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Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies is an interdisciplinary refereed journal focusing on the humanities and social sciences of the Balkan countries and the former Soviet republics. The journal welcomes contributions in the fields of history, economics, politics, international relations, culture, art, geography, literature, theology, ethnography and environmental sciences. The idea behind this initiative is to extend a cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary approach over issues of regional importance. Under this light, the journal aspires to act as an academic forum for scholars in historical as well as contemporary context on a wide range of cross-regional issues and to provide the epistemological framework for a comparative investigation, which would enhance our understanding of the Balkan, and Black Sea societies, polities and communities. Furthermore, manuscripts connecting the region with wider scopes, such as technological applications, will be also considered.

The journal is published online with two issues per year (June and December) commencing in 2018 and themed issues are anticipated. Submitted manuscripts should be original and not published or under consideration for publication elsewhere. Their length should not exceed 8.000 words. The manuscript will be subject to anonymous peer-review by at least two members of the scientific committee. The use of graphics and images in colour is encouraged and not subject to limitations (within reason). However, it is the responsibility of the individual authors to acquire copyright permission if needed. The language for manuscripts is English and Turkish. Articles, other than in English or Turkish, will be occasionally accepted. Articles must have an abstract of up to 150 words in English.

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General Style Rules: 1. The text must be formatted with 1.5-inch margins and be double-spaced. 2. A separate cover sheet must be included with the manuscript title, author's name, ORCID iD Number, professional affiliation, complete mailing address and telephone number. 3. A short abstract of 70–100 words in English (including also five key words) should accompany the article. 4. Capitalization: authors should be consistent in their use of capitalization. 5. Italics: the titles of works and periodicals should normally be italicized. Foreign words should also be italicized. 6. In general, foreign words and phrases, both in main text and footnotes should be provided in translation. All non-Roman alphabets should be transliterated according to the rules of international transliteration. 7. All articles should include footnotes. 8. All articles should have a bibliography at the end of the article. 9. Illustrations, tables, maps and figures must be numbered consecutively in the text and captions identifying the source of any image or data should be used. Figure title: below the picture; Table title: above the table. 10. For further reference, The Chicago Manual of Style Online (http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org) is recommended.

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Editorial

The *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* is an Istanbul-based journal that aims to enhance academic exchange among social scientists from Turkey, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Eastern European countries. We initiated the journal in 2018 and have since published ten issues. The current, eleventh issue comprises five research articles and two book reviews.

The inaugural research article in this issue, titled "The Ottoman Dracula: Kazıklı Voyvoda and the Construction of the Rebel and Evil in the Ottoman Empire" by *Adrian Gheorghe*, delves into the portrayal of the rebellious Romanian prince from the 15th century in Ottoman historical narratives spanning the 15th to 18th centuries. Gheorghe seeks to uncover potential links between the depiction of Dracula in German-speaking Europe and Ottoman historical accounts.

The second research article in this issue, titled "İsrail-Filistin Sorunu Gölgesinde Unutulan Bir Halk: İsrail Çerkeslerinin Sosyal Entegrasyonları ve Sorunları" by *Emir Fatih Akbulat*, addresses the overlooked Circassian community residing in Israel. The Circassians were historically settled in the region during the Ottoman era, and after the establishment of Israel, they encountered a new government and language. The author highlights that despite facing discrimination due to their Muslim faith, similar to other Muslims, the Circassians have managed to establish positive relations with Israeli authorities and have been employed in roles such as soldiers or policemen.

The third research article in this issue, titled "Negotiating Values: Diyanet and the Syrian Refugee Crisis" by *Iulia-Alexandra Oprea*, explores the role of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and its Friday sermons advocating for acceptance and tolerance of Syrian refugees in Turkey, employing the Islamic concepts of muhacir (migrant) and ensar (helper). The article also delves into the tension between Islamic humanism and Turkish nationalism within contemporary Turkish discourse, as reflected in the narratives presented by Diyanet.

The fourth research article in this issue, titled "The European Union's Soft Power Dynamics in Kazakhstan" by *Madina Zhunissova*, examines the soft power tools employed by the EU in Kazakhstan since the early 1990s. Utilizing Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, the author seeks to elucidate EU policies in the realms of culture, political values, and foreign policy. Zhunissova's concluding assessment of the EU's engagement in Kazakhstan is that both parties, namely the EU and Kazakh authorities, share an interest in fostering a closer relationship.

The fifth research article (based on a conference paper) in this issue, titled "Transformation of Memorial Culture: The Case of Husein Bey Gradaščević in Contemporary Bosniak Perspective" by *Amir Duranović*, analyzes Bosniak historiography concerning the Bosniak notable Husein Bey Gradaščević, who initiated a revolt against Ottoman central rule in the early 1830s. According to the author, Bosniak historians, especially since the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995, tend to interpret Husein Bey's movement as reflecting the desire of Bosniak notables for national autonomy in the 19th century. Another group of historians, including Turkish historians, assess it merely as a resistance movement against the modernization process in the Ottoman Empire.

The sixth article in this issue is a comprehensive book review by *Emir Fatih Akbulat*, focusing on William H. Holt's book titled "The Balkan Reconquista and Turkey's Forgotten Refugee Crisis." Akbulat also references earlier studies by scholars such as Justin McCarthy and Nedim İpek on the expulsion of Balkan and Caucasian Muslims during the long 19th century. He assesses Holt's new book as a highly significant contribution to the field, particularly in shedding light on the (lack of a strong) memorial culture of migrants from the Balkans and Caucasus in Turkey.

The final paper is a concise book review by *Klaus Kreiser* on the book titled "Das Osmanische Europa. Methoden und Perspektiven der Frühneuzeitforschung zu Südosteuropa" (edited by Andreas Helmedach, Markus Koller, Konrad Petrovsky, and Stefan Rohdewald).

In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to the authors

of these excellent articles. I also extend my thanks to the editorial board members, first of all Cengiz Yolcu, and the referees of this issue for their hard work and valuable efforts during the evaluation process of the articles.

Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, Prof. Dr.

Editor in Chief

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The Ottoman Dracula: *Kazıklı Voyvoda* and the Construction of the Rebel and Evil in the Ottoman Empire

Adrian Gheorghe*

Abstract:
This paper attempts to pave the way for an alternative method and perspective of interpretation. The portrayal of political and military figures in official Ottoman writings can reveal insights into political thought, ideology, and propaganda. In our case, these narratives precisely illustrate how the Sultan justified his campaign against Vlad the Impaler. Such information cannot be provided by European chronicles, for instance.
Moreover, Ottoman chronicles provide insights into diplomatic relations and the exchange of ideas. On another level, concerning mental and social history, they reflect the expectations, fears, prejudices, or ideals of their audience. The authors of these texts did not create their works in isolation from contemporary political or cultural environment. Thus, they are voices of their era, encapsulating and mirroring its expectations. Their writing was crafted for consumption and success. Without this recognition, they risked obscurity, much like the poet Maʿali, who lamented in his dedication to the Sultan within his versed chronicle literarily about his "starvation".
Key words: *Kazıklı voyvoda*, Vlad the Impaler, Wallachia, Ottomans, historiography, literary works

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Introduction

Oriental historical literature presents a unique challenge for European understanding and contemporary scholarship. These works, steeped in literary flair, often exhibit a bombastic style with a penchant for hyperbole. More than medieval European historiography, they aim to captivate the reader (or listener) with the author's emphasis on the purported singularity of the recounted historical events. For instance, an invading army in Wallachia is described as the largest ever seen (a direct assertion) or likened to boundless black clouds (a hyperbolic expression guiding the reader to the same conclusion).

The crafting of such narratives involves sophisticated literary strategies and techniques that can sometimes overshadow the historical content, or even sacrifice it for stylistic effect. It was common for copyists to alter their sources, not merely reproducing but editing and interpreting them according to their literary preferences or aesthetic judgment. This tendency becomes more pronounced in later authors and compilers, who take the historical fabric and the dramatic structure of their sources, yet rework them into a form reflecting their personal style. Often, they might even modify the text's substance by rearranging, omitting, or adding specific scenes or details.

These issues have led many Romanian historians to give little credit to the Ottoman chronicles.[1] For methodologies prioritising positivism or factual history, these sources are deemed less reliable than Byzantine or Western European ones. However, modern historiographical approaches, employing refined methodologies, can effectively utilise Ottoman chronicles. We must acknowledge that historical sources are not universally applicable for all types of historiographical discourse and

[1] For ways of interpreting Ottoman narrative sources and on the problematics, cf. the following discussions: Barbu T. Câmpina, "Victoria oştii lui Ţepeş asupra Sultanului Mehmed al II-lea (cu prilejul împlinirii a 500 de ani)," *Studii. Revista de istorie*, 15, 3 (1962), 533-555, here 536-537; Nicolae Stoicescu, *Vlad Ţepeş* (Bucureşti, 1976), 92, 100 and 112-113; Ştefan Andreescu, *Vlad Ţepeş Dracula. Între legendă şi adevăr istoric* (Bucureşti, 2015) (3rd edition), 121 and 193-195; Matei Cazacu, *Dracula* (Leiden–Boston, 2017), 32; Albert Weber, *Vlad der Pfähler Drăculea (1431–1476). Biographie und Legendenbildung im Spiegel der Wissensgeschichte* (Wiesbaden, 2023), 98-99 [in preparation]. For other recent discussions of Ottoman sources on Vlad the Impaler, cf. Alexandru Simon, *In the World of Vlad. The Lives and Times of a Warlord* (Berlin, 2021), 17-19; Jan Niklas Meier, *Der Woiwode als Monster: Vlad III. bei Michel Beheim und in der "Geschicht dracole waide"* (Baden-Baden, 2021), 149-152.

cannot answer every question. Often, the nature of our sources dictates the kind of history that can be written with their support.

This paper attempts to pave the way for an alternative method and perspective of interpretation. The portrayal of political and military figures in official Ottoman writings can reveal insights into political thought, ideology, and propaganda. In our case, these narratives precisely illustrate how the Sultan justified his campaign against Vlad the Impaler. Such information cannot be provided by European chronicles, for instance.

Moreover, Ottoman chronicles provide insights into diplomatic relations and the exchange of ideas. On another level, concerning mental and social history, they reflect the expectations, fears, prejudices, or ideals of their audience. The authors of these texts did not create their works in isolation from contemporary political or cultural environment. Thus, they are voices of their era, encapsulating and mirroring its expectations. Their writing was crafted for consumption and success. Without this recognition, they risked obscurity, much like the poet Maʿali, who lamented in his dedication to the Sultan within his versed chronicle literarily about his "starvation".

It is therefore essential to know how and why these sources tell what they tell. The present paper seeks to lay the foundation for further scholarly inquiry into this area.

Authors

This paper delves into a comprehensive series of Ottoman authors spanning from the latter half of the 15th century to the early-18th century. It encompasses the early ones (Enveri, the anonymous authors, ʿAşık Paşa-zade, Dursun Beğ), their direct compilers (Mehmed Neşri), but also the major 'classics' (İdris Bitlisi, Kemal Paşa-zade, Hoca Saʿadeddin Efendi). The genres of these sources vary, including panegyrics (as seen in works by Enveri, Dursun Beğ, Maʿali, Kıvami), *Tevarih-i Al-i ʿOsman* ("Histories of the House of Osman": Anonymous Chronicles, Pseudo-Ruhi Çelebi, ʿAşık Paşa-zade, Kemal Paşa-zade, Rüstem Paşa, Solak-zade) and universal chronicles (Hoca Saʿadeddin Efendi, Mustafa ʿAli, Müneccim-başı). Being predominantly sultano-centric, these texts primarily emanate from the sultan's power circle, serving as direct instruments of his ideology. Apart from some anonymous chronicles, which are still waiting to be extensively analysed, we have only two exceptions: Enveri (whose work *Cihan-numa* is dedicated to the great vizier Mahmud Paşa) and ʿAşık Paşa-zade (a well-

respected octogenarian dervish who writes a history of the Ottoman House to outline the alleged key contribution of his fellow dervishes, while putting blame on foreign bureaucrats for any misconduct).

Goals

The primary aim of this study is two-pronged. The first one is methodological and revolves around systematisation. Regrettably, quite many Romanian specialists in Medieval Studies have developed a tendency to indiscriminately amalgamate Ottoman sources from vastly different centuries in their positivist analyses. Without a thorough understanding of the genealogy of the sources utilised, this approach proves highly risky. For example, Mehmed Neşri does not confirm information provided by ʿAşık Paşa-zade, for the simple reason that the latter is the main (and in most instances the unique) source for the former. In the case of the chapter on *Kazıklı voyvoda*, Neşri copies his predecessor without any alteration in content. In conclusion, when two Ottoman sources narrate the same event in identical terms, it should prompt suspicions of a direct connection rather than the misleading notion of multiple sources corroborating a fact. Systematising the representation of *Kazıklı voyvoda* in Ottoman sources necessitates an initial exploration of the transmission chains and the genealogy of historical texts. This study will explore mutual influences, subsequent syntheses, the structuring of accounts on Vlad the Impaler, and the personalisation of these accounts by various Ottoman authors.

The second objective is to decode the narratives on Vlad the Impaler alias *Kazıklı voyvoda*, and to contextualise his image within the Ottoman political-ideological framework and in contrast to other "rebels". This will also involve a comparative analysis with so-called "late Byzantine" narrative sources like Laonikos Chalkokondyles and Kritovoulos Imbrostēs. For being penned in the Ottoman Empire at least a decade after the fall of Constantinople, they should be better called "post-Byzantine" in reference to their Hellenistic-Byzantine rhetorical and stylistic traditions. Notwithstanding this historiographical lineage, both authors inadvertently reflect the Ottoman viewpoint and can, to some extent, be classified as Ottoman authors.

The first author under consideration, Chalkokondyles,[2] operates outside the Ottoman power circles and does not overtly aim to mirror their

[2] Chalkokondyles, in Adrian Gheorghe and Albert Weber (eds.), *Corpus Draculianum: Dokumente und Chroniken zum walachischen Fürsten Vlad dem Pfähler 1448-1650*, vol. 3: *Die Überlieferung aus dem Osmanischen Reich* (Wiesbaden 2013), 9-13.

viewpoints, nor does he engage in direct opposition to them, unlike the post-Byzantine author Doukas, known for his vehement anti-Ottoman rhetoric. Chalkokondyles' work, marked by stylistic and rhetorical sophistication, strives to present recent events with minimal emotional bias, meticulously evaluating his sources. Nevertheless, he is not immune to the influences of Ottoman discourses. His perspective predominantly reflects a Christian and Greek standpoint, indicative of his immediate environment. Yet, on a broader scale, his narrative is a part of the diverse religious and cultural mosaic of Mehmed II's era, a time when Christians held significant positions at the Ottoman court.

In contrast, the second post-Byzantine author, Kritovoulos,[3] offers a distinctly different work: a panegyric honouring Sultan Mehmed II. His narrative spotlights the accommodating Greeks who readily adapted to the new political landscape, portraying the Sultan within the historical cycles of Christian leaders, while showing the same allegiance to the Sultan as they previously did to the Byzantine *basileus*. The survival of Kritovoulos's work in just a single, incomplete manuscript suggests that Sultan Mehmed II, or his officials, were not particularly impressed by the work, nor did they encourage its distribution among Greek subjects. Nonetheless, Kritovoulos, having been a part of the Ottoman administrative apparatus, unambiguously echoes Ottoman perspectives. This disparity presents an opportunity to conduct an analysis from two distinct rhetorical standpoints: the Islamic-Persian-Ottoman and the Christian-Byzantine.

Analysis of material

Despite undeniable differences between European and Byzantine narrative sources and the Islamic ones, it is important not to oversimplify the latter as a homogenous group under the label of 'Ottoman chronicles'. These works exhibit significant diversity in terms of genre, origin, and orientation.

As previously noted, the array of Ottoman literature extends beyond just chronicles or histories (*tevarih*, sg. *tarih*). One cannot expect the same chronological precision and attention to historical detail in a panegyric or an epic, which were popular genres among the Ottomans, as found in European and Byzantine chronicles. The historiographical content in many Ottoman chronicles often serves to construct a rhetorical framework for literary compositions with aims beyond mere historical

[3] Kritouvoulos, in *ibid*., 43-45.

recording.[4] In the Persian-Ottoman context, works frequently blend hagiographic and historiographic elements against vivid background stuffed with hyperboles and allegories.

This is not to suggest an absence of interest in preserving historical memory. Quite on the contrary. For instance, calendars and almanacs (*takvim*) were created annually at the Ottoman court, meticulously documenting the year's events and updating information from almanacs of the previous years.[5] Unfortunately, due to their lack of literary appeal and the resulting scarcity of copies, few of these works have survived, particularly none referencing Vlad the Impaler. They bear resemblance to the Southeastern European monastery annals (Rom. *letopiseț*) and the so-called 'Byzantine minor chronicles'.[6] Although largely lost, many *takvim*s indirectly served as sources for the earliest works in the *tevarih* genre, as seen in certain manuscripts of Oruc, Pseudo-Ruhi Çelebi, and various anonymous Ottoman chronicles. Thus, we are fortunate to find passages with strong factual overtones intermingled between chapters stuffed with literary ballast. Sometimes anonymous copyists compiled such courtly almanacs one after another, adapting them for new purposes and embedding them within a literary framework to appeal to broader audiences.

The Ottoman narrative sources on Vlad the Impaler need to be divided into three evolutionary periods: 1) the early period of contemporary sources (or primary sources, as we have called them in *Corpus Draculianum* III), 2) the period of the classics (or secondary sources) and 3) the period of the epigones (or tertiary sources).[7]

The diversity that we have been talking about may be observed particularly in the first evolutionary phase. It includes eyewitness accounts from participants in the 1462 campaign and narratives based on court almanacs. This is not to say that there were no attempts at writing sophisticated texts laden with literary ballast: some less accomplished

[4] Adrian Gheorghe, "Entertaining the Crowds. Early Ottoman Historiography Between Orality and Bestseller," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungariae*, 72, 1 (2019), 81-91.
[5] Osman Turan (ed.), *İstanbul'un Fethinden Önce Yazılmış Tarihî Takvimler* (Ankara, 1954); Victor Louis Ménage, "The 'Annals of Murad II'," *Bulletin of the School of Orientel and African Studies* 39, 3 (1976), 570-584.
[6] Peter Schreiner (ed.), *Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*, 3 vol. (Wien, 1975); *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 77.
[7] *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, IX-XII.

(Dursun Beğ's work in Ottoman),[8] others more successful (Maʿali's work in Persian).[9] Dursun and Maʿali tried to appeal the refined tastes of the Ottoman elite. They are therefore among the very first Ottoman historiographers to employ rhymed prose (*inşa*; Pers. *enşa*, Ar. *sağʿ*). On the other hand, authors like ʿAşık Paşa-zade opted for a simpler style, closer to the Turkish language spoken in bazaars and public spaces, where his work, passages from it or the oral material on which it was based were recited.[10] In doing so, he was particularly successful, while other authors failed to get beyond the Sultan's personal library.

In the subsequent phase, the most frequently copied authors, like ʿAşık Paşa-zade, or those with significant influence at court, such as Dursun, were perceived. By merging these two narrative lines, the 'classics' and hence the initial canonisation of tradition emerged. After them, no innovations with historical content appear; only literary ones. The latter sometimes create pitfalls, as we shall see below. Theoretically, it is still possible that these 'classics' may have interpolated some sources that are now lost. However, these interpolations have undergone a strong process of literary reshaping, for this is precisely what makes these authors outstanding and the reason for their canonisation: they are the first Ottoman authors to write at the highest level of literary sophistication. Their sophistication was so profound that they became primary sources for later authors, superseding the 15th-century chronicles.

Leading this generation were two early-16th century contemporaries: İdris Bitlisi, who wrote in Persian,[11] and Kemal Paşa-zade,

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[8] Halil İnalcık and Rhoads Murphey (eds.), *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Beg* (Minneapolis, Chicago), 1978 (facsimiles with summarised English translation) and Mertol Tulum (ed.), *Târîh-i Ebü'l-Feth* (Istanbul, 1977). On Dursun, cf. Halil İnalcık, "Tursun Beg, Historian of Mehmed the Conqueror's Time," *Wiener Zeitschrift zur Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 69 (1977), 87-110; Kenan Inan, "A Summary and Analysis of the *Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth* (History of the Father of Conquest) of Tursun Bey", University of Manchester, 1993 (unpublished PhD thesis); *idem*, "On the Sources of Tursun Bey's *Tarih-i Ebü'l Feth*", Eugenia Kermeli and Oktay Özel (eds.), *The Ottoman Empire. Myths, Realities and 'Black Holes'. Contributions in honour of Colin Imber* (Istanbul, 2006), 75-108; *idem*, "The Effects of Ornamented Prose Style on Ottoman Historiography: The *Tarih-i Ebü'l-feth* [History of the Father of Conquest] by Tursun Bey", James S. Amelang and Siegfried Beer (eds.), *Public Power in Europe: Studies in Historical Transformations* (Pisa, 2006), 125-142.

[9] Refet Yalçın Balata, "*Hunkâr-nâma* (*Tevârîh-i Âl-i ʿOsmân*), Mîr Seyyid ʿAlî b. Muzaffer-i Maʿâlî", Istanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1992 (unpublished PhD thesis).

[10] Halil İnalcık, "How to Read ʿĀshik Pasha-Zāde's History", Colin Heywood and Colin Imber (eds.), *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage* (Istanbul, 1994), 139-156.

[11] İdris Bitlisi, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 185-188. A complete edition of his work is still awaited. On the author, cf. Törehan M. Serdar, *Mevlana Hakimüddin İdiris-i Bitlisi* (Istanbul, 2008).

the author of a highly influential chronicle in the Ottoman language[12]. From among other contemporaries, only Mehmed Neşri[13] exerted some later influence, albeit not as extensively as the aforementioned authors. Neşri essentially reworked ʿAşık Paşa-zade's chronicle, augmenting it with interpolations from manuscripts predating the reign[14]

The third-phase authors, whom I have termed epigones, are the least interesting to historians focused on factual history. In terms of content, they may not contribute much new information, but in terms of development and literary quality, particularly in the cases of Saʿadeddin and Mustafa ʿAli, they often surpass their sources, namely Kemal Paşa-zade and İdris Bitlisi. For the historians of literature, this phase represents the zenith of the classical Ottoman historiography. These authors also ley the final brick in the canonisation of the historical tradition on *Kazıklı voyvoda*, yet without providing new historical insights.

The earliest account of Vlad the Impaler in Ottoman sources comes from Enveri's "Book of the Vizier" (*Düstur-name*), a work of the *mesnevi* genre composed in 7640 verses.[15] Written a few years after the Wallachian campaign in the summer of 1462, it was dedicated to the grand vizier Mahmud Paşa. The account, which is very simple, focuses on events, despite some panegyrical glosses. Although not mentioned by name, we can easily identify the Wallachian ruler by the context. The omission of his name is surprising to say the least given Enveri's status as an eyewitness who even wrote a work dedicated exclusively to this campaign. Parts of this now-lost work called *Teferrüc-name* ("Book of Delights") can be found in *Düstur-name*, in verses where the author suddenly begins to narrate in the first person, as an eyewitness of the Vlads second night attack, in the

[12] Şerafettin Turan (ed.), *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman. VII. Defter (Tenkidli Transkripsiyon)* (Ankara, 1991); Kemal Paşa-zade, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 223-224. On autor and work, cf. Victor Louis Ménage, "An Autograph of Kemalpashazade's *Tevarikh-i Âl-i Othman*, Book VII," *Bulletin of the School of Orientel and African Studies*, 23 (1960), 250-264; Yekta Saraç, *Şeyhülislam Kemal Paşazade. Hayatı, Şahsiyeti, Eserleri ve Bazı Şiirleri* (Istanbul, 1995).

[13] Mehmed Neşri, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 265-267. On author, cf. Paul Wittek, "Zum Quellenproblem der ältesten osmanischen Chroniken (mit Auszügen aus Nesri)," *Mitteilungen Osmanischer Geschichte*, 1, 77-150; Victor Louis Ménage, *Neshrī's History of the Ottomans* (London, 1964).

[14] Cf. *An Early Ottoman History. The Oxford Anonymous Chronicle (Bodleian Library, Ms Marsh 313)*, ed. by Dimitris J. Kastritsis (Liverpool, 2017).

[15] Adrian Gheorghe, "Mental Frames and Textual Strategies in Mid-14th Century Byzantine-Turkish Sources on the Beginnings of the Anatolian Turks in Europe," *Südost-Forschungen*, 80 (2021), 1-18, here 5-6; Enveri, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 87-88.

area of Buzău (*Bozu*).[16] Enveri's portrayal of the voivode lacks a clear identity. Strong anachronisms (e.g. the campaign against Wallachia in 1462 precedes the Battle of Kosovo, 1448) suggest a possible conflation of two historical figures: Vlad II Dracul (*Dırakula voyvoda*) and his son Vlad III the Impaler (*Dırakulaoğlu voyvoda*).

The versions of Oruc, who was more of a copyist than a proper author,[17] were written around the same time as Enveri's work. Oruc's greatest merit is the interpolation of some *takvim*s mentioned above. While recycling the information from *takvim*s of the previous years, the chronology was simply adapted, since no absolute dating was used, but one relative to the year of the reigning sultan. This might explain the incorrect dating of the campaign against Vlad (865 H., instead of 866 H.), a mistake also found in many anonymous chronicles.

Oruc is the earliest Ottoman source to mention the name *Drakulaoğlu Kazıklı*. The striking differences between the Oxford, Cambridge, and Paris manuscripts of Oruc's *tevarih* suggest the involvement of various anonymous authors.[18] The Oxford and Cambridge manuscripts narrate dryly, in the style of annals, and without offering any explanation of the reasons for the campaign against *Kazıklı*. The Oxford manuscript, however, adds an unrolling of the battles between his throne successors, most likely sourced from a *takvim*. The same details can be found in the Paris manuscript that gives by far the most detailed and interesting account. Clearly using common sources with ʿAşık Paşa-zade, yet also being aware of the charges brought against Vlad the Impaler at the Ottoman court, this manuscript is the only one to indicate the reason for the campaign against him: his tyrannical outbursts and the murder on the Sultan's men. Yet, the most interesting detail, which delights fur sure military historians, refers to the military events following Hamza Beğ's execution and Vlad's simultaneous attacks across six Danube fords.[19] These details correlate with Vlad's famous letter dated February 11, 1462, written

[16] Adrian Gheorghe, "Understanding the Ottoman Campaign in Wallachia in the Summer of 1462. Numbers, Limits, Manoeuvres and Meanings," Thomas M. Bohn, Rayk Einax and Stefan Rohdewald (eds.), *Vlad der Pfähler – Dracula. Tyrann oder Volkstribun?* (Wiesbaden, 2017), 159-188, here 179.

[17] Victor Louis Ménage, "On the Recensions of Uruj's 'History of the Ottomans," *Bulletin of the School of Orientel and African Studies*, 39, 3 (1967), 314-322; Oruc, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 141-147.

[18] *Ibid*., XXXI.

[19] Oruc, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 153.

in Bucharest (*Uywar*, "New Town" in Hungarian) to king Matthias Corvinus of Hungary.[20]

Comprising over 40 manuscripts and manuscript fragments, written (or compiled) between the reign of Murad II (1421–1451) and the mid-16th century, the so-called "anonymous chronicles"[21] may give the false impression of a common affiliation.

Preliminary assessments reveal five distinct representations of events within these chronicles. One of these versions is also the only Ottoman source that mentions the first reign of Vlad the Impaler. In fact, none of these chronicles seems to know that *Kazıklı* ruled three times (autumn 1448, 1456-1462, and autumn 1476). Consequently, this version dates the beginning of his reign to 1448. Other variants are close to the Oruc's Cambridge manuscript, others to ʿAşık Paşa-zade's chronicle. Two anonymous manuscripts in this series provide novel information about the reason for the Ottoman armed reaction and the infamous night attack(s) in July 1462. The findings of this research, after thorough verification, will be published in a dedicated study, complete with critical editions and translations. It is worth noting that distinguishing between Vlad the Impaler and Vlad Dracul is often a real challenge.

The foundational figures of the classical tradition on *Kazıklı voyvoda* are two contemporaneous but vastly different authors: Dursun Beğ, a secretary and protégé of the former grand vizier Mahmud Paşa and a participant in the campaign against Vlad, and a representative of the dervish circle ʿAşık Paşa-zade. The former wrote a panegyric dedicated to Mehmed II (*Tarih-i Ebü'l-Feth* - "History of the Conquering Father"), adding also information on the early reign of Bayezid II. The second is the most famous 15th-century chronicler, who writes the first detailed history of the Ottoman House (*Tarih-i Al-i ʿOsman*) up to the early years of Bayezid II. Both authors penned their works about two decades after Vlad the Impaler's death.

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[20] Adrian Gheorghe, Albert Weber, Alexandru Şt. Anca and Ginel Lazăr (eds.), *Corpus Draculianum. Documentele şi cronicile privitoare la viaţa şi domnia lui Vlad Ţepeş Drăculea (1437-1650)*, vol. 1: *Documentele de cancelarie şi corespondenţa*, tom 1: *Documentele valahe* (Bucureşti–Brăila) 2019, no. 23, p. 103-130, especially 116.

[21] Victor Louis Ménage, "The Beginnings of Ottoman Historiography," Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East* (London, 1962), 168-179 and Murat Cem Mengüç, "A Study of 15th-Century Ottoman Historiography", University of Cambridge, 2008 (unpublished PhD thesis). So far the only edition is that of Friedrich Giese (ed.), *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken: Tevarih-i Ali 'Osmān*, 2 vol. (Breslau, 1922 and 1925).

Dursun Beğ offers a notably lengthy and detailed account, though less analytical. His chapter on the Wallachian voivode notably reproduces and partly expands upon the "letter of conquest" (*fetih-name*) of Wallachia, which was recently discovered by the *Corpus Draculianum* team. Tasked with crafting such a crucial piece of propaganda as the letters of conquest, it is unsurprising that Dursun's narrative aligns with the sultano-centric, official court perspective. Despite notable efforts, Dursun's writing in the *inşa* style is burdened with excessive allegories and hyperbole.[22] Intriguingly, the name of the Wallachian rebel is mentioned only in the chapter title and at the chapter's conclusion. Otherwise, Dursun consistently avoids his name and replaces it with various derogatory terms.

Dursun's account is particularly significant for its deeply negative portrayal of *Kazıklı*. He frames his depiction from two perspectives: *Kazıklı*'s status as a *kâfir* (infidel) and as a rebel. Dursun infuses his narrative with diabolical and tyrannical overtones, exaggerating to justify the Ottoman intervention in Wallachia, similar to his approach in the letter of conquest sent to Karaman ruler Damad İbrahim Beğ, likely in early August 1462, immediately following the campaign. Central to Dursun's argument is the theme of *Kazıklı*'s ingratitude towards the sultan, who had been instrumental in establishing his power. By failing to show gratitude to his benefactor, the infidel, according to Dursun, loses his sense of reason and descends into tyranny.

Dursun theorises about all this at length in the introduction (*mukaddime*) to his work. What follows thereafter is in fact a historicisation, i.e. an exemplification with historical events of this theoretical part. Moreover, Dursun's work has many and precise overtones of the very popular genre called 'mirror of princes' (Pers. *nasihat-name*; Arabic. *mirʿatu'l-muluk*).[23] The author takes great efforts in placing precisely not only the Sultan's role in the world, but also the expected conduct of other rulers towards him. Central to this worldview is the concept of gratitude (*şükr*), which the Sultan rewards through justice (*ʿadalet*) and generosity, his defining attributes alongside wisdom (*hikmet*), honesty (*ʿiffet*) and courage (*şecaʿat*).[24] It should come therefore as no surprise that the rebel voivode is equipped with the opposite of these values. However, the letter of conquest

[22] Dursun Beğ, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 115-118.
[23] *Ibid*., 116. On mirrors of princes, cf. Linda Darling, "Mirrors for Princes in Europe and the Middle East. A Case of Historiographical Incommensurability," Albrecht Classen (ed.), *East Meets West in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times. Transcultural Experiences in the Premodern World* (Berlin–Boston, 2013), 223-242.
[24] Dursun Beğ, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 116.

addressed to Damad İbrahim Beğ proves that these ideas did not spontaneously emerged during the writing of Dursun's *tarih*, even though its drafting process went through several stages. Dursun's ideological approach is contemporary with the narrated events and served as incentive for the Ottoman intervention in Wallachia. His account accurately mirrors the court ideology of Sultan Mehmed II.

ʿAşık Paşa-zade, on the other hand, seeks to explain political events by identifying concrete causes that necessitated the Sultan's intervention in Wallachia. His account is considerably shorter, free from elaborate literary claims and complex allegories. ʿAşık Paşa-zade does not mention any action by *Kazıklı* during the Ottoman siege of Trapezunt, although in principle the (hidden) rebel could have taken advantage of the Sultan's preoccupation. The Wallachian ruler even sends his messengers to congratulate the Sultan on his new conquest but avoids a personal appearance when summoned. Here, ʿAşık Paşa-zade skips a causal element, omitting the mission of Hamza and Yunus Beğ to Wallachia, focusing only on the voivode's violent reaction. This omission subtly underscores the negative character of the Wallachian rebel. If the Ottoman author had mentioned the plan to capture the voivode, his reaction would have been justified, at least in part. By excluding any rationale for the voivode's violent response, ʿAşık Paşa-zade accentuates his irrationality and propensity for violence. Rather than explicitly labelling these as defining traits of the rebel (and tyrant), as Dursun did, ʿAşık Paşa-zade implies that the Sultan had no alternative but to intervene to restore order and well-being to his subjects affected by *Kazıklı*'s actions.

