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ABOUT

Journal of Diplomatic Research (JDR) is an international peer-reviewed academic journal published electronically on a biannual basis by the Association for Research on Diplomacy (DARD). Concordantly, JDR is open to all original studies on international relations, political science as well as theoretical, historical and methodological studies on diplomacy.

GOAL AND SCOPE

The goal of JDR is to present to the audience the studies on diplomatic history, diplomacy theories, diplomacy studies with quantitative, qualitative and integrated research methods, military diplomacy as well as other interdisciplinary diplomatic research and book reviews.

In this context, JDR stands as an international peer-reviewed academic journal bringing together scientists analyzing the phenomenon of diplomacy from all perspectives.

Diplomatic history, diplomatic theory and new diplomacy types form the primary area of investigation. Principally, JDR presents to its audience the information and understanding in the framework of:

Structural problematiques of the subject of diplomacy, latest understandings, theories and concepts on diplomacy, traditional research on diplomacy, diplomacy law and history, case studies on diplomatic processes and negotiations, application of various research methods on diplomatic research

TYPES OF ARTICLES

JDR accepts four different types of articles and book reviews. The articles include:

Original/Research Article: It is a scientific research article explaining an original argument, event or behavior from a specific theoretical perspective by using accurate methodologies. It is aimed to justify a general or a specific behavior based on the methods used, i.e. quantitative, qualitative or integrated methods. The primary objective of original articles within the scope of diplomatic research is to use primary data and appropriate methodology. This type of original and research articles is encouraged by the journal.

Review Article: This type of studies intended merely for introductory purposes, present an extensive summary on a specific event, phenomena or field. Following an extensive literature review with the purpose of informing audience on any subject related to diplomacy, these studies evaluate the current status of events, phenomena or the field. These studies research out to a wide audience and form the basis for original/research articles on the same subject.

Case Study: This type of studies involves the analysis of single cases or the comparison of different cases of similar nature intending to explain various outcomes of such a comparison. Case studies with an appropriate method presents to audience different perspectives and contributes theoretically to the field.

Methodological Study: These studies aim to test a specific method used in different disciplines or currently used in other fields of social sciences in the context of this specific field of research. The original methodologies of various fields such as anthropology, statistics, psychology and mathematics can be used in research on diplomacy.

Book Review: This type of studies aims to form a view on newly published books with a potential to contribute greatly to the field literature, identify differences and similarities with previously published books, and fill in the gap in the literature.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

** Articles and book reviews submitted to JDR should comply with APA 6 submission guidelines. Endnote or Mendeley APA 6th applications are suitable with the submission guidelines of the JDR. Detailed information on our journal listed below.

** The main text should include the following format: 1.5 line spacing, Times New Roman with 11 type size.

** Information on the type of the submitted work and the word count should be stated at the top left corner of the main text.

** Word counting includes bibliography and appendix: Number of words for submissions are as follows: original/research article 6.000-10.000, review article, 5.000-8.000, case studies 5.000-8.000, methodological studies 6.000-10.000, book reviews 2.000-4.000.

** Each paper must include 150 words English and Turkish written abstract and 750 words extended English summary if the paper was written in Turkish language.

** References

Authors should comply with the draft of American Psychological Association (APA) publication guideline. Link for APA guideline: www.apastyle.org

** Bibliography

Bibliography should include all the sources referenced to in the text. Journal and book titles should be in italic font. Bibliography should be in alphabetical order by author's surname. If reference is given to the same author's different works, a chronological order (most recent work first) should be followed. Page numbers should be provided for periodicals and chapters in edited books.

HAKKINDA

Diplomasi Arařtırmaları Dergisi – Journal of Diplomatic Research (JDR), Diplomasi Arařtırmaları Derneđi (DARD) tarafından elektronik ortamda, yılda iki kez yayınlanan, uluslararası hakemli bir akademik dergidir. Bu bağlamda JDR, uluslararası ilişkiler ve siyaset bilimi başta olmak üzere diplomasi alanına ilişkin kavramsal, teorik, tarihsel ve metodolojik tüm özgün çalışmalara açıktır.

AMAÇ VE KAPSAM

JDR'nin amacı diplomasi tarihi, diplomasi teorileri, nicel, nitel ve karma araştırma yöntemlerini kullanan diplomasi arařtırmaları, askeri diplomasi ve diđer interdisipliner diplomatik arařtırmalar ile kitap incelemelerini, akademik bir okuyucu kitlesi ile buluřturmayı amaç edinmiřtir. Bu bağlamda JDR, kapsamlı bir çerçevede diplomasi olgusunu tüm açılardan inceleyen bilim insanlarının buluřtuđu uluslararası hakemli akademik bir dergidir. Diplomasi tarihi, teorisi ve yeni diplomasi türleri odaklı çalışmalarda JDR'nin temel inceleme alanını oluřturmaktadır. En temel anlamda JDR, okuyuculara ařađıda belirtilen çerçevede bilgi ve fikir sunmaktadır:

Diplomasi konusunun temel problematikleri, diplomasi üzerine en son fikirler, teoriler ve kavramlar, klasik diplomasi çalışmaları, diplomasi hukuku ve tarihi, diplomatik süreçler ve pazarlıklarla ilgili vak'a analizleri, farklı araştırma metodlarının diplomasi arařtırmalarına uygulanması

JDR, yukarıda belirtilen çerçevede tarih, siyaset bilimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, hukuk, iktisat, cođrafya, antropoloji, psikoloji, yöntembilim ve ilgili diđer alanların katkısına açık olup, bu alanların akademisyenlerinin birlikte hazırladıđı çalışmalarda teşvik edilmektedir.

MAKALE TÜRLERİ

JDR, dört tür makale ve kitap incelemelerini kabul etmektedir. Makale çeřitleri:

Orijinal Makale Çalışması: Özgün bir fikri, olayı ya da davranışı uygun bir metodoloji kullanarak, belirli bir teorik perspektifle açıklayan bilimsel araştırma makalesidir. Nicel, nitel ya da karma yöntemler kullanılarak hazırlanan bu çalışmalarda, kullanılan metoda göre genel ya da spesifik bir davranışın açıklanması amaçlanır. Diplomasi arařtırmaları kapsamında orijinal makalelerin, birincil verinin kullanılarak hazırlanması ve uygun bir metodoloji kullanılması öncelikli amaçtır. Dergi kapsamında bu tür orijinal makale çalışmaları teşvik edilmektedir.

İnceleme Makalesi: Bu türden çalışmalarda belirli bir olaya, olguya ya da alana giriş mahiyetinde olup, kapsamlı bir özet sunar. Diplomasi konusunu içeren herhangi bir konuda okuyucuyu bilgilendirme amaçlı geniş bir literatür taraması sonrasında, olayın, olgunun ya da alanın halihazırdaki durumu değerlendirilir. Bu türden çalışmalarda geniş bir okuyucu kitlesine ulaşır ve o alanda yapılacak orijinal araştırma makaleleri için altyapıyı oluřturur.

Vaka İncelemesi: Bu tür çalışmalarda, tek bir vak'ayı ya da birbirine benzer nitelikli iki vak'anın mukayesesini içerecek birbirinden farklı sonuçların nasıl meydana geldiđini açıklar. Uygun bir metotla yazılan vak'a incelemeleri, okuyucuya farklı perspektifler sunabileceđi gibi, teorik olarak da alana katkıda bulunmaktadır.

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Kitap Kriřiđi: Bu tür çalışmalarda, alan literatürüne katkı sağlayacağı umulan kitaplar hakkında fikir belirtmek, alanda kendisinden önceki kitaplarla farklarını, benzerlikleri ve literatürde gördüđu boşluđu açıklamak amacıyla yazılır.

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** Gönderilen her bir çalışmanın sol üst köřesine, yukarıda bahsedilen makale türü ve kelime sayısı yazılmalıdır.

** Kelime sayıları kaynakça ve diđer ekler dahil hesaplanır: orijinal araştırma makalesi 6.000-10.000, inceleme makaleleri, 5.000-8.000, vak'a incelemeleri 5.000-8.000, metodolojik çalışmalarda 6.000-10.000, kitap incelemeleri ise 2.000-4.000 kelime aralıđında olmalıdır.

** Her bir çalışma için 150 kelimelik Türkçe ve İngilizce özet, eđer çalışma Türkçe ise 750 kelimelik genişletilmiş İngilizce özet gönderimi gerekmektedir.

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Kaynakça, metin içinde atıf yapılan kaynakların tamamını içermelidir. Dergi ve kitap isimleri italik olmalıdır. Kaynakça, yazar soyadına göre alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır. Bir yazara ait birden fazla esere atıfta bulunulmuşsa yazarın eserleri, en yakın tarihli olandan en eski tarihli olana dođru kronolojik olarak sıralanmalıdır. Süreli yayınlar ve derleme kitaplardaki makaleler için sayfa numaraları belirtilmelidir.

The Journal of Diplomatic Research

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Editorial Remarks



As the Editorial Board, we are proud to present our latest issue of the Journal of Diplomatic Research (JDR) under the aegis of the Association for Research on Diplomacy (DARD).

As a result of an intense working process, our new issue has emerged. In this issue, with the decision of our referees and the editorial board, it has been decided to publish 1 article in Turkish and 3 articles in English that we think will contribute to the discipline of diplomacy studies and international relations.

In the first article titled “How does the European Union Contribute to Peace?: A Comparative Discussion”, Pınar SAYAN brings into question the effect of peaceful solutions of the European Union for international disputes through the examples of the Western Balkans and Turkiye.

In the second article, Erjada PROGONATI unfolds a new perspective to political science and international relations and focuses on the chaos theory in his work titled “Chaos Theory And Political Sciences”.

In the third article, Fatih Başar KUTLU analyzes the effect of “cyberspace” to the relations of NATO and the EU that have more conventional problems between, and to their politics in general in his work titled “A New Field Between Two Old Allies: Cybersecurity Approaches of EU and NATO (2016-2020)”.

In the final article, Serhat GÜZEL examines the politics of Russia and Germany prior to the First World War and their failure to reach the pre-determined goals by means of the “Coward Chicken Game” model in his work titled “Almanya ve Rusya’nın Birinci Dünya Savaşı Öncesi Politikalarının Korkak Tavuk Modellemesi Kapsamında İncelenmesi ve Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisine Etkisinin Analizi”.

Last but not least, I would like to extend my gratitude to scholars who meticulously reviewed the submitted articles, all our authors who contributed to our journal with their studies, and also the technical team responsible for the preparation of our journal’s publication.

Assoc. Prof. Öner AKGÜL
Chief Editor

Editörden



Diplomasi Arařtırmaları Derneęi tarafından yayınlanan Journal of Diplomatic Research-Diplomasi Arařtırmaları Dergisi'nin yeni sayısını, editör kurulu olarak sizlerle paylaşmanın gururunu yaşıyoruz.

Yoęun bir alıřma srecinin sonucu olarak diplomasi alıřmaları ve uluslararası iliřkiler disiplinine katkı saęlayacaęını dřndęmz yeni sayımızda hakemlerimizin ve editr kurulumuzun kararıyla 3 İngilizce ve 1 Trke olmak zere 4 makalenin yayınlanmasına karar verilmiřtir.

İlk alıřmamızda Dr. ęr. yesi Pınar SAYAN, "How does the European Union Contribute to Peace?: A Comparative Discussion" makalesiyle AB'nin uyuřmazlıkların barıřlıl yollarla zmnde kullandığı yntemlerin etkinlięini Batı Balkanlar ve Trkiye rnekleri zerinden tartıřmaya amıřtır.

İkinci alıřmamızda Do. Dr. Erjada PROGONATI, "Chaos Theory And Political Sciences" makalesiyle kaos teorisinin sosyal bilimlere ve siyaset bilimine getirdięi yeni bakıř aısını gzler nne sermiřtir.

nc alıřmamızda Fatih Bařar KUTLU, "A New Field Between Two Old Allies: Cybersecurity Approaches of EU and NATO (2016-2020)" makalesiyle, NATO ve AB gibi geleneksel sorunlar yařayan iki rgtn sregelen sorunlarından ziyade "siberuzay" yaklařımları incelenerek, bunun iliřkilerini nasıl etkiledięi analiz edilmiřtir.

Son alıřmamızda Serhat GZEL, "Almanya ve Rusya'nın Birinci Dnya Savařı ncesi Politikalarının Korkak Tavuk Modellemesi Kapsamında İncelenmesi ve Avrupa Gvenlik Mimarisine Etkisinin Analizi" makalesiyle Almanya ve Rusya'nın Birinci Dnya Savařı ncesinde izledikleri politikaları ve savař sonrasında farklı dinamiklerle de olsa amalarına ulařmalarını "Korkak Tavuk Oyunu" modellemesiyle incelemiřtir.

Son olarak dergimize deęerli alıřmalarıyla katkıda bulunan bařta yazarlarımız olmak zere, titizlikle hakemlik yapan hocalarımıza ve dergimizin yayına hazırlıęından sorumlu teknik ekibe teřekkrlerimi sunar, iyi okumalar dilerim.

Do. Dr. ner AKGL
Bař Editr



How does the European Union Contribute to Peace?: A Comparative Discussion*

Avrupa Birliđi Barıřa Nasıl Katkı Sađlıyor?: Karřılařtırmalı Bir Tartıřma

Pınar SAYAN**

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) has a variety of mechanisms for contributing to the peaceful resolution of disputes. In this article, I leave traditional tools such as diplomacy, or peacekeeping aside and identify the mechanisms it uses for the accession countries. I argue that the European Union uses four mechanisms of conditionalities, direct imposition, connecting, and legitimizing to contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes. By discussing the effectiveness of these four mechanisms based on case studies in the Western Balkans and Turkey, I argue that although the European Union may achieve more rapid and concrete results with conditionalities, direct imposition, and to a lesser degree with legitimizing; a long-lasting contribution to the peace can only be secured through connecting. However, connecting mechanism is the most difficult to implement and also to measure, as it involves long-term transformation.

Keywords: The European Union, peace, disputes, Western Balkans, Turkey.

Öz

Avrupa Birliđi uyuřmazlıkların barıřçıl yollarla çözümüne katkı sunmak için çeřitli yöntemler kullanmaktadır. Bu makalede, diplomasi ya da barıř gücü gibi geleneksel yöntemleri bir kenara bırakarak, aday ülkeler için kullandıđı yöntemleri tanımlayacađım. Avrupa Birliđi'nin uyuřmazlıkların barıřçıl yöntemlerle çözümü için kořulluluk, doğrudan empoze etme, bađ kurma ve meřrulařtırma olmak üzere dört yöntem kullandıđını öne sürmekteyim. Batı Balkanlar ve Türkiye vakaları temelinde bu dört yöntemin etkinliđini tartıřarak, Avrupa Birliđi'nin kořulluluk, doğrudan empoze etme ve bir dereceye kadar meřrulařtırma ile daha hızlı ve somut sonuçlar elde etme potansiyeli olmasına rađmen, barıřa daha kalıcı katkıyı ancak bađ kurma yöntemi ile sađlayabileceđini savunuyorum. Fakat, bađ kurma yöntemi uzun süreli bir dönüşümü içerdıđi için aynı zamanda uygulaması ve ölçmesi de en zor yöntemdir.

Keywords: Avrupa Birliđi, barıř, uyuřmazlıklar, Batı Balkanlar, Türkiye.

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Introduction

On 9 May 1950, Robert Schuman famously explained the reasons for founding a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) "The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible" (European Union, 1950). Decades later, it became clear that the European integration process commenced with the establishment of the ECSC had been successful enough to prevent any wars among its participating states. As the power and competences of the EU increased over time, it has found itself in a position to develop and implement policies regarding the conflicts of its members, potential members, neighbors, or even states far away.

The policies that the EU develops to contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the impact of those policies have shown a great variety depending on various factors. However, it is fair to claim that the EU is strongest during the accession process although its impact is not always positive. The policies of the EU may contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the candidate and potential candidate states but also they may cause negative consequences or no consequences at all.

In this article, I try the answer the question of how the EU contributes to the peaceful settlement of disputes. In order to answer this question, I compare the cases of the Western Balkan states and Turkey. In addition to the comparative case studies, I use two datasets based on in-depth interviews and focus groups with individuals who have been involved in conflict resolution as practitioners, activists, politicians, consultants, or donors. The first dataset is collected between 2018 and 2020 through semi-structured in-depth interviews with 40 individuals who have been involved in conflict resolution with regards to Turkey's conflicts with Greece, Armenia, Cyprus, and Kurds. The second dataset is collected between 2021 and 2022, after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, through 12 semi-structured interviews and two focus groups with individuals who have been involved in conflict resolution between Armenia and Turkey.

I argue that the EU uses conditionalities, direct imposition, connecting, and legitimizing during the accession to contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes. While the EU may

achieve more rapid and concrete results with conditionalities, direct imposition, and to a lesser degree with legitimizing; a long-lasting contribution to the peace can only be secured through connecting. However, connecting mechanism is the most difficult to implement and also to measure, as it involves long-term transformation.

In the first part of the article, I discuss how conflict resolution became a part of the enlargement process of the EU. Following that, I explain each mechanism and discuss their effectiveness based on case studies.

How did the conflict resolution become a part of the accession process?

The EU may have contributed to the conflict resolution among its members by its mere existence (the most fundamental example is between France and Germany) but it was not necessarily under its competence to involve in the conflicts of its members or candidates during its first decades. The conflict resolution entered in the agenda of the EU in the 1980s because of the conflicts of the new members as the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, Greece, and Spain. However, conflict resolution before the accession was not an obligation for any of them, and the EU had a very limited role initially.

Following the accession of the UK, the European Community (EC) initiated policies for the Northern Ireland conflict. In fact, according to Hayward and Murphy (2012), the EU "learned" the conflict resolution with Northern Ireland. It was also an advantage to have both the UK and Ireland as members (Hayward & Murphy, 2012). The first community program developed in 1994 was called the "Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Countries of Ireland" (PEACE) with a budget of £240 million, whose priorities were employment creation; urban and regional regeneration; cross-border development; social inclusion and investment and industrial development (Teague, 1996). Despite the EU's ambiguous role in the actual resolution (Hayward, 2007; Hayward and Murphy, 2012, 2018; McGarry, 2006; Teague, 1996), it is possible to observe how the EU has been taking those policies as blueprints for its consequent conflict resolution initiatives. Although the EU's role in Basque case was not found as consistent as the Northern Irish case, its contribution to the cross-

border cooperation was acknowledged (Bourne, 2003; McCall & Itçaina, 2018).

Similarly, conflict resolution with Turkey was not set as a precondition for the accession of Greece despite the contrary warnings by the Commission at the time. Yet, there were instances during the pre-accession period when the EC prevented further escalation (Rumelili, 2008). According to Rumelili, Greek accession to the EC created asymmetries between Greece and Turkey, therefore the EC even had a “conflict-enhancing” impact until the late 1990s rather than resolving (2008: 125). After granting candidacy status to Turkey in 1999, the EU initiated cross-border programs to support civil societies and acquired more influence for the resolution. However, fluctuating dynamics of Turkey-EU relations continue to reflect upon the EU’s impact on conflict resolution in this case.

In the following periods, as the number of the applicant states has increased, the conflict resolution in the pre-accession period became an important factor. The major showcase for the EU’s conflict resolution capacity was the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) enlargement. The conflict resolution was seen as one of the legitimacy sources of the enlargement. In the Agenda 2000, it is stated that “enlargement should not mean importing border conflicts” and continues that the applicants should make every effort to resolve their border conflicts before accession (European Commission, 1997: 59). If they cannot, they should be ready to apply to the International Court of Justice (European Commission, 1997). Although this emphasis enabled the EU to involve more in the disputes and conflicts of the candidates, it was not implemented firmly. For example, it was not an accession precondition for Estonia and Latvia to sign border agreements with Russia as the EU considered Russia responsible for the lack of progress (Joenniemi, 2008). A Commission official adds:

“Well, Estonia had a bilateral dispute with Russia, and the same for some of the Balts. But it was not like the same type of situation where it is an internationalized conflict where you have the UN mediation process, you have a split country where there is a real international problem in terms of recognition of some of these entities. That was not the case. You have a bilateral border dispute with Russia and Estonia and Latvia.” (Interview 1, 2018).

