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## OTTOMANS AND OTHERS: STATE AND SOCIETY IN EARLY OTTOMAN\* HISTORIOGRAPHY

Mehmet Şakir YILMAZ\*

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### Abstract

This paper aims to explore early Ottoman chroniclers' perception of the Ottoman state and society. Unlike 16th century Ottoman historians, who mostly display a shared "classical" Ottoman culture in their understanding and depiction of Ottoman state, early Ottoman authors' views on Ottoman dynasty and society may contribute our understanding of the nature of early Ottoman dynamism. Modern scholars have already clarified different aspects of the issue, trying to explain rise of the Ottoman principality relying on different theories such as gaza theory, Oguz-Turkic state tradition and Rumi identity and culture. This article aims to clarify early Ottoman authors' understanding of the Ottoman polity by focusing on their attitude in depicting Ottomans vis-à-vis others and state vis-à-vis society.

**Key words:** *Ottoman Dynasty, Ottoman State, Gaza, Turk, Turkman, Oguz, Rumi, Ottoman Historiography*

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# ERKEN DÖNEM OSMANLI TARİHYAZIMINDA OSMANLILAR VE DİĞERLERİ: DEVLET VE TOPLUM

## Özet

Bu makalenin konusu erken dönem Osmanlı Tarihyazımında Osmanlı devletinin ve kimliğinin nasıl algılandığıdır. 16. Yüzyıldan itibaren kaleme alınan eserlerde artık oluşmakta olan "klasik" kültürün etkisi baskın bir şekilde görülmektedir, ancak bu klasik formun hâkimiyeti öncesinde kaleme alınan eserlerde Osmanlı devletinin ve kimliğinin Tarih yazarları tarafından nasıl aktarıldığı erken dönem Osmanlı devletinin dinamizmini anlamamıza da katkı sağlayacak bir konudur. Osmanlı devletinin yükselişini açıklama amacıyla geliştirilen gaza teorisi, Oğuz-Türk devlet geleneği, Rumi kültürü gibi tartışmalar ile de ilişkili olan bu konu erken dönem Tarih yazarlarının eserlerinden hareketle irdelenmiş ve devlet-toplum, Osmanlılar ve diğerleri ikilemleri üzerine odaklanılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Osmanlı Hanedanı, Osmanlı Devleti, Gaza, Türk, Türkmen, Oğuz, Rumi, Osmanlı Tarihyazımı.*

## Introduction

The early Ottoman chronicles and other historical works produced in the first two centuries of the emirate were not great in number but they display a wide range of variety in terms of style and content. This paper aims to show different attitudes adopted by 15th century Ottoman historians in constructing an image of "us" and "others" in political and social level. How did early Ottoman writers imagine Ottoman state and society? Were they valuing ethnic and tribal affiliations above other bonds or their solidarity depended more on moral values and religious doctrines? How did they identify themselves vis-à-vis the other segments of the society or neighboring peoples?

These questions are no doubt related with many problematics which were well studied by modern Ottoman historians; for instance, the early Ottomans' "identity" question, is directly related with the question of the emergence of the Ottoman state. Therefore, prominent historians from Halil İnalçık to Cemal Kafadar and Heath Lowry dealt with that question and they provided a fair answer for the nature of early Ottoman state. These studies contributed to the understanding of the term gaza and its relation with Islamic institutions by presenting different perspectives and interpretations. Similarly, Ottomans' tribal origins, the Ottoman dynasty's genealogy, and the role of Turkish state tradition in the rise of Ottoman state were well studied by contemporary historians in recent years.

I will try to explore this "identity question" within the context of early (15<sup>th</sup> century) Ottoman historiography, which means that classical formulation of the term the "Ottoman" or "Rumi" was not yet established firmly. Since it is largely a result of efforts and works of religious, administrative and intellectual elites employed by the Ottoman state in 16th century. Therefore, 15<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman society were not yet dominated by high culture articulated by well-educated and state-employed domestic learned elites, rather it was still under the influence of traditions and institutions of the pre-Ottoman period.

So, I will try to present a survey of early Ottoman historians' attitude toward identity issues and this survey will focus on how they define the ruling elite and how much they associate themselves with the ruling elite.

Besides, I will also try to illustrate their understanding of political, religious and social issues such as how they evaluate state's role in defining religious practices, or treating non-Muslim peoples within the Ottoman borders. Modern scholars had already studied early Ottoman chronicles in order to illuminate some aspects of early ottomans' political culture, such as ethnic origin of the Ottoman dynasty.<sup>1</sup> For example, F. Emecen argues that kayı origin

<sup>1</sup> Feridun M. Emecen, *İlk Osmanlılar ve Batı Anadolu Beylikler Dünyası* (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2021); Feridun M. Emecen, "Osmanlı Tarihçiliğinin Başlangıcı: İlk Manzum Tarihler", *Türk Tarihçiliğinin Asırlık Çınarı Halil İnalçık'a Armağan*, ed. Mehmet Öz - Serhat Küçük (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2017), 105-117; Feridun M. Emecen, "Kayılar ve Osmanlılar: Sahte Bir Kimlik İnşası mı?", *Oğuzlar Dilleri, Tarihleri ve Kültürleri / 5. Uluslararası Türkîyat Araştırmaları Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, ed. Tufan Gündüz - Mikail Cengiz (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkîyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2015), 237-244; Salih Özbaran, *Bir Osmanlı Kimliği / 14.-17. yüzyıllarda Rûm / Rûmî Aidiyet ve İmgeleri* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004); Murat Cem Mengüç, "Interpreting Ottoman Identity with the Historian Neşri", *Living in the Ottoman Realm Empire and Identity, 13th to 20th Centuries*, ed. Christine Isom-Verhaeren - Kent F. Schull (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2016), 66-78; Murat Cem Mengüç, "The Türk in Aşıkpaşazâde: A Private Individual's Ottoman History", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies* XLIV (2014), 45-66; Zeynep Aycibin, "Erken Dönem Osmanlı Kaynaklarındaki 'Türk' Algısı Üzerine Yeni Bir Değerlendirme", *Abdülkadir Özcana Armağan Tarih'in Peşinde Bir Ömür*, ed. Hayrinnisa Alan vd. (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2018), 139-151; Cemal Kafadar, "A Rome of Ones Own: Reflections on Cultural Geography and Identity in the Lands of Rum", *Muqarnas Online Muqarnas Online* 24/1 (2007), 7-25; Tufan Gündüz, "Osmanlı Tarih Yazıcılığında Türk ve Türkmen İmajı", *Osmanlı*, c.7, ed. Güler Eren vd. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), 92-97; Mehmet Öz, "Kuruluşun Aşamaları: Kaynaklar ve Literatüre Eleştirel Bir Bakış", *Osmanlı Tarihi Üzerine I: Kuruluş, Kimlik ve Siyasi Düşünce* (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2019), 13-34; Mehmet Öz, "Erken Dönem Osmanlı Kroniklerinde Türk Kavramı", *Osmanlı Tarihi Üzerine I: Kuruluş, Kimlik ve Siyasi Düşünce* (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2019), 74-104; Hakan Erdem, "Osmanlı Kaynaklarından Yansıyan Türk İmaj(lar)", *Dünyada Türk İmgesi*, ed. Özlem Kumrular (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005), 13-26.

of the Ottoman dynasty was not an invention of 15<sup>th</sup> century historians as it was commonly accepted by modern scholars until recently. As archival and topographical evidences suggest, it might well be a historical reality that the Ottoman dynasty actually belonged to a branch of Kayı tribe, but it was re-remembered and propagated in 15th century after the Ankara defeat. Similarly, Zeynep Aycibin, agreeing with Emecen's findings, confirmed that early Ottoman chronicles used the term Turk interchangeably with Muslim, and they usually referred themselves and the Ottoman dynasty as Turk. Whereas this usage began to change in the 16th century, where most of the Ottoman authors observed the distinction between Turk and Muslim; they no longer used the term Turk referring to Muslim people of the empire or referring to Muslim people in the history. Murat Cem Mengüç is another contemporary historian who examined early Ottoman historiography with an emphasis on identity issues. Following Menage and İnalçık, he states that there are two rival traditions in the Ottoman historical writing, one emphasizing on Turkic character of the dynasty and prevailing among Turkish speaking ordinary people. The other tradition emphasizes on Islamic values or Persian literary tradition in eulogizing Ottoman dynasty as an ideal, ruler-oriented state and it does not stress on Turkic character of the dynasty. Following Jean Jacques Rousseau's term "private individual", Mengüç argues that Âşıkpaşazâde's case fits to the emergence of individuals who owns a considerable size of private property and who seeks his own political ends by negotiating power with the sovereign. In that case, Âşıkpaşazâde's history can be regarded as a means to reach that end and it uses and enhances the first tradition in early ottoman historiography, together with Anonymous Chronicles and Yazıcızâde's chronicle. Lastly, Salih Özbaran focused on usage of the term "Rumi" in Ottoman historical and literary texts and he argued that the Ottoman administrative and intellectual elites preferred to call themselves as "Rumi" instead of Turk and by that, they did not simply mean Muslim, Turkish speaking people living in Anatolia. For Özbaran, "Rumi" identity was not limited with Anatolia and it was not limited with Turkish speaking Muslim people; it included all of the peoples and religions of the empire which was inherited from the Roman Empire.

We will examine those 15<sup>th</sup> century sources of the Ottoman history within that context:

Ahmedî, *İskendernâme*, written between 1390 and 1410.<sup>2</sup>

Yazıcızâde Ali, *Tevârih-i Al-i Selçuk*, written in 1424 or in 1436.<sup>3</sup>

Şükrullah, *Behçetü't-Tevârih*, written in 1459.<sup>4</sup>

Karamânî Nişancı Mehmed Paşa, *Risale*, in 1480.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Ahmedî, *İskendernâme (inceleme-tenkitli metin)*, ed. Yaşar Akdoğan - Nalan Kutsal (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2019); Salih Demirbilek, *Ahmedî'nin İskendernâme Adlı Eseri Üzerine İnceleme* (Edirne: Trakya Üniversitesi, Unpublished Dissertation, 2000); Caroline G. Sawyer, *Alexander, History and Piety A Study of Ahmedî's 14th Century Ottoman İskendernâme* (Columbia University, Unpublished Dissertation, 1997).

<sup>3</sup> Yazıcızâde Ali, *Tevârih-i Al-i Selçuk (Oğuzname-Selçuklu Tarihi)*, ed. Abdullah Bakır (İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2017).

<sup>4</sup> Şükrullah, "Behçetü't-tevarih", *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, ed. Nihal Atsız (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1949), 37-76; Şükrullah Efendi, *Behçetü't tevarih: tarihin aydınlığında* (İstanbul : Mostar, 2013).

<sup>5</sup> Karamani Mehmed Paşa, "Tevarihu's-Selatinî'l-Osmaniyye", çev. Konyalı İbrahim Hakkı, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, ed. Nihal Atsız (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1949), 322-369.

Aşıkpaşazâde, *Kitâb-i Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, written between 1484 and 1502.<sup>6</sup>

Anonymous, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, written between 1495 and 1510.<sup>7</sup>

### Ahmedî's *İskendernâme*

Ahmedî's work *İskendernâme* is the earliest and the most important work reflecting the nature of the cultural environment in early Ottoman Anatolia. It's subject and content is largely derived from earlier Persian examples composed in verse like Firdevsî's (d.1020) *Şehnâme* and Nizamî's (d.1214) *İskendernâme*. But it is not merely a translation of earlier works, Ahmedî (d.1413) inserted religious, philosophical, political and historical subjects into his work and he ended up with a monumental encyclopedic volume. Ahmedî's work did not only transfer Persian-Islamic cultural heritage into Anatolian Turkish culture, it also presented a synthesis of Arab and Islamic culture with pre-Islamic Persian and Hellenistic cultural tradition in the example of Alexander the Great. It is well known that Firdevsî portrayed Alexander the Great in his *Şehnâme* as the last ruler of the Persian Keyani dynasty, son of Darius.<sup>8</sup> Two centuries later, Nizami attempted to combine Islamic and Persian tradition in his *İskendernâme*, equating Alexander the Great with prophetic figure *Zulqarneyn* as mentioned in the holy Qoran. Ahmedî followed Nizami's path going even further by adding stories about Alexander the Great and Hızır, the legendary immortal figure of Turkic-Islamic tradition.<sup>9</sup> For Ahmedî, Alexander the Great was the ancient ruler of the *land of Rum*, therefore, reading about Alexander's deeds also meant learning about distant history of their country.

We should keep in mind that *İskendernâme* is not just a chronicle, or a history work, it has a greater purpose of providing answers for essential questions such as the meaning of life, death and fate. We can safely argue that Ahmedî's work became quite popular in 15<sup>th</sup> century Anatolia by looking at extant manuscript copies, and some of them were illustrated copies, suggesting that they were crafted for the palace.

Ahmedî's *İskendernâme* treats Ottoman history as a part of global history of mankind. Furthermore, Ahmedî makes it clear that just like the prophet of Islam who is superior to earlier prophets due to becoming the last one, the Ottoman dynasty is superior to other dynasties that ruled in the world in the past, such as Chingisids or Ilkhanids etc. By doing so, he stresses on universality of the Ottoman sovereignty in the sense that their right to rule depends on God's will and their observance of justice, so their sovereignty is superior and more justifiable than those earlier dynasties such as Chingisids or Timurids. Ahmedî does not stress on the Ottoman dynasty's noble genealogy, though he vaguely refers to Ottomans' Oguz lineage. Instead, Ahmedî's views on the legitimacy of the rulers becomes apparent in

<sup>6</sup> Aşıkpaşaoğlu Ahmed Aşıkî, "Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman", *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, ed. Nihal Atsız Çiftçioglu (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1949), 79-319; Aşıkpaşazâde, *Aşıkpaşazâde Tarihi [Osmanlı tarihi (1285-1502)]*, ed. Necdet Öztürk (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2013).

<sup>7</sup> Anonim, *Anonim tevarih-i Al-i Osman -F. Giese neşri-*, çev. Nihat Azamat (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1992); Necdet Öztürk, *Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği* (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2015).

<sup>8</sup> Demirbilek, *Ahmedî'nin İskendernâme Adlı Eseri Üzerine İnceleme*, 13.

<sup>9</sup> Sawyer, *Alexander, History and Piety A Study of Ahmedî's 14th Century Ottoman İskendernâme*, 34.

a dialogue between Alexander the Great and Darius. According to *Iskendername*, Alexander replaced his grandfather Feylokos (Philip) as a local ruler upon his death, who was a vassal of the Persian ruler Darius (Darius I). So, when Alexander decided to conquer East, he was actually rebelling against his suzerain and his step brother. So, Darius II argued with Alexander over legitimate ownership of the country before going into war. Darius' claim was based on two important principles: first, land of Rum was conquered by sword, and second, he inherited it from his ancestors. That claim was rejected by Alexander on the grounds that real owner of everything in this world is God Almighty and he distributes wealth and kingship whomever he wishes. Secondly, it is more plausible to lay claim on things with one's own merits rather than his already dead ancestors' achievements.

1045. Bu ki şeh der kim kılıcumuzla Rûm  
Alnup oldu bizüm ol merzibûm
1046. Hâlıkûndur mülk anı\_ol pâdişâh  
Kime kim diler virüp eyleye şâh
1047. Mülk anuñdur Mâlikü'l-Mülk Ol hemîn  
Hîcdür Dârâb u İskender yakîn  
(...)
1050. Dahı şeh didi ki bize tâc u taht  
Degdi Keyhüsrevden ü hem mülk ü baht
1051. Taht Keyhüsrevden irdi-y-ise\_aña  
Şükkr kim Hakdan virildi uş baña
1052. **Mülk mi ol ki\_anı Keyhüsrev vire**  
**Mülk ol kim kişiye Hakdan ere**

Here, it is noteworthy that Ahmedî's Alexander never attempts to lay claim on the throne of Rum due to his hereditary rights since he was the grandson of King Feylekos and son of Darius I. Instead, he stresses on divine grace and the text make it clear that Alexander's right to rule is not limited with the land of Rum but it also covers the other countries conquered by him such as Syria, Egypt, Persia, Asia, China, India and Africa.