The early-16th century gives the first two great Ottoman 'classics': İdris Bitlisi and Kemal Paşa-zade.[25] They wrote histories (*tevarih*) of the Ottoman House (*Al-i ʿOsman*) in the *inşa* style (rhymed prose), achieving a level of literary sophistication previously unseen in the Ottoman historiography. From a genealogical point of view, these two authors unite the versions of Dursun Beğ and ʿAşık Paşa-zade, thus giving the longest narration of the events of 1462.

İdris Bitlisi and Kemal Paşa-zade build the bridge between proto-Ottoman and late Ottoman historiography. By making themselves literary models, most late Ottoman authors use no other sources. This indicates once again that literary quality, rather than informational accuracy or

[25] Ménage, "The Beginnings," and Halil İnalcık, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography," Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East* (London, 1962), 152-167.

proximity to events, is what ensures an author's longevity. Later authors only reshape the compositions of these 'classics' and milestones. Interestingly, by the 17th century, ʿAşık Paşa-zade is primarily known through his most important compiler, Mehmed Neşri.



Fig. 1: The Genealogy of the Ottoman authors writing about *Kazıklı voyvoda* (after *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. III, p. XLI)

As Ottoman literature evolves, becoming increasingly elaborate, the early-16th-century 'classics' are acknowledged only indirectly. New figures emerge as models for future generations. A prime example is Hoca Saʿadeddin Efendi (d. 1599), *Şeyhü'l-İslam* and the most prolific intellectual

of his time.[26] Through Kemal Paşa-zade, the narrative on *Kazıklı voyvoda* was later adopted by Mehmed bin Mehmed, Koca Hüseyin and Solak-zade, and through İdris Bitlisi, by Saʿadeddin and Mustafa ʿAli (see **Fig. 1**).[27]

Summing up, the transmission chains of *Kazıklı voyvoda*'s representation among Ottoman authors can be divided quantitatively into two distinct versions: a longer, often highly sophisticated literary version, and a shorter, summary version with less literary ambitions.

The long version follows this chain: Dursun Beğ - İdris Bitlisi - Kemal Paşa-zade - Hoca Saʿadeddin Efendi - Mustafa ʿAli - Koca Hüseyin.

The short version: ʿAşık Paşa-zade - Kıvami - Neşri - Hadidi - Pseudo-Ruhi Çelebi - Mehmed bin Mehmed - Solak-zade - Müneccim-başı.

The later short versions are largely summaries of older chroniclers, while the authors of the longer versions maintain a commitment to details. Summarisation is achieved in two ways: 1) by condensing the original material, stripping away most stylistic flourishes to retain only the essence (e.g., Mehmed bin Mehmed and Solak-zade summarising Kemal Paşa-zade), and 2) by excising paragraphs deemed irrelevant, typically lyrical insertions (as seen in Mehmed Neşri's approach). In longer versions, authors either 1) stylistically revise the copied fragment (like Kemal Paşa-zade) or 2) assimilate information, process it, and later reproduce it (as done by Koca Hüseyin).

Kazıklı voyvoda in Context: Demonisation or Standard Representation?

A kind of 'demonisation' of *Kazıklı voyvoda* is apparent only in the longer version, following the tradition of Dursun Beğ. ʿAşık Paşa-zade's negative remarks are limited to reflections on events he mentions, and comprise just two *beyt*s (pairs of verses), likely serving as stylistic embellishments without precise ideological intent. Later authors who follow his account mostly disregard these passages.

The followers of Dursun Beğ and ʿAşık Paşa-zade do not display any explicit intention to develop the negative representation of *Kazıklı*

[26] Klaus Schwarz and Gerd Winkelhane, *Ḫoğa Saʿdeddīn, Staatsmann und Gelehrter (gest. 1599), und seine Stiftung aus dem Jahre 1614*, Bamberg, 1986.
[27] Mehmed bin Mehmed, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 329-330; Koca Hüseyin, in *ibid*., 335; Solak-zade, in *ibid*., 343-344; Mustafa ʿAli, in *ibid*., 321-324.

voyvoda. The variations are circumstantial, dependent on each author's literary intentions or preferences. This tradition culminates with İdris Bitlisi and Kemal Paşa-zade, who preserve the core information but envelop it in sophisticated literary styling.

However, when placed within the rhetorical and ideological context of the era, this tradition's vigour diminishes. *Kazıklı voyvoda* is undeniably depicted negatively, but this is expected since he is an infidel and a rebel. This portrayal is consistent across authors and is expressed either directly (through insults like 'accursed', 'impure', 'wicked', 'unfaithful', 'unfaithful dog', 'dark-souled', etc.) or indirectly (through biased narrative). Yet, these techniques are standard in depicting historical figures of similar status, such as Wallachian voivode Mircea the Elder (1386–1418) or Moldavian voivode Stephen the Great (1456–1504). In the case of the Hungarian governor János Hunyádi aka Iancu de Hunedoara (*Yanko voyvoda*) (d. 1456), Ottoman authors exhibit even greater aggression, as he had a much deeper and longer-lasting negative impact on the Ottoman Empire and was therefore perceived as a much greater threat.

The portrayal of Vlad the Impaler often seems to be an intersection between the most dangerous enemy of the day and the great warrior. However, it is crucial to avoid the trap, into which older Romanian historians have fallen, namely to believe as they did that certain Ottoman chroniclers genuinely recognised the voivode's military prowess.[28] The fact that such 'acknowledgments' predominantly appear in the most outspoken authors, i.e. those following Dursun Beğ's discourse, should give us much to think about. In reality, this suggests a rhetorical tactic rather than genuine admiration. In these accounts, *Kazıklı voyvoda*'s power and effectiveness are exaggerated to not only accentuate the Sultan's positive qualities (who supposedly bestowed upon the Wallachian the greatest possible gifts) but also to underscore the recklessness of the disgruntled rebel. *Kazıklı*'s valour and strength are portrayed as products of the Sultan's making and political support. Elsewhere, this bravery is employed rhetorically to demonstrate the rebel's destructive efficiency and to magnify the significance of the Sultan's victory, implying that the Sultan defeated one of the era's greatest warriors. Thus, the Ottoman authors use

[28] Examples: Kıvami, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 229 (the author actually wants to communicate exactly the opposite of what seems to be meant), İdris Bitlisi, 195, 197 and 213, Kemal Paşa-zade, 229 and 255. Stoicescu claims, however, that the Ottoman authors would have hidden Vlad's merits; cf. Stoicescu, *Vlad Ţepeş*,112-113.

Kazıklı voyvoda as a rhetorical device to emphasise the unmatched military leadership of the Sultan.

This ideology is evident not only through Muslim Ottoman authors but also in the works of Christian Ottoman writers. While Chalkokondyles appears to be influenced by the narratives circulating in Ottoman territories where he resided, Kritovoulos actively engages in this rhetoric. Being more analytical than many of his Muslim counterparts, Kritovoulos does not emphatically link *Drakoulis*'s actions to his negative character but presents him as a rebel from the outset. What follows represents Kritovoulos's intention to historicise this statement, i.e. to substantiate it through a selection of events. Kritovoulos emphasises the ingratitude of the Wallachian towards the Sultan, who offered him (and his brother *Rhados*) protection, hospitality, and ascension to power. Cunning is the defining trait of *Drakoulis*, as evidenced by his invasion of Ottoman territory and the subsequent massacre of the Sultan's envoys. The description of the Sultan's campaign in Wallachia reveals reliance on exclusively Ottoman sources, mirroring the Muslim authors' accounts with minor originalities. He highlights the extensive destruction and plunder resulting from the voivode's irrational acts, which led to the near ruin of his own country and power. The only specific military event Kritovoulos details is famous night attack conducted by Vlad the Impaler in person. *Drakoulis* draws this negative depiction from his status as a rebel against Ottoman rule exclusively.

Kritovoulos, influenced by the Hellenistic and Byzantine historiographic tradition, adopts a fact-based narrative approach while rhetorically manipulating events. For instance, he describes the Ottomans sending envoys to *Drakoulis* after his invasions south of the Danube. However, this chronology is not only absurd but also contradicts other sources, which indicate the opposite. The Ottomans initially sent envoys to bring him (dead or alive) to the Porte, which eventually ignited his violent reaction. He killed the envoys and the commanders of the troops sent to capture him, and subsequently developed the military operations into the Ottoman territories. If Kritovoulos had presented the events in their actual sequence, it might have implicitly justified *Drakoulis*'s actions. However, this would conflict with the Byzantine rhetorical concept of a rebel as utterly irrational. Thus, in Kritovoulos's account, *Drakoulis* had to act as an

irrational fool, while the Sultan is portrayed as pursuing legal and peaceful means until the very end.[29]

The accounts of Chalkokondyles and Doukas confirm the existence of a common source material for the post-Byzantine and Ottoman chronicles. Like Dursun Beğ, Chalkokondyles explicitly attributes the Wallachian ruler's power to the Sultan's support. These sources are similar both rhetorically and in certain historical details, such as the alleged 20,000 victims of Vlad's punishments. Their main episodes largely align with Ottoman narratives but are told from a Christian perspective. Chalkokondyles, writing not far from the events, confirms that the aggressive portrayal of *Kazıklı voyvoda* was not an invention of Dursun Beğ, who completed his work two decades later, but a standardised representation of the Wallachian voivode around 1462/3.[30] However, Kritovoulos's omission of the voivode's explicit tyranny suggests limited circulation of this representation and his detachment from the central Ottoman political circles, unlike Dursun Beğ. Kritovoulos, clearly pro-Ottoman and writing at least a decade before Dursun, would not have omitted such piquant details unless unaware of them.

The same goes with Enveri, who was one of men closed to the grand vizier, a participant to the campaign and author of a work dedicated exclusively to these events. It is obvious that they caught his very special interest. However, his focus was not the rebel but his protector, Mahmud Paşa. Enveri uses the events to highlight Mahmud's deeds. Most likely, it was this the incentive that motivated him to write *Tefferüc-name*, and not the Wallachian rebel, whose name he even does not deem necessary to mention in his second work.

Dursun Beğ is an extraordinary case, but his special interest for *Kazıklı*'s tyrannical deeds emerged from his specific role in drafting the letter of conquest of Wallachia. Later, he simply recycled such texts, for he surely wrote more than one in 1462. As essential part of the Ottoman propaganda machinery, these texts required a high level of rhetorical and ideological sophistication, a skill Dursun, serving as chief secretary (*divan kitabı*), honed over two decades until eventually completing his panegyric.

[29] Corpus Draculianum, vol. 3, 48/49.

[30] The German and Russian Tales of Vlad the Impaler recount in a very similar way various episodes of the voivode's violent measures against the elite; cf. Gabriele Annas and Christof Paulus, *Geschichte und Geschichten. Studien zu den Deutschen Berichten über Vlad III. Drăculea* (Wiesbaden, 2020), 48-52; Petre P. Panaitescu (ed.), *Viața lui Vlad Țepeș: cronici slavo-romîne din sec. XV-XVI publicate de Ion Bogdan* (Bucureşti, 1959), 197-214.

That is why the chapter dedicated to *Kazıklı voyvoda* is so long and has such a precise ideological focus, and this without the author excelling in providing historical content. In this regard, he does not even surpass the much shorter account of ʿAşık Paşa-zade, who neither participated in the campaign nor wrote closer to the events than Dursun. It was therefore very appealing to the next generations to merge the two accounts into one that could excel in both ideological and historical content as well as nevertheless in piquancy, for we need to acknowledge the entertaining value of the image of 'the garden of sorrows', a vivid image first introduced by Dursun Beğ. This image became a central feature in later accounts, its piquancy driving authors to perpetuate the tyrannical image of *Kazıklı voyvoda*, a portrayal that initially never surpassed the year 1462/3 and the official diplomatic channels of the Ottoman Porte.

This situation coincides with the first phase in the circulation of the Dracula Tales in Central Europe. Initially compiled in Latin, most likely at the Hungarian court in Buda, these tales aimed to cast Vlad the Impaler in the most negative light, and thereby justify among the Catholic actors, who were financially supporting Hungary, his arrest by King Matthias Corvinus in October 1462.[31] It was later that they were translated in Vienna and made it one decade later into the oldest know German manuscripts. There is no direct link between these and the much younger German Prints that popularised the Dracula Tales from the Nuremberg edition in 1488 onwards. The incentive was once again the entertaining potential of the brutal anecdotes they were describing. Their brutality, however, far exceeds the relatively modest approach of Dursun Beğ and his followers. What these narratives share is the chronologically limited scope of their initial versions. Dursun Beğ's letter of conquest, the basis for his account of *Kazıklı voyvoda*, and the Latin version of the German Dracula Tales circulated exclusively through diplomatic channels between the second half of 1462 and early 1463. The main proof for the Ottoman part is that no contemporary Ottoman author, whether Muslim (Enveri, Oruc, Maʿali,

[31] In addition to the widely-held belief that the Hungarian royal chancellery authored the Dracula Stories, there are three other credible theories. The first alternative suggests that the Transylvanian Saxons may have penned the original text as a propagandistic effort to discredit the voivode, who had inflicted significant economic harm upon them. The second theory posits that an author from a southern German region synthesised various public reports about the voivode into the literary work we recognise today. The final hypothesis proposes that Wallachian nobles could have been the initial authors, drafting public proclamations, a well-documented form of propaganda aimed at the political sphere. This text was subsequently adapted, becoming more literary in nature, and gained popularity in southern Germany. Cf. Albert Weber, *Vlad der Pfähler Drăculea (1431-1476). Genese und Transformation herrschaftsbiographischer Episteme*, Gießen, 2021 (Phd. thesis), 281-285.

Pseudo-Ruhi Çelebi, and some anonymous chroniclers) or Christian (Chalkokondyles, Kritovoulos, and Doukas), replicated accusations in Dursun's terms. Had they been aware of these tales, they likely would have leveraged their sensationalist appeal. Other Ottoman authors like ʿAşık Paşa-zade and many anonymous writers either composed their works long after Dursun's propaganda had ceased to play an active role or were outside the sultano-centric circles of the Empire.

Ottoman Sources and Central European Dracula Stories

Last but not least, I need to address a situation of pure rhetorical nature that has the potential to create serious confusion and lead to wrong conclusions. I am talking about a fragment from the Ottoman chronicle of Koca Hüseyin, which, despite being written in the mid-17th century, might seem to echo details found only in the German Tales on *Dracula Wayda* and related authors.[32]

Once again, it all begins with Dursun Beğ and his followers, i.e. the longer accounts on *Kazıklı voyvoda*. They describe a garden, allegorically likened to a 'garden of sorrows' and allegedly created by the voivode *Kazıklı* out of cynical sadism around his wooden residence (*ağac hisar*). Ottoman authors used this pseudo-historical setting to construct allegories, comparing this garden to those familiar to Eastern audiences, with phrases like "the fresh blood... were tulips in bloom" or "the fruit of the trees were skulls" (Kemal Paşa-zade).[33] It is only much later that Koca Hüseyin adds another detail that brings this image of the garden closer to the (in)famous German Dracula Tales by stating that "this [was] the place of torment and dining".[34]

Nonetheless, there is no evidence to suggest that Koca Hüseyin, known to be the son of the chief librarian of the Gazi Hosrev mosque in Sarajvo, was a renegade from Central Europe or had access to Christian, specifically Central European, sources. Except for Müneccim-başı, who wrote a history of the Ottoman House in Arabic in the early-18th century

[32] Thomas Ebendorfer, *Chronica regum Romanorum. Partea 2*, Ed. by Harald Zimmermann (Hannover, 2003), 917-924, here 918; Michel Beheim, "Von ainem wutrich der hies Trakle waida von der Walachei," *Die Gedichte des Michael Beheim*, vol. 1: *Einleitung – Gedichte*, no. 1-147, ed. by Hans Gille and Ingeborg Spriewald (Berlin 1968), no. 99*, p. 285-316, here 290; Sandra Wolff (ed.), *Die ››Konstanzer Chronik‹‹ Gebhart Dachers. ››By des Byschoffs zyten volgiengen disz nachgeschriben ding vund sachen...‹‹. Codex Sangallensis 646: Edition und Kommentar* (Ostfildern, 2008), 654-661, 673, 685-690, here 659.

[33] Kemal Paşa-zade, in *Corpus Draculianum*, vol. 3, 229.

[34] Koca Hüseyin, in *ibid*., 337.

and had access to Byzantine sources, no other Ottoman authors are known to have actively used Christian sources, let alone central European ones.

As already stated, the tradition about *Kazıklı voyvoda* evolved **exclusively** within a literary context. Not only authors but also many copyists felt entitled to stylistically modify passages and wordings they deemed aesthetically inferior. The most straightforward explanation is that Hüseyin merely reworked the image of 'the garden of sorrows' from his sources, employing a series of allegories and comments that coincidentally brought it closer to images propagated by authors in late medieval and early modern German speaking regions. This alignment appears to be coincidental rather than based on direct influence or shared source material. Nothing more!

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İsrail-Filistin Sorunu Gölgesinde Unutulan Bir Halk: İsrail Çerkeslerinin Sosyal Entegrasyonları ve Sorunları

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Abstract:

A People Forgotten in the Shadow of the Israel-Palestine Problem: Social Integration and Problems of Israeli Circassians
In 2018 Israel adopted the law "Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People". But Israel is also home to the Circassians, a Muslim people of Caucasian origin. Although the Israeli Circassians of about 4,000 do not make up a significant part of the country's population, although they are 'Sunni Muslims', they provide scientifically valuable insights through their civic ties and the social cohesion they have established with the State of Israel. The study, which was prepared by a literature review method, after briefly mentioning the history of Circassian citizens of Israel, will focus on their social integration and problems with the Israeli government and Israeli society. The study will try to find an answer to the question why Circassians, who are Sunni Muslims, like Palestinian Arabs, have high social and political cohesion rather than conflict with the Israeli government and Israeli Jews when viewed in the context of the Palestinian question.
Keywords: Israeli Circassians, settlement, integration

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Giriş

İsrail Çerkesleri "1864 Büyük Çerkes Sürgünü" sonrası Osmanlı idaresi tarafından önce Rumeli eyaletlerine ve 1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi sonrası Biladü'ş-Şam eyaletlerine iskân edildiler. Osmanlı tebaası olarak Biladü'ş-Şam [ya da Levant] eyaletlerine iskân edilen Çerkesler, I. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Ortadoğu'da yaratılan devletlerin vatandaşları oldular. Osmanlı Devleti'nin yıkılması sonrası, Suriye, Lübnan, Ürdün, Irak, Libya ve Filistin devletlerinin vatandaşları olan Çerkesler, yaşadıkları ülkelerin geçirdiği süreçlerden fazlasıyla etkilendiler. 1948 yılında kurulan İsrail, 1967 savaşında sınırlarını genişleterek tamamını vatandaş olarak kabul etmese de başta Araplar olmak üzere büyük bir Müslüman nüfusu sınırları içerisine kattı. Bu Müslüman unsurlardan biri de İsrail Çerkesleri oldu. Günümüzde İsrail vatandaşı olarak yaşayan Çerkeslerin sayısı yaklaşık 4 bin kişi olarak tahmin edilmektedir.

İsrail Çerkeslerine dair bilgilere, az sayıdaki, üç farklı kaynak araştırması üzerinden ulaşılabilir. Birincisi 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında Kuzey Kafkasya Dağlı Müslüman halklarının sürgünleri ve ardından Ortadoğu'ya iskânlarına dair yazılan eserlerin bir kısmından oluşan akademik çalışmalardır. Dawn Cahtty'nin *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*,[1] isimli eseri, Jülide Akyüz Orat, Nebehat Oran Arslan'ın *Kafkaslardan Arap Topraklarına Kafkas Muhacirleri*[2] ve Kemal H. Karpat'ın "Avrupalı Egemenliğinde Müslümanların Konumu Çerkeslerin Sürgünü ve Suriye'deki İskânı"[3] isimli makaleleri bu kaynaklara örnek olarak gösterilebilir. İkincisi, İsrail Çerkeslerine dair yayımlanan, haber, röportaj, sosyal medya paylaşımları ve benzerlerinden oluşan dijital kaynaklardır. Bu kaynaklara, Kafkas-Çerkes diasporasının STK'ları ve yayın organları (cerkesfed.org; Circassianworld; istanbulkafkaskultur.org; KAFDAV; KAFFED; Kafkas Evi; Ajanskafkas; Jinepsgazetesi.com); İsrail'de faaliyet gösteren STK'lar ve yayın organları (The Forward Jewish Independent Nonprofit; The Council for Conservation of Heritage Sites in Israel; jewishvirtuallibrary.org; The Jerusalem Post, Haaretz); ve Türkiye'de faaliyet gösteren medya organları (Anadolu Ajansı; Haber7.com; Hürriyet Daily News; Sabah.com; trthaber.com) örnek olarak

[1] Dawn Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge 2010).

[2] Orat Jülide Akyüz, Nebahat Arslan Oran, "Kafkaslardan Arap Topraklarına Kafkas Muhacirleri. 1864 Kafkas Tehciri: Kafkasya'da Rus Kolonizasyonu, Savaş ve Sürgün," *1864 Kafkas Tehciri: Kafkasya'da Rus Kolonizasyonu, Savaş ve Sürgün*. Ed. Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, *İstanbul: BALKAR & IRCICA* (2014): 485-516.

[3] H. Kemal Karpat, "Avrupalı Egemenliğinde Müslümanların Konumu Çerkeslerin Sürgünü ve Suriye'deki İskânı," *Çerkeslerin Sürgünü 21 Mayıs 1864 Tebliğler, Belgeler, Makaleler*, (Ankara: Kafkas Derneği Yayınları, 2001), 78-111.

gösterilebilir. Üçüncüsü ise doğrudan İsrail Çerkeslerini konu alan makalelerdir. Bu makalelerin tamamı İsrailli araştırmacıların çalışmalarından oluşmaktadır. Eleonore Merza'nın "The Israeli Circassians: non-Arab Arabs";[4] Ashter Stern'in "Education Policy Toward to Circassian Minority of İsrael";[5] Chen Bram'ın "Muslim Revivalism and the Emergence of Civic Society. A Case Study of an Israeli-Circassian Community";[6] Chen Bram'ın "21. Yüzyılda Çerkesler: İsrail'deki Adiğelerin Durumundan Alınacak Dersler";[7] Isabelle Kreindler, Marsha Bensoussan, Eleanor Avinor ve Chen Bram'ın "Circassian Israelis: Multilingualism as a Way of Life"[8] isimli makaleleri, İsrail Çerkeslerini konu alan çalışmalar arasındadır.

Literatür taraması ve nitel veri analizi yöntemleriyle hazırlanan çalışma, İsrail Çerkeslerini konu edinmiştir ve İsrail Çerkeslerinin tarihine kısaca değindikten sonra, İsrail Devleti ve Yahudi-İsrail vatandaşları ile Çerkeslerin sosyal entegrasyonları ve sorunlarını ele alarak sınırlandırılmıştır. Çalışma, Filistinli-Araplar gibi Sünni-Müslüman olan Çerkeslerin, İsrail Devleti ve İsrail vatandaşı Yahudiler ile çatışmak yerine, aksine, sosyal ve siyasi uyumlarının neden yüksek olduğu sorusunu sormaktadır ve İsrail Çerkeslerinin sorunlarına dair bir tartışma başlatmayı amaçlamaktadır. Ayrıca çalışma, düşük popülasyona sahip ve çok az akademik çalışmaya konu olan İsrail Çerkeslerini ele alarak alana katkı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Kafkasya ve Çerkesler

1859 yılında Kuzey-Doğu Kafkasya'nın siyasi ve dini lideri İmam Şamil'i ele geçiren Rusya, Kuzey-Doğu Kafkasya'yı kontrol altına almış, 21 Mayıs 1864'te ise Kbaada Vadisi'nde yapılan son muharebede Kuzey-Batı

[4] Eleonore Merza, "The Israeli Circassians: non-Arab Arabs", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://bcrfj.revues.org/7250

[5] Ashter Stern, "Education Policy Toward to Circassian Minority of İsrael", In K. Jaspaert And S. Kroon (eds.): *Ethnic Minority Languages and Education*, (Amsterdam: Swets And Zeitlinger, 1991): 175-184.

[6] Chen Bram, "Muslim Revivalism and the Emergence of Civic Society. A Case Study of an Israeli-Circassian Community" son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.circassianworld.com/diaspora/middle-east/1243-israeli-circassian-community

[7] Chen Bram, "21. Yüzyılda Çerkesler: İsrail'deki Adiğelerin Durumundan Alınacak Dersler," çev. M. Nesij Huvaj, *Geçmişten Geleceğe Çerkesler Kültür, Kimlik, Siyaset. 21. Yüzyılda Çerkesler Sorunlar ve Olanaklar Bildiriler Kitabı*. Ed. S. Alankuş, E. O. Arı. Ankara: Geçmişten Geleceğe Çerkesler, Kafkas Araştırma Kültür ve Dayanışma Vakfı, 407-416.

[8] Isabelle Kreindler, Marsha Bensoussan, Eleanor Avinor, Chen Bram. "Circassian Israelis: Multilingualism as a Way of Life." *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 8, no. 2 (1995): 149–62.

Kafkasya'daki direniş son bulmuş ve bu surette Rusya, Kuzey Kafkasya'nın tamamını işgal etmiştir.[9] Rusya, Kafkasya'nın işgali sonrası bölgenin otokton halklarını sürgün etmiş, sürgün edilen halkın tamamı Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından kabul edilmiştir.[10] Bu nüfus hareketi 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun toprak kaybetme sürecinde Osmanlı himayesindeki tüm etnik grupların maruz kaldığı sürgün ve katliamlardan'[11] sadece biridir. Yaşanan savaşlar, soykırım ve sürgün Kafkasyalı Müslümanların büyük bir kısmının hayatlarını kaybetmelerine neden olmuştur.[12] Rusya kaynaklı verilerde sürgün edilen Kafkasyalıların 500 bin ile 1 milyon kişi olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Osmanlı arşiv belgelerine dayanan Türkiye kaynaklı verilerde ise bu rakam 1-2 milyon kişi aralığındadır. 1 milyon Kafkasyalının da savaş ve sürgün esnasında hayatını kaybettiği iddiası genel olarak kabul görmektedir.[13]

Kafkasya'dan Osmanlı topraklarına ilk kitlesel sürgün hareketi, İmam Şamil'in Ruslar tarafından esir edilmesi sonrası 1859 yılında başlamış ve 1862 yılından sonra sürgün hareketleri hızlanmıştır. Sürgün edilenler arasında etnik ve dilsel açıdan çeşitli/farklı topluluklar mevcuttur.[14] Çeçenler, Dağıstanlılar, Osetler, Abhazlar, Adigeler, Ubıhlar vd. oluşan Kuzey Kafkasya'nın Dağlı kabileleri genel bir tanımlama olarak Osmanlı-Batı arşiv evraklarında ve literatüründe Çerkesler olarak isimlendirilmiştir.[15] Ancak bu durum günümüzde değişmiş ve kabile isimleriyle tanımlanmaları yaygınlık kazanmıştır.

Çerkeslerin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na iskânı,[16] Anadolu, Rumeli ve Biladü'ş-Şam vilayetleri olmak üzere temel olarak üç bölgede

[9] Abdullah Saydam, "Rusya'nın Kafkasya'yı İşgali," *Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi* 5, no. 1 (1990): 243-261.

[10] Emir Fatih Akbulat, "Syrian Circassians in the Context of the Syrian Refugees' Issue: Nature of the Problem on the Basis of the International Community in Turkey and Russia and Suggested Solutions", *Central European Journal of Politics* v. 3 I. 1 (2017): 5.

[11] Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, "Giriş," *1864 Kafkas Tehciri. Kafkasya'da Rus Kolonizasyonu, Savaş ve Sürgün*, Ed. M. Hacısalihoğlu, *İstanbul: BALKAR & IRCICA* (2014): 14.

[12] Tuğba Erdem, "1864 Kafkas Göçü Öncesinde ve Göç Sırasında Yaşanan Salgın Hastalıklar," *1864 Kafkas Tehciri: Kafkasya'da Rus Kolonizasyonu, Savaş ve Sürgün*, Ed. M. Hacısalihoğlu, *İstanbul: BALKAR & IRCICA* (2014): 171-200.

[13] Cahit Aslan, "1864 Trajedisi", *Sürgün/Exile 21 MAYIS/ MAY 21 1864*. (Ankara: Kafkas Araştırma Kültür ve Dayanışma Vakfı, 2011): 108-110; Sadık Müfit Bilge, "Çerkezler," *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, gözden geçirilmiş 2. basım EK-1. Cilt (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2020), 287-290.

[14] H. Kemal Karpat, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Etnik Yapılanma ve Göçler* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2013), 331.

[15] Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 127.

[16] Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Çerkesleri kabul etmesinin birçok nedeni mevcuttu; Osmanlı Sultanının halife sıfatını taşıması ve bu sebepler dünya Müslümanlarının koruyucusu olması,

gerçekleştirilmiştir.[17] Hıristiyan tebaanın yoğun olduğu bölgeler, Rus sınır bölgeleri, liman kentlerinin yakınları ve ana ulaşım yolları üzerinde askeri hatlar oluşturacak bir plan doğrultusunda düzenlenen iskânlar, Rumeli'den başlayarak güney eyaletlerine uzanan bir hat üzerinde yapılmıştır.[18]

Yaklaşık 300 bin'den fazla Çerkes Rumeli eyaletlerine iskân edilmiştir. Rumeli'ye iskânların sonrasında Çerkesler ve yerel halk arasında ana nedeni toprak meselesi olan ciddi anlaşmazlıklar yaşanmıştır. Sultanın Çerkeslere tahsis ettiği toprakların yerel halk tarafından sahiplenilmiş olması Çerkesleri istenmeyen bir zümre durumuna düşürmüştür.[19] Rumeli'ye iskân edilen Çerkeslerin karşılaştığı bir diğer önemli sorun da Hıristiyan tebaanın bağımsızlık isyanları olmuştur. Ortodoks-Ruslar ile yüzyıllar süren savaşlar sonrası ana vatanlarından sürgün edilen Çerkesler, Rumeli'nin Ortodoks-Slav tebaası ile de çatışmıştır. 1876 Nisan-Mayıs tarihleri arasında büyük bir Bulgar İsyanı başlamış,[20] bağımsızlık ideali ile başlayan "1876 Bulgar İsyanı" Osmanlı idaresi tarafından bastırılmıştır. Ancak yaşanan hadiseler Batı kamuoyunda "Bulgar katliamı" (İngilizce; Bulgarian atrocities) olarak tanımlanmış,[21] başta Rusya ve İngiltere olmak üzere Osmanlı üzerinde bir

İslam inancı gereği muhacirlerin kabul edilmesinin bir zorunluluk olması ve sürgün kararına direnenlerin Ruslar tarafından katledileceğinin bilinmesi, Çerkeslerin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na gelişlerindeki zorunlu nedenler olarak sıralanabilir. Osmanlı'nın da gelen muhacirlerden dolayı bazı kazanımları olduğu da diğer bir gerçektir. Örneğin; Çerkes muhacirler sayesinde Hıristiyanların lehine bozulmuş olan demografinin Müslümanlar lehine artacak olması, Kafkasya'da Ruslar ile uzun yıllardır savaşan Çerkeslerin iyi birer savaşçı olarak Osmanlı Ordusu'na katılmalarından umulan faydalar ve henüz tarıma açılmamış toprakların gelen Çerkesler sayesinde işlenmesi ve diğer birçok neden Osmanlı'nın Çerkesleri kabul sebepleri arasında gösterilebilir. Karpat, "Avrupalı Egemenliğinde Müslümanların Konumu Çerkeslerin Sürgünü ve Suriye'deki İskânı," 84; Ayşe Pul, "Trabzon ve Samsun Limanları Üzerinden Kafkasya Muhacirlerinin İskânı," *Sürgün/Exile 21 MAYIS/MAY 21 1864*. (Ankara: Kafkas Araştırma Kültür ve Dayanışma Vakfı, 2011): 192, 193; İhsan Satış, "19.Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Kafkasya'dan Anadolu'ya Çerkes Göçü ve İskânları," *Geçmişten Geleceğe Çerkesler*, (Ankara: Kafkas Araştırma Kültür ve Dayanışma Vakfı, 2014), 210; Zareta Raşitovna Dzumatova, "Kuzey Kafkasya Dağlıları'nın Türkiye'ye Göçü," *Anavatanlarından Sürülüşlerinin 150. Yılında Çerkesler* (Ankara: Kafkas Araştırma Kültür ve Dayanışma Vakfı, 2015): 34, 35.

[17] Karpat *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Etnik Yapılanma ve Göçler,* 171.

[18] Anzor V. Kushkhabiev, "Çerkesler Anavatanlarına Dönüyor: Tarih, Siyaset, Sosyal Pratik," (Nalçik: Rusya Bilimler Akademisi Kabardey-Balkar Bilim Merkezi, 2013), 82-96.

[19] Kushkhabiev, "Çerkesler Anavatanlarına Dönüyor," 82-96.

[20] Ömer Turan, *The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria (1878-1908)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi. 1998), 42; Yahya Bağçeci, "İngiltere Parlamento Tutanaklarında 1876 Bulgar İsyanı," *International Journal of Social Science*, no. 24 (2014): 216.

