576
Gambia	10nov2020	30	4	14.63973	7.576
Gambia	20sep2021	11	4	14.63973	7.576
Georgia	09oct2020	30	7	15.13219	9.258
Georgia	30jun2021	30	7	15.13219	9.258
Germany	06may2020	28	10	18.23348	10.755
Germany	10oct2021	30	10	18.23348	10.755
Ghana	30mar2021	5	8	17.20891	8.23
Ghana	29aug2021	30	8	17.20891	8.23
Guatemala	01oct2020	30	8	16.66319	8.873
Guatemala	05oct2021	12	8	16.66319	8.873
Haiti	15dec2020	30	5	16.22454	7.4
Hong Kong	11sep2020	30		15.82386	10.759
Hungary	11sep2020	30	10	16.0947	10.088
Hungary	29jun2021	30	10	16.0947	10.088
Iran	30aug2021	30	-7	18.21979	9.65
Ireland	26jun2020	30	10	15.39521	10.927
Ireland	10may2021	30	10	15.39521	10.927
Israel	18jul2020	30	6	15.99974	10.389
Israel	28oct2020	10	6	15.99974	10.389
Israel	07feb2021	30	6	15.99974	10.389
Italy	01jul2021	30	10	17.91702	10.463
Japan	25may2020	18	10	18.65598	10.504
Jordan	01sep2021	30	-3	16.11369	9.371
Kazakhstan	16feb2021	30	-6	16.72113	10.06
Kenya	26oct2021	30	9	17.75501	8.075
Kosovo	25sep2020	30	8	14.42815	
Kosovo	25may2021	30	8	14.42815	
Kuwait	16may2021	30	-7	15.23556	11.124
Kyrgyz Republic	16oct2020	30	8	15.65856	8.71



Country	Policy Cancellation Date	Days b/f Cancellation	Polit y2	Population (log)	GDPpc (log)
Laos	04may2020	5	-7	15.77017	8.752
Latvia	03oct2020	30	8	14.47124	10.059
Lebanon	20jul2020	30	6	15.7396	9.448
Lebanon	27sep2021	30	6	15.7396	9.448
Libya	13jul2021	30	0	15.71441	8.999
Lithuania	17jun2020	30	10	14.84138	10.173
Lithuania	19apr2021	30	10	14.84138	10.173
Luxembourg	20jul2021	30	10	13.31748	11.143
Madagascar	18oct2020	30	6	17.08365	7.175
Madagascar	19oct2021	30	6	17.08365	7.175
Malawi	13oct2020	30	6	16.71381	6.856
Malawi	28apr2021	20	6	16.71381	6.856
Malaysia	10jun2020	30	7	17.26641	10.03
Malaysia	24sep2020	22	7	17.26641	10.03
Mali	10may2020	16	5	16.76403	7.38
Mali	19jul2021	30	5	16.76403	7.38
Mauritania	10jul2020	30	-2	15.29787	8.104
Mauritius	15jun2020	30	10	14.05082	9.844
Mauritius	30jun2021	30	10	14.05082	9.844
Mauritius	21sep2021	30	10	14.05082	9.844
Moldova	10jul2020	30	9	15.0813	8.674
Moldova	12aug2021	30	9	15.0813	8.674
Mongolia	01jun2020	30	10	14.96931	9.315
Morocco	24jun2020	30	-4	17.39984	8.938
Morocco	16nov2021	30	-4	17.39984	8.938
Mozambique	22oct2020	30	5	17.19976	7.161
Namibia	06oct2020	30	6	14.71089	9.371
Namibia	17nov2021	30	6	14.71089	9.371
Nepal	02mar2021	30	7	17.15085	7.858
Nepal	04jul2021	30	7	17.15085	7.858
Nepal	05oct2021	30	7	17.15085	7.858
Netherlands	26jun2021	30	10	16.66222	10.805
New Zealand	14may2020	24	10	15.40178	10.435
Norway	25sep2021	30	10	15.48592	11.244
Oman	23oct2020	30	-8	15.39025	10.516
Oman	13may2021	30	-8	15.39025	10.516
Pakistan	17oct2021	30	7	19.17311	8.566
Papua New Guinea	23jun2020	30	5	15.96801	
Papua New Guinea	29oct2020	4	5	15.96801	
Papua New Guinea	17sep2021	30	5	15.96801	
Paraguay	13oct2021	30	9	15.75513	9.06
Poland	30may2020	30	10	17.45253	10.166
Portugal	01jun2020	30	10	16.14588	10.23
Portugal	01aug2020	1	10	16.14588	10.23

Country	Policy Cancellation Date	Days b/f Cancellation	Polit y2	Population (log)	GDPpc (log)
Portugal	04jan2021	30	10	16.14588	10.23
Portugal	01aug2021	30	10	16.14588	10.23
Romania	01jun2020	30	9	16.78459	9.848
Romania	09oct2020	30	9	16.78459	9.848
Romania	15may2021	30	9	16.78459	9.848
Russia	09jun2020	30	4	18.78864	10.046
Russia	28mar2021	30	4	18.78864	10.046
Russia	10aug2021	27	4	18.78864	10.046
Rwanda	12jan2021	30	-3	16.32527	7.462
Saudi Arabia	30oct2020	30	-10	17.33301	10.768
Senegal	30jun2020	30	7	16.57895	7.841
Senegal	19mar2021	30	7	16.57895	7.841
Serbia	07jun2021	30	8	15.75886	9.547
Serbia	05oct2021	30	8	15.75886	9.547
Slovak Republic	14jun2020	30	10	15.51058	10.193
Slovak Republic	15may2021	30	10	15.51058	10.193
Slovenia	14may2020	30	10	14.54179	10.267
Slovenia	27apr2021	30	10	14.54179	10.267
South Korea	20apr2020	27	8	17.75972	10.495
South Korea	01jul2021	30	8	17.75972	10.495
Spain	21jun2020	30	10	17.65976	10.36
Spain	15sep2021	30	10	17.65976	10.36
Sudan	26sep2020	30	-4	17.54844	8.23
Sudan	15jun2021	30	-4	17.54844	8.23
Sweden	29sep2021	30	10	16.13625	10.7
Switzerland	22jun2020	30	10	15.95752	11.032
Switzerland	26jun2021	30	10	15.95752	11.032
Syria	03aug2020	30	-9	16.6432	8.177
Syria	10jun2021	30	-9	16.6432	8.177
Tajikistan	15jun2020	7	-3	16.02388	8.173
Togo	09jun2020	30	-2	15.88099	7.323
Togo	17nov2020	30	-2	15.88099	7.323
Togo	14sep2021	30	-2	15.88099	7.323
Trinidad and Tobago	22jun2020	30	10	14.14471	10.287
Trinidad and Tobago	26oct2020	30	10	14.14471	10.287
Trinidad and Tobago	17nov2021	30	10	14.14471	10.287
Tunisia	08jun2020	30	7	16.26351	9.271
Tunisia	04oct2021	30	7	16.26351	9.271
Turkey	12aug2021	30	-4	18.22612	9.841
Ukraine	28jun2021	30	4	17.61375	9.179
United Arab Emirates	18may2020	30	-8	16.08049	11.16
United Arab Emirates	19aug2021	2	-8	16.08049	11.16

Country	Policy Cancellation Date	Days b/f Cancellation	Polity2	Population (log)	GDPpc (log)
United Kingdom	03dec2020	30	8	18.01255	10.575
United Kingdom	12apr2021	30	8	18.01255	10.575
Uruguay	10jul2020	30	10	15.05368	9.898
Uruguay	18oct2021	30	10	15.05368	9.898
Uzbekistan	04jan2021	30	-9	17.31067	9.183
Venezuela	07nov2021	30	-3	17.17832	9.485
Vietnam	01oct2020	30	-7	18.37506	8.705
Vietnam	28sep2021	30	-7	18.37506	8.705
Yemen	13jul2020	30	0	17.16537	7.696
Yemen	25sep2021	30	0	17.16537	7.696
Zambia	31jan2021	30	6	16.66921	8.171
Zambia	16may2021	14	6	16.66921	8.171

Table A.2

*Conditioning Effect of Democracy on COVID-19 Deaths Reporting*

	Cumulative, Dem	Cumulative, Non-dem	Daily New, Dem	Daily New, Nondem
Days b/f Cancellation	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Population (log)	-0.305*** (0.011)	-0.000 (0.029)	-0.105*** (0.007)	-0.096*** (0.003)
GDPpc (log)	-0.130*** (0.007)	-0.067*** (0.017)	-0.027*** (0.003)	-0.151*** (0.006)
Constant	7.344*** (0.241)	1.285** (0.610)	2.228*** (0.121)	3.281*** (0.069)
N	3149	1824	3149	1824
R <sup>2</sup>	0.226	0.208	0.198	0.232

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ 

Table A.3

*Conditioning Effect of Populism on COVID-19 Deaths Reporting*

	Cumulative, Pop = 0	Cumulative, Pop = 1	Daily New, Pop = 0	Daily New, Pop = 1
Days b/f Cancellation	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001* (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
Population (log)	-0.207*** (0.021)	-0.783*** (0.029)	-0.109*** (0.005)	-0.204*** (0.029)
GDPpc (log)	-0.027* (0.016)	-0.919 *** (0.091)	-0.087*** (0.003)	-0.072 (0.071)
Constant	4.672*** (0.482)	22.523*** (1.056)	2.902*** (0.079)	4.294*** (0.279)
N	4320	585	4320	585
R <sup>2</sup>	0.211	0.354	0.204	0.177
Observations	2914	372	2914	372
R <sup>2</sup>	0.216	0.142	0.127	0.017

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.4

*Days before Policy Cancellation and the COVID-19 Data Quality, 15-days Window*

	<b>Cumulative Cases</b>	<b>Daily New Cases</b>	<b>Cumulative Deaths</b>	<b>Daily New Deaths</b>
Days b/f Cancellation	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Polity2	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.000)	0.026*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)
Population (log)	0.117*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.169*** (0.024)	-0.094*** (0.002)
GDPpc (log)	-0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.001)	-0.076*** (0.018)	-0.075*** (0.002)
Constant	-1.179*** (0.035)	0.055 (0.079)	4.347*** (0.558)	2.540*** (0.009)
N	2576	2576	2576	2576
R <sup>2</sup>	0.193	0.230	0.233	0.345

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ 

Table A.5

*Days before Policy Cancellation and the COVID-19 Data Quality, Cumulative Cases*

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>
Days b/f Cancellation	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
Polity2		-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Population (log)			0.094*** (0.003)	0.116*** (0.002)
GDPpc (log)				-0.019*** (0.003)
Constant	0.649*** (0.008)	0.675*** (0.013)	-0.876*** (0.054)	-1.103*** (0.069)
N	5481	5307	5277	4973
R <sup>2</sup>	0.155	0.148	0.153	0.171

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ 

Table A.6

*Days before Policy Cancellation and the COVID-19 Data Quality, Daily New Cases*

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>
Days b/f Cancellation	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Polity2		-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)
Population (log)			-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)
GDPpc (log)				0.013*** (0.001)
Constant	0.152*** (0.002)	0.160*** (0.003)	0.377*** (0.071)	0.103 (0.090)
N	5481	5307	5277	4973
R <sup>2</sup>	0.126	0.130	0.139	0.128

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.7

*Days before Policy Cancellation and the COVID-19 Data Quality, Cumulative Deaths*

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>
Days b/f Cancellation	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Polity2		0.028*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.002)
Population (log)			-0.135*** (0.016)	-0.175*** (0.017)
GDPpc (log)				-0.078*** (0.013)
Constant	1.087*** (0.012)	0.889*** (0.015)	3.113*** (0.266)	4.460*** (0.404)
N	5481	5307	5277	4973
R <sup>2</sup>	0.192	0.206	0.208	0.211

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ 

Table A.8

*Days before Policy Cancellation and the COVID-19 Data Quality, Daily New Deaths*

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>
Days b/f Cancellation	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Polity2		-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Population (log)			-0.085*** (0.005)	-0.099*** (0.004)
GDPpc (log)				-0.079*** (0.002)
Constant	0.325*** (0.003)	0.319*** (0.004)	1.712*** (0.073)	2.658*** (0.069)
N	5481	5307	5277	4973
R <sup>2</sup>	0.142	0.149	0.153	0.201

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ 

Table A.9

*Days before Policy Cancellation and the COVID-19 Data Quality, Alternative Measure*

	<b>Cumulative Cases</b>	<b>Daily New Cases</b>	<b>Cumulative Deaths</b>	<b>Daily New Deaths</b>
Days b/f Cancellation	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Polity2	0.002** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
Population (log)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.043*** (0.005)	-0.063*** (0.004)
GDPpc (log)	-0.004** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.002)	-0.015** (0.005)	-0.058*** (0.002)
Constant	0.658*** (0.031)	0.152*** (0.033)	1.437*** (0.121)	1.978*** (0.077)
N	4973	4973	4973	4973
R <sup>2</sup>	0.709	0.462	0.644	0.454

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.10

*Days before Policy Cancellation and the COVID-19 Data Quality, Fixed-Effects GLS Regressions*

	<b>Cumulative Cases</b>	<b>Daily New Cases</b>	<b>Cumulative Deaths</b>	<b>Daily New Deaths</b>
Days b/f Cancellation	0.002** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Polity2	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.025* (0.014)	-0.001 (0.004)
Population (log)	0.116 (0.170)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.181 (0.118)	-0.097*** (0.027)
GDPpc (log)	-0.018 (0.065)	0.013 (0.008)	-0.084 (0.113)	-0.078*** (0.024)
Constant	-1.132 (3.111)	0.126 (0.198)	4.622** (2.312)	2.617*** (0.594)
N	4973	4973	4973	4973

Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

# SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

## How to Define the Elephant: Towards a Novel Conceptualization of Populism

### Fili Nasıl Tanımlamalı: Yeni Bir Popülizm Kavramsallaştırmasına Doğru

Giray Gerim<sup>1</sup> 

#### Abstract

In recent decades, a serious number of studies have been dedicated to defining and conceptualizing populism in order to enable proper and comparative analyses of the phenomenon. They usually studied populism by reducing it to an ideology, discourse, or strategy and provided analytical approaches accordingly although some other approaches (style of communication, political project, etc.) are possible to come across in the relevant literature. Critically engaging with the most influential ones, this article ascertains two principal deficiencies in these bodies of work. Firstly, the minimal and generic definitions presented in these studies empty the concept to a broad extent. Secondly, most scholars assume the concentrated dimension of populism as the whole of the phenomenon and undertake its conceptualization with this assumption to a large extent. As a result of a comprehensive discussion on these main and also some secondary deficiencies, this article offers two ways to treat them. Scholars who examine populism and make comparisons between different cases can either carry out their analyses by taking the multi-layered nature of the phenomenon into account or by clearly stating the dimension of populism which they study and, in this way, limit their work to this dimension without further claims. In addition to all these, showing the inadequacy of the Sartorian approaches that dominate the literature, the article discusses that Wittgensteinian approaches can provide appropriate alternative frameworks for the conceptualization of populism.

#### Keywords

Populism, Populist Politics, Populist Discourse, Populist Strategy, Populist Parties

#### Öz

Son yıllarda, fenomenin doğru ve karşılaştırmalı analizlerini mümkün kılmak amacıyla, popülizmi tanımlamaya ve kavramsallaştırmaya yönelik ciddi sayıda çalışma yapılmıştır. İlgili literatürde başka yaklaşımlara (iletişim tarzı, siyasi proje vb.) rastlamak mümkün olsa da söz konusu çalışmalar popülizmi genellikle bir ideoloji, söylem veya stratejiye indirgeyerek incelemişler ve bu doğrultuda analitik yaklaşımlar sunmuşlardır. Bunlar arasında en etkili olanları eleştirel olarak ele alan bu makale, iki temel sorun tespit eder. Birincisi, bu çalışmalarda sunulan minimal ve genel tanımlar, kavramın içini geniş ölçüde boşaltmaktadır. İkincisi, araştırmacıların büyük bir kesimi, popülizmin üzerine yoğunlaştıkları boyutunu fenomenin bütünü varsaymakta ve kavramsallaştırmasını büyük oranda bu varsayım üzerine inşa etmektedir. Bu iki temel sorun ve ayrıca bazı ikincil sorunlar hakkında kapsamlı bir tartışmanın sonucu olarak, makale, popülizm araştırmacıları için iki yol sunar. Popülizmi inceleyen ve farklı vakalar arasında karşılaştırmalar yapan araştırmacılar, analizlerini ya olgunun çok katmanlı yapısını dikkate alarak kurabilir ya da popülizmin inceledikleri boyutunu açıkça belirterek yürütebilir ve bu şekilde çalışmalarını sınırlandırabilirler. Tüm bunlara ek olarak, makale, literatüre hâkim olan ve çalışmada eleştirel bir biçimde incelenen Sartorici yaklaşımların yetersizliğini göstererek Wittgensteinci yaklaşımların popülizmin kavramsallaştırılması için daha uygun alternatif çerçeveler sunabileceğini tartışır.

#### Anahtar Kelimeler

Popülizm, Popülist Siyaset, Popülist Söylem, Popülist Strateji, Popülist Partiler

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## Introduction

Chavez, Morales, Trump, Bolsonaro, Le Pen, Wilders, Duterte, Modi, Tsipras, Turrión; what exactly is common among them? Their movements' location in the political spectrum? An affinity in terms of ideology? Any specific discourse or strategy? It is quite difficult to answer. At the very least, there will be serious opposition to our response in any case. Let us change the question and ask instead, "What is the link in our minds that relates these names to each other?" There will be almost a consensus on the "populism" answer. Laclau (1977, p. 143) exactly describes this situation, "We know intuitively to what we are referring when we call a movement or an ideology populist, but we have the greatest difficulty in translating the intuition into concepts." Still, in recent decades, the striking rise of the leaders and movements called or labeled "populist" all over the world has immensely increased the interest in populism as a subfield. This interest has instinctively brought about competing definitions proposed to obviate, overcome, or at least diminish the conceptual ambiguity. However, populism's elasticity, ambiguity, and according to some, omnipresence in politics, discourage attempts to find a clear-cut definition (Taguieff, 1995). It is often discussed in contemporary studies that populism changes color according to its environment and appeals to the grievance of the people, intertwined with the ideologies to which it is attached (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2011, p. 33; Taggart, 2000, p. 2). It is the reason that, beginning with early studies, the inability to evaluate the phenomenon on its own has emerged as one of the biggest difficulties encountered in conceptualizing it (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969, p. 4). Additionally, heterodoxy and pragmatism embedded in it in terms of politics render it even more elusive (Bartha, Boda, and Szikra, 2020).

Of course, these adversities do not prevent scholars from seeking inclusive definitions for populism and concept-building efforts. It has been claimed that a minimal definition is necessary "to theoretically comprehend populism" (Deiwiks, 2009, p. 8) or to compose "a general theory of modern day populism" (Pappas, 2016, p. 14). Another reason behind the efforts in defining the boundaries is to obtain safer and more credible grounds for comparisons:

If two or more items are identical, we do not have a problem of comparability. On the other hand, if two or more items have nothing, or not enough in common, we rightly say that stones and rabbits cannot be compared. By and large, then, we obtain comparability when two or more items appear "similar enough," that is, neither identical nor utterly different (Sartori, 1970, p. 1035).

Sartori (1970, pp. 1051-152) complains about conceptual stretching and damage created by "meaningless togetherness" in the construction of concepts. His concept-building approach is based on negation and a ladder of abstraction. He argues that negative identification is a requirement for determinate concepts, and concepts without opposite concepts are indeterminate. In other words, "any determination involves a negation" in order to specify the boundaries. Moreover, for valid, comparative frameworks, a researcher must check where the phenomena stand on the ladder of abstraction. He also carefully adds that the goal to establish a minimal common denominator is not an excuse to feed "primitivism and formlessness." This rigorous approach has been very influential on concept-building efforts including the ones on populism, and many scholars have



struggled to build a concept of populism from their perspectives by finding minimum common denominators and demarking the concept via negations in their works.

The scholars directly or indirectly influenced by this Sartorian definitionism usually set common denominators and boundaries and develop definitions based on them. It has been a common view to date that clear definitions would facilitate comparative studies and provide a significant breakthrough in theory. However, in my opinion, there are some serious downsides that are clearly overlooked. One of the most serious of these, as Finchelstein (2017, p. 145) expresses, is that generic and minimal definitions are usually based on self-referentiality. After articulating the question “What is populism?” and giving a delineated answer to this question, scholars usually limit themselves to their answers and evaluate the cases within the frameworks which they construct themselves. Secondly, adhering to classical definitionism brings about the risk of dismissing the opportunities which can be benefited from ostensive definitions. Lastly and interrelatedly with these two, strict definitions mostly confine a multi-faceted and multi-layered concept like populism to one of its dimensions emphasized in each of them. Roberts (1995, pp. 84-85) adequately explains and summarizes such difficulties in defining populism with the parable of the blind men and an elephant. He contends that most scholars pay attention to its historical/sociological, economic, ideological, and political particularities, rather than seeing the complexity of the phenomenon, and this causes them to fail in grasping the adaptive and dynamic properties and transformations of the concept. Moreover, the analyses within single perspectives give contradictory outcomes to each other.

Although there are works regarding populism as a form of mass politics (Collier, 2001), a political project of mobilization (Jansen, 2011), a political form referring to a definite regime in power (Finchelstein and Urbinati, 2018), a political communication style (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Manin, 1997; Moffitt, 2016), recently, when we review sociology and political science literature on this phenomenon, conceptual approaches have gathered in three main groups. Gidron and Bonikowski (2013) state that populism is defined as an ideology, a discourse, or a political strategy by scholars, and in a more recent work, De la Torre (2019, p. 4) categorizes the approaches to populism as “discursive, political, and ideational theories.” Although the nomenclature changes, it is observed that there is an overlap in this ternary classification. The first goal of this study is to examine how the influential works in these main groups approach and define populism and to show one by one how and why they fail to address the concept in a well-rounded way.

Contrary to classical definitionism which aims to clearly set the boundaries of populism as a concept, we see the Wittgensteinian family resemblance approach. Referring to his famous “game” example, Wittgenstein (1958) asserts that we use this term to describe card games, board games, ball games, and so on although we do not have a clear definition of it. According to him, even if there is no property shared by all of the games and we cannot develop a definition on common denominators, we still detect a network of overlapping and crisscrossing similarities and affinities. Considering the range of populisms, some scholars have remarked that the Wittgensteinian way is necessary to characterize this phenomenon (Brubaker, 2017; Canovan, 1981; Ceci, 2019; Collier, 2001; Roberts, 1995; Sikk, 2009). The opinion shared by them to a broad extent is that the term “populism” can cover very dissonant movements at the same time, and what diverse populist cases

share is a family resemblance. Consequently, different combinations of traits, not “the full set of traits,” constitute each case of populism (Collier, 2001, p. 11816). In my view, such an approach has more potential to grasp this elusive concept and to provide grounds to analyze it than definitions with sharp boundaries. However, even though Brubaker’s (2017) relevant study made a serious contribution in this direction, a comprehensive set of traits to address the family resemblance and a conceptualization which relies on such a set that enables to construct frameworks in order to comparatively analyze cases of populism are still missing in the literature. Consequently, the second goal of this study is to provide this set of traits for contemporary populism and to make room for discussions on a new conceptualization in this direction.

### **Conceptualizations of Populism and the Problem of Context**

Before critically engaging with the three prominent approaches to populism, I would like to shortly discuss the “context” issue, which, I believe, can give us some insights into further analyses. Since populism has an extremely amorphous structure, context is of vital importance in making sense of each case. Populist politics provides a basis of identification for individuals and groups who have not identified with positive social identities by utilizing “deep feelings of discontent” with both political and social life (Spruyt, Keppens, & Droogenbroeck, 2016, p. 335). However, sources of discontent over the rise of populism vary among societies and are intertwined in most cases (Noury and Roland, 2020), and the significance of the roles played by each alters in every single case. Furthermore, how and in which ways that discontent is reconstructed and presented are as vital as what it really is. For this reason, conceptualizations through abstractions that do not pay enough attention to the context mislead and direct us to seek the “essence.” Worsley (1969, pp. 212-213) aptly draws attention to this problem and rejects the Platonist assumption that “ideas can be isolated in some pure, original, embryonic, or archetypal form.” In some studies, this search for the unchanging “idea” or “essence” sometimes breaks populism from its contemporary context since this phenomenon is evaluated over a very broad time span. In her seminal work on populism, Canovan (1981) specifies two main varieties of populism and states that the first broad family, agrarian populism, is a feature of modernizing rural societies while the second one is more about political problems of democracy. Although it can be seen that the agrarian type takes up a lot of space in the theory since the Russian Narodniks and American populists are usually considered the pioneers of populism, this genre’s connection with the contemporary phenomenon is extremely weak. First of all, we should state that there was no direct link even between these two cases in terms of agency. The Narodniks were the Russian intellectuals who believed that the moral regeneration and the political transformation of the Russian people had to be formed around the *narod*, which means “folk,” “people” or “nation.”<sup>1</sup> On the other side, the American case amounted to a type of radical rural politics carried out by farmers (Allcock, 1971, p. 372; Canovan, 1981, pp. 5-6). Moreover, it remained limited to the agrarian and rural segments of society (Goodwyn, 1978; Postel, 2007). Largely for this reason, Müller (2017, p. 88) also asserts that the first American populists were not actually populists in the sense we understand

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1 Worsley (1969, p. 221) enounces that the equation between the words “narodnichestvo” and “populist” is actually a matter of categories available in language.

today since they did not pretend to represent the people as a whole. Secondly, it should be reckoned that the majority of populations were located in rural areas regarding that time, so the disadvantaged conditions such as undeveloped transportation and communication should also be taken into account (Johnson, 1983). This very dissimilar context has to be taken into account when questioning why early populists did not have strong leadership. In the same vein, Moffitt (2016) asserts that populism in its contemporary context is quite different from these early examples since it has crucial importance today in dealing with how populism is mediatized and stylized through media.

