

REVIEW OF
ARMENIAN STUDIES
A Biannual Journal of History, Politics, and International Relations

Issue
47
2023

Facts and Comments

Alev KILIÇ

An Examination on the Demographic Structure
of Armenians in Tbilisi (1897-2014)

Sinan KOÇAK

A Historical Overview of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany

Fuat Ozan BİRKAN

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the
Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the
Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

Fatih KOCAOĞLU - Mehmet KUZU

Diplomatic Activity of the Azerbaijani
Government against the Territorial Claims
of the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920)

Nigar JAMALOVA

BOOK REVIEWS

From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean:
The Global Trade Networks of Armenian
Merchants From New Julfa

Fatma Jale Gül ÇORUK

REVIEW OF ARMENIAN STUDIES

A Biannual Journal of History, Politics, and International Relations
2023, Issue 47

Altı Aylık, Tarih, Politika ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi
Sayı 47, 2023

EDITOR / EDITÖR

Alev KILIÇ

MANAGING EDITOR / SORUMLU YAZI İŞLERİ MÜDÜRÜ

Mehmet Oğuzhan TULUN

PUBLISHER / YAYIN SAHİBİ

On Behalf Of Terazi Yayıncılık / Terazi Yayıncılık Adına
Hazel ÇAĞAN ELBİR

LANGUAGE EDITOR / DİL EDITÖRÜ

Ahmet Can ÖKTEM

EDITORIAL - ADVISORY BOARD / YAYIN - DANIŞMA KURULU

In Alphabetical Order / Alfabetik Sıra İle

Prof. Dr. Seçil KARAL AKGÜN
(METU, Ret. Faculty Member)
(ODTÜ, E. Öğretim Üyesi)

Yiğit ALPOGAN
(Ret. Ambassador)
(E. Büyükelçi)

Ertuğrul APAKAN
(Ret. Ambassador)
(E. Büyükelçi)

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI
(Middle East Technical University - METU)
(Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi - ODTÜ)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Brendon J. CANNON
(Khalifa University)
(Khalifa Üniversitesi)

Ahmet Altay CENGİZER
(Ret. Ambassador)
(E. Büyükelçi)

Prof. Dr. Sadi ÇAYCI
(Başkent University)
(Başkent Üniversitesi)

Prof. Dr. Kemal ÇİÇEK
(Retired Faculty Member)
(Emekli Öğretim Üyesi)

Dr. Şükrü ELEKDAĞ
(Ret. Ambassador)
(E. Büyükelçi)

Dr. Edward ERICKSON
(Marine Corps Uni. (USA), Ret. Faculty Member)
(Marine Corps Üni. (ABD), E. Öğretim Üyesi)

Uluç GÜRKAN
(Journalist)
(Gazeteci)

Prof. Dr. Yusuf HALAÇOĞLU
(Fmr. President of Turkish Historical Society)
(Eski Türk Tarih Kurumu Başkanı)

Prof. Dr. Justin MCCARTHY
(University of Louisville)
(Louisville Üniversitesi)

Dr. Jeremy SALT
(Bilkent University, Ret. Faculty Member)
(Bilkent Üniversitesi, E. Öğretim Üyesi)

Dr. Bilal N. ŞİMŞİR
(Ret. Ambassador, Historian)
(E. Büyükelçi, Tarihçi)

Prof. Dr. Refik TURAN
(Fmr. President of Turkish Historical Society)
(Eski Türk Tarih Kurumu Başkanı)

Prof. Dr. Ömer TURAN
(Middle East Technical University - METU)
(Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi - ODTÜ)

Prof. Dr. Hakan YAVUZ
(Utah University)
(Utah Üniversitesi)

Review of Armenian Studies is published biannually and legally classified as a Turkey-wide periodical publication.

Review of Armenian Studies is a refereed journal. Review of Armenian Studies is indexed in the EBSCO and TUBITAK-ULAKBIM databases. Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The editorial/advisory board takes into consideration whether the submitted article follows the rules of scientific writing and grammar. The articles are sent to two referees known for their academic reputation in their respective areas. Upon their decision, the article will be published in the journal or rejected. The reports of the referees are kept confidential and stored in the journal's archives for five years.

This academic journal is edited by the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM) on behalf of Avrasya Bir Vakfı (1993), and published by Terazi Yayıncılık.

Publication Office

Terazi Yayıncılık Bas. Dağ. Dan. Eđt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Őti.
Abidin Daver Sok. No. 12/B Daire 4 06550 ankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 • Faks: 0 (312) 438 50 26
www.avim.org.tr

e-ISSN: 2757-5845

Subscription Office

Hülya ÖNALP
Terazi Yayıncılık Eđt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Őti.
Süleyman Nazif Sok. No.12/B Daire 4 06550
ankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 - Fax: 0 (312) 438 50 26
E-mail: teraziyayincilik@gmail.com

Design

Ruhi ALAGÖZ

Printing

Sonađ Yayıncılık Matbaacılık
İstanbul Cad. İstanbul arşısı No: 48/48-49 İskitler / ANKARA

Printing Date: 22 June 2023

Annual Subscription Fee - Turkey: 200 TRY
Annual Subscription Fee - International: 60 USD

Please send your payment to the following bank account:

For TRY - Terazi Yayıncılık, Garanti Bankası-ankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/6296007
Postal Check Account Ankara/ankaya/Merkez 5859221

For USD - Garanti Bankası- ankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/9086957
IBAN: TR60 0006 2000 1810 009 0869 57

Statements of facts or opinions appearing in Review of Armenian Studies are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the editor, managing editor, or publisher.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written authorization of the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM).

Review of Armenian Studies yılda iki kez yayımlanır. Yaygın Süreli Yayın.

Review of Armenian Studies hakemli bir dergidir. Review of Armenian Studies dergisi TÜBİTAK ULAKBİM ve EBSCO tarafından taranmaktadır. Yayıma sunulan makaleler hakem denetimine tabi tutulur. Gönderilen yazılar ilk olarak yayın/danışma kurulunca bilimsel anlatım ve yazım kuralları yönünden incelenir. Daha sonra uygun bulunan yazılar, alanında bilimsel çalışmaları ile tanınmış iki ayrı hakeme gönderilir. Hakemlerin kararları doğrultusunda yazı yayımlanır ya da yayımlanmaz. Hakemlerin gizli tutulan raporları derginin arşivlerinde beş yıl süre ile tutulur.

Bu akademik dergi, Avrasya Bir Vakfı (1993) adına Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi (AVİM) tarafından hazırlanmakta ve Terazi Yayıncılık tarafından basılmaktadır.

Yayın İdare Merkezi

Terazi Yayıncılık Bas. Dağ. Dan. Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Abidin Daver Sok. No. 12/B Daire 4 06550 Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 • **Faks:** 0 (312) 438 50 26
www.avim.org.tr

e-ISSN: 2757-5845

Abone Sorumlusu

Hülya ÖNALP
Terazi Yayıncılık Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Süleyman Nazif Sok. No.12/B Daire 4 06550
Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 - **Fax:** 0 (312) 438 50 26
E-mail: terazi yayincilik@gmail.com

Sayfa Düzeni

Ruhi ALAGÖZ

Baskı

Sonçağ Yayıncılık Matbaacılık
İstanbul Cad. İstanbul Çarşısı No: 48/48-49 İskitler / ANKARA

Baskı Tarihi: 22 Haziran 2023

Yurtiçi Yıllık Abone Ücreti: 200 TL
Yurtdışı Yıllık Abone Ücreti: 60 USD

Aşağıdaki banka/posta çeki hesap numaralarına ödeme yapabilirsiniz:

Terazi Yayıncılık, Garanti Bankası-Çankaya/ANKARA Şubesi 181/6296007
Posta Çeki Hesabı: Ankara/Çankaya/Merkez 5859221
IBAN: TR60 0006 2000 1810 009 0869 57

Aksi belirtilmediği sürece Review of Armenian Studies'de yayımlanan yazılarda belirtilen olay ve fikirler sadece yazarına aittir. Editörünü, sorumlu yazı işleri müdürünü veya yayın sahibini bağlamaz.

Tüm hakları saklıdır. Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi'den (AVİM) önceden yazılı izin alınmaksızın hiçbir iletişim, kopyalama sistemi kullanılarak yeniden baskısı yapılamaz. Akademik ve haber amaçlı kısa alıntılar bu kuralın dışındadır.

CONTENTS*(İÇİNDEKİLER)*

	Page
Contributors	5
<i>(Yazarlar)</i>	
Editorial Note	7
<i>(Editörün Notu)</i>	
ARTICLES	13
<i>(MAKALELER)</i>	
Facts and Comments	13
<i>(Olaylar Ve Yorumlar)</i>	
Editorial / <i>Başyazı</i>	
Alev KILIÇ	
An Examination on the Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi (1897-2014)	63
<i>Tiflis'teki Ermenilerin Demografik Yapısı Üzerine Bir İnceleme (1897-2014)</i>	
Research Article / <i>Araştırma Makalesi</i>	
Sinan KOÇAK	
A Historical Overview of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany	95
<i>(Almanya'daki Ermeni Diasporasının Tarihsel Bir Genel Değerlendirmesi)</i>	
Research Article / <i>Araştırma Makalesi</i>	
Fuat Ozan BİRKAN	
The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations....	119
<i>(Ermenistan'ın Dış İlişkileri Çerçevesinde İkinci Karabağ Savaşının Ermeni Ekonomisi ve Finans Piyasalarına Etkisi)</i>	
Research Article / <i>Araştırma Makalesi</i>	
Fatih KOCAOĞLU - Mehmet KUZU	
Diplomatic Activity of the Azerbaijani Government against the Territorial Claims of the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920)	159
<i>(Azerbaycan Hükümetinin Ermenistan Cumhuriyetinin Toprak Taleplerine Karşı Uyguladığı Diplomatik Faaliyetler (1918-1920))</i>	
Research Article / <i>Araştırma Makalesi</i>	
Nigar JAMALOVA	
BOOK REVIEWS	179
<i>(KİTAP TAHLİLLERİ)</i>	
From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants From New Julfa	179
<i>(Hint Okyanusu'ndan Akdeniz'e: Yeni Culfalı Ermeni Tüccarların Küresel Ticaret Ağları)</i>	
Fatma Jale Gül ÇORUK	

Contributors

Ambassador (R) Alev KILIÇ graduated from the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University in 1968. The next year, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Kılıç served as Ambassador to F.R. of Yugoslavia between 1996 and 1998 and Ambassador/Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg between 1998 and 2001. In 2001-2004, he served as the Deputy Undersecretary for Economic Affairs of the Ministry. He served as Ambassador to Switzerland (2004-2009) and Ambassador to Mexican United States (2009-2011). He retired from the Ministry in 2011. Ambassador (R) Kılıç has been the Director of Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM) since 2013.



Res. Assist. Sinan KOÇAK graduated from Department of History of Bartın University in 2016. In 2019, he completed his master's degree education in the History of the Republic of Türkiye Program by preparing his dissertation titled "Birinci Balkan Savaşının Bulgar Yazar İvan Lesickof'un 'Balkan Muharebatı Hatıratından' Adlı Eseri Ekseninde Tahlili" ("The Analysis of the First Balkan War Through Bulgarian Author Ivan Lesickov's Work Titled 'Memoirs from the Balkan War'"). In 2020, he began his doctorate degree education at the Department of Armenian Language and Culture of Ankara University. Since 2021, Koçak has been serving as a Research Assistant at the Department of Caucasian Languages and Cultures of the Faculty of Language and History-Geography at Ankara University. Through his linguistic skills in Ottoman Turkish, English, and Armenian, he has produced works on the demographic structure of the Armenians.



Res. Assist. Dr. Fuat Ozan BİRKAN graduated from the Department of International Relations of Uludağ University in 2011. In 2014, he received his master's degree from the same department with the dissertation titled "Germany-Armenia Relations since the 19th Century and the Impact of These Relations on Turkish Foreign Policy". He obtained his doctoral degree on Political Science and International Relations in 2023 at Marmara University with the dissertation titled "The State, the Sultan and the City: Representation of State through Architecture and Ceremony in the Ottoman Empire". Since 2020, he has been serving as a Research Assistant in Political Science and International Relations Department at Istanbul Aydın University. He continues his studies on political history, the Turkish-Ottoman history, and the history of migration.



Res. Assist. Dr. Fatih KOCAOĞLU graduated from Anadolu University's Political Science and Public Administration undergraduate program in 2014. In September of the same year, he was appointed as a Research Assistant to the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences at Gazi University within the scope of Türkiye's Teaching Staff Training Program (ÖYP). In 2016, he graduated from Gazi University's Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration with the thesis titled "Savaşın Ekonomi Politikği Üzerine Sümer Dünya Sistemi Örneği" ("Introduction to the Politics of Economy of War with the Example of Sumerian World System"). In 2021, he defended his doctoral thesis at Gazi University's Department of Political and Social Sciences with the dissertation titled "Mekân Ve Siyaset İlişkisi Bağlamında Dünya Tarihsel Mekânı: Antik Yakındoğu Örnekleri" ("World Historical Space in the Context of the Relationship Between Space and Politics: Examples of the Ancient Near East") and received his PhD title. After the name change of Gazi University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Dr. Kocaoğlu continues to work as a Research Assistant at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University's Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration. His professional field of study is political science.



Dr. Faculty Member Mehmet KUZU completed his undergraduate degree with honors (second place) from Selçuk University's Department of Business Administration in 2010. In January 2011, he was appointed as a Research Assistant in the Accounting and Finance Program of the Department of Business Administration at Bayburt University's Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences within the scope of Türkiye's Teaching Staff Training Program (ÖYP). In September 2011, he started his master's degree education at the Accounting and Finance Program of Department of Business Administration at Gazi University's Institute of Social Sciences. In December 2011, he was assigned to Gazi University's Institute of Social Sciences and then to the same university's Business Administration Department at the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences as a Research Assistant. In 2014, he completed his master's degree with the thesis titled "Reel Etketif Döviz Kuru Endeksini Etkileyen Faktörlerin Avrupa Borç Krizi Çerçevesinde Analizi" ("The Analysis of the Factors that Affect Real Effective Exchange Rate Index within the Framework of the European Debt Crisis"). In August 2014, he started his doctorate degree education in the Accounting-Finance Program of the Department of Business Administration at Gazi University's Institute of Social Sciences. With the end of his assignment period in December 2017, he was reappointed as a Research Assistant in the Accounting and Finance Program of the Department of Business Administration at Bayburt University's Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences. In November 2019, he defended his dissertation titled "Döviz Kuru, Faiz Oranı Ve Enflasyon Çerçevesinde Cari İşlemler Dengesinin Yönetimi" ("Management of Current Account Balance within the Framework of Exchange Rate, Interest Rate and Inflation") and received his PhD title. Since August 2021, he has been serving as a Dr. Faculty Member at the Banking and Insurance Program of the Department of Finance, Banking and Insurance at Bayburt University's Vocational School of Social Sciences. Dr. Kuzu's professional fields of study include International Finance, Corporate Finance, Financial Markets, and History of Finance and Political Economy of Finance.



Researcher Nigar Imran gizi JAMALOVA received her bachelor's degree in History in 2006 from Baku State University by defending her thesis titled "The Activities of Azerbaijani Legions during World War II". In 2009, she received master's degree in Baku State University by defending her thesis titled "The Activities of the Azerbaijani Political Emigration for the Implementation of the 'Caucasian House' Idea". She completed both of her degrees of education with honors diplomas. In 2014, she completed her doctoral thesis titled "The Policy of Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing of the Republic of Ararat (Armenia) against the Azerbaijani People (1918-1920)".



She has participated in international conferences, seminars, trainings and courses held in the Republic of Azerbaijan and abroad, and has been rewarded diploma and certificates for her participation. She is the author of articles and publications on historical topics. These include two collections of German archival documents, one collection of articles by a historian, and many of her own articles.

Jamalova previously worked as a Lecturer at Baku College of Food Industry and as a Researcher in the Gobustan State Historical Preserve. Currently, she works as a Researcher at the Institute of History named after A. Bakikhanov of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences (ANAS).

As always, the first article in the 47th issue of our journal is “**Facts and Comments**”. This article covers the domestic and international developments of Armenia, the background to why the peace agreement envisaged and outlined in the armistice of November 2020 could not be realized in the two and half years that elapsed, how the current efforts proceed, and relations between Türkiye and Armenia in the light of the normalization of relations process in the period of December 2022-June 2023. Russia’s war against Ukraine failing in its aim of a quick victory, and the prolongation of the war and its transformation into a war of attrition has revealed the military deficiency of Russia. The West, seeking other means of pressing and further jeopardizing Russia, has seen the opportunity in approaching Armenia, an ally and traditionally under very tight reins of Russia, to broker the peace agreement with Azerbaijan and eventually drive Russia away and to establish its own domain. The region becoming a new flash point in the West-Russia adversity has not caused discomfort in Armenia. To the contrary, Armenia appears to have seen an advantage in dealing with parties with varying interests and calculations in the region to minimize its losses in the Second Karabakh War and possibly make new gains. Relations with Türkiye have moved within the framework of the normalization process, albeit experiencing sharp ups and downs. Armenia’s humanitarian assistance following the earthquake disaster of 6 February in Türkiye, the opening of the border crossing for Armenian vehicles to this end, the visit of the Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ankara and to the disaster area have raised the hope for good-neighborly and compassionate relations. However, immediately after, the inauguration of a monument in Yerevan consecrating radical Armenian nationalist terrorism has once again confirmed that there is no change in the anti-Turk or Türkiye sentiments and policies. Prime Minister Pashinyan’s attendance to Turkish President Erdoğan’s new term reception after his election win provided another glimmer of hope for the progress of relations.

In his article titled “**An Examination on the Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi (1897-2014)**”, Sinan Koçak analyzes the demographic structure of Armenians living in Tbilisi between 1897 and 2014. The article includes information about the total population of Armenians, their distribution according to various attributes, the Armenians’ political, socio-cultural, and economic structures. The article focuses on three periods for its demographic analysis: the Tsarist Period, the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet Georgia. The numerical data for these periods are provided from the official population

censuses carried out during the mentioned periods. Koçak seeks to present the numerical and sociological assets of the Armenians in Tbilisi in a holistic way through a combination of demographic and human data.

In his article titled “**A Historical Overview of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany**”, Fuat Ozan Birkan evaluates the history, structure, and activities of the Armenian Diaspora community in Germany. The presence of the large number of Turks living in Germany potentially complicates the activities of the Armenian community. The author argues, however, that the community’s persistent initiatives, the intersection of Armenians’ and German politicians’ interests against Türkiye, and the weak organizational capacity of the Turks in Germany have proven favorable for the Armenians. Thus, Birkan indicates that although the Armenian community in Germany has traditionally remained in the background in comparison to the examples where the Armenian Diaspora is highly influential (such as in France and the US), the community is growing and becoming more visible.

In their article titled “**The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia’s Foreign Relations**”, Fatih Kocaoğlu and Mehmet Kuzu dissect the implications of the Second Karabakh War for Armenia from multiple perspectives and through detailed data gathering techniques, but with a focus on economic and financial matters. The authors seek to make deductions about the military and strategic consequences of the Second Karabakh War for Armenia. Armenia’s place in the complicated nexus involving Russia, Iran, Western countries, Türkiye, Israel, and Azerbaijan have had substantial implications for Armenia’s economy and financial markets. In the end, Kocaoğlu and Kuzu conclude that Russia’s positive impact on the Armenian economy has decreased and is being replaced with the positive impact of Western capital, thereby highlighting Armenia’s traditional capacity to play major powers against each other for its own benefit.

In her article titled “**Diplomatic Activity of the Azerbaijani Government against the Territorial Claims of the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920)**”, Nigar Jamalova examines the diplomatic efforts of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) to counter the First Republic of Armenia’s (FRA) territorial ambitions in 1918-1920. The author indicates that ADR’s efforts fell under three categories: 1) correspondence and meetings with representatives of foreign countries in the South Caucasus; 2) correspondence and meetings with FRA; and 3) Initiatives at the Paris Peace Conference. Jamalova concludes that, except for the concession that had to be made in handing Yerevan to FRA, ADR successfully prevented FRA from realizing its ambitions, and none of the major powers of the time or the Paris Peace Conference as a whole officially recognized FRA’s territorial claims against ADR.

Our 47th issue also contains one book review by Fatma Jale Gül Çoruk on the book titled “**From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa**”. The book offers a fascinating account of the resourcefulness of the Armenian merchants based in Isfahan in building a vast trade network in the 17th and 18th centuries. It also delves into these merchants’ trading practices, correspondence methods, and relations within the community and with the outside world. Çoruk argues that these characteristics make the book a major source for studies on trade networks.

Have a nice reading and best regards,

Editor

EDITORIAL / BAŞYAZI

To cite this article: Alev Kılıç, “Facts and Comments”, *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 47 (2023): 13-61.

Received: 14.06.2023

Accepted: 21.06.2023

FACTS AND COMMENTS

(OLAYLAR VE YORUMLAR)

Alev KILIÇ*

Abstract: *This article covers the domestic and international developments of Armenia, the background to why the peace agreement envisaged and outlined in the cease-fire agreement of November 2020 could not be realized in the two and half years that elapsed, how the current efforts proceed and relations between Türkiye and Armenia in the light of the normalization of relations process in the period of December 2022-June 2023.*

Russia's war against Ukraine failing in its aim of a quick victory, the prolongation of the war and its transformation into a war of attrition with the active and substantial support of the West has revealed the military deficiency of Russia. The West, seeking other means of pressing and further jeopardizing Russia, has seen the opportunity in approaching Armenia, an ally and traditionally under very tight reins of Russia, to broker the peace agreement with Azerbaijan and eventually drive Russia away and to establish its own domain. Russia too has recognized this development as a threat in the region, seen as vital for its connectivity with the South and the East and considered to be its soft belly. Armenia's ambivalence and potential for shift of allegiances have become a serious concern for Russia.

The region becoming a new flash point in the West-Russia adversity has not caused discomfort in Armenia. To the contrary, Armenia appears to

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5180-2896>
Ambassador (R), Director of the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM)
Email: akilic@avim.org.tr

have seen an advantage in dealing with parties with varying interests and calculations in the region to minimize its losses in the 2020 war and possibly make new gains. This expectation has led to the procrastination of the formulation and signing of the peace agreement. Karabakh and the issue of the delimitation of the borders have come to the fore as major obstacles.

A similar duality is witnessed in domestic politics. On the one hand advocating peaceful and liberal principles, the Armenian administration has found a passable excuse for restraint in those principles due to the activities and actions of the very small but vociferous opposition guided and directed by the radical Dashnaksutyun-ARF with a dark terrorism record and their sponsors and financiers in the Diaspora. The attitude and sermons of the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin very much in line with the radical opposition has been another factor in restraining the administration.

Relations with Türkiye have moved within the framework of the normalization process, albeit experiencing sharp ups and downs. Armenia's humanitarian assistance following the earthquake disaster of 6 February in Türkiye, the opening of the border crossing for Armenian vehicles to this end, the visit of the Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ankara and to the disaster area have raised the hope for good-neighborly and compassionate relations. However, immediately after, the inauguration of a monument in the capital city of Yerevan consecrating radical Armenian nationalist terrorism has once again confirmed that there is no change in the anti-Turk or Türkiye sentiments and policies. It cannot be denied that these sentiments and policies enjoy the support, even encouragement of the third parties where Armenian diaspora is entrenched and also on grounds of religious solidarity. Prime Minister Pashinyan's attendance to President Erdoğan's new term reception after his election win provided another glimmer of hope for the progress of relations.

Keywords: Pashinyan, Mirzoyan, Lavrov, Blinken, Michelle, Sholz, Bono, Vardanyan, Lachin Corridor, Zangezur Corridor, Nemesis Monument

Öz: *Bu incelemede Aralık 2022-Haziran 2023 tarihleri arasında Ermenistan'daki iç gelişmeler, dış dinamikler, 2020 yılında cereyan eden savaşı sonlandıran Kasım 2020 ateş-kes anlaşmasının üzerinden geçen yaklaşık iki buçuk yıla rağmen hala öngörülen barış anlaşmasının imzalanamamış olmasının nedenleri ve bu yönde süregelen girişimler ile Türkiye-Ermenistan arasındaki ilişkiler ve başlatılan normalleşme sürecindeki gelişmeler ele alınmaktadır.*

Rusya'nın Ukrayna'ya karşı giriştiği savaşta öngördüğü hedeflere ulaşamaması, savaşın uzaması, Batı'nın aktif biçimde Ukrayna'yı

desteklemesiyle savaşın uzun vadeli bir yıpratma savaşına dönüşmesi, dolayısıyla Rusya'nın askeri zaafiyetinin de ortaya çıkması, Batı'nın Rusya'ya daha da zora sokmak ve zaafiyetini pekiştirmek amacıyla Rusya'nın geleneksel olarak mutlak güdümünde olduğu bilinen Ermenistan üzerinden Güney Kafkaslarda yeni bir cephe açabilmek üzere Ermenistan-Azerbaycan barış sürecinde başat rol üstlenme girişimleri dönem içinde bölgeye damgasını vurmuştur. Batı'nın bu şekilde Rusya'ya bölgeden uzaklaştırma ve nüfuz alanı oluşturma olasılığı karşısında, Güney ve Doğu ulaşımını sağlayan hayati çıkarlarının bulunduğu ve yumuşak karnı olarak tanımlanan bu bölgeye yönelik gelişmeler Rusya tarafından kuşkusuz tehdit olarak algılanmıştır. Bu süreçte Ermenistan'ın ikili tutumu ve bağlılıklarını değiştirme potansiyeli Rusya için ciddi bir endişe kaynağı olmuştur.

Bölgenin Rusya-Batı rekabetinde yeni bir odak noktası haline gelmesinden rahatsızlık duymak bir yana, bu gelişmeyi avantaja dönüştürmek peşinde koşan Ermenistan, bölgede farklı hesapları ve çıkarları bulunan tarafları kullanarak savaş sonrası kayıplarını en aza indirmek, hatta yeni kazanımlar sağlamak amacıyla nihai barış anlaşması imzalanması sürecini sürüncemede bırakacak bir yaklaşımı benimsemiştir. Karabağ konusu ve sınırların tespiti başlıca uyumsuzluk unsuru olarak ön plana çıkmıştır.

İç politikada da benzer bir ikili yaklaşım sürdürülmüştür. Yönetim bir yandan barışçı ve liberal ilkeleri savunurken, diğer taraftan radikal ve terör geçmişi tescilli Taşnaksutyun-EDF güdümündeki, sayıca çok az ancak militan bir muhalefetin ve bunların Diasporadaki yönlendirici ve finansörlerinin etkinliklerini kendilerini engelleyen bahane olarak kullanılabilmiştir. Eçmiadzin Katolikosluğunun da muhalefet çizgisindeki eylem ve söylemi de kuşkusuz yönetimin hareket serbestisini kısıtlayan bir unsur olmuştur.

Türkiye ile ilişkiler normalleşme süreci içinde ilerlemeye devam etmiş, ancak keskin iniş ve çıkışlar göstermiştir. Türkiye'deki 6 Şubat deprem felaketi Ermenistan'ın insani yardım girişimi, Türkiye'nin bu amaçla Alişan karayolu sınır kapısını açması, Ermenistan Dışişleri Bakanının ziyareti ile ileri ve dostça bir düzeye ulaşırken, Erivan'da radikal Ermeni milliyetçisi terörizmi kutsayan bir anıtın açılması gerçekte Türk ve Türkiye karşıtı hissiyat ve yaklaşımda hiçbir değişikliğin olmadığını bir kez daha göz önüne sermiştir. Ermenistan'ın bu genel hissiyat ve yaklaşımında Ermeni diasporasının radikal faaliyetlerine hoşgörü gösterilen ülkelerden ve dinsel dayanışmadan da destek, hatta teşvik gördüğü yadsınmamaktadır. Başbakan Paşinyan'ın Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın davetine icabetle seçim sonrası kutlama törenine katılması ilişkilerin geleceği için yeni bir ümit ışığı yaratmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Paşinyan, Mirzoyan, Lavrov, Blinken, Michelle, Scholz, Bono, Vardanyan, Laçın Koridoru, Zangezur Koridoru, Nemesis Anıtı

1. Domestic Developments in Armenia

The inability to leave behind the wounds and despair caused by the 2020 (Second) Karabakh War, which ended with Azerbaijan's decisive victory, and inertness to quickly take steps towards a new beginning led to the perpetuation of a general weariness and pessimism. The conditions of the peace agreement were the main item on the internal political agenda and all criticism from the opposition concentrated on this issue.

Armenia's Ministry of Interior, abrogated under former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan to bring the police force under his direct control, was re-established on 9 January and Vahe Ghazaryan, a friend of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from childhood, was appointed as the minister.¹ In addition to law enforcement, the Ministry's scope of authority includes rescue and migration operations.

Despite the continuation of the boycott of parliamentary sessions by 35 opposition MPs since April 2022, the ruling party, which has a parliamentary majority, has refrained from exercising its legal authority to depose them.

On 19 January, a fire broke out in a military barracks, killing fifteen soldiers and injuring seven others, three of them gravely.² This was the largest non-war military loss in Armenia's history. The military authorities and the leadership were heavily criticized.

The third meeting of Armenia's program launched in 2020 to utilize diaspora experts in state institutions and administration was held on 6 February. Prime Minister Pashinyan delivered the keynote speech at the meeting, where the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs reported on the progress made and stated that 50 experts are currently working in 24 different institutions.³ On March 10th, the first pan-Armenian citizens' assembly session was held in Yerevan under the title "Convention of the Future Armenian". Approximately two hundred participants took part in the meeting and discussed the issues of "historical responsibility", "Armenia-Diaspora unity", "population growth"⁴.

1 Siranush Ghazanchyan, "Vahe Ghazaryan appointed Armenia's Minister of Interior," *Public Radio of Armenia*, January 9, 2023,

<https://en.armradio.am/2023/01/09/vahe-ghazaryan-appointed-armenias-minister-of-interior/>

2 "Armenian soldiers die in fire blamed on heater lit with petrol," *BBC News*, January 19, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64329367>

3 "We must make efforts to ensure efficiency and development. PM Pashinyan receives participants of 'iGorts' program," *Armenpress*, February 6, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1103473.html>

4 Mane Babajanyan, "The Convention of the Future Armenian held in Yerevan," *The Armenian Weekly*, <https://armenianweekly.com/2023/03/15/the-convention-of-the-future-armenian-held-in-yerevan/>

The Armenian Government barred another Armenian militant (the Central Executive chairperson of the Dashnaktsutyun-Armenian Revolutionary Federation/ARF party's youth branch in France) from entering the country and declared him *persona non grata* in January. This was the fourth ARF militant banned from entering the country.⁵ The Armenian ARF party opened the International ARF Youth Conference in Yerevan on 6 February. The conference was attended by 33 organizations from 14 countries. These countries were listed to be Armenia, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Canada, the United States, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Australia, and three from South America.

A month later, on 6 March, the ARF celebrated its 132nd anniversary, and the program organized by the ARF Western United States Central Committee, in which radical, irredentist Armenian views were expressed, was also broadcast on Armenian television channels. Likewise, in March, Armenia's High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs under the Prime Minister held meetings with Armenian Diaspora representatives in the Eastern region of the United States. In press releases following his meetings, the High Commissioner "discussed the need for cooperation among Armenian-American elected officials in order to effectively advocate for the Armenian cause" and stated that he "discussed the need for unity and cooperation within the Diaspora in order to effectively utilize the Diaspora's resources in support of Armenia and Artsakh [the so-called Armenian state in Karabakh]"⁶. The visit and contacts of the High Commissioner were criticized by the ARF.

The opposition parties, spearheaded again by the ARF started street protests on 23 May against the Prime Minister upon his statements to sign a peace agreement with Azerbaijan that will also recognize Karabagh within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. On 24 May the ARF Bureau announcement read: "We will not tolerate coercive agreements that violate the interests of the Armenian nation."⁷ The supreme assembly of ARF-Armenia convened on 9 June to examine the activities of ARF-Armenia and to guide the strategy and tactics to the current challenges. The party leader said at a news conference on 13 June that to prevent Pashinyan's program, his party would try to initiate a popular movement starting with demonstrations in summer. He admitted that the opposition's 2022 bid for regime change did not attract

5 "Armenian government continues anti-ARF policies toward ARF Youth," *The Armenian Weekly*, January 29, 2023, <https://armenianweekly.com/2023/01/29/armenian-government-continues-anti-arf-policies-toward-arf-youth/>

6 "Zareh Sinanyan fiddled his violin during visit to eastern US cities while Armenia, Artsakh burned," *The Armenian Weekly*, March 11, 2023, <https://armenianweekly.com/2023/03/11/zareh-sinanyan-fiddled-his-violin-during-visit-to-eastern-us-cities-while-armenia-artsakh-burned/>

7 "ARF Bureau: 'We will not tolerate coercive agreements that violate the interests of the Armenian nation'," *Armenian Weekly*, May 24, 2023, <https://armenianweekly.com/2023/05/24/arf-bureau-we-will-not-tolerate-coercive-agreements-that-violate-the-interests-of-the-armenian-nation/>

sufficient popular support. He expressed confidence that the opposition would pull larger crowds this time.

In an interview with a newspaper on 14 February, Catholicos Karekin II, the spiritual leader of the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin, one of the four centers of the Armenian Apostolic Church, explained that his relations with Armenia's administration were distant and merely ceremonial and that he does not deny that there are disagreements between them. Karekin II has repeatedly accused Pashinyan and his government of making concessions to Türkiye and Azerbaijan, called for his resignation, and argued that "the Nagorno-Karabakh people's right to self-determination is non-negotiable". Pashinyan and members of his government, in turn, boycotted attending Christmas and Easter services led by the Catholicos and excluded the Catholicos from official and national day invitations. The Catholicos once again made these views and opinions public on 20 April. He emphasized that his previous call for Pashinyan's resignation was not limited by time and that the situation in the country unfortunately continues to be dangerous and worrying.⁸ On 22 May, there was a renewed exchange of barbs as Pashinyan accused the Armenian Apostolic Church of meddling in politics, prompting a scathing retort from Karekin II.⁹ On 23 May Karekin II and the Catholicos of Cilicia Aram I (the spiritual leader of the Armenian Catholicosate located in Antelias/Lebanon) issued separate statements criticizing and condemning Pashinyan that he had agreed to recognize Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Both, Karekin II and Aram I said that Pashinyan's acknowledgement was "unacceptable". On 12 June, the Supreme Spiritual Council of the Church chaired by Karekin II once again denounced Pashinyan's policies, warned against "humiliating" peace deal, and demanded to resolutely defend the non-negotiable rights of the "Artsakh" people to self-determination.¹⁰

Prime Minister Pashinyan held a meeting with President Vahagn Khachaturyan on 29 May where the President expressed his support to the Prime Minister and his government regarding their policies aimed at establishing peace in the region.¹¹ He added:

"Last week was an important event in our political life, starting with the meeting in Brussels, after which you clearly expressed the view of

8 "Catholicos on demanding Armenia PM Pashinyan's resignation: Our fatherly exhortation not limited by time," *News.am*, April 20, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/755831.html>

9 "Tensions Between Pashinyan and Karekin II Escalate," *Asbarez*, May 22, 2023, <https://asbarez.com/tensions-between-pashinyan-and-karekin-ii-escalate/>

10 "Armenian Church Again Warns Against 'Humiliating' Peace Deal," *Azatoryun*, June 12, 2023, <https://www.azatoryun.am/a/32455807.html>

11 "Prime Minister Pashinyan meets with President Khachaturyan, refers to Azerbaijan's behavior after Brussels talks," *Armenpress*, May 29, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1112089.html>

the government of the Republic of Armenia, according to which we accept the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and expect the same from Azerbaijan... I want to assure you once again that I support and will support all the programs that you implement, which are aimed at establishing peace in the region, to the best of my ability”.

In its annual report on the state of freedom in the world, published in March, the US organization Freedom House left Armenia’s “partly free” status unchanged, but downgraded its overall rating.

The results of the October 2022 census in Armenia were announced in early May. The permanent population was given as 2,928,914. Permanent population refers to the population with permanent residence in Armenia, i.e. the population that is currently present or temporarily absent in the census. The current population, meanwhile, was recorded as 2,638,917. This number includes permanent residents and temporary residents. The previous censuses conducted in 2001 and 2011 gave the permanent and current population as 3,213,011-3,002,598 and 3,018,854-2,871,771 respectively. In 2022, 25,000 Armenians applied for citizenship, a record number since 1991, while approximately 40,000 ethnic Armenians had received citizenship between 2018 and 2021.¹²

According to foreign trade statistics released in January, Armenia’s exports increased by 75,2% last year. Russia ranked first with 2.07 billion dollars. The United Arab Emirates came second with 479 million dollars and China third with 329 million dollars. The biggest leap in exports was with the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC), which increased 211 times to 4.76 million dollars. Greece also increased 14 times to 324 million dollars. Other countries include Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Georgia, Iran, the UK, and Korea. The most important item in exports was minerals with 929 million dollars. Other items were precious and semi-precious stones with 885 million and motor vehicles and parts with 615 million dollars.¹³

Another piece of related data on the economy is that the largest tax revenue in the budget comes from the Zangezur copper enterprises, amounting to 360 million dollars. This accounts for 7,5% of Armenia’s budget revenues. The Russian Gazprom company ranked second in tax revenues with around 110 million dollars and the tobacco company ranked third with 90 million dollars.

12 “Armenia’s permanent population is 2,928,914, according to new census,” *Armenpress*, May 2, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1110018.html>

13 “Armenia’s foreign trade turnover in January 2023 increased by 93.8% to nearly \$1.3 billion,” *Arka News Agency*, March 6, 2023, http://arka.am/en/news/business/armenia_s_foreign_trade_turnover_in_january_2023_increased_by_93_8_to_nearly_1_3_billion

On 22 February, it was decided to re-open the Amulsar gold mine operated by a Canadian company, which was closed in 2018 following protests by environmentalists.¹⁴

Tens of thousands of Russian citizens transmitted their accounts to Armenian banks due to the war in Ukraine, and according to Central Bank data, money transfers from Russia totaled 3.5 billion dollars in 2022, up from 865 million dollars a year earlier, with transfers from the US coming in second with 670 million dollars.¹⁵

In January, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced that it had provided 117 million euros to Armenia's private sector for use in SMEs and telecommunications. The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed on 13 June the first review under the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Armenia, enabling access to SDR 18.4 million (about 24.5 million dollars), bringing total access to SDR 36.8 million.¹⁶

The Minister of Economy Vahan Kerobyan said in the parliament during budget discussions on 30 May that the volume of FDI's made in Armenia in 2022 stood at nearly 1 billion dollars. He informed through social media on 7 June that construction of a steel plant by American investment of around 70 million dollars, covering an area of 16,500 square meters, started in the village of Yeraksh at the Azerbaidjan border with 200 work force already employed.¹⁷

Prime Minister Pashinyan announced on 8 June that he has formed a working group to realize his government's ambitious plan to build a new nuclear power station.¹⁸ The group is to specifically explore the possibility of replacing the aged Metsamor nuclear plant by small modular reactors designed by US companies. One such company is the NuScale Power Corp which plans to build Armenia's first such plant by 2030. The background to this development rests on the memorandum of understanding on "strategic nuclear cooperation" signed in May 2022 during Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan's visit to the US.

14 Arshaluis Mgdesyanyan, "Armenia restarts controversial gold mine," *Eurasianet*, February 27, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-restarts-controversial-gold-mine>

15 "Russia-Ukraine war: 2022 witnesses a fourfold growth in money transfers from Russia to Armenia," *Ampop Media*, April 27, 2023, <https://ampop.am/en/transfers-from-russia-to-armenia-increased-4-times/>

16 "First review under the stand-by arrangement and request for modifications of Performance criteria and monetary policy Consultation clause—press release; staff Report," *International Monetary Fund (IMF)*, June 2023, <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/journals/002/2023/205/002.2023.issue-205-en.xml>

17 "First time ever, Armenia's foreign direct investments stand at \$1 billion," *Armenpress*, May 30, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1112116.html>

18 "PM Pashinyan activates task force in charge of construction of new nuclear power reactor," *Armenpress*, June 6, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1112610.html>

2. The Peace Agreement Process between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Two and a half years after the 2020 Moscow cease-fire (armistice) agreement that ended the war between the two countries, the failure to reach the stage of signing a peace agreement has increased uncertainty and tension in the region. This situation was all the more exacerbated with the war in Ukraine as it offered possibilities for third party alignments and foreign interventions with the ultimate motive of creating a new front against Russia.

Azerbaijan prioritized the signing of a peace treaty to secure its gains from the war. However, Armenia, in anticipation of the changing political landscape and international support, chose to stall the process to reverse its loss of Karabakh as well as to make changes in its favor in the delimitation and demarcation of the disputed borders. The status of the Armenian minority in Karabakh, access from Armenia to Karabakh, the Lachin Corridor vs. the Zangezur Corridor were the main issues of the period.

Armenia's objection to Azerbaijan's demand for access to its cross-border territory of Nakhchivan through Armenia via the Zangezur Corridor became a controversial issue based on irrational claims. In response, Azerbaijan reacted in a step-by-step manner through the Lachin Corridor, which serves a similar function. On 12 December, environmentalist Azerbaijani civil society representatives blocked the road in opposition to the mining activities in the area.¹⁹ Prime Minister Pashinyan pinned blame on Russia for the development, stating that it was the responsibility of the Russian Peacekeeping Force to keep the road open. He went further and called for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in Karabakh if Russia was unable to do so. The Spokesperson of the Russian Presidency noted that the United Nations (UN) cannot send an additional peacekeeping force to Karabakh without Azerbaijan's approval.²⁰

Armenia brought the issue to the UN Security Council. Here, the US, France, and Russia demanded the immediate opening of the road. However, the Security Council members could not agree on a joint resolution and the draft prepared by France was not approved.²¹ Armenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not refrain from praising the French diplomatic initiatives, which were

19 "Protests of Azerbaijani eco-activists continue on Khankandi-Lachin road?", *Report.az*, February 9, 2023, <https://report.az/en/karabakh/protests-of-azerbaijani-eco-activists-continue-on-khankandi-lachin-road/>

20 "UN mission on Lachin corridor only possible with consent of Azerbaijan, Armenia, says Russia," *Anadolu Agency*, February 8, 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/un-mission-on-lachin-corridor-only-possible-with-consent-of-azerbaijan-armenia-says-russia/2812026>

21 "Despite 'Glimmer of Hope' in Armenia, Azerbaijan Conflict, Escalating Tensions Threaten to Derail Fragile Progress, Senior Official Tells Security Council," *United Nations*, December 20, 2022, <https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15154.doc.htm>

opposed by Russia. Prime Minister Pashinyan also criticized Russia and its former Soviet allies for not supporting it within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). On 17 January, Armenia called for a special meeting of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to discuss the humanitarian situation arising from the closure of the Karabakh road, where Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan accused Azerbaijan with intentions of ethnic cleansing.²²

On 1 January, Russia's Ministry of Defense announced that the CSTO "Indestructible Brotherhood-2023" annual military exercise would be held in Armenia. At a press conference on 10 January, Pashinyan announced that it would not be appropriate to hold this exercise in Armenia this year. During the meeting, Pashinyan was asked about the possibility of Armenia's exit from the organization in light of his criticism of the organization. Pashinyan gave the following incomprehensible answer to this question: "Can we say that Armenia will leave the CSTO? Maybe the CSTO will leave Armenia? Does this whole situation in the region suggest that the CSTO intends to leave Armenia?"²³ At the same meeting, Pashinyan made another vague statement:

"Recently Azerbaijan, in its contacts with Western partners, justifies its aggressive actions on the fear that Armenia and Russia are preparing joint aggressive actions against Azerbaijan and that they [the Azerbaijanis] are taking preventative measures. [...] We call our Russian colleagues' attention to the fact that when they stay silent it means that Russia's military presence in Armenia does not only guarantee the security of the republic, but the opposite: It creates a security threat for Armenia."²⁴

In a statement released by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 March, Armenia took another step in this direction and announced that Armenia has renounced the quota of Deputy Secretary General assigned to it within the CSTO.

Prime Minister Pashinyan said at a press conference on 22 May that Armenia would decide on whether to withdraw from the CSTO if Yerevan determines that it is a non-functional structure.²⁵ Russian Presidential Spokesperson told

22 "Ararat Mirzoyan met with the US co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Louis Bono," *Radar.am*, February 18, 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2553468329/>

23 Joshua Kuchera, "Armenia refuses to host CSTO exercises," *Eurasianet*, January 10, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-refuses-to-host-csto-exercises>

24 Kuchera, "Armenia refuses to host CSTO exercises."

25 "Armenia to leave CSTO if Yerevan deems it 'non-functional organization'— prime minister," *TASS*, May 22, 2023, <https://tass.com/world/1621147>

the media on the same day that the CSTO enjoys authority among the member countries and Russia will continue the dialogue with Armenia on the CSTO. Armenia appeared to boycott a regular meeting of the CSTO defense ministers on 25 May in Belarus as the Armenian Minister failed to attend with no explanation.

Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan initiated another anti-Russian rhetoric, publicly claiming that Russia was pressuring Armenia to join the “union state” with Belarus and to open an extraterritorial corridor to Azerbaijan for access to Nakhchivan.²⁶ The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted harshly to the statement and demanded proof of these allegations.²⁷ Pashinyan intervened here as well, saying that they had not received any official proposal in this direction, that Grigoryan had probably received some signals through his unofficial contacts, and that facts could not always be proven. At a press conference on 20 January, the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia denied these allegations and statements, mockingly describing them as nonsense.

A striking observation on the situation in Karabakh came from Ukraine. An official from the Presidential Office argued that the so-called Armenian administration in Karabakh is a puppet of Russia, that the issue is being turned into a crisis through misinformation. For example, the Armenian population in Karabakh is reiterated on every occasion to be 120,000, whereas this number is unlikely to be more than 40,000. In other words, the population is overstated by three times in the most lenient calculation. Moreover, the ultimate position designed for the former Russian oligarch Ruben Vardanyan, who was brought to power in Karabakh, is the Prime Ministry of Armenia.²⁸

Armen Sarkissian, the former President of Armenia who resigned from his post and left the country, wrote an article in the *Time* magazine published in the US on 12 January, in which he argued that Karabakh is Armenian territory.²⁹ What draws attention here is not the content of the article, but the fact that A. Sarkissian, with well-known connections, was reminded to the public as an alternative name at a time when Pashinyan was under pressure to resign and Vardanyan’s name was mentioned.

