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In This Issue

This issue of *All Azimuth* continues its global vocation of investigating the state of the discipline, exploring core-periphery relations, assessing the potential of IR research from the Global South, and deliberating on ways to amplify IR research from there. The last of these is, in essence, a normative plan of action. We reasoned that diagnosing the Discipline's problems and identifying promising research agendas are best pursued locally. To this end, *All Azimuth* hosted its 6th Annual Workshop on Global IR, entitled "Think Global, Act Local: The Globalization of Turkish IR," on November 5-6, 2021, at Bilkent University. The presenters at this workshop focused on three major themes: understanding and diagnosing the current state of the IR discipline, both generally and specifically in Turkish academia; developing homegrown theoretical concepts; and thinking about ways to understand and develop IR pedagogy.

Our first article explores a deeper issue in the IR discipline across the globe: its awkward relationship with policy practice. In "International Relations in Search of an Antidote," Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu discusses the problem of IR's event-drivenness and identifies the reactive nature of the discipline as a structural problem that often results in a crisis of theorizing. The author examines factors such as the relationship between science and statecraft, the disconnect between scholars and practitioners and the distortion of theories by both, the paradoxical relationship between rationality and irrationality, and, ultimately, the disconnect between theory and practice. The crisis of theorizing is illustrated by examples from political realism and classical liberalism, while Karaosmanoğlu proposes a *Clauswitzian* modus vivendi to reconcile the relationship between scholarship and statecraft.

Our next set of articles home in on Turkish IR, seeking to define the features of and problems endemic to the IR discipline as practiced in Turkey. The second article of this issue assesses the Global nature of the discipline in Turkey by investigating the usage of non-Western theories in research and education by IR scholars in Turkey. In "Non-Western Theories in International Relations Education and Research: The Case of Turkey/Turkish Academia," Mehmet Akif Okur and Cavit Emre Aytekin aim to understand the level of engagement with the non-Western IR debate in Turkish academia, and to evaluate the familiarity of Turkish IR scholars with non-Western IR theories. This is achieved through a 47-item online survey of 116 academicians from 57 Turkish universities. The findings on the Turkish IR community sadly corroborate recent findings on the scarcity of non-Western theories in the global discipline, revealing that scholars tend to prefer Western critical IR theories over non-Western theories, despite their cognizance of the objectivity and universalism problems of Western IR. Okur and Aytekin nevertheless note that while there is an absence of non-Western IR theory usage, thoughts, concepts, and theories emanating from the Turkish-Islamic world have resonance among Turkish IR scholars.

While IR scholars in Turkey may exhibit limited engagement with homegrown scholarship outside of the West, Kyriakos Mikelis argues that IR in Turkey has its merits and potential to serve as an example of disciplinary development elsewhere. He asks a different question in the third article, "Lessons Learned from the Development of Turkish IR: A View from Greece." Specifically, can the development of the IR discipline in Turkey serve as a role model or source of inspiration elsewhere? The primary finding of the article is that contrary to the dependency/vulnerability-centered explanations for the development of IR, the Turkish IR community has been successful. Mikelis explores how Turkish self-reflection and the

search for disciplinary identity within Turkish IR scholarship can inform the development of Greek IR scholarship and foreign policy.

Our fourth article, "Turkish IR Journals through a Bibliometric Lens," by Hakan Mehmetcik and Hasan Hakses, evaluates three International Relations journals in Turkey, *All Azimuth, Insight Turkey,* and *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi,* which together constitute the mainstream of Turkish IR journals. The article applies a bibliometric analysis to survey the publication records of the three journals in order to provide a general picture of the field in the last decade. The article also aims to distinguish certain characteristic differences and similarities among the journals by surveying their materials and authorships using comparative bibliometric analysis. By studying the leading journals of the field in Turkey, the article aims to understand the field orientations and organization of the IR discipline in Turkey. The study is important as no comparative bibliometric analysis has been conducted on these journals.

The article, "Sea Blindness in Turkish IR Literature" by Levent Kırval and Arda Özkan, problematizes IR's lack of engagement with the seas and maritime issues. Sea blindness refers to an inability to appreciate the economic and strategic importance of maritime issues and domains. In addition to explaining the importance of maritime topics for world politics, the article also expresses concerns about the dearth of engagement with these topics in Turkey by offering a detailed breakdown of maritime-related publications in Turkey's top IR book and journal publishers. The goal of this statistical analysis is to determine whether there is sea blindness in Turkish IR literature. The study aims to reveal the number of articles and books that cover the seas as crucial study areas of IR in Turkey, as well as their broad focus areas and perspectives.

Article number six shifts our focus once again to the nexus of pedagogy and publishing in Turkey. "The Trajectory of International Relations Dissertations in Turkish Academia Between 2000 and 2020," by Özge Özkoç and Pınar Çağlayan, aims to analyze Turkish International Relations dissertations written at various Turkish universities between 2000 and 2020 in order to reveal general trends and indicators in the field. Additionally, it aims to test the validity of the claim that Turkish IR academics mainly contribute to the Western-oriented discipline of IR as local or regional experts, dealing with Turkish foreign policy and regional problems rather than with theoretical concerns in IR.

The final article of this issue contributes a homegrown IR concept in the form of "medeniyet" or civilization. In "A Genealogy of the Concept of Civilization (Medeniyet) in Ottoman Political Thought: A Homegrown Perception?" Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık examines the evolution of this concept, from its first perception by Ottoman intellectuals as a tool to reach an ideal state of being to a much more plural and ideologically-shaped perception of world politics in time. The paper discusses the central debates on civilization in the late Ottoman Empire, including the singularity/plurality of civilization(s), the existence of Islamic civilization as an alternative to European civilization, the degree of importing from European civilization, and the distinction between culture and civilization.

International Relations in Search of an Antidote[1]

Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
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Abstract

This essay is based on the author's long-time observation of the International Relations discipline and the repeated crises it has experienced. The piece identifies 'event-drivenness' as the structural reason behind these crises, in other words, the course of the discipline naturally follows global IR events and, depending on how transformative these events are, when responding to them, is more likely to fall into an existential crisis—with the most recent one being potentially fatal. By discussing in detail the a) science-statecraft relationship; b) scholar-practitioner disconnect; c) distortion of theories by scholars and practitioners; d) paradoxical relationship between rationality and irrationality; and e) theory-practice disconnect, the essay seeks to operationalize these crisis-generated processes when responding to major events. In order to show these crisis generation processes in detail, it uses the theories of political realism and, to a lesser degree, classical liberalism, as case reflections. As a possible solution to the reciprocal condescension between scholarship (theory-making) and statecraft (practice), the essay proposes a "Clausewitzian" modus vivendi that aims at creating a culture of synthesis between the presumed producers and consumers of IR knowledge.

Keywords: Antinomy, paradox, fusion, doctrine, dialectic, enlightenment, and counter-enlightenment

1. Introduction

Ontological and epistemological problems have been the major research topic of the discipline of international relations (IR) since its commencement in the United States after its victory in the Second World War. Despite abounding theories and publications in IR, however, the world has not become a safer place to live in. The supposedly revolutionary new concepts and approaches still tend to remain event-driven, and in fact follow things that happen in the field, rather than precede them. Since the end of the Second World War the United States has played a pioneering role for developing the discipline of International Relations (IR). However, in the absence of a common understanding, IR has remained divided into various paradigms such as realism, neo-realism, liberalism, neoliberalism, postmodernism, globalism, and critical

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[1] My academic conversations with my dear friend Ersel Aydınlı have motivated me to write this essay. Our discussion's contributions have been considerable and unforgettable. It is also impossible to forget my daughter Defne's skillful help in formatting the text. Furthermore, I am always grateful to Gizem Koçver for her valuable work in our research center, and to Julie Mathews and Onur Erpul.

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theory.[2] In the first place, all these theoretical studies have evolved under the shadow of realism as interpreted in terms of power politics. The growing impact of radical realism has motivated an opposition group of academics and intellectuals to try refining realism. In the literature of IR, these controversial activities were called "Great Debates."[3] Meanwhile, the American tradition of liberalism has also participated in the debate. The "great debates" have maintained their influence without even trying to achieve a shared understanding on theory-making. In Turkey, some of our inquisitive colleagues, with the leadership of Professor Ersel Aydınlı, began to develop a context (as I understand, an ecological discipline) for the creation of "homegrown theorizing."[4] Such theorizing is to be new and independent from American IR. Its purpose would be to transcend all limitations arising from the core of IR.[5] A limited group of scholars and intellectuals is now becoming fully aware of this need. Homegrown theorizing would reflect a strong regionalism and the growing revolutionary significance of the "periphery" by indicating political change against the weight of the core.[6]

The perspective shifts involving bitter disputes about ontology and epistemology have finally brought the discipline to a chaotic situation and decline. *Foreign Affairs* and its editor Prof. Gideon Rose, in the March/April 2021 issue, published a series of critical essays under the general title "Decline and Fall."[7] These articles implied a two-fold meaning: one is about the continuation of the United States' global leadership. The United States have emerged from the end of the Cold War as a unipolar and dominant state. The other meaning is the ongoing crisis of the discipline of IR, particularly the theory-making dimension of IR intellectuals and scholars in the United States. This irreconcilable association between the two has constituted a serious disadvantage to the development of IR.

It is quite interesting that some of the articles in the special issue of *Foreign Affairs* are written by business administration professors who complain about the habitual methodologies and the lack of serious security of historical data, real or imagined. This is another selective characteristic of the discipline of IR that has been based on harmful factors. Eclecticism has directed the IR discipline and theorization, giving special space to the methods of the natural sciences. On the other hand, it encouraged political scientists, social scientists and market researchers to advise IR scholars.

One of the key aims of this essay is to examine the fundamental mistakes which have been committed by the United States and the Western nations since their victory in the Second World War. Two more basic problems have followed the former one. A certain motivation and rivalry in IR's theoretical studies is observable. At the same time, we are now embarrassingly challenged by the relationship between America's persistence of world leadership and the possibility of IR's revival as a strong and respectable world-wide scholarly discipline. At present, the reconciliation of these two claims seems impossible.

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[2] For an overview of paradigmatic research in the IR discipline, see Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Daniel H. Nexon, "Paradigmatic Faults in International-Relations Theory," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 4 (2009): 907–30; David A. Lake, "Why 'isms' are evil: Theory, epistemology, and academic sects as impediments to understanding and progress," *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (2011): 465–480.

[3] Wæver, Ole. "The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations." *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 687–727, doi:10.1162/002081898550725. 715

[4] Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin, eds., *Widening the World of International Relations: Homegrown Theorizing* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).

[5] Turton, Helen Louise, "Locating a Multifaceted and Stratified Disciplinary 'Core'," *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 9, no. 2 (2020): 177–210.

[6] Aydınlı and Biltekin, eds. *Widening the World.*

[7] See Gideon Rose, "What's Inside: Can America Ever Lead Again?," *Foreign Affairs,* March/April 2021.

Now we need to put forward three questions. Question one: Is it possible to put an end to the destructive aspects of IR's dynamism? Question two: Is it possible to create a completely new IR discipline with a new approach and new concepts? Question three: What is the most real and predictive role of politics, history, law, and philosophy? These formal hypothetical questions are now separated for the sake of better understanding and explanation. Their present position ought however, to change into integration. Otherwise, a complete separation of their premises would ultimately make vain the conceptualization and theorizing processes. This essay will be composed of the following layers: The chaotic situation and the "great debate;" realism and liberalism; the gaps between scholars, agents, and institutions; assertive and dialectical concepts; objectivity and subjectivity; rationality and irrationality; purpose and instrument; enlightenment and counter-enlightenment; and intellectual encounters on politics, history, philosophy and law in an integrated way from the 18th to the 21st century. The essay argues that contemporary IR theorists and foreign policy practitioners have much to learn from the insights of Kant, and more importantly, Carl von Clausewitz, whose ideal-type theorizing served as a framework for the practical ends of statecraft rather than engaging in abstraction with theory as an end in itself.

Since the end of the Cold War, these questions have remained at the forefront. American Presidents, as individuals, have certainly had their own views, but their orientations have remained within the fundamental framework of realism and liberalism. They are generally concerned with their quantitative aspects. Pragmatism, an American philosophical concept, is culturally valid within the framework of those two basic principles. Since the end of the Second World War, America has had the geopolitical privilege of moving from peripheral obscurity to global hegemony. Its most useful capability has been less about strategic insight than about decreasing losses. Its pragmatism has diminished the destruction effects of governmental or/and military shortcomings. The International Relations discipline is sometimes ironically called an "American social science."[8] One can argue that all these problems cannot be dealt with by putting the great turn of the world outside the United States. The two doctrines, realism (extended to power politics) and liberalism, were authenticated by politicians and bureaucrats as the fundamental principles of American political culture. But this is not everything. Power politics and liberalism came to be used as the instruments of world leadership and for the implementation of a hegemonic foreign policy. It is to be noted that this American national foreign policy doctrine was also accepted, refined, and propagated. Nevertheless, without much delay, a group of academics started to criticize this official "IR theory" and foreign policy, which are predicated on power politics and liberalism and their conduct toward war, peace and domination. These critical studies, however, did not have any considerable constructive doctrinal foreign policy, so traditional defense policy and economics continued to dominate crisis management and military operations.[9]

Many IR scholars pretentiously evaluated their discipline as akin to the natural sciences. They aimed at producing absolute knowledge, which they argued had to be useful not only to their colleagues and students, but to everybody, including statecraft practitioners. One of the consequences of the Enlightenment was that science and technology was able to claim a much better place than the political arena within international affairs. On the other hand, we

[8] Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106, no. 3 (1977): 44–60.

[9] Nicolas Guilholt, *After The Enlightenment (Introduction)* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1-26.

can all appreciate that the legacy of the Enlightenment and its critics have much broader and deeper resources. Humanity has also inherited a rich philosophical, and historical literature. We must not be too far to argue that we are able to benefit from that intellectual treasure in dealing with the problems of the present turn, including in IR, by neglecting politics and strategy.

Two short statements from Henry A. Kissinger may be apropos to the present discussion: "America doesn't need an alibi, it needs a strategy." Elsewhere he transcends military strategy, power politics, and neo-realism: "The deepest problems of equilibrium are not physical but psychological or moral. The shape of the future will depend ultimately on convictions which far transcend the physical balance of power."[10] There is no doubt that Kissinger had extraordinary skill and depth in state affairs. He has always approached statecraft with regard, and he had the skill to put forward his critical arguments with dexterity, and utmost clarity.

2. The Great Debate

Stanley H. Hoffmann and Kenneth W. Thompson put forward three kinds of theory applications.[11] The first one is the normative and value theory, which is based on "the study of politics in terms of desiderata." Originally, the political desiderata have been ethical or moral. Thompson reproduced this theory as the study of politics, however, it is a kind of theory produced by philosophy. Its theoretical origin can be traced back to Kant's theory of perpetual peace. As a purely political practice this effort has always been exercised whenever required. Its theorization, however, was "alarming" to political scientists who, "allegedly confining themselves to the study of facts as contrasted with values, so often failed to take stock of this realm. The scientific approach blunts the fact that ethics and purpose relate to practical matters." They assert that the problem is more than social customs. Nevertheless, the critical scholars do not seem to deny the sociological aspect of normative theory completely, because it is also related to national interest and its acceptance by the population. Moreover, moral pretension may arise from higher claims concerning civilization or justice. When the conduct of foreign policy is democratic, this tendency increases rather than diminishes."[12]

The second theory is empirical or causal theory. This theory's essential purpose is to analyze actual political behaviors and to identify the main variables, such as the balance of power, offered as the key to the 18th and 19th centuries of international relations. The third theory is called political science theory or theory as a set of recipes for action as systematic advice on statecraft. This theory's primary purpose is to provide the decision-makers with the intelligence needs of the time. At this point, the theory contributes to the success of diplomatic and military operations.[13]

A remarkable social democratic thesis of liberal and social values of individual freedoms and, if not equality, at least welfare, have developed. The cost of welfare has increased gradually, social programs have bred a stifling bureaucracy, and demand for rights and litigations have multiplied considerably. A generalization of the great movement for

[10] Henry A. Kissinger, "In Afghanistan, America needs a Strategy, not an Alibi," *International Herald Tribune,* June 25, 2010; and Henry A. Kissinger*, American Foreign Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company IHC, 1974), 78–9. Also see Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 230–34.

[11] Stanley H. Hoffmann, ed., "International Relations as a Discipline," Part I in *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960), 1–12; and Kenneth W. Thompson, "Towards a Theory of International Relations," in Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory,* 17–28.

[12] Thompson, "Towards a Theory," 20–1.

[13] Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory,* 8–9.

emancipation from traditional customs, hierarchies and realism and all sorts of stratifications have become serious problems.

Small wars, deterrence of a nuclear war, and stopping the escalation of armed conflicts, in other words "rules of the game," gradually developed and dominated the international agenda in military interventions and proxy wars. Globalization, the revolutionary development marked by the successive improvements in communications, have shrunk the world. Globalization represents a single, worldwide international economic and political system in the context of liberalism. Globalization has undermined the system of sovereign states from below and from above. One aspect of this is the empirical revolution of globalization and interdependence.[14] It deprives states of much of their currencies and their budgetary policies. Globalization transfers power from the state to a private world economy of investors, businesspeople and firms, traders, bankers, speculators, and communications experts. That transfer is, to quite an extent, uncontrolled because of the lack of relevant and satisfactory global regulations and institutions.

The second revolution against sovereignty is normative: Human rights, international criminal justice, stopping air and water pollution, and the limited ability and intention of the states to fight against terrorist organizations. Some of the great powers, hiding behind human rights, are actively supporting terrorist actions. Various countries, for example, Turkey, have been victims of this kind of contradictory behavior of the United States. We live today in a world of novelties, complexity and uncertainty. It is still a world of states, but problem solving requires multi-polarity. It is a "world that moves in two opposite directions at the same time."[15] One of the dimensions is "horizontal," and signifies the competitive aspect of international politics. The other dimension is "vertical," which signifies domination and dependence.[16] Kenneth Waltz's neorealism has changed the form of the IR debate.[17] His neorealism is as hegemonic as Morgenthau's mainstream theory.[18] It emphasizes not the state and its foreign policy but the entire international system and its structure. His theory is the distribution of power, particularly military power. The neoliberal scholars put forward their findings as scientific conclusions and veil their normative character as being values and norms. Indeed, they were only the old liberal values of common understanding of cooperation. However, they were not explained in these terms. In fact, they claimed falsely to have a new science as a whole. This is just one of the very good examples produced by a worldwide IR scholar group, one which cannot be construed as being anything more than a pretentious attempt to seem more scientific and more impressive. The above-mentioned IR scholars probably expected the statecraft to be influenced by their scientific approach. However, this was just wishful thinking. American politicians and bureaucracy have not cared much about what and how the scholars think.[19] We may even argue that American statecraft has treated IR theories with neglect and condescension. In decision-making and implementation they fundamentally depend on a combination of realism and liberalism, without taking an interest

[14] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, "Domestic Institutions beyond the Nation-State: Charting the New Interdependence Approach," *World Politics* 66, no. 2 (2014): 331–63.

[15] Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory,* 54–69.

[16] Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory,* 51–3; Stanley H. Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics* 11, no. 3 (1959): 374–76; and Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington DC, Institute of Peace, 1993).

[17] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

[18] See Ole Wæver, "Waltz's Theory of Theory," *International Relations* 23, no. 2 (2009): 201-222.

[19] Paul C. Avey and Michael C. Desch, "What Do Policymakers Want From Us? Results of a Survey of Current and Former Senior National Security Decision Makers," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2014): 227–46.

in the theorization studies of the IR discipline. In the statecraft, the transformation of these fundamental concepts are accepted as values and norms of a doctrinal belief.

The scholars of the great debate do not complain only about the hubris of the politicians, they also complain about the "tension" between theorization and politicians, probably to avoid bias: "Among the materials to be used for such a research, none has been more neglected than the writing of philosophies, theorists, and statesmen…There have been some path-breaking efforts which study theories and writings of statesmen as distorted mirrors of the world around them. Much more could be done if we used such works not for new chapters in histories of political thought but as tools for the analysis of actual systems and situations."[20]

The moral issue has always been persistent. It was raised both in theory and in the practical conduct in international affairs. It is not only because of the honesty and integrity of individuals and collective human beings. Another reason for obeying the social values and norms is the social pressure on the members of society. Nations and civilizations are more inclined than individuals to follow their own interests. This also brings about a critical situation is democracies, the statecraft's choice between "good" and "bad" or "right" and "wrong" becomes more difficult.[21] The problems do not arise only from the combination of realism and liberalism, but also from two different kinds of liberalism. One of them is Kant's liberalism, which is regulated through universal rules and a moral imperative doctrine which may turn into an ideology. But Kant is highly abstract and did not write much on international relations. The second kind of liberalism was philosophical, less rational, more suitable to a calculation of consequences, and may be affected by sentiments and passions. On this issue, Hoffman shared the position of his Harvard colleague Judith Shklar, particularly her essay published in her book titled "Liberalism of Fear". Stanley H. Hoffmann says that he is "concerned with one particular aspect of liberal ethics: the ethics of political life."[22]

3. The Cornerstone of Realism and Its Distortion

The theory that represented the center of IR in the years of its commencement was Professor Hans Morgenthau's realist theory of power politics. The concept of national interest defined in terms of power was the central concept of the radical realism of Morgenthau.[23] Political sociology and political science have used as a model the image of integrated community. This kind of a system did not fit with the area of the critical scholars of the great debate. Whatever else, the nature of IR was considered as an integrated system. As an autonomous discipline it should again have to struggle for the invention of a new theory of IR. Morgenthau formulated theoretical questions according to the dependency and independency of the discipline. The political realist should maintain the autonomy of the political sphere; the economist should think in terms of interest defined as wealth, which is a form of power. The economist asks: how does the policy affect the wealth of society? The lawyer asks: is this policy in accord with the rules of law? The moralist asks: is this policy in accord with moral principles? And the political realist asks: how does the policy affect the power of the nation or the decision-making elite? Morgenthau underlines that political realists are not unaware of the existence

[20] Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory,* 26–7 and 102–3.
[21] Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory,* 244 and 242–54.
[22] Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory,* 244.
[23] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations.*

and relevance of standards of thought other than political ones. As a political realist, one cannot treat equally with other standards, but subordinate other standards to those of politics. This subordination, however, is not absolute.[24] The realist analysis of power is highly debatable. The tendency to equate politics and the effects of the "lust for power" narrows the premise of realism and mutilates it. In fact, evil and violence are not basic instincts of human beings. Much of the international or domestic evil of power is produced by the changing conditions of a context. Even a good person can be forced to act immorally. Unfortunately, this issue has been largely neglected by the radical realist theory, with the exception of Hans Morgenthau.

The usefulness of strategic planning is another important aspect of theory-making. Sometimes these two words are employed interchangeably. It is almost a common belief that the criterion of a good foreign policy is its rationality. However, there is here another limitation. The success and its degree of rationality can only be evaluated and understood at the end of the operation, in other words after the implementation of the plan. The lack of a fruitful discussion of ends has brought the interpretation of power politics to the static quality of the theory. The permanence of power politics itself has become a goal. The importance of the transitory characteristics of diplomatic strategic plans are completely ignored. I would like to finish this paragraph with a philosophical limitation. The problem arises from rational principles. It is of a dialectical nature where the rationality desired contains its opposite, irrationality. The harder we struggle for rationality, the closer we get to irrationality.[25] Morgenthau inspires the reader that he is also inclined to recognize this paradox.

4. Science: Servant or Master?

After positing his radical interpretation of realism, Morgenthau apparently felt the necessity of asking and trying to answer a subtle question. He introduces his remarkable book, *Servant or Master,* with his yearning of the ancient days: "The Aristotelian concept of science as a self-sufficient human activity was indeed appropriate."[26] Then he complains about the growing role of scientists in bureaucracy and politics. After all, they claim to be the guardians and augmenters of the truth, but "the result is not only corruption but also hypocrisy."[27] The utilitarian orientation of science and technology toward statecraft constituted a radical break with the traditional habits and constructed artificial walls of monopolizing military and diplomatic knowledge. So, modern scientific knowledge became esoteric. It seems that Morgenthau believed that this shift of power within the government meant the usurpation of the fundamental democratic right of control of the layman. Another great risk was that the scientific elites, through their involvement in the political and military decision-making process, would become "both the supporters and ideologues" of diplomatic and strategic policies. Morgenthau dealt with the above-mentioned questions. In one of his monographs in 1972 he reminded quite clearly that politics is concerned not only with power, but normally with resources and instruments of power as well. This implies that through power, science and technology enter the area of high politics. As a result of this, a paradox comes to the

[24] Hoffmann, "International Relations," 349–50. Particularly, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1968), part IV- part VI; and James Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (New York: Lippincott, 1971), 75–80.

[25] Justin E. H. Smith, *Irrationality: A History of the Dark Side of Reason* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2019).

[26] Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 4–11.

[27] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1972), 1–19 and 73–104.

fore, as science serves as an instrument for acquiring arms, fighting, national security, and for demonstration of power. When science and technology are used for such aims, they become transformed into a political implication. Their service to the government is expected to distinguish between what is true and false. However, if this original purpose is replaced by a political doctrine or an ideological value system, science and technology elites open themselves up to "corruption and hypocrisy." Such professional and moral disintegration leads to the degeneration of science itself, as a system of theoretical knowledge about what is true and what is false. The loss objective standard incapacitates the state.

Morgenthau's approach to IR is within the general framework of realism. He exposed his basic understanding of IR with a critical style in the first ten pages of his monograph. He revealed that the most important challenges to the discipline derived from interactions between scientific objectivity and political subjectivity. It is the distinctive characteristic and ambition of a human being to become conscious himself or herself through their experiences. The development of natural and humanistic sciences and the speed of technological achievements have provided occasions for humanity to be able to live in awareness. Nevertheless, there are also other ways of becoming conscious of oneself, such as religion, art, love, nationalism and ethical considerations, which also have always been within politics. According to classical realism, domestic national politics and international politics are not completely separated from each other politically. Their interaction is particularly important in the ethical and ideological arenas. Morgenthau argues that politics is managed by objective laws which lay in the nature of humanity. In all realist theories, power is accepted as a key concept and defined in terms of interest. All statesmen think and act on the basis of interest, which is an objective and universal concept. Despite this assumption, Morgenthau does not attribute fixed meanings to the fundamental concepts of power and interest. We know by historical experience that interactions between objectivity and subjectivity in politics cannot be avoided. In other words, rationality and irrationality, neither of them can be eliminated from the decision-making process. The process should then require a solution to this paradox.

5. Political Realism and Modus Vivendi

John J. Mearsheimer, in one of his book chapters on liberalism, used a legal concept: *modus vivendi.* He asserted that political liberalism had two variants: "Modus vivendi liberalism and progressive liberalism."[28] This division between two kinds of political liberalism, especially that associated with the well established legal concept of modus vivendi, moved Mearsheimer toward norms and legal studies despite his staying within the framework of realism in general. The application of this concept could possibly produce a juridical effect in liberalism and realism, or the fusion of the two. There are two differences between modus vivendi liberals and progressive liberals: They think differently about the content of individual rights, and about the role of the state. In modus vivendi liberalism, rights depend on individual freedom, and acting without government interference. Progressive liberals also benefit from individual freedoms. They can call on the government to help its citizens. They believe all individuals have a right to equal opportunity, for social engineering by the state. The modus vivendi liberals on the other hand, have always looked at social engineering with suspicion. They have always considered social engineering as an instrument for the strongly connected within

[28] See the discussion on "Modus Vivendi Liberalism and Progressive Liberallism," in *Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities,* ed. John J. Mearsheimer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 55–90 and Chap.5.

a particular political and economic system. It would be a useful practice of making changes to laws in order to establish a new society according to unfamiliar political ideas and culture in order to tie the target country or the region firmly to the hegemon.

Progressives tend to emphasize that reason facilitates extreme tolerance in liberal societies and can help move them toward universal consensus on moral matters. Modus vivendi liberals usually reject those claims and instead focus on the limits of reason. They are entitled to argue that it is too early for the conclusion of the expected essential treaty. In the meantime, with consent or tolerance, both political liberals should keep the gates ajar for consensus. The classical purpose of modus vivendi is to allow the parties to learn the virtue of restraint, including the proper way of claiming forbearance and patience. In legal terms, modus vivendi is a temporary agreement or arrangement until a final settlement is arrived at. Mearsheimer did not focus on this aspect of political liberalism. In order to explain clearly American foreign policy doctrine he emphasized that liberalism only works if there is a higher authority like the state, which can maintain order. If there is no such an international system, liberalism degenerates into realism. To work effectively, liberalism requires a hierarchy of two or more great powers. Mearsheimer employs the word "anarchic" instead of "chaotic" for the present international system because according to him, there is a certain order in anarchic societies, but in chaos there is no order at all.[29] Although there is today a certain international order, survival still is every state's primary goal. They want to maintain their territorial integrity, personality, sovereignty, and economic and technological development. On the other hand, there is today no substitute for interventionist states for the fulfilment of these goals. This is the reason why liberalism depends on hierarchy and why it effectively becomes realism with two or more great powers. Mearsheimer, in his remarkable critical analysis of political liberalism, does not seem to be very happy about "the Triumph of Liberal Progressivism." He begins the relevant paragraph not with progressivism, but by reminding readers of the classical meaning of modus vivendi:

> ...in its original form, political liberalism was synonymous with modus vivendi liberalism. But variant gradually fell out of favor, partly because a laissez-faire approach to governing led to extreme economic inequality and widespread poverty... Utilitarianism and liberal idealism emerged in good part as responses to modus vivendi liberalism's shortcomings... Yet progressive liberalism has not won such a decisive victory as to render modus vivendi liberalism irrelevant. Modus vivendi liberalism has a substantial following in every liberal society, and its advocates sometimes have a significant influence on public discourse. But in practice, the best its proponents can do is to curb the excesses of the interventionist state. There is virtually no hope of replacing it with a state that keeps away from social engineering and positive rights.[30]

6. The Gap between Theory and Practice

We have so far worked to understand and explain theory-making disputes and restraints upon the discipline of international relations. Some of these problems have arisen from groups of scholars and intellectuals, while others have originated from the official policy makers. American practitioners' foreign policy making, as we have already dealt with, depends considerably on the fusion of realism and liberalism. The combination is far from a synthesis

[29] Hoffmann, "International Relations," 353–54; Mearsheimer, *Great Delusion,* chap.5.
[30] Ibid, "The Triumph of Liberal Progressivism".

of two theories; rather, it is nothing more than a doctrinal principle, i.e. a way of utilizing liberalism to strengthen realism according to the national interest. However, the expected result was not achieved. The practitioners' disregard has been completely limited, and has distorted the government's knowledge about the non-Western world. The lack of correct variables has badly affected Washington's diplomatic and military operations. American political decision makers and military commanders have often lacked a clear idea about their strategy as well as that of the invaded area, and thus failed to conduct their efforts successfully. Scholars and practitioners in the conduct of diplomatic-strategic policies are usually handicapped by their different cultures. Members of two combatting communities have often been socialized in different professional and intellectual arenas. Usually they have different interests, sometimes even highly opposed interests. They may even claim them as national interests. Actually, this has been the case in America's great debates on IR. Government agencies are usually too reserved and distrustful of academics. Although they often object to the scientific assumptions of foreign policy analysis, it is true that they from time to time happen to confess their appreciation of scholars' criticisms. However, this has not been a usual behavior. A rather worrying thought often strikes academic scholars and intellectuals, which is that the eyes of policy specialists reflect a bored and sour face whenever they hear the mention of the word "theory" or the phrase "scientific study of IR" from academic scholars. The slightly hidden and unsympathetic reaction of the foreign policy practitioners is naturally embarrassing to academic scholars.[31]

Practitioners and policy specialists have rarely welcomed the high level of abstraction which is often employed in scholarly writings. However, we know that they have also adopted a questionable opposite approach concerning the relevance and utility of theoretical generalizations and models involved by academic researchers. For instance, it was the case in the association between the Air Force and RAND Corporation, and Robert McNamara's system analyses. The first one was successful, while the second one failed. The time has thus come to ask the following question: what is the state of contemporary IR theory and what has it contributed so far to the knowledge base for conducting foreign policy? In this essay, I have so far emphasized the mistakes committed and their negative effects on the following struggles. More than failures, scholars and intellectuals have arguably not developed satisfactory predictive IR theories. For various reasons, they did not expect too much from general theories of IR. A few of them did not attempt to provide all the knowledge needed for the diplomatic-strategic conduct. In other words, they refrained from starting with theoretical assumptions. Instead, catching up with changing realities, they proposed to foreign policy decision makers and practitioners to involve certain philosophical and legal concepts to soften further moralistic political decisions and implementations. Two very good examples of this are Raymond Aron's "praxeology" and John Mearsheimer's "modus vivendi."

One of the most important critical arguments came from a distinguished historian, Professor John Lewis Gaddis, at Yale University. The fundamental aspect of his argument is the independency and dependency of variables in IR theories. In short, the core idea is underlined as followed: If history is essentially required in IR theory making and teaching, we must understand and acknowledge that separation between dependent and independent variables is invalid. All kinds of variables are interdependent. IR theorists, like historians,

[31] George, *Bridging the Gap*; and Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2005).

should assume the interdependency of variables as they trace their interconnections through time. In order to moderate a little, the devastating logic of his argument, Gaddis dedicated some thoughts to reductionism and the ecological approach. Reductionism approves that there are independent variables and it will be possible to decrease the number of dependent ones. Reductionism could also occasion to fulfil the principle of parsimony. The ecological approach also appreciates the specification of simple constitutive elements: "It is worth asking, therefore, where the pressure for reductionism within the social sciences actually comes from. The answer, I think, is that these disciplines prefer reductionist over ecological methods of inquiry because they see in reductionism the only feasible way to generalize about the past in such a way as to be able to forecast the future." Gaddis finished his remarkable explanation about the interdependency of variables with "a palpable hit:" "The ecological viewpoint is inclusive, even as the reductionist perspective is exclusive; but would anyone claim that inclusion is any less 'scientific' a procedure than exclusion?"[32]

Before passing to the analysis of our modus vivendi, I would like to share with you one more of our common troubles. It has always been one of the most complex issues of theory making that it is much less knowable than the past. It is about the future. It lies on the other side of singularity that is the present. It has been the most attractive, but the hardest singularity to reach rightfully. With modernization and primacy of instrumental technology, the goals of the diplomatic-strategic activities have vanished. In fact, we should know where we want to go and for what. We should avoid unexpected itineraries. We should know about the relationship between the region, its population and potential instruments. To have a correct knowledge about the equilibrium between goals and instruments is of utmost importance for both parties. Aspirations and imagining may be limited, but instruments are always limited. Many IR scholars and strategists have dealt with this paradox by offering oversimplifications like rational choice assumptions, structural functionalism, modernization theories, and neorealist theory.

The crux of historical and philosophical problems has not been taken on in detail. We are today almost completely convinced that, in the United States, no bridge will soon be constructed between statecraft and scholarly-theory construction. Both parties view askance the possibility of meaningful engagement. Reciprocal condescension, even if it is as soft as glazed looks, are not encouraging at all.[33]

7. The Clausewitzian Modus Vivendi

The Clausewitzian modus vivendi has two major perspectives to develop. The first one is the paradox between the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment. How can we stop the clash of ideals between these two rival worlds? This mutual struggle has not been solved. This is still the most important philosophical subject-matter and it continues to involve any scientific or humanistic problem. The second perspective of Clausewitz was about historical studies. Clausewitz gained a remarkable historical and political experience. He played a leading role together with his teacher and friend General Scharnhorst in the military reform of Prussia after his active participation in the Napoleonic Wars. I will come back to the story

[32] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (Oxford University Press, 2002), 55; John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy* (USA: Penguin Random House, 2018). In this book, Gaddis explains Clausewitz's "softened realism."

[33] George, *Bridging the Gap*, 6.

of Clausewitz after a brief introductory reminder.

Following his explanation of the core assumptions of realism, Mearsheimer asserts that "none of these assumptions by itself portrays the competitive and dangerous world usually associated with realism."[34] But states are rational actors. Yes! But, they are usually instrumentally rational. The theory makes no dependable judgements on the rationality of goals, with the only exception of survival. When we continue an attentive reading of Mearsheimer, we observe that he is gradually and partly inclined to criticize realism. He asserts that realists do not show much respect to inalienable rights. Moreover, according to him, liberalism does not deceive realism. This may be true. But we know that both liberals and realists exaggerate liberals' influence in politics by spreading democratization.

Finally, we witness in Mearsheimer that modus vivendi liberalism has become competitive with progressive liberalism. As Mearsheimer argues, the United States public is inclined toward a more restrained foreign policy based on modus vivendi liberalism, which differs from the liberal-realist hegemony. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine War may in some way accelerate the modus vivendi variant. We have already seen the difference between the two variants of political liberalisms: modus vivendi liberalism and progressive liberalism. For the first one, rights are all about individual freedom to act without government interference; for the second one, rights are also imperative, but they favor a much more activist government which can even help the society move toward universal consensus on moral and economic matters. Modus vivendi liberals reject those claims and emphasize rationality's limits in order to maintain security and national sovereignty.

Up to this point, the legal concept of modus vivendi has been employed within the framework of IR theory making and policy implementation. However, its original and essential meaning has been somewhat forgotten. The crux of the philosophical problems were not taken on through modus vivendi as applied in its original meaning. Its primary task was to provide the mutually disagreeing parties with a preparatory transitional period before the conclusion of a permanent treaty or any other permanent legal arrangement. The European philosophers and intellectuals had to deal with a similar problem, on a greater scale, from the 18th to the 21st centuries. We cannot say that the problem has now been concluded. Indeed, the problem is still far from that point. The fundamental problem is much deeper and older than the decline of IR. The core paradox arises from the lack of consent between the radical supporters of the Enlightenment and those of the Counter-Enlightenment, and their mutual arrogance and hubris. The radical Enlightenment people believe that they are the key to making the world a much better place. The modus vivendi liberals expect to be treated with tolerance, but they do not want tolerance meaning consent. On the contrary, it allows for lack of consent. During the provisional period, "the aim should not be to guarantee equal outcomes, just equal opportunity." The Enlightenment, with its optimistic and rational doctrine and its rich history from the Renaissance to the French Revolution and even beyond it, has continued until our days. Indeed, the great success of Newtonian (1643-1727) physics increased the confidence of scholars and intellectuals, with the exception of legends, astrology and alchemy.[35] As far as politics is concerned, since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), nation states have not submitted their will to another state or organization. Even then, political

[34] Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion*, 133.

[35] Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy* (Cambridge University Press , 2010). Please see Heuser's book for more detail. Also see Kerem Karaosmanoğlu, *Komplo teorileri: disiplinlerarası bir giriş* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2019).

tolerance has dominated implementation, and conspiracy theories too have benefited from populist statecraft.

Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) made it clear and relatively easy to understand the ideas of the key figures in the development of Counter-Enlightenment, such as Vico (1668-1744) and Herder (1744-1803). I must note that Berlin preferred to use the more general word "romanticism" instead of "counter-Enlightenment." I do not want to take much of your time with a very detailed explanation so I will limit myself to one of the arguments that is related to our previous analyses:

> The Romantics did more than draw attention to the irrational springs of human behavior. By insisting on the diversity of human ideals they showed the need - however much they might deny it - for tolerance, for the necessity of preserving an imperfect equilibrium in human affairs... The result of Romanticism, then, is liberalism, toleration, decency and the appreciation of the imperfections of life…some degree of increased rational self understanding. In a reversal of a kind common in the history of thought, the Romantics gave a new lease on life to ideas and values they despised.

Existentialism owes its success story to the Romanticism that critically penetrated the modern philosophy of the Enlightenment.