On the other side, conceptualizations too attached to particular contexts lead to seriously controversial results, such as identifying the aforementioned “idea” or “essence” of populism within those contexts. To exemplify, particularities such as egalitarian stance, redistribution policies, and support for the state intervention in the economy, exhibit the leftist nature of populism in Latin American countries (Mudde, 2011; Seligson, 2007; Weyland, 2010). Focusing on this continent, some scholars evaluate populism through the economic policies in Latin America where popular governments attempt to revive national economies through redistribution of sources which is most of the time followed by massive irresponsible or ill-planned spending (Acemoğlu, Egorov and Sonin, 2013; Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991). Yet, both Roberts (1995) and Weyland (1996) show us that there is no direct causal link between populism and any specific socio-economic model. In parallel, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017a, p. 522) criticize economic definitions such as these and claim that they restrict populism to leftist or inclusionary forms and exclude right-wing instances.

To capitalize on the discussion carried out so far, it can be concluded that the ways to approach populism can be as problematic as the phenomenon itself. Therefore, I assume that each of the competing approaches should be examined through such a lens as well.

### **Populism as an Ideology**

The ideational approach may be the most popular one among all which aim to define populism. As a prominent name of this approach, Mudde (2004, p. 543) gives a frequently cited definition of populism:

...an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.

Although it is possible to see various definitions of political ideology in the literature, almost all of them share the emphasis on a coherent set of beliefs, ideas, and values both to comprehend and explain the world and also on a program for action based on this set (Ball, Dagger, and O’Neill, 2014; Freedon, 2006; Heywood, 2003; MacKenzie, 2003). However, it is almost impossible to infer any reference to such a program.

Mudde borrows the term “thin-ideology” from Freedon’s work. According to the morphological perspective propounded by Freedon (2006, p. 77), ideologies are “characterized by a morphology that displays core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts.” He describes the term “thin-centered ideology” which has a restricted core compared to full-fledged ideologies and remarks that a thin-centered ideology shows “a structural inability to offer complex ranges of argument” (Freedon, 1998, p. 750). Yet, he also

argues that “decreased integration does not imply the absence of a set of unifying core concepts altogether.” It is quite difficult to extract a sound understanding of the term. For instance, in examining nationalism, he concludes that this phenomenon oscillates between being a thin-centered ideology and existing as a component of other ideologies (p. 751). Mudde (2004) draws on his ideational approach on this slippery slope. Aslanidis (2016, p. 91) severely criticizes this and asserts that we always need a limited set of core attributes when it is necessary to define something. He contends that an endless number of concepts such as Euroscepticism, fascism, xenophobia, technocracy, racism, globalization, consumerism can be called ideology within this “concocted” framework; even concepts like people-centrism and anti-elitism, which are presented as the core features of populism, can be viewed as thin ideologies.

Stanley (2008, p. 100) aptly denotes another difficulty in recognizing populism as an ideology:

Whilst many prominent ideologies have ‘left record’ of themselves in the shape of philosophical political institutions that transcend individual parties, movements or leaders, there is little evidence of institutional elements indicating a common purpose or unity amongst populists: there is no Populist International; no canon of key populist texts or calendar of significant moments; and the icons of populism are of local rather than universal appeal.

Nevertheless, he thinks that these can be disregarded due to the aforementioned “thin” nature. According to him, populism is a “distinct ideology” even though it does not have a comprehensive program to offer solutions to substantial political questions; however, its thin nature disables it “to stand alone” (p. 95). He specifies the conceptual core of populist ideology with a few concepts which can be summarized as the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, the positive valorization of the first and denigration of the second, and an emphasis on the idea of popular sovereignty (p. 102). Nevertheless, is such a core enough to evaluate populism as an ideology, even if a thin one? Compared to other ideologies, Bonikowski (2016, p. 12) asserts that “populism is based on a rudimentary moral logic,” and instead of providing a comprehensive understanding of politics or society like them, it only gives “a simplistic critique of existing configurations of power.” Besides, this logic is not unique to it. Laclau (2005a, p. 18) contends that simplification of political space through antagonisms cannot be seen as a trademark which is peculiar to populism because this is just at the center of the political. According to him (2005b, p. 47), no political movement can be entirely exempted from populism, because all of them discursively construct “the people” against the enemy to configure the political sphere.

Another issue to examine regarding the approaches which view populism as an ideology can be the repeating themes in the definitions. Müller (2017, p. 19) regards populism as “a particular moralistic imagination of politics,” a way of perceiving politics as a confrontation between the pure, unified people and morally inferior elites. According to another popular and very similar definition by Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008, p. 3), populism is “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.” It can be seen that “virtuous and homogeneous people against immoral elite” is a leitmotiv in the definitions. But is this explanatory enough for all cases of populism?

Katsambekis (2016, p. 6) examines the case of Syriza and asserts that the plurality embedded in the notion of “the people” in this party’s discourse contrasts with the homogeneous and unified people concept in ideational approaches. As he points out, Syriza’s appeal is to a “plural people” which consisted of various excluded, marginalized, or empowered groups. Furthermore, he discusses that the moral ground suggested by these approaches is not validated in this case. In this party’s discourse, the predominant division is between the “neoliberal establishment” and “those without a voice.” Therefore, he propounds that this populist case is not mainly moralist, and the moralistic embellishment of antagonism is not necessary in general. Although the antagonism can be primarily moralist as in the cases of Chavismo or Podemos, it can also be political as in the case of Syriza.<sup>2</sup>

Papas (2016, pp. 8-9) draws attention to a problem other than homogeneity and morality in the conceptualization of populism and discusses that elitism cannot be “a real negative pole for populism,” because, in diverse political situations such as aristocracy, oligarchy, fascism, authoritarianism, technocracy, and meritocracy, it is possible to claim that some “elite” rules, and none of them is intrinsically in enmity with populism. In parallel, Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2014, p. 1328) firstly claim that elitism is the mirror image of populism, but they later admit that they are “not necessarily mutually exclusive” in practice and they also share a disdain for politics.

By ruling out key elements such as leadership, strategy, and style of communication, ideational approaches and the definitions set forth by them reduce populism to an ideology relying on the dichotomy of the pure people and the immoral elites, and such conceptualizations may work to comprehend radical right-wing parties at the margins of the political systems, particularly when they are in opposition (De la Torre and Mazolleni, 2019, pp. 85-87). Yet, this dichotomy does not grant much insight into the transformation of the mainstream parties to adopt the populist style and discourses.

Some advocates of the ideational approach also justify that scholars would need to draw from the insights of alternative approaches in order to examine the issues such as the conditions brought about by populist leaders or the impact of populism on democracies. Attested also by its proponents, the ideational approach fails or seems inadequate in understanding the interaction of populism with other political ideas and in theorizing the “modes of political organization” pursued by the populists (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017b, p. 526). Still, many scholars insist on this approach since it gives them the opportunity to make at least an ostensible difference between populist and non-populist, and to carry out comparative analyses; however, this function is not problem-free. By addressing the newly founded parties in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, Sikk (2009) shows that the distinction between the populist and non-populist is very disputable especially in the cases of new parties since they intrinsically incorporate anti-incumbency. In my opinion, this point concerning the “thin-ideology” in question is very significant. If we go a little further with the argument, any opposition party is inherently “anti-establishment.” Moreover, all of them may consider a party in power as the “ruling

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2 In his more recent study, Katsambekis (2020) strengthen this point by examining parties and leaders of the populist left in Europe and concludes that constructing homogenous people is not a necessary condition for populism. Besides, he points out that moral framings are prevalent in political discourse in general and cannot be considered specific to populism.

elite” to some extent, and all of them may also have a claim to represent “the people.” Therefore, this is an easy template to fill and does not say much on its own. Thus, it can easily dilute what ideology refers to in political analysis.

We may give an example of this issue. After examining Le Pen, Haider, Chavez, and Morales, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2011, p. 31) ask what is in common among them. They admit that the first two are very different than the latter two. In the cases of Le Pen and Haider, the socio-cultural dimension is prominent, and the exclusionary features (against the immigrants) are clear, while in the latter cases of populism, the socio-economic dimension prevails, and the inclusionary features are more noticeable. However, they still claim that there are parallels among all of the leaders, such as complaining about the corrupted state of the system which brings about the misuse of political representation, the elites’ incapacity or lack of interest in addressing the “real” problems of the people, and the elites’ intention to rule against the will of “the pure people.” According to them, these are sufficient to assert that all four of these figures share the same ideology.

Moreover, to highlight the ideological ground, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2014, p. 383) trivialize the significance of other aspects of the phenomenon of populism, such as leadership. They argue that many populist political parties have outlived their founding leader or never had a dominant leader. They give the Belgian Flemish Party and the Danish People’s Party (DFP) as examples. However, they miss a critical point concerning this matter. The ideological core of the VB is Flemish nationalism. There is a demand for nationalism, anti-immigration attitudes, and so on, and the party canalizes them to party politics. The same can be said in the case of the Danish People’s Party (DFP) as well. That is why focusing on populism as the ideological core is misleading in these cases. These parties may apply populist discourses and strategies to gain power, but they still do it in accordance with their already existing ideological framework. Instead of “populist,” it may be clearer to use specific terms such as “xenophobic,” “illiberal,” “right-wing nationalist,” etc., as Sikk (2009, p. 11) suggests for such cases.

All in all, it is not possible to state that populism can be adequately understood and explained with ideological terms alone. The frames offered by ideational references do not provide much beyond the well-known premises of party politics.

### **Populism as a Discourse**

In dealing with populism as a discourse, we should make a distinction at the beginning. Although most of the approaches rely on Laclau’s works or have been developed through critical readings of them, there is also one other branch that can be considered a part, or (mostly methodological) extension, of the ideational approach. We will examine them in order.

Although Laclau (2005a; 2005b) did not put forward a systematical and clear methodology to examine populism, he delineated a theoretical framework for this phenomenon. He asserted that we can understand it by focusing on how “the people” is constructed as a hegemonic concept in political discourse. The antagonistic logic created by the boundaries of this construction is at the core of the phenomenon.

Parallel to Laclau, Panizza (2000, p. 179) propounds that populism discursively builds “the people,” “the other,” and the antagonism between them in economic or political terms or sometimes as a combination of both. According to him, “at the heart of the

populist appeal lies the imaginary constitution of popular identities in opposition to the established order.” But, in another study, he also notes that “almost every political speech appeals to the people or claims to speak for the people, which could make it impossible to distinguish populist from non-populist political entities” (Panizza, 2005, p. 5). This theoretical line concentrates on how social categories are configured and prescribes a shift from ideology to political logic; however, some scholars put the antagonism at the center (De Cleen, 2019), while some put the resentment at the centre of populist logic instead of it, and assert that logic of resentment sets populism in motion by creating identifications and normative group boundaries (Da Silva and Vieira, 2019).

Undoubtedly, discourse is a vital part of populism and populist politics. Notwithstanding, proponents of discursive approaches have a tendency to induce populism to one of its dimensions. As a good example, Aslanidis (2016) puts forward that finding and analyzing discursive elements which exalt the “noble people” and condemn “corrupt elites” is sufficient to seize and measure populism. Therefore, he denotes that populism is a discursive frame rather than a strategy or ideology. According to Aslanidis, Laclau “pioneered efforts to discard nonessential dimensions (economic, social, etc.) that contaminated the literature and focused on the discursive construction of populist appeals,” but his theory heavily relies on a qualitative and interpretive ground; therefore, “it fails to provide objective comparative methodological instruments, remaining indifferent towards any quantitative valuations” (p.97). This is exactly where discourse-oriented interpretations of the ideational approach come into play. Aslanidis argues that Mudde’s ideological definition can be turned into a discursive definition with a little change:

Based on the above, we consider ‘discourse’ as much better suited to characterize the conceptual genus of populism. If we do away with the unnecessary ideological clause in Mudde’s (2004) formulation, we are left with a purely discursive definition: populism modestly becomes a discourse, invoking the supremacy of popular sovereignty to claim that corrupt elites are defrauding ‘the People’ of their rightful political authority. It becomes an *anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign People* (p. 96).

Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017a, p. 513) state that the ideational approach “draws heavily from earlier discursive theories” and propound that its superiority to political-strategic, structuralist, and economic approaches comes from its ability to provide “empirical measures” thanks to this. They argue that this approach enables scholars all around the world to possess the tools to analyze populism, and they attempt to illustrate it through their study which comparatively addresses the presidential discourses of three Latin American countries, namely Argentina, Peru, and Chile. They use holistic grading, which prescribes reading the text in its entirety, to deal with the selected speeches of the leaders, and the coders assign scores: 0 means “little or no populism,” 1 means “moderate or inconsistent populism,” and 2 means “strong and consistent populism” (p. 518). According to them, this systematic reading of political speeches is both impressively successful in “capturing scholarly wisdom” and helpful for revealing “the shortcomings of alternative definitions” (p. 523).

Actually, it is possible to detect many problematic points in this approach and its methodology. First of all, the ideational approach is not a must for such research. In any approach, researchers can set a priori criteria and make assessments based on them. Secondly, what each score amounts to is not clearly explained at all, and what that “little

populism” actually means is clouded. Thirdly, the study controls the effectiveness of the ideational definition of populism through the criteria that are already set by that very definition, which looks like a vicious circle. We can explain this point a little further. Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017a, p. 519) state that although Carlos Menem has been generally viewed as a prototypical neo-populist figure of the 1990s’ Latin America by some scholars (Gibson, 1997; Weyland, 1996), the analysis of his selected speeches in office could not find clear references to the Manichean distinction between the people and the elite. They add that his discourse has a highly redemptive but also a pluralist tone that is so much less populist than the discourse in his first presidential campaign, and they give an example to validate this claim in which Menem emphasizes the necessity of reunifications of Argentineans. Indeed, this is a very good example of the aforementioned vicious circle. The criteria set by the approach to identify populism are applied to a case; it is declared that according to these criteria, no populism is detected in the case, and the writers then propound that the approach validated its empirical convenience. Moreover, as De la Torre and Mazzoleni (2019, p. 89) assert, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017a) restrict the discourse analysis to the text itself, but such an analysis should involve some complementary components such as the performances of speeches and the reception dimension of the discourses. They also put forward that Hawkins (2010, p. 77) reaches false positives in another study through a similar statistical measurement of political discourse, such as categorizing George W. Bush as a populist, who clearly is not, or counting a socialist leader, Salvador Allende as a populist, whose ideology already accommodates a discursive “the people against the oligarchy” theme on a Marxist ground.

As the last issue, human subjectivity in the assessment is as evident as in any other approach. Poblete (2015, p. 214) successfully clarifies that in Hawkins’ methodology, the holistic grading technique is “properly qualitative” although the comparison of the cases is carried out within a quantitative framework. Because, at the end of the day, what he applies are the hermeneutic skills of the analyzer. Therefore, he posits that the analysis should be considered closer to qualitative comparative analysis which is contrary to what the researchers emphasize.

Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2014) aim to measure populist attitudes and explore the link between them and party preferences in the Dutch case. Their dataset specifies three attitudes, namely populist, elitist, and pluralist, and put the first one. However, the statements they call populist, elitist, and pluralist are quite disputable. According to them, “The politicians in the Dutch parliament need to follow the will of the people” is a populist statement that is what people simply expect in every democracy. Another statement is “It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups,” and they call this a pluralist statement (p. 1331). In my view, it is not surprising at all if a participant gives high points to both statements since there is no conflict among them *prima facie*. Thus, when such a study obtains some numeric data, this does not mean that it is entirely free from subjectivity. Furthermore, if we use this dataset in another case country, it will likely differ in what they understand referencing these statements (such as the concept of “other group”), and this will not give us a healthy comparative quantitative framework. Eventually, for a comparative analysis of the cases, we still need the researcher’s interpretation as in other approaches, and Kuhn (1962) showed us that the nature of observation is not free from



the theories which researchers rely on and is not independent of their prior experiences and held beliefs. This is contrary to the prominent scholars writing on populism such as Müller (2017, p. 40) who thinks that populists “employ a very specific kind of language,” and therefore it does not depend on subjective impressions to decide if someone speaks this language or not; focusing on discourse is not a panacea to the subjectivity problem in this matter.

Lastly, in addition to these theoretical and methodological issues, I would like to shortly discuss another issue concerning the discursive approaches to populism. As we all know, what discourse means can be conceived beyond speech and text. Accordingly, the dimensions such as means and performative aspects of discourse are also critical to evaluate discourse since populism can also be seen as a political communication style (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Moffit, 2016). Manin (1997, p. 220) aptly argues that contemporary political communication via mass media changed the nature of representative democracy because political figures do not depend on the mediation of the party network to directly communicate to their electorate. To some extent, it gives a face-to-face, a direct link between the leader and voter, which stands out as a significant aspect of contemporary populist cases. In the same vein, Moffit (2016) puts forth that definite traits of and tendencies in media logic, such as simplification, intensification, dramatization, personalization, emotionalization, and prioritization of conflict are analogous with or complementary to populism, and this explains the recent success and proliferation of populism around the world. It is possible to think about this issue in a way that is connected to the neglect of the role of leadership in the ideational approach, which is also a controversial issue. Concerning it, Weyland (2017, pp. 53-54) notes that Hawkins’ approach scores the speeches made by top leaders and does not even examine other documents of the movements, but he still prefers not to acknowledge the essential role of leaders in his conceptualizations. He regards this as a critical failure of ideology-centered and discursive approaches that causes them to miss the core intention of populism, which is not to empower “the people” but to embody the general will of the people in a personalistic leader.

Nevertheless, even if these points are considered, discourse can only give us a partial picture of the phenomenon of populism. Social circumstances of discursive practices are constitutive and constructive for any discourse, and they are also crucial for the analysis of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, p. 4). Social reality is actually a conglomeration of discourse, practices, and structures, and it cannot be reduced to any of these components; therefore, scholars who analyze the discursive aspect of social reality usually aim to place it within a broader social context (Parker, 1998; Wodak, 2006). Consequently, although political discourse is an essential part of the phenomenon, it should not be simply considered equal to populism.

### **Populism as a Political Strategy**

Even though there is no consensus on the main attributes of populist strategy among the scholars who use the political approach, it can be easily stated that they all hold the same focus on agency and political action rather than ideology (Barr, 2018, p. 44). Therefore, conceiving populism as a political strategy shifts our attention to populist mobilization

itself from varying ideological tenets, political positions, and organizational structures, and, to some extent, helps us to broaden our understanding of the phenomenon which at times stays confined to definite and undisputedly populist actors in politics (Gerim, 2018, p. 428). To illustrate the point, Ware (2002) asserts that in the case of the U.S., it is extremely difficult to make a distinction between populist appeals and mainstream political traditions, values and conflicts. He notes that there once was a political movement under this name, but now it is a political strategy which is deployed by a wide range of politicians. Bonikowski (2016, pp. 13-16) expounds this argument well by remarking that populism is not a stable property of political actors, and for this reason, making a clear-cut distinction between the populist and non-populist is not easy and postulated in the ideational approach. Politicians' reliance on populism varies on the conditions. Being a strategy applied by "political outsiders," the populist tone may change over the course of a career. As an example, he shows that less experienced U.S. presidential candidates have a greater tendency to draw on populist rhetoric than those who previously held office in Washington D.C. In addition, it is difficult to assume that populist strategy works at the same efficiency level everywhere or in every political campaign. The preferences and interests of voters give it a level and a form most of the time. Therefore, he claims that it is "not a coherent worldview but a dynamic framing strategy" (p. 23). As another proponent of this approach, Barr (2018, p. 50) puts forward that the propositions which the ideational approach scholars offer to keep the core of the concept to a minimum can result in an expansive extension. For instance, if the Manichean discourse is what defines the core of populism, then it is possible to consider both George W. Bush and ISIS populists. Regarding all of these, one can say that the idea of a unifying ideology is clearly disavowed in this approach.

The proponents of the political-strategic approach emphasize that populist actors rely on a specific strategy to reconfigure the political sphere. According to De La Torre (2019, p. 2), we can attain a similar political logic and strategies among populists to get to power and to rule:

- They conceive politics as an antagonistic contest between the people and their enemies. That is why democratic adversaries are seen as enemies by them.
- They claim to be the only voice and even the embodiment of the people.
- After gaining power, they have a tendency to disregard pluralism and try to control the public sphere and civil society.

Based on these features, De la Torre (2019, p. 9) defines populism as "political discourses and strategies that aim to rupture institutional systems by polarizing society into two antagonistic camps." Similarly, but emphasizing the demand side as well, Betz (2002, p. 198) defines populism as primarily a political strategy whose political rhetoric is the evocation of latent grievances and the appeal to emotions provoked by them.

Still, possibly the most influential and also the most controversial definition in the political-strategic approach belongs to Weyland (2001, p. 14; 2017, p. 59).

...a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers.

Weyland's theoretical approach completely rules out the ideological component in populism (2017, p. 54):

The driving force behind populism is political, not ideological. Prototypical populist movements are practically impossible to define in ideological terms. Argentine Peronism for decades spanned the full arch from fascist right to radical left. And who could define the Bolivarianism of Hugo Chávez, who took advice from reactionary Norberto Ceresole as well as Marxist Heinz Dieterich?

Nevertheless, it is obvious that both of these leaders have some ideological preferences affecting their strategies. For this reason, ignoring this component poses a risk of giving us a deficient picture of the phenomenon due to the lack of showing how ideological stances are articulated to populist strategies or vice versa.

When it comes to the methodology in examining populism, although Weyland (2001) was convinced to make binary categorizations in his previous conceptualization, his recent study remarks that the fuzzy-set approach circulated by Ragin (2000) is more helpful in capturing the gradations and chameleonic nature of populism in reality (Weyland, 2017). He argues that by virtue of this approach, considering how they score in their ideological commitments, party organizations, personalistic tendencies, and populist aspirations may give more reliable results in the analysis and comparison of populism, especially in the European cases. Thereby, he posits that the political-strategic approach has clear analytical advantages compared to other approaches such as separating right-wing extremism from populism and capturing the volatility, changes, and transformations of the populist movements and leaders (p. 68).

By focusing mainly on Weyland's works, Rueda (2020) asserts that the political-strategic approach is conceptually unfit for the analysis of populism. According to him, this approach disregards the significance of ideological stances of leaders and views their policies and discourses only as instruments to attain power (p. 3-5). To some extent, it can be argued that the political-strategic approach does not pay enough attention to how populist strategy is articulated to the ideological positions of leaders. However, he also argues that this is misleading since we only see them as profit-maximizing rational actors, and we cannot be sure about what is on their minds "without getting into the populist's head," as Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012, p. 9) state. Interestingly, in direct contrast to Rueda, Aslanidis (2016, p. 96) criticizes the same approach by denoting that "one could rightfully claim that each and every political action is strategic rather than ideological or straightforwardly technocratic since political agents are rational actors aiming to maximize political returns for their decisions," and therefore, we cannot "simply lump together every type of political behavior under strategy." According to him, we sacrifice populism's conceptual refinement by defining it as a strategy since "strategy is inherent in political activity" (p. 96). This is, again, to some extent, correct, but it is still a debatable argument because one can easily answer it by stating, "so does discourse," which is what populism is according to the definition offered by Aslanidis himself. In other words, if we put every political action or behavior into the category of discourse, the result is the same; we miss the social and political reality beyond the discursive dimension although this is a quite significant part of the processes through which these realities are constructed. Then, this is a criticism that can be directed to all approaches we addressed.

Another topical issue concerning the political-strategic approach is the essentiality of personalistic leaders (De la Torre, 2010). Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017a, p. 523) allege that political-strategic definitions privilege charismatic leadership and fail to grasp that populism is above all a moral set of ideas. They remark for instance that the people “who supported Alessandri in Chile in the 1920s or Perón in Argentina in the 1940s did not vote for them simply because they were enchanted by a charismatic leader.”

