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Editorial

The last issue of the fourth volume of IJPS is presented by valuable essays of academicians for the regard of followers and the academic world. This issue contains six manuscripts evaluated by the meticulous works of the referees. Therefore first appreciate the devoted academicians who spent their time for evaluations.

Second thanks to the authors who choose IJPS for publishing their exclusive works. Lastly, we should mention the board's members and the editorial team who steers the IJPS to get the Journal to gain the respect of the scientific world.

The first article of this issue is titled "Environmental Economic Diplomacy Approach in International Law of Transboundary Water Sharing" by Nima Norouzi, and Elham Ataei. In this article, the Authors have reviewed and analyzed existing international laws in the field of transboundary waters, as well as water treaties and the approaches, used to resolve disputes, by using international documents and information.

The second article titled China's One Belt One Road Project and Its Effects on Mediterranean Security and presented by M.Kağan Kozanhan. According to the essay As a rising power, China, by following globalizing policies, has strengthened its place through industrial production with cheap labor and has become an important actor through investments regional and overseas, noticeably reaching an effective position.

In this frame, by this study, China's "One Belt One Road", which constitutes the most known example of international expansionism policy and is called as "Silk Road", was put under the scope, and the investments and constituted policies were examined.

The third article is about the rivalry between USA and China. This time, Harun Abubakar Siddique uses Modelski Model & Offensive Realism Theory to explain this situation. The author claims that this model produces an explanation that includes the past, present, and future within the framework of the enormous increase in the interdependence of states at the global level. And the author uses this model to understand the political and economic order that has emerged around China's evolving role in the global political system.

The fourth article is about the international economic challenge by China. Many works have been presented about global economic rivalry which has been taking China to the center. Many of them were focused on the Silk Road project of China, but the author of this article marks the increasing significance of the Arctic region. According to the author, with the adoption of the Polar Silk Road (PSR) policy framework by China, emerging opportunities and challenges for Nordic countries in the region have received wider attention. So this article mainly explores several plans and projects regarding the development and utilization of Arctic sea routes under the shadow of increasing global uncertainties.

Our fifth article, prepared by Sanjay Kumar Pradhan, is about the Russia-Ukraine war. The author underlines that the "Special Military Operation" carried out by Russia on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, is the most serious war since the Second World War. The rationale for this war, dubbed the operation by Russian President Vladimir Putin, is that Russia cannot stay safe, develop and survive with a NATO member Ukraine. However, in this article, the author also underlines that today's war is the result of various factors that paved the way for a more painful outcome between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, the article tries to analyze today's Russia-Ukraine war with an approach suggesting that the conflicting claims and interests of the two countries, starting with Kievan Russia, are the result of "how the west dragged Moscow into a deadly war with Kyiv".

The last paper on this issue is about Israel's foreign policy. The author of the article, A.Murat Ağdemir, draws attention to a psychological factor that frames the general attitude of Israel in its foreign policy. Accordingly, in this article, the author examines whether the argument that "Israel has no friends", which is based on the feeling of loneliness and reflects the Jewish people's worldview, is still a valid aphorism for foreign policy decision-makers.

We hope to meet with new articles in the next issue.

Editor-in-Chief

Editörden,

IJPS'nin dördüncü cildinin son sayısı, akademisyenlerin değerli yazılarıyla takipçilerin ve akademik dünyanın dikkatine sunulmaktadır. Bu sayıda, hakemlerin titiz çalışmalarıyla değerlendirilen altı yazı bulunmaktadır. Bu nedenle öncelikle değerlendirmelere zaman ayıran özverili hakemlerimize teşekkür ederiz.

İkinci olarak, değerli çalışmalarını yayınlamak için IJPS'yi seçen bu sayının değerli yazarlarına teşekkür ederiz ve tabiki son olarak, derginin bilim dünyasının saygısını kazanması için IJPS'ye yön veren kurul üyelerinden ve editör ekibinden bahsetmeliyiz.

Bu sayının ilk makalesi Nima Norouzi ve Elham Ataei tarafından kaleme alınan "Sınır Ötesi Su Paylaşımına İlişkin Uluslararası Hukukta Çevresel Ekonomik Diploması Yaklaşımı" başlığını taşımaktadır. Bu makalede yazarlar, sınıraşan sular konusundaki mevcut uluslararası kanunları ve su anlaşmalarını ve ihtilafların çözümünde kullanılan yaklaşımları uluslararası belge ve bilgilerden yararlanarak gözden geçirmiş ve analiz etmişlerdir.

"Çin'in Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Projesi ve Akdeniz Güvenliğine Etkileri" başlıklı ikinci makale ise M.Kağan Kozanhan tarafından hazırlanmıştır. Makaleye göre yükselen bir güç olarak Çin, küreselleşen politikaları izleyerek ucuz işgücü ile sanayi üretimi yoluyla yerini sağlamlaştırmış, bölgesel ve deniz aşırı yatırımlarla önemli bir aktör haline gelmiş, gözle görülür şekilde etkin bir konuma gelmiştir. Bu çerçevede, bu çalışma ile Çin'in uluslararası yayılmacılık politikasının en bilinen örneğini oluşturan ve "İpek Yolu" olarak adlandırılan "Bir Kuşak Bir Yol" kapsamına alınmış, yatırımlar ve oluşturulan politikalar incelenmiştir.

Üçüncü makale ABD ile Çin arasındaki rekabeti konu alıyor. Harun Abubakar Siddique bu kez bu durumu açıklamak için Modelski Modeli ve Saldırgan Gerçekçilik Teorisini kullanıyor. Yazar, bu modelin küresel düzeyde devletlerin birbirine bağımlılığındaki muazzam artış çerçevesinde geçmiş, bugünü ve geleceği içeren bir açıklama ürettiğini iddia ediyor ve yazar bu modeli, Çin'in küresel siyasi sistemdeki gelişen rolü etrafında ortaya çıkan siyasi ve ekonomik düzeni anlamak için kullanıyor.

Dördüncü makale Çin'in uluslararası ekonomik meydan okuması hakkındadır. Çin'i merkeze alan küresel ekonomik rekabet hakkında birçok çalışma sunulmuştur. Birçoğu Çin'in İpek Yolu projesine odaklanmıştı, ancak bu makalenin yazarı Arktik bölgesinin artan önemine işaret ediyor. Yazara göre, Çin tarafından Kutup İpek Yolu (PSR) politika çerçevesinin benimsenmesiyle, bölgedeki İskandinav ülkeleri için ortaya çıkan fırsatlar ve zorluklar daha fazla ilgi gördü. Dolayısıyla bu makale, artan küresel belirsizliklerin gölgesinde Arktik deniz yollarının geliştirilmesi ve kullanımına ilişkin çeşitli plan ve projeleri incelemektedir.

Sanjay Kumar Pradhan tarafından hazırlanan beşinci makalemiz ise Rusya-Ukrayna savaşı hakkındadır. Yazar, Rusya'nın 24 Şubat 2022'de Ukrayna'ya yönelik gerçekleştirdiği "Özel Askeri Operasyon"un, 2. Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana karşılaşılan en ciddi savaş olduğunu altını çizmektedir. Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin tarafından operasyonun olarak adlandırılan bu savaşın gerekçesi, Rusya'nın NATO'ya üye bir Ukrayna ile güvende kalamayacağı, gelişemeyeceği ve hayatta kalamayacağıdır. Ancak yazar bu makalede, bugünkü savaşın, Rusya ile Ukrayna arasında daha acı bir sonuca zemin hazırlayan çeşitli faktörlerin bir sonucu olduğunu da altını çiziyor. Bu nedenle, makale, bugünkü Rusya-Ukrayna savaşının, iki ülkenin Kiev Rusyasından başlayarak çatışan iddia ve çıkarlarının bir sonucu olduğunu ve "Batının Moskova'yı Kiev ile nasıl ölümcül bir savaşa sürüklediğini" ileri süren bir yaklaşımla analiz etmeye çalışıyor.

Bu konudaki son yazı İsrail'in dış politikasıyla ilgili. Makalenin yazarı A.Murat Ağdemir, İsrail'in dış politikasında genel tutumunu çerçeveleyen bir psikolojik etmene dikkat çekmektedir. Buna göre yazar bu makalede yalnızlık duygusuna dayan ve Yahudi halkının dünya görüşünü yansıtan İsrail'in dostu yok argümanının dış politika karar alıcıları için hala geçerli bir aforizma olup olmadığını incelemektedir.

Bir sonraki sayıda yeni makalelerle buluşmak dileğiyle.

Editör



Environmental Economic Diplomacy Approach in International Law of Transboundary Water Sharing

Nima NOROUZI*

Elham ATA EI**

Abstract

In this article, the existing international laws in the field of transboundary waters, as well as water treaties and the approaches used to resolve disputes, have been reviewed and analyzed by using international documents and information.

As international convention's provisions, every state in the common river basin has the right to have fair and reasonable exploitation of the water flow of the transboundary watershed in its territory, with the obligation not to cause damage to other countries. This right is determined by considering the natural factors of the watershed, existing and potential uses, social and economic needs of the countries of the basin, and the effects of exploitation on other countries. But the factors presented for this purpose are general and have different technical and legal interpretations.

Keywords: Environmental diplomacy, hydropolitic, water security, transboundary water, Environmental water law

1. Introduction

Legal scholars believe that one reason for the evolution of the legal regime over international rivers has been water disputes between coastal countries. In addition to international treaties, conventions, and international governmental and non-governmental institutions' efforts, we can mention the conclusion of 3600 bilateral and multilateral treaties from the 800s AD to 1985 AD.¹ The provisions of most of these treaties have been on shipping and navigation, fisheries, shared control of water resources, development of hydropower, and, most importantly, shared use of water. The first and most important international study on the legal horizons of common international water resources, especially international rivers, by Professor Smith is from the University of London in his book "The Economic Application of International Rivers." In this book, in addition to international treaties, he has referred to realist doctrines to reduce water conflicts in the international river basin.²

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¹ Jeffrey Albert. "Rethinking the management of transboundary freshwater resources: a critical examination of modern international law and practice." In *Natural resources forum* 24, no. 1, pp. 21-30. (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2000).

² Mark Zeitoun and John Anthony Allan. "Applying hegemony and power theory to transboundary water analysis." *Water policy* 10, no. 2 (2008): 3-12.



The new evolution of the international law of international rivers is the conclusion of the Convention on the Law of Non-Shipping Use of International Waterways, dated 21 May 1997 - the Assembly adopted the draft resolution by 103 votes to 3 (Burundi, China, and Turkey) and passed 27 abstentions - the result of 33 years of work by the International Law Commission. This treaty has not yet entered into implementation.³

The Convention is a structural treaty aimed at using, developing, maintaining, managing, and protecting international waterways and the optimal promotion of their sustainable use for present and future generations. It deals with the main procedural aspects and practical facts as a structural convention, leaving the rest to the coastal states. To be considered on a case-by-case basis in the agreements they conclude. Such agreements may accept or amend parts of the Convention. The Convention is divided into seven sections and contains 37 articles. Besides, it contains an appendix on mediation containing 14 articles. The main areas mentioned in the Convention are the definition of the term waterway, waterway agreements, fair and rational use and non-damaging obligations, the announcement of planned actions, the protection, maintenance, management, and settlement.⁴

Research, with explicit reference to the use of international waterways for shipping, emphasizes that shipping uses are not within the scope of this Convention, except for uses that affect shipping. However, it should be noted that Article 10 of the Convention states that in the absence of an agreement or custom in opposition to this Convention, the use of international waterways shall take precedence over other uses. Therefore, it is taken from this article to show that shipping uses, which were superior (over other uses) during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are no longer superior to non-shipping uses.⁵

This article goes further and wants that attention should be paid to basic human needs in case of conflict between international waterways. "Special attention is paid to the adequate supply of water to sustain human life, including drinking water and water needed to produce food for human consumption," said a statement issued by the working group reviewing the draft

³ Lei Xie and Imad Antoine Ibrahim. "Is the ecosystem approach effective in transboundary water systems: Central Asia as a case study?." *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water* 8, no. 5 (2021): e1542.

⁴ Eyal Benvenisti. *Sharing transboundary resources: International law and optimal resource use*. Vol. 23. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

⁵ Ariel Dinar and Yacov Tsur, eds. *Management of transboundary water resources under scarcity: a multidisciplinary approach*. World Scientific, 2017.



convention, which addresses basic human needs. "Famine prevention must be done," Article 10 is also used by some authors to support the concept of human rights on water, along with other similar sections of the Convention in other international legal instruments.⁶

The Convention uses the term "international waterway" to mean "a waterway of which parts are located in different countries" and the waterway as representing both a system of surface and subsurface waters which, because of their physical connection to a single comprehensive "It is formed and flows naturally in a common path." This definition includes groundwater that is associated with surface water. And it does not include transboundary aquifers that neither pour water into surface water nor catch water. Imagine that because of this vacuum, the International Law Committee issued a separate resolution proposing that these laws in this Convention govern other types of groundwater.⁷

Waterway agreements related to Article 3 of the Convention state that the Convention should not affect the waterway country's rights and obligations formed under the treaties. However, if necessary, this article urges the parties to consider aligning those memoranda of understanding with the Convention's essential provisions. Besides, Article 3 refers to some, but not all, waterway states that are parties to a waterway treaty and emphasize that no provision of this Convention applies to the rights and obligations of waterway states to which they are not a party that it doesn't affect.⁸

The Convention refers to the principles of equitable and rational use contained in Article 6 and the factors and conditions that should be considered to define such use. Article 6 (paragraph 1) of the Convention states that the use of international waterways is fair and reasonable in light of the following conditions and factors. (a) geographical, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological, and other natural features; (b) take into account the social and economic needs of waterway countries; (c) the population of the waterway in the country of the waterway; (d) the effects of the use or uses of a waterway in one waterway country on other waterway countries; (e) the potential and actual capacity to use the waterways; (f) the

⁶ Joseph W. Dellapenna, "The customary international law of transboundary fresh waters." *International journal of global environmental issues* 1, no. 3-4 (2001): 264-305.

⁷ Jacques Ganoulis, Lucien Duckstein and Peter Literathy, eds. *Transboundary Water Resources Management: Institutional and Engineering Approaches* 7. (Springer Science & Business Media, 1996).

⁸ Ariel Dinar, Shlomi Dinar, Daene C. Mckinney and Stephen C. Mccaffrey. *Bridges over water: understanding transboundary water conflict, negotiation and cooperation*. Vol. 3. (World Scientific Publishing Company, 2007).



maintenance, protection, development, and economy of waterway resources and the cost of effective means; And (g) the availability of secondary solutions, the comparable value in a particular application or current use. In this respect, the Convention is the same as the principle adopted 30 years ago in the Helsinki Convention, which established fair and rational use as the guiding principle of international water law. And taking into account the special circumstances and factors to reveal this just use.⁹

Article 7 (paragraph 2) addresses rational and equitable use principles, regardless of when serious damage has been inflicted on another waterway country. The paragraph also indicates that the injury cause must be tolerated when possible damage is considered. A careful reading of Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the Convention should lead us to the conclusion that the principle of the "obligation not to harm" is less important than the principles of "fair and reasonable use." Therefore, it can be concluded that, like the Helsinki Law, the principles of "rational and equitable use" are the guiding and fundamental principles of the UN Convention on Waterways.¹⁰

Other fundamental obligations of the Convention, including the obligation to cooperate among conditions, are establishing joint mechanisms or commissions, the routine exchange of data and information, and informing other waterway countries of the planned solutions governed by Section 3 of the Convention. This is the longest part of the Convention. And these obligations also include nine articles on aspects related to informing other waterway countries about planned solutions that may cause significant adverse effects.¹¹ Those aspects include a time frame for a response; Commitments to the notified country over a specific period include responses, non-responses, consultations and discussions regarding planned solutions, procedures in the absence of a notification notice, and immediate management of planned solutions.

Environmental protection of international waterways is covered by Section 4, Articles 20 to 26, entitled "Protection, maintenance, and management" of international waterways. This

⁹ Richard E. Just and Sinaia Netanyahu. eds. *Conflict and cooperation on trans-boundary water resources*. Vol. 11. (Springer Science & Business Media, 1998).

¹⁰ Sharmila Murthy. "Can international water Law be a tool for water diplomacy?." *Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict* 27, (2014): 17-25.

¹¹ Dieter Helm and David Pearce. "Assessment: economic policy towards the environment." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 6, no. 1 (1990): 1-16.



includes several waterway countries' obligations, including protecting and maintaining ecosystems, preventing, reducing, and controlling pollution, introducing dangerous or new species, and protecting and maintaining the marine environment. The Pledge of Understanding statement sets out clauses that set a precise standard for waterway countries.¹²

Article 33 and the annexed parts to the convention deal with the mechanism and procedures for resolving disputes. This article covers several methods of resolving disputes, including negotiations, the search for joint efforts of Jamileh, mediation and compromise by a third party, the use of joint waterway institutions, or the referral of a dispute to the International Court of Justice. However, Article 33 details the fact-finding procedures, which only include parties who review the fact-finding commission's report in good faith. The Convention gives member states the option of remitting their dispute to mediation following the Convention's provisions and the laws annexed to the International Court of Justice. It should be noted again that this principle is also not binding and is simply an option. The number of countries that acceded to the Convention on 1 Jun 2010 is 19, and the remaining 16 required are 16.¹³

No expiration date has been set for the implementation of the Convention. The Convention will be implemented by its members after 35 accessions or acceptance, no matter how long it takes. It is not surprising that complex and controversial treaties take a long time to implement. Implementing the Convention on the Law of the Sea took almost 12 years. However, judging by the prolonged process of signing, acceptance, and accession due to the misunderstandings mentioned above, there is a risk that the Convention will not be implemented because the number of admissions and accessions does not seem to reach the required level.¹⁴

This Convention has a significant impact on bilateral and multilateral water treaties. Several international identities, such as the International Court of Justice, support the Convention. In the South African Development Community, the member states shared their protocol on waterway systems in 1995, adapting to the Convention's provisions in 2000. Most

¹² Kyoko Matsumoto. "Transboundary groundwater and international law: past practices and current implications." (2002).

¹³ Yanmei He. "China's practice on the non-navigational uses of transboundary waters: Transforming diplomacy through rules of international law." *Water International* 40, no. 2 (2015): 312-327.

¹⁴ Gabriel E. Eckstein. "Water scarcity, conflict, and security in a climate change world: challenges and opportunities for international law and policy." *Wis. Int'l LJ* 27, (2009): 409.



of the revised protocol material on shared waterways in the South African Development Community is a copy of the Convention.¹⁵

The World Commission on Dams notes that the principles set out in the 1997 UN Convention on the Right to Non-Shipping Use of International Waterways are guaranteed and that every country must make every effort to accept and implement them. The World Water Council has described parts of the Convention and concluded that "it is worrying that even after all the time spent preparing the convention, it does not seem likely to accept enough countries to implement it." The World Water Commission has also called the Convention weak in the 21st century. The commission added that although the Convention is weak, it is worth noting that the first step is to show more respect for the global water figure.¹⁶

According to McCaffrey, some experts consider the basic principles of the Convention, such as the fair and rational use and commitment of non-harm, the communication and exchange of data and information, and areas related to environmental protection, to reflect the basic tenets of customary international water law. Thus, even if the Convention is not implemented, it has received widespread support and is widely believed to reflect International Water Law.¹⁷

Since the world's population is growing exponentially and the quantity and quality of natural resources are decreasing, the number and intensity of water disputes between countries have increased, and attention has been paid to examining and providing new and creative solutions for the peaceful resolution of resource disputes. Transboundary water is an important step in establishing stable and safe international relations. There are nearly 263 border river basins and lakes in the world, which cover almost half of the earth's surface and contain 60% of the world's river flow. About 40 percent of the world's population lives in border basins. One hundred forty-five countries have border basins, and 21 countries are completely located in border basins.¹⁸

¹⁵ Anton Earle. ed. *Transboundary water management: Principles and practice*. (Earthscan, 2013).

¹⁶ Bo Appelgren and Wulf Klohn. "Management of transboundary water resources for water security; principles, approaches and state practice." In *Natural resources forum* 21, no. 2, pp. 91-100. (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 1997).

¹⁷ Jeffrey Albert. "Rethinking the management of transboundary freshwater resources: a critical examination of modern international law and practice." pp. 21-30.

¹⁸ Joseph W. Dellapenna. "The customary international law of transboundary fresh waters." pp. 264-305.



In the conditions of water shortage, the main issue at the heart of transboundary water disputes is the way to divide water, which, due to the generality and lack of transparency of existing international laws, can be said to be practically a solid international standard for dividing transboundary water resources and the resulting benefits. There are none of them.¹⁹

In the survey conducted by a study, 250 independent international treaties, including 688 agreements on 113 common watersheds, were signed between 1820 and 2007. While the scope and content of these treaties vary widely, they cover approximately 70% of the world's transboundary basins. In terms of content, the focus of the treaties mentioned above has changed from the issues of regulation and development of water resources to the issues of water resources management and creating a structure and framework for this management as the previous issues such as hydroelectricity, water allocation, and irrigation are still important. Still, the environment is currently the most common topic mentioned in the text of the treaties.²⁰ Treaties also increasingly include data and information sharing and have dispute resolution mechanisms and a mechanism for the participation of parties beyond government actors.

Iran has bilateral agreements with its neighbors on most of the border rivers, including the 1920 treaty with the former Soviet Union regarding the Aras, Atrak, and other 12 common rivers, the 1954 protocol of the Sari Su and Qara Su rivers with Turkey, the 1971 river treaty Hirmand with Afghanistan and the border water agreement of 1975 with Iraq. This expansion of the border rivers in Iran clarifies the importance of researching and studying international laws in the field of transboundary waters, which is examined in this article.

2. Theories Governing Treaties and International Laws

The theories governing international agreements include four theories of absolute territorial sovereignty (Harmon doctrine), the theory of absolute river integrity, the theory of limited territorial sovereignty, and the theory of common water sovereignty. According to the literature, these four theories can be divided into extreme and moderate formats.²¹

¹⁹ Ruby Moynihan and Bjørn-Oliver Magsig. "The Rising Role of Regional Approaches in International Water Law: Lessons from the UNECE Water Regime and Himalayan Asia for Strengthening Transboundary Water Cooperation." *Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law* 23, no. 1 (2014): 43-58.

²⁰ Alistair Rieu-Clarke and Ruby Moynihan. *Transboundary water governance and climate change adaptation: International law, policy guidelines and best practice application*. (UNESCO Publishing, 2015).

²¹ Halla Qaddumi. *Practical approaches to transboundary water benefit sharing*. (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008).



Extreme Principles: Haqabah is based on hydrological or calendar criteria. Many of the common claims for Haqabah are based on two general bases: either it is based on hydrology, that is, where the river or aquifer originates, and the amount of runoff that is produced in a particular country, or It is the basis of the calendar, that is, who has had the longest use of water.²²

- The theory of absolute territorial sovereignty is often used by the upstream coastal country. This principle refers to the doctrine proposed by U.S. Attorney General Harmon in 1895 in the Rio Grande River dispute with Mexico, arguing that a state has absolute rights to the water flowing through its territory. . It should be noted that this theory was immediately rejected by Harmon's successor and was later officially rejected by the United States and was never used in any other water treaty, except for rare cases in some internal tributaries of transboundary waters. This doctrine was rejected in the International Court of Justice in the "Lake Lennox" case in 1957. It is not cited in international arbitrations related to transboundary waters.²³

- Downstream countries often refer to the theory of absolute river integrity, which shows that every country along the river has the right to use the natural flow of the entire river system entering its borders. This principle has been accepted in international forums as much as the theory of absolute sovereignty.²⁴

In arid or mixed regions (wet upstream and dry downstream), downstream countries often have less rainfall than their upstream neighbors. As a result, they depend on river water for a long history and often have older water infrastructure. This principle of acquiring royalties due to old usages is known as "historical royalties" or, in other words, "first in time, first in royalties".²⁵

Usually, the reference to these conflict-oriented doctrines corresponds to the position of the basin countries in terms of being upstream or downstream, and for upstream countries such

²² Patricia Wouters and Sergei Vinogradov. "Reframing the transboundary water discourse: Contextualized international law in practice." *Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law* 29, no. 3 (2020): 385-394.

²³ Nurit Kliot. *Water resources and conflict in the Middle East*. (Routledge, 2005).

²⁴ Dombrowsky, Ines. "Revisiting the potential for benefit sharing in the management of trans-boundary rivers." *Water Policy* 11, no. 2 (2009): 125-140.

²⁵ A. Dan. Tarlock. "International water law and the protection of river system ecosystem integrity." *BYU J. Pub. L.* 10, (1996): 181.



as Ethiopia and Turkey, they are often based on arguments based on the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, and for downstream countries such as Iraq and Egypt is based on historical rights.²⁶

Moderate principles: over time, the extremist defined rights were moderated, and most countries accepted the limitations of both theories of absolute territorial sovereignty and river integrity.

The theory of limited territorial sovereignty is a consensus and a balance between the subject of the hydrological era and the calendar era. In other words, any government can use the existing waterways in its territory as long as it does not cause serious damage to the interests of other governments along the river. This theory allows the good neighborly relations of states adjacent to a waterway to be better manifested and emerge. Today, the theory of limited territorial sovereignty constitutes the dominant theory, and the procedure of governments has moved towards accepting this theory.²⁷

Examples of international jurisprudence in the use of this theory are the procedure of the government of Chile (upstream state) and Bolivia (downstream state), the judgment issued in 1931 in the case of New Jersey and New York, and the judgment in the case of deposition of substances in the Danube in 1927, the opinion 1929 Permanent Court of Justice in the case of territorial jurisdiction of the International Oder River Commission, 1939 opinion of the Supreme Court of Italy in the case of Mediterranean Coast Electric Energy Company v. Le Gori Company, 1942 Rio Commission Report on the damage caused by the diversion of the Indus River by the state Punjab to the state of Sindh, the arbitration verdict of 1945 in the dispute between Ecuador and Peru regarding the Zarumilla river and the court verdict in the "Lake Lenox" case can be mentioned.²⁸

All these arbitrations somehow recognize the rights of the upstream government to take advantage of the benefits of the border and common river to promote the welfare of the people and the economic progress of its country. At the same time, it has been stated that the upstream

²⁶ Ibrahim Kaya. "The Euphrates-Tigris basin: An overview and opportunities for cooperation under international law." *Arid Lands Newsletter* 44, (1998).

²⁷ Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman. "Principles of transboundary water resources management and Ganges treaties: an analysis." *International Journal of Water Resources Development* 25, no. 1 (2009): 159-173.

²⁸ Günther Handl. "Territorial sovereignty and the problem of transnational pollution." *American Journal of International Law* 69, no. 1 (1975): 50-76.



government cannot release itself from the obligation of non-compliance—damage to the ability to use river water for other governments. Also, the downstream government cannot ask the upstream government to waive its authority to provide the downstream government with the entire water flow. Both countries should take advantage of the benefits of the river, and these interests should be compatible as much as possible. The following explains that the provisions of the 1997 Convention are also in accordance with the theory of limited territorial sovereignty.²⁹

Regarding the theory of shared sovereignty, it should be noted that despite the political borders that separate the states, the states around an international waterway form a single entity and society. At the same time, the undeniable truth is that the common sovereignty of borders and shared rivers is not observed in the practice of countries due to the difficulty of reaching an agreement regarding the use of the benefits of these rivers and the preservation of their bed.

3. Existing International Laws Regarding Non-Shipping Uses of International Waterways

The documents that reflect the current legal situation in the field of transboundary waters include:

- a. The Helsinki Rules, which the International Law Society compiled in 1966.
- b. The 1997 United Nations Convention on Non-shipping Uses of International Waterways is the result of the work of the International Law Commission and is based on the Helsinki rules.
- c. The European Water Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Waterways and International Lakes 1992 was established based on the Helsinki rules and by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).
- d. The Berlin Rules of 2004, in which the revised version of the Helsinki Rules is presented.

This article examines and explains the contents of the documents mentioned above.

- Helsinki rules of 1966 about non-navigational use of international waterways

²⁹ Hillel I. Shuval. "Approaches to resolving the water conflicts between Israel and her neighbors—a regional water-for-peace plan." *Water International* 17, no. 3 (1992): 133-143.



First, the main provisions of this document will be discussed. The content of Article 4 of the Helsinki Rules is as follows:

"Each watershed state in its territory has the right to fairly participate in the benefits of using the waters of the international basin."

According to Article 5 of the Helsinki Rules, the right to reasonable and fair participation is determined in each case based on a list of factors and conditions. This list considers three types of factors:

- Natural factors: the geography of the catchment area, especially the distribution of the basin area in the relevant countries, the hydrology of the basin, and the runoff produced in each of the relevant countries; The climate of each basin country.³⁰

- Historical data: past uses, especially those that have remained until now.

- Economic and social needs are the needs of each relevant country. The possibility of development with alternative resources, the cost of this replacement, and the necessity of minimizing resource waste.

"Benefits" are mentioned in the right of fair participation. According to the interpretation of Article 4 of the Helsinki Rules, for an action to be introduced with benefits, it must be economically or socially useful. On the one hand, this means that a user with no benefit to the government and who does not bring good cannot have a fair title.

On the other hand, preference should not necessarily be given to more effective activity at the economic level. It is sufficient that that use is effective considering the economic and technological level of the relevant government. This means that the social use of activity can prevail over its economic benefits.

In addition to being fair, each coastal state's right to use the waterway must also be "reasonable." That is, it is not enough that the division is fair, but it must be ensured that the total number of uses of the waterway provides basic privileges for the relevant governments. This interpretation of the International Law Society relies on a set of convention regimes that emphasize "wise," "ideal," or "best possible" exploitation. In addition, Article 5 of the Helsinki

³⁰ Kliot, Nurit, D. Shmueli, and Uri Shamir. "Institutions for management of transboundary water resources: their nature, characteristics and shortcomings." *Water Policy* 3, no. 3 (2001): 229-255.



Rules, which refers to fair and reasonable participation factors, mentions the necessity of avoiding unnecessary waste.

Suppose important damages are caused downstream within the framework of reasonable use. In that case, these damages are not considered legitimate. A coastal waterway government should not have reasonable activities more than its right to fair use, which shows that priority is given to fair use here.³¹

A complex set of factors is involved in preferring one situation over another. To better represent various factors, the International Law Society has imagined a hypothetical situation in its commentary on Article 5 of the Helsinki Rules, which is examined below.

The mentioned assumption is that downstream government A has used the waters of the waterway shared with government B for many years for irrigation purposes. Meanwhile, upstream government B informs government A of its intention to build a facility on the same river to produce electricity. The two mentioned activities cannot be combined. The question that arises here is how to solve this problem. If the situation is such that in the case of State A: a) the exploitation of electricity does not necessarily end irrigation activities. Still, it forces State A to use more efficient methods, methods that nevertheless do not allow State A to have the same have the previous production level. b) Government A can procure these materials from another place instead of the food it cannot produce at an approximately similar price. c) Recently, a significant amount of underground water has been discovered in the territory of state A and regarding state B: a) the production of electrical energy will have a great impact on this state, and b) many people will benefit from this new activity.

The traditional analysis of this situation gives priority to the case of current use, i.e., the irrigation activities of State A, while according to Article 5 of the Helsinki Rules, "existing uses" are only one factor, among other factors. In the present case, three other considerations will weigh heavily on government B:³²

a) In general, this government's most profitable use of the waterway is the production of electrical energy.

³¹ Marwa Daoudy. "Asymmetric power: Negotiating water in the Euphrates and Tigris." *International Negotiation* 14, no. 2 (2009): 361-391.

³² Michelle R. Sergent. "Comparison of the Helsinki Rules to the 1994 UN draft articles: will the progression of International Watercourse Law be dammed." *Vill. Envtl. LJ* 8, (1997): 435.



b) Government A has the possibility of substitution, either through the purchase of agricultural products, the improvement of its irrigation system, or the use of its underground water.

c) To produce electric energy in another place, government B must tangibly pay a higher price.

However, some strategies can be used to protect the interests of government A: for example, restricting the authorized activities of government B, giving money to government A to allow it to upgrade its irrigation system, or paying compensation to This government is trying to compensate for the loss caused by the interruption of its irrigation activities.

The procedure of the International Law Association for drawing a concrete picture of Article 5 shows that several elements can affect the analysis and resolution of the dispute. This causes a lack of stability or, to put it better, a lack of predictability in these claims. In a better interpretation, the principle of the right to fair and reasonable participation cannot be considered a factor for stability in international relations. But at the same time, it should be kept in mind that it is impossible to prove the superiority of some uses or the precedence of existing uses in international arbitrations. The subject of the existing usage is also stated in Articles 6 and 7 of the Helsinki Rules, and it covers two issues:³³

a) Do the existing activities take precedence over new uses, and if yes, to what extent do these activities take precedence?

b) Can a government start a new use despite the interests of current consumers?

Article 8 of the Helsinki Rules considers the current use preferable unless the reasons justifying their continuation in other new conditions are no longer acceptable and a new activity has replaced them. However, if necessary, the current user may be reduced and abandoned after compensation.

3.1. 1997 United Nations Convention on Non-Navigational Use of International Waterways

In 1970, the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly under the title "Progressive development and formulation of rules of international law related to international

³³ Salman MA. Salman. "The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: perspectives on international water law." *Water Resources Development* 23, no. 4 (2007): 625-640.



waterways" was approved. According to the resolution mentioned above, the International Law Commission started working on the issue of international waterways. Five special rapporteurs guided the activities of the commission. After twenty years, in 1991, this commission issued its first draft under the title "Law on non-navigational uses of international rivers" based on the two principles of "reasonable and fair use" of common waters and "obligation not to cause serious damage to other countries along the river." Presented This draft was presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 1994. After reforms in 1997, it was presented under the title "Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Waterways" for the signature of the UN member states. Finally, August 2013 became effective after reaching the number of agreeing countries' quorum.³⁴

However, after the presentation of the Convention in 1997 and before its implementation, the general and important rules of the said Convention were used as common law by arbitration courts and international organizations; for example, four months after the presentation of the Convention in the United Nations. (in the same year 1997), the International Court of Justice cited it in its judgment on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project. In its judgment, three requirements include fair and reasonable use, non-serious harm, and prior notification of planning measures. They were used as international customary laws.

The Convention contains 37 articles, which are arranged in seven parts: First part: Is the introduction. Part II: General principles. The third part: Planned actions. The fourth part is protection, maintenance, and management. Fifth section: emergency conditions. The sixth section is miscellaneous cases, and the seventh is cases related to arbitration and dispute resolution.

The main provisions of the Convention are in sections one, two, three, and four. The first part includes the definition of the important term international waterway. Article 2 of this section defines the term "waterway" as "a system consisting of a surface and underground water that forms a unit due to its physical connection and leads to a common point." This definition is important because it includes underground waters that are hydrologically related to surface waters, which include many underground water resources worldwide. It also defines "international waterways" as "waterways whose parts are located in different countries." In

³⁴ Stephen C. McCaffrey. "Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses." *United Nations*. Available online at: http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/clnuiw/clnuiw_e.pdf (2008).



addition, the Convention clearly states in Article 3 that the previous bilateral or multilateral protocols and agreements between the countries are the first and prevail over the provisions of this Convention.³⁵

Article 5 contained in the second part is the main expression that is the cornerstone of the Convention, which is fair and reasonable use and participation in international waterways. To ensure countries' fair and reasonable use in an international waterway, factors and conditions are provided in Article 6. According to this principle, countries participate in the use, development, and protection of international waterways fairly and reasonably.

Another key provision of the Convention is the requirement not to cause serious harm, as stated in Article 7. This article requires countries to take appropriate measures to prevent significant damage to other countries in the international waterway basin. Emphasis on prevention is important, and since it is often difficult to stop or correct an activity once it has started, it can be very complicated and expensive, so if this is possible, compensation can be paid to compensate for the damage. The principles of Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention complement each other. In the negotiations related to articles 5, 6, and 7 effectively, the goal is to reach a solution, all the basin's countries fairly and reasonably use the waterway and its benefits. This solution will likely involve compensation to achieve a fair balance of uses and benefits.³⁶

The third part of the Convention includes the principle of prior notification of the planned actions and the description of some details of the different aspects of this requirement. The essence of this principle is that if the planned actions of a country are likely to cause significant adverse effects in the country or other countries along the international waterway, the said government is obliged to promptly inform other relevant countries of its plans. If the mentioned countries believe that the mentioned programs are inconsistent with the requirements of articles 5 or 7, the process of consensus and consultation and, if necessary, negotiation will be followed to reach a fair solution.