So, the first principle that Ahmedî reminds us is the divine origin of rulership, which also means that to become a universal ruler one does not need to have hereditary rights or a noble lineage. The second principle that Ahmedî clarifies in his versed narrative is that Alexander's fortune to be a universal ruler does not impose on other people religious or ethical liability to obey his rule; people would prefer to obey him if they are smart enough to see that it is for their own benefit. If they obey him, they collect the benefits of this obedience by becoming partners in Alexander's fortune:

2018. Her ki girmeye anuñ fermânına  
Kasd itmiş ola kendü cânına
2019. Her kime k'ide inâyet Zü'l-Celâl  
Aña isyân iden olur pâyimâl



However, it is certain that nothing is permanent in this world and especially rulership is bound to be temporary:

1987. Nevbet-iledür cihânda saltanat  
Kimseye dâim virilmez memleket

The third principle and the moral of the story is given at the end of the work: everyone seeks glory and eternal life, Alexander the Great was the most successful figure in the world but even he could not get eternal life (*ab-ı hayat*) after a long struggle looking for it. His son, İskenderus b. İskender realized that even if you rule a thousand year in this world it means nothing compared to the eternal life. So, he preferred to live a simple and pious life, which eventually caused disorder among the people due to competing city rulers who proclaimed themselves as kings and attacked each other's kingdom.

In short, for Ahmedî, the real *ab-ı hayat* is knowledge and if one seeks eternal life, he should seek knowledge, and pursue a virtuous life free from greed, worldly pleasures and lust.

8262. İlm-durur dedüğüm Âb-ı Hayât  
Kî'anı bulan nefse irişmez memât  
8263. İlm ehli zinde-i câvid olur  
Câhil olan ayşdan nev-mîd olur  
8264. Ger meselde ne-durur dirseñ gürâz  
Ol degüldür hergiz illâ hırs u âz

Within that context, though universal sovereignty is a sign of God's favor, Ahmedî does not consider rulership as a great success in itself, as it is expressed in the case of Chingis Han. As Ahmedî described, Chingis Han was a merciless infidel but his rule covered all of the world and he divided it among his sons; Berke was the sultan of Turks and Hulagu inherited Iran:

6680. Oğlunuñ biri Çağâtâ Hân-ıdı  
Biri dahı Berke Türk sultân-ıdı<sup>10</sup>  
6681. Biri Kıpçak-ıdı sorarsañ be-nâm  
Virdi bu illeri anlara temâm

<sup>10</sup> Berke was the third son of Coci and grandson of Cingiz Khan, he was the ruler of Altın Orda (Golden Horde) between 1256 and 1266.

6682. **Kâfir-i bi-rahm-ıdı Çingiz Hân**

**Likin oldı devleti böyle ayân**

6683. Verdi İrânı Hülâgûya temâm<sup>11</sup>

Uydılar nâ-çâr aña hâs u âm

Ahmedî's work focuses on the land of Rum and Iran as the two principal geographic units and it also emphasizes two imperial tradition or two universal rulers Alexander and Chingis in the context of world history. Feridun Emecen had already pointed out that we see Ottoman's claim for universal rulership expressed in literary works such as Ahmed-i Dai's Divan or Abdülvasi Çelebi's Halilname in the early 15<sup>th</sup> century, when the Ottomans were still suffering from defeat in Ankara battle.<sup>12</sup> Ahmedî's İskendernâme exhibits that universal rulership idea as well, and it seems that it was very familiar concept for Anatolian Muslim people who witnessed and shared a similar political culture with peoples of Iran especially after the Mongol invasion. Universal leadership idea can also be regarded as a popular literary theme in the Persianate poetic tradition dealing with political world history. Ahmedî narrates the history of the Ottoman dynasty within that context juxtaposing it with the rule of infidel Mongol rule and he strongly emphasizes Islamic themes such as gaza, piety, generosity and justice in eulogizing the Ottoman sultans.

Ahmedî's work emphasizes on self-creating heroic characters such as Alexander the Great and Chinghis Han and it never stress on the Turkic or Rumi character of the people living, or soldiers fighting under the banner of Ottomans. He sometimes uses simply "halk" (people), and sometimes muslims, *ehl-i din* and *ehl-i ilm* to describe ordinary people. And for the military elite, Ahmedî calls them sometimes as "kişi" person or he refers them as *leşker* or *leşker-i İslam*:

7125. Uydu anda çoh kişi Ertugrula

Oldur iş kim dâniş-ile togrula

7126. Ol gelenlerle gönül berkitdi ol

Hak yolına canını terk etdi ol.

While describing the struggle between the Ottomans and Karamans, Ahmedî states that Tatar tribes and Turkoman tribes such as Varsak, Turgud, Türk, Rum and Şam were among the soldiers of Karamanids, whereas Gazi Murad were alone in that campaign and he succeeded in defeating "Turk and Tatar".<sup>13</sup> *İskendernâme* emphasizes on sincerity of the Ottoman dynasty and attributes their achievements to their sincere endeavor in searching for God's favor. As a result, he states, the Ottomans achieved conquering many lands and cities from

<sup>11</sup> Hulagu was Cingiz Khan's grandson, and he was the founder and first ruler of Ilkhanids (1256-1265). His father Toluy was Cingiz Khan's youngest son, and his brother Möngke was the fourth great khan of the Mongols, who entrusted Hulagu with the conquest of Iran and Baghdad.

<sup>12</sup> Emecen, "Osmanlı Tarihçiliğinin Başlangıcı: İlk Manzum Tarihler", 107-111.

<sup>13</sup> 7245. *Hem Tatar hem Türk olıban telef / Kılıcına oldılar anuñ alef.*

the infidels that no other dynasty in the history of Islam has ever reached.<sup>14</sup> Ahmedî also praises Bayezid's aggressive expansion campaigns over other Turkish principalities stating that thanks to the just administration of the Sultan whole Rum country prospered and all the people enjoyed benefits of the Ottoman administration.<sup>15</sup>

## Yazıcızâde Ali and Tevârih-i Al-i Selçuk

Ahmedî's Islamic, sedentary and Persianate view is not shared by all early 15th century Ottoman intellectuals; Yazıcızâde Ali who authored a lengthy work probably in 1424 on the history of Rum Seljukids; entitled *Tevârih-i Al-i Selçuk*. Yazıcızâde Ali did not provide an account of the Ottoman history in his work but like Ahmedî, he presented his view on the nature of the early Ottoman state.

Unlike Ahmedî, Yazıcızâde Ali emphasized on the role of Turkoman-Oguz tradition played in the formation of the Ottoman principality and he portrayed the Ottomans as a continuation of the Seljukids. Yazıcızâde begins his works with a brief account of world history and geography, explaining the origin of the Turkic tribes and their relation to each other. According to this account, Turkic peoples were descendants of Prophet Noah's son Yafes, who originally inherited land of Turkistan to be base of his conquests of other countries such as China, India, İnan Zemin, Rum, Damascus and Egypt.<sup>16</sup> For Yazıcızâde, Turkic tribes shared the same lineage with the Mongol tribes, but some Turkic tribes chose to convert into Islam and they came to be known as Oguz, whereas those who did not accept Islamic faith were known as Mongol tribes.<sup>17</sup>

Yazıcızâde states that Oguz and Turkoman are synonymous terms referring to the same nomadic people, and the founder of the dynasty Osman Bey had recommended his son to maintain a nomadic way of life since it was the source of their power: "Merhum Kara Osman dahi, dayım bu ögüdi oğlanlarına virür imiş: "Olmasun ki oturak olasız ki beglik Turkmanlık ve yürüklik idenlerde kalur" dir imiş." (s.25)<sup>18</sup> Then, Yazıcızâde explains how an efficient state organization is achieved by building upon the nomadic, tribal hierarchical relations. Thus, he also hints that the ottoman state was in fact a commonwealth of the Oguz tribes. For Yazıcızâde, Osman Beg was elected as the sultan of the Oguz people according to the Oguz customary law by other tribal leaders thanks to two reasons: his lineage to Kayı tribe and his rank in the service of the late Seljukid Sultan Kaykubad.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>14</sup> 7302. *Âl-i Osmânuñ çün ihlâsı oldı hâs / Buldılar Hak Hazretinde ihtisâs / Kanda vardılar-ısa yol buldılar / İller alup halka gâlib oldılar. (...)* 7305. *Ey tevârihi bilen kişi ayân / Bilür-iseñ eylegil baña beyân / Kim kopalıdan Muhammed ümmeti / Kim olar-durur Halilüñ mülleti / Farz olalı bu halk üzre cihâd / Bularuñ bigi kim etdi icitihâd / 7308. Kâfir elinden bu mıkdar il ü şehır / Aluban kıldı mülükün cümle kahr.*

<sup>15</sup> 7345. *Komadı ol yörede şehır ü diyâr / Kamusını feth itdi ol nâm-dâr / Geldi dâru'l-mülke vü oturdı şâd / Memleketde kıldı gâyet adlı dâd / Halk ol adlı çünki andan buldılar / Ulu kiçi işe meşgul oldılar / Bu kamu Rüm içre bir yer kalmadı / Kim anuñ adlı-y-le ma'mûr olmadı.*

<sup>16</sup> "Yafes zürriyyatına Türkistan iklimini yir ve yurt virdi ki, anda çoğalup andan çıkup kalan iklimlere dahi padişah olup gaza ve cihad kılalar." Yazıcızâde Ali, *Tevârih-i Al-i Selçuk* (Oğuzname-Selçuklu Tarihi), 3.

<sup>17</sup> *Anlar ki Oguz'la müttefik oldılar, müvahhid olup Tengri'yi bir bildiler; anlar ki ittifak itmeyüp Oguz'a uymadılar, kafir oldılar, adları Mogol ve Tatar oldu.* s.5.

<sup>18</sup> See also 751, stating that history shows us that it was nomadic people who always rised for power and founded new kingdoms.

<sup>19</sup> "Kayıdan Ertugrul oğlu Osman Beg'i ucdığı Türk begleri dirilip kuriltay idüp Oguz Töresin sorışup han dikdiler" p.713

Yazıcızâde reminds his readers that Osman Beg's enthronement was arranged according to Oguz tradition and Oguz ceremonial gestures were not all forgotten during that time as it was in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. It is noteworthy that Yazıcızâde explains Osman Beg's ascension to throne as a consequence of Tatar invasion of Anatolia and collapse of Seljukid power, but he does not take a stand against Ilkhanids. For instance, he narrates Ilkhanids – Mamluk wars of 1299 from a perspective of Ilkhanids, stating how Ghazan Han –the padişah of Islam- asked for permission or fetva from the learned man to launch a campaign against a Muslim power who committed crimes against innocent Muslim peoples living under the rule of Ilkhanids.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, Yazıcızâde does not use a negative tone for Timurids or Karamanids in his work.

Yazıcızâde concludes his work by inserting a long story about Gazneli Mahmud and indicating its similarity to the events witnessed in Osman's Beg's time. Story tells that Mahmud was only a little boy when a group of Hindu learned men from the oldest temple in the city of Sumenat paid a visit for Mahmud's father, Sebuktegin in Gazni. They have presented very generous gifts and they asked only for a letter of immunity in return, which grants them freedom of religion when the city of Sumenat would fall into the hands of prince Mahmud in the future. As skilled astrologers, they had foreseen the future of their city a decade earlier. Accepting gifts, Prince Mahmud granted their wishes, but many years later, events developed in a way that their sacred idol were broken into pieces at the hands of Mahmud's soldiers revealing a rich treasure hidden inside. Anyway, Yazıcızâde concludes his work by stating that Christian monks from monastery of Margarit in the city of Siroz paid a similar visit to Osman Gazi before the conquest of Bursa. Bringing gold and silver, they asked for some legal and financial privileges because they had already foreseen Osman's rising star from Söğüt by observing sky.

The moral of the story is that Osman's rulership was predetermined and experts of astrology had foreseen it before the conquest of Bursa.

So, Yazıcızâde disagrees with Ahmedî on a number of issues such as role of Oguz traditions or Turkoman tribes in the formation of Ottoman state but both of them agree on one thing that the rise of Osman was written in the stars.

## **Şükrullah and *Behçetu't-Tevârih***

Şükrullah (d. after 1464) is another noteworthy historian of the 15<sup>th</sup> century whose world history *Behçetu't-Tevârih* (written in 1459) deals with the history of the Ottoman dynasty in the last chapter. *Behçetu't-Tevârih* is written in Persian and it resembles Ahmedî's *İskendername* in style and in content but it presents a more detailed account of the Ottoman and world history. Ahmedî and Şükrullah both concentrates on piety, generosity and justice of the Ottoman sultans, they indicate noble Oguz genealogy of the Ottoman dynasty but they portray Ottoman sultans as sultan of gazis or padişah of Islam, rather than Han of Oguz tribes.

<sup>20</sup> ibid, p. 715.

As I have mentioned above, Ahmedî seems to narrate the story of Alexander and history of Rum as if it is a part of their own story, whereas Şükrullah's chapter on various Turkic tribes or on peoples of Rum places a chronological or geographical distance between the reader and the subject. Şükrullah designed Behcetu't-Tevârih to be an encyclopedic resource for every Muslim interested in the creation of world and heavens, history of prophets, geography, astronomy, Islamic history, religious sciences and biographical information for prominent scholars of each Islamic discipline; *fiqh*, *hadis* and *kelam*. For the Ottoman history, Şükrullah follows a stereotypical description of the Ottoman sultans stressing on their justice, piety, sincerity, generosity and respect for learned people.

He singles out Ottoman sultans in their heroic endeavor to construct the Ottoman principality and avoids mentioning other significant figures who contributed to the development of the state. Within that context, for instance, he does not describe election of Bayezid I by army commanders after the death of Murad I in Kosova battle, or execution of Bayezid's brother, Yakub Çelebi. Similarly, Yıldırım Bayezid or Süleyman Çelebi died a natural death in Şükrullah's account, and he did not mention at all about İsa Çelebi's struggle for throne and his death at the hands of his brother.

Like Ahmedî, Şükrullah portrays sultans as self-creating heroes; their personal qualities and achievements are the sole reason for Ottoman power and each sultan ascended to the throne by his own fortune and capabilities, not by the consent and support of other commanders. Ertuğrul was appointed as a frontier commander by the Seljukid sultan Alaaddin and when Ertuğrul died, the same sultan appointed his son Osman to the same post with more power by granting him ceremonial objects like *tuğ*, *davul*, *kılıç* and *kaftan*.<sup>21</sup> Like Ahmedî, Şükrullah presents Ottoman sultans and his soldiers as warriors of Islam and he maintains this sharp distinction between Muslim and infidel as if there is constant war between the two. And when it comes to explain wars with other Anatolian Muslim principalities, Şükrullah states that defending Muslim people against external attacks is even more important than expanding Islam's borders. Like Ahmedî, he emphasizes that Karamanoğlu gathered forces from Tatar, Türkmen and Varsak but Sultan Murad asked only for God's help, and he won the battle. About Ankara defeat, once more Şükrullah distorts historical reality and blames Tatar and infidel soldiers, stating that Tatar soldiers switched sides and infidel soldiers escaped the battlefield.

## Karamânî Mehmed Paşa

Karamânî Mehmed Pasha (d.1481) wrote his work on Ottoman history in Arabic during the reign of Mehmed II. His work shares similar perspective with Şükrullah's Behcetu't-Tevârih and Ahmedî's İskendernâme; he idealizes Ottoman sultans and relates everything good over the land of Rum to their auspicious presence.<sup>22</sup> Being a descendant of famous Sufi Mevlânâ Celâleddin Rûmî, Karamânî Mehmed Paşa served for 14 years as the head of Ottoman chancellery which eventually led him to the highest post; grandvizirate in 1478. He contributed to the formation of Ottoman central administration during the time of

<sup>21</sup> Şükrullah Efendi, *Behcetu't tevarih: tarihin aydınlığında*, 377-379.

<sup>22</sup> "Geniş sınırlı ülkenin içinde bir iyilik ve olgunluk yoktur ki ondan taşmış ve yayılmış olmasın." Karamani Mehmed Paşa, "Tevarihu's-Selatini'l-Osmaniyye", 349.

Mehmed II especially by his services in the codification of Ottoman laws. However, he did not express his contributions or anyone else's contributions to the construction of Ottoman administration in his work. His work aims to demonstrate Ottoman dynasty's hereditary and legitimate right to rule by enumerating achievements of the sultans which Karamânî reads as a sign of divine approval. Karamânî follows Şükrullah's account in stating that Seljukid Sultan Alaaddin Keykubad had appointed Ertuğrul as a leader of Ghazis and upon Ertuğrul's death Osman Bey enjoyed even higher rank granted from the Seljukid sultan.

