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Research Article

The Effect of Agglomeration Strategy on Rural Resilience from the Perspective of Homestay Tourism Operators

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ABSTRACT

Homestay tourism villages (HTVs) represent a path for the transformation, revitalization, and sustainability of rural communities. However, due to the risks inherent in homestay tourism, they are often vulnerable to internal and external environmental changes which derive from the fragility and instability of integration of rural culture and tourism, unstable outcomes of science and technology, etc. Resilience theory provides a new perspective for homestay tourism rural sustainability research and is of great significance for exploring how rural tourism stakeholders can resist and resolve internal and external disturbances and enhance the capability of sustainable development. To address this issue, we conducted a qualitative and quantitative analysis of data from HTVs, proposed a theoretically hypothetical model of the impact of agglomeration strategy on the resilience of HTV, finding that homestay operators' agglomeration strategy promoted HTVs' resilience against environmental changes. Similarly, operators' willingness to reach a consensus regarding strategic decisions improved rural resilience. Therefore, homestay operators' agglomeration strategy can have a positive effect on HTVs' resilience by promoting consensus development. Our findings provide a guideline for homestay tourism and rural resilience in the post-pandemic era.

Keywords: Agglomeration strategy; Rural resilience; Consensus development; Rural revitalization; Rural homestay

1. Introduction

Rural resilience (RR) is a concept that refers to rural communities' capacity to cope with internal and external environmental disturbances. Rural resilience is not limited to rural communities' efficient capability to recover from crises, it is also evidence of sustainability and represents a competitive advantage (Cox & Hamlen, 2015; Roberts et al., 2017).

As the COVID-19 pandemic has been effectively curbed in China, the country's tourism industry has entered a post-pandemic stage. The conditions of this stage are intertwined with lingering problems from the pre-pandemic period, while various uncertainties associated with changes in the economy, policies, and markets have also emerged. In addition, various events, including natural disasters and trade disputes, have posed a major threat to the functioning and sustainability of rural tourism in recent years. Therefore, the development of rural resilience has become a research hotspot in the field of tourism management (Luthe & Wyss, 2014). Although there is no consensus among researchers as to what the generation and intervention mechanisms underlying rural resilience are, and an authoritative explanation and generalizable principle on this matter has not yet been formed (Cochrane, 2010; Dong et al., 2021), the effect of homestay operators' individual-level strategies on rural resilience has garnered significant interest from various scholars (e.g., Feihan et al., 2021).

Since Porter (1990) first developed the concept of industrial agglomeration, the theory surrounding this concept has developed rapidly in both academic research and industrial practice. The relationship between industrial agglomeration and regional economic growth has become an important research topic in economic geography and economic growth theory (Luo et al., 2009; Porter, 1990; Klarin, 2021). The essence of industrial spatial agglomeration and economic growth is the symbiosis between the two. According to Martin & Ottaviano (2010), the agglomeration of various industries and businesses stimulates regional economic growth; vice versa, regional economic growth is a driving force for industrial agglomeration (Ahmed et al, 2021). However, the tourism industry has outstanding geographical and spatial agglomeration effects due to its strong relevance (Li, 2009; Yang, 2012; He et al., 2021). Prior studies have focused on the agglomeration effects (Heffernon et al., 2000; Jackson & Murphy, 2006), scale effects (Novelli et al., 2006; Sigurðardóttir & Steinthórsson, 2018), external effects (Majewska, 2015), and regional competitiveness (Trinh, 2016) of regional tourism. Additionally, Chinese scholars have focused on the mechanism of the interaction between agglomeration in the tourism industry and regional economic growth. Additionally, they have discussed economic development strategies in regional tourism from the perspective of agglomeration in the tourism industry (Wang et al. 2019; Yao, 2019; Xu, 2020; Zhu, 2018; Feihan et al., 2021). Similarly, other scholars have explored the mechanism linking agglomeration in the tourism industry and regional economic growth from various theoretical perspectives, such as push-pull theory (He & Hu, 2018), the function model (Wang & Huo, 2018), and the spatial measurement model (Liu et al., 2013), improving our understanding of this interaction. Thus, few studies have carried out an empirical analysis of tourism operators' agglomeration strategies, and they have not presented an in-depth discussion of the relationship between operators' *agglomeration strategy* (AS) and rural resilience.

When exploring the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience, it is important to consider *consensus development* (CD) as an important intermediary in this relationship. Agglomeration strategy rarely directly affects group behavior and performance, but instead indirectly affects the rural level through individual-group value matching (Long & Zhao, 2009). The process of consensus development implies the consistent recognition of homestay operators' ru-

ral-tourism development strategies, objectives, and implementation methods of homestay operators (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). Reaching a consensus regarding agglomeration strategy helps ensure the smooth progress of rural-tourism strategy adjustments and reforms (Huang, 2011). Accurately perceiving changes in the external environment and making quick strategic adjustments are important prerequisites for rural resilience (Kantur & Iseri-Say, 2015). Therefore, consensus development is likely to mediate the relationship between AS and rural resilience. Further, agglomeration strategy may also contribute to rural resilience by promoting consensus development.

In this study, we assessed whether homestay operators' agglomeration strategy can effectively improve the resilience of homestay tourism villages (HTVs) through consensus development. Specifically, this study explores the following issues through empirical research: (1) the effect of agglomeration strategy on rural resilience and (2) the mediating role of consensus development in said effect. This study presents valuable contributions to the field-relevant literature: First, it re-examines agglomeration and its positive role in promoting rural resilience during the pandemic and in the post-pandemic era, thereby enriching the literature on agglomeration, its effects, and consequences. Second, while prior research has focused on the macroscopic effects of agglomeration on the regional economy, this study explores the impact and mechanism of agglomeration on rural tourism stakeholders, complementing research on the antecedents of rural resilience at the micro level. Third, we developed a model of the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience treating consensus development as a mediator. At the practical level, this study provides new ideas for how to promote the development of homestay operators and HTVs, and could help tourism operators cultivate the synergy between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience.

2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Agglomeration strategy and rural resilience

Several factors affect rural resilience on the macro (organization), meso (sector), and micro (individual) levels (Gibson & Tarrant, 2010). Among them, operators' positive outlook, group commitment, interpersonal-interaction motivation, and other individual characteristics have been widely recognized to have a fundamental role in resilience (Giustiniano & Cantoni, 2018). For example, when faced with a negative environment, maintaining a positive outlook (such as hope) can help individuals remain optimistic and adopt positive coping behaviors, thereby inducing individual-level resilience (Shin et al., 2012). Further, when the individual's positive emotions are threatened by a long-term confrontation with difficult circumstances, the sense of identity, trust, and responsibility engendered by group commitment can help individuals free themselves from negative emotions and replenish individual resilience in a timely manner (Sommer et al., 2016). Additionally, when faced with environmental challenges, individuals with high interpersonal-interaction motivation will likely develop a willingness to learn, share knowledge, and engage in teamwork beliefs (Britt et al., 2016). This way, individual resilience can extend to the group level (Meneghel et al., 2016), helping the group survive amidst difficult circumstances.

From this perspective, agglomeration strategy (as a higher-level concept than individual traits) can theoretically have a positive effect on group resilience. According to the theory of work values, when following the right set of values, individuals internalize the importance of work, which in turn inspires them to accomplish their goals and develop a strong sense of self-efficacy (Schwartz et al., 2012). Further, individuals with the right set of work values have positive emotions and enthusiasm for the work they are engaged in (Steele & Liu, 1983); they are willing to continuously improve their skills and behaviors by collaborating with their peers. Additionally,

pursuing and accomplishing internal goals can help fulfill the individual's needs. The satisfaction of basic psychological needs forms a strong psychological connection between the individual and their work, as well as with the group they are engaged in, thereby instilling them with a high level of work commitment and group commitment (Deci et al., 2017). Therefore, as a specific work value, agglomeration strategy can theoretically stimulate positive work-related emotions and motivate individuals to interact and collaborate with their peers, thereby promoting rural resilience.

Furthermore, combined with the conceptual framework of resilience constructed by Kantur and Iseri-Say (2015), this study posits that agglomeration strategy can have a positive effect on rural resilience. First of all, agglomeration strategy can help rural homestay operators improve their position perception, which is their group's self-perception, judgment of crisis situations, and coping skills when facing a crisis. Whether a group's position perception is accurate determines its subsequent coping strategies, and thus also forms the basis of rural resilience (Hind et al., 1996). Since the integrity of a group is undermined in a crisis, accurate position perception often requires the contribution of its members. The industry ideal of homestay rural tourism is a cognitive work value; it can inspire individuals to love their work and perform it with confidence, awe, and responsibility, while encouraging them to develop a high level of group commitment (Liu, 2018). Therefore, when a group faces a perception crisis, individuals with an *industry ideal* (II) can express their understanding and work toward a consensus within the group, helping the group strengthen its position perception and even repair any damages caused by the crisis.

Further, agglomeration strategy helps improve rural contextual-integration capability. Rural contextual-integration capability is the key to the smooth realization of rural risk-response strategies and to the construction of rural resilience. Studies have shown that increasing homestay operators' participation and improving the quality of their interactions in crisis management scenarios are important ways to improve their contextual integration capability (Mallak, 1998). *Mutual assistance* (MA) is an interpersonal work value that can guide operators to be willing to help others, thereby establishing a good interpersonal relationship of sharing and cooperation. Individuals with a strong willingness to help each other will introduce trust and integrity in the crisis management decision-making process, creating a harmonious and interactive decision-making atmosphere (Weick, 1993). Mutual assistance not only helps improve groups' adaptability during decision-making, but also helps them improve their ability to comprehensively allocate human resources. Mutual assistance among homestay operators is a process of continuous communication and reaching consensus on group goals, missions, and strategies. It helps build a supportive and caring group environment, and helps groups improve their ability to integrate and utilize environmental resources.

Finally, agglomeration strategy helps improve rural development stakeholders' strategy formulation and execution efficiency. The perception of crisis situations and its own situational integration reality, as well as the rational formulation and effective implementation of response strategies, are the main characteristics of rural resilience (Mallak, 1998). As traditional strategies are often inadequate when responding to real-world crises, HTVs should be supported to formulate and implement crisis-response strategies. However, the formulation of these strategies requires the extensive participation of critical, creative, and proactive homestay operators with a clear vision during the implementation of their strategy (Kantur & Iseri-Say, 2015).

Willingness to improve (WTI) is a power-based work value; operators with this value develop a sense of accomplishment through their reputation and influence. Encounters with abnormal

environments and major crises provide opportunities for individuals to demonstrate their individual skills and gain reputation and influence. Therefore, individuals with WTI have a strong motivation to participate in crisis management decision-making and strategy development. In addition, this type of operator pays attention to the improvement of personal skills and the stimulation of potential. For this reason, these individuals can approach their work goals with enthusiasm and perseverance, having developed strategic execution abilities. Therefore, we developed the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Agglomeration strategy has a positive effect on rural resilience.

2.2. The mediating role of consensus development

In prior research, consensus development has been mainly regarded as the degree of recognition that the organization's strategic goals, strategic implementation methods, and implementation tools receive by individuals at the highest level within the organization (Bourgeois, 1980). Further, scholars have conducted in-depth discussions regarding the scope and structural dimensions of consensus development. In terms of the scope of the operators, the relevant operators are gradually expanded to the managers and all employees at all levels of the organization. Various researchers posit that ignoring the importance of employees' role in strategic management leads to friction and resource consumption within the organization during strategy implementation, resulting in failure to achieve company-wide strategic goals (Huo & Wang, 2017). In terms of its dimensional characteristics, Floyd, & Wooldridge (1992) pointed out that reaching a consensus within a group not only implies developing a shared understanding of a strategy (consensus understanding), but also implies developing an accompanying commitment (consensus commitment). Consensus understanding is the clear and collective understanding of strategic goals and means, which constitutes the cognitive elements of the consensus-development process. Meanwhile, consensus commitment comprises the emotional elements of the consensus-development process. The reason for the importance of consensus development is that to ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of the organization's strategies, it is not only necessary for employees at all levels of the organization to have a deep understanding of the established strategy, but also for them to generally agree and actively participate in its execution. Additionally, Huang (2011) states that employees' broad recognition of the consensus is equally important to ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of company-wide strategies. Therefore, the dimensional structure of consensus development is further subdivided into three aspects: *consensus understanding* (CU), *consensus recognition* (CR), and *consensus commitment* (CC). Thus, consensus development is not only the result of a reasonable and scientific strategic decision-making process, but also a prerequisite for the effective implementation of organizational strategies and the attainment of favorable results. Therefore, when an organization faces a crisis, the higher the degree of consensus among employees is, the more likely it is to implement a rational and effective response strategy (Välikangas, 2020). Having an effective response strategy can help an organization recover quickly from a crisis and even achieve growth through organizational resilience. This suggests a natural connection between consensus development and rural resilience. Thus, we developed the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Consensus development has a positive effect on rural resilience.

Agglomeration strategy is a value centered on mutual assistance, willingness to improve, and industrial ideal that can continuously stimulate individuals' positive outlook regarding their careers, as well as towards the industry and their group. It is crucial to improve homestay operators' consensus development. Agglomeration strategy can help homestay operators deepen their consensus understanding, and the operators' cognitive ability and willingness to learn are decisive factors influencing their ability for consensus understanding. Operators with willingness to improve pursue a sense of accomplishment through reputation and influence, so they are willing to continue to improve their personal cognitive ability and skill level through active and persistent learning in order to achieve their goals. Meanwhile, said operators also value the group's evaluation of their own competence, so that they have a strong interest in group strategy and a strong motivation to link up individual goals with group goals, which enhances their understanding of strategic goals (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2003). Additionally, agglomeration strategy can improve homestay operators' consensus recognition. Generally, the degree of the operator's CR mainly depends on their expectations of the extent to which the implementation of the agreed-upon strategies (defined through consensus) can promote the realization of personal interests. Due to differences in personal abilities, ideals, and organizational levels, homestay operators' goals and interests vary, and there is also a certain degree of conflict between their goals and those of the group (Mi & Li, 2003). If the operator believes that implementation of the agreed-upon strategies represents a threat to their own goals and interests, this will directly hamper the group's capability to reach a consensus. Further, mutual assistance, as an interpersonal work value, can guide operators to resolve goal-related conflicts with other operators and with the group at large through active and effective communication; therefore, mutual assistance helps operators align with the group's consensus. Further, operators with agglomeration strategy awareness also tend to have a higher consensus commitment, which requires operators to have a high willingness to reach a group-wide consensus (Yan et al., 2015). Thus, we hypothesized the following:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Agglomeration strategy helps promote consensus development.

Furthermore, agglomeration strategy can have a positive effect on rural resilience by promoting consensus development. There are three mechanisms to achieve this. The first way to achieve the aforementioned effect would be to improve a village's ability to perceive the event of a crisis and its impact. Operators with agglomeration strategy awareness are more likely to work toward consensus, and the higher their degree of alignment with this consensus is, the more likely they are to meet the performance expectations of a homestay village (Boudreau et al, 2001). According to the theory of internal incentives, individuals who have made outstanding contributions to the realization of group goals, whose own behaviors are in line with rural development expectations, will experience an excellent mental experience (Deci et al, 2017). This experience encourages operators to increase their engagement in pursuing the development goals of homestay-type villages, instilling them with positive attitudes and behaviors, such as self-confidence, optimism, and hard work (Carmeli et al., 2009). When a village faces a crisis, these positive attitudes and behaviors often engender a sense of responsibility to identify the crisis, thereby helping the village adjust accordingly.

The second way to achieve the aforementioned effect would be to improve homestay villages' ability to accurately identify their own weaknesses in crisis situations. In addition to reducing task ambiguity and role conflicts, as well as contributing towards better business performance

(Boudreau et al, 2001), operators who work towards developing consensus will also exhibit a shared mental model (Barnes, 1997). Having a shared mental model is helpful for the high-quality knowledge exchange between operators regarding the village's weaknesses and coping capabilities during a crisis. It can also assist villages effectively integrate the internal and external resources needed to respond to crises through cooperation.

Finally, the third way to achieve the aforementioned effect would be to improve the village's ability to develop and implement effective response strategies. A high level of consensus alignment indicates that rural homestay operators are actively involved in consensus development and can accurately understand, agree with, and commit to the strategic goals of the rural homestay (Huang, 2011). Meanwhile, consensus development is an effective means to enhance the effectiveness of strategy execution. Additionally, the higher the degree of consensus alignment is, the process of implementation of the consensus of cooperation and coordination can be improved, the effect of the implementation of the better (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). According to the conceptual framework of resilience constructed by Kantur & Iseri-Say (2015), rural villages' ability to reach a consensus on how to efficiently respond to crisis situations is a manifestation of rural resilience to consensus. Consensus of rural resilience is an important part of rural resilience (Chen et al., 2019). Thus, we developed the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Consensus development plays a mediating role between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience.

Our hypothetical framework is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Proposed research model

3. Methods
3.1. Sample and data collection
In this study, we included homestay operators in homestay-type villages from *Jiangning District* (JND) and *Taihu Lake* (THL) in Jiangsu Province, *Dongtou* (DT) and *Moganshan* (MGS) in Zhejiang Province, and *Jiaochangwei* (JCW) in Guangdong Province. Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Zhejiang are economically developed provinces where homestay-type villages develop rapidly. The requirements for tourists are getting higher (Gu, 2013). Homestay operators in the aforementioned provinces need continuous innovation as their purpose and means of survival. After conducting

extensive theoretical and empirical research, we attribute the development of homestay tourism villages in these places to the implementation of an agglomeration economy model (Wang et al. 2019; Yao, 2019; Xu, 2020; Zhu, 2018; see Figure 2). Under top-down or bottom-up governance situations (see Table 1), homestay operators implement an agglomeration strategy to form an *economically-oriented agglomeration group* (EAG), a *governance-oriented agglomeration group* (GAG), or a *culturally-oriented agglomeration group* (CAG). EAGs transform local idle houses into homestays through space practice, realizing the possibility of consumption, and creating a local and gentrified consumption space. Meanwhile, GAGs strengthen the investment, construction, and management of the built environment, establish a local institutional space, and promote the production of the built environment space. Additionally, CAGs invest in the social field, promote the specialization of local homestays and the construction of local subjective values, and ultimately form rural resilience and promote the sustainable development of the countryside. Therefore, it can be said that the agglomeration strategy is the "foundation" of homestay operators.

Figure 2: Homestay-tourism village model

However, due to the significant risks involved in homestay-tourism villages, they are prone to fail due to environmental uncertainty (You et al., 2019). Hence, improving rural resilience is key to the success of homestay tourism. To do so, it is necessary to investigate the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience from the perspective of homestay operators in homestay-type villages.

This study analyzes data obtained through a combination of field work and a survey. From 2011 to 2019, we conducted several field surveys and visited homestay villages in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Further, we conducted an initial survey and a follow-up visit to a homestay village in Guangdong in 2012 and 2019, respectively. Based on this research, combined with the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, we developed a survey on the resilience of homestay-type villages.

The questionnaire used for this study was created on an online survey platform (*wenjuanxing*). Subsequently, it was sent to potential responders either via an online link or by sending the paper version of the questionnaire by post. For each surveyed homestay, we simultaneously distributed two questionnaires (A and B). Questionnaire A comprised two sections, agglomeration strategy and consensus development, and it was intended to be answered by three or fewer homestay operators. Questionnaire B collected basic information data related to the homestays and rural resilience. Since homestay operators have a more comprehensive understanding of the general situation of homestays than ordinary employees, they answered questionnaire B. Questionnaires A and B were paired and coded with each homestay's name.

The survey period started in May 2020 and lasted until the end of October 2020. A total of 300 A questionnaires and 100 B questionnaires were distributed. Subsequently, 191 valid A questionnaires and 69 matched and valid B questionnaires were retrieved; thus, the effective response rates were 63.7% and 69%, respectively. Among the 69 sampled homestays, from the perspective of development stage, homestays in the growth stage were the most common (55%). The numbers of homestays in the start-up period (14.5%) and the mature period (15.9%) were similar, while the remaining homestays (14.6%) were in a recession, re-opening, or adjustment transition period.

Table 1. Comparison of governance models of homestay tourism village

	Top-down approach	Bottom-up grassroots approach
Site	JND; DT; THL	JCW; MGS
Resource endowment	Historical and cultural village; characteristic industry	Natural ecological resource
Development goal	Leisure slow life	Eco-tourism
Transformation mode	Capital dominance	Change people first, then create space
Management mode	External capital	Community-led
Sense of place	Revitalize local cohesion	Large numbers of villagers moved out; reconstruction of community values

3.2. Measures

The three dimensions of agglomeration strategy were measured using a scale we developed specifically for this study based on a set of three scales developed by other authors; we adapted these scales to the context of homestay tourism. The agglomeration strategy scale assessed industrial ideal, mutual assistance, and willingness to improve using the three following subscales. Homestay operators' industrial ideal was assessed using a subscale based on the Employee Occupational Engagement Scale (Saks, 2006), including 10 items, such as "I spend a lot of time working in the homestay every day." For mutual assistance, a scale drawn from Chattopadhyay (1999) was used to measure the interdependence of work tasks that includes six items, such as "Our

homestay operators must cooperate closely with each other to normally complete the rural development goals." To measure operators' willingness to improve (which reflects their pursuit of perfection at work), we adapted the Burns Perfectionism Scale (Burns, 1980) for which 10 items were rated, such as "setting a higher or even unrealistic consensus standard to evaluate self-worth." Using exploratory factor analysis, we found that the cumulative variance contribution rate of the three factors extracted from all the above items was 82.1%, and that the internal consistency coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) of the overall AS scale was 0.771, indicating that it had good reliability and validity.

To analyze rural resilience, we developed a scale including items from two dimensions: adaptability and optimization ability. To measure adaptability, we adapted the scale developed by Kantur & Iseri-Say (2015), with seven items, such as "When needed, the group of homestay operators will adapt to take the necessary actions." To measure optimization ability, we adapted the scale developed by Chen (2016) with three items, such as "The group of homestay operators can always learn from mistakes and problems in time to optimize or construct new coping models." Exploratory factor analysis showed that the cumulative variance contribution rate of the two common factors extracted from all items was 81.1%, and that our rural resilience scale's internal consistency coefficient was 0.823.

To measure consensus development, we adapted the three-dimensional metric table compiled by Huang (2011). Exploratory factor analysis showed that the cumulative variance contribution rate of the two common factors extracted from all 13 items was 77.8%, and that internal consistency coefficient of this tool was 0.845.

The items of all the above scales were scored on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 to 7, representing the degree of conformity with the group's agreed-upon strategies from low to high. In addition, this study also controls the effect of the homestay's life cycle (with 1 representing the mature period and 0 all other stages, including the start-up, recession, re-opening, adjustment, and transition periods) on the empirical results.

4. Results
4.1. Common method variance (CMV)
In order to minimize the common method deviations that may be caused by the same responding subjects, we implemented a combination of longitudinal design and a setting of reverse items to collect data for questionnaire A. First of all, at the first time point, we asked the operators to complete the agglomeration strategy scale, and added the reverse items on the consensus development to this scale. Second, after at least one week, we asked the same operators to complete the consensus development scale, and added the reverse items on the agglomeration strategy scale to this scale. Finally, we sorted out any conflicting or inconsistent items at two different time points. After explaining the meaning and purpose of these items to the homestay operators, they were to make a supplementary answer at the third time point. Statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS 20.0 software. Further, Harman's single factor method was used to conduct a common method deviation test. We found that the three analyzed factors exhibited values greater than 1 for all items, while the variance contribution rate of the first factor was 25.10%, which is less than half of the total variance contribution rate (74.86%), showing that the deviation of the common method used in this study is within an acceptable range.

4.2. Confirmatory factor analysis

Further, we used Mplus 7.4 software to conduct confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the three core variables (AS, RR, and CD) to examine their discriminative validity. We set the benchmark model as a three-factor model (M1), assuming that the three variables had a high degree of discrimination, so that the three common factors would be extracted. The candidate models included all three two-factor models: M2 (in which we assumed that agglomeration strategy and rural resilience had a low degree of discrimination, for which two common factors were extracted), M3 (in which we assumed that agglomeration strategy and consensus development had a low degree of discrimination, for which two common factors were extracted), and M4 (in which we assumed that rural resilience and consensus development had a low degree of discrimination, for which two common factors were extracted). Additionally, another candidate model was included, namely, a single factor model, M5 (in which we assumed that the three variables had a low degree of discrimination, for which we extracted a common factor). As shown in Table 2, the benchmark model in this study has an acceptable degree of fit (χ^2/df = 2.211, CFI = 0.950, TLI = 0.933, RMSEA = 0.041); the benchmark model was significantly better than all candidate models, indicating that the three core variables have high independence and discrimination, and the discriminative validity of the scale of this study was good.

Table 2. Confirmatory factor analysis

Model	χ^2/df	CFI	TLI	IFI	NFI	RMSEA
M1 (AS, RR, CD)	2.211	0.950	0.933	0.939	0.929	0.041
M2 (AS + RR, CD)	4.137	0.875	0.799	0.804	0.794	0.092
M3 (AS + CD, RR)	4.561	0.852	0.758	0.761	0.751	0.115
M4 (RR + CD, AS)	4.863	0.810	0.712	0.720	0.708	0.126
M5 (AS + RR + CD)	6.867	0.693	0.514	0.528	0.509	0.161

4.3. Descriptive statistics and correlations

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of each variable and the correlation coefficient between the variables. It can be seen that agglomeration strategy is significantly positively correlated with rural resilience ($r = 0.334$, $p < 0.01$), which is consistent with H1, as expected in this study. Further, agglomeration strategy was significantly positively correlated with consensus development ($r = 0.245$, $p < 0.01$), while consensus development was significantly positively correlated with rural resilience ($r = 0.191$, $p < 0.01$). This provides preliminary data support for the research hypotheses H2, H3, and H4. In addition, the correlation coefficients of the control variables showed some interesting results. For example, operators in the 28–35 age group and working in homestays in the growth stage exhibited better agglomeration strategies and consensus development practices, which made them important contributors to rural resilience.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of variables

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
AS	4.66	1.313	1					
CD	4.63	1.397	0.245***	1				
RR	4.93	1.264	0.334***	0.191***	1			
Gender	0.19	0.382	0.017	−0.033	0.046	1		
Age	4.79	1.434	0.309***	0.212***	0.489***	−0.011	1	
Growth stage	2.52	1.301	0.110**	−0.072	0.117**	0.028	0.030	1

Note: M stands for mean, SD stands for standard deviation; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

4.4. Tests of hypotheses

We used SPSS 20.0 software to perform a multiple linear regression analysis in order to test the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience (the main effect hypothesis) and the mediating effect of consensus development on the aforementioned relationship (the mediation effect hypothesis). The results of multiple linear regression analysis are shown in Table 4.

First, we tested the results of the main effect hypothesis. As shown in Table 4 (column 2), we found that after controlling for gender, age, and growth stage, agglomeration strategy had a significant positive effect on RR ($\beta = 0.196$, $p < 0.001$). Therefore, H1 was verified. In order to have a clearer understanding of the mechanism underlying the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience, we investigated the internal relationship between the two variable dimensional structures (as shown in columns 6 and 7). The results show that the three major dimensions of agglomeration strategy are industrial ideal ($\beta = 0.102$, $p < 0.05$), willingness to improve ($\beta = 0.228$, $p < 0.001$), and mutual assistance ($\beta = 0.237$, $p < 0.001$), all of which can significantly promote the *adaptive capacity* (AC) of rural areas. Additionally, willingness to improve ($\beta = 0.141$, $p < 0.01$) and MA ($\beta = 0.114$, $p < 0.05$) can also have a positive impact on rural communities' *optimization ability* (OA).

Table 4. Hypothesis test results

Variable	RR				CD	AC	OA
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Gender	0.034 (0.817)	0.029 (0.703)	0.033 (0.806)	0.038 (0.907)	−0.036 (−0.763)	−0.077 (−1.791)	0.014 (0.294)
Age	0.487*** (11.809)	0.422*** (9.791)	0.391*** (8.985)	0.253*** (7.858)	0.181*** (3.666)	0.008 (0.149)	0.169*** (3.448)
Growth stage	0.020 (0.448)	0.036 (0.850)	0.027 (0.642)	0.007 (0.155)	0.066 (1.405)	0.069 (1.571)	0.062 (1.331)
AS		0.196*** (4.609)	0.183*** (4.309)		0.132** (2.853)		
CD			0.155*** (3.716)	0.160*** (3.795)			
II						0.102* (2.303)	0.081 (1.735)
WTI						0.228*** (4.382)	0.141** (2.570)
MA						0.237*** (4.553)	0.114* (2.069)
R^2	0.254	0.286	0.304	0.275	0.179	0.219	0.135
Adj R^2	0.244	0.275	0.292	0.263	0.164	0.203	0.117
F	25.405***	25.474***	23.856***	24.024***	8.340***	13.451***	7.449***

Note: t values is in the parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Next, we examine our findings vis-à-vis the mediation hypothesis. We found that agglomeration strategy can play a positive role in promoting rural resilience, as shown in columns 2, 6, and 7. The second step is to examine the impact of manufacturing consensus on rural resilience. Further, we found that the estimated coefficient of consensus development was significantly positive ($\beta = 0.160$, $p < 0.001$), as shown in column 4, which supports H2. Additionally, we found that agglomeration strategy had a significant positive effect on consensus development ($\beta = 0.132$, $p < 0.01$), which verified H3. The fourth step is to examine the mediating effect of manufacturing consensus on the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience. After incorpo-

rating consensus development as a variable, the impact of agglomeration strategy on rural resilience was significantly weakened, but it remained significant ($\Delta\beta = 0.013$, $p < 0.001$). Column 3 shows that the positive effect of agglomeration strategy on rural resilience was partly transmitted through consensus development. Therefore, H4 was verified.

4.5. Robustness check

One concern about the results of the main effects test is that the econometric model may have endogenous problems caused by self-selection. Homestay operators who value the development of rural resilience may prefer to use industrial ideal, mutual assistance, and willingness to improve as a group value guide. To control the above-mentioned endogenous problems caused by self-selection, we used the Heckman two-stage model. All calculations were performed using StataMP 14.0 software.

In the first stage, in the Probit model with agglomeration strategy (higher than the median value of 1, otherwise 0) as the dependent variable, the instrumental variable chosen was the *number of cultural and creative brands* (NCCB) formed as a result of the agglomeration of homestay operators (reflected by interconnected systems of rural governance and local products). Further, cultural and creative brands are the result of agglomeration strategies (Zhang, 2018). The greater the number of cultural and creative brands in a given homestay's location is, the more media campaigns may encourage homestay operators' agglomeration strategy. However, cultural and creative brands usually had no direct impact on rural resilience.

In the second stage, the *inverse Mills ratio* (IMR) was incorporated into the model as an independent variable to re-examine the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience, and to examine whether the main test results were robust to endogenous problems caused by self-selection. As shown in Table 5, the regression results of the first stage show that the regression coefficient of NCCB was significantly positive ($\beta = 0.240$, $p < 0.01$), which indicates that the instrumental variables selected in this study had strong explanatory power. The second stage regression results show that the coefficient of IMR was significant ($\beta = 0.106$, $p < 0.01$), which indicates that the self-selection problem does exist. More importantly, the estimated coefficient of agglomeration strategy was significantly positive ($\beta = 0.171$, $p < 0.001$), indicating that the main effect test results remain robust to endogenous problem caused by self-selection.

Table 5. Results of the main effect robustness test based on the Heckman two-stage model

Variable	First stage	Second stage
	AS dummy variable	RR
	1	2
Gender	−0.075 (−0.539)	0.029 (0.731)
Age	0.046(1.272)	0.411*** (9.430)
Growth stage	−0.232*** (−9.973)	0.022 (0.525)
NCCB	0.240** (2.587)	
IMR		0.106** (2.515)
AS		0.171*** (3.991)
R^2		0.296
Adj R^2		0.283
Pearson χ^2/F	138.586 (sig = 0.654)	22.880***

Note: The Z-test value is in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The classic test method to assess the intermediary effect may be biased because it is difficult for the estimated coefficients to meet a normal distribution. Using SPSS20.0 software, we conducted a bias-corrected non-parametric percentile bootstrap test to assess the robustness of the mediating effect of consensus development in the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience. Based on the original sample data (N = 191), 71 bootstrap samples were randomly selected repeatedly for testing. As shown in **Table 6**, for the impact of agglomeration strategy on rural resilience, the 95% confidence interval (0.038, 0.072) did not include 0, while the mediating effect of CD was significant (β = 0.177, $p < 0.01$), accounting for 36.95% of the total effect. Further, we also found that all the three dimensions of consensus development, namely consensus understanding, consensus recognition, and consensus commitment, all had significant mediating effects in the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience. This indicates that the test results of the research hypotheses in this paper are robust.

Table 6. Robustness test results of the mediation effect using bootstrapping

Intermediary model	Direct effect	Indirect effect	95% confidence interval
AS→MC→RR	0.302*** (4.169)	0.177** (2.618)	0.038,0.072
AS→CU→RR	0.201* (2.463)	0.152*** (3.097)	0.026,0.051
AS→CR→RR	0.203*** (3.308)	0.115* (1.966)	0.033,0.085
AS→CC→RR	0.284*** (3.072)	0.082* (2.063)	0.020,0.043

5. Discussion
5.1. Conclusions
This article used qualitative data obtained from HTV operators through field surveys and online questionnaires to explore the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience. Drawing on prior literature of tourism strategy management, it discussed the mediating role of consensus development in the aforementioned relationship, thereby developing a homestay rural resilience framework. We found that agglomeration strategy (as a group value with industrial ideal, willingness to improve, and mutual assistance at its core) had a positive role in promoting rural resilience. Further, we found that consensus development had a positive effect on rural resilience, and that it could provide a strategic guarantee for the development of rural resilience. Additionally, we found that agglomeration strategy helped promote consensus development, and that homestay operators with an inclination to follow an agglomeration strategy are more likely to understand, recognize, and commit to the sustainable development of rural homestays. Moreover, we found that agglomeration strategy could have a positive effect on rural resilience by promoting consensus development. Furthermore, we found that the three dimensions of consensus development (consensus understanding, consensus recognition, and consensus commitment) played an intermediary role in the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience.

5.2. Theoretical implications
The possible theoretical contributions of this article can be classified into three categories. First, this study deepens our understanding of the connotation, impact, consequences, and mechanisms of agglomeration strategy in the field of tourism. To date, researchers have not yet reached a consensus regarding the definition and functions of agglomeration strategies. Unlike previous studies, this article defines agglomeration strategy as a specific group value with industrial ideal, willingness to improve, and mutual assistance at its core. This study enriches field-relevant re-

search on the pre-dependent variables of spatial resilience of groups from the level of individual factors. The exploration of the antecedent variables of rural resilience in this study is of great significance to attain an in-depth understanding of the origin and cultivation of rural resilience.

Additionally, we have found the "missing link" of the association between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience. Prior studies on the relationship between individual values and group behaviors mostly focused on this relationship from a psychological perspective. However, this article draws on the literature of strategic management in tourism, identifying the bridge between individual values and group behaviors.

5.3. Managerial implications

The managerial implications of this study are the following: First, attach importance to "the power of unity" and carry out the mental cultivation of group values from the height of values. In the current global context, agglomeration strategies are no longer limited to the agglomeration and complementarity of the industrial chain; rather, they have evolved to guide modern business operators to discover their own work values and beliefs, which can foster the sustainable development of groups or regions. Second, this study highlights the importance of cooperation and consensus development in decision-making and in strategy formulation and implementation. Homestay rural tourism has shifted from high-speed growth to high-quality development, resulting in consensus development becoming an increasingly complex process. As it is an important means to ensure implementation of development goals, consensus development has gained increasing prominence in the resilience of homestay tourism. Third, this study highlights the importance of turning crises into opportunities, formulating strategies suitable improvement of rural resilience.

To continuously improve rural resilience and actively grasp the valuable opportunities that come with it, it is necessary to effectively respond to the challenges posed by changes in the environment. It is necessary to actively foster cooperation among homestay operators and actively explore strategies for resilience-based growth. Additionally, it is necessary to seize the opportunities provided by the digital economy to empower HTVs' position, resource integration, and strategy execution, building a systematic resilience mechanism adapted to the characteristics of specific HTVs.

5.4. Limitations and directions for future research

This research had some limitations. First, due to the inherent flaws of the questionnaire survey and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the effective recovery rate of some survey sites was low, which affected the representativeness of our data. Simultaneously, due to time and resource limitations, the sample included only five homestay-type villages in three provinces, which may reduce the generalizability of our results.

In our future research, we plan to improve the scientific nature of our investigation and expand its scope. Additionally, we will analyze the relationship between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience in greater depth using a longitudinal multi-temporal tracking study. Second, as this study focuses on the effect of agglomeration strategy on rural resilience with consensus development as an intermediary factor, it did not consider the practical implications of this effect. In the future, we will search for appropriate boundary conditions to enhance the contextual characteristics of research. Third, this study only focused on consensus development as an intermediary of the effect of agglomeration strategy on rural resilience, and did not comprehensively and sys-

tematically analyze the complex mechanism of action between agglomeration strategy and rural resilience, even though there might be several underlying factors and complex mechanisms. Future research should explore the mechanism by which the tourism industry fosters rural resilience from different perspectives.

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Research Article

Dominant Religion, Radical Right-Wing, and Social Trust: An Empirical Investigation

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ABSTRACT

This paper empirically investigates the impact of dominant religion and radical right-wing political views on social trust, using data taken from the World Values Survey on 60 countries over the period 2010–2014. To supplement the existing literature, we consider both religion and political views at the same regression equation, and relatively recent data to reflect terrorism and anti-immigration policies in recent years. It is found that people living in Asian countries where Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, and Shintoism are the dominant religions trust others more than people living in Christian and Muslim countries. A plausible explanation is that Asian religions are closely related to the ethics of life regarding relations with neighbors, which may have a positive impact on trust among people. However, when classified according to the frequency of participation in prayer, it is observed that these religions may not have a distinctly discriminatory impact on social trust. The impact of radical right-wing political views on trust is negative and statistically significant, meaning that people with radical right-wing political views have a relatively lower social trust than others. The empirical results suggest that religion and political views influence trust and can be a factor in producing either harmony or division among people.

Keywords: Religion, Political View, Right-Wing, Social Trust

1. Introduction

Social trust is the "social glue" that connects different parts of society, allowing people to function in economically efficient, politically peaceful, and both democratically and culturally diverse and harmonious ways. Moreover, social trust connects people in society enabling them to conduct themselves safely and providing them with the relative ease with which to carry out daily activities such as driving, using public transportation, trading goods and services, socializing at local bars, cafes, and so on. (Dingemans, & Van Ingen, 2015).

This paper empirically investigates the impact of religion and political views on social trust. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to see whether people with different religious behavior and political views have different attitudes towards social trust. Investigating the effect of religion and political views on social trust is important since social trust itself is a crucial factor in the development process. We briefly summarize the importance of social trust in economic and social development in the following pages. At the outset, we state that we intend to shed some light on the empirical side of the relationship between social trust and religion and political views. We already know from existing literature that the issue has not been settled since there are conflicting findings on the effect of religion and political views on social trust. Therefore, we believe that it is still worthwhile to investigate the topic with more empirical findings since theory can provide logical arguments about the effects of political views and religion on social trust in both negative and positive directions. We already know that the literature on social trust is rich. However, we do not know what the separate effects of religion and political views on social trust are when both are included in the same analysis. We also controlled the effects of different major religions present in a country. This, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been done using World Values Survey (WVS) data.

Trusting others has been studied in economics over the last three decades since social trust is recognized as important in the promotion of economic growth and social development (Bjørnskov, 2012; Kwon, 2019). In other words, it is considered that without social trust, a country's economy cannot perform well because transaction costs – costs in undertaking economic transactions by economic entities – would be too high. That is, trust contributes to economic efficiency in markets, to private provision of public goods, to social integration, to co-operation and harmony, to personal well-being, to democratic stability, and even to good health and longevity, as noted in Delhey & Newton (2003). This implies that finding individual and societal determinants of social trust is an important research topic. Moreover, You (2012) pointed out that generalized interpersonal social trust is different from "institutional trust" (trust in institutions) or "political trust" (trust in political institutions, such as government) and "private trust" (trust in personal relationships).

This paper aims to focus only on trust in others with whom one has no personal relationship. We analyze the determinants of social trust among unknown people in a society. Specifically, this study attempts to examine whether trust can be affected by religiousness (or dominant religion) and right-wing political views. The relationships between religion and social trust, and between political views and social trust have been examined separately in the existing literature, and hence the investigation has not been exhausted. This paper takes into account both dominant religion and radical right-wing political views in the same regression and examines their impact on trust. In this analysis we also investigate whether there is a specific religion that is closely related to social trust.

It is of note that most of the previous literature on this topic used data collected before 2010. However, we use data collected by the World Values Survey over the period 2010–2014 (Sixth wave). These years are significant in terms of number of deadly terrorist attacks in the world. The Center for Systemic Peace[1] lists 712 bomb attacks on non-combatant (civilian and political) targets by non-state actors resulting in 15 or more deaths between 2010 and 2019. More than 61

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[1] The Center for Systemic Peace is a non-profit company founded in 1997 to conduct on innovative research of the problems of political violence under the global system (refer to https://www.systemicpeace.org/).

percent of these attacks took place between 2010 and 2014. These attacks mostly occurred in Islamic countries and among religious groups. We intend to supplement the existing literature by investigating the years in which there were many bomb attacks (namely, between 2010 and 2014), years in which there was political polarization in the world.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses

This section gives, first, some theoretical perspectives and empirical findings that have already informed the topic or question. Second, in this section we look at the unaddressed puzzle, controversy, or paradox that this study addresses and, third, why it needs to be addressed. Fourth, we consider what is new in this study, and finally, we look at how our study fundamentally changes, challenges, or advances our understanding about social trust.

First, social scientists theoretically and empirically have been trying to understand the various aspects of social trust for more than three decades (e.g., Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey & Newton, 2003; Newton, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 1999, 2000). All these studies, mostly theoretical, investigated, as is usually the case, either individual determinants of social trust, such as age, gender, income, social status, and education level, or societal determinants of social trust, such as membership of voluntary organizations, network of friends, and religious denominations that are connected to each other.

Second, although we have some understanding about the determinants of social trust, we believe that other aspects of social trust, such as individual religious and political views, are still worth investigating. It has been pointed out that social trust has been declining over the years (Rapp, 2016). The next section of this paper will shed light on how such decline is measured. We also address the question of how social trust relates to religiousness and political views, since there are some conflicting findings about the effects of these factors. Some studies find that religiousness and political polarization increase social trust, others find the opposite.

Third, this paper investigates how the degree of people's religiousness or behavior in regard to praying and political views relate to social trust. Specifically, people with radical political views are said to trust others less because political polarization is one important dividing line in social issues (Berning & Ziller, 2017; Rapp, 2016). In addition, Beugelsdijk & Klasing (2016) found that high diversity regarding political ideological values is related to lower social trust. Similarly, Duckitt (2001) and Duckitt & Parra (2004) investigated that radical-right-wing conservatives might not expect others to behave in a manner that promotes collective interests. Berning & Ziller (2017) addressed the issue of individual social trust decreasing radical right-wing populist party preferences. Other papers by Balliet et al. (2018) and Koivula et al. (2017) demonstrated that the level of trust among the supporters of populist parties is relatively low and higher levels of ideological conservatism are associated with lower concern with others' social value outcomes. Balliet et al. (2018) also supported the notion that, with increasing conservatism, concern for equality in social value outcomes decreases. The right and left distinction is one of the most useful and popular ways to classify the political ideology in the Western world, as in Erikson & Tedin (2003) and Balliet et al. (2018). Specifically, Balliet et al. (2018) examined that ideology is concerned with behavioral options and outcomes desired in the social decision-making process. Liberals (on the left of the spectrum) have more egalitarian consequences, whereas conservatives prefer more inequitable outcomes.

Meanwhile, there have been many studies which show the possible impacts of religion on social trust (e.g., Berggren & Bjørnskov, 2011; Daniel & Ruhr, 2010; Dingemans & Von Ingen, 2015; Grechyna, 2016; Olson & Li, 2015; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Uslaner, 2002). The existing

literature reports conflicting results about the impact of religiousness on social trust.[2] For example, Uslaner (2002) stated that "religion has an uneasy relationship to trust," whereas Putnam & Campbell (2010) stated that "religious people . . . are more trusting of just about everybody than are secular people." Daniel & Ruhr (2010) showed that black Protestants, Pentecostals, fundamentalist Protestants, and Catholics trust others less than individuals who do not claim a preference for a particular denomination. They also suggested that liberal Protestants trust others more and this effect is reinforced by attendance at religious services.

Berggren & Bjørnskov (2011) stated that the negative impacts of religion on daily life could come about in two different ways: by how religiosity affects the religious and by how religiosity affects the non-religious. Religion may create a divide in society if those who believe see others as morally inferior and if they are more prone to condemn what they consider to be immoral behavior. Berggren & Bjørnskov (2011) used new data from the Gallup World Poll on 109 countries and 43 U.S. states to estimate the impact of religion on social trust in everyday life. The empirical results suggested that a robust and negative relationship exists between religiosity and social trust, both internationally and within the U.S.

Fourth, what is new in this paper? This paper investigates the effects of both political view and religiousness in the same regression. It also provides more evidence on the empirical side of the determinants of social trust by including religiousness and political views of individuals along with other determinants (investigated previously in the literature) in the same regression.

Therefore, our final aim is basically to advance our understanding of the relationship between religiousness, political views and social trust by giving more empirical evidence.

Based on the literature review above, we empirically test the following hypotheses in this study to provide more empirical evidence. We use WVS data for this since the WVS data set is the best suited for the hypotheses below.

Hypothesis 1: People of right-wing persuasion trust others less compared with the rest of the population.

Hypothesis 2: Religious people or those who pray frequently trust others less compared with those who seldom pray. Hypothesis 3: People living in countries with mostly Asian religions (Hinduism + Shintoism + Confucianism + Buddhism) have higher social trust.

The third hypothesis is based on the general perception that people who adhere to Asian religions look for harmony with society, nature, and other people, whereas Islam and Christianity look for justice. Justice, however, is more based on value judgement.

The following section uses statistical analysis to investigate the hypotheses.

3. Data

In this study, we use the data set of the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), covering 88,565 individuals from 59 countries around the world over the period 2010–2014.[3] All variables, except for age, are designed as categorical or dummy variables with minimum and maximum values of zero and one, respectively. It should be noted that not all respondents answered all questions.[4] Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics about the variables used in the regression analysis. For dummy variables, the mean values reported in Table 1 are the percentages of indi-

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2 These conflicting results are summarized in Dingemans and Von Ingen (2015).
3 These may be downloaded from https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.
4 For this reason, the number of observations used in the regression analysis is reduced to 59,559, as shown in Table 2.

viduals in the appropriate category for answering the questions. For example, approximately 25 percent (mean: 0.248) of 86,285 people replied in the affirmative to the statement "Most people can be trusted." The sum of people who answered the same question by replying that we "need to be very careful" is 64,909 (75%). The question of trust is the dependent variable in the regression analysis. In addition, the independent variables include political view, age, education level, income level, marital status, employment status, sex, social class, frequency of prayer, and the dominant religion in the country where the respondent lives.

Before we proceed, it would be useful to give some methodological information. Some might question the applicability of the use of international data such as WVS in our analysis here. We state that there are some difficulties and limitations of using such a data set to compare the case of one country with others, but that there is also great usefulness in this. In terms of difficulty, the data set might not really define what the political left and the political right are. It leaves this to the respondent of the survey. Different countries give different meanings to these terms. However, the "political right" in many countries means more market-oriented policies and political ideas (this is almost the universal meaning of it economically). In addition, (social) trust as a concept might not be given the same meaning in every country in the sample, which consists of 59 countries. Social trust is also not defined in the data set. Respondents answer this question according to whatever meaning they "load" to the concept. However, we still think that there is some usefulness in the data set. One of the areas of its usefulness is the fact that it covers many different countries. Therefore, it provides one with great variation, which is needed for regression analysis. Another useful aspect of the data set is that it is an important survey about "values" of societies however they define those values. It gives researchers an opportunity to investigate the social values that have not been investigated before. The most important limitation of the data set is the fact that it does not follow the same person over different waves. Therefore, a panel regression analysis is not possible. However, we still get an idea about the relationship between social trust, political view, and religious behavior.

Though the paper tries to give a detailed account of different religions (at the aggregated level) and their effect on degrees of trust among people, we would like to mention at this stage that we cannot analyze the differences among people living in different countries with the same dominant religions. For example, we cannot see how a country such as Turkey has (di)similarities with other Islamic countries such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq Malaysia, Palestine, Pakistan, Tunisia, Qatar, and Yemen. All these Islamic countries may be different from one another in many aspects. These countries may be different at the trust level, and the determinants of social trust among Islamic countries can reveal different aspects of societies. For this, however, a different analysis is required, which might be a topic for another paper. Therefore, we would like to state at this stage that a religious block of countries may have both similarities and distinctions.

The next section gives some descriptive statistics about regression variables.