³⁵ Stephen McCaffrey. "The contribution of the UN Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses." *International Journal of Global Environmental Issues* 1, no. 3-4 (2001): 250-263.

³⁶ Aaron Schwabach. "United nations convention on the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses, customary international law, and the interests of developing upper Riparians." *Tex. Int'l LJ* 33 (1998): 257.



Article 10 also says that in the absence of an agreement or custom among countries, "no use has inherent priority over other uses" and that "in case of conflict between different uses [that must be resolved], the needs of the Human life should be given special attention."

The fourth part of the Convention deals with the protection, maintenance, and management of international waterways. It includes regulations for protecting and maintaining the waterway ecosystem, prevention, reduction, and control of pollution, and advice on managing international waterways. It has also emphasized that international waterways and their facilities in armed conflicts should be protected from aggression by the parties involved.³⁷

The provisions of the Convention include two general principles of fair and reasonable use to achieve optimal and sustainable exploitation and the requirement not to cause serious damage to one country to other countries in the basin. It provides factors to determine the amount of fair and reasonable use. It states that "The weight given to each factor is determined according to its importance" and that "the order of these factors is not important for fair and reasonable use. Still, all of them should be considered as a whole". According to previous research, most of the discussions related to the Convention revolve around how to use it reasonably and fairly in each country of the basin to achieve the optimal exploitation of the river and the benefits arising from it in terms of the commitment to non-harming and The debate on which principle, "reasonable use" or "non-injury" should be prioritized, has been one of the focal points of the 1997 convention.³⁸

According to the opinion of the second reporter of the International Law Commission, "fair use" is the priority. Still, the third reporter has argued for the priority of "not seriously harming." The commentators also had the same problem adapting the concepts as the reporters: the background findings show that the recent reporters were right. The absence of serious harm should be a priority. At the same time, some sources argued for fair use and show that Article 7 (which in The Convention includes a clause for harm reduction and dialogue on compensation) is evidence of this argument. The World Bank, which must follow international law principles in its financing projects, recognizes the importance of fair use in theory. Still, for

³⁷ Malgosia. Fitzmaurice. "Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses." *LJIL* 10 (1997): 501.

³⁸ Peter Beaumont. "The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses: its strengths and weaknesses from a water management perspective and the need for new workable guidelines." *International Journal of Water Resources Development* 16, no. 4 (2000): 475-495.



practical measures, the simplicity of implementation considers the absence of serious damage and a project. It will not finance any project that causes damage without the approval of all the basin's countries.³⁹

According to research, the definition of deliberately ambiguous concepts ("reasonable," "fair," and "serious"), both in terms of legal interpretation and political interests, has guaranteed the continuation of ambiguity in the rules of customary law.

The relationship between reasonable and fair use and the obligation not to cause serious harm is a balance between the issue of hydrological rights and historical rights. The 1997 Convention includes provisions for both concepts without determining a clear priority between them. Although, at first sight, it seems that the provisions of the Convention are set in favor of downstream countries, upstream countries such as Turkey express their opposition to this Convention. They expressed and welcomed it in front of inferior countries like Syria. But later, the upstream countries supported emphasizing the principle of fair use in this commission because this principle gives the same weight to the needs of the present as the needs of the past. In the same way, the downstream countries support the theory of historical rights in preserving the previous uses by emphasizing the principle of no serious harm.

3.2. European Water Convention on Exploitation and Protection of Transboundary Waterways and International Lakes

The Convention on the Use and Protection of Boundary Waterways and International Lakes was established by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) based on the Helsinki rules and was approved in Helsinki on 17 Mar 1992, and entered into force in 1996. The mentioned commission is one of the five regional commissions of the United Nations, which was established in 1947, which provides the possibility of studying issues and problems related to the economy, environment, and technology and providing operational solutions for the governments of Europe, North America, Central Asia, and Israel. More than 150 large rivers and 50 large lakes are within the boundaries of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), which flow along or cross the border of two or more

³⁹ Khaled Abu-Zeid. "International water law from Helsinki rules to the United Nations convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses." *Water Resources Impact* 3, no. 4 (2001): 26-31.



countries. Also, more than 170 underground water tables have been identified in the region, and it is expected that more of them will be identified in the future.⁴⁰

The main goal of the Convention mentioned above is to strengthen local, national, and regional actions within the scope of UNECE to ensure the quantity, quality, and sustainable use of border water resources. According to this Convention, the general duties of countries are:

- Prevention, control, and reduction of transboundary damage to the environment, human health, and economic-social conditions
- Management of common waters rationally and fairly according to the ecosystem
- Preservation of the ecosystem
- Conducting environmental assessments to prepare emergency plans, determine environmental standards, and minimize the risk of accidental water pollution

The Convention on protecting and exploiting border waterways and international lakes consists of three parts and 28 articles. The first part contains seven articles of a set of regulations related to all members of the Convention and includes issues such as monitoring, research and development, information exchange, and information protection. The third part is the organizational provisions and includes membership conditions, the necessity of the Convention, dispute resolution, etc. The most important things that the Convention emphasizes are:⁴¹

- Paying attention to the importance and urgency of protecting and exploiting border waterways and international lakes, which can only be done effectively with participation and cooperation.
- Worrying about the short and long-term negative effects of changes in the status of border waterways and international lakes on the environment, economy, and health of the European Economic Commission member countries.
- Strengthening domestic and international measures to prevent, control, and reduce the discharge of dangerous substances into aquatic habitats and the pollution of marine habitats, especially coastal areas with underground water sources.

⁴⁰ Francisco Nunes Correia and Joaquim Evaristo da Silva. "International framework for the management of transboundary water resources." *Water International* 24, no. 2 (1999): 86-94.

⁴¹ José María Santafé Martínez. "The Spanish-Portuguese transboundary waters agreements: Historic perspective." *Water international* 28, no. 3 (2003): 379-388.



- Creating a regional strategy for environmental protection and rational use of natural resources in member countries.⁴²

- Cooperation between member countries in the protection and exploitation of border waters through an agreement between neighboring countries with common water resources, especially in areas where such agreements have not existed.⁴³

In European countries, the issue of water quality and the environment is the main concern related to transboundary waters. The importance of water quantity in these countries is much less than what exists in arid and semi-arid countries of the world, so in In this Convention, a lot of emphasis has been placed on the issue of maintaining water quality and sustainable exploitation of border water resources. Also, in the provisions of this Convention, the issue of flood warning systems and the cooperation of the relevant countries for this purpose are stated. In 2003, the Convention mentioned above was amended to allow the membership of countries outside the scope of UNECE. For this purpose, other countries of the world were also invited to take advantage of the legal framework of the Convention and use its experiences. According to the mentioned amendment, any other country member of the United Nations can become a member of the Convention after the members' agreement. Still, it did not meet with much luck from other countries.⁴⁴

4. Global Experiences of Water Conflicts and Their Resolution

This Section Includes Ruling Theories In Water Disputes And Allocation Methods Of Border Water Resources

4.1. Ruling Theories in Water Disputes

In the background research on 145 existing historical treaties in the field of border water, it is observed that in the experiences of water disputes and their resolution, general principles, especially the extreme principles of absolute territorial sovereignty or the absolute integrity of

⁴² Andreas Thiel. "Transboundary resource management in the EU: transnational welfare maximization and transboundary water sharing on the Iberian peninsula?." *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management* 47, no. 3 (2004): 331-350.

⁴³ Liang Yuan, Weijun He, Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu, Zaiyi Liao, Xia Wu, Min An, Zhaofang Zhang, and Thomas Stephen Ramsey. "Transboundary water sharing problem; a theoretical analysis using evolutionary game and system dynamics." *Journal of Hydrology* 582, (2020): 124521.

⁴⁴ Elshan Ahmadov. "Water resources management to achieve sustainable development in azerbaijan." *Sustainable Futures* 2, (2020): 100030.



the river, are invoked. Not taken and fair use, the basic principle prevails, but the legal definition of the term fairness seems too vague and relies heavily on the agreement of both parties.⁴⁵

4.2. Allocation Methods of Border Water Resources

Allocation methods of border water resources can be divided into three main categories, described below. Rights-based methods: This method focuses on water rights between countries, defined as absolute territorial sovereignty or integrity of the river or as fair use and an obligation not to cause serious damage. Extreme theories have been used only in three cases of sub-branches of international waterways:

a. Mexico and the United States of America have established absolute territorial sovereignty over some internal Rio Grande/Rio Bravo branches.

b. In the 1950 border water agreement between Austria and Germany, of the five Isar river branches that flow from Austria to Germany, one branch flows to Germany without using the upstream country (Austria); Austria fully uses two branches. And the other two branches are used by Austria, provided that there is flow at least in the winter months.

c. In the 1925 agreement on the rivers that form the borderline between Finland and Norway, half of the border stream was allocated to each country. Still, absolute sovereignty over all the tributaries on the coast of each country was given to the respective country.⁴⁶

One of the treaties that have greatly benefited the upstream country is the 1925 agreement on the Gash River between Italy (for Eritrea) and England (for Sudan), which not only gave all the low flow and half of the average flow of the river to Eritrea as the upstream country. Sudan also agreed to pay Eritrea's share of the agricultural income in the Gash delta.⁴⁷

The issue of non-serious harm is usually considered in the treaties; for example, all six existing treaties on the Nile are about the preservation of Egypt's primary uses. Most of the time, in border agreements between two countries, even without the focus of the agreement on border waters, a clause is included in the agreements, and that is the protection of existing uses;

⁴⁵ Patricia Wouters, and Sergei Vinogradov. "Reframing the transboundary water discourse: Contextualized international law in practice." *Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law* 29, no. 3 (2020): 385-394.

⁴⁶ Patricia Wouters. "International law-facilitating transboundary water cooperation." *Published by the Global Water Partnership, TEC Background Papers* 17, (2013).

⁴⁷ Mark Zeitoun, Marisa Goulden, and David Tickner. "Current and future challenges facing transboundary river basin management." *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 4, no. 5 (2013): 331-349.



for example, Peru continues to supply water to Ecuadorian villages as part of continues from the 1944 border delimitation agreement; In the boundary water agreements between the United States of America and Canada and between the United States of America and Mexico, clauses for prior use have been included.⁴⁸

Needs-based methods: Almost all disputes that have resulted in an agreement, especially in dry rivers, have not been rights-based (purely hydrology of the basin or specifically historical uses) as the model used for negotiations, but rather based on It has been needed. The need is based on irrigable land, population, or specific project needs. Since there is usually older and more water-based agriculture downstream of dry rivers, the downstream countries have a greater claim. Preservation of existing uses is a very clear expression of "need." In other words, rights have opened a way to meet existing needs. Of course, this does not mean allocating more water, but it means that the water needs of existing uses are guaranteed. Mexico, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan have defined and guaranteed all their needs in their respective treaties.⁴⁹

In the agreements signed between Egypt and Sudan in 1929, the allocation amount was determined based on basic agricultural needs. Egypt argued for a greater share of the Nile River due to its large population and extensive irrigation. Then in 1959, Sudan and Egypt divided the water between the two countries for future development conditions. The current allocation is 5.55 billion cubic meters per year for Egypt and 5.18 billion cubic meters per year for Sudan, according to each country's needs.⁵⁰

In the Jordan River, the only approach that has been negotiated so far (although it was not approved) is the Johnston Compromise, in which, instead of examining the inherent rights of each of the countries in the basin, a study was conducted based on needs. In Johnston's approach, based on the report of the Tennessee Valley Authority, regardless of political boundaries, the water needs of all the irrigated lands of the Jordan Basin, which can be irrigated by gravity flow, were estimated. After that, each country's allocation was determined based on

⁴⁸ David G. Lemarquand. "Preconditions to cooperation in Canada-United States boundary waters." *Nat. Resources J.* 26, (1986): 221.

⁴⁹ Aaron T. Wolf. "From rights to needs." In *Management of Shared Groundwater Resources*, pp. 133-165. (Springer, Dordrecht, 2001).

⁵⁰ Abiy Chelkeba Worku. "State succession in international transboundary water obligations: South Sudan and the Nile water agreements." *Mizan Law Review* 10, no. 1 (2016): 100-125.



these agricultural needs, with the agreement that each country could use its share of water in any way it wanted, including transferring it outside the basin.⁵¹

According to the researchers, basic human needs are defined as 50 liters per day for urban use (25.18 cubic meters per year), regardless of the region's climate. In the past, 75 cubic meters per year have been estimated as the appropriate per capita minimum for the Middle East. Some others have determined the minimum per capita basic allocation between West Bank and Jordanian Palestinians to be 100 cubic meters per year for domestic and industrial uses plus 25 cubic meters per year for agriculture.⁵²

5. Economics-Based Allocation Methods of Border Water Resources

This section includes the benefit sharing approach: useful and optimal use of water and sharing the resulting benefits, water market, interest portfolio, and water interest portfolio to evaluate economics-based allocation methods of border water resources.

5.1. Benefit Sharing Approach: Useful and Optimal Use of Water and Sharing The Resulting Benefits

The approach of sharing interests is one of the most recent approaches in the discussion of changing the shape of the conflict over common water resources. This approach is based on the fact that water, like any scarce resource, should be allocated to its most efficient use, and then the profit should be distributed in a fair way among the countries of the basin.

In practice, economic criteria have not affected water allocation except in exceptional cases.⁵³ Out of the 28 existing treaties in the economic fields of water, payment for water itself is mentioned in 4 treaties, and payment for lost electricity generation or flooded lands is also mentioned in 10 of the 28 treaties.

In the 1926 agreement on the Cunene River between Portugal and South Africa, no payment was made for water diverted for vital uses. Still, if the water was used for "beneficial purposes," South Africa had to pay Portugal a fee. Great Britain agreed in 1926 to pay

⁵¹ Graham Wright. "Devilish straits: re-interpreting the source of Boundary Waters Treaty success." (PhD diss., University of British Columbia, 2008).

⁵² B. Morel. "Security and the environment in the Middle East water issues." In *Environmental Security and Environmental Management: The Role of Risk Assessment*, pp. 17-24. (Springer, Dordrecht, 2006).

⁵³ Laura Read, Kaveh Madani and Bahareh Inanloo. "Optimality versus stability in water resource allocation." *Journal of environmental management* 133, (2014): 343-354.



(upstream) Eritrea a share of cultivation in the Gash Delta equal to 20% of any sales over £50,000. This payment was stopped when Great Britain took over Eritrea in World War II.⁵⁴

5.2. Water Market

In theory, creating a water market causes efficient water allocation even in border basins. Still, in practice, organizational barriers prevent the complete formation of a water market.⁵⁵ In addition, due to the high water transfer costs, inter-basin water transfer is rarely done, and the water market is mainly limited to the basin's countries. Also, the water market still carries with it the problems caused by the undefined rights of water ownership and the lack of an enforcement mechanism. It cannot solve all the problems regarding the commodity nature of water and spiritual values. The result of these uncertainties has been that no international water market has ever been established. In 1997, in the dispute between the Euphrates basin countries, Syria strongly objected to the proposed plans for water pricing. This issue led to a temporary deadlock in the negotiations. In addition, some Islamic legal interpretations prohibit demanding money for water alone.⁵⁶

5.3. Interest Portfolio

Recently, the relationship between water and politics and water and other resources has been increasingly discussed. These multiple relationships may create more opportunities to provide creative solutions and increase economic productivity through a portfolio of interests.⁵⁷ Some resources that are included in water negotiations are:

a. Financial resources, for example, the World Bank's financial resources helped resolve the Indus River disputes, and the United Nations investments helped to achieve the Mekong Agreement.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Richard Meissner. "Hydropolitical hotspots in Southern Africa: Will there be a water war? The case of the Kunene River." *Water wars: Enduring myth or impending reality*. Durban: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), (2000).

⁵⁵ Henning Bjornlund. "Efficient water market mechanisms to cope with water scarcity." *Water Resources Development* 19, no. 4 (2003): 553-567.

⁵⁶ Karen Bakker. "The business of water: Market environmentalism in the water sector." *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 39, (2014): 469-494.

⁵⁷ Udo Schneider, Markus Ziese, Anja Meyer-Christoffer, Peter Finger, Elke Rustemeier, and Andreas Becker. "The new portfolio of global precipitation data products of the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre suitable to assess and quantify the global water cycle and resources." *Proceedings of the International Association of Hydrological Sciences* 374 (2016): 29-34.

⁵⁸ Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi. "Transboundary water interaction I: Reconsidering conflict and cooperation." *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 8, no. 4 (2008): 297-316.



b. Energy resources are one of the growing items in the interesting portfolio. Concerning the Mekong Agreement, Thailand provided financial assistance to a hydroelectric project in Laos in exchange for a share of the generated electricity. 3) Political capacity that may be done indirectly, such as the Middle East peace negotiations, or is done explicitly, such as the negotiations between Turkey and Syria on water issues that are tied to Syria's relations with Kurdish separatists.⁵⁹

In a research, a series of ranking indicators were defined for three security, economic-social and environmental issues, presented in table 1.

Table 1. Security, Economic-social, and Environmental Indicators

Environmental indicators	Social and economic indicators	Security indicators
Importance of flow regime	GDP per capita	Military expenses as
Water quality index	Poverty Population	A percentage of GDP
flow from the environment(base current)	Life expectancy at birth	Availability/use of water
Sustainable development using water	Infant mortality rate	Water dependence ratio (%)
Biodiversity	Literacy rate	History of agreements related to water
	Energy use	cooperation within the basin
	Agriculture as a percentage of GDP	Political geography/government stability
	The industry as a percentage of GDP	Migration
	Availability/use of water	The level of regional integration

⁵⁹ Stavros Panageas and Mark M. Westerfield. "High-water marks: High risk appetites? Convex compensation, long horizons, and portfolio choice." *The Journal of Finance* 64, no. 1 (2009): 1-36.



5.4. Water interest portfolio

This approach refers to cases where the interesting portfolio only includes water-related cases. One of the complete baskets available in this field is the basket of water interests between India and Nepal in 1959 on Bagmati and Gandak and in 1966 on Kosi (all tributaries of the Ganges). These two treaties include provisions for various water-related projects, including irrigation, hydroelectricity, navigation, fishing, related transportation, and forestry (India planted trees in Nepal to reduce downstream sedimentation). Although Nepal has recently expressed frustrations with these two agreements, the structure of these treaties is a good example of how a broader portfolio can provide more creative solutions.⁶⁰

6. Conclusion

Over time, the international procedure governing transboundary waters has moved away from the extreme principles of absolute territorial sovereignty and river integrity to moderate principles of fairness and justice. The theory of limited territorial sovereignty, as a middle and moderate theory, is the dominant and accepted theory among governments and international judicial and arbitration courts. International laws in the field of water are set based on the principles of this theory. According to this theory, any government can use the existing waterways in its territory as long as it does not seriously harm the interests of other governments along the river. This theory implies the good neighborliness of states adjacent to a waterway.

By adopting the moderate theory of limited territorial sovereignty, the 1997 convention has established rules for international waterways, including border surface and underground waters that are hydrologically related to the said surface waters.

According to the provisions of this Convention, "fair and reasonable use" in the international waterway is supported, and indicators for determining and distinguishing fair and reasonable use in terms of the principle of "obligation not to cause serious damage" are provided to other countries in the basin, which should all be used together. Be considered as a whole, and none of these indicators has priority over the other. Also, no use has inherent priority over other uses, except for vital human needs.

⁶⁰ Philip Hirsch, Kurt Mørck Jensen, Ben Boer, Naomi Carrard, Stephen FitzGerald, and Rosemary Lyster. *National interests and transboundary water governance in the Mekong*. Australian Mekong Resource Centre, in collaboration with Danish International Development Assistance, 2006.



The principles of "fair and reasonable use" and "no serious harm" are vague and have different interpretations for determining the physical and historical rights of the upstream and downstream countries. Although the principle of not seriously harming other countries in the basin implies the priority of previous activities (which is generally in the downstream countries) and limits the fair and reasonable use of the upstream, on the other hand, the absolute superiority of the previous activities with the principle of fair use and reasonable conflict, and the principle of fairness does not necessarily and always give priority to the first activities. As observed in the review of Article 5, existing activities are one of the factors that will ultimately determine the issue of fair and reasonable use.

Since there is no universally accepted method for the fair distribution of transboundary water resources, and the international water laws, including the 1997 Convention, due to the generality and comprehensiveness of its provisions and considering all the conditions of the world's border basins, researchers and theorists, also, some politicians are inclined to use the need-based approach instead of the legal approach. This approach is somewhat contradictory and simplistic compared to the existing approach in the international laws of transboundary waters, especially the 1997 convention. The existing uses are only one of the ten factors considered for water allocation in the said Convention.

Also, in this area, economic theories have been formed with the concept of increasing the basin's productivity to distribute water more efficiently alone or to distribute its benefits in collaborative use. This approach is also somewhat far from the provisions of the 1997 Convention because in the said Convention, in addition to the fact that economic use is one of the factors of water allocation. Still, at the same time, preference should not necessarily be given to more effective activity at the economic level. It is enough that The use should be effective according to the economic and technological level of the relevant government. This means that the social use of an activity can be superior to its economic benefits.

In the practice of governments, economic benefits have not been explicitly used in water allocation. Still, economic rules have helped define the "beneficial" use stated in the mentioned Convention. In contrast, the basket of benefits includes water resources and non-water resources, solutions in total It has been suggested positively. It seems to be of interest to policymakers, which is an example of Iran's desire to create a non-water interest portfolio with Afghanistan to ensure the stability of the Hirmand watershed and the allocation of more water



for Hamon's environmental watershed in exchange for technical and sanitary assistance and services. Security, economic, immigrants, etc., provided to Afghanistan can be seen.

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China's One Belt One Road Project and Its Effects on Mediterranean Security

Murat Kağan KOZANHAN¹*

Abstract

As a rising power, China, by following globalizing policies, has strengthened its place through industrial production with cheap labor and has become an important actor through investments regional and overseas, noticeably reaching an effective position. In this frame, by this study, China's "One Belt One Road", which constitutes the most known example of international expansionism policy and is called as "Silk Road", was put under the scope, and the investments and constituted policies were examined. With that being said, the probability of the armament phases of the project and Turkey's position in this project were analyzed from the perspective of China's changing naval force strategy, and predictions about possible emergent opportunities for Turkey–China relations were made.

Keywords: *One Belt One Road, Mediterranean, China, Naval Force, Armament.*

1. Introduction

In the unipolar world order led by the United States of America (USA), formed after the Cold War, not only China protected its socialist state order, but also took effective steps for the transition multipolar world order and has been doing so by pursuing policies close to liberal views within the framework of economics and diplomatic.

In this direction, China, as a rising power, has noticeably reached an active position all around the world by encouraging corporations to invest overseas based on international expansionism policies in the recent past. In this process, China gained prestige and started to adopt a more holistic foreign policy.²

In 2012, the change in China's policies especially became evident along with Xi Jinping's presidency. The sagacious decisions made by the new administration, which efficiently analyses the benefits of globalization, transformed China into an influential and international actor that designs new projects in terms of economics. In September 2013, China's "One Belt One Road (OBOR)", which constitutes the most known example of international expansionism policy and is called as "Silk Road", was mentioned by Xi Jinping, the president

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² Stuart Harris, "Çin Dış Politikası", çev. Aslan Yavuz Şir, 1. bs (İstanbul: Matbuat Yayın Grubu, 2015), 70.



of China, in Kazakhstan.³ After the statement, the baselines of the project had gradually become evident with the published news file and the project's map.

According to the announced map, the overland "Silk Road", a part of the project, starts from China and follows on to Europe through Central Asia, Iran and Turkey, and after reaching the Port of Rotterdam ends in Venice by heading south. The seaway "Silk Road", on the other side of the project, follows a route down from the South China Sea to Kolkata then to the Indian Ocean and Kenya in Africa, and then it connects with the overland "Silk Road" by crossing the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.⁴

China often refers to the tradition of the historical Silk Road in the process of OBOR. The reason lies behind it is the effort to show the intention of maintaining the continuity of a mission that proved itself before. Thus, China internationally aims to make the OBOR process perceive more benevolent by referring to a historical trade route, which was positively imprinted in the memories of societies, and to contribute to the building of a reciprocal sense of trust. Fundamentally, the OBOR continuously expands its borders to new countries, it, on the other hand, offers economic benefits to the countries, that it crosses over. Thanks to these benefits, nearly the whole Asia continent and nearly half of Europe have already become a member of the initiative. It can even be said that China has become a neighbor of the European Union (EU).⁵ In this way, China tries to create a new, cross-continental sustainable economic zone between Asia and Europe, and to make the global economy happen in a Eurasia-centred framework with the OBOR.⁶

The OBOR project completely identifies with the term "soft power", which was propounded by Nye.⁷ Within the context of the project, China invests in participating states by providing unsecured loans, and channels other states to participate in the project by using principles of persuasion and appeal. In this way, it tries to extend its hegemonic power to a

³ Jeremy Page, "Çin kendisini yeni Asya düzeninin merkezinde görüyor", *The Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 10, 2014 1:52 am ET, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/cin-kendisini-yeni-asya-duzeninin-merkezinde-goruyor-1415602328> (03.04.2021).

⁴ Altay Atlı, "Çin ve Yeni İpek Yolu Projesi", *Analist Dergisi*, no. 4, (2014): 74.

⁵ Bülent Güner, "OBOR Girişimi'nin Coğrafyası", *Marmara Coğrafya Dergisi*, no. 37 (2018):121.

⁶ Taşkın Deniz, "Yeni Umutların Işığında Tarihi İpek Yolu Coğrafyası", *Marmara Coğrafya Dergisi*, no. 34 (2016):199.

⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1. bs (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.



global scale. However, it should not be forgotten that soft power may not always be sufficient for global hegemony. Besides economic power, military power is also to be used when it's needed.⁸

Within this scope, by the current literature that handles and analyzes the "OBOR" project of China, the main research question of the study is what the relationship between the development of the OBOR project and its security is, and what its effect on the Mediterranean security is. The purpose of the study around the research question is to examine the validity of the main arguments of the studies in the literature on this subject by addressing the security problem in China's OBOR project and thus contribute to the literature with up-to-date evaluations. In this context, China's expectations from the OBOR project will firstly be discussed, the geopolitical importance of the OBOR project will be touched upon, and the armament of the project by China will be examined within the framework of ensuring the security of the project's sea line and the strategic points on this line, the last step of the OBOR, the security of the Mediterranean, and its effects on Turkey will be evaluated in the study and the research will be ended. In this frame, primary sources and the descriptive analysis method have been used for this research.


2. Expectations About the One Belt One Road Project

As it's shown on the OBOR Map – 1, it consists of the overland route, called as “Silk Road Economic Belt”, and the sea route, specified as the “Maritime Silkroad Initiative”. The overland route is divided into two from the north of China, one reaches Turkey from the south, and the other reaches Europe from the north. In practice, the belt gains importance on the overland route. Because China government prefers the rail system as it is faster than maritime trade.

⁸ Gülşen Aydın and Müge Yüce, “China’s Hard Power versus Soft Power in Central Asia: An Analysis of the One Belt-One Road Initiative as a Soft Power Instrument”, *Caucasus International* 8, no.8 (2018): 75-76.



Map - 1: One Belt One Road Project Route



Source: Feng YUAN, The One Belt One Road Initiative and China's Multilayered Multilateralism, Mapping China's 'One Belt One Road Initiative', (Ed.: Li Xing), Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019, s.91-116., <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92201-0>.

In fact, land transportation is riskier. Risks threaten maritime security and are directed at maritime trade, such as piracy and maritime terrorism, which take place in recently occurred threats on high seas, notably decreasing nowadays. As a possible view, the reason why China's preference was the overland route will be the decrease of overland risks, and the change of instability in the districts, where the route is, shortly. China will provide maritime security and regional stability to regions, which are on the "Maritime Silk Road's" route, by taking necessary measures against threats at sea with participating countries and the ones, which are on the sea route. The deployed naval force units around the Horn of Africa are one of the indicators of these measures that China takes to fight against piracy. China and participating countries, as cooperation whose interests are common and share the same fate, serve the national interest of China including China's security, and also improve China's soft power, and shape the international public opinion for modernization of its trade transportation.⁹

Whether China will succeed or not is a matter of debate in the literature. According to Krukowska, the OBOR makes Asia an important global actor as a source of regional integration and empowerment. As China grows, it affects the global order. It shows its economic impact

⁹ Liu Haiquan, "The Security Challenges of the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative and China's Choices", *Croatian International Relations Review*, no. 78 (2017): 144-145.



all around the world and particularly in developing countries that have low costs of production and are dependent on loans. Therefore, it is indicated that Pekin's economic growth can have unforeseen impacts on the regional and global world order.¹⁰

Consequently, it is expected that the OBOR project will leave a bigger mark than the Marshall Plan or the expansion of the European Union. With the OBOR's entrance into the economic system, a three-centered structure will occur meanwhile there are two big commercial-economic centers in the world. However, to the realization of this scenario, it is required that China shall not be a hegemony, which enforces its rules, methods, and ideology, instead, it shall help its partner countries to industrialize, develop and improve their living standards.¹¹ On the other hand, China shall strive to increase investments in the topics such as infrastructure, energy, etc. with economic motivation in Central Asia, and to create conditions, which facilitate regional trade. With this perspective, its policy, aimed at Central Asia countries, seems quite successful.¹²

China's developments, created with the OBOR, are important within the frame of global rivalry with the USA. Thus, Henry Kissinger identified the hegemony wars between the USA – China as follows:¹³

“By working consonantly, China and Russia aim to demolish the world order, whose architecture was created by the USA. If the USA and EU, which are two different sides of the Atlantic Ocean, dissent from each other, China will be able to realize its centuries-old dream by taking the control of this region and including it with Eurasia. If China includes Europe with the geography of Eurasia, the USA must be up against as a big island which, is surrounded on both sides by China, and this situation will end the hegemony of the USA.”

From these statements, it is possible to say that one of the OBOR's aims is to surround the USA in the Atlantic Ocean, which China is a neighbor of the USA in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁴ In a similar way to this opinion, Chinese strategist Yan Xuetong asserts that the USA's

¹⁰ Monika Krukowska, “China's ‘One Belt One Road’ Strategy and its Implications for the Global World Order, *International Business and Global Economy*, no. 35/1 (2016): 157.

¹¹ Sarmiza Pencea, “A look into the Complexities of the One Belt, One Road Strategy”, *Global Economic Observer*, University of Bucharest, June 5, no (1) (2017): 155-156.

¹² Ümit Alperen, “Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Girişimi ve Çin'in Orta Asya Politikası”, *Bilge Strateji* 10, no.19, (2018): 35.

¹³ Cüneyt Başaran, “Ticaret Savaşları: Yeni Bir Safhaya Geçerken Geçmiş Hatırlamak”, 2018. <https://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/cuneyt-basaran/2511300-ticaret-savaslari-yeni-bir-safhaya-gecerken-gecmisi-hatirlamak> (02.04.2020).

¹⁴ Berkan Karamurtlu, “Kuşak Yol Projesi Bağlamında Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin Küresel Hegemonya Girişimi”, *Doğu Asya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 6 (2020): 76.



global hegemony ended after the cold war, and China came back to play this super-power part, therefore it's probable that an interesting war between China and the USA will erupt, and this situation can turn into chaos in the future.¹⁵

The OBOR has an ideological component as well as an economic one. This component is the opposite of the economic model, which represents western states that emphasize reforms in sectors such as education and health, yet avoid public infrastructure. The fact that China has started to shape the international system according to its interests has led other states, especially the USA, to see China as an increasing security threat. It is obvious that this situation will lead to intensifying global rivalry.¹⁶ It emphasized the rivalry between these countries in the recently published Marine Force strategy document of the USA. In the aforementioned document, it is stated that China reached a level where it can execute an operation on the Indian Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, and South-North Poles by emphasizing that the OBOR reinforces China's units' operational capability away from its mainland thereby improving China's logistics and base capability.¹⁷

If it is put aside the USA's concerned about global rivalry, it is deemed to be expected that the OBOR increases the improvement of intercountry cooperation, co-investments, and cultural communication. Nonetheless, there are also some concerns about whether the project will succeed or not. In fact, the OBOR emerged at a time when traditional globalization was opposed and criticized. The OBOR emerged at a time when traditional globalization was opposed and criticized. Although China is centered in the OBOR, the investment cost of the project is high, therefore, it principally necessitates the support of the participating states. However, whether the participating countries will assume this economic responsibility is a controversial issue. In return, both economic and political power empowerment of China on the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea with this project, the reaction of the USA and other global/regional powers are of capital importance.¹⁸

¹⁵ Osman Tekir ve Nesrin Demir, "Çin'in İpek Yolu Girişimi ve Küresel Ekonomik ve Siyasal Sistemi Dengeleyebilme Olasılığı", *Yönetim ve Ekonomi*, no.1 (2016): 273.

¹⁶ US Navy, *Advantage At Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power*, (December 2020): 4.

¹⁷ Esme Özdaşlı, "Çin'in Yeni İpek Yolu Projesi ve Küresel Etkileri", *Turkish Studies*, no. 10/14 (2015): 594.

¹⁸ Özdaşlı, "Çin'in Yeni İpek Yolu Projesi ve Küresel Etkileri", 594.



The project poses some risks along with the resultant structural changes and social content of the project. Due to China's fluctuating economic indicators, the OBOR's global impact has not completely become evident yet. The existence of state establishments decreases the profitability of private enterprises and this issue spoils the appetite of entrepreneurs, in addition to the fact that China's provided financial support for participating countries cannot provide stability and safety in some participating countries due to local opponents, corruption, and judicial inconsistency.¹⁹

It is obvious that asymmetric threats will affect the safety of the project and participating countries. The weaknesses of the countries on the overland and sea route of the OBOR project have the potential to pose a threat. Besides China, it is important to provide a safe environment for the participating countries in the project. Thus, the Republic of China Armed Forces may be necessary to be deployed in regions, which are away from China's mainland, for national interests' protection.²⁰ Consequently, China's increasing activity in the surrounding seas has caused problems, perceived as China's increasing use of military and political power, about a reasoned change of policy or a reaction to various developments including the USA-China rivalry.²¹ Another component of the aforementioned concerns arises from the possibility of China's resort to military force during economic investments, especially in unstable regions.

3. The Geopolitical Importance of the One Belt and One Road, and the Armament of the Project

The OBOR both works as economic leverage and provides an advantage to China in geopolitical rivalry. Thus, with the effect of the global geopolitics race, armament and arms trade has started to become prominent within the context of the project. Since October 2013, the date China declared the OBOR, China has started to trade arms with countries, with which it did not have any commercial relationship before. The maintenance of military equipment and its ammunition supply gradually cause the deepening of military relations between these countries and China, and also China provides loans to these countries for these sales, which will buy military equipment and weapon. Accordingly, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,

¹⁹ Sebastian Gebauer, "China Heads West: 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative", *Gdanskie Studia Azji Wschodniej*, no.11 (2011): 57.

²⁰ Andrzej Bujak, "Global Aspects of Security Environment – 'The One Belt, One Road' Project", *Economia I Prawo. Economics and Law*, no. 4 (2016): 449-450.

²¹ Stuart Harris, "Çin Dış Politikası", 188.