Karamânî Mehmed's work includes earliest account of famous dream story and it is a little bit different from later accounts. In that version, it was Ertuğrul not Osman who had seen the dream and it did not end with a marriage with Sheyh Edebalî's daughter. Ertuğrul is hosted by a certain faqîh and he does not sleep during the night out of respect for the Holy Qoran. At the end of night, he falls asleep and learns that he and his line will be exalted in this world as a reward for his respect for the Holy Book.<sup>23</sup>

Karamânî Mehmed Pasha indicates Oguz lineage of the Ottoman dynasty in a number of places but he does not ascribe it much significance. For Karamânî, it was Oguz descent that was honored by Ottoman dynasty's conquests and achievements not the other way around. And the most important of these achievements are; being the leader of ghaza, building mosques, madrasas, tekkes and imarets, being a center for learned men and defending *ehl-i sunnet* creed in the Muslim world, cleansing the land of Rum from heresy. Karamânî does not try to explain reasons for defeat in the Ankara battle or sources of conflict and hostility with other Muslim powers like Karamanids and Akkoyunlu. But he describes them as Turkmen without feeling any sympathy or affinity and he uses the term Turkmen for Karamanids, Karakoyunlus or Akkoyunlus and once for Uzun Hasan himself. He sometimes uses expressions like army of Rum, or country of Rum but mostly he uses "gazîs" or "soldiers of Islam" (*leşker-i İslam*) to refer to the Ottoman side. He carefully observes a distinction between the sultan and his servants or soldiers and he associate state only with the Ottoman sultan and dynasty, not with any group of officials or supporters.

## Aşıkpaşazâde, Kitâb-i Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman

Âşıkpaşazâde takes a stance just in the opposite of Karamânî Mehmed Pasha in his *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman* which was written in the reign of Bayezid II probably in 1495. He harshly criticized Karamânî Mehmed Pasha for inventing unheard, unjust ways to find new financial resources for state treasury. But a more fundamental distinction between the two authors lies in their interpretation of the Ottoman history.

Unlike Karamânî Mehmed, Âşıkpaşazâde tries to demonstrate that the Ottoman success was a result of collective efforts of many people, who can be categorized under four headings: gâziyân-ı Rum, abdalân-ı Rum, baciyân-ı Rum and Ahiyân-ı Rum. Âşıkpaşazâde himself can represent at least two of these groups; abdalân and gâziyân and he tries to demonstrate that these groups laid the foundation of the Ottoman state and early Ottoman sultans themselves looked like abdalân and gâziyân in their actions and life style. We can show many passages displaying this aspect of Âşıkpaşazâde's History, but I think it will

<sup>23</sup> ibid. 344.

suffice to give only a few examples since it is already a well-known subject in Ottoman historiography. For instance, Âşıkpaşazâde's account of Osman's dream gained popularity in Turkish literature and it differs from Karamânî Mehmed Pasha's text radically: Osman Bey had a vision that a moon rises from Sheyh Edebali's chest and it lands on Osman's chest. Then a big tree begins to grow up over Osman's chest and its branches cover the whole world. Osman pays a visit to Sheyh and asks for interpretation of the dream. Edebali explains it saying that you will have my daughter's hand in marriage and your descendants will rule all over the world.

Another important passage presents a detailed account of Osman's relations with the Seljukid Sultan Alaaddin and how Osman received ceremonial gifts from the Seljuk Sultan. According to Âşıkpaşazâde, it was Osman not his father who first contacted with Sultan Alaaddin and eventually Osman received recognition from the Sultan in return of his respect and loyalty. But Âşıkpaşazâde emphasize on two aspects of that ceremony, which included beating the drum: first, that it signifies Osman Bey's authorization as a leader of frontier ghazis, and secondly, it proves how the Ottomans followed sufi traditions in all their actions; since it was an Abrahamic and sufi tradition to offer food for every visitor, and beating drum also meant inviting people for meal.

Âşıkpaşazâde does not hesitate to use the term "Turk" for the Ottoman state especially when he was quoting others' phrases for the Ottoman soldiers or administration. Whereas sometimes he uses Turkoman in a pejorative sense denoting their loose sense of fidelity. His work does not include a chapter on first Ottoman-Karaman conflict where Turkoman, Tatar and Varsak allied against the Ottomans. But he explicitly describes events and betrayals during conflict with Timurid forces. Âşıkpaşazâde states that Tatars betrayed first, then every provincial military unit betrayed the Ottoman sultan and joined their old leader on the other side, then Bayezid's sons including Çelebi Mehmed left the battlefield with their soldiers. Christian forces remained loyal and they fought very well until the end. So, unlike Şükruallah, Âşıkpaşazâde does not blame only Tatars and infidels for the failure in Ankara battle. He also does not hesitate to present a detailed account of struggles between brothers during interregnum era and he describes how frontier begs played decisive role in determining the future sultan. Likewise, Âşıkpaşazâde does not hesitate to describe army commanders' effective role in Bayezid's enthronement after the death of his father in Kosova. In short, Âşıkpaşazâde's portrayal of Ottoman sultans does not fit to an idealized sultan figure empowered by the heavens, but rather looks like a humble person looking for alliances and support of local leaders and even ordinary soldiers.

## **Anonymous Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman**

Anonymous author of Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman was a contemporary of Âşıkpaşazâde and he composed his work during the reign of Bayezid II. His attitude towards Ottoman history resembles Âşıkpaşazâde's way but he relies on a number of different sources for some important issues. For instance, in the case of Osman's dream, Anonymous author states that Ertuğrul had a dream and he went to Konya seeking interpretation of a famous wise man called Abdülaziz who was respected by all including Seljukid Sultan Alaaddin. Tevârih narrates this short anecdote at the first place, then it continues with another version of the story saying some people argues that it was Şeyh Edebali who interpreted the dream. Then

he narrates the story that ends with Osman's marriage with Edebalı's daughter.

Anonymous *Tevârih* also differs from Âşıkpaşazâde's account in explaining Ottoman-Seljukid relations. It only states first part of the story saying that Ertuğrul sent his son Saruyatı as an emissary to Sultan Alaaddin asking for a place to settle. Sultan Alaaddin accepted their request and assigned them to Karahisar – Bilecik region. *Tevârih* does not include any other incident indicating that Osman received ceremonial gifts from the Seljukid Sultan authorizing his leadership among the frontier gazis. But it simply states that when Osman replaced his father many young warriors gathered around him and they have raided a lot conquering many places. As a result of these conquests, *Tevârih* adds the first Friday prayer was performed in Karahisar in 689/1290 or 699/1299 and Osman's name was pronounced in *hutbe*.<sup>24</sup>

Like Âşıkpaşazâde, Anonymous author criticized establishment of new practices and institutions serving to centralization of Ottoman administration. Within that context, he is critical of madrasa educated bureaucrats, pashas and kadıs who gained wealth and power as the Ottoman principality expanded its borders. Unlike Âşıkpaşazâde, Anonymous author's critical perspective is not limited with central administrations actions, he also narrates and criticizes examples of fierce competition among frontier commanders. For instance, according to *Tevârih*, Hacı İlbeyi's achievements sparked enmity of Lala Şahin and his entourage and they conspired against him which ended with Hacı İlbeyi's death.

*Tevârih* especially criticizes fratricide and claims that early beys had good relations with their brothers and they used to consult with each other. *Tevârih* claims that fratricide was invented during the time of Bayezid, but when we look at section on Bayezid's enthronement, *Tevârih* states that it was commanders and officials (beyler) who decided to enthrone Bayezid and kill Yakub Çelebi. Bayezid was not among the decision makers during the process. In fact, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*'s style does not place Ottoman sultans at the center of the narrative, instead, it mostly emphasizes actions of local leaders, commanders, dervishes, or central officials. It aims to collect interesting stories and anecdotes of Ottoman history. As a result of this understanding, it includes a large part on legendary history of Constantinople while it never mentions Ottoman sultan's construction projects, charitable actions etc., unlike most of other chronicles which includes at least a paragraph at the end of each section. On the other hand, *Tevârih* sometimes uses terms like Osmanlı or Karamanlı not only to denote ruler class but to refer to ordinary people living under the banner of these principalities. For instance, he criticizes Karamanoğlu population living in İstanbul quarters for five generations who still feel loyalty to Karamanoğlu. He claims that they would enjoy it if the Ottomans were defeated by infidels.

<sup>24</sup> *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman – Giese Neşri*, haz. Nihat Azamat, İstanbul, Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınevi, 1992, s.9, *Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği* haz. Necdet Öztürk, İstanbul, Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2015, s.9



## Conclusion

As a conclusion, early Ottoman historiography demonstrate a wide range of diversity in their approach to defining what is Ottoman? Those Ottoman chronicles that were composed for the palace in ornate, literary style like Ahmedî's İskendernâme, Şükrullah's Behçetüt-*Tevârih* and Karamânî's Risale show a similar attitude to limit borders of political by using the term for the Sultan himself. For them, Ottoman state was an achievement of the Ottoman dynasty and they are the source of legitimacy and well-being of every Muslim in the country. On the other hand, Yazıcızâde's work describes Ottoman state in broad terms and tries to include all Turkish (Oguz) people within that roof.

Âşıkpaşazâde aims to demonstrate that Ottoman state was founded by dervishes and dervish minded sultans and it needed to remain in that way, recognizing "Ottomanness" of these circles. On the other hand, Anonymous author of *Tevârih* widens range of the term even further by pointing out actions and achievements of middle ranked people that contributed to the foundation of the Ottoman principality and it also uses the term to denote ordinary people living willfully under the banner of Ottomans.

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## “STATE” CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA: A DECADES-BACK HISTORICAL REMINDER

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### Abstract

Corporatism as an ideology has a relatively long history. In its modern forms, however, as a particular ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the state, in particular with reference to its variety as regards, generally defined, antiliberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian states, preeminently in Latin America, it has emerged and developed mainly through the second half of the twentieth century. This paper will basically dwell on historical, theoretical, and institutional examination and evaluation of that variety of modern corporatism, which has come to be labelled, almost unanimously, as “state” corporatism, concluding with a critical assessment. This reminder, made through the mentioned studies emphasized, will reveal the rich literature on corporatism and analyze the points underlying the definition of “scattered intellectual kitchen.” As a dimension of the analysis in question, it will focus on different corporatist samples and discuss the corporatist model in Latin America with its aspects and orientations within the framework of these samples.

**Keywords:** *Corporatism, State, Authoritarianism, Latin America, Interest Representation*

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# LATİN AMERİKA'DA “DEVLET KORPORATİZMİ”: ONLARCA YIL GERİYE UZANAN BİR HATIRLATMA

## Özet

Bir ülkede toplumun önde gelen sivil çıkar gruplaşmalarını devlet/iktidar “karar-verme” yapılanmasına -değişen mekanizmalarla katılımını sağlamak üzere- bağlayan, kavramsal-kurumsal bir siyasal yapı biçimi anlamında modern “korporatizm” özellikle 20. yüzyılın son çeyreğinde, başlıca iki ayırdedici türüyle, bir yandan “liberal” bir yandan da “otoriter” siyasal sistemlerin incelenmesinde bir süre hayli rağbet gören bir model olmuştur. İşte bu yazıda, ikinci türüne örnek olarak, Latin Amerika bağlamında 1970’lerde mevcut siyasal sistemleri açıklamada siyaset bilimi çalışmalarında üzerinde bir hayli kalem oynatılmış bulunan “devlet korporatizmi”, söz konusu çalışmaların kayda değer örneklerine atıfla, konuya ilk defa aşına olacak okuyucuya tanıtıcı bir usluapta, yeniden hatırlatılacaktır. Üzerinde durulan önemli çalışmalar vasıtası ile yapılan bu hatırlatma korporatizme dair zengin literatürü ortaya koyarken, “dağınık entelektüel mutfak” tanımlamasının altında yatan noktalar analiz edilecektir. Söz konusu analizin önemli bir boyutu olarak farklı korporatist örneklemelerin üzerinde durulmakta ve bu örneklemeler çerçevesinde Latin Amerika’da korporatist model yön ve yönelimleri ile tartışılacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Korporatizm, Devlet, Otoriteryanizm, Latin Amerika, Çıkar Temsili*

## Introduction

The concept of corporatism, whose origins date back to the 13th century, is the subject of analysis involving many different states with its intellectual approaches and application forms. With the emphasis on diversity in its conceptual dimensions, corporatism, which is the subject of the definition of a "scattered intellectual kitchen," has a rich literature network including regime types, different political systems, forms of dominant ideologies, levels of political mobilization, and changing public sphere scopes. The study, which primarily aims to present the network in question and the intellectual accumulation offered by this network, includes direct quotations from authors who stand out with their critical studies on corporatism. At this point, the purpose of direct citation is to present the author's text directly to the reader while conducting the discussion on corporatism through primary sources. In this sense, the study provides the reader with analyzing intellectual debates on corporatism from primary sources.

After these discussions on the theoretical framework, the study touches on the forms of application of corporatism by states. In these examples, which focus on Scandinavian, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, West Germany, Great Britain, Austria, and the Netherlands, the ways and methods of applying the corporatist model, including liberal corporatism, are briefly mentioned. The aim of considering these examples is to refer to the corporatist forms of Latin America, which differ from the underlined model in the conspicuous examples of corporatism. The study primarily deals with these differentiating trends with the literature on Latin America and then discusses their prominent features in terms of application ways and methods. In this discussion, where Latin America stands under the heading of "decoupling from the liberal corporatist model" stands out as a critical point. However, the study aims to present rich literature on corporatism to the reader with academic studies and examples reflected in the field.

## Conceptual Framework

Corporatism as an ideology has a long history. Broadly speaking, its origins can even be stretched back to the thirteenth century, when early representative assemblies began to play a role in the governance of some European countries (Wolfe, 1974: 323-25). Its modern roots, however, should be found in the versions of the nineteenth-century social and political thought, with their reaction against the newly-emerged individualistic, competitive, conflict-ridden social and political structures. That reaction has made fashionable "the quest for organic concepts of society, or organic solutions." (Newton, 1974: 36) Accordingly, many corporatist theorists have commonly put an emphasis on unity, or better to say, on class harmony, their shared notion being that "class harmony and organic unity were essential to society and could be secured if the various functional groups –especially those of capital and labor- were imbued with a conception of mutual rights and obligations." (Panitch, 1977: 61) To put it differently; here,

"Society is seen as consisting of diverse elements unified into one body, forming one Corpus, hence the word Corporatism. These elements are united because they are reciprocally interdependent, each performs tasks which the other requires." (Marsh & Grant, 1977: 195)

Though the above notion of unity is crucial in corporatist thought, there is however some sort of 'disunity', i.e., a considerable variation in conceptual dimensions of corporatist theory. In the beginnings of the twentieth century, in particular, "there was no single coherent corporatist doctrine, nor any dominant corporatist doctrinaire. Corporatism was, rather, an untidy intellectual kitchen." (Newton, 1974: 36) As an eminent scholar has literally described so well:

"The army of corporatists is so disparate that one is led to think the word, corporation, itself is like a label placed on a whole batch of bottles which are then distributed among diverse producers each of whom fills them with the drink of his choice. The consumer has to look carefully." (Schmitter, 1974: 88)

Notwithstanding how 'disparate', as a matter of fact, when 'looking carefully', one can easily see the distinction: Schmitter's hitherto best-elaborated definition of 'corporatism' as

"A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports." (1974: 93-94)

The definition is distinct; for, defined as such, i.e., "as a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state" (Schmitter, 1974: 86), as well as "a concrete, observable, general system of interest representation," it will certainly be, in Schmitter's own words, "compatible with several different regime-types, i.e., with different party systems, varieties of ruling ideology, levels of political mobilization, varying scopes of public policy etc." (1974: 86, 92) Schmitter's analytical definition, in short, provides us "useful reference points for assessing the weighing of pluralist and corporatist structures in different contexts" (Metcalfe and McQuillan, 1979: 270). For, defined as such, corporatism will be one of several configurations of interest representation, hence, "a heuristic and logico-analytical construct composed of a considerable variety of theoretically or hypothetically interrelated components" (Schmitter, 1974: 94).

What is more, such an elaboration on corporatism has paved the way, to Schmitter, for another conspicuous conceptual contribution: the construction of two differing sub-types: one is "societal", the other "state" corporatism. He seems to have originally found this key distinction in the most classical work on corporatism by one of its earliest theorists, Mihail Manoilescu's *Le Siècle du Corporatisme*, as labeled 'corporatisme pur' and 'corporatisme subordonné', respectively. Having reiterated, expanded and discussed at some length, these two sub-types were also labeled as 'corporativismo de associação' and 'corporativismo de Estado', by Portuguese students of corporatism (Schmitter, 1974: 102-103). Besides, several other scholars specialized on modern corporatism are also observed to have distinguished between these two types, with differing labelings; to name only a few: those of an emi-



ment scholar, Winkler, as “state-dominated corporatism” and “institutionalized pluralism” (1976: 100-101); the schematization by a sociologist, Lehmbuch, as “liberal” and “statist” corporatisms, as well as the classification by another specialist, Kvatik, as “corporate” and “statist” pluralisms (see, Almond, 1983: 249-50).

