

# PERCEPTIONS

## JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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Ukraine: A New Version of Active Neutrality  
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Rethinking Actor and Order with Complexity  
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# PERCEPTIONS

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## ARTICLE

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# Türkiye's Foreign Policy vis-à-vis the War in Ukraine: A New Version of Active Neutrality

Armağan GÖZKAMAN\*

### Abstract

*Facing one of the biggest military crises on the European continent, Turkish foreign policy has shown strong features of an updated version of active neutrality. The present research revolves around five main axes that characterize the endeavor of Turkish authorities: High-level mediation efforts, condemnation of—and political position toward—the war, synchronization with the Transatlantic Alliance, military cooperation with Ukraine, adherence to the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits and political relations with the Russian Federation. Türkiye's foreign policy setting has led to a stronger diplomatic visibility for the country and serves the objective of establishing it as an indispensable, front-line diplomatic actor.*

### Keywords

Turkish foreign policy, Russia-Ukraine war, active neutrality, Russia, Ukraine

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## Introduction

The war that Russia has been waging in Ukraine since the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 2022 has been a major issue affecting peace and stability with repercussions that go well beyond the Ukrainian borders. Already in 2014, Russia had annexed Crimea following the Ukrainian Revolution and orchestrated a secessionist movement in Eastern Ukraine that led to a protracted conflict between Kiev and the self-proclaimed “popular republics” of Luhansk and Donetsk. As a prelude to the annexation, the Kremlin recognized the two breakaway regions. Only three days after this decision, and just minutes before from the Russian armed forces’ attack on Ukraine, Putin laid out the “reasons” why the latter was necessary: In his view, Ukraine was part of Russia and had no right to statehood. Further, he claimed that it was under neo-Nazi rule that was persecuting the Russian minority; it was therefore necessary to demilitarize and de-nazify the country.<sup>1</sup>

As a key regional power and neighbor to both of the belligerents via the Black Sea basin, Türkiye had to assume an important role in the mediation processes, which proved extremely difficult from the very beginning. This role emerged from Türkiye’s deliberate choice of active neutrality. Thus, Ankara preserved relations simultaneously with Kyiv and Moscow. The country also succeeded in maintaining its position as an acceptable mediator. Türkiye had adopted its active neutrality policy earlier on, during WWII, vis-à-vis the Axis and Allied powers. To understand the new version, it is important to understand (1) the principles of foreign policy that determine Türkiye’s diplomatic moves, (2) how Ankara positions Türkiye with regard to the conflict, (3) the decision to close the Turkish straits to warships of the belligerent sides, (4) Türkiye’s attachment to the Transatlantic Alliance, (5) its defense cooperation with Ukraine and (6) the preservation of its relations with Russia.

## Turkish Foreign Policy Principles regarding the Conflict

In line with the “peace at home, peace abroad” principle that has been adopted since the proclamation of the Republic, Türkiye prioritizes

peace, stability and prosperity among its foreign policy principles. Next, the objective of implementing “enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy” stands out in Türkiye’s relations with the outside world.<sup>2</sup> At this point, it is important to emphasize the logical connection between the adjective “enterprising” and the country’s willingness to take initiatives. One can argue that Turkish foreign policy makers are disposed to undertake regional and global responsibilities.

The above-mentioned guiding lines and policy choices inevitably lead to an active diplomacy with a multitude of geographic and thematic scopes, for which Türkiye has a plethora of assets, including a unique geographical location, considerable economic and human resources and a strong diplomatic tradition bolstered by a large diplomatic network. It is therefore not surprising to see Türkiye’s specific position in many international organizations; when it comes to conflict resolution and mediation, its key role is evident, particularly in the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

Since the beginning of the war of 2022, Türkiye has aimed to implement a foreign policy that has taken shape on three grounds: Reacting against Russia’s unjust war while remaining an acceptable mediator for Moscow, maintaining good relations with Ukraine to continue to be among the potential guarantors in a future peace scenario and remaining on the same side with its Western (in particular, North Atlantic) partners. This highly delicate, three-pillar balance is difficult to maintain, yet Türkiye has been very successful in making it work. It should be noted that, while pursuing and seeking to maximize its national interests, Türkiye has endeavored to regain importance after a relatively long period of problems with its allies, with the aim of improving relations with traditional allies such as the US and the EU. A tangible improvement of relations will indeed require long-term efforts; nonetheless, proving an effective mediator in a conflict of such magnitude would be a very important achievement for Türkiye.

In addition to the objectives outlined above, the search for international prestige has been among the motivations of Turkish foreign policy. This search for prestige may relate to its intrinsic value or a specific objective.<sup>3</sup> In the Turkish case, an objective that particularly stands

**In the Turkish case, an objective that particularly stands out is to establish a position as a pivotal diplomatic actor.**

out is to establish a position as a pivotal diplomatic actor. Domestically, policymakers in Ankara have enjoyed widespread support. Turkish society has been highly attuned to the Ukrainian people's

suffering and has supported Ankara's efforts to alleviate the humanitarian tragedy in the region. According to a survey carried out in late February 2022, around 69% of the respondents affirmed that Russia was waging an unjust war in Ukraine.<sup>4</sup> A month after the war started, public approval for Türkiye's neutral policy vis-à-vis the two belligerents was as high as 91.5%.<sup>5</sup> To the question, "How do you interpret the [official] visits of several statesmen and state representatives to Türkiye since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war?" 60.6% of the participants chose to answer that their Republic had become a "determining power" in foreign policy.<sup>6</sup>

With this popular support, Türkiye has demonstrated strong activism and carried out various mediation efforts through a very careful, balance-based approach. On February 24, the Foreign Ministry's press release hinted at Ankara's position by "rejecting" the "unacceptable" Russian operation that "violates" international law and "threatens" regional and global security. Soon afterward, phone calls between the defense ministers of Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine<sup>7</sup> preceded the hosting of the first high-level tripartite meeting with the presence of Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers in Antalya.<sup>8</sup> Following Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu's separate meetings with Sergei Lavrov and Dmitri Kuleba in Moscow and Lviv, respectively, Istanbul hosted peace talks between delegations from the two countries in late March. Türkiye's mediation efforts paved the way for the agreement reached in July 2022 between Russia and Ukraine on the safe dispatch of foodstuff and fertilizers from Ukrainian ports. Abroad, Türkiye's pivotal role in the process has been recognized as essential.<sup>9</sup>

## Condemnation of the War and Adherence to a Pro-Ukrainian Alliance of States

On February 22, Türkiye denounced Russia's recognition of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. In line with Ankara's support of Ukraine's sovereignty since the invasion of Crimea in 2014, a declaration of the Turkish Presidency pointed to the impossibility of accepting the above-mentioned recognition on the grounds that Ukraine's political unity and territorial integrity had been violated. It is therefore not surprising to see Ankara among the capitals that were quick to reprimand the military attack that started on the 24<sup>th</sup> of February, and to call for a ceasefire.

Ankara's diplomacy proved Türkiye's solidarity with a large group of states that aimed for a rapid cessation of Russian hostilities so that a peaceful end to the conflict could be reached. This credo determined Türkiye's position during the votes in the UN

General Assembly's (UNGA) 11<sup>th</sup> emergency session, which aimed to address the above-mentioned hostilities. One of the six main organs of the UN, the UNGA is a platform of deliberation to which all 193 members of the Organization send representatives. Ankara, as other capitals do, attaches particular importance to this UN body, for a number of reasons -despite the fact that the resolutions voted there are not legally binding. Legitimacy is one of them: Resolutions determine the appropriateness and moral acceptability of foreign policy decisions. The number of states that endorse them matters.

The UNGA is also a kind of barometer that demonstrates political inclinations within the UN: Debates and voting processes display member state's attitudes and preferences vis-à-vis the items on the institution's agenda. These preferences give rise to groupings that reveal which states subscribe to a given cause and form a kind of alliance while others adopt an opposing view or refrain from taking sides openly. What is more, the level of endorsement for an UNGA resolution indicates how

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strong international public opinion is. It is plausible to say that these two variables are connected: When public opinion rallies around an important question such as the conflict in Ukraine, the vote in the General Assembly has a higher chance of reaching the qualified majority.<sup>10</sup>

On March 2, Türkiye was among the 141 states that aligned themselves with UNGA resolution ES-11/1 condemning Russian “aggression” on Ukrainian soil “in the strongest terms” and demanding the withdrawal of all Russian forces from the country. Belarus’ involvement in the aggression against Ukraine, along with Russia’s decision to recognize the two breakaway republics in Donetsk and Luhansk, were also subject to condemnation in the text. These statements were largely in line with the foreign policy decisions adopted in Ankara.

The text of ES-11/1 includes a call on the belligerents to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure.<sup>11</sup> The second resolution elaborated during the 11<sup>th</sup> emergency session and endorsed by 140 states, including Türkiye, focused more on humanitarian concerns and reiterated the call for Russia to withdraw its forces from Ukraine.<sup>12</sup> The third resolution merits special attention, as it relates directly to discussions regarding UN reform and indicates Türkiye’s position toward this matter. As mentioned above, the UNGA has the prerogative to discuss issues pertaining to international peace and security, and can refer them to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) when “action is necessary”. Cataclysm within tragedy, the aggressor in Ukraine is a permanent member of the UNSC whose veto power makes the institution ineffective. Elaborated in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the third resolution is in fact a meaningful contribution to efforts to address the problem of inertia on a broader scale. Türkiye has clearly taken a place among the states that sponsored the resolution and consequently voted in its favor.

On April 7, 2022, the UNGA adopted Resolution ES-11/3 to suspend Russia’s membership rights in the UN Human Rights Council<sup>13</sup> because of “grave concern at the ongoing human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine” and “gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights.”<sup>14</sup> Türkiye was again among the 93 UN member states that voted in favor of the UN text and proved once more its choice to side with the international community.

## The Regime of Turkish Straits: A Focal Point in the Conflict

Türkiye was the first state to qualify the Russian invasion as “war”. The country consequently invoked Article 19 of the Montreux Convention and closed the Turkish Straits to the war vessels of belligerent states, namely Russia and Ukraine. A peculiar aspect of the conflict in Ukraine is that access to the Black Sea is possible via the Strait of Çanakkale and the Strait of Istanbul, which are both subject to Turkish sovereignty. Early in the conflict, the Ukrainian Ambassador in Ankara requested that Turkish authorities close the Straits to Russian vessels intended for naval warfare.<sup>15</sup> Since 1936, the provisions of the Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of Turkish Straits gives Türkiye the right—and the obligation—to do so in wartime. Türkiye’s qualification of Russia’s aggression as war on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February<sup>16</sup> was more than a discursive act: It laid the legal ground for the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Convention.

Taking the decision to close the Straits to warships of the belligerents was not easy. The decision is the outcome of a comprehensive evaluation process, as it had the potential to bring about serious consequences for Ankara: Moscow could take it as an offence and Ankara could lose its neutral position—to which it has attached extreme importance since the beginning of the conflict. Nonetheless, it was incumbent on Türkiye to implement the relevant provisions of the Convention impartially. That is exactly what it did by invoking Article 19.<sup>17</sup>

Much to Ankara’s pleasure, international reactions have been positive. Three of them merit highlighting. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken “appreciated” Türkiye’s implementation of the Montreux Convention and Ankara’s official position on the issue, as declared by the Turkish foreign minister himself, and the country’s valuable support for Ukraine.<sup>18</sup> Russian Ambassador to Türkiye, Aleksey Yerhov, also expressed his appreciation for Türkiye’s compliance with the Convention.<sup>19</sup> Maria Zakharova, Spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, was among the political figures that expressed satisfaction regarding this decision.<sup>20</sup> Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy affirmed his gratitude as well. In a social media message that echoed the statement of the U.S. Secretary of State, Zelenskyy emphasized Türkiye’s preven-

tion of Russian war vessels' entry into the Black Sea and its considerable military and humanitarian support.<sup>21</sup>

Implementing the Montreux Convention has therefore been an occasion for Ankara to garner two major benefits. First, it proved once again Türkiye's geopolitical importance. The country's strategic geographical location positions Türkiye in the spotlight at a highly critical juncture. Second, the decision to close the Straits has consolidated Türkiye's pivotal role in the conflict, both for the warring parties and Türkiye's allies.

### Solidarity with NATO despite the “Red Lines”

Although Ukraine is not a member of NATO, it gained a seat in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council soon after announcing independence in 1991 and took part in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework in 1994. A NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) crowned the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership (CDP) in 1997; the CDP reflects the highest level of political commitment that both sides have agreed to undertake.<sup>22</sup> The NUC has been highly instrumental for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration and has paved the way for further cooperation, including Ukraine's active contribution to allied operations and missions.

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 led NATO to attach particular importance to supporting capability development in Ukraine. On grounds of sovereignty and territorial integrity, NATO and its member states deplored and denounced not only the annexation, but also the recognition of two breakaway republics in the Donbass region along with the current military attack. Within NATO, a high level of support followed this condemnation to uphold Kiev's legitimate and legal right of self-defense.

Practical assistance accompanied the political support. Since 2014, NATO has multiplied its support to Ukraine by enhancing existing programs and adding new ones. Additional support came from member states in bilateral frameworks as well. After all, Ukraine was seen as a distinctive partner by the allies. The Bucharest summit of 2008 had already given a green light to a future membership of Ukraine. The

declaration of 2009 that aimed to complement the CDP also set up the prospect of membership for Ukraine. Yet the post-2014 period and especially the ongoing invasion have put this prospect on hold. Because Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the Russian assault does not trigger the mutual defense clause under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore, the Alliance focuses on Ukraine's capability development and capacity building while providing financial and military assistance to the country.

From the inception of the conflict in Ukraine, Ankara has clearly shown its position of full commitment to the NATO alliance while preventing confrontation with Russia through meticulous diplomatic moves. Türkiye's reaction against the invasion was in line with its solidarity with NATO. It was also in line with the position of the European Union. The simultaneous and seemingly contradictory processes remind the outside world of Türkiye's value as an ally. What is remarkable about this value relates to a region that has a specific importance for the Alliance: Russia's ongoing attack against Ukraine goes beyond a mere military conflict—it represents a confrontation between democratic ideals and the Kremlin's revisionism which is a clear breach of the international law.<sup>23</sup> Türkiye therefore holds a key position in a region where the future of Europe unfolds.

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Finland and Sweden's decision to join NATO constitute a point that deserves attention for this study. Ankara clearly delineated its early objections to their inclusion and sought to maximize its national interests without putting the Alliance's forthcoming enlargement in peril. It was difficult to expect, from the beginning of the so-called crisis, a veritable veto against the enlargement. In principle, Türkiye has never been against the accession of new members to NATO. What Ankara did was in fact to use a window of opportunity that made it possible for Turkish policymakers to raise two issues that have been generating dissatisfaction: the support provided to the Kurdistan Workers' Party

(PKK)—especially by Sweden—and the arm export ban that these two states had imposed on Türkiye. Ankara managed to bring these issues to international public attention without creating a predicament for the Alliance.

Much ink has been spilled on a completely different scenario that Turkish authorities are assumed to have planned. Put simply, a blockage of Finland and Sweden's accession, even if not successful, would please Russia and ameliorate Russo-Turkish relations. According to this view, Ankara had planned to kill two birds with one stone: to negotiate with Helsinki and Stockholm to obtain concessions, and to consolidate its partnership with Moscow. At least two arguments refute this assumption. First, as noted above, Ankara was not against the idea of enlargement, and unambiguously put the emphasis on two, security-related issues. It was obvious that it would withdraw its objection as soon as it secured the necessary pledges from Helsinki and Stockholm. Second, the logic of the assumption entails that Ankara would definitely block the Alliance's expansion to Nordic territories. Türkiye would not give a go-ahead to the two candidates, the argument goes (as Türkiye in fact did at the Madrid Summit of June 2022), because if it did, Türkiye's relations with Russia would seriously deteriorate. This scenario would indeed be unacceptable for a state that seeks to remain a crucial diplomatic actor at any cost. The facts of the outcome and Türkiye's transparency in accepting the enlargement once Finland and Sweden's side of the bargain was sealed reveal the truth of its intentions.

## Defense Cooperation with Ukraine

Türkiye has not only reprimanded Russian actions in the region, but has intensified relations with Ukraine on various grounds. The military field is particularly important in this regard, due to Turkish-made Bayraktar drones. The Bayraktar system's effectiveness is a justification of earlier "tests". The TB-2s proved very effective during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of 2020 when Azerbaijan relied heavily on them against Armenian forces on the front line. Due to the key role that Bayraktar played in this conflict, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev awarded the company's Chief Technology Officer (CTO), Selçuk Bayraktar, with

the 'Karabakh Order'.<sup>24</sup> Previously, in Libya, the same drone system contributed to an operational success when used together with Turkish naval units in support of the UN-backed Libyan government's military operation to Al-Watiya air base.<sup>25</sup> Northern Syria is another region where the drone system showed its value.<sup>26</sup>

Due to the advantages that the unmanned military system presents,<sup>27</sup> it has been easy for the Turkish company to export its products to Ukraine. It is important to underline that drone exportation to Ukraine is part of a broader setting where Ankara and Kiev have pledged closer cooperation in defense procurement. The two nations aim at technology transfer and joint fabrication of drones and have agreed to diversify their commercial transactions in the military field. It is in this context that Ukraine has ordered naval units from Türkiye. The Turkish and Ukrainian presidents have also signed an agreement regarding space technology that includes the coproduction of a rocket launcher.

Many commentaries have highlighted the fact that Turkish drones have had a major impact on the war in Ukraine. Various success stories in various geographies have drawn attention to how the nature of the war has changed. These successful missions have catalyzed the debates on the future of conflict.<sup>28</sup> Thanks to their low-cost, real-time intelligence gathering capacity and high-precision strike capability, TB-2s have helped reduce the asymmetry of military power between Kiev and Moscow. As Ukraine's Air Force spokesperson Yuri Ignat notes, drone tech has given the Ukrainian army a "qualitative edge" over the Russian forces.<sup>29</sup>

On the downside, there is a risky scenario in which Türkiye could lose its neutral position in Putin's eyes due to its heavy involvement in Ukraine's resistance against the Russian military offense. Türkiye's military support has been revolutionary in the sense that it has seriously altered the flow of the war by creating an unexpected advantage with drone technology and boosting the morale of the Ukrainian nation.

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This could seriously deteriorate Türkiye's relations with Russia. Much to Ankara's relief, this scenario has not come to pass—yet. Nevertheless, the risk remains present at the time of this writing and will obviously become more pressing in time. On various occasions, Russian authorities have complained about the Turkish exportation of drones to Ukraine. That the transactions have taken place between private companies—not between states—does not prevent the Kremlin's ire. Nor does the fact that drone exportation to Ukraine started in 2019.

The following statements of the President of Türkiye's Defense Industries, İsmail Demir, illustrate the concern in the Turkish capital:

“Türkiye is the only country, I guess, that can give a call to both parties and invite them to the peace table. How can you do this if you send tens of thousands of weapons to one side? (...) We are much more careful. (...) We have to be able to talk to both sides, someone should be close enough to both parties to build trust. Our priority is to make sure that peace prevails.”<sup>30</sup>

It seems possible to present the opening of a factory in Ukraine as a way out of this predicament. Even before the Russia-Ukraine war, the production of Turkish drones on Ukrainian soil had become a matter of consensus between the two states. The tragedy that unfolded after February 24 has certainly slowed down the project but has not led to its cancellation.<sup>31</sup> The reason one can expect that the Kremlin will not object to a common production facility relates to Türkiye's earlier political choices: Ankara opposed Western sanctions against Russia and consequently refused to enforce them, and has not banned Russian commercial aircraft from Turkish airspace.

## Good Relations with Russia in spite of all the “Risks”

In order to ensure the confidence of both Kiev and Moscow, Ankara has endeavored to keep the same distance toward and maintain good relations, as much as possible, with the two capitals. This made it necessary for Turkish policymakers to make political choices and undertake economic initiatives simultaneously with both countries.

The Sochi meeting held between the Turkish and Russian presidents on August 5, 2022, is emblematic in this regard. Among the meeting's outcomes, the agreement on payment in rubles stands out.<sup>32</sup> The adoption of the Russian payment system (MIR)

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by five Turkish banks should be interpreted in this context. The Central Bank of Russia implemented the card payment system in 2017, and the ending of Visa, Mastercard and American Express operations in the country made MIR the main corporation for electronic fund transfers. Another important decision that came out of the bilateral summit in Sochi had to do with Türkiye's partial payment for Russian natural gas in rubles.<sup>33</sup> The political significance of this decision merits highlighting; on March 23, Vladimir Putin had announced—as a reaction to the military support provided to Ukraine—that Gazprom would not accept payments in euros or dollars from “unfriendly” countries.

Ankara's decision to adopting the Russian payment system and make payments to Russian companies in Russian currency has generated concern in Western countries, as has the increase in commercial relations between Ankara and Moscow. In the first seven months of 2022, an increase of 19.5% was observed in Türkiye's exports to Russia compared to the previous year, when the trade relations between the two countries remained limited due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Imports driven by the significant rise in global oil and natural gas prices as well as Türkiye's growing energy demands leapt by 112.9%, reflecting an increase in trade of more than \$17 billion in favor of Russia. In July alone, the rise in imports reached 75.2%, while 78.4 percentage points of growth were measured for exports compared to 2021. In volume, the increase in Turkish imports from Russia was more than \$1.9 billion.<sup>34</sup> Western politicians and analysts have interpreted these increases as the Kremlin's effort to compensate for its losses due to international sanctions.

