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EDİTÖRDEN

Değerli Okuyucular,

İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi tarafından yayınlanan, *Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences Dergisi*, 1983 yılında yayınlanmaya başlamış, o tarihten beri alanında öncü ve seçkin dergilerden biri olma özelliğini sürdürmektedir. Dergimizin ismi yayın hayatına başladığından beri “İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi” iken Ekim 2017 tarihli 57. sayısından itibaren “*Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences*” olarak değiştirilmiş ve Cilt uygulamasına geçilmiştir. Dergi halen Emerging Sources Citation Index, Ebsco Political Science Complete, TR DİZİN (ULAKBİM) Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Veri Tabanı ve Akademia Sosyal Bilimler İndeksi (ASOS Index) tarafından taranmaktadır.

Dergimizin Cilt 31 Sayı 2, Ekim 2022 tarihli yayınında on dört makale yer almaktadır. Bu makalelerden ilki, “A Strategic Narrative Construction of the Trump Administration on Iran’s Nuclear Program (Trump Yönetiminin İran’ın Nükleer Programına Yönelik Stratejik Anlatı İnşası)” başlıklı, Doç.Dr. İsmail Akdoğan ve Prof. Dr. Yusuf Adıgüzel tarafından yazılmış makaledir. Bu makalede, Trump yönetiminin 2017-2021 yılları arasında İran’ın nükleer programı hakkında inşa ettiği stratejik anlatıyı incelenmektedir. Çalışmanın temel amacı, ABD’nin nükleer anlaşmadan çekilme ve İran’a yönelik yaptırımları yeniden uygulama sürecinde Trump yönetiminin nasıl bir stratejik anlatı inşasında bulunduğunu tespit etmektir. Araştırma, Trump yönetiminin Orta Doğu’da İran’ın artan güç kapasitesi ve bölgesel etkinliğinin önüne geçmek amacıyla uygulamaya koyduğu “maksimum baskı” stratejisi uyarınca aldığı kararları uluslararası kamuoyu nezdinde meşru göstermek amacıyla stratejik anlatıyı bir araç olarak kullandığı sonucuna ulaşmaktadır.

“Islamists On Wire: The View Of Islamist Publications Toward Government Policies In Turkey During The 1980s (1980’ler Türkiye’sinde İslamcı Dergilerin ANAP Politikalarına Bakışı)” başlıklı ikinci makale, Doç.Dr. Güven Gürkan ÖZTAN tarafından hazırlanmıştır. Bu çalışma, İslamcılar arasındaki çeşitli politik tutumları, hükümet politikalarıyla karşılıklı etkileşimi hesaba katarak açığa çıkarmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu hedef çerçevesinde, ANAP’ın tek başına hükümte olduğu 1983-1991 arası dönemde, entelektüel-politik tartışmaları içeren seçilmiş İslamcı süreli yayınları temel alarak, belli başlı İslamcı grupların ANAP hükümetlerinin politikalarına yönelik bakışını irdelemektedir.

Bu sayının üçüncü makalesi Doç.Dr. Alper YAĞCI tarafından yapılan bir alan araştırmasının sonuçlarını aktarmakta ve “Actual and Popularly Attributed Placement of Political Attitudes on the Left-Right Scale: Results from a Representative Survey of Turkey (Siyasal Tutumların Sol-Sağ Cetvelinde Gerçek ve Zannedilen Yerleşimleri: Türkiye’ye Dair Temsili Bulgular)” başlığını taşımaktadır. Yazar çalışmasında bireylerin sol-sağ cetveline kendilerini nasıl yerleştirdikleri sorusunun özellikle seçmen davranışına ilişkin çalışmalarda sıklıkla gündeme geldiğini, fakat bu cetvelin anlam içeriğinin mevcut literatürde sorgulanmadığını vurgulamış ve orijinal bir anketin verilerine dayanarak, sıradan insanlar için sol-sağ ayrımının gerçek ve atfedilen anlamları arasındaki farkı incelemektedir.

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Aylin Ece ÇİÇEK ve Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Damla CİHANGİR TETİK tarafından hazırlanan “Theoretic and Methodological Approaches Towards the Application of Mixed Methods in the Discipline of International Relations (Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininde Karma Yöntemlerin Uygulanması)” başlıklı dördüncü makale, ilk olarak Uİ disiplindeki yöntemlerin tarihsel ve bilimsel evriminin kısa bir özetini sunmakta, ikinci olarak, yönemsel olarak karma yöntem yaklaşımlarına odaklanarak bilimsel araştırmanın yürütüldüğü mevcut durumu tanımlamakta ve son olarak özellikle Uİ disiplinde, karma yöntem tasarımlarının güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini vurgulayarak farklı yönemsel yaklaşımları ele almaktadır.

Sayının beşinci makalesi Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Düriye İlkin BUKE OKYAR tarafından yazılmış, “Notes of a Turkish Intellectual on Imagining a Palestinian state: Osman Okyar and the 2nd International Symposium on Palestine, 1971 (Bir Türk Aydınının Filistin Devleti Hayalı Üzerine Notlar: Osman Okyar ve 2. Uluslararası Filistin Sempozyumu, 1971)” başlıklı makaledir. Bu makale, Türk aydını Osman Okyar’ın perspektifinden bir devlet hayal etme eyleminin aktif olarak gerçekleştiği 1970’lerde Filistin milliyetçi hedeflerinin en parlak günlerini yeniden su yüzüne çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Osman Okyar’ın konferansa ilişkin ayrıntılı notları, tarihin o önemli anına ancak o orada bulunanlardan edinilebilecek özgün bakış açısıyla bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır.

Arş.Gör.Dr. Uğur ARCAGÖK ve Prof. Dr. Çiğdem ARICIGİL ÇİLAN tarafından yazılmış olan “A New Institutional Sustainability Index Regarding Local Governments: The Case of Istanbul (Yeni Bir Kurumsal Sürdürülebilirlik Endeksi: İstanbul Örneği)” isimli makale, sayımızın altıncı makalesidir. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, yerel yönetimlerin kurumsal sürdürülebilirliğini ölçmektir. Bu çalışmada, dünyanın en önemli metropollerinden biri olan İstanbul ilindeki ilçe belediyelerine dayalı bir kurumsal sürdürülebilirlik endeksi geliştirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Sonuçlar, İstanbul belediyelerinin düşük ekonomik ve çevresel sürdürülebilirlik endeks skoru elde ettiğini göstermektedir.

Yedinci makale, Öğr.Gör.Dr. Mustafa Bölükbaşı tarafından hazırlanmış ve “Measuring the Level of Party Institutionalization in Turkey (Türkiye’de Parti Kurumsallaşma Düzeyinin Ölçülmesi)” başlığını taşımaktadır. Yazar, Türk parti sistemi hakkında oldukça geniş bir literatür bulunmasına rağmen, Türkiye’de parti kurumsallaşması hakkında çok az tartışma yapıldığını belirtmektedir. Bu sorunun üstesinden gelebilmek için, bu makale Parti Kurumsallaşma Endeksi’ni (PII) önermektedir.

Dr. Murat Güneylioğlu tarafından yazılan, “The Norm Contestation and the Balance of Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Region: The Eurasian Economic Union versus the European Union (Eski Sovyet Coğrafyasında Norm Mücadelesi ve Yumuşak Güç Dengesi: Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği ve Avrupa Birliği Arasındaki Rekabet)” isimli makalede yazar, Avrupa Birliği (AB) ve Rusya liderliğindeki Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği (AEB) arasındaki güç rekabeti esasına dayanan norm mücadelesini incelemektedir. Makale, AB ve AEB’nin örgütsel yapılarını ve normatif gündemlerini karşılaştırmakta ve AB’nin bölgede bıraktığı yumuşak güç boşluğunun; egemenlik ve güçlü liderlik gibi “geleneksel Avrasya değerleri” olarak tanımlanan unsurlara dayalı normatif bir çerçeveye geliştiren Rusya tarafından doldurulmakta olduğunu savunmaktadır.

“Citizens’ Perceptions of Public Administration Ethics, Public Service Quality and Politicization of Public Organizations: A Study in Diyarbakır (Vatandaşların Kamu Yönetimi Etiği, Kamu Hizmet Kalitesi ve Kamu Kurumlarının Siyasallaşmasına Yönelik Algısı: Diyarbakır’da Bir Araştırma)” başlıklı makale Arş. Gör. Dr. Müslüm KAYACI tarafından hazırlanmıştır. Çalışma, kamu kurumlarının siyasallaşmasının kamu yönetimi etiği ve kamu hizmet kalitesine nasıl zarar verdiğini ve kamu hizmet kalitesinin artmasında kamu yönetimi etiğinin önemini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Diyarbakır’da anket yöntemiyle gerçekleştirilen bir saha araştırmasından elde edilen bulgular bu önermeleri desteklemiştir.

Arş.Gör. Burak Ağalday ve Arş.Gör. Mehmet İhsan Özdemir tarafından hazırlanan “Information Vulnerability Amid The COVID-19 Pandemic: Syrian Refugees In Turkey (COVID-19 Pandemisinde Bilgi Kırılganlığı: Türkiye’deki Suriyeli Mülteciler)” başlıklı çalışmada Suriye iç savaşı sırasında Türkiye’ye sığınan Suriyelilerin bilgiye erişimi ele alınmaktadır. Özgün çevrimiçi anket verisi ve pandemi sürecinde kamuoyunu bilgilendiren ilgili kurumların arşivleri ışığında Suriyelilerin bilgi kırılganlığı ve bilgi kaynakları incelenmiştir.

Rethinking the Limits of the Concept of Agency in the International Relations Discipline: The Case of the Climate Justice Movement (Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininde Aktör Kavramının Sınırlarını Yeniden Düşünmek: İklim Adaleti Hareketi Örneği)” isimli makale doktora öğrencisi Özgür AKTAŞ tarafından hazırlanmıştır. Yazar makalede Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininde uzun yıllar boyunca aktör kavramı belli teorik kabuller çerçevesinde ele alınsa da hangi siyasi unsurların aktör olarak nitelendirilebileceği konusunun göz ardı edildiğini vurgulayarak, 21. yüzyılın kendisine has sorunları ve dinamiklerinin aktörlüğe dair söz konusu kabulleri yeniden değerlendirmeyi gerekli kıldığını belirtmektedir.

Doktora öğrencisi Ölçüm AKYÜZ ve Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Mehmet Ali AKYURT tarafından hazırlanmış olan “A Comparison Between Hobsbawm’s and Bayat’s Views on Non-Western Social Movements (Hobsbawm ve Bayat’ın Batı-Dışı Toplumsal Hareketlere Bakışlarının Karşılaştırılması)” başlıklı makalede Hobsbawm ile Bayat’ın toplumsal hareketlere dair araştırmaları karşılaştırmalı olarak ve aralarındaki süreklilik vurgulanarak ele alınmakta gerek felsefi ve teorik temelleri gerekse geliştirdikleri kavram ve tipolojiler söz konusu zenginleşmeye katkıları bağlamında incelenmektedir.

“Big Questions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Public Administration and Policy (Kamu Yönetimi ve Politikasında Yapay Zekanın (AI) Büyük Soruları)” isimli makale Doktora öğrencisi Mehmet Metin Uzun, Prof. Dr. Mete Yıldız ve Prof. Dr.Murat Önder tarafından hazırlanmıştır. Bu makale, kamu yönetimi ve kamu politikası literatüründe yapay zekanın

“byk sorularına” odaklanmaktadır. Byk sorular yaklaşımlarının temel motivasyonu, “sorular cevaplar kadar nemlidir” yaklaşımlarıyla şekillenmektedir. Bu araştırma yapay zekâ literatrndeki byk soruları rvelendirilmek ve AI ynetişimi araştırma gndemi perspektifinden olası yanıtları ve zmleri tartışımayı amalamaktadır.

İbrahim RKMEZ ve Prof.Dr. Mete Cneyt OKYAR'ın “The Effect of Renewable Energy on Energy Import Dependence: An Empirical Analysis in Turkey (Yenilenebilir Enerjinin Enerji İthalat Bağımlılıđına Etkisi: Trkiye zerine Ampirik Bir Analiz)” isimli makalesi Sayımızın son makalesidir. Bu alıřmada 1990-2018 dneminde Trkiye'de yenilenebilir enerji kaynaklarının enerji ithalat bağımlılıđı zerine etkisi ARDL sınır testi yaklaşımları kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir. alıřma sonucunda; yenilenebilir elektrik retimi, kiři bařına GSYH, kentsel nfus artışı ve dnya dođalgaz fiyatlarının enerji ithalat bağımlılıđı zerinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlı etki yaptığı belirlenmiştir.

Dergimizin bu sayısına makaleleri ile destek veren yazarlarımıza, hakemlik yapan deđerli Hocalarımıza ve Editrler Kurulu yesi Hocalarımıza teřekkrlerimi sunarken, okuyuculara faydalı olmasını diliyorum.

Prof. Dr. Esra Nemli alıřkan
Bař-Editr

EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, of Istanbul University is a peer reviewed journal which endeavors to disseminate academic knowledge among scholars, educators, policy makers and other societal stakeholders. With the valuable contributions of the participating authors to date, it has succeeded to take its place among the significant journals that are nominees to play the role of shaping the content of political sciences discipline in Turkey. It is currently indexed in Emerging Sources Citation Index, Ebsco Political Science Complete, Turkish Index of Social Sciences and Humanities (ULAKBİM) and Academia Social Science Index (ASOS Index). Following the change of its title to “Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences” in October 2017, the journal encourages theoretical and empirical articles majorly in the field of political sciences while also inviting substantive research from areas of social, humanities and administrative sciences.

This issue listed as Vol.31 Issue 2, October 2022 includes fourteen articles. The first article which is entitled as “A Strategic Narrative Construction of the Trump Administration on Iran’s Nuclear Program” is written by Assoc.Prof. Ph.D İsmail Akdoğan and Prof. Ph.D. Yusuf Adıgüzel. This study mainly aims to explore the strategic narrative that the Trump administration constructed about Iran’s nuclear program and tries to identify what kind of strategic narratives the Trump administration constructed during the period of the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and its re-imposition of sanctions against Iran.

The second article which is authored by Assoc. Prof. Ph.D. Güven Gürkan ÖZTAN is entitled as “Islamists On Wire: The View Of Islamist Publications Toward Government Policies In Turkey During The 1980s”. This paper aims to extrapolate the different political stances of Islamist actors with respect to their reciprocal interaction with the ANAP governments in the 1980s in Turkey. Based on a selection of Islamist publications, this article analyzes the views of prominent traditional Islamic groups and Islamist authors about government policies during which the ANAP governed as the single party between 1983-1991.

The third article of this issue is authored by Assoc. Prof. Ph.D. Alper YAĞCI and entitled as “Actual and Popularly Attributed Placement of Political Attitudes on the Left-Right Scale: Results from a Representative Survey of Turkey”. In this article the author mentions that individuals’ self-placement on the left-right scale continues to be a staple of voting studies, but the semantic content of this scale is rarely explored. This study aims to examine the discrepancy between the actual and perceived meanings of the political left-right divide among ordinary people, based on original data from a representative sample of Turkey.

The fourth paper is entitled as “Theoretic and Methodological Approaches Towards the Application of Mixed Methods in the Discipline of International Relations and written by Ass. Prof. Ph.D. Aylin Ece ÇİÇEK and Ass. Prof. Ph.D. Damla CİHANGİR TETİK. The article firstly provides a brief summary of the historical and scientific evolution of methods in the IR discipline, secondly, it describes the current situation in which scientific research is conducted by focusing methodically on mixed-method approaches, and finally, it discusses different methodological approaches, emphasizing the strengths and weaknesses of mixed-methods designs, especially in the IR discipline.

The next article of this issue which is authored by Asst. Prof., Ph.D. Düriye İlkin BUKE OKYAR is entitled as “Notes of a Turkish Intellectual on Imagining a Palestinian state: Osman Okyar and the 2nd International Symposium on Palestine, 1971”. This article aims to resurface the Palestinian nationalist objectives’ heydays in the 1970s, when the act of imagining a state actively took place, from the perspective of a Turkish intellectual, Osman Okyar. The memoirs of Osman Okyar from the Second International Symposium for Palestine, Kuwait, in 1971 is used to uncover how the Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLM) articulated the structure of their dream state in the 1970s.

The sixth article of this issue is entitled as “A New Institutional Sustainability Index Regarding Local Governments: The Case of Istanbul” and is written by Res.Ass.Ph.D. Uğur ARÇAGÖK ve Prof. Ph.D. Çiğdem ARICIGİL ÇILAN. The main purpose of this study is to measure the institutional sustainability of local governments. In this research, it is aimed to develop a corporate sustainability index based on district municipalities in Istanbul, one of the world’s most important

metropolises. The results show that Istanbul municipalities achieve low economic and environmental sustainability index scores.

Ph.D., Lecturer Mustafa BÖLÜKBAŞI contributes this issue by his article entitled as “Measuring the Level of Party Institutionalization in Turkey”. The author states that although there is a fairly large literature on the Turkish party system, there has been little discussion about party institutionalization in Turkey. To overcome this problem, this article proposes the Party Institutionalization Index (PII).

The paper entitled as “The Norm Contestation and the Balance of Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Region: The Eurasian Economic Union versus the European Union” is the eight article of the issue and written by Ph.D.Murat Güneylüoğlu. The author examines the struggle for norms based on power competition between the European Union (EU) and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The article compares the organizational structures and normative agendas of the EU and the EEU and explains the soft power gap left by the EU in the region; It argues that it is being filled by Russia, which has developed a normative framework based on elements defined as “traditional Eurasian values” such as sovereignty and strong leadership.

Res.Ass. Ph.D. Müslüm KAYACI contributes this issue by his article entitled as “Citizens’ Perceptions of Public Administration Ethics, Public Service Quality and Politicization of Public Organizations: A Study in Diyarbakır. The study aims to explain how the politicization of public institutions harms public administration ethics and public service quality and the importance of public administration ethics in increasing the quality of public service. The findings obtained from a field study conducted in Diyarbakır with the survey method supported these propositions.

The paper “Information Vulnerability Amid The COVID-19 Pandemic: Syrian Refugees In Turkey” is written by Res. Ass. Burak Ağalday and Res. Ass. Mehmet İhsan Özdemir. In this paper, the authors studied the Syrians who fled to Turkey during the Syrian civil war. They examined the Syrians’ information vulnerability and sources of information using original online survey data and archives of official institutions in charge of the refugee response and the management of the pandemic. It is concluded that Syrians are less knowledgeable than the host community regarding COVID-19 precautions and administrative measures.

The next article of the issue which is authored by Ph.D. Student Özgür AKTAŞ is entitled as “Rethinking the Limits of the Concept of Agency in the International Relations Discipline: The Case of the Climate Justice Movement”. In the article, the author emphasizes that although the concept of actor has been handled within the framework of certain theoretical assumptions for many years in the discipline of International Relations, the issue of which political elements can be qualified as actors has been ignored, and states that the specific problems and dynamics of the 21st century necessitate re-evaluating the aforementioned assumptions about acting.

In the article “A Comparison Between Hobsbawm’s and Bayat’s Views on Non-Western Social Movements” which is authored by Ph.D. Student Olçum AKYÜZ ve Ass.Prof. Ph.D. Mehmet Ali AKYURT, Hobsbawm’s and Bayat’s studies on social movements are discussed comparatively, though the continuity between them is emphasized. Both their philosophical and theoretical foundations as well as their concepts and typologies are examined in the context of their contributions to the literature.

Ph.D. Student Mehmet Metin Uzun, Prof. Ph.D. Mete Yıldız ve Prof. Ph.D. Murat Önder contribute this issue by their article entitled as “Big Questions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Public Administration and Policy”. This article focuses on the “big questions” of artificial intelligence in the public administration and public policy literature. The main motivation of the big questions approach is shaped by the “questions are as important as the answers” approach. This research aims to frame the big questions in the AI literature and discuss possible answers and solutions from the perspective of the AI governance research agenda.

The article entitled as “The Effect of Renewable Energy on Energy Import Dependence: An Empirical Analysis in Turkey” is the last article of the issue and authored by İbrahim ÜRKMEZ ve Prof. Ph.D. Mete Cüneyt OKYAR. In this study, the effect of renewable energy sources on energy import dependency in Turkey during the period of 1990-2018 was

analyzed using ARDL limit test approach. It has been determined that renewable electricity production, GDP per capita, urban population growth and world natural gas prices have a statistically significant effect on energy import dependency.

I would like to thank to the authors who participate in this issue with their valuable papers, the reviewers for their precious effort, the editorial board members of the journal while hoping this issue to be an enjoyable and useful read for all the readers.

Prof. Dr. Esra Nemli Çalışkan
Editor-in-Chief

A Strategic Narrative Construction of the Trump Administration on Iran's Nuclear Program

Trump Yönetiminin İran'ın Nükleer Programına Yönelik Stratejik Anlatı İnşası

İsmail Akdoğan¹ , Yusuf Adıgüzel² 

Abstract

This study mainly aims to explore the strategic narrative that the Trump administration constructed about Iran's nuclear program. The study tries to identify what kind of strategic narratives the Trump administration constructed during the period of the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and its re-imposition of sanctions against Iran. For this purpose, the study was conducted by analyzing the official statements, remarks and speeches of U.S. foreign policy-makers, which make up the primary data source of the study. The qualitative method was adopted for data survey and collection, and the analysis of the obtained data was analyzed through the technique of qualitative content analysis. By using the qualitative method, the paper seeks to ascertain meaning construction in the discourse of foreign policy-makers. During the research process, it was observed that the Trump administration utilized strategic narratives on three different levels: issue narratives, identity narratives, and system narratives. The research concludes that the Trump administration employed the strategic narrative as a tool to legitimize its foreign policy decisions derived by the "maximum pressure" strategy that aimed to restrict Iran's increasing power capacity and to reduce its regional influence in the Middle East.

Keywords

Strategic Narrative, the Nuclear Deal, Sanctions, Trump Administration, Iran

Öz

Bu çalışma, özü itibarıyla Trump yönetiminin (2017-2021) İran'ın nükleer programı hakkında inşa ettiği stratejik anlatıyı incelemektedir. Çalışmanın temel amacı, ABD'nin nükleer anlaşmadan çekilme ve İran'a yönelik yaptırımları yeniden uygulama sürecinde Trump yönetiminin nasıl bir stratejik anlatı inşasında bulunduğunu tespit etmektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda çalışma, birincil kaynaklar olan siyasi elitlerin resmi demeç, bildiri ve açıklamaları incelenerek yürütüldü. Veri tarama ve toplama sürecinde nitel yöntem benimsenirken, elde edilen verilerin çözümleme işlemi nitel içerik analizi tekniğiyle yapıldı. Araştırmaya sürecinde Trump yönetiminin olay anlatısı, kimlik anlatısı ve sistem anlatısı olmak üzere üç farklı düzlemde stratejik anlatı inşasında bulunduğu gözlemlendi. Araştırma, Trump yönetiminin Orta Doğu'da İran'ın artan güç kapasitesi ve bölgesel etkinliğinin önüne geçmek amacıyla uygulamaya koyduğu "maksimum baskı" stratejisi uyarınca aldığı kararları uluslararası kamuoyu nezdinde meşru göstermek amacıyla stratejik anlatıyı bir araç olarak kullandığı sonucuna ulaşmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Stratejik Anlatı, Nükleer Anlaşma, Trump Yönetimi, ABD, İran

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Introduction

The Donald Trump administration (2017-2021) abandoned the “constructive engagement” strategy of the USA towards Iran during the period of Barack Obama (2009-2017) and imposed the “maximum pressure” strategy (Pompeo, 2018a). Under the Trump administration, the U.S. Middle East policy changed greatly. Adopting the “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran, the U.S. has once again started to behave with unilateralist and interventionist foreign policy in the Middle East (Walt, 2019). Such foreign policy has led to deteriorating U.S. relations with hostile regimes like Iran. Exposed to a “maximum pressure” strategy, Iran has behaved more aggressively with policies that have jeopardized regional stability and security. As a result, even though the Trump administration said that it tried to ensure regional stability and security in the Middle East, this strategy has not served this purpose.

Acting in line with this strategy, the Trump administration decided to withdraw from the nuclear agreement signed between Iran and P5+1 countries (2015) in May 2018. Behind this, the Trump administration both reinforced financial sanctions against Iran and decided to impose an oil embargo and largely prevented Iran’s oil export. Although the United States has the opportunity to behave more flexibly than other countries in its decisions and practices concerning its foreign policy thanks to its status as a super power in the global distribution of power, it needs to legitimize in international public opinion the attitudes and behaviors that it displays in line with its own strategic interests. The US decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal, which suspended Iran’s nuclear program, required the persuasion of the international community, especially Russia, China, Germany, Britain and France, which are parties to the nuclear agreement. Moreover, the fact that Iran acted in accordance with the terms of the agreement urged the Trump administration to make a great effort to justify its decision to international public opinion. It is for this reason that the significance of using strategic communication as an effective tool in foreign policy comes to the fore.

Decision-makers employ strategic communication as a valuable means for expressing and explaining their attitudes and actions to international audiences. Strategic narrative constitutes one of the techniques of strategic communication. However, to understand the strategic narrative, it is necessary to have knowledge of strategic communication. This discussion has been done in the conceptual framework of the article. The new technological paradigm and new media ecology, especially based on how developed the level of information and communication technology is, have made strategic communication an important instrument in national security strategies for states in international politics. This new international communication ecology contains both opportunities and threats simultaneously for states. At the current stage, the increasing suspicion that people can easily access alternative sources in the process of obtaining information and that the information presented reflects the reality draws states and non-state actors into an intense war of information. For this reason, two issues arise regarding strategic communication in international politics. First of all, even if foreign policy-makers are right in their foreign policy decisions and practices, they may prove to be weak against their rivals unless they can explain themselves to international public opinion by using strategic communication effectively. Secondly, foreign policy-makers have to endeavor to justify their foreign

policy decisions before the international community in line with their national interests and strategic goals. Thus, a convenient discourse climate is built in the process of reaching the desired strategic goal.

This study deals with the strategic narrative constructed by the Trump administration to justify its decision to withdraw from the deal signed with Iran and impose sanctions against it in the eyes of international audiences. The study aims to contribute to the literature on formation and projection of strategic narratives in foreign policy. The purpose here is not to judge any country, but to scientifically analyze the strategic narrative construction. In this context, it seeks an answer to the question of what is the strategic narrative that the Trump administration constructed in order to legitimize the “maximum pressure” strategy pursued towards Iran.

This study, based on the conceptual basis of the notion of a strategic narrative in international communication, focuses on the construction of strategic narratives at three levels: issue narrative, identity narrative, and system narrative. The qualitative method is used in the research process, and the data obtained are analyzed via the technique of qualitative content analysis. The data collected and classified in accordance with the codes and categories specified with the qualitative method were visualized via tables.

Literature Review

Although scientific studies on the use of strategic narratives as a tool in foreign policy are quite new, the literature on this field has gained a very rich content in the last two decades. The first scientific study using the strategic narrative as a tool in foreign policy was conducted by Roselle (Roselle, 2006). In the study concerned, Roselle examines the strategic narratives used by the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, to explain to both domestic and international public opinion their defeats in Vietnam and Afghanistan during the Cold War and why they had to retreat. Roselle concludes that the political leaders of the period, aiming to cover up their military defeats in the field and prevent any damage to their superpower identities, tried to justify the withdrawal of the USA and the USSR from Vietnam and Afghanistan, occupied by them, on the basis of the narrative that “the local allies took control in the field and therefore the goal was achieved”. In addition, this study focuses on how television is used as a media tool in the process of delivering the strategic narrative produced by political leaders to target audiences. Using the concept of strategic narratives in his later work, Roselle (2010) focuses on how the strategic narrative is instrumentalized through social media in the process of establishing and maintaining alliances in international politics.

Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle (2013) conduct case studies in their work in which they handle the concept of strategic narratives in a systematic manner. One of these case studies deals with the strategic narrative produced by the parties in the process of the power struggle between Israel and Arab countries. The study examining the 2002 Israel-Palestine conflict and the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war indicates that both sides were engaged in counter-strategic narrative production in order to gain the support of national and international public opinion. In their narratives, while the Israeli side claimed that it was trying to overcome the dangers to its national security, the Arab side emphasized the resistance against the occupation and the Zionist regime. This case study sets an example

of strategic narrative competition. Another case examined in the study is the strategic narrative forged and implemented by the USA and European countries about the Iran nuclear program. The study examined the differences and similarities of the narratives produced by the USA and EU-3 countries (France, Germany and the U.K.) between 2000 and 2010 regarding the Iranian nuclear program. It focused on the narrative produced by the USA and the EU-3 countries about the international system and the place that Iran's nuclear program occupied in it. In addition, the identification of narratives for the study was made not through what is published by media organs, but through official statements and security documents of the countries. During Khatami's period, the US labeled Iran as an "axis of evil" and a "rogue state" and suggested the use of force, while the EU-3 countries drew attention to Iran's right to have a peaceful nuclear program and put the words "dialogue" and "negotiation" to the fore.

Hellman and Wagson (2015: 6-23) deals with the strategic narrative rivalry between the government and opposition groups in the national public opinion regarding Swedish military personnel taking part in NATO in Afghanistan in 2010. The study reveals that the Swedish administration was trying to legitimize the presence of soldiers in Afghanistan through the narrative of "ensuring security and stability and building a democratic system". The study also points out the competition of rival narrative in the form of a hegemonic narrative and a counter-hegemonic narrative thanks to the opportunities provided by social media. Szostek (2017) examines the statements of the Russian foreign policy-makers during the Winter Olympics in Russia in 2014 and the identity narrative about Russia in Russian television news. The study argues that through the anti-American and anti-Western narrative produced, an identity was built that projects Russia as the "great European power".

Unlike the studies mentioned above, Schmitt's (2018: 1) study examines not only the formation and projection of the strategic narrative, but also its reception. It examines whether the strategic narrative produced by Russia based on anti-Americanism is accepted by French public opinion. The main argument of the study is that Russia's system and identity narrative about anti-Americanism finds a response among anti-liberal groups in France. The study by O'Shea (2018:4) covers what strategic narrative is used in the Japanese media regarding the American military base Okinawa Japan. The study concludes that the conservative Japanese media justified the necessity of a military base through the narrative that "it is a deterrent to the Chinese threat." Bilgin (2018) examines the projection of the "war on terror" narrative in American cinema, which aims to legitimize the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the eyes of domestic and international public opinion in the post-September 11 period. In the study, Bilgin concludes that in the 2012 American film *Zero Dark Thirty*, the US war in Afghanistan was legitimized by reflecting the war in Afghanistan as part of the fight against terrorism (Bilgin, 2018:126).

Miskimmon and O'Loughlin's (2019:279-280) study compares how the European Union is evaluated by the Israeli and Palestinian elites and media. Barthwal-Datta (2020) discusses the strategic narrative constructed by the Bush administration to legitimize the nuclear cooperation agreement with India (2005) to the national public. The study, covering an issue narrative, concludes that the Bush administration presents the nuclear

cooperation in question as an “unprecedented opportunity” for the US (Barthwal-Datta, 2020: 12). Chacko and Barthwal-Datta (2020) compare the narratives of regional order put forward by India and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region. The study argues that while India constructed a “multipolar regional order” narrative that included the USA, China and Russia, Australia constructed a US-centered narrative of “maintaining the regional status quo” after the Second World War (Chacko and Barthwal-Datta, 2020:4). Yang (2021) focuses on the system narrative of the Chinese administration regarding global governance reform during the Xi Jinping era. The study reveals that the Beijing administration has a narrative language to review the current system according to the interests and values of China, taking into account the power status it has achieved, instead of destroying the global system (Yang, 2021:14). Lastly, Deverell et al. (2021) compare the strategic narratives of the Russian state-sponsored media Sputnik about the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) in the period 2014-2019. The study draws attention to the fact that although there are differences between them, Russia is building up a narrative that tries to weaken the Western Bloc countries by disrupting the internal harmony within them (Deverell et al., 2021:16-17).

In conclusion, judging by the literature on the use of strategic narrative in foreign policy, it is possible to divide the current studies into four essential categories. Firstly, they are divided into two essential categories as national opinion and international public opinion in terms of the target audience. Secondly, in terms of the materials examined in the process of determining strategic narratives, these studies are divided into three categories: official statements of political leaders, media outlets and cinema. Thirdly, they are divided into three different groups in terms of the types of strategic narrative: system narrative, identity narrative and issue narrative. Fourthly, they are divided into three separate groups in terms of the process stages of the strategic narrative: forming, projection and reception. Our study concerns the international public in terms of the target audience; focusses on official statements of foreign policy-makers in terms of the materials studied; covers issue, system and identity levels in terms of the narrative level and deals with the formation and projection of narratives in terms of process stages.

Conceptual Framework

The great progress achieved in information and communication technologies in the post-Cold War period had extremely significant repercussions for the course of international politics. As a result of the widespread use of mass media, the new communication ecology, where the time and space barriers to accessing information have disappeared but at the same time information is exposed to manipulation and distortion to such an extent, has made international communication more complicated. While Castells (2009: 23-24) defines this situation, arising due to information and communication technologies, as “a new technological paradigm”, he argues that it brings along new conditions that he calls “network society” and “information age”. For this reason, states, the core actors of international politics, need more than ever to justify their decisions and actions before national and international public opinion. This new situation urges states to use strategic communication techniques effectively in international relations.

Two important developments at the beginning of the 21st century played a key role in the increasing importance of the strategic narrative in international politics. These are

the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and then Iraq in 2003. It required the effective use of a strategic narrative that the USA needed to overcome the difficulties it faced in persuading the national and international public opinions about its occupation of these two countries. Although the United States tried to legitimize its military intervention in Afghanistan through narratives of “war on terror” and “self-defense”, it began to forge a new strategic narrative to reduce reactions displayed afterwards to its permanent military presence and to justify the drastic measures taken in the face of the increasing challenge of the Taliban. On the other hand, the fact that the UN Security Council’s permanent members Russia and China, and NATO members Germany, France and Turkey openly opposed the invasion of Iraq, put the Bush administration in a rather difficult situation. In order to manipulate national and international public opinion, the Bush administration created the strategic narrative “the global war on terror”. In addition, under the conditions of political instability and civil war in both Afghanistan and Iraq in the post-invasion period, the US’s failure to achieve success against rebel armed groups despite its military power made the use of strategic narratives inevitable in the process of persuading the local people. Conflict management became a major problem in American foreign policy for the first time after the Vietnam War due to the reactions of the national and international community.

Strategic Communication

Strategic narrative constitutes one of the techniques of strategic communication. Therefore, any effort to understand the concept of strategic narrative requires knowledge of what strategic communication means first. Strategic communication is a multidisciplinary concept used in different scientific disciplines such as political communication, international communication, business, public relations and marketing. Hallahan et al. (2007:3) define strategic communication as the systematic formulation and implementation of communication in order to achieve a predetermined goal. He also argues that communication is used for a specific purpose in the strategic communication process. Strategic communication, in its simplest form, is the strategic organization and execution of communication (Moss and Warnaby, 1998:131-140). Emphasizing that not all communication can be considered strategic, Zaharna (2010:6) points out that communication forms that are not pre-planned, systematic and goal-oriented are not to be considered within the scope of strategic communication. According to Freedman (2006a:73), strategic communication is the ability to turn public opinion in one’s favor, whilst maintaining public support. Paul (2011:3) defines it as “coordinated actions, messages, images, and other forms of signaling or engagement intended to inform, influence, or persuade selected audiences in support of national objectives”. According to Farwell (2012), who sees strategic communication as an art, strategic communication is the use of actions, words, images and symbols to influence the attitudes and opinions of the target audience in order to achieve the specified goal. In addition, Farwell considers strategic communication, which has an important place in national security discourse, as a critical power source in the process of informing, influencing and persuading the target audience.

Strategic Narrative

Suganami (1999:379) suggests that social actors build both themselves and the social structure that they are in by producing narratives. For this reason, he states that the social structure in question presents a complex form of relationship in which three elements, namely actor, structure and narrative, are shaped by each other. Examining the use of the concept of narrative in the social sciences, Paterson and Monroe argue that narratives affect people's perceptions of political reality and their reactions to political developments. Therefore, narratives play a critical role in constructing political behavior and are produced in order to understand and interpret political reality (Paterson and Monroe, 1998:316). Roberts (2006:707-710), on the other hand, defines narration as the practice of telling stories about connected human deeds.

Freedman (2006b:22), who discusses the concept of strategic narrative in terms of political science and international relations, emphasizes how narratives can be used strategically in order to weaken the legitimacy of the enemy in military conflicts and argues that narratives help the public to understand why military power should be used. In addition, Freedman defines strategic narrative as a plot that allows persuasive explanation and inference to events. Using the concept of strategic narrative in the field of political communication, Roselle (2006:1) examines how the two superpowers (USA and USSR) presented / explained their defeats in Vietnam and Afghanistan. In this study, Roselle reveals that foreign policy-makers try to legitimize their foreign policy decisions and practices both in the eyes of their own people and the international public by forging a specific narrative through the media. According to Antoniadis, Miskimon, and O'Loughlin (2010:5), strategic narratives provide "representations of a sequence of events" and a communicative tool which is used to give "determined meaning to past, present and future in order to achieve political objectives".

The strategic narrative makes problems understandable to the society concerned in case of uncertainty. A strategic narrative is needed to frame the issue, shape the debate and remove ambiguity because society gains knowledge/opinion about events and develops proper attitudes thanks to strategic narratives. As for governments, by convincing the public through strategic narratives, they become able to justify political decisions that would otherwise not be supported by the public. Ringsmose and Børgesen (2011:505-528) argue that if the political power produces a coherent and credible strategic narrative about its military interventions, the likelihood of gaining popular support increases. Holtzhausen and Zerfass (2015:4) draw attention to the fact that strategic narrative is a purposeful communication practice in which the actors in communication do act so as to reach their goals. Nissen (2015:45) states that the key function of the strategic narrative is to provide a framework that helps to shape the past, present and future of conflicts in order to gain and sustain power in the international system. Barthwal (2015:328-330) emphasizes that strategic narratives are built as part of a communication process that takes place in a very complex communication ecology that includes political leaders, non-governmental organizations and think tanks.

Stating that strategic narrative interweaves past failures, current challenges and the possible future with a good plot line, Krebs (2015:1-23) underlines that it has functional roles such as imparting meaning to global events, defining the boundaries of legitimate

politics and shaping national security policy. Defining strategic narrative as a basic tool that ensures the consent of society for waging wars, Bilgin (2018: 118) emphasizes that obtaining public consent gives great power to governments. Drawing attention to the instrumentality and teleology of strategic narratives, Madisson and Ventsel (2021:22) emphasize that the meaning of conflicts is shaped in a desired way thanks to these narratives and helps the target audience to make sense of the developments experienced.

Strategic narrative in international relations has become a more systematic concept with two different joint studies published by Miskimmon et al. in 2013 and 2017. These researchers, who have made a great contribution to the literature, introduced the most comprehensive and accepted definition of the concept. Miskimmon et al. (2013:1-14) define strategic narrative as a tool which shapes the thoughts and behavior of actors and which is used by political actors to influence perceptions of events, identities and the international system. Thus, strategic narrative is regarded as a useful instrument that states resort to in order to expand their sphere of influence, manage expectations, and create a favorable discourse environment. Strategic narratives determine the identities of political actors (who are we?), their desired goals (what do we want?) and what the obstacles are to achieving them and how to overcome them. Miskimmon et al. (2017:6) define strategic narratives as “a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors.” In this way, political actors legitimize their actions against the target audience by using strategic narratives and influence the behaviors of the target audience.

In international relations, strategic narrative is produced on three different levels (Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, 2014:76). The first is issue narrative. Issue narrative regulates why a particular policy is needed in the face of any development, how this policy will be implemented and how it will be accomplished. Issue narrative explains what the conflict or issue is, who the key actors are, and how a particular course of action plan will resolve the issue. Thus, it communicates the fact that the politics followed by other foreign policy-makers and domestic and international public opinion are correct and accessible. Issue narrative is used to get engaged in the political course by shaping the discourse ecology in which the political decision is put into practice. In addition, issue narrative helps to demonstrate that the political stance of the decision makers on any issue is legitimate, attractive and applicable.

At the second level is identity narrative. Identity narrative explains what the story of a state or nation is and what values and goals it has. Thanks to identity narrative, political actors construct not only their own selves but also the identities of other actors. For example, American political leaders can present the US as a “superpower”, “pro-democracy”, “peace-loving” and “problem solver” actor. At the third level is system narrative. System narrative both sets out how any state defines the current global / regional order and reveals how it envisions a global / regional order. System narrative articulates how world politics is structured and operates and who the primary players are. States use system narrative to construct a perception of the structure of the international system. States produce narratives to establish and maintain a regional or global order that will be in their favor. While system narrative describes how the power is structured,

maintained, changes and transforms, it identifies who is challenging and threatening this current system. For example, expressions such as “Soviet Expansion”, “The Cold War”, “The Rise of China” and “The Global War on Terror” are part of the US narrative regarding global order.

To sum up, when these three narrative types are considered together, the general point to be reached is that strategic narrative is formed and projected in order to influence, direct and shape the thoughts, reactions and behaviors of the target audience. From this point of view, states that use strategic narrative to achieve goals and priorities concerning foreign policy aim to achieve the following four main objectives. To legitimize the foreign policy attitudes and behaviors of states in the international public opinion through strategic narrative (1). To prevent or reduce the possible opposition of other states to the foreign policy, attitude and behavior of any state about a particular development or a state (2). To gain the support of third countries in a policy that any state pursues towards a particular state (3). To delegitimize the attitude and behavior of the state for which the narrative is produced towards the policy pursued against it (4).

Method

The present study examines how the Trump administration tried to justify its decisions to withdraw from the nuclear deal and impose sanctions in line with its “maximum pressure” strategy towards Iran in the eyes of the international public opinion. The study aims to reveal what kind of strategic narrative the Trump administration constructed for the purpose of influencing and persuading international public opinion about its attitude and behavior towards Iran. The scope of the study is determined by three factors. First, it focuses on the period when the US withdrew from the nuclear deal and then began to impose sanctions and embargoes. Second, it just tries to reveal what the produced strategic narrative is. Therefore, the reception of the developed strategic narrative or whether it was as well received as expected or not is beyond the scope of the study. Third, it focuses on the strategic narrative which was created to influence and persuade international public opinion. Therefore, the strategic narrative projected by political leaders for their domestic public is not within the scope of the study. In summary, considering that each strategic narrative has three stages –formation, projection and reception, the scope of the study is restricted to the analysis of the first two stages. The reception process that examines the effect of the constructed narrative on the target audience is beyond the scope of the study. To understand the reception of any constructed strategic narrative requires field research on the audience. The reception of the Trump administration’s strategic narrative about Iran’s nuclear program is the subject of other research.

The research population consists of all the official documents issued by the Trump administration about the Middle East and Iran between 2017 and 2020, as well as statements made by senior foreign policy-makers. The research sample consists of security strategy documents published by the Trump administration and the official statements of political leaders. In this connection, written texts and oral explanations constitute the primary sources of the research. Primarily the security documents published by the Trump administration at various times were examined. In addition, official statements, remarks and speeches by President Donald Trump, Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of

State Mike Pompeo regarding Iran's nuclear program and the sanctions imposed (Küpel, 2016) were analyzed.

The study employs a qualitative research method. Source survey and data collection are carried out by using the qualitative method. The analysis of the qualitative data obtained from the survey of decision-makers' statements, remarks, and speeches is conducted via the technique of content analysis. Thanks to this method applied in the research process, it is possible to reveal the obvious or subtly hidden meanings and themes produced in written texts and oral ones transcribed, and it is attempted to identify the social reality which was built. Thus, it is thought that the strategic narrative produced by the Trump administration about Iran can be revealed by focusing on the meanings placed in the content of the texts examined.

The model of analysis categories used by Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, & Roselle (2013) was used to determine the meanings and themes which were focused on for the purpose of revealing the strategic narrative. This model provides a meaningful and systematic explanation of why and how political leaders use strategic communication to reach their foreign policy goals and priorities. This model requires the conduction of text analysis at three different levels: issue narrative, identity narrative and system narrative. The data obtained were classified according to these three categories, and then an evaluation was made on the findings achieved. It is thought that the model utilized will help determine how the Trump administration defines Iran's nuclear program and the nuclear deal signed (issue narrative), what identity it attributes to Iran (identity narrative) and, finally, what kind of vision of a global and regional order it has (system narrative). Thus, the Trump administration tried to legitimize their Iran policy by using the strategic narrative it developed and to convince international public opinion of its harsh attitudes.

In addition, while the Trump administration's strategic narrative is analyzed in reference to the above-mentioned categories, we use sub-categories. When it comes to the issue narrative, we adopt Robert Entman's (1993) familiar framing concept. He examined any political and social event in three elements: issue definition, causal relationship, and solution suggestion. Given the identity narrative, we examine it according to two factors that are self-identity and other identity. As for the system narrative, we split it into two sub-categories: regional and global system narrative. Lastly, when featured themes are determined in all these categorizations (issue narrative, identity narrative and system narrative) we prefer making division like main themes and sub-themes to make themes more meaningful and understandable.

Findings and Discussion

Issue Narrative

Table I

Issue Narrative

Subcategories	Featured Themes
Issue Definition	<p>Main Themes</p> <p>The (Iran) Deal;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • does not prevent Iran's nuclear program, but just postpones it for a while. • does not end Iran's ballistic missile program. • does not terminate Iran's aggression in the region • jeopardizes the security of the US, the Middle East, and the world • brings peace, stability and security neither to the Middle East nor to the world. <p>Subthemes</p> <p>The Deal;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • does not have a strong control mechanism. • does not end Iran's ambition to become a "regional hegemon". • does not eliminate Iran's ambition to become a "nuclear power". • provides a large financial resource to Iran and this resource is spent on; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Financing terrorism ❖ Welfare of the Regime ❖ Nuclear and ballistic missile programs
Causal Relationship	<p>Main Themes</p> <p>The Deal;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As it left Iran with impunity, the regime's aggressive behavior in the region increased. • The threat of terrorism in the Middle East and around the world has risen as it does not constrain Iran's aggressive behavior. • As it lifted the financial and political sanctions on Iran, it widened its room for maneuver. • Unless Iran's nuclear program is terminated, the world's leading supporter of terrorism will have the world's most dangerous weapon. • If the US adheres to its commitments in the deal, Iran will continue to cause conflicts and turmoil in the region. <p>Subthemes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran gained the opportunity to realize its regional ambitions. • Iran further disrupted peace, security and stability in the region. • Iran further increased its influence in the Middle East. • The deal sparked an arms race in the Middle East

Solution Suggestions	<p>Main Suggestions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The production of nuclear weapons should be prevented for regional and world security. • The world should not stand aside watching indifferently while Iran produces nuclear weapons. • The US should never allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. • In order to achieve peace, security and stability in the region and the world, the United States and its allies have to withdraw from the agreement and apply sanctions. • The US should prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons by withdrawing from the nuclear deal and imposing sanctions. • Sanctions should be imposed to cut the financial resources of the Iranian regime. • The sanctions should continue to be aggravated as long as Iran does not end its aggressive behavior. • Punitive action should be taken against Iran’s aggressive behavior and the previous administration’s mistakes should not be repeated. <p>Sub-Suggestions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US allies in Europe and the Middle East should stand by the US in this process. • Other countries should stay away from activities that will contribute to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic program and its economy; otherwise they should be punished. • Heavy defects in the nuclear deal must be fixed or eliminated so that the regime cannot produce nuclear weapons. • A new nuclear deal should not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons, produce ballistic missiles, support terrorism and engage in aggressive actions.
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Source: Themes were inferred from research sources listed in the appendix 1.

In Table I, the data regarding the issue narrative of the research is classified. The data classified here serves to identify the strategic narrative of the Trump administration on how it looks upon the nuclear deal, what policy should be pursued against it, how it will be implemented, who the primary players are, and how the problem will be resolved. First, looking at how the problem is defined, it is observed that the Trump administration characterized the nuclear deal with quite negative themes. What stands out as the most frequently used main themes are statements that the deal in question did not prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons, but only postponed it, and it did not deter it from developing a ballistic missile program and displaying aggressive attitudes. In addition, it is pointed out that the nuclear deal does not bring peace, stability and security to the Middle East and the whole world, but on the contrary, it endangers its security. Sub-themes are the issues that the deal does not have a strong control mechanism; provides financial resources that give Iran a better living space; and that these resources are used for the nuclear and ballistic missile program, financing terrorism and the welfare of the regime. It is also stated that the agreement does not end Iran’s ambition to reach the status of becoming the “regional hegemon” and having “nuclear power”. When the keywords used in the whole process are looked at, it is observed that wherever the term “nuclear deal” is mentioned, negative words are quite often seen to co-occur with it. Words such as *flawed*, *scary*, *terrifying*, *corrupted*, *problematic*, *disastrous*, *unilateral*, *worst*, *controversial* and *unsuccessful* are frequently used expressions in the lexical environment of the “nuclear deal.”

Considering the causal relationship dimension, which is the second sub-category of the issue narrative, the themes that establish a cause-effect relationship between Iran's aggressive/expansionist behavior and the nuclear deal are observed. In this context, in terms of the main theme, it is emphasized that the aggressive behavior in the region increased because the deal left Iran unpunished, that the threat of terrorism in the Middle East and the world escalated since it did not restrict Iran's aggressive actions, and its maneuver space expanded in the region as the deal lifted the financial and political sanctions on Iran. If Iran's nuclear program is not terminated, we are warned that the regime, the world's leading terrorism supporter, will obtain the world's most dangerous weapon. In addition to these, sub-themes are observed that after the deal, Iran found the opportunity to realize its regional ambitions, increase its influence in the Middle East, cause an arms race and disrupt peace, security and stability in the region. As for the definition of actors, which is the third sub-category of the issue narrative, the Trump administration, Israel and Saudi Arabia are described as positive actors, while the Obama administration, the Iranian regime, Spiritual Leader Khamenei, Qasem Soleimani, the Revolutionary Guards, the Quds Force, Shia militias, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and the Assad administration are profiled as negative actors. Apart from these, US citizens, the people of Iran, the people of the Middle East and the USA's allies are described as the suffering parties.

With regard to the fourth sub-category *solution suggestions* for the issue, a very detailed suggestion list is given. For the security of the region and the world, the main suggestion is frequently mentioned that the USA and its allies should not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Another main suggestion is also frequently expressed that the USA and its allies should withdraw from the deal so as to achieve peace, security and stability in the region and the world. Furthermore, it is suggested that the heaviest sanctions should be imposed in order to change Iran's behavior and cut its financial resources. It is pointed out that the previous administration's mistakes should not be repeated, that it is the right step to punish Iran and that if it does not change its unfavorable behavior, the sanctions will need to be further intensified. As a sub-proposal, it is stated that it will be for their own good for the third parties to refrain from commercial relations with Iran and avoid activities that will contribute to Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program; otherwise, they will also be punished with sanctions. Among the secondary suggestions, the sub-proposal comes to the fore that a new deal should be signed with the terms that Iran must not produce nuclear weapons, develop ballistic missiles, support terrorism and engage in aggressive behavior, thereby eliminating the severe flaws of the current deal.

Identity Narrative

Table II
Identity Narrative

Subcategories	Featured Themes
<p>Self-Identity</p>	<p>Main Themes The USA;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • strives for peace, security and stability in the region and the world. • tries to prevent Iran, which supports terrorist organizations, from disturbing peace, security and stability in the region. • strives to stop Iran from endangering the security of the world by producing nuclear weapons and executing a ballistic missile program.. • fights terrorist Iran and the terrorist organizations it supports. • tries to make Iran act like a “normal state” <p>Subthemes The USA;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • makes efforts to end the long-standing suffering of the Iranian people. • tries to provide freedom and prosperity for the Iranian people. • Tries to hold Iran accountable for its malicious and destructive actions or policies.
<p>Other Identity</p>	<p>Main Themes Iran;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is the world’s leading state-sponsor of terrorism. • poses a threat to the security of the region and the world by producing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. • supports terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. • fuels civil wars in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Palestine, and conducts proxy wars. • interferes with the internal affairs of the countries of the region, violating their sovereignty. • exhibits aggression in foreign policy. • threatens the national security of the countries in the region. • causes death, destruction and chaos in the region and around the world. • disrupts peace, security and stability in the Middle East. <p>Subthemes Iran;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • threatens global trade and international maritime transport. • tries to establish “regional hegemony” in the Middle East. • persecutes both its own people and the people of the region. • is dragging the region into an arms race. • violates international law and human rights.

Source: Themes was inferred from research sources listed in the appendix 1.

As seen in Table II, the Trump administration’s identity narrative is analyzed in two categories: *self*-identity and *other*’s-identity. Firstly, with regard to the self-identity category, it is emphasized as one of the main identity themes which projects the USA as striving to ensure peace, security and stability in the Middle East and to prevent Iran from disrupting it. Another main identity theme is that the primary concern of the US is that it aims to prevent Iran from endangering world security by producing nuclear weapons and developing ballistic missiles. It is also among the main identity themes that the primary purpose of the USA is to deter Iran from supporting terrorist organizations, to restrain its aggressive behavior and ultimately to ensure it acts like a “normal state”. Issues such as

making Iran accountable for its malicious behavior, ending the suffering of the Iranian people and providing freedom and prosperity to them are observed as secondary self-identity themes. The USA is described with positive words such as responsible, leader/pioneer, troubleshooter, solution producer, pro-peace, anti-terrorism, freedom-fighter, provider of prosperity, advocate of law, anti-armament and justice seeker.

When it comes to the subcategory of other's identity, the statement that Iran is "the leading terrorist state in the world" constitutes the main theme of other's identity that is widely used. Iran is depicted as a state that threatens the security of both the region and the world, claiming that it is carrying out a nuclear and ballistic program, supporting terrorist organizations in the region, fueling civil wars and waging proxy wars. In addition, Iran is defined as a state that threatens the national security of the countries in the region, interferes with their internal affairs, violates their sovereignty, exhibits destructive and aggressive behavior and disrupts peace, security and stability. These core otherizations are enhanced by sub-marginalizations. Under the secondary themes regarding the subcategory other's identity, the themes are included that Iran persecutes its own people, disregards human rights and international law, endangers global trade and international maritime traffic. As for keywords, Iran is described with words or phrases with negative connotations such as Rogue state, aggressive, expansionist, malicious, terrorism exporter, terrorism sponsor, pro-violent, lawless, abnormal, destabilizing, spreading chaos, blood shedding, threatening, destructive, degenerated, corrupt, murderer, dictator, oppressive and cruel.

System Narrative

Table III

System Narrative

Subcategories	Featured Themes
Global System	<p>System Themes for the Present</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The global security, stability and welfare order are endangered. • The free and open international order is at risk because of Iran's behavior. <p>System Themes of Future</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional power balances should be maintained in the Middle East, Europe, East Asia and the Americas in order to maintain the global balance of power. • Efforts should be made to preserve the free and open international order.

<p>Regional System</p>	<p>System Themes of the Present</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Middle East has a regional order characterized by insecurity, conflict and instability. • The regional order in the Middle East is shaken by Iran’s expansionism, civil wars, proxy wars, sectarian wars, regional rivalry, terrorist organizations and failed states. • Currently there exists an order in the region where states intervene in each other’s internal affairs and violate their sovereignty.
	<p>System Themes of Future</p> <p>A regional order should be built:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • where a single regional power cannot dominate • where peace, security, stability and prosperity will be ensured • where any aggressive states will be deterred • which will not be a safe haven for terrorist groups • in which strategic sea routes in the region are safe • which contributes steadily to the global energy market • in which states respect each other’s sovereignty and their own peoples

Source: Themes was inferred from research sources listed in the appendix 1.

System narrative, which is the third level of strategic narrative, is discussed in two sub-categories in the study, namely the global and regional order narrative. With respect to the global order narrative, it is stated that Iran, together with Russia, China and North Korea, is a state which challenges the free and open international order. It is pointed out that global security and welfare is under threat due to the behavior of these states. These constitute prominent themes related to the current global order. Apart from these, there are also order themes for future. In order to protect the global power balance where the USA has the superiority, the regional equilibrium of power should be kept in strategic regions such as the Middle East, and efforts should be exerted to protect the free and open international order. As for the regional order narrative, the Middle East refers to a regional order dominated by insecurity, instability and conflict. In the Middle East, the regional order is described as being shaken by Iranian expansionism, civil wars, proxy wars, sectarian wars, regional rivalry, terrorist organizations and failed states. Currently there is an order in the Middle East where states intervene in each other’s internal affairs and violate their sovereignty. As the narrative of the future order, a regional order must be built where peace, security, stability and prosperity are ensured; a single regional power cannot dominate; aggressive states are discouraged; terrorist organizations are not involved; strategic sea passage routes are safe, and which steadily contributes to the global energy market and respects the peoples of the region.

Conclusion

This study examined the strategic narrative that the Trump administration built around Iran’s nuclear program. The research is the product of an effort to understand the strategic narrative developed by the Trump administration in order to legitimize the decisions under the “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran in the eyes of international public opinion. If the ultimatum published by Foreign Minister Pompeo (2018a) is examined, it will be realized that the most fundamental strategic goal of the Trump administration in the Middle East is to weaken Iran’s national power capacity and to reduce its regional

influence. Iran's increasing power capacity and its expanding regional influence mean that the current balance of power in the Middle East is turning against the United States and undermine its interests in the region. The Trump administration put into practice the strategy of "maximum pressure" in order to achieve the strategic goal it had set. This strategy involves its efforts to subject the target country to multi-dimensional (political, economic and military) pressure, pushing it to behave in the desired direction. However, the nuclear deal was a major obstacle to the Trump administration's ability to implement its "maximum pressure" strategy on Iran. For this reason, there was a need to create a favorable communication environment where the US could withdraw from the nuclear deal and re-enforce sanctions. When the speech texts of the American foreign policy-makers were examined, it was observed that strategic narrative was used as a technical tool in foreign policy in order to create the aforementioned strategic communication climate. As a result of the research carried out, three basic findings were reached.

The first finding was reached within the scope of the issue narrative. The issue narrative formed regarding the nuclear deal discusses the fact that it did not prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; on the contrary, thanks to the sanctions lifted, which led to Iran having large financial resources, Iran was provided in a sense with both financial resources by means of which it could develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and a large room for maneuver in which to pursue aggressive behavior in the region. Therefore, it is alleged that the agreement brought peace, security and stability to neither the region nor the world, making Iran a state that supports terrorist organizations in the region, interferes with the internal affairs of the countries of the region and persecutes its own people. For this reason, a solution proposal was presented that it was inevitable for the USA to withdraw from the deal and re-impose sanctions, and that other states should assist the USA in this process to prevent Iran's aggressive behavior.

The second finding is reached within the context of the identity narrative. By making the distinction between *self*-identity and *other* identity in narrative construction, while the USA is profiled as a responsible/savior actor that solves problems, ensures peace and maintains security, Iran is presented as an irresponsible/abnormal regime that creates problems, and endangers or destabilizes regional and global security. Furthermore, it is claimed that Iran supports terrorist organizations intensely; therefore, Iran is profiled as a terrorist regime. moreover, Iran is presented as a state that violates human rights against its own people, violates international law, threatens global trade and disrupts international maritime transport. It is clear that all the negative identity references put forward are used to convince the international community of how necessary the stringent measures taken against Iran are and to guide the behavior of the states accordingly.

The third finding is about the system narrative. From the texts examined, it was obvious that the system narrative was constructed on two levels, global and regional. Judging by the global system narrative, it is emphasized that the US-led global balance of power is indispensably needed to ensure, protect and maintain world peace and security. Looking at the regional system narrative, the Middle East suggests an order characterized by conflict, war and disorder. The atmosphere of order and trust in the Middle East seems to have disappeared due to the civil wars, sectarian strife and proxy wars caused

by Iran's actions. The re-construction of a regional order is imagined where a single regional power (Iran) will not be able to dominate; peace, stability and prosperity will be ensured; aggressive states will be deterred; states will not interfere with each other's internal affairs and terrorist organizations will be denied a favorable atmosphere. Iran is presented as chiefly responsible for the negative portrayal drawn regarding the current regional order, and it is attempted to persuade the target audience about the necessity of the harsh policies pursued against Iran.

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Islamists on Wire: The View of Islamist Journals Towards Government Policies in Turkey During the 1980s

İslamcı Dergilerin 1980'lerde Türkiye'deki Hükümet Politikalarına Bakışı

Güven Gürkan Öztan¹ 

Abstract

This paper aims to extrapolate the different political stances of Islamist actors with respect to their reciprocal interaction with the ANAP governments in the 1980s in Turkey. Based on a selection of Islamist publications, this article analyzes the views of prominent traditional Islamic groups such as Erenköy and İskenderpaşa orders and Islamist authors about government policies during the period between 1983-1991 in which the ANAP governed as the single party. The analysis will take place on three subjects that shaped the aforementioned period as well as the entirety of Turkish-Ottoman modernization. The subject of economy reveals that Islamists benefitted from neoliberal policies while taking a critical position towards it. In terms of culture, as the second subject, Islamists criticized the ANAP governments for encouraging individualist-hedonistic tendencies and invited them to Islamize the realms of education and culture. The subject of international relations, on the other hand, was dominated by Turkey's possible accession to the European Community (EC) on which various Islamist groups tried to have an impact by steering the ANAP's foreign policies.

Keywords

Islamism, Motherland Party, Neoliberalism, Islamic communities, Islamist publications

Öz

Bu çalışma, İslamcılar arasındaki çeşitli politik tutumları, hükümet politikalarıyla karşılıklı etkileşimi hesaba katarak açığa çıkarmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu hedef çerçevesinde, ANAP'ın tek başına hükümette olduğu 1983-1991 arası dönemde, entelektüel-politik tartışmaları içeren seçilmiş İslamcı süreli yayınları temel alarak, belirli başlı İslamcı grupların ANAP hükümetlerinin politikalarına yönelik bakışını irdelemektedir. Önce 1980'lerde İslami çevrelerin politik pozisyonları serimlenecek daha sonra İslami grupların ve İslamcı yazarların yürüttüğü temel tartışmalar ve hükümete yönelik eleştirileri incelenecektir. Bu çerçevede döneme damgasını vuran ve Batılılaşma ekseninde tartışılan üç boyut belirlenmiştir. İlk boyut, ekonomik alandaki gelişmelere dairdir: İslamcıların bir yönüyle neoliberal politiklardan dolayı olarak istifade ettiği diğer yandan bu politikaları çeşitli yönlerden eleştirdiği gösterilecektir. İkinci boyut kültürel alana dairdir: İslamcı gruplar hükümetin bireyci-hazcı eğilimleri teşvik ettiğini iddia ederken eğitimin ve kültürün İslamlaştırılması için hükümeti daha fazla adım atmaya davet etmiştir. Üçüncü boyut dış politika alanıdır: İslamcı grupların ANAP'ın dış politika tercihlerini etkilemeye gayret ettikleri, AT üyeliğine dair tartışmalar üzerinden kanıtlanmaya çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

İslamcılık, Anavatan Partisi, neoliberalizm, İslami cemaatler, İslamcı yayınlar

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Introduction

In recent years, there has been a surge in the number of academic works on Islamist political actors in Turkey. However, these studies hardly focus on the diverse positions taken by Islamist actors in relation to government policies in the 1980s, widely known as the “revival period.” An analysis of the different political trajectories of Islamist groups throughout the 1980s will not only provide insights into the scope and layers of their relationship with the single-ruling party at the time, namely Motherland Party (ANAP), but also be instrumental in understanding the internal debates and strategies of power of Islamists in the 1990s and 2000s. Islamism gained an advantage over the left/socialism and doctrinal nationalism in terms of both state cadres and organizational capacity in the aftermath of the 1980 coup d’etat in Turkey. That is because the junta regime provided Islamist actors with ample maneuver room as it relied on what is often called “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” in the restoration of the official ideology and mobilized Islamic motives for the purpose of envisioning a solidarist-corporatist society (Şaylan, 1992: 105-114; Yavuz, 1997: 67-70). Islamic groups and Islamist authors in Turkey sought to enhance their social and political influences by using various instruments, primarily publishing, in the second half of the 1980s – a period dominated by ANAP – during which the civilian politics executed the general principles of the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” (Salt, 1995; Öztan, 2019). As the single ruling party from 1983 to 1991 and the spearhead of the neoliberal transformation in Turkey, the ANAP restructured the positions of all political and social actors within the Turkish political spectrum, including Islamist actors. In that respect, different forms of relations of Islamic circles with the ANAP governments should be taken into consideration in the examination of Islamism in the 1980s.

Based on the intellectual and political debates in the prominent Islamist journals of the era, this study aims to analyze Naksi groups, especially Erenköy and İskenderpaşa orders representing traditional Islamic organization as well as the radical Islamist circles that were anti-democratic system and flourished in the 1970s.

This research concentrates on Naksibendi Sufi orders due to their considerable influence on the right-wing politics since the beginning of multi-party system and particularly during the ANAP governments with respect to their strategy of working “within the system”. This research also refers to the Islamist circles that were “anti-systemic” and accordingly kept their distance from the ruling parties. However, on the level of intellectual debates, it is hard to provide a clear-cut separation between traditional Islamic organizations and the “anti-system” Islamist circles that give their converging views on issues like anti-Western skepticism and the place of interest-rate in the banking system. This article aims to explore the similarities and differences between these groups by drawing on the arguments provided in their publications. The content analysis method will be used to examine the view of Islamist journals towards ANAP government policies during the 1980s.

Following the return to civilian rule, traditional Islamic communities and Islamist intellectuals started to convey their views to the Islamist base and beyond on a variety topic ranging from politics to everyday life in Islamist journals. In addition, they tried to affect government policy with their published views and debates. In his study of Islamist publications, Doğan (1994: 85-86) separates the Islamist journals in the 1980s and 1990s

into two main categories. Journals such as Nurus' *Sızıntı*, and Kadiris' *İcmal* and *Öğüt* predominantly focus on religious themes of Sufism rather than making concrete political demands or pressing for the revision of the existing regime. *Altınoluk* published by the Erenköy Naksibendi order along with *İslam Dergisi*, *İlim ve Sanat*, *Kadın ve Aile* by the Iskenderpaşa order, on the other hand, negotiated between the trends of Sufism and more radical political inclinations among Islamists while presenting clearer political demands. These publications also included Turkish-Islamist motives as well as Islamist ideas. In this context, *İslam Dergisi*, *İlim ve Sanat*, *Kadın ve Aile*, and *Altınoluk* were addressed in order to observe the views of the main branches of Naksibendis that pursued a politics of balance with the ANAP governments.

Doğan (1994: 83) also enumerated *Mektup*, *Tevhid*, *Kararlı Genç Adam*, *Yeryüzü*, *Değişim*, *Taraf*, *Girişim*, etc. among the journals that embraced radical Islamist theses of the time. Some of them such as *Tevhid*, *Kararlı Genç Adam*, and *Yeryüzü* were published at the end of the ANAP era; others, such as *Değişim* belonged entirely to the post-ANAP era. *Girişim*, *Mektup*, and *Diriliş*¹ were long-running journals and published by Islamist authors with no ties to the existing Islamic groups that aimed to influence the government's policies indirectly, on the other hand, they are a part of this study due to their distant stance towards ANAP governments. *Ribat*, a radical Naksi journal that kept its distance from the government was also included in this study.

In recent years, although there are plenty of articles and PhD theses that examined Islamist journals (e.g. Çakır, 2011; Özçetin, 2011; Maviş 2017; Bakacak 2020), these studies rarely elaborate the political views of Islamist journals towards political power in Turkey. This study differs from others in terms of the subject it deals with. The agenda items can be categorized under three headings. The first one comprises Islamist critiques on the economic policies of the era. The second heading is the cultural issues such as the alleged moral crisis, individualism, and hedonism, which were popular subjects among the Islamist intellectuals of the time. Here, these subjects will be handled in the context of consumption culture and the media. The last heading involves different approaches to Turkey's developing relations with the European Community (EC). Each of these topics echoed the long-standing Islamist critique of Westernization and shaped the Islamist literature that was produced throughout the neoliberal transition. This paper claims that Naksi groups, especially İskenderpaşa and Erenköy orders, despite their different opinions and occasional onslaughts on the government, to a large extent, avoided direct confrontation with the ANAP, but rather pursued a politics of balance. Non-affiliated Islamist authors that kept their distance from the government sharply criticized capitalism, modern forms of hedonism, and Westernization but abstained from taking a defiant stand against the ANAP in general. This situation can be explained with reference to the fact that Islamism in the 1980s had not yet shaped its own perspective of attaining the political power in Turkey.

1 *Diriliş* published by Sezai Karakoç touched upon a large variety of subjects including literary-philosophical debates and more up-to-date issues like inflation rates and accession to the EC. *Girişimi*, on the other hand, occasionally broke away from the strategy of maintaining the politics of balance between Sufi orders and the ANAP governments as the journal deployed a rather "oppositional" rhetoric towards the latter and expressed scepticism towards the notion of democracy

Islamists in the context of the ANAP's Restructuring of Turkey in the 1980s

Although the 1980 coup had its toll on *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) politics, as some Islamist politicians were imprisoned, most Islamist actors maintained their place and power. Moreover, they saw a political opportunity in the post-coup period in which the left was almost entirely suppressed. Abstaining from criticizing the coup openly, Islamist political actors endeavored to increase their impact on politics indirectly, and yet effectively. Their strategy was to engage with the power struggles among the ruling classes while, at the same time, to step up their efforts in the area of publishing with the goal of building an ideological coherence among different Islamic circles. The absence of *Milli Görüş* in the form of a political party running in the 1983 general elections channeled conservative electors towards the ANAP. Nakşibendi İskenderpaşa order endorsed Özal's ANAP in the 1983 elections and obtained a certain status among groups with Islamic ties in the party. The Erenköy Nakşibendi order, a prominent branch of the Nakşibendis, just like the İskenderpaşa order, supported *Milli Görüş* in the pre-1980 period and endorsed the ANAP in 1983 (Yavuz, 2003: 144-145). Most decisively, the majority of Nakşibendis threw their weight behind the party and, in return, Nakşibendis would be given a privileged status in the ANAP (Eligür, 2010: 120). Süleymancı took side with the ANAP in the 1980s while they heavily invested in building student dormitories as a source of recruitment (Şaylan, 1995: 162-163). There was a disagreement among the branches of the Nurcu movement whether to support Özal's ANAP or not. The Yeni Asya group saw the party as a product of the coup d'état and chose to oppose it while other Nurcu branches were supporting. The Yeni Asya group, on the other hand, sided with the True Path Party (DYP) (Yavuz, 2003: 175; Yükleyn, 2008: 385).

When founded in 1983, the ANAP was largely built upon its leader figure Turgut Özal, who had been an economic technocrat in the 1970s and was from conservative background and Nakşibendi order (Salt, 1995: 17). The party founders were mostly composed of individuals from the private sector and former members of the parties that were closed by the junta regime (Ergüder, 1991: 155). On the eve of the general elections in November 1983, the ANAP laid special emphasis on its economic promises and obtained an indisputable electoral success.

The ANAP stepped into politics at a time when the New Right was on the rise across the world. Özal and his party immediately took on the political stage as the leading actors of restructuring Turkey in accord with the requirements of global capitalism in the 1980s. The ANAP's political program also coincided with that of the junta regime, that is, the claim to start a "clean slate" in politics by erasing the residues of the earlier paradigm. Accordingly, Özal did not miss any opportunities to underline the ANAP's difference from the political parties of the pre-1980 period as he delineated both his party's ideological line and the ANAP cabinets in accordance with the idea of neoliberal transformation. The ANAP developed its own structure as ideologically eclectic by following the examples of the New Right governments around the world, which combined neoliberalism with conservatism as in the cases of Thatcherism and Reaganism.

In line with its ideologically eclectic organization, the ANAP's claim to involve all four major political inclinations in Turkey, namely nationalism, conservatism, liberalism, and "social justice", had two advantages: the veiling of possible crises triggered by the

neoliberal transformation and engulfing the social base of the political parties closed by the junta regime. However, these four political inclinations were not represented equally within the party. According to Feroz Ahmad (1985: 219), it was not clear to what extent the ANAP embraced the legacy of the Justice Party (AP), the dominant center-right party in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, the influence of the National Salvation Party (MSP) and partially the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), respectively the Islamist and nationalist parties in the pre-1980 Turkish politics, was more tangible in the party cadres. In addition, the role of social democracy within the party was considerably weak. This inequality of representation of different political inclinations reflected itself in the first ANAP cabinet as its conservative character was quite visible (Ahmad, 1985; 218-219). Yet, Özal not only was able to hold together conservatives and liberals until the early 1990s, but also made the traditional networks of Naksi orders compatible with the social fabric of cities, hence contributed to the legitimization of emerging views about the role of Islam in urban life (Yavuz, 2003: 75).

In this context, except some Nurcu groups and radical Islamists, Naksi groups generally found Özal's policy of "combining the four political leanings" reasonable and largely supported the coalescing of the neoliberal strategy of capital accumulation with the ideological tenets of neo-conservatism. There were three major factors for the Islamist support. The first factor was economic and related to the incentives given to conservative business circles in Anatolian towns to invest and accumulate capital in the new growing markets. The second factor was socio-cultural. The ANAP governments' frequent references to the Ottoman heritage lay the ground for the rise of Islamist publishing and rendered conservative actors more visible in the domains of culture and education. The third factor was directly political, and it entailed the welcoming of Islamists to the party and state cadres, as Şimşek (2004: 121) points out: "Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), given its strong Islamist/conservative faction, started to place more and more conservative people in state cadres."

Naksi political actors, who actively participated in the ANAP, climbed up the stairs in politics and bureaucracy by virtue of their relations with sufi orders during the ANAP governments (Güney-Ayata & Ayata, 2001: 95). According to Metin Heper, a significant number of ultra-nationalists and militant-Islamists took on crucial roles and responsibilities in the party bureaucracy. However, for Heper, this situation derived from the lack of deliberation in recruiting members to the party due to time shortage (Heper, 1990: 332). Our argument, on the other hand, is that, instead of being an unintended consequence, this was a deliberate choice that aimed at gathering all constituents of the right-wing politics under the banner of the ANAP and absorbing the potential of "anti-parliamentarian" politics.

Naksi cadres partaking active politics in the ANAP declared their loyalty to parliamentary democracy throughout the ANAP's consecutive electoral victories. Leaving aside some of their reservations, Islamic groups were careful not to directly get in conflict with center-right politics or their promises of political and social change. On the contrary, the political actors from Islamic background usually contributed to the consolidation of conservative-populist discourse, which was built upon economic growth and wealth increase, with religious motives. However, they also made maneuvers in

alliance with the nationalist party cadres in order to balance the influence of liberals within the ANAP and to make conservative views dominant especially in educational and cultural policies of the ANAP governments (Ergüder, 1991: 160). Islamist circles that were more skeptical towards the ANAP, on the other hand, remained suspicious of the structural and cultural transformations accompanied by the policies of “opening up” and “democratization” that were associated with Özal. These circles assumed a critical stance towards the ANAP governments on a wide range of subjects such as foreign relations and economic policies. Among them were groups and individuals that remained loyal to the *Millî Görüş*, writers who proclaimed to be independent Islamist intellectuals, and spokespersons of the Islamist circles that did not openly endorse the ANAP. These actors decried Özal’s pragmatism in the political field and criticized the ANAP governments’ policies of encouraging consumption culture in Turkey. In the following sections, these variety of Naksi groups and Islamist authors’ views were examined thematically.