Belarus, and Ukraine have taken place in the countries, to which China exports arms, since the realization of the OBOR. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malesia, Kenya, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan are the countries, which buy arms from China. In a sense, the OBOR has started to become a tool for China to justify the improvement of its defense relations.²²

The acceleration of China's military modernization program, improvement of the navy, and acquiring ports on a global level concern western states about the role of the OBOR in China's security strategy. Despite the rarely used ports on the Indian Ocean, the building of developed ports calls the possibility of being used for military purposes rather than commercial ones to mind.²³ In this context, when China's presence in the Indian Ocean is examined, one of the most prominent overseas military bases is the logistics support facilities located in Djibouti, in the Bab el-Mandap, which connects the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, on the other hand, is not used for commercial traffic despite the great investment made, and it is not expected to generate profits for many years.²⁴ Similarly, Pakistan's Gwadar Port, which will connect the oil coming from the Persian Gulf with tankers from the Persian Gulf, where most of China's oil imports are met, to China through a pipeline, is far from currently hosting both tankers and merchant ships that will provide sufficient profitability.²⁵ The fact Because the specified ports do not provide economic benefits, the aim of China to hold these ports should be evaluated within the framework of regional geopolitical goals rather than commercial purposes.

It can also be said that China has been making an active effort for the construction and development of the ports included in the OBOR project for military and civilian purposes and dual-function use. These ports also cover the choke points in the transport network, starting from the mainland of China, extending to the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East. The Chinese even gave these ports a special name: "strategic

²² James Daniel, "China's One Belt, One Road Initiative and Its International Arms Sales", *Military Review*, no. September-October, (2019): 108-109.

²³ Daniel Russel ve Blake Berger, "*Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative*", Report, (Asia Society Policy Institute, 2020): 5.

²⁴ Lain Marlow, "China's 1 Billion White Elephant", *Bloomberg*, April 17, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-17/china-s-1-billion-white-elephant-the-port-ships-don-t-use>, (09.04.2021).

²⁵ Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, "China-Pakistan Gwadar Port Runs into Rough Weather", *The Economic Times*, September 10, 2019, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-china-gwadar-port-runs-into-rough-weather/articleshow/71041565.cms>, (09.04.2020).



maritime hub".²⁶ The current five-year plan of the National Development and Reform Commission of China, emphasizes the need to build a strategic maritime hub on the OBOR project and states that they should be included as part of the strategy to keep maritime trade routes open.²⁷

China's concept of strategic maritime hubs is flexible. Ports can have different configurations and their properties can change according to many factors. One of these factors is the strategic value of the port, which depends on its distance from critical nodes and maritime trade routes. Another factor is the amount of Chinese government and private sector investment in the port and how much control they have over the operation of the port and the surrounding facilities. The level of tolerance shown by the host country and its people to China's presence in the region is also important.²⁸

The strategic maritime centers of China in the OBOR can be used in quite different ways in terms of military. For example, civil fuel ships located at commercial ports that can provide indirect support to the Chinese Armed Forces can provide supply support to ships belonging to the Chinese Navy. However, the logistic support facilities in Djibouti clearly give the appearance of a port used for military purposes.²⁹ Four-port projects in the Indo-Pacific region are shown by Chinese strategists as potential strategic maritime centers. These ports, each of which has a different development level in terms of military use, are Pakistan's Gwadar Port, Cambodia's Koh Kong Port, Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port, and Myanmar's Kyaukphyu Port.

Both Pakistan's Gwadar Port and Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port are located on China's supply routes to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Gwadar is at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, and Hambantota is in the Indian Ocean near the world's busiest trade route. Myanmar's Kyaukphyu Port and Cambodia's Koh Kong Port are right next to the Strait of Malacca, which

²⁶ PRC National Development and Reform Commission, "The Thirteenth Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the PRC (2016-2020)", Central Compilation & Translation Press, Part XI, Chapter 51, Section 2, https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201612/P020191101481868235378.pdf, (09.04.2021).

²⁷ PRC National Development and Reform Commission, "Chapter 51, Section 2.

²⁸ Peter Dutton vd., "*Djibouti: China's First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint*", Report, (Newport: US Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 2020), 1.

²⁹ Daniel Russel ve Blak Berger, "*Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative*", 23.



is a critical sea node and an important security concern for China. All these ports meet the criteria of strategic maritime centers due to their geopolitical importance.³⁰

As it is known, the most important challenge for China is that it is dependent on Middle Eastern and African countries in terms of energy. The fact that energy imports pass through maritime trade routes and at critical junctions such as Hormuz and Malacca also brings along an important security risk for China. For this reason, Beijing establishes close relations with the countries in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and tries to increase the number of projects that improve the maritime trade infrastructure. For example, the Kra Canal built in Thailand is seen as an alternative to the Malacca Strait.³¹ On the other hand, the OBOR causes the Chinese Navy Strategy to transform and operate in a wider area by going beyond its existing borders. The expansion of the area of operation of the Chinese Navy also facilitated the realization of China's goal of increasing its regional influence.

One of the critical needs in achieving success in this strategic struggle is the construction of overseas bases and ports in the countries that cooperated. It is clear that the OBOR is an important part of the goal of "turning the Chinese Navy into a global player", which is China's higher-level strategic effort.³² When the activities of the Chinese Navy are examined in the last decade, it is seen that it has started to operate and show presence in the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, Baltic Sea, The Arctic, and Antarctica regions³³. China has made long-term port agreements with Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Djibouti, Tanzania, Mauritius, Namibia, and Greece to cover the whole world. It also negotiates with these countries for the operation of some ports in China, Maldives, Scandinavia, and Greenland.³⁴

³⁰ Daniel Russel ve Blak Berger, "Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative", 24.

³¹ Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu ve Cenk Özgen, "The Relationship Between The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Chinese Naval Strategy", *Alanya Academic Review Journal*, no. 2 (2020): 298.

³² Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu ve Cenk Özgen, "The Relationship Between The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Chinese Naval Strategy" 299.

³³ Craig Hooper, New Polar Strategy Must Focus On China's Long March To Antarctica, Forbes, 10 January 2021, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/01/10/new-polar-strategy-must-focus-on-chinas-long-march-to-antarctica/?sh=188cae1763e3> (12.04.2021)

³⁴ James Fanell, "Asia Rising: China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure", *US Naval War College Review*, no. 1 (2019): 18.



4. The Impact of One Belt, One Road Project on Mediterranean Security and Turkey

Considering the economic potential of the OBOR project, the cooperation between Mediterranean countries and China becomes more prominent. For this reason, the Mediterranean can be characterized as having a special position in terms of OBOR. In the region where investment and credit opportunities are mostly provided by China, countries look at events from different angles due to regional problems caused by the competitive environment. At this point, China's position and strategies for the region gain importance.³⁵

Looking at the developments in the Mediterranean, it is seen that China is trying to create an alternative to the influence of the USA on Europe with the bilateral and multilateral agreements it has made with the EU and its member states. China has divided Europe into geographical and economic regions within the scope of the OBOR. These consist of a total of four regions: Baltic, Northern, Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe. China, which has an effective position in the transportation sector on the line starting from Greece to Portugal in Southern Europe, increases its share in import, export, and customs trade.³⁶ The westernmost branch of the OBOR is the Mediterranean region. China's investments in ports and other maritime infrastructures in the region are also shaped within the framework of OBOR. In recent years, China's naval presence in the Mediterranean has also attracted attention. For example, two frigates belonging to China and an auxiliary class ship conducted naval operations in the Mediterranean with Russia in 2015.³⁷

China is gradually getting stronger in the region economically, politically, diplomatically, and strategically. However, China prefers to develop bilateral cooperation with countries instead of a holistic strategy in the Mediterranean.³⁸ For example, the 25-year lease of Israel's northern port of Haifa Port is interpreted by China as a reflection of the US-China

³⁵ Meryem İlayda Atlas ve Deniz İstikbal, "Rusya ve Çin'in Doğu Akdeniz Politikaları", *Doğu Akdeniz ve Türkiye'nin Hakları*, ed. Kemal İnat, Muhittin Akman ve Burhanettin Duran, 1. bs (İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, 2020), 186.

³⁶ İrem Osmanoğlu, "Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Projesi ve Avrupa Birliği", *Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Projesi: Kavramlar, Aktörler, Uygulamalar*, ed. Serdar Yılmaz, 1. Bs (Ankara: Astana Yayınları, 2019) 143-147.

³⁷ Michael Paul, "Partnership on the High Seas: China and Russia's Joint Naval Manoeuvres", *SWP Comment, German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, June, no. 26 (2019): 2.

³⁸ Slobodan Radojevic, "Political and Strategic Changes in The Mediterranean", *The Review of International Affairs*, no.1179 (2020): 69.



strategic competition.³⁹ In addition, within the framework of diplomatic initiatives initiated by China toward European countries, on October 14, 2014, China signed a financial and trade agreement worth eight billion Euros with Italy.⁴⁰ This step taken with Italy served as a starting point for China to develop its relations with other countries. China not only established economic partnerships with Italy but also signed cultural agreements. Opened language and culture centers, student affairs desks at universities, quotas reserved for students to do internships in Chinese companies after graduation, and the popularity of Chinese in the private sector are also a reflection of the soft power elements implemented by China.⁴¹

The relations between Hungary and China, which played an important role in the OBOR project, were initiated long before the project in the field of academics and education. Education agreements between the two countries brought along cultural and economic cooperation. In addition, China is on the way to having a say in inland waterway transport in Europe, thanks to the agreements it has made on transportation on the Danube River. China's developing relations with Hungary also strengthen Hungary's place in the EU.⁴²

In the OBOR project, Greece's Piraeus Port is in an important position as it is the first entry point to Europe. China, which leased 2/3 of Piraeus Port for 35 years in 2009, continues to grow its investments and gain advantages. With the agreement signed between the two countries on August 27, 2018, Greece is trying to increase its influence on the EU, while China aims to strengthen the Port of Piraeus with these connections since it has the ports it has invested in Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, and the Baltic. In addition, China has taken initiatives with the Greek Cypriot Administration to establish oil transmission lines and liquefaction facilities.⁴³

However, EU-China relations could not maintain the initial rate of expansion and even started to shrink gradually. It can be said that there are two reasons for the decrease in the

³⁹ Roie Yellinek, “*US-Chinese Competition over the Haifa Port*”, Perspective Paper No: 1,071, (The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2019).

⁴⁰ Valbona Zeneli, “Italy Signs on to Belt and Road Initiative: EU-China Relations at Crossroads?”, *The Diplomat*, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/italy-signs-on-to-belt-and-road-initiative-eu-china-relations-at-crossroads/> (23.04.2020)

⁴¹ Osmanoglu, “Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Projesi ve Avrupa Birliği”, 143.

⁴² Osmanoglu, “Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Projesi ve Avrupa Birliği”, 144.

⁴³ Burak Şakir Şeker, “Deniz Enerji Güvenliği: Doğu Akdeniz’deki Güncel Gelişmelerin Jopolitik Dengelere Etkisi”, *Turkish Studies*, no. 7 (Winter 2018): 221.



effectiveness of EU-China relations.⁴⁴ First, the EU's internal problems stemming from the crisis in the eurozone and the immigration problem, and its conflict with Russia over the Ukraine crisis weaken the EU's global leadership capability. The second is that China's rise has diversified its diplomatic needs.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, EU countries are trying to take part in the project individually, if not as a community, and seize the opportunities that arise.

Turkey, which is an important transit country in the Black Sea, Aegean, and Mediterranean maritime transport and land transport between Asia and Europe, is one of the prominent countries in the OBOR. The fact that Turkey neighbors many countries with rich underground resources and is close to hydrocarbon resources discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean and the OBOR project pass through Turkey will make it easier for Turkey to enter new markets. Within the OBOR project, it is expected that the investments to be made in the middle corridor, which includes Turkey, will reach eight trillion dollars, and the investments to be made only for transportation roads are expected to reach 40 billion dollars.⁴⁶ The OBOR project, which is on the agenda with infrastructure works in Turkey, includes cultural and financial cooperation beyond the trade corridor.⁴⁷ Turkey is an increasingly important country within the scope of the project in terms of its young population, economy, and geopolitical position. Turkey offers an ideal geopolitical resource for the project, which adopts the principle of covering a wide area.⁴⁸ After joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is the main financial institution of the OBOR project, in 2015, and after the "Silk Road Initiative Memorandum of Understanding and Draft Agreement" was adopted in 2016, Turkey was officially involved in this process.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Ersan Bocutođlu, "Çin'in Bir Kuşak-Bir Yol" Projesinin Ekonomik ve Jeopolitik Sonuçları Üzerine Düşünceler", *International Conference on Euroasian Economies*, Session, 1C Bölgesel Çalışmalar, (2017): 270.

⁴⁵ Jinghan Zeng, "Does Europe Matter? The role of Europe in Chinese Narratives of 'One Belt One Road' and 'New Type of Great Power Relations'", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, no. 5 (2017), 1172-1173.

⁴⁶ Soner Esmer, "Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Projesinde Türkiye'nin Önemi", *ÜTİKAD*, 2017, <https://www.utikad.org.tr/Detay/Sektor-Haberleri/14489/bir-kusak-bir-yol-one-belt-one-road-projesinde-turkiye-nin-onemi>, (06.05.2021)

⁴⁷ Ahmet İkiz, "Tek Kuşak Tek Yol Projesi ve Türkiye'ye Olası Etkileri", *Elektronik Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, no. 72, (2019): 1698.

⁴⁸ Varis Çakan, "Yeni İpek Yolu Projesi: Beklentiler, Sorunlar ve Gerçekler", *Asya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no.1, (2017), 45.

⁴⁹ Bülent Güner, "OBOR Sürecinde Türkiye: Beklentiler ve Sorunlar", *Sosyal, Beşerî ve İdari Bilimlerde Akademik Araştırmalar*, no. 32 (2018): 70.



Within the scope of the OBOR project, many studies have been carried out in partnership with Turkey and are planned to be carried out. One of these projects is the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway project.⁵⁰ The arrival of the train from China to Turkey on 5 November 2019 and the opening of the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) on 30 November 2019 show that Turkey has high expectations for the project.⁵¹

Looking at the developments in terms of sea, Chinese companies, especially COSCO, have also invested in Turkish ports since 2015. In this context, Kumport, Çandarlı, and Mersin Ports were the ports they were most interested in.⁵² Kumport has formed the most important pillar of the OBOR project in Turkey with the acquisition of 65% of its shares by three major Chinese state companies on November 14, 2015.⁵³ At this point, the Çandarlı central port project, which is under construction in the Aegean Sea with an annual capacity of 12 million TEU, is an important alternative for China to choose for transportation to Europe.⁵⁴

Considering the additional uncertainties that the OBOR project may bring to the Eastern Mediterranean, it is predicted that Turkey can be an important balancing power between Western countries and rising Asia in terms of maintaining stability in the region. In this context, it is of vital importance for the Turkish Navy to assume a role that enhances stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey currently carries out important tasks in the surrounding seas to contribute to regional maritime security. Operation Black Sea Harmony in the Black Sea, situational awareness, and present activities are carried out in the Aegean Sea, and Operation Mediterranean Shield is carried out uninterruptedly in the Mediterranean.

The balance Turkey has established in the Black Sea between the non-riparian Western countries and Russia, depending on the Montreux Agreement, has been an indicator of stability

⁵⁰ Bahar Yiğitel, *Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Projesi ve Türkiye*, ed. Serdar Yılmaz, 1. Bs. (Ankara: Astana Yayınları, 2019): 160.

⁵¹ Enver Günay vd., “Tarihi İpek Yolundan Modern İpek Yolu Projesine: Türkiye-Çin Ekonomik İş Birliği Çerçevesinde Orta Koridor ile Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Girişimi”, *Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi, İİBF Dergisi*, no. 9 (2019): 172.

⁵² Saldıray Türkkan, “Çin’in Kuşak ve Yol Girişiminin Akdeniz ile Türkiye’ye Yönelik Ekonomik Yansımalarının İncelenmesi”, *Deniz Gücü ve Güvenliği İncelemeler*”, ed. Murat Kağan Kozanhan, 1. Bs. (İstanbul: Millî Savunma Üniversitesi Basım evi, 2020): 119.

⁵³ Kumport Liman Hizmetleri ve Lojistik Sanayii ve Ticaret A.Ş., “*Kumport Sürdürülebilirlik Raporu*”, 2017, http://www.kumport.com.tr/resources/files/documents/surdurulebilirlik_raporu_v2.pdf, (03.05.2021)

⁵⁴ Cem Gürdeniz, “Çin-Türkiye Deniz İpek Yolu İş Birliği”, 2018, <http://ankaenstitusu.com/cin-turkiye-deniz-ipek-yolu-isbirligi>, (04.05.2021)



in the region. With the implementation of China's OBOR project, Turkey will be able to play a similar role in the Mediterranean. In this context, Operation Mediterranean Shield, carried out by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, stands out in terms of reducing risks and threats in the region and increasing stability and security. The scope of the Mediterranean Shield Operation, which has been carried out since 2006, is trying to be transformed into an international platform by expanding the crisis environment caused by the mixed environment in Syria and the increasing activities of non-regional actors in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first participant of Operation Mediterranean Shield, which became friend and ally country Pakistan in 2019, is continuing with the participation of Albania, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Georgia, Libya, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Jordan.

Turkey has turned into a noticeable power in the region with the effect of the development of the defense industry in recent years. Turkey, which will reinforce its regional power position with the power transfer capability it will gain with the entry of TCG ANADOLU into the inventory, will be among the countries that provide the greatest support to NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean, beyond the protection of national rights and interests, and will make significant contributions to the peace in the region.

It will be inevitable for Turkey to cooperate with China on maritime security, with the effect of China's increasing interest in the Eastern Mediterranean due to both the ports it has acquired within the framework of the OBOR project and its rich hydrocarbon reserves. For this reason, initiatives should be taken to develop educational and training activities with political and military cooperation between Turkey and China. Planning joint exercises and training activities to improve the interoperability of the Turkish Navy and Chinese Navy elements at every opportunity will be appropriate to increase bilateral relations.

In this direction, within the framework of contributing to the stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, military relations with the countries of the region should be developed, bilateral and multilateral exercises should be carried out, and training and capacity-building activities should be continued. Organizing port visits to countries in the region within the framework of naval diplomacy will also strengthen Turkey's leading position in the region.



5. Conclusion and Evaluation

The OBOR project, which emerged as a result of the economic development of China, revitalizes the historical Silk Road from Asia to Europe and causes great hopes for the future economically for China as well as for the countries on the route. Although the landline side of the OBOR project is progressing faster, it is observed that China made significant investments, especially in the Indian Ocean regarding the sea line part. This momentum gained in China's economic development with the OBOR project caused concern in the aftermath of the Cold War, thinking the United States, the dominant actor of the unipolar world order, fell behind in the competition.

On the other hand, some concerns about the project have also surfaced. One of these is the risk that countries that borrowed large amounts from China within the framework of the project will become dependent on China by having difficulties in repayment. Another concern is that the US sees the project as a threat to itself and efforts to prevent it. In addition, there is the possibility that stability and security problems along the route of the project will constitute a basis for the use of the project by China for military purposes.

The fact that China has increased its arms sales to the countries involved in the project, and that some ports that are considered to be used within the framework of the project are defined as strategic maritime centers and also serve military purposes, show that the USA and Western states are not unfair in these concerns. China's goal of turning its navy into a global player inevitably coincides with these concerns.

Europe, which is located on the route of the OBOR project, has a very important place as it creates a border zone. Even though the EU's view of the project is doubtful, China has established bilateral relations with European countries and has ensured the successful execution of the project so far. Considering this situation as an opportunity, Greece has been included in the project with Piraeus Port. Turkey, on the other hand, is a country of critical importance for the OBOR project due to its geopolitical location between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Supporting the OBOR project with studies of different aspects, Turkey draws attention to Kumport Port and Çandarlı Port in terms of maritime, which are planned to be opened in the future.



The impact of the OBOR project on maritime trade is expected to increase exponentially, in today's world where logistics transportation is preferred mostly by sea due to lower costs in the global economy. But for this, the necessity to protect the maritime trade arises, and it is foreseen that China's trade fleets and naval forces operate in coordination with each other. China's expanding economy needs natural resources in different parts of the world, and the delivery of its products to the markets of other countries means the necessity of ensuring security on the transportation route.

It is not expected that the armament works initiated by China in the countries along the OBOR project route in Asia will be needed in the Mediterranean today. However, there is also the possibility that China's future interests in the OBOR project may be damaged due to risks such as the failure to reach an agreement between the countries of the region, especially on maritime jurisdictions, the increase of irregular immigration, and the continuation of civil wars in riparian countries. In such a scenario, China will want to apply its armament policy in Asia to the Mediterranean, which may cause instability in the region. At this point, the most obvious risk for Turkey can be considered as the Piraeus Port of Greece. However, as long as Russia's increasing presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and its interests with China in the region coincide, it is clear that this situation will create a leverage effect for China. However, it should be kept in mind that the hesitations experienced by the EU in its holistic view of China may cause pressure on Greece regarding Piraeus Port at any time. In such a scenario, the alternative for China in the region will undoubtedly be Turkish ports.

On the other hand, the Eastern Mediterranean, which has undergone a great change with the effect of hydrocarbon discoveries and has increased geopolitical importance, may become an area of the struggle of global powers with the effect of China's OBOR project. The countries where China meets its increasing energy needs today are mostly Gulf countries in the Middle East. However, the high energy potential in the Eastern Mediterranean is capable of meeting some of China's needs thanks to its articulation with the OBOR project in the future. Turkey, which has the longest coasts in the Mediterranean, is considered to be in a critical position in terms of sustaining lasting peace and stability in the region and realizing the economic potential of the region.



In this context, the Mediterranean Shield Operation carried out by Turkey in the region is an important activity, therefore, it is important to continue the efforts to ensure the participation of other countries by making the operation international. The aforementioned operation can play a stabilizing and balancing role for the countries in the region and NATO as well as for China's OBOR project.

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Understanding the US and China Rivalry through Modelski's Model & Offensive Realism Theory (The Past, Present & Future)

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Abstract

While the impact of the US-Chinese rivalry on the global political system has led to considerable literature, there are some discussions on the possible strategies that the USA and China can follow in this rivalry. On the one hand, it is wondered what kind of road map the USA and China will follow, on the other hand, Modelski's Long Cycle Model can offer an explanation and prediction opportunity in this regard. This model produces an explanation that includes the past, present, and future within the framework of the enormous increase in the interdependence of states at the global level. In this study, the explanation model developed by Modelski is used to understand the political and economic order that has emerged around China's evolving role in the global political system.

Keywords; US, China Rivalry, Modelski Model, Offensive Realism

1. Introduction

Thought-provokingly George Modelski presents a theory or model that cyclically explains the historical events which brought to the international political scene an active dominant power phrased as 'world leader', in whose leadership the agenda for global politics is aligned. According to Modelski, spanning from the 1500s, there have been four world leaders but five rounds, to name, Portugal from 1494–1516, then the Netherlands from the year 1580–1609, next was Great Britain, that lasted for two rounds, firstly from 1688–1713, and second from 1792–1815, then came the United States spanning from 1914/ 45 to date. Modelski's model divides the cycle of events into four phases; the first is the Phase of Global War, the second, is the Phase of World Power, the third, is the Phase of Delegation, and the last, is the Phase of Deconcentration. These phases last for about 25-30 years making the whole cycle a 100 or 120-year lifespan before the next cycle begins all over again.¹

If the 1970s/1975 with the events of the Oil embargo, end of dollar convertibility, and end of the Vietnam war was the end of the world power phase i.e., the second phase of the four phases of Modelski's model, then it is first preceded by the macro decision phase (under the learning mode) and then the next is implementation phase which coincides with the World

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¹ George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 40.



power phase (under the systemic mode) as Modelski mentions.² Considering all its capabilities, China could be considered to assume the world power thus rivaling the current world power, the US. This paper has three main parts, first, the past thus it describes Modelski Model, phase after phase, considering the events after the Global war Phase i.e., the two world wars. It considers two great powers, the USA and China since the former is considered the world leader after the world wars and the latter a burgeoning world power. The second, the present thus describes the problems facing China which makes it difficult for the country to assume the seat of world leader even if the moment is ripe. And the last part is the future thus the paper turns toward looking into the future. In doing so, John Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism Theory is considered, which posits at its core, that to be secure from all aggression a country must maximize power and seek hegemony at all costs, thus China cannot rise peacefully through its seeking hegemony, at least regional hegemony. In this part, the flaws and the inconsistencies of the theory will be discussed and argued that China will not behave in the likeness of the theory henceforth the 'containment' policy that the theory of offensive realism advocates for the US to take is misguided. Then the recommendations and conclusion close the paper.

2. Methodology

This paper uses a mixed approach in terms of research methodology. It largely employs the use of a qualitative research style and grounds some of the findings on a quantitative research approach. In using a qualitative approach, it analyzes Modelski's Model. The paper thus centers on the masterpiece of George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics*. Although the work of Modelski has a significant portion of quantitative expositions, this paper largely considers the qualitative nature of the model. The descriptive analysis of the historical events is encapsulated in smaller bits called phases and in the larger context called Cycles or Rounds. The paper also uses the theory of John Mearsheimer in understanding the future of the political atmosphere vis-a-vis the US-China divide. This theory from a qualitative approach is used to investigate whether China will be aggressive or not and if there is a need for China to be aggressive. In its contextual analysis, the inconsistencies and flaws of the theory become clear which makes it quite a weak candidate for assisting in postulating the events of the future as far as US-China relation is concerned. Surveys provided by the Pew Research Center are used to

² Modelski, *Long Cycle of World Politics*, 67.



discuss the challenges faced by China. Data provided by Statista outlining the US and China's engagement both nationally and internationally is used. The surveys and data are used from these institutions because of the institution's meticulous attention to detail and research which their standing in the database industry is a testament. Finally, one obvious limitation of the paper is, that it does not spend much time grappling with too many details when it mentions technological, information, or digital might. It considers rather the significant point which has a bearing on this paper since an in-depth and critical investigation into the technological might or prowess is beyond the scope of this paper.

3. The Past–Capturing the Last Century (1914 to date) Within Modelski's Model

Modelski's Model of Long Cycles in World Politics runs or begins it first and on course till the last phase for approximately a hundred years (or hundred and twenty). That is, each phase takes about twenty-five years to conclude, although it sometimes lasts more or less than twenty-five. Like the Netherlands' round of world power, the global war spanning from 1580 to 1609 i.e., the Spanish-Dutch war lasted for about twenty-nine years. However, Britain's second round of world power had its global war period spanning from 1792 to 1815 i.e., Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon for about twenty-three years.³

3.1. Phase One (1914–1945) Global Wars or Chaos

Modelski's model has phase one to be the period of Global Chaos of War, consequently, through the stratagem of a particular State, it emerges world leader. The first and second world wars of 1914 and 1945 are the depiction of this phase. This phase is mostly borne out of the struggle for dominance between the new emerging powers and hitherto the hegemonic power which is going through the final phase thus the Deconcentration of power, and thanks to exhausting its material strength in responding to challenges it falls from the world leader. Portugal's fall from grace was orchestrated by the primary challenger, Spain. The exploration expeditions forced the then-dominant power into a Treaty where the whole world was divided into two parts, one for Portugal and the other for Spain in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). Great Britain also suffered major blows during its double cycle of leadership by challengers such as France and Germany. Significantly, Modelski did not discard the idea that Seapower played a major role in creating dominance, in projecting into the future then, it's imperative to

³ Modelski, Long Cycles, 80.



consider the current trends of events that heavily play an important role in the global scene. These include the power of information acquisition, Intel, space exploration, robust internet accessibility i.e., the innovation of 5G, technological might, and advancements. Chinese company Huawei quite recently topped the world in the innovation of the 5G internet. Such advancement is tied to the financial prospects such that, the SWIFT network, for example, speeds up money transactions, the logistics network links the manufacturing of the local sector to the global supply chain, and information and opinions travel across the globe almost instantaneously.⁴ The United States having realized sooner or later the carpet will be dragged under its feet quickly issued an ultimatum to countries preparing to patronize the new technology and banned its domestic market from using it as well.⁵ China in the last days of 2020 launched a space mission to bring back Lunar rock samples from the moon, such a mission has only been undertaken by two states, the US and the Soviets in the '70s, which quite did not sit well with the US. “China wants to seize the lunar strategic high ground and become the world's pre-eminent spacefaring nation” the vice president of the USA, Mike Pence, stated, in a speech where he iterated that the US would return to the moon by 2024.⁶

The significant impact of the information age after the 1970s due to the efforts of the US government and Silicon Valley (not only but also others) changed the structuring and interaction of societies on the globe. Although the information was shared before, it is nowhere near how fast it is shared now across the globe. It has increased exponentially.⁷ The information or digital age has ushered in a society where social practices occur without the necessity of territorial proximity.⁸ Events are taken live; political authorities have live conferences with their fellow political leaders from other countries via the internet. This phenomenon has further been strengthened with the coming of the Covid-19 pandemic. The banking system the economic powerhouse of most countries is beholden to the strength of the accessibility of strong networks

⁴ Gokhan Tekir, “Huawei, 5G Networks, and Digital Geopolitics”. *International Journal of Politics and Security* 2, no.4 (2020): 115.

⁵ Farrell Henry and Newman Abraham. “Weaponized Globalization: Huawei and the Emerging Battle over 5G Networks”, *Global Asia*, 2021, https://www.globalasia.org/v14no3/cover/weaponized-globalization-huawei-and-the-emerging-battle-over-5g-networks_henry-farrellabraham-newman (12.08.2021)

⁶ Steven Lee Myers and Kenneth Chang. China Brings Moon Rocks to Earth, and a New Era of Competition to Space. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/science/china-moon-mission-rocks.html> (12.08.2021)

⁷ Manuel Castells, *The Rise of The Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010)

⁸ Manuel Castells. “Grassrooting the Space of Flows,” *Urban Geography* 20, no. 4 (1999): 295.



and information. The first-comer advantage in a business setting is also applicable and much direr in the setting up and improvement of network systems. Those who create new means and forms of networking in the information or digital age often could restrict either intentionally or by setting up barriers for the newcomers. The first comers or actors affect the rules of adopting the new technology.⁹

About 80% of the world use smartphones and the influence of networking and social media being prevalent has influenced the speed of sharing information.¹⁰ It has created platforms for discussion, pointing out the wrongs of political leaders, sometimes said to indirectly influence elections through the spread of misinformation, perhaps, the so-called domino effect of geopoliticians is seen on social media, given the widespread protests after the gruesome murder of George Floyd in the US, spreading of hate, people being conscientize about their ancestry among others have had a significant contribution on society.

This appears like the age where Sea power was a significant threat to the world power or a means to be a world power.¹¹ All the world powers in Modelski's Model have had a splendid feature in terms of sea power. This buttresses the point that the mastery or dominance of the prevalent technology in a particular epoch is much needed to assist any country or state that seeks world leadership. Henceforth, dominance in the field of networking or the internet cannot be underestimated. It's a necessity for being a world leader (This is implied by President Xi when he mentioned that 'there is no way that China can ask for or rely on buying the key and core technology from foreign countries'¹²). Some might even say since territorial proximity is in decline in terms of societal activities, the conventional way of the battle for world leadership i.e., through the military might (the global wars or chaos) could be replaced or metamorphosed into global network chaos or war. In this case, the infighting between countries

⁹ Walter Powell, "Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization," *Research in Organizational Behavior* 12, (1990): 304.

¹⁰ Mark Leonard, "Introduction: Connectivity Wars," in *Connectivity Wars Why Migration, Finance and Trade Are The Geo-Economic Battlegrounds of The Future*, ed. Mark Leonard (London: The European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016), 15.

¹¹ Modelski, Long Cycles, 45


¹² Xi Jinping's Sept. 2020 Speech on Science and Technology Development <https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-xi-jinpings-sept-2020-speech-science-and-technology/>. (27.03.2020)



will be predominantly getting hold of the internet or networking. Interestingly, military Intel and the information of spies are shared across the network.¹³

The divide between China and the US in terms of technology is seen in the Top500, an annual chart detailing the five hundred supercomputers in the world. China 2019 has led the US with the number of Supercomputers it has. The fight for the creation of the new technology 5G has been between, unsurprisingly, China and the US. This struggle in the sphere of gaining significant access in the internet age is borne out of the hubris to dominate and take the mantle of world power. This could eventually breed severe confrontation amongst states which will perhaps make the conventional military confrontation obsolete. According to the Nikkei survey, Chinese companies have expanded their dominance in the global high technology market, having outstripped Japan, it is chasing the United States in the number of sectors in which it leads in terms of market shares.¹⁴ More so, China is on a trajectory to overtake the US in Artificial Intelligence supremacy according to former CEO of Google Eric Schmidt.¹⁵

Figure 1. Distribution of the 500 most powerful supercomputers in the world from 2019 to 2021, by country



Source: Statista¹⁶

¹³ Annegret Bendiek, Nadine Godehardt, and David Schulze, “The Age of Digital Geopolitics,” *International Politics and Society*, <https://www.ips-journal.eu/in-focus/chinas-new-power/article/show/the-age-of-digital-geopolitics-3593/> (10.10.2021).

¹⁴ Staff writers, ‘Chinese tech companies topple Japan, chase US in market share’, Nikkei, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Chinese-tech-companies-topple-Japan-chase-US-in-market-share>. (12.08.2020)

¹⁵ Eric Schmidt and Graham Allison, ‘Is China Winning the AI Race?’ Project Syndicate, 2020, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-versus-america-ai-race-pandemic-by-eric-schmidt-and-graham-allison-2020-08> (4.08.2020)

¹⁶ Statista. “Distribution of the 500 most powerful supercomputers in the world 2019 to 2021, by country” <https://www.statista.com/statistics/264445/number-of-supercomputers-worldwide-by-country/> (22.09.2021)



3.2. Phase Two (1945–1975) World Power

Consequently, the next phase is the phase of World Power, that is, the second phase where the victor from the global chaos (the first phase) emerges as the world leader. This new world leader enacts new projects, in the form of institutions and sets the global political scene in order. As in the case of the United States, it institutionalized the United Nations, and several significant financial institutions like the World Trade Organization after the world war ended. These institutions are put in place to cement the world leader's position and set the global agenda. Not only does the United Nations sometimes undermine the sovereignty of the state through its UNSC decisions but also, institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization sometimes undermine the economic sovereignty of States in its directives. Here in this phase, most often the country that emerges victorious engages in the global wars rather late and so doesn't exhaust its material strength. After the end of World War II, the USA was arguably the only world power that was not "structurally affected by the conflict" and was able to set a global agenda around the twin themes of National Self determinism and development that established its position as a world leader.¹⁷ Through the 1948 Marshall Plan aid was provided to European countries due to the devastation resulting from the world war. It provided more than \$15 billion in aid to help reconstruct the heavily affected countries. The Marshall Plan is considered a key catalyst to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949.¹⁸ However, considering future events, it posits China to emerge as the dominant power, because of the difference in events in the first phase (i.e., a shift away from the conventional military confrontation to undercutting in the technological, space, and informational domain) the involvement, or the demeanor of the rising world leader will also change. To overtake rivals in this information age, there is fierce development in technology, although, economic and military will be resorted to when need be.

3.3. Phase Three (1975–2000) Delegitimation

The Phase of Delegitimation follows the third phase in the four phases of Modelski's Model. This is the period where the benevolence of the world leader starts to be questioned, the order which has been set and running begins now to receive scrutiny, and dissent grows stronger

¹⁷ History, "Marshall Plan.", 2009, <https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/marshall-plan-1> (05.06.2020)

¹⁸ Colin Flint. Introduction to geopolitics. (New York: Routledge, 2016.)



meanwhile the world leader is relatively strong. In the case of the United States, the burgeoning dissents from both states and non-governmental organizations can't be underestimated, the likes of Iran, Al Qaeda, etc. The ideological basis on which the US promotes international peace and security is in high disrepute i.e., the promotion of liberal democracy and human rights. This began after the campaign war on terror championed by the Bush Administration. People's rights were trampled upon through the preemptive strike initiative, Guantanamo Bay especially was the facility used to molest unjustified tagged criminals, and continued help granted to the Israeli state by the USA at the detriment of the Palestinians also caused a lot of dissent from countries, Iran for example. On a recent note, the way the Trump Administration maltreated immigrants at the border drew international concern, where mothers were separated from their babies, and during his last days how the Capitol was raided by Trump supporters marked a low moment in the institutionalization of democratic principles across the globe which the United States have forever preached. This caused a lot more dissent from outsiders to chastise the double standards of the United States. Brewing dissent caused both the US and Iran to come close to a brink of war when Iran's Solemani was killed by a USA drone strike. China has nonetheless questioned the democratic tenets of the United States as well when the USA sought to infringe on the sovereignty of other countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, China was on abstention when the vote was cast in the United Nations Security Council to intervene in Iraq in the last 90s thus falling within the third phase of delegitimation. In plain words, "the Delegitimation phase coincides with the Clarification phase of the new emerging dominant power", in this projection being China.¹⁹ China has also strengthened its relations with Iran, this relationship can be understood as strategic because of the confrontations Iran has had with the US during the Trump Administration.