In fact, in most cases, populist leaders are central, and their direct link to and identification with ordinary people render them “akin to infallible sovereigns,” and to a broad extent, make their decisions unquestionable (Arditi, 2004, p. 143). A personalistic leader embodies the will, interests, and aspirations of a homogeneous people, and in this way, gives them an identity (De la Torre, 2019; Diehl, 2019). Therefore, it is at the core of the phenomenon in many cases. Similarly, Urbinati (2014, pp. 128-129) argues that there is a difference between populism and popular movements such as Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party. According to him, they do not have a centralized leadership to obtain political power by mobilizing the masses, and populism is more than discontent and protest.

Personal charisma is also usually regarded as an important part of this leadership (Weyland, 2017, p. 50). However, even a proponent of the political approach, Barr (2018, p. 55) admits that charisma and other personal characteristics are quite difficult to reliably specify and assess, and this fact has the risk to undermine comparative analysis. In all likelihood, the concept of charisma is what causes the trouble at this point. If populism is conceived within a reciprocal relationship, it becomes easier to understand that this concept, most of the time, indicates to the relationship between the leader and the supporters rather than an innate quality (Knight, 1998, p. 231). In other words, what matters is the perception of the supporters (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 6), and it is actually something constructed, rather than an innate leader trait.

Roberts (1995, p. 87) holds a similar position in regards to the problem of leadership and states that “deinstitutionalization of political authority and representation” through personalist leaders is substantial for comprehending some contemporary forms of populism, especially in Latin America. I believe that this is the most significant point concerning this issue. The proponents of ideational approaches mostly study European cases and do not put enough emphasis on leadership, whereas the scholars advocating the political-strategic approach deal with Latin American cases and view leadership at the center. Indeed, this is maybe the most prominent feature in a lot of cases of populism outside Europe. However, for the sake of reaching a consensus-based on least common denominators, the definitions developed in the ideational approach generally do not mention it as a core feature.

However, regarding all the discussions, it is still possible to assert that addressing populism as a strategy can only offer a partial and inadequate picture of the phenomenon although it provides us with important theoretical and analytical insights, just as the other approaches do.

### **Defining the Elephant: A Reconceptualization of Populism**

To capitalize on the discussion carried out so far, it is apparent that each of these approaches enlightens significant dimensions of populism. However, each one highlights

the lacking and lagging aspects of the others although sometimes they exaggerate these aspects in order to show that the rival approach is not suitable to define populism. Then what is populism? Is it an ideology, a discourse, or a strategy? It is viewed as none of them. Generic and well-constrained definitions in a classical Sartorian way do not offer an adequate framework for this multi-faceted and multi-layered phenomenon. What I argue at this point is that studies on populism should either clearly acknowledge which component(s) of populism they address or deal with this phenomenon within a framework that integrates its components and constituents. The first option is rather clear. To exemplify it, a scholar may aim to analyze or compare discursive aspects of populism in two or more cases. In this situation, indicating the discursive features to focus on and accordingly specifying the same codes to be comparatively analyzed would be sufficient. However, it is important to realize and clearly state that this is a one-dimensional and partial analysis of populism rather than a comprehensive one. To put it differently, what should be denoted is that this hypothetical work examines populist discourse, not populism, although it is a vital part of the entire phenomenon. On the other hand, the second option requires a new conceptualization of populism.

In general, I concur with De la Torre and Mazzoleni (2019) that populism scholarship should embrace “pluralism and hybridism” without reducing the phenomenon to any of its components. Based on this, what I propose here is a Wittgensteinian approach to populism which is combined with a multi-dimensional conceptualization, and I will try to give an outline for it. It is previously argued by some scholars that Wittgensteinian family resemblance may give more fruitful outcomes if it is used to examine populism instead of dichotomous categorizations. Nevertheless, some of them discussed secondary issues, such as the usage of the term “populism” as a classifier, admonition, and descriptor, and the family resemblance among these usages (Ceci, 2019; Sikk, 2009), while some others did not offer any clear model (Canovan, 1981; Collier, 2001). Roberts (1995) and Brubaker (2017) stand out among those scholars by listing the core properties they derive from different approaches. While both have listed key points to describe the phenomenon, there are some points that are overlooked or not sufficiently emphasized on both lists. For instance, Brubaker gives an account of populism “as a discursive and stylistic repertoire,” and his list says nothing about leadership or the redistributive (or clientelistic) populist economic strategies, which are critical especially for populist political strategies outside of Europe. Roberts’ list includes these, but on the other hand, his list does not touch, for example, one of the most fundamental elements of populist politics, antagonism. For this reason, delineating a set of ideas and features by completing the missing places and by also making use of the elements highlighted by different approaches in the discussions so far is the first step of this conceptualization. However, I should state in advance that the goal of forming this set is not to attain a definition of populism that is applicable to all cases but to enable a conceptualization through family resemblances (Collier, 2001, p. 11816). In other words, it is not necessary to have A-B-C-D-E as a set to define populism, as one case may have A, C, and E traits while another features A, B, D, and E. Reckoning with this, we can say that the following are the common traits of populist politics:

- The claim to speak on behalf of “the people” which is sovereign (Brubaker, 2017); and usually presented as moral and homogenous, although not always (Katsambekis, 2016).

- A redefinition of “the people” in a way that an idealized group replaces the whole and an allegation that only the ones in this group are sovereign (Egedy, 2009; Taggart, 2002; Urbinati, 2019a).

- An anti-elitism that is usually accompanied by anti-pluralism (Müller, 2017).

- An anti-establishment stance appealing to the subaltern, marginalized or resentful sectors (or groups) of society.

- Redistributive and often clientelistic economic policies appealing to the lower segments of society (Roberts, 1995).

- A political logic based on antagonism instead of rivalry and a reconfiguration of politics relying on this antagonism (Brubaker, 2017; De la Torre, 2019; Laclau, 2005a).

- A personalistic and strong political leadership identified with the party or movement, which is in this way also identified with “the people,” and a kind of relationship between the leader and supporters bypassing intermediary institutions or diminishes their significance (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Urbinati, 2019b; Weyland, 2017).

- A particular interpretation of democracy that highlights one of its main principles, the sovereignty of the people, against, or sometimes at the cost of, the others, such as rule of law, separation of powers, etc. (Akkerman, 2003; Finchelstein and Urbinati, 2018; Jagers & Walgrave 2007).<sup>3</sup>

In each populist case, it is possible to find at least several of these properties. Besides, in each case, some of them are more prominent than others since every single case has its own dynamics which are forged by the social, cultural, economic, and political circumstances of its home country. At this point, the alternative perspective suggested by Jansen (2011) sounds very helpful. By focusing on populist mobilization, he evaluates populism as a political project rather than as a type of ideology, regime, party, or movement. Needless to say, each mobilization project has some peculiarities. By identifying populism through family resemblances, we also ensure that these peculiarities do not prevent us from studying the cases under the umbrella of this concept. This is a crucial advantage of the Wittgensteinian approach over Sartorian definitions. It shifts the focus from an unfruitful “populist or not” discussion to the study of populist premises in different layers of this mobilization process.

The second step of my reconceptualization is to adopt a multidimensional approach to populism. As previously discussed, each of the approaches substantially enlightens one side of the phenomenon. Nonetheless, each of them neglects some dimensions and aspects that do not fall within their point of view. For this reason, any comprehensive conceptualization of populism has to adopt a multidimensional approach considering all of them. What I propose is a tripartite conceptualization that can also be utilized to

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3 Especially the last feature creates a serious problem in terms of objectivity for the study of populism and prevents some scholars from taking an unbiased stance particularly when it comes to populists in power. Because they clearly consider populism as a serious threat to democracy which reflect the will of the powerful as the popular will and aim to rule out checks and balances such as rule of law, separation of powers, civil society, on this will by reducing democracy to its main principle (Finchelstein and Urbinati, 2018; Müller, 2016; Urbinati, 2019a). Some regard the situation as a right-left distinction and argue that left populism has progressive attributes, compatible with constitutive democracy (Akkerman, 2003; Mair, 2002). Yet, wider discussion on this issue is beyond the scope of this article.

construct analytical frameworks. To flesh it out, a populist case can be both identified and analyzed through ideological, discursive, and strategic dimensions in an interaction with one another. If we think of this in the form of intertwined circles, ideology takes place in the innermost circle. Every political movement has an ideological basis, although some do not completely coincide with an ideology since it is quite common to see ideological stances which combine certain elements from different ideologies. Besides the narrow meaning of the term, it would be useful to consider what is meant by ideology as the position of a movement or party in a specific political spectrum. In each populist case, the traits listed above are combined with this basis in a particular way. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that it is not an addition but an articulation (De Cleen, 2019, p. 37). In other words, it deeply reforms this basis. Therefore, it is essential to address this articulation while analyzing populism.

We can view the discourse as the circle just above. This dimension shows how the articulation of the ideological priorities of political movements with the populist characteristics mentioned above reflects on the dimension of political discourse. As discussed earlier, the political communication style adopted to convey the populist message to the masses is also an element of discourse. Moreover, it is clear that this dimension has more concrete data to offer for the analysis of populist cases than other dimensions. However, when taken on its own, problems with the context dimension of the analysis are inevitable. Besides, while we are dealing with a case, we cannot analyze the ideological stance without resorting to the discursive dimension, and it is not possible to analyze the discourse without the ideological context. Therefore, any multilayered analysis of the phenomenon must take into account the intense permeability between these two layers.

Strategy is a broader dimension that can be seen above the first two. Political movements determine their strategies aiming to come to power by taking into account the political and social conditions they are in. For populist politics, this strategy can be seen as the construction of politics through an antagonistic logic rather than competition. However, all factors such as the balance of power with political rivals and the socio-economic conditions in the country are taken into account when constructing this antagonistic strategy.

It is essential to see that there is an intense interaction between all these dimensions. All are important elements and context providers in shaping others. But none of these levels or dimensions alone has the power to explain the phenomenon of populism. For this reason, analyses that manage to count in and integrate all of them have the opportunity to provide us with a much more comprehensive picture of the phenomenon.

Researchers can develop different datasets and analysis frameworks for each level/dimension with the help of the properties of populism listed above to analyze their cases and they can also design their studies focusing on a single layer/dimension. However, if a roadmap needs to be presented in this study to aid a holistic analysis, we can briefly go over an imaginary X party/movement. The first task in such an analysis could be to focus on this party's manifesto, program, party family, position in the political spectrum, etc., and examine how these are articulated with the populist premises given above. Afterward, speeches of the party leaders, election campaigns, communication methods, and so on

could be surveyed to explore the populist components in the discourse of the party in question. In the following stage, the populist elements in the party's political strategy could be addressed by scrutinizing how it establishes its relations with the other actors in the political and social spheres of the country in order to come to power or maintain power. Again, it is possible to establish alternative analysis structures considering the multidimensionality of populism, and this roadmap is only one of them.

As the last point, I should note that this study does not aim to reconcile the reviewed approaches. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss and resolve the ontological and epistemological contradictions between these approaches. The point emphasized in the study is that although the definitions offered by each approach point to essential dimensions for the study of populism and provide significant insight into explaining this phenomenon, each of them gives us an incomplete picture of the phenomenon when taken alone. Furthermore, variability of the prominent properties among cases makes it impossible to define the phenomenon with the possibilities offered by Sartorian approaches. The multilayered and Wittgensteinian approach propounded in this study is a solution proposal to overcome this problem and provide a more profound insight into populist politics.

### **Concluding Remarks**

It is extremely difficult to make unquestionable definitions of many concepts in social sciences, and when it comes to populism, it is almost impossible to present a generic and universal definition of a phenomenon whose unique variants are seen in such a wide geography. This study proposes a new conceptualization based on family resemblance rather than definitions that claim to be suitable for all such variants and generally rely on minimal common denominators and lack much explanatory power.

The study accomplishes this conceptualization in two stages. In the first stage, it is argued that so far the studies have tried to explain populism by reducing it to any of its dimensions, and therefore, both such explanations and analyses of the phenomenon based on them are inadequate. For this reason, a multi-dimensional and family resemblance-based approach is defended instead of such unidirectional and Sartorian definitions. In the second stage, the features in which this family resemblance can be identified are listed, and a multi-layered conceptualization combining ideology, discourse, and strategy as layers that interact with each other is presented.

Certainly, this proposed conceptualization does not pretend to end the ongoing discussions between competing approaches. Nevertheless, it aims to contribute to the broadening of our perspective on the phenomenon that is increasingly an integral part of democracies such as populism. If we end by referring to that famous parable again, evaluating the elephant as a whole, rather than the parts that are closest to us or appear most decisive to us, will put our discussions on this animal on a more fruitful path.

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## Understanding the Climate-Conflict-Migration Nexus: Immigration from Climate-Conflict Zones to Turkey

### İklim-Çatışma-Göç Bağını Anlamak: İklim-Çatışma Bölgelerinden Türkiye'ye Göç

Zahide Erdoğan<sup>1</sup> , Safure Cantürk<sup>2</sup> 

#### Abstract

Regardless of the level of development, all countries are affected by the negative consequences of climate change, and economic, environmental, and social consequences emerge accordingly. Climate change is now being considered as a development and security problem. The main reason for this is that climate-related extreme weather events cause disasters, and that climate change is a threat multiplier for conflicts as it increases the struggle for scarce natural resources. This paper attempts to explain migration to Turkey from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh based on climate-induced internal displacement data using the Foresight Model. The study focuses on whether it is possible to predict migration from these countries by using the Foresight Model based on the comparison of the limited data with the IDMC data. Immigration was examined in three countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, with the exception of India, which was compatible with disaster-induced internal displacement IDMC data, by comparing DGMM data on illegal migrants apprehended with YÖK data on international students. It is concluded that a minimalist approach is more appropriate to explain climate induced migration to Turkey, and the micro and meso factors should also be considered based on the Foresight Model. IDMC, DGMM and YÖK data are compatible with each other, and there is a need for comprehensive data, including these data in climate-induced migration forecasts.

#### Keywords

Climate change, Migration and conflict, South Asia, Vulnerability, Security

#### Öz

Gelişmişlik düzeyinden bağımsız olarak tüm ülkeler iklim değişikliğinin olumsuz sonuçlarından etkilenmektedir ve bu doğrultuda ekonomik, çevresel ve toplumsal sonuçlar ortaya çıkmaktadır. İklim değişikliği artık bir kalkınma ve güvenlik sorunu olarak ele alınmaya başlanmıştır. Bunun temel sebebi iklim ile ilişkili aşırı hava olaylarının afetlere yol açması yanında, iklim değişikliğinin kit doğal kaynaklar için mücadeleyi arttırmasıyla çatışmalar için bir tehdit çarpanı konumunda olmasıdır. Bu makale Afganistan, Pakistan ve Bangladeş'ten Türkiye'ye göçü iklim kaynaklı yerinden edilme verilerine dayanarak Foresight Modelini kullanarak açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Foresight Modelini kullanarak mevcut sınırlı veri ile IDMC verisinin karşılaştırılmasına dayanarak bu ülkelerden göçün tahmin edilmesinin mümkün olup olmadığına odaklanmaktadır. Afganistan, Pakistan ve Bangladeş olmak üzere Hindistan hariç söz konusu üç ülkeden göç, IDMC ülke içinde yerinden edilmelere ilişkin verisinin Göç İdaresi'nin yakalanan düzensiz göçmen verisi ve YÖK uluslararası öğrenci verisi ile uyumludur. Minimalist yaklaşımın Türkiye'ye iklim kaynaklı göçü açıklama da daha uygun olduğu ve Foresight Modelindeki mikro ve mezo faktörlerin de dikkate alınması gerektiği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. IDMC, Göç İdaresi ve YÖK verisi birbiri ile uyumlu olup, iklim kaynaklı göçü tahmin etmek için bu veriler dahil kapsamlı verilere ihtiyaç bulunmaktadır.

#### Anahtar Kelimeler

İklim değişikliği, Göç ve çatışma, Savunmasızlık, Güney Asya, Güvenlik

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## Introduction

Climate change and its consequences have been one of the most pressing issues on the international agenda since the last quarter of the twentieth century. The global average temperature has already risen by around 1.1°C in the last 150 years when compared to the pre-industrial period (EEA, 2019). The Climate Change Report, published by the Working Group 1 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in August 2021 within the scope of the 6th Assessment Report (AR6), reveals that not only the global average temperatures, but also the negative effects caused by extreme weather events related to climate change will increase in terms of area and speed (IPCC, 2021). Significant security risks emerge as a result of this issue at the global, national, regional, and local levels. Due to the level reached by the results of the changes in the climate system, natural resources are damaged. For this reason, besides the inability to provide water and food security, especially scarce natural resources are adversely affected, and conflicts arise.

Temperature increases will lower product yields, agricultural output will decline, and those working in the agricultural sector will lose their jobs, resulting in food shortages. A vast number of people throughout the world still lack access to safe drinking water, and rising temperatures and decreasing annual precipitation will further reduce drinking water availability. Food and water supply issues, on the other hand, will result in a rise in poverty and pandemic illnesses. All of these issues will result in the emergence of new migrant movements known as climate refugees or climate migration.

Today, the world is increasingly faced with mass migrations, wars and violence due to climate-related disasters. Disasters are severe disruptions with far-reaching human, material, economic, or environmental consequences that the affected community cannot handle on its own (UNHCR, 2021). Sudden-onset disasters are linked to “meteorological hazards including tropical cyclones, typhoons, hurricanes, tornadoes, blizzards; hydrological hazards including coastal floods, mudflows; or geophysical hazards including earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions” (UNHCR, 2021). Furthermore, the Cancun Agreement defines slow-onset events, which include desertification, biodiversity loss, land and ecosystem degradation, ocean acidification, and sea level rise (United Nations, 2010, p. 6).

In the studies carried out by the World Bank and the United Nations (UN) Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) in 2020, it was emphasized that disasters due to climate change, the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) pandemic and conflicts between countries have led to the loss of decades of gains (UNDRR, 2020, p. 2; World Bank, 2020, p. xi). This issue has important consequences in the environmental, economic and social context.

Although no country or region is protected against the aforementioned effects of climate change, the people in developing countries that do not have sufficient capacity to adapt to these effects are more vulnerable because the livelihoods of these countries are more sensitive to natural disasters such as drought and flood. Extreme weather events have had the greatest impact on Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and the Bahamas in 2019, as well as Puerto Rico, Myanmar, and Haiti between 2000 and 2019. Between 2000 and

2019, it is estimated that 475,000 people died as a result of climate change, with a global loss of 2.56 trillion dollars (Eckstein et al., 2021, p. 5). Droughts in Africa and Brazil have been exacerbated by rising temperatures, as have severe heat waves in India, fires in Australia, Greece, and Turkey, as well as floods and storms in Bangladesh, China, Turkey, and Germany.

In the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) prepared by the IPCC, it is stated that inequality will grow in both developed and developing countries. In the IPCC's Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees, it was stated that these communities, whose economic activities are based on agriculture, had to migrate from their rural areas due to the increase in temperature and water stress (IPCC AR5/WGII SPM, 2014; IPCC SR1.5, 2018). Net migrant countries are typically low-income African and Asian nations such as Syria, Bangladesh, Sudan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Climate change, however, is not just a problem in the South or in specific countries; people in North America and Europe are also damaged and forced to migrate as a result of climate change. It should be noted, however, that climate change will have a substantial impact on developing countries, which have limited capacity to deal with the consequences. Furthermore, climate change will have a significant impact on more vulnerable groups, such as children, women, immigrants, the disabled, youth, and the elderly who have lower resilience. As a result, when the effects of climate change become more severe, it is more likely that immigration from these countries will increase.

Climate change's negative effects, as well as the security and migration issues they cause, are high on the agenda in Turkey and other countries. Turkey, as part of Mediterranean Europe's southern belt, is vulnerable to climate change, with rising temperatures and decreasing precipitation. This situation has a negative impact on water resources, food production, rural development, and exacerbates regional disparities (7<sup>th</sup> National Communication of Turkey, 2018). Furthermore, due to its geographical and socio-cultural characteristics, Turkey is notably vulnerable to human mobility, affecting both the population and the economy directly and indirectly affecting neighbouring countries. In addition to this, some of the climate-vulnerable countries may be important in Turkey's foreign policy due to humanitarian considerations, historical affinities, or being Ottoman subjects namely Turkic Republics and Balkan states.

There has been a considerable amount of literature published on climate change and Turkey. Climate models and climate-induced damage are generally the focus of these studies. Furthermore, some studies address the effects of climate change in Turkey such as impacts on health (Şeker et al., 2020), the resilience infrastructure of Turkey (The World Bank, 2019), vulnerabilities and resilience (Ulku, 2014), potential effects of climate change on energy, tourism, forests, water resources and living conditions (Sen et al., 2017; Şen, 2013), and societal perception (KONDA, 2019). To the best of our knowledge, there is no other study that tries to analyse the migration from climate-affected South Asian countries to Turkey based on limited data using the Foresight Model. Using the Foresight Model, this article tries to explain migration to Turkey from some South Asian countries based on climate-induced displacement.

This paper begins with the conceptual framework and the methodology on climate security, resilience and refugees. Climate change, conflict proximity, climate refugees,

minimalist and maximalist approach, and the Foresight Model are also covered in this section. Following that, international agreements are examined to cover the link between climate change and migration, and solutions. UN 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals, Paris Climate Agreement, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and Global Compact for Migration are examined to understand the relation between climate change, migration, and climate security related issues. Based on the IDMC, Council of Higher Education (YÖK) and Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) data, the impact of climate change on migration from some South Asian countries to Turkey is examined using Foresight Model.

### **Conceptual Framework**

The term “climate security” refers to the serious risks and threats posed by climate change, which directly or indirectly endanger people’s lives, the continuity of ecosystems, and the welfare of countries, as well as actions and policies designed to reduce the level of vulnerability to the negative effects of climate change (Trombetta, 2008; Dellmuth vd., 2018: 3). Climate security related issues are negotiated under documents such as the UN 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Paris Climate Agreement, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Global Compact for Migration. (United Nations, 2015a, 2015b; UNFCCC, 2015; Global Compact for Migration, 2018).

The desire to increase resilience in the face of the growing threat of climate change is the primary reason for the issue’s importance in the international arena, particularly at the UN. Resilience is a concept associated with humanitarian aid that denotes the ability to cope. The United Nations defines resilience as a systems or community’s capacity to resist and absorb hazards while mitigating their consequences in a timely and accurate manner, and ‘adaptation’ as the process of mitigating the effects of actual or anticipated climate change or avoiding harm and increasing benefits (UNHCR, 2021). Extreme weather events, the number, frequency and severity of which increase due to climate change, and disasters such as droughts, floods, landslides and fires are increasing. For these reasons, economic development is adversely affected, urban infrastructures are damaged, water and food security are disappearing, and the struggle and conflict for scarce resources has increased, and many people have become climate refugees or climate migrants and have to leave their places of residence (IPCC AR5 WGII SPM, 2014).

Although migration is carried out for many different reasons mentioned above, these factors can be grouped as socioeconomic, political and environmental factors in general. While economic structure, income, and unemployment are important factors; political reasons, particularly the issue of security and freedom, can lead to conflicts. Environmental factors such as storms, droughts, and floods caused by excessive temperature increases, as well as weather-related factors, are also important reasons for migration. Today, environmental issues are increasingly being linked to migration and displacement, making the issue of climate change and migration more prevalent.

Immigration and environmental changes have been associated since the 1980s (Hinnawi, 1985). Climate change has an impact on international and internal migration, defined as the movement of people from their home country to settle permanently or



temporarily in another country, whether voluntary or forced (IOM, 2004, p. 33). Globalization, transportation, and technological advancement have all contributed to an increase in international migration. In the discussions of this topic, the usage of immigrant and refugee concepts are frequently used interchangeably. However, these are different concepts. According to UNHCR's approach, refugees are people fleeing the torture and conflicts they face due to religion, race, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, and they seek to reach a safe area by crossing national borders. Refugees' return to their countries will pose a problem in terms of their life safety. Therefore, they are protected by international law according to the 1951 Refugee Convention. In this respect, being defined as a refugee is very important and includes rights (UNHCR, 2010; p. 14, 2015, 2020b, p. 20; Zetter, 2007). However, those displaced as a consequences of climate factors are not considered refugees under international law. Environmental factors, on the other hand, can combine with other factors to reach a level that endangers human life. These people are not protected, because the definition and criteria of climatic or environmental displacement and being a refugee within this scope are not established internationally or nationally. Not all people who are forcibly displaced and cross the border are legally considered refugees.

