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EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, of Istanbul University is a peer reviewed journal which endeavors to disseminate academic knowledge among scholars, educators, policy makers and other societal stakeholders. With the valuable contributions of the participating authors to date, it has succeeded to take its place among the significant journals that are nominees to play the role of shaping the content of political sciences discipline in Turkey. It is currently indexed in Emerging Sources Citation Index, Ebsco Political Science Complete, Turkish Index of Social Sciences and Humanities (ULAKBİM) and Academia Social Science Index (ASOS Index). Following the change of its title to “Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences” in October 2017, the journal encourages theoretical and empirical articles majorly in the field of political sciences while also inviting substantive research from areas of social, humanities and administrative sciences.

This issue listed as Vol.32 Issue 1, March 2023 includes seven articles. The first article which is entitled as “Crisis and Corruption in Spain: Improving the Quality of Governance to Fight Corruption” is written by Prof. Ph.D Fernando JIMENEZ SANCHEZ from University of Murcia, Spain. The paper analyses data on the skyrocketing perception of corruption in Spain and links this perception not so much to an increase in bribery as to growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system. For this reason, it argues that there is an urgent need to improve the quality of Spain’s government institutions if citizens’ trust in their public institutions is to be restored. The paper finally poses nine reforms to raise quality of government in Spain.

The second article which is authored by Prof. Ph.D. Jose-Ignacio TORREBLANCA from The National Distance Education University of Spain-UNED is entitled as “Social Networks and Democracy: Problems and Dilemmas of Regulating the Digital Ecosystem”. This article analyses how the disintermediation of information facilitated by social networks aggravates the crisis of democracy. It shows how the characteristics of the digital ecosystem facilitate the spread of disinformation and fake news, erode citizens’ trust in the veracity of information and contribute to the undermining of representative democracy and its institutions. It also examines the regulatory strategies being adopted by democratic governments to restore the quality of public space and public confidence in the media and the dilemmas and difficulties they face in doing so.

Assoc. Prof. Ph.D. Erdal EROĞLU from Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University and Assoc. Prof. Ph.D. Gülçin TUNÇ together with Mine AYDEMİR DEV from Bursa Uludağ University and contribute to this issue by their article “Measuring NGOs’ Active Participation in Municipal Decision-Making in Türkiye”. This study tries to develop a new scale for measuring the active participation relation between municipalities and NGOs. The authors emphasize that while citizen participation at the local level is widely researched, a scale that aims to get NGO members’ perceptions about their level of participation and focuses on the budgeting process is not available. They have developed a new two dimensional participation scale which consists of ‘Participation mechanism’ and ‘Participation process’ and expect that obtaining data from NGOs will make it easier to understand the complex participatory relationship between citizens and the local administration.

The fourth paper is entitled as “Politicization of Migration Policies in the Visegrad Group’s Member States: A Means of Creating External Enemies of the Political system?” and written by Assoc. Prof. Ph.D. Przemyslaw Osiewicz from Adam Mickiewicz University of Poland. The main purpose of this article is to examine whether the process of politicization of migration policies in the member states of the Visegrad Group is used to create the image of external enemies of these societies. The author’s main assumption is that the leaders of the V4 states intentionally politicize migration issues and use them to achieve internal objectives. The author expects the main theoretical contribution of the article is to be the original typology of creating the image of migrants as enemies of the state, whereas the empirical contribution is actually based on an in-depth analysis of a selected cases of a group of V4 countries.

The next article of this issue which is authored by Assoc. Prof. Ph.D Marc Smyrl from University of Montpellier of France and Assoc. Prof. Ph.D Ceren Ark-Yıldırım from Istanbul University is entitled as “Between Locally Led Response and Domestic Blame Avoidance: Dilemmas in the Management of Syrians in Turkey”. In this article the authors try to find an answer to the question of “to what extent can humanitarian governance and host-country social protection schemes

converge?“. Although the 2016 humanitarian summit recommended a model of international humanitarian governance in which social policy instruments and actors should be given greater weight in humanitarian management, the authors argue that as long as supporting forced migrants from public resources is seen as an undesirable action by voters, host country governments must balance implementation of this internationally established norm with attention to “blame avoidance.”

The sixth article of this issue is entitled as “Citizens’ Attitudes Towards Online Communication Channels in Contacting Local Governments and the Emergence of Integrated Multi-Channel Platforms: The Case of Orange Table” and is written by Asst. Prof. Dr. Bengi Demirci and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nilüfer Güner Bildik from Akdeniz University. The article explores attitudes of citizens towards online communication channels when contacting local governments. The research was conducted with residents of Muratpasa district of Antalya and revealed that citizens still prefer traditional offline communication channels when contacting municipality. Calling by phone was the most preferred way which was followed by going personally. Social media was one of the least preferred communication channels.

Asst. Prof. Dr., Saadet Ulaşođlu İmamođlu from Kırklareli University contributes this issue by her article entitled as “The Impact of Ethnic Discrimination on the Prevention of Human Trafficking”. The article starts by emphasizing the importance of human trafficking problem for the international community and the legal framework that requires countries to take effective measures to eliminate this crime. Then the author examines whether or not ethnic discrimination affects countries’ preventative measures for human trafficking. The results of statistical analysis based on a data set that involves 165 countries over the years between 2003 and 2015 show that ethnic discrimination deteriorates the prevention of human trafficking.

I would like to thank to the authors who participate in this issue with their valuable papers, the reviewers for their precious effort, the editorial board members of the journal while hoping this issue to be an enjoyable and useful read for all the readers.

Prof. Dr. Esra Nemli alıřkan
Editor-in-Chief



SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Crisis and Corruption in Spain: Improving the Quality of Governance to Fight Corruption

Fernando Jiménez Sánchez¹

Abstract

This paper analyses data on the skyrocketing perception of corruption in Spain and links this perception not so much to an increase in bribery as to growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system. For this reason, it argues that there is an urgent need to improve the quality of Spain's government institutions if citizens' trust in their public institutions is to be restored. Corruption scandals in Spain have mainly emerged from sources such as town planning, public procurement and, above all, illegal party funding. All these corruption sources have evidenced serious institutional problems in Spanish governments and public administrations in all levels (national, regional and local). The paper poses nine reforms to raise quality of government in Spain. The first four proposals (strengthening the oversight capability of legislatures, the judiciary independence, the role of independent authorities, and reducing governments interference in the work of the media) focus on making limitations on the executives actually effective. The final five ones (improving quality of regulation, increasing professionalization of higher levels of public administration and public companies, maximizing transparency and the right to access to public information, protecting effectively whistleblowers, and disincentivating political careers of civil servants) focus on reducing the opportunities for corruption.

Keywords: Corruption, Spain, Quality of government, institutional reforms, public trust

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A Skyrocketing Perception of Corruption

Beginning with the analysis of data on the perception of corruption in Spain, Figure 1 brings together data from the special Eurobarometer on corruption to highlight the profound deterioration that has taken place in this country from the years of the Great Recession onwards.




Figure 1. Perceptions of corruption in Spain 2005-2022

Source: Special Eurobarometer on Corruption

Numerous indicators from many different surveys show an alarmingly high perception of the extent of corruption among Spaniards, and a significant increase in the years coinciding with the deep economic crisis that began in 2008. Data from the special Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which have been conducted at the EU level every two years or so since 2005, show that the deterioration in the perception of the problem in Spain is more than evident (Figure 1). Of all the EU countries, Spain is the one that has seen the biggest changes in recent years in the perception of corruption and in the perception of corruption as one of the most important problems facing the country. According to the latest available survey, conducted in April 2022, 89% of Spaniards believe that corruption is very or fairly widespread in the country. This figure places Spain in the top group of EU countries where this perception is highest, behind only Greece (98%), Cyprus and Croatia (94%), Hungary (91%) and Portugal (90%), and well above the EU average of 68%. Fourteen years earlier, in 2005, the perception of corruption as a major problem in Spain (73%) was high but close to the EU average (72%).

It is true that this increase in the perception of corruption has taken place in a context of severe economic crisis and harsh austerity measures in public spending, which have caused great social unrest. The increase in the perception of corruption and, above all, the way in which public concern about the problem has grown in recent years, seem to be a fundamental component of the climate of mistrust and discontent that has taken hold among Spaniards.

However, we must add a new aspect to these data in order to have a more accurate description of the corruption problem in Spain. This is the citizens' direct experience of paying bribes or, as it is known in the literature of corruption analysis, victimization surveys. In stark contrast to the high perception of the phenomenon, data on victimization are particularly low. According to the different waves of TI's Global Corruption Barometer, Spain's levels are very similar to those of Germany, Switzerland, Norway and even Finland.

Spain is one of the EU countries with the greatest difference between a very high perception of corruption and a very low direct experience of paying bribes to obtain public services. If we take the first figure, Spain would belong to a club of European countries that includes the leaders in this classification: Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Portugal, Slovakia and Hungary. However, if we look at the data on direct experience with bribery, the members of the club to which Spain would belong would be the United Kingdom, Portugal, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland and Denmark.

This scenario suggests that countries such as Spain and Portugal, but also some others such as Austria, Ireland and France, share a unique problem in terms of the extent and characteristics of corruption. The citizens of these countries perceive a high incidence of the phenomenon, but unlike countries suffering from systemic corruption (many of those in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, as well as Greece, if we stay within Europe), the direct experience of corruption in accessing certain public services is almost negligible. The reasons for the high perception of the problem must therefore be sought elsewhere.

In the Spanish case, there are several factors that explain this situation: a succession of corruption scandals that are closely followed by the media and political spokespersons and that tend to have a great impact on public opinion (cf. Palau and Davesa, 2013); or the spread of a perception of impunity and lack of punishment due to the exasperating slowness of judicial proceedings (around 10 years on average in corruption macro-cases) and the recurrent use of pardons for this type of crime (132 pardons for politicians convicted of corruption between 2000 and 2012). Moreover, as Frank Rusciano (2014) has shown, there is a high correlation between high perceptions of corruption and deteriorating perceptions of public service delivery, which is certainly the case in Spain. In addition to these factors, there is the background of a political culture characterized by a cynical view of democracy, which fuels great suspicion about the motivations of the main political actors, and in some periods of severe economic crisis, such as the one we have been experiencing for various reasons in the last decade, a deep institutional discontent that exacerbates the high perception of the phenomenon.

Main Causes of Corruption in Spain

The low level of direct experience of ordinary citizens does not mean that corruption is a minor problem in this Iberian country. What happens is that it is usually high-level corruption that affects the political and economic elites, and very little that of the civil servant at the counter or that suffered in other countries by the users of the main public services, such as health, education or the police. In the case of Spain, if we take into account the information provided by the scandals of these 40 years of democratic rule, political corruption has been recorded in three main areas of action with strong links between them. These are irregular party financing, the public procurement of goods and services, and urban planning.

Starting with party financing, the main problems have been related to illegal donations by certain large companies, the “generous” forgiveness of credit debts by financial institutions, or the abuse of public administrations under party control through actions such as the collection of commissions for the award of contracts, the diversion of funds from public subsidies, or the decapitalization of public or private companies.

The regulation of political financing in Spain, even after the reforms of 2007, 2012 and 2015, has been and continues to be seriously flawed. Some authors have suggested that these flaws are deliberate, as they are “designed to prevent knowledge of activities that political parties prefer to keep hidden” (García Viñuela and González de Aguilar, 2014: 160). In other words, with such a regulation of political financing, it is difficult to achieve the goal of citizens’ trust in parties. The shortcomings have been analyzed by various authors (Jiménez, 2007b; García Viñuela and Artés, 2008, Pérez Francesch, 2009) and by the GRECO reports (2009, 2011 and 2013). Problems can be found in each of the three main pillars of the Recommendation (2003)⁴ that the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe (CoE, 2003) dedicated to this issue: transparency, monitoring and sanctions (Jiménez, 2018, Jiménez and Villoria, 2018).

It has also been observed how a large part of the scandals of these years were related to the collection of illegal commissions for the award of public contracts, which, in certain cases and in certain percentages, were intended to finance the party that controlled the public administration that awarded the contract. The request that the Court of Audit devoted in 2006 to the analysis of the problems of control of local entities (Court of Audit, 2006) also reflected on the awarding of contracts, and many of these reflections are still fully valid and can be applied to other administrations. For example, some of the irregularities observed by the Court are due to the inadequate regulation of certain aspects of procurement. Specifically, the Court highlights three main aspects: the lack of definition of the characteristics that projects put out to tender should have; the lax regulation of calls for tender; and, finally, the inadequate definition of modifications, extensions and complementary works.

Even taking into account these regulatory shortcomings, the general rule is that the better equipped a public administration is in terms of human and material resources, the more difficult it is for administrative procurement to generate corruption. The problems become more serious the lower the scale of human and material resources in the hands of the administrations and also in the bodies of the institutional or instrumental administration

(public companies, consortia, foundations, etc.) where the control mechanisms are relaxed.

It can be concluded that public procurement, especially in territorial and institutional administrations, is carried out within a deficient institutional framework and in accordance with widespread irregular practices that make it very difficult to effectively control the actions of those responsible for these administrations. In short, this is a very fertile ground for the emergence of corrupt practices.

Finally, the institutional framework in which urban planning policy has been carried out in Spain in recent years has created enormous incentives for corruption from two sources. On the one hand, there is the fact of the enormous economic impact that public decisions - essentially in the hands of local and regional authorities - have had on urban land use. An impact that, unlike in our neighboring countries, is essentially on the wealth of the owners of the land that has been rezoned. In times of boom in the housing sector, such as the one Spain experienced between 1997 and 2006, and given the enormous difference between the value of rural land and that of building land, the temptation to “buy” a public decision that changes the declared use of a specific piece of land becomes difficult to resist. On the other hand, the various control mechanisms with which our political and legal system tries to prevent the use of public office for private gain, i.e. political corruption, have proven to be clearly insufficient in this area (Jiménez, 2009, Romero et al., 2012, García-Quesada et al., 2013, Jiménez et al., 2014 or García-Quesada et al., 2015).

Serious problems have been identified on at least four different levels: regulatory, bureaucratic, political and judicial. The hyper-regulation of urban planning activities paradoxically leaves certain doors open for a high degree of arbitrariness in decision-making. The use of administrative silence for the approval of clearly illegal urban planning licenses, as well as the conclusion of agreements with private individuals that give them a decisive role not only in the execution of urban planning, but in the planning itself, are clear examples of this problem.

Second, the bureaucratic internal control procedures that have traditionally been used to try to ensure the legality and economic rationality of the decisions of local authorities are now so deficient that in reality they do not provide effective control in the vast majority of our local authorities. The Court of Auditors warned of this serious problem in its devastating 2006 motion mentioned above. Thus, such a crucial internal control task as the audit function, which is reserved for officials with national accreditation, is “sensibly conditioned” for the following reasons, among others: a large number of posts reserved for officials with national accreditation remain vacant and are filled by random appointments, often with personnel “whose qualifications are not always adequate”; or the integration of officials with national accreditation into the local civil service, which has led to the dependence of those who have to control on the local body itself, which they are responsible for auditing.

As far as political control is concerned, although in many cases the role of the opposition is key to uncovering corrupt practices in this sector of activity, in many other cases it is incapable of sounding the alarm bells that lead to scrutiny of the work of those

in power. This is mainly due to three alternative reasons: either because of the lack of information on these matters, given the opacity of many urban planning procedures, such as agreements in many cases, or because of the social discomfort that it can cause these people to play the role of inquisitors of a leader who is highly respected and supported by the people, or because, as in Tagentopoli Italy, these other councilors receive their share of the spoils.

Finally, with regard to judicial control, the administrative jurisdiction, with cases that take an average of about eight years to resolve, presents a serious problem of efficiency that renders its control role highly ineffective in practice. Criminal jurisdiction, for its part, has also shown some problematic aspects in this area. On many occasions, investigating magistrates have raised preliminary administrative questions which, although they could have resolved them themselves, have been left in the hands of the public administration disputes judiciary, with all the consequences that this entails in terms of prolonging the proceedings. In addition, the complexity of urban planning offences often exceeds the human and material resources of the examining magistrates.

Many of these corruption cases in these three main risk areas have many common elements that need to be identified in order to make them the target of reform policies that seek to fight corruption effectively. In general, cases of irregular party and campaign financing have been linked to the other risk areas: rigged public contracts or urban planning decisions that favor the interests of certain businessmen. In other words, in all of them we find an exchange of irregular financing for public decisions that favor the donors, often in violation of regulations. The most worrying thing is that for a political party to be able to get the public administrations under its control to contribute to this exchange, it is necessary for those who work in such organizations to have a system of incentives that makes them willing to violate legal mandates. This is, as the prosecutor in the Palau case said in his indictment, the “abusive ascendancy” that senior party officials exercise over the staff of public administrations and which results in the “corrosion of the obligatory impartiality” of the latter.

As the work of Dimitri Sotiropoulos and others has shown, public administrations in southern European countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal) are generally characterized by extensive politicization. Sotiropoulos (2006) pointed out how this higher degree of penetration of party influence in the public bureaucracy is evidenced by two types of clientelism: top and bottom. Top clientelism refers to the depth of political appointments in the upper echelons of the administration. Unlike in Northern and Western European countries, political appointments in the South are not limited to the highest levels (ministers and secretaries of state or equivalent), but go down several levels to clearly technical positions, for which civil servants with clear sympathies for the ruling party or parties are selected. Bottom-up patronage refers to the self-serving control that the ruling parties exercise over the recruitment of those who will fill jobs in the lower echelons of the public sector.

As Víctor Lapuente pointed out in one of his press articles, this politicization of public administrations spreads a clear awareness among civil servants and public employees of what the real rules of the game are: “If a promising young person who has just joined an administration has professional ambitions, he will realize that devoting 100% of his effort

to doing an impeccably professional job may not be the best way to reach the top”. What is more, this excessive politicization of public administrations very often and worryingly extends to the independent control bodies (Constitutional Court, General Counsel of the Judiciary, Council for Transparency and Good Governance, Court of Auditors, National Securities Market Commission, National Commission for Markets and Competition, Nuclear Safety Council, etc.), hindering the effectiveness and impartiality with which they must carry out their work.

In general terms, as the Transparency International report on the Spanish National Integrity System (Villoria, 2012) concludes, the concern to ensure the governability of the political system has led, over the years of the democratic regime, to the strengthening of the ease of public decision-making to a point that is probably excessive and hinders the effective functioning of the controls that limit the exercise of political power.

These problems described above are serious enough, but the worst of all is the failure of our political leaders to address the root causes of corruption. For too long, either nothing has been done or only cosmetic reforms have been made to get out of the way. While it is true that this inaction did not cause much concern among citizens for many years, in the end, the harsh years of crisis that began in 2010, as mentioned above, completely changed the perception and concern about corruption. Since then, Spanish society has shown a high level of indignation and constant unease towards corruption and politicians in general. At the same time, the level of trust in governments in our country has plummeted, going from a more or less even balance between those who trust and those who do not trust in April 2001 (45 versus 47 percent) to a truly dramatic situation in November 2019 (20 versus 75 percent), according to Eurobarometer data. The reader can imagine how difficult it is to develop public programs and conduct national policies in an environment of distrust and institutional dissatisfaction such as the one that has arisen.

This is why it is so important to introduce appropriate and necessary far-reaching reforms that drastically reduce the opportunities for corruption in order to regain the trust of citizens in their public institutions and political leaders. However, as Daniel Kaufmann is fond of saying, “You don’t fight corruption by fighting corruption,” i.e., the only way to minimize corruption risks is through reforms that improve the quality of governance in a country. I will conclude this text by outlining a minimum program to do so, in line with a report prepared with Francisco Alcalá for the BBVA Foundation and the Ivie (Alcalá and Jiménez, 2018).

Moralizing Public Life by Improving the Quality of Governance

Since the pioneering work of Douglass North (North and Thomas, 1973 and North, 1990), we have known that a country’s institutions are a key factor in explaining its level of development. Institutions encourage and constrain certain behaviors of economic and political actors, so that a country’s development depends on the extent to which its institutional framework encourages innovation. This depends on the economic institutions that have been put in place, and these in turn depend on the political institutions of the country in question. The question, of course, is what we should do, what institutional reforms we should introduce, in order to improve the quality of institutions in Spain, in order to boost the country’s development and increase the level of public integrity.

While countries that stand out for the quality of their government institutions (and are therefore more effective in controlling corruption) have developed a system that strengthens the effectiveness and legitimacy of checks and balances to limit the use of power by the executive, in Spain we have taken the opposite path over the years. We have opted for the ease with which the government can make decisions, and we have considered it a nuisance that the mechanisms of control and accountability should be limited as much as possible. The extreme situation to which the crisis that began in 2008 has led us, has exploded the level of dissatisfaction of Spanish citizens with the functioning of our system of government, while the succession of corruption scandals has exposed many of its weaknesses.

It is therefore necessary to reverse this situation by means of appropriate institutional reforms that allow for a more effective control of power, without going to the extreme of making governance impossible. To this end, I divide the proposals into two main groups. The first aims to reduce the sense of impunity associated with rising levels of corruption by strengthening the checks and balances of the political system. The second set of proposals aims to reduce the opportunities and resources available for corruption.

With regard to the first set of measures, we have observed that the mechanisms for controlling executive power in Spain do not guarantee a sufficiently effective limitation of executive power. This implies introducing reforms in at least three areas: strengthening the traditional separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary; strengthening the specialized control bodies that have emerged over time in all liberal democracies (ombudsman, information commissioners, courts of auditors, independence of central banks...); and guaranteeing a level playing field with fewer government distortions for the media.

In these three areas, the reforms to be introduced would have three common features: guaranteeing and strengthening the independence of the work of these institutions from the government; increasing their capacity and resources so that they can carry out their oversight functions effectively; and, finally, establishing mechanisms of responsibility and accountability by which these oversight bodies must demonstrate that they are making good use of the increased powers that these reforms would give them.

The four reforms that could be pursued in this area are as follows.

Strengthen the Oversight Capacity of the Legislature (at all territorial levels)

The aim would be to provide more resources and specialized support staff to strengthen the work of parliamentarians and municipal representatives, enabling them to carry out a more conscientious monitoring of the executive's activities. Ramió (2016) has proposed the creation of a public policy evaluation office within the legislature, in order to have precise knowledge of the real impact achieved by the various government action programs. This office should be composed of highly specialized and well-paid professionals, as its proper functioning would be highly cost-effective for the proper use of public resources.

Strengthen the Independence of the Judiciary

Although, in general, the independence of the judiciary is sufficiently guaranteed in Spain and judges carry out their work without constant political interference, a well-known

GRECO report has drawn attention to the excessive politicization of the appointment of members of the higher bodies of the judiciary (Supreme Court and High Courts of the Autonomous Communities) through the politicization of the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) and has recommended that measures be taken to strengthen the independence of these bodies.

In addition, a number of corruption-related trials have revealed serious problems with the effectiveness of the functioning of the courts. Proceedings for corruption offenses tend to take considerably longer than the average for ordinary cases. In addition, a fact that often hampers the investigation of these cases in Spain is related to the enormous number of public officials with privileged immunity, which leads to the transfer of cases under investigation from one court to another, with the consequent delays. Therefore, it would be advisable to reduce the number of people with privileged immunity in Spain as much as possible, so as not to alter the principle of the natural judge or hinder the development of investigations.

Strengthen the Independence and Capacity of Specialized Oversight Bodies Such As Courts of Audit, Transparency Councils, Ombudsmen, etc.

The procedures for appointing the heads of these bodies must ensure the suitability of the candidates, both in terms of their professional qualifications and their political independence. And once appointed, they should be provided with adequate resources to carry out their responsibilities, while being encouraged to do so with maximum efficiency and independence.

Reduce Government Interference in the Work of The Media

It is necessary to maximize the impartiality with which the various governmental bodies that are competent in the matter carry out three important tasks: they contract institutional advertising in the media; they distribute subsidies among them; and they grant licenses among the audiovisual media so that they can operate. This means reducing as much as possible the margin of discretion (or arbitrariness) with which these three tasks are carried out. This requires the development of objective criteria for the distribution of these assets and their maintenance over time.

A second component of this proposal has to do with the governance of public media. With few exceptions, the most common model of public media management in Spain is highly politicized. The public media are usually conceived as a resource that serves the interests of the party at the head of the government on which the media depend, thus ignoring alternative models of less politicized management, such as the often cited example of the BBC.

As for the second set of measures, which in this case refers to reducing the opportunities and resources for corruption, one of the leading specialists in the analysis of corruption and what needs to be done to contain it, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2016), emphasizes the need not only to improve the controls that allow for effective limitation of executives, but also to reduce the opportunities for corruption. Corruption is understood as all institutional arrangements that allow privileged and discretionary access to public power. For example, the existence of monopolies and oligopolies, but also other types of arrangements such as negative networks of social capital, cartels and other collusive arrangements, or

deliberately poor and inadequate regulation that encourages administrative discretion, or the lack of transparency that turns information into privileged capital for those in power and their close associates. In this second area, the reforms that should be promoted are the following:

Improving the Quality of Regulation

Regulatory quality is one of the World Bank's worst governance indicators in Spain (in fact, the worst one in the last years). As Mungiu-Pippidi warns, the poor quality of regulation leaves room for the discretionary, opaque and ultimately corrupt exercise of power. The Sansón Carrasco Collective (2014) of the Hay Derecho Foundation offers a rather worrying data on the regulatory tangle that exists in the country: in Spain there are one hundred thousand regulatory provisions, ten times more than in Germany, despite the fact that this country has twice the Spanish population and a (complex) institutional architecture similar to that of Spain. Although the temptation to solve public problems with new regulations is deeply rooted in the culture of Spanish political representatives, given this panorama, it would be better to undertake a serious task of regulatory simplification in order to untangle the situation in which we find ourselves (Jiménez, 2020).

Improving the quality of regulation should also be accompanied by the introduction of a legislative footprint. In other words, all regulations should have a clear record of the political process from which they emerged: who was involved in the process, with whom they met, which stakeholders were consulted or submitted their views on the regulation, etc.

Depoliticize The Higher Levels of Public Administration and “Para-Administrati-on” (Companies, Agencies, Foundations, etc.).

A decisive criterion of the quality of state institutions is the observance of the principle of impartiality in their functioning. In this respect, the degree of politicization of public organizations is crucial. The more politicized they are, and the less professional they are, the greater the scope for them not to respect this principle. Thus, in the actions of politicized public administrations, the electoral interests of the parties in charge predominate over the professional logic of what good public administration should be. For example, public contracts are awarded not to the company that made the best offer according to technical and professional criteria, but to the company that contributed to the electoral effort that brought that party to power. Or public jobs are awarded not to the most suitable candidates in terms of education, capacity and merit, but to those who form part of the party's electoral support base, regardless of whether they are qualified to carry out the tasks in question.

A large number of the corruption scandals that we have witnessed over the years show the ease with which the leaders of the governing party, at whatever territorial level, get the public administrations under their control (and even more so the public companies, foundations and other decentralized bodies) to bend to their dubiously legal or blatantly illegal desires. In this way, they have been able to exchange certain public decisions, such as the awarding of a contract, the granting of a building permit or a certain regulation favorable to the interests of a third party, for support for the party in the form of votes, donations or favorable image campaigns in the media.

A key objective for improving the quality of our political institutions is therefore to reduce the degree of politicization of public administrations. This requires that the number of posts whose appointment depends on criteria of political trust be greatly reduced and limited to those at the highest level of each organization, where the political priorities of the organization are set.

In addition, something that was only advanced on paper in the Basic Statute of the Public Employee in 2007 should become a reality: the regulation of professional public management. Spanish public administrations need professional public managers who can provide good management skills and give stability to public policies beyond the electoral cycle. To this end, access, tenure and exit from these positions should be regulated, ensuring protection against partisan or arbitrary dismissal. This includes selection and performance evaluation processes that are not in the hands of the politicians at the top of these organizations.

Ensure Maximum Transparency of Public Organizations and the Ability to Assess the Real Impact of Their Actions.

The ability to control corruption and for the public to know what is being done with the resources that citizens contribute through their taxes requires maximum transparency in the functioning of governments. Opacity increases opportunities for corruption, waste and mismanagement of public affairs. Advancing this goal would require progress in a number of areas, including the following.

First, full transparency in public spending should be achieved. This requires not only that public bodies provide all the information necessary for citizens to know how their money is being spent, but also that the way in which this information is provided adheres to a number of principles. The first is that such information should be as simple as possible so that it can be accessed in a very intuitive way. In addition, the information must be provided in formats that can be worked with by those who have the interest and knowledge to do so (media professionals or NGOs).

A second important aspect is the knowledge of the public and private agendas of the most relevant public officials. At present, information is only given (and not very accurately) about their public agendas, but it is important to know what kind of people and institutions these representatives meet with in their free time. And in this effort to improve citizens' access to key public information, with the aim of reducing opportunities for corruption, it is also important to remember the importance of thorough impact assessment of public policies.

Finally, another important aspect of this proposal has to do with improving information on the conflicts of interest in which public officials may be involved. In many cases, those who hold public office are confused about how to behave when faced with a potential conflict of interest in the exercise of their office or when they leave their office to engage in a private activity. The creation of public ethics commissions within public organizations to enforce codes of conduct and monitor potential conflicts of interest at all three stages of public life (entry, performance and exit) would be a good solution.

Protect Whistleblowers

Whistleblower protection is a key aspect of undermining corruption schemes and breaking the circles of silence around them. Indeed, the experience of some corruption whistleblowers has been traumatic. The implementation of whistleblower protection mechanisms would serve to change these incentives and would likely encourage the disclosure of new cases of corruption by significantly reducing the expectations of impunity held by many of those involved.

Debureaucratize Politics by Separating Administrative and Political Careers

The depoliticization of public administration should be complemented by preventing civil servants and public employees from entering politics. This, of course, would mean a revolution in the current situation where civil servants are over-represented in the Spanish political class.

This proposal has been promoted among us, notably by Víctor Lapuente (2016, ch. 2), and is based on the following reasoning. If we want those who work in public administrations to be able to develop a logic of action based exclusively on professional and purely technical criteria for the management of public affairs, counterbalancing the necessary and legitimate electoral logic of the public officials who run public organizations, the careers of the one and the other must be clearly separated. To the extent that civil servants can understand that the leap into politics is the best way for them to culminate their professional careers and consolidate the highest levels of employment to which they can aspire, we will contribute to confusing the two operational logics that drive public administrations, and we will torpedo the possibility of both logics acting as counterweights to prevent abuses in one direction or the other, because the result is a collusion of interests between both types of actors.

Conclusion

This paper analyzes data on the skyrocketing perception of corruption in Spain and links this perception not so much to an increase in bribery as to growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system. For this reason, there is an urgent need to improve the quality of Spain's government institutions if citizens' trust in their public institutions is to be restored.

It is true that this increase in the perception of corruption has taken place in a context of severe economic crisis and harsh austerity measures in public spending, which have caused great social unrest. The increase in the perception of corruption and, above all, the way in which public concern about the problem has increased in recent years, seem to be a fundamental component of the climate of mistrust and discontent that has taken hold among Spaniards. To these data, however, we must add a new aspect in order to have a more accurate description of the corruption problem in Spain. Spain is one of the EU countries with the largest difference between a very high perception of corruption and a very low direct experience of paying bribes to obtain public services. This scenario suggests that countries such as Spain and Portugal, but also some others such as Austria, Ireland and France, share a unique problem in terms of the extent and characteristics of corruption. The citizens of these countries perceive a high incidence of the phenomenon, but unlike countries suffering from systemic corruption (many of those in Eastern Europe

and the Balkans, as well as Greece, if we stay within Europe), the direct experience of corruption in accessing certain public services is almost negligible. In the Spanish case, there are several factors that explain this situation: a series of corruption scandals that are closely followed by the media and political spokespersons and that tend to have a strong impact on public opinion.

However, the low level of direct experience of ordinary citizens does not mean that corruption is a minor problem in our country. In the case of Spain, if we take into account the information provided by the scandals of these 40 years of democratic rule, political corruption has been recorded in three main areas of action with strong links between them: the financing of political parties, the collection of illegal commissions for the award of public contracts, and urban planning policy. Many of these corruption cases in these three main risk areas have many common elements that need to be identified in order to make them the target of reform policies that want to fight corruption effectively. In general, cases of irregular party and campaign financing have been associated with the other risk areas: rigged public contracts or urban planning decisions favoring the interests of certain businessmen. What is most worrying is that for a political party to be able to get the public administrations under its control to contribute to these exchanges, the people working in these organizations must have a system of incentives that makes them willing to violate legal mandates. Moreover, this excessive politicization of public administrations very often extends, worryingly, to the independent control bodies (Constitutional Court, General Counsel of the Judiciary, Council for Transparency and Good Governance, Court of Auditors, National Securities Market Commission, National Commission for Markets and Competition, Nuclear Safety Council, etc.), hindering the effectiveness and impartiality with which they must carry out their work.

While countries that stand out for the quality of their government institutions (and are therefore more effective in controlling corruption) have developed a system that strengthens the effectiveness and legitimacy of checks and balances to limit the use of power by executives, in Spain over the years we have taken the opposite path. The extreme situation to which the crisis that began in 2008 has led us has exploded the level of dissatisfaction of Spanish citizens with the functioning of our system of government, while the succession of corruption scandals has exposed many of its weaknesses. It is therefore necessary to reverse this situation through appropriate institutional reforms that allow for a more effective control of power, without going to the extreme of making governance impossible.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Social Networks and Democracy: Problems and Dilemmas of Regulating the Digital Ecosystem

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Abstract

The crisis of representative democracy is to a large extent a crisis of disintermediation. Its best known and most studied manifestation is expressed in the weakening of political parties and representative institutions and the link between them and the citizenry. However, the weakening of traditional media and the progressive replacement of their intermediary role between politics and citizens by social networks, although less studied, is of critical importance. This article analyses how the disintermediation of information facilitated by social networks aggravates the crisis of democracy. It shows how the characteristics of the digital ecosystem facilitate the spread of disinformation and fake news, erode citizens' trust in the veracity of information and contribute to the undermining of representative democracy and its institutions. It also examines the regulatory strategies being adopted by democratic governments to restore the quality of public space and public confidence in the media and the dilemmas and difficulties they face in doing so.

Keywords: Democracy, Social media, Mass Media, Disinformation, Fake News, Authoritarianism, Internet Governance, Freedom of Speech, Information-age, Public Sphere

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Introduction¹

It is well known that representative democracy is undergoing a profound crisis. Freedom House (2022) and other relevant organisations have noted, in parallel to the rise of populism and authoritarianism, the worrying decline of democracy at the global level, a trend that is manifesting itself for the seventeenth consecutive year and is therefore structural rather than cyclical.

The facets of this democratic crisis are manifold and cannot be dealt with systematically here. It is important to note, however, its intimate connection with the technological change facilitated by the digital revolution. This transformation has a profound and lasting impact on a fundamental element of democracy: the functioning of the public space and, within it, the role of the media as intermediaries between citizens and political power.

This article aims to analyse the characteristics of the digital ecosystem that erode citizens' trust in the veracity of information and thus contribute to undermining democracy and its institutions. It aims to facilitate discussion on the regulatory options that legislators should consider protecting the general interest and rebuild a public and media space compatible with democratic principles and values.

The article has four sections. The first examines a lesser-known aspect of the crisis of representative democracy: the informational crisis that accompanies it. The second section details the characteristics of the digital ecosystem that increase the weakness and vulnerability of shared public space and representative institutions. The third outlines the reasons and ways in which authoritarian regimes exploit these vulnerabilities to interfere in democratic electoral processes and to undermine citizens' trust in democratic institutions and political forces. The fourth attributes these tensions to an extremely lax regulatory approach that has had adverse consequences both from a market (opening the way to monopolistic practices and situations) and political and social (weakening of the media and shared public space) point of view. To conclude, the different regulatory strategies adopted in the US and the European Union are examined, pointing out the markedly interventionist character of the latter as opposed to the US.