Table 1. Summary of descriptive statistics

Variables	Categories	Number of Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Most people can be trusted (Dependent Variable)	(1) Most people can be trusted	21,376	0.248	0.431	0	1
	(0) Need to be very careful	64,909	0.752	0.247	0	1
Self-positioning in political scale	(1) Right wing	5,489	0.081	0.273	0	1
	(0) The rest of the population	61,980	0.919	0.081	0	1
Age		88,382	41.998	16.568	16	102
Highest educational level attained	(1) No formal education	5,394	0.061	0.938	0	1
	(2) Incomplete primary school	5,018	0.057	0.232	0	1
	(3) Complete primary school	9,655	0.11	0.312	0	1
	(4) Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	6,619	0.075	0.264	0	1
	(5) Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	16,653	0.190	0.392	0	1
	(6) Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	7,046	0.080	0.271	0	1
	(7) Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	15,441	0.176	0.380	0	1
	(8) Some university-level education, without degree	6,552	0.075	0.262	0	1
	(9) University-level education, with degree	15,388	0.175	0.380	0	1
Scale of incomes	(1) Lower step	6,947	0.081	0.919	0	1
	(2) second step	6,310	0.074	0.262	0	1
	(3) Third step	9,977	0.117	0.321	0	1
	(4) Fourth step	11,774	0.138	0.345	0	1
	(5) Fifth step	18,315	0.215	0.411	0	1
	(6) Sixth step	1,311	0.154	0.361	0	1
	(7) Seventh step	10,265	0.120	0.325	0	1
	(8) Eighth step	5,765	0.068	0.251	0	1
	(9) Ninth step	1,596	0.019	0.135	0	1
	(10) Tenth step	1,256	0.015	0.120	0	1
Marital status	(1) Married	49,284	0.558	0.442	0	1
	(2) Living together as married	6,073	0.069	0.253	0	1
	(3) Divorced	3,347	0.038	0.191	0	1
	(4) Separated	1,659	0.019	0.136	0	1
	(5) Widowed	5,371	0.061	0.239	0	1
	(6) Single	22,587	0.256	0.436	0	1
Employment status	(1) Full time	27,839	0.320	0.680	0	1
	(2) Part time	8,054	0.093	0.290	0	1
	(3) Self employed	10,873	0.125	0.331	0	1
	(4) Retired	10,458	0.120	0.325	0	1
	(5) Housewife	13,365	0.154	0.361	0	1
	(6) Students	6,441	0.074	0.262	0	1
	(7) Unemployed	8,315	0.096	0.294	0	1
	(8) Other	1,693	0.019	0.138	0	1
Sex	Male	42,235	0.477	0.523	0	1
	Female	46,239	0.523	0.499	0	1

Social class	(1) Upper class	1,660	0.019	0.981	0	1
	(2) Upper middle class	17,230	0.201	0.400	0	1
	(3) Lower middle class	30,855	0.359	0.480	0	1
	(4) Working class	24,776	0.288	0.453	0	1
	(5) Lower class	11,374	0.132	0.339	0	1
How often you pray	(1) Several times a day	24,540	0.296	0.704	0	1
	(2) Once a day	14,670	0.177	0.382	0	1
	(3) Several times each week	9,016	0.109	0.311	0	1
	(4) Only when attending religious services	5,538	0.067	0.250	0	1
	(5) Only on special holy days	5,358	0.065	0.246	0	1
	(6) Once a year	1,635	0.020	0.139	0	1
	(7) Less than once a year	6,581	0.079	0.270	0	1
	(8) Never, practically never	15,504	0.187	0.390	0	1
Dominant religion in the country	Muslim	25,588	0.290	0.450	0	1
	Christian	47,546	0.540	0.500	0	1
	Hinduism + Shintoism + Confucianism + Buddhism	15,431	0.170	0.380	0	1

Note: The statistics are based on the data set provided by the World Values Survey.

Since we try to understand the impact of "religiousness" on social trust, this should be used as a variable that reflects some of the possible effects of religious culture. It is assumed that the frequency of prayer can show some degree of religiousness or at least it shows the degree of acceptance of religious culture. We organize this variable into a dummy variable using the WVS question of "Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray?" There are eight categories from which respondents can select only one that best defines them. Those eight categories are as follows: several times a day, once a day, several times each week, only when attending religious services, only on special holy days, once a year, less than once a year, and never.

Table 1 shows that 24,540 people, approximately 30 percent (mean: 0.296) of the sample, gave "several times a day" as the answer to the above question. The sum of people who answered the same question by saying "once a day" and "several times each week" was 23,686 (14,670 and 9,016 people, respectively), which is about 28.6 percent. Similarly, the sum of people whose answer to the same question was "only when attending religious services;" "only on special holy days;" "once a year;" "less often than once a year;" and "never" was 5,538; 5,358; 1,635; 6,581; and 15,504, respectively. These respondents constitute close to 42 percent of the whole, while those for whom 'frequent prayers' was the answer (the first three categories) represent almost 59 percent. This categorical variable is numbered from 1 ("several times a day") to 8 ("never"), meaning the increased value signifies a lower degree of religiosity.

Another topic examined by this paper is whether social trust differs depending on the dominant religion. In order to do this we investigate countries in which high levels of trust are found to be present and which have a dominant religion such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Confucianism, atheism. Dominant here means more than fifty percent. For instance, Korea's population is almost 57 percent atheist and hence Korea is classified in this paper as an atheist country. Turkey is classified as a Muslim country since 99.8 percent of the population is Muslim. Data on the percentages of different religions in a country are taken from the World Factbook, which is issued by the Central Intelligence Agency. In our survey 29 percent of the sample population lives in Islamic countries, 54 percent in Christian countries, and 17 percent in countries in which Hinduism, Shintoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, or atheism dominate.

Determining the impact of political views on social trust, we define a political variable through the WVS question of "Self-positioning in the political scale," consisting of 10 categories. Categories 1 and 10 refer to political tendencies of the most left- and the most right-wing, respectively. For two reasons, we convert this variable to redefine and recode it into a new dummy variable (right-wing) of two values, one and zero. The first reason is that only around 75 percent of individuals answered this question. People seemed to be hesitant to answer a question about political views. Second, people who placed themselves in categories 5, 6, and 7 on the scale constitute more than half (53 percent) of respondents. That is, more than half the individuals are neutral rather than right- or left-wing.

The radical left-wing (about 7 percent) and radical right-wing (about 8 percent) represent a political polarization in a sense. That is, excluding the radical left- and right-wing, the total number of individuals accounts for 85 percent. Since we examine whether people with radical right-wing political views trust others more, we recode the variable by converting the category 10 to 1 and otherwise to 0, creating a new dummy variable for radical right-wing political views. As shown in Table 1, the percentage of people who define themselves as radical right-wing is 8.1 percent.

Some other explanatory variables are also included in the regression analysis. Except for age they are also categorical variables, some of which are ordered in an increasing order, such as education level, income scale, and social class. A number is assigned to each category, and the number increases as the order of the corresponding category changes. However, some categorical variables, such as employment status and marital status are not ordered. The mean values reported in Table 1 define the corresponding percentage of people who responded to the relevant categorical state or question. For example, those who define themselves as upper class constitute 1.9 percent of the total sample size.

4. Regression Results

The regression method uses probit analysis because the dependent variable is a binary variable: 1 (most people can be trusted) and 0 (need to be very careful). As already mentioned, the independent variables are the determinants of social trust, which have frequently been used in the existing literature (e.g., Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey & Newton, 2003). The regression results are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Regression results

Estimation Method	Probit analysis	
Dependent Variable	Most people can be trusted (WVS)	
Independent variables	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**
Constant	-1.143***	0.067
Radical right-wing (political views)	-0.117***	0.022
Age	0.008***	0.001
Highest educational level attained (Reference category: No formal education)		
Incomplete primary school	-0.057	0.042
Complete primary school	-0.004	0.036
Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type	0.128***	0.037
Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type	0.102***	0.035
Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	0.199***	0.038
Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	0.221***	0.035
Some university-level education, without degree	0.368***	0.038

University-level education, with degree	0.364***	0.035
Scale of incomes (Reference category: First level)		
Second level	-0.003	0.031
Third level	0.019	0.027
Fourth level	-0.0003	0.027
Fifth level	-0.024	0.026
Sixth level	-0.010	0.027
Seventh level	0.060**	0.028
Eighth level	-0.006	0.032
Ninth level	0.221***	0.045
Tenth level	0.258***	0.049
Marital status (Reference category: Married)		
Living together	-0.0008	0.023
Divorced	0.017	0.029
Separated	-0.053	0.043
Widowed	-0.094***	0.027
Single	0.033**	0.016
Employment status (Reference category: Full time)		
Part time	0.046**	0.021
Self employed	-0.106***	0.019
Retired	-.043*	0.023
Housewife	-0.105***	0.021
Student	-0.057**	0.026
Unemployed	-0.169***	0.022
Other	0.00004	0.043
Sex	0.034***	0.012
Social class (Reference category: Upper class)		
Upper middle class	-0.015	0.041
Lower middle class	-0.118***	0.041
Working class	-0.187***	0.042
Lower class	-0.219***	0.045
How often to you pray (Reference category: Several times a day)		
Once a day	-0.012	0.018
Several times each week	0.201***	0.020
Only when attending religious services	0.169***	0.024
Only on special holy days	0.179***	0.025
Once a year	0.406***	0.039
Less often than once a year	0.290***	0.023
Never, practically never	0.482***	0.017
Dominant religion in the country (Reference category: Hinduism + Shintoism + Confucianism + Buddhism)		
Muslim	-0.167***	0.020
Christian	-0.179***	0.017
Log pseudo likelihood	-31,209.37	
Pseudo R^2	0.05	
Wald χ^2 (21) (Prob. > χ^2)	3,102.22 (0.000)	
Number of Observations	59,559	

Note: ***: $p<0.01$, **: $p<0.05$, *: $p<0.10$

In Table 2, the estimated coefficients of "Muslim" and "Christian" are negative and statistically significant (-0,167 and -0.179, respectively). This implies that people living in countries where the dominant religions are Muslim and Christian have less trust in others than people living in countries dominated by Asian religions, such as Hinduism, Shintoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. One plausible explanation is that Asian religions emphasize the ideals of harmony, compassion, and non-violence, perhaps in a more powerful way than the so-called Abrahamic

religions, as noted in Clobert et al. (2014). In addition, it is also possible that Asian religions are closely related to certain life ethics such as relations with neighbors, which may have a positive effect on the formation of trust among people.[5]

The estimation coefficients for the number of people who regularly pray, are positive and statistically significant, except for those who answered, "once a day," meaning that people who participate a lot in prayer may have relatively low trust. It is also observed that those whose reply to the question about participation in prayer was either "seldom" or "never" are associated with a relatively high social trust compared to those who participate in it "frequently." It is generally known that religious people within the same denomination or sect can have higher social trust among themselves. However, our regression finding, without controlling for denominations, implies that those who pray frequently have relatively low social trust. Theoretically or intrinsically no religion teaches its followers not to trust others per se. Nonetheless, our empirical finding is inconsistent with the results of some literature, such as Valente & Okulicz-Kozaryn (2020) who found that frequent participation in prayer can increase social trust. Hence, this result may be a case study (a group of countries in WVS for the years 2010–2014) in which participation in prayer may not have a distinct effect on the formation of trust.

Meanwhile, the impact of radical right-wing political views on trust is negative and statistically significant. That is, people with radical right-wing political views have a relatively lower trust. This result is consistent with the findings of the existing literature. Berning & Ziller (2017) provided evidence about a negative relationship between social trust and right-wing political views in the Netherlands. The existing literature also provides extensive evidence that radical right-wing populist parties attract electorates with low social trust (e.g., Marcel et al., 2002; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005). Berning & Ziller (2017) emphasized that right-wing politics is related to anti-immigrant policies and people with right-wing political views support an anti-immigrant stance. Stankov (2021) highlighted that populist politics contribute to the increased visibility of the right-wing parties and that terrorism linked to right-wing ideology is on the rise. It is also known that after the Syrian civil war started in 2010–2011, there has been the pressure of a great influx of immigrants flooding into European countries and radical right-wing political parties have been on the rise in terms of electoral support.[6]

Table 2 shows that the estimated coefficients of education level, social class, and income level are observed as expected, which is similar to the previous literature. That is, it appears that social trust increases according to education level, social status, and income level.

Lastly, we argue that right wing political ideology and religiosity play an important role on the level of trust. But some might raise the question that this may also be related to the level of social and economic development of a particular country, to the degree of political polarization and to the openness of the political system. In other words, economic and social development, political polarization, and openness of the political system can affect social trust in a country. Those economic, social, and political variables are important in gaining an understanding of the nature of social trust. If an aggregated analysis at the country level had been conducted, those socio-eco-

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5   These results are not irrelevant to the fact that most bomb attacks and anti-immigration policies over the period 2010-2014, which is the sample period of this study, appeared in Muslim- and Christian-dominated countries, as described in Section I.
6   It should be noted that the above results can be analyzes more elaborately. That is, it may be possible to determine how the dominant religion affects trust in a group with the same political views, or how political views affect trust in a country dominated by a particular religion. This will be an interesting topic for future study and will complete the analysis of this paper.

nomic and political variables would have been measured somehow. For example, we would have needed to measure the openness of the political system or political polarization and included those factors in order to analyze the aggregated level of social trust. To address this point we need to add some remarks regarding the individual level of our analysis (59,559 persons or respondents). It would be necessary to include the above-mentioned variables if the study were conducted at an aggregated country level. However, our paper covers different countries at the individual level, and individual level social and economic variables such as the highest education level attained and income levels are included in the analysis.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

In this paper, we estimate the impact of dominant religion and radical right-wing political views on social trust. The association between religious practice (frequency of prayer) and social trust is also examined. We use data on the sixth wave of the World Values Survey, covering 88,565 individuals from 60 countries around the world over the period 2010–2014. This study uses a regression that simultaneously considers dominant religion and political views affecting social trust, and relatively recent data reflecting terrorism and anti-immigration policies in recent years.

The findings of the study show that people living in countries dominated by Asian religions, such as Hinduism, Shintoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism have higher trust in others than those living in countries dominated by Christianity and Islam. In addition, estimated results suggest that the frequency of participation in prayer may not have a distinct impact on social trust. On the other hand, the impact of radical right-wing persuasions on trust is negative and statistically significant, meaning that radical right-wing political views result in a relatively lower trust. Hence, those with right-wing political views and those who frequently pray trust others relatively less. These empirical findings suggest that religiousness and political views can be dividing factors in the world, which is confirmed in that anti-immigration sentiment and terrorist attacks are creating a divided world based on religion and/or political views.

In terms of our hypotheses listed in the previous section, we cannot reject any of the hypotheses based on our regression results. One of the main investigation points of this paper is to empirically test whether religiousness or religious behavior in terms of frequency of praying and political view can affect social trust. We found that people who are more religious and of right-wing persuasion do not have a higher social trust than others. After controlling the regression for many other independent variables we also found that people living in Asian countries have a higher level of social trust,. This last finding is a new one since not many previous studies have investigated the same question or hypothesis in the same way .

As discussed in the text, social trust is important in many different aspects of social life such as income distribution, economic and social development, etc. Therefore, social trust has been a subject of investigation in many different social sciences or disciplines including economics, sociology, and political science to name a few (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey & Newton, 2003; Newton, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 1999, 2000). Social trust is studied differently in different disciplines. In economics however, it is mostly studied empirically using different data sets.

Scholars in different disciplines choose to undertake different methods and analysis, depending on their question of study or investigation. Therefore, our paper is intended to contribute to the empirical literature about determinants of social trust. Our paper is different from many others in terms of data set and time span. We use the 6th wave of the WVS data set, which covers the years between 2010 and 2014. Our results tell us that in those years for the countries in the 6th wave,

listed in the appendix, social trust was affected by political view and religious behavior. The practical contribution of this paper is to add more evidence for the possible relationship between social trust and religious behavior and political view. In addition, and importantly, social trust is higher in countries where Asian religions (Hinduism + Shintoism + Confucianism + Buddhism) are dominant. What does this imply about economic variables? It is difficult to explore all the implications of this finding. However, we observe that all these countries with Asian religions experience have higher growth rates in their market oriented economic policies. Of course, this observation does not offer any causal relationship. It just offers a detailed future study in subject matter.

This paper empirically challenges some previous findings. It also advances or produces more evidence for some other findings in the previous literature. The subject matter is not exhausted with the current paper. There needs to be more studies, both empirical and theoretical, investigating the relationship between social trust, political view, and religious behavior.

There are of course some limitations to our paper. First, we use the 6th wave of the WVS. This sample covers 60 countries for a certain period (2010-2014). The study would have been much more comprehensive if all the waves would have been followed for the same countries.

For future research, we believe there is a need for a new data set. In addition, survey data should be implemented by the election results of some countries to see whether the said data confirm the election results or not. All these studies require further research and a new paper.

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Appendix. Countries in the 6th wave: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lybia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

Research Article

Orientalist Encounters at School: Security and Inclusion in the Education of Syrian Refugee Children in Istanbul

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ABSTRACT

After the Syrian crisis, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey is estimated to be approximately four million. Currently, one of the most significant aspects of the integration process of refugees in Turkey is the education of refugee students. Investigating the process of the co-education of refugee and Turkish citizen students in public schools provides some insight into what the future might hold for these refugees and sheds light on the dynamics of living together with locals. The first aim of this research is to explore the reception of the refugee students by the teachers in order to understand inclusion and/or exclusion mechanisms in education. Second, this study examines the roles that ethno-religious and political identities play in relations between teachers and refugee students by focusing on ethno-religious identity and discrimination. Drawing on the debates on orientalism and securitization in migration, it explicates the ways in which teachers justify their judgments and impressions of the refugee students through orientalist codes. To achieve this, public school teachers from two districts of Istanbul were invited to take part in this ethnographic research which was conducted in 2018.
Keywords: Refugee Students, Syrian refugees, Education, Orientalism, Securitization

1. Introduction

After the arrival of Syrian refugees in Turkey, the Turkish government's security policies, border security and the Syrian "integration" into the Turkish society became politicized and remain as contested issues. One of the contexts that portray current tensions regarding refugees and their social inclusion in Turkey is the school environment. The education of refugee children also presents a realm where the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey is debated and in which an impression can be obtained of how Syrian refugee subjectivities are imagined and perceived as a part of society. The inclusion of Syrian refugees and their co-existence in the local community indicate a structural problem in terms of the Turkish state's migration and refugee policies, with regards to the ambiguity of long-term policies towards migration in Turkey. This article investigates refugee education in Turkey through an analysis of schools as spaces of encounters and identity formation.

According to official estimates, more than four million people who fled their homes due to the armed conflict in neighboring Syria currently live in Turkey (UN 2020).[1] Although Turkey is a party to the 1951 UN (Geneva) Convention on Refugees and 1967 Protocol, it has maintained a geographic reservation and disallowed non-European migrants to gain refugee status in Turkey. Therefore, the Syrian population in Turkey has not officially been given "refugee" status and Syrians who were accepted into the country were given temporary protection status. When the Syrian crisis began in 2011, Turkey initially followed a welcoming approach by declaring "Syrians as guests" (Dağtaş, 2017). Since then, the prolonged war in Syria, growing anti-refugee discourses in mainstream Turkish society, and the indeterminacy surrounding Syrian refugees' status have sparked public discussions about the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey and the need to develop policies that would recognize Syrian refugees as permanent members of the Turkish society. Temporary Protection Status for Syrians has not changed but Turkey has adopted new laws and followed certain policies in line with global and European reactions to mass migration. Turkey introduced a new law in 2013 called the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which paved the way for a coherent body of law on migration and asylum. However, through the discourse on 'migration management', the Turkish government plays a dominant role in controlling the migrant flows (Memişoğlu and Ilgıt 2017). There have been non-governmental organizations operating in the field of migration, but the government made DGMM (Directory of Migration Management), a civil authority on migration management, the main institution responsible for migrants (Memişoğlu and Ilgıt 2017, p. 323). Today, Syrian refugees have access to work permission, education, and health care. Nonetheless, ambiguity regarding the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey continues.

Ethnographic research on the integration (*uyum* in Turkish) of Syrian refugees into mainstream Turkish society has hitherto focused on the protection of refugees' social rights (Eroğlu et al., 2017; Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016), state responses to mass refugee flows (Can, 2019; Şahin-Mencütek, 2019), humanitarianism and border control (Fernando and Giordano, 2016), refugee "crisis" as a historical phenomenon (Chatty, 2017; Saraçoğlu and Belanger, 2019), and the Islamic notions of community (Zaman, 2016). Among these, migration scholars aimed at understanding the plight of the refugees but left out political polarization and its impact on refugee-host relations in urban areas. Drawing on the refugee and critical pedagogy literature, this article explores young Syrian refugees' inclusion in, and exclusion from, educational settings within a broader political context by investigating the encounters between educators and the Syrian chil-

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1   Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey accessed 06/22/2022

dren that shape and are shaped by existing ethnic and religious identifications and the ways in which these identities operate in the social sphere.

In the most recent research on migration in Turkey, refugee education figured as an important problem, along with refugees' socio-economic impact on society. Up until 2016, Syrian refugee children had two options to receive formal education: They could enroll in public schools, or they could register at Temporary Education Centers (TECs), which were developed specifically for the Syrian refugee children (Özer et al., 2017, p.115).[2] Alternatively, they could enroll in private schools. Due to concerns about the quality of education and future options[3] for Syrian students, the TECs have now been closed and the students have been moved to Turkish public schools. This means that more Syrian refugee students experience potential conflict with Turkish teachers and other students as schools become major sites of their social encounters. Today, more Syrian refugees[4] live in Istanbul than in any other part of Turkey, which makes Istanbul a major field site to observe refugee-host encounters. According to the 2021 UNICEF report, children make up approximately 45% of Syrian refugees, and almost half of those who live in urban cities are not enrolled in school.[5] As a result, thousands of refugee children are deprived of access to public education and schooling in Turkey.[6]

In this research, we aim to examine whether primary and secondary school teachers' ethno-religious and political identities play a role in refugee student-teacher relations by looking at exclusion and inclusion mechanisms of the refugee students inside schools. We discuss how teachers and administrators position Syrian refugees in a certain political and ideological realm and how this positioning facilitates or hinders the adaptation of Syrian pupils into public schools by using Said's Orientalism and the Copenhagen school's securitization as conceptual frameworks. Based on an ethnographic study[7] in Zeytinburnu and Sultangazi[8] in Istanbul, we argue that the exclusionary practices of school teachers regarding refugee children are intertwined with anti-Syrian discrimination in Turkey which perceives Syrian refugees as security threats and as belonging to the "Orient". We found that the teachers' ethno-religious identities and their own experiences of injustice in the political realm do not necessarily preclude them from engaging in discriminatory practices against the refugee students. Finally, we discuss the educational environment in Istanbul as one based on the securitization of the refugee children rather than one which stems from an inclusive approach to ethno-religious and racial diversity in public schools. This finding invites us to rethink educational settings as microcosms of the larger social and political landscapes and design long-term policies for "integration" of the migrants.

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2   As of 2021, there are 854,839 refugee children enrolled in formal education in Turkey (UNICEF 2021) accessed 06/22/2022 Retrieved from
    https://www.unicef.org/media/118576/file/Syria%20Crisis%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report%20
    (Refugee)%20-1%20Jan%20-%2031%20Dec%202021.pdf
3   Initially, temporary education centers (TECs) were established in the 25 refugee camps built along the Turkey–Syria border as well as in communities with large numbers of refugees. They provided schooling based on the Syrian national curriculum, taught in Arabic, which was supplemented by Turkish language and history lessons. (Hauber-Özer, 2019 p.50)
4   Retrieved from https://multeciler.org.tr/eng/number-of-syrians-in-turkey/accessed 06/22/2022
5   Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/unicef-turkey-2018-humanitarian-results accessed 07/12/2020
6   Retrieved from https://t24.com.tr/haber/istanbul-da-yasayan-gocmenlerin-cocuklari-okullara-kayit-olamiyor,837785 accessed 07/23/2020
7   This study was conducted by following ethical considerations with the permission of the ethical board at Binghamton University-Human Subject Research Review (2015-2018). Every interlocutor was informed about the research and their consent was taken.
8   Over 500,000 Syrian refugees who reside in Istanbul are concentrated in Esenyurt, Başakşehir, Sultangazi, Küçükçekmece, Bağcılar, Zeytinburnu and Fatih districts (Narlı 2018).

2. Education System and Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Many critical social scientists and pedagogy scholars have pondered over the way in which school impacts societies by looking at issues such as discrimination and multilingualism (Çayır, 2014; Çayır and Ayan, 2012). In the Turkish context, since the rise of the modern state and the idea of creating a nation –a proper nation, much of recent scholarly work has investigated Turkey's education system in relation to Turkish nationalism and classes on religion (White, 2012). Scholars in Turkey have criticized the education system extensively due to its militarist and nationalist agenda and have revealed the deficits of Turkey's education system regarding the right to access equal education (for instance see Sen 2020; Aydın and Dogan 2019). Turkey has a very centralized education system in the sense that education policies are created by the government and implemented by the Ministry of Education through provincial directorates. However, the cultural landscape is far from being such a monolithic bloc (Tongal, 2015, p.15). This contradiction creates difficulties in the education of diverse communities and in providing multilingual education. The centralized system operates on the assumption of equal opportunities and "sameness". However, socio-cultural factors such as language, religion and gender cause inequality in education. Issues such as education in the mother tongue and access to schools in various districts in Turkey were already presented as major limitations in the Turkish education system even before the Syrian conflict.

The needs of Syrian students, such as the challenges they face during their integration into public schools and their coping mechanisms, as well as the needs of Turkish teachers, are relatively new areas of ethnographic research for scholars in Turkey. Scholars have examined Syrian students' linguistic and cultural adaptation (Çelik and İçduygu, 2018; Taşkın and Erdemli, 2018), their academic performance (Tösten et al., 2017), and their educational needs (Aydın and Kaya, 2017) through both quantitative and qualitative research. The current literature emphasizes in-class problems that teachers experience and refugee students' access to public school education (Uyan-Semerci and Erdogan, 2018) as part of the structural problems of the Turkish education system and of Syrian refugees within the Turkish education system in particular (Özer et al., 2017). Social scientists have drawn attention to the importance of building intercultural education and to the acknowledgment of diversity in classrooms (Tongal, 2015), in order to achieve an inclusive school environment. Our contribution to this existing scholarship is the way in which discriminative encounters lead to constructing 'the other' as a security threat. We argue that our critical framing of teacher-refugee student encounters from the prism of securitization and Orientalism could contribute to the debates over the ideological role of schools. In this way we could engage in a critical vocabulary sentient to enduring problems in refugees' access to education and social integration, such as human rights, migration policies and ethno-religious identity in Turkey. In this article, we argue that the inadequacy in multicultural and multilingual education and discriminative orientalist perspectives within the educational context in Turkey contribute to failures in refugee education and in Syrian students' access to an equal and non-discriminatory classroom environment.

3. Methodology and Fieldwork

This research was conducted by using qualitative research techniques. Our ethnographic strategies included focus groups, participant observation, and in-depth interviews while we also benefited from our own positions with respect to our experience as teachers at different levels and in various contexts.[9]

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9   Our own subject positions and ethnic identities became part of the conversation we had with our interlocutors

In order to demonstrate the practices of exclusion and inclusion in the school environment in relation to larger politico-ideological subject positions, we conducted interviews with 30 teachers from 3 different elementary and secondary schools in two districts of Istanbul. The schools were all public schools and one of them was a TEC in transition to becoming a coeducation school. We began our research by interviewing teachers, who worked from first to eighth grade in the largest public school in Sultangazi and one of the most refugee populated public schools in Zeytinburnu from September to October 2018. Our fieldwork included many trips to both districts, and we held three meetings in our focus group interviews, one of them being in Zeytinburnu and two others in Sultangazi. The participants were chosen by considering their ethno-religious and political affiliations. The school we chose in Sultangazi is renowned for its high academic achievements and quality of education. We analyzed the data using qualitative research analysis software and categorized the interviews according to certain keywords and participant profiles.

The sampling strategy was through the snowball technique, however our criterion for the sample of the participants was based on ethnoreligious and political diversity. The teachers we interviewed were from different ethno-religious backgrounds including Turkish, Kurdish, Arab, Alevi, and Sunni identifications, as well as those from nationalist persuasions . Our goal was to understand the differences and similarities among teachers' approaches to the students despite their distinct backgrounds. The participants were fully informed about the research and their consent were taken prior to the interviews. We chose Sultangazi and Zeytinburnu to conduct our research because these two districts share certain similarities regarding demography, the local population's socio-economic status, and history of city planning[10]. The urban landscape in these two districts of Turkey is now host to 'the largest number of refugees worldwide, with close to 4.1 million refugees' (United Nations, 2020) and reshaped by decades of internal and external migrations, unplanned *gecekondu* (slum) growth, failed public works, and more recently gentrification. The arrival of the Syrian refugees impacted the labor market, and members of the local population from different migrant backgrounds have now become the ones who "host" the Syrians.

A combination of Sultançiftliği and Gazi neighborhoods, Sultangazi is one of the newer districts of Istanbul, which became a municipality in 2009. Gazi, a heterogeneous neighborhood in terms of ethnicity and religion, was established during the 1980s as a result of rural-urban migration arising from economic reasons. The neighborhood, which was portrayed as a site of left-wing extremism in the 1990s (known as the Gazi events), served as a refuge for the Sunni Kurds who were forcibly removed from their villages during the late 1990s and 2000s (Güneş, 2013, p.17). Although Gazi residents' experiences are different from the Syrian refugees, they seem to have more experience of "integration" into urban life and exclusion from social public life due to their position as internally displaced persons. Similarly, Zeytinburnu, which has the highest ratio of

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and contributed to our negotiations of inclusivity and diversity in educational settings. One of us is a Kurdish scholar and primary school teacher, while the other is an Arab scholar and a former high school teacher.

10 We picked Sultangazi and Zeytinburnu as our research sites for a few reasons. First, even though both places have similar demographics and socioeconomic backgrounds, they differ within the context of schoolteachers' political orientations and ethno-religious backgrounds. Sultangazi and Zeytinburnu are microcosms in terms of showing the landscape of Syrian migrant population in Turkey. The Syrian refugees in both districts are from various cities and regions of Syria and they include different ethno-religious backgrounds. As per the teachers from Turkey, in Zeytinburnu they were mostly practicing Muslims and identified themselves as religious and pro-government. However, the teachers in Sultangazi were more diverse in their ethno-religious background including Sunni and Alevi Kurds and socialist/leftist Turkish teachers. Second, Sultangazi was more accessible to the authors due to one of the authors' long work experience at, and therefore previous affiliation to, one of the schools in Sultangazi up until 2017.

Syrian refugees in Istanbul (almost 9% of the population), is a working-class neighborhood housing many different migrant groups from a diversity of countries that moved into the neighborhood over a period of six decades. Established in the late 1940s, Zeytinburnu was one of the first *gecekondu* (shantytown) districts of Istanbul. As a residential area, it was constructed by rural migrants who came to the city in search of jobs in large industrial factories surrounding Zeytinburnu (Yonucu, 2008, p. 52). It is predominantly a residential district whose inhabitants consist of workers who are employed in the informal small-scale workshops, unemployed jobseekers, and the permanently unemployed who have lost hope of finding jobs. Rural migrants in Zeytinburnu, just like those in Sultangazi, are mostly Kurds who were forced to leave their villages in the 1990s. It also includes several groups of immigrants of Turkish origin, such as Turks from the Balkans, including Bulgarian Turks, Turkmen and Uzbeks from Afghanistan who mostly immigrated in the 1980s, and the Uyghurs from China (Narlı, 2018 p.275).

By looking at two districts of Istanbul with the densest refugee populations our goal is also to reflect upon the current debates and discriminatory practices against refugees in Turkey.

4. Theoretical Framework: Orientalism and Securitization

In his seminal work *Orientalism*, Edward Said (1978) explains that the West's relationship with the Orient has always been intrinsically connected to its usefulness to Western interests. Although rooted in colonialism, this Western-centric way of looking at the world extends far beyond armies and territorial ambitions, entering into the ideological realm by means of literary productions, media accounts, and ethnographic narratives (Arif, 2018, p.34). Through discursive and other practices, the Orient is homogenized and framed in fixed representations which, through portrayals of "the Other" as mysterious and exotic, depict it as strange at best, and uncivilized and barbaric at worst. Moreover, it is portrayed as a threat to its antithesis the West, which purportedly represents civilization, democracy and a vast array of other principles, deemed to be more virtuous (Said, 1978).

According to Said orientalism is an intricate discursive practice through which the West constructed the Orient as primitive or inferior to its self-image and thus legitimized its civilizing mission into the lands and societies of this mythical Orient (Said, 1978). Following Said's conceptualization, scholars refer to cultural hierarchies as "neo-orientalism" (Sadowski, 1993; Musarrat, 2000) taking place within their own societies. One such example of cultural hierarchies is discussed through the conceptualization of "nesting orientalisms" in the context of former Yugoslavia (Bakic-Hayden 1995). The author argues that "the gradation of "Orients" is a pattern of reproduction of the original dichotomy upon which Orientalism is premised. In this pattern, Asia is more "East" or "other" than Eastern Europe; within Eastern Europe itself this gradation is reproduced with the Balkans perceived as most "eastern"; within the Balkans there are similarly constructed hierarchies" (Bakic-Hayden,1995, p.918). According to Barbero (2012), after 9/11, these discursive forms were used to stigmatize immigrants, in particular those who came from Muslim and Arab regions, whose existence was posited as a threat to the so-called Western rational and democratic values and social order. The new discursive form constructed immigrants as incapable of integrating. This incapability is explained as having originated in immigrants' cultural backwardness (Barbero, 2012). Orientalist perspectives toward migrants began to become visible in Turkey as it transitioned into a country of immigration rather than a transit country for migrants. (İçduygu 2002). Although this study uses "Orientalism" as a tool to understanding the positioning of Syrian refugees in Turkey, there are many scholarly works which have focused on discrimina-

tion against Syrian refugees in Turkey. These scholars emphasized normalization of discriminatory discourses against Syrians (Terzioğlu 2017), more recently hate speech and discriminatory rhetoric on social media (Bozdağ 2020; Filibeli and Ertuna 2021) and migrant inclusion/exclusion mechanisms (Saraçoğlu and Belanger 2019; Sözer 2022). This paper builds on this literature by analyzing inclusion and exclusion mechanisms through the lens of Orientalism and the educational context. As this article suggests the educational context provides further evidence for the issue of "integration" by putting the migrant as the main actor responsible for the integration process.

The second conceptual framework used in order to understand the relationship between teachers' perceptions of Syrian refugee students in public schools is the securitization theory. A leading school in security studies, the Copenhagen school, focuses on the ways in which the process of securitization in the domestic context plays out in relation to migration. The Copenhagen school introduced the concept of securitization to critical security studies (Rumelili and Karadağ, 2017), which is concerned with how security problems are constructed and exercised in politics (Baran, 2018). The securitization process is analogous to a "speech act" (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998). Instead of attributing the act to something tangible, this process considers utterance itself to be the act. Something is accomplished by defining the words (such as making a promise, wagering, or naming "something"). When one says 'x security issue,' one is speaking of a 'performative' rather than a 'constative,' and thus there is no true status but a 'felicity condition' (Waever, 1995; Butler, 1997). According to the Copenhagen School, security is intersubjective and a problem becomes a security matter through the process of securitization. In this sense, the issue of security does not stem from an actual threat that already exists as such, but is constructed through speech acts (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998:25). The facilitating conditions for securitization are based on the historical relations with the subject of the threat. Securitization practices that include both discursive and non-discursive forms attempt to secure the "host community" against the "collective dangerous force" of migrants (Huysmans, 2006). In Europe, with growing asylum applications and international migration numbers, a politics of *unease,* where migrants and asylum seekers were not individually described as threats and enemies, emerged (Huysmans, 2006). Instead, migrants were lumped together with other more traditionally "scary" threats such as international crime and/or domestic criminal activities (Hammerstad, 2014; Huysmans, 2006). The securitization of Syrian refugees has also been studied in the Turkish context particularly on issues such as public security, labor market and socioeconomic problems (Donelli 2018; Toğral Koca 2016). For instance, in his recent research, Erdoğan finds that as a result of a comprehensive survey data, security concerns are quite high in society, and these concerns will eventually influence politics, which shows that securitization is a bottom-up process in Turkey arising from "society/grassroots" (2020, p. 76). In a similar vein, this article discusses these increasing security concerns in society in the context of educational settings and Syrian refugee children.

5. Orientalist Encounters: Ethno-religious Identity and Discrimination

In October 2018, we met with Bahar[11], a 36 year old Kurdish woman, and her friend Ayşe, a 38 year old Turkish woman; both were public school teachers in Sultangazi. Bahar, a primary school teacher in Gazi, was one of the employed teachers and defined her political position as 'leftist'. Bahar was concerned about the refugee children and their future in Turkish society. She was also very vocal about migrant rights and often emphasized during our conversations the need

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11   All interlocutors' names are pseudo names in order to maintain confidentiality.

for political solutions, which means structural changes and right-based solutions. Perhaps that is why she accepted our request for a series of interviews. We met with Bahar and Ayşe in the head-quarters of the teachers' union. Both teachers considered themselves to be not only educators but also activists. Both were involved and active union members. Both had Syrian students in their schools.

When we asked them about their experiences in the classroom, Bahar began talking about the difficulty of achieving "harmony" in the classroom due to communication problems. In our con-versations and follow-up interviews, Bahar and Ayşe highlighted their perception about the Ara-bic language and Arab ethnic identity. Ayşe jumped in when we asked further about the linguistic aspect of failure in communication with Syrian students: "You know what, whenever I hear my students speak it feels like they are reading the Quran. I don't know, I guess the language [Arabic] is just not appealing [to me]." Ayşe's response urged us to investigate what the underlying reason for her statement might be. We had often heard similar statements from the teachers about their sense of Arab culture, epitomized by language and ethnic identity, and how they associated cul-ture with student behavior in the classroom. Teachers also affiliate Arabic with a geographical area and/or region, namely the "Middle East", and situate it in a "backward" position.

Bahar and Ayşe talked about how "Arabness" and Islam played a role in their perception of Syrian refugees. The meanings attached to "Arabness" directly informed teachers' relations with both the students and their parents and triggered stereotypes by leading to a dismissive attitude in their encounters with the Syrian pupils. Bahar and Ayşe admitted multiple times how the way they imagined Arab identity and their own bias against the Arabic language impacted their relation-ships with their students. Bahar and Ayşe's mindful statements indicate a distinction between political consciousness as opposed to a cultural "inclusion". Although they are aware of their bias and make an effort not to reiterate mainstream exclusion practices, their engagements with the Syrian students remain limited. When we asked more questions about how this language as a signifier was constructed by the teachers, Bahar and Ayşe talked about the link between Arabic and Islam by revealing the adverse effect of Arabic education on Turkish people. Ayşe was an activist engaged in quite a few non-governmental organizations that worked on migration and women's rights. According to her, there were not enough training materials for teachers who had refugee pupils in the classroom. As we continued our interview, she lamented: "I tried to learn Arabic to be able to communicate with my Syrian students. I really wanted to but there is no sec-ular Arabic book, which is discouraging." She admitted that she had not learned Arabic, since it sounded like an Islamic language. For her, Arabic served as a metaphor for Islam and as a repre-sentation of the times before a secular and modern Turkish state. Bahar stated similarly: "Arabic is a language which is over-identified with Islam. We can't learn Arabic. For example, I immedi-ately perceive [Arabic] speakers, as if they were Islamists. I know it might be wrong but it is what it is." The language of Arabic and the Arabness of refugees have become categories of the racial-ization of the "Arab" as argued by De Genova regarding Muslim/Arab asylum seekers in Europe. He highlights how Muslim/Arab asylum seekers are assumed to be dangerously deficient in terms of "European values" and how they are presumed to be culturally alien, newly arrived and unas-similated (De Genova, 2018, p.1774). For instance, De Genova states that the migrants in Europe with brown/black bodies are perceived and treated as sexual predators, terrorists and thus as disposable lives (De Genova 2018). As discussed in the following sections regarding securitiza-tion, Syrian refugees in Turkey have also (even more recently) been stigmatized as "pervert" and as threats to public order, which is directly associated with "brown" bodies, in our case, with

Arabs. This becomes more salient in our interviews when it comes to the level of development and "progressive" cultural backgrounds.

In almost all subsequent interviews, these teachers talked about how Syrians were different from "us" and how "backward" their culture was. Our interlocutors identified themselves as social democratic and left-wing in terms of their political views and voting behaviors. Regardless of their political party preferences, both stated that their attitudes towards and relations with the Syrian students were bound by their ideas and prejudices against Arabness or the Arabic language. Even teachers who were zealous supporters of progressive politics in education, such as education in the mother tongue and intercultural approaches, did not distinguish between Islamism and Arab ethnic identity, which impaired their individual interactions with the Syrian students. This new form of exclusion indicates a new form of discrimination, which complicates a linear understanding of traditional racism. Stolcke (1995) distinguishes cultural fundamentalism from conventional racism by arguing how it legitimizes the exclusion of "foreigners and strangers". In this sense, Stolcke adds that "contemporary cultural fundamentalism is based on two conflated assumptions: that different cultures are incommensurable and that, because humans are inherently ethnocentric, relations between cultures are by 'nature' hostile" (1995, p.6). Following Stolcke's conceptualization, what the schoolteachers' statements show is that the cultural barrier between Syrian and Turkish culture bearers is insurmountable, which naturalizes cultural differences and hence exclusion of "others".

During our interviews in Sultangazi, we found one of the main reasons for exclusionist attitudes of the teachers against Syrian students to be their perception of the Arabic language as a set of religious symbols rather than a means of communication. Many teachers we spoke with stated that the rise of the Arabic language was a threat to secularism. They suspected that the increase in the religious migrant population would pave the way for the Turkish state to reinforce its Islamist policies and ideologies. They were worried that Turkish society might become more Islamist as a result of refugees from Syria, who were deemed to be more pious than Turks.

The meaning of Arabic and Arabness is thus formed discriminatorily through institutionalized discourses and is reproduced by Turkish teachers who have essentialized culture, language, and identity. The reproduction of Arab identity with all its complicated connotations forces us to rethink the construction and the perception of the "Orient" in Turkey, which, in this case, refers to the 'Arab'. Public school teachers assume that the Arab population in Turkey will create a more conservative society and that Syrians are representative of political Islam. This is particularly due to the Turkish government's initially sympathetic response to the Syrian migration. The presumption that immigrants are conservative seems to be indisputable among teachers and this certainty stems from the fear that the presence of the refugees will eventually nurture Islamism and become bearers of the current Turkish government's Islamist policies.

6. Constructing the "Orient": Syrians as the New Others

School teachers and administrators adhered to Said's portrayals of the Orient during our fieldwork. When our respondents compared Turkey with Arab countries, they positioned the latter as "stuck back in time" and their people as ignorant. This trope of "ignorance" as an essential characteristic of Arab society establishes a hierarchy between societies. While this hierarchy identifies the host "Turkish" society as progressive and "Western", it deems Arab society as the exact opposite, which is "backward". Here, "backward" implies that Arab society would never keep up with "our society" as often seen in the Orientalist accounts.

When our interlocutors made cultural comparisons between themselves and the Syrian refugees, one of the ways in which they verbalized Syrian culture was by claiming their "lack of modernity" through the portrayal of Arab women. Many feminist scholars found that power relations were deeply embedded in Orientalism and problematized gendered constructions of the Orient. For example, Kahf (1999, p.9) argues that the figure of the oppressed Muslim/Arab woman was an important dynamic which created the French and British Orientalisms in the nineteenth century: "In subjugating whole Muslim societies, [the French and the British] had a direct interest in viewing the Muslim woman as oppressed." In a similar vein, while comparing Syrian women to Turkish women, they stated that Syrian women were not emancipated. The teachers stressed Syrian women's unwillingness to be outside of the home or alone in public. Our interlocutors based their argument about the perceived non-modern positions of Syrian women on their clothing and their care about school meetings. For example, another public-school teacher we interviewed, a Turkish-Sunni teacher who identifies herself with liberal and secular ideologies, Özlem (35), had experienced communication problems with Syrian parents. Özlem stated that the refugee parents did not attend parent-teacher conferences at all, but then acknowledged that teachers were responsible for not trying harder to reach out to the parents of the refugee pupils: "I don't want to see women wearing *kara çarşaf* (chador)! They are oppressed and do not send their daughters to school. There are cultural differences between us; they are not liberated. When I see these women, I immediately think we are going backwards." Özlem construed Syrian parents as a threat to "Turkish women's liberation," as she referred to the chador as a symbol of "Islamist and therefore anti-modern" Syrian culture. Moreover, she added that Turkish society might transform into a conservative Arab society if Syrian refugees were not fully "integrated" into Turkish society. These statements indicate the teachers' association of theocracy with the presence of religious students at their school and that they project their own fear of Islamization in Turkey onto the refugees. As Stolcke underlines, "a cultural "other," the immigrant as foreigner, alien and as such a potential "enemy" who threatens "our" national-cum-cultural uniqueness and integrity, is constructed out of a trait which is shared by the "self." (1995, p.8). Similarly, the schoolteachers we interviewed segregate cultures in a manner that allows cultural differences to become substantial through their political meaning, which may lead to the migrants being threatening to the national community.

Another primary school teacher we interviewed in Sultangazi, Zeynep, a 38 year old Kurdish Alevi woman, said that she was taken aback with Syrians' domestic practices. Zeynep observed that the "Syrians" were quite different from the "Turks" with regards to family structure in terms of parent-child relations: "Their families are different from us, they live in ghetto-like places. Their girls are not like our girls. Their girls cannot go outside by themselves. The Republic of Turkey and Syria are culturally different. They're simply different from us." The school was a space of cultural encounters for Zeynep, and the formation of cultural difference functioned in gendered terms, as she held migrants responsible for not "mingling" in Turkish society. Despite the fact that there has been prevalent discrimination against immigrants and poverty among the refugees, Zeynep blames refugees for spatial differentiation or for failure to integrate their children into Turkish society. The reiteration of cultural differences by the teachers refers to the "unassimilable" aspect of migrants (De Genova 2018), more importantly it refers to the construction of the Orient (in this case more Oriental than the Kurdish Alevi teacher) similar to what De Genova calls the construction of "European whiteness" in the context of Europe's migrant crisis.

Like Zeynep's construction of "our" vs. "their", we have often come across dichotomies like "us" vs. "them" and "our students" (*bizim öğrenciler*) vs. "Syrian students." These dichotomies

generalize individual behavior to an entire society and essentialize all Syrians as members of a homogeneous society.

Said addresses similar generalizations about the Arabs in his analysis of the 'Western gaze' about the Arab mind and character (Said, 1978, p.412). He notes that to speak about the Arab mind, psychology, or society in general means to ignore the recent history of Arab countries and the fact that Arabs comprise millions of people who live in countries that are, in some cases, not only geographically (Ventura, 2017, p.284) but also culturally very distant from one another. Similarly, the main feature of the mindscape of teachers conceives essentialist ways of categorizing Syrians as "Arabs": a group that is confined into a rigid, monolithic category, which dismisses diversity and heterogeneity in the Arab Middle East. For instance, the teachers often talked about Syrians using a particular grammatical sentence structure. Through statements which begin with "The Syrians or Arabs are…," they implied that all Arab countries are the same and, by default, they share the same determined characteristics regardless of ideological, religious, and denominational differences among dozens of Arab societies. Teachers associated Syrianness (Can, 2019) with Islam and Arabness, excluding other ethno-religious communities such as Christian Arabs. The categorization of Arabness reveals an ironic fact among teachers. On the one hand, the kind of orientalist perspective above clearly indicates how non-Turkish teachers who are indeed in a "minority" position in Turkey are politically conscious of the violation of migrant rights and they do empathize with refugee experiences in urban spaces. On the other hand, the teachers who identify themselves as internal migrants and/or as oppressed citizens of Turkey legitimize their "distance" from Syrian refugees through cultural codes, including but not limited to ethnic difference and religiosity.

Another teacher, Cengiz (40), whom we interviewed at a TEC in Zeytinburnu, identified "becoming Arab" as a notion that is truly "disturbing". Cengiz expressed: "There is also an overwhelming fear among the secular teachers of Arabization. The level of education in the Middle East is very problematic. They cannot even help themselves. Wherever there are Arabs, there is trouble. Look at Taksim. Everybody talks about how they are fed up with these Arabs." Cengiz stated that the Arabs were uneducated, hence "ignorant" and if "we [the Turks]" started to look like them it would mean that Turkish society would become more Islamist, which would not be progressive nor would move forward.

Teachers like Cengiz felt concerned about the Arabization of the Turkish society and about how any "integration" may be achieved between mainstream society and the refugee groups. According to the teachers in Sultangazi, the fact that the Syrians preserved their cultural identities in Istanbul was an indicator of their unwillingness to adjust into urban "Turkish" culture. Emre, a 33-year-old teacher and a student counselor, provided a good indication of this concern. Emre had been appointed by UNESCO through the "Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System" (PICTES) project, a two-year-program which was run by the Turkish Ministry of National Education (MEB) from 3 October 2016 and financed by the European Union to integrate Syrian students into the Turkish education system and develop their proficiency in Turkish (Sülükçü and Savaş 2018, p.1). Emre identified himself as a Turk and a secular, social democrat. During our interview, he explained how he was worried about "Syrians" who failed to "integrate". He said, "Just look at Cebeci (a neighborhood in Sultangazi): it already looks like small Syria. They don't feel the need to adapt, I think. We are getting Arabized instead [he laughed in an angry tone]. Even our lifestyle is changing; *nargile* [hookah] cafés are everywhere now.