Another concept, migrant, is used to describe people who have chosen to move in order to improve their living conditions, not because their lives are directly in danger, and it is possible for these people to return to their countries (UNHCR, 2015). The distinction between forced and voluntary migration stems from the fact that forced migration is motivated primarily by political considerations such as conflict and oppression, whereas voluntary migration is motivated primarily by economic factors (Betts, 2009, p. 4). However, it should not be forgotten that the difference between voluntary and forced migration is not always so obvious in practice. Although the 1951 Refugee Convention clarified the distinction between two types of immigrants by linking them to persecution criteria, there is a link between the decision to migrate and many economic, political, and environmental factors (Scheel & Squire, 2014, pp. 2–3). In recent decades, immigration has grown massively, and there were 272 million international immigrants in 2019, with 82 million residing in European countries. (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2019, p. iv).

Although migration between countries, particularly with refugees, receives more attention, internal migration can also have a significant impact for countries (UN DESA, 2013, p.15). According to estimates, 763 million people migrated within the country (UN DESA, 2013, p. 15). Furthermore, World Bank predicts that 143 million people will be internally displaced in three regions by 2050: There will be 86 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa, 40 million in South Asia, and 17 million in Latin America. (Kumari et al., 2018, p. xv). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated that by the end of 2020, the total number of internally displaced people reached 55 million and 85% of this was due to conflicts mostly triggered by climate change related impacts (IDMC, 2021a, p. 8).

Internal conflicts, such as in Colombia, Somalia, Mali, Iraq, and Syria, or mismanagement, political instability, and oppression, including in Kenya in 2007 and Libya since 2010, or other variables such as food shortages, drought, and natural

disasters, account for the vast majority of displacements (Zetter, 2015, p. 6). However, Castles (2002, p. 5) discussed that the ‘environmental refugee’ literature is not sufficient to understand the process because the process is affected by more than one factor and is linked to social, political and economic factors. Thus, climate change is likely to cause the recurrence of sudden disasters such as floods, exacerbate the impact of slow events and non-weather events such as earthquakes (IOM, 2014, p. 5), and act as a threat multiplier for potential conflicts (UNHCR, 2021).

Conflict-induced migration is currently one of the world’s most pressing issues, and climate change has the potential to exacerbate conflict drivers. Schlessner et al. (2016, p. 9216) point out that the majority of the conflicts are based on ethnic divisions, and while there is no data that climate change triggers the conflicts, the impact of climate change is more tragic in cases of ethnic conflicts. Warming and drought, sea level rise, a rise in the occurrence and intensity of natural disasters, and competition for natural resources can all contribute to conflict escalation (Kumari et al., 2018, p. 24). Climate change has the potential to reduce agricultural production, resulting in lower incomes, food insecurity, and dwindling water resources. As a result, a scarcity of resources can spark new conflicts or exacerbate existing ones. The vulnerabilities and weak coping mechanisms of low-income countries, in particular, in reduced living resources as a result of climate change and increased resource scarcity pressure, can lead to internal or international migration.

The economic dimension of migration is another issue that needs to be taken seriously. Economic explanations are frequently used in migration theories. The connection between immigration and the economy is not new, and Ravenstein’s migration laws (1885, 1889) at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century demonstrate that economic factors take priority. Among the well-known models are Lee’s (1966) push and pull theory, Mabogunje’s systems theory of rural-urban migration (2010), Harris and Todaro’s economic model (1970), and Piore’s dual labour market theory (1979). Bijak (2006) categorizes migration theories used across disciplines as economic, sociological, geographical, and unifying. Environmental factors are not included among the direct factors influencing migration in these theories. However, among other migration drivers, environmental factors are included in the Foresight report published in 2011 (Foresight, The Government Office for Science, 2011).

There are two basic approaches to climate migration: minimalist and maximalist-alarmist. Loneragan (1998) states that it is not correct to separate climate migration from social, political and economic factors, and that people’s perception is also effective along with real conditions. Black et al. (2011) and the Foresight Model (2011), on the other hand, consider economic, social, political and cultural factors in accordance with the minimalist approach. El-Hinnawi (1985), Myers (1993) and Westing (1992), who establish a direct relationship between climate and migration, can be counted as representatives of the maximalist approach (Diallo &Renou, 2015). In order to understand the decision to migrate or stay, environmental factors should be included in the model that explains the migration decision. A conceptual framework for the migration-environment relationship was developed as part of the Foresight project, and five major factors influencing migration were considered. According to the model (Figure 1), environmental factors will influence other factors, thereby changing the outcomes of migration (Foresight, The Government Office for Science, 2011, p. 11).

Although the model identifies environmental, political, demographic, economic, and social issues as the primary drivers, migration decisions are also influenced by micro and meso level factors. The political environment, the cost of migration, social networks, diaspora ties, job finding, and technology are all identified as facilitators in the model. Micro drivers have been identified as wealth, age, gender, preferences, education, marital status, ethnic origin, faith, and language. The decision to move or to stay will be influenced by a combination of all factors. As a result, while the environment does not cause migration on its own, it can cause migration in conjunction with other factors. Furthermore, the facilitators and personal characteristics will influence both the migration decision and the destination country.




Figure 1. Foresight Project's conceptual framework  
 Source: (Foresight, 2011, p. 12)

The environment is seen as a negative factor affecting internal migration in refugee studies, and the “political paradigm” gives limited space to the impact of the environment (Piguet, 2008, p. 2). The complexities of climate change and its influence on individuals raise the issue of their legal ramifications; people may migrate due to environmental factors in slow-onset events, but in sudden disasters, vulnerability, rather than environmental factors, may be the primary risk factor driving displacement (IOM, 2014, p. 27). On the other hand, factors such as famine, conflict, governments, and the characteristics and opportunities of individuals or households can all influence migration decisions (IOM, 2014, p. 28). Piguet (2008, p. 3) concludes that environmental factors are not the only reason for migration and that they can reduce or increase migration flow depending on social-political and the economic situation of the threatened region. As a result, while climate change is a driver of migration, the main reason for migration is the vulnerabilities of the regions and a lack of cope with capacity.

Aside from academic debates, the concept of climate refugee has been the subject of several court decisions as a result of refugees from countries affected by climate change, such as Tuvalu, Fiji, and Bangladesh, seeking refuge in countries such as Australia and New Zealand. Environmentally driven migration is a new area, and it may be necessary to resettle displaced people if an island, such as Kiribati, disappears, whereas in other cases, environmental reasons may be a factor that amplifies the impact of other causes

of mobility (Betts, 2009, p. 10). Hinnawi (1985, p. 4) defines “environmental refugees” as anyone who migrates for protection from harm or better living conditions, however the term “climate refugee” has become more popular as global warming has increased (Piguet, 2008, p. 1). For example, in a decision made by the UNHCR in response to a lawsuit filed by Kiribati citizen Ioane Teitiota, who requested to become a refugee in New Zealand, it was stated that people whose lives are threatened due to climate change or natural disaster should not be returned to their country of origin and that refugee laws can be applied in such cases (UNHCR, 2020a). Teitiota’s case tells us that the criterion of persecution is no longer sufficient to define refugees, and countries have to consider accepting those whose lives are threatened by climate change as refugees.

While explaining the relationship between globalization and forced migration, Betts (2009, p. 154) emphasizes that the causes of cross-border displacements, such as conflict, persecution, environmental causes, and economic pressure, are related to the consequences of globalization such as production, governance and identity. Furthermore, migration was previously associated with those fleeing communism and between East and West, but now there is transcontinental migration between South and North (Betts, 2009, p. 157). It is critical to consider climate change’s direct and indirect impacts. Climate change affects more than just fragile states and conflict zones. It should be considered that climate change may harm the economic growth of not only low-income countries or conflict zones, but also developed countries. Climate change will influence migration patterns to developed countries as well as the direction of their development assistance.

As countries deal with the influx of migrants and refugees, restrictive policies have been put in place to control the flow of undocumented migrants, and especially EU’s efforts to prevent undocumented migration have increased. With the 2015 refugee crisis, the issue of refugees and asylum seekers has taken centre stage on the agendas of all countries, including the EU. This paved the way for international studies and agreements that link migration and climate change.

### **Methodology**

This study is based on IDMC, DGMM, YÖK statistics and scanning of international documents and adopts a qualitative approach. The main research question is: How does climate change affect migration from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to Turkey using the Foresight Framework? Sub-questions are: What is the relationship between climate change and migration? How does the threat-increasing role of climate on the relationship between climate change, migration and conflict work? In the study, the data of IDMC, DGMM and YÖK were used as secondary data. Because the focus was on climate-driven migration, economic factors were ignored. IDMC data has been chosen because it is among the most comprehensive data in this sector, as it is gathered from UN agencies, national governments, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh were chosen based on IDMC data; however, India was excluded from the comparison due to a lack of DGMM data. Because there is no other data that can be utilized on this topic, DGMM and YÖK data were picked. In Turkey, most Afghan immigrants are unregistered, and there are approximately 300,000 Afghan immigrants

(BBC, 2021). As a result, the statistics of irregular migrants apprehended by the DGMM were considered for comparison.

Generally, pull and push factors have been used to explain migration drivers. According to Beine and Parsons (2015, s. 763), there is a minimal direct relationship between climate-related issues and international migration, but there are frequently indirect consequences, such as wage differences in the country of origin and destination linked to climate change. Fussel et al. (2014) state that it is incorrect to make generalizations about future migration without precise data in the calculation of the environment-migration link, and the deterministic perspective that relates mass migration with climate change is rejected in studies on the subject. This paper argues that the minimalist approach is more effective in predicting climate-induced migration than the maximalist-alarmist approach in the case of Turkey. One of this paper's limitations is the absence of comprehensive data sets on the climate-migration link in Turkey. As a result, estimates of climate-related migratory patterns in Turkey will be based on a restricted data and minimalist approach.

This research is a limited evaluation of prospective migration from some South Asian countries to Turkey based on restricted available data. This article is only an attempt to explore the conceptual framework's consistency with the available statistics. Climate change's impact on migration, on the other hand, is dependent on assumptions and has limits. Within the framework of the Foresight model recognized in this study, migration is influenced by macro variables such as economic, social, political, and similar factors, as well as micro and meso ones such as diaspora links, ethnic and religious closeness. Climate is one of the things that binds all of these together. With the limited data available, it is impossible to predict the migration trend towards Turkey based on the migration-climate link, hence the focus has been on addressing the factors influencing migration within the framework of the Foresight model. Experts in the field may be able to offer more detailed information, but owing to Covid-19 concerns, experts in the area were not interviewed.

When discussing environmental factors, migration should be discussed alongside macro, meso, and micro factors, and the Foresight framework prepared by Black et al. (2011) (Foresight, The Government Office for Science, 2011) covers all these factors and environmental relationship. Black et al. (2011) point out that the climate can pose a direct threat to the space and at the same time indirectly affect the economy and living opportunities, indirectly affecting domestic and international migration. Climate change may act as a 'threat multiplier' (UNHCR, 2021) in conflict areas, and this paper uses this concept to explain whether conflict and climate relation cause migration or not. In terms of climate and migration, the Global Compact for Migration promotes disaster planning, collaboration with neighbouring countries, the implementation of humanitarian visas, private sponsorship activities, and, most importantly, keeping people in their country of origin.

This study aims to understand the possible migration flows to Turkey on the axis of climate and conflict, rather than discussing Turkey's asylum or migration policies. So, this research may contribute to better understanding the relationship between conflict, climate, and migration, as well as provide insight into potential migration waves to Turkey, where the climate change is also a factor using the macro, micro and meso factors.

### **International Agreements on Climate Change-Migration Nexus**

As stated above, migration decisions are influenced by a variety of economic, social, and environmental factors, and it may be motivated by different reasons. However, the climate change issue, which is the basis of these factors, is increasingly coming to the fore. The migration and climate relationship and measures are also included in various international agreements on climate change. The relationship between climate change and migration was included for the first time in studies under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the context of the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework. It is agreed in the Cancun Agreement to expand cooperation in displacement, migration, and relocation as a result of climate change (United Nations, 2010). The issue of the effects of climate change on migration was raised again in the Doha decision on Loss and Damage in 2012 (UNFCCC, 2012). The Warsaw International Mechanism has incorporated the approaches determined to reduce the damage linked to climate change, and human mobility is included in the five major strategic studies determined. Human mobility is defined in this framework as migration, displacement, and planned relocation (Approaches to Address Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts in Developing Countries, 2021).

Another important UN document that deals with the relationship between climate change and migration is the UN 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015. SDG-13 has the title ‘Climate Action’. The Target 10.7 under SDG-10: Reduced Inequalities includes to take immediate action to combat climate change and its consequences, and one of the targets is to facilitate safe, regular, and responsible migration. In addition, SDG-5: Gender Equality, SDG-8: Decent Work and Economic Growth and SDG-16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions include content and targets that deal with migration and mobility of people (United Nations, 2015a; MDP, 2021).

The Paris Agreement, which was adopted as a result of the UNFCCC 21st Conference of the Parties (COP-21) held in Paris at the end of 2015 in the same year as the SDGs, and entered into force as of 4 November 2016, is an internationally legally binding agreement on climate change. Article 7 of the Agreement established the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). The aim of GGA is to keep global warming well-below 1,5 degrees Celsius by increasing adaptation efforts. GGA is to increase adaptation capacity and resilience while decreasing vulnerability (UNFCCC, 2015, 2021).

An important UN document is the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, and this international agreement covers the relationship between migration and climate change. Climate change as a cause of migration has been recognized by states at various levels. Countries have agreed to develop programs and increase resilience against disaster-related migration movements under this Framework (United Nations, 2015b, p. 20).

The Global Compact for Migration is document which takes a comprehensive and holistic approach to international migration. The Global Compact for Migration includes commitments related to “natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation”. Following the UN 2030 Agenda and SDGs, Member States committed to international cooperation to facilitate safe, orderly, and regular migration.

The Global Compact for Migration declares that it is a “non-legally binding, cooperative framework” and confirms “the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy” (Global Compact for Migration, 2018).

One of the Global Compact for Migration’s goals is to reduce the factors that force people to leave their home country, with adaptation in the country of origin given priority. To reduce the negative effects of climate change, the countries agreed to improve analysis and information exchange, create adaptation and resilience strategies, incorporate displacement aspects into disaster preparedness strategies, and improve cooperation with neighbouring states. Furthermore, countries’ responses to natural disasters, other uncertain situations, and slow-onset natural disasters, as well as the negative effects of climate change and environmental degradation, vary. The countries agreed to provide humanitarian visas, private sponsorship, and educational opportunities for children of migrants who were forced to leave their home countries caused by natural disasters or other unforeseen circumstances. The Global Compact prioritizes policies aimed at keeping people in their countries of origin, while emphasizing the minimizing of structural problems and drivers that induce people to migrate. That is, it seeks to present options for people to remain in their home countries while adapting to climate change. Furthermore, in natural disasters that make it impossible to stay in the country of origin, the goal is to provide means for safe and regular migration, such as humanitarian visas and private sponsorship (Global Compact for Migration, 2018).

The Global Compact lays out the steps to be taken in emergencies like natural disasters, as long as they stay within the states’ sovereignty, and it establishes the objective of safe and regular migration. As a result, countries need monitor and manage safe and regular movement, and understanding the relationship between climate change and migration is crucial in anticipating possible migratory trends, particularly irregular migration.

### **Climate Change, Migration and Turkey**

Because of its geopolitical position, Turkey is constantly concerned with the issue of migration, both as a transit country and as a country of immigration and emigration. As a result, estimating potential migration movements to the country is critical. However, because the migration decision is influenced by a variety of factors, it is impossible to predict which country to migrate and when. Immigrants to Turkey, for example, may be impacted not only by conflict or climate change, but also by a migration flow to Turkey due to historical or cultural ties. Not only asylum seekers but also immigrants from the Balkans and Turkic Republics, with which the country has historical and cultural ties, as well as Pakistan and Myanmar, are making their way to Turkey.

Climate change has a significant impact on Turkey, as does the country’s geopolitical position, which leads to both voluntary and forced migration from the neighbouring countries. However, being a transit country, in between sending states and receiving states, entails some uncertainty, and some immigrants are frequently trapped in these countries. As a result, Turkey’s position requires it to manage both the immigrants who are directed towards it and those who want to go to Europe but remain in the country. Taking into account the impact of tropical storms, heavy rains, floods, and drought on migration, as well as the current migration pattern to Turkey, future migration to Turkey

can be expected from South Asia, the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Middle East within the framework of the Foresight model. Even if there is no conflict with the effect of the climate, components such as familial ties, ethnic and religious identity, language, social networks, and diaspora linkages that are incorporated in the model and directly affect the choice might enhance migration from these regions to Turkey.

Sofuoğlu and Ay (2020) point out that climate change is predicted to exacerbate political instability by reducing food production, diseases, and stress on water resources in the MENA region and act as a threat multiplier (Sofuoğlu and Ay, 2020). Iraq and Syria, Turkey's neighbouring countries, are active conflict zones, and drought, water shortages, and food shortages in these countries may exacerbate conflicts. Syria has been involved in conflict for more than a decade, and climatic factors have exacerbated the vulnerability caused by the internal conflicts. The example of Syria illustrates the relationship between climate, migration, and conflict. According to some scholars, following the 2006 drought in Syria, agricultural products decreased, water and food prices increased, and people migrated to cities, resulting in increased pressure on jobs and resources, combined with ethnic segregation and poor governance, ultimately leading to war (Chen, 2019; Karak, 2019; Mansharamani, 2016).

Drought has had a significant impact on Eastern Syria and Northern Iraq since the beginning of 2021, putting pressure on agriculture and water resources, and the society's coping capacity is low due to years of conflict. The number of displaced persons has not changed, but there is a high risk of food and water shortages (Copernicus, 2021). The continuation of the drought may result in increased migration to Turkey, as well as internal displacement. On the other hand, protests in Iran have been sparked by the country's drought and water shortage, which has been ongoing since 2020. According to IDMC, approximately 146.362 people will be forced to move in the case of an earthquake and 30.141 people will be forced to move in the case of a flood in Iran (IDMC, 2021b). It can be concluded that drought alone does not cause migration from Iran to Turkey but can lead to migration when other factors such as conflict come together. Turkey requires a monitoring mechanism for climate affected migration that takes into account disasters that may occur in its neighbours.

Areas affected by climate change are regions where, although not conflict, there is likely to be internal displacement and this could trigger international migration. According to IDMC data, the Pacific and the East Asia generate 39,3 percent of new displacements in 2020, South Asia generate 30,1 per cent, Sub-Saharan Africa generate 14 per cent, and the Americas generate 14,7 per cent, with tropical cyclones, monsoon rains and floods being the primary causes (IDMC, 2021a, p. 21). The total number of IDPs by end of 2020 is 55 million (IDMC, 2021, p.8). 48 million is as a result of conflict and 7 million is as a result of disasters. When the data is compared, it is clear that not all conflict zones are disaster zones, and disaster-induced displacements can occur on their own. Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have the greatest rates of disaster-related displacement in South Asia (*Figure 2, Figure 3*). Syria, on the other hand, tops the list of countries with conflict-related displacement, while Afghanistan comes in fifth.






Figure 2. IDPs as a result of conflict

Source: (IDMC, 2021, p.8)




Figure 3. IDPs as a result of disasters

The estimation of migration to Turkey from zones affected by climate change is important in terms of policy making. According to DGMM statistics in 2019, there were 454.662 irregular migrants, and in 2020, there were 122.302. As of December, 2021, the number of irregular immigrants was 162.966 (Figure 4).





Figure 4. Irregular migration to Turkey (2011-2021)

Source: (DGMM, 2021)

When the countries from which irregular immigrants originate are examined, Afghanistan ranks first, Syria second and Pakistan third according to the DGMM 2021 data. Based on the statistics, it is possible that migration from these countries to Turkey could grow as a result of climate change or other factors in the Model (Figure 4).




**Figure 5.** Irregular immigration to Turkey by origin countries

**Source:** (DGMM, 2021)<sup>1</sup>

South Asian countries are one of the most vulnerable to displacement and climate change. Afghanistan has a number of vulnerabilities because of its topography and climate, making it vulnerable to natural disasters such as floods and drought. Additionally, climate change problems are compounded by decades of conflicts, socioeconomic problems and food insecurity. On 23 June 2021, the Afghan government announced that 80 percent of the country is under threat of drought, and that families who depend on agriculture, especially in rural areas, have been displaced within the country (DRC, 2021). While it is important to distinguish Afghan migration from climate migration, poverty caused by climate-related drought causes underdevelopment, conflict, and chaos. Such conflict environments will become more common in drought and famine-stricken countries in the future. With the Taliban seizing control of the Afghan provinces, it is estimated that 500,000 people will flee to neighbouring countries, according to the UN (Deutsche Welle, 2021). So, in this case, the main driver of migration seems to be conflict, but the drought may be viewed as a threat multiplier for internal displacements and international migration. Despite the fact that Turkey is not a neighbour of Afghanistan and there is roughly a 3,000-kilometer distance between the two countries, Afghan immigration, which has increased in recent years, is still one of the most discussed topics in Turkey. Because the EU does not want to repeat the 2015 crisis, while activating the aid mechanism to keep the Afghan crisis in neighbouring countries, Germany may attract immigration as a result of its large Afghan diaspora (Deutsche Welle, 2021). When the Foresight model is applied, drought and the resulting food security crisis are identified as environmental factors, while conflicts are identified as political factors. Other causes for migrating include economic and social factors such as education and social networks formed with people who have previously emigrated to Turkey. The Model is supported by the fact that according to DGMM statistics, the number of illegal immigrants addressed is 70,252 and the number of international students is 8,428. As a result, while migration to Afghanistan is primarily motivated by conflict-climate, the Foresight model's diaspora connection and social network are likely to facilitate migration to Turkey as a transit or receiving country.

<sup>1</sup> Data for Bangladesh is August 2021 data, other country data is 2021 year-end data. Since Bangladesh was not found in DGMM year-end data, August data was taken.

According to the IDMC report, 806.000 people were internally displaced in Pakistan in 2020 due to disasters (Figure 3). Despite the fact that there is no active conflict in Pakistan and Bangladesh, such as there is in Afghanistan, migration to Turkey continues (IDMC, 2021). Pakistan is ranked third in illegal migrants caught by the DGMM, while Bangladesh is ranked seventh (Figure 3). Pakistan and Bangladesh, according to IDMC statistics, are climate-vulnerable countries. The number of Pakistani illegal migrants caught, according to DGMM statistics, is 16.133, and the number of international students, according to YÖK data, is 2.948. There are 2,347 irregular migrants from Bangladesh caught, as well as 751 international students. These statistics may be viewed as the influence of international student mobility, religious affiliation, and social networks, in addition to Turkey being a transit country. On the other hand, economic motivation should always be kept in mind in understanding international migration.



**Figure 6:** Data by country and source  
**Source:** DGMM, 2021; YÖK 2021; IDMC 2021

Possible migration movements to Turkey from Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which are the most vulnerable to disaster-related displacement, are consistent with DGMM data on irregular migrants apprehended except India and YÖK international student data. As a result, Turkey will need to establish precise datasets and a model for all of the elements in the Foresight Model in order to forecast migratory mobility and design policies. In addition to political and environmental factors, social factors such as education, networks formed by past immigrants and students, and religious affiliation are also important in attracting people to migrate out of these countries and predict climate-conflict affected migration.

From the review of above-mentioned countries, it appears that environmental factors such as floods or drought do not always result in international migration. Internal displacement can, however, occur as a result of these processes. Even if migration occurs during a drought, international migration is likely to happen when non-environmental factors and drought interact. For example, the escalation of conflicts in Afghanistan may have triggered migration in conjunction with the drought but drought is not a cause alone. As a result of the country’s vulnerabilities, which include multiple vulnerabilities, migration has occurred. However, simply being a transit or neighbouring country

cannot explain the migrations to Turkey. Former immigrants' social networks, as well as international students' social networks, are essential. Therefore, it may be possible to make predictions about climate-conflict-induced migration from countries within the framework of comprehensive models.

### Conclusion

Climate migration is a complex problem, and because there is no single solution, solutions that increase immigrants' resilience and adaptation come to the fore. It is also very difficult to predict the climate-conflict driven migration to countries. Therefore, within the framework of a model such as the Foresight model, it is necessary to know the other components that will affect the decisions of individuals and households, beyond the dynamics of migration, in order to predict the direction of migration. However, it must be acknowledged that neither conflict-related nor climate-related migration can be completely avoided.