A Public Space in Crisis

Democracy is impossible without a shared public space. In that space there are facts and opinions. Information establishes the facts and deliberation allows for the exchange of arguments about the value and interpretation of those facts. In this public space, so-called "alternative facts", a crude but dangerous synonym for lies, are set against "raw facts". That is why it is said that citizens are entitled to their own opinions, but not their own facts. Without facts there is no possibility of debate, no possibility of establishing truth and no possibility of democracy (Arendt, 2017 [1967]).

In a small-scale democracy, such as the Greek one, the public space (the agora) can be face-to-face and governed by direct communication. But in a large-scale democracy, this is impossible. Because of their scale and complexity, contemporary democracies can only be indirect, or representative, democracies, which is why the crisis of representation

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they suffer is so important and central to the democratic crisis. Liberal democracy, with its checks and balances, separation of powers and rule of law, cannot be led just by assemblies. In fact, direct democracy has never guaranteed a quality deliberative public space, not even, as Socrates himself could testify, in Greece itself. Just as assemblies tended to be irrational even in Greek times and were easily manipulated by demagogues, contemporary experiments with direct democracy formulas have not generally fared any better (think, for example, of the Brexit referendum).

As we see daily, today's digital agora is very much like those chaotic assemblies, Greek or contemporary, where emotion easily prevails over reason and the most radical opinion displaces the most moderate. And it bears little resemblance to democratic parliaments, which over time have developed numerous institutional mechanisms designed to guarantee a certain stability of legislation: elections every four years, voting discipline, super-majority decision thresholds, constructive motions of censure, or specialised committees, among other mechanisms (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981).

While there was initially hope that the digital revolution would facilitate the transition to closer and more authentic direct democracy, this utopian dream has turned out to be false, and even dangerous. Digital democracy is technologically possible, but its political consequences can be devastating. Democracy requires, and will continue to require, intermediaries (political representatives) and, at the same time, the media, which are crucial for citizens to be able to know truthfully what their representatives are doing and thus to be able to control them effectively. Without reliable intermediaries, citizens cannot know the facts, establish the truth and thus control their rulers.

The problem is that technological change, as it has taken place over the last two decades, alters the ecosystem that allows representative democracy to exist. First, because it weakens the traditional intermediaries, the political parties, allowing citizens to coordinate more effectively to come up with alternative formulas for political participation and representation. This, which in principle should be welcome in that it allows citizens to break the oligopoly exercised by traditional parties, ends up proving problematic because the new parties or forms of participation that emerge, whether civic platforms or virtual communities, often fall into the same vices that they denounced and end up becoming plebiscitary parties dominated by hyper-leadership without internal plurality. All this is due to the same phenomenon experienced by the Greeks: disintermediation does not transfer sovereignty from the intermediaries to the grassroots, but to an even smaller and more difficult to control minority. The large technological platforms, after disintermediating the traditional media, have become closed monopolies that abuse their dominant position and prevent and block the progress of other companies (Lanier, 2018; López-Blanco, 2019; Soros, 2019).

The impact of digital disintermediation does not end with the weakening of political representation, but also has a powerful impact on the media, whose business model is weakened, making it impossible to finance quality journalism. It does so primarily through the diversion of audiences and consequent advertising revenues to digital platforms and social media. The European Commission has estimated that between 2010 and 2014 alone, the loss of revenue for print news publishers was €13.45 billion (European Commission 2018). These figures should come as no surprise as Facebook/Meta has 2 billion users,

YouTube 2.1 billion, WhatsApp 2 billion and Instagram 1.2 billion, and Tik Tok 1 billion. Out of a worldwide digital advertising market of \$567 billion, Google and Facebook now account for 29% and 19%, respectively (Digiday, 2022).

As in the case of political parties, the crisis of the traditional media would not represent a problem if, as was envisaged at the beginning of this revolution, their digital substitutes could not only replace them in the fulfilment of this intermediation function, but even improve it, thus making it possible to overcome the shortcomings and errors of their analogue predecessors. The problem is that the new intermediaries, technological platforms and social networks, largely because of their own nature and business model, but also because of inadequate regulation, do not offer a re-intermediation that compensates for the disintermediation they cause, and therefore lack the necessary qualities to generate an alternative democratic public space to the one they destroy.

As evidence of this erosion of public trust, the Gallup Institute (Gallup and Kellogg Foundation 2019) found that between 2003 and 2016, the percentage of Americans who said they trusted the media fell from 54% to 32%. Most respondents identified inaccuracies and biases as the main factors behind their loss of trust in the media, to the point of placing it at the bottom of indicators of trust in democratic institutions (Ingram, 2018).

At the European level, things are not much different: according to Eurobarometer data, 68% of Europeans say they have been exposed one or more times a week to false or distorting information. Significantly, while 53% of Europeans still say they trust the press, only 24% say they trust the information they receive via social media and messaging platforms. The worrying result is that 82% of respondents say that fake news and misinformation are a problem for democracy (Eurobarometer 2018).

According to the Edelman Trust Barometer, which includes 26 countries, the problem is global in scope: put in order of their degree of trust in four key institutions - governments, businesses, NGOs and the media - the latter would be the worst rated institution of the four, enjoying the trust of only 47% of respondents, with only a worrying 36% trust in Spain (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2019).

The deterioration of that trust has led the London School of Economics to identify five major ills in British citizens' attitudes towards the public sphere and, consequently, to assert the existence of a "systemic information crisis that requires coordinated, long-term institutional responses" (Livingstone, 2019: 7). These five elements would be: "confusion", leading citizens to be unsure about what is true and what to believe; "cynicism", leading them to lose trust, even in authoritative sources; "fragmentation" of citizens into information niches where parallel realities and narratives exist; "irresponsibility", visible in the proliferation of organisations that operate both outside traditional ethical codes and outside control and accountability for their actions; and, finally, "apathy", manifested in a growing disaffection of citizens with the public sphere and a loss of faith in democracy and its institutions.

Risk Factors in the Digital Ecosystem

It is important to point out that the information crisis predates the digital era, as do the problems of democracy. Each wave of populism and democratic crisis has been

associated with an information crisis and a communication technology that has made it possible to disseminate the ideas of these movements. The press, which today we praise and whose demise we fear, played a major role in mobilising the first waves of populism that shook European democracies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It was also instrumental in instigating in European populations the nationalism that led to the Great War of 1914. As the British tabloids still show today, the tabloids never needed digital tools to sell its yellow journalism to the public. And the same can be said of radio, now considered a reputable medium, but which has been the indispensable companion of all totalitarianisms, from the 1930s to the most recent Rwandan genocide. And even books and the printing press, today sacralised as the highest forms of communication and culture, have historically played a very problematic role as instruments for spreading falsehoods, hateful ideologies, and disinformation. Recall how the biggest anti-Semitic propaganda operation, the one articulated around the false Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which claimed to prove the existence of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy, was prepared, printed, and disseminated by the Tsarist political police. Thus, the relationship between politics and communication technologies has always been complex. In that sense, although the digital revolution does not offer something new (the possibility of manipulating public opinion), it does offer something new and different (the possibility of doing so much more quickly and effectively).

There are several problems endogenous to social networks and digital platforms that make them highly problematic from the point of view of democracy. Disintermediation, already mentioned, is one of them. Also important is the business model, based on the so-called “attention economy”, which revolves around the need to keep users on the platforms for as long as possible to expose them to as many advertisements as possible and to collect as much data on their behaviour as possible. The monetisation of attention requires prioritising emotions and the most controversial or eye-catching facts; in the case of politics, this involves amplifying negative or confrontational messages that deepen polarisation and generate traffic (Goldhaber, 1997; Gómez de Ágreda, 2019).

Another element is opacity. The algorithms that decide what takes precedence and what users of social media platforms and networks see first or most often are opaque. This means that users who want to appear in prominent positions on search engines or platforms have incentives to try to force the ranking system that companies use (the algorithms) in their favour. Most of the time this is done legitimately, i.e., by paying companies to achieve a better ranking, others by trying to understand how search engines work to optimise their posts for better rankings; sometimes by artificially and fraudulently generating traffic (Ghosh and Scott, 2018; Simpson and Conner, 2020).

A third problematic factor inherent to the digital ecosystem is the lack of adequate filters and controls, as networks are designed to facilitate access, not restrict it, making it easier for false information to pass as legitimate. In turn, the platforms’ automatic advertising systems allow and encourage the creation of websites that appear to be legitimate media outlets but function as repositories and launderers of fraudulent information. These media pretend to be journalistic companies, but in reality, they are agents at the service of certain causes and political actors whose main task is to launder false information (Meleshevich and Schafer 2018). They usually establish and present themselves as local

media, as they are the ones, due to their proximity, that unsuspecting citizens are most likely to trust, and they generate traffic based on legitimate news (weather, sports, events or local information), which allows them to capture advertising revenue. On top of this content, they then add different layers of misinformation, for example, xenophobic or conspiratorial in nature (Yin *et al*, 2018).

In addition to the dissemination and re-dissemination of messages, true or false, by social networks on the basis of their algorithms, there is the presence of third party actors, who with advanced tools (fake accounts, bots) are able to create or amplify conversations, falsifying the image and perception that other users have of what is really happening and what is being said in the digital agora. For example, a study by Alto Analytics (2019) showed, after examining a total of 25 million movements on social networks (combining Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and other digital communities), that 0.05% of users, who showed abnormal behaviours suggesting automation in the dissemination and re-dissemination of content, were responsible for at least 10% of the total political content generated during the Spanish European election campaign in May 2019. Similar studies by the same company have detected similar patterns of abnormal behaviour in phenomena such as the election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, the yellow vest protests in France, or the anti-vaccine movements, among others.

The investigations into the Brexit referendum in June 2016, along with the US election in November 2016 that brought Trump to power, have given us a better understanding of how malicious actors have been able to exploit some of these features of social media to manipulate voters' sentiments and potentially guide their vote. Investigations by the FBI, the US Attorney's Office and independent experts have yielded solid and abundant evidence on the depth and extent of such interference. Operation Lakhta, coordinated from the Internet Research Agency, a huge troll farm based in St. Petersburg, published some 10 million fake tweets, 116,205 fake Instagram posts, 1,107 YouTube videos and 61,483 Facebook posts, reaching a combined audience of 126 million people in the US. This immense digital activity was not only important in quantitative terms but also qualitatively, as it was designed and targeted with very precise patterns of message segmentation by communities: the campaign encouraged right-wing voters to go out and vote through fake ads in which Muslim organisations invented in St. Petersburg but pretending to be based in the US called for a vote for Hillary ("Muslims for Hillary"). In other cases, the influence was aimed at reinforcing the African American community's feelings of pride and belonging (@blacklivesmatter) in order to demobilise their vote and get them not to support Hillary Clinton (SCSI, 2018; US vs Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, 2018).

The micro-segmentation and disinformation tools used by the Kremlin converged with those used by the Trump campaign, directed by Steve Bannon, financed by Robert Mercer (who had also promoted Brexit) and designed by the Cambridge Analytica company, directed by Alexander Nix, which brought together the best experts in psychometric techniques, i.e., designed to understand and manipulate the emotions of voters. One of these techniques, called OCEAN, used five concepts: "openness" to experience, "conscientiousness", "extraversion", "agreeableness", and "neuroticism" to construct personality profiles. This research was then transferred to the experimental level, where, via focus groups with groups of potential voters, an attempt was made to understand how

negative political emotions functioned and were instigated. SCL, Cambridge Analytica's campaigning company, boasted to its clients that it had profiled 240 million Americans, with between four and five thousand pieces of data on each of them (Confessore and Hakim, 2017; Wylie, 2019).

The ease with which it was possible to present distorted information or manipulate emotions and influence the voting intentions of millions of Americans was not only due to the lack of scruples of some companies or businessmen but also to the simplicity with which these companies were able, thanks to their collaboration with digital platforms such as Facebook, to appropriate the personal data of 87 million Americans to use them for fraudulent political purposes. In this way, they gained invaluable voter information that other political campaign operators and polling companies lacked, allowing them to target their campaign resources and messages to 13.5 million potential voters in sixteen key states in the American Midwest that traditional companies had previously ignored for lack of accurate data and profiles (Persily, 2017).

It has been estimated that the combined impact of these actions resulted in 25% of Americans being exposed to some form of fake news during the height of the election campaign (October-November 2016), but with a very significant incidence among conservative voters: 6 out of 10 visits to these fake news repositories were concentrated among the top 10% of conservative voters (Guess *et al*, 2018). Moreover, older people were the most vulnerable: those aged 65 and over were five times more likely to share fake news than those aged 18-25 (Barberá, 2018; Howard *et al*, 2019).

Although companies such as Facebook have repeatedly denied offering their customers products based on information about their users' emotional states, there is sufficient evidence that their staff have done so (Levin, 2017). More seriously, Facebook has not only collected emotional information, but experimented with how to create or manipulate those emotions (Garcia-Martinez, 2017). The ultimate goal of all this research, commercial in its origin, was to offer advertisers the possibility to reach their potential consumers with a precision never known before, even in a predictive way, i.e., to be able to predict from consumers' activity on social networks at what point a consumer was planning or predisposed to purchase a consumer item (Biddle, 2018).

In the political arena, Facebook researchers have also successfully experimented with techniques to increase voter turnout based on social pressure from the voter's immediate environment: in the 2010 congressional elections, it mobilised an additional 340,000 voters in an experiment involving 61 million users (Bond *et al*, 2012; Corbyn, 2012). It has also done research on how to influence the political opinions and votes of people using its platform based on the order of presentation and sequence of presentation of information about a candidate or party or according to theories of 'emotional contagion' (Kramer *et al*, 2014).

As Soshana Zuboff (2020) has warned, for years users thought they were using Google as a search engine when the reality was that Google was the instrument for searching them. It was therefore just a matter of moving the research that the platforms themselves were already doing on the emotional predispositions of their users from the consumer to the political level (Christl *et al*, 2017). Given the immense volume of personal information

collected by platforms without users' knowledge and for marketing and advertising purposes, it was only a matter of time before this information was used for electoral purposes. As Emma Briant (2018) has pointed out, advances in propaganda techniques that combine the illegal extraction of personal data with the use of artificial intelligence tools and knowledge derived from neuroscience and psychology are far ahead of our knowledge and, consequently, our ability to regulate.

Foreign Interference in Democracies

Although important, election interference represents only a small part of the disinformation problem: its scope and depth have made it a major global problem. Freedom of the Net (2019) identifies as many as 30 governments that produce and disseminate content to distort information circulating on the internet, with particular emphasis on Russia, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

As we have seen during the COVID-19 crisis, information has become an additional field of geopolitical friction between authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies (Rosenberger and Howard, 2020). In the Russian case, through increased actions aimed at sowing confusion and mistrust in scientists and politicians. And in the Chinese case, through a strategy aimed at covering up the damage that the initial origin and concealment of the virus has done to its international image (Cardinal, 2020; East Stratcom Task Force, 2020). This strategy has had two elements of action: one positive or friendly, consisting of using social networks to amplify the image of Chinese generosity and the corresponding gratitude; the other, more aggressive, aimed at sowing information that reinforces the theory that the virus may not have originated in China or attacking those who criticise China. An example of this first strategy is the study by Formiche magazine of the 47,821 tweets by the Chinese Embassy in Rome in February 2020 showing photographs of planes carrying Chinese medical equipment to help in the COVID-19 crisis: the study concluded that 46.3% of these tweets, under the hashtag China with Italy (*#forzaCinaeItalia*), showed automated patterns of behaviour and therefore sought to artificially create the appearance of spontaneous solidarity between China and Italy (Carrer and Bechis, 2020).

That both Moscow and Beijing are the actors that most systematically employ disinformation is neither coincidental nor confined to the COVID issue: in fact, they do so strategically. There are two reasons for this. First, for authoritarian regimes, control of information is an existential necessity: just as democracies cannot survive without free media and informed citizens, dictatorships cannot coexist with freedom of information without a crisis. Therefore, even if they did not need them to sustain themselves internationally, it would still be essential to have and practice such propaganda and disinformation strategies inwards, which gives them experience and repertoires of action in this area (Sanovich, 2017).

Second, if, as is the case, these regimes also live in a hostile geopolitical environment, outside information is essential in two different ways: first, passive, insofar as they need to block or filter their citizens' access to truthful information from abroad; second, proactive or offensive, which consists of weakening their enemies. The latter strategy, which consists of disseminating false or malicious information that diminishes the enemy's self-confidence and thus its willingness and ability to confront, has dominated

the geopolitical landscape of Russia-West relations over the past decade. According to the European Parliament, information warfare strategies operate on two fronts: one, cybersecurity, where the aim is to damage the opponent's information infrastructures; and two, psychological, where the aim is to influence the enemy's population and/or its leaders to make decisions favourable to the opponent's interests (European Parliament Research Service, 2015).

In the case of Russia, the consistency and perseverance of its disinformation strategies is, paradoxically, related to its weakness. Since coming to power in 2000, Putin's goal has been, to use Trump's frame of mind, to 'make Russia great again'. However, despite its vast natural resources and the availability of a large armed forces, including nuclear weapons, Russia's leaders are aware that the West's power is far superior economically and militarily - its GDP is lower than France's and its military spending is a fraction of that of the US and Europe.

Yet, as the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact showed at the time and the so-called 'colour revolutions' on Russia's borders have demonstrated, far more threatening than the West's military might is the attractiveness of its model of life to its citizens. This factor, which Joseph Nye has described as "soft power", refers to the attractiveness and influence that open, prosperous, and free societies exert on those that are not (Nye 2005). In the case of Russia, the extension to its borders of the number of free and democratic states that have looked to the Atlantic Alliance, rather than Moscow, for their security guarantees has been interpreted in Moscow as a threat to the survival of Putin's political model. From the secession of Kosovo, a dangerous precedent for a federal country with large Muslim minorities, to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, a country that Russian nationalist elites see as inextricably linked to Russia, to the pro-democracy protests in Russia in December 2010, which Putin has always seen as US-instigated, it has been clear to the Russian regime that its survival depended on weakening the appeal of the Western model of life, both to its own citizens and to Western citizens themselves. This has led to a strategy of reinforcing the verticality of power within Russia, terrorising or putting heavy pressure on dissidents but, above all, imposing an iron grip on the media, especially television. And, in parallel, an external strategy aimed at promoting Westerners' distrust of their democratic institutions and, especially, providing information support to the anti-establishment forces that in each country, from the National Front in France to Alternative for Germany or the League in Italy, were most likely to bring to power populist anti-European parties that would weaken both intra-European cohesion and the transatlantic link (Milosevich, 2017).

It is in this context that Russian state media (Sputnik or Russia Today) aimed at foreign audiences are born and operate. As US Secretary of Defence General Mattis (2005) pointed out in 2005, the overwhelming US military superiority forces its enemies to renounce conventional warfare and forces them instead to seek niches of irregular confrontation where the combination of technology and other opportunistic tactics allows them to gain an advantage, a strategy confirmed by Russian strategists in their numerous pronouncements on hybrid warfare and their actions abroad, from Crimea to Salisbury (Ng and Rumer, 2019). The strategy is also confirmed by the heads of Russian state media, such as Margarita Simonyan, director general of Russia Today, who in 2013 confessed

in an interview that in ‘peacetime an international channel would not be necessary, but in wartime it can be crucial’ (Resinger and Golts, 2014; Rutenberg, 2017). Since then, whether it is the idea that the European Union has no future, that the far right is spreading across Europe, encouraging xenophobic movements, campaigns against George Soros, lies about the downing of MH-17 over Ukrainian territory or vaccines, these state media have exploited all the weaknesses they have found in Western democracies, including, in the Spanish case, the secession of Catalonia (Alandete, 2018; Polyakova *et al*, 2017).

Disinformation not only weakens democracies but, in parallel, strengthens authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes have not only mastered social media on the international front to discredit democracies in the eyes of their citizens and their own, but at home to strengthen their regimes in hitherto unthinkable ways. What were once mass media and totalitarian propaganda tools have today become mass surveillance tools thanks to the combination of artificial intelligence tools that allow them to collect and exploit data to politically profile their citizens to control them more closely. In the Chinese case, the use of such techniques, combined with facial recognition, has degenerated into an authoritarian techno-nightmare of major proportions and put the Chinese regime in a position to achieve the dream of every authoritarian regime: to be able not only to detect dissidents before they organise themselves but, using artificial intelligence tools, to predict who they might potentially be (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Soros, 2019).

The Internet was born out of a utopian dream of global liberation and universal knowledge. But the reality today is that of the 3.8 billion people who have access to the internet, 71% live in countries where they can be fined or imprisoned for expressing their political opinions or religious feelings on the internet and 56% in countries where the authorities block content for ideological reasons. In fact, only 20% of internet users live in countries considered free and only 7% of countries that hold competitive elections are free from electoral interference (Freedom on the Net, 2019).

The owners of Cambridge Analytica claimed to their clients that their technicians needed only 70 likes from a Facebook user to know more about that person than their friends, 150 to know more than their parents and 300 to know more than their partner. Above that number, they presumed, they already knew more about that person than the person themselves (Illing, 2018). A claim intended to prove the commercial potential of their apps, which allowed them to promise a phone or insurance company that they could predict when a user was going to request a transfer or unsubscribe, but which in a context such as China’s takes on a very threatening meaning from the point of view of human rights and the possibility of political change. And it highlights the extent to which malicious use of the digital ecosystem is intimately linked to the very characteristics of that ecosystem.

Regulatory Options and Models

The dire consequences of the deregulation of social platforms and networks in terms of the functioning of markets, increasingly dominated by the monopolistic practices of a few companies, and its debilitating impact on democracies and their representative institutions, is generating a convergence in terms of regulatory preferences. It is remarkable, for example, that one of the fathers of the Internet, Tim Berners-Lee (2014), and a renowned

sociologist such as Anthony Giddens (2018) agree on the need to enact a Digital Bill of Rights to complement the classic declarations of rights. Gone is the well-meaning utopianism that presided over the beginnings of the digital revolution, visible in John Perry Barlow's 1996 Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace: "We are creating a world in which everyone will be able to participate without privilege or prejudice created by race, economic or military power or place of birth, a world where everyone will be able to express their beliefs, whatever they may be, without fear of being coerced or silenced" (quoted in Persily, 2019).

Statements like that reflect well the spirit that dominated internet regulation in its early days. That same year, 1996, saw the enactment of the US Communications Decency Act, a law that today virtually all observers place at the root of the problems of accountability of social media platforms and networks for the content they publish. In section 230, section C.1, the US Congress established that "no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider". In this way, it provided immunity to technology companies, but also to the authors of blogs or any other type of pages, against content posted by third party users that could eventually be considered defamatory or offensive by the courts. This law provided legal cover for users of YouTube, Vimeo, Facebook or Twitter to post their content on these platforms without being obliged to view their content beforehand or authorise its publication. Its aim was to preserve freedom of expression, as review was considered a form of censorship, and to allow for growth and innovation in the sector, something it certainly achieved. In practice, however, it turned technology platforms into "noticeboards" exempt, except in a very small number of cases, from liability for their content.

One of the main criticisms of this law today is that it ignores the fact that these companies were always much more than neutral repositories where users hosted their content: in practice they have been and are active agents that order, prioritise and re-distribute this content to monetise it through the sale of advertising, which in practice makes them publishers of this content. The media emerged with the purpose of serving that purpose of conveying truthful information and were regulated accordingly to ensure that they did so and to punish those who failed in that duty. Social media, by contrast, were not born to inform, a job that requires editors, hierarchy, barriers to access, regulation, control, and courts to bring the media before to force them to rectify, but for people to share their life experiences horizontally on a massive and immediate scale. The paradox is that, as happened in the case of other digital platforms, such as Uber, they were not regulated at the beginning either by the service they provided (transporting passengers) or by the legislation of the sector of what the companies claimed they were (communication platforms), remaining in a kind of legal limbo in which they largely remain today.

From the well-meaning utopian thinking that was at the origin of social networks, which, in a kind of global Athenian agora, affirmed the creation of new spaces of freedom and collective democracy based on direct communication between citizens, we have moved on to a much more pessimistic view of the compatibility of democracy and social networks. Unsurprisingly, once the economic and commercial fabric that underpins the free nature of these enterprises, not to mention their permeability to capture by foreign

agents and powers, has been exposed, discourses about the global agora, the birth of a global consciousness and what Zuckerberg has called the “fifth estate” have lost all their appeal (Thornhill, 2020). If malicious action by authoritarian states is possible, it is largely due to the failure of democracies to adequately regulate social networks (Freedom of the Net, 2019). An entirely new regulatory approach to the problem, one based on the duty of care of platforms, is needed, experts argue (Perrin, 2020).

Such regulation is something that the EU is able to do successfully, even to lead globally. The differences between the US and EU regulatory cultures are stark. The European Commission has successfully intervened in the privacy framework with a regulation, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (European Union, 2016, which has been a turning point for large technology companies, which have been forced to adopt much higher privacy standards than those they must observe in the US. In other fields as well, such as copyright, artificial intelligence, child protection, the right to be forgotten or disinformation, the EU has shown a clear capacity to become a regulator and creator of global standards, which has led some to characterise it as a “regulatory superpower” (Bradford, 2020).

To date, the US government and Congress have shown little capacity or interest in confronting its technology industry, which contributes substantially to its global power and economic well-being, as well as to campaign finance. For its part, China seeks to recreate its own local Silicon Valley to exploit to the full the capacity of these technologies to exert social control and thus sustain the CCP-led authoritarian regime through a suffocating layer of digital technology. We have seen, however, how in recent times the investigations and sanctions by European competition authorities into abuses of dominant positions or irregular practices by these large companies have begun to open a crack in the US legal system, empowering activists whose regulatory theses are closer to Europe’s positions (Burnell, 2018).

With regard to China, although the EU has watched with great frustration as the new great Chinese digital wall has grown beyond the regulatory reach of Europe, and also of European technology companies, which are excluded or discriminated against in the Chinese market, we have seen the awakening of a new awareness in Europe of the need to ensure that Chinese companies operating on European territory comply with European standards in terms of data protection and also positioning in terms of critical infrastructures. Here too, COVID-19 has provided a new awakening by highlighting how the mobile applications that are essential for an orderly and successful exit from the pandemic may represent a new twist in the ability of states (China) or companies (US) to further intrude on people’s privacy (Ghosh, *et al* 2020; Simpson and Conner, 2020).

In the specific field of disinformation, the European Commission has decided to consider it a threat to democracy, public policy, citizens’ security, public health, and the environment, and to take action accordingly. The Commission’s Communication on the issue, adopted in April 2018, under the title “Combating online disinformation: a European approach”, defines disinformation as “verifiably false or misleading information which is created, presented and disseminated for profit or to deliberately mislead the public, and which is likely to cause public harm”. Disinformation, the Commission argues, “erodes trust in institutions and in digital and traditional media and damages our democracies by

hampering citizens' ability to make informed choices, supports radical and extremist ideas and activities, and undermines freedom of expression" (European Commission, 2018).

The Commission's approach is that disinformation is not an accidental product or an unintended consequence of freedom of expression on social media. Both those who create it and those who collaborate in its dissemination are responsible for it. Among the former, the Commission points to "a range of domestic and foreign actors using mass disinformation campaigns to sow mistrust and create social tensions, which can have serious consequences for our security", and can also be part of "hybrid threats to internal security, including electoral processes, especially when combined with cyber-attacks". The latter include "social networks, video-sharing services and search engines, which play a key role in spreading and amplifying disinformation online" as they have not only "failed to take proportionate action or address the challenge posed by disinformation and manipulative use of platform infrastructures" but have also failed to allay suspicions that the personal data of millions of users is sufficiently protected against unauthorised use for electoral purposes by third parties.

Hence, the European Commission rightly considers that the problem goes far beyond fake news. Indeed, to the extent that it diverts attention from the main problem and minimises it, the focus on fake news can be counterproductive. Certainly, news verification is an important element in any kind of strategy against disinformation, but it cannot be the only one, nor will it be effective if it ignores that the problem is not just fake news, but fake media, fake users and, above all, that the problem does not originate in politicians failing to tell the truth, but in society ceasing to believe in the possibility of truth. The problems and controversies surrounding verification companies, many of them funded by platforms such as Facebook, have rightly highlighted the limits of the verification strategy. As we have seen, verifying that a Trump statement is false then requires, as Twitter has recently done, the courage to label that statement as false or malicious, or remove it because it glorifies violence.

The translation of this regulatory challenge into actions is very revealing. After intense negotiations by the European Commission with tech companies, they have been forced to adopt a code of conduct that obliges them to monitor fake profiles and accounts and report regularly on their actions. The results are very illustrative and show that the scale of the problem is even greater than previously thought. In just the first two months of active scrutiny of its own platform activities in 2018, Facebook identified 600,000 fraudulent or inappropriate ads. Google, meanwhile, revealed that between September 2018 and August 2019 it had taken 314,288 actions against ads served on its own platform. Microsoft also provided surprising data, reporting that it had removed 900 million ads. As for fraudulent profiles and fake accounts, Facebook, which does not provide information on the total number of accounts, only statistics on users, says it deactivated 2.19 billion fake accounts in the first quarter of 2019, identifying at least 7,606 accounts to which it attributed "coordinated disinformation actions". Twitter, meanwhile, terminated 126 million accounts and YouTube did the same with 10 million channels to which it attributed fraudulent or inappropriate content. The magnitude of these data reveals the extent of the problem of laxity and lack of control by poorly or inadequately regulated companies (European Commission, 2019).

The European Commission is therefore right when it argues that combatting disinformation requires, in addition to the promotion of education and media literacy, a more transparent and accountable ecosystem, as this is the only way for citizens to regain trust in. As Persily (2018) points out, actions should encompass a broad panoply of measures: erasure, relegation, disclosure, delay, dilution, diversion, deterrence and education. Internationally, foreign policy.

In addition to the European Commission, many European states have taken or are considering taking measures against disinformation. But fighting disinformation is not easy. As in so many other regulatory areas, it is easier to point out what should be avoided than to design a catalogue of actions that would radically eliminate the problem, especially when, as has been said, the problem is the ecosystem itself. The German government, for example, has opted for a strategy of fining internet platforms that do not eradicate content reported and verified as false or hate speech. France, on the other hand, has preferred to focus on judicial control of platform content (Colomina, 2019).

Underlying the disagreements between the US and the EU, which are undoubtedly business and geopolitical, are important differences in political and legal cultures. The First Amendment of the US Constitution restricts the possibility of limiting freedom of expression in a much more restrictive manner than is established in European legislation, where the regulation of hate speech allows for a wider range of measures and legal actions against platforms and users (García Morales, 2020). In the European case, we have even seen a ruling by the Court of Justice of the EU in which it held that political propaganda in the event of a military conflict is not guaranteed by freedom of expression, thus validating the restrictions imposed on the official Russian news agency to report on the Ukrainian conflict in the territory of the EU (Hanley, 2020).

At one extreme, citizens' trust in democracy and even democracy itself is at stake. At the other is freedom of expression, whose limits must be as narrow as they are clear. In the middle are technology companies, faced with a new citizen awareness and legislators who have lost their technological innocence and are moving towards regulation that they see both as a threat to their business and as worrying from the point of view of legal security. Platforms' lives, once comfortable and dominated by steady growth in revenue and users, are now dominated by concerns about the sustainability of their business. Even after hiring thousands of people to monitor what their users post, platforms do not see themselves capable of ensuring that the content that remains on their walls complies with the law (Hobbs, 2019). And they are right, because if in the same country, as is the case in Spain, two courts can rule completely differently in two similar cases on the content of expressions posted online, imagine the challenge this poses when the network is global, and what a judge in the US may consider protected by freedom of expression in Germany constitutes a crime classified as hate speech.

An additional problem with regulation is that of effectiveness. Any measure of control or prohibition forces an adaptation of the opponent: what is true for those who design fighter planes that fly under the radar is also true for the perpetrators of disinformation. The regulation and limitation of visible content on Facebook and Twitter has already had the unintended consequence of encouraging the migration of much toxic content to networks such as WhatsApp, where the dissemination can be equally or even more

viral but much more difficult to detect and control, or to alternative closed platforms, such as gab.ai, the platform of the US far right (very popular in the 2018 Brazilian election), where it is preached that there is no censorship but total freedom of expression to upload content that in reality is pure hate. As evidenced by advances in the production of deep fakes, technology will always be ahead of the regulator, especially in the realm of the illicit, which means that governments can easily end up in the worst of all worlds: sacrificing freedom without achieving security. But that is the world they must navigate: however uncomfortable, difficult and fraught with contradictions, it will always be far better than the dissonance between some people's certainty of living in a utopia of global connectedness in freedom and others' certainty of being trapped in a dystopian technological nightmare. As many of the initiatives taken by companies to better regulate the sector globally and rebuild trust demonstrate, that road has already begun to be travelled (Paris Call, 2019; Zuckerberg, 2019).

Finally, we cannot ignore the fact that, alongside the problems of disinformation supply, there are also problems of demand, ranging from the psychological and cognitive predispositions of people to receive and disseminate this type of information to those related to a lack of political or informational culture, which therefore also require educational interventions that, in a democracy, are necessarily difficult (Jackson, 2018; Jeangéne *et al.*, 2018).

Conclusion

Disinformation poses a threat to democracy. But as with almost all threats to democracies, responses to them will always be limited in scope and effectiveness by the need, in their right to self-defence, not to harm themselves and their values more than their enemies do. In the fight against disinformation, democracies operate with one hand tied behind their backs, almost both. Because the dispute over truth is part of the democratic discussion, shielding the truth is neither possible nor desirable: it is directly counterproductive and incompatible with democracy (Arias Maldonado, 2017). Democracies, it has been said, must fear both their own and foreign powers (Innerarity and Colomina, 2020). Limitations on freedom of expression, while justified, will of necessity always be imperfect and incomplete.

The dilemma is clear: leaving the censorship of tech companies' content in the hands of governments is as bad an idea as leaving it in the hands of the companies themselves. In turn, the absence of limits on content not only damages the democratic public space and makes it permeable to misinformation, both from local and foreign actors, eroding citizens' trust in their institutions and values, but can also harm individuals and rights in substantial ways.

The EU and member states are therefore faced with the need to act in different ways at different levels. At the international level, they seek to act firmly against actors who use disinformation as a weapon of war to undermine democracies, while leading a global regulatory response based on the universal principles and values that underpin representative democracy, human rights and a rules-based multilateral liberal order that is highly beneficial to Europe. At the domestic level, by contrast, while protecting users from the most serious and obvious online harms that violate their fundamental rights,

they seek a constructive and careful approach to achieve (through a three-way alliance between governments, business and citizens based on dialogue and experimentation), build and sustain a quality public space and media that bring proven facts to public debate rather than polarisation and undermining of democratic institutions.

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Measuring NGOs' Active Participation in Municipal Decision-Making in Türkiye

Türkiye'de Belediyelerin Karar Alma Süreçlerine STK'ların Aktif Katılımının Ölçülmesi

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Abstract

This study develops a new scale for measuring the active participation relation between municipalities and NGOs. While citizen participation at the local level is a widely explored topic, a scale that aims to get NGO members' perceptions about their level of participation and focuses on the budgeting process is not available. We carried out an extensive review of the participation and budgeting literature and considered the inputs obtained from this review in developing our two-dimensional and 6-item participation scale. 'Participation mechanism' and 'participation process' were determined as two dimensions. This was a decision made based on the existence of an emphasis on the interplay between the participation mechanisms used and the participation process actualized in the relevant literature. As existing scales for examining local participation are designed to get data from public officials, we hope that obtaining data from NGOs will enrich our understanding of the complex participatory relationship between citizens and the local administration.