What has been obvious is the Monroe Doctrine style of address that the Premier of China, Xi, has issued severally. Xi reiterated that there should be no "bossing and meddling" in the affairs of other countries especially Beijing since it came under pressure for its treatment of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xinjiang.²⁰ China's top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, equally, warned the

¹⁹ Pop, A. and Grigoras, R. Long Cycles: A Bridge between Past and Futures. 6th International Conference on Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA) – Future in the Making Brussels. 2018, <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/fta2018-paper-b5-pop.pdf> (20.03.2021)

²⁰ Business Standard, "China's Xi launches veiled attack on US, warns against unilateralism", 2021, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/china-s-xi-launches-veiled-attack-on-us-warns-against-unilateralism-121042000775_1.html (11.10.2021)



Biden Administration against meddling in the affairs of China in its region.²¹ Even Chinese scholars have debated whether China should adopt a full-blown Monroe Doctrine or kick America out of Asia, to the extent that De-Americanization has become a popular term in the political parlance of the Chinese.²² The recent pullout of US troops from Afghanistan sparked a lot of criticism from different countries. Russia's Putin chided the US in a joint speech with Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel, saying— “it is necessary to stop the irresponsible policy of imposing other people’s values from outside, the desire to build democracy in other countries, not taking into account either historical, national or religious characteristics, and completely ignoring the traditions by which people live”.²³ Gorbachev commented saying America's presence in Afghanistan was a failed enterprise from the start.²⁴ China has had its share of criticisms against the US as far as the Afghanistan crisis is concerned. There has been significant questioning of the US's principles, especially in the aspects of Human Rights, State self-determinism, etc. due to the posture the US exudes across the globe. It is important to note that sometimes or even most times the sentiments of delegitimation continue till the manifestation of the fourth phase.

3.4. Phase Four (2000–2025/30) Deconcentration

The final phase of the model is the Deconcentration phase; this is where the dominant power finally is overwhelmed with a series of confrontations that exhausts its material strength. In reacting to the challenges, the actions and its rhetoric tend to contradict thus highlighting the inefficiency of the world leader. Modelski’s choice of wording is important, he refers to the dominant power as World Leader which denotes the presents of followership, in other words, some countries choose to follow the trend of events willingly whilst others are coerced to do so. In the event of a reaction on the part of the world leader, the followership he gained will be

²¹ James Areddy, “China’s Top Diplomat Warns Biden Against Meddling in Hong Kong, Xinjiang”. The Wall Street Journal, 2021, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-top-diplomat-warns-biden-against-meddling-in-hong-kong-xinjiang-11612243592> (11.10.2021)

²² Suisheng Zhao. “A New Model of Big Power Relations? China–US strategic rivalry and balance of power in the Asia–Pacific, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24, 93 (2015): 377-397

²³ Robyn Dixon. “Putin chides U.S. on its actions in Afghanistan — and warns of the risk of terrorism”. Washington Post, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-putin-merkel-us1990-failure/2021/08/20/c22cbd54-01d8-11ec-ba7e-2cf966e88e93_story.html (15.11.2021)

²⁴ Erin Snodgrass. “Mikhail Gorbachev, who withdrew Russian troops from Afghanistan in 1989, said the American campaign was a 'failed enterprise from the start'.” Business Insider, 2021, <https://www.businessinsider.com/mikhail-gorbachev-calls-us-presence-in-afghanistan-failed-enterprise-2021-8> (15.11.2021)



lost because of the contradiction between his rhetoric and actions. Pop & Brinza points out, that although there's the tendency for the West and US to cooperate with China because of the important role China has assumed on the economic front, the globalization role seen in the Belt and Road Initiative and the economic interdependence of China and USA, there's also the tendency of a confrontation between China and the USA because of trade war temptations and military escalation of tensions connected with the status of Taiwan or the traditional disputes over the land of the South China Sea and the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands.²⁵

4. The Cold War and Modelski Model

The cold war began shortly after the end of the second war, a covert war between the US and the Soviet Union in 1947. Unlike what the model presages, the world power phase of the US round was confronted with challenges from the Soviet Union. These challenges could be interpreted through the lens of Delegitimation which should have occurred after twenty to thirty years when the world power phase was in session. The cold war is not considered part of the global war or chaos in phase one because first, it involved predominantly two superpowers fighting to impose their understanding of state structuring, one favoring the Liberal capitalist model and the other Communism in the guise of Marxism-Leninism. Second, it was a covert confrontation, which is why it has its name 'Cold' War. The Cold War appears to be inconsistent with the Model because, as represented by the model, there must be one world leader coming out of the global wars or chaos and so, all challenges are squashed through the global war i.e., the first phase. However, at the end of the first phase, that is after the second world war, there seems to have been still a challenger lurking around, the Soviet Union. Unless the world power maintains its innovativeness, and advanced knowledge and creates institutions it will not survive through to the end of its round. The introduction of graduate education, research, and grants into the university system paid off. Between 1903 and 1973, one-third of the Nobel Prizes were awarded to Americans and the significant scientific project, the Manhattan Project (conducting the nuclear weapon) was completed in the United States. These helped to keep the US as the world leader and later the collapse of the Soviet Union. The advent of this incident is rather an exception to the model. This exception was caused because the global political system which the model based on rigorously to devise its interpretation had

²⁵ Adrian Pop and Andreea Brînză. "Power Transition and Balance of Power: Comprehending the Power Dynamics of the 21st Century. *Public Administration & Regional Studies* 1, no.19, (2017).



somewhat a different turn in the 1820s. The oceanic voyages at about 1500 created that global layer of interdependence that should be called the global system.²⁶ This system was a complex system that tend to problem-solving global security etc. through the diverse introduction of innovation.

The Monroe Doctrine kept the western hemisphere from external interference and in return, the US will not interfere in the external affairs of other countries. If the global political system had lacked such an incident (Monroe doctrine), there would have been the test of powers till the global war revealed the ultimate single world power as it did, considering the previous cycles. However, the United States entered the global wars quite late, the Soviet Union was allowed to grow in strength henceforth it was until the inevitable breakaway from the doctrine occurred that finally the US and the Soviet Union experienced some severe confrontations. The breakaway from the Monroe doctrine could be seen in US involvement in the Second World War. Thus, if the Monroe doctrine was implemented the US wouldn't have entered the war at all.

5. The Present–The Challenges China Faces

Before mentioning the challenges, China is virtually ranked the number one country rigorously involved with artificial intelligence with a whopping sum of \$150 billion worth of AI global superpower. The country has benefited immensely from the circa 750 million people using the internet that help with digital data to process.²⁷ The innovativeness of China is seen through its initiative of the Belt and Road Project, which grants connectivity as of January 2021 through 140 countries that have signed the memorandum of understanding. These countries are forty in Sub-Saharan Africa, 34 countries in Europe (18 EU members) and Central Asia, 25 In East Asia & Pacific, 17 in the middle east and north Africa, 18 in Latin America & Caribbean, and 6 in Southeast Asia.²⁸ It goes without saying; that China's aforementioned initiative is a significant innovation that puts China at the center stage of steering the helm of affairs. Another important project is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), headquartered in Beijing, China. The creation of the bank was in alignment with the Belt and Road initiative, it also has,

²⁶ Modelski, Long Cycles, 25

²⁷ Smriti Srivastava. "Top 10 Countries Leading The Artificial Intelligence Race." Analytics Insight, 2019, <https://www.analyticsinsight.net/top-10-countries-leading-the-artificial-intelligence-race/> (11.11.2021)

²⁸ Christoph Nedopil. "Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative"; Beijing, IIGF Green BRI Center, 2021, <https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/> (15.11.2021)



as of January 2021, 103 countries encompassing several countries across the globe. Corporate Finance Institute states, “as a China-led enterprise, the AIIB also serves the purpose of strengthening China’s position as a world economic power”.²⁹

The foremost challenge China faces is the distrust that has been created around the name China, through diverse efforts some for political and economic scores. A damning job was done by Trump when he was running for the Republican presidential candidate, he touted the goods and services of China as low standards, and that China involves in malicious economic tactics and technological undercutting to boost their global standing. A detailed example is the incident of 5G. The introduction of the so-called ‘Clean Network Program’ (echoes the Long Telegraph and its eventual policy structure i.e., the Containment of the Soviet Union) was announced in August 2020 by the then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in addition to the announced initiative in April of ‘5G Clean Path’ which was to secure a 5G network for US diplomatic facilities. Mike Pompeo described the initiative as “the Trump administration’s comprehensive approach to guarding our citizens’ privacy and our companies’ most sensitive information from aggressive intrusions by malign actors, such as the Chinese Communist Party”.³⁰ Prior to the Clean Network Initiative, Huawei in its report said it operated in 170 countries and built over 1500 networks.³¹ Close to 80% of the global 5G market was dominated by three companies, Huawei 30%, Ericsson 26%, and Nokia 22%. Huawei led in the development of 5G technology, 35% of the patent related to 5G was owned by Huawei, and the US companies owned less than 5% of the patent. The combined investment of Ericsson and Nokia and other companies in Research and Development lagged that of Huawei.³² Huawei began also getting a foothold in the EU due to partly the lack of coordination among members to create a common 5G deployment etc. Out of 91 contracts with Huawei 47 of them were in Europe.³³

²⁹ Corporate Finance Institute. “What is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)?”, 2020, <https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-aiib/#:~:text=The%20creation%20of%20the%20AIIB,with%20%24100%20billion%20in%20capital> (15.11.2021)

³⁰ David Fidler. “The Clean Network Program: Digital Age Echoes of the “Long Telegram”? Council on Foreign Relations, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/clean-network-program-digital-age-echoes-long-telegram> (15.10.2021)

³¹ Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd. 2019 Annual Report, Huawei, 2020, 1. (14.08.2021)

³² Lorenzo Mariani, and Micol Bertolini. “The US–China 5G Contest: Options for Europe.” Istituto Affari Internazionali, 14, 2019. <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/us-china-5g-contest-options-europe> (12.10.2021)

³³ Dephne Ringuet. “5G: Huawei unveils new infrastructure products aimed at Europe.” 2020, <https://www.zdnet.com/article/5g-huawei-unveils-new-infrastructure-products-aimed-at-europe/> (10.11.2021)



In an address by the undersecretary for Economic Growth, Energy of the Environment, Keith Krach, mentioned, that as of January 1, has launched the Clean Network Initiative already, 26 out of 27 EU members joined, the total of countries that signed unto the initiative was 60 and over 200 telecommunication companies joined. This tanked the burgeoning influence of Huawei's 5G, the company lost its first-year revenue in the fourth quarter of 2020, the sales of smartphones also tanked, and it was forced to launch its brand-new smartphones with 4G instead of 5G.³⁴ The United Kingdom followed suit in barring the operations of Huawei after some time since it was hesitant to give in to the warnings the US churned out.³⁵ The choice of wording is very important as the US chose to give the initiative 5G Clean Network, clean gives the understanding that Huawei's choice of 5G is malicious. It reiterates claims that Chinese products should not be trusted. Huawei which is believed to be beholden to the Chinese government suffers then from the China-US rivalry. The ban that was signed by the Trump Administration was later in June 2021 expanded by the new Biden administration.³⁶

According to research, due to the pandemic and how the Chinese government is blamed to have watched the virus spread widely, there has been a significant increase in negative evaluations of China across the globe. The data shows (see fig. 1.2) people have grown tremendously unfavorable views toward China. This is a significant challenge to overcome, when views are unfavorable it becomes difficult for China to engage in strategic alliances and coalitions with other countries. Countries will be hesitant to engage with China when they distrust its intentions of China. Under the Modelski model, if China is to succeed in the US it needs a strong coalition and countries to follow the agenda it sets.


³⁴ Lorenzo and Micol, The US-China 5G Contest, 13-15

³⁵ US Department of State. The Clean Network. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html> (12.11.2021)

³⁶ David Sanger and David McCabe. "Biden Expands Trump-Era Ban on Investment in Chinese Firms Linked to Military." NewYork Times, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/03/us/politics/biden-ban-chinese-firms-trump.html> (15.11.2021)



Figure 2. Increasingly Negative Evaluations of China



Source: Pew Research Center³⁷

Domestically, according to the University of San Diego study, the average level of Chinese faith in the government rose from 8.23 in June 2019 to 8.65 in February 2020 and 8.87 in May 2020. Average ratings (1 to 5 Likert scale) on whether they prefer living under China's political system over others climbed from 3.89 in June 2019 to 4.14 in February 2020, and 4.28 in May 2020. This depicts a significant trust of the populace in the central government although the outside countries see it differently.³⁸

Another noteworthy challenge is America seems to be nowhere close to waning in terms of military might if conventional military confrontation is the norm or if technological, information, or internet might is considered the new norm. First, in the past decade, the military expenditure of the USA has tripled that of China. In 2020, according to data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the USA spent 778232 million dollars whilst China spent 252304 million dollars³⁹, this is beside China's inability to match the

³⁷ Pew Research Center. "Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries, 2020, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/> (14.11.2021)

³⁸ Lei Guang, Margaret Roberts, Yiqing Xu and Jiannan Zhao, 'Pandemic Sees Increase In Chinese Support For Regime, Decrease In Views Towards The US', UC San Diego China Data Lab, 2020, <http://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/viz-blog /pandemic-sees-increase-in-chinese-support-for-regime-decrease-in-views-towards-us/> (14.10.2021)

³⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database. 2020 <https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932020%20in%20constant%20282019%29%20USD%20%28pdf%29.pdf> (11.11.2021)



modernized military of the US after enormous expenditure.⁴⁰ On the other side, although China leads, according to the recent data, the USA in terms of Supercomputers, the first top ten supercomputers out of the top500 have five of them from the USA. This signifies that the USA has much quality and faster processing supercomputers than China although in terms of quantity China leads.⁴¹

6. The Future; Theory of Offensive Realism and China's Rise.

In examining the past and current, the models model explains the events between the global power (here the US) and the contender for world leadership (China), however, offensive realism theory much more explains the future events according to China's rise. Modelski's model makes inevitable the decay of global power and the rise of the contender due to exhaustion of material strength and inconsistencies in the demeanor and beliefs of world power.

“The uneven growth of power among states is the driving force of international relations” according to one considered to be the greatest realist, Thucydides.⁴² This has also been the inspiration of all realist writers, including Waltz, etc., however, this section discusses Mearsheimer's offensive realism theory. Like all realist writings, offensive realism has similar departing points to Waltz's defensive realism. With Waltz, the balance of power is inevitable and suitable, the utmost priority of States is to seek security in a global political system where there is no hierarchy of power or umpire to seek the welfare of all.⁴³ It is an “each one for himself” environment. So, weaker states will ally with each other to balance the stronger state. In this way, the stronger state's aspiration of seeking hegemony will be tremendously difficult to attain. With offensive realism, it rejects the notion of the state being security maximizers because no amount of security will satisfy states, henceforth, States are rather power maximizing since that's the only way to ensure their survival in a global system bereft of no umpire. Since balancing power is cost-bearing and a desire to challenge strong states through an alliance with weaker states is a hefty task, Mearsheimer, mentions, that states will buck pass,

⁴⁰ Suisheng Zhao. The US–China Rivalry in the Emerging Bipolar World: Hostility, Alignment, and Power Balance, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 31, no.134, (2022) 169-185,

⁴¹ Top500 List. <https://www.top500.org/news/fugaku-holds-top-spot-exascale-remains-elusive/> (08.11.2021)

⁴² Thucydides (1972) *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Warner

⁴³ Kenneth Waltz. “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.” in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, edited by Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb, 39-52. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).



that is, they will transfer the responsibility of balancing power to other states until they are in grave danger.⁴⁴

Offensive realism theory to Mearsheimer (2001, 30) is the more accurate situation and plausible solution for states, thus if states want to survive, they should always act like a good offensive realist. It stands on five assumptions, first, *anarchy*, the global political system lacks hierarchy in authority i.e., each one for himself, second, States possess offensive capabilities thereby making them potential threats to other states, third, uncertainty of intentions, fourth, survival goal i.e. every state's goal is to survive, in Mearsheimer's words, to maintain territorial integrity and autonomy of domestic political order, fifth, rationality i.e. States calculate the benefits, risks and act accordingly. Based on these assumptions, Mearsheimer concludes that States are motivated to chase regional hegemony since it's the safest way to ensure their security.⁴⁵ Global hegemony is the safest (compared to regional and others), however, it is essentially unattainable, and so states turn to regional hegemony.⁴⁶

6.1. The Flaws and Inconsistencies

First and foremost, Mearsheimer conflates means with ends, that is, he does not differentiate between bidding for hegemony and being a hegemon. There is a difference between going through the pain and risking it all for hegemony and being a hegemon.⁴⁷ Bidding for hegemony is a risky venture. The question that will be lingering in the minds of States that bid for hegemony will be the chances of surviving the bid to attain the end goal, that is, regional hegemony. The rationality assumption predicts that no state will risk it all for a venture which is likely to crash their survival. "Most great powers are extremely likely to survive, most great powers that bid for hegemony do not".⁴⁸

Second, in the analysis of Mearsheimer, five states have ventured such bid, they are; Imperial Japan, Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the United States. Surprisingly enough, out of the five bidders who attempted only one survived i.e., the United States. However, Mearsheimer is confident other states will imitate Uncle Sam, i.e., take

⁴⁴ Mearsheimer. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), 39-40

⁴⁵ Mearsheimer. *Tragedy of Great Powers*, 30

⁴⁶ John Lukacs. *George Kennan: A Study of Character*. (New Haven; Yale University Press, 2007), 48

⁴⁷ Jonathan Kirshner. "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China." *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no.1, (2010): 53-75

⁴⁸ Kirshner, *The Tragedy of Offensive Realism*, 61



after the United States successful bid for regional hegemony, seeing the hopes for success too. Owing to their survival and rationality, States will consider bidding for hegemony through inspiration from the success of the United States and will assess its current situation. The pressing question is, what are the estimates of survival of great powers in absence of a bid? The conservative answer would be 98%, after a successful bid the survival estimate will be 99.99%. However, if the bid has an unsuccessful estimate rate of 50%, then as rational and survival-oriented as States are, will refrain from such a bid.⁴⁹

Finally, to imitate the USA for regional hegemony in hopes that a state will succeed is to presuppose the conditions that allowed the USA such success in their regional hegemony bid applies to all-state. In other words, the environment that allowed the United States to thrive in its quest for hegemony is not similar, not even close to the one presently existing for States who plan on bidding for regional hegemony. The United had weaker neighbors in its backyard and the Western countries who could have been adversaries were also weak. In the presence of a country like the United States currently, a more formidable and stronger state with a plethora of alliances, it will be almost impossible for any other state to thrive in its quest to bid for regional hegemony.

6.2. The US-China Rivalry, the Offensive Realism Theory, and Modelski's Model.

China as a great power, if it decides to bid for hegemony will be rational and consider the goal of survival as a priority, at least according to the theory of offensive realism. Already, China is seated as one of the significant players in the global economy, it is a beneficiary of the global system, as well as a benefactor, i.e., other states, rely on China's huge market size due to its population for exporting goods and services and China also export goods and services to a significant number of States. In just 2008, China was the second-largest export market for States like Argentina, Chile, Iran, Kazakhstan, Taiwan, and South Korea (exported twice as much to China as it did to the United States), amongst others.⁵⁰ Thucydides mentions a significant moment in the Hellenistic age, where “indignation was felt against Athens, rooted in apprehension about its imperial aims, which pushed men to favor Sparta”.⁵¹ Not only does

⁴⁹ Kirshner, *The Tragedy of Offensive Realism*, 63

⁵⁰ Kirshner, *The Tragedy of Offensive Realism*, 70

⁵¹ Robert Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 93-4



China lose its close ties with states it exports its goods and services, but also, it pushes states through the indignation they feel about China's hegemonic aims, so, they will ally themselves with other states, conservatively with the United States i.e., when China's hegemonic aspirations are written on the wall. How about when it is unsuccessful in its hegemonic quest? On top of losing close ties, it risks its survival priority, which according to offensive realism theory, it is a candy every state cherishes. What if China's hubris makes it think that since the United States was successful in its bid for regional hegemony there is room for it too? Imitating Uncle Sam, Mearsheimer puts it. First, in the backyard of China is Russia, a state with nuclear weapons that possibly share similar aspirations of regional hegemony, Japan, India, Taiwan, and the Korean state. These are states that could build nuclear weapons in just a jiffy if need be. They have significant market sizes such as India and are significant players in the technological space. Unlike the United States bidding regional hegemony close to a weak now Mexico and Canada states alongside relatively weak external adversaries. France could not handle Louisiana till it sold it to the United States, according to the documents on the Louisiana Purchase.⁵² That is indicative of how weak and internally driven European states were (i.e., maximizing power in Europe). Putting a check on or containing the United States in the western hemisphere was not their priority. Most importantly, unlike now, when the United States considered bidding for hegemony in its time there was no United States (or a similar state significant as it) to contain it. This will be a vital consideration for China when it considers bidding for regional hegemony given that the United States can project its military capabilities across the continent or put checks on China as far as its technological or networking might is concerned. Imperatively, "just as containment is not a viable option for the US, regional dominance cannot be a viable objective for China. Neither the US nor China can be the single dominant power" in the Asian region or its sub-region although "many Chinese have seen containment as not just one of many arguments in the US-China policy debate, but the real US policy".⁵³

The model of Modelski predicts that, far from what offensive realism theory mentions based on the postulated assumptions that states are power-thirsty and security is their priority

⁵² Colin Elman, Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional Hegemony. *American Political Science Review* 98, no4 (2004): 563-70.

⁵³ Suisheng, The US-China Rivalry in the Emerging Bipolar World, 378



and no amount of power is satisfying to them, go the extreme lengths of maximizing power which seems in their quest for regional hegemony. First and foremost, Modelski's model having its beginning of the cycle in the 1500s due to the rapid and intensive interaction between States after the opening of a direct sea route between Europe, India, and China as well as the discovery of America recognizes the significance of the global political and economic system and how it functions. This global system culminated in the creation of an interdependent globe. The global system generates demand for global leadership. All social systems thrive on two sets of mechanisms, regulation, and development, according to Laszlo.⁵⁴ Thus, it appears, above all else, that, innovation is the pathway to world leadership. Innovation is what propels states to the seat of world leadership. It is what has done it for the past five rounds for four states, Portugal, Netherlands, Britain (twice), and the United States vis-a-vis Modelski's model. The global system is a system that cannot go unchecked, it needs repairs to problems, politically, economically, technologically, etc. "A power greater than any hitherto known might be subject to a general law of decay" Thucydides quotes Pericles.⁵⁵ Like the global system and world leadership, it decays, and it is the state with the necessary innovation that takes the baton. Portugal's policy of exploration, development, and intercontinental trade, its oceanic navy might (nothing like it had ever seen before until its time) was the innovation that got it the seat of world leadership and kept it there for some time until the Netherlands outstripped it of such authority. After Portugal was plagued with catastrophic sea disasters (*Storia tragico-maritima-tales of catastrophe at sea*), the Netherland by developing a large navy, a shipping industry, building ships, developing land drainage and agriculture, the blend of early nationalism and flourishing capitalism, the effective solution devised in response to the need for integration, (a problem the wars of religion had brought to the fore of the global stage) propelled it to world leadership. Britain's innovativeness such as its political development solved much of the Dutch's problems, the Puritan revolution among others, and the King and Parliament struggle which gave birth to the Act of Settlement in favor of the parliament gave a huge impetus to parliament rule, propelled it to take the world leadership. Most of these problems solved were by learning from the troubles plaguing the Dutch. Britain's second round was also a result of its industrial revolution which was monumental in shaping the cause of history. Simply put, the

⁵⁴ Ervin Laszlo, *Introduction to systems philosophy; toward a new paradigm of contemporary thought*. (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1972).

⁵⁵ Thucydides (1972) *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Warner, 64



first round was the innovation in politics i.e., the procedural basis for democracy and the stabilization and delimitation of the political systems, and the second round was the innovation in the economic and industrial sectors. The grounds were much smoother for the advent of markets of continental dimensions which undercuts the influence of sea power and favored continental states. America's innovation was distinct in its production of aircraft, communications (press and movies, the first motion in 1908 were completed in Hollywood), and petroleum. An educational revolution or knowledge revolution was what broke the grounds for America's bid for world leadership.⁵⁶

As far as the US-China rivalry is concerned, it is the introduction of innovative ways and means that will tip the scale (after four modernization (industry, agriculture, science & technology, and defense)⁵⁷ efforts there have been significant efforts toward the initiative of innovativeness & ingenuity given how China has become the only country that has all the industrial categories listed by the UN Industrial Classification i.e., it possesses all 39 industrials categories, 191 intermediate categories, and 525 subcategories thus the system could independently produce all its industrial needs).⁵⁸ These innovations should be problem-solving in nature. Unlike, offensive realism theory, it's China's ability to solve problems in its innovativeness that will win it a ticket for world leadership or regional hegemony, so to speak. Some problems plaguing this round or century are Climate change, the inequalities experienced or worsened by capitalist machinations, and the menace of disinformation and misinformation, among others. (After WWII, the United States produced about half of the world's GDP, one-quarter towards the conclusion of the Cold War, and just one-seventh today. Once-universal enthusiasm for the United States has waned as a result of recurrent demonstrations of bigotry, political venality, and xenophobia.)⁵⁹ The Chinese could have a clear shot at world leadership if its innovativeness could surmount these troubles plaguing the current phase or round. Societal inequalities which some believe to be springing from capitalism could be corrected by economic and political innovations. China, unlike the United States, is not a hardcore capitalist state i.e., it could present an economic model that solves much of the problems faced by the world leader.

⁵⁶ Modelski, Long Cycles, 92

⁵⁷ Yan Xuetong, The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10, 26 (2001), 33-39.

⁵⁸ 我国是全世界唯一拥有全部工业门类的国家' ['China is the only country in the world with all industrial categories'], *Xinhua*, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-09/20/c_1125020250.htm. (15.11.2021)

⁵⁹ Suisheng, The US-China Rivalry in the Emerging Bipolar World, 183



In terms of Climate change, technological innovations, as well as politics, could give China the impetus to outstrip the United States in its world leadership. China, unlike the United States, is not torn between whether climate change is a facade or a reality. It is making significant moves towards reducing its carbon emissions. It has pledged to be carbon neutral in 2060. China has the largest installed renewable energy capacity, in 2020 renewable energy consumption in China reached 7.8 exajoules which surpasses any other country in the world, and it is the world's largest solar market.⁶⁰ In its handling of society, though highly open to criticism, China was applauded by the WHO for its handling of the covid-19 pandemic.⁶¹ China's not too welcoming attitude towards diverse or polarizing speeches kept society under strict check for the so-called betterment of all.⁶² China recovered from the epidemic the fastest of any major country, and it was the only large economy to have positive GDP growth of 2.3 percent in 2020.⁶³

Although quite early enough, Chinese tech companies have already applied for a patent for the development of 6G technology. According to the current data, 40% of the global application for the patent of the 6G technology is China's against the US's 35%. China leads the 6G charge.⁶⁴


⁶⁰ Statista. "Leading countries by renewable energy consumption worldwide in 2020", 2021, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/237090/renewable-energy-consumption-of-the-top-15-countries/> (10.05.2021)

⁶¹ Stephanie Nebehay and Emma Farage, "WHO lauds Chinese response to virus, says world 'at important juncture'." Reuters, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-who-idUSKBN1ZS2EE> (15.10.2020)

⁶² Elanah Uretsky. "What China did right in handling Covid-19 pandemic – and the United States did not", 2020, <https://scroll.in/article/979357/what-china-did-right-in-handling-covid-19-pandemic-and-the-united-states-did-not> (15.11.2020)

⁶³ Suisheng, *The US–China Rivalry in the Emerging Bipolar World*, 182

⁶⁴ Statista. "China Leads the 6G Charge", 2021, <https://www.statista.com/chart/25794/6g-patents-by-country-region/> (20.05.2021)

**Fig.3** Distribution of 6G Patent Application in 2021

Moreover, in using the Probabilistic Modified Trends School, one of the three approaches in the current state of the art of scenario construction, the following scenarios are mentioned;⁶⁵

a. Under the Grand Entente Scenario, NATO and EU will strengthen their cohesion and reinforce the notion of the West, just like how the Second round of Britain's dominance witnessed a peaceful transition to the USA, there'll be the same transition of hegemonic power, China will take an increased role in the Korean Peninsula which will lead to Korean reunification only after Northern side has denuclearized, from 2040 onwards, China and USA will have a GPI indicator of 15% and 24% respectively.

b. Under the China Teapot Scenario, it posits, that the USA and China will have a GPI indicator of 14% and 23% respectively, the economies of both countries as it'll be in decline the new norm will be a zero-sum game, which will further heighten the competition for resources and dominance, the US will not accept China's desire to expand its market, the two countries will send military forces to strategic areas to test them, there will be no agreement concluded between both countries on the subject of the job market.

⁶⁵ Pop, A. & Grigoras, R. Long Cycles: A Bridge between Past and Futures. 6th International Conference on Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA) – Future in the Making Brussels. 2018



c. Under the Back to the Future Scenario, China will prepare itself to become the new hegemonic power and the dispute with the US will reach its height, China's tactics of string pearls of taking control of key ports gradually will lead it into conflict with the US and the EU, China allies itself with Iran, Russia, possibly Turkey after it has left NATO and other non-state actors to challenge US and EU thus the alliance of the West. In 2040, politics will be characterized by open antagonism concerning China's burgeoning dominance, where China will be acting in the same fashion and there'll be frequent disputes in the United Nations.

In economic growth thus 2030 onwards or even closer China is projected to outstrip the US for the biggest economy title.⁶⁶ As is seen under both scenarios Grand Entente and China Teapot, the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) that is the measurement of the performance of the economy, China outranks the USA. The GPI differs from GDP because the GPI considers the negative effects the economy has had whilst the GDP centers on the growth of the economy without adding to it the negative sides such as climate change. The GPI indicators put China above the US, in addition, China also gained numerous strategic allies such as Russia, Iran, and Turkey.

7. Conclusion

With the Modelski Model in mind, the current time is the phase of deconcentration which means sooner or later the US will be outstripped of the world leadership role. The paper highlighted two significant points among other things, first, China is considered the favorable contender that faces obstacles it needs to deal with, and second, the US's plans of containment are misguided. Another important point is that global wars could take the form of technological warfare be they biological or chemical warfare. Changes in times due to the innovations of the US (as the world leader) could affect the phase of global wars as well. Moreover, China's rise is considered threatening to global peace as far as offensive realism is concerned. The global political system according to the Modelski model produces leadership, therefore China's rise could be considered inevitable meaning reversing course is almost impossible. This is clearly at odds with the cycle's description of the historical events. Venice could not reverse the course when Portugal was on the move because of her vested interest in the existing system, her limited

⁶⁶ Lizzy Burden., "China's Economy Set to Overtake U.S. Earlier Due to Covid Fallout". Bloomberg, 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-26/covid-fallout-means-china-to-overtake-u-s-economy-earlier> (19.12.2021)



natural resources, and her lack of access to the ocean and this trend could be seen in how leaders are being replaced.

“To rule over the whole of the inhabited world regards it as a matter that scarcely requires proof that all existing things are subject to decay”⁶⁷, this round could be extended in the United States' favor when, first, it looks at itself in the mirror, second, determine the woes it faces, third, seek to provide innovation to solve the problems faced largely by this round or cycle and finally, it should have the political will, determination, and courage to accept its wrongs and implement the corrections. These will in turn help the United States in affecting decisions, debating, coalition, administering, welcoming innovations, and being innovative, and these are the qualities to be taken up by the world leader.⁶⁸ China has a good shot at the seat when it does not follow the hubris of vague conceptualization of its capabilities and strengths. Although it is a favorable candidate, it is far from easy to materialize. In fact, Modelski in his foresight predicted the Soviet Union as a tough challenger during the deconcentration phase. Hindsight 2022, the Soviet Union did not even make it to the twenty-first century. As the United States is dealing with its problems, the concern of China should be on improving its ingenuity to provide innovative means to walk past the problems of the current round. China must desist from suspicious behavior, trust in the global system is paramount. In 2010 it changed the name of its strategic move from “Peaceful Rise” to “Peaceful Development” which the ex-ambassador of China to France commented saying, “they are essentially the same concept; We changed the terms because some think the word “rise” sounds a bit aggressive, but the phrase “peaceful development” is more peaceable” a depiction of China's concern about the way it portrays itself.⁶⁹ Cooperation between the two states is essential, hostilities will result in indignation felt by other states towards the state that flexes its muscles around. And rightly as Pan Wei, a professor at Beijing University, suggested “Nobody can destroy China if China does not destroy itself first”.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Polybius (1979) *The Rise of the Roman Empire* (Introduction by F. W. Walbank)

⁶⁸ Modelski, *Long Cycles*, 16

⁶⁹ Suisheng, *The US–China Rivalry in the Emerging Bipolar World*, 379

⁷⁰ 潘维 [Pan Wei], ‘中华不自乱·无人可乱华’ [‘Nobody can destroy China if China does not destroy itself first’], *环球时报* [Global Times], (25.04.2013)



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China's Polar Silk Road: Opportunities and Challenges for Nordic Arctic

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Abstract

Recent global and environmental changes have marked the increasing significance of the Arctic region. With the adoption of the Polar Silk Road (PSR) policy framework by China, emerging opportunities and challenges for Nordic countries in the region have received wider attention.

This article mainly explores several plans and projects regarding the development and utilization of Arctic sea routes under the shadow of increasing global uncertainties. It suggests that sides can facilitate efforts toward convergent preferences in bilateral and multilateral contexts for achieving greater benefits from integrated projects within the framework of the PSR. Despite all significant evidence for the improvement of China-Nordic cooperation, obstacles need to be overcome by focusing on coordinated policies toward global governance, accommodating common interests, and promoting sustainable development.

Keywords: *China, Polar Silk Road (PSR), China-Nordic cooperation, Arctic governance, sustainable development*

1. Introduction

The Arctic region has been significantly affected by the impacts of climate change and globalization in the last few decades. The Arctic sea ice has been melting rapidly because of global warming. As a result of this environmental change, access to natural resources and the establishment of new maritime sea routes in the Arctic region has drawn global attention. Most importantly, the idea of the North-East Passage (NEP) has led many countries to consider how to utilize new commercial opportunities through the maritime route of the Nordic and Russian Arctic rather than traditional routes along the Suez Canal. On the other hand, China's growing interest in the Arctic region has become evident since 2013. China geographically defines itself as a "Near-Arctic State" which claims to be one of the continental states in the Arctic Circle. China improves its connections with changing regions especially by focusing on the impacts of the Arctic climate system, infrastructure development and finance, and resource exploration and exploitation activities. In addition to that, China's shipping companies are actively involved in pilot voyages via the Northern Sea Route. In order to incentivize the complementary nature of two major production and consumer markets of Asia and Europe, China demonstrates significant efforts to promote cooperation with Nordic countries. China's active engagement with the Arctic Council indicates its receiving attractiveness to the relevant Arctic countries as

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well as its determination to contribute to global governance. By recognizing China's globalized interest in the Arctic region, it can be understood how China's current foreign policy widens its scope in a search for obtaining a global role in world politics today.¹

Recent policy-related studies have reflected considerations upon China's primary interests in the Nordic countries.² Some of them especially emphasize the significance of economic interests while others point out long-term implications for the security environment. In an attempt to combine both benefits and costs of China's engagement with the Nordics, there are some rationalist evaluations of China-Nordic cooperation in terms of Nordic countries' bilateral relations with China.³ From an institutional perspective, China's growing role in the Arctic is examined through different aspects including its inclusion in the Arctic Council,⁴ impacts on the EU,⁵ and the investigation of new possibilities for emerging governance structures with an emphasis on China-Nordic sub-regional cooperation.⁶ Even some studies have begun to explore the long-term institutional implications not only for Europe but also for the East Asian reorganization.⁷ With the globalization of the Arctic region, the main focus of research has shifted towards the efforts for framing the Polar Silk Road in terms of its economic, social, and environmental impacts.⁸ However, after intensifying conflict and following the war in Ukraine, the changing geopolitical context has become prominently critical. Subsequently, the emergence of triangular relations among China, Russia, and the Nordic countries concerning the Polar Silk Road and trans-Arctic connectivity has drawn particular attention.⁹ Notwithstanding, China's modification of its BRI policy with a green development vision has

¹ Marc Lantaigne and Ping Su, "China's Developing Arctic Policies: Myths and Misconceptions", *Journal of China and International Relations* 3, no. 1 (2015): 1-25.