26 “Armenia ‘Forced To Join Russia-Belarus Union’,” *Azattyun*, December 27, 2022, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32195524.html>

27 “Kremlin slams ‘provocative’ Armenian claims about ‘being forced to’ join Russia-Belarus union state,” *Anadolu Agency*, December 27, 2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/kremlin-slams-provocative-armenian-claims-about-being-forced-to-join-russia-belarus-union-state/2774043>

28 Joshua Kuchera, “Ukrainian officials support Azerbaijan in blockade of Karabakh,” *Eurasianet*, January 25, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/ukrainian-officials-support-azerbaijan-in-blockade-of-karabakh>

29 Armen Sarkissian, “The Humanitarian Crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh Is a Textbook Example of Ethnic Cleansing,” *Time*, January 12, 2023, <https://time.com/6246850/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-lachin-corridor/>

The contradiction between the Armenian leadership's rhetoric and actions regarding the situation in Karabakh was once again displayed on 14 January when the Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs officially met with the newly appointed "foreign minister" of "Artsakh" and congratulated him on his new post.

On 23 January, the European Union (EU) decided, at the request of the Armenian government, to send a new 100-member observer mission, including 30 police officers, to replace the 40-member civilian observer mission that began duty on 20 October and ended on 19 December.³⁰ The mission's term of duty was predicted to last for two years and to begin on 20 February. It was announced that the delegation would be headed by a German Federal Police official. Germany would also provide 15 police and civilian personnel. Germany's active interest in the region was formalized by the German government's official statement on this issue.

Azerbaijan and Russia expressed their discontent with this EU initiative. Russia characterized the initiative as a move to undermine Russia's peace efforts and the EU's aspiration to establish influence in the region. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov suggested the deployment of a CSTO delegation as an alternative. Although Armenia did not officially respond negatively to this proposal, it chose to remain distant. In this context, Pashinyan claimed that unlike the EU, the CSTO does not recognize the current borders of Armenia, a member of the CSTO.

In a statement on 16 February, Pashinyan informed that they had presented Azerbaijan with some new proposals for a peace agreement, but did not elaborate on their content and the extent to which they were compatible with the principles proposed by Azerbaijan in March 2022. In this context, Armenian Security Council Secretary Grigoryan's proposal that the Karabakh issue must be addressed in the peace agreement and that Karabakh Armenians must start direct negotiations with Azerbaijan within the framework of an "international mechanism" was sternly rejected by Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which stated that Armenia still cannot accept Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson emphasized that Armenians living in Karabakh are citizens of Azerbaijan. On the other hand, Azerbaijani officials met with representatives of Karabakh Armenians twice in late February and early March at the headquarters of the Russian Peacekeeping Force in Karabakh.³¹ However, the parties mutually

30 Arshaluis Mgdesyian, "EU approves new monitoring mission for Armenia, over Russian and Azerbaijani objections," *Eurasianet*, January 25, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/eu-approves-new-monitoring-mission-for-armenia-over-russian-and-azerbaijani-objections>

31 Burç Eruygur, "Azerbaijan invites representatives of Karabakh Armenians for 2nd round of talks," *Anadolu Agency*, March 13, 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/azerbaijan-invites-representatives-of-karabakh-armenians-for-2nd-round-of-talks/2844376>

rejected the content of the talks. On the morning of 5 March, a clash broke out in the region, killing three Karabakh Armenian policemen and two Azerbaijani soldiers. Azerbaijan's call to the Karabakh Armenians to hold a new meeting in Baku received a negative response from the Armenian representatives on 28 March. The reasons cited were the venue, agenda, and timing of the meeting.

On 16 March, Pashinyan announced that they had received new proposals from Azerbaijan on the peace agreement, thus beginning the fourth round of negotiations on a draft agreement text. In an interview with an Egyptian news agency on 24 March, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia stated the following about Armenia's demands for a peace agreement:

“Clarification of parameters for the delimitation of the state border, distancing of forces from the state border and the creation of a demilitarized zone along the borderline, establishment of a mechanism of guarantees, which will ensure the implementation of obligations, establishment of an international mechanism to address the issue of rights and security of the Armenians in Karabakh”.³²

An interview given in Baku by Toivo Klaar, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, who visited the region in March, caused serious discomfort in Armenia. Klaar stated the following in his interview:

“Transparency is absolutely legitimate. I think the idea that there should be transparency about what is being transported on the Lachin road is absolutely legitimate. Because we do not want the Lachin road to be used for any shipment of goods that would exacerbate tensions or be used for any military or sort of illicit purposes... I think the view in Armenia is true that these [i.e. Lachin and Zangezur] are two separate issues. One is the Lachin road, which is covered in one point of the November 2020 Statement, and then there is the connection between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan which is covered in another point of the 2020 Statement. So, from that point of view, these are treated in different areas of that statement. But in the end, it is a question of discussion, of negotiation.”³³

32 “FM briefs Egypt media on details of Armenia proposals forwarded to Azerbaijan,” *News.am*, March 23, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/751288.html>

33 “Toivo Klaar: We can have peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan -INTERVIEW,” *APA*, March 8, 2023, <https://apa.az/en/foreign-policy/toivo-klaar-we-can-have-peace-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-interview-398159>

Azerbaijan's position on this issue is clear and has been reiterated at the highest level:

“If Armenia does not want to recognize free passage across the border from the Azerbaijani mainland to Nakhchivan, then checkpoints should be established at both ends of the Zangezur Corridor and on the border between the Lachin district [of Azerbaijan] and Armenia”.

In its decision announced on 22 February, the UN International Court of Justice, in line with Armenia's application, demanded that Azerbaijan ensure unimpeded traffic flow on the only road connecting Armenia and Karabakh. Azerbaijan's initiative to establish a checkpoint at the entrance to open the road was opposed by Armenia as well as Russia.

Ruben Vardanyan, who was appointed as the head executive of the so-called Armenian administration in Karabakh in November, was dismissed from his post on 23 February, in less than four months in this position. Vardanyan announced that he would not return to Russia and would personally continue his struggle in Karabakh.³⁴

On 22 March, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan stated that he welcomed his Russian counterpart Lavrov's call for a trilateral meeting, which was originally proposed for 23 December but could not be realized due to Armenia's refrain, adding that this meeting could take place soon.³⁵ On the same date, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken had a telephone conversation with the Armenian and Azerbaijani Ministers of Foreign Affairs and, as it was later revealed, invited his counterparts to the United States for a trilateral meeting.³⁶ The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson stated on 12 April that Azerbaijan and Armenia had agreed to come to Moscow for peace treaty talks and that the exact date of the meeting would be announced afterwards.

On 11 April, a new and small-scale clash broke out between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces with mutual casualties.³⁷ On 23 April, Azerbaijan

34 “Vardanyan was not fired at Aliyev's request”: opinion from Yerevan,” *Jam-News*, February 23, 2023, <https://jam-news.net/dismissal-of-ruben-wardanyan/>

35 “Mirzoyan-Lavrov meeting in Moscow,” *Jam News*, March 21, 2023, <https://jam-news.net/meeting-of-lavrov-and-mirzoya-in-moscow/>

36 “Secretary Blinken's Call with Azerbaijani President Aliyev,” *US Department of State*, March 21, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-azerbaijani-president-aliyev-11/> ; “Secretary Blinken's Call with Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan,” *US Department of State*, March 20, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-armenian-prime-minister-pashinyan-12/>

37 “Azerbaycan-Ermenistan sınırlarında çatışma: 3 Azeri asker şehit,” *NTV*, 11 Nisan 2023, https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/azerbaycan-ermenistan-sinirinda-catisma-3-azeri-asker-sehit,Gz_oG6jTI0uP2HeEQz34AQ

unilaterally set up a checkpoint at the entrance to the Lachin Road.³⁸ In response, the Prime Minister of Armenia once again called for the immediate deployment of an international monitoring mission in the region. The US, the EU, France, and Russia condemned Azerbaijan's unilateral action.

In his address to the Parliament on 18 April, Prime Minister Pashinyan expressed more explicitly his view on Karabakh, which he had been indirectly conveying for some time, and officially declared that Armenia unconditionally recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and is ready to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan with this understanding. Pashinyan stated that Azerbaijan must likewise recognize Armenia's territorial integrity of 29,800 square kilometers within the Soviet Union-era borders³⁹ (Armenia claims that 75 square kilometers of its territory remained on the Azerbaijani side after the 1990s and that 150 square kilometers were occupied in 2021 and 2022, while Azerbaijan claims that many villages on the border and across the border are under Armenian occupation). In response to the criticism and reactions from the opposition that Karabakh is being surrendered, Pashinyan claimed that the former administration had already adopted this understanding by approving the Madrid Principles, which led to further criticism and accusations. In a statement to the press on 20 April, Catholicos Karekin II stated "I can't imagine that Artsakh [the so-called Armenian state in Karabakh] can be part of Azerbaijan". Stating that the issue is a source of great concern for the people of Armenia, the Catholicos did not refrain from provocation, stating that the freedom and independence of the "people of Artsakh" must be protected at all costs.

On 30 April, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan announced that the parties would meet in Washington for trilateral talks with the US Secretary of State Blinken. The talks, which were announced to last four days, started on 1 May. On the first day, Blinken met separately with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, followed by a trilateral meeting. In the upcoming days, the Armenian and Azerbaijani Ministers held bilateral talks, followed by trilateral talks once again. Blinken emphasized that the talks were positive and that he was hopeful regarding the outcome. The US Department of State Spokesperson echoed this optimism. Following the end of the meeting, Blinken also announced in a written press release that significant progress had been made in the talks.⁴⁰ On the other hand, in an

38 "Azerbaijan sets up checkpoints on the Lachin corridor," *Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)*, April 27, 2023, <https://www.eiu.com/n/azerbaijan-sets-up-checkpoints-on-the-lachin-corridor/>

39 "Armenia ready to recognize Azerbaijan's 86,600 km2 territorial integrity which includes Nagorno Karabakh – Pashinyan," *Armenpress*, May 22, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1111461.html>

40 "Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Bilateral Peace Negotiation Closing Session with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov," *US Department of State*, May 4, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-bilateral-peace-negotiation-closing-session-with-armenian-foreign-minister-ararat-mirzoyan-and-azerbaijani-foreign-minister-jeyhun-bayramov/>

interview on 5 May, while in Czechia, Pashinyan expressed that the main disagreements with Azerbaijan were not only concerning Karabakh, but also over borders and security guarantees, and therefore the progress made in Washington was “minimal”.⁴¹

The talks in Washington have preceded the trilateral meeting that was envisaged to be held in Moscow, which has provoked a reaction from Russia. The Spokesperson of the Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the US and France were not aiming for honest mediation and that their real intentions were political and aimed at undermining Russia’s efforts. On 2 May, the Russian Presidential spokesperson reiterated this viewpoint, stating that an agreement between the two countries is only possible with the implementation of the 2020 cease-fire agreement brokered by Russia.⁴²

While Moscow was expected to be the next meeting venue, it was announced on 8 May that the European (Union) Council President Charles Michel had invited the leaders of the two countries to Brussels on 14 May. On 10 May, the Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan would also meet in Moscow on 19 May, hosted by Russia. This was confirmed by the Spokesperson of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 17 May. At the press conference, the Spokesperson stated that the ministers would hold bilateral and trilateral talks. A statement from the US Department of State conveyed that US Secretary of State Blinken met with Michel on 11 May and they discussed support for the parties at the 14 May meeting.

On 12 May, Armenia’s Security Council Secretary Grigoryan, known as the shadow negotiator, traveled to Brussels to establish contacts with his Azerbaijani counterpart Hikmet Hajiyev to make preparations and preliminary work for the Brussels tripartite summit.

The 14 May Brussels trilateral summit produced concrete decisions on the subject. The parties confirmed unequivocally that they recognize each other’s territorial integrity of 29,800 and 86,600 square kilometers within the borders of the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration. The territory of Azerbaijan as such includes Karabakh, and thus, for the first time, Armenia recognized Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory without specifically mentioning it by name. However,

41 “Azerbaijani MFA comments on Pashinyan’s claims voiced in Czechia,” *APA.az*, May 4, 2023, <https://apa.az/en/foreign-policy/azerbaijani-mfa-comments-on-pashinyans-claims-voiced-in-czechia-402526>

42 “Peskov comments on Armenian-Azerbaijani talks in the US,” *Mediamax*, May 2, 2023, <https://mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/51161/>

the other part of the problem, which is the rights and privileges of the Armenian people there, is not addressed.⁴³

The President of the European Council made the following statement at the end of the meetings:

“It was a pleasure to host President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan today for a fifth meeting in Brussels. Our exchanges were frank, open and result-oriented. They focused on progress on the path towards Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization. The leaders shared a common willingness for a South Caucasus at peace. I commend their respective efforts. Together, we reviewed all issues on our agenda.

Following the recent positive talks held in the United States on the peace treaty, the momentum should be maintained to take decisive steps towards the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On border issues, we reviewed progress and the next steps regarding the delimitation of the border. In this context, the leaders agreed on the resumption of the bilateral meetings on border issues. The leaders confirmed their unequivocal commitment to the 1991 Almaty Declaration and the respective territorial integrity of Armenia (29,800 km²) and Azerbaijan (86,600 km²). The ultimate delimitation of the border will be agreed through negotiations.

On connectivity, the sides made clear progress in their discussions aimed at unblocking transport and economic links in the region. Positions on this topic have now come very close to each other in particular on the reopening of the railway connections to and via Nakhchivan. Their respective teams have been tasked to finalize an in principle agreement on the modalities for the opening of the railway connections and the necessary construction works together with a concrete timetable. They also agreed to draw upon the support of the World Customs Organization in supporting this work.

On humanitarian issues, there has been an understanding that further detainees would be released in the coming weeks. I also stressed the need to safeguard the mutual understanding that soldiers who have

43 “Press remarks by President Charles Michel following the trilateral meeting with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia,” *European (Union) Council*, May 14, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/14/press-remarks-by-president-charles-michel-following-the-trilateral-meeting-with-president-aliyev-of-azerbaijan-and-prime-minister-pashinyan-of-armenia/>

simply got lost and crossed to the other side would continue to be released through a speedy procedure. We also discussed the importance of stepping up work on addressing the fate of missing persons and on demining.

We continued our exchanges on the issue of the rights and security of Armenians living in the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. I encouraged Azerbaijan to engage in developing a positive agenda with the aim of guaranteeing the rights and security of this population, in close cooperation with the international community. I also raised the need for a transparent and constructive dialogue between Baku and this population.

I believe that it is important to refrain from hostile rhetoric, engage in good faith and show leadership to reach mutually-acceptable solutions.

The EU has no hidden agenda. Our sole aim is to help Armenia and Azerbaijan reach a comprehensive and fair peace. We are ready to contribute to their joint efforts. We have agreed to hold the Brussels meetings as often as necessary. Leaders will meet again in Brussels in July. And as was already announced publicly, we will also meet again in the very near future together with President Macron of France and Chancellor Scholz of Germany on the margins of the 2nd European Political Community Summit in Chişinău. I also intend to invite the leaders for another such meeting in the margins of the third EPC summit in Granada in October.”

The President of the European Council also outlined a roadmap for the continuation of the talks. Accordingly, the next meeting of the two leaders would be a trilateral meeting on 1 June in Chisinau on the occasion of the second meeting of the European Political Community, followed by a quintet meeting to include the leaders of France and Germany. Their following meeting is envisaged to take place at the meeting of the European Political Community in Granada in October. Armenia has accepted these proposals, while Azerbaijan has stated that it has not made a decision concerning the quintet format.

Russia has followed these developments with concern and has repeatedly expressed its grievance and discontent on various occasions. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov, in a speech on a Russian TV channel on 17 May, accused the US and its Western allies of putting pressure on Armenia in order to “expel Russia from Armenia” and claimed that Russia had information that they were telling Armenia “come to us, drive the Russians out of your territory, and the border guards too, remove the Russian military base, the

Americans will help ensure the security of Armenia” and that the Western policy was clearly provocative.⁴⁴

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Moscow on 19 May at the invitation of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov. Minister Lavrov first met with both ministers separately, then in a trilateral meeting, followed by a bilateral meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers. Lavrov made the following statement to the press after the trilateral meeting⁴⁵:

“Work on the peace treaty is undoubtedly fundamental. But our partners confirmed today that without solving the issues of delimitation, unblocking transport and economic links and an overall improvement of the security situation in both Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border it’s very hard to make progress on concrete aspects of the peace treaty. We discussed all this together. Regarding the peace treaty, I think that on a number of articles which we discussed today we managed to bring the two sides’ understandings closer to a common vision. We hope that a positive result will be achieved as a result. The parties are very, very close to a final agreement.”

Lavrov announced that a Russian-Armenian-Azerbaijani task force would meet next week, after a long break, to discuss practical solutions for transport links. Lavrov also announced that a separate Armenian-Azerbaijani working group on border delimitation and demarcation would soon begin its work with Russia’s support.

A final development announced from Moscow following the Ministers of Foreign Affairs’ trilateral meeting was that, at the invitation of President of Russia Vladimir Putin, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to hold a trilateral summit in Moscow on 25 May.

At a news conference in Yerevan on 22 May, Prime Minister Pashinyan confirmed in clear words that he has agreed Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh through a peace treaty currently discussed between the two countries.⁴⁶ As to be expected, the opposition was scathingly against it. Karabakh Armenians more so, claiming that it grossly violates the provisions

44 “Sergey Lavrov: US ‘advises’ Armenia to drive away Russian military base, border guards,” *News.am*, May 17, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/760347.html>

45 “Sergey Lavrov on what was achieved at the trilateral meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia,” *Turan.az*, May 19, 2023, https://www.turan.az/cache/2023/politics_news/free/news-2023-5-free-politics_news-en-4705.htm

46 “Armenia hopes talks with Azerbaijan will swiftly lead to peace treaty,” *Armenpress*, May 22, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1111443/>

of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of Armenia. The common understanding was that such a deal would be devoid of legal basis. The radical ARF leader said the party would do everything to scuttle planned “surrender” of not only Karabakh but also Armenia.

With the Russian President as host, the trilateral summit was held in Moscow on 25 May. President Putin said outstanding differences between Baku and Yerevan are “purely technical” and “surmountable”. He said the Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani vice-premiers should iron them out. Putin also held bilateral meetings with the two leaders.⁴⁷

On 26 May, the US Special Envoy Louis Bono for Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations again visited Armenia, following his talks in Azerbaijan.⁴⁸ The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that they reviewed the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization process with Armenian Minister Mirzoyan.

With the Karabakh Armenian representatives having responded negatively to the invitation for talks by Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani President Aliyev warned on 28 May the illegal administration in Karabakh that he could offer any kind of amnesty only when the “parliament” is dissolved, the “president” surrendered, and all “ministers”, “deputies” and others left their posts.⁴⁹ The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted, alleging that Aliyev not only threatened the Karabakh Armenians with “ethnic cleansing” but was also preparing the ground for another aggressive action.⁵⁰ The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the criticism, stressing that Baku intends to take all necessary steps to reintegrate local Armenian residents. The US Department of State spokesman welcomed on 30 May Aliyev’s remarks on consideration of amnesty. The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed dismay at the US praise of Aliyev’s remarks. The Karabakh illegal authorities likewise expressed deep disappointment and bewilderment.

The European (Union) Council President hosted another Aliyev-Pashinyan meeting in Chisinau on 1 June, attended also by the President of France and Chancellor of Germany in the margins of the second meeting of the European Political Community. The European Council President said after the meeting

47 “Putin Hosts Fresh Talks Between Pashinian, Aliyev,” *Azattyun*, May 26, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32428164.html>

48 “US Envoy Again Visits Armenia, Azerbaijan,” *Mirror Spectator*, June 1, 2023, <https://mirrorspectator.com/2023/06/01/us-envoy-again-visits-armenia-azerbaijan/>

49 “Azerbaijani president gives ultimatum to Karabakh authorities,” *Eurasianet*, May 30, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijani-president-gives-ultimatum-to-karabakh-authorities>

50 “EU Urges Dialogue Between Azerbaijan, Karabakh Armenians,” *Azattyun*, May 30, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32435480.html>

that it had been a good preparation for the next meeting to take place in Brussels on 21 July.⁵¹

The trilateral meeting of ministers of foreign affairs planned to be held in Washington on 12 June was postponed on short notice.⁵² According to the spokesperson of the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was postponed at the request of the Azerbaijani side. Neither the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the press elaborated on this issue. US Department of State Spokesperson said it was purely due to scheduling issues and that they hope to reschedule talks “as soon as we can”.

The Russian President met with the Armenian President on 9 June in Sochi for the second time in two weeks to discuss bilateral issues and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.⁵³

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson again slammed the EU for opening three more EU monitoring “hubs” in Armenia in written comments released on 16 June.⁵⁴ She claimed that the main purpose of the EU mission was to drive Moscow out of the region. The EU mission countered that it always planned to operate from six hubs with maximum 103 international staff.

3. Armenia’s Foreign Relations

The development that marked the period was Armenia’s steps to politically distance itself from Russia and establish closer ties with the West, particularly the United States. It proceeded through taking advantage of Russia’s weakness revealed by the war in Ukraine and its isolation from the West, and encouraged by the West’s attempts to further squeeze Russia in the South Caucasus. It is not surprising for those who are familiar with Armenia’s history to observe that throughout history, Armenia has maintained the tradition of closely assessing the changing balances, abandoning the power to which it has hitherto paid allegiance, and establishing ties in favor of the stronger and rising power.

51 “EU Hosts Another Aliyev-Pashinyan Meeting,” *Mirror Spectator*, June 8, 2023, <https://mirrorspectator.com/2023/06/08/eu-hosts-another-aliyev-pashinyan-meeting/>

52 “Azerbaijan postpones planned talks with Armenia in Washington D.C.,” *Armenpress*, June 8, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1112814/>

53 “Putin, Pashinian Meet Again,” *Azatoryun*, June 9, 2023, <https://www.azatoryun.am/a/32452518.html>

54 “Russia Again Slams EU Monitoring Mission In Armenia,” *Azatoryun*, June 15, 2023, <https://www.azatoryun.am/a/32460878.html>

Armenia's open opposition to Russia and its allies in the CSTO is based on the allegation that Russia and its allies are disregarding its security and that they have left Armenia alone against Azerbaijan. Prime Minister Pashinyan repeated this claim once again on 3 January. He went even further and declared that Russia could pose a security threat to Armenia. On 10 January, he also accused Russia of wanting to include Armenia in the Russia-Belarus alliance.

Armenia's failure to find the support it expected from the Russian Peacekeeping Force was brought to the agenda with calls for the deployment of an international force. This policy took a concrete form by the invitation of an EU observer mission, not surprisingly drawing the ire of Russia. In an interview with a Russian press agency on 2 February, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov summarized that Azerbaijan had retrieved its territories that had been under Armenian occupation for years, that Russia had taken action for the deployment of CSTO forces on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border following the conflict that broke out in September 2022, that Armenia first demanded that the organization unconditionally condemn Azerbaijan's aggression, but that the members of the organization opposed this, and therefore the organization could not deploy troops. The possibility of Armenia's exit from the CSTO by giving up its highest quota in the Organization, the post of Deputy Secretary General, was widely voiced during the period. Armenia's Security Council Secretary Grigoryan accused Russia of not even delivering paid-for weapons and cautioned that the security conjuncture in the world was changing. The last statement on the issue was made by Armenia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mnatsakan Safaryan on 17 May, who stated that the possibility of Armenia's exit from the CSTO was not on the agenda at the moment.⁵⁵ Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan attended the regular meeting of CSTO ministers of foreign affairs held in Minsk on 20 June, confirming continuing interest of Armenia in the organization.

France continued its biased stance, once again becoming the major supporter of Armenia during this period. On 12 January, the Speaker of the French Parliament paid a two-day official visit together with a delegation. Emphasizing the France-Armenia friendship and solidarity on every occasion, the Speaker of the Parliament, in response to a journalist's question, stated however that France does not recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh as per international law.

On 12 January, Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Garibashvili paid a working visit to Armenia. The Armenia-Georgia Commission for Economic

55 "Armenia to leave CSTO if Yerevan deems it 'non-functional organization'— prime minister," *TASS*, May 22, 2023, <https://tass.com/world/1621147>

Cooperation Meeting was chaired by the two Prime Ministers. During his visit, the Georgian Prime Minister reiterated his readiness to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan to ensure peace and stability in the region. Afterwards, at the Davos Economic Forum on 19 January, Garibashvili stated that Georgia is indeed a neutral and impartial mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The President of Azerbaijan Aliyev, who also attended the same meeting, stated that a trilateral meeting of the three regional countries would contribute to peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Prime Minister Pashinyan, on the other hand, did not attend Davos despite being invited. When Aliyev accused Pashinyan of running away from peace talks, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan responded afterwards that Armenia was closely following the calls of the international community and was ready to engage in more substantial negotiations.⁵⁶ This approach was another indication that Armenia's goal was not to sit at the peace table for a solution with the countries of the region that know the problems and the issue from the inside, but to rely on big powers to put pressure in its favor.

Armenian President Khachaturian visited Estonia on 16 March.⁵⁷ The motive was to keep the ties warm with the Baltic states who have been making efforts to assume a role in the Armenian cause. On 23 May, he went to Qatar to attend the Qatar Economic Forum.

Relations with Iran maintained their closeness and mutual solidarity during this period. On 18 January, Yerevan and Tehran were declared sister cities.⁵⁸ As part of "regular political consultations", Iran's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs held talks with his counterpart, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other officials in Yerevan on 22 March. He reiterated Iran's opposition to the deployment of foreign forces in the region. On 10 April, the Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia met with the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran in Tehran.

On 18 January, political consultations between the Armenian and Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) Ministers of Foreign Affairs were held in Yerevan. On this occasion, the parties emphasized the importance of the trilateral cooperation between Armenia-GCASC-Greece. At the end of March, the Ministries of Defense of Armenia and Greece signed

56 For more information: Murad Abiyev, "Georgian Gambit" By Azerbaijan In Davos," *Caliber.az*, January 23, 2023, https://caliber.az/en/post/139036/?fbclid=IwAR2VzJhYOplddjF0Lkhf5Xj0R2fZmLz_XLHDV6dHvPAg9Sbnco0uPkoCJ4

57 "Vahagn Khachaturyan and the Prime Minister of Estonia discussed issues of security and regional importance," *Radar Armenia*, January 16, 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2547727481/>

58 "Tehran, Yerevan Become Sister Cities," *Azattyun*, January 18, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32229418.html>

a military cooperation program for 2023. 15 of the 21 activities in the program are envisaged to be carried out in Greece and six in Armenia.

On 23 January, during a two-day visit to Brussels, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan met with NATO Secretary General and addressed the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European (Union) Parliament. Mirzoyan also met with the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and on 25 January, the EU announced that it had decided to send a 100-member border observer mission to Armenia, despite the objections of Russia and Azerbaijan. On 26 January, the first high-level EU-Armenia Political and Security Dialogue was held in Yerevan. It was stated that this meeting, which symbolizes the desire and intention to enhance cooperation between Armenia and the EU, would be held annually.

Ruben Rubinyan, Deputy Speaker of the Armenian Parliament, representative of the normalization process with Türkiye and head of the Armenian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, met with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on 26 January and asked her to put pressure on Azerbaijan to open the Lachin Road. On 16 February in Yerevan, the Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe presented the Council's "Action Plan" for Armenia, which was admitted to membership in 2000 together with Georgia and Azerbaijan.⁵⁹

As part of his visits to the region, the President of Egypt paid an official visit to Armenia on 29 January and signed several agreements and documents of understanding with the Armenian President, who described the visit as a historic event. On 7-9 March, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan traveled to Cairo to attend the Council of the Arab League's 159th Ministerial Meeting and delivered a speech at the meeting. Mirzoyan stated that Azerbaijan was providing misleading information on relations with Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh on international platforms, especially in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Non-Aligned Movement, where Armenia was not represented, and that they expected that these initiatives, which also conjured the sensitive issue of Islamic solidarity, would not draw friendly Arab countries into the sphere of religious differences and would be rejected.⁶⁰

59 "New Council of Europe Action Plan for Armenia launched in Yerevan," *Council of Europe*, February 16, 2023, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/new-council-of-europe-action-plan-for-armenia-launched-in-yerevan>

60 "Sisi Arrives in Armenia in First Ever Visit by an Egyptian President," *Egyptian Streets*, January 29, 2023, <https://egyptianstreets.com/2023/01/29/sisi-arrives-in-armenia-in-first-ever-visit-by-an-egyptian-president/>

On 2-3 February, Prime Minister Pashinyan held a bilateral meeting with his Russian counterpart in Kazakhstan, where he attended the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council meeting in Almaty.⁶¹

The Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan paid a working visit to Germany on 6-7 February and held a joint press conference following his meeting with the German Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Prime Minister Pashinyan traveled to Germany on 16 February to attend the Munich Security Conference. He took part in the session of the conference titled “Moving mountains? Building security in the South Caucasus”, moderated by the OSCE Secretary General, attended by the President of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Georgia. Contrary to expectations, a bilateral Pashinyan-Aliyev meeting did not take place in Munich. Nonetheless, the parties held a trilateral meeting on 18 February with the attendance of the US Secretary of State. Following the trilateral meeting, the parties did not announce any concrete agreement on any issue. The European (Union) Council President also met separately with both leaders on the margins of the conference. Another interesting figure Pashinyan met with in Munich was Bob Menendez, Chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who is recognized in the US Senate with his extremely Armenian biased stance.⁶²

On 22 February, Luxembourg’s Minister of Foreign Affairs paid an official visit to Armenia and expressed support for Armenia. On 9 March, in response to a question in Parliament regarding his meeting with the President of Azerbaijan in Davos, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs said that he expressed concern about the closure of the Lachin Corridor and asked Azerbaijan to withdraw to the borders before the conflict of 12 September 2022.

Armenia abstained in the UN General Assembly vote on the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan traveled to Syria on 23 February meet his Syrian counterpart and the President of Syria to express condolences following the earthquakes on 6 February.

61 “Nikol Pashinyan and Mikhail Mishustin meet in Almaty,” *Prime Ministry of Armenia*, February 2, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/02/02/Nikol-Pashinyan-Mikhail-Mishustin/>

62 “Pashinyan and Menendez discussed the developments taking place in the South Caucasus,” *Radar.am*, February 18, 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2553432870/>

Prime Minister Pashinyan returned to Germany on 2-3 March for a working visit, meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and President Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Berlin. In a joint press conference, Chancellor Scholz called for respecting the right to self-determination of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, a rhetoric that is no longer voiced even by the Armenian leadership.⁶³ Scholz's more "royalist than the king" rhetoric led to speculations as to whether Germany was trying to replace France in Armenia. Germany's active involvement in the EU observer mission, assuming the chairmanship of the mission, and now having a say on the ground added another dimension to the speculations.

Armenia's Chief of General Staff and a high-level delegation met with their Indian counterparts in New Delhi on 6 March and discussed developing military ties between the two countries. In the political and economic sphere, Armenia is seeking to promote a North-South Transportation Project from Mumbai in India to Bandar Abbas in Iran and through Armenia.⁶⁴

Louis Bono, the newly appointed US Envoy to the South Caucasus, arrived in Yerevan on 7 March as part of his visit to the region and held his first meetings.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan traveled to Moscow on 20 March at the invitation of his Russian counterpart. The message conveyed at the joint press conference held after the head-to-head and delegation talks was that the talks were comprehensive and that the relations were progressing well and continued along traditional lines. However, Mirzoyan's criticism of the Lachin Corridor and his insistence on sending an international mission to Karabakh indicated that the differences could not be resolved. A development that further strained relations emerged in the last week of March. Immediately after the International Criminal Court's (ICC) arrest warrant for the President of Russia Putin, the Armenian Constitutional Court's attempt to initiate a parliamentary process for Armenia to become a party to the ICC provoked an intense response from Russia. On 27 March, Russia officially warned Armenia that such a step would have extremely negative consequences for the Russia-Armenia relations. Thereafter, there was no further development on the issue in Armenia.

In April, Armenia continued to test Russia's composure. In an announcement made by the US Department of Defense, Armenia, along with non-NATO

63 "Olaf Scholz Backs Karabakh's Right to Self-Determination," *Hetq*, March 3, 2023, <https://hetq.am/en/article/153738>

64 "Armenia to elaborate new Europe-India-Iran transport corridor," *Mehr News Agency*, May 8, 2023, <https://en.mehrnws.com/news/200471/Armenia-to-elaborate-new-Europe-India-Iran-transport-corridor>

members Georgia, Moldova, and Kosovo, was included among the 26 countries that will would in the US-led NATO military maneuvers to “deter threats to peace in Europe and defend the continent against aggression”.⁶⁵ On 6 April, the US Deputy Department of Defense Spokesperson announced at a briefing that Armenia would also participate in the exercise, which would start on 22 April and take place on the soil of 10 European countries, with 9,000 troops from the US and 17,000 from other countries. After remaining silent for a while, Armenian military officials announced on 7 April that Armenia would not participate in the US-led exercise. During this period of uncertainty, on 5-7 April, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the US European Command, accompanied by a delegation, held talks in Armenia on military training opportunities and joint exercises. On 12 April, a spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Armenia had been officially asked to clarify its participation in NATO’s “anti-Russian” military maneuvers.⁶⁶

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan paid a working visit to Romania on 3-4 April. In the North-South corridor project, which Armenia has been promoting, Romania is the designated connection point with Georgia in the Black Sea.⁶⁷

A delegation headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Global Markets of the US Department of Commerce visited Yerevan for the Economic and Energy working group meetings as part of the Armenia-US Strategic Dialogue. It was reported in the press that the US delegation pressed Armenia to comply with the sanctions against Russia.⁶⁸

On 14 April, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan held a bilateral meeting with his Russian counterpart in Samarkand, where he was attending a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).⁶⁹

Armenia, Iran, and India held their first meeting as a trilateral group in Yerevan on 21 April. The meeting focused on communication and economic

65 “Armenia to participate in US-led Defender 23 military exercises,” *News.am*, April 6, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/753546.html>

66 “Moscow requests clarification on Armenia’s participation in NATO drills,” *Mediamax*, April 13, 2023, <https://mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/50944/>

67 “Ararat Mirzoyan will be in Romania on a working visit,” *Radar Armenia*, 3 Nisan 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2560923819>

68 “Ambassador Kvien’s Remarks at American Chamber of Commerce in Armenia General Meeting,” *US Embassy in Armenia*, May 3, 2023, <https://am.usembassy.gov/american-chamber-of-commerce-2/>

69 “Rusya Dışişleri Bakanı Lavrov, Ermeni mevkidaşı Mirzoyan ile Semerkant’ta görüştü,” *Son Dakika*, 14 Nisan 2023, <https://www.sondakika.com/haber/haber-rusya-disisleri-bakani-lavrov-ermeni-mevkidasi-15767263/>

issues. Sources in India compared this initiative to the trilateral grouping of Pakistan, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan.⁷⁰

Following his visit to Azerbaijan, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Armenia on 27 April and restated France's strong support for Armenia.⁷¹

Prime Minister Pashinyan travelled to Czechia on 4 May for a two-day official visit. On the same day, the sixth meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation of the two countries was held in Prague. Pashinyan gave an interview to a Czech TV channel, where he said "We are not Russia's ally in the war with Ukraine and our feeling from that war is anxiety because it directly influences all our relationships". The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed on 2 June that those remarks were noted.

On 9 May, Pashinyan travelled to Moscow to attend the Victory Day celebrations and held a meeting with Russian President Putin.⁷² In a TV address on 15 May, the Russian President's Spokesperson described the two countries' ties as an "advanced partnership" and a "special relationship that has deep historical roots" and emphasized that the relationship has a bright future. On 25 May, Pashinyan travelled to Moscow to take part in the 30th session of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and again held a meeting with President Putin. On 7 June, Pashinyan went yet again to Russia ostensibly to attend the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council held in Sochi, where he had another meeting with Putin. Neither the Russian Presidency nor the Armenian government's press office reported any details of their conversation.

Pashinyan travelled to Iceland to attend the European (Union) Council summit on 16-17 May. In his speech there, he reaffirmed the Brussels agreement.

Slovenia's National Assembly President paid an official visit to Armenia on 30 May.

After Iran, Russia too decided to open a consulate in Syunik (Zangazur) province's Kapan city, which is situated in the Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran border triangle. A statement issued by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the decision was taken during the 25 May meeting between the

70 "İran, Hindistan ve Ermenistan Arasında 3'lü İstişare," *Tesnim Haber Ajansı*, 21 Nisan 2023, <https://www.tasnimnews.com/tr/news/2023/04/21/2883376/iran-hindistan-ve-ermenistan-aras%C4%B1nda-3-l%C3%BC-isti%C5%9Fare>

71 "French FM visits Armenia in difficult period of time – Mirzoyan," *Armenpress*, April 28, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1109835.html>

72 "PM Pashinyan attends Victory Day Parade in Moscow," *Armenpress*, May 9, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1110514.html>

leaders of the two countries. This development was confirmed also by the Armenian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs on 19 June.⁷³ It was indicated that there are around a thousand Russian citizens in the region and that almost all of them are soldiers on border guard duty.

4. Relations with Türkiye

The normalization process that started between the two countries has not yet produced concrete results at the pace and on the issues that Armenia prioritized. The process continued to progress in a step-by-step manner and in concordance and alignment with the regional progress. The new year began with a concrete step in the normalization process, with the announcement that Türkiye and Armenia would allow direct air transportation of cargo. The next step would be Türkiye's opening of land border crossings to third country citizens. In a statement made on 10 January, Prime Minister Pashinyan described the permission for freight shipment as a commendable step and said that this was of great importance not only in terms of the Armenia-Türkiye relations but also in the context of recent developments in the international supply chain, that Armenia attaches importance to regional transportation and that it is ready to provide a railway connection from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan.⁷⁴

The hope that Armenia's humanitarian response to the earthquake disaster of 6 February in Türkiye during the period would lead to the establishment of a mutual understanding of good neighborliness was soon replaced by pessimism due to the following negative rhetoric and vengeful acts coming from the Armenian side.

On 20 January, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan stated that he had received an invitation to the Antalya Diplomatic Forum, scheduled for March, and that he would gladly attend this year, as he did last year. He added that no date had yet been set for the next meeting of special envoys, but the visit to Antalya was very important for the continuation of this process and for achieving substantial results. Unfortunately, the Antalya Forum was postponed due to the earthquake disaster in February.

Following the earthquake disaster, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced Armenia's readiness to help, and following a telephone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced his decision to send a

73 "Russia wants to open consulate-general in Kapan," *Armenpress*, June 19, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1113578/>

74 Ani Mejlumyan, "Armenia begins work to restore railroad ties with Azerbaijan," *Eurasianet*, January 19, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-begins-work-to-restore-railroad-ties-with-azerbaijan>

27-member rescue team and relief supplies. Türkiye opened the closed border crossing to allow the aid vehicles to pass through.⁷⁵ Armenia's decision to provide humanitarian aid to Türkiye was criticized by the domestic opposition and radical factions in the Diaspora, who stated that Armenia's goodwill gestures would not change Türkiye's policy towards Armenia. Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan arrived in Ankara on 15 February to express condolences, accompanied by a Deputy Minister and the special envoy for the normalization process, met with his Turkish counterpart, held a joint press conference and then went to Adıyaman to observe the work of the Armenian rescue team on site. Mirzoyan had the following to say about his meeting with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.⁷⁶

“Certainly, our meeting today is determined by the disaster that has claimed many lives, however, being in Türkiye at this difficult moment, I would like to once again reiterate the readiness and willingness of the Republic of Armenia to build peace in the region and, particularly, to fully normalise relations with Türkiye, establish diplomatic relations and fully open the border between Armenia and Türkiye. I would like to inform, as Minister Çavuşoğlu noted a little while ago, that today we have discussed some details on this process, and we have an agreement to jointly repair the Ani bridge, as well as take care of the relevant infrastructure ahead of the full opening of the border.”

Turkish Minister Çavuşoğlu's statement published in the Armenian media is as follows:

“The process of normalizing relations continues in South Caucasus. We believe that the cooperation that happened during these days will contribute to this process. The normalization processes of Armenia with Turkey and Azerbaijan, I believe, will contribute to establishing stability and welfare in our region. With sincere steps our three countries can bring lasting stability to the Caucasian region.”

Çavuşoğlu also emphasized the importance of repairing the Ani Bridge located on the historic Silk Road on the border between the two countries.

Prime Minister Pashinyan, in his address to the Council of Ministers on 16 February, stated that “Foreign Minister Mirzoyan's visit to Turkey is very

75 “İnsani yardım için Türkiye-Ermenistan kara sınırı 35 yıl sonra açıldı,” *Sözcü*, 11 Şubat 2023, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2023/gundem/son-dakika-insani-yardim-icin-turkiye-ermenistan-kara-siniri-35-yil-sonra-acildi-7588680/>

76 “Mirzoyan Ankara'da: 'Bu Acı Bize Yabancı Değil',” *VOA Türkçe*, 15 Şubat 2023, <https://www.voaturkce.com/a/mirzoyan-ankarada-bu-aci-bize-yabanci-degil/6963797.html> ; “Press Statement of the Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan following the meeting with Foreign Minister of Türkiye Mevlüt Cavusoglu,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, February 15, 2023, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2023/02/15/fms_armenia_turkiye/11865

important and meaningful” and gave the floor to the Minister to provide information. Mirzoyan said the following:⁷⁷

“I have to state that the Turkish side, on the level of the central, local authorities and the population appreciated the service of our rescuers and the provision of humanitarian aid. [...] I also spoke to our rescuers, they told me how the population treated them. I think this was an important humanitarian step. Certainly we discussed some issues concerning the bilateral relations, concrete agreements were reached, as my Turkish counterpart said in his statement for the press, I can also state that there is a decision to speed up this process of dialogue and the processes taking place with the goal of ultimately opening the borders. It was announced that we will carry out joint work in direction of restoring the Ani Bridge. Essentially, we will try to complete by the beginning of the tourism season the process of opening the land border for citizens of third countries and diplomatic passport holders of our two countries.”

Prime Minister Pashinyan re-emphasized that Armenia’s action had a humanitarian purpose first and foremost and expressed that he found the criticism of providing aid to Türkiye unacceptable.

While Turkey and Armenia were taking steps towards normalizing their relations, statements from the West that would undermine this process continued during the period. The European (Union) Parliament included a radical Armenian narrative in a report published on 15 March. The response of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to this rhetoric is as follows:⁷⁸

“The European Parliament’s regular report, titled “EU-Armenia Relations”, dated 15 March 2023 once again includes unfounded allegations regarding Türkiye and 1915 events.

These remarks which disregard historical facts and international legal norms are null and void.

We call on the European Parliament to act in conformity with political ethics and international law, instead of reiterating such one-sided and baseless claims.”

77 “PM Pashinyan describes Foreign Minister’s Turkey visit as ‘very important and meaningful,’” *Armenpress*, February 16, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1104282.html>

78 “QA-5, 17 March 2023, Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Tanju Bilgiç, in Response to a Question Regarding the European Parliament Report on ‘EU-Armenia Relations’,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, March 17, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-5_-avrupa-parlamentosu-nun-ab-ermenistan-iliskileri-baslikli-raporu-hk-sc.en.mfa

Türkiye-Armenia football national teams played the first leg of the 2024 European Cup Group D match in Yerevan on 25 March. In accordance with a UEFA decision, Turkish spectators were not allowed to attend the match. Indeed, the events that took place in the stadium showed how even a sporting event can be radicalized. Türkiye won the match 2-1.⁷⁹ The burning of the Azerbaijani flag at the opening ceremony of the European Weightlifting Championships in Yerevan on 17 April, in public view inside the indoor sports hall was another indicator how sporting events are politicized and radicalized.

During his visit to Türkiye, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov said in Ankara on 7 April: “We welcome the normalization of relations between Armenia and Türkiye that started with our support. We welcome the efforts to unblock transport links and communications”.⁸⁰

On 17 April, the government of Armenia announced the results of the 2022 action plan, which also included the steps taken within the scope of the normalization process with Türkiye. On this occasion, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated the following:⁸¹

“There is a big opportunity to establish normal relations between our countries. And this opportunity increased when we decided to respond, with the logic based on humane, good-neighborly values to the devastating earthquake that hit Turkey in the beginning of this year. And the government and public of Turkey perceived and accepted our actions as such. And the dozens of Armenian flags flying in front of the Turkish foreign ministry during Foreign Minister Mirzoyan’s Ankara visit weren’t simply a protocol attribute [...]. The flags of Armenia and Turkey were hoisted on the ruins of our relations and the devastating earthquake. [...]”

24 April, which has become a symbolic date in the Armenian claims and rhetoric, was highlighted and reiterated also this year with the supporting statement of US President Joe Biden, with no need for further comments.

The statement made by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this issue is as follows:⁸²

79 “Euro 2024 elemeleri: Türkiye ilk maçta, Ermenistan deplasmanında 1-2 kazandı,” *BBC Türkçe*, 26 Mart 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cd12191w61ko>

80 “Çavuşoğlu ve Lavrov’dan Ankara’da ortak basın toplantısı: “Suriye ile normalleşme sürecinin şeffaf bir şekilde devam etmesini bekliyoruz,” *T24*, 7 Nisan 2023, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/rusya-disisleri-bakani-lavrov-ankara-da-cavusoglu-ile-heyetlerarasi-gorusme-gerceklesti.1102966> ; “Russia hopes no one will impede settlement in South Caucasus — Lavrov,” *TASS*, April 7, 2023, <https://tass.com/politics/1601183>

81 “Armenian Prime Minister speaks about ‘big opportunity’ to normalize relations with Turkey,” *Armenpress*, April 18, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1108950.html>

82 “No: 111, 24 April 2023, Press Release Regarding the Statements Made by the Government Officials of Some Countries on April 24, 2023,” *Ministry Of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, April 24, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-111_-24-nisan-2023-tarihinde-bazi-ulkelerin-hukumet-yetkililerince-yapilan-beyanlar-hk.en.mfa

“The unfortunate statements that are incompatible with historical facts and international law regarding the events of 1915 are futile efforts aimed at rewriting history for political motives.