Keywords: Scale development, Active participation, NGOs, Municipality, Validity, Reliability

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, belediyeler ile STK'lar arasındaki aktif katılım ilişkisinin incelenmesinde kullanılacak yeni bir ölçek geliştirmektir. Yerel düzeyde vatandaş katılımı literatürde farklı yönleriyle ele alınmasına karşın STK üyelerinin belediye karar alma süreçlerine katılım düzeyleri hakkındaki algılarını bütçe sürecine odaklanarak ortaya koymayı hedefleyen bir ölçek mevcut değildir. Yazındaki bu boşluğu doldurmak yönünde, katılım ve bütçeleme süreçleriyle ilgili geniş bir kaynak taraması yapılmış ve bu tarama sonucunda elde edilen girdiler iki boyuttan ve altı maddeden oluşan yeni ölçeğin geliştirilmesinde kullanılmıştır. Ölçeğin içerdiği iki boyut, "katılım mekanizmaları" ve "katılım süreci" olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu kararda, seçilen katılım mekanizmaları ile pratikte gerçekleşen katılım süreci arasındaki karşılıklı etkileşime yazında sıklıkla vurgu yapılması etkili olmuştur. Yerel düzeyde vatandaş katılımını tespit etmeye yönelik mevcut ölçeklerin büyük oranda kamudaki yöneticilerin algısını ölçmeye odaklanmış olması dolayısıyla STK'ların algısını elde etmeye yönelik bu çalışmanın vatandaşlar ve belediyeler arasındaki karmaşık katılım ilişkisinin anlaşılmasına katkı yapacağı düşünülmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Ölçek geliştirme, Aktif katılım, STK'lar, Belediye, Geçerlilik, Güvenilirlik

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Introduction

In social sciences, a voluminous literature has grown on participatory governance and democracy as of the 1970s. Behind this heightened interest lie paradigmatic shifts both in the organization of life and in scholarly thinking. Two sets of interrelated developments are central to these shifts: a) the reorganization/ rescaling of economic and political activities (Swyngedouw, 1992; Brenner, 2004) b) the restructuring of state-society relations and public administration (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007; Chhotray & Stoker, 2009). The centrality of “networked or heterarchical coordination” rather than hierarchical authority is their main point of intersection (Jessop, 2016: 164).

As the discourse gradually moved away from seeing the state as the central governing actor to emphasizing state-society relations (Kooiman, 2003), discussions on such themes as participatory and direct democracy, civil society, active citizenship, and governance network have proliferated (Brannan et al., 2006; Zittel & Fuchs, 2007; Steffek et al., 2008; Veltmeyer, 2008). Many studies underscored the prominence of citizens’ active participation in a stable democracy and achieving “multiple accountabilities” (financial, political, and operational) (Rivenbark & Kelly, 2006: 36).

The increase in citizens’ trust in the government, political efficiency, legitimacy of decisions, efficiency in performance budgeting, and social and economic equality through enhanced political engagement are expressed as important outputs of the participatory decision-making process at both the central and local levels of government (Ebdon, 2002; Devas & Grant, 2003; Innes & Booher, 2004; Fung, 2006; Sintomer et al., 2008; Michels & De Graaf, 2010; Marquetti et al., 2012). Some studies remaining under this theme focused on the effect of adopting an active participation model on local budget performance and reported positive effects (Orosz, 2002; Ebdon & Franklin, 2004; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Shah & Shen, 2007; Berner et al., 2011).

The concept of active participation is linked with that of active citizenship (Chandler, 2001) and delineates the active inclusion of citizens as stakeholders in the public decision-making process. Therefore, the active participation of citizens clearly goes beyond being informed about policy decisions and electing political representatives and is about having a say in policy choice (Rios et al., 2016). In other words, realizing citizens’ active participation entails, to some extent, the model of direct democracy and implies that citizens should “take policy choices rather than merely selecting political personnel” (Zittel & Fuchs, 2007: 3).

This paper grasps the contemporary emphasis on participatory local governance and aims at developing a new scale for measuring non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) active participation in the municipal decision-making process with a focus on budgeting in Turkey. We bring forward the question, “How do NGOs perceive and evaluate their participation in the local decision-making process?” and intend to elaborate on the civil society side of the local participation relationship. Existing studies, which examine citizens’ engagement in local decision-making, especially those using quantitative research methods, mainly include administrative actors as their unit of analysis. Our focus on NGOs also stems from the fact that policy development efforts for enhancing democratization and accountability at different scales often prioritize institutionalized

forms of participation (Cohen & Rogers, 1992; Posner, 2004 Ebdon & Franklin, 2006; Marien, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2010; Cheema, 2011).

When the participation relationship between municipalities and NGOs in Turkey is evaluated, it can be argued that participation has been a political discourse for many years, but it has not been successfully implemented in decision-making and budgeting processes (Sarıbay, 1997; Tekeli, 2017). It can be claimed that this problem arises from such disadvantageous situations of municipalities. First, municipalities in Turkey are financially dependent -to a large extent- on the central government (Erođlu ve Serbes, 2018). As a matter of fact, it is important for municipalities to have a certain amount of taxation authority to directly determine their spending priorities according to the needs of the local people as well as to increase their own revenues and to be able to independently determine local tax rates and bases without the intervention of the central government (Pratchett, 2004: 360). Second, when the municipal system in Turkey is examined, it can be observed that the strong mayor model has been adopted (Bulut & Taşıyıcı, 2006; Toprak, 2011; Arıkbođa, 2013).

A new local government law, enacted in 2005, highlighted the incorporation of NGOs in the local governance process in different ways including their involvement in the preparation of municipal strategic plans and their contribution to specialized municipal committees in their areas of expertise (Municipal Law Numbered 5393, article 24/41). Besides, these reforms emphasized the importance of governance for enhancing efficiency in the provision of public services as well as increasing accountability. Citizens' voluntary participation in local service delivery was established as a statutory provision, and 'city councils' were introduced as a new governance mechanism, the primary goal of which is defined as the enhancement of participatory democracy and civic virtues at the local level.

Several regulations regarding the participation of NGOs have been included in the following laws: Metropolitan Municipality Law No. 5216 in 2004, Municipal Law No. 5393 in 2005, and Law No. 6360 on Establishing Metropolitan Municipalities and Twenty-Six Districts in Thirteen Provinces and Amending Some Laws and Decrees in 2012. Each regulation contains important clauses on governance and participation such as the articles numbered 13, 24, 41, and 76 of Law No. 5393. It is accepted that non-governmental organizations and municipalities are common stakeholders in Articles 7 and 15 of Law No. 5216. However, a more detailed analysis of the items reveals the necessity of making legislative changes or new regulations to render local participation effective and stronger. It can be claimed that there are many deficiencies in the legislation mentioned above. For instance, there are no provisions regarding the participation of NGOs in the preparation of the municipal budget, nor are there any obligations regarding the cooperation of municipalities with the NGOs. The references to the participation of NGOs in the relevant legislation are few, and they are also not clear and understandable. Statements on cooperation are of a general nature and there are no specific provisions regarding their content and form.

As known, scales are widely used in social sciences to collect quantitative data from people and using an existing scale would save time and resources. However, a scale for measuring NGOs' active participation in municipal decision-making processes

with a focus on the budgeting process is not readily available. Therefore, this study is an intention to fill this gap in the literature. It offers a two-dimensional participation scale with ‘participation mechanisms’ and a ‘participation process’ as its dimensions and takes into consideration the remarks made about structural, institutional, contextual, and human agency variances regarding the purpose, model, outcome, and efficiency of active participation in the literature.

Active Participation

In modern liberal democracies, the participation of people in administration has mainly been realized indirectly through electing representatives for the national assembly, the municipal council, etc. More direct forms of participation opportunities for the decision-making process have also existed such as referendums, public hearings, public meetings, citizen advisory boards, the right to attend (and monitor) municipal council meetings, etc. As governing, which is defined simply as “interaction in some way or another” by Kooiman (2003: 8), has been approached within the governance framework, normative considerations about the interaction between public officials and citizens have been shaped around themes including the horizontal organization of public administration, bottom-up approach to policy making, decentralization, transparency, and accountability (Novy & Leubolt, 2005) alongside active participation and active citizenship.

Thus, two of the premises of the governance paradigm are the vitalization of participation mechanisms that goes beyond citizens’ role as voters or watchdogs and the active participation practices which allow citizens’ direct deliberative engagement in the policy-making process. It is essential to note here that not all mechanisms of public engagement outside those of representation and information flow are classified under active participation. In this regard, the OECD (2001: 15-16) divides citizen engagement in policy-making into three: “access to information”, “consultation/feedback”, and “active participation”. Access to information refers to the one-way conveying of documents prepared by public institutions and other kinds of public information. In ‘consultation/feedback’, opinions of citizens may be taken in the process of forming a certain policy, or they may only be asked for giving feedback on a policy paper draft or service provision. Active participation, on the other hand, accounts for a heightened level of mutual influence and citizens’ exerting influence on public decisions as well as good communication between public officials and the citizens (OECD, 2001; Yang & Pandey, 2011).

In the Council of Europe’s ‘The Code of Good Practice’, which focuses on improving the participation of NGOs in the decision-making process, four gradual levels of participation are identified as “information”, “consultation”, “dialogue” and “partnership”; the intensity of participation is the highest in the partnership level of participation (CoE, 2009). While NGOs’ active involvement is seen both in dialogue and in partnership, “a partnership implies shared responsibilities in each step of the political decision-making process from agenda setting, drafting, decision and implementation of policy initiatives.” (CoE, 2009: 8). “Delegation of a specific task to an NGO”, “participatory forums” and “the establishment of co-decision-making bodies” are exemplified as partnership activities (CoE, 2009: 8). Along the same lines, Berner (2003: 428) advocates “authentic participation”, which he refers to as “... give and take that would characterize policy

development, not just policy approval or disapproval” in his study on citizen involvement in local government budgeting.

Sherry P. Arnstein (1969) provides one of the earliest studies about public engagement in the policy-making process by evaluating different mechanisms and practices of public participation put into effect around urban development issues based on the criteria of the reflection of people’s will to make decisions. She offered an eight-rung ladder of public participation, which was categorized under three levels of citizen involvement in the decision-making process (Arnstein, 1969). The three levels and the types of public participation are as follows:

- Nonparticipation¹ (1. Manipulation 2. Therapy)
- Tokenism (3. Informing 4. Consultation 5. Placation)
- Citizen power (6. Partnership 7. Delegated power 8. Citizen control)

Arnstein’s (1969) influential paper indicated that the effectiveness of active participation depends on multiple factors. The need for building consensus among stakeholders on the purpose and expected outcome of participation (Brannan et al., 2006; Michels & De Graaf, 2010), authentic dialogue, networks, and institutional capacity (Innes & Booher, 2004), continuous communication, and clarifying the roles of stakeholders (King et al., 1998; Roiseland & Vabo, 2015) are accentuated for the effectiveness of active participation practices in later studies. Beaumont & Nicholls (2008) and Zittel & Fuchs (2007) draw attention to social, political, and institutional contexts which affect the relationship between specific institutional reforms and political participation. For Beaumont & Nicholls (2008), formal institutions gain their actual meanings and functions under the sociopolitical context in which they are introduced. Callahan (2007) stated that there is a gap between the idea and the practice of citizen participation; she argued that while public administrators recognized that their traditional roles as “rulers”, “implementers” and “experts” were changing, they were falling short in adopting the alternative roles of “public servant”, “co-producer”, “broker” and “employee”². Roiseland & Vabo (2015: 7), in a similar manner, stated that interactive governance is dependent on the roles adopted by elected politicians, administrative staff, and citizens.

Berner et al. (2011) measured the perceptions of different stakeholders (elected officials, staff members, and citizens) about the meaning and the most effective method of citizen participation in local government activities and concluded that citizen participation is viewed in a variety of ways. Jurlina Alibegović & Slijepčević (2018), who conducted a survey among local city councilors in sixteen European countries, reported similar results. Their findings illustrate that while most of the elected officials agreed that residents should have the opportunity to convey their views before important local decisions are made, a significant share of the officials also desired to design policies independently of the opinions of local people (Jurlina Alibegović & Slijepčević, 2018). Fung’s (2006) insights, which are also based on the evaluation of cases of community participation in the

1 In Arnstein’s typology “nonparticipation” does not mean the non-presence of citizens, but carrying an objective by “powerholders to educate or cure the participants” (Arnstein, 1969: 26) rather than seeking citizens’ genuine participation.

2 She defined the dynamics of interaction between the administrator and the citizen to be “active” and the method of interaction to be “partnership” when both the role of administrator and the citizen is co-producer.

U.S., add to these empirical findings. According to him, the effectiveness of empowered participation at the local level is tied to three main conditions: 1. the participants of the decision-making process. 2. the way the participants communicate with each other, and the decisions that are taken. 3. whether deliberations throughout the process are reflected in policies or not (Fung, 2006).

The literature review presented so far indicates that analyzing active participation requires considering participation mechanisms together with process design and the larger social, political, and cultural context. Therefore, we defined two domains for active participation: participation mechanisms that include methods designed for realizing citizen involvement and the participation process that encompasses the structural, contextual, and personal dimensions of the participation practice. The participation process may include all the factors that add to the effectiveness of participation mechanisms. Table 1 below shows a summary of the existing literature on public participation in terms of different participation mechanisms and the factors affecting the involvement of citizens in the participation process:

Table 1

Summary of the Literature Review on Different Participation Mechanisms and the Factors Affecting Active Participation

Source	Participation mechanisms	Participation process (Factors affecting active participation)
CoE (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Work group or work committee, -Hearings and public forums, -Citizens' forums and future councils, -Key government contact. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The rule of law, -Adherence to fundamental democratic principles, -Political will, -Favorable legislation, -Clear procedures, -Long-term support and resources for a sustainable civil society -Shared spaces for dialogue and cooperation.
Ebdon (2000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Meetings prior to budget development, -Citizen input to budget process throughout the year, -Formal groups, -Sending budget summary for comments, -Media coordination of input process, -Sending information to citizens, -Availability of budget to the public. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Local governance structure (including the distribution of power between central and local governments), -Cultural diversity/homogeneity, -Political culture.
Ebdon & Franklin (2006)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Public meetings, -Focus groups, -Simulations, -Advisory committees, -Surveys. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Environment (a. form of government and administrative structure b. political culture c. legal requirements), -Process design (a. timing, b. type of budget allocation, c. participants d. sincerity and will- ingness), -Mechanism, -Goals and outcomes (a. gathering input for decision-making b. enhancing trust).

Source	Participation mechanisms	Participation process (Factors affecting active participation)
Ianniello et al. (2019)		-Contextual factors (a. information asymmetries b. public officials' attitudes), -Organizational arrangements (a. the criteria of community representation b. process design), -Process management patterns (a. group dynamics b. collaboration quality).
Pandeya (2015)		-Institutional and policy frameworks, -Organizational characteristics, -Bureaucratic responsiveness, -Participation mechanisms, -Representativeness, -Citizen competence.
Røiseland & Vabo (2015)	-Forums, -Committees, -Projects, -Hearings or public meetings.	
Yang (2005)		-Socio-economic context (a. social-economic status of the local government unit, b. metropolitan context, c. social capital), -Government institutions (a. form of government and council selection method, b. managerial attitudes and actions towards participation and communication).
Yang & Callahan & (2005)	-Neighborhood meetings, -Issue-oriented meetings, -Focus group discussions, -Round-table dialogues.	-Citizen involvement (CI) in local decision making, -The use of CI mechanisms, -CI in street-level services, -CI in management function.
Yang & Callahan & (2007)	-Public hearings, -Community or neighborhood meetings, -Citizen surveys, -Citizen focus groups, -Citizen advisory boards or committees, -Issue-oriented committees.	-Responsiveness to participatory values, -Responsiveness to external stakeholders, -Responsiveness to administrative practicality.
Yang & Pandey (2011)		-Local political environment (i.e., the support of elected officials), -Organization characteristics of local governments (a. bureaucratic red tape, b. hierarchical authority c. transformational leadership), -Involvement mechanisms (a. the use of multiple mechanisms b. interactive effect between transformational leadership and variety of involvement mechanisms), -Participant characteristics (a. participant competence b. participant representativeness).
Zhang & Yang (2009)	-Citizen groups or committees, -Coordination with media for input by city managers, -General citizen involvement.	-City managers' professionalism, -Political and institutional environment, -Willingness by city managers to represent citizens/ to incorporate citizen input into decisions.
Zhang & Liao (2011)	-Public hearings, -Citizen surveys, -Advisory boards, -Forums or workshops open to citizens, -Regular meetings on the budget, -Posting budget materials on the Internet.	-Public officials' attitudes and perceptions towards citizen participation, -Forms of local government, -Council's diversity and politics, -Community characteristics.

Other studies have also discussed the purpose, process, and outcome of active citizen participation at a more theoretical level (Fung & Wright, 2001; Beckett & King, 2002; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Chirenje et al., 2013; Heinelt, 2013;). The literature review made it explicit that analyzing active participation is a complex issue and although citizen participation in local decision-making is a widely expressed ideal, there is a clear gap between its ideal and implementation. Furthermore, the implementation and outcomes of active citizen participation vary to a large extent. Given these drawbacks, nonetheless, it is possible to define certain directions which will guide empirical research like taking into consideration the (existing and newly introduced) participatory mechanisms, the local political and institutional environment, public officials' attitudes towards citizen participation, and the competence and representativeness of participant citizens.

The extended literature review presented in this section also serves to justify our focus on measuring NGOs' participation in the local decision-making process since most empirical studies dealing with citizen involvement in local policy-making focus on evaluating participation from the perspective of local government officials. While participant characteristics such as competence and representativeness are taken into consideration by some researchers (Yang & Callahan, 2011; Yang & Pandey, 2011) as variables explaining citizen involvement, a scale for measuring NGOs' participation in the local policy development process based on NGOs' perspectives seems to be absent. While acknowledging the debates about the democratic and transparent characteristics of NGOs as well as their varied capacities (Kissling & Steffek, 2008), we assume that NGOs have a meaningful level of competence and representativeness for actively contributing to local decision-making. Departing from this assumption and in an effort to fulfilling the gap in the literature for measuring citizen participation at the local level from NGO members' perspective, the methodological steps of our scale development study are presented in the following section.

Method

Data and Participants

The data for this study, which had a cross-sectional characteristic, was collected from NGOs' executive members (e.g., executives or executive assistants in associations, foundations, professional chambers and trade unions, and provincial-district presidents and vice presidents in political parties) in Turkey between October 2020 and April 2021. By following the conclusion reached through the literature review on the classification of NGOs, all NGOs included in four different categories were discussed. These four categories are associations, academic chambers, political party representatives, and trade unions.

To represent Turkey, the number of NGOs in the provinces³ in NUTS Level 1 was examined in the first instance. Then, for each NUTS-1 level region (the total number

3 In Turkey, 'province' is the name given to largest administrative divisions at the national government level. Thirty provinces out of a total number of 81 contain metropolitan municipalities at the local government level. Metropolitan municipalities, borders of which overlap with that of the provinces, form a higher tier of municipal government having basically a coordination function over district municipalities. The remaining 51 provinces have provincial and district municipalities without a metropolitan administrative model.

of regions at the NUTS-1 level is 12⁴), a metropolitan municipality and a provincial municipality were selected depending on their level of development and the number of NGOs they had. Municipalities that are in provinces with the highest number of NGOs and with higher developmental levels were given priority in the selection. Consequently, 13 metropolitan municipalities and 10 provincial municipalities were included in the study. A total of 800 data were obtained from NGOs operating in 23 provinces through face-to-face and online questionnaires.

Scale Development and Analysis

There exists a considerable body of literature on scale development, translation, and validation. In the development process of a new scale, the first step is to make sure that a scale about the identified construct of interest is not available. Secondly, the indicators of the domain of interest must be decided on and at this stage, it is vital that previous studies and expert judgments are reviewed. In this way, existing questionnaires in the literature can be evaluated for the determination of indicators (DeVellis, 1991; Hinkin, 1995; Clark & Watson, 1995: 309; Tsang et al., 2017: 80). Figure 1 shows the steps of developing a new scale as summarized by Tsang et al. (2017).

As seen in Figure 1, if a validated questionnaire is not available for the identified construct of interest, developing a new scale becomes the objective, and issues related to the scale to be developed are evaluated by a committee consisting of experts in the next step. Since a scale measuring the active participation relationship between municipalities and NGOs with a focus on NGOs' perceptions and local budgeting was not available, our study aimed at developing a new scale for this construct of interest and used different statistical methods in different steps of the scale development process. Members of the research team as well as two external academic experts, one from the field of political science and one from public finance, constituted our expert committee.

4 Regions at NUTS-1 level are divided into sub-regions at NUTS 2 level and ultimately 81 provinces of Turkey are represented at the NUTS-3 level.




Figure 1. Questionnaire development process

Identifying the dimensionality of the construct is one of the primary issues in developing a new scale. Many constructs contain multiple dimensions. The dimensionality of the construct of interest is determined based on the literature and it is decided whether the scale has a unidimensional or multidimensional structure (Turker, 2009: 416; Tsang et al., 2017: 82). In our study, we proposed a two-dimensional structure for the active participation scale. These dimensions are the ‘participation mechanisms’ and ‘participation process’.

Another important issue in the questionnaire development process is the format of the questionnaire form and its items. In our study, a five-point Likert scale was preferred for scale items to indicate the degree of agreement (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree). As known, the five-point Likert-type scale is the most common scale used in social sciences (Jenkins & Taber, 1977; Weijters et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2015; Chyung et al., 2015). Particular attention has been paid to designing the scale items to be easily understood (Tsang et al., 2017) by the participants, and as many short and clear items as possible were formulated. In designing the scale items, we considered other important issues such as building the internal consistency of the items, avoiding using items that may produce biased answers, and deciding on whether the reverse-coded items will be included in the scale or not (Tsang et al., 2017).

Although there is no specific rule about the length of the questionnaire, attention should

be paid to the length so that the participants keep their willingness to answer. It should also contain adequate items about the structure of interest to be measured. It is desirable that the final form of the questionnaire be short. However, since a number of items may be eliminated in the later stages of the study, it is useful to keep the items pool-wide at the beginning. A pool of scale items should be written, and these items should be reviewed by experts. Grammar checks should also be done. In addition, it is recommended to conduct the questionnaire on a small sample before starting the pilot test. Thus, suggestions for possible improvements to the questions can be received and the questionnaire form can be improved (Simmons, 2001: 103; Tsang et al., 2017: 83).

In our study, all items that will measure the relevant concepts were included in the questionnaire; expert reviews were received; grammar checks of the questions were made, and the questionnaires were carried out with a small sample of 32 people. After suggestions for possible improvements were obtained and evaluated at this pre-test stage, the questionnaire form was revised. The pilot test started afterward, and further revisions were made to the questionnaire by examining the pilot data. Finally, validity and reliability analyses were performed using the main data.

Reliability analysis is important to evaluate the consistency of scale items. In this study, the internal consistency coefficient was used for reliability analysis. Validity analysis allows for examining the structure of the scale. Construct validity, which investigates the validity of the theoretical structure, is mainly considered in the validity analysis.

Findings

Item Development and Pre-test

In this study, we referred to the literature review presented above to create the items of the active participation scale. As stated earlier, we defined two domains for active participation as 'participation mechanisms', and 'participation process'. An item pool was created to include 14 items, 8 of which belonged to the domain of the participation mechanism, and 6 to the domain of the decision-making process.

To explore participants' perspectives on the proposed scale, we conducted a pre-test that was applied to 32 voluntary participants. To make the questionnaire more comprehensible and clearer, the participants were also asked to report the deficiencies they identified in questions that caused confusion. After getting participant feedback, items were reviewed by the expert committee. At the end of these revisions, we ended up with a 10-item scale.

Item Performance and Pilot Test

After the survey form was finalized, pilot data analysis was performed. A total of $n = 151$ data including political parties, unions, professional chambers, and associations from seven different municipalities were collected.

The asymmetry and kurtosis of the scale items and then the correlations between the scale items were examined (Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2011). When asymmetry and kurtosis were examined, none of the items of the ten-item scale were found to be more than ± 1.96 . After that, we examined the inter-item correlations. One item was found to have a low correlation ($r < .20$). This item ("NGOs deliver opinions on matters of their

interest in specialized municipal committees.”) was removed from the scale. One item (“Municipalities get opinions from NGOs by organizing advisory board meetings.”) was also removed because it was highly correlated with another item ($r > .90$, $p < .001$). After these items were removed, the scale consisted of eight items.

Exploratory Factor Analysis

Eight hundred data obtained in this study were approximately divided into two, and one half ($N = 380$) was used for the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and the other half ($N = 420$) for the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Demographic information for $N = 380$ data is included in Table 2.

Table 2
Demographic Characteristics (N=380)

	Frequency	Percent
NGO types		
Political parties	29	7.6
Unions	82	21.6
Professional chambers	65	17.1
Associations	204	53.7
Gender		
Female	79	20.8
Male	214	56.3
Approximately equal	87	22.9
Age		
18-29	15	3.9
30-39	139	36.6
40-49	140	36.8
50-59	73	19.2
60 +	13	3.4
Education		
Primary school	14	3.7
Middle school	46	12.1
High school	121	31.8
University	170	44.7
Higher education	29	7.6

We conducted the Principal Component analysis (PCA) using all eight items to find out the number of components. While determining the number of components, we examined the eigenvalues greater than one. Two domains were planned while creating the initial active participation scale, but all items were collected in three factors as presented in Table 3; we examined the factor loadings, items cross-loaded, item-total correlations, and communalities.

Table 3
Item-Total Statistics and Factor Loading Matrix

	Item-Total Statistics			EFA		
	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted	Factor loadings		
				1	2	3
PPI*	.439	.280	.703		.667	

	Item-Total Statistics			EFA		
	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted	Factor loadings		
				1	2	3
PP 3	.490	.374	.692		.759	
PP 4	.365	.213	.717	.400	.319	
PM 1	.072	.025	.770			.862
PM2	.499	.335	.690	.752		
PM3	.589	.511	.670	.849		
PM4	.489	.384	.694	.806		

*'Participation process' and 'participation mechanisms' were abbreviated as PP and PM, respectively

The results of the EFA suggested three-factor structures for the eight items. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test score was .75 and Bartlett's test score was 696.398 ($p < .000$). These results mean that the sample size was adequate, and Bartlett's test was significant; thus, it is convenient to use factor analysis. The Cronbach Alpha was found to be .73 on the 8-item scale. The explained variance value was obtained as 64.44%. However, problems were detected in two items of the scale. The first problematic item is PM1 ("NGOs generally attend municipal council meetings."). The values in the column "Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted" reveal that removing the PM1 item from the scale increases the Cronbach Alpha value. The item also did not load on its expected factor "participation mechanism". The second problematic item is PP4 ("The municipality consults and gets information from NGOs in planning service delivery."). It is seen in Table 2 that the factor loading of the PP4 (PP8) item is low ($< .50$) and loaded on both factors. When the items were reevaluated under these results, we decided to remove two of the items (PM1 and PP4) from the scale.

After these two items were removed from the scale, the 6-item active participation scale was reevaluated. The results of the EFA suggested that two factors explained over 65% of the variance. Table 4 shows the factor loadings and all loadings were relatively high, ranging from .70 to .85. According to the scale statistics, the mean value of the scale was obtained as 17.67 (± 4.46) and the Cronbach Alpha value was found .76.

Table 4
Factor Loadings

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Extraction	Factor Loadings	
				1	2
PP1	2.88	1.09	.536	.700	
PP2	2.78	1.11	.743	.857	
PP3	2.88	1.18	.586	.742	
PM2	2.64	1.09	.606		.755
PM3	3.15	1.14	.774		.852
PM4	3.34	0.98	.674		.812




Figure 2. Scree plot

Along with eigenvalues, the scree plot was also examined (Weber et al., 2004: 363). In a scree plot, the line usually runs from the top left to the bottom right of the chart, as each factor explains less variance than the previous factors. The first point, where relatively less variance is explained, and the line becomes horizontal, indicates the number of factors. When Figure 2 is examined, it is seen that the scree plot also points to a two-factor structure.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

At this stage of the study, the CFA analyses were performed with the other half of the sample (N=420). Table 5 depicts the demographic information about the sample.

Table 5
Demographic Characteristics (N=420)

	Frequency	Percent
NGO types		
Political parties	37	8.8
Unions	97	23.1
Professional chambers	93	22.1
Associations	193	46.0
Gender		
Female	54	12.9
Male	260	61.9
Approximately equal	106	25.2
Age		
18-29	12	2,9
30-39	156	37.1
40-49	160	38.1

	Frequency	Percent
NGO types		
50-59	70	16.7
60 +	22	5.2
Education		
Primary school	8	1,9
Middle school	44	10.5
High school	133	31.7
University	190	45.2
Higher education	45	10.7

Normality was examined before performing the CFA analysis. When the skewness and kurtosis values were examined on the item basis, it was seen that the values were within ± 1.96 . In addition, the Mardia value calculated for multivariate normality was found to be $c.r.= 1.617$.

As the EFA suggested a two-factor solution, the model was specified with two latent factors. The CFA analysis was performed to verify the factor structure found by the EFA analysis. The estimates were made with the Maximum Likelihood (ML) commonly used in the CFA. The standardized regression weights obtained as a result of the CFA and the two-dimensional structure of the scale are shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (N=420)

The factor loads obtained in the CFA model range between .59 and .88 as seen in Figure 3. After estimating the models, goodness-of-fit statistics were obtained. In the CFA analysis, the model is desired to have insignificant chi-square values. In the other words, a nonsignificant p-value is obtained if a CFA model fits the data well. The CFA produced a chi-square of 17.273 (8) with $p<.027$ in this model. Commonly reported fit indices can be listed as follows; Model Chi-Square (χ^2), (Adjusted) Goodness of Fit (AGFI/GFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). Fit indices indicated a good fit with the data ($\chi^2/df=2.159$; $p=.027$; $RMSEA=.053$; $SRMR=.034$; $GFI=.987$; $AGFI=.966$; $CFI=.984$; $NFI=.971$). These goodness-of-fit statistics show that the structure has a good fit.

Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity

The active participation scale of 6 items showed a good degree of internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha .75). The item-total correlation is detailed in Table 6 together with the mean and standard deviation.

Table 6
Item-Total Correlation for Active Participation Scale (N=420)

Items	Mean	Standard deviation	Extraction	Item-Total Correlation
PP1	2.89	1.16	.570	.427
PP2	2.75	1.14	.707	.479
PP3	2.92	1.13	.565	.490
PM2	2.44	1.10	.644	.416
PM3	3.01	1.14	.744	.599
PM4	3.22	1.03	.609	.504

Table 7 depicts the active participation scale's Mean, Standard Deviation (SD), and validity values calculated. CR (Composite Reliability) was found to be .84 and AVE (Average Variance Extracted) was equal to .47.

Table 7
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Reliability Values

Scale	Items	Mean	SD	Cronbach's Alfa	CR	AVE
Active participation	6	17.23	4.46	.75	.84	.47

The Cronbach Alpha and CR values calculated to investigate the reliability of the scales were found to be above 0.70. This shows that the scale has internal consistency. At the same time, the calculated AVE value of 0.50 is required to investigate the convergent validity. This value was 0.47 on the scale and it is very close to 0.50. This value provides validity when evaluated together with CR (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). It is also desired to be $CR > AVE$. This means that the variance explained by the structure is greater than the variance caused by the measurement error. In other words, the variance of the measurement error is small. In this study, $CR > .70$ and $CR > AVE$ conditions are satisfied.

Conclusion

The purpose of our study was to develop a scale for measuring NGOs' active participation in the municipal decision-making process. In parallel with the rise of the governance paradigm, many studies, as well as policy initiatives, were devoted to analyzing active participation at the local level to enhance its practice and obtain several expected benefits including democratic/civic awareness and budget efficiency. Much of the empirical research on local participation which focused on identifying factors that affect the level of citizen participation has targeted public officials. The number of studies that examined NGO members' participation in the local decision-making process per se is quite limited (Orbista, 2012; Sener, 2014) and they do not adopt a scale development approach.

Given the decisive position public authorities hold for the realization of citizen participation in representative democracies, the fact that the substantial proportion of the scale development research focuses on examining public officials' attitudes may seem reasonable. However, obtaining more data on citizens as the other stakeholder of the participatory relationship is likely to help the efforts for designing effective participation

mechanisms and processes to a great extent. Besides, developing a scale for measuring NGO members' perceptions amounts to focusing on a group of citizens who are likely to be more competent and display a higher degree of representativeness, especially with respect to the budgeting process. Obtaining data on NGOs by using such scales will allow us to comprehend in more detail 'organized citizens' as well as the variations regarding their level of participation in local decision-making depending on the differences between them (issue characteristics, organizational structure, member demographics, etc.). Data on NGOs' participation in the local decision-making process when evaluated together with data obtained from public officials may also contribute to clarifying the level of tokenistic tendencies regarding citizens' involvement (Yang & Callahan, 2005; Pandeya, 2015). We hope that the development of a new scale that aims to measure citizen perception alone will contribute to the literature as investigating a multi-faceted phenomenon like citizen participation requires such diversification efforts.

The scale developed in this study included six items under two dimensions. Items under the dimension of 'participation mechanisms' included different participation mechanisms such as city councils -a relatively new mechanism in Turkey-, regular meetings, and individual contacts. While these items do not directly match with participatory mechanisms that are categorized under active participation in the literature, it is essential to note that whether a participation mechanism contributes to active citizen involvement is dependent on the participation process, which includes several factors related to the social-cultural, political, and organizational environment. In other words, the actual effect of participation mechanisms in the decision-making process is determined throughout the participation process, which is measured in our study by a combination of items formulated around NGO members' opinion delivery to the municipality and their perception as being 'active stakeholders' in the policy development process. This is consistent with the essence of the debates on active participation, i.e., the reflection of opinions delivered by citizens into policy decisions.

Regarding the items of the participation mechanism dimension, it is possible to attribute the co-existence of 'individual contacts' together with city councils and regular meetings to political patronage (Heper & Keyman, 1998) and "tamed civil society" in contemporary Turkey (Yabancı, 2019: 285). On the other side, individual contacts may be interpreted as a facilitator for the development of genuine and continuous communication between the NGOs and the local administration as well as an indicator of public officials' positive attitudes towards citizen involvement, which are often mentioned in the literature as variables that are important in increasing the effectiveness of public participation. These possible interpretations are partly related to the participant's social expectations bias, a limitation that is associated with the survey data used in our study. To evaluate the extent of this bias, applications of this scale in different local contexts are thought to be helpful. As another limitation of our study, we can mention our data's cross-sectional feature since longitudinal data were also suggested during the scale development in different studies (Morgodo et al., 2017). Longitudinal use of this scale in specific localities may reveal temporal changes in NGOs' perceptions about their participation in local decision-making, which may contribute to evaluating the evolution of the local context regarding citizen involvement. Moreover, like similar studies, this study is based on the responses

of single NGO informants. Multiple respondents per NGO would increase reliability. Despite the limitations, the findings obtained in this study offer a deeper understanding of the active participation relationship between NGOs and municipalities in the local decision-making process.

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Appendix. Final Version of The Active Participation Scale

	Please select the number that best represents how you think about the statements below. Please choose only a single number for each statement and do not leave any statements blank.	1 Strongly disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither agree nor disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly agree
PM2	NGOs can monitor municipal expenditures through city councils.	1	2	3	4	5
PM3	The municipality holds regular meetings with relevant NGOs in the decision-making process.	1	2	3	4	5
PM4	Individual contacts between the municipal officials and NGOs are effective in designing local services.	1	2	3	4	5
PP1	The municipality considers the opinions of NGOs about budgeting decisions on municipal services.	1	2	3	4	5
PP2	NGOs take part as active stakeholders in the decision-making process of the municipality.	1	2	3	4	5
PP3	The municipality receive opinions from NGOs in the decision-making process.	1	2	3	4	5



Politicization of Migration Policies in the Visegrad Group's Member States: A Means of Creating External Enemies of the Political system?

Przemyslaw Osiewicz¹

Abstract

The main purpose of this article is to examine whether the process of politicization of migration policies in the member states of the Visegrad Group is used to create the image of external enemies of these societies. The main assumption is that the leaders of the V4 states intentionally politicize migration issues and use them to achieve internal objectives. The official migration strategies of these states conform to generally accepted norms. Yet, the narrative of executive bodies fosters the 'we-they' division and the negative image of immigrants. Migrants are shown as external enemies and a source of potential threats to state security. The main theoretical contribution of the article is the original typology of creating the image of migrants as enemies of the state. The empirical contribution, in turn, is based on an in-depth analysis of a selected case, a group of V4 countries that so far have not been compared in terms of the dominant arguments serving to create the image of migrants as enemies of the state. The main research hypothesis is as follows: the politicization of migration issues in the V4 countries serves to create specific types of images of external enemies and is used instrumentally to achieve objectives in domestic politics.