That the expansion of commercial and financial relations between Türkiye and Russia could undermine the Western sanctions was stated explicitly in a letter that Wally Adeyemo, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of

the Treasury, sent to the American Chamber of Commerce in Türkiye in August 2022. With his letter, Mr. Adeyemo warned that Turkish firms could face U.S. sanctions if they enter into commercial activities with the Russian individuals under sanctions.<sup>35</sup> Although discussions have not taken place at the EU level, some media outlets pointed to the possibility that member states could consider financial restrictions or reductions vis-à-vis Turkish firms. A call on Western companies to leave Türkiye was among the options.<sup>36</sup>

Turkish authorities rely on at least two arguments to counter such proposals. First, Türkiye is already among the states suffering the most from the consequences of the war in Ukraine. To subscribe to the international sanctions would have devastating effects for the Turkish economy, as the Western partners can well understand. Second, Türkiye has struggled hard to keep diplomatic channels open with Putin's Russia and has undertaken many high-level initiatives. Some of Ankara's achievements have proven highly useful not only for Turkish interests but also for the entire world. The most prominent example is certainly the grain export corridor brokered by Ankara in close cooperation with the United Nations. In less than a month after the signing of the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports, more than 660,000 tons of agricultural product was authorized to leave Ukrainian ports.<sup>37</sup>

## Conclusion

At the time of writing, the cessation of Russian hostilities in Ukraine remains elusive. This renders diplomatic channels all the more important, and Türkiye's contributions all the more valuable. Türkiye's high level of efforts demonstrate the value that Ankara attaches to the resolution of the conflict. There are reasonable grounds to believe that that this perception in the Turkish capital will not change in the future.

**Türkiye's high level of efforts demonstrate the value that Ankara attaches to the resolution of the conflict.**

As mentioned in the introductory section above, the objective of this study is to demonstrate that, since the onset of the war Russia has been waging in Ukraine, pol-

icymakers in Ankara have pursued a policy of active neutrality built on three pillars. The first of these is political and military support to Ukraine. Kyiv has looked to Ankara as a guarantor for a possible peace process since the inception of Russian assault. It seems necessary to underscore that this has much to do with the attitude that Ankara has consistently maintained since 2014, when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and the conflict in Donbass started.

The second pillar has to do with relations between Ankara and Moscow. Despite intermittent clashes of interests and political divergences that sometimes infringe upon Türkiye's vital interests, Turkish policymakers still strive to develop strategic relations with Russia. The two states are in a special relationship characterized by a complicated nesting of strategic connections. Thus, for instance, Ankara does not participate in the Western sanctions toward Moscow. Instead, the two countries create new economic and financial frameworks together. This cooperation guarantees a front-line diplomatic position for Türkiye. A point that merits particular attention is that keeping diplomatic channels open with the Russian executive is extremely difficult, and Türkiye is among the very few international actors that are able to do it.

The third pillar involves Türkiye's relations with the "West," where the Transatlantic Alliance has a particular standing. As noted above, Türkiye's reactions to the conflict in Ukraine have exhibited a significant degree of alignment with Western partners, even when unity was not always easy to find within NATO or the EU with regard to Russia. The diplomatic visibility that emanates from Türkiye's mediation efforts has had a highly positive impact for its prestige vis-à-vis the Western world. Such visibility suits Türkiye's objective to establish itself as a pivotal diplomatic actor in the international arena.

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## ARTICLE

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# Rethinking Actor and Order with Complexity Theory: A Novel Approach to Diplomacy

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### Abstract

*This paper aims to analyze how changing patterns about notions of “actor” and “order” in international relations inform the practices of diplomacy through the framework of complexity theory in an age of uncertainty. To this end, concepts in complexity theory—nonlinearity, network, emergence and co-evolution—are used as analysis tools to revisit actor and order. The main findings of the research suggest that changing global dynamics lead to the emergence of a complex adaptive international system encouraging scholars and practitioners to rethink actor and order. Four findings about the practice of diplomacy also emerge due to this new theoretical analysis: First, understandings of order in the international system have evolved to reflect a more regional-centered approach rather than a global one. Second, the diversification of actors and interactions in the international system directly change the nature of diplomacy, now conceived as a process that evolves in a networked-based relationship. Third, the dominant consequences of participating in a complex, adaptive system are interdependence and co-evolution between actors within diplomacy. Lastly, policymakers have increased their ability to navigate inherent uncertainties and expand the purview of diplomacy to include non-traditional diplomatic agents.*

### Keywords

Complexity theory, diplomacy, co-evolution, international system, network

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## Introduction

International relations (IR) can be deemed a dynamic and fluid branch of the social sciences. Although it is a young field compared to other social science fields, its theoretical and practical discussions have generated a notable accumulation of knowledge. IR's main concepts, such as order and actor, have been the focal point of various theories and approaches. Prevailing questions include how international order emerges and changes over time and how diversity and interactions among actors influence international relations and the practice of diplomacy. Although there is a broad literature about these concepts and questions, very few studies have attempted to understand the new dynamics of the international system and the changing nature of the practice of diplomacy. Indeed, IR theories have always struggled to bridge the gap between reality and theorizing.

The end of the Cold War triggered a rethinking of international relations from a broader sense of understanding due to changing social, economic and political dynamics, along with discussions of globalization and glocalization. In this respect, whatever the outcome of the international system debate, most IR researchers are revisiting their approaches in light of more complex, multifactor-structured, interconnected and nonlinear assumptions to better understand the system's changing dynamics and their consequences. These developments have compelled academics and practitioners alike to approach international relations from a multidisciplinary perspective.

Complexity theory (CT) and its properties have emerged as a tool with which to understand social phenomena in the last two decades, and may also be an alternative tool to bridge the present gap in the IR literature. CT is an umbrella approach for all nonlinear approaches.<sup>1</sup> Nonlinearity, network, emergence and co-evolution are essential concepts that elucidate the understanding of complex systems, and thus may be used to revisit order and actor in IR.

The practice of diplomacy has a long history that has evolved as actors have diversified through time. As well as the concepts of order and actor, IR theories fail to adequately address the implications of the practice of diplomacy, which is why complexity theory is both helpful theoretically and brings new understanding to the practice of diplomacy.

With this in mind, the present article revisits IR's notions of order and actor through the lens of complexity theory and its properties to provide a new angle for diplomacy and diplomats. The first section presents a broad summary of the debates in traditional IR theories about order and actors. The second part offers an explanation of complexity theory and its five main components: multi-actors, nonlinearity, network, emergence and co-evolution. The third section presents an analysis of the concepts of order and actor with reference to the properties of complexity theory within a complex, adaptive international system approach. The fourth part touches upon how networks are influential in diplomacy, while the final section imagines the implications of CT for the practice of diplomacy, particularly in terms of the concepts of interdependence and co-evolution.

**Complexity theory (CT) and its properties have emerged as a tool with which to understand social phenomena in the last two decades, and may also be an alternative tool to bridge the present gap in the IR literature.**

## Actor and Order in IR: From Past to Present

The conceptualization of order and actor is a widely discussed problem in the field of IR. First of all, world order itself is a contentious concept, difficult to tie down to a single definition, but is often used in the discipline of IR.<sup>2</sup> Within the various definitions of order that will be discussed in this section, rare junctures have been considered to determine order in international relations. These turning points occur during periods of great upheaval and change in the international system, when the old order is shattered by war, and powerful actors (generally states) attempt to re-establish basic organizing principles and arrangements as a new order. Second, the definition of actors is one of the main focal points of IR theories, and is the subject of ongoing ontological and epistemological debates regarding who can act, and how, in international systems. The problem of actor is highly correlated with the level of analysis in the discipline, which makes discussions about actors additionally contested.

As mentioned above, different IR theories define “order” and “actor” in different manners in terms of how they are structured through rules, interactions, institutions, laws and norms within the developing and perpetuating patterns of relating and acting referred to as the international system.<sup>3</sup> Starting with the most famous approach, Realism suggests that coercion, hegemony and balance of power are the main determinants of order.<sup>4</sup> Realists claim that state power creates and maintains order, and adjustments in state power distribution are ultimately responsible for changes in order. Realists consider the state as the principal actor in the international system, although they accept that there are other actors with comparatively limited power, which are not their focus in analysis.

Similar to Realism, Neorealism, especially as theorized by Waltz, proposes that non-state actors are obvious, but prefers to focus on the structural relationship between actor and system where the hegemonic state employs power capabilities to organize relations among states, and creates and maintains order.<sup>5</sup> Liberalism questions the state-centrism of Realist approaches in light of the rise of non-state actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs), international and supranational organizations and the transnationally organized groups that emerged during the post-WWII period.<sup>6</sup> Deudney and Ikenberry extend the actor definition of Liberal theory to include a liberal international order that is composed of three elements: international law, free trade and international norms.<sup>7</sup> Later, Constructivists suggested that actors other than states matter in international politics, and that what actors do is heavily impacted by who they are and how they view themselves and others. This self-reflexive turn also formulates actors’ perception about order, which involves changes in state social behavior that influence state perceptions of the international order, as well as state behavior.<sup>8</sup>

As a reaction to traditional IR theories and their assumptions, as briefly outlined above, Critical theory emerged as an umbrella term for theories that address actors who are frequently ignored by traditional theories, like women and those from the Global South. Akin to the perception of actors in CT, there is a claim that traditional IR theories are unjust, as is the international order, from an emancipatory perspective.<sup>9</sup>

## Desperate Need to Rethink IR Theory and the Practice of Diplomacy

Two vital inferences are required to rethink IR theory and its implications for diplomacy. First, alterations to the definition of concepts within different theoretical frameworks can be deemed a result of catastrophic events such as war and ongoing epistemological and ontological discussions. “Traditional” or “mainstream” approaches to IR traditionally argued that there is a visible order in world affairs, from which we may offer explanations and make predictions. The notions that IR is “based on law-like regularities that allow the possibility of making claims about how the ‘international’ system works” and the belief that “there is an external reality of which we can have knowledge...” are the main properties of these theories.

Yet globalization and highly complex social realities have proven that the traditional IR theories are insufficient to explain the highly complex social realities<sup>10</sup> that reflect the structure of the international system and its actors:

“Like other complex ecosystems, such as the nervous system or a rain forest, the international relations system is succumbing to its complexity laws. A central administrator rarely guides the communal actions that characterize development processes in complex organizations.”<sup>11</sup>

Events like 9/11 and global economic crises are concrete cases of unpredictability; they reveal how the dynamics of the world are made up of a complicated mixture of order and disorder.<sup>12</sup> These and other realizations have rendered IR theory particularly receptive to new concepts and ideas from the field of complexity.

Second, interference, mostly related with the practice of diplomacy, is also worth a mention. Diplomacy, at its core, is the peaceful handling of interactions by and among international players, at least one of whom is generally governmental.<sup>13</sup>

**Traditional” or “mainstream” approaches to IR traditionally argued that there is a visible order in world affairs, from which we may offer explanations and make predictions.**

Settings and actors in diplomacy can't escape the changing nature of the international system. However, the literature about diplomacy, the practice of diplomacy and IR theories have had a mutually incognizant relationship for a long time. Diplomacy, according to most IR theories, is superfluous. Because of this, the practice of diplomacy has not played a big role in the inter-paradigm disputes of the last few decades.<sup>14</sup> The glaring gap between theory and practice is related to the deficiency of IR theories in explaining the realities of the international system.

The gap between theory and diplomacy in practice directly reflects on diplomats who, as a profession, conduct major official social, economic and political relations on behalf of their countries. Increasing complexity and diversity in the international system has brought in non-traditional diplomatic agents from various sectors, and the state-centric perspective has started to lose its importance.<sup>15</sup> Not only are non-traditional diplomatic agents involved in diplomacy, the skills required by professional diplomats have changed to accommodate and effectively work in this unpredictable international system—a non-traditional ecosystem. Thus, a nonlinear approach should also address this gap between practice and theory.

## Complexity Theory: Concepts and Beyond

Newton described a universe comprised of particles made of the same material that move in absolute space and time under the control of forces that obey unchanging and universal rules. Mathematically, these laws could be represented precisely. In other words, the Newtonian paradigm views the world as a perfect watch, a mechanism governed by predictability and absolute order. Social science did not escape being viewed from the basis of Newtonian laws. Locke and other early political and social thinkers tried to “reduce the patterns observable in society to the behavior of its members” by following Newton's lead.<sup>16</sup>

However, scientific developments in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially relativity and quantum mechanics, proved that there are limits to the clockwise and linear universe where some phenomena are orderly—and others disorderly. The phrase “complexity theory” has come to refer to a variety of approaches that originated in the natural sciences involving

non-linear, complex and chaotic systems, in contrast to Newtonian science that posits path dependency and predictability.

Complexity is especially sensitive to systemic features and relationships, refuting the reductionist claim that complex systems can be fully comprehended by analyzing their individual pieces. The field of complexity studies poses questions about the inter-twining or inter-connectivity of elements within a system and between a system and its environment. Heterogeneity or diversity in the numerous subsystems of an organization is the focus of complexity theory.<sup>17</sup>

**Complexity is especially sensitive to systemic features and relationships, refuting the reductionist claim that complex systems can be fully comprehended by analyzing their individual pieces.**

Five main concepts have been developed within CT: *complex adaptive system, multi-actor, nonlinearity, network, emergence and co-evolution*.<sup>18</sup> First, many natural systems (brains, immune systems, ecologies, societies) and, increasingly, many artificial systems (parallel and distributed computing systems, artificial intelligence systems, artificial neural networks, evolutionary programs) are characterized by seemingly complex behavior that emerges as a result of often nonlinear spatiotemporal interactions among a large number of component systems at various levels of organization. *Complex adaptive systems* (CAS) are dynamic systems that can adapt to and evolve with their surroundings. It is critical to understand that a system and its environment are inextricably linked, and that a system will constantly adapt to a changing environment.

Second, a *multi-actor* structure can be considered one of the main sources of unpredictability in a system, sourced from interactions across time and space, influencing and being influenced. Actors interact with each other in a *nonlinear* way in endless loops. The nonlinear relationship between actors is considered to be a source of unconventional rules, in contrast to the path dependency structure. Nonlinear interactions create feedback loops in the system which are neither beneficial nor negative in and of themselves. 'Positive' feedback loops are those that establish attractors, or self-reinforcing linkages among co-evolving agents, so that the system creates more of the same behavior.<sup>19</sup> 'Negative' feedback

loops interrupt the existing pattern and generate novelty, leading to innovation in the best-case scenario or putting the “brakes” on what could otherwise become a disastrous spiral in the worst-case scenario. In simple terms, positive feedback means more leads to more, while negative feedback means more leads to less.

Third, *emergence* is one of the distinguishing properties of complex systems; this term is used to describe the patterns, structures and properties seen at the level of the system that cannot be deduced by examining the individual component elements alone.<sup>20</sup> Put more simply, synergism is a function of emergence, in which system-wide traits emerge from interactions among components rather than superposition.

Fourth, unique interactions between actors, between actor and system, and between actor and universe naturally compose *networks*. Networks can take many different forms, but they all consist of nodes and links and are organized horizontally without hierarchy. Nodes can be corporate actors (states or organizations) or individuals. Networks are not merely collections of components, but also interactive agents that self-organize to produce a shared ecology for the larger system. Simply put, there is natural representation of a complex system by means of a network structure.<sup>21</sup>

The last feature of complexity theory is *co-evolution*, which emphasizes that there is no such thing as a self-evolving organism. Co-evolution, as defined by Mitleton-Kelly, is “the evolution of one domain or entity (that) is partially dependent on the evolution of other related domains or entities, or one domain or entity changes in the context of the other(s).”<sup>22</sup> Co-evolution refers to a framework for 1) antecedent conditions; 2) co-evolving activities, actions and processes; and 3) their outcomes.<sup>23</sup>

## Rethinking Actor and Order in a Complex, Adaptive International System

To address the difficulties of studying international relations through the lens of traditional theories, and to bridge the gap between theory and practice, a growing number of scholars have embraced paradigm

change, recognizing the need for flexibility in theoretical discussions and/or the imperative to develop other theories and approaches. In this respect, following the catastrophic paradigm shift in the natural sciences, complex systems have attracted attention in the social sciences.<sup>24</sup> A remarkable amount of literature has emerged about understanding the international system and complex international phenomena that shape perceptions of actor and order, although there are some methodological and ontological limitations.

In order to understand the implications of complexity theory for actor and order, the structure of the international system itself should be the starting point. From a complexity theory perspective, the international system is a complex adaptive system.<sup>25</sup> Tóme and Açıkalin suggest that the international system includes various independent and interdependent actors, from sovereign states to individuals, transnational social movements, international/regional organizations, NGOs, transnational organized crime networks, transnational terrorist groups and multinational corporations.<sup>26</sup> In addition to addressing a diversification of actors, complexity theory implies that these actors interact with each other in a nonlinear trend with infinite numbers.<sup>27</sup> Further, the interactions and societal processes that arise between actors are realized through social construction by the system itself, which is in turn dictated by the self-interests of actors.<sup>28</sup>

Regardless of their size and influence, every political action of actors in the international system has unintended consequences that shape the actions of other actors. In contrast to traditional approaches, CT emphasizes how local interactions can take a central role; this can be formulated in IR as follows: even ordinary individuals are influential in a complex adaptive international system with sensitive initial conditions to create a new order (butterfly effect).<sup>29</sup> A concrete example of this process is the Arab Spring, which started with Bouzazi's self-immolation.<sup>30</sup>

From this interpretation of complexity theory, the multi-actor and nonlinear relationship structure of the complex international system reflects on the understanding of order in the complex in-

**In order to understand the implications of complexity theory for actor and order, the structure of the international system itself should be the starting point.**

ternational system. As a property of complexity theory, emergence in particular has undeniable implications while rethinking order in terms of the multi-actor structure and nonlinear relationship. As Gunitsky points out, emergent qualities imply that the attributes of the international system cannot be derived purely from the characteristics of its constituent parts, in contrast to Waltz.<sup>31</sup> Through this emergence, a phase transition occurs that modifies the initial, lower-level states of the system. One of the distinguishing features of CAS is its capacity to adapt, fluctuating between chaos and order. Emergence renders CAS irreducible; higher-order levels cannot be reduced to their original lower-level states due to their emerging features. As a result, CAS avoids the status quo while preventing utter disorder by functioning between chaos and order. This self-organizing equilibrium enables CAS to learn and grow into a new order.<sup>32</sup>

As mentioned above, interactions between and nonlinear relationships among actors have implications for change in international relations through both positive and negative feedback loops by self-reinforcing and self-dampening in the international system.<sup>33</sup> Examples of both positive and negative feedback can be found with long-term and short-term consequences. Band-wagoning policies by states are one of the long-term impacts of positive feedback loops when a state aspires to join an alliance, and when a state relies on a more powerful partner within an existing alliance for security. Deutsch cites the 1914 armament race and the escalation of mobilization orders throughout Europe as examples of 'positive' feedback, in which an initial action becomes self-reinforcing and creates consequences that increase over time.<sup>34</sup> There is no doubt the 1914 arms races triggered World War I and the catastrophic events that paved the way for WWII and a new order in the international system.

The important feature of every negative feedback is that it reacts to counterbalance, rather than trigger, any changes in the environment. Negative feedback is central to the homeostatic systems that actively maintain the relatively stable conditions necessary for survival. During the Cold War, strategic policy deterrence was primarily geared at stopping hostile power centers—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea—from at-

tacking the U.S. and its close allies.<sup>35</sup> In this regard, the Cold War itself can be considered a long-term example of negative feedback. Although two superpowers competed with each other, this competition created unexpected equilibrium. The resulting equilibrium in the order of the international system lasted for almost 50 years within a bipolar world. It should be noted that because no third country acquired capabilities similar to those of the United States and the Soviet Union, the bipolar system itself has endured. Thus, positive feedback loops in the complex international system are prone to involve change and the emergence of new order, while negative feedback loops maintain the existing order.

Furthermore, complexity theory suggests that multiple subsystems at sublevels in a complex system influence the system's emergent behavior and outcomes. As is known, level of analysis has been always an issue in IR when analyzing change; analyses that only embrace the individual, state and system generally neglect regions that play vital roles as subsystems of global order.<sup>36</sup> Although different parameters are used to define regions as subsystems in IR, the post-Cold War era was marked by self-organizing regions that comprised both continental regional international subsystems (Europe and Southeast Asia) and littoral regional international subsystems (Pacific Rim, Baltic, Caspian).<sup>37</sup> For example, Karaca and Yüce assert that the South and East Asia sub-systems have dominant positions on international petroleum and natural gas transportation lines, as well as leading economic structure in global goods exports and imports, constantly increasing energy demands, and a legal framework organized for international finance and investment centers. This makes them one of the determinant regions in the global order from a relatively wider point of view.<sup>38</sup> Regions as subsystems and their actors are capable of learning and behavior that modifies their own environment and in turn affects the global order.

## Role of Networks in the Complex Adaptive International System

Although the term “network” is relatively new in international relations, the significance of new information technologies was soon recognized. The complex adaptive international system as explained above

includes numerous actors, from states to multinational corporations and international organizations, with interactions propelled by communication and financial flow. Networks are an undeniable reality in the complex adaptive international system in which these actors are embedded. Technology has dramatically improved the ability of peoples and groups to interact across borders, and has expedited and magnified the strength of all types of social and political networks.<sup>39</sup>

Considerations emerging from interactions in a “networked world” must include this larger knowledge of networks when dealing with foreign policy issues. When networks are defined, they may mean multiple things. However, we think of a network as a collection of interconnected entities—in this case, states and non-state actors.<sup>40</sup> From this point of view, rethinking the behavior of actors and diplomacy in a networked world occurs through the concepts of power, cooperation and rivalry.

