

**Cilt** Volume **32** **Sayı** Number **2** E-ISSN **2618-6330**

# **SiYASAL**

**Journal of Political Sciences**

## INDEXING AND ABSTRACTING

Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI) - Web of Science

Political Science Complete - EBSCO

TR Dizin - TÜBİTAK ULAKBİM

ERIH PLUS

SOBIAD

DOAJ



**SİYASAL: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCES**  
Cilt/Volume: 32 • Sayı/Number: 2 • Ekim/October 2023  
E-ISSN: 2618-6330 • DOI: 10.26650/siyasal

**Sahibi / Owner**

**Prof. Dr. Ayşegül KOMSUOĞLU**

İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası  
İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye  
Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Political Sciences and  
International Relations, Istanbul, Turkey

**Sorumlu Yazı İşleri Müdürü / Responsible Manager**

**Prof. Dr. Esra NEMLİ ÇALIŞKAN**

İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye  
Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Business Administration, Istanbul, Turkey

**Yazışma Adresi / Correspondence Address**

İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dekanlığı  
Dergi Yazı Kurulu Başkanlığı, Beyazıt, İstanbul, Türkiye  
Telefon / Phone: +90 (212) 440-0000/12236  
E-posta: sbfdergi@istanbul.edu.tr  
<http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr>  
[www.dergipark.org.tr/siyasal](http://www.dergipark.org.tr/siyasal)

**Yayıncı / Publisher**

İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınevi / Istanbul University Press  
İstanbul Üniversitesi Merkez Kampüsü, 34452 Beyazıt, Fatih / İstanbul, Türkiye  
Istanbul University Central Campus, 34452 Beyazıt, Fatih / Istanbul, Turkey  
Telefon / Phone: +90 (212) 440 00 00

Dergide yer alan yazılardan ve aktarılan görüşlerden yazarlar sorumludur.  
Authors bear responsibility for the content of their published articles.

Yayın dili İngilizce'dir.

The publication language of the journal is English.

Mart ve Ekim aylarında, yılda iki sayı olarak yayımlanan uluslararası,  
hakemli, açık erişimli ve bilimsel bir dergidir.

This is a scholarly, international, peer-reviewed and open-access journal  
published biannually in March and October.

**Yayın Türü / Publication Type**

Yaygın Süreli/Periodical

## DERGİ YAZI KURULU / EDITORIAL MANAGEMENT BOARD

### Baş Editör / Editor-in-Chief

**Prof. Dr. Esra NEMLİ ÇALIŞKAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [enemli@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:enemli@istanbul.edu.tr)

### Baş Editör Yardımcısı / Co-Editor in Chief

**Prof. Dr. Oylum KORKUT ALTUNA**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [oaltuna@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:oaltuna@istanbul.edu.tr)

### Dergi Yazı Kurulu Üyeleri / Editorial Management Board Member

**Prof. Dr. Esra NEMLİ ÇALIŞKAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [enemli@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:enemli@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Prof. Dr. Oylum KORKUT ALTUNA**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [oaltuna@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:oaltuna@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Çağatay ASLAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Aylin Ece ÇİÇEK**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [aylin.cicek@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:aylin.cicek@istanbul.edu.tr)

### Alan Editörleri / Section Editors

**Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Çağatay ASLAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Aylin Ece ÇİÇEK**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [aylin.cicek@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:aylin.cicek@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Prof. Dr. Fernando Jiménez SÁNCHEZ**, University of Murcia, Department of Political Science and Administration, Murcia, Spain - [fjimesan@um.es](mailto:fjimesan@um.es)

### İstatistik Editörleri / Statistic Editors

**Prof. Dr. Enis SINIKSARAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [esiniksaran@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:esiniksaran@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Prof. Dr. Hakan SATMAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İktisat Fakültesi, Ekonometri Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [mhsatman@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:mhsatman@istanbul.edu.tr)

### Dil Editörleri / Language Editors

**Elizabeth Mary EARL**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Yabancı Diller Yüksekokulu, İstanbul, Türkiye - [elizabeth.earl@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:elizabeth.earl@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Rachel Elana KRISS**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Yabancı Diller Yüksek Okulu, İstanbul, Türkiye - [rachel.kriss@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:rachel.kriss@istanbul.edu.tr)

## EDITORIAL BOARD

**Tindara ADDABBO**, University of Unimore, Department of Economics, Modena, Italya  
- [tindara.addabbo@unimore.it](mailto:tindara.addabbo@unimore.it)

**Meliha ALTUNIŞIK**, Ortadoęu Teknik Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, Ankara, Türkiye - [maltunis@metu.edu.tr](mailto:maltunis@metu.edu.tr)

**Saadet Gülden AYMAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [guldenayman@gmail.com](mailto:guldenayman@gmail.com)

**Karol BIENIEK**, Pedagogical University of Krakow, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Sciences and Administration, Krakow, Polonya. - [karol.bieniek@up.krakow.pl](mailto:karol.bieniek@up.krakow.pl)

**Ayşegül KOMSUOĞLU**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [komsu@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:komsu@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Zeynep DÜREN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye  
- [zeyduren@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:zeyduren@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Charlotte EPSTEIN**, The University of Sydney, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sydney, Avustralya  
- [charlotte.epstein@sydney.edu.au](mailto:charlotte.epstein@sydney.edu.au)

**Pınar GİRİTLİOĞLU**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [pinozden@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:pinozden@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Gülşay GÜNLÜK ŞENESEN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [gulaygs@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:gulaygs@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Yaprak GÜRSOY**, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Institute, Contemporary Turkish Studies, Londra, İngiltere - [y.gursoy@lse.ac.uk](mailto:y.gursoy@lse.ac.uk)

**Mehmet Akif İÇKE**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [mehmetakificke@gmail.com](mailto:mehmetakificke@gmail.com)

**Umbreen JAVAID**, University of the Punjab, Centre for South Asian Studies, Department of Political Science, Punjab, Pakistan - [umbreenj62@gmail.com](mailto:umbreenj62@gmail.com)

**Fernando JIMENEZ SANCHEZ**, Universidad de Murcia, Catedrático de ciencia política y de la administración, Murcia, İspanya. - [fjimesan@um.es](mailto:fjimesan@um.es)

**Mustafa KİBAROĞLU**, MEF Üniversitesi, İktisadi, İdari ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [mustafa.kibaroglu@mef.edu.tr](mailto:mustafa.kibaroglu@mef.edu.tr)

**Bogook KIM**, Sungkyunkwan University, Academy of East Asian Studies, Seul, Güney Kore  
- [kimbogook@hufs.ac.kr](mailto:kimbogook@hufs.ac.kr)

**Christos KOLLIAS**, University of Thessaly, Department of Economics, Volos, Greece - [kollias@uth.gr](mailto:kollias@uth.gr)

**Emre Eren KORKMAZ**, University of Oxford, Department of International Development, Oxford, İngiltere - [emre.korkmaz@qeh.ox.ac.uk](mailto:emre.korkmaz@qeh.ox.ac.uk)

**Ziya ÖNİŞ**, Koç Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [zonis@ku.edu.tr](mailto:zonis@ku.edu.tr)

**Olga KRASNYAK**, National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moskova, Rusya  
- [okrasnyak@hse.ru](mailto:okrasnyak@hse.ru)

**Alexandre KUKHIANIDZE**, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Department of Political Sciences, Tiflis, Gürcistan - [alex\\_kukhianidze@yahoo.com](mailto:alex_kukhianidze@yahoo.com)

**Gül Mehpare KURTOĞLU ESKİŞAR**, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, İşletme Fakültesi, İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İzmir, Türkiye - [gul.kurtoglu@deu.edu.tr](mailto:gul.kurtoglu@deu.edu.tr)

**Roman KUŹNIAR**, University of Warsaw, Department Of Strategic Studies And International Security, Varşova, Polonya. - [r.kuzniar@uw.edu.pl](mailto:r.kuzniar@uw.edu.pl)

**Andrea LOCATELLI**, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Facoltà di Scienze Linguistiche, Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Milano, İtalya. - [andrea1.locatelli@unicatt.it](mailto:andrea1.locatelli@unicatt.it)

**Rajiv NAYAN**, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Yeni Delhi, Hindistan - [rajivnayan@hotmail.com](mailto:rajivnayan@hotmail.com)

**Yaşar ONAY**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [yasaronay@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:yasaronay@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Ömer Faruk ÖRSÜN**, New York Üniversitesi-Abu Dhabi, Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, Abu Dhabi, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri - [omerorsun@nyu.edu](mailto:omerorsun@nyu.edu)

**Eeva-Kaisa PROKKOLA**, University of Oulu, Faculty of Science, Regional Policy and Regional Development, Oulu, Finlandiya - [eeva-kaisa.prokkola@oulu.fi](mailto:eeva-kaisa.prokkola@oulu.fi)

**Pierre Bruno-RUFFINI**, University of Le Havre, Faculty of International Affairs, Le Havre, Fransa. - [pierre-bruno.ruffini@univ-lehavre.fr](mailto:pierre-bruno.ruffini@univ-lehavre.fr)

**İlter TURAN (Emekli)**, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, İstanbul, Türkiye - [ilter.turan@bilgi.edu.tr](mailto:ilter.turan@bilgi.edu.tr)

**Kıvanç ULUSOY**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [kivanacu@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:kivanacu@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Fatma ÜNSAL**, Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi, Mimarlık Fakültesi, Şehir ve Bölge Planlama Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [funsal@msgsu.edu.tr](mailto:funsal@msgsu.edu.tr)

**Ayselın Gözde YILDIZ OĞUZALP**, Yaşar Üniversitesi, İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [ayselin.yildiz@yasar.edu.tr](mailto:ayselin.yildiz@yasar.edu.tr)

## İçindekiler Table of Contents

### MAKALELER ARTICLES

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- Housing Segregation in the Rental Housing Market: A Field Experiment for Istanbul**  
Kiralık Konut Piyasasında Barınma Ayrımcılığı: İstanbul için Saha Deneyi Uygulaması..... 133  
Mustafa Kahveci

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- Transformation of Conservative Politics: A Total Politics Analysis**  
Muhafazakâr Siyasetin Dönüşümü: Bir Total Siyaset Analizi..... 155  
Şükrü Mutlu Karakoç

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- The Impact of Local Government Policies on Internal Migration: The Case of TR1 Region**  
Yerel Yönetim Politikalarının İç göçe Etkisi: TR1 Örneği..... 179  
Zeynep Karal Önder, Yılmaz Kılıçaslan, Nezih Varcan

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- Critical Security Perspectives on the U.S.-Mexico Border**  
Eleştirel Güvenlik Perspektifinden ABD-Meksika Sınırı..... 201  
Çağla Lüleci-Sula

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- Governance And Policy Responses to Covid-19 In Aviation: An IGO and NGO Perspective**  
Havacılıkta Covid-19'a Karşı Yönetişim ve Politika Yaklaşımları: Uluslararası Otoriteler ve  
Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Perspektifi..... 217  
Volkan Yavaş, Ferhan Kuyucak Şengür, Armağan Macit

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- Investigation of Perceptions of Afghan Immigrants Living in the TRA1 Sub-Region within the Scope of  
International Migration about the Region**  
Uluslararası Göç Kapsamında TRA1 Alt Bölgesinde Yaşayan Afganistan Uyruklu Mültecilerin Bölge  
Hakkındaki Algılarının Araştırılması..... 239  
Asiye Şimşek Ademi, Erkan Oktay

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- Securitization of Islam in France: Everyday Lives of French Muslims.....**  
Fransa'da İslam'ın Güvenleştirilmesi: Fransız Müslümanlarının Gündelik Hayatları ..... 259  
Birsen Aybüke Evranos

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- A Farewell to Arms in the 21st Century: The Case of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front**  
21. Yüzyılda Silahlara Veda: Moro İslami Kurtuluş Cephesi Örneği ..... 279  
Yunus Çolak

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- A Constructivist Analysis of The Concept of Security Communities with Reference to NATO's Approach To  
Countering Terrorism in The Post-September 11 Era**  
11 Eylül Sonrası Dönemde Nato'nun Terörizmle Mücadele Yaklaşımına Atıfla, Güvenlik Toplulukları  
Kavramına İlişkin İnşacı Bir Değerlendirme..... 297  
Hasan Ulusoy

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- Co-existence of Democracy and Capitalism: A Reflection of Reciprocity or Ideology?.....** 311  
Tareq Hossain Khan

#### *Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

- Analysis of Charismatic Deposits and the Staging of the President of Madrid's Speeches. A Case Study.....** 337  
Luis Ramos





## EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, of Istanbul University is a peer reviewed journal which endeavors to disseminate academic knowledge among scholars, educators, policy makers and other societal stakeholders. With the valuable contributions of the participating authors to date, it has succeeded to take its place among the significant journals that are nominees to play the role of shaping the content of political sciences discipline in Turkey. It is currently indexed in Emerging Sources Citation Index, Ebsco Political Science Complete, Turkish Index of Social Sciences and Humanities (ULAKBİM) and Academia Social Science Index (ASOS Index). Following the change of its title to "Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences" in October 2017, the journal encourages theoretical and empirical articles majorly in the field of political sciences while also inviting substantive research from areas of social, humanities and administrative sciences.

This issue listed as Vol.32 Issue 2, October 2023 includes eleven articles. The first article which is entitled as "Housing Segregation in the Rental Housing Market: A Field Experiment for Istanbul" is written by Asst.Prof. Ph.D. Mustafa KAHVECİ from Istanbul University. This paper examines the housing discrimination towards the Syrian population living in Turkey under temporary protection status. The paper specifically focuses on the migrants' experience of the initial housing search and the instances of bias in the rental housing market. Findings reveal a discrepancy, with approximately 35% of housing tour requests made by Syrians for properties directly managed by landlords being declined, in contrast to a mere 2% rejection rate for the local population. This disparity not only escalates the housing costs for Syrians due to the limited access to available properties in the rental housing market but also contributes to an uneven spatial distribution of Syrians across Istanbul's districts.

The second article which is authored by Asst. Prof. Ph.D Şükrü Mutlu KARAKOÇ from Istanbul Medeniyet University is entitled as "Transformation of Conservative Politics: A Total Politics Analysis". This article aims to analyze how the transformation in conservative politics took place. To this end, it proposes to start from the total politics analysis, which provides the opportunity to analyze Türkiye's politics through social group behaviors. In this article, it is argued that conservative politics developed a qualified relationship based on mutual interaction and autonomy between the social sphere, the political sphere and the power domains during the 2000s. It is also claimed that as of the 2010s, there has been a transformation in this capacity of forming qualified relationship, which has led to a critical split within conservative politics.

Asst. Prof. Ph.D. Zeynep Karal ÖNDER, Prof. Ph.D. Yılmaz KILIÇASLAN and Prof. Ph.D. Nezh VARCAN from Anadolu University contribute to this issue by their article "The Impact of Local Government Policies on Internal Migration: The Case of TR1 Region". The paper aims to reveal the effect of local government policies on the migrant intention of the residents by examining the residents who have an intention/plan/will to migrate in Turkey. The primary data are obtained by surveys from residents in the region that has the highest in- and out-migration (TR1 region). Impact of local government policies on migration potential estimated by using discrete choice models with primary data. The findings show that the local government's planning and settlement policies, social security policies, and security policies are the policies having the greatest impact on the migration decision.

The fourth paper is entitled as "Critical Security Perspectives on the U.S.-Mexico Border" and written by Asst. Prof. Ph.D. Çağla LÜLECİ SULA from TED University. This study examines how the Copenhagen School and the Paris School analyze the U.S.-Mexico border. The paper firstly examines how these two schools of thought define, understand, and approach security, secondly it directs its focus on the critical security literature on the U.S.-Mexico borderland and lastly the article discusses both approaches' accounts on the same border and how they handle dis/similar aspects of the migration-security nexus. The study concludes by defending the argument that bridging these two critical security approaches may increase their analytical power in making sense of the migration-security nexus.

The next article of this issue which is authored by Asst. Prof. Ph.D Volkan YAVAŞ from Ege University, Prof. Ph.D Ferhan KUYUCAK ŞENGÜR from Eskisehir Technical University and Lect. Ph.D. Armağan MACİT from Ege University is entitled as "Governance And Policy Responses to Covid-19 In Aviation: An IGO and NGO Perspective". The authors emphasize that the aviation industry is struggling with all its stakeholders to keep the industry alive, after Covid 19. In the paper, they investigated internal and external measures, including the governance of the Covid-19 process. The studies of intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations have been compiled. These studies, which were put forward during the Covid-19 process were evaluated and solutions were offered for the sustainability and future of aviation.

The sixth article of this issue is entitled as "Investigation of Perceptions of Afghan Immigrants Living in the TRAI Sub-Region within the Scope of International Migration about the Region" and is written by Lec. Ph.D. Asiye ŞİMŞEK ADEMİ and Prof. Ph.D. Erkan OKTAY from Atatürk University. The aim of the article is to investigate the phenomenon of migration, which is one of the issues that affect Turkey the most in the national and international arena, in the context of social acceptance. The authors emphasize that obviously harsh solutions to the immigrant problem with strict rules are not only inappropriate for humanity but will also deepen the problem rather than solve it and damage the image of Turkey in the international arena. Therefore, the most fundamental solution to be developed is to ensure social acceptance through suggestions to be developed on soft ground. This is only possible if immigrants are recognized and their perceptions and efforts are known.

Birsen Aybuke EVRANOS, Ph.D. contributes this issue by her article entitled as "Securitization of Islam in France: Everyday Lives of French Muslims". This paper suggests that securitization of Islam in France is not only an exception which calls for adoption of emergency measures but also an everyday formation to define acceptable Muslims. Also, this article provides empirical evidence to securitization theory which has been mostly theoretical so far. The findings show that analysis through both logics of securitization allow to capture a more complete picture and how security practices is translated into everyday lives.

The eight article of the issue is entitled as "A Farewell to Arms in the 21st Century: The Case of Moro Islamic Liberation Front " and written by Yunus ÇOLAK, Ph.D. This study examined the policy change of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) during the 21st century and offered an explanatory typology for changes in the secessionist movements' aims and/or means that they pursue their aims.

The article titled as "Co-existence of Democracy and Capitalism: A Reflection of Reciprocity or Ideology?" is written by Ph.D. Student Tareq Hossain KHAN from The Education University of Hong Kong. This paper examines the relationship between liberal democracy and capitalism and explains why and how capitalism and democracy support each other. It argues that capitalism and democracy fit structurally and mutually make a politico-economic order in which capitalism ensures its autonomies against the state, and democracy commands public policies in which economic structure does not ban the freedom of political choice.

The next article "A Constructivist Analysis Of The Concept Of Security Communities With Reference To Nato's Approach To Countering Terrorism In Post-September 11 Era" and written by Hasan ULUSOY, Ph.D. Ambassador. The article examines the concept of security communities and its relevance for collective security formations in the context of the post-Cold War era. Through a theoretical comparison, the constructivism in its conventional form is assessed to be better explanatory for the general situation in the post-Cold War era. Based on this analysis, NATO's evolution as not only a collective defense alliance but also a security community among its allies is evaluated. In this context, the trilateral memorandum signed between Turkey, Finland and Sweden for counter-terrorism cooperation is also assessed within the framework of security communities.

The last article is titled as "Analysis of Charismatic Deposits and the Staging of President of Madrid's Speeches. A Case Study". The author Luis RAMOS is predoctoral researcher at the University Rey Juan Carlos of Spain.

This paper analyzes the modern charismatic phenomenon which takes place in a personalization of politics paradigm that places the political parties far from the political perceptions of society, whereas leaders look much closer to citizens. The article concludes that Díaz Ayuso as a semi-pure charismatic leader inserted in a personalization of politics paradigm that has used media and drama as tools to maintain power and who tried to de-routinize charisma through her most mediatic speeches.

I would like to thank to the authors who participate in this issue with their valuable papers, the reviewers for their precious effort, the editorial board members of the journal while hoping this issue to be an enjoyable and useful read for all the readers.

Prof. Dr. Esra Nemli Çalışkan  
Editor-in-Chief



## Housing Segregation in the Rental Housing Market: A Field Experiment for Istanbul\*

### Kiralık Konut Piyasasında Barınma Ayrımcılığı: İstanbul için Saha Deneyi Uygulaması

Mustafa Kahveci<sup>1</sup>

#### Abstract

This paper examines the housing discrimination towards the Syrian population living in Turkey under temporary protection status. Since the commencement of the civil war, the Syrian migration to Turkey has transformed numerous cities across the country into varying degrees of Syrian habitation. The Turkish policymakers initially designated Syrian immigrants as “guests”, claiming that their settlement in Turkey was exceptional and would be transitory. However, this phenomenon has evolved into a lasting situation. Inequalities within the housing sector amplify the challenges faced by immigrants in establishing themselves and adapting to their host country. Moreover, the selection of a living locale carries significant importance, influencing the accessibility of local public services and engagement in the labor market. The paper specifically focuses on the migrants’ experience of the initial housing search and the instances of bias in the rental housing market. It is founded upon empirical data derived from a field experiment conducted as part of the research project titled “From Guests to City Dwellers: The Housing Experience of Syrians in Istanbul” Following data collection, a comprehensive three-phase mixed methods research was conducted. In alignment with existing literature, the field experiment was executed employing a sample that accurately represents the rental housing market in Istanbul, the city harboring the highest population of Syrian residents. Findings reveal a stark discrepancy, with approximately 35% of housing tour requests made by Syrians for properties directly managed by landlords being declined, in contrast to a mere 2% rejection rate for the local population. This disparity not only escalates the housing costs for Syrians due to the limited access to available properties in the rental housing market but also contributes to an uneven spatial distribution of Syrians across Istanbul’s districts.

**Keywords:** Housing Discrimination, Field Experiment, Spatial Segregation, Turkey, Syrian migrants

#### Öz

Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de geçici koruma statüsü altında yaşayan Suriyeli nüfusa yönelik barınma ayrımcılığını incelemektedir. İç savaşın başlamasından bu yana, Suriyelilerin Türkiye’ye göçü, ülke genelinde birçok şehri farklı derecelerde Suriyeli yerleşimine dönüştürmüştür. Politika yapıcılarını başlangıçta Suriyeli göçmenleri “misafir” olarak tanımlamış ve Türkiye’deki yerleşimlerinin istisnai ve geçici olacağını iddia etmiştir. Ancak bu olgu kalıcı bir duruma dönüşmüştür. Konut sektöründeki eşitsizlikler, göçmenlerin kendilerini kabul ettirme ve ev sahibi ülkeye uyum sağlama konusunda karşılaştıkları zorlukları artırmaktadır. Ayrıca, yaşanacak yerin seçimi, yerel kamu hizmetlerinin erişilebilirliğini ve işgücü piyasasına katılımı etkileyerek büyük önem taşımaktadır. Bu makale özellikle göçmenlerin ilk konut arama deneyimlerine ve kiralık konut piyasasında karşılaştıkları önyargılara odaklanmaktadır. “Misafirlikten Kent Sakinliğine” başlıklı araştırma projesinin bir parçası olarak yürütülen saha deneyinden elde edilen ampirik verilere dayanmaktadır. Saha deneyi, mevcut literatür izlenerek İstanbul’u temsil eden bir örnekleme yapılmıştır.

Bulgular, Suriyelilerin doğrudan ev sahipleri tarafından kiraya verilen konutlarda için yaptıkları evi görme taleplerinin yaklaşık %35’inin reddedildiğini, buna karşılık yerel nüfus için bu oranın sadece %2 olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu eşitsizlik, kiralık konut piyasasında mevcut mülklere erişimin sınırlı olması nedeniyle Suriyeliler için konut maliyetlerini artırmanın yanı sıra, Suriyelilerin İstanbul’un ilçeleri arasında dengesiz bir mekânsal dağılım göstermesine de katkıda bulunmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Barınma Ayrımcılığı, Mekansal Ayrışma, Türkiye, Suriyeli Sığınmacılar

\* This research is based on data from TUBITAK 1002 research project number 122K927.


**1 Corresponding Author:** Mustafa Kahveci (Asst. Prof. Dr.), Istanbul University Faculty of Political Sciences, Istanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: [mustafa.kahveci@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:mustafa.kahveci@istanbul.edu.tr) ORCID: 0000-0001-5053-2230

**To cite this article:** Kahveci, M. (2023). Housing segregation in the rental housing market: a field experiment for Istanbul. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 133–153. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1349823>

## Introduction

The onset of the civil war in 2011 triggered a swift influx of Syrian migrants to Turkey, resulting in a notable presence of the Syrian population across various cities in the country. The process of settlement, initially conceived as a temporary or exceptional arrangement by policymakers, has over time transformed from a provisional scenario into a lasting circumstance. Consequently, the housing disparities, a pivotal facet of immigrant integration, not only escalated the costs for immigrants to establish roots in their host country but also wielded critical implications on access to local public services and participation in the labor market.

After the COVID-19 pandemic, real rents increased rapidly both in Turkey and in metropolitan areas. The graph below shows the change in real rents in three metropolitan cities. As can be seen from the graph, the real rent index, which had a flat course between 2017 and 2020, increased sharply after 2020. The highest increase was observed in Istanbul. However, when the increase in the real rent index and the timing of migration from Syria are analyzed, while migration from Syria to Turkey intensified between 2015 and 2018, the largest increase in the real rent index occurred after 2020. Based on these data, it does not seem possible to attribute the deepening of the housing crisis in Turkey solely to the increase in migrants.



*Graph 1.* Real rent index in three metropolitan cities (September 2017=100).

Source: BETAM, 2023 p: 6

This paper quantifies the extent of discrimination the Syrian migrants face in the pursuit of rental housing and scrutinizes the underlying determinants. Given the multifaceted nature of the issue, a comprehensive field experiment was conducted by established literature. The data collected through this experiment, detailed below, were meticulously amalgamated with information about property characteristics, neighborhood attributes, and district particulars. The analytical process encompassed initial descriptive statistics, a subsequent regression analysis, and hypothesis testing.

The research findings unequivocally expose the existence of discrimination within the rental housing market. Concurrently, the condition of the housing inventory in the

respective district, the socio-economic fabric of the neighborhood, the concentration of immigrants therein, as well as supplementary information provided during the housing search exert discernible influences on the discrimination phenomenon.

This study enriches the discourse on housing discrimination across three distinct dimensions. First, the existing literature, focuses on Europe and the USA, often juxtaposing Muslim immigrants (typically of Arab or Turkish origin) as marginalized groups against the backdrop of a perceived white, Christian native populace. This study marks a significant departure by presenting the first field experiment on housing discrimination in Turkey, with a distinctive approach of comparing two Muslim communities.<sup>1</sup> These neighboring groups, both predominantly Muslim and historically coexisting within a single geopolitical boundary (Ottoman Empire), invite contemplation on the explanatory potential of religious, cultural, and historical affiliations. Secondly, a noteworthy empirical discovery emerges from this study: discrimination diminishes when an oversupply scenario prevails in the rental housing sector, signifying a reduction in landlords' bargaining power. Notably, the study embraces a unique methodological proposition by integrating micro (telephone interviews, surveys, and in-depth interviews), meso (neighborhood socio-economic and political data), and macro (district-level) variables within the dataset and analytical framework. This holistic approach contributes substantively to comprehending both the magnitude and determinants of housing discrimination. The third contribution is realized through the assessment of the influence of neighborhood similarity on discrimination extent. The study employs shared political preferences as a metric for gauging the commonalities among residents within a neighborhood.

Following the introduction, the study's organization unfolds as follows: A comprehensive review of theoretical and empirical literature pertinent to housing discrimination within the e-housing market is presented. Subsequently, the research design is expounded upon, followed by a thorough discussion of empirical findings. The concluding segment juxtaposes the empirical insights with the theoretical literature, thereby contextualizing the research's significance.

### **Housing Discrimination**

Housing discrimination has been the subject of extensive research, representing a significant impediment to the social integration of ethnic and racial minorities (Pager and Shepherd 2008, Yinger 1998). The adverse impact of housing discrimination is multifaceted, encompassing elevated housing costs for minorities that erode their wealth. This phenomenon also perpetuates spatial disparities, diminishing access to essential public services such as education, healthcare, and municipal amenities, and further exacerbates disadvantages within the labor market (Galster 1992, 1996; Pager and Shepherd 2008; Turner and Mikelsons 2002). The pervasive nature of discrimination fosters stratification, reinforces biases, and escalates intergroup conflicts (Qullian 2014). Extensive empirical research has consistently unveiled the disadvantageous position of minorities within the rental housing market across developed nations. The trajectory of discrimination

---

<sup>1</sup> This comparison is made because both groups are predominantly Muslim, but there is a minority of people with different beliefs in both groups.

economics research originated by investigating discriminatory practices against African Americans in the USA. However, this focus has since broadened due to heightened cross-border population mobility, prompting investigations into discriminatory practices against not only domestic ethnic and religious groups but also immigrants and refugees. Such discrimination leads to minority groups being confined to segregated areas, enduring higher rent per square meter for subpar accommodations compared to the majority population. Notable instances include immigrant neighborhoods characterized by inferior living conditions (Ausborg et al. 2017). During the 1980s and 1990s, classical audit studies primarily involved interviewing two ethnically distinct potential tenants, matched in all other aspects, and assessing differential treatment by landlords and real estate agents. This approach entailed various forms of unequal treatment, such as withholding property showings, refraining from providing information, or failing to respond after showings – all indicative of discriminatory behavior (Yinger 1995). While these studies predominantly concentrated on black-and-white comparisons within the USA, they consistently uncovered persistent and entrenched unequal treatment (Riach and Rich 2002). Recent research has underscored pronounced discrimination against Hispanics, surpassing even that directed at black individuals (Galster 1990a; Roychoudhury and Goodman 1992; Turner and Mikelsons 1992; Yinger 1998, Hanson, and Santos 2014). Furthermore, field experiments have indicated that homeowners tend to channel minorities toward specific neighborhoods. Notably, even when equal numbers of potential tenants from minority and majority groups were presented, they were systematically steered toward disparate localities (Galster 1990b; McIntosh and Smith 1974; Turner and Mikelsons 1992). Ondrich et al. (2003) propose that real estate agents curtail marketing efforts when promoting properties in ethnically mixed or transitional areas. Pioneering experiments by Massey and Lundy (2001) in telephone applications demonstrated that discrimination persists if landlords discern tenants' ethnic origins and immigration statuses through their accents and language dominance during phone conversations. Similarly, Drydakis (2011) discovered that individuals with Albanian accents in the Greek housing market were subject to higher rental rates and more extensive inquiries about their employment and financial circumstances. As the internet and online housing platforms gained prominence, studies employing email correspondence to measure discrimination during the housing application process became more prevalent. Examination of the literature reveals 19 field experiments directly addressing housing discrimination between 2000 and 2014. Of these, 14 pertain to racial and ethnic factors, two concern disability-related discrimination, and three focus on discrimination based on sexual orientation. Among these experiments, 12 were conducted via email, and seven involved direct telephone conversations with landlords or real estate agents (Rich 2014: 34-35).

While early research predominantly spotlighted discrimination against African Americans in the USA, a recent trend has emerged focusing on discrimination against immigrants. These studies investigate the impact of religious differences (specifically discrimination against Muslims) and ethnic origins (e.g., Arab, Turkish). An investigation by Friedman et al. (2010) explored discrimination against Hispanics and blacks in Dallas and Boston. Assessing email responses as a discrimination indicator, only Dallas exhibited discrimination against Hispanics. Positive response rates indicated that both blacks and Hispanics received fewer positive responses than white Americans, with

blacks experiencing even greater disparities. Studies introducing class-related information alongside race found associations between both race and class position with discrimination. An extensive study spanning 10 cities revealed a 4-6% decline in positive responses for blacks; when upper-class status was included in emails, discrimination diminished and became statistically insignificant (Hanson & Haylew, 2011). Ewens et al. (2014) conducted a study across 34 cities with a substantial sample (14,000) and discovered that while both blacks and whites received about 9% fewer positive responses when race was the sole factor, adding positive information led to increased discrimination, particularly among whites. This counterintuitive result was attributed to valuation mechanisms.

An evident surge in European studies has been observed recently, with an initial focus on Nordic countries like Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (Flage, 2018). In Sweden, Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) sent emails to landlords and real estate agents concerning three prospective tenants (Swedish male, Swedish female, and Arab/Muslim male). They discovered that Arab/Muslim applicants received nearly half as many responses compared to Swedish candidates, and Swedish women were favored more. Notably, landlords exhibited greater discrimination than real estate agents. Contrary to findings indicating that providing more information in emails reduces discrimination, Ahmed et al. (2010) found that discrimination persisted even when Arab/Muslim applicants included more information while locals did not. In contrast, Bengsston et al. (2012) identified discrimination only in Stockholm suburbs in Sweden, with a more pronounced gender gap. Exploring discrimination towards Arab/Muslim applicants in Norway, Andersson et al. (2012) found that although discrimination was high against Muslims/Arabs, incorporating more positive information in applications reduced such discrimination against these groups without affecting the preference for women among local individuals. The continued presence of discrimination after providing more information hints at persistent preferential bias. Beatty and Sommervoll (2012) investigating rental housing discrimination against minorities in Norway concluded that immigrants and their offspring pay 8% more in rent than Norwegians, increasing to 14% for immigrants of African origin. Results from Öblom and Antfolk (2017), who examined discrimination against Arabs/Muslims in Finland, demonstrated that the Arab/Muslim minority is preferred over natives, with women receiving more positive responses than men. While immigrant women benefit twice as much as immigrant men, this gender gap narrows among locals.

France, characterized by its non-recognition of ethnic distinctions in its legal system, has been a focal point for discrimination studies. Acolin et al. (2016) investigated discrimination against immigrants from various backgrounds, including Arab/Muslim, Turkish, Eastern European, Hispanic, and Sub-Saharan African. The study found no discrimination against Eastern Europeans and Hispanics but identified discrimination ranging from 16% to 22% against other groups.

Bunel et al. (2016) examined discrimination against Arab/Muslim minorities in Paris and found that candidates with Arab/Muslim backgrounds were one-third less favored than those with French names. An interesting divergence from existing literature emerged when job status and income information were incorporated, leading to an increase rather than a decrease in the disparity between immigrants and locals. Le Gallo et al. (2019) conducted a study in France with a larger sample and discovered around one-third

discrimination rate, like Bunel et al. (2016), while also showing that providing more information mitigates discrimination.

In Italy, Baldini and Federici (2011) compared discrimination against Arab/Muslim and Eastern European immigrants versus the native population. They found higher discrimination against Arabs/Muslims than Eastern Europeans, but both groups faced considerable discrimination. The study indicated that adding information like income and education reduced discrimination and that the command over the Italian language (grammatical correctness of the application) did not significantly affect outcomes.

Germany has often been examined with Turkish people as the minority group facing discrimination (Auspurg et al., 2017; Mazziaotta v.d. 2015). Auspurg et al. (2017) applied to 600 houses in Munich with both German and Turkish-origin candidates, revealing that Turkish-origin individuals received 9% fewer house viewing invitations. Discrimination declined when the candidate held high-skilled jobs but increased for low-skilled jobs. Higher discrimination occurred in houses rented directly by landlords and in neighborhoods with a concentrated Turkish population, supporting the tipping point hypothesis over the increased contact hypothesis. Analysis based on price levels demonstrated statistical discrimination in higher-priced housing and preference-based discrimination in lower-priced housing. Notably, German studies showed that language proficiency plays a pivotal role. In Horr et al. (2018), conducted via phone calls, discrimination was found against individuals of Turkish origin, particularly those with accents. This underscores the significance of language education in migration policies and efforts to enhance integration and diminish discrimination. Cross-country studies present a complex interplay of factors influencing discrimination patterns, revealing both shared trends and unique nuances across different contexts.

An alternative approach to categorizing discrimination surveys, conducted through both email and telephone, revolves around the extent of information disclosed to landlords. This strategy aims to counteract statistical discrimination encountered by landlords due to asymmetrical information while gauging potential instances of optional discrimination. In emails, information is provided, specifying that all attributes of prospective tenants are identical, barring their names. When examining the impact of disclosing more personal details - such as marital status, occupation, number of children, education level, etc. - in email applications, the objective is to mitigate the influence of statistical discrimination. It is observed that this augmentation of information heightens the favorable response rate for immigrants; however, it does not entirely eradicate discrimination (Ahmed et al., 2010; Bosch et al., 2010). Explorations conducted via email or telephone have unveiled subtle forms of discrimination that may not be immediately apparent. For instance, Hanson et al. (2011) discovered that real estate agents in the United States exhibit swifter responses, compose lengthier emails, and employ more positive language in correspondence with white clients.

### **Field Experiment Design**

The design of field experiments within the housing market fundamentally centers on quantifying disparities in application volumes for rental or sale property listings. These discrepancies manifest when requests to view properties are made in written form or via



phone calls, particularly in terms of the invitations extended to immigrants and residents. While advancements in technology have shifted housing market advertising to online platforms, studies employing email inquiries still suffer from reduced response rates compared to requests for property viewings facilitated through direct interaction with landlords or real estate agents. However, email-based inquiries offer the advantage of streamlined data collection, circumventing variables like attire and physical appearance that could influence responses. In this study, the choice of employing phone calls as the primary method is grounded in the prevalent reliance on phone-based interactions within Turkey's rental housing market. Additionally, most advertisements posted by property owners do not include email addresses for contact, unlike the broader literature which often includes advertisements from real estate agencies or developers. This exclusion of agency-related advertisements aims to eliminate ambiguity in attributing discrimination to either real estate agents or property owners. This strategic decision does result in a notable reduction in the study's sample size due to omitted observations. However, the study's focus on host behavior justifies this trade-off, despite its impact on narrowing the study's target audience. The selection of property owners aims for a sample size that duly represents the entire market. Consequently, in pursuit of an unbiased sample, the following formula was employed to calculate a sample size with a  $\pm 3$  margin of error within 95% confidence.

$$n = \frac{N t^2 p q}{d^2 (N - 1) + t^2 p q}$$

The formula provided employs various parameters to determine the sample size for the study. In this context, 'n' denotes the sample size, 'N' stands for the population size (which is 10,000, representing the number of rental houses listed on the sahibinden.com website for Istanbul<sup>2</sup>), 'p' indicates the probability of being selected for the sample (0.5), 'q' represents the probability of not being included in the sample (0.5), 't' signifies the critical value corresponding to a  $\pm 3$  margin of error at 95% confidence level (1.96), and 'd' represents the margin of error ( $\pm 3$ ). When these values are substituted into the formula, a sample size of 964 is derived.

In the process of sample determination, the initial step involved assessing the number of rental houses listed on the sahibinden.com website for each district of Istanbul as of September 1, 2019. Subsequently, 964 questionnaires were distributed across the districts. Following a district-level stratification, a random sampling method was employed to ensure equitable representation, granting each advertisement an equal opportunity for selection.

Regarding the selection of houses to be included in the sample, a random number was generated, corresponding to the number of properties within each district. This number was drawn from the set of house numbers in that district, with each number selected only once. These generated numbers were used to identify rental housing advertisements, with the most recent listings given precedence. Recognizing the periodic fluctuations in the number of rental houses, an alternate list was formulated for districts where the

2 Istanbul was chosen as the study area because it is the largest city in the rental housing market and attracts the highest number of migrants.

initially chosen numbers were omitted. This adjustment considered scenarios where the chosen number exceeded the total available rental housing at that time or when contact information in the advertisement was inaccessible. Thus, a reserve list of 964 numbers was created to account for such contingencies.

In cases where the initially selected advertisement couldn't be reached, subsequent attempts were made using the advertisement linked to the corresponding number on the list.

The experimental procedure followed the protocol outlined by Bosch et al. (2014). The study involved assessing four potential tenants for each advertisement, representing Syrian Female, Syrian Male, Turkish Female, and Turkish Male applicants. A logistical challenge emerged when deciding whether the property owners should be contacted on the same day or separate days. To mitigate the perceived inconvenience for landlords and minimize disruption from four prospective tenant calls in a single day, a rental inquiry was placed for an apartment occupied by a member of the project team, within the specified time frame.

Over three days, the study resulted in 11 inquiries on the first day, 14 on the second, and 9 on the third, from individuals expressing interest in viewing the rental property. This information underscored that homeowners are receptive to receiving multiple calls in a single day, thus confirming the feasibility of making four calls during a day. An observation made during pilot applications, where the search was conducted over two days (alternating between Syrian and local tenants), indicated that certain listings were removed by the second day. This suggested that owners often quickly withdraw their advertisements from the rental market in Istanbul. Considering this insight, the decision was made to conclude searches within the same day.

Additionally, the sequence of calls was considered during the experimental phase. There was a concern that landlords might favor the first caller due to the promise of potential tenancy, potentially leading to subsequent callers receiving more rejections. To address this potential bias, it was planned for the four tenant candidates to contact properties in the sample in a balanced manner. Notably, these four candidates-initiated calls with around 239 to 241 individuals.

Another noteworthy aspect was the response pattern of homeowners who were hesitant about showcasing their properties to Syrian candidates. Rather than outright rejection, they tended to claim that the property was either rented or promised to someone else. This posed challenges in accurately interpreting results, as it was difficult to ascertain whether houses were genuinely rented or if avoidance tactics were employed. To overcome this ambiguity, when the initial Syrian tenant candidate was informed that the property had been removed from the listing, a Turkish candidate was designated to conduct the final inquiry for that advertisement. This approach aimed to differentiate cases where genuine rental changes occurred from instances of polite avoidance. Consequently, if the final call confirmed the removal of the property, it was excluded from the sample, and a replacement advertisement was sought from the reserve list.

Tenant candidates' characteristics, encompassing gender, immigrant status, and native identity, were deliberately selected to closely resemble each other. This strategy involved

the first caller recording their interaction with the landlord and subsequently sharing this information with the three other callers. Minor differentiations were incorporated, such as income, family size, and occupation. For instance, family size remained constant, whether it was portrayed as a family of four with parents and two children or a single parent with a child and grandparent. Likewise, when providing occupational details, vocations unsuitable for Syrians in Turkey, like civil servants, lawyers, and pharmacists, were omitted from the local tenant candidates' profiles. As a result, all potential tenants were "employed" in the private sector, nullifying any potential landlord preference for public sector employment, since it offers higher job security vis a vis the private sector, and therefore signals potentially higher stability in terms of rent payment.

The Syrian tenant candidates were proficient in Turkish and had no trouble understanding their surroundings, though their accents revealed their immigrant status. In field experiments involving direct contact, a key critique pertains to uncontrolled variables (e.g., accent, appearance) beyond the target variable (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017, p.11). Accents and names can hint at socioeconomic class or geographic location, while profile photos on phone apps can introduce bias. Countermeasures were implemented to address these concerns. Local names such as Zeynep and Mustafa, neutral in terms of political or geographical connotations, were chosen alongside common Syrian names like Mohammed (male) and Iman (female). Tenant candidates underwent training through pilot studies, standardizing phone conversations by adhering to interview protocols.

To mitigate the potential impact of the prospective tenants' physical attributes on landlords, profile photo features of the tenants in relevant applications were disabled during the field experiment. To prevent the possibility of post-experiment harassment of the tenant candidates by landlords, dedicated phone lines were procured for the study, which was subsequently terminated after the interviews.

The absence of double-blind protocols is one of the critical weaknesses in direct communication-based field experiments. During the training, all members of the research team were briefed on the goals, method, and potential methodological weaknesses of the study. Bernard and Duflo (2017) maintain that this process may lead the callers in the research team to, consciously or otherwise, gather data concurrent with the theoretical assumptions of the study at hand. Therefore, team members, excluding the project leads conducting calls on behalf of Turkish men, were informed about the research's objectives and general framework. To counter potential bias stemming from race, ethnicity, or discrimination perceptions, clear instructions were given to the three tenant candidates. Their task was to assess whether the observations made during the training, derived from online rental housing advertisements, could be extrapolated more broadly. To uphold data quality, rather than adhering to predefined targets for daily calls, calls were terminated when prospective tenants exhibited signs of fatigue or waning motivation.

To minimize harm to both landlords and prospective tenants, the project team proactively devised measures. Verbal agreements were consciously avoided during calls to prevent binding agreements that might hinder landlords from considering other tenants. Furthermore, precautions were taken to shield Syrian tenant candidates from the potential impact of intense discrimination over a short period. In cases where hosts persisted in scheduling house viewings, house viewings were canceled via text messages.

The data obtained from the field experiment in this study was meticulously coded to ensure relevance and appropriateness. Homeowners' gender was the sole information recorded from the phone interviews. Once coded, additional details such as house size, number of rooms, and neighborhood-specific attributes, including square meter rental prices and location, were extracted from the advertisements. This data was then combined with socio-economic information regarding the neighborhood and district where each house was situated. Neighborhood characteristics were sourced from the "My Neighborhood Istanbul" (Mahallem İstanbul) project database, while data about the number of Syrians and foreigners at the district level were obtained from the TUBITAK-supported POT-A project. An application was made to the Istanbul University Ethics Committee for this study, and as a result of the review, it was unanimously decided that there was no ethical problem in this study.

### Data Analysis

In the process of data analysis, the initial step involved the descriptive evaluation of the extent of discrimination during the housing search, and identifying factors that influenced this discrimination. Subsequently, the reasons why landlords declined house visits by prospective tenants of Syrian origin were investigated. Following the descriptive analysis, a logit model was established to delve into the factors that influenced discrimination.

Discriminatory tendencies towards Syrian tenant candidates manifest, first, during the application process to the public, open call rental listings. Among the 3,856 interviews, derived from four distinct calls each for 964 rental houses in the field experiment, house viewing requests were declined 718 times (18.6%), while acceptance was granted in 3,146 instances (81.4%). Among these rejected requests, 677 were from Syrian candidates and 41 were from local candidates. This indicates that 94 percent of refusals were directed toward Syrians, with the remaining 6 percent toward local candidates. Examining each group independently highlights a stark contrast in rejection rates. Merely 2 percent of house viewing requests from local candidates were rejected, whereas this figure rose to approximately 35 percent for Syrian candidates. The chi-square test statistic indicates a statistically significant difference between the two groups, underlining the considerably higher tendency of landlords to reject Syrian tenants.

Table 1  
*Responses to House Viewing Requests (Broken Down by Nationality)*

Responses to House Viewing Requests		Tenant Candidate		
		Turkish	Syrian	Total
No	N	41	677	718
	%	2,1	35,0	18,6
Yes	N	1891	1255	3146
	%	97,9	64,5	81,4

Pearson  $\chi^2(1) = 691.9396$  Pr = 0.000

Analyzing refusal and acceptance responses based on gender, men were denied house viewings 374 times and women 344 times. Although this appears to favor women, there's no statistically significant difference (Pearson chi-squared: 0.125). Dissecting refusal rates by ethnicity and gender reveals that 49 percent of rejections were aimed at Syrian male tenant candidates and 45 percent at Syrian female tenant candidates. Local candidates

of both genders faced rejection in 3 percent of their search attempts. No statistically significant gender-based difference exists within the ethnic groups.

### **Landlord Gender**

Further examination according to landlord gender reveals that among the 3,864 calls made, 21.4 percent were received by female hosts and 78.6 percent by male hosts. Female hosts rejected 19 percent of calls, while male hosts rejected 18.5 percent. However, this difference isn't statistically significant according to the chi-square test (p-value: 0.737). Evaluating the correlation between racial discrimination in calls and host gender, the rejection rate of Syrian calls, both by male and female hosts, was higher than the average. Female hosts turned down 36.7 percent of answered Syrian calls, while male hosts rejected 34.6 percent. Nonetheless, this relationship doesn't exhibit statistical significance according to the chi-square test (p-value: 0.421).

### **House Rents and Physical Features of Houses**

Table 2 displays the distribution of average rents, categorized by rejection and acceptance. The hypothesis tested through group averages is that landlords charging higher rents are more likely to respond positively to both Syrians and Turkish residents due to a smaller pool of potential tenants. Across the entire sample, the average rent for the 966 houses surveyed in this study is 1724 TL. The average rent for houses to which candidates received rejection responses is 1556 TL, whereas the average rent for those in which the candidates were offered a house visit is 1763 TL. This indicates a rent difference of 207 TL between the groups. The distinction between these two groups is statistically significant. When specifically considering the subset of houses where Syrians were rejected, the average rent is 1554 TL, whereas the average rent for houses where they were accepted is 1817 TL. This signifies a rent difference of 263 TL, which is 56 TL higher compared to the entire sample. The disparity in average rent between homes where Syrians were rejected for a house visit and those where they were accepted also presents a statistically significant difference. Turning our attention to Turkish candidates, the average rent for the 41 houses where they were rejected a house visit is 1593 TL, while the average rent for the 1891 houses where they were invited to view the property is 1726 TL. The rent difference of 133 TL between houses that received rejection-acceptance responses from Turkish candidates is not statistically significant. Upon examining the responses from female candidates, the average rent for houses where female candidates were rejected is 1578 TL, and for houses where they were accepted, it is 1760 TL. The 182 TL difference between these two groups is statistically significant. For male candidates, the average rent for houses where they received rejection responses is 1532 TL, while for houses where they were accepted, it is 1777 TL. The 245 TL difference between these two groups is statistically significant. Upon reviewing both Table 9 and Table 10 in their entirety, a noteworthy observation is that homeowners charging lower rents appear more hesitant to show their homes, particularly to Syrian tenants. While no notable rent-based differences exist between women and men, a clear distinction emerges between local and Syrian tenants.

Table 2  
Average Rejection Responses Based on Rent and Caller

Group	House Visit	Number of Observations (N)	Average Rent ( $\mu$ )	P value $H_0: \mu_h - \mu_c \leq 0$
Whole Sample	No	718	1556,4	0,000***
	Yes	3146	1763,4	
Syrian	No	677	1554,0	0,000***
	Yes	1255	1817,4	
Turkish	No	41	1596,3	0,276
	Yes	1891	1727,6	

The p-value indicates the results of the t-test: \* signifies significance at 90%, \*\* at 95%, and \*\*\*\* indicates significance at 99%.

### House Sizes

Conversely, as average rents increase, there seems to be less emphasis on the local-immigrant distinction. This suggests that landlords may be exercising greater caution and risk aversion for houses with lower average rents. Alternatively, viewed from another perspective, this could indicate selectivity, assuming a higher demand for such properties. Referring to Table 3, which explores the link between house size and acceptance-rejection rates, it becomes evident that the average size of the 718 houses that the candidates were rejected for house viewings is 106 square meters. In contrast, the average size of the 3,146 houses that received acceptance is 112 square meters. Among the 41 houses where rejection responses were directed solely at Turkish candidates, the average size decreased to 95 square meters. For all other groups (the whole sample, male-female, Syrian-Turkish), the average size of houses with rejection responses ranges from 106 to 108 square meters, while the average size of houses with acceptance responses ranges from 112 to 114 square meters. Therefore, one might posit that as the house size increases, landlords become more inclined to allow house viewings for Syrian tenants.

Table 3  
Relationship between House Sizes and Rejection-Acceptance Responses

Group	House Visit	Number of Observations (N)	Average m2 ( $\mu$ )	Standard Deviation	P
WHOLE SAMPLE	No	718	106	33,9	0,000***
	Yes	3146	112	38,4	
Syrian	No	677	108	34,4	0,000***
	Yes	1255	114	39,2	
Turkish	No	41	95	22,5	0,002***
	Yes	1891	112	37,9	
	Yes	611	114	39,1	

The p-value indicates the results of the t-test: \* signifies significance at 90%, \*\* at 95%, and \*\*\*\* indicates significance at 99%.

700 out of 3864 calls conducted during the study were for houses located in housing estates. According to Graph 8, which presents information on the acceptance-rejection rate of these 700 calls, 98 calls (14%) were rejected by the hosts. Examining the distribution

of houses within a housing complex based on racial breakdown, 94 out of the 98 rejected calls were made by Syrians. Among the 350 calls made by Syrians to houses within a housing complex, 256 (73.1%) were not rejected by the landlords; their requests to view the houses were met positively. Syrian tenant candidates were less likely to face rejection when searching for houses within a housing complex compared to houses out of a complex. This relationship is also statistically significant according to the chi-square test ( $p$ -value: 0.000).

### Neighborhood Dynamics

An essential indicator of a neighborhood's desirability for living is the rental prices per square meter. Higher prices in a neighborhood suggest greater preference for that area compared to neighborhoods with lower prices. Therefore, the study initially explored the relationship between rent per square meter of a given neighborhood and the responses received during the field experiment. Such information was already available on the website sahibinden.com. Prices per square meter ranged from 6 to 35. These prices were categorized as follows: Values from 6 to 10 were coded as 1, 11 to 15 as 2, 16 to 20 as 3, 21 to 25 as 4, 26 to 30 as 5, and 31 and higher as 6. Rejection rates are higher in the first three real estate index categories. The lowest rejection rate is observed in the sixth property index category. Rejection rates in the first three categories hover around 19-20%, compared to 16.2% in the fourth category, 10.3% in the fifth category, and 7.5% in the sixth category. This indicates a lower inclination to reject house viewings in regions with higher average rents. In areas with lower rental values, landlords reject Syrian tenants more frequently. Two distinct dynamics may be influencing this phenomenon. First and foremost, Syrian immigrants are concentrated in areas with lower rental values, as evidenced by their settlement preferences. This concentration may be the result of more intense competition for rental housing among the local urban poor in Istanbul. Additionally, landlords might have had potentially negative experiences with Syrian tenants, following the migration wave after 2015, when multiple families often inhabited the same house. When assessing the distribution of average housing rents per square meter in neighborhoods by groups, it is evident that the average rent is higher in the neighborhoods where Syrian applicants received a house visit offer. On the other hand, in the unlikely cases in which Turkish applicants were refused a house visit, neighborhoods tend to have higher average rents. In conjunction with the house rent data, this suggests that as both house rents and the average rent of the neighborhood increase, landlords' tendency to discriminate decreases.

Table 4

*Average Rejection-Acceptance Responses Based on Neighborhood Square Meter Rental Price and Caller*

Group	House Visit	Number of Observations	Average rent	P value
		(N)	( $\mu$ )	$H_0: \mu_h - \mu_c \leq 0$
Whole Sample	No	718	13,49	0,0072***
	Yes	3146	14,03	
Syrian	No	677	13,47	0,002***
	Yes	1255	14,19	
Turkish	No	41	14,02	0,542
	Yes	1891	13,93	

The  $p$ -value indicates the results of the  $t$ -test: \* represents significance at 90%, \*\* at 95%, and \*\*\* indicates significance at 99%.

### **Education and Socioeconomic Indicators**

The education level of a neighborhood's residents stands as a crucial socioeconomic indicator. Neighborhoods boasting a higher proportion of university graduates per thousand individuals tend to exhibit a superior socioeconomic status. This correlation suggests that elevated education levels contribute to heightened average incomes and increased social capital. Hence, the study explores the interplay between the number of university graduates per thousand individuals and the acceptance-rejection dynamics. Categorically classifying the variable of university graduates, we observe higher rejection rates in the first two categories compared to others. Notably, the rejection rate in the fifth category, featuring the highest number of university graduates per thousand people, is 8.1%. Interestingly, as the number of university graduates surpasses 200 per thousand individuals, the rejection rate diminishes. This trend also demonstrates statistical significance according to the chi-square test. Delving into the Syrian perspective, rejection rates for the first and second categories (19.7% and 20.2%) rose to 37.2% and 37.9%, respectively. In the top category, originally at 8.1%, the rejection rate increased to 13.5% for Syrian applicants. This relationship remains significant according to the chi-square test (Pearson Chi2: 22976, p-value: 0.000).

### **Housing Market Dynamics**

The housing discrimination discourse frequently underscores the unmeasured influence of supply and demand conditions within the rental housing market on discrimination patterns. In localities where domestic demand is robust, homeowners enjoy the liberty to exclude immigrants, minorities, or disadvantaged groups while having a high demand for their properties. Conversely, areas with an ample rental housing supply may witness reduced landlord discrimination, given their lessened bargaining power vis a vis the prospective tenant. Our study provides empirical support to these assumptions. The table furnishes insight into the impact of surplus supply in the housing market on rejection and acceptance responses during our field experiment. The surplus supply districts were identified by comparing a district's share of Istanbul's population with its share in the rental housing market. A district qualifies as having a surplus supply if its ratio of advertised rental properties to the total market supply exceeds its population ratio to Istanbul's population. Accordingly, Istanbul's surplus supply districts during the field experiment encompassed Adalar, Arnavutköy, Ataşehir, Avcılar, Beykoz, Beşiktaş, Fatih, Kadıköy, Kartal, Pendik, Sancaktepe, Sarıyer, Şişli, Tuzla, Çekmeköy, Ümraniye, Üsküdar, and Şile. Upon analyzing the data, districts with surplus supply showcase a higher acceptance rate for tenant candidates across all breakdowns. Syrians received a negative response in 29% of their calls in surplus supply regions, contrasting with a 44% rejection rate in regions without surplus supply. The discrepancy between districts with and without surplus housing supply is evident for both Syrian men and women, with rejection rates at 30% and 47%, respectively, in non-surplus regions. The data robustly suggests that higher rental housing volume in a district mitigates discriminatory tendencies due to weakened bargaining power, whereas lower housing supply exacerbates such tendencies. This underscores the potential of housing supply regulation as a positive measure in reducing discrimination.




Table 5  
*Housing Market Structure and its Association with Discrimination*

	Surplus Supply	RESPONSE (N)		p
		Rejection	Acceptance	
Whole Sample	No	343	1097	Pr = 0.000***
	Yes	375	2049	
Syrian	No	319	401	Pr = 0.000***
	Yes	358	854	
Turkish	No	24	696	Pr = 0.004***
	Yes	17	1195	

The p-value indicates the results of the t-test: \* represents significance at 90%, \*\* at 95%, and \*\*\*\* indicates significance at 99%.

### Migrant Density

In addition to exploring issues such as housing discrimination and settlement preferences, it is crucial to analyze the phenomenon of migrant density by juxtaposing it with the telephone experiment. This analysis involves assessing whether specific districts within Istanbul have witnessed a notable concentration of Syrian migrants. The subsequent chart displays the distribution of Syrians across Istanbul's districts for the years 2015 and 2019, using data from the comprehensive POT-A research initiative. In 2015, a significant proportion of the Syrian population in Istanbul, approximately 77 percent, resided within the initial 15 districts listed. However, by 2019, this percentage had risen to 82 percent. Over the interceding years, the registered Syrian populace in Istanbul experienced a notable 58 percent increase, growing from 338,619 in 2015 to 537,420 in 2019. As these districts' contributions to Istanbul's overall demographic landscape amplified, certain regions emerged as focal points of migrant density. Notably, Esenyurt, Sultangazi, Bağcılar, Küçükçekmece, and Fatih stood out as zones where Syrian migrants clustered. A noteworthy observation about these districts is the decline in the proportion of Syrians residing in Fatih. Specifically, this proportion decreased from 7.4 percent to 5.5 percent within the given timeframe. This trend could potentially be attributed to the fact that Fatih often serves as the initial destination for newly arrived Syrian migrants in Istanbul, as underscored by our research findings. Subsequently, as migrants acclimate to the city and seek out employment opportunities, they might opt to relocate to areas in closer proximity to job markets and featuring more affordable rental options. However, an additional consideration arises in assessing this trend. The scarcity of rental housing stock within Fatih, being an established district, may pose challenges in accommodating the burgeoning Syrian population. This dearth of suitable housing could potentially contribute to the observed migration of Syrians from Fatih to other districts over time.



**Graph 2.** Geographical Distribution of Syrians Residing in Istanbul by Districts - Top 15 Districts (Percentage).

The diagram above also underscores the presence of spatial clustering or concentration among Syrians living in Istanbul. Certain districts exhibit a significant concentration of the Syrian population. Notably, districts such as Esenyurt, Küçükçekmece, Bağcılar, and Bahçelievler stand out as locations where undeclared work is prevalent, thereby providing increased job opportunities for Syrians. A distinguishing characteristic of these districts is their position in the periphery of the city. These districts, known for housing Istanbul's lower socioeconomic strata, are experiencing rapid expansion due to new construction initiatives. While indications of socio-spatial concentration within the urban distribution of the Syrian population are discernible, it's imperative to note that an analysis at the neighborhood level, rather than the district level, is required to ascertain the existence of ghettoization. This consideration should account for Istanbul's district sizes, which vary considerably. Unfortunately, the absence of such granular data precludes its utilization from existing sources. However, relying on both macro-level data and on-the-ground observations, it is feasible to assert the emergence of distinct "Syrian districts" within Istanbul. Two distinct inquiries guided our examination of this district-level data in conjunction with the telephone experiment data. The initial inquiry seeks to juxtapose the 15 districts with the highest Syrian population within Istanbul against other districts in 2015. This analysis involves districts encompassing a minimum of 3 percent of the city's total Syrian population. The objective of this comparison is to assess the contact hypothesis, which posits that increased interaction between immigrants and natives leads to reduced prejudice and subsequently diminished discrimination.

Within our telephone experiment encompassing 964 calls, a noteworthy distinction emerged based on the districts in which the calls were placed, taking into consideration our assumption of lower Syrian presence and thus limited landlord contact versus districts with substantial Syrian presence. Among the total calls, 619 were in districts with presumed

lesser Syrian occupancy and, consequently, reduced interaction with landlords. In contrast, 325 calls were directed to properties within districts characterized by concentrated Syrian populations. An intriguing pattern materialized in rejection rates. Districts with limited contact demonstrated an approximate 16 percent rejection rate across the entire sample. Conversely, areas featuring intensified contact exhibited a higher rejection rate of around 22 percent. This distinction also held when analyzing landlord reluctance to showcase their properties to Syrian tenant candidates. In districts with minimal contact, this reluctance reached 31 percent, while in districts with heightened contact, the figure escalated to 42 percent. Further delineation of the data revealed that these tendencies were consistent for both genders within the Syrian population. Specifically, reluctance to exhibit properties to Syrian women was documented at 31 percent in low-contact districts and 39 percent in high-contact districts. Similarly, reluctance percentages for Syrian men stood at 32 percent in low-contact districts and surged to 45 percent in high-contact districts. Across all categorizations in the tabulated results, a compelling trend emerged – the propensity to withhold property showings from Syrian tenants was markedly amplified in districts characterized by intense contact. This disparity between the two groups proved to be statistically significant across all analytical categories. An especially notable finding centers on the variance in landlord responses toward Syrian male tenants. In districts of heightened contact, the tendency to decline property showings to Syrian men surpassed that of less-contact districts by approximately 13 percent. This outcome suggests that perceptions of Syrian male tenant candidates among landlords are adversely influenced by factors such as single/shared housing and the historical memory of these arrangements, which emerged during the initial migration phase.

Table 6  
*Correlation between Syrian Population Density and Discriminatory Behavior*

	Syrian Density	RESPONSE (N)		p
		Rejection	Acceptance	
Syrian	No	387	851	Pr = 0.000***
	Yes	290	404	
Syrian Woman	No	187	432	Pr = 0.006***
	Yes	135	212	
Syrian Man	No	200	419	Pr = 0.000***
	Yes	155	192	

The p-value indicates the results of the t-test: \* represents significance at 90%, \*\* at 95%, and \*\*\*\* indicates significance at 99%.

The subsequent aspect we aim to explore, leveraging insights from spatial concentration data, involves an intuitive investigation of the flooding point hypothesis. To this end, we juxtapose the districts currently hosting concentrated Syrian populations with other districts that did not serve as initial migration destinations. Among the top 15 districts exhibiting Syrian population concentration between 2015 and 2019, the majority remain consistent, albeit with shifting rankings: Esenyurt, Bağcılar, Küçükçekmece, Sultangazi, Esenler, Fatih, Başakşehir, Avcılar, Sultanbeyli, Zeytinburnu, Bahçelievler, Gaziosmanpaşa, Arnavutköy, and Kağıthane. Upon scrutinizing the table, which delves into the correlation between Syrian density and instances of discrimination, a recurrent pattern emerges. Landlords in regions where the Syrian population is concentrated display a lower willingness to exhibit properties to Syrian tenant candidates compared to counterparts in

other districts. This trend holds across all analytical levels. Notably, the discrepancy in this regard is less pronounced for Syrian women compared to men. The contrasts drawn between these district groups exhibit statistical significance across all breakdowns. These findings collectively suggest that, as of 2019, the districts accommodating 82 percent of Istanbul’s Syrian population are converging toward the flooding point. Following the data collection phase, the subsequent analytical methodology employed was logistic regression analysis. This method is employed to model dependencies on one or more explanatory variables when the dependent variable possesses a binary response of either 1 or 0. The independent variables within the logistic regression model can span both continuous and categorical attributes. The logit function, constituting the natural logarithm (ln) of the dependent variable’s probabilities, is foundational to the logistic regression model (Bewick et al., 2005). The mathematical expression capturing this scenario is encapsulated in the subsequent equation:

$$\text{Equation 1} \quad \text{logit}(p) = \ln\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right)$$

In this equation, the symbol “p” represents the probability of observing a value of 1 in the dependent variable. The application of logistic regression analysis is pertinent to this study due to its appropriateness for models involving dependent variables with a binary response format, encompassing values of 1 and 0. In the model derived from the dataset collected during the study, the dependent variable centers on the act of rejection, where “1” denotes instances where the interview request is accepted by the host, and “0” signifies cases where the interview request is declined by the host. Meanwhile, the independent variables encompass several factors: the individual being of Syrian descent, the presence of the property within a housing complex (site), the gender of the landlord, and the availability of surplus housing within the district where the sought-after property is situated. (All independent variables are categorized as binary and categorical. “1” signifies a positive response, while “0” signifies a negative response to the respective question.)

Table 7  
Model Results

Rejection-Acceptance	Odds Ratio	SE
Syrian	0,038*	0,0063
Surplus Supply	1,932*	0,1818
Housing Estate	1,601*	0,2068
Landlord Gender	1,011	0,1139
Constant	29,633*	5,5119
N	3864	
LR Chi2	874,92	
Prob>chi2	0,00	
Pseudo R2	0,235	
Hosmer Lemeshow Test	0,5568	
*0,01		

The table above presents the outcomes of the established model, encompassing a total of 3864 observations. The model, overall, demonstrates a meaningful fit. The results from the Hosmer Lemeshow model compatibility test affirm the model's congruence with the data, thereby establishing its statistical reliability within our study. According to the findings derived from the model analysis, hosts exhibit a higher likelihood of accepting Turkish individuals compared to Syrians. This trend aligns with existing literature on housing discrimination, particularly studies conducted in the United States that compared discrimination between ethnic groups. Such research revealed that minority groups, such as blacks and immigrant Latinos, encountered more challenges in securing housing. These instances of discrimination often led to spatial concentrations of these groups in specific areas. Considering this, the observation that Syrians face a higher likelihood of rejection during housing search compared to Turkish individuals resonates with broader trends documented in the literature. Notably, areas characterized by excess housing supply are approximately 1.9 times more likely to receive inquiries than regions without surplus housing. Considering the discrimination prevalent in the housing market against immigrants, the likelihood of finding accommodation in areas with surplus housing becomes more pronounced. Homeowners are inclined to rent to immigrants rather than endure the economic loss associated with vacant properties. This trend is particularly evident in districts like Esenyurt, which have witnessed considerable housing development in recent years. However, it's important to acknowledge that the choice to live in such districts is influenced by various factors beyond just housing supply, including proximity to industrial areas and socio-spatial dynamics like ghettoization. Another key insight gleaned from the analysis pertains to housing complexes. Properties located within housing complexes are more likely to be offered house visits, compared to those outside of complexes. This pattern can be attributed to the fact that rental costs within complexes are generally higher, attracting residents from higher economic strata. Consequently, an improved economic standing tends to mitigate the likelihood of facing discrimination. Surprisingly, the gender of the property owner emerges as statistically insignificant in our analysis. This implies that, regardless of gender, landlords exhibit similar attitudes towards immigrants within Istanbul's housing market. This uniformity suggests that gender does not significantly impact landlord behavior in this context.

### **Conclusion**

Results of the study show that Syrians living in Istanbul are at a disadvantage in accessing the rental housing market compared to locals. More than one-third of the rental properties advertised are not shown to Syrians by landlords. This not only limits the number of houses that Syrians can access but also affects their participation in the labor market and utilization of local public services. The high tendency not to show houses to Syrians and the fact that it is not very sensitive to income points to discrimination based on preference, one of the two types of discrimination defined by the economics of discrimination literature. Another striking result of the study is that the tendency not to show a house is affected by both the supply level of rental housing in the market and the rent of the houses. As rents rise, the tendency not to show a house decreases, while the tendency not to show a house intensifies in areas where there is a high scarcity in the rental housing market. The findings of both descriptive and inferential data analysis suggest

that as the bargaining power of landlords increases, they are more likely to discriminate/exclude Syrians. In high-rent houses, the bargaining power of the landlord decreases due to the decrease in demand as the rents increase depending on the income level. In houses with relatively low rents, the landlord is in a stronger position to select tenants as the number of potential tenants increases.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** This study was supported by the TÜBİTAK 1002 Research Project (Research no: 119K110).

**Ethical Approval:** An application was made to the Istanbul University Ethics Committee for this study, and as a result of the review, it was unanimously decided that there was no ethical problem in this study.

**Acknowledgement:** I am grateful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Cemal Salman, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Serdar Acun, and Res. Asst. Emir Kurmuş for the fruitful work/companionship we maintained throughout the research process.

---

## References

- Acolin, A., Bostic, R., & Painter, G. (2016). A field study of rental market discrimination across origins in France. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 95, 49-63.
- Ahmed, A. M., & Hammarstedt, M. (2008). Discrimination in the rental housing market: A field experiment on the Internet. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 64(2), 362-372.
- Ahmed, A. M., Andersson, L., & Hammarstedt, M. (2010). Can discrimination in the housing market be reduced by increasing the information about the applicants?. *Land Economics*, 86(1), 79-90.
- Andersson, L., Jakobsson, N., & Kotsadam, A. (2012). A field experiment of discrimination in the Norwegian housing market: Gender, class, and ethnicity. *Land Economics*, 88(2), 233-240.
- Auspurg, K., Hinz, T., & Schmid, L. (2017). Contexts and conditions of ethnic discrimination: Evidence from a field experiment in a German housing market. *Journal of Housing Economics*, 35, 26-36.
- Baldini, M., & Federici, M. (2011). Ethnic discrimination in the Italian rental housing market. *Journal of Housing Economics*, 20(1), 1-14
- Beatty, T. K., & Sommervoll, D. E. (2012). Discrimination in rental markets: Evidence from Norway. *Journal of Housing Economics*, 21(2), 121-130.
- Bengtsson, R., Iverman, E., & Hinnerich, B. T. (2012). Gender and ethnic discrimination in the rental housing market. *Applied Economics Letters*, 19(1), 1-5.
- Bertrand, M., & Duflo, E. (2017). Field experiments on discrimination. *Handbook of economic field experiments*, 1, 309-393.
- BETAM. 2023. sahibindex Kiralık Konut Piyasası Görünümü <https://betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/kategori/ekonomik-arastirmalar/yayinlar/arastirma-raporlari/>
- Bosch, M., Carnero, M. A., & Farre, L. (2010). Information and discrimination in the rental housing market: Evidence from a field experiment. *Regional science and urban Economics*, 40(1), 11-19.
- Bunel, M., L'Horty, Y., & Petit, P. (2016). Discrimination based on place of residence and access to employment. *Urban Studies*, 53(2), 267-286.
- Drydakis, N. (2011). Ethnic discrimination in the Greek housing market. *Journal of Population Economics*, 24(4), 1235-1255.
- Ewens, M., Tomlin, B., & Wang, L. C. (2014). Statistical discrimination or prejudice? A large sample field experiment. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 96(1), 119-134.
- Flage, A. (2018). Ethnic and gender discrimination in the rental housing market: Evidence from a meta-analysis of correspondence tests, 2006–2017. *Journal of Housing Economics*, 41, 251-273.
- Friedman, S., Squires, G. D., & Galvan, C. (2010, May). Cybersegregation in Boston and Dallas: Is Neil a more desirable tenant than Tyrone or Jorge. In *Population Association of America 2010 Annual Meeting*. <http://paa2010.princeton.edu>.
- Galster, G. (1990). Racial discrimination in housing markets during the 1980s: a review of the audit evidence. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 9(3), 165-175.
- Galster, G. (1990). Racial steering by real estate agents: Mechanisms and motives. *The Review of Black Political Economy*, 19(1), 39-63.
- Galster, G. C. (1992). Research on discrimination in housing and mortgage markets: Assessment and future directions. *Housing Policy Debate*, 3(2), 637-683.
- Galster, G. (1996). Comparing loan performance between races as a test for discrimination. *Citiescape*, 33-39.
- Hanson, A., & Hawley, Z. (2011). Do landlords discriminate in the rental housing market? Evidence from an internet field experiment in US cities. *Journal of urban Economics*, 70(2-3), 99-114.

- Hanson, A., Hawley, Z., & Taylor, A. (2011). Subtle discrimination in the rental housing market: Evidence from e-mail correspondence with landlords. *Journal of Housing Economics*, 20(4), 276-284.
- Hanson, A., & Santas, M. (2014). Field experiment tests for discrimination against Hispanics in the US rental housing market. *Southern Economic Journal*, 81(1), 135-167.
- Horr, A., Hunkler, C., & Kroneberg, C. (2018). Ethnic Discrimination in the German Housing Market. *Zeitschrift Für Soziologie*, 47(2), 134-146. doi:10.1515/zfsoz-2018-1009
- Le Gallo, J., l'Horty, Y., Du Parquet, L., & Petit, P. (2019). Discriminations in Access to Housing: A Test on Urban Areas in Metropolitan France. *Economie et Statistique*, 513(1), 27-45.
- Massey, D. S., & Lundy, G. (2001). Use of Black English and racial discrimination in urban housing markets: New methods and findings. *Urban affairs review*, 36(4), 452-469.
- Mazziotta, A., Zerr, M., & Rohmann, A. (2015). The effects of multiple stigmas on discrimination in the German housing market. *Social Psychology*.
- McIntosh, N., & Smith, D. J. (1974). *The extent of racial discrimination* (No. 547). PEP. Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020 Solano, Giacomo and Huddleston, Thomas (2020) ISBN: 978-84-92511-83-9
- Ondrich, J., Ross, S., & Yinger, J. (2003). Now you see it, now you don't: why do real estate agents withhold available houses from black customers?. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 85(4), 854-873.
- Öblom, A., & Antfolk, J. (2017). Ethnic and gender discrimination in the private rental housing market in Finland: A field experiment. *PloS one*, 12(8), e0183344.
- Özbakır B. A., Kurtarr E. , Biricik G. , Kırdar M. G. (2020) "Kentsel Mültecilerin Adaptasyon ve Uyum Süreçlerine Yeni bir Bakış Açısı: Kapsayıcı Kent İnşası Amaçlı Sosyal İnovasyon Deneyi." TÜBİTAK Projesi web sayfası, Erişim linki: <https://www.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/index.html?appid=49511c65bc60408e936187e3a951d3a5>
- Erişim Tarihi: 10.05. 2020
- Pager, D., & Shepherd, H. (2008). The sociology of discrimination: Racial discrimination in employment, housing, credit, and consumer markets. *Annu. Rev. Sociol*, 34, 181-209.
- Riach, P. A., & Rich, J. (2002). Field experiments of discrimination in the market place. *The economic journal*, 112(483), F480-F518.
- Rich, J. (2014). *What Do Field Experiments of Discrimination in Markets Tell Us? A Meta Analysis of Studies Conducted since 2000* (No. 8584). Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Roychoudhury, C., & Krysan, M., Couper, M. P., Farley, R., & Forman, T. A. (2009). Does race matter in neighborhood preferences? Results from a video experiment. *American journal of sociology*, 115(2), 527-559.
- Turner, M. A., & Mikelsons, M. (1992). Patterns of racial steering in four metropolitan areas. *Journal of Housing Economics*, 2(3), 199-234.
- Yinger, J. (1998). Housing discrimination is still worth worrying about. *Housing Policy Debate*, 9(4), 893-927.
- Yinger, J. (1995). *Closed doors, opportunities lost: The continuing costs of housing discrimination*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Yinger, J. (1998). Housing discrimination is still worth worrying about. *Housing Policy Debate*, 9(4), 893-927.







## Transformation of Conservative Politics: A Total Politics Analysis

### Muhafazakâr Siyasetin Dönüşümü: Bir Total Siyaset Analizi

Şükrü Mutlu Karakoç<sup>1</sup>

#### Abstract

Conservative politics, which has left its mark on the last two decades of Turkish politics, has been one of the main carriers of the historical-institutional transformation in the political structure of Türkiye in that period. In the same period, conservative politics has undergone critical transformations within itself; in its internal interaction processes, it has evolved to a different point in the way that it formulates the relationship between society, politics and power. This article aims to analyze how the transformation in conservative politics took place. To this end, the authors start from the total politics analysis, which provides the opportunity to analyze Türkiye's politics through social group behaviors. Total politics analysis argues that politics in Türkiye is shaped around in-group and inter-group power relations among the social groups at the levels of civil society, political sphere and power sphere. In this article, based on the aforementioned conceptual model, we argue that conservative politics developed a qualified relationship based on mutual interaction and autonomy between the social sphere, the political sphere and the power domains during the 2000s. We also claim that as of the 2010s, there has been a transformation in this capacity of forming a qualified relationship, which has led to a critical split within conservative politics.

**Keywords:** Conservative politics, Turkish politics, political transformation, total politics

#### Öz

Türkiye siyasetinin son 20 yılına damgasını vuran muhafazakâr siyaset, bu dönemde Türkiye siyaset yapısındaki tarihi - kurumsal dönüşümün ana taşıyıcılarından biri olmuştur. Aynı dönemde muhafazakâr siyaset, kendi içerisinde de kritik dönüşümler geçirmiş; kendi iç etkileşim süreçlerinde, toplum – siyaset – iktidar ilişkisini formüle etme biçiminde farklı bir noktaya evrilmiştir. Bu makale, muhafazakâr siyasette yaşanan söz konusu dönüşümün nasıl gerçekleştiğini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bunun için de Türkiye siyasetini sosyal grup davranışları üzerinden analiz etme imkanı sunan total siyaset analizinden hareket etmeyi önermektedir. Total siyaset analizi, Türkiye'de siyasetin sosyal gruplar arasında sivil toplum, siyasal alan ve iktidar alanı düzeylerinde yaşanan grup içi ve gruplar arası iktidar ilişkileri etrafında şekillendiğini öne sürmektedir. Makalede, söz konusu kavramsal model etrafında, muhafazakâr siyasetin, 2000'ler boyunca toplumsal alan, siyasal alan ve iktidar alanları arasında, karşılıklı etkileşime ve özerkliğe dayalı, nitelikli bir ilişki geliştirdiği öne sürülmektedir. 2010'lar itibarıyla ise bu nitelikli ilişkilendirme kapasitesinde bir dönüşümün yaşandığı, bunun da muhafazakâr siyaset içerisinde kritik bir bölünmeye yol açtığı iddia edilmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Muhafazakâr siyaset, Türkiye siyaseti, siyasal dönüşüm, total siyaset

**1 Corresponding Author:** Şükrü Mutlu Karakoç (Asst. Prof. Dr.), İstanbul Medeniyet University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of Political Sciences and Public Administration, İstanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: sm.karakoc@medeniyet.edu.tr  
ORCID: 0000-0001-6914-9661

**To cite this article:** Karakoc, S. M. (2023). Transformation of conservative politics: a total politics analysis. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 155–178. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1245290>



## Introduction

Conservative politics<sup>1</sup> stands out today as one of the main actors that shaped the last two decades of Turkish political history. Conservative politics has positioned itself as one of the carriers of the transformation within the structural transformation process in Turkish politics, which began in the 2000s and extended to the end of the 2010s. It is possible to say that conservative politics played a decisive and consolidating role in the demilitarization<sup>2</sup> and socialization of Türkiye's political structure, moving it away from a military-judicial-based bureaucratic center, opening it up to the competition of social groups, and acquiring a plural/multiple character in this respect.

Looking retrospectively, it is possible to say that conservative politics had relatively intense accumulation of political resources in the fields of civil society, economy and culture as of the beginning of the 2000s. After 2000, it has followed a political course that developed a common political vision in the context of fundamental freedoms, equal citizenship, democracy, and that created alternative publics, established political interactions with different segments around democratic politics, struggled for power with the bureaucratic center to demilitarize politics, developed a center of gravity within the system in time, transformed the system in this sense and aimed to solve structural problems. It then faced new challenges and new levels of competition in the political arena, turned in on itself at this point and shifted towards a more authoritarian political attitude. Within this political route, which has transformed the political structure and shaped the history of politics in Türkiye, conservative politics has also undergone critical transformations within itself. It has evolved into a different shape in its internal interaction processes, in the way it relates to politics and power, and in the way of formulating the relationship between society, politics and power, compared to the point where it started twenty years ago. Today, conservative politics has entered a new era with new political actors, new political quests, new styles of politics and new political relations. The question of why and how conservative politics ended up at its current point is one of the main issues academic and intellectual circles deal with and come up with answers within certain intellectual/political perspectives.

Starting from this fundamental problem, this article seeks to answer the fundamental question, how/why has conservative politics transformed since the early 2000s? In this context, this article aims to explain the transformation of conservative politics in the last two decades, the basic dynamics of the transformation and the point it has reached in the end, around a certain conceptual framework. The article proposes to explain the aforementioned transformation around the analysis of "total politics", which presents a framework of analysis for Turkish politics through social group behaviors.<sup>3</sup> It argues that conservative politics in Türkiye is shaped around in-group and out-group (inter-group) power relations of conservative groups at the levels of the social sphere, political field and power field. Thus, it explains the transformation of the last two decades in conservative politics based on this thesis.

---

1 In this study, the conceptualization of "conservative politics" is employed to express the political behavior and representation-interaction relations of social groups that define themselves with Islamic-conservative values. Therefore, the concept describes the politics and power relations of Islamic-conservative groups.

2 In this text, the concept of "demilitarization" means the abolition of the means of influence and intervention of military institutions on civilian political institutions and political power.

3 For a comprehensive conceptual framework of total politics analysis, see: Karakoç, 2023a.

## Literature Overview: A Party-Based Regime Reading

When we examine the literature on Turkish political life, it is seen that important studies have been made in the last 20 years on the course and transformation of conservative politics. It can be said that these studies are the works that deal with conservative politics generally based on the party and democratization-authoritarianism discussions. In other words, these analyses mainly examine the transformation of the Justice and Development Party (JDP & Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AK Parti), as a political actor of conservative politics, around the democratization-authoritarianism debates in the last two decades. Ziya Öniş is one of the prominent figures in the analysis of the JDP politics. Öniş argues that the JDP politics followed a democratization course around the policies of “global integration” with Europe in the first 10 years, and in the second 10 years it evolved into an authoritarian and populist character in the context of “strategic autonomy” policies against the West (Öniş, 2007: 252-253; Kutlay and Öniş, 2021: 1085, 1088, 1091-1094, 1099-1102). Menderes Çınar is another name who deals with the political transformation in the JDP. Çınar stated that the first term of the JDP was shaped by the democracy agenda based on the overthrow of the tutelary order; He argues that afterwards, the Party evolved into an electoral democracy understanding around the discourses of “civilization” and “national will” and an Erdogan-centered “leadership and dominance politics” (Çınar, 2015: 7-40; Çınar, 2020). Based on a similar perspective, Hatem Ete states that the JDP has undergone a three-stage transformation in the last two decades. Ete stated that in this process, the Party first came to the fore with its democratic transformation policy; It then turned to an Erdogan-centered policy through the developments at home and abroad; With the presidential system, Ete claims that it “resigned from democracy” and shifted to a security-oriented, “Kemalist politics” track (Ete, 2020).