It should not be forgotten that 1915 events cannot be defined according to politicians’ personal agendas and their domestic political considerations. Such an approach can only lead to distortion of history. Those who insist on this biased approach will go down in history as worthless opportunist politicians.

We reject these statements, which we consider null and void, and condemn in the strongest terms those who persist in this mistake. Türkiye does not need to be lectured about its own history by anyone.

We urge these circles who seek to derive animosity from history for shallow political considerations to support our Joint History Commission proposal, and the regional peace and cooperation efforts led by our country instead of repeating such grave mistakes.”

Turkish President Erdoğan also sent the following message to the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul:⁸³

“The Patriarch of the Armenians of Turkey, Mr. Sahak Mashalyan, Distinguished Members of the Armenian Community,

Dear Citizens,

I greet you with my most heartfelt feelings and affection.

I respectfully commemorate the Ottoman Armenians who lost their lives in the difficult conditions of the First World War and offer my condolences to their descendants.

On this occasion, I would also like to ask God’s mercy on the Ottoman citizens who died due to the conflicts, rebellions, gang activities and acts of terrorism during the First World War.

With the earthquakes of February 6th, which were described as the disaster of the century, we have once again seen that we, 85 million of us, are people who find peace under the shadow of the same flag, who share the same homeland soil, whose past and future are one, and who are partners in destiny.

83 “Erdoğan’dan Patrik Maşalyan’a taziye mesajı,” *Agos*, 24 Nisan 2023, <https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/28503/erdogan-dan-patrik-masalyan-a-taziye-mesaji>

No matter how tragic, we should not let the events of the past determine our present and future.

We believe that relieving the pain by sharing instead of comparing is the best way for our future.

With this understanding, we are trying to strengthen our internal peace, reinforce our unity and solidarity, and expand the rights and freedoms of all our citizens with the steps we have taken in the last 20 years.

We strive to establish an inclusive and embracing climate in Turkey where no one is marginalized, no one is excluded because of their identity, no matter what faith or ethnic identity they belong to.

In the coming period, we will continue to work with the goal of friendship and peace by seeing our differences as a source of substance/wealth, despite those who try to politicize history.

We will continue to protect the rights and freedoms of our Armenian citizens who make irreplaceable contributions to the cultural, artistic, political, economic, educational, social and humanitarian life of our country.

I sincerely believe that the esteemed members of the Armenian community will give us the necessary support in these endeavors.

With these thoughts in mind, I once again respectfully commemorate the Ottoman citizens who passed away during the disintegration of the Empire.”

The Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul Mashalyan’s response message is below:

“We would like to thank Mr. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for his meaningful and important condolences. Looking back and being stuck in the past is not a useful approach.

The past should be the source from which we draw our nourishment, but we need to reconsider the past for the present and the future. In fact, on the occasion of April 24th, our President was the only state leader to share our pain. In all these messages, we sense an effort to build a bridge, to create a reconciliation between peoples. This is of course very valuable for us and for this geography. Because our effort to build the future is possible by making sense of the past and reflecting it to the present. We cannot change the past. We only have today, and we can build the future with today. So much so that the behavior we should

have in all of this is to build bridges of peace between Armenians and Turks, between Armenia and Turkey in a Christian way, and we have a duty to change this memory, this geography into a memory of peace for the peoples and to turn this fertile geography into God's table. For this, like the patriarchs before us, like our pioneers, we pray from the heart. We ask for God's help to break the ice, to build bridges, to improve relations and to build a better future.

When we look to the future, what we see are options. When the events of April 24th and the 'Great Catastrophe', which our people call 'Meds Yeghern', are analyzed well, considering the First World War, before the war started, people were told that they had enough reasons to fight. So much so that the states were ready to fight. They thought it would have favorable consequences. After four years of war, they realized that it was nothing of the sort. Even the worst peace before the war was much better than the war itself. Because nearly 20 million people disappeared, most of them young people. Soldiers and civilians lost their lives. And of course, today, April 24th, the ember burns where it falls. So, we remember the hundreds of thousands of people we lost. We pray for them, and we will have a service in our church afterwards. We will ask for their prayers. Because in 2015, with a vision, our church felt it necessary to end the mourning and to look at the 1915 Events from a different perspective. Because now, 100 years later, we see that despite that 'Great Catastrophe', our people have survived, they have maintained their existence, they have maintained their language, they have a homeland, they have a large diaspora, they have a population of nearly 12 million. So much so that this 'Great Catastrophe' could not defeat our people. It could not destroy us, we survived. The reason for this is really our faith, our church, our creative abilities inherited from our ancestors. Through all of these, we have successfully lived through 100 years and created new lives for ourselves all over the world. We have rebuilt, we have prospered again. Because God was with us. God took us by the hand and lifted us up. And of course, the prayers of the 100s of thousands of martyrs who died when we looked with the eyes of faith were also instrumental."

The repeated statement of the US President, targeting only Türkiye and the Turks, did not meet the insatiable expectations of the radical elements of the Armenian Diaspora, who are in the habit of demanding something more after each gain, this time questioning and criticizing why it did not include the Armenians in "Artsakh" who were "subjected to genocide by Azerbaijan".

24 April was also commemorated in Armenia, where government officials, including the President, Prime Minister, and President of the

National Assembly of Armenia, laid wreaths at the genocide memorial. Church officials did not attend this ceremony and visited the monument afterwards.

Below is the statement made by Prime Minister Pashinyan on this occasion:⁸⁴

“Dear people,

Dear compatriots,

On April 24, we commemorate the 1.5 million victims of the Armenian Genocide carried out by the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, and tens of thousands of citizens will carry out a procession of respect, remembrance and meditation to the Tsitsernakaberd Memorial.

The April 24 march is perhaps the most impactful occurrence that has predetermined and is predetermining our reality, an exceptional day to think about our history, past and future. What do young parents think when walking to the Tsitsernakaberd memorial, often holding the hands of young children, or what do elderly people with more life experience think?

They are probably thinking about two questions. Why did the Meds Yeghern happen and what should be done to prevent its recurrence? Hundreds and thousands of works have been written about the causes of the Armenian Genocide, many reasons and motives have been revealed. As for the methodology to exclude the recurrence of such a crime, it largely depends on our understanding of the concepts of “state” and “region”.

The state, only a developed and sovereign state is able to ensure the existence and security of our people, and everyone has something to do for the establishment of the state - with education, work, civil responsibility and respect for law.

Our strategic choice for the region is as follows: Do we have the will and ability to normalize and develop our regional relations, regardless of, or even more so, when the existing security threats around us worsen due to regional or extra-regional reasons?

84 “Ermenistan’da 24 Nisan anması,” *Agos*, 24 Nisan 2023, <https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/28500/ermenistan-da-24-nisan-anmasi>

Realizing all the difficulties and complications, our government has decided to go the way of finding a positive answer to that question, because only that way can guarantee security and well-being.

Dear people,

Dear compatriots,

Today we bow to the memory of the 1.5 million victims of the Armenian Genocide and ponder about the past, present and future. And this is the best moment to think about the past, present and future.”

Below is the statement issued by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with reference to the day:

“The international recognition of the Genocide is aimed at preventing the repetition of a similar crime against humanity in any other corner of the world, including the threats of new ethnic cleansing: it is the indifference, tolerance and impunity that make this mass crime possible.

Unfortunately, today as a century ago, the danger of genocidal policy is palpable in different corners of the world. Even today, Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh are facing the danger of genocide and ethnic cleansing. The continuous aggressive policy of Azerbaijan towards the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, the anti-Armenian rhetoric, the actions aimed at depriving Armenians of their homeland, erasing the Armenian trace are nothing, but a manifestation of genocidal intentions.”

On 25 April, a fountain named after “Nemesis”, known as the goddess of revenge in Greek mythology, was inaugurated in Yerevan, blessing an Armenian terrorist organization carrying that name, targeting Turks and Türkiye. While steps were being taken to normalize relations, Türkiye reacted without delay to this development that disregards and undermines the normalization process. The following is the statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 26 April:⁸⁵

“We strongly condemn the unveiling of the “Nemesis Monument” in Yerevan, dedicated to the perpetrators of assassinations against the Ottoman political and military leaders in the early 1920s, as well as the Azerbaijani officials of the time and even some Ottoman citizens of Armenian origin.

85 “No: 113, 26 Nisan 2023, Ermenistan’ın Başkenti Erivan’da Açılan “Nemesis Anıtı” Hk.,” Türkiye Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 26 Nisan 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-113_-ermenistan-in-baskenti-erivan-da-acilan-nemesis-aniti-hk.tr.mfa

The unveiling of this shameful monument is a glorification of a bloody terrorist movement that led to the heinous terrorist attacks in which 31 of our diplomats and their family members were murdered.

The way in which this event has been presented in the Armenian media also reveals a distorted and unacceptable interpretation of history still kept in some minds.

Such provocative steps, which are incompatible with the spirit of the normalization process between Türkiye and Armenia, will in no way contribute to the efforts for establishment of lasting and sustainable peace and stability in the region. On the contrary, they will negatively affect the normalization process.”

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Çavuşoğlu stated that this shameful monument also harmed the normalization process initiated in 2022. He underlined that Türkiye was sincere in its decision to normalize its relations with Armenia, but that it was unacceptable to allow a monument sanctifying terrorism. He announced the closure of Turkish airspace to Armenian aircraft in response to Armenia’s provocations, warning that further steps could be taken.⁸⁶ Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that the erection of the monument was wrong, but shifted the blame on the local authorities, while National Security Secretary Grigoryan stated that it was an internal matter, that no one had the right to interfere in internal affairs and that normalization with Türkiye should be without preconditions.

On 4 May, the Spokesperson of the US Department of State issued a statement saying that they were “disappointed” that Türkiye had closed its airspace to Armenian aircraft and that air links were an important security enhancing measure not only for the two countries but also for the stability of the region.⁸⁷

The President of the National Assembly of Armenia, Alen Simonyan, arrived in Ankara on 3 May to attend the meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and held bilateral and delegation meetings with Mustafa Şentop, the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In this meeting, Simonyan also mentioned the Nemesis monument and claimed that it was not an act of the Government, that no one representing the Armenian government was present at the inauguration and expressed

86 “Dışişleri Bakanı Çavuşoğlu: ‘(Teröristler için Nemesis anıtının yapılması) Ermenistan uçaklarına hava sahamızı kapattık’,” *Habertürk*, 3 Mayıs 2023, <https://www.haberturk.com/ankara-haberleri/31028599-disisleri-bakani-cavusoglu-teroristler-icin-nemesis-anitinin-yapilmasi-ermenistan>

87 “ABD’den Türkiye’nin hava sahasını Ermenistan uçaklarına kapatmasına ilişkin açıklama,” *Habertürk*, May 3 Mayıs 2023, <https://www.haberturk.com/abdden-turkiyenin-hava-sahasini-ermenistan-ucaklarina-kapatmasina-iliskin-aciklama-3588627>

regret at Türkiye's reaction. Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey Şentop emphasized that Türkiye wants normalization to take place and that steps that would harm this process should be prevented.⁸⁸

According to polls conducted by the International Republican Institute, an American company, the results of which were released in early May, France, Iran, and the United States are the countries that the Armenian people consider the friendliest. Russia ranked fourth. The countries perceived as the biggest political threats were Azerbaijan and Türkiye.⁸⁹

In an interview with a Polish magazine in early May, President of Armenia Khachaturyan, in response to the question whether Armenia still wants a strategic military alliance with Russia in light of recent developments, said "Yes! We want to continue cooperating with Russia, and we very much care about it. We want Russia to defend us against Turkey and Azerbaijan".⁹⁰

In an interview with a Czech magazine on 15 May, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that the main goal of Armenia's foreign policy is to establish normal relations with all its neighbors and that Armenia currently has good relations with Georgia and Iran, but almost no relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, which should not be the case.⁹¹

On the eve of Turkish elections in May, Pashinyan said in a press interview "Hopefully we will be able to normalize Armenian-Turkish relations after the presidential election in Türkiye. I also hope we can carry on with normalizing our relations with Türkiye in a natural way. This is high on our agenda⁹²". Pashinyan congratulated Erdogan on winning the Turkish presidential election on 28 May. He said on social media "We congratulate President Erdogan on reelection. I am looking forward to continuing our joint work until full normalization of relations between our two countries".

88 "Ermenistan'dan Türkiye'ye: Nemesis Anıtı, dış politika ifadesi değil," *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Mayıs 2023, <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/dunya/ermenistandan-turkiyeye-nemesis-aniti-dis-politika-ifadesi-degil-2078001>

89 "IRI Armenia Poll Shows Concerns over National Security, Sharp Divisions on Russia, Improving Relations with Turkey," *International Republican Institute (IRI)*, May 1, 2023, <https://www.iri.org/news/iri-armenia-poll-shows-concerns-over-national-security-sharp-divisions-on-russia-improving-relations-with-turkey/>

90 Karol Wasilewski, "President of Armenia: We want Moscow to defend us against Turkey and Azerbaijan," *TVP Weekly*, May 3, 2023, <https://weekly.tvp.pl/69581248/president-of-armenia-we-want-moscow-to-defend-us-against-turkey-and-azerbaijan>

91 "Armenia now has almost no relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which should not remain like that: Pashinyan," *News.am*, May 15, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/760101.html>

92 "Normalizing relations with Turkey high on Armenia's agenda," *Interfax*, May 29, 2023, <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/90917/>

Upon the invitation of Turkish President Erdoğan, Prime Minister Pashinyan arrived in Ankara on 3 June for Erdoğan's inauguration reception.⁹³ He was accompanied by the Special Representative of Armenia for the normalization process between the two countries. His participation in the event once again culminated with the hysterical cries of radical elements, both inside Armenia and abroad. Even a former Minister of Foreign Affairs joined the chorus, alleging that it has caused surprise and anger in wide circles in Armenia and the Diaspora. On the other hand, President Erdoğan praised Prime Minister Pashinyan for attending his inauguration ceremony and told reporters on his way back from his visit to Azerbaijan on 14 June that "Pashinyan's acceptance of our invitation was an important step. He attended our ceremony, overcoming many obstacles emanating from his country's opposition. We held a brief meeting, and I thanked him for accepting the invitation."⁹⁴

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan called his new Turkish counterpart Minister Hakan Fidan to congratulate him on 7 June. It was reported that they also discussed efforts to normalize bilateral relations.

93 Yavuz Aydın, "Ermenistan Başbakanı Paşinyan, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın yemin törenine katılacak," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 2 Haziran 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/ermenistan-basbakani-pasinyan-cumhurbaskani-erdoganin-yemin-torenine-katilacak/2912916>

94 "Sweden must do its part on terrorism for NATO bid, says Erdoğan," *Yeni Şafak*, June 14, 2023, <https://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/sweden-must-do-its-part-on-terrorism-for-nato-bid-says-erdogan-3665162>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “ABD’den Türkiye’nin hava sahasını Ermenistan uçaklarına kapatmasına ilişkin açıklama.” *Habertürk*, May 3 Mayıs 2023, <https://www.haberturk.com/abdden-turkiyenin-hava-sahasini-ermenistan-ucaklarina-kapatmasina-iliskin-aciklama-3588627>
- “Ambassador Kvien’s Remarks at American Chamber of Commerce in Armenia General Meeting.” *US Embassy in Armenia*, May 3, 2023, <https://am.usembassy.gov/american-chamber-of-commerce-2/>
- “Ararat Mirzoyan met with the US co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Louis Bono.” *Radar.am*, February 18, 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2553468329/>
- “Ararat Mirzoyan will be in Romania on a working visit.” *Radar Armenia*, 3 Nisan 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2560923819>
- “ARF Bureau: ‘We will not tolerate coercive agreements that violate the interests of the Armenian nation’.” *Armenian Weekly*, May 24, 2023, <https://armenianweekly.com/2023/05/24/arf-bureau-we-will-not-tolerate-coercive-agreements-that-violate-the-interests-of-the-armenian-nation/>
- “Armenia ‘Forced To Join Russia-Belarus Union’.” *Azatutyun*, December 27, 2022, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32195524.html>
- “Armenia hopes talks with Azerbaijan will swiftly lead to peace treaty.” *Armenpress*, May 22, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1111443/>
- “Armenia now has almost no relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which should not remain like that: Pashinyan.” *News.am*, May 15, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/760101.html>
- “Armenia ready to recognize Azerbaijan’s 86,600 km2 territorial integrity which includes Nagorno Karabakh – Pashinyan.” *Armenpress*, May 22, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1111461.html>
- “Armenia to elaborate new Europe-India-Iran transport corridor.” *Mehr News Agency*, May 8, 2023, <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/200471/Armenia-to-elaborate-new-Europe-India-Iran-transport-corridor>
- “Armenia to leave CSTO if Yerevan deems it ‘non-functional organization’— prime minister.” *TASS*, May 22, 2023, <https://tass.com/world/1621147>

- “Armenia to leave CSTO if Yerevan deems it ‘non-functional organization’— prime minister.” *TASS*, May 22, 2023, <https://tass.com/world/1621147>
- “Armenia to participate in US-led Defender 23 military exercises.” *News.am*, April 6, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/753546.html>
- “Armenia’s foreign trade turnover in January 2023 increased by 93.8% to nearly \$1.3 billion.” *Arka News Agency*, March 6, 2023, http://arka.am/en/news/business/armenia_s_foreign_trade_turnover_in_january_2023_increased_by_93_8_to_nearly_1_3_billion
- “Armenia’s permanent population is 2,928,914, according to new census.” *Armenpress*, May 2, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1110018.html>
- “Armenian Church Again Warns Against ‘Humiliating’ Peace Deal.” *Azatutyun*, June 12, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32455807.html>
- “Armenian government continues anti-ARF policies toward ARF Youth.” *The Armenian Weekly*, January 29, 2023, <https://armenianweekly.com/2023/01/29/armenian-government-continues-anti-arf-policies-toward-arf-youth/>
- “Armenian Prime Minister speaks about ‘big opportunity’ to normalize relations with Turkey.” *Armenpress*, April 18, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1108950.html>
- “Armenian soldiers die in fire blamed on heater lit with petrol.” *BBC News*, January 19, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64329367>
- “Azerbaijan postpones planned talks with Armenia in Washington D.C.” *Armenpress*, June 8, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1112814/>
- “Azerbaijan sets up checkpoints on the Lachin corridor.” *Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)*, April 27, 2023, <https://www.eiu.com/n/azerbaijan-sets-up-checkpoints-on-the-lachin-corridor/>
- “Azerbaijani MFA comments on Pashinyan’s claims voiced in Czechia.” *APA.az*, May 4, 2023, <https://apa.az/en/foreign-policy/azerbaijani-mfa-comments-on-pashinyans-claims-voiced-in-czechia-402526>
- “Azerbaijani president gives ultimatum to Karabakh authorities.” *Eurasianet*, May 30, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijani-president-gives-ultimatum-to-karabakh-authorities>

- “Azerbaycan-Ermenistan sınırında çatışma: 3 Azeri asker şehit.” *NTV*, 11 Nisan 2023, https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/azerbaycan-ermenistan-sinirinda-catisma-3-azeri-asker-sehit,Gz_oG6jTI0uP2HeEQz34AQ
- “Catholicos on demanding Armenia PM Pashinyan’s resignation: Our fatherly exhortation not limited by time.” *News.am*, April 20, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/755831.html>
- “Çavuşoğlu ve Lavrov’dan Ankara’da ortak basın toplantısı: “Suriye ile normalleşme sürecinin şeffaf bir şekilde devam etmesini bekliyoruz.” *T24*, 7 Nisan 2023, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/rusya-disisleri-bakani-lavrov-ankara-da-cavusoglu-ile-heyetlerarasi-gorusme-gerceklesti,1102966>
- “Despite ‘Glimmer of Hope’ in Armenia, Azerbaijan Conflict, Escalating Tensions Threaten to Derail Fragile Progress, Senior Official Tells Security Council.” *United Nations*, December 20, 2022, <https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15154.doc.htm>
- “Dışişleri Bakanı Çavuşoğlu: ‘(Teröristler için Nemesis anıtının yapılması) Ermenistan uçaklarına hava sahamızı kapattık’.” *Habertürk*, 3 Mayıs 2023, <https://www.haberturk.com/ankara-haberleri/31028599-disisleri-bakani-cavusoglu-teroristler-icin-nemesis-anitinin-yapilmasi-ermenistan>
- “Erdoğan’dan Patrik Maşalyan’a taziye mesajı.” *Agos*, 24 Nisan 2023, <https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/28503/erdogan-dan-patrik-masalyan-a-taziye-mesaji>
- “Ermenistan’da 24 Nisan anması.” *Agos*, 24 Nisan 2023, <https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/28500/ermenistan-da-24-nisan-anmasi>
- “Ermenistan’dan Türkiye’ye: Nemesis Anıtı, dış politika ifadesi değil.” *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Mayıs 2023, <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/dunya/ermenistandan-turkiyeye-nemesis-aniti-dis-politika-ifadesi-degil-2078001>
- “EU Hosts Another Aliyev-Pashinyan Meeting.” *Mirror Spectator*, June 8, 2023, <https://mirrorspectator.com/2023/06/08/eu-hosts-another-aliyev-pashinyan-meeting/>
- “EU Urges Dialogue Between Azerbaijan, Karabakh Armenians.” *Azatutyun*, May 30, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32435480.html>
- “Euro 2024 elemeleri: Türkiye ilk maçta, Ermenistan deplasmanında 1-2 kazandı.” *BBC Türkçe*, March 26 Mart 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cd1219lw61ko>

“First review under the stand-by arrangement and request for modifications of Performance criteria and monetary policy Consultation clause—press release; staff Report.” *International Monetary Fund (IMF)*, June 2023, <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/journals/002/2023/205/002.2023.issue-205-en.xml>

“First time ever, Armenia’s foreign direct investments stand at \$1 billion.” *Armenpress*, May 30, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1112116.html>

“FM briefs Egypt media on details of Armenia proposals forwarded to Azerbaijan.” *News.am*, March 23, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/751288.html>

“French FM visits Armenia in difficult period of time – Mirzoyan.” *Armenpress*, April 28, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1109835.html>

“İnsani yardım için Türkiye-Ermenistan kara sınırı 35 yıl sonra açıldı.” *Sözcü*, 11 Şubat 2023, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2023/gundem/son-dakika-insani-yardim-icin-turkiye-ermenistan-kara-siniri-35-yil-sonra-acildi-7588680/>

“İran, Hindistan ve Ermenistan Arasında 3’lü İstişare.” *Tesnim Haber Ajansı*, 21 Nisan 2023, <https://www.tasnimnews.com/tr/news/2023/04/21/2883376/iran-hindistan-ve-ermenistan-aras%C4%B1nda-3-l%C3%BC-isti%C5%9Fare>

“IRI Armenia Poll Shows Concerns over National Security, Sharp Divisions on Russia, Improving Relations with Turkey.” *International Republican Institute (IRI)*, May 1, 2023, <https://www.iri.org/news/iri-armenia-poll-shows-concerns-over-national-security-sharp-divisions-on-russia-improving-relations-with-turkey/>

“Kremlin slams ‘provocative’ Armenian claims about ‘being forced to’ join Russia-Belarus union state.” *Anadolu Agency*, December 27, 2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/kremlin-slams-provocative-armenian-claims-about-being-forced-to-join-russia-belarus-union-state/2774043>

“Mirzoyan Ankara’da: ‘Bu Acı Bize Yabancı Değil.’” *VOA Türkçe*, 15 Şubat 2023, <https://www.voaturkce.com/a/mirzoyan-ankarada-bu-aci-bize-yabanci-degil/6963797.html>

“Mirzoyan-Lavrov meeting in Moscow.” *Jam News*, March 21, 2023, <https://jam-news.net/meeting-of-lavrov-and-mirzoya-in-moscow/>

- “Moscow requests clarification on Armenia’s participation in NATO drills.” *Mediamax*, April 13, 2023, <https://mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/50944/>
- “New Council of Europe Action Plan for Armenia launched in Yerevan.” *Council of Europe*, February 16, 2023, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/new-council-of-europe-action-plan-for-armenia-launched-in-yerevan>
- “Nikol Pashinyan and Mikhail Mishustin meet in Almaty.” *Prime Ministry of Armenia*, February 2, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/02/02/Nikol-Pashinyan-Mikhail-Mishustin/>
- “No: 111, 24 April 2023, Press Release Regarding the Statements Made by the Government Officials of Some Countries on April 24, 2023.” *Ministry Of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, April 24, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-111_-24-nisan-2023-tarihinde-bazi-ulkelerin-hukumet-yetkililerince-yapilan-beyanlar-hk.en.mfa
- “No: 113, 26 Nisan 2023, Ermenistan’ın Başkenti Erivan’da Açılan “Nemesis Anıtı” Hk.” *Türkiye Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, 26 Nisan 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-113_-ermenistan-in-baskenti-erivan-da-acilan-nemesis-aniti-hk.tr.mfa
- “Normalizing relations with Turkey high on Armenia’s agenda.” *Interfax*, May 29, 2023, <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/90917/>
- “Olaf Scholz Backs Karabakh’s Right to Self-Determination.” *Hetq*, March 3, 2023, <https://hetq.am/en/article/153738>
- “Pashinyan and Menendez discussed the developments taking place in the South Caucasus.” *Radar.am*, February 18, 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2553432870/>
- “Peskov comments on Armenian-Azerbaijani talks in the US.” *Mediamax*, May 2, 2023, <https://mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/51161/>
- “PM Pashinyan activates task force in charge of construction of new nuclear power reactor.” *Armenpress*, June 6, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1112610.html>
- “PM Pashinyan attends Victory Day Parade in Moscow.” *Armenpress*, May 9, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1110514.html>
- “PM Pashinyan describes Foreign Minister’s Turkey visit as ‘very important and meaningful’.” *Armenpress*, February 16, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1104282.html>

“Press remarks by President Charles Michel following the trilateral meeting with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia.” *European (Union) Council*, May 14, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/14/press-remarks-by-president-charles-michel-following-the-trilateral-meeting-with-president-aliyev-of-azerbaijan-and-prime-minister-pashinyan-of-armenia/>

“Press Statement of the Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan following the meeting with Foreign Minister of Türkiye Mevlut Cavusoglu.” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, February 15, 2023, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2023/02/15/fms_armenia_turkiye/11865

“Prime Minister Pashinyan meets with President Khachaturyan, refers to Azerbaijan’s behavior after Brussels talks.” *Armenpress*, May 29, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1112089.html>

“Protests of Azerbaijani eco-activists continue on Khankandi-Lachin road?”. *Report.az*, February 9, 2023, <https://report.az/en/karabakh/protests-of-azerbaijani-eco-activists-continue-on-khankandi-lachin-road/>

“Putin Hosts Fresh Talks Between Pashinian, Aliyev.” *Azatutyun*, May 26, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32428164.html>

“Putin, Pashinian Meet Again.” *Azatutyun*, June 9, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32452518.html>

“QA-5, 17 March 2023, Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Tanju Bilgiç, in Response to a Question Regarding the European Parliament Report on ‘EU-Armenia Relations’.” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, March 17, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-5_-avrupa-parlamentosu-nun-ab-ermenistan-iliskileri-baslikli-raporu-hk-sc.en.mfa

“Russia Again Slams EU Monitoring Mission In Armenia.” *Azatutyun*, June 15, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32460878.html>

“Russia hopes no one will impede settlement in South Caucasus — Lavrov.” *TASS*, April 7, 2023, <https://tass.com/politics/1601183>

“Russia wants to open consulate-general in Kapan.” *Armenpress*, June 19, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1113578/>

“Russia-Ukraine war: 2022 witnesses a fourfold growth in money transfers from Russia to Armenia.” *Ampop Media*, April 27, 2023, <https://ampop.am/en/transfers-from-russia-to-armenia-increased-4-times/>

“Rusya Dışişleri Bakanı Lavrov, Ermeni mevkidaşı Mirzoyan ile Semerkant’ta görüştü.” *Son Dakika*, 14 Nisan 2023, <https://www.sondakika.com/haber/haber-rusya-disisleri-bakani-lavrov-ermeni-mevkidasi-15767263/>

“Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Bilateral Peace Negotiation Closing Session with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov.” *US Department of State*, May 4, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-bilateral-peace-negotiation-closing-session-with-armenian-foreign-minister-ararat-mirzoyan-and-azerbaijani-foreign-minister-jeyhun-bayramov/>

“Secretary Blinken’s Call with Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan.” *US Department of State*, March 20, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-armenian-prime-minister-pashinyan-12/>

“Secretary Blinken’s Call with Azerbaijani President Aliyev.” *US Department of State*, March 21, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-azerbaijani-president-aliyev-11/>

“Sergey Lavrov on what was achieved at the trilateral meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.” *Turan.az*, May 19, 2023, https://www.turan.az/cache/2023/politics_news/free/news-2023-5-free-politics_news-en-4705.htm

“Sergey Lavrov: US ‘advises’ Armenia to drive away Russian military base, border guards.” *News.am*, May 17, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/760347.html>

“Sisi Arrives in Armenia in First Ever Visit by an Egyptian President.” *Egyptian Streets*, January 29, 2023, <https://egyptianstreets.com/2023/01/29/sisi-arrives-in-armenia-in-first-ever-visit-by-an-egyptian-president/>

“Sweden must do its part on terrorism for NATO bid, says Erdogan.” *Yeni Şafak*, June 14, 2023, <https://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/sweden-must-do-its-part-on-terrorism-for-nato-bid-says-erdogan-3665162>

“Tehran, Yerevan Become Sister Cities.” *Azatoryun*, January 18, 2023, <https://www.azatoryun.am/a/32229418.html>

“Tensions Between Pashinyan and Karekin II Escalate.” *Asbarez*, May 22, 2023, <https://asbarez.com/tensions-between-pashinyan-and-karekin-ii-escalate/>

“Toivo Klaar: We can have peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan - INTERVIEW.” *APA*, March 8, 2023, <https://apa.az/en/foreign-policy/toivo-klaar-we-can-have-peace-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-interview-398159>

“UN mission on Lachin corridor only possible with consent of Azerbaijan, Armenia, says Russia.” *Anadolu Agency*, February 8, 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/un-mission-on-lachin-corridor-only-possible-with-consent-of-azerbaijan-armenia-says-russia/2812026>

“US Envoy Again Visits Armenia, Azerbaijan.” *Mirror Spectator*, June 1, 2023, <https://mirrorspectator.com/2023/06/01/us-envoy-again-visits-armenia-azerbaijan/>

“Vahagn Khachatryan and the Prime Minister of Estonia discussed issues of security and regional importance.” *Radar Armenia*, January 16, 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2547727481/>

“Vardanyan was not fired at Aliyev’s request”: opinion from Yerevan.” *Jam-News*, February 23, 2023, <https://jam-news.net/dismissal-of-ruben-var-danyan/>

“We must make efforts to ensure efficiency and development. PM Pashinyan receives participants of ‘iGorts’ program.” *Armenpress*, February 6, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1103473.html>

“Zareh Sinanyan fiddled his violin during visit to eastern US cities while Armenia, Artsakh burned.” *The Armenian Weekly*, March 11, 2023, <https://armenianweekly.com/2023/03/11/zareh-sinanyan-fiddled-his-violin-during-visit-to-eastern-us-cities-while-armenia-artsakh-burned/>

Abiyev, Murad. “Georgian Gambit” By Azerbaijan In Davos.” *Caliber.az*, January 23, 2023, https://caliber.az/en/post/139036/?fbclid=IwAR2VzJhYOplddjF0Lkhf5Xj0R2fZmLz_XLHDV6dHvPAg9Sbnco0uPkoCJ4

Aydın, Yavuz. “Ermenistan Başbakanı Paşinyan, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın yemin törenine katılacak.” *Anadolu Ajansı*, 2 Haziran 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/ermenistan-basbakani-pasinyan-cumhurbaskani-erdoganin-yemin-torenine-katilacak/2912916>

- Babajanyan, Mane. "The Convention of the Future Armenian held in Yerevan." *The Armenian Weekly*, <https://armenianweekly.com/2023/03/15/the-convention-of-the-future-armenian-held-in-yerevan/>
- Eruygur, Burç. "Azerbaijan invites representatives of Karabakh Armenians for 2nd round of talks." *Anadolu Agency*, March 13, 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/azerbaijan-invites-representatives-of-karabakh-armenians-for-2nd-round-of-talks/2844376>
- Ghazanchyan, Siranush. "Vahe Ghazaryan appointed Armenia's Minister of Interior." *Public Radio of Armenia*, January 9, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/01/09/vahe-ghazaryan-appointed-armenias-minister-of-interior/>
- Kuchera, Joshua. "Armenia refuses to host CSTO exercises." *Eurasianet*, January 10, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-refuses-to-host-csto-exercises>
- Kuchera, Joshua. "Ukrainian officials support Azerbaijan in blockade of Karabakh." *Eurasianet*, January 25, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/ukrainian-officials-support-azerbaijan-in-blockade-of-karabakh>
- Mejlumyan, Ani. "Armenia begins work to restore railroad ties with Azerbaijan." *Eurasianet*, January 19, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-begins-work-to-restore-railroad-ties-with-azerbaijan>
- Mgdesyan, Arshaluis. "Armenia restarts controversial gold mine." *Eurasianet*, February 27, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-restarts-controversial-gold-mine>
- Mgdesyan, Arshaluis. "EU approves new monitoring mission for Armenia, over Russian and Azerbaijani objections." *Eurasianet*, January 25, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/eu-approves-new-monitoring-mission-for-armenia-over-russian-and-azerbaijani-objections>
- Sarkissian, Armen. "The Humanitarian Crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh Is a Textbook Example of Ethnic Cleansing." *Time*, January 12, 2023, <https://time.com/6246850/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-lachin-corridor/>
- Wasilewski, Karol. "President of Armenia: We want Moscow to defend us against Turkey and Azerbaijan." *TVP Weekly*, May 3, 2023, <https://weekly.tvp.pl/69581248/president-of-armenia-we-want-moscow-to-defend-us-against-turkey-and-azerbaijan>

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

To cite this article: Sinan Koçak, "An Examination on the Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi (1897-2014)", Review of Armenian Studies, Issue 47 (2023): 63-94.

Received: 10.01.2023

Accepted: 12.06.2023

AN EXAMINATION ON THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF ARMENIANS IN TBILISI (1897-2014)

(TİFLİS'TEKİ ERMENİLERİN DEMOGRAFİK
YAPISI ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME (1897-2014))

Sinan KOÇAK*

Abstract: *The aim of this study is to examine the demographic structure of Armenians living in Tbilisi between 1897 and 2014. The scope of this study includes information about the total population of Armenians, their distribution by settlement, gender composition, marriage, language, and religious structure. The demographic characteristics of the Armenians, who have had a significant population in Tbilisi since ancient times, will be an area of interest for this study. In addition, information will be given about the political, socio-cultural, and economic structures of the Armenians in Tbilisi. The temporal framework of this study will consist of three main periods covering the years 1897-2014, namely the Tsarist Period, the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet Georgia. The numerical data for these periods will be provided from the official population censuses carried out during the mentioned periods. In the study, the ratios of the numerical data of the population in urban and rural areas according to gender changes will be examined within the time frame determined above. Again, depending on these variables, data on the use of language (Armenian), which is the symbol of Armenian identity, elements that define the socio-cultural*

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7481-0100>
Research Assistant, Ankara University, Faculty of Languages and History-Geography, Department of Caucasian Languages and Cultures, Department of Armenian Language and Culture
sinankocak@ankara.edu.tr

structures of Armenians living in rural and urban centers, and religious preferences will also be included. In this context, information will be given about the Armenians who are affiliated with the Apostolic Church residing in Tbilisi and the Armenians who adopt the Catholic religious belief. As a result of this study, the numerical and sociological assets of the Armenians in Tbilisi will be presented in a holistic way by supporting the demographic data with human data.

Keywords: *Demographics, Armenian, Georgia Armenians, Tbilisi, Tbilisi Armenians*

Öz: *Bu çalışmanın hedefi 1897-2014 yılları arasında Tiflis'te yaşayan Ermenilerin demografik yapısını incelemektir. Söz konusu inceleme kapsamında Ermenilerin toplam nüfusu, yerleşim yerlerine göre dağılımları, cinsiyet kompozisyonları, evlilik, dil ve dinî yapıları hakkındaki bilgilerin yer alması planlanmaktadır. Çalışmanın ilgi alanında tarihin eski dönemlerinden itibaren Tiflis'te önemli bir nüfusa sahip olan Ermenilerin demografik özellikleri kalacaktır. İlaveten Tiflis'teki Ermenilerin siyasi, sosyokültürel ve iktisadi yapıları hakkında bilgiler verilecektir. Çalışmamızın zamansal çerçevesi Çarlık Dönemi, Sovyetler Birliği ve Sovyet sonrası Gürcistan olmak üzere 1897-2014 yıllarını kapsayan üç ana dönemden oluşacaktır. Bu dönemlere ait sayısal veriler anılan dönemlerde gerçekleştirilen resmî nüfus sayımlarından sağlanacaktır. Çalışmada yukarıda belirlenen zaman çerçevesinde nüfusun kentsel ve kırsal alanlardaki nüfusun sayısal verilerinin cinsiyet değişimlerine göre oranları irdelenecektir. Yine bu değişkenlere bağlı olarak kırsal ve kentsel merkezlerde yaşayan Ermenilerin sosyokültürel yapılarını tanımlayan ve Ermeni kimlik öğelerinin simgesi olan dilin (Ermenicenin) kullanımı ve din tercihleri konusundaki veriler de yer alacaktır. Bu bağlamda Tiflis'te ikamet eden Apostolik Kilisesi'ne bağlı Ermeniler ile Katoliklik dinî inancını benimseyen Ermeniler hakkında bilgiler verilecektir. Çalışmamızın sonucunda demografik veriler beşerî verilerle desteklenerek Tiflis'teki Ermenilerin sayısal ve sosyolojik varlıkları bütüncül bir şekilde sunulacaktır.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Demografi, Ermeni, Gürcistan Ermenileri, Tiflis, Tiflis Ermenileri*

Introduction

There are many studies on “Tbilisi city” in Türkiye. Most of these studies are on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. On 13 November 2022, as a result of the searches we made through the Turkish Council of Higher Education Thesis Center, we reached a total of 30 theses registered with the name “Tbilisi”. Among these theses, Mustafa Tanrıverdi’s study titled “Çarlık Rusyası Döneminde Tiflis Vilayeti (1878-1914)” (“The Province of Tbilisi under the Rule of Tsarist Russia (1878-1914)”) attracted our attention in relation to our article study. Among the academic studies other than theses, there is also a study titled “Ermenilerin Tiflis’teki Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1878-1914)” (“The Armenians’ Political Activities in Tbilisi (1878-1914)”) by Tanrıverdi. Another study on Armenians in Tbilisi is Selim Hilmi Özkan’s article titled “Osmanlı Devleti’nden Gürcistan’a Ermeni Göçü ve Tiflis’de Ermeni Faaliyetleri (1878-1915)” (“Armenian Migration from the Ottoman State to Georgia and Armenian Activity in Tbilisi (1878-1915)”). The article discusses, as the title suggests, the period and the events that led Armenians to migrate from the Ottoman State to Georgia and the activities of Armenians in Tbilisi. The number of studies on Tbilisi Armenians in English is higher than in Turkish. Some of these studies are as follows: Elli Ponomareva’s “Native Tbilisians or Diaspora: Negotiating the Status of Armenians in Tbilisi”, Satenik Mkrtschian’s “Contemporary Armenian Community in Tbilisi”, and Timothy K. Blauvelt and Christofer Berglund’s “Armenians in the Making of Modern Georgia”.

The common feature of the above-mentioned studies, and the point that will offer originality to our study, is that their authors did not address the demographic characteristics of Armenians in detail. Only Tanrıverdi, in his doctoral dissertation, provided information on the demographic structure of ethnic groups in Tbilisi province under Tsarist Russia. As a result of the literature review, the lack of a detailed study on the demographic structure of Armenians in Tbilisi in the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet period, especially in Türkiye, has been the main factor in the emergence of this study. The aim of the study is to thus examine the demographic structure of Armenians in Tbilisi in detail based on the census results conducted between 1897-2014.

Cem Behar, who has conducted remarkable research on populations, categorizes demographic studies into two groups: “formal” and “social”. In formal demographic studies, censuses are at the forefront. In addition, numerical data on populations are presented through statistical and technical methods. Social demographic studies, on the other hand, seek cause-and-effect relationships between phenomena and aim to provide in-depth information about society. In this study, the data obtained through censuses will be used extensively, as well as the events that contributed to the growth of the Armenian population in Tbilisi. In this context, we can state that the evaluations in our

study are based on the data collected with a mixed approach. The main reference sources used are the population censuses conducted between 1897 and 2014. In the analysis section, statistical information will be given first and then the data will be analyzed.¹

The name of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia today, is mentioned as *Tphilisi* and *Thbilisi* in different sources. It is seen that these two usages have changed into Tbilisi since 1936. The city takes its name from a hot water spring on the northeastern slopes of Mtabari. The Georgian word “tbili” (თბილი) means “warm”. There is no clear information about when the city of Tbilisi was founded. In different periods of history, this city was under the control of different states. The Persians, Khazars, Islamic armies, Umayyads, Abbasids, Seljuks, Khwarazmshah, Mongols, Ilkhanids, Timurids, Qara Qoyunlu, Aq Qoyunlu, Safavids, Ottomans, and Russians were the states that dominated this geography. Although it is stated that the population of Tbilisi was 60,000 until Shah Abbas invaded the city in 1614, this figure is exaggerated. Evliya Çelebi (1611-1682), one of the most important travelers of the 17th century, described the region as a medium-sized city. The botanist Tournefort (1656-1708) states that the population in 1701 was around 20,000. In his travelogue, the French scholar states that 14,000 of this population were Armenian, 3,000 Muslim, 2,000 Georgian, and 500 Catholic. The German naturalist and explorer Gldenstdt (1745-1781) also stated in his travelogue that the total population of Tbilisi was approximately 20,000, and also noted that 4,000 people had died in the plague epidemic of 1770. Gldenstaedt, like Tournefort, wrote that the majority of the city was Armenian, while the rest was Georgian and Muslim. Another German scholar Klaproth (1783-1835), who visited Tbilisi in 1808, stated that the city’s population was 18,000. Mustafa Aydın, on the other hand, states that the city’s population reached 25,000 in 1830 and 34,800 in 1850. He also emphasized the rapid increase in the population of Tbilisi due to the development of industry and transportation and determined that the total population increased to 70,000 in 1865.²

Georgia, which is strategically located in terms of its location, has been subjected to invasions and migrations of different states at various periods throughout history. In his article titled “Georgia’s Ethnic History and the Present Migration Process”, Mamuka Komakhia, who is of Caucasian origin, analyses Georgia’s ethnic change process in four stages:

1 Didem Daniş, *Nfus ve Toplum* (İstanbul: İstanbul niversitesi Aık ve Uzaktan Eđitim Fakltesi, 2020), 9.

2 Mustafa Aydın, “Tiflis”, *Trkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 41. Cilt (İstanbul, 2012), 150-152; Joseph de Tournefort, *Tournefort Seyahatnamesi*, ed. Stefanos Yerasimos, 4. Baskı (İstanbul: Kitapyayinevi, 2013), 160.

First—From the Middle Ages to the late 18th century when non-Georgian ethnoses moved to Georgian territory on the invitation of the Georgian czars/princes to settle the land abandoned by the Georgians.

Second—From the early 19th century to the advent of Soviet power. Migration waves (mainly forced migration) changed the size of various nationalities. The Russian imperial authorities moved large groups of non-Georgians to Georgian territory mainly for military-political and economic reasons.

Third—From 1921 to the Soviet Union's disintegration. Industrialization and the industrial boom in Soviet Georgia attracted hundreds of thousands of migrants from all the Union republics.

Fourth—From 1991, when Georgia declared its independence, to the present day. Political, social, and economic cataclysms drove away not only non-Georgians, but also Georgians; in recent times, non-Georgians have been leaving the republic for social and economic reasons.”³

Armenian researcher Satenik Mkrtchian, in his article titled “Contemporary Armenian Community in Tbilisi”, states that the historical background of Armenians in Tbilisi dates back to the late 6th and early 7th centuries. He also points out that the migration of Armenians to Tbilisi began to increase especially after the fall of the Bagratuni Dynasty and the seizure of the city of Ani by the Byzantines. The Armenians participated in the political, economic, and cultural life of the country and had a distinct role in the formation of the Georgian state. During the 1170s, there were so many Armenians in Georgia that an Armenian diocese with its center in Tbilisi was established. Armenians continued to migrate to Georgia in the 14-18th centuries, and this process increased significantly during the early 18th century. According to Mkrtchian's data, at the end of the 18th century, out of the total population of Tbilisi (20,000), 12,000 were Armenians. According to this data, Armenians, who constituted the numerical majority in the city, built churches and other places of worship in Tbilisi. In the early 19th century, they began to be recognized as the natives of the city.⁴

Armenians, who gained important positions thanks to the privileges they received during the Tsarist Russia period, had a significant population in the city thanks to their migration to Tbilisi in various periods. In the 19th century, Tbilisi became a sociocultural, political, and economic center for the

3 Mamuka Komakhia, “Georgia's Ethnic History and the Present Migration Processes”, *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 1 (49), 2008, 160.

4 Satenik Mkrtchian, “Contemporary Armenian Community in Tbilisi”, *Iran & the Caucasus*, Vol.13, No.2 (2009), 299-300.

Armenians. However, after the establishment of Soviet power in Tbilisi, the Armenian population began to decline. In addition, the Second World War and the cultural indigenization in Georgia were other factors that affected the decline of the Armenian population. Apart from these negative developments, the economic and cultural development of Soviet Georgia triggered migration from other Union Republics to the region. In the post-Soviet period, the aggressive nationalist policy implemented by the Georgian government, the socio-economic problems experienced during the Eduard Shevardnadze era, the unwillingness of the Armenians in Javakheti Region to integrate with the Georgians, the fear of assimilation, and migration abroad caused the Armenian population to decrease. Due to these reasons, many Armenians left Tbilisi. Those who remained changed their surnames and remained in the city.