Hierarchies and networks have different distributions of power. Power in hierarchies is distributed vertically, whereas in networks power is proportional to centrality and the degree of connectedness, with the most powerful nodes being those with the most connections. In other words, power in networks does not imply the ability to command or control others, but rather the ability to interact with and thereby influence others.<sup>41</sup> This is why actors in the complex adaptive international system will pursue and use power through their interactions. Networks impact the behavior of actors and the consequences of their actions. An actors’ behavior is also influenced by the dyads that comprise the network. As a result, explanatory power is assigned to both the network and dyad levels. In addition to this, networks can be used as a source of power for actors in the complex adaptive international system. In this regard, information flows between actors in the network play a crucial role. Bearce and Bondannella suggest that “the more institutionalized states’ networks are, the more power these networks have in influencing their member states’ interests. Through information flows, international networks of states provide greater information about the state of the world, including information about member-states’ capabilities, intentions, and so on.”<sup>42</sup>

In the complex adaptive international system, interconnected entities behave in networks based on cooperation or rivalry. In contrast to tra-

ditional IR theories, states as nodes create network behavior within international organizations through interactions. States do not solely act as rivals or cooperate but rather are involved in competition and cooperation at many scales at the same time. For example, cooperation describes the relational characteristics that exist between states where they are acting in networks such as the United Nations, the European Union (EU) or various regional organizations.<sup>43</sup> Cooperation does not take the form of simple collaborations in these networks. Instead, it is enacted through the interactions of evolving subgroups. Interestingly, in order to compete with one another effectively, those subgroups must develop cooperation within themselves, and they, too, may be able to improve the efficacy of their internal cooperation. Moreover, nested cooperation and rivalry between states as nodes with different sizes can emerge organically. Competition on bigger scales inherently develops collaboration at smaller scales because a group must cooperate in order to effectively compete with another, larger group (large-scale competition).

It should be noted that cooperation within networks lowers the cost of collective action, making large and disparate groups better able to organize and influence others than ever before. For example, although members of the EU have distinct and even competing interests between themselves, they have managed to realize common market and currency policies that allow them to compete with non-EU countries. To cite another example, Crooks and others highlight the United Nations General Assembly voting process as a tangible instance of a state-driven network that conforms to the clustering of states for Syria before and after the Arab Spring.<sup>44</sup>

Individuals are also nodes in networks in the complex, adaptive international system, and have undeniable power as such. Non-formal networks composed of individuals across the world can be considered a new path for public diplomacy. The basic form of this network model

**Power in hierarchies is distributed vertically, whereas in networks power is proportional to centrality and the degree of connectiveness, with the most powerful nodes being those with the most connections.**

includes conferences and international events, which foster the creation of networks between people through which states can informally pursue their public diplomacy goals. This is the sort of diplomacy that does not bind members of the international community.<sup>45</sup> Such flexibility is essential for the improvement of society-level interactions, although it is a long-term process when it comes to consequences. Such networks may reorganize themselves and evolve far more quickly than traditional hierarchies, especially in digital networks. The growth of social media has facilitated the rise of a bottom-up approach to international relations, driven by individuals who build networks that cross national lines.<sup>46</sup> Tahrir Square in Egypt at the beginning of the Arab Spring can be deemed as the most powerful case of how individuals can be effective actors through informal networks via Twitter and other social media platforms, as their coordination resulted in a butterfly effect across the region.<sup>47</sup>

The last point regarding networks is that they do not operate separately in complex adaptive systems, but are all interconnected with each other while also having traditional hierarchies. This is why attempting to shape networks can have repercussions beyond causal relationships and, indeed, beyond state borders; change in one network may result in change within another in an increasingly networked world.<sup>48</sup>

## Implications of CAS for Diplomacy: Co-evolution and Interdependence

The international complex adaptive system and network-based relationships have implications for the practice of diplomacy. In the unpredictable structure of the complex adaptive international system, these implications should be examined within the framework of complexity theory, whose main features are interdependence and co-evolution.

First, interdependence in the complex adaptive international system is both a means and an end. This understanding of interdependence differs from the complex interdependence coined by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s, which had three key characteristics: multiple channels, absence of hierarchy among issues and the minor role of military force, reflecting the Cold war atmosphere. In contrast, interdependence in CAS

is sourced from non-linear interactions between an ever-larger number of different types of actors—which makes interdependence existentially important.

Second, actors are not only interdependent upon each other; complexity is a process that connects actors to a larger (international) system, which is why the two are intricately linked, and neither is reducible to the qualities of the other. When interdependence is an existential reality, actors in the international system intrinsically self-organize to adapt to the emergent dynamics of the international system. In this self-organizing process in relation to their interests, co-evolution is a mutual effect that changes the behavior of interacting elements within a social ecosystem. This mechanism connects adaptive actors in co-evolutionary connections with one another and the wider system. In this manner, co-evolution is essential to actors' survival through interactions; their isolation is almost impossible in the complex adaptive international system. Each actor's co-evolution strategies are determinant on the agenda for diplomacy and may yield cooperation, coordination or additional competition between interconnected agents related to changing dynamics. These strategies may in turn serve as the foundation of emergent properties and interaction with emergent phenomenon via feedback loops in the structure.<sup>49</sup>

Due to interdependence and co-evolution, actors in the complex adaptive international system are more prone to be part of a co-evolution process where policymakers face concrete challenges that develop and pursue long-term goals. Policymakers should encourage the emergence of resilient processes of self-organization, rather than controllable processes, so that one has the “ability to cope successfully with challenging circumstances, to defy destructive pressures, and to construct new proficiency out of unfavorable conditions.”<sup>50</sup> To allow for adaptation and change, one must ‘create ambiguity’. More importantly, international players increasingly “orchestrate” others to achieve the goals of their collaborative agenda.

**The international complex adaptive system and network-based relationships have implications for the practice of diplomacy.**

In this respect, agents and tools of diplomacy are swayed by complex adaptive international systems with network-based relations. Diplomats are not solely professional diplomats anymore; all individuals can be considered diplomats when technological advances, particularly digitalization, impact how a diplomat's job is seen, and increase the number of local and international players who engage in effective activities. Their primary purpose is to foster multilateral contact among diverse entities, both at the official level and among specialists and public personalities from various areas in order to address specific problems and promote national interests. Reaching out to overseas audiences becomes more important for governments as a result of network diplomacy. Building partnerships with NGOs is no longer enough for governments. Facilitating relationships between different types of actors, including epistemic communities, is now in the interests of governments.

When it comes to the skill-set for new-generation diplomats who will engage in diplomacy in the complex adaptive international system and network, the increasingly specialized and technical nature of the discussions and negotiations mean that 1) more personnel with digital literacy are needed to staff foreign ministries; 2) diplomats need to be highly multitasking; 3) experts from various sectors must be brought in as technical advisers and consultants; 4) they should be flexible to accommodate new circumstances that can be revamped in the short term due to nonlinear relationships between actors; and 5) they should be able to cope with long-term, puzzling negotiation processes involving uncertainty. It should be underlined that they should not only keep up with new conditions, but should have the ability to manipulate uncertainties, which is the immanent characteristic of the complex adaptive international system, to their advantage.

## Conclusion

International relations, along with the theoretical and practical aspects of diplomacy, is a dynamic field that includes various approaches and interdisciplinary discussions. Concepts of the international system, actor and order have been contested in terms of their definitions and relations with the notion of power. Traditional theories of IR have been challenged in recent decades, and there is already a gap between prac-

tice and theory. Today, the international system is more complex than ever, characterized by interdependence and nonlinear interactions between diverse actors. In order to grasp the new international system and its implications, complexity theory and its properties will help to redefine actor and order from a more realistic and holistic perspective.

As part of this effort, order and actor should be comprehended within a complex adaptive international system with multiple actors interacting through positive and negative feedback loops that determine changing patterns in the system. The emergence of a new order is due to the butterfly effect, with consequences arising even from simultaneous, small interactions among actors. Also, the self-organizing property of the system allows us to understand how order and change are related to the actors themselves. Within this new theoretical analysis, there are five main findings:

First, change and order are two sides of the same coin in the complex adaptive international system. In other words, order is not long-term equilibrium that can be disrupted at times; rather, change is the nature of the system itself. Second, all actors in the complex adaptive international system are also included in regions as subsystems. These subsystems have their own complex adaptive structure because this order is more regional-centered rather than global. Regions play key roles as subsystems to form the emerging global order. Third, the diversification of actors and their interactions in the international system create networks that are not hierarchical but rather nodal based. Network-based relationships directly affect actors' foreign policymaking and the understanding of power. Cooperation and rivalry between actors have a nested form, and are complimentary strategies for co-evolution. Fourth, the dominant consequence of having a complex adaptive international system and network is the creation of tremendous interdependence and co-evolution among actors; this has implications for diplomacy. Policymakers attempt to set long-term foreign policy goals, while change is normal and order can emerge at different times and scales; hence, controlling uncertainties is the priority for actors. Lastly, diplomats are not only traditional diplomats anymore—members of all professions (academics, students, artists, etc.) can be deemed to be non-traditional diplomatic agents that can represent and pursue states' interests in networks through multilateral diplomacy.

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## ARTICLE

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# A New Era in Diplomacy: The Case of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum

Ahmet Nazmi ÜSTE\* & Ulviyye SANILI AYDIN\*\*

### Abstract

*This article aims to research the reasons necessitating new methods in diplomacy. Diplomacy is evolving and its language and methods are changing due to new fluctuations in global politics compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic. The study argues that the evolving nature of international society and its current agenda generate a symbiotic environment in diplomacy, requiring the adoption of new methods and approaches. In this context, the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, established as a platform where various experts, stakeholders and decisionmakers have an opportunity to discuss significant global and regional challenges, find solutions and exchange ideas, may be considered one of the best examples of innovative diplomatic methods in the new global era.*

### Keywords

Antalya Diplomacy Forum, diplomatic symbiosis, global governance, international society, new diplomacy

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## Introduction

Diplomacy is one of the most important and well-known foreign policy tools used by states to implement their foreign policy decisions. All of the specific actions and methods of any international legal actor regarding its foreign policy are defined as diplomacy.<sup>1</sup> The concept has never diminished in importance due to the fact that interstate relations, the international system and global politics are constantly evolving into new dimensions and confronting new issues and challenges.

The phenomenon of “globalization” forced many to think intently about the links and dependencies between the actors of global politics.<sup>2</sup> In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, particularly in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, radical changes in the paradigm of global politics have multiplied. Although international politics was based on the interaction between states and international organizations until the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, individuals, multi-national corporations (MNCs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) are now accepted as actors in international politics.<sup>3</sup> It would not be correct to claim that international actors themselves have changed today. However, relationships between actors and intra-actor relations have become almost indistinguishable and international relations are more integrated than ever before.<sup>4</sup>

Integration, which was hailed at the beginning of the globalization process, has occurred significantly in economics, finance and technology as of the time of this writing, but it has not been realized at the level of institutions and ideas. Indeed, for some, the integration process has increased resistance against globalization. While the global economic “cake” has expanded, carelessness in distribution has been remarkable, triggering the reflex of nation-states to protect their sovereignty against a globally integrated world economy. International economic arrangements, which were not debated much in the early periods following the collapse of the Soviet Union, have been increasingly discussed, especially among civilians, and have even been accepted in certain political circles as the cause of many problems, from terrorism to immigration, from poverty to unemployment.<sup>5</sup>

Since the dissolution of the bipolar system, civil society has increasingly moved toward the center of politics in an environment of striking

inequality in global income distribution, and indeed may find itself charged with an important mission for global democracy. Even in the U.S., it is noteworthy that Democrat and Republican politicians alike have affirmed the attitudes of civil society toward state power and agree that this would enrich democracy—that civil society would succeed where politics could not. There is a large amount of data confirming that this idea is frequently discussed and accepted by American universities. Perhaps it is best illustrated by President Bill Clinton’s statement: “the era of great governments is over.”<sup>6</sup>

But despite civil society’s increasing importance, sovereign states have not disappeared. Moreover, they can no longer be isolated, nor can their border walls remain high. Although the international system has an anarchic appearance, the existence of a global order cannot be denied. Areas of cooperation, juxtaposed with the use of high technology in arms and the defense industry have created an environment where global harmony and conflict are intertwined.

The intertwined relations of states may be seen in every field from conflict to joint work. States no longer experience bloc-type disconnections. The fact that two states may cooperate in one field while enmeshed in conflict in another is not surprising. In such a context, it is inevitable for diplomacy to develop new methods.

The present study hypothesizes that the evolving nature of international society and its current agenda create a symbiotic environment in diplomacy, requiring the adoption of new methods and approaches in diplomacy. In the first part of the study, international society and diplomatic actors are discussed. The second part debates the diplomatic symbiosis that dominates the evolving international system. In the last part of the study, the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF) is analyzed as an example of new approaches in the diplomatic, symbiotic environment.

## International Society and Global World Order

In his lectures at the London School of Economics, Martin Wight places the English School on a “rationalist” or “Grotian” ground. Hugo de Grotius criticizes realists and pacifists in his study titled “De Jure Belli

ac Pacis”, claiming that the notion that everything is permissible in war, as well as the view that those who use force will never be justified are not acceptable, and instead highlights a “middle way” (*via media*) between both approaches. Thus, according to the English School, the international system is more “civilized” than realists claim. It is not possible to expect conflicts to simply disappear, as idealized by utopians. The expectations of this school have never been to achieve the level of stability of national societies in international relations. The divergence of thought between the realists and idealists, which is called the “first debate” in terms of the history of international thought, poses the concepts of a cosmopolitan administration, morality and trust against those of state-centered power, interest and security in interstate relations.<sup>7</sup>

International liberal and utopian politicians consider the realists pessimistic and lacking in political imagination regarding the development of a cosmopolitan morality and the creation of a global climate of peace and security. However, the strained atmosphere of the bipolar system between the two world wars and in the post-WW II period has revealed many reasons justifying the realists. According to Hedley Bull, the observations of realists about the actions of hostile parties to control and neutralize each other, at times by cheating, in an anarchic state is an irrefutable finding. However, this is not the only dimension of the essence of world politics. Although states (mostly) control war tools

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and equipment, the simultaneous development of peaceful mechanisms for interaction between states and a peaceful international environment corresponding to the interests of states has created the phenomenon of “international society”.<sup>8</sup>

The idea of an international society presumes the existence of an international environment where common rules have developed to

a great extent. Yet a paradox is inherent in the environment itself: the powerful states of the international system will not support something

contrary to their interests as global values and rules develop, and thus, the strong ones will gain an unfair advantage over the others. Although the scholars of the English School are continuing to study options to improve the problematic areas of international society, it is not possible to claim that they do not expect a radical change in this sphere. Still, there is an expectation that a system of states interconnected with each other will expand the field of their “common interests”, which will produce common values and institutions.

Bull states that it is not necessary for states interconnected on the basis of common interest to have common civil roots; rather, states with different cultural backgrounds can be included in an equitable society in the context of “common interest”.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, it can be expected that states developing common institutions and rules, and meeting in a partnership of interests will put their own interests in second place from time to time in favor of the continuation of the system. The capacity of such a system to benefit each unit depends on its “sustainability” and the “predictability” of developments within the system.<sup>10</sup> However, since the continuation of the system and the interests of the states will overlap within the process, states will not have to manage any conflict.

With the development of international society, debates on institutions that can become partners began. For example, Bull conceives of five institutions of international (interstate) society: war, balance of power, concert of the great powers, diplomacy and international law. Barry Buzan and Cornelia Navari add the institution of sovereignty and Nicolas Terradas adds the institution of trade. As the level of adoption of these institutions by the states increases, it is possible to discuss positive development in terms of an international social order. However, these institutions may not always lead international society to balance and unity. These institutions sometimes have unifying and sometimes dividing characteristics. For example, besides the destruction of order, wars also have the feature of developing a new order and institutions.<sup>11</sup> It is not always possible for the order to be accepted and approved by each state. If the existing order is not accepted by a group of states, it will not only make the construction of international society difficult, but will hinder cooperation and common achievements. For this reason, implementable agreements with common denominators should be

sought after wars. Bull notes that states can benefit from the advantages of international society without transferring their sovereign rights to a higher authority. According to Bull, the legitimate use of force, respect for each other's borders and mutual trust (*pacta sunt servanda*) are the basic rules that are considered to be more important than the common culture and lifestyle among states.<sup>12</sup>

A similar approach is argued by John Rawls in his study titled, "The Law of Peoples". Rawls emphasizes that political, economic and cultural differences in the international arena are acceptable if states comply with common principles. According to Rawls, these common principles are: states' respect for each other's political sovereignty and territorial integrity, adherence to treaties and the law of war, openness to cooperation in order to reduce injustices such as poverty among states to reach a more fair socio-political global structure and avoidance of the use of force except for the purposes of self-defense and humanitarian intervention. It is claimed that all states that adhere to these principles deserve global justice and that states and different cultural structures can coexist.<sup>13</sup> States and societies that agree on the minimum common principles can form a part of the international community and respect each other's differences. States cannot exist in isolation from each other within the global structure. The environment, climate change, the pandemic, international trade, terrorism, drug trafficking, migration and refugees are issues that states can only deal with effectively through cooperation and coordination. The globalization process has both accelerated the development of common institutions and required the revision of existing institutions.<sup>14</sup>

Globalization emerged as a concept expressing and affirming economic integration in the 1970s. It came to be considered an irreversible global process in the 1980s and '90s, and began to appear in politics and law. It may be argued that opinions about globalization have become more realistic since the end of the first quarter of the 2000s. Those who define globalization as a danger and those who evaluate it as an opportunity exist together. And many of those who supported nation-states' integration under the great economic umbrella of globalization in the 1980s and 90s now argue that nation-states should be stronger against international military instabilities.

A chaotic atmosphere now prevails in the international arena, where contradictions and differences continue to coexist. Maybe the most distinctive feature of the new period is disorder—the intertwining of contradictory tendencies that seem doomed to a constant consumption of energy to outdo each other. Choices and decisions about the global future must be formulated within this common environment. Perhaps the current situation can be considered a key that can turn this uncertainty into an opportunity. From now on, states will decide by reflecting their will, or play their roles passively according to the decisions of a great power—or the process will proceed entirely based on luck without any intervention. The last of these three options seems unlikely; it is obvious that even in an uncertain environment, states and alliances strive constantly to produce projects for the future.

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Global problems are too complex to be controlled by hard power—arms and economy—alone. Recourse to soft power elements is seen as inevitable in most cases. According to Nye, a country's soft power can come from three resources: its attractive culture to others, its political values admired by others and its foreign policies accepted as legitimate and having moral authority.<sup>15</sup> Soft power relies on generally accepted rules and conditions. Regardless of its ideology, culture or economic structure, a state must respect the minimum common ground of the international community in order to remain a member of international society.

A state should not intervene in the sovereign rights and borders of another state. This would be a violation of international law, and would consequently reduce the effectiveness of the state's soft power. Using diplomatic methods is of crucial importance in international relations, so much so that establishing dominance with hard power will lead to the loss of soft power instruments.

Today, it is impossible to discuss a complete and perfect global structure. Although the existence of global powers is not denied, the inter-

nal dynamics of regional subsystems have an indisputable influence on global politics. In their study titled, “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver draw attention to the fact that regional powers were not allowed to act under the hegemonic pressure of the two superpowers during the Cold War. However, the areas of action of regional powers expanded with the end of the bipolar system.<sup>16</sup>

### Global Issues and Diplomatic Symbiosis

Interaction among regional powers has gained a more important dimension that should be taken into account in the analysis of global politics. Regional states’ perception of threats from neighbors, the intra-regional securitization processes and relations between intra-regional states began to be examined from different aspects, forming the basis for the development of Regional Security Complex Theory. The concept of a regional security complex was introduced by Barry Buzan in 1983. Later it was developed as one of the security theories of the Copenhagen School in a joint study by Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan.<sup>17</sup>

To thoughtfully consider global problems and address them in any meaningful way, regional issues must be focused on. Understanding regional dynamics and cooperating with regional powers has become more important than ever before. Global powers are expected to understand the regional dimension and develop communication in this direction. However, Regional Security Complex Theory emphasizes possible disconnections in communication channels due to the “securitization” of regional states against each other. Additionally, the fact that states of the same region generally define the “other” from their immediate surroundings while constructing their national identities constitutes an important obstacle to the development of regional relations. When working to establish or manage regional relations, a government’s direct contact with such an “other” involves an effort that needs to be meticulously explained in order to be legitimized and accepted by the domestic public.

The globalization process has increased the interaction of societies with each other, and student exchanges, labor circulation and migration

have increased contact among citizens of different cultures. Between 1990 and 2008, the proportion of international migrants increased by 36%.<sup>18</sup> While we tend to think of such contact as occurring simply between members of two different cultures, this is not always the case: interactions can occur between members of more than two communities. A person who interacts within many societies may develop a sense of multidimensional belongings. For example, a person with a Polish mother and a Turkish father who settles in England is affected by all three identities, but will not be able to fully represent all three, as he/she is a foreigner in England, an expatriate in Türkiye and a Turk in Poland. Although such multinational connections may seem like a disadvantage at first glance, multifaceted affiliations have the ability to form bridges between societies.<sup>19</sup>

The global structure, which has been called the “new world order” in the last 30 years, has not been clarified in terms of content. It has developed features close to a “universal system” or “hierarchical system”. Such structures will give

priority to the international system in decision-making processes. At the same time, states cannot ignore the requirements of their national processes. As a result, many states find themselves adopting an intertwined form of domestic and foreign policy. In fact, it has become impossible for states to deal with their domestic and foreign policies separately from each other.