Keywords: Visegrad Group, Migration policy, Politicization, V4, Migrants

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Introduction

For many centuries, migration issues have aroused a lot of emotions both in the origin countries of emigrants and among the societies receiving immigrants. The right to stay and enjoy various social or economic advantages or privileges sometimes causes tensions between members of different communities, fosters internal divisions, strengthens stereotypes, and even leads to outright hostility and acts of violence. All these negative aspects of migration processes can be effectively prevented or at least limited. In this case, however, much depends on the official policy of the host country, as well as the narrative that dominates the mass media.

Central European countries, which were in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union during the Cold War years, for a long time did not experience the phenomenon of mass immigration, characteristic and discernible in many Western European countries at that time. This lack of experience was not conducive to the development of procedures or solutions that could help take in immigrants in the future. Moreover, the process of socialization did not include issues related to accepting immigrants, creating safe and friendly living conditions for them, and social sensitivity to issues related to religious, ethnic, or racial diversity.

During the last decade, migration issues have regained importance in the European Union. The main source of the increase in the number of people seeking refuge in Europe was the process of rapid socio-political changes in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. It was the conflicts and the economic instability in many of them that forced many of their citizens to look for a better future and security in Europe. For the first time, the challenges related to the uncontrolled influx of immigrants also began to affect the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe.

This article is devoted to four of those countries that are grouped within a sub-regional international organization, the Visegrad Group. The organization was founded in 1991 and groups four states, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Initially, its founders were motivated by the idea of coordinating mutual efforts to obtain membership in NATO and the EU. Once these goals were achieved, the leaders of these countries began, with varying degrees of intensity and effectiveness, coordinating their actions within the EU so that the voices of the countries in the region were heard more clearly.

The process of politicization of migration policies in the V4 states is a relatively new phenomenon. In 2012, Agnieszka Zogata-Kusz pointed to the specificity of immigration policies in these countries, paying particular attention to the relatively low number of immigrants, the lack of a strategy for their admission and integration with the rest of society, and the lack of politicization of migration issues (Zogata-Kusz, 2012, p. 18). Since then, mainly due to the increasing influx of immigrants to Europe due to violent armed conflicts and the deteriorating economic situation in developing countries in Asia and Africa, the situation has changed significantly.

The current positions of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary differ substantially from those presented, for example, in the EU by the countries of Western Europe. At the same time, it is worth paying attention to how instrumentally they use

migration issues to achieve specific goals within the framework of internal policy. In this context, one can talk about the phenomenon of deliberate politicization of the discourse on migration processes, in which the challenges related to the influx of immigrants are used to present the migrants as external enemies of the political system and a real threat to public order. The adopted narrative fosters the feeling of uncertainty and even fear of strangers who are to pose a threat to the democratic foundations of the state. At the same time, it is to strengthen ties between members of dominant national groups and convince them of a kind of moral or civilizational superiority.

As far as the paper structure is concerned, the first part is dedicated to theoretical aspects of migration policy and the process of its deliberate politicization. The analysis is based on concepts formulated by the field's leading scholars. The second part is empirical and deals with a detailed analysis of the official migration strategies of the V4 states and their comparison with declarations and narratives applied by their political leaders between 2015-2021.

Migration Policy, Its Politicization, and the Creation of External Enemies of A State

Studies on the contemporary migration processes and migration policies of individual countries are very extensive and varied. Eytan Meyers points to three major groups of theories explaining immigration control policy. The first focuses on the economic competition between native-born citizens and immigrants. The second highlights the importance of the cultural discord between these two groups, while the third deals with the impact of international relations and international law on national immigration policies (Meyers, 2004, p. 6). For this article and the adopted methodological assumptions, the second theoretical approach is adopted as best reflecting the mainstream narrative and the selection of arguments in the public debate on migration processes in the Visegrad Group countries. As will be shown in the empirical part, the V4 leaders most often refer to cultural, religious, and racial differences, thus pointing to them as sources of potential external threats to public order, national identity, the homogeneous nature of societies in Central European states, and social stability.

It is already known which theoretical approach to migration issues is applicable in the analyzed case. How, then, can this approach be linked to the process of politicization of a migration policy? Such considerations call for the definition of politicization. According to Warren J. Samuels, politicization can mean incorporating actions or beliefs that were not previously in the political domain. It can also mean incorporating an issue that has been ignored for a long time, but for some reason has suddenly become important again (Samuels, 1980, pp. 67-68). The latter approach can be applied to the immigration phenomena to the European Union before 2015, when the politicians of the host countries, except for radical and chauvinist parties, rarely used it as a means of conducting internal politics. The situation changed with the migration crisis in the summer of 2015. This issue was then highly politicized and became a permanent element of public debate, even in those countries where the number of immigrants was not that high at the time, for example, Slovakia or Poland. Thus, it can be concluded that in the case of the V4 countries, the migration problems were ignored for a long time, which allows the use of the second approach to politicization proposed by W. Samuels.

In turn, Michael Zürn defines politicization not only as the transfer of a given issue to the political sphere resulting from objective circumstances but also as the will to take such action, i.e., the deliberate politicization of an issue that has not been the subject of a political debate so far (Zürn, 2019, pp. 978). It can be indicated that this was the nature of the politicization of migration issues in the V4 countries after 2015. It did not result so much from the mass influx of immigrants, as from the need to use the potential inflow of immigrants to shape specific social attitudes, and especially to strengthen national identity.

Zürn also indicates the stages of this process. First, something is transferred to the sphere of public policy, thanks to which there is the possibility of making the collective decisions related to it. In most political systems, collective choice is based on prioritizing an issue on the agenda of the most important politically important issues, discussing it, working out different stances, and then making decisions. The more salient a given issue is subject to public debate and consideration, the greater the polarization of positions on this issue, and thus the greater the degree of politicization of the decision made (Zürn, 2019, pp. 978-979). Such stages of politicizing migration issues could also be observed in the countries of the Visegrad Group after 2015.

In this context, it is worth mentioning the publications, among others, by authors such as Wouter van der Brug, Gianni D'Amato, Didier Ruedin, Joost Berkhout (2015), Swen Hutter (2021), Bern Simon and Olga Grabow (2010) who researched theoretical aspects of the politicization of migration. One can also point to selected case studies such as Nathan Lauwers' (2021) analysis of the parliamentary discourse on the European Union Trust Fund on migration or a paper on the politicization of migration issues during the refugee crisis in the UK and Denmark published by Trisha Meyer, Jamal Shahin, and Sevgi Temizisler (2022). The above-mentioned research on the politicization of migration processes can be complemented by a case study of the Visegrad Group member states. Migration issues were not of political importance for a long time and were not the subject of public debate until the V4 leaders noticed how these issues polarized societies and were used politically in Western or Southern Europe during and after the 2015 migration crisis. For this reason, 2015 was recognized as the starting point for the analysis. The collected data, covering the years 2015-2021, prove that during this period the process of intensive politicization of migration issues in the V4 took place.

Methodological Assumptions

The main purpose of this article is to verify whether the process of politicization of migration policies in the member states of the Visegrad Group serves to portray migrants as external enemies of a political system. The main assumption is that the leaders of the V4 states intentionally politicize migration issues and use them instrumentally to achieve internal objectives. The official narrative of executive bodies in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary fosters the 'we-they' division and the negative image of immigrants. At the same time, measures to limit the influx of immigrants, especially those of a very radical nature, are presented as necessary to protect public order and the democratic foundations of political systems as well as to preserve national identities.

The main research hypothesis is as follows: the politicization of migration issues in the V4 countries serves to create specific types of images of external enemies of a

political system and is used to achieve objectives in domestic politics. In this case, it can be assumed that there is a process of deliberate and very selective politicization of issues related to migration processes. Thus, it becomes a useful tool for distracting citizens from current social or economic challenges and problems under the guise of the need to guarantee internal security. It may even result in restrictions affecting the citizens themselves. In this case, such activities are also presented as necessary and justified to protect the V4 states from potential external threats.

The author applied to process tracing as the main research method. According to Andrew Anguko, it is a qualitative research method that attempts to identify the causal processes between potential causes and the outcome (Anguko, 2019, p. 21). During the research process, it is necessary to determine what actions have been taken, what are their results, and how significant the impact of these actions on the presented results is. The main purpose of the selected method was to establish whether the politicization of migration policies in the V4 states influenced the creation of the image of external enemies. Legal acts and speeches related to the migration processes and published in the Visegrad Group member states between 2015 and 2021 were collected from governmental webpages of the V4 member states. The other source of information was excerpted from public speeches of prime ministers published by renowned press agencies like Reuters and Deutsche Welle. They have all been analyzed in terms of the language used to describe migrants and the migration processes, especially concerning words or phrases that, directly or indirectly, can be interpreted as attributing hostile or dangerous characteristics to migrants. On this basis, they were assigned to the appropriate type of creation of the image of migrants as enemies of the state within the framework of the author's typology proposed below. The most representative, i.e. the most frequently repeated examples were included in the article and compared with similar ones in other V4 countries. Such action allowed us to compare them and determine which type of creating image of migrants as enemies of the state was dominant in a selected V4 state. Adopting such a qualitative method allows for replication of the research in the case of another group of countries.

The start date of the analysis is the beginning of the migration crisis in the European Union in 2015, which resulted, inter alia, in a political debate on the migration processes in individual member states and the future of EU migration policy. The end date is 2021, which saw the migration crisis on the eastern border of the EU, especially on the Polish-Belarusian border. The analysis does not include the events and consequences of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022, which resulted in an influx of a few million refugees to the V4 countries, especially to Poland. This immigration wave differs significantly from those observed in the EU after 2015 due to the lack of significant religious, cultural, and racial differences, not to mention the very circumstances and the scale of this refugee process.

The main theoretical contribution of the article is the original typology of creating the image of migrants as enemies of the state, taking into account the subject criterion. On this basis, four types of creating such an image can be distinguished: (1) migrants as a threat to security and public order; (2) migrants as a threat to values, the dominant religion, and cultural patterns; (3) migrants as a threat to the economic well-being of citizens; and (4) migrants as a threat to public health. The empirical contribution, in turn,

is based on an in-depth analysis of a selected case, namely the group of V4 countries that have not been compared so far in terms of the dominant arguments serving to create the image of migrants as enemies of the state.

Politicization of Migration Issues in the Czech Republic

The Official Stance on the Migration Issues

The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy. The last parliamentary elections were held in October 2021. As a result, a coalition government was formed that grouped the SPOLU coalition (Civic Democratic Party – ODS, Christian Democratic Party KDU-ČSL, and TOP 09) with the Czech Pirate Party and STAN (Mayors and Independents) coalition. It is headed by prime minister Petr Fiala.

According to data from 2020, migrants accounted for 5.9% of the population in the Czech Republic. Their number increased by 6.5% compared to the data for 2019. The main reason for the choice of the Czech Republic by new immigrants was economic, above all the desire to find a job. In turn, the number of asylum seekers fell by as much as 39.4% (Situation of foreigners, 2020).

According to Maciej Skrzypek, there is a number of elements in the Czech politics that testify to the crisis of democratic values and the growing importance of populism (Skrzypek, 2022, p. 149). Such circumstances are conducive to the emergence of xenophobic attitudes based on prejudices and stereotypes. As the historical experience of many countries proves, creating the image of an external enemy is helpful when the rulers want to divert the citizens' attention from current internal problems or indicate their source in external variables. The increase in populism in the Czech Republic was consistent with the strengthening of anti-immigrant attitudes.

The official Czech migration policy is based on the following principles. First, the Czech Republic consistently fosters government control in the field of migration notwithstanding international obligations, for example, those resulting from membership in the European Union. Second, the country's migration policy is based on the coordinated approach of all state administration bodies and local governments. Third, the main goal is to eliminate illegal immigration by a variety of measures at both international and national levels. Fourth, national migration policy, however, does not exclude supporting controlled immigration to the Czech Republic, especially one that is beneficial from a social point of view. Fifth, the implementation of the country's migration policy is conditional upon the mass involvement of non-governmental and other organizations of the civic society. Sixth, the Czech Republic is involved in global and European communities' efforts aimed at coping with migration-related consequences of humanitarian crises and eliminating the reasons for such phenomena (Czech Government's Migration Policy Principles, 2022).

In 2018, the Czech Republic rejected a UN migration pact (Czech Republic rejects, 2018). This decision was interpreted as a manifestation of the overtly anti-immigration policy of the Czech executive bodies. It was also one of the proofs that despite the assumptions contained in the strategy, the Czech Republic does not pursue an immigrant-friendly policy.

Politicization of the Migration Issues As a Means of Creation of External Enemies

Andrej Babiš's government politicized the migration issues and made them an important element of domestic policy. In 2018, the Czech prime minister commented on immigrants from the MENA countries as follows: "These people should stay home and we should help them in Africa. The people around Syria ... would like to return home. (...) They have their culture, we have our culture. They have their values, but we want to keep our values" (Wintour, 2018). In these words, he emphasized the irreconcilable cultural differences which, in his opinion, prevented a common, peaceful coexistence within one society.

The Czech prime minister did not reject the possibility of helping immigrants but suggested many times that it would be safer to do so outside the EU. At the same time, he emphasized his opposition not only to the admission of more migrants but went a step further by proposing the expulsion of those who had already found refuge in the EU. In 2020, during a visit to Warsaw, he said as follows: "We have to change the system of grants and the quota system, it's unacceptable for us. That's why we should keep negotiating... the strategy should look like this – the people coming from these countries, they should be stopped and turned back to their countries and be given help there" (Migrants should be returned, 2020). He also refused to accept Afghan refugees who fled the country after the Taliban took power in August 2021. Referring to this issue, he made the following very clear: "There is no place for them in Europe. (...) An option is to lead talks with (Turkish) President (Recep Tayyip) Erdoğan, like in the past, but I don't think that's a good alternative. A better alternative is a solution making the people stay in Afghanistan" (Czech PM says, 2021). Earlier Czech Interior Minister Jan Hamáček openly referred to potential security threats and suggested that the Afghan migrants pose such threats: "I will not bring 18-year-old Afghans to the Czech Republic because I consider it a security risk" (Jurečková, 2020).

When Babiš launched his election campaign in September 2021, he made anti-immigration policy one of the pillars of the electoral agenda of his populist ANO party. During the inauguration of the campaign, he stated: "This is the last chance to protect our national interests, living standards, our culture. (...) As long as I am prime minister, we will not accept a single illegal migrant" (Muller, 2021).

The same approach to immigration was represented by President Milos Zeman. In 2015, he openly criticized welcoming refugees from Middle Eastern countries fleeing the threats of the so-called Islamic state. Zeman even suggested that they should stay in their countries and fight against the fighters of this terrorist organization. Moreover, he described the mass influx of refugees as an organized invasion: "I am profoundly convinced that we are facing an organized invasion and not a spontaneous movement of refugees. A large majority of the illegal migrants are young men in good health and single. I wonder why these men are not taking up arms to go fight for the freedom of their countries against the Islamic State" (Viner, 2015). Such a position was at the same time a clear suggestion that the refugees constituted a threat to the security of Czech citizens and that they did not need any help.

All the above-mentioned statements clearly show the negative attitude of Czech decision-makers towards migrants. They emphasized migrants' cultural diversity, as well as portraying them as sources of threats to the security of the state and citizens.

This attitude served to create an image of an external enemy, which was used to achieve domestic policy goals, for example, to achieve the highest possible result in the last parliamentary elections. In the case of the Czech Republic, one can say that the adopted hypothesis has been positively verified concerning to the analyzed period in 2015-2021. Two types of creating the image of migrants dominate, i.e. migrants as a threat to security and public order as well as migrants as a threat to cultural patterns and social values.

Politicization of Migration Issues in Hungary

The Official Stance on the Migration Issues

Hungary has been a parliamentary republic since 1989. Nevertheless, the political situation in this country began to change dramatically after Viktor Orbán became the prime minister. The Fidesz-KNDP party has been in power since 2010. The party dominates the Hungarian political system and is led by Viktor Orbán (Fidesz) and Zsolt Semjén (KNDP). Orbán as the prime minister modified the system in a very significant way, seriously restricting civil liberties and the possibility of equal competition for power between various political groups. Such a policy meant that Hungary is now classified as a flawed democracy and is officially criticized by the European Commission. Fidesz promotes national values, and populism, and refers to Hungarian nationalist traditions. Such an approach influences the position of the ruling party regarding the migration processes.

The Hungarian migration strategy for 2014-2020 covered mainly procedural issues, with particular emphasis on the rights and obligations of refugees. However, it does not contain specific information on the forms of support and integration of newcomers with the rest of society (Governance of migrant integration in Hungary, 2022). In 2018, the number of foreign nationals residing legally and permanently in Hungary was 156,000, this is 1.6% of the country's population. This number increased in 2019 to 180,773 and in the first half of 2020 to 200,150 (Hungary: Population, 2021). In 2021, only 38 people managed to apply for asylum in Hungary, eight of whom came via the Embassy procedure (Country Report: Hungary, 2021, p. 13).

According to the official strategy on migration adopted by the Hungarian government, "the document clearly envisages the potential societal, social and budgetary effects of migration, emphasizes the requirement of fair treatment and the human rights dimension of migration, and provides firm responses to the risks of national security, public order, and public policy related to illegal migration" (Hungary's migration strategy, 2014). Such an approach suggests that the migration policy is to respond to potential threats related to migration processes, rather than constitute an effective tool of assistance for people forced to migrate and stay on the territory of Hungary. Many of the actions and statements of members of the ruling party often prove this, especially of the prime minister.

One of the characteristic elements of Hungarian policy during Orbán's rule is the creation of internal and external 'enemies' of the state. One of the layers of enemy creation is presenting people of a different sexual orientation, culture, or race as sources of threats to traditional values, and the populist, homogenous vision of the people and the nation (Drinóczi, Mészáros, 2022, p. 110). Orbán treats immigrants very instrumentally and has contributed to a significant politicization of migration issues in Hungary.

Politicization of the Migration Issues As A Means of Creation of External Enemies

In 2018, Orbán described immigration as ‘an invasion’ and migrants as ‘a poison.’ He even went so far as to make the following highly controversial comment: “We don’t see these people as Muslim refugees. We see them as Muslim invaders. We believe that many Muslims inevitably leads to parallel societies because Christian and Muslim societies will never unite. Multiculturalism is only an illusion” (Viktor Orban’s most controversial, 2018). Such a narrative did not leave the public with any doubts as to who and what posed a threat to the security of the state and its citizens. Moreover, the politicization of migration issues and the presentation of migrants as enemies were to justify the introduction of restrictions to the democratic system. Among the limitations was the restriction of the possibility of obtaining asylum in Hungary, a decision which was met with harsh criticism from the European Union for not meeting EU standards (Hungary asylum, 2021). The situation did not change even after the EU court ruling in December 2021. At the same time, during the election campaign that was taking place at that time, the Hungarian prime minister indicated two most important issues during the campaign – migration and the rights of LGBTQ groups (Hungary to defy EU court ruling, 2021). Thus, he indicated two parallel groups of enemies of the system: internal enemies – LGBTQ, and external enemies – migrants. He made the restriction of the rights of members of both groups equal and justified it by the necessity to protect the foundations of the functioning of the state and society.

In June 2021, Viktor Orbán proposed to ban immigrants for two years. He justified the closure of the EU against the influx of immigrants for security reasons. The Hungarian prime minister said as follows: “Migrant armies are banging on all the gates of Europe. (...) Migration is inherently bad.” He also referred to migrants as ‘Muslim invaders’ and suggested that “all terrorists are basically migrants” (Hungary’s Orban, 2021). Apart from the very controversial tone and the wording used, there was another attempt to politicize the migration issues and use them as an excuse to introduce restrictions on civil rights. In this case, the Hungarian prime minister justified the need to introduce them under the pretext of defending public order and democratic values. This is an element of thinking typical of neo-militant democracy systems.

The statements of the Hungarian prime minister quoted above clearly prove that he is using the politicization of migration issues to create external enemies of Hungary. He presents them as a threat to the ethnic homogeneity of society and national values. Such actions are aimed at gaining the citizens’ support, especially during elections. They also make it possible to gain support for current political projects that have nothing to do with migration processes. On the other hand, the very existence of a potential external threat mobilizes citizens to support certain ideas or solutions. For this reason, the adopted hypothesis has been positively verified with Hungary in the analyzed period between 2015 and 2021. Two types of creating the image of migrants dominate, i.e. migrants as a threat to security and public order as well as migrants as a threat to cultural patterns and social values.

Politicization of Migration Issues in Poland

The Official Stance on the Migration Issues

Poland is a parliamentary republic. The country underwent a process of systemic transformation in the 1990s and since 1989 it has been classified as fully democratic. However, the situation began to gradually change after 2015. Since that year, the Polish political scene has been dominated by the United Right, led by the Law and Justice party headed by the charismatic leader Jarosław Kaczyński. The parliamentary majority and successive governments of the United Right began to gradually take control of the judiciary, and public media and took over some private media. The control over the public media made it possible to create the image of the internal and external enemies of the state. The latter group included immigrants and refugees, although during the migration crisis in 2015 and later, few refugees reached Poland. When that happened, they generally arrived following the law. The situation changed only in 2021 when immigrants began to attempt to cross the Polish-Belarusian border on a mass scale outside the border control points.

Compared to the Civic Platform ruling in the previous period, members of the United Right share a very critical attitude towards immigration, especially from non-European countries. However, the right-wing government began to pursue an ad hoc migration policy during this period, without a dedicated strategy or even indicating the most important goals. The ruling party's politicians also reacted to the current events in the geopolitical environment of Poland, rather than preparing the state for possible scenarios and the need to accept large groups of immigrants or refugees.

In 2020, the Team for Migration presented a document entitled Migration Policy of Poland – Diagnosis of the Initial State. Yet it does not serve as an official migration strategy for Poland. It only constitutes the basis for such a strategy document which is currently being drafted (Governance of migrant integration in Poland, 2021). Until the autumn of 2021, such an approach seemed justified, and the situation did not require the Polish government to take special measures regarding migration issues. The situation began to drastically change only in the fall of 2021, during the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border. By 2022, i.e. the mass influx of war refugees from Ukraine, the share of migrants in the total number of 38 million Polish citizens was insignificant, especially when compared to other EU countries. As of 2021, non-Polish residents numbered 111,800, up from 55,400 in 2011, with Ukrainians accounting for 47.4 percent, almost a four-fold increase from 2011 (Poland unveils, 2022).

Politicization of the Migration Issues As a Means of Creation of External Enemies

One of the main features of contemporary political debate in Poland is a very high level of emotionality. This phenomenon gained importance and was exacerbated after the Law and Justice party took power in 2015. According to Joanna Rak and Roman Bäcker, the emotional narrative began to dominate the political discourse, the development of which was supported by the clear domination of the ruling party over the public media and state institutions (Bäcker, Rak, 2022, p. 95). This domination of emotions over factual arguments has become particularly evident in the public debate related to migration

phenomena. Stereotypes and prejudices began to dominate in it, as well as strongly emphasizing the potential threats related to the influx of immigrants of a different culture or religion.

The best proof of this was the resignation of the government of Beata Szydło, the first prime minister of Law and Justice after 2015, from the commitments made by the previous prime minister Ewa Kopacz. The head of the government on behalf of the Civic Platform agreed to Poland's participation in the quota refugee distribution system during the migration crisis in the summer of 2015 (Cienski, 2016). However, her decisions were changed by Szydło. At the same time, the new head of government clearly emphasized that Poland would prefer the immigration of Christians, but would not accept followers of other religions. It was an obvious allusion to Muslims who dominated the 2015 migration wave.

When the European Union attempted to exert pressure on the Polish government, Szydło officially declared as follows: "We cannot be blackmailed by the threat that part of our EU funds will be cut off as punishment, because we don't agree to the forced relocation of migrants from North Africa and the Middle East" (Polish PM rejects, 2017). Migration issues became even more politicized in the fall of 2021 when thousands of immigrants coming mainly from the MENA countries began to storm and attempt to illegally cross the Polish border from Belarus. Prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki became the main promoter of this policy. In this context, however, the radical measures taken by the Polish government met with approval from the European Union and even tacit approval from the opposition groups. At stake, at least officially, was the defense of the EU's external borders, as well as the European identity and security of EU citizens. As part of the aforementioned activities, a state of emergency was introduced in the border area, which contributed to a serious limitation of the possibility of exercising civil liberties (The safety of Poland, 2021). Even journalists could not appear in the zone for a long time, which in practice prevented the public from accessing reliable information on the actual state of emergency.

In November 2021, Morawiecki linked the immigration crisis with the safety of Poland and the EU. In addition, the Polish prime minister compared the crisis to a hybrid war. He stated as follows: "Lukashenko launched a hybrid war against the EU. This is the greatest attempt to destabilize Europe in 30 years. Poland will not yield to blackmail and will do everything to defend the EU's borders" (Poland says border crisis, 2021). The close connection of migration issues with the security of the state and its citizens has thus become an argument that is difficult to undermine in the public debate. Anyone who called for humanitarian aid to immigrants at the border exposed themselves to criticism and accusations of acting to the detriment of the state. The policy of the Polish government towards the influx of immigrants from Belarus was also in line with the policy consistently pursued by Law and Justice since 2015. This policy assumed a strict and very restrictive migration policy, except for facilitating access to the labor market for those foreigners who could fill the gaps in the domestic labor market. At the same time, the migration crisis of 2021 contributed to an increase in political tensions between the government and the opposition, and an increase in anti-immigration sentiment in Polish society (Majority of Poles, 2021). Moreover, many citizens were willing to agree to the

introduction of a state of emergency in the border area and the restriction of civil liberties, adopting the official argumentation and narrative of the executive actors (Majority of Poles support a state of emergency, 2021). Therefore, it can be assumed that the politicization of migration issues was conducive to the introduction of restrictions characteristic of the neo-militant democracy system.

In Poland, after 2015, migration issues were highly politicized. The politicians of the ruling United Right began to use them instrumentally to create external enemies of the Polish state. Migrants were presented as strangers, people who are unable to function following local values and rules. Also as a source of potential threats to state security. As was the case in the Czech Republic and Hungary, also in Poland, migration issues were used by the ruling party during the 2019 election campaign. Moreover, the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border was used as a pretext to introduce a temporary state of emergency in the border zone. This type of restriction was applied for the first time in the history of democratic Poland after 1989. However, they affected not so many migrants as residents of nearby towns and journalists who were effectively prevented from observing and reporting the situation from the scene of the events. For the above-mentioned reasons, the adopted hypothesis has been positively verified with Poland in the analyzed period between 2015 and 2021. Two types of creating the image of migrants dominate, i.e. migrants as a threat to security and public order as well as migrants as a threat to cultural patterns and social values.

Politicization of Migration Issues in Slovakia

The Official Stance on the Migration Issues

Slovakia is a parliamentary republic with a multi-power system. It has been unsustainable in recent years, as evidenced by the frequent changes in government. In the 2019 parliamentary elections, the anti-corruption movement Ordinary People OĽaNO and the Social Democrats received the most votes. The current prime minister, Eduard Heger, comes from the populist OĽaNO.

Foreigners constitute about 3% of the population in Slovakia, which places it among the countries with the lowest percentage of foreigners in the European Union, just ahead of Poland and Romania. The main reason for choosing Slovakia as a place of stay is economic. Incidentally, it is worth noting the exceptionally low number of asylum applications – 370. Even more striking are the statistics for granting such status. Throughout 2021, only 29 people received it (Migration in Slovakia, 2022).

In September 2021, the Slovak government adopted a new strategic document related to migration issues, namely *The Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic: Perspective until the Year 2025*. The new strategy clearly emphasizes that the government prefers targeted, economic immigration. The main goal is to attract potential employees in industries where their shortage is particularly noticeable. At the same time, it is recommended to manage migration processes in such a way that secures the interests and security of Slovak citizens and legal migrants and simultaneously does not lead to any tensions or social conflicts (Slovakia adopts, 2021). The adoption of this strategy was a tribute to communities reluctant to accept large groups of immigrants and striving to limit the influx of people of different cultures and religions.

In Slovakia, as in other previously discussed countries of the Visegrad Group, one can see the domination of emotions and various prejudices in the public debate on migration phenomena. Over time, after 2015, this dominant narrative began to translate into specific political decisions and changes in legislation, including those that introduced restrictions on civil liberties. According to Max Steuer and Martin Kovanic, one of the main challenges to Slovak democracy was a response to the post-2015 migration crisis that linked migration issues with terrorist threats. The adoption of such a narrative later served as a justification for the introduction of counter-terrorist measures, which at the same time limited civil liberties. (Steuer, Kovanic, 2022, p. 165). It was the first proof of the politicization of migration issues to create an external enemy, which in turn was to achieve internal political goals, such as greater control over society.

Politicization of the Migration Issues As a Means of Creation of External Enemies

In 2016, Slovak prime minister Robert Fico linked refugees with terrorist attacks in Europe. He openly stated as follows: “Many things are being said and written, but the Slovak government sees a direct link between the current migration flows and the (November) attacks in Paris and recent events in Germany” (Gabrizova, 2016). At the same time, he announced that Slovakia would not accept Muslim immigrants because of their different attitudes towards women and “diametrically opposed values and ways of life” that make their integration into Slovak society impossible (Gabrizova, 2016). This way, Fico was part of the xenophobic and anti-immigrant narrative that dominated the political discourse in all V4 countries during the migration crisis. Although Slovakia was not affected by the influx of immigrants like neighboring Hungary, it did not prevent its prime minister from instrumentally using the migration issues. Their politicization allowed the Slovak leader to create the image of an external enemy in difficult times, to unite citizens around shared values, and to strengthen a sense of national community.

Compared to Robert Fico’s rule, the situation improved significantly after Peter Pellegrini took office in 2020. He represented a more liberal stance on migration issues and was more open to cooperation with the EU. Pellegrini did not use anti-immigration rhetoric like Fico and did not try to gain political support by appealing to prejudices or stereotypes. Yet his successor, Igor Matovič, was not open to immigration and tried to stop it. His opinions were anti-immigrant (Slovakia’s populist, 2020; An anti-corruption campaigner, 2020).

The positive trend in avoiding the politicization of migration issues is visible in the current government of Eduard Heger. In 2021, prime ministers of the Czech Republic, Austria, and Slovakia adopted a joint statement against illegal immigration (Central Europe takes, 2021). But Heger mainly criticized the actions of the Belarusian president who tried to use immigrants to destabilize the situation in Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. He did not attribute any negative traits to immigrants and did not try to create the belief that they were people with bad intentions. During this period, Slovakia’s politics began to differ from the politicization of migration issues in the other V4 countries.

The case of Slovakia is therefore different from that of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The negative narrative and the politicization of migration issues were noticeable in the discussed period only during the rule of prime minister Fico. He used migrants as

external enemies of the Slovak state and thus tried to mobilize his electorate and win new supporters. His successors were either far from such activities (Pellegrini, Heger) or used them to a very limited extent (Matovič). The level of corruption and the economic problems of Slovakia during Fico's rule became such social problems that the ruling camp was unable to obscure them with anti-immigration rhetoric. In this case, creating an external enemy has failed in the sense that it has not obtained enough votes to maintain power. Proof of this can be, for example, the successful election campaign of Igor Matovič in 2020, which focused primarily on corruption issues (Slovakia parliamentary elections, 2020).

For the above-mentioned reasons, the adopted hypothesis has not been positively verified about Slovakia in the analyzed period between 2015 and 2021. The politicization of migration issues was used to create the image of the Slovak state's external enemies only during the rule of Robert Fico. Before 2018, two types of creating the image of migrants dominated, i.e. migrants as a threat to security and public order as well as migrants as a threat to cultural patterns and social values. However, both disappeared from the official government narrative after prime minister Fico lost power.

Conclusion

The presented arguments allow us to state that in all four member states of the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) the phenomenon of politicization of migration processes was noticeable after 2015. Yet the Slovak case differs from the remaining three because after the rule of prime minister Robert Fico, his successors did not use the politicization of migration processes to create the image of an external enemy. Two out of four proposed types of creating the image of migrants dominated, namely migrants as a threat to security and public order as well as migrants as a threat to cultural patterns and social values.

The harsh rhetoric and politicization of the migration policies in the V4 states were used mainly to introduce significant restrictions and seriously limit immigrants' access to these states as well as to gain public support. Such activities strengthened the 'we-they' division and did not foster the integration of those immigrants who already live in the analyzed V4 countries. The ruling parties and their leaders presented immigrants as a source of potential threats to the security of the state or its citizens, often also to justify the introduction of significant restrictions, such as freedom of movement. Such a situation arose, for example, when the state of emergency was introduced in the border area in Poland during the migration crisis in 2021. Such actions proved that the leaders of the Visegrad Group countries instrumentally used migration issues, leading to a high degree of their politicization, which in turn was to justify socially unpopular actions.

It should also be noted that the heads of governments in all V4 countries emphasized cultural and religious differences, making their very existence a source of potential threats. The thesis about the incompatibility of immigrants with social systems and standards in the V4 countries is not so much controversial as it is dangerous. Such an approach to this issue is evidenced by the statements of the leaders of individual countries cited in the text, often diverging not only from the principles of political correctness but also from basic humanitarian values. This way, the leaders of these countries, except for of Slovakia in

the last few years, have created an image of external enemies for democratic systems that strongly influences public opinion. This is evidenced by the fact that migration problems are one of the main issues in election campaigns, and anti-immigration groups continue to win the elections.

Definitions of politicization proposed by W.J. Samuels and M. Zürn were fully applicable to the migration issues in the V4 countries. Under the influence of the events related to the migration crisis in 2015, these issues, which until then had not been of interest to politicians, were suddenly included in the political discourse. Importantly, in the case of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, it happened even without an influx of immigrants. However, even then they were presented in a negative way that reinforced stereotypical divisions and prejudices. At the same time, the ruling parties in the V4 countries used the uncontrolled influx of immigrants to the EU as a pretext to strengthen their nationalist narrative and their political position.

Immigrants as external enemies were convenient because they could not in any way related to such formulated arguments. Leading politicians in the V4 countries did not refer to any data or factual arguments. Their views on migrants were purely speculative. One of the approaches to the migration policy proposed by E. Meyers, formulated based on cultural differences, is certainly applicable in the case of the V4 countries. As it shown in the quoted statements, the leaders of these countries refer mainly to cultural, religious, and different values. Interestingly, they ignored economic issues. This is another argument that proves that their goal was not to discuss the data in a matter-of-factly, but to appeal to citizens' emotions and to unify them in the face of the alleged threat posed by migrants.

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Between Locally Led Response and Domestic Blame Avoidance: Dilemmas in the Management of Syrians in Turkey

İnsani Yardımın Yerelleştirilmesi ve Suçlamadan Kaçınma Arasında: Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin Yönetiminde İkilemeler

Marc Smyrl¹ , Ceren Ark-Yıldırım² 

Abstract

Based on observations and unstructured interviews with key actors conducted in Turkey in 2019 and 2020, this study considers the dynamics of sovereignty and transnational cooperation in the management of forced migration. We focus in particular on the question: to what extent can humanitarian governance and host-country social protection schemes converge? The 2016 humanitarian summit recommended a model of international humanitarian governance in which social policy instruments and actors should be given greater weight in humanitarian management. In this paper, we use the case of humanitarian assistance to Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey to test the limits of this policy shift. We argue that as long as supporting forced migrants from public resources is seen as an undesirable action by voters, host country governments must balance implementation of this internationally established norm with attention to “blame avoidance.” “Avoiding blame is the main obstacle preventing the full convergence of humanitarian aid instruments with national social protection instruments.