This study consists of three parts. The first part is titled “The Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi under Tsarist Russia”. In this section, the political and socio-economic conditions of the Armenians who lived in Tbilisi during the Tsarist rule will be explained and then their demographic characteristics will be discussed. The second section is titled “The Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi during the Soviet Union Period”. Under this title, the events that caused the population movements of Armenians residing in Tbilisi during the Soviet Union period will be mentioned and then information about their demographic structure will be presented. The third chapter is titled “The Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi in the Post-Soviet Period”. In this section, information will be given about the events that led to the population mobility of Armenians in Tbilisi in the post-independence period and then there will be an emphasis on their demographic. In addition, although the focus is on the Armenians in Tbilisi, data on Armenians in Georgia will also be frequently included in order to see the whole picture.

1. The Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi under Tsarist Russia

Information on the administrative structure of Tbilisi is as follows: On 10 April 1840, the Caucasus Krai⁵ was divided into two administrative regions: the Georgia-Imereti Guberniya⁶ and the Khazar Oblast⁷. According to this administrative structure, Tbilisi was one of the 11 uyezd⁸ of the guberniya. In

5 Krai (Russian): Territory.

6 Guberniya (Russian): Governorate, a territorial unit in Imperial Russia. See: Farid Shafiyev, *The Russian-Soviet Resettlement Policies and Their Implications for Ethno-Territorial Conflicts in the South Caucasus*, Carleton University, Unpublished Thesis, Ottawa, 2015, x.

7 Oblast (Russian): Province. Shafiyev, *The Russian-Soviet Resettlement Policies...*, x.

8 Uyezd (Russian): Region, a territorial unit in Imperial Russia. See: Shafiyev, *The Russian-Soviet Resettlement Policies...*, x.

1846, a new administrative organization was introduced. Accordingly, some parts of Georgia-Imereti Guberniya were reorganized under the name of Tbilisi Guberniya. According to the regulation dated 14 December 1846, the Tbilisi Guberniya consisted of Tbilisi, Telavi, Gori, Elizavetpol, Signakh, Nakhichevan, Yerevan, and Alexandropol uyezds. Later, Akhalkalaki was included in the Alexandropol uyezd, and the Ossetian and Tushino-Pshavo-Khevsurian okrugs⁹ were included in the Tbilisi Guberniya. In the charter, the city of Tbilisi was mentioned as the center of the guberniya. In addition, the governor of Georgia-Imereti was henceforth referred to as the Military Governor of Tbilisi. Throughout the 19th century, there were changes in the borders of the guberniya. In 1849, Yerevan, Nakhchivan, and Alexandropol uyezds were separated from the Tbilisi Guberniya and reorganized under the Yerevan Guberniya. The Tbilisi Guberniya was directly subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire. However, it also had administrative responsibilities to the Caucasus Regency. The Caucasus Regency, the most authoritative power in the Caucasus, was abolished because it was considered incompatible with the integrity of the centralized structure. In 1882, the Viceroyship of the Caucasus was established instead of the Regency. By the last quarter of the 19th century, the Tbilisi Guberniya consisted of nine uyezds and one okrug. These were the Tbilisi, Mtskheta, Borchaly, Akhalkalaki, Dusheti, Gori, Tionety, Telavi, and Signakh uyezds, and the Zakatal okrug.¹⁰

In 1844, with the establishment of the Caucasus Regency, Tbilisi became the center of the Russian Empire's administration of the Caucasus and remained so until the end of the empire's presence in the region. The Tbilisi Guberniya was important not only as an administrative center but also as a social, economic, and political center. As a center of trade, Tbilisi was important for its agricultural economy and as a place where goods were sold. It also had an important share in the guberniya's exports, with products such as wheat, barley, corn, flax oil, wool, leather, livestock, oil, chicken, fruit, cheese, workwear, rugs, timber, and wine. The guberniya was multiethnic and multicultural in terms of its ethnic and religious composition. According to the 1897 census, about 50 languages were spoken in Tbilisi. The cosmopolitan structure of the Tbilisi Guberniya was undoubtedly the result of the Russian Empire's population and territorial policy.¹¹

When historical processes are considered, it is observed that some factors were more prominent in the settlement of Armenians in Tbilisi. In addition to the

9 Okrug (Russian): Administrative Region, District.

10 Mustafa Tanrıverdi, *Çarlık Rusyası'nda Tiflis Vilayeti (1846-1914)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2019), 6-9.

11 Tanrıverdi, *Çarlık Rusyası'nda Tiflis Vilayeti*, 7-8.

vibrant trade life in Tbilisi, the fact that the Russian Empire began to have a say in the region where the city was located politically enabled the Armenian migration to this point. In addition, the administrative rivalry between Armenian leaders also triggered migration to Tbilisi. Armenians, who had a significant population in the Tbilisi Guberniya, did not only live in Russian Armenia. There were also significant Armenian populations in the major cities of the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian Empires. After the death of Karim Khan in 1779, the struggle between the Armenian rulers led to the migration of a large number of Armenians from Yerevan and Karabakh to Russia and Georgia. This conflict between the Armenian rulers influenced the choice of the city of Tbilisi as a center by the Armenians. In the early 19th century, the Russian Empire's crossing of the Caucasus Mountains caused a new migration movement. In this process, Armenian migration from Yerevan to Tbilisi took place. Migration to Tbilisi continued to increase until the first quarter of the 18th and 19th centuries. After a while, Armenians became the majority in the cities where they settled. However, most of the influential Armenian leaders, with the exception of the Tbilisi community, lived outside the Caucasus.¹²

In the early 18th century, one aspect of the economic strategy of the progressive movements that began with Tsar Peter I was to increase the empire's revenues in order to reach "warm waters" through the Caucasus region. Steps were taken in Transcaucasia to achieve this goal. In 1782, Georgian King Heraclius (Erekle) II sent a request for an alliance to Russian Empress Catherine II in order to get rid of the pressure of the Ottoman and Persian empires among other reasons. Georgia officially became a Russian protectorate on 24 July 1783.¹³

The Russian Empire carried out several activities in order to change the ethnic structure of the Caucasus. Between 1826 and 1828, the Russian Empire invited Armenians residing on the Iranian and Ottoman borders to its territory. Thereupon, Armenians who supported Russia during the Ottoman-Russian War migrated to Russian territory after the war.¹⁴ The Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople) signed in 1829 paved the way for another migration movement. As a result of this treaty, approximately 20,000 Armenians left Ardahan, Beyazıt, Kars, and Erzurum and migrated to Yerevan, Nakhichevan, and Tbilisi. Similarly, around 50,000 Turks, Kurds, and Iranians settled in the Ottoman Empire and Iran.¹⁵

12 George A. Bournoutian, *Ermeni Tarihi Ermeni Halkının Tarihine Kısa Bir Bakış*, 2. Baskı (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2016), 132-191.

13 Özgür Türker ve Abdolvahid Soofizadeh, "Gürcistan'ın Rus Himayesine Girmesi ve Sonuçları: Georgiyevsk Antlaşması'ndan Ağa Muhammed Han'ın Tiflis Seferi'ne", *History Studies*, Cilt 7, Sayı 3, Yıl: 2015, 149-163.

14 Selim Hilmi Özkan, "Osmanlı Devleti'nden Gürcistan'a Ermeni Göçü ve Tiflis'de Ermeni Faaliyetleri (1878-1915)", *Yeni Türkiye*, Sayı 62 (Eylül-Aralık 2014): 1801.

15 Bournoutian, *Ermeni Tarihi*, 193.

From this time on, Armenians began to dominate Tbilisi both demographically and class-wise. Richard G. Hovannisian, a professor of Armenian history, has pointed out that Tbilisi in the nineteenth century had become “an important center of Armenian intellectual and political life” that rivaled Istanbul.¹⁶ In addition, Mkrtchian shared the following data on the population of Armenians in Tbilisi during the Russian Empire:

“In 1817, the Armenian population constituted 75,6% of the total population in Tiflis [Tbilisi]. This figure decreased gradually: in the 1830s to 65%, 1850s to 54%, and in 1886, according to the official statistics, to 47,7%, and made up only 36,4% in 1899. Indeed, in the second half of the 19th century, the Armenians no longer had a majority in the city, merely a plurality.”¹⁷

Bournoutian states that an Armenian middle class had begun to emerge by the second half of the 19th century, and underlines that Armenian merchants gained power in Tbilisi, Elisavetpol, Baku, and other urban centers of Transcaucasia towards the end of this century.¹⁸ Ronald Grigor Suny notes that Georgian nobles did not like the Armenians. He explains the reasons for this situation as follows: “the [existence of] fundamental cultural differences between the emerging bourgeois civilization of urban Armenians and the traditional aristocratic values of the Georgian upper class, and the demographic, political and economic hegemony of Armenians over Tbilisi and most of the country.”¹⁹

The Armenian middle class was concentrated in the cities of Baku and Tbilisi, where Armenians had considerable influence. They were influential in trade, banking, crafts, and bureaucracy. In Tbilisi, even the mayor and some of the members of the municipal council were Armenian.²⁰ Suny emphasizes that “in the railroad workshops of Tbilisi, in the oil fields of Baku, and in the refineries of Batumi Port, Armenians constituted an important segment of the Caucasian working class”.²¹ Giving information about the 19th century “Armenian Bazaar”, the most important trade center in Tbilisi, Tanrıverdi states that Armenians who engaged in trade in Tbilisi formed an organization similar to the guild organization in the Ottoman Empire and called the head of each organization “foreman”.²²

16 Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Armenian People From Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997), 431.

17 Mkrtchian, *Contemporary Armenian Community in Tbilisi*, 300.

18 Bournoutian, *Ermeni Tarihi*, 229.

19 Ronald Grigor Suny, *Ararat'a Bakmak Modern Tarihte Ermenistan* (İstanbul: Aras, 2015), 70.

20 Bournoutian, *Ermeni Tarihi*, 230-231.

21 Suny, *Ararat'a Bakmak*, 42.

22 Mustafa Tanrıverdi, “Ermenilerin Tiflis'teki Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1878-1914)”, *19-20. Yüzyıllarda Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri-Kaynaşma-Kırgınlık-Ayrılık-Yeni Arayışlar*, Cilt:2 (İstanbul 2015), 1154.

Bournoutian emphasized that after Georgia came under Russian rule, Armenians opened a Russian school and Russian Orthodox seminaries in Tbilisi. Armenians also published the newspaper *Kavkaz* (*Кавказ*) in Russian.²³ Suny also noted the opening of the Armenian elementary school Nersesian Camaran in Tbilisi, which was part of a small network of schools in churches and homes, often taught by a single teacher. He also added that by the end of 1836, Caucasian Armenians had 824 churches and 21 parochial schools.²⁴

Tbilisi was also an important base for the Armenian revolutionary movement. Armenians in Russia also supported revolutionary groups established in Yerevan, Karabakh, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Tbilisi.²⁵ The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, also known as *Dashnaktsutyun* (Dashnak Party), founded in Tbilisi in 1890, was one of the most important of such revolutionary groups. Among the founders of this revolutionary organization were Kristapor Mikayelian, Simon Zavaryan, and Stepan Zoryan. The aim of Dashnaktsutyun was to create an independent Armenian state in eastern Anatolia.²⁶ Pointing out that Dashnaktsutyun was a separatist organization founded in Tbilisi in 1890, Tanrıverdi stated that the Russian Empire did not oppose it at first since its targets were Ottoman Armenians. However, when the aims of Dashnaktsutyun members began to cover the Caucasus, the Russian government changed its perspective towards them. In fact, since it considered Dashnaktsutyun's political activities in Tbilisi as a terrorist movement, it took every measure to stop them.²⁷ Using Tbilisi as a base for its separatist ambitions, Dashnaktsutyun engaged in propaganda against the Ottomans through the press organs in Tbilisi. During this period, many periodicals were published in Tbilisi, which was active in the field of media. One of them, the newspaper *Mshak*²⁸ (*Մշակ*), published news that encouraged Armenians to revolt. Likewise, the newspaper *Droshak*²⁹ (*Դրոշակ*) also urged the Armenian community to revolt.³⁰

23 Bournoutian, *Ermeni Tarihi*, 231-233.

24 Suny, *Ararat'a Bakmak*, 101.

25 Bournoutian, *Ermeni Tarihi*, 237.

26 Աշոտ Սարգսյան, Արարատ Հակոբյան, *Հայոց Պատմություն (Հնագույն Շրջանից Մինչև Մեր Օրերը)* (Երեվան: Ճարտարագետ, 2004), էջ 176-177.

27 Tanrıverdi, "Ermenilerin Tiflis'teki Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1878-1914)", 1153.

28 It was a literary and political newspaper published in Tbilisi between 1872 and 1920. The newspaper was published weekly in the first years and then became a daily. The founder and first editor of the newspaper was Grigor Artzruni. For further information, see: Գարեգին Լևոնյան, *Հայոց Պարբերական Մամուլը* (Երեվան: Հրատարակություն Մեյրնյան Ֆոնդի, 1934), էջ 19.

29 This newspaper, which was the publication of Dashnaktsutyun, was published in Geneva between 1891-1914 and in Paris between 1925-1934. In its early period, it was published every fifteen days, and later in monthly intervals. Kristapor Mikayelian was the founder of this periodical. R. Zoryan, S. Zavaryan, S. Vratsyan, and A. Camalyan were newspaper editors. For detailed information, see: Մ.Ա. Բարդիյան, *Հայ Պարբերական Մամուլը* (Երեվան: Հայկական ՍՍՀ ԳԱ Հրատարակչություն, 1986), էջ 47.

30 Özkan, "Osmanlı Devleti'nden Gürcistan'a Ermeni Göçü ve Tiflis'de Ermeni Faaliyetleri (1878-1915)", 1804.

Following the defeat of Tsarist Russia by Japan in 1905, a constitutional regime was proclaimed in the same year. With this revolution, the Tsar accepted liberal reforms and constitutional monarchy. During this period, the Tsarist government lost its authority in the Baltics, Poland, and the Caucasus. The 1905 Revolution created a climate of freedom that prevented the continuation of the Russification policy for a while. Political pressure on Jews and Armenians was lifted. This atmosphere of freedom lasted for about 2 years. In 1907, a new system was implemented in the elections and as a result, the representation of the people in the non-Russian regions and along the borders was reduced. Thus, in 1907, nationalist practices made a return. In this process, many rights of the communities living in non-Russian regions were taken away. The return to the policy of Russification was met with a reaction by non-Russian communities and led to the emergence of underground resistance groups. These resistance groups continued to grow stronger until the First World War and the October Revolution. With the end of the Tsarist regime, the Russification policy came to an end.³¹

The demographic structure of Armenians in Tbilisi presents the following picture: According to 1880 population data, a total of 86,455 people lived in Tbilisi. Among them, Armenians constituted a part with 38,513 people. 21,504 Armenians were male and 17,009 were female. Armenians made up 45% of the total population and compared to other ethnic groups, Armenians were the most populous group in the city. After the Armenians came the Georgians, Russians, and Turks.³²

The first general census in the Russian Empire was conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1897. About 135,000 people, including teachers, priests, and literate soldiers, took part in this census. The census recorded the names, surnames, gender, age, marital status, social status, place of birth, address of residence, religion, mother tongue, literacy, and occupation of the inhabitants of 89 provinces of the Empire.³³ According to the first census, a total of 1,051,032 people lived in the Tbilisi Guberniya. The number of Armenians belonging to the Apostolic Church was 210,161. Of these, 113,399 were men and 96,762 were women. The number of Catholics was 20,216. Of this population, 10,363 were male and 9,853 were female.³⁴ The data showing the beliefs adopted by the Armenians in Tbilisi is as follows: 81,778 Armenians

31 Selim Öztürk, "Çarlıkta Ruslaştırma Siyaseti ve Sovyet Sonrası Dönemde Ruslaştırmadan Geriye Dönüş Politikaları", *AVRASYA Uluslararası Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Cilt 7, Sayı:16 (2019): 1104.

32 Tanrıverdi, *Çarlık Rusyası'nda Tiflis Vilayeti*, 49.

33 George Bournoutian, "The Population of the South Caucasus according to the 1897 General Census of the Russian Empire", *Iran and Caucasus*, 21 (2017): 324-325.

34 "Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи 1897 г. Распределение населения по вероисповеданиям и регионам", *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*, accessed 22 March 2022, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_rel_97.php?reg=96.

of the Apostolic Church lived in urban areas. Of these, 45,466 were men and 36,312 were women. In addition, 1,833 Catholic Armenians lived in urban areas. Of these, 979 were men and 854 were women.³⁵ The number of native Armenian speakers in the Tbilisi Guberniya was 196,189. Of these, 105,035 were men and 91,154 were women.³⁶

In 1906, the rural population of the Tbilisi Guberniya was 826,889. The number of Armenians living in rural areas was 168,051. There were 89,818 men and 78,233 women in 18,578 households. The total population of Georgians was 368,058. As can be seen, Georgians outnumbered Armenians in rural areas. Georgians also constituted the majority of the population in the Tbilisi Uyezd. After the Georgians came the Armenians and Turks. According to the statistical data of 1906, a total of 15,769 Armenians lived outside the city of Tbilisi in 178 settlements of the Tbilisi Uyezd. 8,458 of them were men and 7,311 were women, residing in 2,074 households.³⁷

According to the 1917 census results, the distribution of Armenians living in rural areas of the Tbilisi Guberniya by region was as follows:

REGION	POPULATION	REGION	POPULATION
Akhalkalaki	68,592	Signakh	5,777
Ahiska	6,762	Telavi	3,717
Borchali	23,087	Tionety	144
Gori	11,668	Tiflis	17,584
Dusheti	2,608		
		Total	139,939

Table 1: Armenian Population in the Rural Areas of the Tbilisi Guberniya According to the Census Results of 1917³⁸

According to 1906 data, the number of Armenians living in rural areas of the Tbilisi Guberniya was 168,051. In the 1917 census, the Armenian population was recorded as 139,939. In other words, the Armenian population had decreased by 28,112 people in 11 years. The reason for the decrease in the Armenian population between 1906 and 1917 can be attributed to the

35 “Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи 1897 г. Распределение населения по вероисповеданиям и регионам”, *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*, accessed 22 March 2022, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_rel_97.php?reg=185.

36 “Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи 1897 г. Распределение населения по родному языку, губерниям и областям”, *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*, accessed 22 March 2022, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97.php?reg=104.

37 Tanrıverdi, *Çarlık Rusyası'nda Tiflis Vilayeti*, 49-67.

38 “Ethnic Composition, All Rural Places of Eastern Georgia: 1917 Census”, *Pop-Stat*, accessed 22 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic-loc1917-east.htm>.

Russification policy that was reintroduced in 1907. The Russification policy continued until 1917 when the Tsarist regime came to an end.

2. The Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi under the Soviet Union

Since the Soviet Union had a multinational structure, it emphasized federal units in its administrative structure. Consisting of 15 Union Republics, the Soviet Union was organized into three different categories. These were Autonomous Republics, Oblasts, and Okrugs³⁹. The capital of Soviet Georgia, one of the 15 Union Republics of the Soviet Union, was Tbilisi. Soviet Georgia included three autonomous regions. The Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia were ethnically based. However, the Autonomous Republic of Adjara was based on religion.⁴⁰

Stating that the status of the city of Tbilisi did not change until the Bolshevik Revolution, Mustafa Aydın states that the population of the city consisted of Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and Armenians. Tbilisi was the capital of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, which gained its independence on 22 April 1918. On 26 May, the Georgians, who left this formation, formed an independent Georgian State under the auspices of Germany and chose Tbilisi as the capital again. The city of Tbilisi was first captured by the British after the First World War and then by the Red Army in February 1921. Between 1922 and 1936, it was the capital of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. In 1936, after the dissolution of this union, Tbilisi became the capital of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, one of the independent members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and remained so until 1991, the year of the dissolution of the USSR.⁴¹

Here is an overview of the main events that influenced the change in the Armenian population in Tbilisi: After the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, the mutual territorial claims between Georgia and Armenia caused Armenians in Tbilisi to be seen as potential enemies. Therefore, Armenians started to lose their influence in the city. In addition, Dashnaktsutyun leaders in the city were arrested and Armenian property was confiscated. As a result, many Armenians migrated to Yerevan. Until the 1920s,

39 Eldar İkramoğlu Aslanov, "Ülke Ülke Yerel Yönetimler Azerbaycan'da Yerel Yönetimler", *Çağdaş Yerel Yönetimler Dergisi*, 7 (3): 115.

40 David Losaberidze vd., "Local Government in Georgia," *Developing New Rules in the Old Environment*, ed. Igor Munteanu, Victor Popa (Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, 2002), 308.

41 Aydın, "Tiflis", 152.

Armenians constituted the majority of the population in Tbilisi. However, after Georgia came under Soviet rule, the number of Armenians living in the city began to decline. It is possible to analyze the Armenians in Tbilisi during the Soviet period in two groups. The first group, called Old Armenians, were those who had settled in Tbilisi before 1915. The second group consisted of Armenians who migrated to the city after the 1915 Events.⁴²

According to Bournoutian, the number of Armenians residing in Soviet Armenia was smaller compared to those living in other Soviet countries. The majority of Armenians lived in Tbilisi, Baku and other Russian cities. However, it is claimed that later on there was a cultural indigenization in Georgia and Azerbaijan, and Armenian intellectuals, especially those living in Tbilisi and Baku, were directly affected by this situation and migrated to Yerevan.⁴³ In addition, Suny states that Yerevan welcomed Armenians who could not receive higher education or reach good positions in Azerbaijan and Georgia.⁴⁴

After joining the Soviet Union, Georgia experienced significant economic and cultural developments. Economically, the Zemo Avchala, Abasha, and Rioni hydroelectric power plants started operating in 1927, 1928, and 1934 respectively. In addition, many enterprises started production during this period. During the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937), Georgia became an industrial-agricultural republic. In the cultural sphere, there was a significant increase in the number of literate people in Georgia and 700,000 students were educated during the Second Five-Year Plan. In addition, 20,000 specialists were trained in 19 colleges. Theaters, clubs, libraries and reading rooms were opened in various parts of Georgia.⁴⁵ The economic and cultural developments in Soviet Georgia made the country a center of attraction among other Union Republics.

If we look at the demographic characteristics of Armenians in Tbilisi, according to the results of the 1922 census, the number of Armenians living in urban areas of Georgia was 135,448, while the number of Armenians living in Tbilisi was 85,309.⁴⁶ According to the 1923 census, 24,900 Armenians lived in the rural areas of Tbilisi. The Armenians lived in the settlements of Avchala, Asuretis, Aghbulaghis, Gomboris, Dighomis, Ertsoş, Zemo Tsalkis, Teletis,

42 Elli Ponomareva, "Native Tbilisians or Diaspora: Negotiating the Status of Armenians in Tbilisi", *Proceedings of the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography*, Vol.2, 122-123.

43 Bournoutian, *Ermeni Tarihi*, 266-268.

44 Suny, *Ararat'a Bakmak*, 298.

45 Fahrettin Çiloğlu, *Dilden Dine, Edebiyattan Sanata Gürcülerin Tarihi* (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1993), 66-67.

46 "Ethnic Composition, All Urban Places: 1922 Census", *Pop-Stat*, accessed 22 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic1922-cities.htm>.

An Examination on the Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi (1897-2014)

Kojoris, Manglisis, Martqopis, Mtskhētis, Priutis, Sagarejos, Sartichalis, Kvemo Tsalkis, and Qaraia.⁴⁷

According to 1923 data, the number of Armenian speakers in the rural areas of Tbilisi was 15,085. Their distribution by region was as follows:

REGION	NUMBER OF ARMENIAN SPEAKERS	REGION	NUMBER OF ARMENIAN SPEAKERS
Avchalis	38	Manglisis	161
Asuretis	733	Martqopis	4
Aghbulaghis	4,900	Sagarejos	37
Gomboris	6	Sartichalis	3
Dighomis	7	Kvemo Tsalkis	1,657
Zemo Tsalkis	7,380	Qaraia	50
Kojoris	109		

Table 2: The Number of Armenian Speakers in the Rural Areas of Tbilisi during the Soviet Union According to the 1923 Census Results⁴⁸

Data from 1923 shows that the place where the Armenian language was most widely spoken among the rural areas of Tbilisi was Zemo Tsalkis. It was followed by Aghbulaghis, Kvemo Tsalkis, Asuretis, Manglisis, and Kojoris. There were very few Armenian speakers in other regions. The main reason for the low number of Armenian speakers in rural areas was that the Armenian population in Tbilisi mostly lived in urban areas.

According to the results of the census conducted during the Soviet Union, we have the following data on the population of Armenians living in Soviet Georgia:

47 "Ethnic Composition, All Rural Places: 1923 Census", *Pop-Stat*, accessed 22 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic-loc1923.htm>.

48 "Linguistic Composition, All Rural Places: 1923 Census", *Pop-Stat*, accessed 23 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-lang-loc1923.htm>.

YEAR	TOTAL POPULATION OF SOVIET GEORGIA	TOTAL ARMENIAN POPULATION	RATIO OF ARMENIANS TO TOTAL POPULATION
1926	2,666,494	307,018	11.5
1939	3,540,023	415,013	11.7
1959	4,044,045	442,916	11.0
1970	4,686,358	452,309	9.7
1979	4,993,182	448,000	9.0
1989	5,400,841	437,211	8.1

Table 3: Armenian Population in Soviet Georgia and its Ratio to the Total Population (1926-1989)⁴⁹

It is understood from the data that the total population of Armenians in Soviet Georgia tended to increase between 1926 and 1970. When the table above is analyzed, it is seen that the total Armenian population was the highest in 1970. The Armenian population, which was 452,309 in 1970, decreased to 437,211 in the 1989 census. This can be attributed to the migration movements and the cultural localization of Soviet Georgia. Moreover, the proportion of Armenians to the total population was on a steady downward trend since the 1939 census. The main reason for this was the Second World War that started in 1939. This 6-year-long war had an impact on the decline in the total population.

The distribution of Armenians living in Soviet Georgia according to their settlements was as follows:

49 “Всесоюзная перепись населения 1926 года. Национальный состав населения по регионам республик СССР”, “Всесоюзная перепись населения 1939 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР”, “Всесоюзная перепись населения 1959 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР”, “Всесоюзная перепись населения 1970 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР”, “Всесоюзная перепись населения 1979 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР”, “Всесоюзная перепись населения 1989 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР”, *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*, accessed 26 March 2022,

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_26.php?reg=2330.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_39.php?reg=4.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_59.php?reg=8.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_70.php?reg=6.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_79.php?reg=6.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=6.

YEAR	URBAN POPULATION	RURAL POPULATION	TOTAL POPULATION
1926	149,545	157,473	307,018
1939	196,784	218,229	415,013
1959	242,399	200,517	442,916
1970	255,115	197,194	452,309
1979	260,658	187,342	448,000
1989	260,516	176,695	437,211

*Table 4: Distribution of Armenians in Soviet Georgia by Residential Areas (1926-1989)*⁵⁰

In contrast, the urban Armenian population in Soviet Georgia increased year by year. From 149,545 in 1926, the urban Armenian population increased to 260,516 in 1989. However, the number of Armenians living in rural areas declined after the 1939 census. From 218,229 in the 1939 census, the Armenian rural population dropped to 176,695 in 1989, the last census of the Soviet Union. One of the important reasons that triggered the increase in the urban population and the decrease in the rural population was internal migration from rural to urban areas.

The gender composition of Armenians living in Soviet Georgia was as follows:

50 “Всероссийская перепись населения 1926 года. Национальный состав населения по регионам республик СССР”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1939 г. Распределение городского и сельского населения СССР и союзных республик по национальности и полу”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1939 г. Распределение городского и сельского населения СССР и союзных республик по национальности и полу”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1959 года. Городское и сельское население республик СССР по полу и национальности”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1970 года. Городское и сельское население республик СССР по полу и национальности”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1979 года. Городское и сельское население республик СССР по полу и национальности”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1989 года. Распределение городского и сельского населения республик СССР по полу и национальности”, *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*, accessed 27 March 2022,

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_26.php?reg=2330.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_39_gs.php?reg=5&gor=1&Submit=Tamam.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_39_gs.php?reg=5&gor=2&Submit=Tamam.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_59.php?reg=6.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_70.php?reg=6.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_79.php?reg=6.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_89.php?reg=6.

YEAR	MALE POPULATION	FEMALE POPULATION	TOTAL POPULATION
1926	155,628	151,390	307,018
1939	208,617	206,396	415,013
1959	212,824	230,092	442,916
1970	217,874	234,435	452,309
1979	214,630	233,370	448,000
1989	211,245	225,966	437,211

Table 5: Distribution of Armenians by Gender in Soviet Georgia (1926-1989)⁵¹

According to the data in the table presented above, it is seen that the Armenian population in both male and female genders tended to increase in the period between 1926 and 1970. However, while the male population outnumbered the female population in 1926, by 1959, the female population had surpassed the male population. The main reason for this was the Second World War between 1939 and 1945. During the war period, the male population decreased significantly as men went to the front, where many of them lost their lives. In addition, the political and socioeconomic problems in the country in the post-war period led to a decline in both male and female population after 1970.

The Armenian population in the Tbilisi Region in particular was as follows: According to the 1926 census, a total of 128,745 Armenians resided in the Tbilisi Region. Of the Armenians in the Tbilisi Region, 100,148 lived in the city of Tbilisi.⁵² While the number of Armenian speakers in the Tbilisi Region was 98,301, 81,477 of this number were living in the city of Tbilisi.⁵³

51 “Всероссийская перепись населения 1926 года. Национальный состав населения по регионам республик СССР”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1939 г. Распределение городского и сельского населения СССР и союзных республик по национальности и полу”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1959 года. Городское и сельское население республик СССР по полу и национальности”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1970 года. Городское и сельское население республик СССР по полу и национальности”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1979 года. Городское и сельское население республик СССР по полу и национальности”, “Всероссийская перепись населения 1989 года. Распределение городского и сельского населения республик СССР по полу и национальности”, *ДЕМОСКОПИ Weekly*, accessed 28 March 2022,

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_26.php?reg=2330.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_39_gs.php?reg=5&gor=3&Submit=Tamam.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_59.php?reg=6.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_70.php?reg=6.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_79.php?reg=6.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_89.php?reg=6.

52 “Ethnic Composition, All Communes: 1926 Census”, *Pop-Stat*, accessed 23 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic1926.htm>.

53 Linguistic composition, all communes: 1926 census”, *Pop-Stat*, accessed 23 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-lang1926.htm>.

An Examination on the Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi (1897-2014)

The table below shows the gender composition of Armenians living in Tbilisi according to the censuses conducted during the Soviet Union:

YEAR	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
1939 ⁵⁴	67,090	70,241	137,331
1959 ⁵⁵	69,764	79,494	149,258
1970 ⁵⁶	70,545	79,663	150,208
1979 ⁵⁷	71,527	81,373	152,900
1989 ⁵⁸	70,989	79,149	150,138

Table 6: Gender Composition of Armenians in Tbilisi According to the Census Results of the Soviet Union Period (1939-1989)

The table showing the gender composition of Armenians in Tbilisi shows that there were more women than men. The Second World War may be pointed as reason for the higher proportion of women. During this war, many people lost their lives fighting in the ranks of the Red Army. However, the population of both men and women continued to increase until the 1979 census. In 1989, the male population was 70,989 and the female population was 79,149. The total population increased continuously until 1979. At its peak in 1979, the total number of Armenians in Tbilisi was 152,900.

3. The Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi in the Post-Soviet Period

Georgia, which gained its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has faced a number of political and socioeconomic problems. The first of these problems is the failure in the process of state and nation building. The second is the problems experienced in the process of democracy implementation. The third problem is the issue of social integration between Armenians and

54 “Всероссийская перепись населения 1939 г. Распределение городского и сельского населения областей союзных республик по национальности и полу”, *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*, accessed 24 March 2022, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rer_nac_39_gs.php?reg=26&gor=3&Submit=Tamam.

55 Всесоюзная перепись населения 1959 года. Городское и сельское население областей республик СССР (кроме РСФСР) по полу и национальности”, *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*, accessed 24 March 2022, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/resp_nac_59.php?reg=61.

56 “Всероссийская перепись населения 1970 года. Городское и сельское население областей республик СССР (кроме РСФСР) по полу и национальности”, *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*, accessed 24 March 2022, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/resp_nac_70.php?reg=66.

57 “Всероссийская перепись населения 1979 года. Городское и сельское население областей республик СССР (кроме РСФСР) по полу и национальности”, *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*, accessed 24 March 2022, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/resp_nac_79.php?reg=69.

58 “Всероссийская перепись населения 1989 года. Распределение городского и сельского населения областей республик СССР по полу и национальности”, *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*, accessed 24 March 2022, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/resp_nac_89.php?reg=63.

Georgians. Armenians, especially those living in the Javakheti region of Georgia, are far from integrating with Georgian society and rely on the support of foreign powers to feel safe. They oppose the Georgian government's efforts to integrate Armenians and insist on not learning Georgian. They also perceive the government's efforts as cultural assimilation.⁵⁹

Elli Ponomareva points out that in the post-Soviet period, Armenians in Tbilisi have found themselves in a rapidly nationalizing state and witnessed the status of Armenians in the newly established state becoming a matter of debate. She also emphasizes that since 1988, minorities in Georgia have been defined as "guests in our [Georgian] land".⁶⁰ However, political scientist Timothy K. Blauvelt, in his article titled "Armenians in the Making of Modern Georgia" in the book *Armenians in Post-Socialist Europe*, states that Armenians are envisioning their future in Georgia with fear after having experienced the aggressive nationalism under Zviad Gamsakhurdia and socioeconomic problems under Eduard Shevardnadze. The same source also reports that many Armenians living in Tbilisi migrated to the West, Russia, and Armenia in the early 1990s due to political and socio-economic problems and claims that some of those who remained in the city have changed their surnames to resemble Georgians. Blauvelt emphasizes that Armenians who have continued to live in Tbilisi after the Rose Revolution (2003) are in fear of assimilation. The reason given by the political scientist is that Armenians have lost the privileges for the use of their mother tongue. They also face obstacles such as the problem of church ownership and lack of representation in the Georgian parliament.⁶¹

The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about significant changes in the lives of Armenians living in Tbilisi. As a legacy of the Soviet Union, many of the Armenians in Tbilisi were fluent in Russian, which enabled them to hold important positions. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, after which the Russian language lost its importance, the lack of Georgian began to be felt in the Armenian community and this led to the Armenians in Tbilisi losing their status.⁶²

In the post-Soviet period, two censuses have been conducted throughout Georgia. The first of these was conducted in 2002. According to this census, the total population of the country was 4,371,535.⁶³ Of this population, 248,929

59 Timuçin Kodaman ve Adem Ali İren, "Gürcistan Ulus İnşa Çabalarının Önünde Bir Engel: Cavaheti Ermenileri", *Uluslararası Alanya İşletme Fakültesi Dergisi*, C:5, S:2, Yıl:2013, 74.

60 Ponomareva, "Native Tbilisians or Diaspora", 124.

61 Timothy K. Blauvelt, Christofer Berglund, "Armenians in the Making of Modern Georgia," *Armenians in Post-Socialist Europe*, ed. Konrad Siekierski, Stefan Troebst (Köln: Böhlau Verlag Köln Weimar Wien, 2016), 76-83.

62 Ponomareva, "Native Tbilisians or Diaspora", 125-126.

63 "All Places: 2002 Census", *Pop-Stat*, accessed 25 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-census2002.htm>.

An Examination on the Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi (1897-2014)

were Armenians.⁶⁴ Of these, 171,139 were representatives of the Apostolic Church.⁶⁵ We do not have any information about the religious beliefs of the remaining 77,790 people. The existence of data on the population of Catholic Armenians during the period of Tsarist Russia is an indication that they had a significant proportion of the population at that time. The fact that the Catholic Armenian population in Georgia was unknown by the 2000s can be considered as an indication that there were no Catholic Armenians of significant numbers left in Tbilisi by that time.

The picture that the above table presents when we look at the Tbilisi Region in particular is as follows: According to the 2002 census, the number of Armenians of the Apostolic Church living in the Tbilisi Region was 51,687.⁶⁶ In total, 82,586 Armenians lived in this region. Their distribution according to rayons⁶⁷ was as follows:

RAYON	POPULATION	RAYON	POPULATION
Gldani-Nadzaladevi	13,706	Mtatsminda- Krtsanisi	8,259
Didube- Chugureti	8,644	Vake-Saburtalo, Tsqneti	5,219
Isani-Samgori	46,757	Rural Area	1

Table 7: Armenian Population in the Rayons of the Tbilisi Region According to the 2002 Census Results⁶⁸

The rayons with the largest number of Armenians in the Tbilisi Region were Isani-Samgori, Gldani-Nadzaladevi, Didube-Chugureti, Mtatsminda- Krtsanisi and Vake-Saburtalo, Tsqneti.

The second general census in Georgia took place in 2014. According to this census, 3,713,804 people live in Georgia. 2,122,623 of them live in urban areas and 1,591,181 in rural areas.⁶⁹ According to 2014 data, the total population of Armenians, the third largest ethnic group in Georgia, is 168,102.⁷⁰ Of these,

64 “Ethnic Composition: 2002 Census”, *Pop-Stat*, accessed 25 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic2002.htm>.

65 “Religious Composition: 2002 Census”, *Pop-Stat*, accessed 25 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-religion2002.htm>.

66 “Religious Composition: 2002 Census”, *Pop-Stat*, accessed 25 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-religion2002.htm>.

67 Rayon (Russian): Region, a term used to define territorial units in the Soviet Union. See: Shafiyev, *The Russian-Soviet Resettlement Policies...*, x.

68 “Ethnic Composition: 2002 Census”, *Pop-Stat*, accessed 25 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic2002.htm>.

69 “2014 General Population Census Main Results”, *National Statistics Office of Georgia*, accessed 25 June 2022, http://census.ge/files/results/Census_release_ENG.pdf.

70 Ralph Hakkert, *Population Dynamics in Georgia - An Overview Based on the 2014 General Population Census Data* (Tbilisi: National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2017), 47.

86,538 live in urban and 81,564 in rural areas.⁷¹ Compared to the 2002 census, the Armenian population in Georgia has decreased by 80,827 people. The reasons for this decrease include the inability of Armenians in Javakheti Region to integrate into Georgian society, socioeconomic problems during Shevardnadze’s years in power, migration of Armenians to other countries, fear of assimilation, and loss of status of the Armenians.

In the 2014 general census, population data based on the age range indicate the following information: The number of Armenians between the ages of 15-24 is 12,500, while the number of Armenians between the ages of 15-29 is 20,600.⁷² 15.7% of the Armenians in Georgia are included in the elderly population group.⁷³

According to the data of the same year, the number of Armenians in the Tbilisi Region is 53,409. 53,183 of them reside in urban areas and 226 in rural areas.⁷⁴ Compared to 2002 data, the Armenian population has decreased in all rayons. For example, in the 2002 census, a total of 13,706 Armenians lived in the Gldani and Nadzaladevi rayons. When we examine the 2014 statistics of the same rayons, we see that the Armenian population has decreased to 8,124. The Armenian population in these rayons has thus decreased by 5,582 people. According to the 2014 census, the distribution of Armenians living in other rayons of the Tbilisi Region is as follows:

RAYON	POPULATION	RAYON	POPULATION
Gldani Rayon	4,934	Mtatsminda Rayon	1,396
Didube Rayon	1,385	Nadzaladevi Rayon	3,190
Vake Rayon	1,070	Saburtalo Rayon	1,359
Isani Rayon	19,378	Samgori Rayon	13,764
Krtsanisi Rayon	3,313	Chugureti Rayon	3,620

Table 8: Armenian Population in the Rayons of the Tbilisi Region According to the 2014 Census Results⁷⁵

71 “Ethnic Composition: 2014 Census”, *Pop-Stat*, accessed 25 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic2014.htm>.

72 Frank Eelens, *Young People in Georgia - An Overview Based on the 2014 General Population Census Data* (Tbilisi: National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2017), 17.

73 Bart de Bruijn and Maka Chitanava, *Ageing and Older Persons in Georgia - An Overview Based on the 2014 General Population Census Data* (Tbilisi: National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2017), 22.

74 “Ethnic Composition: 2014 Census”, *Pop-Stat*, accessed 25 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic2014.htm>

75 “Ethnic Composition, All Places: 2014 Census”, *Pop-Stat*, accessed 25 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic-loc2014.htm>.

Data from 2014 shows that the rayon with the highest number of Armenians in Tbilisi Region is Isani. This rayon is followed by Samgori, Gldani, Chugureti, Krtsanisi, Nadzaladevi, Mtatsminda, Didube, Saburtalo, and Vake. Compared to the 2002 census, the ranking of the rayons with the highest number of Armenians remains unchanged.

From a religious point of view, Georgia is known as a Christian-majority country. Approximately 83% of Georgia's population is Orthodox, 11% is Muslim, and 3% are Armenians belonging to the Apostolic Church.⁷⁶ The number of Armenians belonging to the Apostolic Church in Georgia is 109,041. Of these Armenians, 47,423 live in urban areas and 61,618 in rural areas.⁷⁷ Compared to the 2002 census, there is a decrease of 62,098 Armenians belonging to the Apostolic Church in Georgia. The total number of Armenians belonging to the Apostolic Church in the Tbilisi Region is 29,368. Of these, 29,320 live in urban areas and 48 in rural areas.⁷⁸

When the marital status of the ethnic groups in Georgia is analyzed, it is seen that Georgians and Turks are more homogeneous than Armenians. While 97.5% of Georgians and 97.6% of Turks prefer to marry Georgians and Turks respectively, the situation is slightly different for Armenians. Only 79.5% of Armenian marriages are homogeneous. In urban areas 66.1% and in rural areas 93% of the marriages are homogeneous. The fact that there are fewer homogeneous marriages among Armenians compared to other ethnic groups can be interpreted as one of the factors that trigger the assimilation process of Armenians in Tbilisi.⁷⁹

The linguistic skills of Armenians living in Georgia were also within the scope of our study. The data we obtained in this context are as follows: In Georgia, knowing Georgian is a prerequisite for pursuing higher education and having a career. In urban areas, 78.9% of Armenian men and 76.9% of women speak Georgian. In rural areas, 24% of men and 20.5% of women speak Georgian. In total, 46.4% of Armenian women and 47.4% of men can speak Georgian.⁸⁰ It is evident from these numbers that, among the Armenians living in rural areas of Georgia, the rate of Georgian speakers is much lower than in urban areas. The main reason for this may be the limited educational opportunities in rural areas compared to urban areas.

76 Eelens, *Young People in Georgia*, 17.

77 "Religious Composition: 2014 Census", *Pop-Stat*, accessed 25 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-religion2014a.htm>.

78 "Religious Composition: 2014 Census", *Pop-Stat*, accessed 25 March 2022, <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-religion2014a.htm>.

79 Ralph Hakkert and Nana Sumbadze, *Gender Analysis of the 2014 General Population Census Data* (Tbilisi: National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2017), x-18.

80 Hakkert, *Gender Analysis*, xi-42.

Conclusion

Based on the works analyzed in this study, the following information can be provided about the historical background of the Armenians in Tbilisi and the events that led to their population mobility: The historical background of Armenians living in Georgia dates back to the late 6th and early 7th centuries. The fall of the Bagratuni Dynasty and the Byzantine takeover of the city of Ani accelerated the migration of Armenians to Tbilisi. By the 12th century, the number of Armenians in Georgia had reached a significant proportion and they had even formed their own diocese centered in Tbilisi. Between the 14th and 18th centuries, the migration of Armenians to Georgia continued, and by the end of the 18th century, the number of Armenians in the city of Tbilisi, which had a population of 20,000, had reached 12,000. The death of Karim Khan in 1779 led to a struggle among the Armenian rulers. As a result, many Armenians living in Yerevan and Karabakh migrated to Russia and Georgia. According to 19th century data, Armenians had begun to be recognized as the natives of the city. In the early 19th century, the Russian Empire's crossing of the Caucasus Mountains caused a new wave of migration. Between 1826 and 1828, the Russian Empire invited Armenians from Iran and the Ottoman Empire to its territory to intervene in the ethnic composition of the Caucasus. Thereupon, Armenians who supported Russia during the Ottoman-Russian War settled in Russia after the war. Moreover, 20,000 Armenians migrated to Yerevan, Nakhchivan, and Tbilisi in accordance with the Treaty of Edirne signed in 1829. In the 19th century, Tbilisi became an important center of intellectual and political life for Armenians. However, as of the second half of the 19th century, Armenians began to lose their population dominance in the city.

Tbilisi was an important center for the Armenian revolutionary committee members operating against the Ottomans. Especially Dashnaksutyun, which was founded in 1890, was one of the most prominent of such committees. After the Bolshevik Revolution, problems emerged between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and Armenia due to mutual territorial claim, which led to the Armenians in Tbilisi being perceived as a threat. Over time, the Armenians in the city began to lose their influence. In addition, Dashnaksutyun members in the city were arrested and Armenians' properties were confiscated. As a result, Armenians began to migrate to Yerevan. Until the 1920s, Armenians had a significant population in Tbilisi. However, the establishment of Soviet rule in Georgia led to a decline in the number of Armenians living in Tbilisi. During this period, Armenians were divided into two groups: those who migrated to the city before and after 1915. Over time, Georgia's cultural indigenization directly affected Armenians and led them to leave the city. The Second World War also contributed to the decline of the Armenian population in Tbilisi. Apart from the events that contributed to the population decline, the economic and cultural progress in Soviet Georgia led to migration from other

regions to Georgia. In the post-Soviet period, the ultra-nationalist policy implemented by the Georgian government, socioeconomic problems, fear of assimilation, and loss of status caused most of the Armenians in Tbilisi to migrate to the West, Russia, and Armenia. Meanwhile, some of those who preferred to stay in the city changed their surnames, which began a process of assimilation.

