

e-ISSN: 2757-5845

REVIEW OF
ARMENIAN STUDIES
A Biannual Journal of History, Politics, and International Relations

Issue
48
2023

Facts and Comments

Alev KILIÇ

An Analysis of the Activities and Goals of
Armenian Terrorist Organizations Between 1973-1986

Elteriřhan ELÇİBEY

Indian Armenians from the Past to the Present

Fatma Jale Gül ÇORUK

An Armenian Revolutionary from Istanbul to Marseille:
Kaspar Nalbandian

Serap BOZPOLAT AYAN

TRANSLATION

The Armenian Revolt in Van:
Insights from Military History Documents

Güzin ÇAYKIRAN



TERAZİ
YAYINCILIK

REVIEW OF ARMENIAN STUDIES

A Biannual Journal of History, Politics, and International Relations
2023, Issue 48

Altı Aylık, Tarih, Politika ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi
Sayı 48, 2023

EDITOR / EDİTÖR

Alev KILIÇ

MANAGING EDITOR / SORUMLU YAZI İŞLERİ MÜDÜRÜ

Mehmet Oğuzhan TULUN

PUBLISHER / YAYIN SAHİBİ

On Behalf Of Terazi Yayıncılık / Terazi Yayıncılık Adına
Hazel ÇAĞAN ELBİR

LANGUAGE EDITOR / DİL EDİTÖRÜ

Ahmet Can ÖKTEM

EDITORIAL - ADVISORY BOARD / YAYIN - DANIŞMA KURULU

In Alphabetical Order / Alfabetik Sıra İle

Prof. Dr. Seçil KARAL AKGÜN
(METU, Ret. Faculty Member)
(ODTÜ, E. Öğretim Üyesi)

Yiğit ALPOGAN
(Ret. Ambassador)
(E. Büyükelçi)

Ertuğrul APAKAN
(Ret. Ambassador)
(E. Büyükelçi)

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI
(Middle East Technical University - METU)
(Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi - ODTÜ)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Brendon J. CANNON
(Khalifa University)
(Khalifa Üniversitesi)

Ahmet Altay CENGİZER
(Ret. Ambassador)
(E. Büyükelçi)

Prof. Dr. Sadi ÇAYCI
(Başkent University)
(Başkent Üniversitesi)

Prof. Dr. Kemal ÇİÇEK
(Retired Faculty Member)
(Emekli Öğretim Üyesi)

Dr. Şükrü ELEKDAĞ
(Ret. Ambassador)
(E. Büyükelçi)

Dr. Edward ERICKSON
(Marine Corps Uni. (USA), Ret. Faculty Member)
(Marine Corps Üni. (ABD), E. Öğretim Üyesi)

Uluç GÜRKAN
(Journalist)
(Gazeteci)

Prof. Dr. Yusuf HALAÇOĞLU
(Fmr. President of Turkish Historical Society)
(Eski Türk Tarih Kurumu Başkanı)

Prof. Dr. Justin MCCARTHY
(University of Louisville)
(Louisville Üniversitesi)

Dr. Jeremy SALT
(Bilkent University, Ret. Faculty Member)
(Bilkent Üniversitesi, E. Öğretim Üyesi)

Prof. Dr. Refik TURAN
(Fmr. President of Turkish Historical Society)
(Eski Türk Tarih Kurumu Başkanı)

Prof. Dr. Ömer TURAN
(Middle East Technical University - METU)
(Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi - ODTÜ)

Prof. Dr. Hakan YAVUZ
(Utah University)
(Utah Üniversitesi)

Review of Armenian Studies is published biannually and legally classified as a Turkey-wide periodical publication.

Review of Armenian Studies is a refereed journal. Review of Armenian Studies is indexed in the EBSCO and TUBITAK-ULAKBIM databases. Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The editorial/advisory board takes into consideration whether the submitted article follows the rules of scientific writing and grammar. The articles are sent to two referees known for their academic reputation in their respective areas. Upon their decision, the article will be published in the journal or rejected. The reports of the referees are kept confidential and stored in the journal's archives for five years.

This academic journal is edited by the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM) on behalf of Avrasya Bir Vakfı (1993), and published by Terazi Yayıncılık.

Publication Office

Terazi Yayıncılık Bas. Dağ. Dan. Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Abidin Daver Sok. No. 12/B Daire 4 06550 Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 • **Faks:** 0 (312) 438 50 26
www.avim.org.tr

e-ISSN: 2757-5845

Subscription Office

Hülya ÖNALP
Terazi Yayıncılık Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Süleyman Nazif Sok. No.12/B Daire 4 06550
Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 - **Fax:** 0 (312) 438 50 26
E-mail: terazi yayincilik@gmail.com

Design

Ruhi ALAGÖZ

Printing

Sonçağ Yayıncılık Matbaacılık
İstanbul Cad. İstanbul Çarşısı No: 48/48-49 İskitler / ANKARA

Printing Date: 8 December 2023

Annual Subscription Fee - Turkey: 200 TRY
Annual Subscription Fee - International: 60 USD

Please send your payment to the following bank account:

For TRY - Terazi Yayıncılık, Garanti Bankası-Çankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/6296007
Postal Check Account Ankara/Çankaya/Merkez 5859221

For USD - Garanti Bankası- Çankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/9086957
IBAN: TR60 0006 2000 1810 009 0869 57

Statements of facts or opinions appearing in Review of Armenian Studies are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the editor, managing editor, or publisher.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written authorization of the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM).

Review of Armenian Studies yılda iki kez yayımlanır. Yaygın Süreli Yayın.

Review of Armenian Studies hakemli bir dergidir. Review of Armenian Studies dergisi TÜBİTAK ULAKBİM ve EBSCO tarafından taranmaktadır. Yayıma sunulan makaleler hakem denetimine tabi tutulur. Gönderilen yazılar ilk olarak yayın/danışma kurulunca bilimsel anlatım ve yazım kuralları yönünden incelenir. Daha sonra uygun bulunan yazılar, alanında bilimsel çalışmaları ile tanınmış iki ayrı hakeme gönderilir. Hakemlerin kararları doğrultusunda yazı yayımlanır ya da yayımlanmaz. Hakemlerin gizli tutulan raporları derginin arşivlerinde beş yıl süre ile tutulur.

Bu akademik dergi, Avrasya Bir Vakfı (1993) adına Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi (AVİM) tarafından hazırlanmakta ve Terazi Yayıncılık tarafından basılmaktadır.

Yayın İdare Merkezi

Terazi Yayıncılık Bas. Dağ. Dan. Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Abidin Daver Sok. No. 12/B Daire 4 06550 Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 • **Faks:** 0 (312) 438 50 26
www.avim.org.tr

e-ISSN: 2757-5845

Abone Sorumlusu

Hülya ÖNALP
Terazi Yayıncılık Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Süleyman Nazif Sok. No.12/B Daire 4 06550
Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 - **Fax:** 0 (312) 438 50 26
E-mail: terazi yayincilik@gmail.com

Sayfa Düzeni

Ruhi ALAGÖZ

Baskı

Sonçağ Yayıncılık Matbaacılık
İstanbul Cad. İstanbul Çarşısı No: 48/48-49 İskitler / ANKARA

Baskı Tarihi: 8 Aralık 2023

Yurtiçi Yıllık Abone Ücreti: 200 TL
Yurtdışı Yıllık Abone Ücreti: 60 USD

Aşağıdaki banka/posta çeki hesap numaralarına ödeme yapabilirsiniz:

Terazi Yayıncılık, Garanti Bankası-Çankaya/ANKARA Şubesi 181/6296007
Posta Çeki Hesabı: Ankara/Çankaya/Merkez 5859221
IBAN: TR60 0006 2000 1810 009 0869 57

Aksi belirtilmediği sürece Review of Armenian Studies'de yayımlanan yazılarda belirtilen olay ve fikirler sadece yazarına aittir. Editörünü, sorumlu yazı işleri müdürünü veya yayın sahibini bağlamaz.

Tüm hakları saklıdır. Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi'den (AVİM) önceden yazılı izin alınmaksızın hiçbir iletişim, kopyalama sistemi kullanılarak yeniden baskısı yapılamaz. Akademik ve haber amaçlı kısa alıntılar bu kuralın dışındadır.

CONTENTS*(İÇİNDEKİLER)*

	Page
Contributors	5
<i>(Yazarlar)</i>	
Editorial Note	7
<i>(Editörün Notu)</i>	
ARTICLES	9
<i>(MAKALELER)</i>	
Facts and Comments	9
<i>(Olaylar ve Yorumlar)</i>	
Editorial / <i>Başyazı</i>	
Alev KILIÇ	
An Analysis of the Activities and Goals of Armenian Terrorist Organizations Between 1973-1986	63
<i>(1973-1986 Yılları Arasında Ermeni Terör Örgütlerinin Faaliyet ve Hedeflerinin Analizi)</i>	
Research Article / <i>Araştırma Makalesi</i>	
Elterişhan ELÇİBEY	
Indian Armenians from the Past to the Present.....	85
<i>(Geçmişten Günümüze Hindistan Ermenileri)</i>	
Research Article / <i>Araştırma Makalesi</i>	
Fatma Jale Gül ÇORUK	
An Armenian Revolutionary from Istanbul to Marseille: Kaspar Nalbandian.....	109
<i>(İstanbul'dan Marsilya'ya Sivaslı Bir Ermeni İhtilalci: Kaspar Nalbandian)</i>	
Research Article / <i>Araştırma Makalesi</i>	
Serap BOZPOLAT AYAN	
TRANSLATION	127
<i>(ÇEVİRİ)</i>	
The Armenian Revolt in Van: Insights from Military History Documents	127
<i>(Askerî Tarih Belgelerine Göre Van'da Ermeni İsyanı Günlüğü)</i>	
Güzin ÇAYKIRAN	

Contributors

Ambassador (R) Alev KILIÇ graduated from the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University in 1968. The next year, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Kılıç served as Ambassador to F.R. of Yugoslavia between 1996 and 1998 and Ambassador/Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg between 1998 and 2001. In 2001-2004, he served as the Deputy Undersecretary for Economic Affairs of the Ministry. He served as Ambassador to Switzerland (2004-2009) and Ambassador to Mexican United States (2009-2011). He retired from the Ministry in 2011. Ambassador (R) Kılıç has been the Director of Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM) since 2013.



Dr. Fatma Jale Gül ÇORUK completed her undergraduate degree in the Department of Turkish Language and Literature at Gazi University's Faculty of Science and Literature. She obtained two Master's degrees; one from the Department of Folklore of Gazi University's Institute of Social Sciences with the dissertation titled "Kayseri Esnafının Kent Kimliği Oluşumuna Etkisi" ("The Effects of the Kayseri Tradespeople on the Formation of City Identity"), and the other from the Department of Armenian Language and Culture of Ankara University's Graduate School of Social Sciences with the dissertation titled "Hiciv Üzerine Bir Çalışma (Türk, İngiliz ve Ermeni Edebiyatları Örneğinde)" ("A Study on Satire (Based on Examples in Turkish, English, and Armenian Literatures)"). She obtained her Doctoral degree again from the Department of Armenian Language and Culture of Ankara University's Graduate School of Social Sciences with the dissertation titled "Osmanlı Çeviri Geleneğinde Ermeni Çevirmenler ve Çeviri Sorunları" ("Armenian Translators and Problems in Translation in the Ottoman Translation Tradition").



Dr. Çoruk has conducted research on translation studies, Armenian culture, folklore, and Turkish literature. She served in various academic posts: as a part-time Instructor of Turkish Language at Gazi University between September 2007 and January 2010, as an Instructor of Turkish Language at Kırıkkale University between January 2010 and October 2011, and again as an Instructor of Turkish Language at the Turkish Command for Gendarmerie Schools. Since September 2014, she has been serving as a Research Assistant at the Department of Caucasian Languages and Cultures of Ankara University's Language and History-Geography Faculty.


Elterişhan ELÇİBEY graduated from the Department of International Relations of Middle East Technical University (METU) in 2022 as a saluatorian. After receiving his Bachelor's degree, he started to pursue a Master's degree in 2023 in the Department of International Relations of Ankara University's Graduate School of Social Sciences. During his undergraduate studies, he wrote a non-compulsory bachelor's dissertation titled "Multi-vector Character of Belarusian Foreign Policy and Belarus-Russia Relations". In 2021, he was nominated as an exchange student by the School of Politics and International Studies of the University of Leeds. He has written several academic articles in biannual periodicals and peer-reviewed journals including the *Eurasian World* journal. His research interests are Public International Law, Post-Soviet Studies, and Energy Diplomacy.



Doctorand Serap BOZPOLAT AYAN completed her primary and secondary education in Sivas and received her undergraduate education at the Department of History of Sivas Cumhuriyet University's Faculty of Letters in 2004. She completed her Master's degree in the Department of Modern History at the Social Sciences Institute of the same university by successfully defending her dissertation titled "Tanzimat'tan Önce Sivas'ta Gayrimüslimler" ("Non-Muslims in Sivas Before Tanzimat/Ottoman Reorganization") in 2007. She subsequently began her doctoral studies in the same field and is currently in the dissertation phase of her studies. She served as a member of the governing board of the Sivas Branch of the Turkish Hearths between 2013 and 2023. Her research focuses on Turkish Revolutionary History, Ottoman social structure, the Armenian Question, and Azerbaijani history. Since 2005, she has been serving as a Lecturer at Sivas Cumhuriyet University's Department of Atatürk's Principles and History of the Turkish Revolution.



Assoc. Prof. Dr. Güzin ÇAYKIRAN graduated from the Department of History of Erciyes University in 2004. Between 2004-2005, she received Armenian language education at the Department of the Armenian Language and Culture of Ankara University. In 2011, she completed her Master's degree in History of the Republic of Türkiye. In 2020, she completed her PhD education at the Department of History of the Republic of Türkiye of Gazi University. She also received a Bachelor's degree in Sociology during this process. Çaykiran became an Associate Professor in History of the Republic of Türkiye in August 2023. She mainly conducts research on the 1915 Events and military history. She speaks Ottoman Turkish, English, and Armenian.



As always, the first article in the 48th issue of our journal is “**Facts and Comments**”. This article covers the period of June-November 2023 of the internal developments in Armenia, the international standing and relations of Armenia, Azerbaijan’s establishment of sovereignty over the entirety of Karabakh with the anti-terrorist operation launched on 19 September, the transport corridor of Zangezur, and the bilateral relations of Türkiye and Armenia. The article emphasizes Russia’s weakening interest and impact in the region stemming from its war with Ukraine, the strategy of the West to distract Russia on a second front as well as its initiative to align Armenia on its side with a view to reducing the influence of Russia in the South Caucasus, and Prime Minister Pashinyan’s green light to the West’s approach at the expense of alienating Russia. The article also considers the “Peace Crossroads” project announced by Armenia in November, which has raised the optimism that a solution to the transport issue could be at hand.

In his article titled “**An Analysis of the Activities and Goals of Armenian Terrorist Organizations between 1973-1986**”, Elterişhan Elçibey mentions that the terrorism perpetrated by Armenian radicals in the past against Turkish targets was the result of a hostile Armenian nationalism based upon anti-Turkish sentiment with the aim of attaining short-term political gains. Elçibey indicates that transnational Armenian terrorist activities reached their zenith when these activities turned out to be a grave threat to multiple countries rather than to specific countries such as Türkiye. He highlights that the terrorist organizations of the Armenian radicals carried out more than 300 terrorist acts in 20 different countries in less than 20 years, primarily against Turkish targets. He argues that between 1973 and 1986, these organizations came to be known as the world’s most dangerous and notorious groups.

In her article titled “**Indian Armenians from the Past to the Present**”, Fatma Jale Gül Çoruk seeks to present a holistic perspective on Indo-Armenian relations from the ancient times up to the modern times. She discusses when and how the relations began in the historical process, the reasons for and the details of the process that led the Armenians to India, as well as the formation stages of the Armenian settlement centers in India. In addition, she discusses in detail the cities with the densest Armenian settlements and the social, political, religious, and commercial activities of the Armenians in those places. Lastly, Çoruk presents information on the commercial and military foundations of today’s Armenia-India relations.

In her article titled “**An Armenian Revolutionary from Istanbul to Marseille: Kaspar Nalbandian**”, Serap Bozpolat Ayan makes extensive use of archive documents to study Ottoman authorities’ intense pursuit of Kaspar Nalbandian, a member of the Armenian revolutionary movement against the Ottoman Empire. She indicates that Sivas was important for the Armenian community living in the Ottoman Empire due to substantial numbers of Armenians inhabiting the region and that it became one of the important centers of the Armenian revolutionary movements in the Empire. Members of Armenian political organizations from Sivas -which included Nalbandian- came to operate outside the province as well, encompassing the rest of the Ottoman lands and beyond. Bozpolat Ayan’s study attempts to provide insights into the functioning of the state mechanisms on these issues, and to present the journey of an Armenian individual to offer glimpses on the Armenian movements in the era.

Our 48th issue also contains the translation of a Turkish language article titled “**Askerî Tarih Belgelerine Göre Van’da Ermeni İsyanı Günlüğü**” (“The Armenian Revolt in Van: Insights from Military History Documents”) by Güzin Çaykırın. Çaykırın examines the daily progression of the Van Revolt of 1915 initiated by the Armenian revolutionary committees in the Ottoman city of Van, shedding light on military history documents (war reports) and revealing the impact of this revolt on both Muslims and Armenians.

Have a nice reading and best regards,

Editor

EDITORIAL / BAŞYAZI

To cite this article: Alev Kılıç, “Facts and Comments”, *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 48 (2023): 9-62.

Received: 04.12.2023

Accepted: 06.12.2023

FACTS AND COMMENTS

(OLAYLAR VE YORUMLAR)

Alev KILIÇ*

Abstract: *This article covers the period of June-November 2023 of the internal developments in Armenia, the international standing and relations of Armenia, the progress in concluding the peace agreement following the establishment of full sovereignty of Azerbaijan in Karabakh and the bilateral relations of Türkiye and Armenia in the light of the process of normalization of their relations.*

During the period, the main concern and strive of Armenia was focused on the availability of modifying the cease-fire agreement of 9 November 2020 that ended the Second Karabakh War (44-day War), through a peace agreement to its favor to the extent possible. The third party to the cease-fire agreement and supervisor of the implementation of the agreement, Russia's weakening interest and impact in the region stemming from its war with Ukraine on the one hand and the strategy of the West to distract Russia on a second front as well as its initiative to align Armenia on its side with a view to reducing the influence of Russia in the South Caucasus has received a positive response from Armenia.

Prime Minister Pashinyan, who was elected on a pro-West platform has given the green light to this initiative of the West at the expense of alienating Russia, whereby peace agreement negotiations with Azerbaijan have

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5180-2896>
Ambassador (R), Director of the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM)
Email: akilic@avim.org.tr

primarily moved on to Brussels and Washington D.C., leaving Moscow at a secondary status. When this process encouraged by the West started initially in a balanced manner, but inherent in its nature and possibly due to promises made to Armenia, deviated to a biased pro-Armenian course, it has caused Azerbaijan to keep its distance and eventually to refuse to attend the invitations.

The 24-hour military operation of Azerbaijan on 19 September which brought the end of the separatist administration in Karabakh and established its full sovereignty on the whole territory of Karabakh has thus removed the major hurdle before the peace agreement. However, three points of dispute; the demarcation of borders and a sub-item under this heading, the enclaves within Armenia, the return of refugees to their homelands on a reciprocal basis, and the opening of the transport corridor of Zangezur have kept their places in the agenda. The “Crossroads of Peace” Project Armenia announced in November has raised the optimism that a solution to the transport issue could be at hand.

However, the double discourse on part of Armenia, on the one hand alleging that Azerbaijan committed ethnic cleansing by forced migration of Karabakh Armenians and also alleging that Azerbaijan is planning an assault to “Western Azerbaijan”, disparaging Azerbaijan with false accusations at all international forums, yet on the other hand presenting itself as the only party whose singular desire and aim is to establish peace; has dimmed chances for an early conclusion of a peace agreement.

Relations with Türkiye have kept their positive impetus in line and tandem with the development in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Keywords: Pashinyan, Mirzoyan, Grigoryan, Asriyan, Putin, Erdogan, Lavrov, Fidan, Blinken, Michel, Karabakh, Zangezur corridor, Crossroads of Peace, ICJ, CSTO.

Öz: *Bu incelemede Haziran-Kasım 2023 tarihleri döneminde Ermenistan'daki iç gelişmeler, dış dinamikler, Azerbaycan'ın Karabağ üzerindeki egemenliğini sağlaması sonrası barış anlaşması sürecindeki gelişmeler ile Türkiye-Ermenistan arasındaki ilişkiler ve normalleşme sürecinin seyri ele alınmaktadır.*

Dönem içinde Ermenistan'ın başlıca uğraşı ve kaygısı İkinci Karabağ Savaşı (44 Günlük Savaşı) sona erdiren 9 Kasım 2020 ateşkes anlaşmasını olabildiğince lehine çevirebilecek bir barış anlaşması arayışı içinde geçmiştir. Ateşkes anlaşmasının üçüncü tarafı ve uygulanmasının gözetimini üstlenen Rusya'nın Ukrayna savaşı nedeniyle bölgeye ilgisinin ve etkisinin zayıflaması, Batının ise Rusya'ya ikinci bir cephe açmak, Rusya'nın güney Kafkaslardaki

nüfuzunu azaltmak üzere Ermenistan'ı yanına çekme girişimleri Ermenistan'da olumlu karşılık bulmuştur.

Esasen Batı yanlısı bir platformla yönetime gelen Başbakan Paşinyan Batının bu yaklaşımına, Rusya'yı karşısına almak pahasına, yeşil ışık yakmış, Azerbaycan ile barış anlaşması görüşmeleri, Moskova'nın ikinci plana düştüğü, Brüksel ve Vaşington odaklı yürütülmeye başlanmıştır. Batının başta dengeli olarak başlattığı bu süreç, doğası icabı ve muhtemelen Ermenistan'a bulunulan vaatlerden dolayı, Ermeni yanlısı bir çizgiye girince, Azerbaycan Batının girişimlerine tavır koymaya ve davetlerine katılmamaya başlamıştır.

Azerbaycan'ın 19 Eylül'de 24 saatlik bir askerî harekât ile Karabağ'daki ayrılıkçı yönetime son vermesi ve Karabağ'ın bütünü üzerinde egemenliğini tesis etmesi, barış anlaşması önündeki en büyük engeli ortadan kaldırmış, ancak üç sorunlu konu: sınırların tespiti ve bunun bir alt başlığı olarak Ermenistan içindeki anklavlar, göç eden nüfusun karşılıklı olarak geri dönmeleri ve Zangezur ulaşım koridoru konusu gündemdeki yerini korumaya devam etmiştir. Ermenistan'ın Kasım ayında geliştirdiği "Barış Kavşakları" projesi ulaşım sorununun da çözülebileceği iyimserliği uyandırmıştır.

Bununla beraber, Ermenistan yetkililerinin iki yüzlü söylemi, bir yandan Azerbaycan'ın Karabağ Ermenilerini göçe zorlayarak "etnik temizlik" yaptıkları ve Azerbaycan'ın "Batı Azerbaycan"a saldırı planları içinde olduğu yolunda sahte suçlamalarla bütün ikili temaslarında ve uluslararası forumlarda Azerbaycan'ı kötülemesi, diğer taraftan barış havarisini kesilerek, barışı isteyen ve hedefleyen tek taraf olduklarını ileri sürerek, kısa zamanda bir barış anlaşmasının imzalanması ümitlerini soldürmüştür.

Türkiye ile ilişkiler barış anlaşması sürecindeki gelişmeye bağlı ve paralel olarak olumlu beklenti anlayışını sürdürmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Paşinyan, Mirzoyan, Grigoryan, Asriyan, Putin, Erdoğan, Lavrov, Fidan, Blinken, Michel, Karabağ, Zangezur koridoru, Barış Kavşakları, UAD, KGAÖ.

1. Domestic Developments in Armenia

The peace agreement process and this process' problematic sub-headings, Karabakh and the the status of Karabakh Armenians, mutual claims over border demarcation with Azerbaijan, the Lachin corridor link, transportation from the Zangezur corridor, and the status of the Armenian population that fled from Karabakh were key issues that occupied Armenia's internal political agenda during this period and mobilized the opposition against the government.

Tensions between the Armenian Administration and Armenian Apostolic Church flared up once again during the beginning of this period. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sternly warned the Church, which continues to criticize the administration's actions, not to interfere in politics. The Church officials, on the other hand, did not relent and reiterated that they would continue to state what they knew to be true. A statement was made on 8 June at the regular meeting of the Supreme Spiritual Council chaired by the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin Karekin II, criticizing Pashinyan's peace agreement process. Additionally, claims were made that the honor of the state was disgraced and that the nation was humiliated. It was noted that the right to self-determination of the illegal, self-proclaimed state of "Artsakh" cannot be renounced under any circumstance.

Similar anti-administration protests and declarations by the opposition, which were evoked by the Dashnaksutyun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation-ARF) party, displayed a tendency to intensify from the beginning of the period. During a speech on 13 June, the ARF leader called on the opposition to engage in joint demonstrations and actions throughout the summer. The ARF additionally escalated its oppositional activities against Pashinyan and the administration within the Armenian Diaspora as well. Consequently, some ARF Diaspora militants were prevented from entering Armenia and sent back from Yerevan airport.

Prime Minister Pashinyan's meeting with President Vahagn Khachaturyan at the end of May was covered in detail in the press. It was expressed that the administration is united, that there is no disorder. The President made the following statement:

"First of all, Mr. Prime Minister, I want to once again express my support to you and the Government regarding the policy that you implement together with the government, which is aimed at establishing peace in the region. In connection with this, last week was important for our political life, starting with the meeting in Brussels, after which you clearly expressed the view of the government of the Republic of Armenia, according to which we recognize the territorial integrity of

Azerbaijan and expect the same from Azerbaijan. I think this was a very important statement. [...] ¹

In turn, the Prime Minister stated the following: “In this regard, I can testify that a very constructive cooperation has been established between the president-parliament-government trio, which is very important especially in this period.”

On 15 June, a former education minister and a mayor were arrested within the scope of ongoing corruption charges against former executives.² The former Armenian Defense Chief, who was arrested on corruption charges, was denied release and the court ordered his continued detention on 30 August.³

Against the backdrop of the war with Azerbaijan, ongoing tensions due to failure to sign a peace agreement, small-scale clashes on the border from time to time, the Karabakh Armenians issue dominating the agenda, and the escalation of demonstrations and protests against the Pashinyan administration, the municipal elections in the capital Yerevan on 17 September have been reliable and essential political indicators. The two main opposition parties decided not to participate in the elections and the turnout was very low (only %28.46). None of the candidates secured the required majority of votes. Although the ruling party was far ahead of its closest contender, it lost its majority with only 24 members in the 65-seat Municipal Council because of its %32.5 vote percentage. Thus, it had to form an alliance for its candidate to be elected as mayor. As a result, ruling party candidate Tigran Avinyan was elected as mayor on 10 October. The main opposition, which has abstained from the democratic contest for power against the Pashinyan administration, commented on the election results that the ruling party fell short by having only 80,000 votes this time, while it received 294,092 votes in the 2018 elections.

Upon Azerbaijan establishing sovereignty over all of Karabakh on 19 September, large-scale demonstrations and protest attempts started in Yerevan. Police intervention led to clashes. The migration of Karabakh Armenians to Armenia constituted the most important and prioritized subject and problem in the country during the period. Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson announced on 4 October that the number of people coming from

1 “Prime Minister Pashinyan Meets with President Khachaturyan”, *Prime Minister of Armenia*, May 29, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/05/29/Nikol-Pashinyan-met-with-Vahagn-Khachaturyan/>

2 Grisha Balasanyan, “Yerevan Police Arrest Former Education Minister for Money Laundering”, *Hetq*, June 15, 2023, <https://hetq.am/en/article/157170>

3 Artak Khulian, “Former Armenian Defense Chief To Remain In Jail”, *Azatoryun*, August 30, 2023, <https://www.azatoryun.am/a/32571274.html>

Karabakh was 100,632.⁴ Given Armenia's track record of manipulating numbers, these figures should be noted with "caution" at this stage. On one hand, a high number could strengthen Armenia's and its supporters' pervasive allegations of "ethnic cleansing". On the other hand, it could create justification for an increase in the requested foreign aid to the refugees. Azerbaijan, which keeps a record of those who have left, has not made a statement regarding the figures. The reason for this caution stems from the possible accusations that Azerbaijan may face in the case of a low number of departures, taking into account the narrative of 120,000 indigenous Armenian population in Karabakh, which is generally accepted by Armenia and its supporters.

The Armenian administration stated that the fact that Armenians from Karabakh hold Armenian passports does not mean that they are entitled to Armenian citizenship and that they can only be granted migrant status under temporary protection. It was even declared that they would not be able to benefit from the social assistance and payments made to them while they were in Karabakh, amounting to approximately 30 million US Dollars a month. However, this decision was reversed. It is understood that the reason for this approach of the administration is to force these refugees to return. Intense pressure on Azerbaijan in this context has already been instigated by Armenia's Western supporters. In principle, Azerbaijan invites these people to stay in their homes as Azerbaijani citizens, but does not prevent them from leaving voluntarily. However, at this stage of events, it is understood that Azerbaijan will demand "retaliation in kind" for the Azerbaijanis, who were forced to leave and are wishing to return to their homes and homelands in Armenia.

In December 2022, the law on the establishment of a new "Foreign Intelligence Service" within the security and intelligence system of Armenia was adopted. With the appointment of Kristine Grigoryan as the head of this service on 4 October, the institution became operational.⁵

On 30 October, during the budget talks in the parliament, Pashinyan stated that the defense budget for 2024 will be significantly increased, with a %125 increase compared to the 2018 budget.⁶

In early June, Pashinyan appointed a thirteen-member high-level working group to address the issue of building a new nuclear power plant to replace the

4 "Number of Forcibly Displaced Persons from NK Stands at 100,632", *Armenpress*, October 4, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1121185.html>

5 Naira Bulghadarian, "Armenia's First Foreign Intelligence Chief Named After 'Training'", *Azatoryun*, October 5, 2023, <https://www.azatoryun.am/a/32624669.html>

6 "Armenian PM Says Increasing Defense Spending is for Preparing for Peace", *Arka.am*, November 16, 2023, https://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenian_pm_says_increasing_defense_spending_is_for_preparing_for_peace/

Metsamor nuclear power station. Providing about 40% of Armenia's power generation, it has been operational since 1980 and has an extended lifespan until 2036. The Russian company Rosatom, which recently upgraded the plant's 420-megawatt reactor, has shown interest in the issue. On the other hand, the US has also taken a close interest in the matter. As part of the "Strategic Nuclear Cooperation" memorandum of understanding signed by Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan during his visit to the United States (the US) in May 2022, the US NuScale Power Corps offered to renovate the plant with small modular reactors (SMRS).⁷ This initiative also aims to reduce Armenia's energy dependence on Russia.

The International Monetary Fund Board of Governors completed its preliminary examination on 13 June, in accordance with the Stand-By agreement. As a result, Armenia will be able to receive a further 18.4 million more of SDR (Special Drawing Rights). This brings the total SDR received to 36.8 million (approximately 49 million Dollars).

On 13 June, the Central Bank announced 6.9% growth for 2023.⁸ The Armenian Minister of Finance, on the other hand, announced on 30 October that growth of at least 7.2% will be achieved in 2023, and a 7% growth is predicted for 2024.⁹

The noteworthy activity in Armenia's economy has been linked in particular to the increase in trade transactions with Russia and Iran. Exports from Armenia to Russia tripled in 2022 and in January-May 2023.¹⁰ These exports mainly consisted of goods produced in third countries and exported through Armenia to Russia, which is under sanctions due to the Ukraine war. Likewise, according to Iran's official data, Iran's exports to Armenia increased by 38.4% in the 21 March-21 June quarter compared to the same period of the previous year. Iran's non-oil exports to Armenia increased by 62.5% in one year, amounting to 478 million Dollars.¹¹ Having the need to intervene in this situation, the US, in the framework of its developing close multilateral relations, sent the Head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination of its

7 Robert Zargarian, "Armenian Task Force To Explore Nuclear Plant Options", *Azattyun*, June 8, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32450621.html>

8 "Armenian Central Bank Raises 2023 Economic Growth Forecast to 6.9%", *Interfax*, June 13, 2023, <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/91398/>

9 "Armenia's Economy will Grow by 7.2% in 2023 and by 7% in 2024 - Finance Minister", *Arka News Agency*, October 30, 2023, https://arka.am/en/news/economy/armenia_s_economy_will_grow_by_7_2_in_2023_and_by_7_in_2024_finance_minister/

10 "Armenia Sees Continued Surge In Trade With Russia", *Azattyun*, July 12, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32500512.html>

11 "Export from Iran to Armenia Increases over 38% in Q1", *Tehran Times*, July 25, 2023, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/487237/Export-from-Iran-to-Armenia-increases-over-38-in-Q1>

Department of State to Yerevan at the end of June and initiated an evaluation of this situation.¹²

2. Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Agreement Process

Three years after the cease-fire agreement signed in Moscow in November 2020, the fact that a peace agreement has still not been signed continued to be an obstacle that affects and restricts regional relations as well as Armenia-Azerbaijan bilateral relations, and going beyond this, becoming a global agenda issue. The regional countries Russia and Iran, which the US Department of State spokesperson once described as “unreliable partners”, had no complaints about the perpetuation of the impasse and made efforts to keep away non-regional countries. Both these factors also contributed to the prolongation of the process. The problem regarding the status of Karabakh and the Armenians living there, which was the most critical obstacle to a peace agreement, was resolved gradually over the period, and finally on 19 September, by a 24-hour military intervention by Azerbaijan.

During a press conference in Yerevan on 22 May, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced in crystal clear terms that he had agreed to recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty in Karabakh through the peace agreement being worked on between the two countries.¹³ Thus, the territorial integrity pillar of the problem was clarified. The issue of the status of Armenians living in Karabakh remained as the other pillar awaiting a solution. Therefore, this case was concluded on 19 September. As expected, Pashinyan’s announcement was harshly condemned by the opposition. Moreover, Karabakh Armenians expressed their anger and frustration even more vigorously, claiming that this decision constituted a violation of the Declaration of Independence and the Armenian constitution. Critics believed that such an agreement would be devoid of legal basis. The leader of the Dashnaksutyun (ARF) party, which is leading the opposition and known for its radical actions and rhetoric, declared that they would utilize every means to scuttle this plan, which meant the surrender not only of Karabakh but also of Armenia.¹⁴

The two highest ranking Armenian clergymen, the Catholicoses of Etchmiadzin and Cilicia (situated in Antelias/Lebanon), issued separate statements in which

12 Siranush Ghazanchyan, “Head of US Sanctions Coordination Office, Ambassador James C. O’Brien Visits Armenia”, *Public Radio of Armenia*, June 29, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/06/29/head-of-us-sanctions-coordination-office-ambassador-james-c-obrien-visits-armenia/>

13 Siranush Ghazanchyan, “Head of US Sanctions Coordination Office, Ambassador James C. O’Brien Visits Armenia”, *Public Radio of Armenia*, June 29, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/06/29/head-of-us-sanctions-coordination-office-ambassador-james-c-obrien-visits-armenia/>

14 Astghik Bedevian, “Armenian Opposition Signals Protests Against ‘Karabakh’s Surrender’”, *Azatutyun*, May 22, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32424296.html>

they described Pashinyan's statement as "unacceptable". Additionally, they made provocative statements that the right to self-determination of the illegal Karabakh Armenian administration, which they defined as the "Artsakh Republic", could not be given up.¹⁵ Following this, publications began widely circulating in Christian media outlets, regardless of whether they were Catholic, Evangelical, or Orthodox, evaluating and supporting the subject and the problem on the basis of a clash of religions. The severity of such publications increased during the period, reaching to claims that "Ancient Christian Enclave Faces Genocide by Starvation",¹⁶ and that "Armenians were subjected to genocide for the second time". This group also recruited Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the shady former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and used his report of 7 August, which stated that Azerbaijan's actions amounted to genocide, as legal evidence.¹⁷

Immediately following the meetings held in Washington DC and Brussels in May, a third trilateral meeting was held in Moscow on 25 May, at the invitation of President of Russia Vladimir Putin, to discuss a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Putin, who also met bilaterally with the leaders of the two countries, said that the differences between the two countries were "purely technical" and "surmountable" and that the deputy prime ministers of the two countries should find solutions to them.¹⁸ Ultimately, no concrete progress was made there either.

The US Special Envoy to the region, Louis Bono, visited the two countries on 25-26 May and held high-level talks, signaling the US's continued interest and determination to play a leading role.¹⁹ It was noteworthy that Bono's title included the designation of US Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is de facto obsolete.

As a result of the negative response, as well as the conditions put forth to Azerbaijan's invitation, which was forwarded to the representatives of the Karabakh Armenian population to meet for a discussion of the other Karabakh conflict pillar awaiting a solution, Azerbaijani President İlham Aliyev issued a warning on 28 May. He stated that they could be pardoned only if the

15 "Armenian Church Again Warns Against 'Humiliating' Peace Deal," *Azattyun*, June 12, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32455807.html>

16 Gina Christian, "Ancient Christian Enclave Faces 'Genocide by Starvation,' Says Armenian Catholic Bishop", *CNEWA*, September 11, 2023, <https://cnewa.org/ca/ancient-christian-enclave-faces-genocide-by-starvation-says-armenian-catholic-bishop/>

17 "Exclusive: Nagorno-Karabakh Exodus was Genocide, says Former ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo", *Armenpress*, November 9, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1123809.html>

18 "Putin Hosts Fresh Talks Between Pashinian, Aliyev," *Azattyun*, May 26, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32428164.html>

19 "US Envoy Again Visits Armenia, Azerbaijan," *Mirror Spectator*, June 1, 2023, <https://mirrorspectator.com/2023/06/01/us-envoy-again-visits-armenia-azerbaijan/>

“parliament” was dissolved, the “president” surrendered, and all “ministers”, “deputies”, and other officials resigned.²⁰ Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to this warning, claiming that Azerbaijan was not only threatening the Karabakh Armenians with “ethnic cleansing” but also preparing for a new attack.²¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan rejected these allegations and stated that Azerbaijan intended to take all necessary steps to reintegrate the local Armenian population in Karabakh. A US Department of State spokesperson announced on 30 May that they welcomed Aliyev’s declaration of amnesty.²² The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed indignation at the US praise for Aliyev’s declaration. The illegal administration of Karabakh also voiced deep disappointment and astonishment.²³

On 6 July, the Karabakh separatist administration also rejected Azerbaijan’s call to demobilize its armed forces. A senior official stated that it was essential to maintain the defense army at a crucial time for the country’s survival. The President of the National Assembly of Armenia, Alen Simonyan, stated that some EU partners had applied to the “European Peace Fund” to purchase military equipment but received no positive response.²⁴

On the occasion of the second meeting of the European Political Community in Chisinau, Moldova, on 1 June, President of the European Council Charles Michel organized a five-party meeting between the parties, attended by the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany. After the meeting, Michel said that it was a good preparation for the next meeting in Brussels on 21 July.²⁵

The trilateral meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs that was planned to be held in Washington on 12 June was postponed at the last minute. The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated that the meeting was postponed at the request of Azerbaijan.²⁶ No statement was made by Azerbaijan

20 “Azerbaijani President Gives Ultimatum to Karabakh Authorities,” *Eurasianet*, May 30, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijani-president-gives-ultimatum-to-karabakh-authorities>

21 “EU Urges Dialogue Between Azerbaijan, Karabakh Armenians,” *Azattyun*, May 30, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32435480.html>

22 “Continued Peace Talks Between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” *U.S. Department of State*, May 30, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/continued-peace-talks-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan/>

23 “Karabakh ‘Deeply Disappointed’ By U.S. Statement”, *Azattyun*, June 1, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32438800.html>

24 “EU Has Denied Military Aid to Armenia”, *Asbarez*, July 5, 2023, <https://asbarez.com/eu-has-denied-military-aid-to-armenia/>

25 “Remarks by President Charles Michel after his Meeting with the Leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, France and Germany”, *European Council*, June 1, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/01/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-after-his-meeting-with-the-leaders-of-armenia-azerbaijan-france-and-germany/>

26 Siranush Ghazanchyan, “New Round of Talks Postponed at the Request of Azerbaijan – Armenia MFA”, *Public Radio of Armenia*, June 8, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/06/08/new-round-of-talks-postponed-at-the-request-of-azerbaijani-sidd-armenia-mfa/>

or the US. The US Department of State spokesperson explained that the postponement was due to a scheduling problem and that they hoped that a new date would be set as soon as possible.²⁷ On the other hand, the remarks made by the US Ambassador to the OSCE at a plenary session on 6 June caused serious discomfort on the Azerbaijani side according to the press. Azerbaijan demanded an explanation from Washington and Brussels and stated that it would decide from now on whether to continue the talks hosted by these parties depending on the response it receives.