Economic, social, demographic, and environmental factors, as well as a variety of macro, meso, and micro factors, have an impact on migration decision according to the Foresight Model. Although countries' concerns about the effects of climate change have been around for a long time, the link between migration and climate is a relatively new topic. Climate change is a global issue, not just a developing-world issue. Climate change impacts developed countries in a variety of ways as well. This paper tries to forecast the possible migration from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to Turkey within the framework of the Foresight model, based on the climate-migration relationship and the conflict-increasing effect of the climate. In this paper, the data of IDMC, DGMM and YÖK were used as secondary data. This paper is an assessment of potential migration from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to Turkey based on limited data. This article is only an effort to explore the conceptual framework's consistency with the existing data. The influence of climate change on migration, on the other hand, is contingent on assumptions and has limitations.

Turkey, due to its geopolitical position, is vulnerable to droughts, floods, and temperature increases caused by climate change, as well as climate and labour-based migration from other countries. In addition to being a transit country, particularly in terms of migration to Europe, Turkey also receives immigrants from the Balkans and Turkic Republics, which have historical and cultural ties. Migration from these regions requires consideration of micro and meso factors in the Foresight Model as well as climate change. According to IDMC statistics, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have the highest disaster-induced internal displacement among South Asian countries. When these statistics are compared to DGMM's irregular migrant data, they are found to be consistent, with the exception of India. YÖK international student data, on the other hand, is compatible with both IDMC and DGMM data. Afghanistan is the country with the most irregular migrants apprehended, followed by Pakistan. As a result, it has been established that, in addition to political and environmental factors, social factors such as education, networks formed by past immigrants and students, internal displacements, and religious affiliation are also important in attracting people to migrate out of these countries. Therefore, the minimalist approach is more effective in predicting climate-induced migration than the maximalist-alarmist approach in the case of Turkey.

Detailed data sets should be preserved in order to comprehend migration to Turkey as a result of climate change, taking into consideration the drivers such as environment, politics, society, economy, demographics, personal and household characteristics, and intermediate obstacles and catalysts. It is recommended that the causes of migration be thoroughly explored by interviewing people who have migrated as a result of climate change, as well as region specialists, and that a prediction model for Turkey be developed.

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## The Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: A Multi-Sectoral Analysis

### Boko Haram İsyanı'nın Nijerya'ya Etkisi: Çok Sektörlü Bir Analiz

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#### Abstract

Using the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and qualitative methodological approach, this article examines the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the various sectors and arenas of security as proposed by proponents of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Findings of the article suggest that the presence and activities of this terror group have impacted the various arenas of security and have also created dire sub-regional and regional implications in spite of the various counter-measures designed by sub-regional and regional actors to counter the threat posed by the terror group. Therefore, to address this challenge, the article offers practical recommendations to critical and relevant actors involved in countering the presence of this group at the various political, military, societal, economic, environmental, sub-regional, and regional levels.

#### Keywords

Boko Haram, Insurgency, Multinational Joint Task Force, Nigeria and Lake Chad Basin, Regional Security Cooperation, Sectors of Security, Sub-Regional

#### Öz

Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisini (BGKT) ve nitel metodolojik yaklaşımı kullanan bu makale, Boko Haram isyanının/ ayaklanması'nın Kopenhag Güvenlik Araştırmaları Okulu'nun savunucuları tarafından önerildiği gibi çeşitli güvenlik sektörleri ve arenaları üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Makalenin bulguları, bu terör örgütünün varlığının ve faaliyetlerinin çeşitli güvenlik arenalarını etkilediğini ve ayrıca alt bölgesel ve bölgesel aktörlerin terör örgütünün yarattığı tehdide karşı koymak için tasarladıkları çeşitli karşı önlemlere rağmen korkunç alt bölgesel ve bölgesel etkiler yarattığını göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, bu zorluğu çözmek için makale, bu grubun varlığına çeşitli siyasi, askeri, toplumsal, ekonomik, çevresel, alt bölgesel ve bölgesel düzeylerde karşı koymada yer alan kritik ve ilgili aktörlere pratik öneriler sunmuştur.

#### Anahtar Kelimeler

Boko Haram, İsyân, Çok Uluslu Müşterek Görev Gücü, Nijerya ve Çad Gölü Havzası, Bölgesel Güvenlik İşbirliği, Güvenlik Sektörleri, Alt-Bölge

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## Introduction

The emergence and activities of Transnational Terrorist Organizations (TTOs), especially in the Post-Cold War period, have impacted the way and manner states and the international community respond to and deal with these emergent threats at the state, sub-regional, regional, and global level (Makarenko, 2004). As a consequence of this, regional and sub-regional actors on the African continent are also not insulated from the challenges associated with the presence and activities of these foreign terrorist organizations (Gibson, 2004; Tella, 2018). Nigeria, for example, is said to be grappling with the greatest existential threat to its sovereignty since the end of the Civil War (1967-1970) with the rise and dastardly activities of the radical insurgent group often referred to as Boko Haram (Odo, 2015; Ogunnubi, 2017).

As illustrated by Hansen and Musa (2013), the Boko Haram insurgent group has carried out a series of coordinated attacks on the Nigerian state and various institutions that have adversely affected the country's socio-political and economic development since its activities became well known in 2009. The actions by this group have led to the wanton destruction of lives, properties, and the economy of not only the northeastern region of Nigeria, but also the intended consequence is experienced at both the sub-regional and regional level. These threats, as expressed by many researchers, are not only a challenge to Nigeria's corporate existence as a state, but also pose a serious threat to various sub-regional and regional organizations on the continent. The daunting challenge is faced by multilateral groups such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU), whose major role is to ensure the cooperation and integration of member-states in areas and aspects that will lead to the promotion of peace, progress, and development, and collectively deal with any action that will pose a threat to the region (Ogbonna & Jiménez, 2017).

Many studies (Hansen, & Musa 2013; Ayegba, 2015; Nweke, 2014; Hansen, 2017; Maza, Koldas & Aksit, 2020) have proffered the preconditions leading to the emergence of the Boko Haram terror group. These include the long history of maladministration and bad governance, the instrumentalization of violence by the elites, the rise of poverty amidst plenty, the long history of social inequality and injustice, an upsurge in unemployment, endemic corruption, the increasing level of illiteracy in the northern region, and the negative instrumentalization of religion as a vehicle to perpetuate violence, etc. (Adibe, 2013; Hansen, & Musa 2013; Ayegba, 2015; Nweke, 2014; Hansen, 2017; Maza, Koldas & Aksit, 2020; Iyekepolo, 2020). Despite the role played by the Nigerian government and the various sub-regional and regional organizations in taming and countering the activities of this group, there are certain challenges especially, as it relates to the paradigm of sub-regional security cooperation in countering the Boko Haram insurgency.

It is, therefore, within this context that this article aims to critically examine and contribute to the existing literature on the Boko Haram insurgency and its impact on the various sectors and arenas of security as put forward by proponents of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. In doing this, the study seeks to critically interrogate, analyze issues, and ask questions on the impact of the Boko-Haram insurgency at the various sectors of security, at both the sub-regional and regional levels. The research

draws most of its analysis from secondary sources, reports, and personal interviews with researchers who have contributed to issues around conflict, security, and debates around insurgent groups operating across the continent, and other relevant materials. In spite of the availability of several existing studies and literature on the Boko Haram insurgency, there has been a dearth of literature that focuses on the implications and impact of the insurgency on sectors and arenas of security within the operational and theoretical lens of the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Therefore, this article seeks to fill this gap by contributing to the multisectoral implications of the Boko Haram insurgency under the RSCT theoretical framework of analysis.

Structurally, the article is divided into the following parts: the first part is the introduction, which offers a general overview of what the article sets out to achieve in terms of its objectives, frames the research questions, and states the structure and organization. The second part centers its discourse and analysis on framing a theoretical lens and examining the relevant literature and debates on the Boko Haram phenomenon and sub-regional security cooperation on the continent. Extant studies, review, and discussion on the evolution of the Boko Haram insurgency, ideology, philosophy, and modus operandi form the second part of the article for the sake of better inference and clarity. The next part of the article offers a sectoral analysis of the impact and implication of the Boko Haram insurgency as encapsulated by proponents of the Copenhagen School of Security. These sectors and the arena of security include the military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors. The impact of the continued activities of this group will also be analyzed at the sub-regional and regional levels. The final part of the article offers concluding comments and practical recommendations on how critical actors involved in the fight against the activities of Boko Haram can effectively combat and contain its activities.

### **Boko Haram: Theoretical Discussions and Review of Existing Works**

As observed by Kellstedt and Whitten (2018), as a paradigm, a theory is vital and important in every research process given the fact that it has the tendency and potency to bring out the logical and causal mechanism between the issues under investigation and analysis to bring out a well-structured and coherent narrative. As a theoretical framework, this article will adopt the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to explain the logic behind the challenges of sub-regional security cooperation in dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The RSCT is a securitization theory developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, whose primary focus is to conceptually and analytically examine security, threats, and threat perception in a geographically structured manner by combining some elements of materialist and constructive narration with the ideas of threats on states and regions, and establishing the processes that define security cooperation amongst actors in the global system (Buzan & Weaver 2003; Godehardt & Nabers 2011). The RSCT also looks at the impact of threats that transcend traditional boundaries of states and spread to other regions.

The RSCT is used here to explain how sub-regional and regional actors can uniformly come together to combat the challenge posed by the Boko Haram insurgent group given the magnitude and intensity of their actions, which transcend the Nigerian state

and spill over to other countries as well (Blanchard, 2014). The theory provides a vivid theoretical lens for analyzing sub-regional security cooperation, especially as it relates to the counterinsurgent efforts being done to contain the activities of the Boko-Haram radical group. As put forward by Comolli (2015), analyzing any counterinsurgent effort in addressing the Boko Haram insurgency requires regional, sub-regional, and national collaboration by these actors. This is because Boko Haram today has not only presented an existential security threat to Nigeria; its activities also pose a complex regional security concern. Therefore, this existential reality requires support from other global, regional, and sub-regional players in the continent because the “War on Terror” requires this semblance of alliances and cooperation to make it realizable.

Apart from the theoretical undercurrents of the Boko Haram and the RSCT, there is a plethora of literature regarding the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria and also sub-regional cooperation within the ECOWAS sub-region. Akinbi (2015) tried to critically analyze the Boko Haram insurgency in light of the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. This perspective points to the fact that the activity of the insurgent group has grave political implications on the stability and consolidation of democracy in Nigeria and, to an extent, the West-African sub-region.

Another narrative, by Abimbola, Adesote, and Olonisakin (2013), analyzes how the Boko Haram phenomenon emerged as purely a domestic security concern of the Nigerian state. To them, the insensitivity of the Nigerian government and security actors allowed the pattern and trend of the Boko Haram group to spiral to other parts of Nigeria and other neighboring states, requiring a more proactive response by the ECOWAS community to ensure the activities of the group are contained. Studies by Bappah (2016) Ogbonaya, Ogujiuba, and Stiegler (2016) and Botha and Abdile (2019), examined the challenges of regional cooperation in West Africa, especially in combating the Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria, ranging from the lack of a clear-cut security policy and framework in dealing with the menace, to the non-commitment and lack of political will from member states to ensure the activities of the group are contained, and the lack of an effective operational strategy and standby-force as plausible factors militating sub-regional security cooperation in the counterinsurgent efforts against the organization. Other research (Maiangwa, 2013; Edward & Kwabena, 2015; Olumuyiwa & Maiangwa 2017b; Onapajo, Uzodike & Whetho, 2012; Popovski & Maiangwa, 2016; Umokoro, 2016; Kallon, 2017), has captured the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency at the various levels and sectors of society and the various regional and sub-regional responses by these regional and sub-regional actors in containing the threats posed by the continued presence and activities of this group.

Counterinsurgent efforts against the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria were also studied by Oyewole (2015), Eji (2016), and Ojelade (2018). These narratives and studies ranged to the role of the Nigerian state, and largely the contribution of regional players like the AU and the ECOWAS, which ultimately culminated in the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF) against the Boko Haram insurgency. The functionality and operability of the MNTJF against the Boko Haram insurgency were captured in scholarly works such as those by Comolli (2015), Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo (2016), De-coning (2016), Agbibo (2017), Albert (2017), and Obamamoye

(2017). Despite the plethora of studies regarding the Boko Haram insurgency and the role of sub-regional actors like the ECOWAS, there are however limited studies and discussions on the impact and implication of these phenomena at the sectoral level of security analysis and the challenges facing the smooth operationalization of the Task Force saddled with containing the activities of this ragtag and dreaded organization.

### **Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency: A Multi-Sectoral, Sub-Regional and Regional Analysis**

The Boko Haram insurgency has a significant impact on and implications for the various sectors and arenas of security. This is based on the fact that the group has been able to effectively carry out a series of coordinated attacks on state institutions, individuals, and the private sector. Many consider these attacks to be a threat not only to Nigeria but also to the various security sectors at the state, sub-regional, and regional levels. This part of the article will offer a multisectoral analysis of the impact and implications of the Boko Haram insurgency within the lens of the various sectors and arenas of security as put forward by proponents of the Copenhagen School of security.

#### **Boko Haram and the Military Security Sector**

The threats posed by the Boko Haram incursion on the military sector of security put to test the capacity and capability of Nigeria's defense forces in tackling this dreaded organization (Onuoha & Thurston, 2013). As put forward by proponents of the Copenhagen School, a threat to this sector has dire consequences on the other sectors of security. This is because it raises the discourse and narrative on the ability of the state to carry out its responsibility of not only protecting the lives and properties of its citizens, but also measures her wherewithal in response to threats on both her internal, external, and territorial sovereignty (Stone, 2009). Scholars such as Brenya and Kuffuor (2015), Bappah (2016), Maiangwa (2017), Ogunnubi (2017), and Haruna (2018) assert that Nigeria's military was hitherto seen as one of the most powerful defense forces in Africa based on its antecedents and successes in the various peacekeeping engagements in war-torn countries across the continent in the 1990s and early 2000s. The emergence of this dreaded organization now puts to test that assertion. This is because many analysts argue that the Boko Haram insurgency has significantly painted the Nigerian military in a bad light and has further opened up the "Pandora's box" of the deep-rooted crises that have affected this sector in performing its task of dispelling and managing the insurgency. As further shown by Aljazeera ("Report: Boko Haram," 2018), Campbell (2021), "Boko Haram overruns" (2018), and Ogundipe (2018), the military sector is one arena where the Boko Haram insurgents seemed to have sway based on the levels, intensity, and successes recorded in carrying out certain attacks in the northeastern region of Nigeria, leading to a high number of fatalities of both military and civilians, with over 20,000 media-documented deaths, many towns, cities, and villages captured by the terror group, and also the destruction of military tanks and equipment. This led many to believe that the military sector is one sector that has been the focus of attacks by Boko Haram. While the threats associated with the military sector were seen to be a consequence of the lack of professionalism exhibited by its members, the over-politicization of the sector, lack of a coherent strategy and rule of engagement in counter-insurgency, and challenges

associated with operations and logistics are amongst several other factors inhibiting this sector in managing and containing the Boko Haram phenomenon. The fact that this sector of security falls largely within the response and cooperation of the various regional and sub-regional actors in dispelling the activities of this insurgent group under the Multinational Joint Taskforce (whose role encompasses a military approach to counter-insurgency) tends to significantly impact how this sector deals and manages the impact of this group. Consequently, Onuoha and Oyewole (2018) stated that the activities of this insurgent group and the inability of this sector to effectively manage this threat have significantly affected the military arena and invariably affected other sectors of security.

### **Boko Haram and the Political Security Sector**

Ntamu and Ekpenyong (2014) hinted that the Boko Haram insurgency is not only a threat to Nigeria's security, but it has become an existential threat to the survival of the political and legal entity called Nigeria. When discussing the paradigm of political security, Buzan explained that political security seeks to deal with the legitimacy of the political system and institution to handle any form of an existential threat to its survival, given that, once that necessary legitimacy which is the basic [irreducible] minimum is absent, it creates the preconditions for insecurity (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998). As asserted by Okpaga, Chijioke, and Eme (2012), this narrative puts to the test and challenges Nigerian political, legal, and legitimate sovereignty as a result of the activities of this terrorist organization. Going by the series of attacks carried out by this organization on state institutions and agencies, the question arises as to the Nigerian government's requisite capacity to deal with this ragtag group (Ibid). Anyadike (2013) also supported this by observing that the Boko Haram organization threatened the Nigerian Government with certain conditions, which involve the prisoner exchange of some of its members who were arrested by the government and the immediate resignation of the Executive Governor of Borno State (Alhaji Kashim Shettima). The group also engaged in attacking security officers, chasing them to other neighboring cities in the Northeast (such as Bama and Baga) while declaring a caliphate in the captured towns. This has posed a serious challenge to the entire political and national security framework of the Nigerian state. It also questions the legitimacy and ability of the Nigerian government to effectively tackle this scourge. Therefore, as intimated by Siollun (2015), the activities of this insurgent group raised serious questions regarding the ability of Nigerian political leaders to effectively handle the Boko Haram question. This led to various narratives put forward by political pundits and analysts asserting that the inability of President Goodluck Jonathan to clinch the 2015 General Elections was predicated on the fact that over the past six (6) years, his government has shown a lack of political will to handle the myriad challenges bedeviling the country, especially the Boko Haram crises. It was this failure that led to the organization further consolidating its power by capturing cities in the Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States (BAY states) and establishing a mini-caliphate. This made it possible for the terrorists to successfully raid military camps, chasing away soldiers and carting away several military tanks and equipment (Blair, 2015).

Another narrative was also given. This one proposed that the constant attacks and presence of Boko Haram have not only made the regime unpopular, but have also made

the government lose credibility in the face of Nigerians because of the enormous amount of resources that have been channeled towards dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency with little or no visible results to show that the government is making fruitful efforts in dealing with this menace (Oduah, 2015). Again, the highly publicized abduction of the “Chibok girls” attracted global outrage and attention on the need for the Nigerian government to show serious zest and commitment in ensuring that the fight against this group is won if the regime wants to gain back the trust of the people and her allies among the organizations of states around the world. This failure led to people viewing the 2015 General Elections as a “vote for insecurity or vote for security,” in which many voters opted for the latter (Maiangwa & Agbiboa 2014; Habila, 2017; Hashimu & Ancel, 2017). This political implication has further negatively impacted the Nigerian government and puts to the test not only the government’s capacity to tackle this challenge, but also the assurances and guarantees by the transformed African Union (with the various RECs) that “African problems” can be solved by Africans.

### **Boko Haram and the Societal Security Sector**

Many studies (Solomon, 2013; Blair, 2015; Montclos, 2016; Oriola & Akinola, 2018) have revealed that the activities of the Boko Haram sect have significantly affected the “Islamic identity” negatively. As indicated by Beydoun (2018), this is due to the organization’s modus operandi, where most attacks are carried out using certain Islamic incantations and chants such as “Allahu Akbar,” which, loosely translated, means, “God is the greatest.” To many, the use of these chants creates a violent, negative, and false view and perception of Islam because the phrase is mostly used to signify victory or Allah’s protection when these radical jihadi sects carry out their activity. Subsequently, many say that the use of such chants as a tool by these radical groups to instill fear and terror invariably portrays Islam as a violent religion (Pérouse, 2014).

Another contribution by Nwigwe (2019) asserts that the use of dress by Boko Haram forms and constructs a certain negative perception in the hearts and minds of people. This form of the narrative was given credence based on data which showed that, increasingly, Boko Haram insurgents wear “head-gear, turbans, hijab, and veils” whenever they are out to attack. This form of dress is traditionally used in Islam to signify one’s membership in a religion that abhors all forms of moral decadence, and to show respect for humanity by dressing modestly to demonstrate devotion to and respect for the teachings and precepts of Islam. Therefore, the use of this dress by this radical group to carry out heinous acts of terror portrays a high sense of defiance of all that Islam stands for.

Ishaku (2018), a renowned journalist who has researched the Boko Haram sect, noted during a phone conversation with the authors that, “the use of fashion to constantly portray Islam in a bad light by the Boko Haram and any other radical jihadist terrorist organization is a threat to the identity, values, teachings, and principles of Islam.” If this negative perception is not contained, it will be very difficult to convince people not to immediately label an individual who dresses in a manner that represents his/her religion a terrorist or member of Boko Haram (Ibid). Further observation shows that the societal threat posed by the Boko Haram insurgents was further fueled by the ever-increasing politicization and instrumentalization of religion and identity by the political, religious,

and traditional elites to further pursue their agenda and interests, more often than not, to the detriment of the larger segment of society. This is seen through the constant negative securitization of speeches by these leaders in order to indoctrinate these negative values and ideas into people who naively accept and imbibe these teachings and use them (Adesoji, 2010; Walker, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013). This is because the leaders of Boko Haram and other radical sects operating across the Sahel generally galvanize, mobilize, and instrumentalize these negative religious views, sentiments, and ideologies to further divide societies and create conditions for insurgencies to thrive because of these negative and total misrepresentations of religion and societal beliefs. In the same vein, the Boko Haram insurgency has negatively impacted the process of social interaction among various groups in the region who hitherto were united irrespective of their cultural, religious, and ethnic backgrounds, creating a precondition for mistrust and division among such communities. To this end, it is important for relevant actors involved in countering and combating the Boko Haram insurgency to take cognizance of the ideational and identity construct of the inhabitants of the northeast region (NE) of Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region (LCB), given the fact that their cultural homogeneity has been exploited, instrumentalized, and weaponized through negative and divisive doctrinal narratives by these rogue elites to further exacerbate and promote extremism and terrorism (Weeraratne, 2017; Uwakwe & Miapyen, 2018; Iyekekpolo, 2020).

### **Boko Haram and the Economic Security Sector**

The economic implications of the Boko Haram insurgency fall largely within the lens of the threats posed by this group to the economy of Nigeria and the region. Regarding the impact and implications of the Boko Haram insurgency on the economy, Ayegba (2015) argued that due to the activities of the Boko Haram radical group, the economy of Nigeria and the entire northeast region have been rendered comatose. This has led to the closing down of businesses, companies, and financial institutions such as banks and discount houses. It has also caused the massive loss of jobs among the teeming populace who derived their sustenance from engaging in business and rendering of services. This position was also corroborated by Durotoye (2015) and Bakare (2016), who noted that not only is the economy of the northeast region severely affected because of the activities of Boko Haram, the Nigerian government recorded a loss of revenue through foreign direct investments running into billions of dollars. With these negative economic deficits, no business investor or organization will want to invest in a region ravaged by insecurity and uncertainty. This figure was further corroborated in the World Investment Report (WIR) published in 2013 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which observed a decline of about 21.3% in the nation's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the economy of the northeast region, amounting to about USD 8.9 billion in 2011 and over USD 7 billion in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013). A recent "Economic Freedom Index" report by the Heritage Foundation (2018) ranked Nigeria 115/180 globally and 16/56 regionally, meaning it is one of the hardest places for investments to thrive due to the continued activities of this radical insurgent group. This negative assessment was also seen in a recent report published by The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) for the period 2014–2018, which showed that of countries that are most suitable for business, Nigeria was ranked 76/82 and scored 4.47/10. Negative factors such as



the increasing volatility occasioned by the incessant attacks by this radical terrorist group were seen to be partially responsible for not creating a conducive environment for businesses to thrive (EIU, 2018).

As a result of the continued activities of this group, Nigeria has suffered economic loss in the area of trade, investments, and effective flow of capital within the economy. This was further corroborated by the Borno State government in recent statistics, which revealed that attacks carried out by this group have led to the wanton destruction of properties and investments in the northeastern part of Nigeria worth over 1.3 trillion Naira (over USD 9 billion) (Premium Times, 2018). This was further supported and corroborated recently by Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff General, Major General Tukur Buratai, who presented a paper titled "Counter-insurgency and the Role of the Nigerian Army in creating a conducive environment for Nigeria's Economic Development." He admitted that the massive economic loss because of the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency amounts to over USD 3.5 billion (107 billion Naira) worth of agricultural produce in the northeastern region of Nigeria, leading to massive and dire economic consequences for not only the country but also the economy of the Lake Chad Basin, where member countries enjoy this agrarian produce (Premium Times, 2017).

This massive economic downturn because of the economic threats posed by the Boko Haram insurgents is no longer just a Nigerian problem, given that because of its activities, the downturn has spiraled to other neighboring states, such as Cameroun, Chad, and Niger. These countries had enjoyed harmonious trading and economic relations amongst themselves, but this terrorist group has further affected their harmonious economic relations because so many businesses were adversely affected, leading to many closing down and the loss of jobs and means of subsistence because of fear of constant attacks by the insurgents. Thus, this economic loss has the potential to further cripple the economy of not only the region but the country (Tukur, 2017). It is with this perspective that the committee set up by the Nigerian government to reconstruct, rehabilitate, and rebuild the northeast region showed that over USD 9 billion is needed to reconstruct and rehabilitate the damaged properties (Nwabughio, 2016). In view of all these negative economic indices, it is clear that the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents impact the economic security sector of Nigeria and the region at large.