Keywords: Migration, Humanitarian Assistance, Cash Transfer, Blame Avoidance

Öz

2019 ve 2020 yıllarında Türkiye’de gerçekleştirilen gözlemlere ve kilit aktörlerle yapılandırılmamış görüşmelere dayanan bu çalışma, zorunlu göçün yönetiminde egemenlik ve ulus ötesi işbirliği dinamiklerini ele almakta ve “insani yardım yönetimi ve ulusal sosyal koruma programları ne ölçüde birbirine yakınlaşabilir?” sorusuna odaklanmaktadır. 2016 insani yardım zirvesinde, insani yardım yönetiminde sosyal politika araçlarına ve aktörlerine daha fazla ağırlık verilmesi gereken bir uluslararası insani yardım yönetişimi modeli önerilmiştir. Makalede, bu politika değişikliğinin sınırlarını test etmek için Türkiye’deki geçici koruma altındaki Suriyelilere verilen nakit desteği örneği kullanılmaktadır. Zorunlu göçmenleri kamu kaynaklarından destekleme, seçmenler tarafından istenmeyen bir eylem olarak görüldüğü sürece, “suçlamadan kaçınmak” için ev sahibi ülke hükümetlerinin uluslararası oluşturulan bu normu tam olarak uygulayamayacağını savunuyoruz. Bir başka deyişle, bu makalenin ana iddiası “Suçlamadan kaçınmanın”, insani yardım araçlarının ulusal sosyal koruma araçlarıyla tam olarak yakınlaşmasını engelleyen temel neden olduğudur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Göç, İnsani Yardım, Nakit Destek, Suçlamadan Kaçınma

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Since 2011, Turkey has witnessed a mass influx of migrants fleeing the Syrian civil war as well as other regional conflicts. The country hosts the largest number of international forced migrants¹ in the world (UNHCR , 2023). By far the largest group of these are some 3.5 million Syrians granted Temporary Protection Status (Göç İdaresi, 2023). The presence on Turkish soil of this significant population for an indefinite period has inevitably raised questions relating to domestic security and border control, as well as generating demand for social services ranging from health care to housing, education, and income support. The research presented here focusses on the years 2012-2022.² Over this decade, we suggest, the position of the Turkish government has undergone a complex and non-linear evolution, the result of attempting to balance a number of distinct and imperfectly compatible preferences and constraints.

Most obviously, the potential for further mass cross-border movements of displaced persons prompted the Turkish government to change its approach to migration, closing the border with Syria in 2016. (Batalla and Tolay, 2018: 5). Subsequent decisions restricted the areas within Turkey to which forced migrants could relocate – in principle, at least, stopping movement toward Istanbul as of 2018.³ The necessity of addressing the social and humanitarian needs of forced migrants already on Turkish soil, meanwhile, has led to increased involvement by national and local institutions of the Turkish state. All of these moves are consistent with a reassertion of sovereignty. In addition, the latter in particular is in accordance with the recent evolution of international norms for humanitarian assistance, as proposed by the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, which place the direct involvement of host country authorities and organizations at the heart of response strategy.

While moves to tighten border control on the one hand and to provide active locally-led support for migrants on the other are consistent in the international context, however, their domestic political implications are very different. The research presented in this article suggests that the ideal of full integration of national and international humanitarian efforts may not be altogether sustainable over the medium term because of the host country governments' desire to avoid blame for the unpopular action of supporting refugees from public resources. "Blame avoidance," we conclude, is a key – and understudied – obstacle that prevents international humanitarian instruments from fully converging with national social protection instruments.

This article is based on systematic analysis of public documents, complemented by observations and interviews carried out at the local and national levels in Turkey, as well as interviews with key informants in the European Commission. All interviews were carried out between 2019 and 2020, although documentary research was extended to the first months of 2023. At the request of our interview partners, interviews are entirely

1 This article does not consider the question of persons displaced within their country of origin, sometimes labeled "internal migrants." In the pages that follow, accordingly, the term "forced migrants" will be taken to refer to those whose movement has led them to cross an international border.

2 Research for this article was conducted prior to the 2023 earthquake that devastated a large region of southeastern Turkey and northern Syria. Accordingly, it does not take any account either the direct policy responses to the earthquake or of the indirect impact of this event on Turkish politics and policy more broadly. We have explicitly chosen, moreover, not to update our argument to include discussion of this exogenous event, with a view to preserving the potential comparability of our core argument, which does not depend on an external shock to explain observed effects.

3 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/16/turkey-stops-registering-syrian-asylumseekers>

anonymized. Accordingly, interviews or observations are referenced solely by date. The purpose of the interviews, it should be stressed, is illustrative, they provide background information and suggest examples. We make no claim to have or to reveal privileged information. Quite to the contrary, the central observations of this article focus on the public pronouncements and the official actions of actor and agencies in positions of authority. It is these that lead us to the conclusion that host-country governments face a conflict between the imperatives of sovereignty and the desire for blame avoidance, and that this internal conflict illuminates the logic of a pattern of action than might otherwise be difficult to explain.

Who Governs Migration ?

Is control of cross-border migration the sole purview of sovereign states? Is providing economic support for forced migrants allowed to settle, even temporarily, the sole responsibility of the host state? Are one or the other, conversely, subject chiefly to international law, norms, and collective responsibility? In the latter case, is there any scope at all for discretion on the part of host-country actors? The answer to these questions, central to the issues explored in this article, have evolved considerably since the mid-20th century, but this movement has not been linear.

Reasserting sovereignty

Taking the questions most generally, we can see the emergence following World War Two of a body of international law based on human rights understood at the level of individuals, which if taken literally suggested that individuals had far-ranging rights to settle where they chose, including crossing international borders, and that states for their part had broad duties to extend to migrants rights and services equivalent to those provided for citizens. Writing at the end of the 20th century, Sassen (1999) pointed to Article 14 of the UN's universal declaration of human rights, which provides the right "*to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution*," as marking the emergence of "de-facto transnationalism in migration policy". As neoliberalism spread around the world in 1980s, state service provision declined while the private sector took its place. In this context, "*corporations, markets and free-trade agreements are now in charge of 'governing' an increasing share of cross-border flows*" (Sassen, 1999: 177). If anything, however, this trend to "globalization" further removed the control of migration from the arbitrary choices of sovereign governments.

In retrospect, it seems clear that Sassen was describing a historical moment that had already ended. Writing less than a decade later, Koser (2007: 237) provides a clear rejoinder, noting that "*whatever the impact of global economic flows and interstate pacts, states firmly retain the right to [...] control immigration and membership*". Several episodes illustrate this shift notably the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia. Notwithstanding the ongoing role of international organizations such as (but not limited to) the UNHCR, the legal basis for an international human rights regime that recognizes the right of migrants, and the proliferation of transnational civil society organizations, the trend at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries was not so much the "*emergence of transnational civil society*" as an increasingly effective reaction on the part

of national governments. In the end, Koser (2007: 233) concludes that “*transnationalism has reinforced state control.*” The emergence in Europe of “temporary protection” in the wake of the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia (Koser, 2007: 239), and its extensive use by the USA with respect to forced migrants from Central America (Wilson, 2020) mark an important turning point in this development, as governments imposed on forced migrants a status determined (and revocable) by domestic political decisions rather than by either international law and organizations or pressure from transnational economic actors. Ironically, the political salience of perceived loss of control of national borders in the face of massive flows of asylum seekers contributed significantly to the retreat from a more liberal asylum regime as governments in Europe and elsewhere faced a significant backlash from citizens and, increasingly from organized opposition parties, who focused on the perceived cost of hosting large numbers of forced migrants. (Guiraudon and Lahav, eds., 2006) It is to this aspect of the problem that we now turn.

Bearing, and sharing, responsibility for forced migrants

Reassertion of sovereignty with respect to migration and border control notwithstanding, the reality of the decades since the 1990s has been one of increasing flows of forced migrants. This, in turn, has presented states and international organizations with the unavoidable responsibility of humanitarian support and the vexing question of who is to pay for it. In the face of this new reality, a number of distinct responses have emerged, ranging from a near-total delegation of responsibility to international organizations to a renewed ideal of shared responsibility. A useful starting point for understanding these responses, and the persisting differences among them, is to ask what type of policy is being considered. Far from an academic question, this proves to have important practical consequences, and will be at the heart of our ultimate conclusions.

Economic and social support for forced migrants is frequently labeled as “humanitarian” assistance the better to distinguish them from social support based on the rights and duties of national citizens. Over time, however, economic support of migrants may come to resemble the types of social assistance typically reserved for citizens. The notion of “transnational social protection” has thus been taken up by several authors (Levitt *et al.*, 2017; Paul, 2017; Mingot and Mazzucato, 2018: 21-28) in the context of international migration. The resulting hybrid policy regime has been characterized as:

the combination of provisions provided by the state, the market, the third sector (i.e., NGOs, churches, international organizations) and family and social networks to protect individuals and families against declining living standards arising from a number of basic risks and needs (e.g., employment, healthcare, housing, nourishment, education and social participation) in a transnational manner. (Mingot and Mazzucato, 2018: 21-28)

Bilecen and Barglowski (2015: 203), similarly, evoke an “interrelation or ‘assemblage’ of formal and informal elements, with social actors constantly negotiating and combining the use of formal and informal provisions.” The form taken by this “interrelation or assemblage” varies significantly from one case to another. Initially, resources of host countries faced with large and unexpected movements of forced migration may be overwhelmed while at the same time the possibility of international crisis response is at its highest. In such cases, the international humanitarian system may be directly involved

in one or more of the activates outlined by Hoffman and Weiss (2017) as: “*articulation of rights, supplying relief, and providing protection.*”

Beyond “articulations” and “assemblages,” however, distinct types emerge. Experience in cases such as Kenya beginning in the 1990s has shown that when states are overwhelmed by the burden of mass population influx the presence of actors in a position to provide resources, such as UNHCR and international NGOs, can lead to a willing transfer of responsibility by otherwise viable states (Frangeigh, 2016). In such cases, UN agencies such as UNHCR behave in effect as a “surrogate state.” As such they create “their own territory (camps), citizens (refugees), public services (education, health etc.) and ideology (gender equality).” (Slaughter and Crisp 2009: 8). In some cases, such as Iraq, the government can choose among the transnational actors; thus, IFRC was preferred to UNHCR to manage camps for Iranians of Kurdish origin, but the ultimate outcome is still one of near-total delegation of responsibility and authority (Krill, 2001).

This central role of UN agencies in migration governance has been called “State to UN responsibility shift.” (Kagan, 2011) In the case of Lebanon and Jordan, it was formalized by “Memoranda of Understanding” in 1998 and 2003 (Frangieh, 2016) limiting the host state’s responsibility for refugee management and protection. Considering subsequent events, however, it is evident that the Memorandum of Understanding was not a policy instrument designed for mass influx of displaced persons as has been seen more recently in the case of the Syrian crisis. To meet the new challenge, Lebanon and Jordan increased their responsibility towards refugees, mainly to control registration (Frangieh, 2016: 41-42). When it came to meeting economic needs of forced migrants, however, the “state to UN shift” was evident, as the cash transfer program for Syrian refugee in Jordan were financed and managed directly by UNHCR (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2018).

In the face of such responsibility shifts, however, actors and analysts have increasingly recognized that the distinctiveness of humanitarian assistance, traditionally focused on short-term emergency assistance, is eroded in cases of protracted crises. When the refugee presence is protracted, the social support instruments of the hosting country may be called on to address the needs that result. Among the reasons for this is the recognition that the humanitarian system, typified by top-down and internationally led structures, is not ideal for managing complex and ongoing crises (Gingerich and Cohen, 2015). Moreover, observers have increasingly emphasized the inherent limits of humanitarianism. Stubbs (2002: 325) argues that humanitarian assistance by its nature focusses “*not on structures of welfare governance, but on aid to specific vulnerable groups*”. As such, it risks establishing an *ad hoc* and inconsistent policy response, different from the more systematic approach of national social assistance.

These concerns were addressed directly in the consultation period for the UN World Humanitarian Summit 2016. Humanitarian aid organizations proposed the Charter for Change, “to practically implement changes to the way the Humanitarian System operates to enable more locally-led response” (Charter 4 Change, 2015).⁴ It proposed transferring 20 per cent of all humanitarian funding to local and national organizations by 2018 as a means to “*Increase social protection programs and strengthen national and local systems and coping mechanisms in order to build resilience in fragile contexts*” (Grand Bargain Document, 2016: 14). Following in this same logic, several policy documents relevant to

4 <https://charter4change.org>

the case studied here, such as European Commission (2019) and UNHCR (2019), argue for that humanitarian and social support instruments should be more similar, and that the preexisting structure of national social policy instruments should form their core. The purpose of international support, in this logic, should be to strengthen, but not to supplant national policy tools.

This is not, however, the end of the story. While the documents that came out of the 2016 summit addressed both the necessary conditions for a more effective policy response and the desire of host-country authorities to reassert sovereign authority, they paid less attention to another of the key lessons of the 1990s and 2000s discussed at the beginning of this section: beyond its objective economic burden, the perceived economic cost of hosting migrants has become an important political risk to host-country governments. (Guiraudon and Halav, 2006) In response to – or in anticipation of – accusations of spending on migrants resources that should be reserved for citizens, governments may not wish to be visibly associated with the support of refugees, deferring instead to international organizations or NGOs as part of a strategy of “blame avoidance.”

As a general premise of policy, this is a well-known attitude: “*Blame avoidance refers to the act of minimizing the expected blame that one must face when something unwanted happens in the public sector domain*” (Rajala, 2019). Although the humanitarian assistance governance are now more dependent on national welfare system, the political and social cost of this governance provides an incentive for national public actors to avoid being seen as fully involved, and to transfer the governance and public face of the program to NGOs and transnational actors. This dilemma, between “locally -led response” on the one hand and “blame avoidance” on the other is the focus of the case study introduced below and analyzed in more detail in the following sections.

Delegation and sovereignty in Turkey

This new commitment to improve the integration of humanitarian actors and host-country social protection systems brings us back to the notion of “transnational social protection” evoked above (Levitt *et al.*, 2017; Hoffman and Weiss, 2017) with its “assemblage” of national and transnational actors. With respect to Turkey and the response to forced migration from Syria, Yılmaz (2019) comes to a similar conclusion, observing that the EU-Turkey agreement “*shaped the welfare mix by empowering the public sector mandate vis-à-vis the humanitarian actors.*” A similar point is made by in the case of refugee health care by Ark-Yıldırım, Komsuoğlu and Özekmekçi (2019).

Based on preliminary evidence, these studies came to conclusions with respect to aid for forced migrants in Turkey whose logic resembled Koser’s (2007) claim with respect to migration policy: transnational policy instruments may end up reinforcing state control. Of central importance to this claim were the consequences of the “externalization of migration governance” (Üstübcü, 2019) on the part of the European Union. According to this argument, which we share in part, the EU’s decision to aid persons fleeing the Syrian civil war in the countries bordering the war zone, rather than in the EU itself, as formalized in our case by the EU-Turkey accords of 2016, had the ultimate, if perhaps not the intended, outcome of strengthening the institutions of the Turkish state.⁵

5 This article does not address the cases of Jordan and Lebanon, in which large numbers of Syrians also sought refuge and which were the recipients of significant aid from the EU. Our conclusions here may be useful as

From the ottoman era to today, Turkish state is generally characterized as a centralized and powerful state that is reluctant to share the attributes of sovereignty. As such, near-total delegation of responsibility to transnational entities, as seen in Jordan or in some African States, was not an option for Turkey. Even so, the initial response in the beginning of Syrian war, when the presence of forced migrants was considered temporary and short term, was marked by the presence of both international and non-governmental organizations on the Syrian border.

The perception of this situation changed in 2015, when it became evident that the number of forced migrants was increasing rapidly and that they were likely to remain outside of Syria for an indefinite period. The resulting “refugee crisis,” sparked by illegal crossings by Syrian migrants into the EU led directly to the EU-Turkey agreement of 2016, which in turn led to a significant increase in the involvement of Turkish national institutions. Most visibly, this took the form of Turkish enforcement of a closed border, both with Syria and with the EU. In addition, measures were put in place to increase the control of Syrians within Turkey. It is this latter policy that is at the heart of our argument, relating as it does to the management of the social support programs that were funded by this same EU-Turkey agreement.

The resulting governance model, merging international resources and locally-led response, was very much in the spirit of the new thinking on humanitarian assistance, as expressed in the contemporaneous World Humanitarian Summit, held in Istanbul that same year, which urged a closer integration of international and host-country actors and policy instruments. However, being publicly seen by as the only entity responsible for the support of Syrian migrants posed problems for the Turkish authorities (Beyaz et. al. 2019) because of its high and growing social, political, and economic cost.

In the pages that follow, we divide our analysis chronologically into two distinct periods. The first, prior to 2016, is marked by a proliferation of transnational instruments but also by the beginnings of the reassertion of state authority. The second, marked by the impact of the 2016 EU-Turkey accords brings a significant increase in state capacity but also, especially in the most recent years, an expressed reluctance on the part of Turkish authorities to abandon key elements, both practical and symbolic of transnationalism.

Open Borders and Transnational Humanitarian Assistance

Turkey’s initial response to the Syrian civil war was to allow Syrians to cross its border freely even without identity documents (Özer, 2015; Batalla and Tolay, 2018).⁶ Syrians were accommodated in state-organized camps. Only a limited number of international or and national actors were active (European Commission, 2019) and their offer for help was largely denied by Turkish government (Gökalp-Aras and Şahin-Mencütek 2016; Kale, 2017; Memisoglu and Ilgit, 2017). Three reasons are given for this refusal: belief that the Syrian presence was temporary accordingly (Memisoglu and Ilgit, 2017); reluctance to share domestic information (Kale, 2017); and finally a desire to promote the view of Turkey as an important power and leading humanitarian actor in the region (Gökalp-Aras and Şahin-Mencütek 2016).

starting points for parallel research in these other cases.

6 The legal basis for this policy was the pre-existing visa-free agreement signed 2009 between Syria and Turkey, which the Turkish government chose to apply to forced migrants after 2011.

From a national to a transnational response

This understanding of temporality can be seen in the official vocabulary. Syrians were initially granted the ill-defined status of “guests.” Temporary Protection Status was granted in October 2011. When the number of Syrian refugees exceeded 100.000 in October 2012 a further directive was issued, but not made public (Memisoglu and Ilgit, 2017).

A measure of clarification came only in October 2014 with the “Law on Foreigners and International Protection” and with the Regulation on Temporary Protection of the same year. The choice of TPS instead of a more robust status created several advantages for the Turkish Government as it had already created for Western Europe in the case of Bosnian refugees (Koser, 2007). Firstly, TPS is defined within national and administrative laws and regulations without reference to international laws and conventions. Public discontent can be controlled by “stressing the temporary nature of the status.” (Koser, 2007: 239) Even so, the 2014 law and regulation marked the recognition that the situation was more than a momentary emergency to be addressed through informal means.⁷ In a move that reinforced this new understanding, the same 2014 directive shifted responsibility for managing forced migrants from AFAD, Turkey’s principal emergency management organization, to the newly created DGMM, the directorate general for migration management. A further element of this recognition was already under way, as the Turkish state gradually accepted an increased role for transnational actors. Within a year, the Government of Turkey understood that the cost of hosting forced migrants would be high as the war would continue longer than expected, and public discontent linked to the presence of forced migrants was increasing (Kale et al., 2018). Accordingly in 2012, Turkey requested aid from United Nation as part of a UN regional response plan (Memisoglu and Ilgit, 2017).

Even after the presence of international agencies was accepted, tensions were evident between national and transnational approaches to migration management. International agencies willing to contribute to meeting this cost of assisting forced migrants generally preferred not to provide funding directly to government agencies. One reason for this was a general preference on the part of international donors for working through NGOs rather than government agencies (Memisoglu and Ilgit 2017). In addition, questions of access and control persisted. In the early years of the crisis, the Turkish government limited any access to refugee camps. Donors, however, were reluctant to provide any assistance without overseeing how the government spent and distributed the money (*op. cit.*).

From Food Distribution to Cash Assistance

An important consequence of this initial experience was a shift from in-kind to cash assistance for forced migrants in Turkey. Initial food-distribution programs run exclusively by the Turkish government proved expensive (Inglis and Vargas, 2014) and in many cases unsatisfying for those receiving aid (Interview, 2020). Turkey officially requested WFP support to assist Syrians in late May 2012 (WFP, 2012). In July 2012 WFP conducted a voucher feasibility study which recommended providing complementing food assistance by using voucher transfers (Inglis and Vargas, 2014; WFP, 2012). In the year that followed,

7 The introduction of this law was also result of the Turkey’s efforts to conformity with EU acquis.

the scope of the program was significantly increased, as Syrians numbered continued to rise, and more sustainable schemes of cost and responsibility sharing were explored. An overall cost-sharing arrangement was reached between the Turkish government and WFP in 2014. Through this agreement, the WFP contribution toward a cash-transfer card was reduced from 80 TL to 60 TL, with the resulting shortfall 20 TL uploaded by AFAD, on AFAD e-card for food and non-food items (WFP Turkey, 2016b).

By this cost-sharing arrangement, the program was progressively expended to 220.000 Syrians in 21 camps in June 2014. However, in February 2015, because of funding constraints, WFP withdraw earlier than planned from 10 camps. In the camps where WFP withdrew, AFAD, continue the assistance. WFP adjusted its transfer value to 50 TL per person, while the AFAD uploaded 35 TL on AFAD e-card (WFP Turkey, 2016b). Today, the cost sharing modality is still active as September 2021 (WFP Turkey, 2021). The transfer value provided by AFAD increased to 50 TL while WFP's share stayed same for food assistance contribution in camps (Health World News, 2017). As of September 2021, WFP support was reaching 46.654 refugees in 6 camps, out of a population of approximately 60.000 in the 7 camps remaining in activity (WFP Turkey, 2021). Government service model for Syrians in camps has transformed into responsibility-sharing models.

Over these same years, the number of Syrians living outside camps increased exponentially. Out-of-camp cash policy evolved in an opposite direction to that of in-camp policy: aid distribution was initially carried out mostly by NGOs, but the Turkish government gradually increased its oversight and direct involvement. (Mauder *et al.*, 2018; European Commission, 2019). An out-of-camp version of basic need cash assistance was first institutionalized in 2015. The TRC and WFP launched the program in May 2015. The *Kızılaykart* at that time worked on the same principles used the in-camp programs: as an e-voucher, which could only be used in designated shops⁸ (Interview, 2020). From June 2015 to April 2017, the program spent a total of 147.624.903TL and reached 159.960 beneficiaries. This program was terminated in 30.04.2017 (Ombudsman Institution of the Republic of Turkey, 2018).

Policy Consequences of the EU-Turkey Accords: The limits of state control

Starting in the second half of 2014, the number of forced migrants arriving on Turkish soil increased quickly, further evidence that the situation would not be resolved quickly. (See Table 1, below) This coincided with the rise of ISIS and of the Syrian Kurdish movement. It is in this context that that a new series of negotiations were undertaken by Turkey and the EU about forced migrants flows and, more generally, that the Turkish government continued to rethink and change its policy approach towards support for forced migrants. In this section, we consider the consequences of this acceleration in cross-border flows for both immigration and humanitarian assistance policies.

⁸ E-vouchers enable recipients to make purchases up to the value of the voucher and are often for one-off use in designated stores, within a specified timeframe (Ford, 2017).

Table 1
Registered Syrian Migrants in Turkey

Year (January 1 st)	Number of Syrians under temporary protection
2012	9.500
2013	148.441
2014	559.994
2015	1.552.839
2016	2.503.549
2017	2.274.500
2018	3.424.237
2019	3.622.366
2020	3.575.369
2021	3.643.769

Source: UNHCR: Operational portal – Syrian Refugee Response – Turkey

< <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113>>

The EU-Turkey Accords: A Greater Emphasis on Security in Migration Policy

The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan was announced in October 2015 and confirmed on 18 March 2016 by EU-Turkey Statement. It was intended both to prevent irregular migration flows to Europe and provide support to forced migrants and Turkish Host Communities. Under this plan, Turkey would accept the return of newly arrived irregular migrants transiting through Turkey as of 20 March 2016. For every Syrian sent back, one registered Syrian in Turkey could be resettled to the EU. The EU-Turkey statement considers Turkey as a “safe third country;” all asylum applications submitted in Greece by persons coming from Turkey are considered inapplicable and all the applicants are returned to Turkey (Gkliati, 2017).

This agreement was based on the 2005 Regional Protection Programs (RPP) proposed by the European Commission with the “*aim to improve refugee protection in target regions through the provision of durable solutions. Voluntary repatriation and local integration are the primary durable solutions considered within RPPs, with resettlement to a third country considered when neither of these options are feasible*” (European Resettlement Network, *no date*). RPP’s were initially established in Africa and parts of the former Soviet Union. A program of this type, targeting Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, was established in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2012 in order “*to develop sustainable capacities to respond to the crisis in the medium and longer term*” (European Resettlement Network, *no date*). Although funding levels remained modest, the main activity of support was similar to what would be provided in Turkey.

An important element of this agreement was improving control of refugee entering Turkey. The 18 march EU-Turkey statement emphasizes the “*achievement*” such as “*the introduction of new visa requirements for Syrians and other nationalities, stepped up security efforts by the Turkish coast guard and police and enhanced information sharing*” (European Council, 2016). The registration of Syrians into the Turkish migration system is also required under the Joint Action Plan (European Commission, 2015: 2). In order slow or halt the inflow of people several restrictions were put in places. A border wall

was built from 2016 to 2018 (Batalla and Tolay, 2018), and visa requirements were put in place in 2016 for all persons coming from Syria into Turkey by air or by sea as well as for arrival to Turkey by air for citizens of 18 countries.⁹ Finally, Istanbul and nine Syrian Border cities (Adana, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye, Şanlıurfa and Hatay) have stopped registering Syrians since late 2017 or early 2018 (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Relocating to Istanbul has been also stopped in 2018 because of the increasing population (Kızılkoyun, 2018). To this end, Istanbul Governor's Office issued a decision requiring return to the province of original registration by 20 August 2019 (Tekten, 2019). According to the governor of Istanbul 97.255 Syrians registered in other cities left Istanbul (Hürriyet, 2020).

In practice, the migration aspects of the EU-Turkey agreement demonstrate an effective convergence of security interests between Turkey and the EU, as each side found reason to restrict the movement of forced migrants both into and within Turkey. From the European perspective, this is clearly a case of “externalization of migration governance,” (Üstübcici, 2019) with the Government of Turkey designated as the EU's external agent. As noted by Frelick, Kysel and Podkul (2016: 193), such policies amount to “migration containment and control” although, they are publicly presented as “*either or both a security imperative and a life-saving humanitarian endeavor.*” From the Turkish perspective, security imperatives were equally evident. Transnational elements did not altogether disappear, as evidenced by the ongoing presence of UN agencies. Even so, when it comes to the control of borders and of persons, transnational norms or organizations were eclipsed by a more traditional government-to-government accords.

But what of cash assistance and other forms of material support for forced migrants? We might expect that the trend to ever-greater state control would be evident here as well. As detailed below, however, the outcome was considerably more nuanced. A critical part of the externalization of migration governance was EU budgetary support for Turkish actions for economic and social support of forced migrants. The European Commission's Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO) managed humanitarian aid, while other types of assistance were incorporated into the pre-existing Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) under the authority of the Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG-NEAR).

This distinction had important consequences for the dynamics of transnationalism. The central mission of DG-NEAR is to assist with capacity-building in partner states; increases in state control are thus consistent with its broader approach. The humanitarian orientation of DG-ECHO, on the other hand, predisposed it to work with international agencies and NGOs rather than governments.¹⁰ It's actions in Turkey, nevertheless, supported the evolution toward greater government engagement in direct service delivery for refugees over time. The role of NGOs was transformed from direct delivery to providing services not provided by governments such as legal counselling or specialized health services

9 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda. See: https://www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-12/third_progress_report_on_turkey_visa_liberalisation_roadmap_en_0.pdf

10 According to *Humanitarian Aid Regulation* 1257/96, DG-ECHO depends on intermediaries for program implementation.

or services to unregistered refugees (DG-ECHO Evaluation Report, 2019: 15). At the same time, the Turkish Government limited NGO action by enforcing regulations on international NGO staff. As a result, several NGOs ended operations following non-renewal of their registration (Aras and Duman, 2019).¹¹

The Emergency Social Safety Net and the Consolidation of Cash Assistance

Since March 2016, European humanitarian assistance to Turkey has been consolidated into the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT). Among its central components is the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), an unrestricted cash transfer program intended to help forced migrants meet basic needs (DG-ECHO, 2021a). The program assists refugees living outside camps who meet the program's criteria for vulnerability, who are registered either in the temporary or international protection status, and also registered in the Turkish government's address registration system. Assistance goes primarily to families with four or more children; 60% of beneficiaries are below 17. 89 % users are Syrian; 6.6 % users are from Iraq; 3,5% from Afghanistan. Households receive 155 TL (around 15 euro at 2021 exchange rates) (DG-ECHO, 2021b) per family member per month; a quarterly top-up is based on family size.

In practice, the ESSN replaced and expanded pre-existing cash assistance programs. Between 2015 and 2017, approximately 300,000 refugees received assistance (160,000 from the WFP/TRC off-camp Kızılaykart and 140,000 through other NGOs basic needs assistance program) (Maunder, 2018: 18). After establishment of ESSN, DG-ECHO largely ended support to NGO cash transfer programs for basic needs (Maunder, 2018: 65). EU regulation (1257/96) mandates that humanitarian funding can only be directed to international organizations or EU-registered NGOs. The WFP was initially designated to carry out this task in partnership with the TRC.

An important policy innovation brought about by ESSN was the systematic involvement of a key Turkish domestic welfare institution, the district Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (SASF). In the context of Turkish social policy, the SASF's function is to provide social assistance to eligible persons throughout Turkey. The foundations are established at the district level, 1003 in all. Each SASF has an executive committee headed by the district governor, which makes final decisions about beneficiaries. Those foundations are under the control of General Directorate of Social Assistance which is under the Ministry of Family and Social Services. While SASFs, with their close relationship to the state, are not as NGOs, they are frequently considered "parastatal." (Öktem 2018; Yılmaz and Yakut-Çakar, 2008). For Turkish citizens, they provide social assistance within the framework of policies produced by the central government. In this way foundations implement poverty alleviation policies determined by the central government. In the case of ESSN, the SASF were given the task of evaluating individual applications based on ESSN's eligibility rules.

This public involvement in humanitarian activity has two important consequences: The WFP's role is limited to acting as a bridge and umpire between funders and national institutions. However, this umpire role is constrained by the law on protection of personal

¹¹ One indicator of this is the distinct decrease in IO and NGO agreements. From a high point of 24 in 2016, these dropped in half to 12 in 2018. (DG-ECHO Evaluation Report, 2019: 15).

data. By this law, the Turkish Government restricts WFP's access to household data of actual or potential beneficiaries. "Although TRC has served as an intermediary between the government and WFP on this, it has only been authorized to share an anonymized sample of 3% of the applicant data." (Mauder, 2018: 35).

The SASF, unlike the WFP, have access to household data. Their action, moreover, is not limited to a mechanical application of pre-set criteria. The ESSN's "discretionary allowance" instrument allows up to 5% of a given foundation's assistance budget to be spent at the discretion of its governing board – potentially allowing it to extend aid to families who might not otherwise qualify. The counterpart of this flexibility is that the SASF have become the final arbiter of who receives assistance: there is no formal channel for appeal to international actors. Requests for information and redress end up with the board of the local SASF, which has authority and a limited discretionary budget to grant exceptions. Lacking any direct appeal mechanism, the only possible corrective measure for excluded vulnerable refugees is thus the "*discretionary allowance*" given to each SASF. As of 2018, boards of trustees were granted discretion to include households that do not meet the demographic criteria. This "*discretionary allowance*," thus, is not an absolute right; it is under the authority of the board of trustees who can choose to use it or not.

Between Humanitarian Assistance and Blame Avoidance: Transnationalism Still Matters

The discussion above, and the central role played by the SASF, might be taken as evidence of a desire on the part of Turkish national authorities to assume full control over cash transfer instruments. Recent developments in management of this policy, however, suggest a more nuanced interpretation.

With the arrival of the second tranche of the FRIT distribution, ESSN was divided into two parts. As of 2021 a distinction was made between ESSN and Complementary Emergency Social Safety Net Program (C-ESSN). Following this reform, the existing ESSN program was transformed into a "livelihood program" intended to assist with the transition to formal employment. As presented by the EU delegation to Turkey,

The project aims to support Syrian and Turkish small and medium size enterprises. These enterprises promote the formal employment and inclusion of unemployed or informally employed persons under temporary protection and Turkish citizens into the economic life (Statewatch, 2020).

As before, EU funding comes from DG-ECHO and requires an international intermediary. For the new programming period, this role is played by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) rather than the WFP. This shift is consistent with statements by both Turkish and European actors that the overhead costs associated with WFP management were excessively high (European Court of Auditors, 2018). In addition, it seems likely that the close links between the TRC and the IFRC, whose vice president responsible for the European region as of 2017, Kerem Kınık, is also president of the TRC, contributed to support by the Turkish government for this change. More broadly, this move was interpreted by experts as a sign that the role of the TRC would be strengthened, making it in effect the lead implementation partner (Parker, 2019).

The reimagined ESSN “livelihood” program’s capacity for generating employment, at least in the short term, is clearly limited. The program document cited above projects the creation of some 2,800 jobs and support for an equivalent number of businesses – a drop in the ocean of over 4 million migrants. These numbers suggest that the distinction between migrants who have ‘no chance of obtaining formal employment’ and others may be largely irrelevant in a situation where opportunities for formal employment remains scarce. So long as the commitment not to cut off assistance for those who are seeking but have not yet attained employment persists, public statements by Turkish authorities suggest that they consider it essential that European burden sharing continues – and thus that elements of transnationalism persist.

The new C-ESSN program, for its part, aims to support existing beneficiaries of the ESSN categorized as most vulnerable, those who are considered to have no chance of obtaining formal employment. The agreement instituting C-ESSN was signed on 17th December 2020 between the Ministry of Family and Social Services (MoFSS), the Turkish Red Crescent and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG-NEAR); implementation began on the 1st of January 2021 (Turkish Red Crescent Migration Services Directorate, 2020). As is usual for programs financed by DG-NEAR, financing for C-ESSN takes the form of a €245 million Euro direct grant to the MoFSS (DG-NEAR, 2021). There is no equivalent to the role played first by the WFP and later the IFRC in the ESSN. From the EU’s perspective, the shift in funding source from DG-ECHO to DG-NEAR marks the policy aims of transitioning from emergency humanitarian support to longer term state capacity building, following the practice both EU’s “neighborhood” and “pre-accession” instruments.

From the perspective of the Turkish government, the shift to direct grants brings with it increased control of public authority over basic needs distributions. From this, it might be implied that with transfer of control comes a transfer of responsibility. This last point, however, is contested by Turkish authorities. In its public pronouncements, the MoFSS has made clear its contention that C-ESSN remains a humanitarian, rather than a social program.

We call this project C-ESSN for short. C-ESSN stands for Complementary ESSN. When we say C-ESSN, we want to emphasize that our project is the support and complement of ESSN. As a matter of fact, we will implement this project on the Red Crescent Card platform as in our ESSN project and we will continue the humanitarian assistance approach as in the ESSN (Euronews, 2020). (author’s translation from Turkish original)

Central to this claim is the more general Turkish position that European financial support must continue for so long as large numbers of Syrian migrants remain in Turkey (Interview, 2020). Tying the new program to the old by retaining the label ESSN is a way to emphasize this position.