In a televised speech broadcast on 3 June, the US Ambassador to Armenia stated “we believe and hope that it is possible” regarding whether Armenians in Karabakh could live under Azerbaijani rule. This was rigorously criticized and rejected by the Karabakh Armenian administration. The head of the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), which is known for its intensive lobbying activities in the US, especially towards members of the US Congress, has also taken the lead in this endeavor and issued a detailed statement targeting the US administration.

The postponed Washington trilateral meeting was held on 27-29 June. On the opening day of the meeting, Karabakh separatists opened fire on Azerbaijani troops. This incident signaled discontent with the possible realization of a peace agreement and was an attempt to undo the peace efforts. This meeting once again demonstrated that the US-sponsored peace agreement initiative brought together Russia, the Church, the separatists in Karabakh and the Dashnaksutyun party, which leads the radical opposition, on the same front. In his closing remarks after the meeting, US Secretary of State Blinken emphasized that much work remains in order to reach a final agreement. In a statement released by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 30 June, the Ministry reiterated that the two main issues on which no agreement could be reached were the demarcation of borders and the establishment of a dialogue between the Karabakh Armenian administration and Azerbaijan, and that the rights and security of Armenians in Karabakh should be guaranteed within the framework of an “international mechanism”.

When the trilateral talks with the EU failed during this period, the US invited the parties for a new trilateral meeting on 20 November. On 15 November, a Department of State official made a speech in the US Congress that was pro-Armenian and accusatory against Azerbaijan. On 16 November, the US Senate voted to cut off all military aid to Azerbaijan, prompting Azerbaijan to officially announce that it would not attend the meeting due to US bias.²⁸ The US

27 “U.S. Looks Forward to Rescheduling Postponed Armenia-Azerbaijan Talks in Washington”, *Armenpress*, June 14, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1113208/>

28 Siranush Ghazanchyan, “Azerbaijan Accuses US of Bias, Refuses to Participate in a Meeting with Armenian FM in Washington”, *Public Radio of Armenia*, November 16, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/11/16/azerbaijan-accuses-us-of-bias-refuses-to-participate-in-a-meeting-with-armenian-fm/>

Department of State spokesperson confirmed this in a statement on 17 December, expressing that the US supports the continuation of the negotiation process, whether here or elsewhere, wherever it takes place, and will continue to support the resolution of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia through peace talks.²⁹

On 9 June, Prime Minister Pashinyan held a bilateral meeting with Putin in Sochi, on the occasion of the Commonwealth of Independent States leaders' summit. This was the second meeting in 15 days, following a bilateral and trilateral meeting with Putin in Moscow on 25 May on the occasion of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting, where bilateral issues and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict were addressed.

In a written statement on 16 June, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson criticized the EU's decision to open three more observation centers in Armenia, claiming that the EU observation mission's main goal was to exclude Russia from the region. In its response, the EU observation mission recalled that it had been planned from the beginning that the 103-member mission would operate from six centers.³⁰

On 24 May, during a parliamentary session, Pashinyan conveyed that there was also an enclave issue with Azerbaijan, that there were some small villages and territories of this kind in the territory of both countries, and that they had not yet decided how to resolve this issue, whether to exchange or find another solution.³¹ This issue emerged as a sub-issue of the border demarcation work, which constituted another obstacle to a peace agreement during the period.

On 15 June, Armenia blamed the Russian peacekeepers for the clash that broke out at the checkpoint set up by Azerbaijan on the Lachin road next to the border with Armenia, when Azerbaijani border guards raised the Azerbaijani flag on the other side of the bridge adjacent to the checkpoint within the view range of the Russian peacekeepers, and accused them of remaining silent concerning the intervention in Armenian territory. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson described this criticism as "completely unjustified" and stated that the incident occurred because the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders had not yet been demarcated. The Armenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Russian Ambassador to Armenia and expressed its discontent. On the other

29 "Washington Reaffirms Support for Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks", *Azattyun*, November 17, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32688496.html>

30 "EUMA: From Very Beginning European Union Mission in Armenia is Fully Transparent about Its Plan", *News.am*, June 15, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/765530.html>

31 "Armenia, Azerbaijan Have Reciprocally Recognized the Existence of Enclaves", *Armenpress*, May 24, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1111678.html>

hand, in the aftermath of the conflict, Azerbaijan began to block the transportation of aid supplies to Karabakh through this route.

On 22 June, the governor of the US state of Kansas and a commander of the Kansas National Guard visited Armenia and were received by Pashinyan.³² Armenia's military ties with the US have been maintained through a partnership agreement signed in 2003. Armenia's Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Edvard Asriyan, visited the US on 17-18 July on the occasion of the 13th anniversary of this partnership and to hold talks.³³

The trilateral meeting scheduled for 21 July by European Council President Michel was brought forward and held in Brussels on 15 July. After this sixth EU-sponsored meeting, Michel announced in a press conference that the following issues were discussed:³⁴

- Sovereignty and territorial integrity: The Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders once again fully reconfirmed their respect for the other country's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Based on the understanding that Armenia's territory covers 29.800 km² and Azerbaijan's 86.600 km².
- Border delimitation: Both leaders reconfirmed their unequivocal commitment to the 1991 Almaty Declaration as a political framework for the delimitation.
- Connectivity: The work on this issue is ongoing.
- Humanitarian supplies: We discussed the situation of the Karabakh Armenian population and the situation around the Lachin corridor. The current state of affairs is clearly not sustainable and is in no one's interest.
- Rights and security: The population on the ground needs reassurances, first and foremost regarding their rights and security. In this context, I expressed the EU's encouragement for direct dialogue between Baku and representatives of Armenians living in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

32 "The Prime Minister Received the Governor of Kansas and the Commander of the National Guard", *Radar Armenia*, June 22, 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2574825954/>

33 "Chief of General Staff of Armenian Military Visits United States", *Armenpress*, July 18, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1115663/>

34 "Press Remarks by President Charles Michel Following Trilateral Meeting with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia", *European Council*, July 15, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/15/press-remarks-by-president-charles-michel-following-trilateral-meeting-with-president-aliyev-of-azerbaijan-and-prime-minister-pashinyan-of-armenia/>

- Detainees: We also discussed the issue of detainees. The leaders reconfirmed their commitment to the gentlemen's understanding that the release of soldiers who inadvertently cross to the other side would be facilitated.
- Follow-up: We agreed that our teams will remain in close contact to ensure concrete follow-up on what has been discussed today. I also reiterated my intention to invite the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders for another meeting in Brussels after the summer, as well as for another pentilateral meeting, with the participation also of the leaders of France and Germany, in Granada in the margins of the next European Political Community Summit.”

Statements made by Armenia and Azerbaijan following the meeting indicate that both sides continue to have different stances and priorities. Pashinyan expressed on 20 July that “no concrete results” could be achieved.³⁵

Russia did not hide its dismay with the EU-sponsored talks. In a statement released by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 15 July, it was stated that Armenia's recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory in the EU-sponsored talks held last October and May further complicated the problems in the region. In this context, the Ministry stated;

“We respect the sovereign decision of the leadership of Armenia, but it radically changed the fundamental conditions under which the declaration of the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan was signed on November 9, 2020, as well as the status of the Russian peacekeeping force deployed in the region”.

The statement also noted Russia's readiness to organize a trilateral foreign ministers' meeting in the near future, followed by a trilateral summit.³⁶

In a statement released by Armenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 17 July, it was reported that they had not received a meeting proposal from Russia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan reacted to the Russian Foreign Ministry's statement and emphasized the “unacceptability” of the attempt to impose interpretations and conditions on the fact that Karabakh is within the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan.

35 “Pashinyan: No Concrete Results From the Brussels Meeting”, *MassisPost*, July 20, 2023, <https://massispost.com/2023/07/pashinyan-no-concrete-results-from-the-brussels-meeting/>

36 “Russia Strongly Urges Azerbaijan to Unblock the Lachin Corridor”, *Armenpress*, July 15, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1115533.html>

At the invitation of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Moscow on 25 July and held bilateral and then trilateral talks with Lavrov. After the meeting, Lavrov expressed that the road to a peace agreement was not easy, that there were several complex and important issues to be resolved, and that he understood the need to persuade the Armenians in Karabakh to negotiate their rights with the Azerbaijani authorities as soon as possible within the framework of the rights recognized for ethnic minorities in international agreements. Thus, for the first time, Russia officially recognized Azerbaijan's sovereignty over the whole of Karabakh and that Karabakh Armenians stand under Azerbaijani rule. Russia also addressed the issue of the rights of Karabakh Armenians within the framework of existing international minority rights treaties, without mentioning any international mechanism. Lavrov noted that Azerbaijan was ready to recognize these rights on a reciprocal basis and that Armenia was ready to apply these agreements to its citizens. These statements led to speculation in the press as to whether Armenia was opening the door to the return of Azerbaijanis who had been forced to escape from there in the past. Lavrov also stated that there are plans to organize a trilateral summit of leaders later this year.³⁷

As part of their ongoing attitudes and statements against the Pashinyan administration, Armenians in Karabakh reiterated on 25 July their demand for the administration to abandon its rhetoric of recognizing Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and that they would not give up their right to self-determination. In a press conference on the same day, Pashinyan defended his decision to recognize Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, explaining that Armenia cannot protect Karabakh, is not in a position to "determine the fate" of the Karabakh people, and that the Armenian representatives of Karabakh themselves should be a party to negotiations with Azerbaijan, and that this should be done within the framework of an international mechanism.³⁸ Karabakh Armenians and Pashinyan's opponents in Armenia rejected this position, stating that the recognition of Azerbaijan's sovereignty would force Karabakh Armenians to leave the country. On 27 July, the Karabakh "parliament" also issued a call to United Nations member states to recognize its independence under the principle of the right to remedial secession.³⁹

37 Elena Teslova, "Armenian, Azerbaijani, Russian Foreign Ministers Discuss Karabakh Settlement", *Anadolu Agency*, July 25, 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/armenian-azerbaijani-russian-foreign-ministers-discuss-karabakh-settlement/2954256>

38 "Armenia Cannot Decide Nagorno-Karabakh People's Fate, Representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh Should be a Party to Negotiations, Pashinyan", *First Channel News*, July 25, 2023, <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/07/25/Armenia-cannot-decide-Nagorno-Karabakh-people-s-fate-representatives-of-Nagorno-Karabakh-should-be/967329>

39 "The Karabakh "Parliament" also Issued a Call to the United Nations Member States on July 27, Asking for Its Independence to be Recognized within the Scope of the Principle of the Right to Compensatory Secession", *Hetq*, July 27, 2023, <https://hetq.am/en/article/158507>

The EU welcomed Azerbaijan's proposal to find a solution to the obstacles encountered on the Lachin road, for an alternative route through the Agdam province to deliver food and other humanitarian aid to Karabakh. Armenia and Karabakh Armenians rejected the alternative route and blocked the food and aid convoy that Azerbaijan wanted to send via the Agdam road by placing concrete blocks on the road. The mayor of Askeran, at the entrance to the Agdam road, stated that "We don't want to get anything from our enemy". On 30 August, Azerbaijan also blocked the convoy that France wanted to send through the Lachin road, under the auspices of the Mayor of Paris. The Mayor called on President of France Emmanuel Macron to take the issue to the UN Security Council.⁴⁰ On 1 September, European Council President Michel called for bold compromises and suggested that the Lachin corridor should become fully operational and the Agdam road should be opened.⁴¹ In a statement issued by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was conveyed that the Lachin corridor as a link between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh was an agreed condition and that there was no alternative. Moreover, it was expressed that other possible transportation routes could be decided in negotiations between the Azerbaijani and Karabakh authorities within the framework of an international mechanism.

On 2 August, a spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized Pashinyan's 25 July press conference in which he said that Russia could no longer devote enough "energy and time" to the region due to the Ukraine war and questioned the continuation of the Russian peacekeeping force. The spokesperson stated that these remarks were far from reality, especially in light of the "series" of high-level meetings that Russia has organized recently. Calling Pashinyan's remarks on the Russian peacekeeping force "incomprehensible", the spokesperson said: "Does the Armenian leadership really think that this activity is not needed or not desirable? Do they want it to end? They must make up their minds. Unfortunately, we often see representatives of the Armenian leadership take an ambivalent position on several key issues. We wish there were no ambiguity on this issue."

On 30 August, the Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson lashed out at Armenia again, saying that the humanitarian crisis in Karabakh, which deepened after Azerbaijan blocked the Lachin corridor, was caused by Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan's recognition of Karabakh as Azerbaijan's territory. The spokesperson also recalled that this recognition

40 Tigran Hovsepiyan, "French Aid Convoy Barred From Entering Karabakh", *Azatutyun*, August 20, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32571631.html>

41 "Statement by the Spokesperson of Charles Michel, President of the European Council, Regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan", *European Council*, September 1, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/09/01/statement-by-the-spokesperson-of-charles-michel-president-of-the-european-council-regarding-armenia-and-azerbaijan/>

was formalized at the October 2022 and May 2023 meetings held under the auspices of the EU. Additionally, the spokesperson mentioned “We believe it’s inappropriate, wrong and unjustified to lay the responsibility for what happened on the Russian peacekeeping contingent”. The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted promptly, listing in detail Russia’s failure to fulfill its commitments, and stating that Russia’s comments “cause confusion and disappointment”.⁴²

On 31 August, the Armenian government ratified the “Agreement on the Status of the EU Mission in Armenia” signed between Armenia and the EU at Armenia’s request.⁴³

Arayik Harutyunyan, the President of the illegal “Artsakh Republic” in Karabakh, resigned on 31 August. In a statement, he explained that he had taken this decision in view of his contacts with local and foreign officials and the public.⁴⁴

On 1 September, the Pashinyan administration referred to parliament for ratification the Rome Statute on Armenia’s accession to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which Russia openly opposes and wants to see abandoned. On 5 September, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson announced that they had requested a statement from Armenia on this issue and that they would determine their next steps according to the response.⁴⁵ Russia described the parliamentary ratification of the Statute as a hostile act. On 14 October, the process was finalized with the approval of the President.⁴⁶

Pashinyan has adopted the method of publicizing his administration’s political approach, disposition and course through the international media channels which he considers well-known and close to him. In a long, comprehensive and detailed interview published in *La Repubblica* newspaper on 3 September, he stated that the security policy of relying on Russia was a “strategic mistake”, that his government was trying to “diversify its security arrangements”, and

42 “Russian MFA Rejects Accusations against Russian Peacekeepers over Lachin Corridor”, *TASS*, August 30, 2023, <https://tass.com/politics/1667621>

43 “Proposal to Sign an Agreement on Status of EU Mission in Armenia Approved”, *First Channel News*, August 31, 2023, <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/08/31/Proposal-to-sign-an-agreement-on-status-of-EU-mission-in-Armenia-approved/987018>

44 “Artsakh President to Resign”, *Asbarez*, August 31, 2023, <https://www.asbarez.com/artsakh-president-to-resign/>

45 “Russia Wants Armenia to Explain Ratification of ICC Rome Statute — Diplomat”, *TASS*, September 5, 2023, <https://tass.com/politics/1670155>

46 “Armenian President Approves Parliament’s Decision to Join the International Criminal Court”, *APNEWS*, October 14, 2023, <https://apnews.com/article/armenia-icc-russia-putin-26612df6d4687d0fd7137144aff3ef9c>

reiterated his criticism of the Russian peacekeeping force.⁴⁷ On 4 September, the Russian side reacted harshly to these statements and the allegation that Russia was “unwilling or unable” to defend Armenia, calling Pashinyan’s statements “unacceptable” and warning Armenia against helping the West to “push Russia out of the region”. The Ministry spokesperson went even further and targeted Pashinyan personally.⁴⁸ Russian Presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov issued a statement on 5 September, stating that Russia is an integral part of the region, that Russia has no intention of turning its back on the South Caucasus, that they respect Prime Minister Pashinyan and appreciate the constructive relationship between him and Putin, but that they cannot agree with his statements in the interview, reminding that more Armenians live in Russia than in Armenia.⁴⁹

On 9 September, Pashinyan expressed a wide range of views in the same vein, this time in an extensive interview published in *Politico*.⁵⁰

The Karabakh “parliament” elected a new “president” on 9 September. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately condemned the election as “a gross violation of the Constitution and legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan as well as norms and principles of international law” and noted that the separatist regime in Khankendi had “taken the path of provocation and escalating the situation”. The EU also promptly announced that it did not recognize the so-called presidential elections. The United Nations spokesperson responded to the question that the UN organization recognizes Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and that Armenians in Karabakh should respect this.

On 8 September, the Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Armenian Ambassador in Moscow to protest “a series of unfriendly steps” taken by Armenia against Russia in recent days. These “steps” included the suspension of relations with the Common Security Organization (CSTO) and non-participation in joint manoeuvres for two years, joint military manoeuvres with the US in Armenia, the visit of the Prime Minister’s wife to Ukraine, sending aid to Ukraine, forwarding the statute of the ICC to the Armenian parliament for ratification, and “offensive statements” by the President of the

47 Andrew Osborn, “Armenian PM Says Depending Solely on Russia for Security was ‘Strategic Mistake’”, *Reuters*, September 3, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenian-pm-says-depending-solely-russia-security-was-strategic-mistake-2023-09-03/>

48 “Moscow ‘Dissatisfied’ with Armenian Prime Minister’s Statements about Russia — Diplomat”, *TASS*, September 4, 2023, <https://tass.com/politics/1669525>

49 “Russia Cannot ‘Turn Back on’ South Caucasus Region, No Such Plans Envisioned — Kremlin”, *TASS*, September 5, 2023, <https://tass.com/politics/1670081>

50 “Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Interview with POLITICO Europe”, *First Channel News*, September 13, 2023, <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/09/13/Armenian-Prime-Minister-Nikol-Pashinyan-s-interview-with-POLITICO-Europe/994935>

National Assembly of Armenia Simonyan targeting the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson.⁵¹

Russian President Putin also blamed Pashinyan for the situation in Karabakh in a speech he delivered on 12 September in Vladivostok, during his visit on the occasion of the Economic Forum. He stated;

“The president of Azerbaijan is now telling me, ‘Well, you know that Armenia has admitted that Karabakh is ours, that the issue of Karabakh’s status is closed’. What should we say? There is nothing we can say. If Armenia recognized that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, then what are we talking about? This is the key component of the whole problem. The status of Karabakh was decided by Armenia itself”.⁵²

On 9 September, Karabakh Armenians opened the Aghdam road, which they had closed, to the aid convoy sent from Russia.⁵³

Azerbaijani armed forces launched an anti-terrorist operation against the separatists in Karabakh on 19 September⁵⁴ and reached their goal within 24 hours. Armenian representatives of Karabakh called for a cease-fire and requested a meeting. The Azerbaijani side invited Armenian representatives to meet in Yevlakh, Azerbaijan, but stated that the operation would continue if they did not dissolve the government and armed forces. Under these conditions, a cease-fire was declared on 20 September and negotiations started in Yevlakh on 21 September.⁵⁵ According to the cease-fire agreement, the Armenian side accepted:

- Surrendering all their weapons and heavy equipment,
- Armenian armed elements leaving the region,
- Accepted, on 21 September, the conditions of holding meetings in Yevlakh for the integration process, in accordance with the Constitution of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan’s limited military operation received intense reaction messages, especially from pro-Armenian Western countries and organizations. On this matter, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the following statement:

51 Emre Gürkan Abay, “Russia Summons Armenia’s Ambassador to Protest Yerevan’s ‘Unfriendly’ Steps”, *Anadolu Agency*, September 8, 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/russia-summons-armenias-ambassador-to-protest-yerevans-unfriendly-steps/2986973>

52 “Russia Again Blames Pashinian for Karabakh Crisis”, *Azattyun*, September 12, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32589437.html>

53 “Karabağ Rus Yardımının Ağdam’dan Girişine İzin Verdi”, *Agos*, September 9, 2023, <https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/29098/karabag-rus-yardiminin-agdam-dan-girisine-izin-verdi>

“Due to the long-standing armed attacks and provocations directed against members of the Azerbaijani army and security personnel by illegal Armenian armed groups in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani army has launched today (19 September) an anti-terrorist operation which targets exclusively military elements.

Azerbaijan had to take the measures it deemed necessary on its own sovereign territory as a result of the fact that the legitimate and rightful concerns it has constantly expressed about the situation on the ground in the past three years since the end of the Second Karabakh War, have not been resolved.

We believe that result-oriented continuation of the comprehensive negotiation process that has been meticulously carried out between Azerbaijan and Armenia to date, is the only way for maintenance of peace, security, prosperity and lasting stability in the region.”⁵⁶

As the operation was completed in a short time and did not harm the civilian population in any way, the reactions did not go beyond the usual rhetoric, and the main concern soon focused on the situation and future of the Armenians in Karabakh. France invited the UN Security Council (UNSC) to an emergency meeting to discuss the issue. During the meetings held at the UNSC, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan claimed that Azerbaijan would use force against the civilian population if not prevented by global powers, and that Azerbaijan’s goal was to subject the Armenian population to ethnic cleansing. On the same day, Pashinyan’s statement “At this moment, our assessment is that there is no direct threat to the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh” put Mirzoyan in a difficult situation.⁵⁷ Azerbaijan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs accused Armenia of providing false information and stated that the operation was carried out against Armenian forces.

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized that the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was not in question and that the issue was the possibility for the Armenian people to live in Nagorno-Karabakh with their rights respected. The Permanent Representative of the US to the UN noted that Azerbaijan had a responsibility to ensure that its forces strictly comply

54 “Statement by Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense”, *Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan*, September 19, 2023, <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/statement-by-azerbaijan-s-ministry-of-defense-49350.html>

55 Farid Zohrabov, “Meeting Between Azerbaijan, Karabakh Armenians in Yevlakh Underway - First Footage”, *Trend News Agency*, September 21, 2023, <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3800703.html>

56 “No:229, 19 September 2023, Press Release Regarding the Military Operation Launched by Azerbaijan in Karabakh”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, September 19, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-229_-azerbaycan-tarafindan-karabag-da-baslatilan-askeri-operasyon-hk.en.mfa

57 Fin DePencier, “Pashinyan Says Armenians Should Stay in Karabakh”, *Eurasianet*, September 22, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-says-armenians-should-stay-in-karabakh>

with international law and that Azerbaijan also had international responsibilities and commitments to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals living on its territory. Russia's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN stated that peace had to include clear and reliable guarantees for the respect of human rights and security of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and that they believe in developing a gradual roadmap for the integration of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh into the constitutional order of Azerbaijan with clear guarantees for their rights and security. Türkiye's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Burak Akçapar said: "Our primary goal should be for everyone, including Armenians, to live peacefully, side-by-side on Azerbaijani lands. We support the steps taken by Azerbaijan to protect its territorial integrity."⁵⁸

The recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty in Karabakh prompted the anti-government forces in Armenia once again, leading to demonstrations and protests, including clashes with the police. On the other hand, the government accused the Russian peacekeepers again of not doing their duty and not preventing the attacks. In his nationally televised address to the nation, Pashinyan signaled Armenia's distancing from Russia. In his speech, Pashinyan stated that the country's current foreign security alliance was "ineffective and insufficient". He also underlined the importance of membership in the ICC, which Russia opposes.⁵⁹ He concluded his speech with a call for respect for Armenia's sovereignty. On 25 September, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned Pashinyan's statement.⁶⁰ Afterwards, on 5 October, at the Valdai Club meeting in Sochi, Putin reiterated his views from his Vladivostok speech and again blamed Armenia for Azerbaijan re-establishing sovereignty in Karabakh.⁶¹

In order to speed up the peace process and prepare for the summit to be held in Granada on 5 October, the Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, Armen Grigoryan, and the advisor to the President of Azerbaijan, Hikmet Hajiyev, met in Brussels on 26 September with the participation of the political

58 "Latest Clash between Armenia, Azerbaijan Undermines Prospects of Peace, Speakers Warn Security Council, Calling for Genuine Dialogue to Settle Outstanding Issues", *United Nations*, September 21, 2023,

<https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15418.doc.htm>

59 "Armenia PM Signals Foreign Policy Shift Away from Russia", *Le Monde*, September 24, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/24/armenia-pm-signals-foreign-policy-shift-away-from-russia_6139059_4.html

60 "Russia Calls Pashinian's Criticism of Moscow over Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh 'Unacceptable'", *Radio Free Europe*, September 25, 2023, <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-armenia-azerbaijan-pashinian-criticism/32608635.html>

61 "Vladimir Putin Meets with Members of the Valdai Discussion Club. Transcript of the Plenary Session of the 20th Annual Meeting", *Valdai Discussion Club*, October 5, 2023, <https://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/vladimir-putin-meets-with-members-of-the-valdai-club-transcript-2023/>

advisors to the President of the European Council, President of France, and the Chancellor of Germany.⁶²

On 4 October, the President of Azerbaijan Aliyev announced that he would not attend the Granada summit.⁶³ As per the Azerbaijani APA news agency, Aliyev accused European leaders of being pro-Armenian and requested that the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also attend the meeting. But, when this request was not accepted, he decided not to attend.⁶⁴ The declaration issued after the quadrilateral summit, which Pashinyan attended, provided further evidence that Aliyev's accusation of bias was accurate. In the last paragraph of the declaration, the opening of all borders specifically referred to the Turkish-Armenian border.

On 29 September, Armenia applied to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) requesting Azerbaijan to take provisional measures to protect the rights and security of the civilian population in the disputed area between the two countries.⁶⁵ The ICJ announced that it would begin hearing the application on 12 October under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The Court announced its decision on 17 November. Azerbaijan welcomed the Court's decision and noted that what the Court asked to be done was essentially in line with Azerbaijan's official statements and practice.⁶⁶

In a resolution adopted on 5 October, the European (Union) Parliament accused Azerbaijan of ethnic cleansing and strongly condemned the "threats and violence carried out by Azerbaijani soldiers".⁶⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye reacted to the EP's resolution with the following statement on 5 October:

62 "Brüksel'de Ermenistan-Azerbaycan Görüşmesi Başladı; Toplantının "Yapıcı" Geçtiği Vurgulandı", *T24*, September 26, 2023, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/bruksel-de-ermenistan-azerbaycan-gorusmesi-basladi-toplantinin-yapici-gectigi-vurgulandi.1131906>

63 "Breaking: Azerbaijan Opts out of Granada Summit", *ArmenPress*, October 4, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1121173.html>

64 "Azerbaijan's President Refuses to Attend EU Talks with Armenia PM", *France 24*, October 4, 2023, <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20231004-azerbaijan-s-president-refuses-to-attend-eu-talks-with-armenia-pm>

65 "Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia V. Azerbaijan) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures", *International Court of Justice*, October 29, 2023, <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/180/180-20230929-pre-01-00-en.pdf>

66 "No:658/23, Press Release on the Decision of the International Court of Justice of November 17, 2023", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan*, November 17, 2023, <https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no65823>

67 "European Parliament Resolution of 5 October 2023 on the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh After Azerbaijan's Attack and the Continuing Threats Against Armenia (2023/2879(Rsp))", *European Parliament*, October 5, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-10-05_EN.html#sdocta10

“The non-binding resolution titled ‘On the situation in ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ after Azerbaijan’s attack and the continuing threats against Armenia’ adopted by the European Parliament (EP) today (5 October) is a symbol of irresponsibility, prejudice, bias and ignorance.

We condemn this resolution targeting our country based on the discourse of a group of populist and discriminatory EP members who are seeking for unfounded accusations and allegations against Türkiye for years.

European politics, within which populism, racism, Islamophobia, anti-multiculturalism and anti-integration sentiments are steadily gaining strength, displays itself within the current composition of the EP through all its excess. It is our wish for EU’s own future that the current EP, whose term of office is about to expire, would be renewed with a new composition comprising representatives who are constructive, inclusive and reasonable and committed to the fundamental values of the EU.

Türkiye exerts an intensive effort in establishing peace, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus; conducts a normalisation process with Armenia; makes concrete contribution to the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia; mobilizes, within the framework of international law, all its capabilities to build peace, brotherhood and common interest throughout all conflict areas and humanitarian crisis, including the war in Ukraine; and stands as the key actor in this endeavour whose weight and efforts are sought under the leadership of our President.

We see it as a systemic weakness that those irresponsible texts that are taken seriously by nobody other than a few marginal sectors are recklessly laid before us as EP resolutions and therefore we do not take them seriously.”⁶⁸

On 3 October, Armenia condemned the UN delegation which visited the region to investigate Armenia’s allegations of ethnic cleansing and forced population displacement in Karabakh. The delegation reported that there was no evidence of violence against civilians and no damage to civilian public infrastructure in Khankendi.⁶⁹ Armenia accused the UN delegation of acquitting Azerbaijan.

During the President of Azerbaijan Aliyev’s visit to Georgia on 9 October, the proposal to continue the peace agreement process under Georgia’s mediation

68 “No: 245, 5 October 2023, Press Release Regarding the Resolution Titled ‘On the Situation in ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ after Azerbaijan’s Attack and the Continuing Threats Against Armenia’ Adopted by the European Parliament”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, October 5, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-245_-_avrupa-parlamentosu-nun-kabul-ettigi—karar-hk.en.mfa

69 “UN Team Completes Mission to Karabakh”, *United Nations Azerbaijan*, October 2, 2023, <https://azerbaijan.un.org/en/248051-un-team-completes-mission-karabakh>

was brought to the agenda. Azerbaijan conveyed that it was appropriate for three regional countries to take part in this process.⁷⁰ Pashinyan stated on 10 October that the process was being conducted in Brussels, that Aliyev was trying to step back from the principles agreed in Brussels by changing the platform, that he was not against any talks, but that he did not understand the logic of going beyond the framework of the agreed principles.

On 11 October, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of occupying 8 Azerbaijani villages. Pashinyan stated that the future of the disputed territories would be decided by the demarcation of the border between the two countries.⁷¹

At the 54th meeting of the UN Human Rights Council on 11 October, 34 countries issued a joint statement expressing extreme concern regarding the serious humanitarian and human rights crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh.⁷² All signatory states are Western.

Pashinyan was invited to address the opening session of the European Parliament on 17 October. In his 45-minute speech, Pashinyan emphasized democracy, blamed Russia, and stressed Armenia's aggrievement at the hands of Azerbaijan. He also stated that Armenia had been under siege by Azerbaijan and Türkiye for 30 years. He concluded his remarks by highlighting Armenia's readiness to approach the EU to the extent that the EU deems it possible.⁷³ Russia's reaction to the speech was revealed in a report by the *TASS* news agency citing a high-level source. The Russian official claimed that Armenia was on the fast track to become a new Ukraine after Moldova.⁷⁴

The second meeting of the 3+3 format, the first of which was held in Moscow in 2021, was held at the Foreign Ministers' level in Tehran on 23 October, hosted by Iran. Georgia did not attend this meeting due to its ongoing disputes with Russia. In the joint statement issued at the end of the meeting, the parties confirmed the inalterability of each other's borders. It was decided to hold the next meeting in Türkiye.⁷⁵

70 "Aliyev'den Barış Mesajı", *Cumhuriyet*, October 9, 2023, <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/dunya/aliyevden-baris-mesaji-2128012>

71 "Baku Steps Up Claims on 8 Armenian Villages 'Occupied By Armenia'", *Asbarez*, October 11, 2023, <https://asbarez.com/baku-steps-up-claims-on-8-armenian-village-occupied-by-armenia/>

72 "34 Countries Issue Joint Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh at UN Human Rights Council Session", *ArmenPress*, October 11, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1121753.html>

73 "5. Formal sitting - Address by Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia", *European Parliament*, October 17, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2023-10-17-ITM-005_EN.html

74 "Pashinyan Follows in Zelensky's Footsteps by Quantum Leaps — High-Ranking Source in Moscow", *TASS*, October 18, 2023, <https://tass.com/world/1692799>

75 "Iran and Russia Denounce West over Caucasus Tensions", *France 24*, October 23, 2023, <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231023-armenia-azerbaijan-join-iran-hosted-talks-aimed-at-reconciliation>

On 24 October, Pope Francis of the Roman Catholic Church (the Vatican) awarded Prime Minister Pashinyan one of the Vatican's highest honors for his contribution to the development of relations between the Vatican and Armenia.⁷⁶

The meeting of the European Council President with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Brussels in October was reportedly postponed, but no new date was given.⁷⁷

On 25 October, Pashinyan reiterated his previous views and statements in an interview published in the *Wall Street Journal*. A noteworthy point this time was his statements on establishing close relations with Türkiye and the Turkish people.⁷⁸

3. Armenia's Foreign Relations

During the period, Armenia conducted intense diplomatic traffic. The main reason for such activity was the Karabakh conflict, in addition to, and indirectly related to, the Armenian administration's search for an alternative to Russia, its review of its ties with Russia, its efforts to get closer to the West, the EU and the US, and the West's encouragement and incentive attitude in this regard.

At a press conference on 22 May, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated "If Armenia decides de jure to leave the CSTO, it would happen only after Armenia establishes that the CSTO has left Armenia. This agenda exists should the CSTO become a non-functional organization. Then we would have to resolve our security issues on our own."⁷⁹ These statements kept the speculations about Armenia leaving the CSTO and the questions of when and how Armenia would leave the CSTO on the agenda.

The Armenian Minister of Defense opted out of the CSTO Defense Ministerial Council meeting in Minsk on 25 May, without revealing the reason of his non-participation.⁸⁰

76 "Prime Minister Pashinyan Receives the Medal Awarded by Pope Francis", *Prime Minister of Armenia*, October 24, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/10/24/Nikol-Pashinyan-meeting/>

77 "Armenian-Azeri Brussels Summit Won't Take Place", *ArmenPress*, October 25, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1122753.html>

78 "Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's Interview with the Wall Street Journal", *Prime Minister of Armenia*, October 25, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/10/25/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-The-Well-Street-Journal>

79 "Armenia to Leave CSTO if Yerevan Deems It 'Non-Functional Organization'— Prime Minister", *TASS*, May 22, 2023, <https://tass.com/world/1621147>

80 "Armenian Defense Minister Opts out of CSTO Council Meeting in Belarus", *ArmenPress*, May 25, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1111768.html>

On 23 May, Pashinyan received the special representative of NATO Secretary General for the South Caucasus and Central Asia Javier Colomina. According to a statement released by the Prime Minister's Office, issues related to Armenia-NATO partnership and cooperation were discussed.⁸¹

On 25 May, Pashinyan attended the 30th anniversary celebrations of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Moscow and delivered a speech.⁸² On 7 June, he travelled to Sochi for the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council meeting,⁸³ and had bilateral meetings with Putin on both visits.

On 22 June, Pashinyan received the Governor of the US state of Kansas and Director of Joint Staff of Kansas National Guard, who visited Armenia.⁸⁴

On 26 June, Pashinyan had a telephone conversation with the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.⁸⁵ On 24 July, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan visited Tehran to meet with his Iranian counterpart. Mirzoyan, who was also received by the Iranian President, described Iran as his country's "special partner".⁸⁶ At the joint press conference, Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that they were uncomfortable with the presence of foreign forces in the region, that Iran welcomed the 3+3 format and that they were ready to host this meeting. Following the escalation of tensions on the border with Azerbaijan, Pashinyan held a telephone conversation with the Iran's President on 9 September, as well as with the President of France, the Chancellor of Germany, and the US Secretary of State.⁸⁷ Armenia's Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan arrived in Tehran on 1 October to discuss the situation following Azerbaijan's military operation in Karabakh on 19 September, and met with high-level officials, including the President.⁸⁸ On 3

81 "Prime Minister Pashinyan Received the Special Representative of NATO Secretary General Javier Colomina", *Prime Minister of Armenia*, May 23, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/05/23/Nikol-Pashinyan-meeting/>

82 "Meeting with Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan", *President of Russia*, May 25, 2023, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71206>

83 "Eurasian Intergovernmental Council in Sochi: How Meeting of Eurasian Five Heads of Government Held", *Official Information Source of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan*, June 9, 2023, <https://primeminister.kz/en/news/reviews/eurasian-intergovernmental-council-in-sochi-how-meeting-of-eurasian-five-heads-of-government-held-24410>

84 "PM Pashinyan Receives Kansas Governor and Director of Joint Staff of Kansas National Guard", *ArmenPress*, June 22, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1113912/>

85 "Prime Minister Pashinyan Holds Telephone Conversation with President of Iran Ebrahim Raisi", *Prime Minister of Armenia*, June 26, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/pressrelease/item/2023/06/26/Nikol-Pashinyan-Telephone-Conversation/>

86 "Armenian FM Visits Iran", *Azattyun*, July 24, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32517144.html>

87 "Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and The President of the Republic of Iran Hold Telephone Conversation", *Prime Minister of Armenia*, September 9, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/09/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-Telephone-Conversation-3/>

88 "Armenian Security Council Secretary Arrives in Tehran", *News.am*, October 1, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/784376.html>

October, Iranian Army Chief of Staff, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, offered to deploy military observers to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border amid the lingering risk of renewed fighting there.⁸⁹ Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan visited Tehran on 23 October and met with the Iranian President.⁹⁰ An Armenian delegation led by the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs of Armenia went to Tehran on 31 October to participate in the forum on the development of economic cooperation between Iran and Armenia.⁹¹ On 13 November, Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Grigoryan met with Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian. In a statement, Grigoryan's office said the sides discussed "the prospects of developments of the Armenia-Iran economic relations."⁹²

The head of the US Department of State's Sanctions Coordination Office went to Armenia on 29 June to discuss Armenia's position on sanctions against Iran and Russia.⁹³ An official from the United Kingdom (the UK) Foreign Office in charge of the same issues accompanied his US counterpart on the same dates. The EU special representative on sanctions recently visited Armenia for the same purpose.