In such a key distinction, societal corporatism can be observed as “a system of relatively autonomous associations whose activity and support for government constitute a major source of political legitimacy,” while state corporatism is “characterized by government penetration and control over interest associations.” (Bailey, 1977: 263) Stated differently, these two sub-types may well be differentiated in accordance with the acquisition by associations of corporatist patterns, “whether imposed by the state or grown out of the efforts of private interests to institutionalize their relationships with the state.” (Metcalfé and McQuillan, 1979: 270) Viewed statically, the sub-types in question share structural features; yet, when viewed in action, they are the products of considerably different political, social, and economic settings, hence the vehicles for varying relations of power and influence—as concisely explicated by Schmitter himself:

“Societal corporatism is found imbedded in political systems with relatively autonomous, multilayered territorial units; open, competitive electoral processes and party systems; ideologically varied, coalitionally based executive authorities—even with highly ‘layered’ or ‘pillared’ political subcultures. State corporatism tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinate to central bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed. Societal corporatism appears to be the concomitant, if not eluctable, component of the post-liberal, advanced capitalist, organized democratic welfare state; state corporatism seems to be a defining element of, if not structural necessity for, the antiliberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neo-mercantilist state.” (1974: 105)

The primary sources on corporatism also necessitate mentioning the way the concept is applied by states. At this point, different examples of corporatism will be mentioned in the following section.

## Conspicuous Examples of Corporatism\*

### i) *Scandinavian Model*

In the Scandinavian polities economic sectors, e.g., labor, employers, farming, fishing etc., are well-organized, and within each sector a centralized/bureaucratized network of interest

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\* This part of the study includes sections from the article, “Liberal Corporatism in Western Democracies Revisited: Couple of Decades Back Historical Travelling. For details please visit: Karaman, L. (2008). Revisiting ‘Liberal’ Corporatism in Western Democracies: Couple of Decades-Back Historical Travelling. *Civilacademy: Journal of Social Sciences/Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, vol.6, no.2, 137-160.

groups serves as the primary means for the improvement of sector interests; most of them moreover have the position or power to develop, and even implement, policies which are exceedingly important for them in many issue areas.

ia) *Swedish case*

In the Swedish model, to which theorists of the new corporatism frequently refer, comprehensive and/or widespread agreements between peak labor and management associations have become the primary instrument of economic planning, and collective bargaining over the relevant economic issues has been highly developed, since the "Saltsjöbaden agreement" of 1938. In accordance with this, the state appears not to interfere the just-mentioned collaboration formally. However, information coming from the government on the economic situation as well as on desirable outcomes is taken into consideration in the process of bargaining (Lehmbruch, 1977: 107-08; Anderson, 1977: 150-51). Justification for that specific bargaining approach concerning economic (especially incomes) policies rests on two facts: first of all, it is generated by a process of deliberation among functional associations; on the other hand, it meets certain explicit criteria of public purpose, such as full employment and equal pay for equal work.

A more multi-partite form of corporatism is also seen as established in Sweden. There, some theorists draw attention to the fact that various interest organizations are integrated into the "Royal commissions" by a process called 'remiss-ytranden'. In accordance with this, major organized associations are invited to give their own opinions as soon as an issue is initiated. It should not be forgotten, however, that this practice largely takes place at the formulation phase of policy-making; it does not inevitably mean that those organizations also have definite influence in the implementation phase (Nedelmann and Meier, 1977: 47 ff.).

ib) *Norway's pattern*

In Norway the new corporatism appears to take a distinguishable form. Monopolization of distinct issue areas by the networks of interest groups is widely recognized; it is obviously seen that the articulation, modification, and even formation of several public policies have been increasingly left to a functional elite, namely, the leadership cadres of those groups. The interaction between the government and those groups is realized in an extensive network of committees, since that network is regarded as "the central decision-making arena which works with a 'technicalized' procedure." The corporate arrangement in the Norwegian model is largely institutionalized through the just-mentioned pattern (Kvavik, 1974: 115-16).

Under a closer look into the above model, the incorporation of all recognized interests is seen to have been achieved in more than one way: 1) "Remiss" system: as in the case of Sweden, it is that of submission by an organization a written evaluation in response to the invitation by a pertinent administrative department; the written response mentioned here is about a certain policy issue put forward newly. This system thus helps, in effect, to incorporate almost all the relevant organizations in to the decision-making process. 2) Committees: Access to policy-making by many a group is indeed provided by means of direct participation in specified administrative committees which formulate important policies. 3) Delegation of public responsibility to private organizations: This particular practice

is common in farming and fishing; e.g., in the case of the former, an organization called 'Landbruketsentralforbund' implements the details of the contract between the government and the association which represents the farming sector (Kvavik, 1974: passim).

The development of the above model in Norway in time, has in fact brought about some noticeable changes. Concisely put, these are: a) the lessening of interest group activity directly in connection with political parties and the legislature; b) the change in organizational and leadership structure, i.e., the increasing salience of technically-trained bureaucratic representatives as the spokesmen of relevant organizations (Kvavik, 1974: 99-102). Broadly speaking, 'travelling' beyond the borders of Norway, such changes turn out to be the inevitable consequences of the new corporatist experiment in industrial democratic countries.

ic) *Danish version*

In the Danish political system, "public committees" are to be seen as the prominent establishment for integrating interest groups with the state. Three interrelated aspects pertaining to those committees are worth-noticing: 1) First of all, these committees help interest groups to incorporate into the corporatist mechanism whenever issues concerned with the groups are to be decided; 2) integration here means that of actors; a lot of different actors from within interest groups as well as administrative and political bodies come together and bargain with each other regularly by way of those committees; 3) committees are set up for almost every area of public policy-making; thus, the groups incorporated have occasion to participate in all phases of policy-making (Johansen and Kristensen, 1978: 8-9).

Another noticeable feature of the Danish model is that, though the main focus of the corporatist structure is again on the functional representation of private interests, several other categories of interests also play an important role in the process, such as 'local interests' (of municipalities and/or counties) and 'institutional interests' (through representation of public institutions like hospitals, universities, social welfare agencies etc.). In addition to the representatives of the above-mentioned interests, bureaucrats from the central civil service, politicians from parties and/or parliament, and the relevant experts are the major membership categories in the committees in question (Johansen and Kristensen, 1978: 13).

As to which policy areas are the most appropriate for the incorporation of groups by the committees, the corporatist practice in Denmark is widely observed in relation with first of all in the areas involving 'specific regulation' (namely, those of agriculture, labor, commerce and so on) and secondly in the policy areas dealing with public services. Since the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, the committee system specific to the Danish model has grown concomitantly with the growth of the public sector, depending in the meantime on the increasing influence by that sector on the members of the organizations as well as the economy in general (Johansen and Kristensen, 1978: 16-20).

ii) *The case in West Germany*

In the liberal democratic Western part of Germany, before the 1990 reunion, concentration on (the state and interest groups) cooperation concerning income policies began in 1964 by the creation of a 'Council of Economic Experts', which would present the government opinions upon the macro-economic issues in general. The Council soon began to plead for

a concertation by establishing "a relationship of trust" among autonomous groups. Eventually, since the early 1970s, 'Konzertierte Aktion' has been evolved into the pattern of regular meeting, several times a year, with various economic organizations and presided by the Federal Minister of Economy. There, the role of government is an active and leading one, the organizational representation of interests is broadened. By comparison, the Aktion seems to lack some aspects of the typical new corporatist mechanism; besides, influence of the groups is not high enough, in that it does not reach much the stage of decision-making. The Aktion is actually perceived more as an instrument of the government. Despite its deficiencies as such, however, it has in practice been apparently useful for crisis management. Apart from the practice by the Aktion, corporatism manifests also an embryonic variety in the field of labor relations: the long-applied pattern of worker-management collaboration at industry-level decision-making, namely, 'codetermination', has its roots in the tradition of German political thought (Lehmbruch, 1977: 104-07).

In Germany, on the other hand, there exists an interesting institutional practice in the Parliament of the free state of Bavaria. In that bi-cameral parliament, the lower chamber, Landtag, elects the minister-president and approves his cabinet. Despite its strong position, however, Landtag is to share its legislative authority with the Senate. It is this Senate which is constituted in a corporate fashion in such a form that varying functional (social, economic, cultural, even religious) interests emitted out of the Bavarian society thus receive opportunity to be represented. Each senator is in fact elected by his/her organization as a spokesman of each group of interest. Through its diffuse composition, the Senate provides a balance of group interests in an informal sense. The major legislative rights of the Senate members are those of initiation, consultation, review, and/or investigation through hearings. In the process of turning a bill into a law, accordingly, they offer expert advice in the form of recommendations for the perfection of the legislation. The Bavarian Senate, in conclusion, serves as an effort to adapt a 'mode of representation' (originating in the past of the country) to the needs of a modern, heterogeneous society. It assertedly stands as a token for the recognition of the need to institutionalize the participation of diffuse groups in the political process, or of the increasing role of functional representation in the post-industrial western societal milieu (Wolfe, 1974: 330-35, 338-40).

### iii) *Great Britain's Distinction*

The case of Great Britain has some distinction for a relatively substantial debate exists as to whether it obviously has the new corporatist structure or not. Nonetheless, despite the adversarial nature of party politics in Britain, it is observed that both the Labor and the Conservative governments have found themselves compelled to adopt corporatist solutions, following the end of the World War II, for in the period followed social integration and unity among several interests were exceedingly needed. Accordingly, concentration on indicative planning in particular has involved the major interest groups in tripartite discussion through a new body set up in the beginning of the 1960s, to be called as NEDC (National Economic Development Council). It is this emergent 'tripartism' at the national level between the government and the peak industrial associations -TUC (Trade Unions Congress) and CBI (Confederation of British Industry)- in the evolution of economic and industrial policy that might be asserted to have been a close identity with the new corporatist model (1). It should be added, however, that the British tripartism does not approximate the close and regular collaboration in all phases of economic policy-making as is in that of

the typical new corporatism. The British government has at times concluded agreements with the TUC and CBI to restrain wage and price increases in return for specific policy concessions; yet such concertation has turned out to be short-run responses to particular crises and relevant policy problems. It has not been transformed into a well-institutionalized system of economic management. Therefore, the British government is seen to have often preferred to deal with the two sides of the industry separately, rather than together, as in the case of the Social Contract (2).

It is contended, by way of conclusion, that defensively strong but undisciplined and fragmented trade unions –as in the case of Britain- can hamper the functioning development of corporatist processes. The rationale for this argument is the fact that there exist severe ‘intra-class’ obstacles to the establishment of viable corporatist structures, for the successful institutionalization of new corporatism involves the prevalence of disciplined and hierarchically-structured unions (3).

#### iv) *Austria's Difference*

The case of Austria presents a noticeable example which has considerably been described as having “a prototype of neo-corporatism, [earlier] after having been a prototype of ideologically fragmented political system.” (Lehmbruch, 1977: 112-13)

Since the ends of 1940s a process of organizational concertation has emerged within Austria. Motivational residues from a period of intense segmentation and hostility among rival subcultures have indeed given way to viable corporatist practices. The relevant elaborate system which has been working regularly, namely, ‘Sozialpartnerschaft’, is of salience for political coordination as it has agreedly contributed to successful public policies (Lehmbruch, 1983: 158-60).

The cooperation/collaboration thus established from 1948 onward with trade unions and business organizations with a view to arranging wages and prices, was later turned into a more formal and/or institutionalized one, with the establishment of ‘Paritätische Kommission’ (Joint Commission on wages and prices) in 1957. Within its structure organized labor is seen to have been granted the same number of seats as business and agriculture together have been. In the formal conventions of the Kommission, as a rule, Federal Chancellor (or, the Minister of the Interior) has presided over; at times certain other ministers have also attended. Nonetheless, characteristically since the end of the then-coalition government in 1966, those official representatives have been sitting as advisors only, not being dominant over its actual functioning. Since that time, as a matter of fact, several important decisions by the Kommission have been made without even actual participation of the governmental members. This is such a considerably important point that indicates obviously to the increase in the autonomy by the relevant interest groups in the bargaining process as well as to the decrease in the role of the state (Lehmbruch, 1977: 101-04).

#### v) *Salience of the Model in the Netherlands*

It is not incorrect indeed to say that relatively the most salient institutionalization of the new corporatist pattern can be found in the Netherlands. In 1945 “the Foundation of Labor” was first created, with the agreement by the respective organizations of labor and em-

ployers, as a private institution, recognized by the government. Its designated task would be giving expert opinions on all problems related with industrial relations, including primarily wage policies. As a more concrete step in the process of corporatist structuring, in 1950, ‘Sociaal Economische Raad’ (the Social Economic Council) was established by law. This is in fact a tripartite board comprising 15 representatives from labor, 15 from employers, and the remaining 15 nominated by the Crown (notably, several economic experts, directors of Central Planbureau and Central Bank). This institution, which has worked in a regular manner since its establishment, principally serves as an advisory body to the government on matters of economic policy, in particular, on macro-economic decisions, in addition to its functioning for the adjustment of diverging interests successfully (Lehmbruch, 1977: 95, 108-09).

## State Corporatism in Latin America: Theoretical and Historical Appearance

In what follows the above-summarized theoretical introduction, it will be in appropriate order to dwell upon the framework, in practice, of ‘state corporatism in Latin American politics.

To begin with its historical background, corporate tradition in Latin America takes its roots from the periods of rule under Spain and Portugal. Thus, the political-cultural origins of the Iberic-Latin corporate tradition lie in the older Roman period. In that:

“The Roman practice of a patrimonial state apparatus that regulated the entire process of economic and political life through control and manipulation of the various corporate groups was transferred to the new world via Spain and Portugal. The new world turned out to be very similar to the old world with regard to societal structure and function.” (Landry, 1976: 71)

From the age of the Roman Empire to first the Spanish and Portuguese colonial times and then to the post-independence period in Latin America, corporatist thought has remained alive by adapting itself to newer demands from the ever-changing socio-economic environment. No matter when and how, corporatism has continued to reflect roots from its Romanic and Catholic past. The old power bases are indeed in decline due to the socio-economic changes through the twentieth century. The Church, the landowners, the old caudillos have been replaced in this region by the new ones, comprising the educated professionals, organized labor and peasants, mass-based political parties, more professionalized and development-oriented militaries, the new Church and the like. Nevertheless, the political system –having proven to be rather flexible– has allowed the old groups to gradually fade and the new ones to be slowly incorporated without radically altering the distinct Latin American system. Accordingly, in spite of all the socio-economic changes of the century, “the traditional organic-corporate-elitist-patrimonial order in the Iberic-Latin nations remains remarkably strong and viable. With one or two exceptions, it is probably still the dominant mode throughout the countries of this culture area.” (Wiarda, 1973: 231)

The above explanation on the origins and development of Latin American corporatism is held by several specialists on the subject –again, Howard J. Wiarda taking the lead- whose approach may well be called as “organicist- historico-cultural”. According to that approach, development in Latin America does not resemble the one observed in Western Europe and North America; it rather involves the adaptation of an old order to several new forces/ conditions. Thus, it is not a process of innovation but of assimilation and reorganization. Latin American systems, accordingly, have evolved through more or less distinctive developmental patterns as is succinctly put by the same Wiarda himself:

“Because of their distinct background and antecedents, as well as their later pattern of socio-cultural evolution, the Latin American nations merit separate treatment and interpretation. Their developmental processes are unique and poorly understood; they seldom find expression in our studies of the history of political thought or in the literature on social and political development. Indeed, it is likely that in Latin America we are looking at a ‘Fourth World of Development’, one that corresponds neither to the earlier capitalist or socialist models, nor to the ‘new nation’ model of Africa and Asia. Latin America has evolved its own way of trying to manage the major challenges of modern times...” (4)

When it comes to the conceptualization on ‘state corporatism’, several leading scholars dwelling on the subject, such as P. Schmitter, H. J. Wiarda, K. Mericle, G. O’Donnell, R. Kaufman, J. M. Malloy, A. A. Stepan, have all developed largely analytical definitions. Regardless of the use of differing vocabulary and expression, in those definitions corporatism is commonly treated “as an approach to organizing state-society relations,” or, “as a type of interest representation based on non-competing, officially sanctioned, state-supervised groups.” (Collier and Collier, 1977: 493) Amidst the just-mentioned variety on the characterization of state corporatism, however, “a distinction might be drawn between a cultural emphasis, approaching in some cases a form of cultural determinism, and a structural one. While the conceptualizations to be found in both approaches share some traits, the assumptions and methodologies associated with them are significantly different.” (Bailey, 1977: 261)

Linn Hamnergren, in addition, makes the above-noted distinction somewhat broader; in his view, “definitions of corporatism vary from those focusing solely on structural characteristics to others which include attitudinal variables, or even specify a total view of society and the political order.” (1977: 445)

At this point, one might call the above-mentioned two-dimensional conceptualization, for the sake of brevity, as ‘culturalist’ and ‘structuralist’ approaches, respectively. Beginning with the former, one can observe that the existing authoritarian-corporatist patterns in most part of Latin America, as briefly mentioned earlier, are essentially the reemergence of the traditional essence of an Iberic-Latin culture. As Wiarda concisely puts:

"'Corporatism' refers to a system in which the political culture and institutions reflect a historic, hierarchical, authoritarian, and organic view of man and society. In the corporative system the government controls and directs all associations and societal interests, holding not only the power to grant or withhold recognition (without which the group's very existence remains unlegitimated), but also access to official funds and favors, without which any group or interest is unlikely to succeed or even survive. As emphasized in this context, 'corporatism' means not only some of the formal corporative experiments of the 1920s and 1930s., but implies more fundamentally an older tradition and mode of behavior and organization whose roots lie deep in Iberian history." (1974d: 275-76)

Beyond the above more general reference, to explicate a more specific 'culturalist' formulation, Wiarda –who appears to be an outstanding proponent of culturalist approach- suggests elsewhere a two-part definition:

"...a system of authority and interest representation derived chiefly (though not exclusively) from Catholic social thought, stressing functional representation, the integration of labor and capital into a vast web of hierarchically ordered, 'harmonious', monopolistic, and functionally determined units (or corporations), and guided and directed by the state... (and) a far longer cultural historic tradition stretching back to the origins of the Iberic-Latin systems and embodying a dominant form of socio-political organizations that is similarly hierarchical, elitist, authoritarian, bureaucratic, Catholic, patrimonialist, and corporatist to its core." (5)

As to the structuralist approach, its concentration comes out to be on the non-ideological nature of the corporative model in which interest associations are dependent upon government authorities for the maintenance of group identity and access to public policy-making. Moreover, the 'state corporatism' of this type is considered as a specific alternative to both liberal-capitalism and socialism, as a source of legitimation of political power. Thus, this alternative envisions "the monopolization of interest representation by non-competing, officially sanctioned functional organizations, which are supervised by agents of the state bureaucracy;" accordingly, concisely put, the state corporatist systems are "vertically segmented societies, encapsulating individuals within a network of legally defined guilds and corporations which derive their legitimacy from, and are integrated by, a single bureaucratic center." (6)

In concluding this analytical treatment of corporatism in Latin America, it will be of great interest to cite Collier and Collier's attempt at a definitional synthesis. Viewing the available definitions as pointed to "three specific types of mechanisms used in regulating state-group relations: structuring, subsidy, and control", they elaborate the following definition to be employed as a synthesis:



“A system of interest representation is defined corporative to the extent that it is characterized by a pattern of state structuring of representation that produces a system of officially sanctioned, noncompetitive interest associations which are organized into legally prescribed functional groupings; to the extent that thesis associations are subsidized by the state; and to the extent that there is explicit state control over the leadership, demand-making, and internal governance of these associations.” (1977: 493)

In a culturalist perspective, as far as the functioning of the corporative model is concerned, the state and society in the Iberic-Latin context are thought of as an organic whole. Accordingly, the corporatist framework refers to a system in which the political culture and institutions reflect a historic hierarchical, organic, corporative view of society and polity. Metaphorically speaking,

“The corporate structure resembled the human body, with the brain being the center and coordinating agent of all the various parts, and each major organ and component part representing a different group. For the body to function, all the parts must work in harmony with and at the direction of the brain. Thus, the government must serve as the brain and all groups must harmoniously work together, or the socio-economic structure will fail to function properly. Only the government knows that the common good is something more than the sum of the good of all the individual parts of society.” (Landry, 1976: 72)

In a structuralist perspective, on the other hand, corporatism should be understood as a certain mode of interrelationships between the state and society, or better to say, “as a set of structures which link society with the state.” (O’Donnell, 1977: 47) Stated differently, the corporatist structure is a certain way of organizing the relationship between the state and major interests in the society that it rules. Accordingly, in the Latin American corporatist system the state plays obviously an active positive role in defining legitimate interests, recognizing corporatist groups, and determining rules of the game. In fact, the central point in this state corporatism is that “the state is stronger than civil society”, whereas in Western European regimes “civil society is stronger than the state”. Therefore, writers on this type of corporatism, by and large, have located an authoritarian administrative state at the center of the Latin American political system (Malloy, 1977: 480; Schwartzman, 1977: 92; Hambergren, 1977: 447; Mericle, 1977: 303-04).

As to the group structure, state corporatism appears to certainly have “a coherent and operationally definable group theory of politics that is opposed to other group theories”, differing in particular from that in the pluralist model (Malloy, 1974: 55-56). Within this context, the key idea is that interest articulation is directed through hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized (or created) by the state and retaining, in turn, a certain degree of internal autonomy. This autonomy allows for some variety in organization, yet “the emphasis on hierarchy, exclusive membership, and vertical channelling of communications suggests a concentration of power at the top as well as a tendency toward unique position in the political system for each group member. There is little expectation of any downward diffusion of political power, especially one which would weaken members’

attachments to the corporate groups." (Hammergren, 1977: 452) Consequently, the overall picture is one of the convergence of political power at the center and top of corporations. This situation discourages the emergence of autonomous intermediate power positions. While new vertical positions may be created over time, they nevertheless are modeled on this basic pattern, by virtue of the strong power elite control within this model. For, "in the corporative system, the government controls and directs all associations, holding the power not only to grant or withhold juridical recognition but also access to official funds and favors without which any sector is unlikely to succeed or survive." (Wiarda, 1973: 222)

The aforesaid idea that 'the state is stronger than society' connotes to say that "the group which controls the state apparatus is able to impose its will upon other, private sectors of society, thanks to its control of extractive resources, military manpower, or communication networks." (Schwartzman, 1977: 92) It is almost obvious, in that respect, that one of the key features in Latin American corporatism is 'the power elite control of socio-economic and political structures'. As a matter of fact, Latin American political elites have used the introduction of corporative structures as a means of winning and consolidating political power; decisions have usually been made "by a cadre of elite group representatives, linked by formal and informal ties to the administrative hierarchy and centering, ideally, in a single individual who personifies the national values, knows the general will." (Wiarda, 1973: 224)

Within a culturalist framework, then, what follows the above explanation is that:

"The corporative structure tends to serve the interests of the dominant elites by subordinating the rising social forces to the authority of the elite-dominated central state apparatus. The characteristically Iberic-Latin model of development seeks to preserve as much as possible of the traditional order by structuring the participation of these new power contenders under its control and direction." (Wiarda, 1973: 233-34)

The noticeable reference to 'power contenders' just made above will make it apposite, if not necessary, to shortly specify a salient view from that perspective by a distinguished student of Latin American politics, C. W. Anderson, who appears to have developed a formulation, which merits due attention as it explains functioning of the state corporatist political processes through 'power contending' among elites in particular, briefly as follows:

"The problem of Latin American politics is that of finding some formula for creating agreement between power contenders whose power capabilities are neither comparable... nor compatible... One may say that the most persistent political phenomenon in Latin America is the effort of contenders for power to demonstrate a power capability sufficient to be recognized by other power contenders, and that the political process consists of manipulation and negotiation among power contenders reciprocally recognizing each other's power capability... New contenders are admitted to the political system when they fulfill two conditions in the eyes of existing power contenders. First, they must demonstrate possession of a power capability sufficient to pose a threat to existing contenders. Second, they must be perceived by other contenders as willing to abide by the rules of the game, to permit existing contenders to continue to exist and operate in the political system." (1974: 249ff.)

## Conclusion

Based upon the reminder so far made in this paper on first conceptual dimension and then some examples in brief with reference to 'state corporatism' in Latin America, one can conclude that, albeit in varied form(ulation)s, the corporative model does reasonably highlight certain features of modes of interest representation within the context of Latin American political systems, distinguishable from several other ones –especially from that so-called liberal variety of corporatism in Western political systems. Corporatism in the former, specifically put, may well be considered as a system of non-pluralist group representation.

As a matter of fact, historically viewed, the coming of a series of military regimes in several Latin American countries has made authoritarian-corporatist models of politics useful tools for our understanding of the nature and direction of political change in this region of the world. Accordingly, when associated with such authoritarian regimes, corporatist features come out to have operated not only as a means of control but also as a channel of communication between the state organs and social groups. Thus, the state corporatist model has indeed been a useful analytical tool, for the followers of both culturalist and structuralist approaches, to a great extent to be employed in their effort to explain Latin American politics.

At this point, however, one last word in the sense of a critical evaluation on the very employment/application of this model on Latin American context, as is crystallized in the view by two students of Latin American politics, should not go unheeded; in that, in S.D. Baretta and H. E. Douglass's view, three related fallacies endanger the already developed literature on (state) corporatism: i) the tendency to counterpose corporatism –as the true, normative pattern which organizes the relationship between state and society in Latin America- to democratic pluralism (it is of importance, to their view, that corporatism, treated as such, cannot account for regime changes); ii) the fallacy of uniqueness (it is not wrong at all to use corporatism as an attempt to answer the question of how Latin America may be differentiated from the USA and Europe, yet –to their view again- this might in the meantime too easily lead us to the extreme point of assuming that there is something absolutely singular in the political development of Latin America); iii) the fallacy of immutability of cultural patterns (when taken at this level, lastly in their view, there is a tendency to think about corporatism as a constant pattern, which in turn implies theoretical and political dangers) (1977: 513-16).

Notwithstanding the fact that they might at first sight point to a degree of deficiency in the field of corporatist literature with particular reference to Latin America, as is held by again the above-cited students of corporatism, as a matter of fact, "the criticisms contained in each of the three fallacies are largely directed against the use of the term corporatism. Labels tend to focus attention on themselves and away from the realities for which they stand." (Baretta and Douglass, 1977: 515) Accordingly, by way of conclusion, one can still hold –in a somewhat culturalist tendency- that the corporatist model itself (having been observed as resurgent in the Iberic-Latin world by the last quarter of the last century, and one form or another of its organization being experienced in several countries of that world –in differing degrees in Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Argentine, as well as Spain and Portugal) is still useful as an explanatory tool in making sense of that world's tradition and socio-political structures –if heuristic up to a certain point and providing answers only to certain questions, as is admitted as well by Wiarda, probably the leading culturalist (1974a: 32).

## Endnotes

- (1) Beloff and Peele, 1980: 215-17. Professor Beer qualifies that kind of practices, which came out of the rising organized interests in the twentieth-century Britain, as "quasi-corporatism" (see, Carpenter, 1976: 14).
- (2) Metcalfe and McQuillan, 1979: 272 ff. For a relevant information about the Social Contract (between the government and labor) see A. Cox, 1981: 79-81 and 85. As an additional note for more elaboration: Lehmbruch considers such a bilateral separate bargaining between the government and individual groups as "an embryonic variety of liberal corporatism" (1977: 95). Incidentally, in Marsh and Grant's opinion, there are differences in emphasis between the tripartite relationship in Britain and the typical new corporatism; in that "tripartism might best be viewed as a sub-type of liberal corporatism." (1977: 196).
- (3) In this regard, Cox and Hayward largely examine the shortcomings in Britain's establishing a well-institutionalized new corporatist structure (1983: 221-29).
- (4) 1974b: 7. The above summarized culturalist explanation of the Iberic-Latin tradition as well as of the origins and maintenance-cum-change of Latin American corporatist structures in keeping with that tradition is observed to have been made well in the same author's several other writings: 1974a: 3-33; 1974c: 199-229; 1974d: 269-92; 1978: 3-37. For some other explanations along this line, see also: Pike, 1974: 132-39; Newton, 1974: 40-49; Landry, 1976: 71-77.
- (5) 1974a: 6. It should be additionally noted, at this point, that according to this approach "corporatism is not to be equated with fascism, nor are the Latin experiments to this direction to be considered as merely the less developed versions of the fascist model... Rather, this model is a complex and varied form, distinct from both liberalism and totalitarianism with a long tradition of its own." (pp. 9-11)
- (6) Kaufman, 1977: 111. For additional opinions which see corporatism as an alternative model, see also: Malloy, 1977: 480, and 1974: 54; Schwartzman, 1977: 91-92; Wiarda, 1974a: 31-32.

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## THE ORIENTALIST DISCOURSE LANGUAGE USED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES NEWSPAPER AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS

Sacide Nur AKKAYA\*

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### Abstract

Language, which is the main communication tool between people, is a phenomenon that can turn into a political propaganda instrument that directs societies and affects the citizens of a country or the people of the world. In this context, this relationship between language and power can manifest itself clearly at various points in social and political life. Especially in the media world, according to various cases, it is seen that the language used has changed, while media organs meet certain events with the reader, they support different thinking structures and maintain an understanding of publishing that serves to adopt them. This directive style attitude can be observed in the news texts of the New York Times newspaper after 9/11 and the policy of America, which initiated a military intervention in Afghanistan on October 7 following the September 11 attacks, is legitimized not only through an act of terrorism, but also through Islam and orientalism, in accordance with some statements in this newspaper. In this study, firstly, the relationship between politics and language will be addressed, and then the forms of orientalist discourse and its equivalent in the New York Times on the axis of the analyzed news will be discussed.

**Keywords:** *Orientalism, Discourse, The September 11 Attacks, Press, The New York Times*

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# 11 EYLÜL SALDIRILARINDAN SONRA NEW YORK TIMES GAZETESİNDE KULLANILAN TERÖR ODAKLI ORYANTALİST SÖYLEM DİLİ

## Öz

İnsanlar arasındaki temel iletişim aracı olan dil, toplumları yönlendiren ve bir ülkenin vatandaşlarını veya dünya insanlarını etkileyen siyasi bir propaganda aracına dönüşebilen bir olgudur. Bu bağlamda dil ve iktidar arasındaki bu ilişki, toplumsal ve siyasal yaşamın çeşitli noktalarında kendini açıkça gösterebilmektedir. Özellikle medya dünyasında, çeşitli vakalara göre kullanılan dilin değiştiği, medya organlarının belirli olayları okuyucuya ulaştırırken farklı düşünce yapılarını desteklediği ve bunları benimsemeye hizmet eden bir yayıncılık anlayışını sürdürdüğü görülmektedir. Bu yönlendirici üslup tavrı, New York Times gazetesinin 11 Eylül sonrası haber metinlerinde gözlemlenmekte ve 11 Eylül saldırılarının ardından 7 Ekim’de Afganistan’a askeri müdahaleye başlayan Amerika’nın bu politikası, bu gazetede bazı açıklamalara göre, sade bir terör olayı olarak ele alınmamakta, hatta oryantalist bir söylem dili aracılığıyla meşrulaştırılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada öncelikle siyaset ve dil ilişkisi ele alınacak, ardından oryantalist söylemin biçimleri ve New York Times’taki muadili, incelenen haberler ekseninde tartışılacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Oryantalizm, Söylem, 11 Eylül Saldırıları, Basın, New York Times*

## Introduction

Terror is an element that is the weapon of a group of minorities, namely the weak, trying to spread an extremist ideology. The most important feature of terrorism is the use of “extreme violence”. This term was first used as a phrase to describe state violence against citizens during the French Revolution. In the last 50 years, terrorism stands out as an element of war that a state or group uses to create political and economic instability in another country, using agents or proxies (Griffiths & O’Callaghan & Steven Roach, 2008, p. 310.). Behind these violent activities lies the motivation to spread the notion of fear among the society by killing and harming people. While the terrorist activities carried out by Marxist-Leninist groups across national borders in the 1970s occupied the world agenda, as a result of an important event in the 2000s, this situation became global and the most remarkable global problem. Following the attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon in the USA in 2001, the bloody action carried out by the terrorist group Al-Qaeda introduced to the world the concept of “militant Islamic terror” (Griffiths & O’Callaghan & Steven Roach, pp. 358-360). Although there were extremist acts before that, in the period after the September 11 attack, responsibility was not assigned to a certain group, and a series of terrorist adjectives such as “militancy, violence, extremism, barbarism” became a “clothing” for which Muslims were generally held responsible.

It can be said that this situation did not happen all at once, and its flow became a “form of perception” that continues to exist today as a result of a certain political processes. Although it is stated that the defense policy shaped by the USA after the September 11 attack was planned on a military operation to capture the terrorist Laden and eliminate the Taliban, these military processes were not basically a movement against Al-Qaeda, which was a single organization. Establishing on a “global jihad” incident that provides the legitimacy for the US to invade different parts of the East (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, etc.); was the main reason for the perception pattern. The important point here is that the activity carried out by a terrorist organization is treated as an act of extremism required by Islamic law. The attitude that has risen from this in the US policy and media has both put the Muslims living in the USA into a difficult situation by turning them into potential terrorists and has caused a very negative perception of Islam on the US citizens (Griffiths & O’Callaghan & Steven Roach, p. 363).