Emre's reproach was that immigrants were not willing to integrate into Turkish society; on the contrary, "they", the Turkish people, have changed their lifestyle to accommodate the newcomers. One of the ways of constructing the Arab image as the Oriental was by rendering cultural differences as essential and natural. The cultural difference that teachers often referred to seemed to be an attempt to justify their discrimination against refugee students. As De Genova carefully puts, this kind of discrimination is made available through the "sociopolitical production of racialized distinctions" and as an "integration" dilemma or an affront to national (or European) "culture", "values", or "civilization" (De Genova, 2018, p. 1778). Cultural comparisons did not only essentialize cultural practices but became the sole referents of the "distance" teachers embraced in their interactions with refugee students.

One such cultural realm of comparison is parent-child relations at home. Teachers spoke about Syrian students' aggressive attitudes towards other students, which they imagined to arise from their families' non-modern practices to discipline their children at home. Modernity is constructed as an intrinsic feature of the Turkish culture, which is identified as "Western" and in opposition to the "Oriental" Arab culture. This way the image of the "Other" is built through oppositions to the West, which represents the "self" and the hegemonic center. Here, the Syrian "Other" is marginalized, and the boundaries between the Syrian refugees and Turkish society are accepted as rigid and insurmountable (Ventura, 2017, p.285). Our interlocutors often stated that the level of violence that Syrian parents used was extreme and unacceptable in child education in modern Turkey. "The students don't even understand us or listen to us unless there is corporal punishment," said Gül, another teacher we interviewed in Sultangazi. When we inquired further about why teachers thought violence was common within Syrian families, they explained it in terms of violence being cultural, implying that Syrians were not modern. Another teacher in Sultangazi, Sema (28), agreed with Gül and added: "These are classroom methods that we used 30 years ago. At home, the guy beats his wife and children; there is domestic violence among Syrian families. Three or four families would be living together in the same apartment." Our participants held Syrian culture responsible for their educational methods and ignored migrant and refugee experiences. The teachers we interviewed found family structure and values essentially different from Turkish culture. As they orientalized the way Syrian families engaged with their own children, they excluded other factors such as stress and trauma and found culture to be the culprit for domestic violence.

Discussing the perception of Arabs in the Turkish media from the perspective of Said's Orientalism, Bora (2014) illustrated how symbolizing everything backwards, the "Arab" was seen as the main obstacle by Turks on their way to modernity and Westernization. Drawing from Bora (2014), the "Arab," who is embodied by the Syrian students in our case, represents laziness, violence and idleness in the eyes of the Turkish public-school teachers. As the notion of immigrant in Turkey became synonymous with "Arabness," and by association with Syrianness, the Orientalist construction of the "immigrant" as the Oriental Other prevailed in public and state discourses in Turkey. As Bigo (2002, p.72) rightfully points out, the immigrant is politically meaningful only in a discourse of "struggle against illegal immigrants," or in a discourse of "regulation," but, in either case, in a rhetoric of cultural nationalism which regulated citizenship by difference from the Other. The rhetoric of cultural nationalism extends beyond ethno-religious discrimination as observed in school encounters and introduces another aspect of Othering by reframing immigrants as security threats. In this sense, one of the striking findings in ethno-religious encounters is that "Orientalizing" Syrians is not only a product of mainstream Turkish nationalist teachers. Even the

teachers who identify themselves as Kurdish and/or Alevi do not see their "minority" position enough to be in solidarity with Syrian refugees. Although the type and the reasons of exclusion vary, they still find refugees distant from their own culture and expect "them" to integrate into society.

7. **The Securitization of Refugee Children**

Since the early stages of the Syrian conflict, the Turkish state has followed a flexible approach, avoiding the discourse of securitization of the refugee movements and announcing that its refugee policy was on humanitarian grounds. After the EU-Turkey deal in 2016, the government's migration policies shifted (İçduygu and Aksel 2013; 2015; Üstübici and Ergün 2020). The government adopted a security-oriented discourse, due particularly to its position on the establishment of an official, state-like Kurdish-majority presence in northern Syria, which the Turkish government perceived as a threat to its national security (Donelli 2018, p. 5). Ambiguities embedded in Turkey's migration policy and its policies towards the Syrian conflict complicated the relationship between the Syrian refugees and the local population. The Syrian migration became over politicized as it became a major tool for the political parties' election propaganda (for instance please see Yanaşmayan et.al 2019). This is most visible in the realm of education. Despite the debates that associate security discourses with Turkey's foreign policy and migration regime, the ways in which Syrian refugees have been securitized in domestic contexts have hitherto been glossed over. The Turkish government's inability to provide long-term solutions for effective "social cohesion" systematically left Syrian refugees outside of the political landscape in Turkey. Today, the integration of Syrian refugees does not include the need for "living together," but focuses on preventing Syrians from becoming threats to the security of "Turkish" society.

Toğral Koca (2016) argues that a security framework that emphasizes control and containment has been essential to the governance of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Although Syrians have been depicted by the Turkish government and, initially, by the public as "brothers/sisters in religion," and as "victims" who needed to be welcomed with a "humanitarian" outlook, refugees have increasingly been associated, in the public discourse, with crime, socio-economic problems, "cultural deprivation," and internal security (Toğral Koca, 2001, p.56). During our research, we observed that Turkish teachers and administrators not only perceived Syrian students as a "burden" and a threat to the Turkish labor market, but also imagined and framed them as a security problem for Turkey, particularly through assumptions over the future of Syrian children and their well-being in Turkey.

A month after our interviews in Sultangazi, we went to Zeytinburnu to meet another group of teachers for the second time. The profile of the participants this time was different from our previous participants, since the teachers in Zeytinburnu were mostly practicing Muslims and identified themselves as religious and pro-government. When we arrived, three teachers were already waiting for us in one of the offices, including an interlocutor who had worked in Zeytinburnu a few years previously before being reassigned to another municipality.

Admittedly, we went into the interview with the assumption that pro-government Islamist teachers would likely have better relations with the students and that their encounters would be relatively familiar in terms of ideological backgrounds. At first, the teachers mostly talked about the lack of support they had and about the problem of language, because Syrian students' command of Turkish was still suboptimal, a topic which we had anticipated would come up. However, as the conversation moved to teachers' relations with the students and the challenges of the future of refugee education in Turkey, we

discerned a new facet of Orientalism that had been evident in conversations about Syrian refugees in Turkey in multiple other contexts, that is, the depiction of the "Other" as a security threat unless "we" educate "them" for our own sake. As stated above, drawing on Stolcke's conceptualizations of "new racism" and "cultural fundamentalism", although some of the schoolteachers we interviewed find the cultural barrier to be an insurmountable aspect of refugee-local relations, some teachers, such as Nilay below, adheres to the notions of cultural hierarchy and a non-conventional racism, and she still puts an emphasis on "winning refugee students over" for the future of society.

A 40 year old, dedicated teacher, who identified herself as a practicing Muslim and taught Turkish to the Syrian children, Nilay openly stated that the migrant students who were currently in her class were not well-equipped in terms of academic requirements and that this may be a "problem" in the future. Nilay relayed: "There is no social cohesion in our country. I doubt that schools can help all these tensions go away. If there happens to be some sort of integration, I am sure it will take four to five generations. Regarding the current generation that we are dealing with, well, there will be huge problems, this is a lost generation."

During our fieldwork, we often heard teachers, such as Nilay and others, talk about the danger of a "lost generation" and possible strategies to "win them over," which mostly focused on how to prevent refugee children from becoming security threats in the public sphere. Teachers seemed genuinely worried about social cohesion due to their everyday experience with refugee children. Some common experiences in terms of difficulties in communication and language or academic performance urged them to take action, so they began working harder to have children practice Turkish and to convince them not to quit school. Several teachers in Sultangazi were very caring and diligent in their efforts to build a cohesive classroom environment, fight racism and work extra shifts with the refugee students. After conducting interviews and non-participant observation of their activities at school, however, we found that teachers' motivations in working with refugee students were also for their "own security." In a focus group interview, two assistant principals Selin (32) and Dilek (40) stated that their prejudice against Syrian students had been broken down once they had begun working with them, but that migrant education was still significant in being "for our own sake". Selin commented:

> My own prejudices were destroyed by the children here. There is a serious problem of stereotyping [of Syrians] here in our society. People think that they "feed" the refugees and that Syrians have more rights than regular Turkish citizens. Well, I think there should have been regulations before the state accepted so many of them, but now they are here and Syrians are everywhere. So we have got to think about education. We have got to educate them for ourselves.

Both teachers and school principals were concerned about the upcoming Syrian generations due to the lack of education and schooling opportunities for them. Educators lamented about the lack of management and effective solutions on the part of the government, yet refugees were accepted unconditionally. While the teachers insisted that access to education was essential for the integration of the refugees, they equated the lack of education with the threat of "danger" for Turkish society, as a result of which discriminative assumptions over the "ignorant Syrians" were reproduced. "We should educate them for ourselves" was what we heard from teachers from different ethno-religious backgrounds. During our second focus group interview, one of the Turkish language teachers, Yusuf, a 27 year old pious man, talked about his and his colleagues' individual efforts and the lack of state support by the relevant institutions:

Teaching Turkish as a second language is a brand new notion in Turkey. All the responsibilities and requirements regarding teaching Turkish are left to us. The Syrian children don't come to school. So many refugee children in the neighborhood are not enrolled. We visit them at home and enroll each one of them. Girls are married off, teenage boys have to work multiple jobs. These children don't go to school, and this is a big danger for Turkish society. They will be trouble in the future.

For educators, the education of Syrian children became a matter of security rather than a basic human right in the context of public schools.[12] During our fieldwork, many of our interlocutors stated, "*Başımıza bela olacaklar.* [They are going to be trouble for us.]" This phrase refers to the imagination of the Syrian youth becoming a palpable threat. Security must be understood as a "speech-act" (Williams, 2003, p.512); the formation of a "new refugee threat" should similarly be viewed and the school discourse should be analyzed as a "speech-act". Through securitizing speech by means of "speech-acts", or language games of insecurity, the threat is vocalized and embodied (Huysmans 2006, p.7). The securitization of Syrian children and their families reinforces new forms of hierarchies between Turkish and Syrian people through a discourse of "educating" the "backward society." It also disposes of the possibility of right-based approaches to migration.

Without a doubt, the anti-migrant discourse in Turkish schools and the public reaction to Syrian migration can be reduced to neither mere anti-Arab and Orientalist approaches nor sheer xenophobia. Our argument goes beyond the simplistic claim that our interlocutors always discriminated on the basis of purposeful ideological constructions and identities of their Syrian students. However, there are two main venues in which the educational context demonstrates discrimination in Turkish-Syrian encounters: first, the historical construction of the Arab subject as the one deprived of progress and civilization, and second, the stigma attached to the Syrian youth as violent and dangerous. The Arabness of Syrians is one example of the ready-made identities that fuel anti-migrant discourse and help build discriminatory practices around it. Therefore, Arab subjectivity and the historical understanding of Arab culture and the Orient, in our case the Arab Middle East, are at the heart of the alleged "incompetence" of the students in terms of both their behavior and academic success at school. Migrant students become threats in the classroom environment, which is an indicator of the difficulties of their "integration" into Turkish society. Failure to educate Syrian children presents itself as an essential threat to the shared spaces of the "citizens" of Turkey, risking turning "our country," Turkey, into Syria. The teachers who find Syrian refugee children a "threat" within the classroom seem to locate their difference in the realm of Orientalist perspectives such as lacking manners and being "backward". However, the teachers who particularly emphasize the need for education for the refugee children openly securitize the refugee "problem" and believe that Syrian children will harm society if they are left out of the classroom.

The behavior of Syrian children is construed as "violent" and teachers categorize these children as a dangerous group of students who threaten the school's safe and peaceful environment. All teachers, regardless of their ideological or ethnic backgrounds, agree on the "security" aspect of migrant student education. The "dangerous" children are seen as unpredictable, furious, and

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12 Since 2017, the discourse of "the lost generation" has become more visible through the debates revolving around schooling of Syrian refugee children and child labor. The securitization process itself is intertwined with national policies. For further information please see https://news.un.org/en/audio/2017/01/621912 (accessed 06/23/2022) and for a discussion paper on the making of a lost generation please see Dayıoğlu et.al 2021)

inclined to violence, as their culture and families dictate. Our interlocutors stated more than once that Turkish parents frequently complained about Syrian children's behavioral problems and that the teachers were caught in the middle of them as Turkish parents did not want their children to be in the same class as Syrian children. During our conversations with teachers in Zeytinburnu and Sultangazi, one of our interlocutors emphasized how "cultural" differences and Syrian teachers' educational methods created tensions. Yağmur, a 33 year old fifth grade teacher explained that the Syrian students' violent behavior had a lot to do with the absence of Syrian parents: "Syrian students are prone to violence. I have 35 Syrian students and only one student's parents show up [to parent-teacher conference]. We do not even meet students' parents. The kids fight all the time; they joke through violence. They even fight in the middle of the lecture." Our interlocutors essentialized cultural differences and violence by emphasizing how Syrian students cause disorder and were violent against their Turkish peers. The parents' negligence is not interpreted as a part of their struggle to make ends meet but as a cultural matter. The cultural assumption is an extension of cultural domination. The fear of migrants is not exclusive to the teachers, but is a part of the historically established hierarchy between the West and the East.

The identification and recognition of a "threat" depend on the perceptions of those with the capability to frame them as such. In this regard, public schools are the sites where the securitization process closes off alternative debates concerning the complex and variable character of both education and migration and instead poses to be the space for the reproduction of refugee children as the new Oriental Others. Thus, Orientalist discriminative stereotypes pervade through accounts of the school's capacity and educational policies, making it very difficult to reach an accurate judgement of the actual situation of Syrian refugees in Istanbul and the processes and inequalities they encounter.

8. Conclusion

Turkey's educational policies that fail to promote the encouragement of diverse and intercultural educational practices hinder social inclusion and integration both for migrant groups and for different ethno-religious communities in Turkey. In this study, we have demonstrated that although the unresolved structural problems of the Turkish education system, which disregards ethnic and cultural diversity, are part of the failure of refugee education in public schools, the systematic social discrimination of Syrians as well as Orientalist and securitization discourses embodied in teaching practices and curricula in Turkey play a larger role in preventing the inclusion of Syrian refugee students into public schools.

The education system in Turkey disallows a multi-cultural school context in which ethnoreligious diversity would be accepted and practiced. This has been exacerbated by anti-Syrian sentiments in various cities in Turkey. The Turkish education system homogenizes students by encouraging monolingualism, cultural nationalism, and Orientalism among the student body. Furthermore, the imposition of central decisions fails to ameliorate specific issues that teachers and schools face in public schools, especially in Istanbul (Çelik and İçduygu, 2018, p.6). We agree with the scholars of education and migration that educational policies which have focused on uniformity and centrality in Turkey fail to meet teacher and student needs in the context of migrant education and social cohesion in schools.

The gradual integration of Syrian students into public schools was a much-needed educational policy decision, however, the sudden transition compelled schools to go beyond their existing capacities and create their own methods to "manage" refugee children successfully. The current

system of public schools serves as an "imagined" homogenous community and, therefore, can potentially result in pushing Syrian children out of school (Çelik and İçduygu, 2018, p.11). It also reinforces negative stereotypes and eventually contributes to perpetuating what has been done for decades and probably centuries: blaming the victims for not integrating and for failing at school. Moreover, our research offers another lens to understand exclusion and inclusion mechanisms of refugees in Turkey by showing how Orientalist approaches in schools as a racialization process portray refugees as either potential criminals and therefore a menace to law and order (De Genova 2018) or as "Arabs" whose culture is fundamentally different from modern "Turkish" culture. What is striking in this ethnographic research is that even the teachers who come from underprivileged and "minoritized" communities participate in and re-produce orientalist perspectives towards Syrian refugees in Istanbul.

This research has examined the ways in which securitization constitutes the foreground for the education and social support of migrants, which begets a larger challenge in their inclusion. Seeing refugee children as a threat stems mainly from the fear that society might be converted into a more conservative and dangerous one in the absence of education –assimilation- of the refugees. Teachers essentialize the need for cultural assimilation and perceive Turkish culture and language as the only viable options for the safety of the host society and the accommodation of refugees. The teachers' own positioning of Syrian refugees as the Oriental others and the failure in offering permanent solutions on the part of the government leave refugee children vulnerable to further discrimination, exploitation and inequality. Instead, educators should be part of the educational policies and undertake the responsibility of accepting education as a basic human right. The ramifications of securitization of migration in Turkey are yet to be unfolded. The issue of Syrians' permanent settlement is still politically explosive, and the Turkish government has been hesitant to acknowledge publicly that it foresees the long-term integration of the refugees into Turkish society. Ultimately, Turkey needs to recognize the urgency of long-term solutions, removing geographical limitations in the 1951 UN Refugee (Geneva) Convention to bestow refugee status for Syrians and follow a right-based approach for both its citizens and its Middle Eastern refugees.

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Intergenerational Differences in Communication Processes with the Homeland: Turkish Immigrants Living in Australia

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ABSTRACT

The focus of this study is the first-generation Turkish immigrants who
went to Australia to work after the bilateral agreement signed between
Australia and Turkey in 1968 and their second and third generation
relatives. The objective is to reveal the communication processes of
different generations of Turkish immigrants living in Australia with Turkey
in terms of transnationalism. The research was designed as a holistic
single case study in accordance with the qualitative method. Accordingly,
triangulation was ensured by using data collection tools such as online
observation, semi-structured interviews and participant observation. The
field research was carried out in Sydney, Australia between September
2018 and January 2019. During the research, semi-structured interviews
were held with 30 participants who were reached by snowball sampling.
Of the 30 participants, 14 are from the first generation, 13 are from the
second generation and 3 are from the third generation. Findings show
that the means of communication and engagement with their homeland,
which have evolved significantly since the beginning of Turkish
immigration to Australia, directly affected the migrants' lives. Additionally,
it has been observed that transnational ties are strengthened by the
choice of communication tools that provide instant communication. It
was also revealed that the developing technology and historical
conditions had different effects on different generations of migrants.
Keywords: Intercultural communication, Migration, Transnationalism,
Australia, Multiculturalism

1. Introduction

The establishment of economic, political and socio-cultural ties between the country where immigrants live and their homeland is explained with the concept of transnationalism. It is known that the idea of transnational spaces considers the migratory system as a boundary-breaking process in which usually two or more nation-states are penetrated by and become a part of a singular new social space (Kivisto & Faist, 2009, p. 139). In this context, one of the most important auxiliary factors that enable the establishment of transnational ties or support the formation of transnational social spaces is communication. Identifying how the communication processes of migrants take place and how they change over time also helps to better understand the transnational ties established and the transnational spaces that are formed.

The purpose of this study is to reveal the communication processes of different generations of Turkish immigrants living in Australia with Turkey in terms of transnationalism. The study focuses on the first-generation immigrants who went to Australia to work after the bilateral agreement signed between Australia and Turkey in 1968 and their second and third generation relatives. The fieldwork was conducted in Sydney, Australia as a part of the research for the doctoral thesis called "Communication processes of Turks living in Australia in the context of transnationalism" and it was funded by The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) with the scholarship called "2214-A International Research Fellowship Program for PhD Students". The year 2018, when the field study was conducted, was celebrated as the 50th anniversary of the Turkish immigration to Australia. There is no doubt that there are great changes in communication in a migration process that has left behind half a century.

The expatriate psychology of living far away creates the need for immigrants to communicate with their homeland in order to overcome their longing and sense of belonging. In the case of Australia, distance emerges as a factor that complicates this situation. Technological advances gain importance in the daily lives of transnational migrants, especially in places such as Australia where distance can create serious communication problems. In the early years of labor migration to Australia, immigrants often turned to letters to establish interpersonal communication with their loved ones in their homeland. In the following years, even if the means of communication by telephone became easier, it took decades for the use of this type of communication to become economically widespread. When we look at the issue of getting news from the homeland, it is known that audio and video tapes have been the most common communication tools in the hands of immigrants for many years. Unlike in Europe, the distance and the large time difference have prevented tools such as radio and newspapers from being an effective source of information for immigrants in Australia.

Considering the years when television started to become widespread, it was said that "close is far, far is close" (Türkoğlu, 2015, p. 2). However, due to the time difference, the prevalence of satellite subscriptions has never been as much as the demand for videotapes. The whole process described regarding the use of communication tools has undergone a transformation with the widespread use of internet technology. With internet technology, humanity has now had the opportunity to interact one-on-one instead of seeing the distance closely.

With this perception, the question of what kind of identities Turkish immigrants in Australia produce is deeply related to both Turkey's relationship with these immigrants in the transnational area and the ground provided by Australia's multiculturalism policy (Şenay, 2010, p. 284). For this reason, it is necessary to examine the transnational spaces created by these immigrants in terms of social communication. Through this analysis, it can be possible to understand how the commu-

nication of immigrants with the homeland has transformed compared to the past decades and how this transformation has shaped their social identities.

2. Background

Looking at Turkey, we can say that in the rapid urbanization process that followed the international migration movements in the early years of the Turkish Republic, there was an intense rural to urban migration. Then, with the articulation of the urbanization process to the international labor market, an intense labor migration was observed (İçduygu et al., 2014, p. 173). This labor migration from Turkey abroad was primarily directed towards Western Europe, especially Germany. Since the period of this new mass migration movement is also a process in which industrialization accelerates and the effects of globalization are seen, the aforementioned labor migration has different characteristics than the previous ones (Şahin Kütük, 2017, p. 86). The mutual agreement of the states and the fact that the immigrants are mostly workers has affected the structure of this migration wave and the way the countries are affected by this movement.

As Mortan & Sarfati (2014, p. 33) explain, immigration from the Turkish-speaking world to Australia took place in five waves (Table 1).

Table 1. The migration waves from Turkey to Australia

Waves	Years	Explanation
First wave	1945-1974	The migration of the Turkish Cypriots
Second wave	1968-1975	The labor migration due to the bilateral agreement
Third wave	1969-1975	The migration of the Western Thrace Turks
Fourth wave	1980's-today	The brain drain due to developments in Australia's mining industry
Fifth wave	2000's-today	The economic migration by entrepreneurs from Turkey

The first of these started with the Turkish Cypriots in 1945 and continued until the 1974 Cyprus Operation. The second wave covers immigrants from Turkey as a result of the agreement signed between Turkey and Australia in 1968. The migration of the Western Thrace Turks, the third wave, started in 1969 under the *Australia-Greece Human Immigration Agreement*. The fourth wave of immigration is a brain drain due to developments in Australia's mining industry. The increasing importance of Australian coal mines around the world, as well as the intensive extraction of oil, especially oil, led to the need for expert petroleum and mining engineers in the 1980's. The fifth wave, on the other hand, still continues with the businesses and active economic relations established by entrepreneurs from Turkey after 2000. Only one of these five waves occurred under a formal agreement. The negotiations of this agreement began in 1965 and were signed in Canberra on 5 November 1967. After this agreement, there has been an intense demand from candidates who wanted to work in Australia. Upon this intense demand, it was thought that it would be healthier to establish Australia's own consulate in Turkey in order to carry out migration procedures more easily (Inglis, 2011, p. 50). Thus, the Australian Consulate General was opened in Ankara in a short time, and after a heavy workload, the first delegation set out to Australia six months later (Inglis, 2011, p. 55). From 1968 to 1975, a total of 22,558 people from Turkey settled in Australia, 14,192 of whom were within the scope of the special support program (Special Passage Assistance-SPAP) (Mortan & Sarfati, 2014, p. 32).

The fact that Australia paved the way for the spouses and children of people who wanted to immigrate caused married couples to choose Australia instead of Europe (Şenay, 2010, p. 266). It can be said that the most important reason for the preference here is the idea that immigrants

could return to Turkey after working as a family and earning more income. However, some of the immigrant candidates applied to go to Australia due to the difficulty of going to Germany compared to previous years and the very long waiting lists (Şenay, 2013, p. 41). An extremely ironic point to be noted here is that many people who came to Australia from Turkey following the 1967 agreement lacked the knowledge that they were taken to this new country as permanent migrants (Şenay, 2010, p. 266). So much so that, in the agreement signed in 1967, there was not a single article expressing the permanent aspect of the migration in question (İçduygu, 1994, p. 76). From the very beginning, Turkey wanted this to be a temporary migration, objected to the use of expressions such as «immigration» and «settlement» in the title of the agreement during the negotiations, and demanded that the terms «residence» and «employment» be used instead (Şenay, 2010, p. 267). This reluctance can be explained by the main concern in Turkish politics that if people moved to Australia as immigrants, they would not be able to provide foreign currency to Turkey. Those who left expected to return to Turkey as qualified manpower and foreign capital after two years.

Therefore, even when the immigrants completed all their paperwork and set foot in Australia, there had been no indication to let them know that they were actually immigrating permanently. Since the agreement in question imposed a two-year working obligation, the immigrants also thought that they would return after the two-year mandatory serving time (Mortan & Sarfati, 2014, p. 35).

The initial desire of immigrants to be guest workers kept the idea of return in their minds for a long time and, unlike the immigrants in Europe, and the restriction of communication by long distance further strengthened this idea (Mütercimler, 1998, p. 43). According to İçduygu (1994, p. 77), only 18 percent of the Turks who went to Australia between 1968 and 1974 thought to stay in Australia, while by 1987, more than half of them decided to stay. While there were reasons, such as owning real estate and adapting their children to Australia, the benefits of the Australian government in terms of social rights were also important in the increase of the number of people who had considered staying in Australia. As an indicator of immigration policies that support persistence, the Australian government offered citizenship to all children of immigrants, not just those born in Australia (Inglis, 2015, p. 53). The recognition of dual citizenship by both Australia and Turkey has enabled immigrants to become Australian citizens without endangering their Turkish citizenship. Seeing that they were staying permanently, Turks started to take root by investing in real estate and encouraging their children to have a better education instead of putting them into business life as soon as possible, and they have also accepted to acquire Australian citizenship (Inglis et al., 2009, p. 110).

The biggest commonality between Turkish migration to Australia and Germany is that migration movements to both countries started through bilateral agreements. The main difference, as mentioned before, is that most countries in Western Europe, especially Germany, consider immigrants from Turkey as temporary immigrants, whereas Australia was in search of permanent immigrants from the very beginning of the process. This situation has brought about differences in many aspects in the practices towards immigrants.

The most important difference of the Turks who migrated to Australia from those who migrated to Europe is that they benefited from rights such as citizenship and voting after the legal period, since they were accepted as immigrants, and many legal and social problems were solved more easily (Mütercimler, 1998, p. p. 28). In Germany, a special legal status was introduced against foreign workers, which restricts family reunification, limits the labor market and social righ-

ts (Castles and Miller, 2008, p. 291). For this reason, while Germany continued to insist on citizenship based on blood ties and refused to recognize dual citizenship status, Australia gave the right to dual citizenship to those who came from the first immigrant convoy that set foot in Sydney in 1968 (Mortan and Sarfati, 2014, p. 37). At this point, it is seen that the policies of the two countries are quite different from each other.

3. Methodology

This research is designed as a holistic single case study due to its nature. Therefore, it is suitable for a qualitative paradigm. In these kinds of studies, cases are more or less already "out there" and discoverable; as theoretical constructs, cases serve the research interests of the investigator (Schwandt & Gates, 2014, p. 601).

The research in Australia took place from 17 September 2018 to 11 January 2019. With the help of institutions such as Turkish associations and consulates, documents were scanned, observations and semi-structured interviews were made by visiting the areas where Turks live. The data collected at all stages in the research data collection process were tried to be consistent with each other in terms of providing triangulation. Observations, interviews, researcher diaries and observation reports were created and recorded. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 people within the scope of the research (Table 2.). The participants consist of the first-generation immigrants, their children and grandchildren who migrated to Australia between 1968 and 1975 through the previously mentioned special support program (SPAP) and continue to live in Australia today. Accordingly, 14 of the participants are from the first generation, 13 from the second generation and 3 from the third generation. Two of the first generation participants are accepted as a 1,5 generation since they migrated with their family in their adolescent years. Of the 30 people interviewed, 19 were women and 11 were men. During the interviews, 25 participants preferred to speak in Turkish and 5 participants in English.

Table 2. Participants

#	Name	Generation	Age	Occupation	Education Level	Preferred Language
1	Kâmil	1	78	Retired	Primary school	Turkish
2	Kadriye	1	65	Retired	Middle school	Turkish
3	Şevvâl	1,5	62	Housewife	Middle school	Turkish
4	Besim	1	72	Retired	Middle school	Turkish
5	Semra	1	65	Retired	High school	Turkish
6	Adalet	1,5	65	Retired	University	Turkish
7	Ercüment	1	55	Job hunting	University	Turkish
8	Fikret	1	64	Shop owner	High school	Turkish
9	Gülnaz	1	66	Retired	High school	Turkish
10	Feriha	2	58	Housewife	High school	Turkish
11	Saliha	1	62	Retired	High school	Turkish
12	Yeliz	2	34	Job hunting	University	Turkish
13	Şenol	2	48	Café owner	University	Turkish
14	Hayrullah	1	67	Retired	Middle school	Turkish
15	Raziye	1	66	Retired	Middle school	Turkish
16	Kemal	1,5	52	Private sector employee	High school	Turkish
17	Alpay	3	23	Private sector employee	University	English
18	Özge	2	40	Private sector employee	University	English
19	Didem	2	50	Private sector employee	High school	Turkish
20	Gülbin	2	48	Housewife	High school	Turkish

21	Sinem	3	25	Private sector employee	University	English
22	Gül	2	44	Private sector employee	High school	Turkish
23	Meltem	2	40	Civil servant	University	English
24	Gülten	1	70	Retired	Middle school	Turkish
25	Berrin	1	69	Retired	High school	Turkish
26	Emir	3	23	Student	University	English
27	Cevdet	1	75	Retired	Middle school	Turkish
28	Fatma	2	49	Private sector employee	High school	Turkish
29	Kadir	1	50	Private sector employee	University	Turkish
30	Melek	2	51	Civil servant	High school	Turkish

The collected data were analyzed with a narrative analysis approach. In this type of analysis, the research product is a story—a case, a biography, a life history, an autobiography, an autoethnography—that is composed by the researcher to represent the events, characters, and issues (Bochner & Riggs, 2014, p. 204). During the analysis process, the opinions of more than one field expert were obtained and triangulation was provided, as stated before. Written transcripts of the interviews were analyzed using NVivo 12. The method suggested by Bryman (2012, p. 597) was followed in the coding stage of the data. Accordingly, the transcripts of the interviews were read through, the codes that could be relevant were planned, and finally, by going back to the interview transcripts, each interview was coded on NVivo.

As a result of the analysis of the interviews, 27 codes emerged under five main themes (Table 3).

Table 3. Distribution of the codes

Migrating to Australia	Life in Australia	Means of Communication	Socio-cultural dimensions	Political dimensions
Adaptation period	Perception of migration	TV	Masculinity	Political view
	Living conditions	Newspaper	Family	Legal rights
	Discrimination	Radio	Belonging	National values
	Distance problem	Internet	Language	Voting
	Returning to Turkey permanently	Cinema	Interacting with other Turks	Australia's current state
	Australia-Turkey comparison	Book		Turkey's current state
	Longing for Turkey	Telephone		
	Traveling to Turkey			

These themes are: migrating to Australia, life in Australia, means of communication, socio-cultural dimensions and political dimensions.

4. Findings
4.1. Migrating to Australia

The aspects in which Australia differs from other European countries in terms of immigrants have been mentioned before. In order to better understand how conscious immigrants are of these differences and the reasons for choosing Australia for their decision to migrate, it was necessary to learn about their migration stories before talking about their life in Australia.

One of the most striking points about the arrival stories of the participants, who are especially first-generation immigrants, is that they did not think about Australia in detail while making the decision to migrate. In applications made with the idea of going abroad, it is seen that Australia was recommended to the participants by public employees or by their relatives who had gone to Australia before. In fact, most of the first-generation participants stated that they actually made

applications to go to Germany at first. However, as mentioned previously, the fact that Australia accepts immigrants as a family stands out in terms of being preferred. Feriha, one of the first generation participants, touched upon this situation while talking about the departure process of her family: "*My father applied to the employment agency to go to Germany. The officer there said, 'If you are married and have children, I will send you to Australia.' I guess it was our fortune to come here.*" Some expressed their uneasiness about distance and going to a country they have never known. However, they mostly emphasized that migration was inevitable due to their conditions of living. After all, it is a common belief that the intention of a person who leaves their home to work is not to embark on an unknown adventure, and that they make such a choice in order to leave their struggle behind. Therefore, the decision to migrate can be a step taken with hope for a better future, or it can be seen as a reluctant separation. Raziye (1,5 generation) talked about her hopes of starting a new life for the future of her children and said, "*I did not come here willingly. Because it is a country that is far away and we did not know anything about. We thought about it a lot, but we were enthusiastic in the end. Because the conditions in Turkey were not good. We came here for a better future.*" Also, Adalet's (1,5 generation) accounts show the reflections of the two-year rule of not returning to Turkey: "*We had such a different life there (Turkey)... I'm talking about 45-46 years ago from now. I didn't put my hand in cold water from hot water there, I was a student. We had come here for two years. With the plan of working hard and going back...*"

As it is understood from the stories, Turks who could not go to Germany or another European country as workers saw Australia as an alternative to those countries. It has been understood that most of them had in mind to return after two years of working and improving their economic conditions. None of the participants stated that they had researched Australia and consciously wanted to live there for the rest of their lives. This situation confirms the difference in attitude between the two countries in the bilateral agreement.

4.2. Life in Australia

For those who want to go abroad as a worker and return after a while, saving as much money as possible in a short time is the first priority. This is also observed in the participants who went to Australia. Raziye, one of the first generation participants, said, "*My husband worked at night and I worked during the day. We saved money for a car and house. We felt a longing for our homeland and family for 6-7 years. Now I won't leave, even if they shoo me away. It's been nearly fifty years.*" Another first generation participant, Hayrullah, talked about the opportunities offered by the state while evaluating the living conditions he is in today: "*In Turkey, when you work hard all your life, the pension you receive will barely make a living. Now, even if you retire here, they don't let you struggle. You're not desperate for anything. For example, you go to the doctor, you do not pay.*" It was also seen from the researcher's point of view that what Hayrullah said was compatible with his lifestyle. In the researcher's diary, the entry on the visit to the Hayrullah's house dated October 8, 2018, said, "*Their living conditions are very good. They live in an Australian style house with a garden which they bought 35 years ago. The house is decorated in Turkish style with the TV in the main corner. Photographs of children are lined up.*"

Since the primary purpose of the first-generation immigrants coming to Australia is to work, it is not hard to predict that they come by accepting their immigration status in some way. However, for the second generation, even the third-generation, who went to Australia at a young age or was born there, it seems that there may be a more mixed perception of immigration than the first

generation. Therefore, second and third generation participants were asked about their first memories of immigration were rather than the immigration story. Accordingly, most of the participants stated that the perception of immigration is formed in the primary school age. Özge, (second generation) established a connection between the perception of migration and the spoken language: "*Since my parents always spoke Turkish to me, there was never a question for me whether you were Turkish or Australian. I guess I was not aware of the nationality distinction until I was 8-9 years old*." Didem, one of the second generation participants, said, "*In school, for example, they can tell when your name is foreign. They used to say 'You're a wog' and used to make fun of my name, but such things did not upset me much.*" According to these statements, both the feeling of not belonging to society and the feeling of being excluded as a stranger first occur in the school environment. In this context, if the school environment provides a cultural environment close to home, it can be said that the difficulties in adaptation decrease much more quickly. Looking at the third generation in addition to the second-generation examples above, it is seen that upbringing causes a difference between generations. Alpay (third generation) clearly explained the situation of not feeling like an immigrant:

> Honestly, I've never had an adjustment problem because I was born here. I was good at school; my English was good. My mother put a lot of effort into this. Actually, I didn't feel very Turkish until I was 6-7 years old. I was going to a regular public school. One day we were told that there would be a class about religion. I didn't even know there were separate religions. Since most of my friends were Croatian or Bosnian, I went to the Catholic class with them.

From what Alpay tells, it is seen that cultural conflicts can be postponed when there are no language and communication problems.

One of the most important problems faced by immigrants is discrimination. Feriha, one of the first generation participants, said, "*It may seem like there is a boring life in Australia, but we are living peacefully. Nobody interferes with your race or religion.*" She clearly expressed her views about not witnessing discrimination, especially in Sydney. Meltem, a second generation participant, confirms the statements above: "*When we first came, no one with different ethnic origins lived on our street other than us. Sometimes we would hear things like, 'Go back to your country.' Over time, Macedonian, Yugoslavian and even Asian families began to move in. As the cultural diversity increased, we became much more comfortable.*" Here, it is seen that the multicultural structure of Australia is also given importance by the immigrants. Although it is possible to say that people's peace of mind increases as cultural diversity increases, this situation does not provide data that can claim that there is no discrimination.

The most important difference of Australia from the other country that hosts labor migration is its distance from Turkey. This problem has caused many negativities in transportation, communication and economic issues since the beginning of migration. In addition to these, one of the most important negativities is the psychological effects caused by being far. While the participants were talking about many different topics the distance problem always came up when they were sharing their feelings. One of the most expressed things about the distance problem is being away from family. Kadriye (first generation), shared the pain of her experience by crying saying, "*When I heard that my mother had cancer, I thought that I wouldn't be able to make it in time. They would have buried her until I spend so much money on tickets and go all that way so I didn't go.*" Berrin (first generation) also experienced a very similar situation. She said, "*When my father passed away, I couldn't attend his funeral. When my mother died, this time I didn't go because I realized that I wouldn't be able to attend anyway. I thought that would upset me even more.*"

Regarding longing for one's homeland, the entry in the researcher's diary dated October 26, 2018, states, "*There is a such thing called 'bringing Turkish air'. I experience this a lot. People tend to get very happy when I tell them that I came from Turkey recently.*"

4.3. Means of communication

After the bilateral agreement, 53 years have passed since the first immigration to Australia. In these 53 years, there have been rapid developments in communication technologies and these developments have directly affected people's lifestyles. Especially for those living in a country like Australia, which is at the other end of the world compared to Turkey, it can be thought that every development has the potential to bring them closer to their country.

The interviewed participants also stated that the developing technology helps them to keep up with life in Turkey better than before. Regarding this topic, Adalet (first generation) established a direct link between developing technologies and longing for homeland by saying, "*We have the chance to follow the news every day... We didn't have such a chance in the past. The advancement of technology has been very good in this respect. Maybe that's why we don't miss Turkey as much.*" Kemal (1,5 generation), on the other hand, summarized the impact of developing technology on their lives: "*Our Turkish television is always connected. Turkish TV did not exist here before. When we first came here, there were videotapes. At that time, for example, you would go to a Turkish grocery store and they had Turkish movies to rent. Everyone used to gather in somebody's house to watch old Turkish movies.*"

Due to the fact that Australia is seven hours ahead of Turkey, participants with broadcast subscriptions are forced to watch only daytime television. On the other hand, people who do not experience problems such as time differences or subscription fees seem to watch Turkish television over the internet.

Şevval (1,5 generation) said, "*I don't watch TV much. It's mostly from the internet. I turn on the computer in my room and stretch my legs.*" Melek, also a second-generation participant, contributed to this view by saying, "*I watch TV series and other programs that I am interested in whenever I want. The internet is enough for me.*" Thus, it is possible to say that the problem of accessing television has disappeared with the development of technology. It has been observed that the younger second generation and third generation participants are more distant to Turkish television. Özge (second generation) explains:

> I don't like watching Turkish television. I find it very simple. We have live broadcast at home. Whenever I am at home, there are programs for housewives because of the time difference. Gossip programs or programs to find missing people... I don't care about them because I don't understand the culture. What interests me are the travel channels, programs showing different parts of Turkey. I can't say that I follow the news in Turkey either because I don't know how accurate the news is. The (Turkish) media is mostly right slanted. I don't think there is a balance. I also get lost in the details on the ones that slope to the left.

From this explanation, it can be understood that she has a conscious choice of keeping a distance from Turkish media.

From the first years when Turks went to Australia, the newspaper has been one of the communication tools that have transformed with the developing technology. It is known that it was difficult for newspapers to go to Australia in the years when the internet was not yet widespread. Over the years, it has been seen that Turks started to print their own newspapers. It can be said that local Turkish newspapers, which are usually published weekly, and national newspapers from

Turkey have lost their popularity with the spread of the internet. It has been observed that there are more participants who no longer find it logical to follow the weekly newspapers.

When asked about newspapers, most of the respondents mentioned the internet. However, just like television, it was observed that Turkish newspapers were not preferred among young second-generation and third-generation participants. Özge (second generation) said, "*It is very difficult for me to read Turkish. I can understand Turkish very well, but I cannot speak it like them. That's why I prefer to read the Guardian rather than something like Hürriyet. Also, I am more interested in what is going on in America or Europe than in Turkey.*"

It would not be wrong to say that in the pre-internet era, the radio was a means of communication through which Turks living in Australia could receive the most up-to-date news from their homeland. All of the interviewees who commented on the radio are first-generation participants. Feyyaz (first generation), on the other hand, expressed his reaction to the fact that Turkish radio is not preferred by Turks living in Australia. "*Look, our radio has been reduced from seven days to four days. In the future, maybe it's going to decrease to three or even two!*"

Undoubtedly, the wide use of the Internet for people living away from their own countries has led to changes in many issues. It has been seen that the internet has come to the fore in various issues mentioned so far. Among the interviewees, all but one of the first-generation participants stated that they use the internet. When the topic of the Internet was brought up, most of the participants talked about how much it made their lives easier. Adalet (1,5 generation) stated that she communicates with Turkey much easier than before by explaining, "*We used to try to talk on the phone and it was very difficult. Now, my internet gives me the chance to talk on a regular phone for 250 minutes a month. Besides that, I have WhatsApp. It's very comfortable.*"

Participants especially emphasized the importance of social media to them. When talking about social media, Feriha (second generation) said the following: "*In the past, when we went to Turkey, we used to see the people had changed. Now, at least we can see photos from time to time. I remember in the past, we used to pay 20-30 dollars to talk for five minutes. It's not like that anymore. We have all kinds of communication like WhatsApp and (Facebook) Messenger.*"

Some of the participants emphasized that the internet not only facilitates communication with their relatives, but also makes them feel closer to their country. While Saliha (first generation) describes this situation, she said, "*After the video chat, you feel like you went there.*" Fatma (second generation), on the other hand, said, "*You don't feel distant when you know what's happening.*"

4.4. Socio-cultural dimensions

When talking about social life, one of the most recurring statements of the interviewees was about families. A family is a group of people closest to a person. Family ties can have effects that can determine or restrain the goals in people's lives. In this research, while the participants talked about their life in Australia, their future plans or what they could not achieve, the idea was always shaped around the family. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that one of the most important factors triggering the immigration status of immigrants or the feeling of being abroad is family ties.

While discussing the participants' arrival to Australia, it was noticed that women had almost no say in the decision to migrate. This is a situation that manifests itself in the stories of both female and male participants. This situation coincides with the views of Castles and Miller (2008, p. 38) that women are expected to obey men in making immigration decisions. In the findings

obtained in this study, it was understood that men make important decisions about their families by themselves and women only implement the decisions taken.

Another prominent matter is belonging. It is known that belonging is one of the important concepts in the subject of transnationality. In this study, it was observed that the majority of the participants felt that they belonged to Australia. However, in this sense of belonging, the number of those who emphasize being caught between two cultures is significantly high. Explaining the in-betweenness as a second-generation participant, Didem (second generation) said, "*Everything is difficult for the second-generations like us because we are stuck in the middle. I don't feel like an Australian here at all. I am Turkish, but when it comes to where I want to live, this is my home. But I can't give up my Turkishness.*" We see that the situation described as "being stuck in-between" mentioned here is generally the common discourse of the older second-generation participants. It can be said that this is due to the fact that they do not see themselves as fully Australian and on the other hand, they cannot connect with Turkey as well as their parents. Regarding this, Kaya (2007, p. 494) suggests defining this situation as hybrid cultures, rather than as «being stuck in between». It was seen that the in-betweenness of the younger second-generation and the third-generation is slightly different. For this, it would not be wrong to define being stuck as being a little more Australian.

The biggest obstacle to be overcome in order not to experience communication problems in the lives of immigrants is undoubtedly language skills. It was seen that most of the first-generation participants were sensitive to their children and grandchildren about speaking Turkish, but they are not happy with the results. Second-generation participants are more understanding and flexible about language than first-generation participants. This can be explained by the fact that they speak less Turkish than the first-generation. It is also clear that language skills create a generation gap between the first and third generations. The fact that many first-generation participants have similar complaints supports this situation. Didem (second generation) accepted the language problem between generations and said, "*I think they will lose their Turkishness a little in each generation. We speak English most of the time with my husband so the children don't get to learn Turkish either. But it wasn't like that in our time. Our mothers always spoke Turkish, we had no other choice.*"

4.5. Political dimensions

During the interviews, it was observed that the participants often needed to express their thoughts about Turkey. Although these thoughts generally manifest themselves in the form of homesickness, they also include the participants' thoughts on Turkey's agenda. Similarly, participants' views on Australia were also included. From what has been mentioned so far, it can be said that the participants are integrated into living in Australia, do not experience discrimination and have a generally positive view of their life in Australia. To clarify this situation, interviewees were asked what they thought about the current situation in Australia. Melek (second generation) said, "*I am at peace here. There is no favoring here, you manage things with your own effort. You lead a quality life as a human being. You can trust that the state and you are not afraid of being unemployed,*" underlining her reasons for being peaceful in Australia.

The opinions of the participants about Turkey, who live in a geography far from Turkey, are important in terms of understanding how they perceive their homeland and whether their thoughts are affected by the forms of communication they establish. Contrary to the mostly positive opinions about Australia, it was noteworthy that the participants' opinions about Turkey's current

situation were extremely negative. The economic situation of Turkey is one of the main issues addressed by the participants who have negative thoughts about the situation in Turkey.

It is seen that the third-generation participants evaluate Turkey as foreigners and with a much more objective view. Alpay (third generation) explains how he sees Turkey from an outside perspective by saying, «*I am a third-party observer. I see and read from an impartial point of view, but what I understand here is very sad. I am proud to be Turkish, but Turkey›s current situation embarrasses me.*" We can see that third-generation participants also have a negative point of view.

During the interviews, it was observed that the participants made comments on national values while talking about many subjects. It is noteworthy that the expressions of "being Turkish" and "protecting Turkishness" are frequently included in the discourses of the participants. Although they do not explain what these expressions mean in more detail, it is possible to deduce from the observations that these expressions mean to keep the Turkish culture alive in Australia and to live as Turkish as possible. As an example of the aforementioned statements, Feriha (second generation) said, "*My husband is from Turkey. I didn't bring him, but he had come just before we got married. We have two sons, they were born and raised here. My eldest son is very Turkish, he is a Kemalist. He always has the flag in his hand. The little one doesn't care much but he also preserves his Turkishness*." It is worth pointing out that Turkishness was used here as something measurable.

It is known that the political views of the Turks living in Australia differ from the Turks living in other countries, and they even show a polarization much more similar to that in Turkey. Depending on the course of the interviews, the participants were also asked for their political views if they talked about political issues. Talking about this issue was continued only with those who wanted to respond. When the answers given by the participants are compared with the results of the 24 June 2018 Presidential and 27th Term Parliamentary Elections, it is seen that they are compatible with the results of the polls in Sydney, where the research was conducted. In addition, Şenay's (2013, p. 57) study confirms that the Turks living in Sydney are polarized within themselves politically. Most of the participants especially first and older second-generations defined themselves as Kemalists who follow Ataturk›s ideas. Some of the participants had reservations about pronouncing a party›s name, even though they were not asked.

Among the participants, there are also those who support the AKP. Gülbin (second generation) talked about her voting habits instead of her political views: "*Actually, Turkey is similar to most countries like Russia, China, even America. There are countries that are in a worse situation than us and I think Turkey is doing very well. I vote for Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan is a very successful man. For example, his attitude towards Russia... I also like his morals.*"

It would not be wrong to associate the aforementioned polarization with the participants' media consumption habits. During the interviews, it was observed that each participant's interpretation of their political view was coherent with the political tendency of the media organs they declared they followed. In the entry dated September 28, 2018 in the researcher's diary exemplifies the atmosphere of polarization: "*The gentleman who runs the Turkish market tried to understand my political view through the Turkish newspapers I was holding. He pulled back a little when I commented neutrally. I realized that he felt more and more comfortable as we spoke*." It would not be wrong to state that the prominence of the political polarization affected the relations that were tried to be established with immigrants during the research.