The Covid-19 pandemic revealed the inevitability of international interaction and the active role of nation-states in the implementation of global decisions. Despite all the deficiencies in the management of the process, it has been observed that civil society is an important actor too.<sup>20</sup>

As Edmund Burke III states, the first quarter of the 21<sup>st</sup> century witnessed important breaks and innovations in international relations and world history. These developments were to some extent intellectual revolutions with the acceptance of the global interdependence of societies. The multifaceted, multicultural and variable structure of international

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relations has emerged as a reality. In such a structure, to define diplomacy merely as “the process of transferring the thoughts of a government on certain issues to another government” places the all other factors affecting the diplomatic process in a secondary position, including global politics, civil society, internal and external shareholders, climate-related shareholders, global health policies, migration movements, historical background and the idea of global justice.

The multi-actor understanding of diplomatic activity, characteristic of the new diplomatic era, posits that foreign policy is an amorphous phenomenon, devoid of strict institutional markers. Thus, socio-cultural aspects of the activities of diplomacy in the new era are extended to include such topics as the symbolic language of diplomacy, the role of art, the daily working life of a diplomat, the informal channels of diplomacy, reflections of diplomats, etc.<sup>21</sup> Levy explains this situation as a crisis of confidence in inter-state relations that makes the intensification of diplomacy one of the key factors in building bridges for the future and requires new, more effective methods of diplomacy.<sup>22</sup> In other words, as the threats and challenges of today show, the efforts of classical diplomats are not sufficient; that is, employees of state bodies engaged in foreign relations are not enough to avoid a catastrophe. This circumstance determines and legitimizes the development of so-called public, civil, or people’s diplomacy to a certain extent. The role of participants in diplomatic processes, participants who are increasingly the subjects of international contacts, is played by new institutions consolidating the interests of various social groups: businesses, academic society, civil society organizations, religious associations and finally, private individuals. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is possible to fight effectively for peace only with the whole world, that is, the whole human race.

In this sense, a wide range of protagonists are actively involved in peacekeeping activities, and any individual is not only *homo sapiens* but also *homo diplomaticus*.<sup>23</sup> The monopoly of the state and of specialized actors—diplomats—to formulate and lead foreign affairs has been eroded, highlighting “the increasing symbiosis between the activities of state and non-state representatives through multiple interactions taking place between the actors concerned by the foreign action of state.”<sup>24</sup>

In other words, the international system is now dominated by diplomatic symbiosis. Lexically, “symbiosis” expresses any of various living arrangements between members of two different types, including mutualism, commensalism and parasitism, where both positive (beneficial) and negative (unfavorable/harmful) associations are involved. The members are identified as symbionts. Any relationship between two species populations that live together is symbiotic, whether the relationship benefits, harms or has no impact on the populations.<sup>25</sup> In other words, symbiosis is a state of relationship between two species in which each creates the required environment for the other for its continued existence.<sup>26</sup> Diplomatic symbiosis can be defined as a relationship between all shareholders, partners, actors or organizations that depend on each other equally within international society.

As mentioned above, diplomacy in the current international system experience is subject to fundamental changes at an unexpected rate.<sup>27</sup> Considering that diplomacy means to establish relations at various levels and with several actors, it is necessary to bring together the attempts of the social, private and public sectors within the evolving nature of international society. There is a close symbiosis: diplomacy between states cannot be conducted only through their respective executive departments of foreign affairs. Diplomatic symbiosis between shareholders is determinant of serving the overall national interests of states. The liberalizing and globalizing economy requires diplomatic support. So, diplomacy has to be relevant to the changing definition of national interests and priorities.

The globality of today’s problems and the necessity of seeking solutions in interconnected relations have made participatory democratic diplomatic platforms on a global scale absolutely crucial. In their 2019 study titled “Participatory Democracy”, Roussopoulos and Benello attach importance to “choosing a collective path” as the primary effort structuring the concept of “participatory democracy”. Resting their analyses on a “human” basis, they state that people desire a community where it is possible to control the decisions taken on issues concerning themselves.<sup>28</sup>

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The dominant actors of global politics no longer possess the capacity to securitize the other elements or factors of global politics for their unilateral interests. The world has perceived the importance and necessity of collective effort. Trump, for example, as a president evaluating global politics from a unilateralist perspective, grounded his politics on the motto, “America first”, reflected in his immigration and trade policies. He exhibited the same attitudes during the Covid-19 pandemic and attempted to manage the process of addressing the crisis unilaterally instead of through global coordination. In other words, Trump tried to solve a global problem with a nationalist attitude, nicknaming Covid the “Chinese Virus”.<sup>29</sup> This approach did garner reactions in both foreign policy and domestic policy; many criticized Trump for failing in the fight against Covid-19 and for his uncooperative position.<sup>30</sup>

Granted, societies sometimes prefer security in the “security-freedom” dilemma,<sup>31</sup> which may give rise to nationalist impulses. Yet security can also be gained by expanding community. Societies’ attention to global problems increases due to the role of developing communication networks and civil society organizations. It may be argued that the rate of governments’ involvement in cooperation on global problems affects the rate of domestic support more than in previous eras. Due to the intertwining of domestic and global issues, it is not possible to understand diplomatic interactions between states only on a bilateral level. Moreover, the number of issues that concern only two states is gradually decreasing. Almost all problems have a global dimension. The dependency of states in global politics, their attempts to survive and their integration with each other form a complete “symbiotic” relationship model. Such an intricate style of global politics has made the development of new methods in diplomatic relations inevitable.

### Diplomacy in a Symbiotic Atmosphere: the Antalya Diplomacy Forum

As mentioned above, the need for diplomacy is greater than ever before across a broad spectrum of global and regional concerns; the pains of reshaping the global economy and conducting international politics are increasing, and regional and global tensions are escalating.<sup>32</sup>

In this new era of an evolving international order, more innovative methods, and regional and global initiatives are observed in Turkish foreign policy. Diplomatic practices such as education diplomacy, sports diplomacy, science diplomacy, public diplomacy and trilateral cooperation mechanisms aim to serve Türkiye's role as a game-maker on a regional and global scale. In this context, the ADF deserves particular attention.

Encyclopedia Britannica defines 'forum' in its origin as a place: "in Roman cities in antiquity, a multipurpose, centrally located open area that was surrounded by public buildings and colonnades and that served as a public gathering place. It was an orderly spatial adaptation of the Greek agora, or marketplace, and acropolis."<sup>33</sup> The forum was the place in ancient Rome and other cities where people gathered to talk about public affairs and take decisions on the main issues affecting the populace. Public issues were discussed there with the broad participation of all relevant parties.

Today a large number of interested parties can take part in the diplomatic process in addition to official diplomats. In fact, it has been observed in recent years that politicians generally appear in diplomatic negotiations rather than diplomats. As emphasized above, both the field of diplomacy and the partners of diplomatic processes have expanded with increases in digitalized technology.<sup>34</sup> Recent developments in international relations have triggered the revival of the "forum" style meetings observed in ancient Rome with a contemporary interpretation, allowing the various parties to come together. Since these meetings are not bilateral, the participation of parties in conflict at the same platform is not considered strange, and domestic political reaction is minimal. Indeed, it is easier for parties for whom it is difficult to establish bilateral contacts to meet in a forum. Such parties are often able to find opportunities to negotiate there.

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The determination of the right location for forum diplomacy is vital, as it needs to be at a central point of global politics, at a reasonable distance from most of the participants in terms of transportation, and security must be considered. Climate, time zone and topographic suitability can be added to these criteria. The number and quality of participants are factors that directly affect the success of the forum.

The ADF can be considered as the application of an old method of diplomacy in a new format. Antalya, on Türkiye's southern Mediterranean coast, is one of the leading tourism centers in the world. The region's suitable location in terms of transportation is in perfect harmony with its climate, which makes the tourism sector active in all seasons. Most importantly, the ancient city of Patara, which served as the capital of the Lycian League, one of the oldest republics in history, is located within the provincial borders of Antalya. It would be appropriate to remember Montesquieu de L'Esprit des Lois's statement in 1748: "If I had to give a perfect example of a confederation republic, I would show Lycia. It would be correct to call this parliament building, Lycian Union Parliament Building."<sup>35</sup>

Similarly, an article in the *New York Times* titled, "Patara Journal; A Congress, Buried in the Sand, Inspired One on a Hill", recalls that the administrative structure of the Lycians, which was established in Patara and hosted the oldest parliament building in the world 3,000 years ago, formed the basis of the U.S. federative system. The newspaper drew attention to the fact that the Lycian League, which consisted of 23 cities connected to a central administration with a federative structure, was one of the rare examples of representative democracy in ancient times and that a similar model was observed in the U.S. federative system.<sup>36</sup> Because of its rich history and present-day amenities, Antalya was a right choice for the ADF forum location. Its founders aim to institutionalize the ADF as a global platform brand that brings together official and non-governmental actors to discuss global and regional issues.

Organized under the auspices of the President of the Republic of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and hosted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the first forum was held on June 18–20, 2021 at the NEST Congress Center in Antalya. The first Forum explored the horizons of diplomacy across a range of key regional, glob-

al and thematic issues under the theme, “Innovative Diplomacy: New Era, New Approaches”. In his inauguration speech, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu emphasized the importance of Antalya: “We organized the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in this city, which was home to Patara, the first parliament of the world, where the tradition of seeking solutions to problems by talking and negotiating began.”<sup>37</sup> Underlining the benefits of international cooperation, Minister Çavuşoğlu stressed that no solitary country can find solutions to the problems facing humanity without acting together.<sup>38</sup> Eleven Heads of State and government, 45 Ministers of Foreign Affairs and minister-level representatives attended the Forum; this meant that one out of every five Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the world participated in the ADF.<sup>39</sup> Additionally, three former heads of state and government, approximately 52 representatives of international organizations, former government officials, representatives of the business world, opinion leaders and academicians, media representatives, youth organizations and university students attended the ADF. In addition to two sessions of “Global Governance: New Approaches for Global Solutions” and “How Can We Strengthen Regional Solidarity in View of Lessons Learned?” attended by leaders, several sessions, panels and talks were held at the ADF on regional, global and thematic topics (see Table 1).<sup>40</sup>

**Table 1.** The ADF 2021

<b>Panels</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-A New Era in Transatlantic Relations</li> <li>-Partnership with Africa: Mutual Gains</li> <li>-Infodemic and Fake News in the Virtual World</li> <li>-Southern Caucasus: New Opportunities for Regional Peace and Cooperation</li> <li>-Innovative Mediation Regional Cooperation in Asia</li> <li>-Humanitarian Approach towards Refugees and Migrants</li> <li>-The Middle East and North Africa: Towards a Sustainable Agenda</li> <li>-Women's Contribution to the Search for Peace</li> <li>-Tackling Extremism and Discrimination</li> <li>-A Regional Conference for Eastern Mediterranean</li> <li>-The Business Sector and Economic Diplomacy</li> <li>-Terrorism Threat Transforming</li> <li>-Energy: What Future Awaits Us?</li> <li>-Neighbors SEE Together: Future of Europe</li> <li>-How to Increase the Effectiveness of Regional Organizations?</li> <li>-Youth Forum</li> </ul>
<b>#ADFTalks</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Innovative Mediation</li> <li>-The Way Forward for a Realistic Settlement in Cyprus</li> <li>-Iran's Neighborhood Doctrine</li> </ul>
<b>#ADFRound</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-The Increasing Importance of Parliamentary Diplomacy</li> <li>-From Theory to Practice: Innovative Ways for a more Effective Diplomacy</li> </ul>
<b>#ADFRound/ SideEvent</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Türkiye-Africa Opportunities for Cooperation</li> <li>-A New Diplomacy for A New World</li> </ul>
<b>#ADFYouth</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Night Talks</li> </ul>

The Forum brought in innovations in line with its main theme, including a “Diplomacy Tunnel” from Kadesh to the present, and a digital exhibition organized with photos by world-renowned photographer Ara Güler and painter Osman Hamdi.<sup>41</sup>

The second Forum was held on March 11–13, 2022. Participants addressed a wide range of topics in international relations under the overarching theme, “Recoding Diplomacy”. 17 Heads of State and Government, 80 Ministers and 39 international organization representatives attended the second ADF. Three leaders’ sessions on “Price of Peace or Cost of War”, “Regional and Global Pathways to Peace and Prosperity” and “Representing Change”, as well as 27 panels, four interviews, three roundtable meetings and three side events were organized throughout the Forum (see Table 2);<sup>42</sup> 212 bilateral meetings were held between the participating delegations.

**Table 2.** The ADF 2022

<b>Panels</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strengthening solidarity and promoting peace through soft power</li> <li>- Afghanistan: How to cope with new realities?</li> <li>- A vision for development in Africa</li> <li>- Cooperation and competition in the Asia-Pacific</li> <li>- Searching for a common ground in the Middle East</li> <li>- Climate change and energy transition</li> <li>- Energy security in turmoil</li> <li>- A green economy for an inclusive and sustainable growth</li> <li>- Combating disinformation in the Post-Truth age</li> <li>- AI, Metaverse and all else</li> <li>- What does strategic autonomy entail for Europe?</li> <li>- Peaceful resolution of maritime boundary disputes</li> <li>- Addressing irregular migration: A holistic approach</li> <li>- Countering terrorism: What is missing?</li> <li>- Revitalizing multilateralism: UN and beyond</li> <li>- Women empower humanity</li> <li>- Fighting racism and discrimination</li> <li>- Democratic governance and security</li> <li>- Reconciliatory dialogue in the Balkans</li> <li>- Post-pandemic recovery, livelihoods and localities</li> <li>- Effective global governance</li> <li>- Prospects for an inclusive peace in the South Caucasus</li> <li>- Re-energizing the dynamism in Latin America and the Caribbean</li> <li>- Food security &amp; Transforming agriculture</li> <li>- Equity in global health</li> <li>- Preserving cultural heritage in a digital age</li> <li>- Justice, reforms and stronger institutions</li> </ul>
<b>#ADFTalks</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Bridging diversity</li> <li>- Europe's neighbors, Europe as a neighbor</li> <li>- Multilateralism for Peace and Stability</li> <li>- The future of Bosnia and Herzegovina</li> <li>- Cyprus settlement: Reaffirming inherent rights</li> </ul>
<b>#ADFRound</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Asia Anew: For a sustained regional growth</li> <li>- Recording diplomacy</li> </ul>
<b>#ADFRound/SideEvent</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Parliamentary diplomacy</li> </ul>
<b>#ADFYouth</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sports</li> </ul>

The ADF is designed as a dialogue platform that enables leaders, politicians, academicians, opinion leaders, diplomats, businesspeople, youth and the media sector to come together every year to address global and regional issues with a visionary perspective and offer solutions to contemporary problems. The Forum seeks to contribute to the formation of new ideas and trends regarding the future of the region and the world, and to shape the global agenda and discourse. Different but complementary views are brought together in the panels, and tested through interactions with the audience. The participation of young

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people and students in the ADF is notable in the context of sharing experience and constructing the future. More than 2,000 participants attended the first Forum and more than 3,000 the second, from different sectors involved in diplomatic processes in some way. The successful use of digital innovations in events, the up-to-datedness of the ADF's social media accounts and the number of followers are significant features for

its transformation into a global brand in the category of an informal diplomatic platform and a respected think-tank. The casual dress code of the forum aimed to provide solutions to the problems of the participants in a comfortable, stress-free environment in the best holiday spots of Antalya.

The ADF continues its activities in the digital environment as #ADFTalks, #ADF120Sec, #ADFOpinion and #ADFVisitorsCorner throughout the year. On these platforms, the ADF hosts virtual events, attended by distinguished speakers that address global and regional issues in collaboration with leading international think-tanks. These features make the ADF unique among its peers.

## Conclusion

Diplomacy as a foreign policy tool has evolved in parallel with the transformation of the global system throughout the ages. Recently, the globalization process has caused international relations to gain new features and involve new actors and shareholders beyond those of the previous periods. Technological innovations, the intertwining of commercial and economic relations and the transparency of today's borders increase human mobility and expand states' classical sovereignty areas. These changes, which entail shifts in the relationship between state and individual, require attention.

Today, there is a lack of decisive central authority in international politics. Regional security complexes must be considered in order to understand the international system as a significant phenomenon that reveals the importance of the nation-state structure. To manage such a structure requires states to develop common denominators among themselves. Thus, states have found ways to cooperate in many areas, even while some of their old conflict issues remain unresolved. To fail to do so would risk being excluded from the global community.

Participation in the global community is of the essence in areas that require global efforts, such as the pandemic, migration, drug trafficking and terrorism. In the present global political atmosphere, not only states but all stakeholders play important roles; states are seeking cooperation opportunities in such a symbiotic environment. Thus, the practice of diplomacy, including its language and methods, is transforming due to new fluctuations in global politics compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic. Individuals, societies and states need robust diplomacy to resolve conflicts, manage crises, ease adaptation to changes and encourage cooperation and partnerships. To this end, diplomacy needs innovative, efficient and effective methods with renewed language and unconventional digital capabilities. It must be rapidly responsive, attentive and adaptive to the demands of the day. Forum diplomacy provides an ideal opportunity for diplomatic contacts in this sense. It provides a platform where even parties in conflict, who cannot come into contact on bilateral ground, can come together peacefully. Fora offer crucial opportunities for parties whose bilateral diplomatic dialogue channels have been broken.

In this context, the ADF was established as a platform where various experts, stakeholders and decisionmakers address important global and regional challenges and exchange intellectual ideas. Aiming to create a conciliatory dialogue environment where opposing views can be aired and discussed productively, the ADF actively served to support peace and diplomacy by hosting the first high-level contact between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Ukraine. The ADF forms a roof under which everyone who seeks creative solutions to global issues can take part, offering a new environment and a new diplomatic, symbiotic atmosphere as an effective foreign policy instrument of the future.

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## ARTICLE

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# From “Innovative Diplomacy” to “Innovation Diplomacy”: The Case of the United Arab Emirates

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### Abstract

*As one of the prominent actors in the Arabian Gulf, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has moved away from an approximately decade-long military interventionism toward an innovation-based diplomatic offensive. It not only seeks to promote itself as a constructive and responsible actor in the regional and global arena but also to achieve sectorial diversity to prepare for the post-carbon era. Focusing on design and production based on cutting-edge technologies, the UAE offers generous incentives to attract foreign human capital and thus furnish the Emirati citizens with advanced knowledge and expertise. In this vein, Abu Dhabi promotes the country's historical and cultural landmarks along with its ambition and readiness for innovation via tech-based endeavors. This article explores how the UAE, in its pursuit of economic security, pursues a multidimensional “innovation diplomacy” supported by innovative approaches to classical diplomacy. Depicting how advanced technologies are the focus of its publicity and the development of foreign relations, the UAE demonstrates how “innovative diplomacy” serves a commercial “innovation diplomacy” for future prosperity at the hands of enlightened locals.*

### Keywords

Middle East, Arabian Gulf, United Arab Emirates, innovative diplomacy, innovation diplomacy

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## Introduction

With the first oil discovery in the region in the 1950s, countries in the Arabian Gulf were categorized as “late-late” or even “late-late-late” industrializers. They were distinguished from the first industrializer, Great Britain, which developed through invention, and the second wave industrializers, Germany, Japan, the USSR and the U.S., which thrived via innovation. The Gulf countries kept pace through learning and imitation thanks to the oil revenues enabling them to import talent and technologies. They transformed from “a pearling/fishing/trading economy into a knowledge economy” in a very short time span.<sup>1</sup>

For its part, the UAE ceased to be a British protectorate in December 1971 and was reborn as a monarchic federation of seven emirates with tribal origins and a rentier economy. It has rapidly grown into a very ambitious powerhouse in the broader Middle East. Although Abu Dhabi has long been engaged in humanitarian aid and peace missions, in the last decade, the UAE embraced a muscular foreign policy judging by its troop presence to suppress the Arab Spring in Bahrain, enforce the no-fly-zone in Libya, support government forces against the Houthis in Yemen and fight against ISIS.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, John Biden’s successful “America is Back” campaign left a huge imprint, as Abu Dhabi recalibrated its vision to launch a diplomatic offensive. Currently, its policy focus places more emphasis on issues like mediation in international affairs, sustainable energy and economic diversification.<sup>3</sup>

In this vein, the United Arab Emirates has been using diplomacy at an exponential rate, mainly for economic gains. Traditionally speaking, diplomacy is known as a tool at the hands of diplomatic corps to wield a country’s soft power, which obviates coercive means to attain national interests. Nevertheless, cutting-edge technologies have introduced novelties that shape who will conduct diplomacy, how to conduct diplomacy and for what kind of interests. Concomitantly, the UAE foreign policy establishment has adopted an integrated approach to digitize diplomatic services for nation-branding purposes in collaboration with various ministries, governmental agencies, businesses, higher education institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at the national and international level. These efforts to generate positive appeal on a global scale has much to do with the aim of sustaining prosperity

in a post-carbon era. “Innovating diplomatic practices” to attract talent and investment from around the world to boost “innovation-based prosperity” is at the heart of the UAE’s national agenda.

Related scholarly literature revolves around the UAE’s foreign policy practices as an ambitious small state,<sup>4</sup> digitalization of the UAE’s diplomacy<sup>5</sup> and assessments of UAE innovation policies on a sectoral basis.<sup>6</sup> So far, the literature has mainly focused on the digitalization of diplomatic activities in Western settings. Specifically, there is a dearth of studies to explore “innovative diplomacy” in the Middle East, while much of the existing work on digitalization in this region concentrates

**The term “innovation diplomacy” emerged at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century as a creative tool to encourage trade rather than simply boost relations with foreign audiences.**

on the impact of social media to challenge state authorities.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, this article’s contribution is to introduce the main actors, strategies and sample practices of innovation diplomacy in the UAE with an eye to evaluating its strengths and shortcomings.