This process, in which the religion of Islam and its members were transformed into a form of terror, actually emerged as a continuation of the external worlds that the American foreign policy had constantly invented in historical continuity in order to realize its imperial goals. Because, Western power in the form of European colonialism in the nineteenth century and American supremacy in the twentieth century brought Western culture to many parts of the contemporary World (Huntington, 2015, p. 124.), and a modernization process was experienced under the name of modernization, in which Western powers benefited from the assets of the Eastern natives. Defined as universality for the West, this American supremacy has meant imperialism for other civilizations. In order to keep this process alive and to preserve the superior status of the West in the context of expansionist movements, various arguments were kept alive, and the interests of the West were defined as the interests of the people of the world, and the colonialist global actions centered on West-America thus gained legitimacy (Huntington, p. 268). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union,

America, which put into effect the policy of spreading to every land that it has interests as the only Superpower of the world, continues to benefit from the resources located on the borders of other nations, while it is seen that the West, which was invented by orientalism, got support from the ways of defining the East. Especially in the period from the September 11 attack to the occupation of Afghanistan by the USA, it is seen that the intervention to these lands has been made legitimate by using the power of the media and the metaphor of "Islamic terrorism"; which was made legitimate by using the power of the media, and which was constructed through the country's leading media organs; was used in a framework that will serve the internalization of this concept in the eyes of the US public.

In this article, which was prepared based on these facts, the appearance of this form of discourse in the New York Times, which helped the occupation processes and ultimately served to create an "ordered terror perception" in the minds, was examined. In this context, the "orientalist discourse language" that can be observed in many areas of the American media is analyzed based on the news in the "World" news of the New York Times newspaper, one of the leading media organs of the country. In the news analyzed in this context, it is revealed that an objective journalistic language was not used after September 11. While describing and analyzing the attack, it was seen that in the background of the newspaper language, a single voice containing anti-Muslim rhetoric was dominated and the concept of terrorism was shown side by side with the religion of Islam within the framework of a specific discourse.

## 1. Methodology of the Study

Based on the news texts published in the New York Times in a certain period of time, this research, in which a form of discourse is discussed in detail, has been put forward by using the method of "critical discourse analysis" through media publications. Discourse analysis, which is a research method that deals with the meaning products formed through speech and texts, is a scientific approach that examines how the media positions and classifies reality, and then performs a categorization process over the language used. The ultimate goal of the analyst is to uncover discourse that has a social and political impact that will transform existing relations of power and domination (Çağlar, 2010, pp. 199-204). In this context, for this study, the framework in which the Western media's view of Eastern civilization is shaped and the manifestations of orientalist, domination-oriented, colonialist approaches in this point of view have been observed in the New York Times newspaper. The understanding of orientalism mentioned within the scope of the article is based on the scientific framework that Edward Said created in his book called "Orientalism". The date range, which is the subject of the review, is limited from the date of the September 11 attack to October 7, when the invasion of Afghanistan began. This date range has been chosen in order to be able to see more clearly and analyze the process of America's first official intervention against its new terrorist identity. In the said date range, all the news published in the "World" class were examined separately and it was seen that the contents that could be material for this article were included in the news on terrorism and defense policies, which are mostly given under the title "A Nation Challenged". Apart from these articles, the editorials of the newspaper or other classifications of the newspaper have not been addressed.

The discourse analysis made on these articles shows that although some unknown persons or organizations responsible for the attack, it is clear or possible to observe that there is quite detailed information around implicit expressions in the newspaper about the information related to the “fact” that this attack was carried out by a Middle Eastern group. It is possible to say that this form of discourse includes an expression structure dominated by the orientalist perspective, which is shaped by the West’s view of the East and includes colonialist aims, as we will discuss in this article. In this context, according to the language of discourse in the news of the newspaper; it can be stated that the framework which points to these issues are classified on such headlines and examined in a detailed way: “Muslims choosing members of other religions as a target in terms of terrorizing the West”, “members of the religion of Islam may be in the position of potential people who may be involved in terrorism” and “the obligation of America’s mission to bring peace to the barbarian Middle East.”

## **2. 9/11 Attack and US Policy: Initial and Concluding Discussion**

The USA, which was at the center of a grouping of multi-civilizational countries in order to prevent the further expansion of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, continued its efforts to impose its own socio-political order and model on the World by using other states or groups with its policies of balance and fear. After the Cold War ended with the victory of the USA and its allies, the international system turned into a unipolar structure and the main actor of this “New World Order” was America. The USA, which has a military, economic and political power that cannot be balanced, greatly increased its freedom of action in the world geopolitics between 1990-2000 and aimed to become a global empire as the only superpower of the World. This strong structure acted within the framework of a system based on unilateralism, in which an expansionist understanding was adopted, instead of being built on the concept of multilateralism in accordance with the liberal understanding. In this new era, when the Cold War ended, Huntington expressed that the most important differences between peoples in the World are not ideological, political or economic, but cultural differences and he emphasized the use of politics in defining these identities in this process where peoples began to define themselves with cultural values, traditions and institutions. In this process, in which nation-states come to the fore as the main actors in world events, the behavior of nation-states is shaped by power and wealth, but also by cultural preferences and differences, as in the past. The most important state blocs are no longer developing around two superpowers as in the Cold War era, but around the world’s seven or eight basic civilizations. This means that the rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations. The main axis of post-Cold War World politics is the struggles between Western power and culture and the power and power of non-Western civilizations (Kantarıcı, 2012, pp. 50-68).

In this conflict, the West being the most powerful civilization and holding serious opportunities such as military and communication resources; it also meant the formation of a political process in which Western culture was the focus in shaping the new World order. In this context, the US policy developed after September 11 stands there as one of the most important example in the political history of how cultural codes are used politically in the

context of wars between civilizations. With the Bush Doctrine announced after the attacks, in the process when the USA started intercontinental operations with its great military power and the American foreign policy was shaped within the framework of a superpower phenomenon (Kantarci, p. 73), the expansionist movements were legally legitimized around this doctrine and it is seen that the concept of “Islamic terrorism” as an external enemy is presented as an argument for this approach against the people of the USA and other people in the world. This concept, which was activated with the September 11 attacks, as will be explained in detail in the following pages of this article, the idea that orientalism has formed over the past centuries, where the West naturally defends superiority over the East, has created a very suitable cultural basis and a vision around a vision in which civilizations are considered the enemy, not individuals. By developing a defense strategy, Islam and all its elements were considered as a part of this negative structure. The process in which the Clinton administration promoted cultural diversity in the 1990s evolved into another direction with the Bush doctrine after the September 11 attacks (Huntington, p. 459), and in this context, years of occupation practices, as in the case of Afghanistan, were carried out with arms, as well as the image of Islamic terrorism was institutionalized by using the power of the media.

After the September 11 attacks, a suitable ground was created with the help of certain cultural codes in order for the claims of the American-made “new world order” to come true after the Cold War, and the American foreign policy, which changed in practice after the attacks, was able to take any action that it perceived as potential or real for its national interests and placed the “preventive” and “pre-emptive” attack ideas against a threat at the center of its foreign policy trend. It is seen that this “more aggressive” and “one-sided” tendency of USA brings an excessive expansionism with it and at the same, the USA tries to legitimize by saying that it does this for the security of the whole world. The existing prejudice about Islam, the historical other of Western civilization, helped the Bush administration win popular consent for its aggressive foreign policy, and the Bush administration, with the support of the media and military, succeeded in reassuring the American public that the war on terrorism was necessary and inevitable. In this context, the invasion of Afghanistan that started about a month after the September 11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq that started in March 2003; in terms of its political, economic and social consequences, it has shown to the whole world that what has been done is the steps of a strategy aimed at globalizing and consolidating the hegemony of the USA. After the September 11 attacks, the USA, which followed a foreign policy plan to impose its absolute sovereignty on the entire international system, entered into a very aggressive and foreign policy orientation in line with this purpose, and for the first time in its history began to spread excessively.

The fact that the USA was exposed to a terrorist act that took place in its own territory created a unique ground both in the national and international arena for the US administration to follow unilateral policies, and this situation caused the local and global opposition to remain rather weak against the invasion of Afghanistan, which was legitimized under the name of the war against terrorism. In this context, the idea that states can benefit through expansionism and the exaggeration of this idea by the state administration, directs states to aggressive policies that harm themselves and their aims, and causes them to pass into the over-expansion stage as more aggressive. However, in this process, the state that implements the strategy harms itself and is constantly in expansionism towards the environment, causing the costs of expansionism to exceed the benefit obtained after a point. It is

stated that the USA has spent around 4.5 trillion dollars within the scope of military operations and other expenses since 2001 in order to fully establish its hegemony in Afghanistan, Iraq and other regions. In this sense, the USA faced financial losses and failed to ensure the security of its soldiers and superiors in Iraq, Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries. As a result of the operations carried out since 2001, according to official figures, 5,881 US soldiers died in Iraq and Afghanistan. The cost created by the US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan caused a major recession in the US economy and the US budget started to run continuously. This situation shows that; although the USA gains a great deal by controlling the natural resources of Iraq and Afghanistan; in fact, when considered in the short term, it had to bear a serious cost that exceeded its earnings (Ataman & Gökcan, 2012, p. 199-210). This process shows that a 20-year period of “intervention” did not bring more freedom or democracy to Iraq or Afghanistan, as the US initially claimed, and that the US presence even more damaged the concept of peace in these lands. This situation reveals that the concept of freedom should not be treated like a crusade, that it is only a suggestion and cannot be gained through expansionist activities. While the unwarranted intervention in Iraq increased the untimely chaos in the region, the Afghanistan operation took its place in history as a bigger failure. As a matter of fact, the “extreme expansionist” US policy that started in 2001 resulted in the surrender of these lands to the Taliban in 2021. This political failure has not only been a political defeat for a country, but has also condemned the people of Afghanistan, which it promised to bring peace, to an atmosphere of endless turmoil and insecurity of the Taliban, which is only united by hatred of America and has many conflicts within itself. On the one hand, the “crazy interventionism” attitude that started in the 21st century and then, the Biden administration’s extremely unorganized and evasive withdrawal from Kabul, causing a “mindless wholesale return migration”; it has taken its place in the historical process as the important examples of the American inconsistency, excessive expansion and the extreme retreat caused by it (Habertürk, 2022, “Future Ideas-How Will Migrations Change The World?”).

### 3. Orientalism and the Language of Discourse Created by This Structure

Ideologies that concern a society and affect the individuals of that society first of all enter people’s lives orally and then grow like an avalanche with the contribution of literary works and create sociological effects. The ideology of orientalism, which is the name given to all the studies conducted by Western researchers on issues such as the culture, language, religion, race and life styles of Eastern societies, has emerged as a simple thought for the first time, although it has reflected in all areas of life. Then, it has grown and developed with oral and written culture. Subsequently, with the power of countless works written, orientalism has become a reality that feeds Western countries and maintains its existence strongly today. This great literary diversity is visibly embodied in letters, diaries, memoirs, travel writings, historical-fictional texts, religious-literary texts, essays, novels, stories, poems and drama (Kula, 2011, p. XXXIII).

The basis of the concept of orientalism, which entered *Dictionnaire De L’Academie Française* in 1838 with the meaning of “Oriental study”, is that Western orientalists perceive the data about Eastern lands and people in a way that will serve their own benefits and, based on this perception, develop an orientalist and dominant logic of attitude. In this logical framework, the East is the great “other” that helps the West justify its reality (Kömeçoğlu, 2007, p. 141). Considering orientalism as a model of thought, Bryan Turner states that this model

is based on a special epistemology and ontology that creates a radical distinction between Orient and Occident, Western and Eastern. According to Turner, this concept can also be regarded as a set of institutions, disciplines and activities specific to Western universities interested in the study of oriental societies and cultures. In other words, it is possible to see orientalism as a unified institute that basically deals with the Orient (Turner, 2002, p. 148). Putting all studies on the Orient into a definition of “the East produced to serve the West”, does not mean that all of these studies serve against the Easterner. However, the fact that a significant part of the Eastern image in the European-American media is full of deliberate errors and distortions, and this known false information is passed down from generation to generation, can be seen as a situation that shows that orientalist products are produced on a large scale for the disadvantage of non-Western societies (Turner, p. 435).

Orientalist activities, in the 11-17. centuries, while topics such as Eastern originated book translations and language education developed intertwined with branches such as literature, sociology, and theology, the Western orientalism's effort to recognize Eastern societies, became an expansionist activity carried out with some political initiatives and actual wars between the 18-20. centuries. In the 21st century, it is possible to say that orientalist representations are expressed through a visual language that directly affects the cultural hegemony manifested through art, literature, design and communication, and that orientalist studies have become works for political benefit, directly involving the governments of the countries. This means that the great states, which have colonial aims against other states, transform orientalism according to their needs in the new age. By creating state-funded funds for these studies, comprehensive studies on the East are carried out and this information is used in these expansionist processes. An example of this is the Middle East Studies Association, founded in Washington in 1966, operating partly under the control of the Federal government. In this article, as a reflection of the orientalist mindset in the American media, a detailed analysis of the juxtaposition of the concepts of terrorism and Islam will be made through newspaper language.

#### **4. Presence of “Directive Political Discourse and Image” in the Media**

According to Foucault, who examines the relationship between knowledge and power, “truth” depends on the power systems that produce and sustain it in a circular relationship, and the powers that create it and then expand it. So that, the political problem is not wrong, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology; it is “the information itself” (Kahraman, 2002, p. 159). In this context, orientalism, which we define as the ideological beginning of the expansionist political policies of some states, represents an important part of the relationship between knowledge and power. Edward Said explains this situation as “putting everything that has been thought, said or even done about the East in certain patterns in an intellectual approach” (Said, 1998, p. 27). That is, discourse languages serving specific purposes can be seen as an intellectual part of the expansionist activities of states.

Today's representation of “orientalism”, which we define as one of the behaviors of governments, does not progress as linearly as it used to be, and it is shaped to create universal and multifaceted effects with the strong use of the media & culture industry. In fact, how certain political social events today will be perceived by the society can be guided/directed by images provided by the media. In this respect, American-European television programs and series, which can be considered as an important example, stand out as productions watched



in the world with their strong infrastructure. As a matter of fact, it is seen that there is always a “Great Enemy” in line with US foreign policies in the politically fictional Hollywood cinema: the Japanese and Nazis in the Second World War, the Russians during the Cold War and the Arabs after the Cold War (Güngör, 2011, p. 3). Here, it would be appropriate to state that the orientalist attitude, which we will examine mostly towards Muslims and Middle Easterners in this article, is an approach not only towards the members of the Islamic religion but also towards the whole world except itself.

As a branch of orientalist activities in the construction of cultural identity, especially in the depiction of the modern Middle East, Hollywood cinema is used as a powerful cultural production tool. Lina Khatib concluded that in a total of 70 American and Arab films released between 1980 and 2005, Hollywood films presented a uniform Arab identity focused on religion and extremism, and different aspects of Arab individuality were depicted only in Arab productions (For more information: Khatib, 2006). Khatib also states that while there is an emphasis on sexism in these productions, this issue is used to demonize Arabs and to legitimize America's actions. For example, in *The Mummy* movie released in 1999, American characters were portrayed as civilized, while Egyptians were clearly portrayed as ignorant and barbarian.

In this context, since the beginning of the 20th century, the perception of the Easterners and Muslims shaped around the image of the “barbarian Oriental” in the American media, after the September 11 attack in 2001, as a continuation of this process and with the “information production policy” carried out through the media, has transformed into “terrorist Eastern”. As a matter of fact, a military campaign called “War on Terrorism” was launched under the leadership of the USA to eliminate the threat of terrorism, and around this global campaign, US officials described 9/11 attacks as “war actions” against the Western civilization. As a result, this new type of war against terrorism has turned into a campaign that transcends state borders and operates outside the scope of international criminal law in many respects. It is possible to list the general strategic priorities of the “war on terrorism”, which is at the center of the Bush administration's foreign policy, as the seizure of all the financial assets of terrorists, the intervention of the states hosting terrorists, and the spreading of democracy to the regions in the Middle East where authoritarian governments have long been suppressed. In this context, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan was the first official intervention of the “war on terror”. The second was the Iraq war, which the UN and the international community define as a “unsuccessful and unnecessary war.”

These military interventions took their place in the pages of history as processes in which the peace, security and rights of citizens were never protected. This process which needs to be questioned clearly whether it is a just war or just a legitimate defense (Griffiths, O'Callaghan & Roach, pp. 331-332) and the global “War on Terror” campaign, contributed to the strengthening of the fear of Islam (Islamofobia) which has escalated into Western societies today and has become widespread by turning into an industry and sometimes causing severe acts of violence. The disastrous events of September 11 made it difficult to notice many positive developments; in contrast to the classical American legal maxim, Islam and Muslims have become “guilty until proven innocent”. Islam is often seen as the cause, not the context, of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism. Because Islam was not well known in the West, the first encounter with Islam for many Americans coincides with a recent history based on the Iranian Revolution in 1978 and the hostage crisis in the American embassy;

the feeling of insecurity and fear stemming from terrorism, allowing Islam to be used as a reflection of certain areas of concern by some state policies; with the effect of a certain form of discourse used through the media, the anxiety felt towards Muslims fed their thoughts of hatred and discrimination (Lean, 2015, pp. 7-20). Of course, it is not possible for a distorted image of Islam to affect the masses objectively and positively.