5. Conclusion

In the fifty-year period of immigration to Australia, there have been two major turning points in the communication processes of immigrants with the homeland. The first of these is the possibility of accessing current news and simultaneous television broadcasts that come with internet and satellite technology. It would not be wrong to say that this coincided with the beginning of the 2000s. Since the 2000s, immigrants living in Australia have had easier access to television broadcasts, and their dependence on video tapes has begun to decline. The second turning point was the spread of social networks. With social networks, immigrants have turned into participants instead of being remote viewers. With this process, the obligation to follow the news and developments in their homeland or their relatives from afar disappeared. In other words, it is now possible to bring what is far closer. It is seen that social networks are widely used not only for younger generations but also for first generation participants. A remarkable detail here is that the most preferred communication tools are social networking tools that allow instant communication. This shows that immigrants give importance not only to easy communication but also to be able to communicate with their homeland whenever they want. Thanks to the means of communication, a resemblance of the homeland can be created symbolically, even if it is far away, but this is not considered a real reflection (Şanlıer Yüksel, 2008, p. 206). Satellite television subscriptions and reading local Turkish newspapers and the periodic screening of films made in Turkey also support this symbolic creation. The fact that this creation is not a real reflection is due to the fact that no alternative can overtake instant communication tools.

An important point that the participants emphasize is that they see themselves as more distant than other immigrants. It can be said that the phrase "bringing Turkish air" is related to this. For them, reaching their homeland "at the other end of the world" is seen as a major obstacle to be overcome in itself. For this reason, someone who has just come from Turkey gives them happiness. In this respect, it is possible to say that developing technology creates a similar happiness for them. Being able to reduce distances also means establishing stronger transnational ties. The easier they communicate, the more engaged they get about their homeland. This engagement thereby determines their voting decisions in Turkey, financial investments about Turkey and frequency of visits to Turkey. This situation also explains the fact that immigrants are in a race for gaining information about Turkey. Having information about the current affairs literally represents the level of Turkishness in their minds. This shows us the connection of communication processes with identity formation.

Another important distinction of the generations is second and third generation being less engaged with the Turkish media. It is clearly seen that the first generation participants see themselves as torn off or exiled from their homeland and always experience a longing for Turkey, while second and third generation participants are clearly integrated to their life in Australia and returning to Turkey is not a possibility on their agenda.

When we look at how immigrants define their own identities, it is seen that the belonging they feel towards Australia does not affect their commitment to their own culture. Participants show a similar approach to definitions such as "being Turkish" and "Turkishness". On the other hand, it is said that transnational media dulls the feelings of nostalgia for transnational immigrants' countries. Karanfil (2009, p. 898) argues that this situation also brings alternative approaches to the idea of being Turkish. Because, according to them, being Turkish is a more appropriate definition for their real daily life in Australia, but it does not overlap with being Turkish within the borders of Turkey. Therefore, communication processes lead to a new definition of identity.

In today's Australia, taking on a singular, monolithic cultural identity, called "Turkish" or "Australian" or even "Turkish-Australian" are not in question (Hopkins, 2009, p. 244). Furthermore, it can be said that Turks living in Australia do not need religious references when defining their own identity. Although the existence of a patriarchal structure has been observed, it is not possible to say a similar situation for the younger generation, especially in terms of this study. However, factors such as the design of the immigration scheme in Australia as being permanent, the effects of geographical distance, and the multicultural structure may explain the differences in the findings from the examples in Europe.

Perhaps, the words of Özge, one of the second generation participants, express this situation perfectly: "*If they asked me, 'Who is an Australian?' I'd probably say, 'Someone like me.' Like, a second generation, someone whose parents weren't born here.*" A comment very similar to the one here was made by a Lebanese participant in Koleth's (2015) research: "*I was born here, but I obviously don't look like I was born here. And it's really stupid, because how many years does Australia have to have had a multicultural community for them to stop asking that question 'Where are you from?' . . .? We need to accept that we're Australian and move on.*" (Koleth, 2015, p. 250)

This can also be seen as a result of Australia's multicultural policies. The terms "multicultural Australia" or "Australian multiculturalism" have long been the focus of debate (Jakubowicz, 2015, p. 222). Despite this, it is known that Australians have an embracing attitude towards multiculturalism. So much so that instead of seeing multiculturalism as the unity of groups, they see it as a mixture of different individuals and accept this as the identity of the country (Modood, 2013, p. 162). The attitudes of the participants in this study also support this idea.

It was observed that the communication processes of the participants with their homeland also reinforced their political views. It is known from previous studies (Şenay, 2013) and election results that the Turks living in Sydney tend to a more leftwing "Kemalist" political view compared to migrants living in other cities of Australia. Similar density can be seen in the distribution of the participants of this study. It is noteworthy that during the talks about Turkey, the conversation is shaped around today's politics. Particularly, the level of preoccupation with the developments in their homeland of the participants, who have integrated into the life in Australia, who consider themselves permanent in Australia, and who state that they do not experience any problem of belonging, is surprising.

It is possible to say that the indicators of transnationality are gradually decreasing with the younger generation. While the ties and communication efforts of the first generation with the homeland are stronger, this situation decreases as the generations get younger. The first generation participants are more engaged with Turkish media, they are eager to follow the current affairs regularly. Another important result about this topic is that the participants who own property or have financial investments in Turkey are also the older participants. These participants either have received retirement benefits from Turkey or are planning to receive them. We can comment that the younger generation participants do not have any financial interest about Turkey. Their family ties are also not as strong as the older generations. The older generations prioritize family on their visits to Turkey while the younger generations occasionally visit Turkey only for vacations.

The point that needs to be emphasized in this regard is that when it comes to the definition of generations, it is not possible to make a clear distinction as first, second and third generations. In this respect, it is necessary to take a closer look at the second-generation immigrants. As seen in

the findings, it is possible to talk about the existence of two different groups among the second-generation participants. This distinction was made in the findings as "older" and "younger" second generation groups. To define these two groups, it can be said that the older second-generation participants are those who migrated to Australia at a very young age with their first-generation parents, or those who were born in Australia in the first years of migration and were over the age of 40. The younger second generation can be defined as individuals who are in their 40s or younger and are mostly born in Australia, often the youngest children in their families. Markus (2017, p. 110) mentions that there have been significant improvements in the socio-economic status of Turkish society as the second generation who were born in Australia started to mix with daily life since the 1980s. This confirms the existence of two groups related to the second generation. The main difference between these two groups is that the younger second generation has similar characteristics with the third generation. It has been observed that the older second generation defines themselves as «stuck in-between» more than other generations. Similarly, Vasta (2015) emphasized in his study that there is a distinction between the elder and the younger in the second-generation immigrants of Italian origin. According to this study, while older second-generation immigrants think that they should behave more like Australians, younger second-generation immigrants can be proud of their ethnicity and cultural backgrounds (Vasta, 2015, p. 292).

An important similarity between the younger second generation and the third generation is that although they embrace their Turkish identities, their communication processes with the homeland are negligible. Compared to older generations, these participants follow the news about Turkey less, travel to Turkey less, and hardly include Turkey in their future plans. The number of immigrants displaying such characteristics is actually not as few as is supposed. Contrary to popular belief, the vast majority of immigrants still do not keep in constant and frequent contact with their homeland and do not make any effort to establish new ties (Özkul, 2016, p. 489). Thus, it turns out that the way immigrants communicate with their homeland allows us to better understand their transnational ties.

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Research Article

Market Liberals at a Crossroads in Post-Gezi Turkiye: Making Sense of a Framing Dispute

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ABSTRACT

The Gezi protests were a watershed moment for market liberals since it triggered inter-movement and intra-movement schisms. A flagship institution of market liberals, Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu (the Association of Liberal Thought) underwent such a schismatic process and, consequently, new market-liberal organizations arose from the schism, which was characterized by a frame dispute with the ALT over the policies pursued by the incumbent government, Justice and Development Party (JDP). The framing dispute between the two factions occurred along the lines of securing democracy versus the restriction of state power. This study delineates the root causes of the framing dispute between market liberals. To this end, two factors are proposed to account for it within the context of this paper. These two factors can be encapsulated as the growing conservative/liberal division among market liberals and entrenched interpersonal patronage networks within political circles which is closely related to the changing nature of government-civil society relations in Turkey. Drawing from semi-structured interviews, publications of market liberals, and a good number of secondary sources, we aim to shed light on the rift within market liberals in post-Gezi Turkey.

Keywords: Liberalism, Civil Society, Turkey, Gezi Protests, Frame Dispute

1. Introduction

It is a truism to claim that liberal values in Turkish society are not so prevalent and deep-rooted to constitute a genuine political alternative on the basis of pure liberalism. Some exceptions notwithstanding, for the most part, liberals have sought to cooperate with conservative and Islamist (political) movements to be able to participate in Turkish political life. Considering non-governmental activities, one can easily detect numerous liberal civil society organizations operating in the public realm. Of these civil society organizations, *Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu* (Association for Liberal Thought, hereafter ALT), is an Ankara-based institution that has been advocating liberal principles since the 1990s. ALT and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have been the two longest-lasting and influential formations of market liberalism or classical liberalism for many years. Market liberals[1] succeeded in acting together during the 1990s and the early 2000s, but that situation changed following consecutive events, and both inter and intra-movement disputes in classical liberal circles emerged. Even though there had been some disagreements about several minor cases previously, the clear division between market liberals was crystallized by the Gezi Protests. In response to the souring political environment, many market liberals within ALT began to express their dissatisfaction more vocally toward the incumbent government's *modus operandi*.

Consequently, the above-mentioned disagreements within ALT led to an inter-movement and intra-movement division within market liberals at different times. The inter-movement dispute during the Gezi protests precipitated the estrangement of *3H Hareketi* (hereafter 3H M, an Istanbul-based youth organization founded upon the principles of classical liberalism and libertarianism in 2006), the founders of which were once closely associated with ALT.[2] The *Özgürlük Araştırmaları Derneği*, the Freedom Researches Association (hereafter FRA), consisting mainly of academics, students, and professionals, was established more recently in Ankara in 2014 with similar principles to those of the 3H M. While the FRA was founded upon an intra-movement division within the ALT, the 3H M had never become a part of the ALT; rather it was involved in an inter-movement framing dispute with the ALT in the aftermath of the Gezi protests. Although both organizations had once had strong ties with ALT, they fell out and adopted different frames over the unfolding political developments in Turkey in due course. Whilst these two dissident organizations accused the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party-hereafter JDP) government of violating fundamental rights and civil liberties, ALT favored the ruling party by emphasizing its legitimacy stemming from its democratically elected status.

Against such a background, several questions beg answers concerning the schism that took place within market liberals. What are the frames adopted by the diverse liberal circles that caused inter and intra-movements divisions? Second, related to the first question, what are the perceptions vis a vis the root causes of such a framing dispute within market liberals? Taking these questions into consideration, this study aims to shed light on the framing disputes which resulted in fractionalization within the market-liberal movement with an emphasis on ALT. It was selected

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1   The term liberal in Turkey is often used to describe groups that support political freedoms and freedom of expression but are not always pro-free market economy. The distinguishing feature of ALT is its commitment to the market liberalism which is in line with understanding of Pils and Schoenegger claiming "a market economy fosters the ends of a liberal society best" (Pils & Schoenegger, 2021, p. 2). For this reason, we preferred the concept of market liberalism in this study. The term, market liberals, as employed in this manuscript denotes the liberals in the classical sense who advocate free markets with limited government intervention. For different definitions of liberal(s) in Turkey see (Gürpınar, 2013; Köroğlu, 2012; Uslu, 2015).

2   Since 3H M was not a formal branch of ALT, this estrangement was not a formal disengagement but rather an ideological one caused by the attitudes of leading market liberals in ALT towards the ruling party and its policies after the Gezi Park protests.

as a case for this paper since it is generally accepted as a roof organization that has gathered classical liberals in Turkey for over 20 years. Accordingly, this research explores the different diagnostic framings of market liberals concerning the political currents in Turkey, mostly revolving around the policies of the JDP. As an interpretive case study using semi-structured interviews and secondary sources, including chronicles, it is shown that the different perceptions toward the post-Gezi political environment in Turkey resulted in a frame dispute which culminated in a fissure in ALT. To this aim, three critical junctures, namely the Gezi Protests, the December 17-25 corruption probes, and July 15, 2016, failed coup are highlighted in this paper.[3] To clarify, these events provided a ground on which the frame dispute was built. Moreover, drawing on the related literature, the growing conservative-liberal divide amongst market liberals and the entrenched interpersonal patronage networks with political circles are identified as the underlying perceptions vis a vis the causes of the framing dispute which resulted in a schism. In so doing, this study explores a recent phenomenon, namely the fractionalization among market liberals in Turkey about which there are only anecdotal descriptions lacking any empirical evidence. Moreover, the nature of government-civil society relations was another determinant according to the data gathered from various sources to account for frame disputes. This also indicates that the government-civil society nexus is a relevant parameter that ought to be considered in understanding schism and fractionalization in non-western democracies.

This paper is structured as follows: the first part gives an overview of the history of ALT from its inception and the process of fractionalization, the second section reviews the theory of schism in organizations and discusses the methodology utilized for the research, the next section reveals the discrepancies among liberals in relation to the post-Gezi political environment in Turkey and the underlying factors causing the framing dispute. Lastly, a general synopsis of the schism is given in light of the theoretical and empirical debate laid out in the previous sections.

2. Liberalism in Turkey: From Past to Present

Although the first traces were found in the early 18th-century print media (Berkes, 1998, p. 42), the idea of modern liberalism purporting to the rule of law and a free-market system based predominantly on private property emerged mostly during the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the stage of history in the second half of the 19th century. The failed reform attempts of Sultan Selim III were accomplished to some extent by Sultan Mahmut II. Among other aspects, Sened-i İttifak, which is considered to be the sharing of power held by the central authority with a few agrarian elites, was regarded as a step towards a kind of constitutional rule[4] (Karpat, 2002,

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3 Gezi refers to a series of demonstrations that started in May 2013 as a protest to environmentally disruptive urbanization plans of the Gezi Park in Istanbul. With the violent eviction of protestors by the police, the demonstration escalated, and Turkish society was divided in the matter: on the one hand those supporting the demonstrators for basic human rights like freedom of expression, and on the other hand those supporting the government because they considered the uprising as not legitimate. The incidents of 17-25 December 2013 refer to a series of events following a criminal investigation involving several key political and bureaucratic figures in the Turkish government. Since high-ranking officers were also involved, the discussions around the investigations were more political than legal. Thus, some parts of society believed that it was merely an attempt to topple the government (partly also because it was believed to be carried out with the support of the Gülenists, led by former preacher F. Gülen). Others, however, evaluated the events as a violation of the rule of law. The coup attempt of July 15th, 2016, by some military cadres was allegedly orchestrated by F. Gülen and caused a further widening of the rift within society.

4 Karpat emphasizes this point by stating that "But, interestingly enough, others such as Ziya Gokalp, father of Turkish nationalist ideology, regarded the rise of the *ayans* as the beginning of a struggle for freedom." (Karpat, 2002, pp. 41-42, emphasis in original).

p. 40, p. 48; Göcek, 1996, p. 51; Köroğlu, 2012, p. 120). The declaration of the Tanzimat Fermanı and later the Islahat Fermanı, which ensure equal rights both for non-Muslims and Muslims, and the debates on free trade and liberty, in general, can be seen as signs of the development of a general sense of liberalism in Ottoman Empire. The ideas which can be considered within the context of political and economic liberalism were discussed widely by various prominent intellectual figures in the second half of the 19th century (Karpat, 2002, p. 51; Köroğlu, 2012, p. 120).

In relation to the political demands for re-enacting the constitution, which was suspended by Sultan Abdülhamit II, Prince Sabahattin, a member of the royal family and nephew of the Sultan, became prominent as one of the leaders of the Young Turks and popular due to his ideas favoring decentralization and private entrepreneurship (Guida, 2021, pp. 97-102; Kadıoğlu, 2007; Berkes, 1998, pp. 309-31). Similarly, Mehmed Cavid bey, generally accepted as a liberal politician and later the finance minister of the ruling party, Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), was famous for his liberal economic thoughts published in economy journals (Guida, 2021, pp.96-97; Karaman, 2005, p. 91; Özavcı, 2012, p.142). Because Prince Sabahattin was forced to leave the country after the abolition of the sultanate, the development of the idea of liberalism in Turkey was deprived of this powerful voice in the new republican era. Some journalists, such as Ahmet Emin Yalman[5] (see Coşar, 2004, pp. 76-77) and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın[6] (see Koçak, 2005), and politicians, such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu (Guida, 2021, pp.102-106; Kadıoğlu, 2007; Coşar, 2004, pp. 75-76), attempted to articulate liberal views in economics and politics. However, because of the blatant statism of the 1930s and the rigid anti-liberalism of the ruling party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi–Republican People's Party) at that time, the liberal views of intellectuals didn't have any significant impact on the public (Guida, 2021, p.106). In parallel with the liberalization in the country after World War II, classical liberal ideas were publicly discussed again, and publications in favor of liberalism began to be seen in academic and intellectual circles.[7]

On the other hand, it is a fact that liberalism, in its classical sense, did not find wide-scale social support in Turkey. For example, at this point, it was emphasized that liberalism in Turkey ought to resort to a nationalist-conservative discourse to communicate effectively with society in general (Türk, 2005, p. 119).[8] Likewise, the failure of the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP), the only political party that fully supports market liberalism in Turkey, was attributed to the inadequacy of emphasizing only liberal values, and it was argued that a liberal political program could be successful if it was blended with conservative values (Erdoğan, 2005, p. 35).

In this context, the divergences of classical liberal movements in Turkey seem interestingly similar. Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti (The Association for Spreading the Free Ideas), experienced a significant disintegration following the 1950 elections, after a few years of activity. After the Democratic Party government, the separation manifested itself in religion, "secularism" and

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5   At this point, Coşar further addresses that "His [Ahmet Emin Yalman] outwardly liberal stance was displayed not only in his writings, but also in his participation in the first meeting of *Dünya Liberaller Birligi* (World Union of Liberals) on 9–14 April 1945" (Coşar, 2004, p. 76, emphasis in original). See also Sadoğlu (2005, p. 307).

6   Regarding Yalçın, Koçak argues that "Yalçın, while defending the political liberalism against any kind of dictatorship, he did not refrain from defending democracy in Turkey" (Koçak, 2005, p. 252).

7   Two notable examples are the Turkish translations of "Road to Serfdom" by Friedrich von Hayek in 1948 and "Bureaucracy" by Ludwig von Mises (who is not a popular figure even today in Turkey) in 1947. Also "Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti" was an important initiative aiming at promoting liberal ideas in the second half of 1940s (Guida, 2021, pp.107-108; Birinci, 2018; Sadoğlu, 2015).

8   At this point, DP's conservative-liberal policies and the Republican People's Party's resistance should also be addressed.

"reactionism", and there was a separation between the members. The two prominent figures of the association, Ali Fuad Başgil and Ahmet Emin Yalman, parted ways. While the association condemned the "reactionary movements" in 1951, Başgil opposed the association's point of view (Sadoğlu, 2005, p. 308).[9]

However, with some exceptions, the idea of liberalism after the 1950s did not have a significant impact on public opinion until the 1980s (Denli, 2018, p. 59). Along with widespread ideas in favor of a market economy in the 1970s, the word liberalism started to be prominent in Turkey, especially in the discourse of Turgut Özal in the 1980s (Guida, 2021, p.106; Öniş, 2004, p. 120).[10] Also the early signs began to appear that the Kurdish issue and secularism would be the controversial topics among liberals at that time. In this regard, Atilla Yayla,[11] a leading figure among market liberals, states that Aydın Yalçın's closeness to the official view and his preference for a Kemalist position on religious freedom and a liberal position on the Kurdish question caused him to leave this group (Yayla, 2003, pp. 82-83; Denli, 2011, p. 192, footnote 63; Denli, 2018, p. 24).

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Birikim circle and Second Republicans also became influential with anti-Kemalist rhetoric (Denli, 2018, p. 24).[12] On the other hand, the two major institutions emerging in Turkey in favor of market liberalism were ALT and the Liberal Demokrat Parti (Liberal Democratic Party-hereafter LDP). Market liberals (ALT and LDP) differ from the above-mentioned cadres (despite their social liberal views) with their strong emphasis on the free market and capitalism.[13] Although LDP, as a political party, founded by the businessman Besim Tibuk, did not achieve notable success in the general elections, it had a relatively significant impact on Turkish political life compared to its actual vote base (Erten, 2005, p. 629).

Moreover, although it may not be considered liberal in all its aspects due to the composition of party elites, the short-lived Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi (New Democracy Movement) (Yılmaz, 1999, p. 185)[14], the political initiative of big business representatives, promoting democratization and freedom discourse in the early 1990s, might be named in this context. Among these initiatives, ALT, which constitutes the subject of this study, has been able to continue its activities without any contraction. In a nutshell, the history of liberalism in the classical sense started with Ottoman modernization as emphasized throughout the article, and all the names mentioned are essentially classical liberal figures. In this sense, it is possible to talk about an uninterrupted classical liberal tradition in Turkey since the 1800s, which is generally defined as classical liberalism today. Most of the liberal movements that emerged in the period that started right after the Second World War are of a classical liberal character. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that there have been vivid interactions, albeit replete with crises and ruptures, between conservative

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9   For points of divergence in The Association for Spreading the Free Ideas, also see (Guida, 2021, pp.107-108; Birinci, 2018, pp. 88-91; Demirel, 2015, pp. 111-114)

10 For further corroboration see (Denli, 2018, p. 59).

11 Atilla Yayla, the founding figure of ALT, states that he came from a traditionally anti-communist, right-leaning family and was right-wing and anti-communist during his university years. He also adds that he hated capitalism as a right-wing socialist in those years (Yayla, 2003, p. 73, p. 79).

12 There is an extensive literature on the variation within right and left liberal movements (Gürpınar,2013; Köroğlu, 2012, pp. 127-131; Uslu, 2015, pp. 19-20).

13 Interviewee-B1 reiterates the similar point with regards to the variations within liberals. See also (Gürpınar, 2013; Köroğlu, 2012, pp. 127-131; Uslu, 2015, pp. 19-20).

14 For the similarities between LDP and YDH, and their relations to ALT and Second Republicans (Köroğlu, 2012, p. 130). Gürpınar (2013, pp. 209-214) stresses that it would be pertinent to claim that YDH can be identified as democrat not liberal due to its emphasis on identities and multiculturalism within the framework of positive freedoms rather that free market and negative freedoms.

and liberal segments of intellectuals and politicians until today. Secondly, a body of literature emphasizes that conservatism is embedded in liberalism with a specific reference to Hayek.[15] Both Coşar (1998, pp. 36-39; 2004) and Denli (2011, pp. 189-192; 2018, pp. 83-84) accentuate this point by addressing the theoretical influence of Hayekian conservatism in the establishment of ALT in its very early stages (see also Gürpınar, 2013, pp. 262-263).[16]

In a nutshell, the history of liberalism in the classical sense started with Ottoman modernization as emphasized throughout the article, and all the names mentioned are essentially classical liberal figures. In this sense, it is possible to talk about an uninterrupted classical liberal tradition in Turkey since the 1800s, which is generally defined as classical liberalism today. Most of the liberal movements that emerged in the period that started right after the Second World War are of a classical liberal character.

2.1. The Trajectory of ALT: From Foundation to the 2000s

ALT was founded "informally" by a cluster of academics in 1992 (Yayla, 2003, p. 17; Özipek, 2005, p.620 ; also see Guida, 2021, p.108)[17] and became a legal entity as an association in 1994 (Yayla, 2003, p.18; Özipek, 2005, p.620).[18] As opposed to social democrats, ALT was formed on the principles of free-market capitalism and liberal democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Özipek, 2005, pp.620-621, p.624).[19] In a general sense, ALT can be located somewhere between a scientific community and a social movement. At first, the association became known for its efforts to introduce the ideas of some famous classical liberal figures, especially Friedrich von Hayek, by publishing translations of their works (Yayla, 2003, p.18).[20]

ALT modeled itself on the UK-registered organization, *IEA* (Institute of Economic Affairs) (Yayla, 2003, p. 19; Coşar, 2004, p. 89). The founding figure of ALT, Atilla Yayla[21] added that this formation, besides various purposes, aims to "prepare the ground for a mental transformation in the direction of liberalism" and "operates literally as a third sector organization" (Yayla, 2003, p. 23). Moreover, in some cases, ALT did not restrain from being actively involved in political campaigns. For example, ALT launched petition campaigns to counter the lawsuits which were levied against Mustafa Erdogan

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15 For Hayekian conservatism see (Cliteur, 1990).

16 Nevertheless, within the scope of this study, conservatism denotes an amalgam of religious nationalism with strong connotations to traditionalism. Thus, it is rather distinct from the Anglo-Saxon conservatism generally attributed to Hayek.

17 As stated by Yayla, at the end of 1992, after the meeting of a group of nine people with liberal tendencies and "agreeing that liberal values and institutions should be promoted and disseminated intellectually in our country", it was decided to establish ALT (Yayla, 2003, p. 17). As Yayla (2003, p. 18) emphasized, this informal formation organized Hayek symposiums in 1993 and the members of the community began to write in newspapers and magazines.

18 For a brief history of ALT (Guida, 2021, pp.108-109; Yayla, 2002, p. 48; Erdoğan, 2005, p. 36; Özipek, 2005).

19 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to make a distinction between market or classical liberals and social liberals. Whereas both currents within liberalism previously supported the JDP against Kemalism tutelage under the aegis of military, left liberals are composed of intellectuals mostly from leftist origins and still keep some certain objections toward the capitalist market mechanism. Among those names are, Ali Bayramoğlu, Etyen Mahçupyan, Cengiz Çandar and Mehmet Altan who are also known as Second Republicans see (Ersoy & Üstüner, 2016). For further information on liberal intellectuals see (Gürpınar, 2013; Köroğlu, 2012, pp. 127-131; Uslu, 2015, pp. 19-20).

20 Bora (2017, p. 559) remarks the choice of word "capitalism" directly instead of the softer one "market": "Atilla Yayla's defense of capitalism in its literal meaning beyond market, taking the people who are not anti-capitalists avoids using the word into account, was a notable defiance". See also (Coşar, 2004, p. 91)

21 Atilla Yayla states that he came from a traditionally anti-communist, right-leaning family and was right-wing and anti-communist during his university years. He also adds that he hated capitalism as a right-wing socialist in those years. See (Yayla, 2003, p.73 and p. 79).

due to his criticism of party closures in 2001 (Hukukçuya tazminat cezası, 2014) and Atilla Yayla's comments regarding Kemalism in 2006 (Atatürk'e 'Bu adam' sözüne, 2008). In both cases, ALT was actively involved in the defense of these two leading figures of the organization (Yılmaz, 2013, p. 247, p. 259). Moreover, many of the central figures of ALT actively participated in the *Yetmez ama Evet* campaign to amend the Turkish constitution of 1982. The ALT also printed a pamphlet in Kurdish in favor of the referendum campaign (Demirel, 2012, p. 87 footnote 11; Yılmaz, 2013, p. 268).

In the second half of the 1990s, the political atmosphere marked by the military's constant meddling provided an opportunity for ALT to become more widely known (Gürpınar, 2013, p. 266). The tension, due to the rapid rise of political Islam, led by the *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party-y-hereafter WP) and the response to these developments by the military from 1995 which resulted in a so-called "soft" or "post-modern" coup in February 1997 when the leader of WP was forced to resign after a national security assembly meeting. Two of the founders of ALT, Atilla Yayla and Mustafa Erdoğan, took sides with WP against the military intervention and became publicly known for their works in newspapers and journals.[22]

Liberte Publications, a subsidiary of ALT, has published a wide range of translations and original works, ranging from classical liberalism to anarcho-capitalism. Along with book publications, it has also published two journals, Liberal Düşünce (Liberal Thought) (Liberal Düşünce Dergisi, n.d.), and a 16-issue pro-market economy journal, Piyasa (Market) (Piyasa dergisi, n.d.).[23] Since 2000, ALT has also organized a large-scale annual academic conference, Liberal Düşünce Kongresi (Liberal Thought Congress) (Liberal Düşünce Kongresi, n.d). In addition, a Liberty Award (Özgürlük Ödülü) was presented to selected figures from the business world[24], journalists, politicians, and academics between the years 2002-2013. Activities such as these liberty award ceremonies were held on May 14th, a day with a symbolic meaning. On this day, the Democratic Party of Adnan Menderes came to power in Turkey in 1950 after the first free elections with a multi-party system in the republican era (Hürriyet yemeği, n.d.).

ALT has organized meetings, some with broad participation and some with a narrow focus, from the early 2000s on topics such as the Kurdish Question, the Alawi Question, and Freedom of Religion. In addition, seminars, education programs, and conferences focusing on freedom of speech, human rights, rule of law, entrepreneurship, and free-market economy have been held in universities all over the country with contributions from lecturers and students close to ALT (Toplantılar, faaliyetler, n.d.). Until 2016, the association cooperated intensively with foreign liberal institutions and carried out numerous educational and publishing activities in this context. The Mont Pelerin Society held a special meeting in 2011 in collaboration with ALT in Istanbul (Mont Pelerin Cemiyeti Özel Toplantısı, n.d.). The relationship with the German-based Friedrich Naumann Foundation, which had cooperated closely with ALT for many years, was terminated after 2016 due to its attitudes against the ruling JDP government during the Gezi Park events and after the coup attempt of July 15, as mentioned in an article by Atilla Yayla (Yayla, 2017).

2.2. ALT- JDP Relations in Perspective: Conservative-Liberal Rapprochement

The popularity of ALT was enhanced among conservative and religious people for its support of democracy against military tutelage in the February 28, 1997, military memorandum and for

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22 For the role of "Liberal Düşünce" and the circle of ALT after the coup of "28 Şubat" see (Özipek, 2005, p. 626; Akın, 2018; Gürpınar, 2013, pp. 266-267).

23 For publications of ALT also see (Guida, 2021, p.108; Özipek, 2005, p.623).

24 One of these awards was presented to Besim Tibuk, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in 2005.

opposing the pressures on Necmettin Erbakan and his pro-Islamist WP. During this period, conservative academics were generally introduced to ALT publications and its meeting facilities, and they accepted the association in recognition of the freedom it offered against the backdrop of oppression encountered at universities during the period of the 28 February postmodern coup.[25]

Although it has been stated in the main declarations of ALT and the statements of Atilla Yayla that they are not close to any political party, the fact that they took a stand in favor of religious groups in the process of the closure of the VP after the February 28 coup and the contact with many conservative academicians and writers generated the perception that ALT has close connections with JDP-led governments (Demirel, 2012, pp. 91-92). In fact, the formation of this perception is not totally unfounded. For example, JDP, after coming to power with a strong government in the 2002 elections, declared a 'Conservative Democrat' identity with a flamboyant congress in 2004. Almost the entire organization of this congress was planned and carried out by people with close relations to ALT (Demirel, 2012, p. 89).

Nevertheless, the democratic political climate started to worsen after the Gezi Protests in 2013. A vast literature on politics and democratization in Turkey has addressed the fact that the government frequently embarked on the "national will (*milli irade*)" rhetoric to highlight their legitimacy in politics. In so doing, the JDP cadres, however, often omitted the liberal character of modern democracy in their remarks by underscoring their status as the democratically elected government by the majority. This also coincided with the existing literature maintaining the *majoritarian understanding of democracy* which became prevalent in Turkish political life in post-Gezi Parkı Turkey (Başer & Öztürk, 2017, pp. 56-57; Bilgiç, 2018; Kubicek, 2016, pp. 123-124).[26]

The aforementioned political landscape has also had repercussions for market liberals. The so-called cooperation between JDP and market liberals started to be weakened in the wake of the Gezi protests. For example, shortly before the Gezi Protests, an important figure of the party (although he later corrected his statement) stated that they did not have to continue with their erstwhile allies, including liberals, in a live broadcast program he participated in 2013 (Babuşcu: Gelecek 10 yıl, 2013; Bora, 2017, pp. 564-567). Simultaneously, the debate over democratic backsliding found resonance in liberal circles as well. Accordingly, the centrifugal figures of market liberals voiced their concerns by stating that Turkey was going down an authoritarian path. Özpek confirms this point by stating that ALT's unconditional submission to the JDP government arises from its elected status and the popular support it gained (Özpek, 2015, pp. 9-11).

2.3. ALT at a Crossroads: Schism in the Post-Gezi Period

Until around 2010, ALT appeared to be an integrated and robust movement that revolved around the charisma of Atilla Yayla. During this period, some of the JDP leaders' discourses, which were interpreted as threats to individual freedoms, caused discomfort within ALT, but, apart from some individual criticisms[27], there was no divergence leading to disintegration. The debates, which would lead to a serious break, started during the Gezi Park events that erupted in 2013. At first, some of the members and executives who were hesitant adopted a critical stance

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25 For a discussion of relationship between LDT circle and conservatives see (Demirel, 2012, pp. 89-90; Gürpınar, 2013, pp. 266-270; Denli, 2018, pp. 51-52).

26 The political system in Post-Gezi Turkey's was conceptualized by means of different labels as well. For these labels see (Özbudun 2015; Esen & Gümüscü, 2016) .

27 For a criticism from inside see (Erdoğan, 2013).

against the government while staying in ALT.[28] These criticisms were openly directed at the government's approach during and after the Gezi Park protests and ALT for its support of the government's stance. As a matter of fact, at ALT's widely attended congress in November 2013, there were heated debates concerning the Gezi events and, significantly, it was the last meeting of ALT before its disintegration.[29]

After the 17-25 December operations, as another watershed moment at the end of 2013, the whole agenda of the country was shifted in another direction, which caused a rift within ALT. A group of members went to a separate association in response to ALT's support of the government position.[30] Although the rupture took place during the Gezi Park and 17-25 December incidents, the leading figure of ALT, Atilla Yayla, defined the separation process in detail as related to "the Kurdish problem, the cases of democracy, the position of the conservative religious community and their politicians, the Gezi Park protests and finally the coup and massacres in Egypt" (Yayla, 2015, pp. 41-42).[31] The Journal of Liberal Thought also published a special issue on segregation in 2015 which can be considered as a self-assessment of ALT with regard to the divisions among market liberals.[32]

In the case of market liberals in Turkey, the discrepant frames over the external political milieu in Turkish politics caused a framing contest. Those frames, depicting distinct political realities, help legitimize the standing of each liberal community. For example, ALT, once the umbrella organization for market liberals, overly emphasizes the legitimacy of the democratically elected government and the vulnerability of the state against security threats. 3H M and FRA, on the other hand, address the infringement of human rights and the rule of law since the Gezi protests in Turkey. In the wake of Gezi, 3H M harshly criticized the excessive use of force against the protestors. Similarly, the founders of FRA, who, at that time, were in the ranks of ALT, did not align with the frame of ALT regarding the Gezi protests and the December 17-25 corruption probes. Subsequently, both 3H M and FRA also protested the massive purge targeting government officers and academicians in the wake of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt. In contrast, ALT kept emphasizing the magnitude of the security risk that the legitimate government faced.

Today, there are liberal initiatives outside of ALT and FRA in Turkey as well. Although 3H M had been in contact with ALT in various ways prior to the Gezi Park events, it is not regarded as a splinter of the ALT as it has its own annual congresses, publications, and educational activities.[33]

All in all, this research draws upon frame theory to explore the content of frames, employed by an assortment of market liberal organizations, causing division and the perceptions vis a vis the causes of frames disputes within market liberals based on interviews and publications of market liberals.

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28 Bican Şahin, Chairman of ALT at that time, who later founded FRA, specifies in an article after the Gezi Park protests that JDP eliminated the grievances of Sunni people who constitute the majority of its own grassroots such as headscarf, imam hatip schools etc, but the problems of Kurds, Alawis and non-Muslims still persist (Şahin, 2013, p. 166).

29 The authors'observation in ALT Annual Conference 2013, Cappadocia, Turkey.

30 For the detailed analysis of fragmentation process after December 17-25 probes see (Uslu, 2015)

31 For an analysis of disintegration in regard to relations with the ruling party, see (Demirel, 2015, pp. 115-117).

32 See *Liberal Düşünce Dergisi*, no 77, 2015. Liber+ also published a special issue on the same topic. See. Türkiye'de Liberalizm, *Liber +,* Vol.1, No. 4, 2015.

33 It should also be noted that the first generation who established the 3H M had close acquaintance with Atilla Yayla and Mustafa Erdoğan. Both names supported 3H M in the initial periods of the organization. Aside from 3H M, there are newfound liberal organizations in Turkish intellectual life. Daktilo 1984, which was founded by a group of academics and professionals who declare themselves to be liberal-minded (Özpek, 2020) can be seen as another liberal formation on its way to institutionalization.

3. Schism and Framing Disputes in Organizations: A Theoretical Review

Factionalism and schism are common phenomena that occur in civil as well as governmental organizations, including political parties, non-state organizations, and professional corporations. Factions occur within political as well as (non-political) civilian milieus (Boucek, 2009, p. 461). Moreover, new oppositional factions in an organization are predisposed to turn into splinter organizations under certain conditions (Rochford Jr., 1989; Kretschmer, 2017). Factionalism generally precedes the schism, yet dissident sub-groups can be re-integrated and persist in an organization without causing a schism (Krestschmer, 2017, p. 404; Balser, 1997, p. 200). As a matter of fact, schism is the last stage of a process that concludes with a group exit process. Through this last stage, there are many other stops on the road to schism. That is why the schismatic process is of paramount importance to account for the disintegration of the organization (Dyck & Starke, 1999). In most cases, either ignoring or muting the dissent demanding change over the functioning of an organization is a prelude to the schism (Hirshman, 1970). The study of factionalism and schisms in organizations resides at an intersection of several disciplines, including political science, management, sociology, and even psychology. There is a sizable body of literature derived from these diverse disciplines that probe the reasons leading to the divisions within different types of political as well as non-governmental organizations. In the related literature, there are studies stressing external (environmental) factors together with internal factors that give rise to factionalism and the concomitant schism (Balser, 1997).

Factionalism and schism are two phenomena, which can be seen in a variety of groups, being explored within the framework of organizational theory (Balser, 1997). Group infighting over a particular issue opens "the identity contours of the group" (Ghaziani & Fine, 2008, pp. 53) to the debate and, occasionally, a new group identity emerges under favorable conditions as sub-group members have "conflicting ideas that were inconsistent with the status quo" (Dyck & Starke, 1999, pp. 803-804). Organizational cohesiveness depends on the extent to which an organization is adaptive to the challenges facing the collective identity (Gamson, 1996). There is a host of research connecting frame theory and collective identity. Frames help to create a group identity and mobilize the group (Aroopola, 2011). As Coles succinctly emphasizes, "collective identity is not a synonym for frames, but the two are correlated in intimate ways" (Coles, 1999, p.334). Snow and Benford delineate the different types of framings. According to them, diagnostic framing is pertinent to the "identification of the problem" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615; Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 200). Hallahan denotes the same process as "issue framing" with "different parties who vie for their preferred definition of a problem or situation to prevail" (Hallahan, 1999, p. 210). Individual frames as opposed to collective frames are generally related to "the most salient aspect of an issue." (Chong & Druckman, 2007:101). This research stream can also be extended to a third approach by which frame theory is closely associated with the "collective action" of an assortment of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). Ellingson (1995) argues that there is a "dialectical" process where discourse might produce and also be produced by collective action.

Under the circumstances of a crisis, different factions' adoption of different frames in relation to contested issues leads to a "frame dispute." Those disputes can occur in different contexts as inter and intra-movement disputes due to controversy over "the content or the forms of the framing activity." (Benford, 1993, p. 680). Moreover, frames disputes are closely associated with social movement theory in the sense that it focuses on the collective action of movements. Thus, different social movements such as environmental movements (Krogman, 1996), peace movement organizations (Coy & Woehrle, 1996), and conservative Christian political movements

(Rohlinger & Quadagno, 2009) are analyzed in terms of frame dispute in the related literature. It is conceivable that sometimes subgroups form as a result of the organizations' disputed "particular versions of reality" and might result in factionalism due to the identity conflict within the movements (Benford, 1993, p. 678; see also Hunt et al, 1994). Indeed, such disputes might have ramifications over the strategy of the movement as well. "Segments of a movement engage in an intra-movement contest over tactics and goals" and might pave the way for challenging the "dominant" frame of the movement (Zald, 1996, p. 270). This process in some of the literature is called a "framing contest" and is linked with an organizational strategy which is taken as the dependent variable (Kaplan, 2008). It should also be noted that those who refuse to rally around the dominant frame might opt to generate a "counter-frame" to challenge it as part of a framing contest (Chong & Druckman, 2013).

On the other hand, a stream of research links group "fault lines"[34] and frame disputes. According to this stream, internal framing disputes can be related to group fault lines, in this regard, it is argued that "more often than not frame disputes erupt between ideologically diverse wings of a movement." (Benford, 2013). Benford (1993), on the other hand, addresses the frame dispute between moderate and radical factions within and among movements. Wiktorowicz (2002), points out that "intra-movement divisions (such as hardliner softliner, conservative-liberal, old–young, ideologue-pragmatic) can create internal framing disputes". Haines (2006, as cited in Benford, 2013, p. 1) also stresses that membership profile plays an important role in framing disputes along with organizational culture and framing vocabulary.

4. Methodology

The main topic of this interpretive case study is to investigate the underlying motives that caused the schism among market liberals in Turkey. The benefits of a single case study are manifold such as "explaining the presumed causal links", "describing an intervention and the real-life context" and "illustrating certain topics within an evaluation" (Yin, 2003, p. 15). Even though there has been some anecdotal evidence on the subject, no empirical research has been carried out. Hence, this research should be first considered as an exploratory case study in the sense that it is geared towards the discovery of the content of competing frames and causes of such a divergence.[35] With this object in mind, the data was drawn from three sources: semi-structured interviews, official publications of liberals (ALT in general) and secondary sources related to market liberals.

As the backbone of this research, we utilized semi-structured qualitative interviews with present and former members and associates of ALT. In doing so, we paid close attention to ensuring diversity in the sample at hand. To this end, we identified three main groups in terms of their relationship with the organization, especially after the fragmentation. The interviewees were determined regarding their relationship to the liberal movements mentioned in this study. To avoid selection bias, interviewees from disparate sub-groups were selected. The first group is still active members of ALT and has some sort of "decision-maker" role. As we will see in the interviews, they advocate the policies of the incumbent government on many points; these three participants were coded with the letter "A". The second group consists of those who decided to stay within ALT but have a different approach in terms of the attitude of the previous group and are

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34 Fault lines refer to gender, age, status, etc., among group members. See (Lau & Murnighan, 1998).
35 This two-fold purpose of this case study can be conceptualized within the framework of theory building and testing, see (Ragin & Schneider, 2011).

more critical, especially of some specific aspects. These three interviewees were coded as "B". The third group, on the other hand, can be defined as the opponents; they decided to leave ALT and became members of the recently founded new associations or to take a different path; that is, they did not become a member but share similar viewpoints and have a very critical attitude towards ALT and the government. These five interviewees were coded with the letter "C". The reason that this group is higher in number is that some of them joined the new associations and some did not but still have a similarly critical attitude. A fourth group, consisting of three interviewees, was coded as "D" since their relationship with the movement was of a different nature than the others. This block includes veterans of ALT. They have been generally indifferent to the disputes and recent developments and have not taken a clear position as to the dispute within market liberals.

There were 14 interviews conducted between January 2018 and May 2019. Each interview lasted between 60 and 100 minutes and was recorded for accuracy. Moreover, interviews were transcribed to analyze using a computerized method with the help of MAXQDA software on qualitative data. The interviews were carried out in different places, that is, sometimes in cafes or offices. The length of them also varies, not because we asked additional questions but because some of the participants provided more details than the others. The interviews were semi-structured, which facilitated focusing on several points about the fragmentation with some narratives related to the schism being repeated. To identify the dominant narratives, the recurring themes residing within the text of interviews were garnered. These issues were later classified into codes and then into units of meaning; thus, they provided the data to understand the phenomenon. The details of the phenomenon will be discussed in the analysis. As stated, we conducted in-depth interviews with persons who experienced the schism within ALT. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed by first coding the text and later by combining the codes into units of meaning.

To reach a robust conclusion on the divisions in ALT, the authors also utilized secondary sources as supplementary materials to understand the various narratives embedded in the debates that eventually led to a schism among market liberals of Turkey. Within the framework of this study, data on the related subject was enriched by employing not only semi-structured interviews but also periodicals, including *Liberal Düşünce,* which is the flagship publication of ALT, and many other secondary sources encompassing publications of the splinter organizations related to the issue.

5. Frames of Turkish Politics and Market Liberals in Post-Gezi Period: Data and Analysis

In the next section, the dynamics of the disintegration will be discussed in the context of interviews and secondary sources including official chronicles of ALT and participant observations from annual congresses. In this respect, diagnostic frames were identified, which is democracy versus liberalism in terms of restriction of state power to elucidate the frame dispute causing inter and intra-movement schisms among market liberals. Secondly, the underlying causes of framing disputes were identified by scrutinizing the perception of market liberals.

5.1. Identifying the Frames: Securing Democracy versus Limiting State Power

This study contends that the collision of two diagnostic frames over Turkish politics ended with a schism in ALT in the aftermath of the Gezi protests. However, it is also possible to observe that, prior to the Gezi protests, the discourse of the government, in general, caused disputes within the ALT. There was fervent debate casting doubt on the liberal tenets to be seen in the policies

of the government including statements on unisex student houses, the use of alcohol in the public realm, and abortion. These issues found resonance, especially at informal talks at the traditional ALT congress in Cappadocia in 2012.[36] The authors participated in the annual meetings of the ALT in 2013, 2016, and 2018. It was seen that the dialogues, to a large extent, mirrored the contemporary themes in Turkish politics. In this respect, the year 2013 was remarkable in that it was the first annual meeting after the Gezi protests and where the cleavage within ALT became visible (see Guida, 2021, p.109; Uslu, 2015). The debates in 2013 revolved around the political meaning of the Gezi protests, with some ALT members stating that the protesters were nothing more than radical leftist mobs. For others, the Gezi protests were within the limits of freedom of speech and demonstration, and the excessive police violence that ensued ought to be condemned.[37]

Before the incidents like the Gezi protests or the probes, ALT was able to act as an 'umbrella' organization and embody members from various circles. As a participant put it, the association lost this characteristic in time:

"…being part of ALT was very cool once. You could look onto Turkey from high above, you were beyond politics, you had principles, you could express yourself as you wished. Then, something happened, instead of looking at our principles we looked at the position of JDP; we considered if the things we said, were harmful to the JDP. So, its former cool position, its prestigious position diminished." (Interviewee-B3)

However, the Gezi protests and some other incidents changed the discourse of ALT ending with a rift in the organization. This is certainly observable in the way of framing the very same incident and displayed the perceptions and attitudes of the two sides. Thus, incidents such as the Gezi protests or the coup attempt in 2016 proved to be ideal examples to illustrate the schism within liberals. Since the eruption of the Gezi protests, the predominant master frame in ALT's decision-making circle was defending democracy and an elected government (as opposed to liberalism) by all means, including advocating the JDP government in the face of all types of critiques. The violation of human rights and the rule of law were swept under the carpet with the emphasis being on a government elected by the people through the ballot box. This point was criticized by circles within and outside the ALT, claiming that Turkey had lost its democratic credentials with a government stripped of any power limitations. For example, one of the founders of the 3H M confirms this point in his critiques vis-a-vis ALT by stating that;

"…these people were not liberals. They were conservative democrats who were at peace with the market economy. I can't call them democrats because they perceive democracy merely as getting elected through the ballot box. Because liberals do not take democracy as a value unless there is liberalism… Ballot box democracy can form another tyranny." (Interviewee-C4)

During the Gezi protests, ALT cadres counter-framed the protests as an illicit act targeting the democratically elected legitimate government. In other words, the Gezi protests were not considered within the scope of freedom of expression, and protestors were portrayed as unleashed mobs destroying private property and endangering public life as in this example:

"Taksim Solidarity, whose political agenda turned out to be beyond saving Gezi Park, resorted to any means available to them in an attempt to keep the unrest alive. Thousands of people proceeded to occupy Gezi Park. Taksim Square, too, was annexed to the original occupied site." (Yayla, 2013, pp. 8-9).

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36 The authors' observation in ALT conference in Cappadocia in 2012.
37 For the causes, processes and consequences of Gezi protests see (Demirel-Pegg, 2018; Koca-Atabey, 2016).

Some members of the ALT also questioned the authority and legitimacy of the protestors against the government stating the following;

"...Well, the main reason for fragmentation among liberals was their stance between the legitimate and the illegitimate. Naturally, we have to side with the legitimate and refuse the illegitimate. This is one of the reasons for fragmentation." (Interviewee-A1)

According to one of the founding members of FRA, the Gezi protests were nothing but a democratic reaction to excessive government interference. Here, we can clearly see how the same incident is framed from a completely different perspective as opposed to the framing of ALT members:

"I consider [Gezi] as a democratic movement… It was a movement where people were protecting their lifestyle. …People saw that their lives were under threat. And I believe it was going to be a wonderful social movement if state violence had not taken it in another direction." (Interviewee-C3)

In response to the master frame, the counter-frame of splinter organizations highlights the need for limitations of state power pursuant to universal human rights and liberal democratic standards. It was argued that, since the Gezi protest, the incumbent government has resorted to a more security-oriented approach and has exceeded the limits of its legal authority. This frame contests that domestic politics incited the inter- and intra-movement schismatic process triggered by the Gezi protests and aggravated by the 17- 25, December 2013 Corruption Probes and the July 15 coup attempt.