Immanuel Kant had two diametrically opposed positions. He disliked Romanticism, and at the same time, he was rightfully regarded as one of the defenders of Romanticism. He was brought up in a religious family and he detested any form of exaggeration, mysticism, ambiguity and confusion. Perversely, Kant was very much interested in sciences. Kant exerted this duality and played well his decisive role in the development of a new philosophical and intellectual climate. Berlin underlines: "We are children of both worlds." Despite the Kantian dualist philosophy and his book *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), the German *Aufklarung* advocates were appalled by the Counter-Enlightenment philosophy.[36]

Kant and Clausewitz, the two great theorists of peace and war, lived, thought, and wrote in a turbulent period when political and intellectual life in Europe (including the Ottoman Empire) was undergoing a radical transformation caused by the French Revolution and the philosophical debate between the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment. The arguments of these two formidable thinkers continue to inspire contemporary international affairs and are regarded as the classical actors of the two opposing schools of thought. In the first view, Kant is a source of inspiration for the liberalism-oriented intellectuals, and Carl von Clausewitz for realists. However, they have often been subject to superficial or distorted interpretations. The major argument of this essay is that these two thinkers were influenced by political and intellectual movements of their time in similar ways. They had a significant shared area of reasoning and conceptualization. They both developed their ideas on a similar epistemological ground. Kant's "perpetual peace" and Clausewitz's "absolute War" are unattainable ideals. They are abstractions which make theorizing possible. Like Hobbes, Kant defines "the state of nature" as a "state of war." Nations are in conflictual and cooperative relations with each other in the state of nature (or the state of war). Clausewitz's concept of "real war" represents the wars that take place in life (that is to say in the state of nature). They are the wars that occur in specific historical situations. Perpetual peace and absolute war

[36] Isaiah Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment* (Princeton University Press, 2013), ix-xi; 26–307; and *The Roots of Romanticism* (Princeton University Press, 1999), 26–170. And Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (Oxford University Press, 1989).

belong to the world of "noumena" whereas the state of nature (or war), in contemporary IR terminology, belong to "the anarchic society." Clausewitz's "real war" belong to the world of phenomena. Although Kant's perpetual peace is an unachievable target, nations have a moral obligation to make every effort to achieve it as if it is attainable. According to Clausewitz, every war tends to escalate to absolute violence. "Absolute War," albeit philosophically valid, is an abstraction. In the real world, politics and many other factors that Clausewitz calls "friction" introduce themselves in the act of war and reduce the absolute violence to the modified forms it assumes in history. In both scholars we observe a philosophical attempt to reconcile the ideal (or the image) with the real. In the final analysis, both thinkers meet in this effort of mutual consent through the possibility of reasonable politics suggesting, *inter alia,* a moral obligation to limit violence; in Kant, through an imaginable perpetual progress to eternal peace; in Clausewitz and in the contemporary strategic terminology, the management of the "security dilemma" in its extensive form.[37]

Where there is exaltation of reason (rationality), and an intention to eradicate its opposite, irrationality, the latter will not surrender easily. On the contrary, it will defend itself by spreading into the social order. At the social level it is expressed as religion, ethics, culture, myths, legends, rioting, mass demonstrations, renouncing vaccination. The harder we struggle for rationality, the more we move toward irrationality. Therefore it is irrational to seek to eliminate irrationality, both in society and in our mental capabilities. Justin Smith, referring to the French historian Paul Hazard, calls this result "la raison aggressive."[38] As Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer pointed out, freedom depends on the satisfaction of passion; we ought to rebel against the dominance of rationality.[39]

Some people and some political regimes may have evil intentions. They abuse modernization and technological development to increase their power in order to dominate or eradicate other states. The national socialism of Hitler is a prototype example of that kind of political regime. Any victory of rationalism or any ideational effort to permanently set up a social order which condemns extremism will be a good beginning. If the purpose of this effort is to secure a quiet and peaceful society on the basis of rationality, the problem will be again of a dialectical nature, where the social and political order to be constructed will evidently contain its opposite. The endurance of the construction of will then depends on the political involvement through the process of *praxis*. Politics can either play a constructive role by fusing the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment or can play a dividing role between the two. "It is a great paradox of the present age that, even though the totality of all human learning is more accessible than ever before in history —indeed a billion of us on earth can now easily access it with a special device we carry in our pockets— nonetheless false beliefs are as epidemic as ever."[40] The interaction between objectivity and subjectivity in the political cannot be avoided. Of course, the subjective is not always irrational. But we can say that irrationality is ineliminable if we want to develop a theory. This presents another case of opposites. Like in the story of Kant and Clausewitz, they sought to reconcile opposites by first posing them; gradations, qualifications, and mitigations could then come after. Clausewitz himself explained the result as follows:

[37] Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Muhteşem ortaklık: Kant ve Clausewitz," *Uluslararası İlişkiler-International Relations* 4, no. 14 (2007): 161–84.

[38] Smith, *Irrationality*, 5–27.

[39] Smith, *Irrationality*; and Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Aydınlanmanın diyalektiği,* trans. Nihat Ülner ve Öztarhan Karadoğan (İstanbul: Kabalcı, 2000).

[40] Adorno and Horkheimer, *Aydınlanmanın diyalektiği,* 288.

> When two ideas form a true logical antithesis, each complementary to the other, then fundamentally each is implied in the other. The limitations of our mind may not allow us to comprehend both simultaneously, and to discover by antithesis the whole of one in the whole of the other. Nevertheless each will shed enough reciprocal light to clarify many of the details... A shift in our viewpoint will bring us nearer the subject, so that we can examine more closely what we previously surveyed from a distance.[41]

Clausewitz made clear that "war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means... The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."[42] Gaddis tries to make the relationship even clearer: "if war, in this sense, reflects politics, it must be "subordinate" to politics and therefore to policy, the product of politics."[43] Ends can be infinite. They depend on passion, love, identity, morality. and honor, and are almost impossible to scale rightfully. Means can never be like that. If you want to be reasonable you should try to scale your aspirations according to your instruments. "Whatever balance you strike, there will be a link between what is real and what is imagined: between your current location and your intended destination. You won't have a strategy until you have connected these dots, dissimilar though they are, within the situation in which you are operating."[44]

Enlightenment thinkers underlined the significance of systematic approaches while the Counter-Enlightenment and Clausewitz emphasized great generals and political leaders and their genius for war and peace. But Clausewitz never forgot about the dialectical nature of paradoxes. In general, he argued, "the more physical the activity the less difficulties there will be" in establishing precise rules. "The more the activity becomes intellectual and turns into motives which exercise a determining influence on the commander's will, the more the difficulties will increase. Thus it is easier to use the theory to organize, plan, and conduct an engagement than it is to use it in determining the engagement's purpose,"[45] which is the final task of politics.

A theory can produce many choices on the settlement of an issue. Clausewitz is also liable to promise too many choices. But Clausewitz repeatedly states what his own strategic theory cannot do: 1) Construct a model for the art of war that can be applied in any war; 2) Put forward a positive doctrine, a manual for action; 3) Serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path one must take; 4) Cover every abstract truth; or 5) Mark the narrow path on which the sole solutions supposed to have liability of planting a hedge of principles on either side.[46] Furthermore, Clausewitz would certainly not support oversimplifications for the purpose of parsimony, stability, and universality. For example, he did not think of separating independent from dependent variables; he did not like to use "rationalism" on every occasion such as "rational choice models." He disliked arguments in organizational studies and to provide politics with a single choice. He believed that a theory must never lose sight of the human dimension of life. However, this was not enough for him. Ultimately, his fundamental approach was to keep in mind the theoretical and empirical significance of the Enlightenment, and the dialectical relationship between both perspectives.

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[41] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), 523. See also Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy*,196.

[42] Clausewitz, *On War,* 87.

[43] Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy,* 197.

[44] Ibid, 21.

[45] Clausewitz, *On War,* 140–41. Also look at, Hugh Smith, *On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas* (London: Palgrave, 2004), 171–73. Clausewitz called this procedure "method" or "mode of procedure", but it is not routine, it is not based on definite individual premises, rather on the "average probability*" On War*, 151–55.

[46] Smith, *On Clausewitz,*173.

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Non-Western Theories in International Relations Education and Research: The Case of Turkey/Turkish Academia

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Abstract

This study examines the usage of non-Western theories in research and education by International Relations (IR) scholars in Turkey. Our primary purpose is to understand the level of engagement with the non-Western IR debate, with its prospects and variations, in Turkish academia, and to evaluate the familiarity of Turkish IR scholars from different schools with non-Western IR theories. Relevant data were obtained from a questionnaire with 47 items designed to let participants, consisting of 116 academicians at IR departments from 57 Turkish Universities, provide their teaching experiences, views, and perceptions concerning non-Western IR Theory. While our findings based on this data confirm the literature on the scarcity of non-Western theories in Turkish IR scholarship, we have also furthered it with many details. Firstly, according to the findings, respondents who study and teach IR Theory at Turkish universities think that the IR theories of Western origin dominating the literature are not universal or objective in terms of their function as interpreters of IR issues. But interestingly, those considerations direct scholars to Western critical IR Theory schools rather than non-Western theories. The other key conclusion of this study confirms our expectations. The thoughts, concepts and theories emanating from the Turkish-Islamic world have much more recognition than other non-Western IR theories among Turkish IR scholars.

Keywords: Non-Western IR theory, Turkish International Relations, International Relations education, theoretical preferences, survey

1. Introduction

In the context of International Relations Theory (IR Theory), a debate continues on the distribution of knowledge production in line with the power imparities, civilizational fault lines, intellectual disintegration, and interactions between parties of these divisions. In relation to this, intellectual and philosophical deliberations that have been developed and accumulated over the years on the political nature of knowledge are garnering increasingly more attention. Ideas about the relational character of power and theory production, which

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constitute a part of the fourth great debate in IR, are well-known. The birth and formation of IR as a highly American social science is now being made explicit in the context of calls for non-Western/Global IR Theory. We have strong and widely accepted comments from prominent figures of the discipline that reveal different dimensions of the issue.[1]

The discussion on the division of Western and non-Western Theory is a candidate to be the new theoretical divergence point of IR.[2] In order to examine the hierarchical character of the discipline between core and periphery, behavioral measures such as the geographical distribution of scholars who can publish in theoretical journals,[3] citation networks, bibliometric situations,[4] PhD degrees from foreign countries,[5] resource material selections[6] for the curricula and syllabi,[7] and individual perceptions of academics toward the core-periphery debate in the discipline[8] have been used.

Turkish academia enjoys a dynamic and prolific community of IR scholars. Although it resembles the discipline's dominant epistemic community, there is no doubt that Turkish academics are interested in the non-Western IR Theory debate. In this study, we wish to concentrate on this topic, which has received scant attention. It would be of interest to know whether Turkish academia has an inclination toward non-Western Theory. Our primary objective is to assess the familiarity of Turkish IR scholars with various non-Western IR theories as well as the debates surrounding them.

The article pursues a detailed account of Turkish scholarship regarding IR Theory to understand how and to what extent non-Western IR theories, concepts, and theorists are utilised. We sought to assess how the Western/non-Western/post-Western debates impact Turkish IR Theory teaching and research activities in light of the large and voluminous accumulation produced to date. We developed a questionnaire based on practical and epistemological themes relevant to the subject of non-Western IR theories. Our questions were intended to provide data for evaluating perceptions of the objectivity, universality, and

[1] On the American characteristic and structure of the discipline of International Relations, see Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106, no. 3 (1977); Steve Smith, "The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?," *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 2, no. 3 (2000): 394; Arlene B. Tickner and Karen Smith, *International Relations from the Global South: Worlds of Difference* (London: Routledge, 2020); Helen Turton, *International Relations and American Dominance: A Diverse Discipline* (New York: Routledge, 2015); Ekkehart Krippendorf, "The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations," *Millennium* 16, no. 2 (1987): 207.

[2] Peter M. Kristensen, "Dividing Discipline: Structures of Communication in International Relations," *International Studies Review* 14, no. 1 (2012): 46.

[3] Jörg Friedrichs and Ole Wæver, "Western Europe: Structure and Strategy at the National and Regional Levels," in *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, ed. Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2009).

[4] Peter Marcus Kristensen, "Revisiting the 'American Social Science'—Mapping the Geography of International Relations," *International Studies Perspectives* 16, no. 3 (2015): 246–69; Daniel Maliniak et al., "Is International Relations A Global Discipline? Hegemony, Insularity, and Diversity in The Field," *Security Studies* 27, no. 3 (2018): 448–84; Xiaoming Huang, "The Invisible Hand: Modern Studies of International Relations in Japan, China, and Korea," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 10, no. 2 (2007): 168–203.

[5] Maliniak et al., "Is International Relations a Global Discipline?"

[6] Jonas Hagmann and Thomas J. Biersteker, "Beyond the Published Discipline: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of International Studies," *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 2 (2014): 291–315; Amitav Acharya, "Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, And Contributions," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (2016): 7. For a current discussion of the Western-centricity of textbooks used in IR instruction, see Brieg Powel, "Blinkered Learning, Blinkered Theory: How Histories in Textbooks Parochialize IR," *International Studies Review* 22, no. 4 (2020): 957–82.

[7] For the current Global IR research conducted by Aydınlı and Erpul with 151 syllabus samples from 45 different countries, see Ersel Aydınlı and Onur Erpul, "The False Promise of Global IR: Exposing the Paradox of Dependent Development," *International Theory* (2021): 1–41, doi: 10.1017/S175297192100018X. For a study examining different postgraduate level IR syllabuses from leading universities in the Global North and South for diversity, see Nathan Andrews, "International Relations (IR) Pedagogy, Dialogue and Diversity: Taking the IR Course Syllabus Seriously," *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy & Peace* 9, no. 2 (2020): 267–82.

[8] Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al., "The IR of the Beholder: Examining Global IR using the 2014 TRIP Survey," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (2016): 16–32.

value-relevancy of IR theories in the survey, the details of which will be explained in the methodology section. Beyond that, we want to find out which non-Western theories are more commonly referenced. To achieve such an outcome, we separate non-Western ideas into three sub-sections: Asian-based (or originated) theories, African-Latin American-based theories, and Turkish-Islamic World-based theories.

Based on the data gathered from our survey, this article combines two investigations: First, the article aims to explore Turkish academia's stance toward IR theories and the degree of its interest in the non-Western IR Theory debate. Second, the article strives to pinpoint where this interest originates from and what the fluctuating tendencies toward non-Western IR theories are. By addressing the relevant questions, we want to contribute to the understanding of this understudied topic. To accomplish that goal, we will present a general literature review on non-Western IR Theory in the following part of the text. After outlining our data-gathering methodology, we will reveal any correlations between answers to our questions by displaying them in charts. The variations in participants' views toward mainstream theories, their meta-theoretical and epistemological assessments of the nature of theories, and interest in non-Western theories classified by their geographical/civilizational origins will also be examined in this evaluation process.

2. An Outlook on the Non-Western Theory Debate

Opinions about US or Western dominance in the discipline, which seem to have become so widespread as to resemble the debates that built the grand narrative of IR, bring about questions regarding the value of mainstream IR theories in geographies that do not contribute to their production. In the words of Bilgin and Çapan, the discipline that has become today's social science through globalization starting in the 1950s was essentially regional IR. Criticism from the 2010s that academics outside of North America and Western Europe are not adequately represented in publications and curricula is a result of the globalization of knowledge once produced for a specific region.[9] However, realizing the inadequacy of the existing literature on theories[10] is a typical motivation to search for new theories. The unearthed inefficiency of the mainstream in the face of new developments can be shown as a distinct reason for the need to have non-Western theorization.[11] It is possible to come across, for example, remarks stating that if these theories were produced in the West, then they are for the West, as indicated by the Coxian interpretation of theory. [12]

[9] Pınar Bilgin and Zeynep Gülşah Çapan, "Introduction to the Special Issue Regional International Relations and Global Worlds: Globalising International Relations," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 18, no. 70 (2021): 2–3.

[10] For studies containing views on the ineffectiveness of mainstream theories, see. Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship around the World* (London: Routledge, 2009); Acharya, "Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions," 5; Andrey Makarychev and Viatcheslav Morozov, "Is "non-Western Theory" Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR," *International Studies Review* 15, no. 3 (2013): 328; Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 22.

[11] Studies critical of non-Western theories point to political motivations as an alternative to the analytical need thesis. See Alexei D. Voskressenski, *Non-Western Theories of International Relations: Conceptualizing World Regional Studies* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 34. For a view that politically defined agendas also exist outside of the West see also: Evelyn Goh, "US Dominance and American Bias in International Relations Scholarship: A View from the Outside," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 4, no. 3 (2019): 7. For an innovative study of the ideological aspects of IR Theories in a broader sense, see Brian Rathbun, "Politics and Paradigm Preferences: The Implicit Ideology of International Relations Scholars," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 3 (2012): 607–22. Quoted by Deniz Kuru, "Homegrown Theorizing: Knowledge, Scholars, Theory," *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 7, no. 1 (2018): 77.

[12] In its original form, Robert Cox's statement "Theory is always for someone and for some purpose" does not refer to the location where the theory was produced. However, some, like Hobson, interpret it as a metaphor for the relationship between theory and the place where it is constructed. See, John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 16; Giorgio Shani, "Toward a post-Western IR: The Umma,

Cox clearly expresses that he has spatial identity formations like civilizations in mind while thinking about the effects that theoretical debates and theory production processes have on world politics. The following quotation is from his latest book:[13]

> My scholarly objective was to try to understand the forces that were shaping the world's future in the early decades of the 21st century and the potential for compatibility and for conflict amongst them. This led me to focus on civilizations as the constituent entities of the world. Civilizations were ways of being that combined and integrated social, cultural, political and economic aspects of life, each of them active in the making of the future… ...My object was rather to understand better how people in different human communities came to understand the world which they perceived around them, what stimulated their acceptance or rejection of aspects of that world, and what might arouse in them a determination to do something about it.

Cox rejects the fixation of identities in a permanent conflictual movement as described in the Clash of Civilizations thesis, but he also clearly accepts that civilizational identities affect ways of thinking. Furthermore, civilizations have their respective territories, although people who once socialized in a certain civilizational zone can change their area of settlement to the territory of another civilization and even attempt to self-assimilate themselves there.

This is adaptive critical inference, implying that different geographies can add different characteristics to theory.[14] The basis of non-Western Theory is that key mainstream concepts take Western history as a reference point.[15] Suggestions for alternatives to the Western historical narrative are also within this scope. To broaden the framework here, a convergence is perceived between the emphasis on flaws caused by the dominance of Western Theory and the acceptance of problems in the literature based on the Eurocentric perspective prevailing in political history narratives. This reasoning is important for our research, as we also aim to explore perspectives on the position of postmodern, postcolonial, and critical theories with origins in the vast literature of Eurocentrism because one of the contested issues in the non-Western IR Theory literature is the contribution of these critical theories to the construction of non-Western theories.[16] Calls for the need to globalize IR by providing intellectual diversity are, in a way, an extension of the post-positivist approaches of the last 20 years.[17]

The current state of this debate on the geographical and, therefore, political nature of IR Theory production is manifested in the invitation for inclusion of non-Western voices. Now, not only criticism of Western domination, but also proposals regarding the exploration and

Khalsa Panth, and Critical International Relations Theory," *International Studies Review* 10, no. 4 (2008): 722; Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium* 10, no. 2 (1981): 129–30.

[13] Robert W. Cox, *Universal Foreigner: The Individual and the World* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013), 301.

[14] For example, for an attempt to construct a theory attributed to the national characteristics, see. Song Xinning, "Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics," *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 26 (2001): 61–74.

[15] On the failure of Western ontological vision to accurately describe non-European reality, see Erik Ringmar, "Alternatives to the State: Or, Why a non-Western IR Must be a Revolutionary Science," *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* (2020): 149–62; Robbie Shilliam, *International Relations and non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity* (London: Routledge, 2010), 18.

[16] On the promotion of non-Western approaches by Western-Criticism by Critical, Postmodern and Postcolonial IRTheories see, Shani, "Toward a post-Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and Critical International Relations Theory," 723; Gonca Biltekin, "Understanding Turkish Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century: A Homegrown Theorizing Attempt" (PhD dissertation, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2014), 22; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why is there no non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction," in *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (New York: Routledge, 2009), 9; Pınar Bilgin, "How not to Globalise IR:'Centre'and 'Periphery' as Constitutive of 'the International'," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 18, no. 70 (2021): 1–15.

[17] David L. Blaney and Tamara A Trownsell, "Recrafting International Relations by Worlding Multiply," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 18, no. 70 (2021): 46.

building of alternative approaches are well known to the academic community.[18] We already have a sizable literature dedicated to discussing and revealing that mainstream IR Theory has its origins in the history of Western thought. The well-known lack of non-Western theories in the discipline's core is attributed to reasons such as ignorance and isolation, academic network concerns, or lack of necessity.[19] Regardless of all that, given that different life experiences can change certain assumptions, as David A. Lake has said,[20] the call of Acharya and his followers is to propose Global IR as a framework to overcome these constraints.[21] Not presented as a stand-alone theory, Global IR is a framework challenging the supremacy of Western-dominated theoretical research,[22] although it can be seen as another medium for integration of peripheral academia into the Western core because of the unbalanced and unsatisfactory practical results of this approach. The stated objective was to become a platform for creating new theories beyond criticism of Western domination in the literature. This platform, in Acharya's own words, is an effort to overcome the singularity of universality through the perspectives of world history and regional integration, in line with the goal of pluralistic universality.[23] But the results of this mission thus far have not appeased critics complaining of the ongoing supremacy of Western institutions and perspectives even though they are now called global, not Western.

It can be expected that the role of non-Western actors in the production of knowledge and theory will rise in line with the processes increasing their share in the construction of ontological reality that was once monopolized by mainstream IR Theory.[24] One of the important arguments of the non-Western Theory debate is that Western dominance in the discipline bears on the power relations in international politics.[25] In line with this logic, it is reasonable to draw attention to the relationship between theory, state interest, and politics. The assertion that IR Theory should represent humanity more largely stems from intense philosophical and empirical study underlining the knowledge/power/geography interaction. Following this reasoning, efforts to evaluate the current US or Western-dominated IR discipline through the perspective of a critical sociology of science, propose new concepts and theories, and observe non-Western production through empirical studies will serve this process.

[18] Andrew Hurrell, "Beyond Critique: How to Study Global IR?," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (2016): 149–51.

[19] For a study on the Core's indifference thesis that explains the US IR Academy's insularity in terms of non-US theories see, Ole Wæver, "The Sociology of a not so International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 687. For the thesis of no-need Non-Western theory see, John J. Mearsheimer, "Benign Hegemony," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (2016): 147–49.

[20] David A. Lake, "White Man's IR: An Intellectual Confession," *Perspectives on Politics* 14, no. 4 (2016): 115. For the thesis on academic network and career relations see, Arlene B. Tickner, "Core, Periphery and (neo) Imperialist International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 636–38.

[21] Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

[22] Acharya, "Advancing Global IR".

[23] Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): 647–59.

[24] Acharya and Buzan, "Why is There no non-Western International Relations Theory?," 3.

[25] For examinations of the link between power relations in international relations and the theories, see Mohammed Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002): 27–48; Tickner, "Core, Periphery and (neo)Imperialist International Relations," 627–46.

3. Diagnosis of Turkish IR Scholarship in the Context of non-Western Theory

Our research provides new empirical data shedding light on the debate that aims to shape IR studies from local angles by investigating the relevance of non-Western IR Theory studies in Turkish academia. We question how this debate in the worldwide scholarly community of IR is reflected in Turkish IR scholarship. IR scholars in Turkey are largely a part of the epistemic community of Western IR in terms of many parameters. TRIP (Teaching, Research, and International Policy) studies, which successfully describe IR's identities and structures in different geographies, also indicate this reality.[26] However, non-Western Theory, homegrown theory building, and Global IR debates are still among the emerging interests of the Turkish IR community.

We have gathered an important impression from TRIP surveys about the influence of IR Theory study and non-Western theories in Turkish IR academia.[27] Comprehensive interpretations can be made from these data regarding the development, current situation, basic features, and position of Turkish scholars in the worldwide IR community. For example, we know that there is a strong balance in Turkish academia between those who see themselves as part of the global, regional, and local networks. Global IR studies based on Wemheuer-Vogelaar and Bell's 2014 TRIP data come to similar conclusions.[28] But it does not contain a theory or concept that can be directly defined as or associated with non-Western Theory, and so what it measures is the rate at which both Western and non-Western scholars use existing mainstream epistemology and paradigms.

It is noteworthy that in Wemheuer-Vogelaar's survey, there was no significant difference between the numbers of participants who stated that they did Western theoretical studies and those who did Non-Western ones.[29] However, despite this result, we draw attention to the fact that theoretical studies can have different forms and meanings, and we think that these differences should be measured separately on the basis of civilizational identities. IR communities in the non-Western world may differ on what it means to theorize or do a theoretical study. Considering that the non-Western world is perceived by the core as a place where theories are tested, distinguishing which type of theoretical work is more common in those peripheral academic communities is necessary.[30]

Thus, we aim to reveal the issues that are not included in the TRIP surveys, which are the largest sources that shed light on the disciplinary and theoretical tendencies of Turkish IR academia. In the comprehensive pool of TRIP data, knowledge about the debate on non-Western IR Theory is incomplete, especially since non-Western theories, concepts, and names are not directly involved. In this sense, our study is an effort to produce pioneering data containing these parameters.

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[26] The Teaching, Research, and International Policy Project (TRIP) carried out by the Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations within the William and Mary College in the USA since 2004.

[27] For the analysis of the TRIP 2018 research results on the Turkish IR academy see, Mustafa Aydin and Cihan Dizdaroğlu, "Türkiye'de uluslararası ilişkiler: TRIP 2018 sonuçları üzerine bir değerlendirme," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 16, no. 64 (2019): 3–28.

[28] The IR of the Beholder: Examining Global IR Using the 2014 TRIP Survey. For another study that analyzes the Global IR debate using TRIP 2014 data, see Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers and Michael J. Tierney, "Is International Relations a Global Discipline? Hegemony, Insularity, and Diversity in the Field," *Security Studies* (2018): 448–84, doi: 10.1080/09636412.2017.1416824.

[29] Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al., "The IR of the Beholder," 13.

[30] This is an important topic in the discussion of Non-Western IRTheory, implying that there is a division of labor between Western and post-Western in theory study. See, Sneh Mahajan, "International Studies in India: Some Comments," *International Studies* 47, no. 1 (2010): 61; Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds," 648; Takashi Inoguchi, "Are There any Theories of International Relations in Japan?," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (2007): 369–90.

4. Research Design and Methodology

The main purpose of our study is to make a detailed account of Turkish IR scholarship so that we can see its considerations regarding the universality and objectivity of the IR Theory curriculum. In this vein, the ways in which Turkish scholars incorporate theory into other IR courses, and the extent to which they use various non-Western IR theories, will also be explored. During this exploration, we will try to show how and to what degree non-Western IR theories, concepts, and theorists are referenced. In light of the voluminous data accumulated thus far, we tried to evaluate how the teaching and research activities conducted by Turkish scholars in the field of IR Theory are affected by the Western/Non-Western/Post-West debates.

While the term "Western" points to a concrete geography, especially in the axis of the USA and Europe, the term "non-Western" takes the form of an "all-encompassing" and unlimited phenomenon. In fact, it is quite possible to refer to categorizations based on different aspects, such as geographic/civilizational distinctions outside of the West. In this research study, we try to demonstrate this phenomenon in the context of IR scholarship in Turkey. While we take "non-Western" as a general category, we additionally divide it into sub-sections. Thus, we will see whether there is a difference between possible sub-units of non-Western theories, reflected in theoretical and pedagogical tendencies and perceptions. We divided non-Western theories according to sub-geographical or civilizational/cultural categories: Asian-based (or originated) theories, African-Latin American-based theories, and Turkish-Islamic World-based theories. In that triple division, theories of Asian origin correspond to the local theorizing efforts of Asian countries such as China, India, Japan, and Korea,[31] the theories of African-Latin American origin refer to the equivalent of the same such efforts in Africa and Latin America, and theories originating from the Turkish-Islamic tradition of thought are used in reference to the philosophical concepts, thoughts, and approaches arising from the historical geography of the Turkic or Islamic World.

The above categorizations are inspired not only by their civilizational identification. Convergences in the literature, geographical reference points, and familiarity with Turkish academia influenced their determinations. Theories of Asian origin as a category is predicated on a geographical base. We choose to cluster together theories of African and Latin American origin, relying on compatible terminology which incorporates both geographies in different contexts, such as "the 3rd World," "the Postcolonial World," or "the Global South." Many countries from Latin America and Africa have shared a colonial past. During the post-colonial period, this commonality aided in the convergence of perspectives of multiple scholars from those regions. The rationale behind classifying the Turkic-Islamic World as a single category is rooted in the fact that non-Western homegrown theories usually refer to past thinkers who lived before the age of Western domination. Before European hegemony, Turks not only lived in Islamic civilization, but also played a long leadership role over large segments of the Islamic World.

4.1. Design and implementation of the questionnaire

We directed our survey to International Relations academics in Turkey. Due to the specificity of the research subject, we relied on a narrowed definition to identify our research sample.

[31] For an example of studies based on homegrown theories, see Yaqing Qin, "A Relational Theory of World Politics," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (2016), doi: 10.1093/isr/viv031.

The survey was sent to academics who teach IR Theory and publish, study, or at least conduct doctoral research on this subject. The questionnaire was applied online between May 24th and June 24th, 2021. The respondents were asked a total of 47 questions, grouped under the headings of participant demographics, the importance of IR Theory for the discipline, its status in teaching and literature, the degree of academic and professional success in IR Theory courses, their interaction with other IR courses, and the participants' approach to non-Western IR theories.

We have grouped the data into five classifications according to their relevance to the specific questions. These are as follows: 1) the objectivity and universality of mainstream IR theories, their relationship to the values and interests of the West, and their usability in non-Western contexts; 2) the Western/non-Western Theory divide and the interaction of IR Theory with other IR courses; 3) mainstream theories and, if any, non-Western theories that the participant focuses on while teaching and researching; 4) participants' outlook on the non-Western Theory debate and its relation to critical theories in the Coxian sense; 5) the threefold distinction between the non-Western theories of Asia, Africa/Latin America, and Turkish-Islamic origins. We will discuss the results with cross-analyses, visualizing them with charts.

The participant group, consisting of a total of 116 academics from departments of IR at Turkish Universities, represents 57 Turkish Universities and different staff levels, from Professors to PhD Candidates (Figure 1). This number appears to be in line with the overall proportion of such specific sample studies.[32]



Figure 1: Academic Degrees of Respondents *(N = 116)*

[32] For examples of studies with similar methodology and response rate, see Helen Milner et al., "Future of the International Order Survey (FIOS)," (Princeton University, September 2020). https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/hvmilner/files/survey-report-milner.pdf; "Snap Polls," (Williamsburg, VA:: Teaching, Research & International Policy (TRIP), 13.09.2021). https://trip.wm.edu/data/our-surveys/snap-polls; Cullen Hendrix et al., "Beyond IR's Ivory Tower," *Foreign Policy*, September, 28, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/28/beyond-international-relations-ivory-tower-academia-policy-engagement-survey/.

The survey questions were designed to examine the extent to which non-Western IR Theories are involved in education and research processes in Turkish academia. It may be argued that the result of the measurement regarding the place of non-Western theories in the teaching process is already evident on the grounds that Western-centered International Relations theories have a stronger weight in the instruction content. However, we believe that a precise understanding on this subject will help us better comprehend the state of non-Western Theory in research. This finding may unearth that the majority of Turkish IR scholars continue to teach what they have been taught and see non-Western literature as too young, low quality, not well-established, possibly marginal, deserving less attention, and outside the scope of standard curricula. But there is no empirical indication that these impressions rely on a serious study of theoretical literature arising from the non-Western world. Moreover, the difference in these standpoints' references to non-Western theory can provide comparable data on the penetration of these theories into IR syllabuses and methodologies. More broadly, our main objective is to answer how International Relations education is practiced in Turkey in the context of the debate on Western and non-Western theory. Thus, we aim to reveal the ways and proportions in which the academic community prefers to use or refer to non-Western IR theories. What are the most known and referenced non-Western approaches in the field of IR Theory? Are some of those approaches more familiar to us than others? We have looked for answers to these questions.

We are aware that the making of studies on IR Theory may be subject to different interpretations. By keeping this in mind, we asked the participants a number of specific questions to see which theories they prefer. Among the inquiries were the level of interaction between IR Theory and other courses, and in which proportion IR Theory contributes to the understanding of other courses in their department's curricula.

Ultimately, our findings gave us the opportunity to examine Turkish academics' perceptions of the concept "non-Western." In light of our findings, we can draw leading conclusions about the distinctions made by participants, implicitly or explicitly, between Western criticism and non-Western approaches, and the Western/Asian dichotomy.

5. Evaluation of Turkish IR Scholars' Perspectives on IR Theory

To understand Turkish IR scholars' perceptions and ideas on IR theories, we asked participants to express which IR theory they focus on more while teaching, and which other IR courses they found most connected to IR Theory. The percentages of respondents regarding the theories they focus on more while teaching and researching IR are visualized in Figure 2 and Figure 3.



Figure 2: Division of Respondents by Percentage of Theory They Emphasize More in IR Theory Courses



Figure 3: Division of Respondents by Percentage of Courses They Consider To Have More Interaction With IR Theories[33]

The data visualized in the graphs indicate that Turkish IR scholars are mostly familiar with Realist theories and that they see IR theories mostly in interaction with International Politics courses. These two findings highlight that current topics in the agenda of International Politics

[33] The group of *Other* gathers three courses with few responses as TFP: Turkish Foreign Policy; HPT: History of Political Thought; IO: International Organizations

can be a factor affecting which IR theory has been given more weight in Turkish academia. Additionally, the weak portrayal of the interactions between Philosophy of Science, Turkish Foreign Policy, or Current Issues and IR Theory helps us understand Turkish academia's relatively indifferent approach to non-Western theories. What can further clarify this point is respondents' thoughts about meta-theoretical debates on mainstream IR theories. The data presented in Figure 4 is important for this case.



Figure 4: Respondents' Perceptions on the Objectivity, Universality, and Value-Relevancy of Mainstream Theories

Respondents were asked to rate their opinions on the connection of mainstream IR Theory literature to the values and interests of the West and its level of universality/objectivity on a scale of 1-10. They stated that the current IR literature reflects the interests and values of the West to a considerable extent (average value of 7.88 out of 10), and its level of objectivity/universality is low (average value of 5.66 out of 10).

Coxian critical theory underlines the relationship of theory with the interests and perspectives of multiple actors. It is understood that the premise of this thesis, which reflects the political characteristics of the discipline, has also received general acceptance in Turkish academia. Accordingly, there is a meaningful correlation between the belief that mainstream theories are neither objective nor universal and the interest in non-Western theories from Turkish IR academia. Taking a step forward to better focus on the implied relationship, we reached the finding in Figure 5 when we cross-tested the participants' views on the relationship between IR theories/IR courses and their views on the mainstream theory/Western interest/value relationship.



Figure 5: Respondents' Perceptions of "Western Interests/Values in Mainstream IR Theory" by Their Consideration of IR Theory/Course Interaction

Figure 5 shows the difference between those who associate IR theories with the philosophy of science and those who emphasize their power of explanation in current world politics. Accordingly, those who think that IR theories interact more with courses such as International Politics and Current Issues gave lower scores on the questions about representation of Western interests and values in mainstream IR Theory. Considering that more scholars are in the second group, it can be said that the tendency toward non-Western IR Theory is gaining momentum among those who relate IR theories with Philosophy of Science.

When we established the same cross-correlation according to the theory that the participants focused on in their lectures, another remarkable divergence appeared. This divergence manifests itself in an alignment of postmodern/postcolonial theories and realist theories at both ends. According to the responses displayed in Figure 6, the perception that mainstream theories are related to the values and interests of the West is high in postmodern, postcolonial, and critical theories, while it is lower in Realism, Social Constructivism, and variants of Liberalism. Another point that draws attention here is that the value/interest related nature of mainstream theory has an average value among the participants who state that they follow the Global IR call in teaching. This finding tells us that the followers of Global IR, at least in Turkey, do not associate mainstream IR Theory with Western values/interests to the degree that proponents of critical, postmodern, or postcolonial theories do.



Figure 6: Respondents' Perceptions of "Western Interests/Values in Mainstream IR Theory" by Theories "They Emphasize Most"

There is also a remarkable margin between the direction of the respondents' answers about the objectivity and universality of mainstream theories. Figure 7 shows that those who focus on Liberal/Idealist and Realist theories find mainstream IR Theory more universal and objective than those who focus on Critical Theory and Global IR.



Figure 7: Respondents' Perceptions of "Universality and Objectivity of Mainstream IR Theory" by Theories "They Emphasize Most"

Up to this point, we have depicted Turkish IR scholars' views of mainstream theories through their perceptions on the courses, interests, values, and objectivity aspects they

associate with them. In our attempt to explain the place of non-Western IR theories in Turkish IR scholarship, which is the main purpose of our study, we asked questions from different angles to reveal the respondents' perceptions on non-Western Theory. First of all, we asked participants to show their thoughts on the usability of Western-based theories and concepts to explain the issues originated in or related to non-Western regions and contexts. In Figure 8, the average score that the participants gave to this question on a 1-5 scale is visualized.



Figure 8: Respondents' Thoughts on the Applicability of Western Concepts and Theories on the Issues of the Non-Western World

The average of the answers is 3.47 (which corresponds to a level of approximately 70% on a scale of 100). This means that a considerable number of Turkish academics do not see any harm in using Western theories and concepts in issues of the non-Western world. This attitude, which seems to contradict previous results implying that mainstream theories are not objective and value-free, shows that Turkish IR academics' approaches to non-Western IR Theory require further interpretation.

These two data were cross-correlated to reveal the relationship between participants' preferred theories and their thoughts about the validity limits of Western concepts/theories. As a result, we found that those who leaned more toward the core Western theories based on the universalist assumptions of positivist epistemology such as Realism and Liberalism were also in the group that voted the most for the non-Western usability of Western concepts and theories (Figure 9).



Figure 9: Classification of Respondents' Thoughts on the Usability of Western Theories in the Non-Western World According to the Theory They Emphasize

In order to shed light on this view in more detail, we asked questions that would unravel the concept of "non-Western" and reveal which non-Western subgroups of theories are more influential to Turkish IR scholars.

6. Turkish IR Scholars' Perception of Non-Western IR Theory

To find out their perceptions of the importance of non-Western theories and approaches in global and local IR literature, respondents were asked to rate their opinions on a scale of 1-10. This question, the results of which we have illustrated in Figure 10, was posed along with the finding that the importance given to non-Western theories in IR Theory courses and research in Turkey is scored approximately 55% lower than the worldwide score. Accordingly, Turkish IR scholars think that the attention given to non-Western theories in teaching and research activities in Turkey is less than that given by the rest of the world, perhaps even the West itself. After this comparison, the question of how important a place non-Western Theory should have in the IR curriculum in Turkey was answered with a score 33% higher than the current global rating. Accordingly, we can deduce that participants desire to see more non-Western Theory references in IR teaching and research in Turkey than they think are currently available in the world.



Figure 10: Respondents' Perceptions of the Significance of non-Western Theory/Approaches in Local and Global Contexts

To understand how non-Western theories are practiced and referenced by the Turkish IR community, we posed a question to scholars by classifying non-Western theories into 3 different groups (Figure 11). The tripartite categorization regarding the different non-Western origins of the theories was established on the basis of data obtained by an open-ended inquiry method. We asked separate open-ended questions for each of those in our classification. For example, respondents encountered questions like this: *Do you include any Asian-origin theory in your IR Theory teaching?*

Respondents freely typed the names of the non-Western theory or theorist they referenced in their instruction or research activities. Those who did not refer to such theories in teaching or research left the open-ended questions blank, and these were coded as "none" in our analysis. When we cross-matched the data obtained from this question, in which we also count the "none" answers apart from these three options, with our other questions, we had the opportunity to make a comparative analysis of Turkish IR scholars according to their use and non-use of non-Western Theory.



Figure 11: Percentages of Non-Western IR Theories Applied by Respondents During Instruction

62 respondents, corresponding to 54% of the 116 academicians who answered the question, said that they included at least one of the non-Western IR Theory groups in their lectures. Those who did not include non-Western theories have numerical superiority, and the non-Western Theory group reportedly taught most in Turkish academia is that of Turkish or Islamic origins. When we asked the same question in the form of study/research instead of theory teaching, we reached the results in Figure 12. The ranking does not change, but this time we have a much higher number of "none" answers. Accordingly, we realized that the rate of using non-Western theories in lectures is higher than the rate of using them as theoretical frameworks in research activities. When we recall that Turkish IR academicians are highly suspicious about the objectivity and universality of mainstream theories and see them as highly related to the interests/values of the West, there appears to be a contradiction that deserves more attention. One possible explanation is that while it is easier to include approaches that are not related to the interests and values of the West in a lecture on IR Theory, this opportunity decreases when it comes to study/research due to some reasons like the nature of the established academic order, academic network effect, and lack of knowledge or awareness about alternative theories.



Figure 12: Percentages of Non-Western IR Theories Applied by Respondents in Research

For example, when we distribute the rate of adherence to non-Western theories by academic degree, we encounter the picture that emerges in Figure 13. Accordingly, just the professors marked a non-Western theory group rather than "none" answers.



Figure 13: Percenteges of Non-Western IR Theories Applied by Academic Degree

Does the choice of academicians to refer to, or not to refer to, any of the non-Western theories correlate with their perspectives about the objectivity of mainstream IR theories?

The results depicted by the answers to this question are illustrated in Figure 14. Accordingly, those who do not use non-Western IR Theory are also the ones who have the most positive opinions about the universality and objectivity of mainstream theories. Users of Asian theories are the most suspicious about these aspects of Western ones.



Figure 14**:** Respondents' Perceptions of "Universality and Objectivity of Mainstream IR Theory" by the non-Western Theory Groups They Apply

One of the prominent topics in the literature on the debate on non-Western IR theories is whether all schools that criticize the knowledge produced by Western domination can be labeled as non-Western. Although it is accepted that it opens the door to non-Western theories, whether theoretical schools such as Postmodernism, Post-Colonialism, Critical Theory, and Dependency are accepted as non-Western Theory is an important determinant over the respondents' perceptions of non-Western theories. The distinctive case is that these approaches have rich literature, but mostly they are theoretical schools that have gained a position and are being shaped in the West. We think that whether an academic who claims to use non-Western theories was referring to these schools or not is important. So, in order to get a more accurate picture, we made an additional inquiry (Figure 15).