Within the scope of this study, the first population data related to the Tsarist Russian Period belongs to 1880. According to this data, the number of Armenians living in Tbilisi was 38,513. According to the 1897 census, there were 210,161 Armenians belonging to the Apostolic Church in the Tbilisi Guberniya. When the 1897 census is compared to the 1880 census, it is seen that the Armenian population increased approximately 6 times. However, it is not correct to interpret this increase as an explosion in the Armenian population, because the main reason for the increase stemmed from administrative structure. While the 1880 data refers to the “city of Tbilisi”, the 1897 census refers to the “Tbilisi Guberniya”. To summarize, the Guberniya was a much larger administrative unit than the city. Therefore, it was normal that the Armenian population in the Guberniya was much larger. Some questions arise when the number of native Armenian speakers in the Tbilisi Guberniya is compared to the total Armenian population. According to the 1897 census, the total number of native Armenian speakers in the Tbilisi Guberniya was 196,189. According to the same census, the number of Armenians belonging to the Apostolic Church was 210,161. When the Catholic Armenian population of 20,216 is added to this number, the total number of Armenians is 230,377. However, when the total number of Armenians whose mother tongue is Armenian is considered as 196,189, it can be concluded that 34,188 Armenians did not speak Armenian as their mother tongue. This shows that Armenian was not the mother tongue of all Armenians living in the Tbilisi Guberniya. Between 1906 and 1917, there was a decrease in the population of Armenians living in rural areas. In 1906, 168,051 Armenians lived in the rural areas of Tbilisi Guberniya. According to 1917 data, the population of Armenians living in rural areas of the Guberniya decreased to 139,939. The main reason for the decrease of 28,112 people in 11 years was the Russification policy pursued by Tsarist Russia.

One of the most detailed population data on Armenians in Tbilisi during the Soviet Union is the 1926 census. According to this census, 128,745 Armenians lived in the Tbilisi Region. 100,148 of this population resided in the city of Tbilisi. The number of Armenian speakers in the Tbilisi Region was 98,301. In other words, the number of those who were Armenian but did not speak Armenian was 30,444. The main reason for this situation was the language policy implemented during the Soviet Union. In line with this language policy, every nation living under the Soviet Union was expected to speak Russian.

According to the censuses conducted during the Soviet Union, the Armenian population in Tbilisi showed an increasing trend until 1979. In parallel to this, both male and female population increased continuously until 1979. The 1979 census was a turning point for Armenians in Tbilisi and their population started to decline after this date.

In the post-Soviet period, population censuses were conducted in Georgia in 2002 and 2014. According to the 2002 census, a total of 82,586 Armenians lived in the Tbilisi Region. Among them, the number of those belonging to the Apostolic Church was 51,687. Meanwhile, according to the 2014 census, 53,409 Armenians reside in the Tbilisi Region. Of these, 29,368 belong to the Apostolic Church. When the two censuses are compared, it is seen that the total Armenian population in the Tbilisi Region has decreased by 29,177 people in 12 years. Similarly, the number of Armenians belonging to the Apostolic Church has decreased by 22,319. The main reasons for this decrease can be attributed to the political and socioeconomic problems in the country.

The small number of Georgian-speaking academics in Türkiye causes the studies on Georgia and especially on Tbilisi to be limited. At the same time, the fact that Georgians had been under the rule of Russia for many years was influential in the writing of many sources in Russian. Especially the publication of the census results of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union in Russian attracts the attention of scholars who would like to focus on this subject. As a disadvantage-advantage situation again, the fact that some of the statistical sources by the National Statistics Office of Georgia being published in Georgian creates a problem in analyzing those sources, but this problem can be solved by referring to Russian and English sources.

This study represents an intense effort to identify the units of the administrative structure of Tbilisi during Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and independent Georgia. It briefly gives the equivalents of these administrative units in Türkiye in the footnotes section to avoid creating confusion for the readers. As mentioned above, this article has mainly utilized Russian and English sources. Having examined the demographic structure of Armenians in Tbilisi across different periods, it constitutes one of the links to our academic studies on the demographic characteristics of Armenians residing in different countries of the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Census Results of Tsarist Russia

“Ethnic Composition, All Rural Places of Eastern Georgia: 1917 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 22 March 2022.

<http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic-loc1917-east.htm>.

“Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи 1897 г. Распределение населения по вероисповеданиям и регионам.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 22 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_rel_97.php?reg=96.

“Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи 1897 г. Распределение населения по вероисповеданиям и регионам.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 22 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_rel_97.php?reg=185.

“Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи 1897 г. Распределение населения по родному языку, губерниям и областям.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 22 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97.php?reg=104.

Census Results of the Soviet Union

“Ethnic Composition, All Communes: 1926 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 23 March 2022. <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic1926.htm>.

“Ethnic Composition, All Rural Places: 1923 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 22 March 2022. <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic-loc1923.htm>.

“Ethnic Composition, All Urban Places: 1922 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 22 March 2022. <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic1922-cities.htm>.

“Linguistic composition, all communes: 1926 census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 23 March 2022. <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-lang1926.htm>.

“Linguistic Composition, All Rural Places: 1923 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 23 March 2022. <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-lang-loc1923.htm>.

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1926 года. Национальный состав населения по регионам республик СССР.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 26 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_26.php?reg=2330 .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1939 г. Распределение городского и сельского населения СССР и союзных республик по национальности и полу.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 27 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_39_gs.php?reg=5&gor=1&Submit=Tamam .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1939 г. Распределение городского и сельского населения СССР и союзных республик по национальности и полу.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 27 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_39_gs.php?reg=5&gor=2&Submit=Tamam .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1939 г. Распределение городского и сельского населения СССР и союзных республик по национальности и полу.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 28 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_39_gs.php?reg=5&gor=3&Submit=Tamam.

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1939 г. Распределение городского и сельского населения областей союзных республик по национальности и полу.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 24 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rer_nac_39_gs.php?reg=26&gor=3&Submit=Tamam.

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1939 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 26 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_39.php?reg=4 .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1959 года. Городское и сельское население республик СССР по полу и национальности.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 27 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_59.php?reg=6 .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1959 года. Городское и сельское население областей республик СССР (кроме РСФСР) по полу и национальности.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 24 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/resp_nac_59.php?reg=61.

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1959 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 26 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_59.php?reg=8 .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1970 года. Городское и сельское население республик СССР по полу и национальности.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 27 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_70.php?reg=6 .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1970 года. Городское и сельское население областей республик СССР (кроме РСФСР) по полу и национальности.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 24 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/resp_nac_70.php?reg=66.

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1970 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 26 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_70.php?reg=6 .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1979 года. Городское и сельское население республик СССР по полу и национальности.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 27 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_79.php?reg=6 .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1979 года. Городское и сельское население областей республик СССР (кроме РСФСР) по полу и национальности.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 24 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/resp_nac_79.php?reg=69.

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1979 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 26 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_79.php?reg=6 .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1989 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 26 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=6 .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1989 года. Распределение городского и сельского населения республик СССР по полу и национальности.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 27 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_89.php?reg=6 .

“Всесоюзная перепись населения 1989 года. Распределение городского и сельского населения областей республик СССР по полу и национальности.” *ДЕМОСКОП Weekly*. Accessed 24 March 2022.

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/resp_nac_89.php?reg=63.

Data from National Statistics Office of Georgia

“2014 General Population Census Main Results.” *National Statistics Office of Georgia*. Accessed 25 June 2022.

http://census.ge/files/results/Census_release_ENG.pdf.

“All Places: 2002 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 25 March 2022.

<http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-census2002.htm>.

“Ethnic Composition, All Places: 2014 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 25 March 2022.

<http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic-loc2014.htm>.

“Ethnic Composition: 2002 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 25 March 2022.

<http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic2002.htm>.

“Ethnic Composition: 2014 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 25 March 2022.

<http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-ethnic2014.htm>.

“Religious Composition: 2002 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 25 March 2022.

<http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-religion2002.htm>.

“Religious Composition: 2014 Census.” *Pop-Stat*. Accessed 25 March 2022.

<http://pop-stat.mashke.org/georgia-religion2014a.htm>.

de Brujin, Bart and Maka Chitanava. *Ageing and Older Persons in Georgia - An Overview Based on the 2014 General Population Census Data*. Tbilisi: National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2017.

Eelens, Frank. *Young People in Georgia - An Overview Based on the 2014 General Population Census Data*. Tbilisi: National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2017.

Hakkert, Ralph, Sumbadze, Nana. *Gender Analysis of the 2014 General Population Census Data*. Tbilisi: National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2017.

Hakkert, Ralph. *Population Dynamics in Georgia - An Overview Based on the 2014 General Population Census Data*. Tbilisi: National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2017.

Books

Blauvelt, Timothy K. and Christofer Berglund. “Armenians in the Making of Modern Georgia.” *Armenians in Post-Socialist Europe*, ed. Konrad

An Examination on the Demographic Structure of Armenians in Tbilisi (1897-2014)

- Siekierski, Stefan Troebst, 76-83. Köln: Böhlau Verlag Köln Weimar Wien, 2016.
- Bournoutian, George A. *Ermeni Tarihi Ermeni Halkının Tarihine Kısa Bir Bakış*. 2.Baskı. İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2016.
- Çiloğlu, Fahrettin. *Dilden Dine, Edebiyattan Sanata Gürcülerin Tarihi*. İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1993.
- Danış, Didem. *Nüfus ve Toplum*. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Açık ve Uzaktan Eğitim Fakültesi, 2020.
- de Tournefort, Joseph. *Tournefort Seyahatnamesi*. ed. Stefanos Yerasimos. 4. Baskı. İstanbul: Kitapyayınevi, 2013.
- Hovannisian, Richard G. *The Armenian People From Ancient To Modern Times, Volume II*. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997.
- Losaberidze, David, vd. "Local Government in Georgia," *Developing New Rules in the Old Environment*. ed. Igor Munteanu, Victor Popa. Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, 2002.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor. *Ararat'a Bakmak Modern Tarihte Ermenistan*. İstanbul: Aras, 2015.
- Tanrıverdi, Mustafa. *Çarlık Rusyası'nda Tiflis Vilayeti (1846-1914)*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2019.
- Բարլոյան, Մ.Ա. *Հայ Պարբերական Մամուլը*. Երեվան: Հայկական ՄՍՀ ԳԱ Հրատարակչություն, 1986.
- Լեվոնյան, Գարեգին. *Հայոց Պարբերական Մամուլը*. Երեվան: Հրատարակչություն Մելքոնյան Ֆոնդի, 1934.
- Սարգսյան, Աշոտ, Արարատ Հակոբյան. *Հայոց Պատմություն (Հնագույն Շրջանից Մինչև Մեր Օրերը)*. Երեվան: Ճարտարագետ, 2004.

Articles

- Aslanov, Eldar İkramoğlu. "Ülke Ülke Yerel Yönetimler Azerbaycan'da Yerel Yönetimler." *Çağdaş Yerel Yönetimler Dergisi*, 7 (3): 115.

Aydın, Mustafa. "Tiflis." *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 41. Cilt, İstanbul 2012, 150-152.

Bournoutian, George. "The Population of the South Caucasus according to the 1897 General Census of the Russian Empire." *Iran and Caucasus*, 21 (2017): 324-325.

Kodaman, Timuçin, Adem Ali İren. "Gürcistan Ulus İnşa Çabalarının Önünde Bir Engel: Cavaheti Ermenileri." *Uluslararası Alanya İşletme Fakültesi Dergisi*, C:5, S:2, Yıl:2013, 74.

Komakhia, Mamuka. "Georgia's Ethnic History and the Present Migration Processes." *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 1 (49), 2008: 160.

Mkrtchian, Satenik. "Contemporary Armenian Community in Tbilisi." *Iran & the Caucasus*, Vol.13, No.2 (2009): 299-300.

Özkan, Selim Hilmi. "Osmanlı Devleti'nden Gürcistan'a Ermeni Göçü ve Tiflis'de Ermeni Faaliyetleri (1878-1915)." *Yeni Türkiye*, Sayı 62 (Eylül-Aralık 2014): 1801.

Öztürk, Selim. "Çarlıkta Ruslaştırma Siyaseti ve Sovyet Sonrası Dönemde Ruslaştırmadan Geriye Dönüş Politikaları." *AVRASYA Uluslararası Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Cilt 7, Sayı:16 (2019): 1104.

Ponomareva, Elli. "Native Tbilisians or Diaspora: Negotiating The Status of Armenians in Tbilisi." *Proceedings of the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography*, Vol.2, 122-123.

Tanrıverdi, Mustafa. "Ermenilerin Tiflis'teki Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1878-1914)." *19-20. Yüzyıllarda Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri-Kaynaşma-Kırgınlık-Ayrılık-Yeni Arayışlar*, Cilt:2, (İstanbul 2015): 1154.

Türker, Özgür. Soofizadeh, Abdolvahid. "Gürcistan'ın Rus Himayesine Girmesi ve Sonuçları: Georgiyevsk Antlaşması'ndan Ağa Muhammed Han'ın Tiflis Seferi'ne." *History Studies*, Cilt 7, Sayı 3 (2015): 149-163.

Theses

Shafiyev, Farid. *The Russian-Soviet Resettlement Policies and Their Implications for Ethno-Territorial Conflicts in the South Caucasus*. Carleton University: Ottawa, Unpublished Thesis, 2015.

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

To cite this article: Fuat Ozan Birkan, "A Historical Overview of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany", *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 47 (2023): 95-117.

Received: 19.04.2023

Accepted: 13.06.2023

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA IN GERMANY

(ALMANYA'DAKİ ERMENİ DİASPORASININ
TARİHSEL BİR GENEL DEĞERLENDİRMESİ)

Fuat Ozan BİRKAN*

Abstract: *The Armenians, one of the first nations that come to mind when the term "diaspora" is mentioned, have made this situation a part of their political, social, and cultural identities. On the other hand, Germany is one of the countries with the highest number of immigrants in the world. In this context, the intersection of Armenians and Germany constitutes an interesting experience in the field of migration and diaspora studies. Although it has remained in the background in comparison to the examples where the Armenian Diaspora is highly influential, Germany is one of the prominent countries in which this community has started to grow and become visible. The presence of Turks in Germany, a country where Armenians have begun to be influential not only socially and economically, but also politically, makes it interesting to examine the Armenian Diaspora in Germany from several dimensions. The historical interactions between Germany and Armenians and their relations being shaped by the presence of third parties make the research on Armenians who migrated here significant also for diaspora and migration studies. This study aims to present a brief history of this thriving community and a summary of its political and social activities in Germany.*

Keywords: *Armenians, Germany, Diaspora, Migration*

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9339-2781>
Res. Asst. Dr., İstanbul Aydın University, Department of Political Science and International Relations
fuatbirkan@aydin.edu.tr

Öz: “Diaspora” denilince akla gelen ilk uluslardan biri olan Ermeniler; bu durumu siyasi, sosyal ve kültürel kimliklerinin bir parçası haline getirmişlerdir. Öte yandan Almanya dünyada en çok göçmen barındıran ülkelerden biridir. Bu bağlamda Ermeniler ile Almanya'nın kesişmesi göç ve diaspora çalışmaları alanında ilginç bir deneyim oluşturmaktadır. Ermeni Diasporasının etkisinin yüksek olduğu örneklerle göre geri planda kalsa da Almanya bu topluluğun gelişmeye ve görünür hale gelmeye başladığı önde gelen ülkelerden biridir. Ermenilerin sosyal ve ekonomik olduğu kadar siyasi olarak da etkili olmaya başladıkları bir ülke olan Almanya'da Türklerin varlığı, Almanya'daki Ermeni Diasporasını çeşitli boyutlarıyla incelemeyi ilginç kılmaktadır. Almanya ve Ermeniler arasındaki tarihsel etkileşimleri ve üçüncü tarafların varlığıyla şekillenen ilişkileri, buraya göç eden Ermeniler üzerine yapılan araştırmaları diaspora ve göç çalışmaları için de önemli kılmaktadır. Bu çalışma, bu gelişen topluluğun kısa bir tarihini ve Almanya'daki siyasi ve sosyal faaliyetlerinin bir özetini sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ermeniler, Almanya, Diaspora, Göç

Introduction

Germany, one of the most prominent countries receiving immigrants in Europe, has made multiculturalism a part of its social and political identity. Germany had been a homeland for people of many ethnic origins under the roof of its statehood throughout history. Unlike the early modern period, however, German society tried to be homogenized by Nazi Regime, especially with their unprecedented atrocities committed during the Second World War. After the war, Germany had become a country of migration in a strict sense as a result of the country's need for labor force. Although Germany's migration experience goes as far back as can be imagined, the scope and the narratives of the migration stories differ from each other: the migrations during the rule of the Holy Roman Empire, the Germans' migration to North America in the 18th century, and the gradual increase in migration to Germany after the 1950s. These eras compose a general view of Germany's migration experience.

The migration experience of Armenians, which is the focus of this study, is quite different from the ones of Germans and Germany. The Events of 1915 (or "the Armenian genocide" as Armenians claim) continued to be intensely discussed today, and the relocation and the displacement of Armenians from their lands, constitute one of the most controversial and tragic parts of migration history. Apart from what had really happened in 1915, many Armenians also migrated to the United States of America (USA), and Europe before and after that date. The Armenians living abroad, now also known as the Armenian Diaspora, constitute a greater number than the Armenians living in Armenia. Therefore, it would not be that wrong to claim that Armenians have lived with the very concept of migration since at least the 17th century. The migration of Armenians to the USA and France in 1915 has been studied many times and is yet to be thoroughly studied. However, relations between Germany, as one of the largest migrant-receiving countries, and the Armenians, a nation whose history mostly resonated with migration, have not come to the fore very often in academic research.

This study aims to discuss a brief history of Armenian migration to Germany, the institutionalization efforts of the Armenian Diaspora in that country, and the associations and communities that are still actively working today. The political activities of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany, especially regarding the recognition of the Events of 1915 as genocide, and the interactions of the Armenians with German society, will also be addressed.

The Migration of Armenians to Germany

The migration of Armenians to Germany dates back to the times when there was not even a German and an Armenian “nation” in terms of their modern definitions. In the beginning, the most important factor in the relationship between the two folks was religion, namely Christianity. The relations, which started based on religious affinity, increased through the arrivals of Armenian merchants and students to Germany in the 18th and 19th centuries.¹ If a date is required to emphasize the case, it might be said that the first relations between Germans and Armenians began in 1097 during the First Crusade. The Christianity identity of both sides enabled these relations to start on a religious basis, and these relations took on a commercial status in time.² In 1505, Armenian merchants had special commercial privileges in German lands, and Israel Ori, one of the most prominent leaders of the Armenian independence movement, settled in Germany in 1695. Armenians that migrated to Germany in the 17th and 18th centuries established intense relations with the local merchants in the region. The “Armenian Trade Organization” was established in Germany in 1863, since it was already evident that trade constituted a milestone for relations and sympathy towards Armenians. The relations, initially based on religion and trade, started to ramify into other areas such as politics and education. The notable figures of the Armenian families in Germany assumed governmental positions and became commissioners or representatives in the parliaments in various German states. When Berlin became the capital in the 1870s, the first foreign students attending Berlin University were Armenians, and the student organizations founded by Armenians came into view in the 1880s.³ In conjunction with the foundation of the first Armenian student association in Leipzig in 1885, the relations began to gain momentum.⁴

Relations based on religious interactions, which started very early with the First Crusade, then with organizations founded by Armenian students who arrived in Germany, were quite strong between both sides by the end of the 19th century and continued until the end of the First World War. The fact that the organizations established in Germany with missionary purposes were particularly aimed at Armenians indicates how important religion was in the relations of both sides. The relations established with Armenians living in the

1 Aydan İyigüngör, “The Profile of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, 3 (2001): 258.

2 David Zenian, “The Growing Pains of a New Community”, *AGBU Magazine*, November 1, 2001, <https://agbu.org/growing-pains-new-community>, accessed January 3, 2023.

3 Zenian, D. “The Growing Pains of a New Community”.

4 Mihran Dabag, “Die armenische Minderheit”, *Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ein Lexikon*, hrsg. von Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen und Georg Hansen (München: Beck Verlag, 1995), 61.

lands of the Ottoman Empire, before the First World War, also stood out with its religious dimension. Since Armenians did not have a state of their own in the 19th century and these relations had to be carried out through the Ottoman Empire, the Germans tried to make contact with Armenians in Anatolia mainly through missionary organizations. During this period, missionaries from many countries were founded in the Ottoman Empire (especially American, British, and French missionaries), and the Germans intensified these attempts during the end of the 19th century. For example, after the incidents involving the Armenians occurred in the Ottoman Empire between 1894-1896, a German Protestant pastor by the name of Johannes Lepsius founded one of the first relief organizations called *Deutsche Hilfsbund für Armenien* (German Aid Association for Armenians) to aid the “persecuted” Armenians.⁵ Some institutions were also established in Germany to aid Armenians. These institutions started to operate in Anatolia within a short time. *Deutsche Orient-Mission* (German Eastern Mission) took first place among the German missionary organizations in the Ottoman lands, and this institution was followed by the *Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft* (German-Armenian Association), which was established specifically for Armenians shortly after.⁶ These organizations tried to provide German aid and support for the Armenian people as part of their main purpose. After the emergence of these two missionary institutions, the others which were initially religious and seemed to be based on social aid, but also had a political purpose, began to spread rapidly within the Ottoman lands. Other institutions that were established in Germany and engaged in missionary activities for various purposes in the Ottoman Empire were as follows⁷: *Deutscher Hilfsbund für Christliches Liebeswerk im Orient e.V.* (German Association of Aid for Christians in the East), which was established in the Rhein-Main region including Frankfurt and Mainz; *Deutsche Evangelische Missions-Hilfe D.A.W.W.* (German Evangelical Relief Delegation), founded in Berlin and *Orient-und Islam-Mission des Deutschen Evangelischen Missions-Ausschusses* (Delegation Committee of German Evangelical Missions to the East and Islam).

In addition to medical and social aid, German organizations also published books in the German language about the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. For example, a journal called *Der Christliche Orient* (The Christian East) was published in 1897 and aimed to inform the Germans about the Christians living in the East and mostly in the Ottoman Empire.⁸ Another

5 Zenian, “The Growing Pains of a New Community”.

6 Selami Kılıç, “Ermeni Propagandaları ve Alman İmparatorluğu’nun Ermeni Politikası: Alman Arşiv Belgeleri Açısından 1917-1918”, *Atatürk Yolu*, 19 (1997): 268.

7 Wolfdieter Bihl, *Die Kaukasus-Politik der Mittelmächte Teil 2: Die Zeit der Versuchten Kaukasischen Staatlichkeit (1917-1918)* (Wien: Böhlau, 1992), 66.

8 Füsün Alver, “Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat Olarak Ermeni Diasporasının Almanya’da Politik Halkla İlişkiler Çalışmaları ve Geleneksel ve Yeni Medyayı Politik Mücadelede Araçsallaştırması”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*. 44 (2013): 99.

example was *Die Allgemeine Evangelische-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung* (The General Evangelical-Lutheran Church Newspaper) which also included news about Armenians.⁹

Although the German and Armenian contacts in this period were maintained with various associations and organizations established mainly in Germany; since Germany was an ally of the Ottoman Empire at that time, it strived not to develop close relationships with the Armenians due to its official policy. In this period, Armenians deliberately avoided going to Germany, but instead migrated to countries such as France and Switzerland where they carried out several political and social activities. It should be noted that the migration of Armenians to France, wherein the Armenian population is quite dense even at present, took place at the beginning of the 20th century, especially after the Events of 1915 and the First World War. However, only a very small number of Armenians migrated to Germany between 1915 and 1916.¹⁰ Leipzig, Dresden, Hamburg, and Berlin were the major cities that the Armenians settled in during that period.¹¹ Between 1939 and 1950, Armenians who were taken prisoner by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Second World War, were brought to the regions under the US occupation in Germany. Some of these Armenians migrated to the USA after the war, and some settled in Germany.¹² In the 1930s, there were, at most, two hundred Armenians living in Germany. However, it is estimated that the number of Armenian prisoners of war brought to Germany and settled after the Second World War was around five thousand.¹³

The large-scale Armenian migration to Germany started in the 1960s. As a result of Germany's urgent need for an immigrant labor force after the 1950s, many guest workers began to migrate to that country. Economic and political reasons as the pull factors for immigrants created the largest migration of Armenians to Germany, which continued from the 1960s to the end of the 1990s. During the 1960s, Armenian guest workers along with their Turkish

9 Uwe Feigel, *Das evangelische Deutschland und Armenien: Die Armenierhilfe deutscher evangelischer Christen seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts im Kontext der deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 1989), 120. (Quoted by Alver, "Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat", 99.)

10 It should be noted that among the factors that prevented the Armenians from migrating to Germany at that time were Germany's alliance with the Ottoman Empire, Germany's avoidance of any discourse on the Events of 1915, and its disregard for the issue. However, the assassination of Talat Pasha and the release of the assassin Soghomon Tehlirian after his trial that took place in the Weimar Republic after the Empire gives the impression that there was at least some sympathy towards the Armenians among the new government and the state elites, and a critical view of the German Empire's policies against the Armenians. It can also be said that the German reactions to the court verdict were generally favorable among those who were sympathetic to the Armenians.

11 Alver, "Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat", 99.

12 Alver, "Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat", 99.

13 Zenian, "The Growing Pains of a New Community".

counterparts, came to Germany. Most of them were from the Anatolian part of Turkey and had economic reasons, same as the Turks or Italians who came to Germany to work, rather than to pursue political ambitions. In a similar vein to any first wave of the migration, Armenian guest workers lacked political awareness and priority on getting involved in an Armenian community in the country they arrived. They did not even know the Armenian language, and acted together with Turkish guest workers in their social lives.¹⁴ While the first reasons for the migration of Armenians to Germany were economic, political conflicts in Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Iran, and Lebanon led to another migration wave.¹⁵ After the Lebanese Civil War waged between 1975 and 1991, and the Iranian Revolution in 1979, many Armenians living in the region migrated to Germany as asylum seekers. Armenians who came to Germany for political reasons after the 1970s embraced Armenian culture more than the first-wave immigrants whose priorities were mostly economic. These newly arrived immigrants had enjoyed a community life in their previous countries, “had spoken the Armenian language, and had been deeply involved in community affairs” in an organized manner.¹⁶ Most of the Armenians who migrated from the Middle East studied in Germany and continued their professional activities by staying in this country.¹⁷ Those who came after the 1970s set up cultural organizations, and opened Armenian language courses, but were still confined to their social lives within their communities.¹⁸ As a result of the earthquake that hit Armenia in 1988, the war that started with Azerbaijan in the same year due to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, many Armenians living in Armenia, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia migrated to Germany.¹⁹

Germany was the fourth country that the immigrants preferred to seek asylum after the first three; respectively Russia, the USA, and France.²⁰ The Armenians who migrated to Germany did not only settle in big cities as the others did in France, Russia, the USA, Canada, Iran, or Lebanon, but also to the little towns of Germany.²¹ The majority of the Armenians who came to Germany settled in Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Stuttgart, München, and

14 Zenian, “The Growing Pains of a New Community”.

15 Azat Ordukhanyan, *Armenier in Deutschland: Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Erfurt: Der Ausländerbeauftragte beim Thüringer Ministerium für Soziales, Familie und Gesundheit, 2009), 30.

16 Zenian, “The Growing Pains of a New Community”.

17 Alver, “Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat”, 102.

18 Zenian, “The Growing Pains of a New Community”.

19 Alver, “Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat”, 99.

20 Astghik Chaloyan, “Studying Transnational Lifestyles: Transnational Social Fields of Second Generation Armenians in Germany”, *Armenians Around the World: Migration and Transnationality*, ed. Artur Mkrtychyan (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2015), 114.

21 Ordukhanyan, *Armenier in Deutschland*, 26.

Frankfurt, the cities in which the Turkish population is also quite dense. The largest Armenian population settled in North Rhine-Westphalia, in which the very first German-Armenian associations had started to emerge in the 19th century.²²

The Armenian Diaspora and Its Institutions in Germany

It is estimated that the population of Armenia is about three million²³, and it can easily be said that the population of the Armenian Diaspora is much larger than this. The Armenian Diaspora is mostly concentrated in Russia with a population that is estimated at two and a half million.²⁴ The countries in which the Armenian Diaspora is politically more powerful than the others are France and the USA. The diaspora in these countries has a great political and cultural influence on the Armenians and also in the policy-making processes of France and the USA. The influence of the Armenian Diaspora in the foreign policy of France and the USA has manifested itself in various ways, and continues to do so. In Germany, on the other hand, although there is an Armenian community that does work actively, it is not as effective as it is in France and the USA.²⁵ Daily cultural activities and the recognition of the Events of 1915 as genocide are the main activities of the diaspora in Germany.

It is estimated that the population of Armenians living in Germany is around fifty or sixty thousand.²⁶ Not all Armenians living in Germany want to live there only with their Armenian identity. For example, it is known that approximately fifteen thousand Armenians wanted to acquire German citizenship in the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in the north of Germany.²⁷ Those who are German citizens of Armenian origin, Armenians

22 İyigüngör, "The Profile of the Armenian Diaspora", 258-259.

23 "People and Society", *The World Factbook of the USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)*, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/armenia/#people-and-society>, accessed February 8, 2023.

24 Mokhmad Akhiyadov, "Rusya'daki Ermeni Lobisi ve Medya Gücü", *İNSAMER*, 2019, 1.

25 The Germans' reluctance to acknowledge the Armenians' allegations could also be seen as the reason for the Armenians' ineffectiveness in Germany in comparison to France or the USA. One explanation for the Germans' reluctance towards the Armenians' cause is that the Germans wanted to maintain the uniqueness of the Holocaust in comparison to the Events of 1915. Another explanation is the refrainment of the Germans from engaging in any accusation about Germany's role in 1915. The last explanation could be that, due to the Turks vastly outnumbering the Armenians living in Germany, German politicians could have refrained from causing a breach of faith in their relations with the Turks. As a consequence, the Germans have not traditionally paid any specific attention to the Armenians or their allegations, and the Armenians were thus deprived of any tools to promote their claims until recently. See also: Armenuhi Nikoghosyan and Sezer İdil Göğüş, "Is the Work Done? Views from Armenians in Germany on the Recognition of the Armenian Genocide", *Prifblog*, April 30, 2020, <https://blog.prif.org/2020/04/30/is-the-work-done-views-from-armenians-in-germany-on-the-recognition-of-the-armenian-genocide/>, accessed June 6, 2023.

26 "Germany", *Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs (Armenia)*, <http://diaspora.gov.am/en/pages/61/germany>, accessed February 20, 2023.

27 İyigüngör, "The Profile of the Armenian Diaspora", 259.

waiting to acquire citizenship, and Turkish citizens of Armenian origin who have migrated to Germany along with the Turks constitute the general profile of Armenians in Germany. Even though there are Armenians among the Turks in Germany, it is difficult to give a clear answer due to the lack of specific statistics for Turkish citizens of different origins. The Armenians, who wanted to acquire German citizenship and whose number reached fifteen thousand, migrated to Germany from Armenia, Iran, and Lebanon, but not from Turkey.²⁸

As mentioned above, the Armenians in Germany make a different impression than those who migrated to other countries. While the Armenian Diaspora has a significant political influence in countries such as France, the USA, and Russia, they were unable to make inroads in politics in Germany until recently. The Armenians there acted mostly on the basis of culture and especially religion in their personal or social relations with the German society and the state. In Germany, Armenian history and culture are largely unknown to the general public, and to the ecclesiastical, academic, and higher political circles.²⁹ This situation continued until the further establishment of associations and institutes related to Armenians. Armenian activities, which gained momentum since the 1970s, were not limited to religion and culture. They began to gain intensity in the field of history and politics. However, the Federal Republic of Germany had not done any serious attempt at the development or institutionalization of the Armenian community, so there was not eagerness on part of the German government to specifically engage with the Armenians.³⁰ The organizational efficiency of the Armenian communities and institutions in Germany that started in 1965 and accelerated in the 1970s depended mainly on the willingness of the Armenians to integrate themselves into German society.

Although the institutionalization of the Armenians in Germany started mainly after 1960, these organizations have a historical background related to the various institutions founded at the beginning of the 20th century. Relations that started with German missionary organizations gained a different dimension with the establishment of *Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft*

28 İyigüngör, “The Profile of the Armenian Diaspora”, 260.

29 Ordukhanyan, *Armenier in Deutschland*, 27.

30 It is crucial to state that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) experience in German history has often been overlooked by historians. It is known, however, that discussions on genocides were considered taboo subjects both in the USSR and the GDR. GDR’s official treatment of the Armenians’ allegation of genocide thus reflected this dismissive mindset. According to Sandy Zurikyan, “the genocide” was seen as a crime carried out by the “monopoly capitalists” and the “imperialists”: “The Turkish people were portrayed as victims who had been misled rather than being perpetrators in narrative history of East Germany. The Ottomans and Turks were never called ‘exploiters’ or ‘imperialists,’ and instead, the incidents were blamed on the ruling party of the Young Turks”. Regarding the political stance of the GDR, see also: Sandy Zurikyan, “Armenian Genocide and East Germany”, *Keghart*, March 2, 2016, <https://keghart.org/armenian-genocide-and-east-germany/>, accessed June 5, 2023.

(German-Armenian Association-DAG). DAG, of which Johannes Lepsius is one of the founders, is one of the most prominent and active diaspora organizations that maintains its activities today.³¹ As its founder was Lepsius and its history is quite old, this organization was of great importance for the Armenians living in Germany.³² This association, initially founded for aiding the Armenians in social and religious issues, started to follow a policy that defended the Armenian theses regarding the Events of 1915, and came to the fore in German public opinion with this aspect. Since the day it was founded, DAG has aimed to introduce and promote Armenian culture in Germany and to improve Armenian-German relations. For this purpose, DAG has held conferences on historical, cultural, and literary topics; made translations, and published many publications; for example, the journal *Mesrop* that it has been publishing since 1918.³³

One of the earlier examples of the institutions of the Armenians in Germany was the *Verein der Armenischen Kolonie* (Association of the Armenian Colony), which was founded in Berlin in 1923. After the Second World War, this association was closed due to the immigration of many Armenians from Germany to the USA. Afterward, there has been an effort to revive this association since 1966 with the efforts of Armenian guest workers from Turkey and Armenian students from Iran.³⁴ The Armenian Church helped the integration of these two groups (guest workers and students) into Germany and in a short time, Armenian physicians, scientists, artisans, and small traders were admitted to the membership of the association. The association was renamed as *Armenisch Apostolische Kirchengemeinde Berlin* (Berlin Armenian Apostolic Church Community) in 1980 and has been called *Armenische Gemeinde zu Berlin* (*Armenian Community in Berlin*) since 1998.³⁵

The *Armenische Gemeinde zu Hamburg von 1965 e.V.* (Armenian Community of Hamburg) was established in 1965³⁶, and *Armenischer Kulturverein Hessen e.V.* (Armenian Cultural Association of Hessen), which is another diaspora organization and supporter of the Hunchaks and Soviet Armenia, was established in 1968 in Frankfurt.³⁷ These organizations aimed to protect the

31 For more detailed information about *Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft*, see: <https://www.deutscharmenischegesellschaft.de/eine-seite/>, accessed February 20, 2023.

32 Johannes Lepsius, as a German Protestant missionary and Orientalist, had a special interest in Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and tried to influence the German public opinion with his alleged documentation of the genocide.

33 Alver, "Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat", 100.

34 Alver, "Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat", 100.

35 For more detailed information about *Armenische Gemeinde zu Berlin*, see: <https://www.armenische-gemeinde-zu-berlin.de/seite/168197/armenische-gemeinde-zu-berlin.html>, accessed February 20, 2023.

36 Alver, "Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat", 100.

37 Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987), LXXXVII-LXXXVIII.

Armenians in Germany under a union, and to organize them in a sense of solidarity. Until the 1970s, the Armenian community established small churches and associations, and as of 1975, Armenian associations that launched large-scale activities were established in Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and München. In the early 1980s, many associations were established in Bonn, Braunschweig, Bremen, Bielefeld, Duisburg, Eppingen, Hanau, Kehl, Neuwied, and Nuremberg.³⁸

Since the 1980s, the agenda of the Armenians in Germany took on a political aim and the Events of 1915 began to be handled more often by the Diaspora. As mentioned above, after 1980s, the newly-arrived-immigrants prioritized political issues more than their predecessors and their actions took a political dimension also with the help of globalizing world at that time. As of this date, the Armenian institutions have started to work more actively to convince the German public opinion to accept the Events of 1915 as genocide. One of these institutions is the *Informations-und Dokumentationszentrum Armenien* (Information and Documentation Center of Armenia), which was founded in 1985 by Tessa Hofmann and Gerayer Koutcharyan. The aim of this institution, as the name suggests, is to prove that the Events of 1915 were a genocide based on documents and to share this information with the Germans. Hofmann, who was in charge of the directorate of the *Armenien-Koordinationsgruppe* (Coordination Group of Armenia), is also a member of the *Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker* (Society for Threatened Peoples).³⁹ She is the prominent supporter and, in a sense, the spokesperson for the Armenian's allegation of genocide in Germany. The other institution based on research on genocide is the *Institut für Genozid- und Diasporaforschung* (Genocide and Diaspora Research Center), which was founded by Mihran Dabag in 1989 as an affiliate of Ruhr University.⁴⁰ The *Institut für Armenische Fragen* (Institute for Armenian Studies) is another institute established in Berlin for “studying Armenia's problems and future through publications”.⁴¹

The efforts of the Armenians in Germany on institutionalization produced results during the 1990s. In conjunction with the changing international agenda, many Armenian institutions and organizations have started to accelerate their political activities since 1990. One of the most important results of these attempts is the *Zentralrat der Armenier in Deutschland* (Central Council of Armenians in Germany), which was established in 1993. This institution is an umbrella organization to which all Armenian associations

38 Alver, “Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat”, 100.

39 Selami Kılıç, *Ermeni Sorunu ve Almanya: Türk-Alman Arşiv Belgeleriyle* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007), 230.

40 Alver, “Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat”, 101.

41 For more detailed information about Institute for Armenian Studies, see: <http://armstudies.com/en/index.php>, accessed February 22, 2023.

and organizations in Germany are affiliated, and almost all Armenian activities are carried out under the supervision of this institution.⁴² The main aims of the Central Council of Armenians in Germany are;

“to promote and coordinate the cultural and charitable activities of members, to support the efforts that serve the cooperation with German organizations, and to promote the coexistence between Germans and Armenians, to foster cooperation with the other Armenian organizations in Armenia, in the European Union and in the other countries, and to expand and promote the communication between the Armenians and all their organizations in Germany.”⁴³

The Central Council of Armenians in Germany also established a working group called the *Arbeitsgruppe Anerkennung* (Recognition Working Group) in 1998 and has carried out many activities for the recognition of the Events of 1915 as genocide by Germany.⁴⁴

In addition to the Armenian organizations that were established in Germany recently to mold the public opinion regarding the recognition of the Events of 1915 as genocide, other Armenian organizations also have this aim, but their main founding purposes are to operate in numerous fields. Some of the organizations which undertake activities in order to facilitate the daily lives of Armenians living in Germany, apart from influencing the public opinion about genocide are as follows⁴⁵:

“*Die Diözese der Armenischen Kirche in Deutschland* (Diocese of the Armenian Church in Germany), *Verein Armenischer Mediziner in Deutschland e.V.* (Association of Armenian Doctors in Germany), *Armenischer Unternehmer Verein e.V.* (Armenian Entrepreneurs Association), *Der Armenisch-Akademische Verein 1860 e.V.* (Armenian Academic Association 1860), *Verein armenischer Frauen in Deutschland e.V.* “*Silva Kaputikian*” (Association of Armenian Women in Germany “Silva Kaputikian”), Research on Armenian Architecture Organization, *Studentenklub HAIK* (HAIK Student Club), *Stiftung für Armenische Studien* (Foundation for Armenian Studies), *MESROP-Zentrum für armenische Studien an der Stiftung Leucoria* (MESROP-Center for Armenian Studies at the Leucoria Foundation), Hayastan All-Armenian Fund, *Armenische Hilfswerk H.O.M.*

42 İyigüngör, “The Profile of the Armenian Diaspora”, 260.

43 For more detailed information about *Zentralrat der Armenier in Deutschland e.V.*, see: <http://www.zentralrat.org/de/zentralrat>, accessed February 22, 2023.

44 İyigüngör, “The Profile of the Armenian Diaspora”, 260.

45 Ordukhanyan, *Armenier in Deutschland*, 49-64.

(Armenian Relief Organization), *Verein der Freunde von Artsakh-Karabach* (Association of Friends of Artsakh-Karabach)”.⁴⁶

It could be claimed that all these institutions are working actively in the socialization and integration process of the Armenians in Germany. The recognition of the claimed genocide by other countries, which constitutes the main goal of the Armenian Diaspora, has also been the main goal of the diaspora in Germany. Institutions and organizations that support the Armenian claims have held conferences on this issue, published brochures and books, and endeavored to raise awareness of their allegation of genocide in the German society. As there is no political party in which Armenians are represented in Germany⁴⁷, these institutions have been the main instrument to influence the German Government and German public opinion politically in the background. The last part of this study will briefly touch on the social and political activities of the diaspora in this country.

The Social and Political Activities of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany

As stated above, the Armenian Diaspora in Germany has a very different presence than the other Armenian communities. Armenians from Turkey are mostly composed of workers who came for economic reasons, while those from the Middle East are mostly composed of students and those who migrated for political reasons. Most Armenian students from the Middle East preferred to stay in Germany and are represented in academic professions.⁴⁸ The Armenians living in Germany are quite willing to adapt to German society, and therefore they put a premium on learning the German language. In addition, obtaining German citizenship to benefit from social rights and services in Germany is among the important issues for Armenians. Owing to the constitutional amendment made by Armenia in 2007, the Armenians in Germany began to exercise their right to have dual citizenship.⁴⁹ As can be seen from the efforts on acquiring citizenship, a large part of Armenians living in Germany aim to settle in Germany rather than return to Armenia.⁵⁰ Besides that, the Armenians in Germany maintain their cultural, political, and

46 For a detailed list of these associations, see: Armenische Gemeinde Baden-Württemberg, <https://agbw.org/wichtige-links/>, accessed February 22, 2023.

47 Alver, “Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat”, 101.

48 Mareike Dreusse, “Zwischen Deutschland und Armenien: Die transnationale Diaspora als Akteur sozialen Wandels / Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung zu herkunftslandbezogenen Transferleistungen der armenischen Diaspora in Deutschland”, Abschlussarbeit im Master of Social Sciences and Economics, Universität Wien, 2008, 59.

49 Tessa Hofmann, “Die Laender. Armenien- Überleben am Fusse erloschener Vulkane”, *Der Kaukasus: Geschichte-Kultur-Politik*, hrsg.. Marie-Carin von Gumpfenberg und Udo Steinbach (München: Verlag C.H.Beck, 2008) 32. (Quoted by Alver, “Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat”, 102.)

50 Dreusse, “Zwischen Deutschland und Armenien”, 67.

economic relations with Armenia. The relations between Armenians living in Germany with Armenia vary depending on which country they migrated from. The Armenians from Armenia have the most intensive contact with Armenia due to their relatives in Armenia, as most of them go to Armenia regularly to visit their families and friends. The Armenians who migrated from Iran also maintain their relations with Armenia, and they visit that country more or less regularly. The Armenians who migrated from Turkey, on the other hand, have fewer direct contacts with their country of origin; nevertheless, they also feel a strong emotional connection to Armenia.⁵¹ The relations between the Armenian Diaspora in Germany and Armenia became more intense with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and the establishment of the Republic of Armenia.⁵²

After the disintegration of the USSR and the increasing effect of globalization, the Armenian Diaspora in Germany started to intensify its relations with Armenia. These relations developed in both material and moral ways. For example, the Armenian Diaspora developed very close relations with Armenia on the transfer of know-how. Since 1990, The *Verein Armenischer Mediziner in Deutschland e.V.* (Association of Armenian Doctors in Germany) has been transferring technological knowledge to Armenia in the field of health and especially in microbiology. The *Studentenklub Hayk* (Hayk Student Club) carries out activities and projects on supporting Armenian students in Germany, establishing a network of representatives of Armenian students and young academics in Germany, and promoting Armenian culture.⁵³ In addition, the knowledge acquired in the academic field is being transferred to Armenia by the *Der Armenisch-Akademische Verein 1860 e.V.* (Armenian Academic Association 1860). This association aims to establish a cultural tie between Germany and Armenia and that scientific studies would be beneficial for Germany as well as Armenia. German literary works are translated into Armenian, or translations are made for some journals within the scope of these cultural studies.⁵⁴ Another example is the found in the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund (with headquarters in Armenia) used by the Armenian Diaspora in Germany. This fund is represented in Germany by a local committee and the Armenian Diaspora community contributes to the development of Armenia with donations. It was founded in 1992 and financed by immigrant Armenians trying to help Armenia with short-term humanitarian aid, as well as long-term infrastructure development.⁵⁵

51 Dreusse, "Zwischen Deutschland und Armenien", 67.

52 Alver, "Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat", 102.

53 Ordukhanyan, *Armenier in Deutschland*, 55.

54 Dreusse, "Zwischen Deutschland und Armenien", 72-73.

55 Ordukhanyan, *Armenier in Deutschland*, 62 63.

A Historical Overview of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany

Apart from the activities that aim to facilitate the daily lives of the Armenian community in Germany, the transfer of the knowledge, information, and money gained in Germany to Armenia, and projects are developed mostly on issues such as health and education. In this way, the Armenian Diaspora strengthens its ties with its homeland by striving to promote Armenia in fields such as history, culture, tourism, science, and politics. Considering that Germany's volume of trade with Armenia amounted to over \$530 million (3.8% of the country's overall trade turnover), the extent of the efforts of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany towards its own country can be seen more clearly.⁵⁶

The mystical longing for the homeland and the cultural code it brings out are the most important factors in the transformation of immigrants into a diaspora in the countries they migrate. With their religion, culture and longing for Armenia, the Armenians are among the first communities that come to mind when the diaspora is mentioned. The Armenian Diaspora, which is scattered geographically in various parts of Germany, is making great efforts to keep their own culture, traditions and religion intact. The most crucial issue that politically binds the Armenians in Germany, as it is in other parts of the Armenian Diaspora, is the Events of 1915 and the related genocide allegation. This essential part of the existence of the Armenian Diaspora is also significantly necessary for the diaspora in Germany. Considering that the 1915 Events and the trauma of claimed genocide are the most important elements that ensure the unity of the Armenian Diaspora, it is quite natural that all cultural and religious codes are used through revoking that issue. Therefore, the Armenian Diaspora in Germany has also been engaged with these historical and cultural codes based on the longing for Armenia and the claimed genocide that caused them to leave their homelands. Having been integrated around these themes, the Diaspora shapes its political and social goals accordingly. Especially with the independence of Armenia, the Armenians in Germany have made it their main aim to engage in German society, not only socially, but also politically. As of this date, the activities have been carried out mostly on the claimed genocide and its connotations with Holocaust to influence public opinion due to the sensitivity of the Germans on the issue.