### “Innovative” vs. “Innovation” Diplomacy

Today, information and communication technologies (ICTs) are not only part of our daily lives—they have begun to shape diplomacy multifariously. This phenomenon is denoted in a myriad of ways, such as “e-diplomacy”, “cyber diplomacy”, “digital diplomacy”, “innovative diplomacy”, “Internet diplomacy”, “social media diplomacy”, and “Twiplomacy” among others. This article uses “innovative diplomacy” as an umbrella term to refer to diplomatic activities in the virtual sphere as a radical departure from classical diplomacy.

Throughout the past decade, diplomatic services were accelerated and facilitated by the launch of e-mail communications, social media outlets, mobile applications and the websites of ministries of foreign affairs and embassies,<sup>8</sup> coupled with knowledge-management tools based on the digitization of key documents and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data. Various European countries like Australia, France and Switzerland systematized these undertakings by adopting digital

foreign policy strategies.<sup>9</sup> An exclusive focus on the UAE reveals how the country utilizes websites and social media for sharing diplomatic actions or for crisis communication, like the announcement of the Qatar boycott of 2017 or the Abraham Accords of 2020 over Twitter.<sup>10</sup>

The term “innovation diplomacy” emerged at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century as a creative tool to encourage trade rather than simply boost relations with foreign audiences. It seeks to bring forth international partnerships between research and business and to attract investment and talent for economic gains. Indeed, as early as the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the state was acknowledged as the best medium to facilitate commercial and financial activities, provide vital information about foreign markets and promote national products abroad.<sup>11</sup> The first “science attaché” tasked with following scientific developments was dispatched to the U.S. Embassy in Berlin in 1898. European countries would follow suit in the aftermath of WWII. Throughout the Cold War, the “Asian Tigers” owed much of their development to diplomatic actions to stimulate innovations. This change in focus from science to innovation is best exemplified by the transformation of the Dutch “technical-scientific attaché” into an “innovation attaché” in the new millennium with an eye “to support the competitiveness of the Netherlands, mainly through signaling and facilitating opportunities for R&D collaboration.”<sup>12</sup>

Innovation diplomacy blends together foreign policy and economic policy in an increasingly cultural setting. Thereby, according to concepts introduced at the 2010 joint conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Royal Society (UK), innovation diplomacy differs from “science in diplomacy” (influencing foreign policies with scientific advice), “diplomacy for science” (international science collaboration for the common good) and “science for diplomacy” (scientific collaboration to improve foreign relations). To the contrary, it incorporates exerting soft power by highlighting the attractiveness of a country as an innovation center and building bridges between international businesses, NGOs and universities to boost national competitiveness. It also embodies the creation or revision of legal and commercial frameworks to attract not only capital but human capital.<sup>13</sup>

Establishing a “knowledge economy” is a cherished goal of innovation diplomacy. Knowledge-based economies require a workforce with competencies much different from those required in a hydrocarbon-based economy, like “abstract reasoning, analysis, problem-solving, communication, decision-making, and collaboration.” Wealth in a knowledge economy mainly derives from “intellectual capabilities” rather than “physical inputs or natural resources.”<sup>14</sup>

In short, innovation diplomacy consists of governmental action to publicize its science and technology infrastructure to attract a skilled workforce, fuel the domestic economy and improve a country’s status in global markets. This requires coordination among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies, consulates and related governmental agencies to promote engagement between public and private actors for nation-branding as a hub of the knowledge economy.

### The UAE’s Innovation Diplomacy: Rationale

As a classic rentier state, the UAE recognized in the 1970s the futility of public expenditure to generate long-term growth and economic competitiveness. To avoid fluctuations in oil markets and break dependency on natural resource exploitation, Abu Dhabi transformed its developmental strategies to focus on science and technology for a possible zero-carbon future.<sup>15</sup> Featuring a small population and heavy reliance on foreign workers, Abu Dhabi pursued various educational and employment policies to furnish the Emiratis with entrepreneurial spirit as well as the knowledge and skills to take posts, particularly in the budding private sector. The “Emiratization” policy inaugurated in the 1990s has been a flagship endeavor in the name of positive discrimination toward UAE nationals. Its agenda includes incentivizing companies to hire Emiratis so that they would accumulate expertise to keep pace with global developments, make the most of technological and commercial opportunities and tackle contemporary challenges.<sup>16</sup>

The Emiratization policy evolved over time to concentrate on innovation and a knowledge economy, paving the way to the formulation of consecutive, interrelated strategies to upgrade human capital in the country. The domestic component of Emiratization involves the Fed-

eral Government’s investments in science, technology, Research and Development (R&D) and intellectual property protection, among others. The international dimension is related with “innovation diplomacy”, while publicization of these efforts in digital outlets like the Official Website of the UAE Government falls under “innovative diplomacy”.

For Abu Dhabi, innovation diplomacy is a means to attract “foreign investments and talents” across strategic sectors for economic growth and diversification at home. It seeks to brand the UAE “as an ideal destination for living and working” for nation-building purposes. In short, tapping into the capabilities of expats to improve domestic labor productivity lies at the heart of innovation diplomacy.<sup>17</sup>

**In 2010, the UAE launched Vision 2021 “to make the UAE one of the best countries in the world by the year 2021.**

### The UAE’s Innovation Diplomacy: Main Actors and Strategies

In 2010, the UAE launched Vision 2021 “to make the UAE one of the best countries in the world by the year 2021.” Its “United in Knowledge” pillar focuses on a competitive economy to be driven by innovative Emiratis. The Strategy maintains that the UAE will harness “the best talent from around the world” for specific industries “where Emiratis can learn most from global expertise” in return for “fulfilling employment and an attractive place to live.”<sup>18</sup>

A complementary official document is the UAE’s National Innovation Strategy launched in 2014 “with the aim of making the UAE one of the most innovative nations in the world within seven years.” It accords a significant role to schools and universities in “promoting innovation by collaborating with top global academic institutions to introduce new specialized educational materials.” The Strategy calls upon the “world’s leading innovative companies,” while underscoring the UAE’s image as a world center for testing innovations in pre-defined strategic fields, namely “renewable and clean energy, transportation, technology, education, health, water and space.”<sup>19</sup>

The year 2017 was totally remarkable in terms of the acceleration of efforts to meet the goals of the National Innovation Strategy. Reporting directly to the Cabinet, the Soft Power Council was set up to implement the UAE Soft Power Strategy. Introduced as “the largest framework for integrated diplomatic action,” this roadmap promoted the country as a global meeting point featuring a strong economy and robust infrastructure. The Strategy aims to polish the image of the UAE to materialize its “developmental, economic and cultural goals and ambitions.”<sup>20</sup> Abu Dhabi appointed the world’s first “Minister for Artificial Intelligence” to administer the UAE Strategy for Artificial Intelligence. The same year witnessed the promulgation of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) Strategy and the Future Foresight Platform.<sup>21</sup> The latter is a “smart and interactive electronic platform” showcasing research as well as international and local scientific references that will help broaden the horizons of those interested in the future. It joins the Future Foresight Program

**The UAE underscored innovation as a cornerstone of its Stronger United commitments upon election to the UN Security Council as non-permanent member for the 2022–2023 term.**

in partnership with Oxford University “to qualify a generation of specialists in the fields of future foresight and drawing future scenarios to achieve the UAE’s Government vision.”<sup>22</sup>

In 2018, the National Strategy for Advanced Innovation replaced the National Innovation Strategy

to underscore broad thinking, experimentation and risk-taking as per the goals of UAE Centennial 2071. In the same year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MoFAIC) and the Ministry of Culture and Knowledge Development collaborated to launch the “Cultural and Digital Diplomacy” initiative to promote the Emiratis’ exclusive stories of creativity and innovation, along with the country’s historical landmarks.<sup>23</sup>

This and similar initiatives demonstrate that the UAE’s innovation policy is an integrated national undertaking to increase the country’s attractiveness in the eyes of foreign talent and investors. Emphasized across various digital platforms is the message that the UAE offers a desirous environment for investing, living and working, and that col-

laboration between academic and private UAE institutions and their foreign counterparts would stimulate innovation. The list is exhaustive— some examples are as follows: National Advanced Sciences Agenda 2031 (2018), UAE Policy for Advanced Industries (2019), Research and Development (R&D) Governance Policy and the foundation of the Emirates Research and Development Council (2021), and the UAE Strategy for Talent Attraction and Retention (2021).<sup>24</sup> The UAE underscored innovation as a cornerstone of its Stronger United commitments upon election to the UN Security Council as non-permanent member for the 2022–2023 term.<sup>25</sup>

Prior to its renaming in February 2021 as “The Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy (AGDA)”, the Emirates Diplomatic Academy (EDA) of 2014 held innovation at the heart of its activities. The EDA/AGDA offers accredited scholarly programs and top-class executive training “to develop future diplomats, as well as the government and business leaders of tomorrow.” It is tasked with pioneering new approaches in international relations to fulfil the targets of Vision 2021. As 2015 was dubbed “The Year of Innovation in the UAE”, the Academy organized brainstorming workshops during the annual UAE Innovation Week under the title “Innovation in Diplomacy Labs”, whereby students exchanged ideas to reinforce the UAE’s image regionally and globally. In one of these sessions, participants deliberated on a “Virtual Reality Embassy” to improve the UAE’s diplomatic activities via secure online access.<sup>26</sup> The EDA’s publications on the nexus between innovation and diplomacy include *Transforming Diplomacy through Data-Driven Innovation* (2017) and *Diplomacy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence* (2020).

The UAE has Education & Technology Sciences Attaché Offices in Australia, Canada, Egypt, the UK and the U.S., each featuring Instagram accounts.<sup>27</sup> Among their chief goals are cooperation with educational and science and technology institutions and discovering best practices in the field of R&D for benchmarking purposes. To this end, the attachés welcome delegations from distinguished universities and visit such universities themselves to discuss potential areas of collaboration.<sup>28</sup> With knowledge at the heart of innovation policies, huge investments were made for renowned higher education institutions like New York University to set up branches in the UAE or to realize partnerships

**The COVID-19 pandemic offered the UAE an unexpected blessing to harness its “innovative diplomacy.**

with them like the one between the Masdar Institute of Science and Technology and MIT. These efforts not only buttress the image of the country but also present a prime opportunity for local Emi-

rati students.<sup>29</sup>

The Ministry of Industry & Advanced Technology’s “Make It in the Emirates” campaign fits very well into innovation diplomacy as an open invitation to entrepreneurs, industrialists and investors from all corners of the world. Accordingly, the Ministry praises the UAE for its ease of doing business (e.g., the Golden Visa, allowing foreigners to own 100% of their companies), abundance of energy and raw materials, as well as quality information and communications technology (ICT) and logistics infrastructure.<sup>30</sup>

### The UAE’s Innovation Diplomacy: Sample Practices

The COVID-19 pandemic offered the UAE an unexpected blessing to harness its “innovative diplomacy” capabilities in the name of “innovation diplomacy”. Accordingly, Abu Dhabi launched multilateral and bilateral initiatives to connect with state and non-state actors via digital communications. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation hosted several specialists and officials, including state and foreign ambassadors, in various teleseminars during the “Online Cultural Marathon Symposium” broadcast on the Ministry’s social media platforms. The event comprised weekly sessions on various topics ranging from “Space Diplomacy” to “the Role of Embassies in the Future”. State representatives abroad held a virtual discussion on “The History of the UAE” documentary series, while the Youth Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Diplomatic Youth Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation organized a workshop on June 8, 2020 via video-telecommunications about “The Future of Diplomacy Post-Covid-19”.<sup>31</sup>

In November 2021, the new AGDA hosted the 47<sup>th</sup> International Forum on Diplomatic Training (IFDT) to discuss timely issues like diplo-

macy in a post-pandemic era and digital diplomacy. Launched in 1972 by a consortium of academic and diplomatic training institutions, the forum’s membership has grown to include participants from 56 countries. Discussions have recently revolved around the “integration of technological skills into diplomatic training,” gender mainstreaming in diplomacy and the future of international governance.<sup>32</sup> The AGDA is known for its “Women in Diplomacy Index”. First published in 2018, the Index’s 2022 edition maps the share of women ambassadors from the world’s 40 largest economies and the European Union (EU). Revealing that there are only 927 women out of a sample of 4,293 ambassadors, the Academy raises awareness on the gender gap in diplomatic representation on a global scale while boasting about its women graduates, who comprise 60% of the total number of participants.<sup>33</sup> Currently, AGDA actively partners with prestigious academic institutions and experts worldwide to train the next-gen diplomats to manage global challenges (Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies) or launch the Future Diplomats Peace Game (Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs).<sup>34</sup>

The Mohammed Bin Rashid Centre for Government Innovation along with the Global Innovation Council announced the Moonshot Pilot Grant with the aim of “testing breakthrough practices with the UAE government.” This grant was a follow-up of the Moonshot Apprenticeship Program incubated during the summer of 2021. The initiative convened select talent from around the world to brainstorm ideas about how the UAE should transform within 50 years. The apprentices interacted with a group of UAE government officials to experiment with ideas with the goal of addressing long-term challenges.<sup>35</sup> The Center also set the stage for the adoption of the “Agile Nations Charter”, electronically signed in the English language on November 25, 2020 by representatives from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs of the UAE; the Danish Business Authority; the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy of the United Kingdom; the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan; the Ministry for Technological Innovation and Digitalisation of Italy; the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Singapore; and the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat to foster dialogue on rulemaking to help businesses start and scale innovations across their markets with due protections for citizens and the environment.

Joint operations may range from exploring means to develop interoperable rules relating to innovations, to assisting innovative firms to navigate member countries' regulations and managing innovation-related, cross-border risks.<sup>36</sup>

Bi- and trilateral deals also abound, concluded particularly with countries with a striking performance in technological advancements. Following the Abraham Accords, the UAE and Israel started discussions about creating an ecosystem “to develop the next 50 years of innovation in the Middle East.” This comprehensive plan involves close ties between businesses, start-ups and universities to realize the UAE’s vision “to make the desert green.”<sup>37</sup> Bilateral collaboration in innovation will use the UAE-IL Tech Zone, established in December 2020 as a platform to connect Emirati and Israeli experts to generate mutual gains particularly in agri-food tech, clean-tech, digital health, energy, fintech and sustainability.<sup>38</sup> To this end, the Abu Dhabi Investment Office (ADIO) inaugurated activities in Israel as its first international outpost. The event was broadcasted online on April 12, 2021 and publicized strategic opportunities for Israeli firms in the UAE.<sup>39</sup>

As a follow-up, the UAE’s embassy in Israel set the stage for “a first-of-its-kind business conference on Israeli technology and innovation”, hosting about 200 entrepreneurs, businesspersons and government officials including the Emirati Minister of State for Entrepreneurship and Small & Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and the Minister of State for Foreign Trade. The event was facilitated by a Tel Aviv-based non-profit organization, Start-Up Nation Central, “that builds bridges to Israeli

innovation.”<sup>40</sup> Meanwhile, the UAE-IL Tech Zone gathered thousands of members as well as followers on social media, took delegations and start-ups to the UAE to showcase their advantages and form partnerships, and organized 12 virtual events around technology and innovation-related subjects.<sup>41</sup>

**New ventures on innovation involve various Asian countries. Existing cooperation with China, India, Japan and South Korea in energy and construction has expanded to include (but is not limited to) the innovation priority fields of clean energy, health, space, transportation and water.**

The UAE considers space “the next frontier for business innovation.” As Abu Dhabi seeks partners for commercialism in “space mining” or “space tourism”,<sup>42</sup> a joint mission between Israel and the UAE might be in the offing, in order to realize in 2024 “the first lunar double landing in space exploration history.”<sup>43</sup>

New ventures on innovation involve various Asian countries. Existing cooperation with China, India, Japan and South Korea in energy and construction has expanded to include (but is not limited to) the innovation priority fields of clean energy, health, space, transportation and water.<sup>44</sup> For example, the UAE-Israel dialogue encouraged Japan to partake in joint activities; although Tokyo had been the first capital in Asia to initiate relations with Tel Aviv, bilateral relations did not take off against the background of Arab sensitivities. Consequently, Japan, Israel and the UAE held the first Trilateral Innovation Forum in January 2022.<sup>45</sup>

As part of the Ghadan 21 accelerator program to sustain an innovation ecosystem in the UAE, the Abu Dhabi Investment Office (ADIO) authorized the Korean cloud technology company Bespin Global to set up regional headquarters and two innovation centers in Abu Dhabi. The company will engage with local higher education institutions to train 5–10 Emirati interns per year and launch hackathons.<sup>46</sup> In January 2022, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to broaden the horizon of bilateral cooperation to include the fields of biotechnology, life sciences and logistics. By this means, Abu Dhabi looks forward to establishing itself as a hub for the distribution of South Korean medical and pharmaceutical products and as an incubator for innovation in clinical research.<sup>47</sup> One related development was the establishment of the KU-KAIST Joint Research Center between Khalifa University and the Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology in April 2019 to pave the ground for research projects focusing on the technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution pertaining to healthcare and transportation.<sup>48</sup>

UAE-China tech-oriented relations are flourishing as well. An exemplary case is how Yuan Longping, dubbed the “father of hybrid rice”, successfully harvested “desert sea rice” in Dubai. Cooperation areas include the medical field, e.g., the joint work between Chinese and Emirati

companies to conduct clinical trials and produce Sinopharm vaccines in the UAE to contribute to the UAE's "health diplomacy". Scientific research agreements have taken place between UAE University and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, while the Mohammed Bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence has hired Chinese professors for key teaching and managerial positions.<sup>49</sup> In June 2021, the UAE was welcomed at the Pujiang Innovation Forum in China as the country of honor, with the Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber praising both countries in creating "the world's largest single-site solar power plant, Noor Abu Dhabi." In his words, "when countries collaborate to innovate, costs come down, economic opportunities go up and society benefits."<sup>50</sup>

The UAE's pioneering outlook has sought to unite the Arab world under the banner of innovation. To this end, a delegation from the UAE Ministry of Education visited the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO) in February 2022. The participants agreed to use AI extensively in education and make joint efforts to materialize several projects like the "Arab University Ranking", "Arab Mathematics Olympiad" and the "ALECSO Olympiad for the Development of Arab Children's Scientific Skills".<sup>51</sup>

The cooperation agreement of July 2021 between Austria and the UAE in hydrogen technology was an attempt to reconcile developmen-

**The UAE is listed as 1<sup>st</sup> regionally and 33<sup>rd</sup> globally in the Global Innovation Index 2021.**

tal and environmental interests through innovation diplomacy. The stated objective was to leverage the UAE's "ideal conditions for green hydrogen production" and Austria's time-honored "expe-

rience in gas transport and storage as well as the required infrastructure." The MoU was hailed by the UAE Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology as a demonstration of the country's "commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050" via clean energy solutions.<sup>52</sup>

## Evaluation and Conclusion

Despite concerns over confidentiality due to reliance of foreign expertise in innovation-led diplomatic endeavors<sup>53</sup> and over the predomi-

nance of Arabic and English in digital communications, which might hamper access to broader audiences,<sup>54</sup> the UAE is positioning itself as a forefront country to harvest the fruits of innovation diplomacy efforts. It ranks very high in various global indices. The UAE is listed as 1<sup>st</sup> regionally and 33<sup>rd</sup> globally in the Global Innovation Index 2021.<sup>55</sup> In the Global Knowledge Index 2021, the UAE appears as the 12<sup>th</sup> with a score of 67.3 out of 100.<sup>56</sup> According to the Global Soft Power Index of 2022, the UAE is number one in the region, ranking 10<sup>th</sup> globally. The Global Entrepreneurship Index 2022 ranks the UAE as the 1<sup>st</sup> on a global scale.<sup>57</sup> The country is home to 251 scaleups (tech companies established after 2000 that have generated a minimum of \$1M in revenue ever since), with Dubai as the preferred destination for about 40% of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) scaleups, plus many renowned tech companies like Careem, Kitopi and Noon.<sup>58</sup>

However, a closer look at some variables might be revealing in terms of evaluating the impact of innovation diplomacy on the outcomes of the Emiratization policy. The IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2022 lists the UAE as “the most competitive economy in the MENA region” and the 12<sup>th</sup> in global ranking. Judging by its scores in various sub-indices like “adaptability of government policy”, “basic infrastructure”, “highest internet users” and “immigration law”, the UAE demonstrates a terrific performance among the 63 countries covered by the research. Nevertheless, it scores low as regards “strong R&D culture” (3.6%), “high educational level” (7.1%) and “skilled workforce” (25%). It ranks 45<sup>th</sup> and 53<sup>rd</sup>, respectively, in terms of “educational assessment PISA–Maths” and “R&D productivity by publication.”<sup>59</sup>

Likewise, according to the Global Talent Competitiveness Index 2021, which ranks countries and major cities “on their ability to develop, attract and retain talent”, the UAE ranked 25<sup>th</sup>. Its main strength lies in its ability to “attract” talent (7<sup>th</sup>) mainly owing to its superior “external openness” (2<sup>nd</sup>). Its ability to “grow” talent (28<sup>th</sup>) is associated with weaknesses in “formal education” (74<sup>th</sup>). Yet the country’s capacity to “retain” talent is disappointing (55<sup>th</sup>), primarily related to “lifestyle” (78<sup>th</sup>) indicators.<sup>60</sup>

Importing skilled talent in leaps and bounds and introducing novelties in the educational system do not resonate well with many conservative

Emiratis, and clash with the idea of “a cohesive society and preserved identity” underscored in many of the UAE’s strategy documents. The mismatch between “economic prosperity” and “cultural identity” is hard to overcome, since the UAE’s non-oil sector still requires low-skilled workers in great numbers, thus adding more fuel to the fire.<sup>61</sup>

Only a minority of locals attend the offshore campuses of prestigious universities, which are often the preference of resident migrants. Rather than making efforts to upgrade the country’s status, these rare Emiratis often prefer to seek careers abroad thanks to “international degrees” and the “globalized study experience” offered by these higher education institutions.<sup>62</sup> Overall, businesses in the UAE operating in innovation-based sectors complain about the continuing lack of technical qualifications and essential skills like “critical thinking”, “team work” and “communication” in many Emiratis. Here, the social welfare system and generous benefits offered in the public sector pose major impediments. To complicate things further, the government’s decision to allow foreign investors 100% ownership of their ventures diminishes chances for many Emiratis to ‘learn by doing’ through partnerships. Indeed, it has been noted that private companies in the UAE “prefer hardworking workers from any nationality.”<sup>63</sup>

These findings demonstrate that the UAE offers a very promising technical and legal infrastructure to enable innovation-led projects to entice foreign expertise. However, the spillover impact of this expertise on the UAE’s educational system and social relations has been minimal. The policy of exporting talent or ideas has not yet materialized into a robust educational renewal to prepare local students for future challenges or inspire an R&D culture and spirit within Emirati society. Retaining an already limited number of the brightest Emiratis is difficult, since many seek greener pastures abroad, while skilled expats find it hard to adjust to a different cultural setting regardless of a multitude of incentives to stay.