[21] "War in the East Atrocities in Bulgaria," *The Manchester Guardian*, 10 Temmuz 1876, s. 6; "The Atrocities in Bulgaria," *The Manchester Guardian*, 12 Temmuz 1876, s. 6; "The Atrocities

baskı kurulmasına neden olmuştur. Bulgar İsyanı'nın bastırılması sonrası Büyük Güçler'in (Düvel-i Muazzama) isteğiyle İstanbul'da gerçekleştirilen Tersane Konferansı'nda bilhassa Rusya, Çerkeslerin tamamının Rumeli'den gönderilmesini ve yeni Çerkes iskânlarının kesin surette yasaklanmasını Osmanlı'ya dayatmıştır.[22] Tersane Konferansı'nda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Çerkeslerin Rumeli'den sürgün edilmesi ve diğer birçok şartı kabul etmemesi neticesinde[23] Rusya, Osmanlı Devleti'ne savaş açmış,[24] 1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi bir Müslüman sürgünü ile sonuçlanmıştır. 1 ila 1 milyon 500 bin insanın Rumeli'den Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun diğer bölgelerine gönderildiği, 300 bin insanın da bu savaş ve savaşın getirdiği sürgün nedeniyle hayatını kaybettiği tahmin edilmektedir.[25]

3 Mart 1878'de Osmanlı-Rus Harbi'ni sona erdiren Ayastefanos Antlaşması imzalanmış, ancak Büyük Güçler'in çıkarlarına karşı Rusya'nın büyük menfaatlerini ihtiva ediyor oluşu, antlaşmanın Büyük Güçler tarafından yeniden yapılmasını istemelerine yol açmıştır. Berlin'de düzenlenen yeni bir konferansta Ayastefanos Antlaşması yerini Berlin Antlaşması'na bırakmıştır.[26] 1878 Berlin Antlaşması neticesinde diğer Rumeli Müslümanları ile birlikte Çerkesler de Rumeli'den uzaklaştırılmışlardır. 1878 Şubat ayına gelindiğinde Rumeli eyaletlerinde yaşayan Çerkeslerin tamamına yakını, Selanik, İstanbul ve Kavala Limanlarından Anadolu ve Biladü'ş-Şam vilayetlerine sevk edilmiştir.[27]

1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi sonrası Nisan 1878'e kadar Rumeli topraklarından Biladü'ş-Şam vilayetlerine sevk edilen muhacirlerin çoğu Çerkes olmak üzere 26 bin kişiden fazladır.[28] 1878 yılının sonu itibariyle 25

in Bulgaria," *The Times*, 12 Ağustos 1876, s. 6; "The Atrocities in Bulgaria," *The Times*, 4 Eylül 1876. s. 10; "The Atrocities in Bulgaria," *The Times*, 16 Eylül 1876, s. 10; "The Atrocities in Bulgaria," *The Times*, 25 Eylül 1876, s. 10.

[22] Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 102; Emir Fatih Akbulat "Büyük Doğu Krizinde (1875-1878) İngiliz Kamuoyu ve Dış Politikasında Çerkes İmajı" (Doktora Tezi, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, 2023).

[23] "The Eastern Question Conference," *The Times*, 20 Kasım 1876, s. 5; "Başlıksız haber". *The Manchester Guardian*, 21 Kasım 1876, s. 5; "Solutions of the Eastern Questions," *The Times*, 23 Kasım 1876, s. 10.

[24] Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990): 81, 82.

[25] Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 96.

[26] Ali İhsan Gencer, "Berlin Antlaşması," *DİA İslam Ansiklopedisi*, c. 5 (Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1992), 516-517.

[27] Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 103, 110.

[28] Nihat Berzeg, *Çerkesler Kafkas Sürgünü: Vatansız Bırakılan Bir Halk* (İstanbul: Chiviyazıları Yayınevi, 2006), 245, 246. Ayrıca bkz. Akyüz, Oran, "Kafkaslardan Arap Topraklarına Kafkas Muhacirleri. 1864 Kafkas Tehciri: Kafkasya'da Rus Kolonizasyonu, Savaş ve Sürgün," 485-516.

bin Çerkes Suriye'nin güneyine, 10 ila 15 bin Çerkes ise Halep bölgesine gönderilmiştir.[29] 1878-1880 yıllarında ne kadar Çerkesin Rumeli'den tahliye edilerek Biladü'ş-Şam vilayetlerine iskân edildiği, Osmanlı makamları tarafından düzenli kayıtların tutulamaması, nüfusun büyük bir kısmının sürgün sırasında ve yerleştikten sonra hayatını kaybetmesi vb. nedenler dolayısıyla mümkün olmamıştır.[30]

Çerkeslerin iskân edildikleri bu yeni topraklara adaptasyonları da kolay olmamıştır. Sürgünün neden olduğu psikolojik ve fiziksel zorlukların yanı sıra, coğrafi koşullara uyum sorunları ve yeni komşuları ile ciddi çatışmalar yaşamışlardır. "Sultanın jandarmaları" olarak görülen Çerkesler, Arap, Bedevi, Dürzi, vd. tebaanın yaşadığı bu coğrafyada istenmeyen yabancılar olarak görülmüşlerdir.[31]

Ayrıca Çerkeslerin Biladü'ş-Şam vilayetlerine iskânları sürecinde aksaklıklar birbiri ardına devam etmiştir. Suriye limanlarında indirilen Çerkesler ile ilgili problemlerin başında lojistik hizmetleri gelmiştir. Çerkeslerin Suriye coğrafyasına iskânı sonrası iaşelerinin temini ve yeni yaşam ve iklim koşullarına adaptasyonları da diğer büyük problemler olmuştur.[32]

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından Biladü'ş-Şam vilayetlerine iskân edilen Çerkesler, bölgenin kaotik atmosferinden fazlasıyla etkilenmişlerdir. İskânların başladığı ilk günden itibaren bölgenin yerel halklarıyla, Rumeli'de yaşananlara benzer şekilde, bilhassa mîrî araziler üzerine anlaşmazlıklar yaşanmıştır. Osmanlı Sultanının şahsi mülkü olan ve Çerkeslere tahsis edilen arazilerin uzun yıllardır Arap ve Dürzi kabilelerince sahiplenilmiş olması, Çerkesleri yerel halk nazarında işgalci durumuna düşürmüştür. Bölgede Osmanlı İmparatorluğu aleyhine başlayan bağımsızlık ayaklanmaları da Çerkeslerin karşılaştıkları bir diğer büyük sorun olmuştur. Sultanın koruması altında bölgeye iskân edilen Çerkesler, Osmanlı düzenli birlikleriyle beraber ayaklanmaların bastırılmasında aktif rol almıştır.[33] Osmanlı idaresinin de desteğini alan Çerkesler, Bedeviler ile yaşadıkları birçok çatışmadan galip ayrılmıştır. Osmanlı idaresinin, Golan Tepeleri, Havran ve Hermon Dağları gibi isyan

[29] Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 103, 104.
[30] ORSAM, Suriye Çerkesleri, Orsam Rapor No: 130. (2012), son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.orsam.org.tr/eski/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/20121226_130turing.pdf.
[31] Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 127,128.
[32] Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 104.
[33] Emir Fatih Akbulat, "Uluslararası Göç Ağları ve Dayanışma Türkiye ve Suriye Çerkesleri Buluşması: İstanbul ve Balıkesir Orhanlı ve Atköy Yerleşim Birimleri Örneği," (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul Yeni Yüzyıl Üniversitesi, 2017): 80, 81.

bölgelerine iskân ettiği Çerkesler, yarı-otonom etnik ve dînî bir grup olan Dürziler ile de büyük anlaşmazlıklar ve çatışmalar yaşamışlardır.[34]

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Sonrası Orta Doğu ve Çerkesler

Çerkesler I. Dünya Savaşı'nın sonuna kadar Osmanlı ordusunun askerleri olarak Batılı güçlere ve Arap-milliyetçisi isyancılara karşı savaştılar.[35] I. Dünya Savaşı'nın kaybedilmesi sonrası Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ortadoğu'daki toprakları Fransa ve İngiltere tarafından Suriye, Irak, Lübnan ve Filistin olarak bölündüğünde,[36] Osmanlı tebaası olarak Ortadoğu'ya iskân edilen Çerkesler de Fransız ve İngiliz manda idareleri altında kurulan devletlerin vatandaşları oldular.[37]

I. ve II. Dünya Savaşı arası dönemde Suriye, Ürdün ve Filistin sınırlarında kalan Çerkesler bu ülkelerin içinden geçtiği kaotik süreçlerden fazlasıyla etkilendiler. Fransız ve İngiliz idareleri tarafından çizilen yeni sınırların Arap milliyetçileri tarafından kabul edilmemesi ve Balfour Deklerasyonu ile Filistin'e kitlesel Yahudi göçlerinin başlaması, bölgeyi günümüze kadar sürecek bir çatışma sarmalına soktu. Birleşmiş Milletler'in 29 Kasım 1947 tarihli oylaması ile Filistin, Arap ve Yahudi devleti olarak paylaştırıldı[38] ve Arap-İsrail birlikleri arasında çatışmalar başladı. Çerkesler, gönüllü birlikler oluşturarak Filistin'deki savaşta Arapların yanında yer aldılar.[39] Ancak Filistin'de İngiliz manda idaresinin sona ermesinin hemen ardından 14 Mayıs 1948'de İsrail Devleti'nin kurulduğu ilan edildi[40] ve birinci Arap-İsrail Savaşı bu surette başladı. İsrail birliklerinin galibiyeti ile neticelenen savaş sonrası bağımsız İsrail Devleti kuruldu.[41] Bu surette Osmanlı idaresi tarafından Filistin'e iskân

[34] Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 105-107.
[35] ORSAM, Suriye Çerkesleri, Orsam Rapor No: 130. (2012).
[36] Global Britannica, "Sykes Picot Agreement," son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://global.britannica.com/event/Sykes-Picot-Agreement.
[37] Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 128,129.
[38] United Nation, "The Plan of Partition and end of the British Mandate", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/ch2.pdf.
[39] ORSAM, Suriye Çerkesleri, Orsam Rapor No:130. (2012)
[40]Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx
[41] Encyclopedia Britannica. "Arab-Israeli wars", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Israeli-wars

edilen Çerkesler de İsrail sınırları içerisinde kaldı ve İsrail vatandaşları oldular.[42]

Çerkesler açısından bir diğer önemli dönüm noktası da Haziran 1967'de başlayan Arap-İsrail Savaşı sonrası İsrail'in Suriye'ye ait olan ve büyük bir Çerkes nüfusunun yaşadığı Golan Tepeleri'ni işgali oldu. İsrail, Golan bölgesinde yaşayan yaklaşık 25 bin Çerkes'i sürgün etti.[43] Çoğunluğu kendilerine Suriye ve Ürdün'de yaşayan Çerkesler tarafından ulaştırılan yardımlar sayesinde Şam'a ve Suriye'nin diğer kentlerine yerleşti. Bu dönemde bir kısım Golanlı Çerkes de ABD'ye kabul edildi.[44]

Günümüzde İsrail Çerkesleri

19. yüzyılın son çeyreğinde "Osmanlı Sultanının bölgedeki koruyucuları olarak Filistin'e gönderilen Çerkesler" 1870'li yılların sonunda Kfar-Kama ve Reyhaniye köylerini kurdular.[45] Dilleri, gelenekleri ve Sultana bağlılıkları dolayısıyla Çerkesler Arap komşularınca hiç de iyi karşılanmamışlardı. Yahudiler ile ilişkileri ise başlangıçtan itibaren sorunsuzdu.[46]

Kutsal Topraklar'daki [Filistin] Yahudilerin ve Çerkeslerin modern tarihleri iç içe geçmiştir. Siyonist-Yahudi göçmenler Kutsal Topraklar'a geldikten kısa bir süre sonra 1882 yılında Galilee'deki ilk Yahudi tarım yerleşimi olan Rosh Pina'yı Çerkes yerleşimlerine sadece 10 mil uzakta kurmuşlar ve kendileri gibi dışarıdan gelmiş olan Çerkesler ile yakın ilişkiler geliştirmişlerdi. Yahudiler ile Araplar arasında İngiliz mandası

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[42] Kafkas Evi, "İsrail Çerkesleri", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.kafkasevi.com/index.php/article/detail/42; KAFDAV, "Sosyal İlişkileri, Ekonomik ve Kültürel Yaşamları, Politik ve Kültürel Hakları ile Sürgünden Günümüze İsrail Çerkesleri", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.kafdav.org.tr/israil-cerkesleri.

[43] ORSAM, Suriye Çerkesleri, Orsam Rapor No: 130. (2012).

[44] Cahtty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 121

[45] Kfar-Kama ve Reyhaniye Köylerinin kuruldukları tarihlerle ilgili bir çok kaynakta farklı tarihler verilmektedir örneğin; Languages of the World, "Circassians in Israel", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.languagesoftheworld.info/uncategorized/circassians-israel.html; The Forward Jewish Independent Nonprofit, "Circassians Are Israel's Other Muslims Read by Oren Kessler", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://forward.com/culture/161187/circassians-are-israel-s-other-muslims/; Circassian World, "Restoration and Reconstruction of the Circassian Village Kfar Kama, by Orit Shwarts", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.circassianworld.com/diaspora/middle-east/1412-circassian-village-kfar-kama-orit-shwarts.

[46] Kreindler, Bensoussan, Avinor, Bram. "Circassian Israelis: Multilingualism as a Way of Life.", 149–62.

döneminde çatışmalar başladığında, genellikle tarafsız kalan Çerkesler, Yahudilerin sürgün ve dağılma tarihi ile özdeşleştiler ve birçok Rusya Yahudisi ve Çerkesin Rus dilini bilmesi iletişimlerini kolaylaştırdı.[47]

Yaklaşık 3 bin kişilik nüfusa ve 10 bin dönüm araziye sahip "Aşağı Celile" [Mount Tabor] yakınlarındaki Kfar-Kama, günümüzde belediye statüsünde bir yerleşim yeridir. Kfar-Kama, İsrail'in kuzeyinde yer alır ve Yahudi yerleşim birimleriyle iç içedir.[48] Köyün ileri gelenlerinden, Abrag Ferid, Kfar-Kama'nın adının Aramice olduğunu, "birinci" anlamına geldiğini ve köyün tarihinin Musa Peygamber öncesine dayandığını iddia etmektedir.[49] Kfar-Kama Köyü'nün tarihine dair Şogen Pshamaf ise şunları anlatmaktadır:

> *"105 yaşındayken kaybettiğimiz ninemden dinlediğim kadarıyla size anlatayım. 1864 yılında Balkanlara göç etmek zorunda kalan Çerkeslerden bir grup, buralardaki yerli halkla yaşanan sorunlar nedeniyle 1870'li yıllarda ikinci defa göçe tabi tutulmuşlar ve deniz yoluyla bugün İsrail toprakları olarak bilinen bölgeye gönderilmişler. Yerleşim önceleri kıyı bölgelerinde olmuş, ancak daha sonra sıtma salgınları nedeniyle kuzeye doğru yönelen 17 Şapsığ aile Kfar-Kama'yı kurmuşlar. Aslında Kfar-Kama'nın bir yerleşim yeri olarak tarihi 1200 yıl önceye kadar gidiyor. İlk sakinleri Magriplilermiş. Ancak Çerkesler geldiklerinde Kfar-Kama'yı terkedilmiş bir yerleşim olarak bulup, yeniden iskân etmişler. Kendilerine bölgede daha önce etraflarındaki Bedevi kabileler tarafından hiç kullanılmayan bir yapı malzemesiyle, kiremitten evler yapmışlar. Yerleştikleri bölgede ticari faaliyetleri başlatanlar da Çerkesler olmuş."*[50]

Kfar-Kama'nın merkezinde bazalt kaya ve beyaz taştan inşa edilen, son derece dekoratif ve güzel bir cami bulunmaktadır. Minarenin üstündeki soğan şeklindeki oda, sadece mimari açıdan eşsiz değildir, aynı zamanda kilometrelerce uzaklıktan da görülebilmektedir.[51] Geçirdiği

[47] The Forward Jewish Independent Nonprofit, "Circassians Are Israel's Other Muslims Read by Oren Kessler"
[48] KAFFED, "İsrail Çerkesleri", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.kaffed.org/bilgi-belge/soylesiler/item/285-israil-cerkesleri.html.
[49] *Haber7.com*, "Çerkezlerin en rahat yaşadığı yer İsrail'de", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.haber7.com/dunya/haber/571553-cerkezlerin-en-rahat-yasadigi-yer-israilde.
[50] KAFFED, "İsrail Çerkesleri".
[51] *The Jerusalem Post*, "From the Caucusus to the Galilee", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.jpost.com/Local-Israel/Around-Israel/From-the-Caucusus-to-the-Galilee

restorasyonlar sonrası birçok değişim yaşamış olsa da minberi ve üzerindeki Osmanlı bayrağı simgesi bugüne kadar korunmuştur.[52]

Kfar-Kama Belediye başkanı sembolik olarak İsrail'deki Çerkeslerin temsilcisi konumundadır. Belediye önünde, İsrail bayrağı, yerel konsey bayrağı ve Çerkes bayrağı asılmaktadır.[53] Kamu hizmetlerinin yeterliliği, köyün temizliği ve evlerin düzeninden anlaşılmaktadır. Altyapı-üstyapı probleminin olmadığı köyde, belediye başkanı ve belediye meclisi üyeleri Çerkeslerden oluşmaktadır. Köy sakinleri, dünyada Çerkeslerin en rahat yaşadığı yerin Kfar-Kama olduğunu iddia ederek, dinlerine, örf ve âdetlerine karşı bir baskı söz konusu olmadığını, dinî bayramların ve ramazan ayının kutlanmasında herhangi bir engellemeyle karşılaşılmadığını ve İsrail Devleti ile de hiçbir sorunlarının olmadığını belirtmektedir.[54] Ayrıca 1996 yılında İsrail Devleti İsrail'de yaşayan Çerkesler konusunda danışmanlık yapmak üzere Başbakanlığa bağlı bir birim oluşturulmuştur. Şogen Pshamaf, Netanyahu Hükümeti'ne Çerkesler konusunda danışmanlık yapmış İsrailli ilk Çerkestir.[55]

Günümüzde Kfar-Kama Çerkeslerinin bir kısmı başta işsizlik olmak üzere çeşitli nedenlerle İsrail'in büyük şehirlerine göç etse de köyleri ile olan bağları devam etmekte, düzenli olarak köylerini ziyaret etmekte ve sosyal etkinliklere katılmaktadır.[56] Çerkes âdetlerinin sürdürüldüğü ve Çerkesçenin konuşulduğu Kfar-Kama[57] İsrail'deki Çerkes kimliğinin yoğun bir şekilde yaşatıldığı, merkezî bir konuma sahiptir.

İsrail'de bulunan Çerkes köylerinin ikincisi olan Reyhaniye'de yaklaşık bin kadar Çerkes yaşamaktadır.[58] Nüfusun azlığı ve coğrafi konumu dolayısı ile Reyhaniye, genel anlamda Kfar-Kama kadar bilinen bir Çerkes yerleşimi değildir. Reyhaniye, Müslüman-Araplar ve Dürziler ile yakın bir coğrafyada, Lübnan sınırı yakınlarındadır[59] ve civarındaki 12 Arap yerleşimiyle birlikte bir belediye bölgesi oluşturmaktadır. Belediye

[52] *Sabah.com*, "Kfar Kamalılar Türkiyeli damatları sevdi", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.sabah.com.tr/galeri/yasam/kfar-kamalilar-turkiyeli-damatlari-sevdi.
[53] Kafkas Evi, "İsrail Çerkesleri".
[54] *Haber7.com*, "Çerkezlerin en rahat yaşadığı yer İsrail'de".
[55] 1996 yılına kadar Araplar ve Dürziler için oluşturulan bu birimin 1996 yılında Çerkesler için de oluşturulmasına karar verilmiştir. KAFFED, "İsrail Çerkesleri".
[56] *The Jerusalem Post*, "From the Caucusus to the Galilee".
[57] *Haber7.com*, "Çerkezlerin en rahat yaşadığı yer İsrail'de".
[58] Asher Shafrir, "Ethnic Minority Languages in Israel", *In Proceedings of the Scientific Conference AFASES* (2011): 493-498.
[59] *The Jerusalem Post*, "From the Caucusus to the Galilee".

meclisinde Reyhaniye bir üye ile temsil edilmektedir.[60] Reyhaniye köyünün tarihine dair Gış Memduh şunları anlatmaktadır;

> "*Reyhaniye'ye yerleşim 1878'deki göç dalgasıyla birlikte olmuş [1877-1878 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi sonrası]. Karadeniz üzerinden gelen kafilelerle birlikte önce Anadolu'ya, ardından Osmanlı yönetiminin uygun bulduğu şekilde deniz yoluyla önce Akka limanına gönderilip, sonra da etraftaki değişik yerleşim birimlerine dağıtılmışlar. Ancak bu dağınıklıktan rahatsızlık duydukları için Sultan'dan kendilerine bir köy tahsis etmesini istemişler. Sultan'dan olur çıkınca da aralarından üç atlıyı yerleşime elverişli yeni bir yer bulmak üzere bölgeyi keşfe göndermişler. Üç hafta boyunca kendilerine yeni bir yer arayan üç atlı, nihayet toprağını, havasını, suyunu Kafkasya'dakine benzer gördükleri Şeyh Dağı'nın etrafında karar kılmışlar. Sonunda 1881 yılında Osmanlı'nın da yardımıyla burada Reyhaniye'yi inşa etmişler. Reyhaniye'nin etrafı hep Arap yerleşimiymiş ve 'yabancı' ve kendilerine benzemez gördükleri Çerkesleri 'Moskovalı' diye çağırırlarmış. Böylelikle güvenlik nedeniyle Reyhaniye bölgede emsali hiç görülmedik bir yerleşim planıyla inşa edilmiş. Hepsi bitişik nizam olmak üzere Batı'dan 20, Doğu'dan 20, Kuzey ve Güney'den ise 8'er evden oluşan geometrik bir plana göre kurmuşlar köyü. Evlerin ortak duvarlarına küçük pencereler açılarak, herhangi bir tehlike anında bütün köyün haberleşebileceği bir güvenlik sistemi oluşturulmuş, köyün etrafı da tek kapısı gece kapanacak şekilde duvarla çevrilmiş. Toplam 56 ev inşa edildiğine bakılırsa, 56 aileymiş Reyhaniye'ye yerleşenler. Sonradan 10 aile daha gelmiş. Ancak onlar bu mimari plan nedeniyle evlerini duvarın dışına kurabilmişler. Reyhaniye, Osmanlı yönetiminden sonra, 40 yıl İngiliz vesayetinde kalmış. 1948 yılında İsrail Devleti kurulurken ise ikiye bölünmüş. Golan Tepelerindeki diğer 12 Çerkes köyüyle birlikte Kuzeyi Suriye toprağı, Güneyi İsrail toprağı sayılmış. Böylece aileler bölünmüş, Çerkes köyleri birbirinden ayrı düşmüş. Bu arada yine 1967 yılında İsrail Golan Tepelerinin Suriye taraflarını ele geçirince, Çerkes köylerinin nüfusunun önemli bir kısmı Şam'a yerleşmek durumunda kalmış, sonra da bir kısmı ABD'ye göç etmiş. 1967 yılındaki bu değişiklikten sonra Reyhaniyelilerin bir kısmına da göçten pay düşmüş.*"[61]

İsrail'de Çerkes Kültürünün Muhafazası ve Çerkes Diasporası ile İlişkiler

Yaşadıkları ülkelerde devlet otoritesiyle geliştirdikleri uyumlu ilişkiler ile bilinen Çerkesler, İsrail'de de ülkenin sadık vatandaşları olarak

[60] KAFFED, "İsrail Çerkesleri".
[61] KAFFED, "İsrail Çerkesleri".

kabul görmekte,[62] sosyal yaşama diğer İsrail vatandaşları ile eşit ölçüde katılmakta ve Kafkasya'dan taşıdıkları geleneklerini korumayı sürdürmektedir. Örneğin düğünlerde hala Çerkes kaması ve kılıçları ile süslenmiş geleneksel kıyafetlerin giyilmesi ve evlilik ritüelleri gibi geleneksellikler büyük oranda devam ettirilmektedir. Kfar-Kama Köyü'nün girişine dikilen "at üzerinde bir Çerkes savaşçı" figürü köyün bir Çerkes köyü olduğunu sembolize eden önemli yapılardandır. Hem Kfar-Kama hem de Reyhaniye köylerinde Kiril harfleriyle yazılmış, İbranice ve Arapça çevirisi olan tabelaları görmek oldukça ilginç bir durumdur.[63] Çerkesler, İsrail toplumsal yaşamı ile bütünleşirken, ulusal kimlik ve dillerini korumakta da başarılı olmuşlardır. Müslüman kimlikleri de Çerkesleri asimilasyondan koruyan başlıca etkenler arasındadır.[64]

Kfar-Kama Köyü'nde Çerkes kültürünün yaşatıldığı önemli merkezlerden biri de "Çerkes Kültür Mirası Merkezi" [İngilizce; The Circassian Heritage Center] isimli müzedir.[65] Müzenin sergi salonunda Çerkes tarihiyle ilgili fotoğraflar, belgeler, eserler, giysiler, mobilyalar ve antika-silahlar bulunmaktadır. Müze, Kfar-Kama'yı ziyaret eden kimseler için görülmesi elzem yerlerden biridir.[66]

Çerkeslerin anavatanı Kafkasya günümüzde Rusya Federasyonu sınırları içerisindedir ve Çerkeslerin Kafkasya ile olan ilişkilerinin niteliği İsrail-Rusya ilişkileriyle de yakından ilgilidir. Bilhassa "Soğuk Savaş" döneminde İsrail ile Sovyetler Birliği ilişkilerinin olumsuz seyri, Çerkeslerin de Kafkasya ile olan ilişkilerini olumsuz yönde etkilemiştir. Ancak Sovyetler Birliği'nin son döneminde Mihail Gorbaçov ile düzelme eğilimine giren ilişkiler, 2000 yılında iktidara gelen Vladimir Putin ile ileri bir boyuta taşınmış,[67] ilişkilerin olumlu seyrinden faydalanan Çerkeslerin de bu oranda anavatanlarıyla iletişimleri artmıştır. İsrail ile Rusya arasında

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[62] *Odatv.com*, "Çerkesler Bu Akrabalarına Çok Şaşıracak", son güncelleme 20.04.2023 https://odatv.com/cerkesler-bu-akrabalarina-cok-sasiracak-1907101200.html

[63] *Kafkas Evi*, "İsrail Çerkesleri"; *trthaber.com*, "İsrail'deki Çerkes köyü adetlerini sürdürmeye devam ediyor", son güncelleme 20.04.2023 https://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/israildeki-cerkes-koyu-adetlerini-surdurmeye-devam-ediyor-389281.html.

[64] *Kafkas Evi*, "İsrail Çerkesleri".

[65] The Council for Conservation of Heritage Sites in Israel, "Circassian Heritage Center–Kfar Kama", son güncelleme 20.04.2023 https://shimur.org/sites/circassian-heritage-center-kfar-kama/?lang=en; Chen Bram, "21. Yüzyılda Çerkesler: İsrail'deki Adiğelerin Durumundan Alınacak Dersler", 412, 413.

[66] *The Jerusalem Post*, "From the Caucusus to the Galilee".

[67] *The Jerusalem Post*, "Despite Syria, Israel-Russia relations are the warmest in history", son güncelleme 20.04.2023 https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Despite-Syria-Israel-Russia-relations-are-the-warmest-in-history-485062.

varılan vize mutabakatıyla da turistik ziyaretlerin sayısı her geçen gün artmaktadır.[68] Gelişen İsrail-Rusya ilişkilerinin etkisiyle İsrail Çerkesleri günümüzde Kafkasya ile yakın ilişki içerisindedir.[69]

Kfar-Kama ve Reyhaniye'de her yıl "21 Mayıs 1864 Büyük Çerkes Sürgünü" anma etkinlikleri kapsamında bir dizi program düzenlenmektedir.[70] Bilhassa Kfar-Kama Köyü düzenlenen bu etkinliklerin merkezi konumundadır. Düzenlenen etkinliklere anavatan Kafkasya[71] ve dünyanın diğer Çerkes diaspora temsilcileri tarafından da katılım sağlanmaktadır.[72]

1990'lı yıllarda gelişen ulaşım ve iletişim imkânlarının da etkisiyle Kfar-Kama ve Reyhaniye köyleriyle Türkiye arasında bağlar kurulmaya başlanmıştır. Bu dönemde Türkiye Çerkesleri ile İsrail Çerkesleri arasında evlilikler gerçekleşmiştir.[73] Ayrıca dünyanın en büyük Çerkes diasporasına ev sahipliği yapan Türkiye'nin birçok yerleşim yerinde Kafkas-Çerkes sivil toplum örgütlenmeleri kurulmuştur. İsrail Çerkesleri, bu sivil toplum örgütleriyle sıklıkla bir araya gelmektedir ve karşılıklı ziyaretler

[68] *Ajanskafkas*, "İsrailli Çerkes heyeti Kafkasya turunda", son güncelleme 20.04.2023 http://ajanskafkas.com/haber-arsivi/israilli-cerkes-heyeti-kafkasya-turunda/

[69] *Kafkas Evi*, "İsrail Çerkesleri".

[70] Chen Bram, "21. Yüzyılda Çerkesler: İsrail'deki Adiğelerin Durumundan Alınacak Dersler", 413; *Haber7.com*, "Çerkezlerin en rahat yaşadığı yer İsrail'de".

[71] Anavatan Kafkasya'ya geri dönüş Çerkes diasporası için bir ideal olarak tartışılmaktadır. Her ne kadar bu ideal Çerkes diasporasının tamamınca desteklense de dünyanın farklı coğrafyalarında yaşayan çok az sayıda Çerkes anavatanları Kafkasya'ya geri dönmüştür. Zira Kafkasya'daki siyasi istikrarsızlık, ekonomik zorluklar vd. nedenler anavatana geri dönüşün önündeki önemli engellerdir. Jade Cemre Erciyes, "Sovyet Sonrası 25 Yılda Türkiye'den Kuzey Kafkasya'ya Geri Dönüşün Dönüşümü: Köprüleri Yakmaktan Köprüler Kurmaya" Kafkasya Çalışmaları, c. 2 s. 4 (2017): 1-30; İdeoloji, diaspora milletlerin kimlik inşaası sürecinde önemli ve benzersiz bir rol oynamaktadır. İsrailli Çerkesler açsından ise Kafkasya'ya göç fikri ideolojik bir eylemden ziyade, ancak pratik ve ekonomik hususlara dayanabilir. Chen Bram, İsrail'e göç eden Yahudiler ile Çerkeslerin kıyaslanamayacağını iddia etmektedir. Zira Yahudilerin Filistin'e kitlesel göçlerinin arka planında dini ve ideolojik bir fikir yatmaktadır. Bu ideolojik altyapı İsrail Çerkesleri açısından henüz gerçekleşmiş bir olgu değildir. Ancak toplumsal dayanışma ve etnik bilinç anlamında Çerkesler ve Yahudiler kıyaslanabilir. Zira Amerikalı Yahudiler de İsrail'e göç etmemelerine rağmen kültürel ve ideolojik bağlarını ve hatta desteklerini İsrail toplumuna sunmaktadırlar. Kısacası, aslında birey ikamet etmediği bir vatanın parçası olabilir. Circassianworld.com "Circassian Re-Immigration to the Caucasus, by Chen Bram", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.circassianworld.com/diaspora/middle-east/1246-circassian-re-immigration.

[72] *Jinepsgazetesi.com*, "Kfar Kama: Kutup Yıldızı", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.jinepsgazetesi.com/makale/kfar-kama-kutup-yildizi-2-1494;
Çerkeslerin anma etkinliklerine dair bir çalışma için bkz. Emir Fatih Akbulat, "Türklerin ve Akraba Toplulukların Acı Yıl Dönümleri" ed. Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu. (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2023): 57-96.

[73] *Sabah.com*, "Kfar Kamalılar Türkiyeli damatları sevdi".

gerçekleştirilmektedir.[74] Ayrıca Türkiye'de faaliyet gösteren sivil toplum örgütleriyle İsrail Çerkesleri arasında ortak etkinlikler ve dayanışma platformları da kurulmaktadır.[75]

Türkiye ile Kfar-Kama'yı birbirine bağlayan tarihsel bir hadise de Çerkes Ethem Bey'in[76] bu köyde 1920'li yıllarda bir süre yaşamasıdır. Ethem Bey, Türkiye'den ayrılması sonrası kardeşi Reşit Bey ile önce Almanya'ya, ardından Hayfa'ya, daha sonra Kfar-Kama'ya gelerek köyün ileri gelenlerinden "Şhaloh" sülalesine mensup Said Bey'in evine misafir olmuştur. Ardından Ürdün'e giden Ethem Bey, köy ile bağını koparmamış, Kfar-Kama'ya gelip gitmiştir. 1949'da ölen Ethem Bey'in Kfar-Kama'da 6 ay yaşadığı ev ise şimdi müze ve kültür merkezine dönüştürülmüştür.[77]

Çerkeslerin ve Yahudilerin Tarihsel Bağları

1870'li yıllarda Çerkeslerin Filistin bölgesine yerleşmelerinden yaklaşık 20 yıl sonra Doğu Avrupa menşeli Yahudi yerleşimciler de bölgeye gelmiş, ilk kolonilerini Kfar Tavor, Ilaniya ve Yavniel isimleriyle kurarak Çerkes köylerine komşu olmuşlardır. Bu dönemde Çerkes ve Yahudi yerleşimciler arasında sıcak ilişkiler kurulmuştur.[78] Çerkeslerin ve Yahudilerin derin tarihsel bağlara sahip oldukları iddia edilemese de günümüzde İsrail nüfusunun önemli bir bölümü eski Rus topraklarından Filistin'e göç eden Yahudilerden oluşmaktadır. Hatta İsrail'de İbranice ve İngilizceden sonra en fazla konuşulan dil Rusçadır.[79] Rusya kökenli Yahudilerin bir kısmı da Kafkasya ile tarihsel bağları olan insanlardır. Çerkeslerin ve Yahudilerin bu manada bir yakınlığa sahip oldukları

[74] *cerkesfed.org*, "İsrail Kfar Kama ve Türkiye Çerkesleri İstanbul Çerkes Derneğinde Buluşuyor", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.cerkesfed.org/2017/09/07/israil-kfar-kama-ve-turkiye-cerkesleri-istanbul-cerkes-derneginde-bulusuyor/.

