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The Afro Eurasian Studies has been established in summer 2011 to offer a respected peer-reviewed outlet for the scholarly research in social and administrative sciences, which would shed light on the history and the current state of economic, political and social dynamics of Africa, Europe and Asia. The journal welcomes original manuscripts in English on a range of subject matters including economics, finance, management, political science, public policy and international relations with particular focus on the Afro Eurasian region.

The Afro Eurasian Review Journal differs by containing articles about the countries in the Afro-Eurasian region, and with this originality, the journal aims to make a high contribution to the academic literature. In this issue of the journal, the reflections of different global problems have been evaluated at the national level. The first article in the journal presents a comparative analysis of Türkiye's soft and hard power policies in Africa and Sub-Saharan countries with France. Secondly, a social problem is reawakened to the agenda by examining the development of identity politics in India and the phenomenon of religious humiliation. The third article aims to evaluate the foreign policy of Ghana during the military regime that followed the military coups in the country. Lastly, the unifying effect of the One Belt One Road Project with globalization and the importance of the Turks for this path in the history are discussed.

About the Publisher

The Afro Eurasian Studies is published by MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association); a non-governmental and non-profit business association headquartered in Istanbul, Türkiye. Established in 1990, MÜSİAD assists their members in their endeavours in business, investments and international trade with over 100 local branches worldwide.

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As a culmination of the research experience accumulated over the years, the Economic and Social Research Centre within MÜSİAD has embarked upon the challenge of publishing an international journal. Thus the Afro Eurasian Studies has been born in Türkiye, at the epicentre of Afro Eurasia, out of a desire to contribute to the international discourse on the new dynamics of the region.

Editor

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TÜRKİYE'S AFRICA-SUB-SAHARAN POLICIES AND ITS COMPETITION WITH FRANCE

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Türkiye'nin Afrika-Sahra Altı Politikası ve Fransa ile Rekabeti
Öz

Türkiye yaklaşık son yirmi yılda dış politika yaklaşımında bir dönüşüme giderek Orta Asya, Kafkasya, Balkanlar ve özellikle de Afrika'da varlığını daha da hissettirmeye başlamıştır. Şüphesiz bu durum dış politikada yeni bir bakış açısı gerektirmektedir. Bu nedenle yirminci yüzyılda bu bölgelerden uzak durmasının veya ilgisiz kalmasının nedenlerini sorgulamayı da gerektirmiştir. Türkiye, özellikle Afrika'da sahip olduğu tarihsel arka planın getirdiği kültürel ve dini değerleri vurgulamak suretiyle önce yumuşak güç unsurlarıyla Afrika politikasını temellendirmeye çalışmıştır. Yumuşak gücün tek başına yeterli olmayacağı gerçeğiyle, özellikle 2011 Arap Baharı'ndan sonra "sert güç" politikası da devreye alınmıştır. Şüphesiz Türkiye'nin Afrika'da uyguladığı dış politikalar geleneksel sömürgeci güçleri, özellikle hala bölgede etkinliğini sürdürmeye çalışan Fransa'yı rahatsız etmektedir. Bu çalışma Türkiye'nin Afrika'daki tarihsel geçmişi, yumuşak güç-sert güç uygulamaları ve bölgede çıkarları olan Fransa ile olan ilişkiler üzerine odaklanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sahra Altı Afrikası, Türkiye, Yumuşak Güç, Sert Güç, Türkiye-Fransa Rekabeti

Turkiye's Africa-Sub-Saharan Policies and Its Competition with France
Abstract

Türkiye increased its presence in Central Asia, Caucasus, Balkans, and especially Africa by transforming its foreign policy. Undoubtedly, this situation requires a new perception in foreign policy. Therefore, it required the causes of the policy of disinterestedness to these regions in the 20th century. Türkiye, endeavored to structure its African policy with the soft power instruments emanated from its historical background by stressing cultural and religious values. Being aware of the fact that soft power is not sufficient enough, hard power instruments have also been implemented after Arab Spring in 2011. Certainly, Türkiye's foreign policy in Africa disturbs imperialist powers especially France which wants to maintain its influence. This study deals with Türkiye's historical presence in Africa, its soft and hard power instruments and its relations with France which has interests in the region.

Key Words: Sub-Saharan Africa, Türkiye, Soft Power, Hard Power, Türkiye-France Competition

Introduction

It has been observed that there has been a great struggle in the African continent, especially in the sub Saharan region and in North Africa, which can be described as the gateway to the sub Saharan region, as in various parts of the world.
It is known that the sub-Saharan region, which is an important geopolitical and geo-economic area, is known as the traditional power, France, England, the United States, as well as the newly developing powers that claim Global power, aiming to have a greater say in global sharing. However, the face of competition has started to change. Undoubtedly, there may be many reasons for the intensification of competition in the region. However, among these, the fact that approximately two-thirds of the population is under the age of twenty-five can be considered as an important feature in the face of the aging and unpopulated West. However, the fact that it has abundant natural resources and a great potential for renewable energy is one of the reasons that increase the attractiveness of the region (Gain, 2021). The existence of these and other dynamics causes intensification of competition between regional actors such as Russia, China and Türkiye, as well as the West, which has existed as a colonial and imperial power in the region for centuries. We know that these forces want to take part in Africa again or again. Of course, it brings with it the analysis and questioning of a substantial literature on the colonial past of countries such as France and England, the former colonial powers in the region, and the methods and tools they used for exploitation.

Economic motivation generally constituted one of the main reasons for colonial occupation. The period when Europe seized and exploited the human and natural resources of the continent by using its superior military power is considered as the colonial period in African historiography. In this period, African peoples did not knowingly and willingly give up their freedom and resources (Okon, 2014: 193). However, efforts to cooperate with the world's leading actors in recent years have led to significant changes in Africa's foreign relations. While many of these countries, including China and the Gulf countries, are located in the region, the presence of many countries and the significant flow of resources have also caused economic and political understanding to be reshaped. Instead of relying solely on the United States and former colonial powers, Africans made an effort to establish relations with foreign countries. This has created an opportunity for African countries to diversify their partnerships and accelerate the economic growth of the region (Devermont, 2018).

Türkiye has undergone a radical change in foreign policy since the 2000s. It has started to (re)develop a Global perspective on global problems, especially in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, by leaving as much as possible from the endless energy-consuming debates of domestic politics. Africa has also become one of the regions where Türkiye continues its struggle to exist effectively and intensely.

Actually, Türkiye is not a foreign country to Africa and African societies. He has relationships with a long history. Even briefly, it would be useful to dwell on Türkiye's past in Africa.

Historical Background of Türkiye's Relations with Africa

When we look at the history and back ground of Türkiye-Africa relations, it will be seen that it has a history going back centuries. The Ottoman Empire maintained ties with most of the African coast, either as part of the empire or as a vassal of it. The North African region—Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt to the south to Sudan, to parts of Niger and Chad, and to Eritrea to the east; The places as far as Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia were in the interest of the Ottomans (Malnassy, 2020: 74). The West's search for new trade routes led the Ottomans to take various measures, with the Ottoman Empire's taking control of trade routes after the conquest of Istanbul. Because the vital change that started with the world trade routes reaching the Atlantic coasts from the Mediterranean and piling up everything in the region in the name of capital and enterprise in the Western ports wasa in a quality that would determine the fate of the Ottoman Empire along with the Mediterranean and the Near East in the long term. According to Sabri F. Ülgener's determination, it is paradoxical and surprising that the rise of the Ottoman Empire and the period of the slow dissolution of the region coincided with the same period. In fact, far-sighted Ottoman sultans and state dignitaries realized this trend. Therefore, Yavuz Sultan Selim's expedition to Egypt should be seen as an effort to retain a strategic gateway to determine the fate of the declining Mediterranean and therefore the empire, rather than a simple invasion movement (Ülgener, 1991: 22). The Ottoman State's interest in the continent continued during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent and in the years that followed. Even in the years when the state was on the verge of weakening, it made great efforts to hold on to the continent. For example, it is stated by some thinkers that the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference was not a meeting where a colonial division was decided, but rather to facilitate conflict free imperialism in an increasingly crowded market (Stone, 1987: 57). With the participation of the Ottoman Empire in this conference and signing the agreement, it made other countries accept its rights in Libya, but also recognized the rights of France in the Muslim majority regions such as Algeria and Tunisia, which were formerly Ottoman provinces. Ottoman Empire had to leave the continent at the beginning of the twentieth century.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Türkiye completely lost interest in the north of the continent it had controlled for years. There are many reasons why he lost interest in the continent. The first of these is the entry of Türkiye into the orbit of the United States of America, especially after the Second World War. Then, the indexing of Turkish foreign policy to the West is focused on trying to join the European Union (Lawal, 2021).

In addition to these informations, it has been tried to prevent Türkiye's pro-

duction of policies related to its near and far surroundings with the existing and created instability. Obstacles have been removed from establishing relations with both the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. For example, it was prevented from being active in foreign policy, as stated by the terrorist organization PKK, which emerged in the 1980s, and later by the President of the United States, Trump himself (Adams, 2015). In addition, the Islamic State (ISIS/DEAS), which was created by the United States of America and used for terrorist acts with all kinds of support, was prevented from being active in foreign policy. In fact, although France has not been an Eastern Mediterranean country in recent years, it has been too involved in the energy debates in this region. It would not be wrong to consider this situation as efforts to keep Türkiye distracted from its own sphere of activity, like the policies they have been implementing for nearly two hundred years in this region. For all these and other reasons, Türkiye had isolated itself from its traditional spheres of influence, including North Africa (Saddiki, 2020). However, in the middle of the twentieth century, the continental countries that started to get rid of the status of exploited countries began to declare their independence. As such, Türkiye recognized almost all of the countries that gained independence. Türkiye established diplomatic relations with them and opened embassies in countries such as Ghana. Although Türkiye's relations with North African countries increased significantly during the Cold War, Türkiye generally did not get involved in African affairs. therefore, he missed the chance to develop political, economic and commercial ties (Dahir A. H. 2019)

After the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye, it can be said that foreign policy and relations priorities focused on solving important problems in the immediate environment, such as the status of oil-rich Mosul on the Iraqi border and establishing good relations with neighboring countries. This is an amazing situation. During this period, Türkiye opened embassies in many European and Middle Eastern countries. But none of this happened in Africa. In fact, this meant a passive role for Türkiye in international relations. Between 1923 and 1998, this was true not only for Africa, but also for all regions outside of Europe (Wheeler, 2011: 44).

Despite all these events and policies, Türkiye has put aside its administrative instability since the 2000s. Türkiye seems to have focused itself on the places it needs to be, especially on the African continent. There are undoubtedly lots of reasons for its focus on Africa.

The reasons for Türkiye's Focus on Africa

The slave traders of the developed Western countries, as colonizers or investors, tended to the African continent in the last three hundred years. However, the dominant trend today, and especially in recent years, has been the phenomenon of large emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil assuming their own claims to the continent. There are various debates among experts as to what the purpose of these countries is. However, a significant number of scientists attribute the current

trend largely to economic motives. Türkiye, which has the potential to be influential on the continent in economic, political and cultural issues (again), is the last country to be included in Africa compared to other countries. It is seen that Türkiye has steadily increased its diplomatic and foreign policy presence in Africa since the 2000s.

This mobility led to the creation of diplomatic missions on the continent, the expansion of economic activity, and humanitarian diplomacy. This developing relationship between Africa and Türkiye resulted in the declaration of 2005 as the "Year of Africa" (Adams, 2015). After declaring 2005 as the "Year of Africa", Türkiye has started to establish political and economic ties across the continent, and this is part of expanding its reach worldwide (Armstrong, 2021). Perhaps the most important reason for Africa's relations with Türkiye is this, analysts say. Türkiye does not bear the negativities created by former colonial powers such as France on the continent. However, it is based on the fact that almost all of the countries where Türkiye is active in the continent have significant Muslim populations that are more open to partnering with an Islamic power (Lawal, 2021).

In fact, Türkiye's increasing presence in Africa and Sub-Saharan began with the writing of the document called "Action Plan". This document was prepared in 1998 by the Turkish Ministry of State, which forms the basis of the political and economic agreements between Türkiye and the continent.

However, it was never (or not) implemented due to the serious economic crisis in Türkiye (Dedet, 2021). For this reason, foreign observers draw attention to the wrongness of attributing Türkiye's relationship with Africa to the Justice and Development Party (Adams, 2015). However, it should be admitted that the acceleration of Türkiye's African policy started with the Justice and Development Party.

It is seen that Türkiye has started to spread its political, economic and even military position to all four corners of Africa in a quiet way since the 2000s.

Türkiye's foreign policy, which has changed since the 2000s, has found its best reflection in Africa (Grigoriadis & Fusiek: 2022).

As mentioned above, Türkiye, which lost its interest in the continent after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, was granted observer status in the African Union (AU) in 2005. This situation has transformed its foreign policy towards the continent by designating this year as the "Year of Africa". Türkiye has been a soft power deployment situation towards Africa at the same time. Again, this has been instrumental in gaining local support for its participation in trade and other important investment projects on the continent (Hussein, 2020). In fact, it can be said that Türkiye silently carried out its political, economic and military foreign policy transformation towards Africa.

Indeed, with the establishment of the Republic, secular elites formed a Turkish Global identity with a conscious reference to Europe or the West, during periods when the Republican People's Party and military regimes, even if other political parties were

in power, the military bureaucracy. According to this identity, Türkiye was portrayed as a modern European country that would adhere to liberal principles. In the environment of the Cold War, they tried to emphasize their pro-Western identity, in harmony with the then EEC and the USA, on economic and defense issues. In this context, Türkiye was supported by Western partners as a moderate ally of geopolitical importance. However, with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party from the beginning of the 2000s, a new political identity began to emerge. This political identity aims not only to reinvigorate the traditional Turkish influence in the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, but also to assert more broadly the Turkish Policy feature at the Global level against Europe and the West (Langan, 2016: 1401).

Between the establishment of the Republic and the beginning of the 2000s, Türkiye-Africa relations decreased to a very low level. It is also claimed that the reasons for this are due to internal problems such as the nation-state building process experienced by both African countries and Türkiye in the struggle against colonialism (Özkan, 2011: 120).

In this political transformation, the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and the efforts of countries to adapt themselves to the change in the world order should not be ignored. The new international environment created by this change has forced Türkiye, which is at the crossroads between continents, to follow a different foreign policy than before (Dahir A. , 2021: 30). The transformation in Türkiye's foreign policy, especially the change in Africa, was also expressed on the official website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is an important point here that improving relations and cooperation with the African continent constitutes one of the basic principles of Türkiye's multidimensional foreign policy. One of the main reasons for this is that Africa will play a more active role in the international system from the second half of the twenty-first century. For this reason, it is the issue that it can play a more important role at the Global level.

Following this, it is stated that Türkiye will share its historical experience, social, political and cultural accumulation in Africa with African countries on the basis of the principle of "African solutions to African problems" and mutual benefit (MFA, 2022). In an article published on December 22, 2021 in "Foreign Policy", which produced ideas for the United States on foreign policy, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan defined himself as a friend of Africa. He stated that he made many diplomatic trips to Africa and that as of 2021, the projects given to Turkish construction companies in Africa reached 71.1 billion dollars. He stated that while trade with Africa was only 5.4 billion dollars in 2003, it reached 25.3 billion dollars by 2021 (Gbadamosi, 2021). In a way, he has fulfilled its duty to warn the United States of Türkiye's growing influence in Africa.

In 2003, the number of embassies in African countries was only 12. Today, this number has increased to 43, and the number of embassies of African countries in

Ankara has increased from 10 to 37 in the same period (Marcou, 2022). And in the same period, the amount of foreign direct investment, which was US$ 100 million, rose to US$ 6.5 billion. In addition, there was a five-fold increase in trade between the same years (Fabricius, 2021). Since 2005 was designated as the "Year of Africa", Türkiye has established political and economic ties across the continent through aid and trade. In making these breakthroughs, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who served as the Prime Minister until 2014 and as the President since then, developed relations with African leaders. It has helped Turkish companies access new markets and financed projects that portray Türkiye as the guardian of Islamic culture in heavily Muslim Africa (Armstrong, 2021). These religious structures can often be combined with charitable activities or humanitarian aid (funding irrigation projects). These humanitarian, religious and cultural initiatives are led by public institutions such as the Presidency of Religious Affairs, Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, Anadolu Agency, as well as NGOs (Marcou, 2022). Such initiatives bring to mind the concepts of "soft power-hard power".

Türkiye's Soft Power in Africa

We see that the idea of distinguishing between hard power and soft power was first introduced by Nye in the 1990s. Nye generally defines power as "the ability to influence others to achieve one's desired results". It also characterizes hard power as coercive power used through domination, incentives or threats. Military intervention, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions are considered hard power. As a matter of fact, the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the UN economic sanctions against Iraq in 1991 following the First Gulf War are examples of the use of hard power.

Soft power, collectively, refers to the tools in a nation-state's arsenal that do not lead, reward, or threaten other actors to preferred behavior (Seymour, 2020). The main purpose of the soft power discourse put forward by the American political scientist Joseph Nye in the 1990s is exactly this. It was to show that the USA is not a declining power, but that it can maintain its position as the world's leading superpower. He argued that the USA should maintain an ambitious foreign policy program using "soft power" without being imprisoned within the borders of the country. Following these early studies, the concept of soft power began to be used internationally as a part of the state's generalized strategy in an increasingly interdependent world (Angey-Sentuc & Molho, 2015: 3).

Türkiye has worked to establish multiple partnerships in order to achieve its strategic goals in a world where competition in almost every field, especially economic and political, is intense. It continues its quests to improve African relations especially in the sub-Saharan region as well as in the western part of the continent. It plays an important role in (re)structuring the regional and Global equations and balances in the Sub-Saharan region of the continent (Askar, 2020). With more than one billion people living in cities that provide rapid economic growth, Africa attracts

the attention of countries such as China, Russia, Gulf countries and Türkiye (Nussbaum, 2020). It is seen that it has a long history connecting Türkiye and Northern and Sub-Saharan countries since the beginning of the fifteenth century, creating a synergy that forms the basis of Türkiye's soft power (Uslu, 2015: 106). In fact, for Türkiye, North Africa has always had a special place in relations with the former Ottoman lands. However, in the last two decades, it has begun to turn its attention to African countries geographically located under the Maghreb (African countries with a coast to the Mediterranean). And these regions have begun to be seen as secondary and peripheral in terms of interests of Türkiye (Donelli & Levaggi, 2016: 103).

Türkiye had the chance to assert itself as an important player in the continent with the famine, which affected three and a half million people in Somalia in 2011. On August 17, 2011 date, Türkiye hosted the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) emergency summit, where it forced forty Muslim states for three hundred and fifty million dollars in aid. After then, at the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly, he presented Türkiye as the protector of the world's moral obligations towards people in need. Following this, the visit to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, where there is a terrorist risk, was the implementation of an important soft power application (Czerep, 2019).

Private donations have been mobilized on an unprecedented scale by NGOs, artists and other groups to aid relief efforts in Somalia. In 2011, $300 million was donated, in addition to 94 million state aid. As stated above, despite the high security risks, a volunteer of 500 people reached Somalia before the end of 2011. Turkish medics converted an old ammunition depot into Mogadishu's most modern hospital in two months (Czerep, 2019)

Sub Saharan foreign policy of Türkiye, which seeks to increase its geopolitical gains in Africa through soft power, relies on a common religious identity and cultural resources to expand its economic activities, strengthen its presence and engage in security cooperation with these countries. It has combined diplomatic and economic efforts by providing financial and political support to multilateral initiatives, launching direct THY flights, investing in infrastructure and identifying new routes to regional markets (Gain, 2021).