Success in the long term will require the harmonization of “innovation diplomacy” with domestic policies to address the sensitivities of locals and businesses. The UAE has unquestioningly made great strides and broadened its horizons by engaging in mutually beneficial technical partnerships enabled by innovation diplomacy. However, top-down

novelties introduced to uplift a country in a very short period of time may bring forth unintended, negative consequences. The UAE would make the most of its innovation diplomacy efforts if it embraces slow and steady structural change at home to scrutinize its welfare state benefits, overhaul its educational system and precipitate a social contract between locals and expats.

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## ARTICLE

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# Türkiye's Role in the Afghan State-building and Reformation Process in the 1920s and 1930s

Murat ASLAN\*

### Abstract

*The period of the 1920s and 1930s witnessed significant reformation efforts in both Türkiye and Afghanistan initiated respectively by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Amanullah Khan. However, while Türkiye under the guidance of Atatürk made significant progress in the reformation and modernization process, the reforms launched by Amanullah Khan in Afghanistan failed despite the strong assistance the Afghan government received from Türkiye and other countries. This article seeks to explain the motivations of the two leaders as well as the discourse of their interaction with the goal of understanding the influence of the Turkish experience on the Afghan reform process. It could be argued in this regard that the origins of Turkish-Afghan relations lie in the shared interest of the two countries for reformation, while mutual sympathy and the needs of the Afghan people inspired the further pledges of the Turkish government to Afghanistan.*

### Keywords

Türkiye, Afghanistan, reformation, Atatürk, Amanullah Khan

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## Introduction

Relations between the Turkish and Afghan people began even before the foundation of the Republic of Türkiye in 1923. The Afghans' perception of Türkiye in those days was largely influenced by the psychological authority of the Ottoman Caliph. Nevertheless, the two nations re-interpreted each other's importance after the signature of the Turkish-Afghan Friendship Treaty of March 1921, which was one of the first bilateral treaties that recognized the Turkish government in the international arena, predating even the Moscow Treaty that was signed with the Bolshevik government in Russia the same month.<sup>1</sup>

The formation and context of the Turkish-Afghan agreement in 1921 need to be further scrutinized in order to understand the motivations of the two countries. The purpose of the Turkish government—not the state since it was not established yet—can be classified under two headings. The first was its eagerness to find political support from the outer world for the War of Independence that was still going on in Anatolia. For instance, the Turkish delegation in Moscow which was there to hold talks with the Bolshevik government coincidentally met with the Afghan delegation in a hotel hall. The presence of the two delegations in Moscow at the same time reflected their common desire to find a counterbalance against Britain.

The second motivation of the Turkish government was the search for military equipment and economic incentives from Russia and the Eastern Muslims (a term coined for Indian Muslims and Afghans) to be used in the War of Independence. In this sense, an agreement with Afghanistan, which was the only independent state of the Islamic world at the time, would not only deliver a strong message to the world that the Turkish people were seeking to become a respected member of the international community, but also increase the pressure over Britain to withdraw from the Turkish territories, since acting otherwise could alienate and even provoke the Muslim nationalists in India.

The Afghans, on the other hand, had succeeded in winning their independence in the 1919 war against Britain, relying primarily on Russian political, economic and military support. Even though at the beginning, the Afghan perception of the Turkish Independence War had more to do with their respect for the Caliphate than the Ankara government's independence goal,<sup>2</sup> the presence of a common enemy (i.e. Britain), similar domestic concerns and the search for support in international engagements fostered a sense of solidarity between Turks and Afghans.<sup>3</sup>

A significant development in the establishment of the relations between the two countries was the Afghan government's request for military and professional support from the Ankara government. Afghanistan's desire to attract Turkish aid and support, even though the Turkish nationalists were fighting for their own sovereignty at the time indicates the positive image of the Turks in the Afghan mind. In addition, Afghanistan's lack of infrastructure and relative backwardness required significant foreign aid so that the country could facilitate domestic reforms. However, Afghans' bias against foreign assistance was strong, since imperial powers like Russia and Britain had engaged in harsh geopolitical competition with each other in the past to create a sphere of influence in Afghanistan. The Turks, who were similarly fighting against imperial powers, on the other hand, had the human resources the Afghans needed because the Ottoman Empire had been sending students and professionals to Europe for almost two centuries.

In short, the expectations and needs of Türkiye and Afghanistan were consistent, which was a major factor in their interest in developing their bilateral relationship. Even though the two peoples shared the same religion for many years, the geopolitical concerns and realist interests of their governments brought them closer after they became independent following WWI. To support this argument, this article seeks to examine the development of Turkish-Afghan relations in the 1920s and 1930s.

## An Overview of Turkish-Afghan Relations in the 1920s

To understand the evolution of Turkish-Afghan relations, the developments of the 19<sup>th</sup> century should be taken into consideration. For instance, the Muslims in Afghanistan and India viewed the Turkish-Russian War of 1877-1878 and the Turkish-Greek War of 1897 as the attack of the Christian world on the Muslims. While the failure of the Ottoman army in these wars was resented by the Afghan people, Turkish victory against Greeks in Thessaly provided the spark for the Tirah uprising in India, where Afghans were heavily involved.<sup>4</sup> It should also be noted that every development that took place in the Ottoman-Western engagement appeared on the agenda of the Eastern world after a delay due to the primitive communication technology of the time. Nevertheless, when the news of the Tripoli War in 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 were received, many Eastern Muslims volunteered to join the Ottoman army.<sup>5</sup>

The interest of Eastern Muslims in the Ottoman affairs was closely related with the emergence of a pervasive and communal motivation propelled not by state actors but by social groups. The initial cause was the sense of a common enemy: Britain. Angered by the longstanding British occupation of their territories, Afghans and Indians desired to witness a Turkish victory against the British in Anatolia. Meanwhile, influential Muslim intellectual figures in India like Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Jauhar brothers and Abu Al Kalam Azad harshly criticized the Western assault on the Caliphate.<sup>6</sup> Complicating the matters, the Ottoman Sultan who was also recognized as the Caliph of the Islamic world made a call to the Muslim masses around the world to support the Ottoman army in WWI, despite the British military's conscription of Indian Muslims against the Ottoman-German alliance.<sup>7</sup>

In contrast to the Indian Muslims, the call for *jihad* (holy war) diffused in the minds of Afghans more conspicuously. The British-Russian agreement to partition Iran and Afghanistan in 1907 was a clear warning to the Afghan people, which urged intellectuals like Mahmud Tarzi to promote nationalist and pro-Turkish ideas in Afghanistan.<sup>8</sup> Tarzi particularly

played an important role in convincing Habibullah Khan, the father of Amanullah Khan, who ruled Afghanistan until 1919 to help the Turkish opinion-makers in Egypt to escape to Afghanistan with the goal utilizing the professional skills of these people for the Afghans' own modernization process.<sup>9</sup>

Mustafa Kemal's speech in the Erzurum Congress held in 1919 indicated the general Turkish perception toward Eastern Muslims as he made strong reference to the resistance movements in Egypt, India, Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq.<sup>10</sup> He emphasized that Britain was the common enemy of all these peoples, while he presented the Turkish War of Independence as a struggle on behalf of the Eastern peoples who had suffered under colonial rule for centuries.<sup>11</sup> The timing of the speech was interesting as it coincided with the third Afghan-British war, which had brought full independence to the Afghan people. Yet, despite this victory, Afghanistan was still in ruins and suffering from poverty and unmet basic needs.

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Amanullah Khan's commitment to maintain the independence of Afghanistan with an Islamic, liberal and nationalistic perspective urged him to establish dialogue with the Ankara government. Since he prioritized being recognized as a fully independent country by other states and eradicating the image of Afghanistan's dependence on Britain, he was eager to reach out to the Turks.<sup>12</sup> The Afghan interest in the Turkish independence movement was also because the Afghans for their part had realized during their 1919 war against Britain that they were militarily weak against the British army as well as against the opposing tribes in the country, and experienced Turkish officers could provide military support to reform the Afghan army.<sup>13</sup> For this purpose, Amanullah Khan sent a letter to Mustafa Kemal via three Turkish officers released from the Russian prisoner-of-war camps who were heading to Türkiye by way of Afghanistan. He informed the Turkish leader of the services of these officers to the Afghan people and requested a Turkish military delegation to renovate the Afghan army.<sup>14</sup> Even before the letter reached Mustafa Kemal, the delegations of the two countries in Moscow signed the Treaty of Friendship on March 1921, which paved the way for them to deepen diplomatic relations and cooperate more efficiently.

Mustafa Kemal's response to mobilize Turkish support to Afghanistan was immediate, even though his forces were still fighting the Allied Powers, mainly the Greek army in Anatolia. On May 19, 1921, the Ankara government decided to send an envoy accompanied by a military delegation to organize the Afghan army. Mustafa Kemal also expressed his gratitude to the appointment of an Afghan diplomatic delegation

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headed by Sultan Ahmed Han and appointed Abdurrahman Bey as the Turkish envoy in return.<sup>15</sup> Abdurrahman Bey was a significant figure as he was an Afghan who participated in the Balkan Wars and WWI in the cadre of the Ottomans before joining the Turkish army of the Ankara government during the War for Independence. It should also be noted that these first contacts between Mustafa Kemal and Amanullah

Khan coincided with the Turkish army's defense maneuver in the Battle of Sakarya in 1921, which is also known as the "Officers' Battle" due to

the vast number of Turkish officers who lost their lives.<sup>16</sup> It was remarkable in this regard that the Ankara government did not refrain from sending aid to the Afghans even though the Turks needed every single officer on the battlefield against the British-supported Greek army.

Mustafa Kemal's interest in Afghanistan was double-pronged. His first goal was to gain international recognition for his government, while the second was to benefit from the positive image of the Afghans in the eyes of the Turkish public. For instance, the Afghan Ambassador Sultan Ahmed Khan's arrival in Ankara took place right before the opening ceremony of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) and the ambassador presented his greetings to the Turkish people during this ceremony. Sultan Ahmed Khan's letter addressed to the TGNA was also warmly received by the members of the assembly.<sup>17</sup> In the letter, the Afghan ambassador presented his salutes and support to Mustafa Kemal, while he praised the common Islamic bonds between the Turkish and Afghan people. After the letter was read before the TGNA, the members of the assembly acknowledged the two nations' close relations and praised the Afghans' support for the Turkish War of Independence.<sup>18</sup>

The clear commitment of the TGNA to develop Turkish-Afghan relations in the early 1920s convinced Mustafa Kemal to make critical changes in his Afghan policy. For instance, in order to continuously support the human resources needs of the Afghan people, he appointed Fahrettin Pasha as the ambassador of the Ankara government to Afghanistan in September 1921. Fahrettin Pasha was regarded as the hero of the Holy Madina campaign against the British army during WWI, and his appointment sent several messages to the world. First of all, appointing an ambassador as the highest representative of an independent state in another independent state strengthened the two countries' recognition of each other. Secondly, Fahrettin Pasha was famous for defending the holy Muslim lands as he refused to retreat, even though the Ottoman government in Istanbul ordered the army under his command to surrender. Thus, instating such a figure as Türkiye's ambassador sent a clear message to Britain as millions of Eastern Muslims were still living under British rule.<sup>19</sup> In this sense, it could be argued that the Ankara government hoped to exert pressure over Britain to withdraw its aid from the Greek army fighting against the Turks in Anatolia.

Turkish interest in Afghanistan was also motivated by the deeply needed morale boost in the Turkish army and the justification of the War of Independence in the international sphere by attracting the support of the Muslim communities around the world. The early 1920s was a time

of tremendous psychological shock for the Turkish public and the political figures due to foreign troops' advances into Anatolia's heartland, while the Ottoman Sultan who was also the Caliph of the Islamic world adopted a negative attitude toward the Ankara government. Thus, the support of the Indian Muslims and the Afghans was important for the TGNA in terms of receiving approval from the Muslim world.<sup>20</sup> The War of Independence in this sense would be perceived as a war being waged to save the Caliphate and the Ottoman Sultan, since the conception of the Republic and the idea of a people-based government was not yet fully formed in the minds of the Turkish public. In this regard, the Afghan diplomatic presence in Ankara was actually the symbolic representation of loyalty to the Caliphate. This is also probably why the Turkish official gazette, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, which had a limited printing and distribution capacity, continuously urged the Turkish public to praise the Afghan presence in Ankara and support the war.<sup>21</sup>

Türkiye's concern for recognition also continued after the Lausanne Treaty and the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Ankara, which was the new capital of Türkiye, was not popular among the European powers, and most of them did not even move their embassies to Ankara for years with the expectation that the Turkish government would eventually take a decision to move the capital back to Istanbul. While this issue continued until 1929, the USSR and Afghanistan were the two states that carried their embassies to Ankara to support the Turkish government. In addition, Afghanistan became the first government to congratulate Mustafa Kemal for the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, while Amanullah Khan's "Grand Tour" that included Ankara in 1928 could be regarded as an acknowledgement of Türkiye's sovereignty.<sup>22</sup>

The Afghan government's positive perception about Türkiye even before the start of the Turkish War of Independence was guided by logical reasons. Because they recently became independent from British domination, the Afghans sought to be recognized by other states to strengthen their sovereignty. Besides, they required foreign aid to renovate their country and build an army. The Ottoman government would not be able provide material support to the Afghans, however, educated Turkish soldiers could fill the human resources gap, which was the reason why Afghanistan hosted many Ottoman soldiers running away from the Allied powers during WWI. Amanullah Khan hoped to benefit from these soldiers in reforming the Afghan military system. Cemal Pasha, one of the "Three Pashas" who ruled the Ottoman Empire until 1918, for instance, became a prominent figure in the Afghan military

reformation process.<sup>23</sup> Amanullah Khan assigned Cemal Pasha specifically to build a presidential regiment. Despite problems like shortage of weapons and equipment as well as aging soldiers, Cemal Pasha regularly informed Mustafa Kemal of his progress in Afghanistan and requested more Turkish officers in Kabul.<sup>24</sup> He even consulted Germany to receive material assistance, but he was assassinated in Georgia before he could return to Kabul.<sup>25</sup>

It should be noted, however, that Cemal Pasha's efforts to receive foreign aid were met with suspicion in certain circles in Afghanistan not only because he had fled from Anatolia after WWI, but also due to his role in the 1908 coup that overthrew Abdulhamid II, who was perceived as a respected Ottoman ruler in Kabul.<sup>26</sup> The fact that Cemal Pasha and his crew were under close scrutiny of the Afghan government at the time negatively influenced the success of Turkish contribution to the Afghan military reform process in the early 1920s.

## Afghanistan's Quest for Economic and Political Assistance

The internal political and social environment in Türkiye and Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s may provide a better understanding of the course of Afghan-Turkish relations. The leaders of the two countries were similar in terms of their quest to start a reformation process after independence. However, while Türkiye achieved to launch a remarkable reformation process led by Atatürk, Amanullah Khan failed to do the same thing in Afghanistan due to a number of political and economic reasons.

Amanullah gained reputation inside Afghanistan as a respected ruler, since he was committed to achieving Afghan independence. He was a charismatic, liberal and reformist leader who was also a good follower of Islamic faith. He opposed radicalism, while he was also aware that his ruined country lacked infrastructure, and suffered

from problems like illiteracy, uneducated human resources and a dependent economy. At the same time, however, tribes which played an important role in the Afghan society challenged Amanullah's authority

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and continued to promote radical ideas at the local level. The competing tribes particularly criticized Amanullah on the grounds that the agreement with Britain perpetuated the division of the Pashtun land. In addition, there was also considerable propaganda against his rule in the British outposts in India.<sup>27</sup>

Meanwhile, conservative Afghan society disappointed by Amanullah's reform attempts and agitated by British propaganda reacted with dismay, probably due to the quick implementation of the reforms.<sup>28</sup> Funding of the reforms was another concern for Amanullah, as he had to apply to Russia and Britain for financial support, which inevitably meant greater foreign meddling in the Afghan internal affairs.<sup>29</sup> Hence, the multiethnic Afghan society which was unprepared for such a deep reformation process and reeling from the worsening financial situation made Amanullah's authority even more vulnerable to foreign incursion.

Amanullah's reform attempts encountered additional challenges as the abolition of the Caliphate with Türkiye's decision in 1924 weakened the unity between the Afghan and Indian Muslims. Amanullah could still rely on the idea of Muslim solidarity, but this would not be enough to achieve the groundbreaking reforms in the country as he was not politically powerful enough to convince the Afghan society. In contrast, the Turkish reform movement happened very quickly and Atatürk's charisma and strong leadership eased the Turkish transformation process. Afghanistan, on the other hand, lacked the social readiness, human resources and level of technology to replicate the same success.

Nevertheless, Amanullah's reform perception may be compared to Atatürk's course. Amanullah described himself as different from previous rulers: "I am a revolutionary King; I desire to make revolutions in every phase of life in Afghanistan."<sup>30</sup> The similarity of the two leaders in this regard was that they desired to transform the public to build modern states. The difference between them, however, was their *modus operandi*. Atatürk pursued his reform path by mapping the needs and customs of society while benefiting from his power of persuasion to reform their minds. Amanullah, on the other hand, did not have Atatürk's power of persuasion, and the Afghan community's socially heterogenic and geographically scattered structure hindered communication efforts.

Nonetheless, Amanullah's reform process greatly benefited from the Turkish experience as many Turkish technicians, teachers, doctors and engineers were sent to Afghanistan, while Türkiye also provided military

assistance which was warmly welcomed by the Afghan leadership. The personal letters exchanged between Amanullah and Atatürk demonstrate that reformation efforts brought the two governments closer to each other after 1923. However, especially following the uprising of a tribe in the Khost province in the 1923-1924 period, the Afghan reformation process lost momentum and Amanullah started to focus more on bolstering the unity of the country instead of introducing new reforms.

### Amanullah's Reform Attempts

The Afghans had been struggling to survive between the spheres of influence of Russia and Britain for many decades. For these two imperial powers, the Afghan territories had no significance other than playing the role of a buffer zone in their ongoing "Great Game" with each other. Amanullah sought to change this role assigned to Afghanistan by the imperial powers after he became the ruler of Afghanistan, while he also tried to augment the integrity of Afghani multiethnic society. His reign coincided with the transformation process experienced in the Islamic communities in the early 1920s.<sup>31</sup> His objectives were to build a nation-state and start social reforms to transform his ethnic/tribal-based, conservative society into a modern one.<sup>32</sup>

The Afghan reforms can be categorized into three phases.<sup>33</sup> The first phase was the 1919–1923 period, in which state-building efforts were prioritized. The 1924 Khost uprising marks the end of this first phase, as it slowed down the reform movement until 1928. The *Loya Jirga* (Grand Council) of 1928 was the final turning point in transforming the country through the consensus of Afghan opinion leaders, although Amanullah's reign came to an end right after this phase.

The planned reforms covered four sectors: social, political, religious and economical. The social reforms were mainly related to changing the traditional, educational and cultural practices. For instance, women's rights and dress codes were significant agenda items. In the educational sphere, Afghanistan sent thousands of students to France, Germany, Austria, India and Türkiye. While female students were only allowed to go to Türkiye due to religious concerns, male students were sent to the other countries to receive training. Political reforms included constitutional amendments, mainly for separating the country's executive, judiciary and legislative powers. Afghans did not look to any single state as a model to achieve these goals but instead considered many examples.

For instance, the administrative and military reforms were mainly excerpted from the Turkish experiences, while countries such as Russia, France and Italy also inspired Afghanistan's military reformation.

The nature of the Afghan society was the fundamental reason for the failure of the reformation attempts, mainly because the Afghan people largely interpreted the reforms through the lens of religion. The people's interest in continuing absolute Islamist practices in their social life made the reforms vulnerable to Mullah-designed propaganda.<sup>34</sup> Afghanistan was under the heavy influence of the clergy, and the male-dominant society gave greater credence to clerics than to progressive statements. Hence the reforms suffered from lack of justification, and Amanullah's efforts to persuade the community were inefficient. His coercive methods did not work much, since the army was not as strong as the militia controlled by the tribes.<sup>35</sup> Meanwhile, increasing the tax rates to finance the reforms was not tolerated by the predominantly rural population of Afghanistan who lacked communication and basic services. The leaders could not clearly explain why the reformation was a requirement for the future of the country.<sup>36</sup> In the absence of compelling explanations, coercion of the government to implement the reforms led to resistance rather than obedience.