[75] cerkesfed.org, "Kfar Kama Xase ve İstanbul Çerkes Derneği Kardeş Dernek İlan Edildi", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.cerkesfed.org/2017/09/15/kfar-kama-xase-ve-istanbul-cerkes-dernegi-kardes-dernek-ilan-edildi/.

[76] Çerkes Ethem, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın başlangıç safhasında kuvâ-yi seyyâre kumandanı olarak hizmet etmiş, ardından Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'e muhalefet ederek yurtdışına çıkmış, 9 Mayıs 1921'de kardeşleriyle birlikte gıyaben yargılanmış ve vatana ihanet suçlamasıyla idama mahkûm edilmiştir. 1938'de vatana dönmesi için çıkarılan affa rağmen yurda dönmemiş ve 1949 yılında Amman'da ölmüştür. Zekeriya Kurşun, "Çerkez Ethem," *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, c. 8 (1993): 275-276.

[77] *Haber7.com*, "Çerkezlerin en rahat yaşadığı yer İsrail'de".

[78] circassianworld.com, "Restoration and Reconstruction of the Circassian Village Kfar Kama, by Orit Shwarts".

[79] Mila Schwartz, "Exploring the Relationship between Family Language Policy and Heritage Language Knowledge among Second Generation Russian–Jewish Immigrants in Israel," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, v. 29 i. 5, (2008): 400-418; Shulamit Kopeliovich, "Reversing Language Shift in the Immigrant Family: A Case-Study of a Russian-Speaking Community in Israel" (Doctoral dissertation, Bar-Ilan University, 2006).

söylenebilir. Örneğin, Haziran 2016'da İsrail Barış Müzesi, II. Dünya Savaşında yaşanan "Yahudi Soykırımı" [Holokost] esnasında bir grup Yahudi çocuğu kurtarmış olan Çerkes köylülerini onurlandırmak için bir etkinlik düzenlemiş, Yair Auron'un Kafkasya'daki bir Çerkes köyü sakinlerinin ikinci dünya savaşı sırasında 32 Yahudi çocuğu kurtarmaları hadisesini anlattığı *Merhametin Yasağı* [İngilizce; *The Banality of Compassion*] isimli kitabının bir bölümü bu etkinlikte okunmuştur. Auron'un aktardığı hikâye şöyledir;

> "*Alman ordusunun Leningrad'ın kapısında olduğu ve II. Dünya Savaşı'nın en yoğun yaşandığı döneminde, 13-14 yaşlarındaki bir grup Yahudi çocuğun Sovyet kontrolü altında bulunan Gürcistan'a trenle gönderilmeleri için bir girişimde bulunulur. Tren Kuzey Kafkasya'dan geçerken Alman ordusu tarafından bombalanır ve vagonlardan biri imha edilir. Bombalamada kaç kişinin öldüğü bilinmiyordur. Trenin zarar görmesi nedeniyle hayatta kalan çocuklar, bir Rus subayı eşliğinde dört at arabasıyla ilerler. Yerli halk tarafından Çerkes köylerine girmemeleri zira katledilebilecekleri gerekçesiyle uyarılırlar. Nazi güçleri de zaten bölgededir. Ancak çocuklar aşırı düzeyde zayıf düşmüşlerdir ve hayatta kalabilmek için başka seçenekleri yoktur. Müslüman bir Çerkes köyü olan 'Besleney'e girdiklerinde, köyün erkek ahalisinin çoğu savaş dolayısı ile cephededir. Köylüler Çocukların Yahudi olduklarını biliyorlardır. Köylüler bir toplantı düzenler ve her hane halkının bir çocuğu barındırması kararına varırlar. Bu kararın köyün tamamını tehlikeye atabilecek bir eylem olduğunun farkındadırlar. Bu sebeple çocukları Çerkes isimleriyle kendi nüfuslarına kaydettirirler. 152 gün boyunca, Alman ordusuna rağmen bu aldatmayı sürdürürler. Bu dönemde sadece bir çocuk Naziler tarafından fark edilerek öldürülür. Savaştan sonra, çocukların bir kısmı aileleriyle yeniden bir araya gelir ve bazıları hayatlarının geri kalanını bu köyde devam ettirir.*"[80]

İsrail'de Eğitim ve Çerkes Dili

1960'lı yılların ortalarından 1970'li yılların ortalarına kadar geçen on yıllık dönemde İsrail'de yaşayan Çerkesler arasında etnik canlanış yaşanmış, bu dönemde Çerkesler tarih ve kültürleri hakkında kitap ve makalelere, otantik Çerkes müziğine ve ulusal giysilerin yeniden

[80] *wasns.org*, "Honoring Muslim Circassians who saved Jewish children", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.wasns.org/honoring-muslim-circassians ; Haaretz, Avraham Burg, "The Righteous Yet Unrecognized: The Muslims Who Saved Jewish Children During WWII", https://www.haaretz.com/life/books/2016-06-29/ty-article/.premium/the-muslims-who-saved-jewish-children-during-wwii/0000017f-e147-d804-ad7f-f1fffc7f0000; *Haaretz*, Judy Maltz, "Israeli Jews and Arabs Plant 'Garden of the Righteous' to Honor Forgotten Holocaust Heroes", https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2016-07-14/ty-article/.premium/garden-of-the-righteous-honors-forgotten-holocaust-heroes/0000017f-dbc0-d856-a37f-ffc0dc440000

canlandırılması gibi çabalara ilgi göstermiştir.[81] 1971'de İsrail Mîllî Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın Çerkesçenin okullarda öğretilmesine onay vermesi sonrası açılan köy okullarına ABD Michigan'dan Profesör John Catford davet edilerek, Kfar-Kama'lı Çerkeslere iki ay boyunca dilbilgisi teknik eğitimi verilmiştir. 1994 yılında İsrail Eğitim Bakanlığı Kafkasya'dan getirilecek bir öğretmeni finanse etmeyi kabul etmiştir.[82] Çerkes tarihinin ve geleneğinin en önemli miraslarından biri de Çerkes dilidir. Çerkesçenin farklı lehçeleri ile korunması ve gelecek kuşaklara aktarılması günümüzde tüm Çerkes diasporası için en öncelikli ödevlerden biri olarak kabul edilmekte[83] ve bu amaçla birçok çalışma yapılmaktadır.[84] İsrail Çerkesleri de Çerkes dilinin muhafazası için ilkokul çağlarından itibaren Çerkesçe eğitim hakkını elde etmişlerdir.[85] Zira Kreindler ve Bram'ın 1995 yılında yaptıkları çalışmalarının sonucunda İsrailli Çerkeslerin anadillerini korudukları anlaşılmıştır.[86]

Çerkesler, yaşadıkları coğrafyalarda diğer kültürler ile etkileşime girme ve bu yeni kültürü benimseme konusunda hoşgörülü bir toplumdur. Anavatanlarında sürgün edilen bu halk için kültürel kodlarının yeniden biçimlenmesi, iletişimlerini kolaylaştıran bir adımdır. İsrail Çerkeslerinin tamamına yakını İbraniceyi bilen ve en azından iki dil konuşan insanlardır. Bu durumlarında kuşaklar boyunca bir değişiklik olmamış ve yıllarca iki dilli olarak kalmayı başarabilmişlerdir. İsrail Çerkesleri, "bir azınlık topluluğun kendi ana dili ile toplumun çoğunluğunu oluşturanların kullandığı dil arasında işlevsel bir ayrım yapıp, bu ayrımın sürdürebilirliği" varsayımını doğrulayacak kanıtlar sağlamaktadır.[87]

İsrail Çerkesleri: Ülkenin Eşit Vatandaşları mı? Yoksa Azınlık Bir Grup mu?

Etnik, kültürel ve dini çeşitliliğe sahip bir toplum olan İsrail'de yüksek düzeyde gayri resmî ayrımcılık söz konusudur. Gruplar toplumdaki rolleri, dînî inançları ve etnik kimlikleri nedeniyle sektörel bir

[81] Stern, "Education Policy Toward to Circassian Minority of İsrael," 175-184.
[82] *Kafkas Evi*, "İsrail Çerkesleri".
[83] Asher Shafrir, "Ethnic Minority Languages in Israel".
[84] *istanbulkafkaskultur.org*, Adigece (Adigey-Batı Lehçesi) Kursu Başlıyor", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://istanbulkafkaskultur.net/adigece-adigey-bati-lehcesi-kursu-basliyor/; KAFFED, "Adığece Öğreniyorum", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.kaffed.org/kultur-sanat/adığece.html
[85] *The Jerusalem Post*, "From the Caucusus to the Galilee"; Chen Bram, "21. Yüzyılda Çerkesler: İsrail'deki Adiğelerin Durumundan Alınacak Dersler," 408-411.
[86] Isabelle Kreindler, Marsha Bensoussan, Eleanor Avinor, Chen Bram. "Circassian Israelis: Multilingualism as a Way of Life".
[87] Ashter Stern, "Education Policy Toward to Circassian Minority of Israel".

şekilde ayrıştırılmaktadır. Bu sayede güçlü kültürel, dînî, ideolojik ve etnik kimliklerini sürdürmektedir.[88] Fakat İsrail Dış İşleri Bakanlığı'nın İsrail'de yaşayan azınlıkları tanımlanırken Çerkesler ile ilgili;

> "*Kuzeydeki iki köyde yoğunlaşan, yaklaşık 4 bin kişiden oluşan Çerkesler, ne Arap kökenini ne de daha geniş İslam topluluğunun kültürel geçmişini paylaşmamalarına rağmen Sünni Müslümandırlar. Ayrı bir etnik kimliği korurken, ne Yahudi toplumu ne de Müslüman toplumu içinde asimile olmadan İsrail'in ekonomik ve ulusal meselelerine katılmaktadırlar*."[89]

şeklinde yaptığı tanımlama, Çerkeslerin İsrail Devleti ile iyi ilişkilere sahip olduğunu açıklar niteliktedir. Zira günümüzde İsrail'de yaşayan 4 bin kadar Çerkes'in[90] İsrail toplumuna entegrasyonları üst düzeydedir. Çerkesler etnik farklılıklarını koruyarak birlikte yaşama ve İsrail'e bağlılığa dayalı bir etnik kimlik özelliği göstermektedirler.[91]

1948 Arap-İsrail Savaşı'ndan itibaren Çerkesler, "Azınlıklar Birimi" [İngilizce; The Minorities Unit] adı verilen özel bir birim bünyesinde, İsrail Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nde askerlik yapmaktaydılar. Çerkeslerin 1958 yılında dönemin Başbakan ve Savunma Bakanı David Ben Gurion'a, yaptıkları resmî başvurunun kabul edilmesi sonrası İsrail Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin sınır polisi ve İsrail polisi gibi tüm düzenli güvenlik birimlerine de girerek üst kademelerde görev almaya başlamışlardır.[92] Son yıllarda Çerkesler, İsrail ordusu ve iç güvenlik teşkilatında görev alabilme hakları dolayısı ile ağırlıklı olarak bu mesleklere yönelmişlerdir. Hatta İsrail ordusunda subay rütbesinde birçok Çerkes bulunmaktadır.[93]

Filistin-İslam toplumunun kültürel geçmişini paylaşmayan Çerkeslerin[94] Sünni-Müslüman olmaları ve İslam dininin ritüellerine

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[88] Asher Shafrir, "Ethnic Minority Languages in Israel".

[89] İngilizcesi için bkz. "The Circassians, comprising some 4,000 people concentrated in two northern villages, are Sunni Muslims, although they share neither the Arab origin nor the cultural background of the larger Islamic community. While maintaining a distinct ethnic identity, they participate in Israel's economic and national affairs without assimilating either into Jewish society or into the Muslim community. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "People: Minority Communities", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/People/Pages/SOCIETY-%20Minority%20Communities.aspx.

[90] Yaklaşık rakamlarla; 2.500 kişi Kfar-Kama; 1.000 kişi Reyhaniye; 25 aile Yahudi yerleşim birimlerinde. Asher Shafrir, "Ethnic Minority Languages in Israel".

[91] Ashter Stern, "Education Policy Toward to Circassian Minority of İsrael".

[92] *circassianworld.com*, "Restoration and Reconstruction of the Circassian Village Kfar Kama, by Orit Shwarts".

[93] *Kafkas Evi*, "İsrail Çerkesleri"; *Languages of the World*, "Circassians in Israel".

[94] *Languages of the World*, "Circassians in Israel".

uymalarına rağmen Filistinli-Araplar ile sosyal ve siyasal anlamda bir ortaklık kurdukları da söylenemez. Çerkesler İsrail-Filistin çatışmasının da dışında kalmayı tercih etmektedir.[95] İsrail Çerkeslerinin Arap komşuları ile ideolojik ve dînî bir dayanışmaya girmeyişleri onların yarı geleneksel bir Müslüman toplum olmalarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Zira Çerkeslerin "Adige-khabze" olarak adlandıkları gelenekleri İslami hassasiyetlerine nazaran daha fazla önem arz etmektedir.[96] Örneğin Kfar-Kama'daki "Çerkes Kültür Mirası Merkezi"nin eş-kurucusu Zoher Thawcho, Çerkeslerin, Araplar ve Yahudiler arasında kurdukları ilişkilerinin dengeli ve tarafsız bir çizgide ilerlediğini iddia etmektedir;

> "*Geleneksel olarak hem Yahudiler ile hem de Araplar ile onlar kendi aralarında kavga ederken dahi dostuz, 'İsrail'in yaptığı her şeyi kutsal görmüyoruz, Arap devletlerinin veya Filistinlilerin yaptıklarını da... 'Bundan böyle seninleyiz, yani birbirimize düşmanız' demiyoruz.*"[97]

Fiziksel görünümlerinin klasik önyargıların aksine Müslüman-Arap imajının çok uzağında olması nedeniyle İsrail güvenlik güçlerinin yaşadıkları şaşkınlık birçok İsrailli Çerkes tarafından anlatılmaktadır. Örneğin Eleonore Merza, "İsrailli Çerkesler: Arap olmayan Araplar" [İngilizce; "The Israeli Circassians: non-Arab Arabs"] isimli çalışmasında şöyle söylemektedir;

> "*Bir gün Musa ile Kudüs'teki tahana merkazit'te [merkezi otogarda] metal detektöründen geçtik. [Musa'nın] Geçmesine izin verdiler ama sıra bana gelince kimliğimi istediler. Konuştuğumuzu gördüklerinde onun da kimliğini istediler. Kızıl saçları ve mavi gözleri dolayısıyla onun Aşkenaz olduğunu düşündüler. Adının Musa olduğunu gördüler –kulağa oldukça Arapça geliyordu ve ona Arap olup olmadığını sordular, zira soyadı hiç de Arapça değildi o da Çerkes olduğunu söyledi. Sonra ona hangi dinden olduğunu sordular, o da 'Müslüman' dedi. Şaşırdılar.*"[98]

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[95] *The Jerusalem Post*, "From the Caucusus to the Galilee".

[96] Bram, "Muslim Revivalism and the Emergence of Civic Society: A Case Study of an Israeli-Circassian Community"; Chen Bram, "21. Yüzyılda Çerkesler: İsrail'deki Adiğelerin Durumundan Alınacak Dersler", 409.

[97] İngilizcesi için bkz. "We've traditionally been friends with both Jews and Arabs, even when they were fighting among themselves," said Zoher Thawcho, the 39-year-old co-founder of the Circassian Heritage Center in Kfar Kama. "We don't see everything Israel does as holy, nor what the Arab states or Palestinians do…. It's not as if we say, 'From now on we're with you, so we're enemies of the other.'" The Forward Jewish Independent Nonprofit, "Circassians Are Israel's Other Muslims Read by Oren Kessler".

[98] İngilizcesi için bkz. "One day, I was at the tahana merkazit [central bus station] in Jerusalem with Mussa and we went through the metal detector. They let him go through but when it was my turn, they asked for my identity card. They saw that we kept talking together so they asked

İsrail toplumunda ve güvenlik güçlerinde Müslüman-Arap nüfusa karşı hâkim önyargılar olduğu bilinmektedir. Örneğin Ryan D. Enos ve Noam Gidron "Farklı Toplumlarda Dışlanma ve İşbirliği: İsrail'den Deneysel Bulgular" [İngilizce; "Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies: Experimental Evidence from Israel"] isimli çalışmalarında İsrail'de yaşayan Müslüman Arap nüfusa karşı İsrail vatandaşı Yahudi nüfusun taşıdığı önyargılar üzerinde durmuşlardır. Bu araştırmanın sonuçlarına göre İsrail vatandaşı Yahudiler Müslüman Araplar ile aynı işyerinde çalışmayı ve aynı bölgede yaşamayı tercih etmedikleri gibi Arap komşuları ile herhangi bir ticari bağ kurmaktan da kaçındıkları savunulmaktadır.[99] İsrail Çerkesleri ise Sünni Müslüman bir toplum olmalarına karşın Yahudi çoğunluğun dışlama eğilimlerinden Araplar ile aynı düzeyde etkilenmemektedir. Ancak yine de Musa isimli İsrailli Çerkesin Kudüs otobüs terminalinde Müslüman kimliği dolayısı ile yaşadığı olay ve benzeri diğer hadiseler Çerkeslerin günlük hayatta İsrail vatandaşı Yahudilerce ne tür dışlanmalara maruz kalabileceklerini de göstermektedir.

İsrail Çerkeslerinin Sorunları

Her ne kadar Çerkesler İsrail Devleti ile uyumlu ilişkilere sahip olsalar da Müslüman kimlikleri dolayısı ile İsrail'de dışlanmaya maruz kaldıkları durumlarla da karşılaşabilmektedirler.[100] Reyhaniyeli bir üst düzey Çerkes askerin eşinin anlattığı hadiseden de;

> "*Çok seyahat ediyoruz ve yurt dışına uçtuğumuz zaman herkes gibi Tel-Aviv'den uçuyoruz. Güvenlik kontrolünden geçtiğimizde sıklıkla sorunlar çıkıyor. Geçen sefer on sekiz yaşında bir çocuk bizden kimlik kartlarımızı göstermemizi istedi. Gülümsüyordu ama kimliklerimizi verdik ve üzerlerinde isimlerimizi görünce gülümsemesi kayboldu. On sekiz yaşındaki bir İsrailli için ismimiz kulağa çok Arapça geliyor. Beklememizi istedi ve komutanını aradı. X [anlatıcının kocası] ona sorunun ne olduğunu sordu […] sorunun ne olduğunu gayet iyi biliyorduk... ve o ona kısaca beklememiz gerektiğini söyledi, hepsi bu. Komutanı geldi ve sorunun ne olduğunu sordu. Ona kimliklerimizi ve ismimizi verdi. Önce nereye, ne amaçla, ne kadar süreliğine gittiğimizi sordu. Kızdım ama bir şey demedim ve o anda X [kocası] askeri kimlik kartını çıkardı… Güvenlik görevlisi*

for his I.D. too. He is a redhead and has blue eyes so they thought he was Ashkenazi. But they saw his name 'Musa' – that sounds quite Arabic and they asked him if he was Arab, but then his family name doesn't sound Arabic at all so he explained that he was Circassian. Then, they asked him what religion he was and he said 'Muslim'. They were dumbfounded." Merza, "The Israeli Circassians: non-Arab Arabs".

[99] Ryan D. Enos, Noam Gidron, "Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies: Experimental Evidence from Israel," *American Political Science Review*, v. 112, i. 4 (2018): 742-757.

[100] *Languages of the World*, "Circassians in Israel".

oldukça utanmıştı. X onun üstü olabilirdi; o özür diledi. X ve ben ya da çocuklar, hepimiz İsrailli gibi görünüyoruz; Ben sarışınım ve herkes benim Aşkenaz olduğumu düşünüyor ve biz de tüm İsrailliler gibi mükemmel İbranice konuşuyoruz... Arap görünümlü insanların aksine, güvenlikte nadiren kontrol ediliyoruz ama kontrol edildiğinde ve güvenlik görevlileri ismimizi gördüğünde diğerleriyle aynı sorunları yaşıyoruz".[101]

Anlaşılacağı üzere, İsrailli Çerkesler sosyal yaşantılarında Müslüman kimlikleri dolayısı ayrımcılığa maruz kalabilmektedir. Zira İsrail-Yahudi toplumunun Müslümanlara karşı taşıdığı önyargılar[102] Müslüman isimleri ve kimlikleri dolayısıyla Çerkeslerin zaman zaman dışlanmalarına neden olmaktadır. Ayrıca İsrail'de yaşayan birçok Yahudi, Çerkeslerin varlıklarının farkında değildir ve bu sebeple İsrail'de var olan genel Müslüman karşıtı ayrımcılığa maruz kalmaktadırlar.[103]

Çerkeslerin İsrail güvenlik birimlerinde görev almalarına rağmen, diğer kamu kurumlarında aynı haklara sahip oldukları söylenemez. Örneğin "Kfar-Kama Kent Konseyi" başkanı Jalal Nafso, *Haaretz*'te yayınlanan bir açıklamasında Çerkes gençlerinin Müslüman kimlikleri dolayısı ile taşıdıkları isimlerin İsrail'de memurluk görevine atanmalarını engellendiğini iddia etmiştir;

[101] İngilizcesi için bkz. "We travel a lot and when we fly abroad, we fly out of Tel-Aviv, like everyone else. When we go through the security check, problems often arise. Last time, an eighteen-year-old kid asked us to show our identity cards. She was all smiles, but we gave her our IDs and when she saw our names on them, her smile disappeared. For an eighteen-year-old Israeli, our name sounds very Arabic. She asked us to wait and called her manager. X [the narrator's husband] asked her what the problem was […] we knew full well what the problem was… and she curtly answered him that we should wait, that was all. Her manager arrived and asked what the problem was. She handed him our identity cards and gave our name. He first asked us where we were going, for what purpose, for how long. I was furious but I didn't say anything, and at that moment, X [her husband] produced his district officer identification card… The security officer was quite embarrassed. X could have been his superior; he apologized. X and I, or the kids, we all look Israelis; I am blond and everyone always thinks I am Ashkenazi, and we speak perfect Hebrew, like all Israelis... Unlike the Arab-looking people, we rarely get checked at the security, but when we do get checked and when the security agents see our names, we have the same problems as the others. Eleonore Merza, "The Israeli Circassians: non-Arab Arabs".

[102] Ryan D. Enos, Noam Gidron, "Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies: Experimental Evidence from Israel".

[103] *Languages of the World*, "Circassians in Israel".

"*[Genç insanlar] terhis olan asker ve subayları görüyor ve onları neler bekliyor? Devlet işlerine atanıyorlar mı? Hayır. Neden? Çünkü isimleri Celal*."[104]

Nüfusları 4 bin kişi ile sınırlı olan İsrail Çerkesleri için evlilik müessesesi, bu insanların geleceği açısından, ciddi bir risk altındadır. Zira Yahudiler ile Çerkesler arasında evlilik bağlarının kurulması önünde dini ve kültürel engeller vardır. Arap-İslam geleneğinde kendileri gibi Sünni-Müslüman olan Çerkesler ile evlilik önünde bir engel olmamasına karşın, Çerkeslerin Araplar ile evlilikleri de asimilasyona yol açacağı gerekçesiyle Çerkesler tarafından onaylanmamaktadır.[105]

Ayrıca İsrail'de Çerkes dilini ve kültürünü korumak gittikçe daha da zorlaşmaktadır. Küçük bir azınlık grup olarak bu ülkede yaşayan Çerkesler için ikincil ve hatta üçüncül bir dil olarak Çerkesçeyi muhafaza etmek kolay bir durum değildir.[106]

Kfar-Kama ve Reyhaniye köylerinin ekonomik anlamda yetersizliği Çerkeslerin İsrail'in büyük kentlerine göç etmelerini kaçınılmaz kılmaktadır. İsrail Çerkesleri zaman zaman Rusya ve Kafkasya'da yaşanan siyasi ve etnik problemlere rağmen anavatanları Kafkasya'ya dönmeyi düşünmektedir.[107] Ancak unutulmamalıdır ki Rusya, diasporadaki Çerkeslerin Kafkasya'ya geri dönüşlerini desteklememekte ve engeller koymaktadır.[108]

Arap-İsrail çatışması içinde Sünni-Müslüman bir azınlığın İsrail ordusunda görev almasının getirdiği riskler kaçınılmazdır. Zira Çerkes erkeklerinin İsrail ordusunda zorunlu-askerlik hizmetini yerine getirmeleri Araplar nazarında Yahudi yanlısı olarak addedilmelerine neden olmaktadır.[109] Müslüman kökenlerinden dolayı Yahudi çoğunluğun içerisine dâhil olamayan Çerkeslerin, İsrail Devletine olan bağlılıklarından

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[104] İngilizcesi için bkz. "[young people] see soldiers and officers who have been discharged, and what is waiting for them? Do they get appointed to government jobs? No. Why? Because their names are Jalal." Languages of the World, "Circassians in Israel".
[105] Chen Bram, "21. Yüzyılda Çerkesler: İsrail'deki Adiğelerin Durumundan Alınacak Dersler" s. 408; *The Jerusalem Post*, "From the Caucusus to the Galilee".
[106] *Languages of the World*, "Circassians in Israel".
[107] *Languages of the World*, "Circassians in Israel".
[108] *Hürriyet Daily News*, ''Syrian Circassians Wait for Trip Back to Russia'', son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/syrias-circassians-wait-for-trip-back-to-Russia.aspx?pageID=238&nid=40925, 02.04.2017; Open Democracy, ''Circassians Come Home'', son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-Russia/svetlana-bolotnikova/circassians-come-home
[109] *Languages of the World*, "Circassians in Israel".

dolayı da Filistin toplumu ile entegrasyonları gerçekleşmemiştir. Meseleye dair Reyhaniyeli bir Çerkes şöyle söylemektedir;

"*Yahudiler için biz sadece Müslümanız ve Araplar için biz İsrailliyiz*."[110]

İsrail'de Azınlık Problemi ve Yahudi Ulus Devlet Yasası

Dünya Yahudilerinin dini ve ideolojik motivasyonlarla Filistin topraklarına göç ettirilmesi yoluyla kurulmuş olan İsrail unutulmamalıdır ki sadece Yahudilerden oluşan bir devlet değildir. Yaklaşık 9 milyonluk İsrail nüfusunun %25'i azınlıklardan oluşmaktadır.[111] Çerkesler ise yaklaşık 4 bin kişilik nüfusları ile İsrail'in en küçük azınlık topluluklarından biridir.[112]

İsrail Merkezi İstatistik Bürosu [İngilizce; The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)], 2009 yılında İsrail nüfusunu "Yahudi, Arap ve diğerleri" olmak üzere üç kategoriye ayırmıştır. 1995 yılına kadar "Arap" ve "diğerleri" kategorileri aynı grupta değerlendirilmekteydi. Ancak Çerkesler ne Yahudi ne de Arap kategorisindedirler. "Diğerleri" kategorisi ise Yahudi şeriatına göre Yahudi sayılmayan bir kısım Rus göçmenler ve yabancı işçilerden oluşmaktadır. CBS'nin kullandığı diğer bir kategori de "Yahudiler, Müslümanlar, Hristiyanlar ve Dürziler" olarak sınıflandırılan "dini ayrım" olmuştur. Bu kategoriye göre ise Çerkesler Müslüman olarak sınıflandırılmıştır. Ancak bazı resmi belgelerde Çerkesler "Dürzi" azınlığa dâhil edilmişlerdir. İsrailli antropolog Chen Bram Çerkeslerin tanımı ile ilgili İsrail Devletine verdiği raporda Çerkesleri Sünni-Müslüman olmalarına karşın kendilerini etnik-kültürel kodlarıyla, ne Arap ne de Filistinli, sadece Kafkasyalı-Çerkes olarak tanımladıklarını belirtmiştir;

[110] İngilizcesi için bkz. "To the Jews, we are mere Muslims and to the Arabs, we are Israelis." Eleonore Merza, "The Israeli Circassians: non-Arab Arabs".

[111] Asher Shafrir, "Ethnic Minority Languages in Israel"; Eylül 2018 sayımına göre İsrail'in toplam nüfusu 8.907.000 kişidir. Yahudi nüfus ise 6.625.000 kişi ile ülke nüfusunun %74,4'ünü oluşturmaktadır. 1.864.000 kişi ile Araplar ise ülkenin %20,9'unu oluşturmaktadır. Resmi verilerde "diğerleri" olarak ifade edilen İsrail vatandaşları ise %4,7 [Arap-olmayan, Hristiyan, Bahai vd.] ile 418.000 kişi kadardır. jewishvirtuallibrary.org "Vital Statistics: Latest Population Statistics for Israel", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/latest-population-statistics-for-israel.

[112] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "People: Minority Communities".

> "*İsrailli Arapların çoğu gibi onlar da Sünni Müslümanlar, ancak kendilerini İsrail'deki diğer Sünnilerden farklı, ayrı bir topluluk olarak tanımlıyorlar ve bu şekilde kabul ediliyorlar*."[113]

2018 yılında İsrailli Çerkesleri de ilgilendiren olumsuz bir gelişme yaşanmış, Temmuz ayında kabul edilen "Yahudi Ulus Devlet Yasası" ile İsrail'de Yahudi olmayan kimselerin asli vatandaş olarak kabul edilmedikleri deklare edilmiştir. Zira İsrail Parlamentosunda sert tartışmalara neden olan ve 62 evet, 55 hayır oyuyla kabul edilen yasa, beraberinde birçok sorunu da getirmektedir. Dönemin Başbakanı Binyamin Netanyahu liderliğindeki aşırı sağcı koalisyon hükümetinin desteğiyle kabul edilen yasa, "Araplara karşı ırkçılığı ve ayrımcılığı kanunla hükme bağlayacağı ve sistematik hale getireceği" gerekçesiyle İsrail'de yaşayan Arapların ve bazı sol kesimlerin tepkisini çekmiştir. Bu yasa ile İsrail vatandaşı olan 2 milyona yakın Filistinli-Arap'ın hakları yok sayılmaktadır.[114] "Yahudi Ulus Devlet Yasası" iki farklı vatandaş modeli öngörmektedir. Buna göre, ülkenin yaklaşık %20'sini oluşturan Araplar ikinci sınıf vatandaş konumuna indirilmiştir ve Arapça resmi dil olmaktan çıkarılmış, ülkenin tek resmi dili İbranice olarak kabul edilmiştir. Tasarının en çok tepki çeken diğer maddeleri arasında, şu hükümler yer almaktadır;

- İsrail bir Yahudi devletidir
- Ülkede kendi kaderini tayin etme hakkı sadece Yahudilere aittir
- İsrail dünyadaki tüm Yahudilerin tarihi anavatanıdır
- Dünyadaki tüm Yahudilerin İsrail'e dönme hakkı vardır
- Yahudilerin dini günleri resmi tatil sayılacaktır ve İsrail'in başkenti Kudüs'tür

Tasarıda "İsrail tüm dünyadaki Yahudilerin tarihi anavatanıdır" (Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People) maddesiyle Filistinlilerin tarihi varlığı ve hakları görmezden gelinmektedir.[115] Her ne kadar "Yahudi Ulus Devlet Yasası" İsrail Devletinin Araplar ile yaşadığı sorunun bir neticesi olsa da İsrailli Çerkesler de bu yasa neticesinde ülkenin ikinci düzey vatandaşı konumuna indirilmişlerdir.[116]

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[113] İngilizcesi için bkz. "Like most Israeli Arabs, they are Sunni Muslims, but they describe themselves as a separate community, distinct from the other Sunnis in Israel, and are recognized as such." Eleonore Merza, "The Israeli Circassians: non-Arab Arabs".

[114] Anadolu Ajansı, "Yahudi Ulus Devlet Yasası: Irkçılığın meşrulaştırılması", son güncelleme 20 Nisan 2023 https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/yahudi-ulus-devlet-yasasi-irkciligin-mesrulastirilmasi/1208359.

[115] Anadolu Ajansı, "Yahudi Ulus Devlet Yasası: Irkçılığın Meşrulaştırılması".

[116] Eleonore Merza, "The Israeli Circassians: non-Arab Arabs".

