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The Understanding of Democracy as a Measure of Integration: An Examination of the Change in Integration Discourse Around the Democracy Debate Based on the Case of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany

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Abstract

This article discusses the intensified debate about people of Turkish origin in Germany in the context of speculations about deviating understandings of democracy among the Turkish diasporas. Based on the thesis that a change in German integration discourse from measurable material achievements of the migrant community to immaterial aspects of adaptation with regard to norms and values is taking place, an argument for a discourse-theoretical perception of this debate is developed, whereby existing forms of the negatively connoted foreign construction of the community of Turkish origin are discussed.

Keywords

Integration, Germany, Democracy, Turkish Diaspora

Introduction

In the course of cross-border political debates in the German-Turkish context, public discussion about the integration status of people of Turkish origin in the Federal Republic of Germany have intensified in recent years. From the Bundestag's Armenia Resolution on June 2, 2016, to the public discussion surrounding various rallies of diaspora members in reaction to the attempted coup on July 15 of the same year, to the dispute over political mobilization efforts within the German-Turkish community in the context of external voting in the elections in Turkey, a discursive constellation emerged that was characterized by an increasing interweaving of domestic and foreign policy references. In addition to already familiar topics surrounding the Turkish diaspora in Germany, such as the *import of social conflicts*¹ and questions of *loyalty*², the discussion increasingly focused

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¹ In the lead-up to a large-scale rally against the attempted coup in Turkey, the then Minister President of North Rhine-Westphalia, Hannelore Kraft, addressed the demonstration participants with the following words: "Do not carry a domestic conflict in Turkey into your adopted home of North Rhine-Westphalia, into your families, your circles of friends and also not into your hearts" (Spiegel-Online, 2016, translation by the author).

² Following the same rally, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made the following statement: "We expect those

on a point that had hardly seemed significant in the previous integration discourse: the understanding of democracy among people of Turkish origin.

Probably the most important event for this process of discursive change was the voting behavior of Turkish citizens in Germany, who were entitled to vote in the 2017 constitutional referendum, introducing the presidential system in Turkey, and the 2018 Turkish parliamentary and presidential elections, in favor of the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP). In view of the problematization of the JDP's style of government, which was described as increasingly authoritarian within German public debates, these results were interpreted as an indication of the growing social disintegration of parts of the Turkish origin community in the country (Adar, 2020). Starting from this, a political debate built up around the theme of a 'deviant' understanding of democracy on the part of people of Turkish origin. For example, in the run-up to the 2017 referendum, migration researcher Ruud Koopmans posited that "significant parts of the Turkish population in Europe have never arrived in democracy" and suggested that more willingness to assimilate should be demanded from "Turks abroad"³ (Welt, 2017). In this process the discussion seemed to come to a head, especially in attributions to the JDP electorate in Germany. Among others, the then chairman of the Green Party, Cem Özdemir, for example criticized that JDP voters in Germany not only supported an autocratic regime, but also openly rejected liberal democracy through their voting behavior (Zeit-Online, 2018). Thus, from this point on, it could be seen that in this and similar media discourse, with openly cross-border references, a primary framing of integration policy took place. The resulting conflation between integration success and ascribed perceptions of democracy thus advanced not only to a central topic within integration discourse, but also, conversely, the attitude of people of Turkish origin toward the basic order of the Federal Republic of Germany and the adaptation of the democratic values that go along with it, became an object of interest.

From a sociopolitical point of view, the intertwining of the integration question with the topic of democracy was and still is undoubtedly explosive. First, the attribution of a deviating democratic conception requires a normative starting point. In the context of the Federal Republic of Germany, this can certainly be established through the minimal consensus of the liberal democratic basic order (Freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung) (Thiel, 2016), but the proof of a deviation only becomes apparent when an active violation (e.g., an anti-constitutional activity) can be registered. The attribution of an anti-democratic attitude thus represents a heavy allegation, which implies not only the potentiality of hostile acts to the constitution but an imminent threat to social peace.

of Turkish origin who have lived in Germany for a long time to develop a high degree of loyalty to our country" (Zeit-Online, 2016a, translation by the author).

³ Translation by the author.

Second, this creates a strong shift within the already negatively connoted (Öztürk, 2021) integration discourse around people of Turkish origin. As a result, for example, previously effective materially-verifiable aspects for measuring integration success, such as language acquisition and social participation, become less important while immaterial aspects, such as adaptation to norms and values, which can hardly be measured, become a determining factor. In this context, previous achievements of material integration not only suffer a massive devaluation, but the idea that parts of the Turkish diaspora are distancing themselves from the basic democratic consensus also constructs a discursive threat scenario that calls the entirety of previous integration policy efforts into question.

First of all, however, it must be acknowledged that this discursive process was and still is largely based on ascriptions by others e.g. discursive actors of the German context towards a sometimes highly generalized Turkish diaspora. The resulting change within integration discourse, on the other hand, has a demonstrable influence on the societal perception of this same ‘group’. It is important to note at this point that there is a lack of reliable qualitative studies on the understanding of democracy within the Turkish community in Germany.⁴ However, it is evident that the current focus on the concept of democracy within integration policy debates results from the conflation of various discursive processes that already exist and have solidified.

On this basis, the main purpose of this paper is to initiate a multi-layered academic discussion around the question of the significance of ascribed democratic perceptions vis-à-vis the community of people of Turkish origin within German integration discourse. Of central importance for this access is the imbalance between the practices of host-society mechanisms of foreign ascription and forms of diaspora-migrant self-ascription. Based on this, the debate to be initiated is not only about the discursive change within the German integration debate, but also about the question of whether and to what extent a supposedly deviant understanding of democracy, in the sense of a substantive understanding, within the Turkish diaspora in Germany can be captured from a qualitative research perspective in political science.

In order to clarify these questions, the study is based on a constructivist discourse theoretical approach, following the work of Michel Foucault, in whose understanding discourse have a subject and collective constitutive function as carriers of knowledge formations and regimes. In this sense, the change in practices of foreign construction in the host society towards migrant communities is to be understood under temporal and spatial contextualities and path dependencies, which will be concretized in the course

⁴ It should be noted that there are some recent approaches in survey research that aim to explore migrants’ perceptions of democracy in Germany in the context of post-migrant discourse. One example is the project ‘Social Conflicts and Dynamics of Party Competition in Times of Migration and Integration,’ funded by the German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs.

of this work using the case of the integration political reception of the new Turkish diaspora policy within German societal discourse. A subsequent consideration is opened up by the significance of the aspect of discursive embedding. Thus, in the case at hand, the assumption is at the forefront that members of the Turkish community in Germany not only have points of reference in the discourse of their host and home societies, but also possess a specific transnational discursive embedding due to their diaspora qualities (Söylemez, 2022), which can have a demonstrable influence on their understandings of democracy. Since the combination of discourse-theoretical considerations to be outlined here has no direct reference point in the literature, the present contribution is intended as a mainly theoretical discussion to stimulate further considerations in migration and diaspora research.

A constructivist view on the sociopolitical functionality of discourses

“Anything said is said by an observer”, this sentence by the Chilean neurobiologists Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela (1980, p. 8), can be seen as the central guiding formula of constructivist thinking. As simple as this statement may appear at first glance, it conceals a profound negation of any objectively ascertainable reality. It is this negation of the order of things, the natural or the universal, (Pörksen & von Foersters 2011), which gives constructivism a special status within the various currents of philosophy. In view of this, the statement can also be understood as a shift of epistemological interest from an ontological what-question, to an epistemological how-question. If this is to be illustrated by the already given example of the observer, it is no longer what the observer sees that is of interest, but how he sees it, because it is only through his process of observation that he constructs what he thinks he sees. Martinsen appropriately points out this perception dependency as follows: “The linchpin of constructivist thinking is the credo that statements about reality are always made from the perspective of an observer” (2014, p. 4)⁵. Based on this, it should be noted that constructivism, despite different varieties, shares a common basic epistemological conviction, which is based on two axioms. First, that what is experienced as reality is not a passive image of reality, but the result of an active cognitive effort (von Ameln, 2004). Second, that no statement can be made about an assured correspondence between objective and subjective reality, since there are no instruments that reach beyond one’s own possibility of cognition (Ibid). This basic principle leads to a front position of constructivism against realism as well as idealism and opens up as a ‘third way’ in epistemological philosophy.

The works of the French social philosopher Michel Foucault can also be assigned to the school of thought of constructivism. Martinsen (2014), for example, treats Foucault’s

⁵ Translation by the author.

work on various social practices under the label of “practice-oriented constructivism” (p. 3). Probably the most important point of access to Foucault’s work is the concept of discourse. Through the analysis of discourse, as forms of public speech, Foucault is able to materialize epochal transformation processes and to describe the social change inherent in them. From a theoretical perspective, however, the introduction of the concept of discourse and its specific use also represents a practical solution to one of the basic problems of constructivist thought. The negation of any ontology and the reference to the fact that perceived reality is shaped by highly subjective processes leads to the question to what extent socially binding structures, or collective knowledge, can emerge in such a radically contingent environment.

Foucault’s understanding of discourse, however, goes beyond a conglomeration of linguistic artifacts. In this case, a conceptual differentiation is required first: In political theory there is no uniform use of the concept of discourse. For example, in the German-speaking world in particular, there is a certain Habermasian hegemony with regard to this term. In this perception, discourse is an arena of communicative action (Biebricher, 2005) and serves to produce a form of cognitivism (Lumer, 1997). Foucault, on the other hand, defines discourse as an all-encompassing “linguistically produced context of meaning that forces a certain conception, which in turn has as its basis and produces certain power structures and interests at the same time”⁶ (Foucault, 1991, p. 32). The effective power that Foucault ascribes to discourse thus not only exceeds Habermas’s idealist definition, it makes discourse a central label of his poststructuralist thought. In this respect, Foucault also emphasizes the social-constructive relationship between language and reality, so that discourse, in contrast to Saussure’s structuralist view, for example, are primarily manifestations of the circulation of valid knowledge (Keller, 2011).

On the basis of his historical-comparative work on processes of knowledge production in different historical epochs of the Occident, Foucault finally states that “our knowledge of the world is discursively mediated”⁷ (Kammler et al. 2008, p. 234). Jäger (2007) later clarifies these remarks by describing discourses as a “flow of ‘knowledge’ or social knowledge stocks through time” (p. 23). As a network of typifiable statements in a temporal-spatial context, discourses have a subject- and reality-constitutive effect (Jäger, 2013). Through this process, discourse not only creates perceptual schemata, it also specifies possible patterns of interaction in the context of constructed reality. Jäger and Jäger (2007) describe this process as follows: “It is not reality that is reflected in consciousness, but consciousness that relates to reality, insofar as discourses provide the application specifications or knowledge for the shaping of reality and, beyond that, the further reality

⁶ Translation by the author.

⁷ Translation by the author.

specifications”⁸ (p. 23). The reference to the application specifications to be derived illustrates that discourse does not constitute a narrative of an objectively comprehensible reality, but can have a ‘life of their own’ vis-à-vis reality (Ibid).⁹ The process of subjectification of the human being through the mediation of objectification presuppositions within discourse (Foucault, 2005) therefore not only turns the understanding of the subject as the originator of structures, institutions, and social relations on its head, it illustrates that the perception of social reality can also be determined by the aspect of discursive embeddedness (Söylemez, 2022). Thus, while discourse remains “little more than the reflection of a truth that arises from its own eyes”¹⁰ (Foucault, 1991, p. 32), its implications are material.

The role and function of discourse becomes particularly clear when considering the relation between subject and object. Foucault (1982) himself describes the importance of this debate by saying: “I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the last twenty years. It has not been to analyze the phenomenon of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects. My work has dealt with three modes of objectification which transformed human beings into subjects” (p. 777). This focus on the subject can be understood as a continuation of the work of his teacher, the philosopher and representative of Critical Theory, Louis Althusser. Althusser devoted himself to the study of ideology and ideological state apparatuses and in this context treated the process of the individual, as producer of the materiality of discourse, towards the subject as carrier of ideology and the social contexts in which he finds himself (2014). This conception of the subject according to Althusser undoubtedly represents the basis for Foucault’s further engagement with this topic. The consideration of the subject, as an individual situated in relations of dependency, which understands itself and appears as a subject at all through processes of adaptation to its environment and to the resulting structures, is a contrary understanding to the classical concept of the subject, which understands it as the “originator of structures, institutions, and social relations”¹¹ (Nonhoff & Gronau, 2012, p. 113). Thus, it is primarily not a question of what the subject is, but rather which procedures allow the subject to emerge in the first place. In view of this central role of the sociopolitical functionality

⁸ Translation by the author.

⁹ This relationship between knowledge and the shaping of reality certainly seems like another “inversion” à la Marx gen Hegel, but cleverly evades an idealism-materialism dispute through Foucault’s fundamental denial of a teleologically based continuity in history in favor of a genealogical reception of history as a sequence of contingent discontinuities (Bublitz, 2003).

¹⁰ Translation by the author.

¹¹ Translation by the author.

of discourse, in which they do not merely reflect reality but rather can be understood as material reality *sui generis* (Jäger & Maier, 2009), it is inevitable for the satisfaction of the epistemological interest of the present study to deal with the knowledge-producing processes of discourse in Germany surrounding the Turkish diaspora and, in the further course, the question of how knowledge formations about democracy can develop a material impact within the diaspora itself.

In this regard, the first question is in which contexts Turkish diaspora are objectified as a group in German public discourse. As mentioned at the outset, it is clear that there are a number of discursive processes surrounding people of Turkish origin, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. An important framing of these forms of debate, however, is provided by the integration discourse. In this context, Turkish migrants and their descendants are not only framed in terms of their sociopolitical participation in Germany, but specific demands are also placed on this group, which means that this discourse as an advisor of applications for action has an important everyday life implication. In view of the fundamental question of the change in the content of the discourse of integration from a material to an immaterial practice of measurement, the aim is to locate these moments of change and to reveal their inherent sociopolitical function.

The continuity of negative perception patterns in the German integration discourse

Germany is not only home to the world's largest Turkish diaspora, but over three million Turks and people of Turkish origin which represent the country's largest non-autochthonous population group (Schührer, 2018). Most of them immigrated within the framework of recruitment agreements from 1961 onwards while 78% of persons with a Turkish migrant background have been living in Germany for at least 20 years (Hanrath, 2011). Meanwhile, the social participation of members of this group, as well as their close ties to each other and to their old homeland, are factors that allow the German-Turkish relationship to grow beyond the simple sterility of interstate relations. In view of this, it is not surprising that within Germany's domestic political context, the discourse on the integration of people of Turkish origin is closely related to the general perception of the success of immigrant integration (Sauer & Halm 2018). Besides the quantity of people of Turkish origin residing in Germany, are qualitative characteristics, such as differences in religion, language and culture compared to the general population that are also of great importance for this development (Esser, 1986). Thus, in the example of the Turkish community in Germany, not only do a large number of mostly negatively connoted characteristics of foreignness accumulate, but at the same time interpretative practices that can already be described as manifest can be found, which construct people who are read as 'Turkish' in a sweeping manner as a collective (sometimes homogenized) group (Uslucan et al., 2023).

Despite the temporary overlap of integration discourse around people of Turkish origin with debates on the social integration of Muslims, defined primarily as a religious social group (Pickel & Pickel, 2018; Sauer & Halm, 2018), it is apparent that national categories continue to play an important role in perceptions of integration policy. In the case of people of Turkish origin, this is characterized by an important historical component. Therefore, in retrospect, it can be seen that the public debate - for example, the discourse about the integration of Turkish people in Germany in a Foucauldian understanding - is highly polarized, both academically and in terms of general discourse. Beginning with the Esser-Elwert controversy in the 1980s concerning multiculturalism vs. assimilation understandings of 'integration' (Kortmann, 2015), to the continuing media reporting on criminality, social misbehavior, and ghettoization (Jäger, 2000) of migrants from Turkey and political debates based on it, the 'Turkish migrant' developed in the public perception of Germany into the collective symbol of a person who is essentially hard to integrate into German society.¹²

For a long time, these forms of negative perceptions of people of Turkish origin have been discursively linked to severe deficits of this group in 'core areas' of integration, for example such as language acquisition and labor market placement, which was readily taken up and continued by the media and political actors. One example of this in the recent past was a study by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development on the integration of various migrant groups. The report, in which the group of people of Turkish origin were described as "by far" the "worst integrated" social group in the German capital (Woellert et al., 2009, p. 7), made high media waves shortly after its publication. The German weekly news magazine *Der Spiegel*, referring to parts of the study, reported: "Things turned out differently, the Turks stayed, but their inner attitude, it seems, did not change. They set themselves up in ghettos, they did not make contact with Germans, and this also made it difficult for their children to find their way into the new society"¹³ (Spiegel-Online, 2009).

These negatively connoted patterns of perception and the debate about the non-integration of Turkish people, due to a supposed "inner attitude," received a certain boost shortly afterwards with the publication of Thilo Sarrazin's controversial book "Deutschland schafft sich ab" (Germany is abolishing itself) in 2010. The book, which sold 1.5 million copies, was based on the thesis that the failure of Muslims to assimilate in Germany threatened public order and that the country was about to be Islamized. In particular, Sarrazin targeted people of Turkish origin in Germany, to whom he not only attributed common racist prejudices, but also ascribed an inability to integrate (Holtz

¹² The decisive factor here is that the majority of discursive processes deliberately did not reflect on these negative developments in the light of their economic and social causes, but rather culturalized them.

¹³ Translation by the author.

et al., 2013). The resulting overall discursive focus in the form of a cumulation between a collectivist foreign construction of people of Turkish origin and an inability to integrate attributed to them thus emerged from a strategic combination of several discursive strands which demonstrably influenced the perception of migrants in general and the Turkish diaspora in particular. In this context, we must deliberately speak of a strategic momentum, since other studies with a far more positive outcome on the integration status of people of Turkish origin published in the aftermath did not receive nearly the same attention respectively or have the same societal impact. For example, Hans' (2019) study supports the fact that younger generations of the Turkish diaspora in particular have demonstrably caught up in the often-problematized core areas of integration such as education, social placement and contacts with the host society. Furthermore, people of Turkish origin have in general achieved demonstrable success in cognitive, economic and interactional integration over the past 20 years (Sauer, 2016). Meanwhile, these processes are also underpinned by the group's self-perception. As the Emnid Research Institute found in its 2016 representative survey for the University of Münster, young German Turks in particular saw themselves "well integrated" while the study equally showed that members of this group felt less recognition of their achievements (Zeit-Online, 2016b). This also ties in with Arkılıç's (2022) remark that the integration discourse in Germany towards persons with a Turkish migration background is characterized by a particularly excluding functionality.

With reference to Foucault (1979), the different weighting of these knowledge formations with regard to the integration of people of Turkish origin in the context of the overall societal discourse of the Federal Republic of Germany can be explained by the strategic nature of (sometimes contradictory) discourse in the sense of tactical blocks in the field of social/political power relations. In this respect, discursive knowledge formations can be deliberately reproduced and circulated by various actors in order to achieve, from their own perspective, a functional construction of knowledge. Whether and to what extent the intensification of negative stereotypes regarding people of Turkish origin in this context represents a dispositive function from the point of view of media actors is of secondary importance concerning the impact of this discursive concatenation on the fundamental comprehension or the change of that very comprehension of successful integration. It is clear that the continuity of negative attributions and homogenizing foreign constructions of the Turkish diaspora, especially in media, not only represents a contrary or counterproductive image to established understandings of successful immigrant integration policy, which is to be understood in equal parts as the provision of opportunities for participation in society and the recognition of such participation (Schu, 2016; Uslucan & Yalçın, 2012). By referring to the immanence of an 'inner attitude' as the reason for the failure of integration, the aforementioned shift away from the valuation of material integration to the dominance of an understanding around immaterial integration is

also taking place. At the latest since 2008, one cross-border reference appears to be particularly concise when it comes to explaining the disintegration attributed to members of the Turkish diaspora, especially in light of the ascription of a growing distancing from the democratic status quo in Germany. What is meant here is the new Turkish diaspora policy, or rather the domestic discursive treatment of it in Germany. Based on this and in reference to the situation of the increasing consolidation of democracy within the integration framework in the German-Turkish context, it seems a fruitful approach to discuss the structural-discursive changes within the German integration debate using the reception of new Turkish diaspora politics as an example.

Cross-border discourse as domestic policy drivers: The new Turkish diaspora policy as a discursive trigger

In retrospect, it can be said that probably the most important impetus for a renewed intensification of the integration issue in the example of the Turkish community in Germany in the recent past and the following rise of discussions on the immaterial integration of this group were of a cross-border political nature. At the latest after a public appearance by the then prime minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Cologne on February 8, 2008, the government in Ankara pushed for a strategic change in its diaspora policies. The speech by Erdoğan, which gained a relatively high profile due to accusations of assimilation against the German government, thereby formulated two central demands on members of the Turkish diaspora, which in the following years were to be the starting point for the increasing convergence of questions of integration and the perception of democracy: first, the acquisition of language skills and the active demand for sociopolitical participation opportunities, and second, the maintenance and strengthening of cultural and social ties to Turkey. While Erdoğan's wish to learn the language (a fundamental demand of German integration policy since the 1980s) may have seemed unproblematic, the demand for opportunities to participate in the context of the host society and the simultaneous strengthening of references to origin may have raised eyebrows in Berlin. Meanwhile, Ankara created facts within a very short period of time: In 2008 and 2012, Turkey enacted external voting legislation and electoral registration for voters residing abroad (Anaz & Köse, 2021). In 2010, diaspora agencies as public institutions were established, including the Presidency for Turks Abroad. In 2014, for the first time in the history of the republic, Turkish citizens residing outside Turkey were given the opportunity to cast their ballots at consular missions.

German political actors reacted to these developments with great skepticism. As early as 2007, the then Integration Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, Armin Laschet, criticized that the implementation of voting rights for Turkish citizens in Germany could be "harmful in terms of integration policy" (Aydın, 2014, p. 7). The possibility of an "externally controlled penetration" of the Turkish community and influence on domestic

political affairs in the Federal Republic, or the instrumentalization of the Turkish community in the sense of the JDP government, was thus perceived as a serious domestic political challenge (Öktem, 2014, p. 7). Despite sporadic criticism, Germany's reactions to Ankara's advances were initially limited. This changed abruptly when bilateral relations between the two countries began to deteriorate in 2016. In this process the fears about the extraterritorial influence on the diaspora experienced a certain materialization when the Turkish president, in the run-up to the 2017 German federal elections, called on members of the diaspora in Germany who were eligible to vote not to give their votes to "anti-Turkish" parties (Der Tagesspiegel, 2017). The direct, albeit only discursive, intervention of the Turkish government in processes of German domestic politics not only led to the peak of diplomatic tensions between the two countries. In this context, then-Foreign Minister Gabriel addressed the people of Turkey with the following words: "I call on all people in Germany to oppose this attempt [...] what Erdoğan wants to destroy in Turkey: freedom, the rule of law and democracy"¹⁴ (FAZ.net, 2017).

The inclusion of the concept of 'democracy' or the targeted intention of an anti-democratic development in Turkey and its possible impact on the local diaspora seemed all the more interesting because the JDP was considered a bearer of democratic hope in large parts of the German discourse landscape until 2013 at the latest. For example, following the 2010 constitutional referendum, the newspaper Die Zeit ran the headline "In Turkey, democracy is winning. [...] The country is moving closer to Europe"¹⁵ (2010). In this context, partly following the narrative of "Muslim Democracy" (Cesari, 2014; Nasr, 2005), the JDP not only received a special form of international recognition, especially within German discourse, but promises such as strengthening civil liberties and limiting the military's powers were also seen as important steps toward overcoming structural weaknesses in the Turkish democratic model. This perception was also complemented on October 19, 2019, when German President Christian Wulff became the first head of state to address Turkey's Grand National Assembly, encouraging those present to proceed along the path of recent democratic constitutional changes (Bundespräsidialamt, 2010). When the ballot boxes in 2017 set up once again for a constitutional referendum, the former triumph of Turkish democracy under the JDP, in the German media coverage now reversed into the eventual "death of the Turkish republic"¹⁶ (Zeit-Online, 2017).

Thus, from a discursive perspective, two ruptures occurred in the course of the subsequent bilateral tensions between the two states. First, a public discussion about the domestic implications of Turkish diaspora policy was established, in which already existing

¹⁴ Translation by the author.

¹⁵ Translation by the author.

¹⁶ Translation by the author.

negative connotations with regard to the diaspora's ties to its origin were addressed. Central to this were narratives about how the Turkish diaspora has always acted as a Trojan horse (Aydın, 2014) or Ankara's fifth column (Tibi, 2017), or could be 'activated' as such at any time. The fact that this perception, like the construction of a homogeneous diaspora on the part of Ankara (Söylemez, 2021), was largely a discursive construction and is not only evident in the failure to recognize many of the groups that came to Germany in the second wave of migration in the 1980s via the route of political asylum and who generally have a rather critical, left-wing or left-liberal position and are explicitly not supporters of the JDP (Uslucan et al., 2023) but also in the assumption that political orientation toward origin in general would be related to tendential deviant understanding of democracy. Thus, at least in large sections of the media, active participation in extra-territorial elections in general and voting for the JDP in particular was framed as an indicator for desintegration. One of the most striking examples of this argumentation logic is probably a commentary from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in reaction of the elections results in 2017: "If hundreds of thousands of foreigners and immigrants are alienated from liberal and secular democracy, it is not because they landed years ago as 'guest workers' in a society that did not yet want to see itself as an immigration society. [...] It is simply the way it is when Germany becomes a country of immigration: The founding ideas of the Federal Republic are at stake"¹⁷ (FAZ.net, 2018).

Although German-Turkish relations have stabilized as of 2019 and the diplomatic controversies seem to have been overcome, the public reception of the episode in German-Turkish relations outlined above highlights two important aspects regarding the implications for German integration discourse. First, despite the 60-year history of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, generalized foreign constructions and the attribution of a fundamental (political) orientation toward their origin still seem to be valid components of the public perception in Germany. It should be noted that the merging of domestic and foreign policy discourse strands around political developments in Turkey and the integration of people of Turkish origin in Germany, in particular, has led to perceptual practices around equating broad parts of the Turkish diaspora with Ankara's political positions. Even if such a generalizing conflation does not take place, it can at least be seen that the political actions of the Turkish diaspora in Germany are repeatedly contrasted with political developments in Turkey. While the methodological-nationalist perception of people of Turkish origin applied here is not surprising, given the longstanding negation of the immigration-social character of the Federal Republic and the ethnic-cultural national understanding inherent here (Sezgin, 2010), it is interesting to note that specific threat scenarios are derived from ascribed 'ties of origin'.

¹⁷ Translation by the author.

Second, the concept of democracy has now become inescapably woven into the discourse of integration and, thus, into the public understanding of social cohesion. However, this has not happened within a dialog process but through mechanisms of foreign construction. In this respect, the discourse contextualities in Germany are not only once again characterized by a special form of impermeability for migrant groups, but also underline the eclectic imbalance between mechanisms of foreign and self-attribution in migration/integration discourse. This is particularly evident in the fact that this mode of conducting the debate, despite its focus on a possible ‘deviant’ understanding of democracy on the part of the Turkish diaspora, has made absolutely no contribution to the question of its content. On this basis, it is now necessary to detach from mechanisms of attribution to foreigners within the German integration discourse and to explore the extent to which a substantive understanding of democracy in the diaspora can be developed through the interplay between host, origin, and transnational ties.

A Discourse-Theoretical approach: The perception of democracy under transnational conditions

Whether and to what extent Ankara’s new diaspora policy serves the instrumentalization of the Turkish community is currently the subject of broad-based domestic and foreign policy debates in Germany. One aspect that is hardly considered in the debate is that the impact of the diaspora policy efforts of Turkish parties, above all the JDP, is to a decisive extent also due to previous failures of Turkish and German policies regarding the wishes and expectations of the Turkish diaspora in Germany (Söylemez, 2021). In this respect, a causality between the endorsement of Turkish foreign policies and resulting disintegration in the German context cannot be immediately identified (Halm & Sauer, 2018). Rather, the results of a survey on migrant representation conducted by the Center for Turkish Studies in Essen among people of Turkish origin in North Rhine-Westphalia, where a third of the Turkish expatriate community in Germany resides, indicate that in recent times, the sense of representation of interests by institutions has generally increased. However, this includes German, Turkish, and transnational actors, such as governments, as well as non-governmental migrant organizations, by which members of the diaspora now most often feel represented (Sauer, 2016). This situation not only indicates that members of the Turkish diaspora have political references in both host and home social contexts, but also that they can construct discursive references in transnational settings. From a discourse-theoretical perspective, this observation allows us to determine the influence of discursively-mediated knowledge formations on the members of the diaspora and makes it possible to assess the influences of different knowledge sources on the diaspora’s internal construction of an understanding of democracy.

Before delving into this aspect in more detail, it is necessary to formulate two central assumptions. First (1), I assume in a Foucauldian-constructivist sense that the

understanding of democracy results from a construction process that is primarily subjective in nature but takes shape through collective references. In this respect, not only does democracy thrive on discourse, but our perception of democracy is also the result of discursive processes. This leads us to the second (2) assumption: I assume, as I will show in the following, that our knowledge about democracy is mediated by discourse in society as a whole. If we want to concretize this in our case study, we can assume that people with a permanent center of life in Germany are initially directly subject to the influence of the discourse of society as a whole, and their perception of democracy is thus determined by the hegemonic knowledge formations of this specific national context. This also includes members of the Turkish diaspora with permanent residence in Germany. However, since the transnational turn in migration research (Clarke, 2013), it should be noted that migrants and people with migrant family histories can also have transnational references and thus connectivity to various social discourses of different national contextualities. Transnationality in this respect is first to be understood as “processes of consolidation of relatively permanent social relations, social networks, and social spaces that are locally anchored in different national societies and do not have a single center”¹⁸ (Pries, 2013, p. 891). From a social sciences perspective, this process in the migration context results in the emergence of transnational densification of social fields and spaces at the level of (primarily) non-state actors, which are characterized by a variety of simultaneous entanglements in contexts of origin and reception (Faist, 2000). In this context, Pries mentions that people of Turkish origin have a variety of social relationships that link the society of origin and the society of settlement (Pries, 2010). Before undertaking a precise investigation of how concrete knowledge formations about democracy can possibly be conveyed to members of the Turkish diaspora via transnational discourse contexts, it is first necessary to undertake a discourse-theoretical reception of the concept of transnationality.

The question that arises here is to what extent conceptions of reality are constituted by individuals or groups who live within transnational contexts. Following Pries’ explanations of transnationalism, these are individuals who, locally anchored in different national societies and, for example, national discourse, constitute relatively durable and dense social relations, social networks, or social spaces (Pries, 2010). Based on Foucault’s fundamentally practice-oriented understanding of discourse presented in the introductory theory section of this paper, people of Turkish origin thus formally represent subjects of a German social discourse, but they also have transnational references via their ties to Turkey. In addition, they may be involved in diaspora-specific mixed discourses. Pries notes, for example, that in the case of transmigration, socio-cultural practices of the society of arrival and the society of origin are mixed in diaspora communities, and new forms

¹⁸ Translation by the author.

of socialization can emerge from this (Pries, 2003). From a sociological perspective, the main interest with regard to the reference of contexts of origin and reception is the resource potential that can be derived from this with regard to participation and integrative processes. From a discourse-theoretical perspective, on the other hand, it becomes apparent that the state of knowledge, in this case, of the Turkish diaspora, is nourished by several, partly overlapping discourses in society as a whole and in specific groups, and in this respect, this also applies to the understanding of democracy.

Cross-border transfer of discursive content and the aspect of discursive embedding

From the theoretical work outlined here, it can be deduced that members of the Turkish diaspora in Germany initially have a multi-layered discursive embedding, i.e. they move within the sphere of influence of discursive processes in the context of reception and origin. This in turn leads to two central questions: First, (1) how can this discursive multiple embedding be understood in practice, or rather, which functional logics does it follow? Second, (2) to what extent are discursive knowledge formations about the concept of democracy, e.g. divergent understandings of democracy, communicated to the diaspora from different sources and how do they manifest themselves?

First of all, it should be noted that spatial mobility between two societies is certainly an important aspect. In the specific case of the Turkish diaspora, it can be seen that aspects of commuter migration between the two societies have been restricted, at the latest with the recruitment stop in 1973, where the freedom of movement of permanent border crossings between the two countries has been severely limited. Thus, from this point on, spatial migration between the two contexts is mainly limited to the obligatory 'home visit' of former guest workers during the summer school vacations. From a discourse-theoretical perspective, however, it should be mentioned that a short-term stay cannot constitute a sufficient reason for discursive embedding since the aspect of continuity, in the sense of a permanent embedding in the national discourse, is not given here (Martinsen, 2014). In addition, the process of cross-generational social integration demonstrably reduces the immediate spatial ties to the society of origin, that is, the density of visits home or the quality. For the discourse to develop its subject-constitutive effect, an awareness of the specific codes of the respective social discourse must develop in the individual. That is, the individual must be able to comprehend the logic of the field of sayability (Foucault, 1991). This means that we can only speak of transnational embedding if individuals are permanently under the influence of several national or transnational social discourses. One possibility for the simultaneous and constant influence of several nationally different social discourses is through the use of various cross-border communication channels. Communication networks used by the Turkish diaspora in the Federal Republic play an important role here and have a connection to discourse of the homeland.

If one wants to concretize these processes using the example of dealing with the genuine Turkish discourse, which also carries knowledge content related to the democracy question, the following communication networks come into question as carriers of discourse content relevant to democracy: (1) Genuine Turkish communication networks (e.g., TV, print, WWW, personal contacts in Turkey), (2) genuine German communication networks, and (3) intra-diasporic communication networks (e.g., diaspora (online) newspapers, social media groups). Hepp et al. (2011) mention that members of the Turkish community tend to use media in a bicultural and ethno-oriented way compared to other migrant groups in Germany. This results not only in a local reference (place of living) but also in a strong communicative orientation toward the country of origin. For the Turkish diaspora, it can be concluded that the formation of origin-oriented communication networks is of particular importance in this context. This finding is also reflected in the consumption of Turkish-language media by the Turkish diaspora (Güntürk, 2000). Here, communication networks with a direct connection to Turkey emerge as an important carrier of discursive content. For example, the use of Turkish TV and print media continues to predominate among people of Turkish origin, despite declining trends in generational comparison (Müller, 2005). The fact that this form of media consumption, along with the associated absorption of discursive knowledge formations, is also reflected in the discursive participation behavior of diaspora members can be observed at the meso level.

A striking example of this is the political positioning and communication strategies of associations of the Turkish diaspora in the course of cross-border political debates in the German-Turkish context, which show that political-discursive contexts from Turkey are certainly perceived by the diaspora in Germany and woven into their specific communication behavior. For example, the study on claim-making by Turkish migrant associations in the course of the Armenia debate around the 2017 Bundestag resolution points out that origin-contextual narratives are taken up by collective actors of the diaspora and reproduced in host society debates (Halm & Söylemez, 2017). It is interesting to note that the discursive contributions of the Turkish associations do not necessarily appear compatible with the overall German debate on this topic due to their proximity to the discourse of the society of origin, and therefore the discursive input of the diaspora actors is hardly heard in the reception context (Ibid). However, it is also quite observable that the discourse reception of transnational debates differs from the perception of host society domestic debates. Another study on this aspect shows that, for example, in relation to the discussion of domestic political debates in the host context, e.g. in connection with racist acts of violence, modes of reception come to light that are neither directly detectable in contexts of origin nor in host contexts. For example, various Turkish migrant organizations, of different religious and political persuasions, show that they make use of diaspora-internal knowledge formations in their political assessment of the Hanau attack in

2020, which have a very community-specific and selective perception of racist violence. Thus, a narrative is sketched that, beginning with the arson attacks in the 1990s in Mölln and Solingen against Turkish families, through the murder series by the National Socialist Underground (NSU), to Hanau, represents a narrative of targeted violence against people from Turkey. This particular form of concatenation of racist attacks is neither a fundamental model in the discussion of racist violence in Germany, nor does such a stringent narrative exist in Turkey with regard to the racist persecution of Turkish diaspora (Söylemez, 2022).

Based on this, it can be stated that the specific discursive embedding of the Turkish diaspora has a demonstrable effect on the perception of social events and processes by its members. A discourse-analytical examination of these processes reveals that, at least at the meso level, knowledge formations in the host society and in the society of origin can play just as important a role as diaspora-internal community, which in turn form their own specific context for discursive positioning behavior. Thus, it can be strongly assumed that the understanding of democracy within the diaspora is influenced by precisely these contextual conditions. Yet, if one considers the discourse outlined at the outset regarding the possible deviation in the understandings of democracy within the group of people of Turkish origin in Germany, it becomes clear that the debate is based far less on concrete models of democracy than on a foreign construction that intends to suggest a deviation in the understanding of democracy. How this concrete form of deviation can be materialized remains open. This, in turn, leads to a much more critical questioning of the meaning of ‘democracy’ in integration discourse and the political functionality of attributing a deviant understanding of democracy to the foreign construction of people of Turkish origin in Germany.

Conclusion: The question of discursive foreign and self-construction


The preceding theoretical view of the field not only shows that members of the Turkish diaspora have access to knowledge formations from various national and transnational sources, but also that there is a significant imbalance between foreign and ‘migrant’ self-attribution in the discourse on the possible deviation of the understanding of democracy of the Turkish diaspora in Germany. Thus, the debate about the understanding of democracy within the Turkish community is decisively dominated by processes of foreign attribution, while the self-descriptions of the community receive little or no access to the field of overall societal discourse. At the same time, intensive debates at the level of Turkish migrant associations show that processes of debate and reflection do take place, and that clear discursive and political positions are taken. Two fundamental problems result from this situation, which are, first, of a socio-political and secondly, of an epistemological nature.