Despite long-lasting debates within the EU, and attempts by the EU for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict, the Republic of Cyprus was accepted to the EU without a concrete solution. However, it seems that the EU trusted Annan Plan to be approved by both sides before the accession. The UN-sponsored resolution plan was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots with 65% and rejected by the Greek Cypriots with 75% in a referendum in April 2004. The enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen stated “I personally feel that I have been cheated by the government of the Republic of Cyprus” (EUObserver, 2004). After the failure of the unification of the island and the difficulties it brought to the EU, the EU has been more demanding about conflict resolution. This point was also repeated in my interviews in Brussels. A Commission official stated:

“By the way, on the basis of this problematic experience [Cyprus], the Commission is now putting in the context of the Western Balkans very clear conditions that they have to solve the bilateral disputes before ever thinking about joining the EU. We pressure Kosovars and Serbians precisely to avoid the situation where this unresolved international dispute would be imported into the European Union because it creates a lot of deadlocks.” (Interview 1, 2018).

Overall, the entire enlargement process is becoming more demanding after the CEECs enlargement (See also Braniff, 2011; İçener & Phinnemore, 2015). The reasons can be summarized as the enlargement fatigue of the EU because of the challenges derived from the domestic politics of the member states as well as problems originating from the recent members, candidate, and potential candidate states as can be seen from the quotation below:

“Things are not as easy as they were in the previous big enlargement in the 1990s or the early 2000s. I think one of the reasons is enlargement is more sensitive within the EU. The large enlargements of the 2000s in a sense made the EU less united. It has created more internal difficulties as we can see with the issues of actions against Hungary or Poland or the verification mechanisms with Romania and Bulgaria, also with Brexit. This has led the EU to be much more prudent or cautious in the enlargement. In this sense, it is reflected also in the enlargement strategy of the Commission now which puts more

focus on what we call the fundamental pillars of the enlargement which are the rule of law, fundamental rights, economic governance, public administration reform and to measure the state of play where the countries are in their relations to preparation for enlargement rather than just progress that has been made every year... We are much more careful about measuring where each country stands in its preparation to avoid the pitfalls that we are facing now with Hungary or Poland which are backtracking on some of their previous commitments on issues like rule of law or fundamental rights. We are taking it much more seriously than in the past." (Interview 1, 2018)

As a result, peaceful resolution of conflicts gained more importance for the EU and it has been more active for the Western Balkan states. While the EU may not involve in every single case, it sees it as an obligation to involve in conflict resolution for the states that are on the accession track. On the other hand, recent geopolitical developments at the Eastern borders of the EU forced it to take unexpected steps. The EU responded to the membership application of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia by granting candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and a membership perspective to Georgia after the Russia-Ukraine War despite their ongoing conflicts. Considering how the EU classified these states as "neighborhood states" a not long time ago, it is a curious question how credible the EU's membership perspective is under these circumstances. Here is how a Commission official compared Ukraine and Turkey in 2018:

"So, the Commission's position is reflecting what the Council is saying: we have to treat Turkey as a candidate country and we have to work on this basis. And not treat Turkey as a different third country like Ukraine for example or Morocco. They are important neighbors of the EU but they are in a different category in terms of engagement, the types of instruments and policies that we are promoting, and the kind of dialogue we have with these countries." (Interview 1, 2018).

Nevertheless, with these recent steps, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Moldova are candidates; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Georgia are potential candidates for the European Union.

It is important to underline that the EU's involvement does not always lead to positive

outcomes. Sometimes it does not make a change and sometimes it may contribute to the escalation of the conflicts or creation of the new conflicts (see Cooley, 2019; Christou, 2010; Diez et. al., 2008). In the next part, I discuss four mechanisms that the EU uses to contribute to peaceful resolution of conflicts for its candidates and potential candidates.

Which methods does the EU use for conflict resolution?

Diez and Cooley (2011) and Cooley (2013) identify two strands of the EU's involvement in conflict resolution. The first strand is using traditional foreign policy tools such as peacekeeping missions, diplomacy, or sanctions and the second one is offering accession and association. In this article, I focus on accession and discuss four mechanisms that the EU uses in conflict resolution; conditionalities, direct imposition, legitimizing, and connecting. In the next part, I will discuss each of them based on case studies.

Conditionalities

The use of conditionalities is a fundamental aspect of the EU accession policy. Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel (2003: 496) argue that the EU often uses reinforcement by reward rather than punishment, through which the EU seeks to change the behavior of the accession states by rewarding pro-social and punishing anti-social behavior. As emphasized by Coppieters et. al. (2004), Tocci (2008), Diez, Albert, and Stetter (2008); it is possible for the EU to have a positive impact on conflict resolution through conditionalities.

For example, in 2001, the EU was actively involved in the negotiation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia and supported its implementation by the deployment of an ESDP mission of EUFOR Concordia in 2003 and police missions of EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT in addition to the aid programs (See Ilievski and Taleski, 2009). More recently, Macedonia agreed to ratify the Prespa Agreement in 2019 with Greece to end the name dispute and change its official name to "North Macedonia". Greece had been protesting the use of the official name of the "Republic of Macedonia" since Macedonia gained its independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. For that reason, Macedonia used "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" when it joined the UN in 1993. Macedonia was granted candidacy status in

2005 and the European Commission continuously gave recommendations to open accession negotiations since 2009. Yet, the decision to open accession negotiations was given by the European Council in 2020, only after the end of the name dispute. The membership to NATO and EU was a major incentive for Macedonia to compromise on this issue.

It is not pronounced as a precondition for Serbia to recognize Kosovo (in the end there are EU member states who do not recognize Kosovo) to be an EU member, however, it is expected from Serbia to engage in a dialogue with Kosovo to resolve their bilateral disputes. In 2013, the EU contributed to the signing of the Brussels Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo for further dialogue and reconciliation among themselves. However, no clear results have been achieved yet. More direct results were achieved about the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) though. The EU put the conditionality of full cooperation with the ICTY for the accession of Serbia and Croatia. When Croatia could not, the opening of accession negotiations were suspended in 2005. Only after the full cooperation of Croatia with the ICTY, the relations were resumed (Braniff, 2011). Similarly, when Serbia failed to fully cooperate with the ICTY, particularly for the arrest of General Ratko Mladić between 2005 and 2007, its relations with the EU were stalled (Braniff, 2011).

As seen by the ongoing disputes between Serbia and Kosovo, or delayed progress with North Macedonia, the existence of conditionalities does not always directly lead to conflict resolution. Tocci argues that the effectiveness of conditionalities depends on the value of the benefits that the EU offers and the credibility of the EU's obligations (Tocci, 2008). Similarly, Diez, Albert, and Stetter underline the short-term and highly limited impact of the EU when there is no membership prospect or the membership is secured (2008: 226). These arguments confirm what is well-known in the conditionalities literature; the EU is most powerful during the accession process but loses its power if the membership prospect is not credible or after the accession (See Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, 2020; Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel 2003).

Direct Imposition

Noutcheva (2012) argues that most of the

conceptualization about the conditionalities was done with regards to the CEECs enlargement and through considering the Western Balkans, she underlines another mechanism other than conditionalities, which is "direct imposition". According to Noutcheva (2012), if the domestic legitimacy of the conditionalities is low and the cost of compliance is higher than the benefits, it may lead to non-compliance. In that case, especially in the cases where the states have limited sovereignty, the EU uses its coercive power. If its coercive power is strong, it may lead to imposed compliance. If its coercive power is weak, it may lead to fake compliance and/or reversed compliance.

Two important examples are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The Dayton Agreement was signed after the Yugoslav wars was imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the newly established state is highly ineffective and prone to new conflicts between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. While the EU was not very active during the war, afterwards it became one of the main actors. The Peace Implementation Council was established after the Dayton Agreement which consists of several countries and international organizations. It had a High Representative to foresee the civilian aspects of peacekeeping and peace implementation. In 1997, at the Bonn meeting, the Peace and Implementation Council gave large competences to the High Representative. Between 2002 and 2011, the High Representative also served as the Special Representative of the EU to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2004, the EU deployed EUFOR Althea to replace NATO for peacekeeping, and the European Union Police Mission between 2002 and 2012. While Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential candidate, its accession is largely conditional on its ability to reform the political system that was imposed by the Dayton Agreement. Knaus and Martin explain the coercive powers that the external actors used in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

"In Bosnia and Herzegovina, outsiders do more than participate in shaping the political agenda – something that has become the norm throughout Eastern Europe, as governments aspire to join the European Union. In BiH, outsiders actually *set* that agenda, *impose* it, and *punish with sanctions* those who refuse to implement it. At the center of this system is the OHR, which can interpret its own mandate and so has essentially unlimited legal powers. It can dismiss presidents, prime ministers, judges, and mayors without having

to submit its decisions for review by any independent appeals body. It can veto candidates for ministerial positions without needing publicly to present any evidence for its stance. It can impose legislation and create new institutions without having to estimate the cost to Bosnian taxpayers. In fact, the OHR is not accountable to any elected institution at all. It answers to a biennial gathering of foreign ministries, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which it chairs and whose report it normally drafts." (Knaus & Martin, 2003: 61).

Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008 and is still not recognized by five of the EU member states (Cyprus Republic, Greece, Spain, Slovakia, Romania) in addition to Serbia. To foresee the status issues an International Steering Group (ISG) was established, consisting of 25 members. The ISG established an International Civilian Office and its representative the International Civilian Representative, which were mandated to monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal by the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The International Civilian Representative also acted as the EU Special Representative for Kosovo until 2012. The Comprehensive Settlement Proposal was integrated into the constitution of Kosovo after its independence. The EU launched the European Union's Rule of Law (EULEX) mission in 2008. It is technical and advisory but it also has executive powers in police, justice, and customs. Moreover, as mentioned above, the EU forces Serbia and Kosovo to engage in a dialogue to resolve their issues as Serbia is a candidate country. It is unlikely for any of them to be members without solving the recognition issue.

Therefore, direct imposition is another mechanism that the EU uses by exerting direct power to protectorates and semi-protectorates. The EU had the power of imposing its policies in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina directly because of the weak sovereignty of these countries and the extraordinary mandate of the EU. The accession process, by its nature, is asymmetrical but this mechanism is the one with the deepest power imbalances. Both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are considered potential candidates but they are both post-conflict states with statehood problems prone to further conflicts. Either of them cannot be considered as candidate without solving their statehood problems and conflicts. Because of the post-conflict situation and weak statehood, the EU had direct powers

in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, that it does not enjoy in any other candidate or potential candidate state.

Connecting

The EU connects not only governments and officials but also civil societies of the conflicting sides. In 1954, Allport (1954) developed the highly influential "contact theory", arguing that through direct intergroup contact, it is possible to reduce racial prejudice in the United States (Pettigrew, 1998). However, for this method to be successful, four conditions are necessary: "equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom" (Pettigrew 1998: 66). The support that the EU provides for civil society dialogues since its involvement with the Northern Ireland conflict are based on the contact theory and aimed to increase the connection among the societies (Hayward 2007). Following the Northern Ireland case, the EU has been developing similar programs to connect conflicting sides.

An example of that is the "Civil Society Development Program" supported by the EU in 2002. Through its components of "Local Civic Initiatives" and "Turkish-Greek Civic Dialogue", the Civil Society Development Program supported the cooperation of civil societies in Turkey and Greece until 2005. Moreover, further funds were provided by the EU through the Interreg III Programme and pre-accession funding to Turkey for cross-border cooperation between Turkey and Greece between 2004 and 2006. Another example is the "Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process" that the EU launched between Armenia and Turkey under the Instrument for Stability. The programme consisted of four stages between 2014 and 2021 with one of them supported by the Swedish Foreign Ministry. While the program is managed and implemented by eight civil society organizations from Armenia and Turkey, each phase also has smaller sub-grant schemes to distribute to other civil society actors. The officials at the European Commission believe the contribution of these programs:

"I think one of the main instruments that we've used, and it's not only in the case of Turkey but in many other areas, is what we call the cross-border cooperation program, which is a way to promote good neighborly relations on the very concrete and local scale. And by favoring economic

development, people-to-people contacts, border facilitation, and border crossing facilitation. All these ways of promoting at the local level, at the grassroots level engagement, understanding and if possible, reconciliation, we've done that quite a lot in many of the regions in all the enlargement countries or the new enlargement countries." (Interview 1, 2018).

"I believe that project that you mentioned [Turkey-Armenia normalization] is indeed one that's had quite some clear results on bringing different groups together and making dialogue possible, which otherwise would not be possible. And I think that's what we find important. It increased dialogue between the different nationalities, between the different groups, let's say. And that's what that's a good example and how we can contribute to a peace settlement." (Interview 2, 2018).

"It's important to say that when in this project we will always be with authorities, we tried to put them all together around the table. You know this is not hidden interventions or operations. We work with civil society organizations. We work with many actors involved in this local and regional social life. So this includes authorities from both sides, from municipalities and villages. So it's like an integrated approach and based on soft, let's say, policies or soft activities from culture mainly, and see where we can interact to promote good relationships and stabilization of, normalization of communities." (Interview 3, 2018).

The connecting mechanism involves socialization or social learning, which entails the internalization of new norms and the development of new identities as a result of interactions among the wider societies (Checkel, 2001; Börzel & Risse, 2003; Radaelli, 2003; Coppieters et. al. 2004; Tocci, 2008). Both Turkey-Greece and Turkey-Armenia programs mentioned above were praised by their coordinators and participants for providing precious opportunities to connect with the other side (Interview 4, 2019; Interview 5, 2019; Interview 6, 2019; Interview 8, 2019; Interview 22, 2020; Interview 25, 2020) as can also be seen from the quotations below:

"It went pretty well in terms of me getting to know, discover a whole new world. You know really opened my eyes to Turkey and the political social context" (Interview 5, 2019).

"I think it made an important difference. Earlier, two societies were entirely apart [Armenia and Turkey] and believed everything that they were being told about the other side. But now it is different. There are people from two sides who are in contact. They tell things, stories about their experiences. There is visibility. This is the first difference. Secondly, there is a change in the bureaucracies. Some official institutions who had zero contact ten years ago, now have contact. There is more contact at both levels" (Interview 6, 2019).

"I hope we could make a difference. At that time, we were so young. We thought that we were doing this thing and everything would change tomorrow. But actually, after the Kayafest [Greek-Turkish festival], if you look at the documentary and booklet, you can see that a lot of participants from Turkey and Greece stated how their opinions were changed after these programs. I do not know if it is a widespread change, but still, it was something" (Interview 22, 2020).

"This program made me more open to the news coming from Greece. I won a scholarship to learn Greek in Greece. It changed my doctoral dissertation topic. It changed how I perceive the world" (Interview 25, 2020).

It is rather well-established that the success of these programs varied based on domestic politics, intra-EU politics, or securitization of the conflict (see Diez & Hayward 2008; Diez et. al., 2008). So, it is not surprising that these programs were also criticized for their limited outreach and bureaucratic structures (Interview 5, 2019; Interview 6, 2019; Interview 8, 2019; Interview 11, 2019). The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War particularly had a profound impact on the Turkey-Armenia Program through the cancellation of some projects or hesitance to participate in the existing ones (Focus Group 1; 2021; Focus Group 2; 2021). Therefore, as aiming to transform the larger society, the success of this mechanism is rather more complex, long-term, and for those reasons, difficult to measure (Hayward, 2007; Braniff, 2011).

Legitimizing

While discussing the EU's impact on border conflicts, Diez, Albert, and Stetter describe "enabling impact". Accordingly, the EU's enabling impact occurs when actors within conflict societies refer to the EU to justify their

actions in terms of conflict resolution. The actors can well be from the government or civil society (Diez et. al., 2008: 27). Hayward and Wiener (2008) argue the EU legitimized cross-border cooperation and became an inspiration and model for multilevel cooperation in the Northern Ireland conflict. Rumelili (2008) argues granting the candidacy status to Turkey in 1999 enabled Greece to pursue a different foreign policy by empowering the moderates in both countries and legitimizing the efforts of rapprochement. An interviewee offered a similar view:

“If we went as the foundation, no university from Turkey would accept us. But when we said it was an EU program, we had more positive results” (Interview 8, 2019).

Similarly, the support that was given by the Turkish government for the acceptance of the Annan Plan for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict can be considered another example when the EU was used as a reference point. On the other hand, when the relations with the EU deteriorate, discursive reference to the EU becomes a liability rather than a legitimizing aspect. Kaliber (2016) argues unlike the previous decades, the EU lost its normative value for the solution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey for the relevant NGOs for example.

Conclusion

The European Union started to develop policies for conflict resolution. In addition to the traditional policies, it uses a variety of methods, particularly during the accession process. The first one of them is conditionalities. Conditionalities work best when there is a credible membership prospect or the cost of compliance is low. Through conditionalities, the EU may contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia, and the full cooperation of Croatia and Serbia with the ICTY are examples of how conditionalities contribute positively. However, the lack of progress in the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo shows the limits of conditionalities. The second mechanism is direct imposition. In states where there is limited sovereignty like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the EU uses its direct coercive powers to implement its policies. The third mechanism is legitimizing. This is a more indirect mechanism than conditionalities and direct imposition. With this mechanism, domestic actors use the EU as a reference point

to legitimize otherwise unpopular policies or actions. The fourth mechanism is connecting. The EU has been initiating programs to support civil societies for cooperation since its involvement with the Northern Ireland conflict. While the first three mechanisms may produce more rapid and concrete results according to circumstances, the results of the connecting mechanism are hard to measure. As connecting aims bring and transform wider societies in conflicting states, it is a long-term but more enduring mechanism.

Considering the EU’s more demanding approach to accession and particularly to conflict resolution since the CEECs accession, it would be interesting to observe how the EU will plan to use these mechanisms for the cases of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.

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List of Interviews and Focus Groups

Number	Position	Date
Interview 1	Head of Unit, The European Commission	2018
Interview 2	Programme Officer, The European Commission	2018
Interview 3	Programme Officer, The European Commission	2018
Interview 4	Project Manager, NGO	2019
Interview 5	Project Manager, International NGO	2019
Interview 6	Project Manager, NGO	2019
Interview 7	Project Manager, International NGO	2019
Interview 8	Former Project Manager, NGO	2019
Interview 9	Founder and Director, International NGO; Academic	2019
Interview 10	Project Manager, NGO	2019
Interview 11	Former Project Manager, NGO/Academic	2019
Interview 12	Former Project Manager, NGO/Academic	2019
Interview 13	Project Manager, NGO	2019
Interview 14	Project Manager, International NGO	2019
Interview 15	Project Manager, NGO	2019
Interview 16	Founder and Director, NGO	2019
Interview 17	Founder and Director, NGO/Academic	2019
Interview 18	Participant	2019
Interview 19	Founder and Project Manager, NGO/Academic	2019
Interview 20	Founder and Project Manager, NGO/Academic	2019
Interview 21	Project Manager, NGO	2019
Interview 22	Former Project Coordinator, NGO/Academic	2020
Interview 23	Journalist and Former Political Advisor	2020
Interview 24	Participant	2020
Interview 25	Participant	2020
Interview 26	Honorary Diplomat	2020
Interview 27	Former Project Manager, NGO	2020
Interview 28	Project Manager, NGO	2020
Interview 29	Participant	2020
Interview 30	Founder of an initiative	2020
Interview 31	Participant/Coordinator	2020
Interview 32	Politician	2020
Interview 33	Coordinator, International NGO	2020
Interview 34	Founder of an initiative/Academic	2020
Interview 35	Journalist	2020
Interview 36	Researcher, NGO/Academic	2020
Interview 37	Head, NGO/Academic	2020
Interview 38	Journalist	2020
Interview 39	Politician/formerly Project Manager	2020
Interview 40	Policy Advisor at the European Parliament	2020
Interview 41	Project Coordinator/Academic	2021
Interview 42	Founder of an initiative /Academic	2021

Interview 43	Facilitator/Academic	2021
Interview 44	Participant/Academic	2021
Interview 45	Participant/Academic	2021
Interview 46	Project Coordinator, NGO	2021
Interview 47	Director, NGO	2021
Interview 48	Politician	2021
Interview 49	Academic	2021
Interview 50	Project Coordinator, NGO	2021
Interview 51	Project Coordinator, NGO	2021
Interview 52	Founder of an initiative /Academic	2022
Focus Group 1	NGO workers	2021
Focus Group 2	Academics	2021



Chaos Theory And Political Sciences

Kaos Teorisi ve Siyasal Bilimler

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Abstract

The classic positivist model that has largely enabled the advancement of modern scientific knowledge is somewhat outdated. This paper aims to explore the new doors opened by chaos theory in social sciences, and more particularly in political science. The basic assumption of chaos theory is that in reality there are no closed systems with a given order. Thus, chaos is present in the most diverse phenomena, both in nature and in the daily life of humanity. The description of complex systems can be understood more simply with the butterfly effect analogy: a butterfly that flaps its wings here causes a movement of the air that can lead to a chain of events and can generate a gigantic effect elsewhere. Even small changes by individuals can bring about big changes in the entire system. Chaos has been defined as a dynamical system exhibiting deterministic, complex, irregular, non-periodic behavior and apparently random but maintaining latent order. Even if the path of chaos does not lead to a new paradigm in the social sciences, it nevertheless demonstrates its great potential for possible reflections and applications. This theory was mainly applied as a metaphor for description and analysis but the rhetoric and semantics of chaos brought with them a whole set of new concepts and terms that can be considered as a resource that allows the researcher to develop the knowledges and explore new aspects of the social and political phenomena observed. Chaos theory delivers new tools and methods for the researcher who intends to analyze statistically the evolution of dynamic political systems.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Chaos Theory, Political Sciences, Order, Disorder.