Sonuç

Çerkesler 1870'li yıllarda iskân edildikleri Filistin topraklarında Arap komşuları ile iyi ilişkiler geliştirememişlerdir. Dilleri ve gelenekleri dolayısıyla dışlanmışlar, Sultanın jandarmaları olarak görülmüşler ve Arap milliyetçilerinin ve Dürzi kabilelerinin hedefi olmuşlardır. Muhtemelen bu sebeple iskânlarının başından itibaren Yahudi komşularıyla dostane ilişkiler kurmuşlardır. 1920 yılında kurulan İngiliz manda idaresi 1948 yılında İsrail Devletinin ilanı ile son bulduğunda Çerkesler artık İsrail Devletinin vatandaşları olmuşlardır. Filistinli Arapların İsrail işgaline karşı direnişi, kendileri gibi Sünni Müslüman olan Çerkesler tarafından sahiplenilmemiş, aksine İsrail hükümetleri ile ilişkileri olumlu seyrini korumuştur. Buna rağmen 1948 sonrası herhangi bir Arap-Çerkes çatışması da kayıtlara geçmemiştir.

Çerkesler ve Rusya Yahudilerinin tarihi araştırıldığında her iki milletin de Rus saldırganlığının hedefleri oldukları anlaşılacaktır. Çerkes sürgününün yaşandığı dönemde Rusya'da büyük pogromlar meydana gelmiş, yüzbinlerce Yahudi sürgün edilmiş ve bu baskı ortamı Siyonist hareketin/ideolojinin Rusya Yahudileri arasında taraftar bulmasına neden olmuştur. Günümüz Yahudi toplumunun bu tarihi geçmiş nedeniyle Çerkesler ile sosyal uyumlarını kolaylaştırdıklarını söylemek iyi niyetli bir yorum gibi görünebilir fakat etkili faktörler arasında sayılmasında da bir mahsur yoktur.[117] Sonuç olarak Çerkesler, İsrail Devleti ve İsrailli Yahudi vatandaşların sosyal uyumlarını kolaylaştıran nedenler;

- Tarîhî benzerlik [sürgün tarihi ve diaspora kültürü]
- Tarihsel olarak Arap-milliyetçileri ile çatışma hali
- Çerkeslerin Filistin'in bağımsızlığı idealini siyasi anlamda destekleyen hareketlere katılmamaları
- Çerkeslerin İsrail güvenlik birimlerinde görev almaları

[117] Ryan D. Enos ve Noam Gidron tarafından yapılan bir çalışma İsrailli Yahudilerin, İsrail'in Arap vatandaşları ile sosyal uyum derecelerini ölçmüş ve sonuç olarak kamu yararının ve şahsi çıkarların zarar görmesine rağmen Yahudilerin İsrail vatandaşı Araplar ile sosyal ve ekonomik anlamda iletişim kurmamayı tercih ettikleri sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Ancak İsrailli Çerkesler İsrail vatandaşı Yahudiler tarafından dışlanmaya maruz kalmadıkları gibi sosyal uyumları da üst düzeydedir. Bu manada İsrailli Yahudilerin Çerkesleri diğer Müslüman unsurlardan bilhassa Filistinli Araplardan ayrı değerlendirdikleri iddia edilebilir. Ancak benzer bir amprik araştırma ile İsrailli Yahudilerin ve İsrailli Çerkeslerin uyum düzeylerinin değerlendirilmesi çok daha güvenilir datalara ulaşılmasını sağlayacaktır. Bkz. Ryan D. Enos, Noam Gidron, "Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies: Experimental Evidence from Israel".

- Çerkeslerin ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal anlamda geniş haklara sahip olmaları
- Eğitim, dil ve kültür yaşantılarını kısıtlayan herhangi bir devlet baskısına maruz kalmamaları, aksine desteklenmeleri

ve diğer birçok neden İsrail'de yaşayan Çerkeslerin sosyal uyumlarını kolaylaştıran faktörler olarak sıralanabilir. İsrail Çerkeslerinin sorunları ise;

- İsrail toplumunun Müslümanlara karşı taşıdığı önyargılar
- Müslüman kimlikleri dolayısı dışlanma
- Güvenlik güçleri dışındaki devlet kurumlarında görev alamama
- Nüfusun azlığı dolayısıyla İsrail toplumunda bilinmeme
- Evlilik kurumunu sürdürmenin önündeki dini ve kültürel engeller
- Kültürün ve dilin korunmasının önündeki yapısal engeller
- Ekonomik zorluklar nedeniyle büyük kentlere göç ve bu sebeple Çerkes asimilasyonunun hızlanması
- İsrail ordusuna hizmet etmelerinin yarattığı güvenlik riskleri
- Yahudi ulus devlet yasasının neden olduğu ikinci sınıf vatandaş statüsü

olarak sıralanabilir. Yaşadıkları kanlı savaşlar ve sürgünler neticesinde ait olmadıkları topraklara iskân edilen beşinci nesil İsrail Çerkesleri, İsrail-Filistin çatışması içinde, Sünni Müslüman bir millet olarak yaşamaya devam etmektedir.

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Negotiating Values: Diyanet and the Syrian Refugee Crisis

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Abstract:
If during the early Republican era migration was a controlled process serving nation-building, the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis has reasserted, and, in the meantime, challenged Turkish national identity. This paper analyzes Diyanet's religious narratives regarding the Syrian refugee crisis, its role in legitimizing the government's refugee policy, and the rising tensions between humanistic Islamic values and nationalism faced by the institution. Methodologically, I primarily rely on content analysis of the Friday sermons released by Diyanet between 2011 and 2018.
Key Words: Diyanet, Syrian refugee crisis, humanistic Islam, nationalism

Introduction

While globalization and migration are often referred to as threats to nations' unity and homogeneity, most modern nation-states have never been ethnically homogeneous. Nationalist movements in the last two centuries attempted to create myths of homogeneity, in some cases even by

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resorting to extreme measures such as expulsions, ethnic cleansing or even genocide[1].

After the Cold War, we have witnessed a surge in national attitudes in Europe and the USA[2], with politicians and mass media portraying new flows of migration as a menace to national security and identity, while humanitarian and religious organizations pushed for migrants' protection. Data shows that despite the popular narrative of accelerated increase, international migration remained stable in relative terms (around 3% of the total world population) in the last century. What has changed is the origin and direction of migration flows: if before 1960, Europe was a continent of emigrants and colonizers, after 1960 it turned into a destination of migrants of diverse origin[3]. Moreover, in a globalized world, migration flows have become "multilayered and not easily controlled by nation-states"[4], generating anxiety and fear of cultural loss. As Faas and O'Connora demonstrate migration is actually "testing the adaptability of national identities"[5], by revealing how inclusive or exclusive is a nation's identity and what are its non-negotiable core values.

Bassam Tibi argues that globalization challenges old wisdom embedded in cultures and compels them to develop new insights, pointing to the universal character of humanism[6]: "The idea of various grammars of humanism that are supposed to exist in a variety of civilizations—such as Islam and the West—suggests the existence of universal core values that

[1] Hein de Haas, Stephen Castles, and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Sixth Edition (Macmillan International, 2020), 366.
[2] Peter Schmidt and Markus Quandt, "National identity, nationalism, and attitudes toward migrants in comparative perspective", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 59:5-6 (2018): 355.
[3] Hein de Haas, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World,* 1-14.
[4] Ahmet İçduygu and Fuat Keyman, "Globalization, Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey", *Global Governance* 6 (2000): 383.
[5] Laura O'Connora and Daniel Faas, "The Impact of Migration on National Identity in a Globalized World: A Comparison of Civic Education Curricula in England, France and Ireland," *Irish Educational Studies* 31:1 (2012): 52.
[6] Humanism is a secular (yet not atheist) concept that places human beings at the centre of the universe. It relies on human reason to understand the world. See Bassam Tibi, "Islamic Humanism vs. Islamism: Cross-Civilizational Bridging," *Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 95: 3 (2012): 236.

can be shared by diverse cultures and civilizations even though these differ from one another."[7]

Islamic humanism or, rather humanistic Islam, a concept proposed by Leirvik[8] who argues that humanism is one of the several possible interpretations of Islam, draws from the sources of Hellenism and can be traced back to the classical period of Islam[9]. In the Arabic language, Islamic humanism, humanity, and humanitarianism are often used interchangeably, as all three terms can be translated with the word *insānīya*'[10]. According to Moussa the concept *insānīya'* means a universal empathy towards all human beings, popularized by Muslim scholars in the 1960s, who argued that Islam and humanism share similar core values, such as justice, dignity, and human rights[11].

Diyanet and the Turkish Nation

Founded after the abolition of the caliphate, Diyanet (the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs) is an official state institution which manages aspects of Islamic faith and worship in Turkey since 1924[12]. The Turkish brand of secularism did not entail the state's neutrality and impartiality towards religions but, as Feyzioğlu[13] noted, it kept the state involved in religious affairs. In other words, religion was not separated from the state, but it was placed under strict state control and even instrumentalized to its aim and goals[14]. Diyanet has played an important role in nation-building, social solidarity, and integrity. From guarding the "rational religion" in the early republican era to promoting Sunni Islam as an antidote to communist and leftist groups and as a core element of

[7] Bassam Tibi, "Islamic Humanism vs. Islamism: Cross-Civilizational Bridging," 248.
[8] The author also proposes the use of humanistic Christianity instead of Christian humanism, following the same logic. See Oddbjørn Leirvik, "Islamic humanism or humanistic Islam?", *Interreligious Studies and Intercultural Theology* (2020): 19-20.
[9] Bassam Tibi, "Islamic Humanism vs. Islamism: Cross-Civilizational Bridging".
[10] Jonathan Benthall, *Islamic charities, and Islamic humanism in troubled times* (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 2016), 18.
[11] Jasmine Moussa, "Ancient origins, modern actors: defining Arabic meanings of humanitarianism", *Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper* (2014): 25.
[12] Radu Gabriel Safta and Călin Felezeu, *Turcia contemporană între moştenirea kemalistă şi Uniunea Europeană* (Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2001), 65-66.
[13] Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Türk İnkılabının Temel Taşı: Laiklik," in *Atatürkçü Düşüncesinde Din ve Laiklik*, ed.Ethem Ruhi Fığlalı (Ankara: ATAM, 1999), 137–198 cited in M. Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 37.
[14] M. Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 38.

Turkishness, Diyanet has been an indispensable institution for every regime and ideology in Turkey[15].

Under the AKP rule Diyanet's power and range of activities were extended, with a substantial increase in its personnel, budget and ranking, the head of the Presidency being included in the state protocol list[16]. Diyanet started to operate outside the mosque and extend its authority over social, family and gender relations both at home and abroad[17], relying on former Diyanet President Ali Bardakoğlu's definition of religion as a "social phenomenon"[18]. Diyanet is one of the largest state institutions, employing around 120,000 people and managing 87,381 mosques in Turkey as of 2016. Yet, the expansion of Diyanet and its capabilities did not result in its independence. The Presidency is still under state control and cannot carry out its agenda[19].

The Presidency enjoys a privileged position in society too, being regarded as one of the most trustworthy institutions in Turkey, as shown by the findings of the Konda poll from 2014, according to which 72% of Turks trust the Diyanet[20]. Moreover, 44% of Turks go to the mosque at least once a week for the Friday prayer, only 23% declaring that they never go to the mosque as reported by the 2012 PEW Research on Religion and Public Life[21]. Consequently, the Friday sermons reach between 44% and 77% Turks each week. PEW Research Center's "The Global God Divide" 2020 study does not survey participation in Friday sermons, but shows that 75% of Turks think that belief in God is necessary to have good morals, while

[15] Ihsan Yilmaz and Ismail Albayrak, "The Evolution of the Kemalists' Diyanet" in *Populist and Pro-Violence State Religion* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 55-87.
[16] Raja M. Ali Saleem, *State, Nationalism, and Islamization: Historical Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan* (Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, 2017), 181-182.
[17] Sevgi Adak, "Expansion of the Diyanet and the Politics of Family in Turkey under AKP Rule," *Turkish Studies* 22 :2 (2021): 205.
[18] Ali Bardakoğlu cited in Chiara Maritato and Luca Ozzano, "Patterns of Political Secularism in Italy and Turkey," *Politics and Religion* 12 (2019): 465.
[19] Chiara Maritato and Luca Ozzano, "Patterns of Political Secularism in Italy and Turkey," 465.
[20] "Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Araştırması Algılar, Memnuniyet, Beklentiler," *KONDA* (2014), 6, http://konda.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/HYD_DIBArastirmasiRapor_Kasim2014.pdf.
[21] James Bell, "The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity", *Pew Research Center Forum on Religion & Public Life* (August 9, 2012), 17, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2012/08/the-worlds-muslims-full-report.pdf.

71% consider religion very important in their lives[22] Another study conducted with 302 students of five faculties at the University of İnönü, shows that 82,1% of the respondents believe that Diyanet is needed in society, around the same percentage is against leaving religious affairs to other religious communities or groups and 51,2% are aware of Diyanet's activities. However, around half of the respondents think that Diyanet could improve its services[23]. On the other hand, there is a 2021 poll published by *Duvar*, an online Turkish newspaper, which shows low trust in Erdoğan's government – who won the elections two years after the study was published-, and public distrust in Diyanet (54% of citizens having no confidence in the institution). Yet according to the same study Diyanet still enjoys more trust than the national education system[24]. Turkish society is polarized on different issues, however, at the moment there is no major "competitor" or credible alternative to Diyanet in Turkey.

Confidence in Diyanet is not an outcome of recent developments or of its status boost. In this regard, a 2002 study concluded that 76% of participants followed the Diyanet fetvas (legal opinions), and 68% believed that the Diyanet plays a leading role in ensuring national unity[25]. Considering the positive image of Diyanet over time, its role as an opinion leader is undoubtable.

One of the main activities of the Presidency is to prepare the content of the Friday sermons. Each year Diyanet releases 54 khutbas - 52 Friday sermons, and 2 special khutbas for Eid al-Fitr/ Ramazan Bayramı and Eid al-Adha/ Kurban Bayramı- which are read in every Turkish mosque. The khutba/hutbe is the Islamic public preaching, carried out

[22] Christine Tamir, Aidan Connaughton and Ariana Monique Salazar, "The Global God Divide," *PEW Research Center* (July 20, 2020), 5-13, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/20/the-global-god-divide/ .

[23] İbrahim Aşlamaci, "Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Hizmetlerine Yönelim Durumları: İnönü Üniversitesi Örneği", *Insan Ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştirmalari Dergisi* 5:6 (2016): 1571.

[24] "Turkish citizens have no trust in Erdoğan's government, poll shows," *Duvar* (October 13, 2021), https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkish-citizens-have-no-trust-in-erdogans-government-poll-shows-news-59191.

[25] Kemaleddin Taş, *Türk Halkının Gözüyle Diyanet* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2002) cited in Emir Kaya, *Secularism qnd State Religion in Modern Turkey, Law, Policy-Making and the Diyanet* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 70.

every Friday and during the main Islamic holidays[26]. In early Islamic tradition, attendance to the Friday sermon was mandatory for free Muslim men, as it indicated their membership in the ummah (wider Muslim community)[27]. The khutbas aimed to answer religious, social, and political questions faced by Muslims, based on the Quran and the Prophet's Hadiths. The role of the preacher or khatib/hatip has been to interpret and apply Islamic teachings and to mediate between Islamic tradition and contemporary realities[28]. Throughout Islamic history, the kuthba either supported or, in some cases, criticized the official stances of policymakers. Since Sunni Islam lacks a formal institutional authority, the khutbas do not represent an official statement of the Muslim community but they "contribute to the construction of sites of deliberation"[29]. Studies on Western European Muslim communities show that participating in Friday sermons regularly can be correlated with higher political exposure and increased voter turnout[30].

Diyanet and the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Turkey hosts the largest refugee population in the world of which 3.6 million are Syrians according to the UN Refugee Agency[31]. Thus, it is not surprising that there is a growing body of literature on the socio-political[32] and economic[33] integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Ankara's policy towards refugees[34] as well as on public attitudes and

[26] Richard C. Martin, *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World* (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 394.
[27] Hadia Mubarak, "Khuṭbah," *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0461.
[28] Emad S. Awad, "Intertextuality in Friday Khutba," *Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture*5: 1 (2017), 59-60, http://jiscnet.com/journals/jisc/Vol_5_No_1_June_2017/7.pdf.
[29] Mazen Hashem, "The Muslim Friday Khutba: Veiled and Unveiled Themes," I*nstitute for Social Policy and Understanding* (2009), 9, https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2009_The_Muslim_Friday_Khutba.pdf.
[30] Michalis Moutselos, "Praying on Friday, Voting on Sunday? Mosque Attendance and Voter Turnout in three West European Democracies", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2019): 1-18.
[31] UNHCR Türkiye, *Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey* (2023), https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey.
[32] Ahmet İçduygu and Evin Millet, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Insecure Lives in an Environment of Pseudo-Integration," *Global Turkey in Europe*, Working Paper 13 (August 2016).
[33] Murat Demirci and Murat Güray Kırdar, "The Labor Market Integration of Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *World Development* 162 (2023).
[34] Nermin Aydemir, "Framing Syrian Refugees in Turkish Politics: A Qualitative Analysis on Party Group Speeches," *Territory, Politics, Governance* 11:4 (2023).

perceptions of the refugees[35]. This paper strictly focuses on Turkish official religious narratives regarding refugees between 2011- when the Syrian crisis began- and 2018. To this aim, it analyses the kuthbas released by Diyanet in the aforementioned period, paying special attention to the sermons making direct or indirect references to the Syrian refugee crisis. While most of the reviewed khutbas give moral advice and guidance on how to be a better Muslim, educating believers about their religious responsibilities and values, there are several khutbas with clear political messages. The political issues raised most frequently are the Palestinian question[36], the Syrian civil war, and the refugee crisis. There is evidence that Diyanet supports the government's policies through the khutbas, an example in this regard is the sermon reminding Turks that „freedom requires responsibility" read in the mosques right after the government's Twitter ban[37]. Therefore, the khutbas also contribute to the formation of public opinion in terms of both domestic and global politics, especially on issues faced by Muslims.

In 2017 Diyanet's institutional capacity was upgraded, providing the Presidency with new opportunities to work on the refugee crisis. Diyanet's Department of Migration and Moral Support Services was created to solve religious, cultural, and social issues resulting from internal and external migration. Later, Diyanet was also included in the Integration Strategy Document and National Action Plan (2018-2023) of the Directorate General of Migration Management as a provider of guidance and religious education to refugees[38].

Diyanet's khutbas referring to the Syrian refugee crisis revolve around five major themes: the Quranic metaphor of ansar and muhajirin, the importance of united brotherhood/sisterhood in Islam, respect for diversity, the moral duty for charity and the obligation to protect the

[35] Şenay Özden, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: MPC Research Reports* (2013).
[36] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "Dinmeyen Yaramız: Kudüs," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Cuma Hutbeleri* (May 18, 2018), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/HutbelerListesi/Dinmeyen%20Yaram%C4%B1z%20Kud%C3%BCs.pdf.
[37] Raja M. Ali Saleem, *State, Nationalism, and Islamization: Historical Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan*, 181.
[38] Birgül Demirtaş, "State, Religion and Refugees: The Case of Turkey and Diyanet," in *Europe in Changes: The Old Continent at a New Crossroads,* Katarina Zakić and Birgül Demirtaş (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2021), 146-147.

mazlum (oppressed). These themes are reiterated in many sermons aiming to change negative attitudes towards refugees and to urge action. Their content supports the government's refugee policy indirectly and showcases contradictions between humanistic Islamic values and nationalism.

Most of the sermons underline the Turkish people's duty to support the newcomers, by invoking the Quranic story of hijrah (hicret), respectively Prophet Muhammad's emigration from Mecca to Medina in 622[39]. The Muslims who left Mecca were called muhajirin (muhacir in Turkish) (migrant) while Medina's first Muslims who welcomed and aided the newcomers were known as ansar (ensar) (helper)[40]. Diyanet's discourse shows a preference of the term muhajirin over the contemporary Turkish term of mülteci in the khutbas, since the former has religious connotations and suggests a spiritual journey, while the second implies need and indicates economic and security-related issues. A khutba[41] published in April 2012 links the relation between ansar and muhajirin to Muslim brotherhood:

"'The bond of faith that brings believers' hearts together is sufficient for brotherhood. It is this brotherhood that ended the historical struggle between the Aws and Khazraj tribes in Medina, the city of the Prophet, and united them. Also in Medina, in the house of Enes b. Malik, our Prophet initiated the practice of brotherhood between the Ansar and the Muhajirin, an exemplary practice that has no equal in history (…) Although their languages, colors, economic opportunities, traditions, and customs were different, our Prophet broke the circle of anger and self-interest and created an exemplary society of brothers who "helped each other in goodness and piety"[42].

While the khutba does not directly mention the Syrian refugee crisis, it encourages believers to take the example of the Prophet and act in the spirit of brotherhood during difficult times. Another sermon from 2017

[39] Zeki Saritoprak Migration, *Feelings of Belonging to a Land, and the Universality of Islam*, in *Islam and Citizenship Education*, eds. E. Aslan, M. Hermansen (Wiesbaden: WienerBeiträge zur Islamforschung, Springer VS, 2015), 45.
[40] Gerhard Bowering (ed.), *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013), 219.
[41] Since the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis.
[42] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "Kardeşlik Çağrisi," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Cuma Hutbeleri* (6 April 2012) https://dinhizmetleri.diyanet.gov.tr/Documents/2012%20Y%C4%B1l%C4%B1%20Hutbeleri.pdf.

emphasizes that the way Turks treat refugees is a trial of their faith and humanity:

"Let's see our guest brothers as a blessing, not a burden. Let's not attribute the mistakes of some to all of them. (…) Every soul that takes refuge in our mercy and hopes for our help is a test of our faith, our Islam, and humanity."[43]

As seen the theme of Muslim brotherhood and sisterhood is closely intertwined with the muhajirin and ansar metaphor, but not limited to it. The importance of Muslim unity is underlined by the Quranic verse repeated in many khutbas "The believers are but brothers" and calls upon the participants to strengthen the unity of the ummah[44], which, according to a 2015 sermon is "trampled on in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Egypt"[45], referring to the devastating effects of the Arab Spring.

Considering the growing anti-refugee sentiments in Turkey, Diyanet tried to tackle the problem of discrimination against refugees by promoting respect for diversity as an Islamic requirement. In the Presidency's narrative racism and xenophobia are linked to the so-called pre-Islamic age of ignorance, Cahiliye dönemi, yet a 2015 khutba sadly noticed that these attitudes are not scarce within the contemporary Muslim community:

"In the Age of Ignorance, people were proud of their ethnic origin and the tribes they belonged to. They would defend their tribes, even if it was unfair, and consider themselves superior to others. One of the most important features of our Great Religion, Islam, is that it has eliminated the superiority of one race over another, one group or community over another

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[43] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "İmanımız ve İnsanlığımızın İmtihani: Mülteciler," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Cuma Hutbeleri* (July 7, 2017), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/HutbelerListesi/%C4%B0man%C4%B1m%C4%B1z%20ve%20%C4%B0nsanl%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1m%C4%B1z%C4%B1n%20%C4%B0mtihan%C4%B1%20M%C3%BClteciler.pdf.

[44] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "Eid al-Fitr," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Cuma Hutbeleri* (June 15, 2018), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/HutbelerListesiIngilizce/Eid%20Al-Fitr.pdf.

[45] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "Birliğimizi, Beraberliğimizi, Kardeşliğimizi Muhafaza Edelim!" *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Cuma Hutbeleri* (September 11, 2015), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/HutbelerListesi/Birli%C4%9Fimizi,%20Beraberli%C4%9Fimizi,%20Karde%C5%9Fli%C4%9Fimizi%20Muhafaza%20Edelim.pdf

group or community. (…) We regret to say that today, among Muslims who believe in the same religion, the same Book, and the same Prophet, the number of those who put their sect, ethnic group, race, and ideology ahead of Islam, the religion of mercy, is not small at all[46].

Lukewarm attitudes towards Arabs are older than the Syrian crisis, being deeply rooted in the Turkish modernization project. The Kemalists were influenced by Orientalism, respectively by the Western representation of the Muslim World. The adoption of the Westernization project and assertion of a distinctive cultural character of the Turks[47] required keeping a distance from everything and everyone regarded as Oriental, including the Arabs. With some exceptions, the new Turkish nation was made up of non-Arab Muslim Ottomans[48]. The Syrian crisis exacerbated the negative attitudes especially, in South-Eastern Turkey where the presence of Syrians has seriously altered the ethnic and religious balance of the region[49], but also in Western Turkey's big cities like Istanbul, Izmir or Ankara, where large numbers of Syrian refugees reside. Many Turks consider that hosting refugees poses economic, cultural, and security-related challenges to their country, 81,7% of them being against granting citizenship to refugees according to Hacettepe University's Migration and Politics Research Center study of 2014[50]. Higher national identification of Turks is linked to negative attitudes towards migration; thus, nationalists are less likely to welcome refugees[51].

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[46] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "İslâm, Irkçılığın Her Türlüsünü Reddeder," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Cuma Hutbeleri* (June 5, 2015), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/HutbelerListesi/%C4%B0slam%20Irk%C3%A7%C4%B1l%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1n%20Her%20T%C3%BCrl%C3%BCs%C3%BCn%C3%BC%20Reddeder.pdf

[47] Ayşe Kadıoğlu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32:2 (1996), 185.

[48] Hasan Kayalı, "Türklerin Araplara bakışı," *Al Jazeera Turk* (July 28, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/turklerin-araplara-bakisi.

[49] Soner Cagaptay, Bilge Menekse, "The Impact of Syria's Refugees on Southern Turkey," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy-Policy Focus* 130 (July 2014), 6-14, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus130_Cagaptay_Revised3s.pdf

[50] M.Murat Erdoğan, "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration", *Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre-HUGO* (2014), 37.

[51] Şenay Yitmen and Maykel Verkuyten, "Positive and Negative Behavioural Intentions towards Refugees in Turkey: The Roles of National Identification, Threat, and Humanitarian Concern," *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology* 28:4 (2018).

Although most of the khutbas preach Muslim brotherhood/sisterhood and equality of believers, themes like the moral superiority of the Turkish nation and its role as a protector of the oppressed are also advanced:

"History witnesses that Allah Almighty (s.w.t.) will not leave helpless our noble nation, who deems protecting their religion and homeland as the most supreme duty. The mercy and grace of Allah (s.w.t.) will be with those who stand by the oppressed, the refugee, and the immigrant."[52]

The khutbas remind and celebrate not only the major events linked to Islamic history like the hijrah[53] or Karbala battle but also cherish Seljuk and Ottoman historical achievements like the Battle of Manzikert[54], the Conquest of Constantinople[55] as well as national celebrations like the Battle of Gallipoli, the Turkish War of Independence[56] or the July 15 failed coup attempt[57].

This approach displays a conflicting positioning of the Diyanet, walking on a thin line between Islamic humanism and Turkish nationalism, in its efforts to mediate not only between tradition and modernity, by

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[52] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "Effort is from believers, victory is from Allah," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Cuma Hutbeleri* (August 24, 2018). http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/HutbelerListesiIngilizce/Effort%20is%20from%20Believers,%20Victory%20is%20from%20Allah.pdf.

[53] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "Rahmet'in Hicreti," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, T.C. Ankara Valiliği İl Müftülüğü Hutbe Arşivi* (November 1, 2013), https://ankara.diyanet.gov.tr/Sayfalar/contentdetail.aspx?MenuCategory=Kurumsal&contentid=241.

[54] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı , "Zaferler Allah'tandır," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, T.C. Ankara Valiliği İl Müftülüğü Hutbe Arşivi* (August 30, 2013), https://ankara.diyanet.gov.tr/Sayfalar/contentdetail.aspx?MenuCategory=Kurumsal&contentid=241.

[55] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, "Fetih Şuuru," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, T.C. Ankara Valiliği İl Müftülüğü Hutbe Arşivi* (May 25, 2012), https://ankara.diyanet.gov.tr/Sayfalar/contentdetail.aspx?MenuCategory=Kurumsal&contentid=241.

[56] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı , "Our Nation's Struggle for Existence: The Victory of Çanakkale," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Cuma Hutbeleri* (March 16, 2018), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/HutbelerListesiIngilizce/Our%20Nation%E2%80%99s%20Struggle%20For%20Existence%20The%20Victory%20Of%20%C3%87anakkale.pdf.

[57] T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı , "Milletçe Yeniden Doğuş: 15 Temmuz," *Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Cuma Hutbeleri* (July 13, 2018), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/DinHizmetleriGenelMudurlugu/HutbelerListesi/Millet%C3%A7e%20Yeniden%20Do%C4%9Fu%C5%9F%2015%20Temmuz.pdf.

interpreting the Quranic teaching in the light of the contemporary developments, but also by negotiating belongings – Turkish national and universal Muslim and mitigating tensions between the sacred and profane.

The khutba is a powerful tool for fundraising too, with believers being encouraged to donate. Diyanet carries out its charitable campaigns through the Turkiye Diyanet Foundation. Since 2011 the foundation has run several campaigns like "Now is the Time to Help Syria" (2012), "It's Time to Help the Turkmens" (2015), "Now is the Time to Heal the Wounds" (2016) or "Don't Let Humanity Die in Aleppo" (2017), raising donations worth more than 197 million TL as for 2017[58]. Helping refugees is considered a form of zakat, a religious obligation of Muslims to donate a part of their wealth, which constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam. Diyanet's explanation of the At-Tawbah Surah[59] includes refugees or people "who had to leave their country due to various pressures even though they had goods and property in their country" as recipients of zakat[60].

Diyanet also runs a fetva hotline service, which provides Islamic guidance related to various matters or questions with the aim to encourage "callers to harmonize their daily lives with the principles of Islam"[61]. In addition to Turkish, the fetva service is available in Arabic, English and German[62]. However, the number of Syrian refugees using the hotline is low[63].

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[58] Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, *Faaliyet Raporu* (2017), 64, https://tdvmedia.blob.core.windows.net/tdv/files/Media/Files/raporlar/TDV_2017_FaaliyetRaporu.pdf.

[59] The 9th chapter of the Quran. The 60th verse specifically refers to the duty of *zakat*: "Zakāh expenditures are only for the poor and for the needy and for those employed for it and for bringing hearts together [for Islām] and for freeing captives [or slaves] and for those in debt and for the cause of Allāh and for the [stranded] traveler - an obligation [imposed] by Allāh. And Allāh is Knowing and Wise."- English translation available on *Quran.com*.

[60] "Tevbe Suresi - 60 . Ayet Tefsiri", *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kur'an-ı Kerim Portalı* (2023), https://kuran.diyanet.gov.tr/tefsir/Tevbe-suresi/1295/60-ayet-tefsiri.

[61] Svante Cornell, "The Rise of Diyanet: the Politicization of Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs", *The Turkey Analyst* (9 October 2015), https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/463-the-rise-of-diyanet-the-politicization-of-turkey%E2%80%99s-directorate-of-religious-affairs.html

[62] "Alo Fetva 190," *Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu* (2023), https://fetva.diyanet.gov.tr/.

[63] Merve Terlemez, "Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum Süreci Açısından Kent Sakinlerinin Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yönelik Algısı: Konya Örneği," (Master's thesis, Selçuk Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Konya, 2020), 148-149.

Diyanet's involvement in the management of the Syrian refugee cisis is not limited to raising donations and promoting tolerance through its sermons. The Presidency enabled young Syrians to continue (or start) formal education through the project "I am aware therefore I stand by you". In 2018 there were 12.978 students registered in 17 schools in Ankara, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Kilis. Besides the Diyanet personnel, the success of the project is ensured by 226 Syrian volunteer teachers[64]. The project included Turkish language courses to Syrian graduate and undergraduate students who wanted to continue their education in Turkey[65].

Many Syrians will probably never go back to their country, given that they have built a life in Turkey, thus, instead of returning to Syria they might turn into a large minority[66]. Diyanet's support for the refugees' settling in Turkey[67] coupled with the decision to grant Turkish citizenship to some Syrians[68] reminds us of the fate of the modern muhajirin - Muslim immigrants from the Balkans, Caucasus, Russia, and the Middle East - who were assimilated into Turkish culture a century ago. Initially, the word vatan or homeland was used to define the "place of birth"[69], however, between 1856 and 1878, when millions of Muslims from the Crimea, Caucasus, and the Balkans were forced to leave their countries, the homeland acquired a new meaning, respectively a safe haven where Muslims could perpetuate their faith, culture, and traditions. The hijrah principle or the obligation to migrate to countries under Muslim rule, facilitated a major human flow to the Ottoman Empire[70].

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[64] "Projelerimiz: "Farkındayım Yanıbaşındayım," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı,* https://www.tdv.org/tr-TR/site/projelerimiz/farkindayim-yanibasindayim-1054.

[65] Sabrina D. Misir Hiralall, Christopher L. Fici, Gerald S. Vigna, *Religious Studies Scholars as Public Intellectuals* (London: Routledge, 2018).

[66] Tim Jacoby, Roger Mac Ginty, Bülent Şenay, "The Vaiz(e) and Syrian Refugees in Bursa," *Turkish Area Studies Review, Bulletin of the British Association for Turkish Area Studies* (2017), 37, http://batas.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/TASR-No29.pdf.

[67] "This land is your land, Turkish religious authority tells Syrian refugees," *Hürriyet Daily News* (March 2, 2017), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/this-land-is-your-land-turkish-religious-authority-tells-syrian-refugees--110369.

[68] "Turkey processing citizenship for 50,000 Syrians, interior ministry official says," *Hürriyet Daily News* (September 22, 2017), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-processing-citizenship-for-50000-syrians-interior-ministry-official-says-118290.