The Economic Dimension: Economic Governance and the Neoliberal Transformation

As advocates of the economic decisions announced on January 24th, 1980, Özal and the ANAP claimed that protectionist economic policies had made the Turkish industry inefficient and uncompetitive. Accordingly, the ANAP made it top priority to replace the model of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) with an economic model that relied on export-oriented growth and the establishment of competitive market rules. Being a follower of a certain notion of “industrial Darwinism,” Özal invested on the idea that large segments of the Turkish society would benefit such economic reconstruction, and consequently the Turkish population would have access to products of better quality and at cheaper prices (Ahmad: 1985: 221). In this process, some measures were introduced to liberalize foreign trade and capital transactions, and new fiscal policy was carried out step by step (Brown 1988: 69).

Islamic groups kept careful tabs on these promises and at first thought that the government would take positive steps towards economic recovery (e.g. *Hilal*, 1984: 2). They considered the enabling of “Islamic banking,”² which excludes the collection and payment of interest, as one of the positive steps on the account of the government. However, despite such developments, it later became clear that the traditional Islamic emphasis on “less consumption, more saving” was at clear odds with the ANAP’s policies of incentivizing consumption, especially in the years following 1987.

Özal considered the curtailing of power of the traditional bureaucracy as imperative in order to establish a new economic and political hegemony because, in his view, the traditional bureaucracy would not approve the ANAP’s objectives or could not keep up with the neoliberal transformation (Heper, 1990: 326). In order to resolve the grievances of domestic and foreign capital-owners, Özal devised legal mechanisms that allowed the government to bypass the established bureaucratic procedures in line with the purported requirement for quick decision-making mechanisms (Ahmad, 1985: 219). Initially, Naksi groups and Islamist authors were ambivalent towards this transformation. On the one

2 The first “interest-free” bank, Albarak Türk Finance Institution Inc., was founded in Turkey in 1985. During the same period, articles applauding banking without interest were published. See. Sevilgen, 1985: 23-29; Gürdoğan, 1985: 30-33.

hand, they were content with the diminishing power of the old Kemalist bureaucracy, which had often acted as a political rival to Islamist politics. On the other hand, the influence of Islamic circles in these newly assigned cadres remained insignificant and that caused disappointment within the Islamist politics.

In general, Naksi political actors were not discontent with the erosion of the traditional bureaucracy as a result of the neoliberal economic transformation in Turkey in the 1980s. Nevertheless, this trend raised significant concern among Islamist writers regarding the possible detrimental effects of technocratization on social sphere and the possible takeover of economic governance by the growingly asymmetrical relations with global capitalism. Anti-imperialist motives, especially the Third-Worldist Islamist theses, came to the forefront particularly among Islamist writers and scholars who cautioned against the tendency to fetishize economic growth in the ANAP governments. Within these circles (such as *Girişim*, *Mektup*, *Ribat*, etc.), the distinction between center and periphery countries, relations of dependency caused by the capitalist system, and Turkey's unequal relations with the capitalist centers were among the topics that were frequently discussed, provided that they were formulated in Islamist framework (Özdür, 1986). Herein, *Girişim* quoted from economist Beşir Hamitoğulları who attended the session with unionist. Hamitoğulları (1988: 50) claims: "Turkey has been implementing a wild, underdeveloped capitalist model that has been dependent on Western countries. for seven years. Both military regime and following civilian regime were founded for this purpose. This is a model, therefore nothing would change whether master or apprentice take power".

The critique of capitalist economy was so sharp in the Islamist journals such as *Girişim*, *Mektup*, and *Ribat*. For example, Sabiha Ünlü (1987: 3-4) from *Mektup* claims that capitalist ethics was not in accordance with the Islamic ethics. Adil Ünlü (1986: 11) implicitly criticized Islamist actors with business ties to the ANAP for using Islam to legitimize their capitalist ambitions. Nevertheless, the Islamist critique of industrialism and free market economy in the 1980s did not lead to the acknowledgment of the structural conflict between capital and labor. On the contrary, several pieces published in Islamist journals suggested that there was no distinction between the capital owner and the worker in Islam (e.g., Taha, 1982: 17-18). In these writings, authors offer prescriptions such as that the employer should pay fair wages to the worker on time (e.g. *Mektup*, 1985: 7; 1987: 14) while the worker was to bear the responsibility of protecting the means of production of Islam.³ Such configuration relied on the imagined relations of productions that were shaped around the shared Islamic beliefs, community ties, and relations of fellow-townsmanship. Therefore, it defined the newly flourishing capital of the towns in Anatolia in the 1980s.

The rapidly surging inflation in the years after 1985 became one of the chronic problems that the ANAP could not deal with. Islamist journals touched upon the issue in varying manners. However, all these journals underlined the government's failure to fight with inflations by referring conservative scholars (*İslam*, 1986a; *Altunoluk*, 1989;

3 Taha, for instance, writes: "The logic of *laissez faire* in capitalist economic system has no currency in Islam. Concepts such as slow-down strike, strike [...] and lockout are the products of *jahiliyyah* systems and they are the gravestones of an area of exploitation at the root of which lie injustice. In Islamic standards, there are notions like working for Allah and earning honest living. Pious workers know that they are responsible for employers' properties" [my translation] (1983: 14).

Panel, 1989, etc.) Islamist writers that wrote on economic issues in Islamist journals, pointed at the rising inflation as an outcome of the flaws within the free market system (e.g., Gürdoğan, 1986a: 8) and affected only “true Muslims” in a negative way (Ünlü, 1988: 5-6). While some of these pieces involved elaborate analyses of inflation, others reduced inflation into an inevitable outcome of the existing relations of production.⁴ Market actors, and particularly executives of private finance, resorted to liberal theses to explain the ongoing high levels of inflation rather than associating it with the risks inherent to global capitalism (e.g. Akın, 1985: 45-46). A number of authors, on the other hand, laid emphasis on the political and cultural character of inflation, in addition to its economic dimension, in order to draw attention to the increase of consumption as a major source of the problem.

Anti-Western Islamist writers, such as Yılmaz (1988) and Keçeli (1989), asserted that economic dependency and culture of consumption were two sides of the same coin. According to them, the United States and European countries had transformed the Muslim populations in Third World countries into consumption societies and prisoners of inflation. As they argued, such processes were carried out by the secular subjects in those countries, these Islamist actors located the main social fault line between the “pious” and “secular” segments of the society (e.g., Yılmaz, 1988: 46). Their analyses of the Turkish economy were reflections of this general overview.

The free flow of imported goods in Turkish market in the second half of the 1980s caused concerns among Islamists especially with regard to its potential psychological effects – overcoming the feeling of deprivation and the rise of mass consumption – on the wealthier segments of the society with enough purchasing power to afford these goods. Conceiving of consumption incentives by both the government and market forces as a form of “Westoxification,” Islamist journals often depicted the rise of inflation as an outcome of “alienation,” a substitute term for “being like Westerners.” In an interview with the journal of *İslam*, Ersin Gürdoğan, for instance, stated that “people in different regions where alienation is widespread consider consumption as an act of faith. The rise of prices gets out of control where everyone wants to ‘purchase’” (*İslam*, 1985: 44).

A common feature of all Islamic circles is to describe banking interest itself as not only the cause of inflation, but also the source of all economic and social problems (e.g., Canbaz, 1987; Döndüren, 1989, Nurullah, 1989). Therefore, Islamist publications often prescribed Muslims to avoid charge interest in their business transactions (e.g. *Ribat*, 1990: 25) and criticized the ANAP governments’ policy of high interest rates. Naksi circles, who underpinned a kind of “domesticated capitalism” from Islamic perspective, underlined the significance of banking without interest, tax reformation, and the furthering of economic relations under the body of Islamic foundations and cooperatives (e.g. Ak, 1984: 41; Akın, 1985: 46-47; Oğuz, 1988-47-49). Those who believed that inflation derived from cultural “alienation” put emphasis on the merits of a simple and waste-free life (*İslam*, 1985: 44). All these different levels of analysis and recipes revolved around the establishment of “a new economic system” in the hands of Muslims and the reorganization of the existing economic field (Çakan, 1989: 9). The authors from *Altınoluk*, such as Gürdoğan (1986a)

4 In an article series published by *Diriliş* (1988a: 15) for instance, the mechanization of production and the fact that most machines are imported are shown to be the sources of the inflation in Turkey.

and Kılıođlu (1986a) noted that an economic system in which consumption was limited by moral standards could only be achieved under the guidance of Islamic values.

The authors that embraced radical Islamist theses advocated the foundation of an Islamic state as the only possible condition for a truly meaningful economic transformation while they were criticizing neoliberal capitalism. The idea that economic activities should be organized by the principle of halal earning and rightful share was predominantly emphasized in *Mektup, Ribat* and *Girişim* (e.g. Gümüş, 1986; İşgör, 1986). As they foresaw, the private property would be respected in this Islamic state on the condition that economic activities could be restricted in areas designated by the Islamic principles (Cabiođlu, 1983: 55). These debates evolved into discussions about the recently established Islamic economic organizations in the early 1990s. As a result of economic policies in Özal period, Islamist business circles were endowed with a new capacity to bypass the state control (Yavuz, 2003: 10).

The Cultural Dimension: Moral Crisis, Obscenity, and the Media

One of the most referred subjects among Islamic groups has been the cultural and moral crisis that emanates from breaking away with the “essence of Islam.” This concern was echoed by both nationalist-conservative actors and Islamist ones in the aftermath of the 1980 coup d’etat in Turkey. During the junta regime and the ANAP governments, Islamic leaders and Islamist authors gave priority to the issues of family and the reconstruction of education along conservative principles⁵ with the intention to provide a solution to the moral crisis that allegedly affected young people the most. However, the neoliberal transformation brought about unforeseen circumstances.

The authors writing in Islamist journals throughout the 1980s were surprised and suspicious in the face of the swift change of social dynamics (e.g. *İlim ve Sanat*, 1989). They argued that immorality peaked in the West, and that reflected in Turkey in the form of increasing individualistic and secular practices (Çelikkol, 1986: 6-7). Topics such as sexuality, nudity, and tabloid headlines were widely addressed in both Islamic circles and the press. Meanwhile, Islamist journals associated these issues with the consumption culture and cultural decay caused by Westernization, which, for them, affected the secular segment the most.

According to Islamist intellectuals, an “Islamic revival” was in the making while at the same time traditional norms and values were being destroyed. These two seemingly contradictory observations can be explained with reference to the quantitative and qualitative change that was taking place in the domain of culture, particularly in popular culture. On the one hand, we witness the proliferation and multiplication of Islamist publications in line with the approval of official policies (Duman, 1994: 83-88). On the other hand, there was a dramatic increase in tabloids that contained celebrity gossip and sexuality. Both Naksi leaders and Islamist writers designated the latter as the underlying cause of the moral crisis while some others characterized it as its symptom. The ANAP’s encouragement of individualistic pleasures and consumption as well as the role of media and advertisement in that was at the center of Islamist criticism during this period (e.g., Özdür, 1986: 23, Çiftçi, 1986: 6; Özdenören, 1987: 22-23).

5 For more information on the role of conservatism and Islamism in educational and family policies in the aftermath of the 1980 *coup d’etat*, see Yavuz, 2003: 75; Öztan, 2019: 12-40; Çađlı, 2019: 41-61.

The ANAP governments increased public investments in advanced communication networks, which led to the expansion of the media infra-structure and the significant rise in the number of media outlets and products in the 1980s. In time, a culture that prioritized entertainment, scandals, and sports became dominant in print and visual media (Kaya and Çakmur, 2010). Given this situation, Islamic circles and especially Islamist authors often depicted the mass media with its far-reaching capacity to address large segments of the Turkish society as the hotbed of cultural decay, *decadence*. (e.g., Aktürk, 1985: 14-15; Killoğlu, 1986b: 16). Raşit Küçük (1988: 46), a conservative scholar, for instance, states his impression that “the majority of current media outlets are given the task to displace and destroy public morality, national and religious values, moral traits, and holy notions”. National broadcasts were not the only concern for Islamic actors who were also uneasy about the free circulation of foreign TV broadcasts and publications that contained obscene elements in the Turkish market.⁶ Naksi writers pointed at the dissolution of the family as the main threat while they linked purportedly immoral actions such as prostitution and alcohol consumption to such publications and broadcasts (e.g. Maraşlı, 1987: 6). Herein, Esad Coşan (1986: 6), the leader of Iskenderpaşa order, wrote that fighting against obscene publications should be among the top priorities of pious Muslims. *Kadın ve Aile*, the women’s magazine of abovementioned order, published a special issue that included the opinions of Islamic scholars and authors such as İsmet Özel, Rasim Özdenören, and Lütfi Doğan (*Kadın ve Aile*, 1986: 8-15).

The supervision and regulation of the use of obscenity in Turkish publications and broadcasts were among the playgrounds on which the conservative faction had the most weight within the ANAP.⁷ The conservatives tried to legitimize their interventions into the cultural sphere with the pretext of protecting the public morality while their ulterior motives were to demonstrate their strength within the party and to ensure the loyalty of the conservative and Islamic base to the ANAP. The motion of Ata Aksu, who was an ANAP MP at the time, for the amendment in the Law of Protecting Children from Obscene Publications [*Küçükleri Muzır Neşriyattan Koruma Kanunu*] in 1986 was such an example. With that amendment, a council of eleven under the prime ministry was authorized to supervise newspapers, magazines, etc. with respect to their detrimental effects on minors. The council was also given the authority to provide expert views on obscenity-related offenses in courts according to the articles 426, 427, and 428.

Opposition parties objected to the amendments on the basis that the process of assigning council members would reflect the caprices of the government the true intention of which was to establish control over the media (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 1986: 538-539). During the parliamentary debates on the law amendment, MP Aksu took floor and stated that the amendment was not “a step back but ahead towards virtue and righteousness” (*Milliyet*, 06.03.1986: 12). Subsequently, Özal himself confessed the role of the conservative faction in the introduction of the law amendment and that it was in conflict with the ANAP’s stance on rights and freedoms (Uluç, 2014: 131-132). Following the promulgation of the

6 News that focuses on the claim that Turkish newspapers with wide circulation had the distribution rights of imported “obscene” publications triggered criticisms against media outlets. See *İslam*, 1986b: 11.

7 For example, Mehmet Keçeciler, the prominent deputy of the ANAP and member of Naksibendi order said that there was no relationship between proliferation of obscene publications and government policy, they did not pay for this (See *Milliyet*, 17.01.1986: 6).

amendments, discussions about obscenity did not fade out but, on the contrary, continued to rage on (e.g. *Altınoluk*, 1986).⁸

In general, Naksi orders expressed their content regarding the amendment and were optimistic about the results of legal arrangement (e.g. *İslam*, 1986c: 31) while other Islamist writers who took a more critical stance towards the ANAP noted that the amendment was merely a populist move with inner contradictions.⁹ Radical Islamist writers, who were not satisfied with the legal arrangement, sought to use the issue of “obscene” publications as a leverage to mobilize the conservative base to boycott the mainstream media.¹⁰

For those who assumed “revelation” to be the sole source of morality, the only possible way to get rid of the “worldly diseases” such as fashion was directing the entire society towards religion (e.g. Necatiođlu, 1985: 4). Even though these figures implied that the ANAP governments had turned blind eye to “immoral” publications and broadcasts (Güñdođan, 1986: 6-7; Küçük, 1988: 46), they did not abstain from imploring the government to eliminate obstacles before the organization of religion in public life in order to solve the crisis of morality. It can be argued that different conservative circles found common ground in pressing for the supervision of the media and cultural sphere in congruence with moral/Islamic standards.

The Foreign Policy Aspect: Discussion of Accession to the European Community (EC)

Upon coming to office, Özal and his party assumed that they could use Turkey’s accession to the EC as a leverage to repair the severed ties with Europe in the aftermath of the 1980 coup and to make way for their neoliberal development strategy. The fact that Spain and Portugal, which had been ruled by authoritarian regimes for decades, became members of the EC in 1986 encouraged the ANAP regarding the accession process.¹¹ Furthermore, the ANAP’s intention to push back the traditional bureaucracy, increasing popular support, and the goal of consolidating free market economy were also of primary importance in making the decision to apply for the EC membership.

Conceiving of the EC first and foremost as an economic unity, the ANAP governments supposed that carrying out economic reforms¹² would be sufficient for Turkey’s accession. However, the issues of democracy and human rights started to become more

8 There were different views as to why “obscene” publications and broadcast were on the rise. Erşin Güñdođan, for instance, drew attention to the capitalist greed for more profit (*Mavera*, 1987: 34). For İ. Özel, on the other hand, socialists were responsible for this surge and the censoring of “obscene” elements in the media was the demand shared by the Muslim majority in Turkey (*İslam*, 1986d: 12).

9 In an interview made by Cihan Aktaş, İhsan Işık remarked that obscenity concerns true Muslims very closely whereas the ANAP government reduced the issue into a short-term conflict of interest between the tabloid media and the government as an insincere and banal investment for the elections (Aktaş, 1986a: 21).

10 Even though many media outlets were fined for breaching the Law of Protecting Children from Obscene Publications (Uluç, 2014: 13), Islamist writers, who believed legal measures to be insufficient, called the Muslim public to take initiative and boycott the mainstream media categorically (Üzmez, 1987: 20).

11 Yılmaz (2011: 191) presents the strengthening of democratic-civilian governments in Greece, Spain, and Portugal during their accession process to the EC as a motivation for the ANAP to start Turkey’s accession to the EC. Similarly, Yavuz (2003: 75) argues that Özal considered the accession to EC as a way to undermine the “authoritarian position” of the Kemalist establishment.

12 As Müftüler (1995:85-98) points out, the economic reforms in Turkey were carried out within the purview of harmonization with the EC.

emphasized in the EC's agenda during that period, but the EC's demands of Turkey to make improvements on these headings were seen as intervention in Turkey's domestic affairs by the Turkish bureaucracy (Balkır, 2001: 199).

Turkey's initial application for the EC membership on 14 April 1987 came as a surprise for the institutions and members of the Community (Kahraman Elgün, 2000: 5) while it also triggered multifaceted discussions both in Turkey and Western countries. Often treated as something more than a foreign policy move, the accession process occupied the domestic agenda in Turkey over the following years. Herein, Turkey's accession affected the way in which right-wing political actors, including Naksi orders, positioned themselves *vis-à-vis* the ANAP government.¹³

The center right (DYP) and center left (SHP, DSP) parties announced their support for the accession, albeit for different reasons. The *Milli Görüş* movement, stand out as the leading political actor that raised the harshest objections from the outset (Güneş-Ayata, 2003: 216).¹⁴ In the same vein, throughout the accession process, Naksi groups among those that more actively partook in the debates around the EC accession, aside from the mainstream politics. Naksi media outlets released exclusive stories (e.g. *İlim ve Sanat*, 1988; *Dış Politika*, 1988) consisting of comments of various opinion leaders, former ambassadors, and scholars (e.g. Kunalalp, 1988; Kuran, 1988, İnan, 1988).

At this juncture, we can designate two types of Islamist responses to the issue of Turkey's accession. The first consists of authors (such as Karaman (1987) and Seyidoğlu (1989)) who did not directly oppose the accession process and even cautiously endorse Turkey's membership to the EC. The main argument of these authors was to benefit from the "opportunities" of the already Westernized life in Turkey. They looked at the EC membership in a "positive light" as long as it entailed wealth and economic progress.¹⁵ The Islamic figures who suggested that Turkey's involvement with the EC was irreversible and that political positions should be taken in line with that fact. Mahmut Bayram, a writer of the Nakşibendi Erenköy's journal, wrote: "[...] since we could not stop this process, as Muslims we should come together and look for ways to prevent our own liquidation" (1987: 27).

The other inclination that was more dominant especially among İskenderpaşa branch of Naksibendis was standing up to the EC membership process. Coşan (1988: 3), forthrightly opposed to Turkey's membership of the EC and denounced pro-Western politicians and intellectuals. As well as İskenderpaşa order, some Islamist authors that wrote on this issue at *Girişim*, *Mektup*, etc., were uncompromising in their rejection of the EC membership of Turkey, which, for them, meant complete submission to the West and secular forces (e.g., Yavuz 1989). In addition, these publications embarked on refuting the claims that membership to the EC was a necessity as introduced by government spokespersons and mainstream intellectuals.

13 For example, Coşan himself explained the reason why the İskenderpaşa order endorsed the RP in the 1987 elections was the fact that it was the only party that countered Turkey's accession to the EC (Çakır, 1995: 36).

14 During the accession process, N. Erbakan visited several cities in order to share his opposing views. See *Milliyet*, 1987: 7.

15 For more articles that rely on similar arguments in *Altınoluk*, see Karaman, 1987: 23. As another writer of the journal, Seyidoğlu (1989: 43) pointed at the traces of the Islamic message in Europe and argued that the accession process would complete that message.

On the one hand, ANAP government presented the EC membership as the next step towards the objective of Turkish modernization, while, on the other hand, the party spokesmen preferred to limit the issue to its potential economic benefits. Özal himself described the EC as an economic unity and claimed that Turkey's membership to the EC would contribute to the country's economic stability (Akçay, 2016: 47-48). Both the authors writing in the journals of Naksi orders and the writers from *Girişim* and *Mektup* typically begged to differ from Özal's view of the EC. In their viewpoint, the Community "was more a political and ideological alliance than an economic one" while some even argued that it was either already a Christian union or on its way to become one (e.g., *İslam*, 1986e: 33, Ayhan, 1988: 20; Yavuz, 1989: 42-43). To substantiate this claim, these authors drew attention to the double standards of European countries towards Turkey especially in relation to the issues of democracy and basic human rights, the depiction of the purported "Islamist revival" in Turkey as a threat by Western intellectuals, and the cases of discrimination against Muslims in Europe (Kahraman, 1987: 27, Varol, 1989: 38-39, *Altınoluk*, 1990: 42). Therefore, for Islamist publications, it was not realistic to rely on the EC membership for improving the human rights and pushing back the traditional bureaucracy.¹⁶

Both traditional Islamic groups and Islamist writers, in general, tend to conceive of the accession to the EC as the continuation of Westernization process, which originated from *Tanzimat* reforms and peaked during the early republican era (Yazar, 1987: 14; *İslam*, 1987).¹⁷ In that respect, they postulated that the EC membership would encourage and benefit the secular forces. Among the Islamist circles, it was widely believed that both the ANAP government, on the one hand, and the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, on the other, were in total consensus as to the issue of accession to the EC (e.g. Karakoç, 1988: 3). In this view, the lack of public consultations and debates was linked to the assumption of such "consensus" (Şan, 1989: 27-28). What we see in the Islamist publications of that time is implicit criticisms of the government for reducing Islamic groups as mere audience rather than political actors (Yazar, 1987: 14-15).

Those who directly opposed Turkey's membership to the EC, on the other side, believed that confronting with the West on this level was full of perils. Authors who emphasized the political and economic risks of accession to the EC were both of the origin of Islamic tradition and the Turkish-Islam synthesis (e.g.. Akdeniz, 1987; Necatioğlu, 1988). In addition, there were theses that Turkey was not ready to be a part of the EC due to the shortage of competitiveness of its economy, and therefore, it could economically turn into a European colony in Islamist journals (Akyazılı, 1986: 46-47, Kerim, 1987: 31-32; Ayhan, 1988: 22, Karakaya, 1988: 19). However, cultural anxieties appeared as the driving force of the anti-EC articles. Accordingly, assimilation and the "loss of identity" – the condition of being neither European nor Muslim – were among the most alluded threats by Islamist authors (e.g., Gök, 1987: 17; Tabakoğlu, 1987: 27). For them, being part of Europe would amount to nothing if Turkey had "no theses left for the World" (Taşgetiren,

¹⁶ One of the clearest expressions of this perspective was made by T. Karamollaoğlu in an interview. As a former member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Karamollaoğlu (1988) claimed that the West cannot play a part in the progress of human rights in Turkey.

¹⁷ This is why it is possible to come across articles that criticize the *Tanzimat* reforms along with those that criticize the EC. See Kar, 1989; Özbilgen, 1988.

1990a: 5). Islamist circles resorted to the traditional harbors of anti-Westernism as they were unable to manipulate the accession process to their own advantage.¹⁸

It is possible to designate a consensus among Islamist writers from *Girişim*, *Diriliş*, etc. in the speculations about the Turkey-EC relations. They deemed impossible the furthering of Turkey's integration into Europe due to political, economic, and particularly cultural factors (Kerim, 1987; Karakoç, 1989). For the dominant position that can be observed in Islamist journals including the İskenderpaşa order, the EC would admit Turkey only with the objective to exploit the resources of the country. In the same line, the most popular claim among Islamists was that the EC would admit Turkey as a member with the aim to prevent the formation of an economic or political union to be formed by Muslim countries (e.g., Gürdoğan, 1988; Karamollaoğlu, 1988).

The process of accession to the EC also re-energized the discussions of establishing an Islamic union, which was popular in the 1960s, alternative to the Western counterparts. Gürdoğan advocated for "The Union of Muslim Countries" whose members had been parts of the Ottoman Empire (1986b: 8-9, 1988: 10-11). *Diriliş* (1988b) and Mustafa Kemal Şan (1989: 28), an Islamist sociologist, presented an organization of Islamic countries akin to the EC as the best viable option. Karakoç, on the other hand, maintained that the EC would not be a long-term guarantee for Turkey and a "union" needed to be formed by Turkey itself (1988: 3). Characterizing Turkey as an essential part of the Muslim world, which was substantiated with certain geostrategic and historical theses, became a prominent point of reference in the discussions of modernization and identity.¹⁹

Coda: Islamism at Crossroads in the 1980s

Islamists underwent a rapid change and experienced disagreements on various issues throughout the process of neoliberalization in the 1980s. There were not sharp differences of opinion concerning the major social, political, and economic issues between systemic and anti-systemic Islamists actors that had undergone similar political socializations. The former, i.e., *İslam* and *Altınoluk*, perceived this change as an opportunity to enter into an alliance with the ruling party and to steer it towards a more Islamic direction. The latter, e.g., *Girişim*, *Mektup*, and *Diriliş*, considered open criticisms of the ANAP as the safeguard of their autonomy. Yet, the main concern of Islamists, be them pro- or anti-government, was the possibility of a new Westernization wave, which they saw as a form of break from the "Islamic essence," to be triggered by the neoliberal transformation. That is why they tasked themselves to warn the government against the dangers of the "Westernized currents."

Especially during its first term in government, the ANAP MPs of conservative or Naksi origins tried to limit the libertarian agenda and the impact of the liberal wing within the party with the support of Islamic groups and Islamist intellectuals. As in the case of amendments made in the Law of Protecting Children from Obscene Publications, such attempts proved to be effective. Moreover, a process of restricting the education

¹⁸ The following statement of Baykan Sezer presents an instance of this view: "Europeans ask us to make some changes to become Westerners. In case that there are no objective measures of being Westerner, they might even demand us to change our names" (1987:34).

¹⁹ For example, Ahmet Taşgetiren (1990b: 3-5), Naksi opinion leader, claims that Turkey should not stay at limbo and be a part of the Muslim world in order to overcome the identity crisis of modernity.

in line with conservative values was underway during the junta regime and the ANAP governments. In spite of these gains, however, radical Islamist circles demanded the government to ground its conservative policies with Islamic principles and to increase the visibility of Islam in the public sphere on the pretext of a widespread moral crisis in Turkish society. They also launched onslaughts against the liberal wing of the ANAP for encouraging individualism and introducing policies to increase secular practices.

The economic transformation during the ANAP period was the driving force that diversified the economic activities of Islamist circles. Advantages given to Islamist capital-owners prepared the ground for the significant organizational capacity of Islamist capitalist groups in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, as we see in the cases of *İslam* and *Altınoluk*, Naksi intellectuals, including those who assumed a balanced attitude towards the ANAP, were not content with the economic and social problems caused by Turkey's engagement with global capitalism. The ANAP's inability to tackle inflation made Islamists, who penned down articles on economy such as Ersin Gürdoğan and Cihangir Akın, concentrate on this problem. In lieu of their demand to domesticate capitalism with Islamic principles, Islamist publications with a balanced relationship with the ANAP endeavored to incentivize the governments to embrace banking without interest rates and forms of solidarity based on Islamic foundations. However, their impact on the economy remained limited in comparison to the areas of education and culture. The handing of the economy over to Western educated technocrats played an important part in that outcome. It is possible to witness such criticisms in the publications aiming at the general public along with journals, e.g., *Kadın* and *Aile*, which predominantly targeted women. Journals like *Girişim*, on the other hand, consisted of harsh criticisms of the economic policies of ANAP governments that involved high interest rates and consumption along with growth oriented development goals. Even if Islamist circles applauded the ANAP governments' effort to improve relations with Muslim countries, they continued to be suspicious towards Turkey's ties to the EC in the context of which their capacity to steer or supervise any processes would be insignificant. The anti-Western inclinations in *Girişim* and *Mektup* translated into negative views of Turkey's accession to the EC. Including those who did not reject Turkey's accession to the EC, e.g., *Altınoluk*, a large majority of Islamist actors agreed on the fact that they were far from being ready to shape this process. While the idea of establishing a union of Muslim countries under Turkey's leadership was revived with the debates about Turkey's possible membership to the EC, it would be far-fetched to argue that this idea was re-fashioned or updated in line with the political and intellectual realities of the time.

In conclusion, Islamists in general, including circles that were close to *Milli Görüş* line and figures who proclaimed themselves as "outside the system," aspired to keep a certain political balance with the ANAP governments. The underlying reason for this position was that Islamists deemed their chance to come to power impossible notwithstanding the phenomenon of "Islamic revival." In this context, Islamist actors rarely targeted Özal and other cabinet members whereas they problematized issues such as Westernization, consumption culture, and morality crisis. When the liberal faction became dominant within the ANAP, Islamist circles started to endorse other parties, namely RP and DYP. With the foundation of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001, most Islamist circles gave their support to this party.

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Actual and Popularly Attributed Placement of Political Attitudes on the Left-Right Scale: Results from a Representative Survey of Turkey

Siyasal Tutumların Sol-Sağ Cetvelinde Gerçek ve Zannedilen Yerleşimleri: Türkiye'ye Dair Temsili Bulgular

Alper H. Yağcı¹ 

Abstract

Individuals' self-placement on the left-right scale continues to be a staple of voting studies, but the semantic content of this scale is rarely explored. This study aims to examine the discrepancy between the actual and perceived meanings of the political left-right divide among ordinary people, based on original data from a representative sample of Turkey. Are economic issues as pertinent to subjectively held left-right placements as people think? In order to empirically address this question, we develop measures for both parts of the question, i.e. how people endorsing certain economic positions place themselves on the left-right scale, as well as what left-right placement they attribute to a hypothetical person endorsing the same positions. We ask similar questions about non-economic issue positions too, all together comparing six issues. The results show that while the semantic content of the left-right scale in contemporary Turkey is mostly about secularism—a non-economic issue—and is popularly understood as such, it is more about environmentalism, and less about economic issues, than what people think. Endorsement of gender equality and freedom of thought also prove to be substantial correlates of a leftward self-placement and they are popularly recognized as such.

Keywords

Left-Right Ideology, Political Attitudes, Turkey, Voting Behavior, Ideology

Öz

Bireylerin sol-sağ cetveline kendilerini nasıl yerleştirdikleri (sol-sağ özdeğerlendirmeleri) özellikle seçmen davranışına ilişkin çalışmalarda sıklıkla gündeme gelmekte, fakat bu cetvelin anlam içeriği mevcut literatürde sorgulanmadan kalmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Türkiye'yi temsil niteliği taşıyan bir orijinal anketin verilerine dayanarak, sıradan insanlar için sol-sağ ayırımının gerçek ve atfedilen anlamları arasındaki farkı incelemektedir. Örneğin, ekonomik meseleler sübjektif sol-sağ özdeğerlendirmeleri için insanların zannettiği kadar önemli mi? Bu soruyu ampirik olarak yanıtlamak için, sorunun her iki bileşeniyle ilgili ölçüler geliştirilerek, hem belirli ekonomik pozisyonları destekleyen insanların kendilerini sol-sağ cetvelinde nereye yerleştirdikleri, hem de bu pozisyonları desteklediği bildirilen hipotetik bireyi aynı cetvelde nereye yerleştirdiklerine dair veriler elde edildi. Ekonomi dışı alanları da kapsayacak şekilde altı politika meselesine dair sorular soruldu. Özdeğerlendirmelere ilişkin bulguların gösterdiği üzere Türkiye'de sol-sağ cetveli daha çok ekonomi dışı bir mesele olan sekülerizm ile ilgili olup halk arasında da böyle anlaşılmaktadır; bununla birlikte sol-sağ cetveli çevrecilikle zannedilenden daha çok ve ekonomik meselelerle zannedilenden daha az ilgilidir. Ayrıca cinsiyet eşitliği ve düşünce özgürlüğü de cetvelin solunda yerleşim ile yakından ilintili olup bu konuda farkındalık da mevcuttur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Sol-Sağ İdeolojiler, Siyasal Tutumlar, Türkiye, Oy Davranışı, İdeoloji

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Introduction

Survey respondents' self-placements on the left-right spectrum, usually measured as a 0-10 or 1-10 scale, is often used in empirical studies of voting behavior and attitudes (Aytaç, 2022; Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2021; Kalaycıoğlu, 2018). In several studies, the correlates of left-right self-positioning have been examined in relation to class position, ethnic and religious identity, and policy-related attitudes and preferences (Arıkan & Şekercioğlu, 2014; Çarkoğlu, 2007; Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009; Esmer, 2002; Özbudun, 2013; Yağcı vd., 2020). Examining the World Values Survey data for the 1990-2018 period, Yağcı (2022) uncovered that in Turkey the distribution of left-right self-placement is structured mostly by attitudes towards secularism and that individuals' economic policy-related attitudes are associated with their left-right self-placements in a much weaker and more ambiguous fashion. Since in elite (media, academia, etc.) political discourse the left-right divide is often evoked to refer to economic ideology, this finding may to some extent be considered as upsetting certain theoretical priors—although a primarily non-economic left-right divide is far from being unique to the case of Turkey. In any case, what we do not know is whether this observation is in any way surprising from the vantage point of ordinary people who are the subjects of the left-right research. In other words, how do survey respondents themselves understand the semantic content of the left-right divide? For example, whom would they place more to the left of the political spectrum—a person advocating secular values, or a person advocating income redistribution? Do such attributed placements mismatch with the self-placement of those respondents who are espousing the said secular or redistributive positions themselves?

This article addresses these questions based on original data from a face-to-face representative survey of Turkey's urban population. We examine the difference between the actually observed and respondent-attributed semantic content of the left-right divide in regard to six issues—secularism, freedom of thought, gender equality, environmentalism, public property advocacy and income redistribution. To this end, the survey respondents were first asked to place on the left-right scale a hypothetical person espousing each one of these issue positions. Afterwards, the respondents' own attitudes on these issues, as well as their left-right self-placements were recorded. The results reveal two findings. Firstly, we confirm that the respondents' own left-right self-placements correlate most strongly with their endorsement of secular values, less strongly with post-material values such as gender equality and environmentalism, and only weakly with their positions on economic issues like redistribution and public property. Secondly, we find that the respondents successfully recognize the primacy of secularism on the left-right divide in Turkey. Among the six hypothetical people each representing an issue position, the respondents attribute the most leftward position to a hypothetical person who advocates secularism. However, respondents still overestimate how economic issues around income redistribution and especially public/private property relate to the left-right scale. In addition, while the respondents' environmentalism is actually strongly associated with a left-wing self-placement, respondents find it relatively hard to attribute a left-right placement to a hypothetical environmentalist person.

To our knowledge, the intersubjective semantic content of the left-right divide in Turkey has not been subject to empirical examination of this sort before. We do have

studies investigating how the voters place political *parties* on the left-right spectrum. To provide a comparison with these, we asked the respondents to place political parties on the left-right scale as well. We confirm earlier findings regarding survey respondents' placement of political parties and show that these align quite well with the self-placement of those respondents who support these parties—better than is the case for the issue positions described above. All in all, our findings suggest that survey respondents find it easier to successfully place concrete political organizations like parties on the left-right spectrum than doing the same for abstract issue positions. This is in line with what Zechmeister (2006: 153) observes for the literature in general: “researchers examining advanced Western democracies have frequently found that citizens of these countries often do not strongly link ideological labels to policy stances, but rather to other factors such as politically relevant parties and groups, *if anything* (e.g., Converse, 1964; Converse & Pierce, 1986; Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Kinder, 1983; Klingemann, 1979; but see Huber, 1989 and Knutsen, 1997).” Probably, people care more about how to choose between political parties than about linking these parties to conceptual divides like the left-right division, and they only indirectly attribute particular issue positions to each side of such a divide. Fully investigating these questions is beyond the scope of this article. Herein we are able to show that the degree of correspondence between the actual and respondent-attributed left-right positions seems greater for political parties than for issue positions. Regarding the latter, while survey respondents do have a recognition of secularism as the primary driver of the left-right divide in Turkey, they still overestimate the economic content of that divide. In fact, while economic issues may be important to political competition in Turkey, they do not map onto the left-right divide well.

Theoretical Issues and the Existing Literature

The discourse of a political left versus right is pervasive, yet ambiguous. In the twentieth century this dichotomy gained widespread usage with reference to an economic debate over the protection of private property and redistribution, and as Stimson et al. (2012: 314) remind us, the “‘left’ and ‘right’ have their origin in disputes between monarchists and republicans. These terms characterized essential differences between political camps in French politics long before the debate over socialism and capitalism, long before the organization of labor, and long before the welfare state.” In other words, the semantic and material correlates of “left” and “right” have been subject to realignments from an early point onwards, and it should not be surprising that they come to mean different things in various temporal and geographical contexts. As Yagci et al. (2020: 3-4) note,

There is ample evidence that mass publics indeed find meaning in the labels of left and right, however, this meaning is neither universal nor always economic (Caprara & Vecchione, 2018; Franklin et al., 2009; Freire, 2015; Zechmeister, 2006) ... Whether the fundamental political cleavage in a given society will revolve around economic issues and whether it aligns with a policy contestation along the linear left-right axis is an open empirical question, as it may depend on the party landscape (Meyer & Wagner, 2020), history of democratization (Huber & Inglehart, 1995), and religious legacy (Davis & Robinson, 2006).

Of course, it is not necessarily the case that there should be *one* distinguishably fundamental political cleavage dominating a society's politics (Benoit & Laver, 2012). Furthermore, there is some asymmetry to the coherence and intelligibility of the labels

of left and right. The set of referents are more clearly specified at the left end of the dimension than at the right end (Mair, 2007) and in this sense, one can talk of one left versus multiple rights (Cochrane, 2010, 2012). Still, mass politics arguably has a built-in tendency— conditional on the electoral system in place—to reduce issues to as few dimensions as possible by sorting political actors into camps of viable size (Stimson et al., 2012), and the left-right divide may serve as a sponge-like super-issue that absorbs and represents “whatever major conflicts are present in the political system” (Inglehart 1990: 273). Consequently, a unidimensional differentiation across a symmetrically conceived left-right scale continues to be the subject of much scholarly research. In a wide literature, the left-right self-placement of ordinary people, measured in surveys by asking the respondents to place themselves on an interval scale with higher values typically signifying a more rightward position, are examined in relation to the respondents’ class position and values (as correlates of the self-placement) or vote choice (typically as a dependent variable) (see Dalton, 2009; Mair, 2007 for reviews).

The subjective meaning of such a left-right scale, though, is often assumed, rather than examined. Among the rare exceptions, in a study that compares the meanings attached to these labels in Mexico and Argentina, Zechmeister (2006) finds that the respondents associate left and right with somehow incommensurate political objects. While the respondents find it easier to define the term “left” in ways that reference policies, the term “right” is most often used to refer simply to political parties and actors. Studying Germany, Bauer et al. (2017) focus on the interpersonal comparability of the left-right scale across individuals and find that respondents associate these labels with different meanings depending on their own self-placement on the left-right scale, on their education level and on their cultural background (being from the formerly socialist East Germany or the West). That both of these studies use time-consuming, labor-intensive techniques may explain why they are rare. While Bauer et al. use open-ended questions to probe what people associate with the labels of left and right, Zechmeister uses a “Q-method” where respondents are presented with cards containing items from a set of 62 possible meanings of the labels. Consequently the latter study is limited to a small sample of university students (109 students in Mexico City and 117 students in Buenos Aires).

There is more research on how voters infer the left-right placement of political parties, often in comparison with party placements in expert surveys or according to widely accepted databases such as the Comparative Manifesto Project. Studies highlight a striking degree of similarity between survey respondents’ party placements and experts’ placements (Adams et al, 2015; Bakker et al, 2012; Dalton et al, 2011), although these do not necessarily match well with party positions coded on the basis of party manifestoes (see Laver, 2014). One interesting finding is about a “U-shaped function” whereby people who are closer to the extreme ends of the left-right scale perceive more distance between parties on the same scale than moderates do. This may be because people would like to minimize the imagined distance between themselves and their preferred party due to motivations for cognitive balance, or because moderates are likely to be less knowledgeable about politics than extremists (Granberg and Brown, 1992).

The literature reviewed so far relates mostly to Western countries, where the applicability of an economic left-right divide has been taken as a default starting point

for theoretical discussions. However, literature on the Middle East may perhaps provide another relevant context for the case of Turkey. Commenting on four countries of the region, Lust and Waldner (2017) argue that, like in many other late democratizers, the main political cleavage lines do not rest on a traditional (presumably economic) left-right divide. In this regard, Benoit and Laver's (2006) study of the relationship between experts' judgments of parties' placements on a left-right scale and their policy positions, is striking. In a sample of 44 mostly OECD countries, Turkey is one of two Middle Eastern cases (the other being Israel), and one of only two countries (the other being Japan) where parties' economy-related policy positions have, according to country experts, virtually no relationship to the left-right cleavage, which appears to be highly correlated with policy positions on cultural issues relating to homosexuality, abortion, and euthanasia (religion per se is not an option in the study). In a similar vein, Aydoğan (2021) examines expert judgments of party positions across the Middle East. While political reforms (relating to democratization) appear to be the most important dimension of party competition for most countries, they find that for Turkey religion/secularism provides the most important dimension. The religion/secular dimension also proves to be highly correlated with parties' left-right placements across the region, but so does the economic policy dimension. Whether these expert-coded features of party competition are echoed in voters' attitudes is a different question. Comparing support for Islamist and secular left parties, Wegner and Cavatorta (2019) find that there are virtually no differences in economic attitudes between respondents voting for these parties, and the ideological congruence between voters and parties is limited to the Islamist-Secular core divide. Çarkoğlu et al (2019) shed more light on this question by differentiating between less and more settled cleavage structures, presumably owing to the institutional history of each country. In Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, with less settled cleavage structures, there is little congruence between respondents' propensity to vote for parties and their levels of agreement with the parties' policy positions, whereas in the more institutionalized democracies of Israel and Turkey voters exhibit a higher likelihood to vote for a party as the distance between the voter and the party in the policy space gets smaller.

Note that neither Wegner and Cavatorta (2019) nor Çarkoğlu et al (2019) examine voters' left-right placements, but there is considerable research on this question as it relates to Turkey. These show that left-right self-placement has no clear class basis but is strongly connected with the individual's religious and ethnic identity (Çarkoğlu, 2007), that it is a strong predictor of voting behavior even when confounders like religiosity are controlled (Aytaç, 2022; Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2021; Kalaycıoğlu, 2018; Yagci and Oyvat, 2020), and that it has an ambiguous relationship with economic policy preferences that defy a simple linear story (Yagci vd., 2020). There is strong evidence that secularism versus religious conservatism cleavage is a powerful driver of the left-right self-placements (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). In fact, Yağcı's (2022) findings from the World Values Survey 1990-2018 suggest that the left-right self-placement correlates most strongly with the respondents' endorsement of secularism, less strongly with post-material values such as freedom of expression, and only weakly with their economic attitudes.

All in all, it appears that the left-right divide is important in Turkey, but it is not primarily an economic divide. This is somewhat in contradiction with an economic understanding

of these terms found in some scholarly literature (see for example Esmer, 2002, p. 99-103 and its critique, Ergüder, 2013, p. 53-54). How the ordinary people understand the meaning of these labels, though, has not been the subject of much empirical research—none of the works cited above in relation to Turkey examined this question. In other words, would survey participants themselves recognize left-right as being mostly about secularism? This, i.e. the intersubjective semantic content of the left-right divide, is what we aim to examine in this study.

The question widely put has multiple pertinent aspects such as symmetry, dimensionality, and salience, and one could imagine several research methods through which it could be attacked. Many such methods, starting with open-ended questions directed to survey participants, would be rather non-standard and labor-intensive, and probably most applicable to small samples, as explained above. In this study we adopt a simple approach. We ask the respondents in a representative survey of Turkey how they would rate on a left-right scale, for example, someone who advocates secularism rather than the application of religious rules. Similar questions are asked about someone who advocates income redistribution, and the like, allowing for inter-issue comparability in regard to attributed left-right positions. Furthermore, we also ask the respondents how much they endorse secularism, for example, and how they place *themselves* on the left-right scale. We can therefore compare the respondent-attributed placement of a hypothetical secular person with the average left-right self-placement of actual secularly-oriented survey participants themselves, to explore relative mismatches across issues. Three hypotheses guide the examination:

H1: Left-right self-placements will correlate less with economic attitudes and more with cultural attitudes like secularism.

H2: Supporters of secularism will be self-placing themselves to the left of those who support redistribution or public property ownership, who will on average stay closer to the center of the left-right spectrum.

H3: Respondent-attributed placements will accurately reproduce the relative self-placements of actual issue supporters (e.g. putting a hypothetical secular person to the left of a hypothetical person who supports redistribution or public property ownership).

H1 and H2 find their justification in previous findings on the salience of secularism and other cultural issues to the left-right divide in Turkey, in terms of either expert opinion (Benoit and Laver, 2006) or self-placement (Çarkoğlu, 2007; Yağcı, 2022). H3, due to the lack of related literature, stands as an exploratory working hypothesis, and there are reasons to be skeptical about whether it may hold true. On the one hand, people must have some understanding of the commonly used political labels of the left and right. On the other hand, as Zechmeister (2006) argues, people may find it difficult to connect these labels with abstract concepts (compared to, for example, connecting them with concrete parties and leaders). In this sense, respondents' placement of various issue positions on the left-right scale may involve a random component, which would generate mismatches with actual self-placements.

Methods and Data

We present the results of an original survey. A face-to-face survey was administered to a sample representative of the adult population in Turkey's urban areas, during 19 August-20 September 2021, in collaboration with Frekans Research. For sample design, the Turkish Statistical Institute's (TÜİK) Address-Based Population Registration (Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt) system 2020 data was used to determine the urban population for Turkey's 26 NUTS-2 regions, and the number of surveys to be administered in each region was determined proportionately to population. A province from each region was selected with probability of selection proportionate to population share in region. For each of these provinces, residential addresses for blocks of 20 residences were obtained from TÜİK and were visited by survey administrators employed by Frekans. In each address, an individual to be surveyed was selected based on a Kish table of alphabetically ordered first names of people living at the residence. Repeated visits were made to each address until the individual was present and willing, or until 3 visits were done. Most surveys were done by 13 September and the operation was complete by 20 September 2021. Ultimately, out of 4,349 addresses contacted, 1,982 surveys (951 males and 1,031 females) were completed with a 47% response rate. The median respondent was a 38 year-old high-school graduate, who reported to have a household income of 4,000-5,000 Turkish liras.

Table 1 below displays the descriptive characteristics of the survey sample. The first column displays how many people actually answered the relevant question, and the second column displays the share of the listed demographic group among those who answered. The third column displays the average left-right self-placement of each demographic group on the left-right scale where 0 is the left-most and 10 is the right-most position. F-test results show that, in regard to their left-right self-placement, most of these groups differ from the rest of the sample in a statistically significant manner. For example, Kurds place significantly to the left, and Sunni Muslims place significantly to the right, compared to other people. Younger people are closer to the left and older people are closer to the right. Higher education is associated with more left self-placement. These findings are in line with what we know about Turkish political attitudes from existing literature (Çarkoğlu, 2007; Yağcı, 2022).

Supporters of each party too form statistically distinct groups, apart from IYI Party supporters, who have an average self-placement similar to the sample mean. We should note here that party support is measured by a question that asks which party the respondent "feels closest to" at the time of the survey. The survey also featured questions probing past or future vote preferences. All these different measures of party choice give similar results regarding the issues of concern here, and the "feeling" question is the one that garners the highest response rate, allowing us greater statistical power for our analyses, so we rely on it as a measure of the party support.

Table 1
Sample Characteristics

	Sample share		Left-right (0-10) self-placement	
	N (answers)	Ratio	Mean	F-Test
Total sample	1982	N/A	5.37	N/A
Male	1982	0.48	5.39	0.812
Kurd (including Zaza)	1942	0.19	4.13	0.000
Sunni	1820	0.94	5.73	0.000
Age, 18-32	1972	0.35	5.06	0.002
Age, 33-48	1972	0.38	5.47	0.338
Age, 49+	1972	0.27	5.66	0.024
Less than high school	1971	0.45	6.18	0.000
High school graduate	1971	0.35	5.05	0.001
University graduate	1971	0.2	4.27	0.000
AKP supporter	1777	0.35	7.75	0.000
CHP supporter	1777	0.27	2.82	0.000
HDP supporter	1777	0.08	2.06	0.000
IYI supporter	1777	0.07	5.37	0.925
MHP supporter	1777	0.04	7.56	0.000

In relation to our subject topic, the survey respondents were first asked to place themselves on the left-right (0-10) scale and then to similarly place on the same scale six anonymous, hypothetical individuals, each defined by one issue position. These include a person who advocates the preservation of the natural environment, a person who advocates freedom of thought, a person who advocates gender equality, a person who advocates secularism rather than religious rules, a person who is against privatizations in the economy, i.e. advocating public property ownership, and a person who advocates reducing income inequality. Table 2 below lists the mean left-right placement attributed to each hypothetical person by the survey respondents. This is what we call *respondent-attributed placements* or, in short, *attributed placements*.

Table 2
Left-Right Position of Hypothetical Individuals as Attributed by the Respondents

Issue endorsed by hypothetical person	Observations	Mean left-right (out of 0-10)	Std. Dev.
Environmentalism	1,734	3.97	2.89
Freedom of thought	1,728	3.5	2.82
Gender equality	1,696	3.52	2.7
Secularism	1,734	3.15	2.6
Public property	1,693	3.38	2.63
Redistribution	1,699	3.54	2.74

Lastly, the respondents were asked to report how much they themselves agree with the advocated position for each of these six issues, on a Likert scale ranging from 1 “absolutely disagree” to 5 “absolutely agree.” Table 3 below lists the mean scores. It seems that the said issue positions, when stated in abstract, prove to be popular and the average respondent

supports all of them moderately. This is despite the fact that each of these issue positions was worded in the survey questionnaire in a way that contrasts it with a contrary position or associates it with some cost to avoid confirmation bias from fully dictating the responses. (The exact wording of the questions can be found in the Appendix).

Table 3
Respondent Endorsement of Issue Positions

Issue	Observations	Mean endorsement (out of 1-5)	Std. Dev.	Correlation with left-right
Environmentalism	1899	3.93	1.14	-0.334***
Freedom of thought	1903	4.16	0.97	-0.292***
Gender equality	1893	4.06	1.03	-0.334***
Secularism	1850	3.89	1.12	-0.427***
Public property	1842	3.94	1.08	-0.246***
Redistribution	1870	4.02	1.08	-0.130***

The table also reports the correlation between the respondent's position on these issues and her left-right self-placement. The correlations suggest that the left-right self-placements are most strongly associated with the respondent's position on secularism and post-material issues like gender equality and environmentalism, and *least* with economic issues around property relations and redistribution. This already supports H1.

In short, the survey questions measure the left-right self-placements of the respondents, the left-right placements attributed by the respondents to different issue positions, and the respondents' own positions on the same issues. Between each set of questions, the survey featured questions unrelated to the topic, so as to prevent the respondents from self-consciously calibrating their answers for greater consistency—a tendency that could be a product of the social desirability bias. Together these measures enable us to compare the attributed and actual left-right placement of people holding certain issue positions. We will undertake a similar analysis of attributed and actual placement of supporters of different political parties too, since the respondents were also asked to place each of the major parties in the Turkish Parliament on the left-right scale, as well as disclose their own party preference. The aim is to shed some new light on the actual and attributed contents of the left-right scale in contemporary Turkey, and on any mismatches in between.

Analysis

We will start by comparing the attributed and actual left-right placements of people supporting each major party to provide a validity check for our attributed left-right placement exercise. Previous studies have established that Turkish voters have a good understanding of where each party lies on a left-right scale. Ecevit and Celep (2018: 208) find, for example, that compared to people who are members of party organizations, “the voters’ estimations are more reasonable ... and more accurate, based on experts’ evaluations, in positioning other parties.” In line with this conclusion, the findings from our sample demonstrate that the left-right positions attributed to each party by the respondents are quite close to the actual average left-right self-placement of the party’s

supporters. Figure 1 below compares these attributed party positions and actual self-placements by party supporters. It can be seen that the average self-placement of İyi Parti supporters is quite close to the center of the left-right scale, and a similar position is also attributed to this party’s supporters by the respondents in our sample. AKP and MHP supporters place themselves close to the rightmost end of the scale, and this aligns with positions attributed to those parties. CHP and HDP mirror the same pattern on the left end of the scale. The only discrepancy in terms of relative positioning is that while actual self-placement of HDP supporters is to the left of CHP supporters, most respondents attribute a more left-leaning position to CHP, but the discrepancy is small.




Figure 1. Mean left-right self-placement of supporters of each party, compared with mean respondent-attributed placements of hypothetical party supporters

In contrast, as we will see, there is a much lower degree of correspondence between actual and attributed positions with regard to the six ideological attitudes, suggesting that people have a better sense of how the left-right division relates to concrete political organizations than how it relates to concepts and issues. In order to examine this question, we already have the attributed left-right placement of someone who supports, for example, income redistribution, and, for the purpose of comparison, we now need to ascertain the mean left-right placement of respondents who actually support income redistribution. One naïve approach for doing this could be to simply take the mean left-right self-placement value of those who score the top support level for the income redistribution issue, but then we would be losing information about variation in self-placement between people scoring different support levels other than the top. So a regression estimation is

needed instead. To this end, we first run a regression to estimate the respondent’s left-right self-placement, with all of the six issue positions as independent variables. Based on this we then estimate the left-right self-placement value for a respondent whose support for income redistribution is set to be at the highest possible value (5 out of a scale of 1-5, indicating “complete agreement”), while all the other issue positions are held at the mean. The output from the regression analysis is available in the Appendix at the end of this article. The table below displays estimated (using the `prgen` command on Stata) left-right self-placement of people scoring 5 out of 5 on each of the listed issue positions. These are what we call the *(estimated) actual self-placements*.

Table 4
Mean Left-Right Position for Each Issue, Estimated on the Basis of Actual Issue Endorsement and Left-Right Self-Placement Responses

Position strongly endorsed	Estimated mean left-right (out of 0-10)
Environmentalism	4.80
Freedom of thought	5.13
Gender equality	4.90
Secularism	4.40
Public property	5.33
Redistribution	5.32

Figure 2 below visually compares these actual self-placements and the respondent-attributed placements reported earlier. While the values refer to the same 0-10 left-right scale as usual, we are visually zooming in on the spectrum to magnify relative differences.




Figure 2. Left-right self-placement of respondents endorsing certain issue positions, compared with mean respondent-attributed placements of hypothetical advocates of same issues

To interpret; first of all, the respondent-attributed placements for all issue positions appear more to the left than the self-placements we estimated on the basis of the actual position endorsement responses. Since the latter was estimated for someone who endorses the issue in question at the highest possible degree, this comparison is revealing. Respondents may be underestimating how popular these issue positions would be in a survey, and consequently they misjudge these issue positions as being more confined to a left-wing political space than what is really the case.

Secondly, in both attributed and estimated placements, secularism turns out to be the most leftward issue position, confirming H2. This finding regarding the *estimated* left-right self-placement of secular people in the sample, together with the correlations reported earlier, confirm Yagci's (2022) finding that secularism is the most important issue axis—clearly ahead of economic issues—defining the left-right self-placement of individuals in Turkey. In addition, an original finding generated herein by the *attributed* placement analysis is that common people in Turkey too are aware of this configuration and recognize it as such. In other words, the intersubjective semantic content of left-right division in contemporary Turkey is understood to refer primarily to a secularism-religion conflict rather than an economic conflict. This is in line with the expert understanding of Turkey's left-right divide as being mostly relating to cultural rather than economic issues according to Benoit and Laver's (2006) expert survey. In any case, it seems that the ordinary people have on aggregate a somewhat accurate understanding of what other people mean when they talk about a left-right division—it is basically about the relative standing of secularism versus religious values. This provides partial support for H3.

Nevertheless, the aggregate judgment of the ordinary crowd is not completely divorced from the said overestimation of the economic content of the left-right division, and we find this another striking finding. This is visible in the discrepancy between the actual (*estimated*) and *respondent-attributed* left-right placements associated with income redistribution and public property. While the left-right placement that we estimated—based on actual endorsements by the respondents—for someone who completely agrees with income redistribution is close to 5.3 on the 0-10 left-right scale, i.e. very close to the center of the spectrum, the respondents attribute a much more left-wing position when they are asked about a hypothetical person who is in favor of such income redistribution. For public property advocacy there is likewise a big discrepancy between actual and attributed placements.: In fact, while the respondents attribute to the hypothetical public property advocate the second most left-wing position after a secular person; judging from actual endorsements, public property advocacy associates with the least left-wing position among all six issues. This is not necessarily because public property advocacy is universally endorsed; actually both environmentalism and freedom of thought are more popularly endorsed positions than redistribution or public property advocacy (see Table 3). In other words, while the respondents correctly recognize that a self-ascribed left-wing placement is defined mostly by secularism, they still have an exaggerated sense of how much economic issues around income redistribution, and especially public/private property, define that placement. H3 is therefore partially refuted.

The placement of environmentalism deserves a special discussion. On the one hand, among the six issue dimensions, the discrepancy between actual and respondent-attributed

left-right placements appears smallest for environmentalism, and this may be interpreted at first glance as improved accuracy for attributions related to this item. On the other hand, this is an artifact of the previously explained leftward bias in respondent-attributed placements for all issue positions, together with the fact that environmentalism is really close to the left. Hence, if we state the outcome in relative terms, while the respondents attribute the *relatively least* left-wing (compared to the other five dimensions) placement to a hypothetical environmentalist person, the estimated left-right self-placement of someone in complete agreement with environmentalism is actually the *second-most* left-wing, lagging only behind a secular person. In addition, the respondent-attributed position for the hypothetical environmentalist position features the highest standard deviation among the six attribution responses, indicating that the respondents find it relatively hard to converge on their attribution when it comes to this item. In short, we can state that environmentalism is a much stronger component of left-wing self-placement in Turkey than people think.

In summary, we find that the semantic content of the left-right scale is mostly about secularism and it is popularly understood as such. While it is *more* about environmentalism than what people think, it is *less* about economic issues than what people think. Before finishing, a second-order question of interest could be what kind of people can more accurately attribute the left-right placement of issues positions. In particular, we may want to know whether the issue positions themselves are associated systematically with a certain bias in attributing a left-right placement to the issues. The regression analysis below was undertaken to examine this question. The dependent variable is the respondent's attributed left-right placement of a hypothetical person advocating the issue position listed in the column title. Apart from demographic variables like education, income, gender and age, the independent variables include the respondent's own position on the same six issues, as well as the respondent's own left-right placement.¹

Table 5
Respondent-Attributed Left-Right Placement of Hypothetical Issue Advocates Regressed (OLS) on Respondent's Own Issue Positions and Characteristics

	Issue endorsed by hypothetical person					
	Environ.	Free. thought	Gender equality	Secular	Public property	Redistribut.
Respondent characteristics						
left-right self-placement	0.546*** (0.023)	0.532*** (0.024)	0.446*** (0.025)	0.355*** (0.026)	0.391*** (0.025)	0.477*** (0.025)
environmentalism	-0.189*** (0.065)	-0.176*** (0.068)	-0.240*** (0.070)	-0.035 (0.073)	-0.053 (0.072)	-0.075 (0.071)
free. of thought	-0.160** (0.078)	-0.170** (0.081)	-0.105 (0.084)	-0.252*** (0.087)	-0.279*** (0.086)	-0.088 (0.084)
gender equality	-0.037 (0.073)	0.003 (0.077)	0.257*** (0.081)	0.008 (0.084)	-0.177** (0.082)	-0.068 (0.079)

1 We also ran alternative model specifications with only the respondent endorsement values and left-right self-placement (with no demographic control variables), which we do not show here for the sake of brevity. The results are essentially the same.

secularism	-0.114	-0.055	-0.115	0.170**	0.247***	-0.031
	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.080)
public property	-0.134*	-0.024	-0.042	0.003	0.007	-0.119
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.075)
redistribution	0.130**	0.046	0.082	0.007	0.120*	0.090
	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.065)
male	-0.108	-0.240*	-0.082	-0.042	-0.020	-0.178
	(0.123)	(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.139)	(0.136)	(0.133)
age	-0.011**	-0.004	0.004	-0.006	-0.018***	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
education	-0.175***	-0.043	-0.017	0.088	-0.097	-0.054
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.069)
income	-0.047	-0.033	-0.052	-0.106***	-0.015	-0.036
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Constant	4.568***	2.917***	2.023***	2.177***	3.098***	2.881***
	(0.526)	(0.549)	(0.570)	(0.592)	(0.579)	(0.569)
R^2	0.47	0.41	0.31	0.18	0.24	0.33
N	1,246	1,238	1,225	1,242	1,229	1,236

* $p < 0,1$, ** $p < 0,05$, *** $p < 0,01$, standard errors in parentheses

To interpret these results, first of all, the coefficient for left-right self-placement is always significantly positive: The more a respondent leans to the right himself, the more he thinks that the issue position in question is to be placed on the right. In other words, people would like to think that these issue positions are close to where *they* stand on the left-right scale. This makes sense when we take into account that all six issue positions were popular across the sample and when we remember the “cognitive balance” motivation mentioned above (see Granberg and Brown, 1992). The second thing to check is the coefficient for the respondent’s own actual position on the issue that is being investigated in a given model, which may take positive, negative or insignificant values across models. For example, in the first model (which is about how the respondent attributes a left-right position to environmentalism), the coefficient for the respondent’s own environmentalism is significantly negative; and the same pattern is observed in the second model (about freedom of thought) with a significantly negative coefficient for freedom of thought. This means, for example, that the more a respondent espouses environmentalism, the more she thinks that environmentalism is a left-wing position, since increasing values on the left-right scale indicate more rightward placement. The same thing goes for freedom of thought, *but not* for gender equality, secularism, public property or redistribution. The coefficient for the respondent’s secularism in the fourth model (about secularism) is significantly positive, indicating that it is the less secular people who tend to perceive secularism to be more associated with the left. The same holds for gender equality. Lastly, the coefficients for the respondent’s support for public property and income redistribution are insignificant in the relevant models, regardless of whether we include the demographic control variables or not. Whether one supports redistribution oneself does not have an association with whether one thinks this to be a left-wing position.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study aimed to examine the discrepancy between the actual and perceived meanings of the political left-right divide among ordinary people, based on original data from a representative sample of Turkey. In other words, are economic issues as pertinent to subjective left-right self-placements as people think? In order to empirically address this question, we developed measures for *both* parts of the question, i.e. how people endorsing certain economic positions place themselves on the left-right scale, as well as what placement they attribute to a hypothetical person endorsing the same positions. The study examined this across six issue endorsement positions, covering economic and non-economic domains: environmentalism, freedom of thought, gender equality, secularism, public property ownership (rather than privatization), income redistribution. The study also inquired about party placements, to provide a comparison and validity check for our exercise of respondent-attribution of placements, since previous literature had already established that Turkish voters' understanding of parties' positions were similar to those of experts (Ecevit and Celep, 2018).

The findings confirm that respondents' placement of political parties on the left-right scale align well with the self-placement of those respondents that actually support those parties. In other words, the respondents are remarkably accurate in their understanding of where parties (or rather, their supporters) stand. The same cannot be said to the same degree for an understanding of what these labels mean in terms of issue positions. On the one hand, the respondents successfully recognize that secularism is the issue that most strongly defines a left-wing self-placement in Turkey—something that was found in more comprehensive data before (Yağcı, 2022) and which we confirm here on the basis of the left-right self-placements of our respondents who take highly supportive positions for secularism. Nonetheless, the respondents still overestimate how much the said left-right placement rests on positioning on economic issues. Among the six issue positions we examined, the endorsement of two economy-themed positions—public property ownership and income redistribution—were the ones that were associated the least with left-wing self-placements in our sample; yet the respondents attribute very left-wing placements to hypothetical individuals who are portrayed as endorsing these values. The opposite is true for environmentalism. While it is associated with the second left-most self-placement after secularism, the respondents attribute the relatively least left-wing placement to a hypothetical environmentalist person among the six hypothetical issue advocates in consideration. The standard deviation for attributions relating to this item is also the largest, indicating that respondents find it relatively hard to converge on an attribution when it comes to environmentalism. All in all, it could be concluded that in contemporary Turkey, the semantic content of the left-right scale is mostly about secularism and it is popularly understood as such, while it is *more* about environmentalism than what people think, and *less* about economic issues than what people think. Economic issues may be important to political competition in Turkey, but they poorly map onto the left-right divide—more poorly than what most people seem to believe.

A discussion of the study's limitations is in order. First, the six issue positions we examined, although rooted in existing literature, are not inductively defined, and one could design alternative studies that make use of a different battery of questions. Secondly,

we are not exploring issues of dimensionality, in the sense of how a left-right divide could relate to differentiation on other, orthogonal divides and how many of them are needed to efficiently represent the issue space in Turkish politics (see Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006 for a discussion). Thirdly, this study does not give information about salience. For example, while environmentalism is associated among our respondents with more left-wing self-placements than redistribution, it is possible for the same left-leaning people to see their position on redistribution as more salient to where they stand ideologically. In other words, in a rank-ordering of policy preferences, they could still have chosen redistribution over environmentalism and felt that they stayed true to their left-wing credentials. Maybe the respondent-attributed placements incorporate such an assumption of differential salience to alternative issues in a way that is not echoed in the respondents' own issue endorsement responses. While this seems like a rather arcane issue, it is worth noting here. To our knowledge, this is the first study that systematically examines the subjective understandings of the left-right divide using survey data in the Turkish context. If other studies follow on from this one, they are advised to improve upon these limitations.

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APPENDIX

A) Relevant Survey Questions

1) Left-right self-placement: We sometimes hear about the concepts of left and right in politics. When you think about this left-right divide in politics, where would you place yourself on a scale where 0 is the most left and 10 is the most right?

Left

Right

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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2) Attributed left-right placements

Now I will describe to you some imaginary individuals. How would you place each of these individuals on the left-right scale?

- Someone who advocates the preservation of the natural environment
- Someone who advocates freedom of thought
- Someone who advocates gender equality
- Someone who advocates secularism [*laiklik*] rather than religious rules
- Someone who opposes privatizations in the economy
- Someone who advocates the reduction of income inequality

And now I will read out the names of political parties. I will ask you to place each one on the left-right scale in regard to the ideas they represent.

- AKP
- CHP
- HDP
- MHP
- İyi Parti

3) Respondent issue endorsements

Now I will ask you which policies you prefer in regard to the governance of our country. Answer each from 1 to 5 where 1 equals completely disagree and 5 equals completely agree.

- How much would you support putting a halt to construction projects for roads, dams and the like because they are harming the natural environment?
- How much would you support everyone expressing their thoughts as they wish even if they are against the dominant values in society?
- How much would you support gender equality over traditional gender roles?

- How much would you support the application of secularism [*laiklik*] rather than the requirements of religion in state affairs?
- How much would you support the important firms in the economy to be owned by the state rather than the private sector?
- How much would you support the disproportionate taxation of high-income citizens in order to reduce income inequality?

B) Regression (OLS) Analysis Grounding the Estimated Left-Right Positions in Table 4

	Respondent left-right self-placement
Respondent endorsements	
environmentalism	-0.405*** (0.076)
free. of thought	-0.144 (0.093)
gender equality	-0.357*** (0.087)
secular	-0.768*** (0.083)
public property	0.072 (0.081)
redistribution	0.068 (0.072)
Constant	11.288*** (0.384)
<i>R</i> ²	0.22
<i>N</i>	1,455

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Theoretic and Methodological Approaches Towards the Application of Mixed Methods in the Discipline of International Relations

Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininde Karma Yöntemlerin Uygulanması

Aylin Ece Çiçek¹ , Damla Cihangir Tetik² 

Abstract

Discussions regarding the conduct of scientific inquiry have existed throughout history. Questions of how to uncover the truth and achieve reliable and valid scientific conclusions, all under the umbrella of objectivity, have led the sciences to evolve in a systematic manner. Hitherto, the general leniency within this conversation has been directed at the hard sciences; however, the Social Sciences have also recently been on the receiving end of paradigmatic shifts in methodologies. Since the behavioral revolution, the conduct of many disciplines under the Social Sciences has slowly moved towards a more quantitative outlook on the path of uncovering social phenomena. Such an alteration in methodology has its benefits as well as certain handicaps when dealing with abstract social concepts and notions which are difficult to quantify. This is especially the case for the discipline of International Relations (IR), where data are of both a qualitative and quantitative nature. Thus, the aims of this study are threefold: first, the study will present a brief summary of the historical and scientific evolution of methods in the discipline of IR; secondly, it will describe the current situation in which scientific inquiry is conducted, focusing on mixed method approaches; and third, it will deal with the different methodological approaches of MM designs established above by highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, particularly in the discipline of IR. Hence, this study aims to contribute both to the literatures of the disciplines of IR and of methodology in Social Sciences.

Keywords

International Relations (IR), Methodology, Mixed Methods, Qualitative Methods, Quantitative Methods

Öz

Bilimsel araştırmanın yürütülmesine ilişkin tartışmalar tarih boyunca var olmuştur. Gerçeğin nasıl ortaya çıkarılacağı, güvenilir ve geçerli bilimsel sonuçlara nasıl ulaşılabileceğine ilişkin tartışmalar, nesnellik şemsiyesi altında bilimin sistematik bir şekilde gelişmesini sağlamıştır. Bugüne kadar bu tartışmalardaki genel kabul pozitif bilimlere yönelikken bugün, sosyal bilimlerde de yöntemsel olarak bu paradigmatik değişimlerden bahsetmekteyiz. Davranışsal devrimden bu yana sosyal bilimlerin altındaki pek çok disiplin, sosyal fenomenleri ortaya çıkarma yolunda yavaş yavaş daha nicel bir bakış açısına sahip olmaya doğru evrilmiştir. Yöntemsel olarak bu tür bir değişikliğin faydaları olduğu kadar nicelleştirilmesi zor olan soyut kavramlarla çalışırken bazı dezavantajları da bulunmaktadır. Bu durum, özellikle, verilerin hem nitel hem de nicel nitelikte olduğu Uluslararası İlişkiler (UI) disiplini için geçerlidir. Bu doğrultuda, bu çalışmanın amaçları üç yönlüdür; ilk olarak, bu çalışma UI disiplinindeki yöntemlerin tarihsel ve bilimsel evriminin kısa bir özetini sunacaktır; ikinci olarak, yöntemsel olarak karma yöntem yaklaşımlarına odaklanarak bilimsel araştırmanın yürütüldüğü mevcut durumu tanımlayacak; ve bir üçüncüsü, özellikle UI disiplininde, bahsi geçen karma yöntem tasarımlarının güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini vurgulayarak farklı yöntemsel yaklaşımları ele alacaktır. Böylece bu çalışma, hem UI disiplinindeki hem de sosyal bilimlerdeki yöntem literatürüne katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Uluslararası İlişkiler (UI), Yöntem, Karma Yöntemler, Nitel Yöntemler, Nicel Yöntemler

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Introduction

Discussions regarding the conduct of scientific inquiry have existed throughout the history of science. Questions of how to uncover the truth and achieve reliable and valid conclusions, all under the umbrella of objectivity, have led the sciences to evolve in a systematic manner. Hitherto, the general leniency within this conversation has been directed at the hard sciences; however, the Social Sciences have also been on the receiving end of paradigmatic shifts in methodologies. Since the behavioral revolution, the conduct of many disciplines under the Social Sciences has slowly moved towards a more quantitative outlook on the path of uncovering social phenomena. Such an alteration in methodology has its benefits as well as certain handicaps when dealing with abstract social concepts and notions, which are difficult to quantify. This is especially the case for the discipline of International Relations (IR), where data are of both a qualitative and quantitative nature. Here it is critical to amalgamate both the theoretical and methodological evolution of the discipline through the Grand Debates in IR (idealist vs realist/behavioralist vs traditional/rational vs reflectivist). The First Grand Debate is of ontological orientation; this is theoretical. The Second Grand Debate is epistemological, which touches upon methodology more than theory. The Third Grand Debate covers both ontological and epistemological debates, and bridges theory and methodology.

Such developments and advancements require a more sophisticated approach to our understanding of the cyclical effects of theoretical developments over methodological choices and vice versa. In this light, the aims of this article are threefold; first, the study will present a brief evolution of the evolution of theory and methods in IR; secondly, it will describe the current situation in which scientific inquiry is conducted, focusing on mixed method approaches; and third, it will highlight the strengths and weakness of the different approaches established above.

The Evolution of Scientific Inquiry in International Relations

The formation of the discipline of modern IR is generally attributed to E.H. Carr (2001), who put forth his ideas of studying the international system in a systematic and objective manner in his seminal work “The Twenty-Year Crisis,” where he presented a clear dichotomy between the normative/idealist and realist analyses of world events. The idea of dividing political philosophy from systematic theory building shaped the framework on which IR has evolved as a discipline. Although precise discussions of methods utilized in analysis followed much later, the notion of objectivity introduced in the 1920s by Carr have been the foundation leading to IR as a science. In order to fully comprehend this route, a brief discussion of the “Grand Debates” in IR needs to be understood thoroughly.

The “Grand Debates” of International Relations Theory

Since its inception in the aftermath of the Great War, IR Theory has housed many diverging viewpoints of theoretic, paradigmatic, and methodologic orientations. The field of IR encompasses far more than interstate interactions: investigating a plethora of phenomena ranging from wars and conflicts to the effects of interstate cooperation and outcomes of domestic issues on the global atmosphere, the discipline of IR analyzes a

multitude of notions from various paradigmatic stances. Stemming from such plurality and complexity of the issues of inquiry, scholars have debated the appropriate ontology and epistemology of the field. The methodological patterns of the Grand Debates of IR theory and discussing their contributions to our knowledge and understandings of IR hold the key to understanding the manner in which the science is conducted. The first major discussion, aptly titled “The First Grand Debate,” circled around the distinction between political normative theory making and its applications to the international system.

The end of the Great War called for recognition that war was not the business of soldiers anymore (Carr, 2001), a development that signaled the beginnings of the field of international relations. The global atmosphere was one of recovery and cynicism, especially after the carnage of the First World War. The failure of Wilsonian idealism and the concomitant surge of opposition marked the origins of the First Grand Debate of IR theory, pitting idealists and realists against one another. Although this debate is regarded as having an ontological basis due to its focus on human nature, its epistemological implications, thus its methodological applications, cannot and should not be disregarded. Carr posits that realism is the “acceptance of facts and analysis of causes and consequences” (Carr, 2001) underlining the positivistic tendencies of the realist paradigm as well as stating the shortcomings of the idealist paradigm as being naive.