² Jerker Hellström, "China's Political Priorities in the Nordic Countries: From Technology to Core Interests", (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2016).

³ Andreas B. Forsby, *Nordic-China Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities*, (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2019).

⁴ Michael Kulth and Kennet Lynggaard, "Small State Strategies in Emerging Regional Governance Structures: Explaining the Danish Advocacy for China's Inclusion in the Arctic Council", *European Politics and Society* 19, no. 1 (2018): 103-119.

⁵ Thomas Christiansen and Richard Maher, "The Rise of China-Challenges and Opportunities for the European Union", *Asia Europe Journal* 15, no. 2 (2017): 121-131.

⁶ Weipeng Zhang and Yu Xiaofeng, "Institutional Approaches to Deepening China-Nordic Sub-Regional Cooperation", *China International Studies* 76, no. 3 (2019): 148-165.

⁷ Valeriy P. Zhuravel, "China, Republic of Korea and Japan in the Arctic: Politics, Economy, Security", *Arctic and North* 24, no. 3 (2016): 99-126.

⁸ Yang Zheng, "China-Nordic Blue Economic Passage: Basis, Challenges and Paths", *China International Studies* 78, no. 5 (2019): 29-49.

⁹ Reinhard Biedermann, "Exploring Sino-Russian-Nordics Triangular Relations: Complex Balancing Along The Polar Silk Road", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* (2021): 1-17.



also received wider attention with rising expectations for its commitment to global governance and sustainable development goals.¹⁰

While existing literature has been largely concentrated on China's strategic interests in the Arctic region and its bilateral relations with the Nordic countries, the emerging opportunities, as well as the challenges resulting from China's PSR, have received less attention. It is particularly important to recognize how China's new policy framework of the PSR contributes to its broader Arctic diplomacy and attempts to develop appropriate collaborative partnerships for global governance concerning sustainable development goals. After the Arctic sea routes were officially incorporated into the BRI, the Arctic region has gained a globalized character and the policy approaches of relevant countries have also been altered. Accordingly, the potential economic and commercial opportunities have been widened with accelerated efforts for improving the regional interconnection between Northern Europe and East Asia. This article mainly analyzes the evolution of China's Arctic policy with a focus on the development and utilization of the Arctic sea routes through specific plans and projects under the framework of PSR. But, it particularly identifies the emerging opportunities and challenges for improving broader cooperation with the Nordic countries under new changing international circumstances. Even though China's PSR faces considerable difficulties in its future development, it is suggested that China-Nordic cooperation can be facilitated through integrated projects of the PSR especially by focusing on the opportunities offered by green development promotion. In addition to the initial focus on maritime cooperation for the Arctic regional development, the commercial implications of the PSR can be extended into other fields that China has begun to offer as a potential collaborative partnership opportunity. Thus, by applying the international political economy perspective to China-Nordic cooperation, this research investigates the future possibilities of deepening interactions between the two sides. It aims to contribute to filling the gap in the existing literature by addressing the new commercial opportunities that are likely to provide greater mutual benefits for all stakeholders of the Arctic region as well as the global governance development.

As an empirical case study, this research conducts a policy-oriented approach to conclude the implementation of China's PSR in the Nordic Arctic. It is analyzed through

¹⁰ Nengye Liu, "Will China Build a Green Belt and Road in the Arctic", *Review of European Comparative and International Law* 27, no. 1 (2018): 55-62.



remarkable academic works that have made theoretical and practical contributions. It pays particular attention to the official policy documents as well as speeches and statements made by state officials as reliable primary sources. The practical impact on policy development is based on suggestions identified with potential improvements towards the China-Nordic cooperation. The qualitative method is used throughout the research based on interpretations of official documents, newspapers, Western, Chinese, and Russian scholarly publications, and think tank policy reports.

This article is structured into three main parts. The first part explains the theoretical perspective of the research by making a distinction between the two different political economy approaches to foreign policy analysis of state-led developmentalism. The second part introduces the evolution of China's Arctic policy with particular attention to its new priorities and orientations. The new policy framework of the PSR is identified with its main components in which the China-Russia cooperation has gained a central place in the Arctic regional connectivity as a consequence of economic realignment between the two countries. The third part particularly focuses on the analysis of emerging opportunities and challenges for the Nordic Arctic which indicates that the implications of geopolitical shift tend to create risks for further cooperation between China and the Nordic countries while other opportunities suggest greater benefits for extended collaborations. In this part, the developmental, social, and environmental challenges are also examined to address the limitations as well as requirements for the future development of China-Nordic cooperation.

2. Theoretical Framework

China's growing economic interest in the Arctic region can be better explained from the perspective of the international political economy. Theoretically, the concept of a 'developmental state' is broadly used for examining the domestic politics of East Asian states. It is one of the central concepts to identify the economic and political systems of Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and China. The developmental state is characterized by the guidance and support of interventionist government for social-economic development by making emphasis on industrial growth within the capitalist environment.¹¹ And it is based on the fundamental

¹¹ Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).



idea that latecomers in the world economy require a centralized approach to industrialization and economic growth.¹²

Until recently, studies on developmental state and state-led developmentalism mostly concentrated on domestic politics and they had less to contribute to the explanations of foreign policy linkages.¹³ However, as East Asian states' engagements with the world economy considerably increased, the term 'economic diplomacy' appeared as a new form of analysis for their foreign policies. It can be broadly defined as "the process of international economic decision-making" which is associated with a country's national interest in terms of economic prosperity or political stability.¹⁴ By definition economic diplomacy contains a practical understanding of foreign policy analysis in capturing the interaction between economic/commercial and political interests. In addition to that economic diplomacy is also understood as "the pursuit of economic security within an anarchic system" by incorporating the security dimension of foreign policy practice.¹⁵ In this regard, to protect their national interests, governments pursue economic diplomacy by using different instruments that can be considered relatively more economic or political. In terms of diplomatic tools and purposes, economic diplomacy can be categorized into five different strands such as commercial diplomacy, financial diplomacy, trade diplomacy, inducements, and sanctions. Commercial diplomacy, for instance, involves certain cooperative efforts employed by government and business actors, such as trade promotion, investment promotion, or tourism promotion, to achieve economic purposes.¹⁶

Even though both share the same point of departure, which is a developmental state, there is another theoretical explanation to address the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy. Based on the assumption that developmental states were transformed as they engage more with the world economy should be taken into account. By referring to their

¹² Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

¹³ Maaïke Okana-Heijmans, "Japan's 'Green' Economic Diplomacy: Environmental and Energy Technology and Foreign Relations", *The Pacific Review* 25, no. 3 (2012): 339-364.

¹⁴ Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock, "What Is Economic Diplomacy?," in *The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations*, ed. Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock, (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2011).

¹⁵ Maaïke Okana-Heijmans, "Conceptualizing Economic Diplomacy: The Crossroads of International Relations, Economics, IPE and Diplomatic Studies", *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 6, (2011): 7-36.

¹⁶ Aki Tonami, *Asian Foreign Policy In A Changing Arctic: The Diplomacy of Economy and Science At New Frontiers*, (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2016).



adaptive nature, pragmatic orientations of developmental states seek to generate capital resources and finance their economic modernization in a way that state-led liberalism or I prefer to use developmental pragmatism, takes the lead in managing their external economic relations.¹⁷ In this understanding of state-led developmentalism, states' economic engagements are embedded within a capitalist system, which is called "alliance capitalism".¹⁸ And this embeddedness for building collaborative partnerships takes place through their globalized networks. It refers to the inner transformation of state capitalism from states' full control over the globalization process to more collaborative, alliance-based, and open-globalized co-development models to utilize the contemporary globalization process. Within this contemporary context, state capitalism 2.0, as the term used by some scholars, represents a new hybrid form of capitalism.¹⁹

Concerning identifying the evolving nature of the "global network state developmental model", some studies conduct empirical quantitative research with a particular focus on Chinese globalizing corporate networks. These studies bring to the conclusion that foreign policies are not formulated and implemented by only governments but through a complex network of policy linkages. They demonstrate that network ties have already been formed between Chinese and international business actors with substantial transnational linkages and hybridized model of engagement.²⁰ Contrary to the arguments against increasing the expansion of Chinese state-owned oil companies on the global stage, they even illustrate that Chinese companies largely cooperate with their Western counterparts and participate the capitalist competition.²¹ And it is also important to see that transnational linkages of Chinese corporate networks do not represent a lower level of engagement with European companies than that with US companies.

Given the fact that China's economic interests are the driving force in its engagement with the Arctic region and that its bilateral relations with the Nordic countries present a unique

¹⁷ Mustafa Tüter, "Japan's New Model of Engagement with Belt and Road Initiative: Economic Statecraft, Developmental Pragmatism and Institutional Shaping", *Journal of Civilization Studies* 6, no. 1 (2021): 123-142.

¹⁸ Victoria Higgins, *Alliance Capitalism, Innovation and the Chinese State*, (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015).

¹⁹ Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G. Lazzarini, "Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their Implications for Economic Performance", Harvard Business School Working Paper, 30 May 2012.

²⁰ Nana' de Graaff, "China Inc. Goes Global: Transnational and National Networks of China's Globalizing Business Elite", *Review of International Political Economy* 27, no. 2 (2020): 208-233.

²¹ Nana' de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, "US Elite Power and the Rise of 'Statist' Chinese Elites in Global Markets", *International Politics* 54, (2017): 338-355.



commercial diplomatic logic, the latter theoretical approach fits better to this empirical research subject in explaining how China's policy of PSR is implemented towards Nordic Arctic. The geographical distance should also be taken into consideration, which makes a remarkable difference, for instance, if compared with China's economic diplomacy towards Southeast Asia, when making theoretically and empirically relevant accounts of foreign policy analysis. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the former economic security-based approach could still be valid if the commercial diplomacy aspect is taken specifically for analyzing the research subject.

3. China's Evolving Policy Towards the Arctic Region

The relatively new phenomenon of the "globalization of the Arctic" broadly coincided with China's multidimensional and multi-faceted diplomatic approach toward the Arctic region.²² China's overall Arctic policy as a way of engaging with the Arctic governance involves various connected policy issues ranging from regional development to traditional and non-traditional security, and from science and technology cooperation to the environment.²³ Additionally, it also presents how China institutionalizes its policies toward Arctic governance in a multilevel approach.²⁴ When the Arctic region was officially incorporated into the BRI, these issues were reformulated according to the needs of China's active engagement with the region. In this regard, due to the inner development of the BRI, the PSR framework mostly reflects the central concerns about infrastructure development and finance and energy-related projects. However, since China's connectivity cooperation with Russia was successfully reached, its leading role in Arctic shipping was also enhanced. Subsequently, China's policy concentration shifted more towards Nordic Arctic and the utilization of new shipping routes also became a relatively more important issue. China is the only country that is capable of sending ships across all three routes defined by the PSR. The effectiveness of international trade shipping is supported by investments in ports and energy supplies, which makes the Arctic sea routes more viable and cost-effective.

²² Ye Jiang, "China's Role in Arctic Affairs in the Context of Global Governance", *Strategic Analysis* 38, no. 6 (2014): 913-916.

²³ Pei Zhang and Jian Yang, "Changes in the Arctic and China's Participation in Arctic Governance," in *Asian Countries and the Arctic Future*, ed. Leiv Lunde, et. all. (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015): 217-235.

²⁴ Reinhard Biedermann, "The Polar Silk Road: China's Multilevel Arctic Strategy to Globalize the Far North", *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* 6, no. 2 (2020): 571-615.



Under new global circumstances, for assessing future development and utilization of Arctic sea routes through the PSR, several factors need to be evaluated.²⁵ First of all, it is directly determined by increasing international trade demand. It is important to maintain a sustainable cargo base, stable transit demand, and year-round operation. All those are affected by the improvement of navigational conditions on traditional routes, including monitoring, marine search, and rescue infrastructures, and practices for safety measures. It means that maintaining navigational safety and security in trans-Arctic shipping transportation is crucial. Second, the PSR's effectiveness is affected by the fluctuations in international oil and gas prices. With the impact of the Ukraine war global uncertainties about the energy market have arisen. And third, the development of renewable energy sources is required to support the efficient implementation of PSR. The last one can especially be a driving force for the future development of China-Nordic cooperation.

3.1. China's New Policy Framework of PSR: Priorities and Orientations

China's Arctic policy was generally oriented towards achieving four main ultimate goals: building a solid Chinese research capacity, accessing energy resources and minerals, ensuring access to the Arctic sea lanes, and being an active player in the evolving Arctic governance regime.²⁶ Following those overall policy goals, China's PSR was first introduced by the Chinese government in the document for international cooperation on the Maritime Silk Road.²⁷ The main component of China's Maritime Silk Road, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, was extended by two additional frameworks, and the PSR was particularly acknowledged in the White Paper on China's Arctic Policy in early 2018.

In its policy formulation, China promotes the PSR as an integral part of its Arctic policy and an extension of the BRI. Building international cooperation in the Arctic region through the development and utilization of major shipping routes and coastal areas has become China's policy priority. By concentrating on the development of the North-East Passage (NEP), which aims to connect the Russian Arctic with the Nordic Arctic, it supports infrastructure building while pursuing coordinated joint efforts towards trade and investment cooperation with relevant

²⁵ Jian Yang and Long Zhao, "Opportunities and Challenges of Jointly Building of the Polar Silk Road: China's Perspective", *Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law* 12, no. 5 (2019): 141-142.

²⁶ Zhang Xia, *China's Arctic Interests and Policy*, (Shanghai: Current Affairs Publishing House, 2015).

²⁷ "Full Text: Vision for Maritime Cooperation Under the Belt and Road Initiative", *Xinhuanet*, 20 June 2017. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/06/20/content_281475691873460.htm (16.07.2022).



countries in the Arctic region. Chinese companies have been actively involved to explore new commercial opportunities by navigating via NEP. This policy orientation is proposed by the construction of the “blue economic passage” which envisions connecting Europe via the Arctic Ocean.²⁸ However, the blue economic passage does not only aim to establish maritime interconnection, but it also involves broader maritime cooperation with the Arctic countries such as the promotion of knowledge and technology transfer and green development.²⁹

After the PSR framework was adopted by China, its Arctic policy was modified and identified with three primary goals: participating in Arctic governance, improving common interests, and promoting sustainable development.³⁰ However, the basic suspicions towards the PSR are shaped by certain concerns raised by the Nordic states, such as China’s population size and its increasing interest in natural resources. Additionally, some of the countries are especially concerned with China’s long-term strategic objectives, even the possibility to deploy military presence in the Arctic.³¹ In this sense, China’s increased strategic cooperation with Russia has not been politically endorsed by the Nordic states in recent years. From another perspective, some scholarly debate also emphasizes that the Northern Sea Route (NSR) has become identical to the PSR after China’s ambitious involvement in the region.³²

All relevant countries in the Arctic region have attempted to produce appropriate policy responses according to the new changes in the international environment. Given the opportunities and challenges they face, they must comprehend new development strategies in the utilization of Arctic shipping. By signaling their changing attitudes towards adaptation to new commercial opportunities, they already made modified policy decisions. While Iceland took the lead to focus on upcoming opportunities resulting from the new Arctic shipping routes, Sweden made a call for efficient and multilateral cooperation by putting reservations on the negative environmental impacts.³³ Finland, however, demonstrated its strong interest in the

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Yang and Zhao, “Opportunities and Challenges”, 132.

³⁰ “Full Text: China’s Arctic Policy”, (Beijing: State Council Information Office of China), 26 January 2018. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm (13.07.2022).

³¹ “China Unveils Vision for ‘Polar Silk Road’ Across Arctic”, *Reuters*, 20 January 2018.

³² Nicolas Groffman, “Why China-Russia Relations Are Warming Up in the Arctic”, *South China Morning Post*, 17 February 2018.

³³ “A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy”, (Reykjavik: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland), 28 March 2011. “Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region”, (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, 2011). Gudlaugur T. Thordarsson, “Iceland-China Relations Will Continue to Strengthen”, *China Daily*, 6 September 2018.



development of the maritime industry and shipping.³⁴ On the other hand, Russian President Putin stated that the PSR will contribute to the improvement of the NEP and eventually become “a globally competitive transport artery” with a lesser cost of services, safety, and quality.³⁵ So, all relevant countries are mindful of the future significance of new shipping routes in the Arctic region and give priority to infrastructure development and investment for the utilization efforts.

For achieving convergence of different national interests and priorities of relevant countries, China follows a path through bilateral and multilateral cooperation in its growing participation in Arctic affairs. China advocates multilateral cooperation for building the PSR, especially emphasizing the need to develop a balanced approach between the development and protection of the Arctic region. In addition, the PSR is also perceived by China as a pragmatic platform for bilateral and multilateral cooperation not only among Arctic countries but also with non-Arctic countries. In practice, China conducted bilateral consultations on Arctic affairs and established regular dialogue mechanisms with all Arctic countries at the bilateral level. For instance, China and Iceland signed several bilateral agreements including the Framework Agreement on Arctic Cooperation.³⁶ Furthermore, China, Japan, South Korea, and some other countries, as potential users and investors, joined in discussions on the Arctic shipping issues for establishing mutually beneficial cooperation.³⁷

Although China demonstrates its interest in the exploration of Arctic resources in the region, sharing scientific knowledge for the protection of the Arctic ecosystem also plays a significant role in its Arctic diplomacy. Since the Arctic region receives the most direct impact of climate change, the development and utilization of Arctic resources should require a perspective of sustainability concerning environmental risk, production safety risk, and ecological sensitivity assessments. Within the framework of PSR, China promotes contribution to scientific research to create a joint responsible action against global challenges. Moreover, when the operations of Arctic shipping routes are concerned, China pays considerable attention

³⁴ “Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region Government Resolution”, (Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office of Finland), 23 August 2013.

³⁵ Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the One Belt, One Road International Forum 2017”, 14 May 2017.

³⁶ “Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao Pays Official Visit to Iceland”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Iceland, 25 April 2012.

³⁷ Mia Bennett, “China, Japan and South Korea Hold Their Own Arctic Dialogue”, *Arctic Today*, 15 June 2017.



to navigation security. For instance, China conducts comprehensive studies and hydrographic surveys for playing an active role in formulating navigational rules for Arctic shipping.³⁸

China is committed to following the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. It pursues a multilateral approach for making cooperation across various sectors, including the green economy, environment, health, and infrastructure. The desired coordination among Arctic states, non-Arctic states, and nonstate actors can only be achieved if the balance between economic development and environmental protection is maintained. The PSR prioritizes addressing this urgent necessity by enhancing technical standards and investment conditions. The PSR framework also aims to develop appropriate solutions for the elimination of digital gaps by creating effective transportation and communication systems and facilitating infrastructure and digital network construction.³⁹

One of the most promising aspects of the PSR for Nordic countries is represented by China's promotion of green technology solutions. The unique nature of the Arctic region under changing environmental circumstances requires well-planned green solutions. Given the past successful examples of collaborations between the Chinese and Nordic enterprises, there appears growing potential for improving cooperative efforts, especially in the developing parts of the Arctic region. However, the expected economic benefits from new shipping routes cannot be attained at the expense of environmental costs. The PSR is designed to integrate economic development with green technology progress. In this regard, China's increasing technological innovation capacity provides some advantages to increasing the attractiveness of the PSR. Related to China's technological innovation capabilities, the PSR also focuses on clean energy cooperation with the Arctic countries. In the construction of Arctic infrastructure, creating sustainable energy systems is encouraged for achieving low-carbon development goals.⁴⁰

³⁸ Qiang Zhang, Zheng Wan and Shanshan Fu, "Toward Sustainable Arctic Shipping: Perspectives from China", *Sustainability* 12, (2020): 1-12.

³⁹ Yang and Zhao, "Opportunities and Challenges", 136.

⁴⁰ Lucia Mortensen, Anne Merrild Hansen and Alexander Shestakov, "How Three Key Factors Are Driving and Challenging Implementation of Renewable Energy Systems in Remote Arctic Communities", *Polar Geography* 40, no. 3 (2017): 163-185.



3.2. China - Russia Arctic Cooperation: Establishing Energy-Driven Regional Connectivity

In the last decades, China-Russia strategic cooperation has improved to a significant level. To deepen this strategic cooperation, both countries now move towards jointly advancing comprehensive social and economic development. In terms of the rising strategic value of the Arctic region, China and Russia share overlapping and complementary interests in deepening pragmatic cooperation. For the Russian side, the Arctic region offers new opportunities for further integration into the global economy and modernization of the energy industry. For the Chinese side, however, it is important to shape global governance mechanisms through establishing collaborative partnerships based on common interests which are enhanced by regional interconnectivity. On this rational foundation of mutually beneficial strategic partnership, China provides funds, technologies, and resources for Arctic development in exchange for getting Russia's political support in Arctic affairs. Russia is certainly the most important partner for China with its largest geography and population in the Arctic region. So, both countries are proceeding to deepen their strategic cooperation in participating in new plans for the Arctic sea routes, infrastructure investment, and energy projects within the context of BRI maritime cooperation in general and the PSR framework in particular.

At the political level, both the Chinese and Russian governments have reached an agreement to move further cooperation in the Arctic by organizing regular meetings. At the present stage, both governments are negotiating the Memorandum of Understanding on transportation in Polar Waters for establishing a legal basis for policy coordination.⁴¹ At the commercial level, the key aspect is to extend cooperation in infrastructure development. The Chinese companies have become increasingly attractive for the construction of Russia's Arctic energy and transportation infrastructure projects. The National Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank have made a huge investment in the Yamal LNG project which is the largest energy and infrastructure complex in the Arctic.⁴² In addition, China and Russia also agreed to sustain their cooperation on the Arctic LNG 2 project which makes China-Russia Arctic cooperation more significant in the future.⁴³

⁴¹ "The Polar Silk Road Attracts the World's Attention", *People's Daily*, 28 January 2018.

⁴² "China Lenders Provide \$12 Bln Loan for Russia's Yamal LNG Project-Sources", *Reuters*, 29 April 2016.

⁴³ "NOVATEK and CNOOC Sign Share Purchase Agreement for Arctic LNG 2 Stake", *Novatek*, 7 June 2019.



Meanwhile, France's Total oil Corporation participated in the Yamal LNG project by holding a 20 percent stake and also received a 10 percent share in the Arctic LNG-2 project in March 2019. Moreover, France's Total declared that it will be a partner in Arctic LNG transshipment hubs by investing in terminals in Murmansk and Kamchatka.⁴⁴ Even though the Yamal LNG project was designed for shipping to the East Asian markets, it can also be piped to Europe. It is expected that 70 percent of the Yamal LNG project will be transported to the East and 30 percent will be transported to the West. This potential energy resource supply is more likely to continue triggering future collaborations between energy consumers in East Asia and Europe for developing infrastructure projects and the NSR.

China and Russia also jointly develop new projects in port and railway infrastructure. For linking Central Russia to Arkhangelsk in the Arctic, China Poly Group Corporation signed an agreement with Russian Interregional JSC Belkomur in 2015. In the construction of the Belkomur railway line, the Arkhangelsk deep-water seaport was also attached to the project.⁴⁵ Another significant port project was reported in Russia's Murmansk, which represents a major transportation hub within the Arctic Circle. This project promises that China will continue to play an active role in the development of the NSR from Northern Europe to East Asia through the Arctic. As of 2018, the NSR has become one of the priority areas and a \$10 billion investment was committed by China Development Bank and Russia's Vnesheconombank that would finance around 70 projects in the Arctic.⁴⁶

What is striking about the future China-Russia Arctic cooperation is that both countries are willing to build a "new growth pole" by improving their trade interdependence. Economic relations cannot be limited to energy cooperation between China and Russia. In this regard, trade diversification is necessary to deepen the pragmatic cooperation between the two countries. To achieve a more comprehensive structure in trade relations, China and Russia are intended to utilize the PSR framework. With new innovative practices that the PSR would offer, the infrastructure and energy development cooperation can contribute to stimulating their collaborative efforts into more "embedded" development models in multiple dimensions

⁴⁴ "France's Total Will Partner with Russia's Novatek on Arctic LNG Transshipment Hubs", *Arctic Today*, 19 April 2019.

⁴⁵ "Governor Orlov Confirms China as Key Arctic Partner", *The Barents Observer*, 28 December 2017.

⁴⁶ Atle Staalesen, "Chinese Money for Northern Sea Route", *The Barents Observer*, 12 June 2018.



including new investment models, profit sharing methods, and equity structures.⁴⁷ This achievement is suitable for promoting China-Russia Arctic cooperation with sustainable development goals.

4. Opportunities and Challenges for the Nordic Arctic

With the development of the PSR framework, China's ideas turned into policy action. However, given the difficulties and challenges of its implementation, practices of cooperation between China and the Nordic countries have tended to be slowing down. Each of them has received a particular type of perception of China and experienced a different type of bilateral relationship.⁴⁸ By putting it simply, China's relations with the Nordic countries can be characterized as broadly pragmatic (Denmark and Iceland), more mercantilist (Finland), or more normative (Sweden and Norway).⁴⁹ After the Ukraine War, the geopolitical challenges have increased and the triangular relationship between China, Russia, and the Nordics has become dependent upon contingencies. Besides, developmental and social capacity gaps between China and Nordic countries entail some requirements which need to be taken seriously to improve further cooperation. On the other hand, environmental challenges produce increasing sensitivities about domestic public opinions influenced by particular interest groups.

4.1. Opportunities for China-Nordic Cooperation: Building Collaborative Partnerships Based on Commercial Interests

China's economic and diplomatic activities have become more evident in the Arctic region since China gained observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013. In this diplomatic achievement, China's primary supporters were Denmark and Iceland. The first commercial voyage undertaken by China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) from a Chinese port to Rotterdam via the NSR was a flagship operation to indicate China's involvement in the Arctic sea routes. This important event symbolized the real globalization of the Arctic. Since China released its Arctic policy in 2018, China-Nordic Arctic cooperation has been accelerated with several PSR plans and projects. China considers the Nordic countries as natural partners for the

⁴⁷ Yang and Zhao, "Opportunities and Challenges", 139.

⁴⁸ Bjornar Sverdrup-Thygeson and Jerker Hellström, "Introduction: Quintet Out of Tune? China's Bilateral Relations with the Nordic States," in *Dragon in the North: The Nordic Countries' Relations with China*, ed. Bjornar Sverdrup-Thygeson (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2016).

⁴⁹ "Sino-Nordic Relations: Opportunities and the Way Ahead", (Stockholm: ISDP, 2016), 10, <https://isdpu.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/2016-Sino-Nordic-Relations-Opportunities-and-the-Way-Ahead.pdf> (28.07.2022).



blue economic passage and suggests a 5+1 framework to promote cooperation for achieving the goals of the PSR.⁵⁰

By looking at China-Nordic relationships closely, it is possible to suggest that each country has followed different trajectories over the years. China has already signed an FTA with Iceland in 2013 and established a strategic partnership with Denmark. The relations with Finland have evolved into a so-called “new type of future-oriented partnership”.⁵¹ In addition to the consensus on developing cooperation on maritime economy and global governance, the Nordic countries also offer China an opportunity to take support for its market economy status in the EU. As a matter of fact, all Nordic countries are founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which means they have already met the preconditions for participating in the BRI projects.

For improving regional development and cooperation, China develops projects to increase interconnectivity between land-based economies and marine economies. It initially requires enhancing infrastructure connectivity by implementing innovative solutions like the Arctic Corridor project and promoting digital connection in the region. By looking at leading international companies in the Nordic region, such as Danish Maersk, Swedish ABB, Norway’s Statoil, Finnish Nokia, and Metso, it is more likely to expect greater engagements with Chinese companies in the future.⁵²

In its relations with the Nordic countries, China prioritizes building global infrastructure networks by enhancing digital connectivity. One of the current significant examples of multilateral cooperation in telecommunication has taken place among Chinese, Finnish, Russian, Japanese, and Norwegian partners in building a 10.500-kilometer fiber-optic maritime cable link across the Arctic Circle.⁵³ In another recent example, the most notable Chinese companies, like Alibaba, JD Group, Huawei, SF Express, and China International E-Commerce C. Ltd, have collaborated with their Estonian counterparts to create a new transit hub of Chinese commodities from e-platforms.

⁵⁰Yang Zheng, “China-Nordic Blue Economic Passage: Basis, Challenges and Paths”, *China International Studies* 78, no. 5 (2019): 29-49.

⁵¹ Ibid, 32

⁵² Camilla T. N. Sorensen, “Belt, Road, and Circle: The Arctic and Northern Europe in China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” in *China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Changing the Rules of Globalization*, ed. Wenxian Zhang, et. all. (Geneva: Palgrave, 2018), 106.

⁵³ Elizabeth Buchanan, “Sea Cables in a Thawing Arctic”, *The Interpreter*, 1 February 2018.



China also advocates advancing clean energy cooperation with the Nordic countries for taking advantage of the protection and efficient use of Arctic resources. One of the successful examples was made with Iceland in greater cooperation on geothermal energy. Later on, Sino Petroleum Corp (Sinopec) and Iceland's Arctic Green Energy Corporation (AGEC) developed geothermal projects in 40 Chinese cities. Chinese companies have also demonstrated their willingness to invest in potential port projects in the Nordic Arctic such as Finna fjordur and Dryness in the Northeast of Iceland.⁵⁴ China and Sweden made their first joint Arctic project on a satellite receiving station in 2016. The China Remote Sensing Satellite North Polar Ground Station (CNPGS) provides China the capability to access data in the Arctic region. Since Sweden is not a NATO member, China can operate space projects, even for military purposes, in this entirely Chinese-owned station.⁵⁵

China and the Nordic countries are jointly demonstrating efforts to build collaborative partnerships for the realization of the Arctic corridor.⁵⁶ Finland and Norway have already proposed the Arctic Corridor, which is a comprehensive transportation program connecting the city of Rovaniemi in North Finland with the Norwegian port of Kirkeness.⁵⁷ The outcome at the end of the program will strengthen the international utilization of the NSR. The program includes several projects such as the rebuilding of the Kirkeness deep-water port and the construction of a railway, a logistic hub in Rovaniemi, and an air logistic hub in Helsinki. The Helsinki air logistic hub is also linked to the Baltic Tunnel, which means that there will be a well-connected Arctic Corridor from Kirkeness to central Europe through the Helsinki-Tallinn tunnel. For China, the Arctic Corridor offers great opportunities for improving cooperation under the framework of PSR. In order to facilitate connectivity between East Asian and European markets, it plays a significant role to integrate the Baltic region and central European market. Chinese companies showed wider interest to invest in costly infrastructure building projects in the Arctic corridor.

⁵⁴ James Kyngé, "Chinese Purchases of Overseas Ports Top \$20bn in Past Year", *Financial Times*, 15 July 2018.

⁵⁵ "Kiruna North Pole Ground Station (CNPGS)", *Global Security*, 2021. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/kiruna.htm> (13.06.2022).

⁵⁶ Henry Tillman, Jian Yang and Egill Thor Nielsson, "The Polar Silk Road: China's New Frontier of International Cooperation", *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies* 4, no. 3 (2018): 358.

⁵⁷ "The Arctic Railway: Rovaniemi-Kirkeness", The Arctic Corridor. <https://arcticcorridor.fi/wp-content/uploads/jkrautatie4scr2eng.pdf> (6.9.2022)



Norway has been one of the largest trading partners of China in Northern Europe. The two countries are intended to complete free trade negotiations successfully.⁵⁸ Within the framework of PSR, Norway's shipping groups are particularly willing to make collaboration with their Chinese counterparts.⁵⁹ Due to the key strategic location and appropriate feasible conditions of Kirkeness, future cooperation between China and Norway will be concentrated on relevant transportation and infrastructure building projects. The expected economic benefits are significant for both countries as ships can move cargoes from China as well as oil and gas from the Russian Arctic through the NSR to Kirkeness.

Norway's strategic vision for the Arctic Corridor has been rearticulated officially during their visit to Shanghai in April 2018. It is understood that Norway is well prepared and determined for the opening up to the NSR.⁶⁰ In reality, the Arctic Corridor cannot be regarded as just a plan, but it has been partially experienced before. In 2010, the first non-Russian flagged commercial vessel sailed directly from Kirkenes through the NSR and the Bering Strait to Lianyungang of China.

In Finland, Rovaniemi has a central place for improving relations with China in several different fields such as energy, mining, tourism, information, and communication technology (ICT), and clean technology. The most important infrastructure project, a maritime fiber cable project, that links Europe to Asia via the NSR has been planned to pass through Rovaniemi. Another important project of Helsinki-Tallinn Transport Link has been planned to connect Finland to Estonia under the Gulf of Finland. Once finished, it would become the world's longest undersea rail tunnel. Moreover, it is expected that Helsinki will be the air hub of the Arctic Corridor. It is important to notice that air travel from China to Finland has grown significantly in the last decade. On the other hand, China is projected to be the 8th most popular destination country for the Finish.⁶¹

⁵⁸ "China Says Free Trade Talks with Norway Should be Accelerated", *Reuters*, 2 August 2018.

⁵⁹ Liang Youchang and Zhang Shuhui, "Norway's Arctic Town Envisions Gateway on Polar Silk Road with Link to China", *Xinhua*, 10 March 2018.

⁶⁰ Atle Staalesen, "Barents Town Envisions Arctic Hub with Link to China", *The Barents Observer*, 6 February 2018.

⁶¹ Hu Tao, "Finnair Flying High with China's Ongoing Growth, Development", *China Daily*, 15 June 2018.



4.2. Geopolitical Challenges

The development of Arctic sea routes cannot be regarded separately from global and regional geopolitics. The US's role as an Arctic coastal state produces some uncertainties about the future development of the PSR. The US plays a core membership role in Arctic affairs and has its policy to shape the sea route development of the region. The US-Russia geopolitical tensions have a significant impact on Arctic cooperation in different dimensions. Especially after the Ukraine crisis occurred, the US and its European allies decided to implement sanctions against Russia. Particularly, the restrictions on technology export for deep sea and Arctic resource development as well as the sanctions against Russian oil companies and banks created obstacles to facilitating the efforts for Arctic regional development. The US standpoint at Arctic Council presents accusations against both Russia and China by calling their military and civilian presence in the Arctic provocative and aggressive. Specifically, the US is worried about Russia's increasing military build-up and its regulation over the NSR. On the other hand, the US also expresses its concerns related to China's possible deployment of submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks.⁶² Moreover, the US has also disagreements with Canada over Northwest Passage (NWP) in terms of conflicting sovereignty claims.⁶³ Canada does not accept the US claims over NWP as legitimate so this additional conflict poses more uncertainty about the future international cooperation on the PSR. It is also important to note that the United Nations Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) is applied to Arctic affairs. However, the only Arctic state which is not a party to the UNCLOS is the US itself.