First of all, with regard to the socio-political problem, the intertwining of democracy and integration is a development that will sooner or later have to take place in immigration societies. Not least, global developments in recent years, such as the emergence of anti-racist protest movements like Black Lives Matter in the United States, or different initiatives to clarify the NSU murders in Germany, have shown that Western societies, in light of migration and changing demographics, must not only deal more decisively with questions of minority rights but also with questions of the extent to which migrant (or migrantized) perspectives are heard in overall societal debates. In the case of Germany, it can be observed that, at the latest since the emergence of the multiculturalism debate in the 1990s, social discourse on the recognition of social diversity have intensified (Eckardt, 2007). Probably the most recent development in this field is the current debate about the post-migrant character of the Federal Republic, in the context of which central concepts, such as homeland and identity are being discussed anew (Foroutan, 2016). This perception was framed not least from the political side, among other things, by an address of the Federal President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in honor of the 60th anniversary of the recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey: “Since you [e.g., the immigrants from Turkey] came here, we have changed. The meaning of the word ‘German’ has changed” (Bundespräsidialamt, 2021). In view of this, there is fertile ground for the emergence of new discussions about the concept of democracy and the possible understanding of a post-migrant democracy, in which people of Turkish origin, as the largest non-autochthonous group in Germany, should naturally have a right to participate. The political reality, however, presents a different picture. The massive imbalance between discursive opportunities for participation, coupled with negatively connotated attribution practices, not only impedes discursive access opportunities for members of migrant communities in general, but also contributes to the perpetuation of negative perceptions. As outlined above, despite their demonstrable material integration successes, members of the Turkish diaspora still represent a problematic group from an integration policy perspective. The discursive recourse to the democracy question in the context of integration, in the sense of a reweighing of material aspects of integration measurement to immaterial aspects, makes it possible to construct new negative perceptions or to maintain attribution practices that already have fundamentally negative connotations. In light of the already existing imbalance between foreign and self-attribution practices, this also opens up new possibilities for the political instrumentalization of integration discourse, which can be used to perpetuate already existing prejudices against the Turkish diaspora. It should be clear, however, that the construction of the diaspora as incapable of democracy or anti-democratic is a far stronger means of delegitimizing this group than objections such as lack of language skills.

From an epistemological perspective, the current political debates about the ‘democratic’ integration of the Turkish diaspora do not contribute to the discussion of

community-internal democracy discourse. Instead, they serve to perpetuate negative foreign constructions of the Turkish diaspora, portraying them as having not yet arrived in democracy. This discourse provides a basis for the application of possible repressive political measures. Whether and to what extent this legitimation framework is based on objective truths is irrelevant insofar as the implications of this perception can be material. But what should an insight-oriented discussion in this field look like? First of all, it is important to ensure aspects of discursive participation. As the understanding of successful integration is underpinned by participation and recognition practices, these must be promoted to the same extent. In other words, sensitivities must be created for the discursive multiple embedding of the Turkish diaspora. The reception of democracy-relevant contributions from the Turkish community is an important data material in this context, which must be considered in transnational discourse contexts that are internal to the societies of reception and origin. An operationalized discourse-analytical approach is likely to be an important methodological approach here. This perspective should be developed in particular with regard to the Turkish election year 2023. There is no question that in this context the discourse about people of Turkish origin in Germany will intensify once again. As before, the focus will be on the voting behavior of the Turkish diaspora, and the final election results will have a demonstrable influence on the social perception practices of Turkish people in Germany. Thus, in the current temporal period, it seems all the more important to develop a multi-layered perception of these developments, reflecting on different forms of attribution in national, international, and transnational contexts. In this respect, I hope that the discussion presented here, including theoretical aspects, will encourage more in-depth research into this topic area and, in particular, into the development of integration discourse and its implications for the diaspora.

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The Effects of Granting the Right of External Voting to the Diaspora Policies of AKP and CHP

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Abstract

By granting the Turkish diaspora the right to vote in general elections in 2014, Turkish political parties' diaspora policies have gained crucial importance, especially considering that votes from abroad constitute five percent of the total votes. In this study, I will try to answer the question of how granting of the right to vote to citizens abroad affected the main Turkish political parties' (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party– AKP and Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People's Party - CHP) diaspora policies. First of all, I start by introducing the Turkish diaspora. Then, I review the history of the Turkish diaspora's right to vote from abroad. Next, I analyze the parties' election manifestos published before the general elections in 2011, 2015, and 2018. The reason for selecting these specific elections is to reveal the alteration of these two main parties' diaspora policies since the 2011 elections were the last election before the granting to vote externally and 2015 and 2018 were the first two general elections afterward. Within the scope of this literature review and document analysis, the issue is analyzed using two perspectives within the framework of the concepts of external voting, election districts, foreign policy, diaspora institutions, culture and integration, political participation, and education. This study establishes that the provision of external voting rights had a substantial influence on the policies of Turkish political parties towards the diaspora, as evidenced by the significant increase in the number of election manifesto articles and the remarkably diverse promises.

Keywords

External Voting, Turkish
Diaspora, Election
Manifesto, AKP, CHP

Introduction

External voting has been discussed in Turkish politics for over 50 years. Discussions began in 1965 with a law drafted by a parliamentarian (Anaz & Köse, 2020) and finally Turkish citizens abroad were granted the right to vote in the presidential elections in 2014. Since the right to vote was granted to the Turkish diaspora, there have been two presidential

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elections in 2014 and 2018, two general elections in 2015, one more general election in 2018, as well as a referendum in 2017. However, since the two general elections in 2015 occurred approximately three months apart (July 7 and November 1), the Turkish diaspora parts of the two parties' election manifestos' are exactly the same. For practical reasons, in this study I did not examine them separately but accepted them as one.

In this article, I claim that Turkey's two main parties' (AKP and CHP) interest in the Turkish diaspora and its issues increased in a positive way for the Turkish diaspora after being granted the right to vote, and this can be observed in the election manifestos. I limited the examination of election manifestos to only two parties due to their significance in Turkish politics and how they represented the main political spheres for more than 20 years. The AKP has been the ruling party since 2002, and the CHP has been the main opposition party since 2002. For this reason, I limited the examination of the parties' diaspora policies to only two main parties. It is meaningful to study external voting and parties' approaches towards the Turkish diaspora because of the percentage of votes from abroad proportion to the total amount of votes. To put it more clearly, external votes were 5 percent of the total votes in the 2018 presidential and general elections, according to High Election Board (YSK - Yüksek Seçim Kurulu) ([YSK Web Portal, 2018](#)). In the 2014 and 2018 presidential elections, Erdoğan won in the first round only by approximately 2 percent, and the referendum in 2017, was concluded roughly 51 to 48 for acceptance. External voting, which represents 5 percent of the total vote, makes a difference in the Turkish election context. The reason behind selecting the three elections, in 2011, 2015, and 2018, is to reveal the alteration of parties' policies and approaches towards the Turkish diaspora since granting the right to vote from abroad. Turkish citizens could not vote in the 2011 general elections abroad, but it changed in 2012. For the first time, Turkish citizens voted in abroad in the 2014 presidential elections and naturally also in the subsequent elections.

Finally, despite increasing interest and attention towards the diaspora and external voting studies over the last decades, there is no study about the effects of external voting on Turkish party politics. Therefore, this study has unique importance because it demonstrates the alteration of the parties' diaspora policies with the effect of granting external voting rights.

Literature Review

Diaspora

The concept of 'diaspora' has an increasing usage trend, especially in recent decades. Although the term was used to mean 'scatter' in Greek, and was used for Athenians who settled outside of Athens, it has changed over time to express religious communities such as Jewish communities or religious minorities in Europe during the Middle Ages ([Köse,](#)

2021). More recently, the word diaspora has become a popular term to describe a nations' trans-border communities, but diaspora is not the only concept for trans-border communities. 'Transnational communities', 'migrant communities', 'minorities', and 'kin societies' are some of the most significant concepts used to describe trans-border communities (Butler, 2001; De Haas vd., 2019; Dufoix, 2008; as cited in Köse, 2021: p. 67; Sheffer, 2003; Vertovec, 1997). The increase in motives and grounds for international migration caused forced emigration to no longer be the main element of diaspora formation. (Köse, 2021). Despite the fact that the term diaspora is still far from having a definitive definition in the near future, there is no harm to use it for transnational communities such as Turks in abroad, or in other words the Turkish diaspora.

The Turkish Diaspora

The Turkish diaspora is a term that is worth debating. Even though the first Turkish 'diaspora formation' movements may be considered with the border changes that emerged after WW1, such as in Brubaker's 'Accidental Diasporas', and with the emigration of Turkish guest workers beginning in the 1960s European countries, mainly to West Germany, as guest workers, the emigrant Turkish diaspora began to emerge (Adamson, 2019; Brubaker, 2000; Köse, 2021). While some scholars such as İçduygu and Sirkeci (2001), accepted the Turkish population in Western European countries as a diasporic community according to Safran's definition (Sirkeci & İçduygu, 2001), some scholars do not use the term 'Turkish diaspora' (Abadan-Unat, 2017; Gitmez, 2019; as cited in Köse, 2021: p.68; Martin, 1991) but instead utilized different terms such as Euro-Turks (Kaya & Kentel, 2005). In spite of the ambiguity of the concept of Turkish diaspora, there has been an expansion in the usage of the term primarily correlated with labor migration and Cohen's (2008) labor diaspora (Köse, 2021). The uncertainty and vagueness of the meaning of the term Turkish diaspora is caused from the dictionary description of the diaspora as *kopuntu* (fragment) by the Turkish Language Society (TDK- Türk Dil Kurumu) and the relationship with the Jewish Diaspora (Köse, 2021). Yıldız (2019) further criticized the acceptance and usage of the term Turkish diaspora by academics due to its indefiniteness and lack of limitation (Yıldız, 2019).

To define the borders of the Turkish diaspora, I accept Köse's (2021) classification for the Turkish diaspora as two concepts: autochthonous diaspora and emigrant diaspora (Köse, 2021). Autochthonous diaspora, also called "accidental diasporas" by Brubaker (Brubaker, 2000), are developed by border changes instead of emigration in comparison emigrant diaspora, as in the case of the Balkans (Brubaker, 2000; Köse, 2021). The majority of the Turkish diaspora was formed through guest worker programs between some Western European countries, such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands, beginning the 1960s (Köse, 2021). Since this study's focus is on the diaspora's political participation by examining the election manifestos in the context of external voting and most of the

autochthonous Turkish diaspora members do not have Turkish citizenship, I refer to the Turkish diaspora as Köse's emigrant Turkish diaspora in this study.

Political Participation of the Turkish Diaspora

Political participation is a broad concept and has multiple meanings. Most of the use of the concept by academics is limited to voting in elections, for reasonable causes, and I too limit the concept of political participation to only voting in this study by examining external voting and parties' diaspora policies through election manifestos in Turkey's politics.

External Voting

External voting, commonly recognized as overseas voting or expatriate voting, pertains to the act of permitting citizens who reside outside their home country to engage in their homeland's electoral procedures and exercise their right to vote. Over the last several decades, most countries worldwide have granted voting rights to non-resident citizens, which has enfranchised about 200 million emigrants in over 140 countries (Anaz & Köse, 2022; Wellman et al., 2022). External voting originated in the late 19th century when United States and Australian soldiers were granted the right to vote; the practice was later expanded to include other professionals and citizens in home-country elections (Anaz & Köse, 2022). According to Lafleur (2015, p. 6), some scholars have become curious about why external voting has spread globally. They sample different hypotheses established on democratization theories (Lafleur, 2015). These hypotheses go by different names and also have sub-hypotheses that can be grouped into two main categories: the norm internationalization hypothesis and the electoral competition hypothesis (Lafleur, 2015). The norm-internationalization hypothesis proposes that the inclusion of emigrants in the electoral processes of their home countries is due to the emergence of a new global normative standard (Lafleur, 2015). This hypothesis suggests two possible ways in which external voting could have become an international standard. One way is through the top-down process of international diffusion, as suggested by Grace and Lafleur (Grace, 2007; Lafleur, 2013, as cited in 2015, p. 7). Another way is through peer pressure, where pioneering states' adoption of external voting legislation encourages more states to do the same (as cited in Lafleur, 2015, p. 7; Rhodes and Harutyunyan, 2010). When countries with significant diasporas allow their emigrant citizens to vote, it could potentially affect election results. Additionally, including emigrant citizens in elections has economic, as well as political benefits because remittances are crucial to many developing economies (Wellman et al., 2022).

The scope to which states permit their non-resident citizens to vote from overseas deviates significantly. This divergence exists across nations and changes over time, as well as within nations depending on the type and timing of the election. In brief, Collyer

(2014, p. 64) summarizes the election systems and external voting practices of countries in 5 groups: (1) countries that do not have elections, (2) countries where people living abroad cannot vote, (3) practices where diaspora members who want to vote have to come to the country, (4) foreign voting countries that have the practice of voting and where the votes cast are transferred to the last constituency in which they were settled or distributed to parties throughout the country, and (5) countries with a constituency practice where the diaspora can elect their own representative (Collyer, 2014: p. 64; Köse, 2020: p. 134).

External voting is a topic that is commonly studied across four key dimensions, including normative political theory (as cited in Anaz & Köse, 2021, p. 183; Gamlen, 2015; Lafleur, 2011), comparative studies (as cited in Anaz & Köse, 2021, p. 183; Farmani and Jafari, 2016; Laguerre, 2013; Rojas, 2004), voting practices (as cited in Anaz & Köse, 2021, p. 183; Brand, 2010), and electoral behaviors (as cited in Anaz & Köse, 2021, p. 183; Jaulin, 2015). In the realm of normative political studies, there are conversations surrounding the authorization or prohibition of overseas citizens to exercise their voting rights (Anaz & Köse, 2021; López-Guerra, 2005). Some argue that external voting can create challenges such as fraud and the cost of the electoral procedure and may endanger the country's sovereignty if the diaspora exceeds the host society's population (Anaz & Köse, 2021; Jaulin, 2015). The topic also generates discussions on citizenship and loyalty to a sovereign state. Some argue that citizens who have a significant stake in their country of origin through family, property, or the hope of returning should have the right to vote from abroad. This is known as stakeholder citizenship (Anaz & Köse, 2021; Baubock, 2006). However, some states exclude citizens who have spent a certain amount of time abroad from voting. In the United Kingdom, for example, citizens are barred from voting in homeland elections after spending 15 years outside the country (Anaz & Köse, 2021). The comparative studies on overseas voting investigate why and how external voting is allowed. Lafleur (2013) identified three reasons for states to allow their citizens to vote from abroad (Anaz & Köse, 2021, p. 183; Lafleur, 2013): emigrants' financial contributions; policies aimed at incorporating overseas citizens to gain their support during political reform and democratic transitions; and finally, when citizens living abroad highlight their ties to their home country, the state is more inclined to grant them voting rights. According to Brand (2014), when the diaspora population reaches a significant point that cannot be ignored by the state, the state is more inclined to institute emigration policies (as cited in Anaz & Köse, 2021, p. 183; Brand, 2014). Additionally, Brand highlights that political parties are more likely to advocate for developing emigration policies if they anticipate that emigrants will support their party over their rivals (as cited in Anaz & Köse, 2021, p. 184; Brand, 2014). In this context, Brand (2010) also posits that external voting is implemented by authoritarian regimes as well as democratic states to address the need for increased political participation, to accommodate

competing elite interests, to maintain the dominant political party's position, and to deter opposition (as cited in Anaz & Köse, 2022, p. 360; Brand, 2010).

Østergaard-Nielsen et al. (2019) examine the factors that impact a political party's stance on voting rights for emigrants (Østergaard-Nielsen et al., 2019). The authors contend that a party's ideology and level of competition within the political landscape are critical drivers in determining its position on the issue (Østergaard-Nielsen et al., 2019). The scholars suggest that a party's stance on immigration is influenced by the societal divide between open and closed systems and the separation of citizens and states (Caramani, 2012; as cited in Østergaard-Nielsen et al., 2019, p. 378). Left-leaning parties usually support immigrant inclusion, while right-leaning parties prioritize the rights of non-resident emigrant citizens (Odmalm, 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen et al., 2019). The findings of a study (Turcu & Urbatsch, 2015) revealed that the political orientation of a government has no significant impact on the implementation of external voting rights (as cited in Østergaard-Nielsen et al., 2019, p. 378; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2015). Additionally, party competition also shapes a party's view on emigrant voting rights, as internal party dynamics can affect migration policies (Østergaard-Nielsen et al., 2019). Further investigation is needed to determine how a party's position on increased emigrant voting rights aligns with its left-right ideology and how it presents its stance, according to the authors (Østergaard-Nielsen et al., 2019).

External Voting in Turkey

Until 1950, Turkey did not have a law regulating the registration or voting from abroad. With the election law of 1950, the registration of those living abroad as voters was included in the law for the first time. According to the election law, people could only vote by coming to the country at that time (Köse, 2020; Milletvekilleri Seçim Kanunu, 1950).

In 1987, the right to vote at customs was legalized as an additional option, however, it is debatable whether this method can be considered as external voting (Köse, 2020). Those who wanted to vote in the ballot boxes established at customs gates had to be living abroad for more than six months and not have a voter registration in Turkey at the same time (Arkilic, 2021; Köse, 2020). Those who were registered in the electoral register, although they lived abroad, were not entitled to vote at customs gates. In short, from 1987 to 2011, the Turkish diaspora voted at customs gates (Köse, 2020; Anaz & Köse, 2020). During this period, some of the voters came to the customs gates just to vote, while the majority of those who voted at the customs gates, came to Turkey for reasons such as work, vacation, or family visits if their arrival date coincided with a general election or a referendum (Köse, 2020). Despite living in abroad, voters who registered in an electoral roll in Turkey could not vote during this period. In addition, the fact that citizens can vote on the condition of coming to the customs gates, starting 75 days before the elections, only partially meets the criteria for voting abroad. According to Köse

(2020, p. 136), whom I agree with on this issue, this practice cannot be considered external voting, but as voting for those who live abroad (Köse, 2020).

In spite of the modifications in the Elections and Electoral Register in 2008 and 2012, due to decisions of both the Constitutional Court and YSK made it impossible to vote in the 2011 elections (Kadirbeyoğlu & Okyay, 2015). The Constitutional Court ruled that the change in the law violates the secrecy of voting (Kadirbeyoğlu & Okyay, 2015; Anaz & Köse, 2020) because it provides a provision for postal voting. Moreover, the law amendment made in 2012 was aimed at eliminating the administrative and legal gaps in voting abroad and to maximize participation in the elections (Kadirbeyoğlu & Okyay, 2015; Anaz & Köse, 2020). With this law amendment (2012), there was no obstacle for the YSK to provide the opportunity for external voters to vote abroad and in the 2014 presidential elections, ballot boxes were established abroad for the first time (Kadirbeyoğlu & Okyay, 2015; Anaz & Köse, 2020).

The fact that the Turkish diaspora started to use its right to vote abroad in 2014 has brought the homeland-diaspora relationship to the political, as well as socio-cultural and economic plane. Voters abroad, with the possibility of voting in the nearest town in the country where they live, without having to travel to their homeland, participated more than anticipated and there was an increased turnout in the 2014-2018 elections.

Anaz and Köse (2022) proposed that Turkey's external voting can be explained through four stages (Anaz & Köse, 2022). The first stage involves changes to voter registration requirements after the introduction of a multiparty system in 1945 (Anaz & Köse, 2022). During the second stage in the period of Turgut Özal's efforts to establish civilian authority in 1987, Turkish citizens were permitted to cast their votes at customs gates. The third stage saw a constitutional amendment in 1995 that removed disputes and expanded democratic rights and freedoms, and the fourth stage coincided with Turkey's efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and accession talks with the European Union, with the implementation of the 2008 and 2012 amendments to the Electoral Act (Anaz & Köse, 2022). Anaz and Köse (2022) further predict a fifth stage that would involve the introduction of a special electoral district for the Turkish diaspora (Anaz & Köse, 2022). Furthermore, Şahin-Mencütek and Erdoğan (2015) analyze the Turkish external voting system and postulated that the process reflects the desire of home states to nurture loyalty and maintain connections with citizens and co-ethnics residing overseas. The authors further noted that migrants from Turkey have been active in advocating for voting rights, and the ruling party may have utilized the external voting system to increase the chances of securing a majority vote for their presidential candidate (as cited in Anaz & Köse, 2022, p. 360; Şahin-Mencütek & Erdoğan, 2016). In response to the authors, Anaz and Köse criticize Şahin-Mencütek and Erdoğan (2016) for not comprehending Turkey's diaspora engagement policies; and they even argue that the AKP's

diaspora policies were successful parallel to their general policies during the early years of power (Anaz & Köse, 2021).

As a conclusion, fifty percent of approximately 3 million registered voters cast their votes in ballot boxes set up in 60 countries and at Turkey's customs gates. This high and increasing participation rate is important in terms of expressing the importance that the Turkish diaspora attaches to political participation in the homeland.

Methodology

The aim of this study is to explore and illustrate how granting rights to vote abroad to the Turkish diaspora affected the two main parties' diaspora policies and promises; for this reason, I examined the political parties' election manifestos to understand and reveal their diaspora policies' evolution since granting external voting rights. For this research, I examined two the main parties in Turkish politics' election manifestos, namely the AKP and CHP, and their election manifestos for three general elections in 2011, 2015, and 2018. There are two reasons behind selecting the AKP and CHP to analyze. First, these parties have been the ruling party and the main opposition party since 2002; and second, these two parties have a leading role within the presidential system, which leads to political conjuncture to the two parties, coalitions, alliances, or blocs. Furthermore, I picked these particular three elections in order to reveal the evolution; in other words, I examined their last general election manifestos before granting the right to vote abroad, which was the 2011 general election, and the first and the second general elections after external voting was granted in the general elections in 2015 and 2018. There were two general elections in 2015 but both political parties' manifestos about the Turkish diaspora were precisely the same, so there is no need to examine them separately.

Every document that contains text could function as a source for qualitative analysis (Morgan, 2022; as cited in Patton, 2014: p. 64), and is called document analysis. The election manifestos were voluntarily prepared and published by these Turkish political parties without any mandatory legal obligations. I obtained the election manifestos through the parties' web sites (AK PARTİ | Dosya Arşivi, 2011; Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 2011). Within the framework of these general election manifestos of the AKP and CHP, I utilize two perspectives to examine them. I compare the quantitative aspect of the election manifestos over the elections. In other words, I extract the parties' every promise, declaration, and statement about the Turkish diaspora as an article to reveal their interest evolution over the selected elections using a quantitative perspective. Additionally, I examine the contents of the election manifestos under the subheadings of foreign policy, diaspora institutions, culture and integration, political participation, and education, respectively in order to reveal the alteration of the political parties' diaspora policies through the content of the manifestos over the three selected elections.

Findings

In this study, as mentioned above, I analyze the general election manifestos of the two main parties in Turkish politics from two different perspectives. First, I use a general perspective consisting of the article counts in the parties' election manifestos and under which headings they declared their promises for these three elections. In the second part, I compare the parties' promises and statements over three elections using content analysis. These elections are the last election before granting external voting rights and the first two elections after, in order to reveal the effect of granting external voting rights on the parties' diaspora policies. Furthermore, this study may be beneficial to debates [such as (Anaz & Köse, 2021)] about the possible effects of making an electoral district abroad.

General Perspective

In the 2011 general elections when external voting did not exist, the CHP had only one article in their election manifesto about the Turkish diaspora; while the AKP had six articles under the headings of 'Our Foreign Policy' and 'Relations with European Union (EU)'.

In the 2015 general elections, the first general election after the right of external voting was granted to the Turkish diaspora, the CHP increased the number of articles about the Turkish diaspora in their election manifestos from one to 19 under a specific heading for the Turkish diaspora called 'Our People Abroad' and some other related headings including, 'Entrepreneurship Ecosystem/Corporate Ecosystem', 'Higher Education System', and 'System of Political Parties'. The AKP, in their election manifestos, increased the number of articles about the Turkish diaspora from seven to 27 under a specific heading, called 'Our Citizens Living Abroad and Related Communities' and divided this heading to two parts called, 'What we did?' and 'What will we do?'.

Lastly, in the 2018 general elections both parties increased the number of articles in their election manifestos. On the CHP side, the number rose from 19 to 24 under a specific heading called 'Our People Abroad' and other two headings called 'Foreign Policy: Stability and Reputation' and 'Diplomatic Initiatives'. On the AKP side, the increase was higher from 27 to 64 articles about the Turkish Diaspora under a specific heading called 'Our Citizens Living Abroad' and grouped the heading again into two called, 'What we did?' and 'What will we do?'.

Content Examination

Foreign Policy

To begin with the CHP, there was no article about the Turkish diaspora in the context of foreign policy in their 2011 election manifesto. However, in the 2015 election, the CHP manifested that they would try every diplomatic way to support those who have

issues obtaining dual citizenship and the security of life and property of people of Turkish origin through diplomatic initiatives. In the general election in 2018, CHP kept the same articles about dual citizenship and security of life in the context of foreign policy, that they first declared in 2015. In addition, the CHP also mentioned the Turkish diaspora in three points. First, the CHP argued that the ruling party AKP's polarization policies also affected the Turkish diaspora. Second, the CHP revealed that they see the Turkish diaspora as the honorary representative of Turkey and an integral part of public diplomacy. Third, the CHP will use the support of its citizens in the process of EU membership.

To continue with the AKP, only one article about the Turkish diaspora in the context of foreign policy was found in the 2011 general election manifesto, which states that the relationship with the EU would positively affect the Turkish diaspora. The 2015 election manifesto of the AKP stated that protecting the interests of the Turkish diaspora, developing their language and cultural accumulation, and taking their services abroad permanently and healthily are the main element of their foreign policy approach. Lastly, in the 2018 general election manifesto, the AKP stated that one of the main foreign policy responsibilities is protecting the bond of the Turkish diaspora with its homeland and the presence of the Turkish diaspora. They also declared that they see the Turkish diaspora as a key part of inter-communal relations.

Diaspora Institutions

According to Gamlen (2019, p. 493), the concept of 'diaspora institutions' is defined as 'formal state offices in executive or legislative branches of government dedicated to the affairs of emigrants and their descendants' (Gamlen, 2014; as cited in Gamlen *vd.*, 2019: p. 493; Newland and Agunias, 2013). In context of this definition, the CHP did not have articles in their any of their three election manifestos; on the contrary, the AKP had articles in all three election manifestos.

The AKP, as a ruling party in 2010 during the founding process of the Turks in Abroad Presidency (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı - YTB), had an article that states that the YTB aims to meet the needs of Turkish diaspora's members and to find solutions to their problems, in the 2011 general election manifesto. The AKP, in their 2015 general election manifesto, mentioned that the YTB began to function in order to handle the Turkish diaspora's problems and financially support them under the headings, 'What did we do?' In the manifesto of the 2018 general election, the AKP stated that YTB would function as a coordinative actor in Turkey's diaspora policy and promised to establish a permanent specialization commission in the Turkish Grand National Assembly with the name, Commission for Turks Abroad. Lastly, the CHP stated, in their 2018 election manifesto that they would ensure that the YTB would be equidistant to all NGOs and that the support given by the YTB would be distributed fairly.

Culture and Integration

The CHP did not have an article about culture and integration in the 2011 general election manifesto and the AKP had only one article that states citizens who live abroad should integrate and should not be assimilated. In the 2015 CHP general election manifesto, they declared that they would find ‘International Youth Centers’, which would function to increase the role for cultural interaction of youth living abroad. The AKP, in the 2015 general election, had a wide variety of articles about culture and integration under both headings. Turkish language and education are a matter that the AKP frequently mentioned in these articles, such as supporting NGOs and foundations for Turkish education and improving services to protect the Turkish and culture. The AKP also, for the first time, mentioned the problems faced by the Turkish diaspora when reintegrating into Turkey in their 2015 manifesto. The AKP emphasized that they published books to support the Turkish diaspora’s culture in this manifesto.

Political Participation

Despite the AKP’s unsuccessful attempts to grant external voting, it was not possible to vote abroad in the Turkish elections in 2011. Naturally, the 2011 general election declarations of the AKP and CHP do not contain any articles regarding external voting or electoral districts. Nevertheless, the presence of articles about the political participation of the Turkish diaspora in the 2015 general election manifestos of the AKP and CHP can be observed, despite the fact that their statements are quite different. On one hand, the AKP stressed that they were the ones who granted the right to vote abroad, which they think strengthens the Turkish diaspora’s relationship with their homeland. On the other hand, the CHP promised, for the first time as a political party, an electoral district for the Turkish diaspora. According to the CHP’s manifesto for the 2015 general election, the CHP defends the electoral district to effectively carry citizens’ problems abroad to the consideration of Turkey. More specifically, the CHP declared that they would allocate 10 representatives and a representative for every 300,000 members of the Turkish diaspora. In the 2018 general election manifestos, there were no significant differences for both parties. While the AKP stressed, additionally, that they provided the right to vote in ballot boxes abroad in more than 50 countries in the last elections as a government; on the other side, the CHP restated precisely the same promises about the abroad electoral district that they made in the 2015 election.

Education

Both political parties did not declare anything about the Turkish diaspora related to education in the 2011 general election manifestos. Nonetheless, the CHP promised that youth abroad could continue their education in Turkey without extending their education period, and the appointment that people of Turkish origin in Europe need would be given priority, in the 2015 general election. On the AKP side, in their 2015 general

election manifesto, the party pointed out that they would improve the services for Turkish language for the Turkish diaspora.

The AKP, in their 2018 general election manifesto, gave a wide variety of promises and stressed its past accomplishments. To mention the AKP's promises, first, they promised to increase quotas in universities and state positions for members of the Turkish diaspora. Second, they provided incentives for universities to open new campuses abroad. Thirdly and most importantly, the AKP promised to employ teachers for the Turkish diaspora from diaspora members. Fourth, they promised to open new research centers that focus their studies on the Turkish diaspora. To mention the AKP's past works according to the 2018 manifesto; the AKP provided free education and internship opportunities, prepared master programs, and appointed more than two thousand teachers and religion officers. On the other hand, the CHP had four articles related to education for the Turkish diaspora, such as ensuring university equivalence for people who have received their diplomas abroad, giving priority to trainers abroad from the Turkish diaspora in appointments, appointing education attachés and teachers for the needed areas, Ensuring that people who started their education abroad and wish to continue their education in Turkey are able to do so without losing a year.

Analysis

In this chapter, I analyze the election manifestos of the two main political parties in Turkey across three general elections, with a specific focus on their promises and statements related to the Turkish diaspora. The first section presents the general perspective, comparing the number of articles in each party's manifesto that discuss the diaspora and identifying the headings under which these promises are made. The second section, titled content examination, delves deeper into the parties' promises and statements over the three elections, exploring their views on foreign policy, education, culture and integration, and diaspora institutions.

Starting with the general perspective, during the 2011 general elections, the CHP included only one article in their manifesto addressing the Turkish diaspora, whereas the AKP had six articles dedicated to the topic, categorized under 'Our Foreign Policy' and 'Relations with the European Union'. In the 2015 general elections, which were the first to permit external voting, both political parties significantly augmented the number of articles addressing the diaspora in their manifestos. The CHP's count surged from one to 19, and the AKP's increased from seven to 27. Subsequently, in the 2018 general elections, both parties further amplified the number of articles related to the diaspora in their manifestos. The CHP's count increased to 24, and AKP's increased to 64. It can be inferred from the aforementioned alteration that the hypothesis positing an enhanced concern among political parties for the Turkish diaspora was bolstered with the extension of external voting rights, thereby attesting to the parties' increased focus on the diaspora. The

investigation of the election manifestos from the general perspective in the first section reveals that the AKP included a more significant number of articles related to the Turkish diaspora than the CHP. This could be attributed to the AKP's strategic emphasis on its past accomplishments, as evidenced by the 'What did we do' section in its manifesto.

The second section portrays the transitions of the two main political parties' diaspora policies, the CHP and AKP, regarding four topics related to the Turkish diaspora: foreign policy, diaspora institutions, culture and integration, and political participation. This section scans the election manifestos of the parties in the 2011, 2015, and 2018 general elections and notes the evolution of their stances on each topic.

Mentioning the Turkish diaspora in their election manifesto in the context of *foreign policy* is clear evidence that indicates the parties' instrumentalized approach to the diaspora, particularly the articles from both parties that see the Turkish diaspora as a critical figure in the EU process. Nonetheless, in 2018, despite the AKP's positive approach towards the diaspora with the promise of "one of the main foreign policy responsibilities is protecting the bond of the Turkish diaspora with its homeland and presence the Turkish diaspora"; the AKP instrumentalized the diaspora in the 2018 manifesto by declaring that "they see the Turkish diaspora as a key part of inter-communal relations". In short, granting the right to vote to the diaspora conveyed the AKP to declare articles that were subjectifying the Turkish diaspora, despite still stated instrumentalizing articles. Over time, the CHP increasingly recognized the significance of the Turkish diaspora in the realm of foreign policy, as evidenced by the party's inclusion of diaspora-related issues in its election manifestos. However, it could be argued that the party's view of the diaspora remains instrumentalist, as its manifestos continue to emphasize the diaspora's role in Turkey's EU membership process.

The changing positions of the AKP and CHP on *political participation* for the Turkish diaspora in the 2011, 2015, and 2018 general elections were fruitful in observing the effects of granting external voting rights. While neither party mentioned external voting in the 2011 election declarations, both included articles about the political participation of the Turkish diaspora in the 2015 election. The AKP emphasized granting the right to vote abroad, and the CHP promised to create electoral districts for the diaspora to represent their issues in Turkey. The 2018 manifestos did not show significant changes for the parties, with the AKP highlighting their provision of voting in ballot boxes in many countries, and the CHP reiterating their promise to create electoral districts. In short, the CHP's main proposal for political participation was the creation of electoral districts for the diaspora, and this can be accepted as a positive impact for external voting. The AKP was consistent, stressing its role in granting the right to vote abroad.

Despite the absence of any mention of *education* for the Turkish diaspora in the manifestos of the AKP and CHP during the 2011 general election, both parties included

promises relating to education for the diaspora in their 2015 manifestos, which may have been influenced by external voting. This trend continued in the 2018 manifestos, with both parties placing an even greater emphasis on education.

Although the 2011 general election manifesto of the CHP lacked an article on *culture and integration*, the AKP only had one. However, in the 2015 general election, the CHP pledged to establish “International Youth Centers” to boost cultural interaction among the diaspora youth. The AKP’s 2015 manifesto contained numerous articles on culture and integration, with a focus on Turkish language and education, supporting NGOs and foundations for Turkish education, and addressing the reintegration problems of the Turkish diaspora. Therefore, it can be concluded that the introduction of external voting had a positive impact on parties’ interest and policy towards the diaspora, particularly in the realm of culture and integration.

The election manifestos of the two main political parties are thoroughly scrutinized from the two perspectives, revealing that both parties have shown increased interest and they have diversified their attention towards the Turkish diaspora. Moreover, the inspection of the election manifestos demonstrates that both parties have increased their focus on the Turkish diaspora in successive general elections.

Conclusion

In this article, three general elections in Turkey are examined: the last election without external voting and the first two general elections after the external suffrage was granted to citizens living abroad. In the last general elections, the rate of the external voters to total votes formed five percent of the total votes, which is quite substantial and could have affected the results of the elections, as leading to the second round in the presidential elections. According to Turkey’s governmental system, both general elections and presidential elections happen at the same time. Therefore, parties and their presidential candidate synchronize their campaigns. Turkey, as a presidential system, is reasonably fit for the two-candidate or two-party election process, and in these contexts, every vote matters for the political parties.

There has been a growing focus on the diaspora and external voting, yet there has been a notable lack of research on the impact of external voting on Turkish party politics. Thus, this study has significant importance, as it sheds light on how the parties’ diaspora policies have evolved in response to granting external voting rights. The research findings illustrate substantial changes in the parties’ manifestos, particularly regarding education, culture, and integration, indicating a positive impact of external voting on party policies. By addressing this research gap, the study enhances our understanding of the role of external voting in shaping diaspora policies and its impact on party politics in Turkey. In this study, I argue that granting external voting rights increased the two main parties’

interest in the Turkish diaspora's problems and expectations, and directed the two political parties to develop diaspora policies.

Consequently, both the AKP and CHP increased their focus on the Turkish diaspora. In their 2018 general election manifesto, the AKP had 63 articles about the diaspora, a significant increase from the 7 in the 2011 manifesto, despite much of it being about past accomplishments. This illustrates the AKP's efforts to capture the attention of the Turkish diaspora. Similarly, the CHP's articles about the diaspora increased from one in the 2011 manifesto to 24 in the 2018 manifesto, and they have promised to make an electoral district abroad since the 2015 elections. Before the external voting rights were granted in the 2011 elections, the CHP rarely mentioned the diaspora in their manifestos. However, after the triggering effect of granting external voting rights, the CHP began to make promises about the diaspora in a reasonable portion of their election manifesto, even proposing an electoral district. This demonstrates the significant impact of external voting on Turkish parties' diaspora policies.

In conclusion, the findings of this study offer a valuable contribution to the ongoing debates surrounding the creation of an electoral district for Turkish citizens residing overseas in the context of Turkish politics. By highlighting the positive influence of granting external voting rights on the diaspora policies of the two major political parties in Turkey, this research provides a deeper understanding of the potential advantages and drawbacks of establishing an electoral district for the Turkish diaspora. An electoral district abroad is a separate district established to enable citizens living outside their home country to participate in their country's electoral process. This approach is becoming increasingly common, allowing diaspora communities to have a say in their home country's politics. Countries like France, Italy, and Portugal have established electoral districts for their diaspora communities. Supporters argue that creating an electoral district for the Turkish diaspora could improve political representation and engagement and strengthen ties between the diaspora and the homeland (Anaz & Köse, 2021; Laguerre, 2013). However, the suggestion raises challenges, such as the potential for fraud and logistical issues (Anaz & Köse, 2021). The decision to establish an electoral district for the Turkish diaspora is still a matter of debate in Turkey.