Öz

Modern bilimsel bilginin ilerlemesini büyük ölçüde mümkün kılan klasik pozitivist model, biraz modası geçmiş durumda. Bu makale, kaos teorisinin sosyal bilimlerde ve özellikle siyaset biliminde açtığı yeni kapıları keşfetmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Kaos teorisinin temel varsayımı, gerçekte belirli bir düzene sahip kapalı sistemlerin olmadığıdır. Böylece kaos, hem doğada hem de insanlığın günlük yaşamında çeşitli olgularda mevcuttur. Karmaşık sistemlerin tarifi kelebek etkisi benzetmesi ile daha basit anlaşılabilir: Burada kanat çırpan bir kelebek, bir olaylar zincirine yol açabilecek bir hava hareketine neden olur ve başka bir yerde devasa bir etki yaratabilir. Bireyler tarafından yapılan küçük değişiklikler bile tüm sistemde büyük değişiklikleri beraberinde getirebilir. Kaos, deterministik, karmaşık, düzensiz, periyodik olmayan davranış sergileyen ve görünüşte rastgele olan ancak gizli düzeni koruyan dinamik bir sistem olarak tanımlanmıştır. Kaosun yolu, sosyal bilimlerde yeni bir paradigmaya yol açmasa bile, olası yansımalar ve uygulamalar için büyük potansiyelini göstermektedir. Bu teori esas olarak betimleme ve analiz için bir metafor olarak uygulandı, ancak kaosun retorik ve semantiki, araştırmacının bilgilerini geliştirmesine ve yeni yönlerini keşfetmesine olanak tanıyan bir kaynak olarak kabul edilebilecek bir dizi yeni kavram ve terim getirdi ve de sosyal ve politik olgular gözlemlendi. Kaos teorisi, dinamik politik sistemlerin evrimini istatistiksel olarak analiz etmeyi amaçlayan araştırmacı için yeni araçlar ve yöntemler sunar.

Keywords: Kaos Teorisi, Siyasal Bilimler, Düzen, Düzensizlik.

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Introduction

Chaos is a confusing term. The etymological origin of chaos is Greek. This concept derives mainly from mathematics and physics and, through the developments of systems theories, information, cybernetics, evolution, thermodynamics of systems far from equilibrium and chaos, with the passage of time it has been object of study of other disciplines, such as the social ones, to establish an alliance between human sciences and natural sciences and to create a "third culture" (Tinti, 1998; 7-12). The discovery and study of the concepts of chaos theory such as non-linearity, unstable equilibria, fractal ensembles, bifurcations and attractors are contextualized in an important period on the level of scientific research. The predominantly accepted definition of chaos which describes it as a long-term aperiodic behavior in a limited deterministic system, having a sensitive dependence on the initial conditions (Sprott, 2003), therefore raises some important questions, whether the existence of chaotic trends on the one hand it imposes fundamental limits of predictability, on the other hand it suggests that certain phenomena that evolve over time, showing apparently random behaviors, could be more predictable than we think because they are governed by deterministic laws.

In the light of the considerations set out so far, it seems necessary to "predict the unpredictable", that is to know the non-deterministic part of the dynamics of evolutionary systems. It is therefore necessary to consider that unpredictability is a new category that replaces, in complex systems, what was defined "randomness" of any deterministic phenomenon whose evolution is foreseen over time and whose fate can be anticipated. In other words, "complex systems present in their structure a series of points that specialists call bifurcations and that are characterized by the fact that they are extremely sensitive to the slightest disturbance" (Ibáñez, 2006:82) and the same cause can have a multiplicity of effects.

Many studies on complexity tend to free themselves from those systems of equations on which, in many ways, chaos theory is based, to make use of an interpretative framework and computational tools that prove to be more flexible especially for disciplines less formalized by the mathematical point of view. Not surprisingly, social scientists find a wider field of application in the most recent techniques that make use of

simulation and computational modeling than those of chaos theory. However, the studies of chaos in the social sciences have also been limited for other reasons.

According to many scholars (Capra, 1996) complexity can be considered as a general field of study that is divided into different lines of research including chaos theory. The other fields of study that in recent years have been attracting a lot of interest are mainly represented by the development of cellular automata, genetic algorithms, computational modeling, fuzzy set theory, artificial intelligence, advanced data mining techniques, multi-agent and network analysis.

According to Castellani and Hafferty the social sciences and sociology in particular, can be recognized as disciplines of complexity, but for this recognition to reach a status of maturity, it is necessary that scholars of these fields acquire a greater awareness and dexterity of the techniques of functioning, especially of the agent modeling, computational mathematics and dynamical systems theory.

This work is part of an attempt to familiarize the main concepts of the mathematical theory of chaos in the political sciences. Most of the studies on chaos and non-linearity, and more generally on the use of mathematics in the social sciences, are in fact carried out mainly by physicists, engineers and mathematicians but, in order for scientific research in this sector to achieve actual developments, it is important intervention by social researchers is necessary. On the other hand, observations, improvements and criticisms are constructive when an effective awareness of the issues at stake is acquired. It is clear that the mathematician and the social researcher have distinct roles with different skills, but if there are meeting points, albeit fleeting, between mathematics and political sciences, in order to generate value on a cognitive level, it is important to develop and share a code that favors their communication.

When we want to analyze and apprehend political or social phenomena, we face a scientific object which is by definition different from that of the exact sciences. Political scientists and sociologists have thus discovered that a high degree of unpredictability of the future is the essence of the human adventure. However, some studies and research projects over the past two decades have

assumed that the concepts and tools of chaos theory are an inherent part of the properties of political science.

Crises and rapid changes are present in our world. Political systems also, are complex because they are made up of a large number of mostly unpredictable components. So there is no definitive order in political systems. Specifically, it is about differentiating processes from structures. The structures are ephemeral manifestations with which we intend to explain the processes, but they are not immutable. Therefore policymakers must be prepared to manage such chaotic phenomena (Farazmand, 2003: 340). Part of the solution can be provided by chaos theory which can help us understand and manage the complex problems that arise from highly complex dynamic systems. Chaotic systems can be distinguished from the two other types of system: the constant system, that concerns systems that converge toward a steady state, such as feelings of national identity that often converge toward equilibrium. The other type concerns systems that exhibit stable oscillatory behavior in a repetitive pattern, similar to electoral cycles. The chaotic system, on the other hand, demonstrates an irregular oscillatory process, like countries that float through anarchy, civil war and democracy (Peled, 2000).

It is in this sense that chaos theory provides a methodological tool that helps us better understand the problems that make up a panorama where politics, chaos and the current social environment are linked. When we refer to a chaos policy, we speak of a complex, open and dynamic political system, founded on a multiplicity of heterogeneous variables interconnected in a coherent manner, characterized by being extremely sensitive to disturbances and variations of quantitative or qualitative degrees that would prevent any accurate prediction of future behavior.

1. The world as a set of complex subsystems

If we give a simple definition of complex systems, we can say that they are open systems made up of more or less complex components that interact with each other through numerous non-linear interactions. The thesis that natural, social, economic, political systems are complex, deterministic, unpredictable and unstable subsystems of what we usually call the world, which in turn is a super or hypercomplex system, is now accepted by scientific literature.

With complexity, the reductionist vision of classical science is overcome and a holistic perspective is welcomed in the study of systems, characterized by non-linear dynamics, which allows us to see emerging phenomena that cannot be identified from the individual components of the system but from the global interaction between them. These emerging properties give rise to new forms of self-organization. Technically, "we speak of self-organization when the dynamics of the system have attractors towards which the system tends to move, if it is in the basin of attraction of one of these." (Bertuglia and Vaio, 2009, p. 321). According to Byrne (1998), the adoption of new ways of conceiving science that sees its future in complexity was necessary to meet the challenges of the changes of recent decades such as post-industrialization, the global economy, environmental collapse, political and cultural conflicts and all those events, the study of which proved inadequate with the traditional tools of science. According to Morin (2007), if on the one hand the complexity becomes the bearer of that sense of uncertainty for a long time rejected, on the other it proposes the development of a multidimensional thought that shows how the various specialized disciplinary categories contemplate common aspects that at the same time need to be distinguished and communicate.

The interdisciplinary nature of complexity, which makes a precise and commonly accepted definition of it difficult, has nevertheless generated numerous misunderstandings which, as Castellani and Hafferty (2008) recall, need to be dispelled. If on the one hand, over the last fifty years, the complex approach has been used in very many areas of investigation, on the other hand, it should be borne in mind that complexity is a sector of empirical research with very specific characteristics that is not bound by a particular political or moral agenda and also far from being considered as a kind of wholeness, it is beyond a metaphorical vision or an almost spiritual attitude according to which every aspect of reality is necessarily interrelated with another.

Another misconception to be overcome is the frequent identification of chaos with complexity. Surely the studies of chaos theory concerning irregularities, bifurcations, attractors, sensitivity from initial conditions and fractal ensembles have given a strong contribution to the study of complex systems by proving that they are unstable, more difficult to control and know, operate in a position far from equilibrium (Kauffman, 1995; tr. it. 2001)

and can give rise to spontaneous processes of self-organization. However, chaos is not complexity. Therefore, not all chaotic systems are complex. Indeed, even very simple systems are chaotic. Rather, it happens that, starting from a restricted and "simple" set of initial possibilities, as time goes on, the universe of possible evolutions of a chaotic system can become increasingly complex. Vice versa, a complex system does not necessarily show chaotic behavior. Indeed, complexity "is configured as a particular intermediate situation between stable equilibrium and chaos, a situation in which the system manifests a behavior that is different from both the tendency to stable equilibrium and the tendency to chaos" (Bertuglia and Vaio, 2007 p. 304).

By generalizing the typology of the complex system, whether natural or social, we know that it is open and presents, before its point of catastrophe, periods of stability and equilibrium. When the system reaches the point of catastrophe (as a characteristic parameter of the system increases up to its critical point) there is discontinuity. At this point the behavior of the system, described by a variable choice that will characterize it, follows a non-linear trend. Complex systems, even if they have fluctuations, are still attracted towards stability, that is towards the production of entropy which therefore represents an attractor for such systems. Systems are therefore usually immunized from fluctuations, from the "bubbling" of elemental activity and from deviations from the average laws of entropy production that this "bubbling" generates relentlessly. It will then be said that the system is resilient. However, when an internal or external force, acting on the system, reaches high enough values to make it come out of the linear region - which is understood to be deterministic - independence from fluctuations can no longer be guaranteed.

Sometimes we speak of systems on the edge of chaos (Kauffman, 1995; tr. It. 2001). In these situations the system is unstable if certain fluctuations can amplify up to invade the entire system pushing it to evolve towards a new regime that can be qualitatively different from the stationary states of entropy production. At this point, the system can still tend towards equilibrium, or it can move towards the point of non-equilibrium which is given the name of the point of catastrophe or the edge of chaos. Ultimately, therefore, when a complex system is subjected to a high force, external or internal, it

undergoes fluctuations that make it unstable. In such conditions of instability the system reaches the point of catastrophe and at this point a new regime evolves, impossible to predict a priori.

It is easy to understand that the "edge of chaos" is paradoxically a critical point, because it is at the same time, a point of dynamic stability and instability. Unpredictability is the consequence of this paradox. It can be said that at the point of catastrophe, on the edge of chaos, the prediction is "unpredictable" rather than probabilistic, while among the points before the catastrophe we can speak of the predominance of deterministic laws. Therefore, since the evolution of a complex system is a continuous alternation of equilibrium (strong determinism) and non-equilibrium (weak determinism), it is easy to understand how classical science is not outdated but should only be considered insufficient (weak). The role of the point of catastrophe is fundamental as it arises as a break with the past: the reassuring presence of the a priori is missing.

2. Deterministic chaos theory, exact sciences and social sciences

The world has always been a complex system in continuous and unpredictable evolution. This lapidary statement contains the most burning problem that the 21st century proposes to us and with which we must confront and which requires a revolution of thought to be faced. Henry Poincaré at the end of the 19th century, spoke of the unpredictability of a system of three bodies interacting with each other. Later it was shown that unpredictability is typical of chaotic systems and that contrary to what is commonly thought, chaotic behavior is apparently messy. If we manage to acquire some new intellectual categories it will be possible to identify a new way of "seeing", "experiencing" and "building" the world. The difficulty of adapting to the dizzying pace of change in the current world derives above all from the inability to predict its changes in advance and to accept that the world is a constantly evolving system, which has become increasingly complex due to the small number of subsystems that compose it and of the growth of their interactions, has made what yesterday we thought unpredictable is now an inevitable reality.

Since the end of the 19th century, scientific and philosophical thought has experienced profound moments of transformation and questioning of

the main theoretical and practical foundations of knowledge such as time, space, perfect determinism, the relationship between causes and effects.

The discoveries of quantum mechanics with Bohr's principles of complementarity, Heisenberg's uncertainty and Einstein's relativity revisited that idea of science based on the correct prediction and replicability of the result of an experiment, bound by certain conditions of observation and control and advocate of a nature considered fundamentally simple and orderly. The subsequent appearance of chaos theory further contributed to redesigning the terms of the question, proclaiming the "end of certainties" (Prigogine, 1996). These studies first marked a clear departure from rigid determinism, defined as "a particular thesis on the causal structure of the world ... so strong that, given a complete description of the entire state of the world at a given instant of time, then, with the help of read, any past or future event can be calculated" (Hempel, 1952: 271). This vision was advanced mainly by Laplace according to which "we must consider the present state of the universe as the effect of a given previous state and as the cause of what will be in the future." (Laplace, 1814; tr. it. 1967: 243-4).

As Bertuglia and Vaio (2007) recall, science, starting from the Enlightenment period up to the beginning of the twentieth century, confused the concept of determinism, i.e. the possibility of identifying direct links between causes and effects that can be expressed by means of laws, with the linearity of the laws themselves, i.e. the assumption that the link between causes and effects is proportional. "Attributing the properties of linearity to determinism involves the assumption that a deterministic model, being therefore linear, must necessarily contain all the information needed for the exact and complete prediction of the future, as happens, precisely for models linear" (ibid: 279). With chaos theory, however, the idea of determinism, far from being an exclusive feature of linear systems, is extended, albeit in weaker but certainly more realistic terms, to non-linear ones as well.

The discovery of chaos theory is traditionally traced back to the publication in 1963 of the article *Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow* by Edward Lorenz, in which the American mathematician devised a non-linear dynamic model for the description and prediction of convective

motions in the atmosphere and found that small variations in the initial conditions they produced large variations in the long-term behavior of the system; in addition to this phenomenon, known as the sensitivity of a system with initial conditions and which became famous with the well-known metaphor of the "butterfly effect" according to which a flapping of the wings of a butterfly in Brazil could cause a tornado in Texas. Lorenz's study and subsequent works by Mandelbrot, Ruelle, Feigenbaum, Yorke and others marked the birth of so-called deterministic chaos, an apparent contradiction in terms, since chaos is commonly associated with an idea of disorder and lack of rules, while the concept of determinism is attributed to predictable and regular phenomena (Bischi et. al., 2004). If, on the one hand, therefore, the discovery of deterministic chaos imposes restrictions on the predictive power of science, on the other it allows the detection of hidden and regular structures in apparently random. The theory of deterministic chaos is in fact considered as a theory of order (Capra, 1996), a hidden order that underlies phenomena with irregular appearances (Gleick, 1987; tr. It. 1989).

3. Chaos and randomness

Recognizing the dynamic nature of a system and studying any instability, chaos theory allows hidden regularities to emerge through the identification of "traces" of determinism; the presence of these elements makes it possible to describe the system and provide a short-term forecast. In the light of what has been described, chaos can therefore be understood as a class of signals that have an intermediate behavior between a regular and predictable trend and an accidental or unpredictable one. Thus, the difference between determinism and chaos paradoxically manifests itself in the sensitivity to the initial conditions that determine the trajectories of the evolution of a dynamic system. Two almost similar initial conditions can lead the complex, chaotic system to two very different evolutionary dynamics. Since complex systems are chaotic, it is therefore impossible to predict their evolution as well. To understand how determinism (order) and chaos (disorder), apparently contradictory paradigms, coexist in the same system, it's useful to introduce the instrument of catastrophe by affirming, moreover, that complex systems evolve through catastrophes.

Chaos shows that currently there is still a tendency, revealed in our everyday language,

which associates the notion of chaos with those of disorder, turbulence, anarchy and confusion. These interpretations of chaos are often associated with random behavior, which is a state of maximum entropy, a characteristic that does not represent the particularity of chaos in the technical sense of the term.

In fact, chaos is not random at all because in a system that has randomness, anything is possible. In a chaotic system, given a specific point in the system's trace, the next point also cannot be predicted. Even so, it is among a large number of possible future states, but this number is never infinite. In this chaotic phenomenon, it is impossible to predict what is possible to happen, what will happen is a consequence of a set of alternatives greater than one, but less than too many that would be impossible to process (Byrne, 1998). Even if a trajectory can also exhibit random behavior, it normally follows certain evolutionary trends, even if it is much more complex and non-periodic than imagined at first glance. In a much more restrictive perspective, trajectories can also be interpreted as a transitional paths through which the system passes to reach another point of stability. (Jong, 1999) In terms borrowed from applied mathematics, chaos refers to complex, irregular, non-periodic deterministic behavior with an appearance of randomness but conserving an invisible order. For all that, statistical practices cannot completely be rejected because even deterministic models retain a complete collection of statistical measures (Brown, 1995).

4. Chaos and political science

In 2008, in full financial crisis due to the unexpected collapse of some American banking systems, a perplexed Alan Greenspan, one of the most quoted economists, chairman of the United States Federal Reserve until 2006, admitted before the United States Congress about the his beliefs: "I found a flaw. I don't know how serious and lasting. But the mere fact that it exists has upset me. The deputy who questioned him asked him: "In other words, you discovered that your worldview, your ideology, was not right, that it did not work." The economist replied: "Precisely. That's right. This is exactly what struck me. Because I went on for more than forty years in the absolute certainty that it worked perfectly".

Probably it is not necessary to hear about Greenspan to get an idea of how unpredictable today, in the eyes of all, the dramatic events

of epochal significance that took place on the environmental, social, cultural and political level that were not intuited in advance and managed with foresight.

There are no universal absolute laws when it comes to the social sciences. Paradoxically, this empirical world is governed by casuistry. Absolute universal laws are an illusion, since the growing complexity of social phenomena prevents us from giving infallible answers to the problems that are imposed in the framework of human relations. Democracy is the political summum, to intervene on these collective problems, or to govern the chaos and imprint an order.

Chaos theory is a branch of mathematics which, by analyzing the dynamics of a system with its possible instabilities, allows hidden regularities to emerge, identifying "traces" of determinism. This is clearly a different determinism from that imposed by the classical view of science because it insinuates itself into non-linear systems that are extremely sensitive to initial conditions. According to Brown (1995), social systems have all three fundamental characteristics of chaos: periodicity, sensitive dependence on initial conditions and only short-term prediction.

In fact, they are aperiodic as they are often the result of behaviors that are repeated over time, but never in the same way, because they are the result of a unique and unrepeatabe path; then they present a sensitivity from the initial conditions, given that small perturbations change and sometimes distort the history of a phenomenon; for these reasons it is possible to contemplate a forecast only in the short term. Furthermore, social systems are characterized by an almost total lack of linearity (McBurnett, 1996). Despite these characteristics, the study of chaos in the social sciences has met with much resistance due to a number of general reasons. First, chaos theory requires a massive use of mathematical analysis that is generally not the subject of study by social researchers (Harvey and Reed, 1996). Furthermore, as Trobia (2001) recalls, unlike studies of chaotic dynamics, most of the methods and techniques of social research consider social phenomena as if they were static, limiting themselves to photographing a certain situation at a given time.