As a matter of fact, although the president of the period George Bush, in many statements emphasized the mission of “bringing peace to the East” as the main purpose of the war waged by the USA against Afghanistan, which was blamed for the attack and later against other Middle Eastern countries; in the following years, the humanitarian crises experienced and the extremely negative perception of Muslims in Western societies stand out as concrete facts showing the formation and outcome of these orientalist goals in the Eastern lands. In this context, orientalism has turned into a phenomenon that has not ended with the colonial process and is used for the purpose of producing information that will provide a basis for legitimacy for some political movements. This conscious structure, which directly or indirectly controls the power and sovereignty of a nation over other spheres, includes the “forms of discourse” that are the subject of this article.

### **5. Orientalist Discourse Language in the New York Times After the September 11 Attacks**

The New York Times, which has been one of the leading media organs of the American State since 1851, is a mirror of the political and social events of the period with its extensive news content and deep-rooted journalism culture. The New York Times, which is an important branch of the American media with its wide readership and deep-rooted structure, stands out as an archive that should be examined in terms of observing the political and social ideas of the American society and its administrators. In this context, when the newspaper archives belonging to the September 11 attack are examined, it is seen that a certain discourse language is used about the Eastern phenomenon, which is positioned as an opposing target around the said attack. In the newspaper, which covered many news about the responsibilities of the post-attack process, this negative process was not attributed to a certain terrorist organization, but in the style of language used, the East was terrorized globally around this terrorist act and Islam, which is seen as belonging to the East, is also organically positioned side by side with the concept of terrorism.

This situation brings to mind that the culture of orientalism develops an appropriate ideology in alliance with political and economic methods against the wide geography it wants to intervene, and in this direction, it uses the power of writing to influence the social mindset with concepts such as the press and the media, and positioning a certain “other” about the East. In this picture, the West, which is positioned against the backward East due to its organic qualities, is placed as a phenomenon that has to intervene in this barbarian way of life. The effect of this historical-cultural accumulation (Kula, p. XLII) that develops around the attitude of orientalism on individuals and the state of the West representing the East and dominating the East “naturally” is transferred to future generations through a collective consciousness (Kula, p. XXXV). In this context, when the literary language of the New York Times is examined, it is seen that the September 11 attack is handled within the framework of this “specified language of discourse”, as we will present the examples below.

### 5.1. Which one is the “Real Target”; Terror or the Islamic World?

The terror acts carried out against the Twin Towers and Pentagon in the USA on September 11, 2001, with their destructiveness and difference in attack dynamics, caused serious changes in American defense policy. In the statements made by the State, it was pointed out that the terrorist-oriented acts the country has been subjected to actually made a “new enemy” visible. Stating that it is faced with a new terrorist identity, the American government set out to develop new policies in this context. Now, this policy of America, which declared that it was having a new perspective on terrorism, was reflected in newspaper reports with the statement that “the approach to issues such as missile defense, globalization and terrorism will change”: (John Vinocur, 2001, “The New World Order Is a Clash of Civilizations”).

“As de facto acts of war against America on its soil, the terror raids not only demanded a committed response from the world community but altered how Americans and their allies would approach issues like the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, missile defense, globalization and terrorism itself.”

Stating that it will make new and different moves against terrorism and even change its defense policy based on this issue, the American government began to give signals about the responsible people of the attack. Although these signals seemed to be related to the states that America saw as the source of terrorism, in fact, the target was not a specific land or country that was thought to protect the terrorist organization; it was the whole of the Middle East. Nearly a month later, although the US will carry out a military intervention in Afghanistan on the grounds that it was protecting the chief responsible of the terrorist act, the news in the NY Times newspaper stated that the target determined as “against the new terrorist identity”; was referred as the “Middle East” where “rogue” regimes took place: (Joseph Fitchett, 2001, “Like the Attack in 1941, Air Terrorism Could Provoke Severe Repercussions: For Washington, a Modern Pearl Harbor”, The New York Times).

“Bush administration and European officials and analysts generally took the view that the anti-U.S. attacks originated in the Middle East, probably with backing from the regimes in rogue states.”

In line with the statements of Richard Perle, a former Pentagon official, it was explained that terrorist attacks were carried out with the “assistance of governments supporting terrorists”; and also stated that, as the new terrorist policy of the state, a “systematic retaliation policy” will be implemented against all governments that helped this terrorist activity:

“This could not have happened without the help of governments that back terrorists,” according to Richard Perle, an adviser to President Bush and a former Pentagon official in the Reagan administration.

The shock of the attack, Mr. Perle said, would galvanize U.S. policy into a systematic policy of retaliating severely against any foreign governments that have helped terrorists working against the United States. Other sources, who declined to be identified, predicted quick U.S. military strikes against targets in the Middle East, probably against Afghanistan, the operating base of the bin Laden network.” (Fitchett, 2001).

In the news published on the following dates, it is seen that the title of “Islamic” was added to the geographical positioning, which is stated to host the terrorist network. When talking about Laden, who is seen as the chief responsible of the actions, it is frequently emphasized that this person is a “Muslim militant” instead of talking about himself as a simple terrorist. While the intervention in this terror network, which is claimed to cover “a number of Asian and African countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan”, is presented as America’s only chance; with this form of discourse, a terrorist act is not attributed to a certain group or organization and it is understood that these acts are evaluated over a “geographical region” and the American attacks, which may include the whole of “Asia and Africa”, are legitimized through these terrorist attacks:

“Senior officials cast aside the niceties of diplomatic language and the military restraint that the United States had manifested in dealing with past terrorist attacks, promising that the response to Tuesday’s suicide missions in New York and near Washington would be “a campaign, not a single action,” that might last a year or more.

Such a campaign could involve American forces in protracted fighting against a number of Asian and African countries, like Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and even Pakistan, which occupies a vital strategic position south of Afghanistan, where the Islamic militant Osama bin Laden is believed to be based” (R. W. Apple Jr., 2001, “No Middle Ground”, The New York Times).

The question that comes to mind here is, “Is the target set by America after the 9/11 attacks terrorism or the entire Islamic world?” Because, while trying to clearly identify those responsible for a bloody terrorist act; the focus is not on a terrorist organization, but on all members of a religion and region. In some news in the newspaper, it is clearly stated that in order to deal with terrorism, it is necessary to “deal” not with Laden and his organization but with the “Islamic world”. As a matter of fact, this policy has brought about consequences (Lean, p. 21) such as profiling Muslims, the requirement of a special identity card for American Muslims, and questioning the loyalty of all Muslim citizens:

“As for terrorism, it was no longer an American obsession that some could dismiss as an excuse for incompetence and one-sidedness in dealing with the Islamic world.

A visitor talking to Mr. Schroeder just minutes after the attacks first became known saw a horror-struck man who knew that the world had experienced a monumental event.” (Vinocur, 2001).

It is also mentioned in another news in the newspaper that the source of terrorism is seen as the whole understanding of Islam and not specific for certain countries. America, which has to protect itself against bloody actions, will have to go through a process “full of danger and will come into conflict with a large part of the Islamic world” while fighting against Laden. These expressions work in the reader’s consciousness as a religion that has an organic connection with radical terrorism, by moving away from associating Islam with peace:

“Such steps might fall short of a knockout blow to the Taliban. Complicating the administration’s planning, the element of surprise has been lost. The Taliban and Mr. bin Laden’s men are expecting a bombing attack and have been evacuating their camps and bases, according to American intelligence.

But there is a recognition that to go further by carrying out a Soviet-style occupation with thousands of troops would place the United States at odds with much of the Islamic world and is fraught with danger” (Michael R. Gordon, 2001, “After: The Strategy; A New War And Its Scale”, The New York Times).

As a matter of fact, this “total” point of view is not limited to the newspaper reports or the foreign policy discourses of the USA. The terrorist act carried out by a radical and minority group brings a race and religion to the new terror defined by the West. Because, while fighting against terrorism, Central American governments have also initiated the process of “examining the bank accounts of Arab residents”, regardless of whether they are related to terrorism or not. Although it is stated that a total defense was made against Laden and his supporters within the scope of the fight against terrorism, it is seen that the process in question diverged from this, and an entire race is blamed through a terrorist minority group:

“Representatives of Central America’s governments announced that they would create a comprehensive regional security plan to combat terrorism and organized crime. The heads of state, who met soon after the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington, proposed that the Central American Security Commission present a plan in 20 days to coordinate security, intelligence and border control activities in the region. Several nations are already examining bank accounts held by Arab residents, while Nicaraguan officials are investigating claims that immigrant smugglers provided false documents to scores of Arab immigrants” (David Gonzalez, 2001, “World Briefing The Americas: Honduras: Regional Anti-terrorism Project”, The New York Times).

## 5.2. The Empire of Fear

The negative perception of the East shaped around the concept of terrorism after September 11 was not only an official policy of the state, but also turned into a form of discourse that would negatively affect members of the society. In the articles we examine in the newspaper, it is observed that within the scope of the fight against terrorism, an empire of fear has been established on the society. It is a certain fact that the September 11 attacks are a very scary, sad and bloody act of terrorism for American and world history. In the face of this reality, instead of fighting terrorism in a balanced way that does not frighten the society; it is seen that the language of discourse in the newspaper is based on the perception that the American people are facing “an Eastern enemy who should be afraid and cautious at all times”. It can be said that this perception has two different faces, within the American society and in the international arena. In this context, thanks to the language of discourse in the newspaper, rather than reporting the issue by emphasizing the terrorist act carried out by a certain group; the news of pro-terrorism Muslim societies that see Western countries as targets are presented to the readers, and the American indigenous people, who do not belong to the religion of Islam, are dragged into an atmosphere of fear.

### 5.2.1. Terrorist Muslims Who Have Targeted the West

Although it was announced that Laden, who was the patronage of Afghanistan, was targeted as the responsible of the attacks and that revenge activities were built on it, both the geographical positioning of the newly defined terrorism refers to the whole of the Middle East and that these new type of terrorists actually exist all over the world. As a matter of fact,

US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld saying that “The terrorist organization Al-Qaeda headed by Mr. bin Laden can operate in 50 to 60 countries and this network is only one of many networks that President Bush has promised to defeat” (R. Gordon & Eric Schmitt, 2001, “A Nation Challenged: The Combat; Scarcity of Afghanistan Targets Prompts U.S. to Change Strategy”, The New York Times) indicates an international network that has chosen West as a target. The striking point in the news in the newspaper is that although the relationship between Islam and terrorism is mostly expressed through the Middle East, “militant Muslims” in other countries are referred to and this process is described as an “Islamic terror network” covering the whole world. Russia, Indonesia and China are presented as the other countries that have suffered from the Islamic militancy that threatens America. Even Indonesia, a Muslim country, is ready to cooperate with America in intervening in this terrorist network, while the emphasis on “militant Islamic violence” instead of radical terrorism is clearly stands out in newspaper reports:

“When the presidents of the United States and Indonesia meet in Washington on Wednesday, they will share an urgent concern: the threat of militant Islamic violence” (Seth Mydans, 2001, “Bush Meeting Jakarta Leader; Islamic Militancy Is Likely Topic”, The New York Times).

“Al Chaidar, a researcher at the University of Indonesia and a member of a militant Islamic group, said thousands of Indonesians did join the war against Russia in Afghanistan a decade ago” (Mydans, 2001, “A Nation Challenged: The Pacific; Indonesia Radicals Issue Threats of Holy War”, The New York Times).

While explaining the concept of violence and terrorism in Indonesia, not only the problem of terrorism in the country is emphasized; also referring to the “concern arising from the increase in the last few years” of terrorist acts originating from Islam; the existence of these acts of violence is verified by the reader. As a matter of fact, according to these news, some negative situations such as “instability, lawlessness and economic difficulties” in Indonesia facilitate the “root and growth of radical Islam”:

“Western officials have been expressing increasing concern over the past couple of years that instability, lawlessness and economic hardship in Indonesia are making it easier for radical Islam, with support from like-minded groups abroad, to take root and grow” (Michael Richardson, 2001, “Anti-Terror Effort May Provoke Her Foes: Megawati Faces Risk In Backing the U.S.”, The New York Times).

While it is being explained that the “Muslim terrorism” faced by America is not only the problem of the USA; The Chechen struggle in Russia is also defined as “Islamic terrorism”. In this way of expression, intervention in this “religious” terror network is made quite legitimate. In the news about Russia’s open support for this struggle, religion of Islam and extremism are again stand side by side:

“In a brief speech on nationwide television, Mr. Putin said that “it goes without saying that we are prepared to make a contribution” to an international antiterrorist campaign, and that other forms of cooperation with outside states in that battle are possible as well.

The nature of that cooperation, he said, “will depend directly on the general level and quality of our relations with these countries and on the mutual understanding in the sphere of struggle against international terrorism.”

That was a clear and pointed reference to Russia’s own problems with Islamic extremists in the breakaway province of Chechnya, where the Kremlin has been repeatedly accused by the West of sanctioning brutality and even criminal behavior by its own troops” (Michael Wines, 2001, “Putin Offers Backing to U.S. for Anti-Terror Operations”, The New York Times).

Another country where Islam and terrorism are mentioned together is China, the most populous country in the world. Terrorist activities in many different parts of the world are defined around a similar definition and targeting only a certain religion. Indeed, “like Russia, China too” has “practical reasons” to support the US campaign against these violent “Islamist fundamentalists”:

“Like Russia, which has also performed a stunning about-face, China has practical reasons for supporting a campaign against violent Islamic fundamentalists. Though it has been spared any bloody conflict comparable to that in Chechnya, China fears the emergence of unrest and terrorism at home, most immediately in the largely Muslim frontier province of Xinjiang, where a stewing separatist movement has occasionally set off bombs or attacked the police” (Erik Eckholm, 2001, “China’s About-Face: Support for U.S. on Terror”, The New York Times).

### 5.3. Barbarian Eastern

One of the basic thinking structures on which the productions of orientalism, which has a hegemonic and reductionist approach on the East, are built on, is the relationship of “East and barbarism”. In this context, the Eastern lands are seen as organically backward and in need of civilization. It seems impossible for a civilized and developed mindset to take place in this depiction of barbarian human societies defined by orientalism. As a matter of fact, it is seen that the news in the New York Times articles published between 11 September and 7 October contain traces of the mentality that implies that the East was “definitely uncivilized”. One of the most obvious examples of this comes to life in President Bush’s statements. In a press release a week after the attack, the President made a statement with an “unusually rough voice” about the capture process of this “militant Islamic leader”. In this speech, which blends the relationship between religion and violence, the way of behavior defined as Islamic terrorism is explained with the words “cutting, hitting and hiding the throats of women on airplanes”, according to Bush. Indeed, it is clear that the attack in question was monstrous. The point we want to draw attention to is that the President emphasizes Islam and bigotry along with terrorism:

“Mr. Bush used blunt language in describing the enemy in what is expected to become the most sweeping international assault ever against terrorism.



“There are no rules,” Mr. Bush said during a visit to the Pentagon on Monday. “It’s barbaric behavior. They slit throats of women on airplanes in order to achieve an objective that is beyond comprehension, and they like to hit and then they like to hide out” (Brian Knowlton, 2001, “Terror in America / ‘We’re Going to Smoke Them Out’: President Airs His Anger”, The New York Times).

The juxtaposition of the religion of Islam with barbarism, apart from terrorism, shows its presence in many different news items in the newspaper. It is an obvious fact that the scenes conveyed in the context of the backwardness of the East can be correct on the basis of individuals and regions. Indeed, there is nothing humanistic in turning a full passenger plane into a 150-ton missile and aiming it at New York’s skyscrapers. What is meant to be made here is that this monstrous attitude and the concept of extremism, carried out by 19 terrorists, is not a concept that belongs to any faith, not just one religion. Just as the attack of a Christian fundamentalist does not mean that all Christians are like that, the same is true of the Islamic faith. However, the narrative language of the news stories seems to present the concept of barbarism as a common feature of all Muslims of different races.

Around the news about the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, it is seen that not only Afghanistan supporting the criminal Laden, but also various stories about the whole East are reflected in the news texts. As a continuation of the radicalism in Afghanistan, a similarly militant group of people from Pakistan is mentioned and the process in question is not specific to a certain radical group, but as a situation that represents all Muslims. Describing the belief that “Muslims are all equal in front of the God” through a scene from daily life, the reporter expresses that for these people who are so poor having empty pockets, the religion is seen as a “shelter”. The origin of this comment is the result of the reporter’s observation of the East:

“Islam is the great refuge of Pakistan’s masses. In mosques, in the fields, on the roadsides, men drop to their knees and perform their daily prayers. However empty their pockets, they are equal in these genuflections before God.” (Barry Bearak, 2001, “A Nation Challenged: News Analysis; In Pakistan, A Shaky Ally”, The New York Times).