It should also be noted that Amanullah had limited options to begin the reformation process. His initial preference for foreign aid was Russia, which withdrew from WWI right after the Bolshevik Revolution and later became the main source of technical and financial assistance for Amanullah's reforms. Interestingly enough, Amanullah also challenged the Bolsheviks' willingness to prevail over Central Asia by pursuing a dual policy—seeking Russian aid while supporting Central Asian resistance movements like the *Basmaci* movement. As argued earlier, the other option was to recruit the Ottoman officers in exile, who could provide significant momentum to the reformation of the Afghan military. Thus, Amanullah immediately provided safe haven to the Ottoman military officers with the expectation that they would share their professional experience and technical expertise with the Afghan government.

Amanullah also sent a delegation to Russia and some European countries in 1921. Under the leadership of Veli Khan, delegates had the authority to sign agreements with states that recognized Afghanistan.<sup>37</sup> As a result, the Afghan delegation signed various trade agreements in Russia, Germany, Italy and France, while they were met with a cold shoulder in Britain – indicating the tense relationship between London and the Afghan government at the time.<sup>38</sup>

Amanullah also contacted Mustafa Kemal during this period even though the Ankara government was still unrecognized and the Turkish War of Independence was continuing in Anatolia. As stated earlier, his first two letters included a request for a Turkish military delegation to organize the Afghan army, since the Afghan army required restructuring to stand against external and internal threats. After receiving the request, Mustafa Kemal sent a letter to the Chief of General Staff that emphasized his positive attitude to the Afghan cause: “The army that would be built in Afghanistan would help keeping Britain away from Anatolia.”<sup>39</sup> Mustafa Kemal also believed that the sustainability of Amanullah’s authority in Afghanistan would be beneficial for Turkish long-term interests in this country.<sup>40</sup>

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Meanwhile, Amanullah achieved obtaining the support of the Bolsheviks by the agreements signed in Moscow in February 1921 and in Kabul in September 1921. The Russian motivation was similar to that of the Turks: keeping Britain away from the regions of Bukhara and Khiva in Central Asia, which were not yet under Bolshevik control. Cooperation with Afghanistan was crucial to achieve this objective. The Russian-Afghan agreements also meant that Afghans recognized the Russian interests in Central Asia. On the other hand, Russia pledged to provide significant financial support to the Afghan government.<sup>41</sup>

The delegation of Veli Khan also visited the US in 1921. While the Afghans succeeded in persuading the US government to recognize their country, they failed to attract technical and financial support from the US.<sup>42</sup> Afghanistan also developed a fruitful relationship with Germany, which accepted many Afghan workers after WWI. Afghanistan had accepted many German immigrants during the war, which inspired pro-Afghan sentiments in Germany. In pragmatic terms, the Afghans viewed Germany as a balance against Britain in their foreign relations.<sup>43</sup> However, the belief that Germans shared the same ancestral roots with the Afghans as both nations traced their ancestry to the Aryans also contributed to the friendly relations between Germany and Afghanistan.

## Amanullah's "Grand Tour" to Türkiye

In 1928, Amanullah Khan made a six-month trip to Egypt, Italy, Germany, Britain, Russia, Türkiye and Iran with the goal of finding foreign aid to modernize his country.<sup>44</sup> Amanullah was fluent in Turkish, which made him popular among the Turkish society. Besides, Atatürk and Amanullah had communicated with each other regularly for many years. Therefore, Amanullah's visit to Türkiye was erected upon a clear understanding of friendship and equality between the two countries. In addition, it was the first foreign state-to-state official visit for Türkiye.

Two issues are worth mentioning during Amanullah's visit. The first involves how the Turks prepared themselves to welcome the Afghan King. The first state-level visit from another state to the Turkish capital was organized perfectly so that the guest would be impressed by the achievements of the newly founded Republic. Hence a Turkish entourage greeted Amanullah in the Soviet port of Sevastopol by *Izmir* vessel, which was a massive burden for the Turkish budget at the time. All the details of the visit were planned, including hosts, servants and even fireworks. After the long train journey to Ankara, an enthusiastic crowd greeted Amanullah at the Ankara Terminal. The streets of Ankara were cleaned, and the construction of the Ankara Palace Hotel was swiftly finished. The citizens of Ankara gathered to see the Afghan King in front of the hotel and celebrated his presence in Türkiye, indicating the Turkish public's sympathy towards Amanullah.

Atatürk also took Amanullah to the TGNA so that he could witness the discussions taking place between the deputies on specific law proposals. The subject of the meeting attended by Amanullah was the change of Turkish numerals to internationally used ones.<sup>45</sup> A parade of the army followed the session of the TGNA – as if it were a message to Amanullah that reforms must be complemented by military power to suppress the radicals and display the army's effectiveness.

**Another highlight of Amanullah's visit to Türkiye was the Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship signed between the two states, which was perceived by the Western newspapers as an alliance at the time.**

Atatürk's personal notes about the visit are also significant to understand the importance of Afghanistan for Türkiye.<sup>46</sup> A booklet, which was prepared for the official dinner to honor the Afghan King and Queen, for example, made reference to the decreed law on the alphabet as well as the of-

ficial language of Türkiye.<sup>47</sup> The second section on how to build an army included remarks about Atatürk's design which was based on the formation of three corps-level units under the authority of a command group that would occupy the Chief of General Staff position. Another section described the military mobilization plans that could be prepared either by Afghans or Turks and also recommended specific roles for Turkish officers. The booklet also underlined the military doctrine to be drafted according to the Afghan needs and the formation of a capable air force that would require training in Türkiye.

In his personal reflections on the evening, Atatürk mentions that he briefed the King about the internal uprisings and how Türkiye addressed them. He also spoke with Amanullah regarding the Turkish personnel's involvement in Afghanistan's foreign and internal affairs, education, trade and agriculture. Atatürk also proposed drafting Afghani history to strengthen the unity of the society. In addition, he talked about the importance of building an Afghan National Assembly, which did not exist prior to 1928. These suggestions prove that Atatürk had already formulated a nation-building conception for Afghanistan in the 1920s.

Amanullah Khan's program in Türkiye should also be noted in order to understand his priorities.<sup>48</sup> His schedule in Ankara was very busy with political negotiations, official visits, sightseeing tours and even a music concert. Yet, Amanullah was mainly interested in learning the Turkish experience in rebuilding a war-torn country. For instance, he asked for and received the city plan of Ankara from the mayor, and very interestingly he declared Dar-ul Aman as the new capital city center as soon as he returned to Afghanistan. He also wanted to see the newly-built factories, state farms and vocational schools in Türkiye. In Istanbul, which was his second destination after Ankara, Amanullah visited the School of Arts, the War College and Istanbul University, as he intended to send young Afghan people who were attending primary and secondary school in Türkiye to Turkish universities.

Another highlight of Amanullah's visit to Türkiye was the Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship signed between the two states, which was perceived by the Western newspapers as an alliance at the time. The first article of the treaty emphasized the friendship between the two states built on peaceful relations. Other provisions confirmed the commitment of the two parties to support one another in the case of a war and maintenance of the Turkish assistance to Afghanistan, specifically in the fields of military expertise and education. It should also be noted

that Türkiye was the only country with which Amanullah signed an agreement during his Grand Tour. While his European tour mainly focused on searching for military and financial aid, the Turkish leg of the tour was designed to win and solidify political commitments and cooperation.

After completing his Grand Tour, Amanullah formulated a reform plan to transform the Afghan society and bravely started the reform process as soon as he arrived in Kabul. He gathered the *Loja Jirga*, the traditional Afghan consultative body of tribal and religious leaders and presented his reform program. The first phase of the program was started a few days later which indicated that Amanullah was impatient to implement the bold reforms.<sup>49</sup> For instance, he removed traditional titles and civilian ranks, changed the dress code, persuaded most delegates of *Loja Jirga* to wear suits during sessions and limited the number of medals for the military. He also exerted pressure on the *ulama* (Islamic clergy) by introducing an examination to test the proficiency of the religious scholars and also forbid *imams* from coming from abroad, mainly from India.

Reforms in civil and social life were also very significant. For example, he addressed corruption which was common in Afghanistan, and governmental clerks were now required to announce their properties, incomes and spending. While he also introduced new measures to fight problems like slavery and drudgery, which were widespread in the country, his achievements in the field of women's rights were limited. The Afghan male society showed strong resistance to the reforms in women's rights, since women's subjugated place in the male-dominant Afghan culture was considered as an area of private life.

In addition to civil and social reforms, Amanullah initiated cultural reforms which included the establishment of theaters and cinemas in the country.<sup>50</sup> While the calendar was already changed in the early 1920s, the 1928 reforms furthered these undertakings by building the School of Arts and Libraries and encouraged private media. The education system was also restructured, and new teaching methods were introduced in the religious classes and schools. Interestingly, the French model was preferred because of Amanullah's father-in-law, Prime Minister Mahmud Tarzi, who admired the French education system. It should be noted, once again, however, that Amanullah sent female students to Türkiye for higher education, which was a courageous decision as the conservative Afghan society was not ready for such a reform. Although the members of the *Loya Jirga* were also involved in the decision to send

female students abroad, there was a reaction to Amanullah from the public when some of these students were spotted in Western attire.<sup>51</sup>

In the judicial sphere, reforming the procedures of trials and observing law-based punishment provided the basis for Amanullah's judicial reforms. However, because Afghanistan lacked a Law Faculty and a secular judicial institution at the beginning of the 1920s, Amanullah had to depend on the traditional system of *kadis* (judges) and *muftis* (legal experts) until a secular system could be established. In addition, the system of taxation was re-designed, even though this was the most widely opposed measure mainly because the financial resources of the tribes were curbed.

In military terms, Afghans relied heavily on Turkish officers and foreign equipment procurement. The Afghan Armed Forces sent soldiers mainly to Türkiye, but also to France, Russia and Germany, to educate their officers.<sup>52</sup> Even though the Turkish officers were keen to build a new and efficient army in Afghanistan, the Afghan military leaders and decision-makers were divided between pro-Turkish and anti-Turkish camps. This was because the Turkish program was perceived negatively by the tribes and active soldiers as it was based on a policy to build a younger army including a salary cut to reduce the number of older soldiers. In practice, however, this policy fueled discontent among all soldiers – not only the older ones.

Even though the repercussions of the Afghan reform movement reached all parts of the country, it proved to be unsuccessful for a number of reasons. The most important factor was the polarization in the society with regard to the reforms. The government's efforts of persuasion were not sufficient and religious and ethnic prejudices that dominated the society could not be easily eliminated. Also, while the Afghan *Loya Jirga* provided an opportunity for political participation to the Afghan people, the emergence of strong interest groups in the assembly which resisted the reform process became a significant obstacle.

## Turkish Support to the Afghan Reformation

Amanullah built the Ministry of Education in 1922 with the goal of reforming the education system. The need to counteract *irtica* (religious reactionism) and tribal loyalty were the main reasons to place education at the top of the new reform agenda of the country. For this purpose, Amanullah sought support from Türkiye. Professor Ethem

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Menemenciöđlu, a top diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was also a professor of international law in Ankara University's Faculty of Administrative Sciences was appointed to the Turkish Embassy in Kabul to provide consultancy to the Afghan Ministry of Education in re-

forming the Afghan education programs.<sup>53</sup> In addition, Emin Ali Cavlı, who was the second advisor to the Ministry of Education, was active in the designing of the education programs. He also researched the various aspects of the life of Central Asian Turkish communities in the Hindukush Mountains until he became paralyzed due to a severe illness and was sent back to Türkiye.<sup>54</sup> Professor Mehmet Ali Dađpınar, on the other hand, was sent to Kabul in October 1936 to work in the foundation of the Faculty of Law and Administrative Sciences.<sup>55</sup>

The Turkish instructors and mentors also played an important role in the inauguration of the Afghan War College in 1926.<sup>56</sup> In addition to military education, the Kabul Medical Faculty was continuously supported by Turkish medical doctors especially after 1937. Well-known doctors like Abdurrahman Derman, Saip Atademir and Şakir Tural were appointed to Afghanistan by governmental decrees.<sup>57</sup> In addition, a medical school was inaugurated in Afghanistan 1932 led by Turkish doctors.<sup>58</sup> Documents from the Turkish archives show that three doctors, were sent to Afghanistan by a governmental decree that year and managed to open a medical faculty.<sup>59</sup> One of them was even appointed as the private doctor of Amanullah Khan. As the number of Turkish officers in Afghanistan increased, a law amending their rights and duties was passed in the TGNA in 1932.<sup>60</sup> As of December 1937, there were 38 Turkish officers and doctors in Kabul, while this number rose to 107 when their families were included.<sup>61</sup>

As stated earlier, the Afghan government also sent many students – mainly military officers – to Türkiye. According to the official archive of the Turkish Presidency, the first group of 15 Afghan officers arrived in Türkiye in 1926.<sup>62</sup> The Turkish Defense Ministry accepted 10 more officers who arrived in 1927, despite the limitations in the Turkish budget.<sup>63</sup> In 1929, on the other hand, five Afghan officers were financed by the Ministry of Defense.<sup>64</sup> Documents from the Turkish archives indicate that some of the Afghan officers sought asylum in Türkiye.<sup>65</sup> Some

of them even gained citizenship like Mehmet Asgar, who attended military training in Türkiye as a young officer and was later enfranchised to the Turkish army.<sup>66</sup>

Apart from military training activities, the Afghan government sent civilian students to Türkiye for education in various fields of study. Most of these students started their education in Turkish schools from the early grades until they graduated from Turkish universities. The reason for offering a complete education package – i.e. from high school to university – was largely due to the lack of such education institutes in Afghanistan. Afghan students were mainly sent to the Faculties of Law, Medicine, Agriculture and Public Administration in various Turkish cities. Atatürk was personally interested in the financing and accommodation of Afghan students in Turkish schools.<sup>67</sup> It should also be noted that the selection of these students was a matter of great concern for the Turkish government. Since the Afghan society was based on a feudal structure prioritizing family and tribal ties, the Turkish authorities were very careful in taking the ethnic balance of Afghan society into consideration while managing this process in order not to alienate various groups in Afghanistan. For this reason, Turkish Ambassador Şevket Mahmut Esendal was specifically tasked with the selection of the Afghan students.<sup>68</sup>

The judiciary was another sphere that included Turkish assistance. According to the official documents, the Turkish government appointed Mehmed Cevat Bey as the first legal consultant to Afghanistan in 1926, who was later replaced by Cevat Bey in 1930.<sup>69</sup> During the following decades, Türkiye continued to send high-level Turkish judges and legal consultants to help the Afghan government in reforming the judicial system.

It should be noted that Türkiye's capacity to assist the Afghan government was limited in some areas. For instance, when Afghanistan requested Ankara to send a mining engineer in 1935, the Turkish authorities could not be of any help as Türkiye did not have anyone working in this field.<sup>70</sup> Eventually, Afghans had to turn to the US which sent engineers to search for oil, and Germany which sent experts in the field of copper and coal mining. This meant that especially in exploring Afghanistan's mining wealth, other countries rather than Türkiye played a greater role. A report from the Turkish Embassy in 1932 drew attention to the increasing number of foreign technicians in Afghanistan and underlined the competition between Germany and Türkiye in a number of technical assistance activities.<sup>71</sup>

## Conclusion

Conditions in the 1920s urged the Afghan government to seek foreign aid from all available sources. The Afghan delegation's trips to other countries in 1921 and Amanullah Khan's Grand Tour in 1928 can be interpreted as the Afghans' desire to gain recognition and support from the international community. Even though it was not yet an independent state in the 1920–21 period, Türkiye emerged as a viable option in the eyes of the Afghan elite due to their favorable view about the Ottoman Empire which was also the seat of the Caliphate. However, it should be noted that the Afghans' positive sentiments towards the Turks was not only due to common religious bonds, but also because they perceived the Turks as an important factor in terms of finding a balance against Britain in their foreign affairs in the post-independence period. Similarly, for the Ankara government, stronger relations with Afghanistan were useful in delivering a strong message of Muslim solidarity to Britain, while also contributing to Türkiye's recognition in the international field. In other words, the mutual sympathy between Türkiye and Afghanistan was complemented by the two countries' pragmatic geopolitical interests.

When establishing the Republic of Türkiye, Atatürk was determined to undertake reforms to create a modern state and a contemporary society through persuasive policies augmented by his leadership. For its part, Afghanistan attempted to start a similar reformation process while benefitting from Türkiye's experience. In this sense, Türkiye was committed to assisting the Afghan reformation process without being reciprocated. However, Amanullah Khan's reformation efforts failed due to a number of factors including social resistance to the reforms. The failure of the reform process made Afghanistan vulnerable to further foreign incursions and internal turmoil in the ensuing decades.

## Endnotes

- 1 For Sarihan, the mood of the National Assembly must be mentioned while voting on the Moscow agreement with the Afghan delegation. All of the members voted in favor of the agreement. Enthusiasm prevailed in the Assembly, since an independent, Muslim state had recognized the Ankara Government, and that recognition could expand to the other nations. The Turkish media was excited when announcing the agreement and the Assembly's acceptance. See: Zeki Sarihan, *Kurtuluş Savaşımızda Türk-Afğan İlişkileri*, İstanbul: Kaynak, 2002, pp. 121–123.
- 2 Ibid, 125.
- 3 Amanullah Khan declared his acceptance of the Agreement before thousands of Afghans in the Abdgâh Mosque. He was keen to have his people hear this statement to underline Afghan Independence due to his policy against Great Britain. Ibid.
- 4 Anuradha Sareen, *India and Afghanistan: British Imperialism vs Afghan Nationalism, 1907–1921*, Delhi: Seema, p. 81.
- 5 Bilal N. Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk*, Ankara: TTK, 1992, p. 375.
- 6 Nile Green, *Global Islam: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 44.
- 7 The Caliphate's Jihad declaration had motivated many Eastern Muslims to join the Ottoman Army. Three soldiers from Afghanistan are registered as martyrs in the archives of the Ministry of Defense. The full list of Afghan soldiers can be extracted by checking the personal files of these soldiers.
- 8 See Omer Tarzi, *Two Kings and a Leader: Mahmud Tarzi*, Cosmo Publishing, 2021.
- 9 Bilal N. Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afghanistan*, Ankara: TTK, 2019, p. 19
- 10 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk (Cilt III)*, İstanbul: MEB, 1969, p. 1257.
- 11 Sebahattin Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali*, İstanbul: Kastaş, 2020, p. 553.
- 12 Mehmet Köçer, *Emanullah Dönemi Afghanistan*, İstanbul: Manas, 2009, p. 89.
- 13 Esedullah Oğuz, *Afghanistan*, İstanbul: Cep, 2009, p. 50.
- 14 The copy of this letter can be found in Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afghanistan*, p. 70.
- 15 Turkish Embassy to Kabul, no date.
- 16 Ministry of Culture and Tourism, no date.
- 17 Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afghanistan*, pp. 85–88
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Sarihan, *Kurtuluş Savaşımızda Türk-Afğan İlişkileri*, p. 213.
- 20 Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afghanistan*, p. 35
- 21 İsmail Akbaş, "Afgan Kralı Emanullah Han'ın Türkiye Gezisi," *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol. 7, No. 16 (2008), pp. 311–333.
- 22 Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afghanistan*, p. 124. Amanullah called his visits to Egypt, Italy, Germany, Russia and Türkiye the 'Grand Tour' of 1928. The objective was very concise. He was in search of aid and recognition. See Oğuz, *Afghanistan*, p. 55.
- 23 Şimşir argues that Cemal Pasha had sent letters to Atatürk asking Ankara to provide assistance to the Afghan army. He requested his former crew to build a Presidential Protection Regiment in Kabul, although Atatürk did not provide adequate support to him. Cemal Pasha is said to have wanted to be Ankara's Ambassador to Kabul, but Atatürk appointed Fahrettin Pasha. Cemal Pasha regularly informed Atatürk about his activities. He was unable to conclude his goal in Afghanistan, namely to organize the Afghans to threaten the British Army in India and encourage Indian Muslims to fight for independence. Unfortunately, he was assassinated in Tbilisi by an Armenian in 1921. Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afghanistan*, pp. 44–54.
- 24 Sarihan, *Kurtuluş Savaşımızda Türk-Afğan İlişkileri*, pp. 67–82

- 25 Baskın Oran (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006*, Salt Lake City: U of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 120–121.
- 26 Sarıhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşımızda Türk-Afgan İlişkileri*, pp. 67–82
- 27 Köçer, *Emanullah Dönemi Afganistan*, pp. 129–131.
- 28 Vartan Gregoryan, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Modernization, 1880–1930*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, p. 477.
- 29 Mary E. Townsend & Cyrus H. Peake, *European Colonial Expansion Since 1871*, New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1941, p. 370.
- 30 Adamec, *Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century*, p. 137.
- 31 Köçer, *Emanullah Dönemi Afganistan*, p. 129.
- 32 M. Nazif Shahrani, "Review: King Aman-Allah of Afghanistan's Failed Nation-Building Project and its Aftermath," *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2005), pp. 661–75.
- 33 Mehmet Saray, *Afganistan ve Türkler*, Ankara: TTK, 2022, pp. 147–149.
- 34 Andrew Chua, "The Promise and Failure of King Amanullah's Modernisation Program in Afghanistan," *ANU Undergraduate Research Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 38 (2014), p. 44.
- 35 Esedullah Oğuz, *Hedef Ülke Afganistan*, İstanbul: Doğan, 2002, p. 62.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 The Afghan and Turkish strategies differ in terms of recognition at any cost. Atatürk sent a delegation to Europe during the Independence War, too. The head of the delegation, led by the Foreign Minister of the Ankara government, had to resign since he had signed agreements with Western states. The reason was that Atatürk was more oriented to having the foreign Powers withdraw from invaded lands and being treated as an equal actor. He opposed any trade or economic concessions that resembled capitulations. The Turks were more experienced than the Afghans in dealing with Western powers.
- 38 Sarıhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşımızda Türk-Afgan İlişkileri*, pp. 35–39
- 39 *Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası*, Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, 1992.
- 40 Sarıhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşımızda Türk-Afgan İlişkileri*, pp. 125.
- 41 Ralph H. Magnus & Eden Naby, *Afghanistan, Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1998, p. 41.
- 42 Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century: Relation with the USSR, Germany and Britain*, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974, p. 61.
- 43 N. D. Ahmad, *The Survival of Afghanistan 1747–1979: A Diplomatic History*, Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1990, p. 177
- 44 Gregoryan, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, p. 500.
- 45 Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afganistan*, pp. 151–200
- 46 *Atatürk'ün Not Defterleri XI*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, 2004, pp. 79–136.
- 47 Şimşir compiles and presents every detail of Amanullah's program. Turkish National Library has the Booklet of the Official Visit that was printed to honor Amanullah. Ibid.
- 48 Akbaş, "Afgan Kralı Emanullah Han'ın Türkiye Gezisi," pp. 311–333.
- 49 Köçer, *Emanullah Dönemi Afganistan*, pp. 135–138.
- 50 Ibid, p. 145.
- 51 Some sources claim that it was the UK's agents who called tribe leaders to a diner and showed them these girls to provoke discontent. There is no proven documentation of the incident.
- 52 Sarıhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşımızda Türk-Afgan İlişkileri*, p. 135.
- 53 Ibid, p. 370.
- 54 Ibid, p. 369.
- 55 Aysultan Hayri, *Afganistan'da Türkçe Eğitimin Tarihi*, unpublished MA thesis, Ankara: Gazi University, 2007, pp. 35–170.