Another name who analyzes the transformation in the JDP is Cihan Tuğal. Tuğal claims that with the passive revolution the JDP carried out in Türkiye, instead of secular hegemony, a new, liberal hegemony was established on the basis of Islamic liberalism; however, he argues that this established hegemony has “inevitably” evolved into authoritarianism over time due to its neoliberal/capitalist origins (Tuğal, 2016: 21-23, 27, 29, 93-98, 100-108, 262, 297, 306-309). Adem Çaylak, who has a similar starting point with Tuğal in terms of a capitalism-oriented analysis framework, also presents a transformation framework through the relationship established by the JDP with the capitalist order. Focusing on the moral dimension of the transformation in question, Çaylak argues that conservative Muslims have become morally corrupted and deprived of justice and equity with the power and capital power that they gained by within the capitalist system, capitalist culture and world of values (Çaylak, 2016: 89-90). Furthermore, the transformation in the JDP has been analyzed through an ideological transformation within Islamism. According to this framework proposed by Fethi Açıkel, the JDP has shaped its political career in an ideological lane starting from Islamic liberalism to pan-Islamic populism and then Islamist nationalism. Therefore, according to Açıkel, the JDP anchored in an authoritarian populist politics, on a plane where the “state becomes personal” by advancing mainly on an Islamist route, the main intersections of which are liberalism, pan-Islamism and nationalism (Açıkel, 2023: 9-60, 155-214).

Ergun Özbudun, who has been following the political life of the JDP for a long time, stated that the Party has evolved from representative democracy to electoral democracy within 20 years and has shifted to “competitive authoritarianism” with the

Presidential system; In this context, he argues that it has evolved into a politics where power is centralized and accountability is weakened around a populist and personalized management approach (Özbudun, 2017: 127-128; 2021: 173-186). There are also names in the literature who analyzed the long 20 years of JDP politics on a democratic plane. Burhanettin Duran is one of these names. According to Duran, the JDP has undergone a political transformation consisting of three phases based on the approaches of “conservative democracy”, “civilization perspective” and “local-national politics”, depending on the cyclical needs, during its 20-year long rule in Turkish politics. During these three periods, the Party displayed a political character that evolved from the “seeking for harmony/integration” with the order, to the “reflection of self-confidence” and then to the “idea of struggle and resistance”; thus, it has become the advocate of a national policy aimed at “deepening democracy” and ensuring “social integrity” in the country.<sup>4</sup> According to this approach, the JDP does not move away from democracy, but “deepens the content of democracy in the face of the problems it has encountered” (Duran, 2018: 47-73).

In short, the prominent studies on conservative politics, whose main framework can be summarized in this way, are mainly party-centered analyzes based on an analysis framework shaped around the JDP. In addition, the analyses in question are formed over the democratization-authoritarianism debates regarding the JDP. In this regard, these studies mainly focus on the issue of how/why the JDP, as a ruling party, became or did not become authoritarian; Conversely, they focus on the issue of how it moves away from democracy or does not.

This article proposes to consider conservative politics with a holistic perspective with its different components. In this context, it gives priority to analysing conservative politics on the basis of the “social group” (Islamic conservative group) as a general unit of analysis, not centered on parties or leaders, but also encompassing the conservative civil/social field. Therefore, the article primarily focuses on the intra-group relationship and interaction between the layers of civil society, the political sphere and the power of the Islamic conservative group (conservative politics), and the transformation there. Secondly, the article deals with the relations and interaction processes of the conservative group with other groups (out-group) in the sociopolitical field. As a result, it examines the effect/reflection of this in-group/out-group relationship and interaction on the political power, profile and style of conservative politics in the political arena in general. Based on all this, the article focuses on the 20-year political power, profile and influence capacity of conservative politics in Turkish politics and the transformation here. For this reason, in this article, the 20-year adventure and transformation of conservative politics is analyzed in a holistic time frame and at equal levels.

### **Total Politics: A Conceptual Framework**

Total politics is a framework of analysis that prioritizes explaining politics through social groups and social group behaviors. It argues that politics in Türkiye is shaped around the interaction processes and power relations between cultural identity-based social groups. According to total politics analysis, political power is essentially the

---

<sup>4</sup> For a similar analysis framework that deals with the JDP politics from the perspective of “local-national politics” shaped on the level of democracy, see: Aslan, 2018: 77-104.

result of in-group political resource accumulation, group integration and disintegration, intergroup struggle, convergence and divergence, in short, “group behaviors” and “group interactions”. The analysis of total politics is based on the assumption that politics takes form through power relations carried out at three different levels/areas: Civil society, the political sphere and the state / power sphere. Ultimately, total politics argues that politics in Türkiye is shaped around in-group and inter-group power relations between social groups at the levels of civil society, the political sphere and the power sphere. In this context, in terms of total politics analysis, politics emerges as a sum/result of multiple political actors, their political behaviors, interactions and alliance processes in multiple fields of struggle (Karakoç, 2023a: 359-360). It can be said that this multiple character of total politics analysis is fed by the perspectives of pluralist theorists, like Arthur Bentley, David Truman and Robert Dahl, in the background. According to them, politics refers to the processes of political behavior, competition and interaction of different social groups at different levels (Bentley, 1935; Truman, 1993; Dahl, 1961).

Around these explanations, it is possible to say that total politics analysis consists of three basic dimensions: the social sphere, the political sphere and the power sphere. In other words, it can be stated that the analysis of total politics deals with politics in three areas: the social sphere, the political sphere and the power sphere.

According to total politics analysis, social groups with a certain cultural identity follow, in the first stage, the course of developing an institutional influence and interaction network in the social field. In this context, they organize and institutionalize in different sectors of the social field, establish mutual connections between these sectors, and connect different areas of civil society (through their own identity networks), thus creating a political resource accumulation in the social field. In this framework, social groups follow the course of organization and institutionalization in different areas of civil society, especially in the sectors of economy, education, profession, culture, media and publication. In this way, social groups tend to create a multifaceted domain and network in the social field (Karakoç, 2023a: 361). This multiple political resource accumulation of social groups will also shape their capacity to influence politics (Dahl, 1961).

According to total politics analysis, social groups, in the second stage, organize in the field of politics in order to develop a direct political influence and representation. Social groups, which are organized through their own identity visions at different points in the field of civil society, organize and gather around political parties that directly represent the characteristics of their own identity, priorities, and visions in the field of politics. Thus, social groups develop a course of linking and articulating civil society and the political sphere. In this way, social groups both develop a relationship of political interaction / representation with a political party leadership structure and get involved in the general representation and the processes of politics in the political field through this political party (Karakoç, 2023a: 368-370). According to total politics analysis, the relationship between political parties and social groups is not necessarily one-way, but rather it exhibits a reciprocal and transitive nature. Periodically, while social groups may exhibit a significant capacity of influence on the discourse and policies of political parties in certain periods, in certain other periods, a political party may develop the power to influence and direct the preferences and approaches of the social groups that it represents,

through its own discourse and vision (Karakoç, 2020: 22). The intra-group interaction processes of social groups and the civil society-political party relations periodically vary (Bentley, 1935:402-422; Truman, 1993:270-272, 350-351; Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987:41-49).

In the third and last stage, according to total politics analysis, social groups based on cultural identity develop intergroup relations and interaction processes in the political field (within the competitive environment there). At this stage, social groups or political parties that are representatives of these groups tend to develop interaction and alliance relations with other social groups, especially in order to be effective and dominate the field of power. All social groups tend to exert influence and dominance in the field of power by forming alliances with other social groups (under a political party or at an inter-party level). Therefore, social groups based on cultural identity shape the system, legislative and executive processes in accordance with the alliance capacities of the political parties representing these groups (Karakoç, 2020: 22).

According to total politics analysis, the relations and interaction processes between multiple social groups with different cultural identities are generally shaped around certain axes of alliance. These axes of alliance can be categorized into two levels: *identity axes* and *normative axes*. It is possible to conceptualize the identity axes as the axis of *religion* and the axis of *ethnicity* in general. Normative axes can be conceptualized as the *sovereignty* axis and the *legitimacy* axis in general. In this context, according to the total politics analysis, political alliances in Türkiye are shaped around four main axes of alliance, two of which are identity and two are normative. These four axes operate by forming lines of dual configuration (structuring, alliance and separation) between social groups. While the axis of religiosity (concerning where and how religion will be positioned in the social and cultural sphere) produces configurations of *Islam* and *secularism*, the axis of ethnicity (related to the social and cultural positioning of ethnic affiliations) develops configurations on the basis of *Turkishness* and *Kurdishness*. While the sovereignty axis creates configurations of *authority* and *freedom*, regarding where (around authority/state or around freedoms) the political sovereignty (legislative, executive and judicial powers as political sovereignty) will be defined, the axis of legitimacy, on the other hand, produces configurations of *globality* and *indigenouness*, based on where political legitimacy will be defined (whether it will be defined around globalism / Europeanness or around indigenouness / nationality). Through these configuration lines, social groups both reveal their political identities and perspectives and develop power relations with other groups. They converge with each other and form alliances or diverge from each other and transition to the level of conflict. The power field is formed around these relations of alliance. In other words, a “political power alliance” that will rule the power field emerges (Karakoç, 2023a: 383-385).

According to total politics, the relationship between the power field and the social sphere, in other words, the representation relationship between the political power and the social groups that it represents, is not one-dimensional. While political power may display a high sensitivity in conveying the demands, expectations and priorities of the groups it represents to the decision-making processes, it may also develop at other times a course of guiding, shaping and managing social groups and political processes around

its own political priorities and objectives (Karakoç, 2020: 22). Therefore, the relationship between social groups and leadership structures / political parties that represent these groups has a highly variable and flexible character (Bentley, 1935:402-422).

As a result, total politics analysis considers Turkish politics as the sum of multiple political actors, their political behaviors in multiple fields of struggle, power relations and interaction processes. Moreover, this framework of analysis is based on the idea that the political power of a social group is linked to its ability to first penetrate all layers of civil society and then connect these social lines of power with the political society through mutual interaction. In the next part of the article, the political transformation of conservative politics from the beginning of the 2000s to the present time is examined based on the total politics analysis in question. To reiterate at this point, the main thesis of the article is as follows: “Conservative politics in Türkiye is shaped around in-group and out-group power relations in which conservative groups live at the social, political, and power levels.” The two sub-theses defended under this general thesis are as follows: When the intra-group relations between civil society and the political sphere in conservative politics (autonomy, upward dynamism, mutual interaction and common vision) are shaped comprehensively, the power, influence and rising process of conservative politics in the political arena can be seen. However, when these relations were shaped around “dependence, pacifism, direction and leadership authority” against civil society, the power and influence of conservative politics weakened and dissolved. This has increased the out-group dependency (at the party level) of conservative politics. Within the framework of these basic arguments, the 20-year course of conservative politics, its transformation and the point that it has reached are examined from an intra-group and inter-group perspective.

## **Conservative Groups and Social Space:**

### **Political Resource Accumulation in the Early 2000s**

It is possible to say that conservative social groups came with a dynamic political resource accumulation in the fields of economy, civil society and culture / intellectuality (especially in the post-1980 period) at the beginning of the 2000s. In this period, it is seen in the field of economy that conservative groups experienced an expansion and enrichment in financial capital accumulation. The liberal economy model based on global markets, which was implemented in the economy after 1980, transformed the capital distribution monopoly of the state in general. The new production and capital accumulation processes that emerged in the early 2000s allowed the emergence of many capital actors with conservative identities concentrated in provincial cities. In this period, the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MUSIAD) stood out as an important capital organization representing the development of the said Islamic conservative capital accumulation. Considering the member structure of MUSIAD in the late 1990s, it can be seen that 2450 of 2897 member companies were established after 1980 and 1706 of the 2450 companies were established after 1990 (Özdemir, 2006: 63, 67; Buğra, 1998: 529, Yavuz, 2005: 131; Gümüşcü, 2010: 841).

The financial capital accumulation in question in the conservative community has a critical importance in the transformation processes of the conservative environment into a relatively political actor in this period. In this context, it can be expressed that the capital

accumulation in question allows for more intense development and effectiveness of non-governmental organizations, which primarily reveal the identity of the conservative environment in the social / public sphere. In addition, it can be stated that the conservative community developed cultural tools such as newspapers, magazines, radio, television and publishing houses in order to convey their voice and identity demands to the public. Similarly, in this period, it can be stated that the capital accumulation in question translated the social demands of the conservative environment into political language and provided an opportunity to expand the political channels that made the political representation of these demands possible.

The field of civil society is the second field which conservative groups entered in the early 2000s with a dynamic accumulation of political resources. In this period, it is possible to say that conservative groups developed a vibrant, rich and effective organizational capacity at different points of civil society around their economic capital accumulation. In the field of civil society and public space, the institutionalization process based on their own cultural characteristics, world views and social visions, which dates back many years, gained a different dimension by gaining intensity in terms of quantity and quality after 1990. Conservative groups, which do not have a homogeneous nature in themselves, and are generally composed of different religious communities, order structures, non-religious and non-order community structures, established civil-religious tendencies, new foundations, associations, private schools, dormitories, courses, private hospitals, medical centers and trade unions (Yavuz, 2011: 77, 81-82; Göle, 2000: 97-112).

Conservative groups offered modern education opportunities in urban centers to the widespread young population in the country through organizations such as foundations, associations, private schools, dormitories, guesthouses and private teaching institutions established in the field of education during this period. In addition, conservative groups undertook a serious civil initiative function between the poor and the needy in Türkiye and the state by developing foundations and associations with the goal of social aid. They developed aid organizations to reduce the daily problems of the poor and needy population, especially in the suburbs of the cities, due to the gap in income distribution in society. They created social formations for the distribution as well as the production of welfare through social aid activities. They established response organizations in cases of disasters and emergencies. Furthermore, in an environment where there are serious problems and blockages in the field of health in the country, especially in big cities, they created alternative, efficient and regular medical institutions with the newly established medical centers, polyclinics and private hospitals (Çaha, 2005: 491; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1996: 244; Şimşek, 2004: 122; Türkmen, 2006: 227-255; Yaşar, 2005: 328, 333-339; Yavuz, 2005: 196; Yavuz, 2011: 80).

Also, in this period, these groups gained visibility by institutionalizing at different points in the field of civil society with the organizations of foundations and associations operating in the fields of history, thought and literature, and new life / culture organizations that they developed in the fields of informatics, tourism, culture, science, art and fashion. During this process of organization, Islamic conservative identity acquired an institutional appearance in different sectors of the social sphere around new knowledge production networks, educational models, professional formations, and holiday and entertainment



environments. In addition, many associations were established, operating in a wide range from scientific research to women's problems, from urbanization to human rights, and from environmentalism to the protection of historical artifacts. In this context, conservative circles created a tendency to socialize and develop a social legitimacy around their own values, symbols and practices (Çolak, 2009: 310; Yavuz, 2011: 77-78, 81; Şimşek, 2004: 121-122; Demir, Acar, and Toprak, 2004:177-178; Göle, 2000: 13-14; 107-108; Yavuz, 2005: 137-138).

Additionally, it is possible to mark the media and broadcasting sector as the third area where Islamic conservative groups came to the beginning of the 2000s with a lively accumulation of political resources. In this period, it can be said that the groups in question showed an important development in organizing in the field of media and broadcasting within the framework of their own world understanding, future visions and cultural characteristics. Islamic conservative groups consisting of different communities, Sufi orders, civil initiatives, ideological attitudes and cultural organizations with different connections with Islam at ideological and cultural levels, founded / published in this period, intellectual / academic journals such as *İzlenim*, *Değişim*, *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, *Bilgi ve Düşünce*, *Anlayış*, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, *Tezkire*, *Yeni Türkiye*, *Divan*, newspapers, radio and television broadcasts such as *Yeni Şafak*, *Milli Gazete*,  *Radyo 7*, *Marmara FM*, *Akra Radyo*, *TGRT*, *Kanal 7*, and *Kanal A*. They also established / founded many new publishing houses such as *Iz*, *Vadi*, *İnsan*, *Kitabevi*, *Şehir*, *Küre*, and *Klasik*. In the early 2000s, new ones were added to these magazines, newspapers, radios, TVs and publishing platforms. With the spread of internet journalism, many internet platforms were established. Through these media and broadcast channels, conservative groups have developed environments to be involved in public debates in accordance with the qualities of their own identity and worldview, to bring their own cultural and political visions to the public sphere, and thus to influence the public (Yavuz, 2005: 151-155; Yavuz, 2011: 79; Çaha, 2005: 484-492).

As a result, within the framework of these developments in the fields of economy, civil society and culture, it can be said that conservative groups gained an intensive knowledge on organization / institutionalization at different points of the social sphere as of the beginning of the 2000s. It can be stated that they linked different areas of the social ground (through their own identity networks) with each other, and in this way, they tended to create a multifaceted domain of influence and interaction in the social area.

## **Conservative Groups and Political Sphere:**

### **The Emergence of JDP in the Early 2000s**

Conservative groups, which underwent a dynamic organization process through their own identity visions at different points in the social sphere throughout the 1990s, took a new organizational path in the field of politics as of the beginning of the 2000s, as well. In this context, they founded the JDP in order to directly carry and represent their own identity, discourse and vision within the current political arena and gathered around it.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Islamic conservative groups, which were involved in the political representation and interaction processes through the Welfare Party (WP & Refah Partisi - RP) throughout the 1990s, experienced a contraction and compression in the current political structure in the period from the second half of the 1990s to the beginning of the 2000s, around the party closure penalties given to the WP movement, and then JDP was founded

The main axis that brought together Islamic conservative groups consisting of different religious communities, Sufi orders, non-communal initiatives, ideological approaches and cultural organizations with different connections with Islam at ideological and cultural levels, under the umbrella of the JDP was undoubtedly *the identity axis*. This identity axis based on religion produced a configuration alliance, rapprochement, and consensus line centered around *Islam*, among conservative groups, whose center was the JDP. This Islamic-centered configuration line essentially expressed a common perspective/stance on where and how Islam would be positioned socially and culturally as a set of values and norms, as well as the Muslim individual's understanding of society and politics. In this context Conservative groups organized a political organization around the JDP leadership structure, based on conservatism, democracy and based on common perspectives such as, "attaching importance to Islam as an identity feature, an existential quality, a social value"; "expansion of the social sphere and sociability to include religious values, preferences and tendencies"; "recognition of religious identity as a legitimate component in the social and public sphere"; "inclusion of religious circles in the public sphere and political representation, decision and administration processes as an equal and legitimate actor"<sup>6</sup> (Akdoğan, 2010: 71-74, 86-91).

Conservative groups came together under the JDP leadership structure, based on a common vision based on the shaping of politics and political legitimacy around social preferences and demands, in other words, the politics of "people's sovereignty" and "national will". In addition, the basic mission of developing a fair, moral, inclusive and exemplary management model based on harmonizing the state structure with social demands, demilitarizing and limiting the state power, establishing the rule of law, ensuring institutional autonomy in the field of civil society formed the common ground of the political representation and interaction relationship between the Islamic conservative groups and JDP (Akdoğan, 2010: 61-62).

Thus, conservative groups acquired the opportunity to connect and articulate civil society and the political sphere around the JDP as of the beginning of the 2000s. In this way, they both developed a political interaction / representation relationship with the JDP leadership structure and also became involved in the general representation and political processes in the political field through the JDP. It can be said that the most basic feature defining the representation relationship between the JDP and conservative groups in this period is that the political demands, priorities and visions of the conservative groups had a decisive and central position in this relationship. In this period, it is possible to say that the impact and influence capacity of conservative groups on the discourse and policies of JDP was high (the representation process was shaped from the bottom up) (Karakoç, 2019: 215).

---

within Islamic conservative groups in 2001. In addition, the Felicity Party (FP & Saadet Partisi - SP), as the new successor of the WP, was positioned as an alternative in the political arena to represent the Islamic conservative groups, especially those that were in the Islamist line.

6 In this period, it can be said that Islamic conservative groups underwent a transformation at the identity level and evolved into a political identity based on conservatism instead of an Islamist-based political identity and developed a relationship with politics and society in general on the basis of conservatism and democracy. For the identity transformation in question, see: Karakoç, 2023b.

## Conservative Groups and the Domain of Power:

### The JDP as a Power of Political Alliance in the 2000s

Conservative groups organized / gathered around the JDP in the political arena as of the early 2000s developed intergroup political interaction processes and relations of political alliance with different social groups based on cultural identity in society, again through the JDP in this period.<sup>7</sup> In this period, conservative groups formed a political alliance, a power alliance around the JDP with Kurdish social groups, liberal democratic groups and leftist social groups in general. It is possible to say that this power alliance developed by the Islamic conservative groups with the said groups centered around the JDP, was essentially an alliance that rose on *normative axes*. These normative axes, which consisted of axes of *sovereignty* and *legitimacy*, produced a *two-layered* configuration, alliance, rapprochement, consensus line, whose epicenter was the JDP, between conservative groups and these social groups on the basis of *freedoms* and *globality / Europeanness*. The freedom-based configuration line expressed a common perspective among these groups regarding the definition of political sovereignty (legislative, executive, and judiciary as the authority to exercise political sovereignty) on the basis of social and individual freedoms. The line of globalism / Europeanness provided a common framework between the groups in question, based on the definition of political legitimacy on the basis of globalism / Europeanness, in other words, around “Western global political norms” (Karakoç, 2023a: 385-386).

These two configurations and lines of alliance also shaped the framework of the political representation and interaction relationship between the JDP and social groups. In this context, the main objectives such as the demilitarization of the state structure, which included the powers to exercise political sovereignty (legislative, executive, judiciary), limitation of state power, socialization of the political system, harmonizing the state structure with changing social demands, dynamics and trends, arranging the public sphere on the basis of fundamental freedoms, establishing a state of law in accordance with the rule of law, ensuring institutional autonomy in the field of civil society, and developing an open society profile created a common ground for political interaction, representation and alliance between the JDP and the aforementioned social groups. In addition, developing social equality in terms of participation in representation, decision and management processes within the political system, in this context, providing an institutional solution framework for the demands of identity recognition among different segments in the public sphere and the search for a legitimate actor status, realization of the necessary legal and constitutional arrangements, and the common agendas of returning from terror- and violence-based organizational tendencies to democratic politics brought together the conservative groups, Kurdish social groups, liberal democrats and leftist social groups around the JDP.<sup>8</sup>

---

7 The political interaction and alliance process in question was shaped around the transformation of the bureaucratic state structure that dominated the political life, the EU membership process, the course of Europeanization, and democratization policies.

8 It is possible to see this the JDP-centered political alliance in the support given to JDP at that time by civil society and media organs representing these groups, regarding the policies and agendas stated here. Also see, Uslu, 2015: 7-13 for similar analyzes on the alliance relations between the groups in question at the time.

In 2002, the JDP government, which was the institutional expression of this political alliance, started to rule in the political arena by relying on the political demands, priorities and visions of the said social groups in the social sphere and by gathering them around a political discourse and program. In other words, the alliance of power that formed around the JDP realized many institutional and constitutional amendments in the context of the demilitarization of state power, the democratization of the political system, the development of a political structure in accordance with the rule of law, the regulation of the public sphere on the basis of fundamental freedoms, the establishment of institutional autonomy in the field of civil society. In addition, the comprehensive ruling alliance centered around the JDP became the bearer of policies aimed at ensuring social equalization by including social segments that had been excluded in the political arena for many years.<sup>9</sup>

As a result, in this period, the JDP has established dominance in the field of power by developing a political representation and alliance relationship with conservative groups on the identity axis on the one hand, and on the other hand with Kurdish social groups, liberal democratic groups and left social groups on a normative axis. It can be said that the main feature that defined the alliance relationship between the JDP and the social groups that it represented in this power alliance was that the political demands, priorities and visions of these social groups had a decisive and central position in this alliance relationship. It is possible to state that in this period the JDP government showed a high sensitivity in carrying the demands, expectations and priorities of the groups it represented to the processes of representation and decision making.

### **Transformation of Conservative Politics:**

#### **Transformation of The JDP and the Power Alliance in the 2010s**

The 2010s constituted a turning point in terms of the representation - interaction processes and political alliance / power alliance developed by the JDP with the above-mentioned groups. As of the first half of the 2010s, a tendency developed to dissolve the existing political interaction and alliance relations between the JDP and Kurdish social groups, leftist social groups and liberal groups. In other words, a fault line was formed on the normative axes (sovereignty and legitimacy axes) (on freedoms based on these axes and configurations based on globality) that used to enable the political interaction and power alliance between the JDP and these groups. It can be said that the political change that emerged after 2010 between the JDP and the social groups regarding the common agenda/vision based on freedoms and globalism has been decisive in developing this fault line. In this regard, both the constitutional reforms between 2002 and 2010 for the demilitarization and socialization of the bureaucratic state structure around the lines of specificity and globality and the intensified policies for the Solution Process towards the search for the recognition of identities between 2009 and 2013 created a critical crossroads. These two critical turning points, on the one hand, shifted the JDP and the social groups within the alliance to the center of gravity of politics, and on the other hand, brought the issue of how to restructure the demilitarized state and politics as a new and

---

<sup>9</sup> For a collective presentation of all these legal and constitutional changes, see: Anonymous, *Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı*, 2013.

structural problem before the said political alliance. From this very point on, the social groups that shaped this political alliance based on freedoms and globalism experienced a differentiation of political agenda, position and vision by returning to their own identity approaches on the restructuring of the state and politics in the post-2010 period. Around this differentiation, they started to be involved in power relations and to compete with each other through their own private / group agendas and goals.

In that political environment, the JDP and Islamic conservative groups, which had a wide sociological base, tended to create politics through a political and power perspective based on “the ballot box and national will”. Among Kurdish social groups, however, the nationalist political discourse voiced by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP & Halkların Demokratik Partisi - HDP) tended to gain more weight.<sup>10</sup> However, leftist social groups, which, together with the JDP, had been the bearers of the process of demilitarization of politics on the basis of freedoms and globalism for many years, set their own political priorities and developed a course of political interaction in the direction of expanding the effectiveness of leftist politics within the field of politics and power around it. Similarly, as a result of the process of disintegration that they experienced among themselves regarding the fundamental issues such as the formation of power/sovereignty institutions (legislative, executive, judiciary) around the will of the people, the limitation of these institutions around the distribution of authority, and the processes of using these institutions as a means of struggle for power by social groups, liberal democrat groups diverged in their position as the carrier within the power alliance (Yayla, 2015: 53-59, Demirel, 2015: 107-123). Furthermore, the Gülen organization, which had been leaning itself on Islamic-conservative grounds for many years, emerged with the aim of creating a new bureaucracy-centered political order instead of the old bureaucratic political structure in this period.<sup>11</sup> As a result, these political visions and approaches led to disintegration and separation on the normative axes (freedoms based on these axes and configurations based on globality) that brought the JDP and these groups together and formed a critical fault line.

The social and political events that broke out one after another on this fault line shaped the fate of the political alliance between the JDP and the groups in question, which had been built on normative axes. In the Gezi events that broke out first in June 2013, relying on its power of authority, the JDP government followed the path of freely realizing its own power policies in the social sphere, while the opposition, which also included leftist social groups, handled the events in their local scale within the framework of a policy aimed at forcing the government to resign (Bayramoğlu, 2012; Ertem and Eseyan, 2013: 221-236, 247-253; Tuğal, 2016: 282, 288- 295). However, the Gülen organization, turning into a terrorist organization, attempted to control the political structure in Türkiye through bureaucratic domination, by means of the process of 17-25 December 2013 and later the military coup attempt on 15 July 2016 (Beriş, 2018: 388-399). The Kurdish nationalist political movement, which received the broad support of Kurdish social groups in the 7 June 2015 General Elections, turned to the politics of creating an autonomous / separate

---

10 It is possible to observe this situation through the PDP’s significant increase in votes in the June 2015 General Elections.

11 For the analysis of the disintegration process in the political alliance relations between these groups centered around the JDP, see: Uslu, 2015: 14-37.

structure from the unitary state structure around the discourse of self-government with the trench events that started after the election (Coşkun, 2016; Mağçupyan, 2015; Tuğsuz, 2017). In this environment of political tension, turmoil, disintegration and conflict, the ruling alliance established around the JDP on the basis of freedoms and globalism disintegrated. This disintegration and the heavy political-social debris brought about by this disintegration clearly undermined the political paradigm in Turkish politics and the JDP movement regarding the construction of political sovereignty (authorities to exercise sovereignty) on the basis of social and individual freedoms, and the shaping of political legitimacy in line with global / European political principles.<sup>12</sup> Afterwards, the JDP movement turned to the configuration/alliance lines at the other end of the normative axes (sovereignty and legitimacy axes) for political interaction and alliance processes, but this time, it adopted a new vision of politics based on authority and indigenouness. This new vision highlighted a political interaction-alliance process based on the authority/state-centered construction of sovereign powers and the shaping of political legitimacy in the context of indigenouness.

### **The JDP and Conservative Groups:**

#### **New Politics in the Second Half of the 2010s**

The disintegration process of the JDP with its allies on the line of freedoms based on the axes of sovereignty and legitimacy and on the line of globality also led to a transformation in the political relationship and interaction style it had maintained with conservative groups on the identity axis for a long time. After the disintegration process in the political alliance structure, the authority and indigenouness-based political vision developed by the party also formed the main axis of the political representation and interaction processes between conservative groups.<sup>13</sup> Around this new political vision, the relationship between the JDP and conservative groups was shaped around the idea of protecting the “party as a movement of political cause” and the “civil political order / stability established in the country”. This idea, however, led to the concentration and centralization of power within the party organization and management staff around the leadership authority, and led conservative groups to the behavior of directly articulating

---

12 Because the 2013 Gezi events, which took place in an environment shaped by the lines of freedom and globality, the judicial operations of the Gülen organization, political crises such as the 2015 trench politics and the 2016 FETO coup attempt, made the issues of “state security, political order and stability in the administration” the main agenda of political life in Turkish politics and weakened the political priorities and tendencies based on “freedoms, rule of law, judicial impartiality”.

13 It is possible to say that the lines of authority and indigenouness that rose in Turkish politics in this period, in general, fed and built each other on the political arena. In this period, it can be said that the line of indigenouness and nationality provided a basis for the emphasis of “authority as the defining element of order, relations, values and rights”, and thus the instrumentalization of society and identities in the name of authority. In addition, it can be stated that the perspective of authority-indigenouness that dominated the politics allowed a political understanding to come to the fore that authority represented the absolute “indigenouness and national”, society and the will of society, and allowed the authority to acquire an absolute position in defining the national and the national, thus determining the framework of political legitimacy. Again, this authority-indigenouness equation, on the one hand, enabled the notion of indigenouness and nationality to be mobilized to define political sovereignty on the basis of authority; On the other hand, it can be stated that it opened a corridor for the authority to strengthen and reproduce the indigenouness / nationality line. Thus, it can be said that the line of authority and indigenouness ultimately legitimized and rationalized each other.

with “party and leader-centered” discourse, policies and programs, and integrating with the party<sup>14</sup> (Karakoç, 2023a: 372-374). This situation increased the weight and decisiveness of the party in the party-social group relationship within the JDP and led to the development of a party-centered relationship and interaction style.

In this period, it can be said that the Presidency system, which was accepted by the referendum on 16 June 2017 and put into practice in 2018, was also determinant in the authority-based formation of the relationship and interaction between conservative groups and the JDP. With the new government model, the adoption of an approach based mainly on the supremacy of the executive within the political system and the empowerment of the executive / president in this direction provided an institutional basis for the development of the said relationship on the axis of party authority. In this context, issues such as the president’s taking on the role of party chairman at the same time, his authority to directly appoint the ministers and senior bureaucracy, the conjunctural strong influence of the government in the shaping of the senior judicial administration, the president’s power over capital processes in the context of the Central Bank and the Wealth Fund, will have a critical impact on shaping the representation relationship between conservative social groups and the JDP around the party/leader authority.<sup>15</sup>

With this new relationship and interaction style, an approach to reshaping the management cadres, institutional balances and power relations within the party around the leadership authority, as well as redefining the party’s relationship with the social sphere and conservative groups around the leadership charisma became evident. In this context, a new understanding of politics, in which power, initiative and responsibility were defined around the leader and with reference to the leader’s authority, came to the fore.<sup>16</sup> The new understanding of politics in question has led to a critical change in the party management cadres, and the founding cadres, who had a strong capacity for interaction between the party and the society and balancing the power relations within the party since its foundation years, lost their position in the party’s senior management and decision processes in general, new cadres, who generally developed their relationship with politics

14 In this context, Islamic conservative groups followed a course of integration and embracing the party, with many declarations of support in favor of the JDP government at the time.

15 For these constitutional amendments, see: 21.01.2017 tarih ve 6771 sayılı “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasında Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun”, (Madde 16, 17): 11.02.2017 tarih ve 29976 sayılı Resmî Gazete.

For the framework of the establishment of the Türkiye Wealth Fund, see: Türkiye Varlık Fonu’nun kuruluş çerçevesi için bakınız: <https://www.tvf.com.tr/uploads/file/6741-sayili-kanun-metni-2652022.pdf>

16 In terms of this transformation based on leadership authority in the JDP’s political understanding, the statement “The JDP is Tayyip’s party”, which came to the fore in the speech of Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdağ, who was the President of the Congress Council, at the extraordinary congress on May 22, 2016, can be marked as a historical turning point. Starting from this period, many statements based on the “leadership authority” will be made at different times from the JDP administration and organizational units, depending on the developments in the agenda. The statement made by Bülent Turan, JDP Group Deputy Chairman, on September 15, 2019 can be counted among these examples. In his statement, Turan said, “I know that without Erdoğan, Bülent Turan is nothing in Çanakkale. If we walk along with Erdogan, we have value. All of our deputies are of the same opinion.” For Bekir Bozdağ’s speech, see: “Bozdağ: AK Parti Tayyip’in partisidir”, [milliyet.com.tr](http://milliyet.com.tr), (22.05.2016), <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/bozdag-ak-parti-tayyipin-partisidir-2249665> (Access Date: 09 April 2020). For Bülent Turan’s speech, see: “AK Partili Turan: İmamoğlu İstanbul’da kazanmadı, biz hediye ettik”, [sputniknews.com.tr](http://sputniknews.com.tr), (16.09.2019), <https://sputniknews.com.tr/20190916/ak-partili-turan-imamoglu-istanbulda-kazanmadi-biz-hediye-ettik-1040185499.html> (E.T.: 09 Nisan 2020).

and society over the “leadership charisma” and “in the axis of leadership authority”, have taken their places. As a result, around this new relationship/representation structure based on the party and leadership authority, the conservative environment has been pushed to the background in the determination of the political agenda, problem, discourse and vision, and the party leadership structure assumed a more active and priority position on its own in this regard. In addition, the party leadership structure developed a tendency towards persuading and directing conservative groups around this assigned agenda, discourse, approach and vision. In this regard, the approach developed by the party on the basis of “leadership authority, indigenoussness and nationality” has subordinated daily life standards, human quality of life, welfare and future expectations; instead, it opened the door to a transformation towards supporting party performance for a “strong state” (Karakoç, 2019: 218-219).

The new political vision shaped by the line of authority and indigenoussness between the JDP and conservative groups also transformed the established relationship and interaction between the JDP and conservative non-governmental organizations, civil groups and conservative media formations as of the second half of 2010. In this period, it can be stated that the political field and the JDP’s weight / determination on non-governmental organizations and the media gradually increased, the institutional autonomy of these areas against politics was eroded, and an institutional hegemony in favor of politics began to take shape over these areas. It is possible to say that some fundamental developments articulated one after the other were decisive in the development of this process. The rise of political and party-related organizations in the field of civil society and media was the first of these critical developments. Another critical development was that political and party-related administrators gained weight in the management of some important non-governmental organizations and prominent media organs. In like manner, the change of staff in the media, at the levels of journalists, writers, and broadcasters, in line with the new vision of the party, formed another part of this critical development. Likewise, in this period, the influence of political-public relations / opportunities in the activity and financial resource processes of civil society movements increased, and non-governmental organizations tended to be organized around various civil platforms such as the National Will Platform, where actors related to politics or political priorities were decisive.<sup>17</sup>

Around these developments, the influence, weight and decisiveness of politics in shaping the positions, agendas, problems, priorities and approaches of civil society and media organizations began to come to the fore. Thus, in these institutional areas, a general attitude towards compatibility with politics, the party and the main perspective of the party (politics/party’s agenda, discourse, priorities and approaches) began to take shape. In these areas, a party-centered tendency to articulate with the political field in general and the party leadership authority in particular has become evident. In terms of conservative politics, politics and party structure became determinant and directive in the relationship between politics - social sphere or between the party - conservative civil society. In this regard, there were certain levels of tension and disagreements between the party and some conservative civil formations, and these tensions resulted in favor of the party in accordance with the vision of the party<sup>18</sup> (Karakoç, 2019: 221).

---

<sup>17</sup> For basic observations on the transformation of Islamic conservative NGOs’ relations with politics after 2010, see: Sunar, 2018: 66-67, 73-75.

<sup>18</sup> The most critical example in this regard is the tension between the Science and Art Foundation (Bilim Sanat



This transformation, which was developed on the basis of authority and locality in conservative politics, produced a critical fault line and a dissolution point on the established interaction and representation relations between the JDP and conservative groups as of the late 2010s. In this context, A cleavage line developed over the political relationship and interaction between the JDP and conservative groups that had established a relationship on the basis of freedoms and globality, thus attaching importance to the definition of political sovereignty on the basis of socio-individual characteristics and in the context of limited state, and the formation of political legitimacy on the basis of global norms such as “rule of law, auditable power, pluralism, separation of powers and liberal democracy.” In like manner, a disintegration line also emerged on the grounds of the relationship and interaction of conservative groups who had established their relationship with the JDP on a religiosity-based idea of “morality, justice, rights, equity, and merit”, thus on identity-emphasized perspectives/principles, and became uncomfortable with the practices at the level of government administration, local organizations and local administrations. These fault lines formed between the JDP and the aforementioned conservative segments, first produced “intra-group” conflict grounds at the intellectual and political elite levels in conservative politics, and over time paved the way for political disintegration.<sup>19</sup>

### Conservative Politics, New Era and New Actors:

#### 2020s, The Future Party and The Democracy and Progress Party

The fault lines faced in the 2010s by the representation, interaction and alliance relations that conservative politics established on the identity and normative axes of the JDP at the beginning of the 2000s in the field of politics resulted in two severe political disengagements in conservative politics after the beginning of 2020. Two new political parties emerged in conservative politics over these fault lines.

In this process, first the Future Party (Gelecek Partisi) was founded on 13 December 2019 with the participation of people, most of whom had JDP backgrounds, under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who had served as a consultant, foreign minister, chairman and prime minister in the JDP for many years, and left the Party in May 2016 as the general chairman and prime minister due to the power relations within the party.<sup>20</sup> Three months later, on March 9, 2020, with the support of Abdullah Gül, who had also served as prime minister, deputy prime minister, foreign minister and also President in

Vakfi), which operates in the conservative civil society universe, and Istanbul Şehir University, which is affiliated with this foundation, and the closure of this university in June 2020, with a Presidential decree. See: “Istanbul Şehir University is officially closed”, *hurriyet.com.tr*, (30.06.2020), <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/egitim/istanbul-sehir-universitesi-resmen-kapandi-41553487> (Accessed: 10 May 2023).

19 In this regard, especially in the period between 2015-2019, intellectual and discursive divergences that came to the fore in the conservative media, job changes at the level of writers and administrators, the opening of new newspapers and digital publishing platforms, (at this point, especially the examples of *duvardibi.tv* and *karar.com* can be marked) as well as the political preference differences between the political elites within the JDP, staff changes and discursive splits constituted clear indications of the aforementioned “intra-group” disintegration in conservative politics.

20 “Davutoğlu’nun genel başkanlığını yaptığı ‘Gelecek Partisi’ kuruldu”, *ntv.com.tr*, 13.12.2019, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/davutoglundun-genel-baskanligini-yaptigi-gelecek-partisi-kuruldu,7hboQfDXEkutwP7B8SRj0w>, (Accessed September 28, 2020); “Gelecek Partisi’ni kurdu... Logosu ‘çınar yaprağı’”, *hurriyet.com.tr*, 13.12.2019, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/gelecek-partisini-kurdu-logosu-cinar-yapragi-41396427> (Access date: September 28, 2020).

the JDP, the Democracy and Progress Party (DPP & Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi - DEVA Partisi) was founded under the leadership of Ali Babacan who had served as deputy prime minister, foreign minister and economy minister in the JDP, together with names who had served as deputies and ministers in the JDP for many years.<sup>21</sup>

When we look at the axes that have shaped the representation, interaction and alliance relations of these two political parties with the social sphere, which emerged from conservative politics, it can be stated that interesting interaction lines and concepts emerge over the identity and normative axes. In this regard, the Future Party has established its line of political interaction directly on the identity axis. It relied primarily on the representation of conservative groups in the political arena. It is possible to say that it has aimed to develop a line of representation and interaction with religious circles as the natural social base.<sup>22</sup> However, it can be said that the Future Party, unlike the JDP, aims to establish the relationship between representation and interaction with Islamic conservative groups on the normative sphere, through freedoms and globality/universalism, and defines and develops conservative politics on the basis of freedoms and globality as a political vision. In this regard, it is seen that there is an intense emphasis in the founding program of the party in the direction of “developing fundamental freedoms, establishing the state organization and political order around freedoms, taking the line of social and individual freedoms as a reference in the use of sovereignty powers”. It is also observed in its founding program that the party marked the global and universal political principles as a founding reference point as the basis for defining political legitimacy. In this regard, both in the founding program and in the party discourse, the party heavily refers to political principles such as “the rule of law, separation of powers, transparency in management processes, accountability and more effective participation in decision-making processes.”<sup>23</sup> However, regarding the Future Party’s political legitimacy and universal politics, it can be said that it attaches critical importance to activating local political accumulation and political values in a universal formulation, with the emphasis on “taking into account past values” and “leaning on the accumulation of the past”. In this sense, it can be said that the party claims to carry the indigenous to a universal level, to model it in a way that fills the universal, to give it a universal dynamism, in short, to formulate the indigenous on a universal level and place it on the ground of political legitimacy.

However, it can be stated that the DPP acts directly on the normative axis in order to develop a more general and broad political relationship, interaction and alliance line, and aims to develop an area of political representation and interaction around this axis through the line of freedoms and globality. When we look at the founding program of the party, a

21 “Ali Babacan DEVA Partisi’ni kurdu”, *haberturk.com.tr*, 10.03.2020, <https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-haberi-ali-babacan-deva-partisi-ni-kurdu-iste-logosu-ve-kurucular-kurulu-listesi-2608978> (Access date: September 28, 2020); “Yeni partinin ‘kurucular kurulu’ listesi belli oldu”, *haberglobal.com.tr*, 09.03.2020, <https://haberglobal.com.tr/gundem/ali-babacan-in-partisinin-kurucular-kurulu-listesi-belli-oldu-deva-partisi-kurucular-listesi-33140> (Access date: September 28, 2020).

22 It is possible to see statements in this direction in the interview of the Deputy Chairman of the Future Party, Etyen Mahcupyan, which was broadcast on Karar TV on April 27, 2020. See: <https://www.karar.com/etyen-mahcupyan-karar-tv-canli-yayininda-1559263> (Access date: May 05, 2020).

23 Gelecek Partisi Program, December 2019. [https://wp.gelecekkpartisi.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Gelecek\\_Partisi\\_Program.pdf](https://wp.gelecekkpartisi.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Gelecek_Partisi_Program.pdf) (Access date: December 17, 2019).

political vision in this direction predominantly shows itself. In fact, this political vision shapes the main backbone of the party program. In this regard, in the founding program of the party, a distinctive approach is predominant in the direction of “expanding the areas of basic freedom, creating the conditions of open society, restructuring the power area around freedoms, law and justice, taking the basic freedom areas as a reference in the use of sovereign powers”. Similarly, in the founding program of the party, a political line that accepts global political principles such as “pluralism, separation of powers, rule of law, transparency in administrative processes, accountability, participatory democracy” as the basic reference points emerges and global/universal political principles are marked as the founding reference ground for the definition of political legitimacy. This political vision of the party, based on freedoms and globalism, is also evident in the political discourses of the party representatives.<sup>24</sup>

However, it can be said that the DPP does not define this political vision in a way based on freedoms and globalism through a primary identity social group, a certain social segment, but rather based the relationship between representation and interaction on the policy of “interaction with all segments around the axis of freedoms and globality.” In other words, it can be stated that the party adopts a political vision to develop a common, equal political representation and interaction relationship with all social groups, including conservative groups, with all segments acting through the perspective of freedom and globalism. Therefore, it is possible to state that the DPP sees not only conservative groups, but also all social groups it can meet on the lines of freedom and globality as an equal natural sociological base, at least that is how it entered the political scene. This approach is clearly seen in the discourses and statements of the party administrators. This approach can be seen in the statements of the chairman of the party and other administrators as reflected in the media: “being a new political party with a new identity, to be established afresh”, “being a mainstream political movement in the middle of the political spectrum”, “developing a relationship of political representation and interaction all over again, without entering into any identity restrictions from the beginning,” “not being imprisoned in identity politics,” “establishing relations and interaction with all social segments around the idea of freedoms, democracy, universal norms, open society, social welfare.”<sup>25</sup>

To sum up, it can be said that both parties that emerged in conservative politics at the beginning of the 2020s have marked the normative axes (the lines of freedom and globality on these axes) as the founding reference point for the line of political representation and interaction. However, it can be stated that the Future Party prioritized building/developing these axes (the line of freedoms and globality on these axes) on an identity sociological basis, while the DPP took the normative axes itself as the founding ground, and promoted freedoms, democracy and globalism under its own leadership structure and aims at a common representation and alliance relationship with all identity social groups that the

24 Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi Program, March 2020. <https://cdn.devapartisi.org/14/DEVA-PARTI%CC%87SI%CC%87-PROGRAMI2.pdf> (Accessed March 15, 2020).

25 Ruşen Çakır, “DEVA Partisi Genel Başkanı Ali Babacan ile Söyleşi”, *medyascope.tv*, 11.03.2020. <https://medyascope.tv/2020/03/11/deva-partisi-genel-baskani-ali-babacan-ile-soylesi/> (Access date: March 16, 2020); “Nihat Ergün KARAR TV canlı yayınında”, *karar.com*, 04.05.2020, <https://www.karar.com/nihat-ergun-karar-tv-canli-yayininda-1560861> (Access date: May 08, 2020).

axes cut horizontally. Therefore, it is possible to state that the Future Party tends to reach a normative interaction ground from an identity sociological ground, while the DPP tends to reach a sociological interaction ground between identities directly from a normative framework.

### Conclusion

Conservative politics, which almost completely and effectively fulfilled nearly all the parameters of the total politics model during the 1990s and 2000s, developed a high capacity of influence and impact with a dynamic organizational process in the social field on the one hand, and with the formation of a dynamic party (the JDP), it has reached an effective political representation capacity, and acquired authority in the field of power by developing a lively interaction relationship with different social groups in the society, on the other hand. As a result, in this period, conservative politics both developed a high level of influence and impact on the three areas (social area-political area-power area) in which power relations took place, and connected these three areas with each other through mutual representation, interaction processes and by preserving the autonomy between areas. Thus, it has found the opportunity to spread its political influence, representation and influence capacity to all areas of society - politics - power. It is possible to say that a representation and interaction relationship based on freedoms and universality played a decisive role in this dynamic political capability.

When it comes to the second half of the 2010s, it can be said that the critical political developments in Turkish political history in general and simultaneously within conservative politics transformed this style of politics. It can be stated that as of this period, the mutual relationship and interaction between the social sphere - the political sphere - the field of power in conservative politics weakened, and the relationship between these three fields took a “one-sided, one-way” course from “top to bottom.” In this context, it can be stated that in conservative politics, the social field has become dependent on the field of politics and the field of politics has become dependent and subordinate to the field of power, that the influence, interaction and impact capacity of the conservative social sphere and the political sphere in general politics and power relations weakened, and the influence and direction capacity of the conservative power field within the politics and representation relations were strengthened. Therefore, it can be pointed out that an authoritative and power-centered understanding of politics gained influence in conservative politics. As a result, in this period, it is possible to state that the conservative society and political area lost blood and dissolved in terms of total politics processes, and as a result, the dependence of conservative politics on authority and indigenouness-based socio-political movements within the general power relations increased.

In this regard, the JDP has emerged as a political actor in the field of politics, relying on the social, economic and cultural resource accumulation and dynamism of the Islamic conservative groups in the field of civil society before 2010. Therefore, the party was formed as an institutional reflection of the accumulation of the power of Islamic conservative groups in the field of politics. In addition, it can be said that the party gained power in the field of politics by relying on the political discourse and energies of large social groups in society around the democratic discourse. When it comes to the

second phase after 2010, it can be said that the party turned its back on its authority/nationality policy and became a dominant political force that dominated and controlled the Islamic conservative groups that had transformed itself into a great power in the previous period. Thus, the party updated its relationship with conservative social groups as a one-sided, top-down and leader-centered one; To this extent, it can be stated that the dynamic and institutional relations between conservative groups and their relations have been disintegrated and weakened. In this political environment, the Future Party and the DPP, which were shaped as an alternative to the JDP in conservative politics as of the beginning of the 2020s, came to the political scene with the vision of ensuring the restoration of both Turkish politics and conservative politics. It can be said that these two new political formations represent both an area of opportunity and a bundle of handicaps for conservative politics and its restoration. It represents the field of opportunity. This is because both parties in question define themselves as “the restructuring of conservative politics on the basis of freedoms and globalism, exiting the spiral of authority, power and dominance; in this context, the conservative social field should be given a dynamic character that can affect power relations around institutional autonomy; reconstructing the conservative political field around social demands and priorities, with a participatory and common sense perspective; and the institutional representative of a policy approach based on the modelling of the power field around the principles of pluralism, horizontal accountability and balance-control. Therefore, new parties identified their political presence in the political scene directly with political restoration. This situation may create an opportunity for the main trend in conservative politics to turn towards the axis of freedoms and globalism in the medium and long term.

Additionally, these two new political formations also represent a bundle of impediments in terms of conservative politics and its restorative possibilities. In this context, first of all, the establishment of the Future Party and the DPP prioritizes “intra-group conflicts and internal conflicts” in terms of the general power struggle within conservative politics. On the one hand, this internal conflict turns into one of the main agendas that structurally define conservative politics; on the other hand, it carries the risk of stabilizing the political positions of the three parties in conservative politics. In this regard, it can be stated that the existence of the Future Party and the DPP in the political scene has a decisive influence on the political position of the JDP and pushes it to be stuck in a certain discourse space.

Secondly, it can be stated that the emergence of the Future Party and the DPP as two separate political parties aimed at political restoration within conservative politics constitutes a critical weak point (a kind of “birthmark”) for both parties, which is likely to weaken their social and political influence capacity from the very beginning. In other words, it can be said that the preference for “two separate formations” left the Future Party and the DPP with a weak level of interaction and energy that they could create together in the field of politics, thus making these two parties political rivals of each other from the very beginning, before being a rival for the JDP.

Thirdly and lastly, the division of the main spine of conservative politics into three expresses the dispersion of conservative political resource accumulation and political energy in a political environment where total politics rules and the age of alliances prevail; therefore, it weakens the influence and power capacity of conservative politics in

Turkish politics and makes it more dependent on other political formations in the political scene as vision, discourse and policy. In this regard, it is possible to say that the two newly formed parties are more dependent on new alliance relations in terms of their own political assets. The critical issue here is centered around the question of whether the new parties can establish this alliance under their own leadership structure or at the inter-party level. The first possibility is a major political transformation, which is very difficult to achieve in societies with multiple identity groups such as Türkiye. The second refers to the possibility of new parties being constantly trapped in a “game-bargain-balance” cycle and a populist political wave in the name of the “power” necessary for politics.

Moreover, it can be said that this diversification in conservative politics has the potential to contribute to the rise of the culture of negotiation and cooperation in the field of politics, and to provide an opportunity to strengthen the base of democratization, limited power and good governance in the country.

In this regard, it is possible to say that the institutional transformation of conservative politics constitutes both an opportunity and a handicapped ground for Turkish politics. In the context of being an opportunity space, it can be said that the diversification of actors in conservative politics has the opportunity to contribute to the orientation of the main trend in Turkish political life towards the axis of freedoms, universality, limited state and good governance, and to the strengthening of this trend in politics. As for being a handicapped ground, it can be stated that the aforementioned transformation may deepen the fragmented and disintegrated political structure in Turkish politics, which in turn carries the risk of compressing Turkish political life into a populist power struggle between parties around the idea of authority and political opportunism, instead of a vision of building a future around the quest for limited power and good governance. As a result, it can be said that the historical transformation in conservative politics and the subsequent split represents a contraction in its capacity to associate the social sphere, political sphere and power sphere around the idea of good governance and to channel Turkish politics into the path of good governance. Time will tell in which direction this contraction process will proceed.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

---

## References

- Açikel, F. (2023). *Kutsal Mazlumluk'tan Makyavelist Despotizm'e: Akp Otoriterliğinin Psikopatolojisi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Akdoğan, Y. (2010). “Muhafazakâr Demokrat Siyasal Kimliğin Önemi ve Siyasal İslamcılıktan Farkı”. edited by H. Yavuz. *AK Parti: Toplumsal Değişimin Yeni Aktörleri*. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, pp. 59-95.
- Aslan, A. (2018). “Yerli ve Milli Siyaset”. edited by İ. Çağlar & A. Aslan. *Kuruluşundan Bugüne AK Parti*. İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, pp. 77-104.
- Bayramoğlu, A. (2012). Tayyip Erdoğan neden başkanlık sistemini istiyor?. *Yeni Şafak*, 15.11. 2012.
- Bentley, A. F. (1935), *The Process of Government*, The Principia Press, INC. Bloomington, IND.
- Beriş, H. E. (2018). “FETÖ ile Mücadele”. edited by N. Miş & A. Aslan. *Kuruluşunda Bugüne AK Parti: Siyaset*, 2nd ed. İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, pp. 379-408.
- Buğra, A. (1998). Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30(4), 521-539.
- Çınar, M. (2015). *Vesayetçi Demokrasiden “Milli” Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, Ü. (1996). Parameters and Strategies of Islam–State Interaction in Republican Turkey. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 28(2), 231-251.
- Çaha, Ö. (2005). “Ana Temalarıyla 1980 Sonrası İslâmî Uyanış: Demokrasi Çoğulculuk ve Sivil Toplum”. edited by Y. Aktay. *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, Vol. 6, 2nd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 476-492.
- Çaylak, A. (2016). “Türkiye’de Muhafazakar Müslümanlığın Dönüşümü ve Çukurambarlaşma”. *Birikim Dergisi*, 332: 89-90.
- Çolak, Y. (2009). “Türkiye’de Laiklik ve İslamcılık Arasında Vatandaşlık”. edited by E. F. Keyman & A. İçduygu. *Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaştırma ve Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık*, translated by B. Ulukan, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, pp. 293-327.
- Dahl, R. A. (1961) *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.
- Demir, Ö., Acar, M. & Toprak, M. (2004). Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40(6), 166-188.
- Dunleavy, P. & O’leary, B. (1987), *Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy*, New York: Meredith Press.
- Duran, B. (2018). “AK Parti’nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü’nün Kodları”. edited by N. Miş & A. Aslan, *AK Parti’nin 15 Yılı*. İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, pp. 47-73.
- Ertem, C. & Esayan, M. (2013). *Dünyayı Durduran 60 Gün: Meydan Darbe Demokrasi*. İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları.
- Göle, N. (2000). *Melez Desenler: İslam ve Modernlik Üzerine*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- Gümüşcü, Ş. (2010). Class, Status and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(7), 835–861.
- Anonim. (2013). *Sessiz Devrim: Türkiye’nin Demokratik Değişim ve Dönüşüm Envanteri 2002-2012*. Ankara: Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı Yayınları.
- Karakoç, Ş. M. (2019). Yerel Seçimlerin Ardından: Total Siyaset Çağında Muhafazakâr Siyaset ve Geleceği. *Liberal Düşünce*, 95, 213-225.
- Karakoç, Ş. M. (2020). Türkiye’de Siyasetin Dönüşümü: ‘Güçlü Devlet Geleneği’nden ‘Total Siyaset’e. *Journal of Economy Culture and Society*, 62, 227-253.
- Karakoç, Ş. M. (2023a). *Türkiye’de Siyasetin Dönüşümü: Kavramlar Kurumlar Teoriler*, İstanbul: Akademik Kitaplar Yayınları.
- Karakoç, Ş. M. (2023b). “İslamcılıktan muhazakârlığa: Roman türü üzerinden Türkiye’de İslami kimliğin dönüşümü üzerine bir inceleme”. *KAÜİBFD*, 14(27): 377-413
- Kutlay, M., Öniş, Z. (2021). “Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order: strategic autonomy or new forms of dependence”. *International Affairs*, 97(4), 1085–1104.
- Öniş, Z. (2007). “Conservative Globalists Versus Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey”. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online*, 9(3), 247-261.
- Özbudun, E. (2017). *Otoriter Rejimler, Seçimsel Demokrasiler ve Türkiye*. (2nd ed.). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Özbudun, E. (2021). *Otoriter Rejimler, Seçimsel Demokrasiler ve Türkiye*. Ankara: Yetkin Yayınları.
- Özdemir, Ş. (2006). *MÜSLAD: Anadolu Sermayesinin Dönüşümü ve Türk Modernleşmesinin Derinleşmesi*. Ankara: Vadi Yayınları.
- Sunar, L. (2018). *Türkiye’de İslami STK’ların Kurumsal Yapı ve Faaliyetlerinin Değişimi*. İstanbul: İLKE İlim Kültür Eğitim Demeği.
- Şimşek, S. (2004). New Social Movements in Turkey Since 1980. *Turkish Studies*, 5(2), 111-139.
- Tanel, D. (2015). Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu Çevresindeki Farklılaşmalar Üzerine. *Liberal Düşünce*, (77), 107-123.
- Truman, D. B. (1993). *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*, Second Edition, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
- Tuğal, C. (2016). *Türk Modelinin Çöküşü: Arap Ayaklanmaları İslami Liberalizmi Nasıl Yıktı?*. translated by O. Akınhay. İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı.
- Türkmen, B. (2006). “Muslim Youth and Islamic NGO’s”. edited by N. Göle & L. Ammann. *Islam in Public: Turkey, Iran and Europe*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, pp. 227-255.
- Uslu, C. (2015). Türkiye’nin Dönüşümü, Cepheleşme ve Liberallerin Ayrışması. *Liberal Düşünce*, 77, 7-40.
- Yaşar, M. E. (2005). “Dergâh’tan Partiye, Vakıftan Şirkete Bir Kimliğin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümü İskenderpaşa Cemaati”. edited by Y. Aktay. *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*, Vol. 6, 2nd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 323-340.
- Yavuz, M. H. (2005). *Modernleşen Müslümanlar: Nurcular, Nakşiler, Milli Görüş ve AK Parti*. translated by A. Yıldız, İstanbul: Kitapyayınevi.
- Yavuz, M. H. (2011). *Erbakan’dan Erdoğan’a Laiklik, Demokrasi, Kürt Sorunu ve İslam*. translated by L. Adalı. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi.
- Yayla, A. (2015). Liberaller Arasındaki Ayrışma Üzerine Serbest Düşünceler. *Liberal Düşünce*. 77, 53-59.

- “AK Partili Turan: İmamoglu İstanbul’da kazanmadı, biz hediye ettik”. *sputniknews.com.tr*. 16.09.2019. <https://sputniknews.com.tr/20190916/ak-partili-turan-imamoglu-istanbulda-kazanmadi-biz-hediye-ettik-1040185499.html> (A.D.: April 09, 2020).
- “Ali Babacan DEVA Partisi’ni kurdu”, *haberturk.com.tr*, 10.03.2020, <https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-haberi-ali-babacan-deva-partisi-ni-kurdu-iste-logosu-ve-kurucular-kurulu-listesi-2608978> (Access Date / A.D.: September 28, 2020).
- “Bozdağ: AK Parti Tayyip’in partisidir”, *milliyet.com.tr*, (22.05.2016), <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/bozdag-ak-parti-tayyipin-partisidir-2249665> (A.D.: April 09, 2020).
- Coşkun, V. (2016). “HDP’nin Mecburi Dönüşü”, *aljazeera.com.tr*, 26.04.2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/tr/gorus/hdpnin-mecburi-donusu> (A.D.: February 10, 2020).
- Çınar, M. (2020). “Bir Erke Dönergeci Olarak AKP”. *birikimdergisi.com*. 20.08.2020. <https://birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/10245/bir-erke-donergeci-olarak-akp> (A.D.: May 03, 2023).
- “Davutoğlu’nun genel başkanlığını yaptığı ‘Gelecek Partisi’ kuruldu”, *ntv.com.tr*, 13.12.2019, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/davutoglundun-genel-baskanligini-yaptigi-gelecek-partisi-kuruldu,7hboQfDXEkutwP7B8SRj0w>. (A.D.: September 28, 2020).
- Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi Program, March 2020. <https://cdn.devapartisi.org/14/DEVA-PARTI%CC%87SI%CC%87-PROGRAMI2.pdf> (A.D.: March 15, 2020).
- Ete, H. (2020). “Erdogan ve AK Parti’nin İktidar Serüveni”. *perspektifonline.com*. 22.06.2020. <https://www.perspektifonline.com/erdogan-ve-ak-partinin-iktidar-seruveni-2/> (A.D.: May 03, 2023).
- “Etyen Mahcupyan Karar Tv Canlı Yayınında”, *karar.com*, 72.04.2020, <https://www.karar.com/etyen-mahcupyan-karar-tv-canli-yayininda-1559263> (A.D.: May 05 2020).
- “Gelecek Partisi’ni kurdu... Logosu ‘çınar yaprağı’”, *hurriyet.com.tr*, 13.12.2019, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/gelecek-partisini-kurdu-logosu-cinar-yapragi-41396427> (A.D.: September 28, 2020).
- Gelecek Partisi Program, December 2019. [https://wp.gelecekpartisi.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Gelecek\\_Partisi\\_Program.pdf](https://wp.gelecekpartisi.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Gelecek_Partisi_Program.pdf) (A.D.: December 17, 2019).
- “İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi resmen kapandı”. *hurriyet.com.tr*. 30.06.2020. <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/egitim/istanbul-sehir-universitesi-resmen-kapandi-41553487> (A.D.: May 10, 2023).
- Mahcupyan, E. (2015). “Kürt Hareketinin Dramı”, *USA Sabah*, 18.08.2015, <http://www.usasabah.com/Yazarlar/etyen.mahcupyan/2015/08/18/kurt-hareketinin-drami> (A.D.: February 10, 2020).
- “Nihat Ergün KARAR TV canlı yayınında”, *karar.com*, 04.05.2020, <https://www.karar.com/nihat-ergun-karar-tv-canli-yayininda-1560861> (A.D.: May 08, 2020).
- Ruşen Ç. (2020). “DEVA Partisi Genel Başkanı Ali Babacan ile Söyleşi”, *medyascope.tv*, 11.03.2020. <https://medyascope.tv/2020/03/11/deva-partisi-genel-baskani-ali-babacan-ile-soylesi/> (A.D.: March 16, 2020).
- Tuğsuz N. (2017). “HDP’nin PKK Partnerliği”, *Kriter Dergisi*, February 2017, Year: 1, No: 10, <https://kriterdergi.com/nigartuğsuz/hdpnin-pkk-partnerligi> (A.D.: February 08, 2020).
- “Yeni partinin ‘kurucular kurulu’ listesi belli oldu”, *haberglobal.com.tr*, 09.03.2020, <https://haberglobal.com.tr/gundem/ali-babacan-in-partisinin-kurucular-kurulu-listesi-belli-oldu-deva-partisi-kurucular-listesi-33140> (A.D.: September 28, 2020).
- 21.01.2017 tarih ve 6771 sayılı “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasında Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun”, (Madde 16, 17): 11.02.2017 tarih ve 29976 sayılı Resmî Gazete.
- Türkiye Varlık Fonu Kuruluş Kanunu. <https://www.tvf.com.tr/uploads/file/6741-sayili-kanun-metni-2652022.pdf> (A.D.: May 10, 2023).



## The Impact of Local Government Policies on Internal Migration: The Case of TR1 Region \*

Yerel Yönetim Politikalarının İç Göçe Etkisi: TR1 Örneği

Zeynep Karal Önder<sup>1</sup> , Yılmaz Kılıçaslan<sup>2</sup> , Nezh Varcan<sup>3</sup> 

### Abstract

This study, which has two interrelated sub-aims, examines the effect of local government policies on internal migration. The first is to find the answer to the question of ‘What is the effect of the components of local government policy on internal migration?’. The second is to create a policy package on internal migration management by obtaining insights based on primary data. In this context, the main aim of this study is to reveal the effect of local government policies on residents’ intent to migrate by examining the residents who desire to migrate in Turkey. The primary data are obtained by surveys from residents in the region with the highest in- and out-migration (TR1 region). The impact of local government policies on migration potential was estimated by using discrete choice models with primary data. The findings show that the local government’s planning and settlement policies, social security policies, and security policies have the greatest impact on the migration decision. These findings imply that local governments should focus on basic human needs while creating expenditure components within the scope of optimal population size in urban area.

**Keywords:** Internal Migration, Internal Migration Management, Local Government, TR 1 Region, Probit, Logit

### Öz

Birbiriyle ilişkili iki alt amacı olan bu çalışma, yerel yönetim politikalarının iç göç üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Bu amaçlardan ilki, ‘Yerel yönetim politikası bileşenlerinin iç göçe etkisi nedir?’ sorusunun cevabını bulmaktır. İkincisi ise, birincil verilere dayalı iç göçler elde ederek iç göç yönetimine ilişkin bir politika paketi oluşturmaktır. Bu bağlamda temel amaç, Türkiye’de göç etme niyeti/planı/isteği olan bireyleri inceleyerek; yerel yönetim politikalarının bölge sakinlerinin göç niyeti üzerindeki etkisini ortaya koymaktır. Birincil veriler, iç ve dış göçün en yüksek olduğu bölgede (TR1 bölgesi) yaşayanlar ile yapılan anketlerle elde edilmiştir. Yerel yönetim politikalarının göç potansiyeli üzerindeki etkisi kesikli seçim modelleri kullanılarak tahmin edilmiştir. Bulgular, yerel yönetimlerin iskân politikalarının, sosyal güvenlik politikalarının ve güvenlik politikalarının göç kararında en fazla etkiye sahip politikalar olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu bulgular, yerel yönetimlerin kentsel alanda optimal nüfus büyüklüğü kapsamında harcama bileşenleri oluştururken temel insani ihtiyaçlara odaklanması gerektiğine işaret etmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** İç göç, İç Göç Yönetimi, Yerel Yönetimler, TR 1 bölgesi, Probit, Logit

\* This study is the output of the project numbered 1909E15 “The Impact of Local Government Policies on Immigration in Immigration Areas” supported by Anadolu University Scientific Research Commission. In the literature part of this study, Zeynep Karal Önder’s doctoral thesis titled “The Relationship Between Internal Migration and Public Policy in Turkey” was used.

1 **Corresponding Author:** Zeynep Karal Önder (Asst. Prof. Dr.), Anadolu University, Faculty of Economics, Department of Finance, Eskişehir, Türkiye. E-mail: zkaral@anadolu.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0002-7032-9448

2 Yılmaz Kılıçaslan (Prof. Dr.), Anadolu University, Faculty of Economics, Department of Finance, Eskişehir, Türkiye. E-mail: yklicaslan@anadolu.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0003-0222-2259

3 Nezh Varcan (Prof. Dr.), Anadolu University, Faculty of Economics, Department of Finance, Eskişehir, Türkiye. E-mail: nvarcan@anadolu.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0002-4374-2675

**To cite this article:** Karal Onder, Z., Kılıçaslan, Y., & Varcan, N. (2023). The impact of local government policies on internal migration: the case of TR1 region. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 179–199. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1244283>

## Introduction

Internal migration is the movement of people within the borders of a country resulting in a new residence regardless of duration, structure or cause (IOM, 2015). Since 2008, the migrating population in Turkey has been between 3% and 3.5% (TurkSTAT, 2018). This indicator means that a population of approximately 2.25 million moved every year in the last 10 years in Turkey. Compared to other countries in the world, Turkey's rate of internal migration is quite high with respect to its population (Bell & Charles-Edwards, 2014: 8; Özbay, 2017). The internal migration in Turkey can be analyzed in four periods. The first period is the first phase of the spatial distribution of the population in the geography of the country, which started with the foundation of the republic and lasted until between 1945 and the 1950s. Between 1927 and 1945, the distribution of the population between provinces-districts and towns-villages followed a stable course, and approximately 70% of the population lived in rural areas. The second period is from between 1945 and the 1950s to the 1980s, when import substitution policies were adopted economically. This period constitutes the second period in which rural-urban migration started, reached its highest level and then slowed down (Akşit, 1998: 25). In this period of the Republic, uncontrolled migration was tolerated for some economic goals, and these influxes caused both social and economic problems in the following periods (Tekeli, 2008: 189). The third period is from the 1980s until 2008. After 1985, the phenomenon of rural-urban migration slowed down compared to the period before 1985, and the process of urban-urban migration showed a significant increase. According to TurkStat data, approximately 50% of the population that migrated between 1975 and 2000 migrated from urban to urban area (TurkStat, 2018)<sup>1</sup>. The main reason for this is that migration turned into urban-urban migration after the urbanization process began in the country, as is the case in the world (Tekeli, 2008:43-44). The last period is the period after 2008 until today (Özer, 2012:55-56). After 2008, with the introduction of the address-based population registration system in Turkey, the rural-urban distribution and the spatial distribution of the population can be monitored more accurately.

This study aims to describe the effect of local government policy components on internal migration and to develop a policy package on internal migration. Since 2008, the rate of internal migration compared to the population of Turkey has been quite high. In this context, to reveal the effect of local government policies directly on residents, a survey has been conducted for residents with the intention of migrating. In this field study, residents were classified according to their intentions to migrate. In this sense, the study differs from other studies in the literature in that the policy basket is formed by obtaining feedback on public services from residents with migration intentions.

The paper proceeds as follows: The next section presents a literature review on the relationship between internal migration and local government policies consisting of a theoretical framework and the impact of local government on internal migration. The third section provides policy implementation in Turkey. The fourth section includes details about the methodology and data used in the paper. In the following sections, we present the findings. The paper ends with a discussion, policy implications, and suggestions for further research.

---

1 In TURKSTAT migration statistics, urban-to-urban migration includes migration from provincial center to district center, from district center to provincial center, from district center to district center, and from provincial center to provincial center.

## **The Relationship between Internal Migration and Local Government Policies Theoretical Framework**

Internal migration management is one of the issues that prompts public authorities to develop policies. Current experiences and studies show that globally, policies regarding internal migration management are mostly developed and implemented by local governments. Studies show that internal migration policies implemented by local governments are more effective than those implemented by central governments (ECLAC, 2008: 230; Afsar, 2003: 10; Ecevit, 1997: 501).

Migration arises from the fact that individuals attribute different meanings to different factors between provinces/regions/geographies. Buchanan, a prominent public choice theorist, argues that differences in economic systems lead to migration and that the difference between regions stems from qualified labor and capital not being equally available in every region. The outward migration of relatively abundant resources and the inward migration of relatively scarce resources is expected to reduce the differences between regions (Buchanan, 1952, s. 209). Thus, subsequent market disruptions can be prevented, and efficiency can be ensured. This distribution is made possible by the differentiation of taxes and expenditure policies by local governments, that is, by providing services tailored to regions. Trying to determine the extent of the state, the public choice school aimed to find the optimum distribution of public goods, thus public expenditures and revenues, in order to determine policies related to immigration (Maddox, 1960). Local governments not only develop policies to “adapt” to the preferences of their voters (consumers) but they must also put forward policies appropriate to the preferences of the optimum number of households (Tiebout, 1956: 420). This situation, which is referred to as the *Tiebout effect* in the literature, is the tendency of individuals to migrate to regions governed by the public income and expenditure structure, where they benefit the most with the least payment. According to Tullock, individuals can consume public goods by residing in the region most compatible with their preferences, and public revenues/taxes are more effective than expenditure policies in the immigration decision (Cebula, 1978: 705). Cebula, who has proven both models empirically, states at the end of the analysis that the welfare system may not end the effects of migration and that real benefit standardization will be needed to end such migration effects (Cebula, 1978: 710). Given that the decision to migrate is a cost-benefit relationship, the relationship between private and social costs and benefits depends on market structure, resource mobility, and the policies of state and local governments (Sjaastad, 1962: 93).

### **The Impact of Local Government Policies on Internal Migration**

While studies on the relationship between public expenditures and internal migration first focused on unemployment, wages, and economic differences between geographical units, later studies dealt with other factors such as education, health, and the environment. Studies carried out in countries other than Turkey have focused more on public policies carried out by local governments, whereas in Turkey, studies in this area have been limited due to data limitations on local governments.

In the analyses made for Canada for the period between 1974 and 1996, Day & Winer (2006) proved the effect of unemployment on internal migration and revealed that it

was not more effective than other factors. The authors also noted that in the long run, it was impossible to eliminate wage differences between regions due to migration (Day & Winer, 2006: 560). In addition, some studies have put forward limited findings that interregional inequalities would disappear with internal migration (Borozan, 2015: 20). Another study conducted in Croatia between 2000 and 2011 focused on the relationship between internal migration, the elimination of regional differences, and growth. The study revealed that although the effect of migration on growth was positive and consistent with theory, migration was mainly related to the characteristics and behaviors of immigrants. In another study that explored the relationship between internal migration and internal migration policies in Tanzania, it was revealed that gender, wage differences, educational background, marital status, and age were key factors affecting internal migration. The most important finding of the study was the emphasis on the regulation of immigration with policies for nonimmigrants, not for immigrants (Msigwa & Bwana, 2014: 44). The literature is abundant with such studies, the common output of which is that national policies on internal migration are affected by social and economic factors. (Cebula, 2005: 267).

Cebula and Nair-Reichert (2012) tested the direct Tiebout effect in the USA. The authors found that the differences in the income tax burden, low property tax, and public education at the primary and middle levels, besides the economic factors within the scope of public policies, were effective on internal migration. Due to the federal government structure of the USA, many studies examine the relationship between the differences in public revenues and expenditures and immigration (Cebula, 1978). Studies have also investigated whether the migration flows in the countryside were affected by tax and expenditure policies in Canada (Day M. K., 1992). The hypothesis tested by developing a migration model in which individuals choose to live in the region where their own benefits would be highest was estimated using the least squares method for the period 1962-1981. The model proved that income tax rates, transfer payments, and average unemployment insurance premiums at the provincial level had a significant impact on migration. The results showed that immigration could be affected by state spending. However, the size and direction of the effect varies according to the type of expenditure (Day M. K., 1992:123). These studies show that if local governments are authorized, they can effectively regulate the spatial distribution of the population in their areas of responsibility.

### **The Impact of Local Government Policies on Internal Migration in Turkey**

There are many empirical analyses of internal migration in Turkey as well. These studies differ at the provincial and regional levels and can be divided into analyses of push and pull factors and determinants of internal migration. The studies commonly question how internal migration correlates to variables such as employment, unemployment, public expenditures, the number of terrorist incidents, private/public hospital beds, convicts, and private/public classrooms.

One of the most comprehensive internal migration studies mostly referenced in the literature is the “Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced Persons Survey” conducted by the Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies in 2006. In the empirical

part of the research covering the years 2004 – 2006, 6,000 households were surveyed, and comprehensive data, especially on forced migration, were collected. The research also presented policy recommendations, such as ‘Removal of Barriers to Return’ and ‘Integration of Those Who Do Not Want to Return,’ for the problems that arise in the implementation of the ‘Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project and Compensation Law (Act.5233)’ (Hacettepe Üniversitesi Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü, 2006).

The first group of studies on migration in Turkey aimed to identify push and pull factors based on differences between provinces or regions. Munro (1974) was one of the first to investigate push and pull factors. A study investigating push and pull factors of internal migration in Turkey for the period between 1968 and 1972 concluded that push factors were used as a development strategy for the period in question (Munro, 1974). Later, Gedik (1997) examined internal migration for the period between 1965 and 1985 in terms of push and pull factors and reported that push factors had a significant effect on migration from village to city. Country-specific macro factors and sociopsychological factors also affected different types of migration, however the distance factor did not, as expected in theory. On the contrary, the distance factors effect was lower. Çelik (2006), in his study covering the years 1990-2000, concluded that in addition to driving factors such as mechanization in agriculture, lack of soil, and security problems; attractive factors such as employment opportunities, education, and health services and the effect of relatives in the city were effective on internal migration.

Pazarlioglu (2007), on the other hand, found that push and pull factors differed depending on the settlement area of the individuals in İzmir. Another comprehensive study dealing with push and pull factors was carried out by Doğan (2010), who sought to explore the factors causing internal migration in Turkey for the 1980-2000 period. Based on fixed effects panel estimation results, the author determined that the main factors were health services, agricultural and industrial employment rates, public investments, and the degree of agricultural mechanization. Push and pull factors were also researched with a focus on the relationship between neighboring provinces and exit-arrival provinces. In his analysis of spatial econometrics, Abar (2011) found that the education and income levels of provinces were effective in migration in 2009 (Abar, 2011). Another study conducted in 2011 found a positive spatial autocorrelation in Turkey and concluded that agricultural lands and crime rates had a negative effect, while education levels, wealth, industry, tourism, and trade had a positive effect on internal migration (Anavatan, 2017).

The second group of studies on the factors affecting migration in Turkey generally focuses on the gravity model and the determinants of migration. The studies were carried out at the provincial level, sometimes covering whole regions and sometimes only certain provinces. In studies where regional differences were analyzed, regression models were generally employed. Those covering the Marmara region concluded that the security and economic characteristics of the region affected the direction of internal migration (Yakar, 2013; Gezici & Keskin, 2005; Bülbül & Köse, 2010; Evcil, Dökmeci, & Gülay, 2006; Çatalbaş & Yaran, 2015).

The studies using the gravity model tested the correlations among age, occupation, education, income differences, unemployment rate, security, kinship, etc., to explore the push and pull factors. The studies concluded that in addition to economic factors, social

factors such as social networks, schooling rate, and the number of hospitals were also effective (Filiztekin & Gökhan, 2008; Gökhan, 2008; Filiz, 2008). Bindak (2015:118) calculated the attraction coefficient for the provinces, tested it with the gravity model, and investigated the effects of the attraction coefficient on a provincial basis, as well as the population and distance variables.

There are studies in the literature that test whether different variables are effective in internal migration. The relationships between variables in Turkey were tested with different methods and with a focus on different time intervals from 1985 to 2005. Some studies in Turkey prove that as the GDP per capita increases at the provincial level covering the years 1985-1990, internal migration increases. Some studies also found that unemployment was one of the determinants of migration (Güleç, 2009; Kocaman, 1998: p. 80). The study carried out by Dökmeci & Korkmaz (2007: 31) covering the years between 1995 and 2000 found that the increase in the number of workers in the industry and services sector affected interprovincial migration positively. However, the study also reported that no consistent relationship was found between per capita income and migration. In the analysis performed by Topbaş (2007) for the 2000 census at the provincial level using the least squares method, it was determined that the main determinants of internal migration were public investments, migration stock, distance, and unemployment. The analysis also showed that income and wage variables did not statistically significantly differ between provinces. Another study concluded that among the components of the GDP of provinces, the type of local services with the highest level of sensitivity of immigrants is public services (Çiftçi & Şengezer, 2017, p. 146). As a result of the analyses made in many studies throughout Turkey, it has been determined that the variables of public investments, unemployment, per capita income, and migration stock are the main determinants of internal migration movements. Wandering & Sharp (2005), however, explored the relationship between regional inequalities and migration for the period between 1985 and 2000 and stated that the effect of social factors, such as public investments, the number of higher education institutions, literacy rates, and the number of doctors, on internal migration was insignificant. However, in a study on investment incentives covering the years 2001-2015, descriptive statistics revealed that although the number of investment incentives increased every year for the TR33 region, they could not prevent migration in the region (Dayar & Sandalcı, 2016). In another study using provincial-level TurkStat data as determinants of internal migration, the internal migration rate was estimated for the years between 2008 and 2015. It was concluded that internal migration rates were affected by divorce, literacy, and suicide rates (Yüksel, Eroğlu, & Özşarı, 2016).

Another variable found to be effective in internal migration in recent years is immigrants' connections in receiving regions. The presence of a previous acquaintance or relative in the receiving city greatly increases the probability of choosing the city (Çiftçi & Şengezer, 2017: 146; Ercilasun, Gencer, & Ersin, 2011:323).

There are also studies in the literature that conclude that social factors are more effective than economic factors such as income and unemployment. These results show that although employment differences between provinces and regions are a determining variable for migration, the effect of per capita income becomes ambiguous. Furthermore,

people who migrate within Turkey prefer to migrate not only for their own welfare but also to enable future generations to enjoy advanced opportunities. Therefore, not every study found a consistent relationship between per capita income and migration.

Finally, studies on migration management in Turkey must be mentioned. Çelik and Murat's paper (2014) on internal migration management emphasizes the necessity of managing internal migration and the need to handle internal migration management from a strategic management perspective. The study also introduces the concept of strategic internal migration management into the relevant literature. Dulkadir (2010), however, aimed to reveal the feasibility of future predictions with Markov Chains models regarding internal migration management. With the internal migration data obtained from the general population censuses conducted between 1980 and 2000, the current situation was explained and the future evolution was estimated in the study. Also, the study concluded that while the Marmara and Central Anatolia regions would continue to receive immigrants, the Southeastern Anatolia and East Anatolia regions would receive the least immigration. These studies are important in that they are interdisciplinary studies that question the operability of management theories in migration management and offer solutions to policymakers.

### **Internal Migration and Local Government Policy Implementation**

Every migration movement has its own dynamics and story, so it should be evaluated with a focus on specific geographical conditions and reasons. This is because it is impossible to determine a general policy without knowing the governing elements (Ecevit, 1997: 501). While 60% of those living in sample rural areas considered migrating to urban areas in 2000, more than half of those who considered migrating declared that they would prefer to live in villages if the opportunities in rural and urban areas were equalized (Kurt, 2006).