Two distinct but complementary arguments support this point of view. Most obvious is the well documented Turkish claim that considerable national resources have and continue to be devoted to economic support of forced migrants, both in terms of direct spending and of commitment of administrative resources – and that without this commitment it would not have been possible to avoid a massive influx of migrants into the European Union. Continued European contribution, in this perspective, is seen as necessary contribution

to a joint endeavor – burden sharing in the strict sense. Beyond this, however, we can ascribe to Turkish authorities a desire for blame avoidance with respect to their own population. We noted above that the potential for public opposition was a concern for the Government (Kale et al., 2018). The Turkish public increasingly sees Syrians as an economic burden and thinks that Syrians benefit from positively discriminated as against Turkish nationals (Morgül, Savaşkan and Mutlu, 2021; Şar and Kuru, 2020). Expressed public opinion disapproves Syrian refugee policy and calls for a policy change (Yayan, 2019). Even though Turks and Syrians live together, the social distance between two communities getting wider over time (Erdoğan, 2020). Examples of this increasingly general discontent include the “Altındağ incident” in Ankara where a Turkish group vandalized Syrian refugees’ shops after a Turkish boy was killed in a dispute between Syrians and Turks (Öztürk, 2021). In the face of these undesirable results of Syrian refugee policy, it is important for the government to show in easily visible ways that Syrians are temporarily in Turkey, and that assistance to forced migrants does not come at the expense of domestic social policy. Maintaining a clear public distinction between “emergency” cash transfer to Syrians – the public face of which is not the State but the TRC – and more permanent programs aimed at Turkish citizens continues to be a useful blame avoidance strategy in this context. The emphasis noted above on the continued use of the TRC card as a platform for distributing benefits to forced migrants contributes to distinguishing it clearly from support programs for Turkish citizens.

Conclusion

Taken as a whole, the evolution of Turkish and European policy on migration control and on basic needs provision to forced migrants allows us to draw a more nuanced picture both of migration governance and of the dynamics of transnational social protection. The example examined here clearly shows the tension and indeed the dilemma faced by host-country governments. It also makes it clear that we cannot simply distinguish between the host-country perspective and that of its international partners. While assertion of sovereignty is a generally-assumed preference of governments, and is confirmed in the present case through the re-imposition of border controls between Turkey and Syria after 2016 as well as controls over the internal movement of migrants within Turkey, we have seen that this represented the clear preference of the European Union, as well as of the Turkish government, and indeed was an integral part of the EU’s strategy of external governance of migration. With respect to social support of forced migrants, we see a non-linear evolution both of Turkish and of international response; with the initial assertion of Turkish sovereignty to the exclusion of international actors followed by closer collaboration with European and international agencies. More recent developments, however, suggest that the preferred international strategy of structuring humanitarian assistance around local actors and organizations, for all its merits, may not be sustainable for host-country governments in the face of eroding domestic political credibility and declining resources. In this latter context, a logic of domestic blame avoidance becomes an important element of host-country decision-making.

Tracing the impact of the FRiT, accordingly, suggests that movements towards and away from transnational management of migration are not uni-directional. With respect to migration control, most obviously, we see that the engagement with the EU and the

advent of the FRiT directly contributed to the end of Turkey's open-border policy with respect to Syria. We cannot conclude, however, that this is simply as a re-nationalization of border control. Rather, as we have detailed in this article, the Turkish decision was an integral part of its accord with the European Union. In the terms we have proposed, this cannot be seen as a shift toward transnational control, since the Turkish state retains full control over this policy. Control over its borders has not been delegated to a non-Turkish entity.

Analysis of programs contributing to meeting migrants' basic needs also require a nuanced characterization. We have shown in this article that FRiT facilitated the increase of state control by shrinking the service provision space for transnational actors, such as humanitarian NGOs. The role of state institutions increased by giving additional responsibility to already existing institutions such as the SASF.

Taken in isolation this episode would support the proposition that translational policymaking is a temporary episode rather than an inevitable longer-term trend; state authority was restored and extended through classic instruments of public authority: border control, and instruments of social support. External resources, namely EU funding of the ESSN, ultimately empowered renewed national control over all activities in its territory including those carried out by transnational actors.

At the same time, however, subsequent developments make it clear that the Turkish state ascribes considerable importance to the visible attributes of transnationalism. Recent evolution of income support programs such as C-ESSN, show that the reassertion of state influence does not replace transnational action. To the contrary, agencies of the Turkish government have made it clear that they want transnational elements of policy to persist, and to be visible. The successors of the original ESSN, while they are increasingly funded through direct grants to the Turkish state, continue to be managed separately from national social assistance programs aimed at Turkish citizens: the TRC rather than the state remains the visible street-level agency; the instrument used is a distinct payment card, not the same as issued to Turkish citizens receiving social assistance. Most obviously, perhaps the label ESSN, with its emphasis on "Emergency" (*i.e.*, temporary) assistance is retained for these new programs.

As we discussed in this article's final section, several reasons can be put forward to explain the seeming contradiction of a government that seeks to increase control while keeping up the appearance of a temporary transnational program. Most obviously, they wish to ensure that burden sharing between Turkey and the EU does not end. At a domestic political level, ongoing and visible involvement of international and transnational actors – the European Union and the IFRC – contributes to a strategy of blame avoidance by underscoring the distinct status of Syrians and thus, it is hoped, helping to deflect domestic opposition to their continued presence and support.

Bringing these two aspects of policy, border control and economic support, together, we see a pattern of strategic action by a government engaging on the one hand with international and transnational partners and on the other with domestic public opinion. Visible elements of sovereignty are put forward in some cases such as control of borders and of the internal movement of migrants, while the visible symbols of transnational influence, such as the public role of first the WFP and now the IFRC are emphasized in

others. In both cases, we see a government seeking to maximize at once external material support and internal political legitimacy.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Citizens' Attitudes Towards Online Communication Channels in Contacting Local Governments and the Emergence of Integrated Multi-Channel Platforms: The Case of Orange Table

Vatandaşların Belediye ile Olan İlişkilerinde Çevrimiçi (Online) İletişim Yöntemlerine İlişkin Tutumları ve Entegre Çok Kanallı Platformların Ortaya Çıkışı: Turunç Masa Örneği

Bengi Demirci¹ , Nilüfer Gürer Bildik² 

Abstract

This article explores attitudes of citizens towards online communication channels and newly emerging integrated multi-channel platforms which combine online and offline communication channels, when contacting local governments. It analyzes citizens' attitudes in terms of their awareness, intention to use and satisfaction, together with the effects of gender, age, education, and socio-economic development level. Main hypothesis of the research was that in highly digitalized world the most preferred way of communication between citizens and municipality would be online contact. The article presents descriptive quantitative analysis based on data obtained by paper-based questionnaire conducted with residents of Muratpaşa district in Antalya, where participants were asked about their preferred ways for communicating with district municipality. This district was chosen for the integrated platform - namely the Orange Table – which was adopted by the municipality, and which combined online and offline communication channels for interacting with citizens. The research revealed that citizens still prefer traditional offline communication channels when contacting municipality. Calling by phone was the most preferred way which was followed by going personally. Social media was one of the least preferred communication channels. Integrated model was widely known and frequently used although not consciously all the time.

Keywords: Citizen attitude, Online communication, Local government, Governance, Integrated multi-channel platform

Öz

Bu çalışma, vatandaşların yerel yönetimlerle olan ilişkilerinde çevrimiçi (online) iletişim kanallarını ve yerel düzeyde çevrimiçi ve çevrimdışı (offline) iletişim kanallarını birleştiren entegre çok kanallı platformları kullanmaya ilişkin tutumlarını incelemektedir. Vatandaşların söz konusu tutumları, bu konudaki farkındalıkları, kullanma eğilimleri ve memnuniyetlerine bakılarak analiz edilmiş ve bu yapılrken cinsiyet, yaş, eğitim ve sosyo-ekonomik gelişmişlik düzeylerinin etkisi dikkate alınmıştır. Araştırmanın temel hipotezi, hızla dijitalleşen dünyada vatandaşların belediye ile olan ilişkilerinde en çok tercih edilen iletişim yolunun online iletişim olacağı şeklinde idi. Çalışma, Antalya'nın Muratpaşa ilçesinde yaşayanlarla gerçekleştirilen ve katılımcılara ilçe belediyesiyle iletişim kurmak için tercih ettikleri yolların sorulduğu, yüz yüze

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anketlerden elde edilen verilere dayalı, betimsel nicel bir araştırmaya dayanmaktadır. Bu ilçe belediyesi, çevrimiçi ve çevrimdışı iletişim kanallarını ortak bir platformda birleştiren entegre bir model olan Turunç Masa uygulamasını kullanmakta olduğu için çalışma alanı olarak seçilmiştir. Araştırmanın sonuçları, vatandaşların belediye ile olan ilişkilerinde geleneksel yöntemleri tercih ettiklerini göstermektedir. Telefon ile iletişim kurmak en çok tercih edilen yöntem iken bunu yüz yüze iletişim takip etmektedir. Sosyal medya en az tercih edilen iletişim kanalları arasındadır. Entegre model, yaygın olarak bilinmekte ve her zaman bilinçli olmasa da sıklıkla kullanılmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Vatandaş tutumu, Çevrimiçi (online) iletişim, Yerel yönetim, Yönetişim, Entegre çok kanallı platform

Introduction

Online communication channels have been adopted by local governments to carry out some of their services and to communicate with their residents. With the advent of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and social media tools, online communication channels have been expected to have a greater share in the citizen-municipality communication compared to offline communication channels. However, it has been observed that offline communication channels are still highly preferred by the citizens for their communication with the municipality. In this context, it is seen that municipalities have attempted to set up multi-channel platforms which aim at integrating online and offline channels for citizen-municipality communication.

This research aims at understanding whether citizens prefer online or offline communication channels in their relations with the municipality. It analyzes the issue by concentrating on the case of Muratpasa Municipality, which is a district (sub-metropolitan) level municipality in Antalya-Turkey. Making research at sub-metropolitan level is important because citizens are expected to contact this level more frequently than the metropolitan level. The research also questions to what extent citizens are aware of integrated multi-channel platforms in their communication with the municipality by concentrating on the case of Orange Table Model which has been in use in Muratpasa since 2014, where traditional face-to-face communication channels are combined with online communication channels. It tries to understand to what extent the citizens are informed about the integrated model-namely the Orange Table- and to what extent they have recourse to it intentionally.

The main hypothesis of the research was that in the highly digitalized world the most preferred way of communication between the citizens and the municipality would be online contact. However, it has been found out that despite the proliferation of various online communication facilities, particularly that of social media tools in the recent years, citizens still prefer traditional offline/face-to-face communication channels to online communication channels in their relations with the municipality. To understand their preferences for communicating with the Municipality, paper-based questionnaire was conducted with 416 citizens over the age of 18 living in Muratpasa district.

In its effort to understand the attitudes of the residents towards online communication channels (e.g. social media accounts of the Municipality) and towards the integrated multi-channel platform (namely the Orange Table) in the district, the research draws upon the model put forward by Yang (2017) – i.e. both attitudes are analyzed in terms of

awareness, intention to use and satisfaction of the residents, together with the effects of gender, age, education and socio-economic development level.

It should be noted that, in this research, offline communication is differentiated from online communication by grouping 'calling, going personally, petition' as offline communication channels all referring to face-to-face communication and 'e-mail, web page, social media, android application' as online communication channels.

Use of online communication channels in local governments is a relatively new topic and so far, it has been mostly analyzed in its relation to transparency, accountability, participation, crisis management and improvement of public services (Bonson, Torres, & Royo, 2012; Desouza & Bhagwatwar, 2014; Guillamon, Ríos, Gesuele, & Metallo, 2016; Kim & Lee, 2012; Stamati, Papadopoulos, & Anagnostopoulos, 2015; Williamson & Parolin, 2012). However, role of online channels in the communication between the citizen and the municipality and the extent to which they are preferred in this relationship have not been studied that much particularly at the sub-metropolitan level. Moreover, multi-channel platforms aiming at integrating online and offline communication channels have not attracted much academic attention. Therefore, this research could be considered as a contribution to the field in this regard. One more contribution is that drawing upon the model by Yang (2017), the research analyzes the attitudes of citizens towards online communication channels and towards integrated multi-channel platforms by considering the issue in terms of awareness, intention to use and satisfaction of the residents, together with the effects of gender, age, education and socio-economic development level.

Literature Review: From E-government to E-governance and Emergence of Integrated Multi-Channel Platforms

The pace of technological developments has been highly affecting the mode of governing. As a result, during the last decades we have been introduced to various concepts such as e-government, m-government, e-governance, and the like.

1990s witnessed the emergence and advance of New Public Management (NPM) Reforms in the public sector in many developed countries, which was later followed by the developing ones (Pina, Torres, & Royo, 2017; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). During the same years, the search for a new mode of governing paved the way for the concept of 'governance' with its emphasis on 'co-doing', which implies the collaboration of all related public, private and civil actors in 'decision-making and implementing the decisions made' (Kooiman, 1993; United Nations, 2009). Characteristics of 'good governance' were listed as participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus-oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability -which were also expected to 'minimize corruption, take views of minorities into account, make the voices of the most vulnerable heard in decision-making and be responsive to the present and future needs of the society' (Hendriks, 2013; United Nations, 2009).

Advent of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and their use in government affairs have brought about the concept and practice of electronic government (e-government) which is usually associated with web 1.0 technology (Uzun, Yıldız, & Önder, 2022). E-government was simply defined as 'the use of ICTs, and particularly the

Internet and as a tool to achieve better government' by the OECD (OECD, 2003a), and as 'having the potential to reduce costs, improve services, bring transparency, accountability and control corruption' (Singh & Sahu, 2008) and as 'an effective communication channel for citizens to participate in democratic institutions and political processes' (Bonson, Royo, & Ratkai, 2015; Moon, 2002). Having been attributed with such characteristics, according to Yildiz (2007), 'e-government has emerged as a popular catch phrase in public administration' and according to Hardey & Loader (2009) it 'has often been a central part of broader attempts to reorganize state services and administration'.

E-government is being used in public administration since 1990s in the form of 'official websites, mayor's mailboxes, hotlines, and online forums' (Yang, 2017), where 'the Internet is the most important tool for its delivery' (Singh & Sahu, 2008). As the use of digital devices such as smartphones and tablets has become widespread, the concept and practice of mobile government (m-government) has become popular, implying that citizens can contact administrative units 'from different entry points' (Yang, 2017). Although it provides easier utilization of public services, m-government is considered as 'a complement to traditional e-government practices' (Yang, 2017).

Development of web 2.0 technology which is defined as 'of the user, by the user and for the user' has paved the way for the emergence of social media and has brought about the concept of Government 2.0 (Chu & Xu, 2009). Thus, Government 2.0 is considered as 'a fundamental shift in the implementation of government' where 'technology and social tools are enablers' (AGIMO, 2009) and 'engagement is the keyword' (Bonson, et al., 2012). Social media relies on 'user-generated content' produced through co-production (also called peer-production and crowdsourcing) (Stamati, et al., 2015) which has been facilitated by new media tools (Firmstone & Coleman, 2015). Meijer (2011), argues that by providing networking, storage capacity and long-distance communication, social media technologies have brought about new interaction patterns in government-citizen relations. As the use of social media tools has become widespread, government units have started to adopt social media tools in their communication with citizens besides traditional e-government applications, with the purposes of transparency, accountability, participation, and innovation in public services -thus for achieving good governance (Epstein, Bode, & Connolly, 2021; Guillamon, et al., 2016; Li, Feng, Timmermans, & Zhang, 2020; Oliveira & Welch, 2013; Yang, 2017).

As social media is becoming an important element of e-government activities, it can be argued that now it is a new phase called e-governance. Dunleavy & Margetts (2015) name the period starting from early 2000s as Digital Era Governance by referring to the impact of digitalization and social media use in government affairs which emphasizes 'services re-organized around digitally-enabled citizens' and 'co-production of public services and policy'. Bergquist, Ljungberg, Remneland, & Rolandsson (2017) argue that with the advent of social media, a move is occurring from NPM-based e-government practices to digital governance. They state that e-government practices are complemented with and challenged by e-governance practices, as digital opportunities for an interactive, reflexive, and transparent dialogue between government and citizens are becoming possible. They also argue that with the advent of social media, e-government and e-governance are becoming integrated where e-governance deals with the decision-making process and

e-government deals with their implementation (Bergquist, et al., 2017), which might be taken as an implication for the need and emergence of new patterns of communication and legitimacy between the government and the citizens and the need for integrated models (Bergquist et al., 2017). Bonson, et al. (2015), define this process as 'transition from e-government (citizen as customer) to we-government (citizen as partner) implying a new kind of social contract'.

Although social media tools have been adopted by different levels of governments, it is the local government level and particularly the municipal level at which they are more frequently adopted and discussed. This is usually attributed to the traditional attitude which considers municipalities as the most convenient level for communication and participation (Borge, Colombo, & Welp, 2009; Cho, Mossberger, Swindell, & Selby, 2021; Guillamon, et al., 2016). Social media tools used by local governments generally include social networking applications like FacebookTM, LinkedIn, GoogleDocs; microblogging services like TwitterTM; media sharing sites like YouTubeTM, FlickrTM; Instant Messaging like GoogleTalk, MSN; Skype, etc. (Meijer, 2011; Oliveira & Welch, 2013).

As online communication -which is basically defined as 'Internet-mediated communication'- is becoming widespread and as social media tools are being adopted by the municipalities, urban communication -which is defined as 'the ways in which people in cities connect (or do not connect) with others and with their urban environment via symbolic, technological and/or material means- has also started to change (Aiello & Tosoni, 2016). In this study, the change that has been brought about to the citizen-municipality relationship by the adoption of social media tools in the provision/utilization of municipal services will be examined. However, it will focus on 'written online communication' and will exclude other online communication types, such as WhatsApp calls, Facetime calls and social media visual calls, as these are not that much used by the municipalities, although might be kept in their future plans.

Literature on the benefits of using social media tools in government-citizen relations in general and in municipality-citizen relations in particular is becoming quite dense. Among these benefits, corporate dialogue, collaboration, providing free and rapid flow/exchange of information, e-participation, inclusion, transparency, accountability, anti-corruption, efficiency, innovation, legitimacy, feedback on service quality/design, data mining, freedom of expression, improving policy-making and public services, reducing barriers of space and time with quicker actions and long-distance communication, crowdsourcing and peer production -thus having positive impact on economic growth and quality of life, improving government-citizen relationship and democracy are widely expressed (Bergquist, et al., 2017; Bonson, et al., 2012; Bonson, et al., 2015; Bonson, Royo, & Ratkai, 2017; Fusi & Feeney, 2016; Guillamon, et al., 2016; Magro, 2012; Meijer, 2011; Oliveira & Welch, 2013; Pina, et al., 2017; Stamati, et al., 2015). Jeffres & Lin (2006) put forward the four macro functions in the use of social media in municipal affairs as 'surveillance of the environment, coordination of activities, socialization and entertainment'. It has been argued that adoption of social media tools by the municipalities has been 'adding an inclusionary dimension to the smart city paradigm' (Patti & d'Antonio, 2016). These are the long-desired characteristics for administrations at all levels and they do certainly

dominate the discussions turning around the adoption of new media technologies to municipal services both in the academia and in the government circles.

However, although adoption of social media tools in the citizen-municipality relations are expected to provide improvement in terms of the above-mentioned traits, there are already various studies analyzing the deficiencies and challenges incorporated in this process. In this context, issues about privacy, security, quality, digital divide -particularly in developing/non-developed countries, lack of information and technology literacy, equity in representation, organizational/technological/financial challenges, an administrative culture not open to digital world have been mentioned as the challenges that should be paid attention in adopting social media tools in municipality-citizen relationship (Bergquist, et al., 2017; Bonson, et al., 2015; Edmiston, 2003; Karkin, 2014; Magro, 2012; Pina, et al., 2017; Singh & Sahu, 2008; Stamati, et al., 2015; Yang, 2017). Digital divide, defined as ‘the gap between individuals/households and geographic areas at different socio-economic levels with regard both to their opportunities to access ICTs and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety of activities’, is considered as a major barrier to e-participation (Hatuka & Zur, 2020; OECD, 2001; Vromen, 2007). In addition to this, it has been argued that ‘one-sided reliance on the Internet for the implementation of e-governance’ would both ‘jeopardize the improvement of service quality’ and ‘shift the burdens to the citizens’, particularly to those not having proper access to the Internet (Singh & Sahu, 2008).

In the face of these challenges regarding the adoption of social media tools in municipality-citizen relations and particularly those arising from the one-sided reliance on these tools in municipal communication, ‘the multi-platform approach’ or as it is also called ‘the integrated model approach’ has been put forward. The logic is to set up a municipality-citizen relationship in which online and offline communication channels are integrated and used together where for instance the internet-based communication devices are used together with landline phones, mobile phones or call centers in the provision of municipal services (Meijer, 2011; OECD, 2003b; Pina, et al., 2017; Singh & Sahu, 2008).

It has been argued that the above-mentioned deficiencies and challenges emerged by the adoption of social media tools in municipal communication would be overcome or remedied with the integrated model. The integrated model is expected to bridge the digital divide, facilitate provision of municipal services to all as there would be various communication channels complementing each other, provide ‘seamless operations’ that the citizen would not be asked to learn the organizational chart to know which department to apply but just to contact the single accessible point, minimize the problem of technology literacy, provide rapid communication (Singh & Sahu, 2008).

Meijer warns that the role of digital communities should not be exaggerated because as ‘individuals are social and emotional beings’ these communities ‘have a limited role compared to other channels of public service provision such as telephone calls and face-to-face meetings’ (Meijer, 2011) which again points to the need for multi-platform/integrated approaches. Pina, et al. (2017) argue that ‘e-participation is only an enabler of citizen engagement’ and ‘it doesn’t overcome all the barriers to these processes’, pointing to the need to integrate e-participation with traditional offline tools for citizen participation’. Moreover, depending upon the conflicting results coming from previous

research regarding the correlation between online and offline participation and regarding their socio-demographic profile, Pina, et al. (2017) and Yetano & Royo (2015) argue that it would be better to combine the two participation methods to become more inclusive. Moreover, it is argued that besides the new technology, what is needed is a new approach (Magro, 2012) and that in the digital era this requires 're-integration, simplification and needs-based holism' (Dunleavy & Margetts, 2010). Thus, all these discussions can be taken as the framework for the endeavors of both scholars and practitioners in adopting multi-platform/integrated approaches, which would also be applicable to the case that will be analyzed in this study.

Finally, when it comes to understanding the attitudes of citizens towards the use of social media tools in municipal services, the theories of Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) can be referred to. After TAM, which was devised by Davis in 1985 to understand the attitudes of people to new technology (Yang, 2017), UTAUT was devised by Venkatesh et al., and it tries to understand the effects of gender, age, experience, and voluntariness to use on the intention of the people to use a newly adopted technology (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). Based on but also furthering these approaches, Yang analyzed the issues of awareness, intention to use and satisfaction of citizens in their use of e-services by considering the effects of demographic factors such as gender, age, and educational background (Yang, 2017). It has been declared that although empirical evidence from different countries has brought about different/opposite results, these models are used in many empirical studies due to their proven applicability (Yang, 2017). Inspired by the model devised by Yang (2017), this study analyzes the attitudes of citizens towards using online communication tools of Muratpasa Municipality and the integrated platform (the Orange Table) by looking at the issues of awareness, intention to use and satisfaction of the residents together with the effects of gender, age, education, and socio-economic development levels.

An Example for Integrated Model - The Case of Orange Table

Antalya is the fifth most populated city in Turkey which is located at the southern coast of the country. Muratpasa is the second most populated municipality in Antalya and according to 2017 data, its population is 488,666 (51% female, 49% male) where 81% of the population (374,945) is over the age of 18 (Statistical Institute of Turkey, 2018).

The Municipality has an official website which provides access to announcements, projects, and events of the Municipality, to information about the Municipality and Muratpasa area, to Municipal services manual, opinion polls about Municipal services, the Orange Table and various other information (Muratpasa Municipality Website, 2018).

There is also an e-municipality platform through which citizens are provided with the following municipal services: Paying debts with the ID number, document tracking and confirmation, tender offer, Orange Table applications, questioning current debts, applying for various courses, applying for jobs, learning land prices, construction costs, depreciation rates and environmental cleaning tax amounts. E-municipality platform which was created in 2012 has reached 27,515 registered users by the year 2018 (Muratpasa Municipality Website, 2018). The ratio of registered users to 2018 population is 5.6%,

which is quite low in the face of rising number of digital platform users. This implies that digital platforms are not that much preferred by the citizens in their communication with the municipality.

The Municipality has been using social media tools for the last ten years; it has Facebook and Twitter accounts since January 2012, Instagram since May 2014. According to August 2018 data, its Facebook account has 43,259 followers, Twitter account 37,473 followers and Instagram account 4520 followers. In general, it is observed that both the citizens and the Municipality use these social media accounts for providing and getting information about local issues/municipal services such as marketplace arrangements, local handcraft exhibitions/stands, sports and cultural activities, available beaches, water outage.

Besides these, Muratpasa Municipality has an integrated model called Orange Table since November 2014, through which citizens communicate with the Municipality and access municipal services via various platforms including both online and offline channels.

Operational process of the Orange Table can be seen in Figure 1 which has been translated and adapted from its organizational chart obtained from the Orange Table center.




Figure 1. Organizational chart flow of orange table

The main starting point of Orange Table was set to find solutions for the problems faced in coordinating and accommodating the information/data coming through various social media accounts while also integrating the ones coming through rather conventional communicating channels such as written applications or phone calls. This model also aimed at decreasing bureaucratic processes by making Orange Table the only contact

point serving as a 'hub' in citizen's relationship with the particular department of the Municipality and providing equality and accessibility for all. The citizen applying to the Municipality through any channels provided by the Orange Table is informed about the reception of his/her application in two minutes by an SMS. Then the application is directed to and examined by the related department. Later, the citizen is informed about the required process and time within 48 hours via telephone if it is available, otherwise via the original application channel. When the process is completed, the citizen is again informed about the result by a phone call. Through this model, citizens have the chance to submit complaints, search for solutions for their problems/concerns and share their suggestions about municipal services via Orange Table which was expected to provide participation, efficiency, accountability, and transparency by attempting to adopt a problem-tracking and solution-oriented attitude.

Materials and Methods

This is descriptive quantitative research. As the quantitative research method, survey method was used. Questionnaire was prepared to understand to what extent the citizens preferred to use internet-based contact and the Orange Table in their relationship with the Muratpasa Municipality. To this end, questionnaires were directed to the residents of Muratpasa aged 18 and over, who were selected from the voting lists by the layering technique, as 18 is the age to become the legal respondent for municipal services besides being the eligible age for voting. The study area was grouped into four different socio-economic development zones (A: highly developed, B: developed, C: developing, D: underdeveloped) based upon the data obtained from the Statistical Institute of Turkey in order to reflect the maybe existing differences in this regard. Face-to-face paper-based questionnaires were conducted between July-August 2018 in the randomly selected sample which was proportioned according to the population of each zone. With a 95% confidence level and at least $\pm 5\%$ precision, minimum sample size was calculated as 384. With an expected 95% response rate then the required minimum sample size was found as 404. However, we conducted our questionnaire with 416 participants. Research ethics committee approval was taken for the survey.

Gender distribution of the sample was the same with Muratpasa Municipality's gender percentages, as 51% female and 49% male. Ages of the participants were changing from 18 to 82, and the accumulation was at the 25-54 interval. Their professions were predominantly private sector employers and employees. Educational status of the participants was mainly bachelor's degree and high school.

The questionnaire was designed in three parts with a total of 39 questions: in the first part general demographic information were questioned, in the second part participants' attitudes towards using website and social media accounts of the Municipality in their relations with the Municipality were asked and in the last part their awareness and use of Orange Table were inquired.

Descriptive statistics were given as frequencies and percentages. In the analysis of categorical variable, when the percentage of the cells which have an expected value

less than five is greater than 20% Fisher's Exact Test, when it was smaller the Pearson Chi-Square Test was used. The results were analyzed by using the SPSS 20 Program. Statistical significance value was accepted as $p < 0.05$.

In addition to survey, a short on-site observation was held in the Orange Table headquarters and documents/reports obtained from the Orange Table were analyzed, from which we get the data about the ways citizens prefer to contact the Municipality and derived the chart in Figure 1. Finally, as a complementary strategy we had online observations on the websites of the Orange Table and Muratpasa Municipality (which will be referred to together as the website of the Municipality throughout the study) and its social media accounts.

Results and Discussion

In this section attitudes of citizens towards online communication models and integrated multi-channel platforms are discussed by considering each issue in terms of awareness, intention to use and satisfaction of the residents, together with the effects of gender, age, education, and socio-economic development level.

Online Communication Channels in Citizen-Municipality Relations

In the case area, 90% of the participants were having Internet access. No relation was found between having Internet access and socio-economic development level. From this it can be inferred that digital divide is not an applicable challenge in our case where 355 (85%) of the participants had at least one social media account and 61 (15 %) had no social media account at all. 85 of them (24%) follow at least one social media account of the Municipality. 270 (76%) respondents have at least one social media account and do not follow any of the social media accounts of the Municipality. 23 of those having at least one social media account (7%) prefer using Facebook when they want to interact with the Municipality. This was followed by Twitter as 14 (4%), Instagram 10 (3%) and YouTube 3 (1%).

In this study, internet-based communication between the citizens and the Municipality were analyzed by concentrating on their use of the Municipality website and its social media accounts. Regarding the website use, the research revealed that 68% of the participants have never visited the website of the Municipality. Reasons for referring to the website were declared as getting information (15%) and using municipal services (7%).

The website mainly gives information about municipal services however only a limited number of operations can be actually realized through the website of the Municipality. For almost all the provided services, the website directs the citizens to the Orange Table, which clearly shows the intention of the Municipality to integrate all contacts with the Municipality into the Orange Table hub.

When it comes to the citizens' use of social media accounts of the Municipality, 331 of the participants (80%) declared that they do not follow any of these accounts; where the Municipality's Facebook account was followed by 58 participants (49%), Twitter by 33 (28%) and Instagram by 27 (23%) participants. Participants stated that they refer to the social media accounts of the Municipality mostly for getting information and

for following the events organized by Municipality. 72% of the participants declared that they had never thought of using the social media accounts of the Municipality for contacting the Municipality. 62% of those who had used these accounts stated that they were satisfied with their experience.

Social media accounts of the Municipality provide communication which targets mainly sharing information with the citizens. As is the case with the website, regarding the demands/issues raised through the social media accounts of the Municipality, the Municipality makes a serious effort to direct these demands/applications to the Orange Table hub. This integration is made by requesting the communication details of the citizens via direct message (DM) to create an application on behalf of them and to inform them about the course/result of their application.

As within the scope of our study we aimed at understanding how effectively the citizens were using the internet-based communication channels of the Municipality, we asked the following questions with which we tried to find out their awareness, intention to use and satisfaction in relation to gender, age, education, and socio-economic structure when applicable.

Awareness. When asked about the first solution they think of when faced with a problem concerning the municipality, the top three answers were calling (57%), applying to the Orange Table (22%) and going personally (15%), whereas online channels (website, social media and e-mail) constituted only 2%.

When it comes to what they do for contacting the municipality, the top answer was again calling (62%), the second one was going personally (27%), and social media was one of the least preferred ways (1%). This shows that internet-based contact doesn't constitute an option at all for the citizens vis-a-vis calling and going personally which indicates the importance of offline/face-to-face communication in their preferences.

All the participants were aware of the presence of the website of the Municipality, whereas when asked about which social media account of the Muratpasa Municipality they had heard, 28% of the participants said they were informed about Facebook, 19% about Instagram, 17% about Twitter and 2% about YouTube. Majority of the participants (62%) were not informed about any of the social media accounts of the Municipality at all.

It has been detected that there is no relation between gender and being informed about the social media accounts of the Municipality.

When distributed according to ages, middle-aged residents are more informed about the social media accounts of the Municipality. This could be because this age group must be in more contact with the Municipality due various reasons.

Those who were informed about the social media accounts of the Municipality were 6% basic education (primary + elementary school) graduates, 34% high school graduates, 60% Bachelor's and higher. This shows that people with higher education level are more aware of the social media accounts of the Municipality.

The percentages of being informed about the social media accounts of the Municipality according to the socio-economic development levels of the neighborhoods were as follows; zone A: 46%, zone B: 24%, zone C: 19%, and zone D: 11%. Therefore, it can

be inferred that as socio-economic development level increases, awareness of the citizens about using social media accounts in their contact with the municipality rises.

Intention to Use. As it has been mentioned, 68% of the participants had never visited the website of the Municipality. 72% of the participants had never thought to use social media accounts of the Municipality.

No relation was detected between gender and the intention to use the website and the social media accounts of the municipality.

Middle-aged participants were more inclined to use the website of the Municipality - with the following percentages: 18-24 ages 12%, 25-44 ages 62%, 45-64 ages 22%; 65 and over 4%. Residents who at least once considered using the social media accounts of the Municipality had the following percentages according to their ages: 18-24 ages 15%, 25-44 ages 64%, 45-64 ages 17%; 65 and over 4%. Intention to use shows similar characteristics with awareness in relation to age distribution.

As is the case with awareness, as education level increases, intention to use the website and the social media accounts of the Municipality rises. However, no meaningful relation was observed between socio-economic development level and intention to use (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Relation between socio-economic development level and choice for communication channels

When it comes to using social media accounts of the Municipality actively, participants who had thought to use but never used them was found as 70%. 80% of the participants were not following any social media accounts of Municipality whereas only 20% were following at least one.

There were no meaningful relations between gender, age and socio-economic development level and following any social media accounts of the Municipality. However, there was a meaningful relation between education and following a social media account. Of those following at least one social media account, 3% were basic education graduates, 38% high school graduates, 59% bachelor's and higher.

37% of the participants following at least one social media account of the Municipality were actively participating on these accounts (like, sharing, posting etc.). In other words, of those participants following at least one social media account of the Municipality, 63% of them do not get into interaction with the Municipality. This implies that there is kind of a one-way, semi-unilateral communication between the two parties where the citizens seem to follow the social media accounts of the municipality without much interaction and active participation.

There was no meaningful relation between gender and socio-economic development level and active use of social media accounts of the Municipality. However, there were meaningful relations between age and education and being an active user of social media accounts. As has been the case with awareness, middle aged and more educated people tend to be more participatory. In addition to this, it has been observed that physical distance between the participants and the Municipality building does not affect the intentions of the participants to use online or offline channels in their communication with the Municipality. It has been detected that majority of the participants intend to make phone calls in communicating with the Municipality no matter what their physical distance to the Municipality building was (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Relation between physical distance and choice for communication channels

Satisfaction. 71% of the participants who have at least once visited the website stated that they were satisfied with the website, 6% unsatisfied and 23% neutral. 62% of the participants who were using the social media accounts of the Municipality were detected to be satisfied with the services/communication provided, 23% were unsatisfied and 15% were neutral.

No meaningful relation was detected between gender, age, education and socio-economic development level and satisfaction with using the website and the social media accounts of the Municipality. From these and the above-mentioned results it can be inferred that in general citizens are reluctant to use the website and the social media accounts, however when they come to use once they are satisfied with them.

Integrated Multi-Channel Platform - The Orange Table

Awareness. In terms of awareness, 88% of the participants were informed about the Orange Table. There were no meaningful relations between gender, socio-economic development level and being informed about the Orange Table.

As was the case with the social media accounts of the Municipality, it was the middle-aged group who was the most informed about the Orange Table, which again could be because they are the ones who somewhat must be in contact with the Municipality. A meaningful relation was detected between the level of education and being informed; people with higher education level are more informed.

Intention to use. It was found that 42% of the participants used the Orange Table consciously at least once whereas 58% had never used it intentionally. The top three ways of contact preferred by those who intended to use the Orange Table were, calling (143), going personally (35) and e-mail (19). The contents of these intentional contacts were as follows: complaints (41%), demands/requests (35%), information (12%), appreciation (7%) and suggestions (5%).

There were no meaningful relations between gender, age, socio-economic development level and the intention to use the Orange Table. As the education level increases, the tendency to use the Orange Table also increases. Those using the Orange Table has the following education levels: 14% basic education graduates, 31% high school graduates, 55% bachelor's and higher.

Satisfaction. 64% of the participants who used the Orange Table at least once were detected to be satisfied with it, where 20% of them were unsatisfied and 16% were neutral. No meaningful relation was detected between gender, age, education and socio-economic development level and satisfaction with Orange Table.

So, since Orange Table is an integrated model which incorporates almost all available communication channels, either being aware of it or not any citizen contacting the Municipality through any of these channels are inevitably included in the standard Orange Table process described above. Therefore, reflecting the spirit of the integrated model, citizens need not to know that they are 'already integrated'.