On 3 July, political consultations between Armenian and Indian Ministries of Foreign Affairs were held in Yerevan.⁹⁴

On July 3, Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Grigoryan went to the US for meetings. On 7 July, Grigoryan met with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,⁹⁵ and later met with USAID Head Samantha Power and Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines.

89 "Iran Offers to Send Observers to Armenian-Azeri Border", *Azatutyun*, October 4, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32622882.html>

90 "Meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia with the President of Iran", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, October 23, 2023, <https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/10/23/mirzoyan-raisi/12288>

91 "Armenia's Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Attends Armenian-Iranian Business Forum", *ArmenPress*, 31 October 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1123232.html>

92 "Secretary of Security Council and Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of Iran had Telephone Conversation", *ILurer*, November 13, 2023, <https://www.ilurer.am/en/2023/11/13/Secretary-of-Security-Council-and-Secretary-of-Supreme-National-Security-Council-of-Iran-had-teleph/1029269>

93 Siranush Ghazanchyan, "Armenian PM, Head of US Department of State's Sanctions Coordination Office Discuss Regional and International Processes", *Public Radio of Armenia*, June 29, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/06/29/armenian-pm-head-of-us-department-of-states-sanctions-coordination-office-discuss-regional-and-international-processes/>

94 "Political Consultations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, July 3, 2023, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/07/03/Arm_Ind_Consultations/12073

95 "Armenia Security Council Secretary Meets White House NSA in Washington, D.C.", *ArmenPress*, July 7, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1114883.html#:~:text=YEREVAN%2C%20JULY%207%2C%20ARMENPRESS..regional%20security%20situation%20and%20challenges>

Lieutenant General Edward Asryan, Chief of the Armenian General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister, visited the US on 17-18 July.⁹⁶ Asryan attended the 30th anniversary celebrations of Armenia's partnership with the Kansas National Guard and met with the Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC). Later, Asryan met with Admiral Christopher Grady, Vice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Charles Brown, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. During the meeting, the US-Armenia "defense partnership" and the resulting "joint military exercises" were discussed.

On 11-20 September, Armenia and the US organized a joint military exercise in Armenia "in preparation for Armenia's participation in international peacekeeping missions". 85 American and 175 Armenian soldiers participated in the military exercise called "Eagle Partner 2023". Armenian Lieutenant General Asryan also observed the exercise.⁹⁷ US observers included Major General Anderson and Brigadier General Ellis. Although there was nothing remarkable about the military aspect of the exercise, its political message was very remarkable. The fact that Armenia, which has not participated in CSTO maneuvers for some time, held a military exercise with the US near the capital Yerevan for the first time in its history and in the shadow of Russian military bases and troops can be described as a political earthquake.

On 3 November, Asryan travelled to Stuttgart to visit the US European Command Headquarters and two training centers and met with the Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Basham.⁹⁸

Trilateral defense consultations between Armenia, Greece, and GCASC were held in Nicosia on 5 July. At the end of the meeting, an annual program of trilateral defense collaboration was signed.⁹⁹ Special forces of Armenia, Greece and the GCASC held military exercises in Attica region of Greece on 6-10 November within the framework of the 2023 international cooperation plan. The exercise, in which real bullets were used, focused on maneuver action planning and the development of sharp-shooting strategy.¹⁰⁰

96 "Chief of General Staff of Armenian Military Visits United States", *ArmenPress*, July 18, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1115663/>

97 "US Completes Joint Military Exercise in Armenia", *Aljazeera*, September 20, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/20/us-completes-joint-military-exercise-in-armenia>

98 "Lieutenant General Edward Asryan Visited the US European Command Center", *Ministry of Defence of Armenia*, November 6, 2023, <https://www.mil.am/en/news/11848>

99 "Armenia-Greece-Cyprus Trilateral Defence Consultations", *Ministry of Defence of Armenia*, July 5, 2023, <https://mil.am/en/news/11612>

100 "Special Forces of Armenia, Greece and Cyprus Hold Joint Drills", *ArmenPress*, November 13, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1124037.html>

Pashinyan paid a working visit to Georgia on the 8 July.¹⁰¹

On 8 July, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan attended the Dubrovnik Conference, where he met with EU External Relations Chief Josep Borrell¹⁰² and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.¹⁰³

President of the National Assembly of Armenia Alen Simonyan accompanied by a delegation went to Paris on a working visit between 10-13 July.¹⁰⁴

On 11 July, as part of his five-day visit to the region, the Vatican's senior cardinal, Secretary of State P. Parolin, visited Armenia after Azerbaijan and Georgia, and was received by the President and Prime Minister. On 13 July, he met with Catholicos Karekin II in Etchmiadzin.¹⁰⁵ In a speech, Parolin reiterated the genocide claim, as the Pope did during his visit in 2016, and said he was honored to visit Armenia and commemorate the victims of the "Armenian Genocide". This previously unannounced and low-profile visit was mainly intended to remind the Pope's interest to the region and to give a new impetus to the peace process.

Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan paid an official visit to Portugal on 13-14 July. On this occasion, he also visited the Gulbenkian Foundation.¹⁰⁶

On 13 July, Deputy Speaker of Parliament Ruben Rubinyan was received Minister of State Tobias Lindner at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rubinyan expressed his satisfaction with the rapidly developing and deepening relations with Germany, and in his capacity as the special envoy for the normalization of relations with Türkiye, he provided information on this issue.¹⁰⁷ On 17 July, Rubinyan met with Matthias Lüttenberg, Political Director

101 "The Prime Minister will Leave for Georgia on a Working Visit", *Prime Minister of Armenia*, July 7, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/07/07/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-Georgia/>

102 "Ararat Mirzoyan, Josep Borrell Discuss Armenia-EU cooperation", *ArmenPress*, July 8, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1114993.html>

103 "Mirzoyan Meets with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe within the Framework of the Dubrovnik Conference", *ArmenPress*, July 8, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1114980.html>

104 "The Delegation Led by Alen Simonyan Leaves for Paris", *ArmenPress*, July 10, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1115084.html>

105 "His Eminence Pietro Parolin Cardinal Secretary of State Visits Armenia (11-13 July 2023)", *Apostolic Nunciature in Armenia*, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://vaticanarm.org/en/archives/7286>

106 "Armenia's Foreign Minister Visit to Portugal", *Embassy of Armenia to the Holy See*, July 14, 2023, <https://vatican.mfa.am/en/news/2023/07/14/fmvisitportugal14072023/11844>

107 "Rubinyan Presented the Process of Regulating Armenia-Turkey Relations", *Radar Armenia*, July 13, 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2578510420/>

for Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia Affairs at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁸

On 19 July, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan met with the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and on 20 July he addressed a special session of the OSCE Permanent Council convened at Armenia's request.¹⁰⁹

Armenian President Kachaturyan left for Italy on 23 July for a three-day visit to participate in a forum of think tanks, starting his visit with a meeting with Mekhitarists on the Armenian island of San Lazzaro degli in Venice.¹¹⁰

The Mayor of Paris travelled to Armenia on 30 August to personally lead an aid convoy through Lachin.¹¹¹ The French Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Armenia on 3 October and declared that France would provide military assistance and arms sales to Armenia.¹¹² The Armenian Defense Minister signed a military memorandum of understanding with his French counterpart in Paris on 23 October. Accordingly, France committed to strengthen Armenia's air defense system, provide military training, and assist in the reform of the armed forces. In addition, in the signed "letter of intent", France agreed to provide short-range ground-to-air Mistral missiles.¹¹³ France quickly started implementation and sent a large number of armored personnel carriers to Armenia via Georgia in early November.¹¹⁴ The French Minister of Foreign Affairs also proposed Armenia to benefit from the "European Peace Facility" funds at the EU Council of Foreign Ministers meeting on 13 November. This fund, which Armenia had previously applied for and been rejected, is intended for the purchase of military equipment.¹¹⁵

108 "Ruben Rubinyan Receives Political Director for Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia of MFA of Germany", *ILurer*, July 17, 2023, <https://www.ilurer.am/en/2023/07/17/Ruben-RubinyanReceives-Political-Director-for-Eastern-Europe-Caucasus-and-Central-Asia-of-MFA-of-G/963691>

109 "Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Delivered Remarks at the OSCE Special PC Meeting", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, July 20, 2023, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/07/20/PC_Mirzoyan/12102

110 "President Khachaturyan Visits Italy, Meeting With Sergio Mattarella Expected", *ArmenPress*, July 24, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1116016.html>

111 "Mayor of Paris Accompanies Humanitarian Cargo on Its Way to Nagorno-Karabakh", *ILurer*, August 30, 2023, <https://www.ilurer.am/en/2023/08/30/Mayor-of-Paris-accompanies-humanitarian-cargo-on-its-way-to-Nagorno-Karabakh/986137>

112 "Fransa'dan, Ermenistan'a Askeri Teçhizat Sevkiyatına Onay", *EuroNews*, October 3, 2023, <https://tr.euronews.com/2023/10/03/fransadan-ermenistanina-askeri-techizat-sevkiyatina-onay>

113 "Armenia, France Sign Military Cooperation Agreement", *Asbarez*, October 23, 2023, <https://asbarez.com/armenia-france-sign-military-cooperation-agreement/>

114 Hoory Minoyan, "French Weapons Arrive in Armenia through Georgia", *The Armenian Weekly*, November 13, 2023, <https://armenianweekly.com/2023/11/15/french-weapons-arrive-in-armenia-through-georgia/>

115 "Armenia-Azerbaijan Situation 'On Agenda' of EU Foreign Ministers' Meeting", *Azattyun*, November 13, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32683039.html>

On 5 September, Armenia sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine for the first time.¹¹⁶ On 28 October, Armenia participated for the first time in the meeting on a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian war, which was held in Malta and attended by 65 countries. Armenia was represented by the Secretary of the Security Council Grigoryan. On this occasion, Grigoryan discussed Armenia-Ukraine bilateral relations with Andriy Yermak, Senior Advisor to the President of Ukraine. The spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Russia considered Armenia's participation in the Malta conference as a "demonstrative anti-Russian gesture". The spokesperson called the Armenian leadership "Russophobic" and claimed that "Those in Yerevan should be aware that this is demonstrative flirting with those who aggressively oppose Russia."¹¹⁷ On 3 November, the President of the National Assembly of Armenia rejected this criticism, stating that "Moscow does not want Yerevan to communicate with partners on multilateral platforms and is trying to maintain Armenia's existential dependence on Russia". Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan explained that the Armenian government hoped to mend fences with Moscow and "move on like partners" but that "not everything depends on one side", saying that the fault does not lie solely with Armenia.¹¹⁸

The statement of the spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9 November that Armenia did not open the border with Azerbaijan for travel and trade despite Armenia's agreement to do so in the cease-fire agreement, again strained the atmosphere and triggered a new debate. The spokesperson also criticized Armenia's decision to set up a separate security unit for passengers, items, and other goods in transit, claiming that according to Article 9 of the agreement, Russian border guards were authorized to control the transportation of people, vehicles and goods between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan. The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson strongly rejected this claim and emphasized that there is no document that Armenia has given up its sovereign rights over its territory.¹¹⁹ Iran, on the other hand, officially confirmed its proposal for an alternative transportation route through Iran on 9 November, and an Azerbaijani official announced that they now preferred Iran over the Armenian route. Upon this development, Turkish

116 "Armenia Sent First Aid to Ukraine since Russia's Full-Scale Invasion", *European Pravda*, September 5, 2023, <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2023/09/5/7168844/>

117 "Armenia's Participation In Conference on Ukraine in Malta Anti-Russian Gesture — MFA", *TASS*, November 2, 2023, https://tass.com/politics/1700761?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com

118 "Armenian Leaders Hit Back at Moscow", *Azattyun*, November 3, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32669928.html>

119 "Moscow, Yerevan Trade More Barbs", *Azattyun*, November 9, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32678237.html>

President Erdoğan warned Armenia to hurry up and fulfill its promise to Azerbaijan.¹²⁰

At a press conference on 16 November, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson once again accused the West of trying to tear Armenia away from Russia. The spokesperson stated; “The West has a beastly grip on Armenia after it failed its policy in Ukraine”. Moscow considers recent statements and steps of the Armenian leadership, including the refusal of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to participate in the upcoming session of the CSTO meeting in Minsk, the expansion of supplies of Western weapons to Armenia, and Armenia’s sudden friendship with Ukraine as links in one chain, a chain of enslavement.¹²¹

On 17 October, Armenian Minister of Economy Vahan Kerobyan travelled to China to attend the 3rd international meeting of the “Belt and Road” project and discussed the possibility of Armenia joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with its vice president.¹²²

On 23 October, Pashinyan travelled to Georgia to attend the 4th Tbilisi Silk Road Forum. In his speech at the forum, Pashinyan described the “Crossroads of Peace” project and listed its principles:

- All infrastructures, including roads, railways, airways, pipelines, cables, and electricity lines, will operate under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the countries through which they pass.
- Each country will ensure border, customs control, and security of all the infrastructures, a special unit will be created within Armenia’s law-enforcement system.
- These infrastructures can be used for both international and domestic transportation.
- All countries will use all the infrastructures on the basis of reciprocity and equality.¹²³

120 “Iran Reaffirms Support for Alternative Transport Link for Azeri Exclave”, *Azatutyun*, November 9, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32678110.html>

121 Elena Teslova, “Russia Warns Armenia Against ‘Trying to Sit on Two Chairs’”, *Anadolu Ajansı*, November 16, 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/russia-warns-armenia-against-trying-to-sit-on-twochairs-/3055192>

122 “Armenia Considers Membership in Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, *ArmBanks*, October 17, 2023, <http://www.armbanks.am/en/2023/10/17/151100/>

123 “Prime Minister Pashinyan Presents the “Crossroads of Peace” Project and Its Principles at the Tbilisi International Forum”, *Prime Minister of Armenia*, October 26, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/10/26/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/>

On 24 October, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Parliament Michael Roth held high-level talks in Armenia and emphasized his solidarity with Armenia.¹²⁴ On 3 November, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Mirzoyan in Yerevan and, at their joint press conference, pledged Germany's support for Armenia's desire and efforts for rapprochement with the EU.¹²⁵ On the second day of his visit, the German minister went to the border with Azerbaijan and was briefed by the deputy head of the EU border monitoring mission. He later said that the two-year cost of the mission amounted to about 31 million Euros, that he was in favor of its further expansion and that Germany was ready to become more involved. On 13 November, EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed to expand the Armenian border inspection mission.¹²⁶

The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs paid a solidarity visit to Armenia and opened the Canadian Embassy in Yerevan on 25 October,¹²⁷ a first for Canada in the South Caucasus. The Canadian Minister also announced that Canada would send observers to the EU observation mission on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, the first non-European country to do so.

On 27 October, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Armenia to restore relations, which Armenia froze in 2012 following the extradition to Azerbaijan and pardon of an Azerbaijani officer convicted of killing an Armenian officer in Budapest in 2004. The Hungarian Minister, who also met with Prime Minister Pashinyan, emphasized that both countries share a common Christian base.¹²⁸

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan officially visited the UK on 13 November and met with the Minister for European Affairs. The talks took place within the framework of the "strategic dialogue" established between the two countries.¹²⁹

124 "No Alternative to Peace in The South Caucasus, Says Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman", *ArmenPress*, October 23, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1122605.html>

125 "Germany's Baerbock Presses Peace Hopes in Yerevan on First Leg of Caucasus Trip", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 3, 2023, <https://www.rferl.org/a/germany-baerbock-eu-expansion-geopolitical-necessityukraine/32669098.html>

126 Heghine Buniatian, "EU Foreign Ministers Approve Expansion of Border Monitoring Mission in Armenia", *Azatutyun*, November 13, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32683155.html>

127 "Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Canada", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, October 25, 2023, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/10/25/arm_canada/12299

128 "Hungarian Foreign Minister Says Armenian Church had Very Important Role in Restoration of Relations with Armenia", *ArmenPress*, November 27, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1122959.html>

129 "The Meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and the UK Minister for Europe", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, November 13 2023, https://www.mfa.am/en/pressreleases/2023/11/13/GB_Mirzoyan/12322

The 21st autumn meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly was held in Yerevan on 18-20 November. The theme of the conference was “OSCE in Times of Crisis: Role of the Parliamentary Assembly in Responding to Internal and External Challenges”.¹³⁰

4. Relations With Türkiye

In an interview with the press before the May elections in Türkiye, Prime Minister Pashinyan said that he hoped that relations with Türkiye could be restored after the elections, that normalization would develop naturally and that this issue was a priority on the agenda. Pashinyan congratulated Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on his 28 May election victory and wrote on social media “Congratulations to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on his re-election. Looking forward to continuing working together towards full normalization of relations between our countries.”¹³¹

Pursuant to President Erdoğan’s invitation, Prime Minister Pashinyan arrived in Ankara on 3 June and attended the official reception of the new presidential term.¹³² Pashinyan was accompanied by Ruben Rubinyan, the special envoy for the normalization process. Pashinyan’s acceptance of the invitation was intensely and harshly criticized by the opposition in Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora. A former Minister of Foreign Affairs also took the lead in this criticism, claiming that his participation was met with confusion and anger in Armenia and the Diaspora. On the other hand, President Erdoğan praised Pashinyan’s acceptance of the invitation, telling reporters on the plane on his return from a visit to Azerbaijan on 14 June, “Pashinyan’s acceptance of our invitation was an important step. Mr. Pashinyan attended our ceremony despite many obstacles caused by the opposition in his country. We had a short meeting and I thanked him for accepting our invitation.” Expressing his appreciation for Pashinyan’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, Erdoğan also touched upon the Zangezur corridor, saying that Iran’s approach to the issue was disappointing and that, unlike Iran, Armenia did not oppose this transportation line.

On 7 June, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan called Türkiye’s new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan, to congratulate him. During the meeting, the sides discussed steps to normalize bilateral relations.¹³³

130 “2023 Autumn Meeting”, *OSCE*, accessed November 21, 2023,

<https://www.oscepa.org/en/meetings/autumn-meetings/upcoming-autumn-meeting>

131 Diyar Guldogan, “Armenian Premier Pashinyan Extends Congratulations on Turkish President Erdoğan’s Victory”, *Anadolu Ajansı*, May 28, 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/armenianpremier-pashinyan-extends-congratulations-on-turkish-president-erdogans-victory/2908381>

132 “PM Nikol Pashinyan Attends Inauguration of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan”, *ArmenPress*, June 3, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1112489.html>

133 “Ararat Mirzoyan had a Phone Conversation with Newly Appointed Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan”, *News.am*, June 7, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/764270.html>

On 28 June, Pashinyan congratulated President Erdoğan concerning Festival of Sacrifice (Eid al-Adha). During the phone call, the parties also touched upon the ongoing process of normalization of bilateral relations to establish diplomatic relations and open the border.¹³⁴

The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), one of the leading organizations of radical Armenian views, launched a campaign on 2 July with insults and hate speech to stop Disney from showing the TV series based on the life of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on the big screen. This initiative provoked reactions from the Turkish public, media, and civil society organizations.

Armenian airlines started flights between Yerevan and Istanbul on 2 July. It was reported that there would be two flights per week.¹³⁵ In response to a written parliamentary question, the Armenian Ministry of Interior and Communications stated that Turkish language classes would be offered in 12 schools during the 2022-2023 academic year.¹³⁶

In response to a question on relations with Türkiye, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan said at a press conference after his meeting with the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna on 18 July that there had been a pause in the normalization process, but that he thought this was due to the election atmosphere in Türkiye. Mirzoyan continued by stating;

“Now it is time to continue the talks on the normalization, and there are very concrete steps that already can be implemented by both sides to make sure that we are on the right track and the things are moving towards the final, comprehensive and holistic normalization of relations, opening the border between the two countries and establishing diplomatic relations. And here, of course, I primarily speak about opening the border between Armenia and Türkiye for third country nationals, but also Armenian and Turkish nationals with diplomatic passports, and there are some other projects which are being discussed as well.”¹³⁷

On 20 July, Armenian media reported that the Armenian government had awarded a tender to a private company to build a checkpoint and customs facilities at the Margara crossing on the border with Türkiye. The head of the

134 “Erdoğan Holds Phone Conversations with Pashinyan, Aliyev”, *Asbarez*, June 28, 2023, <https://asbarez.com/erdogan-holds-phon-conversations-with-pashinyan-aliyev/>

135 “Armenian Airlines Launches Yerevan–İstanbul Flights”, *ArmenPress*, July 3, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1114602/>

136 “Azerbaijani Language is Taught in 4 Schools in Armenia”, *APA*, July 6, 2023, <https://apa.az/en/ciscountries/azerbaijani-language-is-taught-in-4-schools-in-armenia-407144>

137 “Mirzoyan: Now It is Time to Continue Armenian-Turkish Normalization Process”, *Mediamax*, July 19, 2023, <https://mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/51964/>

State Revenue Committee in charge of customs officially confirmed this development and stated that the construction would be completed in the near future.¹³⁸

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan, briefing Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Ceyhun Bayramov after his visit to Ankara on 31 July, said that the Lachin road was located on Azerbaijani territory and that criticism of Azerbaijan's establishment of a checkpoint there was unfair.¹³⁹ After receiving Bayramov, Turkish President Erdoğan emphasized the importance of signing a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the "immediate opening" of a "corridor" linking Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan.¹⁴⁰

Türkiye did not delay in reacting to the "presidential" elections of the illegal separatist forces in Karabakh. The statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is as follows:

"The elections held in the territories of Karabakh region of Azerbaijan under the control of illegal Armenian forces, is a new manifestation of efforts to unilaterally legitimize the current situation in the region, which is contrary to international law. This step is a flagrant violation of international law including the UN Security Council resolutions and the OSCE principles.

We condemn and consider this election which is held in a period when Azerbaijan and Armenia strive to continue peace talks as a move to undermine them.

Türkiye does not recognize this illegitimate election which constitutes violation of Azerbaijan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We call on the UN and international community not to recognize this election.

Türkiye supports the peace negotiations process between Azerbaijan and Armenia and still has the belief that signing of a lasting peace agreement soon, will make a major contribution to peace and stability in the region."¹⁴¹

138 Nane Shakiyan, "Armenia Building Checkpoint on Turkish Border", *Azatutyun*, July 20, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32512161.html>

139 "Lachin Road is Azerbaijan's Territory, Says Turkish Foreign Minister", *ANews*, July 31, 2023, <https://www.aneews.com.tr/world/2023/07/31/lachin-road-is-azerbaijans-territory-says-turkish-foreign-minister>

140 "Erdoğan Speaks For Prompt Signing Of Peace Treaty Between Baku, Yerevan", *InterFax*, July 31, 2023, <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/93162/>

141 "No: 218, 9 September 2023, Press Release Regarding the So-Called Elections Held in the Territories of Karabakh Region of Azerbaijan Under the Control of Illegal Armenian Forces", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, September 9, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-218_-azerbaycan-in-karabag-bolgesinde-duzenlenen-sozde-secimler-hk.en.mfa

President Erdoğan called Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan on 11 September¹⁴² and stated that the elections held in Karabakh were unacceptable, that those who held them should step back and that they should act with caution for stability in the region. In a television interview on the same day, Pashinyan said, “The conversation with Erdogan was strictly official. I can say that the conversation was substantial and useful. There are a number of nuances, and it’s important for a constant conversation to take place around these nuances, positions and assessments.” In the official statements, the same language was used, bilateral and regional issues were discussed, it was noted that lasting peace and stability would contribute to the development and prosperity of all countries in the region, and the determination to continue diplomatic efforts in this direction was expressed.¹⁴³

On 17 September, regarding President Erdoğan’s proposal to organize a quadrilateral summit on Karabakh with the participation of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia, Prime Minister Pashinyan commented; “There are the most various offers and ideas. I wouldn’t want to point out only one of those ideas. That’s not the only idea for me to express an attitude.”¹⁴⁴

After his day-long visit to Nakhchivan and his meeting with the President of Azerbaijan İlham Aliyev, President Erdoğan stated on 26 September that Türkiye did not and would not refrain from doing her part to establish lasting peace in the region. He said that the humanitarian approach of the Azerbaijani people to the Karabakh Armenians despite the oppression and massacre they have been subjected to for the last 30 years was above all praise, that the military operation was carried out with the utmost care to prevent any harm to the civilian population, that Azerbaijan made extraordinary efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to the region, that despite this, the allegations of some countries were nothing but nonsense and slander, and emphasized the importance of the Zangezur corridor becoming operational as soon as possible.¹⁴⁵

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the following statement on the explosion at a gas station in Khankendi, Karabakh on 25 September, which reportedly killed around 70 people:

142 “Erdogan, Pashinian Discuss Karabakh Tensions”, *Azattyun*, September 11, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32588036.html>

143 “Armenian PM Describes Phone Call with Erdogan as ‘Substantial and Useful’”, *ArmenPress*, September 11, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1119262/>

144 “Pashinyan Comments on Erdogan’s Offer to Hold Armenia-Türkiye-Russia-Azerbaijan Summit”, *ArmenPress*, September 17, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1119688.html>

145 “Ankara Urges Yerevan ‘Not to Fall for Provocations’”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, September 27, 2023, <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/we-will-provide-technological-device-support-to-university-students-erdogan-186590>

“We learned with deep sorrow the explosion which happened on 25 September at a gas station in Khankendi, Azerbaijan, which claimed scores of lives, and left hundreds of people heavily injured.

We extend our condolences to the relatives of the victims of this tragic incident, and wish a speedy recovery to the injured.

Türkiye is ready to provide assistance if needed.”¹⁴⁶

On 23 October, on the margins of the 3+3 meeting held in Tehran, Turkish and Armenian Ministers of Foreign Affairs Fidan and Mirzoyan discussed regional and bilateral issues and confirmed their readiness to realize what had been agreed upon so far.¹⁴⁷

On 30 October, Pashinyan said in his speech at the parliamentary discussions of the draft state budget of the Republic of Armenia for 2024, “I have to record once again that our plans include signing an agreement of peace and normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and the normalization of relations with Türkiye, even though we realize that it will not be easy. But moving forward with such a program is in the state interests of the Republic of Armenia.” Regarding Türkiye, he said; “I also want to express my hope that in the near future we will have the implementation of the agreements reached as a result of the discussions and negotiations of the special representatives”. Pashinyan reminded that among the arrangements he mentioned was the opening of the border between the two countries for third country citizens and diplomatic passport holders, and stated that in addition to political arrangements, important infrastructural works were also being carried out.¹⁴⁸

Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mirzoyan also expressed hope for normalization of relations with Türkiye in his speech to the Parliament on 3 November. The Armenian press questioned this optimism, pointing to Turkish President Erdoğan’s praise and satisfaction for Azerbaijan’s recent Karabakh operation at the summit of the leaders of Turkic states in Kazakhstan and at a meeting of his party on 25 October, and his insistence on the Zangezur corridor issue, considering it as a precondition.¹⁴⁹

146 “No: 236, 27 September 2023, Press Release Regarding the Explosion at a Gas Station in Khankendi”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, September 27, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-236_-hankendi-de-bir-benzin-istasyonunda-meydana-gelen-patlama-hk.en.mfa

147 “Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Türkiye”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, October 23, 2023, <https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/10/23/arm-turkey/12290>

148 “Motherland is the State. If You Love Your Motherland, Strengthen Your State. Prime Minister’s Speech at the Discussion of the Draft State Budget 2024 During the Joint Session of the National Assembly Standing Committees”, *Prime Minister of Armenia*, October 30, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/10/30/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/>

149 Aza Babayan and Astghik Bedevian, “Armenia ‘Optimistic’ as Turkey’s Erdogan Insists on Corridor for Azerbaijan”, *Azattyun*, November 3, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32669108.html>

Speaking at the autumn meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Yerevan on 18 November, President of the National Assembly of Armenia Simonyan stated that Armenia was also sincerely interested in settling relations with Türkiye, having open borders and transportation links in the region and engaging in negotiations without preconditions. He expressed that he had great hope that these negotiations would yield desirable results in the visible future.¹⁵⁰ Speaking at the same meeting, Pashinyan expressed the same hope and said;

“Armenia is in dialogue with Türkiye. We have never had such an active dialogue before, even though we have not made any progress in terms of establishing diplomatic relations. However, the normalization of relations between Armenia and Türkiye is the most important factor for the strategic vision of a peaceful, developing environment in the South Caucasus. I hope that the issue of opening the Armenian-Turkish border for citizens of third countries and persons with diplomatic passports will be resolved soon. This will be a very symbolic step.”¹⁵¹

In a detailed video presentation of the “Crossroads of Peace” project released by the Armenian government on 18 November, it was reported that five border crossings with Azerbaijan and two border crossings with Türkiye were envisaged and that infrastructure work had begun.¹⁵²

150 “Speech by RA NA President at Autumn Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly”, *ILurer*, November 18, 2023, <https://www.ilurer.am/en/2023/11/18/Speech-by-RA-NA-President-at-Autumn-Meeting-of-the-OSCE-Parliamentary-Assembly/1032628>

151 “Pashinyan Says Normalizing Relations with Türkiye is Important for Armenia”, *Xalqgazeti*, November 18, 2023, <https://xalqgazeti.az/en/siyaset/148994-pashinyan-says-normalizing-relations-with>

152 “Ermenistan, Zengezur Koridoru’nu kabul etti”, *Kırım Haber Ajansı*, November 19, 2023, <https://www.qha.com.tr/turk-dunyasi/ermenistan-zengezur-koridoru-nu-kabul-etti-481632>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “2023 Autumn Meeting”. *OSCE*, accessed November 21, 2023, <https://www.oscepa.org/en/meetings/autumn-meetings/upcoming-autumn-meeting>,
- “34 Countries Issue Joint Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh at UN Human Rights Council Session”. *ArmenPress*, October 11, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1121753.html>
- “5. Formal sitting - Address by Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia”. *European Parliament*, October 17, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2023-10-17-ITM-005_EN.html
- “Aliyev’den Barış Mesajı”. *Cumhuriyet*, October 9, 2023, <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/dunya/aliyevden-baris-mesaji-2128012>
- “Ankara Urges Yerevan ‘Not to Fall for Provocations’”. *Hürriyet Daily News*, September 27, 2023, <https://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/we-will-provide-technological-device-support-to-university-students-erdogan-186590>
- “Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia V. Azerbaijan) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures”. *International Court of Justice*, October 29, 2023, <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/180/180-20230929-pre-01-00-en.pdf>
- “Ararat Mirzoyan had a Phone Conversation with Newly Appointed Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan”. *News.am*, June 7, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/764270.html>
- “Ararat Mirzoyan, Josep Borrell Discuss Armenia-EU cooperation”. *ArmenPress*, July 8, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1114993.html>
- “Armenia Cannot Decide Nagorno-Karabakh People’s Fate, Representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh Should be a Party to Negotiations, Pashinyan”. *First Channel News*, July 25, 2023, <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/07/25/Armenia-cannot-decide-Nagorno-Karabakh-people-s-fate-representatives- of-Nagorno-Karabakh-should-be /967329>
- “Armenia Considers Membership in Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”. *ArmBanks*, October 17, 2023, <http://www.armbanks.am/en/2023/10/17/151100/>

“Armenia PM Signals Foreign Policy Shift Away from Russia”. *Le Monde*, September 24, 2023,
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/24/armenia-pm-signals-foreign-policy-shift-away-from-russia_6139059_4.html

“Armenia Security Council Secretary Meets White House NSA in Washington, D.C.” *ArmenPress*, July 7, 2023,
<https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1114883.html#:~:text=YEREVAN%2C%20JULY%207%2C%20ARMENPRESS.,regional%20security%20situation%20and%20challenges>

“Armenia Sees Continued Surge In Trade With Russia”. *Azatutyun*, July 12, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32500512.html>

“Armenia Sent First Aid to Ukraine since Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion”. *Europian Pravda*, September 5, 2023,
<https://www.euointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2023/09/5/7168844/>

“Armenia to Leave CSTO if Yerevan Deems It ‘Non-Functional Organization’ — Prime Minister”. *TASS*, May 22, 2023,
<https://tass.com/world/1621147>

“Armenia, Azerbaijan Have Reciprocally Recognized the Existence of Enclaves”. *Armenpress*, May 24, 2023,
<https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1111678.html>

“Armenia, France Sign Military Cooperation Agreement”. *Asbarez*, October 23, 2023, <https://asbarez.com/armenia-france-sign-military-cooperation-agreement/>

“Armenia’s Foreign Minister Visit to Portugal”. *Embassy of Armenia to the Holy See*, July 14, 2023,
<https://vatican.mfa.am/en/news/2023/07/14/fmvisitportugal14072023/11844>

“Armenia’s Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Attends Armenian-Iranian Business Forum”. *ArmenPress*, 31 October 2023,
<https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1123232.html>

“Armenia’s Participation In Conference on Ukraine in Malta Anti-Russian Gesture — MFA”. *TASS*, November 2, 2023,
https://tass.com/politics/1700761?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com

- “Armenia-Azerbaijan Situation ‘On Agenda’ of EU Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”. *Azatutyun*, November 13, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32683039.html>
- “Armenia-Greece-Cyprus Trilateral Defence Consultations”. *Ministry of Defense of Armenia*, July 5, 2023, <https://mil.am/en/news/11612>
- “Armenian Airlines Launches Yerevan-İstanbul Flights”. *ArmenPress*, July 3, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1114602/>
- “Armenian Central Bank Raises 2023 Economic Growth Forecast to 6.9%”. *Interfax*, June 13, 2023, <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/91398/>
- “Armenian Church Again Warns Against ‘Humiliating’ Peace Deal”. *Azatutyun*, June 12, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32455807.html>
- “Armenian Defense Minister Opts out of CSTO Council Meeting in Belarus”. *ArmenPress*, May 25, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1111768.html>
- “Armenian FM Visits Iran”, *Azatutyun*, July 24, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32517144.html>
- “Armenian Leaders Hit Back at Moscow”. *Azatutyun*, November 3, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32669928.html>
- “Armenian PM Describes Phone Call with Erdogan as ‘Substantial and Useful’”. *ArmenPress*, September 11, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1119262/>
- “Armenian PM Says Increasing Defense Spending is for Preparing for Peace”. *Arka.am*, November 16, 2023, https://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenian_pm_says_increasing_defense_spending_is_for_preparing_for_peace/
- “Armenian President Approves Parliament’s Decision to Join the International Criminal Court”. *APNEWS*, October 14, 2023, <https://apnews.com/article/armenia-icc-russia-putin-26612df6d4687d0fd7137144aff3ef9c>
- “Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Interview with POLITICO Europe”. *First Channel News*, September 13, 2023, <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/09/13/Armenian-Prime-Minister-Nikol-Pashinyan-s-interview-with-POLITICO-Europe/994935>
- “Armenian Security Council Secretary Arrives in Tehran”. *News.am*, October 1, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/784376.html>

- “Armenian-Azeri Brussels Summit Won’t Take Place”. *ArmenPress*, October 25, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1122753.html>
- “Armenia’s Economy will Grow by 7.2% in 2023 and by 7% in 2024 - Finance Minister”. *Arka News Agency*, October 30, 2023, https://arka.am/en/news/economy/armenia_s_economy_will_grow_by_7_2_in_2023_and_by_7_in_2024_finance_minister/
- “Artsakh President to Resign”. *Asbarez*, August 31, 2023, <https://www.asbarez.com/artsakh-president-to-resign/>
- “Azerbaijan’s President Refuses to Attend EU Talks with Armenia PM”. *France 24*, October 4, 2023, <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20231004-azerbaijan-s-president-refuses-to-attend-eu-talks-with-armenia-pm>
- “Azerbaijani Language is Taught in 4 Schools in Armenia”. *APA*, July 6, 2023, <https://apa.az/en/cisountries/azerbaijani-language-is-taught-in-4-schools-in-armenia-407144>
- “Azerbaijani President Gives Ultimatum to Karabakh Authorities”. *Eurasianet*, May 30, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijani-president-gives-ultimatum-to-karabakh-authorities>
- “Baku Steps Up Claims on 8 Armenian Villages ‘Occupied By Armenia’”. *Asbarez*, October 11, 2023, <https://asbarez.com/baku-steps-up-claims-on-8-armenian-village-occupied-by-armenia/>
- “Breaking: Azerbaijan Opts out of Granada Summit”. *ArmenPress*, October 4, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1121173.html>
- “Brüksel’de Ermenistan-Azerbaycan Görüşmesi Başladı; Toplantının ‘Yapıcı Geçtiği Vurgulandı’”. *T24*, September 26, 2023, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/bruksel-de-ermenistan-azerbaycan-gorusmesi-basladi-toplantinin-yapici-gectigi-vurgulandi,1131906>
- “Chief of General Staff of Armenian Military Visits United States”. *Armenpress*, July 18, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1115663/>
- “Chief of General Staff of Armenian Military Visits United States”. *ArmenPress*, July 18, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1115663/>
- “Continued Peace Talks Between Armenia and Azerbaijan”. *U.S. Department of State*, May 30, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/continued-peace-talks-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan/>

- “Erdogan Holds Phone Conversations with Pashinyan, Aliyev”. *Asbarez*, June 28, 2023, <https://asbarez.com/erdogan-holds-phon-conversations-with-pashinyan-aliyev/>
- “Erdogan Speaks For Prompt Signing Of Peace Treaty Between Baku, Yerevan”. *InterFax*, July 31, 2023, <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/93162/>
- “Erdogan, Pashinian Discuss Karabakh Tensions”. *Azattyun*, September 11, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32588036.html>
- “Ermenistan, Zengezur Koridoru’nu kabul etti”. *Kırım Haber Ajansı*, November 19, 2023, <https://www.qha.com.tr/turk-dunyasi/ermenistan-zengezur-koridoru-nu-kabul-etti-481632>
- “EU Has Denied Military Aid to Armenia”. *Asbarez*, July 5, 2023, <https://asbarez.com/eu-has-denied-military-aid-to-armenia/>
- “EU Urges Dialogue Between Azerbaijan, Karabakh Armenians”. *Azattyun*, May 30, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32435480.html>
- “EUMA: From Very Beginning European Union Mission in Armenia is Fully Transparent about Its Plan”. *News.am*, June 15, 2023, <https://news.am/eng/news/765530.html>
- “Eurasian Intergovernmental Council in Sochi: How Meeting of Eurasian Five Heads of Government Held”. *Official Information Source of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan*, June 9, 2023, <https://primeminister.kz/en/news/reviews/eurasian-intergovernmental-council-in-sochi-how-meeting-of-eurasian-five-heads-of-government-held-24410>
- “European Parliament Resolution of 5 October 2023 on the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh After Azerbaijan’s Attack and the Continuing Threats Against Armenia (2023/2879(Rsp))”. *European Parliament*, October 5, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-10-05_EN.html#sdocta10
- “Exclusive: Nagorno-Karabakh Exodus was Genocide, says Former ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo”. *Armenpress*, November 9, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1123809.html>
- “Export from Iran to Armenia Increases over 38% in Q1”. *Tehran Times*, July 25, 2023, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/487237/Export-from-Iran-to-Armenia-increases-over-38-in-Q1>