The idea of the backwardness of the East is reinforced by the expressions of the natives of these lands who have been educated in the West (Rick Bragg, 2001, “A Nation Challenged: The Classes; Pakistan Is 2 Worlds: One Urbane, One Enraged”, The New York Times). Added to that, it is stated that these barbaric attitudes proceed in the same way on the state level. The situation of the absolute monarchies in Europe comes to mind with this newspaper report, which is stated to be no alternative to authoritarian governments in the Muslim Middle East:

“But perhaps none of that, scholars said, would be perceived as so burning if there were other outlets for discontent. Nowhere in the Muslim Middle East, not in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia or anywhere else, is there a true alternative to what are essentially authoritarian governments.” (Douglas Jehl, 2001, “A Nation Challenged: The Muslims; More Extremists Find Basis for Rebellion in Islam”, The New York Times).

Another point that draws attention in the Eastern portrait in the newspaper is that people who do not support Laden’s terrorist acts, despite being a member of Eastern society, also



have negative moral characteristics. It can be said that the story of an educated and decent Muslim is not included in these news texts, which include Muslims from different parts of the world such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, China and Russia. When talking about the commander named Ahmed Shah Mesud, who resisted the Taliban, it is stated that he was a person who respected some human rights and had a reasonable stance against the West. This person, who bears the rare traces of modernity among the people and administration of Afghanistan, actually does not seem so modern when “examined more closely”. Indeed, he grows the poppy crop used for drug making “like every Afghan”, and follows conservative Afghan traditions as his point of view on women:

“Thousands of Afghan fighters streamed through the dusty mountain trails of the Panjshir Valley today to bury Ahmed Shah Massoud, their legendary commander who held together the last remaining resistance to the Taliban government. ...

As the Taliban grew internationally notorious, banning television and imposing beards, sheathing women head-to-toe and amputating the hands of thieves, Mr. Massoud enjoyed presenting himself to the West as a “reasonable” Muslim.

“I am for the rights of women,” he said. “Women can work. Women can go to school.”

He made a good impression on Westerners - and he knew this. He spoke French. He liked to reflect on his study of architecture. More than anything he cut a dapper figure, with a forehead full of deep furrows, with a tightly tailored jacket, with the cocked pakool.

But upon closer inspection he did not always seem a man of modernity and enlightenment. When the Taliban banned the growing of poppy last year, Mr. Massoud allowed the crop to flourish in his own domain. And once asked if his own wife wore the head-to-toe burqa, he smiled sheepishly and replied, “Yes, this is the custom” (Barry Bearak, 2001.09.17, “Rebel Chief Who Fought The Taliban Is Buried”, The New York Times).

Another person condemning the violent acts of Laden, the head of the terrorist organization, is a Muslim named Bakri. The Syrian-born Omar Bakri Muhammad, who condemned the attacks and declared his opposition to violence, is in line with the profile of the Muslim “who is not modern and does not see peace as a solution” in the context of ideological ideas. Indeed, although he says he is against terrorism, according to Bakri’s Islamic thought, “armed struggle” is the only way to save Muslim lands. It is noteworthy that the views of Bakri, the founder of the “Salafi jihadist network” called Al-Muhajiroun, are also included in the profile against Laden’s terrorist acts. Against terrorism, an example is set that highlights the relationship between Islam and violence:

“Mr. Bakri, the Syrian-born judge, sat for an hourlong interview in a modernistic office building housing mostly high-tech businesses in rundown Tottenham.

While his group disavows violence in free societies, its manifesto, which is distributed to visitors, says its members believe that jihad (i.e. armed struggle) is the only Islamic way to liberate Muslim land under occupation, e.g. Palestine, Kashmir, India, Chechnya and Bosnia, etc.

“We carry Islam as a political belief, as a complete system; we don’t carry Islam as a religion,” said Mr. Bakri, 43, a bearded and exuberant man clad in black robes and a black fez. “It’s an ideology,” he said, adding that its aim was to restore the Islamic caliphate as a mighty power.

Al Muhajiroun is banned by Britain’s National Union of Students from many college campuses because, as Mr. Bakri acknowledged, it pursues vigorous campaigns to find new followers -- though not, he said, to seek recruits for military purposes. Mr. Bakri also said he opposed Mr. bin Laden’s violence and condemned the Sept. 11 attacks.” (Alan Cowell, 2001, “A Nation Challenged: Suspects; Britain Tracing Trail Of One More Jihad Group”, The New York Times).

In the time interval included in our analysis, in another report published in the New York Times, the hegemonic perspective defined as orientalism and presented in the American media in a veiled language, comes to life with the statements of a European leader. Silvio Berlusconi, the prime minister of Italy at the time, stated in a statement that “Western civilization was superior to the Islamic world”. According to Berlusconi, terrorism, which is responsible for the 9/11 violent attacks, is not an attack by a specific group; on the contrary, it should be handled as a struggle of Easterners and Westerners that “will require Europe to rebuild its Christian roots”. In this struggle, again according to Berlusconi, while the West consists of “a value system that gives people widespread welfare and guarantees respect for human rights and religion”; opposite this, part of the Islamic world lacks civilization to the extent that it is “1,400 years behind.” These preconditions of the Italian prime minister remind us of the distinction between East and West on which orientalism is built:

“The Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, in a briefing for journalists, praised Western civilization today as superior to that of the Islamic world and urged Europe to “reconstitute itself on the basis of its Christian roots.”

Mr. Berlusconi, here to discuss international cooperation against terrorism with the Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, and the German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, gave vent to views likely to outrage Turkey and other Islamic allies of the West and infuriate antiglobalization protesters, besides.

As it designs a strategy against terrorism, Mr. Berlusconi said, the West should trust in the supremacy of its values.

“We should be confident of the superiority of our civilization, which consists of a value system that has given people widespread prosperity in those countries that embrace it, and guarantees respect for human rights and religion,” Mr. Berlusconi said. “This respect certainly does not exist in Islamic countries.”

The West “is bound to occidentalize and conquer new people,” he said. “It has done it with the Communist world and part of the Islamic world, but unfortunately, a part of the Islamic world is 1,400 years behind. From this point of view, we must be conscious of the strength and force of our civilization.” (Steven Erlanger, 2001, “Italy’s Premier Calls Western Civilization Superior to Islamic World”, The New York Times).

#### 5.4. America Brings Peace to the Barbarian East

The examples of news we have covered up to this point of our study, shows that, in America, where the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was decided after 9/11, the situation was not only a military movement for defense against a bloody terrorist act, but it was handled as an all-out struggle against a “religious terrorism brand.” This type of enemy, which is stated to be pro-violent, have no civilized means, and has fundamentalist and barbarian qualities, inevitably because of its radical mindset and lack of civilization; seems to already deserve an American intervention. The next question from this stage is who will carry out this important mission in these regions that have to be intervened. This question will not remain unanswered in the newspaper reports. It is stated by the Islamic terrorism expert Gerecht that the USA should give a real answer to this new terrorist identity:

“We need to send a signal to the Taliban and the rest of the world that they are going to lose power,” according to Reuel Gerecht, a former intelligence specialist on Islamic terrorism.” (Joseph Fitchett, 2001, “U.S. War on Terrorism: It’s Likely to Be Long, Dangerous and Harsh”, The New York Times).

It is also stated in the news that fighting with a violent and radical group will cost the USA a number of costs, and there may be problems with “a large part of the Islamic world” due to the war against terrorism. Again, violence and Islam are side by side; solution and peace lie quite far from this equation:

“Such steps might fall short of a knockout blow to the Taliban. Complicating the administration’s planning, the element of surprise has been lost. The Taliban and Mr. bin Laden’s men are expecting a bombing attack and have been evacuating their camps and bases, according to American intelligence.

But there is a recognition that to go further by carrying out a Soviet-style occupation with thousands of troops would place the United States at odds with much of the Islamic world and is fraught with danger.” (Gordon, 2001).

This inevitable intervention mission of the USA is frequently voiced by President Bush. Bush invites the people of Afghanistan to rescue them from an “incredibly repressive” government. National security adviser Condoleezza Rice promises that the Afghan community will be “better off” without the Taliban government. Historical facts, on the other hand, show that the interventions made by the USA in the Eastern lands, citing 9/11 as the reason, did not have positive results and caused humanitarian crises that will radically affect the lives of the people living here. However, as a result of the preferred and elaborate discourse language in the media language, the intervention mission of a strong state in the region is legitimized:

“President Bush came close to telling the Afghan people today to overthrow the Taliban government, encouraging them to rid Afghanistan of what he called “an incredibly repressive” administration.” (Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, 2001, “A Nation Challenged: The White House; Bush Steps Up Appeal to Afghans To Rid Their Country of Taliban”, The New York Times).

In another speech, Bush also stated that to “undermine the Taliban government and bring peace to the region”, he would provide various aid to the Afghan people. His National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, supports these words by stating that America, “friend of the Afghan people”, is making efforts “to contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan”. These words of President Bush remind us that Iraq was invaded in parallel with the 9/11 process. According to the US, the executive lost the innocent Iraqi civilian life and take the social structure seriously. In 2003, as a result of the occupation of the region by the United States on the grounds that Iraq killed its own people with chemical weapons and would soon carry out an attack on the USA (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2003, p. 55), thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians lost their lives and the social structure of the region suffered serious damage.

As a matter of fact, the occupation process, which is expected to lead to peace, has not been able to provide a robust democratic process to Iraq, nor did it cause a serious reform in the region (Baylis, Smith & Owens, p. 75). In the Intelligence Committee Report of the American Senate published in 2008, the process will be defined as a “strategic mistake” by stating that “there is not enough information” (Glenn Kessler, 2016, “The Pre-War Intelligence on Iraq: Wrong or Hyped By the Bush White House?”, The Washington Post) regarding the chemical weapons that Iraq may have. In this respect, based on the development of historical processes, it can be thought that some military interventions made in conjunction with elements such as violence and terror involve different power motivations in the background. When the Iraq war enters its fourth year, in the Washington Post survey, half of Americans declaring negative views on Islam (Claudia Deane & Darryl Fears, 2006, “Negative Perception Of Islam Increasing Poll Numbers in U.S. Higher Than in 2001”, The Washington Post) does not appear to be an accidental rate in this context:

“President Bush announced today that the United States would try to deliver \$320 million in food and medical supplies to help Afghanistan’s population survive the approaching winter. The announcement appeared aimed at winning over the Afghan people even as Mr. Bush tries to undermine the Taliban government and perhaps deal it a military blow for harboring Osama bin Laden.

Hours later Mr. Bush’s national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, promised a much broader American effort to contribute to “the reconstruction of Afghanistan” once the Taliban was replaced by a government that did not repress its people.

While American officials have stopped short of declaring the overthrow of the Taliban an explicit goal of the administration, the president told a cheering crowd of State Department employees today that the food aid is our way of saying that while we firmly and strongly oppose the Taliban regime, we are friends of the Afghan people.” (David E. Sanger & Jane Perlez, 2001, “A Nation Challenged: Food And Medicine; Bush Plans to Send \$320 Million In Food and Medicine to Afghans”, The New York Times).

## Conclusion and Evaluation

The terrorist attacks carried out in the USA on September 11, 2001 were a turning point in world history and brought about a change process in which the international system was directly affected by the consequences. In this period when US security strategies were restructured due to terrorist acts, the most important goal of American foreign policy was to protect national interests and, in this context, to fight terrorism wherever in the world. The USA, which carried out interventions in certain countries in the Middle East on the grounds that it supported terrorism in the future, took the first step in this way by initiating a military operation in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, on the grounds that it protected terrorists. Rather than bringing peace and stability to the region, this process, which caused a political atmosphere in which innocent civilians were killed and chaos prevailed, was handled in the American media in line with the policy determined by the state. Not only was it media propaganda, but also in this process, this situation was legitimized within the state by legal decisions.

In the process of making the world accept the perception of “Islamic terrorism”, which the USA claimed to have been exposed after the September 11, both this legal legitimacy situation and media organs were used strongly by the US political authorities. This approach, also known as the “Bush Doctrine”, left the enemy undefined and thus created the opportunity for the USA to hit any target it wanted in line with the aim of globalizing its hegemony. The Bush Doctrine was clearly expressed in the principles contained in the “US National Security Strategy” report, which was made public in September 2002. The principle of using the preemptive attack method against rogue states and terrorist organizations that possess or try to possess weapons of mass destruction, which is included in the National Security Strategy, has ensured the legitimization of military interventions. In addition, preventive attack has been seen as a method to promote democracy, peace and human rights all over the world, especially in the Islamic World (Ataman & Gökcan, p. 220). This state-centered attitude, developed through the use of the legal order, has shown the seriousness of the United States to the whole world. In the context of using the media as the second tool in this process of “adoption”, the US and European media were used in depth to legitimize the event, high-investment TV series such as Homeland containing the idea of Islamic terrorism were shot and awards were presented to them by the then President Obama. The use of victimization as a strategy and thus the legitimization of the offensive was thus achieved. As a result, the terrorist muslim metaphor has become an ordinary image that is recognized not only by the American citizen but also by the whole world.

After this strong policy of the USA, European countries also gave the necessary support, and after the USA administration sent forces to this country on the grounds of fighting terrorism, after the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers on September 9, 2001, on the grounds that the attacks originated from Afghanistan, NATO became one of the “allies” for the first time in its history and introduced Article 5 of the North Atlantic Pact, which considers an attack on one to be done against all Allies. NATO has kept the International Afghanistan Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in this country for a long time. NATO forces had just over 9,500 troops in Afghanistan as of February 2021. Of these, 2,500 were American soldiers, and the rest were world country soldiers, including NATO’s mission in Afghanistan (Anadolu Agency, 2021, “Uncertainty prevails after the US decision to withdraw from Afghanistan” (ABD’nin Afganistan’dan çekilme kararı sonrası belirsizlik hâkim). Despite

the fact that the world states support the expansionism of the USA in Afghanistan with such a strong force, the US President Joe Biden independently announced his plan to leave Afghanistan and announced that the troops will begin to withdraw from Afghanistan from May 1. The decision of the US to withdraw from Afghanistan alone, without meeting with its allies, has created a state of concern among all the countries of the world, but the main US allies such as European countries, in fact, should not trust the US too much and they realized that how the US will react in case of possible attacks was a question mark. European leaders, who were of the opinion that soldiers from 36 countries were endangered during the withdrawal in Afghanistan, a NATO mission, due to the lack of coordination of their US allies, and reevaluated their expectations about the US, began to build a future that is less dependent on the US (BBC News, 2021, "Afghanistan crisis: How Europe's relationship with Joe Biden turned sour")

Despite the fact that the years-long Afghanistan occupation resulted in a defeat in the eyes of the countries that supported the USA and these countries experienced a state of awakening in the context of the individual policy of the USA; as a result of these years, Islamophobia has become ingrained in the USA and Europe today and has become a prejudice that complicates the daily life of Muslims. In other words, the contents of the New York Times in 2001 included in this article seriously served today's perception of "anti-Islam and fear". Because, the articles in The New York Times, the long-established US media organ, did not objectively mention terrorist acts in some of the the news published between September 11 & October 7, and these attacks were considered as a terrorist movement against the West by the Muslim Eastern community. Orientalist elements such as not perceiving terrorists as an independent violent group and focusing on the entire Middle East as the center of these acts of violence, discourses of the perception of Muslim Easterners that will cause an atmosphere of fear on US citizens, positioning Muslims side by side with barbarism and the emphasis on the peace-making mission of USA for the solution of problems in the Middle East, appear in newspaper articles as part of a particular discourse. This approach, which brings along the fear of Islam called Islamophobia, does not seem compatible with an objective understanding of news.

In the context of the development of global understanding and the continuity of universal peace, especially on the leading media organs of the great states, it is obvious that a discourse language framing a certain religion and region around various attributes will have a negative impact. Racism and extremism are not an inherent characteristic, and the organic association of any religious or race member with backwardness and violence should not be seen as a reasonable form of understanding. As a matter of fact, the data we have obtained from the articles we have examined shows that the language of journalism in the New York Times consists of discourses that serve to perceive the process as a "war of religion" by commemorating terrorism and Islam side by side, a constant "flow of bad news" is ensured and this inevitably affects the American people's approach to Islam and the Middle East negatively. The negative consequences of the US interventions in different Middle Eastern countries, especially Afghanistan, by citing September 11 as the reason, bring to mind that these political processes can be carried out with the aim of legitimizing different goals. In addition, it is obvious to what extent the orientalist and terror-oriented discourse language, which we put forward in the example of The New York Times newspaper, has served in the escalation of Islamophobia in Western countries in the last 20 years.

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