Figure 15**:** Respondents' Opinions on Whether Critical Approaches Should Be Labelled as Non-Western by the Non-Western Theory Groups They Apply

From the analysis of the answers, we understand that those who do not accept theoretical schools with Western-critical content as non-Western are mostly among the scholars not applying non-Western Theory at all. Those who say that they refer to theories originating from the Turkish-Islamic World come second. Accordingly, it turns out that the professors who refer to Turkish-Islamic world-based theories make the distinction between non-Western Theory and Western criticism in the highest proportion among the non-Western IR Theory users. Perhaps for this reason, the highest average of "yes" answers to the question of whether non-Western IR theories should be used in Turkish Foreign Policy studies came from professors familiar with Turkish-Islamic theories (Figure 16).



Figure 16: Distribution of Respondents' Opinions on the Use of Non-Western Theory in Turkish Foreign Policy Studies by Non-Western Theory Groups

6.1. Influence rankings of philosophers according to Turkish scholars' references

The special question format of the survey makes it easier to measure the impact weight of non-Western philosophers and schools of thought in IR education and research at Turkish Universities. We presented the participants with a list of philosophers/thinkers and asked them to rank these names from 1-15, with the most influential at the beginning and the least influential at the end. The contribution of the philosopher ranking question to the research on Turkish academia is that it can be read alongside the questions based on the non-Western Theory classification in the survey. It is undeniable that Western philosophers had greater influence, but information on whose names came after them, and in what order, offered useful data compatible with our non-Western categorization.

The list consisted of 7 Western and 8 non-Western names. Participants made 2 rankings, one for their influence on IR Theory, and the other for their inclusion in IR Theory curricula.

When we rounded up the most entered names of the respondents, two tables emerged as follows:

Table 1 - Philosopher/Thinker Rankings of Respondents

	How would you rank the philosophers and thought representatives on the list in terms of their influence on IR Theories?	How would you rank the philosophers and thinkers on the list according to the frequency of your reference in the IR Theory Courses?
1	Thomas Hobbes	Thomas Hobbes
2	Niccolo Machiavelli	Niccolo Machiavelli
3	John Locke	Thucydides
4	Immanuel Kant	Immanuel Kant
5	Jan Jacques Rousseau	John Locke
6	Hugo Grotious	Hugo Grotious
7	Thucydides	Jan Jacques Rousseau
8	İbn Haldun	İbn Haldun
9	Nizamü'l-Mülk	Nizamü'l-Mülk
10	Confucius	Kautilya (Çanakya)
11	Lao-Tzu	Confucius
12	Sun Tzu	Sun Tzu
13	Kamandaka	Lao-Tzu
14	Rabindranath Tagore	Kamandaka
15	Oliver William Wolters	Rabindranath Tagore

When we analyzed the rankings as a whole, the top 5 rows according to their IR Theory influence exhibited some statistical indications: 81.9% of respondents did not name any non-Western thinker; 10.3% of them put a single non-Western philosopher; 2.6% put two non-Western names; and only 1.7% put three non-Western names in the first 5 rows. In terms of their inclusion in IR Theory courses, in the top 5 ranks: 75.9% of respondents did not name any non-Western thinker; 13.8% put one non-Western philosopher; 4.3% put two non-Western names; and again, only 1.7% put three non-Western names in these rows. Looking at the sum of both rankings, the rate of not writing any non-Western names in the first 5 rows became 87.1%.

Although it is not perfect, this table helped to make empirically visible the Western theories' dominant position in Turkish scholarship. The table reveals how well-known non-Western philosophers are among the participant academics. Although it could be assumed that Western philosophers would dominate the top ranks, it should be noted that the vast majority of participants did not use non-Western names at all. When viewed in conjunction with the survey's meta-theoretical questions about the theory's universality and objectivity, these findings may indicate that Turkish academia is uninterested in, if not unwelcoming to, the philosophical representatives of the places that are candidates for developing a non-Western International Relations theory. While Turkish academics view the Western-centered curriculum that molded their academic achievement to be problematic, they appear to have failed to build an alternative teaching agenda to adapt non-Western IR literature. The names listed in the rows just below the first 5 rows in this table could be recognized as the philosophers whose potential to create a non-Western Theory should be studied.

7. Conclusion

This study reveals the traces of the global IR discussion in Turkey by exploring the dynamics of non-Western themes in the Turkish IR community. An overwhelming majority of the participants marked the Realist school as the theory they were most familiar with. Figure 3 shows how the academic community most commonly relates IR Theory with the International

Politics course. This might lead us to think that respondents employ theories as a practical guide, and that Turkish academia ascribes an explanatory and problem-solving mission to IR theories.

As a result, it is expected that the Turkish IR community's interest in non-Western theories would grow relative to their skepticism over mainstream theories' problem-solving capacity. That correlation seems to play a bigger role than meta-theoretical considerations. However, it would be vital to conduct further research to assess its consistency. Non-Western IR projects developing a broad and macro theory at the level of International Politics may potentially improve Turkish academics' willingness and interest because concepts and perceptions concerning that level appear to guide the choice of theory.

Turkish IR academics perceive the established theories that they most often apply in their courses and research as representative of the Western world's values and interests. The questions we asked to examine the meta-theoretical perceptions of the respondents demonstrated how they consider the IR theories inherently biased. The majority of respondents do not consider theories as independent of the interests of the place where they are produced, but they nonetheless continue to employ them. It would be hasty and somewhat misleading to explain this behavior simply on the basis of the IR literature's absence of non-Western theories because theories such as Critical Theory that share the same meta-theoretical questioning do not seem to have constituted the dominant IR identity of Turkey.

We believe that we should consider that the Turkish IR community continues to be interested in mainstream Theory for its explanatory claim to International Politics despite a strong meta-theoretical reserve. As shown in Figure 5, the group that gave impetus to non-Western theories consists of researchers who view IR theories to be more relevant to Philosophy of Science. The above summarizes Turkish academia's stance on mainstream IR theories and the viability of non-Western Theory. When it comes to the participants' perspectives on non-Western theories, the first thing to note is their assessments of the theory's objectivity and universality.

We think that revealing the serious correlation between giving importance to the universality and objectivity qualities of the theory and having an interest in non-Western theories is one of the leading contributions of our research. Through this analysis, we have captured a valuable perspective for further discussion of whether the question of non-universality is an issue of the dichotomic Western-Non-Western context, or if it is inherent to the nature of all theories. With the empowerment of the view that theories cannot be universal,[34] this finding contributes to the relevant literature where we observe a trend that the mainstream is getting localized,[35] that is, abstracted from the claim of universality. In addition, we found strong relationships between the types of theory that are emphasized in instruction and research and the interest/non-interest in non-Western theories. Accordingly, the respondents' approaches to non-Western theories are linked to the theories they mainly refer to either in IR courses or research activities.

[34] The necessity of IR Theories to have a claim to universality in the context of non-Western approaches is a subject of debate in the literature. For example, Gelardi argues that non-Western, i.e. local, theories should not be confined to their own region, see Maiken Gelardi, "Moving Global IR Forward—A Road Map," *International Studies Review* 22, no. 4 (2020): 830–52; Salter, on the other hand, argues that theories cannot be global anyway and are limited by the option of being local, see Mark B. Salter, "Edward Said and Post-Colonial International Relations," in *International Relations Theory and Philosophy*, ed. Cerwyn Moore and Chris Farrands (London: Routledge, 2010), 134–35.

[35] Carlos Escudé, "Peripheral Realism: An Argentine Theory-Building Experience, 1986-1997," in *Concepts, Histories and Theories of International Relations for the 21st Century: Regional and National Approaches*, ed. José Flávio and Sombra Saraiva (Brasília: IBRI, 2009).

If we want to classify the approaches of Turkish scholars to non-Western Theories, it seems appropriate to group them according to their ideas about the objectivity and universality of mainstream international relations theories. 57 participants gave 5 or more points to the related question, and 54 participants gave 5 or fewer points out of 10. The sample is almost exactly split in two here. Therefore, we can argue that one of the most important factors that increased the interest in non-Western IR Theories in Turkish IR academia is the negative judgments regarding the objectivity and universality of mainstream IR theories.

The pioneer approaches that problematize the objectivity, universality, and independence of the value/interest of mainstream theories are critical theories that have gained significant positions in the literature before the non-Western Theory debate expanded. Our reference to "critical theories" is broadly used for theories that are not problem-solvers in the Coxian sense. So, we include different schools like Postmodernism, Critical Social Constructionism, Post-Structuralism, Post-Colonialism, and Historical Sociology in our definition. From the study, we see that as a result of the aforementioned criticism of objectivity and universality, Turkish academia has shifted its direction away from mainstream theories and toward critical ones. We saw in Figure 15 the highest rate of not labeling these theories as non-Western. Based on this, we can intuit that the judgment about the nature of mainstream theories prompts Turkish IR scholars to be interested in critical theories to some extent. Therefore, academics do not feel a need to resort to non-Western theories. The lack of a general non-Western IR Theory may explain the presence of Critical Theory as a substitute. According to the findings, academics seek an alternative to Western theories because they believe they are biased or incompatible with the non-Western world's issues. Academics' lack of sufficient knowledge about non-Western theories can explain this phenomenon, but not the absence of available non-Western theories to meet the demand because the current level of theoretical literature on IR falsifies the latter proposition.

Also, the questions about theory-course connections help develop an impression about the argument that non-Western theories are either lacking or not well-known enough. In contrast with that consideration, the Turkish IR community's silence toward non-Western theories seems more relevant to what non-Western theories are trying to achieve. Maybe we can expect that non-Western Theory initiatives aiming to compete with mainstream Theory will capture Turkish scholars' attention to a much higher degree. It will be crucial to determine whether there is a link between departing from the mainstream and turning to critical theories at this point because a key component of this inquiry regards the field (mainstream or critical schools) from which the interest in non-Western theories will be transferred. We feel that this may be a focus for further research. We have seen how the representatives of non-Western thought are ranked low in the lists of philosophers. This shows an inconsistency within an academic community that apparently finds mainstream theories biased/subjective. The role played by critical theories may be one of the possible explanations for this paradox.

So far, we have presented non-Western IR theories in 3 subgroups and tried to understand whether there is a difference between them in the eyes of Turkish scholars. According to the obtained findings, concepts and theoretical knowledge of IR derived from Turkish and Islamic thought are more widely known than Asian or African/Latin American ones in Turkey. We reveal that the concepts and theories based on Turkish-Islamic ideas also dominate the attention of scholars from other non-Western Theory groups, and that this tendency should be interpreted with further study.

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Lessons Learned from the Development of Turkish IR: A View from Greece

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Abstract

The essay addresses an outsider's perception of the characteristics and dynamics of the IR field/discipline in Turkey. How may this country serve as a role model or, at the very least, as a source of inspiration, reflection, or evaluation of the field's development in other local/national settings? In this respect, Greece is chosen as a case study. By addressing and assessing Turkish self-reflection and the search for disciplinary identity within Turkish IR scholarship, what can be learned, on behalf of Greek IR scholarship, regarding both Greece's and Turkey's social scientific development regarding foreign affairs/policy? A major theme discovered is the acknowledgement of the limitations of the dependency/vulnerability-centered explanations for the development of IR.

Keywords: International Relations (discipline/field of); Turkey, Greece

1. Introduction

How do collectivities and people practice, 'speak,'or conceptualize the 'international'? This is the broader focus of International Relations (IR) as a scientific field, i.e., a large-scale unit of knowledge production in which research is guided, as well as an academic discipline, i.e., the field's institutionalized educational form invested in skill inculcation and certification.[1] The subject matter, which IR scholars authoritatively aspire to deal with, is often thought of as something characterized by universal validity. However, there is no shortage of voices in the respective field/discipline that attempt to address this presumed validity, to problematize it, and even to disrupt its perception as a given. This phenomenon has probably been present since the discipline's birth, but it has occurred distinctively since the eve of the current century and onwards.

This trend is well reflected in the emergence and consolidation of IR subfields or problématiques in the name of sociology of IR, historiography of IR, global IR, and the like.[2] It is also clearly illustrated by the vast work within the 'Teaching, Research & International Policy' (TRIP) project.[3] An intriguing name depicting the bulk of the burgeoning literature is 'reflexive studies on IR,' composed of three perspectives: geoepistemic, historiographical,

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[1] For 'field' and 'discipline', see Richard Whitley, *The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

[2] Andreas Gofas, Inana Hamati-Ataya, and Nicholas Onuf, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations* (SAGE, 2018).

[3] Highly indicatively: Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael Tierney, "Is International Relations a Global Discipline? Hegemony, Insularity, and Diversity in the Field," *Security Studies* 27, no. 3 (2018): 448–84.

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and sociological.[4] The geoepistemic approach underscores disciplinary development along geographical lines, particularly in terms of global hierarchies and/or local specificities. The historiographical one involves the unravelling of disciplinary (hi)stories and narratives, either dominant or dissident/alternative. The latter perspective focuses on power relations and patterned interactions within the field.[5] A series of issues has been raised in the search for disciplinary identity, i.e., IR self-reflection, representatively including:

a) the role of specific conceptualizations of the 'international,'

b) the social and intellectual structuring of the field/discipline,

c) the state of affairs, but also the related conditions and underlying structures,

d) the plausibility of advancing alternatives to dominant thinking,

e) the influence and reflection of a variety of interests and policies in the respective research, and

f) the intricacies of problematizing the object of study in the name of emancipation or of tackling hierarchical relations.

Defining IR self-reflection in this way involves understanding it as both an interpretative endeavor and a research program. It is thus a noticeable and undeniable indication of reflexivity in the field. It is also akin to 'reflexive IR,' though not equivalent to it. As I. Hamati-Ataya notes, reflexivity/reflectivity has not only been subject to multiple understandings within IR, but it has also faced major challenges. Firstly, how is reflexivity as an epistemic position translated into the realm of empirical research? Secondly, how is it inscribed in the realm of ethics? In this respect, caution is raised on the equivalence of 'reflexive theory' to'critical' or 'emancipatory theory,' or, subsequently, of ethical/normative issues to epistemic/theoretical ones, and on the need for going beyond meta-explanation of empirical knowledge.[6] IR self-reflection may unfold as critical self-reflection, but neither necessarily nor automatically. Its very existence is not *per se* a criterion for its success and fruitfulness.

A sizeable part of the aforementioned literature includes the manifestation of disciplinary identity at particular local, national, or regional contexts. Just as the existence of a few seminal books or articles on foreign policy/affairs of almost all countries would hardly cause surprise, the existence of books and articles on IR in a country (or a region) is barely surprising. This self-reflection has not been a uniform or singular endeavor. There may be countries with a distinctively small size of related work, while others may have a more sizeable volume. A variety of contributing factors explains a diversified development of IR and, quite possibly, of IR self-reflection. Turkey exemplifies a case of not only a consolidated—even if presumably fragmented—IR, but also of a lengthy IR self-reflection. The latter relates to a distinct, extensive, and self-aware engagement with disciplinary identity, which has an impact on IR work produced as a whole. Participants include mostly scholars of Turkish origin residing in the country, but also some outside it.

In this respect, the present essay addresses an outsider's perception of the characteristics and dynamics of the IR field/discipline in Turkey. Could the country serve (or not, and if yes, how?) as a role model or, at the very least, as a source of inspiration, reflection, or evaluation for the field's development in other local/national settings and contexts? Greece is

[4] Félix Grenier, "Explaining the Development of International Relations: The Geo-epistemic, Historiographical, Sociological Perspectives in Reflexive Studies on IR," *European Review of International Studies* 2, no. 1 (2015): 72–89.

[5] Ibid., 74–76.

[6] Inanna Hamati-Ataya, "Reflectivity, Reflexivity, Reflexivism: IR's 'Reflexive Turn' — and Beyond," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 4 (2013): 669–94.

chosen as a case study. By addressing and assessing Turkish self-reflection and the search for disciplinary identity within Turkish IR scholarship, what can be learned, on behalf of Greek IR scholarship, regarding both Greece's and Turkey's social scientific development regarding foreign affairs/policy?

From the three aforementioned perspectives of reflexive studies in IR, this endeavor mainly falls within the geoepistemic approach. Its driving force is a remark from a renowned Greek IR scholar, Th. Couloumbis, henceforth called the Couloumbis hypothesis, primarily attributing disciplinary (under)development to broader political conditions:

> "countries classified in the category of small, economically less developed, internally divided and strategically located (hence externally dependent and/or penetrated) also tend to exhibit a similar lack of scholarly productivity in the fields of foreign policy analysis and international relations."[7]

This remark, presented in Couloumbis' account of IR in Greece, isn't just a personal or isolated disposition. It was also characteristically reflected in his theoretical opponent P. Ifestos, when the latter harshly noted the propensity of IR communities in "small and dependent states" for "intellectual corruption, political conscription and indecent behavior."[8] Despite the following narrative's obvious comparative tone, the scrutiny of the Couloumbis hypothesis renders it primarily a view of Greek IR through the filter of the Turkish case and extensive reference to the latter. The next section sets up the context of the argument, followed by a section including information for both cases, with use of the Turkish case as a filter for the Greek case. The conclusions are offered in the last section. Put bluntly, Greek scholars need not adopt a 'do it like Turkish colleagues do' stance in endeavors of self-reflection. Yet, they can reconsider their own experiences, taking into serious consideration their Turkish counterparts, acknowledging the limitations of the Couloumbis hypothesis, and the 'dependency and vulnerability excuse' for the development of IR.

2. Why choose Turkish and Greek IR? Why filter the latter through the former?

This section sets up the usefulness and validity of problematizing the Couloumbis hypothesis regarding the Greek case by simultaneously reflecting on the Turkish one. As shown below, there have been instances of self-reflection on European IR that have treated the two cases as fairly similar and as sharing commonalities. Evidently, most of the characteristics cited in the aforementioned hypothesis match both cases, given their rich and often turbulent socio-political histories. An obvious example is the common experience of military intervention in political affairs, no matter the notable differences. Discussion of the two countries, particularly during the Cold War, would inevitably include references to challenges of economic development, internal divisions, and external dependency or penetration. The only characteristic mentioned in the hypothesis that marks a difference is the notion of a 'small state.' In terms of size, e.g., population and geography, the two cases are not equivalent. Even so, however, they are both states that have had to adjust more or less to strategic challenges rather than be willing or able to define the strategic environment, although the latter is a major issue of concern for Turkey in the current century. Below, a common point of departure

[7] Theodore Couloumbis, "Greek Foreign Policy since 1974: Theory and Praxis," *Hellenic Studies/Études Helléniques* 5, no. 2 (1997): 50.

[8] Panayotis Ifestos, *International Relations as an Object of Scientific Study in Greece and Abroad. Course, Object, Content and Epistemological Framework* (Athens: Piotita, 2003, in Greek), 24.

is established so that the instances of separate pathways are highlighted in the next section.

When referring to IR development in particular geographical settings, a common choice is to address it in terms of a division of labor, i.e., a text specifically devoted to one county. Articles or book chapters for different case-studies might occasionally be gathered to form a forum in a journal or a collective volume, possibly in the name of a region or a geocultural entity (e.g., Latin America, Post-West, or Global South), thus allowing for the comparison of case studies. Such a comparison taking place in a more explicit and thorough manner, within a single article or chapter, is less common, but it is certainly a legitimate choice. A relevant example for the present essay was offered by A.J.R. Groom and Peter Mandaville's chapter on the "European Experience" of IR in 2001. As early as then, it was postulated that "IR is gaining strength in Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey," that "There are... relatively few degree courses in IR... designated as such, although there are exceptions in Greece, Turkey and Russia," that "Young scholars of great talent are manifesting themselves in Southern Europe... in Italy, Spain, Greece, and in Turkey," and lastly that "it is now no longer necessary to go abroad to study to make a 'successful' career in IR, although this may still be helpful in Greece and Turkey."[9] A similarly succinct account had been offered by Groom himself, just a bit earlier.[10] In all their brevity, those remarks indeed seem to grasp the gist of the matter.

On their part, K.E. Jørgensen and T. Knudsen affirmed, based on the experiences of scholars in Spain and Italy, that "the impression of rather weak IR disciplines in Southern Europe in terms of institutional autonomy and theoretical innovation remains." They also acknowledged that, when compared to their Northern European counterparts, "the IR traditions of Southern Europe appear to be strong… when it comes to the incorporation and understanding of legal questions and international law more generally."[11] Greece and Turkey were not explicitly referred to in that particular passage. However, optimism that the Turkish case especially would be further explored was eventually expressed.[12] Indeed, such exploration had already started to take place and it has continued throughout the last two decades.[13] Greece was no exception either.[14] The accounts that formed the country-specific self-reflection were offered in either the local language or English. This kind of internationalization of the respective work allows for:

a) the dissemination of the corresponding knowledge to broader audiences,

b) the tackling of language restrictions,

c) cross-cutting analysis,[15] and

[9] The passages are found throughout A. J. R. Groom and Peter Mandaville, "Hegemony and Autonomy in International Relations: The Continental Experience," in *International Relations: Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought*, ed. Robert Crawford, and Darryl Jarvis (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), 158–61.

[10] A. J. R. Groom, "The World Beyond: the European Dimension," in *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*, ed. A.J.R.Groom and Margot Light (London: Pinter, 1994), 229–30.

[11] Knud Erik *Jørgensen* and Tonny Brems Knudsen, "Introduction," in *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations*, by idem., (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 5–6.

[12] Ibid., 11.

[13] Indicatively, see the Turkey-related sources cited in the essay's next section.

[14] See indicatively the sources cited in Kyriakos Mikelis and Charalambos Tsardanidis, "International Relations Scholarship in Greece: The Uncertainty of Influence," *European Review of International Studies* 9, no. 1 (2022): 5, n. 4. Participants in this self-reflection include –among others– the following: a) the IR field's pioneers in the country and first generation of IR scholars (i.e. non-International Law scholars), such as –alphabetically– E. Cheila, D. Constas (whose initial work was devoted to International Organization/Law, quickly switching to International Relations/Politics), Th. Couloumbis, A. Heraclides, P. Ifestos, Ch. Tsardanidis, P. Varvarousis, b) younger generations of scholars like –again alphabetically– I. Kotoulas, St. Ladi, S. Makris, K. Mikelis, P. Tsakonas, A. Tziambiris, and c) scholars working not in Greece but abroad, like St. Constantinides and St. Stavridis.

[15] Kyriakos Mikelis, and Gerassimos Karabelias, "Just another Form of Dependence? A Short Description of the Development of the Discipline of International Relations in Post-war Greece and Turkey," *Balkan Studies* 47 (2013): 165–88.

d) a dialogue that could illustrate the distinct and possibly fruitful dynamics of IR attempting to (re)construct itself.

It is worth noting that Turkey was included as one of the twenty case studies in a major survey of the TRIP project in the early 2010s, reflecting the increased international visibility of several Turkish scholars' work (regarding IR in general as well as IR self-reflection) along with a formidable number of scholars.[16] It is telling that the country constituted the fourth-largest case population in terms of both scholars who were asked to participate on a questionnaire and those who actually responded. Turkey's recognition as an intriguing case study was also illustrated by its inclusion in a whole chapter in A. Tickner and O. Waever's seminal collective volume concerning IR scholarship worldwide. In fact, it was one of the few national cases that have their own designated chapter within the volume.[17] By contrast, Greece, along with Portugal, was very briefly mentioned in a footnote in the chapter devoted to Western Europe as a case of an admittedly emerging IR community that lacked critical mass.[18]

Judging by the content and characteristics of IR self-reflection in a specific geographical setting (e.g., a country), assumptions and inferences can be made about how scholars take notice of each other within that setting. This may also occur among scholars of different settings. Given the often-strained relations between Turkey and Greece, it is interesting to see how the respective scholars take notice of each other. Generally, some kind of scientific communication between Turkish and Greek scholars exists, although it can be described as fairly limited. Respectful dialogue between scholars at scientific conferences is not uncommon, whereas actual collaboration may appear more sporadically in collective volumes.[19] Intriguingly, a few Greek citizens have found themselves to be part of Turkish IR in their capacity as professors of Turkish universities. The opposite is not the case. This is a manifestation not of a country-specific distrust but of the general limitations posed to foreign citizens in Greece wishing to become professors at Greek Universities (which are, by default, institutions belonging to the country's public sector), which may require knowledge and use of the Greek language, or Greek or EU member-state citizenship.

Taking notice of Turkish foreign policy, or at least being expected to have an informed opinion about it, is typically expected of a Greek IR scholar, regardless of her/his academic specialty or particular academic interests, or even presumed competence in tackling the matter. Within Greek IR, Turkish scholarship is less visible.[20] In a certain sense, however, Turkey is given not only a noticeable but an important—no matter how briefly stated—place/role in Greek IR self-reflection. Greece's relations with this country have often been referred to as one of the outstanding factors in a major development of Greek IR: the willful and

[16] Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, and Michael Tierney, *Teaching, Research, and Policy Views of International Relations Faculty in 20 Countries* (Williamsburg: The Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, 2012). For a Turkey-specific analysis, based on this survey, see Mustafa Aydın ve KorhanYazgan, "Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler akademisyenleri: eğitim, araştırma ve uluslararası politika anketi – 2011," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 9, no. 36 (2013): 3–44.

[17] Ersel Aydınlı and Julie Mathews, "Turkey: Homegrown Theorizing and Building a Disciplinary Community," in *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, ed. Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2009), 208–22.

[18] Jörg Friedrichs and Ole Wæver, "Western Europe Structure and Strategy at the National and Regional Levels," in *International Relations Scholarship around the World*, ed. Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2009), 280, n. 5.

[19] Mustafa Aydın, and Kostas Ifantis, eds,, *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004); Alexis Heraclides and Gizem Alioğlu Çakmak, eds., *Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation. From Europeanization to de-Europeanization* (London and New York: Routledge, 2019); Konstantinos Travlos, ed., *Salvation and Catastrophe: The Greek-Turkish War, 1919–1922* (Lexington, 2020); Ronald Meinardus and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, eds., *Bridging the Gaps: An Almanac for Greek-Turkish Cooperation* (Istanbul: Nobel Academic Publishing, 2021).

[20] E.g. in parts of the work of A. Heraclides. Another notable exception (over A. *Davutoğlu*'s work) is mentioned below.

solid transcendence of the International Law and Diplomatic History boundaries that had characterized Greek IR until the mid-1970s. In particular, the strategic failure manifested by the Cyprus imbroglio and the events of 1974, along with increased threat perceptions (all points of dispute and contestation) vis-à-vis Turkey, proved to be major incentives for a reformed IR discourse in the years and decades to come. To be sure, these were contributing factors, but not unique causes,[21] especially taking into account a vast amount of literature devoted to the EEC into which Greece would enter at roughly the same time. Notably, Greek IR scholars are accustomed to hearing remarks like 'Turkish foreign policy is not as preoccupied or obsessed with Greece as Greek foreign policy is with Turkey' from Turkish colleagues in exchanges during conferences. This claim may well be considered to be a valid one. Yet, it is still consistent with two predicaments. The first being that the entry and membership of Greece into the EEC/EU has been an important issue on its own. The second is that, in the hundred years following the Turkish-Greek War, varied (de)securitization and threat-related processes with regard to neighboring states occurred within Greece.

In particular, Greek discourse on Greece's foreign affairs has undoubtedly included the so called 'danger from the East.'[22] Nevertheless, there were lengthy periods during which Turkey was desecuritized or seen as a less threatening state, compared to other countries, for Greece. Security-wise, for example, the first half of the Cold War presented a presumed 'danger from the North,' which would eventually be tackled by means of participation in NATO. This hardly causes surprise, taking into consideration:

a) Bulgaria's occupation/annexation of Greek territory during World War II,

b) the overwhelming perceptions of the Greek Civil War's (non-communist) winners towards the (communist) losing side as anti-Greece agents acting in favor of the USSR and its Balkan allies, and

c) the northern states rather than Turkey being at the center of territorial claims just at World War II's end.[23]

Through the passing of years, perceptions of a northern threat were assumed to be checked or even lessened. At the same time, strained Turkish-Greek relations were manifested in conflicts over Cyprus, leading up to the brink of war, along with a lethal confrontation between Turkish and Greek armed forces in territory belonging to neither the Turkish nor the Hellenic Republics. Having noted the historicity and non-reified nature of threat perception, Greek references and discussions related to Turkey can still obviously include foreign policy issues, but they can also go beyond them in relation to the latter country's IR field and discourse.

3. What to Make of Turkish IR and Its Self-Reflection: A Greek Standpoint

Above it was established that talking of a common point of departure for both cases makes sense. Emphasis may now be put to the commonalities of pathways taken but also to differences, pointing to the insufficiency of the Couloumbis hypothesis. Unsurprisingly, Greek and Turkish scholarship share, within the perception and analysis of international affairs, a persisting facet, i.e., a dominant IR viewpoint that emphasizes the respective foreign policy and related issues. This emphasis has had an impact on the visibility of the work

[21] Highly indicatively: Couloumbis, "Greek Foreign Policy Since 1974," 50–2.

[22] Alexis Heraclides, *Greece and the 'Danger from the East'* (Athens: Polis, 2001, in Greek. Also published in Turkish, by İletişim *Yayınları*, 2002).

[23] A claim *vis à vis* Cyprus is a different matter in this regard, since the island was then part of the British Empire.

produced in foreign languages, particularly English, on a global level. Thus, a challenge is faced by the corresponding IR communities concerning the asymmetrical communication with the field's core and the difficulty for the periphery's research to expand or to be noticed as something more than a mere correspondent specializing in the state's foreign affairs, as regards scholars' participation in theory building. Within Turkish scholarship, this predicament of the dominance of issues deemed important for Turkey's foreign affairs[24] was eloquently presented in terms of "Telling Turkey About the World, Telling the World About Turkey," i.e., of addressing the country's role in the World—e.g., the West, but eventually also beyond it—and vice versa.[25] It was extensively discussed in the name of 'periphery theorizing' or 'homegrown theory,'[26] of the "conceptions of 'the international' beyond the core,"[27] of engagement in scholarly debates and degree of fragmentation,[28] as well as of notions of mutual dependence and task uncertainty in the sociology of science.[29]

Those discussions have extensively drawn from the broader IR self-reflection while simultaneously contributing intuitively to it. By comparison, Greek IR self-reflection has paid some—indeed considerable—attention, but certainly less than Turkish self-reflection does, to the broader IR self-reflection and the totality of its characteristics, methods, and trajectory, as the latter country has evolved in the current century. It has vividly emphasized the 'theory-praxis' predicament of Greek foreign policy, i.e., how theory-informed IR would contribute to a better understanding of the interplay between foreign affairs and Greece's foreign policy. In fact, quite a few relevant texts have included the notion of 'theory-praxis' in their titles.[30] This is not to negate Greek scholars' adaptation to the trends of IR self-reflection particularly in the last decade.[31]

From a Greek point of view, a reasonable starting point is the fact that both cases/countries didn't immediately catch up with typical IR expansion beyond the study of international law and diplomatic history.[32] They have also shared a sizeable growth during the post-Cold War period, which is characteristically evidenced by the creation of the respective IR departments. In this regard, remarks within Turkish scholarship about Political Science's relatively low profile, along with its maturing in the shadow of certain fields such as Law and History,[33] and about how the introduction of International Politics as a distinct field came up

[24] E.g. as discussed in Nuri Yurdusev, "The Study of International Relations in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 17 (1997): 181–90, 183. Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "Turkish Political Science and European Integration," *Journal of European Public Policy* 10, no. 4 (2003): 660–62.

[25] Pinar Bilgin and Oktay Tanrisever, "A Telling Story of IR in the Periphery: Telling Turkey about the World, Telling the World About Turkey," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12, no. 2 (2009): 174–79.

[26] Ersel Aydınlı and Julie Mathews, "Periphery Theorising for a Truly Internationalised Discipline: Spinning IR Theory Out of Anatolia," *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 4 (2008): 693–712; Ersel Aydınlı and Julie Mathews, "Turkey: Homegrown Theorizing and Building a Disciplinary Community". Also see the workshops organized by All Azimuth and related articles. In fact, research on IR self-reflection needs not always be Turkey-centric. E.g. Eyüp Ersoy, "Conceptual Cultivation and Homegrown Theorizing: The Case of/for the Concept of Influence," *All Azimuth* 7, no. 2 (2018): 47–64.

[27] Mine Nur Küçük, "Conceptions of 'the International' Beyond the Core: Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era," *Turkish Studies* 19, no. 4 (2018): 571–92.

[28] Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin, "Time to Quantify Turkey's Foreign Affairs: Setting Quality Standards for a Maturing International Relations Discipline," *International Studies Perspectives* 18, no. 3 (2017): 267–87.

[29] Korhan Yazgan, "The Development of International Relations Studies in Turkey" (Ph.D. diss., University of Exeter, 2012), ch. 5 and 6.

[30] E.g. Couloumbis, "Greek Foreign Policy since 1974"; Panayotis Tsakonas, "Theory and Practice in Greek Foreign Policy," *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 5, no. 3 (2005): 427–37. This choice is vividly manifested also in the related work of St. Constantinides. It is noted that Tsakonas' work explicitly draws from A. George's 'operational code' framework.

[31] For example, part of this includes A. Gofas' non Greece-related contribution to IR self-reflection: Gofas et. al., *The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations*.

[32] This expansion is exemplified –often mythologically– by 'the end of World War I' landmark.

[33] Müftüler-Baç, "Turkish Political Science and European Integration," 655; Yazgan, *The Development of International Relations Studies in Turkey*, 110.

to complement them rather than to replace existing strands of thought,[34] sound very familiar in respect to the Greek case as well.[35] In fact, International Law was Greece's only integrated IR subfield in the global discipline throughout the entire 20th century, with a noticeably internationalized presence of the respective scholars.[36] Comparatively speaking, and taking into account the choice of naming the active Turkish IR association 'International Relations Council of Turkey' (founded in 2004),[37] the institutionalization of this shadow can hardly be missed by Greece. This is manifested in the naming of the first professional IR association in the early 1980s as 'Hellenic Society of International Law and International Relations.' Although the latter has admittedly included scholars or experts from multiple (sub-)fields, its leadership has principally comprised International Law scholars. The establishment of another association consisting of (predominantly non-International Law) IR scholars would occur as late as 2018. It is called Council for International Relations, Greece.

The disciplinary solidification in Turkey involved the establishment of IR departments mainly in the name of 'International Relations' or 'Political Science and International Relations.'[38] In this sense, the study of politics seems to elicit the emergence of IR as an integral scientific field rather than as just a sub-field of Political Science. There is a noticeable uniformity, which owes a lot to the country's standardized academic structure. Compared to this, Greece is characterized by a distinct fluidity and thematic multiplicity or heterogeneity in terms of academic structure.[39] This involves the frequent founding but also splitting and renaming of departments through the decades. Since the switch of the basic academic unit from 'School/Faculty' to 'Department' in the early 1980s, two departments, originally named Political Science and Public Administration, were devoted to Political Science. In a remarkably stable course, the department at the University of Athens retained the title, though including a sector in International European Studies. Yet, the other department at Panteion University was very quickly split into a series of departments, including the department of Political Science and International Studies. The latter was itself split a bit later (mid 1990s) into two departments, including International European Studies, which was eventually renamed in 2013 as International European Regional Studies. This is just an example of the aforementioned fluidity. Overall, the current Greek academic structure, reflecting a varied relation of the 'international' with the 'political,' includes a bit more than a dozen departments devoted to:

a) Political Science, with diversified inclusion of IR courses,

b) International European Studies with a predominant IR identity,

c) International European Economic Studies with a predominant economics identity, and

d) Regional Studies (Balkan, Turkish, Mediterranean, etc.) with a diversified IR identity.

The different history and place of IR departments in the academic structure of the two countries compels us to put into perspective a major impetus—indeed one of a contextual nature—for the aforementioned growth that commonly appears in both Turkish and Greek

[34] Pinar Bilgin, "The State of IR in Turkey," *British International Studies Association News* (2008): 5; Pinar Bilgin and OktayTanrisever, "A Telling Story of IR in the Periphery: Telling Turkey About the World, Telling the World About Turkey,"*Journal of International Relations and Development* 12, no. 2 (2009): 174.

[35] E.g. Couloumbis, "Greek Foreign Policy since 1974," 49–50.

[36] See Antonis Bredimas, *Greek International Relationists at the Hague Academy of International Law (1924-2008)* (Athens: Sakkoulas, 2012, in Greek).

[37] Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi. See Yazgan, *The Development of International Relations Studies in Turkey*, 271–73.

[38] Ibid., 25 and 115–16.

[39] Mikelis and Tsardanidis, "International Relations Scholarship in Greece," section 3.

self-reflections. This impetus relates to the educational reforms from the 1980s onwards, which allowed for academic proliferation concerning IR departments, professors, and students, along with the expansion of multiple disciplines. Those reforms had the same outcome in terms of quantity but varied results in terms of quality. At the beginning of that decade, Greece had already been undergoing its first steps of democratization since the dictatorship's abrupt demise in 1974. Turkey was facing a similar regime for a couple of years, which withdrew from government formation less abruptly. In both cases, academic proliferation was accompanied by the affirmation of polity's primacy. In this general context, expectations for the field to be helpful in the understanding and pursuing of national/state interests would still hold. However, as it has been bluntly noted, this general affirmation and the reinforcement of state control involved different processes and aims. In Turkey, technocratic development was pursued, with the Higher Education Council holding a prominent overseeing role. At the same time, though, state monopoly in higher education was mitigated to a certain extent, at least in terms of the creation of foundation universities. In Greece, democratization and unhampered majority rule were pursued, combining the continuation of state monopoly in higher education with increased student participation in decision-making and the respective electoral processes.[40]

Greek IR self-reflection distinctively addresses the aforementioned predicament in terms of a strengthened freedom of expression. Although academic restructuring had to be centrally approved, there was ample margin for varied choices, at least in terms of academic restructuring.[41] To be sure, research institutes, the number of which has significantly risen since the 1980s, would generally—although with exceptions—rely on public funding, with the effect that negative fluctuations in such funding would seriously affect some institutes' functioning and sustainability. With regard to Turkey, despite the inclusion of various perspectives ever since the institutionalization of Turkish teaching, research remained fairly atheoretical, reflecting the restricted interest in the understanding/'internalizing' of IR theory.[42] Turkish IR self-reflection discusses changes in terms of the emergence of varied competing voices within a fairly pluralistic discipline (at least when compared to the past), warranted by an increased weight of academic criteria, yet it still does so in a troublesome manner. Despite an increased appreciation for theory, a large quantity of scientific work doesn't necessarily entail quality or theoretical innovation.[43] It doesn't automatically ensure disciplinary unity or maturing, either.[44] Moreover, intellectual priorities and research interests still reflect changes in Turkish foreign policy and in the international or regional scenery.[45]

Similar concerns are not uncommon in the Greek case, although they are expressed in a rather brief manner with some exceptions, like the work of P. Tsakonas emphasizing the lack of adequate knowledge, in terms of 'favoring conditions,' in the understanding of effective

[40] Ioannis Grigoriadis and Antonis Kamaras, "Reform Paradoxes: Academic Freedom and Governance in Greek and Turkish Higher Education," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 1 (2012): esp. 148–49. To be sure, in the 2010s, through new reforms, student participation in decision-making faced substantial limitations.

[41] Highly indicatively, even in the case of Political Science departments (which could after all have the same title a bit more easily, compared to departments that are explicitly devoted to international or regional studies), five different titles correspond to six departments: Political Science and Public Administration, Political Science and History, Political Science and International Relations, Political Science, and Political Sciences.

[42] Bilgin, "The State of IR in Turkey," 6.

[43] Aydınlı and Mathews, "Periphery Theorising for a Truly Internationalised Discipline," 698–709; Aydınlı and Mathews, "Turkey," 210–18; Bilgin and Tanrisever, "A Telling Story of IR in the Periphery," 176–79.

[44] Aydınlı and Biltekin, "Time to Quantify Turkey's Foreign Affairs".

[45] Yazgan, *The Development of International Relations Studies in Turkey,* 143; Bilgin and Tanrisever, "A Telling Story of IR in the Periphery," 175.

decision-making.[46] Overall, there is a noticeable variety of criticisms of the poverty of Greek IR work in terms of theoretical confusion, inadequate linkage of research with theory, and lack of theoretical solidity. Nevertheless, IR theory has long been invoked in Greek textbooks and research. Such invocation seems to have suited the usual systematic failure to refer to the IR research published by Greek colleagues. Yet, there has recently been some progress with the coexistence of contending approaches reflecting—when compared to the past—a less conflictual engagement along with some lessening of ideological or interpersonal controversies.[47]

Although this is barely remarked upon in Greek IR self-reflection, a Greek scholar can't help but acknowledge a divergence concerning the above-mentioned delay in keeping abreast of current IR theory. Greece was certainly more delayed than Turkey in this regard. There are academic choices on behalf of early Cold-War scholars who taught International Law in Greece's higher education institution dedicated to Political Science[48] that can indeed be construed as attempts to deviate from a strictly international law perspective, e.g., by teaching Diplomatic History as well.[49] However, these choices unfortunately did not adhere to Interwar's intellectual initiatives for a distinctively systematic analysis, indeed in multiple terms (particularly geopolitics, but also imperialism and international organization).[50] They hardly resembled their contemporary Turkish recognition of international politics as a subject deeming distinct university teaching and as a realm with its own marked concepts. Such recognition is undeniably illustrated by the holding of a conference for this teaching as early as the beginning of the 1960s, indeed based on claims that the systematic teaching of IR would help achieve security,[51] and articles appearing in a major Political Science journal.[52] It was not only about the discipline's institutionalization, which indeed occurred at the time, but also about conceptual evolution within Turkey's socio-political realities.[53] Greek scholarship reached this recognition and solidly included it in teaching starting in the early 1980s.

