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EDITOR'S NOTE

TRAGEDY and GLORY

Human being can develop two radical attitudes towards life. Either he accepts life as it is or he wants to change it for the better. For this, two human abilities come into play: His intellect and will. The human mind has to see the current reality in all its nakedness, draw a pessimistic picture and take precautions. Human will, on the other hand, always hopes and desires for the better. Hope and will/desire are the locomotive forces that enable human beings to hold on to life. It is this strong will that distinguishes the prophets, whom the Qur'an calls 'the firmly determined' (*ulu'l-azim*). These strong wills, no matter how severe the current conditions are, always adhere to the principle that 'another way is possible'. It was with these determined, altruistic and self-sacrificing souls that the fate of history, oscillating between tragedy and glory, was transformed from tragic to glorious. The human tragedies created by selfish spirits devoid of wisdom, working like the collective ego of history, could be prevented thanks to them.

The holy Qur'an mentions tragedy and majesty as two opposing poles, as two forces that turn history around (Fetih, 26). I use tragedy as the equivalent of *hamiyya*, and glory as the equivalent of *sakine*. *Hamiyya* is a word in which selfishness and destruction, marginalization, violation of right and law are nested. In the root meaning of the word, there is causticity, anger and the motive of protecting (patronising) the unjust. The word deciphers the unbelieving, miserable spirits who bully the existence.

I take the word *sakîna*, which is mentioned in the verse as the opposite of hamiyya, as the equivalent of glory. The word contains confidence, tranquility, the desire to protect the righteous. Hamiyya is the name of all kinds of denial of rights, selfishness and self-centredness, while sakîna is the name of securing and protecting all kinds of rights (*taqwâ*).

One of our scholars describes human selfishness and lack of wisdom, which transforms the world into a place where human tragedy is staged, with a conscientious reproach as follows:

"This age lacks wisdom; it suffers from the drying up of the waters of certainty from the clouds of mercy, and from the countless sins committed by the heedless and ignorant. The gates of paradise, which is attained through reason, are closed to people; they are also deprived of realizing the Lord of Paradise because all kinds of deception have polluted the sources of love. They have abandoned the truth for the sake of lies and have become addicted to ornament and ostentation. They no longer wander in the land of

absolutes and swim in the seas of the truths of revelation; they deny eternal good deeds (*al-baqqiyat al-sālihāt* (Maryam, 76) for the temporary ones." (Sebzivārī (d. 1798) Sharh al-Manzūma)

This deciphering of tragedy and glory as the two opposing poles that constitute life brings us to a radical law of life. The Qur'an expresses this absolute law of life with a certainty: "Man's destiny depends on his own endeavor" (Isrâ, 13). With this declaration, the verse calls on man to break the tragic cycle of history in which he has been dragged into nothingness and to act to create a world where goodness and glory reign.

In these days, when we are witnessing the most tragic moments of history, it is our greatest wish that seclusion will prevail against the burning-destructive, corrupting *hamiyyah*. Greetings to the people who saved human dignity by resisting corruption and tyranny and who conveyed the warning to the public conscience that if the desire for a glorious life is not heard, tyrants will continue to rule.

I am grateful to all my friends in the editorial board who made great effort to have our current issue prepared and reached you.

We are looking forward to meeting with the readers in our next issue...

Prof. Dr. Şaban Ali DÜZGÜN
Editor

The Term "Nafs" in The Qur'ān

Kur'ân'da Nefs Kavramı

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Abstract

The definition, nature, characteristics, and identification of the *nafs* are among the most fundamental problems in both metaphysics and theology. The manner in which the subject of the *nafs* is addressed even provides the opportunity to scrutinize the entire Islamic thought tradition through this topic. Indeed, it can be observed that the approach to the topic of the *nafs* is foundational to cosmological, ontological, epistemological, and ethical aspects in understanding existence in general and human existence in particular, which indicates that *nafs* has many dimensions rather than one definitive character. According to the prevailing understanding in the literature, *nafs* is emphasized to a) play a significant role in the formation of existence, b) have a nature separate from the body, c) be the rationale for obtaining knowledge, and d) be a source for ethical actions. In this context, the inquiries "where am I and what am I related to", "what am I", "what and how can I know" and "what should I do" are directly addressed within the framework of the theory of the *nafs*. The presentation of the fundamental determinant of human existence as a separate and distinct entity from the body is based on certain reasons. Humans' abilities to operate cognitive processes at a higher level, to generate ethical actions, and to be addressed by revelation has led to the conclusion that humans are different from and superior to other beings. This distinctiveness and superiority, however, imply that existence is not limited to the material. The idea that matter is always associated with qualities such as change, decay, fragmentation, and extinction has nourished this belief. Therefore, especially in the later period of kalām (*muta'aḫḫirūn*), the conception of existence which is material but is not restricted to materiality alone is rejected. In other words, the idea of a being that, while material, can produce non-material outputs has been abandoned, and human beings have been examined behind the duality of *nafs* and body. The preference for a dualistic understanding is not inherent in the formation of kalām. It is observed that in the early periods of kalām (*mutaqaddimūn*), Muʿtazilī, Ashʿarī, and Māturīdī literature, collectively, emphasized the need to define human existence without reference to a separate *nafs* from the body. This preference for a dualistic understanding in analyzing human existence is a product of the influence resulting from encounters with different cultures. In this regard, the impact of Greek, Indian, Egyptian, and Sumerian philosophies on Islamic thought is evident. The fundamentally non-dualistic approach of kalām seems to be stemmed from the Qur'ān. In our study, the foundation of this claim will be laid down. The word *nafs* one of the fundamental terms of the Qur'ān, will be examined from a holistic perspective. This examination will also provide a basis for evaluating the literature on this subject.

Keywords: Kalām, The Qur'ān, Human, Nafs, Structural integrity.

Öz

*Nefs*in tanımı, mahiyeti, özellikleri, ilişkili olduğu alanların tespiti hem metafiziğin hem de teolojinin en temel problemlerinden biridir. Öyle ki *nefs* konusunun ele alınış tarzı, İslam düşünce geleneğini topyekûn bu konu üzerinden inceleme imkânı dahi sunmaktadır. Zira varlığı ve özel olarak insanı anlama noktasında, *nefs* konusunun kozmolojik, ontolojik, epistemolojik ve ahlâkî alanların tümünün temeline yerleştirildiği görülmektedir. Bu durum, *nefs* teorisinin kendi içinde bir bütün oluşturacak şekilde değerlendirildiğini göstermektedir. Literatürde hâkim olan anlayışa göre, *nefs*in; a) varlığın oluşumunda önemli bir yer teşkil ettiği, b) bedenden ayrı ve farklı bir mahiyet taşıdığı, c) bilgi elde etmenin gerekçesi olduğu ve d) ahlâkî eylemlere kaynaklık ettiği vurgulanmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, "Neredeyim ve neyle ilişkiliyim?", "Neyim?", "Neyi, nasıl bilebilirim?" ve "Ne yapmalıyım?" sorularına *nefs* teorisi bağlamında cevap arandığı söylenebilir. İnsan varlığının temel belirleyeninin bedenden ayrı ve farklı bir varlık olarak sunulması, birtakım gerekçelerden hareket etmektedir. Kognitif süreçleri üst düzeyde işletebilmesi, ahlâkî eylem üretebilmesi; ayrıca vahye muhatap kılınması, insanın diğer varlıklardan farklı ve üstün olduğu sonucuna götürmüştür. Bu farklılık ve üstünlük ise insanın maddî olanla sınırlı olamayacağı fikrini beraberinde getirmiştir. Maddenin daima; değişme, bozulma, parçalanma, yok olma gibi niteliklerle ilişkilendirilmesi bu kanaati beslemiştir. Dolayısıyla –özellikle müteahhir dönemde- hem maddî olan hem de maddî olana sıkışmayan bir varlık tasavvuruna yer verilmemiştir. Bir başka ifadeyle, maddî olduğu halde gayrı maddî üretimler sağlayabilecek bir varlık fikrinden vazgeçilmiş, insanı nefs-beden düalitesi ardında irdeleme tercih edilmiştir. Bu tercih, teolojinin oluşum özünde yer alan bir anlayış değildir. Zira erken dönem Muʿtezilî, Eşʿarî ve Mâtürîdî kelâm literatürünün, ortak bir şekilde, insanın bedenden ayrık *nefs*e referansta bulunmadan tanımlanması gerektiği üzerinde durduğu görülmektedir. İnsan varlığını çözümleme noktasında düalist anlayışın tercih edilmesi, farklı kültürlerle karşılaşma sonucundaki etkinin bir ürünüdür. Bu doğrultuda Yunan, Hint, Mısır ve Sümer felsefelerinin İslam düşünce geleneği üzerinde etkili olduğu görülmektedir. Özü itibarıyla kelâmın düalist anlayıştan uzak yaklaşımının ise Kur'ân'dan temel aldığı söylenebilir. Çalışmamızda bu iddiamızın temeli kurulacaktır. Kur'ân'ın

temel terimlerimden biri olan *nefs* kelimesi, bütünsel bir bakış açısıyla incelenecektir. Bu inceleme, bu konuda oluşturulmuş literatürün nasıl değerlendirilmesi gerektiğiyle ilgili de zemin oluşturacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kelâm, Kur'ân, İnsan, Nefs, Yapısal bütünlük.

Introduction*

Efforts to conceptualize a Qur'ānic term accurately should involve an endeavor to determine the "linguistic", "ethical", "social/historical" and "divine" aspects. It is linguistic because revelation is embodied through the possibilities of language and reflects the intellectual background. It is ethical because all actions in the sphere of existence constructed by the will of both the Creator and human beings are ethical in nature, even though their spheres of influence are different, which is the reason why the revelation takes human disposition as a given ground for it. It is social-historical because concepts have their own history which is formed in line with cognitive structure of the culture and leaves its marks on language and thought. It is divine because it corrects misconceived terms created by social mentality and habits. All these are the founding principles of dealing with any Qur'ānic term. To isolate any one of these principle from others will result in a reductionist outcome in understanding any Qur'ānic term. And it also leads to inconsistency of the conclusion with these principles as the data has not been correctly evaluated, and an incorrect cognitive process has been employed. For example, to reach the root meaning of any Qur'ānic term, pre-Islamic poetic works are initially referred (*linguistic*). However, the accuracy and authenticity of these works are not warrented. Even if their authenticity is warrented they are not absolute binding resources as they are mainly cultural. As it is necessary to look at whether the content that culture attributes to term (*social/historical*) is confirmed by revelation (*divine*). Additionally, evaluating pre-Islamic poetry in light of later perspectives developed by philosophical and theological approaches hinders reaching a correct understanding, which is general case. What we need to understand any Qur'ānic term is to identify principles that can be abstracted from any kind of particular context and to be able to manage our knowledge process under the light of these principles (*ethical*). Creating content by considering these four principles will also enable the discussion of the term on a universal level. This is because the essential nature of any Qur'ānic term encompasses rational, ethical, and existential values. This is a requirement of the nature of revelation. Furthermore, precision in creating content will ensure that the conceptual connection established between the knowing-subject and the known corresponds to a mental reality, not an illusion. A correctly formulated term is "acquired knowledge" and it will serve as a basis for "knowledge to be acquired."

In this regard, human beings should aim to go beyond the act of existence and achieve the act of understanding. In fact, this is a necessary condition of the structure of human existence. The next cognitive condition required by the structure of human existence is to form thoughts. To establish thoughts is nothing but creating through concepts, through a process of awareness

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(*homo concipiens et loquens*).[1] This is because forming thoughts requires being conscious, choosing a topic intentionally, and concentrating on the subject with systematic consistency in a detailed manner.[2]

This article plans to conduct a similar study on the use of the term of "nafs" in the Qur'ān.[3] In this context, the aim is to make an original classification based on the areas of use of the term in the Qur'ān.

1. The Term "Nafs" in The Qur'ān

Words derived from the root *n-f-s* are used in the Qur'ān in various forms such as *tanaffasa*, *yatanāfasu*, *mutanāfisūn*, *nufūs*, *nafs* and *anfus*, totaling 298 instances.[4] When these usages are analyzed, a comprehensive semantic field emerges, consisting of five complementary categories.

1. 1. *Nafs* in the Sense of Existence Itself

When analyzing the verses containing the word "nafs", it becomes apparent that it is used to signify the "existence itself" This primary meaning establishes the core significance of the term. The usage of the word to indicate the essence of a being implies the inclusion of all aspects of that being, making "nafs" a word that cannot be restricted to any specific attribute or dimension. The usage in this sense can be classified into three headings:

1.1.1. It is Used for the Essence of Allah

The use in this context[5] is important for understanding the meaning of the word "nafs." Being divine logically excludes having a composite nature. This indicates that the term "nafs" used for Allah signifies the Essence of Being, Being itself. In this regard, it can be said that the word

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[1] See Betül Çotuksöken, *Kavramlara Felsefe ile Bakmak* (Istanbul: İnsancıl Publications, 1998), 8, 13, 18, 20.

[2] cf. Abū l-Qāsim Mahmūd ibn ʿUmar ibn Muhammad al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Minhāj fī uṣūl ad-dīn* (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Publications, 2020), 98.

[3] The scope of this text is limited to the usage of the concept of "nafs" in the Qur'ān. It explores how the concept is understood and defined by various scientific disciplines, the methods employed in understanding the concept, the attributes assigned to the self, the justifications for these attributes, whether the concept undergoes any semantic evolution, and what the cosmological, ontological, epistemological, and ethical contexts of the concept entail. It also delves into the sources that contribute to the literature on the subject of the self, the reasons and analysis of the mind-body distinction, the psychological motives behind making the mind-body distinction, and whether the terms "rūh" and "nafs" are synonymous. For detailed information on these topics and for an original categorization of the concept of "nafs" based on early Arabic dictionaries, see Tuğba Günal, *Nefs Fenomenolojisi* (Istanbul: Endülüs Publications, 2022).

Regarding the concept of "nafs", classifications of meanings have been made in the books *al-Vujūh wa-al-nazāʾir*, commentaries, or independent articles. These classifications will not be included in our work, and there will be no critique or confirmation of them. Instead, a new categorization of the concept of "nafs" will be established based on its usage in the Qur'ān. This approach is taken because it has been observed that in these studies, the meaning of the concept is attributed in line with theological, philosophical, or Sufi literature, which poses an obstacle to determining its true meaning. For a detailed analysis of the subject based on sources, see Günal, *Nefs Fenomenolojisi.*

[4] Muhammad Fuād Abd al-Bāqī, *al-Muʿjam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qurʾān al-Karīm* (Cairo: Dār al-Hadīth, 1408), 881-885.

[5] See Āl ʿImrān 3/28, 30; al-Māʾide 5/116; al-Anʿām 6/12, 54; Tâ Hâ 20/41.

"nafs", used for Allah and expressing His essence, is synonymous with the words *vajh*[6] and, when singular, *ism*[7] in the Qur'ān.

The usage of "I have chosen/formed you for Myself (*wa'ṣṭanaʿtuka li-nafsī*)" in Surah Tāhā, verse 41, although containing an emphasis and exaggeration similar to expressions like "I built this house for Myself," "I constructed it for Myself,"[8] can also be interpreted as a representation of Allah's conversation with Moses,[9] emphasizing that the selection of messengers and the sending of revelation belong to Allah, and that the messengers are chosen to convey His commands and prohibitions.[10]

In Surah al-Mā'idah, verse 116, regarding the words *taʿlamu mā fī nafsī wa-lā aʿlamu mā fī nafsika*, two interpretations are possible for the term "nafs": a) Interpreting it to convey the meaning of "maʿlūm", giving the sense of "You know what is within me, but I do not know what is within You." This emphasizes the impossibility of attaining knowledge of the divine.[11] b) Relating it to the part mentioning the The Messenger of Allah Isa and interpreting it as "what I have done and what I will do (*mā kāna minnī wa-mā yekūnu*)" in comparison to him, while giving the meaning of "*ġayb*" in the context of Allah.[12] The end of the verse, stating "*Innaka anta ʿallāmu l-ġuyūb*", supports the interpretation of the term "*ġayb*". However, the usage of the term "nafs" in reference to the essence requires interpreting the verse as "You know what is within me, but I do not know what is within You."

In other contexts where the term "nafs" is used for Allah, it is emphasized that the foundational principle determining the relationship between Allah and humans is mercy (*kataba ... ʿalā nafsihi r-raḥmah*),[13] and this fundamental law of mercy (*kataba ... rahmah*) is determined by Allah Himself (*nafs*). This law of mercy, operating from Allah to humans, also entails certain requirements from humans toward Allah. From what we understand from the Qur'ān, these requirements revolve around three principles that are not contradictory but rather complementary: rational,

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[6]   See for example al-Baqara 2/112, 115; al-Qaṣaṣ 28/88; al-Rahmān 55/27; al-Layl 92/20.

[7]   See for example al-Baqara 2/114; al-Mā'ida 5/4; al-Anʿām 6/118, 119, 121, 138; al-Nūr 24/36; al-Rahmân 55/78.

[8]   See Abū ʿAbd Allāh Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn ʿUmar ibn Husayn al-Rāzī, *Asās al-Taqdīs fī ʿilm al-kalām/Allah'ın Aşkınlığı*, trans. İbrahim Coşkun (Istanbul: İz Publications, 2011), 115-116.

[9]   See Abū l-Qāsim Mahmūd ibn ʿUmar ibn Muhammad al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqā'iq ghavāmidh al-tanzīl wa ʿuyūn al-aqāwīl fī wujūh al-ta'wīl*, trans. Muhammed Coşkun et al. (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı Publications, 2018) 4/302-303.

[10]   See Abū l-Ḥassan Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, *Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān*, critical ed. ʿAbd Allāh Mahmud Shahhāta (Beirut: Mu'assasa al-Tārīkh al-ʿArabī, 1423/2002), 3/28; Abū Mansūr Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Mahmūd al-Māturīdī, *Ta'wīlāt al-Qur'ān*, critical ed. Ahmet Vanlıoğlu, ed. Bekir Topaloğlu (Istanbul: Dār al-Mīzān, 2005), 9/198-199; Abū ʿAbd Allāh Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn ʿUmar ibn Husayn al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr: Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb*, trans. Suat Yıldırım et al. (Istanbul: Huzur Publications, 2008), 15/513; Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abī Bakr al-Qurtubī, *Al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* (Beirut: Mu'assasa al-Risāla, 1427/2006), 14/62; Nāsir al-Dīn Abū Saʿīd ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar ibn Muhammed al-Shirāzī al-Baydāwī, *Anwār al-Tanzīl wa Asrār al-Ta'wīl* (Beirut: Dār İhyā al-Turās al-ʿArabī, 1418/1998), 4/28.

[11]   Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Asās al-Taqdīs fī ʿilm al-kalām*, 116; see also Abū Muhammad ʿAlī ibn Ahmad ibn Saʿīd ibn Hazm, *al-Faṣl: Dinler ve Mezhepler Tarihi*, trans. Halil İbrahim Bulut (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Başkanlığı Publications, 2017), 2/180, 181.

[12]   Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, *Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān*, 1/519.

[13]   al-Anʿām 6/12, 54.

ethical, and divine principles. When one does not adhere to these rational, ethical, and divine principles, Allah advises humans to be mindful of their actions towards Him (*wa-yuḥaẕẕirukumu llāhu nafsahū*).[14] This warning is related to the punishment that Allah Himself will administer.[15]

1.1.2. It is Used for Human/Individual

In this sense, the term "nafs" is employed in various contexts, including: a) The killing of a person (*qataltum nafsan*).[16] b) The individual's sole responsibility for oneself (*lā tukallafu illā nafsaka*) and the determination of this responsibility in relation to the inherent capabilities (*wusʿahā/ātāhā*) placed within human existence (*nafs*).[17] c) Striving for the cause of Allah both individually and materially (*bi-amwālihim wa-anfusihim*).[18] d) The supervision/protection of each individual (*in kullu nafsin lammā ʿalayhā ḥāfiẓ*).[19] e) Negative actions with individual or societal implications, the inability to construct belief on a sound foundation, ignoring divine discourse, violating the parameters set by Allah for humans (*ḥudūdullāh*), and the harm inflicted on oneself, in other words, turning injustice against one's own existential potential (*ẓalamū anfusahum-ḥasirū anfusahum*).[20] f) The existence of the human being (*anfus*) serving as evidence for the Creator's existence.[21] In these examples and many other verses,[22] "nafs" is used in reference to the "individual self", encompassing various dimensions such as rational, ethical, doctrinal, sociological, conscience-related, and more.

This meaning is also present in the uses of "in favor of oneself (*li-nafsihī*)"[23] and "to the detriment of oneself (*ʿalā nafsihī*)."[24] In this context, expressions such as "being tested with oneself (*la-tublawunna fī ... anfusikum*)"[25] or "diminishing from oneself (*wa-naqṣin mina l ...*

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14   Āl ʿImrān 3/28, 30.

15   Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, *Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān*, 1/270.

16   al-Baqara 2/72; see also al-Māʾide 5/32, 45; al-Anʿām 6/151; al-Isrāʾ 17/33; al-Kahf 18/74; Tâ Hâ 20/40; al-Furqān 25/68; al-Qaṣaṣ 28/19, 33.

17   al-Baqara 2/233, 286; al-Nisāʾ 4/84; al-Māʾide 5/105; al-Anʿām 6/152, 164; al-Aʿrāf 7/42; al-Muʾminūn 23/62; al-Ṭalāq 65/7.

18   al-Nisāʾ 4/95; al-Anfāl 8/72; al-Tawba 9/20, 41, 44, 81, 88; al-Ḥujurāt 49/15; al-Ṣaff 61/11; see also al-Baqara 2/207.

19   al-Tāriq 86/4.

20   See al-Baqara 2/54, 57, 231; Āl ʿImrān 3/117, 135; al-Nisāʾ 4/64, 97, 110; al-Anʿām 6/12, 20; al-Aʿrāf 7/9, 23, 53, 160, 177; al-Tawba 9/36, 70; Yūnus 10/44, 54; Hūd 11/21, 101; Ibrāhīm 14/45; al-Nahl 16/28, 33, 118; al-Kahf 18/35; al-Muʾminūn 23/103; al-Naml 27/44; al-Qaṣaṣ 28/16; al-ʿAnkabūt 29/40; al-Rūm 30/9; Sabāʾ 34/19; Fāṭir 35/32; al-Ṣāffāt 37/113; al-Zumar 39/15; al-Shūrā 42/45; al-Ṭalāq 65/1.
        For different uses of self(*nafs*)-inflicted harm from one's actions, see al-Baqara 2/9, 90, 102, 130, 187; Āl ʿImrān 3/69; al-Nisāʾ 4/107, 113; al-Anʿām 6/24, 26, 123; al-Tawba 9/42; al-Zumar 39/53.