Reality is a social construction, in which movement, transformation and renewal prevail. For this

reason, a constant review of our methodological principles is becoming increasingly necessary. Chaos theory applied to political science provides plausible paths for the interpretation of political phenomena from perspectives that do not border on the lapidary. Its study and understanding is important if we intend to provide solutions to the different theoretical and methodological challenges that reality imposes, without this meaning that there is a solution for each and every one of the social problems, since human behavior cannot be defined by means of models, be these scientists or mathematicians.

Chaos theory is on a par with complex thought theories, in which Edgar Morin (1990: 146) develops his dialogical method in which all uncertainties are confronted, but which breaks with dialectical confrontations. For him, "complexity is the dialogical order/disorder/organization. But behind the complexity, order and disorder dissolve, distinctions fade. The merit of complexity is to denounce the "metaphysics of order." Morin's dialogic "allows duality to be maintained within unity. It associates two terms that are both complementary and antagonistic" (Morin, 1990: 106)

A diversity of paths to consider; chaos, total error and not the sum of errors, is a trend where uncertainty and heterogeneity converge. From the realm of uncertainty (García, 2011): "the need in the accident and the accidental in the need, is one of the fundamental ideas of a new science, which some call, together with the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, the third great scientific revolution of the 20th century: chaos theory. This theory, which is barely over thirty years old, has opened a promising line of research to understand complex and contradictory phenomena that seemed indecipherable to human knowledge and has dialectically transformed the idea of determination in science."

There is a new dialogue between the methodologies of the exact sciences and the social sciences, which leads to new theoretical proposals of a transdisciplinary nature. From history, Fernand Braudel was inspired by the theories of uncertainties of the Nobel Prize in Organic Chemistry, Ilya Prigogine, to argue his concept of world-economy. Immanuel Wallerstein, equally influenced by both scientists, takes up those founding approaches of chaos theory in his proposal on the world-system, in which he also attempts to update Ludwig von Bertalanffy's

systems theory, to the unpredictability of imbalance-disequilibrium as an explanatory pattern of change. In the social sciences in general and in political science in particular, the last four decades have seen a profound theoretical debate between systems theory (Luhman, 1992) information theory (Castells, 2006) and certain neo-Marxist efforts (González Casanova, 2012 3), for building bridges between science, technology and social thought. For the understanding of the relationship between politics and chaos, the contribution made by Ilya Prigogine from the physical-chemical field is decisive, by postulating that "chemical imbalances do not always lead to anarchy, but sometimes allow the spontaneous appearance of perfectly ordered organizations or structures, dissipative structures, and thus showed that non-equilibrium states can lead to both disorder and order" (Casau, 2009).

In this sense, the field where the limits between myth (necessity-accident) and chaos pierce today is in the understanding of international politics. The world-system, the role of nation states, governance and world governability; a set of concepts associated with the idea of world order, clearly antagonistic to chaos, to runaway globalization (Arrighi and Silver, 2001).

From the theory of the world-system, Immanuel Wallerstein (2005, 4) locates the disruptive character of chaos, but also locates the ordering elements that give system and with it certain regularities and laws that allow understanding the contradictory realities that try to be governed by political means, in whose sense intellectuals can influence. Crisis and chaos are assimilated one to the other. Given the complexity involved in international politics, and the struggle for power as the engine of "disorder", critical geopolitical thought offers plausible ways of interpreting chaos. War and armed conflicts are its maximum expression, but its essence lies in the search for an ordering power, for certain "balances".

Chaos theory is particularly useful in the field of peace research. Chernus (1993) asserts that the quest for order at all costs can only lead to failure. For him, it is paradoxical that states resort to the military option in order to bring order and peace to our fragmented societies.

Firstly, the more the potentialities are diverse and present in a given situation, in terms of both the role of the actors and the interactions between them, the greater the probability of peace

(Galtung, 1975).

Second, chaos theory seeks to model entire systems, emphasizing patterns of overall behavior rather than isolating cause-effect relationships of specific parts of the system (Mesjaz, 1988). Through this approach, chaos theory has shed light on the fact that many social systems are not simply ordered or disordered: some are ordered at times and disordered at others; still others, indicating a constant chaotic behavior, show an important more global stability. Therefore, the notion of stable chaos and randomly ordered points indicate a new way of conceiving peace. Chaos theory allows us to grasp nature and society which is inherently peaceful not because it is orderly but rather because it is fraught with disorder. "Nature would become the model for peace not only because of its diversity and associative qualities but especially because of its transcendence of the distinction between order and disorder" (Chernus, 1993: 113).

Finally, the author sees peace as a random cycle that repeats itself at all levels of actions between people, including the base that is the family up to the level of nation states. Therefore, many peaceful policies are needed to create a peaceful environment for the creation of an overall peaceful politics, with each level of politics demonstrating a harmonious pattern of organization.

Betts (2000) has pointed out that the application of chaos is important for national security and state strategies. Sometimes the results of the applied strategies are not the desired ones of the governments and to get the intended effects, the application is in chaos. This complex phenomenon excludes the control of the causes that produce the desired effects. For this reason, it has been noted that there is little connection between the previously designed strategies and the achieved results. The author emphasizes the characteristic of sensitivity to the initial conditions of chaos theory because he perceives war as a non-linear system that produces erratic behaviors, through disproportionate relations between inputs and outputs (Beyerchen, 1992). However, Betts concedes that although nonlinearity is common to military strategies, it is not absolute or dominant. "If chaos theory meant that no prediction is possible, there would be no point in any analysis of the conduct of the war" (Betts, 2000: 20). Although there is a lack of faith in the predictability of strategies, one should not reject all prediction at the same time as denying

all rational aspects of strategy. Finally, it should be emphasized that the non-linear perspective alters the structure of the problem since military strategy deliberately seeks imbalance, that is, a means of beating one's enemy rather than seeking a mutually acceptable balance.

More precise but still rhetorical examples of the application of chaos theory in the field of international relations can be found in the case of revolutions (for example, that in Iran in 1978-79), considered as non-dynamic dynamic changes from the massive eruption of chaotic uncertainties and bifurcations (Radu, 2000). Other authors refer to small-scale events (such as the role of an individual like Adolf Hitler or Alexander the Great) creating bifurcations and having large-scale chaotic consequences (Farazmand, 2003).

Weisberg (1998) observed, using a particularly original application of chaos theory to political science, that the more frequent the measurement, the greater the observed change. He finds more electoral change when measuring these changes at shorter time intervals. The aspect of chaos theory concerning fractal objects is interesting in order to understand electoral change. According to this theory, scale is important when dealing with certain objects because it allows you to measure many more irregularities with a finer unit of measurement. Fractal geometry suggests a similar result when measuring change over time in political science. In addition, the author confirms the linearity of voting intentions in elections, but points out that certain small events during the campaign can be responsible for larger changes. In the long term, chaos makes predictions about politics impossible.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to explore the new doors opened by chaos theory in social sciences, and more particularly in political science. Thus the main foundations of chaos theory were laid out and sought to understand its uses in the political sciences. Even if the path of chaos does not lead to a new paradigm in the social sciences, it nevertheless demonstrates its great potential for possible reflections and applications. A chaotic system is certainly unpredictable but it is perfectly described by simple and deterministic equations. A system is defined as deterministic when it is possible to predict (calculate) its evolution over time: the exact knowledge of the system at a given instant; the initial state, allows to calculate

(predict) precisely the state of the system at any other time.

First, this theory was mainly applied as a metaphor for description and analysis. The rhetoric and semantics of chaos have brought with them a whole set of new concepts and terms which are particularly useful in order to grasp political phenomena, such as, for example, points of bifurcation, sensitivity to initial conditions, self-similarity, oscillations, dissipative structures or even entropy. This new and rich vocabulary can be considered as a resource that allows the researcher to develop his knowledge and explore new aspects of the social and political phenomena observed. Because not only do these terms bring with them the precision and experience of the mathematical and physical fields, but they sometimes also lift the veil on certain aspects of our phenomena whose meaning and/or full implications may have escaped us.

In addition, and mainly applied in the fields of public policy and the sociology of organizations, chaos theory has introduced a more empirical and quantitative approach. Chaos theory offers new models and tools for researchers based on which the evolution of political systems can be analyzed. All these new tools and models are a good complement to the traditional scientific tools. The innovative aspects of chaos theory are promising in terms of the analysis of the temporal evolution of actors and political institutions. The evolution in space, that is, its trajectory, allowed to the built system is of only three types. The first, defined as stable, static or dynamic equilibrium, provides that the state of the system stops and does not change anymore; it is said to crystallize (static) or "spin around", caged, in a Euclidean space called the "limit cycle" which does not allow it to evolve. In the second type, the trajectory of the system in space moves in an irregular way, so much so that it is said that it has "gone mad" and cannot reach an equilibrium. The third type is the one called "edge of chaos" or "edge of chaos". In this case, the trajectory of the system is attracted to a particular region of space called the "attractor basin" within which the system moves, fluctuates, more or less regularly, around an attractor while maintaining an unstable dynamic equilibrium.

Biological, economic, political and social systems live on the edge of chaos. But if a perturbation, defined as critical, manages to "blow up" the system beyond the "edge of chaos", out of its

attracting basin, therefore far from its attractor, it can fall into chaos or find a new equilibrium completely different qualitatively from the one from which it has been removed. The system is evolutionary. Chaos theory can be briefly concluded with Laplace's famous mathematical intelligence: "We must therefore consider the present state of the universe as an effect of its previous state and as the cause of its future state. An intelligence which, for a given instant, knew all the forces of which nature is animated and the respective positions of the beings that compose it, would embrace in the same formulates the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and of the lightest atom: nothing would be uncertain for it and the future, like the past, would be present in its eyes."

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A New Field Between Two Old Allies: Cybersecurity Approaches of EU and NATO (2016-2020)

Eski İki Müttefik İçin Yeni Bir Alan: AB ve NATO'nun Siber Güvenlik Yaklaşımları (2016-2020)

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Abstract

In this article we will analyze the approach of two well-known allies, NATO and EU, to a new dimension, Cyberspace, which brought a perspective to International Relations, and will try to understand how it could affect the relations between these organizations while there remains the conventional problems such as non-dual members and duplication of structures. Cyberspace, due to its nature, requires a well-organized and coordinated attitude to prevent damage that can be caused by malevolent actors through this new dimension. Therefore, nations and security organizations, The European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization in our case, should first get familiar with the nature of this dimension and following this must create a rapidly working information sharing and development web between like-minded actors. In this sense, we will also try to discuss the common threats according to these two like-minded organizations and finally point out the possible solutions against these threats.

Keywords: EU, NATO, Security, Cyberspace, Cyber Security.

Öz

Literatürde genel kabul gördüğü üzere NATO ve Avrupa Birliği (AB), ikili üyelik sorunu ve organizasyonel yapıda çakışma gibi geleneksel sorunlar yaşayan iki önemli örgüttür. Bu geleneksel sorunlar dışarıda bırakılarak çalışmada her iki örgütün "siberuzay" yaklaşımları incelenerek, süregelen ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediği analiz edilecektir. Bilindiği üzere siberuzay, doğası gereği olası zararları önleyebilmek adına katkı veren devletlerin yüksek bir uyum içinde ve ortak hareket etmesi gerek bir özelliğe sahiptir. Dolayısıyla NATO ve AB'nin de siberuzayda benzer güvenlik kaygılarına sahip aktörler olarak hızlı bir şekilde işleyebilecek bilgi paylaşımı ve gelişim ağı kurması gerekmektedir. Kuruluş değerleri bağlamında ortak birçok paydaya sahip olan bu iki organizasyonun güvenlik planlamalarında da ortak hareket etmelerinden daha doğal bir durum beklenemez. Zira siberuzay, insanlığın gelişimini destekleyebilecek şekilde barışçıl amaçlarla kullanılabilmesi gibi değişen ve gelişen savaş boyutları bağlamında barışçıl olmayan amaçlarla da kullanılabilir. Bu bağlamda çalışmada NATO ve AB'nin "siberuzay" stratejileri inceledikten sonra, aktörler arasındaki sorunlara muhtemel çözüm önerileri getirilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB, NATO, Güvenlik, Siberuzay, Siber Güvenlik.

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Introduction

Last two decades has been a great opportunity for emerging technologies to reach its peak point. While on the one hand they create an easier and more interactive future for us with facilitating our daily lives, on the other hand they are revealing new contexts to take advantage of, for malevolent actors. Besides, our lives now have been almost twenty-four hours of interaction with artificial intelligence.

Emerging technologies are also serving as a backbone of any country in a manner of political, economic and military development. Not just as an additional tool but more as an essential requirement of well-continuity.

In fact, integration of those systems which in total can be named as “Cyberspace” goes deeper and more developed in time with getting integrated with states’ daily functions. Hence, they also attract attention of rogue actors.

Through time, this integrity and advancement also brought the requirement of a multidisciplinary approach to cyberspace instead of an old-minded technical understanding. Therefore, conventional actors of international system, such as NATO and the EU, and their long-term relation which currently including cyber security issues are also examined under cyber security studies. Nowadays, as it is not a matter of possibility but a matter of time to welcome a cyber-attack, integrity of state and commercial actors and international cooperation has become an obligation for all mentioned actors in sense of getting prepared more comprehensively.

In this regard, we will examine two dominant actor and organization of western world, namely NATO and the EU in separated chapters of this article first and their relation with also mentioning the effects of conventional long-lasting relations of those actors later. But in order to provide a sufficient base knowledge priorly, we will mention the definition and some important concepts of cyberspace and exemplify it with infamous incidents.

1. Importance and Definition of Fundamental Concepts

It is possible to say that, in the last decades, humanity developed such tools that speed of such development was incomparable with previous centuries. Although, nowadays reaching the

internet is as simple as calling a service provider, creation and progress of development of such widespread network was established between four state computers in United States. Due to the advantage of fast processing, storing and transferring any information between such systems, with these computers first network, namely, ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network) was established between Los Angeles, California, Santa Barbara and Utah in 1969 by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). (Gary, Jessica & Katherine, 2009: 10)

In a short period of time, ARPANET divided into two to serve research on the one side and to military service on the other. Military service network (MILNET), however, needed more security measures which provided through transfer protocols (Transmission Control Protocol, TCP and Internet Protocol, IP). Protocols are set of rules that data transfer among devices happening through.

1.1. Definition of Cyberspace

This fast spread and mass use of the internet, as expectedly created a new sphere of information. Through time, as it passed through some phases called Web 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 nowadays not only computers or smartphones are connected, but everything possible can be connected to the internet and created its ultimate form which called “Internet of Things”.

While this enormous sphere generates a great opportunity to ease our life, on the other hand, creating possible new threats to our personal data, bank accounts and beyond us, composing danger also in national security levels. Although there is still no commonly accepted definition of this sphere, currently, the concept “Cyberspace” is being used to address it. The term now represents a new and less tangible dimension besides land, sea, air and space. Or as European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) defines; “Cyber space is the time-dependent set of tangible and intangible assets, which store and/or transfer electronic information.” (European Network and Information Security Agency [ENISA], 2017)

Following four features of cyberspace, composes the distinctive nature of cyberspace from other dimensions: (Libicki, 2007:5)

- Replicability; unlike physical rules that binds outer space, existence of things in

cyberspace can be simultaneously exist in multiple locations,

- Different matter of existence; unlike other dimensions, in order to exist in cyberspace, actors are required to be linked and confirmed by each other or the related system;
- A unique aspect of cyberspace also creates its “unavoidably free” nature as it gives a new chance to illegal acts to have their own type of protocols.
- Finally, another separative characteristic of cyberspace is its three layered structure;
 - Physical layer; that consists of cables and devices,
 - Syntactic layer; that is formed by used instructions and controlling systems (such as software languages)
 - Semantic layer, which makes sense to users and interactions of users with the machine-generated information. (Libicki, 2009:11)

1.2. Fundamental Concepts

This forementioned unique characteristic of cyberspace and its role as a new dimension unavoidably brings out new concepts to understand its nature.

1.2.1. Cybersecurity

While security is defined as “*protection of a person, building, organization, or country against threats such as crime or attacks by foreign countries.*” in Cambridge Dictionary, the only difference seems to be the “*carried out using the internet*” addition for cybersecurity.

Although eventually attacks are required to be based on the internet, several different type of cyberattacks can also be carried out through offline means. In addition, as the main goal is to acquire information or access to required data through unauthorized ways, cybersecurity, expectedly, is related to information and network security. (Libicki, 2009:14)

In this context, ENISA (European Cybersecurity Agency with the final decision and European Network and Information Security Agency by its founding name) defines cybersecurity as preventing, envisaging, detecting, decreasing,

examining and removing cyber incidents that happened or has the possibility to occur. Because the information and network security accepted as subsets of cybersecurity, besides integrity, availability and confidentiality; also reliability, safety, sustainability of physical layer, robustness, resilience, transparency, survivability, credibility, non-repudiativity are stated as attributes that a comprehensive cybersecurity structure should bear within.

1.2.2. Critical Infrastructure

Due to its crucial role for modernized societies, protection of those highly connected critical infrastructures inevitably becomes one of the significant necessities of cybersecurity.

What categorizes an infrastructure as critical is the possibility of having destabilizing or alike negative effects upon security, national economy, public health, public safety or any related subject, in case of any type of dysfunctionality happening to such critical systems or sectors. (CISA, 2020)

Due to its very nature and the purpose of creation, networking systems and cyberspace created as a result of it were already put forward in order to connect such infrastructures.

1.2.3. Cyberattacks

Cyberattacks, basically can be described as all possible malicious acts that are aiming to either disrupt or corrupt the integrity, availability and confidentiality of information networks, systems or directly the information. (Scott, 2017:31) While disruption of data deceives systems to act not in the way it is design so, such as instant shut downs, unexpected errors or possible interruptions of operation of other systems; corruption can be seen as a more cunning effect that although changes functioning way of data or algorithms of systems, such changes are made in a way that won't cause obvious effects and so will prevent awareness of the existence of corruption. Nevertheless, these or possible other effects of such attacks are not consequences of a “forced entry”, instead, more possibly described as unauthorized entry by tricking related systems to “think” that ill-aimed attackers are authorized users. (Libicki, 2009:16) Here the importance of cyber hygiene shows up, because such attacks can only be possible by using opportunities granted by vulnerabilities, except insider attacks, that can also be accepted as tricking authorized users in order to help attackers.

1.2.4. Cyberwarfare

Cyber incidents could intentionally be created by hackers directly working for adversary nation-states or by attackers that are supported and sponsored by such states. However, due to relativity of the term war with physical violence and it is quite rare to see violent results of cyberattacks, (Green, 2015:1) in order to describe reciprocal cyberattacks made or sponsored by states, it is more appropriate to use the term “cyberwarfare”.

Although, there are some critics against defining such type of incidents occurring in “virtual” cyberspace as “war” due to the low-level and isolated nature of it, experienced examples in last decades with even rare but possible consequences of causing physical damage, are revealing the increasing significance and unique nature of related subject. While exchange of attacks only occurring in cyberspace could be named as *strategic cyberwarfare* (Libicki, 2009:118), seeing it as a supportive another dimension can be called *operational cyberwarfare*. (Libicki, 2009:139)

2. European Union and Cyber Security

As explained above, continuing integrity of developed nations with cyberspace, reveals new vulnerabilities that could be used either for cybercrimes or to take advantage against those highly-integrated countries by their rivals. Hence it is possible to state that highly integrated societies need brand new understanding of security which, inevitably, comprehends cybersecurity measures.

EuroStat data is showing that internet usage percentage reaches out to almost a hundred percent in relatively developed nations such as the Netherlands, Iceland or Norway. (Eurostat, 2020) Besides significant wake-up calls to understand the necessity of cybersecurity measures such as Estonia and Kosovo examples are also showing the possibility of European soils to be taken as targets.

While currently, effort put forward by European Union is well-known with Network and Information Security Directive (NIS), General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and European Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA), which was first established as European Network and Information Security Agency; in this chapter we will examine the regulative and formative process of European Union through legal documents

and official publications that Union has created between mentioned time period.

2.1. Pioneer Works

While societies were getting more dependent on technological development, especially during the last decade of 20. century, to have a united framework of many areas including security and some aspects of legislation, the EU took a step to regulate “*security of information systems*” for the sake of economic integration and harmonized development, in 1992.