Finally, this study's findings have the potential to inform policymakers and scholars about the effects of external voting on diaspora political participation and its potential impact on Turkish politics. Additionally, this research provides a basis for further exploration of the relationship between external voting and diaspora policies in Turkish politics. This research highlights the positive influence of external voting rights on the diaspora policies of the two main political parties in Turkey, which could be useful for policymakers and scholars interested in external voting and party politics.

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Exploring the Significance of Diasporic Objects in Sudanese-Turkish Dual-Heritage Households: Insights from the African Diaspora in Turkey

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Abstract

The study of diasporic objects has emerged as a sub-concept of material culture studies, reflecting the interconnection of mobility and materiality, and the importance of objects in relation to the experiences of migrants and diaspora communities. In this article, we explore the importance of diasporic objects within the Sudanese diaspora in Turkey, focusing on the significance of these objects in households of dual heritage. Using thematic discourse analysis, we identify three main categories of diasporic objects, including food and kitchen objects, biographic objects, and socio-cultural objects. Drawing on interdisciplinary research, we examine the potential functions and significance of these objects, as well as the broader social and cultural practices that surround them. Our findings suggest that diasporic objects can serve as powerful symbols of cultural identity and personal history, providing a sense of continuity and connection for individuals in the diaspora. Moreover, these objects can offer a source of comfort and support, acting as emotional companions that help individuals to maintain a sense of belonging and identity during the challenging experiences of migration and displacement. Additionally, this article highlights the specific significance of the diasporic objects in dual-heritage households.

Keywords

Diasporic Objects, African Diaspora, Material Culture, Sudanese Diaspora, Dual-Heritage Households

Introduction

Turkey's diplomatic and political interest in the African continent has been evident in recent times, with a particular focus on the Horn of Africa and a special relationship with Sudan. The relationship between Turkey and Sudan has a rich history dating back to the Ottoman Empire (Zengin, 2013) and has evolved over time to become one of the most strategic bilateral partnerships between Turkey and the African continent (Bayram, 2020), especially during the Justice and Development Party's rule (Altunışık, 2011). Along with these political and economic relations, cultural ties and inter-communal

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exchanges have also grown, resulting in a significant presence of the Sudanese migrants in Turkey (Tirab, 2022), who are expected to be among the largest groups of the African diaspora in the country.

As a consequence of Turkey's strategic foreign policy and growing interest in Africa, academic inquiry into African studies in Turkey has witnessed a marked increase in recent years. Within this context, various academic research endeavors have centered on the African diaspora in Turkey, exploring issues such as migration (Özdil, 2008), resettlement (Dziwornu, 2016), and diasporic, migratory and integration experiences (Suter, 2013; Budel, 2013). Additionally, there have been various academic forums dedicated to analyzing the African-Turkish relationship with a specific emphasis on the Horn of Africa. One such example is the "International Symposium: Re-evaluation of the Last Decade of Turkey-Somalia Relations," which was held virtually in August 2020 (Afrika Vakfi, 2021). Another notable event was the international symposium titled "Sudan in Transition and the Turkish-Sudanese Relationships," which took place in Istanbul in October 2022 (Afrika Vakfi, 2022).

This study is a product of a larger research project that was presented at the aforementioned symposium. As part of this project, a prior study was conducted on the experiences of the Sudanese diaspora in Turkey focusing on the intercultural marriages. During the examination of the intercultural marriage experiences of Sudanese migrants to Turkish nationals and the specificities of the dual-heritage households that result from these unions, it became apparent that the Sudanese diaspora preserve and maintain strong ties to their homeland. This connection is reflected in various ways within the domestic space, including their relationship with the material culture elements of diasporic nature, which was observed to be among the means of maintaining their cultural identity and sense of belonging. This observation prompted further inquiry into the significance and meaning of diasporic objects in dual-heritage households of the Sudanese diaspora in Turkey, marking the initiation for the current research project.

Building on a qualitative research inquiry and within the framework of the anthropological study on material culture, this research aims to first analyze the presence and symbolism of material culture in relation to the diaspora experience. Afterwards, the investigation delves into the additional meanings attributed to these objects within the context of dual heritage households. In this framework, this research does not aim to compare the symbolism and meaning of material culture between dual heritage households and single Sudanese households in the diaspora, but rather focuses on the unique utility, functions, and symbolism that material culture and diasporic objects possess within the context of dual-heritage households.

The article sets out by bringing together literature on material culture and diasporic objects, linking these debates with accounts on dual-heritage households. Following

details of the research methodology and the investigated case study, this article presents an analysis of three key categories of diasporic objects and their meanings based on the perspectives of interviewed Sudanese-Turkish couples. This leads to a conclusion highlighting the distinctiveness of these objects within the context of dual-heritage households.

The following work affirms the literature accounts in relation to the importance of the material culture for diasporic communities (Buchli, 2020) and sheds the lights on the additional role of diasporic objects within dual heritage households as: first, a communicative agency of diasporic objects in the context of couple relationships, second a tool of inter-generational cultural transmission, and, finally as a coping and self-protection mechanism in the setting of xenophobic social dynamics. Additionally, along with attracting the attention to the importance of the African diaspora in Turkey, the ensuing discussion highlights the need for a differentiated analysis of diasporic objects in light of their owners' post-migratory experience.

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

Although the study of objects is primarily a component of material culture studies (Berger, 2016), the concept of diasporic objects has emerged as a new sub-concept that may be considered to be a result of the interdisciplinary research inquiry. Additionally, the inter-connection of mobility and materiality established the need to study different objects in accordance with the specificity of the human movement' experience.

For instance, Refugee studies emphasize the importance of material culture and objects for refugees (Dudley, 2010), taking into consideration the significance and value of these objects along and during the experience of displacement. Objects, in this context, can serve as sources of comfort, familiarity, and continuity in a new and often hostile environment (Dudley, 2015).

In migration studies, major shifts in the field occurred and over time and the study of migration has expanded to include a wider range of social relationships, meanings, and practices, moving beyond the traditional understanding of migration as solely an economically driven process. As a result, research approaches that focus on personal accounts of migrants and their lived experiences have emerged. Within this context, there has been increasing recognition of the importance of objects and material culture in relation to mobility (Van, 2017). Scholars argue that the objects that migrants bring with them from their home countries (Basu, 2008; Pechurina, 2015), or acquire during their migratory journey (Miller, 2008), serve as tangible reminders of their cultural identity and personal histories (Hahn, 2013). These objects can serve as a source of comfort and connection to their past, as well as a means of expressing their cultural identity in their new environment (Ahmed, 2003). Overall, the study of material culture in the context of

migration has enriched our understanding of the complex social and cultural dynamics of the migrant experience.

Similarly, in the frame of the diaspora studies, the focus on the experiences of post-migration communities has led to an interest in the role of objects and material culture in the diaspora and as a possible reflection of the diasporic experiences (Pechurina, 2015). This has potentially contributed to the emergence of the concept of “diasporic objects” in which we take interest.

The “Diasporic Objects” concept builds over the special value of material items that “people decide to keep when they move places are more special, since they become invested with the identities of their owners and so embody personal memories and family history” (Pechurina, 2015) making them symbolically and emotionally significant. Hence, these specific travelling objects would be of a certain value.

They may reflect the connection between cultural identity, memories of the homeland (Savaş, 2014), and the process of building a sense of belonging within the diaspora (Knott et al., 2010). Furthermore, as Miller (2008) and Bachelard (1964) argue, the act of bringing and displaying objects from one’s home country serves as a means of feeling safe and at home in the diaspora and creating “proofs or illusions of stability” – a feeling that is particularly crucial when individuals are far away from what is familiar to them.

Although, due to the extensive possibilities and sorts of objects that a person may possess, the literature has posed the need to the diasporic nature of a specific item (Pechurina, 2015). It has been established that specific criteria can be used to differentiate between diasporic objects and other elements of material culture. In this sense, it was suggested that any object used by the owner to articulate their sense of belonging while staying abroad can be defined as “diasporic.” However, there are no hard and fast rules to determine whether an object is diasporic. Scholars suggest several criteria that could be used as a framework for identifying such objects, such as whether the object reflects the movement and migration of people across time and space, holds significant symbolic meaning for a particular community in the diaspora, or serves as a tangible connection to the homeland or to the memories and experiences of the diasporic community. Although, what is of a primordial reference is the significance of these possessions for their owners. This means going beyond merely describing objects and instead examining their meaning, use, and interpretation within their domestic context and in relation to the diasporic experience. In other words, deciding about the diasporic nature of a specific object involves looking at how the objects are utilized and understood by their owners, the tangible attachment to them, and exploring the broader social and cultural practices that surround them.

In line with this, the research identified specific categories of items that could be classified as diasporic, based on the accounts and narratives of the participants. This was

accomplished using thematic discourse analysis of the narratives. As a result, this work discusses three main categories of diasporic objects that have been previously explored in the literature.

The first diasporic objects' category is related to food and kitchen objects. In fact, food and food-related practices have gained special attention among migration and diaspora studies scholars, as they are considered to be powerful expressions of identity and belonging (Pechurina, 2015). As they reflect an ethnic background and specific cultural heritage, food objects becoming symbols of diasporic presence and autonomy in host countries. For example, couscous and couscous pots (Durmelat, 2022) are among the most solid representations of the North African diaspora in Europe, particularly in France and Italy. The consumption of couscous as an overtly ethnically coded food reflects a sense of belonging and identity for the diasporic community.

The second category is related to the study of biographic objects, as we found them to have a solid significance in relation to the diasporic experience of their owners. In fact, as a component of material culture, biographic objects have been the subject of numerous scholarly investigations, particularly in regard to the personal belongings, artifacts, and memories that reflect the personal history of the owner or the collective memory of a family or family member (Thomson, 2011; Harrington-Watt, 2014; Pitt, 2015). In the context of diaspora, these biographic objects often serve as a link to the individual or group's past and their culture of origin and are considered to be of critical importance in maintaining their identity and connection to their heritage (Pechurina, 2020). Hence, biographic objects are even more valuable as they serve as a means of autobiographical remembering, often interlinked with feelings of love and attachment. This is why they were described as "evocative objects," as defined by Turkle (2011), becoming "emotional companions to our lives." Additional research has highlighted the therapeutic value of such objects, which not only protect a sense of belonging and identity but can also bring a feeling of consolation and well-being to their owners (Ahmed, 1999; Marcoux, 2001; Miller, 2008; Turkle, 2007).

From another side, ethnographic research and material culture literature often explores objects that carry socio-cultural significance, such as those representing social norms, cultural symbols, historical events, leaders, or religious items. These objects can highlight a certain identity marker and helps migrants generally and African diasporas specifically "to maintain their unique national identities, continental identities, ethnic, clan, or tribal identities, their linguistic, religious, and class characteristics" (Arthur, 2012, p. 2). Therefore, as similar objects were encountered in this research, we consider socio-cultural objects as third category of diasporic objects to be elaborated in the upcoming pages.

Building on this rich literature, this study is situated at the intersection of material

culture and mobility, drawing on interdisciplinary research to investigate the significance of diasporic objects within the Sudanese diaspora in Turkey. The purpose of this research is to explore the importance of material culture for the Sudanese diaspora in Turkey and to examine the additional meanings and specificities that these objects may have in households of dual heritage.

In this sense, this article contributes to the existing literature by examining diasporic objects and their potential functions and significance within households of dual heritage. The study involves participants who are not only migrants, but also have a Turkish partner through marriage. By considering the significance of this particular diasporic experience and the dual-heritage aspect of domestic spaces, this research aims to add to the literature by exploring the potential significance of these diasporic objects in dual heritage households.

Research Method and Data Collection

The empirical data for this article was collected as part of a larger study that investigated the experiences of the African diaspora in Turkey, including the intercultural marriages involving Turkish and Sudanese nationals. The initial results of the research were presented at the African-Sudanese Research Symposium in Istanbul in October 2022 and published as a conference paper in a book published by the African Foundation ([Özcan & Köse, 2023](#)).

In the frame of this previous project, twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted with six couples of Sudanese and Turkish descent who have lived in Turkey for periods ranging from 10 to 30 years. The primary focus of the research was to explore their experiences in intercultural marriages, but a significant part of the data gathered also pertained to the strategies they use to preserve and present their heritage in their dual-heritage marriages and households. The study emphasized the significance of material culture and revealed that diasporic objects play a crucial role in the diasporic experience of the Sudanese migrants. Hence, it was deemed necessary to further investigate the topic carrying out further investigation focusing on a particularized conceptual and theoretical framework. Therefore, to collect more specific data and focused insights, additional home-based semi-structured interviews were conducted with the same sample of Sudanese-Turkish couples living in Istanbul.

To enhance the explorative interactive dimension of this work, an ethnographic approach was adopted for this research, which emphasizes the utility of home-based semi-structured interviews and conducting the investigation in the context of the participants' everyday lives and domestic spaces ([Small, 2009](#)). Hence, beside the primordial data previously collected, five additional home-based interviews were conducted in Istanbul, with Sudanese migrants and their Turkish wives. All of the participants have been

married for more than a decade and have been always residing in Turkey since the initiation of their relationships. Additionally, all the interviews were conducted between May 2022 and January 2023.

The primordial goal of these interviews was the understanding of the nature and meaning of diasporic objects and their functionality in the context of dual-heritage households. Therefore, while general questions regarding the couple lives and relationships were included as an introduction, the home-based interviews were structured around the observed objects in the domestic space, and discussions were conducted accordingly. The interviews were recorded and thematically transcribed. The researcher took an explicit consent from the participants to use quotes from their testimonies and tell their stories in the frame of this academic work.

When it comes to the data analysis, a thematic analysis was adopted and only directly related passages to the research question were transcribed and categorized in light of the noted observations during the interviews. Moreover, the case-comparative method was utilized to perform an inclusive analysis of the collected data and testimonies, with the objective of comprehending the shared meanings given to diasporic objects. In fact, thanks to this comparative approach between the narratives of the participants we were able to enhance the analysis of the data and support the identification of the most important diasporic items and their significance.

The results of this study indicate the special significance of three main categories of diasporic objects that were unexceptionally present within all the visited households and mentioned in every conducted interview. The selection and categorization of these objects were based on the participants' narratives, each partner's commentary on the specific objects selected and positioned in the home by their partner, and the similarity among the objects, descriptions, and narratives of the interviewed families. The research observed the importance given to specific objects in the homes of the interviewed couples and especially for the Sudanese participants. Based on the above explained elements of selection and categorization, the analyzed data underlines these categories of diasporic objects: first, food and kitchen objects, secondly, biographic objects, and thirdly, socio-cultural objects including religious items.

We can also indicate that the results of this research established a significant conformity with existing literature, revealing specific characteristics derived from the unique nature of the diasporic case, the studied sample, and socio-cultural spatial context. The additional importance and significance of diasporic objects within dual-heritage households was specifically investigated through conducting these interviews with Turkish-Sudanese couples in a home-based context.

Food and Alimentary Products as A Dimension of Interculturality

In all the home-based interviews, the subject of food came up as soon as we were offered beverages as a welcoming gesture. The Sudanese-Turkish hospitality started by asking if we would prefer to have a Turkish tea or a Sudanese Karkade. It was generally the way we stated the discussion about food and food objects with the participants, who usually would offer us a Sudanese treat mentioning that it was specifically brought from -not only Sudan- but their village or city. Asking further questions about the possibility to find these food products in Turkey and from where they purchase them, Sudanese participants explained that they give much importance to bring with them specific traditional ingredients and food products from home, even if they became more and more available in the Turkish markets. It is not only the easily carried light foods such as Sudanese tea, Karkade, or Molokhia but they even bring kilos of Mango to Turkey:

My wife is always asking why I go through the trouble of bringing kilos of Mango with me from Sudan. She says that “we have mango in Turkey.” What she doesn’t understand that it never tastes the same, at least not for me (Abdelkarim, September 2022).

We observed that the participants did not only have Sudanese ingredients and alimentary products but also brought a few cooking objects from Sudan. When asked about these specific objects and their use, they all linked them with being a part of the food preparation process and an essential element ensuring the authenticity of the prepared food. and that it made food “look really Sudanese” when served in these trays. Some participants recounted their recollections of transporting their cherished aliments, ingredients, and food objects from Sudan to Turkey via plane. They shared how they were cautious in handling the items, expressing their efforts over ensuring their safe arrival in their new homes. This demonstrates that the effort invested in bringing these food products and cooking utensils from their former home to their current one reflects something deeper than mere consumption or preference for taste. It highlights the sentimental value attached to these items, embodying a connection to their cultural heritage and identity. They are tools into creating a familiar space and a way to construct the ideal home. Another important fact about food and alimentary elements as objects of belonging and a form of cultural connection with the origins, is that it comes with a practical side, that enhances the feeling with an action or a ritual. The participants stated that these traditional Sudanese plates are being cooked with a special ritual even if it is not prepared for a special occasion.

I honestly prepare Sudanese food in special days or when we are receiving family or friends, it is not a daily activity, that’s why it is even more

significant (...) I usually play traditional Sudanese song, wear a clothing reminding me of home (even a colorful headband I brought from home), I use special cooking objects to cook and very frequently I call my sister to ask her for the recipe even if I am quite sure about it... (Sabri, December 2022).

Food and associated practices play a key role as a belonging expression among the diaspora supporting the construction and the continuity of socio-cultural identities. It was described by the participants to be rather a remembering process and an opportunity to re-live common daily life moments with family members. More than that it was described by a participant to be a proof of belonging. Making the food of home in the diaspora was as well expressed to be a form of recognition to the person's heritage and belonging and a proof of attachment to the home and the family back home. Through the narratives of two female participants, it seemed that cooking was a way to escape a feeling of blame or shame they sound to be facing due to their decision of migrating. When it comes to the Turkish partners, they clearly stated that preparing Sudanese food was their partners' way to feel home, to bring a piece of his/her childhood to their common life, and to pass his/her culture to their children.

One of the participants, a Turkish wife, mentioned that she would feel concerned about her husband when he decides to prepare Sudanese food if it is not a special day or occasion. She felt that making Sudanese food was her husband's way of dealing with sad events he may be facing, and that making "the food of his mother" was his way to find peace and feel safe. When we asked the husband about this, he just said, "maybe she is right." In this context, It was remarked throughout the interviews, that all the narratives and answers related to the food objects and the process of preparing food were frequently linked with remembering the mother, the mother's recipe, the mother's style, the smell of the mother's cooking, which is another form of seeking comfort, peace and stability through recalling the mother figure.

Overall, preparing food in the diaspora is a ritual that connects people to their past and their heritage, and it is often linked with memories of the mother and her cooking. It is a diasporic practice that reinforces attachment to identity and helps to recognize the past, bringing the smells, feelings, and practices of the past home to the new domestic space.

The Biographic Objects and The Memory of Sudan

During the home-based interviews, we were primarily welcomed into the living rooms of the households we visited. Whenever participants wanted to share a specific piece of information or show us a different object located in another room, they would invite us to join them to another part of the house and return to the living room afterward. The

living room, for both Turkish and Sudanese cultures, is the place where guests are received, conversations take place, and time is spent together. It is a space designed to welcome others and present the family. As a result, the living room was the primary space for displaying meaningful objects for the families, objects that spoke of the old home, the new home, and the life in between. This is one of the reasons a significant portion of the interviews took place in the living room, as we would ask questions about these objects and the participants shared with us different stories about each of these objects, their meanings, their stories, and the memories they evoked. In this section, we will focus on the biographical objects, primarily photographs and documents, that we encountered in these dual-heritage households.

Very old family pictures of the Sudanese partners' families were almost always present in each home and were typically located in the living room. We asked the participants about these pictures, including, who were the people in the photographs, how long they had had the photographs, and how they had made their way to Turkey. Each photograph had a different story and brought with it complex and overlapping memories that sometimes-involved memories of past lives in Sudan and memories of life in the diaspora.

This is a picture of my father. He passed away a few months before I came to Turkey in the beginning of 1990. I brought it with me, and it hasn't left me since. It reminds me always of what my father wanted me to be and how to be a good son to him...this photograph also reminds me of my son's first words. He was in my arms, and I was trying to get his attention, showing him these pictures. He took it and looked at it for a long time, as if he was asking about the man in the picture. So, I told him, "This is 'dede', your grandfather Muhammed in Sudan." He looked directly into my eyes, and it was his first word, 'dede'...as if he knew how much this photograph meant to me, he chose to say his first word talking about it. (Abubakir, January 2023)

As Abubakar's story illustrates, these diasporic objects have their own biographies and become representative agents of the intersectionality of different memories. While they were primarily reminders of biographical events happening in relation to the old home, they have also witnessed the lived experiences of their owners, becoming holders of life-long accumulated memories. Confirming previous academic conclusions, throughout their migration experience, the meanings and significance of these objects may change and evolve. They may reflect new memories formed during the journey, while crossing borders to new geographies, settling in new locations, and forming new relationships and families in the diaspora. As suggested by Kopytoff's concept of the "biographies" of objects (Kopytoff, 2009), these diasporic biographic objects gain their own unique history and significance. The possessions of the diaspora live more than one life,

gaining accumulated meanings and becoming imbued with a soul for their owners. In other words, the biographic objects of diasporic nature encountered in the dual heritage households are observed to be powerful agents of intersectionality in terms of the memories they hold.

Furthermore, our research highlights the added importance of these diasporic objects during times of instability. Participants mentioned that during difficult times, they often turn to these objects for comfort and as a way to hold onto their cultural heritage. Additionally, when facing rejection or racist behavior in public spaces, these objects become even more important for their owners as a way to assert their cultural identity.

To be honest, I don't face similar behaviors and racist comments anymore, but I remember that I would be very sad because of some comments about my color or some jokes that made me feel humiliated (...) I always came back home hiding my feelings from my wife, I look to the picture of my father, my family that I left, look to my diplomas on these walls, and remind myself that I have given enough and that I have to be strong and ignore everything that may make me doubt my life decisions (...) everything hanging on these walls is very dear to me (...) (Abubakar, January 2023).

Hence, as shared by Abubakar, these biographic objects and especially the photographic items, became a remarkable source of compassion and support to their owners. These diasporic objects can be symbolic of the owner's connection to their homeland, representing a tangible connection to their past and their cultural identity, and a significant reminder of the owners' goals, motivations, and sacrifices. These objects hence became a reminder, a motivator, and a source of continuity in a new and often hostile environment, providing a sense of stability and belonging.

In addition to the photographs and documents that were prominently displayed in the living room, we also observed other biographic objects that reflected the communal life and experiences of the Sudanese partners after they had come to Turkey. These objects were also typically showcased in the living room and included pictures from the wedding day, diplomas earned by the Sudanese partners (especially those who came to Turkey for educational reasons), and pictures of the children in important moments such as their first day of school.

Interestingly, two of the older participants in their late fifties who had come to Turkey in the early 1990s showed us old letters they had received from their families in Sudan. These letters were unexpected, and it was intriguing to see how the participants considered them as diasporic biographic objects. The two participants explained that even though phones and internet were used 30 years ago, their parents still sent them letters due to the convenience of this tool for the older generation as well as the affordability

of letter-mailing at that time. Some of these letters delivered family news and were sent along with pictures of important events such as weddings or the birth of a nephew.

It is becoming increasingly rare to encounter letters and telegrams in ethnographic research due to the advancement of communication technology, but this was an opportunity to observe the importance of the epistolary agency as an element of material culture and as a diasporic object. These letters, like the photographs and other objects, held memories and stories that were unique to the participants and their experiences of living in a dual heritage household.

To conclude, the biographic objects of diasporic nature we encountered in the dual heritage households during this research have proven to be powerful agents of intersectionality in terms of the memories they hold. From photographs of family members to diplomas and letters, these objects not only serve as reminders of the past life in the old home, but also hold within them the lived experiences and accumulated memories of their owners. In the next section, we will delve further into the topic of diaspora by exploring the socio-cultural significance of objects in these households. Top of Form

Reflecting Dual-Heritage

In this final part we look at socio-cultural objects and we delve into the material culture of dual-heritage households, specifically focusing on objects that hold socio-cultural significance for both Turkish and Sudanese heritage. These specific objects may be “with national symbolics, figures of popular personalities, and various folk crafts do act as visible symbolisations of a country (...) some of them reveal further meanings, which are rarely straightforward and often ethnographically rich” (Pechurina, 2015). In fact, such items were found throughout the household, showcasing elements of both Turkish and Sudanese cultures, often side by side, and highlight common cultural elements shared by both heritages. Meanwhile, a number of these socio-cultural objects also underline the validity of the African and Sudanese heritage in this household.

For instance, one of the key findings of this study is the presence of African cultural objects in all of the households we visited. These items, such as African masks, souvenirs or decorative objects featuring animal figures, are considered important elements for highlighting the African identity of Sudanese participants. They also serve as markers of belonging and connection to Africa, especially for the Sudanese diaspora in Turkey.

Many of my friends in Turkey, asks why I am having this masks, structure, and artifacts in my home. They think that because I am a Muslim who prays than I shouldn't be having such objects in my home. Well, they are wrong! I am a Muslim of course, but I am also a Sudanese and an African man, and we have a different understanding and a different way of

living our religion in tune with our culture. We are not regressive, and God won't forbid us to celebrate our heritage and our ancestors (Naji, January 2023).

Naji sees the presence of these objects as a way of celebrating his cultural and ancestral heritage, which is important to him as both a Sudanese and an African man. This quote shows that socio-cultural diasporic objects play a crucial role in helping members of diaspora communities maintain a connection to their cultural heritage and identity, especially in a new and different cultural context and regardless of the social judgement. In this case, the presence of African cultural objects in Naji's home serves as a way of highlighting his African identity and heritage, which is an essential aspect of his identity that he wants to preserve expressing at the same time the different understanding of Islam he has as an African. The presence of these objects is also an indication of the specific Muslim religious identity of the Sudanese people that is mixed with African heritage as a form of richness and authenticity that reflects their complex history and heritage.

By combining their Muslim religious identity with their African cultural heritage, Sudanese people have created a distinct and multifaceted cultural identity that is reflected in the objects they choose to display in their homes. Additionally, it was clear that these objects served as a tool to challenge prejudice and present what the owner considers to be a correct. In this sense, material culture and diasporic objects seem to be a tool to fight against social prejudice in the diaspora. By displaying cultural objects in their homes, members of the Sudanese diaspora community aim to challenge negative stereotypes and promote a positive or a correct image of their culture. As mentioned in previous research, when individuals from a diaspora community display cultural objects in their homes, they are actively promoting their cultural heritage to others. These objects can serve as a way of educating others about their culture and challenging negative stereotypes.

In addition to the above-mentioned items that reflect African identity, other socio-cultural objects in the dual heritage households reflected key elements of Turkish culture and history. Depending on the interviewees' ideologies, the displayed objects would relate to Ottoman heritage on one hand or Turkish republican identity on the other. We observed pictures of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in two of the homes visited, and Ottoman armoires in the other two. Despite their ideological meanings and affiliations, these objects were described as "representing Turkish culture and heritage." Other objects that represented Turkish cultural heritage were also present, such as Sufi figures, miniatures, and souvenirs from specific Turkish cities. It was clear that each of these socio-cultural objects had a different story. While many of these objects were received as gifts from family members, some were bought during family visits or had an additional significance for the couple.

These were a wedding gift from my friend who is from Konya (showing three small structures of Ancient Sufi Dance and RUMI'S Whirling Dervishes) and I love them of course, but this one (showing a handmade Ramadan lantern) is very meaningful for us, we got it in 1993 in our first visit to Sudan as a married couple (Nalan, January 2023).

What Nalan (spouse of Naji) explained telling the story of decorative items in their living room, reflects the use of objects in dual-heritage households reflects the complex and multifaceted cultural identities of the individuals and communities from where they came, as well as the personal experiences of their owners. For instance, these objects often have unique stories and meanings that reflect the personal experiences of the individuals and families that own them.

The presence of socio-cultural diasporic objects, whether they represent African or Turkish cultural heritage, plays a vital role in helping members of diaspora communities maintain a connection to their cultural heritage and identity, even in a new and different cultural context. These objects provide tangible markers of cultural identity and heritage and serve as a reflection of the intercultural exchange and understanding as a main specificity of the couples' relationship as an intercultural marriage.

Also, religious items were a common feature in the households visited and as described during all the interviews. While some academic research distinguishes religious objects as a distinct category of material culture due to their significance for individuals in the diaspora, we have chosen to include them in the broader category of socio-cultural objects. This classification is based on the participants' narratives, who generally referred to specific religious items as representing a shared Islamic culture between the two countries, rather than as specific religious items. Regardless of religious practice, all of the couples mentioned and described religious elements as objects of cultural significance that represented both Turkish and Sudanese culture. Hence, in our study, religious items were significant as an underlying marker of the shared identity of the couples, rather than being an expression of religious belonging of the migrants.

This lack of emphasis on religious identity may be explained by the fact that all the couples in our study were Muslims and Turkey has a majority of Muslims with a Muslim heritage. As members of the Sudanese community in Turkey, our participants did not mention feeling a specific need to highlight, protect or speak out for their religious identity. Therefore, the religious identity was not perceived different and was not rejected by the society in Turkey. Rather, these objects were significant in highlighting the shared cultural elements of both Sudanese and Turkish heritage, and how these elements were combined and expressed in the households of the Sudanese diaspora in Turkey.

The religious items, particularly the Quran, were not described as diasporic objects or

linked to the Sudanese partner's heritage. In fact, when we asked the participants about the most valuable object that they brought from home or reminded them of home, none of them mentioned a religious object. This may be explained by the fact that different religious items would be found in Turkey as well as in Sudan. We intended to explore this and instead we specifically asked about the meaning and the story of specific showcased religious items, and it was how we got some insights in this framework. Therefore, the religious objects don't seem to have a specific significance in the context of the diasporic experience in the frame of this case study and for this specific sample. Although, a clear attachment to religious identity as a shared cultural element was established through the couples' discourse.

- This tableau (pointing to A tableau of Quran verses in calligraphy) was a gift from my parents and they got it from Al Medina when they were doing Umra, it is very valuable for me and for my wife, not only because it is a gift from my parents but also because it came from the most beautiful place in this world, where our prophet is (...) and it was very useful as well in teaching my son.
- How was that? (The researchers)
- Well, I tried to motivate them to learn Arabic, sent them to school and tried to teach them myself, but it was challenging, when we got this table, my son asked me about what was written in it, and what was the meaning, so I challenged him to read it and I promised him that I will send him to spend the summer in Sudan if he does, he loved going to Sudan in that time. Well, he did, he spent weeks working on it and trying to figure out the letters and it was very useful to make him study Arabic (Abubakir, January 2023).

As made clear in this quote, the Quran tableau had a significance as it was a gift from the parents and as it reminded of a story the father had with his son. Here, we could also note that religious items, as a part of the socio-cultural objects were a tool to educate the next generation and enhance their awareness and knowledge about their culture and heritage, including their religious identity. Additionally, the religious items could be described as being a reflection of the shared identity marker within the dual-heritage household. It is important to note that this finding is specific to the sample and context of this research, and conducting the same research with a different group of people in a different country may lead to different conclusions and results. For example, members of the Sudanese diaspora living in a country where Islamophobia is prevalent may have a different perspective on the role of religious objects in the diaspora. In such a context, religious items may be perceived as more significant as diasporic objects, representing a connection to their cultural and religious heritage that is under threat or in need of protection.

Moving to another point, it was also clear that the Sudanese partners did not place much importance on the utility of these socio-cultural objects, and many of them would be conserved for decades even if they were not usable. For instance, both Sudanese male and female participants brought Sudanese traditional clothes with them and even for their children, although they acknowledged that it was not possible to wear them in Turkey due to the environmental differences between Sudan and Turkey. For instance, The Sudanese traditional clothing is designed to be light for the hot weather in Sudan and thus not suitable for use in Turkey's colder climate. Despite this, the Sudanese participants still brought the clothes with them, and wore them on special days and religious events, "even if only for a few minutes to take a picture and celebrate the moment" (Naji, January 2023).

Finally, when asked about how they thought of their homes, we had two significant answers, one from the Sudanese partners and another from the Turkish spouses. For instance, Nalan told us the following:

All of these objects are very valuable for me, they tell the story of my husband, the story of our love, they reflect how special is our family and our relation (...) whoever comes to our home spends a lot of time asking about these items and finishes telling us that our home looks like a museum (Nalan, January 2023).

Naji in the other hand, answered the question very differently comparing to his wife Nalan saying, "For me, our home is my refuge from the world and is a mosaic with pieces of my memories and many of these pieces brings Sudan here" (Naji, January 2023).

Hence, while the dual-heritage household was a reflection and expression of the intercultural specificity of this marriage for the Turkish spouses, it was of an additional value for the Sudanese partner as it was considered as a safe place that presents their legacy and tell their stories through the presence of these different objects.

To sum up, this section has shown that the material culture of dual-heritage households reflects the unique blend of Turkish and Sudanese cultures, with objects holding significant socio-cultural meaning for both heritages. This reflects the nuances and complexities of intercultural marriages and the ways in which material culture can serve as a marker of cultural identity and belonging.

Conclusion

The assumption of this article was that, as specific as they may be, material culture and diasporic objects would play additional roles and hold other meanings in the context of intercultural marriages. This is due to the potential influence of the nature of the intercultural marriage relationship and the spatial reality in which it takes place. The current

research conducted with the previously described sample has shown the validity of this assumption, revealing that diasporic objects hold an additional importance within dual-heritage households for members of the Sudanese diaspora in Turkey who have entered into intercultural relationships by marrying a Turkish spouse.

In this work, we elaborated on the participants' narratives on the role and significance of three main categories of diasporic objects within the dual-heritage households being, first, food and food objects, second biographic objects and finally the socio-cultural objects. Different objects in this context were observed to have a principal significance for their owners in relation to their experience of diaspora as well as an additional value and meaning within the dual-heritage household.

The importance of diasporic objects in this context can be described through four main points. The first significance pertains to the meaning they represent for their owners, the Sudanese migrants in Turkey. These diasporic objects were described as essential for the Sudanese migrants' feeling of belonging within their new domestic space and were considered to be containers of their personal memories of their previous home, culture, heritage, as well as their lived experience of migration. While these are commonly described results, the specificity in this context is that they make the person feel that they are not dominated in their space of belonging, and that it is a space of safety and acceptance.

The second idea relates to the communicative role of diasporic objects in the context of couple relationships. The Turkish partners interviewed in this research expressed that the use of these objects by their partners in certain times would tell them about what their spouses may be feeling, or if they are going through a difficult time. The use of these objects could be as simple as being part of a celebratory action (when used in special days) but may reflect the psychological state of their owners. Additionally, it was noted that the Sudanese partners consider the respect and care given to these objects to be an expression of love and consideration from their Turkish spouse, as well as a sort of respect for the culture, heritage, and memories of the Sudanese spouse. As a result, the use of diasporic objects in intercultural couples has a special importance in the relationship dynamic.

The third additional role of these objects within dual-heritage households relates to the role of diasporic objects in inter-generational cultural transmission. The Sudanese participants clearly aimed to remind their children that they are Sudanese and have a dual identity. In this sense, the interviewees recognize that through making their children eat Sudanese food, listen to Sudanese music, use Sudanese objects, and see elements reminiscent of Sudan on a daily basis, they aim to enhance the feeling of belonging to Sudan and make their children aware of their Sudanese identity. These diasporic objects were used as tools to pass cultural codes to the new generation, and to raise the children with a feeling of belonging to, and an awareness of, their Sudanese identity. Hence, diasporic objects in

dual-heritage households become tools of education for future generations, playing a role in the identity construction process of the younger generation.

Finally, the advocative role that diasporic objects play within society in dual-heritage households is of a capital importance. These objects become for their owners an expression of the specificity of their cultural heritage and belonging and a sort of resistance towards prejudice or the social denying attitudes they may face in the diaspora. The process of establishing social relationships and being able to assert one's existence can be difficult for those who are part of a diaspora, and these objects serve as a means of asserting that existence and asserting one's cultural identity.

To sum up, this research has made a valuable contribution to both the field of African diaspora studies in Turkey and to the study of material culture and diasporic objects. However, it is important to note that there are several limitations to this study. Firstly, the sample size was limited, and further research involving a larger and more diverse sample could provide a more detailed understanding of the topic. Secondly, the research was specifically focused on Sudanese-Turkish couples in Turkey, which limits the generalizability of the results to other communities of the African diaspora in Turkey. For example, the same research conducted with North-African diaspora in Turkey may yield different results. Finally, the study heavily relied on participants' self-reported psychological aspects, which would benefit from further investigation by interdisciplinary socio-psychological experts. Overall, it should be acknowledged that the findings presented in this study are preliminary and should be used to spark further academic research in the field.

This study sheds light on the importance of material culture and diasporic objects in the context of intercultural marriages and dual-heritage households. Although, many of the mentioned results are specific to the selected sample and to the context of this study. For instance, the same research may show different results if conduct with another group or in another country. Additionally, another limitation of this work is related to the number of the conduct home-based interviews that were only five comparing to the number of semi-structured interviews which were conduct in an external space.

Further research in this area could explore the role of diasporic objects in other cultural contexts or in for other African communities in Turkey and the impact of these objects on the formation and maintenance of cultural identity. It is our hope that this study will contribute to a greater understanding of the complexities and nuances of intercultural marriages and the diaspora experience, and the role of material culture in shaping these experiences.

Annex 1: Participants' Demographic table

- The real names of the participants have been changes to protect their privacy and maintain their anonymity.

- The home-based interviews were conducted with the specific goal of consolidating the results of the initial interviews conducted as part of our research on interracial marriages in Turkey and the diasporic experiences of Sudanese migrants.