21   Fuṣṣilat 41/53; al-Dhāriyāt 51/21.

22   See al-Baqara 2/44, 228, 240; Āl ʿImrān 3/145, 154, 185; al-Nisāʾ 4/63, 79; al-Māʾide 5/25; al-Anʿām 6/158; al-Aʿrāf 7/188; Yūnus 10/49, 100; Yūsuf 12/ 53, 54; al-Raʿd 13/33, 42; al-Nahl 16/7; al-Kahf 18/74; al-Anbiyāʾ 21/35; al-Nūr 24/6, 61; al-ʿAnkabūt 29/57; Luqmān 31/34; al-Sajda32/13, 17, 27; al-Aḥzāb 33/6; al-Zumar 39/56; al-Tahrīm 66/6.

23   al-ʿAnkabūt 29/6; see also al-Baqara 2/110, 272; Āl ʿImrān 3/ 178; al-Anʿām 6/104; al-Tawba 9/35; Yūnus 10/108; al-Isrāʾ 17/15; al-Naml 27/40, 92; al-Rūm 30/44; Luqmān 31/12; Fāṭir 35/18; al-Zumar 39/41; al-Jāthiya 45/15; al-Taghābun 64/16; al-Muzzammil 73/20.

24   al-Fatḥ48/10; see also al-Nisāʾ 4/111, 135; al-Anʿām 6/24, 104, 130, 164; al-Aʿrāf 7/37, 172; al-Tawba 9/17; Yūnus 10/23, 108; al-Isrāʾ 17/15; Sabāʾ 34/50; al-Zumar 39/41, 53; al-Jāthiya 45/15; Muhammad 47/38; al-Qiyāma 75/14.

25   See for example Āl ʿImrān 3/186.

anfusi)"[26] are understood to refer to various difficulties and afflictions that may befall individuals, such as illness, injury, or captivity.[27] Additionally, the term is used in a way that can denote "society" or "community."[28] The use of this word for a group of people confirms its meaning.

1.1.3. It is Used for Inanimate Beings

It is observed that the word is used for lifeless idols that are taken as gods. In the relevant verses,[29] it is emphasized that these beings, which are attributed with divine qualities, cannot even benefit or harm themselves (*li-anfusihim*). By highlighting these characteristics of idols, individuals are expected to engage in rational questioning and draw conclusions about the ineffectiveness and non-divinity of these beings.[30] The term "nafs" is used in this type of usage to signify a being in reference to itself.

2. *Nafs* in the Sense of the Ground of Human Creation

It is observed in the Qur'ān that the nature of human creation is narrated through the term "nafs." In the relevant verses (*ḫalaqakum min nafsin wāḥidatin wa-ḫalaqa minhā zawjahā*),[31] the word "nafs" is used to emphasize the essence of the creation of the human being.[32] This essence encompasses all genders of the species, both female and male,[33] and refers to the *principles*[34] of the material composition of humans and the attributes they will possess.[35] The emphasis on the

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26   See for example al-Baqara 2/155.

27   See Abū Jaʿfar Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, *Tafsir al-Tabarī: Jāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān*, trans. Kerim Aytekin et al. (Istanbul: Hisar Publications, 1996), 2/417; al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, 1/564-565, 1156-1157; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-*Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 7/256; al-Baydāwī, *Anwār al-Tanzīl wa Asrār al-Taʾwīl*, 1/114-115; 2/53.

28   al-Anfāl 8/53; al-Raʿd 13/11. When the word "nafs" is used in the plural form and attributed to others, meaning addressing the other members of society, it signifies "each other" in the Qurʾān. Thus, it carries the sense of essence and individuality. An important example of this usage can be found in Bakara 2/54. See Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, *Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān*, 1/107-108; al-Tabarī, *Tafsir al-Tabarī*, 1/214-216; al-Māturīdī, *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, 1/127-130; al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, 1/380-381; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-*Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 3/8-11; al-Baydāwī, *Anwār al-Tanzīl wa Asrār al-Taʾwīl*, 1/81.

29   See al-Aʿrāf 7/192, 197; al-Raʿd 13/16; al-Anbiyaʾ 21/43; al-Furqān 25/3.

30   See Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, *Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān*, 2/80, 81, 373; 3/81, 226; al-Māturīdī, *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, 6/140-141; al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, 2/1060-1061; 3/742-743; 4/440-441, 810-813; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-*Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 7/252; 11/202, 208; 13/423; 16/148; 17/176; al-Qurtubī, *Al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 12/47; al-Baydāwī, *Anwār al-Tanzīl wa Asrār al-Taʾwīl*, 3/184.

31   al-Nisaʾ 4/1; see also al-Anʿām 6/98; al-Aʿrāf 7/189; al-Zumar 39/6.

32   Hüseyin Atay, "Nefis", *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 37 (1997), 58.

33   See Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-*Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 7/310-311.

34   The fundamental meaning of the root "ḫ-l-q" is "taqdīr." "Taqdīr" is then defined as "to proportion and measure an object in a proper/regulated manner." Therefore, it can be said that the verb "ḫaleqa" indicates both the material form and the structural makeup of the relevant entity. See Abū ʿAbd ar-Rahmān al-Khalīl ibn Ahmad al-Farāhīdī, *Kitāb al-ʿAyn*, critical ed. ʿAbd al Hamīd Hindāvī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyah, 1424/2003), "ḫ-l-q" root; Abū Mansūr Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Azharī, *Tahdhīb al-Lughah* (Cairo: Dār al-Qawmiya, 1964), "ḫ-l-q" root; Abū Nasr Ismāʿīl ibn Hammād al-Jawharī, *Al-Sihah: Tāj al-Lughah wa Sihāh al-ʿArabiyah*, critical ed. Ahmad ʿAbd al-Ghafūr ʿAttār (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm lil-Malāyīn, 1399/1979), "ḫ-l-q" root.

35   For detailed information on the identical nature of the creation stages of women and men, the absence of any differences in terms of existential value, the lack of any ontological inequality between them, and their joint possession of all the fundamental characteristics of the species see Tuğba Günal, "Ontolojik Statüsü Açısından Kadın", *Düşüncede Müslüman Kadın*, ed. Feyza Betül Köse (Istanbul: Ensar Publications, 2021), 39-58.

essence of human beings can be considered as self-emphasis. This emphasis is supported by the 7th to 10th verses of the surah al-Shams: "By the nafs and He who proportioned/designed it (sawwāhā), and and then gave it the ability (fa-alhamahā) to do wickedness and righteousness (fucūrahā wa-taqwāhā). Successful is the one who improves himself/herself (man zakkāhā) and failed is the one who corrupts himself/herself (man dassāhā)." Here, the nafs is approached in a neutral context. Indeed, a structure that is attributed positive or negative value based on preferences must be neutral in essence. In this regard, the nafs, by its nature, appears as a potential structure that does not accept a division into right-wrong, good-bad, beautiful-ugly; rather, it can embody both directions of dual-polar action styles, such as right-wrong, good-bad, and beautiful-ugly. In other words, the human/nafs is a sum of possibilities and ownerships awaiting functionalization, and these possibilities and ownerships are specific to the human species, not to any individual. The use of fa-alhamahā in the verse also supports our approach. The root "la-hi-ma", meaning "to swallow," implies the inclusion of something in essence. For example, an army that swallows/conceals its enemy is called jayshun luhāmun and a horse that swallows/obscures the ground it steps on due to its speed is called farasun lahimun.[36] Therefore, in the verse, the fundamental movement patterns of the human essence[37] are indicated by this root.

In this respect, the notion that the nafs inherently possesses negative qualities, particularly expressed in the context of the statement "wa-mā ubarri'u nafsī, inna n-nafsa la-ammāratun bi-s-sū'i" in the 53rd verse of Surah Yūsuf,[38] does not seem acceptable from a Qur'ānic perspective. "This verse has a specific context related to the desire of the wife of the Egyptian Aziz and her attempts to approach and seduce Messenger Yusuf by deceit and plotting, as mentioned in five places[39] in the surah (rāwadtuhu ʿan nafsihī).[40] In verses 51-53 of Surah Yūsuf, an admission is made following the revelation of this situation. Therefore, the individual persistently continuing this negative behavior (la-ammāratun) is a specific person who confesses to his actions by saying, mā ubarri'u nafsī. The term "al-nafs" used after the expression mā ubarri'u nafsī also refers to this specific individual. In this context, it becomes evident that this verse should not be considered as a general principle regarding the nafs. The fact that the nafs's potential to choose between good and bad actions is activated in favor of the "bad" one does not make it bad from an essential point of view; it shows that the bad is preferred[41] in a specific event or situation."[42]

Similarly, the fact that the nafs can be characterized with attributes such as lawwāma, muṭma'inna and zakiyya also leads to the conclusion that the nafs, by its nature, cannot be "bad." Changing a quality inherently possessed is impossible. If a structure can be endowed with

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36   Khalīl ibn Ahmad, Kitāb al-ʿAyn, "l-h-m" root; al-Azharī, Tahdhīb al-Lughah, "l-h-m" root.

37   The 8th verse of Surah Shams and the 10th verse of Surah Balad are suitable to be read in parallel.

38   See Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, 2/340; al-Tabarī, Tafsir al-Tabarī, 5/31-32; al-Māturīdī, Ta'wīlāt al-Qur'ān, 7/322; al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, 3/626-629; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, 13/261-264; al-Qurtubī, Al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qur'ān, 11/375-377; al-Baydāwī, Anwār al-Tanzīl wa Asrār al-Ta'wīl, 3/167.

39   Yūsuf 12/23, 26, 30, 32, 51.

40   al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, 3/562-563, 574-581.

41   The verses such as al-Nisā' 4/128, al-Mā'ida 5/30, 80; Yūsuf 12/18, 83; Ibrāhīm 14/22; Tā Hā 20/96; al-Najm 53/23; al-Hashr 59/9 should also be approached with this perspective.

42   Günal, Nefs Fenomenolojisi, 37-38.

different characteristics, it has a neutral nature. In this context, it should be emphasized that every moral value attributed to the nafs, whether positive or negative, is not an essential quality of the nafs but corresponds to the individual's choice in specific events and situations. In other words, it is observed here that the nafs is evaluated not in terms of its essential nature but in terms of descriptive qualities. Consequently, it can be inferred that the term "nafs" is used to denote the inherent potential of human creation, free from any classification, nationality, gender, or moral value.

3. *Nafs* in the Sense of Being a Form of Existence

In the context of the type of existence, the term "nafs" is used to refer to a community sharing common characteristics in three dimensions: a) In the verse "The creation of all of you and your resurrection is like the creation and resurrection of a single nafs (*ka-nafsin wāḥidatin*)",[43] the term "nafs" is used in the context of the type of existence. This usage indicates that the system established by Allah for the human species is the same for each individual, and every individual is subject to the same principles. b) The foundation for women and men to be equal partners (*zawj*) to each other is established on the basis of belonging to the same type of existence and is expressed through the term "nafs" (*jaʿala lakum min anfusikum azwājan*).[44] Thus, it points to the commonality of the ontological status and characteristics of women and men; in other words, their existence within the same ontic category. c) The term "nafs" is used to indicate the existential category to which the messenger belongs. The expression *rasūlun min anfusikum*[45] shows that for the messenger, no category other than being "human" can be established. In other words, it is emphasized that the messenger does not possess any qualities beyond humanity and does not harbor characteristics that do not belong to the human species. From this perspective, it can be concluded that the ability to receive revelation exists ontologically in every human being, but this ability is activated only by Allah's choice and will for that person. Therefore, being a messenger is not a supernatural quality but rather a "mission" assigned by Allah.

4. *Nafs* in the Sense of the Intellectual Dimension of Human

The external actions of a person in the outside world go through an internal process before reaching this stage. This process, inherently, can be operated positively or negatively at times. In this context, a significant point to note is the indication of the self as the center of thought (*yatafakkarū fī anfusihim*[46] - *wa-ẕkur rabbaka fī nafsika*[47]). Similarly, belief is associated with the principled attitude of the mind (*fī anfusihim*), and here the term "nafs" is used.[48]

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43   Luqmān 31/28.
44   See al-Nahl 16/72; al-Rūm 30/21; al-Shūrā 42/11.
45   al-Tawba 9/128; see also Āl ʿImrān 3/164; al-Nahl 16/89.
46   al-Rūm 30/8.
47   al-Aʿrāf 7/205.
48   See al-Nisāʾ 4/65-66.

The description of situations where a person performs actions that are not explained for some reasons or does not correspond to their true thoughts is also made with the term "nafs".[49] In this sense, the use of *fī anfusihim* can be said to parallel the uses of *fī ṣudūrikum* and *fī qulūbikum*.[50] Consistent with the potential to be suitable for both good and bad directions, "nafs" is also used with reference to the negative aspect of mental action. For example, in the 16th verse of Surah Qaf (*wa-naʿlamu mā tuwaswisu bihī nafsuhū*), the verb "waswasa" is used together with "nafs". The completely negative context in which the verb "waswasa" is used in the Qur'ān[51] implies that the mental state expressed in the verse is also negative. However, considering the linguistic usage, the root meaning of the verb "waswasa" can suggest that in the verse, the term "nafs" is used to encompass every thought, whether positive or negative, passing through a person's mind. From another perspective, in the Qur'ān, "nafs" is also used for the psychological states experienced from a psychological standpoint. Examples include: *bāḫiʿun nafsaka*,[52] *fī nafsihī ḫīfatan*,[53] *ḥasadan min ʿindi anfusihim*,[54] *istakbarū fī anfusihim*,[55] *fī anfusihim nādimīn*,[56] *ḍāqat ʿalayhim anfusuhum*.[57]

In addition to indicating a person's essence, the use of the term "nafs" for a person's mental structure, thoughts, psychological state, and feelings is essential. Because expressing both the outward appearance and the internal structure of a being with the same word excludes the conception of a dualistic structure and implies that the Qur'an evaluates humans as a whole."

5. *Nafs* in the Sense of the Afterlife Existence

The human entity, expressed with the term "nafs", which signifies its creation, actions of varying moral values, and its intellectual and psychological structure, is also used for death and the afterlife.[58] In this context, death is presented as a common law that equalizes all humans. In other words, the lifespan, determined by the Creator (*bi-iẓni llāh*) and subject to a specific law (*kitāban muʾajjalan*),[59] will inevitably come to an end (*kullu nafsin ẕāʾiqatu'l-mawt*).[60] This is true for every human being (*li-nafsin*). Therefore, death is considered an intrinsic quality of human nature, and the use of the word "ẕāʾiqa" in the form of an active participle emphasizes this intrinsic quality.

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[49]   See al-Baqara 2/109, 235, 284; Āl ʿImrān 3/154; al-Māʾida 5/52; Hūd 11/31; Yūsuf 12/68, 77; al-Isrāʾ 17/25; al-Furqān 25/21; al-Aḥzāb 33/37; Qāf 50/16.

[50]   See for example al-Baqara 2/283-284; Āl ʿImrān 3/154; al-Māʾida 5/52.

[51]   See al-Aʿrāf 7/20; Tâ Hâ 20/20; al-Nās 114/4-5.

[52]   al-Kahf 18/6; al-Shuʿarāʾ 26/3; see also Fātir 35/8.

[53]   Tâ Hâ 20/67.

[54]   al-Baqara 2/109.

[55]   al-Furqān 25/21.

[56]   al-Māʾida 5/52.

[57]   al-Tawba 9/118.

[58]   See al-Baqara 2/48, 123, 281; Āl ʿImrān 3/25, 145, 161, 185; al-Anʿām 6/70; Yūnus 10/30; Hūd 11/105; Ibrāhīm 14/51; al-Nahl 16/111; al-Isrāʾ 17/14; al-Kahf 18/15; al-Anbiyāʾ 21/35, 47, 102; al-ʿAnkabūt 29/57; Yā Sīn 36/54; al-Zumar 39/70; al-Muʾmin 40/17; Fuṣṣilat 41/31; al-Zukhruf 43/71; al-Jāthiya 45/22; Qāf 50/21; al-Infiṭār82/19.

[59]   Āl ʿImrān 3/145; see also al-Munāfiqūn 63/11.

[60]   Āl ʿImrān 3/185; al-Anbiyāʾ 21/35; al-ʿAnkabūt 29/57.

In the Qur'ān, the term "nafs" is also used in verses addressing the state and fate of humans in the afterlife. Accordingly: a) It is the nafs that will be resurrected after the blowing of the trumpet, and it is the nafs that will give a full account of what it did before it died.[61] b) On the Day of Judgment, each nafs will be solely concerned with itself.[62] Indeed, no one's efforts will benefit another (*nafsun ʿan nafsin / nafsun li-nafsin*).[63] c) The nafs that will receive a just reward or punishment without any injustice for its deeds before death is the same nafs.[64]

The use of the term "nafs" in these five categories provides a comprehensive field of meaning that complements each other. When examining all the verses, it is evident that this term encompasses all aspects of human existence: intellectual, moral, doctrinal, sensory, emotional, sociological, cultural, physiological, psychological, and aesthetic dimensions. Created with the capacity to produce thoughts and actions in these areas of life, evaluated as valuable or worthless based on these productions during life, and judged accordingly in the afterlife, the term "nafs" emphasizes "humanity itself." This is crucial because it demonstrates that the Qur'ān does not provide a basis for the claim that the nafs is separate from and different than the body.[65] On the contrary, the Qur'ān emphasizes that humans possess an integral disposition expressed through the term "nafs."

Conclusion

Revelation is a progressive call for history. It maintains the same characteristic within itself. The principles it presents to its recipients aim to improve their lives. In this regard, the method of revelation is to accurately contextualize the concepts it embodies, transforming them from theoretical/abstract constructs into factual realities in daily life. The use of these concepts in the context of reality, operating through reality/truth, seeks to intellectually convince the recipients and guide them towards actions that fulfill their best interests. With this method, the goal is to elevate individual and social gains for the better. In this context, it can be said that the concept of "nafs" is fundamental for understanding human existence. The two conditions that make a concept fundamental are: a) The first condition is necessity. If a concept plays a significant role in the entirety of the subject and constitutes a key element in the formation of the subject-organism, it means that the concept is fundamental. b) The second condition is fertility. If a concept serves as a center to which different concepts are attached and its analysis is carried out with various other concepts, it also means that the concept is fundamental. In this regard, it is observed that the term "nafs" fulfills these two conditions as a fundamental concept for understanding human beings. Addressing dimensions that constitute the foundation of human existence with this term demonstrates the significance of "nafs" as a key concept.

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[61]   al-Anʿām 6/70; Yūnus 10/30; Hūd 11/105; al-Isrāʾ 17/13-14; Qāf 50/20-21.

[62]   al-Nahl 16/111.

[63]   al-Baqara 2/48, 123; al-Infiṭār 82/19.

[64]   al-Baqara 2/281; Āl ʿImrān 3/25, 161, 185; Ibrāhīm 14/51; al-Nahl 16/111; al-Kahf 18/15; al-Anbiyāʾ 21/47, 102; Yā Sīn 36/54; al-Zumar 39/70; al-Muʾmin 40/17; Fuṣṣilat 41/31; al-Zukhruf 43/71; al-Jāthiya 45/22.

[65]   However, in the literature, a prevailing approach contrasts with our observation. Particularly, it is noted that in the context of a few highlighted verses, the term "nafs" is attributed a meaning that constitutes the essence of a person and implies a distinct and separate identity from the body. For an analysis of the verses used as evidence for this approach and evaluations related to those verses. see Günal, *Nefs Fenomenolojisi*, 44-48.

Thus, the Qur'ān presents "nafs" as *the self that constitutes a whole with all its faculties and capabilities.* In other words, in the Qur'ān, "nafs" is used in reference to *the structural integrity that will make the existence "what it is."* This is the Qur'ānic response to the human inclination to understand existence by showing it as a holistic response through the term "nafs", dismissing the dualistic understanding. Approaches developed through the distinction between nafs and body, on the other hand, do not carry a meaning beyond an effort to reconcile/harmonize dualistic thinking influenced by Greek, Indian, Egyptian, and Sumerian philosophies with Islam. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the early Mutazilite, Ash'ari, and Maturidi literature, collectively, emphasize the integral treatment of humans and the avoidance of dualistic understanding. This situation indicates that being a theist does not necessitate being dualistic. The absence of the dualistic consideration of humans in the Qur'ān does not lead to the conclusion that humanity is reduced to mere matter. According to our understanding from the Qur'ān, everything human takes place in the material body; however, everything human is not limited to the material produced by the body. In other words, a human is not identical to the body; the human is the sum of both material and non-material qualities produced by the body and the integral structure of the organism.

Another emphasis on the nafs is that it is not correct to characterize it solely as "evil" from a Qur'ānic perspective. The Qur'ānic use of the term "nafs" contradicts the correctness of characterizing it solely with the quality of "evil." The use of the term "nafs" in the Qur'ān; a) when used for Allah, b) when associated with creation, c) when seen as a potential, and d) when considered as a thought center, contradicts the perception of "nafs" as inherently "evil." At this point, it is crucial to highlight that the ability of the nafs/human to do both good and evil, its ability to acquire positive or negative value based on its choices, and, therefore, the fact that being "good" or "bad" is not an inherent quality of the nafs is emphasized. Talking about a neutral nature for humans is important because the human's capacity to reason, to possess will, responsibility, and freedom is grounded in this rational and moral foundation. In this regard, the use of the term "nafs" in the Qur'ān indicates that it is addressed in five categories:

- *Nafs* in the Sense of Existence Itself

- *Nafs* in the Sense of the Ground of Human Creation

- *Nafs* in the Sense of Existence Type

- *Nafs* in the Sense of the Intellectual Dimension of Human

- *Nafs* in the Sense of Afterlife Existence

The usage of the term "nafs" encompasses the ground where both the internal/mental and external actions shape the potential of the existence, and the results of these actions in the character built by this potential. In another sense, it also involves the situation of this state in the afterlife. Therefore, "nafs" undertakes the role of an umbrella concept for the creation, life, death, and afterlife of human beings; thus, it attributes all aspects of human states directly to the human itself. All these uses indicate that the term "nafs" carries the meaning of 'human existence in all dimensions.'