With the Decision published by the Council (92/242/EC), mainly, importance of providing security to information systems and requirement of strategic framework developed under an action plan were emphasized. (European Council [EC], 1992) 3 years later, with the joint attendance of European Parliament and the Council published a directive “*on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data*”. In fact, this directive can be taken as one of the first steps of currently active and well-known General Data Protection Regulation. (European Parliament [EP] & EC, 1995)

Following the previous work, on 12 July 2002, EP and the Council also established the directive “*concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector*” or Directive on privacy and electronic communications which extends the scope and comprehends also legal persons. (EP & EC, 2002) In this regard, it is possible to say that the Union was having its legislation more comprehensive day by day.

With the increasing and facilitating impact of digitalization, in 1999, Commission initiated eEurope program for the first time with the aim of spreading usage of emerging technologies all over the EU. In that sense, the main objectives were to enable EU citizens to access networks in their houses, schools, business and et. al.. With the eEurope- An Information Society For All program, requested in Lisbon 23-24 March 2000, the European Union for the first time initiated a program that we can identify as a general framework about information networks. Afterwards, eEurope program was followed by eEurope 2004 and i2010 programs that are adding new requirements occurred in time in the nature of information networks and emerging

technologies. (EC, 1999)

Following the adoption of the Europe Plan in the Feira European Council, Commission of the European Communities put another communication forward with the subject of “*creating a safer information society by improving the security of information infrastructures and combating computer-related crime*” to coordinate the fight against cybercrime. (EP & EC, 2001) Beside the cyberspace-based measures and methods, the problem of anonymity and non-legislative needs were also mentioned. Such as the proposal of EU Forum was a structure that consisted of law-enforcement representatives, internet service providers, telecommunication operators, civil society representatives, consumer representatives and data protection authorities.

Later in 2002, in order to extend the scope of progress that the EU has put forward to provide protection of its cyberspace and keep its citizens safe, the Commission has submitted another proposal “*for a Council Framework Decision on attacks against information systems*”. With this proposal, the commission draws attention to increasing attacks against information systems and the rate of organized crime through means of emerging technologies. Following this proposal, the Council has adopted Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on 24 February 2005 that carries the same title with the proposal.

In 2004, Commission with a communication once again extended the scope of protection of information systems and emphasized the importance of critical infrastructures especially in case of the fight against terrorism. In COM(2004) 702 Communication, while on the one side defining the term of critical infrastructure on the other side, the necessity of a general critical infrastructure protection program among the EU was underlined, namely the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection(EPCIP). Later in 2006 repeated once again with further details by COM(2006) 786 final Communication from the Commission “*on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection*”. (European Commission [ECOM], 2006)

As some of the following work put forward in 2008 and 2009, in 2011, another communication presented by the Commission in order to show the achieved goals and to extend the scope of general protection of critical infrastructures, namely “*Achievements and next steps: towards*

global cyber security” which the Commission once again underlined the importance of EU level of integration and cooperation for CIIP and danger of cyber incidents with no importance of either intentionally or not. (ECOM, 2011) Following this effort of Commission, in 2012, the Parliament broadly endorsed latter communication (EP, 2012) and these communications also drew a general base for 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy. (ECOM, 2013)

2.2. European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)

In early 2004, several months before the establishment of aforementioned EPCI Program, due to requirement of a central organization that will provide sufficient support to coordinate national efforts and lead legislative work of the Union, with the initiative of the Parliament and the Council, European Network and Information Security Agency has been established with the Regulation 46/2004. (EP & EC, 2004)

In that sense, the main purpose of the Agency was described as establishing and preserving a high and effective level of security of European networks and information systems. With also provision of a general culture related to cybersecurity for sake of EU citizens and customers and flawless process of internal markets.

Even though the agency was established for only 5 years, laterly this period of time constantly extended and with the Cybersecurity Act, it has become a permanent organization. While this extension first made with Regulation No 1007/2008 until 2012, (EP & EC, 2008) with Regulation No 580/2011 another extension app. until September 2013 was foreseen. While Regulation No 526/2013 concerning the ENISA, provided more autonomy and financial support to the agency. (EP & EC, 2013) Finally in 2019 with the Cybersecurity Act, ENISA happened to be the main and permanent body of the union to provide sufficient support and effort needed in order to keep the Union’s cyberspace safe. (EP & EC, 2019) Besides, the name of the agency was also changed into European Cybersecurity Agency (although the abbreviation kept the same).

Activities of ENISA have been considered under 3 categories: Expertise, Policy and Capacity.

2.3. The Cyber Security Strategy

In February 2013, just 3 months before the Regulation No 526/2013 on ENISA, the European commission created the Cybersecurity Strategy for the European Union with “ An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace” slogan as part of the title. As the sophisticated nature of cyberspace gets more complicated day by day, the Commission determined the Cyber Security Strategy to be a general regulator and a framework. Also, the significance of regulating the digital market and creation of a Digital Single Market was emphasized in the strategy.

In that sense, main principles are stated as; (EP & EC, 2013: 1)

- Applying EU core values to cyberspace,
- Protection of fundamental rights, freedom of speech, privacy and personal data,
- Increasing availability of access to internet,
- Governing stakeholders democratically and efficiently,
- Ensuring security by sharing responsibility.

Forum appreciated in the first part of the Directive, it foresees further cooperation and development of a risk management culture among the Union. Besides, exercises focused on cybersecurity, such as Cyber Europe by ENISA, are stated as an important measure. Yet no regulative measures put forward related to hardware and software developers in the Directive. (EP & EC, 2016)

Responsibilities such as adopting a national strategy, identification of operators of essential services and updating this list per 2 years, creating national computer security incident response teams which will participate in the CSIRTs Network that is established with this directive, given to member states. Directive also asks member states to establish an authority which will work as a single point of contact and provide cooperation in transboundary cases. Designated competent authority shall supervise the process of adopting the directive in the national jurisdictional aspect.

2.5. CERT-EU

Following the adoption of the Digital Agenda for Europe in May 2010, initiatives by the Commission to establish a computer emergency response team at the Union level started. As




Figure 6: Three Key Pillars of Cybersecurity with Roles and Responsibilities in Cybersecurity

2.4. The NIS Directive

Following the attention paid by the Union to improve its cyber security, and the necessity of a general regulation about network and information security emphasized by several different documents repeatedly, in 2016, NIS Directive that determines what should be done by member states, service providers and operators of essential services was adopted by the Parliament, which is also the first EU-wide legislation related to cybersecurity.

Although the work put forward with the EU

this CERT-EU was found necessary to protect networks and information systems of the Union, the Commission asked recommendations from cybersecurity experts known as “ Rat der IT Weisen” which translated into “ Council of IT Wise Men”. After the experts finalised their report upon the request, in November 2010, (The Computer Emergency Response Team EU [CERT-EU], 2020) the following year “Achievements and next steps: towards global cyber-security” adopted by the Union’s Council of Telecom Ministers, which emphasizes the importances of and so calls for establishment of national

computer emergency response teams. (Council of the European Union [CoE], 2011) Finally, after a year of pilot phase, on September 11th 2012, the computer emergency response team for the European Union institutions, agencies and bodies was permanently set up.

While cooperating with national CERTs and also some companies related to information technologies security, the CERT-EU consists of cybersecurity experts from EU institutions. In order to meet the required conditions to prevent cyber incidents, in 2015 a new headquarters established for the team in accordance with increasing expertise and hence the respectability of the team.

And, finally, with the NIS Directive the Union established the CSIRTs Network.

2.6. The Cyber Security Act

Last but not least, one of the most recent and comprehensive regulations is the Cybersecurity Act which was also mentioned above in order to examine the changes it brought to the European Cybersecurity Agency. The Act stated the main problem of the Union in cybersecurity was the requirement of further measures due to the changing nature of cyberthreats and insufficient level of attention paid to the related works.

The fragmentation of legal approaches among the EU Members, insufficient level of awareness and information at the level of EU citizens and companies, and finally dispersed resources and handling between EU Institutions, Agencies and Bodies, determined as 3 main categories of the main problem of not properly acting as required and planned. (ECOM, 2017)

The Act consists of two main titles besides the general provisions and final provisions, which are; ENISA (The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and Cybersecurity Certification Framework. In order to avoid falling into repetition, here we will only take into consideration the latter as the first was explained above in the ENISA sub-title detailly.

Although there has been previous work for certification of ICT production, processing, and services, in order to have a more comprehensive and updated approach, a general European Cybersecurity Certification Framework was established with the act. (ECOM, 2017)

In this regard, certification process primarily aims to protect data, identify vulnerabilities, record data-logs and in case of incident, recover from the best possible point before damage goes further. Beside these, confirmation of ICT products' vulnerability-free and up-to-date software/hardware were also part of the certification process. While the certification was not determined to be obligatory and olders of the certificates are expected to inform related authorities in regard to vulnerabilities and irregularities which may have an impact on the compliance with related requirements. European Cybersecurity Certification Group which was established with the Act, held responsible for advising and assisting the Commission, ENISA, about related processes.

3. NATO and Cyber Security

As the significance and the capabilities of work possibly being done through cyberspaces grows in a short period of time rapidly, the military aspect was also made subject of such development of cyberspace. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was targeted even before constant disturbance of the EU and expected to have further sophisticated cyberattacks due to aforementioned extension of cyberspace into the military aspect.

In this respect, while the first attacks were carried out in 1999, during the Kosovo Operation, it has revealed the significance of this new dimension for the Alliance. Further attacks occurred in 2007, against Estonia and the later use of cyberspace in Georgia in 2008 by Russian Military, as a part of a more complex hybrid-warfare techniques, emphasized the role and significance of NATO with increasing danger of cyberattacks.

Therefore, the Alliance created and extended its own cyber defence approach, starting with 2002 Prague Summit and still keeps cybersecurity measures as one of the main aspects of its security perception.

3.1. 2002 Prague Summit and NATO CIRC

During the NATO campaign to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, despite the superiority of NATO on conventional warfare, so called "nationalist" Serbians responded to such attacks with an unusual way of the time, namely,

through DDoS attacks. In this attempt, they were successful in blocking access to a variety of NATO web sites. The responsible Serbian hackers who were called “Black Hand” also tried to reach the NATO command servers and leak useful information, however, they could only break into networks of air forces, notwithstanding couldn’t reach any useful information. (Szentgali, 2013)

Besides, due to bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which was serving as a re-broadcasting station for the Milosevic’s forces (Sweeney, Holsoe & Vulliamy, 1999), also Chinese hackers along with Serbian and Russians, were launching DDoS attacks. (Healey & Bochoven, 2012:1)

In this regard the Cyber Defence Program was adopted at the following NATO summit in Prague 3 years later. To detect such cyberattacks, to prevent and if required to respond, NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) was also established as a consequence of emphasized importance of cybersecurity at Prague Summit. (NATO, 2002) However the cybersecurity efforts were left to member nations’ initiatives and still were not considered as a strategic task of NATO to fulfil.

3.2. 2008 Bucharest Summit

As the member states held responsible to provide security to their own networks and information systems, another significant attack operated as a wakeup call, like it did to European Union’s awareness of cybersecurity: 2007 Estonia Attacks

Over the decision of changing the place of a war monument from the Soviet Era, an enormous and well-organized DDoS attack hit Estonian critical infrastructure and kept the country blocked for almost a month.

Following the attacks, as the possible impact that could be achieved through cyberspace with a very little effort has been revealed, in a short period of time the significance of cyber defense was recognized by the Alliance. (“A look at Estonia’s”, 2009) Hence in the Bucharest Summit held in 2008, emphasizing the changing nature of new types of threats, also the importance of required security measures promised to be taken by the Alliance.

Following the policy and mentioning of enhancing the capabilities with new structures to be established related to cyberspace, Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)

was established in the capital city of Estonia, Tallinn. Besides, also the Cyber Defense Management Authority (CDMA) was established in Brussels following the Bucharest Summit.

As it continues to guide NATO regarding cyber defense issues CCDCOE, were not really related to operational missions, instead established as a research and complementary centre. Following its establishment, a significant effort put forward by the Centre of Excellence, in order to provide *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum* to cyberspace hence cyberwarfare, the Tallinn Manual was issued in 2013.

While the Manuel draw attention of the media and legal societies even in when it was only a draft (Boyle, 2012) right after its publication, it was accepted as the main authority regarding the applicability of the law of armed conflict for cyberspace, especially western world. (Luukas et al, 2016) 4 years later, CCDCOE published a more comprehensive Manual called Tallinn 2.0.

Finally, as the Alliance held another summit in 2009 in Strasbourg and Kehl for the 60th anniversary of the establishment of NATO, the same topics and effort put forward was emphasized once again. Besides, more work was promised especially those which will be established with international organisations and also third countries. (NATO, 2009)

3.3. 2010 Lisbon Summit

Following the great effort put forward right after the Estonia attacks, focus on defensive enhancement regarding cyber defence continued also in the 2010 Lisbon Summit and the NATO Strategic Concept published in the same year. (Healey & Bochoven, 2012:1)

While in the summit, while uninterrupted access to and integrity of critical systems was emphasized, significantly, cyberspace was mentioned as a new dimension of modern conflicts and hence taken into NATO’s doctrine. In this regard, improvements of related capabilities, making NATO Computer Incident Response Capability achieve reaching its fully operational capacity by 2012 and the requirement of cooperation and close coordination with other actors, like the United Nation and the European Union were underlined. (NATO, 2010)

Besides, also in the strategic concept declared in the same year, rapidly increasing complexity,

and sophistication of cyberattacks with also growing numbers once again emphasized within the Security Environment chapter. Importantly, not only the attacks against state systems or networks, but also attacks that are directed to the private sector, transportation and other related critical infrastructure were also mentioned. ("Strategic Concept..." , NATO, 2010)

3.4. 2011 Policy on Cyber Defense

Following the acceptance of cyber defence as a strategic matter and inclusion of it to the strategic concept, especially with also the effects of the cyberattacks that targeted NATO after the operation in Libya, in 2011 NATO extended its first cyber security policy and published a new one that covers more of required concepts.

The second policy on Cyber Defence was issued in 2011. While the drafting was first made in march, it took 2 more months to finalize the document and attached implementation tool, namely the Action Plan, on 8 June 2011.

While the focus of the plan was to protect the integrity and continuity of relevant systems, in order to develop required cyber defence capability, also NATO Defence Planning Process was given as a guidance for the integration of cyber defence into national defence frameworks. To this end, identification of related networks and information systems and bringing all NATO bodies under a centralized cyber defence program to provide sufficient protection and ensure operationality of the Alliance networks, determined as significant once again. (NATO, 2011) As the possibility of a collective response was also mentioned, responsibility and right to take such a decision was given to the North Atlantic Council. (NATO, 2011)

A new scheme named Cyber Defence Governance was drawn which put North Atlantic Council in the first stage and respectively; Defence Policy and Planning Committee in Reinforced Format, NATO CDMB, NATO CIRC

3.5. 2012 Chicago Summit and NCIA

A year later from the second policy, in the Chicago Summit, cyber defence measures were once again taken into consideration. Almost as a tradition, in the declaration of the summit, first, the works and promised progresses of previous summits

and policies were emphasized and required effort was mentioned to fulfill the stated goals. (NATO, 2012) In the summit, further cooperation with the European Union, the Council of Europe, the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, was emphasized. (NATO, 2012)

Two months later the Alliance merged its existing command, control and communication(C3) organizations and established the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA). (NATO Communications and Information Agency [NCIA], 2020) Most basically, the responsibilities of this new agency was decided as providing relevant information technologies support to any NATO agencies, headquarters (HQ) and command structures. Which also put NCIRC under the rule of the Agency. However, NCIA is not only responsible for cyberspace related issues but also subjects such as air and missile defence command and control, are also in the extent of the Agency. (NCIA, 2020)

In order to establish sufficient cyber security among the Alliance, in 2013, Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MN CD2) program was initiated by the NCIA with five founding members: Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Romania. While Denmark and Norway left the program afterwards, Finland later participated. Within the program, the role of the NCIA is designed as the coordinating and enabling body with the commitment of achieving goals determined for the program. (NCIA, 2020)

3.6. 2014 Wales Summit

As the Alliance progressed a step further with each summit in the cyberspace area, in order to follow the rapid changing nature of it; in Wales Summit, cyberspace measures were also taken into consideration especially as a part of hybrid warfare. (NATO, 2014)

To this end, cybersecurity based decisions explained in two articles for the first time with the Wales Summit. In these articles, the fundamental duty of the Alliance in this regard is stated as defending the networks that belong to Alliance itself and assisting member states in order to make them provide adequate level of security to their national systems and networks.

Besides, with this summit, while the Alliance

declares the acceptance of the application of international humanitarian law and the UN Charter to cyberspace, it also states the possible use of collective defence clause of the Alliance due to increasing damage capability of the cyberattacks and dependency of modern western societies to integrated networks and information systems. In this regard, the decision whether Article 5 was triggered by an attack would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case by case basis.

3.7.2016 Warsaw Summit and The Cyber Security Pledge

After the huge progress from 2008 to 2014 by the Alliance, in the 2016 Warsaw Summit, a whole new paradigm was accepted by heads of state and government of the member countries. With this new paradigm, the Alliance designed a new role to itself. In that sense, NATO decided to define cyberspace as a domain of possible operations.

To this end, in the summit declaration, while the cyber threats described as a clear challenge to security and prosperity of the Alliance and its members, they are acknowledged as harmful as any threats that can be directed from conventional dimensions. In addition to previously mentioned application of UN Charter and international humanitarian law to cyberspace, with the Warsaw Summit also significance and application of human rights to cyberspace was stated. (NATO, 2016) Besides, in order to achieve providing the promised security and enhance cyber defence of the alliance, while the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership defined as an important project; also international cooperation and especially coordination with the European Union once again mentioned. In that sense, the technical agreement established between two organization in the same year was appreciated.

Finally, the Heads of State and Government of the Member Countries defined the 7 areas of efforts, which also includes cyber defence and relatedly information protection. They also issued the Cyber Defence Pledge which, naturally, consists of promises and expectations of member states and the Alliance from them. With the Pledge, while evolving the dangerous nature of cyberspace and acceptance of it as an additional dimension to previous conventional dimensions acknowledged; also the promise of enhancing national capabilities with allocating required

resources and commitment to the Enhanced Policy on Cyber Defence, repeated. (NATO, 2018)

3.8.2018 Brussels Summit and Cyber Operation Centre

Following the decision of considering cyberspace as an addition to conventional dimensions, growing attention paid by NATO to cyber defence also continued in 2018 Brussels Summit. Although the ongoing emphasizing process through summit continues, aggressive behaviour of the Russian Federation, for the first time, expressed within the declaration directly. In addition to this, problematic situation occurred due to faced hybrid challenges consist of disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks are also underlined. (NATO, Brussels Summit, 2018)

Besides, also the necessity of more regular exercises including exercises organized related to cyberspace explained. In that case, it is possible to see the changed approach of the Alliance to the cyberspace especially from laissez faire principle to more acknowledged and effort worthy type of dimension.

Besides, another body related to cyber security operations included to the NATO Command Structure, and designed to be established in Belgium, alongside with Joint Force Command Norfolk, Joint Support and Enabling Command, namely; Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC). In this regard, Cyberspace Operation Centre is expected to be the backbone of the cyber capability of the Alliance and will serve as the theatre component of the Alliance. (Brent, 2019)

In accordance with its principle, NATO organizations that are operating fully or partially to provide a sufficient level of cyber defence the Alliance and principle educational institutes which are either totally based on cyberspace education or extended their scope in sense of including cyber related issues can be tabled as shown below, in Figure 9.

Educational Institutes	Cybersecurity Organizations
NATO Computer Incidents Response Capability (Mons, Belguin)	
Cyber Operations Centre (Mons, Belgium)	The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE; Tallinn, Estonia)
Allied Command Operations Task Force Cyber (Mons, Belgium)	NATO Communications and Information System School (Latina, Italy)
Allied Command Transformation (Norfolk, Virginia)	The NATO School (Oberammergau, Germany)
Intelligence and Security Division (Mons, Belgium)	The NATO Defence College (Rome, Italy)
Intelligence Fusion Centre (United Kingdom)	

Figure 9: Cyber Security Organizations and Educational Institutes of the NATO (Ablon et. al, 2019)

3.9. Cyber Defence Exercises

As it has been mentioned several times in different documents, the Alliance pays a significant amount of attention to exercises aiming to strengthen its cybersecurity. In this regard, as there are plenty of exercises taking different aspects of various scenarios of cyberspace, here we will mention relatively more important two of them, namely; Locked Shields and Cyber Coalition.

Since 2007, NATO continues to hold annual cyber defence exercise called Cyber Coalition, which is also described as flagship cyber defence exercise of the Alliance. And the participant number grows by each year. While the exercise gives the chance of testing the skills of cyber defenders in sense of defending the networks and information systems of the Alliance and also their countries, it also trains those participants in order to make it possible to achieve further goals.