	Name	Gender	Origin	Age	Relationship time	City	Date of interview	Modality of interview
Couple 1	Figen	Female	Turkish	54	27	Ankara	May 2022	Face-to-Face interview
	Hassan	Male	Sudan	59				
Couple 2	Türkan	Female	Turkish	51	25	Ankara	September 2022	Face-to face interview
	Mohamed	Male	Sudan	56				
Couple 3	Fatma	Female	Turkish	57	31	Ankara	September 2022	Face-to-face interview
	Khalid	Male	Sudan	60				
Couple 4	Zeynep	Female	Turkish	54	28	Istanbul	November 2022	Online interview
	Yasir	Male	Sudan	58				
Couple 5	Amira	Female	Sudan	53	25	Konya	November 2022	Online interview
	Selcuk	Male	Turkish	52				
Couple 6	Merva	Female	Sudan	38	10	Bursa	November 2022	Online interview
	Ali	Male	Turkish	40				
Couple 7	Mai	Female	Sudan	35	11	Istanbul	December 2022	Home-based interview
	Ahmet	Male	Turkish	38				
Couple 8	Nalan	Female	Turkish	52	26	Istanbul	January 2023	Home-based interview
	Naji	Male	Sudan	56				
Couple 9	Fatma	Female	Turkish	55	30	Istanbul	January 2023	Home-based interview
	Abubakir	Male	Sudan	58				
Couple 10	Selma	Female	Turkish	37	12	Istanbul	December 2022	Home-based interview
	Sabri	Male	Sudan	41				
Couple 11	Betül	Female	Turkish	51	31	Istanbul	September 2022	Home-based interview
	Abdulkarem	Male	Sudan	57				

- Not all participants have been mentioned in the article, as only selected quotes have been included.

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Securitization of Turkish Nationalist Non-Governmental Organizations in Germany

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Abstract

Since 2013, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) that have adopted Turkish nationalism in Germany have been included in the reports for the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. According to the reports, they are considered to be elements that threaten German democratic culture and minorities in Germany. The issue was brought to the German Bundestag and it was brought to the agenda that these NGOs could be a security threat and have radical right wing features. In this regard, the main purpose of this study is to examine how and why the NGOs that adopted Turkish nationalism in Germany, which have been working through umbrella NGOs as legal entities since 1978, are perceived as a security threat. The background of the path to this process is examined from a social constructivist perspective with the theory of securitization.

Keywords

Securitization, Turkish Diaspora, Germany, Non-Governmental Organizations, Nationalism

Introduction

Securitization happens when an issue is transformed into a threat through social construction processes by security forces, politicians, or bureaucrats (Buzan, Wæverve De Wilde, 1998, pp. 36-40). Problems may exist prior to securitization, however, perceiving problems as threats constitutes securitization. It is a tool that legitimizes immediate action against a constructed security threat. Securitization mechanism sometimes emphasizes taking urgent measures around the securitized phenomenon by disabling political tools. According to the Copenhagen Institute, the securitization process is the discursive creation of the problem in terms of security (Balzacq, 2005, pp. 171-173). In order for the discourse to be successful, not only the actor with the securitization authority is sufficient, but also the discourse must contain a security language. The target audience is then expected to accept and adopt the discourse created with these security elements (Buzan, Wæverve De Wilde, 1998, pp. 32-33).

With the end of the Cold War, the iron curtain was lifted, and the world began to

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witness cultural conflicts rather than ideological ones, as Huntington stated in his article, *The Clash of Civilizations* (1997). Thus, the definition of security has changed its structure. It not only includes ideological and military concepts but also began covering global issues such as climate change, migration and terrorism. Through securitization, many items that did not pose a security problem in terms of discursiveness started to be referred to as danger and threat elements and have been defined with a new security terminology. After the 9/11 attacks, the world began to witness a new understanding of security. The use of the notion of security, securitization of political concerns, and the construction of terms that were not perceived as a threat before, such as “migration,” as a security threat, are the signals of this change.

The primary purpose of this study is to examine Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that adopt Turkish Nationalism in Germany in the axis of securitization and discursiveness of security. Discussions on the prohibition and restriction of the movement are still ongoing, with the proposal on the limitation of the Ülkücü Movement in Germany that was accepted in the German Bundestag in November 2020. There are 18,000 people affiliated with the Ülkücü Movement in Germany today (Bozay, 2017). The possibility of limiting such a large diaspora formation will undoubtedly bring many problems and question marks. Therefore, in this study, the limitation of NGOs that adopt Turkish Nationalism will be examined within the scope of securitization theory. In this regard, the securitization of security and migration is examined in detail in the first part. The history of NGOs that adopt Turkish Nationalism in Germany is examined next. The last part includes an interview with a person who held a senior position in the NGOs mentioned in the findings and press releases.

Securitization

As of the 1980s, research on security practices gained a new breath at the Copenhagen Institute for Peace Studies. Along with conceptual and theoretical discussions about security practices, security research began to be carried out. Contrary to what traditional security definitions express, the expression of speech act, which includes linguistic concepts (discourse), began to be defined. Accordingly, speech act as words and actions in the political field became a research element. According to Huysmans (2011), language, discourse and speech methods should be studied carefully to understand activities in the field of security. Security actions were turned into security elements through these three elements. The use of these three elements briefly brought up securitization with the speech act method (p. 372). Thus, with the discussion initiated by the Copenhagen Institute, the security elements activated through the “speech act” began to be discussed. The performative structure of language caused a discussion and made the issues that were not an element of security, and its effect on the audience through language an issue.

Waever expressed the withdrawal of an issue to the security area as follows; politicians, bureaucrats or security experts bring together a certain issue by using the word security through language. Thus, the subject, which was previously incompatible with security, was taken to the security field with the speech act (1995, p. 55). Emphasis is placed on the necessity of taking urgent measures by emphasizing the need for security intervention and withdrawing to the field of security. This involves the use of force. In a sense, this means moving away from the political ground of the security element and by bringing the use of force to the agenda with urgent measures, it prevents the public from reaching a consensus. According to the Copenhagen Institute, securitization is used by bureaucrats, politicians and security experts for political purposes, but at the same time, it falls on the opposite ground with politics in terms of discussion and the democratic side of politics, as it emphasizes urgent measures. According to Williams (2003, p. 515), withdrawing an issue to the field of security through securitization is a political decision. The security threat is not a natural process, on the contrary, it is a political decision drawn to this area due to special needs. Therefore, it bypasses the basic processes of politics such as negotiation and debate, bringing with it urgent measures, and urgent measures prevent the public from discussion and reaching agreement. According to Balzacq (2005), securitization has historically been made a justification with the occurrence of certain events. Therefore, securitization is not a natural process, but emerges with the past processes of historical events that may cause securitization. According to Williams (2003), securitization cannot be explained by a speech act alone. Besides language, visuals and actuality also contribute to securitization. Accordingly, the factors visualized through the media also contribute to securitization.

With the end of the Cold War, security in the international arena began to take on a new meaning. With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the bipolar system officially ended. The world was no longer between liberal and socialist systems. The socialist bloc was no longer a threat, and the notion of security changed in parallel. Accordingly, security, as it was in the Cold War period, has not been defined as a set of military and ideological threats and entered into a new conceptualization (Buzan, 1997, p. 6-9).

This brings with it new elements of the globalizing world. Security is no longer limited to the military sector. Accordingly, economic, social, military, ideological and environmental sectors have become factors forming the building blocks of security (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998, p. 27-30). Securitization theory argues that national security policy is not spontaneous but is instead created by security actors, politicians, and security professionals. The decision-making actor labels an issue outside the political arena as a “threat” or a “national security threat” through social construction and discursive practices. Thus, it places the issue in the political field and then in the security field (Eroukhanoff, 2018, p. 1).

The decision-making actor carries out the social construction process with the practice of a “speech act” and convinces the audience of the securitization of the issue. The speech act is an important element because it causes specific reactions by using words (Huysmans, 2011, p. 372-373). For example, using racist terminology on immigration and using words such as “invasion” and “influx” to mean immigrant, reinforces the securitization trend (Kaya, 2009 p. 8). In other words, securitization is the situation in which an issue is politicized by actors and turns into a security element. Of course, the most crucial element of the acceptance of the issue, which is constructed as a national security threat, as a security element is the acceptance of the process by the audience. With the acceptance of the process, the definition of the aforementioned issue as a security problem brings with it the necessity of taking urgent measures, solutions and struggles. The method of struggle and emergency measures sometimes bypass the democratic process and cause an oppressive factor that restrict freedom (Miş, 2014, p. 351).

The Copenhagen Institute draws attention to the necessity of desecuritization of the issue and emphasizes the need of processing the issue in the field of democratic functioning. Unlike the Copenhagen Institute, the Aberystwyth School underscores the necessity for paving the way for discussion and negotiation with the political solution mechanism, and the initiation of dialogue, rather than removing it from being a security issue (Balzacq, Leonard, & Ruzicka, 2016, p. 498).

Securitization of Immigration

With the end of the Cold War, migration to Western Europe increased. At the end of the 1990s, the migration ratio to Europe accelerated through the collapse of the Iron Curtain that separated the West and the Soviet Union, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Eastern Europe. Thus the migration issue became one of the major discussions in Europe. According to Huysmans’ *European Union and the Securitization of Migration* study (2000), migration is perceived as a social and socio-economic threat to the internal security structures of Central Europe. Huysmans emphasized that the European Union’s tightened visa policy, increased identity checks for immigrants, and the integration of migrants are the concrete steps toward the securitization of immigration. He emphasizes that with the Europeanized immigration policy, citizens of other countries who do not have the right to free movement in Europe are seen as scapegoats. The discourse on the securitization of immigration has been constructed through groups (non-Western nationals) categorized as potentially dangerous (Huysmans, 2000, p. 751-771).

Ceyhan and Tsoukala, in their article “The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies” (2002), state that the securitization discourse on migration takes place in the socio-economic, securitizing, identifying and political axis. From high birth rates to unemployment, terrorism-related activities to criminal events, the problems are attributed to immigrants without adequate foundation and findings in social, cultural and

economic issues (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002, p. 23-28). Bigo, on the other hand, draws attention in his study, "Security and Immigration" (2002) to the effect of security professionals' practices on the securitization process. He expresses that many practices of security professionals, such as risk assessment, population profile, fear management and unrest, are the main factors in securitizing migration (Bigo, 2002, p. 70-75). According to Kaya's study, *Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization* (2009), Western decision-making actors are handling immigration as a source of unemployment, violence, terrorism and socio-cultural problems. It directly affects the public's perception of immigrants. After the 9/11 attacks in the USA and the attacks in London and in Madrid, securitization of immigration has become an essential issue in the West. Accordingly, the media's emphasis on the destructiveness of migration has led to a discursiveness in which immigrants are made hostile. In addition, the necessity of adopting European values for immigrants revealed that integration is cultural, attitudinal and linguistic rather than political and social (Kaya, 2009, p. 201-202).

In Germany, which has been undergoing sociological and economic change since the 1990s with reunification, the issue of immigrants has been brought to the agenda frequently. It has become a discourse in which immigration is securitized. With Germany's acceptance of ethnic German asylum seekers, 1,556,060 ethnic Germans were accepted with 1,397,640 asylum seekers between 1983-1992 (Panayi, 1994, p. 284). In 1992, Germany received 65 percent of all asylum applications in the European Union countries (European Statistical Office, 2007, p. 2). As a result of such a large migration, debates started among the German public that the asylum laws were loose. The written media and civil society began to express that immigrants abuse the lax laws. Between 1990 and 1993, Conservative Alliance parties (CDU-CSU), and newspapers such as *Bild* and *Welt am Sonntag* started a campaign against refugees (Arslan, 2009, p. 26). A new article was added to the Constitution in 1992 as a result of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU), and Free Democratic Party (FDP) government reaching an agreement with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) by launching an anti-refugee campaign (16a, paragraph 2¹). As a result, the right to asylum was tightened (Arslan, 2009, p. 27). From a discursive point of view, immigrants continued to be scapegoated by the public and the press. The fact that the press organs systematically point out that immigrants abuse asylum laws and that immigrants are seen as the cause of increasing youth unemployment, led to increased far-right incidents. In the 1990s, xenophobia and

¹ 16a Paragraph 2: Auf Absatz 1 kann sich nicht berufen, wer aus einem Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Gemeinschaften oder aus einem anderen Drittstaat einreist, in dem die Anwendung des Abkommens über die Rechtsstellung der Flüchtlinge und der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten sichergestellt ist. Die Staaten außerhalb der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, auf die die Voraussetzungen des Satzes 1 zutreffen, werden durch Gesetz, das der Zustimmung des Bundesrates bedarf, bestimmt. In den Fällen des Satzes 1 können aufenthaltsbeendende Maßnahmen unabhängig von einem hiergegen eingeleiteten Rechtsbehelf vollzogen werden.

racism augmented inexorably. As a result, there was a boost in neo-Nazi attacks against Turkish society and caused severe losses in the 1992 Mölln and 1993 Solingen attacks (Panayi, 1994, p. 284-285). Parallel to Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* study (1997), it has come to the fore in the German public that immigrants do not try to integrate and do not adapt to German societal norms. While the debate about the integration problem between Western values and immigrants continued to increase rapidly, the discourse of securitization of immigration have become a phenomenon that politicians and security forces constantly argued.

Another important factor in security and migration is the 9/11 attacks. The increased security concerns with the 9/11 attacks undoubtedly reflected on immigration and immigrants. Accordingly, the relationship between migration and security continued to be emphasized in the political arena, with an increase in border controls, border security, and the adoption of strict regulations in visa policy practices. Although immigration is not directly related to the 9/11 attacks, the possible criminal problems that immigration could bring became controversial in connection with drug smuggling and potential terrorist acts (Faist, 2005, p. 3). The essential point here is that this discourse is discussed on the axis of "clash of civilizations". It emphasizes that immigrants who do not adapt to Western civilization or from different cultures and ethnicities are perceived as a threat.

NGOs Adopting Turkish Nationalism in Germany

Germany, which was defeated in the Second World War, lost a significant young population during the war. Through the boost in industrialization after the war and considering the young population lost during the war, the need for labor arose. Germany started recruitment agreements to provide a labor force, firstly with Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965 and finally Yugoslavia in 1968 (Steinert, 2014, p. 9-11). The number of 6700 Turkish workers who went to Germany in 1961 reached 605,000 in 1973 (Kaya, 2009, p. 42). Although the recruitment of workers from Turkey was stopped in 1973, the Turkish population continued to increase due to family reunification and births. Because of the military coup in Turkey on September 12, 1980, the initiation of an intense wave of immigration to Germany for political reasons was another factor that increased the Turkish population in Germany (İçduygu, 2012, p. 17). During the labor migration process that started in 1961, it was noted that Turkish workers came especially from rural areas of Turkey (Adıgüzel, 2004, p. 100). They experienced serious adaptation problems, difficulties and troubles during the transition from an agricultural society to an industrial society. It has been observed that first-generation immigrants struggled with language and adapting to German social life and culture (Orendt, 2010, p. 169). In light of all these problems, Turkish NGOs started to be established in Germany that were aimed at establishing a bridge between Turkish society and German society. The main purpose of

NGOs is to provide solidarity among Turkish workers, overcome the problems of adaptation and support social rights. While Turkish NGOs have an important place in terms of providing a familiar and friendly environment for Turkish immigrants who were excluded from German society, NGOs also help Turkish immigrants benefit from social rights (Adıgüzel, 2004, p. 28). For new generations, they provide an opportunity to protect and promote national and spiritual values. NGOs adopting Turkish Nationalism, which will be examined in this study, are essential because they form a large community in Germany. NGOs adopting Turkish Nationalism in Germany do not exhibit a homogeneous structure. It is known that there are divisions and separations due to ideological and structural differences, and they maintain their commitment to Turkish Nationalism under three main organizations. In order to better examine the subject, the background and differences between the three main organizations will be detailed. These organizations are respectively *Almanya Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu* (ADÜTDF or Türk Federasyon); *Avrupa Türk İslam Birliği* (ATİB) and *Avrupa Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği* (ATB). In the reports of the German Federal Organization for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), these NGOs are defined as “Grey Wolves”. However, the term Gray Wolves will not be used in this study. Since “Gray Wolves” is rarely used in political discourse, the term “Ülkücü” is used instead². Although ATİB is defined under the Nationalist Movement in BfV reports, ATİB does not accept to be defined with this term (ATİB, 2020). Therefore, in terms of conceptualization, the expressions of Turkish Nationalism or NGOs adopting Turkish Nationalism will be used in the study. However, the term “Ülkücü” will be used from time to time when referring to official sources since it is used as “Ülkücü Movement” or “Grey Wolves” in official German sources.

Almanya Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu (ADÜTDF)

Almanya Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu (ADÜTDF) was established in order to organize activities and events to protect the Turkish national and spiritual values in a way that respect the culture, religion and laws of the society in which they live. It aims to build a cultural bridge between Germany and Turkey (Adıgüzel, 2004, p. 150). As a result of migration from Turkey to Germany in the 1960s, Germany’s inability to integrate Turkish immigrants led to the establishment of these organizations. As of April

²Gray Wolves is an informal name used to describe the Ülkücü movement. The gray wolf motif is frequently used in many Turkish epics. Especially in the *Ergenekon* epic, in which the origin of the Turks is told, it is believed that the female wolf saved the lives of the Turks. Thus the Gray Wolf motif has become the symbol of the Ülkücü movement. However, sometimes it is used to describe people with Ülkücü ideology. This usage is informal and is not accepted by people affiliated with the Ülkücü ideology.

In this context, although their symbol is Gray Wolf, in our one-to-one interview on the subject, they claim that the use of the Gray Wolf is used to humiliate the ideology they belong to. They stated that the name of the ideology is Ülküçülük.

1978, to establish a strong bond between Germany and Turkey, Christian Social Union leader Franz-Josef Strauss and Alparslan Türkeş met and agreed on establishing a formation that would be a continuation of the Turkish Nationalist movement (Bozay, 2017). According to the statement on the official website, Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu, which was founded on 18 June 1978 in Frankfurt, changed its name to the Almanya Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri at the 25th Grand Convention held on 19 May 2007 (Turkish Federation, n.d.). Thus, it continues its activities as a founding member within the Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu (Türk Federasyon, n.d.). ADÜTDF rejects assimilation and emphasizes harmony. They argue that preserving Turkish identity can only be possible through “European Turkishness” and that this can only be achieved through the harmony of Germany and Turkish society through multiculturalism rather than assimilation (Türk Federation, n.d.). The concept of “European Turkishness”, first expressed by Alparslan Türkeş during the annual general meeting of the Türk Federasyon held in Essen in 1995, emphasizes that Turkish people live in Europe by adhering to their Turkish identity. ADÜTDF emphasizes being a German citizen by adhering to the Turkish identity with the slogan “Be German, stay Turkish” (Werde Deutscher, bleibe Türke) (Bozay and Mangitay, 2016, p. 52). The main element distinguishing ADÜTDF from other NGOs in Germany that adopt Turkish nationalism is the term “European Turkishness”. They claim that Euro-Islam destroys the national consciousness of the Turks. ADÜTDF primarily advocates Turkish and then religious education. The main point that distinguishes them from other Turkish nationalist NGOs is that they state that religious education should be in Turkish (Arslan, 2009, p. 127-132).

Avrupa Türk İslam Birliği (ATİB)

Avrupa Türk İslam Birliği (ATİB) was founded in 1987 by Musa Serdar Çelebi, leaving Türk Federasyon. It has been stated that ATİB, established on 17 October 1987 in Nieder-Olm, has no affiliation with any party and is supra-partisan. At the same time, they emphasized that they have an understanding of being active in the political arena of the country they live in by remaining independent from Turkey’s domestic politics (ATİB, n.d.). Their main objectives are to protect Turkish culture with pluralism and harmony, to continue its activities in the light of Islamic values, to fight for democratic rights and equality demands in Western Europe, and to strive for the correct promotion of Islam in Europe (Fergen ve Wunsch, 2021, p. 9-10). ATİB defines Turks living in Europe under the term “European Muslim Turkishness”. They state that European Turks are permanent in Europe and that they are struggling against Islamophobia while preserving their Muslim-Turkish identity (Adıgüzel, 2004, p. 123). The main difference with other NGOs that adopt Turkish Nationalism is that ATİB puts Islam in the foreground. Although German Officials describe ATİB as a member of the Ülkücü Movement, in its official

sources, ATİB stated that they have parted ways with the implied political movement since its establishment (“Great Reaction to the Report Endangered by ATİB”, 2020). However, since ATİB is described as *Ülkücü* in the German official documents, ATİB is included in this article based on the German official documents.

Avrupa Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği (ATB / ANF)

Avrupa Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği started its activities in Berlin in 1994 under the name of Nizam-ı Alem *Ülkü Ocağı* and then accelerated its structuring. The perception that distinguishes the association from other organizations is they are more dominant in Islamic understanding, but it is also known that the Turkish nationalist line is to be preserved. In 2002, the organization changed its name to Avrupa Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği (ATB). As of 1996, it continued to operate in seven different countries, primarily in Germany. The association aims to bring Turkish and Islamic identity to young generations by emphasizing the need to protect sacred values such as Turkish culture, flag, homeland and Islamic religion in general (Khorchide, 2021, p. 39). The organization, which is based on the concept of “Western European Turkishness”, carries out various activities so that Muslim Turks living in Europe can live without losing their identity. They aim to adhere to the traditions and customs of young people in social and cultural terms, and they carry out activities such as trips to Turkey, religious education, mosque programs, and folklore for young people (Adıgüzel, 2004, p. 149).

Relations between Turkey and Germany

In 1978, CSU Bavarian leader, Franz Josef Strauss, and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chairman, Alparslan Türkeş, declared the climate is well suited for the first Turkish nationalist NGO in Germany so that Turkish workers would not feel alien in Germany and keep their Turkish identity. This decision, which also aims to ensure that the Turkish workers who came to Germany with the 1961 labor agreement will not feel alienated and adapt to the society in which they live, has a deep connection with the political conjuncture of the period. The Cold War era created a bipolar system in the world, namely the eastern bloc and the western bloc; While the bloc of the west represents the countries affiliated with western democracy, the east bloc represents the socialist system on the axis of the Soviet Union and China. After the Second World War, Germany was experiencing this bipolar world order. With the end of the Second World War, Germany, divided into two; east and west, and lived in a bipolar system until the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989. Accordingly, the Western block divided by the wall is the Federal Republic of Germany (FDR or West Germany), allied to the Western democracies, and the Eastern bloc is the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany), allied to the Soviet Union.

According to Mascolo (2021), the reason why CSU Bavarian leader Franz Josef Strauss supported the establishment of the Turkish Nationalist movement along with

NGOs in Germany has a connection with the Cold War. Accordingly, he argues that it is aimed at breaking the tendency of Turkish workers to side with socialism in Germany and to keep them away from socialist ideology by ensuring that they are on a nationalist line with the NGOs affiliated with the Nationalist movement. At the same time, the CDU and CSU are aimed to become important actors for the Turkish diaspora in Germany. In this context, a new era began for Germany with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Accordingly, in the process that started with the anti-immigration campaign led primarily by the CSU and CDU in the 1990s, the view that the Turkish NGOs constituted an obstacle to integrating Turks living in Germany into German society began to prevail. At this point, it can be emphasized that the changing political conjuncture, the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and socialism ceased to be a real threat. Parallel to this, the necessity of NGOs affiliated with Turkish nationalism was opened to discussion on the axis of CDU and CSU.

The changing political conjuncture was not limited to only the Cold War period. In parallel with the changing relations between Germany and Turkey in the 2000s, Turkish nationalists NGOs were also affected. In 2013, for the first time in the reports of the Organization for the Protection of the Constitution of Germany, it was stated that NGOs that adopted Turkish nationalism were elements that could threaten German democracy, it was stated that they were on the extreme right ideology and that glorifying the Turkish race was against the equality principle of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. As of 2013, the bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany also started to change. In this context, the discussion of NGOs adopting Turkish nationalism and the deteriorating Turkey-Germany relations show parallelism. Accordingly, the harsh attitude of the Turkish government during the Gezi protests that started in Istanbul in May and June 2013 and led to mass demonstrations throughout Turkey, was criticized by Germany. For this reason, the EU member states accepted Germany's offer to postpone the Turkey-EU accession negotiations for four months. This situation has also put a question mark on Turkey's EU candidate state status. On June 2, 2016, Germany and Turkey's relations became tense again after the German Bundestag adopted the resolution describing the 1915 events as "genocide". NGOs that adopted Turkish nationalism organized protests across Germany against the resolution. These tensions also caused controversy among the politicians of the CDU and CSU, and the discussions about attempting to ban members of NGOs that embrace Turkish nationalism from being members of the CDU and CSU. However, it was unanimously rejected. NGOs that adopted Turkish nationalism started to create controversy between the CDU and the CSU.

In 2017 Turkish-German journalist Deniz Yücel was arrested in Turkey on charges of "making propaganda for the PKK terrorist organization", and Turkish-German relations were strained again. Deniz Yücel was evacuated as a result of Germany's diplomatic

attempts. But diplomatically, the tense relations between the two countries were striking. As a matter of fact, on March 2, 2017, the Gaggenau municipality rejected the campaign to be organized with the participation of the then Minister of Justice, Bekir Bozdağ, within the scope of the election campaign targeting the Turkish diaspora in Germany for the Turkish Constitutional Amendment Referendum and economy minister, Nihat Zeybekci's campaign in the Porz district town hall was rejected. Upon the refusal of the event to be held, there was a new tension in bilateral relations. Turkish officials interpreted this situation as Germany's attempt to suppress the Turkish diaspora. In June 2017, there was a new tension. After Turkey did not allow the German parliamentary delegation to visit the Incirlik military base, Germany began to withdraw its soldiers from Incirlik Air Base in Adana. As a result of all these developments, the closure of NGOs affiliated with the Nationalist movement and NGOs that adopted Turkish nationalism came to the agenda, but the federal interior minister, Horst Seehofer, refused to ban the organizations.

Securitization of NGOs Adopting Turkish Nationalism

In 2019, within the scope of the Symbol Law³ in Austria, the sign known as the "Gray Wolf Salute", the "Gray Wolf in the Crescent" symbol and various versions of these symbols were banned to fight against extremism. In addition, the restrictions on the NGOs adopting Turkish Nationalism began to be discussed. According to the ban that entered into force on March 1, 2019, a fine of up to 4,000 Euros was imposed for the signs and symbols, and a fine of up to 10,000 Euros or six weeks' imprisonment if repeated (Bundesgesetz, BGBl. I Nr. 2/2019 NR: GP XXVI BR: AB 10094).

In France, in 2020, when Armenian groups gathered in the city of Vienne for the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a clash broke out between Turkish, Armenian and Azeri groups, and four people were injured in the clash. In the following days, "Loup Gris", which means Gray Wolves in French, and the abbreviation "RTE", consisting of the initials of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was painted on the Armenian Genocide Monument with spray in the Décines-Charpieu region. In this regard, the issue was discussed at the Council of Ministers meeting. On November 4, 2020, it was announced that the activities of the Gray Wolves (Ülkücü) movement were banned in France with the decree published by the French Minister of Interior, G ral Darmanin. Darmanin described the movement as "aggressive" ("[France Bans the Nationalist Movement](#)", 2020).

The banning of NGOs that adopted Turkish nationalism brought with it an intense debate. After the clash between the Turkish and Armenian groups in France, it was alleged that the "Armenian Hunt" march was organized by the  lkücü Movement

³ Bundesgesetz, mit dem die Verwendung von Symbolen der Gruppierung Islamischer Staat und anderer Gruppierungen verboten wird (Symbole-Gesetz) BGBl. I Nr. 2/2019 (NR: GP XXVI BR: AB 10094)

members. Thus the question was submitted to the European Parliament on November 10, 2020. In the parliamentary question, they demanded the inclusion of the Ülkücü Movement (the Gray Wolves in the text) on the EU Terrorist List (“[Inclusion of Grey Wolves on EU Terrorist List](#)”, 2020). However, in the relevant reply on February 4, 2021, it was stated that there was not enough evidence that the mentioned movement participated in the action. However, there would be room for investigation and/or prosecution if there is severe and reliable evidence ([Reply on Inclusion of Grey Wolves on EU Terrorist List](#), 2021). Another significant turning point that the Ülkücü Movement was included for the first time in the 2019-2020 Turkey report prepared by the European Parliament Turkey rapporteur Nacho Sanchez Amor. According to the statement in the report, the necessity of being added to the EU Terrorist List, where the said movement may pose a threat to people of Kurdish, Armenian and Greek origin, was called for to ban these organizations in EU member states and to monitor their activities ([Commission Reports on Turkey](#), 2021). Therefore, it has been argued that Turkish Nationalism and the Nationalist Movement in 2020 were opened for discussion on the axis of all European Union member states. The German Federal Organization for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, briefly BfV) is an internal intelligence agency responsible for collecting intelligence and reporting to the Federal Ministry of the Interior. It collects data against all kinds of potential dangers and threats that may harm democracy and disturb the security and peace in matters related to the internal security of Germany. The collected data is published in the annual reports (Verfassungsschutzbericht) to inform the public and raise awareness ([Verfassungsschutz](#), 2020). As of 2013, NGOs adopting Turkish Nationalism were included in the report. Accordingly, ADÜTDF, ATİB and ATB were described as extreme right wing groups. In the 2020 report, ADÜTDF’s ties with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) were mentioned. It is stated that ADÜTDF is a far-right movement, but took a moderate stance in front of the public. In the report, it is argued that ADÜTDF included extreme right-wing symbols in its social media accounts, such as the “Gray Wolf Salute” and the “Three Crescents” that were clearly based on Turkism ideology. It has been mentioned that Turkism is equal to Turkish supremacy and hinders the integration of Turks into German society. Moreover in the report argued that the view of “the Turks are superior” violates the principle of equality stated in the constitution and has a divisive effect ([Verfassungsschutzbericht](#), 2020, p. 281-282). Another organization included in the report, ATİB, was stated to be in line with the nationalist ideology and dominant Islamic elements. Although the ATİB official website emphasizes that they are not part of the Ülkücü Movement, it is argued in the report that being a member of the Ülkücü Movement creates a divisive effect and spreads Turkish nationalism with far-right ideologies. This situation leads to discrimination among various groups, such as Kurds and Jews ([Verfassungsschutzbericht](#), 2020, p. 282-283). ATB is stated as another important

organization affiliated with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and it is argued that a strict limit is drawn against other beliefs. The report stated that ATB poses a moderate external image and stays away from extreme rhetoric in its official statements. However, it has been noted that the Turkish-Islamic synthesis is not only an ideology for ATB but also an indicator of a line that draws strict boundaries against other beliefs (*Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2020, p. 284-285*). On November 18, 2020, the joint proposal named, “To Stand Against Racism and Nationalism, to Suppress the Impact of the Ülkücü Movement⁴” was accepted by the majority of the votes in the German Bundestag. The joint proposal of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens briefly includes the close monitoring of the activities of the Ülkücü Movement (*Nationalismus und Rassismus die Stirnbieten, 2020*). The proposals submitted separately by the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Left Party (Die Linke) regarding the closure of NGOs adopting Turkish nationalism in Germany were rejected. However, in the proposal mentioned above, which was accepted, there is a clause stating that NGOs can be closed if necessary.

Methodology

In the axis of securitization of the diaspora, this study, which examines the NGOs that adopt Turkish Nationalism in Germany, considering securitization, was carried out with the qualitative research method. Qualitative research aims to explore social life's facts and illuminate the subjective meaning between actions and social contexts (*Fossey, Harvey, McDermott, & Davidson, 2002, p. 716*). This study examines these groups using a purposive sampling technique. Instead of taking a large sample, it is preferred that a single person who has experience on the subject and who takes part in the relevant NGO was chosen as a participant. The aim here is to prevent repetition with more than one participant. It is observed that there are hesitations about participation in the study because of the topic. The participants did not want to talk due to security concerns and avoided the interview. This is another important reason why participation was limited to one person. The participant in the current interview was chosen considering having a command of the legal process and bureaucracy in Germany due to his position in the relevant institution, having deep knowledge and experience about the domestic policy of Germany and the joint decision-making mechanism of the European Union. The study conducted a semi-systematic literature review on the securitization process of NGOs adopting Turkish Nationalism in Germany. Since their names are frequently included in the reports of the German Organization for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) three organizations were emphasized, and the research was

⁴ Nationalismus und Rassismus die Stirnbieten – Einfluss der Ülkücü-Bewegung zurückdrängen (19/24388).

formed over three organizations. The three organizations mentioned are, respectively, Almanya Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu (ADÜTDF), Avrupa Türk İslam Kültür Dernekleri Birliği (ATİB) and Avrupa Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği (ATB). Within the scope of the document review, the websites of the relevant institutions, the newspapers in terms of scanning the news on the subject, the statements of the Chairman and members of the organizations and press releases were examined. In addition, the study was carried out by studying information brochures, journal articles, questions submitted to the European Parliament, questions submitted to the German Bundestag on the subject, and the reports of the German Organization for the Protection of the Constitution. Since the research was also carried out with document analysis techniques, the statements and press releases of the relevant NGOs were accessed through keywords. The answers to the interview are presented with direct quotations. Findings obtained through press releases, statements, reports and various documents are also included under the relevant themes, including quotations.

Findings

While the roots of immigrants' problems stem from reasons such as poverty, unemployment and discrimination, the problems are masked and externalized with the securitization process. In the 1990s, in the anti-immigration arguments that increased in Germany and the discourse that Turkish immigrants could not integrate into German society began to become widespread. The CDU frequently mentioned the term "leitkultur" especially in the anti-immigration campaign (Arslan, 2009, p. 35-36). Leitkultur expresses the acceptance of German culture as the dominant culture by immigrants and adapting to it unilaterally. The construction of the discourse is based on the others – us. The slogan "German First" is the basis of the discourse for Leitkultur (Arslan: 2009, p. 38). Heitmeyer's work in 1997 is discursively exemplary in the context of the anti-immigration debates that occupied Germany's politics and media in the 1990s. In the study, the inability of Turks to integrate into German society was attributed to their satisfaction with living with Islam and Turkish identity (Kaya, 2009, p. 18-19). In this context, the Turkish diaspora's living with the values of Turkishness and Islam was seen as the main obstacle to integration into German society. Especially in this period, Turkish immigrants started to appear in the German media with negative expressions, such as criminals and fundamentalists. One of the fourth-generation Turkish youth living in Berlin, Bilal was asked about their thoughts on the possible bans and limitations expected to be brought to NGOs that adopt Turkish nationalism, in the study conducted by Burcu Özçelik. He emphasized that while he is a citizen who respects the laws of Germany, there are no obstacles to defining himself as Turkish and Muslim (Özçelik, 2021). In other words, the groups living in Germany adopting Turkish nationalism state that integrating into German society does not mean to reject Turkish and Muslim identity. They respect German laws, and

they can define themselves as Turkish and Muslim at the same time. They argue that they can adapt to German society in this way. In the meeting held with Turan Şen on February 17, 2003 Deputy Chairman of the Turkish Federation in 2003, it was stated that the general view of the NGOs adopting Turkish Nationalism in Germany is not very good. The general perspective of German society is that the Turkish identity remains, as long as the NGOs exist (Adıgüzel, 2004, p. 293). In other words, Turkish immigrants cannot integrate into German society because of these NGOs.

The minority part of society, which is exposed to racism daily in various contexts, is seen as “foreigners in need of integration”, regardless of their actual needs, and living conditions. They remain as a foreigner and “others” in society. The view of immigrants seen as people needing to be integrated into society causes a negative perception of immigrants. It evokes a negative perception by defining people who need integration. According to Arslan’s statement, this negative perception of integration clearly ended with alienation of immigrants in German society (Arslan, 2009, p. 33-34). At the same time, the media’s definition of immigrants as an element of danger, as people corrupting the social culture with their foreign customs, as potential criminals, and as exploiting resources lead to alienation for diasporic groups. In this context, the efforts of diaspora groups to be protected against discrimination, racism and assimilation cannot be denied. This situation increases the commitment of diaspora groups to their own culture.

It should not be forgotten that we do not want assimilation; we want harmony and integration. The associations in question are, of course, established in compliance with German law, considering the German constitution and culture. However, we are against assimilation because assimilation means a kind of genocide. Because assimilation is equivalent to making the people of that country forget their identity. In this respect, we strive to maintain harmony, integration and cultural identity (Personal Interview, Mehmet, Türk Federasyon).

Securitization of NGOs Adopting Turkish Nationalism

In a way, securitization brings along a process that goes along with politicization. Discourse can be constructed for domestic political purposes. Securitization discourse may also change depending on the political conjuncture (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998 p. 28-29; Miş, 2014, p. 38-349). For the Western world after the 9/11 attacks, the securitization of Islam may not be considered an element of securitization for another country, or issues that were not previously defined as security elements may be drawn into the security field. In this respect, the question of when the NGOs adopting Turkish nationalism in Germany have become a security threat should be questioned. This question was included in the interview:

This is determined by the political conjuncture. While Germany and Turkey established good relations, the Ülkücü Movement was not perceived as a threat; it is brought to the agenda in case of deterioration of bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey. This is used as a trump card in the context of bilateral relations from time to time. Therefore, it can be said that it depends on the political conjuncture; It is a situation that has sometimes been brought to the agenda and sometimes removed from the agenda since the 1990s (Personal Interview, Mehmet, Türk Federasyon).

In his speech about the ban on the Ülkücü Movement in France, President of the Belgian Türk Federasyon, Hamit Atak, states that the ban was decided as a result of the attack on the Armenian bust in France. However, he argues that it was a conjuncture related to Turkey. He stated that these organizations are non-governmental organizations, not political ones (Aktan, 2020). As of 2013, NGOs adopting Turkish nationalism were included under the title of “extreme foreigners threatening security” in BfV reports, and attention was drawn to the social media posts using extreme right symbols of people affiliated with the Ülkücü ideology, independently of the NGOs. In the interview, the statements in the BfV reports were asked:

First of all, there is no basis for the reports. I think most of the reports are biased. We are not racist. First of all, Turkish culture is not a culture that can be compatible with racism. A society that has dominated Anatolia for centuries and lived in Central Asia cannot be expected to be racist. It is impossible for Turks who have lived in brotherhood and unity with different communities for years to be racist. At the same time, racism has no place in our religion. We only aim to spread social and cultural activities, social rights and cultural identity. We try to preserve Turkish culture, language and religion (Personal Interview, Mehmet, Türk Federasyon).