While concentrating on African policies, Türkiye has mobilized its soft power elements. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency supports many development projects, Turkish Airlines connects the region to the world. In addition, many students from the region, mostly in the fields of politics, economy and engineering, receive scholarships from the Presidency for Turks and Related Communities Abroad (Özkan, 2020).
It is seen that the number of students in continental Africa studying in Türkiye has increased even more in recent years(Studyinternational, 2022). In addition to these, President of the Turkish Higher Education Institution, Erol Özvar, stated at the Tür-

kiye-Africa Partnership Summit on 16-18. 2021 that the country will exempt African students from the Turkish International Student Admission Examination, except for those who apply for engineering, medicine and law courses. Thus, he stated that agreements were signed with 21 African countries for cooperation in higher education at the ministerial level, thus paving the way for joint research activities between universities as well as student and faculty exchange. He added that the "religious and cultural closeness" that many African countries have in making these agreements facilitates directing them to universities. He explained that about 40,000 African students from 54 countries are studying in the country, one-third of them are women and 20% of them are enrolled in postgraduate education (Thepienews, 2022).

Türkiye's Hard Power

It is possible that approaching the concepts of soft power and hard power from various angles. According to one approach, as stated above, hard power is the use of military and economic means by a country to pursue its interests over another country. It can take effect quickly when imposed by one powerful country on another with less military and/or economic power (Tandon, 2020). According to another approach, hard power requires military intervention, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions. This is based on power sources such as the armed forces and economic instruments (Gallarotti, 2011: 29). As a matter of fact, Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939 and the UN (United Nations) economic sanctions against Iraq in 1991 after the First Gulf War are examples of the use of hard power (Wagner, 2014).

"Soft and hard power" can often have mutually reinforcing effects. In fact, each power supply group needs at least part of the other for maximum efficiency. Therefore, soft power sources can increase hard power and vice versa (Gallarotti, 2011: 33).

Until recently, Türkiye relied on trade and diplomacy to reflect its power, as well as on its unique geographic location, that was of key importance between Europe and the Middle East. But, the current and potential instability brought about by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings necessitated the transition to a hard power approach in order to protect itself from threats and to realize its aspirations to become a regional power (Bakeer, 2021).

Actually, we know that Türkiye has a unique geographical location that provides intercontinental transitions from culture to energy. Although this situation provides many advantages on the one hand, it also requires it to be strong militarily and economically, that is, to have hard power in order to maintain these advantages. Türkiye's being the second largest army in NATO after the USA, the strongest army in the Middle East and the largest economy in the region, it was not too difficult and did not take time for the country to realize its hard power. The regional vacuum, the rise of radicalism and terrorism, foreign intervention, and the need to combat growing hybrid threats and protect Türkiye's interests have given Ankara the necessary

reasons to mobilize hard power (Bakeer, 2021)

Türkiye is aware of the necessity of military power in order to protect the investments made while Türkiye is developing its economic, commercial and diplomatic relations in the Sub Saharan region,(Armstrong, 2021). Türkiye's participation in the Libyan civil war in 2019 alongside the United Nations-backed Tripoli government was due to a mix of economic and geopolitical interests, as well as securing natural gas concessions on the high seas (Fabrıcıus, 2021).

The active involvement of Türkiye in the civil war in Libya on the part of the "esSarraj" government has banned General Khalifa Haftar's hopes of capturing Tripoli, backed by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Russia and to a lesser extent France. The signed maritime delimitation agreement and military cooperation agreement strengthened Türkiye's position in Libya. The naval agreement allows Türkiye to lay claim to much of the Eastern Mediterranean. The bilateral military cooperation agreement allowed Türkiye to deploy at the request of Tripoli (Tekir, 2020: 191-192).

The important point that draws attention here is the use of Turkish made TB2 aircraft to strike the Khalifa Haftar attack. The use of these weapons has had an effect of hatred not only in Libya, but also in conflicts such as Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh (Borsari, 2022). These systems, in which Türkiye came together (UAV-SİHA, etc.), caused Türkiye to get rid of its colonies from permanent isolation and foreign policy inertia in order to maintain existing partnerships and create new ones. Besides, it is important to have hard guard alongside the soft bridge to help. Because the support of the Turkish military power to the Libyan government in Tripoli and the deployment of aircraft aircraft showed the Africans that this new medium provides military service. The security issues surrounding the third summit in December 2021 reflected the impression that they were handled more softly than economic and humanitarian cooperation. Although it is known that many opinions in the verse undoubtedly keep these issues on their agenda. It is possible to say that these widespread Türkiye's commitments are increasingly taking on a political character.

As a matter of fact, during its armed intervention in Libya in 2020-2021, Türkiye signed military agreements with Niger, Ethiopia, Chad and Togo (Marcou, 2022). In early December 2021, the Ethiopian government had raged for a year in civil war with rebels from the Tigray region. The American observer was surprised when the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front repulsed the attacks with the drones supplied by Iran, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates and Qatar during the war. Again, the direct involvement of at least four Middle Eastern countries in the conflict has surprised many American observers (Lynch, 2022). It is even known that the Western powers put pressure on Türkiye to stop the sale of unmanned aerial vehicles to Ethiopia, which was trying to suppress the Tigray rebellion.

In additionto these, Türkiye, which has a military base in Somalia since

2015 and then in 2019 with security and military cooperation with Libya, had the opportunity to introduce itself as a power in African geopolitics. On the other hand, it is seen that the sales of Turkish defense and military equipment to Africa have increased in recent years (Bonesh, 2021).

Bilateral relations deepened rapidly after Türkiye made the first humanitarian aid initiatives in Somalia in the early 2010s. Türkiye has gained military and political power in the region. Somalia is a very good example to show how Türkiye's soft power elements are integrated with hard power tools (dryadglobal, 2021). In September 2017, it opened a comprehensive military training facility in Mogadishu, Somalia. With the opening of this facility, it has established Maritime Communication Lines (SLOCs) stretching from the Mediterranean coast to the Horn of Africa via the Red Sea corridor, and from the Horn to Qatar in the Persian Gulf. Critical to the functioning of Türkiye's partnership with Qatar, Türkiye's Mediterranean to Mogadishu SLOC has also come to serve the expansion of Türkiye's economic and political influence in the wider East African region (Tanchum, 2021). At the same time, Türkiye's display of both soft power and hard power in Somalia has brought an alternative approach to the sustainability problems of Africa. At the same time, this power-seeking has attracted the attention of many African countries, which have long sought alternatives to Western and Chinese proposals (Donelli, 2020). When military bases are generally thought of as part of a state's fighting infrastructure; that is, it can be considered as an important tool by which states reflect their military forces abroad (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019). It will be seen that Türkiye is determined to show both its military power and military technology with the bases it has established in other countries, especially in Somalia, behind its bases in countries such as Cyprus and Qatar.

Two months after the Mogadishu base was opened, the Sudanese port of Suakin, which has a strategic importance to control the entrance and exit of the Red Sea, was leased for 99 years with an agreement that could result in all kinds of military cooperation. Although Türkiye stated that it had ostensibly leased this port for the purpose of restoring it for tourism, the then foreign minister declared that Sudan accepted Türkiye's offer "to protect civil and military ships" and signed an agreement. A Gulf-backed coup is said to have taken place in April 2019 against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, who is on good terms with Türkiye. Although it has come true, Türkiye's positive development of relations with the Gulf countries as well as with the new administration provides the necessary ground for the execution of regional policies.

The Competition of Türkiye with France in the Region

With the domination of Anatolia by the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century, the East-West trade was also seized, causing the era of discoveries to begin. As a result of the discoveries, the European powers from China to the Americas es-

tablished enormous colonial empires. From 1492 to 1914, Europe's leading powers captured and colonized more than eighty percent of the entire world, despite making up only eight percent of the planet's land mass (Stoler-Conrad, 2015). For nearly five centuries, European empire builders such as England, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy used different strategies and tactics in the countries they exploited, especially in Africa (Jalata, 2011). In addition, those who built these empires thought that they were doing favors for those living in the areas they conquered (Lee & Shultz, 2012: 2). In order to prevent revolts in the areas they captured, indigenous peoples were less likely than foreigners to revolt against their leaders. For this reason, they sometimes preferred indirect management and sometimes direct manage The two largest colonial powers in Africa were France and Britain, both controlling two-thirds of Africa before the First World War and more than seventy percent after the war.

The period from the mid-1800s to the early 1900s was the peak of imperial rule in Africa (Khapoya, 2012: 100). The French colonial empire consisted of overseas colonies and mandate territories that it had conquered from the seventeenth century. After the period until 1814, which was accepted as the first colonial empire, Algeria, which was under the rule of the Ottomans, was captured in 1830. A distinction is made between the period that began with the seizure of Algeria and is considered to have ended in 1962. By the 1900s, although it was far behind the British Empire in terms of both population and size, it had become the world's second colonial empire and reached approximately 12,300,000 square kilometers (Hargreaves, 2005: 1). In the nineteenth century, France's expansion into Africa and Asia was legitimized on the basis of its "civilizing mission" aimed at educating less civilized people in more remote corners of the world (Ware, 2015: 189).

In world history, power struggles have been seen/are seen, which have greatly changed the international political space, the borders of the conquered lands, and have significantly affected the indigenous peoples of the colonial countries under their control. As one of the most powerful colonial countries in modern history, France ruled over a large area of Sub-Saharan Africa until the formation of liberation movements in the 1960s (Krupova & Čech, 2020: 291).

An important piece of the postcolonial puzzle was the military presence of France. This, in addition to the mandate to intervene through defense and military agreements with nearly half of the African states, all helped to promote France's recognition as the African gendarme. With permanent military bases originally located in Senegal, "Cote d'Ivoire", Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Kamurun, and the Central African Republic, the responsibility to "protect Africa from communism" during the Cold War coincided with French interests in maintaining regional hegemony (Benneyworth, 2011). However, the end of the Cold War left France's African policy in a state with no geopolitical or ideological basis (Lavallee & Lochard, 2019: 393).

However, France maintained agreements with most Sub-Saharan countries in a wide range of areas, from foreign aid and technical assistance to defense cooperation. All this helped France to have a power and influence over these countries in political, economic, social and cultural fields (Sabry, 2020). France generally used harsh power and manipulation methods in order to maintain its presence and therefore its interests in Africa. For example, when Guinea, a sub-Saharan country, abandoned the French monetary system in 1960 and wanted to implement its own national monetary system, France printed large amounts of new money before pouring the new currency into the country, increasing inflation and causing the country's economy to collapse. Likewise, when Mali left the Frankish region in 1962, France pressured neighboring countries to limit trade with Mali. This caused the new currency to depreciate and eventually forced Mali to rejoin the French monetary system.

France also has at least two African heads of state who plan to introduce a national currency and remove their country from the French monetary system. It is believed that to have played a role in the murders of Sylvanus Olympio in Togo (in 1963) and Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso (in 1987) (Phase, 2019). Especially the economic interests of France are motivating for the implementation of such policies. For example, Niger, despite being one of the poorest countries in the world in terms of chronic hunger and malnutrition, is rich in natural resources such as uranium. According to the British Geological Survey, Niger is the world's fourth largest producer of uranium. Two-thirds of the electricity France produces comes from nuclear energy. One third of the uranium used in the production of this energy is extracted by the French company Areva (Sabry, 2020).

Since the 2000s, the relations between France and African countries have been defined by a temporary departure from France, with new trajectories, changes in alliances, and diversification of partnerships (Signé, 2019). In addition, the political events that have taken place in some former African colonies in recent years have brought to the fore a new reality that France has lost control over its former partners and customers (Lupelescu, 2021: 26).

There are undoubtedly many reasons for the loss of control in Franco-African relations. One of these reasons is that the countries described as emerging powers want to take advantage of the economic-commercial opportunities of Africa. It is also clear that a solid African presence is essential for any Global player (Fabricius, 2021). While the policy developed by China, as part of its strategy of "going out" (zouchugu) in Africa since the late 1990s, is similar to the "One Belt One Road" strategy it announced later, both strategies have been combined since 2013.   Afterwards, "One Belt, One Road" was gradually expanded to the whole world, especially to Africa (Cabestan, 2019: 592). China is another example of sub-Saharan power projection to exploit Africa's development gap to achieve its leadership goals, and China is making a great effort to promote its sub-Saharan security model as defen-

sive and collaborative. However, factors such as China's bad reputation for financing arrangements that put the countries in which it invests in heavy debt and the fact that it selects workers from its own country have led to the development of a skeptical perspective among African countries (Gain, 2021).

As explained above, Türkiye has an important role as one of the emerging new regional powers in Africa, especially in the last two decades. Before the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye, although the Ottoman Empire had some interactions with Sub-Saharan African countries, it was limited. After the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye, Ankara stayed away from Africa. After the 1980 military coup, although Africa was placed at the bottom of the foreign policy agenda, no real opening could be made. The end of the Cold War changed the Global climate in which Turkish foreign policy developed and Türkiye once again had to try to explore different regions (Areteos, 2021). In addition, the focus on postcolonial discourse intensified after the 2016 coup attempt, which could be regarded as an attempt to overthrow Türkiye's legitimate government by "Western colonial powers" (Grigoriadis & Fusiek, 2022: 4).

Besides all this, in terms of Türkiye's relations with Africa, the leaders of the Justice Development Party emphasized that the Ottoman Empire was never engaged in the full-fledged "colonialism" of the European powers. Instead, it was emphasized that the relationship between the Ottoman center and its periphery was a relationship of consent anchored by cultural ties between Muslim brothers and sisters as part of a "pax-Ottoman". Therefore, in the modern era, neo-Ottoman identity was defined as a benevolent force in an "anti-colonial" narrative in Africa, as opposed to Western hegemony. In addition, the neo-Ottoman discourse emphasizes that Türkiye, as an emerging economy, is willing to demonstrate its friendship materially, that is, through beneficial investments and trade links with poorer countries. Türkiye promises to use soft power tools such as aid to improve the lives of neighboring and distant peoples in this neo-Ottoman era (Langan, 2016: 1403). In this sense, one of the most important areas of Turkish presence in Africa is development, cooperation and the development of cultural relations, which can be considered as important tools of Turkish soft power (Malnassy, 2020: 77)

It has a positive perception in Türkiye's African policy that they truly see African actors as equals and focus on improving relations rather than interfering in internal affairs. Most importantly, Türkiye is not France, England, Belgium or any of the other post-colonial powers, but Recep Tayyip Erdoğan presents Türkiye as an alternative power against great powers such as the USA and China. Although there is not much reaction against Türkiye among African peoples, Ankara's activities are known to cause anger and uneasiness in other world capitals. The most prominent of these countries is undoubtedly France. France is extremely uncomfortable with Türkiye's presence in West Africa, and President Macron openly accuses Türkiye of

inflaming anti-French sentiment (Kliment, 2021).

Türkiye seems determined to maintain its presence in Africa. The fact that many Sub-Saharan countries have predominantly Muslim populations or a significant Muslim minority is one of Türkiye's additional advantages (Shinn, 2015: 3). For this reason, it is seen that Türkiye has been making an effort to strengthen its ties with Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco in recent years. This strategy is more important for Türkiye than its concentration on many fronts in the region. The Maghreb, which is the gateway to the African market, is not a foreign region for Türkiye. Morocco, and especially Algeria and Tunisia, were once Ottoman provinces. For this reason, it has been the subject of special interest in Ankara in recent years (Dahmani & Samba, 2020). The visit of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Algeria-Türkiye strategic rapprochement in January 2020 was the first state visit of a foreign leader after the election of Abdelmadjid Tebboune in December 2019. The imperatives of the Cold War created a foreign policy paradigm in both countries based on a purely ideological foreign policy. Later, in the mid-1980s, under the presidency of President Turgut Özal, a softening environment emerged, which started a new era of mutual cooperation and better understanding between the two countries (Toumi, 2021: 45)

Geopolitics is reshaping the landscape of the entire African Sub-Saharan region. Türkiye, one of the new regional powers, is making important moves to gain a position in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Turkish Grand National Assembly had decided to deploy military units in Mali and the Central African Republic. This decision is a situation that France cannot accept (Toumi, 2021: 42) as the region whose old backyard is accepted. Despite this, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit in October 2021 has been part of Türkiye's attempt to break the economic hegemony of former colonial powers such as France. It could also be accepted as part of an attempt to counter China's influence on the African continent. It has given the traditional players a chance to highlight their failures and injustices in dealing with Africa (Coffey, 2021). In fact, the fact that Recep Tayyip Erdogan, both prime minister and President, has visited thirty African countries in nearly two decades is a sign of Türkiye's significant efforts to stay in Africa.

In particular, the presence of Turkish soft and cultural power in the Muslim regions of Africa is of particular interest. Some European countries, especially France, have wide political and security influence in many African countries. France is trying to redesign its relations with Africa by removing the effects of its colonial past. For this reason, it seems to focus on developing infrastructure on the continent (Tekir, 2022: 82.) France claims that Türkiye is acting against France's relations with West Africa under the brand of "Turkish Model" (Bonesh, 2021).
What is clear is that the increase in Türkiye's political, geopolitical, economic and military presence in Africa in competition with other regional and even Global players in Africa is of the nature to change the regional and Global equations. Especial-

ly the terror and political instability created by the colonial powers both inside and outside of Türkiye, to a large extent with an effective struggle, and the elimination of terrorism originating from Northern Iraq and Syria with deportation operations takes away the destabilization arguments of these countries.

Conclusion

Colonial policies and practices, which started at the beginning of the sixteenth century and continued intensely throughout the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century, began to be questioned frequently in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. Undoubtedly, the African continent has been the area most exploited by the Western powers, especially France and England. The economic, cultural and social policies they implemented in this continent formed the sources of their wealth. Although it is stated that the post-colonial period started with the African countries gaining their independence after the Second World War, the French influence shaped international trade. France's economic cooperation agreements with former colonial countries, as well as defense cooperation agreements, provided privileged access to the products and markets of its former colonies.

However, the events that took place in some former African colonies in recent years (for example, the beginning of the year 2022 necessitated the former colonial powers to seek new ones. Especially, Türkiye's lack of colonial past and its religious and cultural affinity provide important advantages on the continent. Türkiye has a foreign policy. With this change, there is no doubt that since the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has taken important steps towards becoming the most effective power on the continent, especially with its soft power in Africa and its hard power in Libya. This is mainly France, which has been a colonial power in Africa for many years. This will require fighting China and other powers that want to expand the One Road One Belt project into Africa.

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"Dini Değerlere Yönelik Değersizleştirme" ve Şiddet: Hindistan'da Kimlik, Politika ve Sih Ayrılıkçılığı
Öz

Sih dini, Hindistan'da Hinduizm ve İslam'ın gölgesinde ortaya çıktı. Kendisini "Hinduizm"den uzak ayrı bir kategori olarak şekillendirdi. O dönemin Müslüman Hükümdarları Sihizm'in etkisini kontrol altına almaya çalışırken, 19. ve 20. yüzyıllarda Hindu seçkinleri Sihleri asimile etmeye çalışmıştır ve onlara Hinduizm içinde bir mezhep muamelesi yapmıştır. Bu makale, Sihizm'in kendine özgü kimliğini koruma ve asimilasyon girişimlerine direnme arayışının haritasını çıkarmaya çalışmaktadır. Hindistan'daki Khalistan hareketi veya Sih ayrılıkçılığı da ayrı bir kimliği koruma ve asimilasyona direnme girişimidir. Aşağılama genellikle şiddetin doğrudan nedeni olarak tanımlanmıştır. Ancak bu makale, şiddetin bir nedeni olarak "Dini Değerleri Değersizleştirme" kavramını ve ayrıca onun "döngüsel doğasını" incelemeye çalışacaktır. Makale, dini değerleri değersizleştirme ve şiddeti birbirinin hem öncülü hem de emsali olarak sunacak ve böylece birbirini besleyecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dini Değersizleştirme, Şiddet, Sihizm, Kimlik ve Politika

"Religious Humiliation" and Violence: Identity, Politics and Sikh separatism in India
Abstract

Sikh religion originated under the shade of Hinduism and Islam in India. It shaped itself as a distinct category away from "Hinduism". While the Muslim Rulers of that era tried to contain the influence of Sikhism, the Hindu elites in the 19th and 20th centuries tried to assimilate Sikhs and treated them as a sect within Hinduism. This paper tries to map the quest of Sikhism for maintaining its distinct identity and resisting attempts of assimilation. The Khalistan movement or the Sikh separatism in India is also an attempt to maintain a distinct identity and resist assimilation. Humiliation has been often identified as the immediate cause of violence. This paper will however try to probe the specific notion of "Religious Humiliation" as a cause of violence and also its "cyclic nature". The paper would present humiliation and violence as both antecedents as well as precedents of each other, thereby feeding into each other.

