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İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE
EDEBİYATI
ARAŞTIRMALARI
DERNEĞİ

ENGLISH LANGUAGE
AND LITERATURE
RESEARCH
ASSOCIATION OF
TURKEY

IDEAS: Journal of English Literary Studies

April 2023

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This issue is dedicated to
all our friends, colleagues and students
who lost their lives,
their homes,
or loved ones
during the earthquake.

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İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Araştırmaları Derneği
English Language and Literature Research Association of Turkey



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- ✂ aims to supply a highly qualified academic platform for the exchange of diverse critical and original ideas on any aspect of literatures written in English, cultural studies, and literary theory;
- ✂ has consecutive issues of each (annual) volume that are published in April and October every year.

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- ✂ is published by the English Language and Literature Research Association of Turkey (IDEA);
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- ✂ accepts submissions written only in English (only abstracts both in English and in Turkish);
- ✂ accepts submissions from authors who either have their PhD degrees or are at least enrolled in a PhD programme currently;
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Gleick, James. *Chaos: Making a New Science*. Penguin, 1987.

Books with More than One Author

Last Name (of First Author), First Name (of First Author), and Full Name (of Second Author). *Title of Book*. Publisher, Publication Date.

Gillespie, Paula, and Neal Lerner. *The Allyn and Bacon Guide to Peer Tutoring*. Allyn and Bacon, 2000.

✂ Use “et al.” for more than three authors.

Two or More Books by the Same Author

List the works alphabetically. Remember to ignore articles like “a, an, the.”

Palmer, William J. *Dickens and New Historicism*. St. Martin's, 1997.

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Foucault, Michel. *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. Translated by Richard Howard, Vintage-Random House, 1988.

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Duvall, John N. "The (Super)Marketplace of Images: Television as Unmediated Mediation in DeLillo's *White Noise*." *Arizona Quarterly*, vol. 50, no. 3, 1994, pp. 127-53.

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Kincaid, Jamaica. "Girl." *The Vintage Book of Contemporary American Short Stories*, edited by Tobias Wolff, Vintage, 1994, pp. 306-307.

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Quintilian. *Institutio Oratoria*. Translated by H. E. Butler, vol. 2, Loeb-Harvard University Press, 1980.

Quintilian. *Institutio Oratoria*. Translated by H. E. Butler, Loeb-Harvard University Press, 1980. 4 vols.

Dissertations

Bile, Jeffrey. *Ecology, Feminism, and a Revised Critical Rhetoric: Toward a Dialectical Partnership*. 2005. Ohio University, PhD dissertation.



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Editor's Preface

The fifth issue of *IDEAS: Journal of English Literary Studies* has been prepared under great sadness and difficulty. During the refereeing process of this issue, one of the most powerful earthquakes in history hit southeastern Turkey on February 6th, 2023. We had to suspend the preparations for the issue, as none of us had the energy and time to deal with any academic work. Not only because we gave all our efforts to reach out to the earthquake victims as much as we could, like all the other people from all around the world, but also because some of our closest colleagues and dear students lost their lives, loved ones, and homes. It was, unfortunately, not the time for us to concentrate on the journal's fifth issue. We were sadly shattered and devastated.

However, life and academic work had to continue, as it was just another way to hold on. Amid all the enormity in the aftermath of the earthquake, literature and academia enabled each of us on the Editorial Board to return to our students and colleagues towards whom we are responsible. Therefore, we are proud to have the fifth issue despite all odds.

We present five research articles and two book reviews in this issue. The first article entitled “‘The World is too much with us:’ The Character of Literary Studies Today” by Zekiye Antakyalıoğlu deals with the arguments on “post-theory” in the new millennium when literary studies shift “from the deconstructive linchpin of capital-t Theory” towards being more social, political, and “environmentally engaged.” Antakyalıoğlu draws our attention to a change from “the relativist epistemology of poststructuralism to realist ontology” by questioning the “legacy” of theory and form, which is ultimately shattered by the chaotic atmosphere of our age. Antakyalıoğlu discusses practices in literary researches and questions their ethics and aesthetics, contributing powerfully to the debates on “post-theoretical” implications.

Berkem Sağlam's article, “Matriarchal Space and Formation of Identity in *Moll Flanders*,” discusses, through a reading of Daniel Defoe's *Moll Flanders*, how eighteenth-century women established a place for themselves despite all the disadvantages. Sağlam argues that Moll and the “Nurse” who educates her as a child stand out as models of strong women who challenged the male hegemony both externally and internally in the eighteenth century. Sağlam's article discusses how the uses of “space and place” support “Moll's formation of identity” as a powerful and free woman.

“Archival Suspicion and Authorial Desire in *The Dalkey Archive*” by Gülden Hatipoğlu explores “the politics of archive” in Flann O'Brien's *The Dalkey Archive* dwelling on the relation between “archival power and authorial agency” in terms of alternative histories. Hatipoğlu regards the book as an archive and the author as an archivist and

reads the novel within Ireland's post-independence intellectual atmosphere. She argues that O'Brien's humour displays the relationship between the author and archival power.

Serhat Uyurkulak's "Postmodernity and Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal" is a discussion on the quest for authenticity. The article argues that it is possible to observe "an ethical ideal" throughout "the intellectual history of modernity" in this quest. Uyurkulak's study aims to contribute to this idea by referring to certain relevant works from different centuries during the period of modernity. The article mainly questions whether or not conditions of authenticity are still relevant in the period which may be called postmodernity.

Esra Melikoğlu's article titled "Reiteration of Jane Eyre's Search for the Feminine Subject in Atkinson's Crime Fiction" is yet another powerful article on the rewriting of Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* and female gothic narratives by Kate Atkinson. The article focuses on second-wave feminism that asks women to "retrieve half-obliterated feminine subject" in order to construct an identity for themselves. Melikoğlu argues that Atkinson's amateur detective's mission to bring back a vanished sister recalls Jane Eyre's search for a lost woman. The study discusses that today's women, in a similar fashion to the characters in the novels in question, relive "the gothic heroine's dilemma" that makes them susceptible to the romantic love myth, by aborting their feminist mission.

The first one of the two book reviews of this issue is by Murat Öğütcü on *Global Milton and Visual Art* edited by Angelica Duran and Mario Murgia. Öğütcü points out that the edited collection by Duran and Murgia is a textual compilation of transcultural adaptations of poetic works by John Milton. In Öğütcü's views, Duran and Murgia's collection of essays is ground-breaking as it extends Milton's presence out of his texts.

The second book review is by Seda Arıkan on *Posthümanizm: Kavram, Kuram, Bilim-Kurgu* by Başak Ağın. Arıkan translates the title of Ağın's book into English as "Posthumanism: Concept, Theory, Science-Fiction" and considers it an "ambitious work of literary and cultural studies" that aims to provide an overall outlook on posthumanism for Turkish academia. Arıkan points out that the book introduces posthumanism's theoretical framework in Turkish for the first time, establishing itself as the pioneering source for posthumanism in Turkish.

I would especially like to express my heartfelt thanks, among this issue's contributors, to Prof. Dr. Zekiye Antakyalıoğlu, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Seda Arıkan, and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Öğütcü, all of whom live in the earthquake region and have suffered badly during the earthquake. As well as extending my utmost gratitude to the contributors of this issue in a disastrous period in Turkey, I would certainly like to thank my colleagues on the Editorial Board, particularly Assist. Prof. Dr. Reyhan Özer Taniyan and Assist. Prof. Dr. Şafak Horzum, for their tremendous effort and sacrifice in the making of this issue during the harsh and sorrowful days after the earthquake while all of us were involved in several aid campaigns for the victims physically, morally, and financially. I would also like

to thank Assist. Prof. Dr. Kübra Kangüleç Coşkun and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Rahime Çokay Nebioğlu for their hard work in applying to EBSCO and DOAJ for indexing. Hopefully, in the very near future, *IDEAS: Journal of English Literary Studies* will reach a larger readership.

Last but not least, we have, as the Editorial Board, decided to dedicate this issue to all our friends, colleagues, and students who have lost their lives, lost their homes, or loved ones during the earthquake.

Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ali ÇELİKEL
Editor-in-Chief
Marmara University, Türkiye



“The World is too much with us:” The Character of Literary Studies Today

Zekiye ANTAKYALIOĞLU

Gaziantep University, Türkiye

Abstract: Literary studies in the new millennium are described as “post-theoretical,” which implies a paradigm shift from the deconstructive linchpin of capital-t Theory, to a more socially, politically and environmentally engaged, future-oriented, and reparative drive in our discipline. There is a change of attention from the relativist epistemology of poststructuralism to realist ontology in the new fields of study such as posthumanism and new materialism. Post-theory holds two concurrent attitudes toward Theory: acknowledgement and critique. On the one hand, it is indebted to the legacy of Theory and forms discursive practices in relation to it; on the other hand, it is critical of Theory’s anti-essentialism or lack of ethos, and reassesses its foundational axioms with contemporary ontological anxieties and motives. Ours is a chaotic century with manifold problems such as terrorism, war, economic crisis, COVID-19 pandemic, climate changes, oil and water crises, Anthropocene, consumerism, migration, digitalisation, and the question of democracy, etc. This sense of emergency, and its representations in literature, eventually, calls for “character” (essential, mental and moral vision, ethos) and genuine critique (evaluation) from the academics in humanities. This paper aims to offer an outline of the network of practices in literary studies as well as their ethical and aesthetic allegiances with this demand for “character” in mind.

Keywords:

Post-theory,
Ethics,
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Character,
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“Dünya çok fazla bizle”: Günümüz Edebî Çalışmalarının Karakteri

Öz: Yeni milenyumda edebi çalışmalar, kilit ögesi yapısökümcülük olan ve büyük K ile yazılan Kuram’dan bir paradigma kaymasıyla ayrılarak merkezine toplumu, çevreyi ve siyaseti alan, yüzünü iyileştirici/onarıcı bir itki ile geleceğe çeviren “kuram-sonrası” döneme girdi. Günümüz edebi çalışmalarında, özellikle posthümanizm ve yeni materyalizm gibi öne çıkan akımlar, postyapısalcılığın göreceliğe dayalı epistemolojisinden daha gerçekçi bir ontolojiye yönelmekte. “Kuram-sonrası” veya “Post-teori” denilen bu dönem, ‘Kuram’a aynı anda iki farklı tavırla yaklaşıyor: minnet ve eleştiri. Bir yandan kuramdan kalan entelektüel mirasa ve pratiklere çok şey borçlu olduğunu kabullenirken, diğer yandan Kuram’ın özcülük karşıtlığını veya ethos eksikliğini eleştirerek temel aksiyomlarını çağdaş ontolojik kaygılar ve motiflerle yeniden değerlendiriyor. Çağımız, terörizm, savaş, ekonomik kriz, göç, Covid 19 pandemisi, iklim değişikliği, petrol ve su krizleri, Antroposen, tüketimcilik, dijitalleşme ve demokrasi sorunu gibi birçok sorunla boğuşmakta olan kaotik bir çağ. Çağın sorunlarının getirdiği aciliyet duygusu ve bu duygunun edebiyattaki temsilleri, nihayetinde, beşeri bilimlerdeki akademisyenlerden “karakter” (temel, zihinsel ve ahlaki vizyon,

Anahtar Sözcükler:

Kuram-sonrası,
Etik,
Estetik,
Karakter,
Post-postmodernizm,
Edebî çalışmalar

Makale Geçmişi:

Geliş Tarihi:
14 Kasım 2022

ethos) ve gerçek eleştiri (değerlendirme) gibi beklentileri öne çıkarıyor. Bu makale “karakter” talebini odağına alarak günümüz edebi çalışmalarının ve bu çalışmalarda öne çıkan etik, estetik yönelimlerin ana hatlarını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Kabul Tarihi: 16 Ocak 2023

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Introduction

Character, in the positive sense, expresses the presence of virtues such as honesty, reliability, fortitude, empathy, courage, and integrity. So the question of character is, always, also an ethical question. Today, English Studies is dedicated to the recovery of its “character” and “ethos” more than anything else and has become auto-critical in ways it has never been before. This paper seeks to assess the ethical, intellectual, and emotional re-orientations that distinguish English studies today from what it was during the heydays of Theory. It intends to draw a sketch of English studies and track the changes in the mindset and ethical impulses of the academics in the discipline in order to describe our post-theoretical moment.

Why “character” instead of “characteristics”? What is “character”? “Character” is generally defined as the complex mental and ethical traits marking and often individualising a person or a group. Character can be described as the totality of a person’s behavioural and emotional characteristics. When we attribute a person “a strong character,” we generally mean that this person’s set of behaviours, intellectual and emotional capabilities are admirable, or their personality is strong. With “a judge of character,” we refer to someone whose opinions about another’s character are usually right or usually wrong. One can be “a fair judge of character” as well as a “shrewd or impudent” kind. Between the 1920s and the 1960s, literary studies was merely based on historical/archival research and literary critique. Character (of the critic as well as the artist) used to be central to criticism which was primarily a matter of forming judgements about the relative aesthetic merits of literary works—judgements that would then be taken to have some bearing on the rest of life.

For Joseph North, at the beginning of the 20th century, literary criticism was understood as two things: “[T]here were academics who claimed to be scholarly and scientifically objective with a professional knowledge of literature,” this group had to master a specific body or canon of books before proceeding to another; “and there were aesthetes who were committed to aesthetic and impressionistic subjectivities and a taste for aesthetic value,” this group had to master the style and rhetorical strategies of the texts

(21). Aesthetes or belletrists defended appreciation over investigation and value over facts.

This was the background when T. S. Eliot (1888–1965) came up with his famous critique of William Wordsworth (1770–1850) in “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” Central to his argument was “personality” in or as poetic expression:

There is a great deal, in the writing of poetry, which must be conscious and deliberate. In fact, the bad poet is usually unconscious where he ought to be conscious and conscious where he ought to be unconscious. Both errors tend to make him “personal.” Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality. But, of course, only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things. (43)

While judging another’s character, we cannot evade the risk of giving away something from our own. It is a risky business; so risky that it may cause a great poet to dismiss another, by practising exactly the opposite of what he preached. Apart from its daring overtone, what is noteworthy here is that Eliot, who proposed “impersonal voice” as constitutive of ideal poetry, and gave the best examples of it as a poet, did not favour it as a critic. Definitely, he did not conceive criticism as an escape from personality and emotions, or as a disengaged activity. For the last 60 years or so, although we have placed Eliot’s non-fictional writings among the finest examples of critical essays in literary history, we have grown to assume a more impersonal style of criticism which is closer in voice to what Eliot expected from poets. Under the impact of Theory, we even developed a tendency to perceive the critical essay form as unscholarly, subjective and naïve. But, with the turn of the 21st century, a hundred years after Virginia Woolf (1882–1941), we found ourselves once again in the same spot echoing her when we say: “in and about” the 2010s the character of literary studies changed, “the change was not sudden and definite, . . . but a change there was, nevertheless” (4). Today, we no longer perceive our profession as an escape from emotion and personality but a return to them, in order to be conscious where we ought to be really conscious and directly responsive to the changes in life and literature.

“The World is too much with us”—used in the title of this paper—is from Wordsworth’s 1807 sonnet. In this sonnet, Wordsworth, by doing exactly what Eliot objected, uses poetry as a means to call for critical capacity, comprehension, vision, emotion and strong character to express his personal dissatisfaction with the ways we relate to the world and life. An urge we share with Wordsworth today.

Until the 1970s, the critics such as Eliot were perceived as the arbiters of public taste, and they were assumed to set the standards in society. Matthew Arnold, F. R. Leavis, I. A. Richards, and Eliot all had a concept of an “organic, harmonious community with high values” in mind. University’s highest task was to produce knowledge, and art was responsible to maintain an educated public. For North, toward the midst of the 20th century, in the 1970s, literary practices of the belletrists were rejected as necessarily

elitist, as well as the idea of the aesthetic was rejected as idealist, humanist and universalising after the emergence of the social theory, namely the linguistic turn (67). “Theory,” as a heterogeneous assemblage of French-inspired theoretical writings, became the dominant way of reading literary texts in order to understand and theorise the social. From the 1980s to the 2010s, the terms “criticism” and “theory” were absorbed into a single project of historicist/contextualist analysis. Eventually, “Theory became the Newspeak of literary criticism” (Hartman 240) with two major modes of discourse: Postmodernism as its cultural and aesthetic program and poststructuralism as its philosophical, textual and theoretical method.

In the 1980s, Terry Eagleton, as a student of Raymond Williams, recommended the restructuring of departments of literature around the central goal of “education in the various theories and methods of cultural analysis” (North 82). Gradually French Theory became the hegemonic paradigm that set the rules of interpretation and analysis with a reference to a “hermeneutics of suspicion” that was based on the methods of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Postmodern hermeneutics of suspicion referred to a specific form of disengaged contemplation, a symptomatic style of reading that aimed to find out whatever was repressed in the unconscious of texts. Postmodernist, poststructuralist, new historicist, post-Marxist, post-colonialist, and post-feminist schools of thought have been fundamental sources of literary and cultural production, shaped our ways of thinking, and created the deconstructive tradition by radically changing the ways we perceived the concepts such as text, language, sign, gender, race, ethnicity, identity, and society. As Jeffrey T. Nealon remarks, our perspectives were mostly framed by “an insight into the narrow workings of linguistic and textual analysis and not by an insight that helped us to understand the larger fabric of the social, scientific and cultural world” (*Fates of the Performative* xiii). Most of the active academics today were born into this all-encompassing paradigm of Theory and became professionals abiding by the deconstructive, anti-essentialist *modus operandi* of poststructuralism. But in the new millennium, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri observe, “the deconstructive phase of critical thought, which from Heidegger and Adorno to Derrida provided a powerful exit from modernity, has lost its effectiveness” (217).

Parallely, for Nealon, with the turn of the 21st century, “the obsession with showing how binary oppositions in a text cancelled themselves out, is OVER!” (*Post-Postmodernism* 118), and he amusingly warns the younger academics as follows: “The interpretive questions (that painstaking tracing of the chiasmic reversals of presence and absence of meaning in a text) are, at this point, research dead ends in literary study. If you don’t believe it, try deconstructing the hell out of an Emily Dickenson poem and send the results to *PMLA* – and see what happens!” (*Post-Postmodernism* 143). The first decade of the new century has been a period of indeterminacy, the mantras of theory have worn thin over time and theory as the critical parameter of postmodernism found itself in crisis because

of the backlash against everything postmodern. This backlash was prompted by the changes and problems on a global scale and resulted in a resurgence of scholarly interest in theories that are more embedded in the social realities and conditions of life. The new century with its zillion problems—such as terrorism, war, economic crisis, COVID-19 pandemic, climate changes, environmental crises, Anthropocene, consumerism, migration, the question of democracy, and the revival of autocratic, fascist regimes around the world required a serious turn to a more ethically-driven, sociologically informed, politically alert and realistic engagement with the conditions of life. Nealon sees this as a shift from the hermeneutics of suspicion to a “hermeneutics of situation which aims at offering tools for thinking differently about the present, rather than primarily either exposing or undermining the supposed ‘truth’ of this or that cultural position” (*Post-Postmodernism* 88).

A very long period of engagement with theory created in the academy an ontological anxiety which can be diagnosed by the following symptoms and sentiments:

- ❖ The abundance of theory and capitalist forces of publication created out of academics types of touristic readers who jump from one text to another purposelessly;
- ❖ Perceiving historical knowledge as a function of narrative caused a gradual weakening of historical consciousness;
- ❖ Postmodernist “waning of affect” (Jameson 31) narcotised the academy;
- ❖ Ferociously emptied forms of criticism served to promote popular culture, de-aestheticised literature and transformed it into a media commodity (Hartman 240);
- ❖ Theory caused us to spend more time in the B, H and J sections of the library than our own, the good old P section (Nealon, *Post-Postmodernism* 127);
- ❖ What Eliot coined as “dissociation of sensibility” (“Metaphysical Poets” 62), i.e. separation of thinking from feeling, became widespread;
- ❖ Theory without criticism created a pedagogical gap in the classes;
- ❖ Due to “interpretosis” (Deleuze and Guattari 118) or the neurosis of interpretation, we failed to form an ethical and healthy relationship with our reality.

As a result, a demand for “personality and emotions” or “more genuine criticism” and “less disinterested interpretation” turned the scholars to new directions with a feeling that theory has been too much with us!

Today we all agree that the moment of postmodernism has passed. Perhaps, along with it many subdisciplines such as poststructuralism, post-feminism, post-Marxism, and post-colonial studies started to give way to other quests while post-theory,

posthumanism, or post-truth come to the forefront. This common sense directs us toward more inventive, innovative ways of dealing with the “how” (performativity) instead of the “what” (symptomatic reading) regarding the meaning-making processes in the new conditions of life. But, quite ironically, in finding a new term to address what follows postmodernism, we are not that innovative because “Post” is still too much with us!

The facile term “post-postmodernism” demonstrates that the moment of postmodernism might have passed but our infatuation with the prefix “post” has not. Nealon is right in seeing the double prefix “post-post,” as “ugly and infelicitous, difficult both to read and say, as well as nonsensically redundant” (*Post-Postmodernism* ix). Moreover, just as postmodernism was associated with Theory, with capital T, so post-postmodernism today is treated as one of the synonyms for post-theory.

Theory and Post-Theory

Only a quick look at some of the titles of the acclaimed publications since the 2000s may help us to trace the anxieties and re-orientations in literary studies: *Post-Theory: New Directions in Criticism* (Eds. Graeme Macdonald et al., 1999), *Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics, Culture and Literary Theory* (Eds. Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack, 2001), *After Theory* (Terry Eagleton, 2004), *Post-Theory, Culture, Criticism* (Eds. Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter, 2004), *The Future of Theory* (Jean-Michel Rabaté, 2008), *Theory After ‘Theory’* (Eds. Derek Attridge and Jane Elliott, 2011), *Post-Postmodernism: or, The Cultural Logic of Just-in-Time Capitalism* (Jeffrey T. Nealon, 2012), *The Limits of Critique* (Rita Felski, 2015), *The Value of the Novel* (Peter Boxall, 2015), *Literature Against Criticism* (Martin Paul Eve, 2016).

These publications, their focal points or titles may vary but in all of them, the terms “value, ethics and politics” come to the forefront or occupy larger entries in their indexes. Some of these titles imply either a concern about Theory’s end or its transformation into something else while some others indicate a revived interest in concepts such as value, function, critique, appreciation or a return to the long-neglected school of aesthetics.

For example, Peter Boxall, in *The Value of the Novel* (2015), presents the journey of literary value in the history of our discipline and suggests a re-evaluation of the novel, not as something we read, but as something that reads us, that shows us our weaknesses and strengths. In other words, he re-considers the novel as an intellectually, morally and psychologically valuable source that helps us to gain awareness of ourselves and form an understanding of character in a world that is out of joint. He maintains, “Under the contemporary conditions, in which we are all summoned into new forms of community . . . it is the novel we need, more than ever, to help us to understand such communities and to live with them . . . and to frame the utopian potential of the world to come” (144).