The proposal titled, “To Stand Against Racism and Nationalism, to Suppress the Impact of the Ülkücü Movement,” has caused intense reactions. ADÜTDF Chairman, Şentürk Doğruyol states that ADÜTDF has been respectful to the constitutional order of Federal Germany since 1978, it is a democratic non-governmental organization and they reject all forms of racism, violence and terrorism (Türk Federasyon, 2020). Durmuş Yıldırım, Chairman of ATİB, in his written press statement, stated that they are not hostile to any religion, political or belief group. He argued that ATİB is not a member of the Gray Wolves or the Ülkücü movement, and it is a transparent and open non-governmental organization (ATİB, 2020).

It is stated that 18,000 people in Germany have contact with NGOs that adopt Turkish nationalism or feel close to this ideology. In this context, the NGOs’ coming to the

agenda within the prohibition was met with a reaction from the mentioned NGOs and groups. In this respect, the effects of a possible closure attempt on the Turkish diaspora were asked.

There should not be a possible shutdown because the Ministry of Interior has already stated that there was insufficient evidence for the closure. We are just trying to create a cultural identity belonging. Therefore, we are not incompatible with German law. On the other hand, one of the major aims of these organizations is to encourage young people in the field of education and training, to prevent young people from bad habits or engaging in other activities such as terrorism and drugs, to prevent identity crisis and identity search, and to establish a bond between Turkey and Germany (Personal Interview, Mehmet, Türk Federasyon).

Securitization through media constitutes one of the important elements in consolidating the social construction of discourse and its acceptance by the audience. The media plays a major role in discursive securitization, establishing social construction, and accepting the discourse by the recipient. According to Ayhan Kaya's statement, media images and statistics become practical ideological tools that contribute to the production of a sterile European space, those that are ethnocultural and religiously different (Kaya, 2009, p. 15). In this context, the language used in the media regarding the NGOs adopting Turkish Nationalism is of great importance in terms of securitization. As a matter of fact, the title of the 2016 report published in *Tagesspiegel* is important for the securitization element in the media: "Women, Children and Fascists" (Frauen, Kinder und Faschisten). The content of the article included the thousands of Turks gathered in Cologne and demonstrating against the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey. It is stated that the term "Fascists" used in the title is because the Nationalist symbols were used by the community during the demonstration. Therefore, it can be stated that the media, by reinforcing the sterile European space in terms of reporting the news, adopts securitizing discourse on the harmony of groups affiliated with Turkish nationalism with social integration and order.

Discussion and Conclusion

With the end of the Cold War, the end of the bipolar world system, and the 9/11 attacks, the process of securitization of immigration has increased rapidly. The presence of Muslim immigrants in Western countries after the 9/11 attacks caused discussions within the security framework and on the securitization of immigration (Faist, 2005, p. 116). Considering that the majority of the Turkish population in Germany is Muslim, the effect of the said securitization process on the Turkish diaspora can be better understood (Yüksel, 2014, p. 178).


The discourse of Turkish identity and Muslim belonging as an obstacle to integration into German society, which were frequently brought to the agenda with the anti-immigration campaign carried out by the CSU-CDU in Germany in the 1990s, accelerated. In the 1990s, the easy acceptance of ethnic Germans as immigrants to Germany or the fact that they could easily benefit from citizenship, brought the issue of structural discrimination against non-German immigrants. Accordingly, the expectation that Turks working with the status of “guest workers” in Germany is temporary and will return to their countries, and the fact that they cannot easily benefit from the right to citizenship even if they were born in Germany, but that ethnic Germans can benefit from this right, led to debates (Modood, 1997, p. 4). Seeing immigrants as “other” and “temporary” brings exclusion from society in this context. As a result of exclusion and marginalization, Turkish immigrants provide solidarity through diaspora organizations and try to cope with the racism and discrimination they encounter. Today, Turkish people constitute the largest diaspora group in Germany. NGOs adopting Turkish nationalism, on the other hand, continue to operate through umbrella organizations that have been active since the 1960s and have taken on an official framework since the 1970s. NGOs, which aim to promote Turkish culture, provide moral support, solidarity, introduce Turkish culture and Islam to new generations, and become a bridge element between Germany and Turkey, have started to be discussed in the German public in recent years under the heading of securitization.

For the first time, in October 2004, the North Rhine-Westphalia Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) stated that the Ülkücü Movement caused the emergence of a parallel society in Europe and therefore constituted an obstacle to the integration of the European Turkish population (Bozay, 2017). As of 2013, NGOs adopting Turkish nationalism started to take place in BfV reports, and in November 2020, the bans were brought to the agenda in the German Bundestag, but a proposal was accepted regarding restrictions instead of bans. The increasing interest of the young generation for the Turkish nationalist movement in Germany in recent years should be evaluated in this context. As a result of the neo-Nazi attacks that have escalated since the 1990s, the increase in nationalism among immigrant groups is an expected and usual reaction. Re-nationalism is a reaction to the exclusionary mechanisms of the host country. As a matter of fact, after the racist attacks in Mölln and Solingen, the number of members of NGOs adopting Turkish nationalism increased (Aslan and Bozay, 2012). At this point, closing or banning NGOs will cause reactivity for groups that preserve their cultural identity through NGOs. A possible ban or closure attempt has the potential to push the masses underground and is among the possibilities that it will bring along problems such as radicalization and criminalization. At this point, the fact that Turkish Nationalism is under the umbrella of auditable NGOs is essential in preventing radicalization and going underground.

In the resolution adopted by the German Bundestag, there are statements that the Turkish nationalist ideology is shaped around anti-Semitism and that it has a racist view against Armenians and Kurds (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020). However, Faist stated that important conflicts of Turkey, have spread to Germany from time to time since the 1970s. Nevertheless, it has never significantly endangered state or human security in Germany (Faist, 2005, p. 108). Moreover, Turkish immigrants with a Turkish nationalist ideology insist that they have problems with the PKK's European branch, not with the Kurdish people.

In Özçelik's study, Turkish activists stated that the formation of securitization discourse on Turkish Nationalist groups caused neo-Nazi or far-right perpetrators to be overlooked (Özçelik, 2021). The focus of securitization on Turkish NGOs distracts attention from the devastating consequences of far-right violence, such as the Hanau attack. This situation causes the groups that put far-right activism into practice to be ignored and the necessary reaction to the attacks to be resolved at this point. Defining the Ülkücü movement as a security threat after 2010 strengthens the claim of securitization is derived from the changing political conjuncture. Contrary to the traditional security perception, the discursively constructed notion of security is changed, transformed and created from time to time. In this respect, considering the securitization of NGOs adopting Turkish nationalism could depend on the political conjuncture. Examining the nexus between the changing discourse on Turkish nationalism and Turkey-EU bilateral relations can contribute significantly to the literature for future studies. In general, this study aimed to examine the discourse of limiting and restricting the NGOs that adopt Turkish Nationalism in Germany within the scope of securitization.

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The Turkish Nation as a Bridge: Imagining a Nation in Turkish Parliamentary Discourse

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Abstract

This article analyses Turkish parliamentary discourse about Turkish communities living outside of Turkey from 1988 to 2016. It focuses particularly on the usage of the bridge metaphor in discursive strategies towards these communities; concentrated mainly in former Ottoman territories and parts of Eurasia. The article argues that Turkish parliamentarians used the bridge metaphor to frame Turkish communities as part of both the Turkish nation and the nation where they lived, thereby constituting their liminal and in-between identity. Parliamentarians continuously (re-)imagine, (re-)construct, and (re-)produce the Turkish nation by using different discursive strategies that included uniqueness, sameness or difference. They used identity markers as ethnicity, language, geography, history, and religion to address these strategies. Metaphorically framing Turkish communities as a bridge provided them a dominant bridge role, namely that of friendship and peace. By transforming Turkish communities into a bridge of friendship and peace, through different dimensions, they believed that they would have a positive and crucial role for the country where they live and for Turkey. This bridge role provided opportunities as well as limits, illustrating the interplay between discourse and foreign policy developments.

Keywords

Bridge Metaphor,
Imagined Turkish
Communities,
Discursive Practices,
Turkish Parliament,
Foreign Policy

Introduction

This article analyzes the stance towards Turkish communities living outside of Turkey from 1988 to 2016 expressed in Turkish parliamentary discourse. It focuses particularly on the usage of the metaphor of a bridge in discursive strategies towards these communities. A great amount of research has illustrated the popularity of the usage of the bridge metaphor in Turkish identity formation processes and its geopolitical role. In this context, the metaphor of a bridge reflected Turkey's in-between, liminal or hybrid identity and, hence, its geopolitical role (Aykaç, 2021; Rumelili and Suleymanoglu-Kurum, 2017;

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Yanık, 2009). However, there is little research on how the metaphor is used within the construction of the Turkish nation by Turkish parliamentarians. This article aims to fill that gap. It is interested, more specifically, in what it means to metaphorically frame the Turkish communities outside of Turkey as a bridge.

The article argues that Turkish parliamentarians used the bridge metaphor towards its imagined Turkish communities in an attempt to integrate them within the Turkish nation and Turkey's foreign policy ambitions. The metaphor, however, goes both ways. By framing them as a bridge they also positioned these communities partially outside of the Turkish nation. These imagined communities exist in in-between spaces as they become part of both the Turkish nation and the nation where they live. Therefore, they challenge the territorial nation-state (Varadarajan, 2010). The metaphor of a bridge reflects this and constitutes the hybrid, in-between and liminal identity of these imagined communities. Additionally, metaphorically framing Turkish communities as a bridge provides them with a role that serves as a connecting mechanism between Turkey and the country in which they live. In that vein, Turkish parliamentarians used the bridge metaphor to influence and strengthen ties with the countries these Turkish communities live.

The first section covers with the theoretical concepts used and touches upon the concept of imagined political communities in relation to the kin-state. Additionally, it explains the methodology of the research. The second section analyses how parliamentarians used the metaphor of a bridge to approach different Turkish communities: concentrated, mainly, in former Ottoman territories, Greece, the Balkan, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and in different parts of Eurasia. It gives insight into the different ways in which these communities are imagined and constructed; by focusing on elements ranging from language, religion and history to culture, ethnicity, and geography. The third paragraph demonstrates how Turkish parliamentarians transformed these communities into an important foreign policy tool that paved the way to formulate policies towards them and the country where they live. Moreover, it reveals the limits of foreign policy, simultaneous to the opportunities of using the metaphor of a bridge in relation to the imagined Turkish communities.

Imagined Communities and Methodology

There has been a vast amount of research conducted on Turkish speaking communities in Europe, more specifically in West-Europe, that are primary formed through labor migration. These studies focus mainly on the role and perspective of these communities regarding their homeland and/or kin-state (Baser, 2014; Chapin, 1996; Kaya, 2010; Küçükcan, 2007; Sirseldoudi, 2012; Yabancı, 2021) Additionally, these communities are perceived and framed as diasporas. This article refrains from using the term diaspora for several reasons. Firstly, older and new uses of the concept of diaspora focus strongly on migration

and dispersal, and cross-border experiences or a desire to return to the homeland (Faist, 2010, p. 12). This article illustrates that Turkish parliamentarians constructed the Turkish nation abroad by imagining Turkish communities through a shared history, language, ethnicity, and/or religion. These communities do not need to have any cross-border experience, nor do they have to perceive Turkey as their “homeland” or “place of origin.” However, parliamentarians envisioned Turkey as being the state that has the responsibility and privilege to safeguard the security and rights of these communities that are perceived as their kin. This meant that Turkey was hierarchically framed as the “leader” of the Turkish nation, which included Turkish communities worldwide such as the Uyghurs in China and the Turkmens in Iraq. Secondly, the word diaspora is contested in Turkey. Not only did it enter Turkish language more recently, it was also perceived negatively by some political elites as it implied separation, while they tried to approach the nation as a whole. Nowadays the term diaspora is more embraced and used by Turkish officials and academics. However, its meaning and usage remains unclear as it refers to both narrow and broad definitions, which are used interchangeably, thereby making it difficult to grasp what it is exactly meant by the Turkish diaspora (Yaldiz, 2019).

This article, therefore, prefers to use the concept of imagined communities instead of diasporas. Benedict Anderson argued that nations are imagined political communities, in other words, communities come alive and are constructed through imagination. It is imagined because not all of the community members are familiar with each other, yet in their minds they feel a strong connection with one another. Values of comradeship and patriotism are at the core of these imaged communities, thereby having more horizontal relationships instead of hierarchy (Anderson, 2006, p. 6–7). However, instead of focusing on how people imagined themselves as belonging to a community and the comradeship or solidarity that existed within these communities, this article is interested how the nation is imagined, defined, and forged through discursive practices of Turkish parliamentarians. The meaning of the nation is produced, transformed, maintained and dismantled discursively (Wodak, 2017, p. 409).

Turkish parliamentarians used discursive strategies that entail difference and sameness by focusing on the Turkish language, religion, and Ottoman history to detach imagined communities from a fixed territory and mark them as different in the societies where they live, thereby constituting and reaffirming their authority over the nation beyond its borders. In other words, these imagined communities challenged the notion of the nation-state as they existed outside of territorial limits and became defined by liminality and in-betweenness (Hall, 1999). The usage of the metaphor of a bridge played an important role in constructing the liminal and in-between identity of these imagined communities as they integrated these communities into the Turkish nation by making Turkey their kin-state, but at same time reconfirmed their attachment to the state where they live. The research illustrates how the bridge metaphor has the capacity to

unify reasoning and shape discursive structures, thereby bringing identity constructions together.

The focus on citizenship was, for obvious reasons, seen as an important factor in defining the imagined community and the authority of its kin-state. However, citizenship was not an essential factor in determining the nation as many of the third and fourth generation emigrants who are not citizens of their kin-state could still be perceived as part of a larger territorially dispersed nation. Additionally, the imagined community did not need to trace its journey back to a common place of origin. The sense of belonging to a homeland was constituted within the imagined political communities, and also through the interaction between their kin-state and themselves (Varadarajan, 2010).

Turkish parliamentarians focused particularly on Turkish communities in former Ottoman territories. These communities were particularly defined by sudden border changes that are mainly caused by (civil) wars and other (often traumatic) events and conflicts, which were visible during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire from the 19th to the early 20th century. The imagined communities ended up in new and different political spaces, sometimes against their will, and Turkish parliamentarians approached these communities based on their shared Ottoman history, Turkish language and kin, or religion. Rogers Brubaker referred to these communities as accidental diasporas. He argued that these imagined communities had a strong territorial focus and mostly held citizenship of the country where they lived instead of that of their kin-state (Brubaker, 2000, p. 2). This was the case for many of the Turkish communities that lived in former Ottoman territories such as the Turkish communities of Western Thrace in Greece and the Turkmens in Iraq. Turkish parliamentarians supported the rights of these communities and sometimes intervened transnationally, especially when the interest of the imagined communities overlapped with Turkey's foreign policy ambitions (Papuçular, 2020).

As mentioned earlier, in Anderson's definition of the imagined community there is a strong focus on the community-level, particularly on how a group of people imagine themselves being part of a community, which constitutes horizontal relations and resembles a nation. This article takes a different approach and contributes to Anderson's line of thinking by focusing on how political elites, parliamentarians more specifically, construct the nation abroad through discourses. These political elites constantly redraw or (re)confirm the boundaries of the nation-state. It is, thus, important to try to understand how these elites (re)articulate the nation and the role and the responsibilities of its state. As Latha Varadarajan states:

Whether it is "Hungarians beyond the boundaries," "Indians abroad," "Chinese living overseas," or "Russians in the near abroad," state

authorities' constitution of various diasporas as part of an extended global nation is quite clearly a rearticulation of nationhood, a redefining of who can and should belong to the imagined community of the nation (Varadarajan, 2010, p. 22–23).

This article focuses on the parliament to understand and illustrate how Turkish parliamentarians (re)define the Turkish nation globally. The parliament is an empirical site of explicit articulations of identity, an arena of contestation, represented a formal authority, and included a wider political debate – as its inclusion incorporated a variety of political texts as debates, speeches, and statements. In these, a broad range of political actors like the cabinet, the opposition and the president defined their political positions (Hansen, 2006, p. 53–57). This increased the likelihood of identifying discursive strategies towards Turkish communities. In order to understand the development of the imagined Turkish communities within a longer historical period, the article scrutinized a total of 3,576 transcripts of Turkish parliamentary debates between 1988 and 2016.ⁱ This period covered a wide variety of political parties and parliamentarians, thereby providing a broader overview of the bridge metaphor's usage in parliament outside of the current Justice and Development Party (AKP)-period (2002). Moreover, this time span was valuable for exposing any shifts in discursive strategies over a longer period of time. It includes major national and international developments that were important to Turkey's identity and geopolitical role, hence to the Turkish parliament. The 1987 parliamentary elections were the first relatively free elections in Turkey after the military coup of 1980, thereby giving the parliament more legitimacy and authority. The end of the Cold War meant that Turkey needed to redefine its geopolitical role within international politics; making the usage of the bridge metaphor particularly popular (Aykaç, 2021; Bilgin, 2007; Rumelili, 2008; Yanık, 2009). This metaphor was also criticized in this period, especially by AKP-elites.ⁱⁱ Research on the bridge metaphor's usage in parliament illustrated its transformation and decline after 2010 (Aykaç, 2021). It is, therefore, interesting to examine to what extent the bridge metaphor was also used towards Turkish communities outside of Turkey within this period.

In this period, there were other important domestic developments and shifts, such as the electoral growth of political parties that were religiously inspired, like the Welfare

ⁱ All parliamentary debates from the 18th Parliament up to the current 26th Parliament have been included in the analysis, which means that the first parliamentary debate dates back to 14 December 1987 and the last scrutinized one to 7 April 2016. The software program Nvivo 11 was used to organize, categorize, code, and analyze the transcripts. All texts are translated by the author himself, and as such all errors are his own. Transcripts can be accessed via the website of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM): <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/>.

ⁱⁱ The perception was that a bridge role was too passive and did not reflect Turkey's foreign policy-ambitions. See for example (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 350).

Party and later on the AKP, and the tension this triggered regarding civil-military relations (Eligür, 2010, p. 76–84). This could have been reflected on discursive strategies towards the Turkish nation; putting more emphasis on Islam. This was already visible in the period that Turgut Özal was in office, first as Prime-Minister (1983-1989), and later as President (1989-1993). Özal's tenure was known for neo-Ottomanist and Islamist discourse and policies, thereby focusing on Ottoman legacy and territories, and Islam. This tendency was partly in response to international developments that harmed the situation of Turkish and Muslim communities, such as the forced expulsion of Muslims from Bulgaria in 1989; the Aegean dispute and the critical situation of Turks in Western Thrace in the early 1990s; the Yugoslav Wars in the early 1990s, which led to ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims; the Gulf War in 1990-1991 affecting Iraqi Turkmen communities and the Kurdish issue; the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994) leading to the deportation of Azerbaijani Turks; and the impact of the dissolution of the USSR (Yavuz, 2020). Later in this timespan, other important developments and conflicts were the Kosovo War in 1998-1999 and the Iraq War in 2003-2011. Moreover, the situation of the Uyghurs in China kept deteriorating. In other words, this was an important period that contained many international developments and change, which had consequences for the Turkish communities and forced the Turkish parliament to respond. The analysis stops in 2016 due to the constitutional referendum of 2017 that reformed the Turkish political system which significantly decreased parliamentary power (Aykaç, 2021).

The article focuses on the parliament as an actor. It concentrated on the outcome of discourse and counter-discourse within parliament that contributed to Turkey's official discourse and policy. Deductive and inductive coding strategies are combined. The deductive strategy entails systematically searching the word "bridge" within each transcript as the main coding strategy. The analysis focuses on the word bridge in a metaphorical sense and does not include other usages, for example the actual construction of bridges in Turkey. The initial outcome illustrates that Turkish parliamentarians metaphorically framed Turkey as a bridge 631 times within the timeframe. The coding is, furthermore, narrowed by only focusing on the metaphor of a bridge in relation to Turkish communities and kin outside of Turkey, thereby focusing on the Turkish nation abroad. It then identified discursive strategies that focus on uniqueness, sameness or difference towards these communities. The following sub-codes based on (imagined) regions and geographies that are visible in parliamentary debates were created: the West, the East, the North, the South, Europe, the Caucasus, Asia, Central-Asian Republics, the Middle East, the Turkish Republics, the European Community/Union, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, Africa, East-Turkestan, and West-Asia. In addition, sub-codes are created on cultural, religious, historical and political values as democracy, Islam/Muslim population, secularism, liberal/market economy, modern, civilized, brothers, Turkishness

and Ottoman. An inductive strategy led to certain patterns in the data analysis. This entailed the attribution of the metaphor to Turkish speaking communities to make them function as a bridge between Turkey and the country where they live; bringing these, separated but connected, communities (closer) together. These coding and reading strategies give insight into how these Turkish communities were imagined, constructed, and forged by Turkish parliamentarians as part of the Turkish nation and Turkey's foreign policy ambitions.

The Imagined Turkish Communities

This section discusses how Turkish parliamentarians imagined and constructed Turkish communities and why the bridge metaphor is used towards them. It focuses, first, on Turkish communities that lived in former Ottoman territories, before moving on to a broader focus on the Turkish nation. It explains how parliamentarians used the Turkish language, religion, and history to approach these communities. Additionally, it provides a global and national context in which the metaphor towards these communities was used.

Imagined Communities in Former Ottoman Territories

Under the administration of this friend [the USSR] live our brothers who share our language and our faith. We cannot wait for them [the Turks abroad] to reach to us. We must reach out to them, and we must be prepared for this. We must prepare for this by building spiritual bridges. Language is a bridge, religion is a bridge, history is a bridge [...].¹

The above quote allegedly belonged to the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938). Turkish parliamentarians frequently referred to this quote to illustrate the importance of Turkish language, history, and religion in the constitution of the Turkish nation abroad and Turkey's responsibilities towards these imagined Turkish communities. These parliamentarians particularly focused on Turkish language to define Turkishness and kinship by applying a two-pronged approach. First, by directing attention to Turkish speaking communities that once lived under Ottoman rule and, second, by looking at communities living in regions that were never part of the Ottoman Empire but are seen as ethnically Turkish due to their language. The first category focuses on Turkish communities that were formed due to a radical and sudden reconfiguration of the political space along national lines (Brubaker, 2000, p. 1–2). The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire is a good example of such a reconfiguration, especially when focusing on the Turks of Western Thrace that live in Greece, and Turkish communities living in Bulgaria. The Ottoman Empire ruled for centuries over these regions and, hence, the Ottoman-Turkish influences are strongly visible in these regions. These regions are

perceived as their “homeland.” The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 confirmed this: the Turks of Western Thrace were left out of the agreed exchange between population of Turkey and Greece. However, Turkey as their kin-state continues to feel responsible for these communities and supports their rights; sometimes even by intervening directly on their behalf. These imagined communities could also ask their kin-state to intervene. However, kin-states usually intervene when their foreign policy interest overlap with that of its nation abroad (Papuçular, 2020, p. 125).

This was most tangible in the case of Turkish speaking communities in Western Thrace. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz stated in 1988 that Turks of Western Thrace were suffering from social, cultural and religious pressure by the Greek authorities. Yılmaz defined these communities as kin to Turkey.² He made a plea for the importance of these communities to Turkey and urged the Greek authorities to shift their political course on this matter. Yılmaz also recognized the potential bridge role that the Turks of Western Thrace could play between Greece and Turkey.³ In the late 80s and early 90s there was a strong interest in Turkish speaking communities in Greece and Bulgaria. This related to discourse and policies from the “host countries” towards the Turkish communities, but also to foreign policy developments. The early 90s, for example, marked an increase of tension within Turkish-Greek relations over territorial disputes in the Aegean; reflected in discursive strategies towards the Turks in Western Thrace. In 1989, Minister of Defense, İsmail Safa Giray, stated that “tensions within the Turkish-Greek relations have a negative effect on our kin groups living in Greece.”⁴ He framed these communities as Muslim Turks, hence, also adding religion as an identity marker to define them. Giray, furthermore, framed these communities as a bridge, thereby differentiating them from the nation-state they live in.⁵ Parliamentarian Onural Seref Bozkurt from Motherland Party (ANAP) equally framed these communities as a Muslim Turkish minority living in Greece and defined them as Turkey’s kin.⁶ Other parliamentarians also emphasized the pressure these Turkish minorities faced in Greece and the necessity to support their rights as their kin-state.⁷ The importance of Turkey’s Ottoman legacy in shaping its nation and foreign policy ambitions is well-illustrated by AKP-parliamentarian, İbrahim Köşdere. In 2006, he commemorated the anniversary of the Turkish conquest of Rumelia,ⁱⁱⁱ 654 years ago. He extensively elaborated on how the Turks moved from Central Asia to the Balkans, thereby reaching Europe.⁸ Moreover, he noted that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire had far reaching consequences for these regions, particularly for Turks living in Greece and the Balkans. Köşdere illustrated this in the following words:

With the Balkan Wars of 1912, the Ottoman Empire lost all of its Rume-
lian lands except for our present day borders. However, in Rumelia, Turks

ⁱⁱⁱ A historical region that was referring to Greece and the Balkans.

and their kin communities still carry on their culture and existence. These people are in a position to take on the role of establishing peace in the Balkans and functioning as a cultural bridge between the Balkans and the Republic of Turkey.⁹

Köşdere interpreted the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as dramatic and sudden. The newly formed nation-states and the radical political reconfiguration had extreme consequences for the Turkish communities and their kin-state, Turkey. According to Köşdere, the Balkans were once even more a Turkish homeland than Anatolia. He saw the Republic of Turkey as a historical, social and cultural legacy of the Ottoman Empire, hence, arguing that Turkey had certain responsibilities towards these Turkish communities.¹⁰ The bridge metaphor constituted the in-between and liminal identity of these Turkish communities as they (culturally) connect them with Turkey as their kin-state, while also situating them in the Balkan region. Turkish parliamentarians particularly emphasized the sense of belonging to the Turkish nation that existed within Turkish communities living in Greece. In 1995, Ahmet Nedim illustrated this by recalling a visit with Minister Yildirim Aktuna to these Turkish/Greek communities. He quoted a banner which they saw during the visit: “We are born as a Turk, we will die as a Turk; our educational rights cannot be restricted; we will never give up our soil, life and blood.”¹¹ Relying on the message of this banner, Nedim stressed that these communities are part of the Turkish nation, foremost, because of their language and religion.¹²

Turkish speaking communities in Bulgaria were similarly approached. The assimilation policies, pressure and violence faced by Turkish speaking communities in Bulgaria, reached its highest point in the late 80s. In May 1989 this resulted into the “Big Excursion” leading to the migration of Bulgarian Muslims to Turkey. In this period more than 300,000 Turkish speaking communities and/or Muslims were forced to move to Turkey. It became reflected in discursive strategies regarding Bulgaria and these communities. In 1989 ANAP-parliamentarian, Onural Seref Bozkurt, framed the events as a “forced deportation of our kinsmen.”¹³ SHP-parliamentarian, Günes Gürseler, also expressed her concerns and emphasized that Turkey is not pursuing expansionist or pan-Turkish ambitions. According to her, Turkey’s goal is to protect the rights of Turkish minorities living in other countries.¹⁴ In these contexts, the metaphor of a bridge is used to highlight the value of the Turkish speaking communities, namely their potential to create peace, friendship and dialogue between Turkey and the country where they live. When Bulgaria reversed its discourse and policies towards Bulgarian Turks, Turkish parliamentarians responded positively and supported the process of Bulgarian Turks moving back to Bulgaria. In 2010, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)-parliamentarian, Hüseyin Yıldız, remarked that Bulgarian Turks enjoyed more freedom of religion and language and that most of the Bulgarian Turks who returned from Turkey to Bulgaria. He believed that the

Bulgarian Turks played an important bridge role between the two countries and are contributing to friendship and trade within Turkey-Bulgaria relations.¹⁵

The focus on Turkish language and religion remained an important part of discursive strategies to identify the Turkish nation and express primarily sameness and ties between these imagined communities and Turkey. Turkish parliamentarians used these markers to approach these communities that once lived under Ottoman rule. A good example is how Turkish parliamentarians approached the Ahiska Turks that once lived in regions that are now part of present day Georgia. In 1944, during Soviet rule most of them were deported from Georgia to Central Asia. The Ahiska Turks speak the Turkish language and are mostly Muslim. Turkish parliamentarians saw them as part of the Turkish nation and, hence, actively argued for the possibility for them to return to their homelands in Georgia.¹⁶ In 1995, President Süleyman Demirel stated that “Ahiska Turks see Turkey as their motherland.”¹⁷ He believed that if they wanted to return to Turkey, the country should facilitate this.¹⁸ Parliamentarian, Celal Erbay, even argued that the Ahiska Turks functioned as a bridge between Georgia and the countries where they live, stating that if they were allowed to return to Georgia, they would be able to function as a bridge between Turkey and Georgia.¹⁹ Minister Erman Ahin defined all Muslims in Georgia as being part of the Turkish nation instead of only emphasizing the Turkish language. He stated in 1992 that “the local population [particularly in small villages] defines itself as Georgian Muslims and some will speak Turkish as well, especially those that are above the age of 45.”²⁰ Moreover, he noted that most of them had relatives living in Turkey, especially in the border region. Ahin, thus, argued that religion is very important to identify the imagined Turkish community in Georgia.²¹ There was a similar approach towards the Crimean Tatars. Turkish members of parliament saw them as their kin and framed Turkey as their kin-state.²² Some went further and named them “Crimean Turks” instead of Tatars.²³ According to them, they belonged to the same imagined communities based on shared historical, religious and cultural bonds. Along that line, Kosovar Turks were not regarded differently.²⁴

In other instances, religion seemed less important to define the Turkish nation. For example, with the Gagauz people in Moldavia. The Gagauz people are seen as ethnically Turkish and speak also the Turkish language, however, they are Christians. Turkish parliamentarians, therefore, focused on the Turkish language and Ottoman history to integrate the Gagauz people into the Turkish nation and identity. Former President, Süleyman Demirel stated that the “Gagauz people are a solid link in the chain of the Turkish world that is spread across Eurasia.”²⁵ According to him, the shared language and culture made them part of this Turkish world and framed them as “brothers” of Turkey.²⁶ Moreover, this allowed them to function as a bridge of friendship between Turkey and Moldavia. In 1996, parliamentarian, Ertugrul Yalçınbayir also emphasized the shared Turkish language between the Gagauz people and Turkey. He framed them as a bridge and urged

Turkey to use this bridge effectively in terms of aid and cooperation. Additionally, he saw Turkey as a regional power that played an important role in Moldavia, especially when it came to defending the rights of the Gagauz people. Yalcinbayir, therewith, characterized Turkey as the kin-state of the Gagauz people by referring to the Turkish language and Ottoman history and argued that Turkey has the responsibility to support and monitor their rights.²⁷

As mentioned earlier, global developments were reflected in the discursive strategies towards Turkish communities. This was particularly visible in the context of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. As a result of the invasion there was a growing interest and concern towards the Turkmen communities living in northern parts of Iraq, particularly in oil-rich areas as Kirkuk.²⁸ Turkish parliamentarians framed these communities as “brothers” and their kin based on language, religion and history. They argued that Turkey had the responsibility to safeguard the rights of these Turkmens. In 2015, AKP-parliamentarian Ramazan Can argued that “Turkey has always defended Iraq’s peace, stability and prosperity, and will continue to be the sole guarantor of the Turkmen presence in Iraq.”²⁹ Most of the parliamentarians were particularly concerned over the growing influences of the Kurdish population in Iraq and, later on, the threats they faced of Islamic State.³⁰ In these instances the metaphor of a bridge was used to strengthen the position of the Turkmens within Iraq, noticing their precarious position, while at the same time integrating them within the Turkish nation and formulating a geopolitical position.³¹

Imagined Turkish Communities in a Broader Context

This section illustrates how Turkish parliamentarians imagined the Turkish nation and its communities beyond former Ottoman regions. These parliamentarians focused on different kind of Turkish speaking communities, as the Uyghurs in China or Turkish speaking groups in Central Asia. It illustrates that the metaphor of a bridge is particularly used towards Turkish speaking communities that do not uphold a Turkish citizenship and are not approached in relation to a place of origin nor a hope for return.

In that regard, the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1988-1991) caught the attention of Turkish parliamentarians. Many Turkish parliamentarians traced the Turkish nation ethnically back to Central Asia.³² They referred to the Turkic migration which entailed the spread of Turkish people and language across Eurasia from the 6th to the 11th century. Based on these common bonds as language and history, Turkish parliamentarians perceived the Soviet Republics that had large Turkic populations as part of the Turkish nation, and, therefore, as their kin. To a certain degree, this was even recognized by the Soviet Union. In 1990, the Turkish Minister of Culture, Namik Kemal Zeybek emphasized this in parliament by quoting the Soviet Minister of Culture Gubenkov: “developing your [Turkey’s] cultural relations with Turkish-speaking republics within the Soviet Union will serve as a bridge that strengthens the relations between the Soviet Union and

Turkey.”³³ Later on, the newly independent Republics – Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan – were framed as “Turkish Republics” and “brothers”.³⁴ In 1995, Turkish President, Demirel addressed the shared heritage as follows:

Distinguished parliamentarians, when we combine Turkey’s advantages related to its historical and geographical resources within the current changing world order, the Eurasian continent is emerging. I focus on the Eurasian phenomenon deliberately. The shared history, language, religion and culture of 200 million people that are living in this belt, which stretches from the Adriatic to China, is becoming more evident day by day. This is a fact and there is nothing unacceptable about it. Our epics, songs, lullabies, customs, traditions, food, drinks, and the language are all the same. More unifying elements than these cannot be seen in any other partnerships.³⁵

President Demirel focused on history, language, religion and culture in the broadest sense to construct the Turkish nation. Within this Turkish nation, Turkey is situated at the top of the hierarchy, hence Turkey has certain responsibilities and privileges towards these communities and the countries where they live. Some parliamentarians expanded these responsibilities and privileges, and framed Turkey as a relative or homeland to these communities. As expressed by AKP-parliamentarian, Abdullah Çaliskan:

Our geographical location, historical past, and culture impose important responsibilities to us, which we cannot run away from. Due to its geographical location and historical background, Turkey is a country in which different ethnic and cultural communities live together and share the same dreams and ideals. In this geography, history has made us relatives to each other and made us a family. Turkey has become a home to Circassians, Chechens, Tatars, Azeris, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz’s, Turkistani’s [Uyghurs], Bosnians, Albanians brothers that left for different reasons from the Balkans, Caucasus, and Asia. It has also become one with them.³⁶

Çaliskan emphasized Turkey’s geographical location and historical background; transforming Turkey into a homeland for many of the Turkish speaking people; stressing how they had become family due to migration. He went even further and mapped the geographical locations Turkey had family bonds with. He specifically referred to the cities of Pristina, Prizren, Skopje, Gostivar, Tetovo, Sturmiyan, Kircaali, Komotini, Sarajevo, Crimea, Kabarda, Karachay, Grozny, Mohachkala, Batumi, Bukhara, Baku, Samarkand, Taskent, Urumqi, and Shymkent.³⁷ He perceived the Turkish communities over there as their kin, relatives, and brothers, who Turkey could not neglect. Moreover, Çaliskan

used the bridge metaphor to illustrate the in-betweenness of these communities and argued that they functioned as a bridge to connect the region they lived in geographically to Turkey.³⁸

Turkish parliamentarians showed a great interest towards the situation of the Uyghurs in China. The Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group living mainly in the region of Xinjiang in China. Therefore, Turkish parliamentarians perceived them as their kin and felt responsible to defend their rights in China. In 1996, ANAP-parliamentarian, Ahat Andican even stated that “East Turkestan is under Chinese occupation,”³⁹ hence, implying the Chinese rule as illegitimate. Turkish parliamentarians consistently used Xinjiang and East Turkestan together to refer to the region; strengthening the Turkish character of the region and Turkey’s right to be involved. Parliamentarian Mehmet Gül took it a step further and defined the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region as their “ancestral home.”⁴⁰ By that logic, Turkish parliamentarians transformed Uyghurs into the Turkish nation based on common ethnicity, history, culture, language and religion. For example, parliamentarian Sinan Ogan of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) stated in 2012: “We share a common ethnic origin, language, and religion with East Turkestan.”⁴¹ Additionally, Turkish parliamentarians emphasized the growing Uyghur communities in Turkey through migration; illustrating the kinship ties between the two while addressing Turkey’s increasing interest in the rights of the Uyghurs.⁴²

It is interesting to note that the metaphor of a bridge is barely used towards Turkish speaking communities in Western Europe. The only exception was the CHP-parliamentarian, Ali Rıza Gülçiçek as he used the bridge metaphor towards these communities in 2003. He believed that Turkish communities in Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Austria were functioning as a bridge between Turkey and the countries where they lived.⁴³ The answer to why parliamentarians refrained from using the metaphor of a bridge towards these communities, arguably, lay in Gülçiçek’s speech: framing these communities as “our citizens.”⁴⁴ The Turkish communities that migrated from Turkey were seen as Turkish citizens and most also have citizenship, hence, they were for obvious reasons already seen as part of the Turkish nation. As illustrated in the previous sections, the metaphor of a bridge was used to partially disintegrate communities from the nation-state where they lived, while at the same time attaching them to Turkey. This was particularly the case for Turkish speaking communities that did not have any direct ties with Turkey in terms of cross-border experiences and practices, but with which they did share some historical, cultural and religious ties. This was also visible in how parliamentarians approached the Crimean Karaites and Tatars that were living in Lithuania through their emphasis on the common language, Turkish.⁴⁵

An Imagined Bridge of Friendship and Peace

Metaphorically framing imagined Turkish communities as a bridge transformed these communities into a foreign policy tool. This section discusses in more detail what the bridge role assigned to these communities entailed and implicated on a level of foreign policy: revealing its potential, and also its limits. As demonstrated above, the most dominant bridge role conception Turkish parliamentarians assigned to the Turkish communities is that of a friendship and/or peace bridge. The emphasis on friendship and peace was particularly used when the rights of the imagined Turkish communities were under threat and when Turkey had difficult relations with the country where these communities lived. This meant that Turkey was not in a position to defend the rights of their kin through diplomatic relations while at the same time it did not want to interfere in an aggressive manner in the domestic affairs of other countries, since that could further harm the situation of these imagined communities. Parliamentary discourse towards Turkish communities and the countries where they lived, such as Greece, Bulgaria, China, and Iraq, illustrate different dimensions within the friendship and peace bridge.