With realism being the victor of the First Grand Debate and dominating the American school, “the Second Grand Debate” emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Here the discussion was purely epistemological with debate revolving around how one ought to methodologically study international relations. The two camps were highly differentiated: on one hand were the behavioralists, who believed that the positivist methodology should be applied to the social sciences, replicating the natural sciences as much as possible through observation, data, hypothesis testing and falsifiability (Popper, 2002). For the behavioralist camp, causality and analysis through data collection and replication were key factors validating their analyses. The other side of the spectrum, the traditionalist camp, argued that IR could be advanced through detailed historical investigations, participant observations, unique case studies and interpretation (Kaplan, 1966). The behavioralist critique of the traditional approach was based on the notion of falsifiability: the traditional findings were close to storytelling and did not accumulate systematic knowledge and identify/develop general patterns and therefore, were not scientific because empiric evidence could not be verified through the traditional methods. This debate shook the social science discipline to its core with the winner by a landslide being the behavioralist methodology, an outcome still relevant to the discipline today.

The Third Grand Debate of 1988 (Robert Keohane’s speech at APSA) centered around the rational versus reflectivist approach. This debate encompassed both ontological and epistemological concerns. The rationalist camp encompassing the realist and liberal paradigm argued that the positivistic methodology, and the measurement of material-based interest of rational actors was critical in understanding IR. The reflectivist camp, with its critical theory and post-modernism, were firm supporters of the idea that subjective study and interpretation were inseparable from observations and that the rationalist camp was flawed in viewing the complexity of reality. The rational approach criticized the reflectivist camp for their lack of scientific methods (Keohane, 1988). However, the

reflectivist side claimed that they did not believe in a subjective science and this was not a game they could play (Kurki and Wight, 2016).

With all of these debates, new ideas, concepts and notions have entered the IR literature, paving the way for new scientific and critical debates. Such new frameworks contribute to our understandings of the complexity of the world around us, which becomes slightly less overwhelming. Whether this be new ways of perceiving the world around us (new paradigms) or how to conduct research (positivistic/behavioralist), it is evident that discussing and investigating bring the discipline to a higher level of sophistication. This is especially critical when both endogenous and exogenous factors affecting theory and method overlap. The following section aims to unveil this issue by investigating such implications.

The Key Implications of the Third Grand Debate on Methodology and Applications

When Robert Keohane gave his speech at the American Political Science Association (APSA) meeting of 1988, he brought attention to the drift in IR theory, coining the terms reflectivists and rationalists for the two contending views on methodology. Concomitantly, the Third Grand Debate stemmed even further. On one hand stood the rationalist umbrella encompassing the realist and liberal theories of IR. On the other side stood the reflectivist camp with critical theory, post-modernism, feminism, and queer theory housed under its roof. The middle child, constructivism, was not accepted fully by either camp, being too state-centric and systemic for the reflectivists and being non-positivistic for the rationalists.

The rationalists base their claims on two assumptions: firstly, actors are rational and secondly, the interests of these actors are material. Here, the logic of expected circumstances is crucial in their world views. The reflectivists, on the other hand, hold a bounded rationality claim of actors and the interests consisting of ideational, norm-based and cultural sort. For them, the logic of appropriateness was the key to shaping international interactions and cooperation.

The critique of reflectivism on the rationalist approach lies in its undermining of the cultural, normative and ideational notions. For the reflectivist, rational approaches are too limited in analyzing the multitude of actors and phenomena around because it is faulty to assume that all expectations and preferences are shaped by calculations of material gains. For the reflectivists, actor preferences are molded by ideational factors and most importantly, culture. Furthermore, the differentiation of culture requires various types of analysis. For the reflectivists, the rationals are trying to understand the world by looking at it with dark glasses. Furthermore, for the reflectivists, constructivists are too state-centric and systematic (recognizes anarchy as one of the possible outcomes) to function under their umbrella due to the fact that they recognize the game that the rationals are playing, where the game is not suitable for a reflectivist to play in the first place. On the other hand, the rationalist critique of the reflectivists rests on the shoulders of the scientific methods: measuring ideational constructs is close to impossible and the findings cannot be empirically verified, therefore, it is not scientific. Namely, the rationalists argue that reflectivists (including constructivism) fail to produce testable hypotheses because the interests formulated under ideational constructs (identity, culture, norms, etc.) cannot

be purely identified. Furthermore, one rational approach would suggest that material and ideational interests are deeply intertwined and therefore, cannot be separated and thus, cannot be measured separately.

Although constructivists have been rejected by the two main approaches and are in the middle ground of the debate (Adler, 2005) it is critical to underline the importance that they give to ideational interests and the links that these interests hold over preferences and behavior. This is something the rational approaches would not take into account. Accordingly, the critical point for the constructivists lies in the effects of these norms, identities and cultures over individual, collective and state behavior. Concomitantly, with this kind of world view of constant dynamism and change, modeling the world in realist or liberal parsimony is difficult.

Overall, both camps and constructivism have valid arguments. It is also true that when an overly general research pattern is employed the resulting generalization fails to capture the sophistication of reality. However, the purpose of IR is to explain international actions, outcomes and phenomena and the reflectivist camp complicates issues to the extent that no possible explanation can rise to the surface. Thus, it seems that it is almost impossible to use both post-positivist qualitative methods and positivist quantitative methods together in a research study, because of their ontological and epistemological differences on the one hand and their different research design patterns on the other. However, we argue that this is not the case in the discipline of IR and we provide some examples from the recent literature in the next section. However, this study is just the tip of the iceberg in that there is a need for further and much more detailed research focusing particularly on the combinations of different methods in IR research under the Third Grand debate and their contribution to the existing literature.

The Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in International Relations

The quality of any research agenda is based on many factors, such as the novelty of the inquiry, theoretical framing, robustness, validity and reliability, as well as the appropriate choice of methodology. The current trend- and the unspoken rule- in IR is to utilize quantitative techniques in analysis. This general acceptance of the quantitative side of the spectrum brings about key concerns as many lean towards a specific type of quantitative analysis because it has a higher chance of publication. However, much is lost when the method is chosen due to its popularity; one of the basic rules of scientific inquiry is to first identify the research question and decide on the variables after rigorous research. After a solid justification of these steps, the second major phase is to ponder deeply over the research agenda- the methodological path the study is to undertake. As mentioned above there is a positivist bias.

Mixed Methodology (MM): Conceptualization, Advantages and Shortcomings

The advantages of a mixed method approach have been discussed widely, especially since the current trends, which seem to favor quantitative processes. However, this is a rather narrow approach; there are possibilities for large-n studies within small-n research and vice versa (Gerring, 2012). There is a lack of understanding that qualitative and quantitative investigations are indeed complimentary and a combination of methods

is more likely to hold higher explanatory power (Creswell, Plano, & Clark; Greene & Caracelli, 1997; Jick, 1979). The logic behind this is based on the nature of both methods; qualitative work is stronger in highlighting correlations, whereas quantitative work aims to uncover the causal processes at play (Sammons, 2010). As such, both approaches explain the same phenomena from different perspectives, and, if reconciled, would significantly increase the value of the research maximizing the benefits of both methods, while minimizing their respective shortcomings by reconciling the deductive and inductive approaches (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Brady and Collier, 2010). The advantage of adopting a mixed method approach in IR can be recapitulated as the sum is bigger than its parts. Combining two different perspectives is more likely to produce a holistic picture (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010).

However, there are certain points of caution; a mixed method approach is not applicable to all research questions. Secondly, the research design of mixed methodology does not follow the traditional trajectory- although, there have been remarkable works categorizing MM, such as Biesenbender and Heritier, 2014, Morse, 2010 and Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009. There is much debate on the proper way to combine qualitative and quantitative methods.

In their works, Imke Harbers and Matthew C. Ingram have addressed conceptual questions regarding MM. The authors suggest that MM should be understood from three dimensions: “(1) the manner in which the methods are combined, that is, the degree of integration; (2) the sequence in which they are combined; and (3) the analytic motivations for such combinations” (Harbers and Ingram 2020, 1118). This perspective provides a safe road map for authors.

Historically, there have been few investigations utilizing an MM approach. Most visible are the works of Robert Cox and Susan Strange, where categorical and ordinal variables have been considered. In his seminal work titled “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Cox highlighted the importance of the consciousness of the past (Cox, 1981). Following this logic, in *States and Markets* (1988), Strange advocated for an inclusion of a historical perspective within the discipline of International Political Economy. It is argued that the context in which phenomena occur cannot be clinically separated from its outputs. In simpler terms, context matters. This is not the case for many recent studies, as MM has increased visibly; in 2013, Weaver-Hightower and Skelton (2013) experimented on the benefits of mixed-method design by utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods to study the concept of influence of leaders. The author concludes that a mixed-method approach and triangulation could greatly benefit social science research, especially IR and Political Science. Similarly, De Juan and Pierskalla (2014) analyze political trust and how it is influenced by aid and violence, utilizing both survey data and qualitative interviews.

On the other hand, there are many challenges and disadvantages of MM; first, learning and mastering a methodology is temporally quite costly. Second, combining collected qualitative and quantitative data systematically is not an easy feat (Matthews et al., 2005; Kwan and Ding, 2008; Fielding and Cisneros-Puebla, 2009; Yeager and Steiger, 2013). It is quite difficult to decide on the most applicable first step to start the analysis procedures. In some cases, in order to explain and answer the research question of a

study, using MM becomes necessary. Cases such as the following can be considered: when explaining a complex concept of IR, it would be required to evaluate it from different perspectives; when a researcher prefers to explain a research question both in macro (country/international/global) and micro (individual/group) levels; following a correlation between two different variables that came up as a result of a research study, if a researcher would like to explain the causal relationship between those variables in detail; if unexpected results come up during the analysis, a researcher would like to use another method in order to interpret those results (Aydın-Çakır and Türkeş-Kılıç, 2021).

That being said, new developments in the field have suggested novel solutions to seamlessly integrate both methodologies; Abildgaard, J. S., Saksvik, P. O. and Nielsen, K. M. (2016) have suggested the use of quantitative methods to select cases following a qualitative approach, which utilizes the “most similar systems design.” When a qualitative method follows a quantitative one, this approach is called “explanatory sequential design.” In such research, data of the qualitative method allow the researcher to elaborate on the results of the quantitative method. One of the challenges of this MM design is its duration. Research may take a long time, since the research questions, sample and data collection method of the qualitative method should be decided after the end of the quantitative method. Thus, it would be impossible to at the beginning of the research clarify research questions of the qualitative method that could cause some ethical problems (Barnes 2019, 311, Aydın-Çakır and Türkeş-Kılıç 2021, 8).

In the discipline of IR, MM has been applied in several studies ranging from conflict resolution and foreign policy analysis to Europeanization and democratic peace theory. For example, Kapur (2007) has primarily applied a statistical analysis (quantitative method) in his research and thus, showed that there are higher tensions in traditional military conflicts between India and Pakistan when their nuclear power increases. Then, he has explained the reasons for this inference by applying a process tracing method (qualitative method). As another example from the field of foreign policy analysis, Greenhill and Strausz (2014) have conducted a statistical analysis in order to explain the time taken by all United Nations (UN) member states from 1948 to 2001 to ratify the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide during the first stage of their research. After that they have focused on the case of Japan and presented a detailed review of the debates over whether to ratify the Convention. Conducting a MM approach would enable them to test the validity of the results of their statistical analysis, following a case study (Aydın-Çakır and Türkeş-Kılıç 2021). As against the main argument of “democratic peace theory” of IR, Mansfield and Snyder (2005) have argued that in states where the democratization process has slowed down, there are weak political institutions and there is a long-standing conflict with one another, there is a high probability of going to war with each other. In order to test this hypothesis, they have first conducted a statistical analysis using large-N data. Then they have examined some democratic countries that went to war with each other in detail.

The MM approach also has benefits for single-case studies in IR by eliminating their limitations via simultaneous MM designs (Aydın-Çakır and Türkeş-Kılıç 2021, 7). Keeping this in mind, Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm (2018) has conducted process tracing in order to answer how and to what extent EU policies have been institutionalized in Turkish

Foreign Policy between 1987 and 2016. At the same time, she has coded data collected from primary and secondary sources, such as interviews, news, reports, press releases, etc., by discourse analysis. Thus, the findings of process tracing would be strengthened by applying a MM design. Another simultaneous MM study in political psychology, a sub-discipline of Political Science and IR, has focused on foreign policy actors (individuals) in foreign policy-making (Rathbun, Kertzer and Paradis 2017). The researchers conducted experimental laboratory testing and an archive-based case study together. By applying a simultaneous MM design, their aim was to understand the behavior of foreign policy makers under different circumstances and check both the internal and external validity of their arguments (Aydın-Çakır and Türkeş-Kılıç 2021, 7).

Conclusion

The aim of this study is to shed light on the historical and scientific discussions linking theory and methodology in social sciences, particularly in the field of IR, and briefly explain the current situation of MM studies, including their advantages and shortcomings, again, in the discipline of IR, where data are of both a qualitative and quantitative nature. Hence, this study aims to contribute to both literatures of the disciplines of IR and methodology in Social Sciences. Thus, first, it has presented a brief summary of the historical and scientific evolution of methods in the discipline of IR. Secondly, we have tried to describe the current situation in which scientific inquiry is conducted, focusing on MM approaches. Finally, this study has dealt with the different methodological approaches of MM designs by highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, providing examples particularly from the discipline of IR. The evolution of scientific inquiry in IR has paved the way for three “Grand debates” of IR theory, which have been summarized above. It is not surprising that IR scholars have been continuously discussing this in order to find the appropriate ontology and epistemology of the field, since the discipline deals with a variety of issues of inquiry together with complex paradigmatic approaches. Regarding the emergence and evolution of the MM approach in IR, the Third Grand Debate between reflectivists and rationalists became determinant. As a result of the Third Grand Debate in IR, although it seems that the rationalists have won the debate (according to the current publication trends in IR utilizing quantitative methodology), we argue that there is a positivist bias. Thus, the obvious advantages of the MM approach in Social Sciences have become a savior for the ongoing methodological polarization in the discipline of IR. This study supports the argument that qualitative and quantitative investigations are indeed complimentary, and that a combination of methods is more likely to hold higher explanatory power not only in Social Sciences, but particularly in the IR discipline as well. In MM research, while the quantitative method eliminates the limitations of the qualitative one, the findings of the qualitative method present causal relationships among different factors/variables in order to interpret the results of the quantitative one.

However, there are also some disadvantages of the MM approach and challenges in applying it. Although the aim of a MM design is to neutralize the weaknesses of both qualitative and quantitative methods, if it is applied to a poorly justified and imprecisely planned research design, it can multiply the errors of a single method (Dunning 2007, 22). In addition, duration of the analyses in a MM approach is longer and its implementation

cost is higher than the single method. Last but not least, a researcher who applies MM should have a good command and sufficient knowledge of both qualitative and quantitative methods.

Despite all the difficulties and possible problems mentioned above, IR studies conducting MM can reach more valid and reliable results than those that conduct a single method, whether quantitative or qualitative. It is possible to discern this from currently widespread, academically intriguing and successful MM studies almost in all of the sub-fields of IR conducted during the last two decades, as presented in this study. However, as Aydın-Çakır and Türkeş-Kılıç mention, “this does not mean that studies using only qualitative or quantitative methods are less valuable and scientific. It should also be noted that MM cannot be applied to every research question” (Aydın-Çakır and Türkeş-Kılıç 2021, 12).

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Notes of a Turkish Intellectual on imagining a Palestinian state: Osman Okyar and the 2nd International Symposium on Palestine, 1971

Bir Türk Aydınının Filistin devleti hayali üzerine notları: Osman Okyar ve 2. Uluslararası Filistin Sempozyumu, 1971

İlkim Buke Okyar¹

Abstract

Over three-quarters of a century, the fate of the Palestinian people and a prospective Palestinian state was a prominent issue in world politics. Today, the dream for a Palestinian state lay even further as a dream than when it first became to be discussed in the 1940s. The cloth of time and conflict rested a speck of thick dust over the once a Palestinian claim for a secular democratic state founded on Palestine—today Israel, West Bank, and Gaza. This article aims to resurface the Palestinian nationalist objectives' heydays in the 1970s, when the act of imagining a state actively took place, from the perspective of a Turkish intellectual, Osman Okyar. The memoirs of Osman Okyar from the Second International Symposium for Palestine, Kuwait, in 1971 will be used to uncover how the Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLM) articulated the structure of their dream state in the 1970s. And how this dream is voiced by the movements' ideologues such as Khalid Walidi, Yusuf Sayegh, and Nabil Shaath. Okyar's detailed notes of the conference offer an alternative perspective to the long-forgotten goals of the Palestinian Revolution with his unique viewpoints on that significant moment of history that one can only get from the people who were there at the moment in time.

Keywords

Democracy, Secularism, Palestinian Nationalism, Palestinian Liberation Movement, Osman Okyar

Öz

Üç çeyrek yüzyıl boyunca Filistin halkının kaderi ve müstakbel bir Filistin devleti dünya siyasetinde öne çıkan bir konuydu. Bugün, bir Filistin devleti hayali, 1940'larda ilk kez tartışıldığı zamandan daha da ileri bir hayal olarak duruyor. Zamanın ve çatışmanın örtüsü, bir zamanlar Filistin'in Filistin'de -bugün İsrail, Batı Şeria ve Gazze'de- kurulan laik demokratik bir devlet iddiasının üzerine kalın bir toz bıraktı. Bu makale, bir Türk aydını Osman Okyar'ın perspektifinden bir devlet hayal etme eyleminin aktif olarak gerçekleştiği 1970'lerde Filistin milliyetçi hedeflerinin en parlak günlerini yeniden su yüzüne çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Osman Okyar'ın 1971'de Kuveyt'te düzenlenen İkinci Uluslararası Filistin Sempozyumu'ndan anıları, 1970'lerdeki Filistin Kurtuluş Hareketi'nin (FKH) Khalid Walidi, Yusuf Sayegh gibi en önde gelen ideologlarından bazılarının rüya devletlerinin yapısına dair tartışmalarını ortaya çıkarmak için kullanılacak. Okyar'ın konferansa ilişkin ayrıntılı notları, tarihin o önemli anına ancak o an orada bulunanlardan edinilebilecek özgün bakış açısıyla bir yaklaşım sunuyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Demokrasi, Sekülerizm, Filistin Milliyetçiliği, Filistin Kurtuluş Hareketi, Osman Okyar

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Introduction

The question of Palestine continues to impact the politics of the Middle East and Europe for more than half a century calling into question dominant understandings of nationalism, citizenship, and decolonization. The irreversible realities created by the establishment and expansion of Israel on the Palestinian territories cast serious doubts on the feasibility of a future Palestinian state that involved various plans from partition to the two-state solution.

Since the end of World War I, imperial powers, especially Britain, tried to design the British Mandate of Palestine in a way to respond to their inter-war promise—a state for the Jews and a state for the Palestinians. It presented these formulations in various official documents, such as the White Papers of the British Mandate, which refused to give Palestinians any official recognition unless they accepted British policy for a Jewish national home, bounding the realization of a Palestinian state to a Jewish one. However, from Balfour Declaration to the United Nations' approval of establishing a Jewish state in 1948, the enfolding series of events fundamentally challenged a viable and pluralistic state structure in Palestine, bringing the two claimers into a direct encounter.

Amid the shock of becoming stateless, Arab League founded the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 to keep Palestinian activism under control. However, the lack of its leadership led other nationalist branches, such as Fateh (*Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filistini*)—the Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLM)—to overpower the organization's leadership. PLM and its leadership, centralized around Yasser Arafat, emerged as the sole representative of the Palestinian cause in the early 1960s (Cobban, 1984, pp. 21-28). The movement and its leaders dreamed of their own promised nation-state in the context of a national struggle. The heydays of the debates concerning the design of a Palestinian dream state consider the development of philosophical and political currents among the Palestinians between the launch of the Palestinian Revolution in 1968 upon Fatah's finalization of its revolutionary council and its defeat in Beirut in 1982. Throughout this short-lived, turbulent, and somewhat confident period, PLM in the diaspora gained unprecedented support over its fate, embodied in the Beirut-based pseudo-state of the PLM. During the dynamic, forward-looking optimism of the revolutionary moment, the Palestinian revolution's search for a nation-state wrestled with the ongoing traumas of exile, leadership, and armed struggle against Israel. Arab sponsors of the Palestinian cause—such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Kuwait—became hubs for the intellectual debates to program the future of a Palestinian state. And that future was imagined as a “democracy.”

Placing established nationalist aims in light of the scholarly efforts of PLM's imagined state, this paper traces the intellectual debates that became instrumental in “dreaming” the prospective Palestinian state. The PLM's nationalist framework often conceptualizes Palestine in a fashion that simultaneously manifests the “horror and devastation” of its pretext and fosters multidimensional methods of anticipating its future. The latter framework marks Palestine's difference from nations that exist in a sovereign, territorialist form. Unlike most other nationalist movements, Palestinians do not “imagine” the nation as a subconscious means of belonging to a community but as a complex act of resistance, revolution, and survival.

Digging into the past and trying to shed light on micro-moments where the act of dreaming the sovereignty took place, this paper uses the personal memoirs of Osman Okyar (b. 1917-2002) as its source. As one of Turkey's most prominent political economists and intellectuals, Okyar was personally present at the Second International Symposium on Palestine in 1971, Kuwait, where the PLM's revolutionary program and its founders imagined the future Palestinian state. Examining Okyar's notes on the conference is essential for understanding the various debates of the prominent ideologues of the Palestinian Liberation Movement from the perspective of a Turkish intellectual. The notes of Osman Okyar openly state that most of the discussions during the conference pondered around the binary concepts of secular versus religious and ethnic versus pluralistic formulations of a Palestinian state. Through the statements of these intellectuals, one can imagine a Palestinian state as articulated in persistent futurity with parameters set beyond ethnicity and religion. In considering the Palestinian state through and against its limitations, the paper explores the new modes of imagining Palestine at its liberal moment in decolonial history through the contemplation of Osman Okyar, a modern liberal himself.

Osman Okyar was invited to the conference to observe and advise by the forerunners of the Palestinian movement.¹ His views on the Turkish experience of the secular transformation of a majority Muslim country following the Turkish national struggle and establishment of the Turkish Republic carried out most importance concerning the debates on a secular Palestine. Among many contributors to the conference, Osman Okyar comments on the speeches of the four most influential ideologues of the Palestinian Liberation Movement, namely Walid Khalidi, Yusif Sayegh, Nabil Shaath, and Clovis Maksoud. To provide more context to these speeches, as referred to in Okyar's notes, the article will first present a brief bio of Osman Okyar. The following sections will unfold, first, the question of why Okyar was appointed to the symposium, and next, what were the current political developments leading to the symposium in Kuwait. After launching the contextual and historical background, the article will present Okyar's logs for each of the leading figures of the PLO and conclude with Okyar's thoughts on the conference and future of the Palestine.

A Turkish Scholar and Civil Servant

Professor Dr. Osman Okyar, born in Istanbul in 1917, was the son of Ali Fethi Okyar, one of the founding members and the second prime minister of the Republic of Turkey. Osman Okyar started his junior high education in Paris during his father's ambassadorship. Upon his family's return to Turkey, he continued schooling at Galatasaray High School, where he graduated in 1936. During those years, his father, Ali Fethi Okyar, was the ambassador to London. Already fascinated by the modern economic currents of the time and familiar with the works of the prominent British economist John Maynard Keynes, he insisted that his son Osman Okyar study economics in England (Toprak, 2014). Young

¹ According to the author's interview with Seyfi Taşhan, "Osman [Okyar] was a highly valued economist in international circles. In most cases, he was invited to these forums and conferences as an advisor. The conference in Kuwait was probably no exception" (Taşhan, S., personal communication, 02 September 2022). Seyfi Taşhan founded *The Turkish Foreign Policy Institute* (FPI) in 1974 as a private think tank where Osman Okyar was among its founding members. Okyar and Taşhan worked closely for over twenty-five years.

Okyar acted on his father's will and came to London in 1936. After studying English and Latin for a year, he was accepted to Cambridge University Kings College in 1937. There he became a student of prominent scholars like John Maynard Keynes himself. After pursuing his studies with high honors, Osman Okyar was accepted to Harvard University for his graduate studies. However, upon the emergence of the Second World War, he decided not to go. Instead, from 1941 to 1943, he held positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As the second World War came to an end, Okyar went back to his graduate studies. He was accepted to the Faculty of Economics at Istanbul University to pursue a doctoral degree, receiving his Ph.D. in Economics in 1947. During his doctoral study, he worked with famous Jewish-German economist Prof. Dr. Fritz Neumark, who made significant contributions to the development of education in the preparation of the income tax laws of economics in Turkey (Andic & Andic, 1981). Prof. Neumark's contribution to Okyar was indisputable. Under his supervision, Okyar progressed his studies on the Keynesian understanding of liberal economics with a doctoral thesis called "From neo-classical theory to a Keynesian theory" (Tanyeri, 1985). In the following four years, he wrote his second thesis on National Income, which earned him his associate professorship at Istanbul University in 1951.

Osman Okyar's years from 1951 can be summarized as an interrelated relationship between his academic work and civil service in various government positions. While he continued his active teaching at Istanbul University (1951-1967) and later Hacettepe University's Economics department, which he established in 1968, he served in numerous government offices such as the National Institute for Statistics, the Ministry of Development, and the Central Bank of Turkey. Over these years, Okyar was recognized as an outstanding academician and one of the most prominent economists in Turkey.

From the American University of Beirut to the Symposium on A Democratic State in Palestine

Osman Okyar's professional interest in the developments in the Middle East, especially towards the Palestinian problem during the heydays of the cold war, coincides with his appointment at the American University of Beirut Economic Research Institute (1957-58). From the late 1950s forward, the American University of Beirut (AUB) served as an incubator for political movement and resistance among its students and faculty. From its foundation as a Syrian Protestant College in 1866, a missionary initiative by the United States of America (USA), AUB has been one of the major centers for Arab nationalism and student politicization in the Levant (Antonius, 2015; Kramer, 2017).² George Antonius, the early historian of Arab nationalism, wrote in his classic work *The Arab Awakening* that "the university's influence on the Arab revival, at any rate in its earlier stage, was greater than that of any other institution" (2015, p. 43). A similar enthusiasm existed among the participants of AUB toward the Palestinians' struggle to liberate Palestine (Kramer, 2017). An independent Palestine was the pan-Arab promise in the 1970s of the so-called Arab Nationalists Movement. Inevitably, independent organizations among

2 It was a group of American missionaries who established the Syrian Protestant College in October 1866—the name was changed to the American University only in 1920.

the university students branched out of the movements, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which was founded in 1968 by two Arab nationalist figures George Habash and Hani al-Hindi, both students of the AUB (Cobban, 1984, p. 140; Khalidi R., 2007, p. 138; Kramer, 2017, p. 42).

During these highly dynamic years of the Middle East, the Palestinian national movement was emerging as a more politically organized resistance. Especially following the 1967 defeat of the pan-Arab efforts under the leadership of Egypt's Gamel Abdel Nasser against Israel, the movement pledged to a Palestinian Revolution with a somewhat unclear plan on how to achieve it (Kamrava, 2013, p. 85). The "lost years" of Palestinian nationalism (1948-1967) were defined mainly by the Palestinians' constant search for sponsors under Arab nationalism and shadowed the Palestinian state under Nasser's envisioned Arab Union (Sayigh, 2004; Kamrava, 2013). The defeat of the 1967 war burst Nasser's goals. Meanwhile, the inter-Arab efforts were not null to the PLM's initiative of resistance and revolution.

On the contrary, their disillusionment in the 1950s and 60s of a pan-Arab dream gave political respectability and national enthusiasm to the Palestinian movement, resulting in the formal recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 (Peretz, 1970, p. 325). However, the leadership of the newly established PLO under Ahmad al-Shukeiri failed to gain genuine political autonomy and galvanize strong popular support (Cobban, 1984; Sayigh, 2004). Following the 1967 fiasco, Palestinians were determined to replace the old-line leadership associated with al-Shukeiri (Sayigh, 2004). Accordingly, they reorganized the movement by readjusting its goals along the lines of the changing political atmosphere in the Middle East.

However, the setback of the 1967 war mobilized a third phase within the Palestinian nationalist movement, which Yezid Sayigh called "the years of revolution" (2004, p. 143). This new dynamism was the outcome of the younger generation in the diaspora that acknowledged the need for institutional reorganization and military self-assertion. The latter efforts strengthened PLM (*al-Fatah*), the most influential of the many clandestine groups that emerged among the scattered Palestinian diaspora within the PLO (Sayigh, 2004, p. 71). The quest for a new leadership reflected the transformation of the Palestinian community that had occurred during the "lost" generation. After 1948, approximately 50,000 Palestinians attended universities in the respective states where they became new residents. The new generation of Palestinians had all the attributes of a displaced minority group, including great aspirations for upward mobility, political restiveness, and a core of revolutionary-minded young men who aspired to "reestablish the homeland" (Peretz, 1970, p. 326). One of the hubs of this revolutionary movement was, no doubt, the American University of Beirut.

For the years following 1967, most of the new groups that claimed a Palestinian revolution drew inspiration from guerrilla techniques. Quickly, the two-decade synonym of the Palestinians as "refugees" was transformed into "commando warrior" (Sayigh, 2004, p. 217; Peretz, 1970). Yet, these guerilla activities discredited the Palestinian revolution with an uncertain future in international public opinion. For example, at any rate, AUB university's reputation reached its low point in the outside world. The leading cause of this loss of prestige was the students' more militant and robust support of all

things connected to the Palestinian revolution (Anderson B. S., 2008, p. 271). As a result, the so-called Palestinian revolution failed to offer a liable goal for its future and propose an alternative to its conflict with Israel.

In January 1969, Palestine National Liberation Movement (*al-Fatah*) declared officially and for the first time a political program spelling out the ultimate objective of its liberation struggle as the Palestinian Revolution. The declaration stated that from then on, they are fighting to create the “new Palestine of tomorrow,” a progressive, democratic, and nonsectarian Palestine in which Christians, Muslims, and Jews will worship, work, live peacefully and enjoy equal rights. The statement further edits the Palestinian revolution’s reach for support from all human beings who want to “fight for and live in a democratic tolerant Palestine irrespective of race, color, or religion” (al-Fatah, 1969). In that context, the symposium was a quasi-academic political exercise organized by the joint efforts of the General Union of Palestinian Students, which featured prominent politicians and intellectuals from across the Palestinian diaspora to discuss the structure of a future Palestinian state within the means of a secular democracy (Okyar, 1971; Zerkovitz, 2014). Among these academicians were colleagues of Okyar from the AUB: Yusuf Sayigh, Nabi Shaath, and Walid Khalidi.

Okyar’s notes state that the symposium was designed to discuss the Palestinian question on various fronts of secularism, leadership, and democratic state-building (Okyar, 1971). Palestinian nationalist consciousness and identity were relatively modern in their approach to the secular concept of the state. Without denying the Islamist or the Arabist dimensions of Palestinian identity outright, they tend to give precedence to the purely nationalist aspects in their formulations (Khalidi R., 2010, p.149). The Turkish experience appealed greatly to the Palestinian ideologues for imagining their state. The assertive secularism, nationalism, and republicanism of the post-1923 Turkish Republic presented itself, in its unique way, as one for defending norms of the Islamic identity and Muslim solidarity among the Muslim Middle East (Kuru, 2009, pp. 1-6; Topal, 2012).³ Within the cold war dynamics, Turkey’s practice of a secular liberal state posed as a stencil both for the Western capitalists and for the Arab socialists.⁴ Turkey’s configuration of its relationship with Islam within the lines of secular democracy was an appealing aspect of state-building for the Palestinians.⁵

General Union of Palestinian Students’ Kuwaiti office leadership, together with the Kuwaiti Graduate Society, PLO leadership, and the government of Kuwait, played a significant role in the worldwide gathering of the International Conference on Palestine on February 13, 1971 (Zerkovitz, 2014, p. 92). This was the second of the international

3 Ahmet Kuru (2009) groups different approaches to secularism as “passive secularism” as in the case of the United States and “aggressive secularism” as in the case of Turkey and France (2009, pp. 2-4). The abolishing of the caliphate, the closure of all madrasas and tariqats, and the adoption of European codes of law invested in the passive separation of religion from Turkish public discourse. However, the establishment of the *diyanet* (the Directorate of Religious Affairs) and the state project to offer an “official Islam” involved an assertive secularist approach where the state did not aim to reduce religion into an affair of the individual. Instead, it used it as a tool in the process of nation-building.

4 Nasser’s adoption of assertive secularism similar to Turkey is one of such example (Jankowski, 2002, pp. 36-37).

5 In fact, from the 1920s on, Turkey’s support for the Palestinian cause proved itself to be practical as well as rhetorical, always in a balanced approach with Israel and the Western interests, to keep communism—within the cold war politics— at the gate (Uzer, 2017, p. 23).

conferences after the one on March 30, 1965, in Cairo. Kuwait, the conference's location, is significant and certainly requires elucidation. Kuwait was one of the central Arab states that offered support for the Palestinian cause. Since the 1967 defeat of Arab states against Israel, Kuwait has been considered one of the essential destinations by the young Palestinians who fled the territories (Cobban, 1984, pp. 10-14). Starting from the late 1950s, Kuwait welcomed Palestinian immigrants and offered them ample political freedom within the emirate's borders. This honeymoon-like relationship also manifested itself in the emirate's support of Fatah, and it is becoming one of the first Arab states to grant permission to the PLO to operate on its territory (Zelkovitz, 2014; Sayigh, 2004; Cobban, 1984). The General Union of the Palestinian Students office at the University of Kuwait was the microcosm of the Palestinian political arena. Starting in the early 1960s, it served as one of the major centers (after AUB) for the young Palestinian student organizations in the diaspora, one of which Yasser Arafat was a member himself (Cobban, 1984; Sayigh, 2004). If Beirut was PLO's gate to the West, at the time, Kuwait was the key access point of the movement to pursue its financial and political activities in the Gulf (Zelkovitz, 2014, p. 88).

The central theme announced by the symposium committee was "Towards a Democratic State in Palestine." According to Okyar's and Ido Zelkovitz's notes, the opening ceremony was attended by Kuwaiti Prime Minister Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir, who delivered a speech emphasizing the emirate's commitment to the Palestinian issue (Okyar, 1971; Zelkovitz, 2014). There were about 350 delegates that attended this groundbreaking event. Among the invitees were representatives of communist parties and some Liberation movements belonging to the "Maoist or Soviet wing of the left," prominent political figures of the Arab world, many members of its universities, and lastly, independent guests from Europe and America that had taken positions in favor of the Arab cause. (Okyar, 1971, p. 2) The schedule of the first day of the congress was devoted to the history of Israel and the Zionist movement. On the second day, the politics and strategy of the Palestinian movement under current conditions were discussed. On the last day, the structure of the "great" Palestinian state that was anticipated to be established in the future on the territory of today's Israel and the Palestinian Front's means to achieve that goal were debated.

Osman Okyar's Notes on the Second International Symposium on Palestine First Day: Walid Khalidi and Zionism

According to Okyar's notes, the opening remarks of the symposium were given by Walid Khalidi, a prominent professor of political sciences at the American University of Beirut.⁶ In his speech, Khalidi intended to provide an overview of the events that led to the

6 Walid Khalidi was a prominent scholar, a diplomat and a civil servant who devoted his life to the independence of the Palestinian people. He was born in Jerusalem in 1925 into a venerable and cultured family of "jurists, scholars, political figures, and educators since before the Crusades." Khalidi worked in Jerusalem with other young Palestinians in 1945-46 in the Arab League-created Arab Office when it was attempting to put the case of Palestine before the world. The Arab League was called the "unofficial foreign and information office" of the Palestinians. In 1957 he joined the American University of Beirut's Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, where he taught political studies until 1982. During those years he was frequently abroad—as a research fellow at Princeton University (1960-61) and two years (1976-78) on leave from AUB as a fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. Subsequently (from 1979 to 1981), he spent each fall semester at Harvard as visiting professor of government. When he left AUB in

establishment of the state of Israel and the expulsion of the Palestinians from their homes and lands in a comprehensively and insightfully. First, Walid Khalidi explained how, at the end of World War I, the British government allocated the province of Palestine, which it had conquered from the Ottoman Empire to the Jews as a national home in the 1917 Balfour Declaration.

Khalidi's speech followed his introduction of Zionism as an idea that emerged in the late 19th century. Quoted from Khalidi, "Theodor Herzl, convening a congress in Zurich in 1890, was the first person to put forward the idea of establishing a Jewish state in the holy land of Palestine. As a result, the idea began to gather supporters."⁷ Following Professor Khalidi's lack of reference to the Ottoman Empire's approach to Herzl's initial efforts for a national homeland in Palestine, Okyar asked him the question at the end of his speech about his thoughts on the attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards the Zionist intervention. In response, Khalidi added that Empire's opposition to Zionism was a well-known historical fact. Khalidi continued his remarks by referring to Herzl's visit to Istanbul and Jerusalem in 1905. Upon his visit to Istanbul, Herzl was provided an audience with sultan Abdülhamid II, where he requested the sultan's approval for the facilitation of Jews immigration and purchasing land in Palestine. Khalidi clarified that to receive the sultan's assurance, Herzl had offered financial assistance to alleviate the Ottoman debts to Europe, which at the time posed a heavy burden for the Ottoman finances. However, as Khalidi continued, Abdulhamid II rejected this offer and stated that the Palestinian land would not be given to foreigners.

Khalidi's speech introduced the audience to the dominant debate of the Conference's first day, which was dedicated to Zionism, and the Zionist state. Okyar's notes further summarize Khalid's view of the Zionists, who lost their hope in the Ottoman Empire, and approached the British government during the First World War with the hope of securing a homeland. As a result of the Zionists' efforts, the British government promised in 1917, under the Balfour Declaration, that a national home for the Jews would be created in Palestine. But, on the other hand, the British government had promised Sharif Hussein and the Arabs who rebelled against the Turks in 1916 that the lands inhabited by the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire would be given to the Arabs. For the latter reason, the Balfour Declaration included an additional clause ensuring that the rights of the local people would be reserved under the future Jewish state. This was nothing more than the British making two promises that could not be reconciled.

After the victory of the Allies in 1918, Palestine was given neither to the Jews nor the Arabs; instead, it was directly attached to the British mandate. The population of Palestine in 1922 was 750,000, of which 590,000 were Muslims, 83,000 were Jews, and 71,000 were Christians. The Palestinian Arabs did not welcome the establishment of the British mandate in their homeland and the declaration of a future Jewish state as defined by Balfour principles. Under the mandate, Palestinians responded to this duplicity, for the

1982 he settled permanently in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he was senior research fellow at Harvard's Center for Middle East Studies until his retirement in 1997 (Fischbach, 2022).

Please also see <https://www.aub.edu.lb/doctorates/recipients/Pages/khalidi.aspx> for the additional biography of Walid Khalidi.

7 It is important to note here that the congress was actually convened in 1897, in Basel. I assume that Okyar muddled the dates up while reorganizing his personal notes from these meetings.

British turning a blind eye to the extending Jewish immigration with bloody revolts. The 1936 Arab revolt forced the British to change their policy considering Jewish immigration and limit the land sales to the Jews. The British policy change did not have the predicted effect on the flux of the Jews from Europe. Thus, the proportion of Jews in the total population had increased from 12% in 1922 to 17% in 1931 and 31% by 1948. Meanwhile, the tightened British policies over the Jews and the mandate regime's shifting tendency for the Arab cause received a fierce Jewish backlash. The Jewish militias [Irgun], which became more organized over time, started to attack the British forces as the [Second World] war came to an end.

Caught between the two fires, the British had no choice but to refer the matter to the United Nations in 1947. This time, the Jews searched for the support of the United States. The decision to partition and establish the state of Israel came out with 33 votes in favor, 10 against, and 10 in favor of the United Nations. Right after the UN voting, clashes started between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. In the face of Jewish atrocities, most of the Arab population fled to neighboring countries out of fear. Subsequently, the Arabs were defeated in the war, and the Jews expanded the land allocated to them by the UN's plan, annexing Jaffa and the part outside the walls of Jerusalem's old city. After the fighting halted in 1949, Israel controlled 78 percent of mandatory Palestine, compared with the 55 percent allotted under the United Nations partition plan. The number of Palestinians who fled the territories at the time was around 750,000—those who became refugees settled in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Gaza, and Lebanon. The UN initiated a support commission to guide the newly emerged Palestinian diaspora. As a result, after 20 years, refugees formed today's Palestine Liberation Front, or more accurately, various resistance fronts, to obtain their usurped rights. And they became the central element and follower of today's Arab-Israeli conflict.

Second Day: Yusuf Sayegh and the Leadership

According to Okyar, the second day's agenda was set with Yusuf Sayegh's opening remarks, which raised the question of effective leadership for the Palestinian Revolution.⁸ Yusuf Sayegh, a professor of Economics at the American University of Beirut and a member of the Palestine Liberation Council, explained the politics and strategy of the Palestine Front under [the day's] conditions. He underlined that the Palestinian Resistance Movements emerged in a more active stage only following the defeat of the six-day war of 1967. According to Sayegh, upon the failure of the Arab armies, the Arab states faced two options: the first possibility was officially continuing to reject Israel's existence as an independent state by continuing the path they had taken until now, in other words, by not signing peace with Israel. The second option was to make an agreement by recognizing

8 Yusuf Sayegh (1916-2004) was a Palestinian and Arab nationalist, and one of the most influential exponents of Palestinian and Arab planning and development. He entered the national scene just after World War II as the primary organizer of a fund to raise money through taxes and tolls to buy up land threatened by Jewish purchase. Then, after a brief period as an Israeli prisoner of war (1948-1949), he took Syrian nationality, moved to Beirut. Upon he obtained a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University, he joined the American University in Beirut. His growing reputation as a development economist also led him onto a number of international and Arab commissions, including the beginnings of his long association with the Kuwait Fund. Like many Palestinian professionals, was soon drawn back into national politics, becoming a member of the Palestinian National Council in 1966 and one of its chief economic planners after 1967, signaled by his role in the establishment of the Planning Center in Beirut (Owen, 2004, p. 3).

Israel's 1967 borders or borders in proximity to them. In any case, Sayegh brought up the various propositions in discussion for establishing a new Palestinian state within the boundaries of Gaza and the region west of the Jordan River.

Till the day, the Palestinian Council's policy had been towards not accepting peace with Israel, rejecting the establishment of a small-scale Palestinian state around Israel, abolishment the State of Israel, and establishing a new state where Jews, Muslims, and Christians will live together. This alternative, which means continuing the war with Israel, was not widely accepted by other Arab states, especially Egypt. According to Sayegh, Egyptians seemed inclined to recognize Israel's existence and live together if certain circumstances were met. They expressed their softer tendencies during the ongoing congressional deliberations. Articulating the opinion of the Palestinian Council, Dr. Yusuf Sayegh admitted that the liberation movement had a difficult time following 1967, especially after the clashes with the Jordanian government and PLO's subsequent banishment from Jordan. Yet, despite the latter blow of the PLO in Jordan, the legal victimization of the Palestinians caused by the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, the British mandate, and finally, the United Nations resolutions on the creation of Israel remained intact. In Okyar's notes, Sayegh stated that Israel has usurped and violated the basic rights of the Palestinians and that they [PLO] will fight until the rights are fully restored.

Dr. Yusuf Sayegh pointed out that they [PLM] knew the struggle to achieve a sovereign Palestinian state would be long and arduous. However, the most fundamental thing to succeed was the belief that their cause was realistic and viable and needed to be rooted among the larger masses. He also added that the movement could achieve its ultimate aim unless larger groups adopt this belief, like the Arab people in general. However, the impression Osman Okyar obtained from the presentations and behind-the-door talks during the congress was that the central leadership of the PLO was weak as of the day of the conference and that the movement was in desperate need of a leading and unifying leader.

Okyar's perception of Dr. Sayegh's speech was rather pessimistic. Sayegh's constant bringing up the fundamental importance of the masses to achieve the Palestinian cause and the necessity of the awakening of these masses' consciousness seemed relatively distant reality. A social and cultural awakening that would acknowledge the nationalist rights of the Palestinian people required movements that would lead to profound changes in the core of the Arab people— innovations that will transform the social, cultural, and psychological attitudes of the Arabs. Dr. Sayegh added that the duration of such changes might last up to two generations, as the Jews have waited for a long time, and so could the Arabs. The financial conditions in the Arab world to achieve success, in the long run were present; however, when it comes to social and spiritual conditions, they would inevitably emerge sooner or later.

Dr. Sayegh's speech most certainly moved Okyar. In his notes, he referred to his sentiments as how, while listening to Sayegh, his mind inevitably reminded of Turkey's War of Independence and how remarkable it was for Turkey to come out as a secular liberal country despite the disastrous and devastating state the Turkish people were in after the First World War and its dire financial conditions. But, for Okyar, this could not

be succeeded without a leader with a strong will and a clear and realistic determination of the cause. Undoubtedly, Atatürk convinced his close friends of the correctness and reality of the national struggle and awakened the national consciousness to adopt the reason.

In some similar ways, at this stage of their struggle, Okyar clarified that the Palestinians were also looking for a leader who would express their cause precisely, clearly, and realistic way. As in any national struggle, it was of utmost importance to point out the reason for mobilizing the energies that do not fit the conditions of domestic and world politics. And only a good leader could achieve such means. No matter how righteous and humanitarian it seems to be on the side of the Palestinians, these abstract justifications are not enough to recognize the cause. A leader is needed for the struggle. And for Okyar and Sayegh, the question of finding it remained to time.

Third Day: Nabil Shaath and A Secular Democratic State

The third day of the congress was sealed with the discussion of the founding philosophy of the future Palestinian state. Dr. Nabil Shaath⁹, another prominent scholar and lecturer from AUB, took the lead in describing the program and goals of the Palestine Liberation movement concerning the matter. In his address, Shaath stated that the Palestinian movement aimed to establish a secular state that recognized equality for all its citizens regardless of their religion rather than a state solely based on religion. For the PLM and the Palestinian people, the intention was not to drive out the 2.5 million Jews living in Israel on that day and throw them into the sea after their victory over Israel or compel them to peace. Instead, what PLM desired was to create a state in which Arabs and Jews would live together, where all religions, whether Muslim, Christian, or Jewish, would be freely practiced, and where citizens would not be treated differently because of their religion. To Okyar, this whole approach within itself was the Palestinians' will to show the world that they were ahead of Israel—in terms of democracy, pluralism, and citizenship—by comparing their humanist and tolerant state with the state of Israel, where its Jewish people were privileged citizens and the Palestinian Arabs are considered second-class.

Thus, Shaath added, in the program of the Palestine Liberation Front, PLM envisages the establishment of a democratic state in which every citizen would have equal rights within the principles of secularism. According to Okyar, Nabil Shaath's speech sparked a debate, especially on the issue of a secular state in a Muslim-dominated Arab society. Speaking on behalf of one of the Christian organizations, a French delegate, Monsieur Montaron, raised his concern by stating that the Palestinians were behind in explaining their programs to the world for public opinion. He urged them to make their case clear and conclusive, and to convince congress and the public of their program's sincerity.

9 Nabil Shaath is a highly educated, western-style Palestinian politician, with close ties to Yasser Arafat, Israel and the United States. He has been said to be "the real power behind (Arafat's) throne." Received his BA in Alexandria, Egypt and Ph.D. Wharton School of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Shaath returned to Cairo from the United States in 1965. In 1969, he went to Lebanon to teach at the American University in Beirut. He joined PLO in 1970 and served as an adviser to Fatah from 1971. Dr. Shaath became the head of the PLO Planning Centre 1971-1981. He is credited as being the founder of the "Democratic State" approach. In 1974, Dr. Shaath accompanied Arafat in the first PLO delegation to the United Nations and headed the first Palestinian delegation to the UN. He serves as chair of Palestinian National Council political committee. In March 1990, Shaath was appointed to Fatah-Central Committee. Shaath was a member of the Madrid delegation and played a leading role in the Oslo process. Shaath wrote a Palestinian draft Declaration of Principles for the Oslo agreement. (Source: <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/nabil-shaath>)

Returning to the debate on secularism, Monsieur [George] Montaron¹⁰ added that religion and state are firmly connected in all Arab countries of the day. And that there were hesitations about whether it would be possible for an Arab society or even any Muslim community to secularize in the face of their rooted religious traditions. He said that even if Arabs or Palestinians only would agree to the principle of secularity, it would highly be doubtful that Jews would want to live in a secular state that would likely remain under Arab domination. Okyar's notes indicate that Montaron asked Dr. Shaath if putting the concept of a secular Palestinian state in their program was a means for propaganda or/and whether they were genuinely sincere about it. (Which seemed a pretty triggering question even for Okyar himself).

Dr. Shaat's answer was somewhat elusive to this question, saying that the issue was complicated and needed to be given more thought. However, another Palestinian delegate, Dr. Clovis Maksoud¹¹, intervened in the debate, trying to answer the French delegate's question. He admitted that the understanding of equality and secularism was lacking in Arab countries of the day and that hesitantly differentiating attitudes were present in practice. However, Maksoud stated that the secularism and secularization goals adopted by the Palestine Liberation Front constituted humanitarian and advanced hopes on the face of Israel that would never cease to insist on the principles of differentiation as a religiously defined state. Reminding that the essence of Zionism is to prioritize the Jewish race above all other beings, to despise non-Jews, and even to hate them, Palestinians were ahead of Israel, at least in terms of their targeted aim for a pluralistic state.

Okyar indicated in his logs that Dr. Maksoud expressed his belief that the principle of secularism, as asserted only by the Palestinians, would gradually become one of the main aspirations of Arab nationalism, in the broader sense, to be embraced by other Arabs as well in the long run. However, Okyar also implied that the symposium lacked to achieve definite results out of the debates, a more definitive program of the PLM. While the participants of the panel were arguing PLM's aim to establish a democratic secular state, the movement's leaders, in their remarks, were constantly singling out the revolution without establishing the principles of its end goal. For Okyar, who identified himself often with the Western world's modern liberal understanding, the claim of the PLM's leading figures seemed rather "populist."¹² Their argument was often shaped as propaganda against capitalism, and how, together with the world's other Liberation movements, to denigrate the dark forces of imperialism. These round and vague slogans

10 George Montaron (1921-1994) is a militant journalist, resistant, left-wing Christian. He is known for his fights against torture, for freedom of the press, decolonization, for the defense of the Kanak, Palestinian and Sahrawi peoples. He was the director of the Left-wing Catholic weekly *Témoignage Chrétien*. He was a devoted supporter of the Palestinian Arabs. Along with a number of *Témoignage Chrétien's* staff like famous Abbé Pierre, the apostle of the "homeless" after World War I, Montaron participated in an International Christian Conference on Palestine, held in Beirut in May 1971. The meeting provided the occasion for a vast deployment of anti-Israel slogans, embellished by specious theological postulates based on new kind of biblical exegesis which denies Jews any right to the land of Israel (Mendel, 1971).

11 Dr. Clovis Maksoud (Lebanon, 1926 - 2016) is professional diplomat appointed the first time to the Arab League, in order to establish the Arab League mission in New Delhi on February 4th, 1961. Maksoud was the Chief Representative of the League of Arab States in India from 1961 to 1966 before becoming the League's Special Envoy to the United States in 1974 (Maksoud, 1997).

12 Okyar mentions that the participants from the PLM constantly blamed world capitalism and imperialism as the partners in crime of the Zionism.

that were constantly put forward “did not make sense, and created a perception where the Palestinians seemed to be caught up in a Maoist-Communist world order,” a view that Okyar highly opposed (Okyar, 1971, p. 8). Okyar also added that the leaders’ lack of vision for the founding principles of a secular state damaged the Palestinian cause by representing the PLM’s aim not only to defeat Israel, but also to defeat the entire Western world, and “to establish a communist or Maoist order instead” (p. 8). This general perception created by the PLM’s leadership positioned the movement as a threat to the Western World, overriding its real cause of an appropriate state for the Palestinian people. Therefore, “unless the PLM determines its cause in a precise, reasonable and realistic way, and gets rid of the contradictions and illusions, it would not be able to come out from the depression and disintegration it is in that day” (Okyar, 1971, p. 9).

Okyar (p. 9) attests that there was no consensus among the Arab delegates at the symposium on the policies to be followed toward Israel. The behavior of the Egyptian diplomats proved that Egypt had an evident need for peace with Israel. Meanwhile, Palestinian spokespeople insisted on a combat policy until the end—without defining what that end is. Among the other Arab nations, Jordan was condemned for expelling PLO and the more radical PFLP from Jordan for attempting to topple Jordanian King Hussein and seize control of the country.

Final Day: Osman Okyar’s Remarks on Secular State

According to Okyar’s minutes, the morning session of the last day was reserved for delegates of various nationalities who wanted to deliver their opinion on the so far discussed matters. Okyar was among those delegates. Okyar first thanked the organizing committee and made his remarks concerning the importance of the symposium for the future of Palestine and for Palestinians who were expelled from their homeland. Then, he underlined the significance of PLM for being the sole representative to express the feelings of helplessness, hostility, and rebellion against injustice that the Palestinian people have accumulated for nearly 50 years. Including himself, Okyar stated that, clearly, for those who did not share the Palestinian experience personally, it was not proper to advise on the policy and strategy matters of the PLM. Therefore, the most he could offer was to participate in and observe the negotiations concerning the movement’s goals and provide his opinion.

Still, since the idea of a secular state that the Palestinians put forward constituted a revolutionary innovation within the context of Muslim Arab populations, Okyar thought it would be appropriate to ask a question about its formulation to further invest in the debates concerning a secular Palestinian state. The question he raised was: “Is it possible for an Islamic society or state to loosen the tight bond between the state and religion, which comes from the past and which is at the root of the religion of Islam, and to separate them, to accept the principle of equal treatment of all faiths and tolerance of different beliefs?” For Okyar, Turkey was the only state in history with an Islamic past that has experienced such a challenge in this regard. Shortly after the establishment of the Republic, Turkey entered the path of secularism by changing the constitution. The clause that acknowledged Islam as the state’s official religion was abolished. Instead, laws adopted from the West replaced the religious codes. In addition, the education branched under the clergy was abolished and replaced by the civilian one.

“Was the secularist movement successfully carried out for nearly 50 years? In other words, has it erased the reactionary/separationist tendencies in Turkey? Removed dogmatism and brought intellectual and scientific life closer to the level of modern Western states?” Unfortunately, these questions for Okyar remained to be answered, and to defend such strong claims would be an exaggeration within the limits of this symposium. Establishing a secular state was not just a simple matter of form and law. In his opinion, as he noted, secularism does not mean being hostile to religion or rejecting religion, as is sometimes thought and practiced.

On the contrary, secularism nurtured respect and tolerance for all religions by keeping religious influences at a bay of politics, science, and world affairs. Thus, secularism was a change of attitude and mentality rather than a change of shape. At least, this was, in Okyar’s words, “what Atatürk desired” (1971, p. 9). In this regard, Okyar adds, “one cannot claim that [the Republic of Turkey] had fully realized the desired transformation. But one can say that [Turkey] was moving in that direction in form and content” (p. 9) .

Okyar continued his address by adding that although transforming a religiously defined society was complex, Turkey’s experience showed that an Islamic society could move towards secularism. For that reason, the secularist goal adopted by the Palestinian movement was not an imaginary one hanging in the air. More so, the will to move towards secularism represented a genuinely revolutionary change for the Arab societies of the Middle East. During the conference, many references recognized the Palestinian cause involved the need for radical social and cultural change in the Arab masses. Maybe, the secret lay in adopting the idea of secularism by the Arab world. “As a Turk,” [Okyar] “wholeheartedly applauded the Arab nationalist movements that accepted secularism as the principal factor of their future state.”

It was somewhat inevitable for the conference, which gathered together during the most turbulent and depressive period of the Palestinian movement and the Arab world in general, to be predominated by the short-term political conflicts that overshadow the region.

Conclusion

The period between the end of the Great War in 1918 and the establishment of Israel in 1948 was an era of tremendous importance for ex-Ottoman Palestine and the Middle East, one whose consequences still echo today. These decades transformed the nations and created new countries with exogenously built states. An overt European rule of the region drew and redrew national boundaries and gave rise to new power formulations.

The Arab-Israel conflict is the product of an underlying Palestine question, which denotes the half-century struggle of the indigenous Palestinian population against Jewish nationalism. Jewish nationalism and the search for a Jewish homeland converged from Europe in the 19th century upon the Arab-inhabited territories eventually established Israel in 1948. However, the intrusion caused by Israel’s emergence as a solely Jewish state undermined the existence of its pre-existing Arab population. The series of wars launched by the surrounding Arab states in 1948, 1967, and 1973 was their response to the fatal injuries inflicted by Zionism upon Palestine and its native Arab population in

creating and expanding Israel. Therefore, the Palestine problem continues to be the origin and cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and for a long time, it was the key to its solution.

The Second International Symposium on Palestine, organized by the General Union of Palestinian Students and Kuwait Graduate Society on 13-17 February 1971, is one such effort for a solution. The conference brought together the leading intellectuals of the Palestinian Liberation Movement that emerged in 1964 under the auspices of Arab states, mainly Egypt, to examine the realization of an imagined secular democratic state in Palestine where the displacement of the Jews or the segregation of the Palestinian diaspora and the creation of an exclusively racist or religious state in Palestine—be it Jewish, Christian, or Muslim—was unacceptable and unfeasible.

Osman Okyar, an eminent Turkish scholar and intellectual, was invited by the symposium committee to observe and advise the debate concerning the formulation of a democratic secular Palestinian state. His notes concerning the meeting present insight into the discussions carried by the significant ideologues of the Palestinian Liberation Movement in the 1960s and 70s concerning the transformation of Israel and the occupied territories under a single democratic Palestinian state.

Upon his attendance at the conference, Okyar prepared detailed notes of the event where he explained the discussed program of the PLM and the prospect and principles of the future Palestinian state. During the discussions, Okyar was asked to present Turkey's approach to the current PLM statements concerning the design of a democratic and secular Palestine. The principle of secularism held the utmost importance for Okyar and, thus, for Turkey when a Palestinian state was considered.

There is no clear evidence why Okyar kept such a detailed note of the conference or with which specific appointment he attended the symposium. But evidently, he believed that the issues addressed at the meeting were far most important to the future of the Middle East and the question of Palestine. Okyar's statement divulges his intention to inform the Turkish reader about the emerging ideological currents in the Arab world on secularism and the considerations of a secular Palestinian state along with its leadership. Okyar reminding of the distant relations between Turkey and the Arab states since the end of World War I, he stresses how the peculiar political conjuncture following the late 1960s led Turkey to reconsider its position in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of its geographical proximity to the region and the political-ideological aspects of the issue. For Okyar, the uniqueness of his presence at the conference could be considered the changing political role of Turkey in Middle Eastern affairs.

For Okyar, an educated western liberal himself, the PLM's revolutionary idea for a democratic, nonsectarian, secular Palestinian state lacked clarity and elaboration and more so an effective leadership that would guide the movement. Yet, he was impressed with the PLM's efforts to "dream" of a secular state. Okyar believes that some Arab states, especially Egypt, find it very difficult to accept the proposed goal of the PLM of dissolving Israel into one single Palestinian democracy. However, the Palestinian revolution was determined to fight for it. A nonsectarian Palestine was the ultimate long-term goal of liberation as long as the dream state was concerned.

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A New Institutional Sustainability Index Regarding Local Governments: The Case of Istanbul*

Yeni Bir Kurumsal Sürdürülebilirlik Endeksi: İstanbul Örneği

Uğur Arcagök¹ , Çiğdem Arıcıgil Çılan¹ 

Abstract

The literature on institutional sustainability has largely focused on global-based analysis, and it has generally ignored to examine local-based analyses. The main purpose of this study was to measure the institutional sustainability of local governments. In this research, the intention was to develop an institutional sustainability index based on the district municipalities in the province of Istanbul, which is one of the most significant metropolises in the world. A total of 48 variables were used in the calculation of the General Institutional Sustainability Index (social dimension with 26 variables, economic dimension with 15 variables, and environmental dimension with 7 variables). The index consists of 3 sub-indexes comprising the general institutional sustainability index. The social dimension was examined in 6 sub-dimensions, the economic dimension in 5 sub-dimensions, and the environmental dimension in 4 sub-dimensions. The results indicate that Istanbul municipalities achieved low economic and environmental sustainability index scores. Decision-makers will be able to assess the general institutional sustainability index results for their own municipalities and to observe strong and weak aspects with the sub-indexes. In the process of developing the index, missing value analysis, cluster analysis, principal component analysis, and the composite index calculation methods were applied to data from 39 district municipalities in the province of Istanbul.

Keywords

Indicators, Multivariate Analysis, Institutional Sustainability, Sustainable Development and Municipality Sustainability

Öz

Kurumsal sürdürülebilirlik literatürü büyük ölçüde küresel temelli analizlere odaklanmış ve genellikle yerel temelli analizleri incelemeyi göz ardı etmiştir. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, yerel yönetimlerin kurumsal sürdürülebilirliğini ölçmektir. Bu araştırmada, dünyanın en önemli metropollerinden biri olan İstanbul ilindeki ilçe belediyelerine dayalı bir kurumsal sürdürülebilirlik endeksi geliştirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Genel Kurumsal Sürdürülebilirlik Endeksi hesaplamasında toplam 48 değişken kullanılmıştır (sosyal boyut 26 değişken, ekonomik boyut 15 değişken, çevresel boyut 7 değişken). Endeks, genel kurumsal sürdürülebilirlik endeksinin içeren 3 alt endeksten (sosyal, ekonomik ve çevresel) oluşmaktadır. Sosyal boyut 6 alt başlıkta, ekonomik boyut 5 alt başlıkta ve çevresel boyut 4 alt başlıkta incelenmiştir. Sonuçlar, İstanbul belediyelerinin düşük ekonomik ve çevresel sürdürülebilirlik endeksi skoru elde ettiğini göstermektedir. Karar vericiler, kendi belediyeleri için genel kurumsal sürdürülebilirlik endeksi sonuçlarını değerlendirebilecek ve alt endeksler ile güçlü ve zayıf yönleri gözlemleyebileceklerdir. Endeksin geliştirilme sürecinde, İstanbul ilindeki 39 ilçe belediyesinden alınan verilere Eksik Gözlem Analizi, Kümeleme Analizi, Temel Bileşenler Analizi ve Bileşik Endeks Hesaplama yöntemleri uygulanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Göstergeler, Çok Değişkenli Analiz, Kurumsal Sürdürülebilirlik, Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma ve Belediye Sürdürülebilirliği

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Introduction

The word sustainability comes from the Latin word “*sustinere*”. It is found extensively in sources with the meaning of maintaining, being continuous, ensuring, supporting, existing, continuing, and lasting (Onion, 1964). In the Cambridge Dictionary of the Environment, sustainability was defined as “the quality of causing little or no damage to the environment and therefore able to continue for a long time; the idea that goods and services should be produced in ways that do not use resources that cannot be replaced and that do not damage the environment”.

The purpose of the concept of sustainability is basically to embody ethical concerns regarding the need to sustain a suitable ecological infrastructure for future generations. Despite the concept being formulated as a universal principle, in practice, it should be distinctive and flexible regarding the local, social, cultural, political, and ecological conditions (Wiersum, 1995). Due to these reasons, many international conferences have been organized, and action plans and reports were prepared for sustainability to gain a global meaning, and become a global criterion. Sustainable development has three main dimensions, with these being social, economic, and environmental. For the actualization of sustainability, all these three dimensions need to occur simultaneously (Dillard et al., 2008).

The UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Conference) organized in Rio de Janeiro on June 3-14, 1992 was a significant step in terms of the acceptance of a series of principles regarding the adoption of environmentally-friendly regimes by nations. At the Rio Conference, also as known as Agenda 21, that shed light on this study, a different perspective regarding sustainability was proposed because decisions made or opinions regarding sustainability had a global dimension in previous periods. Along with this conference, local administrations, NGOs, other actors, and central administrations were qualified as partners in the international community. In other words, while a macro perspective was dominant regarding sustainability before Agenda 21, a micro perspective was adopted with Agenda 21. In light of this, it is considered that one of the partners in the international community with a significant role for the local dimension of sustainability is the local administrations. In the following years, some practices about the sustainability of local administrations, and especially with respect to the sustainability of municipalities were implemented. All these implementations conducted in Europe and Asia are based on the idea of Agenda 21.

Remmen (2007) suggested some concepts regarding sustainability in their study. First, economic and social sustainability is required for the occurrence of environmental sustainability, and environmental and social sustainability is required for the occurrence of economic sustainability, and environmental and economic sustainability is required for the occurrence of social sustainability (Figure 1).




Figure 1. The three dimension of sustainability

Levett (1998) emphasized that the actualization of economic activities or social activities will not be possible without the main environmental life support systems of our planet (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Russian dolls model of sustainability

The importance of this study for municipalities, one of the most significant actors in local administrations, is to ensure they can assess decisions in terms of sustainability, by developing a sustainability index that will enable them to make better decisions in the domain of sustainability. By measuring institutional sustainability, municipalities will observe the consequences of decisions they make and/or will make in terms of sustainability. In addition, municipalities will be able to compare their actions with other municipalities while assessing themselves in terms of sustainability.

The purpose of the study is to develop a new institutional sustainability index that allows for the comparison of institutional sustainability performances in local and global senses. In this regard, the study was based on the 39 district municipalities of the city of

Istanbul, which is one of the most significant metropolises in the world. It is the most crowded city in Europe, with a population of 15,519,267 according to 2019 Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) data. The municipalities are generally involved in social, economic, environmental and administration activities. In Istanbul, the municipal services are provided by 39 district municipalities, affiliated to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, with 25 located on the European side, and 14 located on the Asian side. The data for the research was obtained from activity reports recently published (2019) by the municipalities; in other words, secondary data was used. In these activity reports, the municipalities provide information regarding municipal work performed in the previous year. In addition to the activity reports published by the municipalities, the budget reports of the municipalities were examined for some information. This information was accessed for the 39 municipalities in Istanbul through the official internet pages of the municipalities. Moreover, information was requested from some public institutions (İGDAŞ, İSKİ, CK Boğaziçi Electricity Administration, Istanbul Provincial Health Directorate, and Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Security) by official letters. As the Istanbul Provincial Health Directorate and the Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Security responded negatively to our data requests, calculations were made for only 2 variables in the social dimension, and variables relevant to crime could not be accessed.

For some questions in the social dimension, data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) were used with respect to the districts. Moreover, regarding the environmental dimension, the data collected by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality was used. But air quality could not be measured individually for the 39 municipalities because there are 11 centers in total where urban air quality is measured in Istanbul. The values measured at these centers were used only for the districts where they are located, and the value of the closest district with measurement performed was used for the other 28 districts.

Istanbul is the province in Turkey that receives the highest migration, and is the most crowded in terms of population. It is one of the prominent cities from the economic, historical, and socio-cultural aspects. The city ranks 34th in the world in terms of economic size. In the list of cities per their population, it ranks first in Europe, and sixth in the world, according to ranking considering the municipal borders. In Istanbul, the municipal services are provided by 39 district municipalities, affiliated to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, with 25 located on the European side, and 14 located on the Asian side of Istanbul (TURKSTAT, 2020). For these reasons, the study was based on 39 district municipalities in Istanbul.

In this study, the duties, authorities and responsibilities of municipalities determined by laws were examined, and a variable collection form consisting of 70 questions was prepared after receiving the opinions of experts. However, 48 variables in total were used for the calculation of the General Institutional Sustainability Index (social dimension with 26 variables, economic dimension with 15 variables, and environmental dimension with 7 variables). Moreover, during the preparation of this form, studies conducted in the international domain regarding the sustainability of municipalities were also considered. This variable collection form, not only examined the social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainability, but the sub-dimensions constituting these dimensions were

also included in the scope of the investigation. In the study, the social dimension was examined with 6 sub-dimensions, the economic dimension with 5 sub-dimensions, and the environmental dimension with 4 sub-dimensions.

Literature Review

Sustainability

While transferring the concept of sustainability to the institutional level, institutional sustainability is defined as the protection of the ability of performing business while meeting the current requirements of an enterprise's stakeholders (shareholders, employees, customers), and meeting the same requirements in the future (Dyllick and Hockerts, 2002). According to the report by the Commission of the European Communities (2001), sustainability is a concept enabling companies to combine their social and environmental concerns with their commercial activities, and enabling their stakeholders to be volunteers. Unlike the previous definitions of sustainability, this definition emphasizes the voluntariness of the stakeholders.

Economic Sustainability

In economic sustainability, sustainability is addressed as an extensively defined approach based on growth that preserves and combines dynamic efficiency, which is measured as the difference between income and expenses, now and in the future (Stavins, Wagner and Wagner, 2003). At the level of corporations, financial sustainability is related to the viability, stability, or security of an enterprise. In their study, Myskova and Hajek (2017) defined economic and financial sustainability as the ability of a company to gain profit, to increase the value of invested capital, and to simultaneously reimburse its short-and long-term liabilities. Financial security is related to the long-term financial balance of a company which reflects its resistance to the negative effects of internal and external threats (Delas, Nosova, and Yafinovich, 2015). Gryglewicz (2011) advocated that the financial sustainability of a company is related to high liquidity, payment power, capital structure, and indebtedness. Dyllick, Thomas and Kai Hockerts (2002) specified that economically sustainable companies are ones that always guarantee sufficient cash flow to ensure liquidity while generating a permanent return above the average for their shareholders. Institutions with a sustainable economic policy increase their competitiveness in the market by responding to the expectations of today's investors and customers.

When examined historically, sustainability indexes are based on the distant past. The first sustainability index applied in companies was the Domini 400 Social Index and Domini Equity Mutual Fund. In the study, potential performance (monthly average variable and raw returns, Jensen's alpha and Sharpe's performance) indexes were examined arising from subjecting the investment decisions to social responsibility screening. Two unlimited comparison portfolios (S&P 500, and CRSP: Value Weighted Index) were used with the Domini 400 Social Index and Domini Equity Mutual Fund, and the results were compared. Consequently, it was decided to use CRSP (Value Weighted Index), because the desire was to minimize the effect size of low potential companies (Sauer, 1997). Compared to the previous research, the performance of the socially responsible portfolio

reviewed in the abovementioned research is not subject to the confounding effects of transaction costs, management fees, or differences in investment policy associated with actively managed mutual funds. Furthermore, this research clearly demonstrates that investors can choose socially responsible investments that are consistent with their value systems and beliefs without being forced to compromise on performance.

Social Sustainability

Friedman (2007) interpreted social sustainability as “enterprises having a single responsibility; it is to remain in the state of making profit in the long term by playing the game per its rules without involving deceit, by participating in free competition, and by using the resources of the enterprise.” McKenzie (2004) stated in their report that social sustainability was the formation of equal access to significant services such as health, education, transportation and shelter, of equality among generations, of the cultural relationship system, and ensuring extensive political participation especially at the local level, and the formation of mechanisms where the requirements are defined.

Eighteen common social indicators were defined in 2000 for the elimination of poverty by the European Union, and approved in December 2001 by the Social Protection Committee of the European Union. These 18 indicators encompass the four significant dimensions of social sustainability: poverty (financial), health, employment, and education. In June 2006, the Social Protection Committee added two more dimensions, i.e., the protection of social life and social sustainability, involving 14 additional indicators. These indicators were recently adopted inclusive goals consisting of 14 indicators, which intend to reflect “social adaptation” and the “growth of the Lisbon Strategy and its interaction with business goals”. Social sustainability gained a structure consisting of three parts: social inclusion, pensions, and health and long-term care (Adelle and Pallemarts, 2009). In 2019, new goals were defined for 2020, and the structure was explained more clearly (European Commission- Social Protection Committee, 2019). However, the unforeseen COVID-19 pandemic has led to failures in the realization of these goals, as was reported in the 2021 annual report (European Commission- Social Protection Committee, 2021). The committee now needs to address the longer-term socio-economic impacts of the pandemic and take into consideration future global crises.

Environmental Sustainability

In ecological terms, sustainable companies are ones that consume natural resources only below the renewal rate of the resource, or at the rate of development of their substitute. They don't cause emissions beyond the capacity of the natural system for absorbing or suppressing these emissions. They are not involved in activities which will decrease the activity of the ecosystem (Dyllick and Hockerts, 2002). If industrial structures consume more energy and material than can be renewed, or if they cause emissions at an amount higher than the volume that can be absorbed by nature, the industrial system becomes ecologically unsustainable (Ayres and Simonis, 1994). In the second part of the Brundtland report, sustainable environment was examined under six dimensions as population and human capital, food security, ecosystems and types, energy, industry, and urban struggle (Imperatives, 1987).

In general, indicators relevant to air pollution, climate change, biological diversity, consumption of natural resources, urban problems, waste generation, water pollution, population, health, and diseases, among environmental indicators, are most frequently used (OECD, 1991). The assessment of environmental tendencies at the level of the European Union and its member states is based on the assessment of indicators. Thirty indicators were used to measure the 27 environmental tendencies defined by the European Union in 2008 for Environmental Resource Planning (ERP). The indicators cover the key environment issues: climate change, energy, nature, biological diversity, health, natural resources, wastes, economy, and practices. These indicators were also divided into groups as circumstances, pressure, responsibility, effect, and driving force indicators (Biesbroek et al., 2010).

Institutional Sustainability in Local Governments

Institutional sustainability indicators can help individuals, communities, organizations, businesses, local and national government to better understand the implications of sustainability actions and encourage them to act in a more sustainable way. Studies on the sustainability of local governments differ in the number of dimensions covered. The dimensions considered in these studies range from one to four, with most of them involving three dimensions. Also, as in the current study, most of the studies on the sustainability of local governments are based on Local Agenda 21.

The most relevant research among those investigating sustainability as one or two dimensions was conducted in the Reggio Emilia area of Italy (North Italy) and the city of Coventry in England. Sustainability was examined as one dimension (i.e., environmental) in Reggio Emilia, while it was examined as two dimensions (i.e., environmental and social & economic) in Coventry. The environmental status of 45 municipalities located in Reggio Emilia was examined using 25 indicators and the municipalities were ranked using Multi-Criteria Analysis (Ferrarini, Bodini and Becchi, 2001). For the city of Coventry, on the other hand, sustainability was examined as two dimensions, the environmental dimension (involving eight indicators) and the social & economic dimension (involving 12 indicators). Researchers developed an environmental indicator system, which covered the generated and recycled domestic wastes, habitats for wildlife, domestic water consumption, electricity consumption, water quality, and air quality (Coventry Agenda 21, 2008). These two studies mainly focused on the environmental dimension of sustainability.

Several other studies examined sustainability as a three-dimensional construct. For example, studies conducted in Algarve (Portugal), Galicia (Spain), and Shanghai (China) municipalities assessed sustainability using three dimensions: social, economic, and environmental. In the Algarve study, data was collected from all the municipalities in the region through a questionnaire, and a profile of the region was created. As a result, a sustainable development index consisting of 20 common indicators for municipal sustainability was developed (Mascarenhas et al., 2010). In Galicia, sustainability was assessed using 38 indicators relating to the three dimensions of sustainability and the data was analyzed using the *Analytical Hierarchy Process* (Gonzalez et al., 2019). The common feature of the Algarve and Galicia studies is that they both are regional-scale studies.

The Shanghai study also measured sustainability as composed of social, economic, and environmental dimensions and measured sustainability using 86 indicators (Yuan et al., 2003). Lastly, a six-year-long project (1995-2001) that offered policy recommendations to improve quality of life and sustainable development conducted by the local government of Bristol assessed sustainability under three dimensions but with a nuance. The study operationalized sustainability as a construct consisting of environmental, ecological, and social dimensions (McMahon, 2002).