- “Fransa’dan, Ermenistan’a Askeri Teçhizat Sevkiyatına Onay”. *EuroNews*, October 3, 2023, <https://tr.euronews.com/2023/10/03/fransadan-ermenistana-askeri-techizat-sevkiyatina-onay>
- “Germany’s Baerbock Presses Peace Hopes in Yerevan on First Leg of Caucasus Trip”. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 3, 2023, <https://www.rferl.org/a/germany-baerbock-eu-expansion-geopolitical-necessityukraine/32669098.html>
- “His Eminence Pietro Parolin Cardinal Secretary of State Visits Armenia (11-13 July 2023)”. *Apostolic Nunciature in Armenia*, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://vaticanarm.org/en/archives/7286>
- “Hungarian Foreign Minister Says Armenian Church had Very Important Role in Restoration of Relations with Armenia”. *ArmenPress*, November 27, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1122959.html>
- “Iran and Russia Denounce West over Caucasus Tensions”. *France 24*, October 23, 2023, <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231023-armenia-azerbaijan-join-iran-hosted-talks-aimed-at-reconciliation>
- “Iran Offers to Send Observers to Armenian-Azeri Border”. *Azatutyun*, October 4, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32622882.html>
- “Iran Reaffirms Support for Alternative Transport Link for Azeri Exclave”. *Azatutyun*, November 9, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32678110.html>
- “Karabağ Rus Yardımının Ağdam’dan Girişine İzin Verdi”. *Agos*, September 9, 2023, <https://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/29098/karabag-rus-yardiminin-agdam-dan-girisine-izin-verdi>
- “Karabakh ‘Deeply Disappointed’ By U.S. Statement”. *Azatutyun*, June 1, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32438800.html>
- “Lachin Road is Azerbaijan’s Territory, Says Turkish Foreign Minister”. *ANews*, July 31, 2023, <https://www.anews.com.tr/world/2023/07/31/lachin-road-is-azerbajans-territory-says-turkish-foreign-minister>
- “Latest Clash between Armenia, Azerbaijan Undermines Prospects of Peace, Speakers Warn Security Council, Calling for Genuine Dialogue to Settle Outstanding Issues”. *United Nations*, September 21, 2023, <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15418.doc.htm>
- “Lieutenant General Edward Asryan Visited the US European Command Center”. *Ministry of Defence of Armenia*, November 6, 2023, <https://www.mil.am/en/news/11848>

“Mayor of Paris Accompanies Humanitarian Cargo on Its Way to Nagorno-Karabakh”. *ILurer*, August 30, 2023, <https://www.ilurer.am/en/2023/08/30/Mayor-of-Paris-accompanies-humanitarian-cargo-on-its-way-to-Nagorno-Karabakh/986137>

“Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Türkiye”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, October 23, 2023, <https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/10/23/arm-turkey/12290>

“Meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia with the President of Iran”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, October 23, 2023, <https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/10/23/mirzoyan-raisi/12288>

“Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Canada”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, October 25, 2023, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/10/25/arm_canada/12299

“Meeting with Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan”. *President of Russia*, May 25, 2023, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71206>

“Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Delivered Remarks at the OSCE Special PC Meeting”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, July 20, 2023, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/07/20/PC_Mirzoyan/12102

“Mirzoyan Meets with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe within the Framework of the Dubrovnik Conference”. *ArmenPress*, July 8, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1114980.html>

“Mirzoyan: Now It is Time to Continue Armenian-Turkish Normalization Process”. *Mediamax*, July 19, 2023, <https://mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/51964/>

“Moscow ‘Dissatisfied’ with Armenian Prime Minister’s Statements about Russia — Diplomat”. *TASS*, September 4, 2023, <https://tass.com/politics/1669525>

“Moscow, Yerevan Trade More Barbs”. *Azatutyun*, November 9, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32678237.html>

“Motherland is the State. If You Love Your Motherland, Strengthen Your State. Prime Minister’s Speech at the Discussion of the Draft State Budget 2024 During the Joint Session of the National Assembly Standing Committees”. *The Prime Minister of Armenia*, October 30, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/10/30/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/>

- “No Alternative to Peace in The South Caucasus, Says Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman”. *ArmenPress*, October 23, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1122605.html>
- “No: 218, 9 September 2023, Press Release Regarding the So-Called Elections Held in the Territories of Karabakh Region of Azerbaijan Under the Control of Illegal Armenian Forces”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, September 9, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-218_-azerbaycan-in-karabag-bolgesinde-duzenlenen-sozde-secimler-hk.en.mfa
- “No: 236, 27 September 2023, Press Release Regarding the Explosion at a Gas Station in Khankendi”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, September 27, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-236_-hankendi-de-bir-benzin-istasyonunda-meydana-gelen-patlama-hk.en.mfa
- “No: 245, 5 October 2023, Press Release Regarding the Resolution Titled ‘On the Situation in ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ after Azerbaijan’s Attack and the Continuing Threats Against Armenia’ Adopted by the European Parliament”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, October 5, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-245_-avrupa-parlamentosu-nun-kabul-ettigi-karar-hk.en.mfa
- “No:229, 19 September 2023, Press Release Regarding the Military Operation Launched by Azerbaijan in Karabakh”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye*, September 19, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-229_-azerbaycan-tarafindan-karabag-da-baslatilan-askeri-operasyon-hk.en.mfa
- “No:658/23, Press Release on the Decision of the International Court of Justice of November 17, 2023”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan*, November 17, 2023, <https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no65823>
- “Number of Forcibly Displaced Persons from NK Stands at 100,632”. *Armenpress*, October 4, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1121185.html>
- “Pashinyan Comments on Erdogan’s Offer to Hold Armenia-Türkiye-Russia-Azerbaijan Summit”. *ArmenPress*, September 17, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1119688.html>
- “Pashinyan Follows in Zelensky’s Footsteps by Quantum Leaps — High-Ranking Source in Moscow”. *TASS*, October 18, 2023, <https://tass.com/world/1692799>

- “Pashinyan Says Normalizing Relations with Türkiye is Important for Armenia”. *Xalqqazeti*, November 18, 2023, <https://xalqqazeti.az/en/siyaset/148994-pashinyan-says-normalizing-relations-with>
- “Pashinyan: No Concrete Results From the Brussels Meeting”. *MassisPost*, July 20, 2023, <https://massispost.com/2023/07/pashinyan-no-concrete-results-from-the-brussels-meeting/>
- “PM Nikol Pashinyan Attends Inauguration of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan”. *ArmenPress*, June 3, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1112489.html>
- “PM Pashinyan Receives Kansas Governor and Director of Joint Staff of Kansas National Guard”. *ArmenPress*, June 22, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1113912/>
- “Political Consultations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Armenia*, July 3, 2023, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2023/07/03/Arm_Ind_Consultations/12073
- “President Khachaturyan Visits Italy, Meeting With Sergio Mattarella Expected”. *ArmenPress*, July 24, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1116016.html>
- “Press Remarks by President Charles Michel Following Trilateral Meeting with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia”. *European Council*, July 15, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/15/press-remarks-by-president-charles-michel-following-trilateral-meeting-with-president-aliyev-of-azerbaijan-and-prime-minister-pashinyan-of-armenia/>
- “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and The President of the Republic of Iran Hold Telephone Conversation”. *Prime Minister of Armenia*, September 9, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/09/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-Telephone-Conversation-3/>
- “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Interview with the Wall Street Journal”. *Prime Minister of Armenia*, October 25, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/10/25/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-The-Well-Street-Journal>

- “Prime Minister Pashinyan Holds Telephone Conversation with President of Iran Ebrahim Raisi”. *Prime Minister of Armenia*, June 26, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/pressrelease/item/2023/06/26/Nikol-Pashinyan-Telephone-Conversation/>.
- “Prime Minister Pashinyan Meets with President Khachaturyan”. *Prime Minister of Armenia*, May 29, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/05/29/Nikol-Pashinyan-met-with-Vahagn-Khachaturyan/>
- “Prime Minister Pashinyan Presents the “Crossroads of Peace” Project and Its Principles at the Tbilisi International Forum”. *Prime Minister of Armenia*, October 26, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/10/26/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/>
- “Prime Minister Pashinyan Received the Special Representative of NATO Secretary General Javier Colomina”. *Prime Minister of Armenia*, May 23, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/05/23/Nikol-Pashinyan-meeting/>
- “Prime Minister Pashinyan Receives the Medal Awarded by Pope Francis”. *Prime Minister of Armenia*, October 24, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/10/24/Nikol-Pashinyan-meeting/>
- “Proposal to Sign an Agreement on Status of EU Mission in Armenia Approved”. *First Channel News*, August 31, 2023, <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/08/31/Proposal-to-sign-an-agreement-on-status-of-EU-mission-in-Armenia-approved/987018>
- “Putin Hosts Fresh Talks Between Pashinian, Aliyev”. *Azatutyun*, May 26, 2023, <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32428164.html>
- “Remarks by President Charles Michel after his Meeting with the Leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, France and Germany”. *European Council*, June 1, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/01/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-after-his-meeting-with-the-leaders-of-armenia-azerbaijan-france-and-germany/>
- “Ruben Rubinyan Receives Political Director for Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia of MFA of Germany”. *1Lurer*, July 17, 2023, <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/07/17/Ruben-RubinyanReceives-Political-Director-for-Eastern-Europe-Caucasus-and-Central-Asia-of-MFA-of-G/963691>

“Rubinyan Presented the Process of Regulating Armenia-Turkey Relations”. *Radar Armenia*, July 13, 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2578510420/>

“Russia Again Blames Pashinian for Karabakh Crisis”. *Azatoryun*, September 12, 2023, <https://www.azatoryun.am/a/32589437.html>

“Russia Calls Pashinian’s Criticism of Moscow over Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh ‘Unacceptable’”. *Radio Free Europe*, September 25, 2023, <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-armenia-azerbaijan-pashinian-criticism/32608635.html>

“Russia Cannot ‘Turn Back on’ South Caucasus Region, No Such Plans Envisioned — Kremlin”. *TASS*, September 5, 2023, <https://tass.com/politics/1670081>

“Russia Strongly Urges Azerbaijan to Unblock the Lachin Corridor”. *Armenpress*, July 15, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1115533.html>

“Russia Wants Armenia to Explain Ratification of ICC Rome Statute — Diplomat”. *TASS*, September 5, 2023, <https://tass.com/politics/1670155>

“Russian MFA Rejects Accusations against Russian Peacekeepers over Lachin Corridor”. *TASS*, August 30, 2023, <https://tass.com/politics/1667621>

“Secretary of Security Council and Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of Iran had Telephone Conversation”. *ILurer*, November 13, 2023, <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/11/13/Secretary-of-Security-Council-and-Secretary-of-Supreme-National-Security-Council-of-Iran-had-teleph/1029269>

“Special Forces of Armenia, Greece and Cyprus Hold Joint Drills”. *ArmenPress*, November 13, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1124037.html>

“Speech by RA NA President at Autumn Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly”. *ILurer*, November 18, 2023, <https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/11/18/Speech-by-RA-NA-President-at-Autumn-Meeting-of-the-OSCE-Parliamentary-Assembly/1032628>

“Statement by Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense”. *Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan*, September 19, 2023, <https://mod.gov.az/en/news/statement-by-azerbaijan-s-ministry-of-defense-49350.html>

“Statement by the Spokesperson of Charles Michel, President of the European Council, Regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan”. *European Council*, September 1, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/09/01/statement-by-the-spokesperson-of-charles-michel-president-of-the-european-council-regarding-armenia-and-azerbaijan/>

“The Delegation Led by Alen Simonyan Leaves for Paris”. *ArmenPress*, July 10, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1115084.html>

“The Karabakh “Parliament” also Issued a Call to the United Nations Member States on July 27, Asking for Its Independence to be Recognized within the Scope of the Principle of the Right to Compensatory Secession”. *Hetq*, July 27, 2023, <https://hetq.am/en/article/158507>

“The Meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and the UK Minister for Europe”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, November 13 2023, https://www.mfa.am/en/pressreleases/2023/11/13/GB_Mirzoyan/12322

“The Prime Minister Received the Governor of Kansas and the Commander of the National Guard”. *Radar Armenia*, June 22, 2023, <https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2574825954/>

“The Prime Minister will Leave for Georgia on a Working Visit”. *Prime Minister of Armenia*, July 7, 2023, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/07/07/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-Georgia/>

“U.S. Looks Forward to Rescheduling Postponed Armenia-Azerbaijan Talks in Washington”. *Armenpress*, June 14, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1113208/>

“UN Team Completes Mission to Karabakh”. *United Nations Azerbaijan*, October 2, 2023, <https://azerbaijan.un.org/en/248051-un-team-completes-mission-karabakh>

“US Completes Joint Military Exercise in Armenia”. *Aljazeera*, September 20, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/20/us-completes-joint-military-exercise-in-armenia>

“US Envoy Again Visits Armenia, Azerbaijan”. *Mirror Spectator*, June 1, 2023, <https://mirrorspectator.com/2023/06/01/us-envoy-again-visits-armenia-azerbaijan/>

“Vladimir Putin Meets with Members of the Valdai Discussion Club. Transcript of the Plenary Session of the 20th Annual Meeting”. *Valdai Discussion*

Club, October 5, 2023,
<https://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/vladimir-putin-meets-with-members-of-the-valdai-club-transcript-2023/>

“Washington Reaffirms Support for Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Talks”.
Azatutyun, November 17, 2023,
<https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32688496.html>

Abay, Emre Gürkan. “Russia Summons Armenia’s Ambassador to Protest Yerevan’s ‘Unfriendly’ Steps”. *Anadolu Agency*, September 8, 2023,
<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/russia-summons-armenias-ambassador-to-protest-yerevans-unfriendly-steps/2986973>

Babayan, Aza and Astghik Bedevian. “Armenia ‘Optimistic’ as Turkey’s Erdogan Insists on Corridor for Azerbaijan”. *Azatutyun*, November 3, 2023,
<https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32669108.html>

Balasyan, Grisha. “Yerevan Police Arrest Former Education Minister for Money Laundering”. *Hetq*, June 15, 2023, <https://hetq.am/en/article/157170>

Bedevian, Astghik. “Armenian Opposition Signals Protests Against ‘Karabakh’s Surrender’”. *Azatutyun*, May 22, 2023,
<https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32424296.html>

Bulghadarian, Naira. “Armenia’s First Foreign Intelligence Chief Named After ‘Training’”. *Azatutyun*, October 5, 2023,
<https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32624669.html>

Buniatian, Heghine. “EU Foreign Ministers Approve Expansion of Border Monitoring Mission in Armenia”. *Azatutyun*, November 13, 2023,
<https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32683155.html>

Christian, Gina. “Ancient Christian Enclave Faces ‘Genocide by Starvation,’ Says Armenian Catholic Bishop”. *CNEWA*, September 11, 2023,
<https://cnewa.org/ca/ancient-christian-enclave-faces-genocide-by-starvation-says-armenian-catholic-bishop/>

DePencier, Fin. “Pashinyan Says Armenians Should Stay in Karabakh”. *Eurasianet*, September 22, 2023, <https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-says-armenians-should-stay-in-karabakh>

Elena Teslova, “Armenian, Azerbaijani, Russian Foreign Ministers Discuss Karabakh Settlement”. *Anadolu Agency*, July 25, 2023,
<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/armenian-azerbajjani-russian-foreign-ministers-discuss-karabakh-settlement/2954256>

Ghazanchyan, Siranush. “Armenian PM, Head of US Department of State’s Sanctions Coordination Office Discuss Regional and International Processes”. *Public Radio of Armenia*, June 29, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/06/29/armenian-pm-head-of-us-department-of-states-sanctions-coordination-office-discuss-regional-and-international-processes/>

Ghazanchyan, Siranush. “Azerbaijan Accuses US of Bias, Refuses to Participate in a Meeting with Armenian FM in Washington”. *Public Radio of Armenia*, November 16, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/11/16/azerbaijan-accuses-us-of-bias-refuses-to-participate-in-a-meeting-with-armenian-fm/>

Ghazanchyan, Siranush. “Head of US Sanctions Coordination Office, Ambassador James C. O’Brien Visits Armenia”. *Public Radio of Armenia*, June 29, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/06/29/head-of-us-sanctions-coordination-office-ambassador-james-c-obrien-visits-armenia/>

Ghazanchyan, Siranush. “Head of US Sanctions Coordination Office, Ambassador James C. O’Brien Visits Armenia”. *Public Radio of Armenia*, June 29, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/06/29/head-of-us-sanctions-coordination-office-ambassador-james-c-obrien-visits-armenia/>

Ghazanchyan, Siranush. “New Round of Talks Postponed at the Request of Azerbaijan – Armenia MFA”. *Public Radio of Armenia*, June 8, 2023, <https://en.armradio.am/2023/06/08/new-round-of-talks-postponed-at-the-request-of-azerbaijani-sidd-armenia-mfa/>

Guldogan, Diyar. “Armenian Premier Pashinyan Extends Congratulations on Turkish President Erdogan’s Victory”. *Anadolu Ajansı*, May 28, 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/armenianpremier-pashinyan-extends-congratulations-on-turkish-president-erdogans-victory/2908381>

Hovsepian, Tigran. “French Aid Convoy Barred From Entering Karabakh”. *Azattyun*, August 20, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32571631.html>

Khulian, Artak. “Former Armenian Defense Chief To Remain In Jail”. *Azattyun*, August 30, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32571274.html>

Minoyan, Hoory. “French Weapons Arrive in Armenia through Georgia”. *The Armenian Weekly*, November 13, 2023, <https://armenianweekly.com/2023/11/15/french-weapons-arrive-in-armenia-through-georgia/>

Nane Shakiyan, “Armenia Building Checkpoint on Turkish Border”. *Azattyun*, July 20, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32512161.html>

Osborn, Andrew. “Armenian PM Says Depending Solely on Russia for Security was ‘Strategic Mistake’”. *Reuters*, September 3, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenian-pm-says-depending-solely-russia-security-was-strategic-mistake-2023-09-03/>

Teslova, Elena. “Russia Warns Armenia Against ‘Trying to Sit on Two Chairs’”. *Anadolu Ajansı*, November 16, 2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/russia-warns-armenia-against-trying-to-sit-on-twochairs-/3055192>

Zargarian, Robert. “Armenian Task Force To Explore Nuclear Plant Options”. *Azattyun*, June 8, 2023, <https://www.azattyun.am/a/32450621.html>

Zohrabov, Farid. “Meeting Between Azerbaijan, Karabakh Armenians in Yevlakh Underway - First Footage”. *Trend News Agency*, September 21, 2023, <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3800703.html>

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

To cite this article: Elterişhan Elçibey, "An Analysis of the Activities and Goals of Armenian Terrorist Organizations Between 1973-1986", *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 48 (2023): 63-83.

Received: 03.08.2023

Accepted: 27.11.2023

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACTIVITIES AND GOALS OF ARMENIAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS BETWEEN 1973-1986

(1973-1986 YILLARI ARASINDA ERMENİ TERÖR ÖRGÜTLERİNİN FAALİYET VE HEDEFLERİNİN ANALİZİ)

Elterişhan ELÇİBEY*

Abstract: *The terrorism that was perpetrated by Armenian radicals in the past was the result of a hostile Armenian nationalism based upon anti-Turkish sentiment, which was used to attain short-term political gains. Transnational Armenian terrorist activities reached their zenith when these activities turned out to be a grave threat to multiple countries rather than to certain countries that Armenian terrorists had targeted throughout history. Particularly, terrorist organizations of the Armenian radicals carried out more than 300 terrorist acts in 20 different countries in less than 20 years. Between 1973 and 1986, such organizations earned a reputation as the most dangerous and notorious groups carrying out a series of assassinations of Turkish diplomats as well as their family members and third parties not involved in Turkish-Armenian ethnic tensions. This academic report aims to present a comprehensive analysis by taking the goals and results of the violent activities of Armenian terrorist organizations between 1973 and 1986 as its main focus.*

Keywords: *Terrorism, Armenian radicals, ASALA, JCAG, Turkish Diplomats*

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1075-2068>

MA Student, Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences under Graduate School of Social Sciences, Department of International Relations

Öz: Geçmişte Ermeni radikalleri tarafından gerçekleştirilen terörizm, kısa vadeli siyasi kazanımlar elde etmek için kullanılan Türk karşıtlığına dayalı düşmanca bir Ermeni milliyetçiliğinin sonucuydu. Ulusötesi Ermeni terör faaliyetleri, bu faaliyetlerin Ermeni teröristlerin tarih boyunca hedef aldıkları belirli ülkeler yerine birden fazla ülke için ciddi bir tehdit haline gelmesiyle zirveye ulaşmıştır. Özellikle Ermeni radikallerin terör örgütleri 20 yıldan kısa bir süre içinde 20 farklı ülkede 300'den fazla terör eylemi gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu örgütler 1973-1986 yılları arasında Türk diplomatların yanı sıra aile üyelerine ve Türk-Ermeni etnik gerilimiyle ilgisi olmayan üçüncü şahıslara yönelik bir dizi suikast gerçekleştiren en tehlikeli ve kötü şöhretli gruplar olarak ün kazanmıştır. Bu akademik rapor, Ermeni terör örgütlerinin 1973-1986 yılları arasındaki şiddet eylemlerinin hedeflerini ve sonuçlarını ana odağına alarak kapsamlı bir analiz sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, Ermeni radikaller, ASALA, JCAG, Türk Diplomatlar

1. Overview of the Terrorism Perpetrated by Armenian Radicals

The terrorism that was perpetrated by Armenian radicals was the consequence of a hostile Armenian nationalism that relied on an anti-Turkish sentiment utilized for short-term political gains.¹ Transnational Armenian terrorist activities reached their zenith in the last quarter of the 20th century when it turned out to be grave threat to diverse countries instead of only specific countries targeted by Armenian terrorists throughout the history. In particular, Armenian terrorist organizations conducted more than 300 terrorist acts in 20 different countries within less than 20 years. These were highly violent and hateful acts which resulted in substantial bloodshed and pain.

Armenian radicals engaged in more terrorist activities and gave a rise to more casualties than all other terrorist groups associated with “nationalist terrorism” from specific Middle Eastern and Western European countries operating concurrently, including violent Palestinian groups, ETA, and IRA.² Between 1973 and 1986, Armenian terrorist organizations acquired a worldwide reputation as the most pernicious, violent, and notorious groups in existence through carrying out a series of grisly assassinations of Turkish diplomats as well as members of their families together with several non-involved third parties murdered in the course of 188 terrorist acts around the world.³ In total, 31 Turkish diplomats and their immediate family members were killed by extremists from the Armenian community in different countries around the world since the first Armenian terrorist incident, which took the lives of Turkish Consul General of Türkiye in Los Angeles Mehmet Baydar and his assistant Vice Consul Bahadır Demir in Santa Barbara, California/United States on 27 January.⁴

At least two main extremist Armenian terrorist organizations known for their deadly and carefully planned operational tactics, namely Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and its Dashnak-affiliated rival, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), targeted and killed about 90 individuals and injured hundreds more through bombing attempts and brutal attacks that spanned Western Europe, North America, the Middle East and the South Pacific in the period from 1973 to 1986.⁵ In

1 Christopher Gunn, “The Rise and Fall of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation Terrorism,” *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 31 (2015): 133.

2 Oleg Kuznetsov, *The History of Transnational Armenian Terrorism in the Twentieth Century: A Historico-Criminological Study* (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Koster, 2016), p. 96.

3 Michael M. Gunter, “Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal,” *Journal of Conflict Studies* 27, no. 2 (2007): 109.

4 Christopher Gunn, “Intra-or International Violence? The Origins of Armenian Terrorism,” *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 25 (2012): 104.

5 Christopher Gunn, “The Rise and Fall of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation Terrorism,” *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 31 (2015): 133.

particular, the Armenian terrorists committed more than 160 bombing attacks in crowded public places like airports, city squares, and bazaars in order to inflict utmost damage. Such bombing campaigns of the Armenian radicals destroyed more than 160 properties in different parts of the world, which cost almost a billion US dollars in damages. According to the reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the United States, Armenian terrorist activities accounted for 24.1 percent of entire terrorist incidents within the US between the years 1980 and 1986.⁶ In spite of adopting an indiscriminate attitude towards the ethnicity of their victims by the end of their operations, these Armenian terrorist groups chiefly concentrated their violence on ethnic Turks, their business interests, and assets of the Turkish government.⁷ Therefore, violent terrorist actions were directed at Turkish embassies and consulates, Turkish and other airline desks, and Turkish demonstrations in abroad so as to draw attention of international society to the long-lasting Armenian Question.⁸

The Armenian terrorist groups concentrated their activities and desires on three aims. Initially, they wanted to take revenge on the Republic of Türkiye owing to 1915 Events or the “Armenian Genocide” during which 1.5 million Ottoman Armenians lost their life according to the Armenian thesis. Secondly, they had an objective of compelling the present Turkish Republic to acknowledge that the ethnic strife in Eastern Anatolia in 1915 was a genocide by the Young Turk government against the Armenians during the Ottoman period. In that sense, they demanded official recognition of responsibility for the alleged pogroms, which Turkish authorities persistently rejected.⁹ Thirdly; as an emotional demand, they aimed to push Turkish authorities to pay reparations for the families of the alleged genocide victims, and make compensations through returning lands in Eastern Anatolia that were said to be populated by Ottoman Armenians before.¹⁰

These are historical claims that are unconditionally admitted as true not solely by Armenian groups, but also by the considerable part of Western European and North American public opinion. That was the motive behind the terrorism of the Armenian radicals, including specifically killing guiltless diplomats

6 Ergün Kırhkovalı, Armenian Terrorism in America and Turkish-Americans, interview by Erkan Demirağcı, *Tarih ve Günce*, June 20, 2018.

7 Gunn, *The Origins of Armenian Terror*, 104.

8 Ulf Björklund, “Armenia Remembered and Remade: Evolving Issues in a Diaspora,” *Ethnos* 58, no. 3-4 (January 1993): 347.

9 Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 4 (December 1993): 236.

10 Eldad Ben Aharon, “Superpower by Invitation: Late Cold War Diplomacy and Leveraging Armenian Terrorism as a Means to Rapprochement in Israeli-Turkish Relations (1980–1987),” *Cold War History*, July 4, 2018, 5.

and many others.¹¹ In short; between the years 1973-1986, Armenian and pro-Armenian terrorist circles instrumentalized “terrorism” as a means of propaganda to bring the genocide allegations to the international public opinion. After noticing the positive reaction to the escalation of violence as well as the emergence of advantageous international circumstances, Armenian extremist groups endorsed terror as an instrument to attain their chief political objectives. It appears that they were exceedingly successful in advertising their claims through terrorist acts. Once the world public opinion was informed, this situation facilitated the parliaments of various countries to make decisions recognizing the genocide discourse.

ASALA and JCAG managed to operate for over a decade as they were capable of maintaining international activities owing to unwavering assistance of sympathizers in the Armenian Diaspora for terrorist acts that killed ethnic Turks. In other words, Armenian terrorism possessed potential international networks wherever Armenians dwelled.¹² Moreover, assaults on Turkish diplomats around the world did not impede their struggle for publicity (in fact, it boosted their publicity on many occasions), and the arrested terrorists did not encounter any serious prosecution.¹³ In that context, the countries where the Armenian terrorist attacks took place neglected that these events possessed a political nature, and thereby they treated them as an ordinary criminal acts. Specifically, unless they targeted non-Turkish individuals, Western countries did not regard ASALA and JCAG as grave threats. What is more concerning is that while Turkish people suffered from the terrorism of the Armenian radicals, it was these Armenians and their supporters who portrayed themselves as victims. Hereby, international assistance was directed towards the Armenians who made their voice heard by means of terrorism.¹⁴

In particular, it has been asserted that radical Armenian terrorism may have a Soviet affiliation, purportedly in response to Türkiye’s alignment with the Western bloc. A number of foreign observers also subscribed to this conspiratorial perspective on terrorism, suggesting that Türkiye had fallen victim to a state-sponsored terrorist campaign orchestrated by the Soviet Union. According to Turkish military, the terrorists were trained in neighboring Arab nations and Bulgaria, with the Soviets overseeing the entire

11 Justin McCarthy, “Armenian Terrorism: History as Poison and Antidote,” in *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection* (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984), p. 86.

12 Michael M. Gunter, “Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism,” *Journal of Conflict Studies* 5, no. 4 (1985): 47.

13 Sadi Çaycı, “Terrorism and Asymmetric Threat: Activities against Turkey, from the Beginning of the 20th Century to the Present (Armenian Terror Activities and PKK Terror Organization Activities since 1915),” *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 18 (2008): 95.

14 Deniz Altınbaş, “The ‘Armenian Question’ in European Union Institutions,” *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 23 (2011): 158.

process.¹⁵ The objective of this campaign was believed to be the destabilization of Türkiye to such an extent that its credibility as an ally would be called into question by NATO and the United States.¹⁶ ASALA, which developed amicable connections with Moscow, was likely among numerous terrorist organizations endeavoring to undermine the stability of Türkiye, and it is plausible that they received clandestine assistance from the Soviet Union.¹⁷ The assistance provided encompassed a range of activities, such as imparting training to terrorists, supplying arms through the global illicit arms trade, and extending both direct and indirect support. Especially, ASALA terrorists received covert assistance through training from the Soviet intelligence service KGB, while Syria provided protection and support to the terrorists due to long-standing political conflicts with Türkiye dating back to the accession of Hatay in 1939. Furthermore, Greek Cypriots also covertly supported terrorists following Türkiye's intervention in Cyprus in 1974.¹⁸

Moreover, the fact that Western countries were hesitant to address the terrorism of Armenian radicals did not lead to suspicions about their sponsorship of these groups. On the contrary, their willingness to embrace an open society and democratic ideals was viewed as the main reason for their tolerance towards terrorist activities occurring within their own borders.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the said countries altered their posture once the Armenian terrorist activities started to harm non-Turkish individuals, especially after the indiscriminate violent actions of ASALA.

For instance, ASALA retaliated against France and Switzerland as the governments of these two countries captured its militants after they committed terrorist attacks, particularly after the 1983 Orly Airport attack.²⁰ Meanwhile, the Armenians residing in Türkiye, who had no contacts with these terrorist actions, were fearful of being caught in the middle of their fellow Armenian nationals living in the Diaspora and a shocked Turkish public. One of the tragic expressions of this depressive mood was the self-immolation of Artin Penik, a Turkish Armenian residing in Istanbul, as a protest against the atrocities of ASALA.²¹

15 Sabri Sayari, "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 2 (March 9, 2010): 206.

16 Sayari, op. cit., 206.

17 Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, 37.

18 Burak Kürkçü, "The Question of State-Sponsored Terrorism: Investigation of ASALA and JCAG in the Light of Available CIA Documents," *Insight Turkey* 23, no. 2 (June 10, 2021): 268.

19 Kürkçü, op. cit., 272.

20 Kürkçü, op. cit., 272.

21 Baskın Oran, "The Reconstruction of Armenian Identity in Turkey and the Weekly Agos," *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, no. 37 (2006): 128.

Nonetheless, Armenian terrorist organizations had actually no chance of attaining their publicly expressed objectives except for bringing the genocide claims to the attention of the international public as well as testing Türkiye's capacity. Contrary to their claims, the Turkish government was not in a position to modify its thesis on the Armenian Question, and the likelihood of violating the territorial integrity of Türkiye was implausible. Eventually, the terrorism of the Armenian radicals started to fade away in the second half of the 1980s when inter-group strife broke out between the two major terrorist organizations; the resulting violence decimated their members.²²

2. Terrorist Organizations Established by the Armenian Radicals

Armenian radicals utilized the names of diverse front organizations in conducting their terror operations.²³ In spite of multitude of organizational titles, there appears to have been solely two major terrorist organizations, namely ASALA and JCAG that was re-labelled as the "Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA)" in 1983 (the decision to rename JCAG as ARA was driven by the realization that they were losing their youthful and proactive members to the more popular and highly energetic ASALA terrorist group).²⁴ In 1975, they were established in Beirut during the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War.²⁵ Both organizations started to assassinate Turkish diplomats and bombard facilities of the Turkish Republic, initially in Europe. Later on, their violent activities spread into North America and the Middle East before conducting more sophisticated assaults including hostage-taking and hijacking.²⁶

ASALA was the first terrorist structure established during the latest wave of Armenian radical aggression. Possessing a leftist leaning, it portrayed the Armenian issue through a Marxist point of view. Furthermore, ASALA acquired a reputation as an exceedingly relentless terrorist organization. Being organized in the conventional terrorist cell structure, militants of ASALA seemed to have a capacity to access quite advanced arsenal, including anti-tank missiles and Soviet-made rifles and explosives. Besides, they were not short on financial resources as well as safe houses thanks to staunch auxiliaries in the Armenian Diaspora.²⁷ Through utilizing several different names,

22 Gunn, *The Rise and Fall of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation Terrorism*, 133.

23 Erich Feigl, *A Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism, Its Causes and Its Historical Context* (Freilassing: Edition Zeitgeschichte, 1986), p. 121.

24 Michael M. Gunter, *Armenian History and the Question of Genocide*, First Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 63.

25 Björklund, *op. cit.*, 347.

26 Gunn, *The Origins of Armenian Terror*, 107-108.

27 Paul Wilkinson, "Armenian Terrorism," *The World Today* 39, no. 9 (1983): 346.

ASALA strived to produce an impression of a broad spectrum of engagement within the worldwide Armenian community to influence both the international public as well as their fellow Armenian nationals. Without doubt, the usage of so diverse organizational titles also aimed to complicate the maneuvers of counter-terrorist forces.²⁸

In its endeavor to seize the leadership of the Armenian Diaspora, ASALA strived to correlate their cause with historical Armenian figures. For instance, some operations of the organization were named after (in)famous revolutionary Armenians such as Andranik Ozanian and Shahan Natalie. Besides, Gourgen Yanikian, who murdered two Turkish Diplomats in Santa Barbara in 1973, was regarded as the spiritual leader by ASALA militants.²⁹ Most importantly; as expressed by its leader Hagop Hagopian, ASALA attacked both verbally and practically not only its principal foe Türkiye, but also a number of states and organizations that hindered activities of the organization. For instance, after it undertook the responsibility for the assassination of the Turkish diplomat Galip Özmen and his 14-years daughter Neslihan Özmen in Athens in 1980, ASALA explicitly declared that their enemy was the Turkish government, NATO, and also reactionary Armenian forces.³⁰ With respect to ASALA's contacts with Europe, France was the top country in giving considerable support to the terrorist organization. The motive underlying was related to high number of Armenians residing in France. Besides, Greece not only safeguarded small units of Armenian terrorists, but also provided direct financial resources to their organizations. Additionally, there were firm contacts between ASALA and PKK terrorist organization for a long time. Especially, the capture of ASALA militants while they were among PKK ranks and the operation of a PKK representation office in Yerevan are known facts.³¹

Additionally, one Armenian terrorist organization remained secretive, namely the "New Armenian Resistance (NAR)". According to statements based on reports, NAR was an organizational title utilized by ASALA militants when they organized assaults on Soviet targets. The terrorist acts associated with NAR seem to have started with a 1977 explosion in an underground station of Moscow. Particularly, on 30 January 1980, NAR released a statement to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the execution of three Soviet-Armenian dissidents involved in the 1977 Moscow underground bombing. The central message conveyed in the declaration emphasized the importance of national independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity in a

28 Michael M. Gunter, "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism," *Terrorism* 8, no. 3 (January 1986): 221.

29 Gunter, *Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal*, 117.

30 Gunter, *Contemporary Armenian Terrorism*, 222.

31 Altınbaş, *op. cit.*, 222-223.

reunified, independent, and socialist Armenia, rejecting any affiliation with either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Hence, the Soviet oppression, which had an anti-Armenian character, was not ignored by NAR, as it had a profound impact on the patriotic individuals living in Soviet Armenia.³² After the 1977 event, NAR committed 14 terrorist attacks, the last of which took place in 1982. NAR claimed responsibility for the bombings that occurred on 24 April 1982, in Federal Republic of Germany, targeting a Turkish store in Dortmund and a Turkish bank in Cologne. These were the final two attacks attributed to NAR, which was operating under a slightly modified name “New Armenian Resistance for the Independence of Armenia”. It is probable that individuals who shared a similar background as NAR eventually joined ASALA, even if only for a temporary period.³³ Throughout this period, the ASALA agenda likely remained of utmost importance.³⁴

On the other hand, JCAG as a right-wing and ultranationalist terrorist organization is assessed to be the secret militant wing of one of the primary and most powerful Armenian political parties, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), or shortly the Dashnaks, whose origins traces back to 1890. The Dashnaks desired the re-establishment of independent and non-communist Armenia as well as the compensation for the alleged massacres of Armenians conducted by Turks. Realizing the militant and potentially more favorable leftist ASALA would be more appealing than the right-wing ARF, leadership of the latter established JCAG as its militant branch to sustain its ranks and contend with ASALA for recruitment.³⁵ The first terrorist act of JCAG was the assassination of Daniş Tunalıgil, the Turkish Ambassador to Vienna, in October 1975, only months after the first terrorist act of ASALA in Beirut.³⁶ In contrast with ASALA, JCAG evidently refrained from other international terrorist networks and concentrated on solely Turkish targets. For instance, after it took the credit for the assassination of Kemal Arıkan as Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles in 1982, JCAG authorities proclaimed that their primary targets were Turkish diplomats and institutions.³⁷

32 Francis P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects* (United States: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 80-81.

33 Hyland, op. cit., p. 77.

34 Hyland, op. cit., p. 84.

35 Gunn, *The Origins of Armenian Terror*, 107-108.

36 Laura Dugan et al., “Sudden Desistance from Terrorism: The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide,” *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 1, no. 3 (November 2008): 235.

37 Gunter, *Contemporary Armenian Terrorism*, 227-229.

3. Goals of the Terrorist Organizations

In general, the goals of the terrorist organizations established by the Armenian radicals can be summarized as the “three R’s”; namely, recognition of the so called Armenian genocide of 1915, financial reparations from the Turkish Republic for the victims of the alleged genocide, and restoration of the “ancestral Armenian homeland”.³⁸ For an Armenian population dispersed over several countries in the world, the ancestral homeland accounted for territories in Eastern Anatolia which had been historically populated by Armenians (and also by Ottoman Muslims, a fact disregarded by Armenian radicals) until they were exposed to relocation by Ottoman forces during the First World War period.³⁹

First of all, all of those extremist Armenian nationalists in the ranks of terrorist organizations shared the principal goal, which was taking revenge for the 1915 events. Even though all those allegedly responsible for the atrocities in the Ottoman Empire were dead, Armenian terrorist groups insisted that the existing Turkish establishment had to take the blame for the crimes of the past, acknowledge the guilt of their predecessors, and make compensations. Despite ideological differences between Marxist ASALA and right-wing JCAG, they were almost fully concordant in the goals they strived to attain through terrorism.