Bluntly put, to find the near-equivalent of S. Bilge or T. Ataöv, one would have to trace Greek scholarship to more than twenty years later, in the cases of the U.S.-trained (PhD-wise) Couloumbis and D. Constas, along with a few others with PhDs from Continental Europe. Despite both countries' strong political relations with the U.S. early on in the Cold War, intellectual engagement of the respective scholars with standard IR, as manifested in the U.S., was not warranted. In this sense, it is highly indicative that, when in the 1960s Greek and Turkish scholars, among others, were asked by a prominent international institution to provide a national perspective on the role of the United Nations, the Turkish report was written in English. The Greek contribution belonged to a minority of essays that were written

[46] Indicativelly, Tsakonas, "Theory and Practice in Greek Foreign Policy".

[47] Mikelis and Tsardanidis, "International Relations Scholarship in Greece," section 4. This was manifested in a conference held by the Institute of International Relations, in December 2019, in celebration of the IR discipline's presumed 100 years of life, combining several and varied voices. A related volume was published.

[48] Then named Panteios School of Political Sciences.

[49] There are a few other instances, often missed in typical IR self-reflection, such as sporadic teaching of IR *per se* in Panteios School, a doctoral thesis in IR as early as in the mid 1960s, and a relevant book written by a member of the School's adjunct academic staff.

[50] Kyriakos Mikelis, "Realist Stronghold in the Land of Thucydides? Appraising and Resisting a Realist Tradition in Greece," *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities* 4, no. 4 (2015): 18–21.

[51] Suat Bilge, "Milletlerarası politika öğretimi," in *Milletlerarası politika* öğretimi *symposıumu* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1962 (Ankara, 31/3-1/4/1961)), 21.

[52] E.g.Türkkaya Ataöv, "The Teaching of International Relations in Turkey," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 22, no. 4 (1967): 373–83.

[53] Gencer Özcan, "'Siyasiyat'tan 'Milletlerarası Münasebetler'e: Türkiye'de uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin kavramsal tarihi," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 17, no. 66 (2020): 3–21.

in French.

Similarly, Turkish scholarship was able to catch-up to the post-positivist agenda, insofar as identity issues received serious attention.[54] This development may well be attributed to the fact that identity challenges and ideological debates, which have always existed in both countries, have been met with much more controversy and intensity in Turkey, at least since the Cold War's end. The 1990s were characterized by challenges, such as the relations with the E.E.C./E.U., a bigger array of issues and choices for Turkish foreign policy, and the disappointment in the West's role in presumably sensitive issues.[55] In this sense, a key challenge that Turkish science has broadly had to face is the oscillation between the enhancement of official ideology and that of a critical vision challenging it.[56] A deep understanding of this predicament has included an extensive interest in the existence and functioning of methodological nationalism.[57] Attention has also been paid by Turkish Scholars to the great margin for pedagogical innovation.[58]

Surely, Greek IR self-reflection echoes the burden of the Greek traditionalism/modernism debate in the understanding of the 'international,' manifested in frequent (but nowadays diminishing a bit) postulations that equated—in a voluntaristic fashion—realism with nationalism or populism and non-realist approaches with mere internationalism. Within this context, attention was drawn to the toll of an 'underdog culture' in tackling crucial foreign policy issues (such as Turkish-Greek relations), often publicly perceived as 'national issues.'[59] What is missed, though, is how scientific discourse was more or less nation-centric and state-centric in the early and mid-Cold War, yet it barely included realism. Presently, the Greek case is characterized by the emergence of multiple pathways for the relevance of realist imagery as well as the potential for transcending it (i.e., either appraising it from a pro-sovereign viewpoint or problematizing and resisting it through a post-sovereign standpoint). In fact, some sort of homegrown theory has occurred in this respect, although not in a self-conscious manner or without its own intricacies.[60] Examples include P. Ifestos' attempt to fashion a Thucydidean Paradigm based on Aristotelean Epistemology, or I. Mazis' attempt to lay forth 'systemic geopolitical analysis.' In this development of homegrown scholarship, the selective incorporation of foreign work remains a formidable challenge, especially when taking into consideration the evocation of foreign work more in terms of shutting down or guiding discussions and dialogue in certain pathways rather than leaving dialogic space open.

The Turkish equivalent of this burden, as regards the 20th century, would probably relate

[54] E.g. Bahar Rumelili, "Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 2 (2003): 213–48. By contrast, in Greek scholarship, IR critique against realism was expressed, during the 1990s and the 2000s, in fairly obsolescent terms, resembling the global 1970s liberal arguments, rather than post-positivist arguments. More nuanced arguments have been developed ever since.

[55] İhsan Dağı, "Turkey in the 1990s: Foreign Policy, Human Rights and the Search for a New Identity,"*Mediterranean Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (1993); Müftüler-Baç, "Turkish Political Science and European Integration," 656–60; Bilgin and Tanrisever, "A Telling Story of IR in the Periphery," 179.

[56] Ayşe Öncü, "Academics: The West in the Discourse of University Reform," in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, ed. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü, and Heinz Kramer (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 143.

[57] Hüsrev Tabak, "Metodolojik ulusçuluk ve Türkiye' de dış politika *çalışmaları*," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 13, no. 51 (2016): 21–39; Mustafa Onur Tetik, "Methodological Nationalism in International Relations: A Quantitative Assessment of Academia in Turkey (2015-2019)," *All Azimuth* 11, no. 1 (2022): 29–47.

[58] Ebru Canan-Sokullu, ed., *International Relations Education in Turkey: New Approaches, New Methods* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi ÜniversitesiYayınları, 2018, in Turkish).

[59] Panayotis Tsakonas, *The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek–Turkish Relations. Grasping Greece's Socialization Strategy* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 34–40.

[60] Mikelis, "Realist Stronghold in the Land of Thucydides?," 21–6.

to the concern (not least in the eyes of the elite) for an avoidance of the Sèvres predicament.[61] Yet it also involves a broader and complex trajectory of the country's security culture and discourse.[62] Interestingly enough, a particular incident/part of this trajectory was noticed by Greek IR. A few IR realist scholars found in A. Davutoğlu and his 'strategic depth' argument an admirable theoretical adversary, who should be acknowledged as such, no matter the critique cast on the argument *per se*, at least from a Greek point of view.[63]

Crucially, as E. Aydınlı and G. Biltekin note for the Turkish case, an apparent theoretical diversity, along with merely a large quantity of scientific work, have automatically guaranteed neither an active engagement in scholarly debates nor an adequate communication, bearing an impact on knowledge accumulation. Thus, the tackling of the fragmentation of Turkish IR as a disciplinary community is still a key challenge, along with the mitigation of a lack of methodological diversity.[64] A couple of observations are in order here.

Firstly, based on surveys with a noticeable number of respondents (although they do not exhaust the totality of the respective communities), theoretical diversity is indeed part of the IR communities in both countries, in the sense that multiple IR perspectives are present. In Turkey, no matter how troublesome, the theoretical diversity seems to be broader when compared to the Greek case. Realism appears to be fairly strong in Turkey, while in Greece it is very (although not absolutely) strong. In 2011, Turkish IR self-identification involved 26% realism, 24% constructivism, and 15% liberalism (with no use of paradigmatic analysis at 11%). In 2016, Greek IR self-identification involved 51% realism, 21% liberalism, and 14% constructivism (with no use of paradigmatic analysis at 7%).[65]

Secondly, the findings of Aydınlı and Biltekin that publication in Turkish IR journals does not necessarily ensure a high level of engagement among scholars are a compelling reminder of the difference between communication and engagement.[66] But Greek IR is still far from facing this predicament, missing adequate communication in the first place. In a nutshell, the very problem of Greece is that the degree of durability, stability and sustainability of IR journals hardly matches the corresponding figures in Turkey. Despite certain noticeable endeavors, presently,[67] there is no Greek journal equivalent to, for example, the Turkish journals *Uluslararası* İlişkiler or *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace*, or even to other Greek journals devoted to International Law. Moreover, the lack of a journal commonly acknowledged by the majority of IR scholars as a must-publish one or as a discussion forum for an entire disciplinary community has not been remedied by political science journals either.[68] It should be noted, though, that the low levels of communication

[61] Berdal Aral, "Turkey's Insecure Identity from the Perspective of Nationalism," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (1997): 87; Mustafa Aydın, "Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 3, no. 2 (2003): 167.

[62] Pinar Bilgin, "Securing Turkey Through Western-Oriented Foreign Policy,"*New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 105–25; Pinar Bilgin, "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation,"*European Journal of Political Research* 44, no. 2 (2005): 175–201.

[63] This reading applies e.g. to I. Mazis (a scholar specialized in Geopolitics), M. Troulis and the formidable opponent of non-realist approaches in Greece, P. Ifestos, who was in fact instrumental in having two of Davutoğlu's books, among which the one related to 'strategic depth', published in Greek.

[64] Aydınlı and Biltekin, "Time to Quantify Turkey's Foreign Affairs," esp. 271–76.

[65] Maliniak et al., *Teaching, Research, and Policy Views,* 27; Kyriakos Pachos-Fokialis, *The Perceptions of Greek International Relations Experts for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* (Athens: Institute of International Economic Relations Report, 2016. In Greek), 27.

[66] Aydınlı and Biltekin, "Time to Quantify Turkey's Foreign Affairs," 268–71.

[67] E.g. *International and European Politics* (published in Greek).

[68] In 2021, a journal was launched by the Hellenic Society of International law and Interntional Relations (*Cahiers of International Law and International Politics*). It remains to be seen whether it will eventually face the fate of Greece-based journals with short-term or mid-term durability like: *Hellenic Review of International Relations*, *International Law and International Politics*,

within the community's own journals also relate to the choices of older generations of scholars to disseminate their work mainly by means of books/textbooks. The latter option has been closely related to the practice of state-subsidizing the publication of books used as course textbooks, which has functioned as a very strong, if not perverse, incentive in decisions regarding knowledge dissemination and academic publishing.

Finally, the relationship between IR and certain subfields has often been troubled if not incoherent, as reflected in the lack of a clear differentiation between IR and security studies as well as strategic or war studies. The journal *Strategein* in Greece and the *Turkish Journal of War Studies* in Turkey constitute attempts to rectify this in both countries. Those efforts are still young, being restricted by an entrenched system where pure war studies are exiled to military schools or mixed with IR and Political Science.

Overall, this section's narration doesn't prove the factual inaccuracy of the Couloumbis hypothesis. Bluntly put, it isn't denied that internal turbulence and strategic fragility are influential in IR development. Evidence for that can be found in both cases. Yet, what is problematized here is the mythological function of this hypothesis. Awareness of this function for the Greek case can be highlighted by addressing missed opportunities and neglected discourses, like the Interwar's geopolitical one, and by exemplifying the Turkish case. In the early ColdWar, both countries fit the description of the original conditions described in the Couloumbis hypothesis. However, this hardly addresses how the Turkish counterparts of Couloumbis had made their appearance more than twenty years earlier.

4. Conclusions

Compared to Greece, Turkey is characterized by an abundance of not only varied but also systematic and theoretically embedded studies or arguments on the status and history of the IR discipline nationally and, at an increasing rate, globally. In a fashion equivalent to the postulation that it is "time to quantify Turkey's foreign affairs,"[69] a major challenge for the Greek IR self-reflection is how it is 'time to problematize the dependency and vulnerability excuse' for underdeveloped IR in the Greek case, taking into account the fairly successful Turkish one.[70] If anything, the effects of the Couloumbis hypothesis have been tackled more thoroughly and extensively in Turkey than in Greece. That is the ultimate lesson learned for a Greek scholar. It is a lesson that may help to rectify the mythological function of this hypothesis.

This is not to directly refute remarks made by Greek scholars that internal divisions and strategic positioning of states—with the latter's concomitant security exposure and external dependence—have undermined IR development,[71] but to take them into comprehensive consideration. In this respect, Greece and Turkey were not so different in the early and mid-Cold War. But they followed different trajectories. This divergence has continued in certain aspects even since the Cold War's end, despite considerable stimuli and challenges for both cases in light of the international system's change.

No matter Greece's troubled relationship with the West, it is no match to the

Defencor Pacis, *Market without Frontiers,* and *International Relations Tribune.*

[69] Aydınlı and Biltekin, "Time to Quantify Turkey's Foreign Affairs".

[70] See Mikelis and Karabelias, "Just another Form of Dependence?," esp. 187–88.

[71] Yannis Valinakis, "Greek Foreign Policy in 1993: In the Crossroad of Decisions," in *Yearbook of Defence and Foreign Policy 1993: Greece and the World 1992* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1993), xi–xii; Couloumbis, "Greek Foreign Policy Since 1974," 50.

political and ideological questioning of the West in present-day Turkey. Yet the latter has not impeded the respective community's integration into the global discipline, no matter its fragmentation. In this respect, it is intriguing to consider whether insights on core-periphery and homegrown theory may well be related to the increasingly turbulent search for identity in Turkey that has included the (internal and external) political developments of the 21st century.

Turkish progress may also compel Greek IR scholars to reflect on the need to go beyond the 'theory-praxis' predicament, along with the corresponding bias for a 'better foreign policy in light of a better theory or more adequate knowledge,' or beyond an understanding of 'backward (traditional) vs. forward (Western or Europeanized) mentality.' In this regard, issues that should arise as relevant include internationalization incentives, the impact of the relation between the 'private' and the 'public' in conducting research or scientific work, gatekeeping mechanisms, the comprehensive inclusion of identity matters in IR research, and, certainly, strained disciplinary inner communication.

To conclude, this essay is not meant to set forth a postulation such as 'concerning IR development, Greek IR scholars got something quite wrong, while Turkish colleagues got it quite right.' And yet, reflecting upon how a neighboring country (Turkey), certainly with its own intricacies, has dealt with the vulnerability/dependence predicament may lead to the refinement or even reconsideration of one's (Greece, in this case) own tackling with this predicament. On the other hand, and as far as Turkey is particularly concerned, the country's claims for soft power provide a compelling incentive for exploring a new other possible case studies of how Turkish IR may exercise direct or indirect influence on the IR communities of other states.

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Turkish IR Journals through a Bibliometric Lens

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Abstract

This article aims at evaluating three International Relations (IR) journals in Turkey, namely, All Azimuth, Insight Turkey, and Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi. The scholarly contributions of these three journals to Turkish IR is worthy of exploration since together they constitute 'the mainstream' of Turkish IR journals. To this end, this article applies a bibliometric analysis in surveying all three journals' publication records in order to provide a general picture of the field in the last decade. When we consider an evaluation of the Turkish IR community, these three journals are also important and represent different sub-groups and interests among Turkish IR scholars. The field orientations and organization of the IR discipline in a given country may be understood by studying the leading journals of the field in that country. With this assumption in mind, this paper attempts to distinguish certain characteristic differences and similarities among these three journals by surveying their materials and authorships using comparative bibliometric analysis. While there are several articles in the literature that discuss the contents of these publications, no comparative bibliometric analysis has ever been conducted on them.

Keywords: International Relations, Turkish IR, Turkish IR Journals

1. Introduction

The global higher education landscape has become more and more metric-driven. As a result of this shift, social scientists have grown more interested in journal publishing than they were previously, even while the longer method of authoring books continues to dominate Social Science research practices. However, books and book chapters garner less attention (e.g., citations) than journal articles.[1] Similar to the situation in many other scientific fields, there has been an explosion in the number of specialized journal titles in social sciences aimed at specific readerships as peer-reviewed journal publications have become by far the most prominent form of production. As a result, academic journals have become the principal

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[1] Mu-hsuan Huang and Yu-wei Chang, "Characteristics of Research Output in Social Sciences and Humanities: From a Research Evaluation Perspective," *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology* 59, no. 11 (2008): 1819–28.

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routes through which scientific knowledge is generated and circulated, and hence reflect established patterns in their respective fields. Furthermore, because journals are selecting what will be published and thus what type of study will be socially and academically rewarded, they have an even broader impact on their field of interest.[2] Furthermore, the field orientations and structure of a discipline in a specific country may be understood by reviewing the publications in the top journals. Therefore, analyzing leading journals in a given scientific field offers extremely rich insights and patterns for evaluating the general/central tendencies in that specific subject.

Since they are field-specific journals, All Azimuth (AA), Insight Turkey (IT), and Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi (UI) are three important scientific journals for the study of Turkish IR. These three journals are the only Turkish IR journals indexed by the Web of Science (WoS),[3] which is generally seen as a positive indicator of a journal's quality. Therefore, we may refer to them as 'the mainstream' Turkish IR journals and assume that they have a broad impact on and role in any evaluation of Turkish IR studies. This paper analyzes the publication records of these three WoS-indexed journals by employing a comparative bibliometric study. The scholarship in these publications, as well as the themes, are investigated from a comparative perspective.

Considering the related literature, there are studies in IR in which the concepts and theories, regional studies, and field publications are bibliometrically analyzed. The increasing use of statistical programs is one factor that has led to the current surge in bibliometric studies. There also exist studies which are limited to the scope of databases and conducted in terms of bibliometrics on the basis of a given concept such as Regionalism,[4] Globalization,[5] and Gender.[6]

In the same way, several bibliometric analyses exist on center-periphery relations,[7] European IR,[8] American IR,[9] and Chinese and Russian IR.[10] However, relatively few studies on field journals exist.[11] To the best of our knowledge, several quantitative assessments of

[2] Kjell Goldmann, "Im Westen Nichts Neues: Seven International Relations Journals in 1972 and 1992," *European Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 2 (1995): 245–58; Ana Andrés, *Measuring Academic Research: How to Undertake a Bibliometric Study* (Elsevier, 2009); William H. Starbuck, "How Much Better Are the Most-Prestigious Journals? The Statistics of Academic Publication," *Organization Science* 16, no. 2 (2005): 180–200; Gualberto Buela-Casal et al., "Measuring Internationality: Reflections and Perspectives on Academic Journals," *Scientometrics* 67, no. 1 (2006): 45–65.

[3] For the list of WoS indexed Turkish journals see: https://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php?category=3320&country=TR [accessed:04-01-2022].

[4] Hakan Mehmetcik and Hasan Hakses, "Globalizing IR: Can Regionalism Offer a Path for Other Sub-Disciplines?," *All Azimuth-a Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 11, no. 1 (2022): 49–65.

[5] Xingjian Liu, Song Hong, and Yaolin Liu, "A Bibliometric Analysis of 20 Years of Globalization Research: 1990–2009," (2012), doi: 10.1080/14747731.2012.658256.

[6] Gudrun Østby et al., "Gender Gap or Gender Bias in Peace Research? Publication Patterns and Citation Rates for Journal of Peace Research, 1983–2008," *International Studies Perspectives* 14, no. 4 (2013): 493–506, doi: 10.1111/insp.12025; Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Samantha Lange, and Holly Brus, "Gendered Citation Patterns in International Relations Journals1," *International Studies Perspectives* 14, no. 4 (2013): 485–92, doi: 10.1111/insp.12026.

[7] Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews, "Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious World of Publishing in Contemporary International Relations," *International Studies Perspectives* 1, no. 3 (2000): 289–303, doi: 10.1111/1528-3577.00028.

[8] Ole Wæver, "The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 687–727, doi:10.1162/002081898550725.

[9] Peter Marcus Kristensen, "Revisiting the 'American Social Science'—Mapping the Geography of International Relations," *International Studies Perspectives* 16, no. 3 (2015): 246–69, doi: 10.1111/insp.12061.

[10] Maria Mary Papageorgiou and Alena Vieira, "Mapping the Literature on China and Russia in IR and Area Studies: A Bibliometric Analysis (1990–2019)," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* (2021), doi: 10.1007/s11366-021-09768-x.

[11] Marijke Breuning, Joseph Bredehoft, and Eugene Walton, "Promise and Performance: An Evaluation of Journals in International Relations," *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 4 (2005): 447–61, doi: 10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00220.x.

journal content have been conducted[12] and only one study[13] has tackled publication records for Turkish IR journals. However, there has never been a systematic bibliometric analysis performed by surveying the materials and authors of these Turkish IR journals. Taking this gap in the literature as our starting point, this study aims at analyzing three leading Turkish IR journals using comparative bibliometric analyses. The central aim of the article is to present a general snapshot of the field by surveying records from these three Turkish IR journals. To that end, the data and bibliometric techniques and methodologies used in this research are briefly outlined in the following material and method section. The primary findings are discussed in the next section on results and discussion, and in the conclusion part, there are some ideas on how we may generalize these findings in terms of assessing material and authors.

2. Material and Method

2.1. Material

This article uses bibliometric data from the WoS database, a platform often used for creating bibliometric data in the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. However, several limitations and shortfalls in judging scientific quality and effect using WoS or equivalent database measures should be noted. Most importantly, using WoS or Scopus to evaluate research may induce biases because English-language journals are overrepresented.[14] Nonetheless, this database provides consistent and accessible data for bibliometric studies.

The WoS Core Collection is made up of multiple indexes that contain material obtained from various journals, books, and other sources. Two of these indexes are connected to research in the social sciences and humanities: 1) Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) and 2) Arts and Humanities Citation Index (AHCI). In addition to SSCI and AHCI, WoS also includes the Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI), which covers all disciplines. Dependency on data consistency and accuracy is an important feature of bibliometric studies, and with inconsistencies and errors being almost inevitable in databases, it is vital to select one that minimizes these. As a result, the WoS was selected by the authors of this study not only because AHCI, SSCI, or ESCI indexation was an essential factor, but also because the WoS is less prone to error while also being a widely available data source for any bibliometric study.

AA is an ESCI-indexed journal published by the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research at Bilkent University.[15] IT is again an ESCI-indexed journal published by the SETA Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research.[16] UI is an SSCI-indexed journal published by the International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT).[17] Even though these three journals are published by Foundations, they are closely affiliated with Sakarya University (IT), Kadir Has University (UI), and Bilkent University (AA). Thus, these journals together

[12] Pınar Bilgin, "Uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarında 'merkez-çevre': Türkiye nerede?," *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations* 2, no. 6 (2005): 3–14.

[13] Elvan Çokişler, "Uluslararası İlişkiler dergisinin bibliyometrik analizi (2004-2017)," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 16, no. 64 (2019): 29–56, doi: 10.33458/uidergisi.652899.

[14] Emanuela Reale et al., "A Review of Literature on Evaluating the Scientific, Social and Political Impact of Social Sciences and Humanities Research," *Research Evaluation* 27, no. 4 (2018): 298–308, doi: 10.1093/reseval/rvx025.

[15] See for more info: https://www.allazimuth.com/all-azimuth-a-journal-of-foreign-policy-and-peace/ [accessed:04-01-2022].

[16] See for more info: https://www.insightturkey.com/pages/history [accessed: 04-01-2022].

[17] See for more info: https://www.uidergisi.com.tr/about-the-journal [accessed: 04-01-2022].

cover a broad range of topics related to Turkish domestic and foreign policy issues, and global affairs in general, and are not only Turkish IR's principal intellectual center, but also a hub for various sub-groups and communities among Turkish IR scholars and the scholars interested in Turkey's international relations.

In brief, a dataset of 1,155 documents were retrieved from the WoS database, all published by these three Turkish IR journals between 2010 and 2021. Several editorial materials were removed from the dataset. When irrelevant or missing contents and duplications were deleted, 969 papers remained, consisting of 596 original research articles, 342 book reviews, and 31 review articles.[18] The data consists of 948 authors, each with 1.02 documents. The three journals combined had an average annual publication number of 80.3, which is a substantial scientific production within the field of Turkish IR.

Even though these journals had publications prior to 2015 or 2010, we only included those that were available via WoS search on December 25th, 2021. It should also be noted that WoS does not instantly index online-first articles. That is, any online-first publications that had not yet been assigned to a volume and issue of the journal at the time of the search were not included in the data. WoS statistics also do not contain pre-indexed articles that were published by journals prior to WoS indexation. We did not set aside any time for certain journals but instead gathered all of the data accessible in the WoS database in order to acquire as much data as possible and to give a general picture of the field in the last decade.



Figure 1: Publications per year and per individual journal

[18] The word document refers to all these different types of publications. If article is specifically stated, this refers to articles only, excluding other documents such as book reviews and reviews.

The figure above summarizes key details of the raw publication records for each journal. Even though the top and bottom parts of the figure visualize the same data in different forms, the difference is important. The line graph at the bottom better reveals the time span, showing that UI has had the longest time span in the WoS database. Both AA and IT only extend back to 2015 in the WoS database. However, the top graph better represents total publication counts, showing that IT, despite entering the WoS database at a later date, has had more publications than the earlier-indexed UI cumulatively. This quantifies the numbers of articles; it only makes sense when the emphasis is put on the publication numbers. UI has published 382 articles over a ten-year period, while AA and IT published 90 and 492 respectively over a five-year period. These numbers constitute average publication counts of 15, 82, and 34.7 for AA, IT, and UI respectively. This great difference in average publications seems interesting, but it must be noted that UI and IT are quarterly journals—apart from some special issues—while AA is a biannual journal.

As for the language of the publications, most are in English. The primary Turkish language publication was UI, but it, too, has made English its primary language. From the data, we can see that all of AA's and IT's publications—90 and 492 respectively—are in English, while 156 of UI's publications (41% of the total papers) are in English. English, then, is the primary language for Turkish IR publications, which is not surprising given the predominance of English as a global *lingua franca* in the field of IR.

2.2. Method

Statistical classifications and analyses of publication content in a field are known as bibliometric studies. E. Wyndham Hulme coined the phrase 'Statistical Bibliography' in 1923,[19] while Pritchard and Gross coined the term 'bibliometrics' to make it more understandable.[20] Bibliometric techniques are now widely used and considered an important part of research-evaluation methodology. Bibliometric methods are increasingly being used in the study of various aspects of science, in the way institutions and universities are assessed internationally, and in journal and author rankings.[21]

Bibliometrics is, in essence, the measurement of scientific indices such as citation, publication, authorship, and so on. The bibliometric analysis method allows for a thorough examination of journal articles, concepts, study topics, and databases. Thus, it allows for the disclosure of which subjects studies focus on regularly, who the most productive authors are, and whose studies are cited most in a given field. Bibliometric studies use a set of indexes to quantitatively evaluate the literature as well. The evolution of the literature can be examined using factors such as the most commonly used keywords in articles, the most cited publications, and co-author network analysis.[22] As such, bibliometric analysis goes beyond identifying the corpus of literature within a certain subject area.[23] One of the primary goals of journal bibliometrics is actually to give information to editorial boards and authors to help them make better decisions during the publication process. However, evaluating specific

[19] Edward Wyndham Hulme, "Statistical Bibliography in Relation to the Growth of Modern Civilization," 1923.

[20] Ole V. Groos and Alan Pritchard, "Documentation Notes," *Journal of Documentation* 25, no. 4 (1969): 344–49.

[21] Ole Ellegaard and Johan A. Wallin, "The Bibliometric Analysis of Scholarly Production: How Great Is the Impact?," *Scientometrics* 105, no. 3 (2015): 1809–31.

[22] Stephen Majebi Lawani, "Bibliometrics: Its Theoretical Foundations, Methods and Applications," *Libri* 31, no. Jahresband (1981): 294–315.

[23] Élaine Gauthier, "Bibliometric Analysis of Scientific and Technological Research: A User's Guide to the Methodology" (Citeseer, 1998).

publications—Turkish IR journals in our situation—serves to further investigate the field's development and evaluation, and to present an overview of the field.

Bibliometrics can also be used to evaluate the significance of a certain article for a specific topic, taking into consideration the citations referenced in any of a sequence of papers.[24] The majority of the quantitative field entries in this method are based on existing papers in scientific databases that have been indexed. It is possible to evaluate the evolution of any scientific literature by restricting it to a set period of time and by depending on a number of characteristics such as the most frequently used keywords, the most cited articles, author relationships, author nation, and author institution.[25]

In brief, bibliometric analysis is known as the statistical classification and assessment of contents of bibliometric data. Bibliometric studies allow for a quantitative assessment of literature using a variety of indexes, which may be used to determine if studies in certain fields present common features.[26] Although bibliometrics is most commonly associated with counting scientific output and assessing its quality and influence, it may also be used to visualize and analyze intellectual, conceptual, and social structures, as well as their development and discipline-specific characteristics.[27] In this sense, bibliometrics tries to characterize the structure and evolution of certain disciplines, scientific areas, or research topics. A bibliometric study can be used to determine general productivity in a specific field, but it can also be used to assess the productivity of individual researchers, journals, nations, or any other level of performance. The goal of our research is to look at the productivity of three Turkish IR journals and the unique bibliometric features of their articles. To put it another way, the goal of this research is to map out these Turkish IR journals using various bibliometric methodologies.

Most of the techniques employed here are among common practices of bibliometric studies. On the technical level, this study used the R statistical computing environment[28] and R-bibliometrix package for the analysis.[29] This research also used a multi-pronged strategy in making code and data accessible, making the complete analysis public, archiving the computational environment, and making the code usable for a broad audience. To this end, all the coding, data, and results are provided in the GitHub Repository in order to encourage transparent and reproducible social science practices.[30] Reproducible scientific procedures and best practices are the only things that will increase research efficiency and the robustness of scientific discoveries.[31]

[24] Francisco Mas-Verdu et al., "A Systematic Mapping Review of European Political Science," *European Political Science* 20, no. 1 (2021): 85–104, doi:10.1057/s41304-021-00320-2.

[25] Mehmetcik and Hakses, "Globalizing IR: Can Regionalism Offer a Path for Other Sub-Disciplines?".

[26] Andrés, *Measuring Academic Research*.

[27] Ozge Kilicoglu and Hakan Mehmetcik, "Science Mapping for Radiation Shielding Research," *Radiation Physics and Chemistry* 189 (2021), doi: 10.1016/j.radphyschem.2021.109721.

[28] For more info see: https://www.r-project.org [accessed: 29-01-2022].

[29] Bibliometrix is an open-source program that simplifies the data-analysis and data-visualization processes. Bibliometrix provides a descriptive analysis and other research-structure analyses after converting and uploading bibliographic data in R. See Massimo Aria and Corrado Cuccurullo, "Bibliometrix: An R-Tool for Comprehensive Science Mapping Analysis," *Journal of Informetrics* 11, no. 4 (2017): 959–75.

[30] Hakan Mehmetcik and Hasan Hakses, "Globalizing IR: Can Regionalism Offer a Path for Other Sub-Disciplines?" *All Azimuth-A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 11, no. 1 (2022): 49–65.

[31] Marcus R. Munafò et al., "A Manifesto for Reproducible Science," *Nature Human Behaviour* 1, no. 1 (2017): 1–9, doi: 10.1038/s41562-016-0021.

3. Result and Discussion

3.1. Authors

The data shows that 946 authors published 964 articles, from which we can easily infer that most of the articles are single-authored productions. Indeed, 791 of the 964 articles are single-authored, and co-authors per document are 1.22 while the collaboration index is 1.68. The formula derived from Total Authors of Multi-Authored Articles/Total Multi-Authored Articles is used to compute the Collaboration Index (CI).[32] For the individual journals, single-authored documents are 71,436, and 284 units for AA, TI, and UI respectively.

Table 1- Authorship Frequency and Authors' Collaborations

N.AUTHORS	N.ARTICLES	FREQ
1	873	0.81665108
2	140	0.13096352
3	34	0.03180543
4	13	0.0121609
5	4	0.00374181
6	3	0.00280636
7	1	0.00093545
9	1	0.00093545

AUTHORS COLLABORATION	AA	IT	UI
Single-authored documents	76	551	298
Co-Authors per Documents	1.39	1.14	1.31

Documents per Author for individual journals are 0.865, 1.04, and 0.895, yielding a collaboration index of 1.89, 1.89, and 1.78 for AA, TI, and UI, respectively. With such a small collaboration index, it would be fair to say that single authorship is by far the most common form of authorship for these three journals. The humanities and social sciences, and particularly IR, have seen a major surge in co-authorship (Sigelman 2009) as the rising frequency of collaborative research and multi-authored publications has become a standard practice in several disciplines including social sciences. Collaborative research has even become a functional prerequisite for current scientific exploration, to varied degrees.[33] We see that this trend is not reflected in Turkish IR journals. The table below summarizes the data in terms of authorship and frequency of different numbers of authorship in the articles published by these three journals. Table 1 above is an authorship frequency table in which we can see how many papers are authored by how many authors, along with a cumulative frequency. These kinds of contingency tables are more informative than the raw numbers since it is much easier to see that works with 3 or more authors are indeed rare for these journals. Table 1 above also provides a collaboration index of the level of collaborative practices across these journals. As stated above, it is clear that most of the published articles here are single-author

[32] For an explanation of collaboration index see Jonathan Stallings et al., "Determining Scientific Impact Using a Collaboration Index," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 110, no. 24 (2013): 9680–85, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1220184110; B. Elango and P. Rajendran, "Authorship Trends and Collaboration Pattern in the Marine Sciences Literature: A Scientometric Study," *International Journal of Information Dissemination and Technology* 2, no. 3 (2012): 166. Yet, for the R-based-calculations see Aria and Cuccurullo, "Bibliometrix." and https://www.bibliometrix.org/vignettes/Introduction_to_bibliometrix.html [accesed: 29/05/2022]

[33] Gary King, "Restructuring the Social Sciences: Reflections from Harvard's Institute for Quantitative Social Science," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 47, no. 1 (2014): 165–72; Gary King, "Ensuring the Data-Rich Future of the Social Sciences," *Science* 331, no. 6018 (2011): 719–21.

documents yielding small collaboration scores.

We may also calculate an author dominance ranking index,[34] or in other words, metrics on the frequency of first authorships if a document has more than one author. We have listed the first eight authors with a dominance factor of 1, indicating that she/he is the first author in all of their multi-authored publications. Merging this information, it would be fair to claim that social science investigation as a collaborative effort has not been greatly adopted by Turkish IR scholars, who would appear to favor the lone-wolf research approach. Furthermore, collaborative works are generally driven by dominant authorship practices and collaboration patterns. Both collaborative and 'lone wolf' approaches create advantages and disadvantages for scholars, yet this issue is mostly perceived as a common drawback in the creation of a community of Turkish IR scholars.[35]

Table 2- Author Dominance Factor

Author	Dominance Factor	TotAl-Articles	Single-Authored	Multi-Authored	First-Authored
BALCI A	1	7	5	2	2
DEMIR CK	1	4	3	1	1
KEKILLI E	1	4	3	1	1
KIBAROGLU M	1	4	3	1	1
KOSE T	1	4	3	1	1
TELCI IN	1	4	1	3	3
ABILOV S	1	3	1	2	2
AYDINLI E	1	3	1	2	2

In terms of productivity, the fifteen most productive authors are listed in Figure 2, which, in conjunction with Table 2 on dominance ranking, shows that dominant authors correspond to a great extent with most productive authors.

[34] The dominance function computes the author's dominance ranking as proposed by Sudhir Kumar and Surendra Kumar, "Collaboration in Research Productivity in Oil Seed Research Institutes of India," in *Proceedings of Fourth International Conference on Webometrics, Informetrics and Scientometrics*, vol. 28 (Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, Institute for Library and Information …, 2008).. See also https://www.bibliometrix.org/vignettes/Introduction_to_bibliometrix.html [accessed: 29/05/20202]

[35] Deniz Kuru, "Homegrown Theorizing: Knowledge, Scholars, Theory," *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 7, no. 1 (June 16, 2017): 69–86, doi: 10.20991/allazimuth.321993; Pinar Bilgin and Oktay F Tanrisever, "A Telling Story of IR in the Periphery: Telling Turkey about the World, Telling the World about Turkey," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12, no. 2 (2009): 174–79, doi: 10.1057/jird.2009.5.



Figure 2: Most Productive Authors



Figure 3: Most Productive Countries

From Figure 3 above, showing the 'Most Productive Countries,' we see that the great majority of authors publishing in these three Turkish IR journals are from Turkey, and a

more detailed inquiry would reveal that those authors in other countries are also originally from Turkey. One of the most important insights on authors and their collaboration may be gained by looking at their affiliations and overall publication patterns. It is unsurprising that the authors publishing in these three IR journals are from Turkey. We know that the country of publication has a high propensity to influence authorship, which is hardly an odd situation given that British publications are predominantly produced by British scholars, and that American journals include more American authors than they do authors from any other nation.[36]



Figure 4: Most Relevant Affiliations

However, when we look at our authors' respective affiliations from Figure 4 above, we see that the most frequent affiliations are as follows: Sakarya University, Kadirhas University, and Bilkent University. This finding might be problematic because it may indicate journalistic clientelism and/or favoritism, by which some authors and affiliations enjoy more expedited peer reviews. However, a deeper examination of the publishing formats and editorial materials reveals that the ratio of founding university affiliation on balance cannot be attributed to favoritism.

[36] Goldmann, "Im Westen Nichts Neues".

Table 3- Affiliation Percentage

#	AA (Bilkent Uni.)	IT (Sakarya Uni.)	UI (Kadirhas Uni.)
TOTAL NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS*	73	322	147
NUMBER OF SELF-AFFILIATIONS**	6 (8.2%)	15 (4.6%)	12 (8.1%)
NUMBERS OF UNIQUE AFF.	51 (69.8%)	169 (52.4%)	88 (59.8%)

*including editorial materials, reviews, and articles

**self-affiliation Bilkent University for AA, Sakarya University for IT, and Kadirhas University for UI.

Table 3 above displays the publication history of the three journals for the past three years, along with the corresponding affiliations. According to the data, scholars affiliated with Bilkent, Sakarya, and Kadirhas Universities account for 8, 4, and 8% of total publications in AA, IT, and UI, respectively (what we called self-affiliation). Because of their high unique affiliation numbers (69, 52, and 59 for AA, IT, and UI, respectively) and low self-affiliations, we can easily rule out favoritism concerns in their editorial processes.

3.2. Papers

The statistics show that these three Turkish IR journals grew by approximately 13.34% every year, and it is worth noting that in doing so, they have helped to broaden the SSCI coverage of Turkish IR.



Figure 5: Mean Total Citation per Article and Mean Total Citation per Year; Annual Scientific Production

Figure 5 shows that two metrics useful for estimating the yearly impact of the journals are the average number of citations each year—the sum of all citations divided by the number of years—and the average number of citations per article—the sum of citations per article divided by the number of years, along with Annual Scientific Production. An intriguing finding here is that while yearly scientific production for all journals is rising, the average citation number per year is not doing the same. Furthermore, the average total citations per

article have diminished considerably. That is, these publications are producing ever more scientific papers, yet their individual impacts are declining, and the overall scientific impacts of the journals are stagnating.

These findings (in Figure 5 above) are important in determining Journal Impact Factors,[37] a metric often used to draw comparisons among academic journals, the results of which in turn often serve as a proxy for journal quality. According to Table 4 below, AA and IT have Journal Citation Indicator (JCI), which is a normalized citation impact of 0.52 and 0.15, respectively. UI has a 0.33 impact factor and 0.15 JCI. Given that the 1.94 median impact factor for International Relations has increased almost half a percentage point in 2020 from 1.261 in 2019, the diminishing average total citations and overall impact of the three journals is contrary to the general trends in Political Science and International Relations journals.

Table 4- 2020 Clarivate Journal Citation Reports

Metrics	AA	IT	UI
Eigenfactor Score	0.00017	0.00044	0.00016
Article Influence Score	0.301	0.269	0.103
Journal Citation Indicator (JCI)	0.52	0.15	0.15
JCI Quartile	Q3	Q4	Q4

* The Journal Citation Indicator (JCI) is the average Category Normalized Citation Impact (CNCI) of citable items (articles & reviews) published by a journal over a recent three-year period.

Journals are often grouped in a distinct and well-known hierarchy, and while this is an insufficient proxy for output quality, it remains the most important predictor of a journal's relative status in the given discipline. In this sense, citation scores are another important metric when it comes to comparing journals to each other. The impact factor (IF) and JCI as a normalized IF score are directly related to citation scores and are often referred to as important indicators of a journal's quality in the given field. This comparison exercise can be extended by including several metrics from the 2020 Web of Science Journal Citation Report (JCR).[38] Table 4 is presented for this purpose. 2020 was chosen because in that year, all three of the journals examined here are included in the report. Several citation indexes along with the Web of Science Journal Impact Factor are all included in the JCR. Some of these indicators are shown in Figure 9 above. The Eigenfactor Score computes a network score based on a 5-year citation network density, with highly cited sources having a bigger impact on the network than sources with fewer citations. The normalized Eigenfactor multiplied by the total size of the cited journal over the last 5 years yields the Article Influence Score. A score greater than 1.00 indicates that the citation effect is higher than the average. Another normalized score produced from citable materials and their average citations is the Journal Citation Indicator (JCI). These measures combine to form the Journal Citation Indicator, which is the primary indicator used to rank journals. We can observe that AA is performing better than the other two Turkish IR journals, attaining a higher quartile ranking based on its

[37] See more on this: https://incites.help.clarivate.com/Content/Indicators-Handbook/ih-journal-impact-factor.htm [accessed: 04-01-2022]

[38] See https://clarivate.com/webofsciencegroup/web-of-science-journal-citation-reports-2021-infographic/ [accessed: 29-01-2022].

impact factor (IF) and citations.