Acknowledgments

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What Does Salafism Promise to Us?
-The Political Theology of Purification and Stability in a Chaotic World-

Selefîlik Bize Ne Vaad Ediyor?
-Kaotik Bir Dünyada Arınma ve Sabitlik Arayışının Politik Teolojisi-

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Abstract

Salafism, derived from the root of 'Salaf' in the sense of 'the former' as a word, means 'the path of those who follow the footsteps of the former' and refers to a kind of religious fanaticism or conservatism. Salafism, which expresses a strict and literal adherence to Islamic tenets and a return to the pure origins of religion in the Islamic tradition, is today used as a synonym for religious radicalism in fields such as Islamic Sciences, Political Science, and International Relations. With its traditional form; Salafism, which establishes itself through a stance against religious rationality and being pro-interpretation, represents a 'return to the essence' reaction against intra-religion pluralism and secularism. The Salafi paradigm, which advocates a return to the essence of religion, is also skeptical of the intellectual and artistic achievements and products of the Muslim civilization, and in this respect it represents an anti-cultural attitude. The damage done by the Salafist activist groups to the Islamic civilization and other cultures is concrete examples of this. This study concentrates on the causes that lead to the Salafist flare in modern times. The study analyzes which religious and social concerns it represents in the face of social change, modernization, and secularization. It examines the relationship between Salafism and Sunnism and highlights the misleading aspects of approaches that try to show it outside of Sunnism. Approaching the subject with an interdisciplinary approach, the study includes analyzes on the intersection of theology, political science, and international relations.

Conceptual analyzes of Salafism reveal the pre-Islamic roots of this concept. In fact, the need to attribute a past essence and manage the present, which is common in every society, appears in the Arabs as 'following the way of the ancestors'. Sanctifying the past breeds suspicion of innovations and differences. 'Islamic essentialism', represented by Salafism, advocates constancy against change, essentialism against pluralism, nass against reason, and following over apostasy. Since it adopts a strict dogmatic (nass) and literal attitude in religious matters, it considers theology, philosophy and Sufism to be a departure from religion. As for the imagination of history, it embraces the idea of deterioration, separation from the essence and decay.

In modern age, the Islamic world has faced a multifaceted crisis and collapse. Problems that started in the political field have expanded into the field of identity and values. Concerns about protecting identity, essence and faith have nourished Salafism as a radical conservatism.

In the Islamic world, where crises continue to increase, Salafism attracts attention as a type of thought, belief, lifestyle and action. However, instead of producing a livable alternative, it represents a reactive stance and advocates a minimal and harsh religious life. Otherwise its harsh approach towards culture and art expresses a nihilistic view towards Islamic civilization. There is a confusion regarding Salafism in the Sunni world. This confusion is historically and theologically related to the adoption of Salafism by Sunnism. However, the growing new Salafism rejects the elements that make up the existing Sunni identity. This is an ironic situation for Sunnism. The theological tension between Sunnism, based on the knowledge of theology, fıqh and Sufism, and strict nass-based Salafism continues.

Keywords: Culture, Essentialism, Identity, Salafism, Secularization.

Öz

Kelime olarak 'öncekiler' anlamında selef kökünden türetilen Salafism, 'öncekilerin izini takip edenlerin yolu' demektir ve bir tür dinsel tutuculuk ve muhafazakârlık anlamına gelmektedir. İslam geleneğinde *Islamic tenetlara* katı ve literal bağlılığı ve dinin saf asıllarına dönüşü ifade eden Salafism, günümüzde İslami ilimler, siyaset bilimi ve uluslararası ilişkiler gibi alanlarda dinsel radikalizm ve köktencilikle eşanlamlı olarak kullanılmaktadır. Geleneksel formuyla, dinsel akılcılığa ve yorum yanlısı olmaya karşı bir duruş üzerinden kendini kuran Salafism, din içi çoğulculuğa ve sekülerizme karşı öze dönüşcü bir tepkiyi temsil etmektedir. Dinin özüne dönüşü savunan Salafi paradigma, Müslüman medeniyetinin düşünsel ve sanatsal başarı ve ürünlerine de kuşkuyla bakar, bu yönüyle de kültür karşıtı bir tutumu temsil eder. Selefi eylemci grupların İslam medeniyetine ve diğer kültürlere verdikleri zarar bunun somut örneklerini oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışma modern zamanlarda Salafism parlamasına yol açan nedenler üzerinde yoğunlaşmaktadır. Çalışmada, toplumsal değişim, modernleşme ve sekülerleşme karşısında hangi dinsel ve toplumsal kaygıları temsil ettiği analiz edilmektedir. Salafismin Sünnilik ile ilişkisi incelenmekte ve onu Sünnîliğin dışında göstermeye çalışan yaklaşımların yanıltıcı yanlarını vurgulamaktadır. Disiplinler arası yaklaşımla konuyu ele alan çalışma, teoloji ile siyaset bilimi ve uluslararası ilişkilerin kesişme alanında analizler içermektedir.

Selefilik ile ilgili kavramsal analizler, bu kavramın İslam öncesi köklerini ortaya koymaktadır. Aslında her toplumda rastlanan ve geçmiş bir öz atfetme ve bugünü yönetme ihtiyacı Araplarda 'ataların yoluna tâbi olma' şeklinde belirir.

Geçmişin kutsanması, yeniliklerden ve farklılıklardan kuşku duymayı doğurur. Selefilik tarafından temsil edilen 'İslamî özcülük' değişime karşı sabitliği, çoğulculuğa karşı özcülüğü, akla karşı nassı, ibtida yerine ittiba'yı savunur. Dinî konularda katı nassçı ve literal tutumu benimsediği için kelam, felsefe ve tasavvufu dinden uzaklaşma sayar. Tarihe bakışta kötüye gidiş, özden uzaklaşma ve çürüme düşüncesine bağlıdır.

Modern dönemlerde İslam dünyası çok yönlü bir kriz ve çöküş yaşamıştır. Siyasal alanda başlayan sorunlar kimlik ve değerler alanına doğru genişlemiştir. Kimliği, özü ve inancı koruma kaygıları radikal bir tutuculuk olarak selefiliği beslemiştir. Krizlerin artarak devam ettiği İslam dünyasında Selefilik bir düşünce, inanç, yaşam tarzı ve eylem türü olarak ilgi çekmektedir. Ancak yaşanabilir bir alternatif üretmek yerine tepkisel bir duruşu temsil etmekte, minimal ve sert bir dinî yaşantıyı savunmaktadır. Ayrıca kültüre ve sanata yönelik sert yaklaşımı, İslam medeniyeti açısından nihilist bir bakışı ifade etmektedir. Sünnî dünyada Selefilik ile ilgili bir kafa karışıklığı göze çarpmaktadır. Bu karışıklık tarihsel ve teolojik olarak selefiliğin Sünnilik tarafından benimsenmesi ile ilgilidir. Oysa güçlenen yeni Selefilik mevcut Sünnî kimliğini oluşturan unsurları reddetmektedir. Bu Sünnilik açısından kriz içeren bir durumdur. Kelam, fıkıh ve tasavvuf bilgisine dayalı kapsayıcı Sünnilik ile katı nassçı ve dışlayıcı Selefilik arasındaki teolojik gerilim hala devam etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kültür, Özcülük, Kimlik, Selefilik, Sekülerleşme.

Introduction

The word Salaf is an Arabic word meaning those who come first. As a term, it refers to the period of the companions, tabiun and tebe-i tabiun, the first generations of Islam. The use of the concept as 'salaf-i sâlih' was conceptualized later. Ahmed b. Hanbal (855) is one of those who place the concept of predecessor at the center of his discourse and use it to distinguish himself from other interpretations of Islam. Important traditionalist names such as İshāk b. Rāheveyh (d. 853), Ali b. al-Medinī (d. 873) and Yahyā b. Maʿīn (d. 847) also helped to spread this concept (Nāfī, 16).

It is known that Ahmed b. Hanbel (d. 855) became a hero after suffering the mihne process. In the course of history, while the Mutazila was in decline, the ahl al-hadīth came to the fore as a political power and gained a decisive position on the understanding of religion. This was not just a theological process. Rather, it was a multifaceted experience with a political and cultural background. In some studies, it has been revealed that Ahmed b. Hanbel was a figure who defended Arab sovereignty and supported the cult of Muʿāwiya (İscan, 2015: 156, 157).

From a theological point of view, Salafism coincides with the Ahl al-Ḥadīth movement. The ahl al-hadīth or ahl al-asar movement advocates religious essentialism and the literal meaning of the text, not reason, interpretation and different approaches in understanding religious texts. While doing this, it is based on the narrations from previous generations. When it comes to religion, transmission is essential, not reason. 'It is better to follow the old than to innovate' (al-ittibā hayrun min al-ibtidā). The opposition between reason and interpretation that characterizes the salafist method coincides with this method of the ahl al-hadīth. In fact, the references made by the Salafis to the Salaf are mostly baseless and forced. Here, there is a backward ideological and dogmatic reading, or rather a construction. In the understanding of religious texts, the narrator, literal tendency and rational and interpretive tendency show themselves in the early periods of Islam. However, with the influence of the Qur'an, the rational and interpretive vein became decisive. Basing the subject as ahl ad-dirāya- ahl ad-dirāya (advocates of reason) and ahl ar-rivāya- ahl ar-rivāya (proponents of narration), Atay gives a list of the prominent ones among the generations that qualify as predecessors and states that most of them do not fit the definition of

'salafist', on the contrary, they value reason, contemplation, theology and philosophy. The picture presented by Atay shows that the Islamic tradition progressed in a rational and exploratory direction in the early stages (Atay, 58-62, 86).

In the Islamic tradition, the rivalry between ahl al-hadīth and ahl al-raʾy has generally resulted in the favor of the former with the consensus of conservative sections and governments. The political and social crises in the Islamic world have also strengthened the hand of the sharp and marginalizing segments represented by the ahl al-hadīth and Salafism. The impact of the crisis on the spread of Salafism to the environment by surpassing its own ecology and suppressing other religious understandings is undeniable. For this reason, we discussed Salafism as a 'crisis theology' in one of our studies (Evkuran, 2015).

There are studies that base the revival of Salafism on the Afghani-Abduh line in the modern world. These studies make a connection by looking specifically at the self-reflexive and tradition-critical tendencies. However, although the Afghani-Abduh movement emphasizes the Age of Bliss and the return to the predecessor generation, it has modernist features. and in this respect, it differs from classical Hanbali and modern Wahhabi Salafism (Lauziere, 2010: 373-375; Büyükkara, 2014: 485).

Salafism has become the most popular topic not only in modern Islamic thought, but also in international politics. Salafism is called 'neo-Salafism' in order to emphasize the difference between its meaning and equivalent in the medieval Islamic world and the form and content it takes today. In some studies, a distinction is made between traditional and radical Salafism (Farouq, 2021: 55). There is a remarkable situation arising from the theo-political divergence between these two. Today's radical Salafists accuse traditionalist Salafists of not being Salafists and state that they direct all their energies to the fight against certain types of polytheism and that they do not deal with important social problems (Çakmaktaş, 2022: 108). In general, the characterization of neo-salafism stems from the idea that there is a difference between Salafism in the classical period and Salafism that emerged in the modern-postmodern age. However, this approach does not prevent some founding thinkers or representatives, especially Ahmad bin Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), from coming to the fore when the subject of Salafism is discussed. While discussing the current problems and crises of the Islamic world, we suddenly find ourselves in the historical and structural problems of classical Islamic thought. Therefore, talking about the present requires examining the past, and today's Muslim mind is vividly experiencing the patterns of understanding constructed in the past. Survival, on the other hand, constantly repeats its own history as a result.

Today, Salafism is considered institutionally as a lobbying activity supported by Saudi Arabia and some Gulf kingdoms. Neo-Salafism is a product of the political and theological alliance that took place in Saudi Arabia that adopted Wahhabi doctrine. The political aspect of the paradigm was undertaken by the Saud family, while the theological aspect was undertaken by the Muhammad b. Abdulwahhab family. This alliance established a closed regime with the help of wealth and started to work as a laboratory where predecessor theses were applied (Asad, 2015: 234).

Salafism does not consider itself a sect. When asked which path they followed, they answered that they followed the footsteps of their predecessors. The concept of 'Madhhap al-Salaf' means 'the way of the predecessor' and is used for historical and theological legitimation (Lauziere, 2010:

372). This concept reveals their views on the phenomenon of sectarianization and sects. Within this scope, among the main problem areas of the study; The increasing sectarian conflicts and the rapid polarization of the Islamic world reveal the importance of approaching the problem of Salafism with a more comprehensive view. It is necessary to reveal a general tendency of Salafism without distinguishing between traditional and new salafism. The questions addressed in this study are:

✓ How does Salafism explain itself and how does it look at other religious sects?

✓ What is the background of the Salafi return to self discourse?

✓ What is the relationship between Salafism and Sunnism?

✓ What are the characteristics of the political-theological ground that feeds Salafism today?

Dealing with the very basic issues and discussions in the subject area of the International Relations discipline today by ignoring sects or religious thoughts may cause some problems in examining the issues in depth and obtaining good results. At this point, evaluating the issue of Salafism (Bağcı, 2019), which is considered as an example in this study, only within the framework of the discipline of International Relations may lead to deficiencies in academic perspective. Likewise, dealing with the subject only in terms of Islamic sciences will bring some difficulties in understanding. In this respect, an inter-disciplinary approach to Islamic sects or the history of thought seems extremely essential, as is the case with Salafism (Ali, 2015). At the same time, Salafism, which is the subject of international relations and global-local politics, is basically discussed in terms of Islamic sciences in this study and it is based on the problematic of how it should be understood as a thinking systematic and practice.

1. The Political-Theological Framework of Salafism

It is not ontologically necessary that the paradigms formed in the past reappear in the later periods of history. It depends on cultural decisions. The phrase 'history repeats itself' should be a reflection of the cyclical understanding of time. Consciously or unconsciously followers of a thought and belief system mystify certain value judgments, behavior styles, identity characteristics in order to "own the truth", and "protect oneself from corruption". It also aestheticizes them with cultural tools such as art, literature, and thought. In addition, fictions realized in philosophical and theological fields, which is a more important and effective method than this, turn into spiritual power through constructions and articulations to belief.

All dogmatic and radical tendencies throughout history emerge as a result of this oblivion. However, the human mind tends to remember and to understand. The transformation of understanding into remembering and its reduction to remembering is a very serious problem for thought. Comprehension includes remembering but transcends it. Remembering demands a more passive and minimized intellectual effort. Every effort to remember requires an interpretation and production in itself. However, a reproduction is allowed to the extent that the dominant culture, beliefs, and cultural-political powers allow. Culture resists, excludes, and accuses any attempt to read and understand that tries to show its historical and interpretive features and thus

to unmask it as absolute and authoritative. It demands to be presented not as an "interpretation" but as an expression of the truth itself.

The more institutionalized the culture's attempts to "sacralize", "seem divine", "appear eternal and eternal", the more authority, continuity, and prevalence it attains. Religion, philosophy, history, art etc. which are the means of sanctification, are obliged to serve dogma All these constructions take place under the direction of a certain form of power. They are made obligated to serve dogma. The areas where the power of dogma is felt most intensely are the areas that produce value and identity. Different or opposing readings that emerge in these areas are most severely reacted. Because cultural power never wants its historical and human face to be seen. It is the result of this resistance that he suffocates the humanizing comments to come out of him in the harshest way and yet in his own bed. In the Islamic tradition, the early seizure of religious thought by politics led to the emergence of the phenomenon of religious grouping at an early date. The reference of the Salafist discourse to the first period (it means the period of the first three Muslim generations) in the name of defending religious essentialism and purity should also be read from this perspective.

What societies experience, realizing the nature of the cultural and historical, is an *enlightenment* unique to them. Enlightenment is not an experience that all societies live in the same form and content. It is a particular discovery that takes place in the context of each society's own values. This discovery is based on the fact that society first confronts its roots and realizes the historical and human intentions, aims, and aspirations underlying them.

There are two intellectual obstacles in front of Muslim societies to realize their own unique renewal. Firstly it is an extreme traditionalist and conservative approach that sees tradition as a structure that 'should be' and 'cannot be otherwise'. This area is completely closed to free thinking in the Islamic tradition, as 'unthinkable/unthought' (Arkoun, 20002: 9). The fact that the knowledge produced based on religious references is seen as 'unthought, holy, unquestionable' has weakened the perception of reality of the Muslim mentality. This approach suppresses the 'excitement of knowing, understanding, and discovering', which is necessary for us to recognize the principles and values that make up the tradition and the processes experienced. This sanctifying approach, which substitutes commitment and loyalty for knowing and understanding, also makes it impossible for the 'different traditionalisms' to arise from the awareness of the diversity within the tradition, and most of all harms the *Tradition* that it claims to protect. A true Enlightenment cannot be without tradition; critical and creative readings are needed to transcend tradition. However, the understandings that have made it their existential duty to protect the tradition with a sense of blessing and protection, make intellectual communication and interaction with the tradition impossible and create a great obstacle in front of creative thinking.

The other main problem is that an anti-cultural understanding that folds history with all its content with the most vulgar glances and eliminates the difference between today and the 'golden age', destroying not only the perception of time but also of space.[1] It is not easy to distinguish

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[1]   Thanks to M. Zeki İşcan for drawing attention to the issue of culturalism. Cultural enmity looks at the social life and the concept of culture, which is its inseparable part, with anger, which looks at the world and social life from within a certain belief or ideology and is the scene of developments that do not comply with the doctrine that it accepts as the 'truth itself'. We use culturalism to problematize a monotype, stagnant mentality that hates change and differences,

between fighting against innovations that corrupt religion and opposing culture. In fact, the feeling of protecting religion against corruption and subsequent deviations is the biggest obstacle to cultural diversity and intellectual freedom (Evkuran, 2015).

Here we are faced with another version of dogmatism. The first spread the sacred through history. It saw our every relationship with time and space as an act or reflection of the sacred, the only cosmic-ontological actor. History is nothing but an expansion of its will or personality. Historical events are acts of God; not of man. In this respect, just as it is not possible to fully understand God and his acts, understanding history is likewise beyond human comprehension! Yet, the causes of historical events do not belong to this world, but to the divine realm.[2] The dominant view on the problem of causality in the tradition of Islamic thought emerges not in our daily lives, but rather when trying to understand major historical and social events.

This time, there is another alternative and opposite reading of the concept of the sacred. An understanding that does not spread the sacred, on the contrary concentrates it in the context of a certain time-space, humiliates history, harbors a theological anger against temporal mobility and spatial diversity, and wages a holy war to 'return them into their originals'. The understanding that we try to define through these features is Salafism. It is not yet easy to try to understand or criticize the Islamic thought with its own concepts Because there has not been a systematic theological criticism of Salafism in the Islamic tradition and today, a language and style that can be used or benefited from in this direction has not emerged. In fact, the struggle between sects and theological systems in the Islamic world reveals a picture in which almost all the negative and destructive games of political power struggles are exhibited. The competition between sects and sects mostly shifted to a political basis and could not gain and sustain the character of a philosophical, theological and intellectual debate.

For this reason, the fact that the discussions about religious problems turn into a matter of faith and unbelief in a short time and the parties easily direct the harshest accusations to each other makes it almost impossible for thought to enter the religious field and make it functional. However, the Holy Qur'an invites us to build faith on reasoning and thinking. It is really striking that the Holy Qur'an, the founding text of Islam, deals with the two basic abilities of man, reason and faith, not in opposition, but in a relationship of solidarity and support.

However, the thought and belief systems put forward in the name of Islam have bring forward a kind of fideism over time. The disempowerment of man in the face of the God and his/her removal from being an agent/subject has also disrupted the balance between reason and faith, which makes man human. This situation has given birth to a paradigm of thought-belief full of mythical narratives that prevent reaching the original message of the Qur'an (Arkoun, 1985: 13). Muslim theologians, who acted to reveal man's need for religion and prophets, limited man as much as possible and ignored his abilities in order to emphasize the perfection of the God's religion. In

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which sees them as a deviation in the face of the truth. The concept of culturalism, besides the point of view that considers a particular culture superior and privileged over others; It also expresses a methodological understanding that tries to read all historical and social problems on cultural differences in social sciences.

[2]   In the works written to explain the *Māturīdī* theological system, which is described as rational and libertarian, it is emphasized that the God is absolutely free in his actions and it is stated that the question "why did he do this?" cannot be asked. Because it is stated that this question will be asked about beings who act with a malady/reason, need or necessity, and that Allah the Almighty is higher than this. See more: *Māturīdī*, 2015:169.

particular, the Asharī kalam system, based on principles such as atomic theory, continuous creation, and the rejection of causality, argued that man is apparently an agent but actually an object (Evkuran, 2015: 54 et al.). The values of surrender, obedience, and feeling helpless have been substituted instead of knowing, understanding, and comprehending. It is noticed that these values are the most prominent features of the Muslim identity today. In this framework, the religious sphere has turned into an authoritarian and irrational world that is as dogmatic as possible, extremely rigid, closed to diversity, and different interpretation of religious texts. For this reason, the return or rise of religion in the Islamic world brings along the multifaceted revival of the problem of dogmatism and authoritarianism (İşcan, 2015: 333).

As a solution, it is seen that the Sufi and mystical discourse, which has been at odds with the Salafi understanding throughout history and has been its target, is tried to be highlighted. However, instead of solving the problem, this deepens the polarization and narrows the capacity of Islamic thought to produce more reasonable solutions. When we look at the result of the work done by two irreducible religious interpretations together, we do not see any gain, but a blockage, depersonalization, and intellectual corruption. If a solution to be established "within the house" and "with the language of the house" cannot be accomplished, it will be inevitable to head for non-Islamic solutions (secular and positivist ways) in the face of fast-flowing and pending problems -just like in the last periods of the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, the tendencies of deism and agnosticism that have become popular in the Islamic world are a result of the blockage in attempts to find solutions within Islam.

2. The Problem of Understanding Salafism

Othering the Salafism by labeling it as an enemy, a great danger, barbarism, etc., prevents understanding its historical and theological functions. This language can be used for political and criminal reasons, but academic and intellectual work requires an empathetic language based on understanding. First of all; it is necessary to try to understand an idea or social movement that is seen as a problem and threat. We must do this, despite the violence it displays, the pain it inflicts, and therefore the temptation into react instantsly. Otherwise, it would not be possible for us to notice the ways of reading, believing, and thinking styles and the non-thought factors behind them, which take place in our history and thought and have the potential to produce problems.

"Problem solving" is often mentioned when these and related topics are discussed. However, it is necessary to reveal what exactly is understood by problem solving. What is really what we see as the "problem"? And what do we do to solve the problem? One of the main difficulties faced by researchers working in the field of social sciences is that the personal beliefs and thoughts of the researcher affect his/her research and harm the objectivity of the research. Investigating the historical and ideological roots of a living and active identity still alive today is a process full of obstacles.