In studies carried out in developing countries on the relationship between internal migration and local governments, the results focus mainly on the effectiveness of local governments. A study conducted in Bangladesh emphasized that key decision-making authorities should be politically decentralized to provide infrastructure and communication, improve transportation efficiency and safety, and ensure that basic social services are provided to a good standard in small and medium-sized cities (Afsar, 2003: 10). In some regions where the population density has decreased rapidly in recent years, local governments can sometimes resort to direct payment policies. These policies are usually implemented when the population of a small and medium-sized city drops to a level where the division of labor required by living in a city cannot be realized.

In Turkey, local governments' internal migration policies are generally defined as a 'social municipality.' Municipal activities, which are evaluated within the scope of a social municipality, are directly related to internal migration. The vast majority of 1,391 municipalities in Turkey carry out activities for social infrastructure, such as free language education, home health care, family health centers, vocational training courses, technical training courses, cultural and artistic centers, theaters, and disability services. In addition to these services, various projects are implemented with the support of national or international organizations. Both social services and national/international projects

greatly impact migration due to their contribution to education and employment, which are the two main causes of migration in Turkey (Karal Önder, 2018). Furthermore, social services make great contributions to the social integration of migrating people.

From time to time, central governments in Turkey carry out locally coordinated projects. The most striking of these projects is the “Multi-Purpose Community Centers” (ÇATOMs) established in 1995 as part of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP). The most important reason why we consider ÇATOMs in this context is their management principle, which stipulates that they are managed by the ÇATOM Boards elected by participants (GAP ÇATOM, 2018). In other words, they are managed by local partners who know the dynamics of the local community and can provide the right services for the community, with the support of national and international institutions, which is the main reason for their success. In addition to this successful example, there are also projects carried out under the coordination of central governments, such as KÖYDES to support the infrastructure of villages, SUKAP to provide financial support for drinking water and sewerage projects of municipalities, and BELDES to meet the infrastructure needs of municipalities (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2017; Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2007; Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2017:23). Nearly 1,000 practices have been completed within the scope of these projects (İLBANK, 2018).

Another important point about local governments and migration policies in Turkey is that migration is not taken into account when determining local governments’ budgets. This is one of the main causes of resource shortages in regions receiving heavy migration, which gets worse with seasonal migration. For example, in the most popular tourist destinations, such as Bodrum, there are significant differences between the summer and winter populations, so services are provided effectively in the winter, while disruptions may arise in the summer. Also, shuttle migration is frequently observed in Turkey, so this type of migration should not be ignored when transferring resources to local governments. Hence, since Turkey is a country of internal migration, migration needs to be managed through long-term migration management practices to be developed by central governments taking into account local and national factors rather than prioritizing economic goals, which hinders the effective implementation of policies.

### **Methodology**

In the study, the effect of local government policies on internal migration was examined using discrete choice models (Probit and/or Logit). The primary data used in the analysis was obtained through a field study (survey) conducted with TR1 residents. According to the Statistical Regional Unit Classification, the TR1 Istanbul region is the most popular region for migrants in Turkey (TurkStat, 2018). Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of Anadolu University

University (Date: 27.11.2019, Decision No: 27/33) before the commencement of the data collection. Informed consent form was obtained from the participants for the study.

Probit/Logit probability models are used in qualitative response regression estimations where the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the value 1 if an attribute is present and 0 if it is absent (Gujarati, 2015:246; Greene, 1997; Madalla, 1983). In the



literature, probability models with qualitative variables are frequently used in migration studies (K. Reddy Sai Sravanth & N. Sundaram, 2023; Tam & Grimes, 2023, Gavonel, 2023; Howard. & Shao, 2022). In Probit and/or Logit models, the dependent variable will be 1 if the person has the intention/plan/will to migrate, and 0 if otherwise. The difference between the two models is mainly due to the difference in the distribution of the error term. In the Logit model, the error term is assumed to have a logistic distribution, while in the Probit model, it is assumed to have a normal distribution (Greene, 1997). In general, discrete choice models are modeled as follows, with  $y$  being the dependent variable and  $x$  being the vector of independent variables (Madalla, 1983):

$$y_i^* = \beta'x_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$y = 1 \text{ if intention/plan/will to migrate } y = 0 \text{ if otherwise}$$

The possibility that a person with an intention/plan/will to migrate will migrate is affected by local government policies, according to the functional classification. In the literature, potential determinants of internal migration are schooling rates, the number of hospital beds, the number of prisoners, tax revenues collected, investment incentives, local government budgets, electricity capacity, labor force participation rates, and the number of public hospitals. This study uses the functional classification of local public expenditures as explanatory variables for internal migration potential. Two different sets of explanatory variables obtained from primary data will be used in the model: individual-specific characteristics and views on local government services. The specification errors in such estimations ignore the relationship between independent variables (Gujarati & Porter, 2009: 470). Interaction among variables may cause a biasing effect due to the multiplicative effect (Güneri & Durmuş, 2020: Gujarati & Porter, 2009: 470). This effect is a specification problem that arises when independent variables affect the dependent variable individually and multiplicatively. Policies can affect migration intention both alone and through a multiplier effect. For this reason, the local government services variables were added to the model one by one in the estimation of the estimation of the probability model, as seen in Equation 2.

$$im_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1sex_i + \beta_2education_i + \beta_3employment_i + \beta_4lincome_i + \beta_5age_i + \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \beta_6poss_i \\ \beta_7public\_eco_i \\ \beta_8environment_i \\ \beta_9settlement_i \\ \beta_{10}health_i \\ \beta_{11}culture_i \\ \beta_{12}.public\_edu_i \\ \beta_{13}ssps_i \\ \beta_{14}gps_i \\ \beta_{15}defence_i \end{array} \right\} \quad (2)$$

In the model above,  $im_i$  is the dependent variable expressing the intention to migrate by taking the value “1” if the participant has an intention to migrate, and “0” if not. As stated above, independent variables were collected in two groups. The independent variables showing the demographic characteristics of the first group are as follows, respectively:  $sex_i$  indicates the gender of the participant<sup>2</sup>, “1” for women.  $education_i$

2 This variable is based on the education period (years spent on education), “2” for primary school dropouts, “4” for primary school graduates, “8” for secondary school graduates, “12” for high school graduates, “14” for associate degree holders, and “14” for undergraduates, “16” for graduates, “18” for a master’s degree holders, and “22” for PhD holders.

indicates the education level of the participant. The  $employment_i$  is the employment status of the participants and takes the value “1” if the participant is employed and “0” if not.  $lnincome_i$  is the logarithm of the income declared by the participants.  $age_i$  is the age of the individuals. The second group of independent variables was generated based on the functional classification of local government expenditures and represented as follows:

·  $poss_i$  is the activities of the functional classification under the title of “Public Order and Security Services”;

·  $public\_eco_i$  is the variable representing the activities of the functional classification under the title of “Activities related to Economic Affairs”;

·  $environment_i$  is for the activities of the functional classification under the title of “Environmental Protection Services”;

·  $settlement_i$  is the activities of the functional classification under the title of “Settlement and Community Welfare Services”;

·  $health_i$  is the activities of the functional classification under the title of “Health Services”;

·  $culture_i$  is the activities of the functional classification under the title of “Resting, Culture and Religious Services”;

·  $public\_edu_i$  is the activities of the functional classification under the title of “Educational Services”;

·  $ssps_i$  is the activities of the functional classification under the title of “Social Security and Social Assistance Services”;

·  $gps_i$  is the activities of the functional classification under the title of “General Public Services”; and

·  $defence_i$  is the activities of the functional classification under the title of “Defense Services”.

During the field studies, the statements regarding the services in the second-level codes of the budget functional classification were simplified and directed at the participants, and they were asked to express their opinions about the services as “positive,” “negative,” or “I have no idea.” A positive expression means satisfaction with the service, a negative expression means dissatisfaction with the service, and the expression “I have no idea” means that they have not experienced the service before. An index was calculated from the participants’ opinions on local government services and included in the model. The index for each functional expenditure item was calculated as 1 for “positive” responses, 0 for “negative” responses, and no value for “I have no idea”, and it was calculated by taking the arithmetic mean for 10 main functional classification items separately and including them in the model.


### **Data and Descriptive Statistics**

Between 2008 and 2019, the share of local government expenditures in GDP in Turkey followed a stable course between 3% and 4.5% (TurkSTAT, 2018). Likewise, the share of local government expenditures in general government expenditures also followed a stable

course between 10% and 12% (TurkSTAT, 2018). These indicators can be interpreted in two ways: First, in the last 10 years, no policy has been implemented in Turkey on the sharing of authority and resources between the central government and local governments, and the current situation has been preserved. During this period, some policy documents, such as Development Plans and Special Specialization Commission Reports, set policy targets for resource allocation by transferring authority to local governments, which have remained unrealized. The second is that when we interpret both variables simultaneously, the increase and decrease in the share of local government expenditures are directly caused by GDP.

### 1.1. Descriptive Statistics of TR1 Region

The primary data used in this study was obtained from a survey conducted in Istanbul in March 2020. The sample was designed by non-random quota sampling and by considering the district population distribution of Istanbul in 2019. Likewise, to reflect the whole Istanbul population, gender and age constraints were determined by randomly stratified sampling. Within the framework of these constraints, 1,000 people participated in the field survey. The distribution sample by districts is shown in Figure 1.



**Figure 1.** District distribution of observations.  
**Source:** The primary data collected by the authors.

Of the respondents, 58% were female and 42% male. 33% were in the age range of 25-35, 29% 15-25, 28% 36-49, and 10% over 50. Furthermore, 55% were married and 40% single. 45% were university graduates, 23% high school graduates, 14% vocational school/college graduates, and 13% postgraduates. According to the results of the field study, although it is controversial whether or not the level of education is compatible with the general distribution, conducting the survey online caused the levels of education of the participants to converge at a certain point. It is normal for the fieldwork to be

randomly distributed since there was no constraint on this subject at the beginning of the study.

One of the important reasons for migration is the employment status of people. When we examine the participants' employment status, a significant proportion (60%) were employed, while 15% were unemployed. Furthermore, 15% of the participants were students, 7% housewives, and 3% retirees.

Considering the employment data, 63% of the participants earned an income from current or past employment, while 37% did not. In studies conducted in Turkey, employment appears to be the second main reason for migration in general.

When the participants' professions according to the ISCO 08 occupational classification are examined, it is seen that 40% had a professional occupation, 24% worked in jobs that do not require qualifications, 11% were managers, and 10% technicians or assistant professionals.

The participants' income levels are as important as their employment status. The employment data show that 63% of the participants had a regular income. However, regarding the participants' monthly income, nearly half (42%) had a monthly income between 2,000 and 4,999 TL<sup>3</sup>. This group was followed by 27% of participants with a monthly income between 5,000 and 9,999 TL. 19% of the participants stated that they had a monthly income between 0 and 1,999 TL. The rate of participants whose monthly income was between 10,000 and 14,999 TL was 7%, and the rate of participants with a monthly income of more than 15,000 TL was 5%. The number of participants whose monthly income was close to 0 TL was only 19%. The reason for this stems from the passive income that people get from family members, scholarships, uninsured/daily/flexible/short-term work, or investments such as real estate, without being employed.

The descriptive statistics on internal migration are given in Appx-Table 1. One of the most critical questions regarding immigration is whether the participants migrated before. Studies in the literature reported that people who migrated once can make migration decisions more easily. The descriptive statistics show that more than 50% of the participants experienced migration before (see Table 1). When causes of migration are examined, it is seen that continuing education (27%) takes the first place. What followed were better job opportunities and working conditions (18%), students who have completed school, migrated to a new place or returned to their hometowns (11%), a new job offer/appointment, or compulsory service (8%). The rate of those who migrated due to marriage and those who migrated to increase their living standards and enjoy the opportunities provided by the city was 8%. This result is in perfect harmony with other studies on the causes of migration in Turkey. The information and experience sources regarding the migration location provides us with critical information about the migration process of the migrating participants. 24% of the participants stated that they migrated to the city where their family, relatives, or friends live, 25% to a city they had visited before, and 25% to a city where they had lived before. 4% of the participants stated that they obtained information about their new city from the media. 68% of the respondents stated that they had an acquaintance, relative, or friend living in the receiving city. The

---

3 The minimum wage was 2,050 TL in Turkey when the survey was conducted.

probability of starting the migration process without information was very low. Similarly, very few people decided to migrate without a social connection in the receiving city. Another descriptive question asked respondents whether they experienced the migration process alone. It is known that family migration occupies a large place among immigrants in Turkey, as pointed out in many studies presented in the literature review (TurkSTAT, 201; Gökhan, 2008). 63% of the participants declared that they had migrated alone. These data contradict Turkey's general migration path. Finally, concerning the question about the intention to migrate, 56% of the respondents stated that they did not intend to migrate from their current cities, while 44% stated that they intended to migrate to another place. Another point that should be mentioned about this question is the similarity between migration experience and migration intention. While the rate of those who migrated at least once before was 53%, the rate of those who intend to migrate again was 43%. Furthermore, the rate of those who answered yes to both questions was 26%.

### Estimation Results and Findings

The estimation results of the Probit and Logit models are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.

Table 2

*The Effect of Public Expenditures on Internal Migration (Probit Model)*

Variables	Basic M.	Poss M.	Public_eco M.	Environment M.	Settlement M.
Sex	<b>-0.208+</b> (-0.106)	-0,185 (-0.123)	<b>-0.201+</b> (-0.108)	<b>-0.198*</b> (-0.101)	<b>-0.188+</b> (-0.1)
Education	<b>0.043*</b> (-0.021)	<b>0.041*</b> (-0.02)	<b>0.042*</b> (-0.021)	<b>0.045*</b> (-0.019)	<b>0.040*</b> (-0.02)
Employment	<b>-0.069+</b> (-0.038)	-0,068 (-0.046)	<b>-0.097**</b> (-0.035)	<b>-0.090*</b> (-0.044)	<b>-0.084+</b> (-0.045)
Lincome	0.057 (-0.061)	0.027 (-0.066)	0.046 (-0.071)	0.054 (-0.07)	0.052 (-0.067)
Lage	-0.005 (-0.004)	-0.004 (-0.003)	-0.004 (-0.004)	-0.005 (-0.004)	-0.005 (-0.004)
Poss		<b>-0.492**</b> (-0.11)			
Public_eco			<b>-0.321**</b> (-0.077)		
Environment				<b>-0.422**</b> (-0.133)	
Settlement					<b>-0.578**</b> (-0.138)
Constant	-0.899* (-0.447)	-0.344 (-0.551)	-0.638 (-0.544)	-0.651 (-0.55)	-0.499 (-0.546)
Observation	922	839	909	914	912
LR chi2(6)	36.68	220.4	68.45	162.3	489.1
Prob > chi2	0,00	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2:	0.014	0.0268	0.02	0.0232	0.0311

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 2  
*The Effect of Public Expenditures on Internal Migration (Probit Model) (countinue)*

Variables	Health M.	Culture M.	Public_edu M.	SSPS M.	GPS M.	Defence M.
Sex	<b>-0.319**</b> (-0.116)	<b>-0.191+</b> (-0.109)	-0.176 (-0.122)	<b>-0.223**</b> (-0.074)	<b>-0.205+</b> (-0.122)	-0.159 (-0.173)
Education	<b>0.047+</b> (-0.025)	<b>0.042+</b> (-0.023)	<b>0.035+</b> (-0.019)	<b>0.033+</b> (-0.02)	<b>0.040+</b> (-0.022)	<b>0.038+</b> (-0.02)
Employment	-0.047 (-0.05)	<b>-0.093+</b> (-0.049)	<b>-0.093+</b> (-0.05)	-0.088 (-0.055)	-0.054 (-0.064)	<b>-0.085*</b> (-0.042)
Lincome	-0.03 (-0.058)	0.051 (-0.072)	0.053 (-0.062)	0.064 (-0.098)	0.072 (-0.064)	-0.012 (-0.111)
Lage	<b>-0.006+</b> (-0.003)	-0.004 (-0.003)	-0.002 (-0.003)	-0.003 (-0.005)	-0.004 (-0.004)	0.003 (-0.003)
Health	<b>-0.308**</b> (-0.116)					
Culture		<b>-0.429**</b> (-0.067)				
Public_edu			<b>-0.309*</b> (-0.125)			
SSPS				<b>-0.448**</b> (-0.072)		
GPS					<b>-0.248*</b> (-0.1)	
Defence						<b>-0.350**</b> (-0.131)
Constant	-0.005 (-0.397)	-0.566 (-0.574)	-0.657 (-0.568)	-0.61 (-0.708)	-0.878+ (-0.514)	-0.266 (-1.004)
Observation	695	891	840	725	859	600
LR chi2(6)	280.7	133.4	70.56	299.8	815.7	97.7
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2:	0.0279	0.0267	0.0178	0.03	0.0203	0.0241

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

According to the results, men are more likely to migrate. Also, the higher the education level, the higher the probability of migration. In both estimated models, the education level appears as the most critical variable that is likely to affect the migration plan.

Another critical indicator of the descriptive characteristics of participants is their employment status. As expected, being employed reduces the probability of migration. The estimation results of the Probit and Logit models revealed that the effects of income and age variables on the intention to migrate were not significant. Surprisingly, the variables of income and age did not affect the intention to migrate.

The second part of the estimation results shows the effect of direct local government expenditures on the migration decision. The participants' opinions for each functional expenditure item were included in the models separately to avoid the multiplicative effect. According to both the Probit and Logit model estimations, as residents' satisfaction with the services provided by the local government increased, their intention to migrate decreased. There is only one exception to this inference. When the Logit model estimation

results are examined, it is seen that the model estimated for the public order and security service is insignificant.

Table 3  
*The Effect of Functional Classification of Public Expenditures on Internal Migration (Logit Model)*

Variables	Basic M.	Poss M.	Public_eco M.	Environment M.	Settlement M.
Sex	<b>-0.335+</b>	-0.298	<b>-0.324+</b>	<b>-0.320+</b>	<b>-0.305+</b>
	(-0.173)	-0.199	(-0.174)	(-0.163)	(-0.161)
Education	<b>0.072*</b>	<b>0.066*</b>	<b>0.069*</b>	<b>0.075*</b>	<b>0.066*</b>
	(-0.035)	-0.033	(-0.035)	(-0.032)	(-0.033)
Employment	<b>-0.116+</b>	-0.11	<b>-0.158**</b>	<b>-0.147*</b>	<b>-0.135+</b>
	(-0.061)	-0.074	(-0.057)	(-0.071)	(-0.074)
Lincome	0.093	0.045	0.076	0.089	0.085
	(-0.098)	-0.107	(-0.115)	(-0.114)	(-0.109)
Lage	-0.009	-0.006	-0.007	-0.008	-0.009
	(-0.006)	-0.005	(-0.006)	(-0.006)	(-0.006)
Poss		-0.784**			
		-0.176			
Public_eco			<b>-0.514**</b>		
			(-0.124)		
Environment				<b>-0.677**</b>	
				(-0.214)	
Settlement					<b>-0.927**</b>
					(-0.221)
Constant	-1.480*	-0.565	-1.058	-1.086	-0.823
	(-0.73)	-0.895	(-0.886)	(-0.896)	(-0.889)
Observation	922	839	909	914	912
LR chi2(6)	38.53		68.08	158.9	452.1
Prob > chi2	2.95E-07		0	0	0
Pseudo R2:	0.0142		0.0202	0.0233	0.0311

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

When we look at the effect of local government expenditures on migration intention at the functional classification level, the expenditure items that are likely to affect migration behavior are “Settlement and Community Services” and “Public Order and Security” services. In the Logit model, it is “Settlement and Community Services” and “Social Security and Social Assistance Services.” The functional expenditure with the lowest observation out of 1,000 samples is “Health Services” and “Defence Services.” Most of these services are provided by local governments in a very limited framework. It has been observed that even though these services are offered within their jurisdiction, they do not reach 60% of the citizens.

As a result, the basic model estimation made for the TR1 region is compatible with the literature. Additionally, the functional government expenditure models provide the opportunity for local governments to choose among functional-level expenditure alternatives. Thus, local governments predict the effects of their policies. This research provides a critical contribution to the literature using an indicator of internal migration policies.

Table 3

*The Effect of Functional Classification of Public Expenditures on Internal Migration ( Logit Model)  
(continue)*

Variables	Health M.	Culture M.	Public_edu M.	SSPS M.	GPS M.	Defence M.
Sex	<b>-0.514**</b> (-0.189)	<b>-0.309+</b> (-0.176)	-0.283 (-0.197)	<b>-0.360**</b> (-0.119)	<b>-0.330+</b> (-0.196)	-0.254 (-0.28)
Education	<b>0.080+</b> (-0.042)	<b>0.069+</b> (-0.038)	<b>0.057+</b> (-0.032)	0.053 (-0.033)	<b>0.066+</b> (-0.036)	<b>0.062+</b> (-0.033)
Employment	-0.081 (-0.08)	<b>-0.152+</b> (-0.079)	<b>-0.150+</b> (-0.082)	-0.14 (-0.092)	-0.089 (-0.104)	<b>-0.136*</b> (-0.068)
Lincome	-0.047 (-0.095)	0.083 (-0.115)	0.085 (-0.099)	0.104 (-0.159)	0.118 (-0.103)	-0.02 (-0.182)
Lage	<b>-0.009+</b> (-0.005)	-0.007 (-0.005)	-0.004 (-0.005)	-0.005 (-0.008)	-0.007 (-0.006)	0.005 (-0.004)
Health	<b>-0.492**</b> (-0.185)					
Culture		<b>-0.687**</b> (-0.108)				
Public_edu			<b>-0.491*</b> (-0.2)			
SSPS				<b>-0.716**</b> (-0.116)		
GPS					<b>-0.394*</b> (-0.16)	
Defence						<b>-0.561**</b> (-0.211)
Constant	-0.052 (-0.655)	-0.941 (-0.931)	-1.07 (-0.923)	-0.991 (-1.153)	-1.443+ (-0.838)	-0.442 (-1.63)
Observation	695	891	840	725	859	600
LR chi2(6)	294.2	134.3	72.9	290.9	763.8	99.99
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2:	0.0281	0.0268	0.0178	0.03	0.0204	0.0241

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

## Discussion

In both estimated models, the level of education appears as the most critical variable that is likely to affect the migration plan. There are three reasons why participants' preferences for living spaces differ as their education level increases. First of all, the theoretical framework shows that semipublic goods affect migration decisions (Buchanan & Wagner, 1970:150; Maddox, 1960:400-401). The second is that people with higher education levels have more employment opportunities (Rempel, 1981:171; Msigwa & Bwana, 2014; Çelik, 2006; Abar, 2011; Anavatan, 2017). The last is that education improves knowledge, manners, and mental horizons, which play a critical role in the world today and affect individuals' preferences for living spaces (The World Bank, 2009:155; ECLAC, 2008:232).

The second point is about more visible services. 'Settlement and Community Services,' 'Public Order and Security,' and 'Social Security and Social Assistance Services' are more



visible as services carried out by local governments. These services have more effect than other services for both those in need and residents living in the same area (Çiftçi & Şengezer, 2017). The most important reason for this result is that every migration movement has its own path. In these processes, it should be carried out by institutions established within the scope of the principle of decentralization that know the strengths and weaknesses of the geography and has a command of its characteristics (Pınar, 2017: 131). At the same time, local governments must support collaboration with local partners (Afsar, 2003:10). Studies show that internal migration policies implemented by local governments are more effective than those implemented by central governments (ECLAC, 2008: 230; Afsar, 2003: 10; Ecevit, 1997: 501). -

### Policy Implications and Conclusions

The spatial distribution of the population in a country is important for the establishment of a balanced economic and social system. A balanced population distribution in geography ensures economic efficiency and a balanced formation of social classes. However, disturbances in the spatial distribution of the population may cause economic and social problems, such as rapid urbanization and population concentration, rural population decline, problems in urban management, slums, and the emergence of displaced persons. The current study investigated the effect of local government policies on internal migration using data obtained in the TR1 region in Turkey to explore the impact of local government services on internal migration. The aim here is to present policy alternatives on migration that local governments can implement.

As a result of the analyses, it has been concluded that each functional expenditure item has an impact on internal migration. The most critical result of the research is its emphasis on the most effective functional expenditure item. This result determines the policy preferences of local governments. When we examine the results of both descriptive and econometric analysis, we argue that local governments should focus on the most basic human needs while forming their expenditure components within the scope of their targets of having the optimum population size in their jurisdiction. The priority of local governments to settlement, social security, and security policies is the policy package that most affects people's migration decision.

The second important result of the study is that if local governments are authorized and do not have any problems with resource allocation, local government policies can affect the residents. They can provide limited services to residents in areas where they have limited authority.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** This study is the output of the project numbered 1909E15 "The Impact of Local Government Policies on Immigration in Immigration Areas" supported by Anadolu University Scientific Research Commission.

**Author Contributions:** Conception/Design of study: Z.K.Ö., Y.K., N.V.; Data Acquisition: Z.K.Ö.; Data Analysis/ Interpretation: Z.K.Ö.; Drafting Manuscript: Z.K.Ö., Y.K., N.V.; Critical Revision of Manuscript: Z.K.Ö., Y.K., N.V.; Final Approval and Accountability: Z.K.Ö., Y.K., N.V.

**Ethical approval:** Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of Anadolu University University (Date: 27.11.2019, Decision No: 27/33) before the commencement of the data collection.

**Informed consent:** Informed consent form was obtained from the participants for the study.

---

## References

- Abar, H. (2011). Türkiye’de İller arası Göçün Belirleyicileri: Mekansal Ekonometrik Model Yaklaşımı. Tez Yöneticisi: M. Sinan Temurlenk . Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü İktisat Anabilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans Tezi.
- Afsar, R. (2003). Internal Migration and The Development Nexus: The Case of Bangladesh. Dhaka: Akşit, B. (1998). İç göçlerin Nesnel ve Özel Toplumsal Tarihi Üzerine Gözlemler: Köy Tarafından Bir Bakış. Türkiye’de İç göç (s. 22-37). içinde İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı.
- Anavatan, A. (2017). Türkiye’de İç Göç ve Belirleyicileri: Mekansal Veri Analizi. *Social Sciences Studies Journal*, 1109-1116.
- Bell, M., & Charles-Edwards, E. (2014). Measuring Internal Migration around the Globe: A Comparative Analysis. KNOMAD Working Paper.
- Bindak, R. (2015, June). İller Arası Göç Tahmini İçin Bir Çekim (Cazibe) Modeli Önerisi. *Social Sciences Research Journal*, 4(2), 111-120.
- Borožan, D. (2015). Internal Migration, Regional Economic Convergence, and Growth in Croatia. *International Regional Science Review*, 1-23.
- Buchanan, J. M. (1952). Federal Grants and Resource Allocation. *Journal of Political Economy*, 60(3), 208-217.
- Buchanan, J. M., & Wagner, R. (1970). An Efficiency Basis for Federal Fiscal Equalization. J. Margolis içinde, *The Analysis of Public Output* (s. 139-162). NBER.
- Bülbül, S., & Köse, A. (2010). Türkiye’de Bölgelerarası İç Göç Hareketlerinin Çok Boyutlu Ölçekleme Yöntemi ile İncelenmesi. *İstanbul Üniversitesi İşletme Fakültesi Dergisi*, 39(1), 75-94.
- Cebula, R. J. (1978). An Emprical Note on the Tiebout-Tullock Hypothesis. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 92(4), 705-711.
- Cebula, R. J. (2005). Internal Migration Determinants Recent Evidence. *International Advances in Economic Research*, 11, 267-274.
- Cebula, R. J., & Nair-Reichert, U. (2012). Migration and Public Policies: A Further Emprical Analysis. *Journal of Economics and Finance*, 36(1), 236-248.
- Çatalbaş, G. K., & Yazar, Ö. (2015). Türkiye’deki Bölgeler Arası İç Göçü Etkileyen Faktörlerin Panel Veri Analizi ile Belirlenmesi. *The Journal of Operations Research, Statistics, Econometrics and Management Information Systems*, 3(1), 99-117.
- Çelik, F. (2006). İç Göçlerin İtici ve Çekici Güçler Yaklaşımı ile Analizi. *Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 27, 149 - 170.
- Çelik, N., & Murat, G. (2014). Türkiye’de İç Göç Sorununa Yeni Bir Yaklaşım: Stratejik İç Göç Yönetimi. *İstanbul Üniversitesi İşletme İktisadi Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 76, 45-61.
- Çiftçi, M., & Şengezer, B. (2017). Türkiye’de İç Göç Hareketinde Hemşericiliğin Analizi. Dans T. K. Koramaz, V. Dökmeci, & Z. Özdemir, Türkiye’de Göç ve İllerin Demografik Ekonomik ve Fiziksel Dönüşümü (pp. 125-170). İstanbul: Hiperayayın.
- Day, M. K. (1992). Interprovincial Migration and Local Public Goods. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 25(1), 123-144.
- Day, K. M., & Winer, S. L. (2006). Policy-induced internal migration: An emprical investigation of the Canadian Case. *International Tax and Public Finance*, 535-564.
- Dayar, H., & Sandalcı, U. (2016). Yatırım Teşviklerinin Göçler Üzerindeki Etkisi: TR33 Bölgesi. *İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırma Dergisi*, 5(7), 2041-2064.
- Doğan, M. G. (2010). Türkiye’de İç Göçü Belirleyen Etkenlerin 1980-2000 Döneminde Panel Veri Analizi İle İncelenmesi. Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu . İzmir: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu Uzmanlık Tezi.
- Dökmeci, V., & Koramaz, T. (2007). Türkiye’de İller Arası Göç (1995-2000). Dans T. K. Koramaz, V. Dökmeci, & Z. Özdemir, Türkiye’de Göç ve İllerin Demografik Ekonomik ve Fiziksel Dönüşümü (pp. 13-36). İstanbul: Hiperayayın.
- Dulkadir, B. (2010). Markov Zincirleri ve İç Göç Tahmini. Balıkesir: TUİK Uzmanlık Tezi.
- Ercilasun, M., Gencer, E., & Ersin, Ö. (2011). Türkiye’de İç Göçleri Belirleyen Faktörlerin Modellenmesi. International Conference on Eurasian Economies (pp. 319-324). Bishkek: International Conference on Eurasian Economies, 12-14 October 2011, Beykent University & Kırgızistan-Türkiye Manas University, Bishkek, Kırgızistan.
- Evcil, A., Dökmeci, V., & Gülay, K. B. (2006). Regional Migration in Turkey: Its Directions and Determinants. Greece: 46th European Congress of the Regional Science Association.
- Ecevit, M. C. (1997). İç Göçün Unutulmuş Kaynakları: Tarımsal Farklılaşma ve Dönüşüm Dinamikleri. Dans II. Ulusal Sosyoloji Kongresi Toplum ve Göç (pp. 493-501). Mersin: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü - Sosyoloji Derneği.
- ECLAC. (2008). Social Panorama of Latin America 2007. Santiago: United Nations Publications.
- Filiz, Ş. E. (2008). Internal Migration Patterns of Turkey. Danışman: Prof. Dr. Fatma Doğruel . İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi.
- Filiztekin, A., & Gökhan, A. (2008). The Determinants of Internal Migration in Turkey.
- GAP ÇATOM. (2018, 02 12). Récupéré sur GAP ÇATOM Hakkında : <https://www.gapcatom.org>

- Gavonel, F. (2023). Are young internal migrants 'favourably' selected? Evidence from four developing countries11. *Oxford Development Studies*, 51(2), 97-125.
- Gedik, A. (1997). International Migration in Turkey, 1965-1985: Test of Conflicting Findings in The Literature. *Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies*, 170-179.
- Gezici, F., & Keskin, B. (2005). Interaction between Regional Inequalities and Internal Migration in Turkey. ERSA Conference Papers.
- Gökhan, A. (2008). The Determinants of Internal Migration in Turkey. İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi Yüksek Lisans Tezi .
- Greene, W. (1997). *Econometric Analysis* Third ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Gujarati, D. (2016). Örneklerle ekonometri. N. Bolatoğlu. Çev.). Ankara: BB10 Yayınları.
- Güleç, M. B. (2009). Rural-Urban Migration And Unemployment: Evidence From Turkey. Danışman: D.Şirin Saraçoğlu. Ankara: Middle East Technical University, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi.
- Güneri, Ö. İ., & Durmuş B. (2020). Dependent dummy variable models: An application of logit, probit and tobit models on survey data. *International Journal of Computational and Experimental Science and Engineering*, 6(1), 63-74.
- Hacettepe Üniversitesi Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü. (2006). Türkiye Göç ve Yerinden Olmuş Nüfus Araştırması. Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü.
- Howard, G., & Shao, H. (2022). Internal Migration and the Microfoundations of Gravity. Working Paper.
- IOM. (2015). International Organization For Migration. Key Migration Term: <http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>
- İçişleri Bakanlığı. (2017). KÖYDES Uygulama Sonuçları 2017 Ödenek Planlaması. T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Mahalli İdareler Genel Müdürlüğü: [http://www.suyonetimi.gov.tr/Libraries/su/%C4%B0%C3%87MESUYU\\_TAHS%C4%B0SUNU\\_19\\_12\\_2017\\_%C4%B0%C3%87%C4%B0%C5%9ELER%C4%B0.sflb.ashx](http://www.suyonetimi.gov.tr/Libraries/su/%C4%B0%C3%87MESUYU_TAHS%C4%B0SUNU_19_12_2017_%C4%B0%C3%87%C4%B0%C5%9ELER%C4%B0.sflb.ashx)
- İLBANK. (2018, 04 12). Su Kanalizasyon ve Altyapı Projeleri (SUKAP). İLBANK: <http://www.ilbank.gov.tr/index.php?Sayfa=htmlsayfa&hid=377>
- Kalkınma Bakanlığı. (2007). 2007 Yılı Belediyelerin Altyapısının Desteklenmesi Projesi (BELDES) Ödeneklerinin İller Ve Belediyeler İtibariyle Dağılımı, Kullanılması, İzlenmesi ve Denetimine İlişkin Esas ve Usuller. T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı. [http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Igili%20Mevzuat%20Belgeleri/Beldes\\_2007-6\\_YPK.pdf](http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Igili%20Mevzuat%20Belgeleri/Beldes_2007-6_YPK.pdf)
- Kalkınma Bakanlığı. (2017). Kalkınma Bakanlığı Tanıtım Kitabı. Ankara: T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı.
- Kocaman, T. (1998). Türkiye'de İç Göçler İllar Arası ve Kır-Kent Göçleri ve Göç Edenlerin Nitelikleri (1965-1990). Dans T. Bulutay, Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapı ve İstihdam (pp. 45-94). Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü.
- K. Reddy Sai Sravanth & N. Sundaram (2023) Analysis of socioeconomic status of young migrant farmers in India using probit regression, *Economic Research- Ekonomska Istrazivanja*, 36:1, 2106267, DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2022.2106267.
- Kurt, H. (2006). Göç Eğilimleri ve Olası Etkileri. *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi*, 4(1), 148-178.
- Madalla, G. (1983). *Limited Dependent and Quatitave Variables in Econometrics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Maddox, J. G. (1960). Private and Social Costs of Movement of People out of Agriculture. *The Amerikan Economic Review*, 50(2), 393-402.
- Msigwa, R. E., & Bwana, K. M. (2014). Assesment of Internal Migration Policies in Developing Countries. Evidence from Tanzania. *Business and Economic Research*, 4(1), 32-47.
- Munro, J. M. (1974). Migration in Turkey. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 22(4), 634-653.
- Önder, Z. K. (2018). Türkiye'de İç Göç ve Kamu Politikaları İlişkisi. Eskişehir: Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü.
- Özbay, F. (2017). Dünden Bugüne Aile, Kent ve Nüfus. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları .
- Özer, A. (2012). Göç Hareketlerinin Kentleşmeye ve Yerel Yönetimlere Etkilerinin Değerlendirilmesi. Türkiye'de İç Göçün Sosyo Ekonomik Sonuçları ve Adana Özelinde Değerlendirilmesi (s. 53-80). Adana: İktisadi Araştırmalar Vakfı.
- Pazarlıoğlu, V. (2007). İzmir Örneğinde İç Göçün Ekonometrik Analizi. *Yönetim ve Ekonomi* , 14(1), 121-135. Regional Conference on Migration, Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia.
- Rempel, H. (1981). Rural-Urban Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Kenya. International Institute For Applied Systems Analysis . Luxembourg: International Institute For Applied Systems Analysis.
- Tam, D., & Grimes, A. (2023). Migration of dual-earner couples: a subjective wellbeing approach. *Review of Economics of the Household*, 21(1), 269-289.
- Tekeli, İ. (2008). Göç ve Ötesi. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. *Journal of Political Economy*, 64(5), 146-424.
- The World Bank. (2009). World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.
- Topbaş, F. (2007). İç Göçün Belirleyicileri Üzerine Ekonometrik Bir Model Çalışması: 2000 Türkiye Örneği. Danışman: Nebiye Yamak. Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi.

- TürkSTAT. (2013). Nüfus ve Konut Araştırması 2011. Ankara: T.C. Hazine ve Maliye Bakanlığı Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu.
- TürkSTAT. (2018). Nüfus ve Demografi İstatistikleri. Ankara.
- Sjaastad, L. A. (1962). The Costs and Returns of Human Migration. *Journal of Political Economy*, 70(5/2), 80-93.
- Yakar, M. (2013). Türkiye’de İller Arası Net Göçlerle Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Arasındaki İlişkinin Coğrafi Ağırlıklı Regresyon ile Analizi. *Ege Coğrafya Dergisi*, 27-43.
- Yüksel, S., Eroğlu, S., & Özsarı, M. (2016). An Analysis of Reasons of International Migration in Turkey with Logit Method. *Business and Management Horizons*, 4(2), 34-45.

## APPENDIX

<b>Appx-Table 1. Descriptive statistics on internal migration activity</b>			
<b>How many times have you immigrated so far?</b>			
I have not migrated before			47%
I have migrated once			22%
I have migrated twice			15%
I have migrated 3 times			8%
I have migrated 4 times or more			8%
<b>Your reason for migration</b>			
I migrated to continue my education (high school/university etc.).			27.1%
I migrated for better job opportunities and better working conditions.			17.7%
I finished school and migrated to a new place or to my family.			10.8%
I got an offer for a job or found a job where I migrated.			8.1%
I migrated because of marriage.			7.6%
I migrated to benefit my social life, to increase the vitality of social life/opportunities.			7.6%
I migrated because I could not find a job at my previous place of residence.			4.8%
I migrated to go to my relatives.			3.6%
I migrated to start a new business.			2.3%
I migrated for the future of my children and for them to receive a better education.			1.7%
I migrated for a better environment (water supply, air cleanliness...etc).			1.6%
I migrated due to a family member's appointment/appointment/marriage/military service, etc.			1.6%
I migrated to get better healthcare.			1.6%
I migrated to rest.			1.5%
Other			1.4%
I migrated to escape violence/terrorism.			0.5%
I migrated to do agricultural production.			0.3%
<b>Did you have any idea about this place before you migrated to where you live today?</b>			
I have lived here before.			25%
I have visited before			25%
My family/relatives/friends have lived or lived here			24%
I had no idea			22%
I had knowledge of the media (including social media)			4%
Other			one%
<b>Did you know relatives, friends, or someone who helped you in the place you migrated?</b>			
Yes	68%	No	32%
<b>Did you migrate alone?</b>			
Yes	63%	No	37%
<b>Do you intend to immigrate from where you currently live?</b>			
Yes	45%	No	56%



## Critical Security Perspectives on the U.S.-Mexico Border

### Eleştirel Güvenlik Perspektifinden ABD-Meksika Sınırı

Çağla Lüleci-Sula<sup>1</sup> 

#### Abstract

Critical approaches to security have enriched the literature significantly by provoking novel theoretical debates and introducing new areas of research since their entrance into the field. They have deepened and widened the traditional understanding of security by introducing referent objects other than the state and types of threats other than the military. These attempts have distracted security studies' extensive focus on state security and pointed to new research topics that were traditionally excluded from the scope of security studies. Curious about how different critical security approaches make sense of the migration-security nexus, this study examines how the Copenhagen School (discursive approach) and the Paris School (sociological approach) analyze the U.S.-Mexico border. It first examines how these two schools of thought define, understand, and approach security. Second, it directs its focus on the critical security literature on the U.S.-Mexico borderland. Third, the article discusses both approaches' accounts on the same border and how they handle dis/similar aspects of the migration-security nexus. The study concludes by defending the argument that bridging these two critical security approaches may increase their analytical power in making sense of the migration-security nexus.

**Keywords:** Border Security, Copenhagen School, Mexico, Paris School, United States

#### Öz

Alana girişlerinden bu yana, eleştirel güvenlik yaklaşımları yeni teorik tartışmalara yol açarak ve yeni araştırma alanları sunarak akademik yazını önemli ölçüde zenginleştirmiştir. Bu yaklaşımlar, devlet dışındaki referans nesnelere ve askeri tehditler dışındaki tehdit türlerini tanıtarak geleneksel güvenlik anlayışını derinleştirmiş ve genişletmişlerdir. Bu girişimler, güvenlik çalışmalarının devlet güvenliğine yoğun bir şekilde odaklı kalmasını engellemiş ve geleneksel olarak güvenlik çalışmalarının kapsamı dışında bırakılan yeni araştırma konularını alana kazandırmıştır. Farklı eleştirel güvenlik yaklaşımlarının göç-güvenlik bağlantısını nasıl anladıklarını merak eden bu çalışma, Kopenhag Okulu (söylemsel yaklaşım) ve Paris Okulu'nun (sosyolojik yaklaşım) ABD-Meksika sınırını nasıl analiz ettiğini incelemektedir. Çalışma öncelikle bu iki düşünce ekolünün güvenliği nasıl tanımladığı, anladığı ve ele aldığını incelemektedir. Ardından, ABD-Meksika sınırını ele alan eleştirel güvenlik literatürüne odaklanmaktadır. Üçüncüsü, her iki yaklaşımın da aynı sınır üzerindeki açıklamalarını ve göç-güvenlik bağlantısının benzer ve farklı yönlerini nasıl ele aldıklarını tartışmaktadır. Çalışma, iki perspektif arasında köprü kuran bir yaklaşımın, göç-güvenlik bağlantısını anlamlandırma konusundaki analitik kapasitelerini artırmakta faydalı olacağı sonucuna varmaktadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Sınır Güvenliği, Kopenhag Okulu, Meksika, Paris Okulu, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri

**1 Corresponding Author:** Çağla Lüleci-Sula (Asst. Prof. Dr.), TED University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ankara, Türkiye. E-mail: [cagla.luleci@tedu.edu.tr](mailto:cagla.luleci@tedu.edu.tr) ORCID: 0000-0002-0534-8271

**To cite this article:** Lüleci Sula, C. (2023). Critical security perspectives on the U.S.-Mexico border. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 201–216. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1268043>

## Introduction

Following their introduction as a distinct field of study after the Second World War, various approaches in security studies have made significant contributions to the study of world politics. While traditional realist approaches dominated the field for decades, the end of the Cold War allowed critical approaches to make a ground for themselves in the literature of security studies. Since their entrance into the field, critical approaches to security have enriched the literature significantly by provoking novel theoretical debates and introducing new areas of research. Traditional approaches focus mostly on the survival and security of the state defined mainly in military terms, while critical approaches have introduced referent objects other than state and types of threats other than military to the literature. These attempts to widen and deepen how security is understood and studied do not only distract security studies' excessive focus on state security but also inevitably point to new research topics that could be studied under security.

Theoretical debates in security studies and International Relations aside, the end of the Cold War brought new challenges to world politics. As Walters (2010, p. 218) briefly puts it, "Globalization has changed the world." It led to the questioning of borders and boundaries of all kinds while bringing societies and economies closer than they were before, making the mobility of not only ideas and theories but also humans, goods, and money easier. The rapid increase in human mobility throughout the world has made migration more visible in the eyes of political and academic circles and enriched the literature on the link between migration and security. Since then, the topic has increasingly been studied through traditional and critical perspectives on security. Walters (2010) argues that according to conventional approaches, migration, and security have become to be linked differently after the 1990s, and this was nothing more than the state's response to rising globalization and the new challenges it brings. States now seek to recruit foreign labor more than ever, while also getting more and more anxious about 'new threats' that also become mobile across borders. On the contrary, critical approaches to security are interested in the social and political presentation of mobility and migration as a 'threat' to states, societies, and economies, an approach that brought much novelty to the linkage between migration and security.

Yet, rather than focusing on how or how much novelty critical approaches brought to the literature, this study focuses on the dis/similarities that exist between critical security schools, a topic that is relatively less considered. Curious about how different critical security approaches make sense of the migration-security nexus, the study compares two perspectives: the Copenhagen School (discursive approach) and the Paris School (sociological approach).<sup>1</sup> It does so by specifically focusing on the studies on US-Mexico border politics as a case. It asks, "How do Copenhagen School and Paris School make sense of the relationship between human mobility and security?" It first examines how Copenhagen School and Paris School define, understand, and approach security to better make sense of the differences and similarities in their approaches to mobility and border security. Second, the article analyzes studies that focus on the mobility-security nexus at

---

<sup>1</sup> This study acknowledges the problems in rigidly labeling research, approaches, and thoughts as 'schools' because of the risks of overgeneralization and also strong knowledge claims. This classification is done since it is already widely accepted in the literature and for the sake of pointing to the similarities and differences between different approaches to security.



the U.S.-Mexico borderland. Third, it makes an analysis of both approaches' accounts on the U.S.-Mexico border and how they handle dis/similar aspects of the link between security and human mobility.<sup>2</sup> The study concludes that although both approaches fall into the field of critical security and share ontological and epistemological commitments, they have subtle perspectives on the mobility-security link and an approach that bridges the two may increase their analytical power in making sense of migration.

### **The Concept of Security: Copenhagen School and Paris School Perspectives**

Security remains an essentially contested concept, in the sense that the question "What is security?" does not have a single agreed answer. The traditional understanding of security, which had been dominant during the Cold War, adopts the argument that "security is prior to language, is out there" and "the more security, the better" (Wæver, 1995, pp. 46-7). This view does not only refer to an objectivist understanding of security but also attributes a positive meaning to it. Walt's (1992, pp. 221-2) definition of security as "the studies of the threat use and control of military force and power" represents another feature of traditional security, which is its excessive focus on military issues. Traditional approaches that are established in the U.S. also take the state as the main referent object of security. As the literature on security developed by the 1970s onwards, definitions and understandings of security have become varied, and the meaning and agenda of security have been widened to include other sectors than the military and deepened to include other referent objects beyond the state. (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 187-188).

Then-new approaches to security, including constructivist security, feminist security, post-colonial security, human security, Aberystwyth School (Welsh School, Critical Security Studies), Copenhagen School, and Paris School (International Political Sociology of security) have drawn attention to the subjective and political nature of security that has not been considered as such by conventional approaches. These approaches do not only adopt a constructivist perspective in their definitions of security and threats, but also they encourage attempts to decentralize the state by focusing on the security and insecurity of multiple actors including human and non-human referents to the agenda. Furthermore, increasingly after the 1970s and 80s they emphasized the significance of and introduced studies on environmental, humanitarian, and societal aspects of security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 2).

Both the Copenhagen School and Paris School originate in Europe. Scholars of both approaches reject the positivist and objectivist approaches to security and they agree that security does not refer to an objective and material condition that exists independent of the meanings that are attached to it. According to these critical security approaches, security is not out there to find, achieve, or analyze. Rather, multiple actors socially and politically construct it via several channels and tools. In that sense, they share a post-positivist and interpretive research agenda, which makes it possible to bridge these two

2 I systematically reviewed the existing studies that 1) are published as peer-reviewed research articles, books, or book chapters, 2) analyze specifically security at the U.S.-Mexico borders, 3) explicitly state that they adopt either the Copenhagen or Paris School perspectives in their analyses, 4) or use the jargon and concepts of either of these approaches without explicitly mentioning the adoption of a theoretical position. Then I interpret how they analyze different aspects of the same border and what they leave behind by adopting the perspective that they choose to promote an integrated and more comprehensive approach to the study of mobility and border security.

approaches to produce more comprehensive analyses of border security. Other than that, Copenhagen School and Paris School have significant differences when it comes to the questions of what security is and what it does.

The Copenhagen School refers to the work of a group of scholars who were affiliated with the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen in the 1970s-80s. In their answer to the question of what security is, the school argues that security is an intersubjective speech act that is socially constructed via language. According to this view, something is a security problem “when the elites declare it to be so” (Wæver, 1995, pp. 47, 55). Such an approach to speech-acts is parallel to J. L. Austin’s articulation and Derrida’s approach to speech and act (Hansen, 2011). Accordingly, rather than practices, policies, or activities, “the utterance itself is the act” of security (Wæver, 1995, p. 55), that is to say, language itself becomes security due to the understanding that something is done by simply uttering it. By talking about security, politicians, and practitioners justify extraordinary measures to deal with it, which the scholars of Copenhagen School define as an act of securitization (Wæver, 2012, p. 53). This definition refers to a constructivist understanding of security, which approaches security as a making of human beings rather than an objective condition that shapes policies and analyses of security.

Scholars of Paris School started a conversation by criticizing the understanding that ‘security is only speech’, arguing that a group of often routinized practices (as discourses that contain speeches, practices, gestures, etc.) are able to construct emergency issues, rather than simply speech-acts (Bigo, 2002, p. 65). Accordingly, security is not only utterance but it is also constituted via everyday practices of often street-level security practitioners. These scholars analyze day-to-day practices as routine, patterned, and unintentional acts. Their definition of ‘discourse’ as more than speech and also ‘politics’ as constituted via everyday practices rely on the arguments of post-structuralism, rather than social constructivism. With a post-structuralist urge to question pre-defined boundaries around concepts and disciplines, these scholars encourage an interdisciplinary approach while defining and approaching security with reference, especially to the disciplines of sociology and philosophy.

Influenced by a Bourdieusian approach, some scholars of the Paris School base their arguments on the concept of *field* with characteristics that are defined by the patterns resulting from the encounters between not only political elites but multiple agents (Bigo, 2013, p. 124). In other words, social and political phenomena, such as migration and border security, can be read as fields that have their code of actions rather than speech acts that are claimed by elites (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 23-25). Other groups of scholars are particularly influenced by a Foucauldian reading of policing as a form of *governmentality* and they approach security practices as performative. Thus, the Paris School highlights the role of mundane practices and the web of relations, and the Copenhagen School mostly focuses on how utterance by itself makes security. Such difference is also apparent in their respective analyses of mobility and security. While the former focuses on routine bureaucratic practices of border security that end up with insecurities for multiple subjects, the latter analyzes how human mobility and migration have been constructed as a security threat through language in the first place.

The concept of securitization refers to an exceptional moment constructed by political elites, which is almost tangible to observe. According to Wæver (1996, p. 108), “security

discourse is characterized by dramatizing an issue as having absolute priority.” Based on this understanding most researchers of the Copenhagen School analyze speeches of influential elites to reveal hints of securitizing moves. On the contrary, as Bilgin and Ince (2014) also argue, for the Paris School, neither there is ‘a moment of security’ claimed by state authority nor are ‘moments of insecurity’ as the critical scholarship argues. Security and insecurity form a continuum and they grow together in the everyday course of things like two faces of the same coin. Security for one can mean insecurity for another, hence, we cannot talk of the presence or absence of security once and for all. Security and insecurity are embedded in everyday (often referred to as micro) practices of multiple agents, which refers to a post-structuralist conceptualization of politics. In other words, security and insecurity are “normal social facts” (Bigo, 2001, p. 98). The School uses the term ‘in/securing’ (or (in)security to emphasize a reflexive understanding of security, that is, “the ways in which our practices produce insecurity as well as security for ourselves and for others” (Bilgin & Ince, 2014, p. 2). Thus, in their analyses of security, scholars of Paris School conduct ethnographic research, and interviews, along with other methods to observe and interpret the daily routines of multiple agents that constitute in/security.

While Paris School scholars analyze practices of multiple actors that make insecurities possible, a significant concern for the Copenhagen School is also “to rescue security studies from being a narrow state-centric military-based concept, without making it an overarching-exaggerated concept which includes any threats to individuals, groups, nations, and humanity” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 482). However, their conceptualization of security (and securitization) is criticized to remain state-centric because of the central role it devotes to elites that represent (mostly state) authority. For the Paris School, empirical security studies of the ‘social’ cannot be limited to the analysis of one actor. The Paris School refers to “the plurality of spaces and actors,” rather than focusing only on elites and how they securitize originally political things and events (Kessler, 2009, p. 88). Put differently, another point of divergence is that the Paris School encourages decentralizing the state with its strong focus on the need for a sociological analysis of security, while the Copenhagen School relies mostly on how elites make security through speech.

These differences stem from the central questions that the two schools ask. The Copenhagen School aims to search for an answer to the questions of “who can securitize what, and under what conditions?” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). These questions point the scholars to analyze speeches of elites and the contexts in which these speeches become possible. According to Bigo (2008, p. 116), two central questions that the Paris School asks are “What security means, and what it does.” Thus, these scholars are not particularly encouraged to define strictly the agents of security, which along with their focus on the sociality of security, results in a wider range of agents when it comes to who makes security. In terms of what security does, both schools demonstrate skepticism towards ‘security’ in terms of its consequences. The Copenhagen School argues that “security has often anti-democratic and anti-creative implications” (Waever, 2012, p. 53). The more things remain in the area of politics rather than security, the better it is. The Paris School’s reference to security as in/security is already self-explanatory. The scholars of it suggest that security practices create insecurities at least for certain groups of society. Thus, they agree on the argument that claims and practices of security need to be approached critically and cautiously.

Studies that contribute to the migration and border security literature base their arguments on these different questions and understandings of security. Migration and border security research from the Copenhagen School perspective analyzes the processes in which migration and mobility are socially constructed as security threats by influential actors to justify extraordinary measures, that are, practices and policies of security. Scholars that adopt the Paris School perspective are interested in security practices not as a result of security discourse, but as the sources of insecurity themselves. Insecurity at the borderlands is not an exceptional moment, on the contrary, is made possible day by day by the routine practices of security professionals. The next section analyzes how the abovementioned differences and similarities between the two approaches are reflected in the study of border security with a specific focus on the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.

### **The U.S.-Mexico Border: Copenhagen School and Paris School Perspectives**

The U.S. external borders have been a topic of interest for the researchers of migration and security nexus. The U.S. government's current security approach towards the Southern borders of the state can be traced to the 1980s. However, Operation Blockade (Operation Hold the Line) of 1993 was a significant initiative that aimed to close the border in Texas to undocumented workers because of defined translational 'threats' of undocumented migration and drug trafficking among others (Ackleson, 2003a). NAFTA further served neoliberal economic structures and interests and aimed to restrict human mobility to the U.S. while encouraging a more liberal approach toward the flow of capital and goods.

The 9/11 attacks have added another layer on top of the securitization of mobility in the United States after which security discourse and practices to limit mobility have increased dramatically. The securitizing discourse of the war on terror let American leaders justify and imply extraordinary measures inside and outside of state borders regardless of the lack of evidence showing that the suspects entered the country through Mexican borders (Ackleson, 2003a). The U.S. governments have increasingly merged issues of mobility and terrorism, putting mobility on the agenda of security, which resulted in an increase in border security measures such as increased federal presence, as well as border patrols and customs at the borders. Since then, both securitizing speeches of political elites and security practices aiming to constrain mobility from the Southern borders have intensified. The U.S.-Mexico borders have increasingly become a field of security made up of a mixture of practices of physical bordering and bordering via surveillance technologies.

The critical security literature on the migration-security nexus contains many studies that focus on the U.S.-Mexico borders, especially analyzing the issue from the Copenhagen and Paris School perspectives. Their respective analyses of border security and migration provide insides into how these two schools of thought define and examine the migration-security nexus. While the studies that adopt a Copenhagen School perspective analyze how influential elites securitize mobility and migration through their speeches, researchers of the Paris School emphasize how bureaucratic daily practices create insecurities at the borderlands or wherever borders are located through the technological and physical practices of security professionals.

Adopting a securitization framework to the issue of borders and mobility, Doty (2007) conceptualizes 'civilian border patrol groups' that operate on the U.S.-Mexico border

and their relationships with statecraft, identity, and security to understand how certain practices may lead to exceptionalism when it comes to ‘securing’ borders. The author links Schmitt’s theory of the political and his approach to the friend-enemy dichotomy with the securitization theory. The article analyzes the conditions under which existential threat discourse occurs. The clearest indicators of securitization in the U.S.-Mexico case are the rhetoric and images on the websites of civilian border control groups and anti-immigrant organizations (Doty, 2007, p. 128). Doty relies on a securitization framework while also approaching discourse in a rather broader manner, not reducing it to only speeches of certain individuals and groups, but integrating visuals and images as part of the securitizing discourse. On the same topic, Ackleson (2005, p. 166) proposes that the official discourse of the U.S. is the most important factor that builds the link between migration and the idea of security, risk, and danger. The study adopts the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of security as constructed discursively by influential elites’ speeches and argues that this discourse creates ‘the other’ (Ackleson, 2005, p. 168). The author adopts a constructivist perspective and analyzes speeches, scripts, and official documents on U.S. border security policies. The article exemplifies the tone of securitization in elite discourse such as a Congressman’s speech about ‘Hold the Line Operation’, which says “Securing our Nation’s borders against illegal immigration is the first priority of our immigration policy” (Ackleson, 2005, p. 175).

Although Doty is more interested in a variety of securitizing actors such as border patrols compared to Ackleson’s relative focus on political elites, both articles integrated a broader understanding of how actors discursively set the agenda of border security. Their main focus is on different types of actors but they apply a similar method to analyze securitization. Doty points to extremist speeches of patrol groups’ founders towards Mexican immigrants, such as “they are illegal aliens” (2007, p. 114) and “defense of nation begins at the defense of the borders” (2007, p. 123). Based on the idea that “how something becomes securitized can be partly traced through discourse” Ackleson (2005, p. 169) also analyzes discourses of influential actors, institutions, and official texts in the United States. Relying on these speeches, the study concludes that securitization of migration which became possible by the U.S. agents’ discourse has increased after 9/11, which ended up with extra control (i.e. federal presence) along the Southern borders (Ackleson, 2005, pp. 175-6).

Applying Buzan’s perspective of securitization, Hutchison (2020) analyzes the discourses of U.S. presidents Obama and Trump to reveal signs of securitization of the Mexican border and immigrants. The author points to the speeches and security mechanisms that create ‘invisible enemies’ out of Mexican immigrants and argues that security speech is not limited to Trump’s election campaign and his administration, but it is an institutionalized perspective that has been going on for decades, including the Obama period. He cites securitizing speeches of influential elites such as then U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Johnson who said “Our message is clear to those who try to illegally cross our borders: You will be sent back home” (Hutchison, 2020, p. 93). The article also analyzes continuity in policies and legal frameworks of border security, emphasizing how the law implementation and deportation regime have been getting stricter for years.

The sociological approach to border security, referred to as the Paris School of security, defines in/security in terms of everyday bordering practices. Approaching security from

a different critical perspective, most sociological researchers imply fieldwork as their main method of border security analysis. Some studies do not only analyze the everyday practices of social actors but also how materials and things can give us hints about the security of the issue of mobility and migration at the U.S. borderlands. For instance, Sundberg's research (2008) draws attention to geopolitical frontiers that are constructed via everyday practices. The research relies on information gathered through textual analysis and ethnography while focusing on the material evidence (identity documents, personal mementos, backpacks, water bottles, etc.) of the undocumented crossing of borders. Sundberg (2008, p. 872) emphasizes that "the emergent narratives and practices around the objects are not directed by elite actors, but arise from everyday encounters between the objects left behind." Due to the geographical change in the U.S.-Mexico border in 1994, it became physically more difficult to cross the border and the article's interest in 'materials left behind' is related to this fact (2008, p. 874). The article analyzes the framing of left materials by government officials and media as "trash" without explanation regarding the geographical and political context behind the existence of such 'trash'. The trash talk is similar to how Mexican immigrants are framed by multiple securitizing actors and media as those who "trash" America (Sunberg 2008, p. 874). Thus, like Ackleson, Sundberg (2008, p. 886) also questions the construction of 'the other' or the relations of inclusion and exclusion that are created by border security initiatives. While the former research relies mainly on speeches that make this construction possible, the latter looks at the material and physical indicators of in/securitization. By conducting fieldwork at the borderlands, researchers of the sociological approach emphasize how security is embedded in everyday routines and micro-practices of bordering, rather than being an exceptional moment that is claimed by political elites.

Talavera et al. (2010) conducted ethnographic research on the deportation regime in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, arguing that undocumented people who live close to this border come across law enforcement in open and public spaces. Like Sundberg, the article focuses on the presence of deportability in the everyday lives of immigrants rather than emphasizing the immediate moments of arrest and removal as indicators of in/security. The article delineates the key themes in people's narratives about deportability as "fear, invisibility, hiding, stigma, loss, grief, depression, anxiety" (Talavera et al., 2010, p. 168). It analyzes the social and political practices of in/security, which create the conditions for the Mexican population to feel the way they do about deportability. Security practices of sheriffs, border patrols, and officers, as well as law enforcement and the way the fields are designed to trigger the sense of fear and insecurity, the sense of being a target, and the idea of spatial separation between 'public as dangerous' and 'private as safe' (Talevera et al., 2010, p. 171). The article gives an account of everyday security practices that make the Mexican population living near the border feel insecure, and it disparately relies on individuals' perspectives unlike the Copenhagen School approach, which highlights political elites as the main actors of border security.

The Paris School's emphasis on routine practices of security has drawn researchers' attention to how technology use at the U.S.-Mexico borderlands or elsewhere within the state insecurities multiple individuals and groups mostly by creating illegal subjects. The events of 9/11 were a significant turning point in the U.S. governments' approach

to security, which triggered a transformation of state borders from being patrol-driven to surveillance-driven. Ackleson (2003) analyzes the U.S. border security regime after 9/11 and the development of “smart borders” that became possible via technology and surveillance systems. The author analyzes how increasing usage of technology creates insecurities for the subjects of the border security regime. Latham (2014) also examines the relationship between mobility and information processing/production through technology use. The article argues that recent interest in border security has two focuses, which are the governance of mobility, and border security through information gathering. Influenced by critical theory and biopolitics literature, the author considers his article to be an example of the latter (Latham, 2014, p. 18). According to the article, since the 1940s, with the help of cybernetics, information is generated on the position of people, and what the article names a ‘world brain’ is established (Latham, 2014, p. 18). Thus, the article does not overlook the continuing significance of the physical space and security practices, but its focus is on analyzing technological spaces (electronic borderlands built by information technologies by the state and nongovernmental institutions) that construct the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.

Amoore (2006, p. 337) also analyzes how surveillance practices make significant tools of bordering. The paper puts forward that the U.S.-Mexico border poses an appropriate empirical case because it is considered to have high-risk groups. This makes surveillance practices at the U.S.-Mexico borderlands more intense than anywhere else. The author analyzes the US-VISIT program of border controls (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology), under which the management of border security stopped being a matter of geopolitical/physical disciplining and became an issue of biopolitics in which everyday life of people can be monitored and controlled. Amoore analyzes risk profiling, representations of biometrics and bodies, and authorization techniques that make the privatization of border security possible. Defining biometric borders, she relies on Bigo’s “Möbius Ribbon”<sup>3</sup> concept, referring to the practices of inclusion-exclusion of migrants as well as the creation of illegal subjects through technology use.

Although Ackleson, Amoore, and Latham focus on a similar topic, they ask different questions informed by their theoretical perspectives. Ackleson (2003, p. 57) asks “How have the threats and solutions at the U.S. borders been defined, both empirically and discursively?” His study focuses on the social constitution of border security against defined threats, policy goals, and limitations, and argues that signs of such construction can be traced in discourse, defined as “scripts of politics” (Ackleson, 2003, p. 58). However, aiming to make sense of the practices of anonymity on the U.S. borders by the state and non-state institutions, Latham (2014) and Amoore (2006) adopt a Paris School perspective, which directs the research to analyze digital technologies of border security. These practices of border in/security also include militarization (electronic and physical domination of the borders by the authority) and ‘border anxiety’ (official and public fear that the border is an insecure line of the Mexican drug cartel, piracy, smuggling,

3 Bigo’s (2001) Möbius Ribbon analogy refers to the blurring of the boundaries between inside and outside and the interpenetration of internal and external securities. He utilizes this analogy to make sense of ‘transborder threats’ as defined by traditional security approaches, which might refer to terrorism, smuggling, and irregular migration (See Mutlu and Lüleci, 2016). The analogy also implies that agents and relations of inside and outside (internal and external) are more often than not unfixed and ambiguous.

violence) (Latham, 2014, p. 22). Online representations highly contribute to everyday violence and the force of the border. In Latham's (2014, p. 28) words "Mobile technology in the borderlands opens onto a range of micro-practices conducted around and across the border in the everyday."

Like Ackleson's research, Astor (2009) examines the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the securitization of migration in the United States. He argues that recent discourse about that border after 9/11 ("secure our borders") has important similarities with the rhetoric in the 1950s that prepared the conditions for Operation Wetback. He asks "How and why unauthorized immigration across the Mexican border became an issue elevated out of the realm of ordinary politics and into the realm of security during the 1950s?" and the answer provided in the article is "through discourse" (Astor, 2009, pp. 6, 11). The author provides examples from securitizing speeches of the representatives from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, American politicians, as well as media sources like newspapers. According to Astor (2009, p. 10), the securitization framework helps make sense of Agamben's conceptualization of "exceptional politics." Their reliance on the definition of security as 'exceptional moments' is why the researchers of the Copenhagen School focus on sharp changes in elite speeches, as well as the possible triggers of such change such as the 9/11 events or the election of anti-immigrant leaders like Donald Trump.

### **Analysis and Discussion**

The previous section reviewed the studies that adopt either The Copenhagen School (discursive) or the Paris School (sociological) approaches in their analyses of the U.S.-Mexico border security policies and practices. Both being critical perspectives on security, these two approaches have their nuances, which this article aims to reveal by examining the studies that focus on the same border, but from different perspectives. On the one hand, the pieces by Doty (2007), Ackelson (2003; 2005), Astor (2009), and Hutchison (2020) adopt a perspective that is more in line with the Copenhagen School's understanding of security, embodied in the framework of securitization. The Copenhagen School focuses on "how migration is connected to representations of national/societal dangers" and "how the development of security discourses in the area of migration is often presented as an inevitable policy response to the challenges for public order and domestic stability" (Huysmans, 2000, p. 757). Some of these studies also refer to Schmitt and Agamben's "exceptional discourse" linked with securitization theory (See Huysmans, 2008). On the other, Latham (2014), Amooore (2006), Talavera et al. (2010), and Sundberg (2008) analyze the U.S.-Mexico borderlands with a specific focus on how everyday practices of border security happen to result in social and political insecurities for multiple actors. Theoretically, most of these studies base their analyses on security as a form of *governmentality*, which refers to how certain practices create normal or proper subjects, resulting in relations of inclusion-exclusion. Some studies utilize the Bourdieusian concept of field in their analyses of how multiple actors create a network of insecurity through their mundane bureaucratic practices.

Differences in these two approaches' definitions and understanding of security are reflected in their approach toward the migration-security nexus in multiple ways. Both



approaches have their advantages and limitations in the analysis of border security. First, the Copenhagen School's excessive focus on moments of exception and following extraordinary measures may result in overlooking how not only elites but also multiple actors construct insecurities on a daily basis through bureaucratic and routine practices. In this sense, the discursive approach is successful in demonstrating the impact of elites on setting up a security agenda, as Ackleson does, while falling short in making sense of the agency of other actors as well as the impact of securitization on immigrants. In contrast, due to its interest in not only what security means but also what it does, the sociological approach integrates how practices of security end up with insecurities for its subjects, reflected in Talavera et al.'s research on the emotions and anxieties of individual immigrants. Different from the Copenhagen School, the Paris School is also interested in how multiple actants including security professionals, bureaucracy, and technologies and fences create insecurities for immigrants daily.

Second, for the scholars of Paris School, physical and material indicators and agents of the process of in/security, including buildings, fences, physical appearances among the borderlands, technologies, security vehicles, things, and even trash that immigrants leave behind as Sundberg's article, are significant in understanding the securityness of an issue. The Copenhagen School is less interested in the material indicators of securitization while focusing on social agents of security, mostly the political elites. This focus on exceptional discourse by the elites may make it difficult for the Copenhagen School analyses to detect and comprehend the presence of insecurities when there is a lack of securitizing speeches by elites (See Lüleci-Sula & Sula, 2021).

Third, the Paris School's extensive focus on unintentional daily practices may risk overlooking the broader political contexts in which insecurity becomes possible. As such, studies that adopt the sociological approach overlook exceptional events that create immense insecurities for multiple referent objects, such as hate speech, conflicts, and even war. Conflicts, invasions, and wars, which the Copenhagen School refers to as extraordinary measures that may follow securitizing speeches, remain a major concern for world politics, as well as the discipline of IR, which no security approaches can rule out in their analyses of politics and security.

The differences in these two schools of thought's focus on analyses and actors are also related to their conceptualization of 'the international.' As quoted from Huysmans above, the Copenhagen School's attempt to enlarge the definition of security is limited by the idea that security should not lose its meaning by overemphasizing the importance of any threats to individuals, groups, nations, and humanity. Thus, the international remains primarily to be a matter of states, policymakers, and their political agenda. Conversely, aiming to bring a sociological approach to the study of world politics, the Paris School challenges the disciplinary boundaries, arguing that conventional IR's tendency to assume international as "a realm of reality with clear boundaries" contributes to the inside-outside distinction of the modern state (Bigo and Walker, 2007, p. 728). This difference is also reflected in their respective approaches toward the migration-security nexus. Technology use, discourses and practices of security professionals, civil bureaucracy, individuals' ideas, borderland as a field and its placement/position, materials, etc. remain within the scope of 'international security' for the sociological approach. However, enriching the

scope of interest also has its disadvantages, such as a possible failure to link the issue with ‘the international,’ as might be a criticism to Talavera et al. Furthermore, defining insecurity as related to disciplinary power and its everyday reproduction may result in overlooking the political (sovereign power) and how politicians contribute to the making of insecurities, sometimes intentionally. For instance, neither Amoores nor Latham emphasized the intentionality aspect of biopolitical governance of security, while the political aspect of securitization is clearer in Doty and Astor’s studies.

Another significant difference between the two approaches lies in their preferred methods. Côté-Boucher et al. (2014) summarize the Paris School’s approach to the migration-security nexus to analyze everyday in/security practices at borders, and to underscore the importance of fieldwork research to provide detailed and contextualized analyses of border security. One goal of the Bourdieusian understanding of the discipline is to provide an empirical visualization of what is defined as ‘the international’ (Pouliot, 2012; Bigo 2011). Since fieldwork has the potential to reveal social ‘realities’ of migration, the researcher needs to leave her/his armchair and experience the field to be able to give an account of in/securities. On the other hand, studies that adopt the Copenhagen School approach do not always define and clarify their preferred methods. Most of these studies do seem to analyze speeches of influential actors rather randomly, without a systematic analysis of speeches or scripts through discourse or content analysis. In some Copenhagen School articles, this ends up with a defective justification (or lack of any explanation) of how they proceed step by step to their conclusions.

As Huysmans (2002) and C.A.S.E. Collective (2006) indicate, one normative dilemma or trap of studying security is the possibility of participating and constantly reproducing discursive securitization. Probably not to fall into this dilemma, most Paris School pieces do not openly name the issue as being related to in/security while the focus on ‘securityness’ is rather straightforward in the Copenhagen School studies. Many of the studies mention migration’s links with daily hardship, violence, and anxiety. However, these studies –consciously or not- avoid direct links by mentioning ‘migration as in/security.’ The securitization perspective on migration is also critical of issues being out into the security realm, though they use the term security as well as risk, danger, and threat without the normative consideration of reproduction of (in)security.

As Katzenstein and Sil (2010) argue and this study observes while analyzing the Copenhagen School and Paris School approaches to the migration-security nexus “research traditions give themselves permission to bypass aspects of a complex reality” that does not fit in their theoretical or meta-theoretical commitments. This makes it -at least from a pragmatic point of view- desirable to integrate multiple approaches to come up with comprehensive answers to our research questions. Such integration can be defined as an attempt to utilize distinct theoretical constructions by pooling them together while being aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing approaches and utilizing both to make sense of a particular social phenomenon. The Copenhagen School and the Paris School share the same meta-theoretical commitments while having the above-mentioned differences in certain theoretical assumptions.

In terms of their ontological commitments, both schools of thought challenge the objectivist understanding of security, defining it as a socially constructed and contingent

phenomenon. While the Copenhagen School focuses on how threats and security issues are constructed through language, the Paris Schools researchers search for hints of security in mundane and bureaucratic practices of security professionals. According to this view, security is not something ‘out there’ to be dealt with or explored but is constituted by multiple subjects. Both schools of thought defend a post-positivist approach to social sciences. Their epistemological commitment highlights the interpretive and constructivist nature of knowledge. Different from the Copenhagen School, the Paris School researchers place a strong emphasis on the reflexive nature of knowledge.

These two approaches are coherent meta-theoretically. They have differing theoretical arguments regarding how security is constituted but do not disagree in their ontological and epistemological commitments. As a result, these can be combined using an eclectic strategy. Such an approach would examine how security is initially formed through linguistic construction as well as how securityness of an issue is continuously reproduced through routine practices of security professionals. As a result, complex social and political issues, such as migration, which have multiple dimensions including political discourse and socio-political practices, can be captured and analyzed more thoroughly through the analysis of both exceptional speeches that may trigger processes of securitization and with the broadly defined concept of discourse that includes not only speeches but also the legal and political frameworks and regular behaviors that enable border insecurity.

### **Conclusion**

Walters (2010) distinguishes critical approaches to the migration-security nexus into two: discursive and material-semiotic (sociological) approaches. This differentiation makes it significant to understand the differences and similarities between security definitions and understandings of the Copenhagen School and Paris School. After analyzing the studies that focus on the migration-security nexus by focusing on the U.S.-Mexico border, this study concludes that although both fall into the category of critical approaches to security and that they share common meta-theoretical commitments, there have differences in their empirical conceptions, summarized in Table 1 below, which reveal certain strengths and weaknesses of both.

First, the Copenhagen School’s focus on speech acts makes it vulnerable to grasping the insecurities resulting from routine practices in the field. Second, its emphasis on political elites as securitizing actors may end up overlooking how multiple actors contribute to the insecurities that immigrants face. Third, Paris School’s extensive focus on unintentional everyday practices may pose a deficiency in analyzing exceptional cases and security measures such as violence, invasions, conflicts, and even war. Fourth, dissimilarity in their conceptualization of ‘the international’ causes them to focus on a limited aspect of the phenomena they are analyzing while leaving untouched other significant aspects of it (either materialities or further political agenda). Fifth, studies of the Copenhagen School are not as open and clear as the Paris School when it comes to how they analyze migration and border security. A lack of clarification regarding their methods might make it difficult to grasp how they come up with their claimed conclusions. Last, most articles from the Paris School perspective refrain from using the term ‘security’ due to the normative dilemma it brings, while the Copenhagen School is more open about defining the moments and processes of security.

Laudan (1977, pp. 104-10) argues that *research traditions* are not much different when it comes to the empirical realities they interpret. Considering that they share a common research tradition, understood from their meta-theoretical commitments, it is safe to call for an integrated approach in the critical analysis of the migration-security nexus. The studies that define security discourse more comprehensively, including speeches, scripts, documents, materialities, and bureaucratic and security practices, present a more comprehensive analysis of a complex social and political phenomenon such as border security. This is why this study presents a call for more integration between these two schools of critical security studies.

Table 1  
*Approaches of the Copenhagen School and the Paris School on the Migration-Security Nexus<sup>4</sup>*

	<b>In/security</b>	<b>Focus of analysis</b>	<b>Referent object</b>	<b>Actors</b>	<b>Preferred method</b>	<b>Main influencers in social/political theory</b>	<b>Possible roots in IR theory</b>
<b>Copenhagen School</b>	Speech-act	Exceptional discourses, securitization of migration, self-other dichotomies, threat construction	Widened, but the main focus is still state	Elites/influential actors	Discourse/content analysis (not a strong emphasis on method)	J. L. Austin, Derrida	Constructivism
<b>Paris School</b>	Everyday practice	Governmentality, dispositif, technology, and surveillance, politics of inclusion and exclusion, political and social consequences of migration practices	More emphasis on individuals/society	Multiple	Ethnography (fieldwork) and textual analysis	Foucault, Bourdieu, Latour	Post-structuralism

4 Please note that this table is only an interpretation made by the author about the differences between the two approaches. It does not aim to draw clearly defined boundaries between these two schools of critical security but is only a tentative list to make it easier to grasp the possible nuances between them.

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

## References

- Ackleson, J. (2003). Securing Through Technology? Smart Borders after September 11<sup>th</sup>. *Knowledge, Technology, & Policy*, 16(1), 56-74.
- Ackleson, J. (2003a). Directions in border security research. *The Social Science Journal*, 40, 773-581.
- Ackleson, J. (2005). Constructing security on the U.S.–Mexico border. *Political Geography*, 24, 165-184.
- Amoore, L. (2006). Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror. *Political Geography*, 25, 336-351.
- Astor, A. (2009). Unauthorized immigration, securitization, and the making of Operation Wetback. *Latino Studies*, 7(1), 5-29.
- Bigo, D. (2001). The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Securit(ies). In M. Albert, ed., *Identities Borders Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory* (pp. 91-116). Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27(1), 63-92.
- Bigo, D. (2013). International Political Sociology. In P. D. Williams, ed., *Security Studies: an introduction* (116-129). NY: Routledge Taylor&Francis.
- Bigo, D. (2011). Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power. *International Political Sociology*, 5(3), 225-258.
- Bigo, D. & Walker R.B.J. (2007). Political Sociology and the Problem of the International. *Millennium- Journal of International Studies*, 3, 725-739.
- Bilgin, P. & Ince B. (2014). Security and Citizenship in the Global South: In/securing citizens in early republican Turkey (1923-1946). *International Relations*, 29(4), 1-21.
- Buzan, B. & Hansen, L. (2009). *Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge University Press: New York.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Boulder: Rienner.
- C.A.S.E. Collective. (2006). Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto. *Security Dialogue*, 37, 443-487.
- Côté-Boucher, K., Infantino, F. & Salter, M. B. (2014). Border security as practice: An agenda for research. *Security Dialogue*, 45(3), 195–208.
- Doty, R. L. (2007). States of Exception on the Mexico-U.S. Border: Security, Decisions, and Civilian Border Patrols. *International Political Sociology*, 1(2), 113-137.
- Eckl, J. (2008). Responsible Scholarship After Leaving the Veranda: Normative Issues Faced by Field Researchers—and Armchair Scientists. *International Political Sociology*, 2(3), 185-203.
- Hutchison, H. (2020). Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and Trump Administrations. *Perceptions*, XXV(1), 81-98.
- Huysmans, J. (1998). Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe. *European Journal of International Relations*, 4(4), 479-505.
- Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the Securitization of Migration. *JCMS: J Common Market Studies*, 38(5), 751-777.
- Huysmans, J. (2002). Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security. *Alternatives*, 27, 41-62.
- Huysmans, J. (2008). The Jargon of Exception—On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of Political Society. *International Political Sociology*, 2, 165-183.
- Katzenstein, P. J. & Sil, R. (2010). Analytic Eclecticism in the study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 8(2), 411-431.
- Kessler, O. (2009). Toward a sociology of the international? International relations between anarchy and World society. *International Political Sociology*, 3(1), 87-108.
- Latham, R. (2014). The Governance of Visibility: Bodies, Information, and the Politics of Anonymity across the US-Mexico Borderlands. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 39(1), 17-36.
- Luleci-Sula, C. & Sula, I. E. (2021). Migration Management in Turkey: Discourse and Practice. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 18(72), 1-22.
- Mutlu, C. E. & Lüleci, Ç. (2016). The International Political Sociology of Security Studies. In Guillaume, X. & Bilgin, P. (Eds.) *Routledge Handbook of International Political Sociology* (pp. 81-91). Routledge.
- Pouliot, V. (2012). Methodology: Putting practice theory into practice. In Adler-Nissen, R. *Bourdieu in international relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR* (pp. 45-58). London: Routledge.
- Sundberg, J. (2008). 'Trash-talk' and the production of quotidian geopolitical boundaries in the USA–Mexico

- borderlands. *Social & Cultural Geography*, 9(8), 871-890.
- Talavera, V., Nunez-Mchiri, G. G., & Heyman J. (2010). Deportation in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands: Anticipation, Experience, and Memory. In De Genova, N. & Peutz, N. (Eds.) *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement* (pp. 166-194). Durham & London: Duke University Press.
- Wæver, O. (1995). Securitization and Desecuritization. In R. Lipschutz, (Ed.), *On Security* (pp. 46-86). New York: Colombia University Press.
- Walt, S. M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2), 211-239.
- Walters, W. (2010). Migration and Security. In Burgess, J. P. (Ed.), *The Handbook of New Security Studies* (pp. 217-228). London: Routledge.
- Wæver, O. (2012). Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: The Europeanness of new “schools” of security theory in an American field. In A. B. Tickner & Blaney (Eds.), *Thinking International Relations Differently*. Routledge.
- Wolfers, A. (1952). ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4), 481-502.

## Governance And Policy Responses to Covid-19 In Aviation: An IGO and NGO Perspective

Havacılıkta Covid-19'a Karşı Yönetişim ve Politika Yaklaşımları: Uluslararası Otoriteler ve Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Perspektifi

Volkan Yavaş<sup>1</sup> , Ferhan Kuyucak Şengür<sup>2</sup> , Armağan Macit<sup>3</sup> 

### Abstract

Throughout the history of the aviation industry, solutions have been developed to advance the process in its environment by developing it technologically, legally, and administratively. However, the industry has had to struggle and adapt to uncertainties, changes, and negativities in its external environment. Although these rarely have positive effects on the sector, they mostly have negative effects. While pandemics are one of them, Covid-19 will undoubtedly remain one of the most symbolic. The aviation industry is struggling with all of its stakeholders to keep the industry alive, both on its own and together. While various academic studies have been carried out in terms of airlines, airports, and passengers, a limited number of studies have been conducted from the perspective of authorities, institutions, and organizations. This study investigated internal and external measures, including governance of the Covid-19 process. Therefore, studies of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been compiled. These studies, which were proposed during the Covid-19 process, were evaluated, and solutions were offered for the sustainability and future of aviation.