Nevertheless, the two organizations were diverged over the third goal, the restoration of lands. While the Dashnaks in JCAG seemed to have envisaged an independent Armenia in Eastern Anatolia, ASALA evidently desired to establish an independent and completely sovereign Armenian state that encompassed the entire historic lands of the ancient Armenian kingdom, including Armenian Soviet Republic and historically Armenian-populated territories in Eastern Anatolia.⁴⁰ In that context; as an anti-Western terrorist organization, ASALA had an objective of uniting the Armenian world with the Soviet Union, and thus it contemplated Armenia under the domination of the Soviet Union as a basis for the revolution.⁴¹ Besides, the establishment of a socialist and revolutionary government was also envisioned. At the end of 1981, ASALA publicly declared its eight-point political program in which revolutionary violence was accepted as the primary method to realize the

38 Gunter, *Contemporary Armenian Terrorism*, 220.

39 Dugan et al., *op. cit.*, 233.

40 Robert Nalbandov, “Irrational Rationality of Terrorism,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 6, no. 4 (December 2013): 99.

41 Keisuke Wakizaka and Gökçe Yılmaz, “Interpreting Relations between Armenian Nationalism, Marxism and the Armenian Apostolic Church,” *Van Yüzüncü Yıl University the Journal of Social Sciences Institute*, no. 55 (2022): 32.

restoration of Armenian lands.⁴² Nonetheless, the likelihood of violating the territorial integrity of the Republic of Türkiye, particularly along the broadest border of NATO with the Eastern Bloc during the climax of the Cold War was quite utopian.⁴³

On the other hand, a more immediate, yet less promulgated objective of ASALA was to stimulate national awareness and action within the Armenian Diaspora. The obsession of Armenian nationalists with genocide allegations stemmed from this factor, as it became a primary driving force. Their main objective was to protect the Armenian identity, which was in danger of slowly disappearing, by highlighting the importance of “historical justice” and channeling their hostility towards Türkiye and its people. According to ASALA members, this awakening was necessary due to the perilous state of a “deep sleep” that the policies of the Dashnaks had led the Armenian people into. The intention of ASALA was to confront the existing Armenian elites, who were led by the Dashnaks and were allowing emigration and assimilation to take place. In connection to this, many Armenians have referred to assimilation as “white genocide.”⁴⁴ It is also noteworthy that ASALA sarcastically highlighted the apathy of the Dashnak leadership towards the Armenian Territorial Question, which was implied when they named their armed group the “Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.”⁴⁵ Hence, in addition to representation, mobilization of Armenians everywhere was also a vital goal for the leadership of ASALA.⁴⁶

4. Chronological Analysis of Prominent Armenian Terrorist Activities between 1973-1986

The vicious cycle of organized terrorism by Armenian radicals in the last quarter of the 20th century did not start with a group action. Rather; it started with the terrorist act of a single individual, which represented a kind of lone-wolf terrorism.⁴⁷ On 27 January 1973, Gourgen Yanikian, a 78-year-old Armenian residing in California/the US, offered Mehmet Baydar and Bahadır Demir, two members of the diplomatic staff of the Turkish Consulate in Los Angeles, to repatriate two rare paintings from Ottoman period, and thus he invited them to his room in the Biltmore Hotel in Santa Barbara, California.

42 Gunter, *Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal*, 118.

43 Gunn, *The Rise and Fall of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation Terrorism*, 136.

44 Gunter, *Contemporary Armenian Terrorism*, 220.

45 Gunter, *Armenian History and the Question of Genocide*, p. 65.

46 Dugan et al., *op. cit.*, 233.

47 Clark McCauley, “Group Desistance from Terrorism: A Dynamic Perspective,” *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 1, no. 3 (November 2008): 290.

When the two unsuspecting Turkish diplomats accepted the invitation, and then entered to the hotel room, Yanikian shot and murdered them in an individual act of revenge.

When he was interrogated, Yanikian reportedly expressed that Ottoman forces had slaughtered his brother and more than 25 relatives in the 1915 events. According to Yanikian, he had been haunted by memories of his childhood in Eastern Anatolia during the early twentieth century and had nurtured a deep desire for revenge for many years. He was born in Erzurum in 1895, and his family narrowly escaped the “Hamidian Massacres” by fleeing to Kars. Eight years later, while returning to Erzurum with only his mother and older brother to retrieve family records and gold, Yanikian allegedly witnessed the murder of his twenty-year-old brother by two Turkish soldiers. In response to the outbreak of the First World War, Yanikian left his studies at Moscow and joined the Armenian irregulars in their fight against the Ottoman Empire. Serving under General Dro’s command in the Armenian Volunteers, Yanikian claimed to have personally witnessed the brutalities inflicted by the Turks, including the suffering of his own family members.⁴⁸ Hereby, his assassination of Turkish General Consul Baydar and Vice Consul Demir relied on retribution for the so-called Armenian genocide. In the course of subsequent trial, Yanikian endeavored to change his murder trial into a case for the 1915 events.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the reaction of Armenians around the world to this assassination clearly indicated that there was a considerable base of support on the side of Armenian communities for aggression against ethnic Turks.⁵⁰

In fact, Yanikian possessed a strange personality. Prior to his act of terrorism, he was reportedly ostracized by Armenian society and viewed as an outsider. Based on the FBI investigation and court transcripts, there were both local police and FBI records on Yanikian dating back to the early 1950s. He was described as a delusional and incoherent individual with disturbed sexual tendencies, financial difficulties, and a deep sense of humiliation. Furthermore, he had been involved in fraudulent activities throughout his life. In his last moments, it appears that Yanikian was desperately yearning for redemption and recognition.⁵¹ Therefore, it is intriguing to observe the selective amnesia surrounding the uncomfortable truths about him, as well as the transformation of his image into that of a hero within the Armenian community following his assault on the Turkish diplomats. This significant

48 Christopher Gunn, “Murder & Memory: The Curious & Intertwined Legacies of Two Armenian Assassins,” in *Türk-Ermeni Uyu mazlığı Üzerine Ömer Engin Lütem Konferansları 2019*, ed. Alev Kılıç (Ankara: Terazi Yayıncılık, 2020), p. 58.

49 Birsen Karaca, “Armenian Terror during the Change in the Perception of and Reaction towards Terrorism,” *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 31 (2015): 217.

50 McCauley, op. cit., 290.

51 Gunn, *Murder & Memory: The Curious & Intertwined Legacies of Two Armenian Assassins*, p.59.

piece of information sheds light on the extent to which Armenian radicals were prepared to stretch their justifications for their deeds. Eventually, Yanikian incited the Armenian Diaspora to violently mobilize against the Turkish government and to kill its representatives. In that context, the general assumption was that Yanikian's violent act became a catalyst for the Armenian terrorist activities conducted by ASALA and JCAG over the ensuing decade.⁵²

After their establishment in 1975, ASALA and JCAG embraced international terrorism so as to bring an attention to their claims.⁵³ Ironically; rather than targeting ethnic Turks, ASALA's first terrorist act in 1975 targeted the headquarters of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Beirut, an institution providing aid to Armenian refugees in Lebanon. Especially, ASALA blamed the WCC for impeding the Armenian Cause for ancestral homeland through urging Armenian youth to emigrate to the United States.⁵⁴

Most importantly, the first five years of several operations conducted by ASALA and JCAG coincided with a period of worsening relations between Türkiye and the Western countries as well as deterioration of the Western publics' opinion of Türkiye chiefly because of Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974.⁵⁵ In particular, the relationship between the United States and Türkiye was negatively affected by the Turkish military intervention. Unexpectedly, this event led to increased political support for Armenians, who received backing from many members of the US Congress. These lawmakers not only disseminated anti-Turkish sentiments but also actively advocated for the Armenian Cause. Furthermore, Armenians aligned themselves with the influential Greek lobby, which shared their strong opposition towards Türkiye, particularly concerning the Cyprus dispute. This collaboration greatly enhanced their political influence and power in Washington.⁵⁶

A comprehensive report was prepared by Turkish authorities regarding the suspected link between Greek Cypriots and this issue. The report consists of brochures and media excerpts containing statements credited to Armenians and Greek Cypriots, which are believed to substantiate the accusation. One example is when the Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios expressed his backing for Armenian Patriarch Koren in August 1977, pledging to offer both material and moral support to the Armenians with the aim of raising global awareness about the Armenian issue.⁵⁷

52 Gunn, *The Origins of Armenian Terror*, 107.

53 Gunn, *The Rise and Fall of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation Terrorism*, 144.

54 McCauley, *op. cit.*, 290.

55 Gunn, *The Origins of Armenian Terror*, 108-109.

56 Gunn, *The Rise and Fall of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation Terrorism*, 144.

57 Gunter, *Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism*, 44.

The first operation of JCAG was carried out on 22 October 1975 when Daniş Tunalıgil, Turkish Ambassador to Austria, was assassinated. Until 1984 when the assassinations of diplomats ceased, militants of JCAG-ARA had murdered 20 Turkish diplomats and their immediate family members, whereas ASALA took the responsibility for solely 8 diplomatic assassinations.⁵⁸ In June 1977; Taha Carım, Türkiye's Ambassador to Vatican City, was killed by an ASALA militant in the garden of his house.⁵⁹ On 2 June 1978, automobile of Zeki Kunalalp who was Turkish Ambassador to Spain at that time was attacked by Armenian terrorists in Madrid. As a result of the terrorist attack, his wife Necla Kunalalp and his brother-in-law retired Ambassador Beşir Balcıoğlu lost their lives at the scene. Besides, a heavily injured Antonio Torres, the Spanish chauffeur, died in the hospital. This was the first operation of Armenian terrorists against relatives of Turkish diplomats.⁶⁰

In December 1978, ASALA carried out the first international terrorist attack when it bombed the Turkish Airlines desk in Geneva.⁶¹ Between the fall of 1979 and the summer of 1983, frequency of Armenian terrorist acts targeting mainly ethnic Turks drastically increased. These terrorist acts occurred in 12 different cities around the world. Evidently, the political turmoil in Türkiye during that period urged Armenian terrorist organizations to escalate their activities. These terrorist organizations took advantage of the political turmoil in Türkiye at that time, as they were convinced that the unstable political situation in the country would improve the chances of their demands being fulfilled. Throughout that period; assassinations, armed attacks, and bombings took the life of 19 people including Turkish officials and their relatives as well as American, French, German, Italian, Swiss, and Yugoslav nationals. In that sense, Armenian terrorist groups even enlarged range of their activities, and started to target non-Turkish victims so as to attract attention to the Armenian Cause and to retaliate the capture of their militants by non-Turkish authorities.⁶²

On 12 October 1979, 27-year-old medical student Ahmet Benler, the son of Turkish Ambassador to Netherlands Özdemir Benler, was murdered by Armenian terrorists in the Hague.⁶³ On 17 December 1980; Şarık Arıyak, Turkish Consul General to Sydney, and his guard Engin Sever were killed by two Armenian terrorists on their way to the consulate.⁶⁴

58 Gunter, *Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal*, 115.

59 Hazel Çağan, "Armenian Terrorism and the Turkish Press (1973-1984)" (MSc Thesis, Middle East Technical University (METU), 2013), 42.

60 Feigl, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

61 Gunn, *The Origins of Armenian Terror*, 111.

62 Gunn, *The Rise and Fall of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation Terrorism*, 145-146.

63 Feigl, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

64 Çağan, *op. cit.*, 64.

The zenith of ASALA's activities was the "Van Operation" on 24 September 1981 when four ASALA militants seized the Turkish Consulate in Paris, murdered its Turkish security guard, injured the consul, and took 56 people as captive. When four Armenian terrorists surrendered to French security forces after 16 hours, sympathy for them was high among French Armenians.⁶⁵

On 28 January 1982; Hampig Sassounian and Krikor Saliba, two terrorists from JCAG, ambushed and assassinated Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles Kemal Arıkan while he was at traffic in Westwood, California/the US. Shortly after the assassination, JCAG telephoned the Washington Bureau of the Associated Press so as to claim the responsibility.⁶⁶ Following the murder of Arıkan, each month a terrorist act against the Turkish officials took place in various parts of the world from April until August. On 8 April 1982; as a result of armed attack by Armenian terrorists in Ottawa, Turkish Counselor for Commercial Affairs Kani Güngör was paralyzed. Subsequently; Orhan Gündüz, Turkish Honorary Consul in Boston, was assassinated on 4 May. Later on; on 7 June, Turkish Administrative Attaché Erkut Akbay and his wife Nadide Akbay were killed in Lisbon. After the assassination of these diplomats; for the first time, a Turkish Military Attaché, Colonel Atilla Altıkat was assassinated by JCAG-ARA militants in Ottawa on 27 August.⁶⁷

Meanwhile, the Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 not only caused ASALA to lose its training bases in the country, but also caused it to lose PLO's support for the organization. On 7 August 1982; two ASALA militants, Levon Ekmekdschian and Zohrap Sarkisyan, opened gunfire in a crowded waiting room at Esenboga Airport of Ankara. While Ekmekdschian was apprehended and then sentenced to death, Turkish security forces shot and killed Sarkisyan in combat. As a result of this terrorist attack; 9 people lost their life and 72 others were wounded.⁶⁸

Following this terrorist act, cleavage among the ASALA leadership occurred. A faction under the leadership of Monte Melkonian defended that operations should be confined to Turkish officials, whereas a faction led by Hagopian was willing to commit attacks on third parties. The contention gave a rise to violent inter-group rivalry that resulted with death of militants from both factions.⁶⁹

65 McCauley, *op. cit.*, 291.

66 Gunter, *Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal*, pp. 111-112.

67 Çagan, *op. cit.*, 73.

68 Feigl, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

69 McCauley, *op. cit.*, 291.

On 9 March 1983; Galip Balkar, Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia, was murdered by two JCAG militants in Belgrade.⁷⁰ As the Armenian terrorism intensified, endorsement for the Armenian Cause decreased while concern for the Turkish victims escalated.

On the side of the Europeans, it was the Orly Airport attack that triggered them to oppose Armenian terrorist acts. On 15 July 1983, a bomb placed by the ASALA militants was detonated at the Turkish Airlines desk at the Orly Airport outside of Paris. As a result of the bombing attack, eight people including four French citizens, two Turks, an American, and a Swede lost their life either because of explosion or severe injuries. Besides; approximately 60 others were injured, and considerable amount of them remained infirm. The massacre perpetrated by Armenian terrorists found a great coverage in the international media. After the chief of the ASALA in France, Varoujan Garabedian, was sentenced to life for the bombing, he confessed that their original intent was to detonate a bomb in the plane of Turkish Airlines during its flight to Istanbul, which would have resulted with more casualties.⁷¹ The Orly Airport attack is not only regarded as an abnormal incident among Armenian terrorist activities, but also it is portrayed as almost the end of the Armenian terrorist activities.⁷²

In particular, the terrorism of the Armenian radicals never displayed the nonchalant attitude against international reactions after the Orly incident. In that period, there appeared a close collaboration between the United States, Canada, and Türkiye on counter-terrorism measures targeted at ending Armenian terrorist activities. Even countries that were formerly hesitant to denounce this terrorism, such as France and the Soviet Union, altered their attitude, and thus they moved from sympathy to repression. Besides, Armenians residing Western countries started to speak out against activities of ASALA. The diaspora's view of ASALA and terrorism may have been shaped by Western values, and their financial interests could have been at risk due to growing Western suspicion and hostility towards Armenian radicals, leading to heightened police surveillance. While it is difficult to differentiate between the overall Western response and that of the Diaspora, it is clear that both groups became increasingly uncomfortable with ASALA's decision to carry out a violent attack like the one at Orly.⁷³ Especially, the Orly attack induced a repression from the French security forces as well as an outrage

70 Feigl, op. cit., 132.

71 Christopher Gunn, "Secret Armies and Revolutionary Federations: The Rise and Fall of Armenian Political Violence, 1973-1993" (PhD Thesis, Florida State University, 2014), 267.

72 Maxime Gauin, "Remembering the Orly Attack," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 7, no. 27 (2011): 114-115.

73 McCauley, op. cit., 237.

among French Armenians.⁷⁴ In addition to expressing their indignation towards ASALA's actions targeting innocent civilians, the Diaspora also exhibited a strong aversion towards the escalating ASALA attacks on other established Armenian organizations.⁷⁵ Thus, Armenian nationalists started to view ASALA's actions as conflicting with the Armenian Cause, and its continued existence posed a danger to the patriotic efforts of the Armenian people. As the Diaspora distanced themselves from ASALA, the organization quickly fell into disarray and experienced a decline.⁷⁶ Moreover, those countries that sustained contacts with ASALA and JCAG-ARA were clearly warned by the previously sympathetic group of states denouncing terrorist activities.

In spite of this atmosphere after the Orly incident, the Armenian Diaspora maintained its commitment to supporting political violence against Turks, which enabled Armenian terrorist organizations to carry on their violent activities for two more years.⁷⁷ On 28 March 1984, a series of organized attacks were perpetuated against Turkish officials in Tehran. Two Armenian terrorists shot and injured Master Sergeant Ismail Pamukçu, who was assigned to the office of the Turkish Military Attaché in Iran, and First Secretary Hasan Servet Öktem.⁷⁸ On 20 November 1984; Evner Ergun, the Deputy Director for the UN Center for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, was assassinated in Vienna. On 12 March 1985, JCAG-ARA realized its one last attack in Ottawa. Three heavily armed Armenian militants raided the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa and murdered Claude Brunelle, the Canadian security guard, during the attack. Thanks to bravery of Brunelle, Turkish Ambassador Coşkun Kırca managed to escape.⁷⁹ On 28 November, French security forces captured notorious Armenian terrorist Melkonian in Paris. In the safe house of Melkonian, French authorities confiscated machine guns, explosives, and time schedule of Turkish ships' visit to ports in France. Remarkably, they also seized a picture of Adnan Bulak, Turkish Ambassador to France, and this gave a rise to speculation that Ambassador Bulak may have been the victim of next assassination.⁸⁰ By 1987, violent activities of Armenian terrorist organizations was almost zero.⁸¹

74 Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 1 (March 1991): 86.

75 McCauley, op. cit., 243.

76 McCauley, op. cit., 244.

77 Gunn, *The Rise and Fall of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation Terrorism*, 146.

78 Feigl, op. cit., p. 133.

79 Gunter, *Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal*, 115.

80 Feigl, op. cit., p. 138.

81 McCauley, op. cit., 291.

Ultimately; between 1973-1986, Türkiye experienced a significant loss of its diplomatic personnel as a result of the Armenian terrorist attacks, making it one of the most victimized nations globally. Many Turkish diplomats and third parties including civilian ethnic Turks and also foreigners were murdered at the hands of the Armenian radicals. The extremist Armenians' aim was to pressure Türkiye into acknowledging the so-called genocide, but this strategy proved counterproductive as it only intensified the Turkish public's resentment and made the country more resistant to Armenian demands. Even though the terror campaign succeeded in drawing attention to the Armenian cause, it ultimately failed to achieve its intended objective of compelling Türkiye to accept responsibility for the alleged genocide.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, it is evident that Armenian terrorist activities are lethal and secretive examples of contemporary international terrorism. In a short time, Armenian terrorists managed to bring the Armenian Cause to the attention of international public opinion through instrumentalization of terrorism, which peaceful and legitimate Armenian organizations could not accomplish.⁸² Meanwhile, persistent pressures from impenitent Armenian Diaspora actors clearly hindered the condemnation of terrorism of the Armenian radicals in international arena. Consequently, indifference of Western countries to this terrorism along with sympathy for the Armenian Cause became prevalent.

Despite the violence and bloodshed, Armenian terrorist organizations never realized their grand objectives. In other words, they could not manage to achieve their three major goals, namely recognition of the so-called Armenian genocide, reparations, and restoration of the claimed lands in Eastern Anatolia. Instead, the terrorism of the Armenian radicals created an intense increase in indiscriminate terrorist attacks against not only ethnic Turks, but also non-Turkish third parties between the years 1973-1986. In the pursuit of justice for the 1915 events; at least 90 people were murdered and hundreds more were injured. Their violent activities occupied the agenda of the governments of Türkiye, Western Europe, and North America for years. Over time, the terrorist activities of Armenian radicals during that period reinforced the "Turkish thesis on the Armenian Question." This thesis connected the planned terrorist attacks with the equally horrific massacres committed by Armenian revolutionary committees against innocent Turks living in Eastern Anatolia during the Ottoman era.⁸³

82 Gunter, *Contemporary Armenian Terrorism*, 243.

83 Doğan Gürpınar, "The Manufacturing of Denial: The Making of the Turkish 'Official Thesis' on the Armenian Genocide between 1974 and 1990," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 18, no. 3 (May 3, 2016): 222.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Altunbaş, Deniz. "The 'Armenian Question' in European Union Institutions." *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 23 (2011): 147-232.
- Ben Aharon, Eldad. "Superpower by Invitation: Late Cold War Diplomacy and Leveraging Armenian Terrorism as a Means to Rapprochement in Israeli-Turkish Relations (1980–1987)." *Cold War History*, July 4, 2018, 1-19.
- Björklund, Ulf. "Armenia Remembered and Remade: Evolving Issues in a Diaspora." *Ethnos* 58, no. 3-4 (January 1993): 335-60.
- Çağan, Hazel. "Armenian Terrorism and the Turkish Press (1973-1984)." MSc Thesis, Middle East Technical University (METU), 2013.
- Çaycı, Sadi. "Terrorism and Asymmetric Threat: Activities against Turkey, from the Beginning of the 20th Century to the Present (Armenian Terror Activities and PKK Terror Organization Activities since 1915)." *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 18 (2008): 89-99.
- Crenshaw, Martha. "How Terrorism Declines." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 1 (March 1991): 69-87.
- Dugan, Laura, Julie Y. Huang, Gary LaFree, and Clark McCauley. "Sudden Desistance from Terrorism: The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 1, no. 3 (November 2008): 231-49.
- Feigl, Erich. *A Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism, Its Causes and Its Historical Context*. Freilassing: Edition Zeitgeschichte, 1986.
- Gain, Maxime. "Remembering the Orly Attack." *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 7, no. 27 (2011): 113-39.
- Gunn, Christopher. "Intra-or International Violence? The Origins of Armenian Terrorism." *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 25 (2012): 103-16.
- Gunn, Christopher. "Murder & Memory: The Curious & Intertwined Legacies of Two Armenian Assassins." In *Türk-Ermeni Uyuşmazlığı Üzerine Ömer Engin Lütem Konferansları 2019*, edited by Alev Kılıç, 1–157. Ankara: Terazi Yayıncılık, 2020.
- Gunn, Christopher. "Secret Armies and Revolutionary Federations: The Rise and Fall of Armenian Political Violence, 1973-1993." PhD Thesis, Florida State University, 2014.

Gunn, Christopher. "The Rise and Fall of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation Terrorism." *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 31 (2015): 133-51.

Gunter, Michael M. *Armenian History and the Question of Genocide*, First Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Gunter, Michael M. "Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 27, no. 2 (2007): 109-28.

Gunter, Michael M. "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism." *Terrorism* 8, no. 3 (January 1986): 213-52.

Gunter, Michael M. "Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 5, no. 4 (1985): 31-52.

Gürpınar, Doğan. "The Manufacturing of Denial: The Making of the Turkish 'Official Thesis' on the Armenian Genocide between 1974 and 1990." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 18, no. 3 (May 3, 2016): 217-40.

Hyland, Francis P. *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects*. United States: Westview Press, 1991.

Karaca, Birsen. "Armenian Terror during the Change in the Perception of and Reaction towards Terrorism." *Review of Armenian Studies*, no. 31 (2015): 205-21.

Kırlıkovalı, Ergün. Armenian Terrorism in America and Turkish-Americans. Interview by Erkan Demirağcı. *Tarih ve Günce*, June 20, 2018.

Kürkçü, Burak. "The Question of State-Sponsored Terrorism: Investigation of ASALA and JCAG in the Light of Available CIA Documents." *Insight Turkey* 23, no. 2 (June 10, 2021): 259-80.

Kuznetsov, Oleg. *The History of Transnational Armenian Terrorism in the Twentieth Century: A Historico-Criminological Study (Pp. 1–328)*. Berlin: Verlag Dr. Koster, 2016.

McCarthy, Justin. "Armenian Terrorism: History as Poison and Antidote." In *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection*, 85-94. Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984.

McCauley, Clark. "Group Desistance from Terrorism: A Dynamic Perspective." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 1, no. 3 (November 2008): 269-93.

- Merari, Ariel. "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 4 (December 1993): 213-51.
- Nalbandov, Robert. "Irrational Rationality of Terrorism." *Journal of Strategic Security* 6, no. 4 (December 2013): 92-102.
- Oran, Baskın. "The Reconstruction of Armenian Identity in Turkey and the Weekly Agos." *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, no. 37 (2006): 123-38.
- Sayari, Sabri. "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976–80: A Retrospective Analysis." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 2 (March 9, 2010): 198–215.
- Wakizaka, Keisuke, and Gökçe Yılmaz. "Interpreting Relations between Armenian Nationalism, Marxism and the Armenian Apostolic Church." *Van Yüzcüncü Yıl University the Journal of Social Sciences Institute*, no. 55 (2022): 24-39.
- Wilkinson, Paul. "Armenian Terrorism." *The World Today* 39, no. 9 (1983): 344-50.

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

To cite this article: Fatma Jale Gül Çoruk, "Indian Armenians from the Past to the Present", *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 48 (2023): 85-108.

Received: 15.09.2023

Accepted: 28.11.2023

INDIAN ARMENIANS FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT*

(GEÇMİŞTEN GÜNÜMÜZE HİNDİSTAN ERMENİLERİ)

Fatma Jale Gül ÇORUK**

Abstract: *In this study, the process of Indo-Armenian relations from the first date that can be followed until today will be discussed in various aspects. When and how the relations began in the historical process, the reasons for and the details of the process that led the Armenians to India, as well as the formation stages of the Armenian settlement centers in India will be discussed. In addition, the cities with the densest Armenian settlements and the social, political, religious, and commercial activities of the Armenians there will be discussed in detail. Information on the commercial and military foundations of today's relations will be presented. In the light of all this information, an attempt will be made to present a holistic perspective on Indo-Armenian relations.*

Keywords: *India, Armenia, Indo-Armenian Relations*

* This article is the revised and expanded English version of a Turkish language article titled "Geçmişten Günümüze Hindistan Ermenileri" that was originally included in the book titled *Türkiye'de Hindistan Çalışmaları-II*. Source: Fatma Jale Gül Çoruk, "Geçmişten Günümüze Hindistan Ermenileri", *Türkiye'de Hindistan Çalışmaları-II* içinde, Yalçın Kayalı (ed.), 109-121 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 2023).

** ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3807-1501>
Dr., Ankara University, Faculty of Languages and History-Geography, Department of Caucasian Languages and Cultures
Email: coruk@ankara.edu.tr

Öz: *Bu çalışmada Hint-Ermeni ilişkilerin takip edilebildiği ilk tarihten bugüne kadarki süreci çeşitli yönleriyle ele alınacaktır. Tarihi süreç içerisinde ilişkilerin ne zaman ve nasıl başladığı, Ermenileri Hindistan'a yönelten sürecin sebepleri ve sürece dair ayrıntıların yanı sıra Hindistan'daki Ermeni yerleşim merkezlerinin oluşum aşamalarına değinilecektir. Ayrıca en yoğun Ermeni yerleşimlerinin gerçekleştiği şehirlerin hangileri olduğu ve Ermenilerin buralardaki sosyal, siyasi, dinî ve ticari faaliyetlerinin neler olduğuna detaylarıyla değinilecektir. Günümüz ilişkilerinin ticari ve askerî temellerine dair ilişkin bilgiler sunulacak; bütün bu bilgiler ışığında Hint-Ermeni ilişkilerine bütüncül bir bakış açısı ortaya konulmaya çalışılacaktır.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Hindistan, Ermeni, Hint-Ermeni İlişkileri*

Introduction

Studies on Turkish-Armenian relations in Turkey are generally based on the Armenian Diaspora and the Caucasian geography. However, with the military agreements and arms purchases signed as a result of the increasing interactions between Armenia and India in recent years, the expanding relations between these two countries needs to be taken into account as well. All the strategic moves that have been made and/or are likely to be made will inevitably have repercussions for both Turkey and the South Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Although there are various arguments on the beginning of the relations between Armenians and India, these relations can be traced back to the 8th century in the light of the available data. The fact that the Armenians have been able to maintain their active presence in India for such a long time is a testament to their ability to live in different geographies without losing touch with their roots. Indeed, “very few people have gone through an experience similar to that of the Armenians; numerous colonies dispersed over a very wide geography that have nevertheless continued their existence. On the one hand, they have been well integrated into their [host countries’] social, economic, cultural, and even political structures, and on the other hand, they have preserved the basic distinctive features of their origins for centuries.”¹

In our study, before touching on today’s relations, we will make inferences on the commercial, political, and social aspects of the Armenian presence in India by touching upon how Armenian-Indian relations began in the historical process, the stages of settlement of Armenians in India, the cities where Armenians densely settled and their activities in these places. In this manner, an attempt will be made to present a holistic perspective on Armenian-Indian relations from the past to the present.

The Roots of the Armenian Presence in India

According to historical accounts, India was one of the countries with which Armenians had contact with long before they migrated and settled there. “It is believed that the first Armenians came with their Assyrian allies, as part of Queen Semiramis’ expedition to India, some centuries before Christ. Some Armenians were sure to have come with Alexander [the Great].”² Various sources indicate that there is information about Armenian-Indian relations in

1 Boğos Levon Zekıyan, *Ermeniler ve Modernite* (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2002), p. 31.

2 Jawhar Sircar, “Armenians: Merchant-Princes of the Past”, *The Sunday Telegraph*, May 2, 1983: 2.

the “works of Xenophon, Zenob Glak, Movses Khorenatsi and Procopius”³, meaning that the interaction of Armenians with India must date back to ancient times. The general opinion about the beginning of relations with India points to the 8th century. “As foreign traders, Armenians were known to large segments of the Indian population. They entered India by land via Iran and Afghanistan. In addition, Armenians played an important role in the commercial, political, social, and cultural life of India in three different periods of its history: ancient, middle, and modern.”⁴

The majority of the Armenians who traveled to India originated from New Julfa, and accordingly, there is a close ethnographic, ideological, economic, and cultural connection between the Armenian settlements in India and the Armenian settlements of New Julfa. Therefore, to fully understand the development of the Armenian presence in this geography, it is necessary to know the historical process experienced by the Armenians under Safavid rule. In short, it would be difficult to understand the formation of the many Armenian-dominated trade cities in India without knowing Persian Shah Abbas’ New Julfa move.

Although Armenians “did not have an independent state after 1375, they managed to gain an enviable place in the commercial world of the Middle Ages thanks to their talents.”⁵ The geographical location of the Armenian settlements at the crossroads of trade also played an important role in this success. In particular, the city of Julfa under Safavid rule stood out as an important trade center of its period. This city served as a trade center both for various parts of the world and within the country. “The people of Julfa had 20-30 years of experience as suppliers of Iranian silk and had international connections and communication networks with distant markets such as Aleppo, Venice, and possibly Mughal India.”⁶ They had established these connections “through the Iranian cities of Shiraz, Bushehr and Bandar Abbas.”⁷

Having previously been in contact with India as traders, Armenians gradually began to settle there for various reasons. The first of these reasons emerged during the reign of the Safavid ruler Shah Abbas (1571-1629). At that time

3 Արթուր Զաքարյան, “Հնդկաստանի հայ համայնքը.(պատմամշակութային անդրադարձ)”, *ԿԱՆԹԵՂ*, 1 (2010): 181.

4 Փանջանյան Սահա, “Հայերը Հնդկաստանում”, *Պատմա-քանասիրական Հանդես*, 2, 1966: 187.

5 Ruquia K Hussain, “Armenian, Iranian and Turkish Merchants in India 1550-1800” (unpublished doctoral thesis, Aligarh Muslim University, 2005), 79.

6 Sebouh David Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa* (New York: University of California Press, 2011), 2.

7 Bahador Mehraki and Abdolrasool Azimiyan, “Economic Endeavors of Julfa Armenian”, *TOJDAC*, 8 (2018): 2.

there had been a long period of war between the Safavids and the Ottomans, interspersed with periods of peace. Shah Abbas regained control of Julfa in 1603, but realizing that he could not protect the region any longer, he decided to solve the problem by having Julfa evacuated and burned to the ground, and published an edict proclaiming this in 1605. As a result of this edict, the Armenian population there was transferred to Isfahan. Panossian notes that; “Half the displaced people died on the way, but special attention was paid to the Julfa merchants who were resettled in a town called New Julfa near Isfahan. [...] As for Old Julfa, it was completely destroyed by the Persian forces along with the other conquered lands.”⁸

Shah Abbas gave control of his country’s silk trade to the Armenians he had forcibly settled in New Julfa. The Armenian merchants in New Julfa sold not only silk but traded all kinds of goods such as rose water, rugs, Indian/Far Eastern textiles, teas, spices, jewelry; and mirrors, glass, watches, woolen clothes, gold and silver coins from Europe. On the other hand;

“The Armenians had their own private shops in the west of Naqsh-e Jahan Square in Isfahan, and in these shops they sold English and Dutch broadcloths, red Venetian textiles, and various Frankish fabrics. These were the goods that were coming to Iran from Europe in exchange for silk. The Shah wanted to benefit from Armenians’ relations with Europe, especially in foreign trade. Armenians were thus able to dominate all of Iran’s foreign trade as far as Venice and Livorno. In fact, apart from Venice and Livorno, Iranian Armenians had special representatives in Amsterdam and Paris.”⁹


Over time, based on the commercial power of the Armenians, New Julfa became the center of a trade network spanning from Manila in the East to Amsterdam in the West. The settlement of Armenians in India increased even more after their exile, and the Armenian movement to India as a distant point of migration intensified. In short, the wave of migration that started from Julfa also shaped the formation of Armenian presence in India.

Emphasis had been placed on the Armenians in commercial affairs during the reign of Shah Abbas. However, this situation gradually decreased after the death of the Shah, and the shahs who came to power afterwards adopted a completely opposite stance to Shah Abbas by “making direct agreements with European merchants and levying heavy taxes on the Armenians in order to

8 Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians from Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars* (London: Hurst & Company Publishers, 2006), 78.

9 Cihat Aydoğmuşoğlu, “Şah Abbas Devrinde (1587-1629) İran’da Ticari Hayat”, *A.Ü. Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi [TAED]*, 48 (2012): 369.

reduce their wealth and economic importance.¹⁰ In response, “Armenian merchants developed their own trade networks covering countries such as Russia, India, Italy, and the Netherlands.”¹¹



Map 1. The trade network of Culfa Armenians and their places of settlement along the coasts of the Indian Ocean during the early modern period¹²

The second reason that accelerated the settlement of Armenians in India was the trade policy of Mughal Shah Akbar (1542-1605). In fact, “the permanent settlement of Armenian merchants was made possible by the encouragement of Mughal Emperor Akbar.”¹³ Shah Akbar invited Armenian merchants to settle in his country to contribute to the country’s economy. He granted them the freedom of travel, allowed them to trade freely, and possess vehicles to transport their goods. It is known that the first Armenian to come upon

10 Panossian, *The Armenians*, 79.

11 Mehraiki ve Azimiyan, “Economic Endeavors”, 2.

12 Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean*, 57.

13 George A. Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People* (California: Mazda Publishers, 2006), 219.

invitation in this process was a merchant named Hakob, originally from Aleppo, and settled in Agra in 1560.¹⁴ However, Abrahamyan claims that the country already had a developed internal and external trade system at that time, and therefore the real purpose Shah Akbar's move was different; "Shah Akbar had realized that the Portuguese who had entered India were very serious and dangerous rivals for the country, especially in the coastal and border regions. Unable to force the Portuguese out of certain regions, the Mughals sought to create against them an opposing group of foreign traders made up of Gujaratis, Arabs, Persians, etc. Shah Akbar also wanted to use rich Armenian merchants for this purpose."¹⁵

Both reasons presented here do not seem to be independent of each other, so regardless of which reason was more pertinent, the formation of permanent Armenian communities in India dates back to the 16th century, that is, to the time of Shah Akbar. Although there had been an increase in the Armenian population especially in the coastal regions, the community continued its development by taking shape in the 17th and 18th centuries. It should also be considered that the trade agreement with the British East India Company in 1688 had an accelerating effect on Armenian population growth. The Armenians established a stable community life in India. They remained close to the Mughals and often served as intermediaries and interpreters between local rulers and European representatives. With this, "the trade centered in India replaced New Julfa as the leading center of world trade in the second half of the 18th century."¹⁶

"In the period after the Mughal rule, Armenians grew deep roots in the political life of India. There is ample data to show that they participated in the political affairs of the country. They helped the British East India Company from time to time. [...] The existence of Armenian settlements in different parts of India can be understood from street names and various graves and churches."¹⁷ There are also various accounts about one of Shah Akbar's wives being Armenian, and that Akbar met an Armenian merchant named Hakob of Julfa and his family while traveling in disguise, and that he saw and grew fond of the merchant's son and adopted him, giving him the name of Dhu al-Qarnayn.¹⁸

Although the Armenians were not a large community, they had an important place and influence in the country thanks to their wealth and unique qualities.

14 For detailed information, please see: Panossian, *The Armenians*, 80.

15 Ռ. Ա. Աբրահամյան, "Հայերեն Ագրայում", *Բանբեր Երևանի Համալսարանի*, 2 (77), (1992): 151.

16 Panossian, *The Armenians*, 79.

17 Սահա, "Հայերը Հնդկաստանում", 187.

18 For detailed information, please see: Ռ. Ա. Աբրահամյան, "Հնդկաստանի գաղթօջախները", *Հայ ժողովրդի պատմություն*, Հատոր IV, (1972): 338.

“Many Armenians provided invaluable service to the Indian government and the Indian people, playing an important role both in India’s ruling elite and in the export of Indian goods to the West prior to British colonization. The Armenians, who were connected to the Indian people with common interests, also actively participated in their struggles.”¹⁹

Armenians fought with the Indians against the Portuguese in Malabar in 1662; they participated in the war on the side of the Indians against the British in Bengal in 1760-64; and “Armenian merchants helped by providing financial resources, Armenian gunsmiths helped by making weapons, and Armenian soldiers joined the Indian army and fought against the imperialists.”²⁰ In addition; “Armenian officers Markar Kalantar, Harutyun Markar, Krikor Ayzvazyan, Bedros Astvatzatur, Ghazar Hakob, Sukias Avedik and others attracted attention with their courage in the battlefield.”²¹

Armenians lived in the Indian cities of Agra, Delhi, Bengal, Bombay, Surat, Calcutta, Chinsura(h), Madras etc. Instead of gathering as one whole community in these cities, they were scattered and lived mainly as merchants, craftspeople (jewelers, tailors, embroiderers, blacksmiths, gunsmiths) and civil servants. There were also government officials, military administrators, translators, and intellectuals among them.