Besides one of the main goal of the exercise is, naturally, establishing a coordination and enabling cooperation among the participants, by enhancing the ability to protect related part of cyberspace and conduct military operations in it. ("Cyber Coalition", 2018)

To this end, with the addition of academics and representatives of industry, for the first time in 2014, participant numbers reached over six hundred. Following years, as more civilian and expert joins, the number grows over a thousand.

In the exercise occurred in 2019, the procedures with NATO's Cyberspace Operations Centre was also emphasized. As the Lieutenant Commander Robert Buckles, who was the Exercise Director, explains; *"This year we emphasized warfare development through new experimentation, development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures with NATO's Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC). And further enhance coordination and collaboration amongst the Alliance within the Cyberspace Domain of Operations."* ("Exercise Cyber Coalition", 2019) Another important annually organised exercise in order to enhance skills of cyber security experts to enable them defend national IT systems and critical infrastructures in case of a real-time attack is; Locked Shields.

Since 2010, NATO keeps the Locked Shield going in order to enhance its capability and skills of IT personnel of the member nations. In time inclusion of the representatives of industry, the variety of the participants also increased. While

the exercise is basically a cyber war game where a team or a group of teams trying to protect pre-determined systems and networks, another in-game villain team attacks and tries to use the most sophisticated real-time methods in order to keep it as near as possible to real-time scenarios. In this regard, this annual exercise is being described as “the World’s largest and most advanced international technical live-fire cyber deterrence exercise” by the Alliance. (Calatayud, 2017)

4. Cooperation Between Two Allies

Following the description and definition of cyberspace related concepts and cybersecurity approaches of both organizations, under this title, a brief background to understand the current position of organizations and their cooperation in cyberspace with further possibilities will be examined.

4.1. Brief Background and Conventional Problems

Although both organizations built upon similar values that can be defined as “Western Values”, refer each other as “strategic partners” (Aghniashvili, 2016:68) and shares 22 members; raises concerns of non-European members and also the Alliance in regard to losing the pivotal role of European Security to another relatively new organization and fall into duplication hence make unnecessary effort. Beside the common members, also the mandates of the NATO and European Security and Defence Policy is overlapping largely, in sense of Petersberg Tasks and both comprehends no geographical boundaries (Hofmann, 2019: 45) which sometimes results with simultaneously arranged operations with no formal link.

Following this, special case of non-dual member countries are also creating a problematic situation between two organizations and poses an obstacle for further cooperation, especially in conventional dimensions. In particular, the situation between one of the significant NATO member, Turkey, and a relatively new member of the Union, Southern Cyprus, is being pointed as one of the main impediment that blocks further cooperation of the organizations. (Hofmann, 2019: 45)

In that sense, while Turkey constantly refuse any attempt that includes reach of Southern Cyprus to any NATO assets or resources, especially in sense of intelligence sharing due to security concerns;

Southern Cyprus also blocks already problematic position of membership process of Turkey and especially the participation possibility of Turkey to the European Defence Agency, which in sense of preserving status quo should have been granted as a right to Turkey.

4.2. Cooperation in Cyberspace

However, despite the problematic consequences of the establishment of European CSDP and although such political deadlocks still exist between organizations, a new momentum to push cooperation between each other reoccurred in 2016 with a joint declaration issued by the president of the EU Council, the Commission, and the secretary general of the NATO. (“Joint Declaration”, 2016)

In fact, it would be more proper to state that the relations in regard to cyberspace between organizations is started with the joint declaration of Warsaw. As there were only a technical agreement that foresees promotion of further cooperation between NCIRC and the CERT-EU.

While there was a clear intention of increasing relations between organizations, especially regarding cybersecurity, for so long, those intentions were not able to go further than just being verbally expressed. In fact, with also the heritage of having different nature than each other where NATO is a political-military international organization, and the EU is parliamentary, economical, and trading based supranational organization; the general approaches adopted by the NATO and the EU are also complementing each other.

In accordance with this, first step of increased cooperation on cybersecurity and defense was forementioned technical agreement which was followed with implemented aspects of the joint declarations. As the technical agreement tried to create a common understanding against the similar challenges that both response teams are struggling with, its framework basically and briefly is consist of information and practices sharing between the NCIRC and CERT-EU. To this end, also participation of EU to Cyber Coalition (Cybersecurity exercise performed by NATO), can be taken as an example of intentions of organizations to have their efforts collaborated.

Following this, joint declaration decisions of 2016 especially stated the necessity of exchanging

concepts of the integration of cyber defense approaches, increasing cooperation in exercises, promoting innovation cooperation in cyber defense research, and finally harmonizing the training requirements and cooperation in trainings. ("Statement", 2016)

Within the period that will be examined hereby, there has been 4 reports regarding the 2016 Joint Declaration;

1. The first report issued on 14 June 2017. Due to comprehensive extent of joint declaration, as it includes several different subjects, according to cybersecurity, main point of report was to intensify cooperation in cyberspace. (NATO, "Progress report on the implementation", 2017)
2. Another report issued briefly after first one on 29 November 2017. (NATO, "Second progress report", 2017) In the report, an important step forward in accordance with goals set to encounter the hybrid threats taken into consideration, establishment of the European Centre of Excellence for countering hybrid threats, in Helsinki. Besides, also the first parallel and coordinated exercise EU PACE17/CMX17 emphasized, which held in September and October of the same year. (NATO, "Common set of new proposals", 2017)
3. The third report (NATO, "Third progress report", 2018) was issued on 31 May 2018. While in the report, proposed 32 further actions on 5 December 2017, in addition to previous 42 of them, accepted in 2016, was taken into consideration; in general the report analyzes the achievements of cooperation and expresses the further possibilities of increasing it.
4. Final report on the progress of the implementation until 2020 regarding to previously mentioned proposals was issued on 17 June 2019. Intensified political dialogue and increasing cooperation were the main points of the cybersecurity aspect of the report. In fact, other subjects such as conventional and hybrids threats were more frequent in the last report.

Beside the 2016 Joint Declaration and 4 reports on it, to increase and accelerate the cooperation process; in 2018 these 2 international organizations have declared second joint declaration stating the intent of further cooperation especially against hybrid and contemporary threats. (NATO, "Joint Declaration", 2018) However, due to detailed mentioning of cybersecurity in previous reports, the second joint declaration was not necessarily deepened in sense of cyberspace. Instead,

cybersecurity was mentioned whenever hybrid threats were taken into consideration.

Indeed, these problematic uneven approaches and nation-based considerations not only pose an obstacle for further cooperation between organizations but also have critical effect within. Nevertheless, while transboundary nature of cybersecurity requires states to have a well international coordination among each other.

5. Common Threats and Possible Future Chances

As a matter of fact, plenty of attacks from a variety of sources including states and non-state actors targeting Europe and North America constantly and increasingly. Especially Russia and China should be taken into consideration with some important examples and their main goals to launch such offensive campaigns.

Besides the milestone attacks like Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, as expectedly Russian offensive targeting western structures and democracies didn't stop at any point. To this end, while the superiority in cyberspace was defined as one of the essential goals for Russian Federation, in their National Security Strategy, also the confrontation in the worldwide information dimension was emphasized.

A variety of democratic processes can be given as example of targeted processes by Russia, in order to either prevent or promote self-proclaimed ideas about those elections or at least to lower the trust in democratic ways and western values, including; Italian elections in 2018, French elections in 2017, the Brexit referendum, and the most popular among mentioned, the 2016 United States Presidential Election. (France24, 2017)

Another actor in cyberspace and with its emerging role in conventional dimensions also, is the People's Republic of China (PRC). Following the military modernization process, PRC also paid an important level of attention to enhance its cyber capacity, especially to have an offensive capacity in cyberspace and to use it to capture especially economic classified information through unauthorised ways and to cyberespionage. Unlike Russia, commercial gain is more preferred by PRC in that sense. To this end, infiltration to 5 US companies, in 2014, by Chinese hackers who eventually found out was People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers and charged by US Justice Department, shows this

intention of PRC clearly. (US District Court, 2014)

To this end, 3 basic suggestions can be stated to increase the cooperation between organizations;

5.1. To achieve having a joint response mechanism, the most important step forward is to establish an Interorganizational Cyber Threat Information Centre.

5.2. Following this establishment of a joint computer response team that will have coordinated staff from NATO CIRC as well as CERT-EU would be an important step.

5.3. A following step would be the creation of a joint program to fund the computer response teams of the organizations, national computer response teams, the joint response team. As a matter of fact, while preventive and deterring actions needs a financial support; the creation of such fund, would be more useful if initiated with previous steps.

Conclusion

Since the creation of the first network in the second half of the 20th century, emerging network and information system technology rapidly dominated almost every aspect of daily life, politics, society and economics. As the internet evaluate from Web 1.0 to Internet of Things, through time, cyberspace developed its own rules and concepts. New set of tools and dimension also transformed the conventional ones and constructed new concepts like; cyber defense, cyber espionage et. al.

Transforming nature of emerging technologies, expectedly effected the international relations and the most important turning point of cyberspace has been the first highly organized and intensified DDoS attacks targeting Estonia in 2007. As a matter of fact, Estonia Attacks not only served as a national wakeup call but also triggered the attention of the European Union which Estonia was participated with 2004 enlargement and the NATO, participated in 2004 as well.

In order to preserve its continuing provision of security and stability to their member while the European Union accelerated its process to build upon previous, less intensified attempts, with a directive on identification and designation of its critical infrastructure, in 2008 (EC, 2008); also the NATO initiated a serious process of progress starting with the establishment of a Cooperative Cyber Centre of Excellence based in Tallinn at the

first summit after the attack, in 2008 as well.

In fact, until 2016 two organization have followed formally separated ways, but nevertheless due to their different nature; the general approaches adopted by these two organizations are occurred as complementary work of each other. However, such cooperation still needs a more enhanced and sincere cooperation. The necessity occurs due the requirement of the cyberspace of a more comprehensive understanding that passes the border-based ideas.

Although the organizations have conventional problems including but not limited to duplication and non-dual membership; these doesn't prevent both actors to construct more cooperative future in cyberspace. Nevertheless, joint declarations and cooperative efforts still doesn't seem deep enough to create a spill-over effect over abovementioned problems.

While it would not be logical for the European Union to try constructing a separated cyber security, reciprocatively it would also be fatal error for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to separate its efforts from cyber security progress of the previous actor. Hence, there is more chances to take advantage of, by both organizations and sincere approach to each other would help to have a more secure future for both actors.

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Almanya ve Rusya'nın Birinci Dünya Savaşı Öncesi Politikalarının Korkak Tavuk Modellemesi Kapsamında İncelenmesi ve Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisine Etkisinin Analizi

Examination of Germany and Russia's Pre-World War I Policies in the Scope of Cowardly Chicken Modeling and Analysis of the Impact of European Security Architecture

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Öz

19'uncu yüzyıl (19. YY.) Büyük Fransız Devrimi'nden sonra sanayileşmenin muazzam bir ivme yakaladığı, sömürge arayışlarının etkili olduğu ve milliyetçilik düşüncesinin ön plana çıktığı bir dönem olmuştur. Bu yüzyılda Rusya ve Almanya, Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisi kapsamında önemli olay ve olguların yaşandığı iki devlet olma özelliğine sahiptir. Özellikle 19. YY.'da Rusya'nın yayılmacı bir politika takip etmesi, Almanya'nın ise Alman Birliğini kurmadan önce ve kurduktan sonra yürüttüğü stratejiler önem arz etmektedir. Çalışmamızda Almanya ve Rusya'nın 1870 yılından itibaren uygulamış oldukları siyasi hamlelerin Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın (1.DS.) sona ermesine kadar olan süreç değerlendirmeye tabi tutulacaktır. Almanya'nın Otto Von Bismarck önderliğinde 19.YY. sonuna kadar sürdürdüğü yönetim dahilinde uyguladığı savaşın dışında kalma politikası, 20'nci (20. YY.) yüzyıla girildiği dönemlerde tersine işlemeye başlamıştır. Rusya'nın ise bir müttefik bulma çabaları İngiltere ve Fransa'nın 20.YY. başına kadarki durumları yüzünden Almanya ile ilişkileri sürdürme zorunluluğuna dönüşmüştür. Ancak süreç içerisinde yaşanan gelişmeler iki devletin 1.DS.'na rakip olarak girmelerine sebebiyet vermiştir. Nitekim iki devlet savaşın sonunda beklemedikleri sonuçlarla karşılaşmıştır. Çalışmanın amacı; Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesinde Almanya ve Rusya'nın takip ettiği politika ve stratejilerini analiz etmek ve her iki devletin rakip olarak girdikleri Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonucunda farklı dinamiklerden dolayı amaçladıkları hedeflere ulaşamamalarını Thomas C. Schelling'in Korkak Tavuk Oyunu modellemesi kapsamında incelemektir. Çalışmada retrospektif analize tabi tutulan iki devletin 1.DS.'ni kaybetmesi ve Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisine etkileri ortaya çıkarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Çalışmada nitel analiz yöntemi kullanılmış olup konuyla ilgili çeşitli akademik tezler, makaleler ve kitaplar araştırma sürecine dahil edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Almanya, Avrupa, Güvenlik, Korkak Tavuk Modellemesi, Rusya.

Abstract

19th century After the great French Revolution, industrialization it was a period in which the search for colonies gained momentum, the search for colonies was effective and the idea of nationalism came to the fore. In this century, Russia and Germany have the distinction of being the two states where important events and phenomena took place within the scope of the European Security Architecture. Especially in the 19th century, Russia's following an expansionist policy and Germany's strategies before and after establishing the German Union are important. In our study, the process of the political moves of Germany and Russia since 1870 until the end of the First World War will be evaluated. 19th century under the leadership of Germany's Otto Von Bismarck. The policy of staying out of the war, which he implemented within the administration he could maintain until the end, started to operate in reverse in the 20th century (20th century). Russia's efforts to find an ally, England and France's 20th century. It has become an obligation to maintain relations with Germany due to the situation until the beginning. However, the developments in the process caused the two states to enter the 1.DS. As a matter of fact, the two states faced unexpected results at the end of the war. Purpose of the study; The aim is to analyze the policies and strategies followed by Germany and Russia before the First World War and to examine the failure of both states to achieve their goals due to different dynamics as a result of the First World War, in which they entered as rivals, within the scope of Thomas C. Schelling's Cowardly Chicken Game modeling. In the study, the loss of the 1DS and its effects on the European Security Architecture were tried to be revealed by the two states that were subjected to retrospective analysis. In the study, basic analysis skill was used and various academic theses, articles and books on the subject were included in the research process.

Keywords: Cowardly Chicken Modelling, Europe, Germany, Russia, Security.

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Giriş

“Bütün silahlanmış kitlelerin savaşa girmek için hazır olması karşısında, en belirleyici nitelikteki bir savaştan başka çeşit bir savaş düşünülemez. Öyle bir savaş ki, uzun bir zaman için Avrupa devletlerinin ve özellikle Rusya ve Almanya'nın gelecekteki göreceli politik pozisyonlarını belirlesin...”

Obruchev Memorandumu

Tarihsel süreç içerisinde yaşanan olay ve olguların sebepsiz, tarihsel bir arka planı olmadan ve belirli bir zemin kazanmadan ortaya çıktığını söylemek güçtür. Öyle ki bu konuda yapılacak olan analizlerin derinlemesine ve retrospektif bir açıdan yapılmaması ele alınan konuların indirgemeci bir şekilde değerlendirilmesine neden olacaktır. Çalışmamızda analize tabi tutulacak olan iki devlet olan Almanya ve Rusya'nın katıldığı 1.DS. öncesi durumlarının da ayrıntılı bir şekilde ele alınması gerekmektedir. Bu bağlamda özellikle 1871 yılında kurulan Alman Birliği'nin tarihsel süreç içerisinde önemli bir yeri bulunmaktadır.

1789 yılında Büyük Fransız Devrimi'nin gerçekleşmesi ile Avrupa topraklarında derin izler bırakan bir süreç başlamıştır. Fransa'nın kıta üzerindeki politikalarının mimarı olan Napolyon Bonapart'a karşı diğer Avrupa devletlerinin denge politikasına yönelik uygulamaları biri dizi savaşlar silsilesinin yaşanmasına sebebiyet vermiştir. Kendisini İmparator ilan eden Napolyon, Koalisyon Savaşları'nın sonunda güçten düşmüş ve Fransa, Avrupa'daki etkisini kısmen yitirmiştir. Avrupa'daki devrim sürecinin önüne geçilmesi ve monarkların eski gücüne kavuşmasının amaçlandığı 1815 Viyana Kongresi ile Avrupa Uyum'u tekrar oluşturulmaya çalışılmış ve bu süreç, “Restorasyon Dönemi” olarak adlandırılmıştır (Fulbrook, 2011:109). Ancak 19.YY. içerisinde Sanayi Devrimi'nin etki alanını genişletmesi ve Büyük Fransız Devrimi'nin bir yansıması olan Milliyetçilik düşüncesinin Avrupa'ya hâkim

olması ile uluslar, kimlik olgusunu ön plana çıkarmaya başlamışlardır.

19 YY.'ın ikinci yarısında Avrupa'da devletin sistemsel bütünlüğünü sağlayamayan iki büyük topluluk olan Almanlar ve İtalyanlar'ın Birliklerini gerçekleştirilmesi ile 1815 Viyana Kongresi sonucunda hayata geçen uyum süreci sona ermiştir (Sander, 2017: 220). Avrupa'daki uyum sürecinin Alman ve İtalyan Birlikleri'nin kurulmasıyla sona ermesi neticesinde Fransa ve İngiltere birbirlerine daha çok yakınlaşmıştır. Ayrıca Çarlık Rusya'nın Avrupa'daki gelişmeleri daha yakından takip etmesi gerekmiştir. Bu olaylar sonucunda ise Avrupa'daki bloklaşma sürecinin başladığı değerlendirilmektedir.

19. YY.'da etkisini iyice gösteren Sanayi Devrimi sadece ekonomik etkilerin ortaya çıkmasını değil devletlerin savunma sanayinde kullanılacak harp malzemelerinin muazzam gelişimine sebebiyet vermiştir. Bu sayede Avrupa'da ön plana çıkmak isteyen devletler arasında silahlanmaya yönelik ciddi girişimler olmuştur. Bu yarış sadece belirtilen dinamikler doğrultusunda olmamış, özellikle sömürgecilik alanında da girişimler meydana gelmiştir. Avrupa Devletleri arasındaki bu yarışma süreci ileride yaşanacak olan savaşın temellerinin atılması açısından önemlidir. Almanya'nın kıtada önemli bir güç olarak ön plana çıkması İngiltere ve Fransa'nın dikkatini çekmiş ve güç dengesinin doğası gereği kıtada güçlü bir aktör olan Almanya, bu iki devlet tarafından kabul görmemiştir. Çarlık Rusya ise her ne kadar Almanya ile iletişim kurmak istese de ilişkiler gevşek bir zeminde ilerlemiş ve İngiltere ile Fransa saflarında yerini almıştır. Bu da savaşa giden bloklaşmanın oluşmasında etkili olmuştur.

Thomas Schelling tarafından ortaya atılan oyun modellemeleri ekonomi alanının yanında uluslararası ilişkilerde gelişen olayların açıklanmasında kullanılmıştır. Özellikle 1960'lı yıllarda ortaya çıkan Korkak Tavuk modellemesi Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ile Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği (SSCB) arasında doruk noktasına ulaşan Küba Füze Krizi'nin açıklamasında sıklık-

la kullanım alanı bulmuřtur. alıřmamızda benzer şekilde arlık Rusya ile Almanya'nın 1.DS. ncesinde icra ettikleri politik hamlelerin savařtan sonraki durumlarını nasıl etkilediđi Korkak Tavuk modellemesi ile analiz edilmeye alıřılmıřtır. alıřmada Almanya ve arlık Rusya'nın 1.DS. ncesinde takip ettikleri stratejileri hangi kriterlere gre belirlediđi, savařtan nceki konjonktr kapsamında iki devletin savařa girmesi halinde olumsuz varyasyonların yapılıp yapılmadıđı ve savař sonrasında ortaya ıkan durumların ne gibi sonular yarattıđı Korkak Tavuk modellemesi erevesinde aıklanacaktır.