Key words: Religious Humiliation, Violence, Sikhism, Identity and Politics

Religious Humiliation

A core functionalist perspective of Religion is that of Emile Durkheim. Durkheim (2001) introduced the concept of "Sacred". He considers sacredness as a central theme in the definition of religion. Sacred symbols as long as they are considered so are religious objects according to Durkheim. Hence any breach of sacredness is considered sacrilege, blasphemy, and desecration and evokes a strong reaction. For Emmanuel Levinas (1976) violence is the other of discourse. Levinas expands the term discourse to mean almost everything other than violence. Levinas attributes discourse as a halt in violence. Hence for him, violence takes place in a situation that prohibits discourse. Religion is a discourse and if halted by power it would lead to -violence. Strong correlations have been found between shame, humiliation, and violence (Gilligan, 1996). The collective memory of shame and humiliation is the key evocation of the oppressed in the near and far past, which in turn evokes streaks of violence. Thus a religious community in order to defend its present failure or disintegration evokes a mythical past of military superiority and present disempowerment, and the need to relive the glorious past. Humiliation is mostly linked to anger towards the perpetrator of humiliation (Torres &Bergner, 2012). Quantitative studies have concluded that humiliation and anger are related to each other (Harter, 2003). It is also argued that revenge is a direct consequence of humiliation (Walker & Knauer, 2011). The psychology of a religious commune is primarily constructed around shame and humiliation, thus justifying violence (Posman, 2006). The induction of humiliation is not plainly psycho-pathogenesis of an individual, but extraordinary acts of violence are committed by ordinary people exhibiting no particular disorder or hyperactivity of the brain but shame, guilt, and burden (Waller, 2012). Religious Humiliation is categorized by intolerance, impediments to practice and preaching, and desecration of religious symbols and sacredness. This paper would try to use the notion of actual or perceived "Religious Humiliation" as a trigger and cause of violence. This paper would also present the view that "Religious Humiliation" and violence are components of a cyclic process that feed into each other. The history of the Sikh religion was explored through functionalism and a phenomenological approach. Several unstructured interviews were carried out with ex-militants and other activists in Punjab. The themes of humiliation, shame, anger, and violence were analyzed using content analysis-conceptual analysis as well as relational analysis.

Sikhism

The foundations of Sikhism were laid in Northern India in the fifteenth century by Guru Nanak. Guru Nanak was born in Punjab in 1469. He gave his followers instructions that were known as Sikhyas. The followers and disciples of Guru Nanak came to be known as Sikhs.The political power in North and North-West India was consolidated by the Sultanate of Delhi under Lodi's for the first fifty years of the life of Guru Nanak.The Lodi dynasty was a self-proclaimed extension

of the Abbasid caliphate. Sikander Lodi who ruled during the time of Guru Nanak invoked Sunni Islam in order to seek legitimacy for his rule. Guru Nanak thus aware of the politico-social situation criticized the ruling Sultans describing them as "Butchers" (Grewal, 2008). He advised people not to submit their loyalty to these rulers but to God. Nanak's call was thus a protest against the ruling Muslim elite who imposed Jaziya as well as the caste-practicing Hindu Brahmins.Nanak increasingly began to identify himself with lower caste Hindus and poor peasantry, this popularized him and his ideas. People who were victims of the ruling Muslim elite or Brahmin hegemony sought refuge in Nanak. In his rejection of Hindu deities and gods, he conceived his monotheism. The Mughal takeover of the Delhi Sultanate during the lifetime of Guru Nanak had a marked impact on the Sikh movement. While the Sikh movement was in its infancy it could ill afford confrontation with the Delhi Sultanate. However, with Mughal and Lodi›s attention focused on battles with each other, an opposite environment was available for the growth of the Sikh movement. When the third Mughal emperor Akbar acceded to the throne in Delhi, it gave a significant push to the spread of Sikhism. Akbar abolished the practice of Jaziya and gave state patronage to non-Muslim religious institutions as well. This gave Sikh Gurus a religious space to establish institutions and aided in an increase in the number of followers. While Guru Amar das composed hymns of Nanak, Guru Ramdas got a tank dug in Amritsar, establishing the holy city of Amritsar as a new Sikh center (Grewal, 2008). Guru Arjan the youngest son of Guru Ramdas was chosen as the fifth Guru. Guru Arjan composed the first Sikh book Adigranth. The township of Guru Ramdas became an autonomous township under the Mughal emperor Akbar. At the time of Akbar's death in 1605, the Sikh identity had shaped up quite distinct from the Muslim and Hindu. With the succession of Jahangir to the throne, the shadow of protection enjoyed by Sikhs disappeared. Guru Arjan was charged with helping a rival prince and summoned to the court of the emperor and punished. The Persian texts Madkhiz-i-Tawdrikh-i-Sikhdnan and Dabistan Mazhab state that Guru Arjan Singh's property was confiscated and tortured to death. In response to this, Guru Hargobind the sixth Guru advocated belligerent and martial activity. He also constructed a military fort. (Grewal, 2008). Meanwhile, Shah Jahan who had ascended the throne after Jahangir entered into a confrontation with Guru Hargobind and ordered a military charge against him.The next in succession was Har Rai. However, his tenure remained largely peaceful, with no confrontations. Aurangzeb ascended to the throne and immediately brought radical changes in taxation, society, politics, and land revenue. The land grants given to non-Muslim subjects were withdrawn immediately and more so with immediate effect in Punjab (Habib,1963). In 1679 Jaziya was re-imposed. Aurungzeb had to fight his way through to climb the ascendency of the Mughal throne with his brothers, his haughty rival remained Dara Shikhoh. A mere rumor that Guru Har Rai had aided his brother

Dara Shikhoh, led to his summoning in the court of Aurungzeb. He however sent his son Ram Rai, who was kept hostage in Delhi while Guru Har Krishan was nominated as Guru. However, Guru Har Krishan was too summoned up to Delhi court. Guru Har Krishan died of smallpox in Delhi and nominated his grandfather –Guru Tegbahadur as the Guru. Tegbahadur traveled extensively in the Gagnetic plains and encouraged the building of temples. When it came to the knowledge of Aurungzeb that the number of temples had increased rapidly and Tegbahadur's offerings had increased manifold, he ordered complete destruction of temples (Grewal,1982). By the last quarter of the seventeenth century, Tegbahadur had become a symbol of resistance against the practices of toil and discretion levied on non-Muslim subjects by Aurangzeb. In 1675, he was arrested, kept in prison, asked to perform miracles6, motivated to convert to Islam, and failing which he was beheaded.Guru Gobind, the youngest son of Tegbahadur was nominated as the Guru and stressed on military training. In 1688 the first battle was fought by Gobind's forces against the invading Mughal armies. The battle inferred heavy losses on invading armies, forcing them to retreat. This battle was not only a military victory but a moral victory for Guru Gobind that not only demonstrated the skills of his forces but the ability of Sikhs to transform themselves from preachers of mere victimhood to warriors. Guru Gobind despite the assassination attempt remained defiant and aided chieftains opposed to Aurungzeb. This was also the time when Guru Gobind Singh introduced the concept of Khalsa -baptism or purification to establish a soulful connection between people and Guru. The conditions of unshorn hair, wearing of arms, and the epithet of "Singh" were symbols of baptized individuals.

From the above discussion, it is clear that the militarization in Sikhism happened because of the actual or perceived "Religious Humiliation". The killing of Sikh Gurus and the desecration of sacred symbols encouraged militarism in Sikhs, which in return led to their further persecution. The Sikh Baptism was also a response to counter attempts of assimilation.

Sikh Identity and politics in British India

The British colonial project in the Indian subcontinent viewed Indian society as fragmented, with each religious cult representing its own interests. The politicization of these groups and cults led to the emergence of communal identities. This replacement of communalism as an alternative to nationalism can be seen as a colonial state project in the public arena (Freitag, 1989). The British government in India started patronizing the Khalsa and Keshdar Sikh with the sole aim of giving them preference both in services and the army. The educational reforms brought about by the British yielded "identity consciousness". Sikhs who had no issues being considered as a sect or mutation of Hinduism began to increasingly make identity assertions. Thus the symbolic outward appearance of an individual became an important identity construct, and there was an increase in the number

of keshdari Sikhs. Another important characteristic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was the emergence of Singh Sabha. The mushrooming of Sabhas could be attributed to the fear of conversions. The first and immediate threat appeared from Christian missionaries but a deep sense of identity insecurity was from the Hindu puritan movement-AryaSamaj. Arya-Samaj a Hindu revivalist and puritan movement considered Sikhs as a sect of Hinduism and tried to assimilate them. The confrontation sharpened as the Sikh leaders demanded a separate Sikh marriage act to assert their identity. This hectic lobbying finally culminated in the Anand Marriage Act of 190911. Sikhs also increased the print propaganda tempo by comprehensively publishing. Most of these printed propaganda materials were comparative, confrontational, and reactionary pamphlets (Singh. K,2004)12. Sikh politics entered a completely new phase of reservation and representation after assertion and recognition. Sikh leaders began to hold regular parleys with the then Governor General of British India- Chelmsford to plead for separate electorates (Grewal,1998).In response to the growing demands, the British finally lent them a little more than twelve percent reservation as against the ambitious thirty percent that was sought.

In 1925, Sikhs were again agitating for "reclaiming the religious space". This movement was launched by the Akalis, who by now had grown in political stature, to get rid of Mahants– the custodians of Gurudwaras, who didn't subscribe to orthodox Sikh practices and abstained from practices and rituals of Khalsa but claimed to be direct followers of Guru Nanak (Fazal, 2014). Since at that point in time, Sikh identity assertion was dominated by Khalsa discourse of appearance and identity and Mahants were still caught in the Hindu appearance and outlook, it was considered impure and hegemonic to lend the control of religious spaces to a sect that chose to refrain from Khalsa rituals. The Sikh Gurudwara Act was passed and enforced in 1925, which excluded the syncretic sects such as the Udasis, the Nanakpanthis, and Sahajdaris from the very realm of Sikhism and control of sacred spaces. Thus the control of Gurudwaras was now wrested by Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC)(Fazal, 2014).

Sikh participation in the anti-colonial movement led by Congress was also subject to their demands for recognition. In 1930 the Sikh leadership announced that it would participate in the civil disobedience movement launched only if their color was incorporated into the Indian national flag. Similarly, in 1931, Master Tara Singh submitted a proposal to Gandhi advocating for more representation for Sikhs on the occasion of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. This was followed by a jolt to popular Sikh leadership with the announcement of the Ramsay-Macdonald communal award that reserved eighty-eight seats for Muslims, forty-four for Hindus, and only thirty-three for Sikhs (Grewal, 1991). Meanwhile, the Pakistan Resolution was passed in 1940 and this resulted in chaos in the Sikh leadership. On the other hand, SAD was compelled

to support British war machinery as a policy to appease them for dismissal of the Pakistan Resolution and the creation of Azad Punjab. More importantly, a fringe group led by Dr. V.S. Bhatti came up with the thought of "Khalistan as a buffer state between India and Pakistan" (Deol, 2000) (Grewal1991). Akalis, however, were persistent with the demand for a Sikh homeland almost till partition as is evident from the following resolution adopted in March 1946:

"Whereas the Sikhs being attached to the Punjab by intimate bonds of holy shrines, property, language, traditions, and history claim it as their homeland and holy land and which the British took as a 'trust' from the last Sikh ruler during his minority and whereas the entity of the Sikhs is being threatened on account of the persistent demand for Pakistan by the Muslims on the one hand and of the danger of absorption by the Hindus on the other, the Executive Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal demands, for the preservation and protection of the religious, cultural and economic rights of the Sikh nation, the creation of a Sikh state."

Similar posturing was evident in the representation made to the Cabinet Mission by Sikh leadership. Master Tara Singh demanded a separate state for Sikhs that would then decide on federation with India or Pakistan. This approach, however, raked up the tensions between the communities with riots engulfing the cities of Lahore, Amritsar, Jalandhar, Sialkot, and Multan (Grewal, 1991). Lord Mountbatten in March 1947 saw the hostilities between the communities as the potential preparation for a civil war and proposed the division of the state along religious lines. Besides, Congress invoked the historicity and sacredness of towns, places, and sites of worship, but those in British administration, who were drawing lines of division, preliminarily adopted the policy of volumetric measurements of population and in a few cases appeasement.

Politics and protest after 1947

After the end of colonial rule in 1947 and the subsequent partition, the major issue was the rehabilitation of refugees from West Pakistan and the allotment of land holdings. For the first decade, Sikh politics too remained entrenched in post-partition issues. In 1948, the state of Punjab was formally shaped by coalescing the small princely states of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Faridkot, Kapurthala, Kalsia, Malerkotla, and Nalgarh with East Punjab and naming this union as PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States Union). The 1951 census enumerated 62 percent of the population in Punjab as Hindu and 35 percent as Sikh. In the 1952 general elections, Congress was allowed to form a government despite not having the stated majority but to be replaced by the United Front government backed by the Akalis. However, after a year, the government was dismissed and Akalis felt alienated by this perceived sense of misuse of power. In 1949, both Punjabi and Hindi were promoted as school languages but the University controlling authorities, which had become the bastions of Arya Samaj refused to entertain the use of Punjabi. Though many formulas were present-

ed to resolve this dispute, Arya Samaj did not accept any of these and in this Jan Sangh and Hindu Maha Sabha were supporting it. Thus the association of religion and language became inalienable in the politics of Punjab, further alienating Akalis and Sikhs in general. In 1953, when the demand for the reorganization of states on a linguistic basis reached its peak, the state reorganization committee was formulated, giving rise to fear and skepticism of creating a Sikh majority state in the garb of a Punjabi-speaking state.

Master Tara Singh, the main proponent of Punjabi speaking state, was arrested in 1955 as the movement for and against Punjabi statehood was increasingly turning into Hindu–Sikh confrontation at least in terms of the abusive rhetoric employed. This invited a clampdown on the Akalis and raiding of Golden Temple premises. The commission on the reorganization of states too saw the Punjabi language movement with sacred religious overtones and thus reorganized the state structure by unifying Punjab, the PEPSU states and the Hindu-dominated Himachal region into a single unit. However, the Akalis rejected any such measure and opposed it tooth and nail. In 1956, delegations of the Punjabi state movement led by Master Tara Singh made representations to Prime Minister Nehru, and a compromise formula was agreed upon to merge PEPSU and not Himachal with Punjab, and Punjabi was introduced in Gurumukhi script as the state language. After the formation of the new Punjabi state, the Arya Samaj again launched a Pro-Hindi campaign. Master Tara Singh who by now had been heading SGPC was being continuously seen as a threat by Congress and attempts were being made to dislodge him from SGPC. In 1960, Tara Singh invoked the Punjabi province movement and won the SGPC elections. The movement gained momentum with the demand for bifurcation echoing all over, resulting in the arrest of Tara Singh and thousands of Akalis. However, Sant Fatah Singh continued the movement by going on fast until the demand was conceded.14 (Chima, J. S, 2010).

In the decade from 1955-65, Punjab had prospered considerably from the Green Revolution as the agricultural produce had gone up by 42 percent (Grewal, 1991). After the death of Nehru, Akalis again began to rake up the issue of a "Sikh Homeland", but this was not a demand for a sovereign state but an autonomous one. With Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister, in an effort to sideline the Alkalis, a resolution for Punjab Province was raked up within Congress and deliberations were being made to grant the Punjab province. This was followed by violent clashes and demonstrations by Jan Sangh against Congress and the Sikhs. Finally, the new state of Punjab was reorganized with Haryana and Chandigarh being allotted status of state and union territory respectively15. The years to come were dominated by a series of unstable governments and political formations. The Akalis were increasingly becoming skeptical about the center-state relations in terms of the development of Punjab, its status visage in the preservation of its identity, and the perceived or actual

threat of dissolution by virtue of assimilation. This called for a resolution on the eve of Baisakhi in 1973 known as the Anandpur Sahib Resolution by the Akali Working Committee. The resolution raked up controversy later, probably due to the occasion and place deliberately chosen for it than its content as such, which was also reiterated by the Akali leadership a decade later, with many rival factions using its modified versions.

Eruption of Militancy

The tradition of Sikhism had evolved under the leadership of ten gurus and assumed finality in the shape of the holy book, the Guru Granth Sahib. The holy book thus takes up the function of a living guru. Unlike Abrahamic religions where the holy book is believed to be revealed by a Prophet and treated as a word of God, Granth sahib is prefixed with the title Guru emphasizing its prophetic character. This philosophical doctrine was however challenged by the Nirankaris who believed in a personified guru. The leader of Sant Nirankaris -Baba Avatar composed religious hymns, a characteristic, and domain of Sikh Gurus, this made Nirankaris unorthodox and their practices were viewed as syncretism. This coincided with the surfeit of political changes taking place in Punjab and the increasing alienation of Akalis with the government in centre and the subsequent agitations in Punjab. These developments were also part of Sikh identity consciousness, motivated by the threat perception of assimilation in larger Hindu society. The rise of Nirankaris, as perceived by people interviewed for this research was thus largely viewed with suspicion and as some described it as the "final nail in the coffin" for the Sikh identity.

On the eve of Baisakhi in 1978, as the Nirankaris led by Baba Gurbachan organized a congregation, Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale the then head of Damdami Taksal vehemently opposed it. Many Sikhs joined Bhindrawale and marched to stop the Nirankari congregation, but had to face bullets. Subsequently, the Akal Takht issued a diktat of boycott against Nirankaris and their practices were viewed as sorcery and corruption of Sikh panth. In August 1978, to conserve and distinctly mark the Sikh identity against what was perceived as religious aggression and onslaught, a small political council was formed known as Dal Khalsa. The AISSF (All India Sikh Students Federation) was founded in the 1940s was revived by Amreek Singh –son of Sant Kartar Singh Bhindrawale and a close associate of Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale. Secessionist and militant ideas were slowly cropping up with the slogan of Khalistan achieving popularity. The idea of Khalistan coupled with the identification of the Sikh nation began to achieve territorial imagination as did vengeance against Nirankaris. Lala Jagat Narain, a newspaper owner who had deposed in favor of Nirankaris in court, was killed for his vehement writings in the chain of newspapers that he owned against puritanical Sikhs. The key suspect in this killing was Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale; he was arrested but only to be released a month later. The Akalis opined that the rising militancy and violence were mainly

due to the failure of the central government to address the demands advocated in Anandpur Sahib Resolution and thus started Dharmyudh–an agitation for meeting their demands stated in earlier resolutions. Akalis soon were joined by Bhindrawale, which increased the mass base of the movement (Jagtar, 2011).

The militant recruitment in its initial years relied on a close group mostly from Akhand Kirtani Jatha. Almost all militants interviewed during the course of this research reiterated that by joining militant groups they were merely responding to the call for saving the Sikh faith. Thus with Nirankaris being allowed to propagate their "syncretism" and the government is perceived as hand in glove with Nirankaris –a threat perception was generated and more so amplified by Bhindrawale with 'Faith under threat' becoming the popular slogan. Sikhs- no doubt were a majority in Punjab and were prominent in the politics of this state but within India were a minuscule minority that viewed every step by the central government with suspicion. The stringent policies of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi added to the perception that the majority community was pursuing the policy of assimilation and that Sikh identity was at stake.