**Keywords:** Covid-19, Air Transportation, NGO, IGO, Pandemic

### Öz

Havacılık sektörü tarihi boyunca teknolojik, yasal ve idari olarak gelişerek çevresindeki süreci ilerletmek için çözümler üretmiştir. Diğer yandan da dış çevresindeki belirsizliklere, değişimlere ve olumsuzluklara karşı mücadele etmek ve uyum sağlamak zorunda kalmıştır. Bunların nadiren sektöre olumlu yansımaları olsa da çoğunlukla olumsuz etkileri olduğu bilinmektedir. 2020 yılı itibarıyla tüm dünyanın gündemine tekrar dahil olan salgın hastalıklar da bunlardan biridir. Yakın geçmişte çeşitli düzeylerde salgın hastalıklar riski olsa da tüm dünyanın ortak kaygısı haline gelen Koronavirüs (Covid-19) şüphesiz en sembolik olanlardan biri olarak kalacaktır. Havacılık sektörü tüm paydaşlarıyla hem bireysel hem de örgütlenerek sektörü ayakta tutmak için mücadele ettiği bir dönemle yüzleşmek zorunda kalmıştır. Bu konuyla ilgili olarak havayolları, havalimanları ve yolcular açısından çeşitli akademik çalışmaların da yapıldığı bilinmektedir. Ancak otoriteler, kurum ve kuruluşlar perspektifinden sınırlı sayıda çalışma ortaya konmuştur. Bu çalışma ile de akademideki bu eksikliği gidermek amaçlanmıştır. Çalışmada, Covid-19 sürecinin yönetimi de dâhil olmak üzere iç ve dış tedbirler incelenmiştir. Bu anlamda Uluslararası Otoriteler ve Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının Covid-19 sürecinde yapmış olduğu çalışmalar derlenmiştir. Covid-19 sürecinde ortaya konan bu çalışmalar değerlendirilerek havacılığın sürdürülebilirliği ve geleceği için çözüm önerileri sunulmuştur.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Covid-19, Hava Taşımacılığı, Uluslararası Otoriteler, Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları, Pandemi

**1 Corresponding Author:** Volkan Yavaş (Asst. Prof. Dr.), Ege University, Aviation HVS, Civil Aviation Management, Izmir, Türkiye. E-mail: volkan.yavas@ege.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0002-4237-6386

**2** Ferhan Kuyucak Şengür (Prof. Dr.), Eskişehir Technical University, Faculty of Aviation and Astronautics, Aviation Management, Eskişehir, Türkiye. E-mail: fkuyucak@eskisehir.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0001-7737-851X

**3** Armağan Macit (Lec. Dr.), Ege University, Aviation HVS, Civil Aviation Management, Izmir, Türkiye. E-mail: armagan.macit@ege.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0002-5694-8285

**To cite this article:** Yavas,V., Kuyucak Sengur, F., & Macit, A. (2023). *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 217–237. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1283916>

## Introduction

The year 2020 is one of the most striking years in recent history. The main reason for this is that the entire world meets one common agenda point: Covid-19. Pandemic diseases have existed in various periods of human history, becoming much more effective in the last century with improved transportation opportunities. It seems that the increasing desire of people to respond to these opportunities is an indicator that pandemics will appear as a problem in the future (Tatem et al., 2012). The transportation sector has a high impact on the spread of several diseases. Looking to the past, unfortunately, air transportation is one of the main actors of transmission of influenza and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) disease, so considering and taking precautions is a vital issue to prevent, control, or monitor the present and future pandemics (Tatem et al, 2012). Similarly, at the beginning of the pandemic, air transport also played a central role in the spread of the coronavirus (Sun et al., 2020). As in the past, today, and even in the future, with the help of air transportation, people who can easily move around the world will be the main factors in the spread of these pandemics.

Since the 1920s, people have been aware of the risk of spreading pandemics by air transport, but have not taken any action for a long time. The first attempt was made with the First International Congress Sanitary Aviation in 1929, followed by the First International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation in 1933. New rules and regulations have been established for aircraft and airports in the face of potential diseases, such as cholera, smallpox, yellow fever, plague, and typhus (Budd, Bell, and Warren, 2011). Following this congress, the second one was held in Madrid in 1933, the third in Brussels in 1935 and a similar one in Paris in 1938, and as a result of all these conferences, a cooperation was established to discuss and research many infectious diseases, especially Cholera (ICAO, 2021). Beside these, “Guide to Hygiene and Sanitation in Aviation” signed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and World Health Organization (WHO) in 1960, is one of the most symbolic agreements regarding aviation and pandemic awareness. With this guide, which has been updated since then, standards for protecting passengers and employees from pandemics have been established for all aviation stakeholders (ICAO, 2021).

The Covid -19 (Coronavirus Disease) has severe economic, social, and political consequences for the aviation sector as well as many other industries. From the beginning of the pandemic, it was observed that the initial reaction was for airlines to suspend passenger flights. Although practically all passenger flights have been grounded, freight and first-aid flights, often known as country rescue flights, have continued (Kilic et al., 2021). The SARS outbreak, which resulted in annual reductions (revenue passenger kilometers (RPKs) by 8% and USD 6 billion revenues for Asia/Pacific airlines), was recovered in six months. In March 2020, at the very beginning of the pandemic, the impact of Covid-19 surpassed the 2003 SARS outbreak, and it was obvious that the recovery path of Covid-19 would be very different from that of SARS (ICAO, 2022). The Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in an extended period of instability, making the future unclear (Kim and Sohn, 2022). Governments have been trying to cope with the devastating social and economic effects of pandemics. Short and long-term policies are being developed to eliminate the pandemic with the least damage and to get rid of its negative effects. However, the effects



of diseases on every part of society make it impossible to formulate policies without community contribution (Huang, 2020). Therefore, policies created by public institutions should be supported, fed, and directed by non-governmental organizations (Kulczyński et al., 2017; Watterson, 2020).

The Air travel has an inherent cross-border nature and demands legal obligations between countries. Unlike many other industries, which grew nationally first and subsequently spread to other nations, the civil aviation industry has always been globalized in nature. Safe and secure air navigation and international air transportation require standardized equipment, infrastructure, and operating procedures. The ICAO, established after World War II, is a specialized organization of the United Nations (UN) responsible for the global regulation of international civil aviation safety, security, communications, and technical aspects. (Kuyucak & Vasigh, 2012). In addition to the ICAO and national authorities, other regional or international organizations, such as the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), regulate civil aviation. Furthermore, some other associations, such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA), which represents the member airlines and Airports Council International (ACI), are very impactful, especially regarding commercial issues in air transport. The influence of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on the technical and economic regulation of international air transport is extremely high. Therefore, in air transportation, which is one of the sectors most affected by Covid -19, we assume that IGOs and NGOs also have a profound direct effect on the normalization processes of the sector.

In this sense, the following questions inevitably emerge.

- What has been the response of NGOs and IGOs in the aviation industry to the pandemic?
- How much impact did the reactions they put forth and the policies they proposed have on the industry during the pandemic?

In this study, we examine in depth the fight of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations against Covid -19 in the air transport sector. By examining the policies proposed by these organizations, we focus on new policy proposals that may favor air transport.

### **Literature Review**

It is a fact that the transportation sector and transportation modes have had an undeniable effect on the spread of pandemics throughout the history of the world. Especially with the Covid -19 pandemic, research and news revealing the positive/negative effects of the transportation sector have come to light. This relationship has become an increasingly important subject of academic research. To reveal this and to highlight the academically examined aspect of the relationship between the transportation sector and pandemic diseases, a study was conducted in the Scopus database containing the words “transport” and “disease”, and 14246 studies were listed. While approximately 11,000 of these studies cover 60 years in the pre- Covid -19 period, approximately 3000 studies were revealed in the post- Covid -19 period in 2 years.



Figure 1. Keyword Density in Academic Studies Before and After Covid -19

To narrow the academic studies in the context of our research, the “policy” keyword was added to increase the number of studies in the pre- Covid -19 period to 742; post-Covid -19 period studies were narrowed down to 458. These studies were visualized comparatively with Vosviewer software in the context of “author keyword co-occurrence,” as described above. The open spaces and large-volume words in the figure indicate the density of the keywords used. Accordingly, while there were different intensities in the keywords of the studies in the pre- Covid -19 period, the focus of the post-2019 studies on Covid -19 was Covid -19. In all of these studies, the density of the words “policy, public health and transportation” draws attention.

Various extraordinary conditions have been experienced in aviation history and have profoundly damaged the sector. Various pandemic diseases have affected the aviation sector as well as around the world, but none of them have had a devastating effect in such a short time as Covid -19. While it is a new threat globally, it has been the subject of many academic studies in a short time owing to the magnitude of its impact.

While air transport was an important activity in terms of the transportation and tourism industries as well as the global supply chain, there was a dilemma about whether to continue its activities during Covid -19. On the one hand, the supply and distribution of medical supplies, and the return of citizens abroad to their homeland; on the other hand, it was clear that their activities should be stopped in terms of control of the pandemic. At this point, both governments and international authorities, especially the ICAO, have come under economic, social, and legal pressures (Macilree and Duval, 2020).

The impact of Covid 19 on the aviation industry was felt by many stakeholders, and the industry in general suffered. Airports are undoubtedly among the most injured. It is stated that airports should take more careful financial steps to ensure their sustainability in the present and post Covid -19, and operationally, the ability to create terminals that are less crowded and suitable for social distancing are important factors for the future (Serrano and Kazda, 2020). In addition to this, airports utilize two advantages: first, airports take the first step in terms of “biosecurity” with their role as a control mechanism, they can check passengers’ situations by using thermal technology and verbal questionnaires, and second, they can play a role as a sensor and can ensure minimization of general risk (Warren, Bell and Budd, 2010).

Although international aviation authorities have declared that the risk of in-flight transmission of Covid -19 is low, the primary factor in the spread of the pandemic worldwide is air transport. It is also known that if a high rate of vaccination cannot be achieved, there is a small risk of the continuation of sphere spread (Sotomayor-Castillo et al., 2020). However, it is still in demand according to a study on passenger behavior and intention in the Covid -19 pandemic, airlines should do more to turn health and safety, such as the distribution of hygienic medical materials, free of charge kits, mandatory masks, and the use of educational videos (Sotomayor-Castillo et al, 2020).

Certainly, passenger behavior will not be the same, as it applies to the entire transport sector in general. Taking this into account, becoming more prepared for similar scenarios invites many individuals or institutions, from industry officials to governments and authorities, to take action (Subramanya and Kermanshachi, 2020). According to aviation experts, the situations that the sector may face after Covid -19 are shrinkage of the aviation sector, government support may affect competition, new entries to the market in the face of the losses of large carriers, the share of regional airlines may increase, low-cost carriers (LCCs) may experience changes in their target markets, and secondary airports will experience more losses.. It has been summarized that the habituation to the method can reduce business travel and the general fear that comes with the pandemic can also affect leisure travel (Suau-Sanchez et al, 2020).

With Covid -19 having an unprecedented impact, many factors are projected to change operationally and financially in the aviation sector. In parallel, state support for financially struggling airlines is also prominent, and it is crucial to evaluate whether this support will not harm competition but whether it can have a leverage effect for the sector (Abate et al., 2020). During this period, airlines were not able to make network and fleet changes at the desired level owing to various restrictions, but governments started to lift travel restrictions with the vaccine, a step that would bring the sector to the expected level in a shorter time (Deveci et al., 2022). However, at the same time, as the effects of the pandemic wane, the question of whether everything should continue as if it had never happened should also be discussed. To assess the “possibilities” of the post-Covid 19 aviation sector, the sector needs an acceptable degree of transformation; these should be radical changes such as reducing long-distance lines, reducing the use of older aircraft, increasing environmental awareness, and considering financial sustainability (Gössling, 2020).

While efforts to normalize continue, it can also be said that Covid -19 has created an opportunity to make a radical change in the industry. Important recommendations will be for the aviation industry to abandon operationally and environmentally inefficient aircraft and routes, start offering passengers greater flexibility in options such as booking-cancellation, and implement biosecurity practices to protect the health of everyone during and before the flight (Dube et al., 2020). In addition, because covid 19 is a struggle for all , it is stated that the sector and its stakeholders do not have a valid action plan against unusual (disaster, pandemic, etc.) uncertainties and should consider this a priority (Dube et al., 2020).

While Covid-19 undoubtedly created a shock effect on the aviation industry, it was also a symbolic event that revealed how unprepared the industry was for the pandemic and

similar uncertainties. Despite similar situations that may occur after this experience, it is emphasized that the managers should determine a return or recovery strategy, a common strategy language should be developed and standardized for all aviation stakeholders, strategies should be updated with constant vigilance, and real-time adaptation to future transformations should be ensured (Linden, 2021). As of 2023, while the effects of the pandemic in the demanding sector have lost their strength at the international level, it is certain that the expected recovery has not yet been achieved with various effects, such as forcing some of them, fuel costs, and the Russia-Ukraine crisis. At these points, the approaches of NGOs and IGOs will make a difference to ensure the sustainability of international aviation and restore high access to its former power (Dube, 2022).

### **Response of Governments, Organizations and Authorities**

The aviation sector has struggled with various crises and extraordinary developments throughout its history, suffered various injuries and losses, but continued to develop and grow. Unfortunately, its experiences over a period of 120 years since 1903, which is considered the beginning of modern aviation history, did not provide an advantage against Covid-19, which it had to face in 2020. Covid-19, with its economic and psychological factors, has caused great damage in the aviation industry as well as in the whole world, and continues to cause wounds. In addition, the start of the measures taken to combat the pandemic in the aviation sector is also proof of the risk faced by the aviation community (Macit and Macit, 2020). Although it is not one of the main indicators that accelerates the transmission of pandemics threatening public health, it is known that air transport has a great impact on the spread of SARS in 2002, H1N1 in 2009, and MERS in 2012. (Kulczyński et al, 2017). In addition, to prevent or reduce the risk of spreading, all aviation actors, such as airlines, manufacturers, authorities, and professionals, have to take joint action and create awareness of possibilities and precautions (Kulczyński et al., 2017). To close all these wounds and minimize risk, all actors from the smallest stakeholders to the largest authorities show various reflexes. In this section, all the reflexes shown by the sector players and authorities have been compiled. These will be examined under two headings: internal precautions (reflexes of countries and local institutions) and external measures and sanctions (Governance of IGOs and NGOs).

#### **Internal Precautions**

It has been reported that various organizations representing or independent of states are effective in the aviation industry and engage in various activities regarding the Covid-19 process. In addition, independent of IGOs and NGOs, countries and institutions (airlines, airports, etc.) started to take measures when the seriousness of the pandemic was being realized. In the first days of the Covid-19 pandemic, due to the lack of sufficient information despite growing concern about the virus, the responsibility for preventing the spread of the virus was taken by airlines and airports (Davies, 2020). With the increase in awareness and concern about Covid-19, all countries and governments had to apply various restrictions, and the temporary closure of air transportation was a common method. Concordantly, the first step is a pioneering example, as it was applied in China. The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) stopped all operations from/ to Wuhan and informed airline companies for Wuhan International Airports to cancel or reduce operations that ensured “zero departure” (Toczauer, 2020).

In the first days of 2020, the first measures that airlines and airports started to take against coronavirus – probably not thought to have such a devastating effect – were summarized on a continental basis on the Time Magazines Website<sup>1</sup>, and it was stated that optional and simple measures specific to almost all flights with China—mainly from/ to Wuhan—were taken in many countries from Singapore in Asia to the United Kingdom in Europe. Following this, as the threat dimension of the Covid-19 pandemic increased, countries had to make their own move away from organizations. Although these moves vary by country and region, they are mainly stated as travel restrictions (Figure 5) and mandatory health measures (Figure 6). For example, the American aviation authority FAA published health guidance in February 2020 for aviation staff who will crew reciprocal flights with China. In March, he declared that he could impose quarantine or travel restrictions on passengers in all operations across the country (FAA, 2021). In addition to the sanctions imposed by the states, the airlines and airports of these states have begun to take extra measures. For example, according to a study that compiled the responses of airlines in Europe against Covid-19, it is seen that important steps were taken throughout the process, as summarized below (Albers and Rundshagen, 2020; 5):

- All European airlines grounded their fleets, and steps were taken towards downsizing strategies (such as layoffs).
- Although many airlines have decided to reduce their fleets, many have canceled new aircraft orders.
- Some airlines receive or request government support.
- Some airlines penetrate new markets to turn the crisis into an opportunity, whereas others stop their operations and declare bankruptcy.

In addition to these developments, the aviation industry had to take responsibility for combating the pandemic worldwide while dealing with its troubles. Air cargo carriers play a significant role in the supply chain processes of medical goods, such as masks and disinfectants, in the early stage of the pandemic. For example, only Qatar Airways carried medical supplies equal to 500 fully loaded B777s during this period (AviationBenefits, 2020). In addition to the internal measures put forward by some countries and institutions, it was clear that the aviation industry needed more international warnings and precautions.

In the first half of 2021, there was a revival in the air transport sector with the widespread distribution and use of vaccines. In addition to the measures taken and implemented in 2020 (mask, distance, ventilation, etc.), airline companies and airports continue to implement PCR testing requirements, vaccine registration card/ID, and biosecurity practices.

### **External Measures and Sanctions**

In this section, external measures are evaluated under the main headings of NGOs and IGOs. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can be defined as non-state, non-profit, and voluntary membership organizations, while intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are organizations that have priority and are often the only state as members are established by official agreements and have international legal status (Steffek, 2013). While it is known that NGOs have an impact on airlines and airports on various issues,

<sup>1</sup> <https://time.com/5769509/airlines-airports-china-coronavirus-screenings/>

especially environmental factors such as emissions and noise, they are also included in various development plans for the aviation sector (Knudsen, 2002). Accordingly, apart from the legal sanctions imposed by IGOs, it is also possible that NGOs have a say in many issues in the aviation industry. In the case of Covid-19, the approaches of IGOs and NGOs have been evaluated separately under the following headings:

### Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

The evaluation began with IGOs, considering that it is more appropriate to provide legal or compulsory applications prelusively. IGOs can be defined as organizations that have been formed because of various agreements, meet regularly, and whose members are the state and its organizations. The World Trade Organization and United Nations (UN) are the best-known examples (Ingram et al., 2005). In terms of the aviation industry, ICAO, which operates under the United Nations, and bilateral air traffic agreements between countries with each other are examples that can be shown as IGO. ICAO was established as a result of the Chicago Conference signed in 1944, and acts as an intergovernmental organization of the aviation industry, which is supported and managed by national governments (ICAO, 2021). In addition, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is considered an IGO because of its role as a regional integration institution (Runov, 2014). On the other hand, bilateral air traffic agreements – first concluded between France and Germany in 1913 – form a regulatory system for the provision of commercial air services between their territories and, in most cases, beyond (Fifth Freedom of the Air ) made by aviation authorities between the two states (Dempsey, 2017). Within the scope of the Covid-19 outbreak, since worldwide measures are taken into consideration rather than measures between countries, activities and governances of ICAO and EASA have been followed and compiled, as shown in the table below.

Table 1  
*Governance of IGOs' on a Monthly Based*

DATE	NGO	SUMMARY	STATEMENT*
<b>January 20</b>	ICAO	Information	✈ Providing information to all states
	EASA	Information	✈ They suggest encouraging aviation personnel to manage on board and detect infected patients.
<b>February 20</b>	ICAO	State Support	✈ Call for state support to control the pandemic, ✈ Membership and support call for CAPSCA (Collaborative Arrangement for the Prevention and Management of Public Health Events in Civil Aviation) ✈ Effective collaboration and coordination with all stakeholders,
	EASA	Advice	✈ They published a safety bulletin for practical precautions that can be taken to reduce the risk of the spread of the virus to operators and their crews.

DATE	NGO	SUMMARY	STATEMENT*
March 20	ICAO	Urging	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Reviewing emergencies in air traffic services and avoiding unnecessary restrictions,</li> <li>➔ Meticulous implementation of the guidelines published in all operations,</li> <li>➔ Notifying the implemented measures to ICAO,</li> </ul>
	EASA	Directive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ It has issued a safety directive as the first operational measure across Europe to control the spread of the virus.</li> </ul>
April 20	ICAO	Measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Notifying any differences regarding licensing and certification,</li> <li>➔ Sharing all kinds of information regarding the measures taken,</li> <li>➔ To facilitate the flights organized for the return of passengers to their homeland,</li> </ul>
	EASA	Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Following the demands from the industry, an update on cabin ventilation systems was published.</li> </ul>
May 20	ICAO	Guidance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Practices to protect flight crews' health in cargo operations and,</li> <li>➔ Guidelines for the transport of infected human remains by air</li> </ul>
	EASA	Guideline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ It has introduced auxiliary directives to restore aviation activities for all operators</li> </ul>
Jun 20	ICAO	Guidance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Council Aviation Recovery Task Force (CART) report</li> <li>➔ Guidance document on the use of air transport in the public health threat process</li> <li>➔ Bulletin: Updating to guidance about flight corridors</li> </ul>
	EASA	Guideline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ The Aviation Health Safety Protocol has been published for all passengers and personnel for the COVID-19 period</li> </ul>
July 20	ICAO	Guidance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Implementation Package (iPack): standardized guidance for public health</li> <li>➔ Data screen is published to show operational impact</li> </ul>
	EASA	Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Published a service bulletin for ground handling operators and airport representatives</li> </ul>
August 20	ICAO	Outlook Report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Stakeholders' mitigation measures</li> </ul>
	EASA	Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Solution of the airworthiness problems of aircraft returning to flight during the post-pandemic normalization process</li> </ul>
September 20	ICAO	Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Economic impacts on civil aviation</li> <li>➔ Website is launched about questions and answers (Q&amp;A) by all stakeholders' aspect,</li> <li>➔ Website about global COVID-19 airport status and data</li> </ul>
	EASA	Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ An up-to-date platform has been established to follow the changing health measures for all European countries.</li> </ul>
October 20	ICAO	System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ COVID-19 Contingency Related Differences (CCRD) system to use capturing differences about applications</li> </ul>
	EASA	Webinar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Online seminar plans have been shared to prevent the spread of the pandemic and to create an atmosphere of trust in general</li> </ul>
November 20	ICAO	Manual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Published a manual named "Testing and Cross-border Risk Management Measures" developed by CAPSCA.</li> <li>➔ Announced an update of CART's, which was previously published for the normalization of air transport.</li> </ul>
	EASA	Guidelines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Published two guidelines on air operations and flight crew during the ongoing pandemic process</li> </ul>







prepared to summarize the actions in 2020, the worst year ever. Both authorities (the ICAO and the WHO) inevitably had to continue to share information periodically in 2021 as of 2020. However, as 2020 is a critical year for the existence and sustainability of the commercial air transport sector, it was thought that it would be more appropriate to tabulate the data for that year. As summarized in the table above, although the knowledge and awareness of the relevant authorities about the Covid-19 pandemic increased in 2020, their reactions have generally been shaped according to instant situations. As of 2021, all the information learned during the pandemic process is shared with relevant stakeholders in a more compact, accessible, and understandable way. In this sense, by creating a website, the ICAO gathered all the information, documents, and documents related to the Covid-19 process in a single place, and shared them with the public. The EASA also shared information and documents related to the website<sup>3</sup> it created in a very similar way from a single place. Authorities continue to share up-to-date information and data from relevant websites<sup>4</sup>.

### Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

In addition to organizations representing countries, organizations are independent of states representing certain professional groups or specific areas in the aviation sector. To express the most general and inclusive definition, NGOs are expected to be completely or largely independent from the state, operate for various purposes, and have a voice in various fields whose primary purpose is not commercial activities (Willett, 2010). In the aviation sector, the concept of an NGO is used from professional employees' associations in the national sense to commercial aviation enterprise unions, which can be evaluated in a wide range of organizations such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and Airports Council International (ACI), which lead the aviation industry.

The following definition, which was updated in 1950 in Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations, can be given as an example as a basis for this wide spectrum, “*Any international organization which is not created by intergovernmental agreement shall be considered as a non-governmental organization for the purposes of these arrangements*” (Lindblom, 2005).

Table 2  
*Brief Governance of NGOs on a Monthly Based*

DATE	NGO'S	STATEMENT*
January 20	IATA	➔ Information: They state that developments are followed meticulously, and members will often receive the most up-to-date information.
	ACI	➔ Advisory: To establish standards and procedures to manage the process with the least risk and to ensure that airports communicate effectively with the relevant authorities.
February 20	IATA	➔ Information: They published a dashboard that conveys details about Covid-19 of all countries around the world.
March 20	ACI	➔ Advisory: By updating the report published in January 2020, ACI calls for much stronger cooperation among airports, airlines, and authorities on the severity of the pandemic.

3 <https://www.icao.int/covid/Pages/default.aspx>

4 <https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-COVID-19-resources>

DATE	NGO'S	STATEMENT*
<b>April 20</b>	IATA	✈ Advisory: They convey the current situation regarding the medical developments emphasized to facilitate the resumption of aviation.
	ACI	✈ Advice: It has published an operational practice manual consisting of a series of recommendations to manage Covid-19 at airports.
<b>May 20</b>	IATA	✈ Roadmap: published a document on biosecurity measures with a view to normalization in aviation.
<b>Jun 20</b>	IATA	✈ Information: published a platform of travel regulations / restrictions for all regions around the world.
<b>July 20</b>	IATA	✈ Updating: shared information on possible scenarios by publishing an up-to-date forecast for global passenger numbers.
<b>August 20</b>	IATA	✈ Advisory: Medical strategies are presented for normalization during the pandemic process.
	ACI	✈ Advisory: published an update on the impact of the global pandemic on airports.
<b>September 20</b>	IATA	✈ Call: issued a call to stakeholders to prepare for distribution processes following vaccination studies.
	ACI	✈ Announcement: they have started work on the "Airport Health Measures Audit" program to accelerate and support the return of airports to normal.
<b>October 20</b>	IATA	✈ Information: they provide information with helpful visuals and videos for travel during the ongoing pandemic process.
<b>November 20</b>	IATA	✈ Information: They published an economic assessment of the industry's current visibility and future.
	ACI	✈ Program: it has been introduced to improve aviation security and save airports worldwide, as a partner with ICAO.
<b>December 20</b>	IATA	✈ Information: They published an economic assessment for all Europe Country during Covid-19.
	ACI	✈ Analyze: They published an analysis revealing the impact of Covid-19 on the airport industry.

\*The table above has been created by compiling and summarizing the documents published on the websites of the relevant institutions by the authors.

In the table that conveys the status of NGOs, it is seen that the IATA and ACI follow recognition, understanding, and acceptance processes similar to IGOs. Subsequently, information and updates regarding the situations encountered by the sector and what needs to be done for normalization come to the fore. Similarly, in summer, standard measures have been proposed to contain the pandemic globally. The economic and operational effects of Covid-19 were analyzed in the last months of the year.

As shown in the table on IGOs, the table above includes information on 2020, when the pandemic was the most destructive and effective. As of 2021, the relevant authorities have continued their sharing on the subject. During this period<sup>5</sup>, the IATA compiles the information obtained throughout 2020 and provides a wide range of free information for passengers from mask use to travel restrictions by 2021, similar to IGOs. It also provides reference information for all stakeholders regarding the travel process and operational management during the pandemic. The ACI also provides a guidance document in which businesses provide best practice examples of the process of resumption in the short term and recovery in the long term, and for businesses to pass this process as strongly as possible<sup>6</sup>. In addition, as with other authorities, the ACI prepared a website and opened

5 <https://www.iata.org/en/programs/COVID-19-resources-guidelines/>

6 (<https://store.aci.aero/product/aviation-operations-during-COVID-19-business-restart-and-recovery-version-1/>).

access to all information and documents regarding the Covid-19 process for airports directly<sup>7</sup>.

### **Discussion and Policy Recommendations**

With the Covid-19 pandemic, different experiences, governance, and policies have been involved in the pandemic management of the world, from governments to international authorities. Some countries and regions want to manage the pandemic control process with softer measures, whereas others have opted for a much tougher and more precise method. In general terms, it has been seen that many positive and negative experiences were obtained, and governments and authorities that we could analyze correctly had a relatively successful pandemic control process. One such example is the South Korean government. With their experience gained from their failures in the MERS pandemic, it has sought to organize common governance and policy with all stakeholders, especially with the voluntary support of citizens, and has become one of the countries that managed and attracted attention during the pandemic (Moon, 2020).

Recently, when facing an unprecedented global health threat, it is obvious that there have been deficiencies in global health governance. Despite its role as a central authority, the WHO has been found to have insufficient power and resources to respond effectively in a global emergency; thus, there has been a tendency towards a nationalist response rather than a global unity throughout the world. At this point, it is predicted that hard times may come if the world does not choose a global cooperation model by moving away from the understanding of “my country first” in the face of other unexpected global threats that the world may encounter in the future, along with the teachings of Covid-19 (Gostin, Moon, and Meier, 2020).

While the coronavirus has necessarily provided a good opportunity for policy change or renewal for the transportation sector in general, organisations have tended to accelerate their pre-pandemic policies rather than adopt radical action globally because of the stress placed on them by the government and authorities (Marsden and Docherty, 2021). In addition, the number of academic studies examining these and similar situations throughout the transportation sector has increased. One of the current examples is the PASS (P: Prepare–Protect–Provide; A: Avoid–Adjust; S: Shift–Share; S: Substitute–Stop) approach inspired by the railway transport policies in Japan and applied to all modes of transport by generalization proposed for Covid-19 and possible future pandemics (Zhang, 2020).

In the continuation of these examples, when looking at the aviation sector, it can be said that the number of similar studies in practice (sector) and theory (academia) is quite small or scattered. The focus of IGOs and NGOs during the Covid-19 pandemic process has been on the health of people using air transport, minimizing the risk of transmission, the safety of airlines and airports, and the effects of Covid-19. Since the beginning of the pandemic, efforts have been made to manage the crisis created by Covid-19. Airline and airport precautions, restrictions, and the provision of significant information have been very effective in process management. Although IGOs have revealed the effects of the pandemic on the aviation sector, their strategy proposals for aviation enterprises have

---

7 <https://aci.aero/advocacy/health/COVID-19/>

been quite limited. Although it has been emphasized that support should be given to the aviation sector, especially government support, there is no suggestion as to which methods and how long this support should be provided. In addition, the greatest strength of IGOs is to establish intergovernmental cooperation in a way that can protect the interests of each member. For this reason, it was possible to harmonize the temporal changes between countries in terms of travel restrictions so that controlled travel could be sustainable on certain routes, especially without disrupting the supply chain. With more than 192 members, the ICAO managed the green corridor creation processes of the countries. To solve the significant restriction in air traffic, especially in the closed European airspace, countries with controlled cases could be brought to the fore in air transportation.

Many studies have shown that coronaviruses have various mutations and different effects. For this reason, IGOs will need to make plans for the future based on the experiences they have gained in the process. In this context;

- To mediate the provision of a participatory and collaborative management between countries.
- To determine support strategies for the aviation sector for governments.
- Identifying the impact and directing support for all areas of the aviation industry.
- To contribute to the necessary legal regulations in the new normal process.
- To identify the risks posed by non-member countries for air transport during the pandemic.
- To develop processes that will increase the readiness of all aviation enterprises, especially countries, to all biological risks.
- To conduct studies to prevent supply chain disruptions due to possible pauses in air transportation.
- To be able to work for governments to adopt and standardize the same practices
- To organize a conference that will emphasize the importance of Covid-19 in the history of aviation, leave a mark, and ensure the unification of national studies and signing decisions as a convention may be policies that should be focused on in the future.

When evaluated by NGOs, important consultancy services were provided during the pandemic. Guidelines were created for airports and airlines. In general, the focus is on the risk of the medical transmission of a disease. This situation is a common aspect of IGOs. They attempted to determine the effects of Covid-19 on NGOs. However, NGOs have limited strategies for eliminating general business-oriented problems. Since the IATA and ACI are direct members of airports and airlines, they are expected to provide effective strategic advice to businesses. Airlines and airport operators need to find solutions to the crises they have experienced by being affected by the pandemic and ensure the management of the sectoral recovery process. In this context;

- Strengthen businesses by encouraging intensive cooperation among member businesses.
- Ensure the recovery of airport operators by planning the densities of airports in a way that temporarily reduces competition.

- Ensure the recovery of airlines by planning airline flight networks in a way that temporarily reduces competition.
- Ensure standardization in the fight against Covid-19 disease of member enterprises (use of disinfection materials with the same content and cleaning time, etc.).
- Evaluate the pandemic period as a digital adaptation process for airlines and airports.
- Policies, such as evaluating the pandemic process (airlines updating canceled aircraft orders for sustainability) can be implemented to establish sustainability policies.

In addition to the various recommendations given above, unfortunately, it should not be overlooked that there are some threats that aviation stakeholders should pay attention to and the importance of measures to address them. During the pandemic period, various fraud and forgery allegations regarding the tests required before flights came to light. As a precautionary measure, it should be taken into consideration that a global health verification system may be important, and the benefits of developing it with the cooperation and leadership of NGOs and IGOs and technology should be supported (Wandelt et al. 2023).

### **Conclusion**

Considering the disruptive effect of Covid-19, it is estimated that the losses caused by the pandemic were higher than the total effect of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the global financial crisis in 2008, and the volcanic eruption in Iceland in 2010. The main reason for the decrease in revenues in the sector is the anxiety and suspicion that the pandemic will increase among passengers (Mehta, 2020).

In addition to the restrictions and warnings of NGOs and IGO, the changing behavior of passengers due to the pandemic has been another serious negative reason for airlines and airports. With all these factors coming together, it has become difficult for aviation enterprises to ensure sustainability. With the aviation industry trying to survive the devastating effect of Covid-19, the first known serious bankruptcy report came from the British airline FLYBE, which was also prominent with controversial government support news (Fortune, 2020). Subsequently, many aviation enterprises had to fight various financial and operational crises. At this point, various questions have been raised regarding the principle of equality in a competitive environment. While Covid-19 has had a significant impact on all stakeholders in the sector, in dealing with financial crises, governments also consider the criticism that support is mostly provided to state-owned stakeholders, which is important for the financial sustainability of aviation and its stakeholders (Sun et al., 2022a).

It is noteworthy that a study compiled and summarized the consequences of restrictions imposed by NGOs, IGOs, and governments worldwide. According to the study, it was stated that the restrictions, together with the anti-contamination medical measures (masks, disinfectant, hygiene, etc.), would only produce a moderately meaningful result; otherwise, they would have a modest effect, and it was also revealed that despite the restrictions, many passengers travel without the virus detected (Chinazzi et al., 2020). This reveals the main aim of this study.

The approaches of IGOs and NGOs in the Covid-19 process, and the aviation industry are very important in terms of the sustainability of the aviation industry and the protection of public health against similar threats. In this sense, it would be a good strategy for all stakeholders in the industry to analyze the Covid-19 process well and use this data to prepare future scenarios. Although the measures and recommendations put forward by IGOs and NGOs throughout 2020 and in the first half of 2021 are “well-intentioned” steps to protect human health and restore the aviation industry, the industry can always respond to such uncertainties in the long run. It is vital to make strategic plans in which they will be able to show reactions. However, at this point, it is important that the sector’s memory and reactions against such situations are not instantaneous or situational, but strategically applicable. In a related study, the Ebola and Covid periods were compared, and it was stated that the aviation industry developed instant or situational reactions and strategies in both events, and it was seen that it forgot the relevant experiences until the next crisis, and it was predicted that it could forget. For this reason, it is important for policymakers to keep contingency plans ready and constantly update them (Aşçı et al., 2022).

To ensure the sustainability of the aviation industry, it should be one of the first goals of the managers in the industry to prepare various scenarios in which the duties and responsibilities of all stakeholders, from airlines to airports and from governments to authorities, are determined in general terms by using the processes and data learned from Covid-19 cumulatively along with previous pandemics. Despite the many negative situations experienced during the pandemic, lessons will be learned and are expected to be learned. In addition, the pandemic will reveal various opportunities. While it is known that entry into the market in the aviation industry in the traditional sense is difficult and rigid, it should not be ignored that this may soften during the pandemic and that new initiatives may be a chance for the sustainability and transformation of the sector (Sun et al., 2022b). Another important lesson to be learned from the pandemic is the need to protect financial buffer reserves between the consequences of possible disasters/pandemics and the need for chambers. In this regard, perhaps the involvement of local governments or international structures with a recommendation or a community throughout its duration creates positive momentum (Dube, 2022).

This study had several limitations. Efforts were made to collect up-to-date information during the study period, but since there were frequent changes in that period, there may have been various deficiencies.

Since the study was carried out through academic studies and websites of relevant institutions, it may be beneficial to support it with expert opinions or the perceptions and thoughts of users/passengers. In future studies, developing the theoretical knowledge and secondary data set forth in this study by supporting it with current quantitative data and revealing the ‘human (employee and passenger)’ perspective in the sector will enable us to obtain more important results. In addition, although the Covid-19 pandemic seems to be over as of 2023, there is still information pollution about the sub-types of Covid and the possibilities of another possible pandemic from various parts of the world. In this case, it is important for policymakers to understand and implement that it is a signal to take steps towards possible unexpected situations in the future and to continue the work.

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The authors declared that this study has received no financial support.

**Author Contributions:** Conception/Design of study: F.K.Ş., V.Y. A.M.; Data Acquisition: V.Y. A.M., F.K.Ş.; Data Analysis/ Interpretation: V.Y. A.M., F.K.Ş.; Drafting Manuscript: A.M., V.Y., F.K.Ş.; Critical Revision of Manuscript: F.K.Ş., V.Y. A.M.; Final Approval and Accountability: F.K.Ş., V.Y. A.M.

## References

- Abate, M., Christidis, P., & Purwanto, A. J. (2020). Government support to airlines in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. *Journal of air transport management*, 89, 101931.
- ACI (2020), ACI World issues guidance on global communicable disease transmission, <https://aci.aero/2020/01/24/transmission-of-communicable-diseases/>
- ACI (2020), Airport Operational Practice – Examples for Managing COVID-19, <https://store.aci.aero/product/airport-operational-practice-examples-for-managing-covid-19/>
- ACI (2020), The impact of COVID-19 on the airport business, <https://store.aci.aero/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/COVID19-4th-Economic-Impact-Advisory-Bulletin.pdf>
- Albers, S., & Rundshagen, V. (2020). European airlines' strategic responses to the COVID-19 pandemic (January-May, 2020). *Journal of air transport management*, 87, 101863.
- Aşçı, H. B., Koçak, R. D., Dalmiş, A. B., & Göçmen, F. D. (2022). Managing Ebola and covid-19 crises for aviation industry: did industry learn how to learn?. *Revista de Investigaciones Universidad del Quindío*, 34(1), 6-20.
- AviationPros (2020), ACI World Publishes Year-end COVID-19 Economic Impact Analysis, <https://www.aviationpros.com/aircraft/business-general-aviation/press-release/21165679/airports-council-international-aciworld-aci-world-publishes-year-end-covid19-economic-impact-analysis>
- Budd, L., Bell, M., & Warren, A. (2011). Global health governance in the UK: airport regulation and the mobile body. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Early View, Published online*, 10(1), 11.
- Davies W. (2020), “Airlines and Airports Across the World Are Working to Limit the Spread of Deadly Coronavirus. Here’s What to Know”, <https://time.com/5769509/airlines-airports-china-coronavirus-screenings/> 27.11.2020
- Deveci, M., Çiftçi, M. E., Akyurt, İ. Z., & Gonzalez, E. D. S. (2022). Impact of COVID-19 pandemic on the Turkish civil aviation industry. *Sustainable Operations and Computers*, 3, 93-102.
- Dube, K., Nhamo, G., & Chikodzi, D. (2021). COVID-19 pandemic and prospects for recovery of the global aviation industry. *Journal of Air Transport Management*, 92, 102022.
- Dube, K. (2022). Emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic: aviation recovery, challenges and opportunities. *Aerospace*, 10(1), 19.
- EASA (2020), Aviation Industry Charter for COVID-19, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/aviation-industry-charter-covid-19>
- EASA (2020), Coronavirus - Advice for airlines and their crews, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/general-publications/coronavirus-advice-airlines-and-their-crews>
- EASA (2020), COVID-19 Travel Information, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/covid-19-travel-information>
- EASA (2020), EASA issues safety directive to combat spread of COVID-19 via airline travel, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/easa-issues-safety-directive-combat-spread-covid-19-airline-travel>
- EASA (2020), EASA issues SIB with recommendations in response to Coronavirus ‘2019-nCoV’ outbreak, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/easa-issues-sib-recommendations-response-coronavirus-2019-ncovoutbreak>
- EASA (2020), EASA published Guidelines for Use of Cargo Tracking Devices in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/easa-published-guidelines-use-cargo-tracking-devices-relation-covid-19>
- EASA (2020), Health Measures - Europe and Beyond, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/community/topics/health-measures-europe-and-beyond>
- EASA (2020), Provision of ground handling services at aerodromes following COVID-19 outbreak, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/provision-ground-handling-services-aerodromes-following-covid-19-outbreak#group-easa-downloads>
- EASA (2020), Travellers should not be treated as high-risk for COVID-19 – ECDC/EASA guidelines say, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/press-releases/travellers-should-not-be-treated-high-risk-covid-19-ecdceasa>
- EASA (2020), Updated COVID-19 Safety Information Bulletin with clarification on recommendations relating to fans for recirculation of air, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/news/updated-covid-19-safety-information-bulletin-clarification-recommendations>



- EASA (2020), Webinars on Support Programmes: Panel 3/4 - Building trust and importance of confidentiality, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/newsroom-and-events/events/webinars-support-programmes-panel-34-building-trust-and-importance>
- EASA (2021), Contamination of Air Data Systems During Aircraft Parking and / or Storage due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/sib-2020-14.pdf>
- EASA (2022), COVID-19 Aviation Health Safety Protocol Operational guidelines for the management of air passengers and aviation personnel in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, <https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/downloads/114674/en>
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2022. Effects of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) on civil aviation: economic Impact Analysis. Montréal, Canada. <https://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/COVID-19/ICAO%20COVID%202022%2003%2008%20Economic%20Impact%20Toru%20Hasegawa.pdf> (Accessed 18 January 2022).
- FAA (2020), 2019 Novel Coronavirus: Interim Health Guidance from the Federal Aviation Administration and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for Air Carriers and Crews, [https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/other\\_visit/aviation\\_industry/airline\\_operators/airline\\_cert/CDC%20FAA%20airline%20guidance.pdf](https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_cert/CDC%20FAA%20airline%20guidance.pdf)
- FAA (2020), Considerations for State, Local, and Territorial COVID-19 Restrictions That Impact Air Transportation, <https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/considerations-state-local-and-territorial-covid-19-restrictions-impact-air-transportation>
- Fortune (2020), The coronavirus is officially claiming its first corporate casualties, <https://fortune.com/2020/03/05/coronavirus-flybe-bankruptcy-aviation-luminous-cruising/>
- Gostin, L. O., Moon, S., & Meier, B. M. (2020). Reimagining global health governance in the age of COVID-19. *American Journal of Public Health, 110*(11), 1615-1619.
- Gössling, S. (2020). Risks, resilience, and pathways to sustainable aviation: A COVID-19 perspective. *Journal of Air Transport Management, 89*, 101933.
- Huang, I. Y. F. (2020). Fighting COVID-19 through government initiatives and collaborative governance: the Taiwan experience. *Public Administration Review, 80*(4), 665-670.
- IATA (2020), Cabin Air & Low Risk of On Board Transmission, <https://www.iata.org/en/youandiata/travelers/health/low-risk-transmission/>
- IATA (2020), COVID-19 Government Public Health Mitigation Measures, <https://www.iata.org/en/programs/COVID-19-resources-guidelines/covid-gov-mitigation/>
- IATA (2020), COVID-19 Travel Regulations Map\* (powered by Timatic), <https://www.iatatravelcentre.com/world.php>
- IATA (2020), Deep Losses Continue Into 2021, <https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-11-24-01/>
- IATA (2020), European Air Transport COVID-19 Impacts and Recovery to be Worse than other Regions, <https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-12-10-01/>
- IATA (2020), IATA Outlines Layered Approach for Industry Re-Start, <https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-05-19-01/>
- IATA (2020), Precautions to Take when Flying, <https://www.iata.org/en/youandiata/travelers/health/precautions-to-take-flying-by-air-in-covid-times/>
- IATA (2020), Restarting aviation following COVID-19 Medical evidence for various strategies being discussed as at 27 April 2020, <https://www.iata.org/contentassets/f1163430bba94512a583eb6d6b24aa56/covid-medical-evidence-for-strategies-200421.pdf>
- IATA (2020), Restoring Aviation During COVID-19, <https://www.iata.org/contentassets/f1163430bba94512a583eb6d6b24aa56/covid-medical-evidence-for-strategies-200806.pdf>
- IATA (2020), Statement on Coronavirus Outbreak in Wuhan (China), <https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-01-25-01/>
- IATA (2020), The Time to Prepare for COVID-19 Vaccine Transport is Now, <https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-09-09-01/>
- ICAO (2020), Aviation and COVID-19, <https://www.icao.int/Security/COVID-19/Pages/default.aspx>
- ICAO (2020), Effects of Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) on Civil Aviation: Economic Impact Analysis, [https://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/COVID-19/ICAO\\_Coronavirus\\_Econ\\_Impact.pdf](https://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/COVID-19/ICAO_Coronavirus_Econ_Impact.pdf)
- ICAO (2020), EUROPEAN STAKEHOLDER MITIGATION MEASURES / OUTLOOK, <https://www.icao.int/EURNAT/Documents/EURNAT-Stakeholders-COVID19-MitigationMeasures.pdf>, 13.11.2020
- ICAO (2020), Global Covid-19 Airport Status, <https://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/COVID-19-Airport-Status.aspx>
- ICAO (2020), ICAO Council endorses new updates to COVID-19 global aviation recovery guidelines, <https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/ICAO-Council-endorses-new-updates-to-COVID19-global-aviation-recovery-guidelines.aspx>
- ICAO (2020), ICAO COVID-19 MITIGATION MEASURES, <https://www.icao.int/EURNAT/Documents/ICAO-COVID-19-MitigationActions.pdf>, 06.11.2020
- ICAO (2020), ICAO Global Aviation Security Symposium 2020 (AVSEC2020), <https://www.icao.int/Meetings/AVSEC2020/Pages/default.aspx>

- ICAO (2020), Implementation Package (iPack), <https://www.icao.int/secretariat/TechnicalCooperation/Pages/iPACK.aspx>
- ICAO (2020), New ACI-ICAO qualification programme to enhance aviation safety, COVID-19 response worldwide, <https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/New-ACI-ICAO-qualification-programme-to-enhance-aviation-safety-COVID19-response-worldwide.aspx>
- ICAO (2020), New manual issued on COVID-19 testing and cross-border risk management, <https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/New-manual-issued-on-COVID19-testing-and-cross-border-risk-management.aspx>
- ICAO (2020), Proposed High-level Conference on COVID-19 (HLCC 2021), <https://www.icao.int/Security/COVID-19/EBandSL/Proposed%20High-level%20Conference%20on%20COVID-19-EN.pdf>
- ICAO (2021), The Postal History Of Icao: Icao and the World Health Organization, [https://applications.icao.int/postalhistory/icao\\_and\\_the\\_world\\_health\\_organization.htm](https://applications.icao.int/postalhistory/icao_and_the_world_health_organization.htm)
- ICAO (2022), Operational Impact on Air Transport, <https://data.icao.int/COVID-19/>
- Kilic, D., Polat, G., & Sengur, F. (2021). Havayolu İşletmelerinin COVID-19 Pandemi Sürecindeki Yönetmelik Tepkileri Üzerine Bir Araştırma. *Uluslararası Yönetim İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi*, 17(2), 353-377.
- Kim, M., & Sohn, J. (2022). Passenger, airline, and policy responses to the COVID-19/COVID-19 crisis: The case of South Korea. *Journal of air transport management*, 98, 102144.
- Knudsen, F. B. (2002). Defining sustainability in the aviation sector. *development*, 25, 83.
- Kulczyński, M., Tomaszewski, M., Łuniewski, M., & Olender, A. (2017). Air transport and the spread of infectious diseases. *World Scientific News*, 76, 123-135.
- Kuyucak, F. and Vasigh, B. (2021) "Civil Aviation", in Encyclopedia of Globalization, Eds: Anheier, H. K., Juergensmeyer, M., & Faessel, V. (2012).. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Linden, E. (2021). Pandemics and environmental shocks: What aviation managers should learn from COVID-19 for long-term planning. *Journal of Air Transport Management*, 90, 101944.
- Macilree, J., & Duval, D. T. (2020). Aeropolitics in a post-COVID-19 world. *Journal of Air Transport Management*, 88, 101864.
- Macit, A., & Macit, D. (2020). Türk Sivil Havacılık Sektöründe Covid-19 Pandemisinin Yönetimi. *Avrasya Sosyal ve Ekonomi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 7(4), 100-116.
- Marsden, G., & Docherty, I. (2021). Mega-disruptions and policy change: Lessons from the mobility sector in response to the Covid-19 pandemic in the UK. *Transport Policy*.
- Mehta P. (2020), <https://scienceforecastoa.com/Articles/SJAAS-V2-E1-1013.pdf>
- Moon, M. J. (2020). Fighting COVID-19 with agility, transparency, and participation: wicked policy problems and new governance challenges. *Public administration review*, 80(4), 651-656.
- Pegasus (2020), Coronavirus Precautions taken by Pegasus, <https://www.flypgs.com/en/press-room/press-releases/coronavirus-precautions-taken-by-pegasus>
- Runov (2014). <http://www.lldc2conference.org/custom-content/uploads/2014/11/PPP-IRU-GPST-@-UNLLDC-Vienna-05-Nov-2014-Final.pdf>
- Serrano, F., & Kazda, A. (2020). The future of airport post COVID-19. *Journal of Air Transport Management*, 89, 101900.
- Sotomayor-Castillo, C., Radford, K., Li, C., Nahidi, S., & Shaban, R. Z. (2021). Air travel in a COVID-19 world: Commercial airline passengers' health concerns and attitudes towards infection prevention and disease control measures. *Infection, disease & health*, 26(2), 110-117.
- Steffek, J. (2013). Explaining cooperation between IGOs and NGOs—push factors, pull factors, and the policy cycle. *Review of international studies*, 39(4), 993-1013.
- Suau-Sanchez, P., Voltés-Dorta, A., & Cugueró-Escofet, N. (2020). An early assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on air transport: Just another crisis or the end of aviation as we know it?. *Journal of Transport Geography*, 86, 102749.
- Subramanya, K., & Kermanshachi, S. (2021). Impact of COVID-19 on Transportation Industry: Comparative Analysis of Road, Air, and Rail Transportation Modes. In *International Conference on Transportation and Development 2021* (pp. 230-242).
- Sun, X., Wandelt, S., ve Zhang, A. (2020). How did COVID-19 impact air transportation? A first peek through the lens of complex networks. *Journal of Air Transport Management*, 89, 101928.
- Sun, X., Wandelt, S., & Zhang, A. (2022a). Aviation under COVID-19 pandemic: Status quo and how to proceed further?. Available at SSRN 4031476.
- Sun, X., Wandelt, S., & Zhang, A. (2022b). STARTUPS: Founding airlines during COVID-19-A hopeless endeavor or an ample opportunity for a better aviation system?. *Transport Policy*, 118, 10-19.
- Tatem, A. J., Huang, Z., Das, A., Qi, Q., Roth, J., & Qiu, Y. (2012). Air travel and vector-borne disease movement. *Parasitology*, 139(14), 1816-1830.
- Toczauer C. (2020), "'Zero departure' at Wuhan Airport amid coronavirus pandemic", <https://aircargoworld.com/news/zero-departure-at-wuhan-airport-amid-coronavirus-pandemic/> 27.11.2020
- Wandelt, S., Sun, X., & Zhang, A. (2023). On the contagion leakage via incoming flights during China's aviation policies in the fight against COVID-19. *Journal of Air Transport Management*, 108, 102377.
- Warren, A., Bell, M., & Budd, L. (2010). Airports, localities and disease: representations of global travel during the H1N1 pandemic. *Health & place*, 16(4), 727-735.

- Watterson, A. (2020). COVID-19 in the UK and occupational health and safety: predictable not inevitable failures by government, and trade union and nongovernmental organization responses. *NEW SOLUTIONS: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy*, 30(2), 86-94.
- Worldometer (2021), Coronavirus Cases, <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/>
- Zhang, J. (2020). Transport policymaking that accounts for COVID-19 and future public health threats: A PASS approach. *Transport policy*, 99, 405-418.



# SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

## Investigation of Perceptions of Afghan Immigrants Living in the TRA1 Sub-Region within the Scope of International Migration about the Region

Uluslararası Göç Kapsamında TRA1 Alt Bölgesinde Yaşayan Afganistan Uyruklu Mültecilerin Bölge Hakkındaki Algılarının Araştırılması

Asiye Şimşek Ademi<sup>1</sup>, Erkan Oktay<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

The world is experiencing the worst immigrant crisis since the Second World War; millions of people have been displaced and forced to migrate. The immigrant problem, one of the most important consequences of forced migration, is one of the most important issues in the international arena. One of the countries most affected by this problem is undoubtedly Türkiye. The aim of the article is to investigate the phenomenon of migration, which is one of the issues that affect Türkiye the most in the national and international arena, in the context of social acceptance. It is obvious that harsh solutions to the immigrant problem with strict rules are not only inappropriate for humanity but will also deepen the problem rather than solve it, and damage the image of Türkiye in the international arena. Therefore, the most fundamental solution to be developed is to ensure social acceptance through suggestions to be developed on soft ground. This is only possible if immigrants are recognized and their perceptions and efforts are known. In the study, *The Perceptions of Afghan Immigrants living in TRA1 Level 2 (Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt) region about the Region were investigated.*

The study was conducted using the grounded theory method. In this method, the problem is heard directly from the interlocutors and the hypothesis is obtained by analyzing the data obtained. In this study, a data pool was created through in-depth interviews and semi-structured questionnaires with immigrants from Afghanistan living in the TRA1 region, and then these data were analyzed in accordance with the grounded theory method. With the results obtained, it is aimed to make an academic contribution to integration studies by revealing the perceptions of immigrants about the region.

**Keywords:** International Forced Migration, Afghan Immigrants, Social Cohesion, Grounded Theory, TRA1 Region

### Öz

Dünya, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana en ağır göçmen krizini yaşamakta; milyonlarca insan yerlerinden edilerek göçe zorlanmış durumdadır. Zorunlu göçün en önemli sonuçlarından biri olan göçmen sorunu; uluslararası alandaki en önemli konuların başında gelmektedir. Bu sorundan en çok etkilenen ülkelerden biri ise hiç kuşkusuz Türkiye'dir. Makalenin amacı ulusal ve uluslararası arenada Türkiye'yi en çok etkileyen meselelerin başında gelen göç olgusunun toplumsal kabul bağlamında araştırılmasıdır. Göçmen sorununa, katı kurallarla sert bir şekilde getirilecek çözümlerin hem insanlığa uygun olmadığı hem de çözümden ziyade sorunu derinleştireceği ve ülkemizin uluslararası arenadaki imajını zedeleyeceği ortadadır. Bu nedenle geliştirilecek en temel çözüm; yumuşak bir zeminde oluşturulacak önerilerle toplumsal kabulün sağlanmasıdır. Bu da ancak göçmenlerin tanınması, algı ve çabalarının ne yönde olduğunun bilinmesiyle mümkündür. Çalışmada, TRA1 Düzey 2 (Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt) bölgesinde yaşayan Afganistan uyruklu göçmenlerin bölge hakkındaki algıları araştırılmıştır.

Çalışma, temellendirilmiş kuram (grounded theory) yöntemiyle gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu yöntemde sorun direkt olarak muhataplardan dinlenmekte ve elde edilen veriler analize tabi tutularak hipotez elde edilmektedir. Çalışmada da TRA1 bölgesinde yaşayan Afganistan uyruklu göçmenlerle yapılan derinlemesine mülakat ve yarı yapılandırılmış anketlerle bir veri havuzu oluşturulmuş daha sonra temellendirilmiş kuram yöntemine uygun şekilde bu veriler analiz edilmiştir. Elde edilen sonuçlarla göçmenlerin bölge hakkındaki algıları ortaya konarak entegrasyon çalışmalarına akademik katkı sunulması amaçlanmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Uluslararası Zorunlu Göç, Afganistan Uyruklu Göçmenler, Sosyal Uyum, Temellendirilmiş Kuram, TRA1 Bölgesi

**1 Corresponding Author:** Asiye Şimşek Ademi (Lec. Dr.), Atatürk University, International Relations, Erzurum, Türkiye.  
E-mail: asiye.s@atauni.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0002-7725-336X

**2 Erkan Oktay (Prof. Dr.),** Atatürk University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Econometrics, Erzurum, Türkiye. E-mail: erkanoktay@atauni.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0002-1739-3184

**To cite this article:** Simsek Ademi, A., & Oktay, E.(2023). Investigation of perceptions of Afghan immigrants living in the tra1 sub-region within the scope of international migration about the region. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 239–258. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1230033>

## Introduction

The phenomenon of migration is an ancient social reality that humanity has frequently faced in the historical process. Today, this ancient reality emerges as the immigrant problem. Those most affected by this problem, which has become one of the most important issues in the international arena, are undoubtedly the countries that are geographically close to a region of war.

Türkiye has become one of the biggest addressees of the migration problem as it is located between a troubled geography where wars and conflicts are intense and natural disasters affect, and a center of attraction, Europe. The **aim of this study** is to contribute to the 'immigrant problem' in line with the humanitarian aid policy adopted by Türkiye. The most fundamental solution to the immigrant problem today is to ensure social acceptance on soft ground. The study aims to make an academic contribution to integration studies by investigating migrants' perceptions of social acceptance.

Contributing to integration efforts is extremely important in terms of showing the measures that can be taken against the recent increase in anti-immigrant sentiment in the world and Türkiye. One of the most important reasons underlying anti-immigrant sentiments is that societies do not know each other and are mutually afraid of each other. This phenomenon of mutual obscurity is also hindering integration and preventing societies from cohesion. As a result of this, very crucial problems can arise, such as the exclusion and isolation of migrants and even ghettoization. The study analyzes the perceptions of the immigrant community about the region and its people by measuring whether these possibilities exist, and if so, to what extent.

Although Türkiye has a significant immigrant population, Syrian immigrants were the first group to be researched due to the urgency of the war. For this reason, the majority of the studies **in the literature** were conducted for this group. Studies on immigrants from Afghanistan - the second largest group of the world refugees - have remained relatively a minority. In this sense, the study comes to the fore by examining the phenomenon of social acceptance from the perspectives of Afghan immigrants. In addition, Afghan immigrants, unfortunately, have a deep experience of being immigrants due to long years of war, drought and environmental disasters such as air pollution. The study is also valuable in terms of benefiting from the migration experiences of a nation with this experience.

In the selection of the TRA1 Region, the data of the Turkish Immigration Administration was used. According to the report of the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management, as of 2023, the number of immigrants residing in Türkiye is 4 million 893 thousand 752. Considering the nationalities of immigrants living in Türkiye, the table is as follows. Iraq is in the first place; Afghanistan is in the second and Iran is in the third place. Turkmenistan, Syria, Germany, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kazakhstan are the other top 10 countries, respectively. As can be seen, immigrants from Afghanistan are in the second rank in Türkiye. While Istanbul ranks first among the provinces with the highest number of Afghan immigrants in Türkiye, it has been observed that the immigrant population is generally concentrated in large provinces. Although the TRA1 region is not the region with the highest immigrant population in Türkiye, it is the region with the highest density of Afghan immigrant population compared to other immigrants. Therefore, the TRA1 Region was selected in the study.<sup>1</sup>

---

1 <https://www.goc.gov.tr/guncel-veriler#>

**The Grounded Theory Method** will be used in the study. Grounded theory is a method that refers to the place of social phenomena in human perception by referring to human consciousness. In this method, in-depth interviews are conducted with participants about a determined subject and a theory is reached by analyzing the data obtained from these interviews (Merriam, 1998). In short, according to this method, the phenomenon being studied is listened to directly from addressees, and instead of being based on an initial hypothesis, a theory is formed with the results obtained from the data received. In the study, in accordance with the grounded theory method, a data pool will be created and analyzed through in-depth interviews with immigrants from Afghanistan living in the TRA1 region.

## Scientific Background of The Study

### Literature Review

There is a vast literature on the immigrant problem, which has recently increased considerably in the world and Türkiye. There are numerous studies on this issue, especially in sending and receiving countries that are among the most important addressees of the problem. When the migrations from Afghanistan are taken into consideration, the countries where these migrations are made can be mentioned as Pakistan, Iran, Türkiye, the Balkans, Europe and America, with Afghanistan being the region of origin. There are serious studies on the causes and consequences of migration in these countries, which can be referred to as the Afghanistan migration route. For this reason, the study examines examples from Türkiye and the world, particularly the work done by people of Afghanistan.

As a result of the examinations, it has been observed that the literature in Türkiye consists mostly of studies on immigrants from Syria, while studies on immigrants from Afghanistan are relatively few. This study aims to fill this gap. In addition, field research has focused only on the problems of the immigrant community or the reasons for migration, whereas when it comes to integration, the host community's views on immigrants are usually included. This study, however, takes a radical approach, focusing not only on migrants' perceptions of the region or their problems but also on their perceptions of the host society. Because integration is not a phenomenon that can be realized unilaterally, but only with the acceptance of both sides. The study was carried out to fill these two main gaps in the literature.

Since the study was conducted as field research, the main sources are the data obtained from the interviews conducted in the field. In addition, the examination of previous studies on this subject has made significant contributions to the establishment of the scientific infrastructure of the subject and the determination of its subject and scope. For this purpose, an extensive literature review has been conducted and important works on the subject have been examined. Since migration has evolved into an issue that affects almost the whole world, it is possible to find countless sources on this subject. However, given the volume of the article, only the basic works are mentioned. In order for the research to proceed properly, the phenomenon of migration must first be understood. For this reason, in the first stage of the literature review, sources related to the phenomenon of migration

were examined. The main purpose of examining these sources is to ensure that the subject is mastered and to establish the academic mindset for the work to be done. Thus, the researcher was able to study the topic in depth by having a basic conceptual framework. Subsequently, sources related to the theoretical and methodological framework in the field of migration were analyzed. By examining these sources, the theoretical framework of the study was created and information was given about the methodological method to be used in the research. Finally, the sources on immigrants, especially Afghan immigrants, who are the main subject of the research, are analyzed.

*The Sources About Immigration Status;* Clarifying migration and other related concepts is crucial for a proper understanding of these concepts, which are often confused and used interchangeably in terminology. Many concepts related to the phenomenon of migration are interpreted differently and even used interchangeably. For instance, concepts such as asylum seeker, defector, immigrant and migrant are often confused and used interchangeably. Türken Çağlar's work titled *Göç Çalışmaları İçin Kavramsal Bir Çerçeve (A Conceptual Framework for Migration Studies)* has made a significant contribution to our article by preventing this confusion and ensuring the correct use of concepts. In this study, the concepts related to migration are intended to be defined, especially based on the sources of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). A terminology of migration concepts, which is used in the same sense by those interested in the subject, has been produced. This has provided guidance in terms of the concepts to be used in the study.

In scientific terms, the phenomenon of migration affects human life in every field from psychology to sociology, from politics to economy and from international relations to the security of states. The fact that this phenomenon is so comprehensive and affects every aspect of human life necessitates its discussion in the academic field. Today, it is still a controversial issue whether migration should be recognized as a field in its own right or as one of the sub-branches of social sciences. Although it is known that many research centers have been established on this subject, the uniqueness of the subject in scientific terms has still not been revealed. For instance, it is still debatable what the methodology of migration issue will be and whether it will develop a theory unique to itself in the theoretical sense. The most important achievement that this project aims to bring to the academic field is to pave the way for a methodology that will enable migration to produce its own theory on migration. The grounded theory method is the most important method in this regard. In the literature review, the important works that guide the methodological discussions of our study are the studies on this subject.

Due to the complexity of the migration issue, it is important to learn the concepts related to migration. The study focuses on the definitions of these concepts. Knowing these concepts, helped to choose the word to be used throughout the study. *Immigrant*; "who is outside the country of his/her nationality and cannot benefit from the protection of this country because of his/her rightful fear of being persecuted due to his/her political views, or who is undesirable to benefit from that country due to such fear, or if he/she has no nationality and as a result of such events, is outside the country of his/her former residence and cannot return there. or any person unwilling to return because of such fear" (UNHCR, 2020). Türkiye accepted the 1951 Geneva Convention with "geographical



restriction” by using the right to choose in terms of space in its 1st article (Ekşi, 2009: 5). *Asylum-seeker*; It is the protection of a person who does not want to seek the protection of the country he has reached by fleeing from his country because he is oppressed, or who does not want to return to his own country (Papademetriou, 1997:21). In other words, it is the temporary protection of people who have applied to become a immigrant, but whose application has not yet been decided. *Immigrant*; It is defined as a person who moves from another country, place or region for economic and other social reasons (Papademetriou, 1997:21). The word “immigrant” does not have a single legal definition in the international literature. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines immigrants as moving away from their normal place of residence and moving to another direction. The legal status of this mobility, whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary, the reasons for the movement, the duration of stay gain importance (IOM, 2020). *Temporary Protection and Guest ; Temporary protection*; It is an exceptional method used for people who need to be taken under immediate protection in cases where being accepted as an asylum seeker in mass migration events would pose a risk. Thus, with this status, it has emerged as a fast and practical application for people who reach the borders of the country in masses (UNHCR, 2020). *Guest*; asylum seekers who came to Türkiye due to the Syrian civil war that broke out after 2011 were first defined as ‘guests’, but it was understood that they were permanent due to the prolongation of the war, and they were granted temporary protection status with the legislation enacted in 2014 (Düzükaya and Yazıcı, 2017: 445).

The immigrants of Afghanistan who come to Türkiye are under the International Protection regime. There is considerable debate about definitions. Due to the breadth of these discussions, the word immigrant will be used in the study.

*The Sources About Methodology*; The first of the researches that shaped the methodology of the study is Hayriye Erbaş’s book titled ‘*From Departures to Escapes Migration and Migrants Theory Method and Field Papers*’. The author’s book, in which she states that she is in a methodological search on migration, has helped to explore the methodological methods that can be used in the field of migration in a deeper way. In addition, the book’s treatment of migration as a humanitarian crisis and its emphasis on the fact that everyone can be a potential migrant is a very effective way to overcome the prejudices that exist in our society. It will also help to overcome prejudices and increase ways of solidarity with migrants.

*The Discovery Of Grounded Theory Strategies For Qualitative Research*, which examines the grounded theory method used in the study, was written by Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss. According to Glaser and Strauss, an adequate sociological theory cannot be independent of the production process; a research process moves simultaneously with the data on the way to a theory. One of the ways to assess whether a theory is useful is how it is generated, and a better theory is inductively generated from social research. Other criteria are logical coherence, clarity, density, scope, integration, theory workability and relevance. They all depend on how the theory is produced. This book has made a very important contribution to our research. Its contributions, such as conducting and analyzing interviews and using the snowball method, are undeniable. The scientific framework of the research is to examine the issue of migration in factual, conceptual,

theoretical and methodological terms. In the application part of the study, although the data obtained from interviews and semi-structured questionnaires conducted in the field are the main sources, previous field research is also very important in terms of guiding the study. For this reason, previous studies on immigrants are examined in the literature review and the common perceptions of immigrants are attempted to be comprehended. *'We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled'* by Wendy Pearlman is one of the most important recent sources on migration. Wendy Pearlman's book is the most comprehensive work to guide the research. In this book, Pearlman narrates the lives of immigrants in their own words. Because the easiest way to understand a problem is to ask the addressee of the problem. Unfortunately, studies by people who have not been exposed to this problem and who try to interpret them from the outside often lead to criticism rather than understanding. One of the main causes of racism and hostility towards migrants in the world is, undoubtedly, ignorance. Individuals, institutions and organizations that do not have information about migrants, unfortunately, cannot provide a clear solution to the problem when they are in a decision-making position. One of the main aims of this study is to convey the problems in the words of the original addressees of the problems, as Pearlman did. Although this book seems to be about immigrants, most of it is about Syrian political history. It tells the process leading up to the war and its aftermath, in short, what happened during this process through interviews with Syrian citizens. As is well known, the migration problem today is multi-layered and deep. Although the author has extensively interviewed Syrian citizens in Türkiye, Lebanon and Syria and, in his own words, listened to the Syrian citizens themselves, about whom we have always spoken until today, he has difficulty in carrying out a deep analysis of the problem as the focus group is very large. In addition, these people consist of a wide range of professions, from insurgents to imprisoned revolutionaries, from doctors to writers. Although this situation helps us to understand the war in Syria and the process that developed in the aftermath in great detail, it is insufficient to fully understand the issue of migration. The research will be more specific as it will focus on migrants' perceptions of the locality in Türkiye rather than the political course of the war.

*The Sources About Afghanistan and Afghan Immigrants; Aresh Nasrisfahani*, in his work on migration, *'Der Khaneyi Berader (In the house of the brother)'*, examines the situation of Afghan immigrants living in Iran. In this book, which discusses the perspectives towards immigrants and their adaptation to Iran and their society, the main question is why Iran is seen as a brotherly home and why immigrants cannot feel like homeowners. Iran may have welcomed the immigrants but the requirements for full integration have not been considered. This book shows clearly what the obstacles to full integration are. The study examines the problem of migration in depth and examines the problems that immigrants face in terms of adaptation. The main contribution of this book to our research is to provide insights into the future of social cohesion. The main aspect of the book to be criticized is its one-sided perspective. The issue of integration needs a dual perspective. *Migration in Afghanistan: History, Current Trends and Future Prospects: (Katie Kuschminder, Manoj Dora)*; Historically, Afghanistan has been a trading country between east and west and a key point on the Silk Road trade routes. Migration is therefore an integral part of this country's historical identity. This has led to Afghanistan's identity as a 'immigrant-producing country'. The reasons for these migrations vary in

each period: war and conflicts, poor economic situation, Soviet occupation, takeover by organizations such as the Taliban, drought, etc. This is a very comprehensive study on Afghan migrations. The fine details that migrations provide about their causes allow for a broader perspective on migration. For instance, contrary to popular belief, the fact that the study states that not only wars and conflicts but also harsh winter conditions cause seasonal migration from Afghanistan to Pakistan, shows that the study is the product of a very comprehensive research. This book has made an important contribution to the research. It is extremely crucial to have a good grasp of the history of Afghanistan and the issue of migration. Because knowing the main outlines of the subject has guided the interviews (conversations) and increased the depth of the conversations.

### **Research Question and Hypothesis**

At this stage, the research question of the project has been put forward. The research question developed at this stage will be revised as the studies deepen.

#### **Research Question;**

What are the opinions of Afghan immigrants living in the TRA1 Region about the region and how do they perceive the region?

What is the level of satisfaction of Afghan immigrants with the region and its people? Will they stay in the region for a long time?

An in-depth interview method was used to answer the first question. In other words, the participants were asked about their thoughts on the region; the answers were then categorized. For the second question, the participants were asked to rate the general picture that emerged as a result of the interviews. Thus, the degree of satisfaction with the region has also been measured.

### **Scope, Sample and Target Population**

The scope of the study is limited to the TRA1 (Erzurum, Bayburt and Erzincan) region. This region, where the Afghan immigrant population is dense, was chosen to conduct the interviews that guided the research. The reason for choosing this region is the high concentration of immigrants from Afghanistan. The study was conducted in these three provinces and its scope is limited to this region.

Target group; the target group of this research is immigrants from Afghanistan living in the TRA1 region. Ensuring harmony between this group and the local population is essential for the peace and prosperity of the region. For this reason, in-depth interviews with participants were conducted to measure their perceptions of the region. The identification and analysis of immigrants' opinions and sharing them with the immigrants and the people living in the region will contribute to the establishment of an environment of mutual respect, which in turn will contribute to social acceptance. Other important elements of the target audience are the policymakers who are likely to benefit from the research results, especially stakeholders, and the audience that the outputs will reach.

A sample is a group of a smaller number of objects and individuals selected in a certain way from a population (Kaptan, 1998: 118). A set of units or elements that are selected from the research population by any method suitable for the purpose and capable

of representing the population is called sample (Ural and Kılıç, 2011: 23). The sample of this project is the immigrants in the TRA1 population who will be reached with the information provided by the provincial migration administrations. In this qualitative study, the number of people is not important. In interviews with individuals according to grounded theory, researchers continue in-depth interviews until they reach similar answers. This usually happens when data starts to be replicated or when researchers are reasonably convinced that all the data that can be collected from the field has been collected (saturation). The interviews are terminated when the data obtained increases and multiplies with the Snowball method and a similarity is reached. These data will then be categorized. In this study, interviews were conducted with 50 participants and data were obtained.

### **Methodology**

In this study, the ‘grounded theory’ approach, one of the qualitative research methods, was used. According to the grounded theory, social reality cannot be understood objectively by looking at it from a conceptual standpoint, from outside. It can only be understood if it is seen in its own patterns. For this reason, the social spaces of Afghan immigrants who have been subjected to forced migration were entered, interviews were conducted with them and their impressions about the TRA1 region were investigated.

### **Grounded Theory Method;**

Glaser and Strauss, who are considered the founders of this method, state that the method will bring a new breath to qualitative research. According to them, previous qualitative studies have focused on how a theory needs to be validated, but this destroys the individual’s desire to explore and even diminishes the value of the field. Authors, who believe and agree that theory testing is one of the most fundamental issues in sociology, argue that many sociologists have re-discovered the known reality by testing existing theories and have produced almost no theory. (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The authors emphasized that categories are hidden in the raw data and that researchers should be able to conceptualize the data obtained without relying on any theory and reveal the categories hidden in the data (Charmaz, 1995; Glaser and Straus, 1967). In short, they state that in qualitative research, data are collected to test theories; in the grounded theory method that they developed, theories can be generated from data. In other words, a researcher will not test theories that consist of repetition but will try to create their own theory.

In their own words, Glaser and Strauss evaluate the grounded theory methodology as follows:

“Much writing on sociological methods has been concerned with how to obtain the precise information and how to test a theory rigorously. In this book, we have presented how to explore theory from data. We call it the grounded theory. This is a major challenge facing sociology today. In this book, we make an attempt to explore the grounded theory. Instead of strictly demarcated procedures and definitions, we present situations, counter-cases and examples. In this sense, we can say that the grounded theory is “the method of comparative analysis.”” (Glaser and Strauss, as cited in Arik, 2016: 286).

The main aim of our study is to investigate the perceptions about integration, which is one of the main solution models of the migration problem. As stated above, the method

that will enable us to achieve this aim is the grounded theory method. Because the study of perceptions cannot be carried out by looking from a distance or commenting on theories. Undoubtedly the most important way to measure perception is to ask participants for their thoughts. In this method, in-depth interviews will be conducted with the participants and their thoughts on the subject will be asked. In methods with multiple-choice questions such as questionnaires, participants' opinions are restricted, and only answers to the existing questions are obtained. However, in the grounded theory method, participants' will is not restricted, and they are allowed to express their own thoughts. Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of Atatürk University (Date: 05.08.2022, Decision No: 231) before the commencement of the data collection. Informed consent form was obtained from the participants for the study. Researchers do not guide the participants, on the contrary, the participants guide the researchers. Researchers categorize answers given by participants and establish their hypotheses. In short, participants play an active role in all processes, which contributes significantly to the scientificity and factuality of the study. Thus, the main aim of the project, which is to investigate perceptions, is realized in a highly objective manner.

The study will proceed through two main questions; data will not be collected only through the questions asked in the interviews. A short questionnaire will also be organized about the categories created based on the answers given by the participants because the aim of this study is not only to measure the perceptions of immigrants about the region but also to determine their satisfaction levels. In fact, these questionnaires will be constructed in a way that can be a kind of provision of the categories formed in line with the answers given by the first participants. Participants, for instance, generally give categorical answers to the question "How do you perceive the region, how does it feel to live in this region?". For instance, "my perception of the region depends entirely on the behavior of its people". As a result of this answer, the questionnaire question is formulated as "how satisfied are you with the people of the region?". In other words, if someone who says they are very satisfied with the public gives a score of 1 in the questionnaire, it means that the interview was not conducted properly. However, if the answer and the score are in agreement, it can be concluded that the interview is successful. In other words, in a way, it is a kind of verification of the interviews.

### Demographic Structure of The Participants

The study was conducted through in-depth interviews. The interviews were conducted with the participants and then they were asked the questionnaire questions prepared as a result of the first interviews conducted as preliminary research. The number of participants is 50 and their demographic characteristics are as follows:

#### Demographic Structure of the Participants

<b>Gender</b>	Out of a group of 50 participants, 28 are women and 22 are men. In percentage, 56% of the group consists of women and the remaining 44% of the group consists of men.
---------------	---

<b>Age</b>	Of the 50 participants, 13 are between the ages of 18-24, 23 are between the ages of 25-35, 11 are between the ages of 36-55, and 3 are 56 years and older. Participants between the ages of 18-24 constitute 26% of the group, while individuals between the ages of 25-35 constitute 46%, individuals between the ages of 36-55 constitute 22% and individuals over the age of 56 constitute 6%.
<b>Marital Status</b>	Of a group of 50 participants, 30 are married, 9 are single and 11 are widowed. In percentage, 60% of the participants are married, 18% are single and 22% are widowed. Of those who are married, 50% are men and 50% are women. Approximately 55% of singles are women and 45% are men. Approximately 36% of widows are men and 54% are women.
<b>Education Level</b>	Of the 50 participants, 20 are illiterate, 11 are primary school graduates, 3 are secondary school graduates, 12 are high school graduates and 2 are university graduates. 2 people are doing a Master's degree. In percentage, 40% are illiterate, 22% are primary school graduates, 6% are secondary school graduates, 24% are high school graduates, 4% are university graduates, and 4% are doing a Master's degree.
<b>Occupation</b>	Of the 50 participants, 21 are housewives, 7 are workers, 9 were self-employed, 8 are students and 5 are unemployed. In percentage, 42% of the participants are housewives, 14% are workers, 18% are self-employed, 16% are students and 10% are unemployed.
<b>Cities</b>	Of the 50 participants, 20 were selected from Erzurum, 15 from Erzincan and 15 from Bayburt. 40% of the participants participate from Erzurum, 30% from Erzincan and the remaining 30% from Bayburt.
<b>Countries</b>	Of the 50 participants, 42 of them came to Türkiye directly from Afghanistan, while 8 of them migrated to Iran and then came to Türkiye after a certain period of time. In percentage, 84% of the participants are from Afghanistan and 16% are from Iran.
<b>Length of stay</b>	Of the 50 participants, 3 have been living in Türkiye for less than 1 year, 19 for 1-3 years, 1 for 3-5 years, and 27 for more than 5 years. In percentage, 6% of the participants have been living in Türkiye for less than 1 year, 38% for 1-3 years, 2% for 3-5 years and 56% for more than 5 years.

### Findings (Satisfaction Ratings)

Through in-depth interviews with immigrants from Afghanistan; the immigrants' perceptions about the TRA1 Region have been revealed. The data revealing these perceptions were obtained from interviews with 50 participants in accordance with the grounded theory method. Then these data categorized by using the snowball method. As a result of this categorization process, it has been revealed that immigrants perceive the region through six variables. These six variables are, in order of importance, security, public, economic welfare, environmental conditions, local community and working environment. In addition, with a mini-questionnaire, the participants were asked to evaluate the region over these six variables, in other words, to score. Thus, both the participants' perception of the region and their level of satisfaction with the region have been measured.

The most important issue that has come to the fore in the interviews with the participants is security. Since the main reason for international forced migration is security concerns, the majority of immigrants primarily address this issue. Another important issue that has

come to the fore in the interviews is the public services provided in the region. As it is known, public institutions are among the most affected by the war. Due to the reasons such as the damage to buildings like hospitals, schools, etc. in the attacks and the lack of sufficient personnel due to the war, the public has the most difficulties in the procurement of public services. Because of this situation, immigrants pay attention to the provision of these services in the regions where they live. In the interviews, the participants also express their opinions on these services.

The economic welfare level of a country is one of the most important factors affecting citizens' satisfaction. Individuals who migrate for reasons such as unemployment and low living standards due to economic deterioration in their own country tend to evaluate the country they migrate to according to its economic conditions. The interviewees also state that the economy is one of the main factors affecting their lives after security and public services. Although the reasons for migration from Afghanistan are diverse, one of the most important reasons is environmental factors such as drought and air pollution. Immigrants who migrated due to these difficult conditions also evaluated the TRA1 Region in terms of environmental conditions and scored it with questionnaires.

The attitude of the local community is also one of the important issues affecting immigrants. During the interviews, they state that the attitudes of the people are also effective in their perception of the region. Finally, the participants also evaluate their working environments or schools they attended while sharing their observations about the region. Given that most of life is spent in the workplace or at school, it is not a coincidence that they have a significant place in the perceptions of immigrants.

In sum, immigrants generally perceive the region they live in through the six variables listed above. After these categories were obtained, when the immigrants were asked to evaluate the region on these issues, the answers they gave were somewhat verified by the ratings they gave. As a result of the analysis, the participants' perceptions and satisfaction levels about the region are as follows.

### **Satisfaction with the Security of the Region**

The human security approach was first conceptualized in the Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994. There are differences in the definition of the concept because it is easier to detect situations where there is no human security than it is to detect situations where it does exist. Given these circumstances, security against chronic threats such as hunger, disease and oppression, and protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the daily life order are defined as the two main elements of human security. Human security covers global hunger, drug trafficking, climate change, HIV/AIDS, irregular migration and terrorism. In the absence of a global protection mechanism against these ever-present threats, two fundamental changes in the understanding of security are expected. First of all, instead of a security approach based on borders, the importance given to the security of individuals should be increased. Secondly, security should be achieved through sustainable human development rather than through armaments (UNDP, 1994). In the study, the importance of both individual and global security perception is taken into consideration. In sum, human security is an extremely crucial issue and it is essential to ensure human security

in all areas and places. The interviews also reveal that immigrants migrated for security reasons and that they mostly focused on security in the regions they came from. The table below shows the degree of satisfaction of immigrants with the security of the region they live in.