Similarly, we can compare three journals on these metrics. The following figures are presented for this purpose. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate that increasing annual publication has not translated into an increasing rate of average citation score for any of the journals.



Figure 6: Average Article Citation per year



Figure 7: Average Total Citation per year

Author-level metrics are citation metrics that evaluate an individual author's bibliometric influence. The H-index is the most frequently-used measure at the author level, and H-Index ratings are also assigned to journals. The number of a journal's published papers that have received more than a specific number of citations is referred to as the 'journal h-index.' For example, a journal with an h-index of 8 has published 8 papers, each of which has garnered at least 8 citations. The G-index gives highly cited articles more weight, while the M-Index is the H-index divided by the number of years. Publishing in a journal with high H-G-M indexes increases the chances of being cited by other authors. Table 5 below shows the H-G-M indexes for these three Turkish IR journals and reveals that all are relatively similar in terms of these indexes. In a similar way, in terms of total citation number, every publication in AA, IT, and UI produced 2.45, 2.13, and 2.3 citations, respectively.

Table 5- Journal Impact and H-G-M Indexes

#	h_index	g_index	m_index	TC	NP	PY_start
ALL AZIMUTH-A JOURNAL OF FOREIGN POLICY AND PEACE	5	5	0.62	145	59	2015
INSIGHT TURKEY	7	8	0.87	324	152	2015
ULUSLARARASI ILISKILER-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	7	8	0.53	375	163	2010

TC: Total citations
NP: Number of Publications
PY_Start: Publication Year Start

We have calculated local citations, which measure how many times an author (or a document) included in a collection has been cited by other documents in the collection. This is an interesting piece of information because it shows whether or not cross-referencing exists among different issues of these publications. The result shows that very few articles are actually read and cited by authors newly contributing to these journals. In the figure below, local citation counts (LCC) are given at the top of the bar under the global citation counts (GCC). For example, KHOSRAVINIK M, 2017, the top paper in terms of global citation with a score of 16, received 0 local citations. This data reveals that if Turkish IR journals are cited, it is not by Turkish IR scholars publishing in these journals, but by others elsewhere.



Figure 8: Global Citation Counts (GCC) vs Local Citation Counts (LCC)

3.3. Networks

Manuscripts' attributes are connected to each other through the manuscript itself with several linkages via author(s) journal, keywords, publication date, etc. These connections of different attributes generate bipartite networks. The scientific collaboration network, university collaboration network, networks of scientific papers (i.e., citation network, bibliographic coupling network, co-citation network), and keywords network are constructed to reveal relationships between/among authors, affiliations, papers and keywords, respectively.[39] By using these linkages, network analysis reveals important insights on how academics cite and are cited, as well as patterns of collaboration between authors, institutions, and nations.

First among networks that can be extracted from a bibliometric analysis is the co-citation network among authors and articles. Reference Co-citations Networks, one type of citation network that can be drawn from bibliometric data, aims to show a network of references that have been co-cited by the selected publications. Co-citation analysis is a useful method

[39] Bo Yang and Jinhai Li, "Complex Network Analysis of Three-Way Decision Researches," *International Journal of Machine Learning and Cybernetics* 11, no. 5 (2020): 973–87, doi: 10.1007/s13042-020-01082-x.

for mapping scientific research subject-matter or topic clustering since changes in research topics would return comparable reference citations. That is, even if not all references for a certain area are identical, there will be meaningful overlaps and similarities among the cited references.



Figure 9: Most Cited Paper and Sources Network

The figure above depicts paper co-citation networks on the left and source co-citation networks on the right. The term 'most cited papers' refers to papers referenced in articles published by these three Turkish IR journals, whilst 'sources' refers to the most cited sources. When we speak of an author network, as shown in Figure 9 above, we are referring to scholars whose papers are cited in the publications published in these Turkish IR journals. All the citation network figures reveal three intriguing sub-areas emerging from the networks of publications by these three journals. We can elaborate even more on the topics covered by the publication taking these individual papers, sources, and authors. However, there are other, better tools to make such inferences, among which are co-occurrences networks, widely used tools in order to evaluate topics in bibliometric data.

To further evaluate the content of the articles published by these three journals, we look at the bibliographic co-occurrences' networks for keywords, abstracts, and titles. A co-occurrence network is a metric that establishes co-occurrence links between documents. If two papers used the same keywords, or themes in their title or abstract, or one or more documents in common, they are bibliographically connected. Among these, keywords co-occurrences are particularly noteworthy.



Figure 10: Most cited Authors' Network

We have performed abstract and keywords co-occurrences network analysis and plotted theme detection results on a bi-dimensional map. The premise is that the more terms that are used in the abstracts and keywords by different articles, the more similar they are in terms of topic.



Figure 11: Co-occurrences network for Keywords and Abstracts

On the left of Figure 11, we see co-occurrences in keywords, and on the right, co-occurrences in abstracts. The data shows three general themes that appeared in the publications corresponding to the co-citation network plots. Among them, as the authors' keywords and abstract co-occurrences reveal, are Turkey, Turkish Foreign Policy, and related issues in

terms of their common theme. When we read bibliographic co-citation networks with co-occurrence networks, along with degree centralities, we may argue that many of the articles published in these three journals are not closely connected in terms of citations.



Figure 12: Clusters by Documents Coupling

We have also created a conceptual structure map of a scientific field, performing Coupled Clusters Analysis (CC) of a bipartite network of terms extracted from keywords, which provides further analysis of the common theme(s) in the publications of these three journals. Both the topic dendrograms and factorial analysis (highest contributing and most-cited documents) show a very similar pattern: 3-4 topic clusters. The calculated clusters are depicted in Figure 12 above. Here, cluster coupling is measured by keywords, impact is measured by global citation scores, and cluster labeling is also done with keywords. We have 7 clusters, with Turkey-Foreign Policy and Eastern Mediterranean having the greatest degree of centrality and global citation impacts. That is, the articles in these clusters are the most impactful articles published by these three Turkish IR journals. The Security-NATO-Iran cluster has the lowest degree of centrality and impact, and leads the least impactful articles in these clusters. Hence, one practical outcome might be that if one is publishing an article in these journals, it would be better to do so on a topic that can be clustered in Turkey-Foreign Policy and Eastern Mediterranean. However, having seven closely-related clusters is a very suggestive finding as it shows that these journals have delved into only a few broader themes/clusters. This is also verified by the topic dendrograms, which is a clustering and mapping scheme for bibliometric analysis. The topic dendrogram in Figure 13 shows that there are two broad topics and several sub-topics emerging in the papers published in these three IR journals.



Figure 13: Topic Dendrogram

The figure below provides yearly trend topics based on field tags. Here we see that the dominating themes in the articles published by these three journals change over time. The trend topics also correspond to the finding we presented in the clusters by coupling.



Figure 14: Trends in Topics per Year

The same experiment may be done with article titles, the results of which are shown in the following figure, in which we see the most frequently used bigrams in the titles of the papers published by our three journals.



Figure 15: Most Relevant Words in Titles

Another way to investigate these shifts in theme is to sketch out the changes in keywords used. The first ten keywords and their growth over the years is provided in the figure below. We see that Turkey and Turkish Foreign Policy are among the top authors' keywords.



Figure 16: Word growth in Authors' Keywords

Another way to evaluate theme is to provide a contrasting cluster map, which is presented below. In this figure, we have used Key Words Plus, which is based on a specific algorithm

exclusive to Clarivate Analytics databases. The words or phrases in Key Words Plus are words or phrases that regularly appear in the titles of an article's references, but not in the article's title itself.[40] The figure shows a thematic evaluation between 2010–2015 and 2016–2021 (five-year periods).



Figure 17: Thematic Evaluation in Key Words Plus

One of the best ways to look at the changes in the thematic evaluation in bibliometric data is to look at three-block plots. We have created such a three-block plot for fields, sources, authors, keywords, and how they are related through a Sankey diagram.



Figure 18: Sources (SO), Authors (AU), and Keywords (DE)

[40] See for more info https://support.clarivate.com/ScientificandAcademicResearch/s/article/KeyWords-Plus-generation-creation-and-changes?language=en_US [accessed 29-01-2022].

4. Conclusion

By finding trends in modern Turkish IR research, in terms of both material and authors, this study set out to provide systematic documentation of the breadth of scholarship as well as the diversity of authorship of articles published in the field's leading Turkish IR publications. To this end, we conducted a bibliographic analysis on data retrieved from the WoS database. The data comprises three journals, All Azimuth, Insight Turkey, and Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, and ranges between 2010 and 2021. The materials included in our analysis are representative of the topic of interest because they are all top-tier Turkish IR journals. All the bibliometric indicators were carefully selected based on the study's objective.

The outcomes of bibliometric studies are quantitative and qualitative. They may also provide assessments of relationships between researchers and study topics through statistical analysis of co-publications and citations. Our findings concerning the three selected journals indicate the following:

The dominant form of authorship is single-authored papers. This may be seen as concerning, indicating as it does that collaboration practices have as yet failed to take root in the Turkish IR community. As the humanities and social sciences worldwide, and particularly IR, are witnessing a major surge in co-authorship, such a lone-wolf attitude among Turkish IR scholars is not a healthy development for the Turkish IR community. We believe this could be addressed through various socialization practices. Another important takeaway from the data is that authorship patterns call for more transparency by these three Turkish IR journals in their peer-review processes. However, we can readily rule out favoritism concerns in their editorial processes due to their high unique affiliation numbers (69, 52, and 59 for AA, IT, and UI, respectively) and low self-affiliations as a percentage of the overall publication counts.

In terms of publication counts, there is a general upward trend, implying that these three publications have been contributing to a broadening of AHCI, SSCI, and ESCI coverage of Turkish IR. However, even as yearly scientific productivity for all journals is increasing, the average citation per year is not. That is, while these publications are producing an increasing number of scientific works, their individual impacts are decreasing, and their aggregate scientific impact remains unchanged. Diminishing average total citations and overall impact contrasts starkly with the general trends in Political Science and International Relations journals. Furthermore, there is very little (almost none) cross-referencing among various issues of these publications, implying that relatively few papers are actually read and cited by the new authors contributing to these journals. According to the statistics, when Turkish IR publications are cited, they are cited abroad rather than by Turkish IR scholars who produce scientific papers in these journals. That is an interesting finding suggesting that Turkish IR scholars follow the research outcomes of others in other countries but not their fellow countrymen. However, it should be noted that new publications provide a challenge for established bibliometric methodologies since citations build over time, even over years in some subjects. IR is such a subject for which citations take time. Given the fact that these journals are relatively young, they are expected to be better cited in the future. Yet, the gap between local and global citations, which is producing almost none in terms of local citations, should be addressed. Overall, we can suggest that Turkish IR researchers publish works in English for Turkish IR researchers, but they are not cited (or may not be read) by Turkish IR researchers.

According to the findings of co-citation and co-occurrence networks, Turkey, Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkish politics appear most frequently in the publication of the three selected journals. Even though we may argue that many of the articles published in these three journals are not particularly linked in terms of citations, the topic dendrograms and factorial analysis show three or four topic clusters. Having closely connected clusters is a highly noteworthy finding since it illustrates that these journals collectively represent common themes/clusters in their field of interest. The topic clustering and thematic evaluations from keywords, abstracts, or titles reveal similar patterns. From this finding, it could be argued that the existing academic interests and contributions from Turkish IR have not constituted a new space for non-Western inferences. While American and European academics are in charge of generating concepts and theories in this system, others are responsible for creating case studies and testing theories in non-Western contexts, and Turkish IR in its current format is not an exception. The topical coverages and clusters, citation patterns, cited sources, and used keywords derived from the bibliographic data we used in this article clearly illustrate this notion. An analysis of books and book chapters written by Turkish IR scholars may serve as supplementary study in this area and could either confirm or dispute the conclusions we have presented here, but it would be worth looking into.

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Sea Blindness in Turkish International Relations Literature

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Abstract

The oceans and seas cover 72% of the Earth's surface, and 85% of global trade is done by maritime transportation. Moreover, 40% of the world's population lives on or near coastlines. Also, the oceans play a crucial role in Earth's biosphere. Recently, by desalination techniques, the seas have become a potable water resource. Therefore, one can say that the oceans and seas are indispensable for mankind. However, international disputes and collaboration efforts between states regarding the seas are not widely studied by scholars of International Relations (IR). This can be referred to as sea blindness, and it may be defined as an inability to appreciate the importance of seas and naval power, particularly with regards to strategic security and economic prosperity. A country with sea blindness is not aware of maritime supremacy as an important foreign policy tool. Similarly, IR scholars mostly focus on land conflicts and not on sea issues when they study international politics. This is particularly true in Turkish IR literature as issues on land are again the focus areas for Turkish scholars. In this context, this article makes an analysis of the articles in peer-reviewed journals and books published by well-known publishers in Turkey, providing statistics about the issues covered. Also, for comparison, major political science and IR journals published abroad are analysed with regards to publications related to the seas. This statistical analysis elucidates whether there is sea blindness in Turkish IR literature. The number of articles and books that cover the seas as crucial study areas of IR in Turkey, as well as their broad focus areas and perspectives, are revealed by this study.

Keywords: Sea blindness, Turkish IR literature, global IR literature, international disputes, maritime supremacy

1. Introduction

The seas have played a key role in the scientific, cultural, and civilizational interaction between states. As the seas are crucial for wealth generation and geopolitical dominance, states have invested in technology and seamanship to master the seas and make use of the opportunities that the seas present. However, in many academic circles, the importance of

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the seas has not been studied extensively, a circumstance which can be referred to as sea blindness.[1] The concept of sea blindness can be defined as a general ignorance and failure to appreciate the importance of the maritime domain by the general public, policy makers, governors and scholars. Surely, it is time for the discipline of IR to pay more attention to the issues of maritime supremacy in foreign policy-making. The current literature only analyses these issues in terms of particular geographic hot spots and the management of specific threats, such as political disputes in the Arctic or the South China Sea, maritime piracy in East Africa, human trafficking in the Mediterranean or organized crime in West Africa.[2]

On the other hand, maritime supremacy essentially covers three basic areas. These are maritime economics, sea power and maritime domain studies. Maritime economics refers to a broad field that includes the commercial relations of humanity with the seas. In addition to military capabilities, maritime economics includes activities such as maritime industry, maritime transportation, maritime trade, port and marina management, as well as insurance and fishing. Sea power is related to military/naval capabilities. In particular, it includes vehicles such as ships, submarines and the infrastructure (such as naval bases) within which they operate. The personnel who equip these vehicles and infrastructures also form an important part of sea power. At the same time, maritime jurisdiction areas and sovereignty issues are among the subjects studied within the framework of sea power. Sea power also includes military power, maritime sovereignty, maritime jurisdiction and delimitation, and law of the sea. Maritime domain studies, on the other hand, comprises areas such as the marine environment, protection of the seas and marine life, maritime safety/security and seamanship. Broadly, the aim of reaching safe (navigational safety), secure (free of crimes) and clean seas is the main study focus of this subject area.



Figure 1: Dimensions of Maritime Supremacy

[1] Gurpreet S. Khurana, "India's Sea-blindness," *Indian Defence Review* 24, no. 1 (2009), http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/indias-sea-blindness/0/, accessed May 4, 2021; Seth Cropsey, *Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking American Seapower and What to Do About It?* (Encounter Books, New York, 2017).

[2] Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds (2017), Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies, *International Affairs*, 93 (6), 1293.

Today, maritime supremacy in foreign policy-making is exercised by the states that have a broader vision of the seas. Sea blindness, on the other hand, is exhibited by states that consider their singular military and security interests as maritime supremacy mostly due to the advantages provided by their geopolitical position. However, these constitute only the sea power (security/defence) element of maritime supremacy. In addition to this, the other two elements, maritime economics and maritime domain studies, include studies in different disciplines such as maritime logistics, maritime industry, marine insurance, international trade, protection of the marine environment, and law of the sea. Yet, the scholarly analyses are mostly centred on the military and security dimensions of maritime studies in Turkish IR literature. As long as the lack of awareness about maritime economics and the maritime domain remains present, sea blindness will always be mentioned with regard to Turkish IR literature. In addition, maritime publications in Turkish IR literature are made periodically within the framework of maritime disputes encountered in foreign policy (such as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean maritime jurisdiction area disputes, Montreux and the Straits issue). Publications on establishing maritime supremacy with a broader vision and, for instance, Turkey's potential of becoming a maritime power (using maritime economics, sea power and maritime domain studies) are very few.

Furthermore, the five sea basins surrounding the country, namely the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea are very important for Turkey. The alternatives and opportunities offered by this complex geography to Turkey are so rich and diverse that they cannot be ignored. Turkey perpetuates a struggle for existence in these regions and sub-regions that differ economically, politically, religiously, culturally and ethnically.[3] Turkey's foreign policy is implemented with the aim to become a dominant actor in these five basins. However, with regard to Turkish foreign policy on these sea basins, maritime supremacy is again understood as only a security/defence phenomenon. Research published in Turkish journals and publishing houses also follows this limited Turkish foreign policy perspective. In this study, we have thematically examined the concept of maritime supremacy, which we have chosen as our main subject, with both its three dimensions and ten key concepts related to it and at the scale of the five sea basins around Turkey. In this context, we examined the articles of journals and the books/chapters published by the publishing houses as main parameters.

Therefore, the main research question of this study is whether there is sea blindness in Turkish IR literature. We try to determine whether there is sea blindness in Turkish IR literature by comparing both Turkish and foreign publications. The number of scholars that analyse the importance of the seas for foreign policy formation is also limited at the global level, although it is not as few as the number of Turkish scholars who do so. In this regard, studies of several scholars who focus on the seas in political science and IR literature will be analysed in the following pages. Subsequently, a statistical analysis of Turkish and global IR literature concerning sea blindness will be provided. This analysis will show the missing maritime dimension in the IR discipline.

[3] Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, ed., *Beş deniz havzasında Türkiye (Turkey in Five Sea-Basins)* (Siyasal Yayınevi, Ankara, 2006).

2. Importance of the Seas for Mankind

The seas have shaped the welfare level, security perception, social behaviour and foreign policy of states for centuries. Moreover, maritime industry is an important element of the economies of states as a means of communication with the world. While the strategic dimension of maritime supremacy is regularly underlined in IR literature, maritime economics and maritime domain studies, which are inseparable components of maritime supremacy, are less emphasized. In this context, it can be said that maritime supremacy is explained only with regard to its security/defence dimension.

When you ask people what they know about shipping or how much is traded by sea, they will most likely comment on several states' naval or military capabilities. But one should not forget that we are still heavily dependent on the global trading system based on shipping. That said, maritime domain explanations are dominated solely by the security/defence lenses.[4] In fact, most of the products we buy reach us by maritime trade. Considering that 85% of global trade is carried out by the maritime sector, sea blindness should not be present given such a huge industry.[5] However, the seas are mostly analysed in the context of security/defence, particularly in IR literature, and this is surely a major shortcoming.

Today, maritime trade and transportation is the backbone of global capitalism and global trade, which includes raw materials, final industrial products, and hydrocarbons. More than 100,000 ships sail in the world's seas and rivers, most of which are commercial fleets. As maritime transportation is the cheapest and most efficient mode of all transportation alternatives, it has played a crucial role in the development of the modern international system based on free trade after the Second World War. Due to the huge transportation capacity of ships, the price of a unit of transportation (i.e., a container) is extremely cheap in terms of shipping costs. Also, due to the right of free navigation in international waters, maritime transportation is performed freely at the global level.[6] The merchant fleets of the world have grown in ship numbers and tonnage particularly in the last 50–60 years. Several international laws and regulations have been enacted, and international organisations have also been formed (such as the United Nations International Maritime Organisation, or IMO) to ensure the security of international waters.

Undoubtedly, for economic development, international trade is essential, and maritime transportation is the main catalyst. The ports and merchant fleets of states are the most critical infrastructures for international trade. Generally, economic development is clearly visible in port cities, and unemployment is not a major problem in such areas. With globalisation, the importance of maritime transportation (both freight and passenger) has further increased. As large amounts of cargo can be transported via ships safely, reliably, and at a low cost, maritime transportation of products is the most preferred method of transportation.[7]

In addition to being important for global capitalism and global trade, the seas are also crucial for defence of the countries. For geopolitical dominance and supremacy, control of

[4] Steven C. Boraz, "Maritime Domain Awareness: Myths and Realities," *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 3 (2009): 136–46.

[5] Martin Stopfort, *Maritime Economics (*Routledge, London, 2009).

[6] The right of free navigation in international seas dates back to the Age of Renaissance in Europe. In *Mare Liberum* (or the freedom of the seas), a book in Latin on international law written by the Dutch jurist and philosopher Hugo Grotius, first published in 1609, Grotius formulated the new principle that the sea was international territory, and all nations were free to use it for seafaring trade. The disputation was directed towards the Portuguese *Mare Clausum* (sea under the rule of a state) policy and their claim of monopoly on the East Indian Trade. Based on Grotius, free navigation in international seas is considered as a basic right for all states of the world in the following centuries. Hugo Grotius, *Mare Liberum* (Lodewijk Elzevir Publishing House, Leuven, 1609).

[7] Stopfort Martin, *Maritime Economics,* Routledge, London, 2009.

the seas by powerful navies is also extremely important. Approximately 5,000 naval ships sail in the world's oceans and rivers. Furthermore, cooperation between states is also crucial for safe and secure seas. In this context, maritime domain awareness is critical. This concept is defined by the IMO[8] as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact economy, safety, security and the environment.9 For this purpose, states are putting several agreements into effect to establish organizations in the international arena, especially focusing on maritime transportation, with the most important one being the IMO. Undoubtedly, countries should coordinate with each other, sharing information to ensure maritime security.

A state's position with regard to the seas is another aspect that affects its political and economic power. If a state has a coast that connects to the world's oceans, it sits in an advantageous position. Landlocked countries lie in a more disadvantageous position when it comes to international trade and geostrategic dominance. History shows that landlocked states face wars more frequently. In contrast, states that have a connection to the world's oceans practice global trade more prolifically and are in a better position for economic development. Also, civilisations have prospered in coastal cities where transportation and cultural interactions between different peoples of that geography have been present. On the other hand, island states have some advantages in international relations as they can protect their lands from foreign attacks by powerful navies. As an exemplary case, the UK is a traditional maritime power. It holds the title of the starting site for industrialisation.[10] Its maritime prowess surely played a key role in this development.

Undoubtedly, sea power is crucial during times of both peace and war. States that wish to achieve an important position in world politics invest in their navy. Also, sea power has the important characteristic of deterrence in diplomacy. The concept of gunboat diplomacy is used for visible displays of naval power, implying or constituting a direct threat of warfare if the terms are not agreeable to the superior force in international politics.[11] With gunboat diplomacy, states aim not only to gain maximum profit from the seas and to impose a certain political view, but also to realize the desired attitudes. In fact, gunboat diplomacy is a show of force with warships.[12] To achieve such sea power, a state's technological competencies and naval arsenal should be developed.

Starting in the 20th century, states that transport goods via land, a highly risky and costly method, have declined economically. On the contrary, states that trade freely via the seas have economically prospered. Such states have mastered a liberal economy and have supported free trade instead of mercantilism. The UK, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Japan and the USA can be given as examples of such states. They purchase raw materials cheaply from land-based states, process them to make industrial products and sell these final products to other states. By trading internationally mostly via maritime transportation, these states have

[8] Due to the international character of maritime industry, problem solving in maritime domain is done by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)-UN, which is a global platform.

[9] Christian Bueger, "From Dusk to Dawn? Maritime Domain Awareness in Sotheast Asia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 37, no. 2 (2015): 157–82.

[10] Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Beacon Press, New York, 1993).

[11] James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (Chatto and Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1971), 10

[12] Thomas D. Goodall, "Gunboat Diplomacy: Does It Have A Place in The 1990's?" *Global Security* (1991), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/GTD.htm, accessed September 17, 2021.

prospered economically.[13]

As can be comprehended from the discussion above, the seas clearly play a key role in states' foreign policy decisions and opportunities. For any state, it is prudent to establish dominance in the seas in order to pursue an effective foreign policy. And for this to happen, besides sea power, states should seek maritime supremacy, especially in terms of maritime economics and maritime domain studies. The most prominent maritime powers, such as the UK, the USA, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal, have reached that level historically by pursuing such a maritime supremacy perspective.

However, studies about the seas are rather limited in the IR discipline, and this limited attention toward maritime issues affects the breadth of IR discussions. That said, although limited in number, several scholars have still underlined the importance of the seas in their studies. In particular, the competition between sea and land powers has been an important issue in international politics for IR scholars. In this context, the limited scholarly analyses in IR about the seas will be summarized in the following pages.

3. Sea Blindness and Utilisation of the Seas in IR: Examples from the Literature

The seas are important factors of geopolitics, and they are also useful for defence. Land powers and naval powers have traditionally been in conflict with each other throughout history. In political science and IR literature, several scholars have analysed maritime or oceanic civilizations (*thalassocracies*) in opposition to continental Eurasian civilizations (*tellucracies*). The terms *thalassocracy* and *tellucracy*, introduced by Schmitt (1950), originate from the terms *thalassa* (sea) in Greek and *telluris* (earth) in Latin.[14] In Greek mythology, *thalassa* was the primeval spirit of the sea, whose name may be of pre-Greek origin. *Telluris* means earth in general, and ground, land or country in particular cases.

More recently, the Russian strategist Alexandr Dugin used this conceptualisation in his works. For him, *thalassocracies* (also referred to as Atlanticist) are represented by the United Kingdom and the United States, whereas Russia and Germany are typical *tellucracies* (also referred to as Eurasian). *Thalassocracies* underline the importance of markets. Because of their geographical location, they have power to promote trade. Individual freedoms and human rights in these countries are outcomes of their commercialism. On the contrary, *tellucracies* are agriculture- and military-oriented, and they are authoritarian.[15] In his analyses, Dugin favours *tellucracies* and considers Russia as a prime example of one. These ideas are derived from the theories of Western European geopoliticians such as Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Halford John Mackinder and Karl Haushofer.[16]

In *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides (generally thought of as the father of Realism) tells the story of the struggle between Athens and Sparta.[17] In this ancient work, one can see the importance of naval power as it had an important role in the Peloponnesian War. The conflict was between Athens, a maritime power, and the preeminent land power of the day, Sparta. Athens' superior fleet and ability to protect vital supply routes allowed it to endure during this war. Although Athens ultimately lost the war, its fleet enabled it

[13] Liam Campling and Alejandro Colas, *Capitalism and the Sea: The Maritime Factor in the Making of the Modern World* (Verso Press, London, 2021).

[14] Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum* (Greven Publishers, Cologne, 1950).

[15] Aleksandr Dugin, *The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia* (Arktogeja Publishers, Moscow, 1997).

[16] Dmitry Shlapentokh, *Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism* (Brill, Leiden, 2007), 102.

[17] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (Penguin Books, London, 2000).

to maintain its empire and retain a vital lifeline to its colonies and vassals that helped it to endure sieges. Furthermore, Athens' eventual defeat came at the hands of the Spartan fleet. During the war, the Spartans not only capitalized on Athens' many mistakes but importantly gathered their own fleet under Lysander, who went on to defeat and later capture the Athenian navy, thus concluding the war in Sparta's favour.

In his seminal book *Leviathan,* Thomas Hobbes used the Leviathan, a mythical creature with the form of a Sea Serpent (Sea Monster), which greatly influenced IR literature.[18] That said, in this well-known book, this mythical creature is used to represent state power mostly on land. According to Judaism, Behemoth, a beast on Earth from the biblical Book of Job (Hebrew Bible), and Leviathan (again from the Hebrew Bible, Sea Monster) are destined to fight with each other until doomsday. However, their depiction in Hobbes' work, and particularly the justification of state power by the protection of individuals by the Leviathan, are limited to political discussions on land.

In *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean*, David Abulafia underlines the importance of naval power, particularly for the societies of the Mediterranean.[19] In his work, Abulafia illustrates how Mediterranean societies become sea powers in order to dominate the region. For Abulafia, Mediterranean history is world history, and sea power is vital for any state to dominate international politics.

In his work, *Histories of the Sea (Histoires de la Mer)*, Jacques Attali shows that civilisations have prospered on the coasts of the Mediterranean. By using the capabilities that the sea presents, these civilisations communicate with each other and economically prosper as a result.[20] In this work, Attali shows how civilizations have become dominant powers in their regions by using the seas.

Alfred Thayer Mahan underlines the importance of sea power for geopolitical hegemony. Mahan believes that there is a strong link between a country's political power and the sea. Use of the sea in trade and control in war in particular is of utmost importance for Mahan.[21] Mahan focuses on strategic locations such as canals, coaling stations, choke points, and states for which control of these locations is crucial for political power. Also, the economic use of the seas is crucial for Mahan, and during times of peace, he believes that states should increase their production and shipping capacities and acquire overseas possessions. Mahan highlights the importance of a transnational coalition acting in support of a multinational system of free trade.

Another important scholar on the topic of sea power is Julian Corbett. Corbett does not place as much emphasis on fleet battle as Mahan does. He concentrates on the importance of Sea Lines of Communication instead of battle prowess. To gain control of the Sea Lines of Communication, destruction or capture of enemy warships and merchants, or conducting a naval blockade, are main options for Corbett.[22]

George Modelski also underlines the value of sea power.[23] For Modelski, only sea powers can respond to global problems and construct a global political system as they have

[18] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Penguin Books, London, 2017).

[19] David Abulafia, *Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013).

[20] Jacques Attali, *Histories de la Mer,* (Fayard/Pluriel Publishers, Paris, 2018).

[21] Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Little Brown and Co. Publishers, Boston, 1890); Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812,* (Forgotten Books Publishers, London, 2012).

[22] Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Antony Rowe Ltd., Eastbourne, 2009).

[23] George Modelski and W. R. Thompson, *Sea Power in Global Politics 1494-1993*, (Macmillan, London, 1988).

open societies and prosperous economies. For Modelski, the challengers to these powers are regional powers with substantial land armies, as well as more reclusive societies and economies. Modelski also argues that the rise and fall of world powers is parallel to the rise and decline of industrial and commercial sectors in the global economy. Modelski refers to these as Long Cycles, which shows a pattern of regularity in world politics. For Modelski, there is a regularity of transition of power between major world powers, all sea powers, such as the Dutch Republic, Portugal, the United States and the United Kingdom.[24]

Immanuel Wallerstein also utilizes the concept of maritime supremacy in his works. In his famous world-systems theory, Wallerstein tells the story of how capitalism changed the world. World-systems theory underlines an inter-regional and transnational division of labour, which divides the world into core states, semi-periphery states, and periphery states. Core states have capital-intensive production, higher skill, and the rest of the world have labour-intensive production, low-skill, and they work for the extraction of raw materials. Yet, the system has dynamic characteristics. As a result of revolutions in transport technology, individual states can gain or lose their core (semi-periphery, periphery) status over time. Certain states become world hegemonies for a certain period of time. During the last few centuries, as the world-system has prospered economically and extended geographically, this hegemony has passed from the Netherlands to the US and the UK.[25] All of these states have been important sea powers and active maritime traders, which has helped them to reach this status. In world-systems theory Wallerstein underlines the importance of shipping and maritime trade, as well as the control of shipping routes, for rising from the periphery to the core.

Halford John Mackinder also asserts the significance of sea power on international relations. Mackinder is considered the founding father of both geopolitics and geostrategy. For Mackinder, the Earth is divisible into:

- The World-Island, the interlinked continents of Europe, Asia and Africa (Afro-Eurasia). This is the biggest, most crowded, and wealthiest of all possible land combinations.
- The offshore islands, inclusive of the British Isles and the islands of Japan.
- The outlying islands, inclusive of the continents of North America, South America, and Oceania.

The Heartland stands at the centre of the World-Island.[26] In 1919, Mackinder summarised his theory as:[27]

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world."

[24] George Modelski, eds., *World System History: the Social Science of Long-term Change* (Routledge, New York, 2000); George Modelski and W. R. Thompson, *Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Co-evolution of Global Economics and Politics* (University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1996); George Modelski and S. Modelski, eds., *Documenting Global Leadership* (Macmillan: London, 1988); R. A. Denemark, J. Friedman and B. K. Gills and George Modelski, eds., *World System History: the Social Science of Long-term Change* (Routledge, New York, 2000).

[25] Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Duke University Press: London-Durham, 2004); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (University of California Press: Los Angeles, 2011); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750* (University of California Press: Los Angeles, 2011); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s–1840s,* (University of California Press: Los Angeles, 2011); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914* (University of California Press: Los Angeles, 2011).

[26] Halford John Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal* 23, no. 4 (1904): 421–37.

[27] Halford John Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (National Defense University Press, 1996), 175–93.



Figure 2: Halford John Mackinder's Heartland (Pivot Area) Theory[28]

The power that controls the World-Island would control more than half of the world's resources. The Heartland's central position and size makes it the key to controlling the World-Island.



Figure 3: Heartland vs. Rimland[29]

Mackinder tried to warn the UK that its dependence on sea power would become a weakness as improved land transport would open the Heartland up for invasion and/or industrialisation.[30] Although he warns Britain not to rely solely on sea power, one can still clearly see a land-sea dichotomy in his analyses. He underlines the importance of control

[28] Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History".
[29] https://geography.name/heartland, accessed June 15, 2021.
[30] Francis P. Sempa, "Mackinder's World," *American Diplomacy,* February 2000, https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu, accessed July 5, 2022.

over the Heartland and thus warns Atlantic powers (particularly Britain) that their maritime dominance at the global level may not be enough to control the whole globe.

Nicholas John Spykman's work is similar to Mackinder's, and it is based on the unity of the world seas and unity of world politics. However, Spykman also extends it to include unity of the airspace. Hence, Spykman underlines the importance of the air force for any country. For Spykman, maritime mobility makes "the overseas empire" a possibility. Spykman divides the world into:

- the Heartland
- the Rimland (same as Mackinder's "inner or marginal crescent")
- the Offshore Islands & Continents (similar to Mackinder's "outer or insular crescent")

"The Rimland" is a term particularly used by Spykman. His perspective is that the most strategic areas in the world are the densely populated eastern, western and southern edges of the Eurasian continent. Spykman criticises Mackinder for underlining the importance of the Heartland and for his preference for land power over sea power.[31] According to Spykman:[32]

"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."



Figure 4: Spykman's Rimland[33]

Another important scholar who utilises maritime concepts in his IR analyses is John Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer is most known for his theory of 'offensive realism'. According to this theory, the great powers aim for regional hegemony in an anarchic international system. For Mearsheimer, a state's power is related to the strength of its military. For him, land force is the dominant military power in the modern era, and large bodies of water (oceans) limit the capabilities of land armies (he refers to this as the stopping power of water). Hence, because of the oceans, no country can become a world hegemon. As a result,

[31] Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (Routledge, London, 2007).

[32] Nicholas John Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (Harcourt Brace & Co. Publishers: London, 1944), 44.

[33] http://www.thehumanimprint.com/?p=2843, accessed May 22, 2022.

the world is divided into different areas where there are major regional powers.[34]

Therefore, for Mearsheimer, the US should try to become the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere only. Also, it should stop the rise of a similar hegemon in the Eastern Hemisphere. Hence, the United States is an offshore-balancer. It may only balance the rise of a Eurasian hegemon. Offshore-balancing highlights withdrawal from onshore positions and underlines offshore capabilities on the three key geopolitical regions of the world: Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf.[35]

As another important scholar of IR, Christopher Layne criticizes Mearsheimer's reasoning. As Layne states, "apparently water stops the US from imposing its powers on others in distant regions, but it does not stop them from threatening American primacy in the Western Hemisphere".[36] Hence, Layne questions the ability of the oceans to constrain power-maximising states into status-quo powers.

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver also underline the importance of the seas in their analyses. These scholars developed Regional Security Complex Theory, in which they argue that international security should be analysed from a regional perspective. Moreover, they argue that relations between states (and other actors) show regular, geographically-clustered patterns. Regional security complexes are, by nature, geographical and consist of neighbouring actors that are insulated from one another by natural barriers such as deserts, mountain ranges and oceans.[37]

Jack Levy and William Thompson, on the other hand, argue that leading sea powers do not have the capability, nor the incentive, to threaten the domestic political order of other major powers.[38] Thus, for them, sea powers are non-threatening actors in international relations. The real decisive actors of global politics are land powers and regional actors in this perspective.

In the analyses of the above-mentioned theorists, the seas hold a pivotal position in discussions of dominance in IR. In some of the examined works, a land-sea dichotomy is also visible. Thus, for various scholars of IR, the competition between land-based and sea-based powers is an important issue in IR. That said, the number of scholars who underline the importance of the seas for global dominance is still marginal. Only few of the studies summarised in the previous pages could be given as examples. In some of these studies, maritime issues are implied, but remain overshadowed by other security topics. There is a fairly mainstream discussion on American grand strategy by IR luminaries (like Mearsheimer and his critics) that is premised on maritime concepts, but again with a very limited and particular focus on the military aspects of naval power. The whole discussion on the (alleged) stopping power of water and offshore balancing further reinforces this article's main argument that maritime topics are either neglected or are only there as an afterthought to national security.

The two important aspects of maritime supremacy (maritime economics and maritime domain studies) are neglected by most of these scholars. Therefore, one can say that sea

[34] John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 2001).

[35] Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (1997): 86–124; Christopher Layne, "Offshore Balancing Revisited," *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (2002): 233–48.

[36] Christopher Layne, "The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon," *Security Studies* 12, no. 2 (2003): 127.

[37] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003).

[38] Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?" *International Security* 35, no. 1 (2010): 7–43.

blindness is a major deficiency within the IR discipline. Similarly, sea blindness has been present in Turkey up until the last couple of years. The rise in sea-related publications in recent years is a result of disputes with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC). Particularly, the defence/security dimension of maritime supremacy is merely analysed in Turkish IR literature. Given these observations, an analysis of Turkish and global IR literature concerning sea blindness will be made in the following pages.

4. Sea Blindness and Turkish IR Literature

Maritime supremacy and its subfields, namely, maritime economics (inclusive of merchant fleet ports and shipyards), sea power (security/defence policy) and maritime domain studies (protection of the seas and marine life) have been shown to bolster states seeking power in IR. Of these subfields, maritime economics is a broader term that includes all the marine- and maritime-related economic sectors in a country. Here, human resources and the general public's awareness of the maritime domain and economic production in these sectors is of utmost importance. Maritime economics also includes maritime industry (trade, transportation and ports). Sea power is related to the military capabilities at sea, infrastructure and naval capabilities. Particularly, the number of ships (the navy) and the related infrastructure (such as naval bases) is crucial. It includes military/naval power, maritime sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction and delimitation areas. Maritime domain studies include maritime environment, maritime safety/security and seamanship. Safe, secure and clean seas are the main targets of policy-makers in this domain.

As a remedy for sea blindness, the general public should also be included in the broad maritime policy decisions of the state. Social activities such as sailing, scuba diving, building model ships, swimming, amateur fishing, and the like should be organised to promote a positive culture around the sea. Coastal areas should be planned so that the seas are easily accessible by the public for recreational activities. Maritime trade and transportation, sea logistics, shipbuilding, fishing, marine insurance and port management zones should be developed to get a bigger share from the global capitalist production system. The relevant high schools and departments or faculties of universities should be established so that the youth is aware of the importance of the seas for economic and political development of the country. With these strategies, the state and society can become more active in maritime economics, sea power and maritime domain studies, which helps move toward the broader political vision of becoming a global maritime power.

Quite contrarily, (and like the Turkish state and society in general) Turkish IR literature in maritime economics and maritime domain studies is limited to naval/military capabilities. The grand strategy of becoming a maritime power is left on the shoulders of military personnel. What's necessary then is the development of civilian seamanship and sea culture in a country. A foreign policy acknowledging the importance of maritime supremacy based on maritime economics, sea power and maritime domain studies for global geostrategic and economic hegemony is lacking in Turkish foreign policy.

Publications in Turkish IR literature follow Turkish foreign policy and focus mostly on the defence/security dimension (sea power) of maritime supremacy. The parameters we use for both journals and published books identify maritime supremacy as a subject, with maritime economics, sea power and maritime domain studies as its subfields, and the five sea basins surrounding Turkey as a thematic area. (We have only looked at the Turkish publications

designating the five sea basins as a thematic area.) In terms of years, the founding dates of the journals and publishing houses until 31 December 2021 are taken as a criterion. The concept of maritime supremacy is not limited to disputes over the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas (or law of the sea issues) or military/security power issues such as gunboat diplomacy. Maritime supremacy also includes maritime economics and maritime domain studies areas. In this context, one can see that sea blindness is present in Turkish IR literature by looking at Table 1, since most of the publications here are related with the military/security dimension of maritime supremacy. The authors of this manuscript have perused the articles published in twenty of the most well-known Turkish political science and IR journals about the seas and have found out the following results.