Apparently, a disinterested or apathetic mode of Theory, (i.e. theory without personality and emotions) is no longer viable for the analysis of the pressing historical considerations. In their introduction to *Theory after ‘Theory’*, Jane Elliott and Derek

Attridge, remark that “whether the news is met with celebration or lamentation, there seems to be little disagreement that the era of theory’s dominance has passed – whatever ‘theory’ might mean or have meant” (1). According to them, the questions either about Theory’s demise, or loss of hegemony “created conversations akin to an ongoing wake, in which participants debate the merits of the deceased and consider the possibilities for a resurrection desired by some and feared by others” (1). For them, “theory continued to diversify, drawing on the work of a range of new figures and examining a host of new archives and arenas, but its new incarnations offered at most a kind of afterlife of the once vital object that was ‘Theory’, a diluted form lacking in both intellectual substance and institutional prominence” (1). In short, Elliot and Attridge believe that “theory continues to thrive, and increasingly adopts positions that challenge some of the fundamental intellectual stances that once defined Theory . . . and theories today are not only subsequent to but also distinct from the body of work known as Theory” (2).

This transformation of Theory is enunciated by the term “post-theory.” In their introduction to *Post-Theory, Culture and Criticism*, Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter suggested two ways of pronouncing post-theory: either as *post-theory* or as *post-theory* (9). For Callus and Herbrechter, ‘*post-theory*’ implies the critical assessments of theory, now posthumously, and how to continue practising theory after high theory, whereas ‘*Post-theory*’ refers to the critical upgrades in the theoretical endeavours and the pragmatic renewal of theoretical practices. The former involves nostalgia, devotion and acknowledgement, whereas the latter celebrates a break, a distancing, and invites a search for alternatives (9).

Another question perhaps is about whether we should pronounce “post-theory” in the singular, or as “post-theories” in the plural. Because, unlike Theory which is now perceived as a singularity, a canonized plane of consistency, a constellation formed by the stars of Theory, post-theories as its offsprings are disarrayed, liquid, multiplying and not likely to form a canon or a constellation anytime soon. Perhaps it is due to their interstellar orientation. In any case, post-theories succeed Theory but cannot liberate themselves from it. They either defer or reterritorialize it to negotiate its aporias that are perceived today in the form of *différance*. The dash between post and theory illustrates this dual sense of continuity and discontinuity.

Claire Colebrook considers “the current terrain of theory as a reaction formation. In response to a world in which ‘the political’ is increasingly divorced from meaningful practice (whatever that would be) theory has insisted in ever more shrill tone on the grounding of *theoria* in meaningful, practical, productive and human organic life.” (67)

For Peter Osborne, “The intellectual present is posited as ‘the after’ of some purportedly concluded period, open to a yet-to-be-determined future: the logic of the ‘post’ in its more positive, forward-looking guise as *the logic of the new*” (26). Osborne evaluates “post-theory” as theory’s becoming anti-theoretical insofar as “theory had previously been associated within philosophy, with metaphysics more generally” (21).

Ernesto Laclau summarizes these various perspectives by asserting that “although we have entered a post-theoretical universe, we are definitely not in an a-theoretical one” (1). If we use, following Laclau, “universe” as a metaphor to illustrate the galaxy of our theoretical system: We may take philosophies as stars forming their gravitational fields, where the planets circulate and remain in the orbit like the ones in our solar system. Grand Theory stands for the planets spinning around stars of philosophy; they take shape according to their relation to stars. And then, the planets of Theory form their own orbits, moons and satellites. The satellites of Theory can be taken as post-theories, which in turn sprout other thematic sub-fields that appear like asteroids or meteorites trafficking around diverse planetary systems, travelling from here to there, crossing various planets and satellites, sometimes fusing with them, sometimes simply disappearing without a trace.

Or perhaps Theory has not passed, only the legendary figures, “the heavenly bodies” who produced it are dead, and the current crisis is due to not knowing who will be next on the throne after Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, or Jacques Lacan.

Vincent B. Leitch [the renowned editor of *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism* (2001)] disagrees with those who believe that theory no longer holds the same significance or gravitational force it once did. In *Literary Criticism in the 21st Century: Theory Renaissance* (2014), he insists that Theory is still alive, strong and intact, and the moment of postmodernism has not passed. Leitch considers ours as an age of “Theory Renaissance,” as a period of vigorous theoretical and intellectual activity, and sees the newly sprouting sub-branches of literary studies and its varieties as a bliss that indicate the dynamism and vitality of our field. He offers a map of current theories that contain ninety-four subdisciplines and fields circling around twelve major topics (reminiscent of planets and satellites) which change spheres and fuse into original combinations. They are disarranged, disintegrated, fragmented and therefore, for Leitch, still postmodern in form. Theory of the 20th century and its mainly fifteen schools of thought remain still important today as sources not only for practical literary criticism but also for teaching theory. Leitch thinks that Theory is far from dead, rather, as an indispensable strength, it continues to prompt and underwrite productive research, generating publications across an expanded spectrum of topics and fields. He uses the term “renaissance” not to accentuate re-birth but to refer to the abundance of intellectual activity (vi–vii). Nealon’s quick search supports Leitch’s view and shows that we are still in the orbit of Theory in our post-theoretical endeavours, and circling around the big names associated with theory: “In 2010, the Arts and Humanities Citation Index turns up 1498 hits for Michel Foucault, 1310 for Jacques Derrida, 699 for Gilles Deleuze and 455 for Jacques Lacan” (*Post-Postmodernism* 114).

Whether or not as a theory renaissance, our sense of being both “after Theory” and “in the theory of the post” requires an assessment of what is new in post-theories. If we

take post-theories, with reference to Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as new “lines of flight,” we might notice that they share similar allergies and anxieties in their critique of Theory. While adopting post-deconstructive strategies in method, they remain quite deconstructive of theory for its lack of *ethos*.

Post-theoretical studies all agree that the analysis of material life escaped Theory. And Jean-Michel Rabaté affirms this: “The problem with Theory,” he says, “seems to be that it is always accused of having missed something. Theory is missing out on ‘life,’ real life that is, as in the expression ‘Get a life!’ about ‘real’ sexuality, ‘real’ politics, and so on. Prophetically Rimbaud had written, ‘True life is elsewhere’” (3).

A comparative list may be helpful at this point to locate this “elsewhere” of post-theories. The following list is an excerpt from the appendix of *Post-Theories in Literary and Cultural Studies* (2022):

Theory	Post-Theory
Critique of philosophy	Critique of theory
Stars	Satellites
French	Global
Eminent	Subsidiary
Productive	Re-productive
Radical	Reactive
Philosophical	Political
Schizophrenic	Hysteric
Apathy	Empathy
Cold War	War against/as terrorism
Astute	Audacious
Genesis	Legacy
Cultural	Natural/Environmental
Amoral	Moral
Textuality	Actuality
Anti-humanist	Posthumanist
Linguistics	Ethics
Nietzschean	Spinozist
Sceptical	Responsible
École	Hub
Seminar	Workshop
Individual	Network (Antakyahoğlu 262)

If Theory was a critique of Western philosophy and was produced by scholars most of whom are acknowledged today as eminent and revolutionary figures, post-theories are critiques of theory, and the producers of post-theories play a subsidiary, reactive role since they are not—at least yet—stars but academics who are lesser in degree and capacity than philosophers and remain indebted to their legacies. Thereby, post-theories

imply a falling-off-from theory, by being re-productive, prompt and impatient in revising Theory for pragmatic and mostly political reasons. If theory was schizophrenic in the sense of being extremely apathetic, post-theories are hysteric in the sense of being empathic and overemotional. Theory was a cold war endeavour but post-theories take shape during the time of war as or against terrorism.

High theory's target of analysis was culture, its critical keys were linguistics and textuality, in post-theories we see a responsible and ethical return to actuality, nature and environment. Theory's domes were *écoles* (as in *École Normale Supérieure*), also each star of theory individually formed his own *école*, gave famous and groundbreaking seminars to their devoted disciples. Post-theories are collaborative endeavours conducted in various hubs, developed in workshops by academics that form various digital networks.

From the listed aspects of post-theories, we can deduce three major lines of flight, three prominent currents that emerged as vibrant fields in literary studies today: Moral value-oriented studies, Aesthetic value-oriented studies and Eco-political value-oriented studies. These three currents are all value-oriented for different reasons, and each value orientation generates new sprouts, new sub-fields that vary in their thematic interests, target concepts or methods.

1. Moral value-oriented studies

Moral value-oriented studies hold diverse perspectives in re-assessing literature's cognitive and psychological functions by turning to certain scholars or philosophers whose views were neglected during the heydays of Theory.

The works of Emmanuel Levinas, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Rorty, Jürgen Habermas, and Lionel Trilling are revisited by some groups of academics to form a contemporary understanding of the social, affective, and moral functions of literature. Some others remain in the orbit of Derrida—not the deconstructive Derrida—but the Levinasian Derrida who wrote intensively on hospitality, empathy, friendship, death, mourning, sincerity, solidarity and sympathy. Or, return to Foucault—not the Foucault of power-knowledge problematic—but the Foucault of the aesthetics of existence, ethics of pleasure. Some focus on Deleuze's essays on the critical and clinical function of art, or his works with Guattari on literature and philosophy as significant sources to bridge the gap between social life and literature, or life and theory. Some revisit Lacan and Freud with posthumanist definitions of subjectivity, identity and alterity. They aim to revive ways of attending literary works as moral embodiments of social values, no longer following Roland Barthes, but offering new ethical inquiries that tend to favour recuperation of authorial agency in the production of texts as socially constructed narratives. They benefit also from contemporary scholars or sociologists such as Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, Zygmunt Bauman, Bruno Latour, Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Rancière and Jean-Luc Nancy to enhance their ethical and aesthetic inquiries.

Scholars such as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Amanda Anderson, Marjorie Garber, Ivan Callus, Peter Boxall, Rita Felski, Toril Moi, John Frow, believing that literary studies has lost the art of discussing characters and concepts in illuminating ways, offer new perspectives on attending literary works for psychological relief, aesthetic satisfaction, cognitive development, identification. They suggest new ways of reading against the grain, treating literary works as potential sources of insight, imagination and ethical improvement. Sharon Marcus proposes that we should be “just readers” using the term “just” in its double sense to be both “mere readers” as opposed to overconfident theorizers and also “ethical readers” seeking to do better justice to the works we encounter instead of examining them just as a self-referential web of signs. With Stephen Best, she offers “surface reading” as a new method which “is an invitation to attentive reading, enjoying what the text invokes without any political or theoretical agenda that determines in advance how we interpret texts” (Best and Marcus 11–13). Similarly, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick offers a model of “reparative reading” instead of “paranoid reading” to highlight the healing functions of art for humanity (123). The New Sincerity (Adam Kelly) and metamodernism (Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker) are other undercurrents that aim to set aside postmodern irony in an age that demands sincere engagements with social and psychological conditions. And Boxall, in *The Prosthetic Imagination: A History of the Novel as Artificial Life* (2020), reimagines the novel from the axis of “prosthetic imagination” instead of the traditional mimetic axis to interpret the new relations our bodies enter in the artificial and digital environments.

Under the rubric of Moral value-oriented studies, we can place the sub-fields such as trauma studies (Cathy Caruth, Roger Luckhurst), gender studies, performativity studies (following Judith Butler, Karen Barad, Jeffrey T. Nealon and Bruno Latour to re-assess the socio-psychological functions of art), hybridity studies, migration studies, testimonial studies, vulnerability/precariat studies, poverty studies, violence studies, affect studies, hauntology, and ecocriticism. This field of study is post-theoretical in method but pre-postmodernist in its attitude toward work, author, authenticity, content, psychology, nature, morality, dignity etc. Its aim is to revive criticism’s ethos, its reason of being, with truly human concerns.

2. Aesthetic value-oriented studies

Aesthetic value-oriented studies implies a return to formalism and is particularly concerned about the negligence of literary criticism that Theory caused for the last sixty years. It holds an intention to compensate the suspicion of the category of aesthetics during the 1970s and the 1990s, amounting at times to hostility, by a more positive re-engagement with aesthetic questions under the banners such as “new formalism,” “new aesthetics,” “neomodernism” to reappraise the strategies and scopes of formalist critique in the present. Scholars like Geoffrey Hartman, Catherine Belsey, Christopher Castiglia, Nikolas Kompridis, Amanda Anderson, Marjorie Perloff, Marjorie Levinson, Rita Felski, and Elizabeth Anker express a plenitude of ideological, cultural interpretations and a

hunger for genuine, attentive, evaluative criticism in literary studies and call for the rehabilitation of the concept of art as technique. Felski and Anker, in *Critique and Post-critique* (2017) invite literary scholars to recuperate the deliberately ignored strategies of former critics such as I. A. Richards, F. R. Leavis, Northrop Frye and Wayne C. Booth as well as the philosophers such as Richard Rorty. They call for a return to compositional, insightful and meditative writing, perhaps, the sincere essay form of Arnold, Samuel Taylor Coleridge or Eliot. For Anker and Felski, “the growing scepticism about the value of the critique calls for another regime of interpretation: one that is willing to recognize the potential of literature and art to create new imaginaries rather than just to denounce mystifying illusions,” and they invite us to an “attentiveness that does not reduce texts to instrumental means to an end” (14). This metacritical value re-orientation attempts to figure out what exactly we are doing when we engage in “critique” and what else we might do instead. They put the emphasis on form and express a plea for returning to scholarly standards in literary critique which resist the established modes of political analysis.

3. Eco-political value-oriented studies

Eco-political value-oriented studies is ideological, revolutionary, operational and activist in spirit, unlike the first two value orientations that focus on the ethical and aesthetic merits of literary works. In order to combine theory with practice they adhere to a performative methodology that focuses on the function of things rather than their meaning. The scholars in this branch particularly focus on the pervasive character of exploitation, perversions of commodification, and the destructive aspects of advanced capitalism. They are critical of the current biopolitical global order and stand against neo-liberal, anthropocentric politics that caused the Anthropocene. They aim to achieve a Spinozist ethics of happiness and open the possibility of a new politics that is beyond the constituted traditions. We can take “posthumanism” as its banner which, as a concept (or ideology) chooses to treat classical humanism and humanist *ethos* pejoratively, but also remains sceptical of the anti-humanist core of poststructuralism for its indifference to *ethos* and *polity*. It aims to replace “human” with an upgraded, de-centred version of “posthuman” as the better alternative for the formation of an “eco-philosophy of multiple belongings” (Braidotti 49). This new materialist or matter-realist school of thought calls for a return to matter, to nature as *zoe*, as life common to all beings. It draws extensively on Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of rhizome, immanence, relationality and functionality in defining human and non-human life and offers a *zoe*-egalitarian ethico-politics as an alternative political model. This new orientation in literary and social studies also interacts with the anti-correlationist, post-Kantian, Object Oriented Ontology initiated by Graham Harman and Quentin Meillassoux et al.; apart from this, it contains areas of study that range from Latour’s socio-ontological “actor-network theory,” to the multidisciplinary variations of posthumanism as developed by Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, Rosi Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz, Jane Bennett, Vicki Kirby, and Cary Wolfe. As a post-theoretical endeavour, it aims to create a new ethics of sustainability that requires an urgent shift from the humanist ideology to the posthumanist alternatives to ensure a

better futurity. For this, it calls for action and decision without which there would be no ethics or politics.

Moral, aesthetic, and eco-political value-oriented studies as post-theoretical endeavours “sustain sincere concerns for fundamental issues and vigorously pursue wholly practical questions relating to political change, living conditions, institutional practices” (Attridge and Elliott 14). They all want to meaningfully diagnose and cure the illnesses of the day.

The moral and aesthetic value-oriented studies are likely to merge into one current and will inevitably undergo a reorientation in line with posthumanist parameters. Posthumanism, on the other hand, should, at some point, reassess its reason of being if it really aims at changing the world. In their introduction to *Posthuman Glossary*, Rosi Braidotti and Maria Hlavajova propose that “new notions and terms are needed to address the constituencies and configurations of the present and to map future directions” (1). The glossary includes 160 entries of neologisms that are attributed to posthumanism. No doubt, today the glossary will have to be re-edited because the production of neologisms is epidemic in the academy. However, considering the posthumanist urge for a much more direct involvement in urgent social and ecological matters of concerns, it requires a more solution-oriented attitude and simpler language to build real channels of communication. One wonders what Vladimir Putin, Joe Biden or Xi Jinping will understand from the terms “chthulucene,” “intra-agential combust identity,” “necropolitics,” “altergorithm” if they ever decide to listen to posthumanist activists, especially when what they need to hear is solutions rather than new words, words and words...

Contemporaneity: The World is too much with us

All three new currents point out that the character of our studies today is gaining strength, which is good. But this strength can easily turn into a weakness if their aims are not internalized with truly scholarly interests. Today our decisive pivot is the critique of the present. But the present is too much with us! And, dwelling on the present, for the sake of relationality, creates the risk of being absorbed by it. It might deprive us of maintaining a secure distance from the rapidity of life, and create the fallacy of perceiving everything as political. Today, everything can easily turn into a matter of politics: emotion becomes politics of affect, art becomes politics of aesthetics, form politics of style, self politics of identity, life biopolitics or zoe-politics. Engendering newer, coherent and determinant values for a better future, requires a less populist and more visionary, reflectional, meditative, self-reflective standpoint which is resistant to temporariness in today's critical endeavours. Otherwise, a direct relation with contingent realities in the present might create a lack of persistency. The leading figures of Theory in the previous century did not produce concepts for immediate gratification or intellectual recognition, let alone the concern for being cited. Unlike them, we live in a digitalised world experiencing every possible effect of immediacy, time-space compression and need to beware of it.

Jean-Michel Rabaté in *The Future of Theory* shares Camille Paglia's following critique of the academy in the 1990s as still a relevant warning:

A scholar's real audience is not yet born. A scholar must build for the future, not the present. The profession is addicted to the present, to contemporary figures, contemporary terminology, contemporary concerns. Authentic theory would mean mastery of the complete history of philosophy and aesthetics. What is absurdly called theory today is just a mask for fashion and greed. (222)

For the sake of compensating Theory's negligence of real, daily life, academic practices coincide too well with present sensibilities, current problems and adjust very quickly to the changing demands of the day, which is both good and bad. It creates the danger of degrading research to newspaper journalism especially when we think of the inflation of academic publications today. It has become way too easy to be published, cited, read, and gain popularity in diverse networks. At this point, Agamben's definition of "contemporary" should be remembered as a note of caution:

Those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands. They are thus in this sense irrelevant. But precisely because of this condition, precisely through this disconnection and this anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping their own time. (40)

For Agamben, "The ones who can call themselves contemporary are only those who do not allow themselves to be blinded by the lights of the century, and so manage to get a glimpse of the shadows in those lights, of their intimate obscurity" (45).

Theories offer an abundance of ways to interpret and publish academic writing without a genuine scholarly interest, which in turn creates a commodification of literature and theory. Therefore, what Leitch sees as "a theory renaissance" might as well be perceived as a chaos of eclectic theories which build a heap of disorganized, disarrayed studies. For Martin McQuillan et al., "The obsession with research dictated by the system much of which is pointlessly conducted for the gain of a research rating and/or promotion accelerates this process of banalization" (xi). The university may be too much with us!

Therefore, it is also possible to see some of the post-theoretical fields as "the by-products that emerged after a long process of Theory's commodification and reification" (Osborne 22). Theory can be a great camouflage to hide mediocrity and enable academics to publish numerous articles or books without having to make any single clear statement. Thereby, for Leitch, genuine criticism is getting rarefied because "we are drowning in published scholarship and its main consequences, namely, fast reading, quick writing and superficial coverage" (25).

To maintain a strong character, literary studies must remember its reason of being as a discipline. We should know our function well and make other disciplines see ours as we do. Only then, perhaps, we can make peace with diversification and not look at it as

chaos. The flexibility of our discipline, our openness to multidisciplinary research can be a strength insofar as we create the awareness that humanities or post-humanities matter. Nealon is right in reminding us that “science without humanities is without the imaginative, creative and critical thought. Humanities teach to think, to transcend, to approach and to imagine” (*Post-Postmodernism* 190).

Conclusion

With these pros and cons in mind, we may say that literary studies today is Janus-faced: one side inspires optimism, idealism, and a sincere commitment to meaningful scholarly efforts for a better future; while the other parasitically feeds on the trophies of neoliberal capitalism. One side opts for setting ethical standards, the other, in a lamentably degenerate fashion, benefits from the lack of professional idealism, commodifies scholarship in pursuit of promotion or popularity in the corporatized education and speeds up the publication system. One side fights against capitalism in every possible way, the other surrenders to its Faustian bargains.

Literary studies today, perhaps like any other discipline, has a split character: If the dark side wins, if we can’t develop intellectually rigorous and institutionally coherent ways of putting our studies to practical use, if we remain out of tune, the efforts for ethical, aesthetic, eco-political turns will be nothing but futile and ostentatious displays of academic discourse.

This brings us to Wordsworth’s sonnet “The World is too much with us.” The sonnet could be read as a lament for humanity’s failure to enjoy and appreciate nature, or as a critique of capitalism. Contrary to what Eliot expects from poets, he offers, in the form of a poem, a splendid, lyrical expression and depiction of character—whether human or posthuman—as the key to a better future.

The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending we lay waste our powers;
Little we see in Nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon! (lines 1–4)

Wordsworth wrote this sonnet two hundred years ago, but as a true contemporary, in Agamben’s sense of the term, as a comprehensive soul beyond his time, he predicts our current concerns and elegantly intimates how not to be forlorn. Today we can read it as a potential source of insight, or as an expression that echoes the inner voice of literary studies which tries to recover its character and restore its ties with life in the post-theoretical moment.

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Matriarchal Space and Formation of Identity in *Moll Flanders*

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Abstract: Despite the apparent disadvantages of women in the eighteenth century, Moll in Daniel Defoe's *Moll Flanders* encounters and learns from many women who have established a place for themselves. Although she never legitimately owns a home of her own until the end of the novel, Moll's adventures feature her movement from establishment to establishment where a matriarch governs—"Nurse," who schools her as a child, the gentlewoman she works for, her landlady in Bath, "Mother Midnight" throughout her years of thievery, and indeed her own mother in America. Each of these arguably strong women inhabits what Gillian Rose in *Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge* has termed a paradoxical space, "a space imagined in order to articulate a troubled relation to the hegemonic discourses of masculinism" (159). Despite the indisputable dominance of men in both the external and internal sphere at this time, the women in this text seem to enjoy spaces in which they can establish their own authority, although these may not be as easily identifiable as the well-established patriarchal norms. This paper aims to discuss the public and private spaces governed by women in *Moll Flanders* and to analyse how this use of space and place contributes to Moll's formation of identity as a strong and liberated woman.