Table 9  
*Satisfaction Level by Satisfaction Type*

Satisfaction Type	Frequency	Satisfaction Level					Total
		Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Not Expressed	Not Satisfied	Not Satisfied At All	
<i>Satisfaction with the Security of the Region</i>	<b>Count</b>	27	13	8	1	1	50
	<b>Percentage</b>	54	26	16	2	2	100
<i>Satisfaction with Public Institutions and Social Services in the Region</i>	<b>Count</b>	16	12	11	10	1	50
	<b>Percentage</b>	32	24	22	20	2	100
<i>Satisfaction with the Economic Welfare Level of the Region</i>	<b>Count</b>	1	4	12	14	19	50
	<b>Percentage</b>	2	8	24	28	38	100
<i>Satisfaction with the People of the Region</i>	<b>Count</b>	17	15	10	3	5	50
	<b>Percentage</b>	34	30	20	6	10	100
<i>Satisfaction with the Working Environment (Schools) of the Region</i>	<b>Count</b>	27	13	8	1	1	50
	<b>Percentage</b>	54	26	16	2	2	100
<i>Satisfaction with the Environmental Conditions of the Region</i>	<b>Count</b>	22	17	8	0	3	50
	<b>Percentage</b>	44	34	16	0	6	100
<i>The overall satisfaction of the participants with the region</i>	<b>Count</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>50</b>
	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>100</b>

As seen in Table 9, the majority of the Afghan immigrants interviewed state that they are satisfied with the security of the region. While 40 out of 50 participants state that they are satisfied with the security, only 2 people are not satisfied and the remaining 8 people do not want to express an opinion. In terms of percentages, 80% of the participants are satisfied with the security of the region, 4% are not, and 16% do not express an opinion.

The majority of the immigrants state that they were not exposed to any practices or acts that jeopardized their safety in Türkiye, where they came after the chaotic situation in Afghanistan, and that they are very satisfied with this situation. In particular, most women state that they feel safe in Türkiye in a wide range of areas, from public security to individual security. As can be seen in the examples below, most of the participants feel safe in Türkiye.

Fatıma<sup>2</sup>, one of the participant women, expresses that she feels safe with the following sentences: *‘I was experiencing very serious problems in Afghanistan. I have been feeling very well since I came to Türkiye. Türkiye is very comfortable’*.

2 Nicknames were used in the study to ensure the privacy of the participants.



It has been observed that the existing laws in Türkiye protect the people of Afghanistan even against their own countrymen. Hediye , one of the women interviewed, says, *“Türkiye is a very safe place, but it would be safer without Afghans. My father killed my mother because I ran away. If he finds out, he’ll kill me too. That’s why I don’t talk to Afghans, so they don’t tell my father”*.

In the interviews, it is observed that men are not as positive as women. This is because they are more involved in the public sphere than women. It is observed that they have problems, especially in terms of occupational safety. Serhat , one of the participants interviewed, states that Türkiye is a safe place in general, but that he has problems in terms of work, especially in terms of salaries, that he did not receive his salary in some workplaces where he worked and that he hesitated to apply to the necessary authorities. *‘When I first came to Türkiye, I was working at a car wash. The owner said business was bad. He started withholding my money. No matter how many times I asked for it, he didn’t give it to me. Where could I go to complain, I was already working illegally. So I quit my job’*.

### **Satisfaction with Public Institutions and Social Services in the Region**

Social work is defined as an applied science that helps people reach an effective level of psycho-social functioning and is used to influence social changes that will increase the well-being of individuals. The principles of human rights and the concept of social justice form the basis of social work. In light of the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, the social work profession aims to provide social welfare and social justice to all citizens of the world regardless of religion, language, race and gender. In the context of this ethical principle, it is an obligation for social work to ensure that migrants live a life worthy of human dignity. Migrants face serious problems in many areas such as health, education, housing, access to employment, language, lifestyle, etc. in the countries they go to. The urgent resolution of these problems depends on the social services provided (İzmirli, 2018).

In the study in which 50 participants participated (Table 9); it is seen that 16 people are very satisfied with the social service of the region, 12 people are satisfied, 11 people do not express an opinion, 10 people are not satisfied, and 1 person is not satisfied at all. In percentage, it is concluded that 56% of the immigrants are satisfied with the social services provided in the region. Almost all interviewees state that education is the area where public services are best provided. Both the parents who send their children to school and the participants who receive education themselves state that they are nearly one hundred percent satisfied with the educational institutions and officials in the region.

Ali, one of the participants, states that his daughter is a primary school student and that he is very satisfied with the education and treatment she received at her school. *‘My daughter is in the fourth grade; she loves her teachers. The teachers love her too. She is very hardworking. The schools here are very good. One day she was absent for a day and they called us immediately and asked why she was absent. That’s why we feel very comfortable, we always know where she is’*.

As a result of the interviews, 22% of the participants state that they are moderately satisfied. They say that while some services are provided well, others are very poor. One

of the participants, Fatma says, *'I am satisfied with hospitals but not with the courts. My husband is a drug addict, his family is after us and I want a divorce. I have been on the case for almost six months and they say it will take another year. Every time I go there, there are some expenses, I cannot pay, I am alone with two little children'*.

As a result of the interviews, it is concluded that the most complained public service is related to hospitals. 22% of the participants are dissatisfied with public services, especially hospitals. The main reasons for this are the lack of insurance, the inability to make online appointments due to language barriers, and the general lack of familiarity with the functioning of hospitals. Serhat , one of the participants interviewed, states that he came to Türkiye three months ago and expresses the problems he experienced in the hospital as he did not know the system of the country in general. *'We came three months ago. I eloped with my wife and we came here for fear of the Taliban. We were allowed to stay because my wife was pregnant and we were not deported. But we had no insurance and we didn't speak the language. We had a very difficult time in the hospital, the procedures were very difficult. There was a Turkish woman next to us and they took her for a caesarean section right away, they kept stalling us. My wife was going to give birth standing up. I comforted her. I said look, that woman is weak, she will have to have a cesarean section, you are strong, you can have a normal birth. Actually, there were problems with the procedures, but I didn't tell her so she wouldn't be scared. I left her for a while and ran to deal with the procedures. Thank God, I got the procedures done and she got into the delivery room'*.

Another important reason for dissatisfaction with the hospitals is the departure of the psychologist assigned to them by the migration administration. Most of the participants, especially women, draw attention to this issue and ask for the reappointment of a psychologist. One of the participants, Musevi , says; *'There used to be a woman named Ayşe. I was taking my daughter to her. Her father had abused her and she had not told anybody out of fear. After he died, my daughter told me about it, so I took her to Ayşe and my daughter slowly started to recover, she gave her some medicines. But now there is no psychologist, the state is directing us to a psychologist in Ankara, we don't know how many months it will take for our turn to come and whether we will be able to get permission. My daughter is now having nightmares again and getting worse again and we don't know what to do. I wish a psychologist would be reassigned to this city'*.

### **Satisfaction with the Economic Welfare Level of the Region**

In terms of economic development, migration can be considered as the mobility of individuals who want to increase their level of human development (Aktaş, 2014: 45). Jacobsen states that immigrants will be less dependent on aid if they are given freedom of movement, facilitated access to resources and work productively with the local people to make a living (Jacobsen, 2002: 95). This will enable immigrants to live in more humane conditions. In fact, it can be said that the main reason underlying the desire to migrate is the desire of individuals to live in better conditions. Therefore, migrants want basic humanitarian conditions to be provided in the countries where they settle. This is also the case for immigrants from Afghanistan. Türkiye is an adequate country in meeting the basic needs of immigrants and providing services in line with the social state approach.

However, the global economic downturn has also affected Türkiye, which undoubtedly has an extremely negative impact on immigrants. In this study, the immigrants, who state that they are satisfied with Türkiye in almost all areas, also express that they have an extremely negative perspective in the field of economy.

Of the 50 participants interviewed (Table 9), only 1 is very satisfied with the economic welfare level of the region, 4 are satisfied, 12 are moderately satisfied, 14 are dissatisfied, and 19 are not satisfied at all. In brief, the degree of satisfaction of immigrants is extremely low. They indicate inadequate social assistance, employment problems and low wages as the most important reasons for this. It is observed that this is mainly due to the economic difficulties experienced during and after the pandemic. 66% of the participants state that their economic difficulties are very serious and that they have difficulty in meeting their basic needs.

Semira (71), one of the participants, states that she had to live alone after the war and the negativities experienced and that she was helped by a young man who is a distant relative. *'My husband and son were martyred in the war. One of my sons is paralyzed and his uncle is taking care of him in Afghanistan. My son, with whom we came here, got married and is in another city. He can barely make ends meet and couldn't take care of me. Thanks to my nephew, he took me in. We are trying to live on Turkish Red Crescent aid, but it is very difficult and everything has become very expensive. We are having trouble'*. Another participant, Şukufe (36), describes her difficulties in the following words. *'I have been here for 11 years and we have never had such a hard time. Even when I first came, we were comfortable, we rented a flat. Now we can't pay the rent. It is difficult to live on the money from the Red Crescent card. It's barely enough for rent and bills'*.

10% of the participants express their satisfaction with the economic prosperity of the region. Those in this group generally consist of people who have an established order and jobs. Puya (45), one of the participants, states that he is a tradesman and lives in good economic conditions with the following words. *'I came here 10 years ago and started a business with my brother three years ago. Thank God, our business is good. We love it here'*. Another participant, Bibigül (20), expresses her satisfaction with the economic conditions in the region in the following words. *'I have been married for three years; my son is two years old. My husband is working, I can buy my son what he wants, I can feed him, I can buy medicine when he is sick. I don't want anything else'*.

24% of the participants state that they are moderately satisfied with their level of economic well-being. Muhammed , one of the participants, says *'what can I say, sometimes it is good here and sometimes it is bad. It's a bit bad now, but thank God, we get by with the helps. There was nothing in Afghanistan. I think it's not very good or bad here, it's normal'*. Meryem , one of the participants: *'Good if you work, bad if you don't. My husband sometimes works and sometimes does not. When he doesn't work, we are in a very bad situation, but when he goes to work, everything is fine'*.

### **Satisfaction with the People of the Region**

Researchers such as Bernays and Robinson argue that public relations is a field centered on social sciences. Social sciences include communication sciences, psychology,

economics, sociology, social anthropology, political science, geography and many other sub-disciplines (Grunig & Hunt, 1984: 5). This situation shows that public relations has an understanding that can create macro effects in society in many areas. Moreover, it points to functions on influencing and persuading people. It is also possible to say that this definition mentions the main foundations of public relations that are intellectually important (Kuş, 2019: 11). In the study conducted with immigrants, it is observed that public relations is one of the most important issues affecting society. The immigrants have stated that their lives are directly affected by the social perspective. Public relations is also the greatest guarantor of social order. For this reason, this phenomenon is also emphasized meticulously in the study.

Of the 50 participants interviewed (Table 9), 17 state that they are very satisfied with the people of the region, 15 are satisfied, 10 do not want to express an opinion, 3 are not satisfied, and 5 are not satisfied at all. The reasons and percentages of satisfaction are as follows;

64% of the immigrants interviewed are satisfied with the people of the region. They state that they especially like the helpfulness and warm-bloodedness of Turkish citizens in the region where they live. Samane , one of the women interviewed, states that she had financial problems but is very pleased with the Turkish citizens who helped her solve these problems. Samane says, *'I divorced my husband, I was left alone with my child, I had nowhere to go. My family is in Afghanistan and if I return they will kill me for dishonoring them. Thanks to the people here, nobody interferes with me, people even help me. Especially my homeowner is very nice, he never said anything when I paid the rent late. I live on aid, and when my child grows up a little more, I will do home cleaning'*. Semira states that the Turks have treated her well with the following words: *'Turks are very tolerant. We are much more comfortable than in Afghanistan. I'm running from Afghans. We have many enemies, but the Turks do not interfere. How nice. If there is a problem, you can already complain'*.

20% of the participants state that they are moderately satisfied. Some of them say that the locals used to treat them well, but now they have started to experience difficulties. Ayşe , one of the participants, says, *'It was not like this when we first came. The neighbors were very good to us. Now they are always insulting, telling us that we are Afghans. The other day my son was beaten by children and he had a nosebleed. And they also spat on him. I think their parents are teaching them to do so'*.

16% of the participants likewise express that they are not satisfied with the people of the region. Those in this group are generally new arrivals, who experienced serious difficulties on the road and had problems adapting to the region. Hatice says, *'The smuggler took all our money while we were coming from Afghanistan. Then he left us and ran away. We were left homeless with five children. They're all little and sick. I tried to enroll them in school but they don't speak the language. So I quit. I only enrolled one of them. I sent my daughter to work. She will have to take care of us. Because, our neighbors, there are so many people in this city but no one sees us. We can't tell them our problems because we don't know their language. No matter whom I went to, I couldn't find a solution'*.

### Satisfaction with the Working Environment (Schools) of the Region

People need to work to earn a living and live in better conditions. The right to work is one of the fundamental human rights and that must be recognized for everyone with the exceptions specified by law. Every state sets rules regulating the right to work of its citizens. However, states regulate the right to work of foreigners, since foreigners living in that country apart from the citizens of the country have the right to work. Türkiye is a country where many foreigners reside due to its economic and political stability, employment opportunities and geographical location. During the interviews, the participants refer to this situation and discuss their thoughts on the subject. Finally, the degree of satisfaction on this issue is measured and the table below is the result.

Of the 50 participants (Table 9), 27 are very satisfied with the environment in which they work or the school they attend, 13 are satisfied, 1 is not satisfied, 1 is not satisfied at all and 8 do not express an opinion. The degree of satisfaction of the participants with their professions and the environments in which they perform these professions is as follows;

58% of the interviewees are housewives or men who cannot work for various reasons. The remaining 42% are either working or students. Based on this 42% segment, the questionnaires were evaluated and percentages were calculated. According to this calculation, 60% of those working or studying are satisfied with their working environment and 40% are not satisfied.

The satisfied participants express their satisfaction in the following words. Ali ; *'I am very happy with my workplace; we have no problems. We are tradesmen, there are some incidents, but generally, we are fine'*. Mehdi , *'I love my job very much, after all, we make a living. We're working a little too hard, but that's okay. After all, I am making sustenance for my family'*. Mehya , *'I go for cleaning, I usually come across very nice people. There are a lot of people who give me things and take care of me. I'm all alone, what am I going to do if these people don't do me favors, don't call me for cleaning?'*

The dissatisfied participants generally complain about the illegal working environment, problems with employers and working hours. Esma , one of the participants, says, *'It is a very interesting situation. School hours are very long here. You go in the morning; you go until the evening and there is no time for you to improve yourself. Too long hours also lead to inefficiency. School hours were shorter in Afghanistan. A friend of mine is in Switzerland and he says it is short there too, I don't understand why it is longer here'*. Rıza , one of the participants, says, *'There are bad people and good people everywhere. I cannot say that all Turks are good or bad. For example, my old boss was a very bad person, he didn't pay my money. I said I would file a complaint and he said I would file a complaint against you for being a fugitive. But my current boss is very good, we have no problems'*. Hatice , one of the participants interviewed, says, *"Today we had a fight with the boss at work. He grabbed my collar and was going to beat me, but the people around broke up the fight. Now how can I call the people here good? I am really upset today. I don't want to quit my job either because I am used to it and I sew well. I am afraid that I might have bigger problems elsewhere'*.

### Satisfaction with the Environmental Conditions of the Region

There are many different definitions of the environment. In general, in a very broad sense, every region up to the point that humans can perceive is considered to be the environment. Today, the environment is considered as a whole of natural, economic and cultural values. All living and non-living beings together with human beings are considered as a whole of physical, chemical, biological and social factors that affect all kinds of actions and behaviors of living beings. In brief; the environment is all physical, chemical, biological and social effects that directly or indirectly affect humans and other living beings (Demir and Hiz, 2017: 813).

The environment is an area that concerns everyone living in it, and the participants also emphasize this issue when talking about their perceptions of the region. The main reasons for their focus on this issue are that environmental conditions play an important role in affecting living conditions and adverse climatic conditions are among the reasons that force immigrants to migrate.

Of the 50 participants interviewed (Table 9), 22 state that they are very satisfied with the environmental conditions of the region, while 17 are satisfied and 3 are not satisfied at all. 8 participants state that they do not want to express an opinion on the subject.

The interviews reveal that 78% of the migrants are satisfied with the environmental conditions of the region. It is observed that they are particularly satisfied with the environmental arrangements, weather conditions and cleanliness of the cities. Considering that Afghan immigrants come directly from Afghanistan (Kabul) and Iran (Tehran), it is not surprising that the vast majority are satisfied with the environmental conditions. Kabul and Tehran are among the world's leading countries in terms of air pollution. When people living in these regions come to the TRA1 region, they like the weather and environmental conditions in the region. Mehsa , one of the women interviewed; *'I was in Tehran before I came here. The air in Tehran was very polluted. Sometimes schools were closed so that children would not be harmed. The air here is very clean but very cold'*.

Studies show that Kabul has very serious air pollution. Even during the pandemic, more people died from air pollution. The relief website, which makes important publications about Afghanistan, shows the extent of air pollution. It also reveals in numbers how it affects people and causes migration. Our studies also support this situation. For example; Nazife , one of the participants interviewed, says, *'The villages of Afghanistan are very beautiful, mountainous but very cold. We went to Kabul and the air was very polluted, especially sometimes it lasted even for a month, you would get a headache as soon as you went outside. My son's lungs were being damaged. We came here and we breathed a sigh of relief'*.

Only 6% of the participants express that they are not satisfied with the weather and environmental conditions. The main reason for this is that they do not have the economic conditions to withstand the cold weather conditions of the region. Zehra , one of the participants, says, *'It is very beautiful here but it is very cold. Even if we light the stove, our house is very cold. The government gives us coal and we buy firewood, but it is so cold that we cannot heat our house'*.

16% of the participants state that they are moderately satisfied with the environmental

conditions. Behram , one of the participants, says, *'the landscaping is good here, the municipality is always cleaning and organizing it. But it's so cold that we don't like it here. It is very difficult for those without money to live here'*.

### Conclusion

Immigrants become part of a country from the moment they arrive. Of course, it is also possible that they are an unwanted part of it (Sallan-Gül, 2002:90). Not existing in a country from the very beginning, arriving there later as a result of necessity, and being temporarily in a transit country like Türkiye for an indefinite period of time make the already difficult life of immigrants – as displaced people- even more difficult (Manap Kırmızıgül, 2019: 87). Although it is not possible to improve these conditions and eliminate the problems completely, many of them can be prevented by ensuring integration. Integration is only possible if mutual perceptions are known. The aim of this study is to provide an academic background to the integration phenomenon by measuring the perceptions of immigrants about the region they live in. In sum, this study does not offer solutions on how to realize integration, but only aims to measure mutual perceptions, which can be considered as the first stage of integration, and the study has proceeded in this direction and reached its conclusion.

Table 9 shows the perceptions of Afghan immigrants about the TRA1 region where they live, and their satisfaction levels measured in six main areas. Accordingly, 31 of the 50 participants are satisfied, 6 are not satisfied, and the remaining 13 do not express an opinion. Some of the participants who do not want to express an opinion state that they do not have a clear idea yet as they are new to the region. Others state that they are living in the region out of necessity, so it does not matter whether they are satisfied or not. In short, it is concluded that 64% of the immigrants are satisfied with living in the region, 12% are not, and 26% do not want to express an opinion on the issue.

As can be seen, the immigrants are generally satisfied with the region they live in. The area with the lowest level of satisfaction is the economy. The study concludes that the difficult economic conditions, especially in the last two years, have deeply affected the immigrants and that social cohesion has also been negatively affected by this situation. The majority of the interviewees state that disagreements started in the last two years. This corresponds exactly to the period when economic conditions began to deteriorate. Because the people of the region blame the immigrants for the economic difficulties. This is the only phenomenon that places dynamite on the ground for social cohesion. Jacobsen's views on this issue are crucial. Jacobsen underlines that when immigrants are given freedom of movement, access to resources is facilitated and they work productively with the local population to make a living, they will be less dependent on aid and tensions and conflicts between the two communities will be more easily overcome. In sum, paving the way for immigrants to work will contribute to the growth of the national economy and ultimately to the economic prosperity of the entire population. In other words, the theory of mutual benefit is the only factor that can contribute to social cohesion. The fact that only economic satisfaction is low among the data obtained as a result of the study summarizes this situation.

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** This research paper is supported by the Scientific Research Projects Coordination Unit of Atatürk University under project ID number 10997.

**Ethical approval:** Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of Atatürk University (Date: 05.08.2022, Decision No: 231) before the commencement of the data collection.

**Informed consent:** Informed consent form was obtained from the participants for the study.

**Author Contributions:** Conception/Design of study: E.O.; Data Acquisition: A.Ş.A.; Data Analysis/Interpretation: A.Ş.A.; Drafting Manuscript: A.Ş.A.; Critical Revision of Manuscript: A.Ş.A.; Final Approval and Accountability: E.O., A.Ş.A.

## References

- Aktaş, M. T. (2014). Göç olgusu ekonomik kalkınmada itici güç olabilir mi? *Aksaray Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 7(1), 37-48.
- Arik, F., & Arik, I. A. (2016). Grounded teori metodolojisi ve Türkiye’de grounded teori çalışmaları. *Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, 58, 285-309.
- Çağlar, T. (2018). Göç çalışmaları için kavramsal bir çerçeve. *Toros Üniversitesi İİSBF Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 5(8), 26-49.
- Demir, N., & Hiz, H. (2017). Çevre Bilinci ve Çevre Koşulları. <https://yesil.istanbul/Content/publications/27.pdf>
- Düzükaya, H. , & Yazıcı E. (2017). Misafirlikten Vatandaşlığa Türkiye’deki Suriyelilerin Hukuki Statüsü: Türkiye Ve Avrupa Birliği Mevzuatı Ekseninde Karşılaştırmalı Bir Değerlendirme. *Hak İş Uluslararası Emek ve Toplum Dergisi*, 6(16), 419-456.
- Ekşi, N. (2009). *Mültecilere ve Sığınmacılara İlişkin Mevzuat*. İstanbul: Beta Yayınları
- Erbaş, H. (2019). *Gidişlerden kaçışlara göç ve göçmenler kuram yöntem ve alan yazıları*. Phoenix Yayınevi.
- Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). *The Discovery Of Grounded Theory Strategies For Qualitative Research*. Aldine Publishing Company.
- Grunig, J. E., & Hunt. T. (1984). *Managing public relations*, CBS College Publishing.
- İlgar & İlgar. (2013). ‘Nitel Bir Araştırma Deseni Olarak Gömülü Teori (Temellendirilmiş Kuram)’. *İZÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 2(3), 197-247.
- İzmirli, Y. (2018). *Sosyal hizmet kongresi 2018: mültecilerle sosyal hizmet*, Aydın Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Jacobsen, K. (1996). Factors influencing the policy responses of host governments to mass immigrant influxes. *International Migration Review*, 30(3), 655-678.
- Kaptan, S. (1998). *Bilimsel Araştırma ve İstatistik Teknikleri*. Bilim Kitap Kırtasiye Limited Şirketi.
- Kuş, O. (2019). ‘Suriyeli Mültecilerin Sosyal Entegrasyonunda Halkla İlişkilerin Rolü’. Doktora Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Halkla İlişkiler ve Tanıtım Anabilim Dalı, İstanbul.
- Kuschminder, K., & Dora, M. (2009). *Migration in Afghanistan: history, current trends and future prospects*. MGSOG.
- Manap Kırmızıgül, Ç. (2019). Komşudan yabancıya, misafirden mülteciye: yerel halkın gözünden Türkiye’de mülteciler. *Nüfusbilim Dergisi*, 41(1), 84-102.
- Nasrisfahani, A. (2018). *Der khaneyi berader: penahendegani Afganistani der Iran*. Pejuheşkahe ferheng, hüner ve irtibatat.
- Papademetriou, D. G. (1997). Migration. Foreign Policy, 10, *Washingtonpost*, 15-31.
- Pearlman, W. (2017). *We crossed a bridge and it trembled: voices from Syria*. Custom House.
- Sallan-Gül, S. (2002). Dış göçler, yoksulluk ve Türkiye’de göçmenlere yönelik yardımlar. *İnsan Hakları Yıllığı, TODAİE*, 23-24, 79-93.
- Ural, A. & Kiliç, İ. (2011). *Bilimsel araştırma süreci ve SPSS ile veri analizi*. Detay Yayıncılık.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Immigrants [UNHCR] (2020). <https://www.unhcr.org/50f94d99.pdf>. (Access: 17.06.2023).
- UNDP Human Development Report Office. 2006. Human Development Report 2006. Date of access; 25.10.2022.
- UNDP Human Development Report Office. 1994. <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgk326/files/migration/tr/NHDR-1994-TR.pdf>
- [https://stuttgartegitim.meb.gov.tr/meb\\_ays\\_dosyalar/2020\\_06/16120154\\_5.SYnYf.pdf](https://stuttgartegitim.meb.gov.tr/meb_ays_dosyalar/2020_06/16120154_5.SYnYf.pdf). Access: 27.11.2022.



## Securitization of Islam in France: Everyday Lives of French Muslims

Fransa'da İslam'ın Güvenlikleştirilmesi: Fransız Müslümanlarının Gündelik Hayatları

Birsen Aybüke Evranos<sup>1</sup> 

### Abstract

Although many analyses of securitization focus on either speech acts and exceptional measures or bureaucratic practices, little research has been undertaken involving the logic of securitization. By shedding light on the impact of the securitization of Islam in France on the everyday experiences of French Muslims, this paper suggests that the securitization of Islam in France is not only an exception that calls for the adoption of emergency measures but also an everyday formation to define acceptable Muslims. Also, this article provides empirical evidence of securitization theory by illuminating how the securitization process is experienced by individuals. The findings show that analysis of the logic of securitization allows us to capture a more complete picture and understand how security practices are translated into everyday lives.

**Keywords:** Securitization, France, Muslims, Everyday life

### Öz

Söz edimlerine ve istisnai önlemlere ya da bürokratik uygulamalara odaklanan birçok güvenlikleştirme analizi yapılmış olsa da güvenlikleştirmenin her iki mantığını içeren çok az araştırma yapılmıştır. Bu makale, Fransa'da İslam'ın güvenlikleştirilmesinin Fransız Müslümanların günlük deneyimleri üzerindeki etkisine ışık tutarak, Fransa'da İslam'ın güvenlikleştirilmesinin yalnızca acil durum önlemlerinin alınmasını gerektiren bir istisna olmadığını, aynı zamanda makbul Müslümanları tanımlamaya yönelik gündelik bir inşa süreci olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Ayrıca bu makale, güvenlikleştirme sürecinin kişiler tarafından nasıl deneyimlendiğini aydınlatarak güvenlikleştirme teorisine ampirik yönden yaklaşmaktadır. Bulgular, güvenlikleştirmenin her iki mantığı göz önüne alınarak yapılan analizlerin daha eksiksiz bir tablo çizmeye olanak sağladığını ve güvenlik uygulamalarının gündelik hayata nasıl yansıtıldığını göstermektedir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Güvenlikleştirme, Fransa, Müslümanlar, Gündelik hayat

**1 Corresponding Author:** Birsen Aybüke Evranos (Dr.), İstanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: aybukeevranos@gmail.com  
ORCID: 0000-0002-7478-8166

**To cite this article:** Evranos, B. A. (2023). Securitization of Islam in France: everyday lives of French muslims. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 259–278. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1248698>

## Introduction

*“Our challenge today is to fight against the abuse which some perpetrate in the name of religion, by ensuring that those who want to believe in Islam are not targeted and are citizens of our Republic in the full sense,”* said French President Emmanuel Macron (2020) while he was introducing the new Law reinforcing republican principles which had apparently a simple aim: fight against Islamic radicalism and concomitantly keep Muslim citizens from being dragged into this ideology. However, the law is the result of a long process that involves the securitization of Islam comprising both bureaucratic practices (since the 1990s) and exceptional measures (between 2015 and 2017) shaping French Muslims’ everyday lives to become accepted Muslims. Thus, the securitization of Islam in France is not a new development that emerged with the terrorist attacks, but an ongoing process comprising different securitizing agents ((in)security professionals, political elite, etc.), different methods (routinized practices and exceptional measures).

By shedding light on the impact of the securitization of Islam in France on the everyday experiences of French Muslims, this paper suggests that the securitization of Islam in France is not only an “exception” that calls for the adoption of emergency measures but also an everyday formation to define “acceptable Muslims” which began in the 1990s. The aim of this process is to exclude “non-acceptable” Muslims whose primary belonging is not to the Republic but to Islam. The “non-acceptable” Muslim definition goes beyond the radical terrorists, it includes also ordinary people like my interviewees: One has been fired because of praying during his break time (Interviewee 20, 2021); the other, a daughter, was harassed by her teacher just for wearing a long skirt (Interviewee 23, 2021). This ongoing process has gained momentum with the series of terrorist attacks since 2015 which have been perpetrated or claimed by the radical Islamist terrorist group, ISIS, and have left more than 260 people dead (Cohen, 2020). Especially, the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015 and Paris attacks in November 2015 prompted the government to take exceptional measures, such as a state of emergency, to fight against terrorism. The exceptional nature of the measures has gained a permanent character by the promulgation of new anti-terror laws which have provided the state with enduring means for the exclusion of non-acceptable Muslims.

The Copenhagen School’s “new framework for analysis”, introduced in the mid-1990s, has continuously and significantly evolved, expanding beyond its initial focus on securitizing speech acts. This expansion encompasses various processes and factors related to, or directly involved in, securitization dynamics (Baele & Thomson, 2022). This broader perspective has illuminated crucial social and political matters, resulting in a more comprehensive understanding of the complex phenomenon of securitization. However, this evolution has also led to the fragmentation of securitization theory into distinct theories, each characterized by unique ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies (Balzacq, 2015). Consequently, efforts have emerged to reconcile these divergent perspectives into unified frameworks, exemplified by several studies (Eroukhmanoff, 2015; Bourbeau, 2014; Mavelli, 2013). Bourbeau (2014) suggests that enhancing our comprehension of securitization requires investigation of both exceptional security discourses and routinized security practices across various periods and scenarios. Building on these works, this article undertakes a unified framework for analysis of the

securitization of Islam to account for the increasing tensions surrounding Muslims in France.

It is now well-established that Islam has been the religion most disproportionately impacted by securitization policies in Western countries (O'Toole et al., 2015; Fox & Akbaba, 2013; Cesari, 2009; Brown, 2008). In this context, the concept of the securitization of Islam has been used to explain different phenomena. These include the increasing perception in Western societies that Islam poses a threat to Western values (Mavelli, 2013; Croft, 2012; Edmunds, 2011), apprehensions arising from Islamic radicalization and how it has led to the adoption of emergency measures (Bonino, 2012; Silvestri, 2010), and the implementation of anti-terrorism and immigration laws that have disproportionately impacted Muslim minority communities (Cesari, 2009). Furthermore, it has been employed to comprehend endeavors to ban headscarves and/or burqas across Europe (Cesari, 2009), along with the discourse of danger surrounding women's involvement in British mosques (Brown, 2008). The securitization of Islam in France has also been the topic of academic debate (Cesari, 2021; Bosco, 2014; Barras, 2013; Fox & Akbaba, 2013; Mavelli, 2013). However, this literature has long been on security discourses and techniques and not much has been said about how security practices have been experienced by individuals and groups (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2015). Hence, what remains unanswered is how French Muslims have personally experienced the securitization of Islam in France.

The analysis proceeds in four stages. Firstly, I will explore both the Copenhagen School's and the Paris School's representations of securitization and how the combination of these approaches is relevant for analysis in the case of the securitization of Islam in France. It will suggest that the securitization of Islam is not only an exception but also an everyday formation of acceptable Muslims. This section is followed by an explication of the methodology. The article then shows that the securitization of Islam has emerged as a result of bureaucratic practices that have created a regime of truth in which the political elites' speech acts (after the various attacks) that legitimized the exceptional measures are recognized to be true. The final section turns to empirical evidence deriving from interviews with French Muslims which sheds light on the everyday lives of French Muslims.

### **Discussion of the literature**

The relationship between religion and security is a developing field of inquiry within the theory of securitization, and its research implications remain to be explored. First developed by Wæver (1995) and Buzan et al. (1998) (referred to as the Copenhagen School), securitization theory provides a useful tool for analyzing this relationship. Securitization theory suggests that security is constructed by speech acts that introduce some issues and practices as existential threats which should be addressed with exceptional measures to be able to survive (Buzan et al., 1998). The Copenhagen School places strong emphasis on speech acts and asserts that "*by saying the words, something is done*" (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). In other words, when an issue is framed as a matter of security with the speech act, and the audience accepts it as such and the issue is securitized. Then it becomes possible to take exceptional measures to address the threat.

The emphasis on the speech act has been criticized by other scholars (referred to as the Paris School) who assert that the construction of security relies on bureaucratic decisions taken by (in)security professionals which create an insecure and uneasy environment in which technology plays a crucial role in surveillance and control (Bigo, 2002). Their understanding of securitization highlights “practices, audiences, and contexts that enable and constrain the production of specific forms of governmentality” (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 457). According to the Paris School, security is a process of risk management in which in(security) professionals play a crucial role in constructing a “regime of truth” that seeks to establish what is deemed as legitimate sources of fear and unease (Bigo, 2008). Their authority is derived from their expertise, including specialized knowledge, skills, and access to various tools like data, statistics, biometrics, and sociological profiles. Thus, the process of securitization, intertwined with routine politics and bureaucracy, does not always rely on explicit speech acts but rather involves the continuous exercise of power by security professionals (Bigo, 2002).

Bourbeau (2014) labels the Copenhagen School’s approach as “logic of exception” and the Paris School’s approach as the “logic of routine”. In an attempt to bring together these two approaches, he argues that focusing on only one theoretical stance does not allow the researcher to capture the whole picture of securitization. These two theoretical stances seem to compete or oppose, but the securitization of an issue might draw on insights from both (Eroukhmanoff, 2015; Bourbeau, 2014; Mavelli, 2013; C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006). Hence, this article seeks to understand how Islam is securitized in France at the individual and community levels with interventions conducted by bureaucrats and (in)security officials over the years, and at the exceptional level with discursive strategies of the political elite after the various attacks in 2015.

The securitization of Islam in Europe can be traced back to the 1990s (Cesari, 2012; for Danish example see Rytter & Pedersen, 2013) when Muslims gained visibility in Western societies as a result of immigration, family union, and high fertility rate (Fox & Akbaba, 2015). With particular focus on France, some estimations<sup>1</sup> suggest that 8.8% (5.7 million) of the French population is Muslim which makes the country the home of the biggest Muslim population in Europe (Pew Research Center, 2017). It is not therefore surprising that France had experienced tensions between the majority and the Muslim “minority” in the 1990s. This was manifested in the rise of the extreme-right *Front National* party which had high electoral support during the same period in some departments where Maghrebin and Turkish immigrants concentrated (Schain, 2006). Such electoral support led established parties to engage in anti-immigrant and anti-Islam policies. Thus, policies to control and scrutinize Islam cannot be reduced to some exceptional measures taken after the various attacks beginning in 2015, since there is an already existing “regime of truth” (Bigo, 2008). For example, as successfully shown by Mavelli (2013), France’s famous burqa ban does not only consist of Sarkozy’s speech act, but it also comprises (in)security professionals’ definition of what a threat to the French version of secularism, namely *laïcité*, is. In this way, considering both, the logic of exception and routine (Bourbeau, 2014) is more relevant when analyzing the securitization of Islam (Eroukhmanoff,

---

1 The Law on Data Processing, Data Files, and Individual Liberties of 6<sup>th</sup> January 1978 does not allow the collection of personal data reflecting religion; therefore, official statistics are not available.

2015; Mavelli, 2013) in France. The attacks of 2015 changed the manifestation of the bureaucratic practices with the speech acts of government elites and the declaration of a state of emergency. After this exceptional process, new laws normalized (Bigo, 2002) and maintained the securitization of Islam in France in the logic of routine.

Existing research on the securitization of Islam mostly focuses on the post-9/11 period which has witnessed a scrutiny of Islam's position in Western public spaces, particularly manifesting in the curtailment of religious activities and practices (Cesari, 2009; Fox and Akbaba, 2013). Moreover, securitization processes may impact the religious group's identity formation by shaping dominant interpretations of identity while suppressing resistance to it (Brown, 2010). Mavelli (2013) contends that securitization contributes to the portrayal of Islam as the "other", deemed a menace to the liberal-secular order prevalent in Europe. This perspective has been expanded by numerous scholars, highlighting how this "otherness" is juxtaposed against Western liberal secular norms. Croft (2012) takes these notions of "othering" a step further, asserting that Britishness is constructed in contradistinction to a new Islamist terrorist Other. This Other is subdivided into "Radical Other" – one that must be feared of and eliminated – and "Orientalized Other" – one that must be disciplined and protected (Croft, 2012: 247). Croft (2012) claims that securitization produces different categories of Otherness which cannot be reduced to "us" versus "them". There are "degrees of difference and Otherness" (Hansen, 2006: 37). Within this context, Edmunds (2011) asserts that being a European Muslim now carries a higher social cost with governments often viewing individuals first as Muslims and then as citizens, thereby fostering a dichotomy between trusted and mistrusted Muslims.

Similar to this logic, I argue that by securitizing Islam, the French state dictates "the just and good way of life" (Huysmans, 1998) of a French Muslim in the *laïc* public sphere. In other words, the French state requires that Muslims should live their religion privately and that no ostensible religious sign or practice is visible in public spaces (e.g., at school, at work, on the street, etc.). Accordingly, France welcomes "acceptable" Muslims – those who fully acknowledge French values and assimilate – while constructing "non-acceptable" Muslims – those who do not comply with the acceptable Muslim definition – as a security threat.

### **Methodology**

The following analysis endeavors to understand first, how the securitization of Islam is exercised in France both in the logic of routine and exception, and second, how this securitization is felt and experienced by French Muslims. To show the involvement of both the logic of securitization, the period of analysis has been determined as between the beginning of the 1990s and today. Although I acknowledge that one of the reasons for the construction of the Grand Mosque of Paris in 1926 was to monitor the Muslim community (Bosco, 2014), the chosen time frame is more relevant since the Muslim "problem" was first politicized in the beginning of the 1990s (Cinalli & Van Hauwaert, 2021), after the famous *affaire du foulard* in 1989, and almost all the interviewees' experience with the securitization of Islam began during this period. The chosen time period allows the researcher to analyze routinized practices (i.e., the implementation of the *laïcité* principle, and construction of an *Islam de France*), and discursive strategies,

and exceptional measures after the various attacks in 2015. The latter part of the analysis relies on speech acts of the political elite (i.e., President Hollande's speeches after the attacks) and implications of exceptional measures (i.e., the state of emergency and promulgation of new laws). The critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995) method was applied for the analysis of the speech acts.

For the second part of the analysis, a qualitative approach is found useful for assessing the securitization experience of the Muslim community. This method provides a convenient analytical tool for understanding how securitization is felt and reflected in Muslims' everyday lives. Accordingly, the second set of data for this study was derived from twenty-nine semi-structured interviews (fifteen Muslim men and fourteen Muslim women aged between 20-47) with Muslims living in Île-de-France using snowball sampling. This region is home to a heterogeneous group of Muslims since it comprises both Paris (where 21 of the interviewees live) and some banlieues (where 7 of the interviewees live) with a dense Muslim population. First contact was made through Muslim associations and social media, and then the interviewee both suggested additional people and provided information to locate more potential interviewees. The interviews took place between the 1<sup>st</sup> of August – 28<sup>th</sup> February 2021, but because of COVID-19 restrictions, the interviews were performed remotely. Permission was obtained from the Istanbul University's ethical committee to perform this research. Interviews were recorded with informed consent and transcribed. All interviews were translated from French and Turkish to English by the author. The transcripts were anonymized and analyzed thematically. The selection of quotations was based on their pertinence to the argument and the specific processes under examination (Hammersley, 1990).

All interviewees identify themselves as Muslims, and they were born into Muslim families except for three who had converted to Islam – one originally a Congolese man and two women of French origin. The contribution of these two French-origin women to the study is important because their approach to the securitization of Islam is a little softer than other interviewees. (The Congolese man's views are similar to those of the interviewees born Muslim since he was already experiencing "otherness" because of his race). The Muslim-born interviewees highlight that Islam is not only a religion for them, but it also means family, community, culture, tradition, legacy, civilization, etc. while for the convert interviewees, it is a faith, a way of worship. As we shall see, they all experience discrimination and marginalization but convert interviewees do not feel their whole identity was attacked by the securitization of Islam, only their religion. They emphasize that they understand why Islam is perceived as a threat, and to them, there is a simple solution: the French state has to learn more about Islam and its peaceful character.

The interviewees consist of civil servants, journalists, representatives of non-governmental organizations, private sector employees and self-employed persons from the middle class. Historically, Muslim immigrants swelled the ranks of the working class and resided in the outskirts of major cities known as banlieues, which resulted in experiences of social, economic, and spatial marginalization (Galonnier, 2015). However, the background of my French-born interviewees reflects an upward social mobility over generations (most of them are third and fourth generation).

The sample consists of different origins: eleven of the participants have Turkish origin, eight of them have Algerian origin, five of them have Moroccan origin and two of them

have Tunisian origin. All participants are French citizens (seven of them were naturalized and nineteen of them are French-born) except for two Turkish participants who have permanent resident permits and whose children are French citizens. The interviews addressed a different array of issues that might affect the experience of securitization: the role of Islam in interviewees' lives; integration into France; experiences with the implementation of the *laïcité* principle; leadership of the Islamic religion; views about media and how it portrays Muslims; perspectives on terrorist attacks; the fear of backlash against Muslims; how the attacks affected interviewees' day-to-day lives.

There are several limitations to this study. First, this study does not speak to the experiences of Muslims from less privileged backgrounds. My interviewees define themselves as middle class, therefore this study is not able to address how social class could impact life in France as a Muslim. This is an important issue for future research. Second, this study does not claim to represent all Muslims in France. Since I have used snowball sampling, the sample cannot be generalized to the wider population. Third, as the sample consists of persons aged between 20-47, this study does not speak to how experiences of securitization differ between younger and older Muslims. Finally, the study does not address the experiences of Muslims living in different parts of France. Hence, how French Muslims' experiences of securitization are affected by living in rural parts of the country, or by living in southern or northern France are questions that cannot be answered by this study.

### **Towards a more complete picture of securitization**

The French government's attitudes and actions towards French Muslims serve as a significant case of securitization, where the focus is on the perceived security threat affecting the French Republic and its values. While the non-acceptable French Muslims are the subjects in question, the securitizing actors include the French government and (in)security professionals such as bureaucrats and civil servants. In this context, I observe that the securitizing actors have employed both discursive strategies and non-discursive practices to frame non-accepted French Muslims as a security matter, which indicates that both the logic of securitization are applicable. The subsequent sections provide an exploration of routinized practices and speech acts in the context of the "Muslim problem" in France.

### ***Laïcité*: A means for securitization**

The French constitution does not recognize any minority and ensures "equality before law of all citizens, with no distinction made on the basis of origin, race or religion" (Article 2). In this way, republican citizenship provides *de jure* equality and requires uniformity. Accordingly, individuals can be accepted as a part of French society if they are considered assimilated. Those who are perceived to be insufficiently assimilated are exposed to significant social exclusion and discrimination even if they have (Fredette, 2014) or have later acquired (Fassin & Mazouz, 2009) French citizenship.

The most important component of this republican universalism is the French *laïcité*, which has been weaponized since the 1990s to justify repressive and discriminatory policies, particularly targeting Muslims. French *laïcité* and Anglo-American

multiculturalism, albeit in distinct ways, both aim to address the question of difference and equality in society. As Kuru (2009) puts it, Anglo-American multiculturalism adopts a passive secularism that emphasizes the recognition of plural identities, whereby the state assumes a more restrained role, allowing for the public visibility of religion. In contrast, France follows assertive secularism in which the state actively works to exclude religion from the public domain (Kuru, 2009). For instance, in the United States, it is the religion that helps immigrants turn to Americans, while it would be inconceivable in France to become French by being Muslim (Foner & Alba, 2008).

As the experiences of my interviewees highlight, since the 1990s there has been a shift in the interpretation of *laïcité* towards a stricter and more illiberal stance. Regardless of political views, generally, the political elite have taken a combative approach, demanding that Muslims hide public expressions of faith, and confine them to the private sphere in the name of assimilation and national identity. According to Barras (2013), *laïcité* has been utilized as a tool to confront the visible manifestation of Islam and this has been done to validate a progressively less accommodating approach towards the demands made by French Muslims in various contexts. This modern interpretation of *laïcité* stigmatizes French citizens based on their religion, shifting the focus from state neutrality to the neutrality expected from certain citizens.

In fact, French Muslims enthusiastically embrace *laïcité* as a principle because it protects everyone's freedom of religion and conscience (Interviewee 4, 2021). "*When I was at school back in the 1980s, the implementation of the laïcité principle was not the same as today. All religions were respected and treated equally*" (Interviewee 14, 2021). However, the increased visibility of Muslims in the public space resulted in the mobilization of the *laïcité* principle to tackle the Muslim problem. The *affaire du foulard* of 1989 and successive events provide a shining example of the securitization of Islam in France which shows how a regime of truth is established and who the acceptable Muslim is. The incident occurred when three Muslim girls were suspended because of their refusal to remove their headscarves at school. Then President, Jacques Chirac, commissioned several politicians, intellectuals, and civil society representatives to determine what constituted a threat to the founding principle of the French Republic (Stasi Commission, 2003). The members of the so-called Stasi Commission, acting as (in) security professionals, deduced that a veiled Muslim woman was a threat to the French state's republican identity and recommended the ban of "ostensible religious symbols" in schools (Stasi Commission, 2003) which was passed into law in 2004. Even if we consider that the *affaire du foulard* was an incident that required emergency measures as suggested by the Copenhagen School, further analysis shows that it provides an incomplete picture.

The Stasi Commission itself may not have created this regime of truth. Until the formation of the Commission in 2003, about a hundred Muslim girls were expelled from school by headmasters (Blavignat, 2018) who acted as another group of (in)security professionals. The conversation between one of my interviewees and the headmaster illustrates vividly this regime of truth: "*When the ban became law, my daughters were in middle school. I went to school to see the headmaster and said to him, 'These girls' right to education is violated. You must be concerned as much as I am.'* Pointing the school door he replied, '*Once you have your foot in that door, your god's law expires, and our*



*republic's law begins.*” (Interviewee 27, 2021). The Commission has only consolidated the idea that *laïcité* is, in fact, a value rather than principle, and a “living practice” (Stasi Commission, 2003: 38). Also, it is suggested by Mavelli (2013) that this understanding of *laïcité* provided the basis for the famous burqa ban. Laurence and Vaïsse (2006) explain that this type of bans is the product of an effort to reduce the development of certain religious affiliations and to curb the potential development of bipartisanship (i.e., both to religion and to the republic) among France’s Muslim population.

In a similar vein, two soft law charters, namely Charter of *Laïcité* in Public Services of 2007 and Charter of *Laïcité* at School of 2013, were issued to remind citizens of their rights and obligations and to structure everyday lives of public servants and students. These charters are followed by the “Great School Mobilization for the Republic’s Values” which includes administrative, curricular, and disciplinary measures after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, to target perceived shortcomings in students’ commitment to republican principles (Lizotte, 2020). Similar to the period after the veil ban, it is expected that teachers and headmasters act as (in)security professionals and systematically report students who question republican values in order to prevent Islamic radicalism (Ministère de l’Éducation nationale..., 2015).

Regarding the *laïcité* principle, the most important theme that emerged during the field study is hypocrisy. My interviewees observe that the French republic is more tolerant of other religions (e.g., Judaism, Christianity), and cultural symbols (Interviewee 12; 15; 24; 25, 2021). For example, one of my interviewees who works as a nurse in a public hospital explained to me that she cannot cover her hair during working hours, while her African-origin coworkers may wear a headscarf resembling the Muslim veil because it is part of their culture, not religion (Interviewee 16, 2021). It is also stated that the aggressive mobilization of the *laïcité* principle towards Muslims has only one purpose: “*to eradicate Islam and Muslim culture in France by assimilating Muslims*” (Interviewee 27, 2021) and “*by turning them into robots who don’t have any belief except the belief in laïcité as a religion of the state*” (Interviewee 16, 2021).

All of these contributed to the construction of acceptable Muslims who would yield to the laic order (Mavelli, 2013) and to the delegitimization of the visible manifestation of religion perceived as undermining the republic. Therefore, to be accepted as a natural part of French society, Muslims must assimilate in a way that their religious belief stays only in their heart. Even though the 2015 Paris attacks made the government construct a discourse around *laïcité* as a threatened republican value, this process cannot be reduced only to speech acts. In other words, the securitization of Islam in France is a long-term process supported by both normal bureaucratic practices and political decisions, and exceptional measures.

### **Controlling Islam à la française**

It is not a coincidence that the French state attempted to control and modernize Islam at the beginning of the 1990s. That period was marked by the debate about the Muslim problem both in the media and among policy-makers (Hajjat, 2013), and the government began to promote an *Islam de France* [Islam of France] instead of *Islam in France* (Fellag, 2014). To this end, in 1990, the Minister of the Interior, Pierre Joxe, established

the *Conseil de réflexion sur l'Islam en France* (CORIF), and following its abolition, successive governments also tried to establish other centralized organizations with which they could negotiate. Finally, *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM) was created in 2003 as the result of Nicolas Sarkozy's bilateral negotiations with three major Muslim federations and other smaller organizations, each of which represents the interests of different Muslim communities (Turkish, African, Moroccan, etc.).

The attempts to institutionalize and domesticate (Zeghal, 2005) Islam show that according to successive governments, some French Muslims' religious practices or behaviors are not compatible with republican values. Therefore, an institution is needed to form an Islam of France and to guide French Muslims to an acceptable way of living their religion. However, this does not resonate with French Muslims' understanding of Islam: "*What does Islam of France mean? Is it an Islam appropriate to the reality of life in France? If so, okay. Already throughout history, Muslim communities have kept Islam alive along with their local cultures. But if the Islam of France is a tool for the French state to impose on Muslims how to live their religion, it is impossible for anyone to accept it*" (Interviewee 17, 2021).

Although the main purpose of the CFCM was to act as the interlocutor of the public authority in Islamic matters (Zeghal, 2005), the institution was also expected to be a social surveillance tool since Sarkozy desired an Islam that fully respects the laws of the republic and does not develop a discourse against republican values (Sarkozy, 2003). CFCM's task of "disseminating a liberal doxa and marginalizing radical elements" (Caiero, 2005: 78) to form an acceptable Islam transforms CFCM's members into (in)security professionals who "[...] *control and regulate our way of life and practicing religion*" (Interviewee 14, 2021).

Competing federations within the CFCM combined with the government's "moderate" Islam agenda delegitimize CFCM's religious recommendations in the eyes of Muslims: "*For a while, they took Moroccan Islam as an example. [...] If a secular government got elected in Türkiye, I think they would say that Islam of France is Turkish Islam*" (Interviewee 13, 2021). Further, it is also puzzling for Muslims that, on the one hand, the *laïcité* principle requires the removal of religion from what is public, and on the other hand the state establishes such an institution to adapt Islam to France: "*If the Islam of France is for the state to control how Islam is practiced, laïcité loses its meaning altogether. Worse still, if the state produces a new Islam, then Islam becomes the religion of the state in the sense that the state deals with worship*" (Interviewee 17, 2021).

Even though some scholars (Bosco, 2014; Fox & Akbaba, 2015; Cesari, 2012) relate these to the politics of exception that emerged after 9/11, I add that it is also part of a "regime of truth" (Bigo, 2002). For example, during the formation of CORIF in 1990, Joxe established a discourse on Islam through security and modernization. According to Joxe, it is necessary to fight against the establishment of "savage" mosques with radical, intolerant, and violent imams (Jouanneau, 2009). Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Minister of the Interior between 1997-2000, said that by creating an Islam of France, he gives Muslims a chance to modernize Islam (Chevènement, 1997). In this regime of truth, Sarkozy emphasized that he was afraid of clandestine Islamic activities because this secrecy led to radicalization (Coroller & Licht, 2003).

The control over Muslims' everyday life also manifests itself in matters related to imams and places of worship. This unease can be explained by their role in shaping Muslim identities. The field research revealed that mosques are community centers where Muslims not only gather for prayers but also for marriages, funerals, learning activities (Islamic history and tradition, Coran, etc.), distributing supplies to those in need, etc. Further, in those gatherings, the new generation socializes with fellow Muslims, and religious and cultural traditions are passed down. A representative of a religious association explained that Muslim children should learn their religion and civilization from a Muslim, since at school they are taught that Arabs were savages before France brought them civilization, and Islam is an oppressive and patriarchal religion that is not compatible with the republican values (Interviewee 13, 2021).

Imams also play a key role, both as guides and community leaders, and they could lead the worshipers with sermons. Realizing imams' influence on the Muslim community, French authorities adopted a security-centered approach to Muslim worship (Frégosi, 2008). Starting from Joxe's term as Minister of Interior in the early 1990s, bureaucrats began to refer to foreign imams as fundamentalist threats to France in administrative memorandums, creating a regime of truth. According to these (in)security professionals, the government should promote a moderate Islam and fight against uncontrolled mosques and imams (Jouanneau, 2018). The documents consulted by Jouanneau (2018) show that this security-centered approach has been consolidated throughout the years and not only bureaucrats and members of the government, but also civil servants and the media adopted a discourse that favors moderate imams who would lead Muslims to an accepted lifestyle.

After the 2015 Paris attacks, this perspective is still visible in a report presented to the French Senate (Sénat, 2016) which recommended school laic imams in France since the imams sent from some Muslim countries who shape Muslim identity according to their beliefs create a security problem. These bureaucrats and senators acted like (in)security professionals and determined what constitutes a threat to the Muslim identity in France. In this regime of truth, President Emmanuel Macron's electoral promises included the establishment of a National Federation of Islam of France (En Marche, 2017) which will be commissioned to fund the construction of mosques and schooling of French imams aiming to "integrate" Islam to France by forming imams who internalize republican values. In addition to this, a legally non-binding Charter of Principles for an Islam of France ("Communiqué", 2021) was created aiming to ensure that the religious organizations in France are aware that the republic's law is superior to God's law. In other words, the willingness to create an Islam of France which will guide Muslims to an acceptable way of life emerged in the 1990s and has continued until this day through a variety of instruments.

### **Securitization as an exception**

In the regime of truth that I have tried to frame briefly above, France experienced various terrorist attacks in 2015 and in the later years. Once an issue is securitized, the securitization gets established at critical moments and then the securitization process becomes difficult to reverse or break (Bourbeau, 2014). At a critical moment, the most important component of securitization is the speech act which poses the issue as

an existential threat that requires extraordinary measures beyond the routine norms of everyday politics (Buzan et al., 1998). A brief analysis of President François Hollande's speech acts shows how the securitization of Islam was constructed around non-acceptable Muslims. In the speeches made after the Charlie Hebdo attack, it was emphasized that the threat was radicalism and obscurantism represented by non-acceptable Muslims (Hollande, 2015a). Freedom of expression, republican values, and gender equality were cited as reference objects (Hollande, 2015c). Securitizing moves aimed to ensure that the citizens are in unity and solidarity (Hollande, 2015b). The policy response in this context included increasing police forces to the extent permitted by ordinary law.

After the 2015 Paris attacks, the threat was defined as ISIS, a radical Islamist terrorist group, and a more aggressive approach was adopted by declaring war against it (Hollande, 2015d). Hollande acknowledged that the French killed the French on the night of the attacks, but he declared these terrorists as non-French, even though they were French-born citizens (Hollande, 2015d). While the enemy is described as barbaric, uncivilized, and a believer of anti-modern Islam, the French are represented as defenders of human rights and freedom. The discourse implies that there is an imagined clash between civilization represented by France, and barbarism represented by Muslims – who are perceived as non-modern. The official discourse served to strengthen French identity through the rule of law and human rights and to exercise power over non-acceptable Muslims through exclusion and/or discipline.

When the French public (the audience) is persuaded (for various polls see Clavel, 2016; IFOP, 2016) that there is an existential threat to the survival of republican values and identity, the implementation of exceptional measures is legitimized. In this context, a state of emergency was declared, more resources were allocated to all areas related to security, an amendment to the constitution was proposed, new antiterrorism laws were promulgated, and human rights were restricted in favor of security. However, to be able to sustain the securitization process, legislative changes that would outlive the state of emergency were needed and would give the state of emergency a permanent character (Agamben, 2005).

As laws represent the political elites' understanding of the values, interests, and qualities of the republic, they are of great importance for securitizing actors to achieve their goals. The amendment to the constitution – which envisaged deprivation of citizenship of a person who acts against national interests and commits terrorist crimes – aimed to establish what national identity is and who comprises it. Later, two new anti-terror laws<sup>2</sup> were promulgated to reinforce the fight against terrorism by making exceptional measures (e.g., stop and search, administrative closure of places of worship, house arrest, etc.) enter ordinary law. The Law reinforcing republican principles enacted in 2021 (after the end of the state of emergency in 2017), also known as the Law against Islamist separatism, makes part of the government strategy to counter non-acceptable Muslims by reinforcing the *laïcité* principle and imposing regulatory constraints on religious associations. These laws show how ideas about security are institutionalized

---

2 Law n° 2016-386 of 3 June 2016 Law reinforcing the fight against organized crime, terrorism, and its financing & Law n° 2017-1510 of 31 October 2017 Law reinforcing international security and fight against terrorism.

and how securitization is removed from the logic of exception and continued in the logic of routine (Bourbeau, 2014).

### **Construction of everyday lives**

The focus on the everyday experiences of French Muslims is useful to understand the implications of security practices on marginalized communities. By doing so, we will be able to trace the impact of security practices on securitized communities, and reveal inequalities, abuses of power, and discrimination. Thus, the following sections focus on how securitization of Islam constructs and affects French Muslims' everyday lives.

### **Being Muslim in France**

Earlier works (Fredette, 2014; Simon, 2012) and field research have shown that French Muslims do love France and feel French. Even though they speak Arabic or Turkish at home and prefer their cuisine of origin, they have adopted a French lifestyle besides their Islamic practices: *"In fact, Turkish culture is dominant at home, but when I am outside, I have no difference from a French person"* (Interviewee 3, 2021). Of the people I interviewed, many (Interviewees 5; 14; 15; 16; 19; 22, 23; 24, 2021) specifically clarified that they felt no conflict between being both Muslim and French: *"I am proud to be both Algerian Muslim and French. I think these identities complement each other"* (Interviewee 19, 2021). Those who have acquired French citizenship are also proud to be so since *"I have chosen this. God wanted me to be Tunisian, but I have chosen to be French. I am happy to be Muslim, French, and European"* (Interviewee 4, 2021). However, the securitizing environment created a prevailing narrative that seeks to categorize Muslims as either accepted or non-accepted. The media too, played a role in this as only two contrasting types of Muslims – or as Połńska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie (2016) put it, good other and negative other – can appear on TV channels: *"To speak for Muslims, the media hand a microphone to those who cannot speak proper French. In the contrary case, they find people who seem more French than the French and speak French very well. Those who do not deny their own identity, background, and culture cannot find a place on media platforms"* (Interviewee 24, 2021).

Building on these insights, the experiences of interviewees illuminate nuances of discrimination and challenges they face caused by securitization. Male interviewees stated that they did not face discrimination before or after the attacks because they do not seem Muslim taken at face value. (Discrimination towards my male interviewees is more subtle.) However, they emphasized that relatives and acquaintances who wear headscarves are usually discriminated against, even harassed verbally and/or physically. One male interviewee told me that his wife and he were dismissed from a dentist's office because his wife was veiled (Interviewee 23, 2021). All of my female interviewees who wear headscarves mentioned that they have been verbally abused. In line with this, some white French developed a sense of entitlement whereby they thought that they had the right to decide who did not belong in France and to pressure them to assimilate. One of my converted interviewees of French origin told me laughingly that a woman stopped her while she was buying groceries and said, *"Take off your veil or go home. This is France." But I was calm and said, 'do not worry madame, I am home'"* (Interviewee 18,

2021). The sense of entitlement includes also “micro attacks” (Interviewee 14, 2021) involving comments and questioning about religious practices: “*I do not go to lunch with my colleagues because they will understand that I am Muslim and start to ask questions about my religion*” (Interviewee 5, 2021). “*Why don't you eat pork? Why don't you drink alcoholic drinks? Why do you fast?*” (Interviewee 14, 2021). Within French society, where the regular visibility of religion is minimal, activities such as daily prayers, fasting, adherence to religious moral principles, and adhering to dress codes are immediately perceived as excessive. From this perspective, individuals deemed as accepted Muslims are those who avoid distinctive attire, do not fast, and refrain from public expressions of their religious beliefs.

If wearing a headscarf is the first conspicuous signifier of being a non-accepted Muslim, having a “Muslim” name is the second. Muslim and Arabic names have been identified as one of the main hindrances to employment and career progression in France (Naseem & Adnan, 2019; Valfort, 2017; 2015). Reflecting that, two of my interviewees left France because one could not find a job although being a healthcare professional (Interviewee 3, 2021) and the other could not advance her career (Interviewee 14, 2021). A correlation between Muslim names and discrimination is also documented in the housing market (Acolin et al., 2016), an issue raised by several interviewees. One interviewee made a test of her own and reached the same result: “*I called the real estate agent and said my name. Once he hears my name he said, ‘Sorry, that apartment is not listed anymore’. But when my French friend called, he said that the apartment is available*” (Interviewee 19, 2021). An interviewee remarks that if one wants to avoid all these problems and “be part of the French community” (Interviewee 14, 2021) he/she can change their name: “*When I applied for citizenship (because my parents were not French citizens) the first question that they asked me was if I wanted to change my name. The officer said it would be easier for me*”. This advice may entail requesting to conceal or tone down any religious association to gain acceptance.

These experiences show that first, my interviewees are happy to have diverse identities (e.g., Muslim, French, Algerian) and they claim themselves capable of balancing these. Second, being a securitized Muslim is mostly gendered and the way that Muslim women dress themselves has become a tool to mark out Muslim woman as being insufficiently French or a non-accepted Muslim. Finally, bearing a Muslim-sounding name is assumed to diminish the possibility to be perceived as an accepted Muslim. These insights illuminate the complex interplay of identities, the gendered nature of securitization, and the impact of names on perceived acceptance within the context of being a securitized Muslim.

### **Experiences with security and surveillance**

According to the securitization theory, if a choice is to be made between security and freedom in favor of security, the audience should accept that there is a security problem and/or it must be persuaded by speech acts (Buzan et al., 1998). However, my interviewees do not believe that there is a security problem in France caused by Muslims (except for interviewee 9) which would legitimize exceptional measures. Therefore, it is pointless for them to waive their civic rights to tackle a problem that does not exist. Yet, the government points the finger at Muslims by saying “*You are responsible for*

*what we are going through*” (Interviewee 17, 2021). This creates a new social reality by securitization in which Muslims encounter suspicion, discrimination, and fear in their daily lives.

Especially after the Paris attacks, my interviewees’ fear of terrorism went beyond the fear of physical harm due to a terrorist attack. Different from the majority of the French public, their loss of security included continuous anxiety related to the security of their environment. Many interviewees mentioned that they were afraid of going to the supermarket or taking the metro after the attacks because it is visible outside that they are Muslim. Some of the female interviewees wore a hat (instead of a headscarf), *“just to blend in as a normal French person”* (Interviewee 16, 2021). As this article suggests, they observed that before the attacks the situation was handled more insidiously (e.g., teachers acting as (in)security professionals at school). However, the attacks and the security environment created by political elites gave permission to hate (Perry, 2001): *“We have heard before that Muslims could not rent an apartment or get a job. They were finding an excuse to reject Muslims. But the attacks freed the discourse. Today, they say openly that they do not want us the way that we are”* (Interviewee 15, 2021). The post-attack security environment exposed a pronounced dichotomy between being an accepted and non-accepted Muslim, accentuating the visible markers of identity and the resulting anxieties while simultaneously emboldening explicit expressions of discrimination.

The state of emergency declared after the attacks granted various powers, including the ability to conduct searches of private residences, dissolve associations (resulting in mosque closures), and impose house arrest on individuals. When I asked about what they think of these exceptional measures, the most common reaction was that the aim of these measures was not to counter terrorism but to counter non-fitting Muslims: *“The government says that we take these measures because we have to take Islam and those Muslims under control.”* (Interviewee 13, 2021). *“My workplace is close to a housing estate where Muslims lived. They raided the houses several times. Many people were detained. But they had nothing to do with terrorism”* (Interviewee 9, 2021). An analysis of administrative court rulings regarding appeals made by individuals during the state of emergency revealed that more than half of the decisions refer to Islam and the level of risk is directly proportioned to the level of religiosity (Hennette-Vauchez et al., 2018). Muslims were targeted for their religious practices considered radical by the authorities, without proving how these pose a threat to public order or security (Amnesty International, 2016). *“They have raided the doner shops around the corner and found prayer rugs in the back. The owners were immediately labeled as radicals and detained.”* (Interviewee 24, 2021). The prevalent perception emerges that the exceptional measures were not primarily directed at countering terrorism, but rather at targeting Muslims whose level of religiosity is perceived as non-accepted.

Within this context, mosques were monitored to oversee the imams, pressuring them to conform to French values: *“If an imam preaches that homosexuality is forbidden in Islam, the ministry closes the mosque because this kind of anti-modern beliefs cannot be tolerated”* (Interviewee 18, 2021). This raises the question, *“Which religion does promote or does not forbid homosexuality?”* (Interviewee 25, 2021). Consequently, the closure of mosques is interpreted as a punitive measure affecting the entire congregation,

tantamount to what some describe as “collective punishment” (Interviewee 17, 2021), alluding to a strategy of enforcing the Muslim community to conform with French values, as highlighted by the phrase *“They want to keep Muslims in line”* (Interviewee 23, 2021). This practice seems to specifically target places of worship based on perceived alignment with French values, further underlining the criteria for being recognized as an accepted Muslim.

During the state of emergency marked by an encouraged vigilance against potential terrorism, surveillance of Muslims manifested on both individual and institutional levels: *“If your neighbor thinks that you are a religious person, he/she calls the police, and you find yourself under house arrest or if you do not let your child to go to the swimming pool at school for religious reasons, the teacher reports you and you end up on the blacklist”* (Interviewee 14, 2021). Other surveillance practices such as profiling, stop and search, etc. were also exercised to discipline Muslims (Interviewee 23, 2021). *“They carried out continuous identity checks in Muslim neighborhoods”* (Interviewee 24, 2021). *“They started to spy on people’s phones, e-mails, and social media accounts. They blacklisted people who said, ‘I am not Charlie’. They raided their homes, monitored every move, every day”* (Interviewee 14, 2021). These created fear among the interviewees, prompting self-censorship of phone conversations, and online interactions, as well as behaving themselves in public: *“Every person could make a mistake. But I cannot because I am veiled”* (Interviewee 16, 2021). Moreover, few interviewees revealed that they have agreed to the interview at risk of being blacklisted. These participants have also warned me about the risk of being blacklisted only because I am conducting research on them (Interviewee 20; 25, 2021). One interviewee drew a parallel to a historical precedent, likening the situation to a contemporary rendition of old Al-Andalus where the Christian rulers established institutions to monitor Jews and Muslims newly converted to Christianity because of suspicion over whether they had genuinely adopted the religion (Interviewee 27, 2021). In this regard, the French government appears to strive for assurance regarding Muslims’ level of assimilation, their avoidance of public displays of faith, and their adherence to French values (Interviewee 27, 2021).

All in all, the trajectory of securitization in France, particularly in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, has underscored the complex interplay between security imperatives and the lives of Muslims. The exceptional measures have contributed to the emergence of a social environment in which suspicion, discrimination, and fear shape the daily experiences of Muslims. The security measures enacted have not only sought to regulate and mold religious expression according to French values but also fostered a divide between the accepted and non-accepted Muslim.

### **Conclusion**

In recent years, the relationship between religion and security has been one of the important themes in the security studies field. The research conducted on the securitization of religion and religious identities highlights the diverse contexts in which securitization processes occur and sheds light on the various impacts on communities affected by these processes of securitization. Securitized religious groups face discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2015), human rights violations (Baker-Beall & Clark, 2021), marginalization



(Howe, 2018), and exclusion (Banai & Kreide, 2017). This article contributes to this literature by documenting French Muslims' everyday lives and by showing how securitization is experienced by securitized objects.

From a theoretical standpoint, this article contributes to the debate between the Copenhagen School and the Paris School on the securitization process within specific contexts. In response to Bourbeau's (2014) call, the evidence presented in this article demonstrates that while the non-discursive approach of the Paris School is valuable for understanding the implementation of institutional control and restrictive policies aimed at eliminating the perceived threat, the Copenhagen School's discursive approach helps in understanding how the government and political elite in France utilized speech acts and extraordinary measures to define non-accepted Muslims. The regime of truth surrounding the mobilization of the *laïcité* principle, and the idea of an "Islam de France" involves a narrative that frames certain religious practices and expressions as incompatible with the republican fabric, ultimately defining the criteria for an accepted Muslim. This regime of truth is reinforced by exceptional measures after the attacks that contribute to the ongoing construction of what is deemed an acceptable Muslim.

The accounts of the interviewees indicate a harmonious balance between their Frenchness and their Islamic faith, but this balance is challenged by securitization. The prevailing narrative of acceptance and non-acceptance seeks to fragment and label, using tools like clothing choices and names as arbitrary criteria for inclusion. The state of emergency invoked after the attacks ushered in an array of measures that ostensibly aimed to counter terrorism. However, as revealed through interviews, the effects were often felt disproportionately by Muslims who were not in alignment with the perceived norms of religiosity.

The underlying principles of securitization theory propose that placing an emphasis on security could necessitate a temporary surrender of specific freedoms. Nevertheless, the narratives provided by the interviewees call into question the validity of deploying such extraordinary measures in the French context (Interviewee 12; 17; 18, 2021). Yet, the French government proceeded with their implementation. Several participants are of the opinion that the ultimate objective of this process is to curtail their liberties (Interviewee 4; 6; 12; 14; 15, 2021), resulting in the deterioration of the balance of security-freedom to the detriment of Muslims. Further analysis will thus necessitate considering the incorporation of extraordinary measures into ordinary legal frameworks, along with the utilization of bureaucratic practices to analyze the balance between security and freedom in France.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

**Acknowledgement:** I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Ceren Ark Yıldırım who supports this study.

---

## References

- Acolin, A., Bostic, R. & Painter, G. (2016) A field study of rental market discrimination across origins in France. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 95, 49-63. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2016.07.003>
- Agamben, G. (2005). *The State of Exception*, K. Attell (trans.) Chicago: Chicago University Press.

- Amnesty International. (2016). *Upturned Lives: The Disproportionate Impact of France's State of Emergency*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur21/3364/2016/en/>
- Aradau, C. (2004). The perverse politics of four-letter words: Risk and pity in the securitisation of human trafficking. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 33(2), 251–277. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298040330020101>
- Baele S. & Thomson, C. (2022) Securitization Theory. In Collins M (Ed.) *Contemporary Security Studies*, (pp. 173-185). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baker-Beall, C. & Clark, R. (2021). A “Post-Copenhagen” Analysis of China’s Securitization of the Uyghur: A Counterproductive Securitization? *Democracy and Security*, 17(4), 427-454. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2021.2020037>
- Balzacq, T. (2015) The ‘Essence’ of Securitization: Theory, Ideal Type, and a Sociological Science of Security. *International Relations* 29(1), 103-113. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814526606b>
- Balzacq, T. (2013). Les études de sécurité. In T. Balzacq and F. Ramel (Ed.), *Traité de Relations Internationales*, (pp. 685-716). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Banai, A. & Kreide, R. (2017). Securitization of migration in Germany: The Ambivalences of Citizenship and Human Rights. *Citizenship Studies*, 21(8), 903-917. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2017.1380649>
- Barras, A. (2013). Sacred Laïcité and the Politics of Religious Resurgence in France: Whither Religious Pluralism? *Mediterranean Politics*, 18(2), 276-293. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2013.799345>
- Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives* 27, 63-92. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S105>
- Bigo, D. (2008). Globalized (In)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon. In D. Bigo and A. Tsoukala (Ed.), *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11*, (pp. 10-48). Oxon: Routledge.
- Blavignat, Y. (2018, July 27). L’affaire des «foulards de Creil» : la République laïque face au voile islamique. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2018/07/27/01016-20180727ARTFIG00053-l-affaire-des-foulards-de-creil-la-republique-laïque-face-au-voile-islamique.php>
- Brown, K. E. (2010). Contesting the Securitization of British Muslims Citizenship and Resistance. *Interventions*, 12(2) 171-182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2010.489690>
- Brown, K. (2008). The Promise and Perils of Women’s Participation in UK Mosques: The Impact of Securitisation Agendas on Identity, Gender and Community. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 10(3) 472-491. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2008.00324.x>
- Bonino, S. (2012). Policing Strategies against Islamic Terrorism in the UK after 9/11: The Socio-Political Realities for British Muslims. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 32(1), 5-31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2012.665619>
- Bosco, R. M. (2014). *Securing the Sacred*. Michigan: Michigan University Press.
- Bourbeau, P. (2014). Moving forward together: Logics of the securitisation process. *Millennium*, 43(1), 187-206. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814541504>
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- C.A.S.E. Collective. (2006). Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto. *Security Dialogue* 37(4), 443-487. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606073085>
- Cesari, J. (2012). Securitization of Islam in Europe. *Die Welt des Islams*, 52(3-4), 430-449. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15700607-201200A8>
- Chevènement, J. P. (1997, November 23). *Déclaration de M. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, ministre de l’intérieur chargé des cultes, sur l’histoire des relations entre l’Etat et les religions, l’attachement au maintien du régime du Concordat en Alsace Moselle et sur les voies de l’intégration d’un Islam à la française*. [Speech transcript]. Vie Publique. Retrieved from <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/207645-declaration-de-m-jean-pierre-chevenement-ministre-de-linterieur-charge>
- Clavel, G. (2016, January 13). Sondage: deux mois après, l’état d’urgence jugé justifié par 77% des français. *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from [https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/actualites/article/sondage-deux-mois-apres-l-etat-d-urgence-juge-justifie-par-77-des-francais-exclusif\\_70134.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/actualites/article/sondage-deux-mois-apres-l-etat-d-urgence-juge-justifie-par-77-des-francais-exclusif_70134.html)
- Cohen, R. (2020, December 9). France Takes on Islamist Extremism with New Bill. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/world/europe/france-islamist-extremism-bill.html>
- Communiqué. (2021). Retrieved from <https://www.cfm-officiel.fr/presentation-de-la-charte-des-principes-pour-lislam-de-france-au-president-de-la-republique/>
- Coroller, C. & Licht, D. (2003, February 21). On ne modifiera pas la loi de 1905. *Libération*. Retrieved from [https://www.liberation.fr/france/2003/02/21/on-ne-modifiera-pas-la-loi-de-1905\\_431569/](https://www.liberation.fr/france/2003/02/21/on-ne-modifiera-pas-la-loi-de-1905_431569/)
- Cinalli, M. & Van Hauwarrt, S. M. (2021). Contentious Politics and Congruence across Policy and Public Spheres: The Case of Muslims in France. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 44(14), 2532- 2550. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1831567>
- Crawford, A. & Hutchinson, S. (2015). Mapping the Contours of ‘Everyday Security’: Time, Space and Emotion. *The British Journal of Criminology* 56(6), 1184-1202. <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azv121>
- Croft, S. (2012). *Securitising Islam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Edmunds, J. (2011). The “new” barbarians: governmentality, securitization and Islam in Western Europe.

- Contemporary Islam*, 6(1), 67-84. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-011-0159-6>
- Elbe, S. (2006). Should HIV/AIDS be securitized? The ethical dilemmas of linking HIV/AIDS and security. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(1), 119–144. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00395.x>
- En Marche. (2017). Le programme d'Emmanuel Macron concernant les questions religieuses et la laïcité. Retrieved from <https://en-marche.fr/emmanuel-macron/le-programme/questions-religieuses-et-laicite>
- Eroukhanoff, C. (2015). The Remote Securitisation of Islam in the US post-9/11: Euphemisation, Metaphors and the 'Logic of Expected Consequences' in Counter-radicalisation Discourse. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 8(2), 246-265. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2015.1053747>
- Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis The Critical Study of Language*, London and New York: Longman.
- Fassin, D. & Mazouz, S. (2009). What Is It to Become French? Naturalization as a Republican Rite of Institution. *Revue Française de Sociologie* 50(5), 37-64. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfs.505.0037>
- Fellag, N. (2014). The Muslim Label: How French North Africans Have Become "Muslims" and not "Citizens". *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 13(4), 1-25. Retrieved from <http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2014/Fellag>
- Fortier, A. M. (2008). *Multicultural Horizons: Diversity and the Limits of the Civil Nation*. London: Routledge.
- Fox, J. & Akbaba, Y. (2015). Securitization of Islam and Religious Discrimination: Religious Minorities in Western Democracies 1990-2008. *Comparative European Politics* 13, 175-197. <https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2013.8>
- Fredette, J. (2014). *Constructing Muslims in France Discourse, Public Identity, and the Politics of Citizenship*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Frégosi, F. (2008). *Penser l'Islam dans la Laïcité*. Paris: Fayard.
- Foner, N. & Alba, R. (2008). Immigrant religion in the US and Western Europe: Bridge or barrier to inclusion? *International Migration Review*, 42(2), 360-392. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27645255>
- Galonnier, J. (2015). The Racialization of Muslims in France and United States: Some Insights from White Converts to Islam. *Social Compass*, 62(4), 570-583. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768615601966>
- Hajjat, A. (2013). Retour sur la Marche pour l'Égalité et Contre le Racisme. *Hommes & Migrations* 1304, 151-155. <https://doi.org/10.4000/hommesmigrations.2677>
- Hammersley, M. (1990). *Reading Ethnographic Research: A Critical Guide*. London: Longman.
- Hennette-Vauchez, S., Kalogirou, M., Klausser, N., Roulhac, C., Salma, S. & Souty, V. (2018). Ce Que le Contentieux Administratif Révèle de l'Etat d'Urgence. *Cultures & Conflits* 112, 35-74. <https://doi.org/10.4000/conflits.20546>
- Hollande, F. (2015a, January 7). *Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, à la suite de l'attentat au siège de l'hebdomadaire "Charlie Hebdo"* [Speech transcript]. Vie Publique. Retrieved from <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/193484-francois-hollande-07012015-attentat-au-siege-hebdomadaire-charlie-hebdo>
- Hollande, F. (2015b, January 9). *Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur l'attentat contre l'hebdomadaire "Charlie Hebdo", le meurtre d'une policière et les deux prises d'otages des 7, 8 et 9 janvier 2015* [Speech transcript]. Elysée. Retrieved from <https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-13247-fr.pdf>
- Hollande, F. (2015c, January 14). *Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur la politique de défense de la France* [Speech transcript]. Vie Publique. Retrieved from <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/193547-francois-hollande-14012015-politique-de-defense-de-la-france>
- Hollande, F. (2015d, November 16). *Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, devant le Parlement réuni en Congrès à la suite des attaques terroristes perpétrées à Paris et en Seine-Saint-Denis, Versailles le 16 novembre 2015* [Speech transcript]. Vie Publique. Retrieved from <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/196856-declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-devant>
- Howe, A. E. (2018). Discourses of Exclusion: The Societal Securitization of Burma's Rohingya (2012-2018). *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 5(3), 245-266. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797018799000>
- Huysmans, J. (2002). Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security. *Alternatives*, 27(1\_suppl), 41-62. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S104>
- Huysmans, J. (1998). The Question of the Limit: Desecuritization and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 27(3), 569-589. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298980270031301>
- IFOP. (2016). *Les Français et l'état d'urgence*. Retrieved from [https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/3434-1-study\\_file.pdf](https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/3434-1-study_file.pdf)
- Jackson, R. (2007). Constructing Enemies? 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse. *Government and Opposition* 42(3), 394-426. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x>
- Jouanneau, S. (2009). Régulariser ou Non un Imam Etranger en France: Droit de Séjour et Définition du 'Bon Imam' en Pays Laïque. *Politix* 89(2), 146-166. <https://doi.org/10.3917/pox.086.0147>
- Jouanneau, S. (2018). The Reinvented Role of Imams in French Society. In M. Hashas, J. J. de Ruiter & N. V. Vinding (Ed.) *Imams in Western Europe Developments, Transformations, and Institutional Challenges* (pp. 143-164). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

- Kuru, A. T. (2009). *Secularism and state policies toward religion: The United States, France and Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lægaard, S. (2019). Religious Toleration and Securitization of Religion. In L. Bialasiewicz & V. Gentile (Ed.) *Spaces of Tolerance Changing Geographies and Philosophies of Religion in Today's Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Laurence, J. & Vaisse, J. (2006). *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Washington: The Brookings Institution Press.
- Laustsen, C. B. & Wæver, O. (2000). In Defense of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 29(3), 705-739. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290031601>
- Lizotte, C. (2020). Laïcité as assimilation, laïcité as negotiation: Political geographies of secularism in the French public school. *Political Geography*, 77. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102121>
- Macron, E. (2020, October 2). *Fight against separatism – the Republic in action* [Speech transcript]. Elysée. Retrieved from <https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/10/02/fight-against-separatism-the-republic-in-action-speech-by-emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-republic-on-the-fight-against-separatism>
- Mavelli, L. (2013). Between Normalisation and Exception: The Securitisation of Islam and Construction of the Secular Subject. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 42(2), 159-181. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829812463655>
- McDonald, M. (2011). Deliberation and resecuritization: Australia, asylum-seekers and the normative limits of the Copenhagen School. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 46(2), 281-295. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2011.568471>
- Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche. (2015). *Grande Mobilisation de l'École pour les valeurs de la République*. Retrieved from <https://www.gouvernement.fr/actualite/grande-mobilisation-de-l-ecole-pour-les-valeurs-de-la-republique>
- Naseem, J. & Adnan, W. (2019). Being Second Generation Muslim Woman in the French Labour Market: Understanding Dynamics of (Visibility of) Religion and Gender in Labour Market Access, Outcome and Experiences. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 61, 79-83. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2019.02.003>
- Perry, B. (2001). *In the Name of the Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes*. New York: Routledge.
- Polońska-Kimunguyi, E. & Gillespie, M. (2016). Terrorism discourse on French international broadcasting: France 24 and the case of Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris. *European Journal of Communication*, 31(5), 568–583. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323116669453>
- Saiya, N. (2018). Confronting Apocalyptic Terrorism: Lessons from France and Japan. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 43(9), 775-795. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1499694>
- Sarkozy, N. (2003). *Musulmans de France* [Speech transcript]. Religioscope. Retrieved from <https://www.religion.info/2003/04/21/document-musulmans-de-france-discours-de-nicolas-sarkozy-au-bourget/>
- Schain, M. A. (2006). The Extreme-Right and Immigration Policy-making: Measuring Direct and Indirect Effects. *West European Politics* 29(2), 270-289. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500512619>
- Sénat. (2016). *Rapport d'Information fait au nom de la mission d'information sur l'organisation, la place et le financement de l'Islam en France et de ses lieux de culte* (No. 757). Paris, France: Sénat.
- Shipoli, E. A. (2018). *Islam, Securitization, and US Foreign Policy*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Silvestri, S. (2010). Public Policies towards Muslims and the Institutionalization of “Moderate Islam” in Europe: Some Critical Reflections. In A. Triandafyllidou (Ed.) *Muslims in 21st Century Europe*, London: Routledge.
- Simon, P. (2012). French National Identity and Integration: Who Belongs to National Community? *Migration Policy Institute*. Retrieved from <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FrenchIdentity.pdf>
- Stasi Commission. (2003). *Rapport au Président de la République*. Retrieved from <https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/034000725.pdf>
- Valfort, M. A. (2017). La Religion, Facteur de Discrimination à l'Embauche en France? *Revue Economique*, 68(5), 895-907. <https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.pr3.0101>
- Valfort, M. A. (2015). Discriminations Religieuses à l'Embauche: Une Réalité. *Institut Montaigne*. Retrieved from [https://www.institutmontaigne.org/ressources/pdfs/publications/20150824\\_Etude%20discrimination.pdf](https://www.institutmontaigne.org/ressources/pdfs/publications/20150824_Etude%20discrimination.pdf)
- Wæver, O. (1995). Securitization and Desecuritization. R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.) *On Security* New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wilkinson, C. (2007). The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe? *Security Dialogue*, 38(5), 5-25. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010607075964>
- Zeghal, M. (2005). La constitution du Conseil Français du Culte Musulman : reconnaissance politique d'un Islam français ? *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 129, 97-113. <https://doi.org/10.4000/assr.1113>



## A Farewell to Arms in the 21st Century: The Case of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front\*

### 21. Yüzyılda Silahlara Veda: Moro İslami Kurtuluş Cephesi Örneği

Yunus Çolak<sup>1</sup>

#### Abstract

This study examined the policy change of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) during the 21st century and offered an explanatory typology for changes in the secessionist movements' aims and/or means through which they pursue their aims. It is possible to find studies that analyze the disarmament of the MILF and renouncing its goal for independence as a policy change in the 21st Century with reference to the involvement of international third parties, the determination to the leaders of the parties for peace, and the military balance in the field. Although all these perspectives are very helpful to understand MILF's policy change, this study argues that the above-mentioned change has occurred as a result of the change in MILF leadership's perceptions of the international conjuncture and great power politics in the 21st century. In addition, C. F. Hermann's typology of changes regarding states' foreign policies adapted to secessionist movements with a few additions and exclusions to analyze MILF's policy changes during the 21st Century. Thus, according to this typology, during the 21st century, a "problem/goal change" has occurred in the MILF policy, which has renounced the goal for independence, settling for autonomy. The source of this "problem/goal change" is categorized as a "leader-driven change" under the influence of an "external shock."