To recapitulate, when the overall available channels to contact the Muratpasa Municipality is analyzed in detail, the following ranking is observed from the most preferred to the least: calling 62%, going personally 27%, e-mail 5%, website 3%, petition 1%, application for android mobiles 1% and social media 1%. Overall, the research revealed that 90% of the participants preferred offline/face-to-face communication channels (calling, going personally, petition) and just 10% preferred online channels (e-mail, web page, social media, android application) in communicating with/getting services from the Municipality (Table 1).

Table 1
Participants' Preferences About Online and Offline Communication Channels

	Offline / face-to-face methods			Online methods			
	Going personally	Calling	Petition	E-mail	Social Media	Website	Android application
Frequency	112	258	5	21	5	10	2
Percentage	27	62	1	5	1	3	1
Percentage	90			10			

As the complementary phase of the research, the data obtained from the Orange Table showing the preferred ways of contact between the citizens and the Municipality during the year 2018 was analyzed. This data revealed that 91% of the citizens preferred offline / face-to-face communication channels (calling, going personally, petition, mobile teams) and 9% preferred online communication channels [e-mail, web page, social media, CIMER (Online Presidential Communication Center)].

Therefore, it can be said that depending upon both the results of our research and the supportive data obtained from the Orange Table, despite the overarching developments in ICTs, people still prefer to find an offline / face-to-face contact in communicating with/getting services from the Municipality. As it has been stated, this research aimed at exploring the attitudes of citizens towards online and offline participation channels in their relations with the municipality and it did not ask about the reasons for the preferences of the participants in communicating with the Municipality. However, it could be inferred from both the literature and the research that people might be preferring offline channels due to the following: it is fast and easier to find a correspondent and an answer via phone calls; it is possible to realize/track only certain processes via the website of the Municipality; continuing use of wet-ink signature; old age (65+) could be considered as a factor leading more use of offline communication channels - in the case study, although 71% of the 65+ age-old participants have internet access, all of them prefer offline channels in their communication with the municipality (50% of them prefer calling by phone and 50% prefer in person visits to the Municipality.) In addition to this, people might have concerns about the privacy and security of the digital realm which might discourage them from using online channels in their communication with the municipality.

Conclusions

With the advent of ICTs, new media technologies and online communication channels are becoming more commonly adopted by local governments for communicating with their residents. However, as our research has indicated, online communication channels are not always that much preferred by the citizens in their contacts with the municipality compared to the rather traditional (offline) ways of communication. Therefore, the need to combine new media tools with traditional communication channels in urban settings has paved the way for the emergence of integrated multi-channel platforms.

Besides combining different communication channels in a hub, integrated platforms have various advantages such as freeing the citizens from the burden of knowing which

department/unit of the municipality is authorized for her/his application; reducing unnecessary workload of the personnel by systematizing all the contacts right at the beginning; and saving time by reducing long bureaucratic processes. However, there is still need to create integrated models responding to the changing requirements of everyday life, being more participatory and providing sustainability for the existing ones.

In the face of increasing use of new media tools and the continuing adherence of the citizens to the traditional/offline communication channels in their relations with the municipality, it seems that integrated models will become more widespread. This research analyzed the attitudes of citizens towards online communication channels in their relations with the municipality and their attitudes towards the newly emerging integrated multi-channel platforms. It explains how the issues of awareness, intention to use and satisfaction of the residents affect these attitudes where gender, age, education, and socio-economic development levels could be influential depending upon the context.

It should be noted that there is no one single integrated model that would be valid for all municipalities. Therefore, when establishing an integrated model, the municipality should create the convenient one according to its own peculiarities. In so doing, it is important to understand the factors affecting the attitudes of the citizens towards online communication channels and towards integrated platforms. This is where this study could be contributory and inspiring. However, there is need for further research particularly to detect the reasons why the citizens do not prefer online communication in their relations with the municipality in the face of rapid digitization, which would help municipalities to devise better-functioning integrated platforms.

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The Impact of Ethnic Discrimination on the Prevention of Human Trafficking

Etnik Ayrımcılığın İnsan Ticaretini Önleme Üzerine Etkisi

Saadet Ulaşoğlu İmamoğlu¹ 

Abstract

Due to the ubiquitous concern about human trafficking, the international community has developed a comprehensive legal framework that requires countries to take effective measures to eliminate this grave crime. As an essential part of this international legal framework, countries have a responsibility to prevent people from being exposed to any type of exploitation. In order to save vulnerable people from exploitation before it transpires, countries are expected to implement preventative measures including alleviation of the factors that increase vulnerability to being exploited and encourage the demand for human trafficking. While ethnic discrimination has been acknowledged as a factor that renders individuals vulnerable to human trafficking and also bolsters the demand for this severe crime, its effect on the implementation of prevention measures has received limited attention from recent studies. To fill this gap, this study theoretically discusses and empirically examines whether or not ethnic discrimination affects countries' preventative measures for human trafficking. The results of statistical analysis based on a data set that involves 165 countries over the years between 2003 and 2015 show that ethnic discrimination deteriorates the prevention of human trafficking.

Keywords: Human Trafficking, Ethnic Discrimination, United Nations, Palermo Protocol, Prevention of Human Trafficking

Öz

İnsan ticareti konusundaki yaygın endişe nedeni ile uluslararası toplum, ülkelerin bu ciddi suçtu ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik önlemler almasını gerektiren kapsayıcı bir yasal çerçeve geliştirmiştir. Bu uluslararası yasal çerçevenin önemli bir parçası olarak ülkelerin, insanların herhangi bir sömürüye maruz kalmalarını önleme konusunda sorumlulukları vardır. Savunmasız durumda olan insanları, henüz bir sömürü ortaya çıkmadan önce, bu ortaya çıkabilecek olan sömürden korumak için ülkelerin, sömürülmeye karşı kırılabilirliği arttıran ve insan ticaretine yönelik talebi yükselten faktörleri hafifletmeyi içeren önleyici tedbirleri uygulamaları beklenmektedir. Etnik ayrımcılık, bireyleri insan ticaretine karşı savunmasız hale getiren, ve ek olarak, bu ağır suçta yönelik talebi arttıran bir faktör olarak kabul edilirken, onun insan ticaretini önlemeye yönelik tedbirlerin uygulanması üzerine olan etkisi son zamanlarda yapılan çalışmalar tarafından sınırlı bir ilgi ile karşılanmıştır. Bu boşluğu doldurmak için yapılan bu çalışma, etnik ayrımcılığın, ülkelerin insan ticaretini önleme konusunda aldıkları tedbirler üzerine bir etkisi olup olmadığını teorik olarak tartışmakta ve ampirik olarak incelemektedir. 2003 yılından 2015 yılına kadar olan dönem üzerinden 165 ülkeyi kapsayan bir veri seti temel alınarak yapılan sayısal analiz sonuçları, etnik ayrımcılığın insan ticaretini önleme üzerinde kötüleştirici bir etkisi olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsan Ticareti, Etnik Ayrımcılık, Birleşmiş Milletler, Palermo Protokolü, İnsan Ticaretini Önleme

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Introduction

Human trafficking, recognized as a contemporary type of slavery, impacts millions of lives in almost every country. Although it is difficult to report the correct number of victims due to their reluctance in interacting with the authorities, the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that approximately 40 million people around the world are victims of this crime (ILO, 2017). Driven by the growing concern over human trafficking, in 2000, the United Nations (UN) approved a comprehensive legal instrument, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Children and Women (hereinafter referred to as the Palermo Protocol), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. To synchronize global counter-trafficking efforts, the Palermo Protocol provides a formal definition for the concept of human trafficking and outlines obligations for countries to prevent and eliminate this problem. It defines human trafficking as employing or relocating people through force, the threat of force, or deception with the intention of exploitation (United Nations [UN], 2000, Art. 3(a)). Acknowledging that prevention of human trafficking is an essential part of anti-trafficking efforts, the Palermo Protocol requires countries to take preventative measures to protect people before they are harmed.

According to the Palermo Protocol, preventative measures include i) mitigating the factors that increase vulnerability to exploitation, ii) discouraging the demand for human trafficking, and also, iii) creating awareness among the public about the identification and risks of human trafficking (UN, 2000, Art. 9(1-5)). Since extreme poverty and expectations of better income-earning opportunities render people, specifically women and children, susceptible to exploitation (ILO, 2006), the Palermo Protocol demands countries to take preventive measures to eradicate poverty and underdevelopment (UN, 2000, Art. 9(4)). As another preventive measure, countries are required to take action to eradicate the income potential in sectors where exploitation occurs, and in turn decrease the demand for all types of exploitation (UN, 2000, Art. 9(5)). The Palermo Protocol also holds countries responsible for launching educational and media campaigns to raise awareness about potential human trafficking (UN, 2000, Art. 9(2)).

While a substantial number of countries commits to fighting against human trafficking,¹ some countries are less concerned with taking strict preventative measures. Motivated by these differences, this study asserts that ethnic discrimination is a significant factor that deteriorates countries' performance in the prevention of human trafficking. Recent research, defining ethnicity as a feeling of unity owing to common heritage and culture, has acknowledged the ethnicity's prominent role on competition over state power (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009; Vogt et. al, 2015). The literature on ethnic power relations suggests that regardless of being the majority or the minority, ethnic groups whose members are engaged in state-level decision-making have advantages in receiving economic gains such as public goods and services as well as legal benefits including citizenship privileges, justice, and impunity from indiscriminate violence (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009; Vogt et. al, 2015). On the other hand, ethnic discrimination occurs when

1 The 2020 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report launched by the United States Department of State presents that 178 countries have committed to the Palermo Protocol to date.

particular groups are deliberately excluded from state-level decision-making because of their ethnic background. Ethnically discriminated groups would be disadvantaged in receiving economic and legal benefits since they are prevented from participating in national decision-making (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009; Vogt et. al, 2015).

Following the discussion on ethnic power relations, this paper argues that ethnic discrimination impedes an effective implementation of preventative measures by i) rendering people more vulnerable to exploitation, ii) encouraging the demand for human trafficking, iii) causing a lack of information on the risks of being trafficked, and iv) inhibiting the political will for anti-trafficking. First, discrimination based on ethnic origin hinders the access of members of these groups to education, the labor market, health care, and social services (De Soto, Beddies & Gedeshi, 2005). Lacking proper skills to raise their socio-economic status and information about the dangers of human trafficking, people are induced to accept increased risks for income-earning activities, and they become easy targets for exploitation (De Soto et al., 2005). Second, ethnic discrimination deteriorates countries' prevention efforts because prejudiced assumptions about the servility and sexuality of people based on their ethnic origin increase the demand for forced labor or sex trafficking (Gutierrez Chong, 2014; Kempadoo, 2004; Poulin, 2003; Todres, 2009). Another issue is that ethnic discrimination diminishes the political will that is necessary to make regulations for counter- trafficking (European Roma Rights Centre, 2011). National governments might not prioritize raising awareness of the dangers of human trafficking or discouraging the demand for exploitation when members of ethnically discriminated groups are the victims. Hence, ethnic discrimination leads countries to fall short in implementing effective prevention measures.

To test the argument about the relationship between ethnic discrimination and prevention efforts of national governments, this study conducts statistical analysis based on a country-level data set. The global data set includes the outcome variable that is the prevention of human trafficking and the main independent variable of interest, ethnic discrimination. Several control variables, such as women legislators, corruption control, the rule of law, regime type, civil conflict, economic wealth, and population, are also included in the statistical analysis because of their possible effects on the suggested link between the outcome and the main independent variable of interest. In congruent with the theoretical argument of this study, empirical examination of the ordered probit regression model shows evidence that ethnic discrimination weakens the prevention efforts of national governments. The results are confirmed by the predicted probabilities estimated based on the main model. Furthermore, the findings remain intact after adding a couple of alternative indicators to the main model, such as involvement in international organizations and commitment to the main anti-trafficking document along with country and year fixed effects.

This paper is divided into seven sections: The first section succinctly reviews the quantitative literature on counter-trafficking and the research that examines the link between ethnic discrimination and human trafficking. The second section presents this study's theoretical argument about the worsening effect of ethnic discrimination on the prevention efforts of countries. The following three sections discuss the data employed

in this study, present the findings of quantitative analysis, and correspondingly report the results from robustness tests. The sixth section discusses the limitations of this study and provides two examples to illustrate the main argument. Finally, the seventh section provides a summary of the empirical evidence reported in previous sections as well as propositions for data-driven policy-making.

Background

As a response to the ubiquitous concern around human trafficking, many countries have committed themselves to fighting against this severe crime. However, some countries have failed to take effective measures to eradicate human trafficking. To understand the reasons for this variation, recent research has focused on factors that affect countries' counter-trafficking practices. Among them Avdeyeva (2012), Bartilow (2008), Cho & Vadlamannati (2012), Cho et al. (2014), and Schonhofer (2017) discuss and show empirical evidence for significant effects of female legislators, control for corruption, and regime types on countries' efforts in eliminating human trafficking. After conducting statistical analyses, their findings show that countries that have more women in their parliaments, take strict measures to control corruption, and have democratic regimes take stringent measures to counter trafficking in persons.

Ethnic discrimination, on the other hand, has been widely discussed as a significant factor that renders people vulnerable to human trafficking. Gutierrez Chong (2014) discusses race and ethnicity as major components of structural poverty and marginalization leading to exploitation. Using excerpts from media and popular literature, Gutierrez Chong (2014) asserts that stereotypical images constructed based on different races and ethnicities make members of these groups an easy target for exploitation. Kempadoo (2004), Poulin (2003) and Todres (2009) discuss the concept of otherness based on ethnicity and its enhancing effect on the demand for human trafficking. According to them, discriminatory stereotypes constructed based on ethnic origin normalize the exploitation of members of the groups considered as others by the dominant groups.

Recent research on individual countries has also endorsed the vulnerability of ethnically discriminated groups to human trafficking. Among these studies, Bedoya, Bedoya & Belser (2009) argue that discrimination against Indigenous people in Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru makes them victims of forced labor while De Soto, Beddies & Gedeshi (2005) examine the marginalizing effect of ethnic discrimination over the Roma people and Egyptians living in Albanian society. Presenting a detailed analysis on human trafficking in Thailand, Rijken et al. (2015) discuss that members of ethnic minorities, such as hill tribe people in Thailand, face a higher risk of being trafficked because they lack basic rights endowed with citizenship. Without proper identification, these people face difficulties in finding formal employment and free movement within the country and thus become more vulnerable to traffickers in search of meeting their basic needs (Rijken et al., 2015). In a different study, Raza (2019) examines China's re-education centers incarcerating Muslim Uyghurs, one of the ethnic minorities within the country, with the aim of teaching them how to become loyal citizens and competent workers. According to Raza (2019), this policy is a cover for forced labor in government facilities because it was historically used by the Chinese authorities to penalize dissenters. Moreover, examining

the efficiency of prevention measures in Vietnam, Le et al. (2018) discuss that awareness-campaigns should target members of ethnic minority groups because they are more likely to be victims of traffickers and these campaigns should be planned considering their low educational attainment and language barriers.

While extant studies discuss ethnic discrimination as a critical factor that reinforces the vulnerability of people to being trafficked, there is a lack of research regarding the association between ethnic discrimination and the prevention efforts of countries. Since this relationship has been insufficiently investigated within human trafficking literature, the purpose of this study is to theoretically argue and empirically examine the impact of ethnic discrimination on an effective implementation of countries' prevention measures.

Ethnic Discrimination and Prevention of Human Trafficking

This study argues that ethnic discrimination impairs prevention efforts by i) generating the necessary conditions for being vulnerable to exploitation, ii) deterring awareness about the dangers of being trafficked, iii) boosting the demand for human trafficking, and iv) impeding the political will for counter-trafficking. The theoretical expectation about the deteriorating impact of ethnic discrimination on prevention measures is postulated on the link between ethnicity and competition over political power. Defined as a shared feeling of unity regarding the joint lineage and culture, and manifesting itself by religion, language, and race, ethnicity has been acknowledged as a significant factor that affects the access to state-level decision-making to control the distribution of economic and legal gains (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009; Vogt et al., 2015). Either majorities or minorities, ethnic groups whose members take part in state governments have advantages in accessing to economic gains such as public employment and services as well as legal benefits in terms of citizenship entitlements, impartial trials, and protection from indiscriminate violence (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). On the other hand, ethnic discrimination occurs when groups are deliberately excluded from state power based on their ethnic background, and these groups will be disadvantaged in receiving public goods and services as well as legal benefits because of their lack of access to state-level decision-making (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009; Vogt et al., 2015).

Discrimination based on ethnic origin brings marginalization of certain groups and prevents them from having benefits that are envisioned for citizens (De Soto et al. 2005; Omelaniuk, 2006; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2008; Velentza, 2020). The Palermo Protocol, the main international legal document for preventing and eliminating human trafficking, requires countries to develop programs addressing fundamental causes of this crime, such as poverty, economic marginalization, and inequality (UN, 2000, Art. 9(4)). However, ethnic discrimination reinforces poverty through a lack of access to education, formal employment and health care and thus increases the vulnerability of individuals to human trafficking (De Soto et al. 2005; Omelaniuk, 2006; UNODC, 2008; United States Department of State, 2021). These people face high barriers in receiving education and have fewer formal employment opportunities that provide a proper wage, health insurance and unemployment benefits (De Soto et al., 2005; European Roma Rights Centre, 2011). With low educational

achievement, members of ethnically discriminated groups either become unemployed or work in the informal sector for lower wages and insufficient social protection (De Soto et al., 2005; European Roma Rights Centre, 2011). Even if they are properly educated, they might not be able to find a decent job due to their ethnicity. For instance, studies show that in the United States, African Americans are more likely to face employment discrimination and unemployment compared to their white counterparts (Butler, 2015). Desperate socio-economic conditions driven by ethnic discrimination lead people to take high risks to improve the quality of their lives. In search of better access to education and employment opportunities, discriminated people who are vulnerable to exploitative practices easily become victim to traffickers who deceive them with false promises of financial gains (United States Department of State, 2021).

Recent research conducted by national and international organizations shows that individuals belonging to ethnically discriminated groups are at the greatest risk of being trafficked because of their vulnerable positions. According to the report of European Roma Rights Centre (2011), in many Central and Eastern European countries, the Roma people are susceptible to human trafficking due to the high level of ethnic discrimination resulting in the lack of access to educational and formal labor opportunities. The Roma people are trafficked mainly for the purposes of forced begging, petty theft, labor and sexual exploitation (European Roma Rights Centre, 2011). Similarly, the recent Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report released from the United States Department of State (2020) states that members of ethnically discriminated Rohingya people in Myanmar are at a higher risk of forced labor and sex trafficking due to their lack of citizenship or identification documents that are necessary to access education, health system, courts, or formal employment.

Other than eliminating poverty and underdevelopment, the Palermo Protocol requires countries to launch awareness-raising campaigns (UN, 2000, Art. 9(5)) among the public to prevent human trafficking. Ethnic discrimination, on the other hand, causes the isolation of discriminated groups in their own neighborhoods, and in turn, the lack of interaction between these groups and the ethnic majority (European Roma Rights Centre, 2011). As an example, in Bulgaria, a significant number of Roma live in neighborhoods inhabited mainly by the Romani people (European Roma Rights Centre, 2011). This segregation leaves individuals belonging to ethnically discriminated groups ill-informed about government policies as well as types, methods, and risks of human trafficking (De Soto et al., 2005; European Roma Rights Centre, 2011; United States Department of State, 2021). With the limited information on exploitative situations as well as their rights and responsibilities, individuals become less alerted to protecting themselves from abusive practices (European Roma Rights Centre, 2011; UNODC, 2008; United States Department of State, 2021; Velentza 2020). Motivated by the search for better education or income-earning opportunities, members of ethnically discriminated groups who are unfamiliar with the concept of human trafficking become easy targets for traffickers who know their vulnerable position and take advantage of it (United States Department of State, 2021). Hence, ethnic discrimination weakens countries' prevention measures by limiting information about human trafficking.

Acknowledging the significant function of the demand in exploitation of vulnerable people, the Palermo Protocol also requires countries to take action to discourage the demand for human trafficking, particularly women and children (UN, 2000, Art.

9(5)). Nevertheless, this study argues that ethnic discrimination weakens prevention measures because it drives the demand for human trafficking by intensifying prejudiced assumptions and beliefs that create acceptance of the exploitation of certain individuals. Ethnic discrimination increases the risk of victimization for particular groups, associating them with negative stereotypes regarding their sexuality, servility, or work performance (Gutierrez Chong, 2014; Kempadoo, 2004; Poulin, 2003; Todres, 2009). Negative perceptions lead exploiters to see ethnically discriminated people responsible for their own problems rather than seeing them as vulnerable victims (Gutierrez Chong, 2014). Association with these stereotypes normalizes the exploitation of members of discriminated ethnic groups, allowing consumers of their services rationalize their behavior (Gutierrez Chong, 2014; Todres, 2009). Some consumers even assert that their purchase of service helps the victims and their families rather than abusing them (Todres, 2009). Fostering the demand for human trafficking through economic marginalization and social stigmatization, ethnic discrimination negatively affects countries' preventative measures.

Finally, as another preventive measure, the Palermo Protocol encourages countries to take legislative, educational, social or cultural measures to reduce the demand for this serious crime (UN, 2000, Art. 9(5)). Ethnic discrimination, on the other hand, deteriorates preventive measures by impeding the political will required to make these essential regulations. National governments have the authority to take measures, such as hindering forced labor by regulating labor standards for wages, hours as well as working conditions, and they are able to properly monitor them. They also have the power to protect people from sexual exploitation by regulating prostitution while also taking cultural and social measures to change public attitude toward exploitation. However, discrimination against ethnic groups prevents national governments from formulating laws and policies to save members of these groups from being trafficked (European Roma Rights Centre, 2011). As in the case of the Roma community, the actions taken by authorities, such as mass evictions and forced migration, may essentially target ethnically discriminated groups and increase their vulnerability to human trafficking (European Roma Rights Centre, 2011).

Consequently, human trafficking is a complex problem. As instructed by the Palermo Protocol, to prevent human trafficking, national governments need to alleviate the factors that make people susceptible to exploitation and discourage the demand. This study argues that ethnic discrimination impedes countries' prevention efforts by increasing the vulnerability to being exploited, encouraging the demand for human trafficking, and reducing the resolve for the fight against trafficking. This theoretical argument results in the subsequent hypothesis:

Hypothesis: Ethnic discrimination deteriorates countries' prevention measures.

Research Design

To test whether ethnic discrimination deteriorates preventative measures for the trafficking of persons, this study empirically examines a data set covering 165 countries

between the years 2003 and 2015.² Congruent with the argument on the adverse impact of ethnic discrimination on the prevention of human trafficking, the outcome variable is *Prevention*, and the main independent variable of interest is *Ethnic Discrimination*. In addition to the outcome, *Prevention*, and the main independent variable, *Ethnic Discrimination*, control variables are added to the analysis for their possible effects on the link between the outcome and the main independent variables. Those control variables are *Democratic Regimes*, *Female Representatives*, *Control for Corruption*, *the Rule of Law*, *Civil Conflict*, *GDP* and *Population*. The data used to measure all the variables are discussed below and summarized in Table 1.

Outcome Variable

Based on the main argument, the outcome variable in this study is the prevention of human trafficking and it is indicated as *Prevention* in the model. *Prevention* is measured by using the data provided by the 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index, coming from Cho et al. (2014) and Cho (2015). To construct the index, the data are derived from the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) reports published by the United States Department of State along with the Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons published by the UNODC (Cho, 2015; Cho et al., 2014). The 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index measures the counter-trafficking practices of each country in three aspects (prosecution, protection, and prevention) annually (Cho, 2015; Cho et al., 2014). Congruent with the theoretical discussion on the prevention of human trafficking, this study measures the outcome variable, *Prevention*, by using the prevention aspect of the 3P Anti-trafficking Policy Index (Cho, 2015; Cho et al., 2014). The index for preventative measures of countries goes from 1 to 5. While the value of 5 shows the strictest prevention measures, the value of 1 shows the worst performance in taking preventative measures.

Main Independent Variable

The main independent variable of interest in this study is *Ethnic Discrimination* because the main argument discusses its impeding effect on preventative measures. Following the discussion on the ethnic power configurations, ethnic discrimination is measured by using the data coming from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set (Vogt et al., 2015). The EPR data set defines ethnicity as a feeling of fellowship based on a shared lineage and culture, manifesting itself through language, religion, and race. It provides data on politically relevant ethnic groups in countries and to which extent these groups join in executive-level decision-making between the years 1946 and 2021 (Vogt et al., 2015). According to this data set, ethnic groups, regardless of being majorities or minorities, are defined as politically relevant if their members are involved in or expelled from state power (Vogt et al., 2015). However, the EPR data set does not provide information on groups whose members are not citizens, for example, migrant employees, unless these groups live in those countries for generations, such as the Roma people residing in many countries (Vogt et al., 2015). To create the data on politically relevant groups, about a hundred country and regional specialists are surveyed to categorize prominent ethnic groups in countries' national politics (Vogt et al., 2015). As the data set registers

2 The time frame of the quantitative analysis is given based on the accessibility of the data used to measure the outcome variable, taken from Cho et al. (2014) and Cho (2015).

politically relevant ethnic groups in countries, it also shows the changes in the size of groups compared to the total population or their status in national politics over years (Vogt et al., 2015). The EPR data set evaluates ethnic groups' power in national politics based on three categories, whether they dominate the politics on their own, share the political power with other ethnic groups, or are excluded from executive-level decision making (Vogt et al., 2015). Accordingly, *Ethnic Discrimination* is defined as the organized and deliberate exclusion of groups from political power based on their ethnic background and the data show the ratio of ethnically discriminated people in countries (Vogt et al., 2015). Ranging from 0 to 1, this indicator shows an increasing share of ethnically discriminated population when it is closer to the value of 1.

Control Variables

Several control variables are added to the quantitative analysis in order to eliminate the probability that the other factors affect the relationship between ethnic discrimination and preventative measures. First of all, current research has discussed the significant effect of regime type on international commitments (Neumayer, 2005; Hathaway, 2007; von Stein, 2016). To eliminate the likelihood that political institutions influence countries' preventative efforts, this paper employs a dummy variable: *Democratic Regimes*. This variable is created based on a Polity index (Marshall et al., 2019), ranging from +10 to -10. According to the Polity index, the value of +10 shows highly democratic countries while the value of -10 indicates highly autocratic countries. For this study, *Democracy* is coded 1 for all the country-years with the value of 6 and above on the 21-point Polity index, and 0 otherwise.

Second, the variable of *Female Representatives* is added to the analysis following the argument that female legislators are more likely to defend women's rights because they are more sensitive to the issues that are related to women (Bartilow, 2008; Cho et al., 2014). The second control variable, *Female Representatives*, shows the share of female representatives in countries' parliaments. The data for this indicator are provided by the World Bank's Gender Statistics Database (World Bank [WB], 2019). The values for *Female Representatives* change from 0 to 1 while the values closer to 1 show more women in parliaments.

The third control variable added to the analysis is *Control for Corruption* because recent studies discuss that countries with corrupted officials fail to take effective measures in fighting against trafficking in persons (Cho et al., 2014). The index for *Control for Corruption*, taken from the World Bank's Governance Indicators (WGI), shows how corruption is perceived in more than 200 countries (WB, 2019). The index for *Control for Corruption* ranges from -2.5 to +2.5. The values closer to +2.5 indicate stricter corruption control than lower values.

Fourth, the *Rule of Law* is included in the analysis to control for its effect on countering human trafficking based on the argument that countries respecting the law succeed in fighting against human trafficking (Cho & Vadlamannati, 2012). The index for *Rule of Law*, coming from the World Bank's Governance Indicators (WGI), ranges from -2.5 to +2.5. The values closer to +2.5 show higher levels of respect for law.

The fifth control variable, *Civil Conflict*, is added to the analysis following the discussion that civil conflicts create opportunities to force individuals into labor and sex trafficking

as well as to combat in armed conflicts (UNODC, 2018, p. 11). The data for *Civil Conflict* are provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Data set (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson et al., 2019). This indicator is coded 1 for years in which civil conflicts are experienced, and 0 otherwise.

Finally, the sixth and seventh control variables are added to the analysis to account for their possible influence on the prevention measures of countries. *GDP* indicates the level of economic development and is added to the analysis due to its possible effect on countries' actions for fighting against human trafficking (United States Department of State, 2021). *Population* is added to the model following the argument that detecting, and in turn, eliminating human trafficking might be difficult in more populous locations (United States Department of State, 2021). The data for *GDP* and *Population* are driven from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WB, 2019). In order to fix the skewed distribution, this study takes the natural log of these two variables.

Methodology

In line with the main argument, the outcome variable in this study is *Prevention*, and it is an ordered and categorical variable with five categories. The models are analyzed using the ordered probit estimation method since it is the proper method for ordered and categorical outcome variables (Long, 1997). Standard errors are clustered on a country level to handle the issue of correlation of errors within countries as well as heteroscedasticity between countries. Additionally, this study includes the lagged outcome variable in the analysis to address the temporal dynamics and control for the likelihood that countries' preventative measures in previous years might affect their performance in future years.

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics that summarize the information on the data used to measure all the variables included in the ordered probit regression model. The first column in Table 1 presents the names for all the variables included in the ordered probit regression model. The second column in Table 1 indicates the total number of observations for each variable in the data set whereas the third and fourth columns show the mean and standard deviations respectively. The fifth and sixth columns in Table 1 present the minimum and maximum values of all the variables, for which the data are discussed in the Research Design section.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Prevention	2492	3.22	1.037	1	5
Ethnic Discrimination	2682	0.029	0.094	0	0.848
Democratic Regimes	2669	0.616	0.487	0	1
Female Representatives	2466	16.556	10.815	0	63.8
Control for Corruption	2485	-0.102	1.008	-1.869	2.47
Rule of Law	2493	-0.121	1.002	-2.606	2.1
Civil Conflict	2669	0.114	0.318	0	1
GDP	2575	24.219	2.197	18.78	30.419
Population	2643	15.814	1.836	9.776	21.029

Note: Descriptive statistics are estimated based on the data discussed in the Research Design section. STATA 15 statistical software is used to estimate the results.

Results

To test the hypothesis on the relationship between ethnic discrimination and the prevention of human trafficking, this study uses the ordered probit estimation method based on the main model, *Model 1* in Table 2, including all the variables discussed in the Research Design section. The results for *Model 1* in Table 2 show that the main independent variable of interest in this study, *Ethnic Discrimination*, has a negative sign as expected, and this effect is significant. This result confirms the significant negative relationship between ethnic discrimination and the outcome variable, *Prevention*. It suggests that higher levels of ethnic discrimination lead countries to take weak prevention measures, and thus it supports the main argument. When looking at the results for the control variables included in *Model 1* in Table 2, *Prevention_(t-1)*, *Democratic Regimes*, *Female Representatives*, the *Rule of Law*, and *Population* have statistically significant positive signs, indicating their significant positive relationship with the outcome variable, *Prevention*. These findings present that taking strict prevention measures in previous years, having democratic regimes, having more female representatives in parliaments, showing high respect for the rule of law and having more people raise the probability of taking severe measures to prevent trafficking in persons. Additionally, the results for one of the control variables, *GDP*, included in *Model 1* in Table 2, demonstrate that it has a positive sign, indicating that wealthy countries are likely to take strict prevention measures, but this effect is not statistically significant. As another control variable included in *Model 1* in Table 2, *Civil Conflict* has a significant negative sign, presenting its significant negative relationship with the outcome variable, *Prevention*. This finding confirms that countries that are involved in armed conflicts are not able to take strong measures to prevent trafficking in persons. The results reported for *Model 1* in Table 2 also show that *Control for Corruption*, as a control variable, has a negative sign, representing its negative relationship with the outcome variable, *Prevention*. Nevertheless, this relationship is not statistically significant. Other than the regression coefficients, *Model 1* in Table 2 presents the threshold values (cu1, cut2, cut3, and cut4) for the categories of the outcome variable, *Prevention*, while the value of Pseudo R² for the model is 0.307. Finally, the number of observations included in *Model 1* in Table 2 is 1,942 as the number of countries in the analysis is 165.

Table 2
Ethnic Discrimination and Prevention of Human Trafficking, 2003-2015 (Main Model)

	(Model 1)
Main Independent and Control Variables	Outcome Variable: Prevention
Prevention _(t-1)	1.053*** (0.046)
Ethnic Discrimination _(t-1)	-0.565** (0.230)
Democratic Regimes _(t-1)	0.223*** (0.061)
Female Representatives _(t-1)	0.007** (0.003)
Control for Corruption _(t-1)	-0.055 (0.113)
Rule of Law _(t-1)	0.301*** (0.115)
Civil Conflict _(t-1)	-0.191** (0.092)
GDP _(t-1)	0.008 (0.024)
Population _(t-1)	0.085*** (0.032)
/cut1	2.226*** (0.385)
/cut2	3.760*** (0.395)

Main Independent and Control Variables	(Model 1)
	Outcome Variable: Prevention
/cut3	5.476*** (0.401)
/cut4	7.149*** (0.421)
Number of Observations	1942
Number of Countries	165
Pseudo R ²	0.307

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The results are estimated based on the main model discussed in the Research Design section. STATA 15 statistical software is used to estimate the results. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$




Figure 1. Predicted probabilities for prevention of human trafficking

Note: Predicted probabilities are plotted based on Model 1 in Table 2. STATA 15 statistical software is used to plot the figure.

While the findings from the main model, *Model 1*, reported in Table 2, support the argument on the link between ethnic discrimination and the prevention of human trafficking, interpretation of coefficients from the ordered probit regression might not be so straightforward. To assist the interpretation of the results from the ordered probit regression, predicted probabilities are plotted using STATA 15 statistical software. Figure 1 presents the predicted probabilities that confirm the results of *Model 1* reported in Table 2. The top three panels of Figure 1 show the probability of having lower levels of prevention scores ([Pr(Prevention=1)], [Pr(Prevention=2)], [Pr(Prevention=3)]) when there is no ethnic discrimination or it is high. As seen in the top three panels of Figure 1, when *Ethnic Discrimination* changes from its smallest to highest value, the probability of having lower levels of prevention scores ([Pr(Prevention=1)], [Pr(Prevention=2)], [Pr(Prevention=3)]) increases. Specifically, when ethnic discrimination is high, the likelihood of taking a prevention score of 1 [Pr(Prevention=1)] rises from about 0.03 to about 0.06 as the likelihood of taking a prevention score of 2 [Pr(Prevention=2)] increases from about 0.15 to about 0.21; and the likelihood of taking a prevention

score of 3 [$\text{Pr}(\text{Prevention}=3)$] rises from about 0.38 to about 0.40. On the other hand, the bottom two panels of Figure 1 present the predicted probabilities of having higher levels of prevention scores ($[\text{Pr}(\text{Prevention}=4)]$, $[\text{Pr}(\text{Prevention}=5)]$) when ethnic discrimination is either absent or at its highest value. As the bottom two panels of Figure 1 show, the likelihood of taking higher levels of prevention scores ($[\text{Pr}(\text{Prevention}=4)]$, $[\text{Pr}(\text{Prevention}=5)]$) decreases as ethnic discrimination switches from its minimum to maximum value. When ethnic discrimination is high, the likelihood of taking a prevention score of 4 [$\text{Pr}(\text{Prevention}=4)$] decreases from about 0.31 to about 0.26. Similarly, the likelihood of taking a prevention score of 5 [$\text{Pr}(\text{Prevention}=5)$] decreases from about 0.13 to about 0.08 as *Ethnic Discrimination* changes from a minimum to a maximum value. These plots support the findings from the main model, *Model 1* in Table 2, indicating that countries are less likely to take strong prevention measures when ethnic discrimination is high.

Robustness Checks

While the results from *Model 1* in Table 2 and the predicted probabilities presented in Figure 1 provide support for the main argument, additional tests are conducted to confirm that these findings are robust to changes in the main model. *Model 2*, *Model 3*, and *Model 4* reported in Table 3 present the results of additional models that are run to check the robustness of the findings from the main model. First of all, *Model 2* in Table 3 includes two alternative variables, OECD membership and commitment to the Palermo Protocol, to control for their possible effects on the relationship between the main independent variable, *Ethnic Discrimination*, and the outcome variable, *Prevention*. The variable of *OECD* is coded 1 for countries that are members of OECD, and 0 otherwise. *Ratification* is coded 1 for countries that are a party of the Palermo Protocol, and 0 otherwise.