As the recognition of the Events of 1915 as genocide by states is one of the most basic aims of the Armenian Diaspora around the world, the Armenian community in Germany has also been working towards the same goal. The Diaspora, seeking to increase its political activities in Germany, brought the Events of 1915 onto the agenda of the German public opinion through photography and painting exhibitions, concerts, and conferences held on April 24 every year. All these events have been carried out through the

56 “Armenia and Germany attach importance to maintaining positive dynamics of trade turnover growth–Pashinyan”, *Arka News Agency*, March 3, 2023, https://arka.am/en/news/economy/armenia_and_germany_attach_importance_to_maintaining_positive_dynamics_of_trade_turnover_growth_pash/, accessed February 27, 2023.

abovementioned Recognition Working Group. A petition regarding the issue was submitted to the German parliament by the Recognition Working Group in April 2000. It was demanded that Germany should recognize the Armenian's allegation of genocide and "additionally that Germany should invite Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide claim".⁵⁷ This petition led the way to the recognition of the Events of 1915 as genocide by a resolution of the German Parliament. In 2005, due to Germany's historic role in Turkish-Armenian relations (as the German Empire was an ally of the Ottoman Empire by the time the Events of 1915 occurred), it was requested that the Federal Government must assume a special responsibility on the issue and take steps to normalize and to improve the relations between Armenia and Turkey.⁵⁸ The responsibility of the German Empire for incidents was also stated in the resolution, and it was mentioned that Germany should not turn a blind eye to its predecessor's contribution to the alleged crimes committed against the Armenian people. In 2015, Joachim Gauck, President of Germany, "acknowledged Germany's 'co-responsibility' for the genocide"⁵⁹, and eventually in 2016, the German Parliament passed "the Armenian genocide" resolution.⁶⁰ Even though the German Government abstained from acknowledging that resolution, and considered it not legal but political⁶¹, this political move proves beyond a doubt that this resolution has been taken by the concerted efforts of a well-organized Armenian community.⁶²

57 İyigüngör, "The Profile of the Armenian Diaspora", 266.

58 For this resolution, see: Deutscher Bundestag, *Erinnerung und Gedenken an die Vertreibungen und Massaker an den Armeniern 1915 – Deutschland muss zur Versöhnung zwischen Türken und Armeniern beitragen (Drucksache 15/5689)* (Berlin: H. Heenemann GmbH & Co., 2005).

59 Ben Knight, "Germany's role in the Armenian genocide", *Deutsche Welle*, April 5, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/new-report-details-germanys-role-in-armenian-genocide/a-43268266>, accessed February 28, 2023.

60 For this resolution, see: Deutscher Bundestag, *Erinnerung und Gedenken an den Völkermord an den Armeniern und anderen christlichen Minderheiten in den Jahren 1915 und 1916 (Drucksache 18/8613)* (2016).

61 "Alman hükümeti "soykırım" demekten kaçındı", *Deutsche Welle*, 17 Mayıs 2019, <https://www.dvw.com/tr/alman-h%C3%BCk%C3%BCmeti-soyk%C4%B1r%C4%B1m-demekten-ka%C3%A7%C4%B1nd%C4%B1/a-48778251>, accessed March 5, 2023.

62 It should be noted that the resolution was passed at a time when Germany-Turkey relations, and the EU-Turkey relations in general, were rather poor. So, this resolution cannot only be attributed to the efforts of the Armenian Diaspora, but also to the attempts of German politicians who wanted to "punish" or "blackmail" Turkey through complicating the accession of Turkey to the EU or ongoing negotiations over the visa-free travel. See also: Ahmet Alioglu-al-Burai, "Did Germany use the Armenian genocide vote to blackmail Turkey?", *Middle East Eye*, June 16, 2016, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/did-germany-use-armenian-genocide-vote-blackmail-turkey>, accessed June 7, 2023. Despite the fact that German-Turkish relations have deteriorated for multiple reasons since the resolution, an official German recognition of "the Armenian genocide" seems improbable in the near future due to internal concerns (i.e. the Turks of Germany) and external geopolitical considerations. See more: Lily Gardner Feldman, "President Biden's Recognition of the 1915 Armenian Genocide: Will the German Government Follow?", *American-German Institute*, May 12, 2021, <https://americangerman.institute/2021/05/president-bidens-recognition-of-the-1915-armenian-genocide/>, accessed June 8, 2023.

After the resolution, some expectations emerged among the Armenians in Germany. One of them is to incorporate the educational materials on “the Armenian genocide” in textbooks in Germany. The Armenians in Germany refers to the resolution whose one of its clauses is as follows⁶³:

“In order to deal with the history of ethnic conflicts in the 20th century, school, university, and political education in Germany need to re-analyze ‘the expulsion and extermination of Armenians’ by including the issue in curricula and teaching materials and by passing it on to future generations. The federal states play a particularly important role in this process.”

Although several federal states such as Brandenburg, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse and Berlin have included “the Armenian genocide” in the curriculum, it is stated that some teachers face resistance from Turkish families.⁶⁴ This resistance from Turks is also a sign for future conflicts between two communities. Besides, the Armenians in Germany ask to erect memorials devoted to “the Armenian genocide victims”⁶⁵ and to organize protests against Turkey’s stance on issue. According to Armenians, these protests will aim at “raising awareness among the public in Germany” since “most people here do not know about Armenia, let alone about Genocide”.⁶⁶

The resolutions regarding the recognition of genocide have been passed by various parliaments around the world. However, it is quite remarkable that such a situation occurs in Germany, in which the number of Armenians is low compared to other European countries, the Diaspora is relatively newly organized, and the highest immigrant population consists of Turks. It can be said that the interests of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany and German politicians converged on an issue that was of interest to both parties. The political and legal actions of Armenians was also facilitated by the fact that the Turks of Germany are poorly organized. As mentioned above, since the

63 Nikoghosyan and Göğüş, “Is the Work Done? Views from Armenians in Germany on the Recognition of the Armenian Genocide”.

64 Nikoghosyan and Göğüş, “Is the Work Done? Views from Armenians in Germany on the Recognition of the Armenian Genocide”.

65 There has been some practice in Cologne, when a cross-stone (*khachkar*) monument dedicated to “the Armenian genocide victims” was erected in 2017. See also: “Armenian Genocide monument raises Turks’ anger in Cologne”, *Tert.am*, November 20, 2017, <https://www.tert.am/en/news/2017/11/20/armenian-genocide/2543696>, accessed June 7, 2023. Another monument was erected in Cologne on 15 April 2018, but due to the absence of an official installation permit, the monument was dismantled four days after its installation. See also: Siranush Ghazanchyan, “The Embassy on dismantling of Armenian Genocide Memorial in Cologne”, *Public Radio of Armenia*, May 7, 2022, <https://en.armradio.am/2022/05/07/the-embassy-on-dismantling-of-armenian-genocide-memorial-in-cologne/>, accessed June 7, 2023.

66 Nikoghosyan and Göğüş, “Is the Work Done? Views from Armenians in Germany on the Recognition of the Armenian Genocide”.

Armenian community has been integrated into Germany, not only in a social and cultural sense, but also in political, it can be asserted that the Armenians (unlike the Turks) have become a community that transformed themselves from “dispersed immigrants into a diaspora” in Germany.⁶⁷

Conclusion

Although the Events of 1915, and the fact that Germany was an ally of the Ottoman Empire at that time created a negative image of Germany in historical memory of the Armenians, it can be said that the main impetus for Armenians to migrate to Germany was economic. The fact that Armenians began to come to Germany intensively, not after 1915 or the First World War, but after the 1960s, and that the reasons for their migration were mainly based on economic factors, put Germany in a different context from other Armenian Diaspora countries. In Germany, where the economy is the most important pull factor for migration, the other factors that encouraged Armenian immigrants were the cultural and scientific advantages that Germany offers. In other words, the economic potential of Germany and the prosperity, social, and cultural opportunities, as opposed to the political and cultural restrictions of the USSR, were the main factors that “pulled” Armenians to that country.

The fact that the population of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany is few in number or less visible than the diaspora communities in countries such as France or the USA does not make the Armenians living here less important or ineffective. Although the Armenian community in Germany is few in number, they are in a very active position in the political and social sense. As a result of the integration of Armenians into German society, the Diaspora here strives to influence the policies of the German Government and defends the rights of Armenians, not only in social life, but also in the political arena. As a consequence of the social, economic, and political activities of the Diaspora, Armenians have been integrated into Germany and continue to improve their status. It can be asserted that the Armenian Diaspora in Germany managed to engage in the German society to which they came as immigrants, by preserving their ethnic, religious, and cultural traits. Especially the presence of the Turkish community in Germany since 1960 makes this country more important for Armenians. Because the Events of 1915, which Armenians consider as the most important factor for the existence and integrity of the Diaspora, and the recognition of the claimed genocide in Germany, where

⁶⁷ We have limited knowledge on how the political activities of the Armenians in Germany are being handled by the Turks in Germany. It is known, however, that the Turks living in Germany are not indifferent to the issue. In this respect, further research is needed to analyze the Turkish-Armenian confrontation in Germany. Regarding the issue, see also: Burak Gümüş, “Almanya Türkleri ve Ermeni Olayları”, *Tesam Akademi Dergisi*, 2/1 (2015): 157-194.

A Historical Overview of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany

millions of citizens of Turkish origin live, are both politically important and have a considerably symbolic meaning. In this context, the large Turkish population living in Germany, and the political visibility of the Armenian Diaspora face off both sides in various ways. In this respect, the Armenian Diaspora in Germany differs from the Armenians in other countries. For this reason, the Armenian community in Germany becomes significant for the Armenian Diaspora as a whole, and the Diaspora attaches particular importance to Germany and the German society regarding the Events of 1915, and the allegation of genocide, with the concern of the Turkish population living in Germany, and the probable activities undertaken by this community.

To conclude, the Armenians in Germany have similar characteristics with other diaspora communities in terms of both integrating into the receiving country, and being economically, socially, and emotionally attached to the homeland. Despite the relatively few numbers of the Armenians in Germany, they maintain the image of the Diaspora politically and socially, and the developing relations in every sense, denoting that the Diaspora continues to increase its effectiveness in Germany.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Alman hükümeti “soykırım” demekten kaçındı”. *Deutsche Welle*, 17 Mayıs 2019,
<https://www.dw.com/tr/alman-h%C3%BCk%C3%BCmeti-soyk%C4%B1r%C4%B1m-demekten-ka%C3%A7%C4%B1nd%C4%B1/a-48778251>, accessed March 5, 2023.

“Armenia and Germany attach importance to maintaining positive dynamics of trade turnover growth–Pashinyan”. *Arka News Agency*, March 3, 2023,
https://arka.am/en/news/economy/armenia_and_germany_attach_importance_to_maintaining_positive_dynamics_of_trade_turnover_growth_pash/, accessed February 27, 2023.

“Armenian Genocide monument raises Turks’ anger in Cologne”. *Tert.am*, November 20, 2017,
<https://www.tert.am/en/news/2017/11/20/armenian-genocide/2543696>, accessed June 7, 2023.

“Germany”. *Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs (Armenia)*,
<http://diaspora.gov.am/en/pages/61/germany>, accessed February 20, 2023.

“People and Society”. *The World Factbook of the USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)*,
<https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/armenia/#people-and-society>, accessed February 8, 2023.

Akhiyadov, Mokhmad. “Rusya’daki Ermeni Lobisi ve Medya Gücü”. *İNSAMER*, 2019: 1-4.

Alioglu-al-Burai, Ahmet. “Did Germany use the Armenian genocide vote to blackmail Turkey?”. *Middle East Eye*. June 16, 2016,
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/did-germany-use-armenian-genocide-vote-blackmail-turkey>, accessed June 7, 2023.

Alver, Füsün. “Ulus Ötesi Tasarlanmış Cemaat Olarak Ermeni Diasporasının Almanya’da Politik Halkla İlişkiler Çalışmaları ve Geleneksel ve Yeni Medyayı Politik Mücadelede Araçsallaştırması”. *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, 44 (2013): 85-122.

Armenische Gemeinde Baden-Württemberg,
<https://agbw.org/wichtige-links/>, accessed February 22, 2023.

Armenische Gemeinde zu Berlin,
<https://www.armenische-gemeinde-zu-berlin.de/seite/168197/armenische-gemeinde-zu-berlin.html>, accessed February 20, 2023.

A Historical Overview of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany

Bihl, Wolfdieter. *Die Kaukasus-Politik der Mittelmächte Teil 2: Die Zeit der Versuchten Kaukasischen Staatlichkeit (1917-1918)*. Wien: Böhlau, 1992.

Chaloyan, Astghik. "Studying Transnational Lifestyles: Transnational Social Fields of Second Generation Armenians in Germany". *Armenians Around the World: Migration and Transnationality*. ed. Artur Mkrtichyan. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang,, 2015: 107-125.

Dabag, Mihran. "Die armenische Minderheit". *Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ein Lexikon*. hrsg.. von Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen und Georg Hansen. München: Beck Verlag, 1995: 61-72.

Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft,
<https://www.deutscharmenischegesellschaft.de/eine-seite/>, accessed February 20, 2023.

Deutscher Bundestag, *Erinnerung und Gedenken an die Vertreibungen und Massaker an den Armeniern 1915 – Deutschland muss zur Versöhnung zwischen Türken und Armeniern beitragen (Drucksache 15/5689)*. Berlin: H. Heenemann GmbH & Co., 2005.

Deutscher Bundestag, *Erinnerung und Gedenken an den Völkermord an den Armeniern und anderen christlichen Minderheiten in den Jahren 1915 und 1916 (Drucksache 18/8613)*. 2016.

Dreusse, Mareike. "Zwischen Deutschland und Armenien: Die transnationale Diaspora als Akteur sozialen Wandels / Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung zu herkunftslandbezogenen Transferleistungen der armenischen Diaspora in Deutschland". Abschlussarbeit im Master of Social Sciences and Economics, Universität Wien, 2008.

Feigel, Uwe. *Das evangelische Deutschland und Armenien: Die Armenierhilfe deutscher evangelischer Christen seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts im Kontext der deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen*. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck& Ruprecht, 1989.

Feldman, Lily Gardner. "President Biden's Recognition of the 1915 Armenian Genocide: Will the German Government Follow?". *American-German Institute*, May 12, 2021,
<https://americangerman.institute/2021/05/president-bidens-recognition-of-the-1915-armenian-genocide/>, accessed June 8, 2023.

Ghazanchyan, Siranush. "The Embassy on dismantling of Armenian Genocide Memorial in Cologne". *Public Radio of Armenia*, May 7, 2022,

<https://en.armradio.am/2022/05/07/the-embassy-on-dismantling-of-armenian-genocide-memorial-in-cologne/>, accessed June 7, 2023.

Gümüő, Burak. "Almanya Türkleri ve Ermeni Olayları". *Tesam Akademi Dergisi*. 2/1 (2015): 157-194.

Hofmann, Tessa. "Die Laender. Armenien- Überleben am Fusse erloschener Vulkane". *Der Kaukasus: Geschichte-Kultur-Politik*. hrsg.. Marie-Carin von Gumpfenberg und Udo Steinbach. München: Verlag C.H.Beck, 2008: 17-33.

Institute for Armenian Studies, <http://armstudies.com/en/index.php>, accessed February 22, 2023.

İyigüngör, Aydan. "The Profile of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany". *Ermeni Arařtırmaları*, 3 (2001): 258-273.

Kılıç, Selami. "Ermeni Propagandaları ve Alman İmparatorluğu'nun Ermeni Politikası: Alman Arşiv Belgeleri Açısından 1917-1918". *Atatürk Yolu*. 19 (1997): 265-291.

Kılıç, Selami. *Ermeni Sorunu ve Almanya: Türk-Alman Arşiv Belgeleriyle*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007.

Knight, Ben. "Germany's role in the Armenian genocide". *Deutsche Welle*, April 5, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/new-report-details-germanys-role-in-armenian-genocide/a-43268266>, accessed February 28, 2023.

Nikoghosyan, Armenuhi and Sezer İdil Göğüş. "Is the Work Done? Views from Armenians in Germany on the Recognition of the Armenian Genocide". *Prifblog*, April 30, 2020, <https://blog.prif.org/2020/04/30/is-the-work-done-views-from-armenians-in-germany-on-the-recognition-of-the-armenian-genocide/>, accessed June 6, 2023.

Ordukhanyan, Azat. *Armenier in Deutschland: Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Erfurt: Der Ausländerbeauftragte beim Thüringer Ministerium für Soziales, Familie und Gesundheit, 2009.

Uras, Esat. *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987.

Zenian, David. "The Growing Pains of A New Community". *AGBU Magazine*, November 1, 2001, <https://agbu.org/growing-pains-new-community>, accessed January 3, 2023.

A Historical Overview of the Armenian Diaspora in Germany

Zentralrat der Armenier in Deutschland e.V.,

<http://www.zentralrat.org/de/zentralrat>, accessed February 22, 2023.

Zurikyan, Sandy. "Armenian Genocide and East Germany". *Keghart*, March 2, 2016,

<https://keghart.org/armenian-genocide-and-east-germany/>, accessed June 5, 2023.

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

To cite this article: Fatih Kocaoğlu and Mehmet Kuzu, "The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations", *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 47 (2023): 119-158.

Received: 12.04.2023

Accepted: 14.06.2023

THE IMPACT OF THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR ON THE ARMENIAN ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ARMENIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

(ERMENİSTAN'IN DIŞ İLİŞKİLERİ ÇERÇEVESİNDE İKİNCİ KARABAĞ SAVAŞININ ERMENİ EKONOMİSİ VE FİNANS PİYASALARINA ETKİSİ)

Fatih KOCAOĞLU*
Mehmet KUZU**

Abstract: *Thirty years after the First Karabakh War, the events that developed with Armenia's attack on the city of Tovuz in Azerbaijan started the Second Karabakh War in September 2020. While the first war was an ethnic-based conflict that emerged in the Soviet geography after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the second war was an ethnic conflict and a proxy war based on political economy, apart from the issues of reclaiming the lands that Azerbaijan had lost military control. After Turkey's geopolitical problems with Russia, it has sought to diversify its energy imports and replace Russian gas with Azerbaijani gas to reduce its dependence on Russia. The Tovuz attack, an essential point in delivering Armenian-Azerbaijani gas to Turkey, occurred in this ongoing process. In this primary layer, the Second Karabakh War was a proxy war based on*

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4661-8888>

Research Assistant Doctor, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration
kokoglusubutay@gmail.com

** ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5354-4368>

Dr. Faculty Member, Bayburt University, Vocational School of Social Sciences; Department of Finance, Banking and Insurance
mehmetkuzu86@gmail.com

the economy and politics between Russia and Turkey. With the war, Iran supported Armenia, and Israel supported Azerbaijan. In the secondary layer, it was a geopolitically based proxy war between Israel and Iran at a weaker level. Since the founding element of the war was the economic-political plane, this study examines the economic-political dimension of the war for Armenia. In this context, this study aims to analyze the effects of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian economy and financial markets within the framework of Armenia's relations with Russia and the Western world. According to the results, during the process that turned into a war, the Armenian economy contracted with the increasing public expenditures during the war, and economic and financial fragilities increased. After the armistice, Turkey's internal economic-political and growing confidence in solving the problem provided capital inflows from Russia and the West, supporting economic growth and financial markets. However, the Armenian economy has been susceptible to the geopolitical and military tensions that have risen during the post-war period. On the other hand, Western and Russian capital are energizing the Armenian economy in alternative ways according to the changing geopolitical and alliance system conditions. Russia's relative influence in this dynamic is more significant. At a higher level of analysis, the main reason for this is Armenia's varying relations with Russia and the Western alliance. As Russia's positive impact on the Armenian economy decreased in the post-war period, this effect was replaced with the positive impact of Western capital on the Armenian economy.

Keywords: Armenia, Second Karabakh War, War-Politics Relationship, Economy, Financial Markets

Öz: Birinci Karabağ Savaşı'ndan otuz yıl sonra Ermenistan'ın Azerbaycan'da Tovuz şehrine saldırmasıyla gelişen olaylar Eylül 2020'de İkinci Karabağ Savaşı'nı başlatmıştır. Birinci savaş, Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından sonra Sovyet coğrafyasında ortaya çıkan etnik temelli bir çatışma iken, ikinci savaş Azerbaycan'ın askeri kontrolünü kaybettiği toprakların geri alınması meseleleri dışında etnik bir çatışma ve politik ekonomiye dayalı bir vekalet savaşı olmuştur. Türkiye, Rusya ile jeopolitik sorunlarının ardından Rusya'ya bağımlılığını azaltmak için enerji ithalatını çeşitlendirmeye ve Rus gazını Azerbaycan gazıyla ikâme etmeye çalışmıştır. Ermenistan'ın Azerbaycan gazının Türkiye'ye ulaştırılmasında önemli bir nokta olan Tovuz saldırısı, devam eden süreçte gerçekleşmiştir. Birincil katmanda İkinci Karabağ Savaşı, Rusya ile Türkiye arasındaki ekonomi ve siyasete dayalı bir vekalet savaşıdır. Savaşla birlikte İran Ermenistan'ı, İsrail Azerbaycan'ı desteklemiştir. İkinci savaş ikincil katmanda, İsrail ile İran arasında daha zayıf düzeyde jeopolitik temelli bir vekalet savaşı olmuştur. Savaşın kurucu unsuru ekonomik-politik düzlem olduğundan, bu çalışma

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

Ermenistan için savaşın ekonomik-politik boyutunu incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma, Ermenistan'ın Rusya ve Batı dünyası ile ilişkileri çerçevesinde İkinci Karabağ Savaşı'nın Ermenistan ekonomisi ve finans piyasaları üzerindeki etkilerini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Elde edilen sonuçlara göre savaşa dönüşen süreçte ve savaş sırasında artan kamu harcamaları ile Ermeni ekonomisi daralmış, ekonomik ve mali kırılganlıklar artmıştır. Ateşkes sonrası Türkiye'nin de sorunun çözümüne ekonomi-politik olarak dâhili ile artan güven ortamının Rusya ve batı kaynaklı sağladığı sermaye girişleri iktisadi büyümeyi ve finansal piyasaları desteklemiştir. Ancak Ermeni ekonomisi, savaş sonrası dönemde yükselen jeopolitik ve askeri gerilimlere karşı duyarlı olmuştur. Öte yandan Batı ve Rus sermayesi, değişen jeopolitik ve ittifak sistemi koşullarına göre alternatif yollarla Ermeni ekonomisini desteklemektedir. Rusya'nın bu süreçteki göreceli etkisi daha önemlidir. Daha yüksek bir analiz düzeyinde, bunun temel nedeni Ermenistan'ın Rusya ve Batı ittifakı ile değişen ilişkileridir. Savaş sonrası dönemde Rusya'nın Ermeni ekonomisi üzerindeki olumlu etkisi azaldıkça, bu etkinin yerini alan Batı sermayesinin Ermeni ekonomisi üzerindeki olumlu etkisi artmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Ermenistan, İkinci Karabağ Savaşı, Savaş-Siyaset İlişkisi, Ekonomi, Finans Piyasaları*

Introduction

Almost 30 years after the First Karabakh war, upon the background of the military attack on Tovuz (which is on the energy lines on the territory of Azerbaijan) by Armenia in July 2020, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war started on 27 September with the operation that Azerbaijan initiated to regain the lands lost during the first war. A ceasefire was established with diplomatic efforts after Azerbaijan managed to recover most of its lost lands at the end of 44 days, leading to the war also being called the “44 Days War”. In this context, it is necessary to analyze the process from the first war to the present to understand the process leading to the second war in the economic-political plane, which is the main subject of this study, as well as in the geopolitical plane.

In line with this requirement, first of all, the ethnic-based conflict dynamics caused by the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR - Soviet Union) should be examined. With the dissolution of the USSR, ethnic conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan sparked over the Karabakh issue. In this context, the Russian Federation replaced the USSR in the international order. Since Russia is a hegemonic power over both countries in the Caucasus region, it has approached the dynamic of conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia with the concept of “neither war, nor peace”. It did not want this conflict to have a clear winner or loser to maintain its current hegemony dynamic in both countries.¹ In this context, Russia deliberately tried to prevent the initiatives of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, which had a diplomatic mission aimed at securing lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan that continued until the second war.²

In this context, the process that causes war is supported by a two-dimensional structure, strategic and military. Accordingly, border and territorial disputes constitute the strategic dimension of the war for both countries that are directly involved in the war; and security policies and military capabilities constitute the military dimension of this war. Although technically only temporary ceasefires were established after the tactics and strategies developed by Russia regarding the war based on its hegemonic role in the Caucasus region, they were short-lived and could not provide permanent peace.³ After the armistice signed at the end of the Second Karabakh War on 9 November, Russia did not

1 Shamkhal Abilov and Ismayil Isayev, “The Consequences of the Nagorno–Karabakh War for Azerbaijan and the Undeniable Reality of Khojaly Massacre: A View from Azerbaijan”, *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 45 (2016): 291-303. 10.15804/ppsy2016022.

2 Abilov and Isayev, “The Consequences of the Nagorno–Karabakh War...”

3 Andrius Bivainis, “Multi-dimensional assessment of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War”, *Security and Defence Quarterly* 38, no.2 (2022): 51-61. doi: 10.35467/sdq/146180.

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

directly intervene in the processes that created the intermediary path of non-permanent non-conflict, which froze a part of the problem for now. This caused a conflict dynamic that has occasionally flared up after armistice, which could lay the groundwork for a new war in the future.⁴

Since the study's primary goal is to evaluate the war as a strategic dimension on the economic-political plane, let us first look at the conflict's military aspect to identify its mediating and regulating impacts:

The use of "UAVs and UCAVs", which are unmanned aerial vehicles that had been imported by Azerbaijan from Turkey prior to the second war, for the first time in a comprehensive conventional warfare, has been a milestone in the transition from traditional warfare to the modern electronic warfare process. Moreover, the Second Karabakh War has shown that modern technological warfare is costly and destructive. War is expensive, especially since the financial burden of current technical wars has increased significantly compared to the past. To have modern military and remote-controlled combat equipment based on the highest technology, the state's economic power must be high, and its defense budget must be sufficient.

If we need to examine the military resources used during the Karabakh war, let us point out that the military resources used by Armenia are imported goods. With a majority of their weaponry coming from Russia or left over from the Soviet era, Armenia has roughly 45,000 active soldiers. In 2019, its military expenditures totaled \$673 million USD. Armenia's economy is hampered, in contrast to Azerbaijan, by its landlocked location between two hostile neighbors and a dearth of oil and gas earnings. Iran to the south and Georgia to the north are its sole open trading borders. Due to the tight ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as historical considerations, Armenia views Turkey as a possible foe as well.⁵

Most of the military resources used by Azerbaijan are imported as well, but a small part is derived from domestic resources. Such domestic resources are produced in factories affiliated with Azerbaijan's Ministry of Defense Industry.⁶

4 Ana Jović-Lazić, "The Second Armed Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh – Causes and Implications," in *Convergence and Confrontation: The Balkans and the Middle East in the 21st Century*, ed. Slobodan Janković. ISBN 978-86-7067-293-2 (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2021), 211.

5 Andrew Philip, "Lessons from the Nagorno-Karabakh 2020 Conflict", *Center for Army Lessons Learned*, August 2021, accessed 12.06.2023, <https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2023/01/31/693ac148/21-655-nagorno-karabakh-2020-conflict-catalog-aug-21-public.pdf>

6 Gubad Ibadoghlu, "The Political Economy of the Second Karabakh War", *SSRN*, October 8, 2021, accessed 23.02.2023, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3939263>

In this direction, the lessons to be learned from the second war in terms of military technology can be sorted as follows:⁷

1. Conventional ground forces lacking adequate sensors are very vulnerable against electronic warfare-based drone weapons.
2. Ground-based integrated fire support and unmanned aerial vehicles are crucial in modern warfare.
3. The deterrent effect of wars has increased.
4. Drones and small and medium-range missiles also play an essential role in detecting and destroying defense systems.
5. Despite advancements in technology, traditional tactics and weapons have retained their importance.
6. Despite the drone era, military geostrategic concepts are still important.
7. The success of the Azerbaijani military in the war, despite the seemingly impossible conditions, went down in the history of wars as an important event.

To express the strategic dimension of the war, first of all, the driving factors that dragged Armenia and Azerbaijan to war should be determined for both countries. Accordingly, the driving factors that led Armenia to the Karabakh war can be listed as “security problem”, “enemy image”, “participation of other countries with interests in the region”, and most importantly, “Armenia’s internal politics and historical memories”. We can briefly explain these factors in the following manner:

Based on Armenia’s security problem, Armenia is geographically located between two Turkish states, Turkey and Azerbaijan. In addition, it has historically fought with these two Turkish states for different reasons and defines them as enemies. On the other hand, the geopolitical purpose of the Armenian state’s construction process by Russia has been to create a buffer zone between “Turkish Turkishness” and “Russian Turkishness”. As a result, the elites ruling Armenia think that the Turkish world will eventually liquidate Armenia, which the Turkish world allegedly (from the perspective of Armenia) sees as an artificial state in the integration process.

7 Can Kasapoglu, “ANALYSIS – Five key military takeaways from Azerbaijani-Armenian war”, *Anadolu Agency*, October 30, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-five-key-military-takeaways-from-azerbaijani-armenian-war/2024430> ; Khayal Iskandarov and Piotr Gawliczek, “The second Karabakh war as a war of new generation”, *Journal of Scientific Papers “Social Development and Security”*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2021). ISSN 2522-9842.

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

The image of the enemy can be examined in two dimensions. The first of these is the historical memory of Russia's past wars with the Ottoman Empire during the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The other is that, after the collapse of the Soviets and because of the fighting against Azerbaijan, Turkey and Azerbaijan are perceived as enemy countries by the Armenian political elites. In addition, the "Greater Armenia" is an aspiration for the Armenian political elite. This image of the enemy intertwined with this aspiration is perpetually maintained, as it includes some of the lands of Turkey and Azerbaijan.

The reason for the involvement of other countries in the issue in this region is that Russia, the USA, and France, which are members of the Minsk Group, are already active in the region. Russia sees the region as a post-Soviet territory, as in, Russia's historical backyard. As a natural consequence, Russia considers the Caucasus to be under its sphere of influence. The USA wants to increase its influence in the region with its Black Sea and Caspian policies. On the other hand, France sees itself as the protector of Armenia under the influence of the Armenian Diaspora. In addition, as a part of the anti-Turkey foreign policy process that has increased in French foreign policy in recent years, France wants to prevent Turkey from gaining strength in the Caucasus. On the other hand, Iran sees the Armenians as a brotherly people, while it sees the Azerbaijani lands as its historical lands. In addition, it considers the presence and strengthening of Azerbaijan in the region as a threat to its national security due to the lands of Southern Azerbaijan in Iran. Turkey's interest is related to seeing Azerbaijan as a strong, successful Turkish state that will assure Turkish presence in the Caucasus.

Concerning Armenia's internal politics and historical memory; the military and political elites who waged the First Karabakh War constitute a significant place in the internal politics of Armenia. Therefore, all developments in Karabakh directly affect the internal politics of Armenia. The historical memory of Armenia has been shaped by the tragic results of the failed dream of establishing a Greater Armenia with the support of the West and Russia at the beginning of the 20th century.

For Azerbaijan, it was retaliation against Armenia for its attack on previously uncontested regions such as Tovuz (as in, regions apart from the areas that Armenia took control of in the first war), taking back lands lost in the first war, and the national identity of Azerbaijan. Concerning the national identity; Azerbaijani people did not want war with Armenia simply for the sake of war, but they demanded the regaining of the Azerbaijani lands that had been under the occupation of Armenian forces for decades.

On the other hand, to better understand the strategic dimension of the war, the position of the strategic players and factions involved in the war and armistice should be accurately described. Although the Armenian lobby in the Diaspora openly declared its support in favor of Armenia during the Second Karabakh War, the effect of this support on the war process did not materialize as expected.⁸ One of the most important reasons for this situation was the widespread perception that Russia, rather than the Western alliance, carried out a proxy war in Armenia during the second war. This is because Russia's geopolitical and military influence on Armenia has been traditionally much greater than that of the Western world. On the other hand, the second war is also expressed as the third conflict phase of the proxy war between Russia and Turkey after Syria and Libya.⁹ However, concerning proxy wars, while Russia and the Western alliance continue their proxy war from time to time through Armenia, it cannot be said that Azerbaijan is continuing Turkey's proxy war. This is so because in the first war, Azerbaijan lost control of its official lands based on an ethnic-based conflict. In the second war, Azerbaijan joined the war simply to regain the lands it had lost.

On the other hand, as an ally of Azerbaijan, Israel's role during the war dramatically impacted the war. In this context, it is stated that due to the dynamic of conflict and tension between Iran and Israel and the fact that Iran, which has Southern Azerbaijan within its borders, supports Armenia in the Karabakh issue, Israel has formed a dialectical alliance with Azerbaijan, which can be considered surprising. The Azerbaijan-Israel partnership is interesting because of Israel's diplomatic issues with Turkey (Azerbaijan's most significant ally), which began with the "One Minute" incident in 2009 and worsened with the "Blue Marmara" incident in 2010. However, Israel's historical issues with Iran and Armenia are based on Azerbaijan's relationship with that country. Attention is drawn to the increasing role of Israel, especially in establishing Azerbaijan's air defense system, in the post-armistice period.¹⁰ On the other hand, it was emphasized that Israel uses its approach to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and the Karabakh conflict as a soft power element against Iran in the context of its disputes with Iran.¹¹ In this context,

8 "The Outcome of the Second Karabakh War: Confrontation Between the Diaspora and the Armenian Government", *Center of Analysis of International Relations (Air Center)*, 2021, accessed 23.02.2023, <https://aircenter.az/en/single/the-outcome-of-the-second-karabakh-war-confrontation-between-the-diaspora-and-the-armenian-government-697>

9 M. Hakan Yavuz and Vasif Huseynov, "The Second Karabakh War: Russia vs. Turkey?", *Middle East Policy*, 27 (2020): 103-118.

10 Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, "Israel's Role in the Second Armenia-Azerbaijan War", *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, 2021, accessed 23.02.2023, https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/The-Karabakh-Gambit_IsraelRole-1.pdf

11 Brenda Shaffer, "Israel's Role in the Second Armenia-Azerbaijan War and Its Implications for the Future", *The Central Asia Analyst*, September 9, 2022, accessed 23.02.2023, <https://www.cacianalyst.org/resources/pdf/220912Shaffer.pdf>

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

because Israel used its role in the Second Karabakh War as a soft power element against Iran, Iran did not allow the celebrations of Azerbaijani citizens in the South Azerbaijan region, which is located within the borders of Iran, for the area that was regained by Azerbaijan with the armistice.¹²

The most crucial element of the strategic dimension of the war is the economic-political plane. In this context, economic-political parts have a founding dialectic during the outbreak of war. After the soldiers that Turkey lost in Syria, especially in February 2020, and after Turkey's apparent victory during its operation called "2019 Spring Shield" that was made possible by the unmanned aerial vehicles against Syria (which enjoys the protection of Russia), an agreement was signed by the Turkish and Russian delegations in Moscow, determining the terms of the ceasefire between Syria and Turkey. Turkey's conflict in Syria's regions, especially in Idlib, the conflicts over the Tel-Rifat territory, the deployment of Russia to the American field military bases vacated in the PYD regions in the "Peace Spring" military operation, and the different axes of the parties regarding Libya, both military and political, are all important factors. This economic-political effect is most pronounced for Turkey, which is highly dependent on Russia's energy resources, and explains why it turned to Azerbaijan gas as a substitute for Russian natural gas. After Turkey's diversification in energy imports with Azerbaijan gas, it was significant that Armenia attacked Tovuz, a critical point in the transport of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey. TANAP has occupied an important position for Turkey for a long time (not just because of the gas it supplies). TANAP was also an important and expensive investment for the Middle Corridor. It was for this reason that Turkey wanted to protect it. At the outbreak of the second war, the conflict in the economic-political plane, in a way, in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, changed the parameters of the war-politics relationship and caused the second war to be based on both ethnic and political economy, rather than the first war that was based purely on ethnic conflict. The effects of the war on the economy are critical for Armenia, which suffered heavy losses militarily, politically, strategically, and economically after the second war process and the armistice. Therefore, this study aims to determine the effects of the war on Armenia in terms of economy and finance. In addition to the adverse effects caused by the war, Turkey's indirect diplomatic and economic-political involvement in the armistice process after the war is essential in the economic gains that the armistice will provide for Armenia.

In this direction, Turkey's efforts to revive trade and economy in the South Caucasus by using diplomatic missions as an intermediary for the

12 Farrokhpour Aida, "The Impacts of the Second War of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (2020) on the Identity Consciousness of Iranian Azerbaijanis", Master of Science (M.S.), *Middle East Technical University*, 2022.

normalization of relations with Armenia and by opening the Zangezur Corridor and the borders with Armenia; added an economic-political dimension to the armistice dynamic after conflicts and conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹³ Similarly, political and economic factors were influential in the process that turned into war. In this context, although it is not a primary factor in the outbreak of the war, the conflict zone is located on alternative trade routes of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); this has enabled it to emerge as one of the primary motivations for the parties in the economic-political process, which is the dominant phenomenon in the spirit of the post-war peace and dialogue process.¹⁴

In addition, the settlement of the peace process in the region on an economic-political basis, together with the potential economic contributions that the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations will provide to both countries, has enabled the cooperation and alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan to evolve into an economic-political and geopolitical integration dynamic.¹⁵

Political circles in Armenia attach importance to relations with the Western alliance; they expected the government of Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power again in the elections held in 2021 after the war, to continue the dialogue process with Baku and Ankara, and by taking into account the initiatives of the Minsk Group, to solve the problem on an international platform that takes into account the mutual interests of both sides and to bring the economic-political dimension of the peace process to the fore.¹⁶

On the other hand, this multilateral dialectical process in the Karabakh issue is one of the most critical obstacles to the permanent emergence of a regional peace system dynamic with political and economic outputs for both countries. The financial inability of both countries, low trade volume and low employment problems based on the Karabakh issue, which has been going on for nearly 30 years, make the economic-political dimension of the armistice and peace process even more critical.¹⁷

13 "Turkey's role in the Nagorno Karabakh war: a potential resource for peace", *Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation*, July 15, 2013, accessed 23.02.2023, <https://caucasusedition.net/turkeys-role-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-a-potential-resource-for-peace/>

14 Damjan Krnjevic Miskovic, "Geopolitics and the Second Karabakh War", *Caucasus Strategic Perspectives* 1, Issue 2 (Winter 2020): 35, [https://cspjournal.az/uploads/files/Vol_1_Is_2_Winter2020/\(3\)%20Damjan%20Krnjevic%20Miskovic.pdf](https://cspjournal.az/uploads/files/Vol_1_Is_2_Winter2020/(3)%20Damjan%20Krnjevic%20Miskovic.pdf)

15 Güçlü Köse and Keisuke Wakizaka, "The Historical Dynamics of the Second Karabakh War and the Shift in Turkey's Policy: The Effects of the Syrian Civil War", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları* XIX, 74 (2022): 311.

16 Robert Aydabirian, Jirair Libaridian, and Taline Papazian, "The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia's Future Foreign and Security Policies", *Armenia Peace Initiative (API)*, July 2021, accessed 23.02.2023, p. 6, https://armeniapeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Armenia_Foreign_and_Security_Policies.pdf

17 Nika Chitadze, "Economic Factors of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 33 (2016): 95.

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

On the other hand, the asymmetrical process in question for both sides has also manifested itself in economic-political terms. After the first war, the necessary investment climate was created in Armenia for its companies in Karabakh to make profitable investments and engage in economic activities with countries such as Russia, the USA, India, Sweden, Lebanon, England, Germany, and France. In this direction, the mining sector has been the main area where Western origin enterprises operate. There are more than 160 different precious metal deposits, five gold deposits, seven mercury, two copper deposits, one lead and zinc deposit, one coal deposit, six alabaster, four vermiculite, one soda production deposit, 12 colored regional soils, decorative stone beds, 21 facing stone beds etc. in Karabakh. These areas, which are of great importance in terms of the economic potential of Azerbaijan, had been processed by these enterprises for about 30 years to the benefit of Armenia. After the first war, Azerbaijan was deprived of the opportunity to use Karabakh's rich mineral resources. Exploiting natural resources in Karabakh during the occupation posed severe environmental and economic risks. In this direction, during the years of work, the mining industry formed highly polluted waste pools that require special cleaning. According to the report published in 2016, millions of tons of heavy metals and other dangerous substances were pouring into the ponds in Karabakh at that time.¹⁸

However, despite the investments and earnings of Western-based enterprises in the Karabakh region, the Armenian economy could benefit at a different rate. In addition to the economic and financial problems left over from the first war, the Second Karabakh War significantly impacted the Armenian economy. After the war, the need for foreign financing, which is one of the main economic problems of the Armenian economy, increased. After the first war, the most challenging issue for Armenia was that Azerbaijan and Turkey closed their borders to Armenia, which triggered economic problems for Armenia and increased its foreign dependency. On the other hand, declining macroeconomic rebalancing with dwindling financial resources and worsening macroeconomic indicators hindered the realization of Armenia's economic development perspectives.¹⁹ Therefore, the war's economic devastation will have serious economic consequences for Armenia in the long run, undermining its financial security. All these problems, the concept of non-peaceful foreign policy towards neighbors and the use of hard power also show that it has never led to development for Armenia and that the only way for Armenia's rapid economic recovery is to participate in regional cooperation. This naturally necessitates Armenia to improve its relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

18 Aynur Nesirova, "Economic Results of The Karabakh War: Plundering in The Territories of Azerbaijan During the Occupation Period", *Uluslararası Yönetim Akademisi Dergisi* 5, 2 (2022), DOI: 10.33712/mana.1094314: 257.

19 "Inflation Reports 2020", *Central Bank of Armenia*, 2020, accessed 12.06.2023, https://www.cba.am/en/SitePages/mp2020_report.aspx

In addition to the defeat in the war that meant the Armenian side's military losses, and demographic and economic aspects were adversely affected by the war as well. The financial cost of the war to Armenia is almost equal to the total military expenditure of Armenia in the last ten years. It will take many years for Armenia to rebuild its army both in personnel and equipment.²⁰

On the other hand, Armenia has also lost access to many natural resources in the occupied Azerbaijani territories, which Armenia and multinational companies had used for nearly thirty years and which played a vital role in ensuring food and energy security in Armenia. For this reason, the Armenian economy must increase its imports of energy and food products to replace the resources it lost in the war.

In addition, the war significantly negatively impacted Armenia's financial sector and increased its financial risk. On the other hand, the Armenian economy may have been affected more by Russia's pressure on the Armenian economy after Pashinyan came to power and the disruption of supply chains due to the Covid-19 pandemic. So the problems related to balancing the Armenian economy are based on the restrictions caused by the COVID-pandemic and the breakdown of supply chains, apart from the 2020 war. Due to the increasing military and social costs during the war, Armenia had to change its budget. Increasing budget expenditures made it necessary to attract foreign capital to the country. This issue will be especially examined in the statistical analyses below. As a result, Armenia's Debt to GDP ratio has reached a dangerous level and is expected to increase in the coming years. Due to these financial problems, Armenia must realize its approved state budget estimates for 2021. Along with the financial sector, economic problems also pressure Armenia's national currency. Currency depreciation has accelerated since the war, prompting the Armenian government to use its foreign exchange reserves to stabilize the dram.

In this context, the liberation of Azerbaijan's occupied territories creates a great potential for sustainable economic development and lasting peace in the region.²¹ This is so because after Azerbaijan has taken back control of its occupied territories, the diplomatic deconfliction process between Armenia and Turkey-Azerbaijan may support economic activities in the region. Until now, the Armenian economy has been negatively affected by the closure of its borders with Turkey. At the same time, the closure of the Nakhchivan

20 Okhan Bagirov, "Economic Implications of Second Karabakh War for Armenia – OpEd", *Eurasia Review*, April 18, 2021, accessed 09.03.2023, <https://www.eurasiareview.com/18042021-economic-implications-of-second-karabakh-war-for-armenia-oped>

21 Mirza Ibrahimov, "The Military and Economic Consequences of the Second Karabakh War for Armenia", *Center of Analysis of International Relations (Air Center)*, 2021, accessed 20.03.2023, p. 14-15, <https://aircenter.az/uploads/files/military%20and%20economic%20consequences.pdf>

corridor negatively affects the economic integration of the Turkic world. In addition, the diplomatic and military conflict environment has hindered the economic potential of the region, which is one of the possible routes of China's modern silk road project.

On this plane, the conflict over Karabakh is one of the most severe and complex ethno-regional asymmetric conflicts in the post-Soviet region, because the parties to the war have different legal statuses, goals, and implementation strategies. While Azerbaijan uses tactics of psychological pressure, and threats to renew military operations, thus intimidating the enemy, stalling forces under the auspices of Russia in Karabakh and its ally Armenia from carrying their actions, which can be defined as deterrence of the enemy. As a result of the divergence of objectives, this conflict is a zero-sum conflict and is unlikely to reach a solution that satisfies the demands of both sides. The course of the battle, the current "neither war, nor peace" situation and the uncertain perspectives of the future can be interpreted in the categories of asymmetry, mainly within the scope of resources belonging to the parties to the conflict. While it is expected that regular clashes will resume between the parties in the short and medium term, the psychological pressure will likely increase further, and the actions in the diplomatic field will intensify. In the ongoing process, the asymmetrical dimension of this war is likely to deepen even more.²²

1. Design of The Research and Data Set

This study aims to determine the economic-political and economic effects of the conflict dynamic that started in 2016 after the first Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia (the 4 Day War) and turned into the Second Karabakh War in September 2020 and to investigate the effects of the results on the multilateral relationship dynamic in the Armenia-Western World-Russia triangle.

First, dummy variables to represent the exogenous effects of the 2020 war were investigated. In this context, a dummy variable modelling the Karabakh War has been developed in line with the chronology of the war.²³ The chronology part of the war, which was developed in the time series of this

22 Rafał Czachor, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict as a Specific Example of Asymmetric Conflict", *Journal of Science of the Gen. Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military Academy of Land Forces*, 185 (2017), 10.5604/01.3001.0010.5119: 17-31.