The Gezi protests had certain ramifications on the internal coherence of ALT and made already existing disagreements more visible within ALT. In other words, it planted the seeds of discord, which would incite factionalism and schism in the following years. As such, this initial disagreement caused a break-up shortly thereafter. In the wake of the 17-25 December corruption probes, a new liberal association, FRA was founded as a splinter group of the ALT (Demirel, 2015, p. 107). Even though FRA was not founded immediately after the Gezi protest, it is often stated that FRA was a fallout of the Gezi protests. As one of the interviewees put it:

"If you ask me, the real break was the break of FRA. Although many people relate the break to 17-25 December, the unrest started with the Gezi Park incidents." (Interviewee-C5)

A further critical juncture was the 17-25 December probes which were assessed and framed from two different perspectives that are from the prism of security as an assault on democracy by leading figures from ALT. They claimed that the corruption case was only a pretext to topple Erdoğan and his companions. They further stressed that a parallel structure had illicitly captured the state apparatus, and therefore, urgent security measures had to be taken. As one of the ALT members aptly put it:

"They said, e.g., if there is corruption, the son of the minister must be arrested. But they didn't see the Gülen movement behind it. As if they don't know the history of Turkey. When was the son of a minister in Turkey ever treated like an ordinary citizen? … They acted as if there were impartial judges and policemen. They turned a blind eye to it, and that is because of their antipathy to the government." (Interviewee-B1)

Although the dissenters within market-liberal circles acknowledge the charges against the "parallel structure"[38], they called for the rule of law, accountability, and protection of basic rights, which reflects the counter-frame in the matter. For example, after December 17-25, some leading

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38 "Parallel structure" refers to a religious movement led by a preacher of Turkish descent, Fethullah Gulen, located in Pennsylvania, USA. The Turkish state designated Gulen and his supporters as a terrorist organization for plotting the July 15 coup attempt.

figures of FRA underlined the necessity of investigating corruption claims. As one of the founders of FRA puts it, there was the demand that those being accused of corruption charges ought to be investigated and, if necessary, stand trial for their offenses regardless of the fact that the "parallel structure" had exposed these offenses (Şahin, 2015).

A further case that had implications for market liberals was the July 15 failed coup. The main argument made by ALT toward the coup attempt was that it was military interference in the civil realm and the security of the state apparatus. In this regard, one of the leading members of ALT drew attention to the dissident liberal group's failure to understand the severity of the situation:

"We should consider things in their own context, for example, the wrongdoings after July 15. Why wasn't there a state of emergency on 14 July but one on 20 July? A serious issue came up. How do we solve this problem? They don't have any solutions." (Interviewee-A1)

In contrast to ALT, both FRA and 3H M emphasize the consequence of the coup attempt by stating that the July 15 attempt further exacerbated the situation in an already malfunctioning democracy in Turkey. They also mentioned the infringement of basic rights during the state of emergency. As one of the founding members of the FRA emphasized:

"Yes, this is a coup attempt... What followed was claimed to be done within positive law, but a rule of law doesn't mean just positive law. So, they arrest journalists; you want to speak about freedom of speech and the press, they call it terrorism and consider it a matter of positive law. Therefore, although they claim to be within the rule of law, I think the borders are too blurred and there are too many violations. No matter what the threat is, no act can be legitimized. Law is needed especially during extraordinary times." (Interviewee-C3)

5.2. Two Causes of a Framing Dispute: Ideological Backgrounds and Interpersonal Patronage Networks

To understand the fragmentation, we further need to consider the members and participants of ALT and how they actually vary from each other. The interviews revealed the typology of participants and members of ALT, pointing out that, especially during the second half of the 90s and early 2000s, people from various backgrounds were active in the association and that this changed over time. Therefore, a few aspects need to be discussed in this context both to understand ALT itself and how it changed and was affected by developments in the broader context. These aspects mainly revolve around the backgrounds of the participants and members and also their patronage networks. As one interviewee highlights, ALT members came from various sociological backgrounds and ALT was able to attract and host them under one "roof":

"If we go back to the beginning, many people from conservative circles came to ALT after the 28 February coup in search of freedoms. … But one needs to say that "white Turks" were also included; one could feel that people with a leftist, nationalist, Alawi background were also drawn towards ALT." (Interviewee-D1)

Despite this sociological diversity, ALT holds a more conservative position as stated by many participants; the reason for this is often explained by the fact that its founders came from a conservative background. Accordingly, one participant maintains that the aim to attract more conservative people was present from the very beginning since the leading figures were the ones who would feel the need for it:

"ALT had an aim to address conservatives in particular… Both Atilla Yayla and Mustafa Erdoğan believed that, if there is a chance for liberal values in Turkey, it would be through ordinary people, not Kemalists." (Interviewee-B2)

For example, a former member of ALT and one of the founders of the newly established FRA states that "Although there are people like me, who come from a leftist cultural background, within ALT the majority is culturally conservative. This certainly has sociological and historical reasons. The intellectual background of the founders also led to the conservative-liberal path of the association..." (Interviewee-C3)

Another interviewee even associated this aspect with their attitude towards liberalism stating that: "I can say the following: I don't think that those born into conservative families really understand what liberalism is. I don't believe that they were able to internalize it." (Interviewee-C2)

Nevertheless, although conservative tunes have prevailed in ALT, it does not mean that it had been completely homogenous at least until recently. One of the repeated themes in interviews related to the emergence of diverse frames is the altering composition of ALT over time. Some critiques assert that the liberal core of the organization has been dissolved and ALT has become a more conservative-oriented movement. In other words, the transformation in organizational structure caused division leading to different diagnostic frames vis-a-vis the post-Gezi period JDP government.

Moreover, the composition of the organization, in terms not only of decision-makers but also members and active participants, drastically changed following the debates over the Gezi protests. The last 'well-attended' conference with attendees and guests from diverse backgrounds was in 2013 when heated discussions were held by members over the acceptability of the politics of the JDP in the post-Gezi period. As one of the former members confessed:

"I observed that academicians who often came to ALT activities in the early 2000s distanced themselves. Some of them maintained their contact in a loose way, but I think it wasn't possible for them to experience an atmosphere where people from all different backgrounds, leftists, conservatives, and liberals, come together." (Interviewee-D2)

The second factor which triggered the framing dispute among market liberals was pertinent to the changing nature of the state-civil society relationship in Turkey. The instrumentalization of civil society has been a strategy employed extensively during the JDP rule. This means that pro-government civil society organizations and their members have enjoyed preferential treatment as a result of their cooperation (Yabancı, 2019; Doyle, 2017).

To put it more clearly, the blurring of the border between state and civil society caused growing interpersonal patronage networks between ALT and the government, and this fact was crucial in the growing rift between market liberals. As one ALT member contends that even though there is no evidence showing that ALT was directly funded by government bodies, it was generally understood that some members had and still have intimate ties with the incumbent government since these members have taken up administrative positions in bureaucracy and academy.[39]

"But this I can say, I believe that their personal prosperity led to the defense of their corrupt democratic ideas. At present, many people have gained material opportunities. These are not the type a businessman would get, but for an academician from the countryside (*taşralı*), it is attractive. The fact that ALT decision-makers are not working in the private sector affects their freedom. If they were acting independently from the state, they might be a bit more critical." (Interviewee-C4):

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[39] One can also see the transition in terms of invited speakers to the annual meetings since 2013 as compared to earlier years. Following the conference in 2013, the invited speakers of events and critical members of the association were those who were affiliated with the bureaucratic cadres and political circles within the JDP ranks and anti-government voices were rare as guest speakers in ALT events.

On the other hand, though some highlight the relationship between the government and ALT, similar criticisms of the other side are expressed within ALT. For example, one of the present leading members of ALT claims that the reasons for the fragmentation and the opposition to JDP are due to expectations that could not be met:

"...It is important that we do not transform our personal problems into public issues. Some who were categorically against the JDP also had personal problems with the party. Either they did not get what they expected, or they obtained it but were later marginalized." (Interviewee-A1)

This is similar to a point reiterated by a former participant who is no longer associated with the ALT, and chose to become an independent liberal:

"At present, it is true that ALT seems to have joined JDP and is taking advantage of the space it has opened up. But it would be an over-generalization to claim it for all liberals." (Interviewee-D2)

6. Concluding Remarks

Since the eruption of the Gezi protests, the rift between liberals has widened to the degree that they went through inter-movement and intra-movement splits in the following years. There is no doubt that ALT, as an umbrella organization, had been the epicenter of the political debates among market liberals during the JDP period. Even though there had been some dissatisfaction over the disruptive policies of the JDP prior to the Gezi protests, the Gezi protests were the breaking point providing a context by displaying the discontent that constituted irredeemable divisions and subsequent disintegration among market liberals in ALT. This rift between market liberals widened in the following years with the 17-25 December Probes and the July 15 coup attempt. During the Gezi protests, different frames of liberal movements constituted contradictory images and meanings that eventually led to fractionalization and schism. The first inter-movement framing dispute over the political environment in Turkey was with 3H M. Whereas 3H M was the most vocal organization in their critiques vis-a-vis ALT, it should also be noted that intra-movement tensions also arose within ALT. Such a backstage dispute concomitantly led to the foundation of FRA following the 17-25 December probes. The founders of FRA departed from ALT as a splinter organization in due course over the intra-movement discrepancies on the interpretation of the 17-25 December probes. The third instance which deepened the rift between ALT and other liberal movements was the July 15 coup attempt after which a record number of civil servants, journalists, and academicians were either purged or detained. In all of these three cases, ALT emphasized the threats toward the legitimate government, whereas both 3H M and, later on, FRA focused on the transgression of fundamental human rights and freedoms in Turkey. From a broader perspective, ALT merely highlights the current situation as a state of exception where the Turkish state was circumscribed by so-called terrorist organizations. FRA and 3HM, on the other hand, underline the extensive human rights violations and backslide in the democracy of Turkey. These clashing frames led to inter-movement and intra-movement schisms among market liberals.

This research argues that the main dynamic which led to the schism within market liberals is the escalating frame dispute between these organizations, ALT, 3H M, and FRA. The clashing frames became prominent as a different strand of market liberals put diverse emphasis on the cause and consequences of the political developments starting with the Gezi period. Within the framework of this research, an attempt was made to explore the frame disputes among market liberals, particularly at three critical junctures, the Gezi Protests, the 17-25 December Probes, and the July 15 coup attempt, by putting ALT at the center. Employing framing theory with a specific

emphasis on framing disputes, this paper demonstrates that diverse constructions of political realities cause divisions among market-liberal movements. Accordingly, the central frames were identified by looking at the content of narratives by market liberals, securing democracy versus restriction of state power.

Yet another question that we attempted to answer in this research is the determinants of the framing disputes, which led to the schism in ALT. Based on empirical evidence, mostly interviews, first, it was argued that framing disputes were predicated by the socio-cultural backgrounds of liberals in that some had a more traditional/conservative stance and others were more secular/liberal. In retrospect, it can be contended that the clash between conservative and liberal circles, as a deep sociological fault line in Turkish politics, emerges as one of the root causes of the divisions between liberals given the history of liberalism in Turkey. In other words, the predominance of conservative figures in the decision-making processes at ALT stood out as a crucial determinant. This fact seems to have affected their position vis-a-vis the policies of the incumbent government and was critical in the fragmentation. Thus, it can be argued that individual-level parameters played a substantial role in foregoing fragmentation. In this context, the partition of market liberal movements in Turkey's political life seems to have interestingly similar patterns. The dissolution of Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti (*The Association for Spreading the Free Ideas*)[40] and the disengagement of Yayla and Erdoğan from the *Yeni Forum* that was led by Aydın Yalçın in the 1980s attest to this claim (see Yayla, 2003, pp. 84-86).

Second, according to interviewees, interpersonal patronage networks between government elites and some ALT members led to either unrestricted support toward the ruling party or the members' self-censorship against the government's arguably anti-democratic maneuvers. On the other side of the ledger, some interviewees, mostly the remnant members of ALT, claimed that the dissident liberals, such as FRA, shored up by international NGOs or illegal groups due to their anti-government stance, form an outsource patronage network. Consequently, this research suggests that the framing dispute among liberals was not based on their distinct interpretation of liberalism informed by theoretical debate. These findings also have implications for the literature on framing disputes with its emphasis on two underlying factors, the growing conservative-liberal divide and the entrenched interpersonal patronage networks causing the dispute. Nevertheless, this research is predicated on the perceptions of the liberal circles regarding the framing dispute following the Gezi Protests. Hence, it is solely based on the perceptions of market liberals who were encapsulated within the scope of this research. Nevertheless, recurring patterns in the collected data demonstrate that the phenomenon was not individually perceived or observed but was merely a common experience for all of them.

Even though earlier literature provides anecdotal descriptions with regards to the liberal-conservative divide and ALT's intermingling with the government (Demirel, 2015: 113-114)[41], this study offers not only a theoretical framework in terms of a frame dispute but also provides empirical evidence based on a laborious field study. This research also bears some broader implications for shedding light on the unique underlying factors leading to such a frame dispute. First of all, this research reveals how underlying structural conditions shape framing processes. Along with group fault lines, in our case, conservative versus liberal and cooptation of the third sector through interpersonal networks, are another crucial factor in the inter and intra-organizational

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40 For an earlier emphasis on this point, see (Demirel, 2015, pp. 113-114).
41 Nevertheless, it should be noted that Demirel does not fully concur with the relevance of these two factors.

division. The second point raised here also illustrates how the flawed nature of state-civil society relations[42] in hybrid regimes might emerge as a vital denominator for frame disputes. Addressing this point might also be considered an original contribution to the literature of factionalism.

Obviously, market liberals in Turkey underwent an unprecedented process recently. New movements relying on the principles of market liberalism proliferated in post-Gezi Turkey. As one member of ALT admits, "Liberals are not under the roof of ALT anymore. They are in an office or in their own rooms, and ALT seems to be limited to a number of academicians." (Interviewee-B3) Nevertheless, this fragmentation should not be thought of as a crisis but rather as an opportunity for the proliferation of new liberal perspectives. There can be no doubt that these new organizations have the potential to contribute to public debate under severe conditions unfavorable to civil society in Turkey.

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42 For civil society-state relations see (Yabancı, 2019; Doyle, 2017).

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Moral Boundaries and Cultural Membership: Perceptions of the LGBTQ in Turkiye

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ABSTRACT

Sexual minorities consistently rank as the most disapproved of group in Turkey although the LGBTQ community remain largely invisible. To explain this disparity, we examine private and public responses to "homosexuality" along four dimensions: demographic factors, social context, religion and religiosity, and public morality. The data come from a nationally representative survey (N=1893). We tested four sets of variables to explain the persistence of mistrust toward sexual minorities. The first two, demographic factors and social context, show limited explanatory power. The third dimension of personal morality is also limited, because boundaries against LGBTQ individuals also cut across religion and religiosity. The fourth dimension, public morality, a vision of moral values shaping public life and political discourse, explains the particularity of the views toward non-straight sexual orientations as the specific alignment of a moral worldview with exclusionary cultural membership. Results are significant in two ways. First, they show that the mistrust of sexual minorities is high. Second, the public displays of mistrust are different from the forms of prejudice expressed toward other groups, such as ethnic minorities. The symbolic boundaries drawn vis-à-vis LGBTQ individuals tells us more about the core values of belonging and solidarity in Turkish society.

Keywords: Moral boundaries, religion, religiosity, public morality, Turkey

Introduction

At the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic in April, the suggestion by Turkiye's Director of Religious Affairs during a televised speech that "homosexuality" causes illness has prompted a clash between conservative politicians and the country's left-leaning lawyers associations over freedom of expression. The director argued that "'evils' such as homosexuality, spread disease and 'decay'" (Wilks, 2020). The Directorate of Religious Affairs is one of Turkiye's most powerful state agencies established in 1924 after the formation of the secular republic to promote the government's version of true Islam, although some argue that the directorate began to promote a more conservative interpretation of Islam in the 2000s (Öztürk, 2016). The director defended his remarks by proposing that he only speaks the truth of the Qur'an.

What explains the extraordinarily high levels of mistrust against a relatively invisible and politically powerless minority? Is religiosity automatically antithetical to attitudes promoting LGBTQ rights? In this paper, we examine contemporary forms of heterosexism and homophobia in Turkiye with these questions in mind. While narrowly referring to gay and lesbian individuals, the term "homosexuality" is inadequately used in Turkish popular debates as an umbrella term to identify non-heterosexual orientations. For the sake of consistency, we will use the term LGBTQ throughout this paper. Studies persistently find pervasive negative attitudes towards the LGBTQ community as the most excluded group in Turkiye (J. Anderson & Koc, 2015; Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009; Duyan & Duyan, 2005; Gelbal & Duyan, 2006). Heterosexism is a dominant force in the public domain (Bakacak & Öktem, 2014). The puzzle is to find out why a relatively small, invisible, and disorganized group in terms of political representation and freedom of speech draws such a strong reaction. Religiosity may be a potent explanation, but atheists, another invisible yet much censured group by religion, appear to be less disapproved of (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007). On the contrary, other groups that are much more visible in polarizing public debates in Turkiye, such as the Kurds and immigrants, draw comparatively smaller levels of intolerance (Aytaç & Çarkoğlu, 2019). Considering the intensity and nature of opposition to minority sexual orientations in the Turkish context, the central thesis of this paper is that we cannot simply treat the LGBTQ community similar to other out-groups, only more intensely opposed. The attitudes toward LGBTQ people reveal the core assumptions about the basis of social solidarity and cultural membership, which are rooted in symbolic boundaries. Our survey results find that homophobia goes beyond demographic factors and religion/religiosity, factors that are usually associated with tolerance for other out-groups and show that deeper symbolic and moral attitudes about collective identity is at work. By distinguishing religiosity from expressions of public morality, we examine the ways in which moral and symbolic boundaries are drawn to the effect of excluding minority groups from a vision of national membership.

Symbolic Boundaries and Religion

A significant aspect of the exclusionary rhetoric against LGBTQ individuals has to do with symbolic boundaries. Whether scholars explicitly recognize it or not, many research areas, including those on immigration, cultural capital, consumption, cultural membership, racial, ethnic, or national belonging, have close connections with the study of boundaries and boundary-making. Boundary work is significant for social actors to make sense, maintain, and naturalize patterns of social inclusion and exclusion. Thus, the study of boundaries and boundary-making is essential to show how culture operates in reinforcing inequalities across diverse mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. In this paper, we show that the symbolic mechanisms of exclusion may target largely

invisible and powerless minorities when the minority in question is seen as violating the taken-for-granted definitions of belonging in a moral and national community.

Symbolic boundaries constitute competing definitions of reality. A continuing effort in the literature on boundaries is to identify the use of symbolic distinctions in creating and maintaining social inclusion, exclusion, and inequality (Edgell et al., 2020). Lamont and Molnar (2002) identify social and symbolic boundaries as two distinct types of boundaries in order to investigate the process of translating symbolic and interpretive strategies into social resources. They define symbolic boundaries as "conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space" (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 168). In this sense, boundaries are also collective identity projects because they both exclude those who are different and include those who are similar. Therefore, an important aspect of symbolic boundaries is cultural membership (Edgell & Tranby, 2010). Cultural membership has to do with the way social actors interpret encounters with real or, in our case, imagined others within a framework of similarity and difference. Understanding cultural membership can help shed light on the complex problems of moral order and social inequality, or how groups understand relationships of trust, social obligation, and hierarchy (Alexander, 2003). Bail (2008) notes that when it comes to boundary drawing in public life, and the question of cultural membership in the nation, members of the dominant group may draw exclusionary boundaries based on gender, race, religion, culture, language, and social class. The boundary that marks cultural membership defines insiders and outsiders in terms of authenticity or legitimacy (Edgell & Tranby, 2010), which, in our case, translate into questions of whether the LGBTQ are seen as legitimate members of national or local collectivities.

An integral part of cultural membership is moral evaluation and moral order because the boundaries that mark cultural membership, mark "good" or "true" members of a collectivity from "bad" or "false" ones (Edgell & Tranby, 2010, p. 177). Boundaries of cultural membership are not formal boundaries although they are not less real than concrete or social boundaries because they mark group membership along the dimensions of similarity and difference and shape patterns of social obligations, public trust, and inequality (Pachucki et al., 2007). Lamont and Molnar (2002, p. 169) consider symbolic boundaries a necessary but not sufficient condition for the production of social boundaries. Only after symbolic boundaries are recognized and understood by members of a collectivity can they translate into patterns of inclusion and exclusion.

We present the depth of negative attitudes toward sexual minorities as an instance of moral exclusion that lies at the foundations of national belonging. The views against LGBTQ individuals shed light on perceptions of moral unity and patterns of cultural membership in Turkish society. Therefore, the issue is not simply a matter of magnitude, reflecting a quantitatively "larger" amount of a generic form of intolerance (Meuleman et al., 2018) that is expected to apply to other outsider groups. Moral boundaries of homophobia and heterosexism are qualitatively different, because "homosexuality" as a public concern maps onto deep symbolic distinctions regarding visions about legitimate belonging many other forms of social exclusion map onto more concrete cultural and/or socio-economic bases and correspond to social positions across the spectrum of social categories, such as gender, class, ethnicity, and education. For example, people's views on gender equality vary along different levels of education, as educated individuals acquire more gender-equal attitudes (Rankin & Aytaç, 2006). We suspect that the perceptions of LGBTQ people in Turkiye cut across many traditional categories of sociological analysis, such as income, education, and gender. This is a significant puzzle to explain. Based on previous findings in the literature that show the extent of public reactions to "homosexuality," we expect homophobia and

heterosexism to crosscut socio-economic categories, cultural boundaries, religion, and religiosity, and to surface in a fundamentally symbolic dimension of moral alterity. In this sense, negative views on sexual minorities transcend personal religious proscriptions or with perceived threats that may originate from perceived social problems. Instead, these views correspond to deeply held moral positions about the nature of social collectivity and visions of public morality. Thus, our focus in this paper is not on the mistreatment of the LGBTQ community. Instead, we are interested in the persistence and depth of attitudes that exclude them as outsiders in public and private life.

The literature on boundaries pays attention to how religious beliefs may maintain, legitimize, or reinforce social boundaries (Pachucki et al., 2007). Religion may be implicated in forming identities and solidarities and reinforcing boundaries against outsiders in different visions of belonging (Edgell & Tranby, 2010). Historically, religion has provided answers on how society should respond to the problems of inequality, difference, and claims made by ethnic, racial and sexual others (Edgell & Tranby, 2014). However, religions are not homogeneous entities because boundaries within religious institutions create social distinctions and relations of power (Lichterman, 2005). Religious identities are fluid, intersectional, and context-specific (Edgell et al., 2020). Exclusionary attitudes do not have to be inherently embedded into religious views. Although we focus exclusively on the role of Islam in shaping these attitudes, paying attention to moral boundaries helps account for the diversity of religious beliefs and avoid reductionist views on religion and religiosity. First, moral boundaries allow seeing religion both as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Second, it is important to underline the overlaps between symbolic and social boundaries (Edgell et al., 2020). Thus, boundary research examines symbolically created but also materially maintained inequalities and social distances. Third, moral boundaries carry the focus beyond religion and religiosity and into collective visions of how religion should shape public morality. Given the relative invisibility of LGBTQ identities in public life, homophobia and heterosexism in Turkiye are largely formed without recognized contact with LGBTQ people and hence tend to be independent of patterns of explicitly formed prejudice. For this reason, in order to identify the role of religion, this paper distinguishes personal religious commitments from a cultural style of public morality that prescribes religious expression to be part of public life and political discourse (Stewart et al., 2018). Research tends to emphasize individual religious commitments and practices in the formation of social exclusions. However, people draw upon multiple discourses to develop conceptions of what is just or moral (Delehanty et al., 2019). This is one of the keys to explaining the magnitude of anti-LGBTQ sentiments in the relative absence of large-scale LGBTQ visibility. We examine moral boundaries against LGBTQ individuals not simply as residual artefacts of religious worldviews, but instead a reflection of moral power to assign worth in visions of national belonging. Our measurements distinguish expressions of individual religiosity from visions of how religion should shape public life.

Solving the puzzle of "homosexuality" in Turkiye requires a systematic understanding of morality, which is located at the intersection of public visions of morality, a repertoire of citizenship, civic inclusion, and belonging. We need to explore how religion and religiosity combine with other factors to shape the way people answer the question of "who is like me?" Morality is a cultural tool, which, among other things, garners an image of religion and how religion should be experienced publicly. Boundaries defining inclusion and exclusion are constructed in interaction with the cultural repertoires available in national contexts. Therefore, our question becomes how this image of religion, seen as a guideline for public life, influences the forming of moral atti-

tudes. That is, how religion as a politico-moral category provides the cultural tools through which people understand otherness and construct exclusionary moral boundaries. At the private level, religious identities shape religious behavior and practices. At the level of public vision, however, it taps into an articulation of public religious expressions, which is connected to a "religiously infused public sphere" (Stewart et al., 2018, p. 32). Public morality incorporates expressions and beliefs that religion should be part of public and political life, highlighting an expectation that public institutions should broadly accommodate religious beliefs and practices. Political leaders, parties, social movements, and interest groups strategically link religion to underline visions of national belonging (C. Bail, 2014). Juxtapositions of religiosity to public notions of social belonging and good citizenship by public figures fuse personal religiosity and public morality and cast outsiders as threats to the stability of civic life (Wuthnow, 2011). By analyzing the effects of both individual religious identity and the politico-moral dimension of religiosity, we want to understand how religious commitments shape perceptions of cultural and civic membership of moral outsiders in the Turkish context.

Religion, National Belonging, and LGBTQ issues in Turkiye

In his classic text, Anderson (1991) argues that images and symbols from mass media and popular culture suggest the content of an imagined national community. Media discourses shape the shared vision of a nation even when they are not explicitly enunciated. This vision is inclusive and exclusive at the same time and can be shaped by a moral account of who is like "us" and who is not (Griswold, 1992). Turkish nationalism is not different from other nationalisms on its emphasis on creating a homogeneous national belonging. Since the foundation of the republic in the 1920s, nationalist elites worked with a vision of a unitary nation that underplayed ethnic, class, and gender inequalities. Ethnic unity has been one of the fundamental concerns throughout the republican history (Ergin, 2016). While the secular elites paid attention to gender equality as a central goal of modernization, there was no room for gender issues outside a nationalist framework (Altan-Olcay, 2009; Arat, 2005). The negative views associated with non-heterosexual orientations map onto this history of homogeneous nation formation and political culture that promotes both heteronormativity and traditional attitudes toward gender and family.

Traditional Islamic scholars view non-heterosexual orientations as deviant and sinful although there have been progressive attempts for alternative interpretations (Jamal, 2001; Minwalla et al., 2005). Because the traditional teachings of Islam are quite explicit in rejecting sexual minorities, some research suggests that anti-LGBTQ attitudes are a result of religious scriptural teachings (e.g., Bonthuys & Erlank, 2012) while others have suggested that these attitudes are beyond what is necessitated by the teachings of the Qur'an (Hooghe et al., 2010). Relative to Christianity, little is known about the relationship between religion and contemporary Muslim attitudes towards LGBTQ individuals. A number of studies suggests that individuals who identify with any religion tend to report more anti-gay attitudes (e.g., Finlay & Walther, 2003; Hunsberger, 1995). However, religiosity, rather than categorical religious affiliation, may be more important in shaping boundary formation (J. Anderson & Koc, 2015; Whitley, 2009). As such, religion and religiosity have often been found to be important predictors of an explicit rejection of sexual minorities, a finding that has been well documented in non-Muslim samples (Whitley, 2009). More research is needed to examine the parameter of perceptions of "homosexuality" by Muslims in Turkiye, because the country, with its long history of westernization as well as a large and diverse population, provides a pertinent context for this investigation.

Unlike in many other Muslim-majority countries, same-sex relationships are not a crime in Turkiye, although there are no specific legal protections against discrimination. The 1980s were dominated by the trans movement, and trans individuals have been legally permitted to have gender reassignment surgeries since 1988, while in the 1990s gay men became more visible in the LGBTQ movement (Çetin, 2016). The official recognition of Turkiye as a candidate for European Union accession in 1999 had an immediate effect on the recognition of the movement. LGBTQ groups have been trying to increase their visibility and draw attention to the inequalities in legal and social arenas since the 1990s, despite having limited popular support. The first Pride march in 1993 was banned by the governor of Istanbul with the charge that it would be against morality and the values of Turkish society. After this ban the Commission for the Human Rights of the European Parliament took up the discrimination against LGBTQ people in Turkiye for the first time in their annual progress report (Çetin, 2016). The LGBTQ movement has evolved considerably since the 1990s although LGBTQ activism continues to draw strong negative reactions both popularly and from political authorities, especially after its visibility during the Gezi protests against the government in 2015 (Çetin, 2016). Public endorsements of anti-LGBTQ rhetoric by politicians and media, and adverse treatment by police and other relevant authorities aligns with the widespread rejection of sexual minorities in Turkish society.

Method

The data were collected in one of the first studies to systematically study moral and cultural boundaries in Turkiye. The project, entitled "The Construction of Cultural Boundaries: Relations Between Cultural, Socio-Economic and Moral Status Symbols in Turkiye", was conducted in two stages over the course of 18 months (ethics approval was secured from Koç University Ethic Committee). After a qualitative component of 49 in-depth interviews, in the first stage, we conducted a nationally representative survey of 1893 adults in the second stage. The questionnaire included questions on taste, knowledge, and participation as well as a wide array of moral distinctions. To measure the dependent variable, we gave participants a list of potential outsider groups that ranked high in previous surveys and asked them if they would oppose having them as their neighbors and if those groups belong in their vision of Turkiye. The sample is based on a stratified random sampling of Turkish national electoral rolls. The list was stratified by region and urban/rural location using the Turkish Statistical Institute's 12 economic and social development regions, such that the resulting sample is proportional to the urban and rural population size in each region and for the country as a whole; 76% of the sample is urban and 24% is rural. Face-to-face interviews for the survey were conducted at the home of respondents.

Although the survey was fielded in 2011, the negative perceptions of sexual minorities in Turkiye remain stable, if not worse, especially after the collapse of the European Union integration process and the increasing power of conservative rhetoric in the country. Our survey also has the advantage of being specially built upon the qualitative findings in the in-depth interviews with the explicit design to collect representative data to examine the formation of cultural and moral boundaries. Although more recent surveys are available, this survey is the only one to be able to establish our central thesis that the negative perceptions of LGBTQ individuals are deeply moral issues that crosscut socio-economic, cultural, and religious boundaries. However, at the end of this paper, we bring up a rough comparison with World Values Survey (Wave 7) to illustrate that a) anti-LGBTQ views are as strong as ever; b) these negative perceptions closely resonate with moral values specifically referring to visions of belonging to a national collectivity as opposed to other sets of variables.

Findings and Discussion

Descriptive results identify "homosexuals" as the group with the most likelihood of mistrust both in private interactions and in public belonging. To measure these two components, we used two items from our survey that tap into one's willingness to create boundaries in public and private life. For private acceptance, respondents were asked to answer whether they would approve or disapprove the members of particular groups as their neighbors. Similar to Edgell et al (2006), we interpret this as a measure of individual trust and acceptance of a person as a moral being. For public acceptance we asked about the extent to which members of a particular group share one's vision of Turkiye. This question is in line with Lamont and Molnar's conception of "cultural membership" (2002, p. 187).

The percentages of disapproval for selected groups are as follows:

Table 1. Public and Private Rejection

Opinions	%
These groups do not belong to the vision of Turkey in my mind	
"Homosexual"	62.6
Cohabiting heterosexual couples	39.2
Armenian	33.0
Jew	31.1
Religious fundamentalist	30.0
Kurd	17.6
I would oppose these groups to be my neighbors	
"Homosexual"	66.2
Cohabiting heterosexual couples	52.2
Atheist	43.1
Non-Muslim	21.5
Kurd	14.8
Foreigner	12.9

For both measures, "homosexuals," the term commonly used in Turkiye to refer to a wide array of sexual minorities, are at the top of the list as the most mistrusted. This observation sets up the central puzzle of this paper that "homosexuality" has the highest level of exclusion at the expense of groups that are more visible in public controversies, such as Kurds, foreigners, or atheists. Most of our respondents not only display their unwillingness to interact with "homosexuals" in private affairs, but also consider them as outsiders within the national community.

Table 2. Percentages of Public and Private Rejection of "Homosexuals"

Public and Private Rejection	Gender		Education		Religion		Location	
	Women	Men	University	No University	Sunni Muslim	Other	Urban	Rural
Not belonging to nation	60.8	64.4	43.0	64.7	65.0	37.7	57.3	75.8
Rejecting as neighbors	64.1	68.2	48.3	68.1	68.2	44.0	61.3	78.1

Descriptive statistics in Table 2 confirm several expected patterns. Women (compared to men), university-educated individuals (compared all other educational levels), and those who live in urban areas (compared to rural settings) tend to display lower levels of homophobia. Sunni Muslims, in comparison to other religions and sects, such as Alevis, are more likely to show disapproval toward the LGBTQ in both public and private acceptance. Do these negative attitudes toward LGBTQ individuals constitute a part of a general pattern of prejudice toward all "undesirable" groups? In other words, is homophobia simply a quantitively more intense form of prejudice? To start examining this question, we analyzed whether the mistrust toward sexual minorities is consistent with the attitudes toward other out-groups. If this is the case, we would observe correlations between the negative attitudes toward LGBTQ individuals and other excluded groups. We report below the correlations between the likelihood of rejecting the LGBTQ and several other groups as neighbors. The table also includes the descriptive categories of gender, education, and religious affiliation.

Table 3. Correlations between Attitudes toward Homosexuals and Other Groups, by Gender, Education, and Religion

Attitudes toward Sample categories	Cohabiting Couple	Atheist	Non-Muslim	Kurd	Foreigner
Entire sample	.464	.479	---	---	---
Women	.457	.525	.329	---	---
Men	.474	.438	---	---	---
Less than university educated	.461	.479	---	---	---
University educated	.392	.387	---	---	---
Sunni Muslim	.448	.472	---	---	---
Alevi	.655	.398	.407	---	.313

Note: Correlations >.3 and statistically significant are reported. All correlations are p<.01.

The table shows that the anti-LGBTQ attitudes correlate with the attitudes toward cohabiting heterosexual couples and atheists. In the entire sample, there is a relatively high correlation between respondents rejecting the LGBTQ and cohabiting heterosexual couples as neighbors (.464), and LGBTQ and atheist neighbors (.479). The disapproval of non-Muslim, Kurdish, or foreigner neighbors, however, does not have a significant correlation with the undesirability of LGBTQ neighbors. With a few exceptions, this is also the case across the gender, education, and religion sub-groups in our sample. The disapproval of "homosexuality," atheism, and opposite-sex cohabitation belong to the same moral universe. This is the first sign that boundaries vis-à-vis the LGBTQ are deeply symbolic, referring to cultural membership and moral belonging in Turkish society, and are qualitatively different from the boundaries drawn vis-à-vis more publicly visible and politically implicated out-groups such as Kurds and foreigners. The overlaps among the negative attitudes toward sexual minorities, atheists, and cohabiting heterosexual couples indicate that the disapproval toward these groups are not only quantitatively intense but also originate from qualitatively different concerns. Within these deeply held moral disapprovals, "homosexuals" appear to be symbolically the most excluded group.

Private Acceptance

We analyzed the different factors contributing to the construction of boundaries around sexual minorities using logistic regression on both of our measures. To find out if the exclusion of

"homosexuals" in Turkiye stem from private interactions corresponding to a moral outlook, we considered whether respondents are willing to have LGBTQ neighbors. Although "public" and "private" are complex concepts, it is important to make this rough distinction to see if disapproval in immediate encounters, such as becoming neighbors, match with a broader vision of exclusion at the national level. We conducted the analysis for both "private" and "public" dimensions and in four blocks for each. The first three blocks include the usual suspects in research on prejudice. These are: (1) demographic information, which includes categories such as gender, age, income; (2) social context, which includes variables about respondents' household, location, and perceptions of these settings; (3) religion and religiosity, which includes variables regarding religion as well as subjective and objective measures of religiosity. The final block, public morality, pertains to a vision of moral belonging and membership and it is what we expect to be the defining characteristic of the attitudes toward the LGBTQ community. The variables in this block measure respondents' vision of how public life should be shaped.

Demographic Variables

Research shows that prejudice toward out-groups is shaped by demographic factors, such as age, ethnicity, and gender (e.g., Andersen & Fetner, 2008; Blashill & Powlishta, 2009; Collier et al., 2013; Sirin et al., 2004; Yang, 1997). Class and education shape attitudes toward others by producing different levels of cultural capital (Persell et al., 2001; Svallfors, 2006). In our analysis, the demographic variables are gender (51.4% female), income (in quintiles, M=2.97, SD=1.4; in actual scores, mean [in Turkish liras]: 1272, SD=925), whether the respondent has a university degree or not (9.3% had a university degree or higher), age (in quintiles, M=2.96, SD=1.4; in actuals scores, M=38, SD=14), and whether the respondent reports his/her ethnic identity to be Kurdish (15.5% Kurdish).

Table 4. Model 1: Logistic Regression of Responses to "I would oppose having a homosexual neighbor"

Independent variables	Model 1	
	Exp (β)	SE
Demographic variables		
Gender (male)	1.34	.107**
Education (less than university)	1.91	.178***
Ethnicity (non-Kurdish)	1.53	.152**
Income (higher)	0.81	.040***
Age (higher)	0.99	.004
Constant	1.93	.052
χ^2	65.90***	df=5
Cases correctly classified, %	65.9	
R^2 (Negelkerke)	.054	

Note: N=1657, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Apart from age, the demographic variables have a significant relationship with the likelihood of opposing LGBTQ neighbors. Men's likelihood of expressing mistrust for the LGBTQ community is 1.34 times higher compared to women. University education appears to be an important factor in reducing prejudices against LGBTQ neighbors in this block, because individuals with lower levels of education are almost twice as likely to express disapproval. As members of an ethnic minority, individuals who identified themselves as Kurd have lower levels of prejudice

against LGBTQ neighbors—individuals who identify as Turks (and other ethnicities) have 1.53 times higher odds of disapproval. Higher levels of income also produce significantly lower levels of prejudice.

Social Context

In the second block, we introduce variables regarding the social location of individuals. Extensive literature suggests that poverty and inequality tend to be positively associated with homonegativity (Brewer, 2003). The absence of diversity (or perceptions of it) in a person's neighborhood is another factor which has frequently been found to be positively related to homonegativity (Cullen et al., 2002; Smith et al., 2009). The variables in this block measure respondents' exposure to diversity, poverty, and inequality. The first variable has to do with whether the respondent's house is in a squatter neighborhood (24.9% of respondents live in squatter housing in our sample). We then ask whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural area. In our sample, 29% of responds live in rural areas, which is representative of the Turkish population. The third variable is the appearance and economic condition of the house, coded by the interviewer. This is a proxy variable to measure the general living conditions of the household. Interviewers judged 21.9% of the houses to be in poor appearance, and the rest is in middle or higher categories. The last two variables measure the respondent's perception of inequality and diversity, because attitudes towards outgroups may be shaped by a person's own experiences with social difference or acceptance of diversity (Hartmann, 2015). The first measure is a 10-point scale of how much inequality they think exists in the country (M=7.8, SD=2.5). The second is a 7-point index of two variables. The questions in this index ask the respondents about the level of diversity in their community and among their friends (M=3.57, SD=1.14).

Table 5. Model 2: Logistic Regression of Responses to "I would oppose having a homosexual neighbor"

Independent variables	Model 2	
	Exp (β)	SE
Demographic Variables		
Gender (male)	1.36	.112**
Education (less than university)	1.74	.181**
Ethnicity (non-Kurdish)	1.55	.164**
Income (higher)	0.90	.047*
Age (higher)	1.00	.004
Social Context		
Residence (squatter)	1.44	.169*
Location (rural)	1.38	.147*
Household poverty (poor)	1.28	.176
Inequality perception (higher)	1.00	.023
Diversity index (higher)	0.83	.053***
Constant	1.91	.053
χ^2	101.13***	df=10
Cases correctly classified, %	65.6	
R^2 (Negelkerke)	.086	

Note: N=1576, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Social context variables do not change the demographic picture as gender, education, ethnicity, and income remain significant in explaining homonegativity. Residents of squatter settle-

ments and rural respondents have higher likelihoods (1.44 and 1.38 times respectively) of disapproving of LGBTQ neighbors. However, respondents who observe higher levels of diversity in their social contexts have lower levels of anti-LGBTQ prejudices.

Religion and Religiosity

Traditionally censured by some of the major religions, "homosexuality" may correlate with religion and religiosity (Janssen & Scheepers, 2019; Olson et al., 2006; Quinn & Dickson-Gomez, 2016; Sherkat et al., 2011). In the third block, we enter variables measuring religion, religiosity, and religious attendance, which aim to capture both objective and subjective engagement with religion. In contradistinction to the next block, the variables used here represent respondents' private experiences of religion, measured through self-reported engagement with religion, religiosity and attitudes toward religiously-connoted practices. Religiosity is measured in terms of an 11-point index reported by respondents, zero indicating not religious at all (M=6.40, SD=2.19). The frequency of attending religious services measures respondents' reported behavior of religious activity in a place of worship or at home. For many (especially Muslim men), attending the mosque on Fridays is a cultural routine and does not necessarily point to high levels of religiosity. A regularity of attendance for more than once a week, however, implies observing Islamic prayer five times a day as required in Sunni Islam. For that reason, we compare regular attendees (more than once a week, 44% of the sample) with those who attend religious services once a week or less. The third variable is whether the respondent believes that being a moral person requires being religious (17.3% agreed). We also compare Alevis (6% in the sample) with Sunni Muslims. Alevis are a heterodox group with links to Shia Islam. It is a matter of debate whether they form a religion, an Islamic sect, a cultural group, or something entirely different. We include this variable because, as the largest minority religion in Turkiye, the Alevis are reputed to have differences in matters of faith and inclusivity (Savcı, 2016). The final variable has to do with whether the respondent celebrates New Year's Eve (53% do). This is a controversial issue in the Turkish context, because many confuse New Year's Eve with Christmas and associate it with Christian traditions. Therefore, disapproval of celebrating New Year's Eve is a good indicator of religiosity. These five variables tap into people way of expressing and practicing religion and religious preferences in their personal lives.

Table 6. Model 3: Logistic Regression of Responses to "I would oppose having a homosexual neighbor"

Independent variables	Model 3	
	Exp (β)	SE
Demographic Variables		
Gender (male)	1.50	.123**
Education (less than university)	1.67	.196**
Ethnicity (non-Kurdish)	1.46	.177*
Income (higher)	0.92	.050
Age (higher)	0.99	.004
Social Context		
Residence (squatter)	1.50	.174*
Location (rural)	1.18	.153
Household poverty (poor)	1.20	.183
Inequality perception (higher)	1.03	.024
Diversity index (higher)	0.85	.055**
Religion and Religiosity		
Religiosity (higher)	1.10	.029**
Religious attendance (>once a week)	1.27	.140
Moral=Religious (yes)	1.12	.155
Sect (Alevi)	1.40	.237
New Year celebration (no)	1.35	.134*
Constant	1.91	.054
χ^2	133.6***	df=15
Cases correctly classified, %	68.8	
R^2 (Negelkerke)	.118	

Note: N=1495, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Adding religion and religiosity variables to the model create important shifts. In the first block, gender, education, and ethnicity, but not income, remain significant. In the second block, urban and rural distinction in homonegativity is not significant. In the third block, higher levels of self-proclaimed religiosity are associated with a higher likelihood of disapproval of LGBTQ neighbors. People who refuse to celebrate New Year's Eve are also more likely to oppose LGBTQ neighbors. The remaining three variables, including religious attendance, are not statistically significant.

Public Morality

Finally, we enter variables that have to do with public morality and tap into belonging and membership in larger society. This block of variables is linked to religiosity, the component we examined in the previous block. However, directly or indirectly, imposing certain religious precepts on others are part of political discourses that give public voice to religiously inspired views. Therefore, the variables in this block are different from variables regarding religion and religiosity in the sense that they capture the views about the type of society respondents envision. We consider public morality as religiously inspired views that operate as markers of belonging. Thus, public expressions of religion serve instances of imaginations of a good society (Stewart et al., 2018). Religiosity or religious practice, as we examined in block 3, look at the way a person leads a religious or non-religious life. However, attitudes toward imposing religion on society tell us more about a person's views of what a good or just society is, who should be included in that society, and how others should shape their moral and religious visions. In this sense, variables in this

block signal what kinds of moral commitments are necessary for being included in the boundaries of good citizenship. These variables have to do with the respondents' vision of how choices made by others in public life should be shaped. If homophobia makes individuals draw boundaries of morality and cultural membership about who belongs to the nation and the neighborhood in which they live, it must have implications for value judgments, such as conservatism, the role of religion in state and society, family values, and the role of education. Three of the variables in this block tap into respondents' views of how religion should shape Turkish society. These variables are: whether respondents agree with the statement that religious values should be emphasized more in Turkiye (76% agreed), whether alcohol sales should be banned in the month of the Ramadan (69% agreed), and whether religion courses should be mandatory at schools (75% agreed). It is important to include education-related variables because schools are venues of moral socialization where debates about moral discourse are reproduced or contested. Because of education's highly-charged significance in identifying a person's moral response to society's current issues in Turkiye (Ergin et al., 2019), we included a variable regarding education in a 5-point scale asking the respondents how important education is (M=3.14, SD=0.65). The final variable asks if the respondent thinks traditional family values should be more emphasized (78% agreed) because opponents of "homosexuality" frequently portray it as a debasement of family values (Williams, 2018).

Table 7. Model 4: Logistic Regression of Responses to "I would oppose having a homosexual neighbor"

Independent variables	Model 4	
	Exp (β)	SE
Demographic Variables		
Gender (male)	1.54	.133**
Education (less than university)	1.36	.213
Ethnicity (non-Kurdish)	1.03	.193
Income (higher)	0.94	.054
Age (higher)	0.99	.005
Social Context		
Residence (squatter)	1.47	.187*
Location (rural)	1.13	.162
Household poverty (poor)	0.89	.195
Inequality perception (higher)	1.06	.026*
Social diversity index (higher)	0.87	.059*
Religion and Religiosity		
Religiosity (higher)	0.99	.033
Mosque attendance (>once a week)	1.10	.151
Moral=Religious (yes)	1.27	.169
Sect (Alevi)	0.80	.264
New Year celebration (no)	1.11	.148
Public Morality		
Religious values emphasized (agree)	1.96	.181***
Alcohol ban in Ramadan (yes)	1.49	.154**
Religion courses required (agree)	1.72	.171**
Education is important (higher)	0.65	.104***
Family values emphasize (agree)	1.61	.163**
Constant	1.87	.056
χ^2	234.8***	df=20
Cases correctly classified, %	65.2	
R^2 (Negelkerke)	.211	

Note: N=1411, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Table 7 displays the four successive blocks of factors that affect individuals' objection to LGBTQ individuals in personal interaction. The introduction of public morality in the final step of the analysis implies that the fundamental factor behind homonegativity in Turkiye is not religion or religiosity expressed in personal behavior. None of the variables in the third block, including subjective evaluations of religiosity, attendance of religious services, or even equating religion with morality, are significantly related with attitudes toward homosexuality. One demographic variable in block 1, gender, remains significant: men are 1.52 times more likely to disapprove a gay neighbor compared to women in our final model. Social context also remains linked with perceptions of LGBTQ neighbors, as residents of squatter areas are more likely to express disapproval. Perceptions of inequality also seem to contribute to negative views in the final model. The perception of living in a diverse context, on the other hand, reduce prejudices against LGBTQ neighbors. The final model shows the central role moral evaluations play in the private disapproval of the LGBTQ community in comparison to demographic variables, social location and more importantly, religiosity. The main driving factor behind the negative private attitudes toward "homosexuality" in Turkiye has to do with an individual's vision of imposing a particular public moral order and this indicates the deeply symbolic exclusion of "homosexuality" that cuts across socio-economic status, urban-rural axis, religion, and religiosity.

National Belonging

To what extent can we generalize the position to disapprove LGBTQ neighbors as a broad rejection of their belonging to the national community? One may argue that a respondent's unwillingness to live with sexual minorities as neighbors indicate an attitude regarding private disapproval and does not automatically exclude LGBTQ persons' social belonging in public life. To find out if it is justified to distinguish public and private acceptance, we conducted the same logistic regression analysis for the public acceptance of LGBTQ minorities. The dependent variable comes from a question we asked to capture the acceptance or rejection of "homosexuals" as a group in the national imagery. The wording is: "Do homosexuals share your vision of Turkiye as a nation?" Since our goal is to compare the private and public disapproval in the overall picture, we are only reporting the final (four-block) model here.