**Keywords:** Philippines, Secessionist Movements, Separatism, Mindanao, MILF

#### Öz

Bu çalışma, Moro İslami Kurtuluş Cephesi (MILF)'nin 21. Yüzyıldaki siyasa değişimini incelemiş ve ayrılıkçı hareketlerin amaçlarındaki ve/veya amaçlarına ulaşmak için tercih ettikleri araçlarındaki değişimlere dair açıklayıcı bir tipoloji sunmuştur. MILF'nin 21. Yüzyılda silah bırakarak bağımsızlık amacından vazgeçmesi neticesinde yaşanan siyasa değişimini, uluslararası üçüncü tarafların devreye girmesi, tarafların liderlerinin barış konusundaki kararlılığı ve sahadaki askeri dengeye referansla analiz eden çalışmalara rastlamak mümkündür. Tüm bu analizler bu siyasa değişimini anlamak için önemli olsa da bu çalışma bu değişimin, MILF liderliğinin 21. Yüzyıldaki uluslararası konjonktür ve büyük güç siyasetine dair eskisine nazaran değişen algılamalarının bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıktığını ileri sürmektedir. Ayrıca çalışma kapsamında, C. F. Hermann'ın devletlerin dış politikalarındaki değişime dair tipolojisi, birkaç ekleme ve çıkarmayla birlikte ayrılıkçı hareketlerdeki siyasa değişimlerine uyarlanmış ve böylece MILF'nin 21. Yüzyıldaki siyasa değişimi analiz edilmiştir. Bu tipolojiye göre 21. Yüzyılda bağımsızlık hedefinden vazgeçip özerkliği kabul eden MILF'nin siyasasında bir "problem/amaç değişimi" yaşanmıştır. Bu "problem/amaç değişiminin" kaynağı ise, "dış şok" unsurlarının etkisi altında, "lider güdümlü değişim" olarak kategorize edilmiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Filipinler, Ayrılıkçı Hareketler, Ayrılıkçılık, Mindanao, MILF

\* This article has been adapted from the author's Ph.D. dissertation titled "Transformation of Secessionist Movements in the 21st Century from Armed Struggle to Disarming: The Case of MILF and LTTE," which is successfully defended on March 13, 2023.

**1 Corresponding Author:** Yunus Çolak, (Dr.), Independent Researcher. Istanbul, Türkiye. E mail: yunuscolaktr@gmail.com  
ORCID: 0000-0002-1935-1965

**To cite this article:** Colak, Y. (2023). A farewell to arms in the 21<sup>st</sup> century: the case of the moro islamic liberation front. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 279–295. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1249989>



## Introduction

Under what conditions would an armed secessionist movement aiming for independence give up this goal? This question first arose during a visit to Cotabato, Philippines, in January 2019 of the author of this paper. At the time, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a former secessionist movement, was campaigning for a referendum scheduled for January 21, 2019, and was preparing to participate in the state mechanism as a legitimate part of the Philippines.

Before addressing the above question, it is essential to define a secessionist movement. Although various definitions are applicable in the relevant literature (Cunningham, 2014, pp. 1–19; Radan, 2023, pp. 30–35; Sambanis, Germann, & Schädel, 2018, pp. 3–4; Sorens, 2012, p. 9), Coggins' definition of secessionist movements is preferred in this paper. According to her (2011, p. 454), a secessionist movement should be defined as a “nationalist group attempting to separate from one state in order to create a newly independent state for its people.” Furthermore, Coggins puts forward specific conditions, such as a declaration of independence, a unique national flag, and a sovereignty claim for a territory to be considered a secessionist movement. While Coggins (2014, pp. 42 & 225) includes groups seeking independence within the framework of decolonization in her definition of secessionist movements, she does not include movements aiming for autonomy.

The primary focus of this paper is to analyze why MILF gave up its fight for independence and chose to disarm in the 21st century. One of the most commonly cited explanations for this decision is I. William Zartman (2001, pp. 22–31)'s concept of “ripeness.” According to studies referring to Zartman's ripeness theory as an explanatory tool, reaching the “mutual hurting stalemate” is the main reason for the MILF to give up its independence and settle for autonomy (Caculitan, 2005 pp. 34-35; Tanrıverdi, 2018b, pp. 109–110; Taufik, 2016). While some studies explain this process with the successful involvement of third parties (Klimesova, 2016, pp. 214–226; Ochiai, 2016, p. 37) attribute this policy change to multiple factors. For example, Abuza (2016, pp. 111–112) lists these factors as the decrease of support for the MILF by the war-weary people of the region, the weakened military power of the MILF compared to the past, MILF leader Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim's leadership prioritized peace, and the international community's support for the peace process. Similarly, Santos (2010, pp. 76–81), emphasizes the internationalization of the issue and MILF's realization that it could not defeat the Philippine Army. Authors such as Abubakar and Askandar (2019, pp. 171–172) emphasize the effect of both internationalization and the leaders' determination for peace. In addition, Tanrıverdi (2017, p. 57) highlights the determining role of Philippine presidents in the process. According to Bertrand (2021, p. 3), the successful peace process between the MILF and the Philippine Government is the outcome of the Philippines' democratization movement, which has grown and solidified over time.

The primary deficiency in the literature analyzing MILF's aim and/or strategy change is the lack of analysis regarding the extent to which MILF decision-makers' perceptions of the structure and functioning of the international system, influenced their decision to make this change. The main claim of this paper is that this fundamental policy change of the MILF in the 21st Century should be analyzed within the framework of MILF's

decision-making elite(s)' perceptions of the functioning, characteristics, and great powers' politics of the international system.

The introduction part of this paper will be followed by a discussion about how policy changes in secessionist movements can be categorized. Under this part, the typology proposed by Charles F. Hermann for the analysis of the changes in the foreign policies of states will be adapted to the policy changes of secessionist movements. Then, in the following part, the historical process where the MILF gave up its goal of an independent state by disarmament will be analyzed regarding the explanatory typology developed within the framework of this paper. Finally, the main findings of the study and suggestions for further studies will be discussed in the conclusion.

### **Analyzing the Aim and Strategy Changes in Secessionist Movements**

How can the triggers and extent of the policy change in secessionist movements be categorized? As far as this study is concerned, no detailed typology or explanatory model categorizes the sources and extent of the change in the goals and means of secessionist movements. Thus, this paper argues that Charles F. Hermann's typology of the primary change agents and extent of change as presented in his explanatory model regarding the change in states' foreign policies could be adapted to secessionist movements. The reason for choosing Hermann's model among the models that assess the change in the foreign policies of states (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014; Carlsnaes, 1993; Doerer, 2013; Goldman, 1982; Gustavson, 1999; Holsti, 2016; Lee, 2012; Legro, 2005; Rosati, 1994; Welch, 2005) is that, as argued by Haesebrouck and Joly (2020, pp. 2-4 & 7), Hermann offers a multi-layered, comprehensive and explanatory perspective compared to the other models or explanations.

In the scholarly work entitled "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy" by Hermann (1990), the central focus lies on exploring the circumstances under which states determine that their existing foreign policy is "seriously inadequate, mistaken, or no longer applicable." He focuses not on a "foreign policy redirection" arising from regime change or state transformation, but on foreign policy changes exercised by the decision-maker, which Hermann calls "self-correction" (Hermann, 1990, p. 5).

Hermann argues that there are four primary agents of the change in the foreign policies of states, which are: "Leader-driven," "bureaucratic advocacy," "external shock," and "domestic restructuring." According to him, a leader-driven change can be realized by a leader who has "...the conviction, power, and energy to compel his government to change course" (Hermann, 1990, p. 12). Moreover, bureaucratic advocacy is a foreign policy change that begins when middle-level officials with access to the government persuade decision-makers to change. According to Hermann's typology, when a politically active community triggers a foreign policy change, it is categorized as domestic restructuring. He states that a foreign policy change within this framework occurs "...when elites with power to legitimate the government either change their views or themselves alter in composition-perhaps with the regime itself" (Hermann, 1990, p. 12).

While the above-stated three sources of the change in foreign policy are elements that can be considered internal to the state, Hermann also puts forward the concept of an external shock as an exogenous source of change to the state. According to him (1990, p. 12) "...external shocks are large events in terms of visibility and immediate impact on the recipient. They cannot be ignored, and they can trigger major foreign policy change..." In conclusion, these four primary agents of foreign policy change of the state might occur at different times or in parallel with each other, or even they can trigger each other.

Hermann has developed four typologies concerning the "extent of foreign policy change" as he calls it. He defined smaller-scale changes in foreign policy without a change in the goals or methods/means as "adjustment changes." Hermann further used the term program change to categorize the situation where the goal of foreign policy does not change but the methods or means adopted within the framework of such a goal change. He categorized the complete change of the foreign policy goal and the state's adoption of a different goal as "problem/goal change." Finally, according to Hermann, the rarest type of foreign policy change, which he categorizes as "international orientation change", refers to changing foreign policy to adapt to international cyclical changes. Hermann argues that this change is not limited to the change of a single policy but can lead to changes in multiple policies (Hermann, 1990, p. 5).

How can Hermann's typology be applied to secessionist movements? Firstly, Hermann's typology aims to understand the change in states' foreign policies. Naturally, the structural differences between states and non-state actors should be considered when adapting this typology to secessionist movements. In this sense, there are major differences between the states and the secessionist movements regarding structure, power capacity, and functioning. However, states and secessionist movements also have similarities, making Hermann's typology applicable to secessionist movements' policy changes. First of all, secessionist movements, just like states, have a decision-making mechanism, albeit smaller. There is even a bureaucratic structure with detailed procedures for decision-making, with a focus on technical issues within many secessionist movements. Besides, as another similarity with the states, secessionist movements are actors that follow and are affected by developments in the international and regional system. Moreover, Hermann's typology offers a holistic analysis at the level of the international system, the state, and the secessionist movement. When adapting Hermann's typology to secessionist movements, it is inevitable to make some modifications while preserving the essence of the typology.






Figure 1. Typology for the policy change in secessionist movements based on Hermann's typology

Within the framework given above, the primary change agent in Hermann's typology applies to secessionist movements, as seen in *Figure 1*. A leader-driven change in the goals and/or means of a secessionist movement is a quite common among them because the perceptions of the leader, or more broadly, the members of the decision-making mechanism, are critical to policy changes in secessionist movements. As Doctor (2020, p. 6) argues, a complete understanding of the nature of the secessionist movement requires a complete understanding of its leadership. All the factors related to change can only have an impact by passing through the leader's or decision-makers' perception filter. Thus, many studies observe the change in the goals and means of the secessionist movement with regard to leader-related factors (Acosta, Huang, & Silverman, 2022; Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham & Sawyer, 2019; Doctor, 2020; Jadoon, Mines, & Milton, 2022; Prorok, 2018; Tiernay, 2015).

As mentioned above, many secessionist movements have a specific decision-making mechanism and a kind of bureaucratic structure. Some secessionist movements even regulate the social and economic lives of the civilian population in the regions where they have established territorial control through the governance system they have created within the framework of local bureaucratic structures (Arjona, Kasfir & Mampilly, 2015, pp. 1-20). But this structure, which is mainly divided into a military and political wing, is quite dynamic and more open to change compared to the states (Cunningham, 2014, pp. 30-31). Therefore, the bureaucratic structure of secessionist movements can significantly influence the movement's primary goals and means. When the agents of this structure drive a policy change of the movement, such changes can be categorized as bureaucratic advocacy. Additionally, the inverse of this situation is also conceivable. That is to say, the bureaucracy of the separatist movement may hinder the alteration of the movement's policies. For instance, as Smith argues, the peace talks between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Sri Lanka in 2002-2006 failed because the LTTE's military hierarchy did not allow the LTTE to transform into a political actor (Smith, 2008, pp. 216-221).

External shock, another element in Hermann's typology, can also lead the change in the aims and means of secessionist movements. For example, LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran

stated that they agreed to the ceasefire in 1987 due to Indian pressure: “When a mighty super-power has determined to decide the political destiny of our people, it is beyond our ability to anything” (Balasingham, 2004, p. 111). Moreover, the norms, rules, and especially the recognition regime in the international system have an impact on the change in the aims and means of secessionist movements as another type of the external shock (Caspersen, 2012; Griffiths, 2021; Fazal & Griffiths, 2014). As Griffiths (2023, pp. 207–217) argues, the international system is a “strategic playing field” with specific rules comprised of secessionist movements and states. Secessionist movements, which are involved in a “sovereignty game” in this field, may change their goals and means as the rules of the “game” change (Griffiths, 2023, pp. 207–217).

Finally, domestic restructuring as primary agent for policy change in Hermann’s typology can be adapted to the policy changes of secessionist movements with certain additions. Hermann considers domestic restructuring when the decision-makers are driven to a policy change for internal political reasons such as public opinion. Secessionist movements, on the other hand, similarly base their legitimacy, especially for the use of violence, on a group or community they claim to represent. Thus, Hermann’s domestic restructuring also applies to the secessionist movements. At this point, the community that Hermann defines as “politically relevant segment of society” (1990, p. 12) is the people who support the secessionist movement actively. In this sense, domestic restructuring as a source of policy change in secessionist movements has two main elements. The first of these elements is the fragmentation within the secessionist movements. It is possible to find many studies in the literature which reveal that fragmentation has a transforming effect on the policies of the secessionist movements (Bakke, Cunningham, & Seymour, 2012; Kathleen G. Cunningham, 2014; Austin C. Doctor, 2021; Krause, 2017; Smith, 2008; Walch, 2016). In this framework, fragmentation within the secessionist movement that occurs when a group breaks away from the movement may force the decision-makers to reconsider its central aims and/or strategies, as it will weaken the movement in every sense. For example, when Karuna, the commander of LTTE’s eastern troops, left the LTTE along with 6,000 others under his command, that led to an important reduction in LTTE’s human resources, resulting in a significant weakening of its military power (Bandarage, 2009, p. 198). Weakening of the LTTE military power was one of the factors that paved the way for the military defeat and the resulting policy change a few years later.

The second element in terms of domestic restructuring is the change in the attitude of the hostile state. This aspect, which is not included in Hermann’s typology, is essential for changing the policies of secessionist movements. Indeed, secessionist movements, first and foremost, try to persuade the hostile state to accept their demands. This makes the hostile state central to the secessionist movement’s policies within the domestic restructuring framework. Moreover, many studies show that parameters such as the hostile state’s regime, economic situation (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011; Collier & Hoeffler, 2006; Cunningham, 2014) and the form of government (Brancati, 2006, p. 52) impact the emergence, goals, and means of secessionist movements.

Based on Hermann’s typology, it is possible to categorize the policy changes of secessionist movements into four different groups, as shown in *Figure 1*. The “Adjustment

change” category is for the minor changes in the policies of secessionist movements, just like states. “Program change” can be used to categorize policy changes in which secessionist movements shift from peaceful means to armed struggle or vice versa without changing their goals. At this point, the ceasefire agreements frequently executed by secessionist movements can be categorized as a program change. “Problem/goal changes” can be used to categorize a fundamental change in the secessionist movements’ main aim. Since the main aim of the secessionist movements is to obtain independence, if any fundamental change occurs in this aim, it can be categorized as a problem/goal change. For example, the Free Aceh Movement’s signing of a disarmament agreement with the Indonesian Government in 2005 (Shea, 2019, pp. 28–30) is a problem/goal change for the movement. “Defeat” is another category that needs to be added to the typology of the policy changes of secessionist movements, as an addition to Hermann’s typology. Indeed, it is always possible for secessionist movements, especially those carrying out an armed struggle, to get weaker in military terms and eventually disappear by getting defeated. Since the secessionist movements would cease their activities under those circumstances, their basic policies would change, too. The main difference of this situation from problem/goal changes is that, unlike problem/goal changes, fundamental policy changes caused by defeat are not a choice but a necessity for the secessionist movement. The most obvious example is LTTE’s defeat against the Sri Lankan Army in the 4th Eelam War (Hashim, 2019, pp. 345–346).

Finally, it should be noted that the foreign policy change categorized by Hermann as international orientation change is not relevant for secessionist movements. According to Hermann, this change is the modification of all the goals and means of a state with multiple foreign policy objectives to adapt to the change in the international conjuncture. However, unlike states, secessionist movements have a single major policy objective, which is to achieve independence. Therefore, the most fundamental policy change of secessionist movements is the change of aim, which Hermann categorizes as a problem/goal change. As a result, international orientation change was left out when adapting Hermann’s typology to secessionist movements. Instead, defeat was added in reference to the extinction of the secessionist movement.

### **Establishment, Structure, Aim and Means of the MILF**

The Moro conflict, in essence, is the secessionist struggle of the Muslim minority living in the regions of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan in the southern Philippines, known as Bangsamoro, against the Philippine Government. While some scholars see this conflict as religious-based (Majul, 1973, p. 93; Stark, 2003, pp. 197–198), others emphasize the Philippines’ modernization process (Hui, 2012, pp. 5–15), the economic aspect of the conflict (Che Man, 1987, p. 39), and the effect of the different identities (Hernandez, 2014, p. 25).

It was only in the 1960s that the Moro problem produced its own organized secessionist movement. In this sense, the Muslim Independent Movement (MIM), founded in 1968 by Datu<sup>1</sup> Utlog Matalam, was the first organized secessionist movement to fight for

1 *Datus* are local leaders of settlements of about 100 people called *Barangays*. They were basically responsible for the safety and well-being of the people living in the *Barangays* they led. In this respect, serving as a Datu refers to both a political position and a social class (Scott, 1994, pp. 5 and 128–131).

independence in the Moro region (Mckenna, 1998, pp. 144–148). Then, in 1972, after the dissolution of the MIM, Nur Misuari founded the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which was more broad-based and organized than the MIM. The MNLF, led by Misuari, initially pursued independence and initiated an armed struggle to achieve that objective. However, the group later abandoned the secessionist struggle and embraced the concept of autonomy through agreements signed with the Philippine Government in 1976 and 1996, with mediation from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (UN Peacemaker, 1976, 1996).

Within this background, the MILF was initiated by Salamat Hashim in 1977, fragmented from the MNLF, and it was officially established in March 1984. Hashim actively participated in the struggle in Moro at a young age, took part in the movement's Central Committee with the establishment of the MNLF, and even chaired the foreign relations committee (Ferrer, 2020, p. 31; Macasalong, 2014, p. 7). Hashim defined the MILF's main goal as to “establish Islam in the Bangsamoro homeland...” (Mckenna, 1998, p. 208). Unlike the MNLF, the MILF used Islam as a unifying ideology, blending it with history, as Liow (2016, p. 97) argues.

Analysis of the MILF's organizational structure reveals a strict hierarchical structure. At the top of this structure are the Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal, the Kajles Shura, and the Central Committee. While Kajles Shura serves as a kind of advisory council, the Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal is a supreme court within the MILF that enforces Sharia law and is able to give binding decisions in this regard (Ferrer, 2020, p. 40).

On the other hand, the Central Committee, as the main decision-making body of the MILF, consists of approximately 12 members, including the MILF Chairman, Vice-Chairman for Military Affairs, Vice-Chairman for Political Affairs, and Vice-Chairman for Islamic Affairs. Members of the Central Committee are selected from MILF-dominated regions based on several criteria, such as tribe and profession. In addition, 11 subcommittees working under the committee secretariat provide technical and administrative support to the MILF leader and the Central Committee in their respective fields. There is also a similar structure at the regional, municipal, and even *Barangay* levels, provided that it is subordinate to the central administration (Che Man, 1987, p. 284). As a result, the Central Committee is at the core of the movement's decision-making structure. Therefore, while collective leadership and a culture of consultation are the hallmarks of the MILF as Hashim argues, the final decision is taken by the MILF leader (Haşimi, 2019, p. 43).

### **MILF's Policy During the Twenty-One Century**

The MILF and the Government of the Philippines signed a ceasefire in 1997 (UN Peacemaker, 1997) and although the parties started peace talks after that date, this situation could only last until 2000. In 2000, the Philippine President Joseph E. Estrada suspended the peace talks, and the Philippine Government launched an “all-out-war” against the MILF (Abuza, 2005, p. 455). In response, the MILF declared an “all-out jihad” on July 12, 2000, (Jeffery, 2021, p. 186) but could never make up for its military losses (Abuza, 2016, p. 75). It was only in 2001 that a ceasefire was restored between the

parties when G. M. Arroyo became President of the Philippines. In this respect, Arroyo declared the all-out-peace policy by emphasizing the necessity of achieving peace within the framework of constitutional processes based on the Presidential Order No. 3 that was issued on February 28, 2001 (GOVPH, 2001). In response, the MILF Central Committee laid down four conditions: (1) acceptance of the validity of the previous agreements between the parties; (2) holding talks in a neutral third country; (3) appointment of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) or a third country that is a member to the OIC, to serve as facilitator; (4) and the retreat of Philippine troops from areas that were under the control of the MILF before 2000. The Arroyo government accepted these conditions, and peace talks between the parties began in Malaysia (Jubair, 2007, pp. 35-36).

In this framework, firstly, the “Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks” was signed in Malaysia on March 24, 2001. Then the “Agreement on Peace Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front” was signed in Libya on June 22, 2001. The ceasefire and peace talks included these agreements to cover the previous agreements, and it was agreed that peace talks would focus on security, rehabilitation, and the ancestral domain. Moreover, the concepts of the Bangsamoro homeland and the Bangsamoro people were used in an official treaty for the first time (UN Peacemaker, 2001a). As a result of these talks, the ceasefire was reaffirmed with the “Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspects of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001” dated August 7, 2001 (UN Peacemaker, 2001b). Furthermore, with the “Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001” signed on May 7, 2002, it was agreed that the Philippine Government would make development investments in the Bangsamoro region (Peace Agreement Database, 2001).

While talks between the Philippine Government and the MILF yielded quick results on security and rehabilitation, the same cannot be said for the ancestral domain issue, which is one of the most important issues for the MILF. The Philippine Armed Forces’ attack in February 2003 on Camp Buliok, which was then the MILF’s headquarters camp, brought the parties back to a state of war, but on July 19, 2003, the parties signed a ceasefire again and resumed negotiations on the ancestral domain issue (Hernandez, 2014, p. 199; Klimesova, 2016, p. 207).

After five years of negotiations, the parties agreed to sign the “Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 (MoA-AD).” This memorandum of agreement was to create an autonomous Bangsamoro region in the south of the Philippines with all the powers and responsibilities of the state, such as education, infrastructure services, judiciary, police force, etc., which would replace the “Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)” that was created in 1996 (UN Peacemaker, 2008). However, one day before the scheduled signing of the memorandum, the Philippine Supreme Court annulled it on October 18, 2008, declaring that it was against the Philippine Constitution (Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2008). Even though this annulment led to a short break in the peace talks, the ceasefire was mainly sustained, and talks were able to resume in 2009. This process accelerated further in 2010 when Benigno S. Aquino III took office. Indeed, as Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim stated, the

meeting between Aquino and Ebrahim in 2011 was a turning point for the peace process (Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, 2022; DPI, 2016, pp. 201–202). Finally, the parties signed the “Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)” on October 15, 2012, followed by the “Comprehensive agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)” on March 27, 2014, marking an important step towards successfully ending the peace process that faltered in 2008. With these agreements, it was decided to establish the “Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM)”, which recognizes Moro identity and has broad military, economic, administrative, and judicial powers (UN Peacemaker, 2012, 2014). Indeed, with some amendments to the CAB and with the support of Rodrigo Duterte, the 16th President of the Philippines, the MILF officially renounced independence and started the disarmament process after acceptance by both wings of the Philippine Congress in 2018 (Bertrand, 2021, pp. 169–171).

### **Analyzing the Aim and Strategy Changes in MILF in the Twenty-One Century**

The MILF’s change of goals and means/strategies can be analyzed in light of the typology presented in this paper. Firstly, as it is given above, the MILF officially renounced its bid for independence by signing both the “Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)” and the “Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)” agreements. These pivotal agreements led to the establishment of the “Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM)”, where the MILF assumed a leading role. This marked a dramatic shift in the movement’s primary aim from seeking an independent Bangsamoro state to accepting autonomy within the Bangsamoro region. Considering the profound nature of this change, it aligns with the category of “problem/goal change” as defined in the typology provided above. By reevaluating and redirecting its primary goal, the MILF underwent a fundamental transformation. Embracing autonomy over independence represents a significant deviation from their original objectives, warranting its classification within the problem/goal change category.

According to the typology presented above, the problem/goal change of the MILF in the 21st Century can be attributed to two primary change agents: “external shock” and “leader-driven change”. It should be mentioned that since the demand for policy change did not come from the MILF’s bureaucratic structure, the source of MILF’s policy change in 21. Century is not a “bureaucratic advocacy.” Moreover, since there wasn’t any fragmentation within the MILF and any meaningful change in the attitude of the Government of the Philippines during the 21. Century, “domestic restructuring” is not a source for the change of the MILF’s above-mentioned problem/goal change. The shift in the MILF’s goals and strategies was influenced by an external shock, which served as a significant trigger for this change. Simultaneously, the leadership within the MILF played a crucial role in driving and shaping this transformation.

The most influential “external shock” that affected the MILF was the radical change in the view of the Great Powers in the international system, particularly the United States (US), toward secessionist movements after the 9/11 attacks. This transformative event had a profound impact on the MILF’s outlook and interactions within the global political landscape. The “global war on terrorism”, led by the US, resulted in a notable reduction in the external financial resources received by the MILF (Abuza, 2016, pp. 77–78).

In addition to the economic impact, the 9/11 attacks and the global war on terrorism also brought about significant military consequences for the MILF. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Philippine Government announced in Memorandum Resolution No. 37 that it would fully support the global war on terrorism and put the Philippine airspace and military bases to the use of the US (Official Gazette of Philippines, 2001). The deployment of US special forces to the Philippines through this memorandum to train the Philippine Army, provide intelligence, and even organize joint operations against radical groups in the Philippines. Consequently, the Philippine Army significantly increased its military capacity with the training and weapons support it received from the US military (Bertrand, 2021, p. 165). Indeed, according to Ebrahim, the leader of the military wing at the time, "...The [US] real purpose is not just to fight the Abu Sayyaf, but the entire enemies of the government, and this includes the MILF" (BBC, 2003).

The US has also been politically involved in the Mindanao conflict at that time. In May 2003, US President George W. Bush demanded MILF lay down its arms, and declared that the US would intervene in the issue within the framework specified by the Philippine Government if the MILF continued to use "terror and force" (The White House, 2003). Immediately following these remarks by US President Bush, the leader of MILF, Hashim, sent him a letter (Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peace Panel, 2010, p. 349) on May 20, 2003 and the MILF announced an official statement (Martin & Tuminez, 2008, p. 4) on June 20, 2003, to state that the MILF is not a terrorist organization but a freedom movement (MILF Peace Panel, The Asia Foundation, 2010, p. 349). Furthermore, the MILF has even supported the Philippine Government's military operations against Abu Sayyaf, a radical group linked to the Al-Qaeda, in an attempt to demonstrate its stance (Quilala, 2007, p. 99). Despite these efforts, the MILF still struggled to convince the US that it had no ties with terrorist organizations (MILF Peace Panel, The Asia Foundation, 2010, p. 353-354). In conclusion, as Prof. Dr. Miriam Coronel Ferrer stated in the online interview with the author of this paper, it is very obvious that these international developments effected MILF's policy change in the 21st Century (Ferrer, 2022). The global atmosphere following the 9/11 attacks exerted political, economic, and military pressure on the MILF, leading the movement to adapt its policies to the new conditions.

The problem/goal change of the MILF in the 21st century can also be classified as a "leader-driven change" due to compelling evidence pointing to the impact of Hashim's death and the subsequent succession of Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim. Prior to Ebrahim assuming leadership, independence remained the core objective for the MILF. However, just after the Hashim's death, under Ebrahim's rule, the movement chose to abandon this goal. For instance, in a letter penned by Hashim to US President George W. Bush, about five months before his death, Hashim urged the application of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution No. 1514 (XV), which advocates independence for colonial countries and peoples, to be extended to the Moro people, thereby demanding independence (MILF Peace Panel and The Asia Foundation, 2010, p. 348). However, the subsequent leadership change brought about a pivotal shift. As Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim elucidated, shortly after Hashim's passing, the MILF chose to diverge from its pursuit of independence (Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, 2022). This transformation was primarily instigated by the MILF leadership's discernment of shifts within the international system

and alterations in the approach of the Great Powers to the secessionist movements. In this context, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim (2022) offers his perspective on the profound alteration in the stance of the Great Powers of the international system towards secessionist movements in the 21st century, articulating it with these words:

“...During the 21. Century, we see that there are some significant changes. You will see that in all secessionists and liberations movements, there are changes as far as the approaches are taken by the superpowers to them. They (Superpowers) seem to realize that those secessionist movements which still lays on the moderate the status. Therefore, there have been many secessionist movements during the 21. Century which progresses in as far as negotiate for peace is concern. One of them is Moro Islamic Liberation Front.”

It is clear from the words of Ebrahim that in the 21st century, the Great Powers are recognizing secessionist movements if they moderate their demands. According to him, this reality, as the main change for the secessionist movements in the 21st century, has enabled the transition of secessionist movements to moderate their demands. Ebrahim's emphasis that the MILF is one of the secessionist movements that has made a policy change within such a framework reveals the effects of the international system and the approaches of its actors on the policies of secessionist movements as an external shock in the 21st century.

Consequently, despite all the pressures for change in MILF policies exerted by the international conjuncture and that emerged in the 21st century especially after the 9/11 attacks, Hashim did not give up his desire for independence at all. Nevertheless, the MILF led by Ebrahim, had a different perspective on the international system and its Great Power's politics compared to Hashim's era. Thus, the MILF Central Committee adopted the above-mentioned “program/aim change” accordingly. For instance, in an interview conducted by Abuza (2005, p. 78), Mohagher Iqbal, who was appointed chief negotiator and spokesperson in the Central Committee after Ebrahim assumed leadership of the MILF, said that the war was mostly a thing that belonged to the 19th century and that the 21st century was declared the century for peace by the UN. While the external shock was the same, the MILF, which aimed for independence based on decolonization in mid-2003, did change its demand from independence to autonomy at the very beginning of 2004. Considering that the main element that changed during this period was the MILF leadership, which had a rather different perspective on the international conjuncture, it is understood that this problem/goal change in the MILF's policy was a leader-driven change accompanied by the external shock which occurred in the international system.

### **Conclusion**

This study has explored the policy changes of the MILF during the 21st century and proposed an explanatory typology to understand the shifts in its aims and means/strategies. The case of the MILF holds significant importance in international relations literature, as it serves as a successful example of a peace process. In this sense, the success of the peace talks between the Philippine Government and the MILF, or in other words, the MILF's renunciation of independence and settling for autonomy, have been analyzed from many different perspectives by several authors in the literature. It is possible to find studies that analyze this transformation with reference to the involvement of international third parties, the determination of the leaders of the parties for peace, and the military



balance in the field. Although all of these perspectives are very helpful to understand the MILF's policy change, these studies often overlooked the perceptions of the secessionist movement's decision-makers concerning the international system and the politics of the great powers. In this respect, this paper argues that the primary reason behind the disarmament of the MILF and renouncing its goal for independence in the 21st century is the result of the new leadership's effort to align its perceptions of the international conjuncture and the great power politics with MILF policies.

The findings of this study support this argument. Particularly, in an online interview conducted with MILF leader Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim, he emphasized that the changing international landscape affected many secessionist movements, leading them to engage in peace processes, including the MILF. Additionally, the Central Committee's decision to relinquish the quest for independence soon after Ebrahim assumed leadership further underscores the role of leadership in shaping the MILF's policies. It is evident that Hashim, who sought US support for Bangsamoro's independence within the framework of decolonization in mid-2003, perceived the international system as conducive to such a request. Conversely, under Ebrahim's leadership and in the same international context, the MILF abandoned independence and opted for autonomy in early 2004. This illustrates that changes in the international system or the decision-making body alone may not trigger policy shifts in secessionist movements; rather, the perceptions of decision-makers, especially leaders, regarding the international system and great power policies are the primary determinants.

This paper further focuses on revealing the typology that would form a basis for the analysis of policy changes of secessionist movements. At this point, the study, which adapts Hermann's typology of changes regarding states' foreign policies to secessionist movements, has produced a meaningful typology with a few additions and exclusions. The MILF's policy change in the 21st century could easily find a place in this typology. Thus, according to this typology, during the 21st century, a "problem/goal change" has occurred in the MILF policy, which has renounced the goal for independence, settling for autonomy. The source of this problem/goal change is categorized as a "leader-driven change" under the influence of an "external shock" as given above. It is pertinent to note that given the absence of a proactive push for policy shift from the MILF's bureaucratic framework during the 21st Century, the MILF's policy change mentioned above cannot be characterized as a "bureaucratic advocacy." Moreover, considering the absence of significant fragmentation within the MILF and any substantial shift in the Philippine Government's stance throughout the 21st century, "domestic restructuring" is not applicable in elucidating the impetus behind the aforementioned problem/goal change.

The typology proposed here holds promise for future studies examining different cases. By applying this typology, researchers can focus on the decision-making mechanisms of secessionist movements in relevant instances, thus developing an explanatory model for understanding the decisions of such movements.

However, it is essential to acknowledge the limitations of this study. One notable limitation of this study is the reliance on qualitative data from interviews, books, articles and official documents. While qualitative data provided valuable insights into the perceptions and decision-making processes of the MILF leadership, the absence of quantitative data

might limit the generalizability of the findings. Additionally, the qualitative nature of the data could introduce potential biases or subjectivity in the interpretation of results. To enhance the validity and robustness of the findings, future research should consider incorporating quantitative data, such as statistical analyses or surveys, to complement the qualitative data and provide a more comprehensive understanding of the policy changes in secessionist movements. Furthermore, the scope of this study is limited to the specific context of the MILF in the Philippines, which might restrict the applicability of the findings to other secessionist movements worldwide. To address this limitation, researchers should explore case studies of other secessionist movements and assess the extent to which the proposed typology applies to diverse contexts, thereby strengthening the external validity of the research.

In conclusion, this research sheds light on the transformation of the MILF's policies and highlights the crucial role of leadership and its alignment with the international conjuncture. The typology presented here provides a valuable framework for analyzing policy changes in secessionist movements, offering avenues for future investigations on conflict resolution and secessionist movements.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

**Acknowledgement:** The author of the study would like to thank Prof. Dr. Özgün Erler Bayır and Assoc. Prof. Fuat Aksu for their contributions.

---

## References

- Abubakar, A., & Askandar, K. (2019). Mindanao, In A. Özerdem & R. M. Ginty (Eds.), *Comparing Peace Processes*. (pp. 161-179) London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
- Abuza, Z. (2005). The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the revolution. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28(6), 453–479. doi: 10.1080/10576100500236881
- Abuza, Z. (2016). *Forging peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, peace processes, and reconciliation*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Acosta, B., Huang, R., & Silverman, D. (2022). Introducing ROLE: A database of rebel leader attributes in armed conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 0(0), 1-10. doi: 10.1177/00223433221077920
- Bakke, K. M., Cunningham, K. G., & Seymour, L. J. M. (2012). A plague of initials: Fragmentation, cohesion, and infighting in civil wars. *Perspectives on Politics*, 10(2), 265–283. doi: 10.1017/S1537592712000667
- Balasingham, A. (2004). *War and peace: Armed struggle and peace efforts of Liberation Tigers*. Mitcham: Fairmax Pub.
- Bandarage, A. (2009). *The separatist conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, ethnicity, political economy*. London; New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
- BBC. (2003, May 6). *The Philippines' MILF rebels*. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3003809.stm>
- Bertrand, J. (2021a). *Democracy and nationalism in Southeast Asia: From secessionist mobilization to conflict resolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/9781108868082
- Blavoukos, S., & Bourantonis, D. (2014). Identifying parameters of foreign policy change: An eclectic approach. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 49(4), 483–500. doi: 10.1177/0010836713517568
- Brancati, D. (2006). Decentralization: fueling the fire or dampening the flames of ethnic conflict and secessionism? *International Organization*, 60(03), 651-685. doi: 10.1017/S002081830606019X
- Caculitan, A. R. (2005). *Negotiating peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines*. (Master thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, California). Retrieved from <https://core.ac.uk/download/36695578.pdf>
- Carlsnaes, W. (1993). On analyzing the dynamics of foreign policy change: A critique and reconceptualization. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 28(1), 5–30. doi: 10.1177/0010836793028001001
- Cederman, L.-E., Weidmann, N. B., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2011). Horizontal inequalities and ethnonationalist civil war: A global comparison. *American Political Science Review*, 105(3), 478–495. doi: 10.1017/

- S0003055411000207
- Che Man, W. K. bin. (1987a). *Muslim separatism: The Moros in Southern Philippines and the Malays in Southern Thailand*. Canberra: Australian National University.
- Coggins, B. (2011). Friends in high places: International politics and the emergence of states from secessionism. *International Organization*, 65(3), 433–467. doi: 10.1017/S0020818311000105
- Coggins, B. (2014). *Power politics and state formation in the twentieth century: The dynamics of recognition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9781107239050
- Collier, P., & Hoefler, A. (2006). The political economy of secession, in H. Hannum & E. F. Babbitt (Eds.), *Negotiating Self-Determination*. (pp. 37-59). Lexington Books. Retrieved from <https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:702908ce-0810-4810-ad1f-28c2cbe38921>
- Cunningham, Kathleen G. (2014). *Inside the politics of self-determination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher, & Sawyer, K. (2019). Conflict negotiations and rebel leader selection. *Journal of Peace Research*, 56(5), 619–634. doi: 10.1177/0022343319829689
- Çolak, Y. (2023). *Silahlı Mücadeleden Silah Bırakmaya 21. Yüzyılda Ayrılıkçı Hareketlerin Dönüşümü: MILF ve LTTE Örneği* (Doctoral dissertation, Istanbul University). Retrieved from <https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezSorguSonucYeni.jsp>.
- Doctor, A. C. (2021). Rebel leadership and the specialization of rebel operations. *Civil Wars*, 23(3), 311–342. doi: 10.1080/13698249.2021.1906073
- Doctor, A. C. (2020). *Rebel leaders and the management of rebel organizations in armed intrastate conflict* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Georgia). Retrieved from [http://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/doctor\\_austin\\_c\\_201908\\_phd.pdf](http://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/doctor_austin_c_201908_phd.pdf)
- Doeser, F. (2013). Leader-driven foreign-policy change: Denmark and the Persian Gulf War. *International Political Science Review*, 34(5), 582–597. doi: 10.1177/0192512112473027
- Demokratik Gelişim Enstitüsü (DPI) (2016). *Çatışma çözümünde Filipinler deneyimi*. Londra: DPI
- Ebrahim, A. M. (2022, December 6). *Online interview with the MILF leader Mr. Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim*.
- Ferrer, M. C. (2020). *Region, nation and homeland: Valorization and adaptation in the Moro and Cordillera resistance discourses*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Ferrer, M. C. (2022, February 4). *Online interview with the Chief Negotiator Prof. Dr. Miriam Coronel Ferrer*.
- Goldmann, K. (1982). Change and stability in foreign policy: Detente as a problem of stabilization. *World Politics*, 34(2), 230–266. doi: 10.2307/2010264
- GOVPH (2001, February 28). Executive order No. 3. Retrieved from <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2001/02/28/executive-order-no-3-s-2001/>
- Griffiths, R. D. (2023). Secession and the strategic playing field, in R. D. Griffiths, A. Pavković, & P. Radan (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Self-Determination and Secession* (pp. 207–218). London: Routledge. doi: 10.4324/9781003036593-19
- Gustavson, J. (1999). How should we study foreign policy change? *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34(1), 73–95.
- Haesebrouck, T., & Joly, J. (2020). Foreign policy change: From policy adjustments to fundamental reorientations. *Political Studies Review*, 19(3), 482–491. doi: 10.1177/1478929920918783
- Hashim, A. S. (2019). Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in A. Silke (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, (pp. 336–349). New York: Routledge.
- Haşimi, S. (2019). *Mücadele ahlakı: Kendi liderinin kaleminden bangsamoro mücadelesi*. M. Uyar & H. Oruç, Trans. İstanbul: İNSAMER Yayınları.
- Hernandez, A. (2014). *Nation-building and identity conflicts: Facilitating the mediation process in Southern Philippines*. Wiesbaden: Springer
- Holsti, K. J. (2016). Restructuring foreign policy: A neglected phenomenon in foreign policy theory, in K. J. Holsti (Ed.), *Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World*, (pp. 1–20). London: Routledge.
- Hui, P. (2012). *The “Moro Problem” in the Philippines: Three Perspectives*, Working Papers, (No. 32). Hong Kong: The Southeast Asia Research Centre (SEARC), Retrieved from [https://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc/Resources/Paper/132\\_-\\_WP\\_-\\_Dr\\_Peng.pdf](https://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc/Resources/Paper/132_-_WP_-_Dr_Peng.pdf).
- Jadon, A., Mines, A., & Milton, D. (2022). Targeting quality or quantity? The divergent effects of targeting upper verses lower-tier leaders of militant organizations, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 0(0), 1-25. doi: 10.1177/00220027221126080
- Jeffery, R. (2021). *Negotiating peace: amnesties, justice and human rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/9781108937184
- Klimesova, M. (2016). *Using carrots to bring peace? Negotiation and third party involvement*. New Jersey: World Scientific.
- Krause, P. (2017). *Rebel power: Why national movements compete, fight, and win*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Lee, Y. W. (2012). Synthesis and reformulation of foreign policy change: Japan and East Asian financial regionalism. *Review of International Studies*, 38(4), 785–807. doi: 10.1017/S0260210511000167
- Legro, J. (2005). *Rethinking the world: Great power strategies and international order*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

- Liow, J. (2016). *Religion and nationalism in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9781316711811
- Macasalong, M. S. (2014). The liberation movements in Mindanao: Islām as A thrusting force. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, 19(4), 01–18.
- Majul, C. E. (1973). *Muslims in the Philippines* (2. Edition). Quezon City: The University of the Philippines Press.
- Martin, G. E., & Tuminez, A. S. (2008). *Toward peace in the Southern Philippines: A summary and assessment of the USIP Philippine facilitation project, 2003–2007* (No. Special Report 202). Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
- Mckenna, T. M. (1998). *Muslim rulers and rebels: Everyday politics and armed separatism in the Southern Philippines*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peace Panel (2010). *GRP-MILF peace process: Compilation of signed agreements & other related documents (1997-2010)*, Mindanao: The Asia Foundation.
- Ochiai, N. (2016). The Mindanao conflict: Efforts for building peace through development. *Asia-Pacific Review*, 23(2), 37–59. doi: 10.1080/13439006.2016.1254364
- Official Gazette of Philippines (2001). Memorandum Order No: 37; Providing for the fourteen pillars of the policy and action of the government against terrorism. Retrieved from <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2001/10oct/20011012-MO-0037-GMA.pdf>
- Peace Agreement Database (2001). Implementing guidelines on the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspects of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on peace of 2001. Retrieved from <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/401>
- Prorok, A. K. (2018). Led astray: Leaders and the duration of civil war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(6), 1179–1204. doi: 10.1177/0022002716680265
- Quilala, D. F. (2007). The GRP-MILF peace process after September 11 and the involvement of the United States. *Philippine Political Science Journal*, 28(51), 85–108. doi: 10.1080/01154451.2007.9723503
- Radan, P. (2023). The meaning of secession in R. D. Griffiths, A. Pavković, & P. Radan (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Self-Determination and Secession*, (pp. 30–38). London: Routledge. doi: 10.4324/9781003036593-4
- Rosati, J. A. (1994). Cycles in foreign policy restructuring the politics of continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy, in J. A. Rosati, J. D. Hagan, M. W. Sampson III, & M. W. Sampson (Eds.), *Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change*, London: Reaktion Books.
- Sambanis, N., Germann, M., & Schädel, A. (2018). SDM: A new data set on self-determination movements with an application to the reputational theory of conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(3), 656–686. doi: 10.1177/0022002717735364
- Santos, S. M. (2010). The communist front: Protracted people's war and counter-insurgency in the Philippines, in D. Rodriguez (Ed.), *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (pp. 17–91). Geneva: Small Arms Survey & South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement.
- Scott, W. H. (1994). *Barangay: Sixteenth-century Philippine culture and society*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Shea, N. (2019). Aceh, in A. Özerdem & R. Mac Ginty (Eds.), *Comparing Peace Processes*, (pp. 18–37). London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
- Smith, C. (2008). Sri Lanka: The continued armed struggle of the LTTE, in J. de Zeeuw (Ed.), *From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War*, (pp. 205–224). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Sorens, J. (2012). *Secessionism: Identity, interest, and strategy*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Stark, J. (2003). Muslims in the Philippines. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 23(1), 195–209. doi: 10.1080/13602000305937
- Supreme Court of the Philippines (2008). *G.R. 183591*. Retrieved from <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/47263>
- Tanrıverdi, G. (2017). Filipinler barış sürecinin tarihsel gelişimi: 1976-2016. *Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi*, 6(2), 53–80. doi: 10.28956/gbd.354133
- Tanrıverdi, G. (2018). *Filipinlerde barış süreci*. (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi). İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul.
- Taufik, F. N. (2016). Causal factors for conducting peaceful settlement between GRP on MILF on ancestral domain aspect 2008. *Dauliyah Journal of Islamic and International Affairs*, 1(2), 135. doi: 10.21111/dauliyah.v1i2.597
- The White House. (2003). President Bush, President Arroyo hold joint press conference. Retrieved from <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030519-6.html>
- Tiernay, M. (2015). Killing Kony: Leadership change and civil war termination. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(2), 175–206. doi: 10.1177/0022002713499720
- UN Peacemaker (1976). The Tripoli Agreement. Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH\\_761223\\_Tripoli%20Agreement.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH_761223_Tripoli%20Agreement.pdf)
- UN Peacemaker (1996). 1996 Peace Agreement. Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH\\_961223\\_PeaceAgreement.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH_961223_PeaceAgreement.pdf)

- un.org/files/PH\_960902\_Final%20Agreement%20Implementing%20the%20Tripoli%20Agreement%20between%20GRP%20and%20MILF.pdf
- UN Peacemaker (1997). *Agreement for general cessation of hostilities between the GRP and the MILF*. Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH\\_970718\\_Agreement%20for%20General%20Cessation%20of%20Hostilities%20between%20GRP%20and%20MILF.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH_970718_Agreement%20for%20General%20Cessation%20of%20Hostilities%20between%20GRP%20and%20MILF.pdf)
- UN Peacemaker (2001a). *Agreement on peace between the government of the republic of the philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front*. Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH\\_010622\\_Agreement%20on%20Peace%20between%20the%20GRP%20and%20MILF.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH_010622_Agreement%20on%20Peace%20between%20the%20GRP%20and%20MILF.pdf)
- UN Peacemaker (2001b). *Implementing guidelines on the security aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of peace of 2001*. Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH\\_010807\\_Implementing%20Guidelines%20on%20the%20Security%20Aspect%20of%20the%20Tripoli%20Agreement.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH_010807_Implementing%20Guidelines%20on%20the%20Security%20Aspect%20of%20the%20Tripoli%20Agreement.pdf)
- UN Peacemaker (2008). *Memorandum of agreement on the ancestral domain aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001*. Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH\\_080805\\_Memorandum%20on%20the%20ancestral%20domains.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH_080805_Memorandum%20on%20the%20ancestral%20domains.pdf)
- UN Peacemaker (2012). *The framework agreement on Bangsamoro*. Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH\\_121015\\_FrameworkAgreementBangsamoro.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH_121015_FrameworkAgreementBangsamoro.pdf)
- UN Peacemaker (2014). *The comprehensive agreement on the Bangsamoro*. Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH\\_140327\\_ComprehensiveAgreementBangsamoro.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/PH_140327_ComprehensiveAgreementBangsamoro.pdf)
- Walch, C. (2016). Rethinking ripeness theory: Explaining progress and failure in civil war negotiations in the Philippines and Colombia. *International Negotiation*, 21(1), 75–103. doi: 10.1163/15718069-12341325
- Welch, D. A. (2005). *Painful choices: A theory of foreign policy change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zartman, I. W. (2001). The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments. *Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 1(1), 22–35. doi: 10.1080/14718800108405087





## A Constructivist Analysis of The Concept of Security Communities with Reference to NATO's Approach To Countering Terrorism in The Post-September 11 Era

11 Eylül Sonrası Dönemde Nato'nun Terörizmle Mücadele Yaklaşımına Atıfla, Güvenlik Toplulukları Kavramına İlişkin İnşacı Bir Değerlendirme

Hasan Ulusoy<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

This article examines the concept of security communities and its relevance for collective security formations in the context of the post-Cold War era. Through a theoretical comparison, thanks to its emphasis on the process of identity building among like-minded states, the constructivism in its conventional form is assessed to be better explanatory for the general situation in the aforementioned era. Based on this analysis, NATO's evolution as not only a collective defense alliance but also a security community among its allies will be evaluated with reference to the creation of a collective identity in countering terrorism, in the post-September 11 era. In this context, the trilateral memorandum signed between Türkiye, Finland and Sweden for counter-terrorism cooperation will also be assessed within the framework of security communities.

**Keywords:** Security Communities, Constructivism, NATO, Counter-terrorism in Post-September 11 Era, Türkiye

### Öz

Bu makale, güvenlik toplulukları kavramını ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde kolektif güvenlik düzenlemeleriyle ilgisini incelemektedir. Kuramsal karşılaştırma yapıldığında, hemfikir devletler arası kimlik oluşumu sürecine verdiği önem sayesinde, Konvansiyonel İnşacılık, anılan dönemdeki genel duruma daha iyi açıklamalar getirmektedir. Bu analiz temelinde, NATO'nun, sadece bir kolektif savuma ittifakı değil, aynı zamanda müttefikleri arasında bir güvenlik topluluğu olarak evrimi, 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde terörle mücadele bağlamında ittifak içinde ortak bir kimlik oluşturulmasına odaklı olarak değerlendirilecektir. Bu kapsamda, Türkiye, İsveç ve Finlandiya arasında, terörle mücadele konusunda imzalanan mutabakat da güvenlik topluluğu kavramı bağlamında ele alınacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Güvenlik Toplulukları, İnşacılık, NATO, 11 Eylül Sonrası Dönemde Terörle Mücadele, Türkiye

**1 Corresponding Author:** Hasan Ulusoy Ambassador / PhD holder in foreign policy, Turkish MFA, Ankara.  
E-mail: [hasulu1970@gmail.com](mailto:hasulu1970@gmail.com), ORCID: 0009-0007-9341-7858

**To cite this article:** Ulusoy, H. (2023). A constructivist analysis of the concept of security communities with reference to NATO's approach to countering terrorism in the post-September 11 era. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 297–309. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1331018>



### Introductory Remarks on the Concept of Security Communities

The concept of security communities is utilized in practice for solutions against the issues affecting states' security in the international arena. It has, hence, a lot in common with the idea of collective security *vis-à-vis* security communities in providing security for members. The early attempts of its theoretical evaluations came in the 1950s. After its inception in use in the early 1950's by Richard Van Wagenen, it was not until the leading 1957 study by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues that this theory gained its whole initial theoretical and empirical standing. According to the definition of Deutsch, a security community is to serve as a group of states which had become integrated with each other to the extent that enables the "real assurance so that the members of that community will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 6). Deutsch proposes that states which are involved in a security community not only constitute a basic stable order, but also, actually, a stable peace. He categorized security communities in two types: the amalgamated and pluralistic ones, which are distinguished from each other according to the degree of the integration of the state power. Whereas both have reliable expectations for the potentials of peaceful change, the former performs when states officially get united, while, in the latter, states preserve their sovereignty (Deutsch, et al, 1957).

Nevertheless, regardless of its capacity for the theoretical and practical standing, the idea of security community did not ever generate a vigorous research agenda within his time. Several reasons can be put forward for this. To begin with, the Cold War conditions coupled with "the balance of terror" stemming from the constructed but also perceived fear of nuclear retaliations, did not allow such projects. As claimed, the Cold War was meant to be an era of 'survival' (Krause, 1998: 301). In such a period, implausible amalgamated security community thoughts were outshined by means of other integrationist approaches, for example, neo-functionalism, while the gradual steps came into existence for unifying the western European states. That era was also marked with the gradual failure of the UN, the only multilateral setting to supposedly reign globally, due to the ideological division in the UN Security Council among the permanent member states.

Furthermore, the realist supremacy in the IR academia ruled over theoretical debates leaving no place for discussions of such communities for ideal peace projects. Besides, as pointed out by Adler, there existed a fragility of the theory itself formed by Deutsch (Adler, 1998: 8).

During the post-Cold War period, the concept became popular again. It is asserted that Deutsch's remarks for a security community appeared mainly convenient once the Cold War ceased to exist. By this peaceful end, policymakers were encouraged to propose ideas aiming for a permanent peace and norms based international system (Adler, 1998). This was no exception. Adler (1998:3) argued it as follows:

"Ends of wars have almost always invited a flurry commentary on the past and hopeful speculation about the future world. But what was unexpected is that statesmen and politicians were referring to the importance of social forces and values nearly identical to those remarked upon by Deutsch - the development of shared understandings, transnational values and transaction flows to encourage community building and to conceptualize the possibility of peace. Similarly, these have found their reflections in the field of theory".



Thus," the revisiting of the concept of security communities can be attributed both to changing approaches of states in the post-Cold War and to corresponding developments in international relations theory that focus on the role of identity, norms, and the social basis of global politics (Ulusoy, 2003:4)".

Adler revisited the concept with particular focus on these achievements. He sought to better explain the concept through his formulation of pluralistic security communities, which he argued to better correspond to the current settings of international relations and the IR theory. Focusing on intersubjective formations such as the importance of identity-building and collective identification, in his book which is named as Security Communities, he mentions the idea of security community as a community of independent states working on the undesirability of contemporary war and on financial, social, politic and moral principles relevant with democracy, economic reform and the rule of law, to ensure their collective security by means of a course, in which candidate states gather on the foundation of common norms and identities. Hence, he described it in such a way that "security communities are socially constructed because shared meanings, constituted by interaction, engender collective identities. They are dependent on communication, discourse, and interpretation, as well as on material environments" (Adler, 1997: 258).

As one can see, identity is the main factor in this process. Collective self-definitions generate internalized patterns enabling persons of various states to identify one another more clearly and therefore react successfully in pursuit of shared interests. Social learning, particularly accompanied by practical and functional activities, facilitates the rise of security communities, as states are inclined to behave in accordance with patterns that common values and identities have established (Adler, 1997: 264).

What composes the security community is thus the common responsiveness to the questions of 'who am I?' and 'who is the other?' That is to say, it is the collective identity, a prerequisite for a workable security community. Constructing collective identities are of significance in the sense that shared identities contribute to creating a shared feeling of security leading to collective security initiatives.

Considering the preceding, one can easily comprehend that common values and collective identities as well as common points of views with regard to perceptions are of particular importance to formulate a security community. Naturally, in this process, the examination of theoretical approaches related to such concepts as identity and security communities is needed..

In view of the brief summary of the concept of security communities, the article's focus will be on NATO's evolution as not only a collective defense alliance but also a security community among its allies, with reference to the creation of a collective identity in countering terrorism, in the post-September 11 era. To better analyze this issue, the social constructivism in its conventional form will be utilized as the theoretical tool with its emphasis on the formation of collective identities, which will be discussed in the following section in comparison with mainstream approaches.

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **Mainstream Approaches**

It is argued that mainstream scholars are mainly not content both with the concept of communities, and with that of security communities. In the understanding of mainstream

<sup>1</sup> scholarship, though states may take part in the rare act of reciprocity for security, it is the anarchical setting of the world order to pave the way for being advantageous over their neighborhood, and for behaving in a self-interested and self-help attitude. Theoretical assessment of the concept of security communities can be made in accordance with theoretical perspectives which explain the absence of war, which security communities aim for. In this theoretical endeavor, realism and constructivism lie at opposite ends.

Realists assert that international relations are related to how power is shared, with less attention to social surroundings. They and their neo-realist variants consider that even if hot conflicts do not occur uninterruptedly, they should be anticipated. Their absence is due to the reason that hegemonies, balances-of-power, deterrence, and alliances can prevent them, however only for a limited time. Here, the advocates of neo-realism assert that the inexistence of war cannot be ensured forever given the anarchical nature of international politics (Adler, 1998, Fearon, 2002 and Adler, 2008).

Neo-liberal institutionalism works on the question of efficient institution-building for survival which can be asserted as similar to constructivism. However, there is a distinction which is argued as follows:

“Their (neo-liberals) commitment to how self- interested actors construct institutions to enhance cooperation prevents them from considering fully how a community might be forged through shared identities rather than through pre- given interests and binding contracts alone, or how interstate and transnational interactions can alter state identities and interests. Indeed, these are covered by the constructivist approach” (Ulusoy,2003;12).

Idealism, too, has something to say about security communities, as it acknowledges the importance of state interests (Adler, 1998: 14). Yet, their assumption that there is a single ideal peace that can be achieved by organizations such as security communities is problematic as there is no such peace. Security communities, nevertheless, could serve peaceful coexistence by facilitating for collective identification and perceptions.

### **Constructivist Approach onto Security Communities**

As the matter of the fact, security and its goal for peaceful change need to be constructed through the institutionalization of transnational values, shared identities, intersubjective understandings, and mutual identification. Thus, as to the concept of security communities, all these reveal the functionality of constructivism.

It was Onuf who first used the term “constructivism”. To put it simply, it means “People and societies construct or constitute, each other” (Onuf, 1989: 38). Two distinct underlying elements can be said about this approach: the role of social factors and their effects on not only actors’ behavior but also their identities and interests (Wendt, 1995: 71-81). Instead of refusing the existence of one physical world, this approach asserts that “how the material world shapes, changes, and affects human interaction, and is affected

---

<sup>1</sup> By ‘mainstream scholarship’, the paper refers to theoretical approaches that have dominated international relations throughout history since the Cold War, i.e. (neo) realists, liberalists (neoliberalist institutionalism), which work on the basis of positivist/rationalist parameters. See K. Krause, ‘Critical Theory and Security Studies’, in *Cooperation and Conflict*, 1998, Vol.33(3) , pp.298-333; also J. Fearon and A. Wendt, ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism’, in W. Carlsnaes (et al), *Handbook of International Relations*, (Sage, London, 2002), pp. 52-73. See also for detailed analysis in Ulusoy, Hasan (2005), “A constructivist analysis of Türkiye’s foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War era”, Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations, PhD Thesis.

by it, depends on prior and changing epistemic and normative interpretations of the material world.” (Ulusoy,2003; 6). With its focus on the foregoing one can see that the said approach combines theories with the comprehension of current world affairs (Adler, 1997).

Constructivism, focusing on identities in formulating the interests and policies of the state, asserts that under suitable circumstances, actors can create mutual identities and norms helping for a permanent peace (Hopf, 1998: 172). Hence, one can claim that this approach can be utilized for better explaining security communities. Surprisingly when Deutsch formulated the idea of security communities, there was no such theoretical approach in IR. Despite this, his sociological approach, which emphasized social transactions and social communication, had an indelible influence on later developments in constructivism. In the 1950s he promoted a research programme on security communities, which dealt with peaceful transnational collective identities, favouring a positivist epistemology, (Adler, 2013). All of these helps indeed for a better account of security communities as they are formed of collective identities.

Constructivism comes with several variants. This article focuses on conventional constructivism as this variant helps for a complementary explanation of the world led by political realism without refusing the parameters of the mainstream school but adding to them the value of intersubjective formulations such as perceptions in foreign policy. It simply concentrates on the lenses over which IR actors conceptualize and construct their understanding of the outside world and beyond. These metaphoric lenses can be seen as the tools forming state identities.

One should here analyze how constructivism and mainstream scholarship treat the issue in order to account for their perceptions of security. In this effort, Krause (1998:330) proposes a workable methodology in the following lines:

“Threat perception is the primary variable in understanding how the concept of security is taken into consideration. In doing so, the emphasis is on how the critical approaches, i.e. constructivism, correspond to the central claims of the security studies agenda of the mainstream approaches. These claims are as follows: Threats arise naturally from the material capabilities of possible opponents in a self-help world of sovereign states; the object of security is the state, and the security dilemma can be ameliorated but not transcended. To assess these central claims in relation to the constructivist approach, the construction of threats and appropriate responses to these threats, construction of object(s) of security and the evaluation of the possibility for transformation of security dilemma, are focused on.”

Such a comparison uncovers significant differences between mainstream approaches and constructivism. Firstly, the former consider threats as “‘given” whereas the latter accept them as constructed. This derives from the fact that while the former is attached to positivist understanding, the latter finds its roots more in post-positivist and intersubjective philosophy.

The following differences to the conceptualization are in fact associated with ‘how’ and ‘what’ question. To put it simply, one can assert that the mainstream approaches are generally explanatory in an analytical setting whereas constructivism focuses on clarifying why and how specific decisions causing particular courses of actions are made. In fact, such concepts as the nature of threat, the object of security and the possibilities

of transformation of security dilemma can be better comprehended by asking “how”. However, mainstream scholars explain them without questioning how they are constructed. As one argues, “understanding (constructivist approach) precedes, accompanies, and closes and thus envelops explanation. In return, explanation (mainstream ones) develops understanding analytically.” (Ulusoy,2003;11)

As a matter of fact, the recognized impact of constructivism in security studies has not been rapid either due to the dominance of the mainstream approaches as it was long considered “the theoretically improvised cousin to the sturdy children of international relations” (Krause, 1998: 330). Yet, taking into consideration the aforementioned comparison, one can obviously see that constructivism in fact complements what is lacking in mainstream approaches in security questions. Constructivism also signifies that they are socially built in respect of culture as well as identity.

As one can see from the above discussion, identification is also of the utmost importance both for security communities and for constructivism. Thus, one needs to elaborate on how it is taken up in IR theories. Identity building is a social process. As one comments, “the process of identity formation is of a kind that develops within a social unit” (Yurdusev, 1997: 18). In this context, Krause argues for the following: “Any identification requires a distinction just as any distinction necessitates some identification. This brings us to the dichotomy of the self/other. The self is identified in relation to its position vis-à-vis the other.” (Krause, 1998;312) In other words, “all identities exist only with their otherness. Without the other, the self actually cannot know either itself or the world because meaning is created in discourse where consciousness meets” (Neumann, 1999: 13).

Yurdusev further argues that” identification is of an exclusionary nature for the non-identified. In other words, in the identification of a group of people as a community, this unit is externalized or disassociated from the values, myths, symbols, attitudes and mores of those (non-identified) with whom the unit does not identify itself” (Yurdusev, 1997: 107). Naturally, facing with a threat perception or presence stemming from the “other” unavoidably solidifies the self’s own identity (Yurdusev, 1997: 21).

Constructivism primarily focuses on identity in IR. Mainstream approaches likewise acknowledge identity. However, what makes it different *vis-à-vis* constructivism is that the former assumes to know it *a priori* and considers states to have a unique identity, unchanged regardless of space and time while constructivism supposes that states’ identities can vary, based on their backgrounds such as history, culture, politics, or societal factors (Hopf, 1998: 176). In this regard, one can clearly see that constructivism can better describe security communities as forms of collective identities.

## **The Concept of Security Communities in the Post- Cold War Context and NATO’s Evolution in Countering Terrorism**

### **Early Post-Cold War Period**

The aforementioned framework shows us the importance of constructivism in its conventional form to better provide perspectives for understanding the concept of security communities. What can be said about NATO, *vis-à-vis* new security threats such as terrorism which has dominated the post-Cold War context in security studies?

Based on the preceding review, one can assert that realism maintained its value as the key understanding of world affairs during the Cold War. Yet, its assumptions were refined/developed by novel approaches eventually. In this sense, despite the gradual emergence of critical approaches, the Cold War can yet be perceived as a period of mainstream scholarship.

As one argues, “realism was the dominant discourse from about the start of the late medieval period in 1300 to at least 1989” (Krause, 1998: 303). When the Cold War came to an end, the scene was as follows: the growing criticism of the mainstream school as failing to predict the courses causing the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

The Cold War, as the symbol of division of the European continent for nearly 50 years, came to an end with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The collapse of the wall also represented the fall of the ideological walls that had been separating the continent for so many years. In the early years of the Post-Cold War period, even politicians and scholars tempted to question the value of NATO, since military alliances dissolve when the common foe, the other, is defeated. Yet, time proved it differently for NATO, with the increase of non-conventional security threats. From this point of view, in addition to many wars and conflicts in only one decade during the post-Cold War period, which added up to more than witnessed in the entire course of the Cold War years not only in its heart (the Caucasus and the Middle East) but also in its nearby (in the territories of the former Yugoslavia), the end of the Cold War has also set new security issues, beside the long-standing concern of a nuclear war amid the two world powers and their plans for large-scale conventional wars. Among these lies international terrorism, which has ultimately made NATO agendas busy, due to its ramifications and links with ethnic animosities and religious fundamentalism, as well as drug and human trafficking, organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and migration flows.

In fact, they are not totally new problems for international security. Nevertheless, what is new at this point is the impact of globalization on these threats and challenges. Now, in a world where things have outstandingly evolved to be more transboundary and interlinked on each other, due to the impact of globalization, just like in the domino theory, anything taking place in a country or in a region, whether it is a terrorist attack or an ethnic conflict, risks further imposing threats on other areas. Corollary to this, security issues have also become more diverse, less identifiable and less predictable. As a result of all this, such transboundary challenges affect security more quickly, more critically in an ever-expanding magnitude with spill-over impact. These threats naturally require collective reactions as they affect nearly all states in one way or another.

### **The Post-September 11 Period**

The September 11 attacks were a turning point in many aspects. These terrorist attacks led to unprecedented consequences for the global affairs in the post-Cold War era (Heisbourg, 2002). In this context, the constructivist perspective can provide a better understanding of how the transformation in NATO has evolved in countering terrorism, which turned out to be the “other” for the “allied selves”.<sup>2</sup>

2 The following part on the evolution of identification of terrorism as a threat and collective enemy for NATO as discussed here is primarily cited from Ulusoy, H. (2007), “One Policy, Many Identities: The Consistency

The brief history of NATO's position to countering terrorism before September 11 is listed in the below chart.

Table 1  
*Analysis of NATO Summit Declarations on Terrorism*

Summits	Terrorism separately mentioned	Risk/Threat	Terrorism mentioned as a security threat for territorial integrity
1991	No	Risk	No
1994	Yes	Threat	No
1997	Yes	Threat	No
1999	Yes	Threat	Yes

Source: NATO, www.nato.int (as cited from Ulusoy, 2007;155)

As the table above illustrates, political discourses concerning counter-terrorism in the NATO texts reflect an increasing awareness of this scourge as a threat with a high potential to endanger NATO and allies as a whole. However, albeit being adopted at the conclusion of the Washington Summit of 1999 as a security threat that could possibly have a detrimental effect on the territorial integrity of the allies, terrorism as such was not directly linked to the clause of collective defence under Article 5.<sup>3</sup> That is to say, the allies were not yet unwilling to focus on terrorism as a threat to be neutralized by the collective defense mechanism of the Alliance if and when necessary.

Furthermore, the references to the co-operation for counter-terrorism were at all times found in the ends of the Declarations, which can be argued as a lack of understanding for the existential importance of counter-terrorism for the Alliance. This perception might be attributed to the lack of progress in the Strategic Concept of 1999 on terrorism, even though the allies were about to gradually face the damages of terrorism for the security of their countries at the said summit.

Hence, prior to the September 11 period, one can only assert the following: Not until the Washington Summit in 1999 was terrorism acknowledged by the Alliance as an asymmetric security threat, likely to affect the territorial integrity of the allies. However, since September 11, the aforementioned perspective has gone through a considerable transformation.

From September 11 onwards, according to this transformation; terrorist acts targeting a NATO member have become listed among armed assaults covered under the clause of the collective defence mechanism in the Treaty which would require the invocation of Article 5. Furthermore, such a decision would need evidence that these armed assaults are orchestrated by foreigners outside the country (Ulusoy,2007).

Hence, during the early days of post-September 11, it was declared that terrorist acts against an ally could be answered by the Alliance by invoking Article 5 as a collective defense measure, on the condition that terrorist attacks were verified as commanded from abroad. In that sense, this was a breakthrough.

Nevertheless, the use of Article 5 was not sufficient to form a joint military operation

of Turkey's Foreign Policy with Special Emphasis on Its Security Dimension in the Post-Cold War Era, A Constructivist Appraisal", The Isis Press, İstanbul, 2007.

3 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is the collective defence clause which can be described as an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies. Yet, as will be discussed in the paper, it has no automatic mechanism but many caveats.

of NATO, to which all allies were obligated to collectively contribute. In nature, it was a military operation of the USA in the form of a coalition of the willing. As a result, many NATO members only contributed a few support troops and tried to sidle away from combat operations and troubled areas. This hesitant behavior of many allies *vis-à-vis* the attacks of terrorism showed that even though they all were in consensus that there was an armed attack to one of them, they were not ready for a joint military operation involving all of the Allies.

As the case of September 11 showed, the lack of specificity in Article 5 provides for the allies to only abide by their NATO commitment without totally participating in the war effort. In fact, this is due to the wording of the clause governing the collective defence mechanism under Article 5 of the Treaty which does not specify the type of assistance the allies would offer to the attacked party even if Article 5 were to be invoked. This was a result of the insistence of the US to be wary of an automatic military commitment at the time of drafting the treaty (Grennan *et al*,2021).

This loophole in that sense had in fact led to harsh criticisms about the real function of NATO as a military alliance during the Cold War. It was also asserted that Article 5, formulated in the harsh conditions of Soviet threats of nuclear and conventional attacks coming from the Warsaw Pact, was of mostly political and symbolic importance, intended to illustrate the allied unity. The critics would argue: If the Alliance could not jointly react in military means with the assistance of all its allies, why was there such a collective defense clause in the Washington Treaty? Similarly, in the aftermath of September 11, criticism from mainly US circles, even led to such arguments that the Alliance itself faced with a failure as a military and defense organization.

Despite all these discussions, the awareness and engagement of NATO in reference to countering terrorism has grown over the years. Since the September 11 attacks, NATO has renewed its strategic concepts twice, in 2010 and 2022 respectively. The official NATO web page states:

“NATO’s strategic concepts are official documents that set out the Alliance’s strategy. The strategy outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and nature, its fundamental security tasks, and the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment. It also specifies the elements of the Alliance’s approach to security and provides guidelines for its political and military adaptation” (See NATO web pages, strategic concepts).

In short, they illustrate the way in which NATO sees the current international security environment and its potential impact on its future. As said, such documents are renewed *vis-à-vis* perceived challenges and threats in the global security environment and to ensure that NATO fulfils its key purpose and executes its core tasks, making growth and adaptation permanent features of the Alliance (Özdemir, 2022) and (Bağbaşıoğlu, 2022).

In fact, the 2022 Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid Summit has led to important steps taken by the Allies *vis-à-vis* countering terrorism. Although the 2010 Strategic Concept which was adopted at the Lisbon Summit indicated the increased awareness of this threat, the 2022 text clearly underlined that “countering terrorism is essential to collective defense”, thus stressing the importance of Article 5 of the Treaty. Furthermore, the text points out that “NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism contributes to all three core tasks and is integral to the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and

defense” (see NATO Strategic Concepts). In that sense, countering terrorism is mentioned as a whole paragraph under the chapter of core tasks entitled “deterrence and defense” (Gilli et al, 2022). These are the testimony of the new engagement of NATO in countering terrorism, given probably the increased terrorist structures of international scale affecting the NATO allies, such as DEASH and others.

What is also noteworthy in that regard at the Madrid Summit is the reference stated in the Summit Declaration to the trilateral memorandum signed between Türkiye, Finland, and Sweden on the margin of the Summit, which was welcomed by all allies.

This memorandum which is accessible in NATO documents (Trilateral Memorandum), stated *inter alia* that “as prospective NATO Allies, Finland and Sweden extend their full support to Türkiye against threats to its national security. To that effect, Finland and Sweden will not provide support to YPG/PYD (The Syrian branch of PKK), and the organization described as FETO (Fettulah Gülen terrorist organization) in Türkiye”.

Despite having been heavily affected by several forms of terrorism coming from different terrorist organizations, Türkiye has never been given a fair treatment to enjoy the use of Article 5 by its allies in its fight against terrorism. Due to the negative approaches of its allies, Türkiye could not initiate Article 5 against such terrorist attacks which threaten its territories and security, unlike the decision taken for the USA in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

Notwithstanding this differentiated treatment to Türkiye, it is true on the other hand that Article 5 in the Treaty does not mean automatic military response by the allies to such armed attacks as argued above. As stated by the provisions in that article, to use this collective defense mechanism, the allies should decide by consensus. If such invocation is initiated, they still need to act by consensus on how to respond to the attack, coalition of willing or joint military response of NATO (see The North Atlantic (NATO) Treaty). Hence, in the failure of such a consensus, the Alliance risks facing a deadlock even in invoking Article 5, as well as deciding on measures of how to respond under Article 5. This is certainly a weakness deep in the organizational system of the Alliance.

As outlined above, NATO has adjusted to the post-Cold War atmosphere with dual models emerging: “one privileging its transformation to an organization of collective security, where cooperative norms would prevail, and the other clinging to collective defense and deterrence calculations” (Von Hlatky and Fortmann, 2020: 568).

In view of the foregoing, with the progress already achieved in NATO, in which the Madrid Summit and 2022 Strategic Concept seem to have contributed much to, one can clearly assert that today NATO has a role in countering terrorism. That is to say, the question of whether NATO should have a role to play in that field has already become redundant. The present question is rather what sorts of role NATO can play in this regard and how it can adopt itself for such a role (Gheciu, 2022 and Müller *et al*, 2022).

### **Concluding Remarks**

The above-mentioned arguments supported by the theoretical framework have attempted to show the relevance of the concept of security communities for NATO and among its allies. First improved by Karl Deutsch, this concept is about forming a



community, by which its members feel better ensured for their own security through collective security.

The fact that the security community and its aim of peaceful change might be established through the institutionalization of mutual identification, transnational values, intersubjective understandings and shared identities, shows the relevance of constructivism in formulating the concept of security communities. Constructivism, with its focus on constitutive norms and identities in shaping state interests and policies, allows for possibility that under the proper conditions, actors can generate shared identities and norms that are tied to a stable peace. Thus, it is argued that security communities can be better understood with the premises of constructivism. It is because constructivism, which recognizes the importance of knowledge for transforming international structures and security politics, is best suited to explain how international community can shape security politics and create the conditions for a stable peace. In this context, given its focus on identity-building and the sense of living together, albeit power is not unrelated, the constructivist approach, by better clarifying how identities are generated, serves as a complementary theoretical tool to provide holistic analyses of world affairs. In doing so, its focus on the role of shared values and collective identities is indeed instrumental for collective security efforts and the formation of security communities.

In a security community, states perceiving common threats construct collective identities against a commonly perceived/identified enemy. In this respect, the comparison between mainstream scholarships and constructivism in its conventional form clearly shows that the latter is theoretically more equipped to analyze the relevance of security communities at present, thanks to its focus on the construction of collective identities.

From the aforementioned perspective, NATO can be considered a form of security community built on the principle of collective security. This means that members of this community will come to the assistance of other member states, even if their own territories remain secure. This is contrary to military alliances, considering that alliances are mostly time-bound and can be dissolved when they are no longer needed or useful. One can say with confidence that throughout the years, NATO has evolved into a community of states that share views and are united not only in contrast to their adversary, the Warsaw Pact, but also by their determination (as declared in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949) "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" (Cottey, 2014 and Willa-Olszanecka, 2021).

During the heydays of Cold War NATO, the allies were able to closely embrace each other within the sense of a true security community (firmly committed to defend each other against a common enemy while enjoying trust and respect for each other) given the threats posed by the Soviet Bloc which was identified as the other of their common self in NATO. In the Cold War era, the 'other' was the East for the West and vice versa. In the post-Cold War, international terrorism came to the agenda of NATO allies following the September 11 terrorist attacks. To a certain extent, this has led to a transformation, albeit slow and gradual, in NATO as its strategic concepts have attested to.

NATO has identified that countering terrorism is essential for its collective defense as terrorists threaten the security of populations, forces, and territory of the allies (NATO Strategic Concept 2022). Thus, it is only normal to expect that the allies should trust each

other in their fight against terrorists. As argued, “trust is the key concept in defining a security community. It can even be considered as a common denominator of the security-community” (Väyrynen, 2023: 362).

This could provide a sound reason why Türkiye was opposed to the adhesion of candidate countries, Sweden and Finland. As can be clearly seen in the 2022 strategic concept, in a collective defense alliance where allies firmly commit to counter terrorism since this is declared as essential to their collective defense, they should expect the same from each other in reference to countering all kinds of terrorist organizations which may find refuge in their lands. To put it more simply, Türkiye was to feel confident about these countries’ undertaking *vis-à-vis* its own security threats and thus needed to be convinced in that regard if NATO is to be still considered a security community in which all allies enjoy mutual confidence and trust as well as security among themselves. This case can be seen in fact as a good indication of the sense of how security communities within a collective defense alliance where based on trust, a stable peace is ensured among the allies, should work at present.

In view of the foregoing one can see the relevance of constructivism in better explaining the issues in NATO leading to a new collective identity of states *versus* terrorism to provide collective security among each other in the sense of a security community while functioning as a collective defence alliance.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

---

## References

- Adler, Eç (1997). Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations. *Millennium*, 26(2), 249–277. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298970260021101>.
- Adler, E., & Barnett, M. (Eds.) (1998). *Security Communities*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598661>.
- Adler, E. (2002). “*Constructivism and International Relations*.” *Handbook of International Relations*, Eds: Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A Simmons, Sage Publication. 2002. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781848608290>
- Adler, E. (2008). The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation. *European Journal of International Relations*, 14, 195, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066108089241>.
- Adler, E. (2013). Constructivism in international relations: Sources, contributions, and debates. *SAGE Handbook of international relations*, 2, 112-144.
- Bağbaşıoğlu, A. (2022). “Implications of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept on its Enlargement & Partnership Policies and Türkiye’s Position: Challenges and Opportunities”, SAM Papers, No:22, November, <http://sam.gov.tr/pdf/sam-papers/SAM%20Papers-No.-22.pdf>.
- Cottey, A. (2014). “NATO transformed: The Atlantic Alliance in a new era”, *Rethinking Security in Post-Cold-War Europe*, William Park, G. Wyn Rees (Eds), Routledge, pp. 43-60.
- Deutsch, K. W.; et al. (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Fearon, J., & Wendt, A. (2002). “Rationalism v. Constructivism”, in W. Carlsnaes (et al), *Handbook of International Relations*, (Sage, London, 2002), pp. 52-73.
- Gheciu, A. (2022). “Protecting NATO’s security community”, NDC Policy Brief, No.10 - May 2022, <https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1705>.
- Grennan, E., & Toros, H. (2021). 9/11 as a policy pivot point in the security community: a dialogue. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 14(4), 438-440, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.1982123>.
- Gilli, A., et al (2022). “Strategic Shifts and NATO’s new Strategic Concept”, Ndc Research Paper, No. 24, June 2022, <https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1716>.