The first dimension is reflected in the realization of Turkish parliamentarians that their bridge framing had reciprocal implications for foreign relations. For example, in 1990 regarding the situation of Turkish communities in Greece, Minister Mehmet Yazar stated that “if the situation in Western Thrace continues, it would seriously damage the Turkish-Greek relations.”⁴⁶ However, this also worked the other way around. Any difficult relations Turkey upheld with the countries in which Turkish communities lived had a negative reflection on the situation of these communities. In the case of Turkish communities in Greece, Minister of Defense, Ismail Safa Giray emphasized that: “it is a fact that tensions in Turkish-Greek relations have a negative impact on our kin and the lack of contact and dialogue between the two countries limit the possibilities to find solutions for the issues that our kin face, as was visible in the past.”⁴⁷ This is an important reason that these communities were framed as a friendship bridge. This bridge role created a context in which the situation of the Turkish communities abroad could be improved while strengthening Turkey’s relationship with the country where they lived.

Turkish parliamentarians, therefore, emphasized the potential or capacity these communities had to function as a bridge of friendship and peace between Turkey and the country where they lived. When relations with these countries was improved along with the situation of the Turkish communities, Turkish parliamentarians used the “friendship bridge” less and/or used other bridge conceptions instead, for example one of trade⁴⁸ or culture⁴⁹. This was particularly visible in the case of Greece and Bulgaria. In the latter, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Çetin remarked the successful bridge role of the Turkish community by stating: “As Turkey, we are very happy that the troubles the Turkish minority has faced is coming to an end and that they have started becoming a

strong bridge of friendship between the two countries.”⁵⁰ Çetin argued that Turkish communities succeeded in transforming themselves into a bridge that fostered friendship between Turkey and Bulgaria.

As mentioned earlier, Turkish parliamentarians used discursive strategies of sameness and uniqueness to constitute Turkish communities living abroad as part of the Turkish nation. The metaphor of a bridge was used to illustrate the in-betweenness of these communities, being part of both nations, providing a delicate instrument to be involved just as well as distanced. This could be perceived, nonetheless, as an interference in the domestic affairs of another country, which would have serious consequences for the Turkish communities living in this country. Additionally, it could also (further) harm the country’s relationship with Turkey, particularly when these relations were already strained. Turkish parliamentarians, therefore, struggled to protect the rights of their kin while at the same respect the sovereignty of the country where they lived.

This second dimension becomes most evident in light of political superpowers: the case of the Uyghurs living in China. MHP-parliamentarian, Sinan Ogan exemplified this with the following words: “Of course, we will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, but we will not remain silent when our East Turkestan brothers are imprisoned innocently and are oppressed.”⁵¹ Ogan recognized the sovereignty of China and Turkey’s wish not the interfere in internal affairs, but at the same time felt the responsibility to defend the rights of the Uyghurs: stretching the Turkish community beyond national boundaries and emphasizing brotherhood. In this case, the metaphor of a friendship bridge was introduced as a solution. The hope was that the Uyghurs could play such an important role in the Turkey-China relations that their rights would be automatically protected within this relationship. However, the continuous deterioration of the situation of the Uyghurs made it difficult to use the metaphor of a bridge. ANAP-parliamentarian, Mehmet Ekici stated in 2010 that “we have reached a point at which we see serious problems at the Chinese foot of the bridge.”⁵² In other words, Ekici argued that the Uyghurs could not become a bridge of friendship due to continuing Chinese oppression of the Uyghurs. He and many other argued for a more proactive approach.⁵³ Moreover, the growing Uyghur communities living in Turkey also impacted the discursive strategies towards China on this matter. As their kin they pressured Turkey to act on their behalf, thereby making the situation more complex and sensitive. Parliamentarian Ramazan Can addressed this issue:

“In addition to our historical and cultural ties with our Uyghur kinsmen, the fact that many citizens of Uyghur origin live in our country further increases the sensitivity of our public opinion, and therefore our government. On the other hand, we also need to take the impact of the Turkish-Chinese relations onto the well-being of our Uyghur kinsmen into

account, since deteriorating relations with China will have direct negative effects on the well-being of our Uyghur kinsmen.”⁵⁴

Although in these instances the metaphor of a bridge was challenged, Turkish parliamentarians kept framing the Uyghurs as a bridge of friendship, thereby reaffirming the authority of the metaphor in parliament. The main reason was that China was transforming or was already transformed into superpower, thus, making it difficult for Turkey to influence or criticize the country. Former Minister of Culture, Ertugrul Günay underlined this by stating:

“China is developing into one of the great states in the world with which we cooperate in various fields. We have no intentions about interfering in China’s internal affairs and we do not want to turn the Uyghur Turks into an issue between us, but we are trying to transform them into a bridge of peace, friendship, integration and brotherhood.”⁵⁵

The difficulty here was that it became impossible to transform the Uyghurs into a bridge of friendship and peace as oppressive Chinese policies towards them were increasing. In that sense, the metaphor of the bridge seems conditional and limited; anticipating some sort of gentle response or at least opening a dialogue. Additionally, it illustrated the failure of Turkey to influence the issue positively through its relationship with the Chinese government.

Similar to the other dimensions, the third dimension addresses stability and peace to Turkish communities. It diverges in its emphasis on security issues that these communities face together with Turkey. This was particularly visible regarding discourses towards Iraqi Turkmen and Iraq.⁵⁶ Turkey became more worried about their situation after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan region in Iraq. Turkey feared for an independent Kurdistan that could endanger the (cultural) rights of Iraqi Turkmen, living in that region, as well as have a spill-over effect on the Kurds living in Turkey. Thus, Turkish parliamentarians emphasized the importance to safeguard the unity of Iraq and the loyalty of the Turkmen to Iraq.⁵⁷ In this context, Turkey tried to develop relations with three relevant parties, namely the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the Federal Government of Iraq, and the Iraqi Turkmen. Parliamentarians aimed to transform the Turkmen communities into a friendship bridge between Iraq and Turkey; integrating the Kurds while bringing stability and peace in the region, therewith, providing the bridge metaphor with yet another dimension. In 2015, AKP-parliamentarian Sirin Ünal argued:

Turkey respects Iraq’s territorial integrity, political unity and sovereignty and cooperates with all parts of society in accordance with the Iraqi

constitution and International Law. Turkey follows the situation of the Turkmens closely, who are seen as the founding members of Iraq and function as a bridge of friendship between Turkey and Iraq.⁵⁸

Ünal illustrated the difficulty Turkey faced in aligning Turkey's geopolitical and strategic interest in the region with that of the Turkmen.

Conclusion

This article illustrates how Turkish parliamentarians construct their nation beyond Turkey's borders. Turkish parliamentarians continuously (re-)imagine, (re-)construct, and (re-)produce its nation by using different discursive strategies that included uniqueness, sameness, or difference. Parliamentarians use identity markers as ethnicity, language, Ottoman history, and religion to address these strategies. This allows imagined communities to either associate with or dissociate from the Turkish nation. Simultaneously, these discursive strategies differentiate the imagined communities from the country where they lived. In other words, these imagined communities challenge the notion of a nation-state as they are marked by liminality and in-betweenness. The metaphor of a bridge played a crucial role in this process as it frames these communities as part of both nations: bringing opportunities, as well as difficulties.

The metaphor of a bridge was particularly used towards Turkish communities living in former Ottoman territories. Turkey shares a common history, religion, language, or ethnicity with these communities, while these communities ended up in different nation-states and did not always have Turkish citizenship. Turkish parliamentarians were, therefore, interested in constituting, imagining and forging them as part of the Turkish nation. This became evident in cases where these communities were culturally, politically and economically under threat as with the Turks in Western Thrace or Turkish communities in Bulgaria. However, parliamentarians imagined the Turkish nation even more broadly and included Turkish communities that were not part of the Ottoman Empire, but with whom Turkey shared ethnic and cultural bonds such as the Uyghurs in China. Within the imagined Turkish nation, these parliamentarians frame Turkey as the highest in hierarchy, meaning that Turkey had the privilege and responsibility to defend the rights of these communities, which they saw as their kin and brothers.

Metaphorically framing imagined Turkish communities as a bridge transformed these communities into a foreign policy tool. Parliamentarians assigned a bridge role to these communities and the dominant bridge conception was the one that focused on friendship and peace. In other words, these imagined Turkish communities should function as a bridge between Turkey and the country where they live that fosters friendship and peace. By transforming Turkish communities into a bridge of friendship and peace, through different dimensions, they believed that they would have a positive and crucial

role for the country where they lived and for Turkey. This way, parliamentarians also justified discourse and policies towards these communities.

There are discursive shifts visible in the usage of the bridge metaphor by Turkish parliamentarians when the situation of the imagined Turkish communities improves and/or Turkey upheld good relations with the countries where they lived. In these instances, parliamentarians framed these communities as a cultural bridge that focused on cultural exchange and trade between the two nations to which they belong. This illustrated the interplay between foreign policy developments and discourse. When the country where these communities live ignored the bridge role conceptions and Turkish discourse, this was also reflected in parliamentary discourse. Or, when confronted with a political superpower, such as China, and the friendship bridge appeared to reach certain limits.

It is, therefore, important to conduct more research on how other countries perceived Turkish discourse that transformed their citizens into imagined Turkish communities and the Turkish nation. Even though parliamentarians emphasized that they did not want to intervene into domestic affairs of other countries, the perception of these countries was possibly different. This article gives insight into how Turkish parliamentarians constructed the Turkish nation discursively and how it created a context that allowed to formulate foreign policy. Further research is needed to explore how Turkey used different foreign policy-tools towards its nation abroad and how this is reflected in actual practice and policy. Additionally, more research is needed to discuss how the so-called community members perceived discursive strategies of Turkish parliamentarians towards themselves and how they are framed as part of the Turkish nation and the possible role they should play.

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AB Göç Yönetimi ve Dışsallaştırma: Türkiye-AB İşbirliği Örneği

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Özet

Avrupa Birliği ülkeleri son yüzyılın en önemli göç destinasyonlarından birini oluşturmaktadır. Göçe dair meseleler eskiden devletlerin kendi egemenlik alanında iken AB projesinin gelişimi ile bu alanlarda Birliğin ulus-üstü organlarının yetkileri artmıştır. Yani AB göç politikalarında uzun bir süre hükümetler arası bir yaklaşım tercih edilirken zamanla kısmi bir ortak politikanın gelişiminden de söz edilmektedir. Güvenlik perspektifinden göç politikalarını oluşturan AB, özellikle son otuz yıldır göçü “dışsallaştırarak” yönetmeyi tercih etmektedir. Suriye İç Savaşı’nın neden olduğu göç krizinin bir sonucu olarak Türkiye ile iş birliği yapmak AB’nin göç politikalarının dışsallaştırılmasında önemli bir yere sahip olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, 2015 yılındaki göç krizi sırasında Avrupa’ya göç akışını önlemek için iki tarafın üzerinde anlaşmaya vardığı 18 Mart 2016 tarihli AB-Türkiye Göç Mutabakatı bir başarı olarak sunulmuştur. Ancak bu açıklamanın yasal niteliği ve çeşitli yönleri birçok tartışmaya yol açmıştır. Gayri resmi yöntemler kullanılarak gerçekleştirilen bu iş birliği AB göç politikalarının dışsallaştırılması açısından önemli bir örnek niteliğindedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Avrupa Birliği, Göç Politikası, AB-Türkiye 18 Mart Mutabakatı, Dışsallaştırma, Göç Krizi

EU Migration Management and Externalization: The Case of Turkey-EU Cooperation

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Abstract

European Union countries have become one of the main migratory destinations in the last century. Issues related to migration were within the scope of the States, but with the development of the European project, the powers of supranational institutions in the Union in these areas have increased. An intergovernmental approach has long been favored in EU migration policies and a partial common policy has developed over time. The EU has built its migration policies from a security perspective and has preferred to manage migration with externalization, especially for the past thirty years. Due to the migration crisis caused by the Syrian civil war, cooperation with Turkey has been an important part of the externalization of EU migration policies. In the EU-Turkey statement on migration on March 18, 2016, both parties agreed to prevent migration flow to Europe from the migration crisis in 2015, and it was presented as a success. However, the legal nature and various aspects of this statement have generated much debate. This cooperation took place through informal methods and is an important example in terms of the externalization of EU migration policies.

Keywords

European Union,
Migration Policy,
EU-Turkey Statement
of 18 March 2016,
Externalization,
Migration Crisis

Giriş

Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği (UNHCR) verilerine göre 2015 yılında bir milyondan fazla göçmenin büyük bir kısmı Akdeniz yoluyla olmak üzere Avrupa'ya ulaştı (UNHCR, 2015). Avrupa Birliği'nin göçü yönetme araçları ve mevzuatını yetersiz bırakan bu büyük göç dalgası, Birliğin göç politikasının iki bileşeni olduğunu iddia ettiği ahlaki ilkelerinin ve pratik çıkarlarının ciddi bir biçimde çatışmasına sebep oldu. Max Weber (Weber, 1963) tarafından savunulan formülü kullanmak gerekirse AB, göçe mahkûm edilmiş insanları korumaya yönelik uluslararası taahhütleri, insani duruşunu koruma iddiası ve etik görevi ile üye devletlerin nüfuslarına vaat ettikleri yaşam tarzlarının gelecekteki istikrarına ilişkin sorumluluk arasında kalmıştır.

AB bu dönemde krizi yönetmek için üç tür önlem almıştır: denizde hayatları kurtarmak, gelenleri üye devletler arasında dağıtmak ve göçmen akışını sınırlamak (Van Middelaar, 2018). İlk olarak AB, dış sınırlarını güvence altına almak, insan kaçakçılarıyla mücadele etmek ve tehlike altındaki göçmenlerin hayatını kurtarmak amacıyla Akdeniz'de üç operasyon yürüttü: Orta Akdeniz'i kapsayan Themis Operasyonu, Doğu Akdeniz için Poseidon Operasyonu ve Batı Akdeniz'i kapsayan Indalo Operasyonu (European Council, 2023). İkinci olarak AB, üye devletler arasındaki dayanışmaya dayalı bir mülteci dağıtım politikası oluşturmaya çalışmış ancak Polonya, Macaristan veya Çek Cumhuriyeti gibi ülkelerin karşı çıkması nedeniyle başarılı olamamış ve "kota politikası" olarak adlandırılan bu politika benzeri görülmemiş bir siyasi krize sebep olmuştur. Üçüncü olarak AB, göçmenlerin kendi topraklarına girişini sınırlamak için bir geçiş ülkesi olan Türkiye ile bu konudaki iş birliğini güçlendirmek için 18 Mart 2016 tarihinde bir mutabakat imzalamıştır.

Eşi benzeri görülmemiş bir düzensiz göç akınının neden olduğu bu durum kimileri tarafından "mülteci krizi", kimileri tarafından "mülteci kabul krizi" olarak adlandırılmaktadır (Wihtol de Wenden, 2017). AB'nin o dönem bu krize dayanışma içinde güçlü bir cevap vermesini zorlaştıran üç temel unsur vardır. Birincisi, göçmenlerin çoğunlukla sığınma talep ettikleri ülkelerin 28 AB üyesi devlet içinde sadece Almanya, Fransa ve Birleşik Krallık olmasıdır. Bu yüzden diğer ülkeler için bu kriz, bahsi geçen ülkelerin sorunuydu. İkincisi; çatışmaların, tarihin, diplomasi vizyonlarının, ulusal çıkarların üye ülkeler tarafından çok farklı yorumlanmasının sonucu olarak farklı göç politikası geleneklerinin olması ve bu durumun AB iltica sistemini uyumlaştırmayı imkânsız kılmasıdır. Üçüncü zorluk ise özellikle kriz anında popülizm ve seçim kaygılarının artmasıyla birlikte üye devletlerin iç siyasi gündeminden kaynaklı problemlerdir (Wihtol de Wenden, 2017).

Göç meselesi, Avrupa siyasi gündeminin merkezi bir unsurudur ve aynı zamanda Avrupa Birliği'nin dış ilişkilerinde giderek artan bir etkiye sahiptir. Bu bağlamda, bu makalenin amacı, AB göç politikalarının gelişimini kavramak ve AB'nin göç yönetimini dışsallaştırmasını Türkiye ile olan iş birliği üzerinden analiz etmektir. Çalışmada, AB içindeki

göç politikalarıyla ilgili bilimsel literatür, resmî belgeler ve ilgili uluslararası anlaşmalar, basın kaynakları vb. kaynaklardan yararlanılmıştır. Bu çalışma kapsamında göç politikalarını etkileyen hükümetlerarası yöntem ve topluluk politikalarının oluşum süreçleri incelenecek ve 18 Mart 2016 tarihli AB-Türkiye Mutabakatı çerçevesinde AB'nin, göç krizine dair sorumluluklarını Türkiye'ye havale ederken AB adaylık sürecini nasıl enstrümantalize ettiği ele alınacaktır.

Hükümetler Arası Yöntem ve Göreli Ortak Politika

Roma Antlaşması çerçevesinde 1960'lı yıllarda Avrupa Topluluğu'nda ortak politikaların gelişimi önemli ölçüde artsa da göç konusu kişiyi, sermayeyi serbest dolaştırma, yerleşme ve çalışma özgürlüğünü sağlama gibi hedeflerle daha çok dolaylı şekilde ortaya konulmuştur. Bu dönemde Almanya, Avusturya, Belçika, Fransa gibi Avrupa ülkelerinin Türkiye, Yugoslavya ve Kuzey Afrika ülkeleri ile yaptığı işgücü anlaşmaları sayesinde ekonomik bir göç rejimi uygulamaya konulmuştur (Balleix, 2013). 1970'li yıllardan itibaren bir yandan ekonomik krizlerin etkisiyle yaşanan durgunluk dönemlerinin yol açtığı yüksek işsizlik oranları diğer yandan da gelişme sürecindeki üretim teknolojilerinin sonucu olarak işçi niteliklerinin evrilmesiyle birlikte dışarıdan göçmen işçi kabulü uygulamasında kısıtlamalar başlamıştır. Öte yandan bu dönemde aile birleşmesi ya da siyasi sığınma talepleri gibi gelişmelerin sürmesi de Avrupa'ya olan göçün bir anda kolayca durdurulabilecek bir olgu olmadığını göstermiştir. Bu dönemler, sosyal güvenlik şemsiyesi altına giren göçmenlere sağlanan güvence ile ekonomik amaca ne kadar hizmet ettiklerinin de kıyaslanmaya başlandığı yıllar olmuştur.

Avrupa Topluluğu'nun göç konusundaki yıllar süren eylemsizliğinin ardından Avrupa ülkeleri, ilk olarak göçmen akışını düzenlemek için hükümetler arası iş birliğini geliştirmişlerdir (Balleix, 2013). Topluluk çerçevesi dışında doğmasına rağmen, hükümetler arası iş birliğinin ilk sonucu 1985 yılında 5 Avrupa Topluluğu Üye Devleti (Belçika, Fransa, Almanya, Lüksemburg ve Hollanda) tarafından imzalanan Schengen Anlaşması'dır. Bu Anlaşma, dış sınırları ortaklaştırarak imzacı devletlerin iç sınırlarındaki kontrolleri kademeli olarak kaldırmasını amaçlıyordu (De Biolley, 2006). Bu devletlerin göç konusundaki resmi iş birliği, kişilerin serbest dolaşımına dayanmaktadır. 1990 yılında Schengen Anlaşmalarının Uygulanmasına dair Sözleşme yine bu devletler tarafından imzalanmıştır. Schengen Bölgesi İtalya, İspanya, Portekiz ve son olarak diğer üye devletlerin katılımı sayesinde genişlemiş ve 1997 yılına gelindiğinde Avrupa Birliği'nin 15 üye devletinden 13'ü Schengen Bölgesi'nde yer almıştır. Schengen Anlaşması'nı dış göçün daha sıkı şekilde kontrol edilmesi yolunda en önemli kilometre taşlarından birisi yapan; içeride geçiş serbestliğini uygularken güçlü denetimle dış sınırları göçe karşı yüksek güvenlikli hale getirme hedefidir. Göç ve güvenlik arasındaki ilişkinin siyasi olarak somutlaştırılması, Schengen Anlaşması aracılığıyla Avrupa'da resmîyet kazanmıştır (Brochman, 1999). Bu yönüyle AB'nin göç politikalarını Schengen Anlaşması'nı dikkate almadan okumak olanaklı değildir.

1986'da "ortak pazardan iç pazara" geçişi temsil eden Avrupa Tek Senedi'nin imzalanması, Topluluk içinde kişilerin serbest dolaşıma yönelik önemli bir adımı sembolize ederken aynı zamanda göç hareketleriyle ilgili hükümetler arası iş birliğinin yoğunlaşmasını sağlamıştır. Kişilerin serbest dolaşımı fikri, yeni ihtiyaçlarla beraber yeni sonuçlar da yaratmış ve iç sınır kontrollerini kaldırma veya azaltma ihtiyacı doğurmuştur. İç sınırlarda denetimlerin kaldırılmasıyla ortaya çıkabilecek güvenlik sorunu, dış sınırlarda denetimlerin güçlendirilmesini, bu alanda yeni düzenlemelerin yapılmasını ve bu konuyla bağlantılı iltica ve göç politikalarının yeniden tanımlanmasını gerektirdiğinden üye devletlerin birlikte hareket etmesini de bir zorunluluk haline getirmiştir. Bu nedenle, söz konusu ülkelerin İçişleri ve/veya Adalet Bakanlarının yanı sıra her devletin üst düzey yetkilileri ve uzmanlarından oluşan Trévi IV (veya Trévi 1992) adlı bir çalışma grubu, özellikle sınır kontrollerinin kaldırılmasının güvenlik konusuyla ilgili olası sonuçları ve ihtiyaçları üzerinde çalışmak üzere kuruldu. Ayrıca ortak bir vize politikası geliştirmek, dış sınırlarda kontrolleri güçlendirmek ve belge sahtekarlığına karşı mücadele etmek için 1986 yılında geçici bir göçmenlik grubu kuruldu. Hükümetler arası iş birliğine dayanan bu çalışma grupları üzerinde Avrupa Komisyonu'nun gözlemci statüsü olsa da Avrupa Parlamentosu ve Adalet Divanı tamamen dışarıda tutulmuştur (Balleix, 2013). Bu çalışma grupları teknokrat karakterlerinden dolayı eleştirilmiştir. Avrupa Tek Senedi'nin imzalanmasını, Schengen'in güvenlik risklerini artıracığı endişelerinin açığa çıkması olarak görmek de mümkündür. Ayrıca iltica ve göç politikalarında bölgesel bir modeli konuşmanın gerekliliği ile ilgili bir çağrı niteliğindedir. Nitekim, göçü daha kontrol edilebilir hale getirmek için ortaya çıkan model 1997 yılında yürürlüğe giren Dublin Sözleşmesi'nde ortaya konmuştur. Dublin Sözleşmesi, 1993'ten beri uygulanan Schengen Sözleşmesi'nin ilticaya ilişkin hükümlerinin yerini almıştır (Gacon, 2001). Dublin Sözleşmesi ile bir sığınmacının farklı üye devletlerde birkaç sığınma başvurusu yapmasının önüne geçmek ve inceleme sürecinden hangi devletin sorumlu olacağını belirlemek amaçlanmıştır. Buna göre, göçmenlerin iltica talepleri tek bir devlet tarafından yürütülecek böylece farklı kararların önüne geçilebilmesi ve süreçlerin hızlanması, döngüsel göçün de frenlenmesi sağlanacaktır. Bununla birlikte, Dublin Sözleşmesi'nin karışık sonuçları nedeniyle Amsterdam Antlaşması, bir üçüncü ülke vatandaşından yapılan sığınma başvurusunu işleme koymaktan sorumlu devleti belirlemek için kriterler ve mekanizmalar getirmiştir (Lamort, 2016).

1990'lardaki başlangıcından bu yana Avrupa göç ve iltica politikalarının entegrasyonu iki farklı mantığı birleştirmiştir: hükümetler arası bir yöntem ve topluluklaştırma (Lavenex, 2006). 1993 yılında yürürlüğe giren Maastricht Antlaşması, üç sütunla tanımlanan bir kurumsal mimari oluşturmuştur. Birinci sütun Avrupa Topluluğu'nun temellerini oluşturur, ikinci sütun Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasını tanımlar, üçüncü sütun Adalet ve İçişleri'ni içerir. Bu yapıda, vizeye dair temel prensipler (örneğin; ülkelerin kara listesi, standart vize modeli, akın durumunda vize zorunluluğunun geçici olarak yeniden tesis edilmesi) birinci sütunda yer alırken iltica, sınır kontrolü ve düzensiz göçle mücadele gibi

konular üçüncü sütunda yer almaktadır. Birinci sütundaki konular “ortak çıkar meseleleri” olarak kabul edilir ve topluluk organları tarafından yürütülür ancak üçüncü sütun hükümetler arası iş birliğinin konusu olduğundan ve genellikle Komisyonun asgari katılımıyla üye devletler arasındaki fikir birliği ilkesine göre yönetildiğinden Topluluk yetki alanında değil hükümetler arası alanda kalmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Maastricht Antlaşması uyarınca Avrupa Birliği’nin demokratik meşruiyetini garanti eden kurum olarak Avrupa Parlamentosu’nun iltica ve göçe ilişkin karar alma süreçleriyle çok sınırlı bir ilişkisi vardı (Balleix, 2013). Yetkileri düzenli bilgilendirilme, istişare, tavsiyelerde bulunma ve konuyla ilgili yıllık bir tartışma düzenlemek ile sınırlıydı. Bu nedenle, Avrupa Toplulukları Adalet Divanı’nın konuyla ilgili yasal kontrolü, Sözleşmenin bunu öngören hükümlerinin yorumlanması sınırları dahilinde zayıf kalmıştır.

Maastricht Antlaşması’nda göçün ele alınış şekline yönelik deneyimler ve eleştiriler nedeniyle göç konusu, hükümetler arası üçüncü sütundan ulus-üstü olan birinci sütuna taşınmış, AB organlarına göç konularında yetki verilmiştir. 1999 yılında yürürlüğe giren Amsterdam Antlaşması, Maastricht Antlaşması’nın karar alma süreçlerine değişiklikler getirerek göç politikası açısından Avrupa Birliği tarihinde ilk kez bazı kararların alınmasını sağlamıştır. Her şeyden önce göç meselesi Avrupa Birliği Komisyonu, Parlamento ve Adalet Divanı gibi kurumların yetkili olduğu Topluluk alanına yerleştirilmiştir (Julien-Laferriere, 2008). Bu Anlaşmanın yürürlüğe girmesinden bu yana göç politikasında özellikle uzun bir süre boyunca yalnızca basit istişare yetkisine sahip olan Parlatentonun yetkilerinin de artmasıyla kademeli bir Avrupalılaşıma yani ortaklaşma gerçekleşmiştir (Guiraudon, 2010). Özetle, Amsterdam Antlaşması vize, iltica, göçmenlik ve kişilerin serbest dolaşımına ilişkin diğer politikalar gibi hususları üçüncü sütundan birinci sütuna aktarmakta dolayısıyla bu konular artık Topluluk yetki alanına dahil edilmektedir. Diğer yandan Anlaşma, AB Bakanlar Konseyi tarafından kabul edilen önlemlerin, bir üye devletin ilgili alanlarda bu Antlaşma ve uluslararası anlaşmalarla uyumlu ulusal hükümleri sürdürmesini veya uygulamaya koymasını engellemediğini de belirterek üye devletlere hareket alanı bırakmıştır (Balleix, 2013). Kısmi yahut görelî topluluklaşma olarak adlandırılacak bu gelişmeler, özgürlük, güvenlik ve adalet alanının aşamalı olarak kurulmasına dayanmaktadır.

1999 yılında gerçekleşen Tampere Zirvesi, AB’nin göç politikalarında önemli bir dönemeç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Dış göçün temel nedenlerine inme iradesinin ortaya konduğu zirvede göçün kaynak ülkelerdeki koşullar dikkate alınmadan yönetilmesinin mümkün olamayacağıyla ilgili bir itiraf da söz konusudur. 2003 yılındaki Lahey Zirvesi’nde Tampere Zirvesi kararlarına bağlılık vurgusu yapılmış olmakla birlikte, düzensiz göçle mücadelenin ön planda tutulduğu ifadeler kullanılmıştır. Bu çerçevede, kısmen yerleştirme programlarına değinilmekle birlikte düzensiz göçmenlerin geri gönderilmesi, sınır güvenliğinin güçlendirilmesi ve Frontex’e fon sağlanmasıyla ilgili vurgular, göçün sınırlar dışında yönetilmesiyle ilgili anlayışı öne çıkarmaktadır. Lahey Zirvesi’nin

kararlarını, 2004 yılındaki Lahey Programı'nın, 'göçün bütün aşamalarına ilişkin kapsamlı bir yaklaşım oluşturulsun' çağrısı tamamlamıştır. 2005-2009 yıllarını kapsayan bu program, göç akışlarının etkin yönetimi, ortak bir iltica prosedürü, yasal göç planı vb. konularda belirli düzenlemeler getirmeyi öngörüyordu. Program kapsamında göç akışını sınırlamak için komşuluk politikası, iş birliği ve kalkınma yardımı gibi bazı araçların devreye sokulması planlanmıştır. Ayrıca, iç sınır kontrollerinin sağlamaştırılmasına ve göç yönetiminde "dış boyutun" güçlendirilmesine vurgu yapılmıştır.

Gelinen bu süreçte, 2008 yılında Fransa'nın dönem başkanlığında oluşturulan AB İltica ve Göç Paktı'nda göç politikalarına yönelik önemli başlıklara yeniden vurgu yapılmıştır. Buna göre üye devletler kendi kapasitelerine uygun düzenli göçmen kabul programları uygulayacaklar, düzensiz göçle etkin mücadele edecekler, düzensiz göçmenleri kaynak ya da transit ülkelere gönderecekler, etkili sınır kontrolü sağlayacaklar ve tek bir sığınma/iltica ağı prosedürü uygulayacaklardır. Nitekim 2009 yılında yürürlüğe giren Lizbon Anlaşmasının 79. maddesi de özgürlük, güvenlik ve adalet alanında oy birliği usulünden vazgeçilerek nitelikli çoğunluk usulüne geçilmesi ayrıca düzensiz göçle mücadelede sınır dışı ve geri göndermenin etkin uygulanmasını vurgulamaktadır (**AB Başkanlığı**). Bu anlaşma, ortak politikalar geliştirmek amacıyla vize, iltica ve göçmenlik konularını Avrupa Birliği'nin yetki alanına taşımaktadır. Dolayısıyla Lizbon Antlaşması'nın yürürlüğe girmesiyle bahsi geçen konularda Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun demokratik denetimi ve Avrupa Birliği Adalet Divanı'nın hukuki denetimi güçlenmektedir. Ayrıca düzensiz göç akınlarını yönetebilmek için üçüncü ülkelerle ortaklık ve iş birliği de Lizbon Anlaşması çerçevesinde öngörülmektedir (**Imbert, 2017**).

AB'nin Göç Politikasını Dışsallaştırması: Türkiye Örneği

Göçün kültürel bir tehditten ziyade fiziksel bir tehdit (**Lahav & Messina, 2005**) olarak görüldüğü 2000'li yıllarda göçe dair politikalar da güvenlikçi bir yaklaşımla oluşturulmaktadır (**Bigo, 1998**). Politik söylemde sıklıkla kullanılan göçmen istilası imajının, politik aktörler tarafından sistematik olarak benimsenmeye devam etmesi sebebiyle canlılığını yitirmediğini söylemek mümkündür. Üstelik göç ve güvenlik arasındaki bu bağın temelleri, gerçeklerden çok hayal dünyasına dayansa da göç politikalarının tanımlanmasında somut sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Bu güvenlikçi yaklaşımla oluşturulan politikalar arasında dışsallaştırma (*externalisation*) Avrupa Birliği örneğinde öne çıkmaktadır. Yirmi yılı aşkın bir süredir Avrupa Birliği ve üye devletleri, Avrupa sınırlarını dışsallaştırmak ve göç akışlarını daha iyi yönetmek için üçüncü ülkelerle yakın iş birliği kurmuştur (**Cournil, 2012**). Ekonomi kökenli olan "dışsallaştırma" terimi, 2003 yılından bu yana STK'lar, medya ve bazı akademisyenler tarafından Avrupa Birliği'nin sığınmacıların kabulü ve barınması veya başvurularının işlenmesi konusundaki sorumluluğunun bir kısmını, genellikle göçmenlerin menşe ülkeleri veya geçiş ülkeleri olan üçüncü ülkelere devretmek için yürüttüğü politikaları adlandırmak için sıklıkla kullanılmaktadır (**Rodier, 2008**). Dışsallaştırma

terimi genellikle bu politikaların muhalifleri tarafından kullanılmakta ve Avrupa Birliği'nin resmi terminolojisinde "iltica ve göçün dış boyutu" olarak tanımlanmaktadır.

1990'ların başında vize sistemi, sınırları yasa dışı yollardan geçenler için cezalar getirirken aynı zamanda geri kabul anlaşmaları ve tampon bölgelerin kullanımını da artırmıştır (Wihtol de Wenden, 2005). Avrupa Birliği'nde göçü dışsallaştırma politikasının, 1997'de imzalanan Amsterdam Antlaşması'nda özgürlük, güvenlik ve adalet alanının ilan edilmesiyle başladığını ardından 1999'daki Tampere Zirvesi ve 2004 yılındaki Lahey Programı'yla devam ettiğini söylemek mümkündür. Tampere Zirvesi'nde Avrupalı liderler, 2000-2004 döneminde Avrupa Birliği içinde iltica ve göç konularına ilişkin ortak bir eylem planı oluşturmaya karar vermişlerdir. Bu zirvede AB topraklarına yönelen göç meselesi, göçmenlerin geçiş ve menşe ülkelerindeki siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal koşullar dikkate alınarak kapsamlı bir şekilde ele alınmış ve üye devletlerin ortak hareket etmesi gerektiğinin altı çizilmiştir (Gacon, 2001). Örneğin bu çerçevede 2003 yılında İngiltere Başbakanı Tony Blair, ekonomik yardım karşılığında menşe ve geçiş ülkelerinde koruyucu tampon bölgeler oluşturmayı teklif etmiştir (Wihtol de Wenden, 2005). Tampere Avrupa Zirvesi'nin sonuçları Avrupa Birliği Bakanlar Konseyi'nin ilgili üçüncü ülkelerle geri kabul anlaşmaları imzalamasına yönelik bir davet de içermektedir (European Council, 1999).

Rodier, göç politikasının dışsallaştırılmasının araçlarını üç başlıkla özetlemektedir: koruma, komşuluk ve ortak kalkınma (Rodier, 2008). Burada "koruma", göçmenlerin Avrupa Birliği'nin koruması altında olacağı Avrupa toprakları dışındaki alanların inşasını sembolize etmektedir. "Komşuluk", düzensiz göçle mücadelede iş birliği içinde çalışmak ve Birliğin sınırlarının etkin yönetimi için Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası çerçevesinde transit ülkeler ve göçmenlerin menşe ülkeleri ile iyi ilişkiler kurulmasını sembolize etmektedir. Son olarak, "ortak kalkınma", AB'nin kalkınma yardımları sayesinde bu ülkelerden gelen göçü sınırlamak için henüz Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası çerçevesi içinde olmayan ülkeleri hedeflemektedir (Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2009).

Göç politikasının dışsallaştırılmasının en önemli araçlarından biri de Avrupa Birliği tarafından sıklıkla kullanılan Geri Kabul Anlaşmalarıdır (Wihtol de Wenden, 2005). Bu anlaşmalar, düzensiz bir durumda Avrupa'ya ulaşan yabancıların menşe ülkelerine veya geçiş yaptıkları transit ülkeye geri gönderilmeleri için devletlerin izlemesi gereken prosedürleri belirleyen anlaşmalardır (Morice & Claire, 2013). Bu enstrüman, Avrupa Birliği'nin yasa dışı göçle mücadele stratejisinin bir parçasıdır. Bu bağlamda ilk geri kabul anlaşmaları Barselona süreci çerçevesinde tartışılmış ve üye devletler "mülteci" kavramı üzerinde anlaşmışlardır (Morice & Claire, 2013). Avrupa Birliği için bir güvenlik bandı olarak da kabul edilen güvenli üçüncü ülkeler, geri kabul anlaşmasının yanı sıra uluslararası metinlerin de sorumluluğunu üstlenmektedir ve hukuken bu metinlerle bağlıdır. Standart bir geri kabul anlaşmasını imzalarken sözleşme tarafları 1951 tarihli Cenevre

Sözleşmesi, 1967 New York Protokolü, 1966 Uluslararası Medeni ve Siyasi Haklar Sözleşmesi, 1984 tarihli İşkenceye ve Diğer Zalimane, İnsanlık Dışı veya Aşağılayıcı Muamele veya Cezaya Karşı Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi ve son olarak Avrupa Birliği Temel Haklar Şartı gibi uluslararası kabul görmüş metinlere uygun prosedürler öngörmelidirler (Cassarino, 2010). Tüm bu uluslararası metinler, devletleri düzensiz göçmenleri güvenliklerinin ve yaşam haklarının tehdit altında olacağı ülke ve bölgelere geri göndermekten menetmektedir (geri gönderme yasağı ilkesi).