Since almost all the Armenians who had migrated to India had their roots in New Julfa, there was an ethnic and religious-based organization and structure among the Armenians of India. They all spoke the same dialect and lived according to the same traditions and customs. Their religious unity was also based on their origins, and it can be said that this sense of unity was the basis of their ability to organize and build their places of worship in a short time and not have any problems while living together. On the other hand, the fact that they had migrated to India “did not mean that they had severed their connections with New Julfa, because they continued to be spiritually and ideologically nourished by New Julfa.”²²

Armenian merchants, who successfully engaged in trade with a wide variety of countries, occupied an important place for India. According to Chaudhury, a record of the East India Company dating back to 1689 refers to the Armenian merchants in India as follows; “These people [the Armenians] are frugal, friendly, and cautious people who have traveled all over India and know almost

19 Ջաբարյան, “Հնդկաստանի հայ համայնքը. (պատմամշակութային անդրադարձ)”, 182.

20 Արամ Սարգսյան, “Հնդկաստան”, *Հայ Միջուրք հանրագիտարան*, (Երևան: Հայկական հանրագիտարան հրատարակչություն, 2003), 358.

21 Սարգսյան, “Հնդկաստան”, 358.

22 Հ. Ղ. Միրզայան, “Հնդկահայ լուսավորականության ակունքները”, *Էջմիածին* 54 (12): 57.

every village and all manner of goods under Mughal rule with excellent skill and judgment.”²³

Dutch, British and French, etc., or in other words, European merchants heading for India received help from Armenian merchants, and made maximum use of Armenians’ power and communication opportunities in the region. Armenians also assumed the role of intermediaries in the increasing relations with the United Kingdom. “The British first encountered the resident and prosperous Armenians in Surat in the 17th century, and they were able to approach the Mughal Palace by developing friendships with them.”²⁴ The Armenians “remained close to the Mughals and often served as intermediaries and interpreters between local Muslim rulers and European representatives.”²⁵ The agreement signed with the East India Company in 1688 provided Armenian merchants with the opportunity to trade freely, acquire property, and open representative offices in all regions under British rule. With these privileges they had gained, Armenian merchants were able to become increasingly powerful; “They expanded in population, wealth, and influence throughout the 17th century.”²⁶

Over time, having gained a more dominant position in Madras and Calcutta, the Armenians began to build trade centers, churches, and schools in a short time after settling in different cities of India; and established printing houses and started publishing newspapers and books.

The first city where Armenians settled permanently in India was **Agra**. As we mentioned above, an Armenian merchant from Aleppo named Hagop settled in Agra in 1560 upon invitation. The Mughal Shah Akbar provided ample opportunities to the Armenians by allocating a settlement area there. It is known that Armenians “operated a caravanserai in Agra and had a neighborhood with their own cemetery.”²⁷ The Armenian settlement in Agra developed further after the exile by the Persian Shah Abbas and the establishment of New Julfa. The first Armenian church in India was built in this city in 1562. Agra lost its importance with the collapse of the Mughal Empire, and the Armenian population there went on to settle in other cities of India.

Although the Armenians had spread to almost all the important cities of India, **Bengal**, where they had started to settle before the British, was an important

23 Sushil Chaudhury, *Trade, Politics and Society/The Indian Milieu in the Early Modern Era* (London: Routledge, 2017), 36.

24 Panossian, *The Armenians*, 81.

25 Սարգսյան, “Հնդկաստան”, 358.

26 Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, 220.

27 Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, 220.

place in the life of Armenians and it is thought that they were present in that region since the early 17th century. Bengali Armenians settled in the Armenian Quarter in **Dhaka**, which is today a part of Bangladesh. Almost all the Indian hemp (jute) trade was controlled by the Bengal Armenians. Armenians influential not just in trade but also in the military field were present in this city. The Holy Resurrection Church (*Դարձայի Սուրբ Յարութիւն Եկեղեցի*) in Dhaka was built in 1781. “There were 90 Armenians living in 25 households in Dhaka in 1876; and 41 Armenians in 10 households in 1917.”²⁸ Today, however, no Armenians reside in Dhaka.

Another Armenian settlement was **Chinsura**, which stood out with its silk trade. Chinsura Armenians held important positions in the Bengal Palace. The first record of Armenians here dates to 1645. The St. Hovhannes Mkrtich (St. John the Baptist) Church (*Սուրբ Յովհաննէս Սկրտիչ Եկեղեցի*) was built in Chinsura between the years 1695-1697. Although there are no Armenians living in Chinsura today, “Armenians in India continue to gather here every year on 13-14 January to attend the Holy Mass.”²⁹

The Armenians settled in the city of **Bombay** in the 18th and 19th centuries. “The British invited the Armenians of Surat to turn the city into a trade center and provided them land and loans to build houses.”³⁰ The Bombay Armenians, most of whom were merchants and craftspeople, lived in their own neighborhoods, and in addition to making jewelry, they were also engaged in the diamond and spice trade. Hodja Minas, one of the famous Armenian merchants, was from Bombay. M. Jacob Seth states that many Armenians lived in Bombay in the 18th century and that it was known that 105 Armenians had lived there in 1813. He adds that he even encountered Armenians when he visited the city in January 1889 and that there were approximately 30 Armenians living in Bombay at the time he wrote his work.³¹ The St. Peter’s Church (*Սուրբ Պետրոս առաքյալ եկեղեցի*) in the city was built in 1796. The said church “opened its doors to the Indian Orthodox Church [Malankara Orthodox Syrian Church] for services in 2019, after a pause of 223 years.”³² The Diaspora Aid Society (*Օճանասփյուն ժողովը*) was established in Bombay in 1815. In addition, the periodicals titled *Tsakhstan* (*Ծաղկաստան*) and *Bombay Armenian Newspaper* (*Բումբայու հայոց լրաթուղթ*) began to

28 Սարգսյան, “Հնդկաստան”, 353.

29 “The Armenian Church of St. John the Baptist”, *Wordpress*, accessed November 26, 2023, <https://anilvohraphotography.wordpress.com/2016/09/20/st-john-the-baptist-armenian-church-of-chinsurah/>

30 Սարգսյան, “Հնդկաստան”, 359.

31 M. Jacob Seth, *Armenians in India from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (Calcutta, 1937), 299.

32 “Mumbai: 223-yr-old church for Armenians has opened doors to Indian Orthodox Church”, *Indian Express*, accessed April 6, 2023, <https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/mumbai/mumbai-223-yr-old-church-for-armenians-has-opened-doors-to-indian-orthodox-church-5705668/>

be published in 1822 and 1844 respectively. Very few Armenians reside in the city today.

Madras was an important center where Armenians flourished from the 16th century onwards. The Armenian community here consisted mainly of wealthy merchants who traded with Europe and the Far East. Madras, where the Portuguese had established a trade center in 1504, was occupied by the British in 1602. Some important intellectuals such as Hovsep Emin, who is of historical importance for Armenians, were raised in Madras. Another importance of Madras for Armenians is related to the printing houses there. A printing house was established by Shahamir Shahamiryan in 1771. The first Armenian periodical, *Azdarar* (*Ազդարար*), began to be published here in 1794. In addition, books and brochures that are of particular interest to the Armenians were printed here as well. The Church of the Holy Virgin Mary (*Սուրբ Աստվածածին Եկեղեցի*) located in the city was built in 1772. It is rumored that the first church in Madras was built in 1712, but that it fell into ruin over time.

Calcutta (Kolkata), a port city, was one of the most important settlements of Armenians in India and maintains its importance for the Armenians today. The Armenian community in the city was established in the 17th century. “The oldest tombstone in the Church of Holy Nazareth dates back to 1630. This evidence suggests that Armenians had settled near Calcutta at least 50 years before the British East India Company established its first commercial enterprise.”³³ Although most of the Armenians there were merchants, there also held positions as craftspeople, architects, doctors, lawyers, etc. “Most Calcutta Armenians had migrated from Shiraz or New Julfa.”³⁴ Calcutta has always been a center of attraction for people of different nationalities at different times. Due to the strategic nature of its geographical location and the associated commercial potential, it has attracted people from both inside and outside the country. “International migrants such as the Dutch, French, Jews, Chinese, and Armenians have given the city its cosmopolitan character.”³⁵

Merchants from New Julfa expanded their maritime trade networks after settling in Calcutta. Ports gained importance with increasing maritime trade and Calcutta as a port city correspondingly witnessed a population increase. In this context, Bhattacharya categorizes Calcutta Armenians into three groups; “resident Calcutta Armenians who arrived in the 18-19th centuries, Julfa Armenians who came from New Julfa in the 19-20th centuries, and the ambitious and hard-working migrants who came from Chaharmahal”.³⁶ By the

33 Sebouh David Aslanian, “Julfa v. Armenians in India”, *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, XV/3, pp. 240.

34 Susmita Bhattacharya, “The Armenians of Calcutta”, *Calcutta Mosaic* (India: Anthem Press, 2009), 72.

35 Bhattacharya, “The Armenians of Calcutta”, 71.

36 Bhattacharya, “The Armenians of Calcutta”, 75-76.

beginning of the 18th century, Armenians had their own ships and even their own ports in Calcutta. Both the development and decline of the Armenian merchants were closely related to the policies conducted by the British. At first, the British utilized the Armenians in every sense, which was a process that benefited the Armenians. However, strengthening their position over time, the British began to eliminate the Armenians in the commercial sense. Lacking an organized structure, the Armenian merchants eventually lost their influence in Indian trade. “Many of the Armenians who lost power in traditional trade started to establish land and real estate businesses. [...] They built private residences, hotels, offices, hostels, and guesthouses.”³⁷

Compared to other cities, there are more Armenian schools, publications, and places of worship in Calcutta. The most well-known place of worship is the Armenian Church of Holy Nazareth (*Սուրբ Նազարեթ հայոց եկեղեցի*), which was built in 1724 by an Armenian who had migrated from Isfahan. The second most famous one is the Church of St. Grigor Lusavorich (St. Grigor the Illuminator) (*Սուրբ Գրիգոր Լուսավորիչ եկեղեցի*), built in 1906. The third one is the Holy Trinity Armenian Church (*Սուրբ Երրորդություն հայոց եկեղեցի*), which was built in 1867 and restored in 2007. St. Sandukht Co-ed School (*Սուրբ Սանդուխտ երկսեռ դպրոց*) and Calcutta Armenian Charity Seminary (*Գալկաթայի Հայոց մարդասիրական ճեմարան*) were established in 1817 and 1821 respectively, and both schools continue their activities today. St. Sandukht Girls’ School (*Սուրբ Սանդիստյան աղջկանց դպրոցը*) and Calcutta Davityan Girls’ Armenian School (*Գալկաթայի Դավիթյան օրինորդաց հայկական դպրոցը*) were established in 1847-55 and 1922 respectively, but the latter school was merged with the Seminary in 1949.

A printing house was established in Calcutta in 1797. Both original and translated books, as well as many periodicals were published here. These publications included *Hayeli Kalkatyan* (*Հայելի Գալկաթյան*) in the year 1820, *Azgaser* (*Ազգասեր*) between 1845-48, *East India Newspaper* (*Արևելյան հնդկաց լրագիր*) between 1862-65, *Azgaser Araratyan* (*Ազգասեր Արարատյան*) between 1848-52, *Yeghbayraser* (*Եղբայրասեր*) between 1862-63, and *Nor Azdarar* (*Նոր ազդարար*) between 1950-56.

Demographic Information

“It is difficult to give a specific figure for the Armenian population in India [in general] and Calcutta [in specific]. As a matter of fact, the layout of the Armenian colonies in India witnessed great changes in the 19th century and the

37 Bhattacharya, “The Armenians of Calcutta”, 78.

only Armenian community that survived was the one in Calcutta.”³⁸ As highlighted by this quote, data on the Armenian population in India varies and it is therefore not possible to give a clear figure on their population.

Armenians have never been a crowded community in these lands. According to the information given by Sircar,³⁹ there were 636 Armenians in Calcutta according to the census conducted in 1837, 892 according to the census of 1850, and 498 according to the census of 1951. As for Bengal, the number of Armenians there was 800 in the year 1872. While different figures are given in various sources, it is generally estimated that between 8000 and 20,000 Armenians were living in India at the end of the 19th century.

According to Abrahamyan, there were no Armenians left in cities such as Agra, Lahore and Surat in 1840, but that there was a sizable population in some cities such as Saidabad. According to data in the 1860s, Armenian centers in many cities had disappeared and that there was not even a trace of Armenians left in these places such as Saidabad and Dhaka. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the number of Armenians in Madras did not exceed 25-30 families. The rich Armenian settlement in Bombay had begun to decline from the beginning of the 19th century. Only 107 Armenians were living in Bombay according to the 1813 census, and according to the 20th century census, that number had dropped to 25. Surat, which was a very important Armenian center in the 18th century, was virtually abandoned at the beginning of the 19th century. By the 1850s, almost all Armenian activities had stopped in the city.⁴⁰ During this decline, Armenians who had lost their influence in other cities of India migrated either to Calcutta or to other countries. “In those years, gold mines were being opened in Australia and many Armenians sought salvation by going there, but the first ones to go there quickly lost everything they had and returned [to India] in disappointment.”⁴¹

On the other hand, the social structure of the existing Armenian population also exhibited a different character in comparison to the previous years. At the end of this process of decline in which many rich merchants went bankrupt in the face of European capital and lost their influence at the state level, the affluent and influential population was replaced by an Armenian population working as clerks, tradespeople, lawyers, doctors, and architects. As previously stated, it is estimated that there were between 8000 and 20,000 Armenians residing in India at the end of the 19th century.⁴² It is known that “2000

38 Bhattacharya, “The Armenians of Calcutta”, 74.

39 Sircar, “Armenians: Merchant-Princes of the Past”, 7.

40 Ա. Գ. Աբրահամյան, “Հնդկահայ գաղթավայրը նոր և նորագույն ժամանակներում”, *Համառոտ ուրվագիծ հայ գաղթավայրերի պատմության*, (Երևան, 1967), 256-258.

41 Աբրահամյան, “Հնդկահայ գաղթավայրը”, 260.

42 For detailed information, please see: Bhattacharya, “The Armenians of Calcutta”, 77.

Armenians were living there [in India] at the beginning of the 20th century, 1500 in the year 1960, 450 in 1980, 300 in 1990, and 200 in 2003.”⁴³ “The turmoil during World War I and World War II and the partition of India further reduced the number of Armenians. In the second half of the twentieth century, there were no Armenians left in Delhi, Agra, Chinsura, Dhaka, and Surat.”⁴⁴

The population of Armenians in India today is around 150-200 people, and most of them are adults. Among today’s Armenians in India, “there are many mixed marriages and very few of them know their native language. Unlike in the past, today’s Indian Armenians do not have any notables or celebrities.”⁴⁵ In interviews conducted by *BBC* in 2019, it was emphasized that there has been an increase in the Armenian population in recent years, and that Indo-Armenian marriages are also contributing to this. It has been reported that 25 families of Armenian origin currently live in Calcutta.⁴⁶

Political Relations

It is evident that Armenians have been living in harmony with the government of their host country. It is known that they participated in India’s liberation struggle and played important roles during that process. Armenians have proven that they are on the side of both the Indian government and the Indian army based on their financial support, the diligence they have shown in matters requiring craftsmanship, and their achievements in the military field. In turn, they were rewarded for the sacrifices they made by being granted privileges or positions. For example, “In 1662, Malabar Armenians fought alongside the Indians against the Portuguese. After the victory, Indian officials appointed Marcos, an Armenian, as governor of Malabar.”⁴⁷ It is known that about 150 Armenians took part in the Battle of Plassey in 1757, and that the commander of the Indian army that fought against the British in Bengal between 1760-64 was an Armenian by the name of Girgor Khan/Grigor Harutyunyan. “Grigor Harutyunyan, a minor cloth merchant, rose to the leadership position of the Bengal Army under the command of Mir Qasim. He is known as Gorgin Khan in Indian sources.”⁴⁸ Despite being a cloth merchant, Gorgin Khan demonstrated extraordinary military intelligence as a commander under Mir Qasim.⁴⁹ Again, the Armenians “actively participated in almost all the anti-

43 Սարգսյան, “Հնդկաստան”, 353.

44 Bourmoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, 355.

45 Ջաքարյան, “Հնդկաստանի հայ համայնքը. (պատմամշակութային անդրադարձ)”, 185.

46 “The Armenian Population in India Is Growing Again, After Centuries”, *TheWire.in*, accessed November 26, 2023, <https://thewire.in/culture/the-armenian-population-in-india-is-growing-again-after-centuries>

47 Սարգսյան, “Հնդկաստան”, 358.

48 Սահա, “Հայերը Հնդկաստանում”, 188.

49 For detailed information, please see: Marshman, John C., *Outline of the History of Bengal* (Calcutta, 1857), 177.

British uprisings that occurred in the first half of the 19th century, and Hakob Petrosyan and Hovhannes Mkrtich, who commanded the armed detachments, are fondly remembered in Indian chronicles.”⁵⁰

As for Indo-Armenian relations in the modern times; during the Soviet period, Indian President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan visited the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in September 1964, while Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did the same in June 1976. India recognized Armenia on 26 December 1991, 3 months after Armenia declared independence following the dissolution of the USSR. At the same time, its ambassador to Moscow was accredited to Armenia. Diplomatic relations between the two countries became official with a protocol signed on 31 August 1992. India’s embassy in Yerevan was opened on 1 March 1999, while Armenia opened an Honorary Consulate in India in April 1994 and established its embassy in New Delhi in October 1999.

Three presidential visits from Armenia were made to India in 1995, 2003, and 2017, and four prime ministerial visits were made in 2000, 2006, 2022, and 2023. As for India, it made two official visits at the level of Deputy Speaker of the Parliament in 2005 and 2017, and one visit at the level of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2021.⁵¹ Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan visited India on 24-27 April 2022, and in September and December 2022, Mirzoyan met with his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar in New York. Frequent interactions have continued at the level of various ministries in 2023. India-Armenia-Iran trilateral consultations were held in Yerevan in April 2023, and the India-Armenia Policy Planning Dialogue meeting was held in Yerevan in July 2023.

Economic and Cultural Relations

The basis of relations between India and Armenia have been economic from the beginning. Today, in addition to political interests, relations between the two sides are developing with a strong economic aspect. There is a commercial network between the two countries in a wide range of areas from food to precious stones, from textiles to industrial products. According to the table prepared by the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the trade rates and import and export information between the two countries in recent years are as follows:⁵²

50 Ջաքարյան, “Հնդկաստանի հայ համայնքը. (պատմամշակութային անդրադարձ)”, 182.

51 “Bilateral Relations”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/in>

52 “Department of Commerce”, *Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India*, accessed November 26, 2023, <https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/iecent.asp>

Department of Commerce
Export Import Data Bank
Country - wise

Dated: 26/11/2023
Values in US \$ Millions

Country / Region: ARMENIA						
S.No.	Year	2018-2019	2019-2020	2020-2021	2021-2022	2022-2023
1.	EXPORT	25.94	40.49	69.83	27.47	61.37
2.	%Growth		56.08	72.48	-60.66	123.37
3.	India's Total Export	330,078.09	313,361.04	291,808.48	422,004.40	451,070.00
4.	%Growth		-5.06	-6.88	44.62	6.89
5.	%Share	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
6.	IMPORT	0.91	1.56	96.46	134.85	72.89
7.	%Growth		71.56	6,097.50	39.80	-45.94
8.	India's Total Import	514,078.42	474,709.28	394,435.88	613,052.05	715,968.90
9.	%Growth		-7.66	-16.91	55.43	16.79
10.	%Share	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01
11.	TOTAL TRADE	26.85	42.05	166.29	162.32	134.26
12.	%Growth		56.61	295.51	-2.39	-17.29
13.	India's Total Trade	844,156.51	788,070.32	686,244.36	1,035,056.45	1,167,038.89
14.	%Growth		-6.64	-12.92	50.83	12.75
15.	%Share	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01
16.	TRADE BALANCE	25.03	38.93	-26.62	-107.38	-11.53
17.	India's Trade Balance	-184,000.33	-161,348.24	-102,627.40	-191,047.65	-264,898.90

As the table indicates, there has been an increase in bilateral trade since 2020-21. However, as of now, there is no significant Indian investment in Armenia. An exception to this has been the various agreements that were signed with a delegation led by a pharmaceutical company in November 2019, and with a business delegation led by the Indian Economic Trade Organization in November 2019.

At the same time, mutual interactions continue in the cultural field. In 2009, the Center for Indian Language and Literature was established in Yerevan with the support of India. In 2010, a Memorandum of Understanding on cultural, educational, and scientific cooperation was signed between India and Armenia. Attention is also being paid to the anniversaries of common elements in the relations between the two countries. In 1994, a special postage stamp was issued in Armenia on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the publication of *Azdarar*. In 2014, Armenia and India celebrated the anniversary of the naming of the Armenian Street in Madras and the 300th anniversary of the friendship between the two peoples. These celebrations were also attended by a delegation from Armenia. The Indian Culture Festival was held in Armenia in 2018. And in 2022, Armenia and India celebrated the 30th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations.

The India-Armenia Friendship Association has made significant efforts to promote Indian culture through numerous events. Translations of classical works in both languages are being made; and events such as photography and

painting exhibitions, Indian film weeks, chess tournaments etc. are being organized.

As part of Mahatma Gandhi's birthday celebrations on 23 May 2019, the Armenian Postal Department issued a special postage stamp in honor of Gandhi.⁵³ A Mahatma Gandhi statue was officially unveiled in Yerevan on 16 August 2021. The Mahatma Gandhi Center at Yerevan State University has been operating since 2021. Additionally, some Indian students have chosen to pursue their education at Yerevan State University and some private universities.

In recent years, there has been an increase in the tourist flow between the two countries. The number of Indian tourists visiting Armenia were showing a strong upward trend that was, unfortunately for Armenia, disrupted by the Second Karabakh War of 2020: 11,589 in 2017, 28,659 in 2018, approximately 50,000 in 2019, only 2920 in 2020, and, increasing again, 17,980 in 2021.⁵⁴

Relations between the two countries are being widely covered in the media of both Armenia and India. News pieces continue to be published about the importance and consistent development of the relations between the two countries. From time to time, both countries make mutual support statements and the publics of both countries show their support for the other country through social media concerning conflicts that Armenia and India experience with third countries. For example, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has made statements indicating that Armenia supported India in the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan in 2019. In addition, Pashinyan states at every opportunity that Armenia attaches special importance to the development of relations with India. India's support for Armenia became more evident in the Karabakh War in 2020, and arms sales agreements between two countries gained momentum during and after this war.

Military Relations

Although the basis of bilateral relations between Armenia and India has been trade and economic cooperation, the two sides have begun to sign partnerships in the field of defense industry in recent years, especially after 2020. In 2020, an agreement was signed on the sale of the Swathi Weapon Locating Radar (WLR) system developed by India.⁵⁵ The first batch of this system was

53 The visuals of the stamp and the poster can be found in the Appendix section.

54 "Bilateral Relations", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia.

55 Alperen Mastı, "Ermenistan, Hindistan'dan 4 adet Swathi Silah Yer Belirleme Radarı satın alıyor", *DefenceTurk.net*, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://www.defenceturk.net/ermenistan-hindistandan-4-adet-swathi-silah-yer-belirleme-radari-satin-aliyor>

delivered on 22 January 2021, and in October 2022, a new agreement was signed for the export of missiles, rockets, and ammunition.

Following the recent violent conflicts with Azerbaijan, news and statements have begun to be made that Armenia is willing to expand its defense cooperation with India. In November 2022, a company called Kalyani Strategic Systems signed a 155 million US Dollars' worth contract to supply artillery weapons to Armenia.

In March 2023, Armenia's senior commander Edward Asryan visited India and held various meetings there.⁵⁶ As a result of these visits, it was announced that Armenia would purchase anti-drone military equipment worth 41 million Dollars from India. In July 2023, the Pinaka Multi-Barreled Rocket Launcher system was delivered to Armenia via Iran.

Conclusion

It can be understood from all this that Armenians had been interacting with India for centuries prior to their migration and settlement in the country in the 16-17th centuries. Since the beginning, Indo-Armenian relations have been economically based. Today, it is seen that it has a structure that is focused on import-export and develops within the framework of a win-win principle.

Armenians, who had affluent lives under Safavid rule, largely lost their political support with the death of Persian Shah Abbas. In the following period, factors such as heavy taxation and persecution led them to India. Here too, they lived in prosperity for a long time with the opportunities offered to them, but then began to weaken as a community as they could not resist the pressure of foreign capital. Armenians not only gained various privileges from the state level and the trust that developed in line with this, at the same time, they managed to gain the affection and trust of the local people. Mixed marriages between Armenians and Indians both in the past and today are also an indication of this.

Armenians had an important place not only in the commercial life of India but also in its social order. While some Armenians served in managerial positions, others served in important roles as military commanders. They managed to maintain their positions in every sense until the consequences of the manipulative British policies began to manifest themselves. The Armenian population began to shrink after they were sidelined from trade affairs. Today, between 150-200 Armenians live in the lands that once hosted an important

56 Shashank Mattoo, "Armenia keen to expand defence links with India as conflict festers", *LiveMint.com*, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://www.livemint.com/news/india/armenia-keen-to-expand-defence-links-with-india-as-conflict-festers-11698254453791.html>

Armenian population. A large portion of this population consists of adults in mixed Indo-Armenian marriages, and very few of them speak their native language. Contrary to their influence in the past, it is not possible to talk about an influential Armenian community in India today.

Armenians have tried to protect their social existence in India by building at least one church in almost every place they settled. The existence of churches was important for both protecting and maintaining their identities in the settled places and for interaction and support within the community. There are still Armenian churches, cemeteries, and monuments in various cities across India. Places of worship continue to be actively used today and people continue to gather in these places for religious services and other occasions.

On the other hand, in the context of political and military relations that have developed after 1992, an increasing interaction between India and Armenia can be observed in recent years. Although they are not adjacent countries, both countries protect each other's interests and express their support for each other at every opportunity. There is a sustained progress in the cultural, economic, and military cooperation between the two sides.

The Armenia-India relationship is built on a solid foundation of common cultural and historical ties. Over the years, with the influence of political processes, efforts have been made to develop cooperation between the two countries in areas such as trade, education, defense, and culture. In the international arena, both countries have demonstrated support for the other in every way. Considering the developments that have occurred and will occur in both the Caucasus and Indian foreign policy, it can be predicted that these bilateral relations will continue to increase and become more relevant.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aslanian, Sebouh David. "Julfa v. Armenians in India". *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, XV/3, pp. 240-242.
- Aslanian, Sebouh David. *From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa*. New York: University of California Press, 2011.
- Aydoğmuşoğlu, Cihat. "Şah Abbas Devrinde (1587-1629) İran'da Ticari Hayat". *A.Ü. Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi [TAED]*, 48 (2012), pp. 365-386.
- Bhattacharya, Susmita. "The Armenians of Calcutta". *Calcutta Mosaic*, India: Anthem Press, 2009.
- Bournoutian, George A. *A Concise History of the Armenian People*. California: Mazda Publishers, 2006.
- Chaudhury, Sushil. *Trade, Politics and Society/The Indian Milieu in the Early Modern Era*. London: Routledge, 2017.
- Hussain, Ruquia K. *Armenian, Iranian and Turkish Merchants in India 1550-1800*. Unpublished doctoral thesis. Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University, Department of History, 2005.
- Marshman, John C. *Outline of the History of Bengal*. Calcutta: P.S. D'rozari o's, Serampore, 1857.
- Mehraki, Bahador and Azimiyan, Abdolrasool. "Economic Endeavors of Julfa Armenian". *TOJDAC*, 8 (2018), pp. 1-6.
- Panossian, Razmik. *The Armenians from Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars*. London: Hurst & Company Publishers, 2006.
- Roy, Achinto and Lahiri-Roy, Reshmi. "The Armenian Diaspora's Calcutta Connection". *Diaspora Studies*, 10/2 (2017): 137-151.
- Seth, M. Jacob. *Armenians in India from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*. Calcutta, 1937.
- Sircar, Jawhar. "Armenians: Merchant-Princes of the Past". *The Sunday Telegraph* (29 May 1983): 1-7.

Zekiyan, Boğos Levon. *Ermeniler ve Modernite*. İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2002.

Աբրահամյան, Ա. Գ. “Հնդկահայ գաղթավայրը նոր և նորագույն ժամանակներում”. *Համառոտ ուրվագիծ հայ գաղթավայրերի պատմության*, հատոր Բ, (1967), 255-279.

Աբրահամյան, Ռ. Ա. “Հայերեն Ագրայում”. *Բանբեր Երևանի Համալսարանի*, 2/77 (1992): 151- 157.

Աբրահամյան, Ռ. Ա. “Հնդկաստանի գաղթօջախները”. *Հայ ժողովրդի պատմություն*, Հատոր IV, (1972): 337-347.

Զաքարյան, Արթուր. “Հնդկաստանի հայ համայնքը. (պատմամշակութային անդրադարձ)”. *ԿԱՆԹԵՂ*, 1 (2010): 181-187.

Միրզայան, Հ. Ղ. “Հնդկահայ լուսավորականության ակունքները”. *Էջմիածին*, 54/12 (1998): 57-63.

Սահա, Փանջանան. “Հայերը Հնդկաստանում”. *Պատմա-բանասիրական Հանդես*, 2 (1966): 187-188.

Սարգսյան, Արամ. “Հնդկաստան”. *Հայ Սփյուռք հանրագիտարան*, Երևան: Հայկական հանրագիտարան հրատարակչություն, 2003: 357-366.

Internet Sources

“Bilateral Relations”. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/in>

“Department of Commerce”. *Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India*, accessed November 26, 2023, <https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/iecnet.asp>

“Mahatma Gandhi statue officially inaugurated in Yerevan”. *ArmenPress*, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1060869.html>

“Mumbai: 223-yr-old church for Armenians has opened doors to Indian Orthodox Church”. *Indian Express*, accessed April 6, 2023, <https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/mumbai/mumbai-223-yr-old-church-for-armenians-has-opened-doors-to-indian-orthodox-church-5705668/>

“The Armenian Church of St. John The Baptist”. *Wordpress*, accessed November 26, 2023,

<https://anilvohrphotography.wordpress.com/2016/09/20/st-john-the-baptist-armenian-church-of-chinsurah/>

“The Armenian Population in India Is Growing Again, After Centuries”.

TheWire.in, accessed November 26, 2023, <https://thewire.in/culture/the-armenian-population-in-india-is-growing-again-after-centuries>

Masti, Alperen. “Ermenistan, Hindistan’ dan 4 adet Swathi Silah Yer Belirleme Radari satın alıyor”. *DefenceTurk.net*, accessed November 20, 2023,

<https://www.defenceturk.net/ermenistan-hindistandan-4-adet-swathi-silah-yer-belirleme-radari-satin-aliyor>

Mattoo, Shashank. “Armenia keen to expand defence links with India as conflict festers”. *LiveMint.com*, accessed November 20, 2023,

<https://www.livemint.com/news/india/armenia-keen-to-expand-defence-links-with-india-as-conflict-festers-11698254453791.html>

APPENDIX



A poster celebrating the 300th anniversary of Indian-Armenian relations



Special postal stamp on celebrating the 200th anniversary of the publication of *Azdarar*



Special postal stamp of Mahatma Gandhi



A photograph from the opening ceremony for the Mahatma Gandhi statue in Yerevan⁵⁷

57 “Mahatma Gandhi statue officially inaugurated in Yerevan”, *ArmenPress*, accessed November 20, 2023, <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1060869.html>

RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

To cite this article: Serap Bozpolat Ayan, “An Armenian Revolutionary from Istanbul to Marseille: Kaspar Nalbandian”, *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 48 (2023): 109-126.

Received: 18.08.2023

Accepted: 29.11.2023

AN ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FROM ISTANBUL TO MARSEILLE: KASPAR NALBANDIAN

(İSTANBUL'DAN MARSİLYA'YA SİVASLI BİR ERMENİ İHTİLALCİ:
KASPAR NALBANDIAN)

Serap BOZPOLAT AYAN*

Abstract: *Sivas, one of the six provinces (Vilayat-i Sitte) important for the Armenian community living in the Ottoman State due to substantial numbers of Armenians inhabiting the region, became one of the important centers of the Armenian revolutionary movements in the Empire. The Hunchakian and Dashnaksutiun Parties were active in the region by establishing branches, and the members of Armenian political organizations from Sivas soon came to operate outside the province as well, in a very wide geography extending to the rest of the Ottoman lands and beyond. Kaspar Nalbandian, the subject of the present study, was one of these Armenians.*

Making extensive use of archive documents, this study covers the pursuit of Kaspar Nalbandian, a member of the Armenian opposition to the Ottoman State, beyond the borders of the Empire. In this context, the study attempts to provide insights into the functioning of the state mechanisms on these issues, and to present the journey of an Armenian individual to offer glimpses on the Armenian movements in the era.

Keywords: *Ottoman, Armenian, terror, crime, fugitive*

* ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2146-6988>
Lecturer at Sivas Cumhuriyet University
Email: serapbozpolat@gmail.com

Öz: *Sivas, yoğun Ermeni nüfusu ve Ermeniler açısından büyük öneme sahip olan Vilayat-ı Sittenin bir parçası olması sebepleriyle Osmanlı dönemindeki Ermeni devrimci hareketlenmelerinin de önemli merkezlerinden birisi olmuştur. Hınçak ve Taşnak cemiyetlerinin bölgede şubeler kurmak yoluyla etkin oldukları düşünüldüğünde, Sivaslı Ermeni komitecilerinin de sadece Sivas sınırlarında değil, Osmanlı ülkesini ve haricini kapsayan oldukça geniş bir coğrafyada etkin oldukları sonucu kendiliğinden ortaya çıkacaktır. Çalışmaya konu olan Kaspar Nalbandian da bu Ermenilerden birisidir.*

Bu çalışma arşiv vesikaları ışığında Osmanlı Devleti'ne muhalif Sivaslı bir Ermeni olan Kaspar Nalbantyan'ın nezdinde bir suçlunun ülke sınırlarını aşan takip sürecini ele almaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın hem devlet mekanizmasının bu konulardaki işleyişinin gözlenmesine katkı sağlaması hem de dönem içerisindeki bireysel Ermeni hareketlenmelerine bir örnek teşkil etmesi amaçlanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Osmanlı, Ermeni, terör, suç, kaçak*

Introduction

The subject of this study is Kaspar Nalbandian, an Armenian revolutionary/anarchist from Sivas in the last era of the Ottoman Empire. The study is based on the archival documents pertaining to Nalbandian and aims to give an example of individual Armenian mobilization against the Ottoman state through a cat-and-mouse game from Sivas to Marseille in the relevant period. In addition, a small light is hoped to be shed on the functioning of the state mechanism in these matters. Moreover, alongside the general uprisings and prominent names, the stories of individuals whose names have not been mentioned in the sources so far will help us in coming up with new approaches to the details of the subject. Each new name and event will contribute to the completion of our knowledge about the functioning of the Ottoman state as well as the Armenians of the era.

Available documents on Kaspar Nalbandian universally mention Nalbandian's involvement in the Occupation of the Ottoman Bank. Yet, Nalbandian's name does not come up in the archive documents from the date of the incident, nor does it come up in published studies on the Occupation¹ or the memoirs² covering the era. Even more interestingly, all the archival documents in which Nalbandian's name is mentioned are from 1906 –ten years after the incident.

At this point, some brief information about the Occupation of the Ottoman Bank would be helpful:

A Brief Story of the Occupation of the Ottoman Bank

From the second half of the Nineteenth Century onwards, Armenian nationalists, with the incitement and support of European states, Russia in particular, began to revolt in many regions of Anatolia. Towards the end of the century, they decided to carry out an action in Istanbul that would cause a splash in the world, and to bring about a de facto intervention of European powers in the Ottoman Empire. They made their plans to achieve these goals. The Ottoman Bank was chosen as the target of action, as most of its personnel were European nationals. The Bank was to be raided and occupied, with bombs to be exploded in many parts of Istanbul at the same time. Thus, the conspirators expected that the European states would intervene in the Ottoman

1 Fikrettin Yavuz, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Ermeni Terörü: 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, 2015) ; Şahin Doğan, "Rus Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını", *SUTAD*, December 2020/50, 341-355 ; Hülya Eraslan, *Osmanlı Bankası Baskını'nın (1896) Osmanlı Ermeni Basınında Ele Alınışı*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Gazi University, Institute of Social Sciences, (September: 2016).

2 Atilla Tuygan, *Osmanlı Bankası Armen Garo'nun Anıları* (Istanbul: Belge Publications, 2009).

Empire with the reflex of protecting their own subjects, and the Ottoman Armenians would gain their physical protection.

In line with the plans, the militants mobilized on the morning of August 26, 1896. The attacks started around 1 pm. The Ottoman Bank was raided and occupied by armed militants carrying sacks of bombs and taking everyone inside hostage. 31 people were involved in the occupation. Simultaneously, bombs started to explode in various neighborhoods of Istanbul. The commotion was bigger than expected. As the occupation continued, a communiqué was prepared to be sent to European embassies in Istanbul. As a first response, Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II accepted the mediation of Maximov, the first interpreter of the Russian Embassy, and negotiations began. In the end, even though many innocent lives were lost and the bank building suffered substantial damage, the militants' demands were granted and they were allowed to leave Istanbul freely. The 17 surviving militants were taken from Istanbul to Marseille on the French cruise ship Gironde.³

Who was Kaspar Nalbandian?