The basic strategic challenge for the Nordic states in the changing nature of the Arctic region is to confront Russia's geopolitical influence. The security dimension of the triangular relationship between China-Russia and Nordic states has become critical after the Ukrainian War.⁶⁴ The Nordic countries are worried about the revisionist attempts of Russia and concerned with China's possible increasing support for Russia's revisionism. On the other hand, an intensified collaboration between China and the Nordics is perceived as at least problematic for Russia. Russia envisions a more comprehensive plan for the Arctic region than just being a transit territory for the PSR. There are some deep underlying concerns on the Russian side that

⁶² Simon Johnson, "Pompeo: Russia is 'Aggressive' in Arctic, China's Work There Also Needs Watching", *Reuters*, 6 May 2019.

⁶³ "Mike Pompeo Rejects Canada's Claims to Northwest Passage as 'Illegitimate'", *The Guardian*, 7 May 2019.

⁶⁴ Biedermann, "Exploring Sino-Russian-Nordics Triangular Relations", 13.



China would organize a coalition with the Nordics demanding internationalization of the NSR.⁶⁵ While Russia prioritizes ensuring its own Arctic sovereignty rights, China and other non-Arctic states support the idea of an Arctic as a ‘global commons’.

Despite all evidence for the improvement of China-Nordic cooperation, one of the consequences of global geopolitical competition appeared when Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland decided to exclude Huawei from the construction of the 5G networks in 2019. As a diplomatic backlash against China’s intensified involvement in Arctic affairs, the cooperative motivations were overwhelmed by economic security interests. And after that China’s public perception in the Nordic countries tended to become worsened.⁶⁶ Additionally, the political elites in the Nordic countries have become relatively cautious about future PSR projects while remaining to be friendly with China.

4.3. Developmental and Social Challenges

What makes the PSR distinctive from other routes in the BRI reflects its high potential for technology cooperation. China attempts to engage with developed countries differently by recognizing their demands. The Nordic countries are attractive to Chinese investors mainly because of few regulatory difficulties and relatively easy access to technology acquisitions. On the other hand, the Nordic countries expect more infrastructure building, technology investment, and capital investment from China with an open economy perspective.⁶⁷ At the EU Summit in 2017, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, supported by the Baltic countries and Netherlands, stood against Germany’s proposal to strengthen regulations on foreign investment.⁶⁸ But after the new EU regulation framework was accepted, these countries have begun to prepare national legislation to implement this policy.

Besides the concerns about Chinese investments in strategic assets across Europe, the PSR more broadly is a new experience for China in cooperation with the developed Arctic economies. In this regard, it requires new procedures and decision-making on matters related to diverse and complicated issues such as social development goals, social justice, ecological

⁶⁵ Anna Ryzhova, “On the Prospects for China Cooperation with the Arctic Countries”, IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, 2020.

⁶⁶ Andreas B. Forsby, *Nordic-China Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities*, (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2019).

⁶⁷ Ole Hedeman, “Chinese Investment in Denmark-Promising Growth Potential for SMEs”, *Danish-Chinese Business Forum Newsletter* 3, 2015.

⁶⁸ Jim Brunnsden, “EU Plan to Curb Chinese Takeovers Risks ‘Trade War’”, *Financial Times*, 17 September 2017.



balance, climate response, and social resource allocation. It is important to notice that most of the Nordic countries still take the lead in technological innovation even if China overtook Iceland and Norway in 2018.⁶⁹ In this context, the need to successfully mind the capacity gaps between the participants will become crucial for the future development of the PSR.

For example, the Arctic region is preoccupied with the social impacts of rapid economic development. As a result of ice melting, easy access to resources and economic development will be improved, but increased commercial activities potentially endanger the traditional way of life for indigenous populations. The issues related to the transformation of indigenous communities cover a wide range of topics from changing migration patterns to land uses, and from identity to social cohesion.⁷⁰ As the UN Sustainable Development Goals indicate, rapid developmental changes need to be compensated by social precautions for local development needs such as education, health, language, and culture for fostering the idea of sustainable human development.⁷¹

The PSR is also predisposed to economic and technological uncertainties. Although the economic capacity of shipping transportation through the NEP has grown significantly, the fluctuations in transit voyages connecting East Asia and Europe still exist. For example, COSCO Shipping announced 14 transit voyages along the NSR in 2019, which is around twice the number in 2018.⁷² However, in terms of the overall number of ships passed through the NSR it is estimated that the numbers are decreasing especially when compared to those in 2013.⁷³ Additionally, as the major part of the NEP, the NSR has experienced considerable capacity growth by Russia's simplifying application procedures for navigation permits and the commercialization process. On the other hand, those new procedures pursued by Russia make other relevant states concerned about Russia's claims over exclusive rights over the NSR even if they help to increase the attractiveness of the NSR for foreign shipping companies.

⁶⁹ In the 2021 global innovation index rankings, Nordic countries have high positions with Sweden as the 2nd, Finland the 7th, Denmark the 9th, Iceland the 17th, Norway the 20th, while China ranks the 12th. <https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator> (23.06.2022).

⁷⁰ Kathrin Stephen, "Societal Impacts of a Rapidly Changing Arctic", *Current Climate Change Reports* 4, (2018): 223-237.

⁷¹ Joan Nymand Larsen and Gail Fondahl, *Arctic Human Development Report: Regional Processes and Global Linkages*, (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2015).

⁷² Malte Humpert, "Chinese Shipping Company COSCO to Send Record Number of Ships Through Arctic", *High North News*, 12 June 2019.

⁷³ Biedermann, "The Polar Silk Road: China's Multilevel Arctic Strategy", 595.



4.4. Environmental Challenges

The potential challenges of global environmental politics are also quite influential for the development of PSR. Different interest groups play significant roles in creating collective responses against global challenges regarding climate, environment, and ecology. They are effective in shaping public opinion in different countries at the domestic level as well as influencing politics at the global level. Although China is carefully committed itself to sustainable development goals within the framework of PSR by declaring that environmental protection is the main focus of all projects implemented, its practices face serious criticism from some NGOs. China tends to consider the positions represented by those interest groups as environmental radicalism, however, it does not help to disregard their influence on the development of PSR.⁷⁴ Some NGOs, like Greenpeace, insist on the idea of prohibition for any sort of development project sensitive to environmental issues. It is noteworthy that Greenpeace puts a considerable measure of effort into agenda-setting toward the future of the Arctic ecosystem in recent years. Many companies are under pressure because of such activism of NGOs on environmental issues in the Arctic. The most notable example was the protest made by the members of Greenpeace against Gazprom in 2013.⁷⁵ This protest generated obstructions to exploration activities and raised tensions with Russian companies and government agencies.

Climate change threatens the Arctic region in terms of several risks such as the destruction of food chains of regional species, barriers to the migration and reproduction of birds and animals, combining with human activities producing pollution. The existing environmental challenges are becoming increasingly critical to the extent that China's economic activities in the Arctic would be restricted by rigid standards. Those restrictions would create costly effects for Chinese enterprises and lead the exploration and exploitation of Arctic natural resources more difficult. The Chinese enterprises need to be mindful that the PSR partners, especially the Nordic countries, give priority to environmental protection over economic gains.

⁷⁴ Yang and Zhao, "Opportunities and Challenges", 140.

⁷⁵ John Vidal, "Russian Military Storm Greenpeace Arctic Oil Protest Ship", *The Guardian*, 19 September 2013.



5. Conclusion

China's evolving Arctic policy is primarily driven by economic/commercial interests. China demonstrates its commitment to the development of the Arctic region not only by mobilizing its investment and commercial resources but also participating in global governance mechanisms. China's PSR as a new policy framework intends to stimulate the development and utilization of Arctic sea routes by concentrating on the NEP. China's continuing involvement in the Nordic Arctic reveals its aspirations for further cooperation with the relevant countries for improving interregional connectivity. This new policy orientation is proposed by the construction of the "blue economic passage" which envisions connecting Europe via the Arctic Ocean. By integrating the Arctic Corridor into the BRI-related projects, it attempts to enrich the NEP with new commercial opportunities as well as energy-oriented regional connectivity. At the same time, the PSR also involves broader maritime cooperation with the Arctic countries such as the promotion of knowledge and technology transfer and green development. The PSR is designed to integrate economic development with green technology progress in promoting sustainable development goals. In this regard, it presents a high potential to create a convergence of interests among different stakeholders in ensuring their economic and energy interests. The PSR framework is more likely to help to secure and diversify the global energy supply for the Arctic countries, including the Nordic countries, in the following years.

In order to accelerate the improvement of the NSR, the Russian Arctic needs to be successfully integrated with Nordic Arctic. China has gained competitive advantages in the Arctic region with its successful diplomatic moves toward Russia in establishing energy-driven regional connectivity cooperation, most notably with the Yamal LNG project. Their relations have been economically realigned and politically improved. It is reasonable to expect that China will continue to take advantage of this strategic gain in seeking to integrate the whole Arctic region in the medium to long-term planning. By offering feasible integrated connectivity projects to the Nordic countries, it recognizes the complementary aspects of international trade as well as the need to contribute to the requirements of infrastructure development. To deepen collaborative economic partnerships with the Nordic countries, China advocates its use of positive inducements through trade and investment promotion. Moreover, China has also obtained sufficient experience from Southeast Asia in terms of how to transfer its resources in infrastructure development and finance into diplomatic efforts for building more effective



regional governance mechanisms. Most recently, the achievement of the RCEP agreement demonstrates how China is capable of contributing to regional governance by establishing convergence of trade connectivity.

China's efforts to construct blue economic passage along different regions and support the Arctic corridor through feasible strategic locations are largely considered promising projects by the Nordic countries. Such projects offered by China are receiving attractions from all Nordic countries as well as global companies mainly because they help to reduce the costly effects of globalization while increasing to gain additional benefits. Given the past successful examples of collaborations between the Chinese and Nordic enterprises, there appears growing potential for improving cooperative efforts, especially in the developing parts of the Arctic region. The most promising aspect of the PSR for Nordic countries is represented by China's promotion of green technology solutions. The PSR as a long-term interregional development and connectivity initiative involves a set of integrated projects to build strategic partnerships toward international cooperation.

However, related geopolitical, developmental, social, and environmental risks and challenges require more coordinated efforts among stakeholders for further cooperation. In a geopolitical context, Russia has positioned itself strongly in the Arctic region by using military power. Russia takes political risks in considering gaining long-term strategic benefits. Although destabilizing effects of the Ukraine War set some limitations on the efforts to improve regional development and trade connectivity in the Arctic, the geopolitical context is not the only determinant to shape the future direction of regional governance. While Russia is financially dependent on China for its aspirational Arctic plans, China increasingly pursues an inclusive policy for getting five Nordic countries into a 5+1 framework to negotiate projects under the PSR. It is reasonable to expect much closer ties between China and the Nordic countries in the coming years even if Russia's aggression in Ukraine creates constraints on the current triangular relationship. The Nordic countries cannot easily sacrifice their expected benefits from the PSR mainly because they relied on international trade as smaller European countries as well as their energy imperative. Moreover, they are well aware of the increasing strategic value of the Arctic region not only because it is crucial for regional connectivity but also because it provides opportunities to access third markets. On the other hand, for overcoming developmental and social challenges China should take developmental capacity gaps seriously and make rational



calculations about the future economic and technological uncertainties. Because China-Nordic Arctic cooperation represents a relatively new experience, China needs to adopt flexible implementations by learning from an experiment. For environmental challenges, however, the most convenient way to ease the possible tensions resulting from environmental concerns is to make strict regulations and standards which lead the Chinese companies to undertake more social responsibilities.

Finally, China has successfully adapted to the Arctic governance system so far, but emerging new challenges implies the need for more flexible responses in the implementation of the PSR. By leveraging the NSR, China's PSR may potentially bring significant contributions to the development of global governance. First, it creates new opportunities to build more coordinated attempts to accommodate common interests among the Arctic countries at the strategic level. Second, shortened maritime routes for trade help to reduce greenhouse emissions that are associated with marine transportation. Third, it envisions developing hybrid power sources, including LNG, which can be used for multiple purposes with green transportation solutions. Fourth, it helps to reduce costs emanated from the safety and security risks in other traditional routes such as the Cape of Good Hope and the Suez Canal. Fifth, it promotes renewable energy development through technology innovation. China's Arctic diplomacy is more likely to maintain a multilateral approach based on the principle of sustainable development, mutual consultation among stakeholders, and a multi-dimensional participation model for long-term projects. China does not only promote coordination and dialogue at multilateral platforms but it also advances bilateral dialogues on the PSR with other countries. It means that China's multilateral approach gives special importance to high-level trilateral dialogues on Arctic issues among multiple actors such as China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

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Kievan Rus: A Tumultuous Journey Ended With War

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Abstract

Russia's "Special Military Operation" against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 can be counted as the biggest ever war in Europe since World War II. The rationale of the operation, as Russian President Vladimir Putin asserts, is that Russia even could not stay safe, prosper and survive with a NATO-leaning Ukraine. Nevertheless, the present-day war is a culmination of several factors which have set the stage for a more bitter outcome between Russia and Ukraine soon. The paper attempts at analysing how the present-day Russia-Ukraine war is a culmination of conflicting claims and interests of the two countries-Russia and Ukraine, starting from Kievan Rus, and how the west dragged Moscow into a deadly war with Kyiv. In the entire gamut of analysis, Ukraine's intertwined history and the Russian claims, NATO expansion, resurgent Russia, and oscillating Ukrainian domestic politics hinged on east-west leanings, all together have been taken into account to unfold the current crisis in a wider spectrum.

Keywords: NATO expansion, Russia, Ukraine, Russia-Ukraine War, Kievan Rus.

1. Introduction

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has raised many issues in global geopolitics and entangled Europe, America, and NATO altogether in the war. Before the war, various diplomatic channels had been open to reduce tension and stop the war, but deadlocks in various negotiations on the issue of Ukraine's possible membership in NATO brought both countries to the verge of war. The six-month war has brought far-reaching implications and immediate outcomes-starting from migration to human losses and sufferings, food supply disruption, and energy crisis. Although Ukraine's quest for NATO membership has turned into an immediate cause of war yet there have been various factors in the Russian-Ukraine relationship which have almost contributed equally to the outbreak of war that could be attributed to the bitter history of Kievan Rus, the resurgence of Russia, and divided loyalty in Ukraine. But, in most of the literature, the NATO expansion and Ukraine's urge for its membership only surface in the present-day war crisis. So the research paper will fill this gap and will highlight other crucial factors, as mentioned above, which have shaped uneasy relationships and conflicting pursuits between the two countries. Taking into account all these aspects, the paper attempts to testify to the hypothesis that the conflicting relations in past, expansion of NATO (specifically

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eastward), the rise of Russia and its quest for a global role, fragmented domestic politics, and loyalty in Ukraine, all together have culminated into the present day war between the two countries. The research has been carried out through descriptive and analytical methods with review works of secondary sources. The research also refereed primary sources of data collected online from the websites of various institutions and governments for a thorough understanding and analysis of the facts and issues which finally culminated in the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022.

2. An Intertwined History

The crux of the present crisis goes back to the first Slavic state of Kievan Rus¹ in the 9th century, where Kyiv was the capital of this empire. Further, parts of Belarus integrated into the Kievan Rus on the river banks of Dnieper. Hence, Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarussians drew their lineage from this Slavic state. About 1,100 years ago, the mighty Kievan Rus conquered a large portion of Eastern Europe under the rule of Grand Prince Volodimer who ruled the empire from 980AD to 1015AD.² But, gradually the mighty empire became susceptible to competing foreign rulers. The Mongol rulers captured eastern Kievan Rus during the 13th century, and the Polish-Lithuanian armies captured the western Kievan Rus of Ukraine in the 16th century. In the seventeenth century, a war between Polish-Lithuanian, on one hand, and Russia, on the other, brought Ukraine to the eastern part of the Dnieper river under the rule of Tsarist Russia. The eastern part of Dnieper was identified as "Left Bank Ukraine"-ruled by Tsarist Russia, and the western part of Dnieper was recognized as "Right Bank Ukraine"-ruled by Polish-Lithuania.³ But in the late 18th century, the right bank (western) of Dnieper Ukraine was recaptured by Russia. In the 19th century, Russia was the most powerful regional political unit, followed by Ukraine, in the entire Russian empire.

During the early years (1914-1915) of World War-I, the aggressiveness between Russia and Austria-Hungary forces had ramifications for the Ukrainians. As the Russian troops advanced into Galicia of western Ukraine and Southeastern Poland, the retreating Austria-Hungary soldiers executed suspected pro-Russian Ukrainians. After

¹ Kievan Rus is also called Kyivan Rus and the capital Kyiv today was called Kiev in the past.

² M. Mirovalev, "Russia and Ukraine conflict explained: What you need to know? 16.12.2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/16/what-you-should-know-about-the-conflict-between-russia-ukraine>, Access Date: 11.05.2022.

³ "The Cossacks, Right & Left Bank Ukraine", <https://www.tidridge.com>, Access Date: 04.05.2022.



capturing Galicia in 1915, the Tsarist rulers took steps for the total incorporation of Ukraine into Russia.⁴Whatsoever, during World War-I western Ukraine turned into a theatre of aggressive operations of these two powers and thus suffered great depredation. In the inter-war period, Poland-occupied Ukraine (Polish-Ukraine) had an offensive campaign against Ukraine's ruler Petlyura. But, the counter-offensive of the Soviet Bolsheviks pushed them out of Warsaw. In October 1920 Poland made a ceasefire with the Soviet government, and in March 1921 both the Polish and Soviet governments concluded the Treaty of Riga. Accordingly, Poland recognized Soviet Ukraine which was largely confined to eastern Ukraine and Poland retained western Ukraine.⁵However, the Bolshevik offensive did not end here and there was protest as well against frequent Soviet assaults on western Ukraine. The civil war in Ukraine broke out against the Russian government's full control of Ukraine. But Ukraine finally merged with Communist Soviet Union in 1922.⁶The outbreak of World War II was another painful journey for the Ukrainians where the Nazi forces caused horrific holocausts. About eight million Ukrainians lost their lives and two million Jews were executed.⁷But, after world war ii and during the cold war, Ukraine had a "boosted" status within the Soviet Union, an arch-rival of the United States, one of the founding members of the UN, and a nominal administrative unit within the Soviet Union. It had a Defence industry, largely agricultural land, and housed many Soviet arsenals. Crucially, Leonid Brezhnev, a Ukrainian, was the President of the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982.

The legacies of Russian rule and its socio-economic structures have well set lasting fault lines within and outside Ukraine today. As eastern Ukraine fall under Russian control much before western Ukraine, citizens in the former have stronger language and socio-cultural ties with Russia and are more likely to support Russian-leaning Ukrainian leaders. Contrary to it, the western Ukrainians have spent centuries of rule under various European powers like Polish-Lithuania and the Austro-Hungarian kingdom and as a consequence, the

⁴"Battle of Galicia", *History Central*, <https://www.historycentral.com/ww1/Galicia.html>, Access Date: 11.03.2022

⁵"History of Ukraine", <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Ukraine-in-the-interwar-period>, Access Date: 06.05.2022.

⁶E. Conant, "Russia and Ukraine: the tangled history that connects—and divides—they", 19 2. 2022, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/russia-and-ukraine-the-tangled-history-that-connects-and-divides-them>, Access Date: 08.03.2022.

⁷O. Lutsevych, and J. Wallace, "Ukraine-Russia relations", 24.03.2022, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/ukraine-russia-relations>, Access Date: 07.04.2022.



western Ukrainians tended their support more for the Western and west-leaning Ukrainian political leaders. While the east Ukrainians are more of Orthodox thought and Russian-speaking, the west Ukrainians are more of Catholic thought and Ukrainian-speaking. On the ecological counts, politics is also shaped- the north and western parts are largely forest regions whereas eastern Ukraine is a highly fertile steppe region and industrialized that bore a striking resemblance in the 2004 and 2010 elections, where the electoral politics was highly polarised. Therefore, uniting the country has become a litmus test. This testifies to what Steven Pifer, the former ambassador of the US to Ukraine, said, “The sense of Ukrainian nationalism is not as deep in the east as it is in the west”.⁸The transition in Ukraine from monarchy to socialism and liberalism has been painful and chaotic, and the “biggest divide after all these factors is between those who view the Russian imperial and Soviet rule more sympathetically versus those who see them as a tragedy”.⁹A large number of Ukrainians who have been born after 1991, called as “Born Free Generation”, are much enthusiastic to drift away from the Russian influence and linkages. Russia, on the other way, and in recent years, has perceived the disintegration of the Soviet Union as the “fall of historical Russia”, and the present-day Russian and Ukrainian identities are “one people” and “a single whole” under “Russian civilization” that includes neighboring states Belarus as well, as claimed by Moscow.¹⁰It implies the views that the Putin government had long expressed for prioritizing a deep-rooted unity and integrity among the Eastern Slavs with an intention of common destiny. As a whole, Moscow has followed a policy based on its assumption that the national identities of these two countries are artificial and thus fragile.¹¹Although Belarus is well accommodated to the civilizational claims, Ukraine rejects Moscow’s claim of “Ukraine never had a stable tradition of genuine statehood”.¹²At this juncture, the west has accommodated Ukraine as a part of their

⁸“The situation of Ukraine as a crisis”, <https://www.bartleby.com/essay/The-Situation-Of-Ukraine-As-A-Crisis-F3HZ4BW3PT8X>.

⁹E. Conant, “Russia and Ukraine: the tangled history that connects—and divides—them”, 19.02.2022, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/russia-and-ukraine-the-tangled-history-that-connects-and-divides-them>, Access Date: 08.03.2022.

¹⁰M. Mirovalev, “Russia and Ukraine conflict explained: What you need to know? 16.12.2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/16/what-you-should-know-about-the-conflict-between-russia-ukraine>, Access Date: 11.05.2022.

¹¹A. Wilson, “Rival Versions of the East Slavic Idea in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus”, in Slatter, W. and Wilson, A. (Eds). *The Legacy of the Soviet Union*, 39-60, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004).

¹²V. Putin, “Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood”, 21.02.2022, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/vladimir-putin-ukraine-never-had-a-tradition-of-genuine-statehood-1.4808469>, Access Date: 03.05.2022.



“anti-Russian plot.”¹³Criticising the role of the west in the formation of independent Ukraine, Moscow hinges, “Ukraine never had stable traditions of real statehood”.¹⁴Declaring Special Military Operation on 24 February, Vladimir Putin told to the Russian media that his target was to “demilitarise” and “de-Nazify Ukraine”.¹⁵However, this campaign of Russia, in reality, is nothing but to make a fundamental transformation that is from the present day “Ukrainify” policy of Kyiv to “Russify” identity of Moscow.

3. NATO expansion- a security challenge to Moscow:

The arguments that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s expansion is a “fateful error”¹⁶and Ukraine is “West’s Fault”¹⁷, as pronounced by the diplomat and realist thinker George F. Kennan and the neo-realist scholar John Joseph Mearsheimer, resounds well how the NATO had provoked Russia for a risky game in Ukraine. The sharpest criticism made by the Russian Vladimir Putin on NATO at the Munich Security Conference, 2007, well reflected the myopia of the west that was imposed on Russia- “NATO expansion and its frontline forces on our borders represent a serious provocation and we have right to ask against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?”¹⁸The decades-long warning by the leaders, diplomats, and scholars all over the world against the very existence and expansion of NATO was to no avail to the successive Presidents of the US, which finally culminated in the ugly face of the Russia-Ukraine war. All the same, the tensions between Russia and NATO have roots back in concerns raised by Mikhail Gorbachev, the former President of the Soviet Union, in the long back. Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the US authorities had discussed Gorbachev only in the context of the reunification of East Germany with West Germany and

¹³ J. Mankoff, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict”, 22.04.2022, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-identity-history-and-conflict>, Access Date: 19.05.2022.

¹⁴ “Address by the President of the Russian Federation”, 21.02.2022, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/President/news/67828>, Access Date: 19.03.2022.

¹⁵ “Demilitarise and denazify: How Vladimir Putin justifies Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”, 24.02.2022, <https://www.firstpost.com/world/demilitarise-and-denazify-how-vladimir-putin-justifies-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-10405181.html>, Access Date: 28.03.2022.

¹⁶G. F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error”, 5. 2. 1997, <https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a-fateful-error.html>, Access Date: 28.04.2022.

¹⁷J. J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin”, 2014, <https://www.mearsheimer.com>, Access Date: 22.05.2022.

¹⁸ T. G. Carpenter, “Did Putin’s 2007 Munich Speech Predict the Ukraine Crisis?”, 24.01.2022, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/did-putins-2007-munich-speech-predict-ukraine-crisis#>, Access Date: 28.02.2022.



its membership in NATO with one identity of Germany, and it assured Moscow that there will be no further eastwards expansion of NATO. But in the later parts of the 1990s, its expansion spread to newly independent Soviet countries-without any discussion with the Russian counterparts and concerns of Moscow. Expansion continued relentlessly, crucially in the backyard of Russia and the European nations which had once been under the Soviets Union-starting from Poland in 1999.¹⁹ Reacting to these developments and reiterating to Gorbachev, President Putin reminds the west how it assured Moscow "not an inch to the east".²⁰

Not only Russia and the global community, to a large extent, opposed NATO but also crucially a host of American strategists echoed the sentiments and concerns of the Russians over NATO. Apart from George F. Kennan and John Joseph Mearsheimer, as argued above, Strobe Talbott, the former Deputy Secretary of State of the USA during the Bill Clinton Administration, viewed, "For the Russians, NATO expansion is a vestige of the Cold War".²¹ In 1997, fifty prominent foreign policy experts of the US signed an Open Letter to President Bill Clinton calling the American effort of NATO expansion "a policy error of historic proportion".²² Reacting to the NATO expansion plan of President Bill Clinton, and President George W. Bush's Offer for Ukrainian membership in 2008, William J. Burns, the present Director of CIA, once said, "the expansion steps have been "premature at best, needlessly provocative at worst, hostility across Russia and brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite".²³ According to Robert M. Gates, the Defense Secretary during George W. Bush and Barack Obama administration, "Trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO is truly

¹⁹Poland was the first country of the former Soviet Union to join NATO (1999), followed by Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia in 2004. The NATO included Poland with a priority as it was iconic centre of Warsaw Pact of Communist bloc. Expansion also includes the east European and central European countries-some of them are bordering to Russia or Black Sea that connects the Russian territory. If compared to Cold War (16 members), the post-cold war era (14 members) period testifies the expansion of Alliance near equal to the pre-1991 period.

²⁰K. Spohr, "Exposing the myth of Western betrayal of Russia over NATO's eastern enlargement", 02.03.2022, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/exposing-the-myth-of-western-betrayal-of-russia/>, Access Date: 12.05.2022.

²¹T. G. Carpenter, "Many predicted NATO expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored", 28.02.2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine>, Access Date: 03.3.2022.

²²B. Dogra, "Prospects of World Peace Damaged by Eastward Expansion of NATO", 2022, <https://countercurrents.org/2022/04/prospects-of-world-peace-damaged-by-eastward-expansion-of-nato/>, Access Date: 03.05.2022.

²³R. Suny, "Ukraine war follows decades of warnings that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe could provoke Russia", 28. 2. 2022, <https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-follows-decades-of-warnings-that-nato-expansion-into-eastern-europe-could-provoke-russia-177999>, Access Date: 27.03.2022.



overreaching. This move is a case of recklessly ignoring what the Russians consider their vital national interests”.²⁴In a more critical voice, Steven Pifer, the American ambassador to Ukraine during Bill Clinton, said, “The 2008 move of US was a mistake. It drove the Russians nuts, created expectations in Kyiv and Tbilisi, which then were never met, and thus made the whole situation a complicated one.”²⁵Unfortunately, the successive American Presidents turned a deaf ear to the policymakers and strategic analysts- within and outside America, and its ‘ open-door’ policy still offers an option for the nations to choose the Alliance. The intense debate on Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine in recent years provoked Kremlin more than before.

It is obvious that the 2008 plan of NATO to enroll Georgia and Ukraine posed a direct and immediate security threat to Moscow as these countries have been passing through anti-Russia and pro-Europe stances. As Russia is economically better, militarily stronger, and politically assertive today than in the 1990s and its complaints against NATO expansion have become more vociferous than before. Kremlin consistently invoked the specter of US ballistic missiles and the combat forces in its backyard-Ukraine. In 2016, NATO declared that it would position four battalions in the Eastern parts of Europe- rotating through Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. In 2017, America also stationed its tank brigades in Poland to bolster NATO’s presence there. All these developments, according to Moscow, are Cold War legacies to avenge Russia by disintegrating it further.²⁶Some factors have substantiated Moscow’s concern. First, when the Cold War is over and Warsaw Pact is dismantled, then what is the rationality of continuing NATO? Second, when Russia is not a security concern to Europe, then on what rationality NATO is expanding its membership to the other European countries, which have been in the backyard of Russia? Third, when Russia is unreachable to the US on many counts, then how Russia is a potential threat to the US or even Europe? Why NATO is so much obsessed with Ukraine? Finding no convincing answer and response from the US on these issues, in December 2021, Russia handed the US and NATO its

²⁴ R. M. Gates, “Quotes”, https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/6257.Robert_M_Gates, Access Date: 17.04.2022.

²⁵J. Kirby and J. Guyer, “The increasingly complicated Russia-Ukraine crisis, explained”, 23.02.2022, <https://www.vox.com/22917719/russia-ukraine-invasion-border-crisis-nato-explained>, Access Date: 25.04.2022.

²⁶Kirby, “Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want?”, 09.05.2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589>, Access Date: 22.05.2022.



list of “legally binding security guarantees” in writing, such as: First, NATO must turn back to 1997 and overturn its eastward expansion. Second, the removal of NATO’s troops and military infrastructure and establishments from its member countries which have joined it since 1997. Third, is the non-deployment of “strike weapons” near the Russian borders. Fourth, no membership for Ukraine in NATO.²⁷Crucially, the last demand was the most pivotal and immediate bargain that Moscow put forward. At this juncture, both the US and NATO, in January 2022, tried to negotiate with Russia in Geneva, but there was no positive outcome. Instead, NATO put forth a new arms control guarantee in which Russia wasn’t interested, “the US ignored its key demands and escalating with new ones”.²⁸The US and NATO further tried to convince Russia that they had not signed any deal with Ukraine, yet they failed to assure Russia that Ukraine will not be a NATO member-even in the future.

Ukraine today has turned into an informal constituent of the NATO alliance without being a formal member. In 2018, the US Congress approved delivery of anti-tank ammunition to Kyiv-the first supply of deadly weaponry to the country since the Russia-Ukraine skirmish in 2014. Further, in 2018 Ukraine joined the US and seven other NATO countries, although not under the banner of NATO, for a large-scale air exercise in western Ukraine.²⁹In January 2021, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky urged American President Joe Biden to “let Ukraine join NATO”³⁰and in September 2021, NATO conducted a joint military exercise with Kyiv code-named “RAPID TRIDENT-2021”.³¹The bilateral security relations between NATO’s leading country the USA and NATO aspirant Ukraine have also been intensified. In 2021, Kyiv turned into the fourth largest recipient of US military funding, and US-Ukraine intelligence sharing has been multiplied-keeping an eagle

²⁷ Roth, A. Russia issues list of demands it says must be met to lower tensions in Europe”, 17.12.2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato>, Access Date: 19.04.2022.

²⁸ Kirby, “Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want?”, 09.05.2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589>, Access Date: 22.05.2022.

²⁹ M. Levin, “Conflict in Ukraine. Center for Preventive Action, 6. 5. 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine>, Access Date: 17.05.2022.

³⁰ “Why Did Russia Invade Ukraine? The Conflict Explained in 10 Points”, 25.02.2022, <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-the-conflict-explained-in-5-points-2786200>, Access Date: 14.03.2022.

³¹ “Ukraine holds military drills with U.S. forces, NATO allies”, 20.09.2021, <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-holds-military-drills-with-us-forces-nato-allies-2021-09-20/>, Access Date: 02.04.2022.



eye on Russian activities across the region.³²All of these implied that one day Ukraine might join NATO. The US, somehow, tried to convince Moscow, as Biden said, “likelihood of Ukraine joining NATO in the near term is not very likely” although did not rule out its membership in the future.³³The reality is that the membership of Ukraine at any time will pose a severe security threat to Moscow as Russia and Ukraine have territorial, political, and security issues, where Ukraine may be used by NATO to provoke Russia into a war or Ukraine may get embroiled with Russia that will invite NATO for a war against Moscow, which will be devastating for Russian sovereignty. This is evident from the fact that Article- 5 of NATO asserts that “any attack against one member of NATO is an attack against all, and thus a collective response to the aggression”.³⁴Taking into account these concerns and justifying military operation in Ukraine, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, said, "There was no other way of explaining to the west that dragging Ukraine into NATO was a criminal act."³⁵ It is an obvious fact that the Ukraine war followed decades of forewarnings, within and outside the US, on NATO expansion.³⁶

4. Resurgent Russia-a Global Power to Reckon With!

In the initial days of Post-Soviet Russia, Moscow was not in confrontation with the west. Even discussion underwent on the possibility of Russian membership in NATO.³⁷ But, the “Colour Revolutions”³⁸ in the late 1990s and early 2010s went contrary to their enhanced

³² “Ukraine holds military drills with U.S. forces, NATO allies”, 20.09.2021, <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-holds-military-drills-with-us-forces-nato-allies-2021-09-20/>, Access Date: 02.04.2022.

³³ “Biden says likelihood of Ukraine joining NATO in near term is ‘not very likely’”, 20.01.2022, <https://globalnews.ca/video/8524725/biden-says-likelihood-of-ukraine-joining-nato-in-near-term-is-not-very-likely>, Access Date: 13.05.2022.

³⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. “NATO on the Map”, <https://www.nato.int/nato-on-the-map/#lat=11.574241956228606&lon=82.84423190180028&zoom=-1&layer=1>, Access Date: 18. 4. 2022.

³⁵ Rosenberg, S. “Lavrov: Russia is not squeaky clean and not ashamed”, 17.06.2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61825525>, Access Date: 07.07. 2022.

³⁶Suny, R., “Ukraine war follows decades of warnings that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe could provoke Russia”, 28. 2. 2022, <https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-follows-decades-of-warnings-that-nato-expansion-into-eastern-europe-could-provoke-russia-177999>, Access Date: 27.03.2022.

³⁷ D. Bechev, “Resurgent Russia: Myth and reality”, 17.02.2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/2/17/resurgent-russia-myth-and-reality>, AccessDate: 12.03.2022

³⁸ “Colour Revolution” implies the revolutions that occurred in the post-communist central and eastern Europe and central Asian countries against the “corrupt” and “authoritarian” governments for restoration and promotion of democracy. During these protests and revolutions all adopted a specific colour or flower as their symbol. These incidents happened in Yugoslavia (especially Serbia’s Bulldozer Revolution, 2000), Georgia (Rose Revolution, 2003), Ukraine (Orange revolution, 2004) and Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution, 2005)., Ukraine (Orange revolution, 2004) and Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution, 2005). Moscow alleged that all these revolution had been engineered by



relationship. The Colour Revolutions had overthrown the Pro-Soviet or Pro-Russian governments in central Asia and eastern and central Europe.³⁹ Reacting to the western role in various Colour Revolutions, Vladimir Putin at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 unleashed a scathing outburst against the west, mainly the US, for trying to enforce its dictates in global politics. "Unilateral, often illegitimate, actions haven't solved a single problem; they have generated new human tragedies and sources of tension".⁴⁰ The speech drew an instant comparison to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's "Shoe-banging" incident at the UN in 1960 which saw Khrushchev's aggressive outburst against western imperialism and the "puppet" role of the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in protecting western interests.⁴¹ Nevertheless, Vladimir Putin flexed his muscle on NATO's membership offer to Georgia and Ukraine. Russia sent its troops to South Ossetia to flush out Georgian troops as US-backed Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili wanted to end the autonomy of this breakaway territory- where the Russian troops had already been stationed as a peacekeeping force under a mandate.⁴² Simultaneously, Russia opened up a new front in Georgia by backing pro-Russian separatist rebels in Abkhazia. Likewise, in Ukraine, Russia conducted a military offensive in Crimea in 2014 and integrated the territory with Russia through a referendum, and backed pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine that reminded the strategies that the Kremlin had resorted against Georgia by backing the rebels of Abkhazia. So, Russia which considered the US, EU, and NATO difficult partners in the past, counted them as full-fledged adversaries.⁴³ Reacting to Russia's potential and emerging role vis-a-vis the west in the Georgian and Ukrainian incidents, former American President Barack Obama had a cautious role not to enrage Kremlin "These are the examples where we have to be very clear about what constitutes our core interest

anti-Russian plots of CIA, acting through so-called "democracy promoting" NGOs of the west and thus export of revolution, in, S. K. Pradhan, "Russia-US Relationship in the Post Cold War Era: Can it be reset? *Journal of Peace Studies* 18, no. 3 & 4, (2011): 27-30.