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- 57 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 20.02.1937, F.K.30.18.1.2, Y.N.72.14.9; Date: 06.04.1937, F.K.30.18.1.2, Y.N.73.27.11; Date: 18.05.1937, F.K.30.18.1.2, Y.N.75.41.3.
- 58 Şimşir, *Atatürk ve Afganistan*, p. 328
- 59 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 11.05.1927, F.K.30.18.1.1, Y.N.24.27.17.
- 60 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 05.06.1932, F.K.30.10.0.0, Y.N.20.119.18.
- 61 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 29.12.1937, F.K.30.10.0.0, Y.N.258.733.26.
- 62 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 25.08.1926, F.K.30.11.1.0, Y.N.26.29.15.
- 63 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 08.09.1926, F.K.30.18.1.1, Y.N.20.57.16; Date: 05.08.1927, F.K.30.11.1.0, Y.N.33.18.15.
- 64 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 12.09.1929, F.K.30.18.1.2, Y.N.5.44.2; Date: 17.07.1929, F.K.30.10.0.0, Y.N.257.731.10.
- 65 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 19.09.1929, F.K.30.10.0.0, Y.N.55.364.2.
- 66 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 13.12.1936, F.K.30.11.1.0, Y.N.109.43.11.
- 67 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 05.11.1935, F.K.30.18.12, Y.N.59.83.8; Date: 05.11.1935, F.K.30.18.1.2, Y.N.59.83.9.
- 68 Saray, *Afganistan ve Türkler*, p. 210.
- 69 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 16.12.1926, F.K.30.11.1.0, Y.N.29.43.6.
- 70 Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 08.08.1936, F.K.30.10.0.0, Y.N.212.444.2; Date: 29.12.1937, F.K.30.10.0.0, Y.N.258.733.26.
- 71 France: six teachers; Italy: three in the War College and one in the Trade Ministry; Japan: one in the War College; India: four doctors and one teacher; Egypt: one teacher; Switzerland: one nurse (male); Iran: one doctor; Türkiye: one officer, four doctors, one midwife. Archives of the Turkish Presidency, Date: 21.02.1932, F.K.30.10.0.0, Y.N.258.7333.2; Date: 21.02.1932, F.K.30.10.0.0, Y.N.258.7333.2.

## BOOK REVIEW

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### Egypt's Diplomacy in War, Peace and Transition

By Nabil Fahmy

Palgrave Macmillan, eBook, 2020, 377 Pages, ISBN: 9783030263881

Biographies, autobiographies, memoirs and the diaries of political leaders are essential sources for Foreign Policy Analyses (FPA), in particular those based on the individual level. Although it is uncertain whether such narratives reflect the truth, they do provide firsthand, insightful accounts regarding the foreign policy of the relevant country. The Arab World regrettably lacks personal reviews, memoirs and autobiographies written by presidents, foreign ministers and other senior career diplomats. Egypt provides the exception to this rule, with several significant writings regarding Egyptian foreign policy produced by former foreign ministers. Nabil Fahmy, a senior Egyptian diplomat, Foreign Minister between 2013 and 2014 and faculty member of The American University in Cairo, presents valuable accounts regarding Egyptian foreign policy in his book *Egypt's Diplomacy in War, Peace and Transition*.

The book consists of ten chapters divided into four distinctive parts. Since there is no introductory chapter, the author explains the reasons, motivations and processes that gave rise to the publication in the preface. In chapter 1, Fahmy explains his personal and professional alignments. The son of Ismael Fahmy, himself a senior diplomat and Foreign Minister of Anwar Sadat (1973–1977), Fahmy explains how diplomacy and international relations attracted him to become a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are mainly related to the challenges and opportunities Egypt has confronted in its foreign policy. In these chapters, Fahmy analyzes the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars and their consequences, 9/11 and its impact

on the Middle East, the Middle East Peace process, the problem of nuclear weaponry in the Middle East, the re-engagement or re-orientation of Egypt's foreign policy and bilateral relations between the U.S and Egypt. Chapters 8 and 9 mainly deal with the country's domestic transition between 2011 and 2013. Fahmy analyzes the toppling of the Mubarak regime in 2011, the presidential elections in 2012 and the removal of Mohamed Morsi from the presidency in 2013. He describes both January 25, 2011 and July 3, 2013 as "revolutions." In Chapter 10, Fahmy thoughtfully considers the question of how to establish better a Middle East in the future.

As a senior diplomat and ambassador to Japan (1997–1999) and the U.S. (1999–2008), Nabil Fahmy witnessed a number of significant developments in Egypt's foreign policy, specifically those having to do with Egyptian-American relations. After attending The American University in Cairo, Fahmy was offered the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) government. However, he rejected these offers in the belief that his foreign policy insights were not aligned with the views of the MB, which were based on a "religious index" rather than "national security" (p. 17). Fahmy believes that Egypt lost its direction in terms of national identity during the MB government. Therefore, when he was again offered the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the post-military coup period, Fahmy did not decline the request. He believes that his mission was to achieve a more assertive and independent Egypt in foreign policy, as desired by the Egyptian people themselves (p. 18). Thus, the "Fahmy Doctrine" describes Egypt's new, multidimensional foreign policy in the aftermath of the military coup.

Before analyzing Egyptian foreign policy in the post-military coup period, Fahmy shares his views regarding the historical developments in the Middle East. According to Fahmy, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 ushered in a new political paradigm in the Middle East. These three geopolitical upheavals resulted in the death of Arab nationalism, the end of the Arab unity and regional, geopolitical imbalances. Iran and Türkiye, as non-Arab neighbors of the Arab countries, increased their impact in the region as a result (p. 23–36).

Unfortunately, Fahmy mainly focuses on the role of Iran and its sectarianism in the region, and does not provide equally valuable insights about Türkiye. Moreover, he generally focuses on external dynamics and influences regarding the geopolitical transformations in the region, and does not assess intra-Arab rivalries such as the Baath competition between Syria and Iraq and Syria's support to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Perhaps most surprisingly, the popular democratic uprisings called the "Arab Spring" that shook the Arab World, constitute a significant geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East that is disregarded by Fahmy.

Egypt had waged several comprehensive wars against Israel alongside other Arab countries such as Jordan and Syria. As one of the leading Arab countries during the Arab-Israeli wars, Egypt later played a crucial role in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. Egypt was the first country to recognize Israel with the Camp David Accords (1978–1979). Fahmy believes that Israel had many more achievements compared to Egypt, and that Egypt made a lot of concessions to Israel (p. 64). Although Egypt was suspended from all Arab and Islamic organizations in the wake of the Camp David Accords, once Mubarak re-activated Egypt's role in the Arab world, the country again became an influential actor in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process during the 1990s. As a career diplomat, Fahmy witnessed several peace initiatives between the Arabs and Israelis, and he explains several crucial dialogues that took place between them at the negotiation tables, including those between Yasser Arafat and Fahmy himself. Arafat's dependence and reliance on Egypt demonstrates the role of Egypt in the peace negotiations (p. 85–90). Focusing on the approaches of various U.S. presidents, such as Clinton, Bush and Obama, toward the Middle East Peace process, Fahmy analyzes their similarities and differences regarding their dealings with the issue, and concludes that it was the U.S. presidents' consistent mistake to believe that once the parties met they could find a solution (p. 108).

While discussing the issue of nuclear weaponry in international politics, Iran and its nuclear program has been one of the dominating agenda items of Middle Eastern politics. However, Fahmy analyzes nuclear programs and facilities in the Middle East in the context of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. By doing so, he reminds readers of the nuclear threats and imbalances in the region, which create an "ominous security environment" (p. 128).

One of Nabil Fahmy's major contributions to Egyptian foreign policy itself and to the literature in general is to overturn Egypt's disregard for and neglect of relations with Russia, as well as African countries such as Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia; and Asian countries such as China and South Korea. Based on the "Fahmy Doctrine," Egypt has developed crucial and friendly relations with these countries in the post-military coup period. In this regard, Fahmy clearly explains Egypt's priority regarding Libya, saying that since Egypt's western border was "unstable and insecure," it has supported Haftar's forces in the Libyan civil war (p. 133). Since Sudan is a crucial country for Egypt in terms of border security, water security and economic security, it was the first country Fahmy visited as Foreign Minister. Although Sudan was determined to side with Ethiopia in the context of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Fahmy explicitly underlines the importance of Sudan for Egypt (p. 134–136).

Although it is itself an African country, Egypt's foreign policy toward Africa and its role in the African Union (AU) have always remained uncertain. Fahmy pays great attention to the continent. As Foreign Minister, he pressed for the lifting of Egypt's suspension from the AU (p. 140). Regarding Egypt's role and its water security in Africa, Fahmy portrays the Nile River and GERD as an "existential issue" (p. 142). In this context, as a foreign minister, Fahmy explains how he urged international actors to not to support the GERD project unless Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan reached an agreement. Fahmy believes that signing the Khartoum Declaration of Principles in 2015 diminished Egypt's negotiation power and opened the way for the GERD project to be supported by international donors (pp. 144–145). However, in this regard, Fahmy disregards the role of Sudan's support for the GERD project. In truth, Egypt's lack of strong ties with the African countries as well as Sudan's support for Ethiopia resulted in the signing of the declaration.

More generally, Egypt's new engagement with the Asian countries and Russia is crucial to understand its new diversified foreign policy. Fahmy explains the country's historical relations with China, South Korea and North Korea, and their impact on Egyptian-American relations. Having visited Russia in 2013, Fahmy realized that Russia had begun to be a more proactive player in the Middle East. Therefore, Egypt worked to

develop bilateral relations with Russia without alienating the U.S. (p. 158). Fahmy describes the long-term American-Egyptian relations as “indispensable but uncomfortable” (p. 161). He clearly underlines how the U.S.’ democracy promotion policy influenced bilateral relations along with the political transformations in the Middle East.

Although *Egypt's Diplomacy in War, Peace and Transition* provides insightful and valuable accounts regarding Egyptian Foreign Policy, the book is also open to criticism. First, since it has both analytic and memoir characteristics, readers should deal with it very carefully, as it contains several exaggerations. Second, in connection with the first critique based on the memoir feature, Fahmy uses few citations except for the full texts of certain agreements. However, full texts of the “Fahmy Doctrine” and Sisi’s first speech in the African Union are notably missing from the appendix. Finally, the book reveals the differences between academics and practitioners in international relations. For example, Fahmy mostly focuses on very deep details regarding the Middle East Peace Process, and pays great attention to each initiative as if they were all highly critical. Such an approach complicates the reading process and draws readers into details that may not be that relevant.

To conclude, providing both an analysis and a memoir, Fahmy makes a great contribution to the literature on Egyptian foreign policy. He provides critical analyses of Egypt’s past and present foreign policy miscalculations. As the son of Ismael Fahmy, Nabil Fahmy offers valuable insights into his father’s views and opinions regarding Egyptian foreign policy. Finally, one can easily understand Egypt’s proactive and assertive foreign policy in the post-military coup period by reading *Egypt's Diplomacy in War, Peace and Transition*.

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## BOOK REVIEW

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### Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations

By Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis

Princeton University Press, 2006, 424 pages, ISBN: 9780691122755

In 2000, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis wrote an article for the *American Political Science Review* in which they argued that United Nations (UN) peace operations could make a significant difference in countries facing civil war by bringing and sustaining peace. Later, the two authors expanded their ideas, particularly their theory of the “peacebuilding triangle”, and wrote *Making War and Building Peace*. It should be particularly noted that Doyle served as former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s special advisor as well as his assistant between 2001 and 2003.

The book is divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter, the authors briefly summarize their thesis and introduce the UN structure, which is key to understanding the subject matter. The second chapter seeks to define the meaning of civil war as well as the theories, dimensions and causes of civil wars and how they can be ended. The third chapter examines the three main pillars influential in peacebuilding: hostility, local capacity and international capacity. Bringing these into a single theory, the chapter introduces what the authors call the “peacebuilding triangle.” The remaining chapters offer insights as to why the UN peace operations failed in cases such as Somalia, Bosnia and Congo, and how they were successful in establishing peace in other cases like El Salvador, Cambodia, Croatia-Bosnia and East Timor.

Doyle and Sambanis pay special attention to the concept of hostility. They argue that ethnic division in a country decreases the prospects of success for sustainable peacebuilding. One reason why UN peacebuilding efforts in Cambodia and El Salvador were successful has to do with the absence of ethnic division. In other words, the authors claim that

peacebuilding fails mostly due to ethnic hostilities. The authors provide significant evidence to support their argument by including detailed tables throughout the book. In addition, they argue that deaths and displacement do not have a very significant place in peacebuilding—contrary to popular belief. Especially in the case of Rwanda, although peacebuilding was not successful, the deaths and displacement did not influence the post-civil war peacebuilding process. Another substantial issue mentioned by the authors while explaining the concept of hostility is the duration of the war. Doyle and Sambanis assert that war duration can influence the peacebuilding process positively. Examining the case of Cambodia, they indicate that the parties had to come to an agreement due to the fatigue caused by the protracted war, while they failed to do so after the long war in the Cyprus case. Finally, the authors argue that the most important factor that can end the hostilities is the signing of a peace treaty.

Doyle and Sambanis highlight level of development as an important factor in peacebuilding and underline that the economic capacity of a country has a direct effect on peacebuilding efforts. If the main factor that determines the development level of the country is the country's natural resources, this could lead to war or prevent peace. In Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia for instance, rebel groups have made use of their countries' rich mineral resources to finance their activities.

The authors also underline the significance of international capacity in the success of peacebuilding efforts. The UN has two main tasks in the peacebuilding process in this regard. The first is to reduce tensions and mediate between the parties of the civil war, while helping them reach a peace agreement. This means that the UN's priority is to ensure "sovereign peace." At the same time, the UN seeks to encourage efforts for "participatory peace" with the goal of preserving peace in the country for at least two years. As part of this effort, the UN helps to re-establish the country's infrastructure, educational system, democratic processes, etc. Out of all the cases presented by Doyle and Sambanis to support their argument, the case of El Salvador is the most interesting, since it is one of the rare occasions when peace was achieved although the number of deaths was extreme and the level of hostility between the warring parties was very high. The parties decided to sign a peace agreement when they came to the conclusion that neither would prevail in the ongoing civil war.

In addition to its role as a mediator, the UN also serves as a vanguard of post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding activities. In Cambodia, for instance, the UN has been quite influential in the reinstatement of democracy; it played a very crucial role in the organization of the Cambodian elections after the war. In addition to facilitating the democratic processes in the country, the UN has played a significant role in post-war peacebuilding and the sustainability of peace in Cambodia.

Doyle and Sambanis present seven conditions for sustainable peace. They indicate that in order to ensure peace in the long term, the security environment in the country must be satisfactory. This is because, as noted by Thomas Hobbes, the absence of security creates war and violence; therefore, security becomes the most important condition for peace. In addition, coordination and harmony with regional and international actors is very important. In order to prove this latter point, the authors once again make reference to the case of Cambodia where the neighbors of the country and several international actors stopped the flow of funding to the rebel groups, which was a decisive factor in ending the civil war. They argue that in order for peace to be sustainable, military victory should be supported by political victory.

In the case of El Salvador, the fact that neither of the parties could gain military superiority over the other convinced them to make an agreement, which eventually led to a successful peacebuilding process in political terms. The authors emphasize that the greatest challenge posed by civil wars is the absence of a centralized authority, which leads to further violence and disorder. In this sense, the acceptance of a state authority and the rule of law by the parties is crucial for peace. The authors argue that specific steps should be taken after the end of a civil war to achieve long-lasting peace. For example, the functioning of democracy in the country, the improvement of the education system and the punishment of war criminals are all crucial elements in preventing the recurrence of violence between the parties.

*Making War and Building Peace* is an important contribution to the field of international relations for three reasons. First, the theory of the “peacebuilding triangle” helps readers easily understand the main dynamics of the process of peacebuilding. Second, the authors introduce remarkable answers as to how the UN could be utilized as an actor for achieving peace following a civil war. Third, it offers a number of essential steps that need to be taken in order to ensure the sustainability

of peace. The case studies presented in the book are quite useful and include well-presented and reliable data that support the theoretical framework. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* is highly recommended for scholars of International Relations and all readers interested in understanding the complex dynamics that contribute to lasting peace.

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## Style and Format

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Articles submitted to the journal should be original contributions. If another version of the article is under consideration by another publication, or has been or will be published elsewhere, authors should clearly indicate this at the time of submission. Manuscripts should be submitted to: e-mail: [perceptions@mfa.gov.tr](mailto:perceptions@mfa.gov.tr). The final decision on whether the manuscript is accepted for publication in the Journal or not is made by the Editorial Board depending on the anonymous referees' review reports.

A standard length for PERCEPTIONS articles is 6,000 to 8,000 words including endnotes. The manuscript should begin with an indented and italicised summary up to 150 words, which should describe the main arguments and conclusions, and 5-7 keywords, indicating to main themes of the manuscript. A title page should be attached to the manuscript, including the title of the manuscript, full name (s) of the authors, academic and/or other professional affiliations if any, complete mailing address, fax and phone numbers of the author to whom proofs and correspondence should be sent. The author is also expected to give a brief biography in a footnote at the beginning of the article. Perceptions also publishes reviews of new books or reports; 'book reviews' are usually around 700-1,500-words."

Manuscripts should be single-spaced written by Times New Roman regular font, 11 point throughout. Justified margins; top and bottom 3 cm, left and right 2.4 cm are required. Manuscripts should be numbered consecutively throughout the paper. Only the first letters of title words should be 'upper case'. Quotations should be placed within double quotation marks ("....."). Quotations larger than four lines should be indented at left margin and single-spaced. Use endnotes and avoid bibliography. British punctuation and spelling should be used throughout. Dates should be in the form 3 November 1996; 1995-1998; and 1990s. All diagrams, charts and graphs should be referred to as figures and consecutively numbered. Tables should be kept to a minimum and contain only essential data. Each figure and table must be given an Arabic numeral, followed by a heading, and be referred to in the text. Appropriate places of tables should be indicated in the text and tables should be submitted in a separate file. If copyrighted material is used in the article, it is the author's responsibility to obtain permission from the copyright holder.

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### Books

John Smith, *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100.

John E. Smith (ed.), *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, pp. 100-102.

John Smith and Mary Jones, *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100. Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, *The Book Title*, p. 100. In endnotes 'Ibid.' should be used where possible, but it should not be used where the previous note contains more than one source.

### Articles in Journals

John Smith, "Article Title", *Journal Name*, Vol. #, No. # (Month Year), p. #.

Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, "Article Title", p. #.

### Articles in Edited Books

John Smith, "Article Title", in Mary Jones (ed.), *Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100.

### Newspaper Articles

Christopher Hooton, "Japan is Turning Its Abandoned Golf Courses into Solar Power Plants", *The Independent*, 21 July 2015.

### Manuscript References

PRO King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E159/69, m. 78. BM Add. MS 36042, fo.2 (plural fos.). Four-figure numerals without comma or space; 2572. Titles of other record repositories, and names of collections of papers, in full in first reference: Scottish Record Office (hereafter SRO), Airlie Papers, GD 16, section 38/82, April 5, 1844. Compton Papers, kept at the estate office of the Marquess of Northampton, Castle Ashby (hereafter CA), bdle. 1011, no.29.

### Official Papers

Parliamentary Papers: Select Committee on Manufacturers (Parl. Papers, 1833, VI), 0.456. Subsequent references as: SC on ... (PP, 1839, VII), 00.2347.

Hansard (Commons), 4th ser. XXXVI, 641-2, 22 Aug. 1895.

### Theses

For titles of published and unpublished theses use italics: John E. Smith, *Title of Thesis*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Name of the University, Year, Chapter #, p. #

### Internet References

Azam Ahmed and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "U.S. and Cuba Reopen Long-Closed Embassies", *The New York Times*, 20 July 2015, [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/americas/cuba-us-em-bassy-diplomatic-relations.html?ref=world&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/americas/cuba-us-em-bassy-diplomatic-relations.html?ref=world&_r=0) (Accessed 21 July 2017).

### Title of Book Reviews

Türk Basınında Dış Habercilik (Foreign News Reporting in the Turkish Media), by M. Mücahit Küçükylmaz and Hakan Çopur. Ankara: SETA, 2010, 168 pages, ISBN 9786054023073.



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