Table 8. Model 4: Logistic Regression of Responses to "Homosexuals do not share my vision of Turkey"

Independent variables	Model 4	
	Exp (β)	SE
Demographic Variables		
Gender (male)	1.46	.132**
Education (less than university)	1.28	.215
Ethnicity (non-Kurdish)	0.92	.197
Income (higher)	0.92	.054
Age (higher)	0.99	.005*
Social Context		
Residence (squatter)	1.47	.184*
Location (rural)	1.11	.160
Household poverty (poor)	1.09	.195
Inequality perception (higher)	1.02	.026
Social diversity index (higher)	0.84	.058**
Religion and Religiosity		
Religiosity (higher)	0.95	.033
Mosque attendance (>once a week)	1.08	.151
Moral=Religious (yes)	1.99	.176***
Sect (Alevi)	0.99	.273
New Year celebration (no)	1.16	.146
Public Morality		
Religious values emphasize (agree)	1.73	.184**
Alcohol ban in Ramadan (yes)	2.19	.151***
Religion courses required (agree)	1.35	.173
Education is important (higher)	0.81	.165*
Family values emphasize (agree)	1.52	.174**
Constant	1.65	.055
χ^2	246.0***	df=20
Cases correctly classified, %	62.3	
R^2 (Negelkerke)	.211	

Note: N=1411, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Statistical models for private and public acceptance are similar in many ways. Similar to the private disapproval model, gender and residence are significant as men and residents of squatter areas are more likely to exclude LGBTQ individuals from their vision of the country. Perceived diversity, too, has an effect on reducing prejudices toward the LGBTQ. Age is significant in the public acceptance model and shows that, unexpectedly, younger people have higher levels of homophobic attitudes, although the substantive effects are small. Most importantly, Table 8 establishes the overlaps between private and public views regarding the centrality of moral exclusion. Variables that revolve around shaping others' lives in terms of a particular moral vision contribute significantly to the model. Respondents who want religious and family values to be emphasized, and alcohol to be banned in the month of the Ramadan are (respectively 1.73, 1.52, and 2.19 times) more likely to say that "homosexuals" do not share their vision of Turkiye. Similar to the model for neighbor preferences, respondents who emphasize the value of education for society are more likely to see "homosexuals" as part of their vision for Turkiye.

However, there are two major differences in the public and private acceptance models. First, different from the private acceptance model, asking for religious courses to be required does not have a significant influence on public acceptance. Second, in this model, those who believe that being moral requires being religious are almost twice as likely to see the LGBTQ not belonging

to the national community. These differences may hint at minor differences in people's public and private attitudes. However, they may also show that the conceptual distinctions between "public" and "private," albeit useful, are not necessarily clear-cut for the respondents. For example, the demand for required religious courses may be considered as a public policy choice as well as a private gesture to raise one's children in a particular way. Similarly, equating religiosity with morality may be seen as a public gesture rather than a private preference. However, the models for private and public acceptance of sexual minorities overlap closely, albeit not perfectly, indicating the widespread discursive appeal of homonegativity in the Turkish context.

A Comparison with WVS-Wave7

The results in this paper come from a survey specifically designed to gauge the role of culture and morality in the social landscape of Turkiye. Because this survey was fielded in 2011, we compared our findings to a more recent survey, the 2017-2021 World Values Survey, Wave 7. This is a challenging endeavor because WVS-Wave 7 is a general survey with limited focus on cultural and moral boundaries. Still, the comparison to a more recent survey (conducted in Turkiye in 2018, N = 2415) is useful in terms of corroborating two central questions we asked in this paper. The first question has to do with whether the level of disapproval toward the LGBTQ community is still as high as we observed in 2011? The second questions asks if this disapproval is simply a generic form of prejudice. In this paper, we argued that anti-LGBTQ views in Turkiye constitute a specific form of moral boundary that crosscuts common socio-economic indicators and delve into deeper issue of cultural membership.

Our question measuring public belonging does not have an equivalent in WVS-Wave 7. However, a comparable question of private acceptance exists. WVS-Wave 7 shows respondents a card with potential outgroups and asks them the following question: "Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?" (Haerpfer et al, 2022). The survey reports that 78.5% of respondents mentioned "homosexuals" among those they would oppose as neighbors. This level of disapproval is only surpassed by drug addicts (89.5%), an outgroup not included in our survey. The relatively high level of disapproval may refer to consistently high and perhaps increasing levels of negative attitudes toward the LGBTQ in Turkiye. Therefore, our initial question that drives this paper (why do "homosexuals" draw so much disapproval despite their limited visibility in public?) maintains its relevance.

In order to corroborate the second question, we created a logistic regression model using some of the variables similar to what we used in our survey (see Table 9), although it was not possible to replicate our 4-block model because WVS is limited in its focus on moral boundaries and cultural membership.

Table 9. World Values Survey-Wave7 (2018, Turkey): Logistic Regression of Responses to opposing homosexual neighbors

Independent variables	Model 1	
	Exp (β)	SE
Gender (male)	0.92	.121
Age (higher)	1.01	.005*
Education (less than university)	1.10	.148
Subjective class (lower)	1.37	.072***
Inequality perception (higher)	0.94	.024*
Location (rural)	1.43	.148*
Belief in God (yes)	0.72	.318
Religious attendance (more than once a week)	1.59	.268
Religion important in life (Yes)	1.87	.178***
Meaning of religion (other world)	1.56	.131***
My religion is the only acceptable one (agree)	2.30	.152***
Constant	0.38	.457
χ^2	197.08***	df=11
Cases correctly classified, %	79.2	
R^2 (Negelkerke)	.155	

Note: N=1869, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

The findings largely overlap with our findings in the sense that variables about "public morality" have a closer affinity to anti-LGBTQ views compared to socioeconomic factors and religiosity. Gender and education are two demographic factors that have no significant relationship. Rural and older respondents with lower (subjectively evaluated) class positions are more likely to oppose "homosexual" neighbors. Variables intended to measure private religiosity have no significant relationship to the disapproval of LGBTQ neighbors. These include belief in God (believers and non-believers are equally anti-LGBTQ) and religious attendance (frequent mosque attendance is not a significant predictor of anti-LGBTQ attitudes). On the contrary, public morality is strongly associated with the tendency to disapprove of "homosexual" neighbors. Respondents who support the view that religion should play an important role in life have 1.87 higher odds of disapproving "homosexual" neighbors. Those who argue that only their religion is the acceptable one are 2.85 times more likely to express disapproval. Similarly, those respondents who say that the purpose of religion is to make sense of life after death rather than of this world are 1.7 times more likely to oppose LGBTQ neighbors.

While the demographic variables do not perfectly match (in the analysis of our survey, for example, gender maintained its significance in the overall model), the broader picture in both surveys clearly overlap. First, the disapproval of LGBTQ neighbors is as intense as ever, even though LGBTQ individuals merely serve as hypothetical others in the absence of actual social encounters. Second, the intensity of the disapproval is not simply a matter of generic prejudice but an expression of exclusion from cultural membership in the national community. This discourse of exclusion cuts through demographic variables as well as religiosity and maps onto statements of public morality—a vision of how the morality of *others* should be shaped.

Conclusion

Although LGBTQ activism resulted in policy changes in Turkiye since the 1980s, members of the LGBTQ community remain largely invisible, especially outside urban areas. However, "homosexuality" has been one of most consistently disapproved identities in the country. This paper

attempts to explain this disparity between the magnitude of rejection and the invisibility of LGBTQ rights in public debates. What makes people draw such strong boundaries between themselves and the members of a group they are unlikely to have ever knowingly encountered? Because LGBTQ identities are rarely public in the Turkish context, we can safely assume that when people voice their opinions about sexual minorities, they most likely do not refer to actual individuals. Rather, what they rather have in mind is the "homosexual" as a boundary-making category that draws a certain deep-seated moral response.

The boundaries against the LGBTQ are not only deep but are also different from "generic" forms of prejudice against other minority groups. In this paper, we first explored characteristics that frequently appear to be linked with homonegativity in the literature. Among demographic factors, only gender maintains a consistent effect on homophobia in public and private encounters. As far as social context is concerned, diversity is important in reducing negative attitudes. It is important to note that homonegativity goes beyond the urban-rural distinctions. Religion and religiosity are also generally linked with negative attitudes, although we found that private instances of religion, religious attendance, and religiosity do not shape attitudes toward the LGBTQ. The effects of religion and religiosity rely on a moral language that claims that religious identity is important for good citizenship, that society's rules should be based on religion and that all traditional values regarding family and morality should be accommodated by the public. Political discourses linked to the moral foundations shape individuals' moral repertoires. Religion gives a clear voice to public morality and cultural membership. Discursive resources from religion potentially contributes to the symbolic construction of boundaries people draw around national identity. It is primarily through boundary drawing based on public morality, and not the individual commitments to religion that Turkish people adopt a narrow vision of private acceptance and national belonging.

What explains the particularity of the views toward "homosexuality" (as well as atheists and cohabiting heterosexual couples) is the specific alignment of a moral worldview with cultural membership in the operation symbolic of boundaries. While homophobia does not correlate with private expressions of religion and religiosity, strong links exist between people's views of a moral and just society and who should be accepted as "good" or "full" members of this society. Attitudes toward sexual minorities are an important indicator of a person's view of morality defined as such. Public morality, rather than religiosity, explains homonegativity, because it is more likely to be associated with a person's view of community, public trust, and civic life. Our findings support the argument that sexual minorities are persistent outsiders in Turkiye because they are perceived to have rejected cultural values and practices understood as constitutive of public morality, civic virtue, and national identity (Edgell et al., 2016). Examining the attitudes towards "homosexuality" sheds light more on the general process of moral boundary making in Turkiye and reveals the continued centrality of public morality as a symbolic boundary maker, rather than the censure of sexual minorities by religion.

Cultural and moral views matter because homophobia is part of people's worldviews that privilege certain moral choices over others. These perceptions may have overlaps with a core set of views about tolerance and prejudice for out-groups in general. But, more importantly, the symbolic boundary drawn vis-à-vis "homosexuals" tells us more about the core values of belonging and solidarity in Turkish society. Although secularists and Muslims appear to be in perpetual conflict in Turkish society, boundaries drawn along the lines of sexuality go beyond religion and religiosity in reinforcing moral order in Turkiye. When it comes to moral values of what is good,

what is right, and who belongs in a framework of cultural membership, "homosexuals" are not merely seen as yet another minority group. Instead, people in Turkiye construct the members of this group as the symbolic opposite of the moral and cultural basis of society. Studying homophobia reveals the nature and the strength of symbolic boundaries as well as their cultural content.

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Research Article

Iranian Merchants as a Religious Community in Late Ottoman Istanbul

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ABSTRACT

Long-term peace between the Ottoman Empire and Iran provided an opportunity for Iranians to carry out various activities, especially trade, in the Ottoman Empire. Istanbul, the link between Asia and Europe, had become a point of interest to Iranian merchants as early as the 18th century, but it was particularly during the second half of the 19th century that one could speak of a well-organized Iranian community at the heart of the social and commercial life of the city. This community, formed mainly by merchants, was also a religious community belonging to the Shia sect, which enabled them to act together and form an organized community in Ottoman Istanbul, the population of which consisted mainly of Sunni Muslims. The combination of religious, cultural, social, and other practices of the Iranian merchants had brought an institutionalization along with it, and thus memories were created that would leave a legacy in the cultural history of Istanbul. Through an investigation of state archives in Turkey, this study aims to explore the story of Iranian merchants during the 19th century Ottoman period in Istanbul, focusing on their commercial, social and religious lives. The findings of the study shed light on the institutionalization of Iranian merchants as a close-knit community based on their commitment to sect-based practices.

Keywords: Iranian merchants, Ottoman, Istanbul, Shiite, religious community

1. Introduction

Despite rivalries between the Ottoman Empire and Iran as two Muslim countries, it is well-known that they succeeded in keeping a long-lasting state of peace for centuries. This enabled Iranian citizens to travel around, trade, and establish and manage foundations within the Ottoman Empire. Since the 1500s, Iranians had migrated to the Ottoman Empire primarily for social and political reasons (Sasani, 2006, p. 73–74). Iranians living in the Ottoman Empire played important roles in the economic, social, cultural, and political spheres of the Empire. In the early 19th century, Iranian merchants became increasingly interested in different cities of Anatolia for trading purposes. During the period from the 1800s until the 1920s, these merchants were at the heart of a well-organized Iranian society and took active roles in the social, political, and economic spheres both of Istanbul and of other Anatolian cities.

In the middle of the 19th century, the trade route between Istanbul and Tabriz was revitalized. With the advent of steamship technology, Europe's interest in trade in the Black Sea and Iran had surged. Added to this, the political developments, economic difficulties, and newly emerging social needs in Iran during the 19th century played a role in the revitalization of the trade route between Istanbul and Tabriz. At the time when Iran was experiencing economic difficulties, the increasing pressures of states wishing to expand their spheres of influence - such as Britain and Russia - almost put Iran into the position of being a colonial state. The success of Iranian merchants carrying out commercial activities outside of Iran encouraged other Iranian merchants to do the same. Thus, during this period, the number of Iranian merchants increased adequately to allow them to create colonies in European cities such as London, Marseille, and Manchester, as was already the case in Istanbul, Baghdad, Baku, Bombay, and Calcutta (Pavlovic and others, 1951, p. 25).

Istanbul had already become an important center for Iranian merchants. Products brought from Iran or produced in Istanbul were marketed to Europe from there. According to Rudolf Gödel, an Austrian merchant trading on the Istanbul-Trabzon-Erzurum-Tabriz route at that time, European companies did not develop direct commercial relations with Iran. Rather, they conducted trade with Iran through companies located in Istanbul. These companies in Istanbul served as intermediaries by connecting them with Tabriz, the center from which Iranian goods were collected for trade with Europe (Issawi, 1971, p. 100).

The presence of Iranian merchants in Istanbul played an important role in the commercial life of the city during the final period of the Ottoman Empire, and this presence certainly left its mark on the social, political, and religious spheres of the time. The fact that these Iranians belonged to the Shia sect was decisive in their formation as a close-knit community in Ottoman Istanbul, where the majority of the population was Sunni Muslim. Their activities and attempts to meet the religious, cultural, social, and other needs of this community gave way to an institutionalization that would meet the aforementioned needs of Iranians for a long time. Such attempts also created memories that left a legacy in the cultural history of Istanbul. Since the 1850s, the period in which larger numbers of Iranian merchants started to populate Istanbul, they began to build their mosques, cemeteries, and hospitals, also establishing schools for their children. They also made significant contributions to the cultural life of Istanbul with their printing and publication activities, including newspapers and magazines. Their traces in the urban space of Istanbul are still visible today in certain architectural structures such as the Iranian Mosque and the Iranian Cemetery. These also indicate that, particularly during the period from the 1850s to the 1920s, the activities of Iranian merchants in Istanbul were focused around the formation of a social and religious life for the Shiite community.

Iranians, who were extremely active in the commercial life of Istanbul at that period, also carried out important activities in the political field. A new space had emerged in Istanbul for opponents of the shah's rule in Iran. The Constitutional Monarchy in Iran (1906) and the Constitutional Monarchy in the Ottoman Empire (1908) were in the same period. During the period leading up to the Constitutional Monarchy, the Iranians in Istanbul conducted some activities in relation to the Iranian constitution, and they worked to strengthen their relations with the Committee of Union and Progress, the leading constitutionalist movement in the Ottoman Empire. They even published newspapers with the intent that their policies could reach every region where Iranians lived. Indeed, the scholarly literature underlines that the Ottoman Empire was a role model for some members of Iran's political and religious elite during the Tanzimat period and the reign of Abdulhamid II (Çetinsaya, 2000, p. 13).

The busy lives of Iranian merchants in commercial, religious, social, and political spheres are evidenced by the accumulation of numerous documents in the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey's Directorate of State Archives, and this has attracted the attention of researchers in recent years. These studies are, however, limited in that they shed light exclusively on the commercial and political activities of the Iranian merchants. Bringing in the dimension of religion, this present study focuses on the Iranian merchants as members of a Shiite community in Istanbul. It explores their activities in the intersections of religion, economy, and politics through document analysis of the primary sources retrieved from the the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey's Directorate of State Archives. In this study, these primary sources were supported with reference to the existing scholarly literature on Iranians living in different historical periods of the Ottoman Empire. These sources were used to explore the commercial and religious activities, and the social relations of Iranian merchants in Istanbul. Based on the findings, the study sheds light on the institutionalization of Iranian merchants as a close-knit community drawn together by their commitment to Shiite practices.

The study is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the historical background of the Iranians in Ottoman Istanbul and Anatolia. The following sections explore the commercial and religious activities and the social relations of Iranian merchants in Istanbul respectively.

2. Iranians in Ottoman Istanbul and Anatolia

The presence of Iranians in Istanbul and Anatolia goes back to the 1500s. According to Han Melik Sasani, who served as the Iranian Ambassador in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, when the Ottoman commanders organized expeditions to Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and the Caucasus, they brought many Iranians to Istanbul either by their own will or by force. In 1514, Selim I forced the people of Tabriz to migrate and brought them to the Ottoman Empire. In the political environment of the period, many prominent people left Iran either due to internal conflicts or for personal reasons (Sasani, 2006, p. 73).

Wars between Iran and the Ottoman Empire between 1578-1639 negatively affected the trade relations between the two countries. Tabriz, which until then had had a central position in the silk trade with the Ottomans, lost its importance, and Isfahan and the Persian Gulf came to the forefront as the new centers of trade. After the 1750s, Iranian merchants of Azerbaijani origin increased their trade with the Ottomans and turned Tabriz into an important trade center once again (Kurtuluş, 2010, p. 175). Starting from this period, the migration of Iranian merchants to Ottoman cities began to accelerate.

The Trabzon-Tabriz transit road was opened in 1830, and with the development of steamship technology, the importance of port cities such as Istanbul, Trabzon and Samsun surged. The creation of a trade route between these cities and Tabriz as well as increasing European interest in trade in the Black Sea and in Iran were among the most influential factors in the migratory movements of Iranian merchants to certain Ottoman cities, especially Istanbul (Dığıroğlu, 2014, p. 71).

In addition to this, factors such as the economic policies of Iran and the profitability of trade for Iranians led Iranian merchants to conduct trade abroad. Studies conducted on the period show that Iranian merchants greatly preferred Tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, India, North Africa, and West Africa as places in which to conduct trade abroad (Atabaki, 2010).

Archive documents show that Iranian merchants began to populate Istanbul in large numbers after the second half of the 19th century. It was noted in a census conducted in 1851 that the total number of Iranian merchants living in Istanbul and dealing with trade was 243. Most of these merchants resided in central trade places of Istanbul such as Beyazıt, Beşiktaş, Üsküdar, and the surrounding areas. These were Iranian citizens who were engaged in trade activities. It is also understood that one hundred of these 243 merchants were involved in the tobacco trade (BOA, İ.HR, .74/3603). This number increases considerably when Iranians who were engaged in work other than trade in Istanbul are also taken into account.

Nevertheless, it is not possible to present an exact number of Iranians who lived in Ottoman Istanbul and Anatolia at that time. The rate of immigration fluctuated from one year to another. Besides, while many Iranians became Ottoman citizens, others were not registered. Based on the data obtained from the consulate's notebooks, Han Melik Sasani, the Iranian ambassador in the 1920s, gives information about Iranians living in Ottoman cities other than Istanbul. For example, the number of Iranians living in Anatolia between 1873 and 1890 who received residence permits was approximately 10,800. In 1919, the number of Iranians in Anatolia was 1843 (Sasani, 2006, p. 77–81).[1] As of 1908, a total of 20,000 Iranians lived in Istanbul (Afary, 1996, p. 231). These Iranians mainly lived in Beyoğlu, Boğaziçi, Üsküdar, Kadıköy, and on the Princes Islands. Yet, the most intense commercial activities took place in Valide Han (BOA, DH.KMS, 25/34).

According to Sasani, among those who came to the Ottoman Empire from Iran, there were also descendants of Iran's ancient dynasties. Some of them assumed senior positions in the Ottoman Empire (Sasani, 2006, p. 74).[2] Many Iranian names and nicknames are listed among the people who were tradesmen in the market, even among ordinary people. The majority of these Iranians became Ottoman citizens. According to the data obtained from the consulate notebook, the number of people who remained Iranian citizens was approximately 16,000. 80% of them were of Azerbaijani origin and came from Tabriz, Khoy, Salmas, Shabestar, and Mamkan. Azerbaijanis were followed by the people of Isfahan, Tehran, Kazvin, Khorasan, and Kashan (Sasani, 2006, p. 74). According to Sakamoto, the high density of Azerbaijanis among Iranian merchants has to do with their place of residence being closer to Istanbul, the similarity between the Azerbaijani language and Ottoman Turkish, and the competence of Azerbaijanis in trade (Sakamoto, 1993, p. 68).

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1   Questioning the reasons for the rapid decrease in the number of Iranians, Sasani stated that they either acquired foreign citizenship due to the persecution of the Ottomans, or were conscripted to the Ottoman army, or some of them were killed by Iranian consular officials. (For detailed information, see Sasani, 2006, p. 77–81)

2   For example, Haydarizade İbrahim Efendi is from the Safavid dynasty, his ancestry goes back to Sheikh Haydar, the grandfather of Shah Ismail. He had important duties in the Ottoman state. He served as a Shaykh al-Islam. He was a mild-tempered, kind person with various virtues. He is known with his help and support to Iranians. Mustafa Zihni Pasha Babanzade, who was the governor of Hejaz for a period, was originally from Suleymaniye Iranians. He has a love for Iran in his heart. (Sasani, 2006, p.74).

3. Commercial Activities

The abovementioned institutionalization of Iranians in the Ottoman Empire is evidence of Iranian merchants' success in trade. It also shows their wealth as well as the responsibilities they undertook to help other Iranians, which made them the forerunners of the wider Iranian community in the Ottoman Empire. These merchants brought about the allocation of a cemetery to Iranians in 1853 (BOA, İ.HR, 104/5103), the establishment of a hospital for Iranians in 1883, and the opening of a school for Iranians in 1884 (Sasani, 2006, p. 81–83). Similarly, the period of mourning organized by the Iranians in Istanbul during the month of Muharram was also conducted under the leadership of these merchants. Indeed, the commercial centers where the merchants were largely located (Valide Han and the inns around it) and the neighborhoods where they resided (Üsküdar) were the places where Muharram mourning was organized for many years (Kurşun, 2007, p. 204–205).

According to Sasani, Iranians tried many jobs and professions and they did not turn away from any field. The Persian carpet trade was mainly in the hands of Iranians with a large number of well-known merchants among them. The carpet trade was followed by bookselling and manufacturing. Some jobs in the market, such as cigarette sales, were considered as occupations exclusive to Iranians. Most of the tea and coffee vendors, as well as the car and phaeton drivers were also Iranian. Each artisan group had its own leader, and these people were called "butlers" in Istanbul (Sasani, 2006, p. 74–75).[3] Other than the professions already mentioned here, Iranians in Istanbul were also active in professions such as calligraphy, bookbinding, papermaking, street trading/greengrocery, *sakalık* (dealing with irrigation in rural areas), and glassmaking (Dığıroğlu, 2014, p. 79).

Among the Iranian merchants, Mohammed Tahir Tabrizi stands out as an important figure in the printing trade. Tabrizi migrated to Istanbul from Tabriz when he was in his 20s and got a license to open a printing house in 1862 (BOA, DH.MDK, 220/88). He first worked as a typographer in Istanbul for many years, and then had a printing house in Valide Han and a bookshop in Hakkaklar Bazaar (BOA, DH.MDK, 154/90). He had close ties with other Iranians residing in Istanbul and had an important position among the Iranian merchants. He provided financial support and accommodation for those who came to Istanbul from Iran for either short or long durations. He even guided the pilgrims who used the Istanbul route to go on a pilgrimage during their stay in Istanbul (Yıldız, 2017, p. 179). Among the many activities of Tabrizi, the publishing of the "Ahter" newspaper, published in Persian between 1876 and 1896, stands out as deserving significant attention. "Ahter" advocated Sultan Abdulhamid II's understanding of the Islamic Union and became an important medium that housed social and political reflections of Ottoman-Iranian relations.

The carpet and tobacco trades were also among the important commercial activities of Iranian merchants. According to Tsutoma, Istanbul played a vital part in Iran's trade with Europe during the Qajar dynasty. For example, Manchester cotton products to be exported to Iran were first brought to Greek or Armenian merchants in Istanbul as wholesale products. Later, these were exported to Iran by Armenian or Azerbaijani merchants who regularly visited Istanbul. Iran did not have to export its commercial products directly to Europe. Until the 1860s Gilan silk was

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3   There were many reputable and wealthy people among Iranian merchants. One of them is Hacı Mirza Fethali Isfahani. He has leather, soap, dyeing, carpet washing and halva factories. He has employed hundreds of Iranians over the years. He buit each of these factories with his own work and managed all of them himself. (See Sasani, 2006, p.74–75).

typically sent to the markets of Milan and Marseille via Istanbul. The time when the silk trade started to lose its importance in the 1870s was the very time which saw the rise of the carpet trade. Until the First World War, Istanbul was one of the main centers from which Persian carpets were exported to Europe and the United States (Sakamoto, 1993, p.58).

According to the 1851 census, almost half of the Iranian merchants (100 out of 243) were involved in the tobacco trade (BOA, İ.HR, 74/3603). There were wealthy and reputable people among the tobacco merchants (Sasani, 2006, p. 79–80).[4] According to Tsutomu, Iran's hookah tobacco was of higher quality than that of other Muslim countries. This tobacco was exported regularly to Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and the Hijaz Region. Istanbul was a place where tobacco was consumed heavily. At the same time, Istanbul was a center where tobacco was distributed to other regions. Indeed, it is well known that there were many Iranian tobacco merchants in Istanbul during the tobacco protest movements in 1891 and 1892 (Sakamoto, 1993, p.58; Issawi, 1971, p.247–249).

Iranian merchants, especially the Azerbaijani Turks of Tabriz, actively continued to trade in Istanbul until World War I. However, Istanbul's prospects of becoming a worldwide carpet market were damaged at the beginning of World War I. The reasons for this included the lockout which was applied to the Bosphorus at the beginning of the war and the increase in customs duties, which before the war had stood at 7% in the carpet trade. In the years of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, Istanbul lost its importance in the international carpet trade. London became the new center of the international carpet trade, and Iranian and Armenian merchants moved from Istanbul to London (Sakamoto, 1993, p.70).

4. Social Relations and Religious Activities

Iranian merchants' economic activities cannot be understood in isolation from their religious activities, which helped them form a close-knit community. As mentioned in the documents in the archive, the Iranians in Istanbul belonged to the Shia sect and as was visible from the wide range of religious practices, religion constituted an important part of their social life. Although both the Iranians and the locals of Istanbul were Muslim, differences in sect led Iranians to seek alternative religious and social spaces in Istanbul. Indeed, pious Iranian citizens requested the Ottoman administration to provide them with a place of worship specifically for their sects. As per their request, a mosque was allocated to them. They acquired a cemetery to bury their deceased. They turned their trade locations and routes with their mosques and cemeteries into the main routes where Muharram mourning was performed. In a sense, they shaped their commercial and social lives within the framework of sect-based religious practices.

The mourning of Muharram, one of the most important rituals of the Shia sect, was significantly influential as a means of showing the religious activities of the Iranians in Istanbul to the public and as a way of forming social relations among Iranians. A look at the Iranian merchants' far-reaching economic and social activities clearly shows that they were extremely dynamic, well-organized, in solidarity, and successful. Their sect-related religious practices and rituals were inflenutial in the establishment of this solidarity and in drawing the boundaries of a close-knit community. For exam-

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4 According to Sasani, "An Iranian named Ali Parağanlı had a reputable tobacco shop in Beşiktaş. This person, in his 50s, had been trading tobacco in Istanbul for more than 30 years. He was never married and used to sleep in the shop at night. Everyone knew that the palace women left their jewels entrusted to him, as he was close to the sultan's palace and he was shopping with the palace dwellers. It was spoken among people that he had a lot of money and that he had precious jewels in his shop. One morning towards the end of November 1920, in the month of Muharram, the news that Tütüncü Ali had died at night was heard…" (For detailed information also see. Sasani, 2006, p.79–80).

ple, Sasani noted that Iranians who married Ottoman women at that time mostly complained about their situation, and after some time most of these marriages ended in divorce. Accordingly, the sect difference between the couples caused most of the Shiite Iranian men who married a Sunni Ottoman woman to be unhappy. This was in fact one of the main reasons why Iranian men did not marry Ottoman Sunni women. These problems led to the enactment of a law by the Istanbul government in 1874 banning Ottoman women from marrying Iranian men (Yurt, 2019). Sasani, who for a while thought that this ban was a disadvantage for Iran and therefore strived for its repeal, later thought that it was in fact favorable for Iran. He points out his reflection on the sect difference in marriage by stating that *"Fortunately, the number of people married to Ottoman women is extremely low and religious feelings play an important role in this"* (Sasani, 2006, p.75–76). As is evident in this example of a ban on marriage , sometimes Iranians as a Shiite community suffered social exclusion in the dominantly Sunni Ottoman society. For this reason, Iranians confined their daily lives and social relationships within their own cultural ghettos. According to François Georgeon, Iranians used to gather in coffeehouses around Valide Han in their free time. Ali Ekber's Teahouse, located in the Kumkapı district, was another important social place where Iranians got together. This teahouse was marked by a portrait of Shah Muzafferuddin hung on its wall. The Iranian flag (with lion and sun) was also hung on its door every Friday (Georgeon, 1999, p.54–55).

Erika Glassen's research shows that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Iranians in Istanbul were not yet such a respected community that they could organize Muharram mourning publicly (Glassen, 1993, p.113). Hammer's writings in 1822 support this view. According to Hammer, the number of Iranians in Istanbul was so small that they were drowned in the vast ocean of people. Most of them were merchants or dervishes. As Shiites, i.e. heretics, they were nowhere allowed to raise their heads. And as heretics, they were more hated than the Jews by the fanatic orthodox Sunnis (Glassen, 1993, p. 113). This hatred and social exclusion were observed by the French traveler Gerard de Nerval, who conveyed memories about the social life of Iranians in Istanbul in his book *Le Voyage en Orient*. During a visit to Istanbul during the 1840s, Nerval wore Iranian clothes and stayed at the Yıldız inn where the Iranians were staying because Christians were not allowed to stay in the area where the inns were located. He introduced himself to others as an Iranian merchant. His memoirs show that the Iranians were interested in him, and he spent time with them by visiting coffeehouses. He noted that from time to time the local people thought that he was Iranian, and he felt that he was excluded because of the sect (Nerval, 2017, p.313–327).

Drawing on such writings, some researchers have explored the ways in which the Shiite-Iranians were able to organize publicly visible Muharram mourning practices in the heart of Istanbul, the capital of the Sunni Caliphate, while being excluded as a minority group. According to Sasani, Iranian ambassador Hacı Mirza Huseyin Khan's (1858-1870) close relationship with the pioneers of the Ottoman Tanzimat reformers (e.g. Mithat Pasha, Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha) probably had a lot to do with the Iranians getting permission to organize public ceremonies for Muharram mourning. These relationships had also influenced Hacı Mirza Huseyin Khan deeply and he tried to copy some of the administrative reforms they had carried out in the Ottoman Empire when he was later Prime Minister in Iran (Sasani, 2006, p.185). Similarly, according to Gordlevski, the Ottoman grand vizier Ali Pasha, a former Bektashi, had protected the Shiite mourning of Muharram in Istanbul (Gordlevski, 1993, p. 169). However, Erika Glassen claimed that it was not only sign of religious tolerance on the part of the Ottoman authorities to allow the Shiite Muharram observances, but it was also an indication of the strength and self-confidence of the Iranian community (Glassen, 1993, p.113).

5. Muharram Observances as a Social Institution

Valide Han, full of the bustle of commercial life, and the Iranian cemetery in Üsküdar (Seyit Ahmet Deresi), were important centers for the Iranians in Istanbul. Most of the merchants carried out their commercial activities in Valide Han and its surrounding inns. Similarly, they resided in areas close to their workplaces, some in Valide Han and its surroundings, and some in Üsküdar and some other regions. The flamboyant Muharram mourning that Iranians conduct every year in the month of Muharram was held in those regions. It is not yet known when exactly the mourning of Muharram first began to be held in Istanbul. However, Sasani states that Iranians in Istanbul did not organize the Muharram observations publicly before the time of Hacı Mirza Huseyin Khan, and that the mourning in Istanbul started thanks to his power and influence (Sasani, 2006, p.85). Mirza Huseyin Khan started his duty in Istanbul in 1858 as the Iranian ambassador and continued this duty until 1870 (Sasani, 2006, p.185). It can be inferred from these findings that the Muharram mourning in Istanbul started in the 1860s (Glassen, 1993, p.114).

There are many documents in the state archives regarding the performance of the mourning of Muharram. These documents indicate that the mourning would start every year in the month of Muharram in Valide Han and would finish in Üsküdar. A document dated 23 September 1887 presents information about the Muharram mourning as well as some social reflections on mourning and some measures to be taken. According to a letter written by Süreyya Pasha, Head Clerk of Mabeyn, to the Grand Vizier, Iranians living in Istanbul gathered in the inns every year and they would practice mourning from the first night of the month of Muharram to the tenth night. They would make a noise in the streets as they moved in groups from one inn to another. On the tenth night of the month of Muharram, around 150-200 Iranians would be wearing white shirts, hitting their heads with swords and daggers, and shedding blood. Another group would go to Valide Han singing elegies in a choir and beating their hearts and they would go back the same way. Students, residents, and some foreigners would gather on the roads to watch the mourning. Some Ottoman women even went to the inns during the day to watch the observations.

In his letter, the Head Clerk of Mabeyn mentions the possibility of a poignant social problem. If one of the locals or foreigners gathered in the streets or inns during the mourning smiled, the Iranians could interpret it as making fun of them. Süreyya Pasha further notes that there is nothing to say that Iranians should perform their mourning in their inns per their sects and beliefs. However, making a noise on the streets at night, being drenched in blood due to sword and dagger wounds on the tenth night of Muharram, gathering in Valide Han singing elegies in a choir, and going out from there to other shops would not have had a good effect on the public. The letter continues with the suggestion that Ottoman women should be prohibited from entering the inns for the purpose of watching the mourning, even during the day (BOA, İ.DH, 82523). As understood from the warnings here, there was a concern that public order could be undermined as the mourning practices had the potential to be transformed from a religious practice to a spectacular ceremony, which could have negative effects on society. Despite these concerns, there were no restrictions on Iranians organizing mourning rituals as per their beliefs (Kurşun, 2007, p.205).

Looking at the Muharram observations in later years, it is understood that the state dignitaries' warnings on confining the mourning to within the Valide Han were largely ignored. A similar warning was made both in 1887 and then again the following year (BOA, İ.DH, 86049). In fact, the Iranian Ambassador Muhsin Han was kindly warned and asked that the mourning should not go beyond the Valide Han in order to avoid any possible problems (BOA, İ.DH, 86124). However, despite such warnings, the observations, which included noisy practices and large crowds of par-

ticipants, continued to spread over a broad area every year. A regular Muharram mourning would begin in Beyazıt and its surroundings and end at the end of the day in the Seyit Ahmet Deresi in Üsküdar. Considering the large number of participants and the extent of the mourning, one can say that Iranian citizens in Istanbul were not the only ones who participated in these observances. The Muharram mourning, which was overseen through certain warnings and measures, was a common activity of all Ja'faris, and became a part of the Ottoman public opinion.

While the Shiite Iranians held their period of mourning in the month of Muharram, during the same period Sunnis had the custom of distributing water to the people in the Sünbül Sinan Lodge in Kocamustafapaşa (Köse, 2012, p. 73–74).[5] Therefore, law enforcement had to be maintained for both sides of Istanbul (BOA, ZB, 380/133 – 383/134).[6] Since there were not enough policemen and gendarmes to maintain order in Seyit Ahmet Deresi in Üsküdar, reinforcements were sent to Üsküdar from the European side. These mourning rituals continued for many years and there are many documents regarding the security measures taken, but there is no information that any unrest occurred during the observations. It is understood that the mourning was carried out peacefully every year (Kurşun, 2007, p.209). As a matter of fact, in 1906, the Iranian government awarded Ahmet Remzi, the Chief of Police in Üsküdar, and the commissioners Kadri, Hüsnü and Şevki Effendis with medals named 'Şir ü Hurşid'[7] and permission was obtained from the Ottoman sultan for them to wear them (BOA, ZB, 473/76; 283/134; 338/78). Thus, the Muharram observations were large-scale events for which the administrators made intense efforts to take precautions against any conflict.

Besides, these observations were also the subject of diplomatic relations between countries. The performance of the mourning ritual spread over a broad area in both the European and Anatolian sides of Istanbul. At the same time it attracted the interest of local people and foreigners living in Istanbul. One can argue that the tradition of hitting their bodies with wedges and swords and shedding blood during the period of mourning was effective in the perception of mourning as a spectacular ceremony and non-Shiites would pour out onto the streets to watch these rituals. The Iranian ambassador Sasani was extremely disturbed and complained about the spectacle that the mourning created. He described his meeting with the secretary at the American embassy before the mourning ritual as follows: *"On the ninth day of the month of Muharram, they were constantly making phone calls from foreign embassies and saying, 'please book a place for us at the show tonight'. After some research, I learned that the ambassadors before me had allocated a special place in Valide Han so that foreign embassies could see the wedging better. Meanwhile, the maid went in and said that the secretary in the American embassy had come and had a very important issue to talk about with you. After the small talk, we had a conversation like this:*

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5 On the tenth day of the month of Muharram, Sunnis have the custom of distributing water in the Sünbül Sinan Dervish Lodge, but it is said that Iranian Shiites also visited here and performed mourning here. It is believed that the mausoleum known as the "Tomb of Double Sultans" in Dergah belongs to daughters of Prophet Hussein, named Fatima and Sakine. Rumours has it that Fatima and Sakine were captured in one of the crusades, and brought to Istanbul by sea. Respectfully to that, Iranians were visiting the Sünbül Sinan Dervish Lodge in the month of Muharram and doing mourning. (Köse, 2012, p. 73–74).

6 On the day of mourning on 7 February 1907, police were tasked in Sünbül Sinan Lodge and Üsküdar to prevent possible tensions and to ensure security. (BOA, ZB. 380/133; ZB. 383/134).

7 Şir ü Hurşid is a description that originates from Mesopotamia and Iran. It has become a symbol for celestial events that emanate from astrological beings. It has become the national emblem of Iran in the historical process and is associated with Shiism. The medals given by the Iranian state were named as "Şir ü Hurşid" and these medals featured the traditional lion and sun depiction. (For more information see; Turan, 2017)

- Where will the Iranians break their heads tonight?

- I don't know.

- Are they doing this without saying anything to the Iranian embassy?

- Yes, because this is something sectarian, it has nothing to do with the embassy.

- How is it that the members of a nation shed their blood in a foreign country without the knowledge of their embassy?

- Yes, it is like this in Iran and there are many examples (Sasani, 2006, p. 87).

Before the appointment of Hacı Mirza Huseyin Khan as Iranian ambassador in Istanbul between 1858 and 1870, it had not been common to practice self-flagellation in the period of Muharram mourning. Iranians had not attended public condolence ceremonies in that period. However, the influence and power of Mirza Huseyin Khan enabled them to organize elegizing councils in Istanbul, just like in Iran (Sasani, 2006, p. 85).

The tradition of blood-shedding by hitting with swords and wedges, which turned the mourning into a spectacular ceremony and attracted the interest of non-Shia people, occasionally caused disputes and important debates among the Iranians. Devout merchants and other religious Iranians who cared about religious rituals, embassy workers representing the state of Iran, and Iranian reformists who were in favor of modernization could be listed among the parties to these disputes and controversies.

As we understand from the notes of the Iranian ambassador Sasani, sometimes people came from distant regions to watch this demonstration of the Iranians and to slander and mock the customs of the eastern nations. This situation was seen as something embarrassing for the Iranian reformists living in Istanbul. At the beginning of World War I, under the pretext of confiscating weapons, Iranian wedges were also taken. Iranian reformists were very pleased with this situation. During the war, it was only reading of elegies that took place, and no self-flagellation occurred. Criticizing the attitude of some Iranians in Istanbul at that time, Sasani claims that by bringing people together under the name of a religious ceremony, they used the religious feelings of people for their worldly purposes, and even the Iranian consulate staff sabotaged the self-flagellation in the rituals in order to put him in a difficult situation (Sasani, 2006, p.86).

The way in which the mourning of Muharram , which left important historical memories of that era of Istanbul, was performed and the effect it had on the beholder, was recorded in the works of some authors who lived in that period and who watched the mourning in person.[8] To better understand the performance of the mourning ritual and its effects, it will be useful to present the notes of one of the authors here.

Sadri Sema describes the tenth day of Muharram in Istanbul as follows: "For ten days in Muharram, Iranians used to perform day and night mourning rituals in their inns in Istanbul and their lodges in Seyyidahmet Deresi in Karacaahmet in Üsküdar. On the tenth day, they gather in this lodge from all over Istanbul, some of them pass in groups, some of them scattered, they go to Seyyidahmet Deresi, towards the evening they return to their inns in Istanbul with a regiment

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8   In Sadri Sema's book "Memories From Old Istanbul", the Muharram mourning of Iranians in Istanbul is described in detail. (Sadri Sema, *Eski İstanbul'dan Hatıralar*, Istanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1994. In the article Cemalettin Bildik wrote in the Akşam newspaper on 4 February 1948 with the title "Istanbul Hanları", further information about the execution of the Muharram mournings was presented. (Cemalettin Bildik, *İstanbul Hanları,* Referred from the Akşam Newspaper dated 4 February 1948 by M. Nermi Haskan, *Yüzyıllar Boyunca Üsküdar I*, Istanbul, Üsküdar Belediyesi Yayınları, 2001, p. 222). "*Asitane, Evvel Zaman İçinde İstanbul I*" by A. Ragıp Akyavaş also decsribes mournings in detail. (A. Ragıp Akyavaş, Asitane, Evvel Zaman İçinde İstanbul I, Ankara, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2004).

equipped with flags. A sad ritual, even a bloody farewell, a sorrow…

Now, on the tenth day of this Muharram, Üsküdar would be the meeting place for the people of not only Üsküdar but all of Istanbul. From the Bosphorus, the Princes' Islands, Kadıköy and all over Istanbul, women, men, and children would pour into the streets of Üsküdar. The rooms, windows, and balconies of all shops were rented. Wooden sofas and couches were built on empty plots, and places were sold for five or ten piastres. An indescribable situation. All those streets, especially Üsküdar Bazaar, would be a flowing groove. It would be difficult to walk on the crowded roads. In the morning people would go to the Seyyidahmet Deresi, and in the evening, they would go along the bazaar, to the pier square.

All Iranians come to Üsküdar on the first ferry. With tea samovars, hookahs, carpets, flags, and chains in their hands and on their shoulders, they rush to the Seyyidahmet Deresi. Prayers and elegies are recited there until the evening. *Ahonds* made speeches, performed rituals, and tears were shed.

When the evening approached, they would gather, line up in order, and arrange groups. They would swing around in the form of a mourning procession, a convoy of sorrow, a mass of remorse. This anguish portraying this sorrow, this place of mourning, the sadness of the Karbala, would be really painful, poisonous, and sad. A meaningful apocalypse… Police and gendarmerie used to line both sides of the roads to prevent any chaos. In the front, the Iranian hodjas, *ahonds*, with white, green turbans, black and green robes, henna beards, black eyes, would pass in formations of orderly rings. Behind them, lush elegy readers with beautiful voices would recite sad odes. Every line of these elegies was followed by a ferocious, bitter groan, a big hum, and deep cries. Screams of regret mixed with tears, deep woes.

In my childhood, the most famous reader of this ritual, this mass of sorrow, was the beautiful, strong and touching voice of a man named Arap Ahmet. I remember it like it was yesterday. There were also other *hafizes*, elegy readers. While they read, the whole group would swell, enthrall, groan, cry, and burst into sobs.

Arap Ahmet, with his hands on his ears, in the middle, would recite facing the group, shouting:

Ya şah-ı Kerbela, nereva bunca gam sana?
Derd-i demadem-ü elem-i dembedem sana?

This couplet was followed by the cries of the whole group, the *sayhas*;
- Ali! Husayn!
How? With heartbreaking howls and moans…
Another elegy reader cried in a sad voice in another group:

Berk-i sehab-ı hadiseden tiğler çeküp,
Yer yer havale-i şüheda kıldın ey felek!

Bir rahm kılmadın ciğeri kan olanlara.
Gurbetde rûzkârı perişan olanlara![9]

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9   The couplets mentioned here belong to Fuzuli's verse in his famous work "Hadikatu's-Suada" in which he describes the Karbala incident. It respectively means; "O fate, you had drawn swords from the lightning of the residing cloud"; "And then, you swung one by one at the martyrs and slaughtered them"; "You had never had mercy on those whose liver is full of blood,"; "And nor on those whose lives and dooms miserable in the foreign land."

Such painful words would be mixed with painful sighs and with tears of fire, and this group of mourning would stir up more emotions. Hearts and eyes were painted with mourning and sorrow.

Further back, on rows of horses, pigeons, tied in white shrouds with their wings painted with blood, passed. This was a symbol of the tragedy... This was followed by flags painted and soaked in various colors, inscriptions, and pictures. From far behind, on both sides of the convoy, in two or three rows, the *fedais* beat their open chests with fists, punching them as if they wanted to tear themselves to pieces… There were several idlers gathered in four corners or in circles in the middle, poor people drenched in blood, with bare chests and backs. They had tassel-shaped chains with stems in their hands, bare backs, and bare chests, "Sharrk! Sharrk!" They would beat and tear our hearts. The clatter of these bloody chains is still in my ears. What was the anger and the bloody torture that these people showed to injure, crush, beat, and even die for the sake of their ancestors? Why? Where did it come from?

Odes, fists swung in harmony with the elegies, chains that work from right to left, from left to right, soaked in blood, chests covered in red blood and wounds, and the venomous sight of the backs; this is not something that can be erased from the mind. This mourning and this convoy of sorrow would go down the street with chains, wounds, the wounded, punches, screams, convulsions, hiccups, and tears. It would disappear towards the pier. I would look behind them. I would hear the cries that rose from the distance, tearing the clouds:

- Ya Ali!

- Ya Husayn!

- The cruelty!

I think I have heard these sad and mournful cries today as well. The convoy passes, the people disperse. The streets get quiet. I would return to my house, but it's like coming back from a funeral. My heart is poisoned by the spectacle of this harsh tragedy, my eyes are wet, my soul is crushed…" (Sema, 1994, p.100–102).

As so vividly described above by Sadri Sema, Istanbul was one of the cities where the Muharram rituals were organized in the most magnificent way. In the shadow of political events such as World War I, the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied Powers, the collapse of the Ottoman state and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the political atmosphere of Istanbul also changed and Muharram observations came to a halt after the 1920s. Indeed, at that time, Istanbul began to lose its importance in international trade as Iranian traders, like many other foreign traders, left Istanbul. However, the city regained its importance as a place of Shiite practices once again with the migration of Azeri-Shiite Turkish citizens from the eastern provinces of Turkey to Istanbul after the 1960s. They settled in the Halkalı region of Istanbul, and a new Shiite community was formed here. Since the 1990s, glorious Muharram mourning practices have become publicly visible in Halkalı. Since then, many people from different parts of society, even political party leaders, have attended these ritual gatherings. As a matter of fact, the mourning of Muharram , which was organized in Istanbul-Halkalı in 2012, was accepted by UNESCO as the mourning ritual that best reflects the spirit of Ashura (Yeler, 2019, p.214).

6. Conclusion

The stories of Iranian merchants retrieved from the documents in the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey's Directorate of State Archives provide important insight into the commercial life of 19th century Istanbul and the religious practices of a Shia community in a dominantly Sun-

ni society. Through an archival investigation of memoirs, letters and other documents, this study analyzed the commercial activities, religious practices and social relations of Iranian merchants in Istanbul in the last period of the Ottoman Empire.

The findings of the study indicate that Iranian merchants were active in trade (from carpet trade to bookselling through manufacturing to tea and coffee) starting from the 1850s to the 1920s, until the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic, and their presence in Istanbul went further than mere involvement in commercial activities. Their social relations were primarily shaped by their Shiite religious practices, and the leading Iranian merchants were institutionalized as a close-knit community without integrating into Ottoman society by forming sectarian-based institutions. For example, they carried out their commercial activities in the inns around the Beyazıt region, which was the center of trade in Istanbul. Valide Han, one of the most important trade centers of Istanbul, in time began to be known as the Iranian's inn.

Iranian merchants were also religious people belonging to the Shiite sect. Sectarian cleavages between Shiism and Sunnism were influential in drawing the boundaries of social relations between Iranians and the dominantly Sunni Muslim Ottoman society. Iranians, who did not worship in mosques frequented by Sunnis built their own mosques in Valide Han and Seyyit Ahmet Deresi, and they also acquired a cemetery to bury their deceased. Besides religious places, they built their own hospital to provide health services to Iranians and opened schools for their children's education. These institutions specifically catered for meeting the basic needs of Iranian merchants in Istanbul, and pinpoint the fact that Iranians confined their daily lives and social relationships within their own cultural ghettos, leading to the institutionalization of Iranian merchants as a closed Shiite group isolated from the surrounding majority Sunni society.

Notwithstanding the Iranian community's tendency towards keeping to themselves, Iranian merchants strived to develop close political relations with the Ottoman rulers. People who came to Istanbul from Iran and opposed the Iranian administration would stay in Valide Han. Some of them published newspapers, conveying their political ideas to other countries where Iranians lived. In fact, some sources indicate that the constitutional monarchy in Iran in 1906 was inspired by the Ottoman constitutionalists.