³⁹ S. K. Pradhan, "Russia-US Relationship in the Post Cold War Era: Can it be reset? *Journal of Peace Studies*, December, 18, no. 3 & 4, (2011): 27-30.

⁴⁰ G. Feifer, "Overview: Moscow Flexes Political Muscle", 05.03.2007, <https://www.npr.org/2007/03/05/7697684/overview-moscow-flexes-political-muscle>, Access Date: 20.05.2022.

⁴¹ G. Feifer, "Overview: Moscow Flexes Political Muscle", 05.03.2007, <https://www.npr.org/2007/03/05/7697684/overview-moscow-flexes-political-muscle>, Access Date: 20.05.2022.

⁴² Another objective of Moscow was to sketch a strategic line that NATO drawn in Kosovo in the 1990s.

⁴³ D. Bechev, "Resurgent Russia: Myth and reality", 17.02.2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/2/17/resurgent-russia-myth-and-reality>, AccessDate: 12.03.2022



today”.⁴⁴ However, the moderate approach of Obama and the friendly gesture of Donald Trump were not in tune with George W. Bush in past and Joe Biden today who has not gone into depth about the repercussions. Nevertheless, the west and NATO promise and assure the non-NATO countries for their side; but in reality, it is not able to take a confrontation with mighty Russia.

The economic boom of Russia, especially during Putin, has provided teeth to Moscow’s global ambitions. Russia before the Ukraine war was a powerful economy characterized by an oil boom; possessed the third largest foreign currency reserves in the world; had a stabilized fund worth of 160 billion dollars; an economic growth rate of 7 to 8 percent; and Europe's biggest market.⁴⁵ Russia has graduated from bystander to leading “power broker” in regional and global politics. Moscow recently hosted Turkey and Iran for a roadmap (Astana Process) to the American decision to pull its troops out of Syria.⁴⁶ Further, Russia has benefited by flexing its role and bringing the conflicts to a low level in west Asia by effectively cooperating and coordinating with mutually antagonistic players. The continuation of Nicolas Maduro's government in power in Venezuela with the major support of Russia is an indication of Russia’s rising power beyond Asia and Europe. The oil and natural gas have endowed Russia with geopolitical mileage. Europe consumes more than 40 percent of Russian energy in its total energy imports; of which Germany is the largest buyer.⁴⁷ Not only in Europe but the entire world Russian energy is taking a headway and its most recent “Asia Pivot” approach has many takers in Asia-including major energy trading partners India and China.⁴⁸ In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, the western nations have imposed sanctions on Russia on various counts but no visible sanctions on the Russian oil and Natural gas sectors because they realize well that Russian energy is vital to run their economy. The OPEC+ is led by Russia which brings the OPEC domination to an edge. Russia is both an energy player and an energy power. As an energy player, it is one of the core countries to shape the energy market, and as

⁴⁴ A. S. Weiss and E. Rumer, “Reckoning With a Resurgent Russia”, 09.09.2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/09/reckoning-with-resurgent-russia-pub-82505>, Access Date: 18.06.2022.

⁴⁵ P. Stobdan, “Resurgence of Russia”, 27.08.2008, <https://idsa.in/event/theResurgenceofRussia>, Access Date: 14. 4. 2022.

⁴⁶ “Syria: the Astana peace process”, 05.09.2018, <https://www.france24.com/en/20180905-syria-astana-peace-process>, Access Date: 25.04.2022.

⁴⁷ D. Bechev, “Resurgent Russia: Myth and reality”, 17.02.2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/2/17/resurgent-russia-myth-and-reality>, AccessDate: 12.03.2022

⁴⁸ S. K. Pradhan, “Indo-Russian Energy Cooperation: Geopolitics in a Fluid Matrix”, *Economic & Political Weekly* LIII, no. 6, (2018): 53-59



an energy power, it uses oil as a tool to punish the adversary (Ukraine in past, and mostly Europe today) and reward the strategic partners (India and China). Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) seem to harbingers a new global order where emergent and non-western power centers are set for a new global order based on economic and security considerations. The BRICS Bank has proved as a non-western financial alternative. Russia's latest move toward Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) which was established in 2014 is an attempt to decrease Europe's influences in its backyard. While the US attempts at shaping the Black Sea region, Russia has emerged as Black Sea Power. While the US and most of the NATO members have been lagging on the Arctic security front, Russia has kept its Arctic Command operational.⁴⁹ Russia also well knows that the future maritime trade route between North Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean is the North West Passage which will largely pass through the vast stretch of northern Russian territory in the Arctic. Hence Russia is setting the tune beforehand to have maximum leverage on this potential and future trade route that will broadly and effectively connect Europe, the USA, and their allies.⁵⁰

Assertive Vladimir Putin has well-illustrated disintegration of the Soviet Union as the “greatest catastrophe” of the 20th century that deprived Russia of its legitimate claims in global politics.⁵¹ He was shocked to see that one-third of Soviet territory and a half of the population have been lost due to its collapse. Disintegration and a poor economy in the 1990s made Russia more susceptible to rival powers. So America and its NATO allies well exploited the situation in the 1990s expanded NATO and reshaped the world order without consulting and considering Russia's core interests. But buoyed by the economic boom and the determined leadership, Moscow once again has flexed its muscles and turned assertive in global geopolitics to regain its lost glory. The Russian strategic policymakers largely believe- “Russia is back and Putin is in charge”.⁵² His radical nationalist policy and explicit goals after assuming power in 2000 have been how to enhance the Russian economy and reversal of west's leverage.⁵³ Former Russian

⁴⁹ S. K. Pradhan, *India's Quest for Energy through Oil and Natural Gas: Trade and Investment, Geopolitics, and Security*, (Singapore: Springer, 2020).

⁵⁰ S. K. Pradhan, *India's Quest for Energy through Oil and Natural Gas: Trade and Investment, Geopolitics, and Security*, (Singapore: Springer, 2020).

⁵¹ D. Bilefsky, R. Pérez-Peña and E. Nagourney, “The Roots of the Ukraine War: How the Crisis Developed”, 21. 4. 022, <https://www.nytimes.com/article/russia-ukraine-nato-europe.html>, Access Date: 28.04.2022

⁵² McAllister, J. F. O. “Russia's New World Order”, *Time* 168, no. 2, (2007): 17-25

⁵³ M. Hofmann, “US foreign policy towards the Russian Federation: The Constrained Empire”, 2006, <https://www.grin.com>, Access Date: 09.05. 2022.



President Dmitry Medvedev's statement in 2009 sent a clear signal to the west that Russia has a "Zone of Privileged Influence", and warned that any pursuance of pro-western policy in its backyard was "dangerous".⁵⁴ While addressing the Russian public, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, sent a blunt warning to his American counterpart Condoleezza Rice, "the American deployment of missiles in Europe could turn the continent into a Powder Keg". Reiterating Lavrov, Putin sent a clear message in 2010, "we may set our missiles on the moon, but before we get to that we would not lose a chance for agreement because you implementing your plans and imposing on us".⁵⁵ Further, the Russian leaders also have well-cultured Russian public opinion and used propaganda to garner national and international support for Russia's foreign policy objectives. Most Russians feel antipathy and humiliation caused by the new global order set by the west. Therefore, Russians out rightly support Putin in dealing with the west, including Ukraine.⁵⁶ Not only President Putin and the Russian public, but even the sharpest critics of Putin in Russia have also considered NATO expansion towards Ukraine as a direct challenge to their national security and survival. Most Russian policymakers and citizens don't envision an old empire, but see the zone of ex-Soviet republics as vital to their interests, and perceive heavily militarised Europe as a potential risk to Russian security and sovereignty.⁵⁷

5. Domestic politics—"Orange Revolution" to "Euromaidan" and beyond:

Till 1995, the Russia-Ukraine relationship was very cordial to its extent, and a landmark step was taken in 1994 that is well known as the "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances"- signed by Russia, Ukraine, and the western stakeholders. But in 1996, Kyiv's support to the Georgian government against the South Ossetia and Abkhazia rebels enraged Russia as the rebels were pro-Russians. Moscow raised concern over Kyiv's involvement in its backyard as its role went contrary to Russian claims of "special privileged status" over the newly independent Soviet states. Kyiv's leading role in the following year that led to the

⁵⁴ A. Cohen, "Russia and Eurasia: A Realistic Policy Agenda for the Obama Administration", 27. 3. 2009, *The Heritage Foundation*, <https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/russia-and-eurasia-realistic-policy-agenda-the-obama-administration>, Access Date: 04.04. 2022.

⁵⁵ S. K. Pradhan, "Russia-US Relationship in the Post Cold War Era: Can it be reset? *Journal of Peace Studies*, December, 18, no. 3 & 4, (2011): 27-30.

⁵⁶ R. Suny, "Ukraine war follows decades of warnings that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe could provoke Russia", 28. 2. 2022, <https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-follows-decades-of-warnings-that-nato-expansion-into-eastern-europe-could-provoke-russia-177999>, Access Date: 27.03.2022.

⁵⁷ "From Hegemony to New Geopolitical Competition", 09.10.2008, <https://www.fiia.fi/en/event/from-hegemony-to-new-geopolitical-competition>, Access Date: 12.05.2022.



establishment of GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, a pro-west organization, further raised serious concerns for Russia since the newly independent countries had been titling towards the west.⁵⁸ The foreign politics of Ukraine are also entrenched in domestic politics. In the 2004 Presidential elections, Ukrainian politics oscillated between pro-Russia and pro-west campaigns. Viktor Yanukovich, the pro-Russian leader won the elections but there was an allegation of large-scale irregularities in the election process. Hence, public protest erupted. In the meanwhile, Viktor Andriyovich Yushchenko, the defeated pro-western opposition candidate, was poisoned, where Moscow's role was suspected.⁵⁹ The Ukrainians took to the street wearing orange-colored clothes, flags, and badges the color that was Yushchenko's political campaign color. As a consequence of severe protest, re-voting was conducted and Yushchenko won the presidential race. While the protestors and Yushchenko fingered the Russian plot in the electoral politics, Moscow suspected its western hand in the entire crisis, to keep Russia's relationship with Ukraine at abeyance. After getting elected, Yushchenko (2005-2010) paid renewed attention to the Ukrainian language, culture, and practices, and pushed for international recognition of the past famine 'Holodomor'⁶⁰ as an "Anti-Ukrainian Genocide".⁶¹ He also showed his interest, which the former Ukrainian Presidents had ignored, that is MAP from NATO. Although Yushchenko's period was not a success in his political intentions yet he had won significant sympathy and support from the west- with their depiction of Ukraine as a nation of Europeans that had undergone Russian oppression for a long.

⁵⁸ The GUAM, established in 1997, is an organization of the post-Soviet states of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Russia sees it as an attempt of both Ukraine and west to reduce Moscow's influence in these states. Crucially, all these four countries have separatist rebels and their de facto controlled-territories and which have shown their adherence towards Russia. These territories include South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Transnistria in Moldova.

⁵⁹ M. Fitzgerald, "Russia Invades Ukraine: A Timeline of the Crisis", 25.02.2022, <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/slideshows/a-timeline-of-the-russia-ukraine-conflict>, Access Date: 15.03.2022.

⁶⁰ In the 1930s, President Joseph Stalin pressurised peasants to join for collective farming. But this move caused famine, starvation and death of about 7 million Ukrainians. The incident is known as 'Holodomor' -means "death by hunger". Later, Stalin pushed a huge number of Russian and Soviet citizens to repopulate the deserted eastern Ukraine-caused by 'Holodomor', in, O. Lutsevych, and J. Wallace, "Ukraine-Russia relations", 24.03.2022, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/ukraine-russia-relations>, Access Date: 07.04. 2022.

⁶¹ "Holodomor Basic Facts", HREC, <https://holodomor.ca/resource/holodomor-basic-facts/>, Access Date: 05.05.2022.



On the other way, the 2010 election victory of Viktor Yanukovich offered an opportunity for Russia to recuperate from the setbacks of the 2004 incidents and the Yushchenko era. In reality, despite his interest in establishing close relations with Moscow, Yanukovich favored signing an “Association Agreement” with the European Union (EU). This is in congruence with the increasing public demand for closer integration and association with the EU that had advocated for establishing a “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area” which would enhance Ukraine’s greater access to the European market. However, the signing of an “Association Agreement” with the EU was incompatible with Moscow’s call for establishing a “Eurasian Union” that would be “a powerful supranational association capable of deepening Moscow’s political and economic influence across the former Soviet Union republics”.⁶² Yet, Yanukovich rejected Eurasian Union membership. So Moscow exercised the carrots and sticks policy. Moscow pressurized Yanukovich through various trade sanctions, banned the import of goods, disallowed Kyiv to use its territory as a transit route, backed rebels in eastern Ukraine, claimed Crimea, and pressurized Kyiv to reject the proposed “New Association and Trade Agreement” with the European Union, that was being negotiated for seven years.⁶³ Therefore, Yanukovich twisted his approach which proved pro-Russia. He postponed the agreement with the European Union; instead, signed a bail-out package worth \$15 billion from Russia. These reversals led to public outrage, well known as the “Euromaidan”⁶⁴ incident where the demonstrators gathered at Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) of Kyiv in late 2013, asking Yanukovich to sign the deal with the EU. Waving the Ukrainian and European Union flags, they advocated for a west-oriented Ukraine, while rejecting Russian influence. Moscow criticized the Euromaidan incident as a “west-sponsored” and “west-backed coup”.⁶⁵ Congruently and unlike the 2004 election fiasco, there were so many official statements from the US in support of the protesters and even American public officials were present in Ukraine to express their solidarity for the revolution in 2013-2014. Putin's

⁶² J. Mankoff, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict”, 22. 4. 2022, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-identity-history-and-conflict>, Access Date: 19. 5. 2022.

⁶³ O. Lutsevych and J. Wallace, “Ukraine - Russia relations”, 24.03.2022, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/ukraine-russia-relations>, Access Date: 07.04.2022.

⁶⁴ “Euromaidan”, in later part, culminated to “Revolution for Dignity or Maidan Revolution” in 2013-2014 with the extent of pro-west and anti-Russian stances.

⁶⁵ Z. Beauchamp, “9 big questions about Russia’s war in Ukraine, answered”, 30.03.2022, <https://www.vox.com/22989379/russia-ukraine-war-putin-zelenskyy-us-nato-explainer-questions>, Access date: 08.03.2022.



government also shared evidence that how the U.S. embassy was involved in providing “a million US dollars per day” to conduct and continue the protest.⁶⁶Nevertheless, Yanukovich failed to survive his rule and finally left for Moscow in 2014.

This political turmoil and anti-Russian wave prompted Moscow to annex Crimea and back the separatists in the southeastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk (Donbas region). Crimea, where more than 90 percent population speaks the Russian language and Russian ethnicity, also voted for integration with Russia. Although the voting was criticized on the ground of the presence of Russian troops during the referendum process yet the outcome of the referendum legitimized Russian interest in Crimea. Under these pressing situations, the new President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko signed the Minsk Agreement (Minsk-I) in September 2014. But the agreement collapsed quickly because of non-compliance by both sides. Yet another attempt was made at Minsk in February 2015 (Minsk-II) where the delegations of Russia, Ukraine, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the leaders of the separatist-held regions signed a 13-Point Agreement. The leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine gathered in Minsk to mark the occasion and issued a “Declaration of Support”. However, Moscow and Kyiv construed the agreement in their way which led to the “Minsk conundrum”.⁶⁷Ukraine saw the 2015 agreement as a tool to retain its stakes in the rebel-held territories that will ensure a ceasefire, a secured border between Russia and Ukraine, elections in Donetsk and Luhansk, and a controlled devolution of power.⁶⁸Russia, on the other, viewed the agreement that Ukraine should ensure a “comprehensive autonomy” to these regions and the presence of their representatives in the central government so that Russia will have veto power indirectly over Kyiv’s foreign policy options in these two regions.⁶⁹Further, the agreement will bring Russia back to the border and intervene in the

⁶⁶ V. Putin, “Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood”, 21. 2. 2022, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/vladimir-putin-ukraine-never-had-a-tradition-of-genuine-statehood-1.4808469>, Access Date: 3. 5. 2022.

⁶⁷ S. Ghosh, “Explained : What is the Minsk Agreement?”, 4. 3. 2022, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/explained-what-is-the-minsk-agreement/article65187598.ece>, Access Date: 27. 4. 2022.

⁶⁸ “Ukraine - Russia crisis: What is the Minsk agreement? 09.02.2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/9/what-is-the-minsk-agreement-and-why-is-it-relevant-now>, Access Date: 13.03.2022.

⁶⁹J. Thakur, “Explained: What are Minsk Agreements and why are they in discussion? 22.02.2022, <https://www.indiatimes.com/explainers/news/minsk-agreements-ukraine-crisis-562733.html>, Access Date: 18.05.2022.



Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk) if further hostility erupts between Kyiv and the Donbas. Nevertheless, neither the past nor the present government of Ukraine made serious efforts to execute the provisions of Minsk-II that required the Ukrainian legislature to introduce laws on special status for these two regions and adopt a constitutional provision for decentralization. Further, President Volodymyr Zelensky, elected in 2019, advocated for a harder stance on Minsk-II. In December 2021, he also suggested that Kyiv should look for modification or abandonment of the agreement if the negotiations do not make headway. Both Kyiv and Moscow well understand that the Minsk agreement would ensure a legal presence of Russian-backed rebels at the national and federal structures, thus limiting Ukrainian sovereignty and increasing Moscow's stake in making Ukrainian foreign policy.

Meanwhile, the policies and acts of pro-Euromaidan and pro-west President Poroshenko turned Russia-Ukraine relations further into a precarious situation. Poroshenko's signing of the "Association Agreement" with the EU clogged the door of Ukraine's membership in the EEU.⁷⁰The language law of 2019 on education, mass media, and administration attempted Ukraine to "Ukrainify" the socio-economic and political structure of the country- the move that went contrary to his predecessor Yanukovich who had favored for pro-Russian media, language, and culture. Poroshenko further made the provisions for the "use of Ukrainian language as the primary language, ordering middle schools that taught in Russian and other minority languages to make the switch".⁷¹All the media outlets were required to print in the Ukrainian language compulsorily while opting for publications in other languages. While there was an exception for English, European official languages, and certain minority languages, the Russian language got deprived of this privilege.⁷²The Poroshenko government justified this under the pretext of Ukrainians' European ambitions. All these acts and discriminations, along with high-handedness against the rebels in Donbas, have been designated by Putin as "smells

⁷⁰ O. Potemkina, 2018. "European Union – Eurasian Economic Union: Cooperation or Competition? Scientific and Analytical Herald of IE RAS 1, no. 4, 6-10, Egmont: *The Royal Institute for International Relations, and Institute of Europe Russian Academy of Sciences*, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328534223_european_union_eurasian_economic_union_cooperation_or_competition, Access Date: 03.03.2022.

⁷¹"New law stokes Ukraine language-tensions", 01.04.2021, <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210401-new-law-stokes-ukraine-language-tensions>, Access Date: 16.04.2022.

⁷²R. Denber, "New Language Requirement Raises Concerns in Ukraine", 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/19/new-language-requirement-raises-concerns-ukraine>, Access Date: 03.03.2022.



of genocide”, perpetrated by the government.⁷³ After him, President Zelensky also followed in his footsteps. Although Zelensky had campaigned to “reboot” the peace process and directly talk to Moscow, in reality, he did not show his sincerity. Instead, after assuming power he started to cut off Russian socio-cultural influence. He closed pro-Russian television and radio networks and imprisoned oligarchs such as Viktor Medvedchuk, who had funded these channels and designated them as “Kremlin’s main proxy”, on treason charges.⁷⁴ Zelensky reformed the security services to remove Russian sympathizers who were accused of the Russian takeover of Crimea and derailed the investigation process that fingered at Moscow’s controversial role in its referendum process.

6. Conclusion

Today’s unstable Kyiv was once the powerhouse of Kievan Rus. After a span of foreign rule, aggression, and Soviet administration Ukraine finally got independence in 1991. So it is wrong not to accept Ukraine’s nation-state identity and its own civilizational identity. Ukraine had been oscillating between the west and Russia. Western countries, especially America, want to see Ukraine in NATO and the European Union, whereas Russia favors Kyiv maintaining a safe distance from the US, NATO, and the EU, and its closer integration with Russia. As a consequence, domestic politics is polarised in Ukraine. However, there are some goals and objectives that most Ukrainians sought. First, a Ukrainian independent identity that is free from Russian “dictates”. Second, redefining its identity in Europe. Thirdly, full freedom on foreign policy choices. However, in its journey since 1991 Kyiv has failed to have a well-measured foreign policy- balancing both Russia and the west. From the perspective of Moscow, it is a pertinent fact that highly armed Europe could be a potential threat to Russian security and integrity-as the country has been invaded about five times by the European powers such as Polish-Lithuania (1610-1612), Sweden (1708-1709), France (1812) and Germany (1914-18, and 1941). In each case, the very essence of the Russian state was under threat. So suspicion

⁷³ “Smells of genocide: How Putin justifies Russia’s war in Ukraine”, 9. 3. 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/9/smells-of-genocide-how-putin-justifies-russias-war-in-ukraine>, Access Date: 17.04.2022.

⁷⁴ P. Dickinson, “Putin’s key Ukraine ally charged with treason”, 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-key-ukraine-ally-charged-with-treason/>, Access Date: 18.04.2022.



and fear of the west have been deep-rooted in Russia, and thus it perceives Europe and Europe-dominated and the US-led NATO as the tools of American imperialism.

While Russia has been gripped by an endless sense of insecurity, America and NATO or the west have sleepwalked into a risky confrontation with Moscow, where Kyiv has fallen to dangerous outcomes of war. Ukraine did not underscore the security concerns of Russia and America ignored Russia's privileged sphere of influence and interest. In doing so, the west and Ukraine have failed to underscore the potential of resurgent Russia and the mighty Kremlin. Both the west and Russia want to maximize their relative gains in the given situation and timeframe. While America along with NATO intends to continue the existing pro-west global balance of power, Russia reappears to offset it. The thriving economy, unmatched nuclear capability, and determined leaderships are the strengths that Russia has today to give a tough check to NATO expansion and the ambitious projects of the west. Most Russians feel that Kremlin doesn't want to escalate tensions, but it is not clear whether Kremlin is capable of preventing itself if such a situation pervades. Congruent to it, Georgia in past, and Ukraine today, have surfaced to the Russian wrath. NATO ensures security to member countries but fails to guarantee security for the NATO aspirant countries when crises surfaced. Further, the European countries must go through critical introspection as if the NATO expansion has enhanced the security of European or made them extremely vulnerable. One of the root causes of present-day war is the culmination of sheer differences in the interests and outlooks between America and Russia. While America wants to protect and promote its interests through the realist stance of expansion of 'power', Russia wants fulfillment of its interest by resorting to the neo-realist sense of 'security' and 'survival'. Therefore, Ukraine has become the obsession of the west and the target of Russia, where the very survival and identity of Kyiv seem unstable.

The Tumultuous Journey of Kievan Rus has ended with a terrible war and dangerous consequences. Yet, to stop the war now certain steps are necessary to follow on an immediate and priority basis. First, the immediate solution to halt war is to resume the Minsk peace initiatives. Second, Ukraine may join the European Union but not the military alliance under the banner of NATO. Third, credible security guarantees to Moscow and transparent acts of NATO need to be ensured, so that the Russians will feel that NATO is in no way going to threaten their territorial integrity and sovereignty. Fourth, Ukraine instead of looking for NATO



should develop its defense sector and develop its deterrence capability. Fifth, Ukraine, as an independent country, has the right to pursue its independent foreign policy, but while doing so it should be careful that there are limitations too because the acts of the country should not risk Russian security. Sixth, As the tension is brewing up for separation in Donetsk and Luhansk, various stakeholders of these regions should take up the matter to such a level to find out a durable solution. Seventh, although there are some controversies on the Crimean referendum process yet the matter needs to be addressed and resolved amicably which may take more time.

On the other way, if the existing situation turns worst, Ukraine surrenders or parts of its territories are captured by Russia or the war continues for a longer period then there will be some probable outcomes. First, Ukraine will leave its claims on Crimea and recognize it as a part of Russia. Second, Kyiv will recognize Luhansk and Donetsk as two independent states. Third, it will sign a deal with Moscow not to join NATO. Fourth, sign a trade deal with Russia and the Eurasian Union and relinquish its intention of joining the European Union. If this situation develops then it is imminent that Russia will get back Ukraine partially or completely that it had till 1991. These outcomes may happen, provided NATO and Russia do not come to a confrontation and Russia doesn't retreat. On the other way round, although mighty Russia is determined yet to take stock of Ukrainian's strong counteroffensive, along with the backing of the west, the war seems to continue for a longer period and the outcome may not be on the expected lines of Moscow. Nevertheless, the Russia-Ukraine war has created a new trajectory in the Russia-Ukraine relationship, that had started with the establishment of the Slavic state Kievan Rus, and further, the present situation has all set the ground for a new global order that will largely redefine and reset Russia-West power calculus.

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Is Israel Still A State that “Dwells Alone” in Its Foreign Relations?

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Abstract

The Jewish people have experienced a history of persecution, restrictions, expulsions, and pogroms. All these accumulated to shape the worldview of the Jews and caused them to see the world as two parts, the Jewish and non-Jewish. The Jews believed that they are a people “who dwells alone”, they should be dependent only on other Jews, and they should be self-reliant. This frame of mind has inevitably affected the policy makers’ decisions while conducting Israel’s foreign relations. In this regard, the purpose of this study is to examine the worldview of the Jewish people and the policymakers to understand how this belief has shaped the foreign policy of Israel and to scrutinize whether the thought of “no friends” is still a valid argument for Israel.

Keywords: *Israel, Israel Foreign Policy, Jews self-reliant, Decision makers.*

1. Introduction

The foreign policy of a state is shaped by various factors, including systemic and domestic elements. Systemic explanations discount the importance of domestic and internal variations within the separate nations,¹ such as historical experience, national character, or cultural heritage. On the other hand, the role of non-state actors in world politics is also significant.² An analysis lacking these factors would not have much explanatory value. This is also true for Israel. The history of the Jews in foreign lands during diaspora life has affected the Israeli people and the leaders who are responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. Because it is clear that the weight of Jewish history has influenced foreign policy choices,³ past experiences of the Jewish people can serve as an explanatory factor for the explanation of Israel’s foreign policy.⁴

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¹ David J. Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations”, *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 80-81.

² See Robert O. Keohane ve Joseph S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

³ For studies of this kind, see Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Shmuel Sandler, “Is There a Jewish Foreign Policy?”, *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 29, (1987): 115-121; Aaron Klieman, *Israel and the World after 40 Years* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1990).

⁴ For an example see Ofira Seliktar, *New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Croom Helm, 1986).



The Jews have a strong feeling of insecurity due to their history full of threats to their existence like the slaughters, pogroms, or the Holocaust in their diaspora life. After two thousand years of exile and diaspora life fearful of extermination, history brought a legacy of deeply felt insecurity to Israel. The past experiences entrenched this sense of insecurity which had increased with the attacks on the Jewish people in Palestine in the 1920s and has been strengthened after the Arab countries' collective attack as a response to the establishment of Israel in 1948. Since then, Israel has felt that it has been surrounded by a hostile world, and tended to see itself as lonely in the world, and in a state of isolation, which is believed by many in Israeli society. The past experiences of the Jewish people and the belief of the worlds being antisemitic have become part of the common understanding of the Jews.

In this sense, the historical experience can be examined as one of the important elements influencing Israel's foreign policy. These experiences have resulted to form a Jewish prism through which to read the events happening in the international arena. This prism is the psychological dispositions of the historical legacy through which images are filtered.⁵ In this context, political actors in Israel have believed that the world has negative feelings toward the Jewish state, and the struggle for survival is so strong that drastic measures and all means could be used in the conduct of Israel's foreign policy. On the other hand, the combination of the Jewish historical experiences of persecution and the Holocaust has been central to the construction of the identity of isolation and self-reliance⁶ (or self-help). This notion implies that the Israeli people are alone in a hostile world, and the international community has been seen as having "offered up the Jews as prey to the enemy's jaws"⁷ during the Second World War. This self-reliance is closely linked to the Jewish narrative of being a "people that dwells alone" and the "two camp" thesis. In this view, the world is seen as divided into Jewish and non-Jewish "camps" with the non-Jewish camp being basically hostile towards the Jews.⁸ The notion of the people that dwell alone has been also called the "people apart syndrome"⁹ which reflects the mentality of providing their protection and not trusting others.

⁵ Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System*, 11-12.

⁶ Samuel J. Roberts, *Survival or Hegemony? The Foundations of Israeli Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 115.

⁷ Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York: Henry Holt, 1991), 428.

⁸ Alan Dowty, "Israeli Foreign Policy and the Jewish Question", *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3, no. 1 (1999): 8-12.

⁹ Asher Arian, "A People Apart: Coping with National Security, Problems in Israel", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33, no. 4 (1989): 610.



Self-reliance simply results from the belief that states, in order to ensure their survival, should rely on their power rather than external powers and agreements or defense pacts with them. The principle of self-reliance passing from the historical Jewish people in the diaspora to Israel as a legacy has required to be militarily, economically, and politically self-reliant. Israel should be strong enough not only to meet her national interests and to provide national security but also not to be restrained in her freedom of action. Israel's foreign policy has included this principle because of the Jewish history and the mistrust of any kind of external power due to the experiences in the diaspora.

Given the accumulated experiences of diaspora Jewish life, which included hatred, mistrust, and contempt for Jews, this paper tries to analyze the effects of this historical experience on Israel's foreign policy. It begins by looking at the Jewish life in exile in a sense of isolation in a hostile world. It tries to elaborate on the growth of the notion of the "people that dwell alone" the self-reliance principle, and their effect on the people who are responsible for the conduct of the foreign policy in Israel. In the end, the paper considers how far Israel can still be ascribed as a lonely state in the international community of states.

2. Suffering of the Jews in Exile and Antisemitism

The destruction of the Second Temple in 70 AD by the Romans is a watershed event in Jewish history, marking the end of sovereignty and the start of diaspora.¹⁰ Jews were expelled from their promised land¹¹ in Palestine to the whole Roman world (and even beyond). Diaspora life was not a neutral experience; it was a life lived in exile, the Jews lacked autonomous political organization, and they were stated as "a pariah people."¹² On the other hand, even though Jewish communities never lived in total isolation from the outside world, to survive, they had to manage their internal affairs and their relations with the outside world. Jewish life

¹⁰ Paul Johnson, *A History of the Jews* (New York: HarperCollins, 1987), 136-143.

¹¹ The holy texts within the scope of Judaism, in addition to being a religious teaching for the Jews, also constitute the historical, cultural and social heritage of the Jewish people. Jews read religious texts as a record of Israel's history and geography, and the land they consider sacred and that they believe was promised in Palestine is considered an important part of this reading. In this regard, Jews believe that the land of Palestine has been promised to them by God within the framework of the Jewish scriptures and of the Bible.

¹² Arnaldo Momigliano, "A Note on Max Weber's Definition of Judaism as a Pariah-Religion", *History and Theory* 19, no. 3 (1980): 313.



in the diaspora and sometimes the physical security of the community itself was dependent on the tolerance of the larger community in which it existed.¹³

Jewish diaspora life was largely closed off from the outside world, and they were forced to live in ghettos. Traditional accounts of Jewish history after the destruction of the Second Temple paint a picture of enforced passivity and powerlessness. Throughout their history, the Jewish people have endured persecution, massacre, murder, and pogroms. After they were murdered in pogroms and massacres for centuries, in modern times the Holocaust continued this saga of Jewish suffering, destroying six million innocent victims in the most terrible circumstances.¹⁴

Jews scattered throughout the world were living in diaspora mainly in Europe and the Middle East. Antisemitism, a complex and perplexing form of hatred of the Jews, had already existed in the ancient world, and Jews were a convenient community of others to point to as scapegoats. They were blamed by Christian populations for the death of Christ from the times of early Christianity, were subject to blood libels, and were blamed for killing Christian children, poisoning wells, and bringing the plague to communities.¹⁵ The crusades were accompanied by violent attacks on Jewish communities, and Crusaders murdered Jews in pogroms as they blamed them for causing the Black Death of 1348, as Christian mobs “plundered, destroyed and killed Jewish communities.”¹⁶

Two of the most notorious antisemitic accusations of Christian populations against Jews were the so-called “blood libel” and “host desecration.” In medieval Europe, violent antisemitism probably increased significantly, especially with the promulgations of the “blood libel,” the allegation that Jews were using the blood of Christian children for ritual purposes.¹⁷ The second such charge made against Jews was that of “host desecration.” It was the accusation that the Jews poisoned the blood and bread employed by Catholic priests in the Mass. Besides

¹³ Raymond Cohen, “Israel’s Starry-Eyed Foreign Policy”, *Middle East Quarterly*, 1994, <https://www.meforum.org/221/israels-starry-eyed-foreign-policy> (23.04.2022).

¹⁴ Hilary L. Rubinstein vd., *The Jews in the Modern World A History Since 1750* (New York: Arnold Publishers, 2002), 110.

¹⁵ Gabrielle Grossman, “The Re-shaping of Anti-Semitism Through the Ages”, *The Journal of Psychohistory* 41, no. 3 (2014): 198.

¹⁶ Doris L. Bergen, *War & Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 5.

¹⁷ Allan Mohl, “The Evolution of Anti-Semitism: Historical and Psychological Roots”, *The Journal of Psychohistory* 39, no. 2 (2011): 119-121.



these two well-known charges, the Jews were also subjected to many other kinds of abuses, such as the depictions of the Jews portrayed as the murderers of Christians.¹⁸

With the growing of modernity and the intellectual sophistication of Europe, fantasies such as the blood libel and the host desecration began to lose their hold, and the eighteenth-century Enlightenment brought hope to Jews. The French Revolution was a positive development, and Napoleon's victories throughout Europe brought better conditions for the Jews.¹⁹ Jews experienced rising toleration and emancipation; ghetto walls came down, and obstacles to professional advancement disappeared.

However, this optimism was short-lived. Following the Enlightenment of the 18th century, the French Revolution, and the Emancipation, the reasons for persecution began to revolve around complaints concerning the Jews' incomplete assimilation to the modern societies they were living in.²⁰ In 1791 the Pale of Settlement²¹ began to be formed in Russia and Jews were limited as to where they could live. Beginning at around the same period, pogroms against Jews occurred in Odesa, Kyiv, and Warsaw.²² The antisemitism between the 1870s and the 1930s which culminated in the Holocaust signaled a reversal in the situation of the Jews that had begun with the Enlightenment. In this regard, there were some prominent antisemitic events during this period. For instance, the Hungarian parliamentarian Gyozo Istoczy mentioned the possibility of a "mass extermination" of the Jews. Adolf Stoecker in Germany established the antisemitic Christian Socialist Workers Party in 1878. Wilhelm Marr published 1879 "The Victory of Judaism over Germanism," in which the term "antisemitism" first appeared. During the 1880s and 1890s, antisemitic pogroms erupted in Russia, which forced the Eastern European Jews to move westward. On the other hand, a new wave of the "blood libel" accusation unfolded in Europe, and antisemitic parties in Austria, France, Germany, and Hungary gained electoral success.²³ This sudden emergence and the growth of

¹⁸ Rubinstein vd., *The Jews in the Modern World*, 111-112.