Finally, some studies examined sustainability under four dimensions. In the study conducted in the municipality of Padua (Italy), local sustainability was assessed by 61 indicators grouped under four dimensions: protecting the environment, developing the economy, ensuring social solidarity, and health/justice. The study conducted in the Milanowek (Poland) municipality, on the other hand, operationalized sustainability as consisting of environmental, social, economic, and institutional dimensions with six strategic purposes and 21 indicators (Gutowska, Śleszyński, and Grodzinska, 2012). In sum, most studies involve the three widely accepted dimensions of sustainability (i.e., social, economic, and environmental). Therefore, we employed these three dimensions to operationalize sustainability in the current study.

Methodology

Variable Collection Form

The variables for the research were selected based on international studies on the sustainability of municipalities related to Agenda 21. They comprise variables regarding the issues under the duty, authority, and responsibility of municipalities where the implementation was performed; in other words, regarding issues covered by the municipal law. In the determination of variables based on municipal law, the opinions of specialists (academics, engineers, and members of NGOs) who previously worked and conducted studies on this issue were sought. In the study, which intended to research the institutional sustainability of municipalities with 70 variables in total, index calculations were made with 48 variables due to the lack of recorded data, inability to access enough data, and variables being eliminated as a result of principal component analysis.




Figure 3. Research design.

Missing Value Analysis

Before starting the cluster analysis, the variables in the data set were normalized, and converted to the range of 0-1. The reason for the use of the following normalization method is to eliminate outliers among the unit values of the variables.

$$\text{Normalization} = \frac{x_i - \min(x_i)}{\max(x_i) - \min(x_i)} \tag{1}$$

Afterwards, cluster analysis was applied to assign missing values. Primarily, the districts were clustered per their sustainability indicators. The central tendency measure (arithmetic mean for quantitative variables, and mode for qualitative variables) of the cluster, where the relevant district was present, was assigned to the missing values.

Principal Component Analysis

Principal component analysis was separately applied to social, economic, and environmental variables that constitute the general institutional sustainability. The variables, whose component load was 0.55 and more, were included in the calculations of the index. The weights of sub-indexes (social, economic, environmental) of the general institutional sustainability index were also determined per the results of principal component analysis. For instance, principal component analysis was applied to 7 environmental variables with a component load greater than 0.55. In this case, for the calculation of general institutional sustainability index, the weight of the environmental sub-index (W_{ENV}) was 7/48 (here, 48 is the total variable number included in the index calculations). When performing index calculations, as high values of some variables would be disadvantageous, these variables were subtracted from 1 before being used in the index calculation (Expense: E6, E7, E8, E9, E10, E11, Loan: E18, E19, Use of Natural Resources: ENV4 Waste Management: ENV9).

Index

The general institutional sustainability index (GISI) consists of 3 sub-indexes of social, economic, and environmental. The general institutional sustainability composite index is calculated with the following formula:

$$GISI = [W_S I_S + W_E I_E + W_{ENV} I_{ENV}] \tag{2}$$

Here, the weights were defined as follows:

$$W_S = \frac{\text{Number of Social indicators included in the calculation of index}}{\text{Total number of variables in all dimensions}} \tag{3}$$

$$W_E = \frac{\text{Number of Economic indicators included in the calculation of index}}{\text{Total number of variables in all dimensions}} \tag{4}$$

$$W_{Env} = \frac{\text{Number of Environmental indicators included in the calculation of index}}{\text{Total number of variables in all dimensions}} \tag{5}$$

The calculations for Istanbul’s general institutional sustainability index, and its sub-indexes are as follows:

$$I_S = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_s} x_i}{n_s}, \quad I_E = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n_e} x_j}{n_e}, \quad I_{ENV} = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{n_{env}} x_k}{n_{env}} \quad (6)$$

I_S	: Social sub – index
I_E	: Economic sub – index
I_{ENV}	: Environmental sub – index
x_i	: i^{th} value of social variable
x_j	: j^{th} value of economic variable
x_k	: k^{th} value of environmental variable
n_s	: Number of Social indicators included in the calculation of index (26)
n_e	: Number of Economic indicators included in the calculation of index (15)
n_{env}	: Number of Environmental indicators included in the calculation of index (7)

Results

Missing Value Analysis

Cluster analysis was applied to the data set without missing values, which consisted of 35 variables. Similar clusters were formed for sustainability, and central tendency measures (arithmetic mean for quantitative variables, and mode for qualitative variables) of districts were assigned to missing values. Before performing cluster analysis, normalization (min. value 0, max. value 1) was applied to compare and interpret the observed values.

Taking into consideration integration coefficients of algorithms for hierarchical cluster analysis used for clustering, Ward’s minimum variance method was selected (Table 1).

Table 1
Integration coefficients of Hierarchical Clustering Analysis

Average	Single	Complete	Ward
0.90562	0.79558	0.95251	0.96951

To decide the number of clusters, the elbow and silhouette methods were used. According to methods, 4 clusters emerged as seen in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Results of Elbow and Silhouette methods

When the number of clusters was selected as 4 in non-hierarchical (K-means) cluster method, the districts, which were present in clusters obtained with hierarchical cluster

analysis, were the same (Figure 5). As specified previously, the central tendency measures for the relevant cluster were assigned to districts with missing values.




Figure 5. Result of hierarchical cluster analysis.

Principal Component Analysis

After the assignment of missing values, principal component analysis was applied for each dimension (social, economic, and environmental) of institutional sustainability. For the principal components, the variables with a component load greater than 0.55 were used for the calculation of the index. In addition, the result of the Quartimax method, an orthogonal rotation method, indicated that there are more meaningful and interpretable relationships than varimax. For these reasons, the Quartimax method was used in the principal component analysis for social, economic and environmental dimensions.

Results of Principal Component Analysis for Variables in the Social Dimension (Table 2).

Table 2
The List of Variables Forming the Social Dimension

Code of Variable	Sub-Dimension	Description of Variable
S1	Population	Measures the population of the district. ¹
S2		Measures the ratio of population of women living in the district to the population of the district. ²
S4		Measures the number of individuals per m ² in the district. ¹
S5		Measures the ratio of individuals of age 16 and younger living in the district to the population of district. ¹
S6		Measures the ratio of individuals of age 65 and older living in the district to the population of district. ¹
S7		Measures the population increase at the district in the last 5 years. ¹
S8		Employment

S14	Governance	Measures the total number of council members at the municipality. ³
S15		Measures the ratio of number of female council members at the municipality to the number of total council members. ³
S16		Measures the rate of valid votes at the recent municipal elections. ¹
S17_1	Education	Measures the ratio of illiterate individuals at the district to the population of the district. ²
S17_2		Measures the ratio of the number of individuals at the district with elementary school and less educational level to the population of district. ²
S17_3		Measures the ratio of the number of individuals at the district with secondary school educational level to the population of district. ²
S17_4		Measures the ratio of the number of individuals at the district with high school educational level to the population of district. ²
S17_5		Measures the ratio of the number of individuals at the district with undergraduate educational level to the population of district. ²
S17_6		Measures the ratio of the number of individuals at the district with postgraduate educational level to the population of district. ²
S22	Health	Measures the distance between the municipality, and the closest hospital/clinic. ¹
S23		Measures the number of health institution operated or owned by the municipality. ³
S29		Measures the number of damaged buildings at the district. ³
S31_1	Cultural Events	Measures the total number of museums at the district. ²
S31_2		Measures the total number of libraries at the district. ²
S31_3		Measures the total number of locations at the district that operate as art gallery. ²
S31_4		Measures the total number of locations at the district where theatres are being performed. ²
S31_5		Measures the total number of locations at the district where movies are being shown. ²
S31_6		Measures the total number of locations at the district where sports activities are being performed. ²
S32		Measures whether the district has guest house, or not. ³
<p>¹ González-García, S., Rama, M., Cortés, A., García-Guaita, F., Núñez, A., Louro, L. G., ... & Feijoo, G. (2019). Embedding environmental, economic and social indicators in the evaluation of the sustainability of the municipalities of Galicia (northwest of Spain). <i>Journal of Cleaner Production</i>, 234, 27-42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.06.158</p> <p>² Mascarenhas, A., Coelho, P., Subtil, E., & Ramos, T. B. (2010). The role of common local indicators in regional sustainability assessment. <i>Ecological indicators</i>, 10(3), 646-656.</p> <p>³Turkey Municipality Law (Law No:5393)</p>		

According to the KMO index value (0.505) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (0.000), it is understood that principal component analysis can be applied to the variables forming the social dimension.

In the data set forming the social dimension, the number of principal components were determined based on the Eigenvalue criterion. There were 7 principal components with

an eigenvalue greater than 1. All 7 principal components define 77.015% of the total variance.

The common variance (communalities) of all the variables forming the social dimension is greater than 0.5.

In the component matrix, variables with a loading value greater than 0.55 were used for the calculation of this sub-dimension of the institutional sustainability index. According to this, the 1st principal component represents education (S17_1, S17_2, S17_3, S17_4, S17_5, S17_6) and population (S2, S5, and S6) variables. The 2nd principal component contains variables with a load of 0.55 and more (S31_2, S31_4, S31_5, S31_6, S1, S14) which mainly measure cultural activities. The 3rd principal component includes variables with a load of 0.55 and more (S7, S22) that specify population and health. The 4th principal component contains variables with a load of 0.55 and more representing population (S4) and governance (S14, S16). The 5th principal component represents cultural activities with the variables S31_3. The 6th principal component, mainly examines cultural activities (S32). The 7th principal component is expressed by the variables that mainly (variables with a load of 0.55 and more) examine employment (S8), and measure health (S23).

Results of Principal Components Analysis Applied to Variables in the Economic Dimension (Table 3).

Table 3
The List of Variables Forming the Economic Dimension

Code of Variable	Sub-Dimension	Description of Variable
E1	Income	Measures the rate per person of the revenue obtained by the municipality. ³
E2		Measures the average income of the households at the district. ³
E4		Measures the rate per person of the expense by the municipality. ³
E6	Expense	Measures the rate per person of total expenditure made by the municipality for socio-cultural, art, science, and sports events. ³
E7		Measures the rate per person of municipality's expenses for ceremonies, hosting and presentation. ³
E8		Measures the rate per person of municipality's total lawsuit pursuit and execution expenses. ³
E9		Measures the rate per person of the total amount of services and aids provided for low-income, poor, needy and orphan individuals. ³
E10		Measures the rate per person of total expenses made for procurement, construction, maintenance and repair of municipal buildings, facilities, and vehicles and materials.
E11		Measures the rate per person of all kinds of infrastructure, construction, repair and maintenance expenses of the municipality. ³
E12	Income or Expense	Measures the rate per person of the municipality's total budget. ³
E13		Measures the rate per person of municipality's total budget deficit or surplus. ³
E15	Invest	Measures the rate per person of the municipality's total investments. ³
E16		Measures the rate per person of total number of beds at the hotels located within the borders of the municipality. ³

E18	Debt	Measures the rate per person of total liabilities of the municipality in the recent 1 year. ³
E19		Measures the rate per person of municipality's total interest and borrowing costs. ³

According to the KMO index value (0.55) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (0.000), it is clear that principal components analysis can be applied to the variables forming the economic dimension.

In the data set forming the economic dimension, the number of principal components was determined based on the Eigenvalue criterion. There were 6 components with an Eigenvalue greater than 1. All 6 principal components define 83.11% of the total variance, and the communality value of all the variables included in the analysis is greater than 0.5.

The 1st principal component represents the variables about income (E1, E2), income/expense (E12, E13), and loan (E18, E19) (variables with a load of 0.55 and more). The 2nd principal component was observed to include variables (E8, E18) with a load of 0.55 and more measuring expense and loan. The 3rd principal component contains variables with a load of 0.55 and more specifying expense and investment (E11, E15). The 4th principal component has variables with a load of 0.55 and more representing expense (E7, E10). The 5th principal component was represented by variables examining cultural activities (E6, E9) (variables with a load of 0.55 and more). The 6th principal component included the variable E16, with a load greater than 0.55, representing investments.

Results of Principal Components Analysis Applied to Variables in the Environmental Dimension (Table 4).

Table 4
The List of Variables Forming the Environmental Dimension

Code of Variable	Sub-Dimension	Description of Variable
ENV1	Air Quality	Measures the average O ₃ concentration (Mg/m ³) in air within the borders of the district. ¹
ENV2		Measures the average NO ₂ concentration (Mg/m ³) in air within the borders of the district. ¹
ENV3		Measures the average PM10 amount (Mg/m ³) in air within the borders of the district. ¹
ENV5	Use of Natural Sources	Measures the ratio of average electricity amount (mwh) consumed at lodgings within the borders of the district to the population. ¹
ENV9	Waste Management	Measures the ratio of total solid waste amount collected within the borders of the district to population. ¹
ENV12	Eco School	Measures the total number of schools located within the borders of the district. ²
ENV13		Measures the total number of eco-schools (having green flag) located within the borders of the district. ²

According to the KMO index value (0.563) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (0.000), principal components analysis can be applied to variables forming the environmental dimension.

In the data set forming the environmental dimension, the number of principal components was determined based on the Eigenvalue criterion. There were 3 components with an Eigenvalue greater than 1. All 3 principal components define 78.06% of the total

variance, and the communality value of all the variables included in the analysis was greater than 0.5.

The 1st principal component included variables with a load greater than 0.55 (ENV1, ENV2, and ENV3) measuring air quality. The 2nd principal component contained variables with a load greater than 0.55 (ENV12, and ENV13) representing ecological education. The 3rd principal component represents the use of natural resources (ENV5) and amount of waste (ENV9). Here, the loads for variables ENV5 and ENV9 are again greater than 0.55.

Index

Principal component analysis was applied individually for each sub-dimension, and the variables with a component load greater than 0.55 were included in the calculation of the index. A total of 48 variables were used in the calculation of general institutional sustainability index (social dimension 26 variables, economic dimension 15 variables, environmental dimension 7 variables). The purpose of the study was to calculate the social, economic, and environmental sub-indexes of general institutional sustainability for 39 districts in Istanbul. First, Istanbul’s institutional sustainability indexes were calculated based on the averages of 39 districts. Thus, this would enable the assessment of whether the index values obtained for the 39 districts were above or below the average for Istanbul.

The calculation of Istanbul’s general institutional sustainability index and its sub-indexes is as follows:

$$W_S = \frac{26}{48} = 0.54166, \quad W_E = \frac{15}{48} = 0.31250, \quad W_S = \frac{7}{48} = 0.14583 \quad (1)$$

The calculation of sub-indexes;

$$I_{S(ISTANBUL)} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_s} x_i}{n_s} = \frac{8.5}{26} = 0.32690 \quad (2)$$

$$I_{E(ISTANBUL)} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n_e} x_j}{n_e} = \frac{8.4}{15} = 0.55979 \quad (3)$$

$$I_{ENV(ISTANBUL)} = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{n_{env}} x_k}{n_{env}} = \frac{2.52}{7} = 0.36007 \quad (4)$$

Then, the GISI will be as follows;

$$GISI = [0.54166 * (0.32690) + 0.31250 * (0.55979) + 0.14583 * (0.36007)] = 0.4045 \quad (5)$$

When these index scores are multiplied by 100, they can be interpreted as 32.69%, 55.979%, 36%, and 40.45%, respectively.

When the general institutional sustainability index scores are examined, the district of Kadıköy is the most successful municipality for general institutional sustainability. Along with Kadıköy, the districts of Beşiktaş, Küçükçekmece, Bakırköy, Maltepe, Kağıthane, Başakşehir, Şişli, Pendik, Ümraniye, Beylikdüzü, Esenyurt, Fatih, Üsküdar, Bahçelievler, Eyüpsultan, Kartal, Ataşehir, Bağcılar, and Beyoğlu are above the average for Istanbul (40.45%) in terms of general institutional sustainability (Table 5, Figure 6).

Table 5
General Institutional Sustainability Index Scores of 39 Municipalities of Istanbul




Figure 6. Map of general institutional sustainability index scores of 39 municipalities of Istanbul based on quartile range

When the social sustainability sub-index scores are examined, the district of Küçükçekmece is the most successful municipality for social institutional sustainability. Along with Küçükçekmece, the districts of Kadıköy, Kağıthane, Eyüpsultan, Başakşehir, Bakırköy, Ataşehir, Beylikdüzü, Beşiktaş, Bahçelievler, Maltepe, Esenyurt, and Ümraniye

are above the average for Istanbul (32.69%) in terms of social institutional sustainability (Table 6, Figure 7).

Table 6
Social Sub-Index Scores of 39 Municipalities of Istanbul

Municipalities	SSI (%)
Küçükçekmece	48.74
Kadıköy	48.48
Kâğıthane	45.52
Eyüpsultan	42.32
Başakşehir	41.39
Bakırköy	39.06
Ataşehir	37.14
Beylikdüzü	36.62
Beşiktaş	36.26
Bahçelievler	35.59
Maltepe	33.66
Esenyurt	33.52
Ümraniye	32.85
Pendik	32.22
Üsküdar	30.69
Sancaktepe	30.15
Kartal	30.12
Fatih	29.52
Tuzla	28.76
Bağcılar	28.58
Esenler	28.15
Sarıyer	27.47
Şişli	27.41
Zeytinburnu	27.07
Büyükçekmece	26.65
Bayrampaşa	26.52
Arnavutköy	25.74
Sultanbeyli	25.48
Sultangazi	25.19
Beykoz	24.39
Avcılar	23.86
Güngören	23.83
Gaziosmanpaşa	23.62
Çatalca	22.96
Beyoğlu	22.57
Çekmeköy	21.65
Silivri	19.44
Şile	17.25
Adalar	15.88




Figure 7. Map of social sub-index scores of 39 municipalities of Istanbul based on quartile ranges

When the economic sustainability sub-index scores are examined, the district of Başakşehir is the most successful municipality for economic institutional sustainability. Along with Başakşehir, the districts of Beşiktaş, Bakırköy, Beyoğlu, Beykoz, Kadıköy,

and Fatih are above the average for Istanbul (55.97%) in terms of economic institutional sustainability (Table 7, Figure 8).

Table 7
Economic Sub-Index Scores of 39 Municipalities of Istanbul




Figure 8. Map of economic sub-index scores of 39 municipalities of Istanbul based on quartile ranges

When the environmental sustainability sub-index scores are examined, the district of Beşiktaş is the most successful municipality for environmental institutional sustainability.

Along with Beşiktaş, the districts of Bakırköy, Şişli, Başakşehir, Adalar, Tuzla, Üsküdar, Sarıyer, Fatih, Beyoğlu, Kadıköy, Çekmeköy, Maltepe Beylikdüzü, Şile, Büyükçekmece, Bağcılar, Pendik, Ümraniye, Beykoz, and Kartal are above the average for Istanbul (33.47%) in terms of environmental institutional sustainability (Table 8, Figure 9).

Table 8
Environmental Sub-Index Scores of 39 Municipalities of Istanbul




Figure 9. Map of environmental sub-index scores of 39 municipalities of Istanbul based on quartile ranges

Sustainability studies conducted in European municipalities (Bristol, Coventry, Padua, Reggio Emilia, Algarve, Galicia, Milanowek) highlighted the need for improvement in environmental and social issues. In the Shanghai study, however, economic sustainability stands out. In the current study, the average sustainability scores of Istanbul municipalities in the social (30.16%) and environmental (33.47%) dimensions were lower than the average scores in the economic (50.62%) dimension, highlighting the need for improvement in social and environmental issues. In this regard, our results are similar to those of the European municipalities.

Discussion

The results of our study showed that Istanbul municipalities achieved low scores on environmental and social dimensions. The fact that the economic activities of the municipalities are legally limited by the national government may explain the higher score on the economic dimension compared to the social and environmental dimensions. When our results are compared to the results of the sustainability studies conducted in European municipalities, concerns about environmental and social issues come to the forefront more than economic issues. This suggests that Istanbul, as a European municipality, deals with issues similar to other European municipalities.

Some of the known basic problems of Istanbul municipalities have been revealed with this study. The results obtained by the index used in the current study are in line with the actual problems of Istanbul municipalities. For example, our results showed that the weakest aspect of Istanbul municipalities in social dimension was urban transformation. Indeed, it is well acknowledged that there is a serious urban transformation problem in Istanbul (Korkut, 2004). Recently, some incentives and aids have been introduced by the national and local governments to solve the urban transformation problem. The other weakest aspect was the air quality in the environmental dimension. This is also a well-known issue, as Istanbul is the most populated and the most industrialized city in Turkey. The irregular migration and irregular industrial settlement adversely affect the air quality of Istanbul (Doğan, 2013). Similarly, the weakest aspect in the economic dimension was income, which is also not surprising, as municipalities are non-profit institutions in Turkey (Turkey Municipality Law: 5393).

The results are also consistent for the strongest aspects of Istanbul municipalities. In the social dimension is governance, waste management in the environmental dimension, and use of and debt in the economy dimension. Istanbul had a high score on the waste management sub-dimension, which is also evident in real-life applications. For example, Istanbul municipalities introduced an eco-friendly practice to solve the waste management problem by applying Smart Recycling Containers to encourage recycling (Tezel & Yıldız, 2020). The other strongest aspect was the debt in the economic dimension, which is also an expected result, as their debt is limited by the national government of Turkey (Turkey Municipality Law: 5393).

When Istanbul is assessed in terms of districts, the results indicate that municipalities should give more importance to institutional sustainability operations. The sustainability index values for all municipalities in Turkey can be calculated if cooperation and agreements are made with the municipalities. Decision-makers will be able to assess

the general institutional sustainability index result for their own municipalities, and to observe strong and weak aspects by virtue of the sub-indexes.

In this study, an institutional sustainability index of the local governments was calculated for the first time in Turkey. The study is distinctive in this sense. It is considered that periodic calculations of general and sub institutional sustainability indexes developed in this study by the municipalities will increase the reputation of the municipalities, and ensure the municipalities monitor their own development related to social, economic, and environmental issues. Also, municipalities will have the opportunity to compare themselves with their rivals. Thanks to these indexes, decision-makers will be able to assess the general institutional sustainability index for their own municipalities, and to observe strong and weak aspects by virtue of the sub-indexes.

Research Limitations

While creating the Variable Collection Form based on questions in international studies investigating the sustainability of municipalities based on Agenda 21, inquiries were made about the duties, authorities and responsibilities of the municipalities where our study was implemented. The remaining questions were prepared based on municipal law by which the duties, authorities and responsibilities of municipalities are determined. In the preparation of questions based on municipal law, the opinions of specialists (academics, engineers, and members of NGOs), who previously worked and conducted studies on this issue, were obtained. In the study, which intended to research the institutional sustainability of municipalities with 70 questions (variables) in total, data for 48 questions could be used for a variety of reasons (lack of recording of data, lack of accessing sufficient number of data and failure of variables in the analyses). In other words, the sustainability index values for 39 municipalities in Istanbul, used as a case in practice, were calculated depending on 48 variables. Last but not least, some sub-dimensions in our study may not be relevant for every municipality, as the duties of municipalities differ by country. The index might be needed to be revised so as to better encompass the specific issues of other municipalities.

Future Research

This study identified that Istanbul municipalities have weaknesses in the social and environmental dimensions. Future research could focus on social and environmental issues specifically, determine the reasons for the failings in these domains, and offer policy recommendations for amending these problems.

Today, there are widely accepted indexes for measuring the sustainability of countries. However, index studies for municipal sustainability have remained at a regional or local scale. One reason for this is that the duties and authorities of municipalities differ by country, which makes a global index for municipal sustainability difficult. Future research could find ways to tackle these differences and offer a global index that could allow for the comparison of municipalities from all around the world.

If cooperation and agreements are made with municipalities, the sustainability index values for municipalities may be calculated in future projects. The sustainability indexes that we developed may be used for calculating the sustainability indexes of local

administrations, not only in Turkey, but also in different countries. Thus, this study will not just ensure the calculation of local sustainability indexes, but it may also contribute to the calculation of sustainability indexes for municipalities in different countries.

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Measuring the Level of Party Institutionalization in Turkey

Türkiye’de Parti Kurumsallaşma Düzeyinin Ölçülmesi

Mustafa Bölükbaşı¹

Abstract

The main aim of this research is to combine theoretical approaches to party institutionalization with empirical operationalization. This study provides a systematic operationalization of the concept of party institutionalization using different indicators in the case of Turkish democracy. Although there has been extensive literature on the Turkish party system, there has been little discussion on party institutionalization in Turkey. The main weakness of most research is the failure to address how to quantify and measure party institutionalization. To overcome this problem, this paper offers the Party Institutionalization Index (PII). The PII is produced by the systematic operationalization of four dimensions of party institutionalization: stability, systemness, reification, and rootedness. The research shows that a political party may have significantly different scores in each dimension. This study argues that political parties with higher membership strength, geographically large-scale units, higher chronological age, more leadership changes, lower electoral volatility, and greater electoral success will become more institutionalized and survive longer. The results indicate that the CHP is the most institutionalized party in Turkey. This study also shows that political parties in Turkey, except for the HDP, display a relatively high level of institutionalization.

Keywords

Party institutionalization, Party organization, Turkish politics, Political parties in Turkey

Öz

Bu araştırmanın temel amacı, parti kurumsallaşmasına yönelik kuramsal yaklaşımları, ampirik operasyonelleştirmeye bir araya getirmektir. Bu çalışma, Türkiye demokrasisi örneğinde, farklı göstergeler kullanarak parti kurumsallaşması kavramının sistematik bir operasyonelleştirmesini sunmaktadır. Türk parti sistemi hakkında oldukça geniş bir literatür bulunmasına rağmen, Türkiye’de parti kurumsallaşması hakkında çok az tartışma yapılmıştır. Çoğu araştırmanın en zayıf noktası, parti kurumsallaşmasının nasıl ölçüleceği sorusuna yeterli bir cevap vermemesidir. Bu sorunun üstesinden gelebilmek için, bu makale Parti Kurumsallaşma Endeksi’ni (PII) önermektedir. PII, parti kurumsallaşmasının dört boyutunun sistematik olarak operasyonelleştirilmesiyle elde edilmektedir: istikrar, sistemlilik, somutlaştırma ve kökleşme. Bu araştırma, bir siyasi partinin her bir boyutta önemli ölçüde farklı puanlara sahip olabileceğini göstermektedir. Bu çalışma, daha yüksek üyelik gücüne, coğrafi olarak yaygın büyük ölçekli örgütlere, daha yüksek kronolojik yaşa, daha fazla sayıda lider değişimine, daha düşük düzeyde seçim oynaklığına ve daha büyük seçim başarısına sahip siyasi partilerin daha fazla kurumsallaşacağını ve daha uzun süre varlığını sürdüreceğini öne sürmektedir. Bu araştırmanın bulguları, kurumsallaşma düzeyi en yüksek olan partinin CHP olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda HDP dışındaki siyasi partilerin görece yüksek düzeyde kurumsallaşma sergilediğine işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Parti kurumsallaşması, Parti örgütlenmesi, Türk siyaseti, Türkiye’de siyasi partiler

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Introduction

Party institutionalization is a major area of interest within the field of political science (Harmel, Svåsand, & Mjelde, 2018). There is, however, no agreement on what party institutionalization implies. In the literature on political organizations, institutionalization has different interpretations. As a result, the argument over how to scientifically quantify institutionalization is still ongoing (Musella & Vercesi, 2019: 226).

Party institutionalization has been linked to different properties, such as autonomy, adaptability, complexity, and coherence (Huntington, 1968), electoral continuity (Rose & Mackie, 1988), reification (Janda, 1980), systemness and autonomy (Panebianco, 1988), behavioral routinization and value infusion (Levitsky, 1998), rootedness, routinization, and reification (Harmel & Svåsand, 1993), systemness, decisional autonomy, reification, and value infusion (Randall & Svåsand, 2002), and autonomy, internal coherence, roots in society, and level of organization (Basedau & Stroh, 2008).

As a concept, party institutionalization has largely emerged in the context of Western industrialized countries (Randall & Svåsand, 2002: 6). Recently, however, there has been a growing body of literature that examines party institutionalization in different regions such as Eastern Europe (Travits, 2013), Latin America (Dix, 1992; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995), Asia (Manacra & Tan, 2005; Ufen, 2007; Hicken & Kuchonta, 2014), and Africa (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Basedau & Stroh, 2008; Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014). The concept has significantly improved, as it has moved across the world (Bolleyer & Ruth-Lovell, 2019: 176).

Although there has been extensive literature on the Turkish party system (Bölükbaşı, 2021; Arslantaş, Arslantaş, & Kaiser, 2020; Sayarı, 2016; Gümüşçü, 2013; Çarkoğlu, 2011; Sayarı, 2007; Sayarı, 2002; Özbudun, 2000; Çarkoğlu, 1998), there has been little discussion on party institutionalization in Turkey. In a comparative analysis of party institutionalization in Turkey and Southern Europe, Yardımçı-Geyikçi (2015) examined party institutionalization in terms of roots in society and organizational development and found that political parties in Turkey are somewhat institutionalized. In a recent study, Kumbaracıbaşı offered an alternative model (the trade-off model) to explain party institutionalization in Turkey and concluded that autonomy and systemness, two important dimensions of institutionalization, are “not always positively correlated” (2020: 240). Such studies, however, have failed to operationalize institutionalization and could not provide a single measurement or index of party institutionalization by combining different dimensions. Öney and Selck (2017), on the other hand, provided indicators to measure different dimensions of institutionalization such as the strength of party organization, the party roots in society, and the legitimacy of parties, yet they treated the institutionalization of individual parties as a subcomponent of the whole party system. However, party institutionalization and party system institutionalization are not always “mutually compatible” (Randall & Svåsand, 2002: 6). Whereas individual parties become organizationally institutionalized, the system they function in can be deinstitutionalized (Bértoa, 2017: 3).

This study broadens the understanding of party institutionalization by moving beyond developed Western democracies. This paper investigates the factors determining party

institutionalization. By proposing viable indicators, the main aim of this research is to combine theoretical approaches to party institutionalization with empirical operationalization. This paper has been divided into three main parts. The first part deals with the conceptualization of party institutionalization. It presents a review of the interpretations of party institutionalization as well as a multidimensional definition of the concept. The second part gives an overview of the history and characteristics of the political parties in Turkey. The third part provides a systematic operationalization of the concept of party institutionalization using different indicators in the case of Turkish democracy.

Conceptualizing Party Institutionalization

Research into institutionalization in political science has a long history. However, it was Huntington (1968) who first systematically investigated the stability of political parties and applied the notion of institutionalization to political party analysis (Bértoa, 2017). For Huntington (1968: 12), institutionalization means “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.” He maintains that a political party becomes institutionalized when it manages to develop mechanisms to prevent excessive personalization and survive a longer period after the founding fathers leave office. For this to happen, party members must weaken their commitment to the goals of the organization but strengthen their commitment to the maintenance of the organization itself (Levitsky, 1998).

Huntington identifies adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence as the major dimensions of institutionalization. Adaptability refers to longevity, namely, the capacity to survive the first generation of party leadership. Organizational complexity involves the multiplication and differentiation of internal sub-units. Autonomy can be broadly defined as the extent to which political institutions have interests and values distinct from those of other institutions and social groupings. Coherence is the degree of agreement on procedures for resolving conflict in the organization. Randal and Svasand (2002: 10) suggest that while autonomy and coherence are separate attributes in theory, they are often interconnected in practice. Huntington’s concept has been widely used in studies on political change in general, as well as studies on party politics (Weissenbach & Bukow, 2019: 162).

Like Huntington, Panebianco also emphasizes the importance of organizational characteristics in his conceptualization. For Panebianco, autonomy and systemness are two correlated dimensions of institutionalization. He argues that institutionalization means “a process by which followers develop an interest in the survival of a party independent of its current leadership” (1988: 53). In other words, the party’s survival becomes valuable in and of itself rather than a tool to achieve other goals. This will require the development of a useful internal incentive structure that provides both selective rewards for people interested in leadership and more collective incentives that create a diffuse commitment to the party (Randall & Svasand, 2002: 10). It is worth noting that his definition is similar to Huntington’s conceptualization. Huntington and Panebianco both stress the importance of autonomy. Panebianco’s dimension of systemness integrates Huntington’s dimensions of coherence and complexity. On the other hand, Panebianco’s approach does

not include adaptability because he claims that a high level of institutionalization lowers an organization's adaptability and flexibility (Weissenbach & Bukow, 2019: 162).

In another major study, Steven Levitsky (1998) mentions behavioral routinization and value infusion as the major dimensions of institutionalization but suggests that these two dimensions do not always change together empirically. According to Levitsky, value infusion occurs "when actors' goals shift from the pursuit of particular objectives through an organization to the goal of perpetuating the organization per se" (1998: 79). He gives the Justicialist Party in Argentina as an example, and maintains that notwithstanding major changes in the organization's goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics, Peronist leaders have remained loyal to the party, and by these means, the party has managed to survive after Juan's death. Behavioral routinization, on the other hand, occurs when rules, procedures, or roles become routine and accepted, and predictable sets of expectations develop around them. However, he argues that according to the criterion of behavioral routinization, the Justicialist Party is not well institutionalized since organizational processes within the party leadership structure are not routinized.

Kenneth Janda (1980) also adopts the term "value infusion," but his approach recognizes not only an internal or organizational dimension of institutionalization but also an external dimension of it (Harmel, Svåsand, & Mjelde, 2019: 10). Janda believes that an institutionalized party seems to have a corresponding image in public awareness, indicating that it is externally objectified (Weissenbach & Bukow, 2019: 163). He suggests that "an institutionalized party is one that is reified in the public mind so that "the party" exists as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behavior valued by those who identify with it" (1980: 19). Moreover, he offers six variables to operationalize the concept of institutionalization: name changes, year of origin, organizational discontinuity, leadership competition, electoral instability, and legislative instability. Richard Rose and Thomas Mackie propose a rather minimalistic approach to measuring party institutionalization and suggest that a political party becomes established "if it fights more than three national elections" (1988: 536). This will require creating subunits across the country, being able to nominate candidates for elections, and continuing to participate in successive elections. As noted by Harmel, Svåsand, and Mjelde (2019: 11), while Huntington and Panebianco emphasize the internal dimension of institutionalization, Rose and Mackie emphasize the external aspect of institutionalization.

More recent studies combine some of those classical components with new ones. For example, Veugeliers's analysis (1995) includes the criteria of national scope and perceived relevance by other parties, as well as the typical element of persistence. According to Veugeliers (1995: 4), institutionalization is a process that incorporates three factors: systemic, temporal, and spatial factors. 1-) A party has systemic relevance if it has coalition or blackmail potential (as in Sartori's definition of the relevant party). 2-) A party has temporal relevance if it exists without interruption and nominates candidates for successive national elections. 3-) A party has spatial relevance if it pervades the political institutions and is represented in the parliament. On the other hand, Pedahzur and Brichta (2002), following Rose and Mackie's conceptualization, underline persistence. The more elections a party fights, the more institutionalized it becomes. They also broaden the

concept by adding the elements of legislative and electoral stability which are included in Janda's definition.

Randall and Svåsand (2002) are possibly among the first researchers to distinguish between the institutionalization of party systems and individual parties and criticize the direct transfer of the European perspective on party institutionalization to new democracies (Weissenbach & Bukow, 2019: 164). Their approach does not equate institutionalization with the party's organizational development. Rather, they argue that a party becomes institutionalized in terms of integrated patterns of behavior and attitudes. They offer "an analytic model that distinguishes between internal and external dimensions, and within these between structural and attitudinal aspects to yield four key elements: systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy, and reification" (Randall & Svåsand, 2002: 24).

Lastly, Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen (2014) present a composite definition and the systematic operationalization of the concept of party institutionalization in the case of a populist entrepreneur party. They argue that "an institutionalized party will have a stable electoral base, will be served by an organizational structure involving a core membership, an effective candidate supply and a de facto dispersal of roles and authority, and its body of elected representatives will function as a coherent legislative actor" (2014: 937). They also identify adaptability as an essential element of party institutionalization. As a result, their approach includes a "stable support base, persistent electoral participation, internal routinization, legislative cohesion and adaptability" (Harmel, Svåsand, & Mjelde, 2019: 12).

Given all that has been mentioned so far, this study defines institutionalization as the process by which parties become stabilized, organizationally developed, reified in the public mind, and deeply rooted within society. Thus, this definition connects party institutionalization with four dimensions of stability, systemness, reification, and rootedness. Stability and systemness are internal dimensions of party institutionalization, while reification and rootedness are external dimensions of that. The fourth part of this paper will operationalize these variables in view of the empirical analysis.

Political Parties in Turkey

The history of Turkish political parties¹ goes back to the early twentieth century. Political parties played a significant role during the late Ottoman Empire and the founding of modern Turkey. The period from 1923 to 1946 was characterized by a non-competitive, one-party system controlled by the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People's Party). Following the transition to democratic politics in the late 1940s, however, the number of parties and their influence in Turkish politics increased significantly (Sayarı, 2002: 10). Among them, the Demokrat Parti (DP, Democrat Party) took over in 1950 and held the majority for a decade until it was closed by the 1960 military intervention. The state attempted to regulate political parties through constitutional provisions in the 1960s. The Political Parties Law (No. 648) was first adopted in 1965, considerably changed in 1983, and has been revised multiple times since then (Sayarı, 2012: 185).

¹ This section gives a brief overview of the history of political parties, party competition, electoral rules, and regulations on party organizations in Turkey. For a detailed discussion of Turkish political parties, see Tunaya (1952); Sayarı (1976); Özbudun (1979); Heper & Landau (1991); Kabasakal (1991); Sarıbay (2001); Özbudun (2011); Sayarı (2012).

Due to the absence of mass support, political competition in the early republican era was mainly limited to intra-elite competition (Sayarı, 2012: 183). The CHP, for example, was a typical cadre party with members from the army commanders, bureaucrats, and local notables, aiming at building a modern nation through socio-economic reforms in a top-down manner. The DP was a cadre party as well. It was founded by former deputies who resigned from the CHP during the political liberalization process after WWII, and its party elite consisted of mostly notables and landlords (Arslantaş & Arslantaş, 2021: 7). Consequently, the competition between political parties was hardly a political reflection of class conflict.

The competition between the CHP and the DP in the 1950s and the closure of the DP by the 1960 military coup had a significant impact on the Turkish party system in the following years. On the one hand, party closure, which is one of the major obstacles to party institutionalization in Turkey, has become normalized. The Constitutional Court has closed 25 political parties since then. Major reasons for closing political parties were violating “the constitutional provisions protecting the indivisible national and territorial integrity of the state” (Özbudun, 2011: 24). On the other hand, the competition between the CHP and the DP has constituted the origins of the center-left and center-right traditions in Turkey. The parliament was mainly dominated by the CHP and the Adalet Partisi (AP, Justice Party), the successor of the DP, during the 1960s and 1970s.

The early 1960s saw “intense competition occurred among several parties for the DP’s votes” (Sayarı, 2002: 13). Eventually, the AP succeeded in replacing the DP. It is worth noting that with the dominance of the AP, a predominant party system was likely to emerge (Ayan-Musil, 2015: 6) but this did not happen because of the electoral volatility, high fragmentation, and ideological polarization in the 1970s (Özbudun, 2000: 74). To illustrate, parliamentary fragmentation increased from 0.57 in 1969 to 0.70 in 1973. The emergence of new right-wing parties such as the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP, Nationalist Action Party) and the Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP, National Salvation Party) was a key factor in high fragmentation. High fragmentation and ideological polarization contributed to increasing political instability, which was one of the main justifications for the military coup of 1980. Military elites closed down all existing political parties and governed the country without any official party until 1983. As a result, it has undermined continuity in party organization, which is the typical element of party institutionalization.

The military elite intended to turn the party system into a “more manageable two- or three-party system” and stop anti-system parties from having seats in the parliament by interventions in electoral institutions such as the introduction of a 10% national electoral threshold and high constituency thresholds (Özbudun, 2000: 75). They also sought to standardize political parties’ organizations by promulgating the new Political Parties Law (no. 2820). This law, still in force, provides detailed regulations governing party structures and intraparty processes such as membership and funding. It also defines the conditions under which political parties may be prohibited (Sayarı, 2012: 185). Consequently, it is fair to say that it is one of the most detailed and comprehensive laws on political parties in Europe (Arslantaş & Arslantaş, 2021: 9).

Electoral rules have always had a major impact on party institutionalization in Turkey. Following the transition to multiparty politics, Turkey used the simple majority

system with party lists in multi-member districts. The electoral system produced a two-party system as well as great disproportionality during the 1950s. For instance, the DP achieved an average of 54% of votes but 82.6% of seats. The simple majority system was never used again in Turkey after the 1950s. Following the 1960 military intervention, proportional representation with the *d'Hondt* method was applied. Turkey has been using the proportional representation system with various variants of the *d'Hondt* method since 1961. Although the electoral system produces relatively lower disproportionality, major parties tend to get a bigger share of seats than their share of votes, whereas smaller parties tend to achieve a share of seats less than their share of votes. The introduction of a 10% national electoral threshold following the 1980 military intervention had a huge impact on smaller parties. One of the primary goals of the high electoral threshold was “to prevent the entry of the smaller parties into parliament, especially those representing religious, sectarian, and ethnic interests” (Sayarı, 2012: 187).

Despite the 1980 military regime's restrictions and political engineering, political parties began to proliferate in the 1990s, and electoral volatility and fragmentation increased. For example, five out of six parties that participated in the 1991 general election passed the electoral threshold and obtained seats in the parliament. Furthermore, anti-system parties such as the pro-Kurdish Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP, People's Democracy Party) and the pro-Islamist Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party) have grown stronger, whereas centrist parties have become weaker and weaker (Sayarı, 2002: 19). However, since the 2002 electoral earthquake, party competition has seen a series of radical changes, including the decline of electoral volatility and political fragmentation, and the emergence of the predominant party system.

There are a number of important differences between the 1990s and the post-2002 period. First, the number of parties in the parliament has decreased. The number of parties with at least three percent of the seats was four in 1991, five in 1995 and 1999 but two in 2002, three in 2007 and 2011, and four in 2015. It could reach five only in 2018. There has also been a dramatic decline in the effective number of parliamentary parties. It decreased from 4.87 in 1999 to 1.85 in 2002. Although the political fragmentation appeared to increase in the 2010s, it was 3.07 in 2018, which was still lower than that of the 1990s. Second, compared with the 1990s, the largest party became stronger in the 2000s. For example, the first party's vote share was 27% in 1991, 21% in 1995, 22.2% in 1999, 34.3% in 2002, 46% in 2007, and 49.8% in 2011. Also, the seat ratio between the first and second parties increased from 1.1 in 1999 to 2.4 in 2011. Despite the relative loss of power, the AKP still has twice as many seats as the CHP even in 2018. Third, in contrast to the 1990s, the post-2002 period saw single-party governments. This strengthened the durability of governments as well as the centrality of the cabinet in the decision-making process. Fourth, the 1990s saw a high level of electoral volatility. By contrast, parties tend to have a relatively more stable voter base since 2002. There was almost no change in the party competition in the 2010s. Thus, the competition between political parties became ineffective – at least until local elections in 2019.

Although Turkish political parties are relatively stable, the issue of party (system) institutionalization in Turkey has been a controversial subject. On the one hand, compared to new democracies, Turkey shows a relatively high level of party institutionalization and

party system institutionalization (Özbudun, 2000: 73; Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2007). For example, since the coup of 1980, only two different party systems have emerged. On the other hand, Turkish democracy, throughout its history, has suffered from problems hindering institutionalization, such as military interventions (Hale, 1994), lack of intra-party democracy (Celep, 2021), political polarization (Aydın Düzgit, 2019), clientelistic relationships between parties and their supporters (Yıldırım, 2020), and personalization of politics (Selçuk, Hekimci, & Erpul, 2019). While parties are somewhat institutionalized, since the Political Parties Law demands a standard organizational form, party leaders have a tremendous grip over central executive committees, and thus leadership change rarely occurs (Özbudun, 2000: 84).

Research Design

Measuring party institutionalization is not an easy task as it is “multifaceted, difficult to operationalize, and sometimes conducive to the tautological argument” (Gunther & Hopkin, 2002: 193). The main weakness of most research is the failure to address how to quantify and measure party institutionalization (Randall & Svåsand, 2002). To overcome this problem, this paper offers the Party Institutionalization Index (PII). The PII is produced by the systematic operationalization of four dimensions of party institutionalization: stability, systemness, reification, and rootedness. It is based on the indicators and ranking orders of each variable. It should be noted that political parties may display different levels of institutionalization in each dimension. For example, a party may be strong in terms of stability, but weak in terms of reification. Therefore, one should measure all dimensions separately to show a general level of institutionalization. The PII is provided according to the procedure used by Musella and Vercesi (2019). The first step in this process is to calculate the sum of all relevant scores for each dimension. The sum is then divided by the highest possible outcome in the best case. The scores range from 0 to 1, where 0 represents no institutionalization and 1 represents the highest level of institutionalization. The mean score of the four dimensions provides the final index of the institutionalization of parties.

Stability seems to be included in all definitions of institutionalization (Bértoa, 2017: 4). It can broadly be defined as durability, longevity, or persistence. It encompasses 1-) Huntington’s adaptability and 2-) Levitsky’s behavioral routinization. Political parties become more institutionalized when they manage to survive the disappearance of their founders (Panebianco, 1988: 162). The ability to survive and stabilize is a matter of time (Harmel, Svåsand, & Mjelde, 2019: 9). The longer a political party exists, the more institutionalized it becomes. Therefore, stability can be measured by the party’s chronological age and the number of changes in party leadership.²

2 Since short-term changes in party leadership do not contribute to institutionalization, changes can only be counted if a leader held the office for at least a congressional term (about two years) and left.

Table 1
Dimensions and indicators of party institutionalization index

	Stability		Systemness		Reification	Rootedness
	Leadership changes	Chronological age	Membership strength (M/E ratio)	No. of provinces parties organized		
0	No change	-	<1%	≤40	<1%	≥10%
1	1 change	≤5 years	1-5%	40-49	1-5%	7-9%
2	2 changes	6-10 years	6-10%	50-59	6-10%	4-6%
3	≥3 changes	11-15 years	11-15%	60-69	11-15%	1-3%
4	-	16-20 years	≥16%	≥70	16-20%	≤1%
5	-	≥21 years	-	-	≥21%	-

The term “systemness” is used here to refer to structural development, organizational strength, or Huntington’s concept of organizational complexity. Systemness may be defined as the increasing “scale, scope and regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a structure” (Randall & Svåsand, 2002: 13). Institutionalized parties will have proliferated and differentiated party branches, stable financial resources, a large number of members, geographically large-scale party organizations, and strong coordination between party leadership and party committees. Therefore, systemness can be operationalized using two different indicators: membership strength (membership/electorate ratio) and the number of provinces where parties are organized.

Reification may be defined as the degree to which a political party’s existence is established in the public mind (Randall & Svåsand, 2002: 14). The broad use of the term is sometimes equated with institutionalization (Janda, 1980). Reification refers to the

party's influence over voters' perceptions. Electoral success may be used as an indicator to measure reification. A higher average vote signifies a greater level of institutionalization.

Rootedness broadly refers to the stable relationship between parties and their supporters. Institutionalized parties manage to link representatives and the represented, and send clear and consistent messages to their voters. For stronger societal roots, value-infusion is crucial. As noted by Levitsky (1998: 82), an institutionalized party becomes valued for itself rather than a simple tool to achieve other goals. Value-infusion seems to be stronger when a political party is identified with broader social groups such as urban working-class or religious communities (Randall & Svåsand, 2002: 21). This results in electoral stability. Therefore, political parties deeply rooted within the society will have regular voters identified with the party (Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2014: 5). Rootedness can be operationalized by electoral volatility. The lower the average volatility a party has, the more institutionalized it becomes.

Empirical Findings

A constitutional referendum in 2017 replaced the parliamentary system in Turkey with a presidential system. Several important constitutional changes were approved, such as the abolition of the office of the prime minister, the separation of the legislative and executive powers, and the introduction of the presidency as the head of both the state and the executive. While the parliament preserved its legislative power, its oversight over the executive was reduced (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017: 306). Additionally, the number of seats in the parliament was increased from 550 to 600, and the age limit for MPs was lowered from 25 to 18. Parliamentary terms were extended from four to five years. Parliamentary and presidential elections would be held on the same day every five years, and the president would be elected using a two-round system.

Table 2
Turkish Parliamentary Election Results, 2018

Party	Domestic votes	Election results of foreign and custom gates' ballot boxes	Total votes	%	Seats
AKP	20,559,732	778,961	21,338,693	42.56	295
CHP	11,086,897	267,293	11,354,190	22.65	146
HDP	5,606,622	260,680	5,867,302	11.7	67
MHP	5,444,728	120,603	5,565,331	11.1	49
IYI	4,932,510	60,969	4,993,479	9.96	43
SP	660,749	11,390	672,139	1.34	0
HÜDA PAR	153,649	1,890	155,539	0.31	0
VP	110,849	4,023	114,872	0.23	0

Source: <https://www.ysk.gov.tr/en/past-elections/1852>.

Notes: AKP = Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (The Justice and Development Party), CHP = Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (The Republican People's Party), HDP = Halkların Demokratik Partisi (The Peoples' Democratic Party), MHP = Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (The Nationalist Movement Party), IYI = İyi Parti (The Good Party), SP = Saadet Partisi (The Felicity Party), HÜDA PAR = Hür Dava Partisi (The Free Cause Party), VP = Vatan Partisi (The Patriotic Party).

One year after constitutional amendments, Turkey held a snap election in June 2018. Erdoğan, the candidate of the People's Alliance, got almost 53% of the total votes and was elected president. In the parliamentary elections, whereas the People's Alliance (the AKP and the MHP) gained more than 53% of the total votes, the Nation Alliance (the CHP, the IYI, and the SP) obtained about 34%. The HDP did not participate in any of the alliances and received 11.7% of the total votes. Parliamentary election results by party level are presented in Table 2. The PII is applied to the political parties with a minimum of 1% of the total votes in the 2018 election, except for the IYI. Despite having remarkable support, the IYI is a young party and provides very little data. Therefore, it was not reported in the findings.

The first dimension of party institutionalization, *stability*, broadly refers to persistence. However, as noted before, the institutionalization of Turkish political parties has frequently been interrupted by either military interventions or the Constitutional Court. For example, despite being first founded in 1923, the CHP, along with other parties, was closed by the military coup of 1980 and could be reestablished only in the 1990s. Similarly, although the history of the SP can be traced back to pro-Islamist parties having been formed by Erbakan in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, all of them were closed by the Constitutional Court, and the SP was only established as a new party in the 2000s. Thus, the parties' chronological age is generally lower than their "biological age." As shown in Table 3, the CHP was organized in 1992, the MHP in 1993, the AKP and the SP in 2001, and the HDP in 2014.

Table 3
Party Age, Territorial Comprehensiveness, and Party Membership

Party	Founding Year	No. of provinces where parties are organized (2021)	No. of party members (2021)	No. of the electorate (2018)	Membership / electorate ratio
CHP	1992 (29 years)	81 (100%)	1,288,226	11,354,190	11.3%
MHP	1993 (28 years)	78 (96%)	475,338	5,565,331	8.5%
AKP	2001 (20 years)	81 (100%)	11,589,000	21,338,693	54.3%
SP	2001 (20 years)	72 (89%)	270,979	672,139	8.2%
HDP	2012 (9 years)	44 (54%)	40,678	5,867,302	0.7%

Source: Author's calculations based on official parties', Constitutional Court's, and YSK's data.

Additionally, Turkish political culture is generally shaped by strong leadership. Change in leadership is very rare since party leaders have powerful authority over delegates. Even if most Turkish political parties cannot be categorized as "charismatic parties" (Panebianco, 1988: 143), they are identified with their leaders, and the power of party leaders is reinforced by the Political Parties Law. Parties are too centralized, and central executive committees have the authority to expel recalcitrant local committees. The law also leaves the candidate selection method entirely to the parties themselves, which increases the power of party leaders. Consequently, Turkish political parties exhibit "strong oligarchical tendencies" (Özbudun, 2000: 83). Political leaders' personal appeals also play a significant role in influencing voting behavior, and as a general trend, the personalization of politics has strengthened the personal appeal of political leaders. Thus, political parties are unlikely to stay in power after the leader leaves office.

Moreover, party leaders fail to resolve intra-party conflicts because factions are completely excluded from power and treated as separate parties (Türsan, 1995: 183). Thus, competition over leadership within parties mostly results in the emergence of new parties. For example, the AKP was founded by the former reformist members of the Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party) after their candidate, Abdullah Gül, lost the election for Chairmanship of the FP in 2000. Recently, the İYİ was founded as a result of splitting from the MHP, while the Gelecek Partisi (GP, Future Party), and the Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi (DEVA, Democracy and Progress Party) were established by former ministers of the AKP. The Memleket Partisi (MP, Homeland Party), on the other hand, was formed by Muharrem İnce, the former candidate of the CHP in the 2018 presidential elections. Consequently, the AKP, the CHP, and the MHP had only one change in leadership, while the HDP and the SP had two.

Regarding *systemness*, Turkish political parties generally demonstrate a high level of organizational strength because legal regulations in Turkey promote geographically large-scale party organizations. Parties have local units at the province (*il*) and the subprovince (*ilçe*) levels, but they were prohibited from forming organizational networks below the sub-provincial level (*ocak* and *bucak*) following the 1960 military intervention (Sayarı, 1976: 195). Parties must be organized in at least half of the provinces and one-third of all subprovinces within these provinces to be able to run in elections. Consequently, the major parties in Turkey inevitably maintain a strong organizational presence across the country. In other words, their territorial comprehensiveness is quite high. According to Yardımcı-Geyikçi (2015: 531), territorial comprehensiveness means “a nationwide organizational presence, which demonstrates the spatial organizational expansion of political parties.” For example, as shown in Table 3, parties in the parliament, except the HDP, have local organizations in almost all provinces throughout the country. Even the SP, which obtains only 1.3% of votes, has 89% of territorial comprehensiveness.

On the other hand, most of the parties’ local bodies are weak in terms of financing and staff. Party organizations in more urbanized, industrialized, and developed regions are complex and active. By contrast, parties’ local bodies in less developed cities are relatively weak and work “only as intermittent structures, with little or no organizational activity between elections” (Sayarı, 1976: 198). Nevertheless, local bodies perform some important tasks like “electoral campaigning and candidate selection, which in turn inevitably makes them more than ‘paper’ organizations” (Yardımcı-Geyikçi, 2015: 531).

Furthermore, in contrast to contemporary Europe (Van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012), party membership in Turkey is considerably high. Almost a quarter of the electorate in Turkey has a party membership. Özbudun believes that the high membership/electorate ratio in Turkey may be explained by the “clientelistic nature of Turkish political parties” (Özbudun, 2006: 553). Party membership is considered a means to gain personal benefits when the party comes to power. For example, the Anavatan Partisi (ANAP, Motherland Party), which held the majority of seats from 1983 to 1991, had more than six million party members but obtained only 1.6 million votes in the 2002 election. Incumbent parties are seen as useful tools for networking because party members have almost no obligations but certain rights. Consequently, as shown in Table 3, the ruling AKP has the highest membership/electorate ratio today (54.3%).

The last two dimensions are *reification* and *rootedness*. The former refers to the party's influence over voters' perceptions, while the latter implies a stable voter base. Since 2002, the AKP has successfully managed to mobilize right-wing voters and become a predominant party. It has won all six elections since 2002 with an average of 44% of the votes. Despite having lost a lot of support in recent elections, it is still the largest party in Turkey in terms of both the number of votes and members. Thus, the AKP's electoral volatility is higher than that of other parties. Concerning the CHP, it was a minor party in the 1990s and even failed to have seats in 1999 because of the high level of fragmentation. In the election of 2002, however, it won 32% of the seats. Having a consistent performance, the CHP has been the second-largest party in Turkey since 2002.

The MHP, on the other hand, has a more volatile voter base. It won 8.2% of the votes in 1995 and could not enter parliament. With the rise of nationalist tendencies in the late 1990s, it managed to obtain 18% of the votes in 1999 but failed to get seats in 2002. It won 14.3% of the votes in 2007, and 13.0% in 2011. Despite increasing to 16.3% in June 2015, the MHP's votes decreased to 11.1% in 2018. With 5.8 million votes, the HDP is similar to the MHP in terms of voter size but has a more stable support base. In the 2000s, the HDP elites sought various strategies to pass the high electoral threshold.³ For example, since there are no national thresholds for independents, by nominating independent candidates, Kurdish nationalists were able to bypass the electoral threshold in 2007 and 2011 (Sayarı, 2012: 187). The HDP was officially established in 2012 and successfully managed to get 13.1% of the votes in its very first election. It won 11.9% of the votes in November 2015, and 11.1% in 2018.

Table 4 provides the political parties' scores on each dimension. It also presents the general score of party institutionalization, namely the PII. From this data, it can be seen that the CHP has the highest PII score (0.80), whereas the HDP has the lowest PII score (0.50). The SP's score is 0.74, the AKP's score is 0.72, and the MHP's score is 0.65. Along with a relatively stable voter base and successful leadership changes, higher chronological age, membership strength and territorial comprehensiveness are key factors to determine the high level of institutionalization of the CHP.

Table 4
Political Parties' Institutionalization Scores by Dimensions

Dimension of institutionalization	AKP	CHP	MHP	HDP	SP
Stability	0.63	0.75	0.75	0.50	0.75
Systemness	1.00	0.88	0.75	0.13	1.00
Reification	1.00	0.80	0.60	0.60	0.20
Rootedness	0.25	0.75	0.50	0.75	1.00
<i>The PII</i>	<i>0.72</i>	<i>0.80</i>	<i>0.65</i>	<i>0.50</i>	<i>0.74</i>

These results suggest that Turkish political parties' institutionalization scores, except the HDP's, are relatively high. A possible explanation for this might be the length of the democratic experience. Turkey's transition to competitive politics was developed in the

3 The high electoral threshold continues to be one of the major obstacles to party institutionalization in Turkey. While the electoral threshold was not abolished by the 2017 Constitutional Referendum, it was transformed into a bloc threshold as the electoral system led to pre-election alliances.

1950s, long before most new democracies (Öney & Selck, 2017: 2). Another explanation for this is the institutional rules (Yardımcı-Geyikçi, 2015: 535). The Political Parties Law demands a relatively standard organizational model that is composed of party congresses and elected executive committees at the national and local levels (Özbudun, 2000: 83). Parties in young democracies, however, are more like personalistic parties than party organizations with a fixed program (Amundsen, 1997; Bedelski, 1994).

The HDP's low score may be explained by its limited local units throughout the country and its lower membership strength. Despite its attempt to develop a nationwide organizational presence, the HDP has local party organizations in only 44 cities. It is possible to argue that the HDP is still a regional party. The party's voter support and organizational capacity are much stronger in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey. The HDP is also the party with the fewest party members among the parties having a political group in the parliament. The party has almost 6 million votes but 40,678 members. To conclude, it is possible to say that pro-Kurdish parties have long suffered from party closures and national thresholds, which have a detrimental effect on party institutionalization.

The results also indicate that a political party may have significantly different scores on each dimension. For example, the AKP is very strong in terms of systemness and reification but relatively weak in terms of stability and rootedness. Because it has the highest score among parties on the dimension of reification, electoral success seems to play a more important role in determining the AKP's level of institutionalization. On the contrary, the SP displays a lower level of institutionalization on the dimension of reification but a higher general level of party institutionalization.

Although the AKP has a strong organizational presence across the country and the highest membership/electorate ratio, it has a lower PII score than the CHP and the SP. There are several possible explanations for this result. First, the AKP is a relatively younger party than the CHP or the MHP. Second, except for the short period of Davutoğlu, the AKP did not have any successful leadership changes. Third, it is still unclear whether the party will survive a longer period after Erdoğan leaves office. Fourth, the AKP has been the ruling party since 2002 but if it loses in 2023, then it would become more difficult to maintain internal coherence. As a result, the AKP appears to be more dependent on electoral success than other parties.

Conclusion

The present study was designed to examine the factors determining party institutionalization. The main goal of the current study was to combine theoretical approaches to party institutionalization with empirical operationalization. This article provided an overview of party institutionalization in Turkey.

The major shortcoming of most studies on party institutionalization in Turkey is the failure to operationalize and measure party institutionalization. This study appears to be the first study to provide a single measurement of party institutionalization by proposing viable indicators. Thus, this work contributes to existing knowledge of party institutionalization not only by providing empirical findings but also by establishing a

quantitative framework. The major advantage of the PII is that it measures four dimensions separately and provides a final index of the institutionalization to range parties from 0 to 1.

This study has argued that political parties with higher membership strength, geographically large-scale units, higher chronological age, more leadership changes, lower electoral volatility, and greater electoral success will become more institutionalized and survive longer. The findings of this study suggest that the CHP appears to be a well-institutionalized party.

A limitation of this study is that it did not deal with the relationship between party models and party institutionalization. Party institutionalization was very much associated with the mass party model that originated in established democracies (Panebianco, 1988). Unlike mass parties (Duverger, 1964), electoral-professional parties (Panebianco, 1988), entrepreneurial parties (Harmel & Svåsand, 1993), business-firm parties (Hopkin & Paolucci, 1999) or charismatic parties (Pedahzur & Brichta, 2002) rely heavily on the personal charisma of their leaders, which appears to be a major obstacle to institutionalization. Thus, further studies should be undertaken to explore how personal parties can be durable.

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The Norm Contestation and the Balance of Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Region: The Eurasian Economic Union versus the European Union

Eski Sovyet Coğrafyasında Norm Mücadelesi ve Yumuşak Güç Dengesi: Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği ve Avrupa Birliği Arasındaki Rekabet

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Abstract

This paper examines the power political norm contestation between the European Union (EU) and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In recent years, the EAEU has increased its regional attractiveness, while the EU's appeal has declined due to its internal problems, the impediments to further enlargement, the failure of color revolutions, and the rise of authoritarianism and nationalism in the region. This situation has provided Russia with significant advantages in consolidating its regional sphere of influence through promoting an alternative regional governance mechanism under its own terms and leadership. The paper compares the organizational structures and normative agendas of the EU and the EAEU. In this regard, it analyzes how Russia's project reconciles regional countries' increasing demand for national sovereignty with their need for regional economic cooperation. The paper argues that the soft power vacuum left by the EU in the region is being filled by Russia which has not behaved solely as a "spoiler" but developed a normative framework based on sovereignty, strong leadership, and other so-called "traditional Eurasian values." The paper examines the links between those values and the EAEU's rising attractiveness for some regional countries from a comparative perspective.

Keywords

Norm contestation, Soft power, Eurasian Economic Union, European Union, Regional integration

Öz

Bu makale, Avrupa Birliği (AB) ve Rusya liderliğindeki Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği (AEB) arasındaki güç rekabeti esasına dayanan norm mücadelesini incelemektedir. Son yıllarda AEB'nin bölgesel çekiciliği artarken; AB'nin cazibesi kendi iç sorunları, daha fazla genişlemenin önündeki engeller, renkli devrimlerin başarısızlığı, bölgede otoriterliğin ve milliyetçiliğin yükselişi gibi nedenlerle azalmaktadır. Bu durum, Rusya'nın kendi koşulları ve liderliği altında alternatif bir bölgesel yönetim mekanizması oluşturarak bölgesel etki alanını sağlamlaştırması yolunda önemli avantajlar sağlamıştır. Makale, AB ve AEB'nin örgütsel yapılarını ve normatif gündemlerini karşılaştırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Rusya'nın projesinin bölge ülkelerinin artan ulusal egemenlik talepleri ve bölgesel ekonomik işbirliği ihtiyacı arasındaki çelişkiyi nasıl uzlaştırdığı analiz edilmektedir. Çalışma, AB'nin bölgede bıraktığı yumuşak güç boşluğunun; egemenlik ve güçlü liderlik gibi "geleneksel Avrasya değerleri" olarak tanımlanan unsurlara dayalı normatif bir çerçeve geliştiren Rusya tarafından doldurulmakta olduğunu savunmaktadır. Makale, bu tür değerler ve AEB'nin belirli bölge ülkeleri nazarında artan cazibesi arasındaki bağlantıları karşılaştırmalı bir perspektiften incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Norm mücadelesi, Yumuşak güç, Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği, Avrupa Birliği, Bölgesel entegrasyon

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Introduction

Since the 2000s, the post-Soviet region has been an area of competition between the EU and Russian-led Eurasian integration projects which have sought to promote regional integration frameworks based on different norms and values. This regional competition culminated in late 2013 when Ukraine was negotiating its Association Agreement with the EU. During the negotiations, the EU offered Ukraine some financial assistance but the agreement included certain institutional and democratic reforms. On the other side, Russia wanted to integrate Ukraine into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and offered a \$15 billion loan without any EU-like conditionality (Plekhanov, 2016, p. 13; Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 87). President Viktor Yanukovich opted for Russia's offer that would provide necessary financial sources to consolidate his authoritarian regime. However, Yanukovich's decision prompted civil protests in the country, which led to the regime's fall. The crisis was followed by Russia's annexation of Crimea and later evolved into a proxy war in Ukraine. Those developments caused the resurgence of military competition and tensions between Russia and NATO reminiscent of the Cold War era.¹

Regional analysts and observers tend to concentrate on the military dimension of regional power politics between Russia and the Western powers, namely the USA and its European allies in NATO. However, the struggle for power and influence in the region is driven not only by traditional geopolitical interests but also by conflicting geo-economic and normative interests to shape regional economic and political governance. To ignore the latter aspect of the regional competition between the West and Russia, which ignited the spark of the Ukraine crisis could lead to incomplete analyses. The future of the regional order in the post-Soviet region will not be determined only through geopolitical and military power competition. There is another emerging critical aspect of competition based on regional integration frameworks and normative agendas that influence the political and economic preferences of local states and constrain the penetration and actions of international powers. In the last two decades, Russia has increased its experience in using a number of new instruments such as norms, values, and institutions to becloud Western initiatives to intervene in regional politics. Driving on such instruments, Russia primarily aims at promoting an alternative regional integration framework that is not based on liberal-democratic values. This represents a significant challenge to the European Union, which has enjoyed a superior normative power in shaping the region during the 1990s and the early 2000s.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was established in 2015, has appeared as an important cornerstone of Russia's new regional vision challenging the EU's influence in the region. The EAEU members include Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Moldova and Uzbekistan joined the organization as observer members respectively in 2017 and 2020. As an organization pursuing economic integration, the Eurasian Economic Union emerged as a regional counterpart of the EU that maintains some forms of partnership relations with the same post-Soviet countries. This paper

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 26th IPSA World Congress of Political Science, "New Nationalisms in an Open World," July 10-15, 2021. The study was completed before the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022, whose regional implications are still evolving and not certain yet. Therefore, this paper excludes the developments following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and covers the norm contestation between the EU and Russia's regional integration project from the early 2000s to 2021

examines the normative framework, organizational structure, and regional agenda of the EAEU in comparison with those of the European Union. It aims at understanding the main reasons why the Russian-led Eurasian integration has increased its appeal to several regional states in recent years. The paper accepts that Russia resorts to hard power against certain countries where the attraction and influence of the EU remain still strong. However, it specifically argues that Russia has been filling the soft power vacuum left by the EU as a result of its normative retreat from most of the region. The paper investigates the main causes of such a shift in the “balance of soft power” in the post-Soviet region touching upon some significant international and regional developments.

The first section deals with theoretical discussions on the growing significance and role of norms, values, and institutions in the current-era global and regional power politics. It refers to the newly emerging “post-realist” literature on norm contestation which examines how norms, values, and institutions can be used as instruments in struggles for power and influence. The second section focuses on alternative regionalisms in the post-Soviet neighborhood embodied in the Eurasian integration project and the EU’s regional partnership initiatives. The links between the EAEU’s organizational structure and the main norms it advocates such as national sovereignty and strong leadership are also examined. The third section elaborates on the primary reasons for the weakening of the EU’s conditionality and soft power in the post-Soviet area such as the crisis of liberal values in Europe, its international repercussions, the failure of color revolutions, and the impediments to further enlargement towards the region. Also, it examines Russia’s initiatives to fill the vacuum of normative agency in the region through building an alternative regional order based on “statist” values and the Russian ideal of “sovereign democracy.” Finally, the fourth section focuses on the rising attractiveness of the Russian-led Eurasian integration project in the perspective of some regional states. It also examines how different states have so far responded to the Russian-led integration initiative from a comparative perspective.

Rethinking Regional Power Politics: The Role of Norms, Values, and Institutions

Power politics has been a central concept in the realist literature on international relations (Morgenthau, 1948; Mearsheimer, 2013). Originally the concept was, and still is, associated with military capabilities, alliances, and the balance of power. Military force and hard power are defined as the central tools of international power politics through which great powers deter their rivals, establish hegemony over smaller states, and ensure regional spheres of influence. Since the 1970s, the realist paradigm has been increasingly challenged by various alternative IR theories such as liberal, institutionalist, constructivist, and post-structuralist approaches. Those posited themselves against some core assumptions of realism and challenged the latter’s views on the salience of anarchy as a constitutive characteristic of international relations, the status of states as the primary actors in international politics, and the durability of “cooperation, international institutions, international law, and norms as critical features of international relations” (Goddard & Nexon, 2016, p. 7; see also Waeber, 1996).

Scholars on different sides of this debate continue to associate power politics primarily with military force and balances of power. They all accept that states which hold the

monopoly on the use of force remain the central actors when considering traditional power politics. However, the main point of disagreement is the potential of international institutions to influence and change state behavior. Liberal approaches suggest that international institutions, norms, and values could somehow reshape international relations by supplanting the dynamics of power politics (Mearsheimer, 1994; Goddard & Nexon, 2016). In this respect, institutions are seen as primary instruments facilitating international cooperation and maintaining peace and stability in the world (Keohane & Martin, 1995).

The 1990s and the early 2000s witnessed the spread of Western liberal values throughout the world which has contributed to economic liberalization and globalization. This process was mostly guided by international institutions originating in the post-World War II Western world. Since the global crisis of 2008, however, liberal norms and institutions have been increasingly challenged by non-Western powers such as a rising China and a resurgent Russia (Cooley, 2015). The emerging rivalry between those actors and the West has not been limited to military power, arms buildup, and geopolitical competition over critical regions and allies. As non-Western major powers have been integrated into the international economic system after the Cold War, the current-era global power competition involves the intensive use of economic statecraft. In this respect, the rising non-Western powers formulate trade policies, investment programs, and regional integration projects not just to improve mutually beneficial relations with other states but to increase their international power and political influence and to promote geo-economic objectives at global and regional levels (Wigell, Scholvin, & Aaltola, 2018).

In order to enhance their political and economic position in an increasingly multipolar world, those powers have created some international institutions such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank), the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), and the EAEU (Gürçan, 2020). Such institutions not only facilitate economic and political cooperation between the members but also bring along normative frameworks which are not based on Western liberal democratic values. In the post-Soviet area, the SCO and the EAEU have commonly built a conservative sovereignty-focused normative framework that supports, consolidates, and legitimizes a statist and authoritarian regional order (Allison, 2018; Kobayashi, 2017). This helps regional states to resist normative pressures from liberal actors outside of the region; and, therefore, beclouds Western attempts to interfere in regional politics and to reshape regional political and economic governance based on their values and interests (Allison, 2018; Noutcheva, 2018).

Could decades-old IR paradigms originating in the Cold War era explain new dynamics of power politics between the Western powers and the rising powers from other parts of the world, which include geopolitical, geo-economic, and normative dimensions altogether? Norms, values, and institutions are usually disregarded by those who have a realist vision of world politics and concentrate on military capabilities and alliances. On the other side, liberal institutionalism has a predominantly optimistic view of international institutions suggesting that the proliferation of institutions would promote stability in international relations at global and regional levels. In the contemporary world, however, a growing number of international institutions and cooperation frameworks do not embrace Western

liberal values. Some of them follow different normative agendas concerning the members' relations with each other and their approach towards their neighborhood. What if two rival economic organizations or integration blocs with their own ideational perspective seek to expand their respective values in a shared region? The post-Soviet region has been a striking example of such a zero-sum norm competition. In the last decade, the deeper and wider involvement of European and Eurasian integration initiatives in the region has not contributed to the stability of the post-Soviet neighborhood. On the contrary "the region has become ever more conflict-prone, with the Ukrainian crisis being just the tip of the iceberg" (Kobayashi, 2017, p. 2).

As the realist and liberal institutionalist theories fall short in capturing such a significant aspect of regional politics, we need alternative research frameworks to analyze the real dynamics of competition for influence between the EU and the Russian-led EAEU. In their article entitled "The Dynamics of Global Power Politics," Goddard and Nexon (2016) call for a new research program for the phenomena that goes beyond the structural-realist framework. The Authors define power politics as "involving politics based on the use of power to influence the actions and decisions of actors that claim, or exercise, authority over a political community" (Goddard & Nexon., pp. 9-10). Considering the complicated nature of 21st Century international politics, they suggest that non-military means such as "economic, cultural, symbolic, diplomatic, and other instruments" matter a great deal for contemporary power politics. The Authors define their approach as "post-realist" which does not view "international organizations, international law, norms, rules, and other favorite topics of liberals and constructivists" as alternatives to power politics but significant "means, medium, subjects, and objects in the struggle for influence" (Goddard & Nexon, p. 6).

How can international institutions, norms, and values actually function as instruments in the struggle for influence in a specific region? Bettiza and Lewis (2020) develop a power political approach to "norm contestation" which examines the battles for influence in international politics taking place at "the ideational level" and driving on "symbolic instruments." Originally, this approach combines insights from the existing literature on "norm contestation" with Goddard and Nexon's eclectic analytical framework on "power politics." Bettiza and Lewis (2020) suggest that struggles in the form of norm contestation usually emerge as a part of power politics since identities and norms are sites of power relations. In general, power political maneuvers aim at expanding one's agency and collective mobilization capacity vis-à-vis the others. Such moves include some combination of two inclusionary strategies, namely, "fragmentation" and "integration." The former strategy aims at disrupting, preventing, breaking apart, and ultimately interfering with the ability of others to follow joint action. At the ideational level, such attempts intend to erode the power and appeal of certain norms shared by rival actors, to undermine their capacity, and to constrain actions in ways favoring dominant norm-maker states. On the other side integrative power political moves aim to expand "one's agency and collective mobilization capability through the articulation of different interpretations of existing norms or the generation of alternative collectively shared [norms,] identities and principles that more closely align with one's values and interests" (Bettiza & Lewis, p. 6).

One could find many examples of normative power political maneuvers by Russia vis-a-vis the West in general, and the European Union in particular, which follows the logic of fragmentation and integration. On the one side, Russia aims at keeping the EU divided by supporting far-right and anti-EU movements and underlining the crisis of liberal values in some of the member states (Weiss, 2020; Financial Times, 2009). On the other side, Russia challenges the notion of universal human rights, as a leading authoritarian power, and propagates alternative norms based on stability, security, state sovereignty, and civilizational diversity vis-a-vis the Western notion of liberal democracy. While the Western liberal world is going under “a crisis of confidence”, such values enjoy significant backing in various parts of the international system not to mention Russia’s post-Soviet neighborhood. This situation increases Russia’s soft power capability, and, accordingly, the appeal of the Eurasian integration initiative supported by Moscow, which promotes solidarity around alternative and authoritarian-friendly norms (see Walker, 2016).

Bettiza and Lewis also examine different forms of norm contestation including “civilizational essentialization” and “counter-norm entrepreneurship” which are also significant considering the research objectives of this study. Civilizational essentialization is about the articulation of certain forms of regional and domestic identities, which are defined by a set of normative and cultural characteristics and are portrayed as “other” to, and are mobilized to challenge the universality of liberal norms and identities. (Bettiza & Lewis, 2020, p. 10). As civilizational essentialization aims at creating common norms and identities, it emerges as a primarily integrative power political maneuver. It is utilized by Russia to advocate a regional integration framework based on “traditional Eurasian values.” As Chebenkova (2016, p. 1) suggests, Russia’s conservatism and civilizational approach seeks to establish an ideational and political alternative to the West, and proposes a unique model for international relations architecture, where Russia would enjoy a special position and significant influence.