23 0 = ceasefire, 0.5 = occasional clashes in the case of ceasefire, 1 = no conflict, 1.5 = increased tension that may evolve into conflict, 2 = conflict, 2.5 = starting of ceasefire negotiations while the war was continuing, 3 = state of war, 3.5 = partial involvement of the Russian Federation in the war. Chronology of the war developed using: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer>, accessed 20.03.2023.

variable, was used. The observation interval of the time series is monthly between January 2016 and December 2022. Other external dummy variables created are the Russia-Ukraine war, the Covid-19 pandemic, credit ratings, and US dollar/Ruble parity.

In the second step, the variables that will represent the Armenian economy and financial world were investigated for the study. All information about internal and external variables has been compiled in this context. MSCI_Armenia data was created by the authors from these data. MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) measures stock price and performance. This data needs to be calculated for Armenia. On the other hand, MSCI_Armenia data was created by the authors due to the discrete data on the Armenian stock market. For this, shocks related to Armenia’s benchmark interest rate on the MSCI_World time series were applied using impulse-response analysis. It was formed as MSCI_Armenia time series with the reactive values obtained. In a way, the mediating effect of share price performances in global markets on stock returns in Armenia has been included in the research. Information for calculating this variable is given in the appendices (See Appendices).

VARIABLE	TYPE	SOURCE
Economic_Growth %	Intrinsic (Dependent Variable)	https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/
Net_Foreign_Reserves	Internal	https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/
Usd_Amd	Internal	https://www.investing.com/currencies/usd-amd
Rub_Amd Parity	Internal	https://en.investing.com/currencies/rub-amd
Industrial_Manufacturing	Internal	https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/
Inflation (CPI)	Internal	https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/
Net_Invest_Position	Internal	https://www.cba.am/en/SitePages/statexternalsector.aspx
Benchmark_Interest	Internal	https://www.cba.am/en/SitePages/statmonetaryfinancial.aspx
MSCI_Armenia	Internal-Agent	Created by authors using https://www.investing.com/indices/msci-world
Unemployment	Internal	https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/
Financial_Balance	Internal	https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/
Karabakh_War	Extrinsic	Developed using https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer .
Rating Notes	Extrinsic	https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/
Covid	Extrinsic	Created by the authors.
Usd_Rub Parity	Extrinsic	https://www.investing.com/currencies/usd-rub

Table 1: Information of Variable Set

The methodology followed in the research design is first to determine the static effects of the independent variables on the growth rate of the Armenian economy and then to determine the dynamic effects by taking these static effects into account. For this reason, three different methods were used in the

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

study. These are the “Augmented Dickey-Fuller” test,²⁴ which examines the stationarity of the variables, the “Robust Regression”, which statically detects the effect of the variables on the dependent variable; and the “Historical Decomposition” method, which investigates the historical dynamic effects between the variables.

Robust regression is the static method used in the research. It is an alternative regression method used when the assumptions cannot be met in the classical least squares method. The robust regression method was chosen for the static analysis because of the multicollinearity problem encountered in the classical regression analyses.²⁵

The other method used in the study is the historical decomposition method derived from the Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) method. The VAR method is a method that detects bidirectional back-and-forth relations and interactions between variables.²⁶ The historical decomposition method derived from VAR is calculated retrospectively by determining the parametric and shock effects of the predictive variables on the target variables during the observation period and how the explanatory variables affect the target variable dynamically during the analysis period.²⁷

Before proceeding to the methodological phase of the research, graphs of the variables were drawn. According to these graphs, interpretations were made on the series of variables during the estimation period (See Figure 1). Performing graphical analysis before econometric analysis contribute to a more meaningful analysis of experimental results.

Concerning the Armenian economy growth rate, it has been observed that it was negatively affected by the conflict dynamics that took place in Azerbaijan and Karabakh. In 2016, the economy contracted with the conflicts that preceded the Second Karabakh War. In 2020, an economic contraction dynamic started in the pre-war period. In this context, the shrinking Armenian

24 David A. Dickey and Wayne A. Fuller, “Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series with a unit root”, *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 74, 366a (1979): 427–431.

25 P.W. Holland and R.E. Welsch, “Robust Regression Using Iteratively Reweighted Least-Squares”, *Communications in Statistics: Theory and Methods* 6, 9 (1977): 813-827 ; James O. Street, Raymond J. Carroll, and David Ruppert, “A Note on Computing Robust Regression Estimates via Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares”, *The American Statistician* 42, 2 (1988): 152-154 ; William Du Mouchel and Fanny O'Brien, “Integrating a Robust Option Into a Multiple Regression Computing Environment”, *Computer Science and Statistics: Proceedings of the 21st Symposium on the Interface* (1989), American Statistical Association.

26 Christopher Sims, “Macroeconomics and Reality”, *Econometrica* 48, no. 1 (1980): 1-48.

27 John Burbidge and Alan Harrison, “An historical decomposition of the great depression to determine the role of Money”, *Journal of Monetary Economics*, Issue 1 (1985): 45-54 ; Mehmet Balcilar, Zeynel Abidin Ozdemir, Huseyin Ozdemir, and Muhammad Shahbaz, “The renewable energy consumption and growth in the G-7 countries: Evidence from historical decomposition method”, *Renewable Energy*, 126 (2018): 594-604.

economy entered a low-profit-low-investment cycle, and the political basis of the Second Karabakh War emerged.²⁸ In a sense, the 2020 war made indirect adverse impact to Armenia's economy. Additionally, with the start of the Ukrainian war in 2022, Russia's geopolitical focus has been on Ukraine. For this reason, Armenia has continued the proxy war of the Western alliance on the Karabakh issue after this date. At this point, it can be hypothesized that the process that turned into war in Karabakh slowed down the economic development of Armenia because of the increasing military expenditures.

The comments made for the economic growth rate are almost valid for the industrial production variable. With this, the industrial production variable is more sensitive to the conflict dynamics in the Karabakh region. This claim will be examined in more detail in the econometric analysis section.

Conflict dynamics negatively affect the budget balance/GDP or fiscal balance variable. It can be argued that the military expenditures made in Karabakh before and during the conflicts caused the Armenian economy to have a budget deficit.

With the increase in the net foreign reserves of Armenia in the period of increasing tension in 2016-2022, during the second war, the reserves decreased. In this case, it can be argued that Armenia was using its foreign resources to finance the ongoing war. However, after the war, there was an increase in foreign reserves again.

The international net investment position, meanwhile, had a continuous deficit. On the other hand, some recovery was observed in the balance of the net investment position with during the post-war period. Although Armenia has been integrated with Russia in the context of security policies, the Armenian lobbies, influential in the USA and France, strengthened the country's political economy and ties with the Western world and its periphery. In this context, the net investment position recovered after the war can be explained by the economic and political relations dynamics of Armenia with the Western world. When viewed on the same theoretical plane, it is observed that post-war Western-based credit rating agencies increased the credit rating outlook of Armenia.

According to the MSCI_Armenia indicator estimated by the authors, it is observed that share prices and performances decreased in Armenia with the war.

28 Fatih Kocaoğlu, "Savaşın ekonomi politiği üzerine Sümer dünya sistemi örneği", Unpublished Master Thesis, *Gazi Üniversitesi*, Ankara, 2014.

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

When the unemployment indicator is examined, unemployment increased during the war period, and unemployment decreased with the armistice and partial dialogue process with Turkey.

With the war, the interest rate of the benchmark bond for Armenia started to increase. This indicates that the borrowing costs of Armenia increased after the war.

A period of high inflation started in the Armenian economy. The causes of this inflation have been, respectively, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Second Karabakh war and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

The US Dollar/Armenian Dram parity rose during the war period. With this, after the war, a severe and notable decrease was observed in the parity with the capital inflows from the West.

Similarly, concerning Russian Ruble/Armenian Dram parity, although it rose during the war, it began to decline after the war. However, this downtrend is less intense than in the Dollar parity. The reason for this is that the capital flows to Armenia after the war may have come from the Western world rather than Russia.




Figure 1: Graphs of Variables

2. Results of the Research

As the first step of the research, stationarity analysis was performed with the help of the Dickey-Fuller unit root test for the variables other than the dummy variables created by the authors. It has been determined that the variables are not stationary at the same level according to the model structures with the constant term, constant term with the trend, and model with constant term and no trend.

A unit root test is a statistical test that checks the presence or absence of a unit root in time series data. A unit root indicates that a time series has a stochastic trend, which leads to a spurious regression and makes it difficult to detect strong relationships between variables. Unit root tests are made to determine whether a time series is stationary or non-stationary. Stationary time series have a constant mean and variance over time, while non-stationary time series have a changing mean and/or variance over time. Dickey-Fuller Test is one of the methods that calculate these unit roots.

For this, probability values were examined. Variables with probability values less than 0.05 are stationary (See Table 2).

UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS TABLE (ADF)	With Constant		With Constant & Trend		Without Constant & Trend	
	t-Statistic	Prob.	t-Statistic	Prob.	t-Statistic	Prob.
At Level						
ECONOMIC GROWTH	-24.614	0.1288	-24.937	0.3305	-15.493	0.1133
NET_FOREIGN RESERVES	0.4664	0.9846	-19.132	0.6387	21.510	0.9922
INDUSTRIAL_PRODUCTION	-53.065	0.0000	-53.549	0.0001	-39.466	0.0001
INFLATION	-0.0267	0.9528	-13.685	0.8630	0.8408	0.8905
BENCHMARK_INTEREST_RATE	-13.126	0.6203	-18.854	0.6530	-0.2806	0.5819
UNEMPLOYMENT	-0.7607	0.8244	-19.878	0.5988	-11.071	0.2415
FISCAL_BALANCE	-13.683	0.5940	-12.734	0.8875	-10.365	0.2681
MSCI_ARMENIA	-71.369	0.0000	-0.7205	0.9672	-82.603	0.0000
INT.NET INVESTMENT POSITION	-0.4084	0.9015	-43.426	0.0048	23.905	0.9957
RUB_AMD	-19.143	0.3243	-37.959	0.0216	-0.4919	0.5001
USD_AMD	-0.5215	0.8807	-0.9127	0.9491	-11.291	0.2336
USD_RUB	-25.729	0.1027	-28.649	0.1792	-0.6133	0.4488
	With Constant		With Constant & Trend		Without Constant & Trend	
At First Difference	t-Statistic	Prob.	t-Statistic	Prob.	t-Statistic	Prob.
D(ECONOMIC GROWTH)	-32.248	0.0222	-31.815	0.0956	-31.996	0.0017
D(NET_FOREIGN RESERVES)	-119.237	0.0001	-120.013	0.0000	-115.079	0.0000
D(INDUSTRIAL_PRODUCTION)	-128.006	0.0001	-127.224	0.0000	-128.819	0.0000
D(INFLATION)	-65.890	0.0000	-66.584	0.0000	-63.357	0.0000
D(BENCHMARK_INTEREST_RATE)	-97.624	0.0000	-105.207	0.0000	-98.254	0.0000
D(UNEMPLOYMENT)	-65.436	0.0000	-66.037	0.0000	-64.593	0.0000
D(FISCAL_BALANCE)	-79.096	0.0000	-79.408	0.0000	-79.373	0.0000
D(MSCI_ARMENIA)	-11.575	0.6878	-81.385	0.0000	-12.449	0.1939
D(INT.NET INVESTMENT POSITION)	-27.710	0.0675	-26.928	0.2427	-12.121	0.2048
D(RUB_AMD)	-96.277	0.0000	-97.601	0.0000	-96.811	0.0000
D(USD_AMD)	-67.653	0.0000	-68.835	0.0000	-66.658	0.0000
D(USD_RUB)	-85.584	0.0000	-85.066	0.0000	-85.965	0.0000

Table 2: Unit Root Test Results

In the second step, the effects of the independent variables on the growth rate of the Armenian economy at the time of the increasing conflict that started in 2016 and the subsequent war were analyzed with the help of a robust regression method.

According to the results, variables with a probability value less than 0.05 are significant at the 5% level. Accordingly, variables such as inflation, unemployment, fiscal balance, MSCI_Armenia, net investment position, Karabakh war, rating grades, and Russia-Ukraine war are insignificant at the 5% level. The Karabakh war dummy variable is significant at the 20% level. For the order of magnitude of the variables with positive coefficients, the benchmarks are the interest rate, financial balance, unemployment, foreign reserves, Russia-Ukraine war, rating grades, industrial production, inflation, Dollar/Dram parity, and Ruble/Dram parity. The order of magnitude of the variables with negative coefficients as absolute values are the constant term,

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

Dollar/Ruble parity, COVID, Karabakh war, MSCI_Armenia and its net investment position (See Table 3).

According to these results, the need to move the research from a static plane to a dynamic plane has emerged to calculate the effect of war on economic growth more precisely during the war period. According to the static results, the most striking result is the low significance level of the Karabakh war variable. From this point of view, it can be hypothesized that Armenia is strongly supported economically by both axes so that it does not collapse after the war, since Armenia receives geopolitical support from both the Western alliance and the Russian Federation. For this reason, it can be hypothesized that the increased foreign capital inflow in the post-war period reduced the significance level of the Karabakh war. In line with these hypotheses, the phase of determining the dynamic historical effects in the research was started.

Dependent Variable: ECONOMIC_GROWTH				
Method: Robust Least Squares				
Date: 04/02/23 Time: 21:22				
Sample (adjusted): 2016M02 2022M12				
Included observations: 76 after adjustments				
Method: M-estimation				
M settings: weight=Bisquare, tuning=4.685, scale=MAD (median centered)				
Huber Type I Standard Errors & Covariance				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	z-Statistic	Prob.
NET_FOREIGN_RESERVES	5.684322	2.416485	2.352310	0.0187
INDUSTRIAL_PRODUCTION	0.145475	0.061784	2.354572	0.0185
INFLATION	0.101677	0.317388	0.320355	0.7487
BENCHMARK_INTEREST	88.80904	30.29979	2.931012	0.0034
UNEMPLOYMENT	11.91049	31.11956	0.382733	0.7019
FISCAL_BALANCE	53.03980	41.55652	1.276329	0.2018
MSCI_ARMENIA	-0.001057	0.001546	-0.683650	0.4942
NET_INVENTION_POSITION	-0.000716	0.001880	-0.381055	0.7032
RUB_AMD	0.000245	9.76E-05	2.504449	0.0123
USD_AMD	0.000961	0.000378	2.546059	0.0109
COVID	-5.362977	2.548906	-2.104031	0.0354
KARABAG_WAR	-0.904333	0.654182	-1.382386	0.1669
RATING	3.270960	0.953449	3.430661	0.0006
RUSSIA_UKRAINE_war	5.543316	4.942826	1.121487	0.2621
USD_RUB	-7.07E-06	1.21E-05	-0.582372	0.5603
C	-79.54187	23.12854	-3.439121	0.0006
Robust Statistics				
R-squared	0.655482	Adjusted R-squared	0.569352	
Rw-squared	0.877382	Adjust Rw-squared	0.877382	
Akaike info criterion	90.20548	Schwarz criterion	135.2673	
Deviance	410.8204	Scale	2.495368	
Rn-squared statistic	315.1764	Prob(Rn-squared stat.)	0.000000	
Non-robust Statistics				
Mean dependent var	5.289342	S.D. dependent var	6.506815	
S.E. of regression	2.834075	Sum squared resid	481.9190	

Table 3: Robust Regression Results

With the obtained data, the VAR model was first established. The appropriate lag length for this model has been investigated. The based VAR model must be stable for the historical decomposition results derived from the VAR equations to be meaningful and interpretable.²⁹ For this reason, the appropriate lag length was investigated first. In this context, the 1st lag length was chosen for analysis. In the first leg, the inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomials are in the unit circle, and the modulus values are less than 1. The model is significant in interpreting the historical decomposition of the unit circle (See Figure 2).




Figure 2: VAR Model Stability Test

The Historical decomposition method provides a dynamic and sensitive analysis of explanatory variables with structural shocks on the target variable and parameter values retrospectively during the observation period. The method is dynamic, as it has been chosen to take the traditional static regression equation analysis to a further dimension because it measures differential sensitivity responses at temporal observation points.

Accordingly, the economic growth rate for Armenia was chosen as the target variable. Explanatory variables are net foreign reserves, inflation, unemployment rate, MSCI_Armenia, Russian Ruble/Armenian Dram parity, US Dollar/Armenian Dram parity, industrial production level, benchmark interest rate, financial balance, and net investment position variables. The

29 Balcilar et. al, “The renewable energy consumption...”

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

external regulatory variables are the Karabakh war, the Russia-Ukraine war, the COVID pandemic, and credit rating agency ratings are dummy variables. In the structure of VAR models, external variables can also be defined as dummy variables. In other words, from the point of view of the VAR model application, external variables and dummy variables have the same form.

Accordingly, let us explain the dynamic effects of the explanatory variables on the economic growth rate of Armenia in terms of the Second Karabakh War.

It has been observed that the growth dynamics have been disrupted due to the negative impact of the process that turned into a war for the Armenian economy in 2020 and the shocks caused by their own effects during the war. For this reason, the negativities in the rate of economic growth before the war attract attention.

Likewise, shocks in the growth rate during the military conflicts in 2016 negatively affected the economic growth dynamics. On the other hand, after the armistice was reached, improvements were observed in the economic growth rate dynamic in 2021. However, with the increasing tension in the region in 2022, the growth dynamic has become vulnerable to shocks again.

Concerning net foreign reserves, in the period leading up to the war in 2020, it had a negative impact on the Armenian economy; This effect turned positive in 2021 after the armistice. Again, as with the shocks in the economic growth rate, the conflict dynamics that started again increased the negative effect of net foreign reserves on the economic growth rate.

It is observed that inadequate industrial production negatively affected economic growth during the war period. Respectively, the negative effect of the war period, the positive impact after the armistice, and the increasing conflict dynamics again caused a negative effect.

The unemployment variable, with the armistice signed after the war in 2020, also negatively affected the economic growth of Armenia.

According to the results of the MSCI_Armenia intermediary variable, the stock market movements that took place for the recovery of the post-war Armenian economy supported economic growth in 2021 with the confidence provided by the armistice. On the other hand, the increasing conflict dynamics in 2022 have reset this effect by decreasing confidence.

The inflation rate, along with the war period, negatively affected the Armenian economy. This effect turned positive in 2022 with the re-balancing of the breaks in the supply chains.

It is observed that the effect of interest rates on the Armenian economy during and after the war was close to zero.

Fiscal balance negatively affected growth for Armenia in the process that turned into war. This situation was reversed into a positive outcome with post-war foreign aid and capital inflows. However, the situation was reversed again as the financial balance slowed economic growth with the increasing tension in the region in 2022.

The international net investment position hurt the Armenian economy like other essential variables leading up to the war. After this, the increased capital inflows with the post-war period enabled the net investment position to support growth.

The effects of exchange rates should be done comparatively within the framework of the US Dollar and the Russian Ruble. Which exchange rate affects the growth positively or negatively for Armenia in which periods? Is Armenia experiencing a trend towards the Western axis in the economic and political sense? Or is there the signal that Armenia is converging to the Russian axis? The US Dollar exchange rate had a negative impact on economic activity during the war period. This effect turned positive after the war. At the beginning of 2022, the result turned negative again. Later, with the visit of the USA House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Armenia and the USA's participation in the Karabakh issue in the direction of Armenia, the effect remained slightly positive.

The Russian Ruble, on the other hand, negatively affected growth during the war period, but supported growth after the armistice. The situation turned for the worse with the emergence of the possibility of a military operation by Russia against Ukraine in the spring of 2021 and the war that broke out in 2022, and so the Ruble severely impacted the growth of the Armenian economy. The Ruble, which recovered in global financial markets after it started to be used as a reserve currency in energy trade, began to energize the economic growth of Armenia again in the last quarter of 2022.




Figure 3: Historical Decomposition Results, Single Graph




Figure 4: Consolidated Graph of Historical Decomposition Results 1

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations




Figure 5: Consolidated Graph of Historical Decomposition Results 2




Figure 6: Consolidated Graph of Historical Decomposition Results 3

Conclusion

In the process that started after the end of the Cold War, risks of ethnic conflict emerged between the countries that emerged from the union in the USSR geography based on disputed regions. As a result of these risks, Armenia occupied the (Nagorno) Karabakh region within the territory of Azerbaijan, and the First Karabakh War began. After the battle, Azerbaijan lost military control of the region to Armenia. After the first war, tensions in the region rose from time to time, and conflicts continued. The most severe of these conflicts prior the Second Karabakh War took place in 2016.

It can be seen that the founding conceptual elements that led to the first and second wars differed. According to this, while the first war was an ethnic-based conflict that Armenia started by claiming the territory of Azerbaijan, the main constituent element of the second war was a proxy war that broke out as a result of the economic-political plane caused by the geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Russia. For this reason, this element underlies the economic-political analysis, which is the primary motivation of this research.

There has been a geopolitical and military rivalry between Turkey and Russia in various regions, such as in Syria and Libya since 2018. Especially after the death of Turkish soldiers in Syria's Idlib in February 2020, there has been a strong perception that a comprehensive alliance system cannot be established permanently. In particular, this perception was primarily seen in Turkish public opinion. In the ongoing process of reducing its energy dependence on Russia, Turkey has sought to diversify its energy imports and relatively replace Russian natural gas with Azerbaijani gas. Later, Armenia carried out a military attack on the city of Tovuz in Azerbaijan, located on the lines transporting Azerbaijani gas to Turkey. After this attack, on 27 September 2020, Azerbaijan launched a comprehensive land and air operation in the Karabakh region to regain the lands lost in the first war.

With the start of the second war, in addition to the support of the Turkish staff, the unmanned aerial vehicles provided to Azerbaijan determined the direction of the war. On the other hand, Israel, as a soft power element due to the geopolitical problems it has with Iran, provided ammunition to the Azerbaijani military through the airspace of Turkey. Iran, meanwhile, supported Armenia along with Russia in this war. Accordingly, the second war is a Turkey-Russia proxy war in the primary semantic layer, in the secondary layer, it can also be expressed as a weaker Israel-Iran proxy war.

After the second war that lasted for 44 days, an armistice was signed under the mediation of Russia. With this agreement, Azerbaijan regained control of 70% of the lands it lost military power in the first war. The second war had

devastating economic-political consequences for Armenia, causing it to lose geopolitical status, and military personnel and equipment.

The study in this conceptual framework aimed to investigate the effects of the second war on the Armenian economy to determine the political and economic convergences between Armenia's Western alliance and Russia relations after the war based on the results obtained. For this reason, variables explaining the economic growth rate of the Armenian economy were chosen. In addition, exogenous variables representing the second war, the COVID pandemic, the country's financial risk situation, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Dollar/Ruble parity were created.

A two-stage structure was adopted in the research method. Firstly, the parameter coefficients of the endogenous variables explaining the economic growth of Armenia between January 2016 and December 2022 were estimated using the robust regression method. According to the results, variables with a probability value less than 0.05 are significant at the 5% level. Accordingly, variables such as inflation, unemployment, fiscal balance, MSCI_Armenia, net investment position, Karabakh war, rating grades, and Russia-Ukraine war are insignificant at the 5% level. The Karabakh war dummy variable is significant at the 20% level. For the order of magnitude of the variables with positive coefficients, the benchmark are the interest rate, financial balance, unemployment, foreign reserves, Russia-Ukraine war, rating grades, industrial production, inflation, Dollar/Dram parity and Ruble/Dram parity. The order of magnitude of the variables with negative coefficients as absolute values are constant term, Dollar/Ruble parity, COVID, Karabakh war; MSCI_Armenia, and net investment position.

In the second stage, the dynamic or time-varying shock and parametric effects of endogenous variables on the growth rate of the Armenian economy were estimated during the analysis period. According to the dynamic analysis, it was observed that the growth dynamics in the Armenian economy deteriorated before the second war in Karabakh and during periods of increasing tension and conflict in the region. During the war, this negative effect got worse. However, it is observed that the economy is doing well in the post-war period. When the dynamic impacts of net investment position and net foreign reserves account for economic growth are followed, it can be stated that the Armenian economy, which was stuck in a bottleneck after the war, was re-vitalized by foreign capital inflows. This situation is observed when the effects of the US Dollar and Russian Ruble on the Armenian economy are examined.

In a way, since Armenia is a country under the patronage of both political axes (Russia and the Western world), the economic contractions caused by the dynamics of war and conflict in the Armenian economy (in particular

The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations

concerning Karabakh) are remedied with the US Dollar (as foreign capital) when Armenia gets closer to the West, and with the Russian Ruble (again, as a foreign capital) when Armenia gets closer to Russia. The stock market movements in Armenia during the periods of capital inflows partially compensated for the losses incurred during the war. Another great point is that the interest policy for Armenia is not a factor since its effect is at a level close to zero. According to the results obtained, if the effects of the financial balance (that is, the budget balance) on economic growth rate is examined, it becomes noteworthy that the expenditures that caused the budget deficit were the basis of the shrinking economy in the pre-war period. This trend is likely to continue as defense budget expenditures will be increased by Armenia in the post-war period.

To summarize, the process that turned into the Second Karabakh War in September 2020 and the increasing public expenditures in the Armenian economy during the war period negatively affected the economic activity in the Armenian economy and caused an economic contraction. During the post-war period, the Armenian economy and financial markets are recovering with the normalizing relations with Turkey, and especially with the West's and Russia's capital inflows. However, while the increasing military tensions in the region have not evolved into war, the Armenian economy is nevertheless very sensitive to these tensions in a negative sense despite the armistice. This is because Armenia maintains both the Western alliance axis and different levels of alliance and cooperation diplomacy with Russia. According to the changing geopolitical and economic conjuncture, it is striking that the Western and Russian capitals alternatively support the Armenian economy. Since Armenia's alliance system with Russia is robust, it should be noted that Russia's influence on the Armenian economy is more potent than that of the West. This is because the biggest trading partner of the Armenian economy is Russia and many Armenian citizens working in Russia transfer their income to Armenia, which explains the higher effect of capital inflows from Russia.

We may see economic consequences from the debate over Armenia's place in the Eurasian region (as envisioned by Russia) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Questions over Armenia's continuing participation in the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a significant economic partner for the country, might result in a decline in trade and investment. Concerns about the stability and security of Armenia might also deter international investment and have a detrimental effect on economic growth. The economic situation may worsen due to local investors losing trust due to the uncertainty surrounding Armenia's ties with the CSTO and the EAEU. Since economic development and stability are intimately related to political stability and security, Armenia's economy may ultimately suffer due to this issue.

Market volatility may result from uncertainty surrounding Armenia's connections with the CSTO and the EAEU. Investors may react adversely to the unpredictability and volatility, which might reduce interest in Armenian assets and cause the value of the national currency to fall. Sell-offs in the stock market might occur as investors try to transfer their money to safer places. Additionally, there may be a rise in borrowing prices and a decline in credit availability, which might even hurt economic activity. In conclusion, the adverse impacts of unpredictability and volatility can reduce the performance of the financial markets and thus damage the Armenian economy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “Inflation Reports 2020”. *Central Bank of Armenia*, 2020. Accessed 12.06.2023. https://www.cba.am/en/SitePages/mp2020_report.aspx
- “The Outcome of the Second Karabakh War: Confrontation Between the Diaspora and the Armenian Government”. *Center of Analysis of International Relations (Air Center)*, 2021, accessed 23.02.2023. <https://aircenter.az/en/single/the-outcome-of-the-second-karabakh-war-confrontation-between-the-diaspora-and-the-armenian-government-697>
- “Turkey’s role in the Nagorno Karabakh war: a potential resource for peace”. *Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation*, July 15, 2013. Accessed 23.02.2023. <https://caucasusedition.net/turkeys-role-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-a-potential-resource-for-peace/>
- Abilov, Shamkhal and Ismayil Isayev. “The Consequences of the Nagorno–Karabakh War for Azerbaijan and the Undeniable Reality of Khojaly Massacre: A View from Azerbaijan”. *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 45 (2016): 291-303. 10.15804/ppsy2016022.
- Aida, Farrokhpour. “The Impacts of the Second War of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (2020) on the Identity Consciousness of Iranian Azerbaijanis.” Master of Science (M.S.), *Middle East Technical University*, 2022.
- Aydabirian, Robert, Jirair Libaridian, and Taline Papazian. “The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies”. *Armenia Peace Initiative (API)*, July 2021. Accessed 23.02.2023. https://armeniapeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Armenia_Foreign_and_Security_Policies.pdf
- Bagirov, Okhan. “Economic Implications of Second Karabakh War for Armenia – OpEd”. *Eurasia Review*, April 18, 2021. Accessed 09.03.2023. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/18042021-economic-implications-of-second-karabakh-war-for-armenia-oped>
- Balcilar, Mehmet, Zeynel Abidin Ozdemir, Huseyin Ozdemir, and Muhammad Shahbaz. “The renewable energy consumption and growth in the G-7 countries: Evidence from historical decomposition method”. *Renewable Energy*, 126 (2018): 594-604.
- Bivainis, Andrius. “Multi-dimensional assessment of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War”. *Security and Defence Quarterly* 38, no.2 (2022): 51-61. doi: 10.35467/sdq/146180.

- Burbidge, John and Alan Harrison. “An historical decomposition of the great depression to determine the role of Money”. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, Issue 1 (1985): 45-54.
- Chitadze, Nika. “Economic Factors of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”. *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 33 (2016): 95-112.
- Czachor, Rafał. “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict as a Specific Example of Asymmetric Conflict”. *Journal of Science of the Gen. Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military Academy of Land Forces*, 185 (2017): 17-31. 10.5604/01.3001.0010.5119.
- Dickey, David A. and Wayne A. Fuller. “Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series with a unit root”. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 74, 366a (1979): 427–431.
- Du Mouchel, William and Fanny O’Brien. “Integrating a Robust Option Into a Multiple Regression Computing Environment”. *Computer Science and Statistics: Proceedings of the 21st Symposium on the Interface* (1989), American Statistical Association.
- Holland, P.W. and R.E. Welsch. “Robust Regression Using Iteratively Reweighted Least-Squares”. *Communications in Statistics: Theory and Methods* 6, 9 (1977): 813-827.
- Ibadoghlu, Gubad. “The Political Economy of the Second Karabakh War”. *SSRN*, October 8, 2021, accessed 23.02.2023. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3939263>
- İbrahimov, Mirza. “The Military and Economic Consequences of the Second Karabakh War for Armenia”. *Center of Analysis of International Relations (Air Center)*, 2021. Accessed 20.03.2023. <https://aircenter.az/uploads/files/military%20and%20economic%20consequences.pdf>
- Idan, Avinoam and Brenda Shaffer. “Israel’s Role in the Second Armenia-Azerbaijan War”. *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, 2021, accessed 23.02.2023. https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/The-Karabakh-Gambit_IsraelRole-1.pdf
- Iskandarov, Khayal and Piotr Gawliczek. “The second Karabakh war as a war of new generation”. *Journal of Scientific Papers “Social Development and Security”*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2021). ISSN 2522-9842.

Jović-Lazić, Ana. "The Second Armed Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh – Causes and Implications." In *Convergence and Confrontation: The Balkans and the Middle East in the 21st Century*, ed. Slobodan Janković, 211-240. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2021. ISBN 978-86-7067-293-2.

Kasapoglu, Can. "ANALYSIS – Five key military takeaways from Azerbaijani-Armenian war". *Anadolu Agency*, October 30, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-five-key-military-takeaways-from-azerbaijani-armenian-war/2024430>

Kocaoğlu, Fatih. "Savaşın ekonomi politiği üzerine Sümer dünya sistemi örneği". Unpublished Master Thesis, *Gazi Üniversitesi*, Ankara, 2014.

Köse, Güçlü and Keisuke Wakizaka. "The Historical Dynamics of the Second Karabakh War and the Shift in Turkey's Policy: The Effects of the Syrian Civil War". *Karadeniz Araştırmaları XIX*, 74 (2022): 311-327.

Miskovic, Damjan Krnjevic. "Geopolitics and the Second Karabakh War". *Caucasus Strategic Perspectives* 1, Issue 2 (Winter 2020). [https://cspjournal.az/uploads/files/Vol_1_Is_2_Winter2020/\(3\)%20Damjan%20Krnjevic%20Miskovic.pdf](https://cspjournal.az/uploads/files/Vol_1_Is_2_Winter2020/(3)%20Damjan%20Krnjevic%20Miskovic.pdf)

Nesirova, Aynur. "Economic Results of The Karabakh War: Plundering in The Territories of Azerbaijan During the Occupation Period". *Uluslararası Yönetim Akademisi Dergisi* 5, 2 (2022): 257-266. DOI: 10.33712/mana.1094314.

Philip, Andrew. "Lessons from the Nagorno-Karabakh 2020 Conflict". *Center for Army Lessons Learned*, August 2021, accessed 12.06.2023. <https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2023/01/31/693ac148/21-655-nagorno-karabakh-2020-conflict-catalog-aug-21-public.pdf>

Shaffer, Brenda. "Israel's Role in the Second Armenia-Azerbaijan War and Its Implications for the Future". *The Central Asia Analyst*, September 9, 2022, accessed 23.02.2023. <https://www.cacianalyst.org/resources/pdf/220912Shaffer.pdf>

Sims, Christopher. "Macroeconomics and Reality". *Econometrica* 48, no. 1 (1980): 1-48.

Street, James O., Raymond J. Carroll, and David Ruppert. "A Note on Computing Robust Regression Estimates via Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares". *The American Statistician* 42, 2 (1988): 152-154.

Yavuz, M. Hakan and Vasif Huseynov. “The Second Karabakh War: Russia vs. Turkey?”, *Middle East Policy*, 27 (2020): 103-118.

Internet Resources (accessed 20.03.2023)

<https://en.investing.com/currencies/rub-amd>

<https://www.cba.am/en/SitePages/statexternalsector.aspx>

<https://www.cba.am/en/SitePages/statmonetaryfinancial.aspx>

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer>

<https://www.investing.com/currencies/usd-amd>

<https://www.investing.com/currencies/usd-rub>

<https://www.investing.com/indices/msci-world>

<https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/>

Appendices

1. Calculation of MSCI_Armenia Mediator Variable

Estimation Proc:

=====

LS(NOCONST) 1 3 ARMENIA_INTERES_ MSCIWORLD @
RUS_UKR_WAR SAVAS COVID

VAR Model:

=====

$$\text{ARMENIA_INTERES_} = \text{C(1,1)*ARMENIA_INTERES_(-1)} + \text{C(1,2)*ARMENIA_INTERES_(-2)} + \text{C(1,3)*ARMENIA_INTERES_(-3)} + \text{C(1,4)*MSCIWORLD(-1)} + \text{C(1,5)*MSCIWORLD(-2)} + \text{C(1,6)*MSCIWORLD(-3)} + \text{C(1,7)*RUS_UKR_WAR} + \text{C(1,8)*SAVAS} + \text{C(1,9)*COVID}$$

$$\text{MSCIWORLD} = \text{C(2,1)*ARMENIA_INTERES_(-1)} + \text{C(2,2)*ARMENIA_INTERES_(-2)} + \text{C(2,3)*ARMENIA_INTERES_(-3)} + \text{C(2,4)*MSCIWORLD(-1)} + \text{C(2,5)*MSCIWORLD(-2)} + \text{C(2,6)*MSCIWORLD(-3)} + \text{C(2,7)*RUS_UKR_WAR} + \text{C(2,8)*SAVAS} + \text{C(2,9)*COVID}$$

Response of MSCIWORLD:	MSCI WORLD calculations is used for mediator MSCI_Armenia	
	ARMENIA_INTERES_	MSCIWORLD
Period		
1	-4.068579	107.7921
2	-13.37175	80.17472
3	-1.718771	72.34194
4	1.800014	76.73850
5	0.968473	74.59420
6	4.628143	72.66136
7	6.403019	72.30786
8	7.416578	71.25839
9	8.974557	70.30973

10	10.04566	69.62330
11	10.90794	68.86833
12	11.74320	68.17552
13	12.40409	67.55065
14	12.95885	66.94181
15	13.43967	66.36828
16	13.83352	65.82551
17	14.16086	65.30353
18	14.43255	64.80337
19	14.65278	64.32202
20	14.83020	63.85637
21	14.97082	63.40516
22	15.07922	62.96661
23	15.16015	62.53917
24	15.21742	62.12172
25	15.25425	61.71314
26	15.27356	61.31251
27	15.27780	60.91904
28	15.26909	60.53202
29	15.24928	60.15085
30	15.21995	59.77502
31	15.18247	59.40408
32	15.13803	59.03763
33	15.08765	58.67533
34	15.03221	58.31689
35	14.97247	57.96205
36	14.90908	57.61059
37	14.84262	57.26232
38	14.77357	56.91706
39	14.70235	56.57466
40	14.62934	56.23501
41	14.55483	55.89798
42	14.47911	55.56348
43	14.40240	55.23142

**The Impact of the Second Karabakh War on the Armenian Economy and
Financial Markets in the Framework of Armenia's Foreign Relations**

44	14.32491	54.90172
45	14.24681	54.57432
46	14.16826	54.24914
47	14.08937	53.92615
48	14.01026	53.60530
49	13.93102	53.28653
50	13.85174	52.96982
51	13.77249	52.65512
52	13.69332	52.34241
53	13.61430	52.03166
54	13.53545	51.72284
55	13.45683	51.41593
56	13.37846	51.11090
57	13.30036	50.80774
58	13.22258	50.50643
59	13.14511	50.20695
60	13.06799	49.90928
61	12.99122	49.61340
62	12.91482	49.31931
63	12.83879	49.02698
64	12.76315	48.73640
65	12.68790	48.44757
66	12.61305	48.16046
67	12.53860	47.87506
68	12.46455	47.59137
69	12.39091	47.30937
70	12.31767	47.02905
71	12.24485	46.75039
72	12.17244	46.47340
73	12.10044	46.19805
74	12.02885	45.92433
75	11.95768	45.65225
76	11.88691	45.38177
77	11.81655	45.11291

78	11.74660	44.84563
79	11.67706	44.57995
80	11.60792	44.31584
81	11.53919	44.05330
82	11.47086	43.79231
83	11.40293	43.53287
84	11.33540	43.27497
85	11.26827	43.01860
86	11.20153	42.76374
87	11.13519	42.51040
88	11.06923	42.25856
89	11.00367	42.00821
90	10.93849	41.75935
Generalized Impulse		

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

To cite this article: Nigar Jamalova, "Diplomatic Activity of the Azerbaijani Government against the Territorial Claims of the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920)", *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 47 (2023): 159-177.

Received: 01.06.2023

Accepted: 17.06.2023

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY OF THE AZERBAIJANI GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA (1918-1920)

(AZERBAJYCAN HÜKÜMETİNİN ERMENİSTAN CUMHURİYETİNİN
TOPRAK TALEPLERİNE KARŞI UYGULADIĞI DİPLOMATİK
FAALİYETLER (1918-1920))

Nigar JAMALOVA*

Abstract: *This article examines the activities of the Azerbaijani government against the territorial claims of the Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920. Armenia's ongoing territorial claims and provocations on the front increase the relevance of the issue raised in the article. The documents in English newly included in the article are of scientific and practical importance in terms of supporting Azerbaijan's position against territorial claims.*

Due to the political considerations at the end of the First World War, the search for allies, the liberation of Baku and the protection of territorial integrity, the prevention of massacres, and social and political problems that could arise in the future, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) was forced to give approximately 10,000 km² of the territory of the former Iravan Khanate to the Armenians. However, the Armenian state nevertheless began to make claims to the other territories of Azerbaijan (Zangezur,

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8764-7816>

Researcher, Institute of History named after A.A. Bakikhanov of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences (ANAS)

Republic of Azerbaijan, Baku city, H. Javid Avenue 115, Building of ANAS, 6th floor
n.abushova@gmail.com, n.camalova@history.science.az

Tel: +994558957557

Karabakh, Nakhchivan, Kars, part of Gazakh district). Armenians nominated territorial claims on the basis that the Armenian population settled in the indicated areas. Nevertheless, the Armenian population was scattered in the territories they claimed and did not have an absolute majority.

The government of Azerbaijan struggled diplomatically against the territorial claims and military aggression of the Republic of Armenia in three directions: 1) Correspondence and meetings with representatives of foreign countries in the South Caucasus; 2) Bilateral correspondence and meetings with the Armenian state; 3) Struggle in the international arena – the Paris Peace Conference.

Despite the policy of ethnic cleansing committed by Armenian forces in order to occupy the territory, as well as the diplomatic struggle, none of the disputed territories of Azerbaijan were officially given to Armenia, except Erivan, which was compromised during the existence of the ADR. Additionally, none of the major powers of the time or the Paris Peace Conference officially recognized Armenia's territorial claims.

Keywords: *Azerbaijan, Armenia, Zangezur, Karabakh, Nakhchivan, Caucasus, Iravan, territorial claims*

Öz: *Bu makale, 1918-1920 yıllarında Azerbaycan hükümetinin Ermenistan Cumhuriyetinin toprak taleplerine karşı yürüttüğü faaliyetleri incelemektedir. Ermenistan'ın günümüzde devam eden toprak talepleri ve cephedeki provokasyonları, yazıda gündeme getirilen konunun önemini arttırmaktadır. Makalede yeni sunulan İngilizce belgeler, Azerbaycan'ın toprak taleplerine karşı benimsediği tavrı desteklemek açısından hem bilimsel olarak ve hem de uygulamada öneme sahiptir.*

Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonundaki siyasi değerlendirmeler, müttefik arayışı, Bakü'nün kurtarılması ve toprak bütünlüğünün savunulması, katliamların engellenmesi ve gelecekte ortaya çıkabilecek toplumsal ve siyasi sorunlardan dolayı Azerbaycan Halk Cumhuriyeti (AHC) eski Revan Hanlığının yaklaşık 10.000 km²'sini Ermenilere vermek zorunda kalmıştır. Buna rağmen Ermeni devleti yine de Azerbaycan'ın diğer topraklarına yönelik (Zengezur, Karabağ, Nahçıvan, Kars, Kazah ilçesinin bir kısmı) hak iddia etmeye başlamıştır. Ermeniler, Ermeni nüfusunun belirtilen bölgelerde yerleşik olmasına dayanarak toprak talebinde bulunmuşlardır. Ancak bu taleplerin aksine Ermeni nüfusu iddia edilen topraklarda dağınık bir şekilde yaşamaktaydı ve mutlak çoğunluğa sahip değildi.

Diplomatic Activity of the Azerbaijani Government against the Territorial Claims of the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920)

Azərbaycan hökuməti, Ermənistan Cümhuriyyətinin toprak taleplerinə və askeri saldırganlığına qarşı diplomatik olaraq üç alanda mücadele etmişdir: 1) Güney Kafkasya'daki yabancı ölkələrin təmsilçiləriylə təmaslar və toplantılar; 2) Erməni dövləti ilə ikili təmaslar və toplantılar; 3) Uluslararası arenada, yəni Paris Barış Konferansında mücadele.

Erməni birliklərinin bölgəyi işğal etmək amacıyla uyguladığı etnik təmizlik siyasətinə və verilən diplomatik mücadeleyə rəğmən AHC'nin varlığı sırasında anlaşma sonucunu verən Erivan dışında Azərbaycan'ın tartışma mövzusu olan topraklarının heçbiri rəsmən Ermənistan'a verilməmişdir. Ayrıca ne dövrün böyük gücləri ne də Paris Barış Konferansı Ermənistan'ın toprak taleplerini rəsmən qəbul etməmişdir.

Anahtar Kelimələr: Azərbaycan, Ermənistan, Zengezur, Karabağ, Nahçıvan, Kafkasya, Erivan, toprak talepləri

Introduction

As a result of the 44-day Patriotic War (Second Karabakh War) between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia in September–November 2020, which ended with the mediation of the Russian Federation, the issues of border delimitation and regulation of interstate relations have become more urgent. The establishment of a joint working group (commission) for the purpose of demarcation and delimitation of the borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia has also been planned.¹ The scientific investigation of the territorial claims of the parties against each other with the new documents included in the article can contribute to the precise definition of the borders between the two countries, finding ways out of the conflict situation, and speeding up the peace process.

Towards the end of the First World War, the political processes occurring in the South Caucasus created conditions for the emergence of independent states. Observing the successes of the Ottoman state on the Caucasus front, Armenian political leaders appealed to the Ottoman ruling circles and asked them to help in the creation of their state. The information received by the Ottoman state from Tehran embassy noted that “Armenian committees and parties declare that they will fight against Russia if an Armenian state is created by the Ottoman government wherever it is.”² Due to the political considerations, the search for allies, the liberation of Baku and the protection of the territorial integrity, the prevention of massacres, and, social and political problems that could arise in the future, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) stated that it would not object to giving approximately 10,000 km² of its Erivan territory to the Armenians.³

As a result, in May 1918, three republics were established in the South Caucasus: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia (Ararat⁴). However, the Armenian

1 “Rusiya Prezidenti, Azərbaycan Prezidenti və Ermənistanın baş naziri mətbuata bəyanatla çıxış ediblər (26 noyabr 2021)”, President.az, accessed January 13, 2022, <https://president.az/az/articles/view/54424> ; “Azərbaycan Respublikası ilə Ermənistan Respublikası arasında dövlət sərhədinin delimitasiyası üzrə Dövlət Komissiyasının yaradılması haqqında Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin Sərəncamı (23 May 2022)”, President.az, accessed January 31, 2023, <https://president.az/az/articles/view/56129>

2 Qiyas Şükürov və Vəlif Qafarov, *Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti 1918-1920 (Osmanlı Arşiv Belgeleri)* (İstanbul: Bilnet Matbaacılık və Yayıncılık. A.Ş., 2018), 29.

3 Cəmil Həsəni, *Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin xarici siyasəti (1918-1920)* (Bakı: GARISMA, 2009), 78-79 ; *İrəvan xanlığı. Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycana köçürülməsi* (Bakı: CBS, 2010), 26 ; Керим Шукюров, *Азербайджан в системе международных отношений: 1648-1991. Документы и материалы* (Бакы: ЭЛМ, 2020), 381

4 The state established in the South Caucasus on May 30, 1918, known mainly as the “Republic of Armenia”, was mentioned in a number of sources (Телеграмма. Председателю Совета Министров. От жителей Агдама (Агдам: 15 июня 1919) // Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsinin İctimai-Siyasi Sənədlər Arxivi (ARPIİSSA), Fond № 277, siyahı № 2, iş № 41, vərəq – 36; *Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti. Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri* (Bakı: Çarşıoğlu, 2008), 104-112, 198; Андраник Озаян (Документы и материалы) (Ереван, 1991), 18, 296; Ю.Г. Барсегов, *Нагорный Карабах в международном праве и мировой политике. Комментарии к документам* (Москва: Мелихово, т. 2, 2009), 183 and etc.) as the “State of Ararat”. Its population mainly referred to this state as “Ararat”.