[69] Taner Akçam, "Türk Ulusal Kimliği Üzerine Bazı Tezler," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, İslamcılık*, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul, İletişim, 2005), 54.

[70] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 330.

Even though, as seen, most Turks oppose the naturalization of Syrian refugees, the common Sunni Islamic religious affiliation, recent developments, and history give us reasons to consider the possibility that some refugees might share the fate of modern muhajirins, being assimilated into the Turkish nation. Of course, such a scenario requires, above all, linguistic assimilation, integration of Syrian refugees into the labor market – a challenging aspect considering the country's current economic situation - and larger social inclusion.

Conclusions:

Stronger national identification is generally linked to negative attitudes towards immigrants and minorities. Turkey is not an exception in this regard, Syrian refugees often being regarded as the undesired „Others". The present paper shows that Islamic narratives focusing on common Sunni Islamic belonging of most Turks and Syrian refugees can provide for softening negative attitudes towards refugees. Motifs in the khutbas associated with humanistic Islam such as brotherhood, unity, tolerance, and justice successfully serve this purpose. However, Diyanet is a state-controlled institution, supporting the state's ideology, and as a result, navigating contradictions and negotiating values. On the one hand, Diyanet has played a key role in legitimizing the AKP's refugee policy, by using the metaphors of the Quranic ansar (helper) and muhajirin (migrants), in the spirit of humanistic values. On the other hand, the Presidency is also actively promoting national identification, by praising the Turkish nation's superiority and celebrating nonreligious national holidays, having to mediate between humanistic Islamic and national values. The present research does not include Diyanet's activities in Turkey-controlled Northern Syria after the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch Operations and is limited to the 2011-2018 period. Further research is needed to compare Diyanet's religious narratives and activities in Turkey and Syria to deepen our understanding of Diyanet's management of the Syrian refugee crisis and reveal potential layers of support for or disapproval of the government's policy.

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The European Union's Soft Power Dynamics in Kazakhstan

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Abstract:
The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991 presented the European Union with an opportunity to extend its influence into the heart of Eurasia, and particularly into Kazakhstan. Within Joseph Nye's theoretical framework on soft power, this study explores three key sources with respect to soft power, namely culture, foreign policy and political values. Through an examination of the European Union's involvment with Kazakhstan, the study provides valuable insights into the multifaceted mechanisms employed by the former to exert influence on this strategic partner in Central Asia over the past three decades.
Keywords*:* European Union, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, soft power, public diplomacy

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Introduction

After gaining independence in 1991, Kazakhstan immediately became the focus of heightened attention from several European countries and subsequently the entire European Union (EU). Initially, Brussels and leading European states were interested in Kazakhstan primarily due to their concerns about global security, and specifically Kazakhstan's inheritance of nuclear weapons from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the voluntary renunciation procedures associated with these.

Only later did energy-related issues take precedence, in light of Kazakhstan's significant reserves of hydrocarbons and uranium, which would enable the possibility of substantial supplies to Europe. Today, after 30 years of cooperation[1], the EU's main interest in Kazakhstan remains unchanged. As to actual cooperation, the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA)[2] between the two entities notes that Kazakhstan holds a significant position as a crucial ally for the EU in Central Asia, a position primarily attributed to the former's substantial reservoir of energy resources and the economic prospects associated with Eurasian connectivity in terms of trade and investment[3].

In addition, and considering the strategic position of Kazakhstan as a state occupying extensive geographic space in the heart of Eurasia at the crossroads of Russia and China, the EU has placed increasing importance on the task of bringing Kazakhstan into the sphere of Western influence. It endeavours to extend normative influence on the latter, specifically emphasizing the cultivation of European values in the terms of democracy, effective governance, human rights and rule of law. These

[1] 2 February 2023, the 30th Anniversary Celebrations of the Establishment Of Diplomatic Relations in the EU and Kazakhstan, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/celebration-30th-anniversary-establishment-diplomatic-relations-between-european-union-and_en

[2] The European Union-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement entered into force on 1 March 2020.

[3] EU-Kazakhstan EPCA, Official Journal of the European Union, L 052, 25 February 202. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2020%3A052%3ATOC

principles are actively advocated as crucial prerequisites for fostering bilateral connection between the two[4].

On gaining independence, Kazakhstan too expressed interest in closer ties with Western states, including those in Europe, and this readiness for enhanced interaction with the EU persists, largely as a result of Europe's development of 'passive soft power'[5]. As asserted by Nielsen, the allure of the EU was so compelling that numerous non-member states aspired not only to establish close connections with it but present themselves as EU membership candidates[6].

In 2008, Kazakhstan launched a new, and unprecedented, foreign policy initiative whereby, at the directive of the Kazakhstan head of state, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed the State Program of the Republic of Kazakhstan's 'Path to Europe'. This consisted of ten priorities with respect to improving vital points in areas related to cooperation with the EU and envisaged a set of measures to enhance the state's interaction with the EU across several areas; technological and energy cooperation, transport, the development of relations in economy and trading, collaboration in the development of small and medium-sized businesses, cooperation involved in improving life quality, as well as humanitarian dimensions. It also aimed at improving the institutional and legal framework of Kazakhstan using the positive European experience[7].

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[4] Rustem Kurmanguzhin, "O vklade Kazahstana v sozdanie Strategii novogo partnerstva Evropejskogo Soyuza so stranami Central'noj Azii na 2007-2013 gg," *Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, 360 (2012): 90-93. [Kazakhstan's contribution of elaboration of "The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership for 2007-2013"], *Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, 360 (2012): 90-93.

[5] Passive soft power refers to the attractiveness and influence that naturally emanate from a country's culture, policies, and values without intentional efforts to project or promote them. It is more about the inherent appeal and influence that arise organically. Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York, N.Y.: Public Affairs, 2011), 94.

[6] Kristian Nielsen, "EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap", *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 9(5) (2013): 729.

[7] Gosudarstvennaya Programma "Put' v Evropu" na 2009-2011 gody: utv. Ukazom Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 29 avgusta 2008 goda, No. 653." Retrieved from 22.04.2023.// [The State Program "Path to Europe" for 2009-2011: Approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated August 29, 2008, No. 653]. Retrieved from http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U080000653_22.04.2023

Kazakhstan's strong leanings towards Europe are evident in the related robust and animated engagement with organizations in Europe. It has an important role in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and assumed its chairmanship in 2010. Kazakhstan maintains prominent relationships with large numbers of international organizations including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Council and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These extensive and active relationships with European organizations are of particular importance in Kazakhstan's European mission.

Thus, given Kazakhstan's interest in Europe, there is reason to believe that Kazakhstan is influenced by European soft power. Guided by Nye's theoretical perspective on soft power resources, this article provides a thorough analysis of European soft power in Kazakhstan from 1991 to 2022. It explores key resources of European soft power such as culture, political values, and foreign policies, and offers a comprehensive understanding of how the EU, as a supranational entity, has strategically employed soft power to build influence in Kazakhstan.

The study employs a qualitative research methodology, combining documentary analysis and elite interviews. Official documents, policy statements and diplomatic exchanges form the primary sources, offering insights into the rhetoric and strategies employed by the EU and Kazakhstan. Elite interviews with key diplomatic figures provide nuanced perspectives on the motivations, challenges and outcomes of EU soft power initiatives in Kazakhstan.

Theoretical Framework

Joseph S. Nye, an American professor and scholar at Harvard University, first introduced the concept of 'soft power' in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.

According to Nye, soft power refers to one country persuading other nations to align their interests with its own—a concept characterized as co-optive or soft power, as opposed to the hard or command power of

ordering others to comply with its desires[8]. While hard power involves coercion, sanctions, payments, bribery and other resources within the behavior spectrum, soft power relies on creating an agenda, building appeal and drawing others through institutions, values, culture and policies. Soft power then, as defined by Nye, is the 'second face of power', and primarily involves creating a center of attraction. Through this center of attraction, which is fed by various sources, other states or public opinions come to embrace your ideals and policies and begin to act accordingly. The essence of soft power is to persuade others to accept foreign policy preferences without the use of force. States effectively employing soft power on the three-dimensional chessboard achieve their goals by creating an allure for other states without the need for hard power tools[9].

Sources of soft power

Using this Nye theoretical framework that identifies three sources of soft power (culture, political values and foreign policy), this article examines EU soft power in Kazakhstan[10].

Nye defines *culture* as a set of values and practices that create meaning for a society[11]. In the modern age, branding created through popular culture figures allows us to see these influences in different parts of the world. Music, art, cinema, gastronomy, fashion, traditions, education, architecture, sports and literature - all are part of the comprehensive phenomenon called culture and are 'marketed' as soft power sources for countries.

Another soft power source is the *political values* demonstrated by a country through domestic and foreign policy. Ease of access to information and increasing demands for all kinds of freedoms enhance the gravitational

[8] Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 6.
[9] Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5.
[10] *Idem*, 11.
[11] *Idem*, 11.

power of those countries which put forward and implement political values with respect to peace, sustainability, rule of law and human rights[12].

Foreign policy also plays an important role in relation to soft power; countries become influential in international politics when their foreign policies are perceived as 'legitimate and moral'. In today's world, it is difficult for states to sustain policies that are not approved of /supported by international and regional organizations, as acting in the face of reaction from the international community may result in various political and economic sanctions. Therefore, states' demonstration of political values admired by others and their following a foreign policy correlated with these values increases their prestige in the international community and encourages other countries to follow their respected foreign policy. In this context, the term 'soft power' is used in such foreign relations[13].

Within the context of EU-Kazakhstan relations, adopting Nye's soft power theory offers a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding how the EU aims to influence perceptions, promote collaboration, and establish a firm footing in Kazakhstan. Nye's threefold categorization of the roots of soft power, which encompass cultural and political values, and foreign policy provides the foundational structure for our examination.

What is EU Soft Power?

Conventional soft power analyses have traditionally focused on the nation-state as the primary unit of examination. However, given its intricate structure comprising diverse political issues and decision-making centers at both the national and suprenational levels, the EU introduces a multilayered complexity to the study of soft power. Many European institutions have been able to interact directly with national citizens both within and outside the EU's borders thanks to the EU's use of public diplomacy as a key tool of soft power. The nuanced dynamics of EU soft

[12] *Idem*, 14.
[13] *Idem*, 16.

power are illustrated by this multifaceted approach, distinguishing it from traditional state-centric analyses[14].

A dominant debate considered the EU and its various predecessors as peace initiatives or models of peace at the beginning of Europe's integration in the 1950s[15]. Since that time, what is now the EU has demonstrated a noteworthy commitment to public diplomacy, a commitment evident in its official discourse. The explicit aim of the EU to assert its identity at the global level is spelled out in its Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was adopted in 1993 under the Maastricht Treaty[16]. This emphasis on identity assertion implies that the primary mechanisms employed in EU public diplomacy—branding, enhancing the EU's international image, and promoting the incremental institutionalization of public diplomacy—all play their part as a comprehensive component of EU foreign policy.

Within the institutional structure of EU public diplomacy, EU representatives are key players. These delegations work together with the Brussels headquarters of the European External Action Service (EEAS)—the EU's diplomatic service—as well as with separate units within the EC dedicated to foreign affairs. This special cooperation extends to general departments specializing in foreign trade, international expansion and development. The delegations are responsible for overseeing a range of public diplomacy initiatives in countries outside the EU. These initiatives include monitoring websites in local languages, coordinating events such as the 'Europe Day' festival, facilitating official visits and exchanges with civil society organizations and local associations, promoting culture and education, and producing promotional materials in line with local media and newsletter.

In order to carry out these activities, there is a need for close coordination among EU delegations, national embassies and EU member

[14] Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 77.
[15] Philippe Raynaud, "De l'humanité européenne à l'Europe politique," *Les Études philosophiques*, 3/1999, 375-381.
[16] Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Maastricht Treaty (Title I, Article 2), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/the-parliament-and-the-treaties/maastricht-treaty.

states' cultural institutes in host countries as well as with the EU Presidency[17].

Normative Power of EU

The 'normative power' concept needs to be defined in order to understand how the EU's softer powers are implemented. The theory of normative power, first put forward in 2002 by Ian Manners, presented the EU as an international political actor capable of expressing a sense of normality and respect for norms amongst other international players, and hence Manners argues for EU coherence in modelling international relations.

According to Manners, normative power is closely associated with 'ideological power' or 'power over opinion', denoting the 'ability to shape conceptions of normal'[18]. He underscores the core of European soft power as its capacity not merely to promote norms but to do so in a normative manner. This 'normative diffusion of norms' can manifest itself through diverse channels, including contagion (where the EU, perceived as a positive example, prompts others to emulate it, as observed with Mercosur), transference (entailing linking the sharing of mutual certain goods and the welcoming of specific adjustments or norms), information (via policy announcements disseminating EU norms), or cultural filters (through the establishment of political identity by those influenced by European normative power, as in, for example, the propagation of human rights in Turkey). Given the significance of the normative diffusion of European norms across borders, Manners argues that it is impossible to conceive of the ideological power of the EU's international role without considering the normative dimension of its impact. This dimension advocates universally-recognized norms and values such as rights and freedoms, democracy and equality, and shapes the foundational principles that guide the EU foreign policy agenda[19].

[17] About the European External Action Service, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/about-european-external-action-service_en
[18] Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), (2002): 236.
[19] *Idem*, 244.

In other words, in wielding its normative power the EU stands as a dynamic and transformative force in the realm of international relations. Through the establishment and promotion of shared norms and values, the EU's activities have a considerable influence on the behaviour of external actors. By setting high standards and expectations, the EU not only shapes its own policies, but also moulds the conduct of global affairs. As a key player in the field of international politics, the EU's normative power is instrumental in fostering cooperation, dialogue and the pursuit of common objectives on the world stage.

European Union Engagement in Kazakhstan: Key Aspects

On February 2, 2023, the EU and Kazakhstan celebrated thirty years of diplomatic relations[20]. In 1993, Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian nation to forge diplomatic agreements with the EU, which reciprocated by opening its own representation in the region in November 1994. This was initially established in Almaty and marked the EU's inaugural diplomatic existence in the area. Later, when Astana was designated the new capital city of Kazakhstan in 2007, the EU Delegation to Kazakhstan relocated there, and the Almaty office ceased operations on November 1, 2010, with all relevant personnel transitioning to Astana.

The primary responsibilities of the EU Delegation in Kazakhstan encompass representing EU interests in the country, fostering coordination with EU member states' embassies, cultivating relations across various domains including political cooperation, economy, trade, and external assistance, and especially as these relate to the EU-Kazakhstan enhanced partnership and cooperation agreement. The delegation actively monitors and implements EU policies across all sectors, with a particular focus on the EU-Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership. Additionally, this delegation is committed to promoting and safeguarding EU values and

[20] European Commision, 2023 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/celebration-30th-anniversary-establishment-diplomatic-relations-between-european-union-and_en.

interests, while simultaneously enhancing awareness and understanding of the EU in the region[21].

The EU-Kazahkstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed in Brussels in 1995 and came into force on July 1, 1999. It was the first legal basis for Kazakhstan's relations with the EU, and was the first such document signed by the EU with a Central Asian state[22].

Considering changes in both internal and external circumstances, the two entered a new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) in 2015. This enhanced EU-Kazakhstan cooperation, and having been ratified by all EU member states and the European Parliament, came into force on March 1, 2020. Economic and financial cooperation, Justice and Home Affairs, Energy and Transport, Environmental Protection and Climate Change, Employment and Social Policies, and Cultural and Scientific Research are the main areas of support for trade and investment development. Currently, the EPCA is making steady progress and strengthening cooperation between the EU, its member states and Kazakhstan with respect to labour policy, social policies, and cultural and scientific research[23]. Sectoral cooperation involves EU-Kazakhstan collaboration in many various areas; the development of civil society, strengthening consumer rights, education, culture, research and innovation, media, the audiovisual sector, sports, civil protection, and public service.

In its engagement with Kazakhstan, the EU also acts through various regional initiatives. *The EU Strategy for Central Asia*, adopted in 2019, sets out a strong framework to increase cooperation among regions, make use of new opportunities and deal with common threats[24]. The European Commission, along with the EU High Representative, launched

[21] Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan_en?s=222.
[22] Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Kazakhstan and the EU, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/enhanced-partnership-and-cooperation-agr/product-details/20170614DPU07842.
[23] EU-Kazakhstan EPCA, Official Journal of the European Union, L 052, 25 February 2023. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2020%3A052%3ATOC
[24] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/kazakhstan/evropeyskiy-soyuz-i-kazakhstan_ru?s=222

a *Global Gateway Initiative* in 2021. This includes a new Europe Strategy to strengthen the intelligence, sustainability and security of interconnections in the fields of information and communications technology, energy and transport, while also strengthening world health, education and research systems. The launch of this initiative is seen as a reaction to China's Belt and Road Initiative, the vast and geopolitically significant network of infrastructure and transportation investments being utilized by Beijing to connect its exporters with Western markets[25].

In 2021, the EU ratified the multi-annual Indicative Programme MIP2021 to 2027 within the framework of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe). Within a targeted strategic framework, the EU has dedicated €16 million to reinforcing its collaborative partnership with Kazakhstan over 2021-2027[26]. In addition, Kazakhstan is due to benefit from several EU regional programs and investments under the Europe Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (ECND+) which will be a key financial instrument in implementing the Global Gateway Initiative[27].

In Kazakhstan, the EU is considered as having a major economic and political role. It is Kazakhstan's biggest overall trading partner, the destination for 39% of total Kazakh exports and accounting for 29.4% of its entire trade in 2021[28]. Also in 2021, the EU emerged as the largest foreign shareholder in Kazakhstan, contributing foreign direct investment (FDI) stock of $61.5 billion, a figure up by 23% on the previous year. This underscores the EU's growing economic agreement with Kazakhstan. The main investing countries are the Netherlands ($5.1 billion), Belgium ($791

[25] EU launches 'Global Gateway' to counter China's Belt and Road https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-launches-global-gateway-to-counter-chinas-belt-and-road/.
[26] Republic of Kazakhstan. Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-01/mip-2021-c2021-9095-kazakhstan-annex_en.pdf.
[27] Kazakhstan. Our partnership, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/kazakhstan_en.
[28] "Indicators of Foreign Trade / Committee of State Revenues of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan // https://kgd.gov.kz/en/exp_trade_files, 22.09.2023.

million), France ($693.5 million), Luxembourg ($323.5 million), and Germany ($265.2 million)[29].

Kazakhstan, in turn, remains the EU's largest trading partner in Central Asia, and its trade turnover with the EU significantly exceeds the combined trade turnover of the other Central Asian countries[30]. With the aim of diversifying the EU's energy supply, exports of Kazakh crude oil are very important.

The dynamics of Kazakhstan-European relations are vividly illustrated by the number of high-level contacts, including leadership, between Kazakhstan and the EU. The First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, visited Brussels nine times (four official visits in 1993, 2000, 2002, 2010, and five working visits in 2006, 2010, 2014, 2016, 2018).

President Kassym Jomart Tokayev's maiden visit to Brussels took place on November 25, 2021 and included meetings with European Council president Charles Michel and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen. Kazakhstan, in turn, has been visited twice by the presidents of the European Council; Herman Van Rompuy in 2010, and Donald Tusk in 2019, and once in 2013 by then president of the European Council, José Manuel Barrosso[31].

Soft Power of EU in Kazakhstan: Cultural Dimension

The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) designates culture as a special form of soft power given the diversity of its manifestations. According to UNESCO, cultural activities are a soft power instrument aimed at facilitating exchanges of views and

[29] Direct Investments by Direction / National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan // https://nationalbank.kz/en/news/direct-investments-by-direction, 22.09.2023."
[30] Данные Агентства Eurostat // Data from the Eurostat Agency https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ext_lt_maineu/default/table?lang=en
[31] Ministry of Foreign Affair of Kazakhstan, https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa/about/structure/departments/npa/380/1?lang=ru.

ideas, supporting the understanding of other cultures as well as fostering links between communities[32].

Robert Schuman, a key architect of the EU and one of its founding fathers, expressed a fundamental perspective in his work Pour l'Europe, stating that 'Europe, before being a military alliance or an economic entity, must be a cultural community in the highest sense of the term'[33]. This articulation underscores the paramount importance of cultural unity as a foundational element in the conception of the European project.

On examining the importance of the EU's existence in realm of soft power, we see that it is strategically positioned to leverage its cultural richness and shared values.

Most European countries have long used cultural diplomacy as a valuable component of diplomatic tools. As for the EU, it is a fairly recent addition to the Europoeans' toolbox. In 2016, the EU announced the 'Strategy for International Cultural Relations'. Support or cultural cooperation between the EU and partners in other countries is a key objective of this strategy. Emphasizing the pivotal role of culture, Mogherini asserted that it serves as an unequivocal driving force guiding the entire EU in addressing common challenges. She envisioned culture as a unifying factor capable of constructing an alliance of civilizations to counteract forces attempting to divide European society[34].

The EU has transformed itself into a global player capable of fostering intercultural dialogue through international cultural cooperation projects. This type of intercultural dialogue is capable of mitigating tensions, preventing crises, facilitating national reconciliation and supporting new story developments in the framework of using soft power as a tool. Importantly, it serves as a strategic response to one major threat the EU faces today, namely radicalization, and reinforces the crucial role of cultural diplomacy as a means of addressing and counteracting

[32] Culture Sector Knowledge Management, 2016, https://en.unesco.org/themes/protecting-our-heritage-and-fostering-creativity/culture-sector-knowledge-management-tools.
[33] Robert Schuman, *Pour l'Europe, (1950),* (Fondation Robert Schuman; 5e édition, 2010): 119.
[34] European Commission, 2016, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/speech-hrvp-federica-mogherini-culture-forum-brussels_en.

contemporary challenges, aligning with the broader objectives of promoting understanding and cooperation on an international scale.

Against the backdrop of the considerable informational influence of the West (the US and Europe) the EU has succeeded in establishing numerous mechanisms of soft power for interaction with Kazakhstani society. These include various cultural activities, grant programs, projects and institutions that offer broad opportunities for employment and education. In this context, it is not coincidental that culture and education emerge as the central and leading focuses of European soft power in Kazakhstan. In particular, it is a demonstration of the EU's achievement in promoting European education standards in Kazakhstan. European cinema and literature, and academic exchanges are pivotal in shaping perceptions and fostering a beneficial picture of the EU in Kazakhstan. In this context of EU engagement with Kazakhstan, the influence of the former's culture, education and media are examined below.

Culture

The EU pays close attention to how Europe's cultural values, ideals and principles are explained/expressed in Kazakhstan, and the official EU institution for the promotion of European culture is the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC). This is a network of European national institutes of culture and national bodies engaged in cultural and related activities beyond their national borders. EUNIC brings together organizations from all 28 EU member states, and designs and implements European policy on culture inside and outside the EU. Currently, EUNIC operates in more than 100 countries around the world through a network of 139 clusters, and its annual budget amounts to $2.2 billion[35].

One of the two clusters of EUNIC in Central Asia is located in Almaty. Its founding members are France Alliance Almaty, the British Consulate, the Dante Alighieri Committee, the Goethe Institute of Kazakhstan, and Hungary's Consul General. In 2012, the Swiss Embassy also joined the founders of 'EUNIC-Almaty'. Greater impetus was given to

[35] European Union National Institutes for Culture-About, https://www.eunicglobal.eu/map.

such work last year (2022) when the EU's National Institutes of Culture approved creating the 'UNICAlmaty' organisation in Kazakhstan. Promoting an increase in EU-Kazakhstan cultural communication is an extremely important objective of this organisation. In Kazakhstan's cities the EU and its member governments organise and hold a variety of activities during which events such as Days of Europe are held[36].

TEMPUS/ERASMUS+

In order to raise education levels among university pupils, a Trans European Mobility Programme on University Studies (TEMPUS) has been running quite successfully in Kazakhstan since 1994.

Under TEMPUS, between 1994 and 2013, funding was secured for more than seventy projects involving forty-six representatives of higher education schools and forty-eight partners from outside the academic world of Kazakhstan. This program has had a significant impact on governance processes in higher education institutions in Kazakhstan. Approximately 26% of TEMPUS appropriations in Central Asia were earmarked for Kazakhstan projects between 1994 and 2012. In view of the increase in overall EU funding for the region from €5 million to €15 million between 2007 and 2012, this meant amounts ranging from €1.4 million to 4.5 million[37].

Thirteen years after the launch of TEMPUS, the EU established another program in Kazakhstan: Erasmus Mundus (EM). This focused on exchanges of students, scholars and academic teams. This initiative has contributed significantly to Kazakhstan becoming a part of the EU's education system. According to an EM report, under the program Kazakhstan received €1.3 million in 2007-2008, a figure that accounted for more than 30% of funding allocated to Central Asian regions. In 2007, there

[36] *Idem*.
[37] *The main achievements of the Tempus programme in central Asia. 1994-2013*, http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/ac6ecbab-0775-4a79-96a4-576f19c53dbc.0002.03/DOC_2.

were approximately sixty scholarship recipients for student mobility in Kazakhstan[38].

Characteristic of both the TEMPUS and EM programs is their comprehensive coverage, right from inception, of virtually all key segments and directions of soft power influence.

In 2014, the EU introduced a number of changes to its education policy. The Erasmus+ programme was thereby substituted for the TEMPUS and EM programmes. Erasmus+ is dedicated to the development of educational mobility, innovation, cooperation, exchange of good practices and support for educational reform.

The management of the Erasmus+ Program in Kazakhstan is carried out by the national office of Erasmus+. The key tasks of the office are to provide a wide range of consultancy services, coordinate activities on higher education reforms within Kazakhstan's National Expert Team, and monitor ongoing TEMPUS projects[39].

For the 2021-2027 period, the EU has allocated €76 million specifically for the Erasmus+ program in Central Asia. In its 1993-2021 phase Erasmus+ played a pivotal role by offering Kazakh students and staff over 3,300 short-term scholarships to facilitate their educational experience and training endeavours in Europe. A noteworthy achievement since 2014 has been the provision of scholarships to 328 Kazakh MA students, enabling them to engage in joint MA programs across European institutions.

Of particular significance is the sustained interest in capacity-building projects within Kazakh universities. Having actively participated in forty-nine of the seventy projects based in Central Asia between 2014 and

[38] P. Jones, The EU-Central Asia education initiative. EUCAM Working Paper 9. (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1604444.
[39] Erasmus+ Representation in Kazakhstan, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/44-kazakh-students-join-european-unions-erasmus-programme_en.

2020, the universities continued their involvement by contributing to the selection of four projects among nine in Central Asia in 2022.

The selected projects strategically address critical areas such as curriculum development and modernization, integrating innovative teaching and learning practices. Furthermore, they aim to enhance university governance and establish robust connections between higher education institutions and the professional sphere. This ongoing commitment to academic collaboration exemplifies the enduring impact of Erasmus+ in fostering educational exchange and cultivating meaningful linkages between Kazakhstan and the EU in the field of education [40].

The EU's efforts to exert influence align and operate in tandem with its member states' promotional institutions such as Alliance Française, Campus France, and the Goethe-Institut. This collaboration aims to enhance EU-bound student mobility and provide access to prestigious universities in third countries. Concurrently, EU initiatives involve establishing European studies centers to strategically influence culturally-oriented principles[41].

In reciprocation, Kazakhstan has consistently exhibited significant interest in fostering ties with the EU within the realm of soft power, with a particular emphasis on the educational sector. The nation has committed substantial resources to aligning its educational system with global standards.

A new law on education was adopted in 2007. This was designed to bring Kazakhstan into line with education models in the Western world and Europe, and incorporated a pathway to a minimum of twelve years of schooling and the integration of tertiary level higher education. Dedicated efforts to assimilate the best practices of the West, with a particular focus on European models, have been an important factor in these initiatives. As early as 2010, Kazakhstan took a pioneering step by becoming the first Central Asian country to formally engage with the Bologna Process, a

[40] Official web site of Representation of the European Union in the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan_ru?s=222.
[41] From Interview 2, 2023.

strategy that attempts to foster a unified European higher education space. This diplomatic decision underscores Kazakhstan's proactive approach to aligning itself with European norms and standards within the sphere of international relations[42].

At the state level in Kazakhstan, outbound mobility of citizens for education abroad, primarily in the West, is actively encouraged. The Bolashak scholarship programme, a government sponsored international scholarship initiative, was launched by Kazakhstan at the beginning of 1993. This program has facilitated the education of numerous Kazakh students abroad, particularly in Western nations, including Europe. In order for the home country to reap the benefits of such programs, on completion of their studies abroad, the scholarship candidates are obliged to return to Kazakhstan and contribute to the country's development by working in their respective fields for a mandatory period of five years. This strategy has proven effective in maintaining a connection between the skilled younger generation and their home country, contributing to the nation's development and growth. Many of them, upon returning to Kazakhstan, assume various positions in state structures. Any citizen of Kazakhstan who aims to obtain an academic degree or undergo internship may participate in the program[43].

Kazakhstan is actively working to create conditions to foster increased interaction between itself and the EU. In 2014, despite not yet seeing clear reciprocation from the EU, the Kazakhstani leadership took a unilateral step to enhance ties with Europe by simplifying the visa regime with several European countries.

Since then, a pilot initiative for visa-free travel to Kazakhstan has been in place for citizens from various countries around the world, including Monaco, Norway, Australia, Hungary, Malaysia, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, the UAE, the US, Singapore, the UK, France, Germany, Japan, Finland, and Switzerland. It should be noted that

[42] Kazakhstan in the Bologna process, ENIC-Kazakhstan. Higher education development national center, https://enic-kazakhstan.edu.kz/en/bologna_process/kazahstan-v-bolonskom-processe.
[43] From official web site of the Bolashak scholarship programme, https://bolashak.gov.kz/en.

thirteen of these regions are European. For up to thirty days, citizens of EU member states may enter Kazakhstan without a visa[44].

In brief, the EU's educational and cultural initiatives, with their primary emphasis on the intellectual segment of society, play a role in shaping pro-European (and generally pro-Western) sentiments among the elites in Kazakhstan. This unquestionably guides the reinforcement of the EU's impact and standing in the target region[45].

EU Soft Power in Kazakhstan: Political Values

Political values play a crucial role in determining the attractiveness of a political system. This section will explore how the EU, with its emphasis on democratic governance and respect for human rights, has sought to influence Kazakhstan. The alignment (or lack thereof) of political values between the EU and Kazakhstan will be examined as a key factor in soft power dynamics.

One primary source of tension between Europe and Kazakhstan lies in the realm of governance, since there is a notable distinction between their political models. European governments and entities have consistently raised concerns about Kazakhstan's perceived democratic deficiencies and electoral limitations, and underscored the necessity for improvements in human rights and democratic progress[46].

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan's leadership has been consistently committed to implementing a progressive reform strategy, choosing economic changes over political ones. The government's rationale is that there is an intricately connected relationship between each stage of political

[44] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa/press/article/details/6764?directionId=3053&lang=ru.
[45] From Interview 3, 2023.
[46] From Interview 3, 2023.

reform and fostering economic issues in the country. This underscores the divergence in soft power dynamics between Europe and Kazakhstan[47].

In the early 1990s, EU policy on Central Asia was formulated with the aim of achieving tactical political objectives; stabilizing the post-Soviet field, helping in urgent economic issues, and fostering democracy, pluralism and market connections. Attainment of these goals was envisioned through both direct economic aid and the exertion of political pressure through international and European organizations and institutions.

Overall, the strategic goals of the EU at that time centred on establishing liberal democracy, law doctrines, and human rights in the region, along with promoting liberalization, democratization, and opening up the region to European and international economic systems.

TACİS

The first EU program aimed at post-Soviet countries in the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which includes Kazakhstan, was 'Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States" (TACIS). For the Europeans, TACIS was designed to assist the newly independent countries in their efforts towards economic and political reforms, liberalization, democratization, the transition to a free market, and law doctrines.

The TACIS initiative operated from 1991 to 2006, during which approximately €7.3 billion was allocated, and over 3,000 projects implemented. However, until the 2000s, a significant portion of TACIS funding was directed towards projects in Russia, while around €366 million was allocated to activities in Central Asian states. Only in the years 2002-2004 did the EU budget for the region double from €25 to €50 million per

[47] J. Engvall, S.E. Cornell, *"Asserting Statehood: Kazakhstan's Role in International Organizations"*, (2015), https://www.silkroadstudies.org/publications/silkroad-papers-and-mono-graphs/item/13178-asserting-statehood-kazakhstans-role-in-international-organiza-tions.html.

year, and by 2005 and 2006, the required funding for projects in Central Asia stood at around €60 million annually[48].

CADAP, BOMCA

After September 11, 2001, there emerged the potential for European contributions to ensure the security of the Central Asian region and for greater EU involvement in regional policies. The European Commission recognized that Caspian resources would play a crucial role in Europe's future energy security (while simultaneously reducing the EU's dependence on Russia)[49].