In 1982 as Miss Gandhi was gearing up for hosting the Asian Games in Delhi, there were apprehensions that Akalis and Sikh separatists were going to disrupt the games. Thus all roads leading to Delhi, particularly the bordering districts of Haryana were turned into a military zone. Frisking and checking on roads leading to Delhi became a routine. All Sikhs were suspects as elected parliamentarians and senior defense persons were not spared. Many were forced to return to their homes. Sikh sacred symbols –Turban, beard, and sword were thus used by government forces to isolate and identify them. This was highly humiliating and was equated with the reign of the Mughals. The shame and humiliation contributed to the perception that Sikhs and Sikh religion was under threat. The idea of the Sikh nation as an "imagined community"15 bound by the bonds of religion and language now began to be replaced by the "ties of perceived collective shame and humiliation". This pushed Sikhs away from peaceful organized protests to violent means, with religion as a key motivation and revenge of collective shame as key motives. The aftermath of the 1982 Asian games was thus a trigger for extremist armed groups like Babbar Khalsa, and Khalistan commando Forces to cash in. Many ex-servicemen sided with Bhindrawale and became his military advisors. Major General Shubegh Singh –a war hero of the 1971 Indo-Pak war, became a military advisor to Bhindrawale. In 1983 President›s rule was imposed in Punjab with violence up surging and political tensions escalating. Soon Punjab was declared a "Disturbed area" and Golden Temple became a rallying place for Sikh Separatists with Bhindranewale camping on its premises. In the first week of June 1984, the Golden temple was surrounded and on 6th June the premises were stormed in by the Indian army. A volley of bullets

that followed resulted in hundreds of deaths including that of Bhindrawale and some of his followers. This army operation named "Blue star" resulted in outrage among the Sikh populace, many went on to the extent of comparing this with the reign of the Mughals, this led to further alienation and led militant extremism that culminated in the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards and anti-Sikh riots in Delhi. The magnitude of Anti-Sikh riots and the events that had unfolded in the last decade led to the formation of several militant groups that were determined to achieve "Khalistan" and were carrying actions almost at will, prominent among them were Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Liberation Force, Bhindrawale Tiger Force and Khalistan Commando Force (Grewal,1991).

The existence of the Sikhs in India as a distinct identity and fear of assimilating and disappearing resulted in not only motivating but making recruits more extremist and fundamental in their pursuit. The feeling of being second-class citizens among the Sikhs was getting further reinforced (Jagtar, 2011). This coupled with the history of Sikhism which had thrived on the idea of sacrifice and martyrdom by Gurus and their followers, the imagery of Guru as not only a messenger but as a warrior who defended faith would not only engage in polemical debates and build on intellectual engagements but militarily challenge enemies, proved detrimental and brought religion and its overemphasized military history into the forefront.

The notions of martyrdom in the Sikh faith were sown by Guru Arjan Singh, the fifth Guru of the Sikh faith, as he himself became the first martyr when he was tortured to death. Thus the seeds of militant Sikhism were sown as the successor of Guru Arjan Singh –Guru Hargobind Singh clearly intertwined religion and politics. The militarization and politicization of the Sikh faith are widely believed to be a direct response to the Islamization of Mughal polity under Aurungzeb (Deol, 2010). It was the tenth and final Guru of Sikhs –Guru Gobind Singh who actually inculcated religious nationalism and martyrdom. Thus many commentators on Sikh History agree that while the first four Gurus remained largely aloof from politics and martyrdom, the later Gurus inculcated these values as a defense against the Islamization of Mughal polity and later organized and maintain a distinct identity. The rejuvenation of the Idea of Martyrdom post-Nirankari episode had its roots clearly in Sikh history. The khalistan movement deliberately invoked religion as means and end in itself, with martyrdom and militant religion gaining more foothold, as it was widely perceived that the Indian state was hand in glove with Nirankaris and that the secular, unbiased nature of the Indian state was a myth and that religion was under threat and Hindu assimilation project was underway. There was thus a déjà vu, that the Mughal state and Indian state were comparables, that both were enemies of Sikh religion, to counter the Islamization of the Mughal empire, the notions of martyrdom were sown in Sikh faith, and to counter the perceived assimilation project of Indian state martyrdom was rejuvenated as an idea.

In the aftermath of operation Blue-star, militant activities began to surge. On July 5, 1984, an airbus from Srinagar to Delhi was hijacked to Lahore. The main demands of the Hijackers were the removal of the army from the Golden temple and the release of all Sikh prisoners (Jagtar, 2011). Operation Blue Star was the second "shame and humiliation" impetus to the Punjab militancy after the 1982 Asian games fiasco. A religious place as sacred as the Golden temple which functioned as a symbol of the Sikh faith was desecrated and a charismatic leader – Bhindrawale had been killed, this had a more collectively humiliating effect. More men began to participate in militancy as the idea of Khalistan began to get religious acceptance. Militant groups began to cheer for the idea of Khalistan. This phase was characterized and distinguished from the previous phase of militancy as the target changed from Nirankaris to the Indian state, its symbols, and "collaborators". Indira Gandhi the then Prime Minister of India was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards in order to seek revenge for the desecration of the Golden Temple.17 This had serious repercussions for the Sikh community as riots broke out in retaliation as a thousand Sikhs lost their lives (Smith, 1984). Thus even as the memories of the Golden Temple were afresh, the Sikh community received another humiliating debacle. Many people interviewed in the course of this research described it as a pogrom against Sikhs. The killings, torture, and desecration of Sikh religious symbols triggered further militant recruitment (Chima, 2010). In the summer of 1992, a major counter-insurgency operation was started by the Indian state leading to the killing of top commanders of militant groups. The Indian state managed to execute a counter-insurgency strategy that rattled the Khalistan armed groups. By the end of 1993, as many as 970 militants had been killed and around four hundred had been arrested(Chima, 2010). The remnant militant leadership settled in Canada, Europe, and Pakistan, from where their activities have been reduced to seminars and sporadic gatherings, calling for rejuvenating the Khalistan struggle.

Conclusion

The history of Sikhism has witnessed a continuous quest for maintaining a distinct identity. Sikh politics and militant separatism have also to be seen in continuity to protect their faith and resist assimilation. In its initial years, Sikhism consolidated itself against Muslim Rulers. In the 19th and 20th centuries, it continuously positioned itself against dominant Hindu movements and resisted assimilation. In the latter half of the 20th century, it resisted syncretism. Sikhism mainly via its strong diaspora in Europe and Canada continues to supply propaganda and politics for the territorial ambitions of a Separate-Sikh state, with the sole objective of protecting assimilation in India. From the above discussion, it is clear that the streak of violence is rejuvenated in Sikhism in response to Religious Humiliation. The militarization of the Sikh faith during the Mughal period, The resistance against attempts of assimilation during British Rule, The protest movements after 1947,

The violence against perceived blasphemy and its state patronage in 1978, the desecration of religious symbols during Asian games, operation blue-star and the riots of 1984 –all led to religious humiliation and gave impetus to violence. Also if we look at the process of "religious humiliation" and violence in the above context, they both precede and succeed each other. Religious humiliation leads to violence and violence leads to more "religious humiliation". The Religious humiliation of Sikhs by Mughal rulers led to their militarization, the militarization led to further "religious humiliation" with the killing of Gurus. The perceived religious humiliation of 1978 by Nirankaris led to violence which led to further humiliation in the 1982 Asian games with the desecration of Sikh symbols, which led to further militant violence till 1984 and further religious humiliation in the form of Operation Blue-star in which the sacred Golden temple was destroyed. This humiliation again led to the assassination of Indira Gandhi, which led to rioting against Sikhs and further humiliation, culminating again in the rejuvenation of militancy.

Notes

1. Sikandar Lodhi actually wasn't a pure Afghan, in the sense that his mother was a Hindu and perhaps in order to fulfill the "racial impurity" he invoked Islam and allowed his governors and military strategists to carry on the destruction of temples. He forbade Muslim women to visit the mazaars or graves of saints and imposed a ban on syncretic practices.
2. The kaliyugais a knife; the rajas are butchers; dharma is fast vanishing; in the dark night of falsehood the moon of truth nowhere seems to rise.
3. Tax imposed on non-Muslim subjects
4. The Sikh Gurus, reinforcing the attitude of Guru Nanak, believed in the possibility of miracles but regarded the power to perform miracles as irrelevant to one›s spiritual status and beneath the concerns of a devotee of God.
5. In an act of defiance and anger a Sikh in Agra threw two bricks at Aurangzeb in October 1676, when he was returning from the Jamia Masjid.
6. Keshdhari Sikhs generally don't trim or remove their hair.
7. The percentage of Sikhs among the Jats rose from less than fifty-four in 1881 to nearly eighty in 1921, while the percentage of Hindus among the Jats decreased from about forty in 1881 to less than ten in 1921.
8. Singh Sabha Movement was a Sikh movement that began in reaction to Christian Missionary activity. Singh Sabhas were public meetings where calls for a return to puritan Sikhism were made
9. All marriages which may be or may have been duly solemnized according to the Sikh marriage ceremony called Anand (commonly known as Anand Karaj) shall be, and shall be deemed to have been with effect from the date of the solemnization of each respectively, good and valid in law.
10. The account of British Intelligence officer David Petrie comprehensively deals

with the politics of dissatisfaction and representation.

11. The award of Cyril Radcliffe brought the larger part of the district of Gurdaspur and a small area of the district of Lahore to East Punjab (Grewal, 1991).

12. Breaking the fast without purpose, after having sworn on the holy book, for which he was punished too later as to perform an Akhand-path, to read barn in excess of the daily norm, to offer kard hparshad worth 125 rupees, to clean utensils of the Guru›s langar and to clean the shoes of the sangat visiting the Gurdwara (Grewal, 1991).

13. Hilarious as it may seem, with Jan Sangh –the right-wing Hindu, the communist party –left and Akalis, diametrically opposed to each other aligning together.

14. The Babbar Akalis were mostly immigrants from Canada , who had returned in the hope of liberating Guruduwaras from the control of Mahants

15. The idea of imagined communities as expressed by Bendict Anderson addressed the formation of nations and nationalism as mutual bonds and ties between people.

16. On every congregation that followed operation Blue- star, youth would often shout in Punjabi –'Sikh quom de tin gaddar –Badal, Tohra, Longawal' which would translate as three traitors of the Sikh nation-Badal, Tohra, and Longawal.

17. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two bodyguards –Beant Singh and Satwant Singh on 31st October 1984. Beant Singh was killed immediately by other guards however Satwant Singh was arrested in an injured state and later hanged. The assassination followed rioting in which mobs vandalized Sikh property and killed more than a thousand Sikhs, as reported by Time magazine two weeks after the assassination.

18. Saffron flags with Khalistan zindabad slogans engraved upon them were raised atop on Golden temple complex.

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GHANA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MILITARY REGIMES, 1966–1993: AN HISTORICAL REVIEW

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Askeri Rejimler Altında Gana'nın Dış Politikası, 1966-1993: Tarihsel Bir İnceleme
Öz

Bu makale, 1966'dan 1993'e kadar Gana'daki askeri rejimlerin dış politika hedeflerini incelemektedir. Altmışların ortaları ve doksanların başlarında, Afrika ve Latin Amerika'nın en çok askeri darbeye sahip kıta olarak ün kazanmak için birbirlerine meydan okudukları görüldü. Frankofon Afrika'daki askeri karışıklıkların çoğu herhangi bir ciddi uzman analizine zar zor yol açabilse de, Gana ve Nijerya'daki isyanlar birçok askeri uzmana Afrika siyasetinin militarizasyonuna farklı bir boyut kazandırmıştı. 65 yaşında bir egemen devlet olarak Gana, 1966–1969, 1972–1979, 1979 ve 1981–1993 olmak üzere dört askeri rejime tanık oldu. Bu askeri devralma politikaları, her zaman ekonomik kötü yönetim ve gücün idari olarak kötüye kullanılmasıyla suçlandı. Gerçekten de, Gana'nın ekonomisi, 1957'deki bağımsızlığından bu yana, istikrarlı ekonomik büyüme söz konusu olduğunda birkaç aksilik yaşadı. Ülke, küresel Covid-19 salgınının ortasında 6 Mart 2022'de 65. bağımsızlık gününü kutlarken, bu çalışma, son altmış yıldaki askeri rejimlerin dış politikasına odaklanarak, ülkenin bağımsızlıktan bu yana siyasi adımlarının izini sürmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Makale, tıpkı askeri subayların yönetmek için siyasi meşruiyetten yoksun olmaları gibi, başarılı dış politika kararları almak için doğru aktörler olmadıklarını kanıtlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gana, Batı Afrika, darbeler, askeri kural, askeri rejim, dış politika

Ghana's Foreign Policy Under Military Regimes, 1966-1993: An Historical Review
Abstract

This paper probes the foreign policy objectives of military regimes in Ghana from 1966 to 1993. The mid-sixties and early nineties saw Africa and Latin America challenging each other for an accolade of notoriety as the continent with the most military coup d'états. Though most of the military disturbances in Francophone Africa could barely provoke any serious expert analysis, the revolts in Ghana and Nigeria had given many military pundits a different dimension of the militarisation of African politics. As a 65-year-old sovereign state, Ghana has witnessed four military regimes: 1966–1969, 1972–1979, 1979, and 1981–1993. These politics of military takeovers were always blamed on economic mismanagement and administrative abuse of power. Indeed, Ghana's economy since independence in 1957 has suffered several setbacks as far as steady economic growth is concerned. As the country celebrated its 65th independence day on 6 March 2022, amidst the global Covid-19 pandemic, this study seeks to retrace the political steps of the country since independence, focusing on the foreign policy of the military regimes within the last six decades. The paper intends to prove that just as military officers lack political legitimacy to govern, they are hardly the right actors to make successful foreign policy decisions.

Key Words: Ghana, West Africa, coup d'états, military rule, military regime, foreign policy

Introduction

The term foreign policy means different things to different scholars. Foreign policy may be seen as the mutual interactions among sovereign nation-states (Bindra 2019; Grare 2002). While many analysts regard it as an external expression or manifestation of the internal objectives of a state, others associate a foreign policy with an elongation of a state's domestic policy (Lampton 2014; Byrd and Komanduri 2013; Eyadat and Mohammad 2010). It is often said that "foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends" (Kissinger 1966: 503). However, the borderline between these highly engaged couples can be anything but thick.

Since 1957 when Ghana gained independence from Britain, the foreign policy of the country has fundamentally remained the same (Sackeyfio-Lenoch 2016). The moment the Gold Coast (former name for Ghana) became the Independent State of Ghana on March 6, 1957, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (the first president of Ghana) made a historic foreign policy pronouncement. He said, "We are going to see that we create our own African personality and identity...We again rededicate ourselves in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa; for our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent" (Asante 1997: 29). Thus, since independence, Ghana's foreign policy has been to put the interest of Africa as its priority (see Gebe 2008; Nanjira 2010; Tieku and Odoom 2020).

By 1962, it became apparent that Nkrumah's major political vision was to export his "version" of continental identity or nationalism to other parts of the African continent (Bluwey 2002). This made Ghana the torchbearer of the fight against colonial dominance in Africa. Ghana became progressively interested in freeing the continent and ultimately uniting the independent African states under a single administrative and economic leadership. Indeed, one of the leading members of the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963 was Kwame Nkrumah. Headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, one of the numerous objectives of the organization was to facilitate the independence drive and champion the interests of all states on the continent. The mandates of the OAU also resonated well with Kwame Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist ideology and "Black Nationalism" (Grilli 2019: 30).

However, members of the National Liberation Council (NLC) truncated, prematurely, Kwame Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist foreign policy agenda through a military takeover on 24 February 1966. This was the first of many such military interferences in the affairs of the new nation's young democracy. These politics of military takeovers were always blamed on economic mismanagement and administrative abuse of power (Bennett 1975; Okeke 2018). For instance, among other things, the NLC had accused Nkrumah of mortgaging the Ghanaian economy to the weak and underdeveloped economies of the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern

Europe and China (Bluwey 2002). Again, before the military takeover, some opposition elements in Ghana maintained that Nkrumah had brought in shoddy goods from the backward economies of Eastern Europe and China. This paper probes the foreign policy objectives of military regimes in Ghana from 1966 to 1993. As the country celebrated its 65th independence day on 6 March 2022, amidst the global Covid-19 pandemic, this study seeks to retrace the political steps of the country since independence; focusing on the foreign policy of the military regimes within the last six decades. The paper intends to prove that, just as military officers lack political legitimacy to govern, they are hardly the right actors to make successful foreign policy decisions.

Methodology

The analytical method needed to study the subject matter of this paper consists of a qualitative examination of data from primary and secondary sources. The information draws from theoretical and historical references, expert testimonies, military doctrinal data, and contemporary academic publications on the topic. The primary sources, in particular, examine expressed ideas and comments by leaders and government officials in the editorials of the state-controlled Daily Graphic newspapers. This paper assumes that the military leaders and their appointees used these editorials of the government-controlled newspapers to express their policies and ideologies to the public. Content analysis of such editorials, without a doubt, will reveal the similarities and differences in the policy objectives of the various military regimes under review. The author's educational background in African Studies also helps put the analysis in perspective. These sources confirm the significance and legitimacy of the discussion. Being more theoretical and historical than technical, the nature of the subject under discussion limits the possibility of using quantitative analysis for the study.

The historical and theoretical references also form the bases of justification for the study. Historically, case studies of four military regimes from 1966 to 1993 are examined to illustrate the efforts of the military in conducting foreign policies in Ghana. Theoretically, the study examines the writings of ancient and contemporary military theorists to provide an evolving integration between military activities and foreign policy decision-making. I use the expression "evolving integration" because of recent happenings on the continent. Following the epidemic of military takeovers in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, and a failed one in Guinea-Bissau in recent times, some regional security analysts are questioning why Africa is experiencing the current wave of coups after democracy; it might seem, had become entrenched in the continent. From all indications, it seems that the continent is not yet done with military rule. That brings us to the two hypotheses around which the entire discussion in this paper revolves. The two hypothetical questions that Claude Welch (1962: 76) had asked decades ago are very relevant in this context: (a) "Can

a military-based government cope more successfully with the difficulties civilian regimes encountered?" (b) "Are some of these problems susceptible to solutions by means congenial to the governing military junta in ways that escaped the preceding civilian regime?"

The analysis of expert testimonies and the reviews of contemporary literature on military diplomacy establish the need and the legitimacy to address the issue of military foreign policy decision-making in relation to the dynamics of the current military takeovers on the African continent, especially in the West African sub-region. In a world that is becoming synonymous with globalization, foreign policy functions throughout the national and international corridors of power; and serves as a significant factor in achieving long-term strategic and operational goals of the international system. Thus, the use of expert testimonies and contemporary literature indicates the growing need to re-examine the role of the military in international relations as well as traditional public diplomacy. The study of doctrinal data of the military also establishes the context of the development and implementation processes of foreign policy decision-making in Ghana since independence on March 6, 1957. The military interventions in the political history of Ghana have significantly affected the country's reputation within the comity of nations, particularly at the levels of regional and international institutions such as ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN. This review, therefore, assesses the established role of these institutions vis-à-vis the framework that drives the foreign policies of military regimes.

Without claiming to be an expert in military governance, the author approaches the subject matter of this paper from the perspective of an "amateur" writer in International Relations and African Studies, with a first-hand experience of the adverse consequences of military regimes. These perspectives and/or experiences range from academic interactions with senior fellows in the fields of International Relations and African Studies to a review of relevant literature in those duo fields of study. Hence, the complete compilations, evaluations, and writing of the paper are achieved through editing, analysing, and synthesizing these diverse sources of information.

The discussion is in three main sections. The preceding section will provide review of literature on some salient themes in the military field, abstracting from the welter of academic, political, and military terminologies that seem to be significant and defining features of military regimes. The second section focuses on the foreign policies of the military governments that had the illegitimate mandate to rule Ghana intermittently from 1966 to 1993. The final discussion section then deduces some general concluding remarks from the discussion, paying greater attention to how military regimes are predisposed to violent conduct and are more likely than their civilian counterparts to take an uncompromising stance in diplomatic negotiations.

Literature Review

This short review of the literature on military regimes illustrates how military pundits and previous researchers have evaluated and analyzed different kinds of military rules across diverse geographical jurisdictions.