Identities or movements founded on a particular belief and ideology resist attempts to objectify and historicize. They want historical and social processes to be considered and interpreted in a way that justifies them. This compulsion is felt at one level or another on those who work in the field of social sciences. Even the fact that the work is carried out under a free and autonomous

institutional roof does not provide the objective and independent work that is targeted from time to time. Although environmental and institutional freedom is ensured, the researcher's individual or group's worldview and personal ideologies can be influential.

When the issue of Salafism and sects is discussed, the above-mentioned problems are experienced intensely. Not only Salafism, but also all religious understandings such as Sunni, Shiite, Sufi etc. attack from the very beginning approaches that describe themselves as "an interpretation of faith". Moreover, they present themselves as "*the very faith*", "*the only true representative of Islam*". Our speakers/scholars on the subject have not only a scientific opinion as an academic, but also a personal opinion and belief as a Muslim on these claims. Therefore, what we are really talking about is our own belief, our understanding of truth, and our identity, deep down. The reason why many of us are interested in this subject cannot be explained by scientific and academic concerns alone. Rather, more succinctly; we are dealing with an existential issue for each of us, and it is for this reason that our speeches and assessments are to a certain extent autobiographical.

How to establish the relationship between the problem and the solution in a political-psychology, where sectarian identities are used effectively in the political arena and Salafism is discussed extensively and with the perception of "imminent threat" on this axis, is a comprehensive and deep problem that concerns not only the origins of Islamic thought, but also its functioning and today. Two of the possible approaches are more suitable for discussion because they are typical. Others are intermediate versions that oscillate between the two.

The first approach: The problem is the existence of the sects themselves. The existence of sects is the biggest obstacle to understanding religion and living it properly. The solution is to abolish sects.

The second approach: The right denomination is one, and it is clear. The Prophet and the Companions directly or indirectly informed which sect was the right one. *Solution:* The right sect is to defend against superstitious sects and to fight against superstitious sects at all levels.

The first approach is a model that has a clear path and experimented with the effect of modernity. However, this model was seen as a part of secular and materialist practices and was perceived as a purge of Muslim identity and values. The fact, that such intellectual readings and the search for solutions, that push the historical-social boundaries come to the fore when the "traditional religious identity" is bracketed or withdrawn, is an indicator of the resistance of the traditional structure to the search for solutions. The fact that it begins to express itself in a totalitarian manner when the obstacles in front of it are removed is due to its predominant substantialist character that dominates the establishment.

The other approach is an expression of the belief that is widespread and powerful in the Islamic world. It is the result of the vulgarization and rationalization of the sectarian view of sectarian identities, which is effective in the civil sphere, politics, culture, and academia. Identities express themselves strongly among the public, in politics and at the intellectual level. When we look at the Islamic world in general, there is this mentality that sees itself as the only defender of the truth and establishes a strong centrality and authoritarianism wherever it dominates. This situation lies behind the failure of healthy relations, institutionalization, and the failure to fulfill

the requirements of a free and open society. While the Shiite and Sunni world were dealing with structural problems in their particularity, they suddenly came face to face with each other as bloc. Ordinary historical and social processes have built reconciliation and flexibility in Shiite-Sunni identities. However, the movements of remembering dogma and returning to the faith on all sides have strengthened radicalism in total. Now a space is opened for the most fanatical of both sides. In an environment where there are so many "righteous" groups, it will be exceedingly difficult to achieve healthy dialogue and the freedom necessary for reason.

Structural analysis of the approaches reveals that the paradigm offers little room for renewal and therefore a rational and flexible solution is required. First of all; it is necessary to realize that the sect is not only a historical and sociological but also a theological fact and necessity. This affirmation paves the way for intellectual readings and makes it possible to reinterpret religious thought in the light of historical and social data. In this context, different religious understandings and interpretations should be seen as a richness, provided that the basic belief principles of religion are preserved.

This approach will also mean that the cultural and intellectual strength of the Muslim community is acknowledged and respected. As a respected member of the human family and the caravan of civilization, the Muslim tradition must be understood correctly, away from any reductionist, simplistic or sanctifying approach. In particular, the Muslim intellectual, who is a child of this tradition, tries to define his own history, culture, and the age when s/he lives in, free from complexes, should be considered as one of the most important steps to be taken for the future of Islamic thought.

The problem of Salafism is not a subject that can be dealt with "on its own" in a sterile and independent manner from Islamic thought and tradition. In addition to its own ideology and values, it is necessary to examine the effect it has on other Islamic identities and the reaction developed against it in a broad context with multiple readings.

It is important to try to understand the Salafi ideology and the 'Salafi anxiety' behind this ideology. Understanding this anxiety and emotion before it turns into a social movement will inevitably mean trying to understand the Muslim faith itself. This theological and philosophical task is the common task of thinkers and intellectuals who work and bear responsibility on Islamic thought.

Salafism first emerged as a method, not as an idea. This method was subsequently developed and formulated as a systematic theory. This understanding, which spread to the base with discourses based on religious references, turned into a religious and political movement over time. Finally, it reproduced itself in modern times as a radical and warlike structure (Koca, 2016: 11-21).

Anxiety/desire, which expresses itself as Salafism, can be characterized as 'going back to the roots'. The desire to return to the essence of Islam, to understand and live it in its original and original form, is clearly expressed as a goal in Salafi texts. First of all; the desire to return to the essence, to go to the moment when religion first touched history and human life is the most innocent and natural feeling and is not unique to religious radical groups such as Salafism. It is an emotion that is present to a certain extent in almost every believer. However, when this feeling

turns into a rigid and closed ideology and destroys the dynamism of religious thought by rejecting contributions from human knowledge such as philosophy, art, and theology, it leads to the mutilation of religious thought.

Calls for a return to roots and essence emerge and institutionalize as a reaction against the drifts and failures experienced in the historical process. The fact that religious differences gradually turn into divisions and conflicts, and harm the Muslim society calls this essentialist thought as a solution. Therefore, the most basic factor that appears in the appearance of Salafism is the structural blockage of the Muslim society in producing knowledge, values, and vision.

One of the important points to be emphasized in studies of Salafism is the so-called 'neoliberal dispositive'. The 'work ideology', which envelops daily life in modern societies and imposes itself as an actual situation, has destroyed living spaces other than production-consumption (Han, 2017: 99). In Muslim societies, where the need for the sacred could not be completely eliminated, conversion to religion began to be experienced in its harshest forms. In the predecessor ascension, it is possible to see the effects of uncertainty, volatility, indifference and resistance to atomization in modern life.

Salafism offers the promise of rediscovering itself by returning to the essence of the Muslim society, which is worn out and tired of religious-based divisions, or it becomes the object and carrier of such a desire. The inefficiency in other social and cultural fields outside of religious thought, the rapid flow of life and the helplessness felt in the face of external challenges have spurred the idea of retreating and retreating to the originals. In this medium of Salafist discourse shines as a hope that coincides with the movement and emotional tendencies of the self.

When religion manages to take a visible place in the social life of a society in the historical process, it begins to function as a "world view". It works more as a social institution than as a metaphysical and moral principle. However, the social and cultural rivalries seen in every society and the tensions caused by these have also emerged in the Muslim society. It has been inevitable to benefit from the 'world protection' function of religion in coping with these and building a healthy social order. Not only the governments but also the opposition are based on an interpretation of Islam that seems right to it.

The political-legal and religious solutions developed to cope with unprecedented situations, to adapt to the historical movement, to protect the social order, and to meet the needs of change required not only relying on the wording of the tenets, but also making interpretations by considering the main purpose of religion. In fact, literal views have often formed an obstacle and a theological barrier in solving problems. It is known that Islamic jurists have developed some methods 'istihsān' (method based on reason and custom), 'qıyās' (comparison, analogy), 'ijtihād' (pass judgment on custom) etc. in order to overcome this problem. All these methods are based on the methodological interpretation of tenets within a particular discipline.

The limits and legitimacy of interpretation were a very important issue. Because, although it is done in good faith, the definition of an appropriate interpretation process is also seen as a matter of interpretation, which is a subject that many Muslim thinkers, especially Ghazalī and Ibn Rushd (*Avorroshe*), are concerned about. On the other hand, the main concern for Muslim thinkers is that

the efforts of *Tawil* and *Rai*, which are legitimate in themselves, by *Batinis* (radical Gnostics), *Gulat Shiites* (extreme Shiites), some *Sufis* etc. Over-interpretation of nass was seen as a falsification of religion. What is done in extreme interpretation is to make unacceptable meanings and judgments by attributing esoteric meanings to it, along with the preservation of the wording.

The use of Tawil as an epistemological weapon[3] must have constituted a sensitivity in traditional Islamic thought. The fact that the Qur'an is also used for secret and dangerous purposes is now a reality rather than a possibility. Since it was understood that this situation, which was perceived as a danger would continue to exist as a potential in the Muslim society, it was necessary to develop a permanent solution. It is possible to list the measures taken as follows:

- to reveal the legitimacy and inevitability of interpretation,

- limiting interpretation and determining its laws against excessive interpretations,

- to warn the public against the dangers of philosophy in terms of sharia and religion,

- allocating dealing with the science of *Kalām* to a limited group.

For the classical period of Islamic thought, sects, Islamic theology, and Fiqh schools are not only a social but also a theological reality. Accordingly, it is seen that the proposed solutions are based on the idea of acceptance of this reality. It can be said that the plurality of sects is adopted as a reality in the face of the uniqueness of religion, and it is considered from a perspective that does not see it as a problem.

Ghazali's assessment of the situation as a thinker trying to interpret his age and values is based on a correct determination. Almost all of the conflicts between the sects that emerged in the name of Islam and all of which claim to represent the truth of Islam arise from the difference in interpretation. What a thinker needs to do is not just to emphasize the founding values of culture; additionally, in the face of the modifier and transformative effects of history and society, it should also fulfill its duty to understand and explain ideology on a principled basis. Reinterpreting faith and values in the face of the weariness of time and space is the real area where the thinker will display his power and talent. Because conservative tendencies that literally emphasize roots and basis are always found in a belief tradition! The problem is not that it's found, or that it comes to the fore in a dominant way at times. The main problem is that other forms of reading are insufficient and clogged at the level that it will be needed. When religious intelligence and intellectual taste cannot manage the crises experienced in the face of historical crises and social problems, they take the initiative to compensate for the gap and drift experienced as a reaction of religious conservatism. In short, the problem is that thought cannot renew itself in general and is insufficient to cope with reality.

Medieval Muslim common sense, expressed in the above measures, describes a prevalent and average approach. There are also approaches that follow a path other than this approach, and they are mostly involved in the *ahl al-hadīth* movement (İşcan, 2014: 229-234). The word ra'y, which means reasoning and expressing personal opinion, is used synonymously with the concepts

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[3] Ghazalī describes the interpretations of Batinids as a kind of magic. See. Gazzalī. *Bâtınîliğin İçyüzü* (çev. Avni İlhan). Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 1993.

of perversion, desire and superstition. So much so that in Salafi discourse, ahl ar- raʾy and ahl al-bidʿa are synonymous (Apak, 2014: 40). An anatomy of the ideology of *ahl al-hadīth* actually gives an approximate portrait of all conservative and religious-radicalistic movements that emerged and would emerge in Islamic thought. However, in the Sunni world. There is a timidity and reluctance to do such a study in the Sunni world. Even in our country, which is a reflection of *the raʾy* and *kalām* tradition and where a more pluralistic and tolerant religious culture is dominant, this reluctance can be found. The reason for this is that the concepts of *ahl al-hadīth* and *Hanbalism* have a respectable equivalent in the Anatolian Sunnism. This is the result of the comprehensive and flexible definitions made in a geography where the management culture and the perception of pluralism are strong.

Ahmet b. Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya, who are the historical references of modern salafist discourse, are thinkers of the crisis period. It is a fact that the Muslim self reacts differently in the face of the crisis. For example, the social and intellectual change experienced during the Abbasid period led to new and advanced interpretations in theology. Mutazila was the defining figure of this period. On the other hand, in the Mihna process, the Ahl al-Ḥadīth, which defended the theory of eternal kalam, was the target of pressure. The effects of social and mental development were perceived by the ahl al-hadīth as a corruption and crisis. After a short period of Mihna, the golden age of Hanbalism began (İğde, 2016: 34-35). On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyya witnessed a clear process of crisis and collapse in which the Muslim geography fell to the ground. Declaring that "Muslims turning away from Islam" were responsible for this collapse, Ibn Taymiyya suggested a radical cleaning in the house as a solution. According to him, problems could not be solved unless 'bidʿa' such as sufism, philosophy and kalam were cleared from the minds and lives of Muslims (Arpa, 2016: 55). Problems such as oppression, occupation and injustice experienced in Islamic countries in the modern period are the 'new mihna' that feed the Salafist fundamentalist readings.

3. Longing for Self-Return or Obsessed with Essentialism?

Returning to the origins, attaining purity or longing for home is a need that adds meaning to life for societies as well as individuals. In a world that is constantly moving and producing different problems, holding on to something stable and solid is a fundamental orientation for identity. In that case, the tendency to go back to the roots should be a feeling arising from existential anxiety before being a thought and an ideology. This powerful emotion that lies behind going back to the roots establishes an appropriate thought. The desire to learn what is in the past and what belongs to the essence re-establishes the identity, keeps the self-intact against disappearances, and ensures historical continuity.

But returning to the core is inevitably an interpretive and speculative effort. As the phrase is, one cannot really go to the past, one cannot really reach the roots; a construction is carried out in the light of today's concerns, needs, longings and thoughts. Practices that are thought to be not explicitly involved in reasoning, such as transferring an idea from the past to the present or reading a text exactly, are actually very modern, contemporary, and hodiernal actions. Its products and influences are also modern and contemporary. Secondly, it should be underlined that these actions are interpretation and reconstruction. Although the Salafist and conservative understandings strongly oppose the introduction of reasoning into religion and the reality, what

they do in the name of religion is no different from being an activity of interpretation and understanding.

The most problematic aspect of this situation is that it hides the fact that the work done is the worst, inefficient, and rude interpretation. The fact that Salafi individuals experience identity-related experiences such as anger, hatred, desire, attachment, and conflict at extreme points is due to their theological identity rather than their individuality. In short, this anger is not a natural emotion that is directly obtained as a result of life experiences. As seen in other identities; it is an artificial situation that occurs in the person or group only when they adopt the predecessor thought.

The more intense and fiercer the desire to return to the origins and the essence of religion, the stronger the reaction against the structures and institutions that are thought to prevent reaching it. Therefore, the first and greatest enemy of modern Salafi thought is Shiism (Shiism). Shiism, which defends the belief in imamate against the Sunni theory of caliphate, conflicts with the Arab-Umayyad support in Salafism. On the other hand, Shiis theology, based on gnostic-esoteric elements, represents a different and opposite interpretation of history and religion (Koçak, 2020: 654, 655). However, the anti-Shia opposition of Salafism does not stem from an inclusive Sunni sensibility. On the contrary, Salafism does not hide its opposition to the schools that make up the Sunni paradigm *Māturīdism*, Asharite, Hanafism and Muslim mystic ecoles (*Sufism*), etc..[4]

One of the main theses of the classical period Salafism is the struggle against innovations. When looked closely, it is seen that the concept of bidʿa in Salafi discourse is used for groups that are in favor of kalam and rai/reason. The Salafist discourse, which defends the claim of defending the sunnah against bidʿah, opposed the interpretation of God's attributes. This attitude has led them to be accused of being similes/anthropomorphists (Koca, 2016: 25).

When the desire to return to the origins suppresses everything else that establishes the religious consciousness and dominates the whole mentality, dogmatism becomes inevitable. Returning to the roots has caused many valuable and meaningful products produced by the Muslim mind to be seen as harmful, bad, and perverted in the historical process. It is seen that Muslim societies produced almost nothing in geographies and periods dominated by the Salafist mentality. On the contrary, there was a complete chaos and internal unrest, as the existing institutions and values were tried to be eliminated in the name of attaining religious purity. The Salafist mentality strongly opposes the concepts of culture, civilization, and art and their juxtaposition with Islam. At the root of its hatred of the present and the place is his belief that the truth lies elsewhere. According to the viewpoint of all radicals, religious or secular, who believe that the truth is always elsewhere, although corruption is inevitable, it still needs to be fought against. Ontological disharmony arises not from history and the flow of time, but from the ontology of being itself (Shayegan, 2020: 43 et al.).

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[4]   There is a discrepancy between the religious identity prominent in modern Salafi texts and Sunnism. It is known that Salafism, whether Shiite or Sunni, defines Sufism as shirk. On the other hand, it is seen that a similar exclusionary opinion is fed about the Sunni kalam schools, although it is not so clear and clear. See more: Şemsuddin es-Salafī al-Afgānī. A'dāu'l-Māturīdiyye li Akāidi's-Salafiyya. Peshawar, 1998, 204; Sefer bin Abdurrahman al-Hawali. The Faith of Murjia and Its Effects on the Islamic Ummah, 2012.

The new Salafism movement, which thinks that the establishment of a single Islamic society in the world is the goal of Islam, insists on the homogeneity of this society. While the "exemplary Islamic society" is different from the world outside itself with all its features, a homogeneous society is proposed in which all individual and public behavior characteristics are one and unique. As seen throughout history, this approach requires a fascist and oppressive authoritarian management approach that struggles with differences, kills constructivism, tries to realize a uniform human design, and mobilizes the state's means for this. This struggle in the name of Islam is unrealistic and leads to new and deep divisions in the Muslim geography where so much pluralism and different theological and cultural diversity dominate. Trying to destroy cultural diversity would actually mean fighting the very concept of culture.

On the other hand, the establishment of a single and universal Islamic society requires the existence of a universal Islamic state and ruler who has undertaken this task. The establishment of an Islamic society and its subsequent domination in the world results in the consumption of the Muslim geography by an aggressive, imperialist, and war-sanctifying policy. From the point of view of Salafism, Muslims are the only responsible and guilty of the corruption of the religion of Islam (Biçer, 2015: 9). The clean and pure Islamic creed has been contaminated by *bidʿa*, superstition and rational thought systems. In that case, the direct and eternal addressees of the Salafi jihad practice are Muslims. It is obvious against whom the jihad, which will last forever, will be waged. The universal Islamic society and the absolutist understanding of government that represents it renders the efforts to establish a social theory meaningless. Efforts to build a political order and form a cultural model to support it suddenly fall into a void. Once the overwhelming and tiring atmosphere of the desert dominates the culture, all social and intellectual endeavors become meaningless.

Paradoxically, Salafism is the soft underbelly of Islamic thought. While seeing it only as a politico-theology based on a certain interpretation of Islam (literary and misunderstanding of Islam), it would not be correct to ignore the modern causes that brought the movement to the fore. Salafist thought has been intensely represented in certain centers of the Islamic world throughout history and today. This situation has been respectfully accepted by Muslim societies with an unspecified courtesy and respect. However, the representation and dissemination of Salafist thought outside its own geography is a problem that needs to be carefully examined.

4. The Relationship Between Sunnism and Salafism

The approach, which prefers to see Salafism as a modern and new movement that emerged as a result of contemporary social and political problems, finds popularity in Sunni intellectual circles. While this approach does not explicitly attribute a dogmatic essence to Sunnism, it sees Sunnism as the most appropriate social and historical expression and representation of Islam. More refined, Salafism tries to absolve it and attributes the evils exhibited by the Salafist movement to the political-ontology of this structure, which it envisions as an essence completely independent of Sunnism. It tries to read this movement, which it sees as a result of the reactive and harsh radical movements that emerged in the Muslim geography dominated by the oppressive governments of the colonial period, entirely on the axis of modern developments. This approach is problematic from a theological as well as a historical point of view. Apart from its political point

of view, it also sets a barrier to self-criticism and lessons to be learned on behalf of Sunnism, as it is based on a one-sided reading of Sunnism.

Salafi thought is a structure addressed within Sunnism and embodied as Hanbalism. However, it is a mentality structure that can be seen in other structures that make up Sunnism in terms of perspective on religion and history. It would be more accurate to talk about interactions and transitions rather than a clear and sharp distinction between the theological elements that make up Sunnism. Considering that the maturation process of the Sunni paradigm is realized by an alliance of schools, this situation can be more clearly noticed. It is seen that the Shafiī-Hanafī, Asharī- Māturīdī schools, which have experienced harsh conflicts in some periods of history, had to get closer with the force of the powerful governments, and this rapprochement shaped the late Sunni imagination. In this context, it can be said that the Hanbali school, which is a persistent defender of the Ahl al-Ḥadīth movement, finds its place under the theological umbrella of the Sunni paradigm. It should not be considered a coincidence that the theological portrait of the movement that emerged as Salafism derives from Hanbalism. Therefore, Salafism is a structural problem in terms of Sunnism and has to be dealt with as such.

However, the current causes that led Salafism to shine at this level should also be carefully examined. The fact that the problem has historical and theological roots should not allow approaches to the subject to be mystified and lead to "escape from the present". The reasons in question are related to the political-cultural operations of the Western global powers against the Islamic world, as well as the blockage of the Islamic world and the inability to resolve the sectarian problem. Radicalism has been revived as a result of Western countries' interventions targeting the important and sensitive centers of the Muslim geography and disrupting the long-established social balances. The fragile sectarian structure in the Islamic world was shaken and suddenly the dormant sectarian tensions were activated. This idea has turned into a power that also affects Islamic education as a result of the work of the active groups that represent it in the regional sense and the work of the countries that support them within the framework of a state policy.

As an important point; It is worth noting that the problem faced by Salafism in terms of Sunnism is basically structural. Salafism, whether at the level of definition or at the level of relationship or struggle, is not an identity that can be easily marginalized and placed across by Sunnism (Korkmaz, 2005: 372)[5]. Sunnism has difficulty in removing this way of reading and believing, which it has internalized to a certain extent, and problematizing it as a separate identity. Therefore, Salafism is a serious barrier to the contemporary Sunni paradigm. If he confronts it intellectually and theologically and renews himself, a great gain can be achieved in terms of Islamic thought. Alternatively, if Salafism cannot cope with its intense political and theological pressure and remains under it, a Sunnism that comes under the domination of Salafism will exhaust all its possibilities among sectarian conflicts. For this reason, it will not be realistic to evaluate Salafism as a structure independent from Sunnism for political reasons, in order to absolve the Sunni identity from the evils of new Salafism and will prevent the needed self-criticism. Eventually, this will leave Sunnism defenseless against the internalized Salafist vein.