Another sphere where Iranian merchants moved beyond the boundaries of their community was the Muharram mourning, the most important religious practice of the Shia sect in the public sphere. In the period from the 1860s to the 1920s, Iranians performed ostentatious mourning rituals in Muharram in Istanbul. The mourning rituals, started in the inns in the Beyazıt region on the 10th day of Muharram every year, continued throughout the day and were completed in the evening in the Üsküdar Seyyit Ahmet Deresi district. The practices of bloodshed by beating their heads with swords and of the recitation of elegies aloud attracted the attention of the local people and even of the diplomatic representatives of European countries. Thus, the mourning of Muharram turned into a public spectacle for both the Sunni community and Western audiences.

All in all, these findings shed light both on the boundaries in which the Iranian merchants isolated themselves and on the ways in which they opened themselves up to the Ottoman society in Istanbul. Their commitment to Shiite practices, the potentially diasporic nature of this community, as well as the ways in which they retained ties with their home country could point to further research questions.

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Research Article

Confronting the First-Level Digital Divide in the Digital Age: A Comparison Between Public and Private University Students in Turkiye

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ABSTRACT

Although access to ICT tools is improving worldwide, the first-level digital divide is still one of the major problems for university students. The inequality that can be seen in the level of access to ICT tools among university students shows that there is more to be said about this problem in the field of higher education. This paper discusses the problem through the example of university students in Turkey. The variables are fixed broadband subscription, ownership of smart TV and paid smart TV applications, a personal computer, and paid mobile applications for ICT access. As a result of the survey given to 2,206 respondents, it showed that private university students have more access to ICTs than public university students, - this difference does not depend only on income level. Additionally, it was determined that there is a significant relationship between income level, parents' education level, where a student lives and ICT ownership. This is significant because as higher education opportunities in Turkey are spread all over the country many students do not have equal access to ICT tools. This study analyzed the effects of the first-level digital divide in Turkey by using a quantitative method.

Keywords: Digitalization, First-level digital divide, undergraduate students, digital inequality, educational inequality

1. Introduction

With its unique nature, digital technologies have created an unusual world, with new jobs, relationships, and ways of working. However, some traditional patterns, like inequalities, continue to exist and become more extreme. According to optimistic scholars, while computers and the Internet are revolutions that diminish social distance, democratize knowledge, and increase social participation, according to critical ones they increase current economic, social, and cultural inequalities. So, the digital divide refers to inequality patterns regarding the distribution of digital technologies and resources. In stratified societies where all resources are distributed unfairly, it is not possible for digital technologies to be shared fairly. For this reason, the digital divide is defined as the unequal distribution of access to and users' skills in information and communication technologies (ICT) among countries and societal strata.

The digital divide generally consists of three levels: access, usage skills, and creating income or benefits. According to this classification, even if the Internet access problem is solved, the skill inequality arising from income, gender, education, age, and other differences cannot be eliminated. Therefore, the digital divide is a multi-dimensional issue. In the literature, there are many studies on second- and third-level digital divides in developed countries. This creates the impression that the first-level digital divide is resolved worldwide. However, the first-level digital divide still requires attention because, having or not having an Internet connection, differences in material access must be considered (Van Deursen & Van Dijk, 2019, p. 355). Thus, this article focuses on the first-level digital divide between undergraduates at private and public universities in Turkey. Turkey is among those countries that have not yet overcome the first dimension of the digital divide. The data from TURKSTAT and OECD that we present below is the clearest indicator of this situation. However, there is not enough research on the first level of the digital divide in Turkey, especially among the young population and undergraduate students.

For this purpose, we compare students in terms of various variables:
* students' personal computer, internet, mobile phone, smart TV, and paid applications ownership (ICT access)
* education level of students' parents, and whether or not they use ICT
* students' residential conditions/patterns (city center, town, countryside)

2. Theoretical Framework: Types of Digital Divide and Educational Inequality

The starting point of the discussions on "the digital divide" is the emergence of ICT, especially computers, mobile phones, and the Internet. Researchers (Dimaggio et al., 2004; Hargittai, 2001; Ragnedda, 2020; Ragnedda & Muschert, 2013, Van Deursen & Van Dijk, 2011; Van Dijk, 2006; Van Dijk & Hacker, 2003; Zillien and Hargittai, 2009) have deeply analyzed the digital divide since the 2000s. The main point of these analyses is inequalities. Accordingly, digital inequalities are reflections of social inequalities. Not only income, but also age, gender, education, race, and location are factors in the emergence of the digital divide. Therefore, if we want to understand the advent and persistence of digital inequalities, we need to comprehend the reproduction of current social inequalities (Ragnedda, 2020, p. 12).

The digital divide consists of three levels, as stated above. The first level is regarding whether or not individuals have access to ICT. Most Marxist scholars (Fuchs, 2015; Fuchs, 2017; Zizek, 2010) think that the digital divide derives from class divisions. Member of the ruling class have higher income levels, are the owners of the means of production, and have digital technologies that are means of production. However, member of the working class, or poor people, have no

access to ICT. Moreover, these inequalities are reproduced in various variables such as age, gender, race, and education. This is evidence that the distribution of digital technologies has created new forms of poverty and exclusion as well as reproducing existing inequalities and social division (Wessels, 2013, p. 18). Ragnedda (2020, p. 41) conceptualizes this new category as "the digital underclass" (underprivileged and disadvantaged class) who access and use the Internet less than others. The digital underclass is highly excluded from knowledge societies because they cannot use social, economic, and cultural resources. Most of them are elderly, unemployed, disabled, less-educated, and lower-income, and lack digital skills. Therefore, they have less access to elementary digital experiments (mental access) and digital skills (skill access), fewer possessions like computers and Internet connections (material access), and fewer usage opportunities (usage access) (Van Dijk & Hacker, 2003, p. 315-316). Based on all this, it can be said that digital and social inequalities intertwine and generate a first-level digital divide.

The second level of the digital divide regards usage or the ability to use. Even though many people think that the digital divide is about accessing or having computers, an Internet connection, and other digital devices, this is not the only problem. When provide everyone a computer and an Internet connection, we can solve access problems, however usage differentiation problems or usage inequity remains because, as Sorj (2013, p. 109) states, "access does not indicate the types of uses [or usage skills]." Indeed, access can hide the usage disparity. According to Hargittai (2001);

> …it becomes less and less useful to merely look at demographic differences in who is online when discussing questions of inequality in relation to the Internet. Rather, we need to start looking at differences in how those who are online use the medium.

The reasons for inequalities of access also apply to inequalities of use. The problem is not access, but it is inequalities. As long as social, economic, and cultural inequalities exist, there will be a digital divide. Therefore, Van Dijk (2005; 2020) suggests a categorical model that makes us understand the digital divide. He proposes a "relational and networked approach" rather than methodological individualism to explore the digital divide. The cause of digital inequalities is not individuals, but the social position of individuals and the relationships between them. Therefore, both access and usage inequality could be understood in the framework of social categories such as white/black, high income/low income, male/female, citizen/foreigner, urban/rural, employer/(un)employed, manager/employee, high-level education/low-level education, old/young, and parents/children.

Although the spread of digital technologies eliminates access inequalities, new differentiations are emerging in most countries, especially in developed ones. The main reason for these differences, as Van Dijk states (2020, p. 40), is that individuals do not have sufficient hardware and software knowledge, and technology literacy and "information capita" are insufficient. The unequal distribution of usage skills results from the categorical binary divisions listed above. Which side of the binary divisions a person is on can determine his/her ability to use digital technology. For example, while those between 18 and 26 years old with higher levels of education use the internet for more "enhancing capita" (Hargittai & Hinnant, 2008), individuals with low education use it for entertainment or chatting, online gaming, reviewing audiovisual programs, social networking, and trading (Van Deursen & Van Dijk, 2011). According to OECD data (2021a), home computer access is 50% in Turkey and 97.6% in the Netherlands. Moreover, while the Internet

usage rate among women is 80%, it is 90% for men in Turkey (TURKSTAT, 2022a). These rates, however, include smart phone possession and usage. Thus, they do not cover ownership of other ICT tools. Considering ownership of other ICT tools, these high rates are overly optimistic figures.

It is known that categorical inequalities (such as young/old, higher education/lower education, and higher-income/lower-income) cause unequal distribution of useful skills. The unequal distribution of skills causes a decrease in the income of all disadvantaged people and a decrease in their participation in social life.

The third component of the digital divide refers to benefits that result from usage skills. As Ragnedda (2020, p. 48) notes,

> individuals do not get the same benefits from the use of the Internet; but in order to capitalize their use of ICTs and "transform" this usage into externally observable outcomes of digital experiences, individuals need both strong offline capital (social-cultural–economic-political–personal) and digital capital.

Accordingly, those who are in stronger positions in society have access to digital technologies and components. Therefore, their usage skills are high due to their education level and digital equipment. Therefore, individuals with strong social backgrounds also have information-related, operational, and content-related internet skills such as information processing, self-direction, problem-solving, and communication. Hence, socio-economic and socio-demographic factors affect users in terms of both access and skills and benefits/outcomes/earnings in favor of individuals with strong socio-economic backgrounds. Therefore, digital capital, defined as accessing and using digital tools, includes economic, social, and cultural capital because digital capital is related to the digital ecosystem. Digital exclusion processes also reflect the digital capital ecosystem. Digital capital helps us understand how and why there are varying degrees of usage and benefits amongst users when given the same technology. It is not enough for individuals to have digital tools; they also need to have the skills to use them -that is, they need digital cultural capital. Therefore, it is essential that they have been brought up or lived in a socio-cultural environment where they will acquire this information (Ruiu & Ragnedda, 2020; Park, 2017).

As we mentioned above, the starting point of the digital divide is access to digital tools such as smart phones, desktop computers, laptops, smart TV, digital applications, and the Internet. The most important point to explain the digital divide is to reveal advantaged and disadvantaged groups in society and to determine how they are affected by these conditions, because only computers and the Internet offer great opportunities for individuals to participate in the knowledge economy (Hsieh et. al., 2008). In addition, this division deepens as information technologies become widespread and expand. Disadvantaged groups are excluded from social, economic, and cultural areas. However, it is known that access to digital tools increases the participation of individuals in the social, political, and economic dimensions of life (Nishijima et. al., 2017). Due to the cost of digital tools, low-income people are deprived of high-skilled employment, economic resources, social inclusion, and quality education opportunities. In particular, access to EIT is so important for high school undergraduate students to participate in decent jobs and employment. In this sense, the marketization and digitalization of education has an increasing effect on the digital divide. Those who access EIT tools have an advantage in terms of every angle, compared

to those who do not access them (Gonzales et. al., 2018). Thus, the digital divide should be considered a matter of concern for scholars, teachers, politicians, and students, because education inequality is a violation of human rights (Soomro et. al., 2020).

Theories about the digital divide aim to explain why people own, access, and use digital tools at different levels. Initially, the digital age was welcomed by academia, politicians, and commentators, as it was thought that it would reduce inequalities and facilitate easy and widespread access to education (Selwyn, 2004, p. 342). As Castells (1999, p. 403) showed, however, the information age has transformed into an age of stepped-up inequality. As a result, developed and developing countries are now experiencing a digital divide in various forms. The most obvious form of this is the first-level digital divide.

Turkey lags behind OECD countries in terms of many variables, such as access to computers from home, speed tiers or Internet speed, employment in the ICT sectors, the evolution of the share of ICT in total employment and value added by the ICT sector, exporting of ICT goods and services, and the expenditure of research and development on the ICT sector (OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2017 Report, 2017). Additionally, the proportion of fixed broadband subscriptions with download speeds of 256 kbit/s or greater is just 20.1% as of 2020 (OECD, 2021b). The OECD average of this proportion is 33.2%. All these indicators show that Turkey has an access and usage gap on a macro scale. According to the Turkish Statistical Institution "Survey on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Usage in Households (2020)" report, the desktop computer ownership proportion is 16.8%, portable computer (laptop, notebook, etc.) ownership is 36.7%, and fixed broadband subscription is 61.9% (TURKSTAT, 2021a). These rates did not increase, indeed they decreased in 2022 (TURKSTAT, 2022b). According to these data, it can be said that there is both an access and usage gap in Turkey. Nevertheless, smart phone ownership and usage are quite widespread. According to an OECD report, Internet access has reached 90.7%, which is similar to TURKSTAT's data (92%).

While there is no shortage of smart phone ownership, the lack of ownership of other digital tools is notable. While Turkey struggled with inequality of access, it also tried to reduce usage differences. Although access inequalities have decreased at certain points compared to previous years, the inequalities regarding usage have continued depending on valuables such as education, income, and age. This paper analyzes by income groups the access and usage differentiations of university students who are at the same education level and age group. In particular, the differentiation between public and private university students and reasons for and dimensions of the differentiations are key issues in this study.

3. Research Hypotheses

As shown by statistics above, it is seen that there is a first-level digital divide in Turkey. The aim of this study is to demonstrate the extent of this divide between private and public university students. Based on the theoretical framework, this research developed three hypotheses to test the effect of the first-level digital divide (level 1) on public and private university students:

H1: Private university students have more ICT ownership and access than public university students.

H2: As the income level of students increases, their ownership and access to ICT increases.

H3: The housing location of students has an impact on their ICT ownership and access.

4. Method

4.1. Data

This research was conducted to analyze the first-level digital divide between undergraduate students studying at public and private universities in Turkey. Between March 2021 and July 2021, 77.7% (N = 1713) of the students participating in the research were public university students and 22.3% (N = 493) were private university students. In addition, 70.6% (N = 1557) of the students participating in the research were female and 29.4% (N = 649) were male.

The universe consists of 2,435,303 active undergraduate students from 204 universities in the fall and spring terms of 2020-2021. 129 of these universities are public, with 2,024,828 students, and 75 are private, with 410,475 students. Those 2,206 participants who formed the sample group were reached by respondent-driven sampling (RDS). Respondent-driven sampling (RDS), a new network-based (i.e., snowball type) sampling method, has been proposed as a way to sample hidden populations that overcomes the venue bias associated with time–space sampling (Wejnert & Heckathorn, 2008, p. 106). Researchers tried to reach all universities in Turkey with an online questionnaire. So, the sample group was formed of participants from 70 public and 30 private universities on a voluntary basis. 1,713 of participants were students in public universities (equal to 0.08 of the public category) and 493 were in private universities (equal to 0.12 of the private category). Ethics committee approval was obtained from the Zonguldak Bülent Ecevit University Human Research Ethics committee.

There is a difference in income level between students studying at public and private universities. Of course, it would not be wrong to say that the biggest difference in terms of the digital divide is income level. However, other variables should not be ignored. As we mentioned earlier, our research focuses specifically on the first level of the digital divide. For this reason, the possibilities of students having and accessing internet and computer technologies were examined. Ownership of ICT tools is limited to three tools. These are smart phones, PC (desktop and laptop), and smart TV. Although other smart technologies are becoming increasingly widespread, they were excluded from the study because there is not a high rate of ownership of these tools in Turkey yet.

Among these three tools, the smart phone is the most widely used tool by 98.1% (N= 2165). It is seen that smart phone ownership is at similar levels both in the world and in Turkey. However, such a high rate makes it impossible to treat smart phone ownership as a variable. Therefore, only (71.7%, N= 1,581) personal computers and (55.6% N= 1,226) smart televisions were included in the ownership category, and the relationship between smart phone ownership and other variables was not analyzed. Access to ICT tools is as important as ownership. Therefore, students' access to fixed broadband was also examined. Although accessing an internet connection would seem easy, there are locational differences in the case of Turkey. In addition, the usage levels of paid applications on mobile phones were also examined. Paid application usage is another factor that indicates both ownership and access to ICT tools, because these applications gradually become embedded in the daily life practices of students. Thus, students' ownership and access to ICT tools were examined based on usage levels of personal computers, smart television, internet access, and paid mobile applications.

Toward this goal, first, comparative descriptive statistics about these variables were accessed, and then the dependent variables were determined, and binary logistic regression analysis was performed. "Logistic regression is a method for examining the association of a categorical outcome with many independent variables" (Lee and Forthofer, 2005, p. 66). Since the variables used in this study included two response categories, binary logistic regression analysis was applied.

4.2. Findings

When examining the distribution of students with fixed broadband subscriptions at home according to their university type, it is seen that the ownership rate is high in both groups. However, it should be noted that ownership is slightly lower among public university students in comparison with private university students. This difference is significant in terms of the relationship between university type and fixed broadband ownership (N=2,206, p=0). Another point to be considered is the rate of students who have fixed broadband or updated their internet services during the pandemic period. This group's rate is 40% within all fixed broadband owners. So, we can relate the higher ownership of fixed broadband and closing of the gap between the two types of university students to pandemic period necessities. Connection speed and quality are other variables that have to be discussed.

Figure 1: Fixed Broadband Ownership

This situation presents a structure in which public university students are at a disadvantage in fixed broadband access. This corresponds to the idea that the first level of the digital divide is about access to ICT and is based on class division. In connection with this, convenient access to fixed broadband can be seen as the first step towards academic success and competitiveness in employment. Fixed broadband ownership as a priory condition for access to the digital world also becomes a priory condition for a higher income and benefits.

Figure 2: Paid Mobile Application Ownership

Mobile applications that pave the way for reaching current and professional audio and video content or joining networks related to certain interests may sometimes require payment for more effective and detailed use. Purchasing power is necessary for users to access more content or make social and professional connections. In this context, when mobile application ownership is taken into account, it is seen that there is a huge gap between private and public university students.

One of every two private university students can pay for a mobile application, but among public university students, this rate is one in four. University type is significantly related to ownership of mobile applications and the difference is almost half for the two types (N=2,206, p=0). 38.9% of the public university students who stated that they do not use paid mobile applications justified economic issues as the reason for not using them. 25.9% of private university students stated that they do not use paid mobile applications for economic reasons. It is clear that public university students have some disadvantages. These disadvantages cause a situation where some students are uninformed about current content on the internet. This situation does not make sense on its own, but if we think of mobile applications as a part of ICT, access to some knowledge will be incomplete without it.

Figure 3: Personal Computer Ownership of Students

Figure 4: Personal Computer Ownership of Students' Family Members

It is useful to consider these two crosstabs together, as they provide important data on access to ICT. One of every three students in public universities does not have a personal computer (33.6%), but in private universities, one of every ten students do not (10.1%). This divide is visible again in family members' computer ownership. 67% of family members of public university students do not have a personal computer, and the rate is 39.4% for private university students. The relation between type of university attended and ownership of a personal computer is significant for both crosstabs (N=2,206, p=0 both).

When we discuss the data in more detail, it can be seen that 62.1% of public university students have to share their personal computers with family members. This rate is 34.8% among private university students. This data is a substantial indicator for determining the relationship between purchasing power and ICT access. Shared use may make it difficult to access a computer and accordingly, knowledge. In this case, the students who can use a personal computer and access knowledge whenever it is necessary will have a chance to step forward in both academic success and professional life. Personal computer ownership, which provides access to knowledge, also allows the owner to reproduce their class privilege. Students who have problems in accessing a computer stand in an underprivileged position, which means they are part of the digital underclass, as discussed above.

Figure 5: Smart TV Ownership

Figure 6: Paid Smart TV Application Ownership

When the ownership of both smart TV and paid smart TV applications is examined, the clear difference between public and private university students reappears. The difference is slightly lower in the smart TV ownership rate (public 52.4%/private 66.5%) but it can be seen that private university students use paid applications on smart TVs much more. The paid smart TV application ownership rate is 37.9% for public and 64% for private university students, and this reveals a huge gap between the two groups. Type of university attended is significantly related with ownership of smart TVs and paid smart TV applications (N=2,206, p=0).

4.3. Multivariate Analysis
4.3.1. Dependent Variables
Four dependent variables were used to analyze the first level of the digital divide. These variables are personal computer ownership, fixed broadband subscription, smart TV ownership, and mobile paid application usage. First, the variables are intended to be computed into a single variable that defines the first level of the digital divide and thus represents the ownership and access of students. However, the Cronbach's Alpha value showing the reliability analysis was not at the desired level. For this reason, it was decided to consider the variables one by one. In addition, the use of paid applications is handled only on mobile devices. Paid applications on a smart TV are not used by almost half of the sample because smart TV ownership is not very common. Therefore, it was used in the descriptive statistics above only to present a comparison, but it was not considered as a dependent variable or combined with the variable of using paid applications on mobile devices.

4.3.2. Control Variables
Based on the literature, two statistical control variables were included in the data analysis. Gender is a dichotomous variable with 0 = female and 1 = male. Parents' educational level can affect students' access to and use of ICT tools. However, since our study focuses on the first-level digital divide, it is thought that the effect of parents' educational level on ICT ownership and access is indirect, not direct. The parents' educational level was created by considering both the parents' education levels together to understand this indirect effect. Thus, the fathers' educational level and mothers' educational level variables were computed. The two-item index was found to be extremely reliable (Cronbach's Alpha = .804).

4.3.3. Independent Variables

This study aims to analyze the first level of the digital divide through public and private university students. There is a huge difference in tuition fees between these universities in Turkey. Therefore, the income level of the students studying at these universities is also different. For this reason, university type and income level were considered as independent variables. Income level is a scale variable from 0 = lower income to 5 = higher income. Based on the literature about the digital divide, location also affects digital inequality (Ragnedda, 2020). Thus, students' residential location is used as an independent variable. Residential location is used as a categorical variable with 0 = village (reference category), 1 = county, and 2 = city. Parents' educational level was constructed to understand both father and mother's educational level's affect on students' ICT ownership. Thus, the fathers' educational level and mothers' educational level variables were computed. The two-item index was found to be extremely reliable (Cronbach's Alpha = .804).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N = 2206)

Variables	N	Percentage
Female	1557	70.6%
Male	649	29.4%
Residential Location (Village) (ref)	318	14.4%
Residential Location (County)	807	36.6%
Residential Location (City)	1081	49.0%
Public University Students	493	22.3%
Public University Students	1713	77.7%
Personal Computer Ownership (No)	625	28.3%
Personal Computer Ownership (Yes)	1581	71.7%
Fixed Broadband Ownership (No)	327	14.8%
Fixed Broadband Ownership (Yes)	1879	85.2%
Smart TV Ownership (No)	980	44.4%
Smart TV Ownership (Yes)	1226	55.6%
Paid Mobile Application Using (No)	1468	67.8%
Paid Mobile Application Using (Yes)	697	32.2%
	M	**SD**
Income	1.59	1.44
Parent's Education Level	6.49	3.13

In our study, gender and parents' educational level were used as a control variable. It is also seen from Table 2 that gender affects all dependent variables. Accordingly, the use of personal computer ownership and paid applications is higher among male students than female students. However, when we look at fixed broadband and smart TV ownership, it is seen that the ownership level of female students is higher than that of male students. The parents' education level is effective on three other variables except for smart TV ownership. This situation can be understood through the odds ratio (OR) value. "More crucial to the interpretation of logistic regression is the value of the odds ratio, which is an indicator of the change in odds resulting from a unit change in the predictor" (Field, 2009, p. 270). As the parents' educational level increases, students' personal computer ownership (b = .177, p < 001. OR = 1.19), fixed broadband ownership (b = .257, p < 001. OR = 1.29) and paid application use (b = .072, p < 001. OR = 1.07) increase.

Table 2. Binary Logistic Regression

Variables	Personal Computer Ownership	Fixed Broadband Ownership	Smart TV Ownership	Paid Mobile Application Usage
	B(SE) - OR	B(SE) - OR	B(SE) - OR	B(SE) - OR
Gender	.292 (.023)** - 1.33	-.400 (.149)** -.67	-.564 (.099)*** -.569	.239 (.108)* - 1.27
Parent's Education Level	.177 (.023)*** - 1.19	.257 (.033)*** - 1.29	.030 (.018)† - 1.03	.072 (.019)*** - 1.07
Residential Location (Village) (ref)				
Residential Location (County)	.453 (.148)** - 1.57	.908 (.167)*** - 2.47	.281 (.141)* - 1.32	.351 (.189)† - 1.42
Residential Location (City)	.458 (.150)** - 1.61	1.348 (.181)*** - 3.83	.366 (.142)** - 1.44	.743(.186)*** - 2.10
Income	.469 (.055)*** - 1.59	.703 (.088)*** - 2.04	.303 (.039)*** - 1.35	.287 (.040)*** - 1.33
University Type	-.604 (.171)*** - .547	-.296 (.255)† - .744	-.148 (.122)† - .863	-.514 (.122)*** - .598
Nagelkerke R^2	.246	.333	.100	.178
N	2206	2206	2206	2206

Notes: †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 2 shows the logistic regression models created to estimate the factors affecting ICT ownership and access among students studying at public and private universities. As mentioned before, ICT ownership and access are analyzed using four variables. The first of these is personal computer ownership. Table 2 indicates that there is a significant relationship between personal computer ownership and students' socio-economic conditions. Ownership increases as income status increases (b = .469, p < 001. OR = 1.59). Students residing in villages have approximately 1.6 times lower PC ownership than students residing in counties (b = .453, p < 01. OR = 1.57) and cities (b = .458, p < 01. OR = 1.61). Personal computer ownership also differs among students studying at private and public universities (b = -.604, p < 001. OR = .547). Personal computer ownership of students studying at a public university is 45% lower on average than private university students.

Table 2 indicates similar results for fixed broadband ownership. Income status (b = .703, p < 001. OR = 2.04) influences internet ownership. However, the most striking indicator of this part of the table is undoubtedly the residential location. Those residing in counties (b = .908, p < 001. OR = 2.47) and cities (b = 1.348, p < 001. OR = 3.83) have higher fixed broadband ownership than those residing in villages. Since this variable shows both ownership and access, according to Table 2, it can be said that those residing in districts have approximately 2.5 times more internet access than those residing in villages. Those residing in cities have 3.83 times more access than those residing in villages. Therefore, residential location is an important variable for the digital divide. However, there was no significant relationship between internet ownership and access and the type of university.

There is a significant relationship between smart television ownership and income level (b = .303, p < 001. OR = 1.35) and residential location (b = .281, p < 05. OR = 1.32) (b = .366, p < 01. OR = 1.44) variables. However, no significant relationship was found between university type and smart TV ownership.

According to Table 2, paid application usage shows similar results with personal computer ownership and fixed broadband ownership. The use of paid applications increases as income level increases (b = .287, p < 001. OR = 1.33). The use of paid applications (b = .743, p < 001. OR = 2.10) of the students residing in cities is 2.10 times higher than the students residing in villages. Using paid applications also differs among students studying at private and public universities (b = -.514, p < 001. OR = .598). The use of paid applications by students studying at state universities is about 40% lower than students at private universities.

Finally, it can be said that the most important factors affecting ICT ownership and access are income level and residential location. The difference between ICT ownership and access between public and private university students is significant for PC ownership and paid application use. Although such a difference is observed for fixed broadcasting ownership and smart TV ownership, this is not statistically significant, but it is to be expected. Based on these results regarding ICT ownership and access, all hypotheses are supported by analysis of the data.

5. Conclusion and Discussion

The institutional arrangement of education is a fundamental right. Moreover, equal access to education is granted by the Constitution. Despite these guarantees, everyone does not access good quality education because of various disadvantages such as socio-economic status, gender, residential conditions, income level, ethnicity, and so on. For these reasons, education has featured as an "inequality-creating phenomenon" (Winker and Degele, 2011). The digital divide is a different dimension of these disparities regarding access to digital education materials. Economic disadvantages, especially, are the determining factor on educational inequalities and affect students' capabilities. Just like the inequalities in access to education are predominantly determined by poverty and by the disadvantaged background of students (Akkan and Buğra, 2021), the access to digital education materials is also determined by their income level and by disadvantaged backgrounds.

When we separate quintiles for annual equivalized household disposable income, while the highest income group has 47.5% of annual income, the lowest one has 5.9% in 2020 in Turkey (TURKSTAT, 2021b). These rates are 46.7% and 6.1% in 2021 (TURKSTAT, 2022c). While the poorest households can spend just 0.2% of their income (where mean annual income is 14,575 Turkish Lira) on education, the wealthiest ones (where mean annual income is 217,649 Turkish Lira) spend 4.2% (TURKSTAT, 2020a; 2020b). When we observe that the Gini coefficient was 0.410 in 2020 and 0.401 in 2021 (TURKSTAT, 2021b; 2022c), it can be said that the wealthiest households can spend much more on education than the poorest ones. Therefore, it is clear that the first-level digital divide is very deep. According to current TURKSTAT data, while the households in the first quintiles spend 5.2% of their income on education, the last quintiles spend 64.5% in Turkey. (TURKSTAT, 2020b).

As shown above, the gap between income levels reflects access to digital technologies. As these research findings show, income level relates to personal computer ownership, fixed broadband access, smart TV ownership, and paid mobile application ownership. Private university students are at higher income levels than those studying in public universities. The first digital divide between the public and private university students concerning access reproduces itself because of skills, capabilities, and competencies. As Nikolaos and others (2019) argue, as socio-economic status affects access, it is also decisive in the acquisition of digital skills.

As of 2012, Turkey ranks 52nd among 142 countries according to the Network Readiness Index values, and 69th and 79th, respectively, according to the Knowledge Index and Knowledge

Economy Index values (Gürcan, 2015). In their research, Baran and Erdem (2017) indicate that there is a deep digital divide in Turkey, especially in view of possession and usage differentiation. According to their data, 21.6% of households in Turkey have a desktop computer, 33.5% a portable computer, 28% a tablet, and 96.6% a mobile phone. Only 20% of these households use desktop computers and 38.8% use portable computers. Connecting to the Internet via TV is seen only in 14.8% of the households. Income, age, gender, location, and education affect this differentiation. The research, however, does not analyze data on undergraduate students. In other qualitative research on university students by Nerse (2020, 1), it is seen that "the individual and family characteristics of the participants, the environment and financial resources of schools, development, emancipation and acculturation factors interactively have effects on inequality, as well as rural-urban segregation and socioeconomic differentiation are evident in digital education inequality." Demir and Bodur's research (2017) on undergraduates in Burdur also shows that the lowest digital divide is regarding mobile phone ownership. However, because this study does not measure the ownership of other ICT tools, it does not offer data about this issue. In the article based on Eurostat data, Yurdakul (2023) states that Turkey ranks last in Europe in fixed broadband internet access, with 51% having access (the EU average is 75%). On the other hand, Turkey is in last place in Europe in terms of average broadband internet speed, with 11.58 Mbps. According to Yurdakul, internet access in Turkey is mostly realized through mobile broadband.

According to the findings of this study, public university students have fewer personal computers, paid-mobile applications, paid smart TV applications, and fixed-broadband subscriptions than private university students. Although there are no data on undergraduate students in Turkey, similar results have been obtained in other countries before. For example, Ricoy and others (2013) allege that university freshmen suffer from various digital tools deficiencies in Spain. In the same way, other research (Mcnaught, Lam and Ho, 2009) carried out in Hong Kong showed that the ICT ownership did not present homogenous distribution between undergraduates. Azionya and Nhedzi (2021, p. 164), in their research on university students in South Africa, state that "network coverage, device type, time of day, socio-economic status and digital competence negatively affect synchronous lecture participation and attendance" of marginalized students more than privileged ones. In their quantitative research, Reisdorf and colleagues (2020) claim that laptop ownership can affect university achievement. Moreover, Helsper and Reisdorfs' (2016) research shows that those individuals who suffer from digital exclusion are generally in disadvantaged groups, especially low-income groups. Accordingly, the situation of not having digital capital starts with a lack of economic capital and then turns into a lack of cultural capital through not having access to knowledge, and into the lack of social capital by not having social ties (Calderón Gómez, 2020). Indeed, while even the quality of the physical-digital tools affects the success of students (Gonzales et. al., 2018), the disadvantages, inequality, and gap caused by being deprived of any of these tools, especially a personal computer and Internet connection, will, of course, be quite large.

Research conducted in the USA (Jaggars et al. 2021), similar to ours, firstly examines how much college students have digital technologies. In research based on income level, race, and resident type, those who are low-income, non-white, and residing outside the city center have fewer digital technologies, as expected (Jaggars et al., 2021, p. 3-6). Unlike our research, however, this research measured the students' perception of success. Accordingly, the students with inadequate technology perceived themselves as less successful than advantaged ones (Jaggars et al., 2021, p. 7). Also, in Jaggars and friends' research, as we emphasize in our research, it is observed that there is a significant correlation between residential settings and ICT ownership and usage

skills. For example, the fixed broadband proportion (ADSL, cable, optic fiber, etc.) of households in Turkey by Statistical Region is 42.5% in southeast Anatolia, 39.5% in central east Anatolia, and 34.3% in northeast Anatolia, but 79% in İstanbul, 59.5% in the western Marmara region, 63.3% in the Aegean region, and 69% in western Anatolia (TURKSTAT, 2022d). These values show that the proportion of those with a subscription to fixed broadband changes with place of residence.

Our three research hypotheses were tested with the findings. It is seen that our three hypotheses are supported by the binary logistic regression analysis. Our first hypothesis claims that (H1) private university students have more ICT ownership and access than students studying at public universities. It can be concluded that only income level difference reveals this situation. However, our study draws attention to the effect of residential location (also H3) in addition to income level. Private universities are located only in large cities in Turkey. Therefore, the residential location variable, as well as income, is an important factor in accessing ICT tools.

Our second hypothesis claims that (H2) as the income level of students increases, their ownership and access to ICT increases. As stated in the literature (Ragnedda, 2020), income level is the most important factor affecting the digital divide. The distinction between public and private universities, which we used in this study, is based on income inequality. However, based on this distinction, we did not want to classify students only as high-income and low-income, because we thought that such a presupposition could lead to a wrong conclusion. While there are low-income students who study in private universities because they receive scholarships, there are also high-income students who choose to study at public universities. Therefore, the income level differs between both state and private university students.

Our third hypothesis claims that (H3) the residential location of students' living has an impact on their ICT ownership and Access. The data we obtained show that residential location is one of the most important factors affecting access to and ownership of ICT tools in Turkey. Access to and ownership of ICT tools decrease as one moves from large cities to districts and villages. This decline is not specific to a particular region. In general, there is a dramatic decrease in the level of access to and ownership of ICT tools with distance from the city center.

In our regression analysis, one of the variables related to ICT ownership is the education level of the students' parents. This is an important variable, but since it is used as a control variable, no hypothesis has been established. Parents' educational level affects students' access to and ownership of ICT tools. Parents can motivate students to access and own ICT tools. However, when evaluated in terms of the first level of the digital divide, this effect lags behind income level and residential location. If the second level of the digital divide had been taken into consideration, the effects of this variable would undoubtedly be discussed much more. We think that parents' educational level has a more direct impact on acquisition of ICT skills than access and ownership. Therefore, methodologically, we did not want to establish such a hypothesis. However, this does not prevent us from having a brief discussion about the importance of the parents' educational level in our dataset. It is reminiscent of Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital to say that the parents' educational level influences access to and ownership of ICT tools. Educational level has a favorable impact on employment, income, and the motivational aspects associated with digital technology. This situation reflects ICT ownership and gives shape to the habitus of young members of households or, as Gomez (Calderón Gómez, 2020) said, it is useful for understanding the social reproduction of inequalities. Hence, it is not surprising that students with high ICT ownership and use acquire these characteristics through cultural transfer. Our research includes data supporting previous research (Nikolaos et al., 2019; Dimaggio et al., 2004; Zillien and Hargittai,

2009; Kaya, 2017) on this subject. These studies demonstrate that parents' ICT usage habits and competencies directly affect their children. The high income level of the households makes it possible for these households to have ICT and increases usage skills. As a result of this, the economic, cultural and social capital obtained increases, and this habitus is transferred to other members of the household. Individuals who are deprived of economic and cultural capital specific to ICT have to overcome more barriers than individuals who have access to ICT. In countries that do not have widespread institutional support and economic power, these barriers can reach insurmountable heights. As Ragnedda states, referring to Bourdieu, "those with a stronger social or economic capital will more likely exploit and get the most out of the digital experience than those who do not have an initially strong socio-economic background." (2020, p. 49).

There are countless studies, articles, reports, and books on the digital divide and inequalities. Most researchers acknowledge the inequalities in access and usage. The crucial point is how to solve this problem. The answer is multi-dimensional and exceeds the scope of this study. Some of these solutions are regulating distribution relations, expanding ICT ownership, providing equal opportunities in education, accepting access to ICT as a human right, and disseminating ICT-based vocational training. This multi-dimensional problem can only be solved with multi-dimensional solutions.

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Research Article

Materialistic Tendency and Conspicuous Consumption Behavior: The Mediating Role of Social Media Usage

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ABSTRACT

This research focuses on the materialistic tendencies and conspicuous consumption behaviors of consumers, especially in today's social media age. The research's goal is to determine the effect of materialistic tendencies on conspicuous consumption behavior and to investigate the role of social media usage in mediating this effect. The data were collected in this context using a prepared survey form, and 596 consumers participated in the survey during the data collection process. SPSS and AMOS programs were used to analyze the collected data. As a result of the analyses, it was discovered that the materialistic tendency had a positive and significant effect on both conspicuous consumption behavior and social media usage; it was also discovered that social media usage had a positive and significant effect on conspicuous consumption behavior. Furthermore, it was determined that social media usage has a partial mediation in the effect of materialistic tendency on conspicuous consumption behavior; in other words, a portion of the effect of materialistic tendency on conspicuous consumption behavior is realized through social media usage. Suggestions for both theory and practice were made in light of these findings.

Keywords: Materialistic Tendency, Conspicuous Consumption Behavior, Social Media Usage, Mediating Effect, Structural Equation Model

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1. Introduction

Consumption behaviors are undertaken by consumers to satisfy their desires, wants, and needs. While some of these needs are physiological, such as eating, drinking, and breathing, others are psychological, such as belonging, feeling valued, and being liked. In meeting both needs, financial considerations take precedence. While consumers act rationally in some cases, they do not act rationally in others. While consumers act rationally by considering their income and the price of the products they intend to purchase, they may also engage in irrational purchasing behavior to appear to be high-status and wealthy. Recent social, economic, and technological developments, as well as an increase in the use of mass media and the fact that brands guide consumers with their promotional activities, pave the way for irrational consumption behaviors.

Consumers who want to flaunt their financial resources will buy expensive goods and services and parade them around. This is known as conspicuous consumption, which Veblen (1899) first described in his book "The Theory of the Leisure Class." Psychological factors such as gaining prestige, belonging, making oneself admired, and proving oneself to others are at the heart of conspicuous consumption behavior (Hız, 2011). It is well known that these people have materialistic tendencies in their consumption behaviors and that these materialistic tendencies benefit them psychologically. Materialistic consumers place a higher value on material elements and prefer products with a visible display in their purchasing behavior. In other words, it is widely assumed in the literature (Podoshen, Lu Li, & Zhang, 2011; Öztek & Çengel, 2020) that the fact that consumers have materialistic tendencies helps them engage in conspicuous consumption. People with a high materialistic tendency also have a high consumption tendency, and they consume special and ostentatious products. These individuals intend to demonstrate their products to others. Social media is one of the channels that people use to show off their products. People have begun to use more social media platforms as the field of social media has advanced, increasing their visibility even further. People can use social media to share their thoughts, consumption habits, clothing and lifestyles, and so on. The motivation for using social media varies from person to person; while some people do not actively operate social media, others use it to share their photos, interact with other social media users, and differentiate themselves from others (Hazar, 2011). On these platforms, most users make show-oriented posts; similarly, it is stated that most brands and luxury products are shared to influence other users. It has been determined that active social media users are more willing to show off and generally act with motivations of imitation, display, and uniqueness (Bayuk & Öz, 2018). It is also claimed that consumers with materialistic tendencies, such as conspicuous consumption, are more likely to share on social media (Ward, Bridges, & Chitty, 2005). As a result, while studies (Nelissen & Meijers, 2011; Barzoki, Tavakol, & Vahidnia, 2014; Thoumrungroje, 2014) on conspicuous consumption, materialistic tendencies, and social media can be found separately in the literature, studies examining three variables together cannot be found. Therefore, the current study fills a gap in the literature and contributes significantly to the international literature.

The goal of this study is to discover whether consumers with materialistic tendencies engage in conspicuous consumption behavior and whether social media usage plays a mediating role between these two variables. The purpose of this study, which also provides an overview of the concept of conspicuous consumption, is to contribute to the literature by investigating the effect of materialistic tendencies on conspicuous consumption behavior and the importance of social media usage in this effect. The findings offer both a theoretical contribution to the field for researchers studying consumer behavior and practical suggestions for marketing applications.

2. Conceptual Framework

2.1 Conspicuous Consumption Behavior

Consumption is defined as the activity of materially and spiritually satisfying people's physiological, sociological, and psychological needs (Torlak, 2000). While low-income people engage in consumption to meet their basic physiological needs, middle- and high-income people engage in consumption for psychological reasons (Becan & Eaghanioskoui, 2019). One of the concepts that emerged at the point of satisfying psychological needs is conspicuous consumption, which has existed since ancient times and continues to be popular today. This concept, also known as status consumption, refers to people's shopping habits and the display of their prestige and status in their surroundings. Conspicuous consumption behavior has been studied in the both national and international literature (İlhan & Uğurhan, 2019; Avcı, 2022; Kumar, Bagozzi, Manrai, & Manrai, 2022; Foo-Nin Ho & Jared Wong, 2023). Conspicuous consumption, according to Velov, Gojkovic, and Duric (2014), is the purchase of expensive goods and services to demonstrate one's purchasing power. This concept, first introduced to the literature by Veblen (1899), was mentioned in the book "The Theory of the Leisure Class", where it was stated that people engaged in consumption activities to show off, and thus the lower class attempted to resemble the upper class (O'Cass & McEwen, 2004). Consumers have begun to show off by considering the images and symbols they provide rather than the products and services they buy, in line with changes and developments in the field of consumption. Consumers meet both their physiological and psychological needs with the products and services they purchase, and in some cases, psychological needs outnumber physiological needs. As a result, conspicuous consumption is a consumption behavior that provides psychological satisfaction to consumers. Based on conspicuous consumption behavior, psychological factors such as making oneself liked by others, proving oneself with consumption behavior, gaining prestige, and respect are effective (Hız, 2011). Conspicuous consumption occurs when a person wishes to satisfy his/her psychological needs while also influencing others. According to Arnold and Reynolds (2002), the products and services consumed give the person identity, help the person show himself/herself to others, and determine the person's social class. In terms of consumer psychology, this consumption tendency includes concepts such as brand, status, symbol, and luxury (Phillips & Back, 2011). It is well understood that there is a link between psychological factors, such as personality, values and beliefs, upbringing, and conspicuous consumption. Many studies in the field of psychology (Saad, 2007; Nelissen & Meijers, 2011) have found a link between conspicuous consumption and achieving and maintaining social status. By providing a psychological advantage to the individual in the consumption process, conspicuous consumption represents its prestigious position in the community. Conspicuous consumption activities performed for the purposes of belonging, self-realization, security, and self-respect also create a sense of achievement by sending a message of wealth (Shukla, 2018). As a result, it is possible to argue that conspicuous consumption is an essential component for consumers in today's materialistic environment.

2.2. Materialistic Tendency

Ward & Wackman (1971) defined materialism as people viewing money and material possessions as a means of happiness and social advancement. Belk (1987) approached this concept from a marketing standpoint, defining it as people's beliefs that the products and services they own are the sources of their happiness or unhappiness. Materialism is a sociological and psychological concept, and studies on materialism have revealed that the concepts of owning, achieving happi-

ness, and demonstrating success are at the heart of materialism. Materialistic consumers focus on the psychological benefits they will derive from the products and services they purchase, they ignore psychological benefits such as the happiness they will experience after the purchase, and they pursue more happiness and thus seek more (Richins & Dawson, 1992). Consumers with a high materialistic tendency have a higher consumption tendency and are more likely to purchase flashy and unique products (Lynn & Haris, 1997). This situation demonstrates the existence of a link between materialistic tendencies and conspicuous consumption. There are studies in the literature that investigate the relationship between materialistic tendencies and conspicuous consumption (Öztek & Çengel, 2020; Lee, Bae, & Koo, 2021). In his study, Wong (1997) emphasized that people's desire to show off their possessions is at the heart of both materialistic tendencies and conspicuous consumption behaviors. According to Velov et al. (2014), there is a positive relationship between materialism and conspicuous consumption; they stated that the material elements possessed define materialism and that people are in the habit of showing the material elements they have. Similarly, Zakaria, Wan-Ismail, and Abdul-Talib (2021) concluded that materialism and conspicuous consumption have a positive relationship. Köroğlu and Demir (2022), who investigated the effects of social status, materialism, and spending tendencies on conspicuous consumption, discovered that all three variables had positive and significant effects on conspicuous consumption.

2.3. Social Media Usage

Social media platforms are web-based platforms that assist consumers in meeting their social needs, connecting with others, and creating and sharing content such as photos, messages, audio, and video (Schiffman & Wisenblit, 2015; Kotler & Keller, 2016). Although there are numerous social media platforms available today, the most well-known ones in terms of content and functionality are Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Consumers now want to appear and show more on social media, and Descartes' "I think therefore I am" phrase has been replaced by "I am seen, therefore I am" (Toprak et al., cited in Bayuk & Öz, 2018). According to studies, consumers on social media share positive things about themselves, and their social media usage increases their conspicuous consumption behavior (Thoumrungroje, 2014). As a result, consumers engage in conspicuous consumption to be seen more on social media, or they engage in conspicuous consumption through social media platforms. İlhan and Uğurhan (2019) developed a three-factor scale, namely consumption interest, personal image representation, and sharing satisfaction, to determine consumers' conspicuous consumption behaviors on social media. Bayuk and Öz (2018) found that people who use social media extensively are more likely to engage in show-oriented sharing and generally act with the motives of imitation, display, and uniqueness. Thoumrungroje (2014) discovered that there is a positive direct effect between social media usage and conspicuous consumption and that people who use social media engage in conspicuous consumption behavior for prestige. Taylor and Strutton (2016), on the other hand, stated that as people's social media usage grows, so does their conspicuous consumption. After researching the relationship between social media usage, self-esteem, and conspicuous consumption, Widjajanta, Senen, Masharyono, Lisnawati, and Anggraeni (2018) discovered that social media usage has a significant effect on conspicuous consumption behavior. Koçak and Uğurhan (2022) determined that young people's social media usage rates are high, and they do not directly engage in conspicuous consumption, implying that the consumers most affected by conspicuous consumption are young consumers.

There is also a link between social media usage and materialism. It has been stated that social media usage has recently increased, that social media provides consumers with the benefit of eliminating time and space boundaries, and that people view social media channels as a showcase to show themselves. As a result, it is argued that using social media will influence materialistic tendencies (Akçalı & Hacıoğlu, 2022). In their study on young people, Balıkçıoğlu and Volkan (2016) argued that social media and television communication are effective on the level of materialism. Burroughs, James, Shrum, and Aric Rindfleisch (2002) discovered that materialism and luxury consumption occur frequently in TV series, that watching these series attracts young people to products and lives, and that there is a positive relationship between the duration of watching TV series and materialistic tendency. It is also believed that there is a link between social media usage and materialistic tendencies. According to Kamal, Chu, and Pedram (2013), there is a link between consumers' social media usage and their materialistic behaviors; Chang and Zhang (2008),on the other hand, discovered that materialism influences consumers' attitudes toward social media advertisements. While Ward et al. (2005) contend that people with high materialistic tendencies are more willing to share on social media, Ismail, Nguyen, and Melewar (2018) contend that the more the social media use, the greater the tendency towards conspicuous consumption and materialism. According to these studies, there are links between materialism, conspicuous consumption, and social media.

3. Method
3.1. Research Model and Hypotheses

As a result of the literature review of the subject, the following research model and research hypotheses have been developed within the model's scope.


Figure 1: Research Model

H1: Materialistic tendency has a positive effect on conspicuous consumption behavior.
H2: Social media usage has a positive effect on conspicuous consumption behavior.
H3: Materialistic tendency has a positive effect on social media usage.
H4: Social media usage has a mediating effect on the effect of materialistic tendency on conspicuous consumption behavior.

3.2. Sample

The universe of this research consists of all consumers living in Samsun. The convenience sampling method, in which all consumers can participate in the research, was chosen as the sampling method. Table 1 contains descriptive information about the participants based on the frequency analysis.

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Participants

		f	%			f	%
Gender	Female	379	63.6	**Age**	17 and below	53	8.9
	Male	217	36.4		18-28	342	57.4
	Total	**596**	**100**		29-39	91	15.3
Marital Status	Married	226	37.9		40-50	95	15.9
	Single	370	62.1		51-61	15	2.5
	Total	**596**	**100**		**Total**	**596**	**100**
Educational Status	Primary	37	6.2	**Job**	State	103	17.3
	Secondary	211	35.4		Private	100	16.8
	Bachelor	226	54.7		Self-Employment	44	7.4
	Postgraduate	22	3.7		Retired	13	2.2
	Total	**596**	**100**		Housewife	69	11.6
Income Status	4,000 TL and below	171	28.7		Student	170	28.5
	4,001 TL-8,000 TL	264	44.3		Unemployed	94	15.8
	8,001 TL-12,000 TL	109	18.3		Other	3	0.5
	12,001 TL-16,000 TL	28	4.7		**Total**	**596**	**100**
	16,001 TL and above	24	4				
	Total	**596**	**100**				

Note: f: Frequency, %: Percent, TL: Turkish Lira

The survey included 596 consumers, 63.6% of whom were female and 36.4% of whom were male. 62.1% of the participants were single, 37.9% were married, and more than half (54.7%) had undergraduate degrees. In terms of profession, 17.3% worked in the public sector, 16.8% in the private sector, and 28.5% were students. The majority of participants (88.6%) are between the ages of 18 and 50, with nearly half (44.3%) earning between 4,001 and 8,000 TL. Considering the demographic information as well as the information about the social media habits of the participants, it was discovered that the majority of them (68.6%) use Instagram and that 55.9% of them spend an average of 1-3 hours per day on social media platforms.