The Meaning of Military Rule

The duo terms "military rule" and "military regime" are used synonymously in this discussion to refer to a subtype of an authoritarian regime. According to the United States Army (1940: 2), a military government is "that form of government which is established and maintained by a belligerent by force of arms over occupied territory of the enemy and over the inhabitants thereof." The laws of war determine the legality of a military government (Omo-bare 1990). The end of the Second World War ushered in many military coup d'états in the so-called "Third World" or developing countries (Perlmutter 1980). Between the 1950s and '60s, many African countries had attained independence from their colonial masters; and started the journey to self-determination. Many modernization theorists at the time were quite optimistic that the newly independent nation-states of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East would eventually develop into capitalist democracies where the civilians would exercise unchallenged authority over the military (see Anber 1967; Berger 2003; Klinghoffer 1973). Unfortunately, those theoretical predictions or hypotheses and expectations were never fulfilled as military takeovers in most Third World countries had reached their crescendo between the 1960s and '70s (Decalo 1973; Gershoni 1996).

Origins of Military Rule

Just as the coup d'états differ in form and substance, so are the reasons. Reasons for coups headed by junior officers are markedly different from that of the coups led by those on top of the military hierarchy (Anene 2000; Kposowa and Craig 1993). Yet, the reasons for those two are not the same as those for palace coups. The distinction, largely, lies between the domestic political variables, internal bureaucratic factors within the armed forces, and external influences from powerful international actors (Craig and Kposowa 1990). Regarding domestic political variables, for instance, economic crises resulting in high cost of living, the high relative frequency of political instability emanating from religious or ethnic conflicts, weak or non-functional state institutions, and rickety political parties are some of the factors that mostly precede military coups (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Frantz and Ezrow 2011; Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius 2013). There are several other research reports on the circumstances that necessitate the rise in military regimes in Africa and some parts of Asia and Latin America (see Collier and Hoeffler 2005; DeRouen and Heo 2001; DIX 1994; Maniruzzaman 1992; Sigmund 1993). Such circumstances include the size of the army and military spending (Collier and Hoeffler 2007). However, none of those studies has been able to hazard a direct correlation between

the numerical strength of the military or the size of its budget and the propensity to stage a coup d'état. As Claude (1978: 142) has indicated, "Militaries numbering in the millions have remained politically passive, under a high degree of civilian control. Conversely, armed forces as small as two hundred (as in Togo in 1963) have successfully intervened in the political process and imposed their leaders upon the body politic." Therefore, the size of the military would not necessarily play a major role if all other factors were held constant.

Several other writers have assigned varied reasons for the surge in military regimes in newly independent developing countries between the 1960s and '70s (Bienen 1980; Cowan 1966; Decalo 1973; Perlmutter 1980). Henry Bienen (1980: 172), for instance, has stated that "[T]here is an old debate, going back to the 1950s, as to whether training programs inculcate into developing countries' armed forces values of civilian control, commitment to development, or professionalism as understood by those who do the training." Bienen (1980) cited memoirs of some Ghanaian military officers such as Afrifa and Ocran to buttress the argument that the impact of the colonial heritage on African military personnel and the training they underwent in the hands of the British army had made them less nationalistic than their civilian counterparts. This is closely associated with another significant trigger, which emerged during the Cold War era, the superpower competition (Daron, Davide and Andrea 2010; Dommen and Maizels 1988). At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States doled out large amounts of military assistance to their clients or allied nations to strengthen military capabilities of those states (see Atomic Heritage Foundation 2018; Rowe 1974). Indeed, Kposowa and Jenkins (1993) have argued that there was a direct correlation between the Cold War and the increased military interference in politics in Third World countries. There has been a downward trend in the number of military regimes in the developing world since the Cold War ended and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Another notable phenomenon that had swept across the newly independent African states, which led to the military involvement in African politics, was the single-party system (Smith 2005). The single-party used in this discussion, denotes "a situation in which only one political party, the governing party, exists or is permitted to exist" (Kilson 1963: 263). Except for Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya, and the Republic of Sudan, where no political parties existed at the time, variations of the one-party political system or the tendency to go in that direction could be seen in almost all newly independent African states (Claude 1978; Kilson 1963). Many of the new leaders in post-independence Africa held the view – albeit erroneous – that the single-party system was the most appropriate vehicle to drive home the concept of national unity. Kwame Nkrumah, the founding Prime Minister and the first President of the Republic of Ghana, for instance, was quoted to have stated flatly that, "[O]ne party rule is the most appropriate political instrument for ending tribalism and for planning

development" (Cowan 1966: 289). The focus on the one-party system as a fundamental axis around which the political structure of a state must revolve had resulted in the personalization of political office and the concentration of political power in the hands of a strong executive president (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010). In the final analysis, the military has to step in to get the leader out of office. When the army ousted Nkrumah of Ghana in 1966, among the reasons for the coup that had enjoyed public support was the single-party socialism and communism that Nkrumah had championed. General Akwasi Amankwa Afrifa, for instance, stated that the military takeover became necessary because the President (Nkrumah) had effectively blocked all channels for a peaceful change of government in Ghana (Apter 1972).

Mechanisms and Impacts of Military Rule

As we have seen in the above discussion, seizures of political power by army officers had become the norm rather than the exception in most parts of the 20th century. This was the most common means of imposing autocratic regimes in the developing world. The consequences of these military regimes are varied. It is well known, that the military is a hierarchical institution with a specialty in the deployment of violence and the use of instruments of coercion (Fjelde 2010; Frantz and Ezrow 2011). Thus, the only means of ruling under the military is by use of force (Davidonis 1944). In most cases, however, military regimes attempt to win the trust of the masses by "proclaiming their intention of returning power to civilians after an unspecified period of house cleansing" (Claude 1978: 139). Consequently, some military regimes, in some instances, have allowed general elections to choose national and local level representative bodies (Said 2012). Still, others have relied on the judiciary (covertly or overtly) with a limited degree of independence to propagate the rule of law (Hadenius and Teorell 2007). In rare instances, military regimes have promulgated national constitutions (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014). Notwithstanding these seemingly positive circumstances, the mere threat, or use, of torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and the application of military codes of conduct to civilians by the military are commonplace during military rule (Brotz and Wilson 1946).

Even though the military is a significant part of the state apparatus and functions under the laws of the state, the institution enjoys (relatively) a high degree of autonomy. This autonomy, it would seem, is because of the constitutional control they have over the instruments of violence and coercion (Bienen 1978). That said, it is worth noting that the military is not a monolithic society or a single actor. It is a hierarchical institution with ranks and classes, which provide a fertile ground for intense rivalry and horizontal competition among the various service units (Wilson 2016). In ethnically diverse societies such as Ghana and many other African countries, a lack of ethnic balance across the major ethnic groups during military recruitment could result in the security institution being regarded as representing one ethnic

group against others (Chazan 1982; Zeff 1981). These divisions and/or problems are aggravated anytime the military has access to political power. Military regimes that struggled in the past to manage these differences have mostly foundered, leading to uncontrolled counter coups and attempted seizures of political power (Hill 1979).

Transitions from Military Rule

Most military governments of the 1960s and '70s, on many occasions, had become democratic (or civilian) in subsequent decades. The military regimes began by taking steps to woo prominent civilians into the military governments (Anene 1997). For instance, Bienen (1975: 328) revealed that between 1967 and 1974, many "civilians functioned as civil commissioners in the Nigerian federal military government and in state governments." While some of those civilians – such as Aminu Kano and Chief Awolowo – had established themselves politically before 1966, many of them had never been active politicians (Bienen 1975). There have been attempts by several analysts to distinguish between democratization and restoration of civil liberties (see Anene 2000; Arceneaux 2001; Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi 1981; Williams and Masters 2011). The academic literature is also awash with the debate over whether a multiparty system automatically leads to democratization (Gandhi 2015). I will resist the temptation to delve into those debates.

There are varied outcomes when the military presides over political transitions from military rule to democracy. In most cases, the military tends to interfere in the process to ensure that their desired outcome is produced at the end of the transition. A case in point is Ibrahim Babangida's "transition" that never took place. Babangida was a military leader of Nigeria from 1985 to 1993 (Adewuyi 2021). The regime initially set 1990 as the deadline for a return to civilian rule. After a failed coup attempt to outstate the regime, the deadline was rescheduled to 1992, which resulted in the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections in Nigeria (Falode 2019). General Sani Abacha eventually toppled Babangida's regime in 1993 (Kraxberger 2004). Military rules in the 1960s and '70s had ended in several ways. After failed military adventures, many of the military regimes had collapsed. The military regimes of Greece in 1974 and Argentina in 1983 are the best examples of failed military adventures (Inglessis and Adelman 2011). Known as "Argentina's Dirty War" era, the last military regime in Argentina lasted from 1976 to 1983 (Osiel 2001). It was the cruellest and the most murderous military rule ever in the Southern Cone (Ehenson 1999; Gomez 2001). With severe economic problems and increasing public opposition, the regime lost popularity. The military government was forced to step aside in 1983 after Argentina's lost to Great Britain in the Falklands War (Feitlowitz 2001).

Still, other military regimes had managed to negotiate a successful return to a multiparty system where they metamorphosed into civilian governments (Eldem 2020). Ghana's Jerry John Rawlings is an excellent case for analysis of a military

leader turned democratic. Rawlings led a military junta from 1981 to 1992 and became a democratically elected President for two terms, from 7th January 1993 to 7th January 2001 (Bluwey 1998). He also served as a military leader for a short period in 1979. He governed Ghana for nearly 20 of the country's 65 years since independence. President Rawlings' economic policies led to Ghana's unprecedented economic crisis in 1983. Having lost popular support for his handling of the country's economy, according to Boafo-Arthur (1999), he was forced (by external powers) to undertake the structural adjustment program and prepare the country for multiparty democracy. Rawlings founded the National Democratic Congress party to contest the 1992 general elections. The NDC won the election making Rawlings the first President of the Fourth Republic. The National Democratic Congress remains one of "the two big tent parties with national appeal and comprehensive platforms" (Minion 2004: 423). The other party is the liberal New Patriotic Party (NPP).

Some of the military rulers had, either through formal or informal agreements, successfully negotiated their way out of political power (Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012). A typical case in point is the Chilean military regime from 1973 to 1990. A 1988 plebiscite voted the military regime out of power, which was followed by a general election in 1989 to return Chile to a multiparty democracy (Loveman 1991). The 1984 Naval Club Pact in Uruguay also fits in this category (Aguero 1998). It is worth noting, however, that not every regime transition leads to democratization. There are instances where a military regime is replaced by another military junta. With this scenario, I draw examples from Ghana and Nigeria. Ghana's Gen. I. K. Acheampong led a military regime under the Supreme Military Council (SMC) from 9th October 1975 to 5th July 1978, when General F. W. K. Akuffo overthrew him in a palace coup. General Acheampong was forced to resign as head of state; and was replaced by his deputy on the ruling Supreme Military Council II (SMC II) (Owusu 1989). In the case of Nigeria, as we have already discussed previously, General Sani Abacha – a military ruler – replaced General Ibrahim Babangida's military regime in 1993 (McGowan 2003).

Most analysts on post-military regimes tend to focus almost entirely on the outcomes of the political processes and the quality of the democratic governments that succeeded the authoritarian regimes (John 1997; Rwengabo 2013; Williams and Daniel 2011). What rarely engages the attention of those analysts is the military prerogatives that were established before the transitions. These prerogatives, in most cases, outlive the authoritarian regime itself (Ensalaco 1995). The prerogatives could be exceptional conditions of service for a category of military officers, entrenched constitutional clauses that give unqualified protection to post-authoritarian regime leaders or a role as ex officio members in domestic security boards. Irrespective of the form or shape of those prerogatives, they most often remain albatrosses around the necks of the civilian governments long after the transition.

Foreign Policy under Military Regimes in Ghana (1966-1993)

The mid-sixties and early nineties saw Africa and Latin America challenging each other for an accolade of notoriety as the continent with the most military coup d'états (McGowan 2003; Morrison and Stevenson 1974). Though most of the military disturbances in Francophone Africa could barely provoke any serious expert analysis, the revolts in Ghana and Nigeria had given many military pundits a different dimension of the militarisation of African politics (Luckham 1994). These coup d'états gave the military a challenging array of new responsibilities, including economic management and foreign policy decision-making. As a 65-year-old sovereign state, Ghana has witnessed four military regimes: 1966–1969, 1972–1979, 1979, and 1981–1993. These politics of military takeovers were always blamed on economic mismanagement and administrative abuse of power (Bennett 1975). Indeed, Ghana's economy since independence in 1957 has suffered several setbacks as far as steady economic growth is concerned. The economic consequences of military regimes will be dealt with on a different platform. The ensuing pages seek to examine the foreign policy options of the military regimes in Ghana within the last six decades.

The National Liberation Council (NLC) and Ghana's Foreign Policy

The National Liberation Council – a group of army and police officers, removed the founding Prime Minister and the first President of the newly independent Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, from office on 24th February 1966 (Harvey 1966). This was Ghana's first post-independence military interference in the country's political affairs. According to the Chairman of the NLC, Lt General J. A. Ankrah, Nkrumah was overthrown because of his dictatorial and repressive rule, corruption and mismanagement of the economy, attacks on academic freedom and curtailment of freedom of expression, interference in the affairs of the armed forces and the police, and the one-party Socialism and Communism (Ankrah 1966; Apter 1972).

The foreign policy of the National Liberation Council did not differ much from that of Nkrumah's administration. In a national broadcast to mark the first hundred days of the regime, General Ankrah stated that:

"*We have endeavoured to keep to our declared policies of non-alignment, balanced neutrality, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Some of our detractors have erroneously stated that with the overthrow of Nkrumah, Ghana would abandon its traditional role in African Affairs, particularly in the anti-colonial struggle. We have, by deeds and words given the lie to this*" (Asante 1997: 36-37).

Indeed, the NLC had many detractors, especially outside Ghana. Although many African leaders had some personal reservations regarding Nkrumah's radical pan-African agenda, the coup did not receive the expected approval from the majority of these African leaders (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1967). Many countries, such as Egypt, Guinea, Tanzania, and Somalia developed a lukewarm attitude to-

ward leaders of the NLC in international gatherings (Asante 1997; Bluwey n.d.). Those states accepted the traditional role that Ghana was playing in African affairs, especially the struggle against colonial rule. Zambia, for instance, recalled its ambassador to Ghana immediately after the military takeover in Ghana to demonstrate its disapproval of the coup. Cuba also had to cut foreign ties with Ghana by closing its diplomatic mission in Accra. The NLC regime, however, enjoyed some subtle endorsement from Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, and Togo for obvious reasons. These countries had strained relations with Nkrumah and his style of leadership (Bretton 1966).

Despite the NLC's resolve to keep to the policies of non-alignment, most of the regime's external policies were western-oriented. There was a subtle approval of the coup by the western world, especially the United States of America and the United Kingdom (Afrifa 1967). It did not come as a surprise to many analysts when a powerful government delegation paid official state visits to France, the US, and the UK to strengthen bilateral relations with, and seek financial support from, those countries. Some of the erudite foreign policy analysts attributed the western connection to the outlook and experiences of the new Ghanaian leaders. According to Bennett Valerie Plave (1975: 133), the leaders of the 1966 revolution were "… conservative, pro-Western, British-trained Ghanaian army and police …." Olajide Aluko (1975) also shared similar sentiments when he postulated that all four police officers on the Council were trained at the Metropolitan College, London, England; and all the four army officers on the Council were trained at different army training colleges in Britain, and Colonel A. A. Afrifa went to Sandhurst. They were therefore anti-communist in outlook while they showed affection towards the British way of life, its legal system, and its democratic ideals.

It is important to note at this point that the National Liberation Council paid little attention to external issues (Asante 1997). To a considerable extent, domestic political pressure created justifiable motivations for this. In other words, the general mood in Ghana before and after the 1966 coup dictated the foreign policy trajectory of the NLC (i.e., a temporal retreat from global affairs). The sentiments across the country were that Nkrumah's administration had concentrated too much on African and international affairs, but paid little attention to Ghana's domestic issues (Bluwey 2002). Others also held a strong conviction that "Nkrumah's violent attacks on the West from 1961 onwards were responsible for the refusal of Western nations to grant long-term loans to Ghana after 1961, and to assist Ghana in securing an international cocoa pact" (Aluko 1975: 60). Thus, at the very dawn of its assumption of office, the NLC regime played on the general mood of the country and restricted its involvement in external matters. For instance, in a radio broadcast to the nation in 1966, General J. A. Ankrah, the Chairman of the NLC stated "… our external relations

shall be guided by our national security, the territorial integrity of all Ghanaians" (Ministry of Information, Ghana 1966: 3). Again, in a meeting with three visiting journalists from Britain, France, and Germany, General Ankrah had reiterated, "the prosperity of Ghanaians is the supreme goal of the foreign policy of the NLC. We shall not deviate from that goal and we shall not compromise over that goal" (Ministry of Information, Ghana 1966: 12). To be charitable to the regime, it is important to acknowledge that the regime's foreign policy trajectory aligned with one of the major theses of foreign policy analysis. The foreign policy of a state is determined, largely, by the interplay between the domestic forces of the state and the changing dynamics of the international environment (Waltz 2001).

The Foreign Policy of the National Redemption Council (NRC)

The government of Prime Minister Kofi Busia was removed from office on 13th January 1972. Ghana came under military rule again for the second time in her 16 years of sovereign nationhood. The coup d'état was led by the acting commander of the Infantry Brigade of the Ghana Army, Lieutenant Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. The officers constituted the National Redemption Council (NRC) and its junta, with Lt. Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong as the Chairman and Head of State (Rothchild 1980). In 1976, the military junta was reorganized. A new policy-making organ was created as the Supreme Military Council (Daily Graphic, 12th November 1976). It consisted of all the service commanders of the Armed Forces. Lt. Col. Acheampong was promoted to the rank of General and retained his position as Chairman of the SMC and Head of the State. On 6th July 1978, General Acheampong was ousted in a putsch and put under house arrest (Rothchild 1980). A new Supreme Military Council II was constituted with General Fred W. Akuffo as its Chairman and the new Head of State. As Asante (1997) has indicated, the Supreme Military Council(s) (SMCs) were continuations of the National Liberation Council. Hence, the foreign policy of the Supreme Military Council II naturally adopted the same policy options as the NRC.

Upon assuming office as the Head of State of Ghana, Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong met the press on 17th January 1972. In that press conference, Col. Acheampong laid bare the foreign policy trajectory of the regime:

"*Our foreign policy will, first of all, be based on a vigorous and dynamic African policy. We intend to foster the closest and most cordial relations with all African States. Furthermore, we cannot remain indifferent to the plight of our African brothers still not free and who suffer indignation on the continent of their birth. Accordingly, we shall vigorously support the eradication of the last remnants of colonialism and racial discrimination from the African continent. Our fellow Africans struggling for control of their destiny under the racist regime of South Africa, under the rebel regime of Ian Smith, in Namibia and the Portuguese-held parts of Africa will have our unflinching support*" (Asante 1997: 41).

From a foreign policy perspective, there was a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of the NRC to sound and look like Nkrumah. Acheampong and his regime lent credence to the leading role Ghana was playing at the time to push for the total liberation of the African continent (Ghana 1976). The disastrous political consequences of colonialism were no longer a distant or abstract matter but a grinding reality for every African. The issue of Rhodesia (now the Republic of Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa featured prominently in the initial stages of the NRC foreign policy. The NRC had begun a phantom mobilization of a volunteer brigade, ostensibly, to join the nationalist guerrilla forces in Rhodesia (Bluwey n.d.).