### **Boko Haram and the Environmental Security Sector**

Challenges to the environment have been given as one factor responsible for the increase in conflict and insecurity, and to a large extent, the unending insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region (Rudincová, 2017). Onyia (2015) observed that studies by various environmental experts show that the inability of policymakers in Nigeria and governments that make up the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to effectively address the challenges associated with climate change, especially in the region, has further stifled the progress and development of the region, leading to drought, massive population explosion, unemployment, and poverty. All these negative factors have the potential to further exacerbate and increase conditions for insecurity and conflict in these areas given the fact that the employment opportunities the Lake Chad Region had created for the growing population of youth no longer exist, leading them to be

easy targets of recruitment by some of these jihadist groups operating across the region (Eichelberger, 2014). This narrative was further corroborated in a recent study and report by Adelphi noting that recent changes to the climate and environment have paved the way for terrorist organizations to further fuel their activities (Doherty, 2017). This is because these groups exploit these negative changes to the environment to recruit members of society who are vulnerable due to the high rate of poverty; these changes also allow and enable these groups to operate with freedom, fluidity, and to a large extent, control and to determine the degree to which people use natural resources such as water and food (Ibid). Another report commissioned by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) highlighted that over time, terrorist organizations often use natural resources as a weaponized shield to carry out their activities. To insurgent groups, controlling who has access to these resources is bait for them (Grecequet, Hellmann, DeWaard & Li, 2019). Therefore, whenever such resources are scarce because of climate change, as witnessed in the northeastern part of Nigeria, Boko Haram insurgents use the deplorable state of the environment to further consolidate their power and operate in the region because some necessities of human existence, such as food and water, are within their control (Rizzo, 2015).

It has again been argued that environmental threats because of the Boko Haram insurgency further created a precondition of insecurity in social relations among various communities in the region through migration of people who are forced to flee their community. As suggested by Bakare (2016) and Enobi and Johnson-Rokosu (2016), the incessant attacks carried out by this group, which has also become a threat to social values considered to be highly emotive and sensitive, such as religion, education, and secularism, create negative stereotypes between members of the two dominant religions in the country (Christianity and Islam). It is through these lenses that tackling issues relating to the biosphere in the region will go a long way in addressing the question and challenges posed by threats to the environment and the overall Boko Haram challenge across the region (“Tackle Lake Chad,” 2018).

### **Boko Haram and the Human Security Sector**

Since it unleashed its reign of terror in 2009, the Boko Haram insurgent group has impacted the safety and security of individual citizens, resulting in a high number of casualties in addition to people suffering various degrees of injuries and traumas. The figures and data released by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (2014), Anderson (2015), Skinner and Begum (2016), and Amnesty International (2018) indicate that the insurgent group took a civilian death toll of about 6,347 in 2014 alone, ranking it as the world’s deadliest organization ahead of the Islamic State (ISIS). Also, in a recent report by the Government of Borno State in Nigeria, which is the state in northeastern Nigeria worst hit by the activities of this group, the Governor revealed that from 2011 to the first few months of 2017, the civilian death toll was about 100,000 (CGNT Africa, 2017). The human insecurity implications of the Boko Haram conflict were recently captured in a report by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in (2017), which states that the displacement of over 2.4 million people because of the Boko Haram conflict has further raised great concern over the cases and challenges of human

security and food security across the West African sub-region, especially the Lake Chad Basin. This is because, at the humanitarian level, this insurgency rapidly increased the number of refugees and further contributed to the displacement of people across the Lake Chad Basin. Consequently, the Commission needs to cater for over 208,000 Nigerian refugees and over 75,000 refugees across Chad, Cameroun, and Niger with a financial cost implication of over USD 157 million. On the aspect of food security, there has also been great concern given the fact that the report predicted that over 7.2 million people across the Lake Chad Basin are in danger of facing severe food crises. The “Refugee Response Plan” started by the Commission requires over USD 241 million to help deal with the insecurity associated with food crises (UNHCR, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2019).

Therefore, with this casualty figure recorded, and the growing rise of humanitarian and food insecurity, it is clear that the Boko Haram insurgent group is not only a threat to Nigeria’s security but is also a major threat to the safety of citizens and individuals, given that a lot of families have become displaced, and women and children have become widows and orphans. With all these negative nuances, the citizens of the Lake Chad Basin stand a great risk if this group continues to operate with no countermeasures taken to address them.

### **Boko Haram: Sub-Regional and Regional Security Impact**

As observed by Pham (2012), undoubtedly, the Boko-Haram insurgency has had a sub-regional and regional implication in the geostrategic politics of the continent of Africa. This is because the activities of the insurgents have now created a security dilemma in the discourse and narrative behind the “Global War on Terror.” Within the West African sub-region and Africa, the spotlight has been shown on the region whenever there is discourse related to terrorism, insecurity, and instability (Ibid). Also, the Boko Haram terrorist group has seriously raised the question of the role and perception of Nigeria as a sub-regional and regional hegemon given the fact that the Nigerian state and armed forces have found it increasingly difficult to dispel or contain the activities of this ragtag group. Once that capability is put to test, other countries looking to Nigeria as a safe-haven whenever they face insecurities are now put in a difficult situation (Oluwadare, 2016). Others have observed (Aduloju, Opanike & Adenipekun, 2014; Comolli, 2015; De Coning, Gelot & Karlsrud, 2016; Emmanuel, 2017) that the Boko Haram threat is no longer Nigeria’s problem alone given that their activities have a sub-regional and regional impact on the continent, in the sense that, their activities have further increased the level of transnational crimes within and across the African continent. The region is also known for its porous borders contributing to the massive proliferation of small and light weapons, creating serious conditions of insecurity in the region. Again, some argue that Boko Haram has been able to effectively collaborate with other designated terrorist groups operating within the African continent, such as Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), the Mujahedeen and Janjaweed militias in Sudan, and Al-Shabab in Somalia, further creating a grave security challenge for most countries in the region in which a majority of these countries are mostly considered weak and lacking effective state-building apparatus and the capacity to manage such existential threats.

In terms of sub-regional and regional economic implications, the actions and activities of the Boko Haram organization have significantly affected trade and commercial activities between Nigeria, her immediate neighbors, and her other trading partners in Africa (Ibid). As observed further by Thomas (2016), the United States Department of State suggested in its report that the Boko Haram terrorist organization is becoming a constant threat to the interests and investments of the United States and other trading partner states in Africa, affecting its geostrategic interest in the region. Second, the trade protocol of the Lake Chad Basin and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member states allows the free-flow of commercial activities between member states, but the constant attacks from Boko Haram have grossly affected trade among these trading partners, causing massive economic shock and shortfalls. With all these issues being raised, the problem of insecurity because of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has seriously impacted the sub-regional and regional security discourse on the continent. An example of these patterns of sub-regional cooperation by relevant actors to combat the monstrous acts of Boko Haram can be seen in the member states of the Lake Chad Basin establishing the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF), which is a strategic military alliance of armed forces of LCB member countries and is made up of Chad, Cameroun, Niger, Nigeria, and The Republic of Benin, due to their close proximity to the areas affected by Boko Haram (Maza, Koldas & Aksit, 2021).

### **Conclusion**

This article offered a multi-sectoral analysis of the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the various sectors and arenas of security, using the analysis and framework put forward by proponents of the Copenhagen School of Security through the theoretical lens of RSCT. The insights and analysis of the article focused mainly on the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the sectors and arenas of security (i.e. the military, political, societal, economic, environmental, sub-regional, and regional sectors). This constitutes a major limitation of the article. However, further research can focus on other theoretical perspectives. The findings of the article suggest that the activities and presence of this group have implications and impacts on the various sectors and arenas of security. Furthermore, despite the various counterterrorism initiatives designed by various stakeholders at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels to combat the activities of this group, Boko Haram continues to expand and solidify its base by carrying out many attacks. Therefore, as part of practical recommendations to counter this group, this article suggests the following:

a. Political actors involved in framing and designing policies towards counterterrorism should show their willingness and commitment in ensuring that the various measures and policies initiated to counter this group are fully implemented.

b. Regarding the military sector, troops that are deployed under the Multinational Joint Taskforce, the G5-Sahel, should exhibit a high sense of professionalism in the discharge of their mandate and should not engage in any activity that will lead to questioning of their legitimacy and professionalism.

c. Regarding the societal threat posed by this group, relevant and critical stakeholders should ensure the implementation of ideational and counter-narratives that

counteract radicalization and other forms of violent extremism in society using religion and various cultural practices of the people.

d. Regarding its impact on the economy, relevant actors and stakeholders should ensure structural challenges such as poverty and unemployment are adequately addressed to deter vulnerable and impressionistic individuals from joining this group.

e. Regarding its threat to the environment, there should be a deliberate policy by key actors in ensuring that issues related to illegal migration, illicit movements of persons and goods, and environmental degradation are also addressed to limit easy cross-border movements of aliens without proper documentation.

f. At the sub-regional and regional levels, relevant actors, such as the AU, ECOWAS, SADC, and EACC, should promote and strengthen their capacity on regional integration, engage in adequate sharing of information and intelligence, and address mutual suspicion, which tends to be a major barrier to sub-regional and regional cooperation amongst various states on the continent.

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## The Concept of Professional Ethics and Debates on Professional Ethics in the Legal Profession: The Case of Ankara\*

### Mesleki Etik Kavramı ve Avukatlık Meslek Etiğine Yönelik Tartışmalar

Zeynep Ceren Nurata<sup>1</sup>

#### Abstract

The purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which professional ethics, which is a criterion of professionalism, is realized for public sector lawyers and corporate lawyers (including lawyers working in law offices) and for self-employed lawyers, and to compare and evaluate the findings. This study examined how the problem of professional ethics in the practice of law is handled according to the professional status of lawyers (self-employed, public and corporate), and it aims to contribute to the literature by focusing on both the perceptions and expectations of the two groups regarding professional ethics. The findings obtained from the research were evaluated by considering the Attorneys' Act, the Code of Professional Conduct, and professional practices. It was observed that there is a significant difference between perceptions and expectations of all lawyers participating in the research, without a distinction between public sector and corporate or self-employed, regarding compliance with professional ethics. When the professional ethics perceptions of self-employed lawyers and of public sector and corporate lawyers are compared, no significant difference is found. However, in terms of professional ethical expectations, it is observed that there are significant differences between the two groups regarding some ethical dimensions.

#### Keywords

Profession, Professional Ethics, Professional, Code of Conduct, Lawyer, Ankara

#### Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, profesyonellik kriterleri arasında kabul edilen meslek etiği konusuna yaklaşımları açısından farklı mesleki statüde çalışan avukatlar arasında algı ve beklentiler açısından anlamlı bir farklılık olup olmadığını ortaya koymaktır. Ülkemizde avukatlar, kamu kesimi avukatları, özel kurum ve kuruluşlarda hizmet sözleşmesi kapsamında çalışan kurum avukatları (avukatlık bürosunda çalışan avukatlar dahil) ile serbest çalışan avukatlar olarak faaliyet göstermektedirler. Kamu kesimi avukatları ile özel kurum avukatları, bir avukatlık bürosunda çalışan avukatlar da dahil olmak üzere, bir işverene bağlı olarak mesleki faaliyetlerini icra etmektedirler ve bağlı avukat statüsündedirler. Serbest çalışan avukatlar ise herhangi bir işverene bağlı olmaksızın kendi nam ve hesaplarına mesleklerini icra ederler. Bu durumun meslek etiği konusuna yaklaşımları açısından söz konusu iki grup arasında bir farklılık yaratması beklenmektedir. Araştırmaya katılan tüm avukatların, kamu kesimi/kurum avukatı ve serbest avukat ayrımı olmaksızın, meslek etiğine uyma konusunda algıları ve beklentileri arasında anlamlı farklılık olduğu görülmüştür. Mesleki etik algılar konusunda, serbest ve bağlı avukatlar karşılaştırıldığında, anlamlı bir fark görülmezken, mesleki etik beklentilerde, avukatın “özen, doğruluk ve onur içinde görev yapma yükümlülüğü” ve “avukatlık faaliyetinin ticari nitelikte olmayışı” alt boyutları için serbest çalışan avukatlar ile bağlı avukatlar arasında anlamlı düzeyde farklılık olduğu görülmektedir.

#### Anahtar Kelimeler

Meslek, Meslek Etiği, Profesyonel, Avukat, Hukuk, Ankara

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## Introduction

Along with social relations becoming globalized, the profession of law has taken on an international character. The technological revolution transforms all social relations, and as a result, there are transformations in the way the profession is practiced. Such developments create a new attorneyship identity and lead to the transformation of legal structures (İnancı, 2000, p. 287). With the intense competition in the legal profession in recent years, it is seen that lawyers all over the world are trying to find a place for themselves in different institutional structures. Along with these different legal entities, the most fundamental problem discussed in the international literature is how differences in the practice of the profession will affect the behaviour of lawyers, but especially the professional ethical behaviour of lawyers (Stagg-Taylor, 2011, pp. 173-192).

The recent mobility in the legal profession, globalisation, the development of technology, the provision of legal services in different organisational structures, and the institutionalisation of pro bono are all changing the face of the legal profession (Wilkins, 2012, p. 39). These new trends present some concerns along with the various conveniences that they bring. Does 'being able to do something' mean, in any case, 'being allowed to do it'? That has been a frequently mentioned problem recently (Tepe, 2015, p. 9). Within the scope of the transformation in the profession, there are ongoing discussions in the literature about whether the ethical rules meet the renewed needs of the profession any longer (Wilkins, 2012, pp. 38-43).

In this context, the aim of this study is to determine the realisation of professional ethics and to compare and evaluate the results for self-employed lawyers and professionals working in the public sector and private institutions and under a service contract with a lawyer.

The study consists of three parts. In the first part, the definition of professional ethics in general is provided, and then professional ethics of the law profession are presented based on national and international literature. In the second part, there is a literature study on ethical elements in the legal profession. The third part is devoted to the field research to determine the perceptions and expectations of professional ethics of self-employed lawyers registered with the Bar Association and lawyers working in public and private institutions, including those working for an employer, in Ankara, Turkey. In the last part of the study, the results obtained from the findings are discussed.

## Professional Ethics and the Conceptual Framework of the Lawyer's Professional Ethics

Ethics, which has been a philosophical discipline since the time of Aristotle, originally comes from the Greek word 'ethos'. There are two different uses of the word. The first one means 'habit, morality (custom), custom'. The second use is expressed as 'transforming the traditional rules of action and value measures into a habit in order to do good'. In this sense, ethics reinforce the basic attitude of being virtuous. Morality or custom 'includes generally binding action models that consist of respect and mutual acceptance processes that develop in mutual relations in a human community and that are validated as norms' (Pieper, 2012, p. 31).

'Moral', which is another concept that is parallel to the word ethics, finds its roots in the Latin words 'mos, mores', which express tradition, habit, or character. Morality, which comes from 'moral', is the set of beliefs and attitudes that determine the good or bad, and right or wrong of an individual's actions/character. Ethics, on the other hand, can be defined as the philosophical study of moral principles. This discipline examines both what is right or wrong and what moral duties and obligations are. Although the concepts of ethics and morale have been used interchangeably in recent years, it is seen that the term ethics is used more in the business literature (Özgener, 2008, p. 32).

Ethics or moral philosophy 'is a discipline that studies universal moral law showing what is bad, what right and wrong mean.' According to the interpretations of some philosophers who try to reveal the difference between morality and ethics, morality is 'the principles, virtues and so forth people follow during their lives. Moral philosophy, on the other hand, is an act of thinking about morality and its nature, its foundations, and a search for what can be more correct and better' (Tengiz, 2001, p. 23-24).

YAZICI and YAZICI (2010, p. 1002) also state that although the words morality and ethics are used synonymously, there is a conceptual difference between the two words. Ethics examines the issue of morality on a normative basis and examines what the correct and appropriate moral principles and norms are. On the other hand, morality deals with the moral values and behaviours of groups and individuals in a certain society and period, historically and factually. Considering the definitions of morality; it is stated that it is possible to define it as 'a set of standards, values, principles, and rules that investigates the correctness or falsity of certain actions and the elements that constitute the well-being of humanity in relation to the goals to which these actions are directed, and explains the types of behaviors and decisions necessary to encourage these elements' (Özgener, 2008, p. 33).

While ethics can be described as a personal trait that depends on one's virtues, morality is about behaviours (Aarnio, 2001, p. 3). According to Wines and Napier (1992, p. 831), ethics is 'the systematic application of moral principles to concrete problems'. When we say professional ethics, we mean the rules for determining the ideal in the performance of a particular profession (Aarnio, 2001, p. 1-9).

### **Professional Ethics of the Legal Profession**

In accordance with the literature of the profession, it is emphasized that the service provided is indispensable for the welfare of society and for humanity, as one of the criteria required to be considered a profession. The existence of the principles of professional ethics is the basis of the trust of the society towards the professions, that the professions will display altruistic attitudes and put the public interest first (Karasu, 2001, p. 110). Therefore, it is clear that every profession will be closely related to ethics.

When determining the principles of professional ethics, the aim is to reach the better and beneficial in professional practices rather than general morality (Tengiz, 2001, p. 25). Professional ethics is 'a functional responsibility, the rules of which consist of practical activities, developed in a particular field, and often transferred and delegated through a particular form of professional socialisation-for example, through a certain type of training.' (Güner, 2002, p. 23). The principles and rules in the process of

professionalisation form the basis of professional ethics. Professional ethics principles do not seek the truth and the good in general. What is important for the principles of professional ethics is to try to determine what should be done and what should not be done during the practice of the profession, the boundaries of which are determined by professional services. Professional ethics are the principles of behaviour that are believed to be moral and fair towards society, the recipient of the service, the profession, and colleagues during the practice of a profession. With the principles of professional ethics determined by the professional organisation, practitioners have attempted to define what is appropriate, moral, and fair within the framework of these rules (Tengiz, 2001, p. 25).

Professional ethics has gained even more importance in the face of problems that have arisen as a result of scientific and technological changes, especially after the 1950s. Technological and scientific developments have brought new ethical problems to the agenda. Reliability has come to the fore, especially as professionals have been criticized for their attitudes in certain social events. Ethical codes are important both in terms of being the factor behind the legitimacy of professions and being the basis for the relations between their members and those who benefit from the service (Karasu, 2001, p.110).

Professional ethics in law reflect common shared values or beliefs about how lawyers should behave. Professional ethics include decisions that will govern behaviours in accordance with cultural norms (Etherington & Lee, 2007, pp. 105-106).

Today, we can talk about the influence of two different approaches in the legal profession. The first is the Continental European approach to the legal system. In countries where this understanding is dominant, advocacy is accepted as a public service, lawyers have the right to take or refuse any job they want, are subject to intense advertising bans, cannot carry their professional activities to a commercial dimension, and cannot open branches. A common professional code of conduct to ensure professional ethics is determined by professional organisations. This is the understanding in Turkey. The other approach is the Anglo-Saxon approach, or the 'American approach to attorneyship' (Güner, 2003, pp. 19-21). In the Anglo-Saxon approach, the legal activity is seen as commercial and the public dimension of the attorneyship activity is put in the background. The legal profession is executed by self-employed lawyers and, like any other profession, the legal profession must be subject to the rules of the 'market'. Obstacles to the performance of the service were removed and the legitimacy of advertisements such as 'legal services at very affordable prices' and 'divorce and legal separation for \$175' were accepted by the US Supreme Court within the scope of freedom of expression (İnanıcı, 2000, p. 277).

In Turkey, which has adopted the Continental European approach to attorneyship, the professional rules that came into force after being published in the Bulletin of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations in 1971 have been applied until now without any significant changes (Sav, 2005, p. 188). These are the rules regulating the relations of lawyers with 'judicial authorities, colleagues, business owners, and professional organizations. These rules mainly aim to protect the autonomy, dignity, honor and the professional solidarity both in the private life of the lawyer and while carrying out the profession'. A professional code of practice can be accepted as a set of ethical rules (Yılmaz, 2008, p. 737).

Although the legal profession is seen as a public service with high ethical standards by the members of the profession, it can also be exposed to some criticisms (Wood, 2000, p. 486). Is there a conflict between striving for profit in the legal profession and complying

with professional ethics, or is it just an illusion? In fact, it is argued that companies<sup>1</sup> that put their responsibilities to their clients before the profit motive can gain higher profits by acquiring more clients, because better service means more clients and, as a result, higher profitability (Stagg-Taylor, 2011, p. 182).

There is a debate in the literature on the extent to which the principles of professional ethics in attorneyship are sufficient to respond to the ethical problems that arise in the practice of the profession. Formalism and liberalism, which, it is claimed, ‘numb’ the moral consciousness of lawyers, are criticized and it is claimed that this leads lawyers to act according to the principle of ‘neutral partisanship’<sup>2</sup> while protecting the legal rights and interests of their clients. It is stated that this means ignoring the demands of ‘third parties, the public, and society’. It is clear that clients will expect from their lawyers the service of defending their interests. However, sometimes clients’ demands may be unethical. The question arises of how lawyers should act against the unethical demands of their clients. Lawyers may warn their clients about unethical requests, and if this does not yield any results, they may withdraw from attorneyship. Lawyers operate in a competitive, capitalist system, so the reconciliation of ‘business ethics’ with ‘professional ethics’ becomes an issue (Wood, 2000, pp. 486-489).

In order to establish professional ethics, all persons and institutions performing the profession must act with an internal sanction. However, there is a need for external sanctions, that is, compelling legal rules in the field of morality (Aktan, 2008, p. 121). The law benefits from effective sanctions in the execution of social behaviour. Sanctions in professional ethics are mostly in the form of professional pressure (such as dismissal from the bar, disqualification, punishment, and reprimand) (Taeusch, 1935, pp. 93-94). Therefore, the duty of professional associations is very important in establishing professional ethics. Professional associations fulfil a very important task in terms of ‘internal self-control’ in the field of ethics (Aktan, 2008, p. 121).

Studies conducted on lawyers in the New York Bar Association in the 1960s revealed that the social environments in which lawyers work affected their ethical attitudes and behaviours. It has been observed that the ethical perceptions of self-employed lawyers and small company lawyers are different from lawyers working in large companies (Levin, 2001, p. 850-851).

A similar study was conducted on lawyers registered with the Chicago Bar Association, the first in 1975 and the second between 1994-95, and approximately 800 lawyers registered with the bar association were examined in both studies. It was revealed that the

1 The European Union and Anglo-Saxon countries, with which Turkey has close relations both legally, politically, and economically, have completed the process of establishing law firms within the framework of the specialization brought by their legal systems and the result of this specialization. Attorney services in Turkey, on the other hand, have not yet reached a sufficient level in terms of specialization and incorporation, except for a few exceptions. However, there is no obstacle to lawyers merging into ordinary partnerships (Yasa İzleme Enstitüsü; <http://yasaizleme.org.tr/>).

2 In this understanding of advocacy, there are two implicitly interrelated principles: partiality and impartiality. The first of them is partisanship, where the lawyer uses all legal means and maximum personal energy and effort to achieve results for any client, being subject only to the constraints of the law. The second is objectivity regarding the morality of clients’ goals. In the lawyer-client relationship, impartiality means that clients’ goals are not attributed to their lawyers. Lawyers cannot be held morally responsible for the matters with which they assist their clients, regardless of how much their assistance injures innocent third parties or harms the public interest in general (Atkinson, 1993, p. 533).

most fundamental difference between lawyers is related to the client or client groups that lawyers address. It has been observed that the legal profession in Chicago is carried out in two different spheres. The first group is small company employees, which means less income and less prestige, and the other group is large corporate lawyers who work with high-status organisation clients, who have prestige, and who are highly paid. In the 1995 study, it was observed that this dual structure, which was stated for the legal profession, continued (Heinz et al., 2005, pp. 6-7; Wilkins, 2012, pp. 26-28).

The differentiation in the fields of expertise of lawyers has also been interpreted as leading to differences in ethical behaviour (Mather, 2011, p. 113). Civil rights/civil liberties, international law, intellectual property, family law, corporate law, real estate, and securities law have been put forward as areas of legal activity where more ethical behaviour may be in question. Apart from this, the areas where unethical behaviours are seen most are divorce, personal injury, bankruptcy, and criminal cases (Heinz et al., 2005, pp. 84-87).

All over the world, the boundaries in the practice of the legal profession are being removed and it is seen that lawyers are globalizing, especially in the USA. Commercial law firms in the US and Europe are emerging and thriving in China, India, Brazil, and many more countries. A new generation of lawyers is being trained in newly emerging American-style law schools. In the light of globalisation and commercial developments, there is a different and a new group of lawyers (Wilkins, 2012, p. 38,39) and it would not be surprising to expect different approaches to the application of professional ethics within this new population.