Counter-norm entrepreneurship is another form of norm contestation which is generally implemented in opposition to liberal projects. It includes attempts to promote a coherent collection of illiberal practices, ideas, and institutions worldwide, which represent “an ideological alternative to liberal forms of domestic and international order” (Bettiza & Lewis, 2020, p. 11). Counter-norm entrepreneurship can also be practiced as an integrative power political maneuver that aims to activate and build common norms and identities around social sites and relevant actors (Bettiza & Lewis, p. 10). A recent work by Keating and Kaczmarek (2019) examines how Russia utilizes counter-norms such as illiberal governance, strong leadership, and sovereignty to attract international support for its anti-Western and anti-American foreign policy.

In this respect, Russia’s power political approach to norm contestation represents a significant dynamic of regional power politics in Eurasia which is not based on hard power instruments but implemented through nonviolent practices including discourses, diplomatic initiatives, advocacy activities, or processes of institution-building based on alternative norms and values (see Bettiza & Lewis, 2020, p. 8). Such practices are often associated with soft power which is defined by Joseph Nye (2004, p. x) as the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion, sanctions, or bribery. Soft power arises from the appeal of a country’s values, culture, and political ideals and rests

on the ability to manipulate the agenda of political preferences. It could be practiced through multilateral diplomacy and international institutions (Nye, 2004, p. 5, 31). The next section examines how Russian-sponsored norms and values are incorporated into the Eurasian integration project which has increased its regional attractiveness vis-à-vis the EU in the current era marked by the rise of nationalism and authoritarianism.

Alternative Regionalisms in Eurasia: The European Union vs. the Eurasian Economic Union

Regionalism could be defined as a “set of governance programs and strategies” which aims at “political, economic, and/or cultural cooperation” between the countries of a certain region (Gürçan, 2020, p. 132). In fact, regionalism is neither a Western nor a European idea, as it has had multiple manifestations worldwide. Yet, the literature on regionalism predominantly adopts a Euro-centric approach that has deeply influenced the development of conceptual tools and theoretical approaches in the field. As Acharya (2016) puts it, this “ethnocentric” approach ignores emerging regionalisms in the other parts of the world, which reflect distinct economic and political conditions and normative aspirations compared to the EU integration project that originated in post-World War II Europe. In other cases, the end goal of regionalism may not be integration in the sense of creating some degree of supranationalism, but more limited cooperation that would preserve state sovereignty and autonomy (Acharya, 2016).

Regional integration projects are embodied in international institutions which are usually classified as supranational or intergovernmental. The EU is located at the most supranational and highly institutionalized end of the spectrum (Dragneva, 2016). EU membership requires transferring sovereignty to common bodies and institutions. Accordingly, the process of membership involves political, economic, and legal reforms to meet the Union’s standards and values and to harmonize domestic legislation with the EU *acquis*. The prospect of membership contributes to the incentive for reform, thus, the enlargement is seen as “the most successful foreign policy instrument” of the EU (EC, 2003). The EU aims at developing a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighborhood where states would enjoy peaceful and cooperative relations. In this respect, the EU also encourages the reform process based on the common liberal values in neighboring countries that currently do not have a membership prospect such as Russia and some other post-Soviet states. Those states would in return benefit from closer economic cooperation and integration with the EU (EC, 2003).

To promote Western liberal values in its Eastern neighborhood, the EU has adopted a strategy called “political conditionality” that offers material rewards such as financial assistance and benefits from full membership on the condition that states comply with the norms of liberal democracy (Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 106). This policy of conditionality is incorporated in membership processes and other available programs and instruments of partnership for regional countries such as European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Eastern Partnership (EaP), Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, and Association Agreements (Tatiashvili, 2016). Through these initiatives, the EU has sought to build a liberal democratic model of governance in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region based on its political norms and values. The process was supported by official EU

pronouncements which have been crucial for articulating what is appropriate in certain contexts and situations and for delegitimizing democratic malpractice (Noutcheva, 2018).

Since the early 2000s, the EU has increasingly engaged itself with Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The ENP which was launched in 2004 brought a sea-change in the process of institutionalization of European values in the region, while it extended the policy of conditionality for regional countries with no prospect of an immediate membership. The new initiative emphasized liberal values such as “democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law” and portrayed them as essential prerequisites for regional “political stability” and “sustained economic development” (Kobayashi, 2017, p. 13). Those values have been the essence of the new normative order intended to be built by the EU, which normalized and legitimized the collapse of the statist regimes through “color revolutions” in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004/05), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) (Kobayashi, 2017).

The chain of color revolutions in the post-Soviet region hastened Russian initiatives to construct regional institutions based on a distinct normative framework that would delimit the EU’s increasing regional influence and promote a regional integration under its own terms and political leadership. Those initiatives were supported by Russian efforts which concentrated on delegitimizing Western support for democracy in the region and on projecting a coherent political governance model based on alternative values. In this respect, Russia made strong condemnations of regime changes following civil mobilizations as examples of an illegitimate subversion of legally elected governments (Noutcheva, 2018, p. 318). The European and Russian views towards regional stability in the post-Soviet neighborhood began to substantially diverge from each other. While the EU preconditioned sustained regional stability with an externally triggered liberal and democratic reform process, Russia delegitimized revolutionary regime changes as a “destabilization” factor which lead to the emergence of crises at regional and domestic political levels (Kobayashi, 2017; Nikitina, 2014).

From the Russian perspective, the regional stability in the post-Soviet area could be built on the basis of an alternative set of “statist” norms. Statism as an ideology has always been very influential in Russian domestic politics, which advocates increasing and preserving the strong role of the state and its capability to sustain the political, social, and international order (Kasymov, 2012, p. 61). It is seen as the best way to protect the nation against various external security threats and foreign encroachments. In this respect, the state is considered to have a universally valid timeless value, and, accordingly, it is positioned on the “pedestal.” Other segments such as society, economy, and culture are subordinated to the state, in contrast to Western civilization, where they are autonomous from the state or on an identical level with the state (Horemuž, 2015, p. 18). In this respect, statism supports and advocates some relevant norms and values like sovereignty, strong leadership, and illiberal governance which have increased their appeal in recent years not only in the post-Soviet region but also in various parts of the globe (Keating & Kaczmarek, 2019).

Since the early 2000s, Russia has repeatedly introduced ambitious regional integration projects often modeled on the EU but evolved into distinctive organizational and normative frameworks. The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was established in 2000

to build a common market in the name of the Eurasian Customs Union which ultimately came into existence in 2010. In 2012, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus transformed this Custom Union into a Single Economic Space (SES). The SES was started with the objectives of promoting a common market for products, “services, labour and capital; the coordination of monetary policies, financial and tax policies; the development of unified transport, energy and information systems and the unification of systems of state support for innovation and priority sectoral development” (Mostafa & Mahmood, 2017, p. 165). In May 2014, those three countries signed the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, which transformed the SES into a full economic union. The EAEU Treaty came into force on January 1, 2015. The membership of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became effective later in 2015 (Khitakhunov et al., 2017; Sergi, 2018). In this respect, the EAEU which was established in 2015 emerged as the latest initiative by Russia to build a multilateral regional institution in the post-Soviet neighborhood (Busygina & Filippov, 2020).

As an alternative to European integration, the EAEU works to protect and legitimize a statist regional order in the post-Soviet region (Kobayashi, 2017). This is one of the main reasons why the EAEU project falls short of creating supranational organizations that would weaken the role of the state and instead puts a strong emphasis on national sovereignty. Article 3 of the Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union (2014) underlines the principles of sovereign equality of the members and the respect for the differences of their political structures. In this regard, the EAEU diverges from the European integration that is based on shared political liberal values. It seems to be closer to the idea of East Asia’s integration which does not seek a universal and maximum possible integration, but a controlled and selective integration limited to the economic realm under the control of sovereign states (Rivera & Garashchuk, 2016).

Intergovernmental organizations like the EAEU could have some common bodies, which are not independent from the member countries, especially from their executive branches. The binding decisions could only be taken with unanimity, which ensures that governments cannot be bound against their will. The EAEU features such an organizational setting whose principal decision-making forums are its Councils (Dragneva, 2016). The highest body of the Union is the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council which consists of the heads of member states. The Eurasian Intergovernmental Council is the junior one including the prime ministers of members. There is no departure from the unanimity rule in the decision-making processes in these bodies. Binding decisions are taken only by consensus with no sacrifice from the national sovereignty of member states. In addition, the Supreme Council including the heads of states cannot be constrained by the decisions of other bodies. Any limitation of national sovereignty is conditional on the consent of all members and could be revoked (Dragneva, 2016). This system protects even the sovereignty of the smallest countries such as Armenia and Kyrgyzstan which are represented on an equal basis vis-à-vis other countries including Russia, the biggest economic power of the Union (Busygina & Filippov, 2020).

In fact, Russia has had some initiatives to create much stronger institutions with a considerable degree of supranationalism since the 2000s (Kobayashi, 2017; Mostafa & Mahmood, 2018, p. 165). In such attempts, Russia did not seek to replicate the EU model but to assert a regional hegemony by creating an appropriate framework that can be used

to convert Russian preponderant capabilities into a direct influence over the regional politics and domestic politics of the member countries (see Sergi, 2018). However, during the negotiations for the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, Russian attempts to create supranational structures have been blocked by Russia's closest allies such as Belarus and Kazakhstan. A primary reason for that was the rising anxiety of regional states from Russia's hegemonic ambitions and interventionism after the Ukraine crisis and the Crimean annexation of 2014 (Busygina & Filippov, 2018, pp. 11-12).

The development of the Ukraine crisis showed Russia that applying too much pressure on its neighbors could lead to some unpredictable and even self-defeating results. This led Moscow to make substantial concessions to regional allies in the negotiation process for the EAEU, which increased the level of multilateralism and ensured the principle of intergovernmentalism in the Organization (Busygina & Filippov, 2018). In this respect, Russia relied less on hard power tactics and focused on increasing the appeal of the EAEU integration alternative based on its organizational structure and normative framework which respect national sovereignty and political concerns of the members.

On the other side, the rising nationalism and the awakened sovereignty sensitivities in the post-Soviet states, which coincided with global-level authoritarian tendencies, have played important factors in shaping the structure of the EAEU. In 2014, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev publicly suggested that the new Treaty for the EAEU "entirely excludes any kind of limitation or violation of Kazakh sovereignty". He maintained that "we have provided mechanisms excluding limitations or violation of our sovereignty at all levels" (Dragneva, 2016, p. 2). The increasing concerns on national values and sovereignty in recent years have also been translated into the cultural sphere. While preserving the official language status of Russian, the state document flow has been changed into the Kazakh language. In 2018, the President issued a declaration instructing Kazakh ministers and parliamentary deputies to use their national language at work. Despite increasing his economic and political partnership with Russia, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, since 2014, has also preferred to use the Belarusian language instead of Russian while delivering his official speeches (Busygina & Filippov, 2020).

In fact, national sovereignty concerns have long been an impediment on the way towards a successful and deeper integration in different regions throughout the world including Europe. In 1968, Richard Cooper defined the central problem of economic cooperation as "how to maintain openness while enabling states to retain sufficient autonomy" (quoted in Keohane, 2009, p. 35). In recent years the problem has ever increased with the rise of nationalism and sovereignty concerns in an economically open world. A growing percentage of people throughout the world express distrust in regional integration which is exploited by populist, nationalist or authoritarian political leaderships. The main question is, therefore, how to reconcile these political tendencies with regional integration projects already undergoing a deep crisis even in Europe (IPSA, 2021). In this respect, Russia's EAEU project appears as an up-to-date initiative to reconcile the need for regional economic cooperation and the rising sovereignty concerns of post-Soviet states through creating an intergovernmental organization and statist normative framework which protects regional authoritarian governance.

Scholars indicate that post-Soviet states which maintain a high level of interdependence in trade, energy, transportation, etc. could benefit from closer economic cooperation with each other and Russia. Regional states are particularly interested in expanding their access to Russia's natural resources and labor markets (Sergi, 2018, pp. 53-57; Busygina & Filippov, 2020, pp. 1-2). However, those states cannot entirely trust Russia which inherently maintains hegemonic ambitions towards the region. Therefore, more limited and pragmatic forms of regional economic cooperation like custom areas or some kind of preferential trade agreements would likely be much more successful. The EAEU's intergovernmental structure could protect the political and economic independence of regional states, which place national sovereignty at the top of their agenda (Busygina & Filippov, 2020). A public survey by Mariya Omelicheva (2015, p. 130) puts forward that national security, stability, and economic development are paramount also to the citizens of Central Asian states. According to the results, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek people all favor political stabilization and fast-track economic progress, which precedes democratization for the majority of respondents. For all these reasons above, the Eurasian integration initiative led by Russia has an increasing appeal for both regional political leaders and the majority of people of Central Asia.

The Balance of Soft Power: The EU Conditionality vs. Russia's Sovereign Democracy

Russia's power political approach towards norms and values and the instrumentalization of such elements in its foreign policy based on nonviolent practices including discourse and institution-building processes constitutes a critical aspect of regional power politics. In this power political game, soft power tools play a central role. By creating its own alternative model of integration, Russia attempts to fill the vacuum caused by the decreasing appeal of the EU's regional initiatives. The current state of the "balance of soft power" in the region and the future changes in that balance will be one of the most crucial factors determining the results of the struggle for influence in regional politics between the EU and Russia. As Krastev and Leonard (2007, p. 2) put it; the future of the international order will be shaped not solely by the balance of hard power but by the balance of soft power namely "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion and payment, arising from the appeal of your culture, political ideals, and policies." This section applies this argument to the post-Soviet area and examines the main reasons why Russia's soft power capability has increased vis-à-vis the European Union for several regional states in varying degrees.

In the 1990s and the early 2000s, the EU's soft power increased throughout the region, which ran parallel to the rise and spread of Western liberal values in the world. The West's victory in the Cold War was achieved not through war but emerged as a result of the internal collapse of communism. According to Alexander Lukin (2014, pp. 43-45), this led to a euphoria underlined by "the end of history" theory by Francis Fukuyama, which proclaimed "the ultimate success and universal recognition of Western values and the Western, progressive social order." After the Soviet collapse, the former communist countries started political and economic transition processes which were by and large guided by liberal-democratic values championed by the West. This was the main factor enforcing the normative power of the EU in the region.

Since the global crisis of 2008, however, it has become commonplace to discuss the normative retreat of the West. The growing socio-economic problems, the mass migration, and the rising threat of international terrorism reinforced nationalism, populism, and illiberal political movements in the European Union. Such political tendencies growing in European countries such as Italy, the Netherlands, and Hungary have put the future of the EU project itself at serious risk (Cooley, 2015; Walker, 2016; Keating & Kaczmarek, 2019). Those developments facilitate Russia's power political maneuvers of norm contestation aiming at fragmenting the EU by supporting anti-liberal political actors and movements in Europe. The discourse used by President Putin in an interview conducted by the Financial Times (2019) could be considered a part of this strategy. While trumpeting the rise of populist national movements and leaders in Europe and the USA, Putin claims "liberalism is spent as an ideological force," which "outlived its purpose as the public turned against immigration, open borders, and multiculturalism." He maintains that liberals "cannot simply dictate anything to anyone just like they have been attempting to do over the recent decades" (Financial Times, 2019).

Such a discourse used by Russia also aims to portray the Western-based initiatives that spread liberal-democratic values as "hypocritical." From the Russian perspective, the weakening of liberalism in Europe and the US shows that Western powers selectively appropriate liberal norms according to their "double standards." This hypocrisy erodes Western agents' ability to create norms and set agendas, as they are no longer trusted to set new international standards that they will want others to adopt but will probably flaunt themselves (Bettiza & Lewis, 2020, pp. 8-9). If Russia could enforce such perceptions of hypocrisy, it could undermine the appeal of the same liberal norms and values that are used by Western actors to legitimize their approach towards the post-Soviet region. As examined below those perceptions also contribute to the appeal of counter-norms produced by Russia and to the integration process in the post-Soviet region around the Eurasian ideal.

Besides the crisis of liberal values in the West and its international repercussions, the failure of color revolutions in the CIS has become a second important factor leading to a decline in the EU's soft power in the region. In the early 2000s, these revolutionary changes were welcomed by the Western powers which considered the people throughout the region to be intrinsically aspired to the liberal-democratic values promoted by the West. According to this perspective, if the leaders of this or that country try to stifle this naturally progressive trend, they would be swept away by a surge of popular protest (Lukin, 2014, p. 46). Even though revolutionary movements supported by Western democracy assistance were successful to this end, the democratic promise of the color revolutions quickly stagnated and dissipated after the initial democratic breakthrough.

As Mitchell (2012, p. 116) suggests, there were significant elements of continuity in the domestic politics of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan after the color revolutions, which were less ambiguous than any democratization trends. Georgia continued to be dominated by a single political party, while power was predominantly concentrated in the presidency. As it was before 2005, Ukraine continued to be divided into regional, linguistic and ethnic lines. The country became less pro-Russian and more liberalism-oriented but there was still political corruption and widespread influence of money in domestic politics

(Mitchell 2012, p. 140). In one year following the Tulip Revolution of 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the new President of Kyrgyzstan suggested that Western individualism does not find any resonance in the country. In 2009, the waning prospects of democratization in the post-Soviet region were even confirmed by the EU which expressed its “grave concern that the pace of reforms has slowed particularly in democratic reforms and human rights standards” (Kobayashi, 2017, p. 17).

While leading to disappointment in the West and the region, the failure of color revolutions exposed the fact that democratizing processes take time and necessitate the development of long-term and comprehensive strategies driving on deep contextual knowledge. This had not been taken seriously by the Western democracy promoters. As indicated by former local members of Western-funded democracy promotion programs in Central Asia, “the mind-sets and attitudes of their countries’ people are the main obstacles to meaningful democratization” (Omeličeva, 2015, pp. 139-140). In this respect, the Western contribution facilitated the replacement of the existing regimes and leaders with pro-Western ones. However, subsequent governments failed to meet the high-level expectations of color revolutions under the domestic conditions of the post-Soviet countries. This seemed to contribute to the success of Russian propaganda in the region, which portrayed Western-led democratization initiatives just as a plot aiming at subverting regimes and spreading Western geopolitical influence throughout the region (Omeličeva, 2015, p. 125).

The third significant factor leading to the decrease of the EU’s influence and soft power in the region is the weakening prospects for the enlargement, which was once portrayed as “the most successful foreign policy instrument” of the Union (EC, 2003). While Russia’s opposition and challenge to the EU enlargement proved to be formidable, the internal problems of the EU risking the future of European integration itself dramatically decreased the possibility of further enlargement. Such a move would likely enforce Euroscepticism and anti-EU movements in some member countries (Ultan & Ornek, 2015). The internal crisis of the EU leads not only to the weakening of its normative and structural power to shape its neighborhood but also a decrease in its willingness to allocate high amounts of material sources to contribute to liberal-democratic transformation in the region (Demeš, 2011).

It is important to note here that Russia has not behaved just as a “spoiler” by enjoying the EU’s economic and political retreat from the region and developing its bilateral relations with local states at the expense of European powers. Russia has also developed an alternative regional framework relying on the statist norms mentioned above and the related sovereign democracy ideal of Russia. This framework has been one of the most critical factors for the increase of Russian soft power in the region vis-à-vis the EU’s partnership initiatives drawing on political conditionality. Originally, sovereign democracy advocates that states have an immutable right to conduct their internal affairs without any external intervention in the name of contributing to democratization and ensuring human rights. The concept contrasts with managed democracy which is identified as “a political and economic regime imposed from abroad by force and deception” (Omeličeva, 2015, p. 176). In this respect, the sovereign democracy model proclaims that each country shall pursue a distinct path for developing its democratic system and political institutions

reflecting its own political culture and historical experiences (see Krastev, 2006; Orlov, 2008).

In recent years, some Russian pro-government experts have claimed that the Western democracy model could not fit all cultures and societies. They have maintained that some societies including the Russian one need a strong and centralized state to manage political transformation and economic development and to avoid conflict and disorder associated with democratic transformation (Noutcheva, 2018, p. 319). Russia's allies in the region view the Russian model of sovereign democracy as attractive since it subordinates democracy and human rights to the stability of government and societies. As Herd (2014, p. 183) suggests the model sees authoritarianism as the solution to instability rather than the cause of it. It is a strong motivation for regional states to join Russian-led "sovereignty-reinforcing" and "protective" integration schemes, which help them to legitimize their domestic political practices and resist normative pressures from Western liberal powers (Allison, 2018).

Some analysts suggest that the EAEU's normative framework is seen as attractive not only by regional governments for regime security reasons, but also by large segments of people who think that those norms could produce viable resolutions for the current era's political, economic, and social problems. According to a Russian conservative scholar, Sergei Karaganov, this situation provides soft power resources for Russia. He claims that "illiberal strongman democracy" prevails mostly in the rising states of the non-Western world, which has been always advocated by Putin since the beginning of his presidency in 2000 (quoted in Bettiza & Lewis, 2020). On the other side, Western-based scholars, Keating and Kaczmarek (2019) suggest that Russia increases its soft power at both the elite and popular level by defending "traditional" values and illiberal governance frameworks. Russia's soft power is contributed by Putin's image as a strong and decisive leader, as contrasted with weak bureaucratic and democratic political leaders and Russia's anti-American foreign policy that emphasizes sovereignty and pluralism. The Authors maintain that in each category, "Russia has global constituencies, beyond what it considers its post-Soviet sphere of influence, that view it as a leader in promoting these values" (Keating & Kaczmarek, 2019, 16).

Regional Responses to Russia's Strategy: The Rising Attractiveness of the Eurasian Integration Project

In the literature, there is a strong tendency to portray the EAEU as an authoritarian club, in which members provide mutual support to each other's actions to consolidate their regimes and to suppress domestic opposition. According to this view, such motivations by political leaders outweigh the real economic benefits (see Rivera & Garashchuk, 2016, p. 102). However, some public surveys show that political and economic cooperation with Russia is also welcomed and supported by people of the post-Soviet region. A Gallup survey conducted in 2015 following the inauguration of the EAEU and Russia's annexation of Crimea revealed that regional approval of Russia's leadership was still very high: 93% in Tajikistan, 79% in Kyrgyzstan, 72% in Kazakhstan, 66% in Armenia, 62% in both Uzbekistan and Belarus (Gallup, 2015). A more recent public poll by the Wilson Center (2020) shows that Russia's image as a great power is predominantly favored

in Central Asia, while China comes second and the US takes third place. Accordingly, Central Asian people confirm closer economic relations first and foremost with Russia. A supermajority of Uzbek (89%), Kyrgyz (87%), and Kazakh respondents (81%) favored furthering economic cooperation with the Russian Federation. The report concludes that people's perception of Russia remains quite positive, maybe "even more than the diplomatic relations and elite opinions might indicate" (Wilson Center, 2020).

Omeliicheva's (2015) study of Central Asia claims that the non-liberal and statist regional governance model offered by Moscow has been a significant source of Russia's rising positive image in the region. She finds out that the Russian perspective of sovereign democracy resonates with the position of Central Asian leaders who have advocated their countries' right to follow their own paths to democracy and economic development. Omeliicheva's (2015) study also involves public opinion surveys carried out in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Those surveys reveal a parallel conviction in the public that "a strong state buttressed by a healthy economy" could better serve Central Asian people than "a weak state associated with liberal policies." Central Asian people welcome Russian-sponsored values such as strong leadership, which is viewed both as a source of domestic stability and as an imperative for dealing with political and economic crises. (Omeliicheva, 2015, pp. 123-130).

Among the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan has been the biggest supporter of the Eurasian integration idea; yet only in the economic realm and with the precondition of preserving national sovereignty. Kazakh sovereignty concerns have further grown after the Russian direct involvement in the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. President Nazarbayev stated that "as far as our independence is concerned, it is a constant. Kazakhstan will not surrender to anybody even an iota of its independence." He maintained that if the rules "are not respected then Kazakhstan has the complete right to end its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union" (quoted in Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017, p. 11). On the other side, Kazakhstan maintains a political regime that could be best identified as a personalistic autocracy. Kazakhstan's constitution concentrates power highly in the presidency (Terzyan, 2020, p. 8). Eurasian regionalism appears much more appealing for a post-Soviet state with such an autocratic regime prioritizing national sovereignty. Still, Kazakhstan maintains some degree of cooperation with the European Union. However, this policy primarily aims to increase its bargaining power and foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis Russia (Meister, 2018).

Kyrgyzstan maintains one of the weakest and most depressed economies in the post-Soviet region. The Kyrgyz economy heavily depends on foreign aid and remittances from its migrant workers living in Russia and Kazakhstan. (Sergi, 2018, p. 57; Mostafa & Mahmood, 2018, p. 166). In 2015, Kyrgyzstan's trade with the Union members accounted for around 42% of its total trade, including 26% with Russia and 16% with Kazakhstan. Under these conditions, gaining membership in the Union was arguably more pressing for Kyrgyzstan than for other regional countries (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017, p. 9). On the other side, some reports suggest that the Kyrgyz economy was harmed after the accession to the Union mainly due to a high tariff system imposed on non-members including China. However, a public survey conducted in 2016 by the International Republican Institute (IRI) found that 65 percent of Kyrgyz people believed that the country was headed in the

right direction by joining the Russian-led Eurasian integration project (The Diplomat, 2016).

Uzbekistan has so far remained out of the EAEU, as a state which has been traditionally disturbed by Russia's hegemonic ambitions in Central Asia (Tolipov, 2019). After President Islam Karimov died in 2016, his successor Shavkat Mirziyoyev continued to follow a multi-vector foreign policy concerning Uzbek relations with Russia, China, and the West, which primarily aims at preserving national sovereignty and foreign policy autonomy (Marszewski, 2018). However, this does not mean that Uzbekistan discredits the Russian-sponsored normative framework and regional governance model. In Central Asia, the Uzbek government has long taken the lead to champion the view that political stability and national security take precedence above all other objectives and considerations like democratic transition. This view has come to be confirmed first by other Central Asian leaders and then by a majority of people in the region (Omelicheva, 2015, p. 124). Furthermore, Uzbekistan has recently signaled that it has been considering the potential economic benefits of joining the EAEU. In December 2020, Uzbekistan was accepted as an observer state at an online EAEU meeting during which Mirziyoyev touched upon "the organization's growing international reputation" and "widening cooperation geography." Mirziyoyev stated that EAEU member states are closely interconnected and deeply integrated concerning transportation and infrastructure and maintained that he wants to see an increased collaboration on these issues to bring down costs (The Diplomat, 2020).

At the May 2021 summit, Mirziyoyev emphasized the significant potential for the development of regional trade relations and Tashkent's willingness to remove trade barriers and take further steps for integration (Kalay, 2021). In 2020, the Center for Economic Research and Reforms in Uzbekistan carried out a public poll including 1,500 students, business owners, and government officials, which revealed that more than 70 percent of respondents have a favorable view towards EAEU membership (The Diplomat, 2020). Uzbekistan's eastern neighbor, Tajikistan has also started considering the advantages and disadvantages of its membership. Given the dependence of Tajikistan on the Uzbek economy and territory for trade and the political parallels between the two governments, it is reported that Tajikistan's membership hinges partly on Tashkent's decision and timeline for joining the EAEU: If Uzbekistan becomes a member "Tajikistan will have little choice but to follow" (The Diplomat, 2021).

In Eastern Europe, Belarus is a post-Soviet state which is highly dependent on Russia for energy, trade, and its economy. The country imports 80 percent of its energy needs including natural gas and oil from Russia. Moscow has provided subsidization on energy prices and some financial assistance in exchange for Minsk's support for Eurasian integration initiatives (Yesevi, 2014, p. 1991). Belarus maintains a truly autocratic and oppressive regime under Alexander Lukashenko's leadership, which created a moral dilemma for the EU in the past for inviting the country into the Eastern Partnership. The access of Minsk to this initiative created some high expectations in the EU for a reform process but soon it became clear that the Belarussian government was only interested in economic benefits from the partnership (Demeš, 2011, p. 13; Simionov, 2013, p. 122). At the same time, President Lukashenko has often driven a hard bargain with Russia in negotiations on the Eurasian integration process to secure the mechanisms to preserve

national sovereignty and especially to reach energy deals on more favorable terms (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017, p. 8; Busygina & Filippov, 2020, p. 7).

Following the domestic crisis and the wave of anti-government protests in May 2020, it became particularly difficult to measure public opinion in Belarus. In late 2020, the Poland-based Center for Eastern Studies conducted a telephone survey with a sample of 1000 Belarussian respondents, which revealed that the positive attitude towards Lukhashenka remained around 41 percent, while 46 percent had a negative view. However, the situation does not seem to change the very positive image of Russia in Belarus, as 86 percent of respondents declared their positive perception of Russia. In addition, Putin himself received the support of 60 percent of Belarusians (Ioffe, 2021; OSW, 2021).

Armenia's accession to the EAEU has become possible after a quick foreign policy maneuver in late 2013. Following a private meeting with Putin on September 3, President Serzh Sargsyan turned away from signing an Association Agreement with the EU and announced Armenia's intention to join the Russian-led Customs Union and then the Eurasian Economic Union (Vasilyan, 2017, p. 33). Scholars view the main reason for this shift as Armenia's continuous dependency on Russian support due to its economic problems and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan (Vasilyan, 2017; Del Medico, 2014). To drive Armenia into the EAEU, Russia also applied some economic carrots, such as discounted energy prices and a financial loan offer (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017, p. 9). Russia already enjoys a monopoly in the Armenian energy and transportation sector. On the other side, the EAEU membership creates advantages for Armenian migrant workers in Russia whose number exceeds one million (Turchyn & Ivasechko, 2020, p. 112; Felgenhauer, 2014).

Among those issues, the Karabakh conflict has been the most significant factor affecting the foreign policy and domestic politics of Armenia. The conflict has been often used to legitimize the restrictions on political liberalization and the centralization of power in the country. (Del Medico, 2014, pp. 7-8). The 2018 "Velvet Revolution" aroused optimistic expectations for a democratic transition in the country, which was led by Nikol Pashinyan who opposed the dominance of the so-called "Karabakh clan" in Armenian politics. Before the revolution, pro-Western opposition figures were also criticizing Armenia's decision to join the EAEU. After coming to power, however, the Pashinyan leadership quickly confirmed Armenia's commitment to Eurasian integration due to certain geopolitical and economic realities on the ground (Terzyan, 2020, p. 8; Kucera, 2019). Later in 2020, the renewed conflict in Karabakh triggered a domestic crisis that risked undoing the success of democratic development after the Velvet Revolution. This situation was confirmed by Freedom House (2021, p. 3) which decreased Armenia's democracy score for the first time since the revolution.

It seems that the Armenian people have also supported the country's orientation towards Eurasian integration. According to an IRI (2018) survey, 78 percent of Armenians believe that Armenia's joining the EAEU has been positive for their country. In addition, Gallup's (2017) international poll also put forward that 89 percent of Armenian people have a favorable view of President Putin. The 2020 Karabakh conflict led to the rise of a public sense of betrayal that Armenia's long-standing ally Russia wasn't providing enough support in the conflict. However, it is suggested that after Russia brokered a

ceasefire on November 10, providing the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers in the conflict area, Armenians came to view Russia again as a “savior” preventing further territorial losses and humanitarian costs (RFE/RL, 2020).

Since the 2000s, Azerbaijan has tried to preserve a neutral position in the competition between the European and Eurasian regionalisms (Valiyev, 2016). Baku maintains a high-level concern for its sovereignty and does not accept any intervention into domestic affairs by external actors. Having rich energy sources, Azerbaijan has been less dependent on the EU’s economic assistance and conditionality (Simionov, 2013). On the other side, the Eurasian integration initiatives have been viewed as an attempt to re-establish a new form of the Soviet Union (Bayramov, 2013, p. 14). Furthermore, Russia’s integration project runs contrary to Azerbaijan’s primary foreign policy objective of becoming an energy hub and a critical country for European energy security. Azerbaijan has been interested in increasing cooperation with the EU in several areas such as energy, transportation, trade, and visa liberalization. Yet, Baku has generally viewed the European Union more as a business partner and rejected implementing the EU-sponsored reforms on democratization (Turchyn & Ivasechko, 2020, p. 111).

Towards the mid-2010s, Azerbaijan began to rethink its approach towards Russia and the Eurasian integration idea in an atmosphere of deteriorating relations with the EU. The drop in global oil prices with adverse impacts on the economy and emerging anti-government protests have further increased authoritarian tendencies in Azerbaijan. The EU became increasingly critical of human rights issues, freedom of the media, and corruption in the country (Valiyev, 2016; Turchyn & Ivasechko, 2020). On the other side, the relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia has become much closer as the two states share a very similar political regime. Despite supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity following the Crimean annexation of 2014, Azerbaijani officials came to endorse Russia’s narrative on the reasons for the color revolution in Ukraine. Some of them portrayed it as a “project” planned and funded by the West, which resulted in civil strife and anarchy in Ukraine and might be repeated in Azerbaijan itself. In recent years, Baku arrested a large number of opposition politicians and activists, while it closed down or harassed Western NGOs and institutions working for democracy promotion in Azerbaijan (de Waal, 2014). All those moves indicate that the Russian-sponsored normative framework and regional governance model find resonance in President Ilham Aliiev’s approach towards domestic politics in Azerbaijan.

In recent years, Azerbaijani leadership has played with pro-EAEU rhetoric to manage its relations with Russia. So far, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been used to justify Azerbaijan’s unwillingness to join the Russian-led Union as it includes Armenia as a full member. It is suggested that the Azerbaijani public could confirm EAEU membership if Moscow, in turn, promises to provide the return of occupied territories, thereby sacrificing partnership with the EU by virtue of retaking territory (Valiyev, 2016). In this respect, it is argued that the recent deal on the Karabakh conflict brokered by Russia which returned a considerable territory to Azerbaijan might change Baku’s strategic calculus toward the EAEU. Russia will probably attempt to use its peacekeeping military forces deployed on Azerbaijani soil as additional leverage on Baku in the way towards the eventual resolution of the conflict. In this respect, Azerbaijan could gain some political rewards in exchange

for joining the Eurasian integration (Shahbazov, 2021). However, Azerbaijan's accession to the EAEU still looks like a distant prospect, given the ongoing conflict with Armenia, Baku's view on Russian-led integration initiatives, and its economic relations with the EU.

There are three other neighbors of Russia located in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus which have generally followed pro-EU policies with the ultimate objective of gaining full membership; namely, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. In response to their policies, Russia has predominantly appealed to hard power tactics to coerce them to change their preference. Those tactics include playing with energy prices, imposing trade barriers, offering financial assistance as bribery, and manipulating their ethnic conflicts. After the Rose Revolution of 2003, Georgia's orientation towards the West with the objective of being a full member of the EU and NATO was responded to very harshly by Russia. Starting in 2005, Russia imposed an economic blockade against Tbilisi. Moscow banned the import of Georgian agricultural products and wine, while it sharply increased the price of Russian natural gas imported to the country (Lomia, 2020). The Kremlin also manipulated ethnic conflicts in the country and intervened in the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. Following a five-day war with Georgia, Russia recognized these two breakaway regions as independent states (Matsaberidze, 2015).

Ukraine has faced similar aggressive moves by the Kremlin in response to its moves towards further integration with the EU. During 2013, when Yanukovich was negotiating Ukraine's Association Agreement with the EU, Russia tried to persuade Ukraine to join the Eurasian Customs Union. Moscow posed strong political pressure on Kyiv and threatened to close the Russian market for Ukrainian products in order to dissuade it from signing the agreement with the EU. Besides, Russia also offered a \$15 billion package of loans, discounts on natural gas prices, and investments in Ukraine's industry as enticements for joining the Eurasian integration (Horemuz, 2015, p. 17; Plekhanov, 2016, p. 13). The Russian offer was very attractive from Yanukovich's perspective, as it did not involve any type of political conditionality. By taking the Russian offer, therefore, Yanukovich would have been free to win the next elections by whatever necessary means with Russian assistance (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 87).

In November 2013, Yanukovich suspended the process of signing the agreement with the EU and reoriented towards the Eurasian integration. This decision soon prompted mass civil protests in Kyiv which led to the Euromaidan revolution of 2014. The new pro-western government established in Ukraine soon signed the Association Agreement with the EU (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, pp. 94-98; Diuk, 2014). In response to the regime change in Ukraine, Russia resorted to hard punitive measures including various economic sanctions, the annexation of Crimea, and military intervention in the civil war in eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin's harsh reaction to Ukraine underscored Russia's hegemonic inclinations. This in turn heightened the sensitivities of independence and sovereignty among other regional states including the EAEU members (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017, p. 11).

Since the mid-2000s Moldova's orientation towards the EU has also led to political crises with Russia and some economic measures by Moscow such as trade restrictions on Moldovan wine and agricultural products. On the other side, the Transnistrian

ethnic conflict and the presence of the Russian military in the country under the label of peacekeepers have been often used as instruments to dissuade Chisinau from joining the EU and NATO (Todua, 2007; Kennedy, 2016). The 2014 Ukraine crisis seemed to deepen the existing ethnic frictions in Moldova. As the crisis developed into ethnic conflicts in eastern Ukraine, the pro-Russian political authorities of Transnistria and Gagauzia declared that Moldova's orientation toward the West and EU was contributing to the country's territorial fragmentation (Suveica, 2014). The annexation of Crimea also resulted in the formation of diverse viewpoints on foreign policy issues in the Moldovan political elite and public. The domestic survey conducted by the Institute for Public Policy of Moldova in November 2014 found that there was a significant reduction in support for EU membership, which fell to 44%, while 47% of Moldovans favored joining the Russian-led Customs Union (see Kennedy, 2016, pp. 524-527).

Later the revelation of the \$1 billion Moldovan bank fraud scandal contributed to a further decline in popularity of the EU ideal in Moldova. As the pro-EU coalition government failed to struggle against corruption, people seemed to have lost faith in the European dream. In March 2015, massive anti-government protests started in Chisinau which helped to strengthen pro-Russian political parties in Moldova (*ibid.*, pp. 525-526; Volovoj, 2017). The November 2016 presidential elections were won by Igor Dodon, who criticized the EU-Moldova Association Agreement signed two years previously. In April 2017, Moldova was granted an observer status in the EAEU. This development marked the Dodon leadership's re-orientation towards Russia (Euractiv, 2017a; 2017b). There was a parallel increase in the Russian leadership's popularity among the Moldovans. The Gallup (2017) poll on the images of global leaders put forward that 77% of Moldovan people had a favorable view of Russian President Putin.

Yet, the rise of the popularity of the EAEU in Dodon's early years at the office did not turn into a long-term trend shaping Moldovan orientation. The attractiveness of the EU idea soon began to increase for Moldovans. A public poll conducted in July 2018, showed that the popularity of the EU reached 46 percent, while the support for the EAEU dropped to 36 percent (IRI, 2018). The next presidential elections in 2020 led to the victory of Maia Sandu, a pro-European leader who had promised to fight against the ongoing corruption problem. Yet, Sandu faced strong parliamentary resistance to her rule, which resulted in a lengthy political and interinstitutional fight. According to a report by the Freedom House (2021), this might erode democratic protections in Moldova even more. The report underlines that there are still strong impediments to a stable and successful democratization process in the pro-EU regional states in the CIS such as high-level corruption, weak domestic institutions, autocratic political tendencies, and problems in ensuring the rule of law (Freedom House, 2021).

The examination of the different countries above shows that Russia resorts to similar hard power instruments and tactics against regional countries where the EU's influence is still strong. However, it is not always clear, whether the EU's influence in those states comes from its soft power based on the attractiveness of liberal-democratic values. The post-Soviet neighbors of the EU usually use their ties with Brussels to gain material benefits and to expand their freedom of action vis-à-vis Russia rather than to support their modernization or democratization process (Simionov, 2013, p. 125; Del Medico,

2014, p. 10). Such a strategy is implemented also by some EAEU members which follow a multi-vector foreign policy to ensure their independence. This fact indicates that a sort of transactional partnership model with the EU has become widespread throughout the region, which differs from the normative partnership model sought by Brussels since the 1990s.

Conclusion

The analysis represented in this paper shows that Russia's regional integration initiatives in the post-Soviet area are supported by a mix of soft power and hard power tools. The Russian-sponsored normative framework and regional governance model are highly appreciated by political leaders and people in Central Asia. When we move our focus towards the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, we see that Russia relies more on hard power tactics such as playing with energy prices and manipulating ethnic conflicts against the pro-Western states. Due to the geography, the local states in these two regions maintain lesser degrees of economic interdependence with Russia and other post-Soviet states, while they enjoy more intense economic ties with Europe. This renders political and economic cooperation with the EU more attractive.

However, those regional states' approach towards the EU primarily aims at maximizing their material interest and foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis Russia. In this respect, they seek political, economic, and security assistance from the West; but there is an ongoing strong resistance against democratic reforms promoted by the EU. In this respect, even the pro-Western governments in the CIS region stop short of fully embracing the idea of European regionalism. The EU's normative influence continues to wane in the region due to certain factors examined in this paper. This leads to the proliferation of transactional partnerships with the EU in the region which seems much more attractive to non-democratic governments. This problem seems to make relevance to contemporary discussions on the weakening of long-term institutional and value-based partnerships throughout the world in the age of rising authoritarianism, populism, and nationalism.

It is still questionable whether Russian-promoted norms and values are so influential and attractive beyond Central Asia. However, high-level approval rates of Russia and its political leadership among the people of countries like Armenia, Belarus, and Moldova could be interpreted as there being no serious opposition to the norms, values, and political ideas promoted by Russia. The public surveys conducted from 2015 to 2020 put forward positive public perspectives which contradict the image of Russia that the EU has sought to promote, i.e. a hegemonic power opposing democracy, modernization, and development in the region. Under these conditions, some regional governments have not found it very difficult to legitimize their pro-Russian policies or rapprochements towards Moscow and the Eurasian integration alternative.

There are some authoritarian states like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan which have not participated in the EAEU since they are not sure whether the economic benefits of joining the Union would outweigh the costs. On the other side, one cannot argue that those states do not sympathize with the normative framework advocated by the Eurasian integration project. In this respect, we can identify another group of regional states which hesitate to join the EAEU due to certain economic considerations but look for a

non-institutionalized partnership with Russia and other members in the organization to consolidate their rule in the domestic realm and the statist regional governance in the CIS region. Such a cooperation and partnership model could also contribute to the success of Russia's power political norm contestation strategy vis-à-vis the EU, which aims to block the expansion of Western political influence in the region.

This paper also put forward the advantages of Russia's power political strategy drawing on non-violent practices, such as norm contestation, institution building, and economic integration initiatives in post-Soviet Eurasia. Compared to military methods like alliance building and interventions into regional conflicts, the Eurasian integration process does not represent a serious challenge to the sovereignty of small regional states. For example, unlike the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is a regional military alliance in the CIS region, the EAEU membership does not require concessions to harmonize foreign policy and security strategy. On the other side, Russia has seemed to be open to making concessions from its intention to build a supranational economic bloc limiting the sovereignty of smaller members for the sake of ensuring larger participation in the EAEU. In its current form, the EAEU brings some restrictions for the member states in their foreign economic relations but the Single Economic Space, in turn, provides some benefits for regional states that maintain a high-level interdependency with each other and Russia.

This paper examined how Russia has increased its political influence and soft power in the post-Soviet region vis-à-vis the EU by following a successful norm contestation strategy since the early 2000s. It is indispensable that Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 would have negative consequences concerning the future of Russia's soft power in the region. The appeal of Russia's regional leadership may decrease even in the countries which are Moscow's close regional allies. However, the intangible norms, values, and principles which have been promoted by that leadership for two decades could not be easily and quickly eliminated from the region by the impacts of the Ukraine war. The authoritarian and statist norms sponsored by Russia would continue to structure regional governance and cooperation in a way that favors Russia's strategic interests and undermines the EU's normative appeal and regional influence. This could help Russia to compensate for the negative effects of its military actions in the region to some extent in the contemporary era which is marked by the rise of authoritarianism and nationalism.

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Citizens' Perceptions of Public Administration Ethics, Public Service Quality and Politicization of Public Organizations: A Study in Diyarbakır

Vatandaşların Kamu Yönetimi Etiği, Kamu Hizmet Kalitesi ve Kamu Kurumlarının Siyasallaşmasına Yönelik Algısı: Diyarbakır'da Bir Araştırma

Müslüm Kayacı¹

Abstract

Citizens' satisfaction with public sector has been a focus of interest especially in new public management literature for almost four decades. For this reason, investigating perceptions and evaluations of citizens for public service quality has become more vital for both scholars and practitioners. Field studies in different contexts can provide evidence for new public management scholars to expand theory and for governments to improve current policies and operations in the bureaucracy. Based on these arguments, this study aims to reveal how politicization in public organizations is harmful for ethics in public administration and public service quality and the importance of ethical public administration to increase the quality of public services. Results from a field survey study in Diyarbakır has provided support for the proposed arguments of the study. Citizens' perceptions about the increased politicization in public organizations have shown negative relationships with ethical public administration and public service quality. Also, support is found for the positive relationship with ethical public administration and public service quality. Theoretical contributions and practical implications of these findings are also discussed with the limitations of field study in the last section.

Keywords

Public Administration Ethics, Politicization, Service Quality, Diyarbakır

Öz

Vatandaşların kamu yönetiminden duyduğu memnuniyet ile ilgili çalışmalar yeni kamu işletmeciliği yazınında neredeyse kırk yıldır incelenen bir konu olmuştur. Vatandaşların kamu hizmet kalitesine dair algı ve değerlendirmelerini araştırmak hem akademisyenler hem de uygulayıcılar için önemli bir durum haline gelmiştir. Konuyla ilgili farklı bağlamlarda gerçekleştirilecek saha çalışmaları yeni kamu işletmeciliği konusunda araştırma yapan akademisyenlere mevcut kuramı genişletme imkanı verirken hükümetlerin de hali hazırdaki politikalarını ve bürokrasideki uygulamalarını geliştirme imkanı sağlayacaktır. Bu önermelerle bağlantılı olarak mevcut çalışma, kamu kurumlarının siyasallaşmasının kamu yönetimi etiği ve kamu hizmet kalitesine nasıl zarar verdiğini ve kamu hizmet kalitesinin artmasında kamu yönetimi etiğinin önemini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Diyarbakır'da anket yöntemiyle gerçekleştirilen bir saha araştırmasından elde edilen bulgular bu önermeleri desteklemiştir. Vatandaşların kamu kurumlarının siyasallaşmasının artmasına yönelik algısı ile kamu yönetimi etiği ve kamu hizmet kalitesi algısı arasında olumsuz ilişkiler tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca kamu yönetimi etiği ile kamu hizmet kalitesi arasında olumlu yönde bir ilişki olduğu görülmüştür. Çalışmanın teorik katkıları ve uygulamaya yansımaları ile ilgili bulgular saha araştırmasının kısıtları ile birlikte son bölümde tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

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Introduction

As a sub-theme of applied ethics, public administration ethics is a more recent research field in general ethics literature since 1950s. It has been strengthened with depoliticization of public administration in 1980s and 1990s which has found significant reflections in minor democratic countries like Turkey within the same period (Eryılmaz, 2012). Due to the destructive impact of politicization in public institutions, expanding ethical values and norms is seen mandatory by both scholars and policy-makers in the field. While new public management has tried to empower public managers and increase decision making authorities of them via depoliticization and increased autonomy, it has not applied with the same expansion level in every country and context (Cooper, 2021, p. 564). Besides, the emphasis of new public management on accountability of the state in every domain has made public administration ethics more significant. Although American Society of Public Administration has approved code of ethics for public servants since 1994, every country has its specific public administration structure and need its code of conduct for public officers. Relatedly, Republic of Turkey has announced “Ethical Behavioral Guidelines for Public Servants” in 2005 which contains eighteen items and expected from public personnel to behave in accordance with these rules. However, there has been limited knowledge about the reflections of these legislations for citizens and their evaluations of the general public administration in Turkey.

Both ethics and politicization in public administration would have direct effects on public service quality. Since the expectations of citizens from public administration for more qualified public services have increased in every day, policy makers and governments should be more action oriented than only approving legislations. Pursuing the impacts of policies related to ethical and impartial public administration can be observed more accurately in quality of public services and perceptions of citizens about them. It is also significant to improve public service quality since private organizations have already set up a standard high quality in their services for general people which would increase the expectations of citizens. The request for high quality in services is so reasonable for citizens since they source public administration with their taxes in democratic states. On the other hand, some of the public services are monopolies naturally and it is harder to satisfy the expectations of citizens and define a standard of quality level in them. For this reason, public service quality in citizens’ thoughts would be highly related with how public personnel and institutions act in ethical and political domains. As mentioned before, there has been a variation for establishing ethical standards and depoliticization in public administration among different democratic settings, it is significant to evaluate each country within its context for the interdependencies between public administration ethics, politicization of public institutions and service quality of them. Consequently, this study is aimed to find out how politicization in public administration would hinder ethical public administration and public service quality and the importance of ethics to improve public service quality.

The following parts of this article is organized into five parts. In the first section, the general literature review about public administration ethics, quality of public services, and politicization in public institutions are summarized. The second part includes the expected relations among these concepts as hypotheses development. The methodology

of the study is mentioned in the third part with a piece of detailed information about the sampling and variables. In the fourth section, the findings of diverse statistical analyses are interpreted. As the last section of the article, the discussion part involves both the evaluations, implications and limitations of the findings.

Literature Review

Public Administration Ethics

Ethics can be defined as system or code of conduct based on universal moral duties and obligations which indicate how one should behave; it deals with the ability to distinguish good from evil, right from wrong and propriety from impropriety” (Josephson, 1989 , p. 2). Ethics is also entitled as moral philosophy and it can be defined as considering moral, moral problems and moral judgments (Frankena, 1988, p. 5). As can be seen in various definitions, ethics is generally defined with a focus on morality. Morality is the wholesome of rules and principles that people involved. At this point, there can be a professional morality, a political morality or even a marriage morality in people’s lives. Professional morality is the all rules and principles that determine a person’s vocational behavior and interactions with other parties in their jobs. However, ethics is different from than morality concept and is a philosophical discipline that explains these behaviors by investigating them within the compass of philosophy and trying to resolve them (Arslan, 2009, p. 132). While morality indicates the opinion of people, ethics implies rules and principles. Whilst the life of people is the subject of ethics concept, morality bases the function of understanding the human behavior. Though ethical evaluations are unbiased and objective, moral ones are biased and subjective (Harper, 2009, p. 1066). In short, ethics is the bigger picture and a more widespread concept that involves the whole landscape and morality only includes some of the details that are sprinkled in this picture.

Although ethics is an expanded philosophical field, it can be classified as ‘normative ethics’, ‘meta ethics’ and ‘applied ethics’ (Kılavuz, 2002, p. 257). While normative ethics define the norms about what is wrong and right and type of actions under specific conditions for people (Cevizci, 2002, p. 7), meta ethics is based on the view that the main purpose of ethics is not defining norms but basing ethical propositions and analyzing them (Kuçuradi, 2004, p. 5). Lastly, applied ethics is the area of ethics that investigates ethics in the context of daily life and actions rather than philosophical examination. The basic consideration of applied ethics is related with the practical nature of ethics instead of theory (Prasad, 2010, p. 14). Related with its label, it puts on the agenda the practical moral problems that are actually discussed by the society. In other words, applied ethics aims to put concrete knowledge through intangible concepts. Nowadays, the areas of applied ethics are diverse and multiple. The sub themes of applied ethics can be summarized as public administration ethics, political ethics, environmental ethics, bio-ethics, media ethics, law ethics, medical ethics, engineering ethics, etc.

When defining public administration ethics, there has been emphasize on some ethical values. Also, public administration ethics determines the rules and principles for public officers when they do their duty and make decisions about administrative processes (Öktem and Ömürgönülşen 2005, p. 232). For instance, OECD has defined main public

administration ethical values as objectivity, legitimacy, integrity, transparency, efficiency-effectiveness, equality, responsibility and justice (OECD, 2000, p. 32). Besides, The American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) has determined ethical values in public administration as prioritizing public interest, supremacy of constitution and law, support of democratic involvement, empowering social equity, full information, individual integrity, incentives for ethical organizations and excellence in public service (Svara et al, 2015, p. 4). Relatedly, Cooper (2004, p. 396) whom has contributed public administration literature significantly has specified public administration values as regime values, constitutional theory and founding thought, citizenship theory, social equity, virtue-personality and public interest. In short, public administration ethics can be defined as “a set of principles and values like neutrality, integrity, civility, justice, transparency, accountability, protecting public interest, duty commitment, merit, productivity, efficiency and quality that public officials and managers have to obey when they make decisions and carry out public services” (Eryılmaz and Biricikoğlu 2011, p. 35).

The significance of public administration ethics has been proved by many research in the literature. For instance, a multi-country study has shown that citizens’ positive evaluations of governments’ fairness, avoidance of favoritism and corruption in public administration increases their trust level for public servants (Van Ryzin, 2011). Moreover, establishing ethics in public institutions via ethical training would foster ethical culture in public institutions by affecting public servants’ behavior positively (Beeri et al, 2013). Another study in USA context has shown that public servants’ ethical behaviors like integrity, openness, loyalty, ethical competence, and service consistency increases public trust for public institutions (Feldheim and Wang, 2004, p.73). Menzel’s (2015) review article about public administration ethics also indicated that improving public administration ethics can increase organizational performance in public administration. Accordingly, public administration ethics have diverse outcomes which directly influence the well-being of citizens and their attitudes in general. For this reason, analyzing public administration ethics through citizens’ perceptions would provide new insights for the literature in different country contexts.

Quality of Public Services

Service quality is defined as the difference between the expectation of customers about the service and perceived service by them (Wisniewski, 2001, p. 381). It is related with the comparison of expectations and the perception about actual performance (Parasuraman, 1988, p. 15). If expectations of customers are above the actual performance, the level of perceived service quality probably will not be satisfactory (Lewis and Mitchell, 1990, p. 12). It is also characterized as the general perception of a customer for a specified product or service about its excellence and superiority (Zeithaml, 1988, p. 3).

As can be realized, the definitions of service quality generally include the themes of customer, satisfaction and consumer. These themes are also closely related with new public management approach which embraces a comprehensive change process in public institutions. Both service quality and customer satisfaction have been accepted as strategic and crucial obligations in re-invention of public sector since 1990s (Rhee and Rha, 2009, p. 1491). Since new public management approach is based on customer satisfaction and

quality, public service quality would have a pivotal role in this research stream (Sezer, 2008, p. 150). Public service quality can be defined as increasing the content of public services as much as private sector and even exceeding its quality level. Moreover, public service quality includes the overall experience of citizens about public organizations' services. In this respect, public service quality should be evaluated through both decision making and applying the decisions and the perceptions of citizens related with these decisions and their applications. In other words, the restoration efforts in quality of public institutions' services are not sufficient to define public service quality. The perceptions and thoughts of citizens whom experience public services in general are also equally significant to determine public service quality. As Walsh (1991, p. 504) summarized as determining whether the level of service quality is high or sufficient is difficult without asking citizens. Citizens' evaluations would always be significant in analyzing public services' quality.

Another description of public service quality considers not only fulfilling service requirements but also paying attention to changing structure of social values (Walsh, 1991, pp. 513-514). Nowadays, the accelerated change in production and information technologies have also increased the expectations for quality in both markets and people's minds. Quality is not perceived only as expensive and luxury but also become a mindset, work and life style. In this vein, the mentality that organizations can sell all the products they produce has evolved into an approach which produces the products it can sold or compatible with customer desires. Similarly, public institutions had to have transformed their service quality into a more citizen oriented and satisfactory level (Peker, 1996, p. 43). Furthermore, the expectations of citizens for public service quality have also become a forcing element for governments to raise their standards in public organizations. However, there are some constraints in comparing public service quality level with private sector services. First of all, public organizations do not have to compete with rival organizations to fulfill customer needs instead of private organizations. Market competition is not an issue for public institutions since they have been a monopoly in many areas of services. For this reason, both managers and officials would not show additional effort to increase the quality of services or products that are produced by public institutions (Gowan, et al., 2001). Additionally, private sector organizations can specialize in a service or product to target a specific customer group but public organizations have limitations to focus on specific services due to the nature of public services. Public services should be open to all citizens and society and the main purpose of them is to satisfy the common needs of citizens rather than making profit. Consequently, these constraints can decrease the quality of public services. On the other hand, the success of governments in democratic countries can be equal to the quality of public services for citizens. In that respect, governments whom want to be re-elected and do not want to lose their power can develop policies that would increase public service quality. This shows that perception of citizens about public service quality can change and vary over time due to new conditions. In this context, investigating and measuring the perception of citizens about public service quality is crucial for both researchers and practitioners.

Empirical evidence shows that public service quality directly effects customer satisfaction. This effect is also driven by the relationship quality which implies the behaviors

of public servants in the eyes of citizens (Rha, 2012, p.1896). Similarly, a study in USA context has shown that quality of public services has an impact on citizen satisfaction with public services (Collins et al, 2019). In accord with public administration ethics literature, government impartiality is significantly related with perceived public service quality especially for citizens with a vulnerable background (Suzuki and Demircioğlu, 2021). Another study provides evidence that public service quality improves public trust and increases positive evaluations of citizens about government performance in USA context (Van Ryzin, 2015). Since public service quality has direct and indirect causal relationships with citizens' evaluations about public administration ethics and satisfaction with public administration, there is still need for research especially in contexts with citizens from vulnerable backgrounds and different democratization levels.

Politicization of Public Organizations

Politicization of public organizations have been defined as “substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service” (Peters and Pierre, 2004, p. 2) and intervention of politics and political tools into public administration by scholars (Cooper, 2021, p. 565). Public services are carried out by both public administrators and personnel and politicians with mutual interaction. It has been discussed for many years in the public administration literature which side of this mutual relationship would determine the public policies and decisions (Svara, 2001, p. 176). The core discussion in this theme is the question that is stated as ‘how an effective and efficient public administration should be?’. Many scholars in public administration like Max Weber, Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow have opposed to politicization of public institutions since the beginning of 20th century to empower the efficiency of public administration and to prevent the misuse of public sources (Dahlström and Niklasson, 2013, p. 891).

Politicization has many types in public administration. While direct politicization means assigning partisans as public officers in public organizations by the governing political party/parties, professional politicization indicates the professional behavior of public officials in fulfilling the public duties despite their politicization. Redundant politicization is establishing new units in public administration to control public policies and public personnel by the new governing party. Anticipatory politicization involves abdication of public officials who think that their effectiveness will diminish in the new ruling party era before the change in government. Dual politicization indicates the dual role of legislative and executive authorities in political appointments and dismissals. Lastly, social politicization is the intervention ability of social actors whom are effective in governing processes for appointing public officers and their career structures (Peters, 2013, pp. 17-19).

The main reason of politicization of public organizations is the wish of the ruling party to dominate bureaucratic hierarchy for executing its own policies efficiently and effectively since public officers and public administration are the executive tools of governments. This causes a continuity of political impact on bureaucracy and the problem of politicization of public administration (Çevikbaş, 2006, p. 276). In fact, public institutions are administrative units that are public oriented services should be executed

rationality. The main role of bureaucracy is producing public service rationally despite the ongoing changes in ruling parties. The basic expectation from public personnel during public service production is that carrying out their roles without the impact of governing party and objectivity. Consequently, the divergence of public personnel from rationality and operationalization of public institutions like a political party unit would cause politicization in public organizations (Dinçer, 1997, p. 1112).

There are also numerous conclusions for politicization of public institutions. According to traditional normative approach, politicization of public organizations would cause a disaster and destruction in democratic politics (Peters, 2013, p. 20). The hegemony of partisanship in public services rather than competence-based criteria would erode the trust of citizens for public organizations and cause queries about the justice of public institutions (Peters and Pierre, 2004, p. 8). The excessive politicization of administration would damage its neutrality and the frequent changes of upper-level managers would spoil consistency, stability and efficiency of the administration (Kim et al., 2022, p. 2). These actions would also hinder the effective and efficient execution of public bureaucracy and corrupt the bureaucratic system (Yılmaz and Kılavuz, 2002, p. 20). Moreover, the accountability of public administration would be affected negatively and the auditing function in public organizations would be limited because of politicization of public organizations. As politicization expanded and effective in public institutions, the labor peace in public administration would be destroyed, the organizational memory would be lost and the daily routines would be upside down (Ståhlberg, 1987, p. 377).

Recent study reveals that politicization in public institutions decreases senior executives' job satisfaction and organizational commitment across Europe (Kim et al, 2022). Relatedly, another study in five post-soviet countries has shown that increased politicization would cause more corruption according to public officials (Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen, 2016). Similarly, a survey study with municipal managers in Chile provided evidence that politicization of public institutions negatively affect organizational performance via damaging recruitment and selection processes, training and performance evolutions in public agencies (Fuenzalida and Riccucci, 2019, p. 561). Although there has been considerable research about the evaluations of public officials and managers for the politicization of public organizations, the side of the citizens and their thoughts about this concept need new research. Connecting politicization of public organizations, public service quality and public administration ethics would merge different streams of research lines in public administration literature. For this reason, we will develop a research framework which considers perceptions of citizens about public administration ethics, public service quality and politicization of public institutions.

Hypotheses Development

The politicization of public organizations should be understood in the context of values that are related with professional public services. Professional public officials are expected to hold off the apprehensions of political parties and leaders to provide services equally for different political views. Indeed, politicization concept is used to describe the erosion of this distance between public officials and political parties (Mulgan, 2007, p. 570). Furthermore, relevant literature for the relationship between public organizations'

performance and politicization of public administration mentions that politicization causes negative consequences for effectiveness, productivity, quality and legitimacy of public administration (Rouban, 2005; Lewis, 2008; Peters and Pierre, 2004). Another stream of research has provided evidence that countries where political loyalty is more important than competence in recruitments of public organizations would have lower economic growth and welfare and higher bribery and corruption levels (Rothstein, et al, 2012; Evans and Rauch, 1999; Dahlström et al, 2012; Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen, 2016).

Although political parties and characters are temporary due to election results, public officers are permanent in democratic systems. In this regard, the neutrality of public officers is considered as a significant value and source of legitimacy in most democratic structures (Peters, 2013). Neutrality in public administration means that public officials treat citizens objectively and act and make decisions without the impact of any political party or figure (Aucoin, 2012). The basic expectation of citizens from public organizations or institutions is getting public services regularly without discrimination. Politicization includes the threat for overshadowing of neutrality. If competence-based recruitment replaces with partisanship recruitment, public services would also be exhibited with partisanship attitude. Providing public services with neutrality, quality and justice forms the basic ethical values in public administration. Thus, public officers should act upon legality, justice, equity and integrity principles in all of their transactions and behavior and they should not discriminate any person according to their language, religion, belief system, political view, nationality, gender and similar characteristics when fulfilling their jobs and providing public services. As a result, politicization of public administration would be one of the significant burdens in applying these ethical values and principles.

Additionally, politicization of public organizations would cause negative impacts on job motivation and satisfaction of public officers (Kim, et al., 2022). Accordingly, public officers with lower job satisfaction and motivation cannot provide public services with a sufficient and qualified level. Since public services are provided with a source of tax income from citizens, it would not be professional when they hinder or are offered sufficiently. Politicization would also damage workplace harmony and peace (Ståhlberg, 1987). Therefore, politicization would be evaluated as an ethical problem that damages professionalization. Consequently, these problems that are related to inner structure of public organizations could also reflected to citizens whom got public services.

Politicization of public organizations is also related with their performance and productivity. Public organizations that are governed by professional managers rather than politically recruited ones have shown better performance results (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006; Lewis, 2008; Hollibaugh, 2015). On the other hand, politically recruited managers have to continue their partisanship and ideological commitment to keep their positions in public organizations. However, this situation will harm their decision-making process, neutrality and rationality (Moynihan and Roberts, 2010). The main reason of existence for public organizations and public officers is serving to public. Public duties should be fulfilled with consciousness of public service and services should be more qualified, beneficial, accessible and accountable. As a result of these, politicization would harm this consciousness. Politicization would replace serving for public with serving

for the political party or ideology. This process will decrease the performance of public organizations which will also affect their efficiency, productivity and quality of public services negatively. Furthermore, serving to political party or ideology with political apprehensions would also be an unethical attitude.

Since these problems would be perceived by citizens and politicization would cause ethical problems and decrease service quality, investigating perceived politicization of public organizations is relevant for public administration literature. In this manner, two hypotheses that considers the relationships between perceived politicization and ethical public administration and politicization and public service quality are proposed for Turkey context:

H1: Perceived politicization of public organizations affects negatively the perceptions of citizens for ethical public administration.

H2: Perceived politicization of public organizations affects negatively the perceptions of citizens for public service quality.

Ethical public administration is not only related with how the constitutional structure of the state should be or the quality of public service that public officers should provide for fulfilling their legal obligations. Certainly, it considers the components of institutional structures for making decisions about quality of public organizations and acceptability of the standards. However, ethical public administration investigates the quality of the government and public administration in general (Yüksel, 2006). The ethical values in public administration have been determined by many scholars in the field so far (Bailey, 1964; Brown, 1986; Goss, 1996). These values belong to a wide range and can be summarized as: impartiality- neutrality, legality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, equality, responsibility and justice (OECD, 2000, p. 32). Also, kindness, respect and caring the citizens can be added into these ethical values.

Neutrality in public services increases both the public service quality perception of citizens whom benefit from these services and public officers whom provide them (Suzuki and Demircioglu, 2021). Providing public services with justice is significant since it will also shape the trust in government and support of citizens for public institutions (Marien and Werner, 2019). There are four issues in citizens' justice perceptions. Firstly, citizens consider just treatments as an ethical right. Secondly, the fair attitude of public officers would increase the citizens' trust towards them. Another issue is that fair processes and procedures would make understand the citizens that they are respected by the public institutions. Lastly, positive perceptions about procedures in public institutions would decrease the uncertainty in the outputs of them (Linde, 2012). In addition to this, treating citizens fairly, obeying rules and laws and respecting to citizens would cause positive attitudes in evaluation of public organizations' performance (Van Ryzin, 2015).

Responsibility of public administration is also a significant ethical value. Responsibility is associated with public officials' performing of public services by fulfilling necessary conditions (Plant, 2018). If responsibility in public services is established properly, it will contribute to public institutions' performance positively (Kakabadse, et al., 2003). Accordingly, integrity is a basic public administration ethical value. It is related with behaviors that violate ethical norms and values of public administration. There has

been a wide stream of research that puts forward different types of unethical behavior and violations of integrity (Rothstein, 2011; Lewis and Gilman, 2012; De Graaf, et al., 2018). The violations of integrity include actions like corruption, bribery, favoritism, conflict of interest, fraud, theft of public resources, waste and misuse of public resources, disregarding the rules and misuse of legal power, improper treatment and threatening, discrimination and not to pay attention to working hours (Huberts, 2018). Transparency as another ethical value which can be used to prevent actions that threatens the integrity value (Meyer, 2018). The quality of public services would be perceived as more qualified when public administrations act upon these ethical values. Thus, the positive perception of citizens about the public administration ethics would contribute the positive perception of citizens in regards to public service quality. The relevant hypothesis that tests this relationship is below:

H3: The perception of citizens about ethical public administration affects positively the perceptions of them in regards to public service quality.

All of the proposed hypotheses are visualized in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Proposed research model.

Method

Sample

The sample of the study involves 543 Turkish citizens in Diyarbakır city. The survey data was collected by face-to-face meetings with respondents from city center in July-August 2021. The related permissions for conducting survey study were got from Dicle University Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Committee in 14.06.2021 with the approval number of 86433. Convenient sampling method was adopted since we have

tried to understand perceptions and attitudes of citizens from various backgrounds and characteristics. The respondents were also assured that their answers will be anonymous. The researcher whom was collected the data encouraged the participants to answers all of the questions in the survey to guarantee the involvement level and increase the sample size. According to Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), Diyarbakır's overall population is 1,517,297 for the year of 2020 (TÜİK, 2020). The researcher collected 592 surveys at the initial step. Due to missing responses in the data, the final sample includes 543 respondents whom are older than 18 years. This threshold age level is adopted to limit the study sample due to suffrage age rules in Republic of Turkey and the pre-acceptance that citizens would be more experienced with public services and institutions after this age. According to Gürbüz and Şahin (2018), the minimum sample size of a 10,000,000 population should be 384. As a result, the final sample size of the study is adequate for further statistical analyses.

Firstly, demographic findings of respondents were analyzed. The mean age of sample is 39.3 (SD=13.26) and the mean value of monthly income of respondents is 3247.47 Turkish Liras (SD=2532.20). The mean income level of respondents corresponds with the minimum wage level in Turkey. Whereas 47.5% of the sample is women respondents, 52.5% is male respondents. The respondents in the sample mainly have primary (27.1%), secondary (25.2%) and high school (20.8%) degrees. According to statistics of TÜİK for the year of 2020, 28% of the population has primary school degree. Moreover, 20% of the population is graduated from secondary school and 25% of the population has a high school degree. These statistics are consistent with our sample distribution. While 62.6% of individuals are married, 30.9% are single and 6.4% are divorced/widowed in the sample. These findings are also similar to general population results in Turkey. In the year of 2020, 58% of the population is married, 37% is single and 5% is divorced or widowed in Turkey (TÜİK, 2021). Consequently, the sample characteristics mainly represent the general population of both the country and the city.

Variables

This study is adopted the survey methodology that consists of both demographic and Likert type questions. Demographic questions were used to ask for gender, age, education level, income level, marital status and political positions of the respondents. Likert type questions were used to measure independent and dependent variables of the research. Measures of these variables are previously used by other studies and have valid reliability values (Mizrahi et. al., 2021b; Vigoda-Gadot, 2007). All the Likert type measures are checked out for construct validity through exploratory factor analyses and reliability analyses.

Politicization of Public Organizations

Perceived politicization of public organizations variable is measured by a 5-point Likert type scale that ranges between 1 (Strongly Disagree) and 5 (Strongly Agree). Three items are constructed the original scale which is developed by Vigoda-Gadot (2007). This study is translated and adopted original three items in the Turkish survey. Exploratory factor analysis indicated that all three items have satisfactory factor loadings which are (1) "The actions of the public administration serve the purposes of only a few

individuals, not the public system or the public interest” (0.92), (2) “Favoritism rather than professionalism determines the decisions made in public administration” (0.93) and (3) “Generally speaking, the public administration operates appropriately and is not affected by political pressure (reversed item)” (0.90). The KMO value of the items is 0.75 and Barlett’s significance test is significant. The mean value of all three items is used to measure politicization in public organizations in further analyses. The variable also has a high reliability value ($\alpha=0.91$). This value should be higher than 0.70 (Gürbüz and Şahin, 2018).

Ethical Public Administration

This variable is used to measure perceptions of citizens in regards to the integrity and ethics level of public employees and also derived from Vigoda-Gadot (2007). Three questions are employed as 5-point Likert scale. These items are as followed: (1) “In Turkey, most of the civil servants are impartial and honest”, (2) “In Turkey, citizens receive equal and fair treatment from public servants”, (3) “In Turkey, deviations from moral/ethical norms in public institutions are common (reversed item)”. Similarly, both KMO and Barlett’s significance test has got satisfactory values for exploratory factor analysis. The items have factor loadings that range from 0.89 to 0.93 which are even higher than the original study of Vigoda-Gadot (2007) and have loaded into a single dimension. The mean value of three items were used to measure the perceived ethical level of public personnel according to respondents. The reliability of the scale is 0.90 which is quite high.

Public Service Quality

Public service quality variable is measured through 12 items that are also Likert type. Respondents were asked to indicate the level of service quality in public organizations that ranges from 1 (Very Low) to 5 (Very High). A list of public organizations that are mainly known at the national level. These are (1) public hospitals and local clinics, (2) public schools, (3) security forces (police, gendarme, watchmen, etc.), (4) courts, (5) Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR), (6) Social Security Institution (SGK), (7) social services, (8) transportation and infrastructure, (9) treasury and finance offices, (10) environment and urban development, (11) agriculture and forestry, and (12) governorship. All 12 items are also loaded to a single variable that explains 62.2% of variance. The minimum and maximum factor loadings of the items are 0.69 and 0.87 respectively which are satisfactory levels in factor analysis. This variable is also highly reliable ($\alpha=0.94$). All of the variables have been validated in Turkish context according to preliminary analyses.

Statistical Analyses

IBM SPSS 25 statistical package is used for all statistical analyses of the study. Control variables (age, monthly income, political position) are used with independent and dependent variables in both correlation and regression analyses due to their high relevance in citizen attitude studies (Mizrahi et. al., 2021a; Mizrahi et. al., 2021b; Vigoda-Gadot, 2007). All of the variables are also tested for their Skewness and Kurtosis values to understand if they are normally distributed. These values are between -1 and +1 and it indicates that normally distributed items and variables are used in further analyses.

Firstly, Pearson's Correlation tests were used to observe the proposed relationships in the research model. Hypotheses are tested through hierarchical multiple regression. All of these analyses are conducted at the 95% confidence interval level.

Findings

Findings related with descriptive statistics and correlations among variables are summarized in Table 1. As can be seen in Table 1, respondents of the survey have a low level of perception regarding the ethics and integrity level of public personnel (Mean = 2.38, S.D = 1.06). Contrarily, participants have a moderate level of perception in regards to public service quality (Mean = 2.71, S.D = 0.91). Respondents of the study have indicated that Turkish public administration has a high level of politicization which is also expected (Mean = 3.62, S.D = 1.08). The inter-correlations among variables have shown expected directions as mentioned in the research hypotheses. There is a negative and significant relationship between perceived politicization of public organizations and ethical public administration variable (-0.76**). Also, the relationship between politicization of public organizations and public service quality is negatively and significantly related (-0.77**). Lastly, ethical public administration and public service quality has shown a significant and positive relationship with each other (0.78**). Although the correlations among independent and dependent variables are quite high and may cause multicollinearity problems, the VIF values in Table 2 and Table 3 are below 10 which is a threshold level for multicollinearity.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson's Correlations

Variable	Mean (S.D)	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Ethical Public Administration	2.38 (1.06)	1	0.78**	-0.76**	0.24**	0.02	-0.63**
2. Public Service Quality	2.71 (0.91)	0.78**	1	-0.77**	0.31**	0.03	-0.68**
3. Perceived politicization of Public Organizations	3.62 (1.08)	-0.76**	-0.77**	1	-0.28**	-0.02	0.62**
4. Age	39.30 (13.26)	0.24**	0.31**	-0.28**	1	0.27**	-0.29**
5. Monthly Income	3247.47 (2532.20)	0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.27**	1	-0.06
6. Political Position (1=Opponent, 0=Other)	-	-0.63**	-0.68**	0.62**	-0.29**	-0.06	1

N=543, ** p < 0.01

Hierarchical regression analyses results are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3. Model 1 has tested the impact of control variables on perceived ethical public administration. According to Model 1 results, only respondents' age ($\beta=0.00$, $p<0.01$) and political position ($\beta=-1.31$, $p<0.01$) have a significant effect on perceptions of respondents about ethical public administration. As the age of citizens increases, their perception in regards to ethical public administration also increases. On the other hand, respondents whom are politically opposed to the government perceive public administration less ethical. Model 2 has tested hypothesis 1 which proposes that perceived politicization of public organizations would have a negative effect on perceptions of citizens regarding ethical

public administration. The significant and positive coefficient of politicization of public organizations variable ($\beta=-0.60$, $p<0.01$) in Model 2 has supported hypothesis 1. This finding indicates that as citizens perceive public organizations more political, they think that public officers have less integrity and ethics.