The NRC's foreign policy towards Ghana's neighbours in particular, and Africa in general, received a positive rating from many foreign policy analysts. Though Ghana's relations with Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo, after the coup, were not seriously damaged, the relationship with Nigeria was unsurprisingly exceptional (Aluko 1981). Ghana's relations with Nigeria date back to the pre-colonial era. Thus, before independence, Nigerians had established businesses in Ghana and contributed unmeasurably to the politico-cultural and socio-economic development of Ghana. As of 1931, the largest single group of immigrants in Ghana had come from Nigeria (Yeboah 1986). The economic affluence of Ghana at the time had made the country the "gold coast" for migrants from neighbouring countries, particularly Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Togo (Honig 2016). Between 1931 and 1963, the population of Nigerian migrants in Ghana increased from 57,400 to 191,802 (Olaosebikan and Ajayi 2014). The net results of these large-scale economic migrants were economic insecurity and youth unemployment with its unintended social vices. The migrants, mostly Nigerians, were accused of posing economic and security threats to Ghana. Therefore, the government instituted policy interventions to control the rising population of aliens in the country. One such policy intervention was the 1969 "Aliens Compliance Order." The order expelled close to 200,000 migrants from Ghana (Peil 1971). Though the policy affected migrants from many countries, such as Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Togo, the Yoruba community in Ghana (mostly from South-Western Nigeria) was the hardest hit. Out of an estimated 191,000 Nigerians in Ghana, the Yoruba constituted about 140,000 at the time (Kobo 2010). Therefore, when the NRC ousted Prime Minister Busia's government, Nigeria was the only West African State that openly rejoiced at the 1972 coup. For instance, Nigeria's most prestigious daily newspaper at the time, The Daily Times, had featured many unprintable comments about the government of the Progress Party (Daily Times 1972). There were clarion calls across Nigeria for the Federal Military regime of Yakubu Gowon to endorse and extend a helping hand to the NRC government.

Ghana, under the NRC, also committed itself to all policy demands of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In an apparent move to cut a niche for itself, the National Redemption Council openly denounced Prime Minister Busia's

proposal to terminate the isolation of apartheid South Africa and to enter into diplomatic negotiations with the regime in South Africa (Rothchild 1980). As I have already discussed in this section, Col. Acheampong, in his maiden foreign policy pronouncement, took a radical and uncompromising stand against the apartheid regime in South Africa and the remaining imperial dominance in Africa. Hence, Ghana was projected as a good African leader with cordial comradeship with fellow African states. In 1973, for instance, Col. Roger Felli, who had just assumed the portfolio for the Foreign Ministry, stated, "Ghana has been welcomed back to her leadership role in Africa. Africa's freedom has always been the central inspiration of Ghana's foreign policy – Ghana without Africa is meaningless and Africa without Ghana is disastrous" (see the West Africa magazine 16th September 1973). Col. Acheampong's government had established a Liberation Information Center in Accra to collaborate on all propaganda activities on the continent. This was meant to strengthen the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa in particular and decolonization in general. The Acheampong regime, unlike the NLC or the Progress Party, provided bilateral assistance to the liberation movements.

The Foreign Policy of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)

A military insurrection on 4th June 1979 removed the Supreme Military Council II from office. A group of young military officers, under the direction of an Air Force Captain, announced themselves as the junta (Feit 1968). That was the insurrection which brought Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings to the Presidency for the first time in the political history of Ghana. This "first coming" of Jerry Rawlings focused exclusively on internal policies. On 4th June 1979, the leader of the junta, Flt. Lt. Rawlings said: *"... we, the young officers of the armed forces and other ranks, rose up in spontaneous mutiny to remove the causes of so much national pollution. Our immediate task was to cleanse the armed forces, which had lost its bearings in the wilderness of indiscipline and unprofessional behaviour. But our fundamental and long-term aim was to launch a revolution which would cleanse the whole nation, turn the hearts and minds of our people against social injustices and ultimately redirect the pattern of our national life…"* (Asante 1997: 43).

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council proclaimed a moral revolution against the Acheampong regimes of 1972 and 1978 and their offspring, the Akuffo regime of 1978/79 (Oquaye 1980). According to the AFRC, these regimes had no ambition for Ghana; and governed without moral principles. There was corruption in government, the military, and civil and public services. Therefore, Flight Lieutenant Rawlings led a small group of officers to stage a mutiny that brought the AFRC to power (Barbara 1982). The mission of the military junta was to rid the system of corruption (with their "house decking" campaign) and return the country to multiparty democracy.

Thus, the regime did not see the need to send emissaries to Ghana's development partners abroad to explain the objectives of the coup. Ghana paid a huge

price for this foreign policy indifference (Rothchild 1980). Nigeria, at the time, was responsible for supplying about 80% of crude oil to Ghana. However, after the coup and the subsequent execution of the former Heads of State of Ghana (General. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong and Lieutenant. General. Frederick W.K. Akuffo), the government of Nigeria cut off the supply of oil to Ghana (Aluko 1981). That resulted in an unprecedented fuel shortage in Ghana. The OAU and the Commonwealth Secretariat also condemned the summary executions and demanded explanations from the AFRC (Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild 1982). However, the military junta did not yield to the pressure emanating from the international community. Perhaps, the only foreign policy move the AFRC made was the decision to attend the Non-Aligned Conference in Cuba. Chairman Rawlings took advantage of the Cuban Conference to explain the aims and aspirations of the AFRC to the Non-Aligned Movement (Asante 1997). That was before the AFRC had surrendered power to President Limann and his PNP Administration on 24th September 1979, just after three and half months at the helm of affairs. The 112 days in office were not all to be seen of Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings in the Ghanaian political landscape. After two years of a multiparty democracy under the leadership of Dr. Hilla Limann, Rawlings ousted Limann's government on 31st December 1981, accusing it of economic mismanagement (Jeffries 1982). A Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) was quickly set up to stir the affairs of the new government. I now wish to turn the spotlight on the foreign policy of the PNDC.

The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and the Foreign Policy of Ghana

The economic mismanagement of the previous military regimes between 1972 and 1979 tended to be the bane of the Limann's Administration. The People's National Party (PNP) government inherited a country with stagnated economic growth. However, President Limann's lackadaisical approach to duty and his uninspiring leadership facilitated the passing of the "death verdict" on his administration (Handley and Greg 2001). On 31st December 1981, a coup d'état, led by none other than Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, was proclaimed. Rawlings later announced the establishment of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) with himself as the chairperson of the junta. The PNDC was to become the longest serving military regime in the political history of Ghana – from 1981 to 1992.

The initial stages of the PNDC regime were preoccupied with efforts to stabilize the country and re-engineer economic growth. The government of President Limann was under enormous difficulties and increasing public pressure to deal with the shortage of essential commodities. Ghana's foreign reserves, which stood at 33 million dollars, were at an all-time low (Owusu 2016). A few months before the December 1981 coup, a renowned Ghanaian lawyer, Mr. William Eugene Ofori-Attah (Paa Willie), made the following observations about Ghana:

"Chaos threatens the thin social fabric of Ghana. Organised labour is in revolt against the government and its private-sector employers. Students in secondary schools and teacher training colleges are in revolt against their teachers, principals, and headmasters. The police are fighting soldiers; prisoners are on strike against prison warders. Farmers are threatening to withhold food from the market, and every Ghanaian seems to be angry with every other Ghanaian" (Paa Willie, February 1981). That was a true reflection of the economic conditions of Ghana on the eve of the removal of the PNP's administration from power. Thus, these domestic difficulties dictated the initial foreign policy trajectory of the PNDC government. However, the retired Flight Lieutenant knew that before he could do anything meaningful on the foreign front, he needed to capture the support of the disillusioned public. In his maiden public statement, Chairman Rawlings proclaimed:

"Fellow Ghanaians, as you will notice, we are not playing the national anthem. In other words, this is not a coup. I ask for nothing less than a REVOLUTION-something that will transform the social and economic order of this country. Fellow citizens, it is now left to you to decide how this country is going to go from today. We are asking for nothing more than popular democracy. In other words, the people should be part of the decision-making process of this country" (Daily Graphic, January 1982).

Unlike previous military governments, and in line with its proclaimed popular democracy and public participation in decision-making, the PNDC regime established political structures across the nation to facilitate mass participation in the political process. Therefore, both internal and external policies became the amalgamation of diffused public interests. However, foreign policy was still the prerogative of the Chairman and official members of the PNDC. A few months after the assumption of power, the regime triggered an aggressive foreign policy agenda to garner financial support from the international community to deal with the domestic economic problems (Shillington 1992).

The regime's first foreign trips consisted of delegations to Cuba, Libya, Eastern Europe, and Nicaragua to solicit financial support and foster closer diplomatic relations (Asante 1997). As we can see from the initial countries visited by the PNDC delegations, the regime was initially inclined to the socialist ideology and did not seem to have any well-defined international economic policy. However, as time went on and the reality began to hit hard, the regime invited the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to the negotiation table as the country wanted to embark on a structural adjustment program to resuscitate the dying economy (Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild 1982; Kraus 1991). At that time, sustained structural adjustment and economic liberalization were seen as being inextricably linked to democratization (Adejumobi 1996; Boafo-Arthur 1999). Therefore, many governments in the developing world, with the support of the IMF and the World Bank, adopted adjustment policies before political liberaliza-

tions. The PNDC regime, thus, established economic diplomatic relations with the two Bretton Woods institutions and many other International Financial Institutions that were willing to come on board to help Ghana out of her economic woes. Undoubtedly, a good relationship with the IMF and the World Bank naturally boosts a nation's international reputation. As a result, with time, Ghana's economic relations with the West and other developed economies attracted positive reviews.

During the PNDC's administration, Ghana established diplomatic missions in Bulgaria and the Republic of Cuba and signed cultural and economic agreements with Sofia and Havana (Asante 1997). It is also on record that the PNDC government sent some of its loyal revolutionary cadres and newly recruited foreign-service personnel to Bulgaria, Cuba, Libya, and the USSR for training (Bluwey n.d.). In addition, there was an agreement between the PNDC government and the Cuban state for Ghanaian students to study diverse fields of medicine in Cuba. The government replicated that agreement in Moscow during the Soviet Union era giving Ghanaian students the rare opportunity to study in Russia. These were the heydays of the Soviet regime when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would offer African students full scholarships to study in different fields.

Ghana's diplomatic relations with Libya under Rawlings were at an all-time high. As indicated above, the PNDC restored bilateral and diplomatic ties with the North African country immediately after it took charge of the governance of the country (Shillington 1992). Under President Limann, diplomatic relations with Libya had been everything but affable. It is worth recalling that after the execution of the former heads of state and several military generals by the PNDC regime, the Nigerian government suspended the supply of petroleum products to Ghana. Rawlings had to rely on Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's Libya for oil (Asante 1997). However, it would seem that because of Rawlings' outstanding relationship with the Libyan leader, the PNDC's diplomatic relations with Ghana's neighbours and the Western World were uncordial. The return of Jerry Rawlings to the political scene did not come as a piece of pleasant news to the leaders of the West African sub-region. On one hand, after taking the leadership role of the country, President Hilla Limann established outstanding diplomatic ties with the governments of Ghana's neighbouring countries and helped enhance political and socio-economic cooperation in the sub-region (Bluwey 2002). On the other hand, almost all the leaders in the West African sub-region looked at Rawlings with subtle disdain and apprehension because of his relations with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. When Rawlings first emerged on the political scene, he developed a personal relationship with Muammar Gaddafi because the two leaders shared the same ideology – the Socialist Ideology. Besides, some African governments had accused Gaddafi of unchecked subversive conduct across West Africa and elsewhere on the Continent. He took his anti-imperialist ideology or agenda around Africa and offered military and financial

support to numerous militant and rebel groups to ferment political instabilities in some parts of Africa (St John 1983). President Limann had shared these common sentiments regarding the conduct of Gaddafi with other governments of West Africa.

Rawlings' posture did not help matters either. His initial foreign policy decision toward neighbouring countries was seen as non-collaborative. Instead of the usual courtesy visits by new leaders to the neighbouring states to announce their presents and strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations, Rawlings had ordered the closure of Ghana's land border and banned night flights into Ghana (Bluwey 2002). These actions by the PNDC brought Ghana into hostile confrontations with her immediate neighbours. It degenerated into allegations and counter-allegations of subversions and incitements of the masses against sitting governments (West Africa, 1982). The PNDC responded to the reactions of these foreign leaders with insults and threats as if the regime was not aware that those affected by Ghana's decisions were sovereign nations who also had the interests of their countries to protect. It is worth noting at this point that Ghana, like every sovereign nation, had the national interests to protect within the comity of nations in the West African sub-region. However, achieving set targets of national interests requires the collaboration and cooperation of neighbouring or other states in the region. For instance, since the 1970s, a joint cement project Ghana had with Togo and the Ivory Coast was doing very well for all the countries. However, due to the closure of the borders, the project and other informal cross-border commodity transactions with Nigeria, Togo, and Cote D'Ivoire had to be truncated. As these acrimonious relations were festering among these neighbouring West African states, subversive elements within the countries seized the opportunity to cause cross-border crimes. The PNDC regime then accused Cote D'Ivoire of granting asylum to Ghanaian political dissidents and allowing its territory to be used as a "launch pad" by Ghanaian rebels.

Conclusion

There is little convincing information about decision-making within military regimes in Africa, especially in the subfield of foreign policy analysis. The discussions in this paper reveal some captivating vignettes of military foreign relations in which form, rather than substance, dominates the decision-making processes. Of course, this cannot be seen as a general pattern of military diplomacy across the African Continent and beyond. However, what can be generalized at least, based on the literature review, is that foreign policy decision-making, whether under military or civilian regimes, is highly centralized in many countries on the African Continent.

Looking at the Ghanaian situation, the substantive diplomatic outcome we can derive from the military regimes under review is that those regimes failed to demonstrate a clear-cut commitment to the foreign policy trajectory of Ghana in either international politics or inter-African relations. In other words, they did not seem to follow the strict foreign policy position of the country since indepen-

dence. Personal interest, rather than national ideological stance, determined the diplomatic trajectory of the military regimes. For instance, during the Cold War, the foreign policy stance of Ghana (under Kwame Nkrumah) was that of non-alignment. However, despite the NLC's resolve to stick to the non-alignment policy position, most of the regime's external policies were western-oriented. Whereas the NLC found comfort in aligning its foreign policy to the interests of powerful western states, the AFRC/PNDC had established a cordial relationship with other developing nations in Latin America. By the end of 1982, a year into the return of Rawlings to the political scene, it was clear that the PNDC regime had found solace with countries such as Cuba, and Nicaragua, among others. All these countries were ideologically sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Thus, with his anti-western dispositions, President Rawlings was ideologically skewed toward the Eastern bloc and was believed to be highly attracted to Marxist-Leninist policies.

What runs through the military regimes in this write-up is that they all adopted suppressive and uncompromising measures to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Contrary to the rhetoric of "house cleaning" or "fighting corruption" in the immediate aftermath of a coup, these military leaders are far from being selfless nation builders and lack the moral high ground to pursue a successful foreign policy that would inure to the interests of the nation they claimed to love. That brings the discussion back to the hypothetical questions posed earlier: (1) "Can a military-based government cope more successfully with the difficulties civilian regimes encountered?" (2) "Are some of these problems susceptible to solutions by means congenial to the governing military junta in ways that escaped the preceding civilian regime?" The answer to these two questions cannot be in the affirmative – at least from the perspective of Ghana's foreign policy during the military regimes under review. Military regimes, given their nature and character, lack the constitutional legitimacy; and the political will to create and promote the conducive environment and diplomatic circumstances that are required to foster good foreign relations and friendly neighbourliness. At best, military governments represent a roadblock to understanding the complexities of the international system. At worst, they are predisposed to violent conduct and are more likely than their civilian counterparts to take an uncompromising stance in diplomatic negotiations.

The forgone analyses provide reasonable grounds to infer that the military regimes in Ghana seemed to have set aside the most orthodox diplomatic caution and behaved in ways that frittered away the last drops of goodwill and respect that the country had left within the comity of nations. The poor quality of foreign policy in those regimes was also a reflection of the lack of intellectual sophistication in governments and the breakdown of the moral fibre of Ghanaian society. For a young middle-income nation such as Ghana, what is needed is a foreign policy that is in line with the country's aspirations and national interests.

Such national interests need to be anchored in democratic development and the socio-economic well-being of the citizens. It should not be driven by any imperialists' political orientation that is meant to gratify internal or external reference groups.

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HUMANITY'S SEARCH FOR A GLOBAL PATH AND THE TURKS

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İnsanlığın Küresel Yol Arayışı ve Türkler
Öz

İhtiyaçların sağlanması, imal edilen ürün ve hizmetlerin yeni pazarlara sevkiyatı nedeniyle, insanlar, toplumlar arasında tarihin her döneminde devamlı olarak münasebetler tesis edilmiştir. İpek Yolu Çin'den başlayarak, Avrupa'ya uzanan tarihin en kadim, etkin, kapsamlı ulaşım rotası olmuştur. Yalnız ticari irtibatlar değil, medeniyetler, dinler, düşünceler bu güzergahtan yayılmıştır, bir hakikattir. Zaman zaman farklı hegemonik kuvvetlerin kontrolünde olan İpek Yolu, emniyetin temin edildiği devirlerde tarafların menfaatlerini korumuş, aktif, fonksiyonel bir güce sahip olmuştur. Hususiyetle İslam'ı kabul ettikten sonra Türkler her devirde bu yolun en mühim aktörü, Müslüman Türk Devletleri de huzur ve emniyetin teminatı olmuşlardır. Oysa, Haçlı ve Moğol işgalleri döneminde menfaatçi, baskın ve sömürgeci bir düzenin varlığını göstermiştir. Deniz yolları açılarak aktif kullanması, ulus devletler kurulması, daha sonra sınırların çizilmesiyle İpek Yolu ehemmiyetini kaybetmiştir. "Bir Kuşak, Bir Yol Projesi" ile (bundan sonra BRI olarak kullanılacak) Çin kadim İpek Yolu üzerinde yeni bir dönemi başlatmıştır. Yüzyıllar boyunca kuşatılmış, içe kapanmış Çin BRI ile adeta "kuşatma" stratejisi geliştirmiştir. Bu açılım başka ülkeler bakımından alaka, merak yanında, cazibe ve kaygıyı birlikte getirmektedir. Birçok devlet bu projede bulunmayı kabul etmiştir. Anlaşmalar imza altına alınmıştır. Çin'in, diğer devletlerle rekabeti bazı yararlar ortaya koyacak gibi görülmekte ise de birçok ülke için bu proje, bağımlılığı, hegemonyayı, sömürüyü çağrıştıran endişeler içermektedir. Müslüman Türk ve diğer İslam Devletleri açısından bu gelişme daha derin bir duyarlılığı taşımaktadır. Sınırlar globalleşme sürecinde göreceli bir şekilde kalkmıştır. Tarihin en fazla yaygın, geniş, ürün, bilgi, insan, ilim, kültür, bilgi, teknoloji, sermaye hareketi bu devirde ve çok hızlı görülmektedir. İnsanlar ve kültürler arasında yoğun, akışkan, bağımlı bir yapı oluşmuştur. Bu gelişmeler iki mühim neticeyi ortaya çıkarmıştır. İlki, yeryüzünün birçok kaynağı, varlığı, imalat ve satış ağları, teknoloji, sermaye gücünü elinde bulunduran küresel egemen sisteme ait şirketlerin kontrolünde olmasıdır. Yeryüzü varlıkları üzerinde adaletli, eşit paylaşım yoktur, yeni emperyal bir sistem ortaya çıkmıştır. Ekonomi, sermaye, teknoloji üzerinde hakim olan Amerika, Avrupa Ülkeleri, Hindistan ve Çin etkinlik sahalarını genişletmektedirler. İkincisine gelince ise, dijital kanallar yoluyla iktisadi, kültürel, siyasal bağlantılar, tanıma, tanışma, bilişme insanlar, ülkeler arasında akışkanlığı artırmıştır. Çok kültürlü, çok hukuklu, bir arada yaşama ortamı yeryüzünün her tarafında adeta zorunlu, gerekli duruma gelmiştir. Küresel yolların işlerlik kazanması, küresel iş birliğinin sağlanması insanlık için önem kazanmaktadır. İnsanlığın müşterek menfaatinin, kaderinin, değerlerinin, yapılarının hakka, insafa, adalete, ahlaka ve hukuka uygun düzenlenmesi, katılımcılığa, çoğulculuğa dayalı eşit bir anlayışın küresel tarzda inşaası lüzumludur. Esasen bu açıdan insanlığın yeni ve küresel yol aradığı anlaşılmaktadır. Kadim İpek Yolu gibi BRI projesinde en merkezi güzergahlar Türk ve İslam Ülkelerinden geçmektedir. Bu vech ile Türk Devletleri "İnsanlığın Küresel Yol Arayışı"nda öncü olabilirler, başat bir rol üstlenebilirler. Mazinin, günümüzün gerçekleri dikkatle irdelendiğinde, bu anlayışın, görevin yerine getirilmesi mümkün olabilir.