Table 1- Articles Published in Turkish Journals About the Seas

	Journals[39]	Number of Articles	Focus Areas[40] of Maritime Supremacy
1	All Azimuth	-	-
2	Alternatif Politika (Alternative Politics)	1	b
3	Ankara University Faculty of Pol. Sciences Journal	23	b, c
4	Avrasya Etüdleri (Euroasian Studies)	11	a, b
5	Bilig	2	b, c
6	Ege Academic Review	-	-
7	Gazi Academic Review	3	b
8	Insight Turkey	10	b
9	Journal of Black Sea Studies	4	a, b
10	Journal of Middle East Studies	1	b
11	Journal of Security Sciences	2	b
12	Journal of Security Strategies	16	a, b, c
13	Journal of Security Studies	1	b
14	Marmara University Journal of Political Science	1	c
15	Ortadoğu Etüdleri (Middle East Studies)	4	b
16	Perceptions	26	b
17	Public and Private International Law Bulletin	18	b, c
18	Siyasal: Journal of Political Science	1	b
19	Turkish Yearbook of International Relations	7	b
20	Uluslararası İlişkiler (International Relations)	4	b

As can be seen in the table above, the number of articles published about the seas is rather limited in Turkey. Particularly, there is a tendency towards publishing material solely on the sea power dimension of maritime supremacy. Of the 20 Turkish journals we analysed to detect sea blindness, we have seen that 2 journals did not publish any articles on the seas. Only 3 of the remaining 18 journals have articles related to a-type,[41] and there are 5 journals that

[39] The Journals are listed alphabetically.

[40] Focus areas are (a) maritime economics, b) sea power, c) maritime domain studies.

[41] The following are some examples of a-type articles: İrfan Kalaycı, "Maritime Trade and Global Financial Crisis: New Strategies for Turkey in the Silk Road," *Avrasya Etütleri (Euroasian Studies)* 45, no. 1 (2013): 87–122 (In Turkish); Oktay Çetin, "A Comparative Model in the Maritime Sector," *Journal of Security Strategies* 5, no. 10 (2009): 35–58 (In Turkish); Oğuzhan Türedi and Hakkı Kişi, "Maritime Supply Chain Security Gaps of Middle Powers," *Journal of Security Strategies* 12, no. 23 (2016): 103–36; Volkan Çağlar, "Sustainable Container Terminal Operations: Challenges and Enhancements," *Journal of Black Sea Studies* 49 (2016): 141–56.

published about c-type.[42] Except for 1 journal (the *Marmara University Journal of Political Science*, which has only 1 publication related to c), almost all of them have b-type.[43] We think it is helpful to give some details in order to understand Table 1. For example, 20 articles are about b and 3 articles are about c in *Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences Journal*, which has a total of 23 articles on the seas. In this journal, there are no articles related to a. In the journal *Eurasian Studies*, only 1 of the 11 articles is about a and the others are about b. When we look at the *Journal of Security Strategies*, we see a little more diversity. This journal, which has published 16 articles on the seas, has 11 articles about b, 3 articles about a and 2 articles about c. All aspects of maritime supremacy (all a, b, and c) have been published in this journal alone. The journal *Perceptions*, on the other hand, has 26 articles about the seas, but they are all about b. In this journal, articles mostly about Turkey's Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea policies were published. *Public and Private International Law Bulletin*, a journal of international law, has published 17 articles. However, only 3 of them are related to c and the others are related to b. In this journal, there is no article about a.

Similar observations can also be made about the books/book chapters published in Turkey. There are very limited publications on the maritime economics and maritime domain studies dimensions of maritime supremacy in Turkish books and book chapters. When we look at the 20 Turkish publishing houses in Table 2, we see that sea blindness continues to be a trend. Only 12 books from the 20 publishers we analysed are about the seas. And 11 of these are about b-type,[44] while only 1 is about c-type.[45] Almost all of the publications related to b are about the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, and only one of them is about the Black Sea. Only TASAM has 1 book about c, and this is about the marine ecosystem. Looking at Table 2, we see that there is no publication about a[46] (on maritime economy), which is an important dimension of maritime supremacy.

[42] The following are some examples of c-type articles: Mustafa Ökmen, "The Environmental Problems in the Blacksea and Perspectives for Local and Regional Cooperation," *Bilig* (2011): 56, 165-192 (In Turkish); Dolunay Özbek, "Implementation in Turkish Law of Oil Pollution Conventions - Some Recent Developments," *Public and Private International Law Bulletin* 24, 1-2 (2004): 599–608; Ruşen Keleş, "Protection of the Coasts and Public Good," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 44, no. 1 (1989): 39-62 (In Turkish); Çağdaş Dedeoğlu, "The Ontology of Security and its Implications for Maritime Security," *Journal of Security Strategies* 15, no.32 (2019): 631–54; Mehmet Palaz, "Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in the Maritime Domain," *Journal of Security Strategies* 15, no. 32 (2019): 713–30.

[43] The following are some examples of b-type articles: Yusuf Aksar, "UN's Palmer Report (Mavi Marmara) and International Law," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 9, no. 33 (2012): 23–40 (In Turkish); Araz Aslanlı, "The Importance of Trans Caspian Energy Cooperation for Turcic Republics," *Bilig* (2017): 83, 27-51(In Turkish); Muhammed Tandoğan, "Strategic Dehlek Islands of Redsea and Their Relevance During the Ottoman Administration Era," *Avrasya Etütleri (Euroasian Studies)* 40 (2011): 259–85 (In Turkish); Umut Kedikli and Deniz Taşkın, "The Eastern Mediterranean Basin in Energy Resources Struggle and Maritime Jurisdiction Dispute," *Alternatif Politika* 7, no. 3 (2015): 399–424 (In Turkish); Hayriye Kahveci-Özgür, "Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons: Regional Potential, Challenges Ahead, and the 'Hydrocarbon-ization' of the Cyprus Problem," *Perceptions* 22, no. 2 (2017): 31–56; Erdem Denk, "Disputed Islets and Rocks in the Aegean Sea," *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* 29 (1999): 131–55.

[44] The following are some examples of b-type books: Hasret Çomak, Caner Sancaktar, Volkan Tatar, Burak Şakir Şeker, *Black Sea Geopolitics* (Beta: İstanbul, 2018) (In Turkish); İrfan Kaya Ülger, *Aegean Conflict in Turkey-Greece Relations* (Derin: İstanbul, 2008) (In Turkish); Hasret Çomak, Burak Şakir Şeker, Ioannidis Dimitrios, *Aegean Geopolitics I-II* (Nobel: Ankara, 2020) (In Turkish); Yücel Acer, *The Delimitation Problems in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean on the Basis of International Court Decisions* (SETA, İstanbul, 2021) (In Turkish); Necdet Hayta, *Aegean Islands Conflict: From 1911 Until Today* (Seçkin: İstanbul, 2006) (In Turkish).

[45] The following is an example of c-type book: Deniz Güler, Ahmet Yıldız, and İzgi Savaş, *New Maritime Security Ecosystem and Eastern Mediterranean* (TASAM, 2019) (In Turkish).

[46] There is no publication about a-type books/book chapters in Turkish IR literature.

Table 2- Books/Book Chapters About the Seas Published by Turkish Publishers

	Publishing House[47]	Number of Books or Chapters	Focus Areas[48] of Maritime Supremacy
1	Alfa	-	-
2	Beta	1	b
3	Derin	1	b
4	Detay	-	-
5	Dost	-	-
6	Gazi	1	b
7	İletişim	-	-
8	İmge	-	-
9	İstanbul Bilgi University	-	-
10	Küre	-	-
11	Metis	-	-
12	Nobel	3	b
13	Remzi	-	-
14	Seçkin	2	b
15	SETA	1	b
16	Siyasal	-	-
17	TASAM	2	b, c
18	Turhan	1	b
19	Uluslararası İlişkiler Kütüphanesi (International Relations Library)	-	-
20	Yapı Kredi	-	-

When analysing international politics, global IR scholars generally base their studies on certain land areas. This is particularly true for the IR literature in Turkey. For Turkish scholars, of the three areas of sovereignty of a state (land, sea, air), the land area is prioritised, and the land conflicts are studied often. This situation is also similar in Turkish foreign policy. The decision-makers in Turkey mostly focus on the seas with regard to their security/defence. The importance of the seas for geopolitical dominance has only come up in Turkey due to the disputes with Greece and GCASC concerning the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, particularly after the 2000s. Although the dispute with Greece over the Aegean dates back to the 1970s, the importance of the seas did not come to the forefront of debates within Turkish academic circles or in Turkish IR literature until the last couple of years.

Also, publications on the five sea basins around Turkey are rather limited in Turkish IR literature. Historically, the Eastern Mediterranean basin has been a very important geostrategic region that connects the East and the West. During the last couple of years, the seas have become a hot topic in Turkey due to disputes with Greece and the GCASC in the Eastern Mediterranean. Coupled with the hydrocarbon research activities in the region, supremacy has become a target for Turkish policy-makers. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, publications about the region only focus on sea power, which concerns disputes regarding maritime jurisdiction areas. In Turkish foreign policy, sea blindness continues to be a trend, and only very recently has the importance of the seas surrounding Turkey been comprehended.

[47] The Publishing houses are listed alphabetically.

[48] Focus areas are (a) maritime economics, b) sea power, c) maritime domain studies.

Analyses of Turkey's Black Sea policy are made by taking into account the different power centres that affect the politics of the region. In Turkish IR literature, strategic analyses are made about the Black Sea, examining aspects such as the geopolitical position of the Black Sea, the role and importance of the Black Sea in terms of Turkey's regional and international security, and Turkey's potential to become an important power within the Black Sea region as a coastal state.[49] Likewise, studies on the Turkish Straits, which are located on the exit route of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, are generally related to issues concerning the law of the sea on the basis of the Montreux Convention, and to hard power issues such as geostrategic and power balances.[50] In the books/book chapters and articles published on the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits that unite the continents, only the naval/military force (sea power) element is discussed among the factors of maritime supremacy. Since there are almost no publications on maritime economics and maritime domain studies, one may conclude that sea blindness is prevalent in Turkish IR regarding the Black Sea and the Straits. As a matter of fact, maritime economics has become a fundamental dynamic that significantly affects the international system and security in these regions, which began to be referred to as the wide Black Sea basin in the post-Cold War period. Also, there is a growing need for studies on marine energy security and the maritime environment in these regions.

In the new geopolitical equation that emerged after the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea is at the forefront of the places where both regional and non-regional power groups are most engaged in the struggle for influence. The most important feature of the Caspian is that it has the richest oil and natural gas deposits in the world. However, the fact that the status of the Caspian cannot be determined (is it a sea or a lake?) causes significant tensions between the littoral states, especially regarding the rich hydrocarbon reserves. Turkey sees this place as an energy transit area in terms of energy projects and pipeline routes in the Caspian.[51] The studies of Turkish IR scholars on the Caspian, who generally follow Turkish foreign policy, are mostly related to the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas, sovereignty rights established on natural resources, political problems between littoral states, energy companies operating in the Caspian basin, the effects of oil and natural gas trade on the global economy, importance of the resources in the Caspian for Turkey, maritime sovereignty and naval/military power. However, there is a need for publications in areas such as maritime economics, protection of the marine environment or management of the ports within the region.

Connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, the Red Sea is a crucial waterway for the world. The Red Sea and Suez Canal are very important geopolitically given their roles in energy transfer and maritime trade. States' foreign policies in this region, their affairs with regional and global actors, and domestic political developments are affected by and also affect the Red Sea-oriented competition. On the other hand, The Persian Gulf, which has rich oil/natural gas deposits, is a gulf connected to the Indian Ocean in the region between southwest Iran and north of the Arabian Peninsula in the Middle East. One-third of the world's oil production is carried out in the Persian Gulf and two-thirds of the world's oil reserves are located in this region. In addition to oil wealth, natural gas is also abundant in

[49] Gökhan Koçer, "Karadeniz'in güvenliği: uluslararası yapılanmalar ve Türkiye," *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 1, no. 1 (2007): 197.

[50] Nuray Ekşi, "Montreux Antlaşması uyarınca Boğazlardan geçen yabancı gemilerin haczi ve bu gemilere el konulması," *Public and Private International Law Bulletin* 37, no. 1 (2017): 126.

[51] İdarbek Amirbek, "Soğuk Savaş sonrası Hazar'ın statüsü ve sınırlandırma sorunu: kıyıdaş Devletler'in yaklaşımları açısından analizi," *Karadeniz Araştırmaları* 12, no. 46 (2016): 24–5.

states such as the UAE and Qatar.[52] Studies in Turkish IR literature are limited to political power struggles between the Red Sea and Persian Gulf littoral states. In both regions, we see a lack of research and a lack of interest in areas such as maritime economics and maritime domain studies, which are key factors for maritime supremacy. Thus, we have shown that sea blindness is also present in Turkish IR literature about these regions.

In addition to the five sea basins that are important for Turkey, the polar regions are seen as a new area of struggle within the scope of both economic investment opportunities and as a new maritime transport route. As a matter of fact, the Arctic and Antarctic regions are very important for global actors due to potential natural resources and the sovereignty struggles of states. Although the polar regions are difficult for human settlement due to the harsh climate conditions, they draw attention with the ample hydrocarbon reserves they contain.[53] In recent years, Turkish IR scholars have started to publish material on topics such as the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions on the poles, the sovereignty struggles between littoral states, and the policies of organizations such as the EU and NATO on the poles. However, studies on only one dimension of maritime supremacy (sea power) have again led to sea blindness with regard to these areas. On the other hand, some other studies are also published on the English Channel between France and the UK,[54] and the South China Sea, where there are disputes between China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei on maritime jurisdiction areas. Yet, these studies are again mostly about continental shelf disputes, the EEZ, and security and defence issues. Turkish scholars have done very limited studies on areas such as marine environment policy, maritime economics, maritime transport policy or the South China Sea. Due to this situation, it is possible to say that sea blindness also exists for these regions.

In sum, despite being surrounded by five sea basins, Turkey has so far failed to develop a robust foreign policy based on attaining supremacy over its surrounding seas and expanding its international trade activities by means of maritime transportation, which necessitates the development of a strong merchant fleet. To the extent that the Turkish IR literature examines maritime issues, its area focus is sadly limited to defence/security issues, focusing primarily on a limited consideration of gunboat diplomacy and issues such as hydrocarbon research activities in the Eastern Mediterranean against Greece and the GCASC. A broad foreign policy based on maritime supremacy that includes maritime economics, sea power, and maritime domain studies is wanting in Turkish politics. Similarly, Turkish IR literature lacks a broad vision. Without such a strategy, it is anticipated that the limited maritime activities and policy-making in Turkey, as well as in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, are destined to be unsuccessful.

The analysis of the number of articles in Turkish journals and books/book chapters by Turkish publishers proves that there is sea blindness in Turkish IR literature. However, sea blindness is also a major problem in the broader IR discipline. That said, the number of articles that are published in foreign journals on the seas, especially about maritime economics and

[52] Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu, "Kızıldeniz'e odaklanan güç mücadelesi: sebepler ve aktörler," *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 11, no. 2 (2019): 327–68.

[53] Michael Byers, *International Law and the Arctic* (Cambridge University Press: United Kingdom), 2013; Trolle-Anderson, "The Antarctic Scene: Legal and Political Facts"; G. D. Triggs, ed. The *Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, Environment and Resources* (Cambridge University Press: United Kingdom, 2008).

[54] John G. Merrils, "The United Kingdom - France Continental Shelf Arbitration," *California Western International Law Journal* 10, no. 2 (1980): 314; Nehginpao Kipgen, "Asean and China in the South China Sea Disputes," *Asian Affairs* 49, no. 3 (2018): 433–34.

maritime domain studies, is much higher than the Turkish ones. The following table shows that European-Western and international scholars are aware of the importance of the seas for foreign policy-making. Table 3 is organised by the top 20 journals of the Scopus index on political science and IR.[55] As can be clearly seen here, the number of articles on the seas is much higher than the Turkish publications about maritime economics and maritime domain studies. However, this number is still not high enough to grasp the importance of the seas for world politics. Therefore, one may stipulate that sea blindness is also a major deficiency of the global IR discipline, but this is a topic that should be researched in another paper.

Table 3- Articles Published in Foreign Journals About the Seas

	Journals[56]	Number of Articles	Focus Areas[57] of Maritime Supremacy
1	American Political Science Review	2	a, b
2	American Journal of Political Science	2	b, c
3	Political Analysis	-	-
4	International Organization	19	a, b, c
5	British Journal of Political Science	-	-
6	Quarterly Journal of Political Science	-	-
7	Political Science Research and Methods	2	b
8	Journal of Peace Research	4	b
9	Political Psychology	-	-
10	European Political Science Review	3	b
11	Journal of Conflict Resolution	10	b
12	West European Politics	-	-
13	Review of International Political Economy	-	-
14	Policy and Society	-	-
15	Perspective on Politics	-	-
16	International Security	16	b
17	International Affairs	26	a, b, c
18	Review of International Organizations	2	b
19	World Politics	2	b
20	European Union Politics	-	-

When we analyse Table 3, we see that 11 of the 20 foreign journals we examined have published articles about the seas. Only 2 of these journals (*International Organization*

[55] Scimago, https://www.scimagojr.com, accessed February 2, 2022.
[56] The Journals are ranked according to their impact factors in the area of political science and IR in 2021 (Scopus).
[57] Focus areas are (a) maritime economics, b) sea power, c) maritime domain studies.

and *International Affairs*) had publications on a,[58] b[59] and c-type[60] articles. *International Organization* has published a total of 19 relevant publications, 7 of which are about a and b, with the remaining 5 being about c. *International Affairs* has published 5 articles about a and c, and 16 about b. There is even one article about sea blindness in this journal. This article has been categorised as c in our analysis, because it is more related to c.

As we can see from Table 3, maritime issues are not frequently studied in foreign journals either. They have been studied only in certain foreign journals with dimensions of a, b and c. This situation shows that there is partial sea blindness in foreign journals as well. However, when the articles in these journals are compared with Turkish IR literature, we can see that dimensions of a, b and c have been studied more in the foreign journals. Contrarily, only the dimension of a is studied frequently in Turkish IR literature. Therefore, we may conclude by saying that there is a lesser degree of sea blindness in global IR literature as compared to Turkish literature.

5. Conclusion

The five sea basins, a concept developed to describe Turkey's sphere of influence, are regions that are frequently studied by Turkish IR scholars and are used to refer to the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea and Black Sea. However, the publications made by Turkish scholars in these regions, which are important for Turkish foreign policy, are generally about sea power, or to be more precise, they are largely security- and defence-oriented. Moreover, when we look at the manuscripts published in refereed journals in the discipline of IR in Turkey, we see that there are not many articles on the other two important dimensions, namely maritime economics and maritime domain studies. On the other hand, books/book chapters published by the publishing houses are mostly written about the five sea basins, and again focus on sea power in international politics.

Whether we evaluate on a basin basis or with all dimensions of maritime supremacy included, we can say that sea blindness is present in Turkish IR literature because scholars do not focus on the two major dimensions of maritime supremacy (maritime economics and maritime domain studies), nor do they take into account all dimensions of maritime supremacy. Another point that should be noted is that the number of security/defence publications based on sea power are also low. Such publications in Turkish IR literature increase cyclically

[58] The following are some examples of a-type articles in global IR literature: Lawrence Juda, "World shipping, UNCTAD, and the New International Economic Order," *International Organization* 35, no. 3 (1981): 493–516; Alan W. Cafruny, "The Political Economy of International Shipping: Europe versus America," *International Organization* 39, no. 1 (1985): 79–119; William T. Burke, "Who goes Where, When, and How: International Law of the Sea for Transportation," *International Organization* 31, no. 2 (1977): 267–89; Francis T. Christy, "Transitions in the Management and Distribution of International Fisheries," *International Organization* 31, no. 2 (1977): 235–65; John S. Maclay, "The General Shipping Situation Get access Arrow," *International Affairs* 22, no. 4 (1946): 488–500.

[59] The following are some examples of b-type articles: Ann L. Hollick, "Canadian-American Relations: Law of the Sea," *International Organization* 28, no. 4 (1974): 755–80; Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfeld, "Outer Space, Antarctica, and the United Nations," *International Organization* 13, no. 3 (1959): 363–79; Evan Luard, "The Law of the Sea Conference," *International Affairs* 50, no. 2 (1974): 268–78; Mark J. Valencia, "Asia, the Law of the Sea and International Relations," *International Affairs* 73, no. 2 (1997): 263–82; Tan; See Sang, "Consigned to Hedge: South-east Asia and America's 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' Strategy," *International Affairs* 96, no. 1 (2020): 131–48.

[60] The following are some examples of c-type articles: Richard N. Gardner, "The Role of the UN in Environmental Problem," *International Organization* 26, no. 2 (1972): 237–54; Bernhard J. Abrahamsson, "The Marine Environment and Ocean Shipping: Some Implications for a New Law of the Sea," *International Organization* 31, no. 2 (1977): 291–311; Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, "Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies," *International Affairs* 93, no. 6 (2017): 1293–311; Barry J. Ryan, "The Disciplined Sea: A History of Maritime Security and Zonation," *International Affairs* 95, no. 5 (2019): 1055–073; Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds, and Barry J. Ryan, "Maritime Security: the Uncharted Politics of the Global Sea," *International Affairs* 95, no. 5 (2019): 971–78.

when Turkish foreign policy faces disputes in maritime jurisdiction areas (such as the Aegean or the Eastern Mediterranean). Of course, a similar situation exists in IR literature at the global level. IR and foreign policy analyses are generally made about the land area of states. However, it should be noted that such publications that focus on all dimensions of maritime supremacy are still more common globally when compared to Turkish IR literature.

Turkish IR literature lacks a broader vision about the seas and underestimates the importance of maritime supremacy for foreign policy-making. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire, Turkey's predecessor, was a major sea power and controlled the seas of the Eastern Mediterranean for more than seven centuries. Modern Turkey should be similarly aware of the importance of the seas for foreign policy and should have a broader vision by prioritising maritime economics and maritime domain studies as key factors of maritime supremacy. Focusing solely on sea power is not enough to create a nation aware of the importance of the seas. And it should be stated that even this focus on sea power has flourished mostly as a result of the recent clashes with Greece and Greek Cypriots, caused by the ongoing dispute in recent decades about the sovereignty of the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. If not for this dispute, one can say that Turks would be relatively unaware of the importance of the seas. Therefore, it is clear that there is a need for ample publications in all areas of maritime supremacy in Turkish IR literature. In the future, it is expected that Turkish scholars will publish more articles and books/book chapters about these vital topics.

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The Trajectory of International Relations Dissertations in Turkish Academia Between 2000 and 2020*

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Abstract

Dissertations are among the most important elements of academic production, along with scientific research articles and books. They not only reveal an academic's field of research, but also provide clues as to what research methods and tools scholars will employ in postdoctoral studies. Moreover, and crucial to this paper, they are important indicators of the trajectory of research fields, as well as their general roles in the academic world. This study aims to reveal general trends/indicators in Turkish International Relations (hereafter IR) dissertations through an analysis of IR dissertations written in various Turkish universities between 2000 and 2020. There is a rather widespread claim among IR academics in Turkey that this particular community largely contributes to the Western-oriented discipline of IR as local or regional experts, dealing mainly with Turkish foreign policy and regional problems rather than with theoretical concerns in IR. A further aim of this study is to test whether this claim remains valid with the analysis of recent IR dissertations produced in Turkish universities.

Keywords: IR studies in Turkey, dissertations, International Relations theories, diplomatic history, international law

1. Introduction

The discipline of International Relations (IR), born in Britain in the early 20th century and cultivated as a Western-oriented discipline in the United States after World War II, has spread to the periphery, including Turkey, over time. During the Cold War period, the development of the discipline of IR —which had arguably become a distinctly "American science"[1]— had

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[1] Hoffmann's study was the first article to address the fact that the discipline developed under the hegemony of the United States or the "core". See Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106, no. 3 (2019): 41–60. After Hoffman's distinctive study, some scholars began to pay more attention to the trajectory of IR in the periphery, in order to challenge the American dominance in this discipline. For further discussion: Norman D. Palmer, "The Study of International Relations in the United States: Perspectives of a Half Century," *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (1980): 343–63; K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston: Allen&Unwin, 1985); Ole Waever, "The

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its own limitations in the periphery, which in part led to the voices of periphery scholars having little resonance in the Western academic world.

More recently, however, a critical approach has emerged across the last three decades, in the Third World generally and in Turkey particularly, that underscores the need for the internationalization or globalization of IR studies.[2] In the Turkish context, scholars following such an approach frequently highlight that the IR community in Turkey has largely contributed to the Western-oriented discipline of IR as local or regional experts, dealing mainly with Turkish foreign policy and regional problems rather than with theoretical work in the field.[3] One central aim of this study is to test the validity of such a claim through an examination of dissertations written at Turkish universities over the last two decades. Moreover, and linked to the aim above, we also seek to reveal general trends/indicators in Turkish IR dissertations, as evidenced by the distribution of dissertation topics by university (including state and foundation universities), as well as by language, gender, and discipline.

Dissertations are, of course, among the most important elements (along with scholarly articles and books) in the production of academic knowledge. There are three main reasons behind their importance. First, for any discipline, dissertations constitute a first step towards becoming a scientist. Second, dissertations provide comprehensive information about the main research areas of scholars. Third, they provide clues as to what research methods and topics scholars may use in their postdoctoral phase. Considering that some researchers will hold senior positions in universities after their PhDs, examining the dissertations will inevitably be helpful in identifying the general trends in both specific topics and methodologies among Turkish IR scholars.

The study is divided into three main sections. The first section presents a brief review of the extant literature on this subject. The second, "Methodology and Research Design", details how we have collected and classified the data. In the third section, "Evaluation of Dissertations and Findings", we examine dissertations in two parts. In the first, we classify dissertations in terms of year, university type, discipline, gender, and language, as part of a quantitative analysis. In the second, we determine the main and sub-research fields of dissertations under the discipline of IR. The data enable us to identify both the general trends in the field of IR based on dissertations in Turkey and the contribution of Turkish scholars to global IR.

2. Literature Review

There are a number of significant studies in the literature that, based on dissertations or publications, deal with the state of Turkish IR studies, scholars, and IR-related studies. In particular, since 2007, the International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT) has played a

Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Development in International Relations," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 687–727; Ersel Aydınlı and Julie Mathews, "Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious World of Publishing in Contemporary International Studies," *International Studies Perspectives* 1 (2000): 289–303.

[2] Aydınlı and Mathews, "Are the Core...,"; Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin, "Widening the World of IR: A Typology of Home-grown Theorizing," *All Azimuth* 7, no. 1 (2008): 45–68; Ersel Aydınlı and Julie Mathews, "Periphery Theorising for a Truly Internationalised Discipline: Spinning IR Theory Out of Anatolia," *Review of International Studies*, no. 34 (2008): 693–712; Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): 647–59; Deniz Kuru, "Homegrown Theorizing: Knowledge, Scholars, Theory," *All Azimuth* 7, no. 1 (2018): 69–86; Pınar Bilgin and Zeynep Gülşah Çapan, "Introduction to the Special Issue Regional International Relations and Global Worlds: Globalising of International Relations," *Uluslararası* İlişkiler 18, no. 70 (2021): 1–11.

[3] Korhan Yazgan, "The Development of International Relations Studies in Turkey" (PhD diss., University of Exeter, 2012), 11–2.

leading role in developing knowledge about the transformations of the discipline of IR in Turkey and its contribution to global IR studies. In 2007 and 2009, IRCT carried out two surveys among IR scholars to assess their preferences, teaching experience, and the future prospects of the discipline.[4] Following these quantitative studies, IRCT has since carried out similar research in collaboration with the Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at the College of William and Mary on the Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) project.[5] In addition to the crucial contribution of the IRCT, two important studies have recently addressed the situation of IR scholars in Turkey. First, a study by Balcı, Cicioğlu, and Kalkan deals with the analysis of IR scholars and departments in Turkey, using data collected from Google Scholar citation counts.[6] Secondly, Emre Erdoğan reveals the academic background of IR and IR-related scholars working in Turkish universities using social network analysis.[7]

On studies dealing mainly with the state of IR studies in Turkey, there are three main articles. Firstly, Demir and Avcı survey the academic state of Turkish terrorism studies in comparison with international studies by collecting data from dissertations, articles, and interviews with terrorism experts.[8] Their work, which employs both quantitative and qualitative research methods, focuses on terrorism studies, which can be evaluated under the umbrella of security studies. In this respect, Demir and Avcı's study seems to share common grounds with our research evaluating IR-related dissertations. However, our research differs from their work in two important ways: we focus on the general tendency of the discipline of IR based on dissertations, and we rely only on quantitative methods. Secondly, Yüksel aims to provide a brief overview of the state of Iranian studies in Turkey, with particular attention to three dissertations from various Turkish universities over the last three decades.[9] This study, based on a content analysis of these dissertations, contributes to the assessment of the condition of regional studies in Turkey. Finally, Turan's article is another example, this time one dealing with American studies as a part of regional or area studies.[10] This article also bears certain similarities to our research, though it differs in important ways. In terms of similarities, clearly, Turan deals with an important topic directly related to the field of IR through an evaluation of American Culture and Literature Programs and publications based in the USA, including academic and scholarly journals, books, and research institutions. However, Turan has not paid special attention to dissertations written about the USA or US foreign policy under the umbrella of IR.

On the other hand, there are a few studies in the literature that focus on dissertations. However, it can be said that these studies do not deal with all dissertations in the field of

[4] Mustafa Aydın, "Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler akademisyenlerinin bilimsel araştırma ve uygulamaları ile disipline bakış açıları ile siyasi tutumları anketi," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 4, no. 15 (2007): 1-31; Mustafa Aydın and Korhan Yazgan, "Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler akademisyenleri araştırma, eğitim ve disiplin değerlendirmeleri anketi-2009," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 7, no 25 (2010): 3-42.

[5] See Mustafa Aydın and Cihan Dizdaroğlu, "Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler: TRIP 2018 sonuçları üzerine bir değerlendirme," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 16, no. 64 (2019): 3-28.

[6] Ali Balcı, Filiz Cicioğlu and Duygu Kalkan, "Türkiye'deki Uluslararası İlişkiler ve bölümlerinin akademik etkilerinin Google Scholar verilerinden hareketle incelenmesi," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 16, no. 64 (2019): 58–75.

[7] Emre Erdoğan, "Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler ve ilişkili dallarda görev yapan akademisyenlerin ilişkisellikleri: bir sosyal ağ analiz denemesi," in *Türkiye'nin Modernleşme Süreci ve Mekteb-i Mülkiye,* ed. Orhan Çelik, Can Umut Çiner and Abdullah Pekel (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 2021): 485–515.

[8] Cenker Korhan Demir and Engin Avcı, "Turkish Terrorism Studies: A Preliminary Assessment," *All Azimuth* 7, no. 1 (2018): 21–44.

[9] Metin Yüksel, "Iranian Studies in Turkey," *Iranian Studies* 48, no. 4 (2015): 531–50.

[10] İlter Turan, "Area and International Studies in Turkey: The Case of the United States," *All Azimuth* 1, no. 1 (2012): 50–63.

International Relations, but rather focus on specific topics, such as terrorism and migration.[11] Overall, considering all these studies, our research promises to fill a gap in the literature with special attention to all PhD dissertations, in terms of university, discipline, gender, language, and more. Additionally, we aim to show the general trends of dissertations by identifying their fields under the umbrella of IR.

3. Methodology and Research Design

We collected the data from the Council of Higher Education's National Theses Centre (NTC) website. Before collecting data from the NTC, we determined which research method would be more useful to obtain a broad picture of our discipline in terms of dissertations across the last two decades. There were two options: either an (IR) department-based search, or a keyword-based search. As is well known, besides IR departments, there are many departments and institutions at Turkish universities where researchers study IR-related topics or subjects. Therefore, we thought that collecting data not only from dissertations written in International Relations (and Political Science and International Relations/PSIR) departments, but also from those in departments related to IR, such as European Union Studies, Security Studies, History, or Regional Studies (mostly Middle Eastern Studies), would provide a better understanding from which to evaluate the state of our discipline. For this reason, we chose the term "international relations" as a keyword instead of conducting a department-based search.

We found 1,544 registered dissertations written across various university departments.[12] However, it was necessary to exclude certain dissertations deemed irrelevant to the field of IR. In order to determine which dissertations could not be evaluated under the umbrella of IR, we took into account their abstracts, keywords, departments, and titles. We thus settled on 1,415 dissertations to be examined in this study.

Based on these 1,415 dissertations, our study has two main aims. First, we aim to explain the general trajectory of our discipline by providing specific information about the researchers and universities where IR-related dissertations have been written over the last two decades. To this end, the data were classified according to the gender of the researchers, the language of the study, the year of dissertation submission, the university, and the department. Moreover, we classified these universities into state or foundation-run universities. Secondly, while defining the potential contribution of Turkish scholars to global IR studies, we aimed to reveal which subjects or topics have been prominent in IR studies due to international or regional developments. After collecting the data, we classified the dissertations by looking at titles, keywords, and abstracts. We defined five main and several sub-fields to show which research fields gained momentum in IR studies during which years.

In this study, we used bibliometric analysis and qualitative content analysis to categorize the data, examining the dissertation abstract and keywords. Bibliometric analysis became a method by which we could categorize dissertations quantitatively.[13] As we know, bibliometric

[11] Rasim Özgür Dönmez, Kasım Timur, "An Evaluation of Ph.D. Dissertations on Terrorism Studies in Turkey," *Alternatif Politika*, no. 1 (2017): 131–41; Elif Alkar, Emin Atasoy, "Türkiye'de göç üzerine yapilan doktora tezlerine yönelik bir içerik analizi," *Tesam Akademi Dergisi*, no. 1 (2020): 67–89; Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın, Nilay Neyişçi, "A Review of Graduate Dissertations on Migration in Turkey: 1967-2018," *OPUS Uluslararası Toplum Araştırmaları Dergisi* 16, no. 29 (2020): 1628–641.

[12] If we conduct a department-based research by using the term "international relations", we reach 696 dissertations written in International Relations departments in Turkish universities. Thus, compared to keyword-based search, we come across much fewer dissertations. In this case, we might miss dissertations related to IR discipline but written in different departments.

[13] See further information: S. M. Lawani, "Bibliometrics: Its Theoretical Foundations, Methods, and Applications,"

analysis is a method that researchers use to analyse data. It is also a research field that applies mathematical and statistical techniques to study published models of information distribution. From this point of view, we have tried to use this method to determine the evolution of dissertations and general trends in time and space. In fact, this method is also used in the analysis of dissertations.[14] However, a bibliometric analysis based on IR dissertations in Turkey has not been done yet.[15] Moreover, qualitative content analysis is used to draw conclusions not only about the frequency of occurrence of words in a text, but also about the context and meaning of related words.[16] So, it can be said that our study is a good candidate to fill this gap in the literature by combining both approaches, using bibliometric analysis to codify the statistical information and qualitative content analysis to show the categories in which the dissertations were studied.

As seen in Table 1 below, in determining the main fields, we set out from a traditional categorization widely accepted by IR scholars: we initially divided IR studies into three main fields, namely "International Law" (IL), "International Relations Theory" (IR T), and "Diplomatic History" (DH). However, when analysing the data, it became necessary to add categories in order to define our discipline more clearly. For example, if a dissertation on IL or IR T included a case study, we used two additional main categories, such as IL+Case and IR T+Case. In particular, by using the category of IR T+Case, we aimed to reveal that researchers focused on the case with a theoretical framework, rather than making a purely theoretical contribution to global IR. At the same time, in order to clarify the difference between pure IL studies without cases and case-oriented IL dissertations, we elected to add IL+Case as another main field. The five main fields of our research thus were: IR T, IR T+Case, IL, IL+Case, and DH.

Yet the question remains, which criteria helped us to make a distinction between the main fields of IR T and IR T+Case? After much discussion, we reached a consensus to follow two approaches through which dissertations could be evaluated under the category of IR T or IR T+Case. First, when reviewing titles and abstracts, we ensured that when a theoretical framework was indicated alongside a case (e.g., "constructivism is used as the theoretical framework for this study"), we categorized the dissertation as IR T+Case–"constructivism". If the researcher did not directly mention a theoretical perspective, we tried to categorize such dissertations by looking at abstracts and keywords. For example, if the researcher's study was about global identity/European identity, we preferred to categorize his/her study as "constructivism". However, if she/he focused on national identity, we evaluated it as "nationalism/ethnic studies/minorities". Similarly, if research was conducted on perceptions, discourse, otherization, or securitization, we used such keywords as "poststructuralism/ postmodernism/securitization" when classifying.[17]

International Journal of Libraries and Information Studies 31, no. 4 (1981): 294–315; Virgil P. Diadato and Peter Gellatly, *Dictionary of Bibliometrics* (New York: Routledge, 1994).

[14] For an example, please see: Judith Wood, "The Growth of Scholarship: An Online Bibliometric Comparison of Dissertations in the Sciences and Humanities," *Scientometrics* 13, no. 1-2 (1988): 53–62.

[15] Elvan Çokişler, "Uluslararası Ilişkiler Dergisi'nin Bibliometric Analizi (2044-2017)," *Uİ Dergisi* no. 64 (2019): 29–56.

[16] Alexander L. George, "İçerik Çözümlemesinde Nicel ve Nitel Yaklaşımlar," in İletişim Araştırmalarında İçerik Çözümlemesi, ed. and trans. Murat Sadullah Çebi (Ankara: Alternatif Yayınları, 2003), 14.

[17] At this point, we need to underline the following to clarify our categorization. Undoubtedly, the discipline of IR is too interdisciplinary to be divided into five main categories. Looking at our discipline, it is relatively easy to define the fields of diplomatic history and international law. However, the field that makes discipline IR interdisciplinary is theoretical studies. Traditional international relations theories have inspired new study fields that have developed in recent years. For example, security, strategy and terrorism studies, foreign policy analysis, and international politics can be evaluated within the framework of realism, on the other hand international organizations and international society can be evaluated under the umbrella of idealism. Therefore,

A further step was needed to specify the main fields in order to map the evolution of our discipline in a more textured manner. When classifying main fields according to basic topics such as human rights, international treaties, law of the sea for IL/IL+Case, or realism/idealism and constructivism for IR T/IR T+Case, new categories were needed for these areas, such as concept analysis for both, or security studies, nationalism, and conflict studies for IR T/IR T+Case, instead of including security studies in realism or nationalism in constructivism. The reason for this is that during our research, we realized that several topics related to concept analysis, security studies and nationalism/ethnic studies occupied a significant place in researchers' agendas as dominant areas of study in the discipline of IR in Turkey.

For DH, we defined several sub-categories for classification, such as "Turkish Foreign Policy" (TFP), Regional Policy, Ottoman History/Diplomacy, and European History. To discuss the aforementioned main argument that Turkish IR research has only contributed to Western-oriented IR by dealing with Turkish foreign policy and regional problems rather than through theoretical studies in IR, we have made several sub-divisions in the categories of TFP and Ottoman History/Diplomacy. Within this framework, we employed the following sub-categories: bilateral relations, regional politics, and general issues. We applied the same method to the categories of IR T+Case and IL+Case to find out which issues have been studied and why Turkish researchers have focused on these cases, taking into account international and regional events that took place during the preparation of these dissertations.

Table 1- Main fields and their identification

Main Fields	Identification
Diplomatic History (DH)	-Turkish Foreign Policy (Bilateral relations, regional politics, and general issues) -Regional Policy (The Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, the Balkans, Russian foreign policy and US foreign policy) -Ottoman History/diplomacy (Bilateral relations, regional politics, and general issues) -European History -Others (Historical comparative analysis, the history of cold war, the history of international organizations etc.)
International Law (IL)	-Concept Analysis (Arbitration, non-Intervention, use of Force, humanitarian intervention, international waters, terrorism, genocide, international migration, displaced people, environment, sovereignty/state, humanitarian intervention, international responsibility, arbitration, internationalization) -Human Rights/Law -International Treaties -Others (Islamic law, humanitarian law etc.)
International Law with a Case Study (IL+Case)	-Human Rights/Minority Rights -International Disputes -Law of the Sea -EU Law -Intervention Law -Protection/Peace Keeping -Environmental Law -Refugee Rights -Self-Defence

while designing our study on the basis of certain categories, we thought that it would be appropriate to consider all these study fields under the umbrella of international relations theories. Thus, we were able to generate a more evaluable dataset.

International Relations Theory (IR T)	-Concept Analysis (type of states, hegemony, sovereignty etc.) -Security Studies -Realism/Neorealism -Critical/Post-positivism -Conflict Studies -Others (Theoreticians, virtual diplomacy)
International Relations Theory with a Case Study (IR T+Case)	-Security Studies -Concept Analysis (Sovereignty, the type of state, public diplomacy, migration etc. -Nationalism/Ethnic Studies -Realism/Idealism (with Neo's) -Critical Theory -Social/Constructivism, -Post-structuralism/Postmodernism -Globalization -Securitization -Conflict Studies -Geopolitics -International System -Decision Making -Gender/Green Theory -Others (Development studies, energy studies)

We have already mentioned that we employed the term "international relations" as a keyword instead of as an academic department while collecting the data. In order to make a comparison between dissertations written in IR departments (including PSIR) and dissertations written in IR-related departments, we used two main indicators, particularly in Part 1: "Only IR" and "Others". While "only IR" refers to dissertations completed in IR and PSIR departments, "others" indicates dissertations in IR-related departments.