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[5]   I respectfully present our respects to Prof. Korkmaz, who is our close friend and one of the most important sages of the field. In the memory of Prof. Korkmaz.

Another point; One of the problems noticed through the problem of Salafism is "Muslim optimism". The theological boundaries and scope of Sunni identity have been constantly updated by theologians in the light of the problems and conflicts experienced in the historical process. The *Ahl as-Sunnah School*, which is basically described as the Sunnah of the Prophet, the way of the Companions, the Tabiun and the leading names of the next generation, has been clarified as not to rebel against the power and to oppose the innovation sects. It has been emphasized as an attitude to hold on to the Sunni view against the views of Muslim schools such as *Mutazila, Shiism, Kharijite,* and *Murjia.* In this framework, while redefining the Sunni scope, ahl al-hadīth and Hanbalism were also included in the list.

It can be said that the opposition of Mutezila and Shiism was effective in this rapprochement. However, Hanbalism, which was included in the Sunni list, created a problem in Sunni conception over time. Hanbalism defined itself on the predecessor axis and developed a narrowing and marginalizing discourse. and started to apply it within the sect. In this discourse, Sunni theological schools, Asharī and Māturīdism, and Hanafism, the Fiqh system, have been the subject of criticism. On the other hand, these schools showed a softer and more accepting attitude about Hanbalism. No clear defense or assessment has been put forward against the attacks of Salafist conservatism. The counter criticism against the 'Kadızadeli' movement during the Ottoman period remained weak and did not lead to an intellectual opening (Akpınar, 2020: 15). In the current situation, the limits of optimism have been exceeded and the reality of fulfilling the requirements of the delayed confrontation makes itself felt.

Another problem is the return to essence and the preservation of the original religion. The identification of the concept of "return to self" with Salafism is fed by a misunderstanding and one-sided propaganda that should be well discussed. It seems that the concerns of returning to essence and preserving the original religion were left to the initiative of Salafi circles. However, it is known that this discourse is also the basic concept of Islamic modernists. The fight against Salafism is not possible by abandoning the concept of the essence of Islam, but by establishing a constructive communication with the sources of this concept. In the face of Salafi criticism, the contemporary Muslim mind sees self-defense as a more durable attitude by reacting based on sectarian identity. The soothing influence of sects is perceived as a solution in the face of Salafi bigotry and Vandalism. Although this is a feasible method to some extent, it is far from providing the final solution. Because this attitude involves the danger of reviving sectarian fetishism. Losing the concepts of essence and origin in the name of combating Salafism can pose great problems for intellectual as well as theological thought.

Conclusion

Defining an identity in the social sciences and politics is a frequent problem. The liberal approach envisages accepting the information given by each individual and social group about their own identity as correct. However, there are some problems here. First of all, the arbitrariness of choosing one's own identity and making any definition of one's identity is intermingled. When an individual chooses an identity, it is a scientific problem, if not political freedom, to give it the meaning s/he wishes. Interpretations and definitions that are incompatible with the historical and intellectual realities of identity are the subject of critical analysis.

In this respect, identification of any kind is a scientific and intellectual task. Independent of the information given by the actors carrying the identity, working on identity is a scientific and academic activity. For this reason, the problem of "identification" in Türkiye regarding other identities is valid for those who adopt Salafism.

Salafism is a political-theology that refers to the first three generations of Muslims, called Salaf. Historically, it emerged after the rational movement in Islam. He represented religious essentialism and minimalism in the face of the diversity and competition of theological, philosophical, and Sufi interpretations. He undertook the role of defending the return to essence and purity against social change, and while emphasizing adherence to the literal meanings of religious texts, he rejected interpretation attempts. He saw the values produced by Muslim societies in the name of enriching religious life as innovations that corrupt Islam and insisted on an anti-cultural line.

The crises experienced in history fed the desire to return to the roots and essence and led to the strengthening of Salafism. The inability to resolve the political and social crises in the Islamic world in modern times has strengthened the interest in Salafism. In particular, problems such as occupations, inequality, inadequate education, and political instability caused Salafism to evolve from an intellectual movement to jihadism. Today, Salafism stands out with its takfiri feature and a completely different appearance from the modernist line led by Afghani-Abduh.

It is a fact that Salafism also affects the relations between sects. Throughout history, Salafism has seen it as the only legitimate force representing Islam against Shiism. It is seen that when Salafism strengthens, the balance between sects deteriorates and tensions rise in the Islamic world. On the other hand, Salafism is represented by Hanbalism in Sunnism and a certain respect is given to it. However, Salafism also negatively affects the balance within Sunnism. Because the view of theological schools that characterize Sunnism, especially Māturīdism, on the relationship between faith and action is rejected definitively. Salafism is also extremely radical about Sufism and considers it un-Islamic.

Although the historical and social conditions highlight Salafism today, the problems faced by Muslim societies in the global world clearly reveal the inadequacy of self-reflexive approaches. Problems such as climate change, artificial intelligence, women's rights, freedoms, pluralism, political and economic imbalances increase the need for an intellectual and libertarian interpretation of Islam.

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Retrospective Analysis of the Development of Scientific Atheism in Uzbekistan (In the 30s of the XXth Century)

Özbekistan'da Bilimsel Ateizm Gelişiminin Retrospektif Analizi
(XX. Yüzyılın 30'larında)

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Abstract

The article provides a retrospective analysis of the ways, mechanisms, and methods of development of atheism in Uzbekistan in the 30s of the twentieth century. It is explained how in the complex process of the formation of the communist worldview it influenced the consciousness of people and what an important role the atheistic education of the peoples of the former states of the USSR played. The struggle against religion is a necessary circumstance for building a socialist society. Modern Soviet atheist literature included studies aimed at a deeper understanding of the issue of scientific atheism and a precise definition of its place in the system of social and natural sciences, especially in the system of philosophical knowledge. Currently, the study of the connection between the theory and practice of atheism and the development of general problems of communist education is intensifying. Soviet philosophers who study the problems of the theory of scientific atheism face a difficult consequently: to find out how the content of scientific atheism, the forms and methods of its dissemination reflected those profound transformations in all spheres of people's lives that took place in a developed socialist society. One of the results of the development of our country along the socialist path, which predetermined enormous socio-economic and cultural transformations, is the formation and steady growth of mass atheism. The disappearance of antagonistic classes in Soviet Union has led to the fact that the edge of the class struggle is turned outward. An enormous role in the spread of scientific atheism is played by the ideological activity of the Communist Party. Finally, the nature of the development of mass atheism, the content, forms, and methods of its propaganda has been and is being exerted and continues to be exerted by the political position of religious organizations. Questions of the formation of the Marxist-Leninist worldview are constantly at the center of the Party's ideological and educational work, an important part of which is atheistic education. During the development of atheism, it? was associated with the activities of the Union of Militant Atheists, which arose from the cells of the society of friends of the newspaper "Bezbozhnik". The Union of Militant Atheists made a great contribution to the development of the theory and practice of anti-religious propaganda. **Problem statement:** The article focuses on the main question: what was the goal of the Communist Party for the development of atheistic ideology? With the help of what methods and mechanisms did they want to degrade the ideological worldview of the peoples of Central Asia? What role did the intelligentsia of Uzbekistan play in the spread of atheistic ideologies? **Goal:** study and analysis of the socio-political consequences of the spread of atheist ideology in Uzbekistan. Investigating the psychological impact of atheist ideology on the consciousness of the people of Uzbekistan. The aim of the study is to determine the concept of Atheism itself and to establish its relationship and mutual influence with the concepts of secular and religious culture, science, philosophy, religious tolerance, free thought, humanism, skepticism, and materialism, which have not been studied sufficiently to date. **Method and outputs:** Analysis with the help of what methods and mechanisms the leadership of the Communist Party propagated the ataxic worldview and ideology. To clarify this, methods of analysis, synthesis, generalization, induction, and deduction were used.

Keywords: Ideology, Socialism, Communist party, Anti-religious activity, Cultural revolution, Atheism, Muslim clergy, Union of Militant Atheists (UMA).

Öz

Makale, yirminci yüzyılın 30'lu yıllarında Özbekistan'da ateizmin gelişme yollarının, mekanizmalarının ve yöntemlerinin geriye dönük bir analizini sunmaktadır. Özellikle o dönemin komünist dünya görüşünün insanların bilincini nasıl etkilediği ve SSCB'nin eski devletlerinin halklarının ateist eğitiminin ne kadar önemli bir rol oynadığı makalenin ana içeriğini oluşturmaktadır. Dinle mücadele, sosyalist bir toplum inşa etmek için gerekli bir durumdur. O dönemde dini fanatizm ve hurafeler kitlelerin siyasi bilincinin yükselmesine ve sosyalist inşaya aktif katılımlarına engel oluyormuş gibi gösteriliyordu. Modern Sovyet ateist literatüründe, bilimsel ateizm konusunun daha derinlemesine anlaşılması ve sosyal ve doğa bilimleri sistemindeki, özellikle felsefi bilgi sistemindeki yerinin kesin bir tanımına yönelik çalışmalar yer almaktaydı. Bilimsel ateizm teorisinin sorunlarını inceleyen Sovyet filozofları sonuç olarak zor bir zorlukla karşı karşıyadır: Bilimsel ateizmin içeriğinin, yayılma biçimlerinin ve yöntemlerinin, gelişmiş bir dünyada meydana gelen insanların yaşamlarının tüm alanlarındaki derin dönüşümleri nasıl yansıttığını bulmak sosyalist toplum için önemliydi. Ülkemizin muazzam sosyo-ekonomik ve kültürel dönüşümleri önceden belirleyen sosyalist yolda gelişmesinin sonuçlarından biri de kitlesel ateizmin oluşması ve istikrarlı bir şekilde büyümesidir. Sovyetler Birliği'nde karşıt sınıfların ortadan kalkması, sınıf mücadelesinin sınırlarının dışa dönük olmasına yol açmıştır. Bilimsel ateizmin yayılmasında Komünist Partinin ideolojik faaliyeti çok büyük bir rol oynuyor. Son olarak, kitlesel ateizmin gelişiminin doğası, propagandasının içeriği, biçimleri ve yöntemleri, dini örgütlerin siyasi konumu tarafından uygulanmış ve uygulanmakta

ve uygulanmaya devam etmektedir. Marksist-Leninist dünya görüşünün oluşumuna ilişkin sorunlar, önemli bir kısmı ateist eğitim olan Partinin ideolojik ve eğitimsel çalışmasının sürekli merkezinde yer almaktadır. Ateizmin gelişmesi sırasında 'Tanrısızlar' gazetesinin dostları topluluğunun hücrelerinden doğan Militan Ateistler Birliği'nin faaliyetleriyle ilişkilendirildi. Militan Ateistler Birliği, din karşıtı propagandanın teori ve pratiğinin geliştirilmesine büyük katkı sağladı. **Problemin ele alınışı:** Makale şu ana soruya odaklanıyor: Komünist Partinin ateist ideolojiyi geliştirmedeki amacı neydi? Orta Asya halklarının ideolojik dünya görüşünü hangi yöntem ve mekanizmalarla bozmak istediler? Özbekistan aydınları ateist ideolojilerin yayılmasında nasıl bir rol oynadı? **Amaç:** Özbekistan'da ateist ideolojinin yayılmasının sosyo-politik sonuçlarının incelenmesi ve analizi. Ateist ideolojinin Özbekistan halkının bilinci üzerindeki psikolojik etkisinin araştırmak. Özbekistan'daki kitlesel ateizmin sosyal epistemolojik ve psikolojik kökenlerinin araştırılması. Çalışmanın amacı, Ateizm kavramının kendisini belirlemek, bugüne kadar yeterince çalışılmamış olan laik ve dini kültür, bilim, felsefe, dini hoşgörü, özgür düşünce, hümanizm, şüphecilik, materyalizm kavramlarıyla ilişkisini ve karşılıklı etkisini kurmak. **Yöntem ve çıktılar.** Komünist Parti liderliğinin ataksik dünya görüşünü ve ideolojiyi hangi yöntem ve mekanizmalarla yaydığını analiz etme. Bunu açıklığa kavuşturmak için analiz, sentez, genelleme, tümevarım ve tümdengelim yöntemleri kullanıldı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İdeoloji, Sosyalizm, Komünist parti, Din karşıtı faaliyetler, Kültür devrimi, Ateizm, Müslüman din adamları, Militan Ateistler Birliği (UMA).

Introduction

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Muslim clergy opposed the cultural revolution and the measures of the Soviet government and the Communist Party aimed at the socialist reconstruction of industry and agriculture in Uzbekistan.

By our definition, the scientific atheism of the Communist Party is a system of beliefs and values that addresses questions about the existence of gods and other supernatural phenomena. Scientific atheism presupposes natural-scientific, philosophical and historical failure. In the first half of the 20th century, there was a certainty that the scientific atheism of the Communist Party was the spiritual future of society, crowding out all other alternatives.

Therefore, in 1928, the Union of Militant Atheists (UMA) was created in Uzbekistan - a voluntary public organization. Cells of the UMA were organized at enterprises, institutions, collective farms and state farms. Propaganda was carried out taking into account the needs of the population, place, time and specific situation. The national cadres of Uzbekistan received qualified training at the anti-religious departments at the pedagogical universities of Uzbekistan, the departments of Moscow and Leningrad universities, and at the postgraduate course of the Communist Academy in Moscow.

Books on anti-religious topics were published in the republic, the anti-religious magazine "The Atheist" (Khudosizlar in Uzbek) and the newspaper "The Atheist" were published. A variety of atheistic material was also published in other newspapers and magazines.

The painful and traumatic experiences of colonization, for individuals and groups, are often marked by deep emotional scars. The immediate and long-term effects of these experiences must be examined critically, and their implications for the present and future dynamics of religion and politics in post-Soviet Central Asian Societies must be explored. For the purposes of this essay, the "post-Soviet" realities in Uzbekistan (entailing particular events, political processes and structural dynamics), therefore, provide the context for an examination of the Turkistan is,

especially the Uzbeks' discourses on leadership and the cultural and ideological crises facing them as a consequence of this historic event.[1]

1. The effects of scientific-atheistic studies on the public in Uzbekistan in the early 30s

In 1929, the Agit propaganda department of the Central Asian Bureau, in its appeal to the agitators of the communist parties, all the district committees of Uzbekistan and the district councils of the "The Atheist " (Khudosizlar - in Uzbek) union, emphasized that the fight against religion should be systematic and systematic and pointed to necessity, publication of popular anti-religious literature in Uzbek, Turkmen, Kyrgyz and Tajik languages. "Moreover, a number of comrades should be entrusted," this appeal emphasized, with translating from Russian into the local language the most necessary and suitable manuals and books on the anti-religious issue.[2]

In the early 1930s, the works of the leading theoreticians and organizers of the anti-religious movement, E. Yaroslavsky, F. N. Oleshchuk ("Religion and class struggle", "On a campaign against God"), and others, the brochures "Communists and religion", "Leninism against religion".

The ranks of propagandists and theorists of scientific atheism were replenished at the expense of people of local nationalities, especially Uzbeks. These include, first of all, K. Makarov, A. Mustakaev, S. Valiev, X. Fayzi.

In the wide deployment of scientific-atheistic propaganda in Soviet Uzbekistan, a large role belonged to the local press. At a meeting of the working collegium of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in 1929, it was decided, in addition to the mass two-week anti-religious newspaper, to invite all newspaper editorial offices to systematically publish material on anti-religious topics.

The issue of training editors of anti-religious people was devoted to the II All-Union Conference on Personnel, which proposed "to organize a press sector under all republican, regional and district Soviets."[3]

These decisions have been successfully implemented. Already in the memorandum on the results of the work of the Union of Militant Atheists (UMA) for the period from the IV Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (1929) to the V (1930), it was noted that "the circulation of the Atheist magazine increased from 3,000 to 5,300 copies; 14 titles of anti-religious pamphlets were published with a total circulation of 62,000 copies. Since January 1930, a new anti-religious newspaper "The Atheist" has been published, which has grown from 500 to 2100 copies in 4 months.[4]

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[1] Nazıf M. Shahranı, "Islam and the Political Culture of 'Scıentıfıc Atheism' in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Future Predıcament", *Islamic Studies* 33/2-3 (1994), 4.

[2] Uzbekistan Archive (CCCPU), "Party Archive Under The Central Committee of The Communist Party of Uzbekistan", *Communist Party Archive of Uzbekistan*, Fund Number 58, no. 629. (1931), 78.

[3] Uzbekistan Archive (CCCPU). no. 629, 79.

[4] Shuxrat Aliyev. "Uraza is a Weapon of the Class Enemy", *Journal the Atheists.* 9/10 (1932), 45-46.

From year to year, the output of atheistic literature increased in Uzbekistan, and its content deepened. If at first the themes of exposing the counter-revolutionary activities of the clergy prevailed, then in the future its themes became more and more diverse. A large place was given to popular explanations of the most important phenomena of nature and social life, the achievements of science, and the disclosure of the anti-scientific essence of religion. The reasons for the emergence of religion, religious holidays, and their social roots in an exploiting society were explained materialistically.

The greatest harm to socialist construction is caused by religious holidays and rituals, which reduce the labor activity of the working people. The task of combating them dictates the need to clarify the origin of religious holidays, their class essence. This led to the appearance of articles by A. Ismail Zoda, Sh. Aliyev, Kh. Kadyrov.

So, in the article by X. Kadyrov "Whose holiday is Kurban?"[5] it is said that the low level of productive forces, the impotence of man in the struggle with nature gave rise to faith in miracles, God, and devils. "People believed in the existence of souls and, in order to appease them, they were forced to sacrifice all sorts of food to them and ask for support in the most difficult moments of life."[6]

A. Ismail Zoda wrote about the origin and class essence of the Muslim fast and the Uraza holiday in the articles "Uraza", "Ramazan", Sh. Aliyev in the article "Uraza is a weapon of the class enemy"[7] and other authors. They showed that these rituals were used by the ministers of religion as a means of ideological influence on the working masses, inciting fanaticism.

The clarification of the origin and class essence of religious holidays and ceremonies contributed to the liberation of the consciousness of the working people from the influence of religious ideology, increased their labor activity, and the desire for knowledge.

In the 1930s, the anti-Soviet activities of some religious organizations were exposed. In this regard, a meeting of the anti-religious commission under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1929 decided to arrange a show trial of the active leaders of the Namangan religious figures of the Mukhitdin-Ishan group and to widely cover this process in the press.[8] Murod Mustakaev, Xakim Tokhtamyshev, Vladimr Vasilevsky, Sulton Tursunov in the articles revealed the subversive activities of the clergy, its close connection with the Kokand autonomy and the liberation armed group of the local population (Basmachism).

Xamid Kadyrov cites Nazirkhan Tura's group in Ferghana as an example of the counter-revolutionary activities of the Muslim clergy in Uzbekistan. Examining the history of counter-revolutionary activity, the author argues that "both in the period of the civil war, and in the

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[5] Xamid Kadyrov, "The Sufism (Mysticism) and Bourgeois-Nationalist Counter-Revolution". "Khudosizlar", *Journal the Atheist* 8 (1932), 7-3.

[6] Kadyrov, "The Sufism (Mysticism) and Bourgeois-Nationalist Counter-Revolution", 3-4.

[7] Ismail Zoda Aliyev, "Uraza & Ramazan", *Journal the Atheist* 9/10 (1932), 45- 46.

[8] Uzbekistan Archive (CCCPU), no, 629, 78.

period of restoration, and in the period of socialist reconstruction, and always, religion and the clergy fulfilled their historical task of serving the oppressors."[9]

Articles by Xakim Tokhtamyshev ("October and Religion") [10], Mixail Bagaev ("Religion and the Danger of War") [11] and Shuxrat Aliyev ("October and Religion") [12] were devoted to the consideration of the counter-revolutionary activities of the clergy[13], which tells about how the leaders of sects and the clergy assisted in suppressing the revolution of 1905, in unleashing the first world imperialist war, about their anti-Soviet activities in the post-October period.

A. Mukhammedov writes about the reactionary role of religion in the capitalist countries in the article "Islamism is a tool for the exploitation of labor power in the hands of the imperialists."[14]

At the beginning of 1935, the newspaper Kyzyl Uzbekistan published a detailed report on the trial of a counter-revolutionary group of clergy headed by Pireshan Abdumutali, who operated in the Ferghana Valley. The same process was covered in the articles "Under the mask of holiness" by Yur Arbat, "Counter-revolutionary under the mask of "jakhriya" and "zikr" Yumai, "The class face of the Ishans in the past and present" by A. M. Gurevich. All of them revealed the essence of this organization, which aimed to overthrow the Soviet power in the village through the collapse of collective farms. They held religious celebrations and talks, the so-called "dhikr", "jahriya", for which they managed to gather 300-400 people. "Their line of conduct," wrote Yuri Arbat, "was dictated by the leaders of the Basmachi gangs, Kurshermat and Islam kurbashi, and mullahs Abdul-Gaziz Maksum and Mulla Dekhkan, who fled abroad, but did not lose contact with their agents."[15]

2. The ideologists of Islam and bourgeois nationalism

The ideologists of Islam and bourgeois nationalism, dividing people along religious lines and calling for "the brotherhood of all Muslims", undermined the class solidarity of the working people and divided them.

One of the most widespread forms of bourgeois nationalism in the republics of Central Asia, Tataria and some other regions of the country was the so-called Sultan Aliyevshchina. Sultan Aliyev was going to organize the Turanian state, which was to include Tataria, Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia. His supporters wanted to create their own party, where the leading role was to be played by the Muslim clergy and the nationalist pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist intelligentsia.

The issue of the close alliance of the Sultan-Aliyevshchina with religion was the subject of several articles in the journal Khudosizlar. They convincingly show how the Sultan-Aliyevites are trying

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[9]   Kadyrov, "Khudosizlar", 7-13.

[10]   Xakim Tokhtamyshev, "October and Religion", Journal *the Atheist* 1 (1931), 17-18.

[11]   Mixail Bagaev, "Religion and the Danger of War", *Journal the Atheist* 2 (1932), 19-20.

[12]   Aliyev, "Uraza is a weapon of the class enemy", 45-46.

[13]   Tokhtamyshev, "October and Religion", 21-22.

[14]   Anvar Mukhammedov, "Islamism is a Tool for the Exploitation of Labor Power in the Hands of the Imperialists", *Journal the Atheist* 4 (1932), 31-33.