On February 16, 1906, according to the letter sent by the Ottoman Consulate General (*Başşehbender*) in Marseille to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nalbandian's physical characteristics were as follows: He was twenty-nine years old. His height was approximately one meter and sixty-nine centimeters. He had black hair with a narrow forehead and dark eyes. His nose and mouth were of medium size while his face was long. His complexion was pale, and he had a full black beard.⁴ Moreover, according to the information provided

3 For detailed information on the Occupation, see: *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni İşyanları (1896-1909)*, III (Ankara: T.C. Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı Publications, 2009), pp. 3-45 ; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol IV. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, 1995), pp. 143-145 ; *Ermeni Komitelerinin A' mál ve Harekât-ı İhtilâliyyesi*, Ed. Erdoğan Cengiz (Ankara: Başbakanlık Publications, 1983), pp. 25-26 ; Yavuz, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Ermeni Terörü...* ; Doğan, "Rus Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını", 341-355 ; Hülya Eraslan, *Osmanlı Bankası Baskını'nın (1896) Osmanlı Ermeni Basınında Ele Alınışı*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Gazi University Institute of Social Sciences, September 2016 ; Selami Kılıç, *Osmanlı-Ermeni İhtilafı ve Sonuçları* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Publications, 2017), p. 42 ; Davut Kılıç, *Osmanlı Ermenileri Arasında Dinî ve Siyasî Mücadeleler* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Publications, 2006), p. 190 ; Yılmaz Öztuna, "Ermeni Sorunun Oluşturduğu Siyasal Ortam", *Osmanlı'nın Son Döneminde Ermeniler*, Ed. Türkkiye Ataöv (Ankara: Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Publications, 2002), p. 55 ; Münir Süreyya Bey, *Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasî Tarihçesi (1877-1914)* (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2001), p. 74 ; Necmettin Alkan, "Ermeni Teröristlerin Osmanlı Başşehri İstanbul'daki Saldırıları ve 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını (ABD'deki 11 Eylül Saldırılarıyla Bir Mukayese)", *Türk Yurdu*, May 2006 - Year 95 - Issue 225 ; Levent Ürer-Asuman Kutlu, "Algının Çerçevesinde: İngiliz Basınında 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını", *Bilig Spring 2023/Issue 105*, pp. 79-97 ; Necmettin Alkan, "Alman Basınına Göre Osmanlı Bankası Baskını ve İstanbul'da Ermeni Terörü", *Ermeni Araştırmaları II. Uluslararası Ermeni Kongresi*, Ankara, Turkey, 2004 ; Gürçan Çilesiz, *İstanbul'da 30 Saatlik Kaos: 26 Ağustos 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını ve Ermeni Katliamı* (Istanbul: Belge Publications, 2015).

4 Ottoman Archives of the Presidency of the Republic (BOA), Dahiliye Nezâreti Tesrî-i Muamelât (DH.TMIK.M), 215/49, 5

by the Consulate General in Liverpool a day later, upon arriving in Marseille, he shaved both sides of his beard and left only on his chin covered by his beard.⁵ In another letter sent from the Ministry of Police to the Ministry of Interior on August 29, 1906, Nalbandian was described as “about thirty-five years old, of medium height, almost physically built, with a swarthy long face, dark auburn hair, a large and pointed beard, an open forehead, hazel eyes and a sharp gaze that attracted attention”.⁶ Obviously the two descriptions do not belong to the same person. It seems that the authorities did not have a precise description of Nalbandian.

The investigations also culminated in various documents containing a short biography of Kaspar Nalbandian. According to information provided, Nalbandian, a member of the anarchist groups, was originally from the Akdeğirmen neighborhood of Sivas. His father was Kalost Nalbandian, son of Kirkor. He studied at the local Jesuit school for three years, then worked as a grocer’s apprentice for a few years. In 1893, when he was twenty years old, he came to live in Istanbul with his father, who was a janitor at the German-Israelite School near the Şişhane Police Station in Beyoğlu. After three years there, he was involved in the Occupation of the Ottoman Bank in 1896. During the incident he injured his arm while throwing a grenade. After the dust settled, he was taken out of the bank with his co-conspirators and deported.⁷

Searching for Kaspar Nalbandian

The first document mentioning Kaspar Nalbandian, sent to the Ottoman Ministry of Interior on February 11, 1906, bearing the signature of Grand Vizier Ferit, reports that Nalbandian traveled to Liverpool with a passport obtained from the Iranian Consulate in Plovdiv. Nalbandian had applied to the Iranian Consulate there and received his passport visa to travel to the United States, but according to the latest information, he was in Marseille. Therefore, it was stated that his behavior and actions there would be monitored by the Consulate General in Marseille in line with the letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that the results would be reported. Moreover, the letter requested a photograph of him be obtained and sent to the Ministry of Police, and that if he came to the country, he should be immediately captured in accordance with the Sultan’s will which was to be announced to the relevant authorities.⁸ Subsequently, on February 12, 1906, the Commission for Accelerated Action

5 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 14

6 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 74

7 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 48 (29 April 1906); BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 51 (23 May 1906); BOA, Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi (HR.SYS), 2787/6 (29 January 1906), BOA, Hariciye Nezâreti Londra Sefareti Belgeleri (HR.SFR.3), 560/45, 4 (23 May 1906)

8 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 2

and Reform sent a letter to the province governorships of Aydın, Edirne, Salonica, Ioannina, Iskodra, Hudavendigar, Aleppo, Trabzon, Kastamonu, Adana, Beirut, Sivas, Van, Bitlis, Erzurum, Diyarbakır, as well as the governorates of Catalca, Izmit, Biga, and Jerusalem, informing them about Nalbandian and demanding necessary action.⁹

On the same day, the Consulate General in Marseille wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, providing detailed information about Nalbandian's situation. The letter read as follows:

“Upon receiving a telegram from the Ministry regarding a person named ‘K. Nalbandian’, I began to make any inquiries within means, with a view to exposing Nalbandian and keeping his behavior under surveillance. Indeed, I learned that a person with this name has been residing in a cheap hotel since February 1st. Nalbandian does not receive newspaper reporters or anyone else at the hotel. I have been keeping Nalbandian under observation in order to understand with whom he has contacts with and what he is doing. Nalbandian registered himself in the hotel book as ‘Nalbandian Jorji [George]’ from ‘Lausanne’ [Switzerland]. Every day he leaves the hotel at the same time, walks around the city, goes to the Greek coffee house frequented by people from Ottoman and Greek lands, eats at a small restaurant adjacent to this coffee house, and visits several times a day the Armenian hotel where poor Muslims and Armenians passing through Marseille stay. I am keeping a close eye on this hotel, which is a hotbed for some notorious people, and I am waiting for legal grounds to intervene. Most of the Muslims and Armenians I have mentioned above are originally from Harput and are just some individuals who are on their way to America without passports. Since no letters to a ‘Nalbandian’ were delivered to the hotel, my efforts to obtain one of his letters have been fruitless. Nalbandian does not know that he is under surveillance, but he is extremely cautious. That he is broke is evident from his inability to pay for his room. I think he is waiting for some money to arrive, to continue his journey. Nalbandian is often seen with ‘Arotion Mukazian’, originally from Samsun, who poses as a traveling merchant. Although ‘Nalbandian’ told the owner of the hotel he was staying at that he was on his way to Russia, according to my intelligence, he intends to go to Bulgaria. However, in the event of any change in his activities and movements, I will inform you of the situation. Moreover, when he leaves this place, I will telegraph his destination. And if I succeed in taking a photo of Nalbandian, I will submit it immediately.”¹⁰

9 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 3

10 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 15; BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 6

It did not take long for new information to follow this letter. According to the information provided in the letter sent by the Consulate General in Marseille to the Ministry of Police just four days later, on February 16, 1906, Nalbandian departed for Batumi on the French Pake Company's ferry called "Sirkas". Another letter sent on the same day by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Interior repeated existing information, adding that a telegram was sent to the Consulate General in Batumi, requesting surveillance of Nalbandian's behavior and actions, and asking for confidential reporting of the matter to the local government in Batumi for necessary measures to be taken.¹¹ An encrypted telegram sent by the Commission for Accelerated Action and Reform to the province governorships of Aydin, Edirne, Salonica, Ioannina, Iskodra, Trabzon, Adana, Kastamonu, and Aleppo, as well as the governorate of Biga informed them about the issue, demanding due diligence in line with the will of the Sultan.¹² In the meantime, the Consulate General in Liverpool gave the news of Nalbandian having left for Bulgaria after staying in Marseille for a while.¹³

Apparently, the confusion about Nalbandian's whereabouts continued. Five days later, on February 21, 1906, upon the arrival of the ferry Sirkas in Biga, in accordance with the Commission's letter dated February 16, 1906, the Governorate of Biga sent an "extremely urgent" encrypted telegram to the Ministry of Police. According to the telegram, Nalbandian of Sivas did not land in Biga, but a person matching Nalbandian's description was found to be on the ferry with three of his friends, and the ferry departed for Istanbul at around 3 pm.¹⁴ Moreover, since the ferry was not expected to stop there for long and was expected to proceed towards the Black Sea, the Ministry was asked to write a letter to be delivered personally to the Commission, so as to notify the provinces once again through encrypted communications.¹⁵

Of course, this investigation not only sought to locate Nalbandian based on physical surveillance, but also to obtain information about the passport he used on his trip. But, once again, there is no clarity on this issue, just as the description of Nalbandian and the route remained murky. Indeed, in a telegram dated February 16, 1906 sent to Tevfik Pasha from Ziya Bey, the Consul General in Marseille, it was reported that the Russian Consul did not issue a visa on the passport the Armenian in question obtained under a false name, and that his photograph could not be obtained. Yet, in a document sent as an attachment to the letter dated February 21, 1906, it was stated that Nalbandian

11 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 8

12 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 9

13 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 14 (17 February 1906)

14 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 10/1

15 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 10/2

had a visa issued on his passport by the Russian Consul and boarded the ferry under a false name, adding that this passport had a clear photograph of him. Despite this, there is no record of such a photograph.¹⁶

Meanwhile, the ferry, which was believed to be carrying Nalbandian, continued on its way. On February 22, 1906, in his reply to the relevant letters of the Ministry of Interior, Şefik Bey, the Minister of Police stated that the ferry Sirkas of the French Pake Company, which had Kaspar Nalbandian from Sivas along with three of his Armenian friends among its passengers, arrived in Istanbul that day, but Nalbandian did not get off the ferry. According to the information provided by the Minister of Police, Nalbandian's main purpose was to encourage Armenians in Russia to emigrate to Ottoman lands. For this purpose, he traveled from America to Marseille and from there he boarded this ferry to Batumi. A special officer was secretly placed on the ferry in order to apprehend Nalbandian as soon as he disembarked at one of the ports the ferry was to visit, and Trabzon Province and Canik District governorships were notified about the matter via encrypted telegram. Thus, Nalbandian was to be tracked not only in the ports but also on the ferry. The ferry left for Batumi at 1:30 am.¹⁷

All the information provided up to this date was then forwarded by the Commission for Accelerated Action and Reform to the Grand Vizier's Office, on February 26, 1906.¹⁸ This can be taken as an indication that the Grand Vizier's Office was taking the issue quite seriously.

Upon being notified on February 22, 1906 about the situation, the Governorship of Trabzon Province, on February 26, 1906, sent an encrypted telegram by Reşad, the Governor of Trabzon, reporting that one of the friends of Kaspar Nalbandian was a person by the name of Agop of Muş. This person was actually Kandil, son of Agik, from Akçan village in Muş province. Kandil was also among those involved in the Occupation of the Ottoman Bank, and together with his friends Kaspar, Agop, Artan, and Arhanik, they fled to their province of birth, either by land or by small boats hugging the coast, after disembarking in Batumi.¹⁹

A telegram sent by the Consulate General in Batumi to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 28, 1906 contains details about Kaspar Nalbandian's passport and the pseudonym he used. According to this telegram, in addition to a passport that had been obtained in Sofia, Nalbandian had an Iranian passport issued in the name of "Avedis Nikogos" by the Iranian Consul in

16 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 11

17 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 12

18 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 13

19 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 16

Marseille and a visa issued by the Russian Consulate in the same city. He entered Batumi with this passport. Upon request, the Iranian Consul in Batumi stated that he could not hand Nalbandian over, but could detain him for fifteen days on bail. Arriving from Trabzon on the same ferry, the special officer reminded the Consulate General in Batumi that the detention of Nalbandian was a requirement of the Sultan's will, whereupon the Consul General requested the issuance of the necessary orders for him.²⁰

Again, in his letter dated February 28, 1906 to the Interior Ministry, Foreign Minister Tevfik Bey provided updates on the current situation and noted that Nalbandian might go to Bulgaria as reported from Liverpool and pointed out the necessity of due investigations in Bulgaria.²¹ In a letter he sent a day later, he stated that since Nalbandian was an Ottoman subject and a native of Sivas, the relevant consulate was notified about the need for Nalbandian's handover by the Iranian Consulate, and dispatch to Trabzon.²² Trabzon Province was also informed about the situation and asked to take Nalbandian under protection when he arrived in Trabzon, followed by reports on his situation.²³

However, the Iranian Consul in Batumi declared that he could not hand over Nalbandian unless he received orders from the Iranian Embassy in Petersburg.²⁴ In response, required orders were issued immediately, and Ottoman Ambassador in Petersburg met with the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires as the Iranian Ambassador was in his homeland. As a result of this meeting, the Iranian Charge d'Affaires promised to send a telegram to the Iranian Consulate in Batumi to deliver Nalbandian and send him to the Iranian Consulate in Trabzon.²⁵

On the other hand, Foreign Minister Tevfik Bey reported that Nalbandian was under the patronage of an Armenian committee, that the leaders of the Committee frequently met with him, that the Embassy in Batumi, the Iranian Consulate and the Batumi local police had been threatened many times due to the investigations sustained, and expressed his reservations by pointing out that Nalbandian's presence in Batumi and establishing contact with the subversives would cause new problems.²⁶ He also reported the entire process in detail to the Grand Vizier's Office on March 7, 1906.²⁷

20 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 17

21 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 18

22 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 19

23 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 20 (3 March 1906)

24 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 22

25 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 21 (3 March 1906)

26 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 22

27 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 29

Failure to Find Kaspar Nalbandian

A telegram sent from Trabzon on March 5, 1906 contained new and striking information obtained as a result of the investigations. As can be recalled from previous correspondence, it was known that Nalbandian was on board the Pake Company's ferry Sirkas and that a special officer was even stationed on board. However, now, according to Reşad Bey, the Governor of Trabzon, the person on the ferry was not the real Kaspar Nalbandian, but his brother Avedis, while the real Kaspar was a school teacher in Lausanne, Switzerland. Although the person in question was requested to be handed over to the Consulate, the only measure that could be applied was to have him detained by the Iranian Consulate on cash bail for a period of 15 days, due to his possession of a duly issued passport. It was stated that his photograph should be obtained immediately so that it could be possible to determine whether the passport belonged to him or not, within the said time frame.²⁸

While all this correspondence was going on, it seems that the letter dated March 3, 1906 from the Consulate General in Liverpool had either not yet arrived or had been overlooked. According to the Consul General in Liverpool, although the letters Nalbandian sent from Marseille reported that he was to go to Batumi, he had actually reported that piece of information in order to keep his actual destination secret, and his actual destination was Bulgaria, as previously stated in a letter dated February 17, 1906. The person who was going to Batumi was another Armenian activist named "Shahinian". Shahinian traveled with Nalbandian from Liverpool to Marseille, and it is possible that they exchanged passports.²⁹ This information from Liverpool was reported to the Ministry of Interior by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 11, 1906. The Consul General in Batumi was also notified about the situation.³⁰

It is now clear that it was not Kaspar Nalbandian who traveled to Batumi on the ferry Sirkas. But the question of the identity of that traveler was to occupy the relevant authorities for a long time to come.

On March 13, 1906, a reply letter from the Consul General in Batumi to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided very detailed information. The letter read as follows:

"The person who arrived in Batumi on the ferry Sirkas with an Iranian passport issued in the name of Avadis Nikogos was in fact Avadis Nalbandian. This was confirmed by two Armenians, one of whom, Yegenoglu Migirdich, said that he got acquainted with Avadis

28 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 24, p.25

29 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 26, p.27

30 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 32, p.33

Nalbandian in Egypt and now recognized him completely. Avadis Nalbandian had a permission slip signed by M. Nalbandian authorizing the itinerant merchant Avadis Nikogos to sign certain documents and issue receipts on behalf of M. Nalbandian. Avadis Nalbandian also told many people that his brother Mardros has been running a school in Switzerland and that he intended to take Armenian children from the Caucasus to that school, for them to receive an excellent education, and even Yegenoglu Migirdich offered to entrust his son to him. According to the information I have received, he came to Batumi with no money other than two French gold coins and was welcomed well and given money by the Armenian committees. Nalbandian was accompanied by Vartan of Kichi and Kandil of Muş during his voyage to Batumi. Likewise, these mischief-makers, who had Iranian passports, traveled to Tbilisi. The Iranian Consul detained Avadis Nalbandian here for fifteen days, at the end of which time, having received no orders, let him go, whereupon Avadis left Batumi for Tbilisi. The Iranian Consul admitted that he had no doubts about Avadis Nalbandian's identity, but stated that he was obliged in good conscience to protect Avadis Nikogos because his passport was apparently legal. Until that day, the Iranian Consul had not received any orders from Petersburg. It was reported by the Governor of Trabzon that the necessary orders were given to Sivas Province, for the dispatch of a photograph of Avadis Nalbandian, in order to prove his identity."³¹

On March 31, 1906, a letter from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Police provided information about the existing correspondence up to this date, and mentioned a relevant letter from Sivas Province. The original manuscript is not available, but as far as the information provided in the subsequent letter from the Ministry of Interior, the said letter from the Governorship of Sivas Province provided the description and identities of two of the Nalbandians, Kirkor and Mardiros, who were elsewhere at the time, along with a photograph of Mardiros, who was the brother of the Nalbandian Pastor Ferdinisi of Sivas, and who at the time was a French instructor at the "Arame Lisan" school in Lausanne, and stated that the other one had fled to Egypt some time after the Occupation of the Ottoman Bank, and that the wanted Nalbandian could be this Kirkor, son of Kalost. In addition, based on the previous letter from Trabzon Province, in which it was reported that Kaspar was in Switzerland, Kaspar's resemblance to Mardiros mentioned in the letter from Sivas Province was pointed out and the launch of a detailed investigation was requested, accompanied with the request to take action in accordance with the Sultan's will, in line with the results to be obtained.³²

31 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 35

32 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 25

It seems that the questions and possibilities about Kaspar's identity and whereabouts were only increasing. Naturally, all relevant authorities in a vast geography were trying to find a solution to this issue. For example, on April 2, 1906, the Ambassador in Petersburg requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to order the Consul in Batum to send his kavass to Tbilisi in order to determine whether the person being pursued in Tbilisi was indeed a wanted person.³³

This request from Petersburg was conveyed by Foreign Minister Tevfik Pasha to the Grand Vizier's Office on April 3, 1906. In addition, Tevfik Pasha advised the Embassy in Tehran to make an attempt before the Iranian Vizier of Foreign Affairs. The subject of the recommendation was to request the Iranian Consul in Tbilisi to hand over Nalbandian, who was likely to be in Tbilisi, to the Consul there.³⁴

On the same day, a detailed report by the officer who had boarded the same ferry with the person believed to be Nalbandian was included in the letter sent from the Minister of Police to the Ministry of Interior. In fact, it had already been concluded that the person on the ferry was not Kaspar. Nevertheless, it seems that the possibility could not be ruled out completely. In fact, although the report is detailed, it contains more information about other Armenians on the ferry, who are believed to have been in contact with Nalbandian, than about Nalbandian himself. Accordingly, Migirdich, son of Senekerim Bakkalyan, also known as Harharyan from Sivas, who had sailed to Samsun on the ferry Sirkas, met Nalbandian on the steamer. Serkiz, who had been taken on board for Sivas, did not disembark in Samsun and when he was found hidden in the engine room of the ferry when it arrived in Trabzon, he was handed over by the captain to the French Consul, and then detained by the local government. After reaching Batumi and staying there for a few days, receiving the letters he was expecting from Jorj (George), also known as Kigork, from Malatya, Nalbandian left for Marseille. But then he and Kigork intended to go to Batumi together again. In addition, three other Armenians, Ohannes (son of Hani from Kabakçı village of Kigi District), Kandil (also known as Ogo, son of Agich from Akcan Village of Mus), and Sinpat (from Kars) were found to be on board the ferry. Of these, Serkiz and Migirdich were to be reported to the Trabzon Province Governorship and Canik District Governorate that they would be traveling to Sivas with their documents, while the need to conduct a detailed investigation was to be communicated to their respective localities.³⁵

On the one hand, the pursuit of Nalbandian continued on the assumption that he was then in Tbilisi, and attempts were made with the Iranian Consulate for

33 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 36-37

34 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 38

35 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 39

his delivery. On the other hand, the reply received from the Consulate General in Tbilisi revealed the futility of all these efforts; the reported person was not in Tbilisi.³⁶

Every possibility was pursued, but Nalbandian could not be found. Nevertheless, the search was kept going, meticulously. A letter by the Ministry of Police to the Ministry of Interior on April 29, 1906 stated for the first time the reason for Kaspar's trip, and thus for these persistent searches. In the document, it was stated that the fact that the suspect traveled from Bulgaria under another name to Batumi via Marseille and Istanbul, and served the purpose of making subversive attempts and entering the country, and even if this was not possible, to follow the subversive attempts closely. It was added that in the case it was not possible to secure the handover of the suspect to the government, he would try to enter the country by finding an opportunity, and for this reason, it was necessary to continue the pursuit by the consulates.³⁷

As stated in the letter dated May 21, 1906 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Grand Vizier's Office, the search for Nalbandian remained fruitless. The investigation nevertheless continued in full swing. Since most of the Armenian subversives were in the cities of Yerevan and Elizavetpol (Ganja) at that time, the Consul General in Tbilisi appealed to the Iranian Consul General to advise the Iranian Consuls in Yerevan and Elizavetpol to carry out investigations to ensure the discovery of Nalbandian. However, Nalbandian was reportedly not in Yerevan or Elizavetpol. Meanwhile, the Consulate continued with investigations in other parts of the Caucasus as well. The goal was to ensure the immediate capture of the suspect and his delivery to Trabzon, if he could be located.³⁸

While this correspondence traffic continued, measures were also taken about the possibility that Nalbandian might travel to other countries outside this region, and the Foreign Ministry notified all embassies of the Ottoman Empire from London to Colombo with orders to be careful.³⁹

The letter sent on May 30, 1906, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Musurus Pasha, the "Ambassador of the Turkish Empire to London"⁴⁰ noted

36 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 43

37 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 48, 64

38 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 54-55

39 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 58

40 I Stefanaki Musurus Pasha (1840-1907) was the son of the famous Kostaki Musurus Pasha. In 1860, he was appointed as the Second Privy Secretary to the Ottoman Embassy in London, under the patronage of his father. In 1868, he was promoted to the position of the First Secretary at the same embassy. He served as the Ambassador to Rome between 1880-1885, as the Governor of Samos between 1896-1899, and as the Ambassador to London between 1902-1907. He died in 1907.

the possibility that Nalbandian might go there in line with some intelligence received, requesting Musurus Pasha to be cautious, and not to issue visa to his passport under any circumstances in case the suspect went to the United Kingdom.⁴¹ After receiving this order, Musurus Pasha carried out the necessary correspondence with the relevant consulates. On June 9, 1906, in his letter addressed to the Turkish Consul General Azaryan Efendi, he wrote the following:

“Mr. Consul General, I would like to draw your attention to a situation concerning a person named Gasbar Nalbandian, based on a report from the Ministry. I advise you to refusing to issue a visa to this person, originally from Sivas, who was exiled from the Empire and sent to Marseille, and who obtained an Iranian passport under another name (Avadis Nikogos), should he apply to your embassy under this name. I would like to ask you to take certain precautions to prevent this person from escaping from your custody.”⁴²

Signifying the lengths Ottoman officials went to find Kaspar Nalbandian, correspondences were made even with the other side of the world. On July 13, 1906, Mohamed Macan Markar Efendi, the Consul of the Ottoman Empire in Colombo, responded to Musurus Pasha’s letter by stating that Nalbandian did not come to his office under the name mentioned or under any other name and that he would always observe the instructions given in the memorandum.⁴³

Going back to talking about Europe, such correspondence were not limited to the one sent to London, as a similar letter was sent to the Embassy in Rome on the same day. In his reply, the Ambassador in Rome stated that he had notified the consuls in Italy about the situation, but asked for a detailed description of the suspect and, if possible, a photograph of him in order to obtain faster results.⁴⁴

The replies received from the Embassy to Serbia and the Embassy to Bulgaria, to the letters sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Serbia and Bulgaria requested an investigation by the Ministry on whether the description of the person who traveled to Sofia with some friends in previous January and who met with Bulgarian and Armenian subversives, who contacted and acted in concert with Serbian subversive Georgovich, and who was later learned to bear

41 BOA, HR.SFR.3, 560/45, 3

42 BOA, Documents of the Consultation Chamber of the Legal Counsel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (HR.HMS.İŞO), 229/57, 1

43 BOA, HR.SFR.3, 560/51, 1

44 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 61

the name Avadis, as a forty-five year old man of medium height, with black hair and beard matched the description of Avadis Nikogos or not.⁴⁵ As a result of the investigations carried out in this direction, it was stated that although the description of the persons in question was similar, the person in question could not be the wanted person since there was a 13-year age difference.⁴⁶

In the letter sent to the Foreign Ministry from the Embassy in Paris, it was stated that the passport issued to “Nalbandian” by the Iranian Consul in Marseille was issued upon presentation of an Iranian passport issued by the Iranian honorary merchant representative in Sofia. In view of the seriousness of the matter, the ambassador warned the consul not to issue such documents to Armenians who had never been Iranian subjects.⁴⁷

Again, the letter dated July 14, 1906 sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Embassy in Petersburg, stated that there was no Avadis Nalbandian or Avedis Nikogos in Baku, according to the information obtained from the Baku Police Directorate.⁴⁸

In the letter sent from the Ministry of Police to the Ministry of Interior on July 7, 1906, it was pointed out that Nalbandian might have entered the country under another name due to the fact that he could not be captured and his location could not be determined, and it was requested that investigations be carried out with the utmost care and seriousness in all relevant provinces as well as –just in case– in Batumi, Tbilisi, and other parts of the Caucasus by appropriate and safe means, to reveal his whereabouts and to take the necessary action.⁴⁹

The correspondence regarding Nalbandian continued repeatedly until September 4, 1906, but to no avail. A serious effort was made to find Nalbandian; he was searched for in the country, in the Caucasus, in the Balkans, in Europe, and even as far away as in Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Although some clues were obtained from time to time, no photograph of him could be obtained, no precise information about his description could be obtained, nor could he be located. The fact that Nalbandian could not be found despite all these efforts and such extensive communication may suggest that he used a different name than his real name and the pseudonyms mentioned in the documents. On the other hand, it can also be assumed that he was protected by the Armenian revolutionary committees, as indicated in several documents. In

45 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 58/2, 60

46 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 67-68

47 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 69

48 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 70

49 BOA, DH.TMIK.M. 215/49, 64

fact, judging by the suspicious attitude of the Iranian consuls, it is possible that Iran was acting as a patron to the Armenians and thus Nalbandian, to some extent.

To Conclude

In 1896, after the major terrorist attack that was the Occupation of the Ottoman Bank, which had extremely serious consequences, the perpetrators were not only left unpunished, they were released without even being questioned. Whatever the reason, this was a sign of major weakness for the Ottoman Empire. Was the fact that one of the names implicated in the incident being sought with so extensive efforts virtually all around the globe -almost exactly 10 years after the incident, an attempt to salvage the reputation the Ottoman state? Unfortunately, despite the intelligence provided by its state organizations, the Ottoman Empire was incapable of either protecting its officials or catching the criminals. Furthermore, the fact that even a single Armenian revolutionary -Kaspar Nalbandian- was able to skillfully evade the Ottoman authorities in this way can be considered as an ominous sign of the dire developments that awaited the Ottoman Empire in the near future. The Ottoman authorities' failure to find and apprehend Nalbandian was in stark contrast to the Armenian revolutionaries' Operation Nemesis soon after the First World War. In this operation, Armenian revolutionaries were able to locate and assassinate high-ranking Ottoman officials in many places.

Returning to the focus of the study, ultimately, it is not known whether Kaspar Nalbandian was involved in any other incident against the Ottoman Empire, of which he was a subject, whether he acted together with the Armenian committees, or whether he lived as a fugitive on his own. But what is known is that Nalbandian has taken his place in history as one of the dozens of fugitive Armenians who committed crimes against the Ottoman Empire in its last decades (and who extended their activities to other lands as well) and who were sought with great effort, but probably never caught.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Documents from the Ottoman Archives of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye

Accelerated Procedures at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DH.TMIK.M)
215/49, s.2 – 74

Political Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (HR.SYS)
2787/6

Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Embassy in London (HR.SFR.3)
560/45
560/51

Documents of the Consultation Chamber of the Legal Counsel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (HR.HMS.İŞO)
229,57

2. Published Documents

Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni İsyancıları (1896-1909). III. Ankara: T.C. Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı Publications, 2009.

Ermeni Komitelerinin A'mâl ve Harekât-ı İhtilâliyyesi: İlân-ı Meşrutiyet'den Evvel ve Sonra. Ed. Erdoğın Cengiz. Ankara: Başbakanlık Publications, 1983.

3. Research and Investigation

Alkan, Necmettin. "Alman Basınına Göre Osmanlı Bankası Baskını ve İstanbul'da Ermeni Terörü". *Ermeni Araştırmaları II. Uluslararası Ermeni Kongresi*. Ankara: 2004.

Alkan, Necmettin. "Ermeni Teröristlerin Osmanlı Başşehri İstanbul'daki Saldırıları ve 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını (ABD'deki 11 Eylül Saldırılarıyla Bir Mukayese)". *Türk Yurdu*. Year 95 - Issue 225. (May 2006).

Çilesiz, Gürcan. *İstanbul'da 30 Saatlik Kaos: 26 Ağustos 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını ve Ermeni Katliamı*. İstanbul: Belge Publications, 2015.

- Doğan, Şahin. “Rus Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını”. *SUTAD* 50 (December 2020): 341-355.
- Eraslan, Hülya. “Osmanlı Bankası Baskını’nın (1896) Osmanlı Ermeni Basınında Ele Alınışı”. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Gazi University, Institute of Social Sciences. September 2016.
- Karal, Enver Ziya. *Osmanlı Tarihi*. IV. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, 1995.
- Kılıç, Davut. *Osmanlı Ermenileri Arasında Dinî ve Siyasî Mücadeleler*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Publications, 2006.
- Kılıç, Selami. *Osmanlı-Ermeni İhtilafı ve Sonuçları*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Publications, 2017.
- Münir Süreyya Bey. *Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasi Tarihçesi (1877-1914)*. Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2001.
- Öztuna, Yılmaz. “Ermeni Sorunun Oluştığı Siyasal Ortam”. *Osmanlı’nın Son Döneminde Ermeniler*, Ed. Türkkaya Ataöv, 41-62. Ankara: Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Publications, 2002.
- Tuygan, Atilla (çev.). *Osmanlı Bankası Armen Garo’nun Anıları*. İstanbul: Belge Publications, 2009.
- Ürer, Levent ve Asuman Kutlu. “Algının Çerçevenmesi: İngiliz Basınında 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını”. *Bilig*, Issue 105 (Spring 2023): 79-97.
- Yavuz, Fikretin. *Osmanlı Devleti’nde Ermeni Terörü: 1896 Osmanlı Bankası Baskını*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, 2015.

TRANSLATION/ÇEVİRİ

To cite this article: Güzin Çaykırın, “The Armenian Revolt in Van: Insights from Military History Documents”, *Review of Armenian Studies*, Issue 48 (2023): 127-155.

Received: 10.07.2023

Accepted: 15.11.2023

THE ARMENIAN REVOLT IN VAN: INSIGHTS FROM MILITARY HISTORY DOCUMENTS*

(ASKERÎ TARİH BELGELERİNE GÖRE
VAN'DA ERMENİ İSYANI GÜNLÜĞÜ)

Güzin ÇAYKIRAN**

Abstract: *Due to its geographical location, Van was a province bordering Iran and in close proximity to Russia in the north. Additionally, the provincial center had one of the highest Armenian populations among the settlements of those lands. Consequently, the geographical location and population factor facilitated the easy organization of Armenians in Van. When the First World War broke out in the Ottoman lands, the Armenians in the province initiated a mass revolt. The revolt initially started in various parts of Van in December 1914 and spread from the surrounding areas to the city of Van. On 20 April 1915, Armenians began the revolt in Van proper by opening fire on Muslim neighborhoods. Fierce battles between the Armenians and Ottoman troops lasted for 26 days. During these battles, numerous Muslims were massacred. According to archival documents, the massacre committed by Armenians in the center of Van on May 17, 1915, was unprecedented in history. From 17 May until the evening of 18 May, the massacre of Muslims continued, and many Muslims who were unable*

* This is the English translation of the Turkish language article titled “Askerî Tarih Belgelerine Göre Van'da Ermeni İsyanı Günlüğü” that was originally published in Volume 1/Issue 1 (June 2023) of the *Tarih Tetkikleri Dergisi* (*Journal of Historical Studies* - Turkey). Source: Güzin Çaykırın, “Askerî Tarih Belgelerine Göre Van'da Ermeni İsyanı Günlüğü”, *Tarih Tetkikleri Dergisi* 1, Issue 1 (June 2023): 31-54.

** ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8524-8405>
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Güzin Çaykırın, Military History Specialist, Turkish Ministry of National Defense, Archives of the Department of Archives and Military History (ATASE)
Email: guzincaykiran@gmail.com

to escape from Van were brutally slaughtered with axes and saws. Finally, on 20 May 1915, Russian detachments entered Van. As a result of the occupation, approximately 100,000 Muslims from Van became refugees and started migrating towards Bitlis. In this study, the daily progression of the revolt initiated by the Armenians in the city of Van will be examined, shedding light on military history documents (war reports), and the impact of this revolt on both Muslims and Armenians will be revealed. The primary sources of the study will be the documents belonging to the Department of Archives and Military History of the Turkish Ministry of National Defense, Armenian documents, and various studies in the literature. These mentioned sources will be analyzed using a comparative method.

Keywords: *Van Province, Armenian Committees, 1915 Van Revolt, 24 April 1915, Armenian Relocation and Resettlement, 1915 Events*

Öz: *Van, coğrafi konumu itibariyle İran'a sınır ve kuzeyden Rusya'ya yakın bir vilayetti. Ayrıca vilayet merkezi, Ermeni nüfusunun en yoğun olduğu yerleşim yerlerinden biriydi. Dolayısıyla coğrafi konum ve nüfus faktörü Ermenilerin Van'da kolayca teşkilatlanmasına olanak tanımıştı. Bunun bir sonucu olarak da Osmanlı topraklarında Birinci Dünya Savaşı başladığı zaman vilayet dâhilinde bulunan Ermeniler topyekûn isyan etmişti. İsyân ilk olarak Aralık 1914'te Van'ın çeşitli bölgelerinde başlamış ve çevreden Van şehrine doğru yayılmıştı. Nitekim Van'da 20 Nisan 1915'te Ermeniler, Müslüman mahallelerine ateş açarak isyanı başlatmışlardı. Ermenilerle Osmanlı birlikleri arasında 26 gün şiddetli müsademeler olmuştu. Bu müsademeler sırasında Müslümanların birçoğu katledilmişti. Arşiv belgelerine göre 17 Mayıs 1915'te Ermenilerin Van merkezde tatbik ettikleri bu katliamı tarih işitmemişti. 17 Mayıs'tan 18 Mayıs akşamına kadar Müslümanlara yönelik sahne-i kıtal devam etmiş ve Van'dan kaçamayan Müslümanların birçoğu baltalar ve testerelerle parça parça edilerek katledilmişti. Neticede 20 Mayıs 1915'te de Rus müfrezeleri Van'a girmişlerdi. İşgalle birlikte Van'dan yaklaşık 100.000 Müslüman da mülteci durumuna düşerek Bitlis istikametine göçe başlamıştı. Çalışmada Ermenilerin Van şehrinde başlattıkları isyan, askerî tarih belgeleri (harp raporları) ışığında gün gün ele alınacak ve bu isyanın Müslümanlar ve Ermeniler üzerindeki etkileri ortaya konulacaktır. Çalışmanın ana kaynaklarını, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Arşiv ve Askerî Tarih Daire Başkanlığı'na ait belgeler, Ermenice kaynaklar ve literatürde yer alan çeşitli çalışmalar oluşturacak ve söz konusu bu çalışmalar, mukayese yöntemiyle analiz edilerek çalışma ortaya konulacaktır.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Van Vilayeti, Ermeni Komiteleri, 1915 Van İsyânı, 24 Nisan 1915, Ermeni Sevk ve İskânı, 1915 Olayları*

Introduction

The first organization of the Armenians in Van was the Union of Salvation, founded in 1872 in the Varagavank (Monastery of Varag) by Khrimian Hayrig (Mkrtich Khrimian)¹. Operating under the slogan “Liberty or Death”, the Union of Salvation soon spread its influence in Van and its surrounding. Karapet Nshikian, one of the members of the organization, sent a letter to the Russian Caucasus Governor-General in May 1872, requesting Russian assistance and the opening of a Russian consulate in Van. At the same time, political propaganda against the Ottoman Empire began to be carried out with the newspaper called *Artsvi Vaspurakan* (The Eagle of Van) published in the Varagavank during this period.² In 1878, a group of Armenian youth founded the Black Cross Society for “protecting defenseless Armenians against Turks and Kurds”.³

With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 (*93 Harbi*), organizations such as the Union of Progressives, the Society of Arms-Bearers, and the Political Association were established in Van. The efforts of the Russian Consul in Van, Armenian-born Konstantin Gamsarakan, and Khrimian Hayrig serving at the Varagavank were effective in the establishment of these organizations.⁴ In 1885, the Armenakan Party⁵ was founded in Van by the teacher Mekertich Portukalian. The party, which was democratic and liberal, organized the Armenian revolt in Van in 1896 with the Dashnaks.⁶ Social Democrat Hunchakian Party, founded by Caucasian Armenians, aimed to establish an independent Armenian state by organizing Armenians living in Eastern Anatolia, Russia, and the Iranian border.⁷ Likewise, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF-Dashnaksutyun) party carried out revolutionary actions by arming the people for an independent

1 In 1858, Khrimian came to Van from Istanbul, where he opened a boarding school at the Varagavank and continued to publish *Artsvi Vaspurakan*, which he had previously been publishing in Istanbul. Source: Teodik Teodoros Lapçincıyan, *Baskı ve Harf: Ermeni Matbaacılık Tarihi*, çev.: S. Malhasyan ve A. İncidüzen (İstanbul: Bırzamanlar Yayıncılık, 2012), p. 110.

2 Dilek Akgümüş, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Ermeni Ayaklanmaları”, *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları*, C 12, S. 23, 2013, p. 24.

3 Among its founders was Mekertich Portukalian. Source: Jean-Louis Mattei, “Mıgırđıç Portukalyan ve ‘Armenia’ Gazetesi (Terörizmden Şüpheli İlimliğa)”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, S. 42, 2012, p. 53 ; Afşin Burak Umar, *Ermeni Devrimci Federasyonu (Taşnaksutyun) Kısa Tarihi*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul 2014, p. 33-34.

4 He first became the Armenian Patriarch of İstanbul and then the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin Catholicos. Umar, *op. cit.*, p. 25, 35.

5 It is noteworthy that the Armenakan Party, unlike other Armenian organizations, used the name “Armenia”, which was used in ancient times for the Eastern Anatolia region. Considering that the *Armenia* newspaper began to be published in Marseille, the party may have been influenced by the Western world’s efforts to attribute the region to Armenians.