¹⁹ Abram L. Sachar, *A History of the Jews* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 278-284.

²⁰ Clive Jones ve Emma C. Murphy, *Israel Challenges to Identity, Democracy and the State* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 4.

²¹ Pale of Settlement was a huge geographical ghetto stretching from Baltic to the Black Sea in which the majority of Eastern European Jews in the Russian Empire would live until the 1917 revolution. See Johnson, *A History of the Jews*, 358.

²² Sachar, *A History of the Jews*, 309-322.

²³ Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism, 1700-1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 257-278; Richard J. Bernstein, *Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 49; Robert F. Byrnes, *Antisemitism in Modern France* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1950), 81-82;



antisemitic violence stunned many Jews who were predicting a further blossoming of enlightenment.²⁴ Because, Jews who were previously persecuted mainly for religious reasons, had to face a new kind of antisemitism after the Enlightenment. Before the 18th century, antisemitism was characterized and motivated by sheer hatred and religious zeal. The new antisemitism was secularized, primarily politically and economically motivated, and its target was Jewish ethnicity.

Antisemitism was profoundly felt by those Jews living in Europe. They had to cope with pogroms in Russia during 1881-1882, riots in Kishinev in 1903, the murder of Jews throughout western and southern Russia in 1905, accusations of betrayal (the Dreyfus Affair in France), and the emergence of racist approaches and antisemitic policies in different countries. As a result, at the end of the 19th century, political Zionism entered the stage of history, and it was an answer to the challenges of modernity which was shaped by enlightenment, secularisation, liberalism, and nationalism. When various remedies, including emancipation, assimilation, separation, and overt persecution and discrimination failed to solve the Jewish Question, “the relationship between the Christian majority and the Jewish minority,”²⁵ a growing number of Jews turned to political Zionism and independent statehood.²⁶

Antisemitic events were also witnessed between the two World Wars. However, once Hitler came to power, he paved the way for the most horrific event in Jewish history, the Holocaust. The centrality of the Holocaust in Jewish identity has been unparalleled. The Holocaust both “formed the collective identity” of Israel and is the “shadow” in which “the most fateful decisions in Israeli history” were conceived.²⁷ It has formed a twentieth-century link with an established narrative of two millennia²⁸ of Jewish history which is remembered as

Albert S. Lindemann, *The Jew Accused: Three Anti-Semitic Affairs (Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank) 1894-1915* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 92; Claire Hirshfield, “The British Left and the ‘Jewish Conspiracy’: A Case Study of Modern Antisemitism”, *Jewish Social Studies* 43, no. 2 (1981): 95; Max I. Dimont, *Jews, God, and History* (New York: Penguin Publishing, 2004), 313; Meyer Weinberg, *Because They Were Jews A History of Antisemitism* (New York: Praeger, 1986), 93.

²⁴ David N. Smith, “Judeophobia, Myth, and Critique,” in *The Seductiveness of Jewish Myth: Challenge or Response*, ed. S. Daniel Breslauer (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 125-126

²⁵ Bernard Reich ve David H. Goldberg, *Historical Dictionary of Israel* (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2008), 260.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Segev, *The Seventh Million*, 11.

²⁸ Dowty, “Israeli Foreign Policy,” 4.



being marked by expulsions, pogroms, and persecution.²⁹ For this reason, it is important to understand the effect of the Holocaust, for explaining the Jewish people's thoughts and feelings about other people. The influence of the Holocaust on the Jewish people's collective memory has been pervasive throughout Israel's short history:

“The Holocaust remains a basic trauma of Israeli society. It is impossible to exaggerate its effect on the process of nation-building... There is a latent hysteria in Israeli life that stems directly from this source... It accounts for the prevailing sense of loneliness, a main characteristic of the Israeli temper since Independence. It explains the obsessive suspicions, the towering urge for self-reliance at all costs in a world which permitted the disaster to happen. It explains the fears and prejudices, passions, pains, and prides, that spin the plot of public life and will likely affect the nation for a long time to come. The lingering memory of the Holocaust makes Arab threats of annihilation sound plausible. But even had there not been any Arabs, or if by some wondrous event their enmity were to disappear overnight, the lingering effect of traumatic memory would probably be almost as marked as it is today. The trauma of the Holocaust leaves an indelible mark on the national psychology, the tenor and content of public life, the conduct of foreign affairs, on politics, education, literature and the arts.”³⁰

In short, Jews had suffered at the hands of the masses; and antisemitism, from theological to social to ethnic, had punctuated Jewish life through the centuries. The reasons for these persecutions were diverse and changed throughout the centuries. However, their effects would affect the life of the Jewish people, and for the Jews, the only reliable allies were and would be the other Jewish communities. This attitude has been labeled as the “two-camp” thesis, which divides the world into Jewish and non-Jewish parts, with the latter seen as hostile and untrustworthy to Jews.³¹ According to this belief, Jews should be dependent only on other Jews, and they should be self-reliant.

3. “People that dwell alone” and Self-Reliance

After the birth of Israel, when Jews moved into this newly formed country of their own, they did not forget the mentality of being alone and the suspicion and mistrust of the “gentile”³² world. Statements and thoughts of the leaders and policymakers reflect the effect of the historical legacy of the Jewish people. Prime Minister Golda Meir was one of the important leaders who felt that her conclusions were based on these distant happenings which were

²⁹ Judith Elizur, “The Fracturing of the Jewish Self-Image: The End of ‘We Are One?’” in *Israel: The First Hundred Years, Volume III Israeli Politics and Society Since 1948 Problems of Collective Identity*, ed. Efraim Karsh (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 14.

³⁰ Amos Elon, *The Israelis: Founders and Sons* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 198-199.

³¹ Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System*, 90, 98, 314, 502.

³² Gentile is the term used by the Jews which refers to the people who are not Jewish.



relevant at all times and places. She expressed her fears as a child of a pogrom in her native hometown, Kyiv:

“That pogrom did not take place at all, but to this day I remember how frightened I was and how angry I was that the only thing my father could do to protect me as I waited for the bullies to come was to nail some planks on the door. And more than anything else I remember the feeling that this is happening to me only because I am Jewish... That was a feeling that I felt many times in my life-the fear, the feeling of being downcast, the awareness of being different, and the deep instinctive belief that a person who wants to stay alive had better do something about it.”³³

Similarly, Meir explicitly stated her feelings while she was at a press conference in Washington: “And you Mr. Alsop you say that we have a Masada complex... it is true. We do have a Masada complex. We have a pogrom complex. We have a Hitler complex.”³⁴ Pinhas Sapir, one of the prominent leaders, had the same feelings, as Meir:

“We have a Warsaw Ghetto complex, a complex of the hatred of the Jewish People, just as we are filled with a Masada complex... From the fighters of the Warsaw Ghetto, from the fighters in the ghettos, in the forests, and from the other camps we inherited the justified feeling with our backs to the wall. This feeling guided us in our various struggles and wars.”³⁵

The establishment of a state for the Jews did not displace the sense that the Jewish people dwell alone. For David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, Jewish people living in different parts of the world was the only reliable ally for Israel. He stressed this belief in the speech he made in 1955: “It is not important what the Goyim (non-Jewish people) say, but rather what the Jews do.”³⁶ Since then, this thought has become part of Israel’s foreign policy. The thought of the world divided into Jews and others have become an important component of Israel’s relations with other countries:

“One of the most fundamental aspects of Israel’s diplomatic tradition is its attitude towards the outsider and foreigner. While Zionism sought constantly to attain international recognition, it was afflicted at the same time by deep, sometimes obsessive, misgivings regarding the intentions of foreign individuals and governments. Antisemitism played a dominant role in molding the dichotomous perception of a world divided up into Jews and Gentiles.”³⁷

³³ Asher Arian, *Security Threatened Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 162.

³⁴ Daniel Bar-Tal ve Dikla Antebi, “Siege Mentality in Israel”, *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 16, no. 3 (1992): 263.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 264.

³⁶ Christopher L. Schilling, “The Ghetto Complex: Rethinking Israel’s Foreign Policy”, *The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences* 5, no. 4 (2010): 466.

³⁷ Sasson Sofer, *Zionism and the Foundations of Israeli Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 365.



This attitude was reflected, for example, in the belief of Yaakov Herzog, an adviser to Meir. He thought that Jewish history was unique, and it also left a legacy of uniqueness for Israel. He wrote that:

“We are not a normal people, we are not free from the Galut (exile) burden and we are not accepted by the world... Political Zionism maintained that the concept of ‘people who dwell alone is, in fact, an abnormal condition. In reality, the concept of ‘people who dwell alone is the natural condition of the Jewish people.”³⁸

The perception of the distinction between Jews and others has had fundamental effects. After Israel was established, the world was often to be seen by many Israeli policy-makers, and by much of the Israeli public, as an inhospitable place, at best indifferent to the fate of the Jews. This profoundly affected the attitudes of the policy-makers toward foreign policy. “The re-interpretation of antisemitism and the Holocaust contributed to a highly Hobbesian perception of international order in Israel.”³⁹ This perception was clearly expressed in Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s book, *The Revolt*: “The world does not pity the victims; it respects the warriors. Good or bad-that is how it is.”⁴⁰ The sense of isolation and the notion of the “people that dwell alone” was still felt by many Jews in Israel. According to this perception, now that the Jews has a state of their own, as one of the Presidents of Israel, Chaim Herzog⁴¹ stated, antisemitism was now being directed against Israel:

“Both the Holocaust with all its hardships and the establishment of the State of Israel did not remove the antisemitism from the world. The hatred of Israel has not ceased; rather it has found other avenues of expressions-against Zionism and against the State of Israel. The phenomenon of hostility towards Israel in the world often takes on very extreme and irrational emotional qualities, which discloses something far deeper than political disagreements per se.”⁴²

This sense of loneliness was greatly increased by a string of events. The days preceding the 1967 Six-Day War were especially traumatic for the Jewish people. They saw the evacuation of UN observers from the Egyptian-Israeli border, and the US failed to break the Egyptian blockade of Israel’s southern sea lanes. The threats from Arab countries and the international inactivity prior to the 1967 War reinforced Israel’s distrust of other states while prompting fears of a possible repetition of the Holocaust. After the war, Israel faced international condemnation because of its occupation of the territories it had seized. Although

³⁸ Ilan Peleg ve Paul Scham, “Israeli Neo-Revisionism and American Neoconservatism: The Unexplored Parallels”, *Middle East Journal* 61, no. 1 (2007): 86.

³⁹ Seliktar, *New Zionism*, 107.

⁴⁰ Arian, *Security Threatened*, 163.

⁴¹ He is the father of the incumbent President of Israel, Isaac Herzog.

⁴² Bar-Tal ve Antebi, “Siege Mentality,” 264.



Israel received large-scale weapons and equipment from the United States during the war and these aids enabled the course of the war to turn in favor of Israel, Israel's almost defeat at the beginning of the 1973 Yom Kippur War strengthened the notion of "a nation that shall dwell alone."⁴³ On the other hand, the arms embargo of France on Israel and the massive break-off of diplomatic relations by many countries (including most of the African and communist ones) following the wars of 1967 and 1973 were chilling. There were many states and firms in compliance with the Arab boycott, and there were many UN votes criticizing Israel, including the 1975 UN resolution which equated Zionism with racism.⁴⁴ Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was reactive when the resolution about Zionism was accepted, and his expression was an important example of his thoughts about Jews' place in the international community: "The whole world is against us when was it not so!"⁴⁵ In short, Jews in Israel saw themselves and Israel as sharing the same fate as the Jews in the diaspora during history. Thus, Israel was a "pariah state" like the Jews had been a pariah, people.

The wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 strengthened the sense of isolation in a hostile world and the belief of the "people that dwells alone." The Jewish people began to think that they were facing the same fate as the Jews who lived in the diaspora. The only difference seemed to be the geographical place they were living, and the others they faced to live together. They had been mostly in Europe during diaspora; after the state of Israel was born, they were in their state. However, they were to experience a similar feeling of isolation. There was a resemblance between the fate of the Jews everywhere, whether in Israel or the diaspora. Even Abba Eban, one of Israel's moderate leaders, similarly described the conditions, as Israel was approaching the 1967 Six-Day War:

"The chilling wind of vulnerability penetrated every corner of the Israeli consciousness. When we looked out at the world we saw it divided between those who wanted to see us destroyed and those who would not raise a finger to prevent it from happening."⁴⁶

Eban's words show the depth of the worldview of "us" and "them" and the feeling of isolation. It was apparent that the Jewish people in Israel were still affected by the horrific past

⁴³ Shmuel Sandler, *The State of Israel, the Land of Israel The Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign Policy* (London: Greenwood Press, 1993), 146.

⁴⁴ Merom Gil, "Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism", *Political Science Quarterly* 114, no. 3 (1999): 411.

⁴⁵ Efraim Inbar, "Israeli National Security, 1973-1996", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555, no. 1 (1998): 66.

⁴⁶ Abba Eban, *My Country* (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), 180.



of their ancestors. They were victims in a hostile world and were persecuted through the ages. All these experiences influenced both the national mood and the conduct of Israel's foreign policy. On the other hand, they had a direct bearing and emphasis upon self-reliance, and on policy-makers skepticism toward the outside world. The influence of the Jewish past on Israel's foreign policy was described by Klieman appropriately:

“At the level of attitudes and perceptions, nineteen centuries from Masada to Maidanek still profoundly influence Israeli international conduct... This weight of Jewish history lies heavily on both leaders and the public. It is one of the primary sources for Israel's underlying insecurity and perceived isolation.”⁴⁷

As the Jewish people continued to experience hostility from other people while they were living in their state, they began to see themselves and their new state to be the object of persecution and discrimination again. The perception of the world as divided between “us” and “them” was most famously articulated in the popular song of the late 1960s entitled, “The Whole World Is Against Us.”⁴⁸ In this respect, the situation of the people in Israel was of a nation that dwells alone, and the feeling of mistrust was an important feature of the foreign policy of Israel. They thought that other people would do nothing to protect Jews or Israel, as nobody did during the Holocaust. As Begin wrote:

“Ask the Jews: Is it possible to destroy a people? Is it possible to annihilate millions of people in the twentieth century? And what will the ‘world’ say? The innocent ones! It is hard to believe, but even in the twentieth century it is possible to destroy an entire people; and if the annihilated people happen to be Jewish, the world will be silent and will behave as it usually behaves.”⁴⁹

Prime Minister Menachem Begin was one of the important leaders who was affected by the negative experiences of Jewish history. Begin's conduct of Israel's foreign policy was a product of his own life experiences. He encountered as a youth the antisemitism in Brest-Litovsk, and his family was killed during the Holocaust. It was apparent that his intellectual and political identity and worldview were shaped by the pervasive and deadly antisemitism of the 1930s and the Holocaust.⁵⁰ The trauma of the Holocaust particularly affected Begin's political opinions. During his political life, he usually viewed events through “the prism of the 1930s,” and “drew analogies with events in this period.”⁵¹ On the other hand, according to Begin, because Israel represented the Jewish people, it was experiencing the same hostilities

⁴⁷ Klieman, *Israel and the World*, 53.

⁴⁸ Amnon Rubinstein, *The Zionist Dream Revisited: From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back* (New York: Schocken, 1984), 80.

⁴⁹ Arian, *Security Threatened*, 163.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Ilan Peleg, *Begin's Foreign Policy, 1977–1983 Israel's Move to the Right* (Westport: Greenwood, 1987), 66.



that the Jews in the diaspora had faced, and Israel's isolation was proof of antisemitism directed against it. That's why he frequently denounced foreign criticism of Israel's policies as motivated by antisemitism. When he was asked to explain Israel's part⁵² in the Phalangist killing of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, for instance, he stated that "Goyim kill goyim... and they blame the Jews."⁵³ He also labeled the very inquiry a "blood libel."⁵⁴

As a result of all the historical experiences, the Jewish people have seen themselves as living in a hostile environment, surrounded by enemies, and constant threats and danger. For this reason, the traumatic history of the Jews including the Holocaust has created a feeling of mistrust towards "others," which also led to the development of the principle of self-reliance in Israel's foreign and security policy:

"The clear feeling of basic mistrust regarding the international environment is the basic feature of the foreign and security policy of Israel. There is a fundamental belief that in the final analysis, the world will do nothing to protect Jews, as individuals, as a collectivity, as a State."⁵⁵

The above examples provide powerful reasons and evidence of this central characteristic of the Jewish people. This characteristic is "self-reliance," which is the result of the feeling of aloneness (people that dwell alone). Self-reliance is significant because, at the global level, Israel sees a world where power and force dominate, and whereby security is only assured through self-reliance and the projection of force. Secondly, self-reliance not only prevents Israel's vulnerability when the ally or the big power changes her policies and stops supporting the state but also provides freedom of action to pursue the national interests of the state.

The principle of self-reliance for Israel means to rely on its military power, rather than on external guarantees such as peace or defense agreements. Israel needs self-reliance to ensure its survival, and this notion is extremely dominant in the Israeli national security paradigm. Ben-Gurion knew that building a militarily strong country was extremely important to survive: "Israel stood up by its strength and will stand firm only if it trusts first and foremost in itself as

⁵² As Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon was forced to resign in 1983 after an investigation found him to be responsible for not stopping the massacre of Palestinians by the Lebanese Christian phalange in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. See Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall Israel and the Arab World* (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 416-417.

⁵³ Jacob Abadi, *Israel's Leadership from Utopia to Crisis* (Westport: Greenwood, 1993), 97-98.

⁵⁴ Peleg, *Begin's Foreign Policy*, 63.

⁵⁵ Asher Arian, Ilan Talmud ve Tamar Hermann, *National Security and Public Opinion in Israel* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 21-22.



a power of growing greatness.”⁵⁶ He also pointed out the combination of self-reliance and military power in 1948 that “we should not deceive ourselves by thinking that formal diplomatic recognition will solve all our problems... We must not forget that our security depends on our might.”⁵⁷ On the other hand, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon asserted in 2001 that “we must all know that we can never place our fate in the hands of anyone else.”⁵⁸ The combination of self-reliance and military power was also expressed in the statement made by Rabin following the 1973 war: “Israel shall dwell alone and only our military might guarantees our existence.”⁵⁹ Rabin also touched upon the same topic when he spoke at the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the uprising against the Nazis by Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto in April 1993, and stated what the Jewish people should have learned of the Holocaust: “What will we learn? We will learn to believe in a better world. But most importantly, we will not trust in others any longer, generous as they may be: only us, only ourselves. We will protect ourselves.”⁶⁰

The lessons of the Holocaust were also brought into focus during the 2006 Lebanon War. It was invoked by the associations between Hitler and Iranian President Ahmadinejad, and the notion of a broader existential threat. There was a strong sense that the international community was in a state of what Shimon Peres referred to as “paralysis” concerning the Hezbollah problem.⁶¹ He wrote of Hezbollah: “Israel really is alone. No one else can stop them. And, on the other hand, no one else can defend us. We have to defend ourselves in... a dangerous world.”⁶² Besides, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expressed similar feelings at that time. He quoted Ben-Gurion and stated that in the struggle for existence, the Jewish people must “always memorize to ourselves, day and night, that our existence-our freedom, our future-depend first and foremost on ourselves, our efforts, our abilities, and our will.”⁶³

⁵⁶ Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System*, 265.

⁵⁷ David Ben-Gurion, “David Ben-Gurion: Broadcast to the Nation after the Arab Invasion (May 15, 1948)”, *Jewish Virtual Library*, May 15, 1948, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ben-gurion-broadcast-to-the-nation-after-the-arab-invasion-may-1948> (26.04.2022).

⁵⁸ “Sharon Maintains Control in Face of Demographic Shift”, *The Irish Times*, August 20, 2005, <https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/sharon-maintains-control-in-face-of-demographic-shift-1.482484> (26.04.2022).

⁵⁹ Inbar, “Israeli National Security 1973-1996,” 66.

⁶⁰ Arian, *Security Threatened*, 175.

⁶¹ Shimon Peres, “The Lessons of War with Hezbollah”, *New Perspectives Quarterly* 23, sy. 4 (2006): 23.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ehud Olmert, “Ehud Olmert Administration: Remarks at Meeting with Heads of Local Authorities During War (July 31, 2006)”, *Jewish Virtual Library*, Temmuz 31, 2006, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/prime-minister-olmert-remarks-at-meeting-with-heads-of-local-authorities-during-war-july-2006> (26.04.2022).



It is clear that the notion of the “people who dwell alone” and self-reliance have been important factors in explaining the foreign policy conduct of Israel. On the other hand, the weight of history has profoundly influenced the worldview of the Jewish people, their threat perception, and their attitudes toward other peoples. In this context, the notion of “the people who dwell alone” which has affected the foreign policy of Israel has been a result of the collective historical memories, and above all, of the Holocaust. The belief that Jewish survival was constantly imperiled and that antisemitism has been widespread fueled the fears and anxieties of Israeli Jews, including Israeli policy-makers. Therefore, these sensitivities and fears of Israeli politicians and the Israeli public at large are simply inexplicable without reference to Jewish historical memories, especially the traumatic collective memory of the Holocaust.

4. Israel’s Foreign Relations and A State that “is not alone”

The historical legacy has affected the worldview and foreign policy perceptions, beliefs, values, and attitudes of Israeli policy-makers and the general public. Whenever they felt condemned by the international community, the more they were reminded more of their Jewish past. Whenever they were welcomed, the more confident they became, and they thought that they were moving away from their predecessors' fate. Despite long-standing efforts to isolate Israel, since its independence, it tried to have good relations with most members of the international community and has joined international organizations. However, the historical experiences of the state of Israel reinforced the feeling of isolation of the Jewish people “as the evoked set of individual and collective memories.”⁶⁴ In this context, the notions of “people that dwell alone” and self-reliance have been well rooted in the political culture of Israel and have been expressed in a variety of ways at different times. For example, in 1974, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said: “We should have no illusions and we should know that we are isolated in the world. Out of 137 member states of the UN, less than 10 support us. Israel shall dwell alone and only our military might guarantees our existence.”⁶⁵ International recognition and support were not trusted, and the only reliable friends were the other Jewish communities of the world. An example of this view was expressed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in 1988 when an international court ruled in Egypt’s favor on the Taba dispute: “The UN, the world court,

⁶⁴ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 213-216.

⁶⁵ Robert Slater, *Rabin of Israel* (London: Robson Books, 1977), 204.



international arbitration, or international conference-it's always against us.”⁶⁶ The belief in a “two-camp thesis,” which accepted the world as divided into Jews and the others, considered other Jews as Israel's only reliable friend. This thought was also expressed by Ben-Gurion:

“Do not forget that although Israel enjoys the friendship of many nations, it is the only country which has no self-governing ‘relatives’ from the point of view of religion, language, origin or culture... The only permanent loyal ‘relatives’ we have is the Jewish people.”⁶⁷

Even though Israeli policy-makers tried to be self-reliant, being a small state with limited resources, surrounded by hostile countries, and full of insecurity and isolation made it impossible for Israel not to need a big power's support. The demand to be self-reliant and the need for major power support put Israel in a significant dilemma. Israel needed this to protect her territories, get arms, and be recognized as a legal state in the region especially in the first few decades after it was established. As a young state newly established in the bipolar world system, she looked for support both from the West and the East. It tried to pursue a nonidentification policy between 1948 and 1950. On the other hand, although the strength of leftist parties in Israel made Israel inclined to the Soviet Union,⁶⁸ the security concerns of Israel have required the support of the US due to Israel's being a small state. However, the importance of good relations with the US was embraced at the expense of the self-reliance principle. Therefore, despite Ben-Gurion's doubts about the intentions of the great powers, which was stated as “in time of peace there is no need for them, and in time of crisis they are useless,”⁶⁹ the US support was accepted as one of the basic pillars of the political dimension of Israeli military policy.

This dependency was criticized by some decision-makers who claimed that it restrained Israel from following her national interests in the international arena.⁷⁰ Although there were cases when the United States objected to Israel's policies (as during the 1956 War), in most cases, it did not prevent Israel from following the path that was thought necessary and whenever fundamental Israeli interests were perceived to be endangered. As a result, Israel noticed that the US support has been beneficial for Israeli interests and so it should not be undermined at

⁶⁶ Klieman, *Israel and the World*, 45.

⁶⁷ Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System*, 276.

⁶⁸ Avi Shlaim, “Israel Between East and West, 1948-56”, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 4 (2004): 658-660.

⁶⁹ Anders Liden, *Security Perception: A Study of Change in Israel's Official Doctrine 1967-1974* (Lund: Distribution Studentlitteratur, 1979), 118.

⁷⁰ Avi Kober, “Israeli War Objectives into an Era of Negativism”, *Journal of Strategic Studies Special Issue Israel's National Security Towards the 21st Century* 24, no. 2 (2001): 191.



the expense of being self-reliant. However, this did not mean that Israel would wait for support and ignore the principle of self-reliance. Instead, it tried to create a balance and Ben-Gurion's following quotation shows this situation:

"I do not say that no material aid will come from outside, but if there is any hope for such a help- and this hope does exist-then to the degree that we demonstrate to the world that we are not dependent solely on outside help, to that degree such help may be forthcoming. Even God himself helps only those who help themselves."⁷¹

On the other hand, the Oslo peace process was a watershed in Israeli foreign policy. It came about due to major changes in the international system as well as in the Middle East due to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War. In this regard, some of the leaders came to believe that international and regional conditions were more favorable to Israel and wanted to get rid of the basic sense of isolation deriving from the historical legacy of the Jews. They thought that the belief of "the people that dwell alone" created obstacles in front of the peace process.⁷² For instance, Rabin expressed that attitudes toward the Jewish state have changed and the Jews should abandon the traditional fear and suspicion of the gentile world: "Israel is no longer a people that dwells alone'...and has to join the global journey toward peace, reconciliation, and international cooperation."⁷³ On another occasion, he pointed out the changes in the international arena, and mentioned the need for change in the belief of isolation:

"The world is no longer against us... States which never stretched their hand out to us, states which condemned us, which fought us, which assisted our bitterest enemies... regard us today as a worthy and respectable address... This is a new reality... Peace requires a world of new concepts."⁷⁴

There were important changes in the world affecting Rabin's thoughts about the fate of Jewish people. When the Cold War ended, Israel's enemies lost their Soviet support, and Iraq was defeated in the Gulf War in 1991. These international and regional developments were acknowledged as a window of opportunity. Besides all these developments, Rabin's Labor

⁷¹ Ariel Levite, *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine* (Jerusalem: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 1989), 30.

⁷² Efraim Inbar ve Shmuel Sandler, *The Changing Israeli Strategic Equation: Toward a Security Regime* (Tel Aviv: BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Security and Policy Studies No. 23, 1995), 54.

⁷³ Efraim Inbar, *Israel's National Security Issues and Challenges Since the Yom Kippur War* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 89.

⁷⁴ Ibid.



government had a different security understanding, and Rabin was an optimist about peace and Israel's standing in the world.⁷⁵ As he declared at that time:

“The train that travels towards peace has stopped this year at many stations that daily refute the time-worn canard-the whole world is against us.’ The United States has improved its relations with us... In Europe, our dialogue with the European Community has been improved and deepened. We have been inundated by visiting heads of state and we have responded to them with friends and with economic and other links. We are no longer a people that dwells alone.”⁷⁶

With this statement, he tried to point out his belief that Israel would be no longer isolated and the need for Jewish people to cease the notion of “the people who dwell alone.”⁷⁷ Rabin was the first leader of Israel who saw the international changes as positive developments for Israel and thought that the new security environment also reduced Israeli threat perception of her existence. This attitude change was part of a far-reaching diplomatic revolution that Israeli foreign policy underwent in the early 1990s.

It is evident that before the establishment of the Israel, state-seeking, and state-making dominated Israel's foreign policy and diplomacy. After the state was established, foreign policy was determined by the element of state-keeping. In this regard, finding and retraining major power political support and the thought of self-reliance which points out that Jews would never again find themselves unable to defend themselves helped shaped the foreign relations of Israel.

However, as seen above, from the 1990s onwards Israel wished and tried to integrate itself fully into the international community, rather than regard itself as destined to remain apart. Unlike in earlier decades when Israelis had tended to view the rest of the world with a large degree of suspicion and pessimism, Israeli policy-makers began to feel a new sense of optimism and confidence in Israel's ability to integrate itself into the international community.

This policy orientation has gradually shown that Israel is not alone in the world without any friends. It has become clear that it now has a diversified foreign policy orientation. Every country in the world has friends and foes. Israel is one of them, and not only it faces hostilities, but also friendships. There have been practical and regional considerations, such as political, economic, and strategic interests, which made it necessary for Israel to develop close ties with

⁷⁵ Efraim Inbar, *Rabin and Israel's National Security* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 133.

⁷⁶ Neil Caplan, “Oom-Shmoom Revisited: Israeli Attitudes Towards the UN and the Great Powers, 1948-1960,” in *Global Politics, Essays in Honour of David Vital*, ed. Abraham Ben-Zvi ve Aharon Klieman (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 167.

⁷⁷ Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo”, *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 1 (1999): 21.



various countries. For instance, after its relations with many of the African countries were cut in 1973, Israel found new partners in Latin America.⁷⁸ When it found itself surrounded by enemies, it aligned itself with the second circle of countries surrounding the first. Because of the hostility of its neighbors, Israel was compelled to look beyond in search of friends and markets. Consequently, Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia have been new countries strategically important to Israel (as they were also the primary targets of its periphery doctrine),⁷⁹ and Israel has attached great importance to the strategic relations with India.⁸⁰ Even though Israel lost some of these countries such as Turkey and Iran, it has found new friends, such as Greece and South Sudan.⁸¹

Israel's international relations have shown the changing patterns in the shifts in Israel's global position, priorities, policies, and self-perceptions. During the 1990s, Israel developed its relations with many Asian and African countries and inaugurated diplomatic relations. Even though the primary reason for the turnaround in Israel's standing in the international arena was the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, especially after the beginning of the peace process, Israel has developed ties with many states. Today, despite the resumption of diplomatic relations with many states that never had any links with Israel in the past, Israel has also bolstered its relations with China, India, and the economic tigers of Asia; the growing economies of Eastern Europe; and Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. As part of the Asian continent, Israel has been interested from its inception in good ties with Asian states, China and India in particular. During the 1990s Israel finally established full diplomatic ties with both of these countries, and Israel's relations especially with India have taken on an ever greater significance since the beginning of the new millennium.⁸²

⁷⁸ Benjamin Neuberger, *Israel's Relations with the Third World (1948–2008)* (Tel Aviv: The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies Research Paper No.5, 2009), 20-21.

⁷⁹ Klieman, *Israel and the World*, 92.

⁸⁰ Neuberger, *Israel's Relations*, 14-15.

⁸¹ Yoel Guzansky, "Israel's Periphery Doctrine 2.0: The Mediterranean Plus", *Mediterranean Politics* 19, no. 1 (2014): 100.

⁸² For the relations between Israel-China and Israel-India, see Jonathan Goldstein, "The Republic of China and Israel, 1911-2003," in *Israel: The First Hundred Years Volume IV Israel in the International Arena*, ed. Efraim Karsh (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 216-248; Aron Shai, *Sino-Israeli Relations: Current Reality and Future Prospects* (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2009); Binyamin Tjong-Alvares, "The Geography of Sino-Israeli Relations", *Jewish Political Studies Review* 24, (2012): 96-121; P.R. Kumaraswamy, "The Maturation of Indo-Israeli Ties", *Middle East Quarterly* 20, no. 2 (2013): 39-48; P.R. Kumaraswamy, "Israel-India Relations: Seeking Balance and Realism," in *Israel: The First Hundred Years Volume IV Israel in the International Arena*, ed. Efraim Karsh (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 249-267.



As for Israel's relations with major powers, it has significant ties with both the United States⁸³ and Russia. Israel has a unique relationship with the United States and since the foundation of Israel, different factors shaped the relations between the two countries and sustained the relations to its current special position. Especially after the Six Day War, the relations between the United States and Israel improved considerably and with the election of President Reagan, a new period has begun. The unique relations found over time still pervade the present-day. For nearly a half-century, sustained political and military support of the United States has shown that the United States is Israel's main ally and friend in the world. The United States has been Israel's significant strategic partner its presidents in turn have pledged their commitment to Israel's security for decades, which many defined as a national interest of the United States. On the other hand, Israel has been one of the very few states in the Middle East to maintain regular relations with Russia after the Cold War. Now it seems that both states are benefitting from this to upgrade their ties to a higher level which may reach a strategic one very soon. In fact, there are multiple converging interests for both countries to expedite establishing a realistic and pragmatic relationship, regardless of any differences in their views on certain international issues.

Moreover, although affected by the course of the Palestinian conflict, and Israeli leaders perceive Iran as the greatest threat to Israel in more than two decades, Israel's relations with its neighbors in the Middle East seem to improve. While Israel is still maintaining peace accords with Egypt and Jordan, it recently signed treaties to normalize relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain⁸⁴ and begin a normalization process with Sudan, deepening and making public dramatic shifts in Israel's regional position. The emergence of an Israeli-Sunni Gulf accord centered on security cooperation may provide Israel with a unique opportunity to both

⁸³ As stated above, Israel sought to have good relations with the United States at the expense of the self-reliance principle. However, the special relationship Israel currently enjoys with the United States has not come into existence suddenly. The relations of the two countries can be examined in three periods of time. During the first period beginning with the creation of the state of Israel until 1967 Six Day War, United States tried not to dissent Arab world and was cautious in its relations with Israel. However, after the Six Day War the relations between United States and Israel began to improve and with the election of President Reagan a new period of strategic relations has begun. The unique relations founded during the course of time still pervades in the present-day. As for Russia, Israel has good bilateral relations that have developed over the years. Compared with the past Cold War, today, the level, scope, and importance of relations between Israel and Russia are unprecedented. Both states see each other as an important friend and seek to establish mutual understanding to improve cooperation in different areas.

⁸⁴ Güngör Şahin ve Serhat Güzel, "Orta Doğu Güvenliğinde Yeni Açılımlar ve İbrahim Antlaşması", *Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, no. 34 (2021): 15-28.



address the Iranian threat and move towards normalizing its relationships with Sunni Gulf states.

As it is clear, despite the sense of being in isolation in the world, Israel is not an isolated country. On the other hand, it should not help isolate itself by its policies toward its nearby neighbors, which might put it in a ghetto in the international community. Even though it has enemies, it has also friends and Israel is not alone. The Jewish people need to come out of the vicious circle of thinking they are still “a people that dwells alone,” and stop seeing the world as divided between the Jews and the others. They should not feel like lonely people in the world. As is evident from the diversification of its foreign relations, Israel has many friends and supporters all around the world.

On the other hand, as new generations emerge in Jewish society, and as Israel continues to develop new connections around the world, the impact of Jewish historical factors on Israel’s foreign relations will most probably decrease over time. The understanding of the reality that others do not want to destroy the Jews or Israel will help Jewish people overcome the siege mentality and the feeling that the Jewish people dwell alone in the world.

5. Conclusions

A century after Jews were to live in different alien nations and have been made the scapegoat for many undesirable events. The isolation and suffering of the Jews have had a tremendous impact on the Jewish people who have come to believe that Jews have been a nation that dwells alone in the world. In this regard, historical experiences of persecution and the Holocaust were central to the construction of the identity of isolation and self-reliance. The notions of “people that dwell alone” and self-reliance have been deeply embedded in Israeli political culture, influenced Israel’s foreign relations, and Israel’s international isolation seemed to prove that the Jewish people’s destiny was to stand apart from other nations.

On the other hand, apart from the above-mentioned considerations, since its independence, Israel tried to maintain positive relations with the majority of the international community and established relations with as many countries as possible. Israel’s close friendship with the United States has been a linchpin of its foreign policy and the Oslo peace process was the centerpiece of Israel’s new foreign policy orientation. Israel’s developing diplomatic relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and South America and growing



normalization of relations concerning the Abraham Accord countries have also made tangible improvements in Israel's foreign relations. All these developments have demonstrated that the notion of Jewish people who dwells alone is increasingly becoming a bygone feeling which Israeli people and policymakers are to realize that they have overcome over many years of statehood.

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