Bu çalışma ile küreselleşme kapsamında kadim İpek Yolu, Çin'in BRI projesi, Türklerin tarihi, güncel etkisi, gücü değerlendirilecektir. Böylece, insanlığın ortak menfaatlerine, kaderine, istikbaline yönelen, güveni, istikrarı temin edecek, insaf merkezli, küresel, evrensel

bir yolun gereksinimi tartışılacaktır. Bu yolun tesisinde Türklerin vazifeleri, mesuliyetleri, çeşitli halklarla, devletlerle kuracakları münasebetler, sağlayacakları iş birlikleri, insanlar, İslam, Türk Dünyası için faydaları, düşünülenlerin mümkün olup olmayacağı bazı makale ve araştırmalar incelenerek ortaya konulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İpek Yolu, Küreselleşme, İnsanlık, Türkler, Yol

Humanity's Search for a Global Path and the Turks
Abstract

Due to the supply of needs and the arrival of the produced goods and services to new markets, relationships have been constantly established among people and communities in every period of history. The Silk Road has become the oldest, most effective and comprehensive communication route in history from China to Europe. It is a fact that not only commercial relations, but also civilizations, religions and thoughts spread through this way. The Silk Road, which came under the control of various sovereign powers from time to time, had an effective function by protecting the interests of the parties within the periods that security was provided. Especially after the adoption of Islam, Turks have always been the most important actor of this road, and Muslim Turkish States have been the assurance of peace and security. During the Crusader and Mongolian occupations, a one-sided self-interested, oppressive and exploitative order emerged. The Silk Road lost its importance with the opening of sea routes, the establishment of nation states, and the drawing of borders. The "One Belt, One Road" project on China's ancient Silk Road is the beginning of a new era. It is seen that China, which has been besieged and withdrawn for centuries, has developed a "siege" strategy with the One Belt, One Road Project. This expansion also carries interest, curiosity, attraction and concern for other countries. Many countries have accepted to take place in this project and they have signed the agreements. Although China's competition with other countries is seen to produce some benefits, it causes anxiety for many countries in terms of dependency, hegemony and exploitation. This situation shows more sensitivity in terms of Muslim Turkish States and Islamic Countries. The borders have been relatively removed within globalization process. The most widespread and rapid movement, circulation and transfer of goods, services, culture, information, technology, finance and human in history are experienced during this process. Density, fluidity and dependency have occurred among people and cultures. These developments revealed two important results. First, the earth's resources, assets, production and marketing networks have come under the control of powerful companies, the global dominant system that holds technology and capital. There is no fair and equal sharing on the resources of the earth, and a new system of exploitation has been established. Primarily the USA, Europe, Russia and especially China which are effective on economy, finance and technology have increased and expanded their sovereignty areas. Secondly, in addition to economic, cultural and political contacts, meeting with digital channels, becoming mutually acquainted has increased the density and fluidity among people. Multicultural, multi-legal coexistence ground has become necessary and compulsory in every point of the world. The global cooperation, the operability of global ways has gained more importance. It is necessary to organize the common interests and destiny, values and

structures of humanity within the framework of rights, fairness, justice, morality and law, and to establish a participatory, pluralistic and equal understanding globally. In this context the humanity is essentially searching for a new global path. As in the historical Silk Road, the most basic routes of the "One Road, One Belt" project pass through Turkish and Islamic Countries. In consideration of the historical and current facts, it may be possible for Turkish States to assume a leading and pioneer role in "Humanity's Search for a Global Path". In this study, within the framework of globalization, historical Silk Road, "One Belt, One Road" project of China, the need of a global road focused on mercy that will provide trust, stability towards the humanity's common interests, destiny and future based on Turks' role, the Turks' duties, responsibilities, and the relationships that they will establish with various countries, the cooperation that they will develop, the benefits of these for humanity and Islamic Turkish World, and whether all of these are possible or not will be discussed.

Introduction

All over human history, the societies have lived in motion. The societies have been opened to other lands for the provision of basic needs such as nutrition, living and protection, commercial activities such as the acquisition of goods, property, production and marketing, political and social reasons such as war, invasion, occupation, revolution, turmoil, migration. Contacts with other societies have been established on issues such as reaching and owning fertile lands and water resources for agriculture and animal husbandry, developing arts and crafts, providing the flow of science, technique and information, and accessing innovations. It is seen that in various periods of history, powers based on religious, ethnic, sectarian, political and ideological bases have developed strategies to perpetuate their dominance. It is difficult to say that actions based on these strategies always have humanitarian, universal, moral and legal measures.

There was a rapid transition from the age of industrialization to the age of information and digital in this period. "Globalization" marked the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. A process in which the flow of people, products, capital, information and technology increases rapidly, and the interaction between societies, people, states and institutions has started and has surrounded humanity. Time and space have converged (Harvey, 2012: 387). At the center of connectivity, dependency, fluidity and interaction, there are "Global companies" of the USA such as finance, technology, energy, mining, consumption, marketing, sales, distribution, film and communication. Global companies have become a giant, monopoly system by seizing many assets that are in the public ownership of countries (Varol, 2017: 407). Especially, communication companies address every moment and area of people, society and life with their developing technologies (Ağcakaya and Öğrekçi, 2016: 33). Powerful devices, soft-ware, programs and applications weaken local structures and render them ineffective. The basic values of society are damaged and the sovereignty of states is restricted. In the globalization process, a dangerous period has begun in which fundamental values are shaken and the scale of rights, justice and fairness are violated. The USA is a dominant, Global sovereign power (Kodaman, 2004: 31). The ancient values of humanity are being shaken and exposed to deliberate destruction and corruption. Belief/religion, life, mind, property, freedom and security are gradually turning into slavery. The Global system establishes a "mono/monopoly" structure, culture, and standardization in economic, political, social and cultural fields, controls the masses, and leaves humanity helpless with its ambitious and even ruthless politics and actions (Korkmaz and Osmanoğlu, 2019: 952). Undoubtedly, this standardization strategy is a serious danger.

As known that Globalization is a new process for humanity. Globalization causes a two-way effect (Uğur, 2016: 6). This situation is such that for the first time in

history, such an effective, comprehensive, instant communication and interaction is experienced among people. The dimensions of living together with knowing, meeting, knowing, knowing and sharing have expanded. In this respect, communication facilities allow the establishment of bridges between people, instant learning and transfer of what is happening in every part of the world. From this point of view, we see that the globalization process is a positive development for humanity. Although the Global system does not leave the intercommunal flow to its own devices, directs it and worries the societies, positive developments and changes can contribute to the wealth of humanity.

China has revived the historical Silk Road and introduced BRI to many countries in the Global power struggle. China's project, which confronts US based companies, is not only on an economic, but also on a political and cultural basis (Dellios, 2017: 234). Both powers establish long term dominance over energy, raw materials, resources and markets and make states indebted. They are trying to keep human resources under control, not just the economy. It is clearly seen that the dominant powers, that have created new ways for humanity, prioritize their own ideology and interests in this way. As a result of these, they are trying to place an indirect bondage on societies with an economic, technological, and then political, socio-cultural dependency that will last at least a century.

China tries to integrate the BRI Project with the historical Silk Road. Silk Road route mainly passed through Muslim-Turkish Geography. The contribution of Muslim-Turks to the success of the Silk Road, that is considered the most important communication route among societies and states, is great. The states that the Turks established after they became Muslims ensured the security of the Silk Road and did not discriminate among the people of different religions, races, sects and colors. They have been a guarantee element for various states and communities. Silk Road that providing security and the presence of trustworthy authorities, has become a busy one, not only for trade, but also for science, culture, wisdom and art. When the road routes passed to the Mongols and the Crusaders, the security and guarantee disappeared on a large scale (Kırpik, 2012: 179).

It is not difficult that realizing humanity seeks a path that is not only economic and monocentric, but also fair, equal, moral, legal, conscientious and fair in our age. The route of the BRI Project announced by China again passes through the Muslim-Turkish and Islamic Geography on a large scale (Okur, 2017: 52). This project of China can be considered as a "siege" rather than a "generation" (Sabancı, 2018: 97). The imperial, invading actions of the USA and its Western allies against Afghanistan, Iraq and other Middle East, Asia-Pacific and African countries are directed towards the same geography. However, it is important that the history, existence and corridor of the Muslim-Turks, who have ensured the right, justice and peace for centuries in these lands and managed the differences. This entity is alive in our corridor age

(Emeklier and Taş and Yılmaz, 2022: 84). Turks, with their closeness and friendship with Muslim societies and countries, their relations with non-Muslims, and their reassuring past, can establish a Global path in this vast geography. Because of that, when Islamic Civilization and Muslim Turkish States lived together with different societies, they protected the basic values of humanity (Şahin, 2020: 85-91).

The history of Muslim Turkish States and Islamic Civilization, Türkiye's recent constructive and unifying foreign policy, encompassing contacts, and the establishment of the Turkish States Organization can be considered as an advantage. In addition, the Turkish presence, which extends from China, India to the interior of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, and living together with different elements, can be considered as a great advantage and opportunity for Global road construction.

This entity can be considered a Turkish geopolitics (Emeklier and Taş and Yılmaz, 2022: 84). The management and understanding of the Turks that protect the cultural structures are valuable. The success of Turks living together with different cultures in a wide geography still continues. All this is important for the Global road building sought for humanity. It can be considered that a serious reference for Humanity's Global Path Quest.

Way Requirements of Humanity

In order for a person to survive, there is the need to live with others and the obligation to share. As a requirement of humanity creation, human beings have to be familiar with and establish relations with their genders. Humanbeing does this with his/her freedom and reason. The mind is the most precious being (Emiroğlu, 1998: 70). It can provide necessary and natural processes such as nutrition, shelter, protection and reproduction only together with others. Meeting, solidarity, helping each other are indispensable parts of this life. The familiarity among people extends from the family to the environment, to society, to other communities. Familiarity also provides exchange of knowledge, experience, technique, culture, progress and development. Therefore, people and inter-communal relations find ways, spread and expand for different reasons. A wide circle of relations takes place with the supply, exchange, import, export of commercial and agricultural products, access to innovations in science, art, craft and technique, curiosity, invention, discovery, education, participation, marriages, migrations (Eroğlu - İrmiş, 2006: 59). Historically, these contacts were not always positive. It is seen that communities penetrate, migrate and settle in other lands for the purpose of war, occupation, invasion, conflict and conflict (Talas - Kaya, 2007: 151). Struggles for the capture of fertile lands, water resources, mines, land and sea trade routes, geopolitical and geostrategic points have been going on for centuries. Cities and regions with historical and religious significance have been the focal point of conflicts.

When humanity's need for a road was legitimate, reasonable, fair, moral

measures, rules, administrations and managers were effective, the way for Global development and progress was paved in migrations made in this way (Karpat, 2016: 27). Otherwise, periods of tyranny, imposition, pressure, and immoral and unlawful behavior have had a heavy toll on humanity and some segments. The periods when the Mongols and the Crusaders dominated the Silk Road were full of destruction (Batuta, 1993: 54; Kayaoğlu, 1972: 360). Many were opened in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, a great and ruthless system of exploitation has been established. In the industrialization process, this order became institutionalized after the Second World War. The number of prosperous countries and societies that protect and develop their political, economic, cultural existence and independence has been limited only in the northern hemisphere of the world. Direct and indirect colonialism, slavery continued. The new roads the world has entered have made some countries privileged. These roads have been the domain of powerful countries and structures. The new exploitation system that globalization has built on values and resources has made the search for a new way compulsory for all humanity. This desire is understood as it penetrates into societies. People are in fear of losing their existence and values. The search for a way of people, societies and countries is not one way in this context. Mankind's search for a way is for their preservation and development. Numerous human to human platforms in digital media, apart from alliances among countries, are indicative of these pursuits.

Silk Road

The name of Silk Road was given by the German Scientist Von Richtofen (1833-1905) (Sabancı, 2018: 81). The Chinese have never used this term before (Kırpık, 2012: 174). This name was given because of the silk trade from China to Europe. This name was given to the road because the most transported trade item along the road was silk brought from China (Turkish Encyclopedia 1946/XX: 180, Kitapçı, 1989

Also it is found different names in various sources. It is called that et-Tarîku'l-Harîr in Arabic, Great Silk Road in English, and Jamb in Mongolian. The major branch of the Silk Road, through that traders and caravans from all nations passed, is called the King's Road (Hedin, 1974: 225). The Silk Road is one of the oldest and largest trade routes in history, has a route from China to Europe (Yereli, 2014: 301). During the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), this road was 5000 miles long. The historical Silk Road is the longest road in the world, covering around five main roads, numerous side roads, cities, towns and villages (Şahin, 2002: 81). It is the world's first European Asia-Africa road connection. There were great wars and rivalries on this road. Political and military events have affected trade and economy. The Silk Road is the largest of the historical main roads used by large caravans for a long time by connecting to other major trade routes in the south and north (Kemaloğ-

lu, 2015: 363). The Silk Road had three routes: the South Road, the Middle Road, and the North Road. The Silk Road was connected to the north-south trade route by advancing from China-Turkestan-Khwarizm-Iran, Azerbaijan-Iraq, Syria-Anatolia, from the Black Sea ports of Suğdak and Sinop to the ports of Sur, Akka and the Eastern Mediterranean. It combined with the Spice Road and surrounded a large trade basin (Aganacov, 2002: 148-149).

Being a trade route, the Silk Road has been the meeting point of civilizations, religions and cultures (Kırpık, 2012: 176). The areas of wealth and opportunity have shown themselves not only economically, but also in many ways. These roads extended to very large lands (Uhlig, Trans. S.Aydin, 205: 150). Traders, scholars, travelers, and craftsmen were included in the caravans (Bik, 2012: 14). The Silk Road, along with the Indian Spice Road, has become a wide trade basin, spreading area of religion, philosophy, art and traditions (Kırpık, 2012: 176). Chinese goods reaching Europe via the Silk Road and other raw materials and commodities taken from Europe are the subject of trade.

Silk was the main product of the Chinese economy from 206 BC. It was kept like gold and used instead of money (Feyizli, 1995: 29). The hometown of silk was not only China. East Turkestan was also the center. (Lablache, 1932: 45). Because it was exported from East Turkestan. Turks have ensured the security of the silk road for centuries. It was stated that there would be no silk road without East Turkestan, and this road would not remain without the Turkish States (Cinkara, 2021: 336). Muslim Turkish States provided security with their military forces, garrisons, outposts, and accommodation with inns and caravanserais on the great route from Turkistan to Europe (Togan, 1946: 471; Kırpik, 2012: 180). They gave guarantees to the other states, communities, caravans, scholars, travelers and artists using the silk road with state power. They have also established a kind of insurance structure that will protect competition in trade (Turan 1988: 126-127, Köprülü, 1991: 53). For the Silk Road Turkish States, the establishment and development of cities and the growth of the economy made an important contribution to the increase of wealth (Bik, 2021: 16). There is also an Uzbek proverb, "There are two great roads in the universe, the Milky Way in the sky and the Silk Road on earth..." for the Silk Road. This road has become busy thanks to the Turks (Cinkara, 2021: 342). The most frequented and transit points on the Silk Road route from China to Europe are the regions where Turks live intensely, and Turkish cities (Okur, 2017: 52). The Silk Road can also be considered the way of Islam. The Silk Road was used in the extension of Islam to Central Asia and the spread of science, culture and civilization that flourished and developed in Transoxiana, Khorasan, and Turkestan to other continents and geographies (Bik, 2012: 8-16). This movement also increased the political, economic, cultural, scientific, knowledge, and wealth of the Turks and raised their level (Cinkara,

2021: 330). Transoxiana basin has been the source of many states. Again, scholars and traders who grew up in this region have taken the leading roles in Islam's access to large human resources and geography such as China and India (Bik, 2012: 16). The Silk Road route gave Muslims, especially Turks, the competence to live together in the management of differences, and gave the opportunity and opportunity for states, administrations and administrators to be successful (Cinkara, 2021: 332). Although the Silk Road has been a route that China has historically been effective and dominant in terms of the products it sells and buys, the safety, reliability and functionality of the road are thanks to the Turks (Cinkara, 2021: 330). When the Turkish States were strong and controlled the road, the Silk Road was able to work and the goods exchange could continue safely. In the periods when there was no security, excessive taxes were imposed, and partisanship was made, the road remained idle and weak, and the routes shifted to the sea route. When the Crusader and Mongolian forces invaded the Silk Road route, the flow and security changed (Barthold, 1981: 615-616; Kalın, 2007, 69). The Silk Road is a Global truth that reveals the historical and global accumulation of Turks in terms of protecting multicultural, multi İdentity, multi structured sides, owning them and managing differences for a long time.

Globalization and Ways

After the Second World War, the struggle for dominance over the earth was shaped by the cold war. In the period called the Eastern and Western Bloc, the European Countries under the leadership of the USA and the Soviet Bloc under the control of Russia were formed. Thus, the struggle of a bipolar world has affected the world. Organizations were formed under the political and military wings of liberal capitalism and socialism (Aktan and Şen, 1999: 11). Under the leadership of the USA, liberal capitalism has clearly come to the fore with its political, economic, cultural and technological superiority. The disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and the fall of the Berlin wall have become the hope of liberal capitalism. With their capital and technological power, Global companies have gained an indisputable power over newly established states and societies in the eastern bloc (Büyükbaykal, 2004: 19). A strong monopoly has been established on the resources and possibilities of the earth, which surrounds and surrounds people, society, the country and the state in all aspects. Sovereignty areas of states were restricted and limited. A new side view of people and society emerged. Humanity has begun to surrender towards relative freedom and permanent slavery (Babacan, 2016: 26). Politics and socio-cultural structures have come under the influence and coverage of Global companies. As the process begins to threaten the independence, sovereignty and values of societies, there is great anxiety, hesitation and even fear (Cinkara, 2021: 347). Growing and developing rapidly economically, technologically, culturally and financially, China turned its advantages on this ground into an opportunity and came to the world stage

with the BRI Project.

The Global system, in which the USA plays a dominant role, is trying to expand and deepen the areas of dominance over this wide geography and to deepen its alliances with many countries. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced her intention for a trade corridor to integrate Afghanistan into North-South trade in 2011, and while emphasizing this, she said that this was partly a "Silk Road Project" (Şahin, 2020: 72). Russia's Eurasian project was also partly part of the Silk Road project. On the other hand, by protecting the historical Silk Road, China is implementing the BRI project, which has economic, political and cultural depth, goals and objectives on a wide geography covering 65 countries (Cinkara, 2021: 341). In this case, it is seen that countries such as India, Russia, France, England, Germany, and Türkiye seek different ways and are partially included in the existing roads.

Searching for the new ways is also on the center of intellectuals and the business world. (Rıfkın, 2014, p.342; Klaus, 2016: 196). Increasing competition in the world, developing technology and communication, the existence of a multipolar world, and the revival of cultural basins suggest some focus (Emeklier, Taş and Yılmaz 2022: 74). The search for new ways has aimed mostly at the interests of power centers. It is planned on the interests of certain countries, groups and sections. Environmental problems, political, economic, social artificial crises, proxy wars over some countries bring new plans to the agenda of the centers that want to secure their interests in the future of the world. It is not aimed at the common future of all humanity, peace, tranquility, welfare, fair and equal income sharing, equal opportunity, food security, nutrition, shelter, health, and improving the quality of life in education. There is no thought, attempt or work on the protection of social values, structures and strengthening the belongings of future generations. On the contrary, mono/single culture, standardization, easy administration and flattening are among the priorities of Global sovereign powers (Erdoğan and Alemdar, 2005: 22).