Keywords:

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Moll Flanders Romanında Anaerkil Alanlar ve Moll'un Kimlik Kazanımında Etkileri

Öz: On sekizinci yüzyıl İngiltere'sindeki kadınların inkar edilemez dezavantajlarına rağmen, Daniel Defoe'nun *Moll Flanders* romanındaki Moll karakteri, roman boyunca kendilerine yer edinmiş olan kadınlar sayesinde kimlik oluşumunu tamamlar. Geleneksel olmayan evlerde yaşamını sürdüren Moll, maceraları süresince karşılaştığı kadın karakterlerin sahip olduğu ve hüküm sürdüğü evlerde bulunur. Bunların bazıları; çocukken ona bakan ve eğiten Hemşire karakteri, evinde çalıştığı soylu hanımefendi, Bath'daki ev sahibesi, hırsızlık döneminde ona yol gösteren 'Geceyarısı Annesi' karakteri, ve hatta Amerika'daki kendi annesidir. Romandaki bu güçlü kadın karakterler, Gillian Rose'un *Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge* kitabında tartıştığı "erkeklerin hegemonik söylemleriyle sorunlu bir ilişkiyi dile getirmek için düşünülmüş bir alan" (159) olan paradoksal alanlara sahiptirler. Bu dönemdeki kadınların yadsınamayacak ölçüde ne evin içinde ne de evin dışında herhangi bir toplumsal güce sahip olmamalarına rağmen Moll Flanders'ın karşılaştığı bu kadınlar, kendi güçlü alanlarını yaratmışlardır. Bu yazının amacı, *Moll Flanders* romanındaki kadınların sahip oldukları umumi ve özel alanların Moll karakterinin kimlik arayışındaki olumlu etkilerini tartışmaktır.

Anahtar Sözcükler:

Daniel Defoe,
On sekizinci yüzyıl
romanı,
Alan çalışmaları,
Kadın alanı,
Kadın kimliği

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Thought of as one of the first examples of eighteenth-century fiction and helping to establish the novel as a legitimate literary genre, Daniel Defoe's (c. 1660–1731) *Moll Flanders* (1722) attempts to tell the "authentic" story of Moll, a notorious thief. The protagonist as a first-person narrator helps the reader to understand the motivations behind her actions, some of which are quite scandalous. Moll meets many men and women throughout the journey of the life that she is remembering, and, although she sometimes omits her personal feelings towards them, it is clear that it is the women rather than the men that have more of an impact on her life. Moll's relationships with the many men in her life obfuscate the equally formative (if not dominant) relationships she has with the women she is exposed to or seeks out during her adventures. Despite the pronounced disadvantageous situation of women in eighteenth-century society, Moll encounters and learns from many women who have established a place for themselves despite the apparent hardships in doing so. Never legitimately or fully owning a home of her own until the end of the novel, Moll's adventures feature her movement from establishment to establishment where a matriarch governs. For instance, there is "Nurse," who schools her as a child, the gentlewoman she works for, her landlady in Bath, the governess who guides her movements roughly from the middle of the novel on, and even her own mother in America. Each of these women is responsible for their own household (or establishment) and is a powerful role model for the protagonist.

These arguably strong women inhabit what Gillian Rose in *Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge* has termed a paradoxical space, "a space imagined in order to articulate a troubled relation to the hegemonic discourses of masculinism" (159). Although the time that the novel is set in is known to be a dominantly patriarchal one, the lack of male presence other than possible sexual partnerships is clearly felt. Moll's narrative of her life strays outside stereotypical dichotomies of public and private spaces. Instead, spaces presented are not only the domestic parlour and kitchen but where women are the ones who govern the entire household. These households can be seen as paradoxical spaces as they are often on the fringes of acceptable society, or masquerading as such. This paper aims, then, to discuss the public and private spaces governed by women in *Moll Flanders* and to analyse how this use of

space and place¹ contributes to Moll's formation of identity as a strong and liberated woman.

An early conflict in the novel comes about as a result of a misunderstanding of what a gentlewoman is. Moll's desire is to become a gentlewoman; she envisions a job with which she can live an independent life by providing for herself without depending on others. The irony of the situation prompts the ladies to laugh at her because the woman she shows as an example for this is a prostitute. Yet Moll is not interested in nobility or class (or lack of it); it is the independence that charms her, regardless of the job itself. It is surprising that the many women she meets in the novel are indeed "gentlewomen" in Moll's understanding of the word: they are able to appropriate spaces in which they are able to make a living. As Sirividhya Swaminathan also suggests, these women characters in the novel have "been ignored largely because twentieth-century critics privilege interiority and psychology, and discount stock or 'flat' characters" (185). Critical focus regarding *Moll Flanders* since its publication has partly concentrated on the quantity and quality of Moll's relationships with men, and mostly on Moll's individualism as a representative of eighteenth-century ideology. However, these women seemingly on the sidelines, I argue, have a formative influence on Moll both in their capacity to give advice and set an example. Reading the novel with an interest in the "variety" promised by the lengthy subtitle and its effect on the readers of the time, Kate Loveman highlights that

In *Moll Flanders*, what the preface terms 'the infinite variety of this Book' comes about because Moll occupies multiple roles—servant, fake aristocrat, tradesman's wife, bankrupt, gentlewoman, prostitute, thief, colonist, condemned prisoner, transportee, and planter—and because she visits assorted locations including Colchester, London, Lancashire, Suffolk, and Virginia. (7)

Much of Moll's drifting from one place to another is opportunistic rather than carefully planned, and she simply moves from place to place based on what she can materially accomplish. However, each of these roles and places is defined through the women who own/operate them, and they are the stable or static means through which Moll navigates her own unpredictable existence.

By all accounts, the eighteenth century was not only a time in which gender roles, particularly in relation to habitation and place, were being re-defined, but also when these were yet not as rigid as they would become by the next century. Soile Ylivuori, for example, refers to how the eighteenth century "witnessed a massive but gradual paradigm

¹ The concepts of place and space have been discussed by geographers, philosophers, environmental psychologists and sociologists extensively. The concern here is not a geographical study. Although both terms are used in relation to Moll's movements, the aim here is not to theorise them, but to emphasize the role of the women inhabiting them. Place, in this essay, refers to a physical entity that has some sort of organisational basis related to ownership—a house, school, shop, and so on, and has meaning for an individual, while space has more to do with open areas, cities, streets, and the environment. For further exploration of these concepts, see Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*, and Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space: The Classic Look at How We Experience Intimate Places*.

change in conceptualisations of gender and body, manifesting both ideas of the old and the new” (43). She adds that there was an increase in public opportunities accorded to women despite “a deterioration of women’s social position and opportunities, as well as narrowing of acceptable feminine identity positions” (45). The women the reader witnesses as being formative in the formation of Moll’s identity enjoy that space within the changing social norms of this era. The novel presents a society in flux (accentuated by Moll’s constant movement), and the struggle of individuals trying to attain a viable social position amidst a rapidly changing social structure. The dramatic shift towards materialism and capitalism, which would gain full momentum in the following decades is keenly felt. Irene Cieraad explains how “[t]he exclusion of women from the domain of production started within the class of better-off merchants in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and gave rise to a spatial segregation of the secluded female home place in opposition to the public male work place” (1–2). In *Moll Flanders*, though, it can be seen that this is yet a process. Most of the establishments and public places that Moll utilises are in fact run by women and not men—the Nurse that runs the orphanage, the Bath landlady who seems to run a motel which, however, becomes little more than a brothel, and Mother Midnight whose business ranges from a maternity/abortion clinic to an institute for the teaching of crime. These spaces, as well as the homes of the Lady and Moll’s mother, have a tenuous position in the social structure, and it is difficult to situate them firmly within public/private or even legal/illegal dichotomies.

The places occupied by these supporting women can be seen as paradoxical spaces, which are further defined by Rose as places “in which someone is liminally positioned within a clash of two or more cultures or belief systems,” as well as “spaces that would be mutually exclusive if charted on a two-dimensional map – inside and outside – are occupied simultaneously” (140). The spaces presented in the novel that Moll frequently inhabits can be seen as both inside and outside of a dominant system, as well as liminal, or at a threshold. The idea of becoming a gentlewoman, for example, can be read in this way, as Moll both does and does not become one. She does become her own definition of a gentlewoman in the sense that she works to make money, which makes her independent as opposed to going into service,² which would make her dependent on her employers. Throughout the novel, it is possible to observe her efforts to gain entry into desirable places, and an equal effort to stay away from the less desirable. She is of course trapped by her class as well as her gender, and it is possible to discern many instances when she does not have legal options. Any unparadoxical physical space she inhabits is not given much narrative space; the financially secure instances, few and far between, in the novel, are written off quickly and not dwelt on as constructive in the formation of her identity.

² It is suggested throughout the novel that there are only two options open to unmarried women of the lower classes. They could either go into service, i.e., become a servant for an upper class family, or, to leave respectable society and become a thief or prostitute. Moll navigates her way in and out of both these options, but mostly remains on the margins of both.

Shirley Ardener claims in “Ground Rules and Social Maps for Women,” that in some “real’ or ‘social’ spaces femaleness may be the dominant determinant, but in others . . . gender may be irrelevant, or insignificant” (4). The sections of the novel situating Moll into Nurse’s, the Lady’s, her mother’s, the Bath landlady’s and the governess’ diverse establishments constitute these matriarchal spaces, which are paradoxically functional in the otherwise male-dominated society of the 18th century. Moll describes the Nurse, the first woman with whom she stays as “a woman who was indeed Poor, but had been in better circumstances, and who got a little livelihood by taking such as I was suppos’d to be; and keeping them with all Necessaries, till they were at a certain Age, in which it might be suppos’d they might go to service, or get their own Bread” (3). By all accounts a perfectly effective school and sanctuary for orphans, this is a space in which the young Moll feels secure, even if her future is not. The paradoxical quality of this seemingly functional institution is that the proprietor is a woman in spite of the patriarchal system outside of it. The only proprietor of the premises is mentioned to be this Nurse, and upon her death, her daughter comes to claim what is left, suggesting that property can be passed down, at least in this instance, matrilineally. The nurse is someone who has lost her social privilege but not her skills, and teaches Moll the values of ambition and hard work. The “good, kind woman” (3) as described by Moll is sorely missed, and she departs bestowing all necessary skills that might become handy to Moll³.

While staying at Nurse’s establishment (roughly between the ages of three to fourteen), Moll is protected not only by this woman’s goodwill but also that of other women. Rather than enjoying any sort of conservation from the social system, it is this group of women, primarily the mayor’s wife and daughters, who support Moll’s desire to become independent. While the magistrates declare that she should go into service when she is eight years old, it is these women who save her until the Nurse’s demise. The whole incident of the Nurse telling the mayor of Moll’s misunderstanding of the term “gentlewoman” and the ladies’ visit to her is told in a humorous tone, underlining Moll’s childish naiveté (to be contrasted with the world-weary Moll later on), but it does reveal the concern of the women around her. Besides her patronage, Mrs. Mayoress also encourages the development of Moll’s work ethic, as Moll relates early on: “Mrs. Mayoress . . . giving me my Work again, she put her Hand in her Pocket, gave me a Shilling, and bid me mind my Work, and learn to Work well, and I might be a Gentlewoman for ought she knew” (5). Moll’s repetition of how this assistance is related to her growth in the following pages shows that this is not only a donation of money to ease the conscience. Additionally, her relation underlines that it is not only Mrs. Mayoress and her daughters that take it upon themselves to help her:

the kindness of the ladies of the Town did not End here, for when they came to understand that I was no more maintain’d by the publick Allowance, as

³ Moll also claims to remember a time before she was three, living with nomadic gypsies, who carried her around with them (2). This episode clearly accounts for her general restlessness and inability to stay in a place for very long, as well as her longing for a life of freedom and mobility.

before, they gave me Money oftner than formerly . . . they brought me Work to do for them; such as Linnen to Make, and Laces to Mend, and Heads to Dress up, and not only paid me for doing them, but even taught me how to do them; so that now I was a Gentlewoman indeed. . . . I not only found myself Cloaths, and paid my Nurse for my keeping, but got Money in my Pocket too before-hand. (7)

It should be noted here that “the publick Allowance,” the payment given by the state for orphans such as Moll, does not prove to be helpful at all, thus the social “system” does not aid her. Instead, it is this unnamed group of women who help Moll finance herself, as well as teach her the skills that enable her to do so. The women that undertake the necessary aid are not members of a specific place or organization, but, signalling what is to come, deliver their help from a space on the margins since they are not legally sanctioned to do so. They neither take full responsibility for Moll by completely removing her from her situation nor do they use their own status to provide Moll or others like her with more. They stay in a paradoxical space by appropriating the task of the state without having any legal obligations to do so and provide Moll with what they can get away with without endangering their own position.

The next place that Moll moves to following the Nurse’s death is the Lady’s house where she has already spent some time getting used to upper-class life. In her encounter with another woman lacking a name (no woman except Moll is named in the novel, and even hers is an alias), Moll feels that this lady “exceed[ed] the good woman I was with before, in every Thing, as well as in the matter of Estate” (8). This house is another place defined through a woman’s symbolic ownership, and it seems that it is completely controlled by the Lady. The presumed Master is largely absent from the narrative and is only occasionally referred to as the “Father,” mostly to comment on his said absenteeism. In one instance, for example, Moll mentions, “they happen’d to be all at Table, but the Father” (27). Similarly, while a “Mother’s Room,” “[Moll’s] chamber,” and a “Sisters’ room” are mentioned, no space is mentioned as belonging to any male member of the family. The first room that the elder brother accosts Moll in is “the Room where his Sisters us’d to sit and work” (12), and the second she mentions as being his “younger Sisters chamber” (13), where she herself also frequently works. It is in fact a house full of women, among those spoken briefly of are the mother, the two daughters, a Cook, a maid and herself. As Ardener further discusses, “the fact that women do not control physical or social space directly does not necessarily preclude them from being determinants of, or mediators in, the allocation of space, even the occupation of political space” (9–10). This is certainly the case in what is referred to as the “Lady’s house,” where most of the spaces are occupied by the women of the household, and the supposed “Master” is absent, both physically and emotionally. Ultimately, it is the Lady that Moll needs to prove her honour to, in order not to be regarded as a social climber in marrying Robin, the younger son. It is the mother who allows the union and permits Moll to enter her matriarchal domain. It was also the mother who hired Moll in the first place. So, although considered socially inferior to her

husband by law, who most certainly owns the physical house in which they live, it is the Lady that governs the space within.

There is no mention of property ownership here, but it is safe to assume that the Lady's husband owns it. In her absorbing chapter "Gendered Politeness and Power," Ylivuori discusses this curious delegation of power and mentions that male power at this time was "frequently insecure, threatened and contradictory, while women held authority within the system over their children, servants and those of lower social class" (37). Further on, Ylivuori questions "whether the small-scale autonomy women were able to achieve within the framework of polite society constituted a subversion of patriarchal power" (38). There is no evidence to suggest that the Lady's authority challenges that of her husband's in any way, yet it is clearly stressed that the spaces in the household have been claimed by the women in it, and that she is the one who has the final word, at least over them. John Tosh, in *A Man's Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian England*, reveals how in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was not much "separation between work and home" (16) and that there was often an economic partnership among spouses of the middle class "in the productive work of the household" (19). Although the Lady and the Master seem to be members of the gentry, his physical absence is suggestive of the idea that he does indeed work for a living, which would place them as members of an affluent middle class. Taking into consideration the lack of boundaries suggested by Tosh, the Master's non-appearance throughout this section of the novel once again evokes the Lady's superiority. This unclear position of power attests to its being a paradoxical space.

Throughout the novel, Moll is not able to stay in a particular place for very long. She is forced to move fairly often, looking for partners and opportunities, and it is this displacement that adds to her strength. As mentioned before, it is interesting to note that most of the places she finds herself in are owned by women. Although in many feminist geographical discussions, "gender relations are . . . of central concern . . . because of the way in which a spatial division—that between the public and the private, between inside and outside—plays such a central role in the construction of gender divisions," (12) as Linda McDowell points out, it is not really possible to observe these dichotomies in *Moll Flanders* as being influential on Moll's development. Drawing upon the function and development of domestic spaces in history, Cieraad explains that it was largely after the 1970s that domestic space began to be "interpreted . . . as a secluded female domain in which women took care of children and the household, while men spent much time in public space earning a living and socializing with other men" (1). Thereafter often condemned as entrapping women inside the kitchen or house, the domestic space or home just does not seem to be relevant in Moll's narrative as she never describes any of the places as private or domestic. As Cieraad further argues, "this concept of domestic space did not exist in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries" (2). Accordingly, what little domestic space Moll inhabits is defined neither as a home nor as a trap. Moll hardly ever has a familial home of her own where comfort (or confinement) in this sense can be found.

Of course, some of the spaces she inhabits when she is “taken in” by some women she meets are private spaces, but Moll herself is transitory throughout the novel. Thus there is no understanding here that the private/domestic space can be oppressive. The reader may assume that her homes with Robin, her draper husband, the banker husband, and finally with Jemy at the end of the novel are gendered domestic spaces, but these are barely discussed in any significant narrative length, and do not suggest a desire on Moll’s part to escape them in favour of a public or outside space. In fact, she does not, in any of these instances, even mention these as either negative or positive, although she does mention being frequently bored in her first unions. It is the spaces in between, the paradoxical ones governed by strong women that have much more of an effect on her and worth glossing over in her account.

Another such place is her mother’s house in America, to which she travels with her brother/husband. Moll insists on having her mother-in-law/mother live with them, and this space quickly becomes both public and private when she shares the secret of the illegitimacy of her marriage with her. This is evidence of what Swaminathan suggests is a “support network formed by women” (200) abundant throughout the novel. While living in this site of her incestuous relationship, Moll does not detail the physical qualities of her surroundings. However, an important scene is when she finally decides to tell her husband what she has deduced, and she describes it thus: “One Evening . . . we were sitting and talking very friendly together under a little Auning, which serv’d as an Arbour at the entrance from our House into the Garden” (Defoe 70). It is significant that this is the place where she chooses to have this most important conversation, a place that can be seen as neither inside nor outside, a paradoxical space where both the interior and exterior of which belong more to her mother than anyone else. Even there, the home that she details the most, Moll does not position herself inside the home, nor does she mention any domestic duties or features. This exchange takes place just outside the house, preventing it from being interpreted as inside or outside. This is perhaps the most conventional family home in the novel that she ever lives in, yet it is also the one that Moll feels most deeply uncomfortable in and feels homesick for the more public spaces of London. Often placed on a metaphorical threshold, as John Rietz also suggests “she is gradually placing herself farther and farther outside the law and outside of accepted categories” (192). Leaving the threshold and renouncing familial connections, she departs America after eight years there, and says, “my Mind was restless too, and uneasy; I hanker’d after coming to England, and nothing would satisfie me without it” (12). Among the spaces she shares with her spouses, this is the only house she goes into detail about. However, it cannot be seen as a home since when she describes her homesickness, it is England that she is referring to.

What awaits Moll in England is a slow descent into the world of crime which she simultaneously abhors and embraces. A “new friend,” (75) before this descent is the landlady in Bath, a precursor to the midwife she will, later on, call “governess” and “mother” in London, and through whom she will acquire a sense of her body as a

commodity. She has already capitalized on it in previous entanglements, but not in such a calculated manner. Of the landlady, she reveals she is “on good Terms with,” and that “tho’ she did not keep an ill House, *as we call it*, yet had none of the best principles in herself,” (74–75; italics in the original) insinuating ulterior motives in the running of the house. Moll believes that her landlady deliberately sets her up with the gentleman who is also renting rooms at the house. Finally, it is also the landlady who shapes the relationship into what it becomes. Moll explains this as follows:

I frequently took notice to my landlady of his exceeding modesty, and she again used to tell me, she believ’d it was so from the beginning; however she used to tell me that she thought I ought to expect some Gratification from him for my Company, for indeed he did, as it were, engross me, and I was seldom from him; *I told her* I had not given him the least occasion to think I wanted it, or that I would accept of it from him; *she told me* she would take that part upon her, and she did so, and manag’d it so dextrously, that the first time we were together alone, after she had talk’d with him, he began to enquire a little into my Circumstances, as how I had subsisted my self since I came on shore? and whether I did not want money? (76; italics in the original)

The repetitive nature of this account reveals that the landlady’s actions here are very purposeful, and she is able to manipulate both Moll and the gentleman into entering a relationship on her own terms rather than theirs. The man does not approach Moll sexually until she proposes it of her own accord. The landlady in all probability does this for her own benefit of keeping the man on as a resident, and perhaps asking for a little extra payment in time for her discretion while running an outwardly respectable house. In appearance a landlady renting out private rooms, she does not seem to view them as private at all. She is able to command what is, in essence, a public commercial space, and to control the events and people in it.

Moll becomes nomadic in a greater sense in the aftermath of this relationship, finding herself in a triad between the banker and Jemy, as well as in the establishment she is compelled to visit to deal with her unexpected and unwanted pregnancy. To begin with the banker, Moll’s only attraction to him is that he is attracted to her, which is secondary to the allure of his house. Although she has also approached most previous relationships with a material concern, it becomes more obvious at the beginning of this one. Entering the banker’s house for the first time, Moll’s observations are as follows: “I found, *and was not a little pleas’d with it*, that he had provided a Supper for me: I found also he liv’d very handsomely, and had a House very handsomely furnis’d, all which I was rejoyc’d at indeed, for I look’d upon it as all my own” (98; italics in the original). Having little to no possessions of her own, this instance shows Moll at a vulnerable moment, wanting to settle down at the slightest possibility. Eventually she does, and she describes their marriage, saying that they “lived . . . in the utmost Tranquility” (135) for a grand total of five years (but only worth two paragraphs), ending with his death. Incidentally, this is

almost the same amount of time as her marriage with Robin, also lasting for five years, but meriting only one paragraph in her account.

Much more interesting and formative for Moll and meriting longer narrative presence in her subjective account of her life is her association with the woman she first calls the “midwife,” then “my Governess,” and finally “mother,” often referred to as “Mother Midnight” in criticism. This woman’s establishment is most certainly a paradoxical space. Her business is not legitimate, but she is a master manipulator in that she is able to transform a woman who comes to her for delivery or abortion into a professional thief. Interestingly, and as Mona Scheuermann has also suggested, “although we often think of Moll as criminal, Defoe devotes three quarters of the book to other aspects of [Moll’s] life” (312). Mother Midnight is the influential character whose work on Moll is unassailable in the further development of her identity. From her pregnancy with Jemy’s child through Newgate and until her days in America towards the end of the novel, it is this woman who arranges practically everything for Moll’s emotional as well as financial security. At the beginning of her attachment, Moll describes her own position as: “I would gladly have turn’d my Hand to any honest Employment if I could have got it; but here she was deficient; honest Business did not come within her reach” (Defoe 142). This is a description curiously reminiscent of the landlady in Bath. Apart from her own apparent talent and dexterity, it seems to be largely due to this woman that Moll becomes such a notoriously successful thief. Mother Midnight’s shelter and guidance help Moll in her quest for security at this point in her life, and paves the way for further success. Parting with her when getting on the ship to America, Moll says, “I was never so sorrowful at parting with my own mother as I was at parting with her” (231). Indeed, despite her inability to provide Moll with a legitimate job, she enables her a fairly gender-neutral environment in which to thrive. In terms of homeless spaces to which insecure or “temporary accommodation” should be included, Susan Watson has argued that they are “not confined to the domestic sphere nor expected to undertake domestic duties any more than the boys” (qtd. in McDowell 91). The surroundings of the governess’ establishment suggest a place in between, where gender becomes blurred and even irrelevant, as class issues are more dominant. Moll easily adopts a man’s disguise, under the governess’s care, and no additional consideration is necessary. Whether she impersonates a beggar or a man, her feelings seem to be identical. Upon a close call when one of her associates is in danger of revealing her identity, she says this “was indeed partly the Occasion of my Governess proposing to Dress me up in Mens Cloths, that I might go about unobserv’d, as indeed I did; but was soon tir’d of that Disguise” (Defoe 160). Much has been made of Moll’s use of disguise in this section of the novel,⁴ yet, based on Moll’s superfluous account of her escapades in this fashion, it seems to be simply another example of her embracing a liminal space.