### **Ethical Elements in the Legal Profession**

Professional ethical codes or principles of professional ethics are ‘the set of rules that specify the standards to be followed by members of a particular profession. These principles include the core values of a profession and the rules that employees are expected to follow’. These principles set the standards of practice either by describing an existing practice or by showing a new practice (Arslan, 2001, pp. 77-78). Not all but the most important ethical responsibilities of lawyers in Turkey, which come from the code of practice and the Attorneys’ Act, are summarized below, under four subtitles.

#### **Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity**

Article 34 of the Attorneys’ Act states that ‘attorneys will perform their duties with care, accuracy, and dignity, act in accordance with respect and trust required by the title of attorney, and are obliged to comply with the professional rules determined by the Union of Turkish Bar Associations’ (Ülgen, 2016, p. 18).

The duty of a lawyer is to show the maximum effort for the successful conclusion of the work or service undertaken. In fact, in French law, the expression ‘the debt of the attorney is a means debt (obligation de moyens) and not the resulting debt (obligation de résultat)’ is used to describe this situation of the attorney (Başpınar, 2008, p. 44). Therefore, what is meant by the lawyer’s careful work is ‘his honesty and every effort to ensure that the work he/she undertakes is concluded in accordance with the right, the law and the interests of the employer’.

However, the lawyer is not obliged to unconditionally obey the instructions of his client that are not clear and understandable enough or that have harmful consequences for the client. If following the client's instruction will result in a violation of the attorney's professional obligations, the attorney is not obliged to comply with the instruction (Sungurtekin, 2012, p. 469, 471).

On the contrary, if the client's requests are in compliance with the principles of professional ethics, but contrary to common morality, the legitimacy of the choice made by the lawyer is an issue to discuss. We can cite an example of the situation that lawyers experience with clients facing the death penalty in the USA. Although a lawyer finds the goals and values of his clients contrary to his/her own views, professional ethics expects him/her to represent his/her clients in the best possible way. Defending a particular mission may outweigh the client's demands for the lawyer. The most typical example of this is when a lawyer who is against the death penalty, despite all his/her efforts, is faced with the client's consent to the punishment regardless of his/her own rhetoric. In this case, professional ethics requires lawyers to stick to the decisions of their clients. However, if the lawyer is against the death penalty and believes that this punishment is a systemic inequality and injustice, he should evaluate whether his/her opinions on this issue are sufficient to overcome the discomfort he/she feels for violating his/her client's consent. In order to protect human dignity, the lawyer may choose to ignore the dictates of the principles of professional ethics. This approach is accepted as morally justified by many contemporary philosophers (Fisher, 2016, pp. 488-508).

Pursuant to Article 38/II of the Lawyer's Professional Rules, 'A lawyer does not accept a job that does not match his time and skills.' (Ülgen, 2016, p. 186). Article 4 of the Oslo Decisions of the International Bar Association introduces a similar regulation with the rule that 'attorneys should not accept a job that their time and abilities do not allow' (Erem, 1995, p. 106).

Ethical rules are important for lawyers to practice their profession reasonably. The only function of the professional ethics rules discussed here is not only to discipline the members of the profession with sanctions such as dismissal or disqualification from the profession but also question whether the violation of these rules can be brought forward as a justification for lawsuits in case of a violation of an ethical principle such as the 'duty of care'. This shows the seriousness of the ethical rules for lawyers and the profession. Clients should know and trust that their lawyers are bound by professional ethical rules ('The Evidentiary...', 1996, p. 1102-1119). In practice in Turkey, the violation of the lawyer's duty of care carries legal responsibility and may lead to sanctions specific to the legal profession (Sungurtekin, 2012, p. 442).

### **Loyalty and Obligation of Confidentiality**

In Article 3 of the Attorney's Code of Practice, 'a lawyer carries out his professional work in a manner that ensures the public's belief and confidence in the profession and work with full loyalty' (Ülgen, 2016, p. 181). As an example of the lawyer's obligation in question, the Code of Practice of Attorneys Article 35 states that 'the lawyer does not accept the representation of two persons in the same case, whose defence may prejudice the defence of the other' (Ülgen, 2016, p. 186), and there is no hesitation in accepting that

if the attorney accepts being the agent of the opposing party and thus abuses the power of attorney, this will shake the client's trust in the lawyer. Therefore, the client is justified in dismissing the attorney merely by stating this reason (Decision of the 13th Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court dated 03.03.1989 and numbered 5293/1388; Journal of Ankara Bar Association, 1993, p. 512-513).

The necessity for lawyers to act in a manner worthy of the respect and trust required by their title, to fulfil their obligations during their professional work, and to remain faithful to their promises stems from the public service nature of attorneyship (Gökcan, 2001, pp. 173-177).

It is stated in the Code of Practice that the lawyer is bound by professional confidentiality (Ulukapı et al., 2002, p. 225; Attorneys' Act Professional Rules Art. 37). According to the relevant article, 'the lawyer will keep this criterion as a basis in abstaining from testimony; the information he/she has learned due to the application of people whose case he/she has not taken is also confidential'. This professional confidentiality is indefinite; leaving the profession will not remove this obligation and the lawyer will take all necessary measures regarding the protection of professional confidentiality. This is all regulated in the professional rules.

Lawyers have an obligation to keep the information conveyed to them by their clients who have come to seek legal advice within the scope of professional confidentiality. However, there are some exceptions to this situation. Seeking advice, etc., with the aim of actually committing a criminal offense or damaging the judicial mechanism are examples of this exception. In the USA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act<sup>3</sup> raised the question of whether lawyers have a duty to report information about their clients to the authorities in the presence of certain special circumstances (Arup, 2004, p. 8).

In terms of professional ethics, keeping professional secrets is of great importance. Violation of the secrets affects not only the one whose secret is disclosed but also the whole society because trust in the profession is shaken to the core (Sungurtekin, 2012, p. 507).

In terms of professional ethics, there are two issues that should be questioned regarding the disclosure of information classified as 'confidential': First, whether the lawyer is obliged to notify his client who is about to engage in illegal activity or has engaged in such an activity in the past, and secondly, when making this statement, whether he/she should take into account the parties his/her client victimizes. Does it make any difference whether the client deceives an administrative/legal authority or an individual? What should be done if the confidential information threatens the life or safety of others? The decision of the Commission formed by the American Bar Association to review the ethical rules in the legal profession is that the lawyer is obliged to disclose professional confidentiality, but there have been opposing views on this issue. For example, the state of New York did not accept that lawyers should disclose information about their clients that they obtained during the attorneyship that could potentially harm them (Davis, 2003, pp. 1281-1292). Therefore, the issue should be evaluated carefully in terms of both private and public law.

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3 The Public Companies Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was enacted in 2002 to ensure quality and transparency in the financial reporting process of publicly-traded companies in the USA and to support effective corporate governance (DNB Legal, 2021).



### **Uncommercial Character of Lawyer's Activity**

Today's lawyer has changed from being a person who only takes into account the effects of legal dispute on their client or only trying to maximize the benefit of their client in a case-by-case situation to a person who considers all segments of a dispute and tries to achieve a result that is fair for everyone. The new definition of advocacy is called 'cooperative advocacy' by academics. Therefore, there is a transition from a client-oriented approach to a society-oriented approach (Freedman, 2011, pp. 349-354).

Pursuant to Article 47 of Attorneys' Act, 'the attorney is prohibited from acquiring contentious rights or mediating the acquisition of contentious rights in the business he/she has seized.' (Ülgen, 2016, p. 26). The aim of this article is to prevent the lawyer from gaining personal benefit from the work he/she is following (Güner, 2003, p. 420) since he/she serves the public. There is no profit motive in the legal profession. There is no direct exchange relationship between the service provided by the lawyer and the fee he/she receives (Yılmaz, 2005, p. 145). As such, the aim is to ensure that the lawyer does not have any personal or financial interest in lawsuits so that he/she does not make the case his/her own business and therefore acts independently against the client (Güner, 2003, p. 421).

Pursuant to Article 48 of the Attorneys' Act (Ülgen, 2016, p. 27), the Law provides for penal sanction for 'those who act as intermediaries in bringing work to the lawyer in return for a fee or any benefit promised or given by the lawyer or the employer, and the lawyers who use the intermediary'. Such behaviours are incompatible with the sanctity and honour of the profession. Despite this, it continues to increase today (Güner, 2003, pp. 422-423).

The Attorneys' Act also includes regulations on the prohibition of advertising (Art. 55) (Ülgen, 2016, p. 28). According to this regulation, 'It is forbidden for lawyers to make any attempts or actions that can be considered as advertisements in order to obtain a job, and to use titles other than the title of lawyer and academic titles, especially on their signboards and printed papers'. Considering the text of the article, it is understood that instead of the phrase 'advertisement is prohibited', the phrases 'to engage in all kinds of attempts and actions that can be considered an advertisement' and 'all manners, words, and behaviors that may indirectly cause an advertisement connotation in the minds of individuals even if they are not perceived as advertisements' are used and thus required to be evaluated within the scope of the advertising ban (Yılmaz, 2005, p. 142).

The Turkish Law of the Attorney's Code of Profession stands out with its dominant structure, especially the prohibition on advertising and the way that it prohibits the lawyer from editing his own web page (Rumpf, 2010, p. 145). In line with Articles 1 and 2 of the Attorneys' Act, 'a lawyer is a person who is in the service of the law and serves the public'. Therefore, unlimited advertising opportunities are incompatible with this qualification (Sungurtekin, 1994, p. 515). According to a decision of the Swiss Federal Court, the profession, in general, does not need advertising because the practice of the profession is tied to a legal monopoly. A commercial advertisement not only harms but also damages the reputation of justice and therefore damages one of the main institutions of the state (Erem, 1996, p. 19).

Although it is stated that lawyers have special professional ethics, it cannot be ignored that they act with the aim of gaining profit in an environment of free competition (Sungurtekin, 1994, p. 525). Competition conditions become more challenging, especially for those young lawyers who have just started the business. Therefore, despite the demand for some advertising activities to be allowed, it is natural to say that there will be limits to it (Daniels and Martin, 2012, pp. 124-129).

The act of lawyers wandering around prisons, police stations, hospitals, etc. to look for clients cannot be accepted as a behaviour compatible with professional ethics. For example, the case of a lawyer going to prison, meeting with defendants and being given a power of attorney by giving a guarantee about the outcome of the case even though he/she has not been invited, or the case of a lawyer making an effort to talk to villagers in an expropriation case even though he/she is not invited do not have a good impact on the profession and also constitute different examples of violating the ban on advertising (Güner, 2003, p. 430).

### **Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation**

In Article 4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, it is stated that lawyers 'have to refrain from all kinds of attitudes and behaviors that will damage the reputation of the profession' and it is stated that the lawyer must act conscientiously and in accordance with human values (Gökcan, 2001, p. 180).

According to Article 43 of the German Advocacy Law (BRAO), '...A lawyer is obliged to act in a manner worthy of the respect, trust and dignity required by the title of attorney, both within and outside the boundaries of the profession' (İzmir Bar Association, 2004, p. 29-30). The Paris Bar Association Bylaw-2000, rule 1.3 titled 'Principles' states that 'all the values that constitute the basic principles of the profession, guide the behavior of the lawyer in every situation' (İzmir Bar Association, 2004, p. 196). In the Principles on the Role of Lawyers (Havana Rules), in the 12th rule, titled 'Duties and Responsibilities of Lawyers', it is specified that 'lawyers always protect the honor and dignity of their profession as a fundamental element in the delivery of justice' (Ülgen, 2016, p. 207). The profession of attorneyship is one of the professions where private life will not be ignored. However, it is natural that private life will have its limits. The opposite situation means a violation of one's privacy, which is 'contrary to the principle of privacy and intangibility of private life' (Çine, 2014, p. 211-213).

According to Article 5 of the Attorney's Professional Rules, 'A lawyer should explain his thoughts in a mature and objective manner when writing or speaking' (Ülgen, 2016, p. 181). 'A lawyer has to maintain a certain level of style in his words and writings and pay attention to the words and phrases he chooses. The lawyer must also comply with the fact that freedom of expression does not give the right to insult people. The act of a lawyer who does not pay attention to this obligation while carrying out his professional activities and also in his private life constitutes a disciplinary action' (TBBDKK, 12.09.2003, 132/251, Journal of Ankara Bar Association, 2004, p. 159).

The lawyer is subject to certain obligations with which he/she must comply, both in the court and outside the court, in his/her relationship with official authorities (TBBDKK 27.09.1986, 52/50, Journal of Ankara Bar Association, 1986, p. 730). As a matter of

fact, in the Professional Rules (Art. 17), it was emphasized that the lawyer had to act in accordance with the criteria arising from the characteristics of the service in his relations with judges and prosecutors; however, it was stated that mutual respect is essential in these relationships (Ülgen, 2016, p. 183).

‘Lawyers...must be conscious of being sensitive and respectful to each other in courtrooms, offices, and bar associations, and to protect and safeguard the collective reputation of the profession. Being a senior in the profession...doesn’t give the right to humiliate another colleague, even if the opposing side causes the argument.’ (28.03.2015 T.E. 2015/20 K.2015/241) (Çelik, 2016, p. 191).

The professional rules try to guarantee that lawyers behave in accordance with a spirit of collegiality in their relations with each other. For example, a lawyer’s threatening a colleague during a phone call (TBBDDKK, 06.04.1991, 27/19, Journal of Ankara Bar Association, 1991, p. 448) was found to be against the law and Professional Rules, and the complainant was reprimanded.

## **Field Research on Lawyers’ Approaches to Professional Ethics**

### **The Purpose of the Research**

The main purpose of the research is to reveal the professional ethics perceptions and expectations of lawyers, compare the perceptions and expectations of self-employed lawyers and affiliated lawyers<sup>4</sup> in terms of professional ethics, and determine and evaluate the differences.

The following research questions will be evaluated with the data obtained here.

- 1) Is there any difference between the perceptions and expectations of lawyers regarding professional ethics?
- 2) Is there any difference between perceptions and expectations of self-employed lawyers regarding professional ethics?
- 3) Is there any difference between perceptions and expectations of affiliated lawyers regarding professional ethics?
- 4) Is there any difference between self-employed and affiliated lawyers in terms of perceptions of professional ethics?
- 5) Is there any difference between self-employed and affiliated lawyers in terms of expectations of professional ethics?

### **The Limitations of the Research**

In the first phase, the plan was to include lawyers registered in the Ankara, İstanbul, Zonguldak, and Adana Bar Associations in the scope of the research. Since different socio-economic conditions of each region will have different effects on the professional behaviour, perceptions, and expectations of lawyers in the representative provinces and four geographical regions of Turkey, the aim was to examine the differences in

4 Lawyers of the public sector, lawyers working in private institutions and organizations with service contracts, and lawyers working for an employer that is a lawyer in return for a fee are referred to as ‘affiliated lawyers’ because they carry out their professional activities under an employer.

professional ethics perceptions and expectations of lawyers practicing in these regions. Accordingly, contact information of lawyers registered with the bar associations was requested from the Ankara, İstanbul, Zonguldak, and Adana Bar Associations. However, lawyers registered with the Zonguldak, Adana, and İstanbul Bar Associations could not be included in the scope of the study, as necessary permissions could not be obtained from those Bar Associations regarding access to information.

The survey data were obtained from lawyers residing in Ankara due to the convenience provided by the Ankara Bar Association in allowing access to the information of lawyers registered with the bar association. Therefore, it became possible to reach both solo practitioners and lawyers working in public and/or private institutions and organisations in Ankara within the scope of available resources. Therefore, among the lawyers registered with the Bar Association, those who were contacted and who volunteered to participate in the research were included in the sample. The scope of our study had to be limited to Ankara since we do not have enough data to allow a comparison on the basis of provinces.

The justice system is a structure with three parts: defence, argument, and judgment. Within the scope of our work, only the professional ethics of lawyers who represent the defence are examined, and the argument and judgment, which are the other legs of the justice system, are excluded from the scope of the study.

## **The Method of the Research**

### **The Data Collection Tool**

The information used in the research was obtained by applying the survey method and face-to-face interviews. In order to carry out the study, a questionnaire form was prepared as a data collection tool. A total of 35 questions were prepared on the questionnaire, except for the demographic questions, to measure perceptions and expectations of professional ethics. Respondents expressed their opinions by marking the values as 1 for ‘not at all/very low’, 2 for ‘low’, 3 for ‘medium’, 4 for ‘high’, and 5 for ‘very high’. The questions were designed to measure both perceptions and expectations with the same question. For this purpose, the questions asked ‘how much is it now?’ to measure perception and ‘how much should it be?’ to measure expectation. With such a design, the aim was to state the difference between the current and ideal situation and make it possible to measure expectations without distracting the respondent concentrating on the question.

### **Data Collection Process<sup>5</sup>**

The population to which the survey was applied consists of self-employed lawyers registered with the Ankara Bar Association and professionals who practice law in public institutions and private institutions in Ankara, Turkey. Six hundred and seventy of the questionnaires sent were responded to and it was thought that sufficient data was provided

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5 The data within the scope of the research was produced from the master’s thesis submitted to Hacettepe University Institute of Social Sciences in 2017. Due to the fact that the data in the master’s thesis were collected before 2017, which was the date of presentation of the thesis, it was stated that ‘the obligation to obtain an Ethics Committee Approval for the studies that have been put into practice (data collection procedures that have been initiated)’ will not be required, in accordance with the Hacettepe University Ethics Commission Directive. Therefore it has been decided to exempt the thesis from Ethics Committee Approval.

for the analyses, so the online questionnaire was closed to participants after 670 returns. A high-reliability coefficient was obtained as a result of the Cronbach non-standardized  $\alpha$  (alpha) test applied to the scales to test the internal reliability.

The data obtained by the survey method were coded and analysed in the SPSS statistical program. During the evaluation of the data, t-test analyses were used for comparisons. In the presentation of the findings obtained as a result of the analysis of the data, analysis was made on the basis of factors. The Keiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) coefficient and Bartlett sphericity test were used in the research to determine if the data set was suitable for factor analysis. Since the KMO coefficient was close to 1 and the significance level of the Bartlett sphericity test was less than 0.005, it was determined that the data set was suitable for factor analysis.

### Characteristics of the Sample

Of the respondents, 40% were women and 60% were men. While 64% of the sample population was composed of self-employed lawyers, 36% was composed of affiliated lawyers. Of the respondents, 9% are between 55-80 years of age, 63% are between 30-55 years of age, and 28% are under 30 years old. In this context, it is possible to say that more than half of the sample population is middle-aged and above.

### Findings

**Research Question 1:** *'Is There a Difference Between Lawyers' Professional Ethics Perceptions and Expectations?'*

Table 1

*Comparison of lawyers' professional ethics perceptions and expectations with t-test*

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	T	p
Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity	Perception	602	3.59	0.59	56.666	0.000*
	Expectation	602	1.73	0.55		
Uncommercial Character of Lawyer's Activity	Perception	599	3.78	0.82	38.926	0.000*
	Expectation	599	2.14	0.82		
Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation	Perception	602	3.39	0.49	-17.841	0.000*
	Expectation	602	3.79	0.51		

\*p < 0.05

According to the results given in Table 1, there is a significant difference between the perception and expectation levels of lawyers in the sub-dimensions 'Lawyer's Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity', 'Uncommercial Character of Lawyer's Activity', and 'Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation' ( $p < 0.05$ ). While the level of perception regarding 'Uncommercial Character of Lawyer's Activity' is significantly higher than the level of expectation, the level of expectation for 'Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation' is significantly higher than the level of perception.

**Research Question 2: 'Is There a Difference Between Self-employed Lawyers' Professional Ethics Perceptions and Expectations?'**

Table 2

*Comparison of professional ethics perceptions and expectations of self-employed lawyers with t-test*

		n	Mean	Std. Deviation	T	p
Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity	Perception	395	3.56	0.63	45.992	0.000*
	Expectation	395	1.66	0.54		
Uncommercial Character of Lawyer's Activity	Perception	394	3.78	0.80	33.912	0.000*
	Expectation	394	2.09	0.80		
Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation	Perception	395	3.40	0.47	-15.812	0.000*
	Expectation	395	3.81	0.51		

\*p < 0.05

According to the results given in Table 2, for self-employed lawyers, there is a significant difference between the levels of perception and expectation for the factors of 'Lawyer's Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity', 'Uncommercial Character of Lawyer's Activity', and 'Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation' ( $p < 0.05$ ). While the perception level is significantly higher than the expectation level for the 'Lawyer's Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity' and 'Uncommercial Character of Lawyer's Activity' factors, the expectation level is significantly higher than the perception level for 'Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation'.

**Research Question 3: 'Is There a Difference Between Affiliated Lawyers' Professional Ethics Perceptions and Expectations?'**

Table 3

*Comparison of professional ethics perceptions and expectations of affiliated lawyers with t-test*

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	T	p
Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity	Perception	207	3.65	0.52	33.375	0.000*
	Expectation	207	1.87	0.55		
Uncommercial Character of Lawyer's Activity	Perception	205	3.80	0.85	20.038	0.000*
	Expectation	205	2.24	0.84		

Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation	Perception	207	3.36	0.52	-9.028	0.000*
	Expectation	207	3.75	0.50		

\* $p < 0.05$

According to the results given in Table 3, there is a significant difference between the levels of perception and expectation for the factors of ‘Lawyer’s Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity’, ‘Uncommercial Character of Lawyer’s Activity’ and ‘Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation’ ( $p < 0.05$ ). While the perception level is significantly higher than the expectation level for the ‘Lawyer’s Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity’ and ‘Uncommercial Character of Lawyer’s Activity’ factors, the expectation level is significantly higher than the perception level for ‘Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation’.

**Research Question 4:** ‘Is There a Difference Between Self-employed Lawyers and Affiliated Lawyers in Perceptions of Professional Ethics?’

Table 4

*Comparison of professional ethics perceptions of self-employed and affiliated lawyers with t-test*

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	T	p
Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity	Self-employed	398	3.56	0.63	-1.590	0.112
	Affiliated	210	3.64	0.53		
Uncommercial Character of Lawyer’s Activity	Self-employed	401	3.78	0.81	-0.268	0.789
	Affiliated	209	3.79	0.85		
Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation	Self-employed	401	3.40	0.47	1.101	0.272
	Affiliated	211	3.35	0.51		

\* $p < 0.05$

According to the results given in Table 4, there is no significant difference between the professional ethics perceptions of self-employed lawyers and affiliated lawyers ( $p > 0.05$ ).

**Research Question 5:** ‘Is There a Difference Between Self-employed Lawyers and Affiliated Lawyers in terms of Professional Ethics Expectations?’

Table 5

*Comparison of professional ethics expectations of self-employed and affiliated lawyers with t-test*

		n	Mean	Std. Deviation	T	p
Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity	Self-employed	397	1.65	0.54	-4.696	0.000*
	Affiliated	207	1.87	0.55		
Uncommercial Character of Lawyer's Activity	Self-employed	394	2.09	0.8	-2.198	0.028*
	Affiliated	205	2.24	0.84		
Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation	Self-employed	395	3.81	0.51	1.302	0.194
	Affiliated	207	3.75	0.5		

\*p &lt; 0.05

According to the results given in Table 5, while the sub-dimensions of 'Lawyer's Obligation to Serve with Care, Integrity, and Dignity' and 'Uncommercial Character of Lawyer's Activity' differ significantly between self-employed lawyers and affiliated lawyers ( $p < 0.05$ ), for the 'Behaving and Living Life Appropriate to Professional Reputation' sub-dimension there is no significant difference between self-employed and affiliated lawyers ( $p > 0.05$ ).

### Conclusion

With this research, lawyers registered with the Ankara Bar Association and lawyers working in public and private institutions in Ankara, Turkey, were selected as the sample, and the aim was to reveal how professional ethics in attorneyship are perceived by the lawyers and whether their expectations are met. It has been revealed that there is a significant difference between the perceptions and expectations of lawyers in terms of professional ethics.

There are studies in the literature on the principles of legal professional ethics. In Mine Tan's (1972) study on Gaziantep Bar Association lawyers, the level of participation of lawyers in political activities and the social and economic characteristics of the profession are examined, but the study does not specifically focus on lawyers' professional ethics. In Cırhınlıoğlu's research (1997) on lawyers registered in the İstanbul and Sivas Bar associations in 1992, the structure of the legal profession and the nature of the relationship between lawyers and the State are examined. The study includes lawyers' evaluations of professional ethics. In the survey study, the majority of the participating lawyers (74.8%) stated that they believed that their colleagues did not comply with professional ethics.

The fields and subjects that are considered to violate the professional ethics of lawyers are grouped into five categories: 1) Lawyers do not examine their cases well, 2) Lawyers have close relations with political organisations and civil servants, 3) Lawyers deceive their clients, 4) Lawyers consider their political power more important than reaching



justice in courts, 5) Losing faith in justice. The most important criticism is that lawyers take on cases in which they are not really experts and that some lawyers, establishing close friendships with police and judicial organisation employees, use these people for their own purposes. It is stated that similar situations are also in question in cases where experts play an important role, and lawyers try to have appropriate reports prepared in favour of their clients by influencing the experts. In addition, there are expectations of lawyers that professional organisations should be more involved in the protection of professional ethics (Cirhinlioğlu, 1997, p. 95-98).