6 Umar, *op. cit.*, p. 36

7 Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987), p. 431.

Armenian state.⁸ According to the Armenian writer Hagopian, these were organizations striving for Armenian sovereignty against oppression.⁹ Van was the main center of these organizations in the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰ In other words, “the province of Van was the most important field to be examined in order to understand the Armenian movement and the spirit of *komitacılık* [engaging in the activities of the Armenian revolutionary organizations].”¹¹

In conclusion, the main reason for the organization of Armenians in Van was its border with Iran and its proximity to Russia from the north. In this respect, the Armenian revolutionary committee members identified three routes to easily transport arms and ammunition from the Iranian border to Van. The starting points of these routes were Russia and Iran, and the destination was Ottoman territories. On these routes, the Armenian committees were able to transport arms and ammunition as well as recruit members for their committees. Therefore, through these routes, Russian and Iranian Armenians could easily establish contact with the Van Armenians.¹²

As can be seen, Van had been a center of organization for the Armenians since the 19th century. As a result, they revolted against the Ottoman state during the First World War, one of the most difficult times for the Ottoman Empire. When the First World War began in 1914, the Armenian committees decided at the Dashnaktsutyun’s (ARF) 8th Congress in Erzurum that they would side with Russia depending on the course of the war.¹³ In line with this decision, ARF, in line with the directives it received from Russia, had published the Instructions for Personal Defense, which served as a guideline for organizing the Armenian revolt in Van.¹⁴ In this context, Armenians, under the leadership of the Dashnaks Aram Manukian, Ishkhan, and Arshak Vramian¹⁵, armed

8 Kamuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası* (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1983), p. 133.

9 U.S. Յակոբեան, Թրքահայաստանի Կորուստը [The Lost of Turkish Armenia], Տպարան Սեդակ, Պեղրուք 1967, էջ 152; Güzin Çaykiran, *Erzurum, Van, Bitlis Vilayetlerinde Ermeni-Kürt İlişkileri (1908-1920)* (Ankara: Hece Yayınları, 2021), p. 57.

10 Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Arşiv ve Askeri Tarih Daire Başkanlığı Arşivi (ATASE) BDH-2820-69-2-54.

11 Orhan Turan, “Van’da Bir İngiliz Konsolos Vekili: Bertram Dickson’ın Taşnak Cemiyeti Üzerine Değerlendirmeleri”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, S. 65, 2020, p. 137.

12 Hasan Oktay, “Ermeniler ve Van İhtilal Örgütü (1896-1915)”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, S.5, Bahar 2002, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=tr&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=301>, accessed March 28, 2021.

13 BDH-2811-26- 28 (18 Eylül 1914); Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, c. 31/S.81, 1982, s. 61 ; Kemal Çiçek, “VIII. Taşnak Kongresi: Ermenilerin Karar Anı”, *I. Uluslararası Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı* (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014), p. 69.

14 Justin McCarthy, Esat Aslan, Cemalettin Taşkiran ve Ömer Turan, *1915 Van’da Ermeni İsyanı*, çev.: Batuhan Yoğun (İstanbul: T&K Yayınları, 2018), p. 198.

15 Mevlüt Yüksel, “Amerikan Board Misyonerlerinden Elizabeth Freeman Barrows Ussher’in Mektuplarında 1915 Van Ermeni İsyanı ve Osmanlı Kayıtları”, *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi*, S. 67, 2020, p. 572-573.

themselves in Van and its surroundings and began to prepare for the revolt.¹⁶ This preparation was put into action when the Russians started their offensive against the Ottoman lands from the Eastern Front (Caucasus Front) on 1 November 1914¹⁷ and on 20 December 1914, there Armenians started a general revolt in the Karçıkan (Reşadiye) and Gevaş districts of Van.¹⁸ The revolt then grew further and spread to the townships of Şatak (Çatak), Havasor, Timar, and Erçek.¹⁹ Meanwhile, on 20 December 1914, a meeting took place between the Russian Tsar Nicholas II and the Etchmiadzin Catholicos Gevork V. The Tsar asked the Catholicos which territories they demanded.²⁰ Therefore, it can be considered that this meeting, which took place at the beginning of the revolt, may have triggered the Armenian revolt in Van.

This study discusses the revolt of the Armenians in Van in 1915. There are various studies on this specific Armenian revolt. Unlike the other studies however, in this study, the revolt that took place in the center of Van is narrated on a day-by-day basis within the framework of military history reports. Thus, it is hoped that the difficulties faced by the 3rd Ottoman Army (which was at war with the Russians on the Eastern Front) against the armed Armenian gangs will be better understood. The main source of this study is the military reports kept on the Eastern Front during the First World War. The study also utilizes Armenian sources and other studies on the subject.

The relevant Ottoman documents have been translated into modern Turkish [and thus English for this translation] as much as possible for a better understanding of the revolt. During the translations, no modern equivalents could be found for some of the place names mentioned in the revolt in and around Van. Therefore, a question mark has been placed next to some of the place names.

The Armenian Revolt in Van: 20 April-17 May 1915

In April 1915, there were approximately 10,000 Armenian rebels in Van.²¹ Many of them were deserters from the army and were well organized²² under

16 BDH-528-2061-22-10.

17 *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi Kafkas Cephesi 3. Ordu Harekâtı*, c. 2 (Ankar: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993), p.101.

18 BDH-4-23A-5.

19 BDH-2820-69-3-1, 18, 33

20 Nejla Günay, "Rusya'nın Osmanlı ve İran Topraklarındaki Ermeniler ve Kürt Aşiretleriyle İlişkisi", *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, S. 56, 2017, p. 68.

21 McCarthy et al., *op. cit.*, p. 227.

22 BDH-2820-69-3-1 ; Çaykırın, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

the guidance of Aram Manukian.²³ The Ottoman military presence in Van consisted of a total of 1,650 gendarmerie and military units. As can be seen, these forces were quite inadequate against the Armenian rebels. This was because the 3rd Ottoman Army in the region was at war with the Russians. The Armenian revolt began on 20 April 1915.²⁴

“20 April 1915: The revolutionaries, most of whom were deserters and acting in an organized manner, started shooting at the Muslim neighborhood and police stations. The committee members at the gate of Hamid Ağa Barracks were killed. The wires of Başkale-Havasor (Gürpınar)-Mirmurtal-Reşat? [telegraph line] were cut.

20/21 April 1915: Fighting intensified on all sides. A sap²⁵ placed under the barracks through the passages opened from the Armenian quarter to the Hamid Ağa Barracks was detonated, causing only the walls of the barracks to crack. The platoon in the barracks could no longer take shelter there²⁶ and had to leave. The revolutionaries occupied the barracks.

21 April 1915: The firing continued fiercely all over the city, the main condition in the city was that Muslims were concentrated in the district and the revolutionaries were trying to seize the castle as it has a position that mostly dominates the city. 800 Armenians, selected from among the committee members, attacked the fortress to take possession of it, but the attack collapsed in front of the fortress. The Armenians in the Bağlar district were relatively more concentrated than the Muslims there, so they attacked the Muslim households. They managed to march on the Muslim houses and destroyed them with their inhabitants. In addition, it was observed that the roads outside the city were fortified by the revolutionaries in the places deemed necessary to prevent the entry of detachments coming from outside.

21/22 April 1915: The revolutionaries destroyed Muslim houses with bombs, and burned and destroyed many Ottoman offices such as the Public Debt Commission, the Post, the Tobacco Reji and many others. A unit of 30 men from the gendarmerie detachment in pursuit on the Havasor side managed to enter the city. The 700 revolutionaries gathered in the village of Gürzot, located between Muradiye (Bargiri) district and

23 Սերգեյ Վարդանյան, “Վանը Միջնադարից Մինչև XX. Դարի Սկիզբը [Van from the Middle Ages until the 20th Century]”, *Պատմա Բանասիրական Հանդես [Journal of History-Philology]*, 3, 2010, էջ 30 ; McCarthy et al, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

24 BDH-528-2061-23-10; BDH-528-2061-23-11 ; Çaykiran, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

25 The extension of a trench to a point beneath an enemy's fortifications.

26 BDH-528-2061-23-11.

Timar subdistrict, were beaten back by the Muradiye district governor. A fierce battle went on between the rebels on the Erçek side and the detachment coming to Muradiye and Saray. There were 20 soldiers martyred and wounded in the city today.

22 April 1915: The firing continued fiercely all over the city. The revolutionaries were constantly being reinforced from the villages²⁷ outside the city. It has been understood that the weapons in the hands of the revolutionaries are small Turkish rifles, Russian field guns and a large number of bombs. It has also been investigated that they are manufacturing cartridges, as they have consumed a lot of ammunition in the continuous battles. An artillery detachment was allocated among the Kuva-yi Inzibatiye (gendarmerie forces) and abandoned cannons were utilized. In this way, the offensive of the revolutionaries could be relatively stopped. A Russian cavalry detachment advanced on the village of Akgiz? north of Saray. The battle on that side continues. A strong enemy²⁸ detachment advanced along the roads near the Iran/Kotur Strait, apparently in pursuit of a plan to transfer Armenian gangs from both sides to Iran/Kotur. The Turkish detachment of 700 men in the vicinity of Kotur retreated a little.

23 April 1915: Fighting continued in the upper and lower town. In the inner city, the force captured a few houses from the revolutionaries. A gendarmerie force of 100 men from Başkale arrived at the center. The district governor of Muradiye, who was on his way to the center with a nearby detachment from the Timar subdistrict, advanced against the revolutionaries who had gathered in Kasmalı Gediği? and occupied the area and arrested them. Some of the rebels who had attacked Muslim villages in the Erçek subdistrict were driven away. It was observed that Armenian gangs inside Iran were pressuring all sides of the border to cross to Van.²⁹

24 April 1915: Fighting continued all over the city. Rebels blocking the road on the Van-Saray route and at Hoş Gediği? near Van were dispersed by detachments sent from Saray and Van. It was understood that the committee members, who were under pressure from Havasor, gathered around Şatak, occupied and fortified the dominant areas and were threatening the central town, and that side was in danger. The detachment sent from Hizan to Gevaş via Karkar River was fired upon by about 100 Armenian revolutionaries in front of the villages of

27 BDH-528-2061-23-12.

28 The term “enemy” in the reports is not used for Armenians, but for Russians.

29 BDH-528-2061-23-13.

Hududyis? and Tap?. As a result, the revolutionaries were defeated in a battle.

26/27 April 1915: Fighting continued in the city. The forces seized a few houses from the revolutionaries. Many deceased people were seen in the captured houses. The victims could not be identified. According to their hats and clothes, they appeared to have come from Russia. Since Van's buildings are made of mudbrick, cannon balls [easily] penetrate them. When the outer part of the house was destroyed, it was defended by opening crenellations underneath. There was very little ammunition left in the force. The ammunition sent had not yet arrived. Therefore, the rebels were attacking the upper neighborhood where they gathered and the trenches they dug in front of Ereğ Mountain. Some of the revolutionaries who came from Havasor and attempted to enter the city were besieged in Nurgüh Gediği? and 49 of them were killed in the battle that took place within 24 hours.³⁰ Others managed to escape. Our detachment, facing an enemy detachment of 1,500 men, mostly cavalry, advancing in Kotur River, withdrew to Razi Strait? after a two-day battle. The detachment in pursuit in the Erçek district was sent to reinforce the detachment in Kotur. An Armenian gang of 50 horsemen who attempted to enter the border at Karadere were driven away after 3 of them were killed.³¹

28/29 April 1915: For a day or two, operations were carried out in the inner city. Attempts were made to encircle the rebels on the Ereğ Mountain side. There were 173 wounded and 60 martyrs in the battles that took place in the city so far. Detachments dispatched from Bitlis and Gevaş fought with the rebels in the villages of Narek, Pagan and neighboring villages of Gevaş and 8 of the ringleaders of the revolutionaries were captured dead. A detachment dispatched from Pervari via Özim to the Müküs subdistrict was exposed to fire from Özim residents and occupied Özim, which was a shelter due to its steep terrain. Moving forward from Kotur River, the enemy continued its offensive. After dispatching Armenian gangs inland, they returned. Pursuit detachments were sent from Kotur to follow³² these gangs. The detachment sent from Muradiye to the Timar subdistrict, defeated about 150 rebels and approached within a distance of four hours to Van. The First Expeditionary Force, which was sent to Iran via Mosul against the Russian force attacking in Iran, reached Dilman. Russians fortified the

30 BDH-528-2061-23-14.

31 BDH-2820-69-3-64(65).

32 BDH-528-2061-23-15.

hills to the east of Silloköyü?. It is understood that some forces are advancing to the Hantahtı area.

30 April/1 May 1915: Fighting continued in the city. Two houses blown up by rebels did not cause any damage as Turkish units had already been evacuated. Only a soldier who was trying to find a sap was martyred. A few more houses were also invaded. The village of Sinike?, east and near the city, was occupied. Rebels who tried to cut off transportation to Van by occupying some points with commanding locations on Van-Bitlis Road were eliminated. The detachment went against the rebels gathered in the river north of Ereğ Mountain and killed 20 of them. Rain and snow prevented the detachment from moving.

2/3 May 1915: Fighting continued in the city. The revolutionaries in the upper neighborhood were dispersed. Turkish detachment advancing to Sinike village took over 15 houses. During the offensive in the Haçboğan neighborhood, the site was seized. This resulted in 23 martyrs and 27 wounded. Fighting continued in the villages of Gevaş district. The detachment sent to Şitak (Çatak) entered Şitak after successfully capturing the site and killing 41 revolutionaries in an attack against the rebels who had settled in fortified positions on Vaviran Mountain (Çeper Mountain).³³

4/5 May 1915: Fighting continued to a minor degree in the city and became very fierce around Bağlar. As a result, several houses were taken over. There were 19 martyrs and 23 wounded. An Armenian gang of 42 men, who were reported to be in Kos Village? of Havasor subdistrict, was surrounded by detachments and 30 of them were killed. The rebels who attacked the church in Gürzot village of Muradiye district were surrounded by the detachment. In the battle that lasted for three days, the rebels fled, 14 of them survived. The rest were eliminated. The detachment suffered two martyrs and 14 wounded.

6/7/8/9 May 1915: Fighting continued in the city. First Expeditionary Force and Mobile Gendarmerie Division fortified the ridges extending east from Hantahtı. Russian forces south of Iran/Hoy advanced. Russian detachments reinforcing Armenian gangs from the Muradiye direction advanced towards Khoy. Armenian gangs advancing from Karadere to the border were supported by strong Russian detachments. Armenian gangs wandering from the Diyadin side moved inland in the direction of Erciş under the protection of the Russians.³⁴ 22 of the rebels who were

33 BDH-528-2061-23-16.

34 BDH-528-2061-23-17.

expelled from the villages of Şuşati? and Kobati? around the town of Van and gathered ammunition in the Yedikilise (Bakraçlı village) area were killed and the rest disappeared around Ereğ Mountain. These rebels, who were cut off from the interior, are being pursued. As the bombs inside the church caught fire, part of the church blew up with the rebels in it. Erzurum and Erzincan mobile gendarmerie battalions sent from Erzurum and the *cebel* squad reached Van.

10/11/12 May 1915: Fighting continued in the inner city, in the Bağlar area and in the Ereğ area. In the city, 11 houses were captured with great difficulty, and 15 were martyred and 45 wounded. The enemy is advancing from Karadere to the border. The enemy that advanced to the Saray frontier occupied the villages of Koçkan Ulya and Suğla. The enemy advancing from Kotur with a battalion of infantry and a cannon is moving towards Razi ridges. The First Force Expeditionary left the Van Gendarmerie Division against the enemy and moved to Van on 12 May 1915, following the Becirga?-Gevaş-Başkale route. This was because the Russians were approaching Van from several directions and the rebels were resisting them in Van.

13 May 1915: The situation in Van has become critically dangerous. Evacuation has become compulsory. The Russians and Armenians who entered the central town of Van in gangs are still resisting in the central town. Today, the sick and wounded and some of the families of officials and residents abandoned all their belongings and 20 boats were sent to Tatvan and some to Havasor.³⁵ In order to secure the road to Gevaş, a battalion of infantry with one cannon was sent from Van to the direction of Gevaş and captured the Şivegah? ridges. A division of 150 cavalry was sent to Tamisli Gediği? in the Timar subdistrict. An enemy detachment advancing from Abaga (Çaldıran) occupied Bargiri (Muradiye). An enemy detachment of three battalions of infantry and two divisions of cavalry advancing from Gürşaman continued its advance. The cavalry entered the center of Muradiye, captured the Bezirmahir (Bendimahi?) bridge in the evening, and their line of retreat was confirmed by several villagers of the *Geylan Haydaranlı* tribe who were *subjected to a terrible massacre*. The enemy, who advanced from Karadere and occupied Koçkan, advanced only his own forces.

14 May 1915: There were minor clashes with the rebels in the city today. The enemy cavalry occupying Bezirmahir bridge was following the street in the direction of Van. The enemy detachment that occupied Gürzot last night left the village three hours later.

35 BDH-528-2061-23-18.

15 May 1915: Fighting intensified in the city. Several houses occupied by rebels in Bağlarbaşı were destroyed by artillery fire. In a combat between the detachments and a gang of 32 men at Tut Stream?, south of Erek Mountain, the gang was completely destroyed.³⁶ Two battalions of infantry and two divisions of cavalry of the enemy were following the Canik-Van route. Today in the evening, an attempt was made in the area around Canik. Earlier on, a battalion of infantry and a division of cavalry advancing from Gürzot crossed in the direction of Derecik at 8:30. The enemy detachment heading towards Abaga from Karadere arrived at Noşar (Sağmal village). Faced with this situation, the central province decided to withdraw towards Hoşab since it was not possible for the detachments to stand against the rebels.

16 May 1915: The enemy is approaching Van from two sides. Thousands of Muslims from Van, including children, women, men, old, and disabled people, walked overland in the direction of Hoşab. The Van-Hoşab Route took a disastrous turn. Mothers, helpless to bear them in their delicate arms, were willing to destroy their lungs with exhaustion in order to save their dignity from the monsters. Exhausted from walking, elderly and disabled men and women departed this life on the side of the road. Starving girls whose feet were swollen from the disasters caused by the long migration, mothers with frantic voices, old people in despair, children with desperate looks asking for help, who were exhausted from walking in this tragedy, who no longer had the strength to drag their shattered and torn feet, and in short, the catastrophe exposed to these people who were walking towards death³⁷ is beyond description and imagination. After the Van government and the Muslims dispatched a detachment to secure the road to Gevaş, all forces decided to withdraw on 17 May 1915. The enemy attacked two battalions of the gendarmerie brigade in Havasor. The commander of the First Expeditionary Force ordered the withdrawal of the aforementioned battalions to Çoh?, but most of them came to Gevar.

17 May 1915: Detachments evacuated the central province of Van. The revolutionaries were not aware that Russian offensive units were reinforcing Van. The revolutionaries knew that this movement was a plan for Turks to flee, and burned down the entire Muslim neighborhood so that they would be left completely without a place to return to. They destroyed and devastated everything with bombs. Some helpless Muslim men and women who remained in Van were cut to pieces with axes and saws. Even those who took refuge in the American orphanage could not

36 BDH-528-2061-23-19.

37 BDH-528-2061-23-20 ; Çaykiran, *op. cit.*, p. 140-141.

save themselves from the tragedy and brutality. On 17 May 1915, Armenians committed this massacre in the central town of Van, which history has never heard of. On 19 May 1915, this scene of massacre continued until the evening. On 20 May 1915, Russian detachments entered Van. After that, the gangs attacked³⁸ and the chase and annihilation of the people began. The First Expeditionary Force was able to reach the south of Lake Van through long wanderings and mountains. The Russians took great advantage of this Armenian insurrection and invaded the Muş Plain and reached in front of Muş with their troops. Meanwhile, they advanced from the south of Van to the Bitlis Strait. Therefore, with these actions, the Armenians caused the destruction of a Turkish corps (...?), the invasion of two provinces such as Van and Bitlis, and the 3rd Army to carry out a very long and very large operation against the Russian forces, which were behind a large part of the 3rd Army, which was the result of the right flank operation that started in mid-June (1915). Some of the Armenian villages of Van obeyed the government and condemned this action. For example, the letter sent to the province³⁹ by the community council on behalf of the inhabitants of the village of İskele, near Van, is a good example of the attitude and behavior of the government towards its obedient people and the attitude of the people who were not affiliated with the [Armenian revolutionary] committees.”⁴⁰

According to daily reports, after 26 days of fierce battles, 1,854 Armenian committee members had been killed. The Ottoman military losses were 140 martyrs and 282 wounded. According to the Armenian writer Martirosyan, 70 Armenians were wounded and 58 were killed.⁴¹ According to Sahakyan, 350 Armenian *fedais* [revolutionary fighters] were killed and about 1,000 Ottoman soldiers lost their lives.⁴² Again, according to the reports, Van was not sufficiently reinforced by the Ottoman troops. Some of the troops were fighting against Russian forces, while others were busy suppressing the Armenian revolt in the villages of Gevaş, Şatak and Tımar subdistrict. Therefore, this situation not only created a security weakness in the center of Van, but also divided the strength of the Ottoman troops in two.⁴³ During the revolt, the troops dispatched

38 BDH-528-2061-23-21.

39 BDH-528-2061-23-22.

40 Report submitted to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief under the name *Van İhtilali Ahiri* after the Van rebellion. BDH-528-2061-23-23.

41 Յ. ՏէրՍարգիսիոսեան, *Մեծ Ղէպէրը Վասպուրականում 1914-1915 թուականներին* [Major Events in Van between the Years 1914-1915], Արարատ, Երևանի, 1917 <http://www.digilib.am/book/2100/2550/19999/Մեծ%20ղէպէրը%20Վասպուրականում%201914-1915%20թուականներին>, accessed June 1, 2023.

42 Ռ.Օ. Սահակյան, “Վասպուրականի Հայության Գոյամարտը 1915 թվականին [The Armenian Struggle in Van in 1915]”, 1995, [http://hpi.asj-oa.am/5236/1/1995-1\(19\).pdf](http://hpi.asj-oa.am/5236/1/1995-1(19).pdf), accessed February 12, 2020.

43 Akgümüş, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

from other regions could not reach Van on time. If one pays attention to the daily reports, it will be understood that Ottoman troops were dispatched to the region only by the middle of the rebellion. Ammunition was insufficient as well. In addition, many of the Armenian committee members were army deserters, which meant that the rebels had military experience.

Indeed, many Ottoman Armenians, who were supposed to defend their lands against the Russian invasion, instead handed over the key to the city to the commander of the Russian Caucasus Army, General Nikolai Yudenich. In return, the administration of the province was given to Armenian Aram Manukian.⁴⁴ However, in July 1915, when the Russians began to withdraw⁴⁵ from Van, Russian General Yudenich ordered the Armenians in and around Van to migrate to the Caucasus. Accordingly, approximately 150,000-200,000 Armenians from Van and its surroundings were forced to migrate to the Caucasus, primarily to Yerevan. During this migration, 50,000 Armenians lost their lives due to disease and starvation and 40,000 Armenians lost their lives due to Kurdish attacks on the migration caravans.⁴⁶ Also, with the occupation of Van, 102,808⁴⁷ Muslims became refugees. These refugees were gathered in Diyarbakır and sent to Urfa, Antep and Adana.⁴⁸

Towards the end of August 1915, the Russians regained control of Van, but gave the administration of the province not to Armenians but to Russian General Pavel Voronov.⁴⁹ Therefore, after the Van revolt, the Armenians of Van were expelled both from the lands they lived in and from the administration of Van. Upon the outbreak of the revolt in Van, the Ottoman Empire decided to shut down the Armenian committees on 24 April 1915 and arrested their members. Moreover, when Van was occupied on 17 May 1915, the Ottoman Empire decided to relocate some Armenians and their families from the battlefields and resettle to the provinces of Aleppo and Mosul on 27 May 1915 in order to ensure the security of the Eastern Front.⁵⁰ Afterwards, this transfer

44 ՏերՍարսիբրուսեան [Ter Martirosyan], 1917, <http://digilib.aa.am/book/2100/2550/20052/Մեծ%20ղեկավարները%20Վասսպուրականում%201914-1915%20թուականներին>, accessed June 1, 2023.

45 On 5 August 1915, Russian troops withdrew from the center of Van to Erçek, and Cevdet Bey, the governor of Van, arrived in Van from Mamuratülaziz on 10 August 1915. BDH-2827-99-4.

46 Nejla Günay ve Güzin Çaykırın, “Rusların 1915 Yılında Van Vilayeti ve Çevresinden Ermenileri Kafkasya’ya Göç Ettirmesi”, *Gazi Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, C 14, S.27, 2020, p. 141.

47 Erol Kaya, “I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Erzurum Mültecileri”, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve Milli Mücadele’de Erzurum*, C.I, Y. Aslan ve T. Başak (Editörler) (Erzurum: ER-VA Yayınları, 2019), p. 97.

48 *Askerî Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, S.31/81, Aralık 1982, p. 229.

49 Ռ. Սահակյան, “Միլիցիայի Կազմակերպումը Վանի Նահանգում (1915 թ. Հոկտեմբեր – 1916 թ. Սեպտեմբեր) [Militia Organization in the Province of Van (October 1915 - September 1916)]”, *Պատմա-Բանասիրական Հանդես*, 2, 2018, էջ49, <https://artsakhlib.am/2019/09/05/միլիցիայի-կազմակերպումը-վանի-նահանգ/>, accessed May 2, 2021.

50 *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri 1914-1918*, C. I (Ankara: ATASE Yayınları, 2005), p.127-133.

activity spread to many provinces of Anatolia because, according to an Ottoman report, *with the possible fall of the Dardanelles Strait, a firing line position in Bursa or Erzurum would extend to Sivas. In such a situation and in the event of an offensive in the Black Sea, the position of Konya would be no different from that of Erzincan.*⁵¹ Therefore, a situation that could occur in any part of the country possessed gravity and impact that could affect every part of the country.

Indeed, with the Van revolt, the Ottoman Empire changed its attitude towards the Armenian committees and the Armenians who aided and abetted them, and began to take serious measures against any activity that could jeopardize the territorial integrity of the state.

Conclusion

The Eastern Front in the First World War was undoubtedly one of the most active fronts with the greatest losses. And the rupture of this front started with the occupation of Van by the Russians. When the Russians occupied Van, they temporarily gave the administration of the city to Armenians. But this was very brief. Accordingly, the Armenians in Van were forced by the Russian to migrate to the Caucasus and Russian officials were appointed to the administration of Van. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire observed how the Armenian revolutionaries jeopardized the territorial integrity of the state with the Van revolt, and responded by closing down the Armenian revolutionary committees and arresting their members. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire had decided to relocate the committee member Armenians with their families to the southern provinces of the state and to resettle them there. As can be seen, the large-scale revolt started by the said Armenians in Van also changed the Ottoman state's attitude towards the Armenian nation. When the daily reports are taken into account, the severity of the revolt is revealed to have been significant.

In conclusion, those Armenian citizens of the Ottoman Empire who were part of the joyful demonstrations and the ringing of bells in churches while the Russian troops were occupying Van were, in truth, responsible for starting the process of their people saying farewell to Anatolia after the revolt in Van.

51 BDH-528-2061-20-2.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archive Documents

MSB Arşiv ve Askerî Tarih Daire Başkanlığı Arşivi (ATASE), Birinci Dünya Harbi Kataloğu (BDH), Klasör-Dosya-Fihrist-Eki

2820-69-2-54, 2811-26- 28, 528-2061-22-10, 4-23A-5, 2820-69-3-1, 18, 33, 2820-69-3-1, 528-2061-23-10, 528-2061-23-11, 528-2061-23-12, 528-2061-23-13, 528-2061-23-14, 528-2061-23-15, 528-2061-23-16, 528-2061-23-17, 528-2061-23-18, 528-2061-23-19, 528-2061-23-20, 528-2061-23-21, 528-2061-23-22, 528-2061-23-23, 2820-69-3-64(65), 2827-99-4, 528-2061-20-2.

Copyrighted and Research Works

Akgümüş, Dilek. “Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Ermeni Ayaklanmaları”. *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları*, C 12, S. 23, 2013, p. 23-47.

Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri 1914-1918, C. I. Ankara: ATASE Yayınları, 2005.

Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, C 31, S. 81, Aralık 1982.

Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi Kafkas Cephesi 3. Ordu Harekâtı, C. 2. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993.

Çaykiran, Güzin. *Erzurum, Van, Bitlis Vilayetlerinde Ermeni-Kürt İlişkileri (1908-1920)*. Ankara: Hece Yayınları, 2021.

Çiçek, Kemal. “VIII. Taşnak Kongresi: Ermenilerin Karar Anı”. *I. Uluslararası Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı*. Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014.

Günay, Nejla ve Çaykiran, Güzin. “Rusların 1915 Yılında Van Vilayeti ve Çevresinden Ermenileri Kafkasya'ya Göç Ettirmesi”. *Gazi Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, C 14/S.27, 2020, p. 133-150.

Günay, Nejla. “Rusya'nın Osmanlı ve İran Topraklarındaki Ermeniler ve Kürt Aşiretleriyle İlişkisi”. *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, S. 56, 2017, p. 61-80.

Gürün, Kamuran. *Ermeni Dosyası*. Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1983.

Kaya, Erol. “I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Erzurum Mültecileri”. *Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve Milli Mücadele'de Erzurum*, C I, (Ed.) Y. Aslan ve T. Başak). Erzurum: ER-VA Yayınları, 2019.

Lapçinciyan, Teodik Teodoros. *Baskı ve Harf: Ermeni Matbaacılık Tarihi*, çev. S. Malhasyan ve A. İncidüzen. İstanbul: Bizzamanlar Yayıncılık, 2012.

Mattei, Jean-Louis. “Mıgırđıç Portukalyan ve ‘Armenia’ Gazetesi (Terörizmden Şüpheli İlimliğa)”. *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, S. 42, 2012, p. 47-76.

Mccarthy, Justin, Aslan, Esat, Taşkiran, Cemalettin ve Turan, Ömer. *1915 Van'da Ermeni İsyanı*, çev. B. Yoğun. İstanbul: T&K Yayınları, 2018.

Oktay, Hasan. “Ermeniler ve Van İhtilal Örgütü (1896-1915)”. *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, S.5, Bahar 2002, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=tr&Page=Dergiler&IcerikNo=301>, accessed March 28, 2021.

Turan, Orhan. “Van'da Bir İngiliz Konsolos Vekili: Bertram Dickson'ın Taşnak Cemiyeti Üzerine Değerlendirmeleri”. *Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi*, S. 65, 2020, p. 131-160.

Umar, Afşin Burak. *Ermeni Devrimci Federasyonu (Taşnaksutyun) Kısa Tarihi*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul 2014.

Uras, Esat. *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987.

Yüksel, Mevlüt. “Amerikan Board Misyonerlerinden Elizabeth Freeman Barrows Ussher'in Mektuplarında 1915 Van Ermeni İsyanı ve Osmanlı Kayıtları”. *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi*, S.67, Ocak 2020, p. 563-600.

Մարտիրոսեան, Յ. Տէր. *ՄեծԴէպքերըՎասպուրականում 1914-1915 թուականներին*, Արարատ, Երեւանի, 1917, <http://www.digilib.am/book/2100/2550/19999/Մեծ%20Դէպքերը%20Վասպուրականում%201914-1915%20թուականներին>, accessed June 1, 2023.

Յակոբեան, Մ.Տ. *ԹրքահայաստանիԳորուստը*. ՏպարանՍեվան, Պէյրուք 1967.


Սահակյան, Ռ. “ՄիլիցիայիԿազմակերպումըՎանիՆահանգում (1915 թ. Հոկտեմբեր – 1916 թ. Մեպտեմբեր)”. *Պատմա-ԲանասիրականՀանդես*, 2, 2018, էջ149-160, <https://artsakhlib.am/2019/09/05/միլիցիայի-կազմակերպումը-վանի-նահանգ/>, accessed May 2, 2021.

Սահակյան, Ռ.Օ. “ՎասպուրականիՀայությանԳոյամարտը 1915 թվականին”. 1995. [http://hpj.asj-oa.am/5236/1/1995-1\(19\).pdf](http://hpj.asj-oa.am/5236/1/1995-1(19).pdf), accessed February 12, 2020.


Վարդանյան, Սերգեյ. “ՎանըՄիջնադարիցՄինչև XX. ԴարիՍկիզբը”. *Պատմա-ԲանասիրականՀանդես*, 3, 2010, էջ20-33, <https://artsakhlib.am/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Սերգեյ-Վարդանյան-Վանը-միջնադարից-մինչև-XX-դարի-սկիզբը.pdf>, accessed May 2, 2021.

APPENDIX


Daily Reports Concerning the Revolt of the Armenians in Van (20 April-17 May 1915)




BDH-528-1029-23-11




BDH-528-1029-23-12




BDH-528-1029-23-13




BDH-528-1029-23-14




BDH-528-1029-23-15




BDH-528-1029-23-16




BDH-528-1029-23-17




BDH-528-1029-23-18




BDH-528-1029-23-19



BDH-528-1029-23-20



BDH-528-1029-23-22



BDH-528-1029-23-23

CALL FOR PAPERS AND STYLE SHEET: *REVIEW OF ARMENIAN STUDIES*

The *Review of Armenian Studies* is a biannual academic journal that was established in 2002 with the aim of publishing academic papers to stimulate inter-disciplinary debate between academics and practitioners on topics relating to Armenian Studies.

The *Review of Armenian Studies* invites paper submissions on any subject related to the journal's scope of research, which include:

- The Armenian revolts in the 19th and 20th century era of the Ottoman Empire
- Historical, political, and social dimensions of the 1915 events
- Various aspects of the dispute over the 1915 events
- Politics in the Armenian world (in Armenia and in the Armenian Diaspora)
- Culture and society in the Armenian world (in Armenia and in the Armenian Diaspora)
- Bilateral relations of Armenia with other countries
- Regional and international politics of Armenia

Review of Armenian Studies is indexed by EBSCO and TÜBİTAK/ULAKBİM.

Manuscript Submission

Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The journal's language is English. *Review of Armenian Studies* accepts academic research that has not been previously submitted to another journal for publication. Submissions must be written in accordance with the standards put forward by the journal, and with a clear and concise language. The journal uses the latest edition of Chicago Manual of Style (full note) as its citation style. Please refer to Chicago Manual of Style official website for further details regarding proper citation methods (www.chicagomanualofstyle.org). *Review of Armenian Studies* recommends the use of automated citation platforms such as "Zotero" or "Citation Machine" to make citation faster and easier for the authors.

Please submit manuscripts via e-mail to Managing Editor Mehmet Oğuzhan Tulun via motulun@avim.org.tr.

Review of Armenian Studies welcomes the submission of manuscripts as articles and book reviews.

Articles should range from 6,000 to 18,000 words and should be approximately 10-30 single-spaced pages in length (including footnotes and bibliography). Articles must be word processed using Microsoft Word, 12 point font, Times New Roman, and should be single-spaced throughout allowing good (1-1/2 inch) margins. Pages should be numbered sequentially. There should be a clear hierarchy of headings and subheadings. Quotations with more than 40 words should be indented from the left margin.

The title page of the article should include the following information:

- Article title
- Names and affiliations of all contributing authors
- Full address for correspondence, including telephone and email address
- Abstract: please provide a short summary of up to 300 words.
- Keywords: please provide 5 key words, suitable for indexing. Ideally, these words will not have appeared in the title.

Book reviews should range from 1,200 to 2,400 words and should be approximately 2-4 single-spaced pages in length (including footnotes), and should be on recently published books on related subjects. Book reviews must be word processed using Microsoft Word, 12 point font, Times New Roman, and should be single-spaced throughout allowing good (1-1/2 inch) margins. Pages should be numbered sequentially. Page numbers regarding the book under review should be given in parentheses within the text, other citations should be given in the footnote section.

Book reviews should have a title. The details of the book under review should be listed with the following details:

- First and last name(s) of the author(s) or editor(s) of the book under review.
- Title of book
- Year of publication
- Place of publication
- Publisher
- Number of pages
- Language of the book
- Price (please indicate paperback or hard cover) if available.

We are now welcoming contributions for the 49th issue of this journal.

Complete submissions are due 1 May 2024.

The editorial office will make every effort to deal with submissions to the journal as quickly as possible. All papers will be acknowledged on receipt by email.



ORDER FORM

Dear Readers,

The entire archive of our periodical publications is available as open access on the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM) website and the DergiPark system.

Please visit the www.avim.org.tr address to find our journal archive and all of our other publications that have been made available as open access.

On the other hand, information on subscription and other book fees is available below for readers wishing to acquire our publications as printed copies.

Name : Address :
Last Name :
Telephone :
E-mail :

Subscriptions

- | | |
|---|----------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ermeni Arařtırmaları Journal - 6 Months | Annual 200 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Review of Armenian Studies Journal - 6 Months | Annual 200 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal - Per Year | Annual 130 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Avrasya Dnyası / Eurasian World Journal - 6 Months | Annual 220 TRY |

Books

- | | |
|--|--------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler Ömer Engin LÜTEM / (Extended version and 2nd edition) | 15 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Armenian Diaspora - Diaspora, State and the Imagination of the Republic of Armenia / Turgut Kerem TUNCEL | 35 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Balkan Savaşlarında Rumeli Türkleri | 25 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kırımlar - Kıyımlar - Göçler (1821-1913) / Bilâl N. ŞİMŞİR | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Turkish-Russian Academics / A Historical Study on the Caucasus | 20 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Gürcistan'daki Müslüman Topluluklar / Azınlık Hakları, Kimlik, Siyaset | 30 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ermeni Propagandasının Amerika Boyutu Üzerine / Bilâl N. ŞİMŞİR | 20 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ermeni Sorunuyla İlgili İngiliz Belgeleri (1912-1923) / British Documents on Armenian Question (1912-1923) / Tolga BAŞAK | 30 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Türk Ermeni İlişkileri Üzerine | 60 TRY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ömer Engin Lütem Konferansları 2021 / Editör: Alev Kılıç | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sovyet Sonrası Ukrayna'da Devlet, Toplum ve Siyaset / Değişen Dinamikler, Dönüşen Kimlikler / Editörler: Ayşegül AYDINGÜN - İsmail AYDINGÜN | 40 TRY |

Contact

Address: Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12/B Daire: 3-4 06550 Çankaya / ANKARA
Telephone: 0312 438 50 23 - 24 • Fax: 0312 438 50 26
E-mail: teraziyayincilik@gmail.com

Account Number:

Terazi Yayıncılık Garanti Bankası A.Ş. Çankaya /Ankara Şubesi
Account No: 181 /6296007 IBAN No: TR960006200018100006296007

Postal Check Account No: 5859221



AVİM
AVRASYA İNCELEMELERİ MERKEZİ
CENTER FOR EURASIAN STUDIES



www.avim.org.tr

ISSN: 1303-5304



9 771303 530402

Price in Turkey: 100 TL
Price Abroad, incl. Postage: 60 USD