- Heisbourg, F. (2002). Anatomy of the New Terrorism: Interview. *Entretien, Le Débat*, 119, 98-107. <https://doi.org/10.3917/deba.119.0098>.
- Hlatky, S., & Fortmann, M. (2020). "NATO enlargement and the failure of the cooperative security mindset", In *Evaluating NATO Enlargement: From Cold War Victory to the Russia-Ukraine War*, pp. 531-561, Cham: Springer International Publishing, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00240-w>.
- Hopf, T. (1998). The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. *International Security*, 23(1), 171–200. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267>
- Krause, K. (1998). *Critical Theory and Security Studies. Cooperation and Conflict*, 33(3), 298-333.
- Müller, L. M., & Beeson, M. (2022). "From collective security to the construction of regional security communities: regional security governance in a global context", *Handbook on Global Governance and Regionalism*, Edited by Jürgen Rüländ and Astrid Carrapatoso, pp. 307–322.
- NATO-The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Washington D.C. - 4 April, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm).
- NATO Strategic Concepts, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_56626.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm).
- NATO Strategic Concept (2022), Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid, 29 June 2022, [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf).
- NATO Trilateral Memorandum (2022), Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid, [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-memo.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-memo.pdf).
- Neumann, I. B. (1999). *Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation (NED-New edition, Vol. 9)*, University of Minnesota Press, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttv1zn>
- Onuf, N. (1989). *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, University of South Carolina Press.
- Özdemir, E. (2022). "Changing NATO Priorities and New Security: Analysis of Strategic Concepts 1949-2022" in *NATO Priorities and Caucasus- Status Quo And Changes*, International Collection of The Papers of The Scientific-Practical Conference, ISBN-978-9941-8-5017-2, [https://eta.edu.ge/uploads/konferenciebis\\_krebulebi/NATO.pdf](https://eta.edu.ge/uploads/konferenciebis_krebulebi/NATO.pdf).
- Ulusoy, H. (2003). "Revisiting Security Communities After the Cold War: The Constructivist Perspective." *Perceptions, Vol VIII*, Issue 3, 161-196.
- Ulusoy, H. (2005). *A constructivist analysis of Türkiye's foreign and security policy in the post- cold war era*", Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations, Phd Thesis.
- Ulusoy, H. (2007). "One Policy, Many Identities: The Consistency of Turkey's Foreign Policy with Special Emphasis on Its Security Dimension in the Post-Cold War Era, A Constructivist Appraisal", The Isis Press, İstanbul, 2007.
- Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing International Politics. *International Security*, 20(1), 71–81. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539217>.
- Willa, R., & Olszanecka, N. (2021). NATO: Building A Security Community in the Face of Covid-19 Pandemic. *European Research Studies Journal Volume XXIV* Special Issue 1, 269-280, <https://doi.org/10.35808/ersj/2041>.
- Väyrynen, R. (2023). *Stable Peace Through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building*. In: Raimo Väyrynen: A Pioneer in International Relations, Scholarship and Policy-Making, *Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice*, vol 28. Springer, Cham. (pp. 345-365), [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13627-6\\_13](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13627-6_13).
- Yurdusev, A. N. (1997), *Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği: Türkiye ve Avrupa*, A. Eralp (Ed.). İmge Kitabevi, Ankara.





## Co-existence of Democracy and Capitalism: A Reflection of Reciprocity or Ideology?

Tareq Hossain Khan<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

There are two types of premises discussing the relationship between democracy and capitalism. First, capitalism and democracy are interrelated since both ideologies protect the liberal concept of private property and the freedom of individuals. However, another bloc believes that these two ideologies are contradictory. Capitalism generates economic inequalities within society that create political disparity. Through a critical survey of some foundational texts and contemporary literature on liberal democracy and capitalism, this article examines their relationship and explains why and how capitalism and democracy support each other. It argues that capitalism and democracy fit structurally and mutually make a politico-economic order in which capitalism ensures its autonomies against the state, and democracy commands public policies in which economic structure does not ban the freedom of political choice. The article concludes that capitalism and democracy were reciprocally causal historically and serve as survival-shield of each other although they are not ideologically tied; democracy is the best institutional safeguard of market freedom and profit maximization, while capitalism creates the practical ground of political competition. Both are functionally well-suited as they ensure high centralization of power and capital in a few hands. This relationship is far more interest-oriented and power-centric than ideological.

**Keywords:** Democracy, capitalism, socialism, freedom, power-reciprocity

**1 Corresponding Author:** Tareq Hossain Khan (PhD Student), The Education University of Hong Kong, Department of Asian and Policy Studies, Ting Kok, Hong Kong / (Assoc. Prof.), Jagannath University, Department of Political Science, Dhaka, Bangladesh. E-mail: s1136207@s.edu.hk ORCID: 0000-0002-5313-6337

**To cite this article:** Khan, T. H. (2023). Co-existence of democracy and capitalism: a reflection of reciprocity or ideology?. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 311–335. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1284826>



## Introduction

Democracy and capitalism are two fundamental elements of modernization. Historically, the two elements are not only related, but the level of the relationship is also so intense and spontaneous that many scholars (e.g., Friedman, 1981; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; North et al., 2009) argue that the relationship between democracy and capitalism is natural. Despite the historical link, democracy and capitalism are two different phenomena. Democracy is a political concept, a process related to the authoritative allocation of values. On the other hand, capitalism is a system of economic rules that speaks of free trade and establishes the right to private ownership and capital accumulation. It is said to be no bourgeois, no democracy (Moore, 1966). Historically, a strong correlation exists between economic growth and democratic values. Individual capacities and preferences are the driving force of this economic-political system. Dahl (1998) suggests that democracy can only be borne in a capitalist economy and has never been sustained in a non-market economy. This argument draws from a simple hypothesis that certain features of market capitalism are favorable to democratic norms that are vital for democratization.

However, they also have a dialectic relation. Capitalist democracy or democratic capitalism was fully established only after the Second World War following the victory of the Allied Forces (Wagner, 2011). In *Capital in the Twenty-first Century*, Thomas Piketty (2014, p. 1) argues that capitalism spontaneously breeds inequalities that undermine democratic values. So, theoretically, there is no clear correlation between the two variables. In reality, modern democracy upsurges with capitalism, and without capitalism, democracy cannot survive. History shows, real or superficially, that all those societies where democracy was continued for a couple of decades were capitalist, although not every capitalist country is democratic (e.g., South Korea, Hong Kong, or Singapore). Schumpeter (1976) argued that “modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process” (p. 297). In contrast, Dahl (1998, p.178) and Diamond (2008, p. 23) claim that because of its adverse consequences for political equality, capitalism, in final consideration, is unfavorable to the development of democracy. However, contemporary politics shows that capitalism may perform without liberal democracy (e.g., China, Hong Kong, Singapore). Following this puzzle, this article examines two interrelated questions: Is there any ideological link between democracy and capitalism? If not, what is the force/interest that makes it possible for the co-existence of democracy and capitalism?

This article argues that there is no ideological relationship between democracy and capitalism; instead, they are ideologically separate. Capitalists support democracy because it does not restrict the freedom of the market in the economic sphere like non-democratic political systems or hinder the accumulation of profits capital; private actors can maintain their autonomy by staying in democratic decision-making structures. Democracy and capitalism jointly provide stability to the economic-political system, but their coexistence with other political/economic systems presents tension in their relations. For example, the coexistence of capitalism and socialism in the case of China (Pearson et al., 2021) or the relationship between theocracy and capitalism in Iran (Sattari, 2020) is troubled.

## Research Method and Data

This article uses a qualitative research approach to answer the research questions raised. My purpose in this article is to look into the link between capitalism and democracy and to explain why and how capitalism and democracy support each other. I do so by explaining the ideas together and considering their relation as a reciprocal function in which both support each other and contribute to their powerful existence. In this regard, I explore how the theorists focusing on liberal democracy (i.e., Seymour Martin Lipset, Gabriel A. Almond, S. P. Huntington, Robert A. Dahl, Larry Diamond) and theorists focusing on capitalism (i.e., Joseph A. Schumpeter, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Charles E. Lindblom, Adam Przeworski, Thomas Piketty, Wolfgang Streek) explained the link between capitalism and democracy to find out why capitalism and democracy support each other. These scholars are well-known social scientists/economists whose writings often overlap on democracy and capitalism. This categorization of scholars is somewhat limited/controversial as it is difficult to group them into an isolated circle. Nevertheless, the overall identity of these scholars can be fixed by focusing on their scholarship. For example, Schumpeter or Friedman explained the main features of democracy, but they are primarily regarded as economists. Similarly, Lipset or Huntington are regarded as political/social scientists, even though they simultaneously explain the nexus between democracy and capitalism. The basis of categorization reflects the fundamental identity and academic attachment of scholars. The categorization has been adopted because it provides more space to incorporate theorists critical of and supportive of democracy/capitalism. Through revisiting foundational and contemporary literature on capitalism and democracy and a brief empirical survey of the politico-economic condition of present capitalist democracy, this article explains the relationship between the two systems and their mutual interests.

As I mentioned, the study follows qualitative research based on document analysis, historical studies, and interpretive analysis. In this research, I have also used descriptive data collected from different datasets (e.g., OECD social spending, World Bank Gini index, World Inequality Data). However, I have not claimed that my study follows a mixed method, though I use time series data to explain my assumption. Methodologically, my attempt is rooted in an interpretive ontological location that critically examines the reasons behind the co-existence of democracy and capitalism despite their ideological differences and the pattern of their relationship based on existing theories and descriptive analysis of historical events that established democracy and capitalism with violence. Therefore, I built arguments and explanations through greater engagement with the basic and latest research published in this area, e.g., summarizing existing research by adding a substantial argument and new analysis.

Interpretive research is a framework and practice within social science research that is invested in philosophical and methodological ways of understanding social reality (Schwandt, 2000; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). The primary goal of interpretive research is to understand and explain why something happens in a specific way. Therefore, it emphasizes sensemaking, explanation, and detail. Central to the interpretive framework is understanding a theoretical or social problem (Bhattacharya, 2008, p. 464). Yanow (2014) suggests that rather than a deductive or inductive rationale, interpretive

research follows an abductive logic of inquiry which “begins with a puzzle, a surprise or a tension”, typically arising from the connection of two variables with observations, experiences, and/or readings (p. 143). In some cases, the research tool may be the only means to analyze historical events or explain the relationship between complex political ideologies (Creswell, 2007). It has been used widely across the social and human sciences as an epistemological framework, especially in political science, anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies.

A very pertinent question is why this study follows the interpretive analysis method to reach a logical conclusion. To answer this question, I will first discuss what interpretive analysis means and its utility in qualitative research. I will then explain how the method can help me meet my research goals or answer the questions raised. I have followed this approach because my question was born out of a puzzle: Why and how does democracy, as an egalitarian political philosophy, support an unequal economic system, or how do they merge into one another in the real world? From existing literature, it is apparent that democracy and capitalism go hand in hand. However, it is still unclear how to explain the co-existence of these two conflicting doctrines.

This article attempts to understand the reasons for their co-existence rather than explaining the causal relationship between the two phenomena (e.g., A case B or A happened because of B). This goal is consistent with the capability of the interpretive analysis because Max Weber says that interpretive inquiry is one of the tools for understanding complex social issues or realities (Weber quote in Bhattacharya, 2008, p. 464). The article asserts that there is no ideological connection between democracy and capitalism and that they arose through violence in the 16th and 17th centuries. This claim requires analyzing the historical events that produced democracy and capitalism, which the interpretive approach can adequately do.

The remainder of this article has four parts. The third part analyzes what ideology means and why democracy and capitalism are not just political and economic systems but ideology. Part 4 describes the main features of democracy and capitalism and examines how extant literature connects democracy with capitalism through the four theorems of the relationship. This discussion aims to show that they have built a supportive relationship where democracy enjoys autonomy in politics and capitalism in economics. How capitalism is established, and the transition of democracy is offered through Part 5. This discussion focuses on my first argument- that there is no ideological correlation between capitalism and democracy. The reasons behind the co-existence of democracy and capitalism are discussed in the final part, Part 6, which has explained my second argument.

### **Why Democracy and Capitalism are Ideology**

In this section, I will explain what ideology means and why this article considers democracy and capitalism as ideologies alongside political and economic systems. Ideology is a fluid and contested concept, and there is no consensus on the definition of ideology in the social sciences (Sargent, 2009; Wetherly, 2017). Ideology is “a set of ideas that tries to link thought with action” (Ball et al., 2014, p.4). That is, ideologies attempt to shape how people think—and therefore how they act. Wetherly (2017) explains



ideology as “a system of ideas involving a vision of the good society” (p. 32). It not only offers a better future but also gives specific directions about the steps that must be taken to attain this goal. Baradat and Phillips (2017, pp.10-11) describe ideology by identifying three features: a vision of the future, a motivational ability to attain goals, and a moral and theoretical base. Sargent (2009) approaches the concept based on the value systems of various societies, while Marxist theorists see ideology as a fabrication/tool used by a particular group of people to justify their actions (Strath, 2013; Foley, 2019). Thus, for them, the dominant political ideology of any political community must reflect the interests of the ruling class. Althusser (2014, p. 108) further clarifies that every capitalist state possesses a repressive state apparatus (e.g., police, army) and an ideological state apparatus (e.g., the Church, the schools, media), which creates public opinion in favor of existing system of government and capitalist activities.

This study considers ideology as a coherent set of principles that explains and evaluates social conditions, offers an action-oriented program for shaping the future and holds a motivational power to command the masses in a particular way to attain its goals. Now, I will analyze whether the concepts of democracy and capitalism fit with the idea of ideology and how scholars in social science use these two concepts. Although socialism and capitalism are primarily two economic systems, they now act as ideologies since they have a set of ideas, strong beliefs, motivation power, and an action-oriented agenda. Capitalism is an economic ideology because it matches the essential features of the ideology presented earlier.

First, capitalism holds a set of ideas, e.g., private ownership of property, unlimited opportunity for the accumulation of capital and property, a free market system with limited/no governmental interference in economic activities, existence of an invisible hand in market coordination, balancing between supply and demand, and no legal barrier on profit maximization. Second, capitalism has the motivational power that directs individuals in economic activities. Although the incentive comes from personal gain and profit motive, that can influence production and innovation.

Third, capitalism is action-oriented because those who choose it as an economic system work to protect and expand it. Althusser (1970, p.107) asserted that a working-class revolution is impossible systematically or through parliament, even if communist leaders get a majority in parliament. Because the capitalists will collectively block it, the police army of the bourgeois state and the opportunistic middle class will challenge the overthrow of capitalism with violent means. The most critical part of Althusser’s hypothesis is that apologists of capitalism are not passive parts of society; they believe capitalism is the best economic system and can improve society by establishing it. Finally, capitalism has a solid moral and theoretical base, which gives it the strength to fight against a powerful ideology like socialism. Capitalism’s solid moral base comes from the concept of individual property rights and economic freedom, where economic freedom is believed to affect political freedom, and liberty and prosperity go hand in hand. On the other hand, the theoretical base of capitalism is rooted in the classical works of Adam Smith and later scholars, including David Ricardo, Milton Friedman, and Maynard Keynes.

Many scholars have discussed democracy simultaneously as a system of government and political ideology. For example, Zakaria (1997) explains democracy as “a political

system” marked by fair elections and the rule of law (p. 22). He also suggests that “democracy is also a single ideology, and like all such templates, it has its limits” (Zakaria, 2007, p. 26). In any book on contemporary political ideology, concepts such as democracy, socialism, anarchism, and feminism are inevitably discussed as subject matters (Sargent, 2009; Freedman et al., 2013; Baradat & Phillips, 2017; Heywood, 2017). Ball and his colleagues (2014) treat democracy not only as an ideology but as the ‘ideal’ of all political ideologies: “Democracy is not simply one ideology among others; it is an ideal that different ideologies interpret in different ways” (p. xi). Democracy is so popular and influential that everyone tries to link his or her ideology, whatever it may be, to democracy. For Ball et al. (2014), democracy is the superior ideology that legitimizes other political ideologies’ actions and visions. For instance, before reunification with West Germany, communist East Germany was known as the German Democratic Republic. Similarly, North Korea’s communist leader Kim Il-Sung named his state/regime the Democratic Republic of Korea.

I do not treat democracy in this study as merely a political system or a form of government; instead, I have interpreted it as a political ideal because, on the one hand, democracy contains certain principles. On the other hand, it motivates democracy believers to establish them. The long struggle to establish democracy against dictatorship in various regions of the world reflects the ideological characteristics of democracy. A system is a bundle of interconnected components that are intended to perform tasks following a specific set of rules, which does not necessarily embrace values or motivation. Democracy is more than a system. That is why Lenin (1969/1902) declared that only two ideologies are open to the working masses: “bourgeois ideology” and “socialist ideology” (p.23). Borrowing this assertion, Althusser (2014) also affirmed that “Bourgeois democracy” exists as a “state ideology” (p. 104). Nonetheless, liberal democracy is labeled as ‘bourgeois democracy’ in Marxist literature.

Scholars (Bjørnskov & Paldam, 2012; Foley, 2019; Wolf, 2023) have described capitalism and democracy as economic and political ideals, respectively. Sargent (2009) argues that democracy and capitalism are so closely tied that the idea of an alternative or segregation seems foolish to most citizens of North America and Western Europe. He reported that in the United States, democracy and capitalism are considered popular ideologies, and people are antagonistic to socialism: “The word socialist is so negative that using this word produces rejection of an idea without further discussion; in many countries, the word capitalist has the same effect” (Sargent, 2009, p. 108). An alternative reading of Sargent’s statement is that, in different parts of the world, people hold capitalism, democracy, communism, and socialism in such a way that these politico-economic systems have transcended their boundaries and transformed into a powerful ideology. These concepts/systems contain all the characteristics/qualities that an ideology needs to have.

### **Capitalism and Democracy: Revisit the Mainstream Theories**

Capitalism is an economic system in which “the means of production and the capacity to work are owned privately and there are markets in both” (Przeworski, 1991, p. 101). Polanyi (2001, p. 74) viewed capitalism as a market society in which social norms,

demands, and the self-governing market guide economic actions and coordination. But Streeck (2014a) refers to capitalism as a specific type of social order that is not only confined to financial affairs but also influences all aspects of life. Capitalism is characterized by the ascendancy of private companies based on investment, innovations, personal profit, and property rights. In contrast, democracy emphasizes individuals' liberty based on exercising human rights. Like Schumpeter (1976), this article considers democracy as a political system in which most of the country's leading government officials are elected through universal suffrage. Lipset (1960, p. 27-31) argues that in a democracy, all citizens have the right to vote for their leaders and engage in political participation that transforms their policy preferences into binding public choices. Like Lipset, Robert Dahl (1989, pp. 213-223) describes democracy as a series of structural procedures that retain active political participation and effective competition among organized groups. Though market economies are not sufficient to establish democracy, it is evident that democracy can never survive in an agrarian society where the elites are essentially landlords. (Dahl, 1990; Bowles & Gintis, 1986). Joseph Schumpeter (1976) wrote that capitalism made modern civilization, with democracy being a part of that civilization. He also argued that democracy was historically loyal to capitalism. The capitalists restructured and redesigned their preferred system by demolishing the old feudalistic socio-political formation preceding its dominance.

Nevertheless, neither capitalism nor democracy wiped out the exploiting structure but established a specially designed order. Huntington (1991) followed Dahl in saying: "The future of democracy depends on the future of economic development. Obstacles to economic development are obstacles to the expansion of democracy" (p. 31). He argues that in the third world, democracy is uncertain; in rich countries, it has already been established. Similarly, Geddes (2009, p. 595) claims that although poor democracies sometimes collapse and turn to autocracy, rich democracies never do; in rich countries, the bourgeoisie and the middle class can establish a solid fortress to protect democracy. However, Gabriel Almond (1991) holds a middle line indicating the relationship. After a long overview of important literature dealing with the themes of the interaction between capitalism and democracy, Almond (1991) concludes, "Democracy and capitalism are both positively and negatively related, that they both support and subvert each other" (p. 473). Diamond (2003, p. 29) flatly states that democracy is a ruling of elected government, a method for choosing representatives through a competitive and fair election. For him, even electoral democracy is not easily attainable as it requires certain economic, social, and cultural conditions. Beyond doubt, this socio-economic structure is made by capitalism, in other words, by capitalist development.

Table 1  
*Four Theorems on the Relationship Between Democracy and Capitalism*

Link between democracy and capitalism	Democracy → Capitalism	Capitalism → Democracy
Supportive relationship	<p>Optimality theorem</p> <p>Democracy ensures institutional guarantee for private property and free market.</p>	<p>Necessity Theorem</p> <p>No capitalism, no democracy; economic freedom is the essential condition of political freedom. Without economic freedom, political freedom can never be sustained.</p>
competitive/antagonistic relationship	<p>Disability theorem</p> <p>Democracy limits freedom of market and private property rights by imposing different laws (e.g., redistribution of wealth).</p>	<p>Inequality theorem</p> <p>Capitalism enhances inequality in society, leads to political discrimination.</p>

Source: Made from different sources, including Beetham (1993), Kurki (2014), and Gedeon (2018)

There are two hypotheses in discussing the relationship between democracy and capitalism. First, capitalism and democracy are interrelated and support each other. Second, capitalism and democracy are antagonistic and limit each other's performance and natural directions. Four theorem have developed in political science highlighting these two basic ideas and debates: (i) the necessity theorem (e.g., economic freedom, which is an intrinsic characteristic of capitalism, is an essential condition of political freedom and competition); (ii) the optimality theorem (e.g., democracy is the best condition for the free market as it protects private autonomies and market competition that are necessary for the capitalism); (iii) the inequality theorem (e.g., economic inequalities of capitalism limit political freedom of democracy); and lastly, (iv) disability theorem (e.g., democracy can undermine capitalism by imposing the rule of redistribution of wealth and control over the market coordination that is the basis of economic inequality) (Table 1).

The necessity theorem and optimality theorem assert that there is a structural and functional correspondence between capitalism and democracy; both support the separation of economy and politics and the concept of separate public-private spheres. They nurture and strengthen civil rights, political rights, and freedom of choice. This is why democratic capitalism creates a stable politico-economic system. The concomitance of socialism/despotism with the free market is unbalanced and unstable, representing contrary rationalities (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Therefore, the co-existence of a non-democratic regime and capitalism may break up in due course. Many scholars (e.g., Rowen, 2007; Diamond, 2017) have predicted that the spread of capitalism may lead to China's transition to democracy.

Kurki (2014, pp.124–128) presented the theory of complementarity, a combination of the necessity theorem and the optimum theorem, describing the relationship between democracy and capitalism. She developed the theory by putting forward four arguments: (i) democracy and capitalism are necessarily complementing and mutually reinforcing because they both believe in individual freedom; (ii) they are statistically complementary (e.g., the link between the wealth and level of democracy); (iii) they are functionally

comparable to one another as both systems work with comparable logics (e.g., competitive market and free competitive election); and (iv) they are accompaniment coincidentally.

The inequality theorem argues that the capitalist economic system inevitably creates inequality within society due to its inherent characteristics that impede political equality and freedom of political choice (e.g., political freedom is worthless without financial independence). It is common in capitalist societies that those with more significant economic influence have more political power than the rest. More precisely, economic disparities naturally translate into political inequalities and impose a hierarchical relational structure of leader-follower like the bourgeoisie and labor. The basic assumption of the disability theorem is that democracy can take various corrective measures to reduce economic inequality in society and try to control it by imposing additional taxes on profits, which can weaken capitalism. Democrats do this to attract people experiencing poverty, but it can limit capitalism's fundamental ideals of free competition, the right to increase private property, and the notion of market coordination by the invisible hand. These two theorems postulate that there is an inverse tendency and tension between capitalism and democracy, resulting in an unstable society and a society of persistent civil discontent.

The last two propositions believe that although democracy and capitalism are closely related, these two ideologies are contradictory (Offe, 1990; Olson, 1993). Capitalism creates huge resource disparities that lead to socio-economic discrimination in contrast to democratic values since democracy speaks of political equality. In a democratic state, everyone enjoys equal rights in voting, freedom of expression, religion, and social mobility. Therefore, capitalism and democracy are contradictory. Capitalism intrinsically is the carrier of inequality; democracy believes in political equality. This article claims that the tensions between democracy and capitalism are superficial. Because their disputes do not ultimately challenge or destroy the two systems (Dahl, 1993; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Instead, it is more of a remedial measure that increases the system's stability. In other words, the tension between democracy and capitalism balances the two systems, reinforcing each other. That is why this article essentially considers democracy and capitalism as complementary and auxiliary forces of others. Free access of individuals to economic resources and organizations (market competition) and political competition reinforce each other: "The open access economic system as a system of economic competition supports the open access political system as a system of political competition" (Gedeon, 2018, p. 191). The following discussion, therefore, mainly focuses on the first two theorems.

Proponents (e.g., Schumpeter, 1946; Lipset, 1959; Tamas, 1992) of the first two theorems believe that both ideologies protect the liberal concept of private property and freedom of individuals. Both dogmas believe in the individual's creative ability and political sovereignty. Capitalism is crucial in shaping democratic values through economic decentralization and expanding free media and the middle class. On the other hand, democracy plays an essential role in the expansion of capitalism by recognizing the right of the individual to acquire property and the accumulation of enormous wealth. Both democracy and capitalism emphasize personal skills, political participation, and the likes and dislikes of individuals. The above discussion has attempted to define democracy and capitalism and discussed the main pattern of their relationship. Now, we will see

how democracy and capitalism have expanded worldwide and whether there was any ideological relationship.

### The Origin and Growth of Democracy and Capitalism: Reflection of Force

The assumption that capitalism and democracy are tied ideologically has two aspects: first, capitalism and democracy are naturally linked, and second, the two concepts are naturally in tension with each other. Classic and neo-Marxists of the 1970s support the first aspect with some minor differences. Those premises claim that a market economy shaped the basic structure of Western societies, while democracy was a “surface phenomenon” (Wagner, 2011, p. 7). However, theorists focusing on liberal democracy oppose this view in explaining the link. They argue that most wealthy nations are democratic and that most democratic countries, except India, are capitalist. So, they concluded that capitalist expansion and the continuation of democracy are directly correlated (Lipset, 1960; 1993; Almond, 1991; Przeworski, 1991; Fligstein, 1996). Lipset (1959) argues that democracy is strongly associated with capitalist development, stating that the “more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (p. 75). For him, a country divided between large poor people and a small well-off class would result either in aristocracy or autocracy. The resources, level of education, urbanization, and industrialization are much higher in democracies than in non-democratic nations (Lipset, 1959, p. 75).

Przeworski also proves that democracies are rare in low-income countries and frequent in affluent nations. Data presented by Lipset show that more industrialized and urbanized countries are likely to be more democratic. In summary, Przeworski and Lipset’s data draw two simple nexus circles: more wealth turns to more democracy, while more democracy brings more wealth (Model 1 of Figure 1); conversely, less wealth results in high autocracy and less democracy reproduces low-level of industry and consumptions (Model 2 of Figure 1).




Figure 1. Link between wealth and democracy

The basic argument of their thesis is that a capitalist economic system promotes a particular socio-economic-cultural development. These developments establish and promote democratic values and institutions (e.g., individualism, secularism,

accountability, political rights, political participation, and civic culture). Almond (1991), Dahl (1998), and Huntington (1968) support this hypothesis. For Huntington (1968), free enterprise stimulates continuous social change and influences the speedy mobilization of new people, to some extent capitalist into politics that builds up democratic political institutions. However, I argue that democracy is not a ‘fruit’ of social evolution or development. It is just a visible surface of an iceberg, with a significant portion submerged in the water. ‘Certain socio-economic index creates democracy’ is a fallacy and hides the original history of the establishment of democracy. Indeed, democracy is a product of force, whether it comes from internal or external sources. Table 2 describes the real transition mode of democracy and argues that there have been three historical routes to democracy: violence (force), colonial legacy, and grants. In France and the UK, democracy (popular sovereignty) was established after the King’s head was decapitated, symbolizing the truth of force- not a peaceful social evolution. The French revolutionary capitalist class did this through the revolution in 1789, whereas the British capitalist force succeeded in cutting the head of the monarch in 1649 (Table 2). Likewise, all Afro-Asian-Latin American societies adopted democracy after a massive killing and destruction by their Western colonial masters.

Table 2  
*The Transition of Democracy in the World*

Country	Year/ Event	Transition mode of democracy	Remarks
England	1649 and 1688	Internal violence, a civil war between 1642 and 1648	Charles I, the monarch of the UK, was decapitated in 1649.
France	1789	Decade-long anarchy and violence after the revolution.	By 1793, almost 40,000 people were executed for “counter revolutionary” activities.
The USA	1780, after independence.	Independence/Civil war; not peaceful transition	After a bloody civil war, American democracy was established without slavery.
Germany and Japan	After WWII	Guided by the American arms forces.	Thousands of US armies still stay in Germany and Japan.
Italy, Greece, Spain, Netherland and Norway	After WWII	Democracy adapted after the occupation of the USA-UK	These countries turned to autocracy in the 1930s.
Eastern Europe	After 1989	Smooth but aid dependency	Democracy is a condition for membership in the European Union.
Iraq and Afghanistan	After American Invasion	Mass destruction and killing	The US army-backed ‘elected government’ has been performing for a decade.
Turkey	After WWI	Military autocracy backed by the Western power in the 1920s	Democratization is necessary for Turkey’s membership in the EU.

Country	Year/ Event	Transition mode of democracy	Remarks
South and South-East Asia	Between 1945 and 1960	Colonial legacy and aid	These countries are practicing democracy with ups and downs.
Central America	After WWII	Serious of US invasion and aid	One of the most influential zones of the USA.
Latin America	After WWI	Colonial legacy	Latin democratization is directly influenced by the USA
Africa	After WWII	Colonial legacy and condition of grant/loan	The poor and violent zone of the world. Democracy faces serious challenges.
Caucasus and Central Asia	After the fall of Soviet Union	Aid diplomacy	EU and USA are pushing democracy with a 'carrot and bamboo' policy.

Source: Made by the writer from different sources, including Huntington (1991a), Berman (2007), and Moore (1966).

After World War II, democracy established in third-world countries was neither a condition of independence nor an outcome of Western aid (Table 2). Even in Germany and Japan, democracy was established under the direct direction of the American army. General Douglas MacArthur of the USA replaced the militaristic and quasi-absolute monarchy, marking the Meiji Constitution (1889) with the Japanese peace constitution in 1947. The democracies of Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain also followed in the same way. These states were freed by Allied powers in 1944, and then democracy was established. Huntington (1991b) recognized this truth but differently: “During the third wave, the European Community (EC) played a key role in consolidating democracy in southern Europe. In Greece, Spain, and Portugal, the establishment of democracy was seen as necessary to secure the economic benefits of EC membership,” (p. 14).

Eastern European Democracy also exposed the condition of the European Union; at least this democracy never presents peaceful social evolution. The breakdown of Soviet Russia made democratization feasible in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. If Soviet control loosened, Huntington (1991b, p. 14) forecasted democracy would be re-established in Central and Eastern Europe. That became a reality after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. According to liberal democracy theorists (e.g., Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991a), the first wave of democratization began in the 1820s and continued for almost a century. During this period, 29 Western countries became democratic. However, a reverse wave took many countries into authoritarianism, including Italy, Germany, and Spain. By 1942, the number of democratic states worldwide was only twelve. The triumph of the Allies over the German-led Axis powers in World War II started a new wave of democratization that climbed to its highest point in 1962 with 36 nations administered democratically. After World War II, decolonization gained momentum. Between 1945 and 1975, 75 new countries emerged as independent states (Westad, 2012, p. 18). Whether they sustained or not, these newly independent countries embraced a market economy and a Western political system of government. To promote the third world's “economic growth and political democracy”, America established two modernization projects and disbursed 12 billion dollars (Latham, 2011, p. 56). After the



communist revolution in China (1949), the Truman and Eisenhower administrations used these aids against Moscow since the decolonized world was a crucial battlefield in the global Cold War. During the 1950s and 1990s, the United States was a key promoter of democratization with its affluent wealth. Without hesitation, Huntington forecasts that the will and capabilities of the USA will determine the future of democracy. He asserts that if the United States becomes a 'fading power,' "the worldwide appeal of democracy will diminish" (Huntington, 1991b, pp. 15-16). So, the two marked arguments of Lipset (1959, p. 86) that capitalism "created the burgher class whose existence was a necessary condition for democracy" and "Protestantism on individual responsibility furthered the emergence of democratic values"- have no natural ground to the expansion of democracy, even in Europe.

There is also a difference in origin; modern capitalism emerged in Great Britain as the product of free enterprise (e.g., the Industrial Revolution), while the liberal idea of democracy and people's sovereignty was instigated in France as a critical dream in the French Revolution. Capitalism can exist without democracy, but a crucial question is whether democracy can survive without a robust capitalist class. The fact is that, in this research, we could not find any example of modern democracy detached from capitalism. For example, the experiences of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century show that capitalism can perform without a representative government system. After the Second World War, authoritarian regimes of Southeast Asia (e.g., Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea) further confirmed the independent power of the capitalist enterprise. However, the long parallel history of market economy and democracy in Europe has tended to make us overlook this stable order in East and Southeast Asia and has manufactured the key idea of contemporary capitalist democracy: that capitalism and democracy are ideologically hanged together (Wagner, 2011, p. 13). Democracy is not a final product of capitalist culture; it is a direct product of a violent force. European colonial power exported 'modernity and democracy' towards the Third World through firepower. Anthropologist Talal Asad (1992) termed this process "the conscripts of civilization" in which all pre-capitalist societies were "destroyed and remade" by European masters (p. 333).

Nevertheless, capitalism and democracy are not connected either ideologically or characteristically. While capitalism tends to centralization of production and power (Ghosh, 1993, pp. 551-554), democracy claims institutional autonomy, free and fair election, freedom of the individual, and decentralization (Dahl, 1989, p. 221; Zakaria, 1997, p. 23). If democracy and capitalism are not ideologically co-related systems, why have they existed side by side for the last couple of centuries? The next part deals with this question.

### **Why Capitalism and Democracy Support Each Other**

Theorists focusing on liberal democracy (i.e., Almond, 1991; Dahl, 1998; Vanberg, 2005; Kurki, 2014) believe that despite considerable differences, democracy and capitalism are closely related. Democracy eliminates capitalism's 'accumulated inequality', the rich-poor inequality. Democrats thwart the possibility of a proletariat/socialist revolution against the bourgeoisie. It seems that there is no ideological link between capitalism and

democracy. But it is just one side of the coin. The other side claims they are related to each other for their existence and prosperity. This relationship is far more power-centric than ideological. In the political arena, democracy speaks of the people's sovereign power. However, in reality, it is a system in which a few power elites, consisting of politicians, capitalists, and bureaucrats, make important decisions through an extreme dictatorship (Boggs, 2011; Wolf, 2023).

On the other hand, capitalism prefers democracy because it does not challenge capitalist exploitation and innovations in the name of private property rights. In a complex social and political system, only a market economy with safe property rights, the rule of law, and competition can preserve the freedom and independence of individuals necessary to maintain democracy (Bernholz, 2001, p. 13). Like democracy, world history suggests that capitalism has emerged through terrible bloodshed and violence in the local or global arena. But protracted conflicts cause more 'misfortune' than profit. That is why capital wants socio-cultural-political security; it wants two infallible tools close to the life and death of capital, those who will unconditionally support capital for their existence (Mueller, 1999).

Capitalists require effective government for the expansion and accumulation of capital. It considers democracy an 'efficient government' in modern society since the vote-based non-violent "competitive struggle for power and office" (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 282) is a practical means to produce a stable system. Schumpeter (1976) argues that in the 16th and 17th centuries, the capitalist process was like liquid water that could not take shape without democracy, a container for capitalism. Through the industrial and political revolutions during these centuries, capitalism broke not only the pre-capitalist framework of society but also destroyed barriers that impeded its progress. In a command economy, the state and government control all property, and everybody depends on the ruling elite for employment and livelihood. An independent press is nearly impossible for the same reasons since the state owns printing presses and paper. In such a system, it is unreasonable to think that the people can effectively oppose the government or government policy, even if it harms the people. In contrast, a market economy establishes a decentralized economic order and sufficient competition among politicians and different parties, in which people can find employment and earn their livelihood. It also provides adequate spaces for small farms, entrepreneurs, peasants, professionals, and wealthy groups. All of them can engage in political activities that significantly threaten an inefficient or oppressive government. The capitalist economic system can thus challenge the failed government or the government that is illiberal to the capitalist system and bring capitalist-friendly politicians to power. Capitalism binds all society to itself; individuals in this system are either entrepreneurs or laborers. If so, capitalism can overthrow or control any government system; why does capitalism particularly like democracy?

Confidence is essential to encourage innovation and capital investment. Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986, pp. 121–22) point out that merchants did not develop enough confidence in governments until the nineteenth century to invest in large immobile factories, bills of exchange, industry, ships, and railway and communication. The rise of democracy in the nineteenth century in the West ensured property rights, personal liberty, and the rule of law, some critical phenomena that further engined the rise of capitalism and democracy. Didi

Kuo (2018) has revealed how the growth of the business class and capitalism profoundly shaped the American and British democratic landscape and how the government and Parliament secured capitalist interests into the party and programmatic politics. We see a high correlation between wealth and political power during the 19th century and today. The ties between people in business/corporations and government/legislature are straight in developed and developing democracies. For example, the British Railway policy demonstrated the affiliation between business and politics. Railway companies began to lobby Parliament and defeated a provision in the Railways Act of 1844 to allow state purchasing of railways.

Table 3


*Changes in Occupational Shares of Conservative and Liberal Party MPs*

Profession/Sectors	Conservative 1868 (%)	Conservative 1910 (%)	Liberal 1868 (%)	Liberal 1910 (%)
Landowners	46	26	26	7
Industry and trade	31	51	50	66
Legal and professional	9	12	17	23

Source: Kuo (2018).

Through the 1830s and 1840s, ship and railway owners had gone to MPs and the Board of Trade. By 1852, ninety-nine MPs were railway directors, and many more were subscribers to new railway companies (Kuo, 2018, p. 119). Moreover, during this century, Parliament became increasingly burdened by private bills, providing clientelism and the state's resources to the capitalists. Kuo (2018) shows that, until 1870, Conservative and Liberal MPs tended to come from landowning, aristocratic families; they pursued patronage for their capitalist peers through the private bills that directed funds to local corporations. However, with time, the trends changed significantly; industrialists became influential political actors. By 1910, they captured both parties' half of seats in Parliament (Tabl-3).

By cutting the gap between the rich and poor, offering social safety net programs, and improving demos' living standards, capitalist development reduces social and political tension; in turn, it gives democratic stability. Within a democratic government, many people will demonstrate when dissatisfied but rarely try to revolt. A large autocratic state, with its millions of army soldiers, might be crippled over a night (e.g., Soviet Union), but even a tiny democratic state never faces violent unrest. This is one of the main reasons that capitalism supports democracy. The bourgeois approves democratic redistribution of wealth because the costs of suppression or the threat of mass revolution would be too high. "Class compromise", in other words, could uphold equilibrium (Iversen, 2006, p. 603). This way, democracy removes the threat that might otherwise abolish capitalist unequal economic order.



**Figure 2.** Social spending in OECD countries in GDP (%)

Source: OECD.Stat (Social Expenditure - Aggregated data), 2023

Figure 2 shows that democratic states of the OECD have increased social welfare spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) since 1980. Social spending increased gradually, from 14.5 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 2021. To survive and avoid political unrest, over the decades, Western democratic countries have raised a larger share in welfare - either by higher taxes or by setting up more regulative actions. According to Peter Bernholz (2001, p. 9), this expenditure incites bad performance, less investment, less innovation, and thus lower growth rates. These, in turn, weaken the capitalist system. He predicted in 2001 that, because of the negative consequences of social spending, politicians would cut down the increasing load of higher taxes and regulations and understand that these policies are not worth following.

Around two decades have passed, and the OECD countries do not retreat from the provisions of transferring money to the 'have not' people. Even after that, the bourgeoisie accepted it and agreed to keep the existing governmental redistributive policies in motion. Otherwise, there is a fear that revolutionary violence will overthrow the capitalist-democratic system, as in the pre-capitalist feudal system in France or England in the seventeenth century. To maintain the current political-economic system, democracy, and capitalism hold onto a clear-cut understanding. This understanding makes a reciprocal relationship in which both get the guarantee of survival.

Before the Industrial Revolution, the bourgeoisie was subordinate to the feudal landed aristocracy. In social stratification, the bourgeoisie identified themselves as even lower than the clergy. Piketty (2014, p. 251) indicates that during the French Revolution, the aristocracy represented 1-2 percent of the population, the clergy less than 1 percent, and the 'Third Estate' (from peasantry to bourgeoisie), more than 97 percent. In the medieval period, as a rising group, they had enough power to mobilize people for their demands. To legitimize its power struggle, the bourgeoisie claimed themselves as a carrier of modernity and the representative of society. Undoubtedly, the middle class and even the poor supported them as the bourgeoisie raised their voice for cutting down the power of the King and unproductive lords. Pre-capitalist society confined social professions to three categories: peasants (serf), the Church, and soldiers of the land/warlord. Capitalistic enterprises offered business as another great professional opportunity in society.

Capitalist values and innovation also create new literature and modern medicine and rationalize behavior and ideas, a “new civilization” (Schumpeter, 1976, p. 125). Capitalist enterprises destroyed the old social-political structure and replaced their political order with democracy. They did this for their interest, not for the people. Except for democracy, no other political system could guard capitalist interests. Monarchy, feudalism, and the Church mutually created a power axis that was rigid and highly hierarchical. To break down this “power block” and to replace a friendly ruling system, the rising bourgeois had no option but democracy. Bourgeois chose democracy because in democracy “the executive of modern State is but a committee for managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx & Engels, 1969, n. d.). Feudalism could not go on with popular participation and institutionalized group competition. This system followed a simple principle - landlords ruled; peasants obeyed. Competing or ‘haves and have-nots’ groups usually resolve their demands through violent conflict, not peaceful negotiations. Because one group’s victory means another’s total defeat, it is like a zero-some game. Thus, as an economic and social order, feudalism and monarchy inevitably created and maintained either tyranny or oligarchical ruling. Capitalism had no future in this system since the landlords enjoyed a wealth and political power monopoly.

Similarly, democracy cannot support a feudalist socio-economic structure because democracy calls for political equity. Feudalism is a closed system in which power, wealth, and honor are transferred through clan or kinship (Andrain, 1984; Schumpeter, 1976). Democracy, on the other hand, offers an open social and economic scheme in which an individual’s merit and innovation get the highest priority. However, with some exceptions, the bourgeois predominantly capture these opportunities. Democracy also legitimizes structural exploitation that fuels capitalism. Again, the bourgeois can easily establish an autonomous center of capital accumulation in democracy (Matin, 2012). That is why the capitalist class not only prefers democracy but also works to establish it.

Without exception, in democratic states, major economic sectors are controlled by private ownership (Andrain, 1984, pp. 652-664; Boggs, 2011, p. xi). Democracy does not prevent or does not try to control the open-market system. A value system, rather than a central plan, regulates economic exchanges. When capitalism falls into deep trouble (e.g., recession, labor unrest), democracy saves capitalism. Historical facts suggest that pumping state resources saved capitalism at least twice (in the 1930s and 2008). To fulfill the capitalist demand, democracy suppresses labor unrest like an evil empire. Between the 18th and 19th centuries, European and American democracies abolished dozens of trade movements. These events are often forgotten except for Chicago’s ‘Haymarket killing’ of May 1886, when police tried to abolish laborers’ just demands (e.g., security in the workplace, an eight-hour day) (Avrich, 1984). We remember the brutal event because of International Labor Day. Unlike democracy, no political system in our contemporary world or history supports capitalism in this drastic way.

Additionally, by allowing free mass media and satellite networks, democracy also promotes a ‘consumerist culture’ that is very necessary for capitalist expansion. Nevertheless, Mass media is strictly controlled by autocratic regimes. In a sentence, democracy is the safety bulb of capitalism. Modern liberal democracy is based on market systems and an explicitly designed private enterprise system. This argument is fortified

by Dahl's (1982) observation: "Democracy is and has always been closely allied with private ownership of the means of production [...] Even today in every country governed by polyarchy, the means of production are for the most part owned privately" (p. 108). In other words, no country where the means of production are controlled by the state [e.g., China, North Korea, and Vietnam] is governed by democracy.

Przeworski et al. (2000) argued that democracy exists when the defeated party in a particular electoral competition has enough chances to win in the future. It happens because waiting for the next election is more attractive than an arms struggle. Democracy establishes a stable economic and social order that ensures a more peaceful environment for the capitalist class to maximize profit. In this context, the 'invisible hand of capitalism' not only controls the market (demands and supplies) but also shapes the government's decisions. This is true for both metropolis (e.g., the USA, UK) and satellite capitalist states (e.g., Bangladesh). For example, in Bangladesh, there is no law for safety measures in the garment sector to prevent the causes of huge fire-killings. Though the garment sector is labor-intensive, no trade union is allowed to form in the mills. The Bangladesh government ensures the demands of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), an association of garment factory owners. Gallagher et al. (2004) provide examples showing that European democratic governments rarely generate marches for popular demands but rather for capitalist interest. Although the American Revolution established a republic, it allowed slavery and forced labor to continue for nearly a century and retained legal racial discrimination for almost two centuries (Piketty, 2014, p. 30). America maintained slavery only for capitalist interests. A similar feature exists in India, as an Indian writer comments: "We have a democracy only in name; the aspirations of the people do not matter, the people have no say either regarding their governance or even in matters affecting their lives, their employment, their education and health, their local development problems" (Ghosh, 1993, pp. 553-554).

Democrats provide institutional protection to the market economy. Wolfgang Streeck (2014a) argues that democratic interference has significantly advanced in recent decades but that trade unions are declining worldwide and have, in many countries, been all but rooted out. In Europe, key economic policies, including wage-setting and budget-making, are formed by supranational agencies like the European Commission and the European Central Bank (Streeck, 2014b, pp. 43-44). The Reserve System directly controls American economic policies. These policies openly protect capitalist interests as they continuously increase inequality within the state. For example, economic inequality in the OECD has increased for several decades. In December 2014, the wealthiest 10% of the population in the OECD area earned 9.5 times more than the poorest 10%. By contrast, in the 1980s, the ratio was 7:1, and the Gini measure increased by 3 points (OECD, 2014, p. 1). On the other hand, between 1986 and 2010, Bangladesh's Gini coefficient rose sharply from 0.25 to 0.32 (World Bank, 2013). The Gini coefficient data of Bangladesh (a periphery) and the OECD (a center) have proved that both worlds (north and south) are facing income inequality. It is not coincidental that both follow capitalist democracy. Perhaps democracy inherently supports capitalist exploitation that increases inequality. The top 1 percent of Americans captured 9 percent of the national income in 1970, which increased to 22 percent in 2019 (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019, p. 480).

Piketty (2014, p. 257) reveals that the richest 10 percent controlled around 60 percent of the wealth in Europe, while the poorest 50 percent owned less than 5 percent. Every democratic country maintains almost the same scenario. According to the World Inequality Database (WID), every region, including Europe, America, and Africa, has extreme wealth and income distribution disparities. Figures 3 and Figure 4 depict that the bottom 50 percent owned only 5-10 percent of global income and wealth in 2021. In contrast, the top 10 percent hold 35-60 percent of the world’s income and 60-80 percent of the world’s wealth. Worse still, the wealth and income of the top 1 percent are 3-4 times that of the bottom 50 percent (Chancel & Piketty, 2021). WID database of 1800-2020 indicates the income of the bottom 50 percent was 14 percent in 1800, which decreased to 7 percent in 2020. On the other hand, in the last two hundred years, the wealth of the top 10 percent has increased from 50 percent to 60 percent (Chancel & Piketty, 2021).




Figure 3. Bottom 50% and top 10% income shares across the world in 2021.




Figure 4. Wealth inequality across the world, 2021

Figure 4. Wealth inequality across the world, 2021  
 Source: Made from World Inequality Report (2022).

Democracy continues to take no effective action against this discrimination through legal reform. Another lesson from this database is that democracy does not challenge capitalism but provides a political basis for capitalist development and sustainability.

Capitalism and democracy have mutually defended this discrimination for the last century. Democracy, with all its power, including state resources and arms forces, protects capitalist interests. The government, Parliament, banks, businesses, and all sources of information are controlled by capitalism. A dominant/center power must be maintained in a military-autocracy with a top-ranked military elite (e.g., Pakistan, Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1980s), in a theocracy with a religious leader (e. g., Iran after the Islamic revolution) and a socialist state with a communist leader (e. g. China, USSR). Only democracy exists where capitalists might be a central force of the state. This is the main reason that answers the question of why capitalism supports democracy. It also reveals the cause of the co-existence of democracy and capitalism. By contrast, democracy supports capitalism only for survival. Democracy itself is a fragile institution, according to Diamond (2008), that needs collective support. Unfortunately, like people's sovereignty, collective support is elusive and uncertain. People or demos are often vague, opportunist, and powerless; Democracy claims strong and definite group support to eliminate counter threat or 'revolution'. Capitalism, more precisely bourgeois, provides this support for democracy. Yes, without democracy, capitalism can survive, but in such a situation, the bourgeois is not the central force and feel a threat from the autocratic ruler (e.g., Japan and Germany before the Second World War, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hungary in the contemporary world). *Freedom House Report (2023)* has categorized Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hungary as partly free; however, they have well-performing and flourishing capitalism.

A free market is necessary for democracy because economic freedom is inextricably linked to freedom of expression, association, and political movement. Friedman (1962, p. 10) and Lindblom (2001, p. 11) claim that capitalism can also develop in authoritarian political systems. Theoretically, there can be both 'capitalist democracy' and 'capitalist dictatorship'; but what is theoretically and practically impossible is socialist democracy or capitalist socialism. Socialism must suppress economic freedom and balance markets and supply-demand chains through central planning and command. This is neither conducive to capitalism nor democracy because socialism wants to coordinate and control the economy and politics with one hand without giving any separate space. As Beetham (1993) suggests that "socialism necessarily unites the two, by making economic coordination subject to a single political hierarchy" (p. 189). Simply put, centralized or autocratic political order concurs with a command economy, while competitive political culture constructs a coherent whole with inclusive economic institutions by creating a virtuous circle (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Recognition of political choice or free competition in politics can undermine financial regulation or firm market management, and leaving the economy to the market can give rise to new political authorities. According to Friedman (1962), in capitalism, the market greatly reduces the scope of decision-making by political regimes in the economic sphere; "by removing the organization of economic activity from the control of political authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power" (p. 15). Capitalists enjoy financial security in democracies as



the political authorities in democracies follow the principle of separation of economic and political spheres. Capitalism may thrive in dictatorships, but capitalists never find comfort in this oppressive political system since political repression or the ruler's agenda can extend to the economy anytime. As North and his colleagues write, a non-market economy limits competition in politics and the economy by negating free access of individuals to economic resources and organizations (North et al., 2009). Capitalists may be able to guard their financial autonomy against the governing elites both in democracy and dictatorship (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Coyne, 2007). However, a pledge of despotism is more uncertain than that of democracy because a dictator's commitment depends on his/her personal decisions, while in democracies, commitment to market freedom relies on the impersonal mechanism of political competition (e.g., electoral politics of elites) and voters (Acemoglu, 2008; Gedeon, 2018).

In a democratic regime, political institutions are standardized, and the principle of separation of powers limits government control. Consequently, the autonomy of the market is not determined by the attitude, behavior, or change of a political leader; instead, it is directed by the rule of law. Dictators are above the law in despotism, whereas in a democracy, executive power is limited by the rule of law. Thus, authoritarian governments may differ significantly from democracies regarding preferences, incentives, reliance on market freedoms, and property rights (Clague et al., 1996, p. 246). In a dictatorship, capitalists can use their various business mechanisms to form a mutual relationship with the power elite.

Nevertheless, capitalists are afraid or uncomfortable with dictatorship for two reasons. First, businesspeople in dictatorships, like democracies, do not find themselves in decision-making structures in government (such as parliaments). Second, as there is no free competition in the political sphere, market coordination is not done by an independent invisible hand: bureaucracy always exercises political power and can be able to constrain and distort economic competition. In capitalism, as in all previous societies, minority domination has been inevitable because of the monopoly of the legitimation of violence, social relations, and modes of production. Robert Michels termed this minority domination an 'iron law of oligarchy'. Democracy is no exception. Like all exploiting systems, it maintains social stratification- vertical relationships of superior to subordinate, employer to employee, man to woman, white to black- all structural discrimination in the name of social bonding. Historical experience suggests that democracy has competing values: firstly, it claims people's sovereignty and popular participation; secondly, and reversely, it swipes away people from the power center. Democracy contains not only economic inequality but also maintains political inequality. Dahl (1989) recognizes that significant inequalities in power have been a universal feature of human relationships throughout recorded history and even in the modern world, "they exist today in all democratic systems...in democratic countries, citizens are far from equal in their political resource and their influence over the policies and conduct of the government of the state" (p. 271).

By 1880, the parliamentary form of government (democracy) had been established in all European countries except Russia (McMenamin, 2004). Surprisingly, very few people had the right to vote. Bowles and Gintis (1986, p. 43) found that in England, about 4 percent of the adult population could vote in 1832, and the right increased to only

about 8 percent after the reforms of 1867. Even in 1911, less than 30 percent of the adult population of the United Kingdom could vote. The situation of voting rights in Germany and France was much bleaker. In Germany, until 1918, the workers were denied economic and political rights (Lipset, 1960, p. 73). Twenty percent of the USA's population was enslaved in 1800. Thomas Piketty (2014, p. 159) shows that among five million of the total population, enslaved people were 1 million. In the Southern part, the white and enslaved ratio was 60: 40. It was a great tragedy that though enslaved people in America represented the equivalent of 60 percent of national income, they were not considered citizens (Piketty, 2014, p. 162). In the colonial world, the practice of democracy was utterly limited. In the mid-twentieth century, only 4 percent of the adult male population could vote in India (Jalal, 1994). This political characteristic of modern democracy is like ancient Greece's democracy in which two-thirds of the people were slaves, and an upper class gathered for democratic rule. These examples clearly show that democracy works for a particular class, and they are capitalist. It is a system in which citizens are left (equally) free to become politically unequal. The democratic system is marked not by equity, active participation by the inhabitants, and something like people's consent but by political discrimination and extreme apathy of the majority — by the minority rule.

### Conclusion

The nexus of market economy and democracy enormously influences our contemporary world and politico-economic order. Capitalism and democracy were reciprocally causal historically and mutually benefited, although they are not ideologically tied. Capitalism needs hierarchy, inequality, and the centralization of production to ensure the bulk of production and high profit. By contrast, democracy promises to establish political equity and a decentralized governing order. They have just one similarity: both are established by force. In the medieval period, capitalism used 'democratic appeal' for socio-political reconstruction. Now, capitalism supports democracy for political stability that can ensure capital accumulation. The bourgeoisie is not threatened by democracy, but rather enjoying a turnover. Piketty (2014, p.25) shows that income inequalities in the USA and Europe's wealthy countries have risen sharply with some stagnation. Japan, Britain, Germany, France- no other industrious country escapes from the "U-shaped curve" of income inequality. Democracy cannot be established and continued without capitalism. Arab countries do not have a democracy as they have no bourgeois, though their per capita income can be compared with Europe (Diamond, 2010, pp. 95-104). Capitalists are the savior of democracy; they are the vanguard of democracy. This mutual interest or 'reciprocity' makes an inevitable link between democracy and capitalism. Like monarchy and feudalism in the medieval period, democracy and capitalism created a power block in the modern world. Capitalistic dominance offers the expansion of democracy; establishing democracy ensures capitalist demands. Reversely, failures of capitalism will be the cause of democratic downfalls. Capitalism is an essential condition for democracy, and democracy is associated with capitalist prosperity. Capitalism requires democracy for its survival guarantee, while democracy needs capitalists' support to wipe out all other political systems. Their relationship is not natural but reciprocal.

So, what explains the co-existence of capitalism and democracy? Democracy prefers

capitalism as an economic system because it recognizes free, fair, and competitive elections and freedom of political choice, which are essential for the birth and growth of democratic politicians. Command economies deny freedom of political choice and necessarily lead to the centralization of political power. Consequently, the command economy is anti-democratic. On the other hand, socialism and dictatorship are reluctant to allow liberal economic policies or a free market; rather, they maintain a planned economy based on bureaucratic control over demand and supply. In other words, in a non-democratic system, capitalists do not have the freedom to accumulate wealth/capital in their hands. As a result, capitalists, by and large, oppose socialism and theocracy. On the contrary, capitalists get unlimited freedom to accumulate wealth in a democracy, which is not available in other political systems. In a democratic system, capitalists can become political leaders and control state policy. Again, capitalists can get policy support from political leaders by bearing election expenses. Capitalists have minimal opportunities to exercise political power in other political systems.

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

## References

- Acemoglu, D. (2008). Oligarchic versus democratic societies. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6(1), 1–44.
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty*. New York: Crown Publishers.
- Acemoglu, D., & James A. Robinson. (2019). *The narrow corridor: States, societies, and the fate of liberty*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Almond, G. (1991). Capitalism and democracy. *Political Science*, 24, 467-74.
- Althusser, L. (2014). *On the reproduction of capitalism: Ideology and ideological state apparatuses* (Translated by G. M. Goshgarian). London: Verso.
- Amadae, S. M. (2003). *Rationalizing capitalist democracy*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Andrain, C. F. (1984). Capitalism and democracy reappraised: A review essay. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 37(4), 652-664.
- Asad, T. (1992). Conscripts of western civilization. In C. W. Gailey (Ed.), *Dialectical anthropology: Essays in honor of Stanley Diamond, Vol. 1: Civilization in crisis: Anthropological perspectives* (pp. 333-51). Florida: University Press of Florida.
- Avrich, P. (1984). *The Haymarket tragedy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ball, T., Dagger, R., & O'Neil, D. (2014). *Political ideologies and the democratic ideal*. Boston: Pearson.
- Baradat, L. P., & Phillips, J. A. (2017). *Political ideologies: Their origins and impact* (12<sup>th</sup> edition). New York: Routledge.
- Beetham, D. (1993). Four theorems about the market and democracy. *European Journal of Political Research*, 23(2), 187–201.
- Berman, S. (2007). How democracies emerge: Lessons from Europe. *Journal of Democracy*, 18 (1), 28-41.
- Bernholz, P. (2001). Democracy and capitalism: Are they compatible in the long-run? In D. Mueller & U. Cantner (Eds.), *Capitalism and democracy in the 21st century* (pp. 9-22). Heidelberg: Springer Verlag Berlin.
- Bhattacharya, H. (2008). Interpretive research. In L. M. Given (Ed.), *The Sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods* (pp. 463-467). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.
- Boggs C. (2011). *Phantom democracy: Corporate interests and political power in America*. Palgrave Macmillan,
- Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (1986). *Democracy and capitalism: Property, community, and the contradictions of modern social thought*. New York: Routledge.
- Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S., & Olson, M. (1996). Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 1(2), 243–276.
- Coyne, C. (2007, August 27). Capitalism and democracy: Friends or foes? *The Economist*. <https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2007/08/27/capitalism-and-democracy-friends-or-foes>

- Creswell, J. (2007). Philosophical, paradigm, and interpretive frameworks. In J. W. Creswell (Ed.), *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (pp. 15–33). New York: Sage.
- Dahl, R. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R. (1982). *Dilemmas of pluralist democracy: Autonomy vs. control*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R. (1989). *Democracy and its critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R. (1993). Why all democratic countries have mixed economies. In J. W. Chapman & I. Shapiro (Eds.), *Democratic Community* (pp. 259–282). New York: New York University Press.
- Dahl, R. (1998). *On democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, L. (2003). Defining and developing democracy. In R. Dahl, I. Shapiro & J. Cheibub, (Eds.), *Democracy source book* (pp.29-39). London: The MIT Press.
- Diamond, L. (2008). *The spirit of democracy*. New York: Times Books.
- Diamond, L. (2010). Why are there no Arab democracies? *Journal of Democracy*, 21(1), 93-104.
- Diamond, L. (2017). *Prospects for democracy and democratization in Chinese societies*. Keynote address to 59th annual conference of the American Association for Chinese Studies Walker Institute. <https://diamond-democracy.stanford.edu/speaking/speeches/prospects-democracy-and-democratization-chinese-societies>
- Fligstein, N. (1996). Markets as politics: A political-cultural approach to market institutions. *American Sociological Review*, 61(4), 656–673.
- Foley, B. (2019). *Marxist literary criticism today*. London: Pluto Press
- Freeden, M., I Sargent, L. T., & Stears, M. (Eds.). (2013). *The Oxford handbook of political ideologies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freedom House Report (2023). *Countries and territories*. <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores>
- Friedman, M. (1981 [1962]). *Capitalism and freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gallagher, M., Laver, M., & Mair, P. (2004). *Representative government in modern Europe*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Geddes, B. (2009). What causes democratization? In R. E. Goodin (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of political science* (pp.593-615). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gedeon, p. (2018). Market and democracy: Friends or foes? Theories reconsidered. *Society and Economy*, 40 (2), 185–210. doi: 10.1556/204.2018.40.2.2
- Ghosh, A. (1993). Socialism, modern capitalism and democracy. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 28 (14), 551-554.
- Hayek, F. A. (2001[1944]). *The road to serfdom*. New York: Routledge.
- Heywood, A. (2017). *Political ideologies: An introduction* (6<sup>th</sup> edition). Palgrave.
- Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1991a). *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1991b) Democracy's third wave. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(2), 12-34.
- Iversen, T. (2005). *Capitalism, democracy, and welfare*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Iversen, T. (2006). Capitalism and democracy. In D. A. Wittman & B. R. Weingast, (Eds), *Oxford handbook of political economy* (pp.601-623). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jalal, A. (1994). *The sole spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the demand for Pakistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuo, D. (2018). *Clientelism, capitalism, and democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kurki, M. (2014). Politico-economic models of democracy in democracy promotion. *International Studies Perspectives*, 15(2), 121–141.
- Latham, M. E. (2011). *The right kind of revolution: Modernization, development, and U. S. foreign policy from the cold war to the present*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Lenin, V. I. (1961 [1902]). *What is to be done? Burning Questions of our Movement* (WITBD). [www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/](http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/)
- Lindblom, C. E. (2001). *The market system: What It Is, how It works, and what to make of it*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *The American Political Science Review*, 53 (1), 69-105.
- Lipset, S. M. (1960). *Political man: The social bases of politics*. New York: Doubleday and Company.
- Lipset, S. M. (1993). Reflections on capitalism, socialism and democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 4 (2), 44-54.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2005[1848]). *Manifesto of the communist party*. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/down-load/manifest.pdf>.
- Matin, K. (2012). *Democracy without capitalism: Re-theorizing Iran's constitutional revolution*. *Middle East Critique*, 21 (1), 37-56.
- McMenamin, I. (2004). Varieties of capitalist democracy: What difference does East-Central Europe make? *Journal of Public Policy*, 24 (3), 259-274.

- Michels, R. (1962). *Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern parties*. New York: Collier Books.
- Moore, B. (1966). *The social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). *Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- OECD (2014) Does income inequality hurt economic growth? <http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/Focus-Inequality-and-Growth-2014.pdf>.
- OECD.Stat (Social Expenditure - Aggregated data) (2023). [https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX\\_AGG&lang=en](https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG&lang=en)
- Offe, C. (1990). *Contradictions of the welfare State*. New York: The MIT Press.
- Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(3), 567–576.
- Patnaik, P. (2008). Capitalism, freedom and democracy. *Social Scientist*, 36 (8), 16-28.
- Pearson, M., Rithmire, M., & Tsai K. S. (2021). Party-state capitalism in China. *Current History*, 120 (827), 207–213. <https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2021.120.827.207>
- Piketty, T (2014). *Capital in the twenty first century*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Polanyi, K. (2001). *The great transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Popper, K. (1962). *The open society and its enemies*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski, A. (2004). Democracy and economic development. In E. D. Mansfield & R. Sisson (Eds.), *Political science and the public interest* (pp.1-27). Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., & Cheibub, J. (2000). *Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950–1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rowen, H. S. (2007). When will the Chinese people be free? *Journal of Democracy*, 18 (3), 38-52.
- Sargent, L. T. (2009). *Contemporary political ideologies: A comparative analysis* (14<sup>th</sup> Edition). New York: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Sattari, S. (2020). The Fetishism of state capitalism in Iran (1944-2020). *Iranian Journal of Public Policy*, 6 (3), 9-31. doi: 10.22059/jppolicy.2021.79491
- Schumpeter, J. (1976 [1943]). *Capitalism, socialism and democracy*. New York: Routledge.
- Schwandt, T. A. (2000). Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry: Interpretivism, hermeneutics, and social constructionism. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 189–213). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Schwartz-Shea, P., & Yanow, D. (2012). *Interpretive research design*. New York: Routledge.
- Strath, B (2013). Ideology and conceptual history. In M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent & M. Stears (Eds.), (2013). *The Oxford handbook of political ideologies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Streeck, W. (2014a). *Buying time: The delayed crisis of democratic capitalism*. London: Verso Books.
- Streeck, W. (2014b). How will capitalism end? *New Left Review*, 87, 35-64.
- Vanberg, V. J. (2005). Market and state: The perspective of constitutional political economy. *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 1(1), 23–49.
- Wagner, P (2011). The democratic crisis of capitalism: Reflections on political and economic modernity in Europe, LEQS Paper No. 44/2011. <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53209/1/LEQSPaper44.pdf>.
- Westad, O. A. (2012). The cold war and the international history of the twentieth century. In Leffler M. P., & Westad O. A. (Eds.), *The Cambridge history of cold war* (pp.1-19). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wetherly, P. (2017). Introduction to ideology: Contesting the nature of the ‘good society’. In P. Wetherly (Ed.), *Political ideologies* (pp. 1-32). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wolf, M. (2023). *The crisis of democratic capitalism*. New York: Penguin Press.
- World Bank estimates (2013). *Gini Index*. <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/bangladesh/gini-index>.
- Yanow, D. (2014). Interpretive analysis and comparative research. In I. Engeli & C. R. Allison (Eds.), *Comparative policy studies conceptual and methodological challenges* (pp. 131-160). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zakaria, F. (1997). *The rise of illiberal democracy*. *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (6), 22-43.
- Zakaria, F. (2007). *The future of freedom, illiberal democracy at home and abroad* (revised edition). New York: Norton & Company.





## Analysis of Charismatic Deposits and the Staging of the President of Madrid's Speeches. A Case Study

Luis Ramos<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

This paper analyzes the modern charismatic phenomenon which takes place in a personalization of politics paradigm that places political parties far from the political perceptions of society, whereas leaders look much closer to citizens.

The first part is structured as a theoretical discussion around charisma and the mass concept, considering Weber's definition of charisma as domination. The reader will find research about how Weber's concept resembles the actual one. In order to link this with the personalization of politics, we analyze the ancient and actual charismatic items hidden in speech.

The contextual and methodological frameworks are comprised in the following part, which consists of a constructivist inductive speech and the staging analysis of Isabel Díaz Ayuso, President of the Community of Madrid from 2019, when she almost lost her first election, to nowadays, when she recently got an absolute majority at Madrid's Assembly. The third part contains a discussion of the results obtained.

The last part is the conclusion, which shows Díaz Ayuso as a semi-pure charismatic leader inserted in a personalization of politics paradigm that has used media and drama as tools to maintain power and who has tried to de-routinize charisma through her most mediatic speeches.

**Keywords:** Leadership, Charismatic Deposits, Myth, Semi-Pure Leadership, Frames, Mass

**1 Corresponding Author:** Luis Ramos (Predoctoral Researcher), Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Department of Public Law I and Political Science, Madrid, Spain. E-mail: [luis.ramos@urjc.es](mailto:luis.ramos@urjc.es) ORCID: 0009-0001-0073-0738

**To cite this article:** Ramos, L. (2023). Analysis of charismatic deposits and the staging of the president of madrid's speeches. a case study. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 32(2), 337–357. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.1339235>



## Introduction

The personalization of politics and charismatic leadership share certain elements, such as the adoption of media logic for political action, the use of showmanship and dramatization to capture voters' attention, and the emphasis on individual personality. While the conceptions of charisma and personalization may appear to differ in many respects, even within academia, charisma and leadership have primarily been studied in the context of business and organizational dynamics (Conger & Kanungo, 1987; Hartog & Verburg, 1997; Jayakody, 2008; Yagil, 1998), while the personalization of politics has become a key focus of sociological research to understand political dynamics (Garzia, 2011, 2013, 2014; Holtz-Bacha et al., 2014; Rebolledo, 2017; Rico, 2009).

Political personalization is a phenomenon that has recently garnered greater attention from researchers in the fields of sociology, social psychology, and political psychology. It represents a substitution of traditional structures, such as political parties, in political and media dynamics through the individualization of the political actors.

Charismatic leadership was described by Weber (2002) as a combination of rhetoric and staging that allowed for the construction of highly irrational social and political dominations, which stands in contrast to bureaucratic and traditional forms of domination.

In this paper, we conduct a case study of the President of the Community of Madrid, Isabel Díaz Ayuso (PP), to analyze the charismatic paradigm in the present day. Through an examination of her discourse and staging, our objective is to understand how the candidate has shaped her political persona using a qualitative and inductive methodology through Grounded Theory. We aim to demonstrate that what may be considered a form of political personalization in today's context fits perfectly within the construction of pure charismatic leadership by Díaz Ayuso.

The paper is organized as follows: section two provides a literature review and conceptual overview of mass behavior in charismatic paradigms, leaders' discursive tools, mythology as a central element of discourse, and the relationship between charisma and the personalization of politics. In section three, the methodology employed to analyze the discourse and staging of Díaz Ayuso is described, while sections four and five are dedicated to presenting the analysis resulting from the methodology. Finally, section six contains the conclusions.

## Theoretical Framework

In order to understand charismatic leadership, as well as the personalization of politics, we must comprehend the social dynamics of individuals when immersed in social groups where emotions play a crucial role. To do so, we must begin with a definition of the "mass", understood as an aggregation of individuals in a group whose unity is based on an idea, ideology, or even a hobby.

Le Bon (2018) coined the term "psychological mass" to refer to individuals who, as part of a specific social group, create a *"kind of collective mind that makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from how each individual would feel, think, and act if isolated"* (Le Bon, 2018; p. 27). Similarly, Gabriel Tarde described "the crowd" as an amorphous and heterogeneous group of people that spontaneously emerges and whose



behavior is characterized by being tumultuous (Tarde, 1986; p. 62).

Both authors concur in an exaggeration of individual feelings facilitated by rapid internal communication based on the later concept of “frames” (Goffman, 2006). This intra-group communication occurs through three consecutive actions: affirmation - of key concepts-, suggestion -belief in the message-, and contagion -transmission of the message-.

These authors acknowledge the existence of a “discrepant” element within these masses/crowds: mass leaders, conceived as individuals with great influence over others through their messages and rhetoric, who possess qualities that differentiate them from the rest of the individuals (Tarde, 1986), and to whom the masses voluntarily but irrationally entrust power (Le Bon, 2018). These leaders have the ability to manipulate the three aforementioned actions of message dispersion, which grants them “prestige”, defined as the “*kind of dominion exerted over our minds by an individual, a work, or an idea*” (Le Bon, 2018; p. 121).

According to Freud (2018), the crowd is characterized by its temporal instability but possesses strong emotional intensity, driven by an irrational component that compels individuals to renounce their selfish interests in favor of others. Freud theorizes that individuals experience a narcissistic restriction that leads them to identify primarily with the leader of the crowd (2018; p. 56). This phenomenon occurs due to a parallelism where the leader surpasses the mass and generates a unidirectional affect towards their person (2018; pp. 59-69).

Similarly, Ortega (2010) theorizes that individuals’ needs for socialization produce the aggregation of affective sentiments without feeling the responsibility of decision-making.

These theorizations lead us to contemporary theories of collective action in which individuals’ behavior is clustered around shared beliefs or common issues (Hardin, 2005; Olson, 2002; Ostrom, 2000). The difference lies in the predominant irrational component present in all of them, for which McPhail (2006) introduces a new concept: “collective behavior”. Through contact and ongoing dialogue, individuals motivated by their individuality in the pursuit of a collective spirit can aggregate themselves and act in the same direction. McPhail’s study of human behavior in crowds is based on the symbolic interactionism of Mead (1982) and Goffman (1977), which emphasizes the importance of communication and symbols perceived by society in constructing meaning and reality. According to Mead’s symbolic interactionism perspective, individuals can develop a sense of self through interaction with others.

The concepts of “dominance” and individuals’ behavior in crowds bring us to Max Weber (2002) who defines dominance in terms of the legitimacy vested in the power holder. Legitimacy lets us define dominance as the probability of finding obedience to a command without the need for coercive action. Among the different types of domination proposed by Weber, we find charismatic domination, whose source of legitimacy lies in emotions and affect towards the ruler. Charismatic domination is unstable, unable to endure over time, but highly adaptable to changes and crises. Weber describes leaders’ charisma as the ability to inspire and captivate others, often characterized by extraordinary qualities or exceptional achievements (Weber, 2002, p. 193).

Among its main characteristics, Weber (2002) considers charisma to be purely irrational, personal, critical -perceived by the followers through opposition to the status quo, imbued with fear-, theatrical -requires a staged performance to foster recognition from the followers-, revolutionary -needing to convey a change from the existing reality-, granted -an exercise of will, bestowed by the followers-, and emotive.

Pure charisma's most important characteristic is that it must be granted: individuals must recognize the charismatic leader as such. This gives rise to the leader's need for recognition, for which they will employ different strategies to acquire and maintain charisma. Over time, charismatic domination transitions from a pure type to a routinized type, which can adopt elements of other types of domination, such as traditional or bureaucratic, or a combination of both (Weber, 2002; p. 201).

When analyzing social modernity, Giddens (1994) alludes to the need to study leadership as a parallel phenomenon to political parties, which are central to modern democratic states. Charismatic leaders are necessary for democracies as they are capable of capturing mass votes within the usual democratic game (Giddens, 1994; p. 188). The most negative characteristic of these leaders is their tendency towards "Caesarism", which is necessarily corrected within parliamentary systems.

Berger and Luckmann (1994) also conceived of the figure of "heroes" who carry out deeds that become symbols and allow for the transmission of knowledge over time, legitimizing social constructs that later become social institutions (1994, p. 95). Above all, the individual must "*penetrate into specific areas of socially objectivated knowledge, not only in the narrow cognitive sense, but also in the 'knowledge' of norms, values, and even emotions*" (Berger & Luckmann, 1994, p. 101) for the survival of each role. Like Weber (2002), Berger and Luckmann also analyze legitimacy over time and encounter a similar problem. They coin the term "symbolic universes" as a way to distance individuals from everyday objectifiable reality, which constitutes a general, unobservable legitimation plane, deeply based on the abstract emotions of individuals where, as we have argued, charismatic leadership is framed and through which the masses identify.

In this regard, House (1976) theorizes about the need for charismatic leaders to represent common symbols capable of instrumentally representing collective consciousness to achieve recognition from the masses and thus shape their behavior (1976, pp. 10-15).

Subsequently, Yagil (1998) argues that charismatic leadership requires a social distance from followers to foster granted legitimacy but considering that proximity from leaders to their followers also generates trust. To address this potential contradiction, the self-concept theory developed by Shamir, House, and Arthur (1993) suggests that leaders' self-perceptions can be transmitted to their followers to gain legitimacy. Followers must perceive the values and self-ideas that leaders have of themselves, which must motivate the masses, mainly through a leadership role that gives "*meaning and direction to their (followers) lives*" (Shamir et al., 1993, p. 584) and the frames (Goffman, 1986; Hartog & Verburg, 1997) implemented by leaders in their speeches to guide action towards specific goals.

As Weber stated, Shamir and colleagues also acknowledge the existence of a necessary paradigmatic situation that fosters the bestowal of charisma based on three characteristics:

the pursuit of dominant values -universal symbols (Berger & Luckmann, 1994)-, an adverse conjuncture for the achievement of goals and ideas, and extraordinary conditions that allow followers to place their self-conception onto the leader (Shamir et al., 1993; pp. 588-589).

Within the framework of the leader's perception by followers, Jayakody (2008) proposes five types of social constructs that the mass must be able to identify to bestow charisma. The first three, cognitive in nature, are based on the perception of extraordinariness -distancing from the ordinary-, the archetypes (Jung, 1970) considered the "*ideal representation of what the follower expects a leader to be*" (Jayakody, 2008; p. 839), and the leader prototype that can be built to reinforce and adapt these archetypes. The last two constructs are situated in an emotional-affective realm, consisting of respect/admiration and love/enthusiasm -constructed through the image of leaders' closeness with their followers- (Jayakody, 2008).

In addition to the followers' perception, Lindholm (2012) analyzes the behavior of charismatic leaders to achieve the desired perception from their target audience. Lindholm posits that there are socially constructed symbolic universes that represent widely accepted symbols in which charismatic deposits can reside, which leaders use in their speeches and actions to embody charisma. This way, discourse and behavior emerge as indispensable tools for charisma construction by leaders, but above all, as a means of perception by followers (Hartog and Verbug, 1997).

Willner (1984), in this line of thought, argues that myths are one of the most useful discursive tools for constructing charismatic leadership, described as symbolic constructions that serve to transmit shared values, culture, and traditions, reflecting the person who employs them. Myths are formed through "*symbols that imply more than their own meaning*" (Willner, 1984; p. 152). Therefore, symbolic language transports the individual to a parallel reality of significance (Berger & Luckmann, 1994; p. 59).

Barthes (2012) analyzes myths, with regard to this matter, as a discursive tool employed by charismatic leaders assuming that myths are the induction of a message through a series of images that allow the receiver to interpret what is being conveyed. Myths can express concepts in discourse without explicitly naming them through the implementation of rhetorical figures.

The emergence of strategies that allow followers to perceive charisma is mainly due to the diminishing importance of the "common" individual in different political systems. Their residual role has fostered a "professionalization of charisma" through political strategists who enable messages to reach societies. Thus, charismatic phenomena burst onto the political scene, especially to bring about changes in highly bureaucratized political systems mainly through media (Breuer, 1996; p. 184), which are closely interconnected with the economic field. Through the "*demagogy of spontaneity*" (Bourdieu, 1997; p. 69), media -especially with the advent of television- produce news imbued with particular opinions that shape viewers' opinions. In this sense, the economic field exerts pressure on the journalistic sphere through audience ratings, leading to the promotion of news with the greatest impact. As a result, the discourses of charismatic leaders, based on all these aforementioned characteristics, find space in the media (Breuer, 1996).

More recently, sociological research has addressed the personalization of politics as a consequence of the role of the media in political socialization (Balmas & Sheaffer, 2014; p. 992; Brants & Voltmer, 2011) and the weakening of ties between traditional political parties and voters (Garzia, 2013; Mair, 2005). From a social perspective, the personalization of politics is a shift in the orientations and affiliations of social groups toward increasingly individualized choices and preferences, with two essential aspects: an increase in the importance of individual political actors and a decrease in the importance of political parties, which take a backseat (Balmas & Sheaffer, 2014). From a political perspective, personalization is based on political leaders adopting the logic of the media to be present in political life (Garzia, 2014; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Sheaffer, 2008) which Manin (1998) named as “audience’s democracy”, and to gain legitimacy (Sheaffer, 2001).

In the case of Spain, we must consider the polarized pluralistic media model (Hallin & Mancini, 2008), characterized by a strong parallelism between the media and political power, attempts by economic agents to instrumentalize the media for political interference, and significant political interference in the media, with the state playing a major role as the main funder.

Political personalism must be accompanied by a series of characteristics attributed to media leaders, such as the appearance of showmanship/dramatization in their performances or attention to their personal traits (Farrell & Webb, 2003; Rebollo, 2017) and the use of rhetoric and care for discourse (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; p. 251). These characteristics align with those outlined for considering a leader as “charismatic” (Conger & Kanungo, 1987), as well as exposure to the media as a tool for seeking legitimacy (Breuer, 1996). Given this coincidence between the characteristics of both concepts, we have not been able to find many pieces of literature that empirically analyze the relationship. Viviani (2023) proposes a theoretical framework based on the process of personalization of populism, where the author establishes the differences between a populist and a charismatic leader. Other studies analyze the impact of personalized candidates’ communication over depersonalized ones (Meeks, 2017), or take into account the personalization and the dramatization of politics as different processes imbued in the mediatization of politics (Kissas, 2019). Furthermore, the relationship between charisma and personalization has not yet been clarified.

In addition, different studies have been conducted to understand the electoral success of our research object, Díaz Ayuso, and the effects of the personalization of politics in the Madrilénian case. Some papers analyze the impact of Díaz Ayuso on digital media news (Córdoba-Cabús et al., 2021), her political social media impact during different election campaigns (García-Beaudoux et al., 2023; Moret-Soler et al., 2022) or the way she created a digital discursive storytelling during the Covid-19 pandemic (García Santamaría, 2022). In addition, many media have addressed Díaz Ayuso as a “pop icon” (Bareño, 2021; Barriuso, 2021; Hernández-Morales, 2022) or as a “pop star” (La Sexta Columna, 2022; Minguito, 2021). Both concepts lead to Mazzoleni’s “pop politics” concept (Mazzoleni & Sfaridini, 2009) but we have not been able to find any academic source which demonstrates this assumption.

### Research Design and Methodology

Our research aims to deploy a new theoretical perspective for the analysis of the traditional concept of charisma through a qualitative methodological design. The main research question of this article is whether it is possible to obtain pure charismatic leadership in highly bureaucratized systems through the latent factor of political personalization present in our Spanish study context. To address this question, we have chosen to analyze the speeches of Isabel Díaz Ayuso, the current President of the Community of Madrid and president of Madrid's Partido Popular (PP), as the object of our investigation. The primary research objective is to analyze the construction of Isabel Díaz Ayuso's charismatic leadership through the critical analysis of her speeches in the context of ongoing political personalization. The secondary objectives of the research are to identify the elements that make up her speeches and to understand, from a holistic perspective, the logical sense they have when framed in their context, as well as why they are implemented.

To approach her charisma, we will employ Critical Discourse Analysis -CDA- (van Dijk, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2003) which serves to identify various dimensions of rhetoric and analyze Díaz Ayuso's staging in the selected speeches. We will use a constructivist inductive approach through Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2006; Glasser & Strauss, 1999), based on collecting data, codifying the speeches through indicators, and creating different dimensions. This analysis consists of a descriptive process with a three-time speech reading base. We use this methodology based on some of CDA's principles, such as discourse and society are linked by media, the discourse has an ideological effect on society, the power relations are essentially discursive, and the discourse analysis must be interpretative and explanatory (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; van Dijk, 2001).

For the speech selection, we will consider the candidate's television media exposure, defined as "the extent to which audience members have encountered specific messages or classes of messages/media content" (de Vreese & Neijens, 2016; Slater, 2004). In this way, we will approximately identify the different speeches given at the time of this exposure. The decision to use the media for the selection of speeches is based on their ability, as intermediaries, to generate frame alignments (Snow et al., 1986) between leaders and individuals, orienting the latter towards the values and objectives the leader wants to convey.


We will use the software "Verba Volant" (*Verba Volant*, n.d.-a) to select the speeches. The application transcribes the historical coverage of all news broadcasts from RTVE, particularly those from its channel "TVE1" since 2014. It allows searches of any word mentioned in the transcriptions, providing all the results from the historical series. In this case, we will use the term "Díaz Ayuso" to search for all results between January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2019 -the year she first ran for election- and June 27, 2023 -the present day-. During this period, the total number of the appearances of the term "Díaz Ayuso" amounts to 893.

Based on Figure 1, we will implement a purposive sampling technique (Campbell et al., 2020; Palinkas et al., 2015). In this way, we can make sure that analyzed items can be reflected in our sample. We can also identify four periods in which the density and the number of Díaz Ayuso's appearances are higher than usual in TVE1 news broadcasts.

- May-September 2019. The main topic was the elections to the Madrid Assembly held on May 26.
- August-October 2020. The main topic was the management of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- March-June 2021. The main topic was Díaz Ayuso calling for early elections to the Assembly of the Community of Madrid and the results.
- January-May 2022. The main topic was the conflict between the leader of PP, Pablo Casado, and Díaz Ayuso.