Table 2
Regression Analyses of Ethical Public Administration as Dependent Variable

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE	VIF	B	SE	VIF
Constant	2.84**	0.13		4.86**	0.15	
Age	0.00*	0.00	1.17	-0.00	0.00	1.20
Monthly Income	-1.370E	0.00	1.08	-9.008E	0.00	1.08
Political Position	-1.31**	0.07	1.09	-0.55**	0.07	1.66
Politicization of Public Organizations				-0.60**	0.03	1.66
R ²	0.40			0.62		
Adjusted R ²	0.40			0.62		
F	123.88**			228.15**		

N=543; ** p < 0.01, *p<0.05

While Model 3 has tested the relationship between control variables and public service quality, Model 4 and Model 5 has tested the relationships of perceived politicization of public organizations and ethical public administration with the same dependent variable. Both age ($\beta=0.01$, $p<0.01$) and political positions of respondents ($\beta=-1.17$, $p<0.01$) have significant relationships with public service quality. As proposed in hypothesis 2, perceived politicization of public organizations has a negative and significant ($\beta=-0.47$, $p<0.01$) effect on perceived public service quality in Model 4. Thus, hypothesis 2 is also supported. Lastly, hypothesis 3 is tested through Model 5. The positive and significant coefficient of ethical public administration in Model 5 has supported hypothesis 3. Consequently, all of the proposed hypotheses are supported.

Table 3
Regression Analyses of Public Service Quality as Dependent Variable

Variable	Model 3			Model 4			Model 5		
	B	SE	VIF	B	SE	VIF	B	SE	VIF
Constant	2.97**	0.10		4.56**	0.12		1.55**	0.00	
Age	0.01*	0.00	1.17	0.00*	0.00	1.20	0.00**	0.00	1.18
Monthly Income	-1.526E	0.00	1.08	-5.142E	0.00	1.08	-8.467E	0.00	1.08
Political Position	-1.17**	0.05	1.09	-0.57**	0.05	1.66	-0.52**	0.05	1.73
Politicization of Public Organizations				-0.47**	0.02	1.66			
Ethical Public Administration							0.49**	0.02	1.69
R ²	0.48			0.67			0.68		
Adjusted R ²	0.47			0.66			0.67		
F	166.55**			273.88**			287.00**		

N=543; ** p < 0.01, *p<0.05

Discussion and Conclusion

The main component of public services is fulfilling them according to ethical values and norms. Public services with an ethical orientation would also satisfy citizens'

expectations and demands. This fulfillment can both increase the power of governments and governance mechanism in public administration. In democratic countries, the success and operations of public administration are closely linked with elected and governing bodies which also has a side-effect as politicization of people in these organizations. On the other hand, public services that are impartial and ethical would be perceived as more qualified and satisfactory by the citizens. Politicization of public organizations would cause legitimacy, quality and productivity problems (Rouban, 2005; Lewis, 2008; Peters and Pierre, 2004). Moreover, trust of citizens for public organizations would be hindered if politicization increases (Peters and Pierre, 2004). Politicization of public administration can cause individual and national negative consequences for every country like lower economic growth and welfare (Rothstein et al., 2012; Evans and Rauch, 1999; Dahlström et al, 2012; Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen, 2016). Relatedly, this study aims to find out how citizens' perceptions related with ethics in public administration, politicization of public institutions and quality of public services would affect each other in the context of Turkey as a young democratic country.

Similar to Vigoda-Gadot's (2007) study, this study considers the perceptions of citizens as a reflection of new public management's orientation that consider citizens as customers. By this way, this paper can contribute to both public administration and public policy literatures. According to the findings of survey study in Diyarbakır city of Turkey, citizens perceive public institutions and public personnel less ethical as their perception about politicization increases. This finding supports the previous literature that politicization has a harmful effect on citizens' trust for public administration (Peters and Pierre, 2004). Besides, this finding is consistent with the results of Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen (2016) and Fuenzalida and Riccucci (2019)'s studies. These studies provide evidence that politicization causes more corruption and non-merit human resources management applications in public organizations. Our study is also original since it examines the perceptions of citizens which is not emphasized much in recent literature. Most of the research about politicization of public institutions has used public officials or managers as their study context (Kim et al, 2022; Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen, 2016; Fuenzalida and Riccucci, 2019). Another finding of the study has provided evidence that perceived politicization of public organizations would decrease the perceived level of public service quality. This finding overlaps with the propositions of Kim et al. (2022, p. 2) whose study highlights the harmful effects of over politicization on upper-level manager appointments, stability and consistency of public institutions. This finding indicates that politicization of public institutions has a cumulative deteriorating impact which would end with a decreased public service quality. The last finding of the study has supported the significant role of integrity and ethics of public administration in citizens' thoughts for perceived public service quality. It also provides evidence for the findings of Suzuki and Demircioğlu (2021) that emphasize the vulnerable citizens and their thoughts for ethical public administration and its relationship with public service quality. Our study also shows that older citizens still have positive evaluations about public administration ethics and public service quality in our sample. These results are not surprising due to ongoing debate about generational differences in political opinions and perceptions of citizens for government's performance. The split between older generations and younger ones have been analyzed by journalists and political analysts in many press outlets so far.

These findings have offered the importance of ethical values and norms for public administration and its whole components in citizens' evaluations as new public management philosophy proposes. Since citizens are seen as clients or customers in this new philosophy, their perceptions and satisfactions should be investigated more in future research to expand theoretical side of new public management literature. Moreover, studies that consider the citizens' evaluations about the operations of public institutions are scarce. This study can start new discussions about the role of citizens in shaping public policy and public administration's operations. Although, governing bodies can measure the results of their policies in public administration with election results, this would be very limited for the future projections of public policies for citizens and their evaluations. It is also valid for public service quality evaluations of citizens in practice. Since competence-based service quality in private organizations increases with an upward trajectory, public organizations should also reply the demands of citizens whom are accustomed to this quality level. Fulfilling the demands of citizens also corresponds with the philosophy of new public management.

Although politicization of public administration has both ups and downs in the related literature, this study demonstrated that street level bureaucrats should keep their objectivity, integrity and unpolitical status while carrying out their public service duties. As politicization disperses among street level bureaucracy, both trust of citizens and quality of services are damaged. When merit-based work placement replaced with politically oriented one, the most effected personnel would be street-level bureaucrats. This would cause a vicious cycle that feed partisanship and serving for the political party instead of citizens. Ideological attitudes of public personnel could cause unethical behaviors and politicization can also breeds this. Politicization may damage the quality of public services through stimulating disharmony among public personnel. Moreover, it can also trigger dissonance among different public institutions which should collaborate during crises or emergency situations. Though politicians think that controlling bureaucracy would benefit them in the short run, increased discontent and reactions of citizens can hinder their political power and status in the long term.

In spite of significant contributions for practice and theory, this study has some limitations. Firstly, this study can suffer from common-method bias since all the data is collected from the respondents with multiple scales at the same time. In future research, scholars can use multiple constructs and measure them with multiple methods to prevent this. Also, future studies should consider the perceptions of public personnel for the same constructs to understand the other side of the coin to prevent common source bias. The sample of the study is limited with one city which can limit the findings. A nation-wide study can give more accurate and inspiring findings in future research. Moreover, political positions of citizens may cause biased perceptions of citizens about public administration which may be a limitation in citizen attitude studies. In-depth interviews with a diverse group of citizens may reveal unconsidered factors that are significant for perceived public service quality and ethical public administration.

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Information Vulnerability Amid The COVID-19 Pandemic: Syrian Refugees In Turkey

COVID-19 Pandemisinde Bilgi Kırılganlığı: Türkiye'deki Suriyeli Mülteciler

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Abstract

States were caught unprepared by the COVID-19 pandemic. This caused a hitch in briefing the public with true and sufficient information. Refugees may be exposed to these drawbacks more due to the language barrier and social isolation. They are an especially vulnerable group in the COVID-19 pandemic due to their adverse life conditions and difficulty in accessing social services and information. In this paper, we study the Syrians who fled to Turkey during the Syrian civil war. We examine the Syrians' information vulnerability and sources of information using original online survey data and archives of official institutions in charge of the refugee response and the management of the pandemic. It is concluded that Syrians are less knowledgeable than the host community regarding COVID-19 precautions and administrative measures. It is also found that the Syrians' level of information on administrative measures is likely to increase when institutional announcements are followed. Additionally, naturalized Syrians are more likely to acquire true information on administrative measures than the Syrians under temporary protection. We argue that official institutions play a crucial role in building refugees' information resilience, yet their briefing is unsystematic and uncomprehensive.

Keywords

COVID-19, Information vulnerability, Institutional briefing, Syrian refugees, Turkey, Precarity

Öz

Koronavirüs (COVID-19) pandemisine devletlerin hazırlıksız bir şekilde yakalandığını söylemek mümkündür. Bu yüzden pandemi sürecine dair doğru ve gerekli bilgilerin kamuoyuyla paylaşılmasında aksaklıklar yaşanmıştır. Mülteciler, toplumdaki tecrit edilmişlik ve dil farklılığı gibi bariyerler nedeniyle bu aksaklıkların yarattığı olumsuzluğa daha fazla maruz kalabilmektedir. Buna istinaden mültecilerin olumsuz yaşam şartları, sosyal hizmetlere ve doğru bilgiye erişimde yaşadığı zorluklar dikkate alındığında onların COVID-19 pandemisinde savunmasız ve kırılgan bir grup olduğunu söylemek yerinde olacaktır. Bu çalışmamızda Suriye iç savaşı sırasında Türkiye'ye sığınan Suriyelilerin bilgiye erişimi ele alınmaktadır. Özgün çevrimiçi anket verisi ve pandemi sürecinde kamuoyunu bilgilendiren ilgili kurumların arşivleri ışığında Suriyelilerin bilgi kırılganlığı ve bilgi kaynakları incelenmiştir. Ev sahibi topluluğun ve Suriyeli mültecilerin bilgiye erişiminin karşılaştırılması olarak ele alındığı bu çalışmamızda Suriyeli mültecilerin COVID-19 önlemleri ve idari tedbirler konusunda ev sahibi topluma göre daha az bilgili olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Ayrıca idari tedbirler konusunda Suriyelilerin bilgi seviyesinin kurumsal duyuruların takibiyle arttığı gözlemlenmiştir. Son olarak, vatandaşlık statüsündeki Suriyelilerin geçici koruma statüsündeki Suriyelilere kıyasla idari tedbirler konusunda doğru bilgiler edinmesi daha olasıdır. Bundan hareketle resmi kurumların mültecilerin bilgi direncini oluşturmada oldukça önemli bir rol oynadığı ancak bu bilgilendirmelerin sistematik ve kapsamlı olmadığı tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

COVID-19, Bilgi kırılganlığı, Suriyeli mülteciler, Kurumsal bilgilendirme, Türkiye, Güvencesizlik

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Introduction

An 18-year old Syrian teen going to work was shot dead by a police officer after attempting to escape a curfew checkpoint (MEMO, 2020). Did he run in order to avoid being fined? Was he aware that the curfew did not apply to working youth? The incident triggered the following research question: Are refugees more vulnerable to COVID-19 than the host community? We study the Syrian-origin people, who fled to Turkey during the Syrian civil war to investigate this question. We examine the difference in the level of information on the basic COVID-19 precautions and administrative measures between the host community and the Syrians. We also analyze the Syrians' source of information during the pandemic. It is argued that Syrians are less knowledgeable on COVID-19, and they rely on authorized institutions (Ministry of Health -MoH-, Ministry of Interior -MoI, Directorate General of Migration Management -DGMM-) briefings. It is suggested that official institutions take the lead in building refugees' information resilience by systematically briefing the refugees, particularly in refugees' native language.

Coronavirus, named COVID-19 and announced as a pandemic by the WHO, spread worldwide, infected nearly 500 million people, and caused more than six million deaths globally by March 2022 (see WHO, 2022). Its impact across countries varied widely. It hit, for instance, Italy and Spain harshly, while it was relatively less impactful in Germany. At the sub-state level, the pandemic has threatened particular groups such as refugees due to their vulnerability towards the virus. While medical history and demographic characteristics are predominantly emphasized in comprehending the implications and alleviating the impact of the pandemic, the governments acted slowly in their response to disadvantaged communities, who lack access to sanitary conditions or necessary information to prevent the infection (Amnesty International, 2020; Subbaraman, 2020). In Turkey, Syrian refugees, who correspond to nearly 5% of the total population, are vulnerable due to their impoverished life conditions, language barrier, and access to information.

In this study, we find that Syrians are less knowledgeable than the host community in basic preventive medical and administrative measures. Amongst the Syrians' information sources are their effort to follow the official institutions' announcements. We also observe a statistically meaningful difference between the Syrians under temporary protection and those who have acquired Turkish citizenship. Education is a significant demographic determinant of the level of information. The study is an attempt to observe the refugees' vulnerability amid the COVID-19 catastrophe. The outputs are not generalizable to the population. We sought to probe the plausibility of the nexus between institutional briefing and refugees' information resilience.

Based on these results, the implications of our study are twofold: first, refugees' vulnerability requires an immediate institutional response so that their disadvantageous position does not exacerbate the impact of the pandemic; and second, refugees' information resilience should be an institutional priority not only in the short term but also in the long term.

We first begin by reviewing the literature on the structural and institutional vulnerability of the Syrian refugees in Turkey. We then introduce three hypotheses and the methodology

to test these hypotheses. We finally analyze the results and discuss the role of institutions in building information resilience.

Literature Review

Refugees experience structural and institutional vulnerabilities. The structural vulnerabilities may stem from host communities' perception of outsiders, the interaction between refugees and host people, the political climate, the size of the refugee population, and the host states' capacity. In the Turkish case, scapegoating, the politicization of the refugee issue, stigmatization, and difficulties in access to the labor market or social services constitute the structural foundations of refugee vulnerability. For instance, refugees are blamed for house rent increases, higher inflation, unemployment, and rising crime rates (Karasu, 2019, pp. 61–62). The negative perception towards refugees is not limited to their social and economic position, it is perpetrated against their culture, belief system, and personal traits. Erdoğan (2018, pp. 56–57), in his large-N analysis of Turks and Syrians, indicated that Syrians are delineated with negative traits such as laziness and rudeness by the majority of Turks. The host community's unfavorable approach towards refugees may hinder refugees' access to social services and the labor market, exacerbating their vulnerability (Pelek, 2019). The discrimination in social and economic life undermines refugees' ability to achieve or maintain a stable standard of living (Şimşek, 2018, pp. 379–383; Tümtaş, 2018, p. 40). Lower and irregular wages, collective living, child labor, and social isolation comprise some of the challenges experienced by the refugees (Akpınar, 2017, p. 20; Güneş Aslan and Güngör, 2019; Incetahtacı, 2020; Ünal and Doğan, 2020). In addition to the social and economic vulnerabilities, the abuse of the issue by political actors may influence refugees' prospect adversely (İçduygu, 2017) and feed negative attitudes through partisanship (Ilgit & Memisoglu, 2017). The political exploitation manifests itself in the EU-Turkey bargaining (Rygiel, Baban, & Ilcan, 2016), pre-election campaigns (Yanaşmayan, Ustubici, & Kasli, 2019), legal status discussions (Akcapar & Simsek, 2018), and the cross-border resettlement of refugees (İçduygu & Nimer, 2020).

While structural vulnerabilities may emerge out of context, institutional vulnerability generates legal drawbacks for refugees. In the Turkish context, refugees' legal status and neglect from organizations are the main facets of institutional vulnerability. As a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention with geographical limitation (Protocol relating to the Legal Status of Refugees, 1968), Turkey has not granted "refugee" status to Syrians; instead, they have been entitled to "temporary protection" since 2014 (Temporary Protection Regulation, 2014). Institutional recognition of temporariness creates ambiguity for the future of Syrians in Turkey due to the issue's sensitivity to the political climate.

Information acquisition crosscuts structural and institutional factors. The mediating role of access to information creates vulnerability both in the structural and institutional landscape. The literature mainly emphasizes the structural outputs of the information landscape and its implications are multifarious. It is commonly associated with refugees' settlement and adaptation to the new surroundings (Lloyd, 2014), social inclusion (Kennan, Lloyd, Thompson, & Qayyum, 2013) and information acquisition for the determination of migration routes (Miconi, 2020). In the new context, the settlers utilize

various sources of information to cope with the contextual factors. The role of youth in the transmission of information to families (Lloyd & Wilkinson, 2016), public libraries (Vårheim, 2014) and social media (Dekker, Engbersen, Klaver, & Vonk, 2018) are some forms of information acquisition. Despite the diversity of the sources of information, the public institutions as policymakers and executors have reliable information and the capacity to disseminate this information. As Erdoğan (2020, p. 179) indicated, refugees request official briefings continually regarding new policies, rights and responsibilities. This study addresses a gap in the literature through highlighting the institutional dimension of the information landscape. We aim to bring up the issue of information resilience in the political science realm and analyze the issue in terms of the authorized institutions' role in access to reliable information. Therefore, we frame the information landscape not in the form of refugees as information pursuers and survivors of the structure but within the context of institutional liability for the provision of information. Particularly in the pandemic, refugees are a vulnerable group due to the lack of cleaning items and domestic water, insufficient nutrition, medical background (Balcilar, 2016; see also AFAD, 2017; Júnior *et al.*, 2020), congested residence, poor access to housing and sanitation (Truman *et al.*, 2009). The lack of or difficulty in access to information may exacerbate the refugee situation. Therefore, we underline the role of institutions in charge in alleviating the refugees' vulnerability by instituting the channels leading to information resilience.

Theoretical Expectations

Hypothesis 1: Syrian-origin individuals are more likely to be less knowledgeable about COVID-19 and administrative restrictions.

We expect that people of Syrian origin in the target population are less knowledgeable on COVID-19 symptoms, preventive measures, and precautionary legal restrictions. Recent research demonstrates that Syrians face a language barrier (Gürsoy & Ertaşoğlu, 2019; İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016; Kollender & Nimer, 2020), which retards their integration to the host community. The studies also indicate that the economic difficulties force the refugees to live in their own segregated congregation (Incehtahtacı, 2020, pp. 516–517). The lack of integration due to poor language proficiency, social discrimination, and isolation is likely to influence Syrians' access to information through interaction. In addition, a low standard of living with limited access to TV and the Internet would be a contributing factor to refugees' level of information.

Hypothesis 2: Syrians who follow the institutional briefings more are likely to be more knowledgeable than other Syrians.

The Ministry of Health, which informs the public on the preventive measures, and the Ministry of Interior, which issues the administrative restrictions, are the leading institutions in managing the pandemic. The municipal authorities also convey information through daily oral announcements at the provincial level. Additionally, we expect the DGMM, the sole authority in the refugee response, to brief its target population, likewise the aforementioned institutions. Thus, we hypothesize that those who follow the institutional channels are more likely to know the preventive and administrative measures.

Hypothesis 3: Syrian-origin individuals who hold Turkish citizenship are more likely to be knowledgeable than those under temporary protection.

Some Syrians that fled to Turkey after 2011 have been granted citizenship based on certain conditions such as marriage, high skills, education and profession (Akcapar & Simsek, 2018, p. 179). We expect the citizenship criteria to foster integration through higher interaction with the host community, social acceptance, and language proficiency (see Ager & Strang, 2008). Income is another facilitator of integration. The wealthier groups are likely to live outside the Syrian population and share a common environment with the host community (Şimşek, 2018). They are also likely to have access to information platforms such as TV and the Internet, which would enable them to learn more about COVID-19 and administrative measures. Thus, citizenship may expedite the process of inclusion, integration, and access to information channels. Therefore, we hypothesize that naturalized Syrians are more knowledgeable than Syrians under temporary protection.

Research Design

We conducted an original survey in Turkey with 625 members of the host community and 659 Syrian-origin people who fled to Turkey after 2011 and have held either temporary protection or Turkish citizenship status. The survey was administered online, involving 46 questions and six additional control variables specific to Syrians. Prior to the question formation, the researchers interviewed 13 Syrians from diverse demographics on the phone to grasp the Syrians' information channels and reflect those in the survey accordingly. The survey took nearly seven minutes to complete and was available in Turkish and Arabic between May 17 & 22, 2020. The Arabic version was translated by the researchers and checked by three Syrian-origin people independently. Both versions were pretested with 22 Turkish and 18 Syrian people. The amendments were made accordingly following the pilot study and those who attended the pretest were excluded from the analysis.

We used convenience sampling to reach the target populations. The participants were approached through Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram announcements through influential public figures and news agencies. In addition, multiple referral mechanisms such as Mukhtars, local & international NGOs, and prominent figures were utilized to reach a diverse sample. We obtained a diversified Turkish and Syrian sample regarding age, gender, household income and ethnicity (Table 1).

We first ran OLS regression to observe if the aggregate level of knowledge of COVID-19 differs across groups, namely the Turkish-origin and Syrian-origin communities. Then we continued with the last model to understand the determinants of the level of knowledge of the Syrian community by adding the Syrian-specific control variables. In the third model we built latent variables (Italicized) whose reliability was tested with Cronbach's Alpha. We reported robust estimates using STATA 15.

In addition to the statistical model, we screened Turkish and Arabic announcements/news by the institutions in charge to better interpret the outputs. We broke down the number of informative announcements available on the official websites and social media accounts between March 11 and May 22, 2020. We counted any announcement or news briefing to people on precautionary and administrative measures. The results are indicated in Table 3.

The fundamental limitation of the study is the survey method, which may create sampling error and coverage bias by excluding those who have poor/no access to computer/smart phone/Internet, those who lack computer literacy, and illiterate people. The social isolation rules (travel restrictions and curfews) and the danger of the entry into the public sphere in the pandemic prevented the researchers from a face-to-face survey mode, which would have eased the outreach to hard-to-reach groups and access to a larger sample size, but produced a risky environment both for refugees and the researchers. We also observed that religious minorities (i.e. Christians) within the host community and a significant number of Syrians refused to participate in the survey due to distrust.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the participants' information level. We asked the respondents to answer six questions about administrative orders to fight the pandemic and six questions about general information on COVID-19 (see Appendix). The answers are threefold: 1.Yes, 2.No and 3.Not sure. The correct answer is coded as "1" and the wrong answer along with "Not Sure" response are coded as "0". The participants' t-score was measured for each question to reflect the impact of the difficulty of the question, then a composite score for each participant was calculated. The t-score of participants ranged between 31-56, indicating the level of information from lowest to highest. Eleven participants, who scored 0, were dropped as they were considered a result of respondent fatigue.

The administrative statements are taken from the ministerial orders, which were effective at the time of field study. The general information statements are based on the Ministry of Health's 14 rules on how to avoid the virus (MoH, 2020) and academic studies reflected in the Turkish press (i.e. BBC, 2020c; van Doremalen *et al.*, 2020). Any questionable or unproven premises are omitted.

Independent Variables

The independent variables are related to the other information channels and the participants' frequency of information acquisition from these channels. For the explanatory variable, we asked a matrix question to the respondents "How often do you follow the following institution's announcements, news, social media accounts or website about COVID-19 [1. Municipality, 2.Governorate, 3. Ministries]?" We also added DGMM in the Arabic questionnaire, which is the sole authority in managing the refugee response. We used a 5-point Likert scale and "Don't know" for the answers: 1) "Never", 2)"Rarely", 3) "Occasionally", 4)"Frequently", 5)"Always."

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Turkish Sample				Syrian Sample			
	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Mean	St.Dev.	Min	Max
Demographic Variable								
Women	0.42	0.49	0	1	0.39		0	1
Age	31.76	9.97	16	74	29.83	8.84	16	73
Income	7.9	4.08	1	16	4.49	2.95	1	16
Education	4.58	0.95	1	7	4.23	0.89	1	7
Household Size	3.19	1.09	1	6	3.35	1.28	1	6
Citizenship holder					0.17		0	1
Turkish proficiency					3.06	1.1	1	5
Source of Information								
Frequency of Wathing TV					1.23	1.3	0	5
Frequency of Surfing Internet					3.04	1.53	0	5
NGO					2.41	1.21	1	5
Institutional Briefing					0	1.77	-2.56	3.57
Dependent Variable								
Disease Score	51.4	4.75	29.5	55.2	48.66	5.42	29.5	55.2
Measures Score	51.5	4.48	34.7	59.58	48.55	3.99	34.6	59.5

We also controlled the socio-economic and demographic factors in our model. Gender, age, household income, educational attainment, citizenship status, Turkish proficiency and occupation are included in the statistical analysis along with the primary control variables.

Results

Table 2
OLS Regression Outputs Predicting the Level of Information

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Syrians vs Turks Information about COVID-19 Disease	Syrians vs Turks Information about COVID-19 Measures	Syrians Information about COVID-19 Measures
Syrian	-2.220*** (0.319)	-2.160*** (0.270)	
Woman	-0.251 (0.332)	-0.216 (0.271)	0.360 (0.402)
Age	-0.0120 (0.0201)	-0.0127 (0.0157)	-0.05** (0.023)
Occupation (Base: Unemployed)			
Housewife	0.363 (0.681)	-0.550 (0.586)	-2.09** (0.919)
Self-employed	-1.220 (0.792)	0.156 (0.697)	-1.612 (1.20)

Employee	-0.611 (0.484)	0.153 (0.392)	0.265 (0.542)
Student	-0.395 (0.463)	-0.674* (0.356)	-1.283** (0.499)
Household Size	-0.337*** (0.130)	-0.264** (0.106)	
Household Income	0.124*** (0.0453)	0.160*** (0.0384)	0.023 (0.0652)
Education Level	0.618*** (0.204)	0.456*** (0.162)	0.790** (0.23)
Citizenship Holder			1.22** (0.50)
Frequency of Watching TV			-0.15 (0.13)
Frequency of Surfing Internet			0.10 (0.125)
NGO Briefing			-0.151 (0.100)
<i>Institutional Briefing</i>			0.044*** (0.11)
<i>Turkish Proficiency</i>			0.04 (0.06)
Constant	49.69*** (1.272)	49.71*** (0.946)	48.90*** (1.464)
Observations	1,203	1,203	429
R-squared	0.102	0.178	0.16

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

We constructed three models indicated in Table 1 to test three hypotheses. Models 1 & 2 illustrate the level of information about COVID-19 and administrative measures across two groups: the host community and the Syrians. The results suggest that being Syrian is significantly associated with a lower level of information both of the disease and the administrative measures (see also Figure 2). In other words, Turks, who have similar socio-economic status with their Syrian counterparts, scored 2.22 higher than the Syrians. As our dependent variable measures the basic knowledge of personal precautions and administrative measures, we can conclude that Syrians are more vulnerable than the host community in preventing the spread of the coronavirus and more likely to face administrative penalties due to lack of information on the official measures. Therefore, we find strong evidence for Hypothesis 1. The results correspond to other researchers' findings on the Turkish (Budak & Bostan, 2020) and foreign contexts (Kananian et al., 2021). Income and education are positively correlated with the level of information, while age and gender do not exert a significant influence. Gender is not a relevant indicator of information level across all models.




Figure 1. The level of information across groups (T-scores).

In Model 3, we analyzed the Syrians to specify their sources of information, the determinants of their knowledge, and to test Hypothesis 2 and 3. A higher level of education is positively associated with the level of information while age moves in the opposite direction, meaning that older people are less informed about the COVID-19 preventive measures. The result is not surprising considering the generational disadvantage in access to information through digital literacy; however it is alarming due to COVID-19’s high fatality among the elderly. Among the sources of information, the Syrians’ level of information is determined merely by the institutional briefing. In this model, we test Hypothesis 3, and find that the naturalized Syrians are more knowledgeable than the Syrians under temporary protection.

Table 3

The Breakdown of Informative Announcements Made by Institutions in Online Platforms

	Website		Twitter		Facebook		Instagram	
	Turkish	Arabic	Turkish	Arabic	Turkish	Arabic	Turkish	Arabic
Ministry of Health	22	NA	329	NA	188	NA	167	NA
Ministry of Interior	69	NA	90	NA	41	NA	36	NA
Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM)	1	1	17(8)	NA	21(3)	NA	7	NA

As we observed that following the institutional websites and social accounts makes a difference, we screened institutional announcements in official websites and social media accounts, including any precautionary measure or administrative regulations on COVID-19, between March 11 and May 22, 2020. Two findings are worth discussing. First, none of the institutions except the DGMM website has an Arabic channel, and additionally, none of these actors except DGMM shared any Arabic briefing in their Turkish accounts. Second, the institutional briefing does not systematically keep up with daily/weekly regulations updates. To illustrate, DGMM’s Arabic announcements in the Turkish social media accounts touch on the majority of the COVID-19 measures (i.e., dated March 23 & April 17) only on Twitter while they ignore certain limitations such as mandatory face mask, curfew for people younger than 20 and some of the weekend curfews. Additionally, DGMM’s most active platform, Twitter, did not share any

informative announcement in Arabic between April 23 and May 21 inclusively, during which weekend curfews and bans on mass Iftar gatherings were applied (MoI, 2020a, 2020b).

Discussion

Refugee vulnerability has moved into a new dimension with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Poor medical background and psychological disorders (Kurt, Ilkkursun, Javanbakht, Uygun, Karaoglan-Kahilogullari, & Acarturk, 2021), impoverished living conditions due to the difficulty in access to the labor market (Elçi, Kirişçiöğlü, & Üstübici, 2021; Falkenhain, Flick, Hirsland, Naji, & Verlage, 2021; Martuscelli, 2021) and social services, crowded homes (Fouad, Mccall, Ayoub, Abu-raddad, & Mumtaz, 2021), job losses triggered by the pandemic (Nimer & Rottman, 2022), limited access to remote education due to lack of necessary technological devices (Primdahl, Borsch, Verelst, Jervelund, Derluyn, & Skovdal, 2021, pp. 82–83) would exacerbate refugees' vulnerability in the pandemic (Júnior, de Sales, Moreira, Pinheiro, Lima, & Neto, 2020). This study revealed a different facet of the adversity: information vulnerability.

The literature of information and health studies emphasize the access to information and the process of refugees' construction of information landscape in terms of the settlement, social inclusion and integration. However, the pandemic shows that refugees' information resilience should not be regarded merely as a long-term, social capital building issue, but also as a realm of prompt action. The long-term projections of resilient refugees may involve the NGOs, IGOs, the host community as well as the authorities managing the refugee response. However, the official organizations would respond more quickly, efficiently, and widely due to their institutionalized, legalized, and data-dominant capacity in emergencies. In the case of Syrians in Turkey, institutional involvement is essential for two reasons: public health in general and alleviating the Syrians' fragility in particular. Considering that Syrians comprise nearly 5% of Turkey's population, the refugees' vulnerability would pose a threat to public health, and this may end up with more exclusionary, discriminatory perception towards the refugees (see United Nations Coordinated Appeal, 2020, p. 32) in addition to the deadly consequences. Thus, the implications of the refugees' access to information exceed the boundaries of a particular community. Secondly, the refugees' lack of information generates medical and administrative drawbacks. The existing fragility due to life conditions and medical background is likely to aggravate the severe impacts of COVID-19 on refugees. Furthermore, administrative fines for violating the COVID-19 regulations would produce an extra financial burden for refugees, who already face economic challenges and relapse with unpaid leaves and dismissals in the pandemic. "The provision of relevant and quality information is one critical form of assistance that must be made available and accessible to these individuals" (Kosciejew, 2019, p. 94). While the diversity of the source of information is valuable for cross-checking the reliability of information under usual conditions, the possibility of misinformation circulation among a group in an emergency may produce greater vulnerability. To eliminate the flow of misinformation among refugees, the authorized institutions, which issue the regulations, decide on the protective measures, or manage the refugee response, should be active in the process of information acquisition.

Several points regarding the statistical outputs are worth mentioning. We observed that a higher level of education is associated with a higher level of information within and across groups. It should be noted that the education level among refugees is low, with 26.5% of the population having no formal education (Erdoğan, 2021, p. 68). Due to the online sampling technique, this research is more likely to underrepresent the undereducated population. Thus, the refugees' vulnerability to COVID-19 would be more burdensome than our measurement as a result of the possible difficulty in accessing the technological tools. Secondly, the NGOs and IGOs have responded successfully to the Syrian refugee inflow in Turkey (Sunata & Tosun, 2019). We expected to recognize the impact of NGOs/IGOs as a determinant of the level of information, but failed to observe a meaningful effect.

Conclusion

We sought to answer the following empirical question: Are refugees more vulnerable to COVID-19 than the host community? We conclude that refugees are more vulnerable to the pandemic due to their level of information on COVID-19 protective measures and administrative regulations compared with the host community. We find that the official announcements and briefings partially increase the Syrians' level of information. The archival screening of the institutional websites and social media accounts indicated that the authorized institutions share limited and unsystematic information regarding the protective measures and administrative penalties. The statistical analysis demonstrated that Syrians receive information from the institutional announcements in general. Additionally, we did obtain a statistical difference in the level of information between the Syrians who are under temporary protection and those who have acquired citizenship.

The role of NGOs and IGOs is also negligible in the pandemic process concerning the fostering Syrians' knowledge on COVID-19. Based on these results, the study also has a policy-oriented nature. Our recommendations for the decision-makers are twofold: first, the official institutions should bear the responsibility and provide refugees with more information, especially in their native language; second, NGOs and IGOs (i.e., UNHCR), which have an extensive, well-trained field staff, should collaborate for the dissemination of information for those who do not have access to the internet, TV or any technological tool. This would facilitate the short and long-term information resilience of refugees.

To the best of our knowledge, this research is one of the first attempts in the literature to reveal the relationship between the refugees' information level and the institutional briefing (see also Healey, Ghafournia, Massey, Andrich, Harrison, Taylor, & Bolsewicz, 2022). Further research is needed to cover a nationally/regionally representative sample with the inclusion of hard-to-reach groups, which we failed to reach in online platforms. In future studies, focus groups or in-depth interviews would uncover why other sources of information (i. e. NGOs) do not enhance the refugees' level of information. In addition, the relationship between the information and source of information can be studied through experimental research design in the future to measure if refugees trust more in institutions rather than other sources. Last but not least, discovering the causal mechanism between naturalization and the level of access to information may shed light on the significance of citizenship status and the integration process.

1. The MoH website does not provide backdated announcements, thus the figure covers only the news. The Municipality's Tweets are available only after April 7. The figures in parenthesis indicate the number of Arabic announcements in the Turkish accounts. The figures in the Turkish accounts show total number of announcements in all languages (i.e. English, Russian, etc.).

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APPENDIX

Measurement of Level of Information
Precautionary Measures
Some symptoms of the disease are high fever, shortness of breath and cough.
Coronavirus can be transmitted during a sneeze.
Washing hands with water is sufficient to protect against the virus.
The coronavirus has the same survival time on metal, plastic or cotton made goods.
People who look healthy may be carrying and spreading the virus.
Only coronavirus patients should wear a face mask.
Administrative Measures
People over the age of 65 and under 20 are banned from going outside except the specified times.
Visiting relatives is prohibited.
Permission must be obtained for entry to and exit from all cities as part of the coronavirus measures.
People with heart disease, blood pressure sickness or diabetes are allowed to go out except Saturdays and Sundays.
It is mandatory by law to wear a face mask in places such as parks, bazaars and markets.
The sale of masks is allowed in pharmacies and markets.

Rethinking the Limits of the Concept of Agency in the International Relations Discipline: The Case of the Climate Justice Movement

Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininde Aktör Kavramının Sınırlarını Yeniden Düşünmek: İklim Adaleti Hareketi Örneği

Özgür Aktaş¹ 

Abstract

For a long period of time, in the International Relations discipline, the concept of agency has been discussed within the scope of certain theoretical premises, and the question of what might be considered an agent has been neglected. However, the distinctive issues and dynamics of the 21st century necessitate to reconsider these premises. The article discusses the agency of the Climate Justice Movement on critical realist ground with a poststructuralist intervention. It suggests that the level of analysis and the agent – structure relations should be considered in tandem to grasp the Movement's agency. It claims that for decentralized agents, the lack of a decision-making mechanism might be the very reason for the agency of the political entity. The article is organized into four main parts. Firstly, the particular features of the Climate Justice Movement will be examined. Secondly, a hypothetical mechanism regarding the agency of the Movement will be reproduced. Reproduction is a mode of inference that is widely used by critical realists as a means of scrutinizing unobservable mechanisms. Thirdly, based on the agency debate in International Relations, various approaches will be analyzed to explain the Movement's agency. Lastly, the reproduced hypothetical mechanism will be scrutinized within the context of level of analysis, structure and agency.

Keywords

Climate Justice Movement, Agency, International Relations Theory, Critical Realism, Poststructuralism

Öz

Uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininde uzun yıllar boyunca aktör kavramı belli teorik kabuller çerçevesinde ele alınsa da hangi siyasi unsurların aktör olarak nitelendirilebileceği konusu göz ardı edilmiştir. Fakat 21. yüzyılın kendisine has sorunları ve dinamikleri aktörlüğe dair söz konusu kabulleri yeniden değerlendirmeyi gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu çalışma, İklim Adaleti Hareketi'nin aktörlüğünü eleştirel gerçekçi bir zeminde postyapısalcı bir müdahale ile ele almaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, merkezi olmayan (decentralized) aktörler için karar alma mekanizmasının noksanlığının söz konusu siyasi unsurların aktörlüğünün temel sebebi olabileceğini iddia eder. Çalışma dört temel bölüme ayrılmıştır. Öncelikle İklim Adaleti Hareketinin özgün nitelikleri incelenecektir. Ardından geridönüm (retroduction) metoduyla Hareket'in aktörlüğüne ilişkin bir varsayımsal mekanizma öne sürülecektir. Sonrasında Uluslararası İlişkiler'de aktörlük tartışması temel alınarak Hareket'in aktörlüğü irdelenecektir. Son olarak, öne sürülen varsayımsal mekanizma analiz düzeyi ve aktör-yapı sorunsalı çerçevesinde değerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

İklim Adaleti Hareketi, Aktörlük, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi, Eleştirel Gerçekçilik, Postyapısalcılık

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Introduction

The distinctive dynamics of the 21st century have nourished political developments that are inclined to rethink the concepts and subjects which have been overlooked or disregarded by the international relations (IR) academia. Undoubtedly, two of the most significant issues are global climate change, which has gained a critical momentum in threatening our lives, and the directly linked reaction to this phenomenon, the emergence of the Climate Justice Movement (CJM). The CJM, in a very short period, has gathered masses on a global scale and pointed out the political, economic and moral dimensions of global climate change which had barely been described in numbers by future projections. Even though the CJM arouses interest to be analyzed by these contributions, the abstract nature of the Movement and the heterogeneous elements of it, complicate its study.

The question should be asked therefore, how beneficial are the debates, conceptualizations and definitions concerning agency in understanding and explaining the causalities which are generated or will be generated by the CJM? Since the early years of the IR discipline, the concept of agency has been discussed in the light of some certain traditions of the philosophy of science. These rather barren dialogues were enriched by the critical realist and poststructural approaches of the 1980s. The aim of this study is to develop a critical realist approach which will scrutinize the agency of the CJM with regards to its unique character and structural conditions. Along with providing a well-structured plan to look into the agents and structures, critical realism introduces the ontological and epistemological premises that underlie the very foundation to produce scientific knowledge. In this regard, Bhaskar's DREI model, which was developed from his critical realist multi-layered ontology for theoretical analysis, will be used.

According to critical realism, the purpose of science is to unearth the mechanisms generating events and phenomena (Bhaskar, 2013: 56). The mechanisms, in the simplest way, are the modes of operation of the structures. Bhaskar claims that reality includes another established layer outside of human thought and perception. The mechanisms, which are the main sources of causality, are the ontologies of the aforementioned reality. By definition, the information of social reality cannot be reached by intuitions nor empirical methods. At this point, DREI is a tool to understand the mechanisms with regards to the methodological limitations of acquiring the knowledge of the 'domain of real' (Bhaskar, 2008:46; Bhaskar, 2016:59). Each letter that constitutes the name of the model signifies a step of the research process, i.e., D is for describe; R is for retroduction; E is for elimination, and I is for identify. The model envisages developing a hypothetical mechanism with references to knowledge that is grasped in the 'domain of actual', and discussing the speculative mechanism and the causal relations within the domain of real (Hu, 2018:6). In this context, the first step is to 'describe' the events or the phenomenon that contradict with the explanations of existing theories. The second step is to 'retroduce' a hypothetical mechanism which is able to explain the defined events or phenomena. The third step is to 'eliminate' the rival theories and explanations. This step is followed by 'identifying' the way of working of the hypothetical mechanism (Hartwig, 2015:195; Minger & Standing, 2017:12). Within this framework, each part of the study is formed to follow the steps of the DREI model.

This study's intended contribution is threefold. Firstly, it aims to contribute to the agent-structure debate in IR with an argument mainly structured on the critical realist theses and supported by a poststructuralist intervention from an agency perspective. As it is claimed, this argument is particularly useful for understanding the possible agency of decentralized political entities. Secondly, by developing the argument with the claim of the agency of the CJM, it aims to provide a meta-theoretical ground for explaining the causal relations concerning social movements and global politics. In this regard, the meta-theoretical claims of the study could open new horizons regarding how social movements' causalities should be inspected; thus, it could lead to new intensive and extensive empirical research (Danermark et al., 2005;165). Last but not least, as the study adopts the DREI model, it utilizes a tool of reasoning that is mainly neglected by IR scholars; thus, it presents an instance of demonstrating the strengths and weaknesses of the model.

What is Climate Justice Movement?

The Roots of the Concept of Climate Justice

The 1972 Stockholm Conference is the first international initiative which discussed the increase of carbon levels in the atmosphere by anthropogenic influences, and thus, the drastic change in the carbon circulation, or briefly, global climate change (Sinn,2012;24). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed at the Rio Summit in 1992, is the first declaration to tackle the issue of global climate change on an international scale. Since 1995, at the Conference of the Parties (COP), which was established by the 1992 Convention, various institutions, have been able to contribute to the global efforts on climate change and the on-going discussion. Hence, many civil society organizations (CSO) were followers of the degradation of the environment even before the COP meetings. For example, around 300 CSOs participated in the preliminary meeting in 1990 in Geneva, and 22,000 delegates from more than 9000 CSOs participated in the Rio Summit (Princen & Fingers,1994:4).

With the participation of thousands of institutions from all over the world, these summits have become the platforms, in which the various opinions about the cause of the problems and different solutions have been defended. The voices that were augmented over the years, have criticized the way in which the problem, which had affected all the living beings in the world, was defined and the solutions that were directly linked to it. These critics have shed light on the injustices and cruelty that many societies have suffered and they have emphasized the political and ethical aspects of climate change. In this context, the politicization of global climate change, in other words the discussion of the historical, social, ethical and economic aspects of the process of ecological disruption and its results, is the first core element of the climate justice idea (Building Bridges Collective, 2010:27).

The concept of climate justice was first used in 1999 in the Greenhouse Gangsters vs. Climate Justice report, published by Corpwatch, to redefine climate change based on environmental justice and human rights (Corpwatch, 2020). However, the inception of the process that made the concept well-known, was the establishment of the umbrella

groups of CSOs and social movements that took position against the carbon trade in Kyoto Protocol. The Climate Action Network (CAN), which embodies hundreds of environmental CSOs, had taken an impartial approach to the issue, thus, some CSOs in this group had left and formed the (Climate Justice Now! CJN!) network at the COP13 summit in Bali in 2007. Furthermore, in 2008, The Climate Justice Action (CJA) network, which had a more radical stance regarding the current approach to global climate change compared to the CJN!, was established. In 2009, the COP 15 summit in Copenhagen was the scene of the clash of these three CSO networks.

According to Ruth Reitan and Shannon Gibson (2012), the three aforementioned CSO networks, represent the three perspectives in the environmental movement; the CAN represents liberal reformism, the CJN! represents eco-Marxism and the CJA represents an anarchist perspective. However, considering the various CSOs, which embody many individuals with different thoughts in these networks, their classification based on ideologies falter. Additionally, a more functional classification is possible based on the interactions of the three and the discourse that was constructed during the COP15 meetings. A widely used slogan during the COP15 protests “System Change not Climate Change” is a prominent criterion for the comparison. While the CAN represents the idea of sustaining the system or abstaining from a systemic change while addressing climate change, CJN! and CJA, which use often “climate justice” in their discourse, defend the necessity of structural change, regardless of their reasoning. In light of this point, it could be said that the second core element of the climate justice idea is the belief that the problem cannot be solved by the current system and thus, a structural change is essential for the salvation of humanity.

Climate Justice Movement: United in Diversity

As mentioned in the previous section, the broad definition of the concept of climate justice came to be a necessity rather than a choice. In the past 30 years, climate justice has been used by various movements and groups (ex: Marxist, anarchist, postcolonial as well as LGBTI+, vegan and Pagan societies from a religious perspective). Along with this diversity, considering the movements that belong to the fundamentally opposing CJN! and CAN networks, as well as the different movements with clashing views on climate justice supporting each other, it is obvious that while forming a definition, the dynamism between groups and ideas within the CJM should not be overlooked (Bennett & Segerberg, 2014:99; Weyler, 2019; Rising Up!, 2020).

Social Movements literature includes many studies that focus on the heterogeneity of global social movements and the dynamism of the elements of the movements (Reitan & Gibson, 2012:400). These studies, which criticize the approaches that disregard the aforementioned aspects and clarifying the elements of the social movements while limiting the scope, highlight the fluid and complex nature of the movements. Yet, it would be contradictory to ignore the plurality and multiple voices, whilst analyzing CJM and from a broader perspective, the social movements that aim to defend structural changes and give voice to the unheard (Zibechi, 2010:83-84). On the other hand, even though diversity is a cornerstone for the movement, the unity of the various elements within it, is just as important. Two closely related elements of unity could be referred to as; discursive

similarities and operational resemblances and cooperation. As mentioned in the previous section, the definition of climate justice with the politicization of climate change and the necessity of structural change, constitutes the base of discursive alignment. The usage of various civil unrest techniques, the realization of social responsibility projects, the organization of events to create public awareness can be taken as some of the examples for an operational resemblance. Additionally, some groups use physical and cyber tools to support each other, which can also be taken as an example of operational cooperation.

The redefinition of the spatial aspect of politics through globalization and the politicization of cyberspace put forward the cyber world as an unruly scene for non-state actors to flourish (Grygiel, 2018:101). The lack of control of authorities on cyberspace and the obsolescence of national borders in this sphere, reconfigure the operational cooperation between the various elements of CJM. Thanks to the possibilities of the cyber world, the cooperation is more than a simple network, it has been enhanced with a discourse where the differences are overlooked and the unity is underlined. The participation of many groups from all over the world, who are connected tightly through the internet, in the Peoples' Climate March in 2014 in New York and the simultaneous solidarity marches in different countries on the same date and the inclusive and unifying nature of the slogans represent some significant examples (Giacomini & Turner, 2015:29). For some, the operational cooperation amplified by the benefits of the cyber world, might outshine the conceptual discussions on climate justice and has the potential to create a discourse of unity. As an Ecuadorian climate activist, Leonardo Cerdo indicates: "*it doesn't matter what we call it; what matters is how we take action*" (Building Bridges Collective, 2010:52).

In summary, the CJM can be defined as a gigantic network of social movements and CSOs, which undertakes the political and ethical aspects of global climate change and advocates fundamental structural changes based on ideological foundations to solve the climate crisis. The heterogeneous structure of this gigantic network hampers the conceptualization of the CJM as an entity with clear goals and methods, capable of decision making, and which has a rational attitude and strategic point of view, i.e., as an instrumental rationalist actor. So, considering its decentralized quality, how would it be possible to probe into the CJM agency in global politics?

What kind of 'Structure' Enables CJM's Agency?

In this part, two fundamental questions on agency of the CJM will be looked into: i) Which level of analysis should be used to examine the Movement's agency? ii) What are the characteristics of the structure relating to agents in the determined analysis level? A hypothetical mechanism on agency, regarding the answers to these questions, will be suggested.

Based on a layered ontology approach, Bhaskar claims that a critical realist explanation of the social world can be made on seven levels: i) the sub-individual psychological level, ii) the individual or biographical level, iii) the level of micro and small group analysis, iv) the meso-level that the relations between the functional roles of a group of a society are examined, v) the macro-level orientated to the understanding of the functioning of whole societies or their regions, vi) the mega-level of the analysis of whole traditions and

civilizations, and vii) the planetary level concerned with the planet as a whole (Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006:289; Bhaskar et al., 2010:9-10). These proposed levels enable analysis of the different levels of agency as well. The classical debates of IR, which centralize states (for instance, the structure of international order, international system etc.) take place in the aforementioned sixth level. On the other hand, the debate on the agency of the CJM and its causality can only be held on the planetary level, because there is a strong interactive connection among the anthropogenic aspect of global climate change, the social world, the planet itself.

A planetary level analysis requires looking into various and complex causality relations. In this context, the 2019 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which provides decision makers detailed reports on many effects of global climate change and precautions regarding them, presents an example for intricate causality relations on climate crisis. For example, in the section on food security, the amount of greenhouse gas emissions during animal-sourced food production and its effects on global warming are highlighted and as an effective solution, a change in consumer habits is recommended (Mbow et., 2019:519). In light of this claim, local, national and international animal-sourced food production firms, individuals who are a fundamental part of the production cycle by their consumption habits, cultural, religious and moral codes which forbid some of the consumer habits and approve the others, and the related societies and CSOs, are some of the elements to be looked into in regards to the climate crisis. Thus, considering that immigrants and natives are the most vulnerable in the face of global climate change (Westra, 2013:28) whereas the multinational firms are the biggest culprits of global warming (Auer,2000:155), it is clear that the non-state actor should be at the center of discussions on global climate change.

Study of the agency of the CJM on a planetary level, draws an abstract picture of the causalities included in the analysis and the elements related to the aforementioned agency. At this point, distinct assumptions on the limits and benefits of this agency can be made from the critical realist perspective to structure. Structure, even though it is a fundamental notion of social sciences, has been interpreted differently by distinct philosophical schools. Porpora has classified them into four: i) patterns of aggregate behavior that are stable over time, ii) law-like regularities that govern the behavior of social facts, iii) systems of human relationships among social positions, and iv) collective rules and resources that structure behavior (Porpora, 1989: 200).

As mentioned before, the structure in IR, which centralizes the state and as taken in Bhaskar's sixth level (or the structure of the international system), corresponds to the second title in Porpora's classification. According to this approach, which can also be taken as "Waltzian", the structure limits the actions of the sole agents of international relations, and it directs states' behavior as far as they are rational agents (See, Waltz, 1979; Ülman et al., 2011). The structure is not a precondition for the existence of actions of states. However, regarding the critical realist approach which can be taken under the third and the fourth sections of Porpora's classification, the structures limit the actions of the agents, as well as enable them to act (Bhaskar, 1979:39). Thus, the structure is not only a restrictor but is a generative ontology. Additionally, as well as the structure is the condition of agency, the agents constantly reproduce and change the structure, therefore their existence

is a condition of the existence of the structure (Bhaskar, 2008:83). This perspective is called 'the duality of structures' and it allocates a wider area of decisiveness compared to Waltz's perspective. Nevertheless, in contrast to methodological structuralism, it does not take structure as the sole notion that shapes social worlds, because according to critical realism, the agents are the creators of the social world and the structures through their actions. In other words, the existence of the structures is a necessity for enabling the agents to create causality, as well as being created by them (Giddens, 1997:5).

In light of this information on the planetary level, to understand the political aspect of global climate change the structure has to be built upon two basic premises: i) Structure needs to enable the study of the agency of the non-state actors because of the aforementioned intricacy of the causality relations. ii) Based on the duality of the structures, structures are the conditions and the restrictions for agency. This indicated structure could be called 'ecological politics'.

At this point, it is fitting to suggest a hypothetical mechanism on agency based on ecological politics. What sort of agencies could be taken as being related to ecological politics? The climate refugees, who have become displaced because of the climate crisis, could be taken as examples. This issue, which came to be known when Kiribatian Ioane Teitota applied to New Zealand for refugee status because of climatic reasons in 2013, is being discussed in the United Nations (UN) by various environmental activist groups. While the legal status of the concept is being discussed (See, Arı & Gökpinar, 2020:43-46) it has been calculated that over 200 million people will be displaced because of climate change by 2050 (Brown, 2008:11). An analysis suggested in this context needs to include the causalities created by states, international organizations, CSOs and climate refugees represented by millions. Additionally it needs, accepting ecological politics, a structural component. Therefore, the heterogeneity of the aforementioned political elements (for example, while the states and organizations have decision making mechanisms, the climate refugees do not have an institutional and hierarchic structure nor a decision-making mechanism) does not prevent them from being agents on an ecological politics basis. In light of this, it could be claimed that hypothetical mechanism, conceptualized on a planetary level, and ecological politics as the structure, enable the agency of decentralized political entities. In the next part, the arguments on agency in IR will be discussed based on this hypothetical mechanism.

The Agency Debate in International Relations

It could be claimed that there are two main meta-theoretical questions in the IR discipline which have contributed to the theoretical aspect of the discipline by their answers and the approaches created: the level of analysis problem and the agent-structure problem. Every study in the discipline, however discrete it might be, includes some certain premises as answers to these questions. Fundamentally, answers to these questions represent a mainframe for the causality of the ontological elements which will be used to explain or understand the chosen situations, processes, relations, norms and events. Until the second half of the 1940s, the perspective to consider the states as the sole agents was generally accepted.

This approach, called a 'traditional' approach by Wolfers in the 1960s, has been criticized by new perspectives which try to interpret world politics (Wolfers, 1965:4).

Its first serious critics suggested that individuals and international organizations could affect the global political dynamics through their own subjectivity. By the proliferation of the methods and areas such as game theory, political psychology and operational code analysis, individuals have started to be accepted as agents in the discipline. At the same time, the increased activity and sphere of influence of international institutions such as the UN and the European Union caused studies that evaluate non-state institutions as subjective agents to flourish. Furthermore, as Doty (1997:372) has brilliantly pointed out, certain political elements have been accepted as agents without any further discussions on agency. The first study that focuses on the subject is Wendt's 1987 article, *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory*. In this study, Wendt probes into Waltz's and Wallerstein's theories and points out the issues on agent-structure approaches in their work. Wendt suggests that Waltz, contrary to his claim, explains the characteristics of the structure of an international system based on the distribution of power between the states. Thus, instead of creating a structural analysis, it adopts methodological individualism, (See, Ashley, 1984:240; Dessler, 1989:448) and thus it overlooks the internal dynamics of the states' agency (Wendt, 1987:340-344). Wendt's paper on agency ignited a serious debate which was shaped by the contributions of critical realists and post-structuralists. The explanations of these two approaches to the issue are deeply contradictory. In this section, the current debate on agent-structure will be evaluated based on these two approaches and their theoretical solutions regarding the agency of the CJM will be discussed.

The Agency within the Agent-Structure Debate

It would be beneficial to look into the suggestions of two celebrated theorists Bhaskar and Margaret Archer who study the agency on a meta-theoretical level, before probing into the critical realist claims on agency. Bhaskar's understanding of the agent-structure relation can be seen in two fundamental notions framed in the Transformational Model of Social Activity: The duality of structures and the duality of praxis. As mentioned, according to the duality of the structures, as structure is a precondition of agency, the agency is the precondition of structure as well. However, according to the duality of praxis, agents unintentionally reproduce and transform the structures, while intentionally realizing their agency (Bhaskar, 1979:38). In this formulation, it is interesting to see that the "intentional actions" are taken as a part of the agency of the agents. Bhaskar's model studies the agent-structure question based on the relation between the society and the individual, however it disregards the agency of institutional agents.

Archer's morphogenetic approach, similar to Bhaskar, claims that the interaction of the structure and the agent continuously causes the reformation of society (Archer, 1995). Even though Archer agrees on the conditionality of agents and structures, she analyses the conditions and effects of the causalities of the two ontologies in separate time periods, thus, suggests a new method that enables the study of the ontologies separately. The most important part of Archer's method relating to the agency debate, is the perception of agency as primary and corporate. According to this approach, individuals are unintentional agents because of the effects of the preexisting social structures on their lives. Being a part of society makes the individual the primary agent. Additionally, individuals may become institutional agents by working with other individuals for common goals and executing

collective actions with intentional participation. This approach enables the theoretical study of agency of the individuals who are involved in social movements, however, it is insufficient in explaining the agency of the social movement itself. In both critical realist approaches, agency is conceptualized intrinsically with human faculties such as intentional behavior and voluntary participation. Critical realist theorists, who study the subject from an IR perspective take on a similar approach to the agents of global politics.

Along the lines of the framework given above, various interpretations of the agent-structure debate have been made in light of the critical realist perspective. Dessler, who criticizes Waltz's structural conceptualization from a Bhaskarian perspective, claims that the main difference between the Waltzian and Bhaskarian perspectives on structure, is structure's function to enable agents' 'intentional' actions (Dessler, 1989). According to Dessler, the sole method of analyzing the causalities that are made by the intentions of the agents, is Bhaskar's limiting yet conditioning understanding of structure. This claim, includes certain ambiguities in how the causalities made by the ontologies could be understood, as much as creating a basis to describe structures and agents as irreducible ontologies. Archers adds the time factor to her model in order to fix this issue. Carlsnaes, derivative of Archer's morphogenetic approach, suggests a model which enables the study of the formative effects of structure and agents on foreign policy making (Carlsnaes, 1992:264). Dessler and Carlsnaes' approach to the agent-structure debate, highlights several important points regarding the nature of agency. However, since the main agent that they point out in their analyses is the nation-state, they offer little with regards to one of the main topics of this study; the discussion on the limitations of agency. Carlsnaes focuses on the reflection of the agent-structure debate on foreign policy analyses. As for Dessler, he suggests that to explain the causes of actions, it is necessary to look into agency analysis as well as structural analysis. Hence, he has looked into the agency of the states, disregarding the possibility of agency of various political entities (Dessler, 1989:453).

Similar to Dessler and Carlsnaes, Wendt uses a critical realist approach to the agent-structure debate and determines certain points on the nature of agency. According to him, all agents basically have three intrinsic capacities, or rather powers: i) to have a theoretical understanding (however inaccurate) of its activities, in the sense that it could supply reasons for its behavior; ii) to reflexively monitor and potentially adapt its behavior; and iii) to make decisions. In this context, Wendt claims that states can be taken as agents by definition (Wendt, 1987:359). The most striking point of his study is his opinion on a states' agency being similar to the individuals, based on capacities and intentions. This understanding highlights two points about the peculiarity of a state agency and its connection to the human agency.

The first point is about the way the agency of the state is studied. Could the causality created by states be understood by analyzing the individuals in the decision-making mechanism? Or, could the politics, practiced by a state as an institution, be understood by analyzing the interests and values that belong to the state itself? Wendt discusses the uniqueness of state agency centered on two notions: collective agency and corporate agency. The collective agency simply represents the sum of the individuals who can use state tools and are able to make decisions in the name of state. There is no description

for the subjectivity of the state. However, corporate agency, used by Wendt to explain the agency of a state, defines institutions as more than the sum of their parts. In order to use this definition, the individuals who form the state should accept the 'self of the state' and act loyally, accordingly (Wendt, 1999:220).

The second matter is Wendt's characterization of the states similarity to humans, based on specific competences such as; intention, consciousness, identity (Wendt, 1999:194). This claim, indicating more than an analogy between humans and states, is nourished, by his work on the possibilities of conceptualizing states as organisms, in light of the basic qualities of them (Wendt, 2004). Wendt's approach has been criticized because of its conceptualization, which had been used by authoritarian and irredentist ideologies, like *Lebensraum* for self-legitimization and its undermining influence on the normative obligations of individuals (Lomas, 2005).

Even though Wendt has constructed his approach to the agency debate on human and state, he does not deny the possible agency of non-state entities and their rising significance in world politics (Wendt, 1992:424) Additionally, 'plural subjects', which he uses while discussing the qualities of corporate agency, pave the way for studying the agency of non-state entities in a broader scope. According to Wendt, plural subjects, contrary to corporate agency, do not have a central authority. Thus, even though they are formed by individuals who share similar goals, the lack of a binding decision-making mechanism enables plural subjects to include various intentions and objectives. For this reason, plural subjects are less capable of forming agencies compared to corporate agencies (Wendt, 2004: 297-298).

According to Wight, who examines the core principle of Wendt's approach, the relationship between human and agency, the main problem of the anthropomorphic state concept is, contrary to Wendt's claims, that taking states as humans is not theoretically functional (Wight, 2006:180-181). Wight claims that the quality of agency uniquely belongs to humans. The state, is a specific structure for humans to perform corporate agency. Thus, the agency of the state could only be understood through the agency of certain individuals in state positions (Wight, 2004:276). From this point forth, Wight developed an understanding of agency based on layered critical realism. The first layer is the recognition of the self based on responsibilities and intentions. The second layer refers to the way in which agency of the first layer becomes 'something' based on a socio-cultural system so that the social systems enable the first layer. The last layer indicates the role of the first layer of agency in the area described in the second layer. Wight aims to differentiate the idea of the Cartesian subject from the agency by his layered agency approach (Wight, 1999:129). However, similarly to other critical realist approaches, he relates the agency, with his first layer, to an internal competence of the recognition of the self.

In different methods and levels, critical realist approaches define agency with certain competences of humanity. For this reason, certain approaches in IR liken the agency of state to humans (Dessler and Carlsnaes), some take the state just as humans (Wendt) and the others explain the agency of the state based on the agency of the individuals that take part in state (Wight). Nonetheless, none of these approaches are useful in explaining the CJM, which is a decentralized political entity, and thus cannot be likened to an

individual, cannot be accepted as an individual and since it does not have a decision-making mechanism cannot be understood by examining certain individuals within it.

The Agency from the Perspective of the Poststructuralist Approach

Different names in critical realist circles scrutinized the agent and structure in a manner that exceeds methodological individualism and methodological structuralism based on relationality of two ontologies. However, the adoption of this approach has brought along certain challenges and obscurity. According to Weber, the study of the agent structure resulted in the certain definition of one of them as static and given, i.e., an analysis on structure takes the agents as static or vice versa (Weber, 1998:87). Additionally, as previously mentioned, critical realist readings are restrictive, as they perceive agency through the likeness to human faculties. Exactly at this point, the undecidability and the indeterminacy concepts of poststructural approach forms the foundations of a perspective that enables the rethinking of the limits of agency.

The poststructural approach rejects the unchanging and given agency conceptualizations. The existence of unchangeable, static and sometimes assumed “natural” categories are accepted as the presumptions of material reality. Contrary to general misconception, the poststructural approach does not reject the presence of these categories and disregard the physical aspects of the social world and human existence. However, according to post-structuralists, the physical aspect of the social world is not the premise of our attempts to interpret existence. The material elements of existence and the causations created by them can only be understood as far as they carry a discursive meaning. This discursivity is extremely open to change and as much close to being completed. This never-ending construction process is the main reason behind the indecisive quality of the concepts.

The main element that creates the construction process is the practices that are intrinsic to discourses. The practices are socially meaningful patterns of action that generate and reify discourses on the material world (Adler & Pouliot, 2011:4). However, the elements that realize practices are the parts of the never-ending construction process as well. Thus, these elements, or rather agents, are ambiguous since they are constructed by the practices and subjects of a never-ending change (Doty, 1997:376-377). The characteristics of the agents are changed by the practices they perform. Another important point of the conditions that make possible the generative power of the practices. Butler (1988:521) has likened the realization of the practices to performances through theatrical lenses. According to Butler, the construction of gender is a continuous process that is caused by performative acts. However, it is also clear that the singular performative acts are not enough to change the nature of the agent, or according to the example, the gender of the individual. The practices that enable the change are related to reiterative performative acts, i.e., performativity (Butler, 1993:12). From this point of view, it could be claimed that the practices are influential on altering the characteristics of the concepts, norms and agents as much as they are repeated.

In light of the post-structural approach, two contributions to the agency debate should be mentioned: i) the reconceptualization of the agency which is perceived as given from a traditional perspective and other approaches ii) the debate of the agency of the political entities which were overlooked. Weber’s study (1998) on the notion of state sovereignty

with Butler's performativity approach, and David Campbell's performative constructivist perspective to state identity, while reinterpreting the relation between the violence and politics can be put under the first category (Campbell, 1998).

The problematizing of the many categories which were presumed to be natural or unchangeable and the study of the agency in a broader perspective are the defining attributes of the examples in the second group. According to the poststructuralist approach, since the agency could not be reduced to possession of certain intrinsic competences, the agency of the political entities could be mentioned even when the presented political activity limits the intellectual capabilities. Abrahamson and Danyi's agency debate on the political action, presented as the hunger strike of the illegal immigrants [sic] in Brussels, tested the limitations of the agency as the aforementioned concept (Abrahamson & Danyi, 2018). These immigrants aimed to make an impactful protest, with their decision to make a hunger strike at the expense of dampening their physical and cognitive abilities. The interesting point here, while their bodies weakened and their physical and mental capabilities decreased in the duration of the strike, the impact and the power of their political action increased. Thus, under certain conditions, the lack of certain faculties, which are seen as preconditions of agency by many, could become the source of the agency of the political entities. Another example in this category is the debate on the 'Polish plumbers' phenomenon, which occupied French public opinion for a long time during the 2005 European Constitutional Referendum process. Inspired by Polish plumbers, Noyes (2018) argues that non-human entities and even the abstract notions could be conceptualized as agents. The media myth of Polish plumbers, which claims that French citizens' jobs would be taken, has been very effective on the outcome of the referendum. Noyes, describes this phenomenon as 'phantom agents' based on its strong effect on various agents.

Poststructuralist answers, based on practices with notions such as undecidability, indeterminacy, performativity, aim to offer a fruitful debate field where the agency of all objects, animate or not, related to humans or not, could be explained. However, this broad conceptualization of agency and study of the agents based on the practices it performed, overlooks the structural incentives and limitations that enable agency, while defining the agent indistinguishably from the other political entities (Ringmar, 2019). This approach, where the characteristics of the agent and limitations of agency become obsolete, would be inadequate to explain a political entity which will be examined on only one analysis level (planetary) and related to one structure (ecological politics) such as CJM and thus enable an explanation of its hypothetical mechanism.

The Debate on the Agency of CJM

In the previous section, the reasons behind the inadequacy of the various interpretations on the characteristics of the structure of critical realist and poststructuralist approaches of IR perspective, to explain the suggested hypothetical mechanism, have been mentioned. On the one hand, the critical realist interpretations of the connection between the agency and the intentional actions of humans remain inadequate to study the agency of decentralized political entities. On the other hand, poststructural solutions examine the agency independently from the structure and reduce the quality of the agents to the

production of the practices. In this section, the function of the reproduced hypothetical mechanism will be elaborated with critical realist and poststructural approaches. According to the critical realist approach, it is crucial to compare the contradictory theories on the subject based on their explanatory power, to unveil a mechanism (Reed, 2005:1630). However, this situation inevitably brings out the question: How suitable is it to use these two approaches together?

The lack of consensus on the ontology between critical realist and poststructuralist approaches has been exposed by many scholars (Yalvaç, 2012; Porpora, 2015; Klevis, 2020). The traces of the aforementioned distance, could be seen in the debate of Wight and Doty, on the agent-structure context (Doty, 1997; Wight, 1999; Doty, 1999, Wight, 2000). Thus, to give an explanation which embodies elements from the two approaches is only possible by being very cautious in a relatively limited area. This study on the agency of the CJM with a Bhaskarian method aims to analyze the phenomena with critical realist meta-theoretical assumptions and to utilize the poststructural approach to overcome the issues concerning agency of decentralized political entities. The analysis, based on these conditions, is constructed on the critical realist premises of the duality of the structures and human's agency on change and transformation of society. It would not be wrong to describe 'human actions as a flow' which continuously reshapes the social world (Bhaskar, 1979). Furthermore, it is clear that the scrutiny on bigger scales of the level of analysis to examine social structure, force us to ponder new forms of agencies. The explanations of names such as Wendt, Wight, Dessler, Carlsnaes could be seen as the reflections of this necessity on governmental and international relations planes. Yet these efforts could not meet with agency of the decentralized political entities such as the CJM. The poststructural approach would enable us to overcome the aforementioned theoretical restrictions.

At this stage, it is necessary to resolve the two possible metatheoretical conflicts of the simultaneous usage of the critical realist and poststructural approaches. Firstly, whereas the poststructural approach removes the limitation of agency by the definition based on practices, the critical realist approach defines the agency as directly related to humans' activities in the social world. The second problem is the establishment of the connection between the attributes of the CJM, which are defined by the poststructuralist concepts, and the critical realist structure. Based on critical realist arguments, it could be claimed that the practices are only formed by human actions. Thus, from this perspective, the agency of the notions like the Polish Plumbers, defined as ghost agents by Noyes, cannot be accepted (Noyes, 2018) because the practices are made by actions and actionability is a human faculty (Wendt, 2002:289). For this reason, even though the productive area of post structural conceptualization of practices is used, adoption of the critical realist understanding of the formation of the practices by humans and the corporate agents formed by humans would resolve the first conflict.

So, how could the CJM, regarding the described characteristics, be analysed as an agent connected to ecological politics? To resolve this meta-theoretical conflict through a critical realist perspective, the duality of praxis and the duality of the structures could be used. According to the duality of the praxis principle, the intentional actions of the agents would unintentionally change and transform the structures. At this point, it would

be beneficial to mention the conceptual differences between the actions and practices. According to Adler and Pouliot, the actions are intentional behaviors realized in a certain period of time, whereas the practices are patterns of action which find meaning in a certain context and are able to build new meanings and contexts (Adler & Pouliot, 2011:5-7). Even though the CJM does not perform actions shaped by certain purposes, it performs practices that create causalities that affect other agents related to ecological politics. Each protest, beyond the boundaries of states, based on the sensitivities regarding the disruption of ecological balance, is a singular example of these practices. This is because the protests connect individuals and peoples of different geographies for a systematic change. (See, Bir, 2020).

Because of its decentralized constitution without an institutional decision-making mechanism, the CJM, described as an abstract collective, does not perform actions with certain purposes. So, based on its abstract collectivity, how can the CJM perform the aforementioned practices? The declaration of action of an institution (for example, a state signing an agreement) in fact, refers to the actions made by the individuals for the interests and goals of the institutions. Thus, the CJM performing these practices, just like every other institution, is only possible with the actions of individuals. The deterministic relation between the intentionality and the actions for the institutions with a hierarchical organizational structure (states, companies etc.), is more apparent compared to the decentralized institutions. In the particular example of the CJM, the individuals who perform these practices may not even notice what they do as parts of the movement (Martiskainen, 2020). However, without a doubt, each of the individuals who contribute to the realization of these practices with their actions, regardless of their levels, is aware of the political aspect of global climate change and believes in the necessity of a structural change. In addition, discursive similarities and operational resemblances and cooperation within the CJM, results in the formation of collective intentionality on various scales.

Returning to the duality of the structures principle, in short, the structures, while limiting the agents based on their positions in their networks, are also preconditions of their activities (Porpora, 1989:200). The CJM demonstrates its agency in an ecological political sphere, by highlighting the relation between the biophysical changes and politics on a global and local level, with the practices it performs. For example, a week before the 27 September 2019 UN Climate Summit, the Climate Strike, with the participation of millions of people from more than 150 countries, protested the UN and the states who ignored global warming and through various method of civil disobedience they drew attention to the low-income groups who are the most affected by the disruption of the ecological balance and to the cruelty that is endured by local communities (Tollefson, 2019).

The nature of the global climate crisis which inevitably involves countless stakeholders and the spaces in the structure which could not be filled by the various other agents -like being the voice of the unheard others- (Mohai, 2009:405) give the CJM an area of agency. The embellishment of the practices, which enlarge the limits of the politics on a local and a global scale with a discourse that criticizes the existing order, even aims to change it and has the potential to undermine the traditional and state-centric system (Princen & Fingers, 1994:217). Nonetheless, considering that the states sometimes do not include

the elements of the CJM to the resolution processes about the disruption of the ecological balance, and their undeniable power and resources, it is clear how much the agency of the CJM and its mobility are limited (See, Brototi & Martinez-Alier, 2019). Thus, whereas ecological politics enables the agency of climate justice in the aforementioned multi-stakeholder system, it also has a complexion that limits it.

Additionally, the ambiguous (the undecidability of the notion of climate justice and the uncertainty of the Movement as mentioned above) and the decentralized composition of the Movement constitutes the foundation of its agencies in ecological politics. The establishment of an institutional organization scheme and the representation by a more limited ideological spectrum than now (for example only Marxist) would undermine the Movement's ability to perform the aforementioned practices. Just like the conclusion Abrahamson and Danyi reached while analyzing the agency of the immigrants who staged a hunger strike, the lack of cognitive abilities and inner competences which are accepted as the conditions of agency by some through a poststructural interference, could be understood as the main source of the agency of the suggested political entity (Abrahamson & Danyi, 2018). Going back to the suggested hypothetical mechanism, the agents related to the ecological political structure, conceptualized on the planetary level, could have a decentralized constitution which could as well be the main source of their agencies. The heavy impact of the disruption of the ecological balance on the lives of every living being in the world, causes the unification of various reactions from different locations, which 'cannot become' one voice. The study of the agency, in the manner that is developed in this paper, enables the unpacking of the causalities created by the various political entities which are overlooked by IR and the reevaluation of the ways that we can interact with people in distant locations on common grounds.

Conclusion

While the disruption of the ecological balance creates a unison, since it is a phenomenon that concerns all humanity, it also separates us, as it does not equally affect everybody. The CJM became the voice of large unheard masses by bringing this phenomenon, which disproportionately affected the lives of humans in a short time, and its results to the global political scene.

In this study, the agency of the CJM is discussed on a critical realist basis with a poststructural interference, and a formula to understand the agency of the decentralized political entities, based on the CJM, is suggested. The debates on the agency in the IR discipline mostly overlooked the agency of the political entities which do not have a decision-making mechanism, instrumental rationalist capabilities, and strategic oversight, thus, which could not be likened to humans in certain regards. In this study Bhaskar's DREI method is applied and the parts of the article structured respectively; d) 'described' the peculiarity of the Movement, r) established the level of analysis and the structure in which the agency of the Movement could be studied and 'retroduced' a hypothetical mechanism relating to this structure, e) 'eliminated' the existing theses of agency that could possibly be useful based of the discussion concerning the peculiarities of the movement and the hypothetical mechanism, and lastly i) 'identified' the connections between the structure and the characteristics of the Movement which enables its agency and explains how the

hypothetical mechanism works. Instead of accepting the agency based on the intentional actions and humane competences, conceptualizing the agency based on the structure in which it formed and the practices it creates offers a theoretical scape in which the causalities created by the decentralized political entities could be debated. In conclusion, it is ascertained that the decentralized agents related to ecological politics could exist and the ambiguity of these agents could be the main source of their agency, thus their ability to generate causalities.

Considering the CJM as an agent that is related to ecological politics (structure) that could be scrutinized on a planetary level (level of analysis) is just an instance to address how to understand and explain the agency of decentralized political entities. Claiming that the concept of agency could not be discussed without examining a related structure and a level of analysis, embodies a foundational principle to deal with the agent-structure problem. Based on this principle, the study pointed out that decentralized political entities could and should be the scientific objective of IR and environmental studies. Moreover it should be noted that in the last decade, plenty of articles focusing on developing the literature methodology and methods of critical realism have appeared (Fletcher, 2017; Hoody, 2019; Hasting, 2021; Dyer & Williams, 2021). In this regard, this brand-new way of taking social movements as actors contributes to this literature by challenging the rooted understandings concerning social ontologies.