AB geri kabul anlaşmaları çerçevesinde, iltica başvurusu reddedilen ve Avrupa Birliği'nden geri gönderilen kişilerin kendileri için tehlike arz eden ülke ve bölgelere sınır dışı edilmeden güvenli üçüncü ülkelerde uluslararası korumanın diğer tamamlayıcı enstrümanlarından yararlanabilmeleri gerekmektedir. Geri kabul anlaşmalarını üçüncü ülkeler için cazip hale getirmek amacıyla özel ticaret imtiyazları, bölgesel ticaret bloğuna katılım, teknik iş birliği, artırılmış kalkınma yardımı ve Avrupa Birliği'ne giriş için vize kolaylığı gibi teşvikler sunulabilmektedir (Cassarino, 2007).

Avrupa Birliği'nin göç politikalarının dışsallaştırılması çerçevesinde Türkiye önemli bir yerde bulunmaktadır. Öncelikle, Türkiye uzun zamandır Avrupa'ya göçün köken ülkelerinden birisidir. Bununla beraber Asya, Orta Doğu ve hatta Afrika'dan Avrupa'ya ulaşmak isteyen göçmenler için de bir geçiş ülkesidir. Bu sebeple, Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye 2002 yılı Kasım ayında bir geri kabul anlaşmasının müzakerelerine başlamış ve uzun bir müzakere sürecinin ardından¹, taraflar 16 Aralık 2013'te anlaşmaya varmıştır. Buna paralel olarak Türk vatandaşları için kısa süreli vize serbestisine dair bir diyalog başlatılmıştır (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2013). AB-Türkiye Geri Kabul Anlaşması aşamalı olarak yürürlüğe girmek üzere imzalanmış, Türk vatandaşları için yürürlüğe girme tarihi 1 Ekim 2014 iken üçüncü ülke vatandaşları için bu tarih 1 Ekim 2017 olarak belirlenmiştir (Giannopoulos, 2019). Ancak Suriye'de yaşanan iç savaşın bir sonucu olan 2015 yılındaki sığınmacı krizi ile Türkiye'yi Ege Denizi üzerinden Yunanistan'a bağlayan Doğu Akdeniz yolunun düzensiz göçmenler tarafından en çok kullanılan güzergâh olması, göçmen ölümlerinin artması ve öngörülemez bir göç hareketliliğinin ortaya çıkması Anlaşmayı üçüncü ülke vatandaşları bakımından daha erken bir tarihte uygulama konusunda AB'yi harekete geçirmiştir.

AB'nin üye olmayan ülkeler ile göç konusundaki iş birlikleri, bazen resmî açıklamalar gibi esnek hukuk (*soft law*) enstrümanlarını kullanarak yapılmaktadır (Basilien-Gainche, 2020). Esnek hukuk, kriz anlarında ve acil durumlarda, doğrudan uygulamaya geçebilmek adına alınan önlemlerle parlamentoların ve yüksek mahkemelerin denetimi ile zaman kaybetmeden politika yapımcıların hızlı hareket etmesine imkân sağlamaktadır (Slominski

¹ AB'nin diğer ülkelerle yaptığı geri kabul anlaşmalarının ortalama müzakere süresi 3-4 yıl iken Türkiye ile yapılan anlaşmanın müzakereleri 12 yıl sürmüştür.

& Trauner, 2021). Bu bağlayıcı olmayan hukuk araçları devletlere eylemlerinde basitlik ve esneklik imkânı sağlamaktadır. Ancak bunun üzerine kurulan iş birliklerinin daha az şeffaf olduğu da yadsınmamaktadır (Giannopoulos, 2019). Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye'nin göç krizi bağlamındaki düzensiz göçle mücadele iş birliği de buna bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. 18 Mart Mutabakatı Birlik tarafından bir acil durum retorikleriyle gerekçelendirilerek yasma organı dışarıda bırakılarak yürütülmüştür. Bu Mutabakatın hazırlanışında ne Avrupa Parlamentosu ne de Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi sürece dahil edilmiştir.

Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği verilerine göre 2015 yılında Suriye'deki savaştan kaçmaya çalışan bir milyonun üzerinde sığınmacı Avrupa Birliği topraklarına Türkiye üzerinden Ege denizini aşarak varmıştır (UNHCR). Almanya'nın teşvikleri ile AB'nin, o dönemde halihazırda iki milyondan fazla sığınmacıya ev sahipliği yapan Türkiye ile ortak bir çalışma yürütmesi bu krizin yönetilebilmesi adına bir çözüm olarak sunulmuştur (Alcandre, 2016). Avrupa Komisyonu'nun da desteği ile bu ortaklık AB'nin düzensiz göç ile mücadelesinin temel taşı haline gelmiştir. Bu çerçevede, 2015 yılının Ekim ayında Avrupa Komisyonu Türkiye'deki sığınmacılara ve onlara ev sahipliği yapan Türk toplumuna finansal destek de içeren bir ortak bir eylem planı önermiştir. Türkiye ve AB'nin alması gereken önlemleri belirleyen bu eylem planı 29 Kasım 2015'te Türkiye-AB zirvesinde de kabul edilmiştir. Zirvenin sonuç bildirisinde taraflar, 2013 yılında imzalanan ve aşamalı olarak yürürlüğe girecek olan Türkiye-AB Geri Kabul Anlaşması'nın 2016 Haziran ayından itibaren tam olarak uygulanması konusunda mutabakata varmıştır (European Council, 2015). Ayrıca taraflar, ilgili 72 kriter karşılandıktan sonra en geç Ekim 2016 sonuna kadar Türk vatandaşları için kısa süreli vize serbestisi uygulamasının yürürlüğe konmasını öngörmüştür (European Council, 2015).

Komisyon tarafından önerilen eylem planı, Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye'den bazı taahhütler içermektedir. Bunlardan Avrupa Birliği'nin en önemli taahhütleri şunlardır: insani yardım dernekleri aracılığıyla Türkiye'deki sığınmacıların durumunu iyileştirmek için mali yardım, Avrupa topraklarına girme sürecinde göçmenlere hukuki danışmanlık, insan kaçakçılığına karşı Türkiye'nin kapasitesinin güçlendirilmesi, AB üyesi devletler ile Türkiye arasında geri dönüş ve yeniden bütünleşme prosedürlerine ilişkin iş birliğinin teşvik edilmesi, Türkiye'de bir Frontex irtibat ofisinin konuşlandırılması ve bunun yanı sıra etkili bir iltica, göç, vize ve entegre sınır sisteminin geliştirilmesi (De Marcilly & Garde, 2016). Türkiye'nin taahhütleri ise uluslararası koruma mevzuatını uygulamak, göçmenleri kayıt altına almak, sığınmacıların kamu hizmetlerine erişimini kolaylaştırmak, yasa dışı göçü önlemek için Yunanistan ve Bulgaristan ile iş birliği yapmak, uluslararası korumaya ihtiyaç duymayan düzensiz göçmenlerin yeniden kabulüne ilişkin prosedürlerin hızlandırılması, ilgili kişilerin mülteci statüsü kazanmasını sağlamak, Avrupa Birliği ve üye devletler ile bilgi alışverişini ve iş birliğini yoğunlaştırmak, yüksek düzeyde yasa dışı göç kaynağı olan ülkelerle vize alma prosedürlerini değiştirmek ve Frontex ile iş birliğini yoğunlaştırmaktır (De Marcilly & Garde, 2016).

Bu ortaklık karşılığında Türkiye, birkaç yıldır tıkanmış olan Avrupa Birliği'ne katılım sürecini (Kafyeke, 2006) yeniden canlandırmayı başarmıştır². Avrupa Birliği de böylelikle, AB üyelik sürecine dair 17. fasıl olan Ekonomi ve Para Politikasını³ açmayı ve ayrıca Gümrük Birliği'ni güncelleştirmeyi kabul etmiştir (European Council, 2015). Eylem Planı'nın uygulanmasındaki ilerlemeye rağmen Türkiye'den Yunanistan'a geçen düzensiz göçmen sayısının Avrupalı liderler için hala çok yüksek olması sebebiyle müzakereler devam etmiş ve taraflar 2016 yılının Mart ayında iki olağanüstü zirvede gelecekteki ayrıntılı eylemlerini yeniden belirlemiştir (Monceau, 2017).

2015'te AB'ye yönelen düzensiz göç artışları AB ülkelerini kaygılandırırken aynı zamanda AB'yi göçün kaynağına ve güzergâhına dönük neler yapılabileceği arayışına sürüklemiştir. Bu çerçevede AB, Avrupa Birliği'nin İşleyişi hakkında Anlaşma'nın üçüncü ülkelerle geri kabul anlaşması yapılabilmesine imkân veren 79'uncu maddesinin üçüncü paragrafı ve uluslararası anlaşmalar yapılması hususunu ele alan 218'inci maddesinin altıncı paragrafının (a) bendine istinaden imzalayıp, 7 Mayıs 2014 tarihinde onayladığı Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Avrupa Birliği Arasında İzinsiz İkamet Eden Kişilerin Geri Kabulüne İlişkin Anlaşma'nın (Asar & Ögdü, 2021) uygulamasının öne çekilmesiyle ilgili hamle-yi yapmış, Türkiye ile 18 Mart Mutabakatı'nı imzalamıştır (European Council, 2016).

Türkiye, 18 Mart Mutabakatı ile ilgili açıklamasında düzenlemenin insani gereklilikler, Ege'de düzensiz göçmen ölümlerinin önüne geçme, insan kaçakçılığı zincirini kırma, insanları düzenli göçe yönlendirilme amacına matuf yapıldığını ifade etmiştir (T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı). Mutabakatta yer alan hususları şu başlıklarla ifade etmek mümkündür: düzensiz göçmenlere yönelik güvenceler kayıt altına alma ve uluslararası koruma başvuruları, geri alınan bir göçmene karşılık bir göçmeni yerleştirme, düzenli göçte kalıcılığı sağlama, Türk vatandaşlarına vize serbestisi, AB'ye düzensiz göçü önlemede Türkiye'den beklentiler, gönüllü insani kabul planı, mali destek, Suriye içindeki insani koşulların iyileştirilmesi.

Mutabakat, Avrupa Birliği tarafından göç krizine bir yanıt olarak sunulmuş ve kısa sürede sonuçlarını vermiştir. Bu sayede Yunan adalarına gelenlerin sayısı önemli ölçüde azalmıştır. Örneğin, Aralık 2015 ile Şubat 2016 sonu arasında Yunanistan'a yaklaşık 200 bin göçmen gelirken bir yıl sonra aynı dönemde gelenlerin sayısı 3 bin 500 civarında kalmıştır (Le Monde, 2017).

Mutabakat siyasi açıdan her iki taraf için de çok faydalı görünse de pek çok zaafi bünyesinde barındırmakta ve birçok açıdan eleştirilmektedir. Her şeyden önce söz konusu Mutabakat, yasal dayanağı olan uluslararası bir anlaşma değil, düzensiz göç karşı ortak

² 2015 yılına kadar Türkiye'nin AB adaylığı sürecindeki 35 fasıldan ancak 14 tanesi açılabilmiştir. Bu fasıllardan da yalnızca birisi tamamlanarak kapatılmıştır.

³ Bu fasıl 14 Aralık 2015 tarihinde açılmıştır.

mücadele için siyasi bir deklarasyondur. Ayrıca uluslararası insan hakları hukuku ve/veya AB hukuku ihlali içerdiğinden, AB-Türkiye beyanının hukuki geçerliliği şüphelidir. İnsani yardım STK'ları, Birliğin göç ve iltica politikasının dışsallaştırılmasını sembolize ettiğine işaret ederek bu mutabakata yönelik ciddi eleştiriler getirmektedir. Hatta, Uluslararası Af Örgütü bu mutabakatı “Avrupa için bir utanç” olarak nitelendirmiştir ([Amnesty International, 2017](#)).

Eleştiriler genel olarak mutabakatın üç yönüne odaklanmaktadır. İlk olarak, Anlaşmanın insan haklarına uygunluğu ve Türkiye'nin mülteciler için güvenli bir ülke olarak değerlendirilmesi Avrupa Parlamentosu'nda ve başka mecralarda çok tartışılmıştır ([European Parliament, 2016](#)). İkincisi, Mutabakatın hukuki niteliğinin tartışmalı olmasıdır ([Guerin, 2019](#)). Eleştirilerin yoğunlaştığı üçüncü nokta ise sığınmacıların AB-Türkiye ilişkilerinde araçsallaştırılmasıdır. Son olarak, 18 Mart 2016 tarihli AB-Türkiye Mutabakatı şekil olarak yalnızca bir basın açıklaması olduğundan Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin onayına sunulmamıştır. Bu durum da hukuki sonuçlar doğuran bu mutabakatın meşruiyetinin sorgulanmasının önünü açmaktadır.

Sonuç

Avrupa Birliği projesi kapsamında göçle ilgili konular eskiden üye devletlerin egemenlik alanında yer alırken zamanla bu meselelere dair Birliğin ulus-üstü organlarının yetkileri artmıştır. Uzun bir süre göçe dair ortak bir politika yokluğunun ardından hükümetler arası yöntem yerini kısmi bir ortak politikaya bırakmıştır. Bu süreçte AB, göç politikaları oluşurken göç konusu da güvenlik perspektifinden ele alınmaya başlanmıştır. Göçün güvenleştirilmesi, göç akışlarının kontrolünün sınırların dışında yapılmasını ve tampon bölgelerin yaratılmasını da beraberinde getirmiştir ve AB, göç yönetimini dışsallaştırmayı tercih etmiştir. Birçok düzensiz göçmen için AB'ye geçişte transit ülke konumunda olan Türkiye AB göç politikasının dışsallaştırılmasında önemli bir role sahiptir ve bu politikaların başarıya ulaşmasında katkısına ihtiyaç duyulan bir ülke konumundadır. Özellikle 2015 yılındaki göç krizi ile AB-Türkiye iş birliği bunun için bir örnek niteliğindedir. Bu iş birliğinin taahhüdü olan 18 Mart 2016 Mutabakatı, AB tarafından Avrupa'ya göç akışını önleyecek acil durum çözümü olarak sunulmuştur. Ancak üzerinden geçen zamana rağmen bu mutabakat gerek yasal niteliği gerek başka yönleri ile tartışmalı olarak kalmıştır ve gayri resmi yöntemler kullanılarak gerçekleştirilen bu iş birliği hala Avrupa'nın düzensiz göçe karşı mücadele mekanizmasının merkezinde yer almaktadır. Eurobarometre verilerine göre, 2019 Avrupa seçimlerinde seçmenleri oy kullanmaya itmiş olabilecek AB'nin karşı karşıya olduğu başlıca sorunlar listesinde dördüncü sırada göçün yer alması, gelecekte de bu konunun gündemde kalacağını işaretidir.

Türkiye, AB'nin göç politikalarında denklem içinde kalacak ülkelerin başında gelmektedir. AB göç politikaları hangi yöne evrilirse evirilsin, ağırlıklı olarak transit ülke

konumuna gelen Türkiye'nin göç politikaları ve uygulamaları AB'yi doğrudan etkilemeye devam edecektir. AB kendi içinde kararlar alıp adımlar atarken Türkiye'nin göç politikalarından bağımsız hareket etmesi düşünülemez. Türkiye'nin sınır yönetimi, başta vize olmak üzere düzenli göç rejimi, düzensiz göçle mücadele kapasitesi ve uluslararası koruma uygulamaları ve bunlara ilişkin koyduğu ve halen koruduğu rezervler AB göç politikalarının sonuçlarını etkileyecek hususlardır. Küresel ve bölgesel göç yönetiminde "kölfe/sorumluluk" paylaşımının salt mali katkıdan ibaret olmadığına ısrarla vurgulanması da bundandır.

Extended Abstract

The purpose of this study is to comprehend the development of EU migration policies and analyze the externalization of EU's migration management through its cooperation with Turkey. The questions to which the study seeks to answer are the following: How were the migration policies of the European Union developed? What is the role of Turkey-EU cooperation in EU migration management? To what extent does the EU-Turkey Statement on March 18 symbolize the externalization of EU migration policy? Our analysis is based on heterogeneous sources: the scientific literature on EU migration policies, official documents, relevant international agreements, and media sources.


Migration management is one of the central elements of the European political agenda and it also has an increasing influence on the external relations in the European Union. Our opinion is that securitization of the migration problem entails the control of migration flows outside the borders and the creation of buffer zones.

Issues related to migration fell within the scope of the States but with the development of the European project, the power of the supranational institutions in the Union in these areas has gradually increased. After years of inaction by the European Community on migration, European countries first developed intergovernmental cooperation to regulate the flow of migrants. With the Treaty of Maastricht and later the Treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon, the intergovernmental method was replaced by a partial common policy.

In this process, while EU migration policies were formed, the issue of migration began to be discussed from a security perspective. The securitization of migration has brought about the control of migration flows outside the borders and the creation of buffer zones, and the EU has chosen to externalize its migration management. In this context, Turkey is a transit country for many irregular migrants on the road to the EU and has an important role in the externalization of the EU migration policy as is a country whose contribution is needed for the success of these policies. In the EU-Turkey Migration Statement on 18 March 2016, both parties agreed to prevent the flow of migration to Europe from the 2015 migration crisis. It was presented as an emergency solution

in Europe. This cooperation, which was carried out using informal methods, is an important example in terms of the externalization of EU migration policies. Although seven years have passed, this statement has remained controversial both in its legal nature and in other aspects, and despite the passing years, this cooperation is still at the center of European policy against irregular migration.

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Dil, Eğitim ve Din Politikaları Çerçevesinde Rusya'da Çokkültürcülük

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Özet

Tarih boyunca büyük göçler ve insani hareketliliğin yaşandığı bir bölgede bulunan Rusya, çok sayıda etnik ve kültürel topluluğun yaşadığı federal bir devlettir. Çarlık Rusyası'nın yayılmacı politikaları ve onun mirasçısı Sovyetler Birliği döneminde uygulanan sürgün ve yeniden iskân politikaları, bugünkü Rusya Federasyonu'nu her açıdan daha da çokkültürlü bir hale getirmiştir. Resmi rakamlara göre Rusya Federasyonu, 100 civarında farklı dilin konuşulduğu 193 farklı etnik gruba ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Bu yönüyle Rusya Federasyonu, kültürel çeşitlilik açısından dünyadaki eşsiz ülkelerin başında gelmektedir. Bu çalışma, dil, eğitim ve dini alana yönelik yasal çerçeve, kurumlar ve uygulamalar bağlamında Rusya'nın çokkültürcü politikalarını tarihsel tecrübe ışığında incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Mevcut literatürün yanı sıra ilgili mevzuat ve uluslararası örgütlerin raporlarından yararlanılan bu çalışmada, Rusya'daki çokkültürcü politikaların, 1990'lerden günümüze nispeten daha liberal bir başlangıçtan güvenlik odaklı ve merkezîyetçi bir yaklaşıma kaydığı bulgusuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Çokkültürcülük, Rusya, Dil, Eğitim, Din, Göç

Russia's Multicultural Policy in Language, Education and Religion

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Abstract

Located in a region that has witnessed many migrations and human mobility throughout history, Russia is a federal state where many ethnic and cultural communities live. The expansionist policies of Tsarist Russia and the exile and resettlement policies implemented in the period of its inheritor, the Soviet Union, made today's Russian Federation even more cosmopolitan from every angle. According to official figures, the Russian Federation is home to 193 different ethnic groups, and around 100 different languages are spoken. This study aims to examine Russia's multicultural policies in the context of the legal framework, institutions and practices regarding language, education and religion in the light of historical experience. This study examines the existing literature, relevant legislation and reports from international organizations, and finds that multicultural policies in Russia started from a liberal and decentralized point in the early 1990s, but then shifted to a security-oriented and centralized approach.

Keywords

Multiculturalism,
Russia, Language,
Education, Religion,
Migration

Giriş

Uzunca bir dönem Türk/Moğol hâkimiyetinde yaşayan Ruslar, 16. yüzyılın başlarında Moskova Knezliği'nin öncülüğünde siyasi birliklerini gerçekleştirdikten sonra hızlı bir yayılma sürecine girmiştir. Başlangıçta ağırlıklı olarak Rus (Slav), Türk ve Moğol halklarından müteşekkil olan Rusya, genişleyerek I. Petro döneminde (1672-1725) imparatorluk haline gelmiştir (Kurat, 1987, s. 81-97) Çarlık Rusyası'nın, Doğu-Batı ve Güney-Kuzey istikametlerinde hâkimiyetini daha da genişletmesi ile bünyesindeki etnik, dini ve kültürel çeşitlilik daha da artmıştır. Çok kısa bir zamanda 21 milyon kilometrekarelik oldukça geniş bir alana yayılan Çarlık yönetimi, söz konusu bu çeşitliliği yönetebilmek ve hâkimiyetini devam ettirmek üzere Bolşevik Devrimi'nden (1917) çok öncesinde bir kısım politikaları devreye koymuştur. II. Katerina döneminde (1729-1796) özellikle Müslüman topluluklara eğitim ve dini alanda tanınan birtakım imtiyazları bu kapsamda örnek olarak verebiliriz (Alp, 2013, s. 119).

Rus İmparatorluğu'nun zayıflamaya başladığı, Bolşevik Devrimi'ne (1917) giden süreçte olası parçalanmayı önlemek üzere ortaya çıkan Avrasyacılık akımını, Rusya'nın çok-kültürlü politikalarının ideolojik başlangıcı olarak kabul edebiliriz. Bununla birlikte Slavofil yaklaşımın kısmen de olsa terk edilip Ortodoks ve Müslüman halkların birlik ve dayanışması temeline oturtulan (Klasik) Avrasyacılığın düşünsel temelleri, merkezinde N. S. Trubetskoy, Petr Savitski ve George Vernadski gibi düşünürlerin çalışmaları ile Bolşevik Devrimi sonrasına uzanır (Beylur, 2021, s. 44-47). Medeniyeti Avrupa'ya has bir olgu olarak gören genel kabule karşı çıkarak bütün medeniyetlerin eşit olduğunu savunan Avrasyacılar, Avrasya medeniyetinin Rus (Slav) ve Türk (Turan) halklarının ortak bir sentezi olduğunu savunur (İsmayilov, 2011, s. 28; İsmayilov, 2012, s. 1). Avrasyacı akım (yeni Avrasyacılık olarak), basın, yayın ve araştırma faaliyetleriyle Sovyetler Birliği sonrasında da Rus iç ve dış politikasında etkili bir konuma sahiptir. Ekonomik, politik ve kültürel sahalarda canlı tutulmaya çalışılan Avrasyacılık akımı, aynı zamanda Rusya merkezli Avrasya Halklar Asamblesi gibi oluşumlar aracılığıyla eski Sovyetler Birliği coğrafyasındaki etnik ve kültürel topluluklar arasında barış ve birlikte yaşama kültürü temelinde iletişimin geliştirilmesine yönelik faaliyetler yürütmektedir (Eurasia-Assembly, 2022).

Tekrar Sovyetler Birliği'nin kuruluş dönemine geri dönersek, Devrimin ardından Bolşevik Hükümeti, yayınladığı "Rusya Halklarının Hakları Deklarasyonu" ile (Kasım 1917) self determinasyon hakkı dâhil olmak üzere azınlık halklara çeşitli haklar tanımıştır (Boris Yeltin Presidential Library, 2022). Söz konusu bu deklarasyon 1923 yılında uygulamaya konulan ve Rus olmayan halkların dillerinin geliştirilmesi, kültürlerinin korunması ve devlet kademelerindeki görünürlüğünün sağlanmasını amaçlayan Korenezatsiya (yerleş-tirme) politikası ile desteklenmeye çalışılmıştır (Liber, 1991, s.18-20). Devamında, SSCB (Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği) Yüksek Meclisi'nin alt kanadında ulusal unsurlara ilave olarak etnik toplulukların da temsil edilmesi sağlanmıştır (Vucinich, 1950, s.

181). 1940 sonrası dönemde Müslüman halklar için SSCB genelinde açılan dini idareleri de bu kapsamda değerlendirmek mümkündür (Erşahin, 1998, s. 130). SSCB'nin ilk yıllarında kültürel çeşitliliğin desteklenmesi alanlarında uygulamaya konan dil politikaları da dikkat çekicidir. Rusça, Gürcüce ve Ermenice gibi diller dışında yazı diline sahip olmayan azınlıklar için yazı dillerinin oluşturulması yönünde çalışmalar yapılmış ve 1930'lu yıllarda ilgili dillerde eğitime dahi başlanılmıştır (Şahin, 2016, s. 24). Dönemi için pozitif ayrımcılık açısından oldukça iddialı ancak büyük ölçüde konjonktürel, sembolik ve aynı zamanda kontrol amaçlı olan bu adımların bazıları, kısa bir zaman sonra Stalin döneminde rafa kaldırılmış, Rusça dışındaki diğer dillerde eğitim yasaklanmış ve bütün farklı kimlikler asimilasyona tabii tutulmuştur. Kruşçev döneminde kısmi bir rahatlama yaşanmış olsa da 1980'lere kadar bütün alt kimlikler, Rus kimliği temelinde dilsel ve kültürel olarak Ruslaştırılmaya çalışılmıştır (Adilbayev, 2002, s. 84). 1985'den itibaren başlatılan yeniden yapılandırma politikalarının (Perestroyka) bir sonucu olarak dil, eğitim ve dini alanda bir rahatlama yaşanırken aynı zamanda sessiz bir şekilde adem-i merkezîyetçi bir yaklaşımın benimsendiği söylenebilir (Zubok, 2021, s. 22-29). Dönemsel değişimlere rağmen her alanda asimilasyon politikalarının sürdürüldüğü SSCB döneminde, uygulamalara rağmen etnik ve milli kimliklerin korunmasının, din ve vicdan özgürlüğünün şeklen de olsa Sovyetler Birliği Anayasası'nda güvence altına alındığını belirtmek gerekir (SSCB Anayasası, 1977).

Sonuç olarak, Sovyetler Birliği dağılmadan önce yapılan 1989 tarihli nüfus sayımına göre 15 ulusal cumhuriyet ve diğer otonom bölgelerde yaşayan çeşitli statülere sahip 128 farklı milli ve etnik kimliğe sahip grup ve bunların ait olduğu onlarca inanç grubu bulunmaktaydı (Jang, 2018, s. 12). SSCB'nin dağılması ile söz konusu bu kültürel çeşitlilik doğrudan diğer bağımsız devletlerde olduğu gibi Rusya Federasyonu'na miras kalmıştır. Güncel resmi rakamlara göre Rusya Federasyonu, 100 civarında farklı dilin konuşulduğu 193 farklı etnik gruba ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Bunlar içerisinde sayıları 50 bin civarında olan nüfusu tehlike altındaki 40 yerel topluluk (indigenous people) bulunmaktadır (Council of Europe, 2021, s. 3). Bütün milli ve etnik topluluklar gibi bu yerel topluluklar da dil ve kültürlerini korumak ve geliştirmek için resmi kayıtlı olarak Federasyon içerisinde sivil toplum yapılanmalarını gerçekleştirebilme hakkına sahiptir. Özetle, Rusya Federasyonu, sahip olduğu kültürel çeşitlilik açısından dünya genelinde ilk sıralarda gelmektedir. Bu nedenle, 17 milyon kilometrekarelik alana dağılan 85 federe birimde Federasyonun birliğinin sağlanması ve ülke genelinde istikrar ve toplumsal barışın korunması Sovyetler Birliği döneminde olduğu gibi bugün de Rusya'nın en öncelikli iç ve dış politika gündemlerinden birisidir.

Rusya'daki çokkültürlülüğün dil, eğitim ve dini alanlardaki yasal çerçeve, kurumsal yapılar ve uygulamalar üzerinden incelendiği bu çalışma esas itibarıyla mevcut literatür, ilgili mevzuat ve uluslararası kuruluşların raporlarına dayanmaktadır. Tarihsel olarak Rusya'daki çokkültürlülüğün oluşum sürecinin özetle verildiği giriş bölümünden sonra

çalışma, çokkültürlülüğün ele alındığı kavramsal çerçeve, yasal çerçeve ve uygulamalar, tartışma ve sonuç bölümlerinden oluşmaktadır. Yer yer değinilmiş olsa da Rusya'nın çokkültürcü politikalarının esas itibariyle yerli topluluklara odaklandığından büyük çoğunluğu Orta Asya kökenli olan göçmen işçiler bu çalışma kapsamına dâhil edilmemiştir.

Kavramsal Çerçeve: Çokkültürlülük ve Çokkültürcülük

Tarih, insanoğlunun siyasi, ekonomik, ekolojik vb. nedenlerle sürekli bir mekânsal hareketliliğine tanıklık etmektedir. Söz konusu bu hareketlilik, tarihsel süreçte bireysel ya da kitlesel olarak çeşitli boyutlarda gerçekleşmiştir. İlk büyük kitlesel göç olarak bilinen Kavimler Göçü ile M.S. 4. yüzyılda başlayan ve kesintisiz devam eden insani hareketlilik, hemen hemen yerkürenin tamamını etkilemiştir. Özellikle 19. yüzyıla damgasını vuran ulusçuluk hareketleri ve sonrasında yaşanan savaşlar ve ortaya çıkan yeni gelişmeler, bu süreci daha da hızlandırmıştır. Daha önceleri büyük oranda zorunlu bir niteliğe sahip olan söz konusu bu insani hareketlilik ya da göç halkasına postmodern çağda gönüllü göçler de eklenmiştir. Tarihsel arka planı, şekli ve kapsamı nasıl olursa olsun göçler, hem öznesi (göçmenler) hem de kabul eden ülke ve toplum açısından bir dizi demografik, ekonomik, siyasi, sosyal ve kültürel sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Günümüz toplumlarının giderek artan oranda temel olgularından birisi haline gelen çokkültürlülük de bu sürecin bir sonucudur (Beylur, 2022, s. 1). Dolayısıyla çağımızda etnik, dini ve kültürel olarak homojen kalan bir ülkeden bahsetmek çok da mümkün görünmemektedir.

Çokkültürlülüğün ortaya çıkışı, esas itibariyle 15. ve 16. yüzyıl sömürgecilik hareketlerinin bir sonucu olarak kabul edilse de aslında çokkültürcü yaklaşımın fiili uygulamalarının bu dönemden çok öncesine, 7. yüzyıldan başlayarak Buhara'ya, Semerkand'a, Merv'e, Endülüs'e ve İstanbul'a uzandığını söylemek mümkündür (Linhard, 2022; Anık, 2012, s. 119). Ancak çağdaş anlamda ilk defa 1957 yılında İsviçre'de kullanılan kavram, 1960'ların sonlarına doğru özellikle Kanada örneği üzerinden literatürde daha fazla yer bulmaya başlamıştır (Özensel, 2023). Çokkültürlülük, etnisite, dil, din gibi farklılıkların yaşam tarzları ve belirli semboller üzerinden kamusal alandaki görünürlüğüdür. Bu çeşitliliğin siyaset eliyle yönetimi ise çokkültürcülük ya da çokkültürcü politika olarak tanımlanmaktadır (Isin, 2006, s. 406). Çokkültürcülüğü anayasal olarak kabul eden ilk ülke olan Kanada, uyguladığı liberal politikalar ile de çokkültürcülüğün model ülkelerinden birisi olarak gösterilmektedir (Özensel, 2012, s. 57). Kanada dışında Avustralya, ABD ve bazı Avrupa ülkeleri de çokkültürcü politikalar açısından öne çıkmaktadır.

İdeolojik, siyasi ve toplumsal içerimleri bulunan çokkültürcülüğün ne olduğu ya da nasıl algılandığına ilişkin çok sayıda tanıma rastlamak mümkündür. Bunlardan bazılarını özetle verecek olursak çokkültürcülük: devletin bütün kültürel grup ve kimliklere karşı tarafsız olması ve azınlık, göçmen ve yerli topluluklara karşı eşit muamelede bulunması (Kymlicka, 1995, s. 666); farklılıkların devlet politikaları ile yönetimi (Isin, 2006, s.

406); az ya da çok asimilasyonun alternatifi bir ideoloji (Runblom, 1994); liberal demokratik prensiplere dayanan bir siyasi sistemdir (Lyne ve Jupp, 2011, s. XI).

Modern ya da postmodern çağrışımı olsun çoğu çokkültürcülük tanımlarında toplumsal yapıdaki çeşitliliğin yönetimi meselesinin öne çıktığı görülebilir. Batı modelinde ilk uygulanmaya başlandığı 1970'lerden 1990'lı yıllara kadar çokkültürlü politikalarda bir yükseliş görülürken 1990'ların ikinci yarısından itibaren (Kanada hariç olmak üzere) bir geri çekilme yaşanmıştır (Kymlicka, 2012, s. 3). Bunun çeşitli sebepleri bulunmakla birlikte 11 Eylül saldırılarının önemli bir milat olduğu söylenebilir. Öte yandan Avrupa'nın göçmen politikalarında sergilediği performans da bu geri çekilmeye etkili olmuştur. Dönemin Almanya Şansölyesi Merkel tarafından, "paralel topluluklara" neden olduğu gerekçesiyle "tam bir başarısızlık" olarak addedilen çokkültürcülük yaklaşımından "sivil entegrasyon" yönünde ciddi bir değişim yaşanmıştır (Banting ve Kymlicka, 2013, s. 578) Benzer eğilim İngiltere, Fransa ve diğer Avrupa ülkelerinde de izlenmiştir.

Sonuç olarak tarihsel süreçte oluşan siyasal ve toplumsal koşullar her ülkenin kendi çokkültürcü politikalarını doğrudan etkilemektedir. Bu nedenle çokkültürcü uygulamalarda ideal ya da genelgeçer bir model gösterebilmek mümkün değildir. Bilakis her ülkenin ya da kültür coğrafyasının kendine özgü bir modele sahip olduğu söylenebilir. Öte yandan ülkelerin çokkültürcü politikalarında zaman içerisinde bazı değişimler de yaşanabilmektedir. Özellikle 2000 sonrası dönemde hem göçmen politikalarında hem de çokkültürcü politikalarda farklı yaklaşım ve eğilimlerin ortaya çıktığı görülmektedir. Başta Kanada olmak üzere sayıları çok fazla olmayan bir kısım çokkültürlü ülkeler, "çokkültürcü entegrasyon" temelinde daha liberal politikalar izlerken (Kymlicka, 1995, s. 666) Almanya'nın öncülüğünü yaptığı bazı ülkeler de "sivil entegrasyon" yönünde yeni bir yaklaşıma yönelmiştir. Milliyetçiliğin artış gösterdiği Rusya da ise özellikle de 2012 sonrası dönemde Rus etnisitesinin ve Rusçanın öne çıkarıldığı asimilasyonist bir eğilimin gittikçe belirgin olmaya başladığı yönünde değerlendirmeler bulunmaktadır (Antonova, 2007, s. 34).

Rusya'da Çokkültürcü Politikalar: Yasal Çerçeve ve Uygulamalar

Girişte değinildiği üzere İmparatorluk geçmişi olan geniş bir coğrafyaya yayılan Rusya, çok milletli, çok etnili ve çok kültürlü yapısının muhafazası için gerek İmparatorluk dönemindeki gerekse SSCB dönemindeki bir kısım uygulamalarını ve aynı zamanda reflekslerini devam ettiren çok sayıda yasal ve kurumsal düzeyde yeni düzenlemeler de yapmıştır.

Anayasa'daki düzenlemelere (2020) ek olarak Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Dili Hakkında Kanun (2018), Rusya Federasyonu Eğitim Kanunu (2012), Rusya Federasyonu İnanç Özgürlüğü ve Dini Kuruluşlar Kanunu (2015), Ulusal Azınlıkların Korunmasına İlişkin

Çerçeve Sözleşmenin Onaylanması Hakkındaki Kanun (1998), Rusya Federasyonu'nda Yerel Özyönetim Teşkilatının Genel İlkeleri Hakkındaki Kanun (2003), Etnik Topluluklar ve Dinler Arası İlişkilerde Çatışma İhtimallerinin Erken Önlenmesi Amacıyla Devlet Bilgi Sistemi Hakkında Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Hükümet Kararnamesi (2020), Rusya Federasyonu'ndaki Sayıları Az Olan Yerli Halkların Haklarının Garantisi Altına Alınması Hakkında Kanun (2019), Rusya Federasyonu'nu Oluşturan İdari Birimlerindeki Devlet Kurumları, Yerel Yönetimlerin Etnik Topluluklar Arasındaki İlişkilerdeki Yetki ve Sorumluluklarının Belirlenmesine İlişkin Bazı Yasalarda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kararname (2013) ve 2025 Yılına Kadar Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Milliyetler Politika Stratejisi (2013) gibi düzenlemeleri bu kapsamda gösterebiliriz (RF Adalet Bakanlığı, 2023). Bu yasal düzenlemelerin yanında Rusya Federasyonu'ndaki çokkültürcü politikaların ihlal edilmesi halinde gerekli önlemlerin alınması konusunda idare ve ceza mevzuatında da çeşitli değişiklikler yapılmıştır.