⁴ See, for example, John Rietz “Criminal Ms-Representation : *Moll Flanders* and Criminal Biography,” and Yao-hsi Shih “Impersonation in Daniel Defoe’s Feminocentric Novels.”

In discussing the relationships Moll has with the women in the novel, further mention of how the issue of class affects the relationships is requisite. Excepting the lady of the house who provided Moll with her first husband by employing her, the other women are of the working classes, regardless of whether they enjoyed better situations earlier in their lives or not. In citing another study by Elizabeth Roberts, McDowell posits, “for many working-class households gender relations were largely based on cooperation rather than antagonism. Both men and women were fully aware of the inequalities and injustices which produced their poverty and were anxious to find a way to ‘get by’” (79). This can be said to be true of some of the places that Moll inhabits throughout the novel and is particularly true for the establishment of Mother Midnight, where the issue of gender is not considered very relevant, and all manner of disguise is encouraged. In the eighteenth century, as Rietz points out, “the roles of woman and criminal were perceived as mutually exclusive, and . . . a figure who straddled these two categories gave rise to considerable confusion” (183). While this may be true from an outsider’s perspective on the criminal world, in the novel it is suggested that this is quite organic, a fate shared by men and women alike. It is quite telling that despite the abundance of male lovers Moll has, hardly any other men are mentioned in the novel, so it is quite difficult to see any interaction between the genders apart from sensual ones, that would illuminate the complex relationship of gender and class as given in the novel. However, it can be argued that this is certainly a narrative which women dominate; it is women that Moll recounts as being formative in her life. Although Mother Midnight initially provides a gendered feminine space for Moll—a place where she can lie in and deliver her baby—the nature of this space quickly changes. After Moll has her baby taken care of, Mother Midnight’s establishment starts accommodating both female and male criminals. Evidently abandoning her job as midwife/abortionist/adoption agent, she starts schooling both women and men in crime.

In her discussion of female friendships and networking in *Moll Flanders*, Swaminathan firstly claims, “middle-class morals mean [little] to lower-class women” (203) and argues that “women seek out other women, and their actions reveal a consciousness of the benefits of networking. The women pushing the boundaries are largely lower-class and marginalized women who operate on the fringes of polite society” (205). Mother Midnight clearly creates a matriarchal space that liberates Moll by helping her claim the streets of London as her domain, as well as aiding her fortune. This is in fact the longest relationship that Moll has with anyone in the novel, and theirs is a true friendship, as Swaminathan also underlines, saying that they “work together to ensure each other’s personal well-being” (204). This is the sort of relationship that Moll has built after those she had with the nurse, the lady, her mother, and her landlady in Bath. At this point in her life, Moll is unable to capitalize on her beauty any more (Rietz 186) and must turn to downright theft rather than coercion. It is only in Mother Midnight’s establishment that she is able to find emotional and material comfort, which she could not find even in her mother’s home.

Moll's success, despite enormous odds throughout her life, is a result of a formation of character moulded by the strong women she encounters. Whatever class they belong to, each of these women have obtained enough power to rule over the spaces they have appropriated. These are paradoxical and matriarchal spaces because they are negotiated spaces carved in the niches of a hegemonic patriarchal culture and society. While the patriarchal society in the next century would place women solely in the private sphere, namely in the "home," forcing them to be content with their lot, in this novel, there is not yet a firm boundary between the public and the private. They are neither accepted nor denied, thus not seen as completely secret or marginal. Glimpses of more traditional domestic spaces in the novel are rare and practically ignored by the narrator, while the spaces discussed above are given more narrative space, suggesting that they have a more formative role in the protagonist's controversial outcome.

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Archival Suspicion and Authorial Desire in *The Dalkey Archive*

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Abstract: The central aim of this article is to explore the politics of the archive and archival mnemonics in Flann O'Brien's last novel, *The Dalkey Archive* (1964). The argumentative axis moves along the relation between archival power and authorial agency, especially in terms of re/imagining alternative histories/archives. Relying on the metaphor of the book as an archive, and the author as an archivist, the article introduces a reading of the novel within the historical context of Ireland's post-independence intellectual and political climate. O'Brien's biting dark humour, which exposes the ideological fictionality of archival constructs and debunks canonical authority, is shown to introduce a critical commentary on many aspects of the relationship between authorship and power.¹

Keywords:

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Dalkey Arşivi'nde Arşive Dair Şphe ve Yazarlık Arzusu

z: Bu makalenin amacı Flann O'Brien'in *Dalkey Arşivi* başlıklı (1964) son romanında arşivin ve arşivsel bellek mekanizmasının politikasını mercek altına almaktır. Tartışma eksenini, özellikle alternatif tarihler/arşivler tahayyl etme bakımından arşivsel iktidar ve yazarlık pratiđi arasındaki ilişki üzerinde ilerlemektedir. Kitap ile arşiv, yazar ile arşivci arasında kurulan metaforik ilişkinin esas alındığı makalede, romanın eleştirel okuması İrlanda'nın bağımsızlık sonrası entelektel ve politik iklimini gz nne alan bir tarihsel bağlam içinde sunulmaktadır. Genel itibariyle, Flann O'Brien'in, arşive dair tm inşaların ideolojik kurgusallığını ifşa eden ve kanona dair her trl otoritenin maskesini dşren kara mizahının, yazarlık ve iktidar arasındaki ilişkinin pek çok ynn irdeleyen bir eleştirel evren sunduđu ortaya konulacaktır.

Anahtar Szckler:

Flann O'Brien,
Dalkey Arşivi,
Yazarlık, Arşiv, Bellek,
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¹ This article has been reproduced from my unpublished PhD dissertation titled *Flann O'Brien's Dialogue with Modernity: Authorship and the Political Unconscious*. 2016. Ege University, PhD dissertation.

How and what we remember has a shaping influence on how we take action physically and verbally as social and political animals. That is one reason why authorities and agents of power have always been keen on controlling archives and mnemonic knowledge. The archivists who fashion, control, and guard the archives are the true owners of mnemonic spaces of cultural identity. As in W. B. Yeats's rhetorical question "how can we know the dancer from the dance?", the role of the archivist in forming and preserving cultural memory through archives invokes a question of a critical nature: how can we know the archive from the archivist? The question is hardly irrelevant since all archives are subject to an ideological selection of material that is to be included in or excluded from the archival space. For this very reason, textual or physical archives of all sorts are somehow 'maimed' from the start, 'infected' by the biased ideological choices or preferences of the founders and owners of the archive. It is not surprising that the original French title of Jacques Derrida's *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression* (1995) – which was first presented as a lecture at the Freud Museum in London in 1994 – is *Mal d'Archive*, meaning "disease" or "evil" of the archives. Inspired by Derrida's argument on the concept of the archive, this article aims to explore how Flann O'Brien's (1911–1966) *The Dalkey Archive* (1964) opens up a critical path for the reader through the archive metaphor. Diverse representations of the archive, including literary and artistic canons, will be discussed in their potential to raise questions about the politics of storytelling and re/writing, alternative histories, counterfactual authorship, memory and identity. It will be shown that *The Dalkey Archive* is a satire on the politics of remembering in post-independence Ireland, as well as a critical commentary on the fictionality of archival constructs including canons of received narratives that function as mnemonic spaces governed by acts of authorship.

The storyline of *The Dalkey Archive* follows two main tracks, both of which revolve around the protagonist and the narrator, Mick Shaughnessy, a young civil servant with literary pretensions. The novel opens with the parodic salute to a scene in the first episode of James Joyce's *Ulysses* (1920), in which Stephen Dedalus and Buck Mulligan go to the shore for a morning bath in the "snotgreen sea," the "great sweet mother" of the Irish (Joyce 5). Mick Shaughnessy and his friend Hackett, on their way back home from this morning swim, meet an injured man and assist him to his home. This man, De Selby, at first glance seems to Mick and Hackett "a decent sort of segotia" (O'Brien 11) but turns out to be an eccentric and arcane scientist, "a strange bird" (O'Brien 17) who can make magic whiskey which is both "ancient" and "a week old" (O'Brien 15). De Selby, as it turns out, has extraordinary discoveries, including a mysterious chemical substance that enables time travel by the annihilation of oxygen from the air and thus the suspension of the passage of time. With the use of this substance called D.M.P.,² he communicates with the Fathers of the Catholic Church in heaven and other biblical figures in order to confirm

² This abbreviation is never explained by De Selby in the novel, but it is ironically suggested that it might stand for the Dublin Metropolitan Police.

or disconfirm the accuracy of historical or biblical narratives. When De Selby reveals to Mick and Hackett his sinister plan to destroy the entire life on earth by using D.M.P., Mick sets out to find ways to stop him and save the world from an apocalyptic end.

In parallel with this task of a saviour, Mick pursues another important mission. After he learns from a customer in a pub that James Joyce has in fact not died in 1941 but has faked his own death and is living in seclusion in Ireland in a seaside town called Skerries near Dublin, he tracks Joyce down and makes him reveal astonishing facts about his literary career. Joyce's account has little concordance with the canonical Joyce's international reputation as an innovative writer. Mick hopes that his girlfriend, Mary, would write all this counterfactual information about Joyce into an "unprecedented book" (O'Brien 106) and shatter the world of literary criticism by invalidating canonical conceptions of Joyce. All these revolutionary attempts, however, are unexpectedly backfired by the author when the novel surprisingly ends with an earthbound cliché. Mick loses interest in saving the world, aborts his mission and dream of exposing the faces behind the masks of meta-narratives, and agrees to marry his girlfriend Mary when he hears about the news of her unanticipated pregnancy. We are left with the image of Mick as a prospective father with nothing much to hope for and pursue than a conservative Irish life. As Mick's missions are left unaccomplished, the novel remains to be a fragmentary archive of satiric speculations about philosophical, religious, historical, and literary issues.

Such unexpected abortion in the storyline is not untypical of O'Brien who tends to play with the idea of dead ends and subvert the classical notion of progressive vision. Notwithstanding the aborted revolution in the novel, the narrative does not fail to point at significant issues about the burden and nightmare of history, and archive for that matter, placing itself on a line of kinship with several sub-genres of today's postmodern fiction. When O'Brien stated in a letter to Tim O'Keeffe that *The Dalkey Archive* "is not meant to be a novel or anything of the kind but a study in derision, various writers with their styles, and sundry modes, attitudes and cults being the rats in the cage" (Clissmann 293), he obviously did not anticipate the evolution which the novel genre and theories on the novel would undergo in the following decades. Today, *The Dalkey Archive*, as it is, may belong to multiple sub-genres at once, including Menippean satire, revisionist fiction, post-war apocalyptic fiction, or speculative fiction. M. Keith Booker, for example, reads it as an "assault on monologism, mastery, and authoritarianism" in the form of Menippean satire (105), and as "a commentary on the way science's attempts to master life have led to the development of technology that threatens to end life altogether", suggesting that the novel also bears undertones of an apocalyptic post-war fiction "centrally informed by the reality of the threat of nuclear holocaust" (106). In its rejection of grand narratives and its mock-attempt to replace them with alternate histories, *The Dalkey Archive* may find a true home in the world canon of counterfactual fiction.

De Selby and Mick are both sceptical about given narratives and they separately carry out their own excavations in order to uncover alternate histories. Shelly Shapiro defines alternate or counterfactual history, as “an alternative to the history we know and have always thought of as untouchable” (xi); and Andy Duncan designates its most common feature as the “divergence from the historical record” (209). Representing writers of alternate history who take the “roads not taken” probably with “[t]he urge to change history,” O’Brien’s eccentric characters are passionate about opening portals for “examining how things *didn’t* happen” (Shapiro xii, xiv; italics in the original). Rereading, reordering, and maybe reconfiguring a given archive is possible only with the emergence of an archival suspicion, which Irish writers deeply felt in post-independence Ireland. *The Dalkey Archive*, in this respect, overtly announces its main concern in its title, which functions as a signpost guiding us to the heart of the subject matter, namely the archive itself. Maebh Long, for example, describes the novel as “an archival research project” which reveals the “inconsistencies and disorder of the archive, together with the archivist’s desire for knowledge, origins and order” (191), and explores the archive metaphor through a psychoanalytical reading of the novel over the subject of the death drive. What Long suggests is somehow related to the politics of authorship, which is problematized in the narratives of late modernist writers as one of the symptomatic traits of Ireland’s belated modernity.

The Oxford English Dictionary gives the definition of the word “archive” as “a place in which public records or other important historic documents are kept”, and as a verb, it denotes the act of placing or storing something in an archive (614). In its conventional conception, the archive is the place where history and memory are stored, and it is considered a reliable source that enables human beings to become “knowers of the past” and “rememberer[s]” (Miller 8). Although the archive is generally identified with remembering and with memory, its very existence is a constant reminder of the possibility of forgetting. As Nicholas Miller notes, “[i]n acts of memory, forgetting must be acknowledged as an instrumental aspect of remembering rather than its opposite; *gaps* make their positive contribution to the forms and images and stories through which the past ‘occurs’ to the present” (8; italics added). Accordingly, reading the gaps is another form of remembering, and therefore, of giving voice to the unspoken in history. Remembering, in this sense, is a political act that brings itself on par with the act of rewriting.

The archive metaphor is politically significant not only in terms of the politics of remembering but also with regard to the forces that determine what is to be stored “inside” the archive and what is to be left “outside”. Derrida in *The Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression* argues that

arkhe . . . names at once the *commencement* and the *commandment*. This name apparently coordinates two principles in one: . . . *there* where things *commence* – physical, historical, or ontological principle – but also the principle according to the law, *there* where men and gods *command*, *there*

where authority, social order are exercised, *in this place* from which *order* is given. (1; italics in the original).

The etymological origin of the word “archive” is the Latin *achhivum* or *archium*, which comes from “the Greek *arkheion*: initially a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the *archons*, those who commanded” (Derrida 2; italics in the original). And *arkhe* in Greek means to command or govern. The Greek origin of the word, therefore, points to a relationship between authority and archive. The archive, as the “place” where “history” is stored, is commanded by an authority that has the right to “interpret” the archive. As Derrida notes,

[t]he citizens who thus held and signified political power were considered to possess the right to make or to represent the law. On account of their publicly recognized authority, it is at their home, in that *place* which is their house (private house, family house, or employee’s house), that official documents are filed. The archons are first of all the documents’ guardians. They do not only ensure the physical security of what is deposited and of the substrate. . . . They have the power to interpret the archives. Entrusted to such archons, these documents in effect state the law: they recall the law and call on or impose the law. (2; italics in the original)

Archive, then, is not just a repository of the past but a space where archival discourse is produced and may be shaped by political and official agendas. It is the archivist who determines what is to be included in and excluded from the archive. He/she selects archival material, classifies and catalogues them, and, in a way, shapes collective memory and determines cultural heritage by housing a selected and classified version of the past. The archive, in this sense, assumes a political power that shapes the representations of the past. As Wolfgang Ernst notes, the archivist “operates in the *arcane imperii*, the hidden realms of power” (47; italics in the original). Joan M. Schwartz follows a similar line of thought, saying that “archives and records, in their appraisal and management by archivists, always reflect power relationships” (3); because,

[t]hrough archives, the past is controlled. Certain stories are privileged and others marginalized. And archivists are an integral part of this story-telling. . . . [A]rchivists continually reshape, reinterpret, and reinvent the archive. This represents enormous power over memory and identity, over the fundamental ways in which society seeks evidence of what its core values are and have been, where it has come from, and where it is going. (3)

The archive, in this respect, has multiple connotations associated with narrativization and textualization. It is the space where words and images of and about the past are assembled to form a unified content of a story about bygone events. Written or otherwise, every text is woven with language and discourse, which are by their very nature always political in the sense that they belong to the world of the symbolic, and, therefore, of the law of the father in Julia Kristeva’s terms.

The metaphor of the book as an archive, and the author as an archivist, provides us with a perspective from which we can question the archival authority of the author whose

“commandment” is central to narrativization. In Ann Laura Stoler’s³ words, in cultural theory, the archive “may serve as a strong *metaphor* for any corpus of selective forgettings and collections – and, as importantly, for the seductions and longings that such quests for, and accumulations of, the primary, originary, and untouched entail” (94; italics in the original). O’Brien’s *The Dalkey Archive* is a textual space of filed information about the past, which is far from being fixed and stable. Affirming Richard Kearney’s claim in “Narrative and the Ethics of Remembrance” that “[n]arrative memory is never innocent” and that it is “an ongoing conflict of interpretations: a battlefield of competing meanings” (27), the novel introduces the notion of the “archive” as a metonymy for history, suggesting that our knowledge about historical events and characters are dynamic and susceptible to change. *The Dalkey Archive*, in this sense, raises questions about the archive and the archivist with a capital A. If “[t]here is no political power without control of the archive, if not memory,” as Derrida says (4), there is no revolution without counterfactual rewriting of the archive, or without giving voice to the “unspoken” element excluded from the archivist’s fabrication of history.

The Dalkey Archive is a novel populated with characters who are bursting to rewrite history for one reason or another. Yet, ironically enough, the novel which accommodates these mock-historian types of characters is itself a rewriting or refabrication of another novel by the same author – *The Third Policeman*. O’Brien plunders, plagiarizes, and even cannibalizes the draft of *The Third Policeman* and incorporates part of its plot into *The Dalkey Archive*. The novel, therefore, reads as a “pilfered pastiche of disparate thematic elements from *The Third Policeman*, recast in a new context” (Hopper 50). Although O’Brien composed *The Third Policeman*, his second novel, in 1940 and 1941, right after the publication of *At Swim-Two-Birds* (1939), it was rejected by publishers and never saw the light of day until it was discovered in a drawer by his wife and published posthumously.

The mad scientist De Selby, whose life and theories are given as a subtext in the footnotes of the *Third Policeman* (1967), is transferred into the main narrative of *The Dalkey Archive* as one of the main characters. His migration from the footnotes of a novel into the main text of another reminds us of the unnamed narrator’s theories of novel writing in O’Brien’s debut novel, *At Swim-Two-Birds*, in which he claims that “[t]he entire corpus of existing literature should be regarded as a limbo from which discerning authors could draw their characters as required, creating only when they failed to find a suitable existing puppet” (33). Another transfer is the fantastic atomic theory which is at work in the surreal hellish setting of *The Third Policeman* and which is responsible for the metamorphosis of men into bicycles and vice versa. The description of the workings of the atomic is almost identical to the passages in *The Third Policeman*. According to the working principles of this atomic theory, the exchange of molecules between men and

³ The anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler is the scholar who theorized the “archival turn” in the 1990s as a shift in focus from “archive-as-source” to “archive-as-subject.”

bicycles as the result of a long-term physical interaction leads to mutual transformation and blurs the boundaries between machine (inorganic) and human (organic). The metaphor of the hybrid form of man-bicycle also suggests that stable and essentialist identity is nothing but an oxymoron in communities that contain multiple forms and ways of existence and that such change is inevitable in the course of any kind of interaction. This suggestion is of course a ridicule and negation of state-imposed nationalist definitions of Irishness in post-independent Ireland which tried to fabricate a uniform and stable national identity for the Irish by founding its discourse on symbolic narratives of a frozen pre-colonial mythic past.

Such implicit critique of fixed and essentialist definitions of identity is juxtaposed in *The Dalkey Archive* with overtly stated suspicions and objections, especially by De Selby, towards unquestioned historical narratives. De Selby introduces his first argument on alternative histories by proposing that Lucifer was in fact the victor of the battle he fought with God:

— I also accepted as fact the story of the awesome encounter between God and the rebel Lucifer. But I was undecided for many years as to the outcome of that encounter. I had little to corroborate the revelation that God had triumphed and banished Lucifer to hell forever. For if – I repeat *if* – the decision had gone the other way and God had been vanquished, who but Lucifer would be certain to put about the other and opposite story?

— But why should he? Mick asked incredulously.

— The better to snare and damn mankind, De Selby answered. (22)

De Selby has reservations also about the factual details of the Jonas episode. He insists that the “great fish” mentioned in the Biblical story is not a whale but a shark:

The references in the Bible, in Testaments Old and New, are consistently to a ‘great fish’. The whale as such is never mentioned, and in any event the whale is not a fish. Scientists hold, with ample documentation in support, that the whale was formerly a land animal, its organs now modified for sea-living. It is a mammal, suckles its youth, is warm-blooded and must come to the surface for breath, like man himself. It is most unlikely that there were any whales in the sea in the time of Jonas. (76)

Neither does he find the story of the Flood convincing: “The story of [the] Flood is just silly. We are told that it was caused by a deluge of forty nights. All this water must have existed on earth before the rain started, for more cannot come down than was taken up. Common sense tells me that this is childish nonsense” (19–20). According to Ernst, “[i]f there are pieces missing in the archive, these gaps are filled with human imagination” (49). De Selby’s reading of the Bible, the canonical text of Catholicism, is subjected to a similar process of filling in the gaps or reading between the lines. In Val Nolan’s words, “[t]he evidence of *The Dalkey Archive* in particular suggests that O’Brien regarded the institution of the Church as another kind of narrative, a fantasy spun – like Saint Patrick – from the fragments of historical record” (188–89). The Bible is considered a fictional text which lacks integrity and can be archaeologically excavated and rewritten. The archivist’s

task is not to simply store given material according to a given order but to revise the archive; and since the archive has a mnemonic function, just like memory it is reconstructed at every and each instance of remembering. The process of textual remembering, in this sense, involves the stages of filling in the missing information or gaps by assumptions or imagination, similar to the cognitive process in the workings of the human brain.

Like De Selby, Hackett too has anarchic attempts to rewrite authorized texts. Hackett believes Judas Iscariot to be a “decent man that was taken in and made a gobshite out of” (O’Brien 65), and describes him as an “intellectual type” who “knew what he was doing” while betraying Jesus (66). Referring to the “Case of the Missing Witness,” he suggests that Judas “may have had a good and honourable intention” (66). In firm belief in the idea that Judas has been misrepresented and his story has been twisted in the Bible, he aims to “rehabilitate” Judas, to “have the record amended,” and to “have part of the Bible rewritten” in order to ensure that “the Bible contains the Gospel according to Saint Judas” (67). Like De Selby, who suspects historical narratives and seeks first-hand information from the dead, Hackett trusts only the word of Judas who can be the sole source of truth about his intentions in betraying his master. When Mick points at the impossibility of knowing what Judas actually thought and intended, saying that he “left no record,” Hackett confronts him on the grounds that “[t]he Roman Church’s Bible has a great lot of material called Apocrypha. There have been apocryphal Gospels according to Peter, Thomas, Barnabas, John, Judas Iscariot and many others” (67). In order to prove his case, he aims to “retrieve, clarify and establish the Iscariot Gospel” (67). Hackett’s commitment to bring an apocryphal text to daylight is revolutionary enough to alter the Biblical canon, and the excavation of a canonical archive to unearth a concealed text is similar to De Selby’s endeavour to resurrect the dead to make them speak.