In July 2005, to ensure coordination and coherence of EU external actions in Central Asia, the European Council established the position of EU Special Representative for Central Asia. This role operates under the direct authority and operational guidance of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The activities of the Special Representative for Central Asia have led to a significant intensification of EU policy in the region. The EU began to pay considerably more attention to issues of democratic transformation, including the protection of human rights and the development of the non-governmental sector in the countries of the region. In this respect, a significant event was the introduction in December 2006 of a new EU program; the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

Additionally, the EU was concerned about issues such as the illegal drug trade. In 2001, to facilitate the development of a strategy to control this trade in Central Asia, it initiated the Central Asian Drug Action Program (CADAP), and in 2002, made attempts to reassess its approaches to the region. The Strategic Document for 2002–2006, as well as the Indicative Program for 2002-2004 adopted by the European Commission, emphasized the need to focus assistance to Central Asia on sectors in which

[48] T. Tsertsvadze, J. Boonstra, "Mapping EU Development Aid to Central Asia", (EUCAM, 2013), www.eucentralasia.eu/uploads/tx_icticontent/EUCAM-FS-1-EN.pdf.
[49] From Interview 3, 2023.

countries in the region wanted to involve themselves. These included ensuring stability, security, permanent economic success, and a reduction in poverty.

A Regional Cooperation Programme aiming at promoting cooperation among the countries of Central Asia in areas of EU interest such as transport, energy, natural resources and environmental management, justice and internal affairs, was proposed as a key instrument. Additionally, the EU suggested a regional program tailored to national needs concerning trade and border management, while simultaneously creating an experimental scheme to reduce poverty in specific areas[50].

In 2003, the EU launched a special program called the Border Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA). This initiative aimed at fostering security, combating smuggling and promoting trade in Central Asia.

Despite the limitations and an incomplete understanding of the challenges facing regional cooperation, the 2002 Strategic Document marked the EU's first consistent political attempt to establish regional frameworks for Central Asia. It presented specific development goals, moving away from the bilateral approach used earlier. The budget allocations for Central Asia from 1991 to 2002, amounting to approximately €944.4 million, indicated that the EU was focused not only on developing political relationships based on individual country needs, but also on creating a model applicable to the entire region[51].

As for political values, after the events of January 2022, Kazakhstan launched a wave of political reforms. In his address to Parliament on March 16, 2022, President Tokayev announced a plan for the accelerated modernization of institutions and political life in Kazakhstan. Brussels enthusiastically embraced the program of political reforms and recognized

[50] From Interview 2, 2023.
[51] Official web site of the Border Management Programme in Central Asia, https://www.bomca-eu.org/en/history.

the legality of the constitutional referendum held in the country on June 5 and launched the New Kazakhstan project[52].

EU Soft Power in Kazakhstan: Foreign Policies

Soft power is intricately linked with a nation's foreign policies. This section will assess how the EU's foreign policies contribute to its soft power, particularly in its engagement with Kazakhstan in areas such as trade, development aid and diplomatic cooperation. The section also analyses the extent to which the EU's approach is fruitful in fostering positive perceptions and cooperation.

Vulnerability in European foreign policy has manifested itself on various occasions. The persistence of divergent national foreign policies advocated by certain member states and the inadequacy of military capabilities have collectively contributed to rendering the EU relatively ineffective as a hard power in global politics[53]. Michalski contends that the inability of the EU and its member governments to establish a unified foreign policy and thus have the EU take its place in international political arenas constitutes a primary obstacle for its aspirations to assert itself as an independent power on the global stage[54], and highlights the challenges inherent in its achieving a cohesive and impactful foreign policy stance.

Influenced deeply by developments in the 2003 Iraq war, with the 2003 European Security Strategy EU members agreed on the need for the Union to become a 'major soft power' in international politics so as to counteract prevailing American unilateralism. The approach delineated in this document primarily relies on leveraging the EU's role in an international manner, or the EU as an entity dedicated to peacekeeping, the

[52] From interview 3, 2023.
[53] Ben Tonra, Thomas Christiansen (eds.), *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
[54] Anna Michalski, ''The EU as a Soft Power: The Force of Persuasion," *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, Ed. Jan Melissen, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 140.

promotion of universal values and multilateralism. Accordingly, the various roles played by EU soft power are of great significance[55].

One source of EU soft power lies in its role as stabilizer and mediator in conflicts in international politics. In this context, the EU has also tried to play the 'humanitarian' role, especially in opposition to the US failures at mediation. In line with these stances, the EU has also tried to create a picture of itself on the international stage as an intermediary voice between South and North, poor and rich. In this position, the EU contributes development funds via the UN Millennium Development Goals.

The EU continues to have a central place in multilateral frameworks and global governance, including participation in the G7 and G20. Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the EU's economic prosperity served as a compelling force, attracting numerous developing countries and highlighting the appeal and positive attributes of the 'European economic model'[56]. Finally, the EU has also contributed to building distinct foreign policy positions on a wide number of global issues including international law, multilateralism, the ICC, and global warming (i.e. Kyoto Protocol, COP21). In sum, all these different roles may arguably reflect the vital role of this soft power in the creation of a more effective EU foreign policy[57].

Over the past twenty years, the Government of Kazakhstan has been making consistent efforts to widely introduce advanced environmental practices into public policy. Among the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan has undertaken the most ambitious environmental transition goals-the achievement of carbon neutrality is envisaged in 2060. This Strategy, approved by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on February 2, 2023, sets goals for zero carbon emissions to combat climate change and defines the main technological transformations needed to

[55] Christopher Hill, "Cheques and Balances: The European Union's Soft Power Strategy," *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (London: Routledge 2010), 182-198.
[56] K. L. Nielsen, ''EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap,'' *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 9(5),2013), 735.
[57] Christopher Hill, "Cheques and Balances: The European Union's Soft Power Strategy".

decarbonize the country[58]. In support of these efforts, the Expert Group on Sustainable Consumption and Production of the SWITCH-Asia Program, funded by the EU, is assisting Kazakhstan in strengthening the integration of sustainable consumption and production (SCP) models into policy and practice, in order to eventually contribute to the country's transition to a green economy, poverty reduction and mitigation of climate change.

The war that began in Ukraine shortly after the 'bloody January'events in Kazakhstan and the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan have highlighted the overlapping views of Europeans and Kazakhstanis, as well as their mutual desire for dialogue. In this respect, in May 2022, in the format of the EU-Central Asia Dialogue on Afghanistan, a meeting of special representatives of the EU and five Central Asian republics was held in Almaty.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of soft power has become increasingly important in world politics since the 1990s. While the end of the Cold War explains a decreasing interest in military objectives, soft power roots itself mainly in globalization, as increasingly shaped by economic, cultural and commercial factors. In such a complex and interdependent context, the EU presents a unique case of a non-state international figure benefiting from soft power as its main instrument in foreign strategy.

Taking into account cultural dimensions, political values and foreign policies, this article has provided a comprehensive examination of EU soft power as it operated in Kazakhstan from 1991 to 2022. EU influence in Kazakhstan has evolved over the years, reflecting the dynamic nature of soft power. Understanding its dynamics is essential for policymakers and scholars alike in navigating the complex terrain of the Central Asia.

Kazakhstan's close alignment with European values and its robust economic and political connections with the EU position Astana as the EU's primary shareholder in the related geography. EU involvement here covers

[58] Kazakhstan's prospects for achieving carbon neutrality, https://qazaqgreen.com/en/journal-qazaqgreen/expert-opinion/596/.

a wide spectrum that includes development of regional and local governance, and initiatives for economic, social and judicial reforms. Most notably, interest and investments play pivotal roles in fostering collaboration between Kazakhstan and the EU. Kazakhstan has devoted substantial efforts to nurturing its ties with European entities, setting ambitious standards for its own future growth. If these standards are met in the coming decades, Kazakhstan could increasingly resemble European states in its legal, political, economic and social frameworks. In other words, become a reflection of a form of soft power whereby cultural, economic, and diplomatic influences contribute to shape the state's trajectory in alignment with European norms and values.

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Transformation of Memorial Culture: The Case of Husein Bey Gradaščević in Contemporary Bosniak Perspective

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Abstract:
This paper discusses the circumstances and ways in which the transformation and interpretation of certain issues from the Bosnian past took place in the historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author focuses especially on the place and role of Husein bey Gradaščević in the anti-Ottoman uprising in 1831/32, which, according to interpretations elaborated here, went from "Anti-reform" to "Movement for the autonomy of Bosnia "or "Both of them" depending on time of writing and authors' approaches. The author paid special attention to books published in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which served as a basis for his assertions about the role of context on the text. At the end of the paper, author also shows and partly discusses reflections created in public space, especially in documentaries available online. Finally, author elaborates on role of historians in public space(s) and challenges between "Academic history writing" and "Public history approaches".
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, History, Historiography, Husein bey Gradaščević, Memorial Culture, Transformation.

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While writing *History of Bosniaks* during 1990s, well known Bosnian law historian Mustafa Imamović claimed in his bibliographical reference that Husein bey Gradaščević, prominent Bosnian 19th century nobleman, belongs to the top Bosnian historical figures with couple of hundreds of bibliographical units written about him by that time.[1] M. Imamović especially emphasizes the importance of the work of the bibliographer Mustafa Ćeman, who completed a Bibliography on Gradaščević with more than 300 titles, which was just then published as an appendix to book written by Sadik Šehić.[2] Regardless of this impressive number of 300 titles, even after Imamović's book *History of Bosniaks*, Gradaščević continued to be written about in the following period as he remained in focus of historians and other authors thus making him one of the most described personalities in modern Bosnian history. Abovementioned *History of Bosniaks*, as the only book of that kind written in Bosnian language so far, eventually became important reference point of contemporary Bosniak self-reflection and milestone of contemporary Bosniak identity arguments. The book itself was published by leading Bosniak Cultural Association "Preporod" in dozens of thousands of copies and was distributed across public, cultural and private spaces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and abroad. The scope of distribution and the importance of Publisher made the book accessible to a large part of the Bosnian public. Simply said, the book became a "must have" in almost all public institutions and many Bosniak households.

Even though that book received dozens of positive critiques and reviews, there were other authors, such as Ahmed S. Aličić, who claimed in his critique that Imamović's book does not reflect authentic Bosniak historiographical reference point thus arguing vastly about shortcomings of Imamović's approach, methodological tools and main conclusions about "How to write history of an ethnic group".[3] As Aličić completed and published his PhD thesis about Husein bey Gradaščević and his role in "Autonomous movement" against central Ottoman authority during 1830s in the same time framework as did Imamović, namely during 1990s, those

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[1] Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka* (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1998): 582.

[2] Sadik Šehić, *Zmaj od Bosne – Husein kapetan Gradaščević između legende i povijesti* (Wuppertal, 1994).

[3] Ahmed S. Aličić, "Historiografska literatura koja se odnosi na historiju Bosne i Hercegovine u 19. stoljeću," *Prilozi*, 29, (2000): 111–116.

two authors probably remained so far the most prominent figures in interpreting the role of Husein bey Gradaščević from partly different points of view. Although the two named authors do not differ in the interpretation and characterization of the movement itself - for them it is an "Autonomous movement" [*Movement for Autonomy of Bosnia within Ottoman Emipire*, i.e.],[4] - Aličić's critique refers to Imamović's approach to the history of Bosniaks in general, and 19th century history in particular.[5]

When discussing character of the Husein bey Gradaščević's movement in 1830s, Imamović claims that "The political program of the Bosnian *ayans was not clearly and completely formulated*, but it can be said that in addition to the already mentioned *rejection of reforms*, which, according to them, were contrary to Islamic tradition, they [Bosnian ayans, i.e.] especially insisted that *their property rights not be affected*, and that in the future the Bosnian governor (*vezir)* is appointed exclusively among local people".[6] It is very much clear that Imamović at this point has an open view of both possible perspectives for the interpretation of Gradaščević's movement, since he takes into account all the factors that could have shaped the motives for the uprising in 1830s. Of course, the fact that Imamović's book *is a synthesis* unencumbered by details, should also be taken into account.

On the other hand, Ahmed S. Aličić claims that "Movement for the autonomy of Bosnia in 1831/32 led by Husein captain Gradaščević, emerged as the event that most strongly marked that era of Bosnia's history",[7] and then further claims that "The movement was *an inevitability*, arising as a consequence of Bosnia's overall relations with the central government and socio-political and economic or social conditions in Bosnia caused by the general collapse of the global system, which, formally at least, was the framework in which Bosnian society developed and existed".[8] When discussing causes of the "Gradaščević's movement", Aličić clearly states *political* and *social* causes naming "Political situation on Bosnian borders" on one hand, and "Higher levies and greater exploitation, without distinction of class and religious affiliation, and this caused the general

[4] Ahmed S. Aličić, *Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832. godine* (Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut u Sarajevu, Posebna izdanja XIX, 1996).
[5] Ahmed S. Aličić,"Historiografska literatura koja se odnosi na historiju Bosne i Hercegovine u 19. stoljeću", 111–116.
[6] Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, 335.
[7] Ahmed S. Aličić, *Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832. godine,* 13.
[8] Ibid, 20.

dissatisfaction of the people in Bosnia",[9] on the other hand. Bearing in mind the aforementioned theses, it might be useful to refer to Aličić's critique of Imamović's book in this context. Namely, Aličić claims that "Imamović portrayed the 19th century more than faintly, which, on the other hand, has a special significance for the contemporary history of Bosnia and its people. I think that Imamović did not fully, or at least not sufficiently, understand this period, or that he presented it in a haphazard manner according to what *was already known* [!] in the historiography of the former Yugoslavia. Hence a whole series of material errors, along with inconsistent interpretations […]".[10] Highlighting the problem of the "Political situation on the Bosnian border" in Aličić's interpretation should be understood both in the context *of the time Aličić is writing about*, but also *in the context of the time when Aličić speaks and writes*. In the context of the time Aličić writes about, it is the question of Hatt-ı Şerif issued by Ottoman sultan to the Principality of Serbia in 1829/30 as a "Last step towards establishing the autonomy of the Principality of Serbia in relations to the Ottoman Emipire". In the context of the time when Aličić writes, these kinds of Ottoman concession to Serbia were interpreted in very simplified manner. [11]

Now, it is possible to understand that Mustafa Imamović draws conclusions from older historiography and does not fully take over Ahmed Aličić's detailed elaboration of the Gradaščević's movement, which might be one of the reasons for such an evaluation of Aličić written a year or two after the publication of the book *History of Bosniaks*. Ultimately, this is a book that summarizes most of the earlier historiographical knowledge on the subject it deals with. However, it should be noted and understood that these two books were written almost in parallel time framework and published almost simultaneously. Additionally, it is the context of the 1990s that has strongly influenced general scene of historiography in Bosnia and

[9] Ibid, 178.

[10] Ahmed S. Aličić, "Historiografska literatura koja se odnosi na historiju Bosne i Hercegovine u 19. stoljeću," 111–116.

[11] Public discourse of the 1990s was not immune to interpretations in which those acts were seen as support to Serbia, and not giving concessions or support to Bosnia, thus very similar to lack of support for Bosnian independence war in 1990s as in the case of United Nations Security Council resolution 713, adopted unanimously on 25 September 1991, in which Security council decides to "Immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and militaty equipment to Yugoslavia". In following years it lead to a massive and agressive war between heavily equpied former Yugoslav Army against emerging Bosnian army under embargo. Resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991. Available here: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/49/PDF/NR059649.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed on 20 December 2023).

Herzegovina, and the country itself was just healing its major historical destruction it went through during 1992-1995 war.

This historiographical debate, however, gained more ground in wider professional discussions about contemporary Bosniak identity, policies and reflections about history. Among those debates, now at the beginning of new millennium, it was Husnija Kamberović, historian and so far the only one among the contemporary authors who wrote *a biography* of Husein bey Gradaščević on the occasion of 200 years of Gradaščević's birth.[12] Therefore, the three of the abovementioned authors remained among top authors who established a kind of a new approach to understanding Husein bey Gradaščević and its movement during 1830s. It goes without saying that the three mentioned are not the only authors who wrote about Gradaščević, but they were and remain influential authors in Bosnian historiography. In addition, I believe that their books were and will remain very influential on scholar and public discourse, so despite some other authors and books, one cannot compare someone's later lesser research work on these topics with the influential reach of the mentioned authors.

Their interpretations and narratives have influenced other disciplines as well, and the development of such an approach stretched across disciplines and different media in last two decades to an extent that recently screened and played documentary movie (Sarajevo, 2022) focuses on Gradaščević's personality of a leading figure in "Bosniak history".[13] The influence on other disciplines is reflected in the perpetuation of the historiographical narrative, which is now taken over by historians who are not necessarily experts in Ottoman history, then sociologists, philosophers, political scientists and others. So, for example, in one of the documentary films, professors of classical history, professors of contemporary sociology, philosophy, then members and descendants of Gradaščević's family appear as interlocutors about Gradaščević. Knowing the circumstances and their academic profile, it can be concluded that none of the aforementioned have special scholar research experience on Ottoman history, they have modest knowledge of Ottoman archival documentation, which is why they practically base their conclusions exclusively on secondary literature. And the fundamental note to the documentary is given by an older interview of

[12] Husnija Kamberović, *Husein-kapetan Gradaščević (1802-1834): Biografija: uz dvjestotu godišnjicu rođenja* (Gradačac: Preporod, 2002).
[13] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoxcZmz04YI&t=12s (Accessed on 10 November 2023)

Ahmed Aličić, despite everything, still the only expert in this field – among interlocutors, who was already dead when documentary was made.[14]

Needless to say, other authors, historians among them as well such as Galib Šljivo,[15] continued to write about Husein bey Gradaščević, but at the level of key interpretations, they remained more or less at the same point of view very much characteristic of the period from the 1990s to the present day. Galib Šljivo is a well-known historian whose research was focused on the Bosnian history of the 19th century, about which he wrote a very significant number of research papers and books. Likewise, Šljivo is known for the fact that his research work is dominated by historical sources that are not of Ottoman provenance, so his insights into the 19th century Bosnian past are based on other historical sources. Husein bey Gradaščević, in those kinds of interpretations, now transmitted through new media, especially video materials available online, is "A leader" who is "Leading Movement for the autonomy of Bosnia", he is "Brave", "Wise", "Fair", and has always "Bosnia in his mind".[16] Such interpretations, of course, always need to be understood in the context in which they arise, but also in accordance with the goals of creating a "Bosniak perspective" in view of the past. Therefore, in this example as well, one can see how "the context of one time" dominates over "the topic of the past".

In order to understand this major shift in interpretation of Bosnian past, one should be given basic information about major changes historiography in Bosnia and Herzegovina went through during the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia and post-war recovery and re-establishment of historiographical institutions in independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose society was heavily divided along ethnic lines. This might be, at the same time, new milestone not only in history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in the history of historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. As main goal of this paper is to record ground works and leading historiographical narratives about Husein bey Gradaščević and juxtapose them in comparative perspective – especially, the narratives of the three abovementioned authors, it needs to be done in a way to

[14] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoxcZmz04YI&t=12s (Accessed on 20 December 2023)

[15] Galib Šljivo, *Bosna i Hercegovina: 1827-1849* (Tešanj: Planjax komerc, 2016).

[16] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OqEawnUQq4 (Accessed on 11 November 2023.) In the context of "narrative creation", it is very important to emphasize the names of the channels that published the aforementioned documentaries. The first one is called "Justice Bosnia", and the second one is "Forgotten Times", which is, in my view, an indication of the choice of terminology adequate for creating a desirable narrative without critical approaching to the subject of the past.

analyse obvious transformation of memorial culture among Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. In order to do so, one should get basic overview of the historiographical debates and trends in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1990s and early 2000s. As claimed in recent reflections about historiography in Bosnia and Herzegovina "the issue of formation, development, current state, and perspectives of Bosnian historiography is also the issue of the contemporary history of Bosnia and Herzegovina",[17] as their relationship is intertwined and their range and achievements are mutually conditioned.

However, the socio-economic and political collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia, the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and the post-war socio-economic and political situation had a strong impact on the Bosnian society, but also on the historiography. It seems, though, that research topics "Have become ethnically defined", which is a clear reflection of the overall social and political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In such a context, several conferences and public debates on historiography in Bosnia and Herzegovina were held in an attempt to evaluate contemporary historiographical trends.[18] Among many authors, it was academician Dževad Juzbašić who claimed that re-establishing of research in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina took place under very difficult conditions, both political and logistic in nature. He further contended that this was not only due to the pinching financial context in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also due to "Nationalist-chauvinist actors among governmental structures" whose main goal was to further divide Bosnian society by creating "Separated and exclusive systems" where science, institutions, art, and education would be separated based on the ethnic principle. Juzbašić sadly concluded that research in historiography was focused "Exclusively on ethno-national history, political history and/or regional or local aspects of history" thus leaving "social and economic history in occasional coincidences".[19]

As could be seen from the previous paragraphs, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there were serious transformations in the historiography

[17] Amir Duranović, "Savremena bosanskohercegovačka historiografija: na margini povijesti", *Na margini povijest. Zbornik radova*. Sarajevo: UMHIS, 2018, 11–29.
[18] *Istorijska nauka o Bosni i Hercegovini u razdoblju 1990–2000 godine* (Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 2003). Also note the following volumes: *Naučni skup: Historiografija u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1990. do 2003. godine* (Sarajevo: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2003); Ulf Brunnbauer (ed.), *(Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism*, Bd. 4, (2004).
[19] Dževad Juzbašić, "Die Geschichtsschreibung in Bosnien-Hercegowina im letzten Jahrzent des 20. Jahrhunderts", *Prilozi*, 31, (2002): 17–31.

of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The transformation was organizational, financial, institutional, and this change as a result, some 20 years later, has influenced scopes of topics and new interpretations of Bosnian past or some of its parts. It is, therefore, very important to notice the fact that all of the abovementioned authors (Mustafa Imamović, Ahmed S. Aličić and Husnija Kamberović) completed and published their books in this time framework. Unlike Imamović and Aličić, who wrote about "History of Bosniaks" and "The movement for autonomy of Bosnia", respectively, as mentioned before, Husnija Kamberović wrote a biography of Husein Gradaščević and therefore should be given additional interpretation here in comparison to other authors.

Kamberović's "Bicentenary biography" of Husein bey Gradaščević, published on the occasion of Gradaščević's 200th birthday is therefore a book written and published to memorialize. The author himself claims that "While several notable works were written about the *movement for autonomy* in 1831/32, headed by Husein-bey, there is not enough literature on Husein-bey's life". After establishing this kind of "Research niche" Kamberović offers a biography of a person who became "The most significant historical phenomenon in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 19th century",[20] by explaining his origins, youth, family life, service in Gradačac captaincy, his construction activities, service as vezir of Eyalet of Bosnia etc. Regarding Bosnian "Autonomous movement", Kamberović offers picture of Gradaščević as comander-in-cheif of local Bosnian units in two military endeavours and confrontations with Ottoman troops, as well as his political and military defeat and exile, death and the fate of his property and assets. Within this kind of biographical structure, the essential characterization of Gradaščević's movement is not significantly questioned in this book as author mainly relies on previous literatures' achievements and viewpoints. Rather than that, H. Kamberović offers different views, but in his own interpretation remains alongside "Autonomous movement" characterization, as stated in the Foreword of the book.[21]

In certain occasions, Kamberović draws lines of difference between arguments of other authors about particular issues, such as, for instance, total number of military personnel who accompanied Gradaščević on his move to Travnik in central Bosnia in 1831 and/or accuracy of certain contemporary historical sources used by different authors.[22] Kamberović is

[20] Husnija Kamberović, *Husein-kapetan Gradaščević*, 5.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid, 47, 41.

also well aware of the viewpoints of historiography about Husein bey Gradaščević and characterization of the movement in papers written by Hamdija Kreševljaković, for instance, who back in 1931/1932 claimed that the movement was "Antireform movement of Bosnian nobility".[23] This claim, obviously, corresponds to other authors' claims of that time such as Slavko Kaluđerčić, who also in 1932 wrote a study about Gradaščević characterizing 1831/32 rebellion as "Antireform movement, especially against new order (*nizam-i cedid*)" and Kamberović clearly explains evolution of different narratives created among generations of scholars in the first half of the 20th century.[24] On the other hand, Ahmed S. Aličić, when discussing older authors, quite freely claims that Hamdija Kreševljaković "Is not relevant in the [historiographical] evaluation of this Movement, nor can he be classified among those who advanced the [scholarly] processing of this Movement".[25] A few lines later, Aličić takes milder version of approach by stating that he does not "Ignore any of the aforementioned historians who wrote about this Movement. For them, we say that they did not have enough authentic archival material about that Movement and that they did not know enough about the global Ottoman socio-economic order or the political system, or the socio-political system in Bosnia".[26]

In given context, Kamberović's characterization of the movement follows the views of more recent historiography, i.e, the authors who were writing and publishing at the end of the 20th century, even though Kamberović is also aware of critique elaborated by American historian Robert J. Donia, whose critical thinking and review of Aličić's book is part of historiographical debates in Bosnia at the beginning of the new millennium. Namely, in his review Donia claims that "The irony is that this scholarly and detailed study [Aličić's book, i.e] ends with doubts about the value of the author's interpretation due to *careless enthusiasm* for Gradaščević's movement".[27] Therefore, Kamberović concludes that Donia's view nearly corresponds to characterization of the movement given by D. Pavlović who back in 1913 claimed that the movement was "Antireform movement" as the demands of the insurgents were such that they characterized the entire movement as a movement for the autonomy of

[23] Hamdija Krešeljaković, *Husein kapetan Gradaščević: Zmaj od Bosne*. Sarajevo: Hrvatsko kulturno društvo Napredak, (1931). Reprint in: Krešeljaković, Hamdija, *Izabrana djela*, knj. IV (*Prilozi za političku istoriju Bosne i Hercegovine u XVIII i XIX stoljeću*). Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1991.
[24] Husnija Kamberović, *Husein kapetan Gradaščević*, 79-80.
[25], Ahmed S. Aličić, *Pokret za autonomiju*, 30.
[26] Ibid, 30-31.
[27] *Prilozi*, 30, (2001): 254.

Bosnia, but Pavlović says that the "Anti-reform motives of the insurgents were hidden behind those demands". In words of Pavlović himself by "Rising against the reforms of sultan Mahmud II, the insurgents gave the movement a more general character, concealing personal and class motives. Defending their personal privileges, they held to protect them best - demanding guarantees for the land (territory of Bosnia, i.e.)".[28] It is worth emphasizing here that R. J. Donia well recognized and evaluated Aličić's book very well. Donia believes that the book is well-founded and significant in research, but also that the author has a certain emotional attitude towards the topic which he calls a kind of a "Careless enthusiasm", which I also consider very correct. Moreover, Kamberović's insight into all the different interpretations shows his serious dealing with the topic. Nevertheless, to understand the history of a narrative, it must be emphasized that the layering of narratives is very noticeable in such discussions. Even when the authors go back several decades in their final assessments of a phenomenon. Thus, with his review of Aličić's book, Donia rightly points out some views about the phenomenon characteristic for the first half of the 20th century. Therefore, one can conclude that the big narratives created during the 1990s still need to be viewed in a wider time span in order to better understand them.

The issue of the territory of the Bosnian Eyalet is one of the most common arguments for the claim that it was an "Autonomous movement". Kamberović himself, in concluding remarks of his book states that "After the Ottoman-Russian war [1828-1829, i.e.], the Ottoman Empire was compelled to make many concessions, including ceding to Serbia some of the *nahiyas* that had until then belonged to the Bosnian Eyalet" thus leading to "Bosnian Autonomy Movement". Ceding the territories of Bosnian Eyalet to Serbia, "Along with other measures that undermined the position of the Bosnian elite, led to the Autonomy Movement", he claims.[29] On the other hand, after claiming that the "Autonomous movement" was "Inevitability", Ahmed S. Aličić stressed the importance of political situation outside of Bosnia. He further claims that "The main goal of the Movement was the determination to protect the *borders of Bosnia*, that is, the country of Bosnia from being dismembered, regardless of who wanted it and for what reasons. Bosniaks saw this as a danger for the Bosniak people,

[28] Husnija Kamberović, *Husein kapetan Gradaščević*, 76-77.
[29] Ibid, 105.

and it is *less important what phrases* and thoughts they used to express them [the goals, i.e.].[30]

By reading such statements more carefully, it is difficult to escape the impression that some of the given statements were not influenced by the context in which the authors wrote. Once again, it is necessary to emphasize that the complex circumstances of the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia and the declaration of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, which, at least partially, had their own reflection on everyday life, but also on the authors' discourse about the past. Of course, it was not only the Declaration of independence that was at stake, but also its defence against aggression and the fight for the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the preservation of the basic fabric of Bosnian society. In such circumstances, the discourse *on Bosnia in the past* could hardly exclude the terminology that vividly showed the layered historical processes whose most complex and negative forms the authors analysed here were exposed to. Perhaps this was expressed most vividly by Mustafa Imamović in the Preface of his book when he said that he "Began writing the book in the *most tragic moments* for the Bosniak people, feeling that in those moments it was my duty towards my own people and the magical country of Bosnia".[31] And yet, despite such complex circumstances as there were in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, Mustafa Imamović emphasizes to his readers that the book "Should not be viewed as *forever given, told and written* history of Bosniaks, but as a concrete research effort that *leaves room* and hope, and that it will be an incentive for younger historians and other scholars".[32]

Despite the clearly visible influence of the context on the authors and even on their certain interpretations of the Bosnian past, it is still important to note their own self-reflection and critical understanding of their own work. This can best be seen in the clearly defined attitude of Mustafa Imamović when he says that he does not consider his book "Forever given history of Bosniaks" while such a thing is a bit more difficult to grasp with Ahmed S. Aličić and his book. However, both of them shall remain important figures in re-establishing and stabilizing narrative of "Autonomous movement". As clearly shown, as he follows the development of the different narratives in detail, Kamberović favors the characterization of the movement as an "Autonomous movement".

[30] Ahmed S. Aličić, *Pokret za autonomiju*, 20.
[31] Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, 5.
[32] Ibid.

Outside of the historiographical discourse, in the Bosnian and Bosniak public spaces, these nuances in the interpretation of history are almost not taken into account whatsoever. Previously mentioned "Ethnic separation" within Bosnian society in late 1990s influenced the communities of historians in a way that mainly Bosniak authors focus on such questions, others less so. Or at least, less so when it comes to certain aspects of Bosnian past for which they do not show particular interest.

Nevertheless, in the Bosniak public space - although it is difficult to precisely determine the boundaries between the exclusively Bosniak and Bosnian public spaces - as they are partially congruent, there is a certain belief about Gradaščević's movement as exclusively "A movement for the autonomy of Bosnia". The idea about "Anti-reform character of the Movement", still relevant in Turkish historiography,[33] for instance, loses ground in Bosnia as time goes on. However, it is a matter of public space, dominated in last two decades by new media and new contents, in which the space for critical questioning of the past has been significantly narrowed. Thus, it is possible that more historiographical irrelevant than relevant interlocutors participated in the creation of the aforementioned video materials about Husein bey Gradaščević, as elaborated previously.[34] This also raises the question of historians' responsibility for their (non)presence in public space. Non-participation in the creation of new content, avoiding new media necessarily leads to important historians remaining outside of contemporary trends. This could further mean that relevant historical knowledge will exist, but it will be harder to reach the audience. On the other hand, non-participation in the public space can also have some positive consequences, since in this way historiography can be saved from unnecessary devaluation. In any case, the circumstances presented here surrounding an important issue of Bosnian history inevitably show the dynamics of changes that historians are a part of.

In such a context, one should raise the question of those two parallel trajectories, one among academic historians or "University style history", and the other – public history, usually seen by academic historians as "Untheorized and uncritical". In such an approach "History becomes heritage, nostalgic and conservative, packaged in such a way that celebrates the past by dressing it up to encourage social consensus, an antiquarian

[33] Fatma Sel Turhan, *Eski düzen adına: Osmanlı Bosna'sında İsyan, 1826-1836* (Istanbul, Küre Yayınları, 2013).
[34] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoxcZmz04YI (Accessed on 12 November 2023) or see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OqEawnUQq4&t=73s (Accessed on 12 November 2023)

ruse to make us believe that consent and conformity is a natural feature of the present".[35] As concluded by Peter Claus and John Marriot, "By collecting evidence of past societies, however, public historians have allowed those scholars working in the academy to rewrite histories in ways that would have remained quite impossible. In doing so, the basis of historical knowledge has been challenged".[36] The short presentation of several very important books of Bosnian historiography presented here in the context of the very complex changes that Bosnia and Herzegovina went through in recent decades shows the justification of the theses about the challenges that historiography is facing.

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[35] Peter Claus & John Marriot, *History: An Introduction to Theory, Method and Practice*. 2nd edition, (London: Routledge, 2017), 268-269.

[36] Ibid, 268.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoxcZmz04YI (12. 11. 2023)

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BOOK REVIEW

William H. Holt, *The Balkan Reconquista and Turkey's Forgotten Refugee Crisis,* Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2019, 328 p., ISBN 9781607816959

Emir Fatih Akbulat*

Türk tarih yazınında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Müslüman tebaasının Rumeli'de maruz kaldığı mezalim ve etnik temizliğe dair çalışmalar cumhuriyetin erken dönemlerinde ilgi görmese de bu çalışmalar son yıllarda artış göstermektedir.