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A Comparison Between Hobsbawm's and Bayat's Views on Non-Western Social Movements

Hobsbawm ve Bayat'ın Batı-Dışı Toplumsal Hareketlere Bakışlarının Karşılaştırılması

Olçum Akyüz¹, Mehmet Ali Akyurt²

Abstract

Until the 1960s, literature on social movements had been limited to such movements that emerged in the West in the modern period-. These movements had organizational structures and leaders and contributed to a revolution. This narrow framework contained parallelisms to the progressive theory of history and modernization theory. Researchers such as Antonio Gramsci, Michel de Certeau and James Scott, and approaches such as 'history from below,' subaltern studies and post-colonial theory played a key role in expanding and enriching views on social movements. Eric Hobsbawm's studies on social movements in both pre-modern Europe and contemporary Latin America and Asef Bayat's studies on contemporary Middle Eastern social movements have contributed to the expansion of the field by going beyond the boundaries of the social movements' literature inspired by modernization theory. In this article, Hobsbawm's and Bayat's studies on social movements are discussed comparatively, though the continuity between them is emphasized., Both their philosophical and theoretical foundations as well as their concepts and typologies are examined in the context of their contributions to the literature. Especially in Latin America and Middle East countries, where legal practices and regulations are insufficient and the existing political and bureaucratic mechanisms cannot represent the public, there are social movements that create a 'passive revolution' in Gramscian sense. Indeed, both Hobsbawm and Bayat studied non-Western social movements that were unorganized, leaderless, without a manifesto and non-revolutionary in the first place. Thus, by emphasizing different forms of social movement and opposition, they contributed to the critique of Eurocentric and modernist prejudices in the literature of social movements.

Keywords

Eric Hobsbawm, Asef Bayat, Non-Western Social Movements, Latin America, Middle East, Subaltern Studies

Öz

Toplumsal hareketler, literatürde 1960'lara kadar, modern dönemde Batı'da ortaya çıkan, örgütlü, lidere sahip devrime katkıda bulunan toplumsal hareketlerle sınırlandırılmıştır. İlerlemeci tarih anlayışına ve modernleşme teorisine paralel konumlandırılabilen bu dar çerçevenin genişletilip zenginleştirilmesinde Antonio Gramsci, Michel de Certeau, James Scott gibi araştırmacıların yanı sıra aşağıdan tarih, maduniyet çalışmaları ve post kolonyal teori gibi yaklaşımlar önemli rol oynamıştır. Eric Hobsbawm'ın gerek modernleşme öncesi dönem Avrupa gerekse çağdaş Latin Amerika çalışmaları ve Asef Bayat'ın Ortadoğu toplumsal hareketleriyle ilgili çalışmaları, literatürdeki modernleşme kalıplarını ötesine geçerek alanın genişlemesine katkı sağlamıştır. Bu makalede Hobsbawm ile Bayat'ın toplumsal hareketlere dair araştırmaları karşılaştırmalı olarak ve aralarındaki süreklilik vurgulanarak ele alınmakta gerek felsefi ve teorik temelleri gerekse geliştirdikleri kavram ve tipolojiler söz konusu zenginleşmeye katkıları bağlamında incelenmektedir. Özellikle yasal uygulama ve düzenlemelerin yetersiz kaldığı, mevcut siyasi ve bürokratik mekanizmaların halk kesimlerini temsil edemediği Latin Amerika ve Ortadoğu ülkelerinde, Gramsci'ci anlamda "pasif devrim" yaratan toplumsal hareketler söz konusudur. Nitekim her iki sosyal bilimci de Batı-dışındaki örgütsüz, lidersiz, manifestosuz ve ilk anda devrimci karakterde olmayan toplumsal hareketleri incelemelerine dahil etmişlerdir. Böylelikle iki isim de daha önce son derece sınırlı bir şekilde analize konu edilen toplumsal hareket ve muhalefet biçimlerinin önemini vurgulayarak toplumsal hareketler literatüründeki Avrupa merkezli ve modernleşme önyargılarını eleştirilmesine katkı yapmışlardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Eric Hobsbawm, Asef Bayat, Toplumsal Hareketler, Latin Amerika, Ortadoğu, Maduniyet Çalışmaları

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Introduction: Social Movements and Eurocentrism

Social change has been a central subject of discussion since the foundation of sociology. Social changes were analyzed by classical sociologists who focused especially on improving foresight and leading society to projected improved conditions. Attempts have been made to understand this subject using evolutionist, dialectic materialist, conflict, and structural-functionalist approaches. One of the main empirical grounds of social change theories is the data which is collected by those who conduct research on social movements. It is important to examine the historical, political, and sociological foundations of social movements, as they frame all oppositional actions, whatever the scale of the movement and the way it spread.

As a response to the social policies and practices developed by the center, direct or indirect forms of opposition are developed by the periphery. These forms of opposition are called social movements (Della Porta and Diani 2020:29–30). The power relations between the central and peripheral actors are one of the main focuses of social scientific explanations regarding social change. Until the third quarter of 20th century, approaches to social movements, whether predicting a socialist or capitalist development, were in line with modernization theory, and parallel to a Eurocentric, linear and progressive understanding of history. This orthodox social movement reading has been challenged by the criticism of further research which refers to the differences and peculiarities of social movements in European countries experiencing late or partial modernization and in non-European countries.

Although it is impossible to assign a precise historical starting point for social movements, according to Charles Tilly, social movements developed in Europe particularly after the 1750s (Tilly 2008:17). Like Tilly, many social scientists took the preparatory phase of the French Revolution as a basis. The French Revolution is accepted as the historical event at the origin of the nation-state and capitalism. Social changes brought about by the nation-state and capitalism started to be discussed under the title of ‘modernization’ by social sciences since the 19th century. For this reason, social events and social movements have been evaluated with an emphasis on social change, mainly understood in terms of modernization. As a matter of fact, assuming the distinction between modern and post-modern, a secondary classification was made as new and old social movements after the 1960s (Özen 2015). The two schools that were influential in this field after the 1960s were (1) resource mobilization theory and (2) new social movements approach (Çetinkaya et al. 2018:33). Although Eurocentrism constituted the mainstream approach in social sciences for a long time, many social scientists criticized orientalism and modernization theory proposing new frameworks of ‘post-colonial studies’ and ‘subaltern studies’ in the post-1960 period. As a result of empirical research trying to overcome the old stereotypes used especially when evaluating non-Western social contexts, social movement evaluations have also diversified and become enriched. One of the mistakes frequently made in earlier studies which adopted modernization theory and the Western-oriented approach was to accept authoritarian regimes as immutable (Akder 2013:90). One result of this mistake has been the ignorance of the mobility of the lower classes, both in pre-modern periods and in non-Western contemporary societies (Çetinkaya et al. 2018:53). In contrast to the explanations focusing on the elites, there were also studies centered upon the lower classes and the oppressed communities, in other words, the ‘subalterns’.

Marxist Perspective on Social Movements: Gramsci and Hobsbawm

The Marxist view of social movements was also developed within the framework of a Western-oriented modernization and parallel to the idea of progress. In the second quarter of the 20th century, as a product of the discussions within Marxism, studies were carried out that focused more on the praxis of the proletariat, and in different social and historical conditions in which this praxis emerged. Contrary to the orthodox Marxist reading of social movements that was mostly formed within the framework of the progressive philosophy of history and remained limited to revolutionary workers' movements, Antonio Gramsci developed a perspective that took revolutionary and non-revolutionary, lower and middle classes, in short, all forms of social movements into account, after studying the practical situation of 1940s Italy in which he lived. His perspective inspired both Eric Hobsbawm's and Asef Bayat's understanding of social movements. Taking the peculiarities of Italian society into account, which unlike other capitalist nation-states would achieve its unity and nation-building later, Gramsci 'reinterpreted' Marx's ideas based on the needs of Italy. According to Gramsci, politics is a mixture of force and consent, coercion, and hegemony. Hegemony, which is characterized as a dynamic structure, means that the ruling class obtains the consent of the ruled ones, receives the support of society, and in this way gains legitimacy. While political society regulates oppression, civil society consists of social institutions that produce consent and establish hegemony. Winning in civil society means establishing hegemony (Demirovic 2012:96–99).

“[For] Gramsci [hegemony] involves four integrally and dialectically related ‘moments’, or ‘component parts’: first, hegemony as social and political leadership; second, hegemony as a political project; third, the realization of this hegemonic project in concrete institutions and organizational forms; and fourth, ultimately and decisively, the social and political hegemony of the workers’ movement.” (Thomas 2013:22)

At the time Gramsci produced his ideas, the existing hegemony in Italy, in which the moral leadership of the Catholic Church was influential, had to be replaced by an alternative moral principle by working class intellectuals (Turner 2006:71). Civil society, as society in general, has a dynamic and changeable structure, and the construction of hegemony is a never-ending process. Accordingly, all the opposition and differentiations that develop within civil society consisting of different groups are considered within the scope of social movement.

With the theory of hegemony, Gramsci associates economic and political change with change in ideology and social relations. Accordingly, those in power, in other words the ruling class, want to protect their own economic and political power, and avoid sharing it with the proletariat and lower classes. However, they have to socialize and democratize the economy and politics as a requirement of holding power (Sassoon 2012:137–38). According to Gramsci, the element of ‘passive revolution’, which he defined by the concepts of hegemony and civil society, was also very important in the establishment of the nation-state in Italy. The peasants accepted the new political regime and Italian unity only with a passive consent. Günersel points out that the concept of ‘passive revolution’ is used in at least two meanings in the *Prison Notebooks*: (1) “revolution without mass participation”, (2) “implicit advancement of a social class that isn’t allowed to advance explicitly (as the bourgeoisie did in restoration France) which Gramsci also

calls ‘revolution-restoration’” (Günersel 1988:8). Tuğal uses the Gramscian concept of ‘passive revolution’ to study the “process of absorption” by “which the dominant sectors establish willing consent (‘hegemony’) for their rule.” Accordingly,

“(…) different from classic revolutions (as in the French, Russian, and Chinese cases) where an emergent dominant class attempts to sweep away the old dominant classes and their institutions through mass mobilization, in a passive revolution popular sectors are mobilized with revolutionary discourses and strategies only to reinforce existing patterns of domination.” (Tuğal 2009:3–4)

In other words, a previously unconvinced segment of society is persuaded by passive revolution. The society doesn’t take any revolutionary action that will overthrow the political power, on the contrary, it actively supports the revolutionary changes that it will bring about. When such mass mobilizations are also included, the scope of the empirical ground and phenomena to be discussed under the title of social movements expands significantly and goes beyond the border of social movements that tend to abolish the status quo.

According to Hobsbawm, when putting forward the concept of ‘passive revolution’, Gramsci’s starting point was the idea that a revolution like the October Revolution (Bolshevik Revolution) couldn’t take place in Europe after 1920. The revolutions that were likely to take place after 1920 would have spread over time. Therefore, Gramsci specifically tried to explain that the revolution was permanent by considering the possibility that stability couldn’t be achieved in the revolution that spread over time (Hobsbawm 2014:363–67). According to Hobsbawm, with his idea of permanent revolution and his philosophy of praxis, Gramsci, unlike other Western Marxists, escaped both being imprisoned within academia and turning into a political ‘ism’ (Hobsbawm 2014:376). Hobsbawm’s reading of Gramsci is parallel with his reading of communism. Having given up on the Communist Party of Great Britain after 1956, Hobsbawm thought that the Italian Communist Party was still worth joining (Hobsbawm 2006b:468). He pointed out that the Italian Communist Party, which attracted those who were against fascism, spread its ideas twenty years after Gramsci’s death (Hobsbawm 2006a:36–48).¹

Why to Compare Hobsbawm and Bayat

There are many social scientists who have studied non-Western social movements in the post-colonial era. Researchers like Franz Fanon (2002, 2021), Eric Hobsbawm, James Scott (1987, 1995), Asef Bayat and Partha Chatterjee (2016) who work on the subject, have deciphered and criticized Western-oriented political philosophy behind the

¹ Antonio Gramsci (1891-1837) was not one of the highly valued intellectuals during his lifetime. His books and articles began to be published 11-12 years after his death. His works influenced determination and dissemination of Italian Communist Party’s goals and principles. He was also founder of the party. After his works were translated into other languages, his thoughts became the theoretical basis of many social movements in the colonies in the process of gaining independency – especially Latin American social movements. Gramscianism is mostly defined in two main lines. The first is the Togliatti line which is named after the Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti, and which was influential in post-1945 Italy. The Togliatti line focuses on social movement and is parallel with Lenin’s perspective. The second is a parallel with Croce’s and Hegel’s line which focuses on ‘civil society’. This approach influenced discussion on Gramscian perspective in America and Austria (Davidson, Jehle, and Santucci 2013). Hobsbawm, as a person who met Togliatti in person and was impressed by him, followed the first line (Hobsbawm 2006b:468).

underestimation of non-Western social movements. Among those authors, Hobsbawm and Bayat are particularly interested in poverty and class-based movements or the poor. With one difference! While Hobsbawm deals with rural movements, i.e., premodern Western and modern non-Western rural class-based movements, throughout his career, Bayat focuses on the urban poor, but also on class-based movements. The main focus of Scott and Chatterjee, on the other hand, is on the cultural dimensions of those movements. Hobsbawm and Bayat both relate the politics to economic realm in the first place, while the former adopts a more macro-political perspective, and the latter a micro-political one. In other words, the main interest of both Hobsbawm and Bayat is on class movements, and especially with a focus on politics or political economy, rather than culture.

There are also other apparent similarities and connections between Hobsbawm and Bayat that prepare the ground for their comparison in this study. The ideational fundamentals of both authors are based on the theoretical framework Gramsci developed in the field of social movements. The first similarity is that both give a relatively central position to the peculiar conditions and changes of certain societies when evaluating social events and phenomena. The second is that both have done studies on non-Western regions that have experienced colonialism and liberation from colonialism. In addition, the dedication of Asef Bayat's work titled *Life as Politics* "To: Eric Hobsbawm, par excellence" (Bayat 2010:V) can be read as a sign of continuity between them in the evaluation of social movements. The date range that both social scientists focus on is the post-colonial period after 1950, which is seen as a break in world history. In this period, while the former colonies gained their political independence their economic dependence decreased, and the concept of globalization was introduced in order to name this entire process of change.

Both Hobsbawm and Bayat have non-Western origins. They both migrated to a western country. Bayat who is known as an American sociologist, is originally Iranian. Hobsbawm who is known as a British historian, is originally the son of a Polish father and an Austrian mother. However, their life stories and approaches have made them critical Western social scientists. In an age where migration has become a central phenomenon, contact between Western and non-Western worlds has increased dramatically, and globalization brings diversity more than homogeneity, Western forms and Western formalism have lost their ground. In such a context, two migrant and 'Westernized' social scientists' views on non-Western social movements have gained importance and relevance. Another point is that the cultural turn in social movements analysis has resulted in a purely cultural or purely political point of view. However, in the neoliberal age, the political economy perspective on class-based social movements must be recalled and this is what is represented mostly by Hobsbawm and Bayat.

Hobsbawm gained his reputation with his studies on world history and politics. Indeed, these studies were the most translated ones among his complete works. His studies on social movements, which are held relatively less in the foreground, are also substantial among all his studies.² Particularly in his work focusing on social movements he is

2 Hobsbawm's works which include evaluations on social movements are (in chronological order) *Labour's Turning Point 1880-1900* (1948), *Fabianism and Fabians 1884-1914* (Doctoral thesis, 1950), *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (1959), *The Jazz Scene* (1959), *Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour* (1964), *Bandits* (1969), *Captain Swing: A Social History of The Great English Agricultural Uprising of 1830* (with George Rudé, 1969), *Revolutionaries*

seen as a historian who has adopted the ‘history from below’ approach together with the representatives of the French Annales School of history and other ‘British Marxist historians’ (which also includes Hobsbawm). With the approach of ‘history from below’, the history of the silent, in other words subalterns, lower classes, laborers, slaves, and colonies has been rewritten (Uslu 2017:99-106). The ‘history from below’ approach brings permeability to the borders between the social sciences and places the agency of ordinary people into the hearth of historical-social events. For this reason, this understanding of history also includes not only historical data, but also data from sociological field studies. Hobsbawm collected data on the period in which he lived, both by compiling social and political events and by making participant observations, especially in his research in Latin America. He studied the region he wrote about, including its political-social changes after 1950, by experiencing it personally in the 1980s (Hobsbawm 2006b:297).

Similarly, Bayat presented his historical-sociological evaluations as a result of research on Middle Eastern countries conducted by himself in person. He considered the Middle East as a part of the Global South, by focusing on the social change after 1980, especially in Egypt and Iran. Asef Bayat’s childhood and youth were also spent in Egypt and Iran (Bayat 2008:11–14, 2015b:25). For this reason, some of the evidence related to everyday life in his works seems to be based on his own testimonies.

Bayat’s work offers explanations focusing on society, the agent of ordinary people and the mechanisms they operate. Especially in Western social movements literature, evaluations made using Western concepts and orientalist judgments have caused the social dynamics of Middle Eastern countries and the differentiations among individual Middle Eastern societies to be misunderstood. For this reason, Bayat presented critical assessments on Iranian and Egyptian social structures with a point of view from within, and also from below. In this way, he made significant conceptual contributions to existing poverty literature and subaltern studies and shaped his theoretical framework depending closely on his empirical field. Bayat’s work can be seen as a rejection of an orientalist conception of the Middle Eastern social movements as similar, fixed, homogeneous and coherent in each country. Nevertheless, in the face of Hobsbawm and Bayat’s Western voices of ‘subordinate’ regions - the former of Latin America and the latter of the Middle East – the question asked by Spivak, ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ could be answered negatively (Spivak 2020:113). It can be said that the question remains valid.

Hobsbawm’s Evaluations on Social Movements

Hobsbawm has been interested in social movements and social change since the beginning of his academic career. In his studies, he objected against modernization theory’s historical prejudices. In his first work, *Bandits*, he dealt with premodern and pre-state rebellions and social opposition based on oral culture and literary works, especially Robin Hood myths. It is possible to talk about three forms of banditry as social bandits - noble robbers, primitive resistance fighters (guerilla units of haiduks)³ and terror bringing

(1973), *Worlds of Labour: Further Studies in the History of Labour* (1984), *Uncommon People: Resistance, Rebellion and Jazz* (1998), *Bandits* (revised addition, 2000) and *Viva la Revolucion: Hobsbawm on Latin America* (2016).

3 This concept means ‘cattle keeper’ and refers to the Hungarian cavalry warriors, who were hostile to the Turks, mostly residing in the border regions as an autonomous community with various agreements within

avengers (Hobsbawm 2000:20). Although he defined the period between 1789 and 1848 as the 'Age of Revolution' while dividing the world history into periods, he emphasized the continuity of social change and drew attention to the existence of social movements before and after this period. He adopts the 'history from below' approach, sees ordinary people as the main agent of historical events, and argues that the will of the masses should be put at the center of the analysis. All these theoretical positions can be associated with his long lasting and continuous interest in social movements (Akyüz 2019:16–17).

Two distinctions stand out in Hobsbawm's assessment of social movements. Hobsbawm divides social movements into pre-political and political movements according to the criterion of era, and into peasant and labor movements according to the criterion of actor. The boundaries between them are not precise and strict, on the contrary they can easily transform into each other, regardless of their characteristics. According to Hobsbawm, the main differences between pre-political and political era movements are whether they have revolutionary or reformist goals, and their organizational capabilities or institutional skills. The pre-political movements are short-lived, formed by bandit gangs, involving a small number of people, emphasizing religiosity, and a product of economic distribution problems. Political era movements, on the other hand, continue their existence in the long run, establish an organization that includes large masses, have an ideology, and aim to change the existing system. Regarding the second distinction based on the criterion of actor, while almost all peasant movements are reformist in character, their importance comes from the point that they form the basis and initial form of the workers' movements and other revolutionary movements (Akyüz 2019:41–42).

The 'social bandit', as an ideal type that Hobsbawm put forward regarding social movements, is a kind of test paper which helps to distinguish different types of social movements. Firstly, the social bandit has an altruistic and socialist character, he doesn't care about his self-interests. Robin Hood distributes to the poor what he steals from the rich, and this makes him the most basic example of this type. Although the social bandit differs from the rest of society in terms of his actions, he shares some ethical values and common-sense understandings which are components of the collective consciousness of society. The social bandit comes into being by committing an act of rebellion after suffering an injustice in the very social environment where he belongs and has grown up. He couldn't find any solution to his problems by applying the bureaucratic and legal instruments of the state laws that depend on the state, and as a result, he developed his own methods. Social banditry in general progressed along a reformist line and focused on the individual, local and specific problems rather than systematic ones. Therefore, social bandits didn't carry out acts of revolutionary character. In addition, social bandits tend to maintain the current situation, and this attitude gives the social bandit a conservative character. The social bandit aims to restore broken values, vacant titles, unsuitable political decisions, and corrupted practices. One of Hobsbawm's most striking judgments is that the most permanent and radical changes are made by conservatives over time. The public writes the history of the social bandit anonymously by poetry, song, story, etc. It is possible to watch his reflection in works of art, especially in ones based on oral culture. Therefore, social banditry narratives can be seen as an integral part of the collective memory (Akyüz 2019:43–48).

Europe (Hobsbawm 2011:100–105).

According to Hobsbawm, it is possible to come across social bandits in three ways: (1) virtuous robber (like Robin Hood), (2) primitive resistance-guerrilla, and (3) terror-spreading-revenge (Akyüz 2019:45). There may be differences depending on the social conditions between the past (pre-political era) forms of social banditry and the situations that emerged (or may occur) in the political era. This situation will lead to the development of new primitive rebellions. The guerrilla movement is important as a form of social movement which shares some characteristics of the pre-political era movements but manifests itself in the political era.

The guerrilla movement, which can be compared to the social bandit type, operates for example at a regional and local level, similar to the social bandit. It emerges in rural areas because it tries to stay out of state control and rural geographical conditions are suitable for this. Although there are also guerilla attacks targeting urban areas, its main field of action is the countryside. The guerrilla movement doesn't have its own production system; therefore, guerrillas get their supplies thanks to their dependency relationship with local people. Guerrillas don't attack local people in return for the provision of their basic needs. Therefore, the guerrilla movement plays the role of a secondary state, and creates its own system including tax collection, legal services, infrastructure, education, and development. While the existing ruling elites have a richer profile, the guerrilla movement has much in common with the local people. This situation can be a forerunner of radical change and revolution, especially in historical moments when redistribution problems occur. Unlike the social bandit movement, in the guerrilla movement Hobsbawm sees the potential for nationalization, becoming a party, and even a state (Akyüz 2019:59–61).

As Hobsbawm states in his work the *Revolutionaries*, the guerrilla movement's relations with the political authority affects its relations with the public, and vice versa. The guerrilla movement exists with the support of the local people, which mostly consists of peasants. What makes a social movement a guerrilla movement is its crowded and anonymous socio-political base, like a 'fish in the sea' (Hobsbawm 1970:54). The guerrilla must fight for and together with the local people. Otherwise, the continuity and success of the troops won't be possible. According to Hobsbawm, if the local people support the guerrilla, they will be adversely affected by the judicial and military forces of the legitimate political authority. In this case, the local public will give more support to the guerrilla. The armed struggle between the guerrilla and the legitimate political authority will continue as long as the guerrilla exists (Hobsbawm 1994:163–64). Hobsbawm envisages here a solidarity between subaltern sections of society. One of the most tragic examples of the conflict between the forceful use of current political authority and popular opposition is the 1949-1953 La Violencia period in Colombia (Hobsbawm 2018:87).

Guerrilla movements emerged during the Cold War and were more effective in Third World countries, especially in "post-colonial" ones with a colonial past. Among these regions, the one that most attracted Hobsbawm's attention was Latin America, which was colonized by imperialist states, failed in capitalization, and had a rural social structure. The guerrilla movement in Latin America rose in the post-1960 period (Akyüz 2019:61). There are three factors that led to the revolt in Latin America. These are (1) seeking social justice, (2) feeling of backwardness, and (3) foreign domination. According to Hobsbawm, these three points are the main reasons behind Latin America's opposition

to North America. The tendency towards socialism is a relatively secondary element (Hobsbawm 2018:68). As an old timer socialist, Hobsbawm⁴ realizes that while the issue of socialism is exciting, local problems in Latin America are of a depth that transcends the ideal of socialism. Indeed, Latin American socialist movements also have some nationalistic⁵ characteristics because of their local bonds and colors.

According to Hobsbawm, Latin America is a proper place to observe social changes. Political instability, economic problems, state organization that doesn't follow democratic policies in favor of public good, with most of the population consisting of peasants, create various types of primitive rebellion in the political era. Although agriculture in Latin America is the main mode of production and the rural area covers large lands that contain most of the population, it is possible to talk about the newly formed industrial production as well as the cities. In the urban population, there is also a slum area housing people who have migrated from the countryside to the city and having precarious working conditions. This segment also has overriding population in cities. Based on these data, Hobsbawm likens Latin American social movements to those of Europe in the Middle Ages in form (Hobsbawm 2018:65) and to the French Revolution in ideological terms (Hobsbawm 2016:64). For this reason, he didn't show any interest in guerrilla movements in Africa and the Middle East and acted with the preconception that they wouldn't achieve successful results. Finally, as he stated in his article published in 1963, although there were popular movements leading to a kind of social change in Latin America, they remained weak in establishing a new social and political organization (Hobsbawm 2018:62).

The social opposition of the poor classes emerged in the Latin American context as a means of the search for justice. In these movements, the peasants were an effective social class, and also important in terms of forming the majority. In addition, they took action with a 'revolutionary' character although their profile was far from the revolutionary profile proposed by Marx. In addition to the peasants, it is possible to talk about the existence of soldiers, the urban poor, a limited number of elites (who give ideology to the movement in some cases) and students (in relation to the increase in schooling). An important feature of Latin American peasantry is that the vast majority consists of landless peasants. A similar social class also emerged after the Industrial Revolution in Europe⁶, but Latin America differed from Europe with its colonial past. The lands were shared by

4 When Hobsbawm was 14-15, he started to read Marx's books on his professors' suggestion in Germany (Hobsbawm 2006b:80). When he was 16, he decided to be a historian following Marx's history approach which considers history only as a science in between dichotomy of science and ideology (Hobsbawm 2006b:11). On the other hand, he defined himself as a Marxist until the end of his life and continued to be a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain until 1991, the official dissolution of the USSR (Akyüz 2019:21).

5 Latin American nationalism aims to achieve political and economic independence against colonizer states. The definition of a nation is made differently from European countries. The concept of nation is defined there as citizens of the country, and the unifying ideology of citizens is anti-imperialism. The elements of cultural nationalism in Latin America haven't yet been discussed sufficiently (Hobsbawm 2018:425-41).

6 After the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), English Poor Laws had an impact on society. The Captain Swing Movement was the determining factor for these laws to come into force. Male agricultural workers who participated in the war were unemployed after the war. During the war, women and children joined the agricultural labor force. Mechanization took place in agriculture. Landless peasants became seasonal workers. Agricultural labor wages fell because unemployed people increased. As a result of this hunger (as a social disaster) increased. People who united around a possibly fictional leader, defined as a captain with a military identity, committed machine-breaking actions. (Akyüz 2019:48-54).

a certain group. Landowners organized agricultural production totally according to the market opportunities provided by the colonial states. This situation resulted in a limited production not reaching the domestic needs sufficiently and therefore not satisfying the local people.

The main method in the revolutionary struggles of Third World countries after 1945 was guerrilla movements (Hobsbawm 2018:267). Although armed bandits gained popular support in Latin America, in most cases the organization quickly disintegrated and failed to maintain its stability. The first exception to this situation was Cuba, and the second was Colombia (Hobsbawm 2018:271). Among the Latin American states, Hobsbawm paid special attention to Cuba. In November 1960, Hobsbawm announced that if the United States didn't take an armed intervention, Cuba's regime would transition to socialism (Hobsbawm 2018:39). According to him, in Cuba, the economic slavery of colonialism was confronted with a revolutionary front (Hobsbawm 2018:41). Cuba achieved success among other national movements and came to the fore by changing the regime (Hobsbawm 2018:268). This made the guerrilla movement in Cuba an exception and an inspiration for guerrilla movements in other countries. The success of the movement led by Fidel Castro should not be considered independent of the conditions of his country. Indeed, there are serious differences between the conditions of Cuba and other Latin American countries. It was particularly after 1959, in reaction to the success in Cuba, that the USA supported the counter-guerrilla forces in other Latin American states (Hobsbawm 2018:283).

Among Latin America's social movements, Colombia was the second country that attracted Hobsbawm's attention after Cuba. As a region where violent incidents and murders occurred, Colombia was a place with serious political and social problems. Firstly, in the absence of a central authority in Colombia, there were incidents of violence that emerged in order to solve social problems without having a legitimate, at least a legal ground. The political party system, which came before the establishment of the state, established the constitutional oligarchy. Violent acts became inevitable when no limitation on armament was imposed. A popular movement developed under the leadership of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and organized both the townspeople and peasants successfully. However, following the murder of Gaitán in 1948, a civil war began. The period of civil war between 1948 and 1953 was followed by with the military coup and the 'La Violencia' period between 1953 and 1957 was spent under a military junta. The polarization created by the people, the army and the oligarchs prevented the establishment of a stable and successful socio-political order. Two components of the oligarchy, namely the conservative party and liberal party, shared the authority and formed an alliance in order to oppress the opposition – as Hobsbawm put it, this process of oppression was an instance of 'politicized banditry' (Hobsbawm 2018:412). From 1950 to 1975, a kind of modern state-building process occurred together with a demographic transition where the share of urban population increased from 30% to 70%. In the 1960s, guerrilla units were established under the name FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) as a product of social tensions. Villagers formed the basis of these unions. In Colombia, the domination of the landlords allowed them to exert political and military pressure, and the guerrilla units aimed to provide justice on the side of the peasant people and to create armed forces that would suppress the military forces of the landlords (Hobsbawm

2018:409–24). As a result, all opposition elements in Colombia were suppressed in some way. Hobsbawm's impression about Colombian guerrilla is meaningful: "Anyone who wants to live in this country can form an armed gang of peasants. The matter begins after that" (Hobsbawm 2018:304–5).

Bayat's Evaluations on Social Movements

In order to understand Asef Bayat's perspective on social change and social movements, we first have to focus on how he interprets the revolution and revolutionaries. According to him, the criteria developed by Western social scientists in order to distinguish revolution from other types of social change, and revolutionaries from followers of other types of social movements are insufficient for understanding the Middle East. Bayat's conceptualization of 'revolution without revolutionaries' underlines this inadequacy, and advocates that the activists of these revolutions were able to mobilize masses and to activate streets and public places, referring to common problems of the people. These actions don't have a revolutionary goal, ideological ground, or any notion of ideal state (Bayat 2017). Bayat gave importance to the actions that took place in Tahrir Square in 2011 in this respect and stated that it set an example for other societies. These actions took place because of the commonness, rather than content, of ordinary people's discontent. Bayat's other important conceptual contribution to the macro-scale social change literature is the concept of 'refo-lution' defined as "revolution that engenders reform rather than radical change" (Bayat 2017:17–20). With this concept, he tries to represent revolutionary movements and changes that lack an ideological direction as well as the skills and notion of establishing a new state, and any aim of institutional reform. This conceptualization, which seems tautological or paradoxical at first glance, can be more easily understood when considering the fact that it occurs in societies where the political authorities suspend individual and citizenship-based rights and freedoms, and the everyday lives of ordinary people are limited by oppression.

From this point of view, Bayat focused on issues such as poverty, change in urban space, and Islamism, while examining official and unofficial strategies and tactics in the private and public spheres, in other words both in civil and un-civil society. He focused on realities outside the political leaders and their bureaucratic elite. According to him, without understanding the idiosyncratic conditions and invisible origins of the changes in the Middle East, correct explanations cannot be presented. Based on this framework, two concepts he introduces establish connection between social change and social movement literatures, and also between macro- and micro-scales of social analysis: 'quiet encroachment of the ordinary' and 'street politics'⁷.

According to Bayat, communities with a seemingly passive character that do not oppose the authority apparently may not be as inactive as one might think. Moreover, cultural explanation for this inaction referring to cultural values, laziness, etc. seems to be unjustifiable. In order to make an accurate analysis, dependency relations should be focused on. Data such as the welfare level of the society, access to resources, how much share

⁷ In his book entitled *Street Politics*, Bayat stated that the first person to use this concept was Ayşe Öncü (written as Uncu as a mistake in Bayat's text) at a conference where Turkish and Egyptian academics came together in Cairo in 1991, but she evaluated the concept in a different way (Bayat 2008:259). See also Ayşe Öncü's article: (Öncü et al. 1994).

individuals get from the system as a citizen, whether civil rights meet the needs determine the action plans. The movements that Bayat calls ‘social non-movements’ are important in this respect. Most of the evaluations on the Middle East have focused on regimes that are defined as authoritarian and despotic, and reached the conclusion that agency cannot occur in these regimes. “[I]n fact the Middle East has been home to many insurrectionary episodes, nationwide revolutions, and social movements (such as Islamism), and great strides for change. Beyond these, certain distinct and unconventional forms of agency and activism have emerged in the region that do not get adequate attention, because they do not fit into our prevailing categories and conceptual imaginations.” (Bayat 2010:3). In order to highlight the connection between individuals’ networks and social action, Bayat proposes the concept of ‘passive network’ as something external and spontaneous, rather than being an integral part of a social movement. Accordingly, common threats activate passive networks in social actions, which actually is always present in social relations (Bayat 2008:47).

Particularly in quiet encroachment, individuals create a form of action while trying to solve their economic problems. Quiet encroachments occur when the law doesn’t apply equally to all people and redistribution problems recur. It aims to escape from the interventions of the state authority, to gain civil autonomy, and to meet basic needs. The main purpose of individuals who act with the basic motivation of desperation, obligation and living with dignity (Bayat 2008:41–42) is to solve their own practical problems. In this respect, this type of social action is collective in that many people resort to it, and individual in that the aims are personal. In this action, individuals try to benefit from social crises to achieve their personal goals. They also develop everyday tactics that are invisible in the public sphere. Bribery for instance is a widely used method in relations with the bureaucratic apparatus (Bayat 2008:44). Here, the state and elites are charged with the economic and political costs caused by those illegitimate economic and political relations.

One of the most common mistakes made when commenting on the Middle East is to consider that “Middle Eastern/Oriental” and “Muslim” are the same. According to Bayat, three elements are important regarding the exceptionalist perception of the Middle East. The orientalist way of thinking prepares a ground to support Western interventions. On the other hand, local regimes and authoritarian governments are constantly supported by the Westerners, and as a result, conservative and non-democratic Islamist movements emerge and spread (Bayat 2015b:32).

Islamism actually emerged against Western domination as a social movement and organization, a proposal of new order, and a theory of liberation. However, it failed to solve problems and to increase welfare, especially as seen in Iran. This failure resulted in the silent development of opposition and social activism. A consensus was reached by the subaltern segment, which corresponds to an ever-increasing large mass in society, but silently, which means without a specific organizational structure, without engaging in large-scale, resounding, public debates. According to Bayat, society kept silent about things that cannot be spoken (Wittgenstein 2013:11) but did not stop. At this point, the quiet encroachment act is unlawful, unpretentious, unconventionally organized, and aims to meet people’s basic needs such as food, shelter etc. This kind of social movement

emerges where neither non-governmental organization support nor government policies successfully meet people's needs and solve their problems.

Bayat also pointed out the possibility that those mentioned reformist social movements gain a revolutionary character. In addition, Bayat here foresees the democratization of non-democratic regimes by being forced to do so:

“After all, change in societies’ sensibilities is a pre-condition for a sustainable democratic turn. Such change is triggered not only through information and education, but especially by the active citizenry of ordinary people (teachers, students, the young, women, workers, artists, and intellectuals) who in their everyday lives voice their demands, broadcast violations, fulfil their responsibilities, and excel in what they do. Muslim citizens cannot spearhead a democratic shift unless they master the art of presence—the skill and spirit to assert collective will in spite of all odds by circumventing constraints, utilizing what is possible, and discovering new spaces within which to make themselves heard, seen, and felt. Through their active presence in every available social space, ordinary citizens can transform their society into one that dejects authoritarian personality, surpasses its governing elites, and becomes capable of enforcing its collective sensibilities on the state and its henchmen.” (Bayat 2015a:121).

According to Bayat, at this point Islamism needs to change, and its transformation into post-Islamism becomes imperative. Post-Islamism offers the opportunity to turn “Islam and Islamic life” into a conscientious choice by removing the pressure exercised by the rulers and the laws they set up. In this way, society- and citizenship-based solutions become possible. The post-Islamic movement demands regulation of citizenship rights related to both private and public spheres. Added to this, new social movements such as the feminist or youth movements fall under the “non-Islamic” social movements category.

The Comparison Between Hobsbawm's and Bayat's Approaches

There are similarities between the post-1945 social movements in the Middle East which Bayat deals with and the social movements of the pre-political period which Hobsbawm identified on the empirical ground of feudal Western Europe. Similarities between these two types of social movements are that they are organized at a regional scale and are the product of gangs (in other words, based on primary relationships such as family-kinship relations). In addition, they have short-term daily goals, they cannot produce ideology, and they do not have long-term plans and programs that aim to establish a new order at the end. Further similarities can be found between the emergence and organization of ‘social bandits’ in Hobsbawm, and the ‘quiet encroachment’ in Bayat. Both emerge in the authority gap and take advantage of it.

The most striking difference between the social movements that Bayat and Hobsbawm deal with is related to the actors of the movements. While women, the unemployed (such as those who have always been unemployed, those who became unemployed in one day after the Islamic Revolution, street vendors, refugees etc.), the new social classes, the precariat, the youth, migrants from rural areas to cities, and international immigrants are included in Bayat's social movement analysis, Hobsbawm focuses on a group of mostly male villagers under the concept of social bandit. As a separate group, he only assigns a subordinate role to the settled villagers who support them. Another difference is their origin of intellectual inspiration. While it is mostly literary works which shape

Hobsbawm's point of view, Bayat's vision of social movements is determined by recent socio-political events and phenomena. For this reason, Hobsbawm is vaguer, and Bayat is more specific in terms of the content and boundaries of the concepts. This judgment is valid not only for Hobsbawm's subcategorization of social bandits, but also for his studies on Latin American guerrillas.

In both Bayat and Hobsbawm, the everyday life and its inherent problems are the basis of the political and social movements analysis. However, Bayat produced more works on the problems encountered in everyday life, daily practices, and actions. As Michel de Certeau did, he aimed to reveal the social conditions by dealing with strategy and tactics in various narratives of events.⁸ Certeau's concept of 'everyday tactics' and Bayat's concepts of 'quiet encroachment of the ordinary' and 'art of presence' are similar to each other. Bayat focuses more on the capillaries of social life, on the relationships and interactions in everyday life, in other words, on the microscale, as opposed to Hobsbawm's more macro-politics-oriented view. In this respect, Bayat more resembles E. P. Thompson, who is among the leading British Marxist historians together with Hobsbawm. Thompson, in his masterpiece *The Making of the English Working Class*, presented a historical analysis of the dynamic character of the class concept because it included the subject and consciousness (Kaye 2009:227–30). In his focus on microanalysis of social relations, Bayat resembles Thompson as well as James C. Scott, whom he occasionally refers to in his own work. Both Bayat and Scott agree that the primary goal in the actions of the urban poor in the Third World countries is survival. Bayat locates Scott in the 'Brechtian line'⁹ which can be seen parallel to Gramsci. On the other hand, Bayat thinks that Scott is insufficient in explaining the action dynamics of the urban poor, considering them only in a defensive position (Bayat 2006:128). According to Bayat, the long-term goal of the urban poor is to improve their own lives with the privileges they receive from the state. Therefore, quiet encroachers aren't only defensive, but they also try to gain privileges with covert attacks (Bayat 2008:33). At this point, Bayat comes closer to Gramscian concept of 'passive revolution' and resembles Hobsbawm in this respect.

The presence/absence and quality of the political consciousness behind the social movements stand out as important axes of differentiation. It is possible to talk about social consciousness in the primitive social movements that Hobsbawm deals with. The upper

8 Michel de Certeau, in his work *The Practice of Everyday Life*, examined the implicit relations between the ruling and the dominated classes. According to his conceptualization, 'strategies' are the distribution of power balances within a given area. On the other hand, 'tactics' are the piecemeal infiltration of a social actor into the domain of his other. This infiltration movement isn't aimed at total interference. While strategies are dependent on space, tactics are dependent on time (Certeau 2009:54).

9 Bertold Brecht was an artist who witnessed Germany under Hitler, World War II, and the emergence of Western Marxism. In addition to his literary works, he was an intellectual who contributed to social science with his writings on socialism. Contrary to the dominance of the bourgeoisie in the fields of education, art, and history, he argued that the proletariat should interact more with these fields, develop criticism, and produce. According to Brecht, the proletariat, who enjoys art with its historical consciousness and the ability to look critically, can adopt and develop the legacy of the bourgeoisie in these areas (Brecht 1977:238–39). In his epic theater works -although it is a more direct didactic language- he gives the reader an active role intellectually and forces him to criticize by alienating him from the narrative and making him think about the characters and their behaviors. It is possible to read Brecht, who supports peaceful ways, as a passive revolutionary advocate in the Gramscian sense. A more detailed evaluation of Hobsbawm's relationship with Brecht (Hobsbawm 2006b:80, 2013:1–3) as a person whom Hobsbawm read, was influenced by, and admired since his teenage years in Berlin, goes beyond the limits of this article.

strata serve as a kind of common enemy that unites organizations among the lower social strata. They come together on the basis of hostility as a collective emotion and political belief. On the other hand, Bayat's 'quiet encroachers' have a lower, if not nonexistent, level of political awareness. Indeed, as the level of consciousness increases in actions that focus on the self-interest of individuals with instant decisions, they would lose their qualification of being 'quiet encroachment' (Bayat 2008:34–35). Bayat regards Scott as the main representative of the 'resistance paradigm' and criticizes him for attributing an excessive political significance to the actions of the poor, namely a resistance intention (Bayat 2006:39 vd.). Bayat's 'quiet encroachment' actions are conscious of the poor and therefore have no political strategies. In this respect, they differ from Gramsci's passive revolution. Of course, quiet encroachment may evolve into a revolutionary structure that will result in the weakening or destruction of legitimate political order, but this isn't its primary goal. On the contrary, two goals of quiet encroachment actions are to ensure the redistribution of social goods, and to gain both cultural and political autonomy from the regulations, institutions and discipline imposed by the state (Bayat 2008:38).

Absence or availability of a leadership constitutes another criterium for comparison between social movements. Hobsbawm's concept of the 'social bandit' refers to a personified character—often a charismatic leader—whether he is a real person or not. On the other hand, there is no fictional or real leader in Bayat's analysis of social movements in the Middle East. He speaks of a social movement closer to a timeless, anonymous passive revolution in Gramscian terms. In this respect, he states that the changes occur in a reformist way by putting pressure on politics and law, not through a total revolution that changes the order. In Hobsbawm's approach, the point whether social movements are reformist or revolutionary gains importance when dealing with the issue of lack of leadership. Accordingly, when it comes to revolutionary social movements, lack of leadership is a weakness, in other words, a leader is a must for revolutionary movements. Primitive social movements without leaders can only bring about reform-like changes, rather than creating radical ones.

However, some problems may also occur in social movements as a result of having a leader. Hobsbawm points out the negative effects of the capture or murder of the leader of a social bandit gang. According to Hobsbawm, capturing or killing the leader is an effort to hide the inadequacy of the law, in a context where existing laws are insufficient to provide justice (Hobsbawm 1973:14). Therefore, the capture or murder of the present leader may weaken the movement against authority. In this case, the movement may be incapable of appointing a new leader and maintaining continuity in the face of the capture or killing of the current leader. This point resembles Scott's emphasis on the importance of anonymity in certain kinds of social movements (1995). In such primitive social movements, Hobsbawm focuses on the possibility of transforming the movement into a modern social movement with a revolutionary character through various changes. Banditry, a category Hobsbawm uses to explain primitive social movements, is not a new mode of production and administration, but a form of opposition. For this reason, the bandit must stop banditry to fully represent the people, which is the paradox of banditry (Hobsbawm 1959:27).

Bayat, on the other hand, focused on the transformative and reformist character of primitive social movements as well as the advantages of this character. The lack of

leadership indicates that the movement becomes anonymous and takes a form that can't be captured in time and space. Here, the resemblance to Scott is more apparent. Indeed, while Hobsbawm focused on the differences between the social movements of the pre-political period and the political period, Bayat focused on the points where the social movements in the political period differ from each other. There are several drawbacks to making a correlation between the practical success of the social opposition and the presence of a leader. As Scott stated, the state of lack of leadership isn't a weakness in itself; on the contrary, it can help the movement acquire a more indestructible and tactical form (Scott 1995:208–9).

According to Hobsbawm, among the examples of Latin American social movements, the leading one is the guerrilla, which is mainly a rural social movement. He argues that guerrilla movements may also take place in the city as a rare phenomenon which should then be called 'urban guerrilla' (Hobsbawm 1970:58, 2018:292). However, riots and rebellions are the main social movement forms in the city context. Bayat's approach to the subject is to point to the action structures that connect these two dimensions to each other. According to him, one of the most basic features of social movements is that they are illegal mass movements which rise in places where the political authorities have the right to intervene but cannot control the masses. In addition, the social movements that Bayat deals with have been the movements created by the new urban population, originally peasants, in relation to the changes experienced under the influence of rapid and uncontrolled urbanization. Whenever we talk about guerrilla, we are emphasizing an armed organization. Therefore, the social movements that Bayat deals with are not guerrilla movements *per se*, however, in terms of the ways and methods they use, for example while escaping from the authority, they seem to agree, reconcile, and follow a guerrilla-like line, and develop alternative opposition styles.

Hobsbawm describes the two ends of social movements based on Cuba as a success story, and Colombia as a disappointment. Bayat's work centers upon the examples of Iran and Egypt, which can be located somewhere in between. Indeed, according to Bayat, the revolutionary processes in Egypt and Iran haven't been completed yet. They still continue. Therefore, there is still the possibility and opportunity to establish a future with the public will at the forefront. As a matter of fact, Bayat predicts that the political Islamist movement should evolve into democratization, and that the opposite situation is unsustainable.

Conclusion

Social movement is one of the main issues of sociology. The first focus of social movement research is on solving the problems and taking control of crises which have emerged as a result of industrialization and urbanization in modern societies. With the challenges in international relations and social theory, the norms and findings of this approach to social movements have been opened to discussion. In this discussion, the concept of 'subaltern' developed by Antonio Gramsci was an important contribution which enabled the development of different perspectives and particularly influenced the way of thinking about Third World countries. With the post-colonial process after 1950, the peoples of the former colonies became citizens of newly emerged nation states. While

former research on the Third World was mainly based on culture-oriented generalizations and prejudices, in the new period, rural and urban social movements in the non-Western context have been subject to research free from bias. The diversity of social opposition forms has been added to the literature with the 'history from below' approach and social science studies that focus on the actor in the structure-agency dichotomy (and on the individual in the state-individual duality).

Both Eric Hobsbawm and Asef Bayat are social scientists focusing on the subaltern populations and social movements in Third World countries. They both produce knowledge about non-Western regions or periphery countries even if their research is institutionally conducted within the academies of the core countries. Their works are widely translated into different non-Western languages, including Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, and contribute to the dissemination of knowledge on non-Western social movements throughout the world. In this study, two social scientists are compared with special focus on the continuities and discontinuities between their approaches to social movements. The study concentrates especially on the theoretical frameworks and data production processes of two social scientists, rather than on an assessment of the social movements that took place in the periphery. Such an analytical comparison can be seen as contribution to a more comprehensive future classification of social movements.

Both Hobsbawm and Bayat focus on resistance mechanisms that develop not only as obvious political oppositions and conflicts with authority, but also less apparent movements embedded in the social sphere. These mechanisms, which develop in the social life, in the capillaries of society, are effective in reshaping not only the social field, but also the political field. Communities that seem apolitical and in harmony with the authorities at first glance create their own common sense and struggle mechanisms and exhibit invisible resistances against the official authorities. These forms of opposition to oppression emerge when laws are suspended and/or democratic laws are not enforced. Therefore, the social movements created by the subalterns create an alternative way of establishing order. The relations between the subordinates and authorities are relations of dependency, and these relations are also effective in determining the targets, forms, and repertoires of collective action. It is possible to say that these are groups which avoid using classical methods and techniques against the authorities and exert influence through secondary means. In most cases, actions don't aim for lasting change and their vision is narrow. This situation is a product of mental structures built in dependency relations. Maybe, in fact, the social opposition isn't clearly visible and doesn't acquire an overtly political character, but contrary to the common premise, it doesn't mean that there is no opposition to or rejection of the authorities. The sharp and often arbitrary rhetoric and practices of the authorities are stretched in the social movements created by the subalterns, which have the quality of 'passive revolution'.

The studies of Hobsbawm and Bayat have expanded the boundaries of the subject of social movements by drawing attention to different oppositional social attitudes, behaviors, and forms of organization. It was seen controversial whether those collective actions could be considered as 'social movements' or not, especially when viewed in terms of norms and criteria articulated in the previous literature. Based on the perspectives of these two social scientists, it is possible to say that social movements in the broader

sense have a deep social impact, even if they do not explicitly target a radical social transformation. In addition, it is also possible for social movements that do not have revolutionary goals to acquire a revolutionary character in time.

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Big Questions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Public Administration and Policy*

Kamu Yönetimi ve Politikasında Yapay Zekanın (AI) Büyük Soruları

Mehmet Metin Uzun¹ , Mete Yıldız² , Murat Önder³ 

Abstract

Technological advancements have created notable turning points throughout the history of humanity. Influential transformations in the administrative structures are the result of modern technological discoveries. The artificial intelligence (AI) ecosystems and algorithms now affect daily lives, communities, and government structures more than ever. Governments are the main coordinators of technological transition and supervisors of the activities of modern public administration systems. Hence, public administration and policies have crucial responsibilities in integrating, governing, and regulating AI technology. Integrating AI into public administration and the policy-making process allows numerous opportunities. However, AI technology also contains many threats and risks in economic, social, and even political structures in the long term. This article concentrates on the big questions of AI in the public administration and policy literature. The big questions discussion started in 1995 by Robert Behn drawing attention to the big questions as the primary driving force of a public administration research agenda. The fundamental motivation of the big questions approach is shaped by the fact that “questions are as important as answers.” This article aims to identify big questions and discuss potential answers and solutions from an AI governance research agenda perspective.

Keywords

Big Questions, AI, Public Administration, Public Policy, AI Governance, AI Policy

Öz

Teknolojik gelişmeler, insanlık tarihi boyunca dönüm noktaları yaratmıştır. İdari yapıdaki dönüşümler teknolojik keşiflerin sonucudur. Yapay zekâ (YZ) ekosistemi ve algoritmalar günlük yaşantıları, toplulukları ve hükümet yapılarını her geçen gün daha fazla etkilemektedir. Devletler teknolojik geçişin koordinatörleri ve modern kamu yönetimi faaliyetlerinin temel denetçileridir. Bu nedenle, kamu yönetimi ve politikalarına yapay zekâ teknolojisini entegre etme, yönetme ve düzenleme konusunda çeşitli sorumlulukları vardır. Yapay zekâyı kamu yönetimine ve politika oluşturma sürecine entegre etmek çok sayıda fırsata olanak tanımaktadır. Öte yandan, yapay zekâ teknoloji ekosistemi uzun vadede ekonomik, sosyal ve hatta siyasi yapılarda birçok tehdit ve risk potansiyeli barındırmaktadır. Bu makale, kamu yönetimi ve kamu politikası literatüründe yapay zekanın “büyük sorularına” odaklanmaktadır. Robert Behn tarafından 1995 yılında başlatılan büyük sorular tartışması bir kamu yönetimi araştırma gündeminin birincil itici gücü olarak büyük sorulara dikkat çekmektedir. Büyük sorular yaklaşımının temel motivasyonu, “sorular cevaplar kadar önemlidir” yaklaşımıyla şekillenmektedir. Bu araştırma yapay zekâ literatüründeki büyük soruları çerçevlendirmek ve AI yönetimi araştırma gündemi perspektifinden olası yanıtları ve çözümleri tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Büyük Sorular, Yapay Zekâ, Kamu Yönetimi, Kamu Politikası, Yapay Zekâ Yönetimi, Yapay Zekâ Politikası

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Introduction

The digital age has undergone tremendous transformations in various areas, including public administration research. Today, information and communication technologies (ICT) affect organizations' structure, functioning, performance, and shift. With digital adaptations being realized in the public sector, public services have started to be provided with innovative strategies. The digitization steps, launched with the e-government approach in the 1990s, became more widespread in the 2000s, thanks to ICT and mobile applications. Especially after the 2000s, internet technology has become widespread worldwide with the developments in ICT, such as the operating system capacity of computers. Therefore, governments' need to strengthen and develop their technological infrastructures has become more urgent in transforming society. The concepts of data processing and data mining have entered the agenda of governments. Different approaches to understanding e-Government have emerged both in academia and in practice.

The ICTs covered by e-Government 1.0 focused on organizational infrastructures; e-Government 2.0 includes social media, Web 2.0 tools, and open data, whereas e-Government 3.0 focuses on new developments such as data analytics-modelling, simulation, AI, and Internet of Things (IoT). The Fourth Industrial Revolution, defined as Industry 4.0, consists of "AI and big data." Industry 4.0 refers to integrated intelligent systems which work with AI algorithms (Ing et al., 2019; Kolberg & Zühlke, 2015). AI technologies are foreseen to form a shift that will affect not only the future of the industry or the marketplace but also the future of humankind. Karnofsky (2016) indicates that "potential future AI precipitates a transition comparable to the agricultural or Industrial Revolution." The underlying reason is that the process brings about a fundamental transformation for human beings and machines. Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology is one of the essential components of the industry 4.0 approach, which has a structure consisting of many sub-components and techniques, such as machine learning, deep learning, expert systems, and robotics.

The term AI emerged as a sub-branch of computer science, which was first used in the modern sense in the 1950s. Arf (1959) predicted that machines cannot be aesthetically pleasing like human beings, that human beings act on their initiative, and that devices can act on their initiative even if it takes a long time. However, AI today constitutes one of the fields of study of cognitive science, philosophy, psychology, economics, and even law, beyond computer science. Moreover, AI is evolving into an interdisciplinary field of research that has recently gained special attention from society, politics, and the public sector, offering various unique opportunities and posing cataphoric risks. (Önder, 2020; Boyd & Wilson, 2017; Wirtz & Weyerer, 2019). In this context, the public administration discipline has started to bear on studies related to AI since the 2010s. Especially with the COVID-19 outbreak, there has been a proliferation of studies on AI in public administration and policy (Önder & Uzun, 2021).

In line with the rising trends in the field, this article aims to reveal the various AI dimensions by focusing on unearthing the big questions of AI in public administration and policy by reviewing the literature. AI has enormous potential in different government sectors, including infrastructure, finance, health, and the legal and justice systems. Therefore, AI-driven public administration applications are critical for governments to

enhance citizens' quality of life and governance capacity (Cath,2018; Dwivedi et al., 2019a; Sharma et al., 2020).

This article reviews the literature on AI to define and discuss the big questions of AI from the public administration and policy perspective. Behn (1995) emphasized that any field of science is figured out by the big questions it poses. Behn's (1995) approach to big questions draws attention to the fact that an area of research is not driven by data or method but by research questions. Since the mid-1990s, public administration academics have focused on showing the big questions in public administration. One of the main aims of this article is to emphasize how the big questions literature stands for a position in the projection of the public administration in the "AI" context. Not only big questions but also the answers to these questions are valuable. Recently, there has been growing research interest in AI in the public administration literature; however, the current studies are related to primarily specific countries' national AI strategies and policies. Nevertheless, there are some gaps in the literature about AI in the public policy-making process, AI governance, and AI regulations.

To show and examine the pieces of literature relevant for proposing big questions of AI research, electronic academic databases in social sciences were searched for several focus keywords and concepts, such as "Artificial Intelligence," "AI," "public policy," and "public administration," "algorithmic government," "AI governance," "AI regulation," "AI policy," "AI principle." Accordingly, the literature review presents academic research dealing with AI in the public sector, especially those focusing on "AI governance." Overall, this article aims to contribute to the government's AI research agenda by presenting some "big questions" for outlining a future research agenda on AI technology and application context.

Big Questions Approach in Public Administration Discipline

Public administration is a core component of humankind's plans to develop a better future for humanity (Kirlin, 2001). The big questions address the macro perspective on the theory and practice of the public administration discipline (Zavattaro, 2018, p. 91). Therefore, big questions that connect organizational and institutional output answer contemporary research and practice issues (Callahan, 2001, p. 495). Defining moments in academic disciplines happen when their fundamental unanswered questions are specified (Brooks, 2002). The big questions approach is not classified in a particular hierarchy of priority or importance. The essential vision is to encourage discussion about the study of public administration. Therefore, the big questions are critical to advance the study field and reveal the primary debates in the public administration discipline (Cooper, 2004, p. 396). Finding the big questions in a research area will lead to discussion in the research area; however, it also includes the risks of misidentification and error (Yildiz, 2013). Big questions in the public administration discussion not only involve and motivate practitioners and scholars but also have significance for many citizens (Kirlin, 2001). The big questions methodology is essential for framing the set of questions on the research agenda and for drawing strengths and limitations of current research (Callahan, 2001). Since the mid-1990s, public administration scholars have focused on identifying the big questions in public administration. All research community members do not need

to accept these questions and their alternative answers. However, they are critical to the advancement of the discipline (Yildiz,2013).

The big questions debate in the public administration literature began with Robert Behn's famous article written in the *Public Administration Review*, entitled "The Big Questions of Public Management" (Behn, 1995). For Behn (1995), as public-management scholars strive to transform their profession into scientific research, they also need to focus on 'big questions' like physics science. Behn (1995) emphasized that any field of science is defined by the big questions it poses. Big questions draw attention to the fact that an area of research is not driven by data or method but by research questions. In this context, Behn (1995) outlined the three big research questions (micro-management, motivation, and measurement) with the opportunity to involve public administration as more beneficial to the public administration research area. Behn (1995) explained that the basis of the locus of big questions is to describe the role of public administration in shaping society historically, and its use to develop the community in the future. Behn's questions, trying to ask how public administrators can handle each of the three big questions, place the public manager at the center point of the public administration (Kirlin, 1996, p. 417). Behn's approach concentrated on fundamental managerial and organizational issues addressed within every governance framework (Mingus & Jing, 2017). In addition, the three questions framed by Behn are essential in leading the debate on the 'big question literature.' Other public administration scholars who participated in the big question discussion followed Behn's pathway and used Behn's question patterns.

However, Behn's questions have been criticized in the literature for being too narrow, instrumental, and focused primarily on the organizational level (Kirlin, 1996; Neuman, 1996). Therefore, big questions literature in public administration can be directed in two approaches. One group of scholars (Neuman,1996; Kirlin, 2001; Callahan, 2001) deal with the broad discussions by addressing the big questions from a macro perspective on public administration. In contrast, other political science and public administration scholars focus on the micro perception of big questions, including specific subthemes in public administration, such as education (Denhardt, 2001), democracy (Kirlin, 1996), administrative ethics (Cooper, 2004), public value (Bozeman, 2009), performance management (Moynihan & Pandey, 2010), intergovernmental relations (Kincaid & Stenberg, 2011), and e-Government (Yildiz, 2013). After becoming a global pandemic, COVID-19 has also been added to the subthemes (O'Flynn, 2021). From a macro perspective, Neuman (1996) concentrated on what will be the central research questions that public administration must answer to reach a level of science. Neuman's (1996) big questions approach emphasizes that the primary character, origins, and philosophy of the discipline of public administration should be related to these big questions. Based on this approach, Neuman's big questions concentrate on big questions about the fundamental characteristic and origin of public administration. However, Kirlin (2001) mentioned that big questions should not focus on instrumental issues but on the implications and importance for the the larger society where public administration is incorporated. Additionally, Kirlin's big questions focus on understanding the role of public administration in traditionally affecting social structure and awareness of its use for shaping society in the future. Callahan (2001) emphasized the necessity of framing

the big questions methodology based on the strengths of earlier studies. Examining and answering the big questions is a circular process in which further studies to address the original set of big questions lead to another series of questions. Therefore, the big questions approach has created different focal points or micro strategies in the public administration literature (Yildiz, 2013). In this context, the big questions are addressed from several micro-approach perspectives through time. It is more ‘popular’ to consider big questions from a micro perspective than a macro perspective. Public administration scholars cannot reach a consensus on big questions because it is challenging to build macro questions (French et al., 2005; O’Flynn, 2021). In addition, the big questions are US-oriented and affect the progress of the literature on the axis of micro questions. The micro approaches discussed in the big question literature are handled from various perspectives. Firstly, Kirlin’s (1996) article titled “The Big Question of Public Administration in a Democracy approach” is crucial to obtaining the discipline beyond the boundaries of the big question. Kirlin’s primary focus is on essential public administration issues from a democratic perspective. Denhardt (2001) developed big questions on the “theoretical and practical education dilemma” in the public administration discipline and criticized the generalizing perception of the big questions approach to the public administration discipline. McGuire and Agranoff (2001) focus on seven essential operational questions based on network management. Similarly, Brooks (2002) and Lohmann (2007) focused big questions on the non-profit organization aspects of public administration.

Over the years, the literature on big questions has been evaluated with a narrower focus and new trends under the discipline of public administration. For example, Yildiz (2013) centered on a new reform area in the public administration literature and emphasized that e-government is a “dynamic field of study.” Since 2010, the big questions literature has produced examples of articles about public administration in China (Mingus & Jing, 2017) and South Africa (Van der Walddt, 2012) beyond the US public administration discussions.

The big questions approach has been interpreted differently since Behn’s framework. Likewise, it should be underlined that each scholar contributes significantly to the progress of the literature. Although the big questions approach has lost popularity in the early 2000s, it is still an excellent opportunity for public administration to answer wicked questions. The central emphasis from which big questions develop should be how public administration impacts people. The focus must be on highlighting the importance of public administration in traditionally affecting the organization and recognizing its value for shaping society (Kirlin, 2001, p. 140). Beyond the traditional effects of public administration, theory and practice play a leading role in the governance, regulation, and adaptation of emerging technologies to government. Indeed, public administration has significantly shaped AI-driven application adoption by the government or outlined national AI strategy priorities and motivations.

The fourth industrial revolution, characterized by technological innovations in multiple domains, such as biological, physical, and digital had incredible impacts on public administration. Since the first industrial revolution, each transformation has built on the previous, constructing opportunities with risks and dangers. New forms of automation and advanced robotic systems have radically transformed the means of production and

our society. AI experts and futurists believe that AI technologies will be one of the main drivers of the fourth industrial revolution and have the potential to transform not only the technology industry but also the way we live our lives. Dobbs et al. (2015) estimated that AI's destructive effects could be seen 100 times faster, and the scale will be 300 times higher than the first industrial revolution. Nevertheless, it also raises many big questions about the field in the future. Neumann (1996) argued that the big questions of a field of research should consider the fundamental characteristics and origins of crucial point matters. Therefore, the big questions about AI in public administration are necessary to deal with fundamental debates such as the possible transformation of AI in a public organization, policy-making process, and governance models.

Thus, AI governance and regulations are big questions that are likely to be questioned in the future of public administration. Overall, based on a study of the AI and public administration academic literature, the following section lists questions about the use and application of AI in public administration, AI governance, and AI regulation. It should be noted that there is no 'absolute truth' or 'one right answer' for 'big questions' (Denhardt, 2001, p. 531).

AI research Agenda in Public Administration

AI is transforming not only technological or engineering innovation but also the sociological, political, and administrative environment. Public administration plays a crucial role in developing and adopting AI (Misuraca & Van Noordt, 2020), which is already adapting to various areas of the public sector (Androutsopoulou et al., 2019; Ojo et al., 2019; Sun & Medaglia, 2019). Although this integration process differs from country to country, AI applications are becoming increasingly common in several government functions (Sousa et al., 2019; Uzun, 2020).

Early studies with the reflections of AI on public administration have considered AI technology as a new level of a computing system. Since the end of the 1980s, studies on AI and public administration have begun in the academic literature. The first studies in the literature were shaped around expert systems and a new level of computing systems. In this framework, Hadden (1989) pointed out that expert systems will improve decision-making and increase public administration productivity. Similarly, Shangraw (1987) argued that expert systems are an opportunity to operationalize the public policy-making strategy. Duffy and Tucker (1995) examined the use of AI from a political science perspective and argued that traditions and meanings could be challenging in modelling AI for political problems. However, scholars emphasized that machine learning systems, election simulations, and expert systems can often be used in future policy modelling. Barth and Arnold (1999), having one of the first studies in the context of AI and public administration, addressed the implications of AI on the government and several dilemmas in the field, such as the use of "administrative discretion, responsiveness, judgment and accountability" innovations in governments. In both articles, attention was drawn to the need for trained experts on AI and computer systems in the public sector.

In the last decade, AI has evolved in various forms, such as internet crowd intelligence, human-machine hybrid-augmented intelligence, and autonomous-intelligent systems. Therefore, after the 2010s, scholars studied AI as a "hot topic" in public administration

and public policies research agenda. Research on various subjects such as the adaptation of AI to public administration, the use of AI applications in public service provision, and the inclusion of AI tools in government-citizen interaction, risk, and concerns about the pace of the AI ecosystem rapidly and national AI policies have come to the agenda of the government. One group of scholars argued that AI would make predictions that can advance the performance of the public sector and provide assistance and improve government functions (Kankanhalli et al., 2019; Margetts & Dorobantu, 2019; Sousa et al., 2019; Wirtz & Müller, 2019). On the other hand, another group of scholars focused on specific AI applications are also on the research agenda such as chatbots (Androutsopoulou et al., 2019; Aoki, 2020) government agencies have also started adopting various Artificial Intelligence (AI, automated decision-making robotics, self-service technology (Chen et al., 2020) and machine learning systems (Ackermann et al., 2018; Anastasopoulos & Whitford, 2019). The main effort in adapting AI to the public sector is the existence of strategy documents. While determining the AI strategy of the countries, defining their priorities and focus is a vital element of AI strategies (Allen, 2019). Chen et al. (2020) argued about integrating AI into the public sector in four stages: (a) relieving human resources, (b) assisting in supplying services, (c) enhancing the capacity of decision making, and (d) transforming public organizations.

AI research has received attention for its remarkable progress and increased policy interest in recent years (Wirtz & Müller, 2019). Two factors can be mentioned as the reason for the enhanced interest. First, ICT technology policies and public administration data studies have evolved into AI studies. Secondly, with the global COVID-19 health crisis, AI integration in the public sector has mushroomed. Governments began using AI opportunities and facilities to combat the outbreak and improve healthcare capacity (Önder & Uzun, 2021). While governments enhance their investments and technological infrastructure in AI, they neglect the black box of AI. Since “pacing problems” and “information-skill asymmetries” are rising in the technical scope of AI, there are legal and administrative regulations gaps. Discussions on AI regulation revolve around issues of authority and legitimacy of distinct types of bodies or groups for regulation. Within this framework, multiple regulatory debates emerge, such as licensing, codes, standards, regional incompatibility of national governments and transnational operators, and ethical and legal perceptions (e.g., Black & Murray, 2019; Reed, 2018; Petit, 2017). In addition, the establishment of a specific regulatory agency or ministry for AI is also discussed in the literature (Scherer, 2015).

Thus, the integration and use of AI in the public sector also raise some big questions. Examining the main questions based on the discussions on the research agenda is significant in finding the position of AI technologies. Exploring the central questions based on the discussions on the research agenda is essential for future debate and research agendas for the AI technology set. Neumann (1996) argued that the big questions are not fully answered because of the multifaceted nature of numerous research topics and paradigm shifts in the sciences. Thus, public administration scholars have different answers to big questions about AI. Based on this approach, the big questions based on the review of the AI literature in public administration are listed as follows:

Question 1. How do AI-Driven Ecosystems Transform the Art of the Public Policymaking Process?

AI technology also has the potential to bring transformations in public policy analysis and the public policy cycle. Evidence-based policymaking, primarily data-driven public policymaking, will share an additional expansion with the combination of AI technology which can also obtain transformations in the public policy cycle.

In recent years, “public policy and technology studies” have become even more critical at the intersection of public policy analyses and e-government studies. Analyzing public policy and the increasing use of ICT in raising and solving general problems are linked, and synergy has occurred between these two areas (Ferro et al., 2013; Misuraca & Viscusi, 2015; Yıldız, 2020). With expanded internet access and the widespread use of social media applications, a new era has started in public policymaking. This new era began being studied as “policymaking 2.0” (Ferro et al., 2013; Misuraca et al., 2014) in literature.

Public policy is a concept that appears in meeting citizens’ demands in the execution of services, ensuring public order, and improving all functions of services and order. Due to the dynamic nature of the public policy process, and the multiple varying connections and factors affecting it, scientists could not set clear and precise boundaries regarding the scope of the public policy process in the historical development of the field (Gordon et al., 1993). It can be argued that there is a desire to solve social problems and respond to people’s requests in the background of public policies. On the other hand, public policies vary significantly since social needs are related to different policy fields. Therefore, public policy deals with various areas such as defense, energy, environment, foreign affairs, education, welfare, security, highways, taxes, housing, social security, health, economic opportunities, and urban development (Dye, 1984).

The criteria for effective and efficient governance with New Public Management’s (NPM) trends have fostered outcomes. These trends have provided the potential for an applicable social science which includes program evaluation, quality of implementation, and emerging methods to solve complex issues using new policy systems and techniques that serve the core concept of evidence-based policymaking (Head, 2008). Evidence-based policy analysis stands for a contemporary and analytical approach to public policymaking. Governments can develop reforms and restructuring solutions in line with public policies with an evidence-based practice that initially motivates policymaking (Howlett, 2009). Evidence-based policymaking” techniques in policy processes increased thanks to the ICTs developed after the 1970s (Busch & Henriksen, 2018).

In the 21st century, technological developments have affected and changed both the public policy data relationship and the policymaking process. Understanding evidence-based public policy has turned into data-driven policymaking with the spread of the internet worldwide since the early 2000s. Big data has evolved into a tool that can be used effectively in policymaking processes. With the integration of machine learning, rational public policy decisions not limited to the human mind have been paved (Munne, 2016; Provost & Fawcett, 2013). In this process, the priority is to obtain data on the practices and operations carried out at the stages of public policy.

People generate more than 2.5 million bytes of data daily (Margetts & Dorobantu, 2019). Digital platforms allow customers and citizens to easily express and share their opinions while making it easier to proclaim their everyday demands and take part in management quickly. As a result of technological transformation, decision-making and policymaking processes in traditional centralized power and management structures change from top to bottom. Furthermore, participatory mechanisms are formed (Linkov et al., 2018; Sousa et al., 2019a). Public officials and policymakers should analyze and respond to their citizens' demands with exact speed and detail (Thierer et al., 2017). Otherwise, the problems cannot be solved quickly, and crises arise. Indeed, the public sector and governments concentrate their abilities and capabilities to analyze and respond to requests transmitted in large volumes of data sets. The multiplication and processing of data sets necessitate a developing governance mechanism and setting up a data-driven decision-making system (Provost & Fawcett, 2013). Similarly, using big data in the public policy cycle has several benefits. Pencheva et al. (2018) mentioned that big data enhances policy analysis, offers better decision-making, and boosts productivity.

Various approaches have been put forward toward policymaking 2.0. Misuraca et al. (2014, p.173) emphasized this phenomenon as “policymaking 2.0” by identifying it as a collection of policymaking technology methods and technical solutions. This term shows the interaction between various technologies and ICT-based modeling used to achieve the participatory, evidence-based government and the associated organizational and social structures. The understanding of policymaking 2.0 has been developed around social media and the feedback from citizens (Ferro et al., 2013). AI can improve various aspects of administration, including operations, citizen engagement, delivery of services, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation of public policy AI-based policymaking involves (Sun & Medaglia, 2019b; Valle-Cruz et al., 2020): obtaining various kinds and volumes of data, improving the frequency of feedback and participation mechanism, and enhancing the ability to reflect publicly informed policy knowledge.

This framework may need change and innovation in the traditional policy cycle in figure 1. Janssen and Helbig (2018) illustrated the traditional public policy cycle shift with ICT and AI technology. The new public policy cycle includes new levels such as conceptualism, data collection, and experimenting.




Figure 1. New modelling of public policy definition source.

Similarly, Valle-Cruz et al. (2020) have proposed a new approach to the public policy cycle called the “Dynamic Public Policy Cycle (DPPC).” This approach refers to ongoing changes at different stages of the AI-based policymaking process. The methodology of the public policy cycle covers multiple phases when AI applications may change the operations of government organizations. The use of AI in the public policy cycle encompasses interrelated phases of agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making, policy implementation, and policy assessment (Pencheva et al., 2018; Valle-Cruz et al., 2019).

The active use of AI in the public policy cycle can supply a suitable opportunity to understand the complexity of public decision-making processes and the actors involved. Furthermore, AI can exert a data-driven empirical impact on the public policy cycle (Thierer et al., 2017). In addition, using AI can drive e-government instruments to be more practical and functional.

Data-driven policymaking contributes to citizen participation in decision-making processes while increasing public values. The motivation based on new opportunities presented by AI in the public sector stems from the data-oriented nature of AI, which supports the policymaking process. Today’s governments have big datasets of their citizens thanks to their e-government systems. Integrating AI into the public policy process will promote an “automatic” and “dynamic” approach and the potential to adapt “policy-making 3.0”. However, integrating AI into the public policy process is linked to multiple issues, such as safety, mass surveillance, and privacy. Therefore, before integrating AI into the policymaking process, the government considers the AI governance and AI regulation context.

Question 2. How should AI Governance and Regulations be Formed?

Technology and digital governance concepts have been discussed in literature since the 1990s (Zimmerman, 1995). Technology governance is a dynamic area of research that focuses on science and technology studies, policymaking, innovation studies, economics, and political science principles and ideas. Recognition of the mutual shaping and co-creation of technology and society is one of the main aspects of technology governance (Ulnicane et al., 2020).

The understanding of digital governance defines citizens’ direct access to information and services through technological means. According to the understanding of Digital Era Governance, it prioritizes considering citizens as partners in government affairs rather than serving them as customers (Dunleavy et al., 2006). Furthermore, digital governance is a “network governance” that enables inter-network communication. With a horizontal coordination structure, digital governance encourages all interested parties to participate in public administration within network-type organizations and uses local information networks (Linkov et al., 2018; Ojo et al., 2019). Floridi (2018) described digital governance as “establishing and implementing policies, procedures, and standards for the proper development, use, and management of the infosphere.”

AI governance comes to the fore as a multi-disciplinary discussion, including science and technology studies, public policy, computer engineering, philosophy, security studies, sociology, law, and international relations. However, AI technology has also expanded

the meaning of the governance concept. Debate continues about the best strategies for the governance of AI. Therefore, AI governance refers to the actions of governments and transnational/global governance, including norms and regulations from AI tech companies, investors, NGOs, and other relevant actors (Bostrom et al., 2019). In early studies, AI governance research focused on national and subnational aspects. However, recent research focuses on AI governance from a global level perspective.