To carry out the analysis, once the total appearances data provided by Verba Volant have been reviewed, we will select the speeches in which Díaz Ayuso has significant media exposure. The selected speeches are shown as follows:

- Díaz Ayuso's campaign kick-off speech in 2019<sup>1</sup>.\*
- Bilateral meeting between Díaz Ayuso and Pedro Sánchez, to discuss pandemic management (September 21, 2020).
- Díaz Ayuso's campaign closing speech in 2021 (May 2, 2021).
- Díaz Ayuso's press conference addressing the conflict with the party's leader (February 17, 2022).



*Figure 1.* Description of “Díaz Ayuso” frequencies from CIVIO  
Source: Verba Volant (2023). Civic Foundation CIVIO

We will establish a set of rhetorical dimensions commonly implemented by charismatic leaders to conduct the qualitative speech analysis. These dimensions will be accompanied by a series of codes that will be used to analyze the different speeches.

<sup>1</sup> \* Due to some audiovisual problems, we have not been allowed to access the kick-off speech during the 2019 campaign. The paper will include the second speech during this campaign, May 10<sup>th</sup>, 2019.

Table 1  
*Dimensions and Codes for Speech Analysis*

Dimension	Code	Attribute
Charismatic Deposits (Lindholm, 2012)	Consumption	Refers to consumption and similar activities, consumption proposals for society.
	Nation	Refers to national symbols, trying to put society together under these common symbols.
	Sport, culture and entertainment	Identification and references to prestigious people in these subjects, which implies a huge ideological and emotional deposit.
	Religion	References to religious motifs with emotional potential.
	Family-friendship	Emotions in references related to friends and family members.
	Love	Publicly expressed appreciation for others.
Mythology (Barthes, 2012)	'Vaccine'	References to small, bad situations so a bigger situation does not need to be mentioned.
	History deprivation	Delete history beyond a cited reality.
	Identification	Realities referenced are explained as an ad hominem fallacy, implying that things are a certain way merely because they might be so.
	Tautology	Definition of one reality by itself, so rational components can be stripped out of it.
	'Nini-ism'	Two opposite realities to the reality referenced are compared and defined as the same, so it is easy to deny both at the same time.
	Qualities' quantifications	A high number of realities are reduced to one quality.
Rhetoric tools (Hartog & Verburg, 1997)	Verification	Use of proverbs and popular expressions related to a message given.
	Metaphors	Symbolic references that might evoke some feelings or emotions in the public.
	Storytelling	Tells a story where the public can find the main moral values that the politician wants to transmit.
	Spins	References to limit or use frames in one or other way, depending on the intentionality.
	Contrast	Description of one reality through its opposite so emotion can be evoked.
	Puzzle options	A way to describe problems and give their solutions at the same time. Solutions must be as simple as possible.
	Positioning	References to simple subjects to show a firm opinion about them.
Goals	Reference to distant and simple goals.	
Repetition	Continued references to simple concepts in order to frame them.	

Source: own elaboration.

## Context

The selection of Díaz Ayuso's political figure is not arbitrary. Her profile fulfills an essential requirement in the analysis of charisma: in her first candidacy for the Presidency

in 2019, all media outlets echoed the fact that she was an unknown candidate, and she came close to losing the elections, yielding the worst results for PP in years.

We must consider that the Community of Madrid is a federal region in Spain where the nation's capital is located. PP has governed the Community of Madrid since 1995. In 2018, former Madrid President Cristina Cifuentes had to quit due to a corruption scandal (Aduriz & Pinheiro, 2019) and, at a national level, actual President Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) managed to carry out a motion of censure against former PP's national President Mariano Rajoy (Garea, 2018). This led to changes in the community and national level, where Pablo Casado was named National PP's President, and Díaz Ayuso -Casado's very closely related and confident person-, the new candidate for the Community of Madrid's federal elections.

The most important polls assumed that the left could govern the Community of Madrid (El País, 2018). In fact, PP was not the most-voted party, but due to an arrangement with Ciudadanos -liberal- and Vox -far right-, Díaz Ayuso managed to maintain the government in Madrid.

In 2021, she called for early elections and achieved results close to an absolute majority in the Madrid Assembly -only four deputies away from it-. More recently, in 2023, she managed to govern alone, obtaining more seats than the absolute majority in the Assembly of the Community of Madrid.

Díaz Ayuso has always been a very mediatic politician, known for her rough criticism of the Spanish national Government during the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular of President Pedro Sánchez, and for the victory she achieved during the internal power struggle in PP between herself and former PP President, Pablo Casado -who was still Díaz Ayuso's close friend-. This last struggle made Casado quit even when Díaz Ayuso was surrounded by a corruption scandal that implicated her brother and herself.

## Analysis

### General Analysis

In an initial analysis, we can observe the exact word match in the different speeches, excluding stop words and words with fewer than four letters to avoid irrelevant interpretations. Throughout the four selected speeches, the most frequently used words by Díaz Ayuso are "Spain", "Madrid", "Community", and "party" (Figure 2).

"Spain" is used as a specific reference to the Community of Madrid, with both elements – "Madrid" and "Spain"- being closely related. We can observe its terminological use in sentences, such as "Madrid is a Spain within Spain", "Madrid is Spain in Spain" (speech 2) or "we are moving Spain from these elections", "Madrid and Spain are watching us" (speech 3). While "Spain" is hardly mentioned in speeches 1 and 4, it is important to differentiate that in speech 2, Díaz Ayuso places the government of the Community and the State on equal footing, creating a paradigm in which any reference to Madrid is also an allusion to the nation, and vice versa.






We must also consider the symbolism of flags and nations employed during her speeches. On two occasions, she associates the flags of Spain and Latin American countries with events in Madrid. In speech 2, for example, she makes the following assertion:

*“When we see demonstrations, when we see images in Tel Aviv, one thinks of Israel, thinks of its President. When one sees demonstrations in Paris, one thinks of France, also thinks of its Government. The same happens with Madrid. Madrid is a Spain within Spain”.*

Another charismatic deposit she refers to is family and friendship. These allusions are framed, both positively and negatively, in relation to the cohesion of her own party. In a negative sense, she refers to internal conflicts with the national leadership and accusations of corruption against herself. In a positive sense, she emphasizes her own family and families in general as an ideological framework consistent with a conservative party like PP.



**Figure 3.** Distribution of allusions to charismatic deposits by speech

Source: Own elaboration

### Analysis of Mythology


To analyze this dimension, we propose the identification and explanation of rhetorical figures proposed by Barthes (2012) that serve to compose myths. As we can observe (Figure 4), the figures that are most prevalent in Isabel Díaz Ayuso’s speeches are qualities’ quantifications and nini-isms.

Qualities’ quantifications are widely used in all speeches except one, with a significant impact on the closing campaign speech of 2021. Its usage is structured in a negative sense, to reduce the proposals of opponents to a conceptual approximation, as seen in speech 1:

*“...they have already warned us: they are going to close subsidized education, they are against special schools where parents with children with disabilities choose to study, they are against the freedom to open or close a store. They have already said it, no to the unified health area, no to educational freedom, no to subsidized education, no to special schools, no to buying when citizens want. What kind of Madrid do they intend to impose on us? But what kind of society does the left want to tell us about now?”.*

A similar discursive construction with similar components is used in speech 3. Through this rhetorical figure, Díaz Ayuso aims to portray the proposals of her opponents as something “bad” for the citizens of Madrid, opposing the formulated idea in the quote: “in freedom”. The enumeration of measures proposed by other parties is reduced to being “against freedom”; which implies “imposing”, as reflected in the conclusion of the quote. In the same speech, the candidate also employs this figure in a positive manner: she lists her own measures, reducing their quality to an unspecified number, defining the quality opposite to that of the political rival.

*“These are measures that provide freedom for each person to decide how they should act, instead of prohibiting, restraining, and fining, which is all the left knows how to do”.*



**Figure 4.** Distribution of rhetorical figures by speech.

*Source: own elaboration*

Throughout speech 2, we can find this rhetorical figure as part of a discursive strategy in which Díaz Ayuso attempts, first and foremost, to downplay the administrative management issues in the Community of Madrid that have been poorly perceived by the public, such as the lack of doctors -an autonomous competence- at the most critical moment of the pandemic in the region. This is done by quantifying the issue and reducing its significance in the overall context of the government’s actions during the pandemic. For example:

*“We closed schools, took a step forward in a very complicated situation, brought in planes, thousands of tons of supplies for our healthcare professionals, built IFEMA, converted new hotels into hospitals, and the new emergency hospital, Isabel Zendal. I would like you to be with us when we inaugurate it shortly because few capitals and few countries in the world can celebrate having a hospital and an airport together, on top of that, in the most generous healthcare system that exists; and that is the brand of Spain”.*

Lastly, speech 3 has the highest number of qualities’ quantifications and can be considered an extension of the rhetorical strategy in speech 1. In this case, the negative

sense is constructed by proposing that Pedro Sánchez is imposing his electoral program on the Community of Madrid, contrary to Díaz Ayuso's agenda. To achieve this, she enumerates all of Pedro Sánchez's measures and quantifies them in a way that leads to only one conclusion: "to obtain a majority to prevent the enumerated measures". A similar approach is applied to the allusion to pandemic protection measures, which concludes with the goal of obtaining a broad majority to avoid them.

Another rhetorical figure employed by Díaz Ayuso is nini-ism. During the first speech in the 2019 elections, the discursive strategy tends to contrast measures implemented by other parties in government with a lack of freedom or moral superiority. After mentioning the unemployment data managed by a left-wing government, for example, Díaz Ayuso concludes that they "always opposed us from continuing to grow in freedom and being a cutting-edge community and capital" (speech 1).

In speech 3, Díaz Ayuso follows a similar dynamic to the first one, but with a higher occurrence of nini-ism. The rhetorical strategy in this case is to compare the national government with communist dictatorships in other countries. She coins the term "sanchismo" in her discourse, referring to Pedro Sánchez, and compares it to communism, given the alliances formed with the political party Podemos. From this comparison emerges the slogan repeated throughout the campaign, "communism or freedom". Once the connection between communism and "sanchismo" is understood, Díaz Ayuso presents herself as the chosen reality: freedom, her campaign slogan.

In contrast, Díaz Ayuso adopts a victim stance in which she compares two realities in speech 4: the Spanish government and the left, on the one hand, as opposition that "attacks" her regional government and, on the other hand, the national leader of her party. In this way, faced with two realities that attack her, she positions herself as the victim of both, being the reality that, through the discourse, the citizen can perceive as better.


We must consider two figures that Díaz Ayuso puts into practice perfectly in speech 4: "vaccine" and "deprivation of history", accompanied by figures such as the nini-ism in a victim position, which generates an emotional impact on the listener.

Speech 4 is a vaccine in itself since it conveys to the public a minimized idea about specific events. In particular, the conflict with the national leadership of PP arose during a COVID-19 pandemic corruption scandal that involved Díaz Ayuso and her brother. This scandal was aired as immoral by the national leader of the PP, Pablo Casado, which led to the construction of an internal conflict.

Likewise, the speech also presents itself as a "deprivation of history" since Díaz Ayuso constructs a history devoid of events that places her in the role of the victim of all the facts, proceeding to deny any plausible alternative.

#### *Analysis of rhetorical tools*

Through this dimension, our research aims to capture the role and use of different rhetorical tools (Figure 6) as proposed by Hartog and Verburg (1997).



*Figure 5.* Rhetorical Tools in each speech.  
*Source:* own elaboration.

The most used rhetorical tool is the spin technique to construct the message in a specific direction intended by the speaker.

The first identified frame is freedom, in a negative sense. In the first speech Díaz Ayuso constructs this frame by attacking the positions of political opponents, with references such as “people here do not want to be tutored or directed, they want opportunities, they want to lead their lives their own way” or “these are measures that provide freedom for everyone to decide how to move and not by prohibiting”. She also negatively frames a lack of freedom proposed by the left through phrases like “the constant rigidity of the left”.

In the second speech, the most prominent spin is “Madrid as a nation” equated with Spain. Díaz Ayuso even speaks of the Spanish public healthcare system, internationally recognized for its free and high-quality services, as the brand of Spain, comparing it to that of Madrid.

In the fourth speech, the spin revolves around the family, in two senses. First, she acknowledges that “family is the most important thing we have” and talks about the vital support she has received from her family. Then she refers to PP as a family with a negative spin. She believes that PP, which was her family, has failed and has not been loyal to her. She emphasizes that being a family in a positive sense implies loyalty.

The third speech could be considered a mixture of the previous spins. We can find clear references to her family as an essential part of her profession. She also mentions PP members and thanks them for their work on the campaign and for their loyalty. Then, she combines the remaining two spins: Madrid and freedom, with statements like “I am free

because I live in Madrid” or “I ask all Madrilenians to allow me to have a government in freedom”.

The next most frequently used rhetorical tool is contrast, through which she presents a serious problem and a simple solution. Contrasts are closely related to one of the spins: freedom.

In the first speech, Díaz Ayuso analyzes numerous problems in Madrid resulting from the Spanish government and offers freedom as a simple but applicable solution. The same occurs in the third speech, where freedom is the solution to Pedro Sánchez as the problem for Madrid.

### **Relation between Codes**

Through a coding matrix, we can examine which codes coincide with each other in our speech analysis. The most coinciding codifications are, firstly, tautologies and nation, due to the fact that Díaz Ayuso’s concept of nation involves identifying Madrid with Spain, and tautologies consist of defining reality by itself. Barthes (2012) states that through this procedure, the speaker can eliminate the rational parts of the discourse to transform it into a completely irrational message. The same occurs with the second equivalence between tautologies and spins. Díaz Ayuso employs the construction of tautologies to frame messages in a convenient sense.

The last significant equivalences between codifications are found between storytelling and nini-ism. Díaz Ayuso tends to juxtapose two realities that oppose hers, creating a story that concludes favorably for her intention while carrying out a discursive narrative.

### **Charisma Analysis**

As we have analyzed, all the tools, rhetorical figures, and references to charismatic deposits have been implemented by the President of the Community of Madrid, to varying degrees. This analysis led us to identify behaviors that coincide with the characteristics described by Weber (2002) that charismatic leadership should have.

Throughout speech 1, Díaz Ayuso attempts to articulate rhetoric that revolves around PP as an institution that has governed the Community of Madrid for a long period of time. Therefore, Díaz Ayuso presents herself as the successor to both the two previous Presidents (Esperanza Aguirre and Cristina Cifuentes) and the party leader, who had placed his trust in her. This procedure aligns with Weber’s description of the charismatic succession that must occur when the bearer of charisma disappears from the public scene (2002, p. 198). Consequently, we can understand that she does not possess any granted charisma but is in search of it.

Her discourse does not allow us to perceive her as a charismatic leader, but rather as someone who is part of an institutional ensemble, which contributes to identifying elements that call for stability. She does not oppose the established power or even criticize it. Rather than this, she focuses on making proposals against her political adversaries. Lastly, the discourse is not dramatic.

The characteristics of speech 2 remain similar to the previous one where rationality predominates. However, we can observe a more critical President that starts questioning

the status quo of reality, accusing the President of the Government of “neglect of duties”, for example.

In contrast, speech 3 presents significant differences from the previous two. On the one hand, we can find a highly personal rhetoric in which Díaz Ayuso assumes the protagonist role. There are surprising and irrational elements in the construction of the discourse, through which she showcases all the management successes achieved over the past two years. Ayuso positions herself as Madrid's heroine, stating that she has managed the pandemic by overcoming the challenges that came her way, including her main opponent, Pedro Sánchez.

On the other hand, Díaz Ayuso utilizes Pedro Sánchez to construct a revolutionary and anti-establishment narrative. She announces, in popular jargon, how she told Sánchez that she “didn't feel like” closing Madrid and the hospitality industry, and how she told her colleagues that “Madrid cannot be blackmailed”. She crafts a critical discourse against the policies carried out by the Government of the Nation.

Furthermore, Díaz Ayuso achieves a crucial discursive effect for charismatic leadership: she manages to give the appearance that charisma has already been bestowed upon her through an extensive enumeration of all the people who have worked for her during the campaign to ensure her presidency.

Finally, through speech 4, Isabel Díaz Ayuso fulfills all the Weber's charisma characteristics. In the previous speech, almost all these characteristics were already fulfilled, except for one: there was a higher leadership than hers, the national leader of the party. In fact, in speech 3, Díaz Ayuso assumes Casado's leadership.

Through speech 4, Díaz Ayuso becomes a fully charismatic leader. She no longer recognizes Casado's legitimacy, criticizing the work of the national leadership of PP and accusing them of not working in the interest of the party or the citizens.

After this, the PP's national headquarters in Madrid were filled with protesters calling for the resignation of Pablo Casado, and Díaz Ayuso emerged as a leader with bestowed charisma.



**Figure 6.** Protesters in 2022 at the national headquarters of PP.

Source: 20 Minutos (Sarría, 2023). Retrieved on June 30, 2023 from <https://www.20minutos.es/noticia/5102148/0/la-semana-en-que-se-bloqueo-la-centralita-del-pp-un-tsunami-de-votantes-y-militantes-se-dieron-de-baja/>

## Conclusions

Isabel Díaz Ayuso has emerged as a charismatic leader in an era of increasing personalization of politics. The analyses conducted on her most impactful speeches reveal the construction of a charismatic leadership style. Both the use of rhetorical tools and the references to charismatic deposits with strong emotional appeal indicate that over time, the leader of the PP has acquired pure charismatic components aligned with her party's ideology (Christian democracy, conservative neoliberalism).

The charismatic deposits through which she has built her charisma primarily revolve around the notions of nation, consumption, and family. These deposits have been intertwined with various rhetorical figures, such as employing the nation as a tautology to eliminate rational considerations and construct a purely emotional discourse.

Furthermore, Díaz Ayuso's speeches were primarily focused on framing her own narrative, making her easily recognizable as a symbol of freedom associated with Madrid or Spain. Through these frames, she has employed spinning strategies to position the meanings associated with these concepts against her opponents, initially the left wing and subsequently Pedro Sánchez and Pablo Casado.

Among the charismatic characteristics, it can be argued that Díaz Ayuso has attempted to carry out a de-routinization of charisma. Routinized charisma exhibits characteristics opposite to those of pure charisma and often occurs in processes of institutionalization. In the paradigm of political personalization, Isabel Díaz Ayuso has gradually instrumentalized routinized charisma within her party in the Community of Madrid. Through discourse techniques and staging, she has approached what can be considered a semi-pure charisma, as described by Breuer (1996), who argues that in contemporary times, there is a fusion between legal-rational and charismatic domination.

The findings of this paper hold paramount importance within the realm of political communication, leadership studies, and the context of political personalization. They provide valuable insights into the intricate nature of political discourses as powerful instruments, wielding significant societal, political, and electoral repercussions. Charismatic leaders demonstrate their prowess in crafting speeches that effectively mobilize individuals, harnessing the potency of abstract symbolic elements deeply embedded in cultural and societal values.

### *Further research and limitations*

While the analysis presented here strongly suggests that Díaz Ayuso embodies a novel and purer form of charismatic leadership, it is essential to acknowledge the limitations of this study. Given its inherently descriptive nature, future investigations into the realms of political personalization and charisma should take into account several critical aspects.

First and foremost, to enhance external validity, we recommend an examination of a more extensive array of speeches and media outlets. This should encompass electoral debates conducted during campaigns, a broader selection of public addresses or orations, as well as speeches preceding and succeeding the press conferences scrutinized herein. Such a comprehensive approach would facilitate a more profound comprehension of the evolving landscape of political communication inherent in the research subject.



Furthermore, future inquiries may endeavor to integrate this methodological framework with agenda-setting and framing methodologies. This holistic approach would yield a more comprehensive understanding of the intricate interplay between media dynamics and the charismatic political discourses exhibited by specific candidates or party leaders.

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The present paper has been made possible thanks to the funding provided by the Grants for University Teaching Staff (FPU21/03549) from the Ministry of Universities and the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training of the Government of Spain.

## References

- Aduriz, Í., & Pinheiro, M. (2019). Casado elige a Díaz Ayuso como candidata a la Comunidad de Madrid y a Martínez-Almeida para la alcaldía. *Eldiario.Es*. [https://www.eldiario.es/politica/casado-candidata-comunidad-madrid-alcaldia\\_1\\_1757004.html](https://www.eldiario.es/politica/casado-candidata-comunidad-madrid-alcaldia_1_1757004.html)
- Balmas, M., & Sheaffer, T. (2014). Charismatic Leaders and Mediated Personalization in the International Arena. *Communication Research*, 41(7), 991–1015. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650213510936>
- Bareño, G. (2021). Isabel Díaz Ayuso: el icono pop que agita el debate en el PP. *La Voz de Galicia*. [https://www.lavozdeg Galicia.es/noticia/espana/2021/11/14/icono-pop-agita-debate-pp/0003\\_202111G14P18991.htm](https://www.lavozdeg Galicia.es/noticia/espana/2021/11/14/icono-pop-agita-debate-pp/0003_202111G14P18991.htm)
- Barriuso, O. (2021). Ayuso, el icono pop. *El Correo*. <https://www.elcorreo.com/politica/ayuso-icono-20210425221917-nt.html>
- Barthes, R. (2012). *Mitologías*. Biblioteca Nueva, Siglo XXI Editores.
- Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1994). *La Construcción Social de la Realidad* (12th ed.). Amorrortu Editores.
- Bourdieu, P. (1997). *Sobre la televisión*. Anagrama, Colección Argumentos.
- Brants, K., & Voltmer, K. (2011). Introduction: Mediatization and De-centralization of Political Communication. In K. Brants & K. Voltmer (Eds.), *Political Communication in Postmodern Democracy Challenging the Primacy of Politics* (pp. 1–18). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Breuer, Stefan. (1996). *Burocracia y carisma: la sociología política de Max Weber*. Alfons el Magnànim.
- Campbell, S., Greenwood, M., Prior, S., Shearer, T., Walkem, K., Young, S., Bywaters, D., & Walker, K. (2020). Purposive sampling: complex or simple? Research case examples. *Journal of Research in Nursing*, 25(8), 652–661. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1744987120927206>
- Charmaz, K. (2006). *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis*. Sage.
- Conger, J. A., & Kanungo, R. N. (1987). Toward a Behavioral Theory of Charismatic Leadership in Organizational Settings. *The Academy of Management Review*, 12(4), 637–647. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/258069>
- Córdoba-Cabús, A., Hidalgo-Arjona, M., & López-Martín, Á. (2021). Coverage of the 2021 Madrid regional election campaign by the main Spanish newspapers on Twitter: natural language processing and machine learning algorithms. *Profesional de La Información*, 30(6). <https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2021.nov.11>
- de Vreese, C. H., & Neijens, P. (2016). Measuring Media Exposure in a Changing Communications Environment. *Communication Methods and Measures*, 10(2–3), 69–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19312458.2016.1150441>
- Elecciones autonómicas: La izquierda recuperaría la Comunidad de Madrid tras 24 años. (2018). El País. [https://elpais.com/politica/2019/05/19/actualidad/1558286092\\_743317.html](https://elpais.com/politica/2019/05/19/actualidad/1558286092_743317.html)
- Fairclough, N. L., & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. In T. A. van Dijk (Ed.), *Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction* (Vol. 2, pp. 258–284). Sage.
- Farrell, D. M., & Webb, P. (2003). Political Parties as Campaign Organizations. In *Parties Without Partisans* (pp. 102–128). Oxford University Press/Oxford. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0199253099.003.0006>
- Freud, S. (2018). *Psicología de las Masas y Análisis del Yo* (Virtual). Omegalfa.
- García Santamaría, S. (2022). Caring Ecologies of the New Right and Left: Populist Performances of Care During the Pandemic. *Media and Communication*, 10(4), 224–235. <https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v10i4.5842>
- García-Beaudoux, V., Berrocal, S., D'Adamo, O., & Bruni, L. (2023). Female political leadership styles as shown on Instagram during COVID-19. *Comunicar*, 31(75), 125–134. <https://doi.org/10.3916/C75-2023-10>
- Garea, F. (2018). Sánchez tumba a Rajoy y llega a Moncloa con el Gobierno más débil de la democracia. *El Confidencial*. [https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2018-06-01/mocion-censura-rajoy-pedro-sanchez-gobierno\\_1572631/](https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2018-06-01/mocion-censura-rajoy-pedro-sanchez-gobierno_1572631/)
- Garzia, D. (2011). The personalization of politics in Western democracies: Causes and consequences on leader-follower relationships. *Leadership Quarterly*, 22(4), 697–709. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.05.010>
- Garzia, D. (2013). Changing Parties, Changing Partisans: The Personalization of Partisan Attachments in Western Europe. *Political Psychology*, 34(1), 67–89. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00918.x>
- Garzia, D. (2014). *Personalization of Politics and Electoral Change*. Palgrave Macmillan.

- Giddens, A. (1994). *El Capitalismo y la Moderna Teoría Social* (5ª). Editorial Labor.
- Glasser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1999). *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for a qualitative research*. Aldine de Gruyter.
- Goffman, E. (1977). *La presentación de la persona en la vida cotidiana*. Amorrortu Editoriales.
- Goffman, E. (2006). *Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. CIS.
- Hallin, D., & Mancini, P. (2008). *Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hardin, G. (2005). La tragedia de los comunes. *Revista de La Universidad Bolivariana*, 4(10), 1–10.
- Hartog, D. N. Den, & Verburg, R. M. (1997). Charisma and Rhetoric: Communicative Techniques of International Business Leaders. *Leadership Quarterly*, 8(4), 355–391.
- Hernández-Morales, A. (2022). Spain's pop polarizer: The unlikely rise of Isabel Díaz Ayuso – POLITICO. *Politico.Eu*. <https://www.politico.eu/article/isabel-diaz-ayuso-profile-spain-madrid-pop-polarizer-unlikely-rise/>
- Holtz-Bacha, C., Langer, A. I., & Merkle, S. (2014). The personalization of politics in comparative perspective: Campaign coverage in Germany and the United Kingdom. *European Journal of Communication*, 29(2), 153–170. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323113516727>
- House, R. J. (1976). A 1976 Theory of Chrismatic Leadership. *Southern Illinois University Fourth Biennial Leadership Symposium*.
- Jayakody, J. A. S. K. (2008). Charisma as a cognitive-affective phenomenon: A follower-centric approach. *Management Decision*, 46(6), 832–845. <https://doi.org/10.1108/00251740810882626>
- Jung, C. G. (1970). *Arquetipos e inconsciente colectivo*. Paidós.
- Kissas, A. (2019). Three theses on the mediatization of politics: evolutionist, intended, or imagined transformation? *Communication Review*, 22(3), 222–242. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10714421.2019.1647726>
- La Sexta Columna. (2022). *Isabel Díaz Ayuso, una "estrella del pop" y la 'alumna más aventajada del "trumpismo" en España.* La Sexta. [https://www.lasexta.com/programas/sexta-columna/noticias/isabel-diaz-ayuso-estrella-pop-alumna-mas-aventajada-trumpismo-espana\\_20220225621949005bbac90001008dc8.html](https://www.lasexta.com/programas/sexta-columna/noticias/isabel-diaz-ayuso-estrella-pop-alumna-mas-aventajada-trumpismo-espana_20220225621949005bbac90001008dc8.html)
- Le Bon, G. (2018). *Psicología de las Masas*. Biblioteca Virtual Omegalfa.
- Lindholm, C. (2012). *Carisma. Análisis del fenómeno carismático y su relación con la conducta humana y los cambios sociales*. Gedisa.
- Mair, P. (2005). *Democracy Beyond Parties*. <http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/05-06>
- Manin, B. (1998). *Los principios del gobierno representativo*. Alianza Editorial.
- Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). "Mediatization" of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy? *Political Communication*, 16(3), 247–261. <https://doi.org/10.1080/105846099198613>
- Mazzoleni, G., & Sfondini, A. (2009). *Política Pop. Da "Porta a Porta" a "L'isola dei famosi."* Il Mulino.
- McPhail, C. (2006). The Crowd and Collective Behavior: Bringing Symbolic Interaction Back In. *Symbolic Interaction*, 29(4), 433–464. <http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm>.
- Mead, G. H. (1982). *Espíritu, persona y sociedad. Desde el punto de vista del conductismo social*. Paidós.
- Meeks, L. (2017). Getting Personal: Effects of Twitter Personalization on Candidate Evaluations. *Politics and Gender*, 13(1), 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X16000696>
- Minguito, Á. (2021). Ayuso: entre lo Pop y lo popular. *El Salto Diario*. <https://www.elsaltodiario.com/opinion/maria-corrales-victoria-madrid-ayuso-pop>
- Moret-Soler, D., Alonso-Muñoz, Laura, & Casero-Ripollés, A. (2022). La negatividad digital como estrategia de campaña en las elecciones de la Comunidad de Madrid de 2021 en Twitter. *Prisma Comunicación*, 39, 48–73.
- Olson, M. (2002). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press.
- Ortega y Gasset, J. (2010). *La Rebelión de las Masas*. La Guillotina .
- Ostrom, E. (2000). *El Gobierno de los Bienes Comunes*. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Palinkas, L. A., Horwitz, S. M., Green, C. A., Wisdom, J. P., Duan, N., & Hoagwood, K. (2015). Purposeful Sampling for Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis in Mixed Method Implementation Research. *Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research*, 42(5), 533–544. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10488-013-0528-y>
- Rebolledo, M. (2017). La personalización de la política: una propuesta de definición para su estudio sistemático. *Revista de Comunicación*, 16(2), 177–194. <https://doi.org/10.26441/rc16.2-2017-a7>
- Rico, G. (2009). *Líderes políticos, opinión pública y comportamiento electoral en España* (Vol. 270). Colección Monografías, CIS.
- Sarriá, B. (2023). La semana en que se bloqueó la centralita del PP: "Un tsunami de votantes y militantes pedían su baja." *20 Minutos*.
- Shamir, B., House, R. J., & Arthur, M. B. (1993). The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership: A Self-Concept Based Theory. *Organization Science*, 4(4), 577–594. <https://about.jstor.org/terms>
- Sheafer, T. (2001). Charismatic Skill and Media Legitimacy. An Actor-centered Approach to Understanding the Political Communication Competition. *Communication Research*, 28(6), 711–736.

- Sheafer, T. (2008). Charismatic communication skill, media legitimacy, and electoral success. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 7(1), 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15377850802063983>
- Slater, M. D. (2004). Operationalizing and Analyzing Exposure: The Foundation of Media Effects Research. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 81(1), 168–183. <https://doi.org/10.1177/107769900408100112>
- Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51(4), 464–481.
- Tarde, G. (1986). *La Opinión y la Multitud* (Vol. 1). Taurus.
- van Dijk, T. A. (2001). Critical Discourse Analysis. In D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen, & H. E. Hamilton (Eds.), *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (pp. 352–371). Blackwell Publishers.
- Verba Volant. (n.d.-a). CIVIO. Retrieved September 17, 2023, from <https://verba.civio.es/about>
- Verba Volant. (n.d.-b). Retrieved June 27, 2023, from <https://verba.civio.es/?q=%22D%C3%ADaz%20Ayuso%22&from=2019-01-01&to=2023-06-27#search-box>
- Viviani, L. (2023). What If Leader Was (Not) One of Us? Towards a Theory of Populist Leadership and Personalization of Politics. *Populism*, 55(2), 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-bja10048>
- Weber, M. (2002). *Economía y Sociedad. Esbozo de sociología comprensiva* (J. Winkelmann, Ed.). Fondo de Cultura Económica de España.
- Willner, A. R. (1984). *The Spellbinders. Charismatic Political Leadership*. Yale University Press.
- Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (2003). *Métodos de Análisis Crítico del Discurso*. Gedisa.
- Yagil, D. (1998). Charismatic Leadership and Organizational Hierarchy: Attribution of Charisma to Close and Distant Leaders. *Leadership Quarterly*, 9(2), 161–176.



### AMAÇ KAPSAM

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, siyaset bilimi, kamu yönetimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, alanlarında uluslararası ve disiplinlerarası makaleler yayınlamaktadır. Dergi, aşağıda belirtilen konuları kapsamak ile birlikte sadece bu konular ile kısıtlı değildir:

- Siyaset biliminin tüm alt disiplinleri, siyaset teorisi, siyaset felsefesi, politik davranış, siyasi kurumlar ve siyasi tarih
- Kamu yönetiminin tüm alt disiplinleri,
- Uluslararası ilişkiler ile ilgili tüm konular: uluslararası hukuk, iktisat, etik, strateji, felsefe, kültür, çevre, güvenlik, terör, bölgesel çalışmalar, küreselleşme ve diğer konular,

Dergi, yukarıda adı geçen disiplinlerin çeşitli yönlerini inceleyen, İngilizce yazılmış araştırma esaslı makalelerin yanında teorik ve kavramsal makaleleri yayınlamaktadır. Ayrıca, dergi uluslararası alandaki akademisyenlerin konuk editörlüğünde çeşitli temalar ile ilgili özel sayılar yayınlamaktadır.

### EDİTORYAL POLİTİKALAR VE HAKEM SÜRECİ

#### Yayın Politikası

Dergiye yayımlanmak üzere gönderilen makalelerin içeriği derginin amaç ve kapsamı ile uyumlu olmalıdır. Dergi, orijinal araştırma niteliğindeki yazıları yayınlamaya öncelik vermektedir. Genel İlkeler Daha önce yayımlanmamış ya da yayımlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Ön değerlendirmeyi geçen yazılar iThenticate intihal tarama programından geçirilir. İntihal incelemesinden sonra, uygun makaleler Editör tarafından orijinaliteleri, metodolojileri, makalede ele alınan konunun önemi ve derginin kapsamına uygunluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Bilimsel toplantılarda sunulan özet bildirimler, makalede belirtilmesi koşulu ile kaynak olarak kabul edilir. Editör, gönderilen makale biçimsel esaslara uygun ise, gelen yazıyı yurtiçinden ve /veya yurtdışından en az iki hakemin değerlendirmesine sunar, hakemler gerek gördüğü takdirde yazıda istenen değişiklikler yazarlar tarafından yapıldıktan sonra yayımlanmasına onay verir. Makale yayımlanmak üzere Dergiye gönderildikten sonra yazarlardan hiçbirinin ismi, tüm yazarların yazılı izni olmadan yazar listesinden silinemez ve yeni bir isim yazar olarak eklenemez ve yazar sırası değiştirilemez. Yayına kabul edilmeyen makale, resim ve fotoğraflar yazarlara geri gönderilmez. Yayımlanan yazı ve resimlerin tüm hakları Dergiye aittir.

#### Telif Hakkında

Yazarlar dergide yayımlanan çalışmalarının telif hakkına sahiptirler ve çalışmaları Creative Commons Atıf-GayriTicari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) olarak lisanslıdır. CC BY-NC 4.0 lisansı, eserin ticari kullanım dışında her boyut ve formatta paylaşılmasına, kopyalanmasına, çoğaltılmasına ve orijinal esere uygun şekilde atıfta bulunmak kaydıyla yeniden düzenleme, dönüştürme ve eserin üzerine inşa etme dâhil adapte edilmesine izin verir.

#### Açık Erişim İlkesi

Dergi açık erişimlidir ve derginin tüm içeriği okura ya da okurun dahil olduğu kuruma ücretsiz olarak sunulur. Okurlar, ticari amaç haricinde, yayıncı ya da yazardan izin almadan dergi makalelerinin tam metnini okuyabilir, indirebilir, kopyalayabilir, arayabilir ve link sağlayabilir. Bu

BOAI açık erişim tanımıyla uyumludur.

Derginin açık erişimli makaleleri Creative Commons Atıf-GayriTicari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) olarak lisanslıdır.

### İşleme Ücreti

Derginin tüm giderleri İstanbul Üniversitesi tarafından karşılanmaktadır. Dergide makale yayını ve makale süreçlerinin yürütülmesi ücrete tabi değildir. Dergiye gönderilen ya da yayın için kabul edilen makaleler için işleme ücreti ya da gönderim ücreti alınmaz.

### Hakem Süreci

Daha önce yayınlanmamış ya da yayınlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Gönderilen ve ön kontrolü geçen makaleler iThenticate yazılımı kullanılarak intihal için taranır. İntihal kontrolünden sonra, uygun olan makaleler baş editör tarafından orijinallik, metodoloji, işlenen konunun önemi ve dergi kapsamı ile uyumluluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar.

Seçilen makaleler en az iki ulusal/uluslararası hakeme değerlendirmeye gönderilir; yayın kararı, hakemlerin talepleri doğrultusunda yazarların gerçekleştirdiği düzenlemelerin ve hakem sürecinin sonrasında baş editör tarafından verilir.

Hakemlerin değerlendirmeleri objektif olmalıdır. Hakem süreci sırasında hakemlerin aşağıdaki hususları dikkate alarak değerlendirmelerini yapmaları beklenir.

- Makale yeni ve önemli bir bilgi içeriyor mu?
- Öz, makalenin içeriğini net ve düzgün bir şekilde tanımlıyor mu?
- Yöntem bütünlüklü ve anlaşılır şekilde tanımlanmış mı?
- Yapılan yorum ve varılan sonuçlar bulgularla kanıtlanıyor mu?
- Alandaki diğer çalışmalara yeterli referans verilmiş mi?
- Dil kalitesi yeterli mi?

Hakemler, gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdır. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir.

Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir.

### YAYIN ETİĞİ VE İLKELER

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, yayın etiğinde en yüksek standartlara bağlıdır ve Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA) ve World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) tarafından yayınlanan etik yayıncılık ilkelerini benimser; Principles of Transparency

and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing başlığı altında ifade edilen ilkeler için adres: <https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-andbest-practice-scholarly-publishing> Gönderilen tüm makaleler orijinal, yayınlanmamış ve başka bir dergide değerlendirme sürecinde olmamalıdır. Her bir makale editörlerden biri ve en az iki hakem tarafından çift kör değerlendirmeden geçirilir. İntihal, duplikasyon, sahte yazarlık/inkar edilen yazarlık, araştırma/veri fabrikasyonu, makale dilimleme, dilimleyerek yayın, telif hakları ihlali ve çıkar çatışmasının gizlenmesi, etik dışı davranışlar olarak kabul edilir. Kabul edilen etik standartlara uygun olmayan tüm makaleler yayından çıkarılır. Buna yayından sonra tespit edilen olası kuraldışı, uygunsuzluklar içeren makaleler de dahildir.

### **Araştırma Etiği**

Dergi araştırma etiğinde en yüksek standartları gözetir ve aşağıda tanımlanan uluslararası araştırma etiği ilkelerini benimser. Makalelerin etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. - Araştırmanın tasarlanması, tasarımın gözden geçirilmesi ve araştırmanın yürütülmesinde, bütünlük, kalite ve şeffaflık ilkeleri sağlanmalıdır.

- Araştırma ekibi ve katılımcılar, araştırmanın amacı, yöntemleri ve öngörülen olası kullanımları; araştırmaya katılımın gerektirdikleri ve varsa riskleri hakkında tam olarak bilgilendirilmelidir.
- Araştırma katılımcılarının sağladığı bilgilerin gizliliği ve yanıt verenlerin gizliliği sağlanmalıdır. Araştırma katılımcıların özerkliğini ve saygınlığını koruyacak şekilde tasarlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma katılımcıları gönüllü olarak araştırmada yer almalı, herhangi bir zorlama altında olmamalıdır. - Katılımcıların zarar görmesinden kaçınılmalıdır. Araştırma, katılımcıları riske sokmayacak şekilde planlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma bağımsızlığıyla ilgili açık ve net olunmalı; çıkar çatışması varsa belirtilmelidir.
- Deneysel çalışmalarda, araştırmaya katılmaya karar veren katılımcıların yazılı bilgilendirilmiş onayı alınmalıdır. Çocukların ve vesayet altındakilerin veya tasdiklenmiş akıl hastalığı bulunanların yasal vasisinin onayı alınmalıdır.
- Çalışma herhangi bir kurum ya da kuruluştaki gerçekleştirilecekse bu kurum ya da kuruluştan çalışma yapılacağına dair onay alınmalıdır.
- İnsan ögesi bulunan çalışmalarda, “yöntem” bölümünde katılımcılardan “bilgilendirilmiş onam” alındığının ve çalışmanın yapıldığı kurumdaki etik kurul onayı alındığı belirtilmesi gerekir.

### **Yazarların Sorumluluğu**

Makalelerin bilimsel ve etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. Yazar makalenin orijinal olduğu, daha önce başka bir yerde yayınlanmadığı ve başka bir yerde dilde yayınlanmak üzere değerlendirmede olmadığı konusunda teminat sağlamalıdır. Uygulamadaki telif kanunları ve anlaşmaları gözetilmelidir. Telifle bağlı materyaller (örneğin tablolar, şekiller veya büyük alıntılar) gerekli izin ve teşekkürle kullanılmalıdır. Başka yazarların, katkıda bulunanların çalışmaları ya da yararlanılan kaynaklar uygun biçimde kullanılmalı ve referanslarda belirtilmelidir. Gönderilen makalede tüm yazarların akademik ve bilimsel olarak doğrudan katkısı olmalıdır, bu bağlamda “yazar” yayınlanan bir araştırmanın kavramsallaştırılmasına ve dizaynına, verilerin elde edilmesine, analizine ya da yorumlanmasına belirgin katkı yapan, yazının yazılması ya da bunun içerik açısından eleştirel biçimde gözden geçirilmesinde görev yapan birisi olarak görülür. Yazar

olabilmenin diğer koşulları ise, makaledeki çalışmayı planlamak veya icra etmek ve / veya revize etmektir. Fon sağlanması, veri toplanması ya da araştırma grubunun genel süpervizyonu tek başına yazarlık hakkı kazandırmaz. Yazar olarak gösterilen tüm bireyler sayılan tüm ölçütleri karşılamalıdır ve yukarıdaki ölçütleri karşılayan her birey yazar olarak gösterilebilir. Yazarların isim sıralaması ortak verilen bir karar olmalıdır. Tüm yazarlar yazar sıralamasını Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu'nda imzalı olarak belirtmek zorundadırlar. Yazarlık için yeterli ölçütleri karşılamayan ancak çalışmaya katkısı olan tüm bireyler “teşekkür / bilgiler” kısmında sıralanmalıdır. Bunlara örnek olarak ise sadece teknik destek sağlayan, yazıma yardımcı olan ya da sadece genel bir destek sağlayan, finansal ve materyal desteği sunan kişiler verilebilir. Bütün yazarlar, araştırmanın sonuçlarını ya da bilimsel değerlendirmeyi etkileyebilme potansiyeli olan finansal ilişkiler, çıkar çatışması ve çıkar rekabetini beyan etmelidirler. Bir yazar kendi yayınlanmış yazısında belirgin bir hata ya da yanlışlık tespit ederse, bu yanlışlıklara ilişkin düzeltme ya da geri çekme için editör ile hemen temasa geçme ve işbirliği yapma sorumluluğunu taşır.

### **Editör ve Hakem Sorumlulukları**

Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar. Gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalacağını garanti eder. Baş editör içerik ve yayının toplam kalitesinden sorumludur. Gereğinde hata sayfası yayınlamalı ya da düzeltme yapmalıdır. Baş editör; yazarlar, editörler ve hakemler arasında çıkar çatışmasına izin vermez. Hakem atama konusunda tam yetkiye sahiptir ve Dergide yayınlanacak makalelerle ilgili nihai kararı vermekle yükümlüdür.

Hakemlerin araştırmayla ilgili, yazarlarla ve/veya araştırmanın finansal destekçileriyle çıkar çatışmaları olmamalıdır. Değerlendirmelerinin sonucunda tarafsız bir yargıya varmalıdırlar. Gönderilmiş yazılara ilişkin tüm bilginin gizli tutulmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdırlar. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir. Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir. Bazı durumlarda editörün kararıyla, ilgili hakemlerin makaleye ait yorumları aynı makaleyi yorumlayan diğer hakemlere gönderilerek hakemlerin bu süreçte aydınlatılması sağlanabilir.

### **YAZILARIN HAZIRLANMASI**

#### **Dil**

Dergide İngilizce dilinde makaleler yayınlanır.

#### **Yazıların Hazırlanması ve Gönderimi**

Aksi belirtilmedikçe gönderilen yazılarla ilgili tüm yazışmalar ilk yazarla yapılacaktır. Makale gönderimi online olarak <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/siyasal> üzerinden yapılmalıdır. Gönderilen



yazılar, yazının yayınlanmak üzere gönderildiğini ifade eden, makale türünü belirten ve makaleyle ilgili bilgileri içeren (bkz: Son Kontrol Listesi) bir mektup; yazının elektronik formunu içeren Microsoft Word 2003 ve üzerindeki versiyonları ile yazılmış elektronik dosya ve tüm yazarların imzaladığı Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu eklenerek gönderilmelidir.

1. Çalışmalar, A4 sayfada üst, alt, sağ ve sol taraftan 2,5 cm. boşluk bırakılarak, 12 punto Times New Roman harf karakterleriyle ve 1,5 satır aralık ölçüsü ile hazırlanmalıdır.
2. Çalışmalar 4500 - 8500 sözcük arasında olmalı ve sayfa numaraları sayfanın altında ve ortada yer almalıdır.
3. Yazar/yazarların adları çalışmanın başlığının hemen altında sağa bitişik şekilde verilmelidir. Ayrıca yıldız dipnot şeklinde (\*) yazarın unvanı, kurumu ve e-posta adresi ve telefonu sayfanın en altında dipnotta belirtilmelidir.
4. Giriş bölümünden önce 180-200 kelimelik çalışmanın kapsamını, amacını, ulaşılan sonuçları ve kullanılan yöntemi kaydeden İngilizce ve Türkçe öz yer almalıdır. Çalışmanın İngilizce ve Türkçe başlığı İngilizce özet üzerinde yer almalıdır. İngilizce ve Türkçe özet altında çalışmanın içeriğini temsil eden 3-5 adet İngilizce ve Türkçe anahtar kelime yer almalıdır.
5. Çalışmaların başlıca şu unsurları içermesi gerekmektedir: İngilizce ve Türkçe başlık, öz ve anahtar kelimeler; ana metin bölümleri, son notlar ve kaynaklar.
6. Metin içi alıntılama ve kaynak gösterme için APA (American Psychological Association) kaynak sitilinin 6. versiyonu kullanılmalıdır. APA 6 stili hakkında bilgi için; <http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr/tr/content/yazarlara-bilgi/kaynaklar> sayfasını ziyaret edebilir veya Yazarlara Bilgi'nin Kaynaklar başlığı altında ilgili açıklama ve örnekleri inceleyebilirsiniz.
7. Çalışmalarda tablo, grafik ve şekil gibi göstergeler ancak çalışmanın takip edilebilmesi açısından gereklilik arz ettiği durumlarda, numaralandırılarak, tanımlayıcı bir başlık ile birlikte verilmelidir. Tablolara ait başlık üstte, Şekiller'e ait başlık altta yer almalıdır. Demografik özellikler gibi metin içinde verilebilecek veriler, ayrıca tablolar ile ifade edilmemelidir.
8. Yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen makale ile birlikte yazar bilgilerini içeren kapak sayfası gönderilmelidir. Kapak sayfasında, makalenin başlığı, yazar veya yazarların bağlı oldukları kurum ve unvanları, kendilerine ulaşılabilecek adresler, cep, iş ve faks numaraları ve e-posta adresleri yer almalıdır (bkz. Son Kontrol Listesi).
9. Kurallar dâhilinde dergimize yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen çalışmaların her türlü sorumluluğu yazar/yazarlarına aittir.
10. Yayın kurulu ve hakem raporları doğrultusunda yazarlardan, metin üzerinde bazı düzeltmeler yapmaları istenebilir.

## KAYNAKLAR

Derleme yazıları okuyucular için bir konudaki kaynaklara ulaşmayı kolaylaştıran bir araç olsa da, her zaman orijinal çalışmayı doğru olarak yansıtmaz. Bu yüzden mümkün olduğunca yazarlar orijinal çalışmalarını kaynak göstermelidir. Öte yandan, bir konuda çok fazla sayıda orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi yer israfına neden olabilir. Birkaç anahtar orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi genelde uzun listelerle aynı işi görür. Ayrıca günümüzde kaynaklar elektronik versiyonlara eklenebilmekte ve okuyucular elektronik literatür taramalarıyla yayınlara kolaylıkla ulaşabilmektedir.

Kabul edilmiş ancak henüz sayıya dahil edilmemiş makaleler Early View olarak yayınlanır ve

bu makalelere atıflar “advance online publication” şeklinde verilmelidir. Genel bir kaynaktan elde edilemeyecek temel bir konu olmadıkça “kişisel iletişimlere” atıfta bulunulmamalıdır. Eğer atıfta bulunulursa parantez içinde iletişim kurulan kişinin adı ve iletişimin tarihi belirtilmelidir. Bilimsel makaleler için yazarlar bu kaynaktan yazılı izin ve iletişimin doğruluğunu gösterir belge almalıdır. Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

### Referans Stili ve Formatı

SIYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences, metin içi alıntılama ve kaynak gösterme için APA (American Psychological Association) kaynak sitilinin 6. edisyonunu benimser. APA 6. Edisyon hakkında bilgi için:

- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
- <http://www.apastyle.org/>

Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar aşağıdaki örneklerdeki gibi gösterilmelidir.

### Metin İçinde Kaynak Gösterme

Kaynaklar metinde parantez içinde yazarların soyadı ve yayın tarihi yazılarak belirtilmelidir. Birden fazla kaynak gösterilecekse kaynaklar arasında (;) işareti kullanılmalıdır. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

### Örnekler:

#### ***Birden fazla kaynak;***

(Esin ve ark., 2002; Karasar 1995)

#### ***Tek yazarlı kaynak;***

(Akyolcu, 2007)

#### ***İki yazarlı kaynak;***

(Sayiner ve Demirci, 2007, s. 72)

#### ***Üç, dört ve beş yazarlı kaynak;***

Metin içinde ilk kullanımda: (Ailen, Ciambune ve Welch 2000, s. 12–13) Metin içinde tekrarlayan kullanımlarda: (Ailen ve ark., 2000)

#### ***Altı ve daha çok yazarlı kaynak;***

(Çavdar ve ark., 2003)

### Kaynaklar Bölümünde Kaynak Gösterme

Kullanılan tüm kaynaklar metnin sonunda ayrı bir bölüm halinde yazar soyadlarına göre alfabetik olarak numaralandırılmadan verilmelidir.

**Kaynak yazımı ile ilgili örnekler aşağıda verilmiştir.**

### Kitap

#### ***a) Türkçe Kitap***

Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8.bs). Ankara: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

**b) Türkçeye Çevrilmiş Kitap**

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* (A. Kotil, Çev.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

**c) Editörlü Kitap**

Ören, T., Üney, T. ve Çölkesen, R. (Ed.). (2006). *Türkiye bilişim ansiklopedisi*. İstanbul: Papatya Yayıncılık.

**d) Çok Yazarlı Türkçe Kitap**

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y. ve Sever, H. (2002). *Türkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme*. Ankara: Total Bilişim.

**e) İngilizce Kitap**

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

**f) İngilizce Kitap İçerisinde Bölüm**

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

**g) Türkçe Kitap İçerisinde Bölüm**

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi. M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi kitabı* içinde (s. 233–263). Bursa: Dora Basım Yayın.

**h) Yayıncının ve Yazarın Kurum Olduğu Yayın**

Türk Standartları Enstitüsü. (1974). *Adlandırma ilkeleri*. Ankara: Yazar.

**Makale**

**a) Türkçe Makale**

Mutlu, B. ve Savaşer, S. (2007). Çocuğu ameliyat sonrası yoğun bakımda olan ebeveynlerde stres nedenleri ve azaltma girişimleri. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Florence Nightingale Hemşirelik Dergisi*, 15(60), 179–182.

**b) İngilizce Makale**

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society*, 10(2), 149–173. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002>

**c) Yediden Fazla Yazarlı Makale**

Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 372, 2087–2096. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184>

**d) DOI'si Olmayan Online Edinilmiş Makale**

Al, U. ve Doğan, G. (2012). Hacettepe Üniversitesi Bilgi ve Belge Yönetimi Bölümü tezlerinin atf analizi. *Türk Kütüphaneciliği*, 26, 349–369. Erişim adresi: <http://www.tk.org.tr/>

**e) DOI'si Olan Makale**

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly*, 27, 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07317131003765910>

**f) Advance Online Olarak Yayımlanmış Makale**

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology*. Advance online publication. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

**g) Popüler Dergi Makalesi**

Semerçioğlu, C. (2015, Haziran). Sıradanlığın rayihası. *Sabit Fikir*, 52, 38–39.

**Tez, Sunum, Bildiri**

**a) Türkçe Tezler**

Sarı, E. (2008). *Kültür kimlik ve politika: Mardin’de kültürlerarasılık*. (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi). Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara.

**b) Ticari Veritabanında Yer Alan Yüksek Lisans Ya da Doktora Tezi**

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 9943436)

**c) Kurumsal Veritabanında Yer Alan İngilizce Yüksek Lisans/Doktora Tezi**

Yaylalı-Yıldız, B. (2014). *University campuses as places of potential publicness: Exploring the politicals, social and cultural practices in Ege University* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from: Retrieved from <http://library.iyte.edu.tr/tr/hizli-erisim/iyte-tez-portali>

**d) Web’de Yer Alan İngilizce Yüksek Lisans/Doktora Tezi**

Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from <http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/yayinlar/phd/ickapak.html>

**e) Dissertations Abstracts International’da Yer Alan Yüksek Lisans/Doktora Tezi**

Appelbaum, L. G. (2005). Three studies of human information processing: Texture amplification, motion representation, and figure-ground segregation. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineering*, 65(10), 5428.

**f) Sempozyum Katkısı**

Krinsky-McHale, S. J., Zigman, W. B., & Silverman, W. (2012, August). Are neuropsychiatric symptoms markers of prodromal Alzheimer’s disease in adults with Down syndrome? In W. B. Zigman (Chair), *Predictors of mild cognitive impairment, dementia, and mortality in adults with Down syndrome*. Symposium conducted at American Psychological Association meeting, Orlando, FL.

**g) Online Olarak Erişilen Konferans Bildiri Özeti**

Çınar, M., Doğan, D. ve Seferoğlu, S. S. (2015, Şubat). *Eğitimde dijital araçlar: Google sınıf uygulaması üzerine bir değerlendirme* [Öz]. Akademik Bilişim Konferansında sunulan bildiri, Anadolu Üniversitesi, Eskişehir. Erişim adresi: [http://ab2015.anadolu.edu.tr /index.php?menu=5&submenu=27](http://ab2015.anadolu.edu.tr/index.php?menu=5&submenu=27)

**h) Düzenli Olarak Online Yayımlanan Bildiriler**

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105, 12593-12598. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105>

**i) Kitap Şeklinde Yayımlanan Bildiriler**

Schneider, R. (2013). Research data literacy. S. Kurbanoglu ve ark. (Ed.), *Communications in Computer and Information Science: Vol. 397. Worldwide Communalities and Challenges in Information Literacy Research and Practice* içinde (s. 134-140). Cham, İsviçre: Springer. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03919-0>

**j) Kongre Bildirisi**

Çepni, S., Bacanak A. ve Özsevgeç T. (2001, Haziran). *Fen bilgisi öğretmen adaylarının fen branşlarına karşı tutumları ile fen branşlarındaki başarılarının ilişkisi*. X. Ulusal Eğitim Bilimleri Kongresi’nde sunulan bildiri, Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi, Bolu.

### Diğer Kaynaklar

#### a) Gazete Yazısı

Toker, Ç. (2015, 26 Haziran). 'Unutma' notları. *Cumhuriyet*, s. 13.

#### b) Online Gazete Yazısı

Tamer, M. (2015, 26 Haziran). E-ticaret hamle yapmak için tüketiciyi bekliyor. *Milliyet*. Erişim adresi: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr>

#### c) Web Page/Blog Post

Bordwell, D. (2013, June 18). David Koepp: Making the world movie-sized [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/page/27/>

#### d) Online Ansiklopedi/Sözlük

Bilgi mimarisi. (2014, 20 Aralık). Vikipedi içinde. Erişim adresi: [http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bilgi\\_mimarisi](http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bilgi_mimarisi)

Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/>

#### e) Podcast

Radyo ODTÜ (Yapımcı). (2015, 13 Nisan). *Modern sabahlar* [Podcast]. Erişim adresi: <http://www.radyoodtu.com.tr/>

#### f) Bir Televizyon Dizisinden Tek Bir Bölüm

Shore, D. (Senarist), Jackson, M. (Senarist) ve Bookstaver, S. (Yönetmen). (2012). Runaways [Televizyon dizisi bölümü]. D. Shore (Baş yapımcı), *House M.D.* içinde. New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

#### g) Müzik Kaydı

Say, F. (2009). Galata Kulesi. *İstanbul senfonisi* [CD] içinde. İstanbul: Ak Müzik.

## SON KONTROL LİSTESİ

Aşağıdaki listede eksik olmadığından emin olun:

- Editöre mektup
  - ✓ Makalenin türü
  - ✓ Başka bir dergiye gönderilmemiş olduğu bilgisi
  - ✓ Sponsor veya ticari bir firma ile ilişkisi (varsa belirtiniz)
  - ✓ İstatistik kontrolünün yapıldığı (araştırma makaleleri için)
  - ✓ İngilizce yönünden kontrolünün yapıldığı
  - ✓ Yazarlara Bilgide detaylı olarak anlatılan dergi politikalarının gözden geçirildiği
  - ✓ Kaynakların APA6'ya göre belirtildiği
- Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu
- Daha önce basılmış ve telifle bağlı materyal (yazı-resim-tablo) kullanılmış ise izin belgesi
- Kapak sayfası
  - ✓ Makalenin türü
  - ✓ Makalenin Türkçe ve İngilizce başlığı
  - ✓ Yazarların ismi soyadı, unvanları ve bağlı oldukları kurumlar (üniversite ve fakülte bilgisinden sonra şehir ve ülke bilgisi de yer almalıdır), e-posta adresleri
  - ✓ Sorumlu yazarın e-posta adresi, açık yazışma adresi, iş telefonu, GSM, faks nosu
  - ✓ Tüm yazarların ORCID'leri

- Makale ana metni
  - ✓ Makalenin İngilizce ve Türkçe başlığı
  - ✓ Özetler: 180-200 kelime İngilizce ve Türkçe
  - ✓ Anahtar Kelimeler: 3-5 adet İngilizce ve Türkçe
  - ✓ Makale ana metin bölümleri
  - ✓ Finansal destek (varsa belirtiniz)
  - ✓ Çıkar çatışması (varsa belirtiniz)
  - ✓ Etik Kurul İzni (varsa belirtiniz)
  - ✓ Teşekkür (varsa belirtiniz)
  - ✓ Kaynaklar
  - ✓ Tablolar-Resimler, Şekiller (başlık, tanım ve alt yazılarıyla)

### AIM AND SCOPE

The Journal accepts and publishes both international and interdisciplinary articles on the fields of political sciences, public administration, international relations. The journal covers, but are not limited to, following topics:

- all subfields of political science, including political theory, political philosophy, political behavior, political institutions and political history,
- all subfields of public administration,
- all topics pertaining to international relations: including law, economics, ethics, strategy, philosophy, culture, environment, security, terrorism, regional studies, globalization and other topics

The Journal publishes theoretical, conceptual as well as research-based articles concerning various aspects of aforementioned disciplines in English language. Turkish manuscripts are published along with an extended abstract in English. Moreover, it publishes special issues on various themes in collaboration with co-editors from the international academic community.

### EDITORIAL POLICIES AND PEER REVIEW PROCESS

#### Publication Policy

The subjects covered in the manuscripts submitted to the Journal for publication must be in accordance with the aim and scope of the journal. The journal gives priority to original research papers submitted for publication.

#### General Principles

Only those manuscripts approved by its every individual author and that were not published before in or sent to another journal, are accepted for evaluation.

Submitted manuscripts that pass preliminary control are scanned for plagiarism using iThenticate software. After plagiarism check, the eligible ones are evaluated by editor-in-chief for their originality, methodology, the importance of the subject covered and compliance with the journal scope.

Short presentations that took place in scientific meetings can be referred if indicated in the article. The editor hands over the papers matching the formal rules to at least two national/international referees for evaluation and gives green light for publication upon modification by the authors in accordance with the referees' claims. Changing the name of an author (omission, addition or order) in papers submitted to the Journal requires written permission of all declared authors. Refused manuscripts and graphics are not returned to the author.

#### Copyright Notice

Authors publishing with the journal retain the copyright to their work licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license (CC BY-NC 4.0) (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>) and grant the Publisher non-exclusive commercial right to publish the work. CC BY-NC 4.0 license permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

### **Open Access Statement**

The journal is an open access journal and all content is freely available without charge to the user or his/her institution. Except for commercial purposes, users are allowed to read, download, copy, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles in this journal without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author. This is in accordance with the BOAI definition of open access.

The open access articles in the journal are licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license.

### **Article Processing Charge**

All expenses of the journal are covered by the Istanbul University. Processing and publication are free of charge with the journal. There is no article processing charges or submission fees for any submitted or accepted articles.

### **Peer Review Process**

Only those manuscripts approved by its every individual author and that were not published before in or sent to another journal, are accepted for evaluation.

Submitted manuscripts that pass preliminary control are scanned for plagiarism using iThenticate software. After plagiarism check, the eligible ones are evaluated by Editor-in-Chief for their originality, methodology, the importance of the subject covered and compliance with the journal scope. Editor-in-Chief evaluates manuscripts for their scientific content without regard to ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship, religious belief or political philosophy of the authors and ensures a fair double-blind peer review of the selected manuscripts.

The selected manuscripts are sent to at least two national/international referees for evaluation and publication decision is given by Editor-in-Chief upon modification by the authors in accordance with the referees' claims.

Editor-in-Chief does not allow any conflicts of interest between the authors, editors and reviewers and is responsible for final decision for publication of the manuscripts in the Journal.

Reviewers' judgments must be objective. Reviewers' comments on the following aspects are expected while conducting the review.

- Does the manuscript contain new and significant information?
- Does the abstract clearly and accurately describe the content of the manuscript?
- Is the problem significant and concisely stated?
- Are the methods described comprehensively?
- Are the interpretations and conclusions justified by the results?
- Is adequate references made to other Works in the field?
- Is the language acceptable?

Reviewers must ensure that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential and must report to the editor if they are aware of copyright infringement and plagiarism on the author's side.

A reviewer who feels unqualified to review the topic of a manuscript or knows that its prompt review will be impossible should notify the editor and excuse himself from the review process.

The editor informs the reviewers that the manuscripts are confidential information and that this is a privileged interaction. The reviewers and editorial board cannot discuss the manuscripts with other persons. The anonymity of the referees is important.



## **PUBLICATION ETHICS AND PUBLICATION MALPRACTICE STATEMENT**

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences is committed to upholding the highest standards of publication ethics and pays regard to Principles of Transparency and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing published by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), the Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA), and the World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) on <https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-and-best-practice-scholarly-publishing>

All parties involved in the publishing process (Editors, Reviewers, Authors and Publishers) are expected to agree on the following ethical principles.

All submissions must be original, unpublished (including as full text in conference proceedings), and not under the review of any other publication synchronously. Each manuscript is reviewed by one of the editors and at least two referees under double-blind peer review process. Plagiarism, duplication, fraud authorship/denied authorship, research/data fabrication, salami slicing/salami publication, breaching of copyrights, prevailing conflict of interest are unethical behaviors.

All manuscripts not in accordance with the accepted ethical standards will be removed from the publication. This also contains any possible malpractice discovered after the publication. In accordance with the code of conduct we will report any cases of suspected plagiarism or duplicate publishing.

### **Research Ethics**

The journal adheres to the highest standards in research ethics and follows the principles of international research ethics as defined below. The authors are responsible for the compliance of the manuscripts with the ethical rules.

- Principles of integrity, quality and transparency should be sustained in designing the research, reviewing the design and conducting the research.
- The research team and participants should be fully informed about the aim, methods, possible uses and requirements of the research and risks of participation in research.
- The confidentiality of the information provided by the research participants and the confidentiality of the respondents should be ensured. The research should be designed to protect the autonomy and dignity of the participants.
- Research participants should participate in the research voluntarily, not under any coercion.
- Any possible harm to participants must be avoided. The research should be planned in such a way that the participants are not at risk.
- The independence of research must be clear; and any conflict of interest or must be disclosed.
- In experimental studies with human subjects, written informed consent of the participants who decide to participate in the research must be obtained. In the case of children and those under wardship or with confirmed insanity, legal custodian's assent must be obtained.
- If the study is to be carried out in any institution or organization, approval must be obtained from this institution or organization.
- In studies with human subject, it must be noted in the method's section of the manuscript that the informed consent of the participants and ethics committee approval from the institution where the study has been conducted have been obtained.

### **Author Responsibilities**

It is authors' responsibility to ensure that the article is in accordance with scientific and ethical standards and rules. And authors must ensure that submitted work is original. They must certify that the manuscript has not previously been published elsewhere or is not currently being considered for publication elsewhere, in any language. Applicable copyright laws and conventions must be followed. Copyright material (e.g. tables, figures or extensive quotations) must be reproduced only with appropriate permission and acknowledgement. Any work or words of other authors, contributors, or sources must be appropriately credited and referenced.

All the authors of a submitted manuscript must have direct scientific and academic contribution to the manuscript. The author(s) of the original research articles is defined as a person who is significantly involved in "conceptualization and design of the study", "collecting the data", "analyzing the data", "writing the manuscript", "reviewing the manuscript with a critical perspective" and "planning/conducting the study of the manuscript and/or revising it". Fund raising, data collection or supervision of the research group are not sufficient roles to be accepted as an author. The author(s) must meet all these criteria described above. The order of names in the author list of an article must be a co-decision and it must be indicated in the [Copyright Agreement Form](#). The individuals who do not meet the authorship criteria but contributed to the study must take place in the acknowledgement section. Individuals providing technical support, assisting writing, providing a general support, providing material or financial support are examples to be indicated in acknowledgement section.

All authors must disclose all issues concerning financial relationship, conflict of interest, and competing interest that may potentially influence the results of the research or scientific judgment. When an author discovers a significant error or inaccuracy in his/her own published paper, it is the author's obligation to promptly cooperate with the Editor to provide retractions or corrections of mistakes.

### **Responsibility for the Editor and Reviewers**

Editor-in-Chief evaluates manuscripts for their scientific content without regard to ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship, religious belief or political philosophy of the authors. He/She provides a fair double-blind peer review of the submitted articles for publication and ensures that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential before publishing.

Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the contents and overall quality of the publication. He/She must publish errata pages or make corrections when needed.

Editor-in-Chief does not allow any conflicts of interest between the authors, editors and reviewers. Only he has the full authority to assign a reviewer and is responsible for final decision for publication of the manuscripts in the Journal.

Reviewers must have no conflict of interest with respect to the research, the authors and/or the research funders. Their judgments must be objective.

Reviewers must ensure that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential and must report to the editor if they are aware of copyright infringement and plagiarism on the author's side.

A reviewer who feels unqualified to review the topic of a manuscript or knows that its prompt review will be impossible should notify the editor and excuse himself from the review process.

The editor informs the reviewers that the manuscripts are confidential information and that this is a privileged interaction. The reviewers and editorial board cannot discuss the manuscripts with

other persons. The anonymity of the referees must be ensured. In particular situations, the editor may share the review of one reviewer with other reviewers to clarify a particular point.

### MANUSCRIPT ORGANIZATION

#### Language

The language of the journal is English.

#### Manuscript Organization and Format

All correspondence will be sent to the first-named author unless otherwise specified. Manuscript is to be submitted online via <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/siyasal> and it must be accompanied by a cover letter indicating that the manuscript is intended for publication, specifying the article category (i.e. research article, review etc.) and including information about the manuscript (see the Submission Checklist). Manuscripts should be prepared in Microsoft Word 2003 and upper versions. In addition, Copyright Agreement Form that has to be signed by all authors must be submitted.

1. The manuscripts should be in A4 paper standards: having 2.5 cm margins from right, left, bottom and top, Times New Roman font style in 12 font size and line spacing of 1.5.
2. The manuscripts should contain between 4500 and 8500 words and the page numbers must be at the bottom and in the middle.
3. The name(s) of author(s) should be given just beneath the title of the study aligned to the right. Also the affiliation, title, e-mail and phone of the author(s) must be indicated on the bottom of the page as a footnote marked with an asterisk (\*).
4. Submitted manuscripts must have an abstract between 180 and 200 words (English and Turkish), before the introduction, summarizing the scope, the purpose, the results of the study and the methodology used. The titles (English and Turkish) of the study should appear above the abstracts. Underneath the abstracts, 3 to 5 keywords (English and Turkish) that inform the reader about the content of the study should be specified.
5. The manuscripts should contain mainly these components: title, abstract and keywords (in Turkish and English); body text with sections, footnotes and references.
6. The manuscripts should contain mainly these components: title, abstract and keywords (in Turkish and English); body text with sections, footnotes and references. The APA (American Psychological Association) reference style should be used for in-text citation and references list. For information and samples on the APA 6 style please refer to <http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr/tr/content/yazarlara-bilgi/kaynaklar> section in the Information for Authors.
7. Tables, graphs and figures can be given with a number and a defining title if and only if it is necessary to follow the idea of the article. The title of table should be placed above the table; caption of figure should be placed beneath the figure. Features like demographic characteristics that can be given within the text should not be indicated as tables separately.
8. A title page including author information must be submitted together with the manuscript. The title page is to include fully descriptive title of the manuscript and, affiliation, title, e-mail address, postal address, phone and fax number of the author(s) (see The Submission Checklist).

9. Authors are responsible for all statements made in their work submitted to the Journal for publication.
10. The author(s) can be asked to make some changes in their articles due to peer reviews.

### REFERENCES

Although references to review articles can be an efficient way to guide readers to a body of literature, review articles do not always reflect original work accurately. Readers should therefore be provided with direct references to original research sources whenever possible. On the other hand, extensive lists of references to original work on a topic can use excessive space on the printed page. Small numbers of references to key original papers often serve as well as more exhaustive lists, particularly since references can now be added to the electronic version of published papers, and since electronic literature searching allows readers to retrieve published literature efficiently. Papers accepted but not yet included in the issue are published online in the Early View section and they should be cited as “advance online publication”. Citing a “personal communication” should be avoided unless it provides essential information not available from a public source, in which case the name of the person and date of communication should be cited in parentheses in the text. For scientific articles, written permission and confirmation of accuracy from the source of a personal communication must be obtained.

### Reference Style and Format

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences complies with APA (American Psychological Association) style 6<sup>th</sup> Edition for referencing and quoting. For more information:

- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
- <http://www.apastyle.org>

### Citations in the Text

Citations must be indicated with the author surname and publication year within the parenthesis. If more than one citation is made within the same parenthesis, separate them with (;).

### Samples:

#### ***More than one citation;***

(Esin, et al., 2002; Karasar, 1995)

#### ***Citation with one author;***

(Akyolcu, 2007)

#### ***Citation with two authors;***

(Saymer & Demirci, 2007)

#### ***Citation with three, four, five authors;***

First citation in the text: (Ailen, Ciambrune, & Welch, 2000) Subsequent citations in the text: (Ailen, et al., 2000)

#### ***Citations with more than six authors;***

(Çavdar, et al., 2003)

### Citations in the Reference

All the citations done in the text should be listed in the References section in alphabetical order

of author surname without numbering. Below given examples should be considered in citing the references.

### Basic Reference Types

#### Book

##### a) Turkish Book

Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8<sup>th</sup> ed.) [Preparing research reports]. Ankara, Turkey: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

##### b) Book Translated into Turkish

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* [Mindsets] (A. Kotil, Trans.). İstanbul, Turkey: İletişim Yayınları.

##### c) Edited Book

Ören, T., Üney, T., & Çölkesen, R. (Eds.). (2006). *Türkiye bilişim ansiklopedisi* [Turkish Encyclopedia of Informatics]. İstanbul, Turkey: Papatya Yayıncılık.

##### d) Turkish Book with Multiple Authors

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y., & Sever, H. (2002). *Türkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme* [Performance evaluation in Turkish search engines]. Ankara, Turkey: Total Bilişim.

##### e) Book in English

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

##### f) Chapter in an Edited Book

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

##### g) Chapter in an Edited Book in Turkish

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi [Organization culture: Its functions, elements and importance in leadership and business management]. In M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi* [Organization sociology] (pp. 233–263). Bursa, Turkey: Dora Basım Yayın.

##### h) Book with the same organization as author and publisher

American Psychological Association. (2009). *Publication manual of the American psychological association* (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). Washington, DC: Author.

#### Article

##### a) Turkish Article

Mutlu, B., & Savaşer, S. (2007). Çocuğu ameliyat sonrası yoğun bakımda olan ebeveynlerde stres nedenleri ve azaltma girişimleri [Source and intervention reduction of stress for parents whose children are in intensive care unit after surgery]. *Istanbul University Florence Nightingale Journal of Nursing*, 15(60), 179–182.

##### b) English Article

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society*, 10(2), 149–173. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002>

##### c) Journal Article with DOI and More Than Seven Authors

Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 372, 2087–2096. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184>

**d) Journal Article from Web, without DOI**

Sidani, S. (2003). Enhancing the evaluation of nursing care effectiveness. *Canadian Journal of Nursing Research*, 35(3), 26–38. Retrieved from <http://cjr.mcgill.ca>

**e) Journal Article with DOI**

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly*, 27, 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07317131003765910>

**f) Advance Online Publication**

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology: Advance online publication*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

**g) Article in a Magazine**

Henry, W. A., III. (1990, April 9). Making the grade in today's schools. *Time*, 135, 28–31.

**Doctoral Dissertation, Master's Thesis, Presentation, Proceeding**

**a) Dissertation/Thesis from a Commercial Database**

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9943436)

**b) Dissertation/Thesis from an Institutional Database**

Yaylılı-Yıldız, B. (2014). *University campuses as places of potential publicness: Exploring the political, social and cultural practices in Ege University* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from Retrieved from: <http://library.iyte.edu.tr/tr/hizli-erisim/iyte-tez-portali>

**c) Dissertation/Thesis from Web**

Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from <http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/yayinlar/phd/ickapak.html>

**d) Dissertation/Thesis abstracted in Dissertations Abstracts International**

Appelbaum, L. G. (2005). Three studies of human information processing: Texture amplification, motion representation, and figure-ground segregation. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineering*, 65(10), 5428.

**e) Symposium Contribution**

Krinsky-McHale, S. J., Zigman, W. B., & Silverman, W. (2012, August). Are neuropsychiatric symptoms markers of prodromal Alzheimer's disease in adults with Down syndrome? In W. B. Zigman (Chair), *Predictors of mild cognitive impairment, dementia, and mortality in adults with Down syndrome*. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

**f) Conference Paper Abstract Retrieved Online**

Liu, S. (2005, May). *Defending against business crises with the help of intelligent agent based early warning solutions*. Paper presented at the Seventh International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, Miami, FL. Abstract retrieved from [http://www.iceis.org/iceis2005/abstracts\\_2005.htm](http://www.iceis.org/iceis2005/abstracts_2005.htm)

**g) Conference Paper - In Regularly Published Proceedings and Retrieved Online**

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105, 12593–12598. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105>

**h) Proceeding in Book Form**

Parsons, O. A., Pryzwansky, W. B., Weinstein, D. J., & Wiens, A. N. (1995). Taxonomy for psychology. In J. N. Reich, H. Sands, & A. N. Wiens (Eds.), *Education and training beyond the doctoral degree: Proceedings of the American Psychological Association National Conference on Postdoctoral Education and Training in Psychology* (pp. 45–50). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

**i) Paper Presentation**

Nguyen, C. A. (2012, August). *Humor and deception in advertising: When laughter may not be the best medicine*. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

**Other Sources**

**a) Newspaper Article**

Browne, R. (2010, March 21). This brainless patient is no dummy. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 45.

**b) Newspaper Article with no Author**

New drug appears to sharply cut risk of death from heart failure. (1993, July 15). *The Washington Post*, p. A12.

**c) Web Page/Blog Post**

Bordwell, D. (2013, June 18). David Koepp: Making the world movie-sized [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/page/27/>

**d) Online Encyclopedia/Dictionary**

Ignition. (1989). In *Oxford English online dictionary* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Retrieved from <http://dictionary.oed.com>

Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.). *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/>

**e) Podcast**

Dunning, B. (Producer). (2011, January 12). *in Fact: Conspiracy theories* [Video podcast]. Retrieved from <http://itunes.apple.com/>

**f) Single Episode in a Television Series**

Egan, D. (Writer), & Alexander, J. (Director). (2005). Failure to communicate. [Television series episode]. In D. Shore (Executive producer), *House*; New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

**g) Music**

Fuchs, G. (2004). Light the menorah. On *Eight nights of Hanukkah* [CD]. Brick, NJ: Kid Kosher.

**SUBMISSION CHECKLIST**

Ensure that the following items are present:

- Cover letter to the editor
  - ✓ The category of the manuscript
  - ✓ Confirming that “the paper is not under consideration for publication in another journal”.
  - ✓ Including disclosure of any commercial or financial involvement.
  - ✓ Confirming that the statistical design of the research article is reviewed.
  - ✓ Confirming that last control for fluent English was done.

## INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

---

- ✓ Confirming that journal policies detailed in Information for Authors have been reviewed.
- ✓ Confirming that the references cited in the text and listed in the references section are in line with APA 6.
- Copyright Agreement Form
- Permission of previously published copyrighted material if used in the present manuscript
- Title page
  - ✓ The category of the manuscript
  - ✓ The title of the manuscript
  - ✓ All authors' names and affiliations (institution, faculty/department, city, country), e-mail addresses
  - ✓ Corresponding author's email address, full postal address, telephone and fax number
  - ✓ ORCIDs of all authors.
- Main Manuscript Document
  - ✓ The title of the manuscript in English and Turkish
  - ✓ Abstract: 180-200 words in English and Turkish
  - ✓ Keywords: 3 to 5 words in English and Turkish
  - ✓ Main article sections
  - ✓ Grant support (if exists)
  - ✓ Conflict of interest (if exists)
  - ✓ Ethics Committee Approval
  - ✓ Acknowledgement (if exists)
  - ✓ References
  - ✓ All tables, illustrations (figures) (including title, description, footnotes)





Istanbul University  
İstanbul Üniversitesi

Journal name: SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences  
Dergi Adı: SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences

Copyright Agreement Form  
Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu

<b>Responsible/Corresponding Author</b> <i>Sorumlu Yazar</i>	
<b>Title of Manuscript</b> <i>Makalenin Başlığı</i>	
<b>Acceptance date</b> <i>Kabul Tarihi</i>	
<b>List of authors</b> <i>Yazarların Listesi</i>	

Sıra No	Name - Surname <i>Adı-Soyadı</i>	E-mail <i>E-Posta</i>	Signature <i>İmza</i>	Date <i>Tarih</i>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

<b>Manuscript Type (Research Article, Review, etc.)</b> <i>Makalenin türü (Araştırma makalesi, Derleme, v.b.)</i>	
--	--

<b>Responsible/Corresponding Author:</b> <i>Sorumlu Yazar:</i>	
---	--

<b>University/company/institution</b>	<i>Çalıştığı kurum</i>	
<b>Address</b>	<i>Posta adresi</i>	
<b>E-mail</b>	<i>E-posta</i>	
<b>Phone; mobile phone</b>	<i>Telefon no; GSM no</i>	

**The author(s) agrees that:**  
The manuscript submitted is his/her/their own original work, and has not been plagiarized from any prior work, all authors participated in the work in a substantive way, and are prepared to take public responsibility for the work, all authors have seen and approved the manuscript as submitted, the manuscript has not been published and is not being submitted or considered for publication elsewhere, the text, illustrations, and any other materials included in the manuscript do not infringe upon any existing copyright or other rights of anyone. İSTANBUL UNIVERSITY will publish the content under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license that gives permission to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format other than commercial purposes as well as remix, transform and build upon the material by providing appropriate credit to the original work.  
The Contributor(s) or, if applicable the Contributor's Employer, retain(s) all proprietary rights in addition to copyright, patent rights.  
I/We indemnify İSTANBUL UNIVERSITY and the Editors of the Journals, and hold them harmless from any loss, expense or damage occasioned by a claim or suit by a third party for copyright infringement, or any suit arising out of any breach of the foregoing warranties as a result of publication of my/our article. I/We also warrant that the article contains no libelous or unlawful statements, and does not contain material or instructions that might cause harm or injury.  
This Copyright Agreement Form must be signed/ratified by all authors. Separate copies of the form (completed in full) may be submitted by authors located at different institutions; however, all signatures must be original and authenticated.

**Yazar(lar) aşağıdaki hususları kabul eder**  
Sunulan makalenin yazar(lar)ın orijinal çalışması olduğunu ve intihal yapmadıklarını, Tüm yazarların bu çalışmaya asıl olarak katılmış olduklarını ve bu çalışma için her türlü sorumluluğu aldıklarını, Tüm yazarların sunulan makalenin son halini gördüklerini ve onayladıklarını, Makalenin başka bir yerde basılmadığını veya basılmak için sunulmadığını, Makalede bulunan metnin, şekillerin ve dokümanların diğer şahıslara ait olan Telif Haklarını ihlal etmediğini kabul ve taahhüt ederler. İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ'nin bu fikri eseri, Creative Commons Atıf-Gayri Ticari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) lisansı ile yayınlamasına izin verirler. Creative Commons Atıf-Gayri Ticari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) lisansı, eserin ticari kullanım dışında her boyut ve formatta paylaşılmasına, kopyalanmasına, çoğaltılmasına ve orijinal esere uygun şekilde atıfta bulunmak kaydıyla yeniden düzenleme, dönüştürme ve eserin üzerine inşa etme dâhil adapte edilmesine izin verir.  
Yazar(lar)ın veya varsa yazar(lar)ın işverenin telif dâhil patent hakları, fikri mülkiyet hakları saklıdır.  
Ben/Biz, telif hakkı ihlali nedeniyle üçüncü şahıslarca vuku bulacak davalarda İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ ve Dergi Editörlerinin hiçbir sorumluluğunun olmadığını, tüm sorumluluğun yazarlara ait olduğunu taahhüt ederim/ederiz.  
Ayrıca Ben/Biz makalede hiçbir suç unsuru veya kanuna aykırı ifade bulunmadığını, araştırma yapılırken kanuna aykırı herhangi bir malzeme ve yöntem kullanılmadığını taahhüt ederim/ederiz.  
Bu Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu tüm yazarlar tarafından imzalanmalıdır/onaylanmalıdır. Form farklı kurumlarda bulunan yazarlar tarafından ayrı kopyalar halinde doldurulacak sunulabilir. Ancak, tüm imzaların orijinal veya kamitlanabilir şekilde onaylı olması gerekir.

<b>Responsible/Corresponding Author;</b> <i>Sorumlu Yazar;</i>	<b>Signature / İmza</b>	<b>Date / Tarih</b>
		...../...../.....