Doksanüç Harbi döneminde yaşanan katliam ve sürgünleri dönemin tanığı olarak anlatan en önemli eser Hüseyin Raci Efendi, "Zağra Müftüsünün Hatıraları. Tarihçe-i Vak'a-i Zağra" başlığıyla yayınlanmış eserdir.[1] Bu eserde bahsedilen olaylarla ilgili İngiliz konsolosluk raporlarını ise Bilal Şimşir yayınlamıştır. Bilal Şimşir'in "Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri"[2] adlı eseri bu alandaki en önemli belge yayını niteliğindedir. Üç ciltten

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[1] Hüseyin Raci Efendi, *Zağra Müftüsünün Hatıraları. Tarihçe-i Vak'a-i Zağra*, haz. Mehmet Ertuğrul Düzdağ, İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1978.
[2] Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri: Belgeler*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1968.

oluşan eserin I. cildi, 1968 yılında yayımlanmış, 1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi'ne giden süreci, harbi ve Müslümanların etnik temizliğini, II. cildi 1879, III. cildi ise 1880-85 yılları arası dönem meselelerini vesikalarla ele almıştır.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Müslüman tebaasına karşı uygulanan mezalim ve etnik temizliğe dair önemli çalışmaları olan bir diğer isim de Nedim İpek'tir. Osmanlı'da nüfus hareketleri üzerine önemli eserler veren İpek'in, yayımladığı makalelerin yanı sıra, "Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri",[3] "Mübadele ve Samsun",[4] "Memalik-i Şahanede Muhaceret"[5] diğer önemli eserleridir. Bir diğer önemli eser, Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu'nun "Doğu Rumeli'de Kayıp Köyler"[6] isimli çalışmasında, bir ulus devlet olarak kurulan Bulgaristan'da homojenleştirme politikalarının neticesinde Osmanlı mirası çok sayıda Müslüman/Türk (aynı şekilde Rum ve Yahudi) köyünün, yok edildiği ve haritadan silindiği ortaya koyulmaktadır.

Diğer bazı önemli eserler şu şekilde sıralanabilir; Bilal N. Şimşir, *The Turks Of Bulgaria in International Fore Documents* Volume I (1985) and Volume II (1986)[7]: M. Hüdai Şentük, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Bulgar Meselesi (1850-1875)*[8]; M. Türker Acaroğlu, *Bulgarlar ve Bulgaristan Üzerine Yüzyıllık Türkçe Kaynakça*[9]; M. Türker Acaroğlu, *Bulgaristan'da Türkçe Yer Adları Kılavuzu*[10]; Ömer Turan, *The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria*[11]; Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu (ed), *Balkan ve Karadeniz Ülkelerinde Güncel Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Osmanlı-Türk İmajı, Kısım 1 ve Kısım 2*.[12]

[3] Nedim İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994.
[4] Nedim İpek, *Mübadele ve Samsun*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000.
[5] Nedim İpek, *Memalik-i Şahanede Muhaceret*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2022.
[6] Mehmet Hacisalihoğlu, *Doğu Rumeli'de Kayıp Köyler İslimye Sancağı'nda 1878'den Günümüze Göçler, İsim Değişiklikleri ve Harabeler*, Ankara: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2008.
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[12] Mehmed Hacısalihoğlu (ed), *Balkan ve Karadeniz Ülkelerinde Güncel Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Osmanlı-Türk İmajı, Kısım 1 ve Kısım 2*, ed. Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, İstanbul: Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi Balkan ve Karadeniz Araştırmaları Merkezi (BALKAR), 2020.

Batı tarih yazınında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun dağılış sürecinde Müslüman tebaanın maruz kaldığı mezalimi ve etnik temizliği konu alan çok az sayıda âlim vardır. Bu manada Dawn Cahtty'nin "Modern Ortadoğu'da Zorunlu Göç ve Mülksüzleştirme"[13] isimli eseri, Osmanlı sonrası "kendilerini anavatanlarından koparılmış mülteciler olarak bulan" insanları ve acılarını sadece Hristiyanlar değil, Müslüman halklar bağlamında da görebilen önemli bir çalışmadır.

Justin McCarty de "Ölüm ve Sürgün"[14] isimli eserinde 1821-1922 yılları arası dönemde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Müslüman tebaasının etnik kıyımını konu edinmiş, ender, Batılı âlimlerdendir.

Batıda Osmanlı tarihi uzmanları arasında Müslüman nüfusun yaşadığı mağduriyetleri de dikkate alan Stanford J. Shaw ya da Heath Ward Lowry gibi âlimlere bir yenisi daha eklenmiştir. William H. Holt, kültür tarihi, dilbilim ve göç konuları üzerine çalışan, Batı'da klasik-oryantalist söylem üzerinden tarihin Batı-perspektifi ile yorumlanması usulünün dışına çıkan, ABD'li bir tarihçidir. Holt, Avrupa'daki Türk varlığına dair Batı tarih yazınındaki Türkofobia etkisini vurgulayarak, klasik Batı-merkezli yazının dışına çıkan kimselerin "Türk yanlısı" etiketine maruz kalarak, bir akademik şüpheye ve küçümsemeye maruz bırakıldığını savunmaktadır.

Holt'un "The Balkan Reconquista and Turkey's Forgotten Refugee Crisis"[15] isimli çalışmasının araştırma konusu Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son döneminde Rumeli'de Müslüman tebaaya karşı uygulanan "etnik şiddet"tir. Holt'a göre, Rumeli Müslümanlarının hikâyesi, toplu mezarlara atılmaları ve camilerde yakılmalarıyla sona ermiştir.

Çalışmada, "diğer toplumlar sadece acılarını unutmamakla kalmayıp, bunu ulusal-kimliklerinin en önemli unsuru haline getirirken, Türk tarihinin 1877-78 yıllarında yaşanan bölümünün neden unutulduğu" sorusu sorulmaktadır.

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[13] Dawn Chatty, *Modern Ortadoğu'da Zorunlu Göç ve Mülksüzleştirme*, İstanbul: Koyu Siyah Kitap, 2019.
[14] Justin McCarthy, *Ölüm ve sürgün: Osmanlı Müslümanlarının Etnik Kıyımı (1821-1922)*, 2. baskı, çev. Fatma Sarıkaya, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014.
[15] William H. Holt, *The Balkan Reconquista and Turkey's Forgotten Refugee Crisis,* Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2019.

Çalışma, 1877-1878 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi sürecinde Müslümanların Rumeli'den sürülmesini "fikir [Müslümanların/Türklerin Avrupa'daki varlıklarına son vermek], eylem [Müslüman/Türk unsurun etnik temizliği] ve hafıza [etnik temizliğin Türk toplumsal hafızasındaki yeri]" olmak üzere üç perspektiften incelemektedir.

Çalışmanın amacı, 1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi sürecinde ve ardından Rumeli'de cereyan eden trajik hadiselerin Müslüman-Türk toplumunda neden bir toplumsal hafızaya dönüşmediğini ve bu unutmanın nedenlerini bulmaktır. Çalışmanın diğer bir amacı da Batı'da hâkim olan "İslamafobya, Türkofobi, etnik şiddet ve hafıza" kavramlarının yorumlanmasına katkı sunmaktır.

Çalışmada Batı'nın Şark anlayışının yarattığı oryantalist düşüncenin hadiseleri yorumlamada taraflı ve ikiyüzlü bir bakış açısına neden olduğu savunulmaktadır. Holt'a göre Avrupa'nın Müslüman-Türkleri değerlendirirken kullandığı oryantalist bakış açısı Batı'nın hadiseleri nesnel ve tarafsız yorumlamasına engel olmaktadır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Müslüman tebaasının maruz kaldığı mezalimin Batı'da görmezden gelinmesinin nedeni, oryantalist düşüncedir. Batı'nın ikiyüzlü tarih okumasının, doğuya karşı üstünlük duygusunun ve bunun yarattığı bir netice olarak doğuyu yönetme ve sömürme hakkını kendinde görmesinin nedeni de yine oryantalizmdir. Holt'un oryantalist söylemi çözümlemek için başvurduğu kaynak Edward Said ve onun *Oryantalizm*[16] isimli eseridir.

Çalışmanın bir diğer vurgusu toplumsal "hafıza"dır. "Anıtsallaştırmayı ve geçmişte yaşanan hadiseleri anma çabasını, bir topluluğun, bir ulusun veya bir devletin geçmişi üzerinden varlığını tasvir etme arayışı" olarak tanımlayan Holt, etnik milliyetçilik veya dini temelli tarih görüşünü reddederek, "hafıza"nın, "travmaların üstesinden gelmek ve tarihi aşarak ve yaralarını kabul ederek bireyleri özgürleştirmek için kullanılabileceğini" savunmaktadır. Holt'a göre, Rumeli'den sürgün edilen insanların trajik hikâyesi hem yaşandığı dönemde hem de modern Türkiye tarihinde kolektif hafızada yer almamıştır. Holt, "hafıza"nın bir analizini yaparak, Rumeli'de Müslümanların nasıl ve neden katledildiği kadar, bu

[16] Edward Said, *Oryantalizm: Batı'nın Şark Anlayışları*, 4. bs. çev. Berna Ünler, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004.

ve bu tür hadiselerin toplumsal hafızalarından neden silindiğinin de sorgulamasını yapmaktadır.

Holt, eserinde, devlet adamları, yabancı elçiler, dönemin sivil, askeri, vb. tanıkları, gazeteciler vd. farklı sosyal gruplardan oluşan kimselerin gerçek hikâyelerinden ve arşiv belgeleri, elçilik raporları gibi birincil kaynaklardan yararlanmaktadır. Ayrıca, sıklıkla, dönemin önemli edebiyatçılarının (Tolstoy ya da Dostoyevski vd.) eserlerine (roman, hikâye, şiir) atıflar yapaktadır. Zira Holt'un amacı hafızayı sadece resmi devlet raporlarında ya da arşiv belgelerinde değil, toplumsal hafızaya etki eden fikir insanlarının satır aralarında aramaktır. Çalışmada sıklıkla eskizler de kullanmıştır. Bu eskizlerde Müslümanlara yapılan mezalimler, yıkılan ve yakılan şehirler köyler ve camiler vb. resmedilmiştir.

Çalışmanın birinci bölümünde; Rumeli halkları, Doğu Sorunu meselesine taraf olan ülkeler ve bu farklı grupların aynı zaman diliminde nasıl ve neden bir araya geldikleri açıklanmaktadır. Holt, bu anlatıyı "göç" olgusu bağlamında, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun etnik, dinsel ve kültürel çeşitliliğini inceleyerek açıklar. Bu çeşitli halk topluluklarının tek bir Osmanlı otoritesi altında nasıl var olduklarını ve birbirleriyle nasıl ilişki kurduklarını inceler. Holt'a göre Müslümanlar, Balkan tarih yazınında göz ardı edilmiştir ve despot bir idari dönemin, sığ ve kökleri derin olmayan, sayıca az bir grubu olarak tanımlanmışlardır. Ancak Holt, karşı bir iddiayla, Bulgaristan coğrafyasındaki Müslüman varlığının, köklerinin derin ve farklı milletlerden oluşan bir yapıda olduğunu savunur. Bu heterojen topluluğun Hristiyan tebaa ile olan ilişkisinin iyi ve kötü yönlerini irdeler. Son olarak Bulgar milliyetçiliğinin bağımsızlığa giden hikâyesini anlatır.

Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde; 1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi'ne neden olan hadiseleri, Nisan 1876 Bulgar İsyanı'nı ve isyanın Bab-ı Ali eliyle bastırılmasının Avrupa kamuoyunda "Türk ve Müslüman karşıtı bir söylem" yaratması ele alınmaktadır. Holt'a göre bu söylem, "oryantalizm ve Turkofobi" kavramları üzerinden yaratılmıştır. Holt, bu söylemin, aslında Avrupa'nın hoşnutsuz olduğu, Pan-Slavist ideolojiyle, İstanbul'u ele geçirme idealine hizmet ettiğini ve Balkan elitlerinin yaşanan tüm olumsuzlukları Türk idaresinin suçu olarak gösterdiğini iddia ederek, Hristiyan tebaanın intikam ve açgözlülük duygularıyla Müslümanları katletmesiyle ve sağ kalanları Avrupa'dan sürmesiyle neticelendiğini savunmaktadır.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde; Rus ordularının Tuna Nehri'ni geçmesinin ardından, Bulgar, Rus ve Kazak unsurların Müslümanlara uyguladığı sistematik şiddetin "etnik temizliğe" dönüştüğü ve Müslümanların kitlesel kaçışını hızlandırdığı savunulmaktadır. Holt'a göre bu şiddet, Rusların kasıtlı ihmali, beceriksizliği ve mezalime bizzat iştiraki, Kazakların ve Bulgarların ise iştiraki ve kışkırtması dolayısıyla ortak bir suç niteliği taşımaktadır. Bu bölüm Osmanlı sonrası Rumeli'de milliyetçilik ve şiddet arasındaki anlam ve ilişki üzerine bir değerlendirmeyle bitmektedir.

Çalışmanın dördüncü bölümünde; Rumeli Müslümanlarına uygulanan mezalim neticesinde ortaya çıkan mülteci krizinin İstanbul başta olmak üzere imparatorlukta yarattığı kriz incelenmektedir. Zira ağır bir kış mevsiminde, ölümcül tehlikelerin ve salgın hastalıkların eşliğinde cereyan eden Rumeli'den kaçış, sadece İstanbul'un camilerini ve kamu binalarını birer muhacir barınağına dönüştürmekle kalmaz, İmparatorluğun içinde bulunduğu, sosyal, siyasal ve ekonomik vahameti de gözler önüne serer. Hatta Ali Suavi'nin öncülüğünde, muhacirlerin kullanıldığı, bir sivil darbe girişimine de neden olur. Holt, bu bölümde Bab-ı Ali'nin mülteci krizini Rumeli Müslümanlarını Anadolu'ya iskân ve ardından asimilasyonla çözdüğünü iddia etmektedir.

Çalışmanın beşinci bölümünde; Rumeli Müslümanlarının çektiği acıların toplumsal hafızaya etkisi analiz edilirken, Müslümanların İberya yarımadasından ve Balkan yarımadasından sürgünü hadiseleri ve Yahudi-Ermeni tarihiyle benzerlikleri aranarak, yaşanan travmalar ve toplumsal hafıza karşılaştırılmaktadır. Zira Holt'a göre bu halkların her biri, Müslümanların aksine, kendi hikâyelerinden güçlü birer kimlik ve toplumsal hafıza yaratmışlardır. Holt, Rumeli Müslümanları bağlamında sosyo-politik faktörler üzerinden toplumsal hafızanın ve unutmanın kaderine dair sonuçlar ortaya koyarken, modern-Türkiye'nin hafızasını da sorgulamaktadır. Holt'a göre, Hristiyanlık kendi kimliğini İslam karşıtlığı üzerinden tanımlarken, "barbarı/Müslümanları Avrupa'dan göndermek" fikri bir karşı şiddet üretir. Bu şiddet çoğu zaman İslam'ın ürettiği şiddetten çok daha fazlası olsa da Avrupa kendi özeleştirisini asla yapmaz. Batı tarih yazınında Rumeli Müslümanlarının maruz kaldığı mezalim ve etnik temizlikten bahsedilmez. Zalim ve barbar bir idare olan Türk imparatorluğunun, "özgürleşmeye çabalayan bir dizi küçük ulusa yönelik bir zulümler yumağının ortasında" yok olduğu anlatılır. Müslümanların maruz kaldığı mezalimi araştıran Batılı âlimler ise açık bir aşağılamaya maruz bırakılır.

Holt'a göre, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun çekildiği tüm coğrafyalarda, adım adım, Macaristan'dan Edirne'ye kadar, sayısız Osmanlı eseri, Müslüman nüfusa yapıldığı gibi, yok edilmiştir. Ancak şaşırtıcı olan Rumeli Müslümanlarının yaşadıkları korkunç mezalimlerin ve bu yıkımın Batı'da bilinmemesi ya da hatırlanmaması değil, Türkiye'de bu olaylara ilişkin genel bir bilgisizliğin hâkim olması ve hatta Rumeli Müslümanlarının yaşadıkları trajediyi ve tarihini Türk eğitim sisteminin öğretmemesidir.

Peki, Türkler neden bu trajik tarihi unutmuştur? Holt'a göre Türkiye'de, katliam, tecavüz ve kaçış anılarına dayanan bir muhacir hafızasının gelişmesini engelleyen üç ana faktör, 19. yüzyılın son çeyreğinde bir araya gelmiştir; (1) Çoğunluğu temel eğitimden yoksun muhacirler, hızlıca iskân edilmiş ve yeni bir muhacir kimliği altında homojenleştirilerek asimile edilmişlerdir. (2) Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Rumeli muhacirlerini anayurtlarına geri döndürecek güçten mahrum olması dolayısıyla muhacirler yeni yurtlarını geri dönmemek üzere sahiplenmek ihtiyacı hissetmişlerdir ve muhacir kimliğinin yerini pan-İslamcı ideoloji almıştır. Diğer çatışma bölgelerinden gelen muhacir dalgaları, Anadolu topraklarına kök salma duygusunu güçlendirmiştir ve bir önceki muhacirlerin yeni muhaceret dalgalarına tanık olmaları kendilerini yerli olarak hissetmelerini sağlamıştır. (3) Sivil toplumu baskı altına alan ve yakın geçmişin duyurulmasını engelleyen Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun otokratik doğası, muhacirlerin asimilasyonlarını hızlandırmış ve bir hafıza yaratmalarını engellemiştir. Bu üç ana faktör bir araya gelerek Muhacir kimliğinin ve hafızasının gelişimini engellemiştir ve hatta etkileri bugün dahi devam etmektedir.

Holt'a göre, bu üç ana neden dışında, muhacir hafızasının yaratılamamasının başka sebepleri de vardır. Örneğin bunlardan biri Sultan II. Abdülhamid'in iktidarı döneminin siyasal ve sosyal atmosferidir. Zira Sultan Abdülhamid döneminde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun varlığını sürdürmesinin birleştirici bir ideolojiyi gerektirdiği belirlenmiş, Rus yenilgisi ve muhacir akını sonrası devlet İslam'ı birleştirici bir ideoloji olarak tanımlamıştır. Ayrıca Abdülhamid'in paranoyaları ve tahtını korumak için kurduğu baskı rejimi de bir muhacir hafızası gelişimini engellemiştir. Zira 1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi sadece Rumeli'nin ya da İstanbul'un işgali tehlikesini değil, Ali Suavi'nin örgütlediği, muhacirlerin kullanıldığı, bir darbe denemesine de yol açmış ve tüm bunlar Abdülhamid'in korkularını paranoyaya dönüştürmüştür.

Holt'a göre, bir muhacir hafızasının yaratılamamasının bir diğer nedeni de "ilk elden anlatım eksikliği"dir. Buna göre, Müslümanların acı hadiselere dayanma konusunda güçlü olmaları; tecavüze uğrayan kadınlar ve onları koruyamayan erkeklerin bu utanç verici hadiseleri saklamaları; yüzyıllarca üstün bir konumda yaşayan Müslüman tebaanın Hristiyan tebaaya yenilmenin yarattığı aşağılanma duygusunu gizlemesi; Müslüman tebaanın genel olarak okuma yazma bilmemesi (Hristiyan tebaanın misyoner okullarında eğitim görerek okuma ve yazma oranlarını yükseltmeleri ve bu nedenle belgeleme konusunda daha başarılı olmaları) hafızanın oluşturulamamasına neden olmuştur.

Holt a göre alfabenin değişmesi (Harf Devrimi 1928'de yapılmıştır) de muhacir hafızasının yaratılmasını engelleyen faktörler arasındadır. Zira tarih ilmiyle uğraşan az sayıda insan hadiseleri cumhuriyet döneminde okuyabilmiştir. Bu felaket durum, dokümantasyona erişimi her ölçüde zorlaştıran dil reformu ile birleştiğinde, sosyolog John Barnes'ın "yapısal hafıza kaybı" dediği hadise yaşanmış ve muhacirlerin tarihi öğrenmemesi için birçok engel ortaya çıkmıştır.

Ayrıca yeni cumhuriyet Osmanlı mirasının reddi üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Sadece siyasi rejim, alfabe ve dil değil, hatta tarih de reddedilmiştir. Yeni cumhuriyet bir ulus devlet yaratmak için etnik kimlikleri reddetmiş ve Türk kimliği altında tüm etnik dini ve kültürel kimlikleri asimile etmiştir. Yeni rejim, bir yenilgi hafızası üzerine değil, Yunanistan'a karşı kazanılan bir zaferin üzerine bina edilmiştir. Yeni Türk devleti, Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın zaferi ardından kurulmuş ve barındırdığı çeşitli Müslüman unsurları Türk kimliği altında homojenleştirerek bir ulus yaratmaya çalışmıştır. Bütünleştirici Türk kimliği, muhacir alt kimliğinin gelişmesine yer bırakmamış, dolayısıyla "hafıza" zayıflamaya devam etmiştir.

Ancak yine de Holt'a göre, 1990'lardan itibaren Türkiye'de 1877-78 dönemi Rumeli hafızası hatırlanmaya başlamıştır. Zira Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi sonrası Türkiye, Batı için eskisi kadar önemli bir müttefik değildir ve yeni bir dış politika perspektifi geliştirilmesine ihtiyaç duyulmuştur. Ayrıca Doğu Bloğu'nun yıkılması sonrası Rumeli'de Osmanlı bakiyesi Müslümanlara karşı yeni bir etnik-milliyetçi temizlik başlamıştır. 1990'larda Sırbistan'da tecavüz kamplarına kapatılan kadınlar ve katledilen erkekler, Türk toplumuna Rumeli faciasını yeniden hatırlatmıştır. Turgut Özal'ın iktidarı yıllarından itibaren ise Türkiye'nin Rumeli'ye olan ilgisi yeni-Osmanlıcılık ideolojisi olarak tanımlanmıştır.

Özetle Holt, 19. yüzyılda Rumeli coğrafyasında Batılı âlimlerin Modern Balkan tarih yazınında görmezden geldiği, 1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi'nde Rumeli'de katledilen Müslümanların hikâyesini anlatmaktadır. Bu hikâyede Rusya, 1877 yazında Slav akrabalarını Osmanlı boyunduruğundan kurtarma bahanesiyle Tuna Nehri'ni geçtiğinde Müslüman tebaa, Rus, Kazak ve Bulgar vahşetinin kurbanları olmuştur. 1877-1878 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi'nde Ruslar, Kazaklar ve Bulgarlar "modern dönemde etnik temizlik olarak adlandırılan" bir dizi eylemi icra etmişlerdir. Rumeli'de yaşanan trajedi neticesinde, yüzbinlerce Müslüman katledilmiş, tecavüze uğramış, malları gasp edilmiş, köyleri yakılmış, sürgün edilmiş ya da kaçmak zorunda bırakılmışlardır.

Müslümanların olmadığı bir Avrupa tasavvurunun, 1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi'nde uygulamaya koyulduğunu ve Müslümanların etnik temizliğe maruz kaldıklarını savunan Holt'a göre, Avrupa'dan Müslümanları temizleme fikri Batı'da Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Balkanlar'da ilerlediği erken dönemlerden itibaren mevcuttur. Balkanların homojenleştirilmesi (ki bu Osmanlı Millet Sistemi'nin tam zıttı bir projedir) Rumeli halklarını terörize eden bir projedir. Bu proje, Rumeli'nin heterojen etnik yapısı üzerinde bir öfke yaratmıştır ve bu tecrübenin yarattığı dehşet, bu gün dahi, Hristiyan-Balkan milletleri üzerinde etkisini bir "kimliksel hafıza" olarak göstermektedir. 19. yüzyılda, Müslümanların mülklerini almak için kin ve nefret suçu işleyen Balkan Hristiyanlarının karanlıkta kalan hikâyesini anlatan Holt, günümüzde, Hristiyan-Balkan milletlerinin toplumsal hafızalarında yer edinen "ırkçılık düzeyindeki Türk/Müslüman nefretini" bir toplumsal trajedi olarak tanımlamaktadır.

Holt'un perspektifine göre Rumeli'de yaşanan trajedilere dair Batıda bilinenler Hristiyan tebaanın yaşadıklarıyla sınırlıdır. Müslümanların acıları ise bilinmez zira araştırılmaz ve hatta bilinmek de istenmez. Bu durumun sebepleri Batının Şark tasavvurunda gizlidir. Oryantalizmin neden olduğu İslamafobya, Türk-düşmanlığı ve Batının Müslümanlara karşı taşıdığı önyargılar, meselelerin tarafsızca ele alınmasını engellemektedir. Tarihin-Batılı okumasında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, eskimiş ve zorba bir idare olarak yorumlanarak, Rumeli'nin Hristiyan halkına zulmeden bir tiran olarak anlatılmaktadır. Rumeli Hristiyanlarının bağımsızlık idealinin ürettiği mezalim ise meşrulaştırılmaktadır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Rumeli'den çekilişi sırasında yaşanan mezalim ve Müslüman halkın sürgün edilmesi ve mülksüzleştirilmesiyle yaratılan her bir Hristiyan-ulus devlet, bir ulusal

bağımsızlık mücadelesi hikâyesi olarak sunulmaktadır. Holt ise bu anlatımın aksine, Osmanlı idaresinin "Millet Sistemi" ile Balkan Hristiyanlarının ulusal-kimliklerini korumalarını sağladığını savunan, Rumeli Müslümanlarının trajedisini anlatarak Batı-tarih okuması literatürüne katkı sunan, ender Batılı tarihçilerden biri olarak önemli bir eser kaleme almıştır. Eserinin, Batı'da Türk karşıtı ırkçılığa karşı mücadelede fayda sağlayabileceğini iddia eden Holt, amacının Türkler arasında bir mağduriyet fikri yaratmak olmadığını, aksine, bu "korkunç anıların acıdan arınmış bir üzüntü" ile yâd edilebilmesini sağlamak olarak açıklamaktadır.

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BOOK REVIEW

Das osmanische Europa. Methoden und Perspektiven der Frühneuzeitforschung zu Südosteuropa. Eds. Andreas Helmedach, Markus Koller, Konrad Petrovsky and Stefan Rohdewald. Leipzig: Eudora-Verlag 2014, 506 S., 20 Karten und Grafiken.

Klaus Kreiser*

Ein Ausschnitt aus der berühmten Pîrî-Reis-Karte aus dem frühen 16. Jh. wurde als Titelbild[1] dieses sehr umfangreichen, durchaus soliden und mit großem Erkenntnisgewinn zu lesenden Bandes gewählt. Trotz des Umschlagmotivs ist das Buch kein weiteres Resultat einer von Osmanisten beherrschten akademischen Konferenz, sondern ein Zwischenergebnis einer mehrjährigen fruchtbaren Zusammenarbeit von Forschern und Forscherinnen mehrerer Fachrichtungen. Es ist eine Selbstverständlichkeit, dass alle Autoren eine ereignisgeschichtliche Betrachtung hinter sich

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[1] Die Länder südlich der Donau sind hier mit dem Namen Memleket-i Rumeli bezeichnet. Erst in den türkischen Schul-Geographiebüchern des 19. Jh.s findet man „Avrupa-i Osmânî". In älteren osmanischen Quellen fehlt das Konzept „Südosteuropa" vollständig fällt auch nicht mit Rumelien zusammen.

gelassen haben, wie es Markus Koller schon in seinem Buch über das ungarische Condominium von 2007 gefordert hatte.[2]

Das ergibt sich auch aus dem Herausgebergremium, das sich aus Gelehrten zusammensetzt, von denen nur der hier genannte hauptsächlich mit osmanischen Quellen arbeitet. Unter den Autoren findet man u.a. Südost- und Ostmitteleuropa-Historiker (Karl-Peter Krauss, Norbert Spannenberger, Konrad Petrovsky, Mihailo St. Popović) und Byzantinisten bzw. Neo-Gräzisten (Nikolas Pissis, Ionanis Zelepos). Osmanistische Beiträge im engeren Sinne leisteten Suraiya Faroqhi, Machiel Kiel, Hedda Reindl-Kiel und Denise Klein. Wirtschaftshistorische Artikel stammen von der türkischen Bulgarien-Kennerin Neriman Ersoy-Hacısalihoğlu und der griechischen Marine-Historikerin Katarina Papakonstantinou. Theologische und religionsgeschichtliche Themen stehen u.a. im Mittelpunkt der Beiträge von Stefan Rohdewald. Petrovskys Artikel behandelt die drei Formen, in denen die orthodoxe Geschichtsschreibung osmanische „Reichsgeschichte" darstellt. Dass nur zwei Beiträge von türkischen Autorinnen vertreten sind, lässt sich nicht allein mit einem schwachen Interesse an südosteuropäischen Themen an türkischen Hochschulen erklären.[3]

Die 19 Artikel des Bandes verteilen sich auf die vier großen Kapitel (17 in deutscher, 2 in englischer Sprache) Herrschaft, Macht und Gewalt (I.), Wirtschaft (II.) Religionskulturen (III.) und Zeitwahrnehmungen bzw. Geschichtsdeutungen (IV.). Die Herausgeber befassen sich in ihrer Einleitung mit dem „Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung", wobei sie als erstes die anhaltende Diskussion um das Konzept „Frühe Neuzeit"

[2] Eine Gesellschaft im Wandel. Die osmanische Herrschaft in Ungarn im 17. Jahrhundert (1606-1683) (Stuttgart 2010. Koller ist auch der Herausgeber von Transottomanica. Osteuropäisch-osmanisch-persische Mobilitätsdynamiken, Göttingen 2019. Zu diesem Band haben mehrere Autoren und Autorinnen des hier besprochenen beigetragen.

[3] Erste Grundlagen für eine „Südosteuropa-Kunde" schuf Rásonyi als Inhaber eines Lehrstuhls für „Hungaroloji" in Ankara. Sein einflussreichster Schüler war der Osmanist Tayyiib Gökbilgin. Das Fach war allerdings nicht gegründet worden, um die balkan-osmanischen Studien zu fördern, sondern wie die „Sumerologie" und „Hethitologie", um den romantischen Turanismus zu verwissenschaftlichen. Rásonyis Nachfolger Tibor Halasi Kún lehrte zwischen 1943 und 1948 in Ankara. Seine Beiträge zur Verwandtschaft zwischen Ungarn und Türken übten großen Einfluss aus, auch wenn das Hauptfach „Hungarologie" heute vor allem sprach und literaturwissenschaftlich ausgerichtet ist. Die von Gökbilgin mit herausgegebene Zeitschrift für Südosteuropa-Studien *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* wurde nach längerem Stillstand wiederbelebt. Zuletzt fanden sich unter den „Reviewing Editors" zwei Fachkollegen aus Skopje, die übrigen stellte die Istanbuler Universität. Die GDAAD wurde in letzter Zeit von Beiträgen nicht türkischer Autoren wie aus der Ukraine oder Bulgarien dominiert.

aufgreifen. Hier wie in den Einführungen zu den Abschnitten wird vor allem die jüngere Forschung berücksichtigt. Die Herausgeber ersparen sich weitgehend einen Rückblick auf frühere Ansätze einer Nationen übergreifenden „Kunde" des osmanischen Südosteuropa.

Anders als der Untertitel vermuten lässt, behandeln mehrere Autoren Zeiträume, die auch einen erweiterten Begriff von „Frühneuzeit" sprengen: Istanbul (Faroqhi), griechische Marine (Papakonstantinou) im 18. Jh. und den Handel im Hafen von Varna (19. Jh.). Größere Längsschnitte findet man z. B. in dem Beitrag von Popović über makedonische Bergwerke von der Spätantike bis in die osmanische Zeit. Mit einer ungewöhnlich gut dokumentierten Renegaten-Gestalt des späten 16, Jahrhunderts befasst sich Tobias Graf, der am Beispiel dieses Ladislaus Mörth den Forschungsstand zur Renegaten Konversion insgesamt ausbreitet.

Der Band eröffnet eine Fülle neuer Einsichten. Manche hätten bei früherer Zugänglichkeit der osmanischen Zentralarchive schon längst nationalgeschichtlich verengte Sichtweisen korrigieren müssen. Der Beitrag von Machiel Kiel und Hedda Reindl-Kiel zur Polog-Ebene ist exemplarisch und in seiner methodologischen Stringenz Pflichtlektüre. Ausgehend von der Auswertung osmanischer Register von 1452/3 im Raum Kalkandelen/Tetovo können die Autoren zeigen, wie langsam der Islamisierungsprozess, der 1710 noch nicht ganz abgeschlossen war, fortschritt, bis er um 1830 den Wert von 58 Prozent erreicht hatte.

Suraiya Faroqhis Artikel ist unerwarteterweise der Einzige, der sich mit der osmanischen Metropole auseinandersetzt. Über Istanbuls Einwohnerzahl und Zusammensetzung haben wir vor dem 19. Jh. nur höchst vage Kenntnisse. Sie setzt sich mit Einwanderern auseinander, die sich als Handwerker und Kaufleute oft in konfessionell gemischten Gruppen um Arbeitsplätze vor allem an der Peripherie bemühten. Sie ist auch die einzige Autorin, die den gründlichsten Kenner des südöstlichen Europas im 17. Jh., Evliya Çelebi wenigstens einmal (aber auch nur beiläufig) erwähnt. Nur in ihrem Artikel werden, ausnahmsweise in diesem Band, anatolische Städte (Bursa, Manisa, Kastamonu, Tokat) als Handelspartner von Istanbul aufgeführt.

Wahrscheinlich wird keine Mitarbeiter an diesem Band bestreiten, dass sich das westliche Anatolien in der „frühen Neuzeit" in seinem physischen und sozialen Habitus allzu stark von dem osmanischen Südosteuropa unterschied. Der osmanische Staat wurde, wenn man demographische Werte zugrunde legt, ja erst nach 1516/17 zu einem mehrheitlich islamischen. Das Postulat der Herausgeber und Autoren, dass

Religion allein nicht ausreiche um Gesellschaft und Kultur des osmanischen Europas zu beschreiben, gilt ja nicht weniger, um „etablierte Zugänge“ auch in den asiatischen Reichsteilen zu überprüfen.