Diplomatic Activity of the Azerbaijani Government against the Territorial Claims of the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920)

state started to make claims to other historical territories of Azerbaijan (Zangezur, Karabakh, Nakhchivan, Kars, part of Gazakh region). It should be noted that when the ADR was created, its area was 113,900 km². The Republic of Armenia made territorial claims to 16,600 km² of this territory.⁵ Territorial claims were linked to historical and ethnic reasons. Thus, the Armenians who wanted to create “Greater Armenia”, claimed a large territory from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea as belonging to them based on ancient times and intended to establish their state in those claimed territories. Armenians lived in a scattered fashion in these areas, and they made territorial claims based on the settlement of the Armenian population.

Some Armenian authors argue that the emergence of territorial disputes should be attributed to the failure of Tsarist Russia to follow the national-ethnic principle during the administrative division. These authors note that the majority of the population of Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Karabakh consisted of Armenians, and the number of the Armenian population decreased as a result of the Baku operation by the Turkish army in 1918.⁶ However, English sources confirm that the majority of the population in Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Karabakh were Muslims⁷ and as a result of ethnic cleansing policy adopted by Armenian political circles, the number of Muslims in Zangezur decreased. However, the complete destruction of Azerbaijanis in Nakhchivan and Karabakh was prevented.

Armenian authors consider that the military operations accomplished by the Turks against the Armenian political circles to prevent the destruction of the local Muslim population and the protection of territorial integrity were related to the ideas of pan-Turkism. These authors accuse the Turks of implementing an ideology aimed at obtaining an ethnically homogeneous territory, in other words, aimed at the destruction of the Christian Armenian population (because they were allegedly viewed as a “foreign element”) that separated the Turkic world geographically.⁸ In their scientific works, however, Azerbaijani

5 İsmayıl Nəcəyev, *Ermənilərin Azərbaycanca qarşı ərazi iddiaları və qanlı cinayətləri* (Naxçıvan: Əcəmi, 2012), 48

6 А.Э. Хачикян, *История Армении (краткий очерк)* (Эреван: Эдит Принт, 2009), 176-178; Т.М. Асоян, *Территориальные проблемы Республики Армении и Британская политика (1918-1920 гг.)* (Москва, 2005), 78 ; Ю.Г. Барсегов, *Нагорный Карабах в международном праве и мировой политике. Комментарии к документам* (Москва: Мелихово, т. 2, 2009), 13

7 Şükürov və Qafarov, *Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti 1918-1920...*, 1 ; *Документы Британского национального архива по истории Южного Кавказа 1918-1920 годов* (Баку: Турхан ИПО, т. 1, ч. 2, 2020), 149-151 ; *Документы Британского национального архива по истории Южного Кавказа 1918-1920 годов* (Баку: Турхан ИПО, т. 1, ч. 1, 2020), 188, 129-130 ; *Armenia in documents of the U.S. Department of State 1917-1920* (Yerevan: Institute of History NAS of Armenia, 2017), 350 ; *Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti. Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri* (Bakı: Çayıoğlu, 2008), 128-137

8 Асоян, *Территориальные проблемы Республики Армении и Британская политика...* ; С.Ю. Аюпян, *Геноцид армян в период Первой мировой войны и его современные этнополитические и международно-правовые последствия* (Ростов-на-Дону: СКНЦ ВШ, 2006), 22 ; Ю.Г. Барсегов, *Нагорный Карабах в международном праве и мировой политике. Комментарии к документам* (Москва: Мелихово, т. 2, 2009), 63.

researchers⁹ have demonstrated that it was in fact the Armenian political circles who implemented such an ideology (in a sense; “pan-Armenianism”) against the Turks and were able to create a mono-ethnic territory in and around Erivan by committing systemic ethnic cleansing.

In our opinion, the claims of Armenian authors that the Christian population hindered the geographical unity of the Turkic world are subjective in nature. The Georgians in the South Caucasus were also Christians and, as is known from history, despite having territorial claims against each other (Batum, Akhalsikh, Akhalkalaki, Borchali, Zagatala), they chose to be mainly collaborators with the Turks.

The territorial claims of the Armenian ruling circles, which are considered as being expansionist politics in modern times, served to strengthen the Armenian state. This policy was accompanied by the systemic ethnic cleansing and military aggression of the state of Armenia against the local Azerbaijani people.

The government of ADR fought diplomatically against the territorial claims and military aggression of the First Republic of Armenia (FRA), mainly via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and foreign representatives, the organization of alliances and military formations, and through the implementation of defense measures. The government of Azerbaijan was engaged in diplomatic activities related to the settlement of territorial disputes mainly in 3 directions: 1) Correspondence and meetings with representatives of foreign countries in the South Caucasus; 2) Bilateral correspondence and meetings with the Armenian state; and 3) Struggle in the international arena.

Relationships with representatives of foreign countries

In diplomatic negotiations and correspondence with the Turkish, English, American and Italian representatives in the South Caucasus, the Azerbaijani government argued that the demands of the Armenian authorities on the territorial issue were unfounded.

As soon as the news was received that Kars was ceded to the Armenians by the British, the Azerbaijani government immediately intervened. The appeals of the people of Kars and the government of Azerbaijan were considered. British representative Arthur James Balfour reported in a letter from Paris that

9 V.Ş. Abışov, *Azərbaycanlıların soyqırımı (1917-1918-ci illər)* (Bakı: Nurlan, 2007) ; K.N. İsmayılov, *Zəngəzurda Azərbaycan xalqına qarşı soyqırımı (1918-1920)* (Bakı: Turxan, 2014) ; H.N. Мамедзаде, *Геноцид азербайджанцев в Карабахском регионе Азербайджана (1918-1920)* (Баку: Турхан ИПО, 2014) ; И.В. Нифталиев, *Геноцид азербайджанцев в Иреванской губернии (1918-1920)* (Баку: Турхан, – 2014) ; N.Y. Mustafa, “1918-1920-ci illərdə İrəvan quberniyası ərazisində azərbaycanlıların soyqırımı”, *Nazimmustafa.info*, Bakı, 2010, <http://nazimmustafa.info/?p=251>

“General George Milne’s intention to transfer power in Kars to the officials of the Republic of Armenia was not realized.”¹⁰ After the British left the South Caucasus, Kars was temporarily captured by the Armenians, but was recaptured by the Turkish army in October 1920.

On November 18, 1918, in the meeting of representative from Azerbaijan Alimardan bey Topchubashov with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul, he announced Azerbaijan’s position on the Karabakh issue, and indicated that the Armenians were raising the Karabakh issue not just for 5-10 villages, but for 4 districts (Shusha, Javanshir, Jabrayil and Zangezur). He mentioned that although the number of Armenians and Muslims was not equal, Armenians did not necessarily have a majority, and moreover, they were not a local population but were transferred from the Ottoman Empire and Iran after the war with Russia (in the 19th century). Then, in that meeting, Topchubashov stated: “Armenians live mixed with Muslims in Karabakh. However, we support a peaceful solution of the problem.”¹¹

ADR Deputy Foreign Minister Adil Khan Ziyadkhanov asked British General William Thomson to liberate Azerbaijani lands occupied by Armenian military units in Yeni-Bayazid district, the southeast side of Goycha lake and Gazakh district from invaders and to return refugees to their lands.¹² Thomson considered these requests and instructed on the liquidation of the Armenian gangs that invaded the territory of Azerbaijan. However, returning the population was not possible to under the then present conditions, as military clashes were still underway.

Armenians were dissatisfied with the positive attitude of the British, especially Thomson, towards Azerbaijan. The representative of Armenian nationalists, Tigran Nazaryan, expressed his objection to Ronald McDonnell, the British representative in the Caucasus after Thomson, against the liquidation of Andranik Ozanian’s gangs, the transfer of Karabakh to the administration of Azerbaijan, and the disregard of the Erivan government’s claims to Karabakh. In response, Macdonell stated in his report to his government that the Karabakh Armenians were different from their brothers in the Republic of Armenia, that the Karabakh Armenians were a fighting people. He answered Nazaryan that,

“Thomson respected all the wishes of the Karabakh Armenians, and as for the disarmament of Andranik’s gangs, this was his personal loyalty

10 *Документы Британского национального архива по истории Южного Кавказа 1918-1920 годов* (Баку: Турхан ИПО, т. 1, ч. 1. 2020), 264.

11 Мамедзаде, *Геноцид азербайджанцев в Карабахском регионе Азербайджана...*, 11.

12 Господину Командующему Союзными Силами в гор. Баку Генераль Томсону. За Министра Иностраннных Дел Зиядханова (Баку: 24 февраля 1919) // *Azərbaycan Respublikası Dövlət Arxivi* (ARDA), Fond № 970, siyahı № 1, iş № 41, vərəq – 13.

and his request to Karabakh Armenians not to remain under the control of the authorities [Azerbaijan] that Thomson considered appropriate. In addition, a conference was called to resolve all these issues peacefully.”¹³

In his response, Nazaryan stated that there were no representatives from the disputed territories at the conference and that they were controlled by a “fake” parliament and ministers. Macdonell noted that he tried to satisfy Nazaryan, but it did not help.

Five members of the Muslim Committee complained about the attack of Armenians on Muslim villages in a telegram sent to the British representative in Tehran. This situation caused additional difficulties for the Allied troops using the Alexandropol (Gumru)-Julfa railway.¹⁴

The High Commissioner of the Allies in the South Caucasus, Colonel William Haskell’s attempts to create a neutral zone and hand over Nakhchivan to the administration of Armenians also failed because of the efforts of the ADR government. Thus, on August 29, 1919, at a conference in Baku, Haskell proposed the creation a neutral zone in the districts of Sharur-Daraleyaz and Nakhchivan. The American governor appointed by Haskell was tasked with managing the neutral zone. The interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia would be equal in the neutral zone, the Baku-Julfa railway would be under the control of the Azerbaijanis, and both sides were obliged to withdraw their troops.¹⁵

Haskell considered that Azerbaijan had provided the strategically important Alat-Julfa railway to the Italians, therefore he was politically pressuring Azerbaijan by expressing his desire to settle the neutral zone in favor of the Armenians. The Azerbaijani government did not approve of Haskell’s interference in its internal affairs. Haskell’s neutral zone proposal was considered as an interference in the borders by the Azerbaijan state. In order to prevent the intervention, the government of Azerbaijan initiated a diplomatic struggle. Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Mammad Yusif Jafarov, who was concerned about deviations from the agreements, called British High Commissioner Oliver Wardrop in Tiflis (Tbilisi) on October 9 and stated that “Alat-Julfa railway is being repaired by the government and providing the road to the Italians under a contract is incorrect information.”¹⁶

13 *Документы Британского национального архива по истории Южного Кавказа 1918-1920 годов* (Баку: Турхан ИПО, т. 1, ч. 2. 2020), 260-261

14 *Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti, Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri* (Bakı: Çasıoğlu, 2008), 174

15 От полковника Вильяма Н.Гаскеля Союзного Верховного Комиссара. Председателю Совета Министров Азербайджана (Тифлис: 1 сентября 1919) // ARDA, Fond № 970, siyahı № 1, iş № 93, vərəq – 3-4.

16 *Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti. Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri* (Bakı: Çasıoğlu, 2008), 388

Diplomatic Activity of the Azerbaijani Government against the Territorial Claims of the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920)

In October 1919, the government of Azerbaijan proposed to transfer the administration of these territories to Azerbaijan. However, the Azerbaijani side also noted that the mentioned areas were part of Azerbaijan, and although Azerbaijan agreed to the creation of a neutral zone, it demanded Haskell to defend the annexation of these territories to Azerbaijan at the Peace Conference.¹⁷

As a result of Azerbaijan's strict objections and, the government's political maneuver to irritate the American officials by negotiating with the Italians about the Alat-Julfa railway, Haskell accepted the indicated territories as the territory of Azerbaijan. The protests of the local Turkish-Muslim population also played a major role in making this decision. This development of events contributed to the dissatisfaction of Armenia. On October 24, 1919, Lieutenant-Colonel Daly went to Nakhchivan to serve as military governor. In Nakhchivan, Daly faced Armenian protests, and he was informed that an agreement had been reached between Colonel Haskell and the Azerbaijani government, which controlled this area until the decision of the Peace Conference.¹⁸

Bilateral correspondence

The government of Azerbaijan was able to achieve superiority in territorial issues by establishing relations with representatives of foreign countries in the South Caucasus. Thus, the idea of creating an Armenian administration in the Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhchivan regions, which were considered controversial, was not realized, and the British, Turkish, American and Italian representatives demonstrated support for the position of the Azerbaijani government. As stated above, Haskell's plan to create a neutral zone in Nakhchivan and Sharur-Derelayaz region also failed as a result of the opposition of the ADR government and the local population.

In order to prevent possible provocations and repressions against Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Armenia (Ararat), and to raise awareness of the events occurring in Armenia and the territories bordering Azerbaijan (Zangezur, Nakhchivan, Karabakh, Kars), contacts and correspondence were constantly established with the representative office of Azerbaijan in Erivan. The telegrams sent by Muhammad Khan Tekinski (the representative of the ADR government in Erivan), to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan, and the representative in Tbilisi

17 Г. Союзному Верховному Комиссару полковнику Гаскель. Министер Иностраннных дел (Баку: 4 октября 1919) // ARDA, f. 894, siy.10, sv.99, v. 8-9

18 Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti. Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri (Bakı: Çasıoğlu, 2008), 263-264

(Mohammad Bey Aliyev) reported on many issues: the military situation in Nakhchivan, Karabakh, Kars, and Zangezur, the number of troops, the military, financial and food aid of the Allied Powers to Armenia, news distributed by Armenians about the presence of “subversive” Muslim committees in Erivan, the massacre by Armenians against Muslims in the Boyuk Vedi, and the actions of the British and American missions.¹⁹

On June 23, 1918, Azerbaijani representative M.Y. Jafarov officially appealed to the Armenian National Council regarding the organization of the commission on the delimitation of Azerbaijan-Armenian borders.²⁰ However, as none of the parties made a compromise, the commission was not created, and after long negotiations, conferences on border issues were finally held in Baku and Tbilisi in 1919-1920. At the meeting of the South Caucasian Conference held on April 11, 1920, the following decisions were adopted: 1) All armed conflicts in Gazakh, Nakhchivan, Ordubad, and Karabakh were to be immediately stopped; 2) The governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia would immediately prevent possible future clashes between Armenians and Muslims in these areas; and 3) The decision of the conference would be immediately communicated to both governments. At the meeting held on April 12, a commission consisting of 6 people was elected to implement the above decisions and supervise them on the spot, restore the status quo, and investigate the initial causes of conflicts.²¹

The local Turkish population also sent letters to the Armenian government protesting territorial conflicts and military aggression. In the letter dated May 15, 1919, sent by the Muslim population of Nakhchivan to the Prime Minister of Armenia, it was noted that the violence against the Muslim nation was triggered due to the transfer of the Nakhchivan-Sharur-Ordubad regions to the administration of the Republic of Armenia, and the legitimate protest was reported to General Thomson. The letter finally stated: “As a representative of the Republic of Armenia, we inform you that you should not agree with this violence and you cannot enter our regions until this issue is resolved at the conference.”²²

On June 15, 1919, residents of Aghdam, who expressed their complete preparedness to protect Karabakh and Nakhchivan as integral parts of Azerbaijan, wrote to the Council of Ministers: “Ararat [Republic of Armenia]

19 Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti. Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri (Bakı: Çəşioğlu, 2008), 199-202

20 Ю.Г. Барсегов, Нагорный Карабах в международном праве и мировой политике. Документы и Комментарии: [в 2 томах] (Москва: Кругъ, т. 1. 2008), 234

21 Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti, *Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri*, 563.

22 Премьер Министру Республики Армении. От Мусульман Нахчевана (Нахчевань: 15 мая 1919) // АРПИИССА, Фонд № 277, siyahı № 2, iş № 57, vərəq – 14.

can acquire Karabakh and Nakhchivan only by force of arms or without Muslims [after killing all Muslims].”²³

Territorial disputes could lead to conflicts and instability in the South Caucasus region, reducing defenses against foreign invasion. That is, during this period, there was a threat of invasion from the north by the Russian army led by Anton Ivanovich Denikin. On June 16, 1919, a defense agreement was signed between the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia in Tbilisi. Armenia did not join this agreement. The lack of Armenia’s participation in this agreement was based on the hope that the Allied Powers’ support would maintain Armenia’s independence and, furthermore, that territorial disputes would be resolved in Armenia’s favor. Mika(y)el Papajyanov (Papajanyan), one of the representatives of Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference, explained the reason for not joining the Georgian-Azerbaijani alliance as follows:

“Erivan and Kars provinces are not economically and strategically important for Russia. Denikin convinced the Armenian government that the new Russian government to be established under his authority can recognize the independence of the Republic of Armenia if the independence of Armenia is defended by the conference of the League of Nations.”²⁴

This also indicated that there could be a secret separate agreement between Denikin and Armenian officials. O. Wardrop’s coded telegram dated November 11, 1919, stated that Denikin was propagating information in Azerbaijan and pressuring Armenia to create disturbances in Zangezur in order to facilitate the occupation of Baku by dividing the Azerbaijani forces into two parts.²⁵ The government of Azerbaijan would be forced to direct a part of its military units to this region to prevent a possible military intervention in Zangezur. In this case, the defense of the northern borders of Azerbaijan was complicated due to the deficiencies of the army.

The government of Azerbaijan created conditions for the Armenian population to be represented by deputies in the parliament to defend their interests. In December 1919, the Armenians had 10 seats in the parliament (4 seats for the Armenian Nationalists party headed by Barunyan, 6 seats for the Dashnak party headed by Arshak Malkhazyan).²⁶

23 Телеграмма. Председателю Совета Министров. От жителей Агдама (Агдам: 15 июня 1919) // АРПИИССА, Фонд № 277, сiyahı № 2, іш № 41, vərəq – 36.

24 Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti, *Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri*, 335-336.

25 Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti, *Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri*, 342.

26 *Документы Британского национального архива по истории Южного Кавказа 1918-1920 годов* (Баку: Турхан ИПО, т. 1, ч. 2. 2020), 199.

Bilateral negotiations and connections to regulate relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia did not yield positive results since the parties mainly resorted to military force in territorial issues, and this situation generated negative socio-psychological effects on the civilian population.

Struggle in the international arena

Territorial issues were observed to be important in the international agreements regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan. Thus, when the Batum contracts were signed in June 1918 between the Ottomans and three countries of the South Caucasus (the terms of the agreements were also acceptable for the Ottoman allies Austria and Bulgaria²⁷), the territories of Nakhchivan and Surmali were united to the Ottomans by being agreed with Azerbaijan.²⁸ The conditions also stipulated that the Republic of Armenia would withdraw the Armenian military forces in Baku.²⁹

The government of Armenia was attempting to resolve territorial issues in the international arena for its benefit. At the Paris conference, Armenian political circles planning the creation of a great and united Armenia proposed 3 schemes regarding the borders of the Republic of Armenia: 1) Boghos (Pogos) Nubar Pasha's "Greater Armenia" project, starting from the Black Sea and extending from Iran's borders to Alexandretta through the Mediterranean Sea (Armenians made up only 3% of the total population in this area); 2) The "six provinces" project, which represented the entity called Armenia together with Sivas, Erzurum, Kharput (Mamurat-al-Aziz), Diyarbakir, Bitlis and Van provinces; 3) The "Erivan project", that is, Armenia, which includes Erzurum province, a part of Trabzon province in the east of Giresun, approximately a part of Bitlis and Van provinces, the territory up to the 30th parallel of north latitude.³⁰ Later, the document stated that the 3rd project was the most modern and was defended by the leaders of the Republic of Armenia in accordance with the present situation of that time.

At the second congress of Western Armenians held in Erivan on February 6-13, 1919, they announced the creation of a united Armenia together with the immigrant Western Armenian government established by Nubar Pasha in Paris. On May 28, the act on "united Armenia" was adopted.³¹ The Azerbaijani

27 Şükürov və Qafarov, *Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti 1918-1920...*, 283.

28 Şükürov və Qafarov, *Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti 1918-1920...*, 220-222; Шукюров, *Азербайджан в системе международных отношений: 1648-1991...*, 383-385.

29 Şükürov və Qafarov, *Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti 1918-1920...*, 233-236; Шукюров, *Азербайджан в системе международных отношений: 1648-1991...*, 388-395.

30 Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti, *Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri*, 222.

31 *Qafqazda ilk respublikalar (1918-1921)* (Bakı: İdeal-Print, 2021), 232-233.

government immediately implemented countermeasures and held meetings with the British, one of the leading states of the Paris conference, and officials delegates represented in the South Caucasus, where they announced the position of the Azerbaijani side on territorial issues. Thus, ADR delegates agreed to the representation of Armenians in the government and stepped towards establishing normal neighborly relations with the state of Armenia. On May 23, Topchubashov, in his meeting with Louis Malet, a member of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, stated about the settlement of the territorial conflict with the Armenians that “if they leave the borders of Azerbaijan [that is, stop military aggression] the Armenians will be represented by 3 ministers in the government of Azerbaijan and 20 deputies in the parliament.”³²

The meeting with Malet in Paris resulted in the British determining decisions in favor of Azerbaijan. Thomson, the head of the British mission in the Caucasus, supported the idea that Karabakh should be part of Azerbaijan. On May 19, 1919, Mallet replied to the Armenian representatives who protested at the Paris Peace Conference that “any solution can only be temporary.”³³

At the Paris conference, Armenian representatives commenced to propagate allegations about the massacre of the Armenian population in Karabakh by Kh. Sultanov. In June 1919, Priest Vahan and M. Bahaturyan, both members of the Karabakh Armenian National Council, presented a memorandum expressing the intentions of the Armenians in Karabakh to General Thomson in Baku. The memorandum objected to the existence of the governor general representing the government of Azerbaijan in Karabakh and indicated 4 ways to solve the problem: 1) Reunification of Karabakh with Armenia pending the decision of the Peace Conference; 2) Re-establishing the Karabakh government that existed before the capture of Karabakh by the Turks; 3) The appointment of a British governor-general who would ensure the interests of local Armenians and Muslims in the Armenian part; 4) The appointment of the British governor-general by providing the right of self-government to all of Karabakh meaning both Armenians and Tatars (Azerbaijani Turks).³⁴ The offer of the Armenians was not accepted.

Armenian government representative Vardanyan stated in his epistle that the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan reported to the representatives of the Republic

32 *Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti, Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri*, 301-302.

33 *Документы Британского национального архива по истории Южного Кавказа 1918-1920 годов* (Баку: Турхан ИПО, т. 1, ч. 1. 2020), 305.

34 *Документы Британского национального архива по истории Южного Кавказа 1918-1920 годов* (Баку: Турхан ИПО, т. 1, ч. 1. 2020), 369.

of Armenia in Baku that the British had provided Karabakh to Azerbaijan and thus there could be no other questions about this issue. Vardanyan also added that they would never agree to transfer Karabakh to Azerbaijan.³⁵

Territorial disputes were the main reason why the Armenian representatives at the Paris conference did not respond positively to Azerbaijan's proposal to establish a confederation. Thus, the Armenian representatives who participated in the Paris conference stated that they could join the confederation only in the form of the entire Armenia, which included the territories they claimed in the Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire.³⁶

On January 11, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference adopted a decision on the de facto recognition of Azerbaijan and Georgia as new independent states.³⁷ Earl of Derby from Paris emphasized in his telegram to Lord Harding that the de facto recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan did not apply to their present and future borders, and even the slightest prejudgment could not be made about this issue.³⁸

The recognition of Armenia was to be combined with the agreement with the Ottoman Empire. The de jure recognition of Armenia was confirmed by the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 and the treaty signed on the same day between the Allies and the Republic of Armenia (signed by Avetis Achoranyan, head of the delegation of the Republic of Armenia in Sevres).³⁹

According to the agreement, the Allied Powers and the Ottoman government recognized Armenia within the borders established by the US President W. Wilson (which were canceled as a result of the vote on June 1, 1920). The territory of Armenia defined as 150,000 km² (160,000 km² as indicated in T.M. Asoyan's dissertation⁴⁰) included the regions of Van, Bitlis, Trabzon, and Erzurum. However, the agreement did not specify how these territories would be provided to Armenia and the obligations of the Allies.⁴¹ It is clear that the terms of this agreement concluded with the Ottoman Empire (based in Istanbul) were not accepted by the new Turkish government (based in Ankara) and therefore the terms of the agreement were not accomplished. Consequently, the solution of the issue of de jure recognition and borders of Armenia was practically not implemented.

35 *Документы Британского национального архива по истории Южного Кавказа 1918-1920 годов* (Баку: Турхан ИПО, т. 1, ч. 1. 2020), 369-370

36 Əlimərdanbəy Topçubaşov, *Paris məktubları* (Баку: Azərneşr, 1998), 16-17.

37 *Azərbaycan Paris sülh konfransında (1919-1920)* (Баку: Ozan, 2008), 5-8.

38 Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti, *Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri*, 407.

39 Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti, *Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri*, 45-46.

40 Асоян, *Территориальные проблемы Республики Армении и Британская политика...*, 209.

41 Хачикян, *История Армении...*, 182.

The Paris Peace Conference left the issue of borders to the three republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) unresolved and postponed it until an agreement was reached between them. After the agreement was reached, a commission for the delimitation of borders had to be created.⁴²

The affiliation problem of the territories of Nakhchivan, Zangezur, Karabakh, which are considered disputed between Azerbaijan and Armenia, was not resolved definitively in the international arena either. As a result of the activities of the representatives of Azerbaijan at the international conference in Paris, the solution of territorial issues considered controversial were left unimplemented and was transferred to the responsibility of these parties.

Conclusion

Consequently, the territorial issues that led to disputes and wars between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1918-1920 were not definitively resolved, and this situation caused the civilian population to face social and psychological problems that are still observed today. The affiliation problem of Nakhchivan, Zangezur, Karabakh regions, and part of Kars and Gazakh districts was attempted to be resolved via consultations with representatives of states with conflicting interests in the South Caucasus region, bilateral negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and international conferences and agreements.

The facts presented in the article suggest that British, Turkish, American, and Italian representatives in the South Caucasus region demonstrated support for the position of the Azerbaijani government. The ADR government agreed only with the fact that Erivan was provided to the Armenians, and at the international conference it was agreed that future territorial disputes should be resolved as a result of negotiations between the parties. The territory of Zangezur and a part of Gazakh province were provided to the Armenian Soviet Republic in late 1920 after the collapse of the ADR. In summary, the diplomatic activity of the ADR government on territorial issues can be considered as a historical experience that should be considered as a guiding experience for the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

As a result of the diplomatic activity in the direction of resolving border disputes in 1918-1920, Azerbaijan agreed to transfer Erivan and surrounding territories to Armenians. Later, Soviet Azerbaijan (founded on April 28, 1920) did not object to the transfer of Zangezur and a part of Gazakh district to

42 Ю.Г. Барсегов, *Нагорный Карабах в международном праве и мировой политике. Документы и Комментарий: [в 2 томах]* (Москва: Кругъ, т. 2. 2009), 190.

Armenia. However, these territorial concessions led to larger social (refugees, massacres of civilians), economic (crisis, famine, epidemic) and political (occupation or total dependence) problems. To prevent the re-emergence of socio-political problems in modern times, both sides can agree to resolve territorial issues at the level of international law without claiming territories against each other.

The results of diplomatic activities in 1918-1920 demonstrated that the military solution damaged both states politically, economically, and militarily, and decelerated the general development of the South Caucasus region. Today, both sides regularly hold meetings with the participation of the European Union (EU), Russia, and Turkey in order to delimit and demarcate the borders, as well as resolve relations by peaceful means. In these meetings, Azerbaijan and Armenia put forward their conditions and, as in 1918-1920, the parties still cannot not reach an agreement on the Karabakh issue. In the current case, that is, in the background of the complicated political and military situation between EU countries and Russia, it seems more appropriate to leave the border issues to the responsibility of the two countries, as it was in 1920. Currently, commissions have been created and negotiations are underway to resolve border issues within the interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

a. Archive Documents

Armenia in documents of the U.S. Department of State 1917-1920. Yerevan: Institute of History NAS of Armenia, 2017.

Azərbaycan Paris sülh konfransında (1919-1920). Bakı: Ozan, 2008.

Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti. *Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri.* Bakı: Çəşioğlu, 2008.

Şükürov, Qiyas və Qafarov, Vasif. *Azərbaycan Cumhuriyeti 1918-1920 (Osmanlı Arşiv Belgeleri).* İstanbul: Bilnet Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık. A.Ş., 2018.

Торçубашов, Әлимәрданбәй. *Paris məktubları.* Bakı: Azərnəşr, 1998.

Г. Союзному Верховному Комиссару полковнику Гаскель. Министер Иностранных дел (Баку: 4 октября 1919) // ARDA, f. 894, siy.10, sv.99, v. 8-9.

Господину Командующему Союзными Силами в гор. Баку Генераль Томсону. За Министра Иностранных Дел Зиядханова (Баку: 24 февраля 1919) // Azərbaycan Respublikası Dövlət Arxivi (ARDA), Fond № 970, siyahı № 1, iş № 41, vərəq – 13.

Документы Британского национального архива по истории Южного Кавказа 1918-1920 годов. Баку: Турхан ИПО, т. 1, ч. 2, 2020.

Документы Британского национального архива по истории Южного Кавказа 1918-1920 годов. Баку: Турхан ИПО, т. 1, ч. 1, 2020.

От полковника Виляма Н.Гаскеля Союзного Верховного Комиссара. Председателю Совета Министров Азербайджана (Тифлис: 1 сентября 1919) // ARDA, Fond № 970, siyahı № 1, iş № 93, vərəq – 3-4.

Премьер Министру Республики Армении. От Мусульман Нахчевана (Нахчевань: 15 мая 1919) // Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsinin İctimai-Siyasi Sənədlər Arxivi (ARPIİSSA), Fond № 277, siyahı № 2, iş № 57, vərəq – 14.

Телеграмма. Председателю Совета Министров. От жителей Агдама (Агдам: 15 июня 1919) // ARPIİSSA, Fond № 277, siyahı № 2, iş № 41, vərəq – 36.

Шукюров, Керим. *Азербайджан в системе международных отношений: 1648-1991. Документы и материалы*. Баку: Элм, 2020.

b. Copyrighted Works

Abışov, Vaqif. *Azərbaycanlıların soyqırımı (1917-1918-ci illər)*. Bakı: Nurlan, 2007.

Насиєв, İsmayıl. *Ermənilərin Azərbaycana qarşı ərazi iddiaları və qanlı cinayətləri*. Naxçıvan: Əcəmi, 2012.

Həsənli, Cəmil. *Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin xarici siyasəti (1918-1920)*. Bakı: GARISMA, 2009.

İrəvan xanlığı. *Rusiya işğalı və ermənilərin Şimali Azərbaycana köçürülməsi*. Bakı: CBS, 2010.

İsmayılov, Kamran. *Zəngəzurda Azərbaycan xalqına qarşı soyqırımı (1918-1920)*. Bakı: Turxan, 2014.

Qafqazda ilk respublikalar (1918-1921). Bakı: İdeal-Print, 2021.

Акопян, Софья. *Геноцид армян в период Первой мировой войны и его современные этнополитические и международно-правовые последствия*. Ростов-на-Дону: СКНЦ ВШ, 2006.

Асоян, Тигран. *Территориальные проблемы Республики Армении и Британская политика (1918-1920 гг.)*. Москва, 2005.

Барсегов, Юрий. *Нагорный Карабах в международном праве и мировой политике. Документы и Коментарий: [в 2 томах]*. Москва: Кругъ, т. 1. 2008.

Барсегов, Юрий. *Нагорный Карабах в международном праве и мировой политике. Документы и Коментарий: [в 2 томах]*. Москва: Кругъ, т. 2. 2009.

Мамедзаде, Натиг. *Геноцид азербайджанцев в Карабахском регионе Азербайджана (1918-1920)*. Баку: Турхан ИПО, 2014.

Нифталиев, Илгар. *Геноцид азербайджанцев в Иреванской губернии (1918-1920)*. Баку: Турхан, – 2014.

Хачикян, А.Э. *История Армении (краткий очерк)*. Эреван: Эдит Принт, 2009.

c. Internet Resources

“Azərbaycan Respublikası ilə Ermənistan Respublikası arasında dövlət sərhədinin delimitasiyası üzrə Dövlət Komissiyasının yaradılması haqqında Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin Sərəncamı (23 May 2022)”. *President.az*, accessed January 31, 2023, <https://president.az/az/articles/view/56129>

“Rusiya Prezidenti, Azərbaycan Prezidenti və Ermənistanın baş naziri mətbuata bəyanatla çıxış ediblər (26 noyabr 2021)”. *President.az*, accessed January 13, 2022, <https://president.az/az/articles/view/54424>

Mustafa, N.Y. “1918-1920-ci illərdə İrəvan quberniyası ərazisində azərbaycanlıların soyqırımı”. *Nazimmustafa.info*, accessed April 5, 2018, Bakı, 2010. <http://nazimmustafa.info/?p=251>

BOOK REVIEW / KİTAP İNCELEMESİ

To cite this book review: Fatma Jale Gül Çoruk, “From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa”, *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 47 (2023): 179-183.

Received: 07.06.2023

Accepted: 19.06.2023

Fatma Jale Gül ÇORUK*

FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN TO THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE GLOBAL TRADE NETWORKS OF ARMENIAN MERCHANTS FROM NEW JULFA

*(HİNT OKYANUSU'NDAN AKDENİZ'E: YENİ CULFALI
ERMENİ TÛCCARLARIN KÛRESEL TİCARET AĞLARI)*

Title: From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa

Author: Sebouh David Aslanian

Published: University of California Press, 2011


ISBN: 978-0-520-26687-2

Language: English

Number of pages: 363

The author of this book, Sebouh David Aslanian, is a Professor of History and the Richard Hovannisian Endowed Chair of Modern Armenian History at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He is also the Director of the Armenian Studies Center within the UCLA Promise Armenian Institute. Aslanian, who received an award for

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3807-1501>
Res. Asst. Dr., Ankara University, Faculty of Languages and History-Geography, Department of Caucasian Languages and Cultures, Department of Armenian Language and Culture
coruk@ankara.edu.tr



the book that is the subject of our review, has published numerous scientific articles on Armenian history and Armenian studies.

His book titled *From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa* and published in 2011 is based on Aslanian's doctoral dissertation, which he completed in 2006, and his postdoctoral fellowship research in various archives.

The book consists of nine chapters, excluding the acknowledgments and preface. The book comprises 363 pages in total and there is a separate section between pages 235-305 composed of endnotes titled for each chapter. There is a bibliography between 307-343 and an index between 345-363.

Following a lengthy chapter of acknowledgments, Aslanian conveys the purpose of the book by stating "This book is an attempt to give meaning to the

global history created by a small community of Armenian merchants from Iran by sorting through and analyzing documents they left behind and looking for intelligible patterns and ‘perceptible relationships among facts’” (p. xviii) in the preface. The author explains that his primary concern is understanding how the merchants of this community structured their social lives, understanding their trading practices and the applications that sustained a global network of settlements scattered all over the world, and examining the repercussions of all these on both intra-community and extra-community relations.

The first chapter titled **“From Trade Diasporas to Circulation Societies”** mentions that, in 1605, Shah Abbas I deported some 300,000 Armenians from Julfa and that the Armenians who survived the deportation process were settled in Isfahan (also known as New Julfa), and explains the privileges granted to them by the shah. It is elaborated how the place and importance of Julfa and Julfa merchants in the world trade network increased in the following period and how Julfa became the first point of this established trade network. The chapter, which also includes a critique of the concept of trade diaspora, discusses the necessity of defining the concept of trade network as a “circulation society” (p. 14) and then explains the history of the Indian Ocean.

Despite being presented under a different title, the second chapter titled **“Old Julfa, the Great Deportations, and the Founding of New Julfa”** is in fact a continuation of the first chapter. It provides a general framework for the history of Old Julfa, the Safavid-Ottoman war and the resulting exile, and the establishment of New Julfa, with various references to travelers.

In the third chapter titled **“The Julfan Trade Network I: The World of the Indian Ocean”** and the fourth chapter titled **“The Julfan Trade Network II: The Mediterranean, Northwestern European, and Russian Networks”**, Aslanian examines the development and expansion of the Julfan trade network in the Indian Ocean, Russia, the Mediterranean, and northwestern Europe, presenting a general overview of the Julfan trade network’s circulation attributes. In these chapters, Aslanian states that these chapters are “meant to provide a historical context for subsequent examination of the various types of circulatory flows characterizing the Julfan economy and society”(p. 45).

The fifth chapter is titled **“The salt in a merchant’s letter’: Business Correspondence and the Courier System”**. This chapter emphasizes on the unifying impact of correspondence in the Julfa-based trade network. It attempts to answer questions of how the information network circulated, whether the merchants used couriers to deliver information to each other and how commercial correspondence played a role in long-distance trade. Through extensive archival research and the analysis of thousands of business letters, Aslanian expresses that he concludes that the merchants of Julfa possessed a

complex system of information circulation and makes inferences on the average speed of communication between settlements through letters. Aslanian examines the content of the letters under the headings of political and social news, news about the merchants themselves, and trade news. He states that the commercial letters even included tables that gave the then current price lists of commodities . On the other hand, he underlines that keeping personal commercial books up to date were contingent upon such letters. This chapter, which also presents facsimiles of letters, conveys that business letters could also contain information regarding family matters and that important information concerning trade could even be included in letters bearing bad news, implying that trade was the main subject of correspondences.

The sixth chapter, titled **“The Circulation of Men and Credit: The *Commenda* and the Family Firm”**, “explores the role of the *commenda* contract in Julfan trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by situating the *commenda* within the context of the ‘family firm,’ the basic organizational unit of Julfan commerce”(p. 121). In this chapter, Aslanian argues, again basing himself on available documents and archival studies, that it was the *commenda* system that enabled the Julfa-centered movement of merchants and goods over long distances, and that *commenda* was the single most important reason for the expansion of Julfan trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In the seventh chapter titled **“Trust, Social Capital, and Networks: Informal and Semiformal Institutions at Work”**, it is emphasized that trustworthiness was a key component of long-distance trade. Aslanian notes that trust was even more vital for merchants when they had to appoint representatives, give power of attorney, or lend large sums of money. In this context, this chapter “seeks to provide a historical explanation for the role of trust and cooperation in the Julfan trade network of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”(p. 168). The chapter also discusses the development of the Julfan commercial law, the impact of information contained in commercial correspondence on the formation of mutual trust, informal and semiformal institutions, the merchants’ council, its practices in disputes, and the activities of portable courts.

The eight chapter, titled **“The Center Cannot Hold: The Decline and Collapse of the Julfan Trade Network”**, focuses on the differences between the collapse of polycentric and monocentric trade networks and then describes the decline and collapse of the Julfan trade network in the eighteenth century. Different interpretations of the process leading up to the collapse are detailed in the chapter. Aslanian argues that the Armenian trade network covered different continents and cultures and was a circular community network that also encompassed its own culture, politics, and economy.

In the final chapter, titled “**Conclusion: Comparative Thoughts on Julfan Armenians, Multani Indians, and Sephardic Jews**”, Aslanian states that there are very few studies that comparatively examine trading communities. As a conclusion of the comparison, he states that Julfan and Multani networks had monocentric and distinct commercial habits, while Sephardic Jews had polycentric and flexible habits, and describes that these characteristics had an impact on geopolitical development in trade agreements and took part in different and large markets. On the other hand, Aslanian concludes that what determines the development of a trade network is the organization of very different networks rather than its geopolitical location.

The most important feature of Aslanian’s work is the fact that it is built on primary sources based on his archival research in different libraries around the world. The fact that it is written in a clear and understandable language increases its value. The texts of contracts, maps, tables, and examples of business letters contained in the book also contribute to the visualization of the narrative. In the first pages of the book, Aslanian reconceptualizes early modern trade diasporas as “circulation societies” with their unique networks and demonstrates the importance of information networks and communication in the functioning of long-distance merchant communities of this period. Aslanian’s study thus constitutes one of the main sources for future studies on trade networks.

CALL FOR PAPERS AND STYLE SHEET: *REVIEW OF ARMENIAN STUDIES*

The *Review of Armenian Studies* is a biannual academic journal that was established in 2002 with the aim of publishing academic papers to stimulate inter-disciplinary debate between academics and practitioners on topics relating to Armenian Studies.

The *Review of Armenian Studies* invites paper submissions on any subject related to the journal's scope of research, which include:

- The Armenian revolts in the 19th and 20th century era of the Ottoman Empire
- Historical, political, and social dimensions of the 1915 events
- Various aspects of the dispute over the 1915 events
- Politics in the Armenian world (in Armenia and in the Armenian Diaspora)
- Culture and society in the Armenian world (in Armenia and in the Armenian Diaspora)
- Bilateral relations of Armenia with other countries
- Regional and international politics of Armenia

Review of Armenian Studies is indexed by EBSCO and TÜBİTAK/ULAKBİM.

Manuscript Submission

Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The journal's language is English. *Review of Armenian Studies* accepts academic research that has not been previously submitted to another journal for publication. Submissions must be written in accordance with the standards put forward by the journal, and with a clear and concise language. The journal uses the latest edition of Chicago Manual of Style (full note) as its citation style. Please refer to Chicago Manual of Style official website for further details regarding proper citation methods (www.chicagomanualofstyle.org). *Review of Armenian Studies* recommends the use of automated citation platforms such as "Zotero" or "Citation Machine" to make citation faster and easier for the authors.

Please submit manuscripts via e-mail to Managing Editor Mehmet Oğuzhan Tulun via motulun@avim.org.tr.

Review of Armenian Studies welcomes the submission of manuscripts as articles and book reviews.

Articles should range from 6,000 to 18,000 words and should be approximately 10-30 single-spaced pages in length (including footnotes and bibliography). Articles must be word processed using Microsoft Word, 12 point font, Times New Roman, and should be single-spaced throughout allowing good (1-1/2 inch) margins. Pages should be numbered sequentially. There should be a clear hierarchy of headings and subheadings. Quotations with more than 40 words should be indented from the left margin.

The title page of the article should include the following information:

- Article title
- Names and affiliations of all contributing authors
- Full address for correspondence, including telephone and email address
- Abstract: please provide a short summary of up to 300 words.
- Keywords: please provide 5 key words, suitable for indexing. Ideally, these words will not have appeared in the title.

Book reviews should range from 1,200 to 2,400 words and should be approximately 2-4 single-spaced pages in length (including footnotes), and should be on recently published books on related subjects. Book reviews must be word processed using Microsoft Word, 12 point font, Times New Roman, and should be single-spaced throughout allowing good (1-1/2 inch) margins. Pages should be numbered sequentially. Page numbers regarding the book under review should be given in parentheses within the text, other citations should be given in the footnote section.

Book reviews should have a title. The details of the book under review should be listed with the following details:

- First and last name(s) of the author(s) or editor(s) of the book under review.
- Title of book
- Year of publication
- Place of publication
- Publisher
- Number of pages
- Language of the book
- Price (please indicate paperback or hard cover) if available.

We are now welcoming contributions for the 48th issue of this journal.

Complete submissions are due 15 October 2023.

The editorial office will make every effort to deal with submissions to the journal as quickly as possible. All papers will be acknowledged on receipt by email.



ORDER FORM

Dear Readers,

The entire archive of our periodical publications is available as open access on the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM) website and the DergiPark system.

Please visit the www.avim.org.tr address to find our journal archive and all of our other publications that have been made available as open access.

On the other hand, information on subscription and other book fees is available below for readers wishing to acquire our publications as printed copies.

Name : Address :
Last Name :
Telephone :
E-mail :

Subscriptions

- | | |
|--|----------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal - 6 Months | Annual 200 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Review of Armenian Studies Journal - 6 Months | Annual 200 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal - Per Year | Annual 130 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Avrasya Dünyası / Eurasian World Journal - 6 Months | Annual 220 TRY |

Books

- | | |
|--|--------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler Ömer Engin LÜTEM / (Extended version and 2nd edition) | 15 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Armenian Diaspora - Diaspora, State and the Imagination of the Republic of Armenia / Turgut Kerem TUNCEL | 35 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Balkan Savaşlarında Rumeli Türkleri Kırım - Kıyımlar - Göçler (1821-1913) / Bilâl N. ŞİMŞİR | 25 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Turkish-Russian Academics / A Historical Study on the Caucasus | 20 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Gürcistan'daki Müslüman Topluluklar / Azınlık Hakları, Kimlik, Siyaset | 30 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ermeni Propagandasının Amerika Boyutu Üzerine / Bilâl N. ŞİMŞİR | 20 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ermeni Sorunuyla İlgili İngiliz Belgeleri (1912-1923) / British Documents on Armenian Question (1912-1923) / Tolga BAŞAK | 30 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Türk Ermeni İlişkileri Üzerine Ömer Engin Lütem Konferansları 2021 / Editör: Alev Kılıç | 60 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sovyet Sonrası Ukrayna'da Devlet, Toplum ve Siyaset / Değişen Dinamikler, Dönüşen Kimlikler / Editörler: Ayşegül AYDINGÜN - İsmail AYDINGÜN | 40 TRY |

Contact

Address: Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12/B Daire: 3-4 06550 Çankaya / ANKARA
Telephone: 0312 438 50 23 - 24 • Fax: 0312 438 50 26
E-mail: teraziyayincilik@gmail.com

Account Number:

Terazi Yayıncılık Garanti Bankası A.Ş. Çankaya /Ankara Şubesi
Account No: 181 /6296007 IBAN No: TR960006200018100006296007

Postal Check Account No: 5859221



AVİM
AVRASYA İNCELEMELERİ MERKEZİ
CENTER FOR EURASIAN STUDIES



www.avim.org.tr

ISSN: 1303-5304



9 771303 530402

Price in Turkey: 100 TL
Price Abroad, incl. Postage: 60 USD