[15]   Arbat Yur, "Counter-Revolutionary Under the Mask of 'Jakhriya'", Newspaper *Pravda Vostoka*. 1 (1935), 32.

to destroy the union of peoples and create an Islamic republic. M. Kobetsky writes: "If the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, uniting the masses, calls for a fight against the exploiters, then the Sultan - Aliyevs also call for a "fight" against the oppressors, but the only difference is who these oppressors are. In the opinion of the Sultan - Aliyevs, the oppressors are not the imperialists, not the bourgeoisie, but Europeans, including Russians and others.

Criticism of the nationalist ideology was of great importance in educating the Soviet people in the spirit of fraternal friendship, proletarian internationalism, and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

Along with counter-revolutionary speeches, the Muslim clergy resorted to the tactics of opportunism. The renovationists began to talk about the democratic tendencies of the Quran, and the founder of Islam, Muhammad, began to be credited with the features of a revolutionary figure and defender of the working people.

The central journals of the Atheist, Anti-Religious, Revolution and Culture pointed out that only a scientific, Marxist study of the problems of Islam could give our anti-redigests a reliable weapon for fighting open counter-revolutionaries and religious opportunists.

The journal Revolution and Culture wrote in 1930: "We believe that the study of the social roots and ideological content of religion in the USSR is the main, top priority task for the scientific formulation of anti-religious propaganda", and The "anti-religious" in 1931 pointed out the need for a complete turn of the organizations of the Union of Militant Atheists to issues of an ideological order, to introduce Marxist-Leninist views into the minds of those millions who break with religion.

In contrast to the statements of the clergy about the eternity of religion, about the divine origin of Islam, in many articles and books devoted to this issue, the historical nature of religion is revealed, its emergence is explained by completely earthly reasons. In the articles "Religion and the birth and destruction of God."

Tokhtamyshev and "How the Ideas of Heaven and Hell Were Born" (the author is not specified), the authors proceeded from the fact that religion is a product of certain social relations.

In the articles "The Origin of Islam and Its Class Essence" by S. Bekbulatov and "The Emergence of the Religion of Islam and Sectarianism" by an unknown author, it is explained that Islam arose in the 7th century. as an ideological reflection of those processes in the economic and political life of the peoples of the Arabian Peninsula, which accompanied the transition of the Arab peoples from the primitive communal system to a class society.

Along with the coverage of the question of the origin of religion, the question of the harmfulness of religious ideas was considered. The article "Let's Expose the Class Essence of Religious Demagogy" (author not specified) says that religion, promising heavenly bliss to workers after death, dooms them to passivity and hopelessness, and distracts them from social and political life.

Rajabzoda's article "Religion is the opium of the people" states that the doctrines of fate, fate and predestination aim to force the working people to patiently endure all kinds of oppression and humiliation, to be obedient slaves of the possessors.

Reasoning about the advantages of poverty, abstinence and patience is most fully manifested in the mystical teachings of Sufism - one of the sects of the Muslim religion. X. Kadyrov in his book "Sufism (mysticism) and bourgeois-nationalist counter-revolution" deeply scientifically and vividly showed its reactionary meaning. Mysticism, the author asserts, is inherent to a certain extent in every religion. But Sufism sets a goal for a person not only to reach paradise, renouncing earthly goods, but also to merge directly with the deity, immersing himself in himself.

The visible world, according to Sufism, is illusory, it is only a reflection of the properties and qualities of the divine absolute. Refuting this position, Kh. Kadyrov materialistically solves the main question of philosophy, draws correct theoretical conclusions. "Out of dead nature," he says, "life was born, out of life a thinking being was born." Spiritual phenomena are a property of highly organized matter, the brain.

In exposing the religious interpretation of mental phenomena, the article "Against Religious Idealistic and Mechanistic Concepts of the "Soul", which emphasizes the class essence of the religious doctrine of the soul, played an important role. "Faith in the eternity of the soul and a better life after death lulls the revolutionary vigilance of the oppressed: classes, demagnetizes them in organizing the struggle to improve their life not in "heaven", but on earth". All the works that refute the myth of the "immortality of the soul" contributed to the assertion in the minds of people of the provisions of dialectical materialism. Gradually, anti-religious propaganda rose to a new level of struggle for the broad propaganda of the scientific worldview. The effectiveness of atheistic propaganda increased as the achievements of science were popularized. In the work of Keldibek Khodiy "The Contradictions of the Koran to Science", the articles of Domaviev "Copernicus and the Clergy" and the unknown author "How science studies natural phenomena" refuted religious ideas about the origin of the world, earth, stars and planets, plants, animals and man, their contradiction to the data of science is shown.

In the brochures of Abdulla Shunosy "The Origin of the World", Rashidhon "The Origin of Life and Man on Earth"[16], Shawkat Domaviev "Where Did Living Beings Come From?"[17], Muminjon Alimov "What are the Basic Substances of Life?", B.A. Keller "The Origin of Man"[18], Gremyatsky "Did man come from a monkey"[19], a reasoned criticism of these religious views was given. Literature about the origin of the world, life and man armed the working masses with scientific knowledge and exposed the absurdity of religious myths.

For the first time in the history of mankind, a scientific worldview based on an understanding of the objective laws of nature and society became the property of the broad masses of the people in many countries.

So, atheism in the Soviet era viewed religion as an illusion, and in the 20th century it became widespread in almost all states of the post-Soviet space. It is a variety of forms of denial of religious ideas and the assertion of moral values of a person. Unlike, for example, Christianity, which has a

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[16]   Igor Gordleyevsky, "The Cult of Saints in Islam", *Journal the Atheist* (1938), 46-47.

[17]   Ilya Klimovich, *Islam*, (Moscow: Publishing house, Knowledge, 1962), 264.

[18]   Tamara Mazitova, *The Highest Standard of Living*, (Tashkent: Publishing house, Knowledge, 1962), 21-23.

[19]   Sergei Alexandrovich Tokarev, *Religions of different peoples in the past and present.* (Moscow: Publishing house, Knowledge, 1961), 3- 4.

god, symbols, etc., atheism does not even have a god. This is the only sign of atheism. Also, in modern atheism there are many problems, both external and internal, which are associated with the growth of conflict. The most serious are external conflicts, and they are associated with the methods of state regulation.

In the conditions of a mature socialist society, the development of mass atheism in our country has entered a new period, which can be characterized as a period of scientific atheistic education. At the same time, the concepts of "scientific atheism" arose, replacing "godlessness" and "atheistic propaganda" instead of "anti-religious propaganda".

During this period, the institutionalization of scientific atheism in the field of higher education took place. The main institutions are: (1) the introduction in universities, pedagogical, agricultural and medical universities of the course "Fundamentals of Scientific Atheism" as a compulsory academic discipline, and in other universities - in the form of elective classes; (2) textbooks and teaching aids for this course, written taking into account higher education specialties; (3) curricula for this discipline, developed in three versions: the main program for all universities, the program for philosophy departments of universities, the program for pedagogical institutes; (4) the creation of departments in universities that provide teaching of the "Fundamentals of Scientific Atheism."[20]

The practice of forming a system for teaching scientific atheism in the country's universities showed that even with constant control by the bodies of the CPSU and the presence of mandatory governing documents, difficulties in their implementation constantly arose in all four basic institutions of this system. Not all universities had the opportunity to create appropriate departments1 or additional specialized existing departments of social sciences[21]. Most often, there was simply a lack of teaching staff competent in the subject; the beginning of the training of scientific and scientific-pedagogical workers in graduate school (specialty: 625 - Scientific atheism) began to replenish these personnel, but did not eliminate the problem of their shortage.

Conclusion

"As the entire economic and political life of society, which began as a result of the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, was transformed, the reasons for the preservation of the religious beliefs of many peoples were eliminated, they more and more gave way to scientifically materialistic views of the world. This is the result of the strong influence of the ideology of the Communist Party, Leninism and Marxism".[22]

The Soviet educational system, probably the most successful Soviet enterprise in Central Asia, claims to have achieved almost one hundred percent literacy in the region. It was the principal

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[20]   Ivan Petrov, "Scientific Atheism", *Questions of history* 58/9 (1967), 3-11.

[21]   Mixail Volkov, *On the Ideological Work of The CPSU: Collection. Dokuments*. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), 309-310.

[22]   Vladimir Tannenbaum, "About the Features of the Nationwide State", *Jounal Soviet state and law* 2 (1932), 32-33.

means for implementation of Soviet linguistic policies and inculcation of Soviet values of Marxism/Leninism, "scientific atheism" and "international socialist brotherhood".[23]

One of the results of our country's development along the socialist path, which predetermined enormous socio-economic and cultural transformations, is the formation and growth of mass atheism. The ideological activities of the Communist Party play a huge role in the spread of scientific atheism. Lenin considered the atheistic orientation of philosophy to be a sign of partisanship and called the fight against religion the ABC of materialism. Finally, the political position of religious organizations has had and continues to have a significant influence on the nature of the development of mass atheism, on the content, forms and methods of its propaganda.

Thus, a voluntary public organization - the Union of Militant Atheists played a big role in promoting atheistic ideologies among the population, and they also collected secret materials about those who were related to religion.[24]

It should be emphasized that at this time many countries located on the territory of the former Soviet Union entered a period of extensive construction of a communist society. Therefore, the communist worldview becomes universal. Soviet anti-religious propagandists thought that the surviving religious prejudices and superstitions of many peoples sometimes still prevent people from fully manifesting their creative powers within the framework of communist ideology. They believed that the long-term program outlined by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU created favorable opportunities for the final overcoming of religious vestiges.

They were in the hope that in the process of building communism the Soviet people would become more and more convinced of the unlimited possibilities of human progress. The launch of artificial earth satellites and space rockets, the world's first spacecraft with a man on board, outstanding achievements in the peaceful use of nuclear energy irrefutably prove the complete failure of the religious worldview.

And so, summing up the above, we can say that the anti-religious activity of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was part of the ideological work. They tried to erase religion and religious values from the consciousness of people. For this reason, they developed various methods of work with the population, aimed at instilling the ideology of the Communist Party into the minds of the people.[25] Uzbekistan was captured and vassal for 130 years by Tsarist Russia and Communist Bolsheviks. However, they failed to break faith in religion. Although they brutally killed and shot people who knew religious knowledge or those who had a book in Arabic. They could not distinguish religious books from ordinary handwritten books. Therefore, ordinary people were repressed and shot.

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[23]   William K. Medlin - William Cave - Finley Carpenter, *Education and Development in Central Asia: A Case Study of Social Change in Uzbekistan* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971). 20

[24]   Peter Quartz, *Questions of the Political Organization of Soviet society.* (Moscow: Publishing house, Knowledge, 1962), 63-64.

[25]   Alexander Lepeshkin, "Program Of The CPSU and Some Questions of The Theory of The Socialist State". *Journal. Soviet state and law* 2 (1932), 12-13.

Assessing how to address and remedy the misfortunes of history, individually and collectively, will be in order, and small steps are being taken. A remarkable consensus is emerging, at least in Uzbekistan and perhaps in other countries also, about ways to address post-Soviet Central Asian predicaments. It is a call for a new kind of education. As to what specific type of education, there are two broad trends reflecting the exaggerated urban-rural and secular (atheistic)-Islamic cleavages produced by the Soviet colonial experience. The highly educated, secularized, substantially Russianized and atheistic urban segments wish to rely on Western secular education (ala Turkish Kemalist model) while the rural population and those with strong rural roots are intent on rediscovering Islam and Muslim knowledge and practices first, then combining these with modern scientific education.

No matter how strong or effective the propaganda work of the party members was, in the deep minds of people, especially the intelligentsia, religious worldviews, knowledge, values and rituals remain. They cannot be completely erased or destroyed.

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The Transformation of Radjʿa Doctrine of Shiʿa: A Case Study on the Nusayrīs, the Druzes and the Bābī-Bahāīs

Şiʿaʼnın Ricʿat Doktrininin Dönüşümü: Nusayrî, Dürzî, Bâbî ve Bahâîler Üzerine Bir Olgu İncelemesi

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The Transformation of Radjʿa Doctrine of Shiʿa: A Case Study on the Nusayrīs, the Druzes and the Bābī-Bahāīs

Abstract

As one of the main tenets of mainstream Shiʿa, the *radjʿa* doctrine is potentially open to radical interpretations. In the background of this belief, the concept of *ghayba* (occultation) with the special meaning attributed to it has vital importance. According to the Imāmiyya or Twelve Imams (Ithnā ʿAshʿariyya) Shiʿism, which has survived to date within Shiʿism and constitutes the vast majority of them, the twelfth imam, Muhammad b. al-Hasan went into major occultation in 941. According to this doctrine, it is believed that one day the hidden imam will return and rule over the whole world, which is filled with injustice. In fact, examples of the belief in *radjʿa* can be traced back to earlier periods. In the early history of Islam, some extreme sects (*ghulāt*) emerged by claiming the immortality of important figures such as, ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib (d. 40/661) and his son Husayn (d. 61/680). The 10th century also became the scene of such claims among Shiʿa such as the return of the hidden imam, Muhammad b. al-Hasan who is believed to be in occultation and will one day reappear to guide all humanity. This study examines three sub-sects of Shiʿism, namely the Nusayrīs, the Druzes and the Bābī-Bahāīs that all interpret the doctrine of *radjʿa* from a gnostic point of view. The first two emerged in the tenth century simultaneously, while the Bābī-Bahāīs in the nineteenth. It is worth to note here that the concept of *bāb* has played the mediating role in the approach to the *radjʿa* doctrine. Ibn al-Nusayr, the founder of the Nusayrī sect, put forward a ground breaking approach to the doctrine by declaring himself as the gateway to the eleventh and twelfth imam. In addition, the belief in the incarnation of God's soul into the body of ʿAli, and later on its transfer to bodies of the imams until it reached the twelfth imam, spread. The Druzes focused directly on the divinity of al-Hakīm bi-Amrillah rather than on the concept of *bāb*. The Bābīs and Bahāʾīs, on the other hand, interpreted the doctrine of *radjʿa* on the basis of the concept of *bāb* and the claim of messiahship, and a new religion. Especially, the Nusayrīs and the Druzes interpreted *radjʿa* phenomenon and transformed it into *hulūl* (incarnation) and *tanāsukh* (metempsychosis). The Bābī-Bahāī community, however, transformed the doctrine of *radjʿa* into the doctrine of prophethood by refusing the termination of the prophethood with the prophet Muhammad. Thus, they claim to be a new religion that abolishes the rules of previous religions. The purpose of this study is to analyse the way in which the selected sub-sects of Shiʿa have approached the doctrine of *radjʿa* and the extent of their interpretation of this phenomenon.

Keywords: Shiʿa, the Nusayrīs, the Druzes, the Bābīsm-Bahāīsm, Radjʿa, Hulūl, Tanāsukh.

Öz

Şiâ'nın temel inanç ilkelerinden biri olan ricʿat doktrini potansiyel olarak radikal yorumlara olanak sunmaktadır. Ricʿat inanışının arka planında gaybet anlayışı ve ona yüklenen insan üstü özel mana son derece hayati öneme sahiptir. Şiîlik içerisinde günümüze ulaşan ve Şiîlerin büyük çoğunluğunu oluşturan İmâmiyye ya da On iki İmam (İsnâ aşeriyye) Şiîliğine göre, on ikinci imam Muhammed b. el-Hasan, 941 yılında büyük gaybete gitmiştir. Bu doktrinle, gizli imamın bir gün geri döneceğine, zulüm ve haksızlıklarla dolu olan tüm dünyayı adaletle hükmedeceğine ve refaha ulaştıracağına inanılır. Esasında ricʿat inanışıyla ilgili ortaya atılan iddiaları daha erken dönemlere götürmek mümkündür. İslam tarihinin erken dönemlerinde, Ali b. Ebi Talib (ö. 40/661) ve oğlu Hüseyin (ö. 61/680) gibi önemli şahsiyetlerin ölümsüzlüğünü iddia eden bazı radikal mezhepler (gulât) ortaya çıkmıştır. Onuncu yüzyıl da yine Şiîler arasında gaybette olduğuna ve tüm insanlığa rehberlik etmek üzere bir gün yeniden ortaya çıkacağına inanılan gizli imam Muhammed b. el-Hasan'ın dönüşüne dair bu tür iddialara sahne olmuştur. Bu çalışmada Şiâ içerisinde ortaya çıkmış üç alt grup olan Nusayrîler, Dürzîler ile Bâbî ve Bahâîler'in ricʿat doktrinine yükledikleri anlam incelenmektedir. İlk ikisi eş zamanlı olarak onuncu yüzyılda, Bâbî ve Bahâîler ise on dokuzuncu yüzyılda ortaya çıkmıştır. Ricʿat doktrinine yaklaşımda bâb kavramının aracılık görevini üstlendiğini ifade etmek gerekir. Nusayrî fırkasının kurucusu Muhammed b. Nusayr en-Nemîrî (ö. 270/883), kendisini on birinci ve on ikinci imama açılan kapı olarak ilan ederek ricʿat doktrinine ezber bozan bir yaklaşım ortaya koymuştur. Buna ilaveten, tanrının ruhunun Hz. Ali'nin bedeninde zuhur ettiği, sonrasında da bu ruhun on ikinci imama gelinceye kadar imamların bedenlerine intikal ettiği inancı yayılmıştır. Dürzîler bâb kavramından ziyade doğrudan Hakim Biemrillah'ın ulûhiyyetine odaklanmışlardır. Bâbî ve Bahâîler ise bâb kavramı temel olmak üzere mehdilik ve yeni bir din olma iddiasıyla ricʿat doktrinini te'vil etmişlerdir. Özellikle Nusayrî ve Dürzîler ricʿat inanışını yorumlayarak bunu hulûl ve tenasühe dönüştürmüşlerdir. Bâbî ve Bahâîler ise nübüvvet vazifesinin Hz. Muhammed ile son bulduğu inanışını reddederek ricʿat anlayışını nübüvvete dönüştürmüşlerdir. Böylece onlar, önceki dinlerin hükümlerini ortadan kaldıran yeni bir din olma iddiasında bulunmaktadırlar. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Şiîlik içerisinden neş'et ederek ortaya çıkmış yukarda adı geçen mezheplerin ricʿat doktrinine nasıl yaklaştıklarını ve bu olguyu ne olarak yorumladıklarını ortaya koymaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Şiâ, Nusayrîler, Dürzîler, Bâbî ve Bahâîler, Ricʿat, Hulûl, Tenasüh.

Introduction

The expected saviour belief is not peculiar to the Muslims, it rather exists among other religions and cultures of the world. From Jews and Christians to Buddhists and Hindus they all have similar approaches to the expected saviour albeit some differences are available.[1] Within the Islamic context, it can be traced back to the first century of the Islamic calendar that proclaims on the expected saviour were raised. Figures, such as Abdullah b. Saba' and Mukhtar b. Abī 'Ubayd al-Thaqafī (d. 67/687) played pivotal role in discussing the need for a divine mission for ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib (d. 40/661) and his family. Thus, some extreme views, such as drawing similarities between the creator and the created, and seeing some divine characteristics on humans arose amongst the Muslim community. These proclaims and approaches were called as *ghulūw* (lit. extreme) and as an adjective of that term, *ghalī* (p. *ghulāt*) groups and sects emerged in Islamic history. Thereby, they were considered as heretics due to their extremist ideas. Such views were generally accepted by some *ghulāt* sects, namely Saba'iyya, Kāmiliyya, Albāiyya, Mughīriyya, Mansūriyya, Khattābiyya, Kayyāliyya, Hishāmiyya, Nuʿmāniyya, Yūnusiyya, Nusayrīyya and Ishāqiyya.[2] These ghulāt sects are mainly associated with Shiʿa community, which is confirmed by Shiʿī heresiographers, such as al-Qummī (d. 301/913-4) and al-Nawbakhtī (d. 310/922) with their extremist ideas.[3]

It is commonly known that the Shiʿa with three main branches namely, Zaydiyya, Ismāʿīlīyya and Imāmīyya has survived to the present day and all constitutes a minority within the whole Muslim community. Within this minority, there has been much turmoil and divergence throughout Shiʿa history. One of the doctrinal disagreements that has existed within the Shiʿa is the *radjʿa.* The word of *radjʿa* literally means "return" and it is generally attributed to the return of an imam into the earth in order to revive and establish a reign of justice before the end of the world.[4] It is corelated with the term of *mahdī* (lit. rightly guided one) that he has been expected by many Shiʿa groups to come to the earth and save people persecuted over the centuries. The *radjʿa* has a base called *ghayba*, which means absence from the creation and presence with God.[5] The term *ghayba* has a specific meaning among the main branch of Shiʿīsm, Imāmīyya or *Ithnā-Ashʿariyya* (Twelvers), that the last imam Muhammad b. al-Hasan is in occultation and is expected to reappear in eschatological times.[6] It has two phases: minor occultation lasted from 260/874 to 329/941, during which the last imam maintained his authority over the community through his four emissaries (*sufarā*) and from that date on he went on to the major occultation. Over the years, this expectation became one of the basic principles in the belief of the mainstream Shiʿī community (Twelvers). Sometimes, however, heretical approaches were observed within the

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[1]   Ömer Faruk Harman, "Beklenen Kurtarıcı İnancının İslâm Öncesi Dinî Arka Planı", *Beklenen Kurtarıcı İnancı*, ed. Yusuf Şevki Yavuz (İstanbul: Kuramer Yayınları, 2017), 44.

[2]   Abu'l-Fath Tâcuddîn Muhammad b.ʿAbd al-Karim al-Shahrastani, *al-Milal wa'l-Nihal* (Damascus: Muassasah al-Risalah Nashirun, 2015), 192–205.

[3]   Abu Muhammad Hasan b. Musa b. Hasan al-Nawbakhtī - Saʿd b. Abdullah al-Qummī, *Kitab Al-Firaq al-Shiʿa* (Istanbul: Matbaat al-Dawla, 1931), 49–75.

[4]   Etan Kohlberg, "Radj'a", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, ed. C.E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 8/371–372.

[5]   D.B. Macdonald, "Ghayba", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, ed. B. Lewis et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 2/1026.

[6]   S.H. Nasr, "Ithna-Ashariyya", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, ed. B. Lewis et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 3/277.

Shiᶜa that *mahdī* candidates emerged and claimed initially representing the imam (*al-mahdī*), then the soul of ᶜAlī b. Abī Tālib transmigrating through the imams to himself, and even God's incarnation (*hulūl*) with themselves.