De Selby and Hackett thus disaffirm the existing order of things, invalidate the factuality of official records and the reliability of the archive of history, and introduce counter-narratives. Most importantly, they consider archives “as epistemological experiments rather than as sources”, and implicitly define the archive “not as sites of knowledge retrieval but of knowledge production” (Stoler 87, 90). O’Brien’s engagement with archival knowledge as such shares a tendency similar to that observed in post/colonial studies, which unveil concealed histories by “rereading . . . archives and doing oral histories with people who lived those archived events to comment on colonial narratives of them” (Stoler 89). Likewise, Hackett seeks unfiltered first-hand information to be obtained from the lost record of Judas Iscariot. De Selby receives first-hand information from the “dead,” communicating with them through a peculiar kind of time travel which enables him to speak directly with the past, without the intermediation of the archive. By releasing an experimental gas called “D.M.P.,” De Selby removes the oxygen from the atmosphere, as a result of which “a deoxygenated atmosphere cancels the apparently serial nature of time and confronts us with true time and simultaneously with all things and creatures that time has ever contained or will contain, provided we evoke

them" (O'Brien 22). He thus gains "access to what is 'classified' and 'confidential'" (Stoler 90).

De Selby's sources of first-hand information about Biblical history include John the Baptist and Saint Augustine of Hippo. His conversation with St. Augustine is a bravado performance of satire towards orthodox theology and its philosophical pillars of religious authority. In this conversation, De Selby's main concern is to determine the factuality and truthfulness of Augustine's accounts in his *Confessions*. Since he has serious reservations about Augustine's fidelity to truth in this autobiographical account, De Selby aims to hear evidential confessions from him to prove that he is indeed a liar. Besides his personal disclosures, Augustine utters astonishing confessions about the founders of the Society of Jesus, including Francis Xavier whom he accuses of spending his time "womanizing in the slums of Paris . . . in warrens full of rats, vermin, sycophants, and syphilis" and "consorting with Buddhist monkeys" (O'Brien 36). He also provides De Selby with insider information from heaven, stating that there are in fact more than two Saint Patricks, contrary to the information circulated around on earth: "We have *four* of the buggers in our place and they'd make you sick with their shamrocks and shenanigans and bullshit" (O'Brien 37; italics in the original). His counterfactual declarations are not limited to key figures of the Catholic Church. He accuses Descartes of stealing the maxim *cogito ergo sum* from his own works and claims that Descartes "have established nothing new, nor even a system of pursuing knowledge that was novel" and that he "spent far too much time in bed subject to the persistent hallucination that he was thinking" (O'Brien 40). His challenging views on Descartes align with De Selby's degrading comments on the founding fathers of science and philosophy, including Newton, Spinoza, Bergson, "poor Descartes," and Einstein who came up with "postulates of the Relativity nonsense" (O'Brien 14, 15).

After Mick and Hackett witness the conversation between De Selby and Saint Augustine, their suspicions about De Selby's madness dissolve, yet due to his ambivalent character they remain doubtful about his good intentions. As another liminal figure in the gallery of portraits in O'Brien's *oeuvre*, De Selby's ambivalence in the novel partly derives from his foreign name, which definitely does not sound Irish. Hackett utters his suspicion about the possibility that De Selby might "be a spy" because his name "sounds foreign" (O'Brien 58). Although Mick contradicts Hackett on the grounds that "the way [De Selby] talks is [a] sign he's native of [their] beloved Ireland" and that "he doesn't like Ireland" like many native Irish (58), Hackett's suspicion hangs in the air throughout the novel, without any definitive revelation about De Selby's origin.

O'Brien's debunking critique of canonical figures is not limited to those above but extends to one of his literary fathers. James Joyce, the "defrocked high-priest of modernism" (Hopper 51), is included by O'Brien into the cast of ambitious rewriters of Biblical history and reformers of the canon. This fictional Joyce, despite his piety, does not blindly embrace the Christian dogma and introduces his own speculative theory about the Holy Ghost. In order to restore truth, Joyce wants to enter the Jesuit Order, become a

priest, and devote his time and energy to his mission of repairing the canon of Christianity. Ironically, however, all he is offered by the Order is the position of a servant boy “in charge of the maintenance and repair of the Fathers’ underclothes in all the Dublin residential establishments” (O’Brien 195). Anticipating Harold Bloom’s view in *The Anxiety of Influence* that “strong poets keep returning from the dead” (140) and “peers in the mirror of his fallen precursor” (147), Joyce is brought back to life in *The Dalkey Archive*. O’Brien resurrects his literary father; and he drags Joyce, Ireland’s prodigal son, back into the tedious and enclosed setting of Ireland, and rewrites the fate of “poor Jimmy Joyce” so as to exorcize the demons of his obsession. This mock-faced resurrection may be read as O’Brien’s way of addressing his personal intellectual archive as a writer.

O’Brien re-writes the authorly destiny of Joyce (or the archive, for that matter) and creates an alternative history for the master. In the novel, James Joyce appears as a minor character, some sort of a pious hermit who has faked his death and now living in Skerries, a little seaside resort in the north of Dublin. This fictional Joyce is the complete opposite of the cult image of the real Joyce in the literary canon, reduced to a caricature of “silence, exile and cunning.” O’Brien’s Joyce is an intellectually impoverished oldster who works as a bartender in a small public house, and who is completely ignorant of the extraordinary international reputation surrounding his name. As we learn from his interview with the protagonist, Mick Shaughnessy, he has escaped from the havoc of the Second World War in Europe, and he is embarrassed by the attention his early writings once received. Mick is so baffled by the difference between the cult image of the real Joyce and this secluded persona that “he thinks this must be either an imposter, or a Joyce who has become deranged with the passage of time” (Clissmann 307).

Celebrated beyond his knowledge as “Dublin’s incomparable archivist”, this secluded Joyce complains about the labels attached to his name: “I’ve had things imputed to me which – ah – I’ve had nothing to do with” (O’Brien 125); “I am a man who is much misunderstood – I will say maligned, traduced, libelled and slandered. From what I’ve heard, certain ignorant men in America have made a laugh of me. . . . A fellow named Gorman wrote that ‘he always wore a monocle in one eye’” (149). He attributes *Dubliners* to an unpleasant collaboration between Oliver St. John Gogarty and himself. He calls *Ulysses* a “dirty book” and “literary vomit,” and denies authorship of this embarrassing “collection of smut” (174, 177). He claims that its fragmented pieces were written by “[v]arious low, dirty-minded ruffians who has been paid to put his material together” (176). This crew of ruffians, who authored this “pornography and filth and literary vomit, enough to make even a Dublin cabman blush” (177) included “muck-rakers, obscene poets, carnal pimps, sodomous pedlars of the coloured lusts of fallen humanity” (176–77). The only ambition of this wholly defeated fictional Joyce is to “translate and decontaminate great French literature so that it could be an inspiration to the Irish, besotted with Dickens, Cardinal Newman, Walter Scott and Kickham” (192–93), and to enter the priesthood and work in the service of the Roman Catholic Church, particularly the Society of Jesus, in order to reform it. As he confides to the priest towards the end of

the novel, he wants to “serve the Almighty deliberately and directly” and to “come into one of the Society’s houses and . . . work there” (192). However, the only position the Jesuits can offer him is that of a “houseboy” who “should be in charge of the maintenance and repair of the Fathers’ underclothes in all the Dublin residential establishments” (195). Wounded and shocked upon this offer and the rejection of his wish to become a priest in the Order, the fictional Joyce remains “unnaturally still in his chair, as if dead” (195), and then he is lost to view and the novel ends without any clue whatsoever about his fate. *The Dalkey Archive* thus portrays a tamed and demystified Joyce who is denied authorship and who is bereft of creative talents, ignorant of his reputation, embarrassed by his writings, and debased by the Church.

Caricaturing of reputable canonical figures like Joyce and Augustine raises questions about the authority of literary canon and scholarship, which shape our conceptions of writers and texts. It leads us to approach received canonical categories with suspicion, and warns us about the made-up or constructed nature of all canons determined by agents of control and power. The canon, after all, is a kind of archive in which some texts are given priority and privilege over others, and it shapes the collective literary memory to be passed on to the next generations. Edward W. Said in *Beginnings* defines the critic as “a revolutionist destroying the canon in order to replace it with his own” (8). Since common cultural values are preserved and transferred by the canon, it possesses some kind of authority and its archival status is crucial for the politics of building and maintaining tradition and national identity. The criteria used in judging the value of a present text is derived from the value system established by tradition which is stored in the archival space of the canon in the long run of history.

Mnemonic excavations of the past, and thus the archive, with the urge to *refashion* the present, are politically oriented in a specific sense, especially in postcolonial countries like Ireland. In postcolonial cultures, to rewrite the archive means a politically significant shift in the positions of the subject and object of the historical gaze. As Miller observes in *Modernism, Ireland and the Erotics of Memory*, “as a nation Ireland has been defined from the ‘outside’ for most of its existence” (9), and “self-fashioning” (8) requires autonomy which enables the passive object of the observing/defining gaze to become the active subject of self-definition. In this respect, rewriting of the archive as counterfactual authorship, as a necessary means of “self-fashioning,” is informed with a liberating potential and promises emancipation from historically misrepresented codes of identity.

In *The Dalkey Archive*, however, this potential on the symbolic level is unexpectedly undercut at the end of the novel. The revolutionary ventures of counterfactual authorship, personified in Mick Shaughnessy, do not reach fruition and are prematurely abandoned. Promised revolution falls into silenced dissent and the novel ultimately closes as “a repository of failed writers, aborted projects and an archive distrustful of archivization” (Long 192). The novel’s ending somehow reflects O’Brien’s own sense of authorship. For O’Brien, authorship was not only an intellectual practice against authority *per se*, but also

an attempt to manifest, if not to annihilate, the tension and anxiety created by the ghostly presence of history and tradition as well as literary fathers or models. This haunting presence of archives of many sorts is juxtaposed with the anxiety of ambivalence created by the political and social order imposed by the Irish State, and by Ireland's problematic relation to modernity and modernization. In *The Dalkey Archive*, as in his other novels, we do not see an urge to overcome this tension and anxiety. Rather, his narrative universe becomes the embodiment of this anxiety, suggesting the vainness of order. However anarchic his narrative techniques and themes may be, O'Brien's narratives always end with a sense of dilemmatic vicious circle or disillusioned anarchy, reflecting the futility of anarchic resistance and rebellion within the strictly sealed borders of Irish intellectual life and the labyrinth of literary tradition.

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Postmodernity and Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal

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Abstract: The quest for authenticity as an ethical ideal can be observed throughout the intellectual history of modernity from the Renaissance to the mid-twentieth century. One of the objectives of this study is to support this fundamental claim with reference to the relevant works of certain writers and philosophers selected from different centuries to represent that long period called modernity. While the thinkers whose works are discussed to reach this goal are primarily Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Sartre, several other names are also included in this overview. Another objective of this article is to identify the common aspects of these theoretical and philosophical narratives titled “authenticity-thinking,” and to underscore their conditions of possibility. Relatedly, the main question that this study tries to answer is whether these conditions are still present in postmodernity (F. Jameson), post-postmodernity (J. Nealon), or digimodernity (A. Kirby) that follows modernity. One of the most crucial elements in this study’s assessment of contemporary societies is the figure of autistic subject that is claimed to have replaced the subject of authenticity.

Keywords:

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Postmodernlik ve Bir Etik İdeal Olarak Otantiklik

Öz: Bir etik ideal olarak otantiklik arayışı Rönesans’tan yirminci yüzyılın ortalarına değin modernliğin tüm düşünsel tarihinde karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amaçlarından biri, kendisine temel oluşturan bu iddiayı bahsi geçen uzun tarihsel dönemi temsilen farklı yüzyıllardan seçilen belli başlı yazar ve filozofların konuyla ilgili eserlerine gönderme yaparak desteklemektir. Bu doğrultuda çalışmalarına değinilen düşünürler arasında başta Rousseau, Nietzsche ve Sartre bulunsa da başka isimlere de yer verilmektedir. Makalenin bir diğer amacı ise tarihsel anlamda izi sürülen ve “otantiklik düşüncesi” olarak adlandırılan bu kuramsal veya felsefi anlatıların ortak özelliklerini belirlemek ve bunları olanaklı kılan koşulların altını çizmektir. Bununla bağlantılı olarak çalışmanın cevaplamaya giriştiği esas soru, söz konusu olanaklılık koşullarının modernlikten sonra gelen postmodernlikte (F. Jameson), post-postmodernlikte (J. Nealon) veya dijimodernlikte de (A. Kirby) mevcut olup olmadığıdır. Bu tartışmanın günümüz toplumlarıyla ilgili yanını oluşturan en önemli unsurlardan biri ise otantikliğin öznesinin yerine geçtiği öne sürülen otistik özne figürüdür.

Anahtar Sözcükler:

Otantiklik,
Postmodernlik,
Dijimodernizm,
Otistik özne,
Etik

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Introduction

Before stating the main objective of this article, let us start with a pair of jeans advertised on amazon.com as being skinny-cut and having the color “authentic repair.” On the webpage featuring this product, it is indicated that those jeans were “made in super stretch denim with slightly slubby character and soft hand. It's been washed down to an authentic, worn-in, look. The shades span from mid-indigo to warm bright blue, with areas that are almost white. Abrasions and repairs have been done with impressive craftsmanship, decorating thighs, knees and back pockets authentically” (“Nudie Jeans”). This study argues that the logic behind this product’s design, and behind the production of many other commodities on the market, relates to one of the most persistent questions of modernity. Mentioning one specific term three times in just a few lines, the discourse used in the text above, and in the descriptions of many other consumer goods for that matter, exploits the desire articulated by that question, namely staying, being, or becoming “authentic” in a world that anonymizes human subjects and forces them to dissimulation. In this article, we will briefly trace the history of how authenticity has been theorized as an ethical or existential ideal with respect to several prominent thinkers from the Age of Enlightenment, the age of industrial capitalism, and the first half of the twentieth century. As one may readily tell, these historical episodes constitute a large part of the period that is generally called modernity. But today, we know that this period has been replaced by another one—postmodernity—which signifies a new political, cultural, and economic condition globally. Therefore, this essay will also consider the postmodern condition together with the new experiences of subjectivity and collectivity it has generated, and it will ultimately try to assess what may have become of that desire called authenticity, and whether it is possible to conceive of it in any meaningful way in the contemporary moment.

Yet, before moving further, it should be emphasized that we will not employ authenticity as a concept that has a positive, decidable, and homogenous content; nor will this study attempt to define or adjudicate the true meaning of authenticity. It will rather be used as an umbrella term that designates a set of family resemblances among various philosophical and existential issues cutting across the history of modernity, and these include the corruption or the recovery of an original state of being; the loss, restoration, or the construction of an identity unique to the subject; alienation or non-alienation; autonomy or heteronomy; bad faith (self-deception) and freedom.

A Brief History of Authenticity-Thinking in Modernity

The first part of this article will concentrate on the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jean-Paul Sartre; however, it is granted that the overview of authenticity-thinking that it will present could be made longer with the inclusion, among

others, of Michel de Montaigne, Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, and Martin Heidegger. After all, it is with Montaigne's 1580 essay "On Cannibals" (105–19) that Renaissance Europe starts questioning its identity from the viewpoint of authenticity. Having read the reports by the European colonizers of South America on the native Brazilian tribes (the Tupi) and their ritual practices of cannibalism against their enemies, Montaigne sets out to evaluate in a comparative way whether it was the European societies or the Tupi who lived in concord with the fundamental traits of authentic humanness. After careful and provocative deliberations which cannot be covered here, Montaigne argues that the Tupi are wild in the same way fruits are wild in their natural mode of existence, as nature itself has created them. Therefore, these tribes seem "barbarous in the sense that they have received very little molding from the human intelligence, and are still very close to their original simplicity. They are still governed by natural laws and very little corrupted by our own" (109). Montaigne, that supreme representative of the Renaissance mind, reaches a clear verdict: European culture has fallen into inauthenticity as a result of the elaborate and inhuman mechanisms of what it calls civilization, whereas the natives of South America are authentic precisely because they have preserved their original essence and natural ways of living. The sixteenth-century Europeans make up corrupt communities as they valorize wealth and power above everything else, whereas for the Tupi communal spirit and well-being are of utmost importance, and this vision makes them a society of gallant people.

In his 1843 work *Fear and Trembling*, Kierkegaard (74–75) levels almost the same criticism against his own historical milieu, nineteenth-century Europe dominated by the values of industrial capitalism and money economy that strip every individual of the qualities that make them an authentic human being with a unique identity and vocation of their own. Kierkegaard's paradigmatic example in this context is the Old Testament prophet Abraham who obeys God's rather irrational and murderous command that he should sacrifice his only son Isaac to the divine with no apparent reason. But it is precisely by committing himself to this unfounded command that Abraham suspends the universal ethics applying to everyone within the anonymous masses of modernity, and thus he faithfully owns the vocation that makes him a singular, authentic subject (107–28). Arguably, Marx attacks the capitalist mode of production on much the same grounds. As he observes, in capitalism, humans are alienated from their labor power and capacity for conscious and meaningful activity (*praxis*), from the products of their labor, from the sense of being creative subjects, and finally, from their species life and fellow human beings (322–32). In this regard, Marx envisions communist society as an association of free producers in which alienation is overcome and individuals can reconnect with the authentic traits of their humanity. In a more existential sense, Heidegger also characterizes the state of the human subject (*Dasein*) in the technology-dominated world of modernity as one of estrangement or inauthenticity (236). He maintains that the "meaning of the Being of that being we call Dasein proves to be temporality" (60), and through the recognition of its own finitude (being-towards-death), the subject becomes

capable of dispensing with all that bogs it down in the everydayness of modernity ordinarily promoting idle talk, superficiality, and the denial of the self's potential of becoming authentic by choosing itself over against the standardizing processes and values of modern society.

At this point, it could be reiterated that the present study does not intend to provide a comprehensive account of the theories of authenticity—such an effort would certainly exceed the limits of an article. It rather tries to substantiate the aforementioned claim that authenticity as an ethical ideal has occupied a central place throughout modernity, and it wishes to do so by devoting more space to three major thinkers from three successive centuries starting with the Age of Reason. This overview will also highlight the common features and conditions of possibility underlying these different formulations of authenticity, and on this basis, it will be assessed whether the same conditions apply in postmodernity as well.

We would like to turn, then, to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who, in his *Second Discourse* delivered in 1755 on the origins of social and moral inequality, speculates for a while on the meaning of the word “misery” and asks the following question: “[W]hat kind of misery can there be for a free being whose heart is at peace and whose body is in good health? I ask which of the two, civil or natural life, is more likely to become insufferable to those who live it?” (52) This rhetorical question presents us in a nutshell with the fundamental problem that Rousseau tackles in his work, and that is how to reestablish equality in all its forms within European societies that are deeply marked by a separation from an original state of equality and happiness. The natural life that Rousseau alludes to is a state in which the so-called “savage man” lives with no misery for he is free to fulfill his natural needs and is not forced to conform to a political and moral system that claims his mind and body in return for a fake contentment (46). Genuine freedom, a non-alienated mind and labor, true morality and a lost, original state of equality are the motifs that make Rousseau a thinker of authenticity—an umbrella term, as underlined before, that denotes various interrelated concerns.

Rousseau asserts that “[i]n instinct alone, man had everything he needed in order to live in the state of nature; in a cultivated reason, he has only what he needs to live in society” (52). Civil society and culture are what we have fallen into; they have been artificially imposed on the human constitution and have corrupted such essential human traits as solidarity, pity, sharing, and concern for others' wellbeing. In a striking example, Rousseau contrasts the types of behavior prevailing in civil society with those in the animal kingdom: “In fact,” he says, “commiseration will be all the more energetic as the witnessing animal identifies itself more intimately with the suffering animal” (54). Then it is justified to argue that in the state of nature, the feeling of commiseration must have been much stronger, and if this is not the case in contemporary societies, it is because human reason now cares only about one's individual interests and gains as opposed to the common good. “Reason is what engenders egocentrism,” Rousseau claims, “and

reflection strengthens it. Reason is what turns man in upon himself" (54). And this egotistical reason does not belong in human nature but is acquired through culture and civilization.

In a famous remark of his, Rousseau expresses what he thinks is the material basis of that egotistical reason: "The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say *this is mine* and found people simple enough to believe him was the true founder of civil society" (60). Private property is the source of the privileges some enjoy to the misery of their fellow beings, and it upholds the oppression and exploitation that are necessary to maintain those privileges. As a result of this inequality, large numbers of people composed of the poor and the propertyless find themselves under the domination of propertied classes, thereby losing their freedom and self-sufficiency. Closely linked to this loss and to the kind of competitive, conflicted society created by private property is the destruction of human virtues such as sincerity and being true to oneself and to others, and of human powers like autonomy and self-determination. In such a society, it is to one's advantage to pretend to be something or someone other than what or who one in fact is. As Rousseau concludes, in modern culture, "[b]eing something and appearing to be something became two completely different things; and from this distinction there arose grand ostentation, deceptive cunning, and all the vices that follow in their wake" (67). One must resist such deceptive kinds of conduct and try to harmonize what they are and how they appear or behave, and the ideal society should be constituted by such honest citizens and authentic individuals.

Rousseau's society generating dissimulation and complicity becomes "the herd" and its value system "slave morality" in Friedrich Nietzsche, against which the "will to power" that only noble souls can own and realize functions as the antidote. It is when he writes about creation and self-creation does Nietzsche reveal his concern with authenticity most clearly. In his 1886 book titled *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche makes a remarkable comparison between two imaginary figures that he calls "the scholar" and "the genius." While he attributes the qualities of begetting or giving birth "in their most elevated sense" to the genius, he asserts that "the scholar, the scientific average man, always rather resembles an old maid . . . [he] is not noble . . . [he is] a type that does not dominate and is neither authoritative nor self-sufficient" (125). That scholar type is the one who produces objective certainties and quantities for the modern masses and their indoctrinators. "He is only an instrument; let us say, he is a *mirror*—he is no 'end in himself'" (126) The scholar mirroring the mediocrity of their age is thus self-denying. The objective, scientific person displays "a dangerous unconcern about Yes and No," they are utterly incapable of affirming or negating life; consequently, they cannot engage in creative and impactful actions. As Nietzsche continues, "If love and hatred are wanted from him . . . he will do what he can and give what he can. But one should not be surprised if it is not much—if just here he proves inauthentic, fragile, questionable, and worm-eaten. . . . After all, he is genuine only insofar as he may be objective: only in his cheerful 'totalism' he is still 'nature' and 'natural'" (127). But this is not what being human is about. A person

“without substance and content,” a selfless person who lacks the strength to create their own laws, values, and passions cannot avoid dissolving into the herd and they would be doomed to live an entirely dependent life shaped by slave morality. “Genuine philosophers,” on the other hand, are the embodiments of authentic humans (or human potentialities) precisely because “their [non-scientific] ‘knowing’ is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—*will to power*” (136). And this is the very power required to lead a life that is liberated from the corrupting and anonymizing values of the modern age.