Yasal çerçeve temelinde, daha önce çeşitli kurum ve kuruluşlar uhdesindeki yapılar tarafından icra edilen Rusya Federasyonu'ndaki milli, etnik, dini ve kültürel çeşitliliğin yönetimi için 2015 yılında Federal Etnik İşler Ajansı (FEİA) oluşturulmuştur. Hükümete bağlı olarak faaliyet yürüten Ajans'ın 85 idari birimde yerel temsilciliği bulunmaktadır. Ajans bünyesinde Etnik Topluluklara Yönelik Devlet Politikası Dairesi, Etnik ve Dini Gruplar Arasındaki İlişkileri İzleme, Aşırılıkları Önleme ve Dini Kuruluşlarla İletişim Dairesi'nin yanı sıra yerli halklar dışında göçmenlere yönelik çalışmalar yapan Analiz, Tahmin ve Yabancı Vatandaşlar Dairesi de bulunmaktadır (FEİA, 2023). İzleyen bölümde Rusya'nın mevcut çokkültürcü politikaları dil, eğitim ve din kurumları üzerinden incelenecektir.

Dil ve Eğitimde Çokkültürcülük

Yasal düzenlemeler açısından bakıldığında Rusya Anayasasının 26'ncı maddesinin 2'inci fıkrasına göre herkes, iletişim, eğitim ve öğretim dâhil olmak üzere günlük yaşamında anadilini kullanma hakkına sahiptir. Bununla birlikte 2020 yılında yapılan referandumla "Rusya Federasyonu'nun tüm topraklarındaki devlet dilinin, Federasyonun çok uluslu birliğinin eşit halklarından birisi ve devlet kurucu milletin dili olan Rusça olduğu" (Md. 68-1-2) hükmü getirilmiş devamında ise federal birimlerin "kendi dillerini kullanabilecekleri" ancak devlet organlarında, yerel yönetimlerde ve diğer kamu kuruluşlarında federe birimlerin dillerinin yanında Rusçanın zorunlu olarak devlet dili olarak kullanılacağı belirtilmiştir (RF Anayasası, 2020). Anayasa ile genel çerçevesi çizilen dil ve eğitim ile ilgili hususlar yasalarla detaylandırılmıştır. Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Dili Hakkında Kanun'da Rusçanın, Federasyon genelinde devlet dili olduğu ifade edilerek, bu hususun çok uluslu ve çok dilli halklar arasındaki "etnik bağları güçlendiren ve karşılıklı anlayışı destekleyen" (Md. 1-4 /5), "manevi kültürü geliştiren ve zenginleştiren" yönüne vurgu yapılmıştır. 2013 ve 2021 tarihli değişikliklerle Rusça ile birlikte diğer "bütün dillerin

devletin koruması altında olduğu” yazı dili olmayan halkların kendi ana dillerinde bir yazı dili yaratma haklarının olduğu ve bu çabaların devlet tarafından destekleneceği yönünde ilave düzenlemeler de yapılmıştır (RF Dil Kanunu, 2022).

Dil ve eğitim hem Çarlık Rusyası hem de SSCB döneminde kullanılan en başta gelen asimilasyon politika araçlarından birisi olmuştur. 19. yüzyılın başlarında Türkolog ve aynı zamanda bir misyoner olan Nikolay İlminskiy’inin öncülüğünde başlatılan dil ve eğitim politikalarının Rus olmayan halklar üzerinde günümüze yansıyan yıkıcı sonuçları olmuştur (Topsakal, 2010, s. 50-51). Rusya Federasyonu ve diğer eski Sovyetler Birliği Cumhuriyetlerinde iletişim ve eğitim dilinin, azımsanmayacak oranda hala Rusça olarak devam ediyor olması (Fierman, 2006, s. 98-116) bunun en somut göstergelerinden birisidir. Rusya’nın, hem Federasyon içerisinde hem de bölgede Rusçanın hâkim dil olarak kalması yönündeki çabaları bugün de devam etmektedir. Mevcut durumda Rusya Federasyonu genelinde 277 dil ve diyalekt bulunmaktadır, bunların 37’si devlet dili statüsüne sahiptir. Bunlardan 24’ü eğitim sisteminde kullanılırken 81’i ise seçmeli ders olarak okutulmaktadır. Mevcut 85 idari birimin (constituent entity) 28’inde anadil, olarak Rusça kabul edilirken 57’sinde ise ilgili idari birimlerdeki hâkim diller anadil olarak kabul edilmiştir (Council of Europe, 2021)

Dil ve eğitim kanunlarında yapılan değişiklikler öncesinde federe birimlerdeki dil eğitimi, federal yasalara uygun olarak yerel idarelerin uhdesinde okul müfredatına eklenmek suretiyle gerçekleştirilebiliyordu. Bu çerçevede özerk cumhuriyetlerden bazılarında ilgili millî diller zorunlu iken Tataristan ve Çeçenistan’da Tatarca ve Çeçence ile Rusça birlikte kullanılıyordu (Jankiewicz, Knyaginina vd., 2020, s. 71). Yeni düzenlemeler sonrasında eğitimde Rusçanın zorunlu dil haline getirilmiş olması, bu yöndeki talepleri tırpanlamıştır.

Dil politikaları ile yakından ilişkili olan Eğitim Kanunu’nda eğitimin seküler doğasına dikkat çekilerek eğitim politikalarının, Rusya Federasyonu genelindeki etnokültürlerin ve geleneklerin korunup geliştirilmesini (Md 4-6) hedeflediği ifade edilmektedir. Kanunun 2018 tarihli değişiklik öncesi halinde, eğitim mevzuatına uygun olarak herkesin eğitim görmek istediği dili özgürce seçebilme hakkına sahip olduğu (Md. 9) hükmü bulunmaktaydı. Bu doğrultuda ders kitapları ve müfredatta ulusal halklar ile etnik ve kültürel azınlıkların tarihi, kültürü, edebiyatı ve dillerinin geliştirilmesine yönelik düzenlemeler yapılmıştır (Salekhova ve Grigorieva, 2017, s. 437). Federasyon bünyesindeki 85 idari birimden anadilini Rusça dışında bir dil olarak seçen 57 idari birimden sadece 12’sinde genel eğitim 16 farklı anadilde yapılabilmektedir. Bu kapsamda 2.402 genel eğitim kurumunda 339.405 öğrenci eğitim görmektedir. Devlet, yerel dilde eğitimin verildiği 16 ana dil için 101 program geliştirmiş, 11 anadilde 222 ders kitabı hazırlamıştır. Bu çerçevede yerel idarelerde tarih, coğrafya ve edebiyat gibi dersler ilgili dillerde verilebilmektedir (Council of Europe, 2021, s. 99). Öte yandan Moskova yönetimi, iklim ve

coğrafi olarak zor koşullarda yaşayan yerel topluluklardaki genel eğitim için mali yardımlar ile Rusça öğretimi konusunda eğitimci desteği sağlamaktadır. Buna ek olarak nüfusları tehlikede olan yerel toplulukların kendi dil ve kültürlerini muhafaza etmeleri için özel programlar da yürütülmektedir.

Ancak 2018 yılında Eğitim Kanunu'nda yapılan değişikliklerle (Md. 11-5.1) bu maddenin içeriği boşaltılmıştır. Çünkü söz konusu değişikliklerle Rusya Federasyonu genelindeki okul öncesi ve ilk kademe eğitim kurumlarında Rusça zorunlu dil olarak kabul edilmiş, federal birimlerin kendi dilleri ise seçmeli hale getirilmiştir (RF Eğitim Kanunu, 2022). Kanun değişikliğinin hazırlık sürecinde federe birimlerdeki yerel eğitim personelinin yetersizliği, daha önce zorunlu olarak öğretilen Rusça dışındaki diğer dillerin seçmeli hale getirilmesine gerekçe olarak gösterilmiştir. Söz konusu değişikliklerle bütün federe birimlerinde iletişimin yanında eğitimde de Rusçanın tek hâkim dil olarak yaygınlaştırılmasının hedeflendiği açıktır. Yaşanan bu süreç, anayasadaki garantiler ile ilgili mevzuatta sıkça yer verilen hak ve özgürlükler ve resmi anlatılarla örtüşmemektedir. Anayasanın dil ve eğitime ilişkin hükümlerine açıkça aykırı olan ve çokkültürlü yapıyı tehdit eden bu adım, SSCB dönemi asimilasyon politikalarını anımsattığı gerekçesiyle eleştirilere neden olurken (Jankiewicz vd., 2020, s. 90) başta Tataristan olmak üzere bazı cumhuriyetlerde de tepkiyle karşılanmıştır.

Dini Alanda Çokkültürcülük

Etnisite ve dini inanç arasında yakın bir ilişki bulunduğu yukarıda belirtilen yasal ve kurumsal düzenlemelerin, dil ve eğitim gibi din politikaları ile de doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak ilişkisi bulunmaktadır. Nitekim ilgili yasal düzenlemelerin başlık ve içeriklerinde milliyet, etnisite ve din çoğu zaman birlikte geçmektedir. Rusya'da Hristiyanlık, İslam, Yahudilik ve Budizm gibi geleneksel dünya dinleri olarak kabul edilen dinlerle birlikte kayıtlı olarak faaliyet yürüten onlarca inanç grubu bulunmaktadır. Rusya yönetimi, etnik ve dini topluluklar arasındaki uyuma aşırı önem vermekte, başta ırkçılık, aşırılık ve nefret suçları ile inançlara karşı sergilenebilecek aşağılayıcı tutum ve davranışlara ilgili yasal düzenlemeler çerçevesinde ağır cezalar uygulamaktadır.

Rusya Federasyonu Anayasasında devletin seküler olduğu (Md. 14-1) ve Federasyondaki bütün inanç gruplarına ait dini grupların kanun önünde eşit olduğu (Md. 14-2) hükümleri bulunmaktadır (RF Anayasası, 2020). 2015 yılında değişiklikler yapılan 1997 tarihli İnanç Özgürlüğü ve Dini Kuruluşlar Kanunu'nun girişinde Rusya halklarının tarihi mirasının ayrılmaz bir parçası olan Hristiyanlık, İslam, Budizm ve Yahudiliğe açık bir atıf yapılırken, Ortodoks inancının Rusya'nın tarihi, manevi ve kültürel gelişmesindeki rolüne özel bir vurgu yapılmıştır. Kanunun devamında, anayasa ve uluslararası hukuktan kaynaklanan vicdan ve din özgürlüğünün hiçbir düzenleme ile kısıtlanamayacağı (Md. 2-3), Federasyon genelinde bütün vatandaşların herhangi bir inanca inanma ya da inanmama, din eğitimi alabilme, dini vecibelerini yerine getirme ve örgütlenme özgürlüğünün olduğu

belirtilmektedir. Rusya Federasyonu boyunca hiçbir idari birim herhangi bir inancı devlet dini ya da zorunlu olarak kabul edemez (Md. 4-1). Kanuna göre herkes bireysel ya da toplu olarak din eğitimi alma hakkına sahip olmakla (Md. 5-1) birlikte din eğitimi sadece resmi olarak kayıtlı dini kuruluşlarda, yetkilendirilmiş kişiler tarafından verilebilmektedir (Md. 5-3) Kanunda 2021 yılında yapılan değişikliklerle toplu bir etkinlik yapmayı planlayan dini kuruluşun, önceden etkinliğin adını, kapsamını, yerini ve katılacakların kimlik bilgilerini ilgili yerel birimlere bildirme zorunluluğu ve eğitim ve törenlerde kullanılacak dini materyal için önceden bildirim yükümlülüğü getirilmiştir (RF Din Kanunu, 1997).

Anayasal olarak seküler ilkeleri benimseyen Rusya’da kamu eğitim kurumlarında herhangi bir inanca ait dini eğitimin verilmesi mümkün değildir. Bunun yerine geleneksel olarak tanımlanan Hristiyanlık, İslam, Yahudilik ve Budizm hakkında genel bilgilerin verildiği ve aynı zamanda farklı inanç grupları arasındaki saygı ve hoşgörünün yerleştirilmesinin amaçlandığı *Dini Kültürler ve Seküler Etiğin Temelleri* adlı ders, zorunlu olarak 4. ve 5. sınıf müfredatına eklenmiştir. Söz konusu derste öğrenci ve ebeveynlere seçmeli olarak *Seküler Etik, Ortodoks Kültürü ve Dünya Dinleri* adı altında farklı seçenekler sunulmaktadır (Clay, 2015, s. 51).

Rusya devleti kayıt olmak şartıyla resmi olarak tanınan inanç gruplarının sivil toplum yapılanmalarına izin vermektedir. 2021 yılı itibarıyla büyük çoğunluğu 4 geleneksel dine ait olan 30 binin üzerinde dini kuruluş bulunmaktadır (Council of Europe, 2021). Buna rağmen inanç ve ibadet özgürlüğüne ilişkin ciddi eleştiriler bulunmaktadır. Belirlenmiş mekanlar dışında dini ayin ve törenler için önceden izin alınması zorunluluğu, dini kuruluşların kayıt süreçlerinde yaşanan sorunlar, küçük ihmaller karşısında uygulanan ağır idari ve para cezaları bunlardan bazıları olarak verilebilir (state.gov, 2021). Bunların dışında İnanç Özgürlüğü ve Dini Kuruluşlar Kanunu’nun girişinde Ortodoks inancının Rusya’nın tarihi, manevi ve kültürel gelişmesindeki rolüne yapılan açık vurgu, yüzlerce yıldır aynı kaderi paylaşan diğer inanç gruplarına sahip halklar ve topluluklarda ötekilik algısını ve duygusunu perçinlemektedir.

Tartışma

Kanada, ABD ve bazı Avrupa ülkelerinin yanı sıra emperyal bir geçmişi olan Rusya da sahip olduğu etnik, dini ve kültürel çeşitliliği ile çokkültürlülük kapsamında incelenen devletlerden birisidir. Aslında Rusya, modern çağın en eski çokkültürlü devletlerinden birisi olarak kabul edilebilir. Bununla birlikte Çarlık Rusyası ve SSCB dönemleri dahil olmak üzere tarihsel süreçte oluşan tecrübe ve gelenek, Rusya’nın, çokkültürcü politikalar açısından söz konusu bu ülkelerle geçmişte olduğu gibi bugün de karşılaştırılabilmesini mümkün kılmamaktadır. Farklı bir ligde bulunsu da sahip olduğu 193 millî ve etnik unsur, 100’ün üzerinde konuşulan dil ve onlarca inanç grubu ile Rusya, federal devlet yapısını devam ettirmek için geçmişte olduğu gibi bugün de söz konusu bu çeşitliliği yönetebilmek için belirli ölçülerde de olsa çokkültürcü yaklaşımı benimsemek durumundadır.

Tıpkı SSCB'nin ilk dönemlerinde olduğu gibi Glasnost ve Perestrojka sürecinin etkisiyle 1990'ların başında Rusya, diğer federe birimlere karşı adem-i merkeziyetçi ve liberal bir tutum sergilemiştir. Bunun sonucunda bağımsızlıklarını ilan eden cumhuriyetler dışındaki diğer federe birimlerde de milli, etnik ve dini bir canlanma ve hareketlenme başlamıştır. Dönemin ekonomik ve siyasi şartları gereği bu gelişmeler karşısında kısa bir süre de olsa sessiz kalan Moskova, Putin'in başbakanlık dönemine denk gelen Çeçenistan müdahalesi ile pozisyonunu değiştirmiş ve kısa bir süre içerisinde bütün federe birimlerdeki hâkimiyetini yeniden sağlamıştır. Putin'in üçüncü başkanlık döneminden (2012) sonra Rusya iç siyasetinde ve çokkültürcü politikalarında önemli değişimler yaşanmıştır. Bu durum, başta anayasa olmak üzere ilgili mevzuatta yapılan değişiklikler ve düzenlemelerde açıkça görülmektedir. Bu değişim, zaten federal mevzuata ve uluslararası sözleşmelere uyulmadığı (Jankiewicz vd., 2020, s. 90) gerekçesi ile sıkça eleştirilere muhatap olan yönetimin çokkültürcü politikalarını menfi yönde etkilemektedir.

Çağdaş çokkültürcü uygulamalar dikkate alındığında Rusya'daki çokkültürcü politikaların güvenlik odaklı olduğu, tıpkı SSCB döneminde olduğu gibi esastan çok şekli bir yaklaşımı yansıttığı söylenebilir. Dolayısıyla yasalar ve ilgili mevzuatın uygulamadaki karşılığı, kültürel çeşitliliğin sembolik göstergeleri olan müzik, folklor, festivaller ve yerel kıyafetlerin görünürlüğünü sağlamanın ötesine gidememektedir (Kymlicka, 2012, s. 7). Milli, etnik, dini ve kültürel çeşitliliğin etkin yönetimi için 2015 yılında oluşturulan Federal Etnik İşler Ajansı'nı ve onun federe birimlerdeki temsilciliklerini ve etnokültürel merkezlerin faaliyetlerini de bu kapsamda değerlendirmek mümkündür. Benzer şekilde eski SSCB coğrafyasındaki etnik ve kültürel topluluklar arasında barış ve birlikte yaşama kültürü temelinde iletişimin geliştirilmesini amaçlayan (Eurasia-Assembly, 2022) Avrasya Halklar Asamblesi'nin çalışmalarının da bahsedilen çerçevenin dışına çıktığını ifade etmek mümkün değildir. Bu yaklaşım federal yapının ve toplumsal uyumun korunması için merkezi ve yerel idarelerin etnik ve kültürel farklılıkların farkında olmasını ve bu farklı grupların asgari düzeyde de olsa birbirlerinin kökenine, inancına ve kültürüne saygı duymasını temin etmekle sınırlı tutulmuş gibi görünmektedir. Dil Kanununda yapılan değişiklik sonrası Tataristan'da ortaya çıkan tepkiler karşısında sergilenen tutum ve benzer gelişmelerde görülen güvenlik odaklı söz konusu bu yaklaşım, kendiliğinden ortaya çıkan farklı kültürel grupların taleplerini görmezden gelebilmekte, beklenmedik ve olağanüstü gelişmeler karşısında aşırı tepkisel davranabilmektedir (Antonova, 2007, s. 26).

Özetle, Rusya örneğinde olduğu üzere çokkültürcü politikaların şekillenmesinde her devletin, kendi tarihi, coğrafi, siyasal ve toplumsal koşullarının ve dinamiklerinin esas belirleyici olduğu görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, bütün eleştirilere rağmen Batılı siyaset teorileri, çokkültürcülük alanında Rusya dâhil olmak üzere eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkeleri ve Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri için çok da somut bir şeyler önerbilmiş değildir (Kymlicka, 2001, s. 14-15). Çünkü Batıdaki kültürel çeşitliliğin oluşum süreci ve mevcut koşullar ile Rusya,

Doğu Avrupa, Orta Asya ve hatta Balkanlardaki tarihsel süreç ve toplumsal dinamikler benzeşmemektedir. Ancak bütün bunlardan bağımsız olarak Rusya'nın, yüzyıllardır birlikte yaşadığı uluslar, toplumlar ve topluluklara yönelik karşılıklı saygı temelinde birlikte yaşama ve ortak gelecek vadeden bir ideoloji geliştirmekte başarılı olamadığını da belirtmek gerekir. 1990'ların ortalarında tekrar canlandırılan Avrasyacılık düşüncesinin de, özellikle 2012 sonrası yaşanan gelişmeleri dikkate aldığımızda etnik Rus toplumu dışında bir karşılığının olmadığı görülmüştür.

Sonuç

Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılması sonrası teşkil edilen federal yapı, 2000 sonrası dönemde sürekli artan bir ivme ile merkezileşmektedir. Diğer federal devletlerle kıyaslandığında Çarlık Rusyası ve SSCB geçmişinden kaynaklanan kendine özgü yapısı ile Rusya Federasyonu'nda yerel birimlerle Moskova arasında her alanda açıkça görülen asimetrik bir ilişki bulunmaktadır. Söz konusu asimetrik ilişki, Moskova'nın çokkültürcü politikalarına yansımaktadır. Mevzuat açısından bakıldığında, 2015 sonrası yapılan bir kısım düzenlemeler hariç tutulursa Rusya Federasyonu yasalarında ve alt mevzuatında çokkültürlülüğü dikkate alan ve koruyan çok sayıda düzenleme ve bu doğrultuda ihdas edilen çeşitli kuruluşlar olduğu görülmektedir. Ancak 2015 ve 2021 yıllarında din kanununda, 2018 yılında eğitim kanununda, 2020 yılında Anayasa'da yapılan değişiklikler ve düzenlemeler, genel çerçevede belirlenen çokkültürcü yaklaşımın merkezi siyasi irade tarafından çok da benimsenmediğini göstermiştir.

Eğitim kanununda 2018 yılında yapılan değişiklik öncesinde 85 federe birimin 24'ünde Rusça dışındaki ilgili yerel dillerde eğitim imkânı bulunurken bu hak söz konusu düzenleme ile rafa kaldırılmıştır. Çokkültürcülüğün önemli göstergelerinden birisi olan anadilin statüsü de 2021 yılında Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Dili Hakkında Kanun'da yapılan değişiklikle oldukça dezavantajlı bir duruma düşürülmüştür. Çarlık Rusyası ve SSCB dönemlerinde uygulanan dil politikaları ile asimile edilen federe birimlerdeki halk, 21. yüzyılda benzer tablo ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Neticede Rus kökenli olmamasına rağmen anadilini Rusça olarak beyan etmek zorunda kalan ancak ona da bilimsel literatürü takip edecek kadar hâkim olmayan adeta anadili olmayan nesiller yetişmiştir. Bu da doğal olarak yükseköğretim kurumlarının niteliklerine ve buralardaki araştırmacıların bilimsel araştırmalarına yansımaktadır. 2015 ve 2021 tarihlerinde din kanununda yapılan düzenlemeler de, bir dizi kısıtlamalara neden olmuşsa da dil ve eğitim kanunlarında yapılan değişikliklere gösterilen tepkilere benzer sonuçlara neden olmamıştır.

Özetle, çalışma boyunca incelenen dil, eğitim ve dini alana yönelik çokkültürcü politikalarında Rusya'nın son on yıllık karnesinin pek iç açıcı olmadığı değerlendirilebilir. Güvenlik eksenli bir yaklaşımın benimsendiği çokkültürcü politikalar, özellikle de dil ve eğitim alanlarındaki kısıtlamalar, Rus olmayan halkları ve toplulukları rahatsız etmiştir. Moskova'nın, bu durumu dikkate alarak yüzyıllardır aynı coğrafyayı ve kaderi paylaştığı

halk ve topluluklara kimliklerini koruyacakları ve geliştirecekleri asgari şartları oluşturması hem evrensel hak ve özgürlükler açısından hem de toplumsal barış ve uyum açısından önem arz etmektedir.

Extended Abstract

History is a witness of the continuous spatial mobility of human beings for political, economic, ecological and other reasons. The nationalist movements that left their mark on the 19th century and the wars and new developments that followed accelerated this process. Multiculturalism has become one of the fundamental phenomena of today's societies and is also a result of this process. It is possible to come across many definitions of what multiculturalism is and how it is perceived that all have ideological, political and social implications. To summarize some of them, multiculturalism is the state's neutrality towards all cultural groups and identities, and equal treatment of minorities, immigrants, and indigenous communities. It is the management of diversity through state policies. Additionally, multiculturalism is an alternative ideology to more or less assimilation. It is a political system based on liberal democratic principles.

However, the political and social conditions formed in the historical process directly affect the multicultural policies of every country. For this reason, it is not possible to show an ideal or generally accepted model in multicultural practices. On the contrary, it can be said that each country has its own unique model. Russia is one of the oldest multicultural states in the modern era. With its 193 national and ethnic constituents and over 100 languages spoken and dozens of belief groups, Russia needs to adopt a multicultural approach, to a certain extent, in order to manage this diversity. Just like in the early periods of the USSR, Russia exhibited a decentralized and liberal attitude towards other federative units in the early 1990s, under the influence of the Glasnost and Perestroika process. As a result of this, a national, ethnic and religious revival started in other federative units, outside of the republics that declared their independence. However, after Putin's third presidency, significant changes occurred in Russia's domestic politics and multicultural policies. This situation is clearly seen in the amendments and regulations made in the relevant legislation, especially in the constitution.

Considering contemporary multicultural practices, it can be said that multiculturalist policies in Russia are security-oriented, reflecting a formal approach rather than a fundamental one, just like in the USSR period. Therefore, the implementation of the laws and related legislation cannot go beyond providing the visibility of music, folklore, festivals and traditional outfits as symbolic indicators of cultural diversity. It is possible to evaluate the Federal Ethnic Affairs Agency, which was established in 2015 for the effective management of national, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, and its representatives in federated units and the activities of ethnocultural centers within this scope.

In summary, as in the example of Russia, it is seen that every country's own historical, geographical, political, and social conditions, and dynamics are the main determinants in shaping multicultural policies. Therefore, despite all criticism, Western political theories have not been able to offer anything concrete in the field of multiculturalism for the former Soviet Union countries, including Russia, and Eastern European countries. The formation process and current conditions of cultural diversity in the West do not match the historical process and social dynamics in Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. However, regardless of this, it should be noted that Russia has not been successful in developing a promising ideology and coexistence on the basis of mutual respect for the nations, societies and communities with which it has lived for centuries. The idea of Eurasianism, which was revived in the mid-1990s, has no counterpart outside the ethnic Russian people, especially when we consider the developments after 2012. In light of the policies over the last ten years, Russia's multicultural policies towards language, education and religion are not very encouraging.

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Book Review

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Book Review

Anna Triandafyllidou and Tariq Modood (eds), **The Problem of Religious Diversity: European Challenges and Asian Approaches**; Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2017, \$53.61 (Paperback), pp. 352, ISBN 9781474419093

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Religion and religious diversity are two of the most critical aspects of European diversity today. Older models of republicanism and multiculturalism appear to be in crisis, but no new “third route” between laïcité and state religion is emerging. The book titled “The Problem of Religious Diversity: European Challenges and Asian Approaches” was unpacked by a group of authors who dissect “the problem and complications of religious diversity in European and Asian societies.” They begin with the questions of whether equalizing upwards or downwards is the best way to deal with religious diversity, what challenges stand in the way of more egalitarian religious pluralism, and what lessons can be drawn from Middle Eastern and Asian policies and practices where religious plurality and integration taking place in public spaces are the rule rather than the exception. In both regions, religious plurality and public religion are the norms.

The authors provide a comprehensive account of the type and degree of secularism as the requirements to address the theoretical or normative difficulties of religious diversity in modern western societies. The authors also investigate how Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Oceania administer and accommodate multiple religious populations under the rule of a single state. The writers also discuss whether separating church and state in Europe or North America is a more successful method to deal with religious diversity than appreciating and accepting religion as part of public and political life.

The book is divided into two thematic parts. In the first part, the book explores the idea and practice of secularism, focusing on Modood’s concept of “moderate secularism” across Europe and beyond. Triandafyllidou’s chapter on the nation and religion sets the background by noting that religious minorities in Europe are considered more problematic than ethnic and national minorities. Islamophobia is a result of a comeback of nationalism and religion as an identity marker, which she calls a “revival of rootedness” in response to globalization’s unsettling effects. Modood promotes moderate secularism, currently prevalent in most European nations. In its most common form, political secularism is about the two-way mutual autonomy of the state and religion, or “twin tolerations” (2001). Modood’s moderate secularism is already existent in most European countries and is defined as a “historically evolved collection of structures and practices” (p.

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58). He prefers a multiculturalist secularism that isn't "intrinsically terrified of religious communities and religion in public life" compared to Rawls' strict separation or its reverse (the reassertion of Christianity in society) (Ch. 3, p. 60-64).

In the first part of the book, Gurpreet Mahajan discusses India's secular paradigm. Those who assume Europe can learn from how the "world's greatest democracy" accommodates religious diversity will be disappointed. Mahajan states neither India nor its moderate secularism "can handle strong religious divisions" (p. 85). Mahajan parodies France's "laïcité" to illustrate her uncertain and unfortunate views. Tariq Ramadan, a frequent visitor to France, is derided by those who claim to protect French secularism and knows what is at stake. Ramadan demonstrates that secularism, at least as a legal framework, is not inherently antagonistic to religious minorities in France, despite what some may say about its allegedly confrontational nature. However, the interpretation of "neutrality" is problematic as a direct response to worries over the presence of Muslims in the western world, who "are perceived to disturb or even destroy the alleged neutrality of public space." (p. 97). Ramadan believes secularism is the best way to govern multiple religions.

Marie-Claire Foblets' concluding contribution to part one of the book, is arguably the most fascinating, as she argues for a form of reasonable accommodation and integration as a strategy to prevent the judiciary from being inundated with issues involving religious freedom and its protection. Foblets criticizes "the instrumentalization of religious freedom for political goals" (p. 120). She suggests that many religious issues could be addressed amicably without litigation if a legal right to reasonable accommodation were applied.

The second part of the book examines case studies that can help Europe manage religious diversity. Alfred Stepan examines Indonesia and the Pancasila philosophy, which explains the country's commitment to democracy and non-confrontational religious pluralism despite calls for an Islamic state. Pancasila explains Indonesia's commitment to democracy and non-confrontational religious diversity. Despite the majority of the Muslim population, other religions' holidays are celebrated. Stepan thinks that European democracies may adopt this strategy because "none of these 60 religious festivals in Western Europe is for a non-Christian minority faith" (p. 146). Due to the Malaysian and Indonesian cultural similarities in terms of religious practices, Europe can't learn much from Indonesia's experience, but Malaysia can imitate and learn much from Indonesia's history. According to Ahmad Fauzi, Abdul Hamid, and Zawawi Ibrahim, "soft secularism" is threatened in a country where state-driven Islamism is harming religious minorities.

Rochana Bajpai thinks that India has secular potential. In the book's last two chapters, Rochana contends that Hindu nationalism is a test case for secularism and diversity in India. Modood's moderate secularism is upheld in India as "equal consideration of

all religions” and “religious freedom rights of groups and minorities” (p. 217). Given the current political climate in India, one would question if other nations should be emulating India’s type of constitutional secularism, which allows for a wide range of religious and ethnic groups to coexist peacefully. It is worth noting that Muslim minorities are almost always at the center of political issues in India and Europe involving secularism and multiculturalism. This analogy isn’t developed enough in the chapter, and it would have been nice to hear more about the implications of Hindu nationalism.

Australia, which combines secularism and multiculturalism, is one of the three final nation scenarios that yield more concrete European lessons. State and federal laws prevent bigotry in public institutions. According to Geoffrey Brahm Levey, “Australian diversity works in some ways, not others” (p. 235). Particularly, he condemns what he sees as a rising tide of cultural nationalism, which has been boosted in the United States as it has in Europe by people’s worries about the integration of Muslims. The evaluation of Israel by Raphael Cohen-Almagor is far more damning since it “offends and discriminates against non-Orthodox Jews as well as non-Jews.” If Australia is unable to live up to expectations as an ideal example, then the judgment of Israel is much more scathing.” (p. 258).

Haldun Gülalp expertly explains how, while having been long cited as an example of “assertive secularism” alongside France, Turkey now employs the precise tools the state uses to marginalize religion in order to establish religious legitimacy. This might be one of the best sections of the book, since it corrects common misconceptions about Turkey’s secular government.

The collection is completed by two thought-provoking works by Joseph Weiler and Bhikhu Parekh. The editors have done an outstanding job of bringing together a remarkable collection of scholars to discuss these issues, which are important not only for political reasons in theory but also for practical policymaking. This book will be very helpful to anybody interested in studying secularism and diversity as they are practiced in other parts of the world. Those who were hoping to get insight into how Europe may meet the challenge posed by its many religious communities may be left dissatisfied. None of the authors argue for Europe to embrace the models and approaches discussed, and one of the main reasons for this is that many of these nations are “tending to move away from religious pluralism and/or secularism toward institutionalized religious majoritarianism” (p. 22). The most essential thing to learn from this situation is perhaps how we can prevent a situation like this from occurring in Europe. At this point in history, it would be a very valuable lesson.

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Book Review

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Book Review

Sanaa Alimia, **Refugee Cities: How Afghans Changed Urban Pakistan**, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2022, pp. 228, \$39.95, ISBN: 978-1-51282286-1

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“For many Afghans the cities of Pakistan are home” (p. 150).

Sanaa Alimia offers valuable insights into the microhistory of Afghan migration to urban Pakistan since the 1970s. She explores urban identities that are less concerned with nationality, ethnicity, and “imagined communities” than with *Insani Haquq* (basic human rights). The book explores how Pakistan’s changing geopolitics affected Afghans’ livelihoods and their sense of identity and belonging during four decades of violence in Afghanistan through oral histories of Afghan migrants in Karachi and Peshawar, two of Pakistan’s main cities. Alimia adopts the term “informal sphere” to characterize the situation of Afghan refugees and Pakistan State’s management of its citizens and noncitizens with regard to access to rights, resources, and social welfare, but with which they are unable or unwilling to actively deal. Refugees’ reliance on the informal sphere is a crucial aspect of daily living. The informality refers to “the production of legal goods and services that are not formally provided, protected and regulated by the state (p. 2).”

Alimia examines the history of Afghan migration to Pakistan during two major invasions: the Cold War period, the Soviet’s invasion in the 1980s when Afghans were welcomed, and the War on Terror (WOT), which began in 2001 when Afghans were unwelcomed. Alimia argues that during the latter period, Pakistan, in cooperation with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), encouraged Afghans to return home. She also highlights the fact that Pakistan is home to one of the highest numbers of refugees, undocumented migrants, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. There are one million low-skilled undocumented migrants from Bangladesh living in Pakistan in addition to a substantial number of Rohingya refugees, migrants from Sri Lanka, and the Philippines. Additional five million people have been internally displaced due to conflict, natural disasters, political persecution, and economic gains. The author uses an extensive multi-sited methodological approach that covers Pakistan’s two major cities, Karachi and Peshawar. The book is the outcome of eight years of fieldwork that includes over 500 interviews with low-income persons, daily wage laborers, small enterprise owners, and people working in the handicraft world (p. 9–10). Additional data was gathered through ethnography

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and archival analysis to support the interviews. The richness of the data is clear in the case studies from Peshawar and Karachi. Alimia was able to record every detail of her conversations with the people she interviewed during her field research.

The historical background of colonial and postcolonial Pakistan is briefly discussed in the introduction, which also sets the tone for the remainder of the book. Alimia critically analyzes the role that Afghan refugees, how they were used as political tools during the Cold War, and how the global war on terror changed the narratives between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The author skillfully structures her arguments into three parts with five chapters. Chapter 1 of Part I covers the Afghan question in Pakistan, as well as the geopolitical game played between the two neighbors during the Cold War and the WOT. The Durand Line, the Pashtun Question, and the tension that these two events created between Afghanistan and Pakistan are central in this section. The author argues that the Afghan state used the separatist Pashtunistan movement to pressurize Pakistan, while Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) supplied weapons in 1975 to Panjshir province in Afghanistan to overthrow the Afghan state.

Part II, consists of chapters 1–4, reconstructs the microhistories of low-income urban neighborhoods in Karachi and Peshawar. To determine whether Pakistani citizens are treated differently from noncitizen Afghan refugees in informal settings, the author also looks at Pakistani low-income citizens. In these chapters, Alimia critically highlights the collective actions of Afghan refugee and low-income Pakistani communities by bringing them to the fore, and, how these two communities fight to secure basic rights and resources. Through these shared actions, Alimia argues, an urban identity is constructed across ethnic and nationality lines. These chapters artfully unfold community mobilization and resilience against state power and relations. The power of middlemen in distributing politics between the state and (non)citizens is central to the debate in these chapters.

Chapter 5 of Part III discusses the new geopolitical game that emerged after 9/11 and a change in Pakistan's approach to managing Afghan migration. After 2001, in the post-Taliban era, Afghan refugees had to deal with sterner monitoring, documentation, detention, and deportation schemes. Return migration became a central part of Pakistan's new policy after the U.S. ousted the Taliban for harboring Osama bin Laden in 2001, who was later found and killed in Abbottabad in 2011. In this chapter, Alimia mentions the presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan without exploring the role of the ISI in providing sanctuaries to the leader of Al-Qaeda. By way of conclusion, the author reflects on the meaning of refugee status, citizenship, border-making, and geopolitical games. She concludes that Afghans have been an integral part of Pakistani urban settings. They have contributed to Pakistan's urban transformation. Some refugees might have returned to Afghanistan or migrated further to Europe due to the increasing hostile environment

in Pakistan, but the cities of which they have been part remain sites of attachment—in memory, identity, and emotions—as well through remittances, visits, return, cultural practices, and social relations (p. 149).

The book is a total masterpiece about the situation of low-skilled Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The voices of ordinary Afghan refugees and Pakistanis are hyper visible throughout the entire study. The author undertakes a bottom-up methodology to look at bigger national, regional, and global geopolitics and their impact on the day-to-day lives of low-income communities. The structure of the book, the quality of the writing, and the details explored in each chapter are all excellent. The analytical view of each case study Alimia has presented is commendable. The author makes it evident that she did not cover the military takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021 and its impact on future migration. She, however, states that Pakistan has offered itself as a transit for Afghans who wish to migrate further to Europe and the Americas.

I would have liked to have seen more about the role of Pakistani's ISI in using some of the formal and informal refugee camps in Khyber Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan as breeding grounds for international terrorism. The fight during the Cold War was not termed as "terrorism," but the process of radicalization and militarization of Afghan refugees and refugee camps started during the Cold War and shifted to religious schools during WOT. Two major educational centers emerged during two defining moments of the Afghan conflict that produced millions of refugees. First, in Hayatabad in Peshawar, where the author spent time during her fieldwork, the University of Dawat-ul Jihad was run by one of the most notorious Jihadi leaders under the patronage of Pakistan's ISI during the Cold War. Second, Darul Uloom Haqqania, some 60 km east of Peshawar, is known as the "University of Jihad" and is home to 4,000 students, mainly from refugee communities. The latter played a significant role, particularly during the WOT, but the author makes no mention of the latter. Additional information on the role of madrassas and their impact on geopolitics would have added extra lenses to the analysis of the WOT and Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Despite these few criticisms, I highly recommend this book as an excellent source for researchers and migration studies scholars, policy makers, international relations experts, and non-governmental organizations that work with Afghan refugees and hosting communities in Pakistan. Alimia offers a unique perspective on the concepts of inclusion and exclusion in her valuable contribution.

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