Previous research indicates that various sub-sects within Shiᶜa have approached the *radjᶜa* phenomenon in different ways and have shown a variety of tendencies.[7] One of the recent studies examines the relationship between *radjᶜa* and *ghayba* in earlier *ghulāt* sects of Shiᶜa. It deals mainly with the Saba'iyya, Kāysaniyya, Jārudiyya, Baqīriyya, Jaᶜfariyya, Nāwusiyya, Mūsawiyya, Ismāᶜīlīyya, and some others that emerged with the death of the eleventh imam Hasan al-ᶜAskarī in 873.[8] It seems some went astray and were called as *ghulāt* since claiming mythical arguments, such as that ᶜAlī did not die in 661 and is waiting to return to the earth. Saba'iyya and Kāysaniyya can be given as examples of that early proclaim.[9] As regards as with the earlier eschatological doctrines including *radjᶜa*, *ghayba*, and *mahdī*, Daftary points out that although early radical Shiᶜītes and their free religious speculations were accepted as innovation (*bidᶜa*) by the Imāmīyya, the criteria of exaggeration changed over time. As a result, approaches towards these notions amongst Shiᶜītes were no longer considered as an exaggeration.[10] Because it harms to the doctrine of the imamate, which is closely related with the *radjᶜa* doctrine. As a raison d'être, the imamate doctrine is one of the main tenets of the Imamī Shiᶜa that ᶜAli and his descendants are in charge with maintaining this role until the end of the world.[11] According to the Imāmīyya, the last Imam Muhammad b. Hasan is believed to be in occultation and as being *mahdī* "the rightly guided one" he will one day return "to fill the earth with justice, as it is now filled with injustice."[12] This is one of the main pillars of the Imāmīyya[13] that whoever rejects this doctrine is not a Shiᶜīte.[14] However, some other sects also emerged within Shiᶜa, claiming that the spirit of God was incarnated (*hulūl*) into their leaders, and then it transmigrated (*tanāsukh*) through imams to their leaders. Since the time of the last imam, three extremist sects within Shiᶜa are known, namely the Nusayrīyya, the Druzes, and more recently the Bābīs-Bahāīs, with the above exaggerated claims. As a result, the main aim of this study is to examine how the *radjᶜa* doctrine was transformed into the doctrine of incarnation and transmigration in these three *ghulāt* sects. The relationship between idea and fact is the main impulse of this study, which is commonly used in researching within the discipline of

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7   al-Nawbakhtī - al-Qummī, *Kitab Al-Firaq al-Shiᶜa*, 41-5-; Abū al-Hasan ᶜAlī ibn Ismāᶜīl ibn Isḥāq al-Ashᶜarī, *Maqālāt al-islāmīyīn wa-ihtilāf al-musallīn* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1963), 46; Abu Mansur Abdulqahir b. Tahir b. Muhammad al-Tamimī Abdulqahir al-Baghdādī, *Al-Farq Bayna'l-Firāq Wa Bayānu'l Firqah al-Nājiya Minhum* (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth, 1995), 255–271; William Montgomery Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Oxford: Oneworld, 1998), 59–61.

8   Halil İbrahim Bulut, "Şii Fırkalarda Gaybet ve Ric'at İnancı", *İslâmiyât Dergisi* 8/1 (2004), 144–152.

9   al-Nawbakhtī - al-Qummī, *Kitab Al-Firaq al-Shiᶜa*, 19–20.

10   Farhad Daftary, *A History of Shi'i Islam* (London: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 2013), 40.

11   Abu Abdullah Ibn al-Muallim Muhammad al-Shaikh al-Mufīd, *Awāilu'l-Maqālāt* (Qumm: al-Mu'tamar al-ᶜAlamī li-Alfiya al-Shaikh al-Mufīd, 1992), 41.

12   Heinz Halm, *Shi'a Islam: From Religion to Revolution*, trans. Allison Brown (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997), 35.

13   al-Shaikh al-Sadūq Abū Jaᶜfar Muhammad b. ᶜAli b. Husain Ibn Babawayh al-Qūmmī, *Al-Iᶜtiqadāt* (Qumm: al-Mu'tamar al-ᶜAlamī li-Alfiya al-Shaikh al-Mufīd, 1992), 60.

14   Ibrahim al-Musawī al-Zanjānī, *Aqāid al-Imāmiyya al-Ithnā As'ariyyā* (Qumm: Qumm Intisharat Hadrat Mahdî, 1984), 2/240.

the history of Islamic sects. This research is limited to merely the three *ghulāt* sects of Shiʿa, though some radical sects, for example Yazīdiyya(Ezidis), has emerged within Sunnism claiming similar arguments. While studying such doctrinal aspect of the selected sub-sects, this study suggests further understanding of these sects by examining their theological arguments on *radjʿa* doctrine.

1. Radjʿa doctrine in Shiʿa and its transformation into hulūl and tanāsukh

The idea of the returning imam among Shiʾa beliefs can be traced back to the first century of Islam, when such names as Abdullah b. Saba' and Mukhtar al-Thaqafī come to mind, who raised the *ghayba* claims for ʿAli b. Abī Tālib and Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya, respectively. From that time until the third century of Islam, many voices were heard in relation to the *radjʿa* doctrine.[15] For instance, in Imāmī branch of Shiʾism, the death of the sixth imam Jaʿfar al-Sādiq (d. 148/765) led to the first major split within Shiʾism. In addition to Ismāʿīlīyya and Imāmīyya, some believed that Imam Jaʿfar did not die and still alive being hidden, waiting one day to return triumphantly.[16] Both in the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, the Shiʿa community organised several revolts against the state authority claiming the right to rule the Muslim community that God had given to the descendants of ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib. Until the eleventh imam Hasan al-Askarī, they never became formal political leader of the whole Muslim community. They were rather regarded as spiritual leader for the Muslim community by Shiʿīte believers. According to them, the last imam Muhammad al-Mahdī is in occultation and he will return in a day. Consequently, over the years *radjʿa* became one of the main tenets of Imāmī Shiʿītes.[17] It is not only about the return of the *imam*, but also does good and evil communities include in eschatological times. According to the Imāmī Shiʿītes, this term is mainly associated with the role of the last imam, Muhammad al-Mahdī, as saviour of the world.

Halm and Brown acknowledge that in its formative period, "Shiʿīsm fluctuated several times between the model of an incarnate, present imam and that of an absent 'hidden' imam, before the 'occultation' model finally found widespread acceptance."[18] The Shiʿītes historically approached to the occultation model from different aspects resulting in further schism. Al-Qummī and al-Nawbakhtī gave an account on the fragmentation of the Shiʿītes. For instance, with the death of Hasan al-Askarī, the Shiʿīte community divided into fourteen or fifteen groups that some of which rejected the death of al-Askarī by ending the imamate line with him as *qāim imam* and believed in his occultation; some accepted his death and followed his brother Jaʿfar as the successor *imam*; and some believed that Hasan al-Askarī had a son named Muhammad who was not commonly known due to security reasons, and they accepted him as the successor *imam*. According to the imamate tradition, it is impossible for an imam not to appoint his successor, nor is the earth without an *imam*. Thus, the Imamiyya established the doctrine of *radjʿa* on the occultation and return of the last imam Muhammad based on traditions and historical events developed over the

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[15] Abu Muhammad b. Ali b. Ahmad b. Saed al-Zahiri Ibn Hazm, *Al-Fasl Fi'l-Milāl Wa'l-Ahwa' Wa'l-Nihāl* (Beirut: Dār al-Jeyl, 1996), 5/34–37.

[16] Halm, *Shiʾa Islam: From Religion to Revolution*, 24.

[17] al-Sadūq, *Al-Iʿtiqadāt*, 60–63; al-Shaikh al-Mufīd, *Awāilu'l-Maqālāt*, 46.

[18] Halm, *Shiʾa Islam: From Religion to Revolution*, 24–25.

years.[19] At that time, another contemporary heresiography writer, al-Ashˁarī (d. 324/935-6) pointed out that Shiˁīte community divided into two groups on the subject of *radjˁa*: one is the majority of them, who claimed that the return to life of some dead people, whatever happened to the sons of Israel, similar things would happen to the community of the Prophet Muhammad. The other group went an extreme side by denying the end of life and resurrection. They argued that a soul would travel from body to body, and if it is good one, it reaches to the best place. If it is evil, it is transferred to the bodies in which his soul will suffer pain and harm. Thus, the world will continuously go on like this forever.[20]

As regards as the occultation and possible types of return of the imam, some Shiˁītes have interpreted the situation radically differing from the mainstream Shiˁa society. The Nusayrīs, the Druzes and the Bābī-Bahāī community are subject to this study, particularly have approached this phenomenon and brought about new ideas to the *radjˁa* doctrine that transformed into *hulūl* (incarnation) and *tanāsukh* (metempsychosis). Before examining the views of these sects, it is useful here to give a brief definition of these two terms, *hulūl* and *tanāsukh*. The former can be defined as "infusion, the indwelling of God in a creature."[21] In other words, it means the transfer of the divine essence or attributes to a human being. The latter is used in so-called 'heresiographical' literature to denote the concept of transmigration. It has two specific usage: transmigration of spirits from one body to another (metempsychosis) and transmigration of a divine element from one imam to another.[22] There is a close relationship between these two concepts since they include metaphysical elements as well as meaning. Whereas, the most obvious difference seems to be on the identity: *hulūl* is essentially from God to human; while *tanāsukh* varies from human to human, from human to animal, plants, and so on.

1.1. The Nusayrīs and their understanding of the radjˁa doctrine

The Nusayrīs (ˁAlawītes) broke away from the mainstream of Shiˁīsm at the end of the ninth century and established an esoteric theology under the leadership of Muhammad b. Nusayr al-Namīrī (d. 270/883). He lived in the time of the tenth and eleventh imams, namely ˁAlī al-Hādī (d. 254/868) and Hasan al-ˁAskarī (d. 260/874). Ibn Nusayr was known with his extreme views among Shiˁa. He initially claimed the prophethood for himself saying that ˁAlī al-Hādī was god. He also made some other extraordinary claims such as, believing in metempsychosis and making prohibitions lawful, including marriage between man and man (homosexuality).[23] He then declared being the *bāb* of the eleventh *imam*. During minor occultation, therefore he was one of main candidates who conducted emissary role between the hidden *imam* and the Shiˁa society at that time.[24] As a consequence of his extreme views, he was considered by the main stream Shiˁa community as heretical and excommunicated. This sect was initially called al-Namirīyya in reference to its founder. Early heresiographical works written by al-Kummī, al-Nawbakhtī, and

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[19]   al-Nawbakhtī - al-Qummī, *Kitab Al-Firaq al-Shiˁa*, 97–109.

[20]   al-Ashˁarī, *Maqālāt al-islāmīyīn wa-ihtilāf al-musallīn*, 46.

[21]   L. Massignon - [G.C. Anawati], 'Hulūl', *Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, ed. B. Lewis et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 3/571.

[22]   D. Gimaret, 'Tanasukh', *The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, ed. P.J. Bearman et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 10/182.

[23]   al-Nawbakhtī - al-Qummī, *Kitab Al-Firaq al-Shiˁa*, 95.

[24]   Yaron Friedman, *The Nusayri-'Alawis: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 75.

Abu al-Hasan al-Ashʿarī gave this name, but later the Nusayrī affiliation was used to identify this sect.[25] Today, members of that sect prefer to be called as Alawī since 1924, when an insider Muhammad Amin Ghalib al-Tawīl published a book called "History of the Alawites" (*Tāʾrikh al-ʿAlāwiyyūn*).[26]

Relevant literature suggests that the Nusayrīyya sect, although originating among the Shiʿa Muslims, has a cosmogony of a gnostic nature derived from pagan, Christian, and Islamic traditions, particularly the early Shiʿī *ghulāt* and the esoteric approach of Ismāʿīlīyya.[27] Furthermore, it has a syncretic theological construction that mixes different religious theories of cosmogony.

Although recent studies reflect that the Nusayrīs reject the *hulūl* theory and evaluate it as a form of apostasy,[28] as can be seen below, the Nusayrīs paradoxically have beliefs and approaches on *hulūl* and *tanāsukh*. According to them, God has repeatedly showed himself to humanity in the form of a human being. For instance, one of their holy book called *kitāb al-majmūʿ* (the comprehensive book) includes a syncretic approach of various religious theories and doctrines. It consists of sixteen chapters that reflect the religious doctrines and rituals of the Nusayrīs as in the form of a catechism. It was released in Arabic by an ex-member of Nusayrīs, Sulaiman Efendi from Adana after his conversion to Judaism, Islam and Christianity while he was in exile in Beirut.[29] From its first chapter, called commencement (*al-awwal*) to the last it has thoroughly phrases and salutations towards a divinity of ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib, and his re-appearance in the body of the founder of the sect and other saints as well as religious figures of Ismāʿīlī branch of Shiʿa. To give an example, the following quotation from the first chapter indicates that ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib is considered as Allah, and thus salutations, prayers are all made for the sake of ʿAlī:

> "Sure is he to who obtains the friendship of him with the prosper bald forehead! My beginning is to acknowledge myself a humble creature. I commence with the commencement of yielding my love to the holiness of the archetypal divinity of the Prince of Bees, ʿAlī 'Ibn 'Abī Tâlib, denominated Haidarah 'Abū Turâb -in reliance upon whom I undertake and by whom I accomplish, through the remembrance of whom I am secured, in whom I am saved, to whom I betake myself, in whom I am blessed, of whom I ask help, in whom I begin and in whom I end, with orthodoxy in religion and faithfulness to the indubitable truth."[30]

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[25]   al-Shahrastani, *al-Milal wa'l-Nihal*, 204.

[26]   H. Halm, 'Nusayriyya', *The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, ed. C.E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 8/146–147.

[27]   Meir M. Bar-Asher - Aryeh Kofsky, *The Nusayri-Alawi Religion: An Enquiry into Its Theology and Liturgy* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 1–2; Daftary, *A History of Shi'i Islam*, 186.

[28]   Reyhan Erdoğdu Başaran, 'Er-Risâletü'l-Numânîyye Eseri Doğrultusunda Nusayrî-Alevî İnancında Tevhîd İlkesinin İzahı', *e-Makalat Mezhep Araştırmaları Dergisi* 14/2 (2021), 958; Reyhan Erdoğdu Başaran, *Nusayrîlik İshakîlik Alevîlik - Tarih, Literatür ve İnanç-* (Ankara: Eskiyeni Yayınları, 2023), 48.

[29]   There is not an exact date when this tract was written, but well known orientalist Edward Salisbury translated it into English and published in 1864. Ahmet Turan published it by translating into Turkish, in 1996. See Edward E. Salisbury, 'The Book of Sulaiman's First Ripe Fruit, Disclosing The Mysteries of the Nusairian Religion by Sulaiman Effendi of Adhanah', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* VIII/2 (1864), 228.

[30]   Edward E. Salisbury, "The Book of Sulaiman's First Ripe Fruit, Disclosing The Mysteries of the Nusairian Religion by Sulaiman Effendi of Adhanah", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* VIII/2 (1864), 234–235.

It is pointed out from the above passage that ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib is obviously considered as Allah. He is also attributed with the name and features of Allah when a believer seeks refuge to the transcendental being. Furthermore, the Nusayrī testimony has problematic as far as the uniqueness of Allah is concerned. For example, the Nusayrī testimony is termed as following: "There is no God but ʿAlī b. Abī Tâlib, with the bald forehead and temples, the adorable; and no intermediary but lord Muhammad, worthy to be praised; and no communicator but lord Salmān al-Fārsī, the pattern."[31] Another divine feature, which is creating, transmigrates from ʿAlī to Muhammad, from Muhammad to Salmān, from Salmān to the five orphans, who are responsible for the creation and maintenance of the whole universe.[32] Indeed, the Nusayrīs believe in creation as happened in following way: ʿAlī created Muhammad from his own light, then from that light Muhammad created Salmān, and Salmān created the five orphans, namely Mikdād b. Aswad al-Kindī, Uthman b. Madh'un an-Najāshī, Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, Abdullah b. Rawāha al-Ansārī, Kanbar b. Kādān ad-Dausī. Friedman points out that the Nusayrī concept of divinity resulted from the Neoplatonic thought. Accordingly, it is an extremely abstract God, from which all creation emanates as light from the sun. There is a gradual regression of created beings, from the more exalted to the more inferior.[33]

As mentioned above, the Nusayrī testimony consists of three elements, and the first letters of these three elements (ع - ayn for ʿAlī, م -mim for Muhammad, and س -for Salmān) symbolically refer to that testimony. There seems to be a close resemblance to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. According to Sulaiman Effendi, "these three are their Most Holy Trinity, Ali being the Father, Muhammad the Son, and Salmān al-Fārsī the Holy Ghost."[34] However, a recent research shows that one of the pioneers in Nusayrī theology, al-Jillī (d. 384/994) advocates the principle of *tawhīd* (oneness of God) and denies any connection of the Nusayrī belief in triad formula with Christianity.[35] Friedman asserts that triadic doctrine has been gradually established in the theology of the Nusayrīs. He reflects on the historical development of this triad doctrine and claims that proto-Nusayrī sources did not speak of a triad at all, but rather it was established by the Nusayrī sect. Furthermore he draws attention to early *ghulāt* sources in the 8th and 9th centuries that they speak clearly of two aspects only, the abstract God and his first emanation, a dual concept also known from the Ismāʿīlī doctrine, namely the *sāmit* (silent) and the *nātiq* (speaker). The latter is the representative and outward aspect of the former. He argues that the Nusayrīs added a third element to the two aspects of the divinity, which is the *bāb*.[36] There is also a close similarity between the Nusayrī triad formula (ع - م - س) with a Jewish sect called Sefer Yetzira.[37] This explains fairly enough the reason behind the triad doctrine in terms of both historical and theological impacts. In other words, the Nusayriyya emerged as a combination of

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[31] Salisbury, "The Book of Sulaiman's First Ripe Fruit", 241.

[32] Turan, "Kitâbu'l- Mecmu'u'nun Tercümesi", 12.

[33] Friedman, *The Nusayri-'Alawis: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria*, 72.

[34] Salisbury, "The Book of Sulaiman's First Ripe Fruit, Disclosing The Mysteries of the Nusairian Religion by Sulaiman Effendi of Adhanah", 247.

[35] Başaran, 'Er-Risâletü'l-Numâniyye Eseri Doğrultusunda Nusayrî-Alevî İnancında Tevhîd İlkesinin İzahı', 964.

[36] Friedman, *The Nusayri-'Alawis: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria*, 74.

[37] Friedman, *The Nusayri-'Alawis: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria*, 96.

Hellenistic and Persian cultures as well as mixing doctrines from Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism.[38]

Regarding the issue of transformation of *radj'a* doctrine, initial point invented by the Nusayrīs is the *bāb* formula. Then it becomes one of the triad doctrine as mentioned before. Nevertheless, a criteria based on the warning of the last imam just before the grater occultation, "whoever claims to have had contact with him, is a liar"[39] seems to be a great obstacle in *bāb* claims. For the Imāmī Shiʿa, from that date on, no one knows the time of reappearance of the last imam. On the other hand, however, the Nusayrīs attempted to struggle over this phenomenon and brought in a different approach. Then, what was the main argument of Ibn Nusayr by becoming a *bāb* of the last imam?

According to the Nusayrī sources, the eleventh imam al-Askarī sent Ibn Nusayr a jar full of butter and milk as well as a message asking people who were present at the meeting of Ibn Nusayr to plant their date kernels together in Ibn Nusayr's garden, promising that one tree would grow from them.[40] It is not difficult to guess that the message has an esoteric order to appoint Ibn Nusayr to lead the community. After vanishing the last imam, close friends and disciples of Ibn Nusayr considered that Ibn Nusayr had to be the legitimate successor of the absent imam. Thus, Ibn Nusayr claimed being the *bāb* of the last imam since his life coincided with the life of two imams, as well as with the appearance and the occultation of the last imam.[41] Thereby, according to Ibn Nusayr, as a gift from the grace of Allah, humans could only understand inferior aspect of divinity with the mediator role of the *bāb*.[42] It is noticeable that for Ibn Nusayr and his disciples, it is essential for the society to have a divinely guided one, who can communicate between the divine and humane. As a result, being the *bāb* of the last imam, Ibn Nusayr plays pivotal role in guiding humanity to comprehend the divine being. In addition to that, Ibn Nusayr was also considered as unique in terms of holding two posts. "According to the Nusayri tradition, Ibn Nusayr was the personification of both the *ism* and the *bāb* (the name of God and his gate), the first two and most important emanations of the divinity."[43] The divine being can only be understood through the gate, which is the personification of Ibn Nusayr. In the following quotation, Bar-Asher and Kofsky illustrate a passage from al-Harrānī's *Kitāb al-usāyfir* that sheds light to understand the incarnation of Allah and whose divine attributes to the *bāb*.