4. Evaluation of Dissertations and Findings

4.1. General findings

Turkish higher education has experienced an upward trend in the last 20 years, in terms of both an increasing number of universities and the universities' qualifications. After 2006, the increasing number of universities, whether state or foundation-run, has not only affected the capacity for undergraduate education in Turkey, but has also triggered the creation of new PhD programs. As seen in Figure 1, the number of dissertations in IR studies has been steadily increasing since 2000. Figure 1 shows that while the number of dissertations has declined in certain years, in general, there has been a spectacular increase in the total number of dissertations. While only eight dissertations were written in 2000, the total number of dissertations reached 141 by 2020.



Figure 1: The Number of Dissertations Between 2000-2020

As mentioned earlier, topics related to IR have been addressed not only in IR/PSIR departments, but also in other departments at Turkish universities, since IR has a multidisciplinary character, and its areas of study are closely connected to other disciplines. As seen in Figure 2, the number of dissertations written in IR-related departments shows the leading role that EU and History departments have played, among other departments. Throughout the research, we found that both the number of EU-related departments and the number of dissertations in these departments increased as a result of the start of Turkey's EU accession negotiations in 2005. On the other hand, the departments of History, Ataturk Principles and Revolutionary History, and Turkish Studies have contributed to the main field of DH. In addition, the security/strategy departments at the Police Academy, the Turkish Military Academy and the Turkish War Colleges have played an important role in the development of security studies since 2010, focusing on terrorism and terrorist organizations.



Figure 2: The Number of Dissertations Written in IR-Related Departments Between 2000-2020

Figure 3 shows the gender distribution among PhD researchers. Until a few years ago, male scholars held a historically hegemonic position in the academic community, regardless of discipline. Although we are still far from full gender equality in the Turkish IR community, the increasing number of female researchers is a significant development. For 2019, the percentage of female research assistants in the departments of International Relations and Political Science and International Relations in Turkey was found to be 38% (compared to 50.4% in Turkey in general).[18] Clearly, this percentage is well below the average for Turkey. Looking at Figure 3, we can see a similar trend in IR studies based on PhD researchers. By 2020, the number of male researchers seems to be almost double the number of female researchers. As we can see in Figure 4-5, the ratio of male and female researchers is very close, both in the category of Only IR and in the category of Others.



Figure 3: The Number of Dissertations According to Gender



Figure 4-5: Gender-Based Distribution by Departments

The number of Turkish state and foundation-run universities has increased significantly since the second half of the 2000s. In addition to state universities, the number of foundation-run universities has also increased significantly. Today, there are 203 universities in Turkey, of which 129 are state and 74 are foundation-run universities. However, we were unable to obtain clear information on how many of these universities offer IR or IR-related PhD programs, despite having consulted the data on the Council of Higher Education's (YÖK)

[18] Birgül Demirtaş and Zuhal Yeşilyurt Gündüz, "Türkiye'de Uİ disiplininde kadın akademisyen olmak: cam tavanlar ve fildişi bodrumlar," *Alternatif Politika* 12, no. 1 (2020): 230.

website and interviewed experts working for YÖK and the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA). Though there is a lack of clear information, we can assume that the number of PhD programs at state universities is higher than at foundation-run universities. Similarly, Figure 6 shows that the number of dissertations written at state universities is much higher than at foundation-run universities. At the same time, there has been an increase in the number of dissertations in foundation-run universities over the last twenty years. If we look at state universities, we see a remarkable increase in dissertations. Figure 7-8 shows that the number of dissertations from only IR departments at foundation-run universities is higher than those at Others. Therefore, we can conclude that the number of PhD programs in only IR departments at foundation-run universities is higher than Others.



Figure 6: The Number of Dissertations According to State or Foundation-Run Universities



Figure 7-8: University Ownership-Related Distribution by Disciplines

Figure 9 shows the top 10 state universities that have played an important role in producing dissertations. İstanbul University, Ankara University, and Marmara University are among the top three. While collecting the data, we also noted the existence of different PhD programs, particularly at Istanbul University and Marmara University, such as EU, Middle East, and IR studies. This situation explains why İstanbul and Marmara University are among the top three. It is also worth noting that Yıldırım Beyazıt University, with 25 dissertations, is ranked 10th as a young state university.



Figure 9: The Number of Dissertations Written at State Universities (Top 10)

Figure 10 shows the top 10 foundation-run universities that have played a prominent role in dissertation writing. As the first foundation-run university in Turkey, Bilkent University ranks first, with 54 dissertations.



Figure 10: The Number of Dissertations Written in Foundation-run Universities (Top 10)

Figure 11 reveals the language used in dissertations. The number of dissertations written in Turkish is much higher than that of other languages. It should be noted that most of the foreign language dissertations are written in English (354 English, 7 French, 1 Arabic). The higher percentage of Turkish dissertations is due to the fact that most dissertations are written in such state universities as Istanbul University, Ankara University, and Marmara University, where Turkish is the language of instruction. Also crucial is the fact that 132 of the 146 dissertations written in foundation-run universities are in English. From this point of

view, one can argue that foundation-run universities have done much to transcend language barriers and to contribute to global IR studies.



Figure 11: The Number of Dissertations According to Language

According to Figure 12-13, 30.29 percent of dissertations written in only IR departments are in English, and 17.98 percent of dissertations in Others are in English. Based on this, IR departments appear to have a distinctly "international feature" compared to Others.



Figure 12-13: Language-Based Distribution by Disciplines

4.2. Evaluation of dissertations according to the main and sub-fields of IR

Figure 14 demonstrates that the field of IR T+Case has the leading number of dissertations (633) produced among the five main fields, followed by DH and IL+Case. It is worth noting that the number of dissertations classified as IR T is quite low (58). The lowest number of dissertations was produced in the field of IL. The data show that there are still many dissertations written in the field of DH, and that DH remains a dominant research area within IR T+Case. The high number of IR T+Case dissertations might lead us to assume an increasing interest in theoretical studies in IR since 2000. However, it is important to emphasize that the majority of these studies have focused on explaining a case with a Western-oriented perspective rather than on making a purely theoretical contribution to global IR.



Figure 14: The Number of Dissertations According to Main Fields in IR

If we look at the most frequently studied topics in DH, we notice that those related to Turkish foreign policy receive far more attention than other topics, as seen in Figure 15. If we add topics related to Ottoman history/diplomacy to this theme, it becomes clear that Turkey's foreign policy attracts much more attention in DH, in line with the general opinion. Figure 16 shows that studies in this area have increased over the years, in parallel with an increase in the number of dissertations. However, compared to other fields, the increase between the years of 2015 and 2020 is remarkable. Researchers may have been influenced by crucial developments and problems in Turkish foreign policy after 2015, bearing in mind Turkish foreign policy's entanglement in regional crises since 2011.



Figure 15: The Number of Dissertations in Diplomatic History

Besides TFP, one of the most studied areas of DH is regional policy, used here to refer to studies of areas such as the Middle East, Central Asia, or the Balkans. According to the

data, the Middle East is the most studied region, with 60 dissertations, followed by Russian foreign policy (29) and US foreign policy (19). Looking more closely, post-2010 Iran (15) and post-2014 Egypt (12) are the most studied countries in the Middle East region. The regions of China/India (15), the Balkans (10) and the Caucasus (10) have also received significant attention within area studies. In accordance with the general opinion, although regional policy is a separate category of Turkey's foreign policy, when looking at the regions and countries studied, the countries which Turkey has regular problems with are studied more, suggesting that researchers have largely limited themselves to Turkey's foreign policy agenda within DH and, by and large, have not been interested in other areas of IR studies.



Figure 16: The Quantitative Distribution of Dissertations in Diplomatic History by Years

In order to determine which topics have been studied under the umbrella of TFP, we had to classify Turkish policy studies based on topics and abstracts. In the process, three sub-categories were added to TFP: bilateral relations, which refers to Turkey's relations with a specific country; regional politics, which refers to Turkish foreign policy towards a specific region; and general, which indicates a time period or specific topic directly related to TFP. As shown in Figure 17, Turkey's bilateral relations with other countries (188) occupy a hegemonic position among studies on Turkish foreign policy. The number of dissertations written in departments related to IR is also remarkable. For example, 78 of the 188 dissertations were written in IR/PSIR departments, while 72 were written in History departments. Similarly, 15 of the 40 dissertations on EU relations were written in EU Studies departments, while 13 dissertations in this context were written in IR/PSIR departments. Clearly, as noted earlier, the contribution of History and EU Studies departments to studies on Turkish foreign policy is significant. In the case of bilateral relations, the range of countries is quite wide. However, relations with the EU (40), the US (28) and Russia/ USSR (18) were the most studied. This was followed by Middle Eastern countries (30). On the other hand, African (3) and Latin American (1) regions do not seem to occupy an important place in the research agenda of PhD students. Cyprus (6), long a key foreign policy issue, Greece (8) and Armenia (2), with which Turkey has a problematic relationship, are among the least studied countries.

Examining "regional politics" as a sub-category of Turkish foreign policy, we found that the Middle East (9) was the most studied region, followed by the Balkans (4) and the Caucasus (4) regions. The data show us that although regional policy occupies a very small place in Turkish foreign policy, the issues studied in this area are generally limited to Turkey's neighbouring regions.

Related to data gathered on "general" issues of Turkish foreign policy, three topics seem to predominate: the foreign policy approaches of political parties (8), the foreign policy preferences of political leaders (7), and public diplomacy (6). Davutoğlu's foreign policy approach has attracted more attention among these issues between 2014 and 2019. Another interesting finding is that the general problems of Turkish foreign policy have largely been ignored by PhD students as a primary research agenda. In this context, the Cyprus issue (2), the Armenian issue (1) and the Kurdish issue (1) were the least addressed topics.



Figure 17: The Number of Dissertations in Turkish Foreign Policy by Sub-Areas

In examining dissertations in the categories of IL and IL+Case, we found that the field of international law includes very few and inadequate dissertations, both in terms of the number of dissertations in general and in terms of the diversity of topics within the field. As seen in Figure 18, concepts related to the field were mainly analysed in the category of IL. The most studied concepts were humanitarian intervention, international migration, international responsibility and sovereignty/state. In the category of "Others", 10 different concepts that were the subject of 10 different dissertations did not provide us with statistically significant data. In addition, the subject of human rights seems to attract the most attention in international law.



Figure 18: The Number of Dissertations in International Law

As can be seen from Figure 19, the categories of human rights and minority rights were mostly studied through a case rather than as a general IL subject. International disputes, law of the sea, EU law, intervention law, protection/peacekeeping, environmental law, refugee rights and self-defence in the main field of IL+Case appear to have attracted research attention to a similar extent. Notable is that in the field of law of the sea, studies on the dispute between Greece and Turkey over maritime territories were the most prominent (6), and that law and EU-related departments of universities have made a significant contribution to the fields of EU law and law of the sea. There is consequently a major deficit in the field of international law in IR/PSIR departments; the field seems to be generally ignored by IR researchers.



Figure 19: The Number of Dissertations in International Law with a Case Study

Looking at Figure 20, IR researchers in Turkey appear to have little interest in IR T, in accordance with the main argument mentioned at the outset. While only 58 out of 1,415 dissertations are in the field of IR T, the number of researchers dealing with case studies in a theoretical framework is many times higher than the numbers of IR T, as seen in Figure 14 and Figure 22. This comparison yields an intriguing result: Although IR researchers are familiar with Western-oriented IR theories and are very willing to apply IR theories to their dissertations, they do not have the same passion to make theoretical contributions to Global IR studies by developing a new approach or perspective.

If we look more closely at the distribution of topics in IR T, conceptual analysis has clearly played a leading role among other topics, as we see in the main field of IL. The most studied subjects were sovereignty (4), different types of states (4), war (3), and hegemony (2). Conceptual analysis was followed by security studies. In this field of study, the most important topics were national security, energy security, and environmental security. Further, the most studied theories were realism, neorealism, and critical and post-positivist approaches. In terms of universities, state universities seem to give more attention to theoretical studies as compared to foundation universities (86%). While foundation universities contributed to this area, with eight dissertations, Bilkent University (5) has contributed the most. Considering the distribution of dissertations in IR T by year in Figure 21, there is no significant increase. It should be noted here that the studies in question aimed to contribute to existing theories and concepts rather than to develop a new theory or perspective.



Figure 20: The Number of Dissertations in International Relations Theory



Figure 21: The Quantitative Distribution of Dissertations in International Relations Theory by Years

Examining Figure 22, we see that studies in the main field of IR T+Case have mostly focused on security studies.[19] There are two possible explanations for this. First, the security concerns that shape Turkish foreign policy have led to an increased interest among researchers in security studies. In this context, 84 of the 168 studies focused on issues directly related to Turkey's national security priorities (security relations with NATO, the USA and the EU, the PKK, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, or energy security), while other studies were tangentially related to Turkey's security concerns (such as Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda). Second, the high number of security studies is due to the high number of dissertations completed in the security studies departments of the Turkish Military Academy, the Police Academy and the Turkish War Colleges after 2010 (35).

It is generally accepted that female IR researchers mainly deal with cases from the perspective of constructivism, post-positivism, and peace studies rather than from the perspective of security, war, and military studies.[20] In this context, an evaluation of the data reveals that female researchers have carried out more studies (242/633) in the IR T+Case category than the general average of all studies. While the rate of studies produced by female researchers in the field of security is 20%, the rate of studies involving critical theory and post-positivist approaches is 28%. For male researchers, this rate is 30% and 19%, respectively. Evaluating these ratios, female researchers are seen to have conducted more studies in the fields of constructivism, post-positivism, and peace studies than male researchers. However, contrary to the general belief, female researchers do not appear to be less interested in security studies.

Besides security studies, one of the most studied areas is conceptual analysis. Here again, as in the categories of IL and IR T, the concepts of sovereignty and the state were the most analysed (10). Such further concepts as humanitarian intervention, international intervention,

[19] Securitization is shown in Figure 22 as a separate category from security studies. Although the field of securitization has been derived from security studies, it is inspired from a critical perspective rather than a traditional perspective regarding the interpretation of the security concept.

[20] Selcen Öner and Merve Özdemirkıran, "Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ) disiplininin eril dili ve Türkiye'de kadın Uİ akademisyenlerinin disiplinin eril diline bakışları,"*Alternatif Politika* 9, no. 3 (2017): 370.

terrorism, migration, pre-emptive war, soft power and public diplomacy have also been examined since 2007. The most analysed case within these concepts is Turkey. Researchers in this category also tend to have a Turkey-based research agenda rather than a global approach. It is seen that the third most studied area is nationalism/ethnic studies/minorities. Turkey has been studied mostly as a case study (22) in this area as well. Additionally, EU identity construction (11), nationalism in Russia and the Caucasus (9), and minorities in the Middle East and the Balkans (13) have made up the general research topics. If we analyse this data on the basis of university, it is seen that foundation universities have contributed most to this category at 80 studies, with the largest contribution coming from dissertations at Bilkent University (32).

Consequently, as seen in Figure 23, unlike other categories, the category of IR T+Case has seen a steady upward trend on a yearly basis, with a particular increase from 2019 to 2020. This trend suggests that the tendency of IR researchers to use theories as a main framework for their case studies will continue and increase.



Figure 22: The Number of Dissertations in International Relations Theory with a Case Study



Figure 23: The Quantitative Distribution of Dissertations in International Relations Theory with a Case Study by Years

5. Conclusion

Focusing on dissertations in IR written at Turkish universities over the last twenty years, this study has determined the trajectory of the discipline of IR in Turkey in two ways. First, we reached four general findings about the situation of our discipline and of IR researchers. The first is that the number of dissertations in IR studies has been steadily increasing since 2000. The second finding is that in terms of gender distribution among IR PhD researchers, we have yet to achieve full gender equality in the Turkish IR academic community, even if the number of female researchers (33 %) in our discipline has been steadily increasing. The third finding of our study is that the number of dissertations written at state universities is much higher than at foundation-run universities. In terms of foundation-run universities, Bilkent University, the first foundation-run university in Turkey, ranks first. Our last result here is that Turkish has been the most used language in dissertations, with English as a notable second. According to the language-based classification, foundation-run universities have contributed more than state universities to overcoming researchers' language barriers, en route to greater integration into the global IR academic community.

In addition to these general findings, our study shows which area has dominated IR and IR-related dissertations over the last twenty years in Turkey. One important caveat is in order. Examining 1,415 dissertations through content analysis presented the researchers with significant practical challenges. As noted earlier, we evaluated dissertations according to the five main fields. By this classification, clearly, the field of IR T+Case has the highest percentage, with 633 out of 1,415 dissertations, followed by DH and IL+Case. IR T and IL studies remain the lowest.

In light of this, four important findings are worth noting. First, the hegemony of IR T+Case might lead us to assume that such researchers have contributed to IR theories through their dissertations, in comparison to the other main fields. But the majority of IR T+Case dissertations have focused on explaining a case or a problem through a Western-oriented theory rather than setting in motion a theoretical discussion. Therefore, the high number

of studies in this area does not mean that Turkey's dependence on the Western-oriented IR discipline is low. Looking more closely at the IR T+Case field, we see that security studies, conceptual analysis and nationalism studies predominate in dissertations. Considering the number of security studies and concepts in dissertations, realist and neorealist theories have had a significant impact on Turkish IR researchers and their theoretical frameworks. The high number of studies on nationalism and constructivism as a theoretical framework also shows us that such studies on national identity are highly valued in Turkey, as in other peripheral/Third World countries.[21] Another interesting finding is the selection of case studies. Regardless of the theoretical framework employed, preferences tend to Turkey, or else to a country in line with TFP, for case studies. This finding leads us to conclude that Turkish researchers still maintain a research agenda focused largely on Turkish foreign policy.

Second, DH is the second main field to have attracted the attention of researchers, in addition to IR T+Case. The data has shown that TFP is the most studied area under the category of DH, especially in the context of bilateral relations. Within Turkey's bilateral relations, the EU as a transnational organization has been among the most studied topics. Considering the beginning of Turkey's negotiation process with the EU after 2004, this growing interest is understandable. On the other hand, dissertations on Turkey's bilateral relations with Middle Eastern countries have enjoyed increasing attention since 2015, essentially reflecting Turkey's troubled relations with the region.

Third, the data reveal that the field of IL has been systematically ignored since 2000. If we add the category of IL+Case (117) to IL (38), only 155 of 1,415 dissertations have been directly related to International Law. In addition to the number of such studies, IL and IL+Case fields are further limited in terms of the diversity of topics. In line with the spirit of the times, humanitarian intervention, international migration, international responsibility, and state/sovereignty problems rank high among the subjects of the field of IL+Case.

Fourth, the data appears to show that purely theoretical studies occupy a small place among dissertations, with 58 dissertations in IR. This small number seems to support the main argument that we emphasized at the beginning of this study. Additionally, classifying IR T dissertations in terms of their abstracts and keywords, we concluded that IR T dissertations consist of "concept analysis", "security studies", "realism/neorealism approach", "critical/post positivist approach" and "conflict studies". Researchers thus appear to tend toward discussions based on Western-oriented IR theories rather than toward developing an alternative perspective. That said, even in light of the limited theoretical contributions of Turkish IR studies to the global discipline of IR, our study has nonetheless pointed to a flourishing of different subjects and areas in IR studies, as well as to the growing interest of researchers in our discipline.

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[21] Amitav Acharya, "Küresel Uluslararası İlişkiler," in *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri*, ed. Tim Dunne et al (Ankara: Felix Kitap, 2021), 401.

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A Genealogy of the Concept of Civilization (Medeniyet) in Ottoman Political Thought: A Homegrown Perception?

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Abstract

Since the first translation of the concept of civilization into Turkish as "medeniyet" in 1837 by Sadık Rıfat Pasha, the then Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna, this coinage has turned out to be an essential component of Turkish modernization. This paper aims to establish a genealogy of the concept of "medeniyet" to demonstrate the divergences of Ottoman perceptions in different periods throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It argues that civilization was first perceived by a group of Ottoman intellectuals as a tool to reach an ideal state of being (c. 1840-1860). The next generation of Ottoman intellectuals (c. 1860-1890) defined civilization as "the" ideal state of being, yet they had different views on the concept, particularly concerning the distinction between material and moral elements of civilization. Finally, the third generation of Ottoman intellectuals (c. 1890-1920), whose thoughts were more or less crystallized under three broad political currents labeled as Westernism, Islamism, and Turkism, had different and sometimes contradicting perceptions of civilization based on their political outlooks. By referring to the writings of these intellectuals, the paper will discuss central debates on civilization in the late Ottoman Empire, such as the singularity/plurality of civilization(s), the existence of Islamic civilization as an alternative to European civilization, the degree of importing from European civilization, and the distinction between culture and civilization. Moreover, it argues that the Turkish perception of "medeniyet" is different from the European perception of "civilization"; in other words, while the Ottoman perception of the concept of civilization is not homeborn, it is homegrown. Accordingly, Ottoman intellectuals not only divided the material and moral elements of civilization and opted for importing the former, but they also questioned the singularity and supremacy of European civilization by referring to "Islamic civilization" either as an extinct yet once-present form of civilization or as a potential rival to European civilization.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire, civilization, modernization, medeniyet

1. Introduction

The word 'civilization,' which had emerged in Europe in the mid-18th century as an ideal to elevate humanity to a higher stage of being, reached Ottoman bureaucratic/intellectual circles in the 1830s. While translating and transmitting this concept, Ottoman bureaucrats/intellectuals did not simply emulate the European definition. They questioned the assertive

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connotations of the concept of civilization that degraded non-European societies by establishing a civilizational classification, and they redefined the concept by distinguishing between the material and moral elements of civilization, blending the European conceptualizations with Ottoman/Islamic notions and perceptions.

An analysis of the emergence and evolution of the concept of civilization in Europe and the Ottoman Empire is therefore essential to understanding how this concept dominated Ottoman intellectual debates as a homegrown, if not homeborn, concept. The debate on civilization was neither new nor genuine to the Ottomans. Recognition of European military superiority by the 18th century had already forced Ottoman intellectuals to think about the reasons for Ottoman decadence, and they began to associate recent European achievements with peculiar developments in the continent. This growing interest was evident in the ambassadorial reports of Ottoman envoys as well as in 18th-century Ottoman political writing. In other words, the Ottomans were aware of the 'civility' in Europe – if not the 'civilization' of Europe – before they had coined the word *medeniyet*. Moreover, similar discussions about European civilization were also evident in semi-independent states in the non-European world, including Persia, Siam, China, and Japan.[1] Their encounters with European colonial powers and the unequal treaty systems distorting their legal structure forced the intellectuals of these countries to consider the reasons for European supremacy, leading them to conclude that civilization, as a catchword, was useful in understanding how the Europeans began to dominate the world and how they could survive in this volatile environment. While Deringil labeled this Ottoman effort of translating and incorporating the concept of civilization into the Turkish political lexicon as a "survival tactic," Blumi argued that the Ottoman ruling elite extended this concept to develop a quasi-Orientalist account of the Ottoman periphery, as well as to use this concept as an intellectual bulwark against European imperialist/expansionist discourses.[2] In other words, the Ottomans utilized the concept of civilization for defining themselves vis-à-vis their constructed "others," both European and non-European.

This article considers civilization as a homegrown concept in Ottoman intellectual circles during "the longest century of the Empire."[3] It argues that the Ottoman perception of *medeniyet* was closely interrelated with the European conception of civilization; however, Ottoman intellectuals had different perceptions of various aspects of European civilization, including its definition as a practice or an idea, its universality, and its totality. The first debate on the concept of civilization was on the very nature of the concept, specifically whether it was a practice to reach an ideal condition, or if it embodied the very ideal condition itself. The second debate scrutinized the universality of the concept of civilization. The proponents of this debate not only questioned the European-ness of this concept but also asked whether there had been, and therefore would be, alternatives to current civilization. Finally, the third debate was the genuine contribution of Ottoman intellectuals to the conceptualization of civilization. Although European intellectuals tended to construct the notion of civilization as an all-encompassing concept covering all aspects of life, most Ottoman intellectuals preferred

[1] Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "The Sultan, the Shah and the King in Europe: The Practice of Ottoman, Persian and Siamese Royal Travel and Travel Writing," *Journal of Asian History* 50, no. 2 (2016): 201–34; Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Osmanlı ve Japon entelektüellerinin modernleşme ve medeniyet algılarının mukayesesi," in *Ortadoğu barışı için Türk-Japon işbirliği*, ed. Masanori Naito, İdris Danışmaz, Bahadır Pehlivantürk, Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık (Kyoto: Doshisha Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015), 10–23.

[2] Ozan Özavcı, *Dangerous Gifts: Imperialism, Security and Civil Wars in the Levant, 1798-1864* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 183.

[3] This expression belongs to İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun en uzun yüzyılı (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2017).

to distinguish between the material and moral elements of civilization. They recognized the necessity to adopt the material elements of civilization while replacing the moral elements with the morality of their own religion (i.e., Islam) or culture (i.e., Turkish culture). This article aims to explore these three debates on civilization to demonstrate the evolution of this concept in Ottoman intellectual circles and to underline the Ottoman contribution to the conceptualization of civilization.

Any search for a genealogy of civilization in the Ottoman Empire would not be immune to some generalizations. Yet, it is evident that the perception of civilization not only evolved but also diverged based on the ideological perspective of the intellectual writing on this concept. While generalizing the conceptualization of civilization to some extent by focusing on the debates on civilization, this article also noted that each debate had been popular at a particular period, and each debate had produced different views based on the ideological inclinations of the Ottoman intellectuals, although these ideological inclinations were crystallized as late as the first two decades of the 20th century. In other words, each debate was more visible in a particular historical/social context. As Duncan Bell reiterated in his critical account of the functions of intellectual history, concepts like civilization must be situated within the linguistic contexts in which they were born. In other words, texts were not enough to understand the emergence and evolution of the concepts; the contexts that these texts were written in should be taken into consideration as well.[4] While each debate on civilization in this article has been presented as dominant in a particular period, in the end, it is concluded that an eclectic approach combining material elements of European civilization and moral elements of Islamic/Turkic culture turned out to be the dominant discourse on civilization in the late Ottoman Empire.

2. Evolution of the Concept of Civilization in Europe

Although the concept of civilization was first coined in the mid-18th century, the words 'to civilize' and 'civility' had been used from the 16th century onwards. Encounters with native peoples of the American and African continents resulted in a sense of European superiority based first on religion (i.e., Christianity vs. paganism) and then, with the Enlightenment, on reason.[5] Civility, which had already been used to define the individual courteous behavior of the aristocracy, was later expanded to label the behaviors of the bourgeoisie, who had adopted such refined manners from the aristocracy.[6] In other words, just before the Enlightenment, the words 'to civilize' and 'civility' had already acquired a social connotation both vertically (i.e., bourgeoisie adopting the courteous behavior of the aristocracy) and horizontally (i.e., the European/Christian sense of superiority over non-European/savage communities).

Although the idea of civilization can be traced back to the early modern period, the word 'civilization' first appeared in 1756 in Marquis de Mirabeau's *L'Ami des Hommes*. This book not only underlined the role of religion in the development of a more civilized society but also established the age-old dichotomy of civilization vs. barbarism.[7] Although Mirabeau perceived religion as the 'mainspring of civilization,' his followers developed a more secular

[4] Duncan Bell, "Political Theory and the Functions of Intellectual History: A Response to Emmanuel Navon," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 1 (2003): 152–54.

[5] Thomas Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997), 30; Bruce Mazlish, *Civilisation and Its Discontents* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 8.

[6] Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process* (London: Blackwell, 2000), 10.

[7] Emile Benveniste, *Problemes de linguistique générale* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 337–38.

understanding in which civilization replaced religion as the source of European superiority vis-à-vis the non-European world. As Pim den Boer writes, "European feelings of superiority were based on a conglomeration of ideas proceeding from the Enlightenment which, in turn, came to be associated with the notion of civilization."[8]

The concept of civilization created its 'others.' Although the idea of classifying people according to their level of civilization was not new, the emergence of the three categories of savagery, barbarism, and civilization, and the establishment of a progressive relationship among them, was crystallized in the 18th century. Again, this classification was both vertical (in time) and horizontal (in space). The verticality rested on the idea that each step made progress from a more primitive way of life to a more advanced one, and all of humanity experienced this transformation, albeit in different periods. Accordingly, barbarism – despite its negative connotation – corresponded to an advanced level compared to savagery, and civilization corresponded to the ideal destination of human progress.[9]

The horizontality of this classification, on the other hand, rested on the idea that humankind was also contemporarily divided into three types of being: savages, barbarians, and the civilized. At the bottom of this hierarchy, there was the savage, defined under two categories: the *ignoble* savage, violent to any kind of human being, whether civilized or uncivilized, and the *noble* savage, whose innate good nature was appreciated vis-à-vis the nature of the contemporary man 'corrupted' by civilization. The savage, in both forms, was perceived as a childish human being who could be educated to mimic European manners, either peacefully (for the noble savage) or through force (for the ignoble savage).[10] Between the savage and the civilized man, the category of barbarian resided. The barbarian referred to a more advanced level compared to the savage; however, unlike the savage, he was perceived as irredeemable and dangerous. Thus, the barbarian could not be educated and continued to present a threat to the civilized.[11]

Civilization had emerged as a universal concept attainable by any human being or society. Yet, in time, it began to be associated with a particular continent, namely Europe. The European colonial expansion towards the non-European world and the scientific/technological achievements of the Industrial Revolution narrowed this universal definition; the concept of civilization was then used to distinguish between 'the achievers' and 'the under-achievers.'[12] Particularly, in the early 19th century, the French historian François Guizot popularized the association of civilization with the particular achievements of Europeans, hence the concept of 'European civilization' emerged.[13] From the mid-19th century onwards, with the impact of Social Evolutionism and Social Darwinism, the concept of 'race' was incorporated into the idea of civilization. It was the French philosopher Arthur de Gobineau who engaged in a hierarchical classification of peoples based on their races. According to Gobineau, it was race that determined the degree of civilization of different communities. He argued that civilizations were created by pure races and degenerated by the mixing of blood.[14]

[8] Pim den Boer, "Europe to 1914: The Making of An Idea," in *The History of the Idea of Europe,* ed. Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (London: Routledge/The Open University, 1995), 38.

[9] Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization*, 32.

[10] Mark Salter, *Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 20–1.

[11] Salter, *Barbarians and Civilization*, 22.

[12] Julie Reeves, *Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 16.

[13] Marcello Verga, "European Civilization and the 'Emulation of the Nations': Histories of Europe from the Enlightenment to Guizot," *History of European Ideas* 34, no. 4 (2008): 359.

[14] Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 59.

Moreover, Gobineau classified races under three categories: "[…] the brutal, sensual, and cowardly black race; the weak, materialistic, and mediocre yellow race; and the intelligent, energetic, and courageous white race."[15] In sum, in line with the increasing European sense of superiority stemming from the intensification of European penetration into the non-European world, the universal conceptualization of civilization first transformed into a geographical one by defining a certain 'European civilization,' and then into a narrower one by associating civilization with a particular race (i.e., the white race).

The transformation of the idea of civilization produced two more debates. The first debate was on the singularity vs. plurality of civilization. This debate questioned whether civilization is a singular concept denoting an ideal condition/process or a plural one allowing for the establishment of various civilization*s*. While some argued that there was only one civilization, i.e., the current 'European civilization,' others claimed that there had been multiple civilizations that had coexisted in history, and this meant that other civilizations might coexist with the European civilization in the future.[16]

The second debate was on the distinction between culture and civilization. According to Elias, while the Anglo-French conception of civilization underlined the singularity of the European civilization as the progress of not only the West but also of humankind, the German conception preferred to utilize *Kultur* instead of *Zivilisation* to denote what the Anglo-French conception meant. *Zivilisation* was of secondary importance for the Germans, referring to "only the outer appearance of human beings, the surface of human existence."[17] Elias further argued that while the Anglo-French conception of civilization evaluated the political, economic, religious, technical, moral, and social facts holistically, the German conception of *Kultur* distinguished between the intellectual, artistic, and religious attributes on the one hand, and political, economic and social attributes on the other. Moreover, while the Anglo-French conception ignored national differences between peoples and emphasized the commonalities of all humankind, the German conception placed special emphasis on national differences and particular identities of social groups.[18] In other words, the universalizing tendency of the Anglo-French understanding of civilization contradicted the more particular German conception of *Kultur.*

In sum, during the 19th century, there were three major debates concerning the concept of civilization. The first debate concerned whether civilization was a practical process attained by peoples/societies or an ideal condition that was the ultimate aim of human existence. The second debate had two dimensions; the first dimension was about the universality of civilization. It questioned whether civilization was an attribute to all humankind or a product of a certain region (i.e., Europe) or a certain race (i.e., the white race). The second dimension, on the other hand, was about the singularity or plurality of civilization. It discussed whether (European) civilization was something unique with no alternative or whether there had been – and therefore would later be – other civilization*s*. Finally, the third debate focused on the totality of civilization; it scrutinized whether the material (technical/scientific) and moral (political/social) elements of civilization were distinguishable or not. All these debates had somehow been referred to by Ottoman intellectuals in their conceptualization of civilization

[15] Paul A. Fortier, "Gobineau and German Racism," *Comparative Literature* 19, no. 4 (1967): 342.
[16] Roger Wescott, "The Enumeration of Civilizations," *History and Theory* 9, no. 1 (1970): 59.
[17] Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 6.
[18] Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 6–7.

in different historical/social contexts. Yet, it was the third debate that had attracted their attention the most. That debate resulted in the intellectuals questioning what and how to import from European civilization, producing two alternative discourses: one for the total adoption of European civilization and a second for its partial adoption by separating and admitting the material elements while rejecting the moral ones.

3. The First Debate: Civilization as a Practice vs. Civilization as an Ideal Condition

The late 18th to the early 19th century was a period of reform in the Ottoman Empire meant to cure an almost century-long time of military decadence associated with internal political and economic disturbances. European military superiority vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire resulted in a period of questioning the reasons for this decay. Ottoman intellectuals generally considered that deviation from 'the ancient codes' (*kanûn-i kadîm*) of the Empire, which had once made the Empire experience its golden age, was the principal reason for this decay. Yet, from the late 18th century onwards, they began to think that the changing circumstances required not a return to the ancient codes, but the establishment of 'a new order' (*nizâm-ı cedîd*) inspired by recent European achievements. As Cemil Aydın mentions, "[…] it was only during the 1830s that Ottoman Muslim elites began to conceptualize a holistic image of Europe as a model for reform and as the potential future of the Ottoman polity."[19] Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the word 'civilization' was first mentioned by three young Ottoman diplomats, Mustafa Reşid Paşa, Mehmet Sadık Rıfat Paşa, and Mustafa Sami Efendi, who were born at the turn of the 19th century and became prominent Ottoman bureaucrats/diplomats towards the 1830s.

The Turkish pronunciation of the word 'civilization' was first mentioned by Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the then Ottoman ambassador to Paris, in 1834. In one of his dispatches written during his diplomatic efforts to avert French support towards the rebellious governor of the Empire in Egypt, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa, and to protest the French occupation of Algeria in 1830, Mustafa Reşid Paşa indicated that the then Ottoman Sultan, Mahmud II, paid significant attention to the "practice of civilization, in other words, the issues of decency of people and enforcement of laws" (*sivilizasyon usûlüne, yani terbiye-i nâs ve icrâ-yi nizamât husûslarına*).[20] As Özavcı aptly argued, Mustafa Reşid was probably aware of the Europeanization of the concept of civilization by Guizot in his lectures delivered at the Sorbonne and also utilized this concept to define Egypt as an Ottoman periphery embodied in the personality of its untrustworthy and unsteady governor.[21] Hence, a quasi-Orientalist account of the Ottoman periphery emerged almost simultaneously with the introduction of the concept of civilization in the Ottoman political lexicon.[22]

Following this first usage, the word was translated into Turkish by another Ottoman diplomat, Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Paşa, in *A Treatise on the Conditions of Europe* (*Avrupa Ahvaline Dair Bir Risale*), written in 1837.[23] In this treatise, Sadık Rıfat Paşa described contemporary European achievements as being a result of "the practice of sociable familiarity

[19] Cemil Aydın, *Politics of Anti-Westernism: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 15.

[20] Cavid Baysun, "Mustafa Reşid Paşa'nın Paris ve Londra sefaretleri esnasındaki siyasi yazıları," *Tarih Vesikaları* 1, no. 4 (1941): 287.

[21] Özavcı, *Dangerous Gifts*, 184.

[22] Özavcı, *Dangerous Gifts*, 186.

[23] Tuncer Baykara, *Osmanlılarda medeniyet kavramı ve ondokuzuncu yüzyıla dair araştırmalar* (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1999), 31.

and civilization" (*usûl-ü me'nûsiyet ve medeniyet*) in this continent.[24] It should be noted that both the French and the Turkish versions of the word 'civilization' were derived from the same root, namely 'city' (*civitas* in Latin and *madina* in Arabic), making *medeniyet* an excellent translation of 'civilization.'[25]

The word *medeniyet* remained in official dispatches or treatises until Mustafa Sami Efendi, a diplomat who had served in the Ottoman embassy in Paris, published his *Avrupa Risalesi* (*A Treatise on Europe*) in 1840. This treatise turned out to be a popular text consolidating the use of the word *medeniyet* in Ottoman literary circles. In the preface of this treatise, Mustafa Sami Efendi stated that his aim in writing this piece was to discuss the achievements of the Europeans as a result of their 'practice of civilization' (*usûl-i medeniyet*).[26] According to Aydın, Mustafa Sami Efendi was among the first Ottoman intellectuals to offer "a holistic assessment of the excellence of Europe and its superiority, connecting all the positive characteristics of European institutions and practices in a civilizational unity."[27] Despite this holistic assessment, similar to Mustafa Reşid Paşa and Sadık Rıfat Paşa, Mustafa Sami Efendi perceived civilization not as an ideal condition to be reached, but as a practice to reach that ideal condition. This practical element was also evident in their political instrumentalization of the concept of civilization. As Wigen writes:

> *Medeniyet* and *sivilizasyon* were used primarily in relation to the conduct of states and statesmen, and the honing of an individual's character was the road to a particular institutionalization of relationships between ruler and ruled. These terms were used in arguing for equitable treatment of the Sultan's subjects on the domestic arena, and to adhere to a certain order between rulers in external relations.[28]

The concept of civilization was introduced in the Ottoman political lexicon during the 1830s, when the Ottoman Empire was simultaneously experiencing a period of upheaval/disintegration and a period of reordering/renewal. The concurrence of the Kavalalı revolt and the proclamation of the Edict of *Tanzimat* was quite timely for this very word.[29] Although initial usages underlined civilization as a practice rather than an ideal condition, İbrahim Şinasi, the eminent poet, journalist, and playwright, reversed this formula in the 1850s and 1860s and presented civilization as the ideal condition. As a symbolic man of letters of the *Tanzimat* era, he was one of the best representatives of the dualism central to the Ottoman social system during and after this period. His writings efficiently demonstrated the opposition between various categories, between the old and new, the *alla turca* and *alla franca*, the Ottoman Empire and Europe, and the East and the West. According to Tanpınar, it was Şinasi who sanctified the concept of civilization as something like religion and crystallized 'civilizationism' (*medeniyetçilik*) as the first ideology of the *Tanzimat* period.[30] This sanctification was evident in his poems dedicated to Mustafa Reşid Paşa. Şinasi was courageous enough to label him as the 'prophet of civilization' (*medeniyet resûlü*).[31] In

[24] Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Pasa, *Avrupa'nın ahvaline dair bir risale* (İstanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1275 [1858]), 9.

[25] Einer Wigen, "The Education of Ottoman Man and the Practice of Orderliness" in *Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth Century Asia and Europe*, ed. Margaret Pernau et. al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 110.

[26] Mustafa Sami Efendi, *Avrupa risalesi* (İstanbul: Takvim-i Vekayi Matbaası, 1256 [1840]), 3–4.

[27] Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 17.

[28] Einar Wigen, *State of Translation: Turkey in Interlingual Relations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018), 88.

[29] For a detailed account of the impact of Tanzimat on the conception of civilization by the Ottoman intellectuals see, Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Kalemiye'den Mülkiye'ye Tanzimat zihniyeti," in *Modern Türkiye'de siyasal düşünce 1: Tanzimatın birikimi ve Meşrutiyet*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 55–8.

[30] Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *19. Asır Türk edebiyatı tarihi* (İstanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1988), 152.