Nietzsche’s target here is the European culture of the nineteenth century, the Europe of closer international relations through capitalism and commerce, of universalized public opinion through such relations and newspapers, of debased mass education and mass democracy that establish a purely formal equality and sameness among the essentially unequal and non-identical. In short, that is the continental stage on which a hypocritical drama of mediocrity and leveling is played out. In this world of generalized pettiness, Nietzsche argues, “the concept of greatness entails being noble, wanting to be by oneself, being able to be different, standing alone and having to live independently” (139). It is only by recognizing and assuming one’s will to power, by creating oneself and remaining autonomous, can one become authentic. There is no lost authenticity to be regained for Nietzsche; an authentic existence and selfhood should be attained through one’s unceasing self-creation and self-governing. The much-debated figure of the *Übermensch* (Overman) signifies that individual who is committed to fashioning themselves through emancipation from the yokes of social and cultural value systems.

That notion of commitment takes us to existentialism, one of the most influential philosophies of the twentieth century, and to its foremost philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre’s historical moment was not only the period between the two world wars, but also the broader era that witnessed the disappearance of religion from the areas of natural sciences, metaphysics, and ethics after the interventions mainly of Charles Darwin, Marx, Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. In that context, also to distinguish himself from thinkers like Kierkegaard, Sartre called his philosophy “atheistic existentialism,” and claimed that the general premise of various existentialisms that existence precedes essence found its fullest expression in his own work. In the 1946 essay, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, Sartre discusses the fundamental attributes of a paper knife to illustrate what he means by that premise. An object such as a paper knife is designed and manufactured by someone in a certain way and with a definite purpose. The manufacturer of that object cannot have produced it without knowing what end it would serve. “Let us say, therefore,” writes Sartre, “the essence of the paper knife—that is, the sum of formulas and properties that enable it to be produced and defined—precedes its existence. Thus, the presence before my eyes of that paper knife or book is determined” (21).

Atheistic existentialism maintains that there is no divine manufacturer in whose mind humans' essential characteristics and purposes may have been preconceived. Sartre writes that "if God does not exist, there is at least one being in whom existence precedes essence—a being whose existence comes before its essence, a being who exists before he can be defined by any concept of it" (22). That being is called human or human reality. Since human has no nature or essence as there is not a divine artisan to conceive of it, all that is known from the viewpoint of human reality is that the world is and we exist in it, but what or who we are is not pre-given to us. A tool such as a wristwatch has a predefined essence; it is made to show the time, and if it lacks the mechanism to fulfill that purpose, it cannot have the identity of a wristwatch at all. We do not have such a determinate function; nor can we tell what essential role makes human what it is. Instead, we are constantly obliged to choose what we are or what we will become; we are obliged to define ourselves by our successive choices and courses of action. As Sartre asserts, "[m]an is not only that which he conceives himself to be, but also that which he wills himself to be, and since he conceives of himself only after he exists . . . *man is nothing other than what he makes of himself*" (22).

In the absence of any unchanging, reliable divine, or objective set of values that define what we are or how we must act, we are free to choose who we are and what we ought to do in concrete situations. Through making choices (not making choices is a kind of choosing too), we project ourselves into the future in line with our ever-conscious conception as to what we will ourselves to become. Nothing exists before that free choice of ours and our sustained commitment to it. "Man is responsible for what he is," says Sartre, and the "first effect of existentialism is to make every man conscious of what he is, and to make him solely responsible for his own existence" (23). Abandonment is the name of the experience wherein we come to terms with the fact that there is not a hypothetical power to draw us to a moral path. Sartre states that humans are not defined *a priori* but by their actions, and that their destiny lies within themselves. "Consequently we are dealing with a morality of action and commitment" (40). However, the recognition that I choose my own actions in concrete situations and commit myself to those choices, and that I am free to choose from among a variety of possible courses of actions, places on me an enormous responsibility and anguish. I am always compelled to decide the meaning of my own being with no reference to my allegedly fixed circumstances, character, or any other deterministic factor. I am responsible to choose without denying my freedom; I am always free to decide what I am in the present or will become in the future; in this particular sense, I am "condemned to be free" (29).

Overwhelmed by the anguishing awareness of their abandonment, of the obligation to choose for themselves a course of action and to create an ethics of commitment, most people negate their fundamental freedom. They develop the attitude of *mauvaise foi* (bad faith) in an utterly self-objectifying and self-deceiving way, and such people "can be judged only on the grounds of strict authenticity" (49). Coming to terms with the ontological fact that our existence is remarkably pointless and that we must create our

own meaning through our deeds and commitments is the precondition for authenticity. So is bearing the responsibility for our choices, which must take individual and collective freedom as their end. As Sartre emphasizes in his 1943 magnum opus *Being and Nothingness*, the fact that humans are often inclined to deny their freedom by objectifying themselves “does not mean that we cannot radically escape bad faith. But this supposes a self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted. This self-recovery we shall call authenticity” (70). Accordingly, it should be possible for humans to live in good faith, authentically, by assuming the full burden of their freedom and the responsibility for choosing and making themselves into what or who they would rather be.

(Post-)Postmodernity and the Possibility of Authenticity-Thinking

Up to this point, we have overviewed some of the major representatives of authenticity-thinking in modernity. But, as noted before, that condition called modernity has morphed into something different in the post-WWII era, in the Cold War period, or during the passage from industrial to finance capitalism first in the West and then the world over with the collapse of the Socialist Block. Again, the present study has no intention to valorize any of the formulations of authenticity that have been addressed so far. Instead of deciding which notion is better than the others, it seems more interesting and productive to think about the fact that throughout the history of modernity, there did exist favorable circumstances or conditions of possibility for authenticity-thinking, which does not seem to be the case anymore. We would like to suggest that one such condition of possibility can be designated as the presence of an outside, real or imaginary. Second, that was accompanied by the element of distance, be it literal (spatial and/or temporal) or metaphorical. And last, all this went hand in hand with the existence of the Other, external or internal to the subject.

What enabled Rousseau to imagine the “savage man” that is one with his unspoiled nature as well as his quasi-communistic society was the colonial encounters Europe had started to have first with the South American indigenous tribes mostly in the early sixteenth century—and Montaigne is a glaring precursor to Rousseau in this context. These figures, the “savage man” and his nonalienated community, constituted the Other and the outside to the forms of subjectivity and sociality Rousseau wished to radically transform. Nietzsche’s promotion of the figure of “the genius” as inhabiting the outside of the calculating, leveling, soulless European culture shows a similar imagining of distance. Or, one may argue, the bohemian artistic and literary cultures (or, countercultures) of the second half of the nineteenth century, as well as the Oriental sources of wisdom (Zoroastrianism or Zarathustra himself, for instance), were veritable figurations of an outside and distance in Nietzsche. Besides, in that period, nature itself, the domain of non-urban, non-industrial life, remained relatively intact until capital colonized it entirely. The three conditions of possibility noted above can be pointed out in Sartre’s case, too. The recovery of good faith or authenticity requires getting outside one’s self-objectified state by becoming other to oneself, by negating one’s present, inauthentic existence through

critical self-reflection and self-distancing. On a different level, Sartre could draw on several socialist experiments as the Other of his capitalist, bourgeois society. For him, the latter signified a gigantic mechanism of objectification and alienation (as mentioned, Marx had diagnosed this about a century before Sartre), and the presence of such political alternatives enabled him to conceptualize acts and choices committed to human freedom and authenticity in social and political terms, as well.

These conditions of possibility are severely and irreversibly undermined in postmodernity. In his seminal study *Postmodernism, or, the Logic of Late Capitalism*, cultural and literary theorist Fredric Jameson argues that the postmodern condition is characterized by certain constitutive features, three of which are “a new depthlessness,” “a consequent weakening of historicity,” and “a whole new type of emotional ground tone” (6–25). According to this theory, in postmodernity, various depth models of the previous era come to be abolished or debunked both in critical thinking and in the experiences of individuals living in “a whole new culture of the image or the simulacrum” (6). These abolished depth models include the binaries of inside and outside, essence and appearance, authenticity and inauthenticity, and latent and manifest, which have been used extensively in fields such as cultural and literary criticism, political theory, existential philosophy, and psychoanalysis. Moreover, the sense of historicity gets eroded in our perception of History (written with a capital “H”) and in our experience of private temporality. As a result of this weakening of historicity, we fail to grasp history as a more or less meaningful, coherent flow, nor can we make a coherent sense of our lives as the structured, unified unfolding of a life span and the flourishing of a self.

The last point about postmodernity that must be explained is the emergence of what Jameson calls “a whole new type of emotional ground tone” (6). This emotional tone is determined by a certain “waning of affect” (10) resulting from the disappearance of the depth model of personality or subjectivity, which has a significant impact on our relationship with ourselves. It is no longer the case that we feel alienated from a core, deep subjectivity that colors our perception of ourselves; nor do we seek anymore to reconnect with such an essence. This situation signals a kind of fragmentation and exhaustion far more severe than the separation from oneself that was experienced before. In modernity, it was presumably possible to abolish alienation through the kinds of strategies of conversion to authenticity proposed by Nietzsche or Sartre (and also Kierkegaard). In postmodernity, with the waning of affect, such existential commitments become impracticable as we feel thoroughly empty and fragmented rather than alienated. It must be obvious that the depthlessness or flatness experienced in postmodernity, and the disorientation felt in relationship to history and to one’s subjective temporality, do not yield favorable circumstances for the imagining of authenticity in the way it has been discussed above.

Jameson notes that all these characteristic features of postmodernity are interlinked with “a whole new technology, which is itself a figure for a whole new

economic world system" (6). This new economic system is known as globalism or neoliberal capitalism with its new models of work and total integration of culture and economy. The technology Jameson evokes is now called ICTs—Information and Communication Technologies. In his now classic book *New Media*, Terry Flew designates six main attributes of ICTs and new media, which are digitalization, convergence, interactivity, virtual reality, globalization, and networks (17–30). It is possible to assert that these attributes have had a significant impact on the fate of authenticity-thinking in postmodernity as they denote the widespread integration of the technologies and processes that have given way to the global establishment of the Web 2.0 together with its blogs, Wikis, social media channels, digital economic activities, and virtual communities as the pervasive ecosystems of lived experience and subjectivity (76–162).

A more recent study building on Jameson's work, *Post-postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Just-in-Time Capitalism* by Jeffrey Nealon underlines that the new economy pointed out by the former has now created "a world of cyber-work, e-commerce, wireless communication, distance education, virtual markets, home health care, and . . . flexibly specialized labor" (39). These decentered, diffused, network-type structures signify the dismantling of their older counterparts such as "the office, the school, the bank, the trading floor, the mall, the hospital, the factory," with the last being the paradigmatic template for the organization of modern society (40). One may recall that although it was patterned on the factory, in the social structure of modernity certain depth models like inside and outside, and distances such as the one between work and leisure, were still in place. Work was not all-encompassing as it is now in (post-)postmodernity; there used to be such a thing as free, personal time as individuals were not expected to be accessible practically round the clock in the name of productivity. Parallel to this, home was not an extension of workplace or office, and we were more likely to be connected to our minds in a relatively unmediated way as they were not entirely occupied and controlled by the images, spectacles, and communication contents of the connected world. Similarly, in modernity, physical distances and cultural outsides were not yet eliminated or blurred by globalization and ICTs.

Besides, in the contemporary world, there is nothing outside culture since every aspect of our collective and subjective lives has been subsumed under the logic of money, which means that today nothing can escape commodification. This new economy produces not only material goods but also social relations, communication, languages, images, lifestyles, subjectivities—in short, it produces culture itself, and the latter in its turn produces capital (200). In this process, producer and consumer become identical; we produce and consume culture concurrently within the coordinates and mechanisms provided by present-day capitalism. In this model, we are three things at once—the producer, the consumer, and the commodity itself. As Nealon observes, the universal imperatives of the current system "ask you to produce yourself through consumption, which doesn't separate you from who you are 'authentically,' but is your only means to make yourself, period" (200). Both the dominant economic and social system, and those

willing to resist it look to the same dynamic for more profit and more self-creativity respectively, and that is the total process of commodification and consumption.

What happens to authenticity-thinking in (post-)postmodernity bearing the abovementioned characteristics? Where can authenticity as an ethical ideal be located in such circumstances? Or, in what shape and form can it be perceived in a world where the loss of depth, selfhood, and temporality holds sway? Among possible others, one answer to these questions would certainly be found in the product description of the pair of jeans with which this article opened. The authenticity marketed through that blurb is first related to the brand identity—these jeans are a pair of genuine “X” brand jeans and that indicates a kind of value in itself. The subjective gain associated with the acquisition of that identity and value is conveyed through the simulated visible effects of an intense, committed, rich, that is, a genuine or authentic life reflected by the worn-in, shaded, abraded, repaired look of the advertised product.

Digimodernism and the Autistic Subject

Before concluding, we would like to look into another answer which shows in a distorted form some of the main attributes of authenticity as an ethical objective theorized in modernity. This example is presented in Alan Kirby’s striking examination of contemporary society titled *Digimodernism*, and it is epitomized by the figure of the autistic—not the alienated individual seeking to attain a non-alienated existence, nor the older kind of self in search of authenticity through a resilient commitment to a life-project as its paradigm of meaning, but the contemporary subject that displays or practices many of the major symptoms of that neurological disorder called clinical autism. Kirby argues that ours is an age of autism in that “we inhabit a society uniquely adapted to the frequent ascription of autism and the identification of autistic traits” (227–28). However, Kirby does not mean to suggest that autism is merely a social construct or that it does not exist clinically. He rather emphasizes that there is a massive increase in the number of individuals unwillingly developing autistic traits to be able to bear the structure, the workings, and the demands of (post-)postmodern society which he calls digimodernity.

The widespread use of new technologies and media such as PCs, the Internet, smartphones, and online video games has resulted in a situation where individuals can operate in different worlds or systems of reality without engaging in social interactions—a state qualified as “systemic desocialization.” Kirby maintains that here is a pattern that extends to the “real world” as a “diminished capacity to relate to or to ‘read’ other people, a preference for solitude and a loss of empathy;” moreover, “such technologies . . . do little to stimulate language acquisition” (230). To this, it seems possible to add the paralysis of self-expression via language and the diminishing of communication skills, verbal and non-verbal alike. All in all, this condition reflects one major characteristic of autism that is described as “mindblindness,” the lack of skills to view the world through the eyes of the Other (229)—something that did not previously have such prevalence and was not at all

valorized in the older theories of authenticity. What we face now is a state in which socialization and communication are seriously damaged, despite all those social media platforms as well as virtual interaction channels universalized first by Web 2.0 and vastly improved afterward.

In Kirby's words, autism "is produced as the exact contrary of hegemonic social forces in a variety of contexts" (231), and at this point, we may briefly examine some traits of contemporary society producing autistic behavioral and cognitive patterns as its diametrical opposite. One of them is the "shift toward global overpopulation, ever-growing urbanization, the spread of constant formal and informal surveillance, the disappearance of wilderness and the near-impossibility of solitude; this not as a fact but as a perception or experience, as noise pollution and light pollution" (231). Against this engulfing experience, the individual living autistically requires solitude and silence; they seek to remain free from any kind of interference, and they value physical integrity as an emblem of the rejection of that condition. Within this framework, it seems possible to couple physical integrity with temporal and cognitive integrity, thereby suggesting a much more complete denunciation of convergence and networking in their multiple forms made possible and even mandatory by ICTs and new media.

Another such pervasive trait is about production and labor regime as it involves "the economic tendency toward ever-greater flexibility, multitasking, ad hoc arrangements, job insecurity, rapid staff turnover, the felt commercial need constantly to update, restructure, retrain" (231). As opposed to this newly dominant economic structure and mode of work, autism requires that the coordinates and punctuations, as it were, of the subject's life remain the same and its past dealings be repeated safely. Whereas the consumerist society is profoundly amnesiac and prefers short-term memory, quickly disposable lives, and rapidly changeable activities, the autistic individual operates through their deep memory retaining as many habits and lasting details as possible. And the third trait that has to be considered for the purposes of this study is "the social shift toward an ever-greater valorization of social skills, of the ability to chat and come across, to accrue popularity and self-present, toward a fetishization of gregariousness and bonding with others through various manipulations and self-betrayals" (231). In contrast to these numbing and performative forms of daily conduct deriving from popular cultural elements like the incessant gossip taking place in reality TV shows or the idolization of celebrities, the autistic subject espouses the authentic, the tangible, and in-depth knowledge versus trivia; genuine facts versus shallow opinions; and problem-solving versus useless idle talk—and one may notice here a trace of Heidegger's attack on the everydayness of modernity threatening authenticity.

Nevertheless, the qualities born by the contemporary subject displaying such autistic symptoms make them an outcast, a loser. Unlike the existentialist hero or the cultural revolutionary promoted in the modern theories of authenticity, there is nothing heroic or commendable about the present-day autistic subjects. These individuals "cannot

be seen as ‘rebels’ against or ‘martyrs’ of contemporary society because they have not chosen their profoundly difficult relationship to it” (233). By the same token, the autistic subject seems to lack the conscious resilience to commit themselves to such ethical courses of action or life-projects as the ones affirmed by Nietzsche or Sartre. Yet, to the extent that it still bears several resemblances to the major aspects of authenticity theorized in modernity, autism figures as a distorted and self-defeating form of the quest for an authentic existence and identity. That is so because it forecloses the social and communicative dimension that was required for the imagining of authenticity even when it seemed to be a profoundly personal engagement. After all, not even Nietzsche’s recluse did give up writing and speaking to the society they willed to destroy and recreate based on transvalued values.

Conclusion

One could suggest that somewhere in the passage from modernity to (post-) postmodernity or digimodernity, the notion of authenticity lost its original thrust as an ethical program for the overcoming of dissimulation, alienation, and apathy, and as the will to autonomy, self-creation, and self-expression. In this particular sense, authenticity once had a utopian aspect to it, which has now been mutated into a debilitating experience and market inauthenticity. We live in a society where there is no longer an outside to capital and culture precisely because they have collapsed into each other through consumerism. Even attempted authentic-looking resistances to the system are quickly integrated into the money economy, or it is soon understood that they were produced by that system in the first place.

Like a dead star, authenticity seems to have left behind the traces of its glorious life. Or one might state that it continues to exist as a kind of zombie—it is dead and undead at the same time. Apart from its shadow-self revealed in the autistic subject, one can see the zombie-like quality of authenticity in the product description of the pair of jeans discussed before. The singularity, originality, subjective intensity, and plenitude, the sense of self-worth, and the experience of self-fashioning—all that authenticity once valorized and promised, they seem to live on in various compartments of consumerist culture in a thoroughly commodified and drained form. Authenticity, one of the most deep-seated concerns of modernity, is still around but it is not recognizable anymore except in its sheer ideological representations alongside the figure of the autistic.

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Reiteration of Jane Eyre's Search for the Feminine Subject in Atkinson's Crime Fiction

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Abstract: Kate Atkinson in her first and fourth crime novel, *Case Histories* and *Started Early, Took My Dog*, rewrites Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* and other Female Gothic narratives to ponder feminism's failure to 'arrive.' Second-wave feminism asks women to retrieve the half-obliterated feminine subject and construct from the fragments an emancipated identity for themselves. In Atkinson's first crime novel, the amateur detective and actress Julia Land must retrieve a vanished sister and, in the fourth, in her onscreen role as a forensic pathologist the identity of a mutilated sex worker. Yet Julia repeats Jane Eyre's simultaneous search for a lost woman and complicity with patriarchy's occlusion of her. Atkinson, it will be argued, signals that the contemporary literary female investigator and ultimately today's women relive the gothic heroine's dilemma: Susceptible to the myth of romantic love, they abort their feminist mission and collude with patriarchy's obliteration of the feminine subject.

Keywords:

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Atkinson'ın Suç Romanlarında Jane Eyre'in Femenin Özne Arayışının Tekkerürü

Öz: Kate Atkinson ilk ve dördüncü suç romanı *Case Histories* (Suç Dosyaları) ve *Started Early, Took My Dog*'da (Köpeğimi Alıp Erkenden), feminizmin başarısızlığını gözden geçirmek için Charlotte Brontë'nin *Jane Eyre*'ini ve başka Kadın Gotik anlatılarını yeniden yazar. İkinci dalga feminizm, kadınlardan yarı yok edilmiş feminen özneyi bulmalarını ve kalıntılarından kendileri için özgür bir kimlik inşa etmelerini ister. Atkinson'ın ilk suç romanında amatör dedektif ve oyuncu Julia Land kaybolan kız kardeşini, dördüncü romanında da televizyon ekranında büründüğü adli tıp doktoru rolünde, bedenine eziyet edilerek öldürülmüş bir seks işçisinin kimliğini bulmak zorundadır. Ancak Julia, Jane Eyre gibi hem kaybolan bir kadını arar hem de kadının varlığını görünmez kılmaya çalışan ataerkiyle suç ortaklığı yapar. Bu makalede, Atkinson'ın çağdaş suç romanında kadın dedektifinin ve günümüz kadınlarının 'gotik kadın kahramanın' açmazını tekrar yaşadıklarına işaret ettiği savunulacaktır. Kendilerini romantik aşk mitine kaptırarak feminist misyonlarını unutup ataerkinin feminen özneyi yok etme suçuna ortak olurlar.

Anahtar Sözcükler:

Kate Atkinson,
Case Histories,
Started Early, Took My Dog,
Jane Eyre,
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Kate Atkinson's (1951–...) crime novel series, in which women continue to vanish, features the private detective Jackson Brodie—and his (ex-)girlfriend the actress Julia Land. In several of the novels, Julia emerges as an amateur detective in real life and/or as a forensic pathologist on the television screen. Second-wave feminism has ascribed to its daughters the task of retrieving the half-obliterated feminine subject and constructing from the remains a liberated identity for women. Yet Julia wavers in her commitment to this task. Atkinson revisits, in the series, an important antecedent of feminist crime fiction, the Female Gothic, to examine an ongoing cycle of partial failure. In *Case Histories* (2004) and *Started Early, Took My Dog* (2010), the first and fourth novel in the series, she mainly reworks Charlotte Brontë's (1816–1855) *Jane Eyre* (1847). Ann Radcliffe's (1764–1823) *The Mysteries of Udolpho* (1794) and Jane Austen's (1775–1817) *Northanger Abbey* (1817) are also alluded to. Radcliffe's Emily St. Aubert, Austen's Catherine Morland, and Brontë's Jane Eyre represent prototypical female amateur detectives; however, they do not accomplish their feminist missions. Atkinson's contemporary amateur detective Julia follows more closely in Jane's footsteps. In *Case Histories*, Julia must in real life retrieve a vanished sister and, in *Started Early, Took My Dog*, in her onscreen role as the forensic pathologist Beatrice Butler the identity of a mutilated sex worker. Yet Julia, on and off screen, re-enacts Jane's simultaneous search for the vanished Bertha Rochester and complicity with the bigamist Edward Rochester's incarceration of his wife, Bertha. While Julia is a present-day version of Jane, Julia's (former) boyfriend Jackson emerges as a present-day version of Rochester. It will be argued that Atkinson insinuates the entrapment of the contemporary literary female investigator and ultimately today's women in the gothic heroine's dilemma: Seemingly empowered feminist agents, they are exposed as present-day Janes who continue to allow the deceptive myth of romantic love to undermine their commitment to feminism and render them complicit with patriarchy's occlusion of the feminine subject. Feminism is thus caught in a time warp and is unable to arrive.