As seen in *Model 2* in Table 3, after including *OECD* and *Ratification*, the effect of *Ethnic Discrimination* on the outcome variable, *Prevention*, remains unchanged. *Ethnic Discrimination* still has a significant negative relationship with *Prevention*. This finding supports the main argument about the impeding effect of ethnic discrimination on the prevention of human trafficking. The signs of *OECD* and *Ratification* are significant and positive, indicating their significant positive association with the outcome variable, *Prevention*. The results reported for *Model 2* in Table 3 present that both membership to OECD and commitment to the Palermo Protocol (*Ratification*) increase the likelihood of taking strict prevention measures. In congruent with the findings from the main model, the results for *Model 2* reported in Table 3 show that control variables such as *Prevention*_(t-1), *Democratic Regimes*, the *Rule of Law*, and *Population* still have significant positive signs, displaying their positive relationship with the outcome variable, *Prevention*. According to these results reported for *Model 2* in Table 3, taking prevention measures in former years, being democracies, respecting the law, and having more people increase the likelihood of taking strong preventative measures in countries. On the other hand, as another control variable, *Civil Conflict*, has a significant negative sign, showing its significant negative relationship with the outcome variable, *Prevention*, after two indicators, *OECD* and *Ratification*, are added to the model. This result confirms that countries experiencing civil conflicts are less likely to implement strong preventative measures. The results for *Model*

2 reported in Table 3 demonstrate that *GDP* and *Control for Corruption* have negative signs, suggesting their negative effects on the outcome variable whereas another control variable, *Female Representatives*, has a positive sign indicating its positive effect on the outcome variable, *Prevention*. However, these effects of *GDP*, *Control for Corruption* and *Female Representatives* are statistically insignificant. *Model 2* in Table 3 reports threshold values (cu1, cut2, cut3, and cut4) for the categories of the outcome variable, *Prevention*, while the value of Pseudo R² for *Model 2* in Table 3 is 0.310. Besides, there are 1,942 observations and 165 countries included in *Model 2* in Table 3.

Model 3 and *Model 4* reported in Table 3 show the findings after adding country and year fixed effects to the main model respectively. Country and year fixed effects are included in the analyses to account for their possible effects. The results for both *Model 3* and *Model 4* reported in Table 3 show that the main independent variable, *Ethnic Discrimination*, still has a significant negative sign after controlling for year and country fixed effects. This result confirms the significant negative effect of ethnic discrimination on prevention efforts of countries. Additionally, among the control variables included in both *Model 3* and *Model 4* in Table 3, $Prevention_{(t-1)}$, *Democratic Regimes*, *Female Representatives*, the *Rule of Law*, and *Population* have significant positive signs, showing their significant positive effects on the outcome variable, *Prevention*. These results confirm that prevention efforts in former years, democratic regimes, women legislators, respect to the rule of law and having more people increase the likelihood of taking strict prevention measures. As another control variable, *Civil Conflict*, included both in *Model 3* and *Model 4* in Table 3, still has a significant negative sign showing its significant adverse relationship with the outcome variable, *Prevention*. According to this result, countries experiencing civil conflict are less likely to take strict prevention measures. The results for both *Model 3* and *Model 4* in Table 3 show that *GDP* has a positive sign, implying its positive effect, and *Control for Corruption* has a negative sign, indicating its negative effect on the outcome variable, *Prevention*. However, these effects are statistically insignificant. Moreover, *Model 4* in Table 3 estimates the main model with year fixed effects to account for years' effects and reports the results for individual years between 2003 and 2015. Other than regression coefficients, both *Model 3* and *Model 4* in Table 3 report threshold values (cu1:cons, cut2:cons, cut3:cons, and cut4:cons) from the ordered probit estimation with country and years fixed effects for the categories of the outcome variable, *Prevention*. The value of Prob>chi² for both *Model 3* and *Model 4* in Table 3 is 0.000. Finally, 1,942 observations and 165 countries are included in both *Model 3* and *Model 4* in Table 3.

Table 3

Ethnic Discrimination and Prevention of Human Trafficking, 2003-2015 (Robustness Checks)

	(Model 2)	(Model 3)	(Model 4)
Main Independent and Control Variables	Outcome Variable: Prevention	Outcome Variable: Prevention	Outcome Variable: Prevention
Prevention _(t-1)	1.030*** (0.044)	1.026*** (0.054)	1.015*** (0.057)
Ethnic Discrimination _(t-1)	-0.540** (0.225)	-0.597** (0.247)	-0.565** (0.235)
Democratic Regimes _(t-1)	0.203*** (0.061)	0.238*** (0.065)	0.263*** (0.072)
Female Representatives _(t-1)	0.005 (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
Control for Corruption _(t-1)	-0.030 (0.112)	-0.058 (0.121)	-0.039 (0.129)

	(Model 2)	(Model 3)	(Model 4)
Main Independent and Control Variables	Outcome Variable: Prevention	Outcome Variable: Prevention	Outcome Variable: Prevention
Rule of Law _(t-1)	0.252** (0.116)	0.318** (0.125)	0.333** (0.130)
Civil Conflict _(t-1)	-0.161* (0.094)	-0.187* (0.095)	-0.202** (0.103)
GDP _(t-1)	-0.022 (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.003 (0.028)
Population _(t-1)	0.106*** (0.032)	0.089*** (0.034)	0.112*** (0.038)
OECD	0.293*** (0.105)		
Ratification _(t-1)	0.171*** (0.060)		
Year 2003			-0.176 (0.197)
Year 2004			0.390** (0.179)
Year 2005			0.320* (0.183)
Year 2006			0.037 (0.191)
Year 2007			0.057 (0.178)
Year 2008.			0.399** (0.176)
Year 2009			0.260 (0.195)
Year 2010			0.576*** (0.201)
Year 2011			0.248 (0.182)
Year 2012			0.518*** (0.198)
Year 2013			0.257 (0.204)
Year 2014			0.004 (0.204)
Year 2015			0.230 (0.181)
/cut1	1.855*** (0.409)		
/cut2	3.381*** (0.418)		
/cut3	5.101*** (0.424)		
/cut4	6.795*** (0.439)		
cut1: cons		2.260*** (0.407)	2.577*** (0.499)
cut2: cons		3.808*** (0.418)	4.161*** (0.512)
cut3: cons		5.537*** (0.424)	5.934*** (0.523)
cut4: cons		7.229*** (0.446)	7.677*** (0.548)
sigma2_u: cons		0.021 (0.022)	0.044 (0.028)
Number of Observations	1942	1942	1942
Number of Countries	165	165	165
Pseudo R ²	0.310		
Prob > chi ²		0.000	0.000

Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The results are estimated using STATA 15 statistical software. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Discussion

This study argues theoretically and tests empirically the relationship between ethnic discrimination and the prevention of human trafficking. While the findings from statistical analyses support the argument that ethnic discrimination weakens the prevention efforts of countries, this study has two limitations. First, the time span of statistical analyses is limited to the years between 2003 and 2015 because of the availability of the data used to measure the outcome variable, the prevention of human trafficking, coming from Cho et al. (2014) and Cho (2015). Available data for additional years would assist to better identify general patterns on prevention of human trafficking. Another limitation to this study is the lack of information regarding prevention efforts at the micro-level. This study uses aggregate-level data to test the relationship between ethnic discrimination and

the prevention of human trafficking. While analyses using aggregate-level data allow researchers to detect broad patterns based on comparisons cross-nationally and over time, they provide less information about the mechanism behind the inspected relationship. To address this limitation, this study presents two illustrative cases to highlight the mechanism behind the main argument.

The examples of Myanmar and Cambodia demonstrate how ethnic discrimination impairs the prevention of human trafficking. First, in Myanmar, the Rohingya people have been denied citizenship and the privileges coming with it based on the 1982 Citizenship Law (Naik & Arafath, 2021). Despite the vigorous evidence regarding the existence of Rohingya in Myanmar for many years, these people have been regarded as illegal immigrants who had originally come from Bangladesh (Naik & Arafath, 2021). Discrimination against the Rohingya people based on their ethnic origin has increased their vulnerability to trafficking by limiting their freedom of movement and thus the improvement of their socio-economic status (United States Department of State, 2021). Without proper identification, they have had a lack of access to job opportunities, proper education, and medical services (United States Department of State, 2021). As a result, for many years, Myanmar has been reported as a country where members of ethnically discriminated groups have been victims of labor or sex trafficking either within the country or in its neighbors (United States Department of State, 2021). Although in recent years, Myanmar took some measures to prevent human trafficking, including raising awareness and issuing identity documents for the Rohingya people, the registration process of national verification system has been criticized for revealing the ethnic identity of Rohingya and not guaranteeing citizenship or the rights granted with it (United States Department of State, 2021).

Cambodia provides another illustrative case for the negative relationship between ethnic discrimination and prevention of human trafficking. The ethnic Vietnamese community residing in Cambodia has been recognized as one of the ethnic groups living in the country for generations (Ehrentraut, 2011). However, the 1993 Constitution and 1996 Law on Nationality defined Cambodian citizenship and authorized government officials to deport foreigners and illegal migrants (Lainez, 2011). Not recognized as Cambodian citizens, the ethnic Vietnamese people settled in Cambodia faced the risk of deportation based on these regulations (Lainez, 2011). However, the crisis was assured by granting the ethnic Vietnamese people the status of foreign national and letting them stay in the country without having citizenship privileges (Lainez, 2011). Without citizenship and proper documentation, the ethnic Vietnamese people are prevented from having basic rights granted by nationality, such as access to formal job opportunities, education, healthcare, fair trial, or property rights (United States Department of State, 2021). Lacking the proper means for raising their socio-economic status, such as education and formal job opportunities, the ethnic Vietnamese people in Cambodia face a higher risk of being trafficked particularly when they seek to fulfill their economic necessities including food, shelter, and medical care (Brown, 2007). Consequently, Cambodia has been reported as a country where the ethnic Vietnamese people are victims of exploitative practices due to their disadvantaged position within their society (United States Department of State, 2021).

Conclusion

As human trafficking has become a global concern that threatens millions of lives in almost every country (ILO, 2017), prevention measures have a critical importance in combatting against this grave crime. While the main anti-trafficking instrument, the Palermo Protocol, details how countries will counter trafficking in persons, national practices for preventing human trafficking vary. Former quantitative anti-trafficking literature discusses several factors that have led to varying anti-trafficking practices, including female legislators, control of corruption, and regime types (Avdeyeva, 2012; Bartilow, 2008; Cho & Vadlamannati, 2012; Cho et al., 2014; Schonhofer, 2017). Although ethnic discrimination has been discussed as a source of vulnerability to human trafficking, its effect on countries' prevention efforts has not been empirically examined within human trafficking literature yet. In order to contribute to the human trafficking literature, this study investigates the association between ethnic discrimination and the implementation of effective prevention measures.

Despite its limitations, this study shows the significant association between ethnic discrimination and the prevention of trafficking of persons. The findings of quantitative analysis highlight the significant negative effect of ethnic discrimination on countries' prevention measures. The results implicate that national and international decision-makers should recognize the deteriorating effect of ethnic discrimination, which makes individuals susceptible to being exploited as well as increasing the demand for human trafficking and address it to eliminate the risk of this severe crime. To implement effective preventative measures, national governments should develop programs to rectify discrimination by strengthening discriminated groups' representation and improve their livelihood options. Easier access to educational opportunities, job-training skills and social protection systems could decrease the susceptibility of members of ethnically discriminated groups to human trafficking. Additionally, national and international policy makers should launch educational campaigns to raise public awareness about the risks of human trafficking and make legislative and educational regulations to shift discriminatory beliefs to protect people from abusive practices which in turn discourage the demand for human trafficking.

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AMAÇ KAPSAM

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, siyaset bilimi, kamu yönetimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, alanlarında uluslararası ve disiplinlerarası makaleler yayınlamaktadır. Dergi, aşağıda belirtilen konuları kapsamak ile birlikte sadece bu konular ile kısıtlı değildir:

- Siyaset biliminin tüm alt disiplinleri, siyaset teorisi, siyaset felsefesi, politik davranış, siyasi kurumlar ve siyasi tarih
- Kamu yönetiminin tüm alt disiplinleri,
- Uluslararası ilişkiler ile ilgili tüm konular: uluslararası hukuk, iktisat, etik, strateji, felsefe, kültür, çevre, güvenlik, terör, bölgesel çalışmalar, küreselleşme ve diğer konular,

Dergi, yukarıda adı geçen disiplinlerin çeşitli yönlerini inceleyen, İngilizce yazılmış araştırma esaslı makalelerin yanında teorik ve kavramsal makaleleri yayınlamaktadır. Ayrıca, dergi uluslararası alandaki akademisyenlerin konuk editörlüğünde çeşitli temalar ile ilgili özel sayılar yayınlamaktadır.

EDİTORYAL POLİTİKALAR VE HAKEM SÜRECİ

Yayın Politikası

Dergiye yayınlamak üzere gönderilen makalelerin içeriği derginin amaç ve kapsamı ile uyumlu olmalıdır. Dergi, orijinal araştırma niteliğindeki yazıları yayınlamaya öncelik vermektedir. Genel İlkeler Daha önce yayınlanmamış ya da yayınlamak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Ön değerlendirmeyi geçen yazılar iThenticate intihal tarama programından geçirilir. İntihal incelemesinden sonra, uygun makaleler Editör tarafından orijinaliteleri, metodolojileri, makalede ele alınan konunun önemi ve derginin kapsamına uygunluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Bilimsel toplantılarda sunulan özet bildirimler, makalede belirtilmesi koşulu ile kaynak olarak kabul edilir. Editör, gönderilen makale biçimsel esaslara uygun ise, gelen yazıyı yurtiçinden ve /veya yurtdışından en az iki hakemin değerlendirmesine sunar, hakemler gerek gördüğü takdirde yazıda istenen değişiklikler yazarlar tarafından yapıldıktan sonra yayınlamasına onay verir. Makale yayınlamak üzere Dergiye gönderildikten sonra yazarlardan hiçbirinin ismi, tüm yazarların yazılı izni olmadan yazar listesinden silinemez ve yeni bir isim yazar olarak eklenemez ve yazar sırası değiştirilemez. Yayına kabul edilmeyen makale, resim ve fotoğraflar yazarlara geri gönderilmez. Yayımlanan yazı ve resimlerin tüm hakları Dergiye aittir.

Telif Hakkında

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İşleme Ücreti

Derginin tüm giderleri İstanbul Üniversitesi tarafından karşılanmaktadır. Dergide makale yayını ve makale süreçlerinin yürütülmesi ücrete tabi değildir. Dergiye gönderilen ya da yayın için kabul edilen makaleler için işleme ücreti ya da gönderim ücreti alınmaz.

Hakem Süreci

Daha önce yayınlanmamış ya da yayınlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Gönderilen ve ön kontrolü geçen makaleler iThenticate yazılımı kullanılarak intihal için taranır. İntihal kontrolünden sonra, uygun olan makaleler baş editör tarafından orijinallik, metodoloji, işlenen konunun önemi ve dergi kapsamı ile uyumluluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar.

Seçilen makaleler en az iki ulusal/uluslararası hakeme değerlendirmeye gönderilir; yayın kararı, hakemlerin talepleri doğrultusunda yazarların gerçekleştirdiği düzenlemelerin ve hakem sürecinin sonrasında baş editör tarafından verilir.

Hakemlerin değerlendirmeleri objektif olmalıdır. Hakem süreci sırasında hakemlerin aşağıdaki hususları dikkate alarak değerlendirmelerini yapmaları beklenir.

- Makale yeni ve önemli bir bilgi içeriyor mu?
- Öz, makalenin içeriğini net ve düzgün bir şekilde tanımlıyor mu?
- Yöntem bütünlüklü ve anlaşılır şekilde tanımlanmış mı?
- Yapılan yorum ve varılan sonuçlar bulgularla kanıtlanıyor mu?
- Alandaki diğer çalışmalara yeterli referans verilmiş mi?
- Dil kalitesi yeterli mi?

Hakemler, gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdır. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir.

Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir.

YAYIN ETİĞİ VE İLKELER

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, yayın etiğinde en yüksek standartlara bağlıdır ve Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA) ve World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) tarafından yayınlanan etik yayıncılık ilkelerini benimser; Principles of Transparency

and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing başlığı altında ifade edilen ilkeler için adres: <https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-andbest-practice-scholarly-publishing> Gönderilen tüm makaleler orijinal, yayınlanmamış ve başka bir dergide değerlendirme sürecinde olmamalıdır. Her bir makale editörlerden biri ve en az iki hakem tarafından çift kör değerlendirmeden geçirilir. İntihal, duplikasyon, sahte yazarlık/inkar edilen yazarlık, araştırma/veri fabrikasyonu, makale dilimleme, dilimleyerek yayın, telif hakları ihlali ve çıkar çatışmasının gizlenmesi, etik dışı davranışlar olarak kabul edilir. Kabul edilen etik standartlara uygun olmayan tüm makaleler yayından çıkarılır. Buna yayından sonra tespit edilen olası kuraldışı, uygunsuzluklar içeren makaleler de dahildir.

Araştırma Etiği

Dergi araştırma etiğinde en yüksek standartları gözetir ve aşağıda tanımlanan uluslararası araştırma etiği ilkelerini benimser. Makalelerin etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. - Araştırmanın tasarlanması, tasarımın gözden geçirilmesi ve araştırmanın yürütülmesinde, bütünlük, kalite ve şeffaflık ilkeleri sağlanmalıdır.

- Araştırma ekibi ve katılımcılar, araştırmanın amacı, yöntemleri ve öngörülen olası kullanımları; araştırmaya katılımın gerektirdikleri ve varsa riskleri hakkında tam olarak bilgilendirilmelidir.
- Araştırma katılımcılarının sağladığı bilgilerin gizliliği ve yanıt verenlerin gizliliği sağlanmalıdır. Araştırma katılımcıların özerkliğini ve saygınlığını koruyacak şekilde tasarlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma katılımcıları gönüllü olarak araştırmada yer almalı, herhangi bir zorlama altında olmamalıdır. - Katılımcıların zarar görmesinden kaçınılmalıdır. Araştırma, katılımcıları riske sokmayacak şekilde planlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma bağımsızlığıyla ilgili açık ve net olunmalı; çıkar çatışması varsa belirtilmelidir.
- Deneysel çalışmalarda, araştırmaya katılmaya karar veren katılımcıların yazılı bilgilendirilmiş onayı alınmalıdır. Çocukların ve vesayet altındakilerin veya tasdiklenmiş akıl hastalığı bulunanların yasal vasisinin onayı alınmalıdır.
- Çalışma herhangi bir kurum ya da kuruluştaki gerçekleştirilecekse bu kurum ya da kuruluştan çalışma yapılacağına dair onay alınmalıdır.
- İnsan ögesi bulunan çalışmalarda, “yöntem” bölümünde katılımcılardan “bilgilendirilmiş onam” alındığının ve çalışmanın yapıldığı kurumdaki etik kurul onayı alındığı belirtilmesi gerekir.

Yazarların Sorumluluğu

Makalelerin bilimsel ve etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. Yazar makalenin orijinal olduğu, daha önce başka bir yerde yayınlanmadığı ve başka bir yerde dilde yayınlanmak üzere değerlendirilmediği konusunda teminat sağlamalıdır. Uygulamadaki telif kanunları ve anlaşmaları gözetilmelidir. Telifle bağlı materyaller (örneğin tablolar, şekiller veya büyük alıntılar) gerekli izin ve teşekkürle kullanılmalıdır. Başka yazarların, katkıda bulunanların çalışmaları ya da yararlanılan kaynaklar uygun biçimde kullanılmalı ve referanslarda belirtilmelidir. Gönderilen makalede tüm yazarların akademik ve bilimsel olarak doğrudan katkısı olmalıdır, bu bağlamda “yazar” yayınlanan bir araştırmanın kavramsallaştırılmasına ve dizaynına, verilerin elde edilmesine, analizine ya da yorumlanmasına belirgin katkı yapan, yazının yazılması ya da bunun içerik açısından eleştirel biçimde gözden geçirilmesinde görev yapan birisi olarak görülür. Yazar

olabilmenin diğer koşulları ise, makaledeki çalışmayı planlamak veya icra etmek ve / veya revize etmektir. Fon sağlanması, veri toplanması ya da araştırma grubunun genel süpervizyonu tek başına yazarlık hakkı kazandırmaz. Yazar olarak gösterilen tüm bireyler sayılan tüm ölçütleri karşılamalıdır ve yukarıdaki ölçütleri karşılayan her birey yazar olarak gösterilebilir. Yazarların isim sıralaması ortak verilen bir karar olmalıdır. Tüm yazarlar yazar sıralamasını Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu'nda imzalı olarak belirtmek zorundadırlar. Yazarlık için yeterli ölçütleri karşılamayan ancak çalışmaya katkısı olan tüm bireyler “teşekkür / bilgiler” kısmında sıralanmalıdır. Bunlara örnek olarak ise sadece teknik destek sağlayan, yazıma yardımcı olan ya da sadece genel bir destek sağlayan, finansal ve materyal desteği sunan kişiler verilebilir. Bütün yazarlar, araştırmanın sonuçlarını ya da bilimsel değerlendirmeyi etkileyebilme potansiyeli olan finansal ilişkiler, çıkar çatışması ve çıkar rekabetini beyan etmelidirler. Bir yazar kendi yayınlanmış yazısında belirgin bir hata ya da yanlışlık tespit ederse, bu yanlışlıklara ilişkin düzeltme ya da geri çekme için editör ile hemen temasa geçme ve işbirliği yapma sorumluluğunu taşır.

Editör ve Hakem Sorumlulukları

Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyuğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar. Gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalacağını garanti eder. Baş editör içerik ve yayının toplam kalitesinden sorumludur. Gereğinde hata sayfası yayınlamalı ya da düzeltme yapmalıdır. Baş editör; yazarlar, editörler ve hakemler arasında çıkar çatışmasına izin vermez. Hakem atama konusunda tam yetkiye sahiptir ve Dergide yayınlanacak makalelerle ilgili nihai kararı vermekle yükümlüdür.

Hakemlerin araştırmayla ilgili, yazarlarla ve/veya araştırmanın finansal destekçileriyle çıkar çatışmaları olmamalıdır. Değerlendirmelerinin sonucunda tarafsız bir yargıya varmalıdırlar. Gönderilmiş yazılara ilişkin tüm bilginin gizli tutulmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdırlar. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir. Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir. Bazı durumlarda editörün kararıyla, ilgili hakemlerin makaleye ait yorumları aynı makaleyi yorumlayan diğer hakemlere gönderilerek hakemlerin bu süreçte aydınlatılması sağlanabilir.

YAZILARIN HAZIRLANMASI

Dil

Dergide İngilizce dilinde makaleler yayınlanır.

Yazıların Hazırlanması ve Yazım Kuralları

Aksi belirtilmedikçe gönderilen yazılarla ilgili tüm yazışmalar ilk yazarla yapılacaktır. Makale gönderimi online olarak ve <http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr> üzerinden yapılmalıdır. Gönderilen yazılar, yazının yayınlanmak üzere gönderildiğini ifade eden, makale türünü belirten ve makaleyle ilgili detayları içeren (bkz: Son Kontrol Listesi) bir mektup; yazının elektronik formunu içeren Microsoft

Word 2003 ve üzerindeki versiyonları ile yazılmış elektronik dosya ve tüm yazarların imzaladığı Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu eklenerek gönderilmelidir.

1. Çalışmalar, A4 boyutundaki kağıdın bir yüzüne, üst, alt, sağ ve sol taraftan 2,5 cm. boşluk bırakılarak, 10 punto Times New Roman harf karakterleriyle ve 1,5 satır aralık ölçüsü ile ve iki yana yaslı olarak hazırlanmalıdır. Paragraf başlarında tab tuşu kullanılmalıdır. Metin içinde yer alan tablo ve şemalarda ise tek satır aralığı kullanılmalıdır.
2. Metnin başlığı küçük harf, koyu renk, Times New Roman yazı tipi, 12 punto olarak sayfanın ortasında yer almalıdır.
3. Metin yazarına ait bilgiler başlıktan sonra bir satır atlanarak, Times New Roman yazı tipi, 10 punto ve tek satır aralığı kullanılarak sayfanın soluna yazılacaktır. Yazarın adı küçük harfle, soyadı büyük harfle belirtildikten sonra bir alt satıra unvanı, çalıştığı kurum ve e-posta adresi yazılacaktır.
4. Giriş bölümünden önce 200-250 kelimelik çalışmanın kapsamını, amacını, ulaşılan sonuçları ve kullanılan yöntemi kaydeden makale dilinde ve İngilizce öz ile 600-800 kelimelik İngilizce genişletilmiş özet yer almalıdır. Çalışmanın İngilizce başlığı İngilizce özün üzerinde yer almalıdır. İngilizce ve makale dilinde özlerin altında çalışmanın içeriğini temsil eden, makale dilinde 3-5 adet, İngilizce adet anahtar kelime yer almalıdır. Makale İngilizce ise İngilizce genişletilmiş özet istenmez.
5. Çalışmaların başlıca şu unsurları içermesi gerekmektedir: Makale dilinde başlık, öz ve anahtar kelimeler; İngilizce başlık öz ve anahtar kelimeler; İngilizce genişletilmiş özet (makale İngilizce ise İngilizce genişletilmiş özet istenmez), ana metin bölümleri, son notlar ve kaynaklar.
6. Çalışmalarda tablo, grafik ve şekil gibi göstergeler ancak çalışmanın takip edilebilmesi açısından gereklilik arz ettiği durumlarda, numaralandırılarak, tanımlayıcı bir başlık ile birlikte verilmelidir. Demografik özellikler gibi metin içinde verilebilecek veriler, ayrıca tablolar ile ifade edilmemelidir.
7. Yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen makale ile birlikte yazar bilgilerini içeren kapak sayfası gönderilmelidir. Kapak sayfasında, makalenin başlığı, yazar veya yazarların bağlı oldukları kurum ve unvanları, kendilerine ulaşılacak adresler, cep, iş ve faks numaraları, ORCID ve e-posta adresleri yer almalıdır (bkz. Son Kontrol Listesi).
8. Kurallar dâhilinde dergimize yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen çalışmaların her türlü sorumluluğu yazar/yazarlarına aittir.
9. Yayın kurulu ve hakem raporları doğrultusunda yazarlardan, metin üzerinde bazı düzeltmeler yapmaları istenebilir.
10. Dergiye gönderilen çalışmalar yayınlansın veya yayınlanmasın geri gönderilmez.

KAYNAKLAR

Derleme yazıları okuyucular için bir konudaki kaynaklara ulaşmayı kolaylaştıran bir araç olsa da, her zaman orijinal çalışmayı doğru olarak yansıtmaz. Bu yüzden mümkün olduğunca yazarlar orijinal çalışmalarını kaynak göstermelidir. Öte yandan, bir konuda çok fazla sayıda orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi yer israfına neden olabilir. Birkaç anahtar orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi genelde uzun listelerle aynı işi görür. Ayrıca günümüzde kaynaklar elektronik versiyonlara eklenebilmekte ve okuyucular elektronik literatür taramalarıyla yayınlara kolaylıkla ulaşabilmektedir.

Kabul edilmiş ancak henüz sayıya dahil edilmemiş makaleler Early View olarak yayınlanır ve

bu makalelere atıflar “advance online publication” şeklinde verilmelidir. Genel bir kaynaktan elde edilemeyecek temel bir konu olmadıkça “kişisel iletişimlere” atıfta bulunulmamalıdır. Eğer atıfta bulunulursa parantez içinde iletişim kurulan kişinin adı ve iletişimin tarihi belirtilmelidir. Bilimsel makaleler için yazarlar bu kaynaktan yazılı izin ve iletişimin doğruluğunu gösterir belge almalıdır. Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

Referans Stili ve Formatı

SIYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences, metin içi alıntılama ve kaynak gösterme için APA (American Psychological Association) kaynak sitilinin 6. edisyonunu benimser. APA 6. Edisyon hakkında bilgi için:

- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
- <http://www.apastyle.org/>

Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar aşağıdaki örneklerdeki gibi gösterilmelidir.

Metin İçinde Kaynak Gösterme

Kaynaklar metinde parantez içinde yazarların soyadı ve yayın tarihi yazılarak belirtilmelidir. Birden fazla kaynak gösterilecekse kaynaklar arasında (;) işareti kullanılmalıdır. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

Örnekler:

Birden fazla kaynak;

(Esin ve ark., 2002; Karasar 1995)

Tek yazarlı kaynak;

(Akyolcu, 2007)

İki yazarlı kaynak;

(Sayiner ve Demirci, 2007, s. 72)

Üç, dört ve beş yazarlı kaynak;

Metin içinde ilk kullanımda: (Ailen, Ciambune ve Welch 2000, s. 12–13) Metin içinde tekrarlayan kullanımlarda: (Ailen ve ark., 2000)

Altı ve daha çok yazarlı kaynak;

(Çavdar ve ark., 2003)

Kaynaklar Bölümünde Kaynak Gösterme

Kullanılan tüm kaynaklar metnin sonunda ayrı bir bölüm halinde yazar soyadlarına göre alfabetik olarak numaralandırılmadan verilmelidir.

Kaynak yazımı ile ilgili örnekler aşağıda verilmiştir.

Kitap

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Say, F. (2009). Galata Kulesi. *İstanbul senfonisi* [CD] içinde. İstanbul: Ak Müzik.

SON KONTROL LİSTESİ

Aşağıdaki listede eksik olmadığından emin olun:

- Editöre mektup
 - ✓ Makalenin türü
 - ✓ Başka bir dergiye gönderilmemiş olduğu bilgisi
 - ✓ Sponsor veya ticari bir firma ile ilişkisi (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ İstatistik kontrolünün yapıldığı (araştırma makaleleri için)
 - ✓ İngilizce yönünden kontrolünün yapıldığı
 - ✓ Yazarlara Bilgide detaylı olarak anlatılan dergi politikalarının gözden geçirildiği
 - ✓ Kaynakların APA6'ya göre belirtildiği
- Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu
- Daha önce basılmış ve telifte bağlı materyal (yazı-resim-tablo) kullanılmış ise izin belgesi
- Kapak sayfası
 - ✓ Makalenin türü
 - ✓ Makalenin İngilizce başlığı
 - ✓ Yazarların ismi soyadı, unvanları ve bağlı oldukları kurumlar (üniversite ve fakülte bilgisinden sonra şehir ve ülke bilgisi de yer almalıdır), e-posta adresleri
 - ✓ Sorumlu yazarın e-posta adresi, açık yazışma adresi, iş telefonu, GSM, faks nosu
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 - ✓ Makalenin İngilizce başlığı
 - ✓ Öz: 180-200 kelime İngilizce
 - ✓ Anahtar Kelimeler: 3-5 adet İngilizce
 - ✓ Makale ana metin bölümleri
 - ✓ Finansal destek (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ Çıkar çatışması (varsa belirtiniz)
 - ✓ Teşekkür (varsa belirtiniz)
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AIM AND SCOPE

The Journal accepts and publishes both international and interdisciplinary articles on the fields of political sciences, public administration, international relations. The journal covers, but are not limited to, following topics:

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The Journal publishes theoretical, conceptual as well as research-based articles concerning various aspects of aforementioned disciplines in English language. Turkish manuscripts are published along with an extended abstract in English. Moreover, it publishes special issues on various themes in collaboration with co-editors from the international academic community.

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b) Book Translated into Turkish

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* [Mindsets] (A. Kotil, Trans.). İstanbul, Turkey: İletişim Yayınları.

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d) Turkish Book with Multiple Authors

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y., & Sever, H. (2002). *Türkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme* [Performance evaluation in Turkish search engines]. Ankara, Turkey: Total Bilişim.

e) Book in English

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

f) Chapter in an Edited Book

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

g) Chapter in an Edited Book in Turkish

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi [Organization culture: Its functions, elements and importance in leadership and business management]. In M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi* [Organization sociology] (pp. 233–263). Bursa, Turkey: Dora Basım Yayın.

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American Psychological Association. (2009). *Publication manual of the American psychological association* (6th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.

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b) English Article

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society*, 10(2), 149–173. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002>

c) Journal Article with DOI and More Than Seven Authors

Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 372, 2087–2096. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184>

d) Journal Article from Web, without DOI

Sidani, S. (2003). Enhancing the evaluation of nursing care effectiveness. *Canadian Journal of Nursing Research*, 35(3), 26–38. Retrieved from <http://cjr.mcgill.ca>

e) Journal Article with DOI

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly*, 27, 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07317131003765910>

f) Advance Online Publication

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology: Advance online publication*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

g) Article in a Magazine

Henry, W. A., III. (1990, April 9). Making the grade in today's schools. *Time*, 135, 28–31.

Doctoral Dissertation, Master's Thesis, Presentation, Proceeding

a) Dissertation/Thesis from a Commercial Database

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9943436)

b) Dissertation/Thesis from an Institutional Database

Yaylılı-Yıldız, B. (2014). *University campuses as places of potential publicness: Exploring the politicals, social and cultural practices in Ege University* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from Retrieved from: <http://library.iyte.edu.tr/tr/hizli-erisim/iyte-tez-portali>

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Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from <http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/yayinlar/phd/ickapak.html>

d) Dissertation/Thesis abstracted in Dissertations Abstracts International

Appelbaum, L. G. (2005). Three studies of human information processing: Texture amplification, motion representation, and figure-ground segregation. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineering*, 65(10), 5428.

e) Symposium Contribution

Krinsky-McHale, S. J., Zigman, W. B., & Silverman, W. (2012, August). Are neuropsychiatric symptoms markers of prodromal Alzheimer's disease in adults with Down syndrome? In W. B. Zigman (Chair), *Predictors of mild cognitive impairment, dementia, and mortality in adults with Down syndrome*. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

f) Conference Paper Abstract Retrieved Online

Liu, S. (2005, May). *Defending against business crises with the help of intelligent agent based early warning solutions*. Paper presented at the Seventh International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, Miami, FL. Abstract retrieved from http://www.iceis.org/iceis2005/abstracts_2005.htm

g) Conference Paper - In Regularly Published Proceedings and Retrieved Online

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105, 12593–12598. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105>

h) Proceeding in Book Form

Parsons, O. A., Pryzwansky, W. B., Weinstein, D. J., & Wiens, A. N. (1995). Taxonomy for psychology. In J. N. Reich, H. Sands, & A. N. Wiens (Eds.), *Education and training beyond the doctoral degree: Proceedings of the American Psychological Association National Conference on Postdoctoral Education and Training in Psychology* (pp. 45–50). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

i) Paper Presentation

Nguyen, C. A. (2012, August). *Humor and deception in advertising: When laughter may not be the best medicine*. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

Other Sources

a) Newspaper Article

Browne, R. (2010, March 21). This brainless patient is no dummy. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 45.

b) Newspaper Article with no Author

New drug appears to sharply cut risk of death from heart failure. (1993, July 15). *The Washington Post*, p. A12.

c) Web Page/Blog Post

Bordwell, D. (2013, June 18). David Koepp: Making the world movie-sized [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/page/27/>

d) Online Encyclopedia/Dictionary

Ignition. (1989). In *Oxford English online dictionary* (2nd ed.). Retrieved from <http://dictionary.oed.com>

Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.). *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/>

e) Podcast

Dunning, B. (Producer). (2011, January 12). *in Fact: Conspiracy theories* [Video podcast]. Retrieved from <http://itunes.apple.com/>

f) Single Episode in a Television Series

Egan, D. (Writer), & Alexander, J. (Director). (2005). Failure to communicate. [Television series episode]. In D. Shore (Executive producer), *House*; New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

g) Music

Fuchs, G. (2004). Light the menorah. On *Eight nights of Hanukkah* [CD]. Brick, NJ: Kid Kosher.

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