[31] İbrahim Şinasi, *Müntehâbât-ı Eş'ar*, trans. Kemal Bek (İstanbul: Bordo Siyah Yayınları, 2004), 56.

another poem, he characterized the Edict of *Tanzimat* as a European idol (*Avrupalı büt*), which inspired splendor and dignity (*revnâk-ü şân*) to transform the Ottoman realm into a land envied even by the Europeans.[32]

Şinasi's newspaper articles were equally important in the dissemination of the concept of civilization to a wider audience. In these articles, unlike his predecessors, he used the expression of 'the condition of civilization' (*hâl-i medeniyet*) instead of 'the practice of civilization' (*usûl-i medeniyet*). This conceptual transformation revealed that Ottoman intellectuals began to gain awareness of the centrality of civilization, instead of its practicality. In other words, civilization was no more perceived as a practice but as the condition itself.[33]

Once civilization had been idealized in the mid-19th century, Ottoman intellectuals began to emphasize its centrality and inevitability. For instance, Münif Paşa, a prominent bureaucrat and intellectual in the Hamidian period, perceived civilization as an ideal condition and the ultimate destination of humanity. He defined civilization as "a reflection of the progress in science and industry" (*ulûm ve sanayîde terakkînin bir tezâhürü*) and considered it an unavoidable process.[34] Similarly, Namık Kemal, an eminent poet, journalist, and novelist, perceived civilization as "a natural requisite of human life" (*hayât-ı beşer için levâzım-ı tabiiyeden*) and underlined the inevitability of the civilizing process.[35] He once wrote that the Ottomans finally recognized the excellence of civilization and the impossibility of standing against it.[36] According to Şemseddin Sami, the linguist and author of the first modern novel in Turkish literature, civilization was not only inevitable but also indestructible. He argued that civilization had expanded to such a level that nothing could prevent its further advancement and nothing could destroy it. For him, civilization could not be destroyed even with the destruction of the entirety of Europe, let alone only Paris and London.[37]

The centrality of civilization for Ottoman intellectuals directed them to reproduce first the dyadic conceptualization of civilized vs. uncivilized and then the tripartite categorization of savagery/barbarism/civilization. They perceived civilization as a source of domination; civilized nations would inevitably dominate the non-civilized ones. Şinasi clearly distinguished between "the civilized and non-civilized nations" (*milel-i mütemeddine ve milel-i gayr-i mütemeddine*), the former being more prosperous, more peaceful, and more political, whereas the latter lacked these qualities.[38] Similarly, Münif Paşa associated science and technology with civilized societies and ignorance with uncivilized societies.[39] In other words, for Ottoman intellectuals, civilization turned out to be a catchword to avert the ultimate destruction of the Empire; the Empire could only survive if she adopted civilization to cure her basic deficiencies.

The tripartite categorization of savagery/barbarism/civilization was not novel for Ottoman intellectuals. Following Ibn Haldun's distinction between savagery, nomadism, and civilization (*vahşiyet, bedeviyet,* and *hadariyet*), they were already aware of the progressive evolution of humankind. The difference between European and Haldunian classifications was the former's emphasis on barbarism as a threat to civilization and the latter's association of

[32] Şinasi, *Müntehâbât-ı Eş'ar*, 48.
[33] Abdullah Kaygı, *Türk düşüncesinde çağdaşlaşma* (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992), 57.
[34] Münif Paşa, "Mukayese-i İlm-ü Cehl," *Mecmua-i Fünûn* 1 (1279 [1862]): 21
[35] Namık Kemal, "Medeniyet," *İbret*, Zilkade 16, 1289 [January 15, 1873].
[36] Namık Kemal, "İttihad-ı İslam," *İbret*, Rebiyülahir 21, 1289 [June 28, 1872].
[37] Zeynep Süslü and İsmail Kara, "Şemseddin Sami'nin 'medeniyet'e dair dört makalesi," *Kutadgubilig* 4 (2003): 276.
[38] Kaygı, *Türk düşüncesinde çağdaşlaşma*, 57
[39] Münif Paşa, "Mukayese-i ilm-ü cehl," 22–3.

civilization with the notion of settlement.[40] Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, a bureaucrat and intellectual who had completed the translation of Ibn Haldun's *Al-Muqaddimah* in Turkish, was very much influenced by the Haldunian notion of civilization.[41] Considering the taxation and security problems associated with the nomadic people of Anatolia and his inspection visits to the Province of Bosnia for settling nomadic tribes in the region, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa even argued that the Empire should end 'the state of savagery and nomadism' (*hâl-i vahşet ve bedâvet*) by establishing 'a military/colonial administration' (*koloni militer usûlü*) in these provinces.[42]

The distinction between civilization as a practice and civilization as an ideal was the first debate among Ottoman intellectuals. The initial definition of civilization as a practice revealed that Ottoman intellectuals still believed that the adoption of this 'practice' would remedy the internal problems of the Empire. Yet, they soon learned that civilization was not only a practical approach for socio-political reform, but indeed it was the ideal condition to be reached by adopting various practices of advanced European countries. This idealization resulted in a firm belief in the inevitability and unavoidability of civilization. The Ottomans understood that the ultimate fate of the non-civilized was subordination by the civilized, yet most of them were still not convinced about the European-ness of civilization and the impossibility of any alternatives to the European civilization.

4. The Second Debate: Is Civilization Something Universal or European? Are There Civilizations other than European Civilization?

In the early 19th century, positivist international law began to replace natural international law. This transformation was very significant because while the latter argued that people had natural rights by birth that cannot be challenged, the former claimed that rights and responsibilities were defined by states, meaning that international law was not natural but rather state-made. Natural international law was something universal, whereas positivist international law is the law created by the European international system. For the Ottomans, whose membership in the European family of nations was contestable, the universal conceptualization was preferable compared to the European one. Therefore, it is not surprising that the first international law treatise translated into Turkish was Emerich de Vattel's *Droit des Gens*, a proponent of natural international law, instead of the then-popular Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law*, a purely positivist text.[43] Similarly, most Ottoman intellectuals questioned whether the concept of civilization was something universal or European, and they believed that adopting a universal conceptualization instead of the European one would be relatively easier since dyadic conceptions of Europe vs. the Ottoman Empire, West vs. East, and civilization vs. barbarism placed the Europeans and the Ottomans in opposing categories, which was a source of discontent for the Ottomans.

Two trends emerged in Ottoman political writing in answer to the question regarding the universality of civilization. The first trend argued for the universality of civilization despite its attribution to the European continent. In other words, some Ottoman intellectuals thought that although it was most visible in Europe, civilization was not bound strictly to

[40] Wigen, *State of Translation*, 84–5.

[41] Ercümend Kuran, *Türkiye'nin batılılaşması ve milli meseleler* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1994), 142–43.

[42] Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir*, 4 Volumes, trans. Cavid Baysun (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), Vol. 3, 34–5.

[43] Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "The Emergence of the Idea of 'International Law' in the Ottoman Empire before the Treaty of Paris (1856)," *Middle Eastern Studies* 50, no. 2 (2014): 242–44.

that continent. According to Aydın, most of the early *Tanzimat* intellectuals, such as Şinasi, believed that "[…] civilization was the common heritage of humanity, not an exclusively European ideal."[44] Moreover, the association of civilization with Europe might also imply the association of this concept with Christianity. As Wigen argued, the dominant discourse in Europe had already associated Christianity with civilization and Islam with barbarism; therefore, Ottoman intellectuals had to adopt an alternative understanding.[45] Münif Paşa's perception of civilization as a universal achievement and a quality envisaged by Islam led him to define 'the true Muslim' as a civilized man.[46] The eclectic and even paradoxical stance of perceiving civilization as a universal phenomenon despite its emergence in Europe was also visible in the writings of Şemseddin Sami. He argued that the concept of civilization was a product of the intellectuals of 18th-century Europe, such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Dalembert, and Diderot. He mentioned that the works of these philosophers were the by-products of "the scientific innovations and philosophical ideas and perceptions" (*keşfiyât-ı fenniye ve efkâr-ı mütalaat-ı hikemiye*) of their predecessors: Descartes, Newton, Herschel, Kant, and Bacon.[47] On the other hand, Şemseddin Sami also criticized the hesitance of some Ottomans in adopting civilization due to their misperception of this concept as a product of Christianity. According to him, despite its European origins, civilization was a universal phenomenon that could be adopted by anyone who employed reason for reaching an advanced level of living.[48] Quite similarly, towards the end of the Empire, Ziya Gökalp, an esteemed sociologist known for being a pioneer of Turkish nationalism, also perceived civilization as a rational process, the creation of humankind's conscious actions; therefore, civilization could be transferred from nation to nation, and it did not belong to a certain region or people. Rather, it was a product of all of humanity.[49]

Once the universality of the concept of civilization was recognized, the second trend argued that historically different regions of the world had once represented civilization. In other words, even if one admitted that civilization was generally attributed to the European continent, before European ascendancy, it was represented by other parts of the world. Therefore, one should not speak of the European civilization as an everlasting civilization; as it had its predecessors, it might have its successors as well. Rejecting the singularity of European civilization did not only serve to convince the Ottomans to adopt the elements of this civilization but it also allowed the Ottoman intellectuals to discuss the existence of an alternative, albeit a historical one; namely, the Islamic civilization. Hence, more conservative Ottoman intellectuals who had concerns about the association of civilization with Christian Europe brought forward Islamic civilization as an alternative to European civilization.

Gökhan Çetinsaya wrote that earlier *Tanzimat* intellectuals did not perceive themselves as inheritors of a civilization other than European civilization. In their writings, clear-cut divisions between the Islamic and European civilizations were hardly visible.[50] However, later on, some Ottoman intellectuals, the most notable of which was Ahmet Cevdet Paşa,

[44] Aydın, *Politics of Anti-Westernism*, 20.
[45] Wigen, *State of Translation*, 80.
[46] Ali Budak, *Batılılaşma sürecinde çok yönlü bir Osmanlı aydını: Münif Paşa* (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004), 271.
[47] Süslü and Kara, "Şemseddin Sami'nin 'Medeniyet'e dair dört makalesi," 274.
[48] Süslü and Kara, "Şemseddin Sami'nin 'Medeniyet'e dair dört makalesi," 272.
[49] Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, comp. and trans. Niyazi Berkes (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1959), 104–6.
[50] Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Kalemiye'den Mülkiye'ye Tanzimat zihniyeti," in *Modern Türkiye'de siyasal düşünce 1: Tanzimatın birikimi ve Meşrutiyet,* ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 57.

questioned the argument of the singularity of European civilization. According to Ümit Meriç, he rather perceived the Islamic civilization as one of the greatest civilizations of world history, which was backward in his time but had the potential to be an alternative to Western civilization.[51] Later conservative/Islamist Ottoman intellectuals also followed his path. They rejected the singularity of European civilization; despite acknowledging the superiority of the West vis-à-vis the Islamic world, they argued that this was only a material superiority. The West was morally corrupted; its material achievements did not suffice to perceive it as the singular civilization of the contemporary world. Thus, the Islamists not only accepted the existence of Islamic civilization but also perceived it as an alternative to Western civilization. They firmly believed in the glory of the Islamic civilization as the source of Western achievements. According to Berkes, in 1886, a series of articles entitled "The Islamic Civilization" appeared in the *Tarîk* journal, which aimed to "[…] show the achievements of the Arabs […] in science, technology (fen), literature and historiography; and, second, to prove that all of these were taken over by the Europeans." This was followed by the Akyiğitzade Musa's book entitled *Avrupa Medeniyetine Bir Nazar* (*A Glance to the European Civilization*), published in 1897, whose opening sentence is as follows: "The bases of contemporary civilization are nothing but the actions and traditions of Muhammad."[52] In sum, as Musa Kazım Efendi defined it, the Islamic civilization was "the genuine civilization" (*sahîh medeniyet*) and there was no other way for Muslims to survive and prosper but to turn to this civilization.[53]

Unlike Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, while recognizing that the Islamic civilization had contributed to the scientific and intellectual development of humanity in the past, Şemseddin Sami admitted that civilization had been spreading to the world from Europe. He argued that while the recognition of Islamic civilization's contributions to the then current civilization of Europe was useful in easing reactions from the ignorant masses against civilization, it also seemed to produce some kind of ungrounded pride that deterred the masses from accepting European achievements. He added that "[…] we can neither use telegraph nor carry out steamship and railway locomotive by the chemistry of Cahiz and philosophy of Ibn Rüşd, just as we cannot cure malaria with the medicine of Ibn Sina." [54] Therefore, he advised intellectuals to leave the study of earlier Islamic civilization to the scholars of history and antiquities, and to adopt European science and technology to become civilized. Later on, more Western-oriented Ottoman intellectuals even denied the existence of any alternatives to European civilization. Abdullah Cevdet, an ardent defender of Westernization, wrote in one of his articles as such: "We have to understand one thing – there are not two civilizations, there is only one to which to turn, and that is Western civilization, which we must take into our hands, whether it be rosy or thorny."[55]

To conclude, concerning the universality and singularity of the concept of civilization, Ottoman intellectuals were divided between a more radical view recognizing European civilization as 'the civilization' and a more balanced view recognizing the European origins of contemporary civilization, yet perceiving it as a universal phenomenon based on reason.

[51] Ümit Meriç, *Cevdet Paşa'nın cemiyet ve devlet görüşü* (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1979), 31.
[52] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London: Hurst&Company, 1964), 263.
[53] İsmail Kara, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık düşüncesi: metinler/kişiler*, 3 Volumes, (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 1997), Vol. 1, 130–31.
[54] Süslü and Kara, "Şemseddin Sami'nin 'Medeniyet'e dair dört makalesi," 279.
[55] Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 358.

This second and more balanced view had two strands as well. The first and more Western-oriented strand argued that though Islamic civilization had once been a strong civilization, it was the Europeans who were the carriers of current civilization. Hence, Islamic civilization was only a matter of history. The second and more Islamic-oriented strand argued that Islamic civilization might have been a glorious civilization and now it might be in decay; however, this did not preclude labeling it as 'the genuine civilization.'

5. The Third Debate: Totality of the European Civilization: What and How to Take?

When Ottoman intellectuals recognized European supremacy over the non-European world and perceived the concept of civilization as a catchword to understand the reasons for this supremacy, they began to think about what to transfer from the European civilization and how to do so. There were three responses. The first one negated any transfer from European civilization, yet proponents of this view remained quite marginal considering that most of the Ottoman intellectuals firmly believed in the inevitability and unavoidability of adopting civilization. Still, total rejection of European civilization due to its association with Christianity resulted in the view that the adoption of even the smallest elements of this civilization might be enough to diverge from 'the true path of Islam.' According to Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, some of the Ottoman *ulama* even "[…] declared those, who diverged to such *alla franca* ideas, as infidels."[56]

On the other margin, some Ottoman intellectuals had been arguing that European civilization should be adopted totally to ensure the survival of the Empire. One of the Ottoman ministers of education, Saffet Paşa, wrote in one of his letters that "[…] unless Turkey […] accepts the civilization of Europe in its entirety – in short, proves herself to be a reformed and civilized state – she will never free herself from the European intervention and tutelage [.]"[57] Several decades later, pro-Western Ottoman intellectuals shared similar views. The aforementioned quotation from Abdullah Cevdet arguing for the total adoption of Western civilization together with its strengths and weaknesses ("*rosy and thorny*") also demonstrated that European civilization was perceived as a whole. To modernize society, the adoption of material achievements did not suffice; a more radical moral and mental transformation was necessary.

Between these two antithetical discourses of a total adoption/rejection of European civilization, the most widely-accepted discourse concerning the level of adoption argued that at least some parts of this civilization could and should be imported. Accordingly, most Ottoman intellectuals argued that the European civilization had two dimensions: one being material and the other, moral. All agreed that the adoption of material elements of civilization would pose no socio-political problems for Ottoman society, whereas they questioned the adoption of moral elements. First of all, these intellectuals criticized the adoption of European civilization's moral elements. Perceiving that the administrative (*umûr-u mülkiye*), financial (*umûr-u mâliye*), and military (*umûr-u askeriye*) achievements of Europe were the real reasons behind the welfare of the continent, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa argued that the adoption of European regulations in these fields could contribute to the revitalization of the Ottoman Empire, provided that these regulations conformed to Islamic law and the customs of the Empire. In other words, in principle, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa was not against importing some

[56] Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, Vol. 1, 63.
[57] Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 185.

elements of European civilization; however, these elements were required to fit into the basic principles of Ottoman-Islamic tradition. This meant that he was against the imitation (*taklîd*) and superficial application of European practices rather than the practices themselves.[58] The reason for his reaction to imitation was his firm belief in the peculiarity of the Ottoman/Islamic culture and the contradiction between the European and Islamic civilizations: "We have some peculiar characteristics; therefore, what is beneficial for other states will be detrimental for us. What is an urgent treatment for them, is a fatal poison for us."[59] Namık Kemal similarly argued that the Ottomans did not need to imitate European civilization as a whole: "We are not compelled to imitate the dance and wedding practices of Europeans just as we are not compelled to derive the habit of eating snails from the Chinese."[60] As a popular journalist and novelist known by the nickname of 'eminent scholar' (*hâce-i evvel*), Ahmed Midhat's dislike of revolutionary change and his preference for a more cautious modernization resulted in his distinction between the material and moral aspects of civilization, which he preferred to label as the distinction between 'technique' and 'idea.' On the one hand, he was aware that the Ottoman Empire fell behind Europe in the technical sense; therefore, the material elements of civilization had to be adopted immediately and without questioning. On the other hand, he perceived Western ideas, such as liberty, republicanism, representative democracy, and laicism, as the 'poisons' of Western civilization, which should be avoided to prevent the total disintegration of the Empire.[61] Moreover, he also criticized superficial Europeanization. The main theme of his novels is, therefore, the adoption of the wrong side of European civilization. There are generally two protagonists: one representing the super-westernized, ignorant, and morally corrupted Ottomans (i.e., Felatun Bey), and the other representing the Ottomans who preserved their religious and cultural values while educating themselves about the material European achievements (i.e., Rakım Efendi).[62] The oppositional representation of these characters, the self-defeat of the former, and the achievements of the latter at the end of the book establish a typical Ahmed Midhat novel.

Unlike the pro-Western intellectuals, the Islamist intellectuals of the late Ottoman Empire were quite firm in the distinction between the material and moral elements of civilization and the adoption of the former. For example, the prominent Islamist thinker Mehmed Akif once wrote in one of his poems: "Take the science and technology of the West, take it / Give, also, your efforts on this way its utmost speed / Because it is impossible to live without these / Because only the science and technology has no nationality."[63] Similarly, according to Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi, a conciliatory approach was necessary, which could both embrace the material achievements of the West and the moral principles of Islam; therefore, there was no sounder way except "the adoption of the way of eclecticism" (*iktitaf mesleğini ihtiyardan daha eslem tarîk yoktur*).[64] According to the Islamists, the ultimate distinction between the Islamic and Western civilizations resulted in the impossibility of incorporating moral elements of the latter into the former. According to Said Halim Paşa, the Ottoman statesman and Grand Vizier between 1913 and 1917, the reason for this impossibility was

[58] Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, Vol. 4, 220.
[59] Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, Vol. 4, 221.
[60] Kemal, "Medeniyet".
[61] Orhan Okay, *Batı medeniyeti karşısında Ahmed Midhat Efendi* (Ankara: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1975), 10.
[62] Ahmed Midhat Efendi, *Felatun Bey ile Rakım Efendi* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018).
[63] Mehmed Akif Ersoy, *Safahat*, ed. Ertuğrul Düzdağ (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1991), 176.
[64] Kara, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık düşüncesi*, 23–4.

that the entire social order of Islam was based on the fundamental principle of the absolute sovereignty of the *shariah*. In other words, the moral elements of Western civilization and Islam were not compatible with each other, and any attempt at reconciliation were thought to have fatal consequences for the Islamic world.[65]

Turkish nationalists were more comfortable in answering the question of what to import from European civilization because, mirroring the German distinction between *Zivilisation* and *Kultur*, they associated the distinction between the material and moral elements of civilization with the distinction between civilization (*medeniyet*) and culture (*hars*). According to Ziya Gökalp, while civilization was international, culture was national. He wrote that culture was "composed of the integrated system of religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, linguistic, economic and technological spheres of life of a certain nation," whereas civilization was "the sum of total of social institutions shared in common by several nations that have attained the same level of development."[66] Moreover, he argued that while culture was composed mainly of emotional elements, civilization was composed of universal ideas applicable to all humankind regardless of their ethnicity or religion. Therefore, while a nation could not imitate the religious, moral, or aesthetic feelings of another nation, i.e., culture, it could adopt universal ideas, i.e., civilization.[67]

The partial adoptionist discourse, in sum, argued for a distinction between material/universal and moral/national elements of civilization; they opted for adoption of the former and rejection of the latter. To complement the material elements of civilization, the optimal synthesis was to add moral elements of a religious/national culture. This was laconically reflected by Şinasi, who defined the ideal combination for the Ottoman Empire as "marrying the virgin ideas of Europe and ancient wisdom of Asia" (*Avrupa'nın bikr-i fikrini Asya'nın akl-ı pîrânesiyle izdivâc ettirmek*).[68] The Islamists offered the preservation of Islamic morality since Islamic civilization was the "real civilization," yet they were not against importing the material elements of European civilization. Some Islamists even argued that some of the moral elements of European civilizations were indeed quite Islamic. As Ahmed Naim stated, "the principles that Europe seems to present as new inventions and as samples for all societies of the world, such as liberty, justice, equality, and solidarity, are among the fundamental principles of Islam."[69] The synthesis of the Turkists, on the other hand, was the creation of a new identity merging European civilization with Turkish culture. As Ziya Gökalp wrote, while the European civilization was dominating the world, quite naturally "the Ottoman civilization, which was part of the Eastern civilization, would fall and leave its place to Turkish culture with the religion of Islam on the one hand, and Western civilization, on the other."[70] In other words, what the Turkists offered was a blend of European civilization and Turkish culture.

6. Conclusion

The concept of civilization was imported to the Ottoman lexicon during the 1830s by a group of young diplomats who had become acquainted with the concept during their service in

[65] Ahmet Şeyhun, *Said Halim Paşa: Ottoman Statesmen, Islamist Thinker (1865-1921)* (İstanbul: ISIS Press, 2003), 130.

[66] Ziya Gökalp, *Principles of Turkism,* trans. Robert Devereux (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), 22-24.

[67] For a detailed account of Ziya Gökalp's distinction between civilization and culture see, Alp Eren Topal, "Against Influence: Ziya Gökalp in Context and Tradition," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 28, no. 3 (2017): 293–302.

[68] İbrahim Şinasi, "İstanbul Sokaklarının Tenvir ve Tathiri," *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, Zilkade 28, 1280 [April 29, 1864].

[69] Ahmed Naim, "İslamiyet'in esasları, mazisi ve hali," *Sebilü'r Reşad*, Kanun-ı Sani 30, 1329 [February 12, 1914].

[70] Gökalp, *Principles of Turkism*, 33.

European capitals. In these years, the concept of civilization had already been consolidated in Europe; however, it had not yet lost its universal and universalizing meaning. Civilization was thus perceived not as a phenomenon bound to a particular group of people, but as a characteristic attainable by all human beings. Based on the Enlightenment notion of reason, the idea of civilization offered a refined, wealthier, and happier life to its adherents.

Indeed, it was this universal nature of the concept of civilization that had attracted the attention of the Ottomans. The diplomats admired the order, well-being, and magnificence of the European capitals in which they had served, and they learned that a similar level of development could be attained in the Ottoman Empire via the 'practice of civilization.' In other words, the initial Ottoman perception of civilization differed from the European view in the sense that civilization was not the end, but the means to reach an ideal end.

From the 1820s to the 1850s, the degree of universality of civilization declined considerably in Europe; or rather, civilization had begun to be perceived as a strictly European phenomenon. This did not necessarily mean that the concept had lost the sense of universality entirely. European intellectuals began to emphasize that their level of civilization was the outcome of several developments experienced in Europe. Therefore, they argued, non-European societies could be civilized, but only if they followed the prescriptions provided by Europeans. Guizot's studies on European and French civilizations were quite popular among French intellectuals of the time, by whom Ottoman intellectuals were influenced to a considerable degree.

This transformation of the concept of civilization from a universal to a strictly European one had dramatic implications for Ottoman intellectuals, and thereby for the Ottoman perception of the concept. For the Ottomans, it was easier to adopt a universal phenomenon since it did not have a cultural/religious base. However, the centuries-long association of Europe with Christianity created significant tensions among Ottoman intellectuals. In particular, there was a concern that any imports from European civilization might not suit the Islamic identity of Ottoman society.

The Ottoman intellectuals of the *Tanzimat* era tried to overcome this dilemma in two ways. First of all, they argued that although contemporary civilization had reached its utmost development in the European continent, this did not necessarily mean that civilization was a European phenomenon. In other words, adopting European civilizational achievements indeed meant adopting what was best for the entirety of humankind, including the Ottomans. Intellectuals like Şinasi and Münif Paşa followed such an understanding. The second attempt to overcome the dilemma, on the other hand, was to distinguish between the material and moral elements of civilization. The material elements of civilization, such as scientific and technological inventions, were not peculiar to the Europeans. Rather, they could be perceived as the universal inheritance of mankind. In other words, there was no problem in adopting such material achievements, which would serve only to increase the well-being of Ottoman citizens and to provide the survival of the state vis-à-vis its adversaries. Since these inventions excelled in Europe, there was no reason to seek an alternative. Their immediate adoption was even deemed extremely necessary.

The moral elements of civilization, on the other hand, were to be treated more carefully. Some of these moral elements, such as social justice, laboring for the fatherland, and modern education, were already tenets of Islam, and as such, these were Islamic principles that every Muslim had to obey. Other moral elements peculiar only to the Europeans due to

their cultural and religious background threatened to conflict with the cultural and religious structure of the Ottoman Empire. In case of such a conflict, the Ottomans wished to preserve their peculiarities and strictly avoid adopting such moral elements of European civilization, as what was useful for the Europeans might have had fatal implications for Ottoman society. In sum, the distinction between material and moral elements of civilization, the unconditional and immediate adoption of the former, and the rejection of the latter turned out to be the basic Ottoman understanding of civilization from the *Tanzimat* period until the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

The rise of Social Darwinism in Europe combined with the Ottoman disappointment in the West, particularly from 1876 onwards, consolidated the Ottoman distinction between the material and moral elements of civilization. Particularly from 1908 onwards, Ottoman political movements sought a synthesis combining European material developments and Eastern (i.e., Islamic or Turkic) morality. Indeed, it was this synthesis that established the originality of the Ottoman perception of civilization. In other words, in distinguishing the material and moral elements of civilization, the Ottomans sought to create a merger between the modern developments experienced in the West and the existing moral structures of the East. Ottoman intellectuals were more or less unified on the first part of this formula, namely the adoption of Western material modernity. However, they differed on the second part of the formula. The Westernists generally rejected the distinction between material and moral elements of civilization and perceived civilization as a totality. They did not deny the Islamic character of Ottoman society; however, they wanted to transform Islam from an all-encompassing socio/political phenomenon to a matter of personal conscience that did not resist modernization. Contrarily, the Islamists tried to preserve the Islamic identity of the Empire. They were confident in Islam as a source of civilization, yet some Muslims had diverged from the true path of Islam. Adoption of the material elements of civilization while sticking to the true path of Islam was thought to be the optimum solution for the Empire as well as the Islamic *ummah*. Finally, the Turkists tried to link the material modernity of civilization with Turco-Islamic cultural traditions. Their distinction between civilization and culture based on the association of the former with material developments and the perception of the latter as the moral basis of society allowed them not to deny but to redefine civilization.

All in all, the ambivalence that Ottoman intellectuals felt during the 19th century between the East and the West led them to seek a synthesis between these two. They were aware that they could not survive without adopting the requirements of their age, yet they were also aware that they could not survive without preserving their Eastern characteristics. Therefore, the only solution was the most difficult option, namely, to conciliate the East and the West. In an age emphasizing the inherent distinction of these two entities and the impossibility of their consolidation, their task was extremely burdensome. However, they at least attempted to achieve this. The ideal once put forward by Şinasi as the "marriage of the mature reason of Asia with the virgin ideas of Europe" became the ideal of 19th-century Ottoman intellectuals, which produced the home-grown Ottoman understanding of civilization.

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Abstracts in Turkish

Panzehir Arayışında Uluslararası İlişkiler

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Öz
Bu makale, yazarın uzun süredir gözlemlediği Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinine ve disiplindeki tekrar eden krizlere dayanmaktadır. Makale, bu krizlerin arkasındaki yapısal nedeni 'olay odaklılığı' olarak tanımlar. Başka bir deyişle, disiplinin en sonuncusunun ölümcül olma olasılığı olan varoluşsal krizler yaşaması olasılığının disiplinin uluslararası ilişkiler olaylarını takip etmesi ve bu olayların dönüştürücülük potansiyeline bağlı olarak onlara yanıt vermesiyle arttığını savunmaktadır. Ayrıntılı bir biçimde a) bilim-devlet idaresi ilişkisi; b) akademisyen-uygulayıcı kopukluğu; c) akademisyenler ve uygulayıcılar tarafından kuramların çarpıtılması; d) rasyonellik ve irrasyonellik arasındaki paradoksal ilişki; ve e) kuram-pratik kopukluğu konularını inceleyen makale, kriz tarafından yaratılan bu süreçleri önemli olaylara yanıt verirken işlevselleştirmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu kriz oluşturma süreçlerini detaylı biçimde gösterebilmek amacıyla makale politik realizm ve görece daha az klasik liberalizmden vaka yansımaları kullanarak faydalanır. Bilim (kuram oluşturma) ve devlet idaresi (uygulama) arasındaki karşılıklı küçümsemeye olası bir çözüm olarak makale, Uluslararası İlişkiler bilgisinin varsayılan üreticileri ve tüketicileri arasında bir sentez kültür yaratmayı amaçlayan "Clauswitzçi" bir modus vivendi önermektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Antinomi, paradoks, füzyon, doktrin, diyalektik, aydınlanma ve karşı-aydınlanma

Uluslararası İlişkiler Eğitimi ve Araştırmasında Batı Kökenli Olmayan Kuramlar: Türkiye Örneği/Türk Akademisi

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Öz
Bu çalışma, Türkiye'deki Uluslararası İlişkiler uzmanlarının araştırma ve eğitimde Batı kökenli olmayan kuramları kullanımını incelemektedir. Öncelikli amacımız, Türkiye eğitimde Batı kökenli olmayan Uluslararası İlişkiler tartışmasına olan ilginin düzeyini anlamak ve farklı okullardan Türk Uluslararası İlişkiler akademisyenlerinin eğitimde Batı kökenli olmayan uluslararası ilişkiler kuramlarına aşinalık derecesini değerlendirmektir. İlgili veriler, Türkiye'deki 57 üniversitenin Uluslararası İlişkiler bölümlerindeki 116 akademisyenden oluşan katılımcıların eğitimde Batı kökenli olmayan Uluslararası İlişkiler

kuramlarına ilişkin öğretim deneyimlerini, görüşlerini ve bakışlarını sunmalarına olanak sağlamak üzere tasarlanmış 47 maddelik bir anketten elde edilmiştir. Bu verilere dayalı bulgularımız, Türkiye'deki Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında eğitimde Batı kökenli olmayan kuramların azlığına ilişkin literatürü doğrularken, birçok ayrıntıyı da gözler önüne sererek literatüre katkı sağlamaktadır. İlk olarak, bulgulara göre, Türkiye'deki üniversitelerde Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramları çalışan ve öğreten katılımcılar, literatüre hâkim olan Batı kökenli Uluslararası İlişkiler kuramlarının uluslararası ilişkiler konularını yorumlama işlevi bakımından evrensel veya nesnel olmadığını düşünmektedirler. Ancak, ilginç bir biçimde, bu düşünceler akademisyenleri Batı kökenli olmayan kuramlardan ziyade Batı kökenli eleştirel Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramları okullarına yönlendirmektedir. Bu çalışmanın diğer önemli sonucuysa beklentilerimizi doğrulayarak Türk-İslam dünyasından kaynaklanan düşünce, kavram ve kuramlar, Türkiye'deki Uluslararası İlişkiler uzmanlarınca alternatif Batı kökenli olmayan kuramlara göre daha fazla tanındığını göstermektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası İlişkiler eğitimi, Batılı olmayan uluslararası ilişkiler kuramları, anket, kuram tercihleri, Türk Uluslararası İlişkileri

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Türk Uluslararası İlişkilerinin Gelişiminden Çıkarımlar: Yunanistan'dan Bir Bakış Açısı

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Öz

Makale, dışarıdan bir bakışla Türkiye'deki Uluslararası İlişkiler alanının/disiplininin özellikleri ve dinamiklerini ele almaktadır. Dışarıdan bir bakış nasıl yerel/ulusal bağlamlarda alanın gelişimine bir rol modeli olabilir, laakal bir ilham, yansıtma veya değerlendirme kaynağı olarak nasıl hizmet edebilir? Bu bağlamda vaka çalışması olarak Yunanistan seçilmiştir. Böylece makale, Yunan Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini adına hem Yunanistan hem de Türkiye'deki dış ilişkiler/politika üzerine sosyal bilimlerin gelişimi hakkında neler öğrenilebileceğini Türkiye'deki Uluslararası İlişkiler akademisinin kendi yansımalarını ve disiplindeki kimlik arayışlarını ele alıp değerlendirerek incelemektedir. Çıkarılan önemli bir ders, Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininde bağımlılık/savunmasızlık odaklı açıklamaların sınırlarının tanınmasının gereğidir.
Anahtar terimler: Uluslararası İlişkiler (disiplin/alan), Türkiye, Yunanistan

Bibliyometrik Mercekten Türkiye'deki Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergileri

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Öz
Bu makale, Türkiye'deki üç Uluslararası İlişkiler bilimsel araştırma dergisini, yani, All Azimuth, Insight Turkey ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi'ni değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu üç derginin Türk Uluslararası İlişkileri'ne yaptıkları bilimsel katkılar incelenmeye değerdir, çünkü birlikte Türk Uluslararası İlişkiler dergilerinin ana akımını oluşturmaktadırlar. Makale son on yılda alana dair genel bir tablo ortaya çıkartmak için bibliyometrik bir analiz kullanarak bu üç derginin yayın kayıtlarını incelemektedir. Türk Uluslararası İlişkiler camiasını değerlendirdiğimizde, bu üç dergi de önemlidir ve Türk Uluslararası İlişkiler akademisyenleri arasındaki farklı alt grupları ve çıkarları (veya ilgi alanlarını) temsil etmektedir. Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin bir ülkedeki yönelimleri ve organizasyonu, o ülkenin önde gelen dergileri incelenerek anlaşılabileceği varsayımı üzerinden bu makale karşılaştırmalı bibliyometrik analiz kullanarak bu üç derginin materyallerini ve yazarlıklarını incelemekte ve aralarındaki karakteristik benzerlik ve farklılıkları belirtmektedir. Literatürde bu dergilerin içeriğini tartışan birkaç makale olmasına rağmen, bunlar üzerinde hiçbir karşılaştırmalı bibliyometrik analiz yapılmamıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası İlişkiler, Türk Uluslararası İlişkileri, Türk Uluslararası İlişkiler dergileri

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Öz
Denizler ve okyanuslar yeryüzünün %72'sini kaplamakta ve küresel ticaretin %85'i deniz taşımacılığı ile gerçekleşmektedir. Ayrıca, Dünya nüfusunun %40'ı kıyılarda veya yakınlarda yaşamaktadır. Okyanusların, Dünya'mızın biyosferi için büyük önem teşkil etmektedir. Bu sebeplerden, denizlerin ve okyanusların insanoğlu için hayati önem taşıdığını söylemek mümkündür. Ancak, devletlerin denizler üzeri gerçekleştirdikleri dayanışma ve çatışmalar Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ) akademisyenleri tarafından yaygınca incelenmemektedir. Bu duruma, deniz körlüğü yani denizleri ve deniz gücünü, özellikle iktisadi ve stratejik güvenlik bağlamında yeterince önemsememe sorunu, diyebiliriz. Deniz körü bir devlet, denizler

üzerine hakimiyet kurmanın önemli bir dış politika aracı olduğunu idrak edememektedir. Uİ çalışanlar da benzer şekilde denizlerden ziyade karada olan çatışmalara yoğunlaşmaktadır. Bu durumu aydınlatmak adına, mevcut makale Türkiye'deki önemli yayıncıların yayınladığı endeksli Uİ dergileri ve kitapları incelemekte ve konu başlıklarıyla ilgili istatistikleri sunmaktadır. Karşılaştırma sunmak adına, yurtdışında yayınlanan önemli Uİ ve Siyaset Bilimi dergileri de incelenmektedir. İstatistiki karşılaştırmanın maksadı, Türk Uİ'nin deniz körlüğünün varlığını tespit etmektir. Türk Uİ'nde denizlerin önemini vurgulayan çalışmalar, genel konular alanları ve perspektifleri bu çalışma tarafından sunulmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Deniz körlüğü, Türk Uİ literatürü, küresel Uİ literatürü, uluslararası çatışmalar, deniz üstünlüğü

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Öz
Tezler, bilimsel araştırma makaleleri ve kitapların beraberinde akademik üretimin en önemli unsurlarındandır. Tezler akademisyenlerin araştırma alanlarını belirtmenin yanı sıra akademisyenlerin doktora sonrası çalışmalarda hangi araştırma yöntemi ve araçlarını kullanacaklarına dair ipuçları sağlar. Tezlerin bu makale bağlamında çok önemli olan bir başka özelliği de araştırma alanlarının gidişatı ve akademik dünyadaki genel rollerine dair gösterge olmalarıdır. Bu makale, Türkiye'deki Uluslararası İlişkiler alanının genel eğilimleri/göstergelerini 2000 ve 2020 yılları arasında çeşitli Türk üniversitelerinde yazılan Uluslararası İlişkiler tezlerini inceleyerek açığa çıkartmayı amaçlamaktadır. Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında çalışan akademisyenler yaygın olarak kendilerinin Uluslararası İlişkilerdeki kuram kaygılardan ziyade Türk dış politikası ve bölgesel sorunlarla ilgilenen yerel veya bölgesel uzmanlar olarak Batı odaklı Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinine katkıda bulunduklarını dile getirmektedirler. Bu makalenin bir diğer amacı da bu söylemlerin geçerliliğini koruyup korumadığını son zamanlarda Türk üniversitelerinde yazılmış Uluslararası İlişkiler tezlerini inceleyerek test etmektir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler çalışmaları, tezler, Uluslararası İlişkiler kuramları, diplomatik tarih, uluslararası hukuk,

Osmanlı Siyasal Düşüncesinde Medeniyet Kavramının Bir Soyağacı: Yerli Bir Algı mı?

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Öz
Medeniyet kavramının 1837'de Osmanlı'nın Viyana Sefiri Sadık Rıfat Paşa tarafından Türkçeye ilk defa çevrilmesinden bu yana, bu kavram Türk modernleşmesinin vazgeçilmez bir unsuru haline gelmiştir. Bu makale, "medeniyet" kavramının bir soyağacını oluşturarak 19. yüzyıl boyunca ve 20. yüzyılın başlarındaki Osmanlı aydınlarının kavramı algısındaki farklılıklarını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Medeniyet ilk olarak (yaklaşık 1840-1860) bir grup Osmanlı aydını tarafından ideal bir varoluş durumuna ulaşmak için bir araç olarak algılanmıştır. Yeni nesil Osmanlı aydınları (yaklaşık 1860-1890) medeniyeti "ideal" varoluş hali olarak tanımlamış, ancak kavramın kendisi, özellikle de maddi ve manevi unsurları arasındaki ayrım konusunda farklı görüşler dile getirmişlerdir. Son olarak, düşünceleri Batıcılık, İslamcılık ve Türkçülük siyasi akımları çerçevesine şekillenen üçüncü nesil Osmanlı aydınlarında (yaklaşık 1890-1920), siyasi görüşlerine bağlı olarak farklı ve bazen çelişen medeniyet algıları gözlemlenmiştir. Makale, bu aydınların yazılarına atıfta bulunarak, geç dönem Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun medeniyet hakkındaki temel tartışmalarından olan medeniyet(ler)in tekilliği/çoğulluğu, Avrupa medeniyetine bir alternatif olarak İslam medeniyeti, Avrupa medeniyetinden ithal etme derecesi ve kültür ve medeniyetin ayrımını tartışmaktadır. Ayrıca makale Türkiye'deki "medeniyet" algısının Avrupa'daki "medeniyet" algısından farklı olduğunu; başka bir değişle Osmanlı medeniyet anlayışının Osmanlı topraklarında doğmasa dahi burada geliştiğini ileri sürmektedir. Dolayısıyla Osmanlı aydınları yalnızca medeniyetin maddî ve manevî unsurlarını ayırıp ilkini ithal etmeyi tercih etmemiş, bunun yanı sıra İslam medeniyetine yok olmuş ancak eskiden var olan bir medeniyet yahut Avrupa medeniyetine potansiyel bir rakip olarak görmüş ve Avrupa medeniyetinin tekilliğini ve üstünlüğünü sorgulamışlardır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uygarlık, medeniyet, modernleşme, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu

Aims and Scope

All Azimuth **,** journal of the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, is an English-language, international peer-reviewed journal, published biannually. It aims:

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- to publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and making scholarly engagements in the dialogue between the "center" and the "periphery",
- to encourage publications with homegrown theoretical and philosophical approaches.
- to transcend conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic and cultural boundaries,
- to highlight works of senior and promising young scholars,
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