Looking back, in the new millennium, Atkinson signals women's failure to accomplish feminism's aims. Kate Millett, in 1970, concluded her *Sexual Politics* with the hope that feminism – or “a second wave of the sexual revolution” – might finally set women free from patriarchal oppression (363). About two decades after that, Luce Irigaray spoke of the need for half-erased or misrepresented women to “find themselves anew, as subjects” (190). The female investigator or forensic pathologist in crime fiction must thus confront trauma and recuperate “the [female] victim's suffering and identity” (Horsley 152). The act of retrieving what was lost will allow for conceptualizations of the liberated feminine subject and models of non-oppressive society. Catherine Riley and Lynne Pearce include Atkinson among a younger generation of women crime writers whose “books are the legacy of feminism's assimilation of the generic conventions of crime to tell new kinds of stories” (136). Yet the new breed of female investigators is still trapped in the old kind of story. Sally R. Munt speaks of Sara Paretsky's serial female

investigator V. I. Warshawski, who made her debut in the eighties, as a deceptive model of female agency: While she is expected to deflect any “masculine threat,” she is often presented as “strong *within* her gender role” (41, 33). Her gender role renders even a tough serial female investigator like Sue Grafton’s Kinsey Millhone, in *As Is for Alibi*, which was published in 1982, gullible to the art of “manipulative seduction,” as practiced by a man who has killed a woman (Reitz 28). A representative of a later generation of female investigators, Atkinson’s Julia is but a contemporary version of Brontë’s Jane whose susceptibility to the myth of romantic love renders her an abortive investigator of patriarchal culpability and a wavering feminist. As Millett observes, “[r]omantic love . . . obscures the realities of female status, blinding women to their own ‘marginal life’” (37, 38) and to the trauma of other women. The allusion, in *Started Early, Took My Dog*, “to ‘Brontë country’” (210) should alert us to the return, in Atkinson’s crime novels, of the ambivalent gothic heroine. While Emma Parker draws attention to Atkinson’s reworking, in *Behind the Scenes at the Museum* (1995), of Female Gothic narratives, such as Emily Brontë’s (1818–1848) *Wuthering Heights* (1847) and Daphne Du Maurier’s (1907–1989) *Rebecca* (1938) (20), Lucie Armit discusses *Case Histories* as a postfeminist Gothic narrative which explores women’s ongoing entrapment in patriarchal culture (16–29). Yet *Case Histories* and *Started Early, Took My Dog* are more specifically rewritings of *Jane Eyre*. *The Mysteries of Udolpho* and *Northanger Abbey* also resonate in Atkinson’s novels. The American poet Emily Dickinson’s (1830–1886) gothic poem “I started early, took my dog” (1862) – in which the persona goes to the seaside where the sea personified as a male threatens to rape her – moreover, serves as inspiration for the title of Atkinson’s fourth crime novel (Beebe 166). In this article, the focus is on Atkinson’s use of the gothic heroine Jane as a lens through which to interrogate the contemporary investigator Julia/Beatrice and ultimately flawed feminists’ dilemma: They are exposed as present-day Janes who resume the search for the vanished feminine subject in patriarchy’s closet only to allow their susceptibility to romance to undermine their search and render them complicit with misogynistic men. Atkinson’s use of intertextuality, then, signals women’s ongoing lack of commitment to feminism.

Atkinson follows in the footsteps of Brontë who, like Austen, in turn, borrowed the storyline of the female amateur detective’s abortive search for a vanished woman from Radcliffe. As Diana Wallace and Andrew Smith observe: “It is Radcliffe’s novels with their heroines in flight from male tyrants” and – in anticipation of French feminism – “in search of lost mothers . . . which we now tend to characterise as the beginnings of ‘Female Gothic’” (2). However, Lisa M. Dresner discusses Radcliffe’s Emily and Brontë’s Jane as prototypical female investigators who fail to find the object of their search on their own (11, 18). Catherine, who, Dresner argues, misinterprets characters’ motives and events (14), most importantly, aborts the search altogether. Both Austen and Brontë, then, offer us variations on the pattern we observe in *The Mysteries of Udolpho*: the failure of the heroine’s search for an incarcerated mother surrogate, her aunt (Dresner 11); her dependence on her reunion with the mother surrogate on the gothic villain; and her

marriage to a seemingly reformed version of the villain. Similarly, a reader of the Female Gothic novel, Catherine suspects General Tilney of having murdered or shut away his wife and begins a search for the absent woman who is, however, abandoned because of her romance with the Tilneys' son Henry. While the critics Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, in *The Madwoman in the Attic*, have established *Jane Eyre* as a feminist novel, they discussed its protagonist as another wavering feminist (336–71). Jane's search for Bertha, who is incarcerated "in . . . Bluebeard's castle" (138) remains inconclusive as well. Jane proves reluctant to lift her love interest Rochester's dark secret; Bertha is finally revealed to Jane (Dresner 18) by a cornered Rochester. Like Emily, Jane not only relies on her search for a lost woman on the gothic villain, but her attempt to construct a liberated identity for herself and other women, as suggested by her threat that she will "'preach liberty to . . . [Rochester's] harem inmates'" (297), is also an abortive one. Jane escapes from Rochester only to marry him eventually. Gilbert and Gubar suggest that Rochester is reformed and capable of 'an egalitarian relationship' with Jane (369). Yet their marriage results in a repetition of women's trauma: Rochester's decision to send Adèle to boarding school – which, in its cruelty, invokes little Jane's school – turns her into another vanished female and severs her bond with her surrogate mother Jane. Blinded by love, Jane is, then, like Emily and Catherine, reabsorbed into "[t]he deceptively reassuring and entrapping social and cultural narratives of domestic bliss, the family, security of home" which, Gina Wisker observes, haunt "women's Gothic" (9). In the Female Gothic tales told by Radcliffe, Austen, and Brontë, the task of retrieving the vanished feminine subject and constructing from the fragments an emancipated identity for women thus remains incomplete.

In *Case Histories* and *Started Early, Took My Dog*, despite the cautionary tales of the Female Gothic and the lessons of feminism, the contemporary female investigator Julia as representative of today's women reiterates primarily Jane's susceptibility to romance and her complicity with patriarchy's obliteration of the feminine subject. The title of the first crime novel alludes to a series of unsolved crimes, among them, the abduction of Julia's little sister, Olivia. In her search for her vanished sister, Julia is, like Jane, dependent on her love interest, the private detective Jackson, who is, as noted above, a contemporary Rochester. Julia colludes with Jackson's attempt to cover up a crime and occlude the feminine subject. In *Started Early, Took My Dog*, Julia is separated from Jackson who, she realizes, is a threat to women. The title of this crime novel alludes not only, as noted above, to a gothic poem by Dickinson, but also to Jackson's journey, together with his canine companion, to a seaside town to kill a woman. While Julia leaves him, she continues to search for romantic love and colludes with the patriarchy. Her onscreen persona, the forensic pathologist Beatrice, another present-day Jane, who must retrieve the identity of a mutilated sex worker, renders Julia's and ultimately today's women's complicity more palpable. An ambivalent figure, the pathologist is associated with the reconstruction of the identity of a female murder victim—and through "[t]he sheer violence of autoptic procedures . . . with the criminal act" (Horsley 152). Beatrice's profession thus highlights contemporary women's entanglement in Jane's dilemma: While they must retrieve the

vanished feminine subject, they continue to allow the myth of romantic love to render them complicit with patriarchy's obliteration of women.

While we are shown, in *Case Histories*, how Julia, a victim of paternal abuse, transforms into a seemingly empowered amateur detective, her interrogation of criminal patriarchy is abortive. Indeed, she reiterates her eldest sister, Sylvia, and the gothic heroine Jane's traumatic experience in and complicity with the patriarchal system. Crime fiction follows the gothic convention of presenting us with a "family with a guilty past" (Scaggs 67). "In Atkinson's work," whether crime or non-crime fiction, "the idea(l) of the happy family is a dangerous illusion and home is always uncanny, marked by absence" – the absence of women – "loss, and trauma" (Hanson 31–32). The Lands' dark family history is a variation of Jane's childhood trauma and the Rochesters' guilty family secret. Julia's father, Victor Land, remembers his vanished mother, Ellen, "as a raving madwoman of the Victorian variety" (*Case 8*). Experiencing severe depression after giving birth to a stillborn baby, Ellen is, as reminiscent of the incarcerated madwoman, Bertha, sent to a lunatic asylum. Victor inherits from his father, Oswald, the role of, an incestuous, Rochester. The gothic chambers of secrets in *Jane Eyre*, the red-room in which Jane is imprisoned as a child for her defiance of her cruel cousin John Reed and the attic in which Bertha is incarcerated transform into Victor's dark study. While the five-year-old Julia escapes her father, outside his room, through screaming, Sylvia is systematically raped in its "forbidden interior" (*Case 7*). Although she is a victim of criminal patriarchy, Sylvia enters into complicity with it by killing her three-year-old sister, Olivia—a betrayal Julia repeats as an amateur detective.

As vaguely reminiscent of a crazed and vengeful Bertha, an apparently mentally deranged Sylvia, who suffers from "fainting fits," contemplates killing her abusive father and ineffectual mother in their sleep (*Case 4*, 404). Yet Sylvia suffocates Olivia instead. As Glenda Norquay notes, in Atkinson's crime fiction "the more conventional notions of victim, perpetrator and crime break down" as suggestive of moral confusion (136). Sylvia sees the gruesome murder not only as a form of mercy killing, which will save Olivia from the father, but also as the offer of a sacrifice to a male God through which she will save herself. Sylvia in fact recollects Abraham's intended sacrifice of his son Isaac (*Case 411*). After the desperate deed, she decides to ask her father what to do. Armit remarks that "Sylvia recognizes that only Victor can act as accomplice" (*Case 21*). Yet Sylvia, who has obliterated a female, is, in turn, complicit with patriarchy. Sylvia's betrayal of Olivia, then, invokes Jane's betrayal of her 'sister' Bertha. Sylvia's eventual transformation into Sister Mary Luke also brings to mind the crazy nun Agnes, in *The Mysteries of Udolpho*, who, in her former life, persuaded her lover, the Marquis de Villeroi, to poison his supposedly adulterous wife, the heroine Emily's aunt. Sylvia's betrayal ultimately foreshadows Julia's own betrayal of Olivia. Atkinson signals that whether in their struggle for survival or in their search for romantic love, women continue to collude with the patriarchy.

In the present of the novel, thirty-four years after her sister Olivia's mysterious disappearance, from a tent in the garden, and two days after her father's death, Julia must adopt the role of feminist amateur detective and interrogate criminal patriarchy and retrieve her lost sister. Yet Atkinson is skeptical about the idea of female empowerment, retribution, and healing. She seems to agree with Munt who suspects, in a chapter title, that the feminist female investigator, or "[t]he New Woman," is but "a sheep in wolves' clothing" (30). Like Jane who survives the cruelty of both her cousin John and the supervisor of Lowood school, Mr. Brooklehurst, the survivor Julia resists confrontation with trauma. However, it clearly continues to inform Julia's present life. As Armitt remarks, "those left behind," namely, the sisters Julia and Amelia, "become haunted by the dark departures of both Sylvia and Olivia" (22). As reminiscent of her prototype, who is, in Rochester's mansion, troubled in her sleep by nightmares, Julia is as a child a troubled sleeper as suggestive of the intrusion of traumatic memories and as an adult an insomniac. Her repeated performance in the role of a terminal patient, in the British television series *Casualty*, moreover, invokes Sigmund Freud's notion of re-enactment of trauma: "[T]he patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten or repressed, but *acts* it out. . . . he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it" (150). Julia's compulsion to repeat trauma suggests her helpless entrapment in it. In order to move forward, she must adopt the role of amateur detective and confront the culpable past. We are reminded of the protagonist of Atkinson's *Behind the Scenes at the Museum*, Ruby Lennox, who, Parker notes, "must face the past in order to have a future" (41). Yet Julia becomes an abortive detective who soon relies on both her search for her lost sister in present-day Rochester and becomes complicit with his concealment of patriarchy's guilty past and present.

Neither the gothic heroine nor her descendant Julia finds the lost female through her own efforts. The incarcerated Bertha is, as noted above, finally revealed to Jane by the culprit, Rochester. After Julia discovers in a locked drawer of her father's desk Olivia's toy mouse which Julia and Amelia interpret as evidence of the paterfamilias' murder of their vanished sister, the sisters hire the attractive hard-boiled private detective Jackson. A flawed man, Jackson is enlisted in the feminist mission of retrieving a lost female only to fall back into the role of the misogynistic Rochester. Jackson is at once a male devastated by his sister's rape and murder, in the 1970s, and, like his avatar, a man who perceives women as a threat to his masculinity. The tough private detective traditionally "perceives women," in particular, forceful women, "as threatening his identity and fears losing control" (Horsley 82). Both Jackson and Rochester have a harem of women most of whom they see as a threat. Rochester's harem mainly includes Jane, her rival Blanche Ingram, and two allegedly unfaithful women in the shape of his former mistress the opera dancer Céline Varens and his wife, Bertha. Jackson's harem mainly consists of his 'deceitful' ex-wife, Josie, who left him and remarried; the inconstant Julia, whom Jackson comes to see, in *Started Early, Took My Dog*, as the epitome of "the treacherous woman" (84); his fugitive con wife Tessa, who steals his money; and his car GPS navigator Jane. While Rochester

incarcerates his wife in the attic, a more radical Jackson thinks “of killing Josie” (*Case 263*). When hired by Julia and Amelia, Jackson unearths the remains of Olivia—but tries to conceal the patriarchy’s guilt. He is in fact also reminiscent of Raymond Chandler’s private detective Philip Marlowe who, John Scaggs notes, recuperates the authority of the status quo by hiding its guilty secrets (67). After interrogating Sister Mary Luke, alias Sylvia, Jackson retrieves Olivia’s bones, in the neighbor Binky Rain’s garden, and discloses Sylvia’s guilt to Amelia. But he keeps the truth hidden from Julia. Jackson tells Julia and the police that when he was walking a dog, it strayed off into the garden and led him to Olivia’s remains, buried in the undergrowth (*Case 368*). Jackson also speaks of “a tragic accident” (*Case 368*) thus covering up a double crime: Sylvia’s desperate deed and the guilt of the incestuous father, who provoked this deed: While Olivia’s bones are unearthed and laid out in the police mortuary her story, then, remains partly unknown.

Julia proves half-complicit with Jackson’s attempt to conceal the crimes. She and Jackson go to see the remains of her sister in the police mortuary. “The traumatized body [is] communicating what has been inflicted on it” (Horsley 150); but Julia is torn between the desire to retrieve her sister’s trauma, by touching the remains of her body on which her trauma is written—an attempt that is forestalled by the forensic pathologist—and the desire to repress trauma. Rather than re/member her sister and create a liberated identity for herself, Julia eventually chooses to prematurely bury and leave behind the ghost of the past. She is heading with her lover Jackson to France, where Jackson has bought a villa. We are reminded of Jane who, though declining the culpable Rochester’s plea that they escape together to France, where he, too, owns a villa, eventually marries him. In their desire for love and a home, both Jane and Julia collude in their own and another female’s occlusion. Today’s wavering feminist is, then, stuck in a time warp and doomed to repeat the gothic heroine’s failure to retrieve her vanished political sister and redefine herself as an emancipated subject.

In *Started Early, Took My Dog*, literary history, once again, repeats itself. Emerging as an introspective detective in real life, who examines criminal patriarchy in her mind, and as a forensic pathologist on the television screen, Julia in both roles repeats Jane’s and in the former role also Catherine Morland’s simultaneous investigation and occlusion of patriarchy’s obliteration of the feminine subject. While Julia realizes her ex-boyfriend Jackson’s culpability and refuses to be reunited with him, she continues to search for a happy end through marriage. We are, once again, reminded of Jane who runs away from Rochester only to marry him after all—and of Catherine who marries the younger son of an alleged gothic villain. Munt observes that the 1980s female investigator, seemingly a representation of a powerful agency, “no longer needs the external man . . . and almost always he is despatched” (41). Yet the contemporary female investigator is still susceptible to the narrative of romantic love, used as a bait by patriarchy. While Julia’s role as a forensic pathologist highlights her complicity with women’s dismemberment, her onscreen persona’s coma signals that Julia is in danger of turning into another vanished woman.

Julia inherits her introspective detecting skills from Catherine and Jane, whose investigation of trauma continues even in their troubled sleep. These skills allow Julia to uncover “[t]he leaner, meaner Jackson,” alias Rochester, hidden within the ‘good’ Jackson whom Julia loves for his refusal to forget his murdered sister (*Started* 83, 66). Julia laughingly says, “Ooh, I’m scared,” but the narrative voice – or is it Julia or Jackson’s thought we read? – ominously says: “Perhaps she should be” (*Started* 83). Although resisting his wish that they be reunited, Julia tries to laugh off the threat that Jackson represents to herself and to other women. As noted above, Jackson, in *Case Histories*, thinks of killing the supposedly treacherous Josie. Julia is in his eyes another deceitful woman: While Rochester refuses to own the daughter of Céline Varens, Adèle, as his child, Jackson is, in the third installment in Atkinson’s crime novel series, *When Will There Be Good News?* (2008), told by his ex-girlfriend Julia the lie that he is not the father of her son. While apprehensive of his potential for violent retaliation, Julia chooses to ignore it, as reminiscent of Jane who tries to ignore Rochester’s culpability. The setting where Julia turns a blind eye to Jackson’s dark self, the Terraces above the old Rievaulx Abbey, alludes to Julia’s identification with, this time, Catherine who, as noted above, comes to suspect, at Northanger Abbey, that General Tilney has incarcerated or murdered his wife. Yet her romantic attachment to their son Henry, who shames her for her gothic ‘scenario’ (182), undermines her investigation into criminal patriarchy. While Catherine marries the younger son of an alleged villain, Emily marries a double of the villain, and Jane the villain himself. Their interrogation of patriarchy’s crimes is thus curtailed. While Julia leaves her husband, Jonathan Carr, and also resists Jackson’s wish that they and their son be reunited, she appears to have found love with somebody else. The die-hard myth of the loving and safe home continues to render women forgetful of the female skeletons in the patriarchy’s closet.

Julia in her onscreen role as the pathologist Beatrice Butler, in the television crime series *Collier*, once again, fails to complete Jane’s feminist mission. Both the set, a box-like and hence, despite its size, claustrophobic aircraft hangar and the stately country seat on the grounds of which the set is built invoke Rochester’s gothic mansion, Thornfield Hall, in which a woman is buried alive. Julia/Beatrice must retrieve her, but the female pathologist who appeared to enter, in crime fiction and crime television series, into a male-dominated field as a feminist agent of retribution cannot evade implication in criminal patriarchy either. The story of how Julia got her role in *Collier* alludes to an attempt at feminist revision. The originally male pathologist was ‘regendered’ when the actor who played him was uncovered as a gothic villain satisfying his deviant desires with child pornography. Female corpses are also exposed to the voyeuristic gaze of the (male) pathologist. What is more, the male-dominated medical discipline has constructed the female body as unruly and irrational. In the late nineties, Patricia Cornwall and Kathy Reichs created female forensic pathologists, the iconic Kay Scarpetta and Temperance Brennan, respectively. However, as noted above, both the male and female forensic pathologist is an ambiguous figure associated with the reconstruction of the identity and

suffering of the murder victim and, through the autopsy, with the criminal act. Julia in her role as a pathologist, once again, reiterates the gothic heroine's simultaneous attempt to re-inscribe the obliterated feminine subject into history and complicity with patriarchy's occlusion of her.

A spirit medium of sorts, the pathologist, as she examines the wounds, must listen to the dead speak. Jackson watches an episode of *Collier* in which Beatrice estimates the time of the death of a sex worker, at the crime scene, and, in another scene, descends to the mortuary to perform an autopsy on the victim's mutilated body. We are reminded of Julia's abovementioned descent to the police mortuary and forestalled attempt to touch her sister Olivia's remains in order to retrieve Olivia's tale of trauma. While the clinical blue scrubs, which Jackson sees Julia wear, when visiting her on the film set, protect Julia's onscreen persona during the autopsy – which is not described to us – from contact with the blood of the corpse, the pathologist cannot evade submersion in the victim's trauma of mutilation. He or she must “listen to the voices of the dead” and assume the task of “reassembling the fragmented body parts” and “reincorporating the body within a narrative structure that will rescue it from abjection” (Horsley 150, 153). In her role as pathologist-cum-spirit medium, Julia apparently draws on her own familiarity, in real life, with violence and death. She mentions “[the physicist Erwin] Schrödinger's cat” which is, she explains to Jackson, “[b]oth alive and dead at the same time” and interprets “[a]rcadia” as life in death (*Started* 116, 68–69). Julia appears to allude to her own experience of trauma and her existence at the threshold between life and death which makes possible communication with the dead. She and her onscreen character have apparently also inherited Jane's paranormal sense perception. Thanks to the servant Bessie's tales of supernatural creatures, the adult Jane can sense the presence of a ghostly Bertha in Rochester's mansion. Yet in her role as Beatrice, Julia, once again, reiterates Jane's partial failure to respond to the ghostly woman's demand for reconstitution.

As noted above, Beatrice's profession is an ambivalent one highlighting women's complicity with patriarchy's obliteration of the feminine subject. Yet her coma signals that colluding women are doomed to vanish from history as well. On the set of *Collier*, Jackson tells Julia, “I've never had a thing for people who cut up corpses” (*Started* 258), the remark alluding to the performance of an autopsy as a violent act. The “phallic instruments” used in an autopsy (Head 42) suggest more specifically patriarchy's dismemberment of women in which Julia/Beatrice is, then, implicated. Beth Head points to “the inherently voyeuristic nature of autopsy” as well (42). Julia/Beatrice also reiterates Jane's implication in the voyeuristic display of the traumatized female body. Stepping inside a room and lifting, in a theatrical gesture, the hanging that hides another door and entering through it into another room, Rochester displays Bertha to Jane, who, adopting the male gaze, in turn, displays to the reader a “beast[ly]” creature (321). Julia's mention, to Jackson, of *Collier's* “[g]reat viewing figures” (*Started* 259) alludes to the implication of Julia's onscreen persona, Julia herself, and the audience in this act of voyeurism. As the representative of wavering feminists in contemporary society, Julia,

then, reiterates not only in her real life, but also onscreen Jane's failure to commit to the task of interrogating patriarchal crimes and reconstructing mutilated feminine subjecthood. In spite of its popularity, the series *Collier* appears to have run its course as suggestive of feminism's (partial) failure. In the last episode, an attack by an unknown perpetrator leaves Beatrice in a coma. The supposedly empowered female pathologist turns into another vanished woman. Beatrice's coma is reminiscent of Jane's fainting fit when imprisoned in the red-room for her abovementioned rebellion against her cousin John. Horrified by the thought that her uncle Mr. Reed, who died in the room, will return as a ghost to punish her for her disobedience, Jane becomes unconscious. With Julia/Beatrice in a coma, the radical potential of feminism appears to be doomed to remain dormant or unfulfilled.