1. 1871-1918 Dneminde Geliřen

Olayların Almanya ve Rusya Aısından Deđerlendirilmesi

1862 yılında Almanya řansyesi olan Otto Von Bismarck 1862 yılında yaptıđı "*Kan ve Demir*" konuřmasıyla Alman Birliđi'ne giden yolun temellerini atmıřtır. Bu bađlamda 1864 yılında Avusturya ile hareket edilerek Danimarka iřgal edilmiř, 1866 yılında Avusturya devre dıřı bırakılmıř ve son olarak 1870 yılında Sedan Savařı'nda Fransa'yı yenerek 1871 yılında Frankfurt Barıřı'nın imzalanması neticesinde Alman Birliđi kurulmuřtur (Blackbourn,1998: 243-259).

Otto Von Bismarck Alman Birliđi'ni kurduktan sonra barıřil bir dıř politika takip etmiřtir. Bu anlamda Fransa'yı tehdit olarak grmesine rađmen Fransa tarafından verilmesi gereken savař tazminatlarının Fransa'yı bir mddet gcsz bırakacađını ngrmřtr. Ancak Bismarck sadece dıř sorunlarla deđil i sorunlarla da mcadele halindedir. Alman Birliđi kurulmuř ancak zellikle Gney blgesindeki Katolik Almanların atıřmacı durumlarını "*Kulturkampf*" marifetiyile istediđi bir yapıya dnřtrmeye alıřmıřtır (Anderson, 1996: 82-115). Bismarck, Kulturkampf politikası ile lkedeki Katolik mezhep inancındaki insanların ynetim birimlerinde daha az ve etkisiz roller almasını amalayan bir strateji takip etmiřtir.

Bismarck tarafından Avusturya-Macaristan ile

Rusya arasında Balkanlar zelinde bařlaması muhtemel sorunların nne geecek tedbirlerin alınması gerekmiřtir. Ayrıca Bismarck Fransa'yı yalnız bırakacak bir yol takip etmek istemektedir. Rusya her ne kadar Fransa ile iliřki kurmak istese de yıpranmıř bir Fransa, Rusya'nın planlarında olmayacaktır. Bu nedenden dolayı Rus arı İkinci Alexander, Almanya ve Avusturya-Macaristan blokuna dahil olmak istemiř ve bylece Birinci İmparatorlar Ligi kurulmuřtur (Gildea, 1987:237). Almanya, Avusturya-Macaristan ve Rusya arasındaki bu ittifaka "*Dreikaiserbund*" adı verilmiřtir (Lee, 2004:155). Birinci  İmparator Ligi'nin kurulmasında temel dinamikler arasında Bismarck'ın Fransa'yı yalnız bırakmayı amalaması ve Rusya ile Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluđu arasındaki iliřkilerin devamını istemesi sayılabilir. Ayrıca Rusya'nın Birinci  İmparatorlar Ligi'ne dahil olmak istemesinin ana etkeni o dnemde Fransa'nın gcsz bir durumda olması, İngiltere'nin kıta Avrupa'sından uzak bir politika takip etmesi ve Rusya'nın bu konjonktr iinde yalnız kalmak istememesi olarak deđerlendirilmektedir (Medlicot, 1945:62).

Birinci  İmparatorlar Ligi, devam eden srete uzun mrl bir grnm sergilememiřtir. Bu bađlamda 1875 yılından itibaren Balkanlar'da Osmanlı İmparatorluđu'na karřı bař gsteren ayaklanmalar iin Rusya'nın blgeye Pan-Slavist dinamiklerle mdahale niyeti (Heraclides & Dialla, 2017: 169-171) Avusturya-Macaristan ile Rusya arasındaki iliřkilerin ılımlı olmaması ve bu karıřık durumun her iki devlet tarafından kendi lehlerine řekillendirmeye alıřmaları Berlin Kongresi'nin toplanmasına ve Birinci  İmparatorlar Ligi'nin dađılmasında etken olmuřtur. Diđer yandan Rusya'nın Berlin bykelisi Peter Saburov'un  yıl nceki řartlar altında kurulan  İmparator Ligi'nin artık Rusya'nın menfaatine ynelik bir anlam tařımadıđı ve Avrupa'da Almanya'ya daha ok hareket alanı tanındıđına ynelik deđerlendirmesi Birinci  İmparator Ligi'nin dađılmasındaki diđer unsurlardan biridir (Gorainov, 1918: 235).

Birinci Üç İmparatorlar Ligi'nin dağılması Almanya ve Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğunun bir araya gelmesine sebebiyet vermiştir. Almanya'nın Fransa'yı devamlı tehdit olarak algılaması, Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğunun ise Rusya ile özellikle Balkanlar bölgesinden dolayı ihtilafa düşmesi bu birlikteliğin temelini oluşturmuştur. 7 Ekim 1879'da kurulan İttifak, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na kadar devam edecek uzun bir birlikteliğin başlangıcı olmuştur. Bu ittifak kapsamında Almanya'nın Fransa ile olası bir savaş yaşaması durumunda Avusturya-Macaristan tarafsızlık uygulayacak, bu durumda Rusya'nın Fransa'nın yanında savaşa girmesi ihtimalinde ise Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğu Almanya'nın yanında savaşa girecektir. Devam eden süreçte ise Romanya ve İtalya ittifaka dahil olmuşlardır (Özdal & Karaca, 2020: 446).

18 Haziran 1881 tarihinde Bismarck'ın girişimleri ile Almanya, Avusturya-Macaristan ve Rusya arasında İkinci Üç İmparatorlar Ligi'nin kurulması için anlaşma sağlanmıştır. Ancak İkinci Üç İmparatorlar Ligi'nin kurulması Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğu ile Rusya arasındaki Balkanlar sorununa bir çare olmamış, aksine ikili arasındaki sorunlar devam etme eğilimi göstermiştir. Bismarck tarafından Balkanların Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğu ile Rusya arasında taksim edilmesi başlangıçta bazı sorunların çözümü için gerekli altyapıyı sağlasa da uzun dönemde Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğunun özellikle Rumeli'nin doğu bölgelerinde Rusya'nın haklarını görmezden gelmesi İkinci Üç İmparatorlar Ligi'nin tekrar dağılmasına sebebiyet vermiştir (Özdal & Jane, 2014: 235)

Bismarck, Almanya şansölyesi olmasından itibaren Avrupa'da savaş istemeyen bir politika üretme eğiliminde olmuştur. Ancak Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğu ile kurulan ittifak Fransa ve Rusya'yı sürekli bir tehdit unsuru olarak algılamıştır. 1870'te Cont Cavour ve Guiseppe Mazzini önderliğinde Birliğini kuran diğer bir devlet olan İtalya'nın (Armaoğlu, 2021:293-296) Afrika kıtasındaki sömürü arayışlarına Bismarck olum-

suz bir tavır göstermemiştir. Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğu'nun İtalya'nın sömürge politikaları için olumsuz bir görüş bildirmemesi neticesinde 1887 yılında Üçlü İttifak'ın yenilenmesi gerçekleştirilmiştir (Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopedia, 2022).

Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğu ile Rusya arasındaki anlaşmazlık Bismarck için aşılması gereken bir problem olarak görülmekteydi (Şafak, 2020). Fransa'da Almanya ile savaşı kuvvetli bir seçenek olarak gören askerlerin etkisi, Charles De Freycinet kabinesinin görevde olması ve Charles De Freycinet'in Savunma Bakanı koltuğuna Alsas-Loren bölgesinden kalan öç duyguları taşıyan General Boulanger'i ataması Bismarck'ın çekindiği noktalardan biri olmuştur. Bu nedenlerden dolayı Bismarck Rusya ile Askeri Teminat Antlaşmasını 18 Haziran 1887 tarihinde imzalamıştır. Antlaşma kapsamında Rusya ve Almanya üçüncü bir devletle savaşa girerse diğer devlet tarafsız kalacak ancak bu madde Rusya'nın Avusturya-Macaristan, Almanya'nın ise Fransa ile gireceği bir savaş esnasında uygulama dışı kalacaktır. Ayrıca Almanya, Rusya'nın İstanbul Boğazlarına yerleşme talebi konusundaki isteklerini kabul etmiştir (Mitchell, 1981:19-28).

Bismarck'ın Fransa'dan duyduğu tehdit algısı canlılığını muhafaza etmiştir. Bu nedenden dolayı Rusya ile sürekli diplomatik ilişki kurma eğiliminde olmuştur. Bismarck, Balkanlar sorunu yüzünden Rusya ile Almanya'nın anlaşmazlık yaşamasını bir kayıp olarak değerlendirmiştir. Ayrıca Rusya'nın Büyük Oyun (Great Game) dolayısıyla İngiltere ile yakınlaşmasının o dönemde mümkün olmaması ve Boğazlar konusundaki tavrının Almanya tarafından tanınması Almanya ile Rusya arasında teminat antlaşması imzalanmasını mümkün kılmıştır. 18 Haziran 1887 tarihinde imzalanan ve çok az sayıda devlet adamının bildiği gizli bir antlaşma olan Rusya-Almanya Teminat Antlaşması (Reinsurance Treaty) gereğince iki devletin başka bir üçüncü devletle savaşması durumunda tarafsızlık gösterilecek ancak tarafsızlık maddesi Rusya'nın Avusturya-Macaristan,

Almanya'nın ise Fransa ile savařması durumunda geçerli olmayacaktır (Kennan,2020: 309-346). Antlařma, Alman İmparatoru İkinci Wilhelm'in teminatı uzatmama kararı vermesiyle geçerliliğini yitirmiřtir. Bu karar Rusya-Fransa iliřkilerinin daha ılımlı bir hale gelmesindeki önemli etkenlerden birisi olmuřtur (Brittanica, 1887).

1880 ve 1890 tarihleri arasında Rusya'da Çar İkinci Alexander'ın ölmesi ve yerine Üçüncü Alexander'ın geçmesi, Almanya'da ise Birinci Wilhelm'in ölümü, yerine Üçüncü Frederick'in geçmesi ancak Üçüncü Frederick'in de ölmesi nedeniyle kısa süren imparatorluğun başına İkinci Wilhelm'in geçmesi gibi geliřmeler yařanmuřtur. Bilhassa Almanya'da İkinci Wilhelm ile Bismarck arasındaki anlaşmazlıklar gün yüzüne çıkmıřtır. İkinci Wilhelm'in halk için özgürlükçü bir bakıř açısıyla kararlar alması, Bismarck'ın fikirleriyle çeliřmiřtir. Dıř politikada ise Bismarck'ın rasyonel hamleleri İkinci Wilhelm tarafından kabul görmemiř, 1890 yılında Bismarck görevinden azledilmiřtir (Ullrich, 2015:116-120). İkinci Wilhelm'in Rusya ile imzalanan Teminat Antlařması'nı uzatmaması ilerleyen süreçte Rusya'nın Fransa ile diplomatik temasa geçmesi ve Panslavizm-Pancermenizm mücadelesini başlatan önemli nedenler olmuřtur (Merriman, 2006:61-67).

Yukarıda açıkladıđımız geliřmeler sonucunda Fransa-Rusya iliřkileri řekillenmeye başlamıřtır. 18 Ağustos 1892 tarihinde Fransa ile Rusya arasında askeri antlařma tesis edilerek imza altına alınmıřtır. Bu askeri antlařma çerçevesinde Almanya'nın veya İtalya'nın Fransa'ya saldırması durumunda Rusya tüm kuvvetleriyle Almanya'ya saldırarak, aynı řekilde Rusya'nın Almanya veya Avusturya-Macaristan tarafından saldırıya uğraması halinde ise Fransa, Almanya'ya saldıracaktır. Almanya'ya karřı kullanılacak mevcut kuvvetler, Fransa tarafından 1.300.000, Rusya tarafından ise 700.000 veya 800.000 kiři olacaktır. Bu kuvvetler, Almanya'nın hem Dođu'da hem de Batı'da aynı anda savařmak zorunda kalacađı bir hızla angaje olmasına neden olacaktır. Antlařmada Rusya ve Fransa'nın başka bir devletle barıř

antlařması yapamayacađı, ayrıca antlařmanın süresinin Üçlü İttifak ile aynı süreye tabi tutulacađının belirtilmesi önemlidir (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 1892). Görüleceđi üzere Almanya'nın herhangi bir anlaşmazlık ve savař hali yařaması durumunda askeri kapasitesini doğuda Rusya'ya, Batı'da ise Fransa'ya karřı bölünmüş bir vaziyette kullanması gerekecektir. Bu durum Almanya'nın teksif unsurunun ortadan kaldırması ve harp planları açısından ilerleyen zamanlarda deđiřikliđe gidilmesi gerektiđini ortaya çıkaracaktır. Fransa ve Rusya arasında yapılan bu askeri antlařmanın Genelkurmay Başkanlarınca imzalanması nedeniyle geçerliliğinin sorgulanması 1894 yılında taraflar arasında imzalanacak olan Fransız-Rus ittifakına giden sürecin başlamasına neden olmuřtur (Kissinger, 2000:225). Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisi kapsamında Alman tehdidine karřı iki devletin güçlerini birleřtirmeye dönük kararlar alması denge politikası açısından önem teřkil etmektedir.

Fransa ile Rusya arasındaki ittifak Avrupa'da kuvvet dengesinin oluřturulması amacıyla teřkil edilmiřtir (Kissinger, 201). Fransa'nın Rusya ile birliktelik oluřturması Almanya, Avusturya-Macaristan ve İtalya tarafından oluřturulan ittifak karřısında güçlü bir yapı çıkartılmasının ön ařamasıdır (Bovykin&Spring, 1976: 20-35). Bu bağlamda Fransa'nın kendisini yalnızlıktan kurtarması, Almanya'nın Bismarck döneminde kurduđu diplomatik üstünlüđu sürdürmemesi, dönemin konjonktüründe Birinci Dünya Savařı öncesindeki kutuplařmaların ortaya çıkması açısından önemlidir (Langer, 1925:554-575).

Yirminci yüzyılın başlarında İngiltere'nin Afrika topraklarında sürdürdüđu Boer Savařı 1902 yılında sona ermiř ve sömürge faaliyetlerine devam etmiřtir. Aynı řekilde Fransa'nın da Afrika üzerindeki iř gücü ve zengin yer altı tahakkümü devam etmekteydi. Bugün Sudan sınırlarında bulunan Fařoda'da İngilizler ile Fransız askeri kuvvetleri arasında çıkan bunalım sonucunda iki devletin donanmaları teyakkuz haline geçmiřtir. Aslına bakılacak olursa belirttiđimiz nedenlerden dolayı

bu dönemlerde İngiltere ile Fransa arasında ılımlı ilişkilerin tesis edilmesi zor görülmekteydi. Ancak Fransız donanmasının İngiliz donanmasına göre güçsüz olması, Almanya'nın aynı dönemde donanma yatırımlarına ağırlık vermeye başlaması İngiltere ile Fransa'nın 1904'te dostluk antlaşması imzalamasının nedenleri arasındadır. Bu antlaşma Samimi Antlaşma (Entente Cordiale) olarak tanımlanmaktadır (Macmillan, 2013: 204-237).

İngiltere'nin yirminci yüzyılın başında Japonya ile ortak çıkarlarının bulunması ve Rusya ile Japonya arasında 1905 yılında gerçekleşen savaşta Rusya'nın yenilgiye uğratılması İngiltere ile Rusya arasındaki diplomatik ilişkilerin bir süre donmasına neden olmuştur. Ancak İngiltere ile Fransa arasında imzalanan dostluk antlaşması, Rusya ile Japonya'nın savaştan sonra barış görüşmelerinde bulunması, İran üzerinde Rusya ve İngiltere arasındaki sorunların çözülmesi ile İngiliz-Rus Antlaşması imzalanmış ve Üçlü İtilafın tamamlanması 1907 yılında gerçekleşmiştir (Uçarol, 2015: 292-297). Bu bağlamda Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesinde blokların oluşum süreci tamamlanmıştır (Sander, 2017: 268-269).

Almanya imparatoru İkinci Wilhelm'in 1905 yılında Fas'a gitmesi Fransa ve İngiltere'nin tepkisini çekmiştir. Sömürge yarışında hassas davranan İngiltere ve Fransa Almanya'nın sömürge arayışından dolayı ilişkilerini daha da sıkılaştırmıştır. Bu olayla beraber 1907 yılında Lahey'de gerçekleştirilen konferansta donanma kuvvetlerinin sınırlandırılması meselesi görüşülmüştür. İngiltere'nin taleplerini karşılıksız bırakan Almanya ile anlaşmazlık yaşanması iki blok arasındaki çatışmaların derinleşmesine neden olmuştur. Bu olaydan bir sene sonra ise Bosna Hersek'in Avusturya hakimiyetine geçmesi Rusya tarafından tepkiyle karşılanmıştır (Uçarol, 538).

İngiltere ile Almanya arasındaki donanma güçlerini maksimize etme yarışı İkinci Wilhelm'in 1911 yılında "*Hoşlarına gitse de gitmese de donanmayı kuruyoruz. Bizim korkumuz yok*" söyliemi neticesinde İtilaf Devletleri'nin çatışma

çözümlerinde daha baskın bir politika takip etmeleri gerektiğini göstermiştir (Bayur, 1991: 237). Aynı yıl İtalya'nın Trablusgarp'ı işgal etmesi Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na zorluk yaratmıştır. 1878 yılında imzalanan Berlin Kongresi kararları çerçevesinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Balkanlar üzerindeki tasarrufunu azaltma girişimleri ile bağlantılı olarak Balkan Savaşları'nın yaşanması, 1.DS. öncesi gelişen en önemli olaylardan biridir. Balkan Savaşlarından sonra Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun güç kaybetmesi ve Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğu'nun Sırbistan üzerindeki politikalarının Rusya'yı rahatsız etmesi mevcut konjonktürün gergin bir vaziyette devam etmesini sağlamıştır (Hall, 2000: 1-2). Bu süreç içerisinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun askeri teşkilat yapısının revizyonu için Alman subayların İstanbul'a gelmesi, bunun karşısında Rusya'nın tepki göstermesi ve 2'nci Wilhelm'in "*Rusya-Prusya münasebetleri ebediyen ölmüştür*" (Baron Me De Taube, 1928: 341) beyanı olayların seyrinin analizi açısından önem arz etmektedir.

İlk başta Avusturya veliahtı Arşidük Franz Ferdinand suikastının hızlandırdığı kriz, 1908'den beri Balkanlar'da meydana gelen sorunlar silsilesinin sonucudur. Avusturyalılar artık Sırp düşmanlarını sonsuza dek ezmeye kararlıydılar. Sırbistan'ı fiilen bağımlı bir devlet haline getirecek bir ultiatom yayınladılar. Ruslar buna müsamaha gösteremezdi ve Avusturya Sırbistan'a ultiatom vermeden önce, Berlin'den savaş durumunda Alman desteğini garanti eden bir güvence almışlardı. Alman hükümeti bu güvenceyi verirken, en azından bir Avrupa savaşını riske attığını biliyordu ancak artık Berlin'de böyle bir savaş neredeyse kaçınılmaz olarak görülmekteydi. Almanya'nın askeri karar vericileri, Ruslar 1905'teki yenilgiden hâlâ tam olarak kurtulmuş değilken, erken davranmanın daha iyi olacağını değerlendirmişlerdir. Fransa hem askeri hem de psikolojik olarak savaşa hazırды. Rusya'da kamuoyu rejimin zayıflığını çok iyi bildiği halde, savaş için yönetime güçlü bir baskı yaptı. İngilizlere gelince, Balkanlar'daki gelişmelere çok az ilgi duyuyorlardı ve kendi iç sorunları bunaltıcıydı: an-

cak eđer Avrupa'da bir savař ıkarsa olası İngiliz zaferi ile Dnya Gc olarak kabul edilmesinin yalnızca n hazırlığı olacaktı. Avrupa bylece Temmuz 1914'te savařın eřiğine geldi (Howard, 2003: 18-19).

Avusturyalılar Temmuz 1914'te ltimatolarını Sırbistan'a ilettiklerinde Almanlar, Rusya'yı mdahale etmekten caydırabileceklerinden emindiler. Bylece askeri gc dengesi amansız bir şekilde Rusya'nın lehine dnerken Almanlar savařa gitmeyi tercih ettiler. Aynı şekilde Rusya'da da benzer hesaplar yapılmaktaydı. Ruslar iin Sırbistan'ı terk etmek, tm Slav davasına ihanet etmek ve yzyılın bařından beri Balkanlar'da kazanılan her Őeyi kaybetmek olacaktı. Almanlar, Avusturyalıları destekleyerek bir Avrupa savařını riske attıklarını biliyorlardı, ama bu kazanmayı umdukları bir savařtı. İngiltere, yaygın olarak Almanya'nın nihai dřmanı olarak algılanmıřtır. Ayrıca İngilizler Almanya'yı bir Dnya Gc olması durumunda yzleřmesi gereken dřman olarak grmekteydi (Howard, 25).