3.3. Data Collection

The questionnaire technique was used to collect data for the study. Following approval from the Gümüşhane University Scientific Research and Publication Ethics Committee, a questionnaire form was distributed to consumers who voluntarily agreed to participate in the study. Items in the questionnaire were related to personal information and research scales (Materialistic tendency, Conspicuous consumption, and Social media usage). All scales used in the study were of

the 5-point Likert type (1 = I strongly disagree, 5 = I strongly agree). When the scale scores were compared, it was discovered that the score for each scale was very high.

Personal Information Form: This section asked consumers participating in the study for information about their age, gender, income level, and so on. The researcher used a personal information form with descriptive questions to determine participants' characteristics and social media usage behaviors.

Materialistic Tendency Scale: The study employed the Richins and Dawson (1992) materialistic tendency scale, which consists of 18 items and three dimensions. Tokmak (2019) used the relevant scale as 7 items in her study, and the current study was based on her study, with the materialistic tendency of consumers measured using these 7 items. To determine whether the data were normally distributed, a normality analysis was performed. Skewness and kurtosis values are used in normality analysis, and if these values are between +2 and -2, the data has a normal distribution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The materialistic tendency scale has a skewness value of 0.000 and a kurtosis value of -0.673 and according to these results, the data has normally distributed. As a result of the factor and reliability analyses for the related scale, the materialist tendency scale was determined to be a single factor, with a Cronbach's Alpha value of 0.844. As a result of the confirmatory factor analysis, the goodness-of-fit values reached [$\chi 2$ (N = 596) = 52.736, p > .05; $\chi 2$ /sd = 4.79, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .97, NFI = .96] were found to be in the good and acceptable goodness-of-fit ranges recommended in the literature.

Conspicuous Consumption Behavior Scale: The study employed Othman's (1989) conspicuous consumption behavior scale, which consists of 10 items. Tokmak (2019) used the relevant scale as 7 items in her study, and the current study was based on her study, with the conspicuous consumption behavior measured using these 7 items. The conspicuous consumption behavior scale has a skewness value of 0.156 and a kurtosis value of -0.691 and according to these results, the data has been normally distributed. As a result of the factor and reliability analyses for the related scale, the conspicuous consumption scale was determined to be a single factor, with a Cronbach's Alpha value of 0.757. When the two items (CCB5, CCB6) were removed from the analysis during the reliability analysis, the relevant items were removed from the scale because the reliability increased even more. As a result of the confirmatory factor analysis, the goodness-of-fit values reached [$\chi 2$ (N = 596) = 1.083, p > .05; $\chi 2$ /sd = 0.54, RMSEA = .01, CFI = .99, NFI = .98] were found to be in the good and acceptable goodness-of-fit ranges recommended in the literature.

Social Media Usage Scale: Jenkins-Guarnieri, Wright, and Johnson (2013) developed a social media usage scale with 10 items, which was used in the study. The current study was based on their study, with the social media usage of consumers was measured using these 7 items. The social media usage scale has a skewness value of 0.282 and a kurtosis value of -0.695, and according to these results, the data are normally distributed. The factor and reliability analyses for the related scale revealed that the social media usage scale was a single factor, with a Cronbach's Alpha value of 0.852. When the three items (SMU7, SMU8, SMU9) were removed from the analysis during the reliability analysis, the relevant items were removed from the scale because the reliability increased even more. As a result of the confirmatory factor analysis, the goodness of fit values reached [$\chi 2$ (N = 596) = 53.793, p > .05; $\chi 2$ /sd = 4.13, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .97, NFI = .96] were found to be in the good and acceptable goodness-of-fit ranges recommended in the literature.

Table 2 shows the research scales' reliability and validity results. The construct validity of the scales is determined using Composite Reliability (CR) and Convergent Validity (Average Vari-

ance Extracted (AVE) values. The CR value must be greater than 0.70 and the AVE value must be greater than 0.50 for the scale to be considered valid (Hair et al., 2010).

Table 2: Reliability and Validity Results

Variables	Items	Standardized Factor Loading	Cronbach Alpha	CR	AVE
Materialistic Tendency	MT5	0.787			
	MT2	0.748			
	MT6	0.739			
	MT4	0.735			
	MT3	0.704	0.844	0.882	0.518
	MT1	0.691			
	MT7	0.623			
Conspicuous Consumption Behavior	CCB4	0.779			
	CCB7	0.740			
	CCB2	0.734	0.757	0.838	0.510
	CCB3	0.674			
	CCB1	0.635			
Social Media Usage	SMU3	0.814			
	SMU4	0.805			
	SMU6	0.739			
	SMU5	0.710	0.852	0.888	0.532
	SMU2	0.686			
	SMU1	0.683			
	SMU10	0.654			

3.4. Data Analysis

The SPSS 21 and AMOS 24 package programs were used to analyze the data collected for this study. The reliability levels of the scales used in the study were determined using Cronbach's Alpha, and the validity levels were determined using confirmatory factor analysis. The AMOS program was used to run the Structural Equation Model (SEM) analysis to test the research hypotheses. The research's mediator variable structural model was tested using SEM, and the goodness-of-fit values were used to determine whether the model was compatible. To ensure that the goodness-of-fit values obtained from SEM were within the desired range, covariance connections were established by the model modifications, and the model was run again. The research hypotheses were evaluated by the model that provided the good fit values obtained after re-running the model. Because there are hypotheses about mediation relations among the research hypotheses, bootstrap values, as well as direct and indirect effects, were considered in the evaluation of mediation relations. Because it was argued that the mediation tests proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) were insufficient in traditional mediation analyses, the bootstrap technique, which produces more reliable results, was chosen.

4. Results

Table 3 shows the mean, standard deviation, and correlation analysis results for the research variables. The mean of the participant's responses to the variables of materialistic tendency (M = 2.79, S =.95), conspicuous consumption behavior (M = 2.63, S =.92), and social media use (M = 2.56, S =.92) was 2.56 or higher. While the variable with the highest average is the materialistic tendency,

the variable with the lowest average is social media usage. When the correlation results are examined, there is a significant positive correlation between materialistic tendency and conspicuous consumption behavior variables (r = .67, p < .01). It was determined that there was a positive significant relationship between materialistic tendency and social media usage variables (r = .55, p < .01), and a positive significant relationship between conspicuous consumption behavior and social media usage variables (r = .55, p < .01). Materialistic tendencies and conspicuous consumption have the strongest relationship, while social media usage and conspicuous consumption behavior have the weakest. The presence of statistically significant relationships between the variables indicates that the necessary conditions for testing the research model on SEM have been met.

Table 3: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlation Analysis Results of the Variables of the Study

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Materialistic Tendency	Conspicuous Consumption Behavior	Social Media Usage
Materialistic Tendency (MT)	2.79	.95	1		
Conspicuous Consumption Behavior (CCB)	2.63	.92	.67**	1	
Social Media Usage (SMU)	2.56	.92	.55**	.51**	1

Note: **p<.01

The phase of testing the research hypotheses began after the relationships between the variables were determined. Before testing the research hypotheses, the goodness-of-fit values of the research model to be tested were analyzed to determine whether the model had a good or acceptable fit. The analysis revealed that some of the model goodness-of-fit values were not among the good and acceptable fit values [χ2 (41, N = 149) = 797.57, p<.000, RMSEA =.08, GFI =.85, AGFI =.81, CFI =.85, NFI =.83, IFI =.86]. As a result, the proposed changes within the scope of the measurement model were examined. Covariance connections were established by the proposed modifications of the theoretical framework to bring the model goodness-of-fit values to a good and acceptable level. Modifications to the model should be made between the error terms of items belonging to the same factor, not between the observed variables of two different hidden variables. Covariance connections were established between the error terms e8-e9 of the conspicuous consumption behavior variable and the error terms e-15-e16 and e17-18 of the social media usage variable, among the error terms of the materialistic tendency variable, e1-e2 (See in Figure 2). After running the final model generated by the covariance connections, it was determined that the goodness-of-fit values obtained were within the range of good and acceptable fit values. [χ2 (45, N = 145) = 526.14, p.000, χ2/df = 3.62, RMSEA =.06, GFI =.90, AGFI =.88, CFI =.91, NFI =.90, IFI =.91] While the final structural model's standard path coefficients are shown in Figure 2, Table 2 shows the research hypothesis results obtained within the scope of the final model.

Figure 2: Final Structural Model

Table 4: Hypothesis Results

Hypotheses	Direct Impact	Indirect Effect	Mediating Effect	Bootstrap Lower Bound	Bootstrap Upper Bound	P Value	Result
H1: MT→CCB	0.692					*	Accepted
H2: SMU→CCB	0.189					**	Accepted
H3: MT→SMU	0.707					*	Accepted
H4: MT→SMU→CCB		0.134	Partial	0.069	0.240	**	Accepted

Note: *p < 0,01, **p < 0,05, ***p < 0,10

When the results of the research hypotheses are examined, the coefficient of the path from the variable of the materialistic tendency to the variable of conspicuous consumption behavior is significant ($\beta = .69$, $p < .01$), and H1 was supported by this result. The path coefficient from the social media usage variable to the conspicuous consumption behavior variable was significant ($\beta = .19$, $p < .05$), and H2 was supported by this result. The path coefficient from the materialistic tendency variable to the social media usage variable was significant ($\beta = .70$, $p < .01$) and it was concluded that H3 was supported by this result. According to H4, which examined the mediating role of the social media usage variable, it was determined that the social media usage variable mediated the effect between materialistic tendency and conspicuous consumption behavior. When the social media usage variable is added as a mediating variable between the materialistic tendency and the conspicuous consumption behavior, full mediation can be noted if the effect of the materialistic tendency on the conspicuous consumption behavior deteriorates, and partial mediation can be noted if there is a decrease. Furthermore, to discuss the mediation relationship, the bootstrap lower and upper bound values must be checked. The values of the resulting Bootstrap confidence intervals must be greater than or less than 0 (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Therefore, it is seen that the effect of materialistic tendency on conspicuous consumption behavior ($\beta = .70$, $p <$

.01) decreases when the social media usage variable is added as a mediator variable (Indirect effect =.13, 95% CI [.069, .240]) and the social media usage variable seems to have a partial mediating role. Accordingly, the H4 hypothesis was also supported.

5. Discussion

The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of consumers' materialistic tendencies on their conspicuous consumption behavior in today's world, where material values are becoming increasingly important, and to reveal the mediating role of social media usage in the relationship between materialistic tendencies and conspicuous consumption behavior. First, the relationships between the research variables were investigated; it was discovered that there are positive and significant relationships between materialistic tendencies, conspicuous consumption behavior, and social media usage. As a result, as consumers' materialistic tendencies increase, so do their conspicuous consumption behaviors and their social media usage; as social media use increases, so do conspicuous consumption behaviors. The positive relationship discovered within the scope of the study between materialistic tendencies, conspicuous consumption behavior, and social media usage is consistent with the findings of previous studies on the same subjects.

In keeping with the study's main goal, significant results were obtained as a result of the SEM analysis, which was used to determine both the direct and mediating effects. The first hypothesis, which sought to determine whether consumers' materialistic tendencies have a positive effect on conspicuous consumption behaviors, was supported. As a result, consumers' materialistic tendencies have a positive effect on their pretentious behavior. In other words, consumers who have strong materialistic tendencies are more likely to engage in conspicuous consumption. Consumers who place a high value on material possessions tend to display the prestige they obtain from these possessions to their surroundings. According to the literature, consumers value psychological as well as physical satisfaction, so they engage in the behavior of displaying what they have and engage in consumption activities to show off. Akın (2021) discovered that materialism, which has sub-dimensions of attaining happiness, possession, and success, positively affects the conspicuous consumption tendency as a result of his research conducted within the framework of materialism, self, and conspicuous consumption. Tokmak (2019), who conducted research on university students, came to the same conclusion, that materialism has a positive effect on conspicuous consumption. In their research on Malaysian Y-generation consumers, Zakaria et al. (2021) discovered that collectivism and materialism have positive relationships with conspicuous consumption. Similarly, many studies in the literature conclude that there is a positive relationship between materialism and conspicuous consumption behavior, and the current study's findings are consistent with previous findings (Barzoki et al., 2014; Velov et al., 2014; Öztek & Çengel, 2020; Lee et al., 2021; Köroğlu & Demir, 2022).

Another finding from the analyses is that consumers' social media usage has a positive and significant effect on conspicuous consumption behavior. Consumers who actively use social media have more conspicuous consumption behavior, according to this finding. Because social media is a place where people express themselves and make their presence known, their products and services are displayed through these channels, resulting in conspicuous consumption behavior. In other words, high-impact products and services are purchased to share on social media platforms and gain more interaction, and these products and services are then shared on social media accounts. Bayuk and Öz (2018) discovered that people who use social media share more ostentatiously and act with motivations of imitation, display, and uniqueness when posting these shares. According to Wai and Osman (2019), who investigated conspicuous consumption behavior in

terms of social media usage, social media usage has a significant positive impact on conspicuous consumption. Similarly, numerous studies in the literature contend that there is a link between social media and conspicuous consumption (Thoumrungroje, 2014; Widjjanta et al., 2018; Bayat & Yıldırım, 2021). The current study's findings also back up the literature.

Another significant finding of the study is that the materialistic tendency has a positive effect on social media usage. According to Ward et al. (2005), people with a high materialistic tendency were more willing to share on social media. In their study of Chinese and American users, Chu, Windels, and Kamal (2016) discovered a strong relationship between materialism and social media usage. Akçalı and Hacıoğlu (2022) discovered a positive significant relationship between social media and materialism as a result of their studies on the mediating effect of materialism on the effects of consumers' frequency of social media use on compulsive purchase intention. As a result, people who place a higher value on their material possessions may choose to share them on social media. This finding backs up the literature. When the mediation hypothesis's findings are examined, it is discovered that social media usage plays a partial mediating role in the effect of materialistic tendencies on conspicuous consumption behavior. This finding suggests that some of the materialistic tendency's effect on conspicuous consumption behavior is realized through social media usage. People see social media channels as a showcase to show the material items they own and value, and they engage in pretentious consumption behavior through social media as social media usage grows. Today, it is well known that luxury brands and products, in particular, are shared on social media to encourage consumers; social media is seen as a way to demonstrate conspicuous consumption behaviors to others who follow the person. Pellegrino et al. (2022) discovered that social media density has a mediating effect on the relationship between materialism and conspicuous consumption behavior in their study of 400 Thai social media users. The result obtained with the mediation hypothesis shows parallelism with the literature.

When the research results are considered in aggregate, it can be stated that they make significant contributions to the field. First and foremost, when the literature is examined, it is seen that the variables of materialistic tendency, conspicuous consumption, and social media use are investigated separately or together with different variables, but not all three variables are investigated together. Although the literature concludes that there are relationships between the three variables, no study has examined social media usage as a mediating variable within the scope of a model. This study makes an important theoretical contribution to the international field by investigating the use of social media as a mediating variable between materialistic tendencies and conspicuous consumption behavior within the framework of a model and producing meaningful results. The study has some limitations as well as important findings. First and foremost, because the data were collected using a convenience sampling method, the results cannot be generalized and include all the survey participants due to time and cost constraints. The sample constraint is that the research was only conducted on consumers in Samsun, and it is expected that similar results would be obtained if the same research was conducted in other provinces. Suggestions are also made to researchers who may conduct research on this subject based on the study's findings and limitations. It can be suggested that researchers who focus on the concept of materialism should research the same subject in the future within the framework of post-materialism and add different variables (such as waste behavior) to the existing model. The same study can be differentiated in terms of the sample, and applied to consumers in different cities or countries, and the results compared in terms of different sample groups. Furthermore, conducting research using qualitative research methods, such as interviews of subjects, is recommended.

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Journal of Economy Culture and Society

Theoric Article

Exploring Transformation Through Travel by Means of the Movie *The Way*

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ABSTRACT

Transformation through travel is attracting scholarly attention due to its potential to trigger a radical transformation extending beyond the traveler's unique experience during the trip of a lifetime. As one of the most common ways of encountering the different, tourism can enable people to become aware of their hidden assumptions and make volitional decisions about them, resulting in a transformation. This study aims to understand how transformation takes place through touristic experience, based on Mezirow's learning theory. To do this, the movie *The Way* (Emilio Estevez, 2010), which depicts the relationship between touristic experience and the transformation of the individual in an artistically powerful manner, was utilized. To analyze the document that constitutes the data source of the research study, a narrative analysis, and a qualitative research design, was followed. The results of the narrative analysis demonstrated that the representations in the movie coincide strongly with the literature on transformation through travel. It showed that transformation begins with the traveler's questioning of self or the perceived world, and that the various difficulties experienced, encounters with the different, and going out of one's comfort zone and habits facilitate transformation through travel. It was also concluded that the authenticity of the touristic experience strengthens its transformative aspect. Thus, the study proposes that in order to strengthen the transformative aspect of the touristic experience, tourists should be offered touristic products and services that contain transformative experiences whose authenticity is preserved.

Keywords: Travel, tourism, transformation, transformative experience, *The Way*

1. Introduction

The relationship human beings establish with their environment, the mediations in this relationship and its transformative effect on people have been the subject of cultural anthropology studies, theories of cultural plurality, identity debates and their philosophical and psychological background, especially after the 19th century. Hence, it is possible to reveal the transformative effect of touristic experience on the individual in a holistic manner through an interdisciplinary perspective. A multidisciplinary approach would be appropriate in studies that deal with travel and transformation together. Each discipline can address the transformation arising from human-environment interaction from different perspectives (Morgan, 2010). Mezirow's transformative learning theory, which focuses on the transformation of the individual, has formed the basis of studies in various disciplines. One of the fields that utilize Mezirow's theory is tourism.

The concept of transformation has been frequently associated with tourism or travel in recent years (Sampaio, Simoni, & Isnart, 2014; Kirillova, Letho, & Cai, 2017a; Pung & Del Chiappa, 2020; Teoh, Wang, & Kwek, 2021). Pine & Gilmore (2011) argued that in order for transformation to occur, a person must experience change in behavior and personal characteristics. They added that this change depends on the personal characteristics of the individual as well as the nature of the encounters. The diversity of tourist experiences and individual characteristics makes understanding transformation a challenging task.

Teoh, et al. (2021) stated that transformative travel experiences initiate a transformation process that results in change, which is instrumental in modifying the perspective of the person undergoing transformation and transferring this new perspective to thoughts, attitudes, and behavior in daily life. Touristic experience and its potential to transform the individual are important because tourist experiences not only provide entertainment, recreation and enjoyment during travel, but also cause changes that are reflected in behavior and attitudes in daily life.

The reason that studies on transformative travel experiences have become more visible in recent years is that transformative travel experiences lead to changes in the consumption habits of tourists and the way they relate to their environment, even after returning home (Soulard, McGehee, & Knollenberg, 2020). In its 2016 report, the World Tourism Organization underlined the transformative power of tourism and described tourism as a tool for cultural-social change (UNWTO, 2016). Santos, Ferreira, Costa & Santos (2020) expressed the need to recognize the importance and value of tourist transformation and to create memorable and transformative tourism experiences.

Studies on the relationship between travel and transformation have generally been concerned with the transformation of specific groups such as backpackers (Noy, 2004), international sojourners (Brown, 2009), and volunteer tourists (Coghlan & Weiler, 2018). While few studies have focused on the characteristics of transformative tourism (Pung & Del Chiappa, 2020), Pung, Gnoth, & Del Chiappa (2020) developed a conceptual model of tourist transformation. The current study will not discuss types of tourism that involve transformative experiences or tourist groups that are more predisposed to transformation, but how a tourist is transformed through travel, by example. To do this, the transformative learning theory, utilized by tourism and various other disciplines, will be drawn upon and how this transformation is realized will be examined through the movie *The Way* (2010). This movie was chosen because it conveys how transformative travel takes place in stages and contains powerful representations of studies that investigate the relationship between tourism and transformation more than similar road movies.

2. Conceptual & Theoretical Background

Participating in tourism activities and traveling has an educative and transformative potential that makes people open to novelties, strengthens understanding and tolerance, and leads to learning, development, mental enrichment, and maturation (Morgan, 2010). As emphasized by Lean (2012: 169), "everyone is transformed by travel to some degree". Similarly, according to Kottler, "[t]here is no other human activity that has greater potential to alter your perceptions or the ways you choose to run your life" (Kottler, 1997: 23). Traveling or participating in tourism activities is seen not only as a means of pleasure, but also as an opportunity for an experience with the potential to transform people for a better life.

If tourism is considered as an experience of breaking out of the routine of everyday life (Cohen & Taylor, 1992), transformation through travel becomes more evident. As a matter of fact, Reisinger (2013) stated that transformation is an irreversible change and mental enrichment that requires a new way of knowing and a radical break from established practices. Therefore, transformative travel experience necessitates a conscious effort on the part of the individual and involves changes in self-understanding, revision of one's belief system, and modifications in one's behavior and lifestyle (Reisinger, 2013). Tourism literature shows that not all tourism experiences have an intrinsic transformative effect and that transformation depends on the quality of the tourist experience. Transformative travel experience considers the transformation phases identified by the transformative learning theory (Mezirow, 1994) as important factors of transformation through travel. Furthermore, Smith (2017) revealed the power of Mezirow's theory by stating that it enables travelers to reflect on tolerance and equality.

According to the transformative learning theory, there are certain requirements that lead the individual to transformation, and these emerge gradually during the transformation of the subject. The qualities of the transformative experience can be instructive in understanding what qualities the touristic experience should have or how it should be constructed to be transformative (Mezirow, 1994; Reisinger, 2013). To investigate the transformative effect of touristic experience, Mezirow's transformation phases (1994: 224) were examined by classifying them into three stages: triggers of transformation, transformation, and post-transformation.

Triggers of transformation;
- A disorienting dilemma,
- Self-examination with feelings of guilt or shame,
- A critical assessment of assumptions.

Transformation;
- Recognition that one's discontent and the process of transformation are shared and others have negotiated a similar change,
- Exploration of options for new roles, relationships and actions,
- Planning a course of action,
- Acquiring knowledge and skills for implementing one's plans,
- Provisionally tying out new roles,
- Renegotiating relationships and negotiating new relationships.

Post-transformation;
- Building competence and self-confidence in new roles and relationships,
- A reintegration into one's life on the basis of conditions dictated by one's new perspective.

The first phase of transformation begins with mental confusion and a disorienting dilemma that causes an inner personal crisis. In transformation through travel, this personal inner crisis arises when the encounter with the Other calls into question established assumptions that make up one's sense of direction and values. As a result, the individual makes a critical assessment of assumptions and frames of reference, usually accompanied by unpleasant or undesirable feelings. They start to question established patterns that enable them to interpret and make sense of the experience. This phase is a kind of self-evaluation and serves as a trigger for transformation. To put it more simply, this is the stage in which the individual's will to change emerges. Transformation is the abandonment of a particular state before the acquisition of a new state. Therefore, the will to abandon the current state rather than the desire for the new state becomes the trigger. Mezirow identified the individual's confusion about the characteristics to be transformed as the basis of the shaping of this will for transformation. This is described as an emotional motivation that will trigger a rational decision. The emphasis on strong feelings such as guilt and shame are evaluated in this way. These are the feelings that call into question some of the assumptions that the individual has and perhaps has never thought about. These feelings, which are encoded as negative, can also function as productive emotions that allow the person to question established convictions, strengthen relationships with other people, and rethink the way they relate to their environment (Walker, 2017).

Interpersonal relationships play a very important role in shaping touristic experience. The individual who enters the transformation process also witnesses similar experiences of other individuals. The opportunities provided by touristic experience for interaction between people motivate the individual in favor of transformation by enabling the exploration of options for new roles, relationships, and actions. The encounter with those different from the person undergoing the touristic experience and the Other who is described as not "normal" requires the individual to plan different courses of action and to acquire knowledge and skills for implementing those plans. According to MacCannell (1973), tourists traveled not only to repeat established patterns and remain within their comfort zones but also to seek authentic experiences. In this sense, touristic experience has a transformative potential as long as it presents the foreign to the tourist in its most authentic form. The touristic experience, during which the roles in the world of everyday life are partially abandoned, offers the opportunity to provisionally try out new roles. This takes the individual to the final phase of the transformation by leading them to renegotiate existing relationships and negotiate new relationships.

The person's reintegration into life on the basis of conditions dictated by the new perspective and worldview gained from this experience points to the transformation that has taken place. In the final phase, the person completes transformation through travel by building competence and self-confidence in the new roles and relationships brought by transformation.

Transformation is a change that occurs through the replacement of the factors that make a particular situation plausible and the introduction of elements that successfully establish an alternative situation (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Although transformation seems to be the result of the individual's free will, processes outside the will must be effective in its emergence. The reason for this is that not only judgments of the individual, but also the ability to make judgments undergo a change and such a radical change in will is the result of the will itself. Lean (2012) argued that the factors affecting transformation are innumerable; they take place before, during and after travel; and the interaction of these factors will affect tourist transformation. According to Lean (2012: 157-168), transformation of the subject through travel is influenced by "(1) social relation-

ships, (2) roles, routines and performances, (3) travel perceptions, knowledge and motivations, before travel; (1) social relationships, (2) roles, routines and performances, (3) reflection on experiences, (4) mobile places, spaces, landscapes and objects, during travel; (1) social relationships, (2) roles, routines and performances, (3) memories and mobile places, spaces and landscapes, post travel". Thus, transformation through travel is influenced by not only the characteristics, but also the memories, experiences and relationships of the individual during different stages of the journey (Lean, 2012).

Kirillova et al. (2017a) considered the individual and the social and cultural world around travelers as a whole and suggested that there are some triggers for transformation through travel to take place. The triggers of transformation through travel are: the timing factor such that the transformation occurs at the end of the journey; the emotion valence varying from a feeling of horror to intense joy; the emotional intensity felt during the transformation experience; the heightened cognition factor created by the reflection process that initiates the transformation; the temporal and spatial transiency and demarcation of the experience that initiates the transformation; a connection to something grand such as God or life; and, finally, the role of circumstantial environment including awe-inspiring nature, encounters with wildlife, a novel cultural setting, and meaningful connections to other individuals (Kirillova, et al., 2017a). In addition to the triggers of transformation through travel, there are also facilitators of transformation (Pung & Del Chiappa, 2020). These are social interaction, which is the most important element of the touristic experience; challenges faced during travel; sense of place created by the different cultural, social elements and belief values in the visited destination; and long stays compared to short stays (Pung & Del Chiappa, 2020). In their study, Pala and Cetin (2022:11) claimed that transformative travel experiences may vary depending on tripographic factors such as "duration and motivation of travel, personal characteristics, and destination features". They also posited that transformation through travel occurs through "behavioral, attitudinal, and personality changes".

Sheldon (2020) stated that transformation through travel or touristic experiences is something that can be designed and identifies situations that involve transformative tourism experiences as deep human connectivity especially in cultural contexts; deep environmental connectivity in natural settings; self-inquiry, self-reflection, self-knowledge; and engaged contribution to the destination by tourists. Moreover, the transformative moments experienced by travelers emerge with Mezirow's disorienting dilemma, causing them to step out of their comfort zones, question their intrinsic values and change their current attitudes and values (Sheldon, 2020; Soulard, et al., 2019). Pilgrimages are also largely defined as journeys in which a person is on a quest, often leading to transformation. On these journeys, people are prepared to look beyond the immediate in their lives and explore ideas and possibilities in community with others (Devereux & Carnegie, 2006). *The Way* (2010) tells the story of travelers who are ready for change and a traveler seized by change on a route known as the Santiago de Compostela Pilgrim Routes, certified as a cultural route by the Council of Europe in 1987 (Council of Europe, 2022). The transformation of Tom, the protagonist of the story, explored in this study is completely consistent with Mezirow's phases of transformation.

Methodology

The research design was influenced by narrative analysis, one of the qualitative research designs. Narrative research considers the life story or experiences of one or more people as its field of study. According to Creswell and Poth,, "narrative stories tell of individual experiences, and

they may shed light on the identities of individuals and how they see themselves. Narrative stories occur within specific places or situations. Temporality becomes important for the researcher's telling of the story within a place. Such contextual details may include descriptions of the physical, emotional, and social situations." (Creswell & Poth, 2018: 112). Riessman (2008) stated that narrative researchers collect various stories of lived experience, which may also include performance narratives that aim to communicate some message or issue. The current study analyzed a fictional story constructed as a motion picture by following its narrative pattern. *The Way* focuses on the story of a father who sets off to recover the body of his son who lost his life during a travel experience. In addition, the movie strongly incorporates narrative chronology (Creswell & Poth, 2018), which is often emphasized in the narrative pattern.

"Narrative stories are gathered through many different forms of data, such as through interviews that may be the primary form of data collection but also through observations, documents, pictures, and other sources of qualitative data" (Creswell & Poth, 2018: 112). The document analyzed in this study is *The Way* directed by Emilio Estevez. The document presents in chronological order the experiences of the main character and his three companions during a pilgrimage.

Riessman (2008) proposed several data analysis strategies for narrative research. These are: *thematic* analysis concerned with "what" is spoken; *structural* analysis that examines "how" a story is told; and *dialogic/performative* analysis that focuses on "who" an utterance may be directed to. In the current study, all three strategies were used for data analysis. First of all, depending on the chronological storyline of the movie, important scenes were analyzed via the strategy proposed by Daiute (2014) including the analysis of values, plot, significance, character mapping, and time. After the first stage of analysis, *transformation phases* defined by Mezirow (1994), *factors affecting transformation through travel* identified by Lean (2012), and *triggers of transformation* suggested by Kirillova, Lehto and Cai (2017) were used for the thematic analysis of important scenes and turning points. For structural and dialogic/performative analysis, philosophy literature was drawn upon. The narrative analysis of the film was carried out independently by three authors, two from the field of tourism and the other from the field of philosophy, and then the findings of the three authors were compared with each other.

The validity and reliability of the research were ensured through *enabling external audits* and *peer debriefer* (Erlandson, et al., 1993; Creswell & Poth, 2018). For enabling external audits, the study was shared with a sociology scholar, whose suggestions were taken into consideration. As for peer debriefer, the research was examined by an academic working in the field of tourism, who is familiar with the subject and the phenomenon under study, and provided feedback to the authors.

3. *The Way* (2010) Movıe
3.1. A brief note on the movie

The 2010 movie *The Way*, directed by Emilio Estevez, is about the transformation of Tom, an upper-class American ophthalmologist played by Martin Sheen, while he walks the "Santiago de Compostela Route". This has been one of the pilgrimage routes of Christians since the Middle Ages. Tom, who has upper-middle class privileges such as a good job, a satisfactory income, and a secure and predictable life, learns that his son Daniel, who has put all of these privileges aside in order to "see the world", lost his life while walking this route and sets off to bring him home for burial.

The prevailing emotion at the beginning of the movie is Tom's grief over the loss of his son and anger at his lifestyle. Tom and his son Daniel are the portrayals of two opposite characters. While Tom represents a planned, controllable, rational, bound, and organized way of life, Daniel

represents a way of life that can push aside a bright career and all the privileges, preferring to go after what he does not know and has not seen, following his will. To put it in terms of the distinction Kierkegaard makes in his major work *Either/Or*, while Tom represents the ethical way of life based on public objective experience, where the idea of duty and order is decisive, Daniel represents the aesthetic way of life based on individual experience, where one's feelings and desires are decisive. This distinction has appeared in various forms in existentialist philosophy and literature since the second half of the 19th century. On one hand, there is rationality, whose power goes beyond explaining the world with modernity, and on the other, there is the inner world and desires of the human being, who expresses themselves with anxiety and crisis as their power is lost within the rational world. This dilemma, embodied in the characters Tom and Daniel, can be seen in Daniel's response to his father, who is angry with him for "ruining his life" and acting without a plan: "You don't choose a life, Dad. You live one." On one side, a life planned and designed; on the other side, a life lived.

Figure 1: *The Way* (2010) Movie Poster

3.2. Triggers of transformation

The next stage of the movie begins when Tom, out of a sense of responsibility, decides to complete his son's unfinished journey, leaving his ashes at places where he wanted to be. At the very beginning of his journey, the captain who helps him with the procedures for his son gives him the following warning: "The way is a very personal journey." This statement does not mean much to Tom who is still at the beginning of the journey, because he is making this journey to fulfill the responsibility he feels towards his son, that is, someone other than himself. What compels him to this journey is not an immediate will, but a sense of responsibility. In the first part of this journey, which he does not desire, the audience witnesses encounters that are quite alien to

Tom. The general theme of this part of the movie can be identified as situations he has never encountered before in his lifestyle, people who are not/would not be in his normal life, places he looks/would look at from afar and perhaps even with a sneer, and the sense of astonishment created by all these encounters. His having to go into the river after the bag containing his son's ashes and then spending the night outside can be interpreted as evidence that he is making this journey not out of desire but out of a sense of responsibility. At this stage, Tom is still making a journey he does not want, but endures due to his responsibility. He feels astonishment at being in hostels where dozens of people stay together, with people who are not/cannot be a part of his daily life, and mingling with nature he would rather be a spectator to than a part of. In this part of the movie, Tom, who belongs to a well-designed world free from accidents and uncertainties as far as possible, displays a non-reactive bewilderment towards the uncertainties facing him. The situation in a café when he wants to order tapas is quite striking in terms of showing Tom's faith in his orderly, predictable world. Joost from Amsterdam, who is a prototype of people who are not a part of his everyday life, warns Tom when he is about to order *tapas* by saying, "[Here,] they're called *pinchos*." Tom's response is the symbol of his absolute trust in his own world: "I beg your pardon Joost, but in Pamplona they're called *tapas*. I just read it [pulling out a tourist guide out of his pocket]. You see, unlike the Dutch guidebook which may be directing you to the nearest party, the American guidebook is designed so that you don't look like a clown if you order *pinchos* when you really mean *tapas*." This dialog represents his negative view of the lifestyle that prioritizes pleasure, embodied in the character Joost. It also illustrates Tom's trust in his own world in the face of a person who is "captive to his desires" whom Tom does not take seriously. This trust is an obstacle that prevents Tom from approaching the foreign with an open mind and trying to understand it. In fact, Tom's avoidance of contact with other people and wanting to fulfill his responsibility and leave as soon as possible until this part of the movie can be explained by this motive.

Figure 2: Beginning of Tom's Journey

3.3. Transformation

The next part of the movie is where Tom begins to understand those around him as he goes through experiences that shake his confidence in his own world. In this part, the audience witnesses Tom's dialogue with the cheerful Joost from Amsterdam, who is on this journey to lose weight and is excessively fond of worldly pleasures, Sarah from Canada, who says she went on this journey to quit smoking, and the Irish writer Jack, who set out to find his lost inspiration. For each of them, the other's world becomes meaningful and intriguing. This part of the movie ends at a police station when one evening Tom gets drunk and confronts those around him with what he perceives as their weaknesses, his anger actually stemming from his own inner turmoil. Tom leaves the police station thanks to his companions who show great understanding for his situation, and the shame and guilt he feels about this night sets the stage for his transformation.

The dialogue between the fellow travelers, which resulted in understanding each other, evolves into acceptance. Tom starts to open his inner world to those around him. Allowing Jack, who is suffering from writer's block, to write his story is a symbol of Tom's opening his inner world. This can be considered as opening his assumptions, which constitute the founding core of his actions, to discussion. This dialogue with the Other now leads Tom to change his perspective and do things he thought he would not do. This narrative about the transformation that the relationship with the Other can create in the established mental schemas is clearly represented in the movie by the story of Tom's bag being stolen by a Romani boy. This part of the movie reveals that encounters are a valuable means for eliminating prejudices. Just when it becomes clear that Tom is getting to know and be a part of the new world around him, his bag containing his son's ashes is stolen by a Romani boy. This means the triumph of the world of reason based on predictability and security, embodied from the beginning in the character Tom, over the world of experience shaped by desires, represented by Daniel. However, the thieving boy's father hands over the bag with great embarrassment, and his moralizing attitude exposes the established mental patterns that lead to all kinds of marginalization practices in the context of discrimination against Romanis. This tilts the balance in the equation between what Tom represents and what Daniel represents irreversibly in favor of Daniel. With the friendly atmosphere they encounter in the wedding they are invited to in the Romani neighborhood and the scene in which the father of the thieving boy bids farewell to the travelers, the phase of embracing the Other evolves into a desire to get to know new Others. Tom now has Daniel's enthusiasm and curiosity about life. The fact that after a long and arduous walk, Tom does not enjoy an overnight stay in a comfortable hotel but misses his life on the road points to a radical change in his outlook on life. The fact that he has his name erased and Daniel's name written on the certificate of completion he receives at the end of the journey can be interpreted as the fulfillment of his responsibility towards his son, as well as his turning into Daniel. Tom, who intends to calculate and organize his life, turns into Daniel, who lives with great curiosity and enthusiasm for everything life brought and will bring.

3.4. Post-Transformation

The final part of Tom's transformation is accompanied by Alanis Morisette's song *Thank U*, an ode to change for what life brings. Tom's journey, which started with grief and anger, ends with inner peace and curiosity for the new. As the captain said at the beginning of the journey, this has been a very personal journey. In the last sequence, Tom is in another part of the world, walking with a backpack, curiously looking around.

Figure 3: New Tom

4. Representations of Transformation Through Travel

The Way contains many connections that were established between being on the road and transformation. Pilgrimage routes have a special place in terms of the relationship between touristic experience and transformation. The route followed in the movie is a holy pilgrimage route that ends in Santiago, where the bones of Saint James are believed to have been found. In Christian theology, pilgrimage refers to a kind of purification, to turning away from what you are. It is no coincidence that the original meaning of *peregrinus*, which lies at the root of the term pilgrim in many Western languages, is *foreigner*. For this reason, the goal is not to arrive at Santiago, the final destination of the walk, but to complete the route that leads there; because this journey promises a process of turning away from what you are. The goal is not to get somewhere, but to get away from some things. Frédéric Gros expresses this ideal as follows: "Internal transformation remains the pilgrim's mystical ideal: he hopes to be absolutely *altered* on his return" (Gros, 2017: 121). Although Tom's journey does not have the same spiritual tone as a pilgrimage,it does evolve into an inner reckoning and self-questioning. From this point of view, the captain's warning at the beginning that this will be a very personal journey becomes even more meaningful.

Another important theme that establishes a connection between being on the road and transformation is that the experience is outside the comfort zone and completely authentic.Being at one with nature and walking are identified as important elements of the transformative touristic experience. American philosopher Henry David Thoreau defined walking as an opportunity to get rid of the sounds of the outside world and listen to one's own voice (Thoreau, 1862). However, this should be a walk towards the wild, towards what is alien to one's self. According to Thoreau, "Our expeditions are but tours, and come round again at evening to the old hearth side from which we set out. Half the walk is but retracing our steps. We should go forth on the shortest walk, perchance, in the spirit of undying adventure, never to return, –prepared to send back our embalmed hearts only as relics to our desolate kingdoms." (Thoreau, 1862). By suggesting walks that transgress comfort zones, Thoreau is suggesting that people encounter what is foreign to them so that

they can hear their own voice. In this sense, Tom's walk is a journey as Thoreau suggests. Tom is in the wild in every sense of the word. He is both in nature and in a world alien to him and this walk in the wild enables him to hear his own voice, as Thoreau promises. This walk will continue, in Thoreau's words, "till one day the sun shall shine more brightly than ever he has done, shall perchance shine into our minds and hearts, and light up our whole lives with a great awakening light, as warm and serene and golden as on a bank-side in Autumn" (Thoreau, 1862). Tom's transformation can be interpreted as such an enlightenment. The adventure in the wild, listening to oneself, seeing the different, inner reckoning, and encounter with the new lead to a new person at the end of the path.

The movie opens with the decision to embark on a journey, develops with the journey experience and concludes with Tom's transformation. The beginning of such an experience can be explained by different motives. Existential crisis, which is defined as a result of the tension between the individual's desire for self-realization and life, is one of these motives. This crisis, which is the founding dynamic of existentialist philosophy and literature, becomes the motivation for a search for the purpose of life. The relationship between existentialism and the theme of death help to understand Tom's motivation for embarking on the journey. Some experiences interrupt the ordinary and familiar course of life abruptly, calling into question the meaning of this ordinary flow. Karl Jaspers, one of the symbolic philosophers of existentialism, defined death as a "boundary situation" that leads one to reflect on one's existence (Jaspers, 2010: 64). A situation like death, which one finds themself inevitably face to face with, is not a situation that can be made sense of within the course of the everyday world. For this reason, it is beyond the limits of our meaningful world. Therefore, death is not something that can be known; it can only be felt. When death is felt, the meaning-laden course of everyday life loses its meaning and the person starts to reflect on the meaning of existence. Tom's loss of his son is this kind of an experience. After Daniel's death, Tom sets off to bring his son home and bury him, and then to resume everything from where he left off; however, he cannot do this. He feels compelled to do something in order to place the pain within the ordinary flow of his life, to make this devastating experience meaningful. The emotional intensity (Kirillova, et al., 2017a) that Tom experiences, the dilemma he goes through as a result of the unexpected encounter with the death of his child and the resulting questioning of himself and the meaning of life (Mezirow, 1994) are the factors that trigger Tom's transformation. This explains his sudden decision at midnight to complete Daniel's journey. Tom's journey progresses in almost perfect conformity with the phases of transformation identified by Mezirow. The course of his relationship with his companions is the most obvious example of this analogy. Tom's feelings of shame and guilt after the scene in which he angrily voices his negative opinions about his friends and ends up at the police station provide a clear example of the factors that trigger Mezirow's transformation. Tom not only regrets but also feels ashamed of what he has done. It is precisely this shame and the resulting guilt that triggers his transformation so that he will never behave like that again.

The main theme of the second part of the movie is Tom's encounters and experiences. It should be underlined at this point that these encounters are contrary to Tom's established convictions and that the experiences during these encounters are foreign to him. Tom is in a world that is completely alien to the ordinary course of his life. However, besides its foreignness, this world is as genuine as it can be. The genuineness here can be interpreted as the authenticity of the experience promised by this world. The nature he is at one with, the hostels he sleeps in, the people he encounters, the food he eats are as foreign to Tom's world as they are genuine in their own exis-

tence. None of them are constructed or planned for Tom's being there; this is precisely why Tom is in the wild. The world he encounters is a new world, and by showing Tom that another world exists, it makes him think that other worlds are possible. The narrative of the first part of the journey is based on the contrast between Tom and this new world he finds himself in. This contrast is important in terms of showing Tom how alien his experiences are to him, making him reflect on these experiences (Lean, 2012), and making him aware of the Other (Kirillova, et al., 2017a). This is because experience is one of the most important means of making sense of the world around one, as well as a major factor that shapes the mental structure of the person.

American philosopher David Lewis claims that "experience is the best teacher" and emphasizes its uniqueness as an instructive occurrence. Having an experience is the best way or perhaps the only way of coming to know what that experience is like. No amount of scientific information about the stimuli that produce that experience and the process that goes on in you when you have that experience will enable you to know what it's like to have the experience. In his famous essay in which he investigates the potentials of experience, Lewis (1988: 29) argues that unless you have smelled a skunk, what you know about the neural system and the sense of smell is of no use. The assumptions that Tom does not doubt the truth of in the least and his rigid point of view can only be shaken with the experiences he goes through supports Lewis' findings concerning the potential of experience.

The relationship between foreignness and the potential to lead to transformation should be underlined once again. In her study about transformative experience, L.A. Paul puts it this way: "When a person has a new and different kind of experience, a kind of experience that teaches her something she could not have learned without having that kind of experience, she has an *epistemic transformation*" (Paul, 2014: 10). The emphasis on "new and different" is quite important, because an experience that can lead to a change in one's point of view and world of thought must be outside the existing perspective. Encountering an unfamiliar world of life has a transformative potential in the sense of witnessing not only a new life experience, but also the existence of different worlds of life. The peculiarity and genuineness of the lived experience can thus be defined as the transformative power of the experience. This becomes clearer when the authenticity of Tom's encounters are taken into consideration.

The final part of the movie depicts the transformation Tom undergoes. Tom transforms into Daniel, whose values are completely contrary to the values Tom represented at the beginning of his journey, and it is his encounters on his journey that lead to this transformation. It can be inferred that this is not a transformation only in perspective from the fact that Tom is portrayed in the last scene as pursuing a new quest. The scene showing Tom continuing his life as a traveler demonstrates how he adapted to his new life. Transformation is important not only in the sense of evolving into something new, but also in the sense of revealing a potential to transform. In this sense, each new journey has the potential to lead to the emergence of a new Tom.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

Studies on transformation through tourism are crucial as they respond to the search of new generations who are more sensitive to today's environmental, social and economic problems and aware of the world they live in (UNWTO, 2016). In particular, altruistic (for example, volunteer tourism) and other forms of tourism sensitive to the Other have the opportunity to transform both the traveler and the host (Kay Smith & Diekmann, 2017). This transformative power of tourism comes from the fact that it is a space for encounter. The traveler encounters in different cities and

countries: tastes, people, landscapes, and cultures that he/she has not encountered before. Mac-Cannell (1976) described tourism as a modern pilgrimage, saying that travelers travel with the aim of seeing and experiencing the new.

In this study, in order to understand how transformation through travel occurs, the movie *The Way*, which represents this transformation, was examined under the guidance of Mezirow's transformation phases. The disorienting dilemma that arises with the death of Tom's son Daniel, his anger at his son's lifestyle and this anger changing direction and spilling over to people he has just met, and Tom's questioning his behavior as a result correspond to Mezirow's first three phases, which are the triggers of transformation. Similarly, Kirillova, et. al (2017a) stated that the awareness created by the questioning process is one of the triggers of transformation. Therefore, transformation through tourism starts with the traveler questioning herself or the world she perceives.

In the transformation phase, Tom's relations with "others" becomes instrumental in understanding them and his changing his relationship style by defining new roles (Mezirow, 1994) is a good representation of how transformation takes place. Various challenges Tom faces during his journey (White & White, 2004; Pung & Del Chiappa, 2020; Tasci & Godovykh, 2021); his encounters with different cultures, people, communication styles, beliefs, food and landscapes (Tasci & Godovykh, 2021; Pung & Del Chiappa, 2020; Kirillova, et al., 2017a; Lee & Woosnam, 2010); and going out of his comfort zone and habits (Tasci & Godovykh, 2021) enabled the transformation to take place. After the transformation, Tom is seen as a backpacker, and this scene represents Tom's integration into his new life with his new perspective. Tom has now transformed into Daniel by adopting the life of the son he was angry with. While this transformation points to the construction of a new self (Coghlan & Weiler, 2018), it shows that there may be some changes in the traveler's personality (Noy, 2004; Tasci & Godovykh, 2021). This study showed how tourist transformation takes place by means of the movie *The Way*, which is a very good representation of this type of transformation. The inferences made through the narrative of the movie help in understanding how the tourist transformation takes place, while also illuminating the features transformative travel experiences should have. In practical terms, this knowledge provides guidance for tourism marketers and practitioners on how to promote and design transformative travel experiences when developing touristic products.

Another point to emphasize is that transformative travel experiences should be authentic. The transformation of the movie's protagonist is not the result of a decision but a series of experiences. What triggers and sustains the transformation are the events that occur around the character, the phenomena that surround him, and the experiences he goes through. The transformative experience must be authentic as well as alien to the world of the traveler (Kirillova, et al., 2017b). In other words, an authentic experience can lead to transformation. It should be emphasized that the authenticity of Tom's experience is crucial in his transformation. This is related not only to the events that occur around him, but also to the sense of intrapersonal authenticity he experiences and his interpersonal relationships (Brown, 2013; Rickly-Boyd, 2012; Kirillova, et al., 2017b). In this context, it is necessary to preserve and sustain the authenticity of objects (these can be cultural heritage assets as well as natural sites) and service elements in areas where tourism practitioners have the authority and power to intervene, especially in travel forms where an existential concern is effective (backpackers, volunteer tourism, faith tourism etc.).

Although the results of the research are closely matched with the literature, it should be noted that they are built on the representations of a phenomenon, not on an actual phenomena. Therefore, this situation is a limitation and calls for caution when taking it into consideration. Future

research may examine movies that represent the problem of a similar nature in the example of different cultures. For example, the 2005 movie Bab'Aziz, which deals with traveling and transformation in the context of Sufi philosophy, can be considered. Thus, the issues of being on the road and transformation in terms of eastern and western cultures can be analyzed comparatively.

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Mutlu, B., & Savaşer, S. (2007). Çocuğu ameliyat sonrası yoğun bakımda olan ebeveynlerde stres nedenleri ve azaltma girişimleri [Source and intervention reduction of stress for parents whose children are in intensive care unit after surgery]. *Istanbul University Florence Nightingale Journal of Nursing, 15*(60), 179–182.

b) English Article

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