Thoughts, opinions and designs of popular scientists and businessmen about green energy and industrial revolutions draw attention İn their search for this path, the predictions (Rıfkın, 2014, 347; Klaus, 2016: 200). All these pursuits and exits are within the framework of the interests and pursuits of Global capitalism. Western countries are privileged. The source and cause of Global problems have become evident in the last century, when the Global system has led humanity to more swamps and dead ends. There is an unilateral system has been established that does not encompass all humanity and does not take it into account. When we look at the history of the world, we have never seen such wide-ranging, large, long-lasting, wide-ranging abuses, deep gaps between societies, no violations of rights of this magnitude, no violation of values in such a short time. The Organization of Turkish States, which was organized under the leadership of Türkiye, is also a political, economic and cul-

tural example of this search for a way (Emeklier, Taş and Yılmaz, 2022: 87).

Social media allows lots of organizations, announcements and resistances of different, large and small groups. Numerous and communicating digital media structures have been formed all over the world. It is possible that these groups will contribute to changing the course of the world and opening up new paths.

BRI (One Belt One Road), A New Process

China, one of the most ancient nations of the world, has produced a high technology and increased its assets despite being in a communist and closed regime for decades. It has become the center of trade and production that surrounds the whole world. It has found a place in the Global capitalist world (Wasserstrom, 2011: 105). China is the world's second largest economy. It combined state capitalism with the statism of communism and the marketism of capitalism. It has provided scientific and technical advances in every field with intensive labor and work, and has reached a strong capital and financial power. At the same time, it is the largest manufacturer, the most trading country, and the country with the most foreign exchange reserves (Jian, 2021: 1).

China wanted to revive the historical Silk Road legacy in the face of the US-based Global siege (Yereli, 2014: 304). BRI has presented the Sea and Land Silk Road project to the world. The project is planned to establish China's political, economic and socio-cultural dominance over the world. (Nazmul Islam, 2021: 9). It has combined its strategic and economic goals with the project, which extends to 63 percent of the world's population and 65 countries (Cinkara, 2021: 341). The BRI Project connects East, Central, West Asia, Africa and Europe (Yıldız, 2021: 21). The Chinese government states that this project belongs to the international community and has a feature that will guarantee equal opportunities for the member states (Jian, 2021: 2). Contributing to Global partnership, cooperation, trust, commitments reflect the views of the Chinese government with the project. The project has been declared as cooperation with neighbors and opening a new page with the world (Li & Wang, 2015: 170). The aim of the project is also to root China's leadership strategy in foreign relations, to ensure its "peaceful rise" abroad and "harmonious society" at home. Again, protecting China's rights at the international level is to strengthen its existence (Nazmul Islam, 2021: 6). The project also has a cultural pillar. As a matter of fact, according to President Xi Jinping of China; China should increase its soft power, communicate its messages better. It is based on being able to tell and present the Chinese stories, the Chinese dream, the idea of the Chinese model, the real, multidimensional view of China to the world (Nazmul Islam, 2021: 8).

China is trying to use its communication power by using its soft power. The erection of the Confucius statue in Tiananmen Square in January 2011 was a breaking point for the Chinese State. This attitude shows the resurrection of the phil-

osophical idea and personality in China (Sagın, 2013: 223). In Confucianism, there is the avoidance of war, the rule of the country by virtue. While driving Confucius to the world as a soft power, China uses the understanding of morality and virtue (Önal, 2020: 218). Confucius Institutes located in over 600 different countries in the world have been assigned an important mission and diplomacy function (Duran and Yılmaz, 202: 79). These institutes aim to spread the Chinese language and culture, to develop education, culture and friendly relations between countries, to encourage multicultural life and to build a harmonious world (Yıldız, 2021: 3). China has developed this project in order to get rid of the siege it has been living through for centuries, to access raw material resources and to increase its exports (Sabancı, 2018: 96).

Development of China, expansion and progress in Western countries and the BRI project are followed with deep concern. According to some Western experts, China is purely self-interested. Their universal messages are not convincing (Nazmul Islam, 2021: 15). Against this initiative of China, other countries, especially the USA, are taking economic, political, economic and military measures. At the same time, they are building alliances and posing obstacles to China's initiatives. Europe, India and Japan are uncomfortable with China's expansion and expansion project (Sabancı, 2018: 92). Russia sometimes cooperates and sometimes worries. According to the Chinese "overt (covert)" or "yin (dark)-yang (bright)" approach, a reality hidden behind the visible; There is a difference between speech and action. It is thought that China has a covert purpose in the cultural context (Sabancı, 2018: 93). The establishment of the China-based world center with the BRI project involves many risks (Dellios, 2017: 234).

There are interesting and different point of views from the Islamic and Turkish world. The BRI project was announced to the world for the first time by the President of China as the Land Road in Kazakhstan and the Sea Route in Indonesia. The announcement and presentation of the project were made in Islamic countries. This is important. The first Confucius Institute was opened in Uzbekistan (Kavas, aa.). Pakistan, Türkiye, Central Asian Turkic Republics and many Islamic countries are involved in the BRI project. In addition, the widespread teaching of the Chinese language and culture in the world is carried out by the International Chinese Language Council Office (HANBAN) (Yıldız, 2021: 3). The key points of the BRI route pass through the cities of Turkish and Muslim countries (Turan, 1971: 201). In terms of energy, raw materials and transportation routes, the route including Iran and Arabia is very important for China (Karluk, 2017: 304). The states located in the regions considered as the Turkish belt have made various agreements with China, but Turkish-Islamic culture is dominant in these countries (Okur, 2017: 52).

The slaughter committed by China in East Turkestan, where it is not a "har-

monious society" in itself, is evident with the persecution it has been subjected to, and it has been criticized. Countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have come under the monetary, debt and credit yoke of China. In return for their debts, they allocated areas such as land and mines to China. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the concern for China is dominant. China's economic power, free movement of goods, money and labor carries risks for the Turkish republics (Cinkara, 2021: 342). Chinese businessmen and workforce flocking to these countries, marriages with local people cause uneasiness. China's human potential and expansionist politics cause fear with its brutal practices. It is stated in the publications and articles published from time to time in the Chinese media and state institutions that the geography of Turkestan is located within the historical borders of China and is mentioned as potential invasion and occupation areas.

China wants to encircle the Turkestan geography (Sabancı, 2018: 97). It is stated that China has long-term debts to its countries, especially in Africa, and obtained the resources of the countries through various fraudulent schemes and bribes. Being closed for centuries, it was burdened with hatred and vengeance against Western countries in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. Forecasts for China's policy are insufficient. The strict attitudes and practices applied to its own people during the pandemic period are followed with concern by other states and societies. Its advanced technology, military capacity and large population always arouse fear.

Behaviors and policies put forward by a structure that is a mixture of Buddhism, communism and capitalism is remarkable. China's traditional policy is to assimilate what is not of itself. It is also to increase its dependence on Chinese culture (Karluk, 2018: 36). As a matter of fact, it has been implementing the policy of intimidation and destruction against the Turks in history and still (Cinlara, 2021: 337). How the Chinese treated the other was written on stone monuments centuries ago. These are seen in the Orkhon Monuments: "The word of the Chinese nation is sweet, and the silk fabric is soft. With sweet words, he would deceive the distant nation with soft silk fabrics and bring them closer" (Ergin, 2003: 13). It is important for both Turks and humanity to remember this experiential warning of Bilge Kagan (Cinkara, 2021: 334). It is claimed that BRI is not a joint project for the benefit of humanity, but purely for the purpose of China's own welfare, expansionism and sovereignty. From another side, the view is this: China has at least declared a joint work with this project and is making investments. The fact that other countries sided with China against the USA and the West, and their positive approach to cooperation is also an indicator of the search for a Global path. In this process, China undertakes infrastructure investments that countries such as roads, ports and railways cannot cope with alone. These give life to the BRI project and show promise. Although these investments are in return for high-interest loans and important concessions given

to China, the work finished in the economy and employment areas of the invested countries contributes. More than 140 countries and China signed a memorandum of understanding for the BRI (Nazmul Islam, 2021: 10).

As a result, there is a bilateral situation in the BRI project. Within the scope of the project, China provides financial, investment, technology trade support and cooperates. China is an alternative to the USA. On the other hand, China opens political and cultural areas on countries. The turmoil within China, the assimilation and torture practices against its own people and especially the Uyghur Turks, and the politics it pursues in the countries it has agreed with within the scope of the BRI, turn the confidence into concern.

Humanity's Need and Seeking a Global Road

Globalization has carried the world and humanity into a process of great change and transformation. Globalization has become an "imperial" system by the hand of Global companies. A great exploitation order has been established with digital tools, channels, programs and applications. The concepts of democracy, human rights, pluralistic participatory and fair order that flourished in the twentieth century have been eliminated. The interests of the sovereign powers have been the reason for the invasions. The greatest advances in history and the greatest problems are experienced together. It is seen that societies strive to protect and develop their own values, resources, opportunities, lands and people. On the one hand, Western countries attract cheap labor, on the other hand, they keep immigrants under ethnic, religious and cultural pressure. Although central and Global authorities produce conflict, war, discrimination and racism, it is generally understood from time to time in the West that their own people do not want chaos and crisis. It is understood that people who know and mingle with each other through trade, science, culture, tourism, education, marriage, migration movements, business and project partnerships are not in favor of conflict, war and turmoil. These are understood through publications, research, interviews, surveys. Some intellectuals make common statements from time to time. It is emphasized that the truth, good and truth belongs to everyone, that the Global dominant focus should be controlled, that justice should be established for the future of humanity, that religion and belief should be protected, and Global thoughts and approaches are put forward (Onat, 2020).

We know that people live in a multi-identity, multi-cultural world. Interpersonal communication, cooperation, thinking together, acting, living and sharing are developing rapidly in both physial and digital media. There is an intense interaction between different religions, languages, races, cultures, genders and colors. In the face of events, people show similarities with their feelings, thoughts, understanding, acceptance and preferences. For example, it can be seen and determined that the peoples did not embrace the wars and sufferings in Syria and Ukraine in recent years. It

can be said that humanity is in search of a Global path in the context of rights, justice, fairness, love, conscience, equality and tolerance. The desire for a world where the earth's resources are used efficiently and shared fairly can be observed. Alliances changing between countries, the demands of people living in various parts of the world, and the outputs of intellectuals can be followed carefully on social media channels. The search for a common world order can be seen for the construction of humanity, the environment and the future with common mind, behavior, consciousness.

The fictionalized and provoked civil wars draw attention. However, exiles, migrations, oppressions, threats, double standards, policies of big states that do not care about the small ones, human rights violations, the unanswered cries of the oppressed and aggrieved people draw attention. The sensitivities of the world public opinion are manifested against problems such as hunger, poverty, massacre, genocide. It is revealed in various platforms that the search for peace, peace and stability is desired by all humanity. This dangerous course necessitates a Global safe path and alliance. China's BRI initiative has been welcomed by some states and authorities. However, China has revealed that its policies and practices have different intentions and purposes. Therefore, the search for a common Global path under the leadership of a just and confident party has become evident.

Global Road Seeking and the Turks

China's BRI project route is the Silk Road. This route is the meeting place of religions and civilizations (Bik, 2012: 7). The countries in which the USA and Western countries play games, fight, wage wars, directly and indirectly intervene and invade are in this geography. The "Great Game" struggle between Russia, England and Western countries took place in the same lands. The Silk Road stretching from Urumqi to Europe is mostly historical and contemporary Turkish geography. On the way, there are cities that mainly belong to the Turkish States or carry the Turkish identity. It is possible to see successful examples of living together in this geography during the period of Muslim Turkish States. (Ascending Silk Road I-III). After the Turks became Muslims, they lived on this route, along the Silk Road and the Indian Spice Road, with ethnic groups such as Arabs, Persians, Chinese, Indians, Russians, Slavs, and religious groups such as Muslims, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Manichaeans, Buddhists, and shamans. Information, 2005: 24).

Muslim Turkish states have established and tried to protect political, economic, social and cultural balances. The basis of this success is the importance given to social values. The beliefs and values of each community are guaranteed in a legal order. For this reason, it is known that Muslim Turkish states, which ruled in different geographies for a long period of time, were not colonialists, developed the lands they were well-off, and preserved material and spiritual values. Undoubtedly, the

state administrators and the public have a share in this success. The joint knowledge, efforts and works of mystics, scholars, poets, artists, dervishes, alperens, honest merchants and prudent sultans, khans, viziers and statesmen have been effective.

Turkish States have tried to maintain a political and socio-cultural balance between Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, East, West, North and South for centuries. It is seen that peace, justice and balance have been achieved in a wide geography with multicultural communities under the domination of Karakhanids, Ghaznavids, Samanids, Timuroğulları, Mughals, Seljuks, Ottomans, Mamluks and other small states. This wide geography has been targeted by states such as the USA, China, Russia, India, England, France and Germany. There are endless crises, problems, wars, conflicts, migrations, genocide, invasions and occupations here. The administrative successes of the Turks in the same lands in the past can serve as an example. The Muslim Turkish entity can easily and realistically think about how they can be the pioneer and implementer of a Global path. Turks are still spread over a very wide geography. The fact that they have adopted and internalized multicultural life can be decisive in the acceptance of the projects to be presented to the people of the age of globalization. The fact that Turks have distanced themselves from discriminatory, exclusionary, marginalizing, racist, sectarian attitudes and behaviors throughout history and today can give confidence in the construction of the Global road. All these may positively affect the attitudes of other societies towards Turks.

Turks have settled all over the world through business, education, tourism, trade and marriage in recent years. Human behavior of Turks can form the socio-cultural basis of a new Global road project. It can be considered important that people who come and settle in Türkiye for various reasons find Turks sincere, cordial, hospitable, generous and humane. The fact that Türkiye is a pioneer, appreciated and preferred country in many respects as a society and state in the Turkish and Islamic geography can be examined in this context. The interest, love and trust of the communities living in the Muslim Turkish geography, feeling close to Türkiye and having contact with Türkiye can be considered as a point of attraction. It is not only Turks and Muslims who are close and interested in Turkish society. In addition to the people of neighboring and surrounding countries, people from many different countries and societies, from various professions and careers, have positive thoughts about Türkiye and Turks. These thoughts and following Türkiye can be among the positive factors in Global road construction. The aid of Turkish people and non-governmental organizations spread all over the world and charity work can be seen as factors that increase love and trust. People who study, do business, have residence permits, citizenship, immovable land, and spend their holidays in Türkiye feel close to this geography, which can reflect positively on the world.

The peaceful, balanced and encompassing foreign policy of the Republic

of Türkiye in recent years can be considered a very important factor. In this respect, Türkiye's performance in international organizations, the Islamic Cooperation Organization, the Council of Europe and the UN can be recorded as very positive points. The sensitivity it shows on issues such as Jerusalem and Ukraine can be considered important in earthquakes and natural disasters in various parts of the world, regardless of country or society. His performance in the UN and other international meetings can be evaluated in the same way. The stance that speaks the truth and is on the side of the truth can strengthen the thesis of the Global road. The recent establishment of the Organization of Turkish States, Türkiye's participation in the Shanghai Five, its presence in NATO and other Western Alliances, and the fact that it is the only country that balances between East and West can be effective.

It may be hopeful for humanity to use its soft diplomatic power in favor of humanity, as in the Russia-Ukraine grain crisis. There has been a large number of foreign students in Türkiye in recent years. In particular, students from poor countries study and are supported. Organizations such as Red Crescent, TIKA, AFAD and large-scale aid and support institutions provide services in the world. In places where Yunus Emre Institutes are opened, Turkish language is shown interest. In many places, there are people learning languages by watching Turkish TV series. Education, tourism, language, humanitarian aid are important elements of inter-communal solidarity, acquaintance and rapprochement. Neighboring and related countries are on the way to imitate Turkish society. It can be easily determined that other societies do not have these positive factors and trust. The advanced human resources, business, politics, trade knowledge and experience of the Turks are increasing. The presence of Turks in Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Russia, Iran, Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, India and China is important. Turks have lived together with Arabs, Russians, Chinese, Indians, Persians, Afghans, Slavs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Africans for centuries. They still live together. They were found with Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists. More than 65 states emerged from the Ottoman Empire, and five states emerged from the Mughals of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Turkestan Khanates. A strong human resource, academician, intellectual, businessman, politician and statesman, who knows these countries and the Global system closely, has been formed. It shows the presence of a strong and qualified diaspora in many parts of the world. Considering this positive time, ground and opportunities, it can easily be said that the Muslim-Turkish existence can be a pioneer in humanity's search for a Global path.

Conclusion

In the history of humanity, societies have witnessed their search for a way within the framework of their needs and desires. The roads opened for trade, science, culture, art and technique have also been the route of religions, thoughts, cultures and civilizations. Ways have been opened and used in order to reach the aboveground

and underground riches, to reach the markets, to import and export. The Silk Road, stretching from China to Europe on the most vibrant geography of the world, has been the most important road operating on different lines for centuries. The vitality of these roads depended on the safety of caravans, people and goods. The commercial vitality reached by the states on the road brought economic, cultural, human and social wealth and development. Cities were established and prospered. Political and military power was important. Allthough there were wars on the Ancient Silk Road, the flow of the road continued. Mongolian and Crusader invasions removed security and undermined operability. It is a fact that various religions, thoughts and cultures spread by using the road, societies affect each other, and social changes and developments are experienced with the increase of immigration. Actually, the Silk Road is the most important line of the historical process in terms of Global civilization.

USA and China have made various exits on the ancient Silk Road. The interventions of USA in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Greater Middle East Project draw attention in this respect. The Historical Silk Road was declared to the world as a BRI comprehensive project by China, and agreements were made with the countries. In many places, studies are carried out within the scope of the project.

Globalization has changed the nature of the roads. The power of capital, goods, information and technology has also opened new routes on societies and states. In the globalization process, the dominant elements have surrounded not only commercial lines but also socio-cultural values, have begun to change, standardize, shake and destroy the ancient structures of humanity. The Global system has paved the way for a much more effective digital medium. This road reaches every person directly. Dangerous paths have been opened that devalue values, reduce assets, make people dependent, and lead them to digital loneliness and slavery. The security of belief/religion, life, mind, property and generation/family is at risk with the path opened by globalization.

The BRI project put forward by China envisages cooperation between countries. Confucius Institutes, which were opened all over the world to spread China's own culture and language, assumed a diplomatic function. China has worrisome expansions in the Turkic Republics and African countries, political and economic, which cannot be understood which is real and which is hidden. China has a history that does not accept other cultures and is intimidating. For this reason, the BRI project spreads doubt, anxiety, hesitation, uneasiness and fear.

In the historical Silk Road geography, there is a historical and contemporary Turkish presence and corridor around it. There is no exploitation, assimilation or genocide in the past of the Turks. They have managed to live together in basic social values. They showed respect for the beliefs, values and cultures of others. They did not discriminate on religion, language, colour or race.
European countries such as the USA, England, France, the Netherlands, China, Rus-

sia, India, etc. The records of countries that are trying to open a Global path are not clean. They have a colonial, assimilating, oppressive, intimidating, murderous past, exclusionary, stigmatizing. These states continue by changing the shell.

Humanity has a distrust of Global companies and states. In social media, publications and statements, it is seen that humanity is in a quest. There is a need to build a new Global road that gives confidence in the political, economic and so-cio-cultural fields and does not abuse it. This path can be built with knowledge, culture, morality, right, justice, fairness, love, compassion and conscience.

The architect and operator of this road can only be Turks among the existing nations. As a Global human being, with the belonging of humanity, this road can be built with the cooperation of societies. Resources can be used efficiently with a common mind and shared fairly, equally and mercifully. Faith, mind, property, life, family can be protected in this way. The Muslim-Turkish entity, which has been living in the most important geography of the world with different elements, races, religions and cultures for centuries, can achieve this with its humanitarian belonging, integrative and encompassing qualities. Türkiye's Global and successful policies can be good examples in this process. The communication and interaction provided by globalization can provide the opportunity and opportunity for humanity to cooperate in this field. With all the Muslim-Turkish presence in the world, worries and expecta-tions can turn into an opportunity for the construction of the Global path that human-ity seeks. In this process, both physical and digital ways can be evaluated effectively. Humanity can find and live a new, peaceful, peaceful, stable and secure life.

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