1911'deki Agadir krizinden bu yana İngiliz askeri liderleri, Fransız meslektařlarıyla Kıtaya olası bir keřif kuvveti gnderilmesi hakkında gayri resmi ama ayrıntılı grřmeler yapmaktaydılar. Kraliyet Donanması, tm dzenlemelerini Almanya ile bir savař varsayımına gre yapmıřtı. Almanya Belika'yı iřgal etmemiř olsaydı, İngiltere'nin tarafsızlığını koruyup koruyamayacađı ve ne kadar sreyle koruyacađı bilinmemektedir. Alman askeri planlamacıları temel bir stratejik sorunla karřı karřıya kalmıřlardı. Almanların basit planı batıda Fransa ve dođuda Rusya arasında yenilgiden kaınmak iin dřmanlarından birini alt edip diđerine mdahale etmek zerinedir. 1866 ve 1870 zaferleri, Bismarck'ın Rusya'yı her iki ihtilafta da etkisiz hale getirmedeki bařarısı sayesinde mmkn olmuřtu ancak 1891'de Fransız-Rus İttifakı anlaşmazlığı yeniden canlandırmıřtır. nce hangi dřman yok edilmeli? 1871'den beri Fransa, Alman sınırı boyunca tahkimat yapıları inşa etmiřtir. Almanya iin tek yol beklenen Rus saldırısını savuřturmak iin kuvvetleri do-

đuya dođru kanalize etmek ve Fransız ordusunu zamanında yenecek şekilde Belika zerinden kuřatma hareketine girmekti. Schlieffen Rus tehdidini pek ciddiye almamıřtır. Ancak Rusya Almanya iin 1914 yılında o kadar byk bir tehdit gibi grnd ki, Alman planlamacılar bazen Rus ordularının kendi kuvvetleri Paris'e varmadan nce Berlin'e girebileceğinden korktular. Bu nedenle, Belika zerinden kitlesel bir iřgal, Alman savař planlarının nemli bir parası oldu ve 1912-13 reformlarından kaynaklanan Alman ordusunun byklğündeki artıř, bunu mmkn kılmak iin tasarlanmıřtı. Almanya Genelkurmay Bařkanlığı'nın, Sırbistan konusunda Rusya ile ıkan bir ihtilafta Avusturyalıları desteklemek iin, Fransa'ya saldırı planı ve bunu da Belika'yı iřgal ederek yapması ynndeki kararında kesinlikle hibir mantık bulunmamaktadır (Howard, 28).

Ancak savařın adil ve savunmacı grnmesi iin Rusya'nın saldırgan olarak gsterilmesi gerekmektedir ve krizin son gnlerinde Alman hkmetinin en byk endiřesi bu ynde olmuřtur. Sırbistan Avusturya'nın ltimatomunu reddetmiř ve Avusturya 28 Temmuz'da Sırbistan'a savař ilan etmiřtir. Bundan sonra askeri hesaplamalar her Avrupa bařkentinde karar verme srecine hkim oldu. Bu bađlamda II. Nikola tm Rus silahlı kuvvetlerinin seferber edilmesini emretti. Bu hareket Almanya tarafından bir tehdit olarak deđerlendirilmiřtir. Seferberliğin ilk hareket edene byk bir stratejik avantaj sađladığı dřnlmřtı. Rusya'nın seferberlik konusunda erken davranmasının diđer bir nedeni ise geniř topraklarından toplayacađı askerler iin ok fazla zamana ihtiya duymasıydı. Seferberlik, Almanya'nın Belika iřgaline yol atı. Harekete geme emri 1 Ađustos'ta Berlin'de verildi. Ertesi gn Belika'dan serbest geiř talep eden bir ltimatom yayımlandı ve Belika tarafından Alman birliklerinin sınırı gemesi 3 Ađustos'ta reddedildi. İngiltere Belika'nın iřgali neticesinde Almanya'ya karřı mdahale edilmesine ynelik giriřimlerini hızlandırdı. İngiliz hkmeti hemen bir ltimatom yayınlarak Belika'nın tarafsızlığına saygı gsterilmesini talep etti ve 4 Ađustos'ta Almanya'ya savař ilan

etti. Bu girişimler Avrupa'nın güç dengesinin korunmasına yönelik geleneksel muhafazakâr kaygılarla birleşerek parlamento desteğini neredeyse oybirliğiyle sağladı. Tüm devletler nezdinde yaşanan bu gelişmeler neticesinde savaş hali ilan edildi ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı başladı (Howard, 31).

Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın Başlangıcı ve Gelişen Önemli Olayların Kronolojik Sıralaması (Uçarol, 597-599);

- 28 Haziran 1914'te Avusturya veliahdının Saray Bosna'da öldürülmesi,
- 28 Temmuz 1914'te Avusturya'nın Belgrad'ı bombalaması,
- Almanya'nın Rusya'ya seferberliği durdurması yönündeki ultiyatomu (31 Temmuz 1914, Savaş İlanı 1 Ağustos 1914)
- Almanya'nın Fransa'nın seferberliği durdurmasına yönelik ultiyatomu (31 Temmuz 1914, Savaş İlanı 1 Ağustos 1914)
- Almanya'nın Belçika'ya, aynı şekilde İngiltere'nin Almanya'ya savaş ilanı (4 Ağustos 1914),
- Avusturya'nın Rusya'ya savaş ilanı (6 Ağustos 1914)
- Boğazların Rusya'ya verilmesi, (4 Mart 1915)
- İtalya'nın Savaşa Girmesi, (20 Mayıs 1915) (**İtilaf**)
- Bulgaristan'ın Savaşa Girmesi (12 Ekim 1915) (**İttifak**)
- Romanya'nın Savaşa Girmesi (17 Ağustos 1916) (**İtilaf**)
- Rusya'da Bolşevik İhtilali (25 Ekim 1917)
- Amerika'nın Savaşa Girmesi (2 Nisan 1917) (**İtilaf**)
- Yunanistan'ın Savaşa Girmesi (26 Haziran 1917) (**İtilaf**)

➤ Brest-Litovsk Barışı (3 Mart 1918) **Sovyet Rusya- Almanya**

Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın devam ettiği süreçte Rusya'da gerçekleştirilen Ekim Devrimi ile beraber Rusya'nın savaş alanındaki askerlerinin vatanlarına dönmesi ve Rusya'nın kendi iç sorunlarıyla yüzleşmesi gerekmiştir. Rusya'nın 1900'lü senelerin başından itibaren dış politikasının uygulanmasında göstermiş olduğu saldırgan politika 1905 yılında Japon yenilgisine neden olmuştur. Japon yenilgisinin Rusya açısından finansal ve uluslararası prestij kaybı yaşattığı değerlendirilmektedir. Devamında ise Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın yıkıcı etkilerini hissetmeye başlamıştır. Rusya tarafından icra edilen politikalar halkın beklenti ve taleplerini karşılamamıştır. Askeri olarak, emperyal Rusya, sanayileşmiş Almanya'nın dengi değildi ve Rus kayıpları, önceki herhangi bir savaşta herhangi bir ulusun verdiği kayıplardan daha fazlaydı. Enflasyon yükseldikçe gıda ve yakıt kıtlığı Rusya'yı rahatsız etti. Zaten zayıf olan ekonomi, maliyetli savaş çabalarıyla bozulmuştur. Bu olaylardan sonra gerçekleşen devrim neticesinde Romanov hanedanı etkisini kaybetmiş ve 1923 yılında Vladimir İlyic Lenin önderliğinde Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) kurulmuştur (History, 2009-2023).

Almanya'nın Rusya gibi savaş başladıktan sonraki dönemde tek çözüm olarak sert güç unsurlarını kullanması ve süreci rasyonel bir şekilde değerlendirememesi Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonunda "Diktat" olarak nitelenen Versay Antlaşmasını imzalamak zorunda bırakmıştır (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2020). Sonuç olarak Birinci Dünya Savaşı nihayete erdiğinde Almanya ve Rusya güçsüz duruma düşmüştür (Historic UK, 2020). O güne kadar çok farklı istek ve arzulara sahip iki devlet umduklarını bulamamış, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'na giden sürecin başlamasının da çıkmasına sebebiyet vermişlerdir.

2. Korkak Tavuk Oyunu ve Almanya ile Rusya'nın Oyun Modellemesi

Thomas Schelling'in Korkak Tavuk oyunu modellemesi yine kendisi tarafından ortaya atılan üç stratejik hamle temeline dayanmaktadır. Bu hamleler; *Taahhüt Stratejisi*, *Misilleme Kapasitesinin Varlığı ve Kesin Olmayan Misillemenin Kesin Misillemeden Daha Etkili Olduđu* yönündeki çıkarımlardır. Schelling'in bu stratejik unsurları belirlediđi dönem 1960'lı yıllardır. Doğal olarak Küba Füze Krizi bağlamında stratejilerin oyun modellemesi olarak değerlendirilmesi Schelling'in çalışmalarına önem katmıştır (Grimes, 2016). Schelling 2006 yılında Nobel Barış Ödülüne layık görülmüştür (Schelling, 2005).

Çalışmamızda değerlendirmesini yapacağımız strateji *Taahhüt Stratejisi* olacaktır. Taahhüt stratejisi iki oyuncunun seçeneklerini en aza indirmesi, bu vasıtaıyla karşısındaki oyuncuya başka opsiyonu kalmadığını göstermesi, dolayısıyla kararından vazgeçme ihtimalini çok az bir seviyeye indirdiğini göstermektir. Schelling bu stratejisini Korkak Tavuk Oyunu ile modellemiştir. Bu modelde iki farklı oyun bulunmaktadır. İlki iki oyuncunun doğrusal bir çizgi üzerinde birbirlerine doğru ilerlemesidir. Bu oyunda çarpışmadan korkarak kendisini çizgi dışına atan oyuncu Korkak Tavuk olarak nitelenecek ve oyunu kaybedecektir. Çizgiden ayrılmayan diğer oyuncu ise oyunu kazanmış olacaktır. (Sıfır Toplam) Bu modellemede bir seçenek daha bulunmaktadır.

Bu seçenekte iki oyuncu çizgiden çıkmayarak birbirleriyle çarpışacak ve birbirlerine ciddi zararlar verebilecektir. Bu modelleme sıfır toplamı olmayacaktır, çünkü iki oyuncu da zarar görecektir. Birinci oyun modellemesinin taahhüt unsuru oyuncunun durdurma mekanizmasını diğer oyuncunun göreceđi bir şekilde uygulamaya çalışmasıdır. Bu oyunda oyuncuların birbirlerine doğru geldikleri araçsal bir araba olarak düşünürsek direksiyonu kilitlemek veya direksiyonu yerinden çıkararak rakibine göstermek sayesinde kararlılığını ispatlamasını taahhüt unsuru olarak değerlendirebiliriz. Direksiyonu çıkartan ve kararlı olduđu anlaşılan oyuncu diğer oyuncu üstünde bir baskı oluşturabilecektir. Ancak bu oyunu kazanacağı anlamına gelmemektedir (Schelling, 1996: 116-118).

Korkak tavuk oyunununun diğer bir modellemesi ise iki oyuncunun arabayla aynı yönde ilerleyerek bir uçurumun kenarına kadar gitmeleri üzerinedir. Bu oyun modellemesinde iki oyuncu arabalarıyla uçuruma doğru hızlı bir şekilde ilerlerler. Hangi oyuncu uçuruma varmadan durur ya da kararını değiştirirse Korkak Tavuk olarak oyunu kaybeder. Uçuruma en yakın duran sürücü ise oyunu kazanacaktır. Ancak birinci oyundaki gibi iki oyuncu da kararından dönmeyerek diğer oyuncunun aracını durdurmasını veya vazgeçmesini beklerse iki oyuncu da uçurumdan dü-

		Çarlık Rusya	
		Diplomatik Kanal	Savaş
Almanya	Diplomatik Kanal	2	0
	Savaş	0	0

Şekil-1. Korkak Tavuk Oyununun Almanya-Rusya Modellemesi

şecek ve ikisi de oyunu kaybedecektir. Bu oyundaki taahhüt unsuru ise kararlı olan oyuncunun diğer oyuncunun göreceği şekilde aracın frenini kullanmamasıdır. Fren kullanmayarak devam eden oyuncu direksiyon yardımıyla uçurumdan kurtulacak ancak kararlı olduğunu bu şekilde karşısındaki oyuncuya gösterebilecektir (Schelling, 1996: 118).

Korkak tavuk modellemesi kapsamında Almanya ve Rusya'nın politikalarında herhangi bir değişiklik yapmayarak savaşın başlangıcından itibaren zarar gördükleri ortaya çıkmıştır. Özellikle Brest Litovsk Antlaşması sonucunda Rusya'nın olumsuz etkilenmesi ortadadır. Şekil-1 incelendiğinde iki devletin diplomatik kanalları kullanması sert güç unsurlarının kullanımından daha fazla yarar getirebilecektir. Bu sayede savaş ihtimalinin önü kesilebilecek, devletler ekonomik olarak yatırımlarını savunmaya aktarmayacak ve halkın ihtiyaçlarının karşılanması ile yönetim kademesine tepkileri azaltabileceklerdir. Ancak bu seçenekler iki devlet tarafından uygulama alanı bulmamıştır. Diğer olasılık; bir devletin savaş seçeneğini kullanması diğerinin ise diplomatik unsurlarını devreye sürmesidir. Bu durumda savaş seçeneğini ikinci plan olarak kullanma amacı olan devletin uluslararası ortamda haklılığını savunacağı ve avantaj elde edeceği değerlendirilmektedir. Ancak reel olarak iki devlet savaş seçeneğinden başka bir ihtimal üzerinde durmayarak savaş sonunda uluslararası arenada çok büyük zorluklar yaşamışlardır. Korkak tavuk oyunu modellemesi kapsamında iki oyuncu da kararlarını rasyonel alamamış ve oyun sonunda iki oyuncu girmiş oldukları müsabakayı kaybetmiştir. Bu bağlamda;

- İki devlet toprak kaybına uğramıştır,
- Sadece toprak kaybı değil ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal boyutta ciddi sıkıntılar yaşamıştır.
- İki devlet savaştan olumlu bir getiri elde edememiştir.

Oyun modellememizin ana unsuru olan Korkak Tavuk oyunundaki durum Almanya ve Rusya'ya entegre edilirse;

- İki oyuncu da taahhüt stratejilerini yanlış belirlemişlerdir,
- Gelişen durumların analizinde ve bu analizlerin savaş politikası anlamında kullanımında rasyonel davranılmamıştır,
- İki oyuncuda araçların direksiyonlarını devre dışı bırakmış, bunu birbirlerine belli etmiş, ancak seçeneklerin azaltılması sonucunda iki oyuncu da uçurumdan aşağıya uçmuş veya arabaları birbirine çarparak ikisi de zarar görmüştür.

3. Almanya ve Rusya Modellemesi Kapsamında Oyun Modellemesinin AGM'ye Etkilerinin Analizi

Birinci Dünya Savaşının iki taraf açısından Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisine etkilerinin kısa vadeli analizi;

- Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra iki devlet toprak ve prestij kaybına uğramıştır.
- İki devletin yanlış politika ve stratejilerinden dolayı monarkların devri sona ermiştir.
- Özellikle Rusya'da halkın geri plana atılmasından ve devlet sınırlarının genişleme ihtiraslarından dolayı devlette kargaşa hâkim olmuştur. (Büyük Fransız Devrimi öncesi Fransa'sı çabuk unutulmuştur.)
- Avrupa'da güvenlik sisteminin etkin olarak uygulanması ve tekrar bir savaşın çıkması engellenmek istenmiştir. İttifak Devletlerine çok maksatlı yaptırım uygulanmıştır.

Birinci Dünya Savaşının iki taraf açısından Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisine etkilerinin orta vadeli analizi;

- Rusya'da Devrim, Almanya'da Versay Antlaşmasının ezici maddeleri yüzünden istikrarsız bir ortam oluşmuştur.
- Almanya'daki ekonomik bozulmadan dolayı aşırı sağ yükselmiş, İkinci Dünya Savaşı yaklaşırken faşizm etkisini göstermeye başlamıştır.
- Rusya'da ekonomik alanda asgari müşterek ihtiyaçların karşılanamaması halkın sefalet çekmesine neden olmuştur. (Holodomor Katliamı)
- Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesinde icra edilen politikalara duyulan güvensizlik devam etme eğiliminde olmuştur. Avrupa'da tekrar bir savaş yaşanmaması için tatbik edilecek politikaların etkili olmadığı anlaşılmıştır.

Birinci Dünya Savaşının iki taraf açısından Avrupa Güvenlik Mimarisine etkilerinin uzun vadeli analizi;

- İki Dünya Savaşı'nın yaşanması ve savaşlardan sonraki süreç ile (Almanya'nın İki Kutuplu Yönetimi) NATO'nun kurulmasına giden süreç başlamıştır. (Kıta dışı müdahale)
- Güvensizlik hissedilen SSCB'nin farklı kolektif örgüt bağlamında güvenliğini sağlama ihtiyacı doğmuştur. (Varşova Paketi)
- Almanya'da Berlin Duvarı'nın yıkılması, SSCB'nin dağılması kapsamında Avrupa'yı etkileyen majör olaylarda başrolde yine Almanya ve Rusya olmuştur.

Günümüzde Rusya'nın sınırlarını genişletecek hamleler yapmaya devam etmesi, Almanya'nın ise silahlanma harcamalarına ciddi yatırımlar yapmayı planlaması (Aşırı Sağ'ın Güçlenmesi-AFD Örneği) Korkak Tavuk oyununu bu devletlere hatırlatacak mı? sorusunun gündemde kalmasını sağlamaktadır.

Sonuç

Almanya'nın Birliğini kurması ve 20'nci Yüzyılın sonlarına kadar Bismarck önderliğinde sürdürülen akıllı politikaların terk edilmesi, aynı şekilde Rusya'nın özellikle Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluğu ile Balkanlar bölgesi üzerindeki çekişmeleri döneme damgasını vurmuştur. İngiltere ve Fransa'nın ise devlet çıkarı kapsamında icra ettiği politikalar Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın engellenmesinden çok başlamasında etkili olmuştur.

Çalışmamızda analize tabi tuttuğumuz Almanya ve Rusya'nın Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na giden süreç içerisindeki durumları Schelling'in Korkak Tavuk oyunu modellemesi kapsamında analiz edilmiştir. İki devlet savaş ihtimalini tek seçenek olarak düşünmüş, ekonomik ve sosyal koşullarını değerlendirmeden kararlar almıştır. Diplomatik vasıtaların kullanılması yerine sert güç unsurları devreye sokularak savaş harici diğer seçeneklerin önüne geçilmiştir. Savaş sonunda ise değerlendirmeye almadıkları olay ve olgular yüzünden iki devlet savaştan zarar görerek çıkmışlardır. Oyun modellemesi bağlamında iki devlet Korkak Tavuk olarak tabir edilecek bir durum yaşamamış ancak almış oldukları kararla galibiyet elde eden bir taraf bulunmamıştır. İki devlet, savaş sonrasında yanlış politikalarına devam etmiş ve 20 yıl gibi kısa bir süre içerisinde ikinci bir savaşın çıkmasına engel olamamışlardır. Günümüzde Rusya'nın sınırlarını ve etki alanını genişletmek için sürdürdüğü askeri müdahaleler, Almanya'da ise aşırı sağın yükselişi ve savunma sanayi kurumlarına önemli bütçe ayırması iki devletin karışıklık yaşama ihtimalini ve tarihsel olarak benzer durumun ortaya çıkıp çıkmayacağını ilerleyen dönemlerde gösterecektir.

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Extended Summary

It is difficult to say that the events and phenomena experienced in the historical process have emerged without a reason, without a historical background or a certain ground. In fact, the fact that the analyzes on this subject are not done in-depth and retrospectively will lead to a reductionist evaluation of the subject. In our study, First World War. situation needs to be considered in detail. In this context, the German Union, especially in 1871, has an important place in the historical process.

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Game models put forward by Thomas Schelling have been used to explain the developments in international relations as well as the field of economics. The Cowardly Chicken model, which emerged in the 1962 years, was frequently used in the Cuban Missile Crisis's statement, which reached its zenith between the United States (USA) and the Soviet Union of Socialist Republics (USSR). Similarly in our study, Tsarist Russia Germany First World War. The effect of the political moves they made before the war on their situation after the war was tried to be analyzed with the Cowardly Chicken modeling.