Dwivedi et al. (2019) emphasized that AI governance means providing the “right value” to AI systems. Similarly, Dafoe (2018) discussed that AI governance is often paired with “AI safety,” and both focus on helping humanity to develop “a beneficial AI.” However, AI governance focuses on institutions and contexts in “how AI is built and used.” Butcher & Beridze (2019) argued that AI governance can be defined as a “range of instruments, solutions, and levers that influence the development and applications of AI.” AI governance is also defined as “tackling the challenges and risk posed by AI” (Wirtz et al., 2020). On the other hand, some scholars express the concept of AI governance as AI regulation (Almeida et al., 2020; Gasser & Almeida, 2017; Thierer et al., 2017; Wang & Siau, 2018). For example, Gasser and Almeida (2017, p. 59) pointed out, “When considering future governance models for AI, it might be helpful and necessary to move beyond such lists and consider some of the larger structural challenges associated with the ‘regulation’ of AI-based technologies.”

AI governance includes long-term processes and focuses on goals rather than rules. Indeed, Almeida et al. (2020) also remarked that showing regulations, standards, and soft law principles are essential for AI governance. To be prepared for AI governance, standards, regulations, and solutions require a multi-dimensional analysis. In addition, global collaborations and interdisciplinary discussions are also a part of AI governance (Cihon, 2019).

AI governance has been studied in various layers and dimensions in the research agenda. These layers deal with the multiple dimensions of governance separately. Gasser & Almeida (2017) discussed AI governance’s heterogeneity, complexity, and degree of technological autonomy. According to Gasser and Almeida’s model (2017), implementing governance structures for AI and algorithmic decision-making systems can occur in multiple layers and include mixed approaches. In this context, “social and legal,” “ethics,” and “technical structure” is proposed as a three-layered model (Gasser & Almeida, 2017, p. 4). Dafoe (2018) specified the AI governance framework with three different research layers: “the technical landscape,” “AI politics,” and “AI ideal governance.” Similarly, Perry & Uuk (2019) considered the policymaking process as a layer of AI governance and emphasized the significance of “AI risk policies.” In this context, “reducing AI risks” is also within the theme of AI governance. Furthermore, Wirtz et al. (2020, p. 6) examined AI governance from a five-layer perspective. These layers are the “AI technology, services, and applications layer,” “AI challenges layer,” “AI regulation process layer,” “AI policy layer,” and “collaborative AI governance layer.”

Regulatory AI governance is often discussed in the literature around AI governance (Almeida et al., 2020; Buiten, 2019; Smuha, 2019; Yeung, 2020). However, there is no consensus on how AI regulation should be or what is the right regulatory policy, instrument, or tools for AI. Clarke (2019) emphasizes that co-regulatory perception is the

most proper approach to the regulatory problem related to AI. Furthermore, studies are highlighting the discussion of AI regulations on a global scale with “transnational legal ordering” or an “international AI regulatory agency” (Erdelyi & Goldsmith, 2018). On the other hand, there is a repeated emphasis on “accountability,” “ethical framework,” and “human rights perspective” in the leading studies on AI regulations (Winfield & Jirotko, 2018; Future Life Institution, 2019; IEEE, 2019).

Several organizations have already developed declarations of the principles or values that should drive the development and implementation of AI in government (Floridi et al., 2018). For example, the EU, UK, and US governments made breakthroughs in AI regulations.

AI governance has shared common themes with digital and technology governance. However, AI governance leads to more complex discussions. Hence, it is necessary to deal with more than one dimension of AI governance, which is a concept discussed on a national scale and comes to the fore on an international scale. Thus, it is not possible to make a single definition of AI nor a single definition of AI governance. Kuziemski and Misuraca (2020) emphasized that “AI governance is a multi-level game characterized by the systemic resistance to steering, due to the sheer volume of actors, the velocity of change, and the perceived inevitability of the very technology at stake.” Overall, AI governance and regulations are necessary to develop the AI ecosystem and prevent technology’s potential harms and risks. Therefore, AI governance will be one of the priority areas on the agenda of policymakers soon because of the government’s current governance effort regarding AI, the principles, standards, and regulatory frameworks vital for future generations.

Questions 3. What are the Potential Opportunities and Threats of AI in the Public Sector?

AI research reveals many findings of the dark side of AI beyond futuristic fiction (Feijóo et al., 2020; Wirtz et al., 2020). While governments improve their investments and technological infrastructure in AI, they neglect the black box of AI. It is too late for us to put AI and ML back into a box (Black & Murray, 2019). AI has massive potential, including education, physical infrastructure, logistics, telecommunications, data monitoring, compliance, financial, sanitary, R&D policies, and lawmaking (Sharma et al., 2020; Sousa et al., 2019b; Valle-Cruz et al., 2019). In addition, AI has promoted productivity in public sector organizations. Automation capabilities assist government agencies in simplifying complex tasks, eliminating redundancies, and improving productivity for increased output. This quality of AI can unlock a range of advantages, such as supply chain management, better decision-making, and waste reduction, resulting in a substantial improvement in total production and economic activity. Mehr (2017) divided AI case studies on citizen services into five categories: “answering questions, filling out and searching information, routing requests, translation, and paper drafting.” These cases primarily focus on governments’ digital information, such as big data sets about citizens, chatbots, and data analytics. With the increased availability of massive datasets and computation power in recent decades, new AI approaches based on data rather than algorithms have been developed (Sousa et al., 2019a). Table 1 below summarizes the use of AI in the public sector and the various dimensions of AI policies in the literature.

Smart cities have seen a tremendous increase in data produced, including real-time and Big Data, with the increased use of digital technology, sensors, and the Internet of Things (IoT). In smart cities, many data such as water, energy consumption, natural disasters, weather and climate, real estate, transportation, and public transportation are essential forms of smart city applications (Perc et al., 2019). Smart cities provide a more effective and efficient use of urban resources, urban planning, urban infrastructure, and traffic (Chang et al., 2019). Furthermore, smart city applications also have substantial advantages in the effective and efficient use of public resources (Janssen & Kuk, 2016).

However, it is frequently discussed in the literature that if AI technology continues to develop at this growth rate, it will cause significant problems in “income distribution” and “unemployment” (Frey & Osborne, 2017). Although governments have initiated AI applications and strategies initiatives, AI still poses several threats, especially to the public sector. While some research has been carried out on AI threats in the public sector, there has been little empirical and systematic research on the AI-driven ecosystem’s negative impact on public administration (Agarwal, 2018; Sun & Medaglia, 2019a;). According to Wirtz et al. (2018), these threats are “threats to be caused by AI applications,” “uncertainties in AI laws and regulations,” “threats related to AI ethics,” and “social problems.” Similarly, Agarwal (2018) argued that AI could cause threats related to employment (job losses), revenue shortfall, privacy, and safety. AI undoubtedly has an impact on the workforce (Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, 2014; Makridakis, 2017; McClure, 2018). The AI revolution will bring about noteworthy shifts in the workplace and the business ecosystem in the next decade (Makridakis, 2017; Su, 2018). Hawksworth & Berriman’s (2018) report estimated that AI technologies can contribute up to 14% to the global GDP by 2030, equivalent to about 15 trillion dollars in today’s values (Hawksworth & Berriman, 2018). However, in the Future of Jobs 2020 Report, the World Economic Forum (2020) estimates that AI will create 97 million new jobs, and 85 million jobs will be displaced by 2025. Economic scholars have discussed how governments will find solutions to technological unemployment since the beginning of the 20th century (Keynes, 1930). Universal Basic Income (UBI) is key to preventing an AI-based job apocalypse, which controls the adverse effects of welfare and unemployment crises caused by automation and robots. (Furman & Robert, 2018; Goolsbee, 2018).

AI-powered biometrics is one of many data analysis technologies under the overarching umbrella of AI. Despite AI-powered biometrics verification and identification benefits, the government’s use of biometric technology without citizens’ consent triggers civil rights and privacy concerns as “algorithmic bias” or “mass surveillance.” China has already adopted the Social Credit System’s AI-powered system, which judges and ranks citizens’ behavior and trustworthiness (Dai, 2018).

AI is conveying a consequential development in the public sector with its opportunities and threats. Nevertheless, research on the public administration agenda still contains hypothetical assumptions about the future of AI improvement. However, more experimental and application-oriented studies are needed to recognize the opportunities and threats of AI.

Table 1
AI Using in Public Services

AI Policy Areas	AI Mechanism	Objective	References
Digital channels of communication between citizens and government	Chatbots Biometric Analytics Text Mining	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Improvement of communication between government and citizens. · Answering questions · Enhancement of citizen knowledge. 	(Androutsopoulou et al., 2019; Capgemini Consulting, 2017; Mehr, 2017)
Predictive analytics and data visualization	Deep Learning Computer Vision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Control and performance monitoring in public areas. · Determine risk or emergency issues. 	(Engin & Treleaven, 2019; Jiang et al., 2020; Maciejewski, 2017; Steuer, 2018; Wirtz & Weyerer, 2019)
Enhancing decision-makers' capabilities	Artificial Neural Network (ANN) Deep Learning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · AI improves the quality of decisions by enabling governments to make fast and accurate decisions. · Data using AI to reach quick and reliable decisions. 	(Allam & Dhunny, 2019; Ojo et al., 2019)
Improving service delivery	Cognitive Robotics Autonomous systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · AI in government systems and internal functions have the capacity to boost policy decisions and provision of services to citizens. 	(Chen et al., 2020; Van Noordt, 2020; Veale & Brass, 2019)
Health & Safety	Machine Learning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Understand and help prevent workplace injuries and illnesses. · Early diagnostics system 	(Barth & Arnold, 1999; Berk et al., 2016; Kankanhalli et al., 2019; Uzun,2020)

Conclusion

Technological progress has been the cornerstone of humanity since ancient times. AI has the potential to transform the economy, science, and security at a scale comparable to the industrial or agricultural revolutions. AI experts and futurists emphasize that AI will bring about a remarkable economic, social, and even political transformation. However, this transformation also generates some risks and opportunities. With the AI revolution, various big questions emerge: “Could AI help solve complicated, even wicked global problems, such as global warming, poverty, and cancer?” or “Could AI lead to the end of humankind?”. These questions are varied for each discipline and contain many uncertainties. Nevertheless, AI has transformed the future and posed various social, economic, and political threats. With the rapid progress of AI, the “technological singularity,” “transhumanism,” and “humanity 2.0” approaches have started to be discussed frequently in the literature.

The lack of consensus on the essential issues of public administration is why paradigmatic progress in the discipline has been halted in our domain. The field of public administration needs to clearly define some of the “big questions” and then begin to answer them (French, 2009). The big questions approach emerged with this motivation as a great debate in the public administration community in the 1990s. Behn (1995) emphasized that if public administration is accepted as a discipline, it must consider its big questions. Neumann (1995) argued that big questions must address the fundamental nature of a field. The big questions have been handled from the micro and macro perspective on the axis

of public administration. While the first scholars gave direction to big questions focused on macro questions, in the following years, researchers focused on big questions in micro fields (democracy, e-Government, education, public values) in public administration. Indeed, big questions effectively build a research community and set a research agenda. In this context, one of the most prominent issues on the agenda of future governments is undoubtedly AI which, by its nature, contains many questions. This article presents underlying questions that many public administration researchers try to answer, as shown above. The big questions determined by examining the AI literature are as follows:

1. How do AI-driven technologies transform the public policy-making process?
2. How should AI governance and regulations be formed?
3. What are the opportunities and threats of AI in the public sector?

These questions are the focus in the literature on emerging technology that can become more complex and diversified over time in parallel with AI development. Nevertheless, AI research in the public administration literature, which is still in its infancy, will concentrate on more specific and application-oriented questions over the next decade. The questions addressed in this article are around the dimensions of AI adoption, AI-driven policymaking, and AI governance aspects. The dynamic use of AI in the public policy cycle contributes to decision-making processes. The “Public Policy Making 2.0” approach, which is emphasized as creating public policymaking integrated with ICT, evolved into the “Public Policy Making 3.0” approach that uses machine learning in the public policymaking process. AI governance provides solutions and instruments for governments to promote AI advancement and regulation. Indeed, AI governance is conscious of designing, developing, and making beneficial use of AI, including a legal framework, regulations, reasonable, transparent, explainable, human-centered principles, and ethical standards, which determine the boundaries or limits of AI.

The “age of artificial intelligence” has just begun, but it already contained numerous unknowns and concerns. AI has the potential to transform the economy, science, and security at a scale comparable to the industrial or agricultural revolutions. There are likely to be enormous benefits for society, but there are also likely to be catastrophic safety, and privacy risks as Hawking argued that “AI will be ‘either the best or worst thing’ for humanity” (Hern, 2016). AI could be the most vital breakthrough in human history because this discovery can take man beyond the galaxies and destroy humankind. The policymaker and public administrator must be aware of AI risks and promote an AI-driven governance and reform movement. Coping with the challenges and risks posed by AI necessitates a trans-disciplinary and multi-dimensional strategy. This article shows that the public administration discipline is also essential in the discussions on the AI revolution and progress. This research highlights that AI research is a growing interdisciplinary research domain that includes not only computer and engineering science but also political science, public administration, legal and ethical studies which are essential for the performance of a supervisory role in regulating and governing AI. Further research is required to explore specific application-oriented AI research, such as deep neural networks, autonomous vehicles, deep fakes, or chatbots. There are many unanswered questions about AI on the public administration agenda; however, the key to adapting and surviving in the AI age remains in asking questions.

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The Effect of Renewable Energy on Energy Import Dependence: An Empirical Analysis in Turkey*

Yenilenebilir Enerjinin Enerji İthalat Bağımlılığına Etkisi: Türkiye Üzerine Ampirik Bir Analiz

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Abstract

Energy import dependency has remained one of the most important problems of countries that cannot meet their energy needs from domestic sources from past to present. Countries with insufficient resources in terms of fossil energy sources have met their energy demand through imports. This situation has caused countries to become dependent on external resources. For this reason, Turkey's energy import dependency has increased continuously; according to the data published by EUROSTAT as of 2018, Turkey is foreign-dependent with approximately 74%. This situation has brought the issue of energy supply security to the agenda in Turkey.

For this reason, it is important to examine Turkey's energy import dependency and to propose solutions according to the results obtained. In this study, the effect of renewable energy sources on energy import dependency in Turkey during 1990-2018 was analyzed using the ARDL bounds test approach. The working results have determined that renewable electricity production, GDP per capita, urban population growth, and world natural gas prices have a statistically significant effect on energy import dependency. World oil prices were not statistically significant. As a result, renewable energy production reduces energy import dependency, while the most important determinant is GDP per capita.

Keywords

Energy Import Dependence, Renewable Energy Resources, ARDL Bounds Test Approach

Öz

Enerji ithalat bağımlılığı geçmişten günümüze kendi enerji ihtiyacını yerli kaynaklardan karşılayamayan ülkelerin en önemli sorunlarından biri olarak önemini korumuştur. Enerji ihtiyacını yerli kaynaklardan karşılamayan ve fosil enerji kaynakları bakımından yetersiz kaynağa sahip olan ülkeler enerji talebini ithalatla karşılamışlardır. Bu durum ülkelerin dışa bağımlı hale gelmelerine neden olmuştur. Bundan dolayı Türkiye'nin enerji ithalat bağımlılığı sürekli biçimde artmış, 2018 yılı itibarıyla EUROSTAT'ın yayımladığı verilere göre Türkiye yaklaşık olarak 74% ile dışa bağımlıdır. Bu durum Türkiye'de enerji arz güvenliği sorununu gündeme getirmiştir.

Bu nedenle Türkiye'nin enerji ithalat bağımlılığının incelenmesi ve elde edilen sonuçlara göre çözüm önerileri getirilmesi önem arz etmektedir. Bu çalışmada 1990-2018 döneminde Türkiye'de yenilenebilir enerji kaynaklarının enerji ithalat bağımlılığı üzerine etkisi ARDL sınır testi yaklaşımı kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir. Çalışma sonucunda; yenilenebilir elektrik üretimi, kişi başına GSYH, kentsel nüfus artışı ve dünya doğalgaz fiyatlarının enerji ithalat bağımlılığı üzerinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlı etki yaptığı belirlenmiştir. Dünya petrol fiyatları ise istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bulunamamıştır. Sonuç olarak, yenilenebilir enerji üretiminin enerji ithalat bağımlılığını azalttığı ve enerji ithalat bağımlılığının en önemli belirleyicisinin kişi başına GSYH olduğu belirlenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Enerji İthalat Bağımlılığı, Yenilenebilir Enerji Kaynakları, ARDL Sınır Testi Yaklaşımı

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Introduction

Energy sources have always had an important place in world history and continue to maintain this importance today. The demand for energy resources has increased significantly compared to the past particularly in regards to the Industrial Revolution. (Yılmaz, 2012: 34). On the other hand, factors such as population growth and population-related high consumption are effective factors in the demand for energy resources. In order to meet the needs of their increasing population and strengthen their economy, countries with sufficient energy resources have caused much environmental destruction by using fossil energy sources intensively without considering their environmental effects (Çıtak and Pala, 2016: 81). Countries with insufficient underground energy resources or production technology have imported their energy resources (Bayrak and Esen, 2014). Since the imported energy sources are fossil-based, they have caused environmental damage. In addition to environmental destruction, the problem of external dependence on energy has also risen in these countries (Uysal et al., 2015: 64). Therefore, import costs have also increased because the increasing energy need with the growth of the country's economy is met through imports (Bayraktutan et al., 2012: 152). This creates a domino effect, increasing the current account deficit and putting pressure on all other economic phenomena (Uysal et al., 2015: 64). In addition to these problems, energy supply security and continuity also pose serious risks, including national security risks, for countries dependent on foreign energy. These countries have shifted to renewable or nuclear energy sources to minimize or eliminate these risks. However, there are high costs and especially security concerns in installing nuclear energy sources (Ergün and Polat, 2012: 38).

Although Turkey is located in the Middle East, it does not have as many energy resources as other Middle Eastern countries.. Due to this situation, Turkey has problems in the supply of energy resources (Yıldırım, 2019: 120). Turkey has become a country that was approximately 74% foreign-dependent in energy in 2018 (EUROSTAT, 2021). Although Turkey is insufficient in terms of fossil energy resources, it is a country with a high potential in terms of renewable energy resources (Gençoğlu, 2002: 57). It is thought that Turkey will utilize this high potential and reduce its dependence on foreign energy. It is also an advantage for Turkey that renewable energy sources are clean and do not emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.. But unfortunately, due to the lack of technological infrastructure, renewable energy sources cannot fully utilize their potential. Renewable energy production produced in Turkey is not at a sufficient level in total energy use (Yılmaz, 2012: 50).

The main purpose of this study is to determine the effect of renewable energy production on energy import dependency in Turkey. The secondary aim of the study is to determine the determinants of energy import dependency in Turkey. For this purpose, the research question of the study is: is there a statistically significant relationship between renewable energy production and energy import dependency in Turkey? Depending on this research question, the research hypothesis was formed that there is a statistically significant relationship between renewable energy and energy import dependency in Turkey.

The study was based on the research question and hypothesis given above. The hypothesis is analyzed with the ARDL bounds test which was developed and published by Pesaran et al. in 2001. In this test, the energy import dependency is the dependent variable.

Renewable energy production, gross domestic product per capita, urban population ratio, crude oil prices, and natural gas prices were used as explanatory variables. Working with both 1 (0) and 1 (1) data allows reaching reliable and consistent results in small data samples. Obtaining the data used in the established econometric model from reliable sources is important for obtaining consistent results. Therefore, the data used in the study is obtained from EUROSTAT, OECDSTAT, World Bank, and BP sources. When the previous studies are examined, the fact that this study has a wider time data range and the use of population and energy resource prices distinguishes this study from other studies. On the other hand, the increasing energy need and the concerns of foreign dependency on energy to rise to the level of national energy supply security risk in Turkey reveal the importance of this issue.

In this study, first of all, energy sources were mentioned. Then, the development of renewable energy in Turkey and energy import dependency in Turkey are explained with the help of tables and figures. Then, the findings of the analysis obtained from the analysis of the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable with the time series method and the interpretation of these findings are included in the literature review, the questions researched by the study, and the hypotheses developed based on these questions. Finally, conclusions were drawn based on the results obtained from the analysis.

The Concept of Energy and Its Importance

The energy, generally defined as the ability to do work, is an important input for the continuity of production in an economy. The energy that manifests itself in almost every field is important in terms of heating, continuity of industrial production, transportation, obtaining electricity as a secondary energy source, technology, and sustainability of economic growth (Kocaturk, 2019: 4). Energy has direct or indirect effects on socio-economic structures. Increasing costs in energy in all countries, especially in developing countries, negatively affect economic growth and current account deficit. It also has an important place in the cost part. It is becoming more difficult to obtain fossil energy sources daily and brings high costs (Erol and Güneş, 2017: 341). Energy is closely related to the development of countries and is one of the most important factors that determine the level of welfare. In this respect, energy is important for countries to maintain their development and sustainability in energy. There is a parallel between GDP per capita and the amount of energy consumed per capita. For this reason, the amount of energy consumed per capita by countries is taken into account (Çalışkan, 2009: 297).

Energy Resources

Energy sources are divided into primary and secondary energy sources. If the energy source has not undergone any change or transformation, it is expressed as the primary energy source. Resources obtained by converting primary energy resources are called secondary energy resources (Koç and Kaya, 2015: 37). Primary energy sources are also divided into two groups as renewable and non-renewable sources. Examples of non-renewable energy sources are coal, oil, and natural gas. On the other hand, for the energy resources that are considered as renewable, solar, wind, and hydropower energy can be given as examples.

Although non-renewable energy sources can regenerate themselves after they are finished, this process is very long. Considering the renewal rates of renewable energy sources, resources such as oil, coal, nuclear, and natural gas are considered as non-renewable energy resources (Pamir, 2015: 45).

The amount of renewable energy sources may decrease and increase depending on time. However, these are resources that do not change over time and can adapt to changes in environmental conditions (Özsabuncuoğlu and Uğur, 2005, cited by Bingül, 2018: 19). Commonly solar energy, wind energy, hydropower energy, biomass energy, and geothermal energy are used as renewable energy sources (Koç and Kaya, 2015: 40).




Figure 1. Demand shares of primary energy sources in the world in 2019 by source.
Source: IEA, (2020) by the author with the help of data.

When Figure 1. is examined, in general, it is seen that approximately 86% of the energy demand in the world belongs to oil, coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy, namely non-renewable energy sources. On the other hand, renewable energy sources, hydropower, wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass energy resources, meet approximately 14% of the world's energy demand. In the light of these data, it is seen that there is a large gap between non-renewable energy sources and renewable energy sources regarding energy demand in the world.

Development of Renewable Energy in Turkey

The world is faced with global climate change due to the high use of fossil fuels and has come to a decision-making position. Especially, the energy demands caused by the increasing population and the increasing energy demand of the production sector have caused energy to become a difficult problem. On the other hand, the use of fossil fuels causes severe damage to the environment. Solar, hydroelectric, biomass, geothermal, wind, and marine energy sources are much cleaner and more environmentally friendly than fossil energy sources. They also provide great advantages in terms of sustainable energy. Renewable energy sources, especially solar energy have the potential to meet a huge part of the energy demand. In this sense, although various investments are made in renewable energy both in the world and in Turkey, these investments should be more. It is

especially important to develop technology for renewable energy sources (Karabağ et al., 2021: 239). In Table 1, the installed power data in renewable energy in Turkey between the years 2015-2019 are given.

Table 1
Turkey's Renewable Energy (2015-2019) Installed Power Development (Megawatt)

Years / Renewable Energy Types	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Hydroelectric	25.867	26.681	27.273	28.291	28.503
Wind	4.503	5.751	6.516	7.005	7.591
Sun	248	832	3.420	5.062	5.995
Geothermal	623	820	1.063	1.282	1.514
Biomass	370	496	641	818	1.170
Renewable Total	31.611	34.580	38.913	42.458	44.773

Source: TEİAŞ, (2020) by the author with the help of data.

Installed power based on renewable energy sources in Turkey, as can be seen in Table 1, follows a constantly increasing trend. The installed power based on renewable energy sources, 31.611 mw in 2015, reached 44.773 megawatts in 2019. The renewable energy source that had the largest share between 2015 and 2019 was hydroelectric, namely HEPPs. Then, wind energy WPPs, solar energy SPPs, geothermal energy GPPs, and biomass energy are named BPP_s. Since 2015, there has been a decline in HEPPs due to the increased SPPs and WPPs. However, as of 2019, HEPPs had the largest share among renewable energy sources and then WPPs, SPPs, GPPs, and BES come, respectively.

Table 2
Share of Renewable Energy (2015-2019) in Turkey's Total Installed Power (Megawatt)

MW / %	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Turkey's Total Energy Installed Power	73.146	78.497	85.200	88.550	91.267
Renewable Energy Installed Power	31.520	34.449	38.751	42.264	44.395
Share of Renewable Energy in Total Installed Power	43,1	43,9	45,5	47,7	48,6

Source: TEİAŞ, (2019) by the author with the help of data.

When the share of renewable energy installed power in Turkey is examined, in 2015, it is seen that the total installed power is 73.146 MW, and the renewable energy installed power is 31.520 MW. The share of renewable energy in the total installed power is 43.1%. There has been a significant increase compared to the previous year of 2015. When the years after 2015 are examined, it is seen that there is a continuous increase in the share of renewable energy. When it comes to 2019, the total installed power is 91.267 MW, renewable energy is 44.395 MW, and the share of renewable energy in the total installed power is 48.6%. These values show that Turkey has made remarkable progress in renewable energy. However, due to the ever-increasing energy demand, Turkey has become dependent on foreign energy sources. Therefore, Turkey needs to gain momentum in renewable energy.

Table 3
Turkey's Renewable Electricity Generation Development (GWh) (2015-2019)

Renewable Energy Types	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Hydroelectric	67.145	67.230	58.218	59.938	88.822
Wind	11.652	15.517	17.903	19.949	21.730
Solar	194	1.043	2.889	7.799	9.249
Geothermal	3.424	4.818	6.127	7.431	8.951
Biomass	1.350	1.658	2.124	3.672	3.522
Renewable Total	83.767	90.268	87.263	97.791	132.277
Total Electricity generation	261.783	274.407	297.277	304.801	303.897
share of renewable energy in total electricity generation (%)	32.8	32.9	29.4	32.1	43.5

Source: TEİAŞ, (2020) by the author with the help of data.

When Table 3 is examined, it can be seen that the share of renewable energy in total electricity generation was 32.8% on average between 2015 and 2018. In 2019, this rate increased by 43.5%. While the renewable energy generation of HEPPs with hydroelectric energy was 80% in 2015, it is seen that there has been a decrease since this year. The shares of renewable energy sources in total electricity generation in 2019 are HEPPs are 29%, WPPs are 8%, SPPs are 3%, GPPs are 3%, and BPPs is 1%, respectively.

Energy Import Dependency in Turkey

Energy import dependency means the proportional expression of dependence on imports for the continuity of the mechanisms that need energy in an economy (Sözen, 2009). EUROSTAT expresses the share of energy imported by a country from foreign countries in total energy as energy import dependency. It calculates this ratio as $(\text{Energy import dependency} = (\text{import-export}) / \text{gross usable energy})$ (EUROSTAT, 2021). In Table 4 below, the energy import dependency ratios of Europe and Turkey for the years 1990-2018 are given.

Table 4
Energy Import Dependency Data for Europe and Turkey for the Years 1990-2018 (%)

Countries / Years	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2018
European Union	50.06	52.15	56.28	57.83	55.75	56.01	58.19
Denmark	45.50	33.55	-35.92	-50.62	-15.97	13.16	22.95
Germany	46.53	56.75	59.44	60.74	59.99	62.13	63.44
Estonia	45.50	33.53	33.77	28.04	15.28	10.03	1.01
Greece	61.85	66.47	69.06	68.20	68.58	71.05	70.68
Norway	-435	-640	-723	-661	-515	-576	-554
United Kingdom	2.28	-16	-17	13.36	29.01	37.64	35.51
Turkey	53.55	59.27	65.38	71.68	70.65	77.88	73.79

Source: EUROSTAT, (2021) by the author with the help of data.

When the data in Table 4 given above are examined, it is seen that the European Union is foreign-dependent in energy at the level of 58.19% as of 2018. Looking at the Table 4, it is seen that Estonia has continuously reduced its foreign dependency since 1990 and has the lowest rate. When we look at Germany, which has a strong position and industry in the European Union, this rate is 63.44%. It is seen that there has been an increase over the years in the United Kingdom, which has recently left the European Union, and as of 2018, it is externally dependent on energy at the level of 35.51%. In Greece, Turkey's

neighbor, this rate is 70.68%. Although most countries are dependent on external energy, there are also countries that are net exporters of energy, export surplus energy. Norway is a net exporter with a very high rate of -554% in 2018. Despite Turkey’s renewable energy investments, energy import dependency has been continuously increasing over the years. And as of 2018, it is highly dependent on foreign energy at the level of 73.79%. In Table 5 below, Turkey’s energy balance between 1990 and 2019 is given.

Table 5
Turkey’s Energy Balance (1990-2019)

Thousand TEP	1990	2002	2017	2018	2019	Change		Direction
						1990-2019	2002-2019	
Total Energy Demand (TED) (1)	52.465	77.075	145.305	143.666	144.205	74.859	87.096	↑
Total Domestic Production (2)	25.138	24.430	35.357	39.675	44.821	78.299	83.467	↑
Total Energy Imports	30.663	57.156	124.425	115.792	115.453	276.522	101.996	↑
Domestic Rate of TED (2/1) %	47.913	31.696	24.332	27.616	31.081	-35.2	-2.1	↓

Source: ETKB, (2022) by the author with the help of data.

In Table 5 above, Turkey’s general energy balance between 1990-2019 is given. Between 1990 and 2019, the total energy demand increased from 52.465 thousand TEP to 144.205 thousand TEP in 30 years. In the 30 years between 1990 and 2019, domestic production in Turkey increased from 25.138 thousand TEP to 44.821. Likewise, total energy imports increased from 30.663 thousand TEP to 115.5 thousand TEP. On the other hand, when we look at the level of meeting the demand of domestic production, it is seen that it has been in decline over the years and is insufficient to meet the demand. the rate of meeting the energy demand with domestic production as of 2019 is 31.0%. Therefore, based on these data, it would not be wrong to say that Turkey is dependent on energy imports.

Literature Review

Energy import dependency poses significant problems for both developing and developed countries. However, it especially affects developing countries such as Turkey which are insufficient in terms of fossil energy resources. Therefore, various studies have been carried out to determine the determinants of energy import dependency and reduce this dependence with alternative energy sources. When we look at the first studies in this field, it is seen that studies are mostly carried out to determine the determinants of oil imports. These studies can be listed as (in chronological order): Zhao and Wu (2007), Altınay (2007), Jiping and Ping (2008), Ghosh (2009), Uğurlu and Ünsal (2009), Ziramba (2010), Ediger and Berk (2011), Kim and Baek (2013), Solak and Beşkaya (2013), Adewuyi (2016), Öztürk and Arisoy (2016), Marbuah (2017), and Çalışkan and Çakmak (2019).

Çoban and Şahbaz (2011) in their study, in which they used annual data for the period 1990-2007 in Turkey found that R&D expenditures negatively and GNP positively causes a change in energy imports. Üzümcü and Başar (2011) in their study, in which

they used quarter annual data for the period 2003-2010 in Turkey; found that there is a negative relationship between current account deficits and economic growth and energy imports. Bilginoğlu and Dumrul (2012) conducted a study to determine the determinants of Turkey's energy imports in the 1960-2008 period and found that the variables of energy production, GNP, the amount of energy used in houses, the ratio of total primary energy supply to GDP are the determinants of energy dependence. Bayramoğlu (2017), in his study using Turkey's 1970-2015 annual data, found that domestic coal production reduces energy dependence. Şişeci (2018) in his study, which deals with Turkey's 2002-2017 period, determined that the GDP and exchange rate are the determinants of energy imports. Fedoseeva and Zeidan (2018), on the other hand, in their study on the period of 1990 to 2015 to determine the determinants of energy imports in Europe, determined that GDP is the most important determinant of energy imports in Europe. Likewise, Kocatürk (2019) stated in his study on Europe and Turkey that there is a strong link between economic growth and energy imports. In their study, Acaravcı and Yıldız (2018) used Turkey data from 1981 to 2015 and they determined the variables of current account deficit, per capita GNP, relative prices, and gross fixed capital formation are effective on net energy imports.

Studies on crude oil imports and the determinants of energy imports are relatively more than studies on the relationship between renewable energy sources and energy import dependency. Studies on the energy import dependency of renewable energy sources are limited in the literature. Therefore, the examination of this subject will undoubtedly contribute to the literature. Studies on the relationship between renewable energy sources and energy dependency are given below.

In Vaona's 2016 study on the economy of 26 selected countries, the dependent variable is the import of goods and services. The reverse of the percent change in the real effective exchange rate index, customs and other import taxes as a percentage of imports of goods and services, electricity generation from renewable resources, electricity generation from nuclear resources, and electricity generation from gas and coal resources are used as independent variables. The annual data were analyzed using the panel GMM method. As a result of the analysis, it was concluded that renewable energy reduces the import of goods and services.

Dertli and Yınaç (2018), in their study on the Turkish economy, examined the relationship between renewable energy consumption, carbon dioxide emissions, energy imports, and economic growth variables. Johansen co-integration test and Granger causality test were used in the study, in which they used annual data for the period 1990-2014. As a result of the analysis, a co-integration relationship was found between the variables, and they observed that there is a one-way causality running from energy imports to renewable energy.

Dinçer, Yüksel, and Canpolat (2019) examined the relationship between energy imports and renewable energy in their study on E7 country economies. Pedroni panel co-integration and Dumitrescu Hurlin panel causality test were used in the study in which they used annual data for the period 1990-2015. As a result of the analysis, a long-term relationship was found between the variables. However, no causal relationship was found between energy imports and renewable energy use.

Canbay and Piralı (2019) examined the effects of defense expenditures and renewable energy on energy imports in their study on the Turkish economy. They used the ARDL limit test in the study in which they used annual data for the period 1975-2015. As a result of the analysis, a co-integration relationship was found between the variables. They concluded that energy imports affected defense expenditures positively, while renewable energy had a negative effect. They found the coefficient of the error correction model, which shows that the deviations from the short-term are eliminated in the long-term, is negative and statistically significant.

Arslan and Solak (2019) examined the effect of renewable energy on imports in their study on the Turkish economy. They used the Johansen co-integration test and the VAR test in their study, in which they used annual data for the period 1984 to 2017. As a result of the analysis, no co-integration relationship was found between the variables. As a result of VAR impulse-response analysis, they determined that renewable energy increased energy imports.

In his study on the Turkish economy, Asya (2019) examined the effect of renewable energy production and per capita GDP on net energy imports. The ARDL co-integration test was used in the study, in which annual data from 1990 to 2015 was used. As a result of the analysis, it was understood that renewable energy production harms net energy imports and positively affects per capita GDP.

When the literature studies are examined in general, it can be concluded that renewable energy sources reduce energy import dependency, while the most important determinant of energy imports is GDP. When examined from this aspect, it is seen that population and energy prices are not included other empirical analysis. This study included population and energy prices in the analysis model, contributing to the literature.

Data Set, Model, and Findings

In this study, annual data covering the period between 1990-2018 were used. The variables used in the study and the sources from which the data were obtained are given in Table 6.

Table 6
Variables Used in Analysis

Notation	Definition	Type	Source	Calculation Method
EID	Energy Import Dependency	Percentage	EUROSTAT	Energy Import Dependency = (import – export) / gross usable energy
REG	Renewable Electricity Generation	Percentage	OECDSTAT	Renewable Electricity Generation = share of renewable electricity generation in total electricity generation
lnGDPPC	Gross Domestic Product Per Capita	Logarithmic (ln)	Worldbank (WB)	GDP Per Capita = gross domestic product/ mid-year population
UPG	Urban Population Growth	Percentage	Worldbank (WB)	Urban Population Growth (yearly)
lnWCOP	World Crude Oil Price (\$)	Logarithmic (ln)	British Petroleum (BP)	US Dollars Per Barrel
lnWNGP	World Natural Gas Price (\$)	Logarithmic (ln)	British Petroleum (BP)	USD per million Btu

While creating the data set, it was tried to go back to the oldest period. However, due to the problems in the accessibility of the data in Turkey, the time dimension was determined as the period between 1990 and 2018. Energy import dependency (EID) is the dependent variable; the independent variables are renewable electricity generation (REG), GDP per capita, urban population growth, world crude oil prices (WCOP) and world natural gas prices (WNGP). The linear estimation equation created by considering the variables used in the study is as shown in equation (1). The natural logarithms of GDP per capita (GDPPC), world crude oil prices (WCOP), and world natural gas prices (WNGP) variables were included in the analysis.

$$EID_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 REG_t + \beta_2 \ln GDPPC_t + \beta_3 UPG_t + \beta_4 \ln WCOP_t + \beta_5 \ln WNGP_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (1)$$

The t index in Equation 1 shows that the series are time series. While β_0 represents the constant term coefficient; $\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4$ and β_5 show the slope coefficients and ε_t represents the error term. In this study, time series analysis was used to examine the effect of renewable energy on energy import dependency in Turkey. While performing time series analysis, it is important to determine the stationarity of the data used. Therefore, the stationarity of the variables used in the study was first determined by unit root tests. ADF and PP unit root tests were used in the study. After the stationarity levels of the variables were determined, the co-integration test was applied. In this study, ARDL co-integration test was used.

Unit Root Tests

Dickey and Fuller developed ADF test in 1981 in order to eliminate the possible autocorrelation problem that may be encountered in the DF test. The problem of autocorrelation is overcome by incorporating the variable lags, which are the subject of the analysis, into the model. In the ADF test, the H_0 hypothesis, which states that the Y_t series contains a unit root, is tested. ADF unit root test hypotheses and model equations are as shown below (Mert and Çağlar, 2019: 99-100).

$H_0: \delta = 0$ (There is a unit root, the series is not stationary).

$H_1: \delta < 0$ (There is no unit root, the series is stationary).

$$\text{None: } \Delta y_t = \delta y_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta_i \Delta y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Intercept: } \Delta y_t = \mu + \delta y_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta_i \Delta y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Trend and Intercept: } \Delta y_t = \mu + \beta t + \delta y_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta_i \Delta y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t \quad (4)$$

Philips and Perron (1988) developed a new non-parametric method. Due to the use of the Philips and Perron test, it is assumed that the distribution of random errors in the Dickey and Fuller unit root test is independent and with constant variance. In other words, it is accepted that there is no autocorrelation between the random errors. This study by Philips and Perron developed this assumption in the Dickey-Fuller test and proposed a new assumption in the distribution of random errors. PP unit root test model equations are as shown below (Sevüktekin and Çınar, 2017: 378).

$$\text{None: } Y_t = \delta Y_{(t-1)} + \varepsilon_t \quad (5)$$

$$\text{Intercept: } Y_t = \beta_1 + \delta Y_{(t-1)} + \varepsilon_t \quad (6)$$

$$\text{Trend and Intercept: } Y_t = \beta_1 + \delta Y_{(t-1)} + \beta_2 \left(t - \frac{T}{2} \right) + \varepsilon_t \tag{7}$$

There are no effects in the DF and ADF unit root tests due to the difference of the standard errors of the error terms that may arise depending on the trend and the effect of the trend on the series. Due to this shortcoming, Philips Perron has developed a new PP unit root test (Tari, 2016: 400).

Table 7
Unit Root Test Results for Level Values of Series

Variable	ADF TEST		PP TEST	
	Constant	Constant and Trend	Constant	Constant and Trend
EID	-1.328971 (0.6017)	-1.663988 (0.7403)	-1.325322 (0.6035)	-1.640612 (0.7503)
REG	-1.894647 (0.3299)	-1.750339 (0.7013)	-1.818453 (0.3642)	-1.639875 (0.7506)
lnGDPPC	0.404752 (0.9795)	-2.333346 (0.4038)	1.378255 (0.9984)	-2.353689 (0.3938)
UPG	-1.333719 (0.5989)	-1.816488 (0.6686)	-8.092646* (0.0000)	-7.358430* (0.0000)
lnWCOP	-0.899315 (0.7734)	-1.942896 (0.6058)	-0.920382 (0.7665)	-2.099368 (0.5239)
lnWNGP	-1.996325 (0.2866)	-1.767929 (0.6930)	-1.890539 (0.3317)	-1.607273 (0.7642)

Note 1: Values in parentheses are probability values.

Note 2: The calculated values are t statistics.

* Indicates that it is stationary at the 1% significance level.

In Table 7, the ADF and PP unit root tests were obtained using the constant and constant-trend model of the level values of the series the stationarities of which were analyzed. EID, REG and lnGDPPC and lnWCOP and lnWNGP series contain a unit root because they are not stationary at the level. According to the ADF test, UPG series is non-stationary, but according to the PP test, it is stationary at the 1% significance level when both the constant and the constant-trend model are used.

Table 8
Unit Root Test Results for First Differences of Series

Variable	ADF TEST		PP TEST	
	Constant	Constant and Trend	Constant	Constant and Trend
EID	-6.489528* (0.0000)	-7.225786* (0.0000)	-6.359071* (0.0000)	-6.400739* (0.0001)
REG	-6.386021* (0.0000)	-6.400739* (0.0001)	-6.386021* (0.0000)	-6.009624* (0.0002)
lnGDPPC	-5.421612* (0.0001)	-5.409429* (0.0008)	-5.421612* (0.0001)	-5.409255* (0.0008)
lnWCOP	-4.365773* (0.0020)	-4.278892** (0.0114)	-4.293070* (0.0024)	-4.185543** (0.0141)
lnWNGP	-6.435447* (0.0000)	-5.846998** (0.0003)	-6.462291* (0.0000)	-11.91708* (0.0000)

Note 1: Values in parentheses are probability values.

Note 2: The calculated values are t statistics.

* Indicates that it is stationary at the 1% significance level.

** Indicates that it is stationary at the 5% significance level.

Table 8 shows the ADF and PP unit root test results obtained using the constant and constant-trend model of the first difference values of the series the stationarity of which was analyzed. EID, REG, lnGDPPC, and lnWNGP series are stationary at 1% significance level at first difference. But the lnWCOP series, in both tests, it is stationary at a significance level of 1% in the constant model and 5% in the constant-trend model. As a result, it has been decided that the series are stationary at 1(1) difference.

ARDL Bounds Testing Approach

In order to remove the constraint stated in the previous section, ARDL co-integration approach was developed by Paseran et al. (2001). The ARDL model can be applied regardless of whether the variables used in the analysis are I (0) and I (1). ARDL model; although can be applied with variables that become stationary of different degrees, it cannot be used in the case of I (2). For this reason, although any of the variables is I (2), their stationarity is determined by unit root tests. If any of the variables subject to the analysis is I(2), the analysis cannot be continued (Mert and Çağlar, 2019: 279-284). An unconstrained error correction model is used in the ARDL cointegration approach. On the other hand, the stationarity levels of the variables to be estimated can be both I(0) and I(1). Beyond that, the ARDL model gives better and more reliable results in small samples compared to other cointegration tests (Narayan and Narayan, 2005: 429). The unrestricted error correction model (UECM) created for the ARDL bounds test is given in the equation (8).

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta EID = & \alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta_{1i} \Delta EID_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_1} \beta_{2i} \Delta REG_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_2} \beta_{3i} \Delta \ln GDPPC_{t-i} \\ & + \sum_{i=0}^{q_3} \beta_{4i} \Delta UPG_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_4} \beta_{5i} \Delta \ln WCOP_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_5} \beta_{6i} \Delta \ln WNGP_{t-i} \\ & + \delta_1 EID_{t-1} + \delta_2 REG_{t-1} + \delta_3 \ln GDPPC_{t-1} + \delta_4 UPG_{t-1} + \delta_5 \ln WCOP_{t-1} \\ & + \delta_6 \ln WNGP_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

From the terms given in the equation (8), α_0 shows the constant term, while Δ shows the difference operator, and ε_t denotes error term. After making the regression estimation given in the equation (8), the existence of co-integration is determined by the F statistic. F test hypotheses are given below.

$$H_0: \delta_1 = \delta_2 = \delta_3 = \delta_4 = \delta_5 = \delta_6 = 0 \quad (\text{No co - integration}).$$

$$H_1: \delta_1 \neq \delta_2 \neq \delta_3 \neq \delta_4 \neq \delta_5 \neq \delta_6 \neq 0 \quad (\text{There is co - integration}).$$

Equation (9) given below was formed to estimate the long-run coefficients by considering equation (1) for the study.

$$\begin{aligned} EID = & \alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^p a_{1i} EID_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_1} a_{2i} REG_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_2} a_{3i} \ln GDPPC_{t-i} \\ & + \sum_{i=0}^{q_3} a_{4i} UPG_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_4} a_{5i} \ln WCOP_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_5} a_{6i} \ln WNGP_{t-i} \\ & + \varepsilon_t \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

Finally, the short-run coefficients are estimated. Error correction mechanism is used for this. The equation (10) created for the error correction model is given below.

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta EID = & \alpha_0 + \sigma_1 ECM_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^p \sigma_{2i} \Delta EID_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q1} \sigma_{3i} \Delta REG_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q2} \sigma_{4i} \Delta \ln GDPPC \\ & + \sum_{i=0}^{q3} \sigma_{5i} \Delta UPG_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q4} \sigma_{6i} \Delta \ln WCOP_{t-i} \\ & + \sum_{i=0}^{q5} \sigma_{7i} \Delta \ln WNGP_{t-i} \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

The term ECM_{t-1} given in the equation represents the error correction term. This error correction term is expected to be negative and significant. Error correction mechanism means that short-run imbalances will be corrected in the long-run.

In applying the ARDL bounds test, appropriate lag lengths are first determined. EID dependent variable; the maximum lag length was determined as 2 for the ARDL (p, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5) model estimation, with REG, lnGDPPC, UPG, lnWCOP and lnWNGP as explanatory variables, and the analysis was started based on the AIC information criterion. The model automatically found the appropriate lag length was automatically found as (1,1,0,2,0,0) by the model.

Table 9
ARDL Bounds Test Results

H₀: No Co-Integration	α	I (0) *	I (1) *
F=5.462439	%10	2.578	3.858
K=5	%5	3.125	4.608
	%1	4.537	6.37
	α	I (0)	I (1)
t=-4.286253	%10	-2.57	-3.86
	%5	-2.86	-4.19
	%2.5	-3.13	-4.46
	%1	-3.43	-4.79

*The critical values produced by Narayan (2005) for n=30.

When the ARDL bounds test results are examined in Table 9, it is seen that the F bound test is 5.462439. This value is greater than the 5% and 10% error levels of the upper critical I(1) values produced by Narayan (2005). Therefore, the HO hypothesis of “no cointegration” was rejected. Therefore, according to the F test, the series are co-integrated at the 5% significance level. Looking at the t test, it is seen that the t value is -4.286253. Since this value is greater than the error levels of the 5% and 10% upper critical values in absolute value, according to both the F test and the t test, the series are co-integrated at the 5% significance level. After it has been determined that the series are co-integrated, they move together in the long run, and long-run predictions are made. The long-run results are given in Table 10 below.

Table 10
Long-Run Results

Variables	Coefficient	St. Error	t-Statistic	P (Probability)
REG	-0.262284*	0.085603	-3.063944	0.0070
lnGDPPC	21.41023*	3.567327	6.001755	0.0000
UPG	8.302404***	4.382182	1.894582	0.0753
lnWCOP	-0.915633	1.374531	-0.666142	0.5143
lnWNGP	4.370648**	1.523593	2.868644	0.0106
R Squared	: 0.975629		Akaike info criterion	:3.903704
Adjusted R Squared	: 0.962727		Schwarz criterion	:4.383644
F-Statistic	:75.61679*		Hannan-Quinn criterion	:4.046416
F-Statistic (Probability):	0.000000		Durbin-Watson stat	:2.199935

* Indicates that it is stationary at the 1% significance level.

** Indicates that it is stationary at the 5% significance level.

*** Indicates that it is stationary at the 10% significance level.

When Table 10 is examined, a negative and statistically significant relationship was determined between the REG variable and EID; it was determined that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between lnGDPPC, UPG and lnWNGP and EID. On the other hand, no statistically significant relationship was found between lnWCOP and EID. On the other hand, in Table 11 below, the error correction model is estimated to determine whether short-run imbalances are eliminated in the long-run

Table 11
Error Correction Model Results

Variables	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistics	P(Probability)
C	-120.0601*	18.56916	-6.465562	0.0000
D(REG)	-0.026332	0.052323	-0.503256	0.6212
D(UPG)	-2.566558	4.755695	-0.539681	0.5964
D(UPG (-1))	10.17392	3.156713	3.222948	0.0050
EC_{t-1}	-0.846358*	0.129957	-6.512621	0.0000
		α	L (0)	I (1)
t=	-6.512621			
		%10	-2.57	-3.86
		%5	-2.86	-4.19
		%2.5	-3.13	-4.46
		%1	-3.43	-4.79

* Indicates that it is stationary at the 1% significance level.

When the results are examined, it is seen that the error correction coefficient was calculated as $EC_{t-1}=-0.846358$. This calculated value should be negative and statistically significant. When $EC_{t-1}=-0.846358$ was examined, it was found to be negative and statistically significant. Looking at the t test, it is seen that this value is calculated as $t=-6.512621$. Therefore, the error correction coefficient is statistically significant. The short-run imbalances in the model will reach the long-run equilibrium after $1/0.84=1.19$ years. Finally, diagnostic and stability tests of the predicted model were performed. Table 12 below shows the diagnostic test results for the predicted model.

Table 12
Diagnostic Test Results

Diagnostic Tests		
Tests	F (Calculated)	P (Probability) *
Heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey)	1.425689	0.2526
Model Specification (Ramsey-Reset)	0.269291	0.7911
Serial Correlation (Breusch-Godfrey)	0.984153	0.3966
Normality (Jarque-Bera)	0.346352	0.840990

*Test probability values greater than 0.05 indicate that the assumptions are met.

When the diagnostic test results were examined, no problem was detected in all diagnostic tests; it has been determined that the model does not have Heteroskedasticity, model specification, serial correlation, and normality problems. In order to determine whether the estimated parameters outside of these diagnostic tests are stable or not, the cusum and cusumQ graphs are given below. When both graphs are examined, parameter estimates were found to be within 5% confidence limits, and no problems were detected. Therefore, the estimated parameters are stable.




Figure 2. CUSUM Chart




Figure 3. CUSUMQ Chart

Robustness Check

In this title, it was tested whether the results of the econometric model established in the study were not found by chance and whether they had stable coefficients. Different techniques are used in the literature, and in this study, oil prices, which were added to the model as a control variable, were excluded from the model, and the analysis was repeated.

Table 13
ARDL Bounds Test and Diagnostic Test Results

Maximum Lag	Akaike Info Criterion (2)	
ARDL Model	Constand (1,1,0,2,0)	
F-Statistics	6.695080	
k	4	
Critical Values		
α	I (0)	I (1)
10%	2.752	3.994
5%	3.354	4.774
1%	4.768	6.670
Diagnostic Tests		
Tests	F (Calculated)	P (Probability)
Heteroskedasticity (Harvey)	1.885334	0.1257
Model Specification (Ramsey-Reset)	0.560213	0.5826
Serial Correlation (Breusch-Godfrey)	1.193984	0.3286
Normality (Jarque-Bera)	0.569989	0.7520

When Table 13 was examined, it was determined that the series were co-integrated and the result found was the same as the result in Table 12 although there were slight differences.

Table 14
Long-Run and Error Correction Model Results

Variables	Coefficient	St. Error	t-Statistic	P (Probability)
REG	-0.248994	0.086358	-2.883263	0.0099
lnGDPPC	19.33653	1.963088	9.850055	0.0000
UPG	8.433291	4.567965	1.846181	0.0814
lnWNGP	3.951621	1.423690	2.775619	0.0125
Error Correction Model Results				
Variables	Coefficient	St. Error	t-Statistic	P (Probability)
EC_{t-1}	-0.800333	0.125122	-6.396435	0.0000
R Squared: 0.975048		Akaike Info Criterion: 3.853190		
Adjusted R Squared: 0.963958		Schwarz Criterion: 4.285136		
F Statistic: 87.92325		Hannan-Quinn Criterion: 3.981630		
F Statistic (Probability): 0.000000		Durbin-Watson Stat: 2.279872		

When Table 14 is examined, small marginal differences are detected in the long-term coefficients. However, it has been observed that it is largely the same with the results in Table 10. Based on these results, it has been determined that the model is stable and has stable long-term coefficients when oil prices are subtracted from the model established in the study.

Conclusion

Energy sources have maintained their importance since the early days they were used. Due to human beings' needs and unlimited demands, the energy demand has increased continuously. This increase has brought about high consumption of energy resources. Especially the developments in the industrial field and the increasing population have increased the consumption of energy resources to the highest level. There are countries that provide high energy consumption from domestic sources. However, countries like Turkey, which are poor in terms of underground energy resources, face many difficulties in meeting their increasing energy consumption with domestic resources. These countries, which could not meet their energy consumption with domestic resources, started to supply their energy deficit. These initiatives have made the countries that are insufficient in terms of energy resources dependent on external energy. At the same time, energy supply security has become one of the most important problems of these countries. These countries are dependent on foreign energy in the field of energy. Although they have implemented policies such as energy resource diversity and energy efficiency, it is clear that such policies alone are not sufficient.

On the other hand, the increasing use of fossil energy resources has caused serious damage to nature. Although it is said that necessary precautions are taken in terms of the environment in the countries using fossil energy sources, the effects of climate change experienced show that the opposite is true. Renewable energy sources stand out as the best alternative energy source in overcoming all these problems and helping countries with insufficient fossil resources to meet their energy needs. Renewable energy sources are distinguished from other energy sources because they are a clean and domestic resource.

In this study, the effect of renewable energy on Turkey's energy import dependency has been tried to be determined. Turkey's energy import dependency, renewable electricity production, per capita gross domestic product, urban population growth, world crude oil prices, and world natural gas prices, a total of 29 years between 1990 and 2018 were used in the analysis. In the study, firstly, the stationarity levels of the series were determined with the ADF and PP unit root tests to determine the stationarity of the series. Then, ARDL co-integration test was applied. As a result of ARDL bounds test, a co-integration relationship was determined between the variables. In other words, it was concluded that the series move together in the long run.

It has been determined that renewable energy is the determinant of energy import dependency in Turkey. This result is similar to the studies of Asya (2019), Canbay and Piralı (2019). It has been determined that per capita gross domestic product is the most important determinant of energy import dependency in Turkey. It has been found that the rate of urbanization is the second biggest determinant of energy import dependency in Turkey. In this context, similar results were obtained by Bayramoğlu (2017). On the other hand, Jiping and Ping (2008) on the Chinese economy, Marbuah (2017) on the economy of Ghana, and Adewuyi (2016) on the Nigerian economy determined that population is among the main determinants of oil imports. This study showed that the second main determinant of energy import dependency is urbanization and population growth. It has been concluded that world crude oil prices are not a determinant of energy import dependency in Turkey. Altınay (2007) and Öztürk and Arisoy (2016) in their study

in Turkey in which they used crude oil imports as the dependent variable, concluded that the crude oil price is not flexible in the long and short run. On the other hand, Solak and Beşkaya (2013), in their study on using net oil imports in Turkey, determined that oil prices do not have an effect on net oil imports. Although energy import dependency has been used in our study, it is possible to say that similar results have been obtained. It has been determined that world natural gas prices are the determinants of energy import dependency in Turkey.

Finally, the short-run coefficients of the variables and the error correction term are estimated. As a result of the analysis, the error term was found to be $EC_{t-1} = -0.84$. It was determined that the error term was statistically significant and negative. Therefore, it has been determined that the short-run imbalances in the model will be eliminated in the long-run. As a result, it has been concluded that renewable energy is effective on Turkey's energy import dependency.

This study was conducted under some limitations. It has been tried to reach a wider data range as a data set. However, since the data between 1990 and 2018 were reached, the study was limited to the years between 1990–2018. In future studies, it will be possible to work with wider data sets as it will be possible to reach a wider data range. In this study, it was considered to use co-integration tests that take into account the structural break. However, the ARDL bounds test was used because the data size is small and the urban population data used in the model is stationary at the level. In future studies, the data size can be larger, and a different variables can be used to represent the urban population data so that the study can be developed with different methods. The study was carried out with the data set of Turkey. In future studies, data sets belonging to different countries or country groups can be studied. Thus, it is possible to compare the regional differences in the results.

Turkey has recently turned to renewable energy sources to a large extent. Electric energy obtained by hydroelectric energy has the largest share among renewable energy sources. However, Turkey benefits from solar energy well below its potential. Turkey is geographically in a very good position in terms of solar energy. Turkey should benefit from all its potential in the light of correct planning when generating electrical energy from other renewable energy sources, especially solar energy. Renewable energy sources should be encouraged. Because as seen in the analysis of the study, renewable energy sources have a reducing effect on energy import dependency. Therefore, more use of renewable energy sources is required.

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AMAÇ KAPSAM

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, siyaset bilimi, kamu yönetimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, alanlarında uluslararası ve disiplinlerarası makaleler yayınlamaktadır. Dergi, aşağıda belirtilen konuları kapsamak ile birlikte sadece bu konular ile kısıtlı değildir:

- Siyaset biliminin tüm alt disiplinleri, siyaset teorisi, siyaset felsefesi, politik davranış, siyasi kurumlar ve siyasi tarih
- Kamu yönetiminin tüm alt disiplinleri,
- Uluslararası ilişkiler ile ilgili tüm konular: uluslararası hukuk, iktisat, etik, strateji, felsefe, kültür, çevre, güvenlik, terör, bölgesel çalışmalar, küreselleşme ve diğer konular,

Dergi, yukarıda adı geçen disiplinlerin çeşitli yönlerini inceleyen, İngilizce yazılmış araştırma esaslı makalelerin yanında teorik ve kavramsal makaleleri yayınlamaktadır. Ayrıca, dergi uluslararası alandaki akademisyenlerin konuk editörlüğünde çeşitli temalar ile ilgili özel sayılar yayınlamaktadır.

EDİTORYAL POLİTİKALAR VE HAKEM SÜRECİ

Yayın Politikası

Dergiye yayımlanmak üzere gönderilen makalelerin içeriği derginin amaç ve kapsamı ile uyumlu olmalıdır. Dergi, orijinal araştırma niteliğindeki yazıları yayınlamaya öncelik vermektedir. Genel İlkeler Daha önce yayımlanmamış ya da yayımlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Ön değerlendirmeyi geçen yazılar iThenticate intihal tarama programından geçirilir. İntihal incelemesinden sonra, uygun makaleler Editör tarafından orijinaliteleri, metodolojileri, makalede ele alınan konunun önemi ve derginin kapsamına uygunluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Bilimsel toplantılarda sunulan özet bildirimler, makalede belirtilmesi koşulu ile kaynak olarak kabul edilir. Editör, gönderilen makale biçimsel esaslara uygun ise, gelen yazıyı yurtiçinden ve /veya yurtdışından en az iki hakemin değerlendirmesine sunar, hakemler gerek gördüğü takdirde yazıda istenen değişiklikler yazarlar tarafından yapıldıktan sonra yayımlanmasına onay verir. Makale yayımlanmak üzere Dergiye gönderildikten sonra yazarlardan hiçbirinin ismi, tüm yazarların yazılı izni olmadan yazar listesinden silinemez ve yeni bir isim yazar olarak eklenemez ve yazar sırası değiştirilemez. Yayına kabul edilmeyen makale, resim ve fotoğraflar yazarlara geri gönderilmez. Yayımlanan yazı ve resimlerin tüm hakları Dergiye aittir.

Telif Hakkında

Yazarlar dergide yayımlanan çalışmalarının telif hakkına sahiptirler ve çalışmaları Creative Commons Atıf-GayriTicari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) olarak lisanslıdır. CC BY-NC 4.0 lisansı, eserin ticari kullanım dışında her boyut ve formatta paylaşılmasına, kopyalanmasına, çoğaltılmasına ve orijinal esere uygun şekilde atıfta bulunmak kaydıyla yeniden düzenleme, dönüştürme ve eserin üzerine inşa etme dâhil adapte edilmesine izin verir.

Açık Erişim İlkesi

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, tüm içeriği okura ya da okurun dahil olduğu kuruma ücretsiz olarak sunulur. Okurlar, ticari amaç haricinde, yayıncı ya da yazardan izin almadan dergi makalelerinin tam metnini okuyabilir, indirebilir, kopyalayabilir, arayabilir ve link sağlayabilir.

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences makaleleri açık erişimlidir ve Creative Commons Atıf-GayrıTicari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.tr>) olarak lisanslıdır.

İşleme Ücreti

Derginin tüm giderleri İstanbul Üniversitesi tarafından karşılanmaktadır. Dergide makale yayını ve makale süreçlerinin yürütülmesi ücrete tabi değildir. Dergiye gönderilen ya da yayın için kabul edilen makaleler için işleme ücreti ya da gönderim ücreti alınmaz.

Hakem Süreci

Daha önce yayınlanmamış ya da yayınlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Gönderilen ve ön kontrolü geçen makaleler iThenticate yazılımı kullanılarak intihal için taranır. İntihal kontrolünden sonra, uygun olan makaleler baş editör tarafından orijinallik, metodoloji, işlenen konunun önemi ve dergi kapsamı ile uyumluluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar.

Seçilen makaleler en az iki ulusal/uluslararası hakeme değerlendirmeye gönderilir; yayın kararı, hakemlerin talepleri doğrultusunda yazarların gerçekleştirdiği düzenlemelerin ve hakem sürecinin sonrasında baş editör tarafından verilir.

Hakemlerin değerlendirmeleri objektif olmalıdır. Hakem süreci sırasında hakemlerin aşağıdaki hususları dikkate alarak değerlendirmelerini yapmaları beklenir.

- Makale yeni ve önemli bir bilgi içeriyor mu?
- Öz, makalenin içeriğini net ve düzgün bir şekilde tanımlıyor mu?
- Yöntem bütünlüklü ve anlaşılır şekilde tanımlanmış mı?
- Yapılan yorum ve varılan sonuçlar bulgularla kanıtlanıyor mu?
- Alandaki diğer çalışmalara yeterli referans verilmiş mi?
- Dil kalitesi yeterli mi?

Hakemler, gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdır. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir.

Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir.

YAYIN ETİĞİ VE İLKELER

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, yayın etiğinde en yüksek standartlara bağlıdır ve Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA) ve World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) tarafından yayınlanan etik yayıncılık ilkelerini benimser; Principles of Transparency

and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing başlığı altında ifade edilen ilkeler için adres: <https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-andbest-practice-scholarly-publishing> Gönderilen tüm makaleler orijinal, yayınlanmamış ve başka bir dergide değerlendirme sürecinde olmamalıdır. Her bir makale editörlerden biri ve en az iki hakem tarafından çift kör değerlendirmeden geçirilir. İntihal, duplikasyon, sahte yazarlık/inkar edilen yazarlık, araştırma/veri fabrikasyonu, makale dilimleme, dilimleyerek yayın, telif hakları ihlali ve çıkar çatışmasının gizlenmesi, etik dışı davranışlar olarak kabul edilir. Kabul edilen etik standartlara uygun olmayan tüm makaleler yayından çıkarılır. Buna yayından sonra tespit edilen olası kuraldışı, uygunsuzluklar içeren makaleler de dahildir.

Araştırma Etiği

Dergi araştırma etiğinde en yüksek standartları gözetir ve aşağıda tanımlanan uluslararası araştırma etiği ilkelerini benimser. Makalelerin etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. - Araştırmanın tasarlanması, tasarımın gözden geçirilmesi ve araştırmanın yürütülmesinde, bütünlük, kalite ve şeffaflık ilkeleri sağlanmalıdır.

- Araştırma ekibi ve katılımcılar, araştırmanın amacı, yöntemleri ve öngörülen olası kullanımları; araştırmaya katılımın gerektirdikleri ve varsa riskleri hakkında tam olarak bilgilendirilmelidir.
- Araştırma katılımcılarının sağladığı bilgilerin gizliliği ve yanıt verenlerin gizliliği sağlanmalıdır. Araştırma katılımcıların özerkliğini ve saygınlığını koruyacak şekilde tasarlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma katılımcıları gönüllü olarak araştırmada yer almalı, herhangi bir zorlama altında olmamalıdır. - Katılımcıların zarar görmesinden kaçınılmalıdır. Araştırma, katılımcıları riske sokmayacak şekilde planlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma bağımsızlığıyla ilgili açık ve net olunmalı; çıkar çatışması varsa belirtilmelidir.
- Deneysel çalışmalarda, araştırmaya katılmaya karar veren katılımcıların yazılı bilgilendirilmiş onayı alınmalıdır. Çocukların ve vesayet altındakilerin veya tasdiklenmiş akıl hastalığı bulunanların yasal vasisinin onayı alınmalıdır.
- Çalışma herhangi bir kurum ya da kuruluştaki gerçekleştirilecekse bu kurum ya da kuruluştan çalışma yapılacağına dair onay alınmalıdır.
- İnsan ögesi bulunan çalışmalarda, “yöntem” bölümünde katılımcılardan “bilgilendirilmiş onam” alındığının ve çalışmanın yapıldığı kurumdaki etik kurul onayı alındığı belirtilmesi gerekir.

Yazarların Sorumluluğu

Makalelerin bilimsel ve etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. Yazar makalenin orijinal olduğu, daha önce başka bir yerde yayınlanmadığı ve başka bir yerde dilde yayınlanmak üzere değerlendirmede olmadığı konusunda teminat sağlamalıdır. Uygulamadaki telif kanunları ve anlaşmaları gözetilmelidir. Telifle bağlı materyaller (örneğin tablolar, şekiller veya büyük alıntılar) gerekli izin ve teşekkürle kullanılmalıdır. Başka yazarların, katkıda bulunanların çalışmaları ya da yararlanılan kaynaklar uygun biçimde kullanılmalı ve referanslarda belirtilmelidir. Gönderilen makalede tüm yazarların akademik ve bilimsel olarak doğrudan katkısı olmalıdır, bu bağlamda “yazar” yayınlanan bir araştırmanın kavramsallaştırılmasına ve dizaynına, verilerin elde edilmesine, analizine ya da yorumlanmasına belirgin katkı yapan, yazının yazılması ya da bunun içerik açısından eleştirel biçimde gözden geçirilmesinde görev yapan birisi olarak görülür. Yazar

olabilmenin diğer koşulları ise, makaledeki çalışmayı planlamak veya icra etmek ve / veya revize etmektir. Fon sağlanması, veri toplanması ya da araştırma grubunun genel süpervizyonu tek başına yazarlık hakkı kazandırmaz. Yazar olarak gösterilen tüm bireyler sayılan tüm ölçütleri karşılamalıdır ve yukarıdaki ölçütleri karşılayan her birey yazar olarak gösterilebilir. Yazarların isim sıralaması ortak verilen bir karar olmalıdır. Tüm yazarlar yazar sıralamasını Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu'nda imzalı olarak belirtmek zorundadırlar. Yazarlık için yeterli ölçütleri karşılamayan ancak çalışmaya katkısı olan tüm bireyler “teşekkür / bilgiler” kısmında sıralanmalıdır. Bunlara örnek olarak ise sadece teknik destek sağlayan, yazıma yardımcı olan ya da sadece genel bir destek sağlayan, finansal ve materyal desteği sunan kişiler verilebilir. Bütün yazarlar, araştırmanın sonuçlarını ya da bilimsel değerlendirmeyi etkileyebilme potansiyeli olan finansal ilişkiler, çıkar çatışması ve çıkar rekabetini beyan etmelidirler. Bir yazar kendi yayınlanmış yazısında belirgin bir hata ya da yanlışlık tespit ederse, bu yanlışlıklara ilişkin düzeltme ya da geri çekme için editör ile hemen temasa geçme ve işbirliği yapma sorumluluğunu taşır.

Editör ve Hakem Sorumlulukları

Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyuğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar. Gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalacağını garanti eder. Baş editör içerik ve yayının toplam kalitesinden sorumludur. Gereğinde hata sayfayı yayınlamalı ya da düzeltme yapmalıdır. Baş editör; yazarlar, editörler ve hakemler arasında çıkar çatışmasına izin vermez. Hakem atama konusunda tam yetkiye sahiptir ve Dergide yayınlanacak makalelerle ilgili nihai kararı vermekle yükümlüdür.

Hakemlerin araştırmayla ilgili, yazarlarla ve/veya araştırmanın finansal destekçileriyle çıkar çatışmaları olmamalıdır. Değerlendirmelerinin sonucunda tarafsız bir yargıya varmalıdırlar. Gönderilmiş yazılara ilişkin tüm bilginin gizli tutulmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdırlar. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir. Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir. Bazı durumlarda editörün kararıyla, ilgili hakemlerin makaleye ait yorumları aynı makaleyi yorumlayan diğer hakemlere gönderilerek hakemlerin bu süreçte aydınlatılması sağlanabilir.

YAZILARIN HAZIRLANMASI

Dil

Dergide İngilizce dilinde makaleler yayınlanır.

Yazıların Hazırlanması ve Yazım Kuralları

Aksi belirtilmedikçe gönderilen yazılarla ilgili tüm yazışmalar ilk yazarla yapılacaktır. Makale gönderimi online olarak ve <http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr> üzerinden yapılmalıdır. Gönderilen yazılar, yayının yayınlanmak üzere gönderildiğini ifade eden, makale türünü belirten ve makaleyle ilgili detayları içeren (bkz: Son Kontrol Listesi) bir mektup; yazının elektronik formunu içeren Microsoft

Word 2003 ve üzerindeki versiyonları ile yazılmış elektronik dosya ve tüm yazarların imzaladığı Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu eklenerek gönderilmelidir.

1. Çalışmalar, A4 boyutundaki kağıdın bir yüzüne, üst, alt, sağ ve sol taraftan 2,5 cm. boşluk bırakılarak, 10 punto Times New Roman harf karakterleriyle ve 1,5 satır aralık ölçüsü ile ve iki yana yaslı olarak hazırlanmalıdır. Paragraf başlarında tab tuşu kullanılmalıdır. Metin içinde yer alan tablo ve şemalarda ise tek satır aralığı kullanılmalıdır.
2. Metnin başlığı küçük harf, koyu renk, Times New Roman yazı tipi, 12 punto olarak sayfanın ortasında yer almalıdır.
3. Metin yazarına ait bilgiler başlıktan sonra bir satır atlanarak, Times New Roman yazı tipi, 10 punto ve tek satır aralığı kullanılarak sayfanın soluna yazılacaktır. Yazarın adı küçük harfle, soyadı büyük harfle belirtildikten sonra bir alt satıra unvanı, çalıştığı kurum ve e-posta adresi yazılacaktır.
4. Giriş bölümünden önce 200-250 kelimelik çalışmanın kapsamını, amacını, ulaşılan sonuçları ve kullanılan yöntemi kaydeden makale dilinde ve İngilizce öz ile 600-800 kelimelik İngilizce genişletilmiş özet yer almalıdır. Çalışmanın İngilizce başlığı İngilizce özet üzerinde yer almalıdır. İngilizce ve makale dilinde özetlerin altında çalışmanın içeriğini temsil eden, makale dilinde 3-5 adet, İngilizce adet anahtar kelime yer almalıdır. Makale İngilizce ise İngilizce genişletilmiş özet istenmez.
5. Çalışmaların başlıca şu unsurları içermesi gerekmektedir: Makale dilinde başlık, öz ve anahtar kelimeler; İngilizce başlık öz ve anahtar kelimeler; İngilizce genişletilmiş özet (makale İngilizce ise İngilizce genişletilmiş özet istenmez), ana metin bölümleri, son notlar ve kaynaklar.
6. Çalışmalarda tablo, grafik ve şekil gibi göstergeler ancak çalışmanın takip edilebilmesi açısından gereklilik arz ettiği durumlarda, numaralandırılarak, tanımlayıcı bir başlık ile birlikte verilmelidir. Demografik özellikler gibi metin içinde verilebilecek veriler, ayrıca tablolar ile ifade edilmemelidir.
7. Yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen makale ile birlikte yazar bilgilerini içeren kapak sayfası gönderilmelidir. Kapak sayfasında, makalenin başlığı, yazar veya yazarların bağlı oldukları kurum ve unvanları, kendilerine ulaşılacak adresler, cep, iş ve faks numaraları, ORCID ve e-posta adresleri yer almalıdır (bkz. Son Kontrol Listesi).
8. Kurallar dâhilinde dergimize yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen çalışmaların her türlü sorumluluğu yazar/yazarlarına aittir.
9. Yayın kurulu ve hakem raporları doğrultusunda yazarlardan, metin üzerinde bazı düzeltmeler yapmaları istenebilir.
10. Dergiye gönderilen çalışmalar yayınlansın veya yayınlanmasın geri gönderilmez.

KAYNAKLAR

Derleme yazıları okuyucular için bir konudaki kaynaklara ulaşmayı kolaylaştıran bir araç olsa da, her zaman orijinal çalışmayı doğru olarak yansıtmaz. Bu yüzden mümkün olduğunca yazarlar orijinal çalışmalarını kaynak göstermelidir. Öte yandan, bir konuda çok fazla sayıda orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi yer israfına neden olabilir. Birkaç anahtar orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi genelde uzun listelerle aynı işi görür. Ayrıca günümüzde kaynaklar elektronik versiyonlara eklenebilmekte ve okuyucular elektronik literatür taramalarıyla yayınlara kolaylıkla ulaşabilmektedir.

Kabul edilmiş ancak henüz sayıya dahil edilmemiş makaleler Early View olarak yayınlanır ve

bu makalelere atıflar “advance online publication” şeklinde verilmelidir. Genel bir kaynaktan elde edilemeyecek temel bir konu olmadıkça “kişisel iletişimlere” atıfta bulunulmamalıdır. Eğer atıfta bulunulursa parantez içinde iletişim kurulan kişinin adı ve iletişimin tarihi belirtilmelidir. Bilimsel makaleler için yazarlar bu kaynaktan yazılı izin ve iletişimin doğruluğunu gösterir belge almalıdır. Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

Referans Stili ve Formatı

SIYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences, metin içi alıntılama ve kaynak gösterme için APA (American Psychological Association) kaynak sitilinin 6. edisyonunu benimser. APA 6. Edisyon hakkında bilgi için:

- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
- <http://www.apastyle.org/>

Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar aşağıdaki örneklerdeki gibi gösterilmelidir.

Metin İçinde Kaynak Gösterme

Kaynaklar metinde parantez içinde yazarların soyadı ve yayın tarihi yazılarak belirtilmelidir. Birden fazla kaynak gösterilecekse kaynaklar arasında (;) işareti kullanılmalıdır. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

Örnekler:

Birden fazla kaynak;

(Esin ve ark., 2002; Karasar 1995)

Tek yazarlı kaynak;

(Akyolcu, 2007)

İki yazarlı kaynak;

(Sayiner ve Demirci, 2007, s. 72)

Üç, dört ve beş yazarlı kaynak;

Metin içinde ilk kullanımda: (Ailen, Ciambune ve Welch 2000, s. 12–13) Metin içinde tekrarlayan kullanımlarda: (Ailen ve ark., 2000)

Altı ve daha çok yazarlı kaynak;

(Çavdar ve ark., 2003)

Kaynaklar Bölümünde Kaynak Gösterme

Kullanılan tüm kaynaklar metnin sonunda ayrı bir bölüm halinde yazar soyadlarına göre alfabetik olarak numaralandırılmadan verilmelidir.

Kaynak yazımı ile ilgili örnekler aşağıda verilmiştir.

Kitap

a) Türkçe Kitap

Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8.bs). Ankara: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

b) Türkçeye Çevrilmiş Kitap

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* (A. Kotil, Çev.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

c) Editörlü Kitap

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e) İngilizce Kitap

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Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology: Advance online publication*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

g) Article in a Magazine

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