Another study in which similar results were obtained is about the lawyers of the Elazığ Bar Association (Uzun, 2000), and in this study, it is seen that lawyers' views on professional ethics have not changed. In answer to the question of whether the lawyers act in accordance with professional ethics, it is seen that most of the participating lawyers believe that their colleagues do not comply with professional ethics.

Lawyers registered with the Elazığ Bar Association have also expressed the opinion that members of the profession attend hearings without adequately examining the cases they have taken. In order to not lose customers in a competitive environment, it is stated that lawyers also undertake lawsuits on issues that they are not knowledgeable about. Another point of criticism is that lawyers may abuse their clients. It is stated that they mislead their clients by pretending that they can win unwinnable cases. Considering that a lay person cannot know the situation of the case as well as his lawyer, it is stated that there is fertile ground for clients to be abused through false and misleading statements (Uzun, 2000, p. 99-100).

Despite the breadth of its functions and the importance it carries, it is possible to say that the public has always approached lawyers with suspicion and distrust. Lawyers have been accused of defending wrongful cases and of misinterpreting and applying the law for their own purposes. This belief among the public will have a negative effect on trust in the profession (Tan, 1972, pp. 51-52).

One of the most important features of professions is that they gather around an organisation. The evaluation made by the lawyers of the Elazığ Bar Association regarding the work of bar associations, which is the organisation around which the lawyers gather, is that bar associations do not work well enough. When asked about the reasons, the majority agree that bar associations fail to protect their professional discipline and professional ethics. A significant portion of the participants stated that bar associations could not meet the common needs of the members of the profession. Other opinions are that bar associations are open to political intervention and insensitive to social problems and injustices, the authorities of the bar association are inactive or not active, the inadequacy of the legal system, and the poor organisational spirit (Uzun, 2000, pp. 122-123).

Although not the same as the above determinations, our study also revealed similar types of results. The survey questions included in the study aimed to measure how much lawyers give guarantees to their clients about the outcome of the case; how much effort they make to reach victims and undertake their defence in case of expropriation processes, industrial accidents, or traffic accidents; what the level of their efforts would be to seize any opportunity to gain fame or to make optimistic, unrealistic statements about the

success of the case or the level of suggestion to the witnesses on behalf of their clients' interests; what the level of their efforts would be to look for clients through association activities or by being in close relations with the officials in the courts and enforcement offices or by visiting places such as prisons, police stations, hospitals, etc.; and finally how much they use the confidential information they get from their clients for their own benefit. All these variables are included in the factor dimension of 'lawyer's obligation to serve with care, integrity, and dignity' and it is seen that there is a significant difference between the perceptions and expectations of the lawyers regarding the factor dimension in question, and their expectations on these issues are lower than their perceptions. This is an expected result because all the variables mentioned are activities that are prohibited under professional rules but still practiced by lawyers.

There was no significant difference in the perceptions of lawyers regarding 'act with care, integrity, and dignity' depending on whether they are self-employed or affiliated lawyers. Because rules regarding care, integrity, and dignity are determined within the scope of professional rules, there are also decisions of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations Disciplinary Board to punish lawyers who engage in opposite behaviours with disciplinary action. Within the scope of the lawyer's duty of care, perhaps the most important issue is that the lawyer does not share with the public the matters that fall under the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship. The obligation to keep confidentiality, which is the basis of the relationship between the lawyer and his/her client, is a matter that the lawyer must meticulously abide by. The confidentiality between a lawyer and a client is something that lawyers cannot compromise under any circumstances and confidential information must not be used in the time of proxy or after it. The opposite view harms the sanctity, respectability, and professionalism of the profession.

Although it is stated that commercial concerns and market conditions are not determinative in the practice of law due to its public service nature, both self-employed lawyers and affiliated lawyers stated that the profession cannot be completely excluded from commercial realities and that they are obliged to take care of their financial interests. The majority of the lawyers who participated in the survey expressed the opinion that financial concerns have an important place in the practice of the profession.

In this context, enough care should be taken to ensure that the minimum wage tariffs for self-employed lawyers be determined in a way that will fully pay for the lawyer's effort in accordance with current conditions. More than ever before, there is a need for the Bar Associations and Union of Turkish Bar Associations to express their struggles to bring the financial and personal rights of public sector lawyers to the same level as judges and prosecutors, with whom they practice the same profession and go through the same educational processes.

There was a significant difference between the perceptions and expectations of lawyers about 'acting in accordance with professional reputation and living life accordingly'. Lawyers expect that the restrictive effects of the profession of law on their private lives should be far less. Although lawyers take care to act in a way that befits the respect and dignity of the profession, they state that they want to continue their lives as individuals without feeling the weight of being a lawyer in their private lives.

As a result, each rule exists to serve a certain purpose, and the rules regarding

professional ethics in the profession of law serve both to regulate the relations of the members of the profession with their colleagues, clients, and judicial bodies and to protect the dignity of the profession. The primary control task in the observance of these rules by the members of the profession is the professional organisations (Ankara Barosu Meslek Sorunları Kurulu, 2004: 32). Therefore, it should be said that professional organisations have a very important role in the implementation of professional ethics.

Professionalism in attorneyship is closely related to professional ethics. Professionalism in law is defined as the prioritisation of respect for the profession and the quality of attorneyship as a public service, not needing anything other than knowledge and legal norms while performing one's duties, and always protecting the dignity in business relationships (Ankara Barosu Meslek Sorunları Kurulu, 2004: 51).

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### AMAÇ KAPSAM

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, siyaset bilimi, kamu yönetimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, alanlarında uluslararası ve disiplinlerarası makaleler yayınlamaktadır. Dergi, aşağıda belirtilen konuları kapsamak ile birlikte sadece bu konular ile kısıtlı değildir:

- Siyaset biliminin tüm alt disiplinleri, siyaset teorisi, siyaset felsefesi, politik davranış, siyasi kurumlar ve siyasi tarih
- Kamu yönetiminin tüm alt disiplinleri,
- Uluslararası ilişkiler ile ilgili tüm konular: uluslararası hukuk, iktisat, etik, strateji, felsefe, kültür, çevre, güvenlik, terör, bölgesel çalışmalar, küreselleşme ve diğer konular,

Dergi, yukarıda adı geçen disiplinlerin çeşitli yönlerini inceleyen, İngilizce yazılmış araştırma esaslı makalelerin yanında teorik ve kavramsal makaleleri yayınlamaktadır. Ayrıca, dergi uluslararası alandaki akademisyenlerin konuk editörlüğünde çeşitli temalar ile ilgili özel sayılar yayınlamaktadır.

### EDİTORYAL POLİTİKALAR VE HAKEM SÜRECİ

#### Yayın Politikası

Dergiye yayımlanmak üzere gönderilen makalelerin içeriği derginin amaç ve kapsamı ile uyumlu olmalıdır. Dergi, orijinal araştırma niteliğindeki yazıları yayınlamaya öncelik vermektedir. Genel İlkeler Daha önce yayımlanmamış ya da yayımlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Ön değerlendirmeyi geçen yazılar iThenticate intihal tarama programından geçirilir. İntihal incelemesinden sonra, uygun makaleler Editör tarafından orijinaliteleri, metodolojileri, makalede ele alınan konunun önemi ve derginin kapsamına uygunluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Bilimsel toplantılarda sunulan özet bildirimler, makalede belirtilmesi koşulu ile kaynak olarak kabul edilir. Editör, gönderilen makale biçimsel esaslara uygun ise, gelen yazıyı yurtiçinden ve /veya yurtdışından en az iki hakemin değerlendirmesine sunar, hakemler gerek gördüğü takdirde yazıda istenen değişiklikler yazarlar tarafından yapıldıktan sonra yayımlanmasına onay verir. Makale yayımlanmak üzere Dergiye gönderildikten sonra yazarlardan hiçbirinin ismi, tüm yazarların yazılı izni olmadan yazar listesinden silinemez ve yeni bir isim yazar olarak eklenemez ve yazar sırası değiştirilemez. Yayına kabul edilmeyen makale, resim ve fotoğraflar yazarlara geri gönderilmez. Yayımlanan yazı ve resimlerin tüm hakları Dergiye aittir.

#### Telif Hakkında

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#### Açık Erişim İlkesi

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, tüm içeriği okura ya da okurun dahil olduğu kuruma ücretsiz olarak sunulur. Okurlar, ticari amaç haricinde, yayıncı ya da yazardan izin almadan dergi makalelerinin tam metnini okuyabilir, indirebilir, kopyalayabilir, arayabilir ve link sağlayabilir.

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### İşleme Ücreti

Derginin tüm giderleri İstanbul Üniversitesi tarafından karşılanmaktadır. Dergide makale yayını ve makale süreçlerinin yürütülmesi ücrete tabi değildir. Dergiye gönderilen ya da yayın için kabul edilen makaleler için işleme ücreti ya da gönderim ücreti alınmaz.

### Hakem Süreci

Daha önce yayınlanmamış ya da yayınlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Gönderilen ve ön kontrolü geçen makaleler iThenticate yazılımı kullanılarak intihal için taranır. İntihal kontrolünden sonra, uygun olan makaleler baş editör tarafından orijinallik, metodoloji, işlenen konunun önemi ve dergi kapsamı ile uyumluluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar.

Seçilen makaleler en az iki ulusal/uluslararası hakeme değerlendirmeye gönderilir; yayın kararı, hakemlerin talepleri doğrultusunda yazarların gerçekleştirdiği düzenlemelerin ve hakem sürecinin sonrasında baş editör tarafından verilir.

Hakemlerin değerlendirmeleri objektif olmalıdır. Hakem süreci sırasında hakemlerin aşağıdaki hususları dikkate alarak değerlendirmelerini yapmaları beklenir.

- Makale yeni ve önemli bir bilgi içeriyor mu?
- Öz, makalenin içeriğini net ve düzgün bir şekilde tanımlıyor mu?
- Yöntem bütünlüklü ve anlaşılır şekilde tanımlanmış mı?
- Yapılan yorum ve varılan sonuçlar bulgularla kanıtlanıyor mu?
- Alandaki diğer çalışmalara yeterli referans verilmiş mi?
- Dil kalitesi yeterli mi?

Hakemler, gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdır. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir.

Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir.

### YAYIN ETİĞİ VE İLKELER

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, yayın etiğinde en yüksek standartlara bağlıdır ve Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA) ve World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) tarafından yayınlanan etik yayıncılık ilkelerini benimser; Principles of Transparency



and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing başlığı altında ifade edilen ilkeler için adres: <https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-andbest-practice-scholarly-publishing> Gönderilen tüm makaleler orijinal, yayınlanmamış ve başka bir dergide değerlendirme sürecinde olmamalıdır. Her bir makale editörlerden biri ve en az iki hakem tarafından çift kör değerlendirmeden geçirilir. İntihal, duplikasyon, sahte yazarlık/inkar edilen yazarlık, araştırma/veri fabrikasyonu, makale dilimleme, dilimleyerek yayın, telif hakları ihlali ve çıkar çatışmasının gizlenmesi, etik dışı davranışlar olarak kabul edilir. Kabul edilen etik standartlara uygun olmayan tüm makaleler yayından çıkarılır. Buna yayından sonra tespit edilen olası kuraldışı, uygunsuzluklar içeren makaleler de dahildir.

### Araştırma Etiği

Dergi araştırma etiğinde en yüksek standartları gözetir ve aşağıda tanımlanan uluslararası araştırma etiği ilkelerini benimser. Makalelerin etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. - Araştırmanın tasarlanması, tasarımın gözden geçirilmesi ve araştırmanın yürütülmesinde, bütünlük, kalite ve şeffaflık ilkeleri sağlanmalıdır.

- Araştırma ekibi ve katılımcılar, araştırmanın amacı, yöntemleri ve öngörülen olası kullanımları; araştırmaya katılımın gerektirdikleri ve varsa riskleri hakkında tam olarak bilgilendirilmelidir.
- Araştırma katılımcılarının sağladığı bilgilerin gizliliği ve yanıt verenlerin gizliliği sağlanmalıdır. Araştırma katılımcıların özerkliğini ve saygınlığını koruyacak şekilde tasarlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma katılımcıları gönüllü olarak araştırmada yer almalı, herhangi bir zorlama altında olmamalıdır. - Katılımcıların zarar görmesinden kaçınılmalıdır. Araştırma, katılımcıları riske sokmayacak şekilde planlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma bağımsızlığıyla ilgili açık ve net olunmalı; çıkar çatışması varsa belirtilmelidir.
- Deneysel çalışmalarda, araştırmaya katılmaya karar veren katılımcıların yazılı bilgilendirilmiş onayı alınmalıdır. Çocukların ve vesayet altındakilerin veya tasdiklenmiş akıl hastalığı bulunanların yasal vasisinin onayı alınmalıdır.
- Çalışma herhangi bir kurum ya da kuruluştaki gerçekleştirilecekse bu kurum ya da kuruluştan çalışma yapılacağına dair onay alınmalıdır.
- İnsan ögesi bulunan çalışmalarda, “yöntem” bölümünde katılımcılardan “bilgilendirilmiş onam” alındığının ve çalışmanın yapıldığı kurumdaki etik kurul onayı alındığı belirtilmesi gerekir.

### Yazarların Sorumluluğu

Makalelerin bilimsel ve etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. Yazar makalenin orijinal olduğu, daha önce başka bir yerde yayınlanmadığı ve başka bir yerde dilde yayınlanmak üzere değerlendirilmediği konusunda teminat sağlamalıdır. Uygulamadaki telif kanunları ve anlaşmaları gözetilmelidir. Telifle bağlı materyaller (örneğin tablolar, şekiller veya büyük alıntılar) gerekli izin ve teşekkürle kullanılmalıdır. Başka yazarların, katkıda bulunanların çalışmaları ya da yararlanılan kaynaklar uygun biçimde kullanılmalı ve referanslarda belirtilmelidir. Gönderilen makalede tüm yazarların akademik ve bilimsel olarak doğrudan katkısı olmalıdır, bu bağlamda “yazar” yayınlanan bir araştırmanın kavramsallaştırılmasına ve dizaynına, verilerin elde edilmesine, analizine ya da yorumlanmasına belirgin katkı yapan, yazının yazılması ya da bunun içerik açısından eleştirel biçimde gözden geçirilmesinde görev yapan birisi olarak görülür. Yazar

olabilmenin diğer koşulları ise, makaledeki çalışmayı planlamak veya icra etmek ve / veya revize etmektir. Fon sağlanması, veri toplanması ya da araştırma grubunun genel süpervizyonu tek başına yazarlık hakkı kazandırmaz. Yazar olarak gösterilen tüm bireyler sayılan tüm ölçütleri karşılamalıdır ve yukarıdaki ölçütleri karşılayan her birey yazar olarak gösterilebilir. Yazarların isim sıralaması ortak verilen bir karar olmalıdır. Tüm yazarlar yazar sıralamasını Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu'nda imzalı olarak belirtmek zorundadırlar. Yazarlık için yeterli ölçütleri karşılamayan ancak çalışmaya katkısı olan tüm bireyler “teşekkür / bilgiler” kısmında sıralanmalıdır. Bunlara örnek olarak ise sadece teknik destek sağlayan, yazıma yardımcı olan ya da sadece genel bir destek sağlayan, finansal ve materyal desteği sunan kişiler verilebilir. Bütün yazarlar, araştırmanın sonuçlarını ya da bilimsel değerlendirmeyi etkileyebilme potansiyeli olan finansal ilişkiler, çıkar çatışması ve çıkar rekabetini beyan etmelidirler. Bir yazar kendi yayınlanmış yazısında belirgin bir hata ya da yanlışlık tespit ederse, bu yanlışlıklara ilişkin düzeltme ya da geri çekme için editör ile hemen temasa geçme ve işbirliği yapma sorumluluğunu taşır.

### **Editör ve Hakem Sorumlulukları**

Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyuğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar. Gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalacağını garanti eder. Baş editör içerik ve yayının toplam kalitesinden sorumludur. Gereğinde hata sayfası yayınlamalı ya da düzeltme yapmalıdır. Baş editör; yazarlar, editörler ve hakemler arasında çıkar çatışmasına izin vermez. Hakem atama konusunda tam yetkiye sahiptir ve Dergide yayınlanacak makalelerle ilgili nihai kararı vermekle yükümlüdür.

Hakemlerin araştırmayla ilgili, yazarlarla ve/veya araştırmanın finansal destekçileriyle çıkar çatışmaları olmamalıdır. Değerlendirmelerinin sonucunda tarafsız bir yargıya varmalıdırlar. Gönderilmiş yazılara ilişkin tüm bilginin gizli tutulmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdırlar. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir. Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir. Bazı durumlarda editörün kararıyla, ilgili hakemlerin makaleye ait yorumları aynı makaleyi yorumlayan diğer hakemlere gönderilerek hakemlerin bu süreçte aydınlatılması sağlanabilir.

### **YAZILARIN HAZIRLANMASI**

#### **Dil**

Dergide İngilizce dilinde makaleler yayınlanır.

#### **Yazıların Hazırlanması ve Yazım Kuralları**

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2. Metnin başlığı küçük harf, koyu renk, Times New Roman yazı tipi, 12 punto olarak sayfanın ortasında yer almalıdır.
3. Metin yazarına ait bilgiler başlıktan sonra bir satır atlanarak, Times New Roman yazı tipi, 10 punto ve tek satır aralığı kullanılarak sayfanın soluna yazılacaktır. Yazarın adı küçük harfle, soyadı büyük harfle belirtildikten sonra bir alt satıra unvanı, çalıştığı kurum ve e-posta adresi yazılacaktır.
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SIYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences, metin içi alıntılama ve kaynak gösterme için APA (American Psychological Association) kaynak sitilinin 6. edisyonunu benimser. APA 6. Edisyon hakkında bilgi için:

- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
- <http://www.apastyle.org/>

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### Örnekler:

#### ***Birden fazla kaynak;***

(Esin ve ark., 2002; Karasar 1995)

#### ***Tek yazarlı kaynak;***

(Akyolcu, 2007)

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(Sayiner ve Demirci, 2007, s. 72)

#### ***Üç, dört ve beş yazarlı kaynak;***

Metin içinde ilk kullanımda: (Ailen, Ciambune ve Welch 2000, s. 12–13) Metin içinde tekrarlayan kullanımlarda: (Ailen ve ark., 2000)

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### Kitap

#### ***a) Türkçe Kitap***

Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8.bs). Ankara: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

**b) Türkçeye Çevrilmiş Kitap**

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**e) İngilizce Kitap**

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**f) İngilizce Kitap İçerisinde Bölüm**

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**Makale**

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**i) Kitap Şeklinde Yayımlanan Bildiriler**

Schneider, R. (2013). Research data literacy. S. Kurbanoglu ve ark. (Ed.), *Communications in Computer and Information Science: Vol. 397. Worldwide Communalities and Challenges in Information Literacy Research and Practice* içinde (s. 134-140). Cham, İsviçre: Springer. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03919-0>

**j) Kongre Bildirisi**

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Say, F. (2009). Galata Kulesi. *İstanbul senfonisi* [CD] içinde. İstanbul: Ak Müzik.

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### Basic Reference Types

#### Book

##### a) Turkish Book

Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8<sup>th</sup> ed.) [Preparing research reports]. Ankara, Turkey: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

##### b) Book Translated into Turkish

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* [Mindsets] (A. Kotil, Trans.). İstanbul, Turkey: İletişim Yayınları.

##### c) Edited Book

Ören, T., Üney, T., & Çölkesen, R. (Eds.). (2006). *Türkiye bilişim ansiklopedisi* [Turkish Encyclopedia of Informatics]. İstanbul, Turkey: Papatya Yayıncılık.

##### d) Turkish Book with Multiple Authors

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y., & Sever, H. (2002). *Türkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme* [Performance evaluation in Turkish search engines]. Ankara, Turkey: Total Bilişim.

##### e) Book in English

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

##### f) Chapter in an Edited Book

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

##### g) Chapter in an Edited Book in Turkish

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi [Organization culture: Its functions, elements and importance in leadership and business management]. In M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi* [Organization sociology] (pp. 233–263). Bursa, Turkey: Dora Basım Yayın.

##### h) Book with the same organization as author and publisher

American Psychological Association. (2009). *Publication manual of the American psychological association* (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). Washington, DC: Author.

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Mutlu, B., & Savaşer, S. (2007). Çocuğu ameliyat sonrası yoğun bakımda olan ebeveynlerde stres nedenleri ve azaltma girişimleri [Source and intervention reduction of stress for parents whose children are in intensive care unit after surgery]. *Istanbul University Florence Nightingale Journal of Nursing*, 15(60), 179–182.

##### b) English Article

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society*, 10(2), 149–173. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002>

##### c) Journal Article with DOI and More Than Seven Authors

Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 372, 2087–2096. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184>

**d) Journal Article from Web, without DOI**

Sidani, S. (2003). Enhancing the evaluation of nursing care effectiveness. *Canadian Journal of Nursing Research*, 35(3), 26–38. Retrieved from <http://cjrnr.mcgill.ca>

**e) Journal Article with DOI**

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly*, 27, 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07317131003765910>

**f) Advance Online Publication**

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology: Advance online publication*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

**g) Article in a Magazine**

Henry, W. A., III. (1990, April 9). Making the grade in today's schools. *Time*, 135, 28–31.

**Doctoral Dissertation, Master's Thesis, Presentation, Proceeding**

**a) Dissertation/Thesis from a Commercial Database**

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9943436)

**b) Dissertation/Thesis from an Institutional Database**

Yaylılı-Yıldız, B. (2014). *University campuses as places of potential publicness: Exploring the politicals, social and cultural practices in Ege University* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from Retrieved from: <http://library.iyte.edu.tr/tr/hizli-erisim/iyte-tez-portali>

**c) Dissertation/Thesis from Web**

Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from <http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/yayinlar/phd/ickapak.html>

**d) Dissertation/Thesis abstracted in Dissertations Abstracts International**

Appelbaum, L. G. (2005). Three studies of human information processing: Texture amplification, motion representation, and figure-ground segregation. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineering*, 65(10), 5428.

**e) Symposium Contribution**

Krinsky-McHale, S. J., Zigman, W. B., & Silverman, W. (2012, August). Are neuropsychiatric symptoms markers of prodromal Alzheimer's disease in adults with Down syndrome? In W. B. Zigman (Chair), *Predictors of mild cognitive impairment, dementia, and mortality in adults with Down syndrome*. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

**f) Conference Paper Abstract Retrieved Online**

Liu, S. (2005, May). *Defending against business crises with the help of intelligent agent based early warning solutions*. Paper presented at the Seventh International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, Miami, FL. Abstract retrieved from [http://www.iceis.org/iceis2005/abstracts\\_2005.htm](http://www.iceis.org/iceis2005/abstracts_2005.htm)

**g) Conference Paper - In Regularly Published Proceedings and Retrieved Online**

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105, 12593–12598. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105>



**h) Proceeding in Book Form**

Parsons, O. A., Pryzwansky, W. B., Weinstein, D. J., & Wiens, A. N. (1995). Taxonomy for psychology. In J. N. Reich, H. Sands, & A. N. Wiens (Eds.), *Education and training beyond the doctoral degree: Proceedings of the American Psychological Association National Conference on Postdoctoral Education and Training in Psychology* (pp. 45–50). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

**i) Paper Presentation**

Nguyen, C. A. (2012, August). *Humor and deception in advertising: When laughter may not be the best medicine*. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

**Other Sources**

**a) Newspaper Article**

Browne, R. (2010, March 21). This brainless patient is no dummy. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 45.

**b) Newspaper Article with no Author**

New drug appears to sharply cut risk of death from heart failure. (1993, July 15). *The Washington Post*, p. A12.

**c) Web Page/Blog Post**

Bordwell, D. (2013, June 18). David Koepp: Making the world movie-sized [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/page/27/>

**d) Online Encyclopedia/Dictionary**

Ignition. (1989). In *Oxford English online dictionary* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Retrieved from <http://dictionary.oed.com>

Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.). *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/>

**e) Podcast**

Dunning, B. (Producer). (2011, January 12). *in Fact: Conspiracy theories* [Video podcast]. Retrieved from <http://itunes.apple.com/>

**f) Single Episode in a Television Series**

Egan, D. (Writer), & Alexander, J. (Director). (2005). Failure to communicate. [Television series episode]. In D. Shore (Executive producer), *House*; New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

**g) Music**

Fuchs, G. (2004). Light the menorah. On *Eight nights of Hanukkah* [CD]. Brick, NJ: Kid Kosher.

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