Atkinson, once again, insinuates the responsibility of both men and women for feminism's partial failure. A mystery pervades the identity and motive of Beatrice's male or female attacker. The only clue that we are given by Atkinson is that the attacker is "the crazed relative of a —" (*Started* 473). Given in *Started Early, Took My Dog* the conflation of Julia and her onscreen persona, the reference to the multiple tragedies in Julia's family (109), and the confusion of text and intertext, the crazy culprit invokes all three: Jackson, alias Rochester, who calls himself a "madman" for running early in the morning (*Started* 176) and in whom, as noted above, lurks a murderous psychopath; the possibly schizophrenic Sylvia, who believes herself to be communing with God; and Brontë's madwoman Bertha. We are, then, allowed to construe Beatrice as the victim of not only a male-, but also a female-perpetrated attack which reinforces the idea that women, too, bear a good portion of the responsibility for their own and other women's ongoing invisibility.

Jackson represents a threat to both Julia and her onscreen persona because they are women and know the patriarchy's guilty secrets. Jackson's expectation that "[Julia] would be a corpse," rather than "a forensic pathologist," in *Collier* (*Started* 255), betrays his own murderous intention toward Julia and foreshadows the attack on her onscreen persona. The palpable threat Jackson poses to another woman, the noir writer Marilyn Nettles, who lives in the seaside town of Whitby, reinforces the assumption of murderous intentions. It is highly significant that he decides to call and arrange an appointment with Nettles after watching an episode of *Collier* in which Julia, in her role as Beatrice, performs an autopsy on the tale-telling corpse of a sex worker. Jackson seeks to hide another crime. As a newspaper reporter, Nettles was on a case of domestic violence in which a police officer killed his lover, a sex worker. In his seeming attempt "to steady the swaying Nettles, Jackson 'accidentally' knocks down her manuscript from the desk" (Melikoğlu 182). Significantly, "the pages of *The Butchered Bride* [are] fluttering like disembodied birds onto the floor" (*Started* 360). We are presented with a figurative manifestation of his intention to disembody and silence Nettles (Melikoğlu 182). Julia and her onscreen persona are, then, other possible victims because they, too, are women who know the patriarchy's guilty secret: its disembodiment of women.

The female candidates for the role of crazy perpetrator, Sylvia and Bertha, might, on the other hand, attack Julia/Bertha in order to cover up and uncover female complicity with criminal patriarchy, respectively. As noted above, Sylvia, who is the deranged victim of an incestuous father, kills her youngest sister, among others, to save herself. Sylvia's attack on Julia/Beatrice would prevent the exposure of both patriarchal culpability and female collusion. Yet Julia and her character not only interrogate, but, like their avatar Jane – and Sylvia – also cover up and collude with a patriarchal crime. We might thus read the attack also as a revenant Bertha's retaliation against another woman who is complicit with patriarchy. In *Jane Eyre*, Bertha attacks both Rochester and her brother, Richard Mason, who, while disrupting Rochester and Jane's wedding, has failed, for years, to put an end to Bertha's live-burial. Julia and her onscreen character are like Mason – and, we might add, Jane – half-complicit with patriarchy and hence possibly the target of Bertha. Atkinson, then, accentuates present-day Janes' occlusion of patriarchal crimes and collusion in their own and in other women's obliteration.

A sense of the futility of hope of feminist revision pervades *Case Histories* and *Started Early, Took My Dog*. While, at the end of the latter novel, Jackson is back on the road, in his car, a piece of impersonal technology, as suggestive of retreat into a male world, Julia and her character turn into absent women. Julia's character is in a coma, and Julia is left without a role to play. As reinforced by the intertextual loop, the wavering daughters of feminism are caught in a time warp, unable to complete Jane's attempt to retrieve the half-obliterated feminine subject and construct from the fragments a liberated identity for themselves. They are still stuck in the gothic house of fiction.

The readers are invited to recognize themselves in Atkinson's present-day Janes and Rochesters and confront their own responsibility for the (partial) failure of feminism. They must also reassemble the fragmented 'body' parts of the novels *Case Histories* and *Started Early, Took My Dog* as suggestive of the reconstruction of feminine subjecthood. Both novels are, like the body of the sex worker on Beatrice's autopsy table, mangled. They reveal the "fragmented, non-linear structure" Parker observes in Atkinson's writing (20). We are reminded of the noir writer Nettles' manuscript titled *The Butchered Bride* which is, as noted above, knocked down from the desk by the perpetrator Jackson, "the pages . . . fluttering like disembodied birds on to the floor" (*Started* 360). 'Mutilated' as they are, Atkinson's and Nettles' narratives mirror the gothic dismemberment of women. The readers must, then, as a pathologist of sorts reconstitute Atkinson's narratives and reassemble the feminine subject's body parts. Yet submerged in the dark reality of fragmentation and dissolution, they must also interrogate their own implication in the patriarchal society and in the collective guilt for the obliteration of women. While Atkinson's crime novels force us to face our own guilt and implicate us in the reconstruction of feminine subjectivity, they close off the possibility of a healing resolution. We are ultimately presented with a world in which feminism's radical potential is doomed to remain unfulfilled.

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***Global Milton and Visual Art*, edited by Angelica Duran and Mario Murgia, Lanham, Lexington, 2021, pp. 432, \$96,65 (hardback), ISBN: 9781793617064.**

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Global Milton and Visual Art can be regarded as a textual cabinet of transcultural visual adaptations and appropriations of John Milton's poetic works. To name a few, through illustrations, film versions, digital new media, paintings, sculptures, and illustrations, the chapters of this volume display how Milton's works have been reinterpreted by various artists from different cultural and regional backgrounds. Highlighting Milton's transcultural and global ekphrastic presence, the fifteen chapters, 103 illustrations and 64 supplemental web images of the book give a visual panorama of intersemiotic adaptations and appropriations of Milton's poetry.

The book is divided into four parts and Part I outlines the contextual framework of the volume through an introductory chapter and a chapter that gives the overall conceptualisation of visualising Milton. Chapter 1, which functions as an Introduction, is written by Angelica Duran and Mario Murgia and lays out how Milton's work "inherently" goes "beyond the realm of written language" through the use of multisensory imagery (3–4). Chapter 2 by Joseph Wittreich argues that the visual culture around Milton's poetic works, especially *Paradise Lost*, drew its impetus from the Romantic movement to romanticise and eroticise Milton's poetry. Wittreich speaks of the "remapping, reconfiguration and redating" of Milton by the followers of the Romantic movement that varied from "new" to common approaches (22–23). Arguing further that most of the initial visual depictions of Milton's work functioned to supplement interlingual translations, Wittreich contextualises the correlation of the historical development of illustrations, translations, and Milton's poetry.

Part II focuses on the much-acclaimed illustrations of Milton's works by Gustave Doré and Doré's transcultural influence over the global visualisation of Milton and his work. For instance, Chapter 3 by Hiroko Sano compares Doré's *Paradise Lost* to the Japanese pictorial genre of ukiyo-e and analyses the reciprocity of such an "influenc[e]" (75). Sano analyses the influence of Japanese art on Doré's works providing a novel perspective on art history. Similarly, Angelica Duran's analysis of a Spanish translation of *Paradise Lost* published in Mexico in 1967 foregrounds the temporal and cultural significance of Doré's illustrations, specifically in the "Mexican" context (96). Duran in Chapter 4 focuses on how Doré's black and white illustrations contrast with the colourful and specifically commissioned illustrations by Mexican artists like Miguel Fernández de Lara. Chapter 5 by Ana Elena González-Treviño draws attention to how Doré's illustrations have been used by Delta Heavy in their music video "White Flag" in 2016 and by David Gilmour and Polly Samson in their musical project "Rattle that Lock" in 2015. González-Treviño underscores how "intermediality" is achieved through the fusion of Milton's works, retro videogame styles, and their respective music in these re-interpretations of Milton's works (120).

The chapters in Part III move towards analyses of diverse artists beside Doré. Moving from famous to lesser-known artists, the chapters do not just give an overview of the visual canon of Miltonic illustrations, but also question and extend that canon. For instance, through a biographical study of some of the artists, Nathalie Collé in Chapter 6 outlines how certain illustrations as "a collective, conscious act of creation" (146) created their canon in the visual representations of Milton and his works. Chapter 7 by Wendy Furman-Adams focuses on the representation of Eve, "Milton's truly epic heroine" (165), by male artists and reorients this canon through an examination of significant female illustrators, like Carlotta Petrina and Mary Elizabeth Groom, and their contribution to the visual understanding of Eve in Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Joshua Reid in Chapter 8 scrutinises Salvador Dali's etchings of *Paradise Lost* where the minimalistic sketches of Adam, Eve, Satan, and the angels highlight the intersections of "nature, gender, and desire" (204). In Chapter 9, Mario Murgia's examination of Hispanic graphic novels foregrounds Milton's "pictorial" position in popular culture (227) and how the genre-specific dark elements of the graphic novel blend with the tragic tone of Milton's epic poetry.

Part IV of this volume looks at the visual representation of Milton's works beyond books. For example, Chapter 10 by Gabriela Villanueva elaborates on Felipe Santiago Gutiérrez's painting *The Fall of the Rebel Angels* (1850) which heavily draws upon Milton's representation of the fallen and "failing" angels in his *Paradise Lost* (247). In Chapter 11, Chia-Yin Huang analyses The Milton Shield exhibited in the 1867 Paris Exhibition, which featured "the War in Heaven and the Creation" (267). Huang further compares the hall and the shield, giving further depth to the analysis of the nonverbal representation of Milton's work. In Chapter 12, Aaron Shapiro scrutinises the Milton Window at St. Margaret's Church in London (1888) which should be considered a "stained-glass biography" of Milton (296). In Chapter 13, Beverley Sherry complements Shapiro's analysis by illustrating global examples of stained-glass representations of Milton and his works as examples of "architectural art" (311), ranging

from the United Kingdom to Canada, the United States, and Australia. In Chapter 14, Islam Issa and Matthew Geary look at Jacob Epstein's sculpture of Lucifer (1944–1945), exhibited in the Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery, which is marked for its “androgynous and vitally orientalized” appearance (350). The chapter focuses on how the sculpture gives clues about both Epstein and Milton as creators of biblical art. In Chapter 15, Jonathan R. Olson analyses how “Milton's Satan” becomes a reference point for Terrence Malick's film *Song to Song* (2016) to depict his “Devil” through the character Cook (367, 372). Referring to painting, stained glass, sculptures, and cinematic representations, Part IV completes not only the global but also the generic versatility of Milton's visual representations.

Global Milton and Visual Art is, thus, in many ways, a ground-breaking collection of essays that looks at Milton's extratextual presence in diverse genres and cultures. By incorporating both the material culture and digital realm through printed illustrations and digital links to web images, the volume also presents novel ways for academic publishing. Consequently, *Global Milton and Visual Art* will be very helpful for academics and students from literature, art history, and media studies departments.

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Posthümanizm: Kavram, Kuram, Bilim-Kurgu, by Başak Ađın, Ankara, Siyasal Kitabevi, 2020, pp. 244,  58,50 (paperback), ISBN: 9786057877703.

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Başak Ađın’s *Posthumanism: Concept, Theory, Science-Fiction* (2020) is an ambitious work of literary and cultural studies whose primary aim is “to give a holistic view of posthumanism to Turkish academia by introducing the theoretical framework of the theory” as well as “to scrutinise the intertwined nature of literature, media, and culture exemplifying from the fields of philosophy and science, thus concretise the theoretical dimension of posthumanism”¹ (1). With that purpose, Ađın rejects the sequence of binaries that have shaped Western liberal humanist thought and explores the intricate relationships between humans and other species, all of which she believes possess agency. Based on the necessity of reconsidering human beings in relation to other biological species and synthetic-robotic-plastic bodies, this monograph is, therefore, a call to the human species. Setting out with the critique of the anthropocentric point of view, Ađın deconstructs the established claims about the essence of being human. The reader witnesses not reversing the dualities, but ‘imploding’ them in order to understand the dynamic networks and “intra-actions,” in Karen Barad’s words (128), of human, non-human, and synthetic bodies. In this respect, Ađın’s monograph is a journey to theory, fiction, and history merged on a philosophical questioning, thus, not a strict answer but an inquisitive discourse on posthuman possibilities.

The first chapter, titled “Roots and Journey: A Brief History of Posthumanism and Its Concepts,” presents the history of posthumanist theory in a precise but comprehensive way by illuminating complicated concepts Turkish readers might not be thoroughly familiar with. In this sense, Ađın’s monograph is significant since she introduces many

¹ Translations from Turkish to English belong to the author.

concepts of posthumanism with clear explanations to familiarise the reader with the terminology. Without losing our connection within the net of posthumanist concepts, we read about the basic arguments of posthumanism. In the first subchapter, “From Prometheus to Neo: Our Mythological and Science-Fictional Relationships with Posthumanism, Transhumanism, and Technology,” Ađın scrutinises the posthuman turn, a deviation from humanism regarding its relationship with technological developments accelerated in the twentieth century but resulted in the questioning of the supremacy of human beings in the universe. It is impressive for the contemporary reader that Ađın does not take sides with anti-technological nostalgic discourses; however, she distinguishes the inevitable interdependency between the species, especially between human beings and robotics. That is a significant point where Ađın evaluates two highly confused concepts that are incorrectly used interchangeably: transhumanism and posthumanism. Thus, this introductory part discusses how transhumanism is the antagonist of posthumanism by surviving solely on technological development. Ađın comments on transhumanism as another form of liberal humanism that holds the duality of body and mind, though in a diverted version. By referring to the primary conceptualising studies on posthumanism, Ađın sheds light on the similarities and differences between liberal humanism, posthumanism, and transhumanism, which makes the reader familiar with many significant theorists such as Katherine Hayles, Francesca Ferrando, Pramod K. Nayar, Donna J. Haraway, Stefan Herbrechter, Cary Wolfe, William J. Mitchell, N. Katherine Hayles, and Nick Bostrom. The core of this section discusses posthumanism as a radical turn from liberal humanism and transhumanism. It appreciates the deconstruction of the agency of human beings and locates it within an entanglement with other species: a way to ‘becoming.’

The second subchapter, “From Potato to the Light: The Oneness of Rhizome, the Duality of Dichotomies, and the Plurality of Posthumanism,” takes the dualistic nature of Western liberal humanist thought conceived in the Renaissance period and reinforced by the Age of Enlightenment as the fundamental problem for posthumanism which collaborates with poststructuralist tendencies. Ađın weaves the critical insights of contemporary poststructuralist theories such as postcolonialism, ecocriticism, postcolonial ecocriticism, material ecocriticism, and ecofeminism with posthumanism to propose it as a comprehensive and plural theory comprising all these. Referring to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Ađın uses the concept of rhizome as a metaphor for the plural, multiple, detached, and heterogeneous, but still, rhizome-like connected organisms in posthumanist thought. Shifting the focus from the contemporary philosophical discussion to the ancient mystical poet Mewlana Jalaluddin Rumi, Ađın strikingly takes us to Rumi’s symbol of ‘light’ as an analogy for the posthumanist unity “that passes through multiplicity” (53).

The last subchapter of this part, “From *Ens* to *Asbestos*: The Eroding of Hierarchal Chain of Being and Unraveling of Naturecultures,” draws extensively on transhumanism developing as “an extreme edge of posthumanism” (56) and its relation to bioliberalism

and bioconservatism which are situated in the centre of bioethical discussions about equality, autonomy, pain, and justice. Questioning transhumanism and bioconservatism based on their attachment to the supposed essence of human beings, Ađın reveals how posthumanism is distinct in combining nature and technology (culture) without preferring one to the other. The main assertions of this part propose that if there is any essence of human beings, it is not a transcendent element solely attributed to human nature but an entangled feature inherited from other species, human, non-human, and even synthetic beings in the universe. Ađın concludes the part on the theoretical background by summarising the posthumanist tendency to stand against the ‘Chain of Being’—adopted by either transhumanism or bioconservatism—and the binaries of mind/body, culture/nature, and text/matter. The claims of the scholars such as Haraway and Bruno Latour about the naturecultures and the agency of non-humans have been fascinatingly explored by Ađın to strengthen the idea of the complex interrelations between humans and non-humans to which the rest of the book is devoted.

The second main chapter, “Posthumanism in Science-Fiction: Literary and Cultural Analyses,” scrutinises posthumanist theory by exploring the genre of science fiction in many fields, from literature to film studies. The first subchapter, “Who is Human and Who is Monster? Posthumanist Questioning in Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein*,” extensively takes the reader’s attention by combining theory with a well-known science-fiction text. Ađın consolidates the ontology of the posthuman condition by analysing Shelley’s *Frankenstein* as a portrayal of the immoral and problematic status of the human being who establishes the dichotomy of *bios/zoē* embodied in the character of Dr Frankenstein and the monster, respectively. In this subchapter, Ađın maintains how anthropocentrism constitutes the central conflict of Shelley’s novel and how Shelley manifests a posthumanist approach in narrative and content, attributing agency to the monster as much as to its human creator. To Ađın, the novel’s anthropocentric agents, Walton and Dr Frankenstein, epitomise the *bios* prioritised in the dichotomy of human/monster, subject/object, mind/body, and culture/nature. Ađın also reads *Frankenstein* as a depiction of the god complex that reminds us of the transhumanist approach and is problematised by Shelley, who anticipates the “anomaly and absurdity” engendered by obsessed rationality, objectivity, and scientific development (100).

This subchapter strikingly develops the connections between new materialism, material ecocriticism, and posthumanism that disregard the absolute agency of the human being by attributing agency and activity to nature and its elements. In this sense, the discussion compels us to ask: “Who is the human and who is the non-human, or the monster in *Frankenstein*?” By proposing the ethical necessity for taking responsibility for non-human subjects, Ađın comments on *Frankenstein* as a discourse of eroding the borders between the centre and the peripheries, humanness and monstrosity, which could be expanded to the issues of race, class, and gender. Ađın’s last remark on Shelley’s monster as a representative of “posthuman becoming” that deconstructs the master/slave dichotomy is noteworthy considering posthuman possibilities.

The second subchapter combines the intimate story of Ađın’s childhood teddy bear named “Memoş” with Brian Aldiss’s story “Supertoys Last All Summer Long” on the basis of the entangled relationships between humans, animals, and all ‘companion species.’ Titled “Teddy versus Anthropos: Necro-Robo-Politics in Brian Aldiss’s ‘Supertoys Last All Summer Long,’” the bulk of the chapter is devoted to explaining and exemplifying the theories of Haraway, Latour, Barad, and Diana Coole. Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” and “The Companion Species Manifesto,” Latour’s “Actor-Network Theory,” Barad’s “Intra-active Entanglements,” and Coole’s “Agentic Capacities” are illustrated in such a plain and well-constructed narration that even the reader unfamiliar with these theories can get into the discussion without being lost in theory. Based on these theories, Ađın reveals the need for a call to revise the human being’s relationship with companion species, including organic and inorganic bodies, which are claimed to have agency and meaning in the posthumanist approach. The common point of the theories Ađın highlights is the entanglement of the stories embodied in human and non-human bodies, which is depicted in a very concrete and enjoyable way through the writer’s relationship with her teddy bear.

By shifting the focus to the literary analysis, Ađın rests her posthumanist claims on the example of human beings’ companionship with AI. Using Aldiss’s science-fiction story primarily, though not limited to it, she takes us through the discussion of the human being not as a single and absolute actor of the universe but as a combination of various actants that have a close interaction. Ađın illustrates, with striking examples from the story, how Aldiss problematizes the dichotomy of *bios/zoë* that results in the lack of love and intimacy between the species. By claiming that as binary oppositions have connectivity, they should be evaluated together, the story is depicted as a significant criticism of the human-centred approach exploiting nature in every aspect and as an example of questioning the ethical responsibility of creating robotics. By referring to Timothy Morton’s *Dark Ecology*, which illuminates our place in the biosphere and revises our connection to non-human beings, Ađın claims the hierarchy between natural beings and technologically or culturally produced ones is destined to be shattered because the biopolitics, whose rules are established by human beings, has been paving the way for the corruption of all species. In this sense, she concludes this chapter, once more reminding Aldiss’s concerns about the destructive necro-robo-politics of human beings that need further attention in our century.

As the title of the last subchapter suggests, “May the Force Be with You: The Journey of Posthuman Subject from Absence to Plurality,” Ađın reserves this part for the discussion of a worldwide famous science-fiction narrative, *Star Wars*, which harbours posthumanist concerns. She provides an excellent overview of science-fiction, a genre that appeared as a discourse against white, male, heterosexual, and sovereign power and voiced the fight by the otherised and marginalised subjects. Especially by reminding us of the significance of feminist science-fiction, which has laid the groundwork for the representation of pluralities, Ađın evaluates *Star Wars* in terms of ecofeminism, material

feminism, and new materialism that are situated under posthumanism as an umbrella theory. Initially, she makes the andro- and anthropocentric approaches in the first parts of the series visible through specific examples. She later depicts how *Star Wars* changes course on behalf of the diversity and mutuality of the companion species.

For Ađın, the biological and robotic diversity depicted in the *Expanded Universe of Star Wars* exemplifies the posthumanist inclusive plurality—Leia and some other female characters are representatives of the empowering female subject who deconstructs the binary oppositions of andro/anthropocentric worlds. Ađın defines this transformation as the eroding of Anthropos, which she claims to be inherently androcentric and speciesist, by the rise of women and/or non-human beings, animals, and robotic bodies that represent the *zoë* and can combine reason and emotion contrary to the pure reason-oriented approach of the male characters. She discusses the posthumanist turn in the *Star Wars* series and its adaptations in terms of the claims of material feminists such as Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, who reconsider the significance of the materiality, agency, and entanglement of the posthuman world. As a last word on *Star Wars*, Ađın accepts the philosophy behind this narrative as a feminist, pluralist, new materialist, and posthumanist ‘power.’ The final point in this part is striking: the ethical need to accept our age as “the age of *zoë*” (202), which requires accepting energy or power or resistance that is not lost but collected and moved among organic and inorganic actants.

Başak Ađın’s *Posthumanism: Concept, Theory, Science-Fiction* is a well-constructed study on epistemology, ontology, and ethics of posthumanism, combining theory with science-fiction in literary, film, and cultural studies. Her analysis of posthumanism in various texts, in reference to multiple theories, is based on rigorous research. Ađın’s language, satiric and humorous from time to time, pushes the reader to delve into posthumanism and its concepts by feeling joy throughout the reading process. Furthermore, I believe this book is quite remarkable for the reader because of its sincere concerns. It is a call from a posthumanist academic who frets about the possibilities of the universe with or without us. The second edition, published in 2022, indicates that her call is well-received by the reader sharing the same concerns.

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