> "There is no entrance [to the ism] other than through the bāb, and there is no knowledge other than through him; and the [visible] form is thus distinctive to the bāb. It is the bāb who created the worlds and formed the entities, and from him were the lights made manifest. He is the goal for every wise person and the aim of every knowing person, and he is the witness, and the testimony is upon him, and he is God's expanding shadow...and the path leading and guiding to the ism. The bāb is the form of the visible reality of the interiority; and he is the divine body and the tree of

38   Bar-Asher - Kofsky, *The Nusayri-Alawi Religion: An Enquiry into Its Theology and Liturgy*, 2–3.

39   Halm, *Shi'a Islam: From Religion to Revolution*, 29.

40   Friedman, *The Nusayri-'Alawis: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria*, 9.

41   Friedman, *The Nusayri-'Alawis: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria*, 15.

42   Friedman, *The Nusayri-'Alawis: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria*, 79.

43   Friedman, *The Nusayri-'Alawis: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria*, 15.

happiness (shajarat ṭūbā) and the Lotus (sidrat al-muntahā) and the garden of refuge (jannat al-maʾwā). To him people return and arrive, and life and death are in his hands."[44]

It can be inferred from this quote that the bāb is found on the nerve point in guiding the humanity towards the divinity. Because he is responsible for the creation and maintenance of the whole universe. The *bāb* is also almighty being representing the transcendental and omnipotent. Accordingly, the *bāb* is in the form of divine manifestation, otherwise it is impossible for human being to know the divine being without the *bāb*. As an outcome of his mercy, the divine being has showed himself in the body of human being. Thereby, God's incarnation had occurred several times until ᶜAlī b. Abī Tālib, from whom then through the remaining imams to the last one, and finally appeared in the body of Ibn Nusayr. Moreover, the manifestation of the divine being as in the form of *maᶜnā* and *ism* happened in seven cycles. According to a Nusayrī catechism, a member of the sect asks the following question: "How many times did our master veil himself and appear in human form? It is answered in below quotation:

> "He veiled himself seven times. The first time, he veiled himself in [the figure of] Adam in his cycle and age, and was named Abel; the second time – in Noah, and was named Seth; the third time – in Jacob, and was named Joseph; the fourth time – in Moses, and was named Joshua; the fifth time – in Solomon, and was named Asaph; the sixth time – in Jesus, and was named Simon [Peter]; and the seventh and last time – in Muhammad, and was named ᶜAlī."[45]

According to Daftary, similarly to Ismailis, the Nusayrīs also espouse a cyclical view of history, which they combine with their Neoplatonised emanational cosmogony. Furthermore, he asserts that each manifestation of the deity occurred in seven eras in the form of a trinity: two entities or persons (*aqānīm*) emanate from the divine Essence (*maᶜnā*), namely, the Name (*ism* or *hijāb*) and the gate (*bāb*), through which the believer may contemplate the mystery of divinity.[46] In the last manifestation of the deity, in Islamic era, for the Nusayrīs, these two divinely posts had been represented by twelve imams and whose *bābs*. The first *bāb* was Salman al-Fārisī while Ali being the *ism*. For the Nusayrīs, the *bāb* of the eleventh imam was Ibn Nusayr, who also became the *bāb* of the last imam since the last imam went into occultation. Consequently, by becoming the heir of *bāb* line Ibn Nusayr has been in occultation since then.[47] It should be remembered that Ibn Nusayr was cursed and excommunicated from the Shiᶜa community because of such claims.[48]

As regards as the transmigration of souls, there are two possible paths in this cycle: good and evil. For the former, the soul of a rightful Nusayrī can immigrate to a better Nusayrī's body. By becoming more righteous the soul transmigrates a better body and is eventually being exalted to the world of light. All these process is called gnosis or esoteric knowledge (*maᶜrifa*) as opposite of metempsychosis (*tanāsukh*). Friedman points out that "while the gnosis, the *maᶜrifa*, leads to heaven; the transmigration into inferior creatures (*musūkhiyyāt*) is considered hell."[49] In the holy book of Nusayrīs, *kitāb al-majmūᶜ* has seven types of metempsychosis, which are classified in the

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44   Meir M. Bar-Asher - Aryeh Kofsky, *The Alawi Religion: An Anthology* (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2021), 62.

45   Bar-Asher - Kofsky, *The Alawi Religion: An Anthology*, 91.

46   Daftary, *A History of Shi'i Islam*, 187.

47   Başaran, *Nusayrîlik İshakîlik Alevîlik -Tarih, Literatür ve İnanç-*, 51–52.

48   *Friedman, The Nusayri-'Alawis: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria*, 8.

49   Friedman, *The Nusayri-'Alawis: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria*, 107.

bad category, thus far from being one of them a Nusayrī should seek a refuge to the divine. These are namely: *Faskh, naskh, maskh, waskh, raskh, qash, qashāsh*.[50] Moosa explains these sorts of metempsychosis that passing of the human soul to various types of creation: *Faskh* from human to a plant, *naskh* from human to another human, *maskh* from human to animal, *waskh* from human to dirty things, *raskh* from human into short plants, *qash* from human to a dry plant or straw, and *qashash* from human to insects (flies, ants).[51] To sum up, reward and punishment happen in this world by transmigrating the souls from one body to another. As a result, the Nusayrīs do not believe in resurrection and life in hereafter.

Having affected from the influence of Imāmīyya, either by education or political discourse. According to Daftary, contemporary Nusayrīs in Syria represent two types of identity: "the more conservative members of the community, living mainly in the Jabal Ansariyya region, uphold the traditional Nusayrī doctrines and rituals, while the urban ʿAlawī groups, known mainly as Jaʿfarīs, are becoming progressively assimilated into Twelver Shiʿīsm."[52]

To conclude this section, it can be argued that the Nusayrīs have contradictories in terms of rhetoric and theology. On the one hand, they deny *hulūl* and see it in the category of *shirk* (associate a partner to Allah). On the other hand, they give all divine features and acts to human under the triad formula of *maʿnā, ism,* and *bāb*. While the Twelver Shiʿa awaits the return of hidden imam; in the time of occultation, Ibn Nusayr plays pivotal role by representing the perfect form of *bāb* in guiding his society.

1.2. The Druzes and their approach to the radjʿa doctrine

The Druze sect emerged as an offshoot within Ismāʿīlī branch of Shi'ism in the early eleventh century. The main reason for the exclusion from Ismāʿīlīsm is that deifying Fātimī Caliph al-Hākim bi-Amrillah (d. 411/1021 or went into occultation).[53] During his reign (996-1021), al-Hākim had unusual and contradictory practices to be implemented within the society such as, neglecting his selfcare by extending nails and beard-hair, as a caliph riding a donkey instead of a horse, forbidding women to walk on the streets, promoting night time shopping facilities, and so on.[54] It is implied that al-Hākim wished to be regarded as a divine figure, above any rank which official Ismailism could give him.[55] Accordingly, he had brought some Ismāʿīlī preachers (*dāʿī*), like Hasan b. Haydara al-Farganī (d. 409/1018), Nashtakin al-Darazī (d. 411/1020) and Hamza b. Ali (d. 411/1021), from Persia and Central Asia to Cairo in order to make propaganda for the public confirmation of the position. Daftary points out that these *dāʿīs* effectively founded a new religious movement, proclaiming the end of the era of Islam and the abrogation of its shariʿa. In 1017, (the opening year of the Druze calendar), Hamza and al-Darazī declared the divinity of al-Hākīm. It can be assumed that al-Darazī was so influential that, the adherents of this new movement later

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50 Salisbury, "The Book of Sulaiman's First Ripe Fruit, Disclosing The Mysteries of the Nusairian Religion by Sulaiman Effendi of Adhanah", 239.

51 Matti Moosa, *Extremist Shi'ites: The Ghulat Sects* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 362–363.

52 Daftary, *A History of Shi'i Islam*, 190.

53 Ahmet Bağlıoğlu, *İnanç Esasları Açısından Dürzîlik* (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2018), 102.

54 Halil İbrahim Bulut, *İslam Mezhepleri Tarihi* (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2016), 412.

55 M.G.S. Hodgson, "Duruz (Druzes)", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, ed. B. Lewis et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 2/631.

became known as Daraziyya or Duruz; hence their general designation as Druzes.[56] In their holy book *Rasāil al-Hikmah* (the Epistles of Wisdom), the Druzes are also defined as *muwahhidūn* (monotheists) since they affirm that "there is no deity to be worshipped in the sky and no imam to be present on the earth except al-Hākim"[57]

It is obvious that the Druzes emerged within esoteric Ismāʿīlī milieu. The Druzes have further advanced that esoteric approach resulting in a number of exaggerations. Until al-Hākim, Fātimī caliphs maintained Ismāʿīlī belief that the imamate duty as the representation of divine vicegerent on the earth. In the reign of al-Hākim, however, Ismāʿīlī esotericism was reached its peak by the conception of God. According to the Ismaili doctrine, the imamate line maintained with the seventh imam, Ismail b. Jaʿfar (d. 138/755-6) who died while his father Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 148/765) was still alive. Hence, they are also called *Sabʿiyya* (sevener) since they believe in the imamate must continue with Ismail and his descendants. They have systematised every doctrine with the number of seven that the prophethood and imamate are all based on cyclical turn of seven such as seven *nātiq* (speaker-prophets), seven *wasî/sāmit/asās* (silent) and seven *imam* (leader). Cosmogony in Ismāʿīlī doctrine is also explained by seven eras which ended with the prophet Muhammad as *nātiq*, ʿAlī as *wāsî*, and Ismāʿil as *imam*. It is stated that Ismāʿīlī influence on the Druze belief so fundamental that the Druzes borrowed from them many ideas varying from cosmogony, history, eschatology to religious duties and rites. For the Ismāʿīlīs, *mahdī* is Muhammad b. Ismail who will return and establish justice rule in the world before the end of the world. The history of human being will end with his imamate that he is alone authority all over the issues in the final day.[58] However, this conception was slightly changed by the Druze theorists. As regards as the return of imam from the occultation, when al-Hākim reappear to conquer and establish justice in the whole world, the Druzes will be the rulers of all mankind.[59] It shows that the r*adj'a* doctrine not only does al-Hākim include but also the whole Druze society whose souls already incarnated into highest level on the excellent bodies of the Druzes.

Although there is a great deal impact of Ismāʿīlīs on the Druzes, it seems that the most important feature distinguishing the latter from the former is the conception of God with the principle of manifestation (*tajallī*).[60] In the Druze sources, seventy-three manifestations of God are mentioned. Hamza b. ʿAli explained in his epistles some of these manifestations, which began with the maqam of *Aliyyu'l-A'lā* and lasted with the maqam of *imam* in which represented al-Hākim's body.[61] According to the Druze sources, God has a divine (*lāhūtī*) and a humane (*nāsūtī*) aspect. His divine aspect cannot be perceived by anyone. Because he is far away from all perceptions, indeterminate and undefinable. Another dimension of God is his *nāsūtī* aspect. Since he is imperceptible and beyond perception in his divine aspect, he manifested himself to human beings in his humane aspect. Since the highest position is imamate, he manifested himself in the person of imam al-

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[56]   Daftary, *A History of Shi'i Islam*, 121.

[57]   Aytekin Şenzeybek, *Resâilü'l-Hikme'ye Göre Dürzi İnanç Esasları* (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi, Doktora Tezi, 2008), 11.

[58]   Bağlıoğlu, *İnanç Esasları Açısından Dürzîlik*, 52–53.

[59]   Hodgson, "Duruz (Druzes) ", 2/634.

[60]   Şenzeybek, *Resâilü'l-Hikme'ye Göre Dürzi İnanç Esasları*, 126.

[61]   Ali Avcu, "Bâtınî Ekolleri Anlamada Anahtar Bir Kavram: Ezille/Gölgeler Nazariyesi [A Key Concept in Understanding of Esoteric Sects: The Theory of Shadows]", *Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi* 20/2 (2016), 127.

Hākim. However, despite this, his divine aspect is not in question in this manifestation. He was manifested only in his humane aspect.[62]

Existing *tanāsukh* understanding among the Ismailis further was developed by Hamza b. ʿAli in the formula of *taqammūs*, which literally meant changing someone's shirt. According to him, the number of souls has never been changed since the beginning of the creation and it is expected every soul to reach its perfection through transmigration.[63] There is not any transmigration between the species like happened in Nusayrīs, by contrast each soul transmigrates from a human body to another until it reaches perfection and then ascends to the stars, nearest position to God.[64] Once a body dies, the soul transmigrates to another body, which is a vehicle for the soul in its journey to acquire the knowledge of existence and happiness. Otherwise, he will go backwards in ignorance and will remain in the centre as well as experiencing contradiction and confusion because of a body that his ego has perverted from its natural position.[65] For the Druzes, it can not be thinkable the death of a soul, nor its resurrection. They interpret the existence of heaven and hell in an allegorical way. Accordingly, judgement day is the final stage in the development of souls that transmigration into different bodies will last at this stage. Regarding *radjʿa* doctrine, the Druzes have the belief of re-appearance of both Hamza b. ʿAli and al-Hākim. According to the Druze sources, as soon as Hamza b. ʿAli arrives to Mecca, God's second appearance in the form of al-Hākim will happen with his sword in his hand. In the meantime, al-Hākim will give the sword to Hamza to carry out punishment and rewarding process. Hamza b. Ali describes this as following way: "On the day of my resurrection, it will be by my hand to reward those who obey and follow what has been revealed, to punish those who rebel and deviate from the revealed truth with the sword of Mawlāna al-Hākim, and to repay all creatures for what they have done."[66] For the Druzes, it seems that the judgement day will happen in this world just before all souls reach their final stage. Hence, they reject resurrection or life in hereafter, instead they believe in that the reward or heaven for the good souls is having the divine knowledge, otherwise punishment is hellfire or to be deprived of this divine knowledge.[67]

In conclusion, the *radjʿa* doctrine was further developed by the Druze theorists that not only al-Hākim but also Hamza b. Ali would return to judge all souls who had reached the final stage of their metempsychosis. No more transmigration of souls will happen at this stage. Thus, having been rewarded with the divine knowledge, the Druzes or *muwahhidūn* will live in this world forever.[68]

1.3. The Bābī-Bahāī movement and their approach to the radjʿa doctrine

Another extreme interpretation regarding the *radjʿa* doctrine within Shiʿīsm emerged with Bābism, in Iran, in the 19th century. The decline of the Safāwī state brought political threats and

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[62]   Avcu, "Bâtınî Ekolleri Anlamada Anahtar Bir Kavram: Ezille/Gölgeler Nazariyesi", 126.

[63]   Bağlıoğlu, *İnanç Esasları Açısından Dürzîlik*, 54.

[64]   Hodgson, "Duruz (Druzes)", 2/634.

[65]   Bağlıoğlu, *İnanç Esasları Açısından Dürzîlik*, 178.

[66]   Şenzeybek, *Resâilü'l-Hikme'ye Göre Dürzi İnanç Esasları*, 418.

[67]   Bağlıoğlu, *İnanç Esasları Açısından Dürzîlik*, 190.

[68]   Şenzeybek, *Resâilü'l-Hikme'ye Göre Dürzi İnanç Esasları*, 419–420.

challenges that led to the establishment of a new central state under the Qajār dynasty to preserve Iran's territorial integrity. Like other Muslim territories, Iran became under the influence of European colonialism. As far as theological issues are concerned within Shiʿīsm some ulama prepared religious formulas in order to solve the problems, which the society tackle with. One of that Shiʿī ulama was Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsaʾī (d. 1241/1826) who established a sufi order (*Shaykhism*) within Shiʿīsm and proposed "perfect Shiʾī idea (*Kāmil Shiʾī*)" as a preparation for returning the hidden imam. As a pupil of al-Ahsāʾī, Kazim Rashtī (d. 1259/1843) succeeded in the leadership of Shaykhism and implied that *bāb* was amongst the members of the cult. But he did not appoint anyone to be a successor after him. As a result, the cult fragmented into two main factions: one grouped around Sayyid ʿAlī Muhammad Shirāzī, the *bāb* (d. 1266/1850) and the other around Hajī Mullā Muhammad Karim Khan Kirmānī (d. 1288/1871). These two factions went on completely different routes, the first moving away from the exoteric practices of Islam and focusing on the revelation of its esoteric (*bātinī*) characteristics, and finally on a new revelation following the emergence of the hidden imam; the second emphasizing the continuing role of the Prophet and the Imams and seeking accommodation with the Shiʿī majority which had formerly excommunicated the founder of the school and his successor.[69]

In 1844, Sayyid ʿAlī Muhammad initially claimed to be the *bāb* of the hidden imam and then moved a step further by announcing himself as the expected *mahdī*. He began to propaganda tours in Shiraz, Isfahan, Tehran, and Tabriz and recruited 18 leading figures within the Shaykhism by taking their allegiance. These last developments caused turmoil within the Shiʿī society that was eagerly awaiting the return of the hidden imam. The emergence of the Bābî movement and its extremist ideas led the Shiʿī ulama to issue a *fatwā* on the apostasy of Mirza ʿAlī Muhammad. Due to his claims to be the *bāb* and the expected *mahdī*, he was executed - in Tabriz in 1850.[70] After him, the Bābī movement transformed into Bahāism and his esoteric views have been further elaborated by Mirza Husayn Ali and Mirza Yahya. Based on the statements of claimed Bābī holy book *al-Bayān* written by ʿAlī Muhammad, he explained that he was sent as a prophet like the prophet Muhammad was sent.[71] Therefore, Mirza Husayn ʿAli (*Bahāullah*) is believed that the expected one in all religions and "the one whom Allah will reveal" foretold by the Bāb.[72] In *al-Bayān*, according to Mirza ʿAli Muhammad, the validity of the Prophet Muhammad's message lasted with the time of twelve imams that the last imam's occultation a millennium had passed and as a new revelation, his turn began in 1844.[73] In believing so, the Bāb claims that *shari'a law* brought by Prophet Muhammad has been abolished and replaced with the best in order to bring humanity to perfection.[74] According to Bābīs-Bahāīs, the prophethood continued with Mirza ʿAli Muhammad and Mirza Husayn ʿAli, as the most recent manifestation of God (*mazhār*). Even these

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[69]   Denis Martin Maceoin, *From Shaykhism to Babism: A Study in Charismatic Renewal in Shîʿî Islam* (Cambridge: King's College, Ph.D Thesis, 1979), 114–115.

[70]   Fatih Topaloğlu, "Bâbîlik-Bahâîlik", *İslâm Mezhepleri Tarihi*, ed. Mehmet Saffet Sarıkaya - Mehmet Ümit (Ankara: Nobel, 2022), 316–317.

[71]   Topaloğlu, "Bâbîlik-Bahâîlik", 317.

[72]   *Bahai Dini: Tarihi, Öğretileri ve Toplumsal Çalışmaları* (İstanbul: Bahai Eserleri Basım Dağıtım, 2016), 19.

[73]   Topaloğlu, "Bâbîlik-Bahâîlik", 321.

[74]   Ethem Ruhi Fığlalı - Ramazan Şimşek, "Bahâîlik ve El-Kitabu'l-Akdes (Türkçe Çeviri)", *E-Makalat Mezhep Araştırmaları Dergisi* III/2 (2011), 14–16.

two are classified with great prophets as well as other religious figures. The below quote describes the importance of that last manifestation.

> "The major manifestations of God that we know of are Abraham, Krishna, Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Jesus, Muhammad, and more recently the Bab and Baha'ullah. Their common goal is to tame the souls and correct the morals of all the people of the world."[75]

As regards as the *radj'a* doctrine in Imāmī Shi'a, the idea of perfect Shi'ī offered by al-Ahsā'ī transformed into *bāb* in the hands of Kazim Rashtī, and finally gave fruit as *bāb* and the expected saviour (*al-mahdī*) commencing another revelation of God to humanity. Because of their heretic views, Ahmad al-Ahsā'ī, Kazim Rashtī, and 'Alī Muhammad (the Bāb), they were all condemned as unbelievers.[76] It can be concluded that *radj'a* doctrine of Shi'a has been shaped as prophethood by the hands of Bābîs and Bahāīs. In addition to that Hurūfism had a great influence on the construction of theology of Bābīs and Bahāīs.[77] Because all religious duties and beliefs are formulated based on numerical values of numbers, particularly number nineteen.

Unlike the Nusayrīs and the Druzes, Bābîs and Bahāīs do not necessarily believe in reincarnation of Allah's soul to human bodies. However, they recommence revelation after a millennium of the twelfth imam's occultation. According to them, the prophethood seems to continue in a cycling process with every thousand year until resurrection.

Conclusion

This study reflects the radical views of some Shi'ī *ghulāt* sects on the doctrine of *radj'a*, which many Shi'ītes today await the return of the hidden imam from the major occultation (*ghaybat al-kubrā*). Contrary to the conventional approach of the Shi'ītes, the Nusayrīs, the Druzes and the Bābī-Bahāīs have interpreted the *radj'a* doctrine and reached extreme results that caused their excommunication from the mainstream Shi'a. It seems that such radical approach has entailed a systematic rejection of existing beliefs and rituals in order to justify these extreme theories. It can be predicted that previous exaggerators within Shi'a had impacts on the formation of radical views of these sub-groups. Esoteric method of Isma'ilīsm has a great influence on the theology of the Nusayrīs and the Druzes. As having been detailed above, the Nusayrīs explain the *bāb* formula based on the Isma'ilī *nātiq* and *sāmit* doctrine. God incarnates between these terms and finally takes the body of *bāb*, who is Ibn Nusayr. In similar vein, the Druzes as an offshoot of Isma'ilīsm see al-Hākim as the manifestation of God. These interpretations are the peak of *radj'a* doctrine as a result of radical approach of these two sects in glorifying a human being with divine attributes. The religious systems of the Druzes and the Nusayrīs are strikingly similar, with one major exception: al-Hākim is God to the Druzes, while 'Ali is God to the Nusayrīs.[78] This is not the case with Bābīs-Bahāīs in terms of glorifying a human being with the divine attributes. However, they clearly deny the finality of the prophethood and glorify a human being with prophetic attributes. Based on *radj'a* doctrine, they developed a perfect Shi'ī formula as a preparation for the imam's return, but the imam reappeared in the mission of a prophet abrogating previous *shari'a* laws.

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[75]   *Bahai Dini: Tarihi, Öğretileri ve Toplumsal Çalışmaları*, 41.

[76]   Maceoin, *From Shaykhism to Babism: A Study in Charismatic Renewal in Shî'î Islam*, 36.

[77]   Fığlalı - Şimşek, "Bahâilik ve El-Kitabu'l-Akdes (Türkçe Çeviri)", 31.

[78]   Moosa, *Extremist Shi'ites: The Ghulat Sects*, 318.

Their theological system is also based on an extremely esoteric sect, Hurūfism as well as *bātinī* exegesis.

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God, Logic and Lies: Intra-Ḥanafī Polemics on Divine Omnipotence in Colonial India

Allah, Mantık ve Yalan: Koloniyal Hindistan'da İlahi Kudret Hakkında Hanefilik İçi Polemikler

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Abstract

This article is the first logical exploration of a major Islamic theological controversy regarding divine omnipotence (*qudra*) emerging in early 19th century northern India and persists today. The controversy involved two interconnected propositions. The first is known as 'imkān-e naẓīr', which is the proposition that God is able to create another identical Prophet Muḥammad. The second dubbed 'ikmān-e kidhb', is the possibility of God being able to lie or say untruths. The article will examine the arguments of two formidable scholars. The first is the one who detonated the controversy Shah Ismail Dihlawi (d. 1831) who argues for the possibility of God to actualise an identical Muḥammad and to lie and the second is his opponent and archnemesis Fazl-e Haqq Khayrabadi (d. 1861), who vehemently rejects both possibilities. The focus of the article is a detailed logical analysis of the structure and premises of the arguments as well as the core modal concepts assumed in the debate.

Keywords: Kalam, Logic, Divine omnipotence, Imkān-e naẓīr, Ikmān-e kidhb, Northern India.

Öz

Bu makale, 19. yüzyılın başlarında Kuzey Hindistan'da ortaya çıkan ve günümüze kadar devam eden, ilahî kudret hakkında önemli bir kelâmî ihtilafı ele alan ilk mantık araştırmasıdır. İhtilaf, birbiriyle bağlantılı iki tez içermektedir. İlk tez "imkān-ı naẓīr" olarak bilinir ve bu, Allah'ın Hz. Muhammed'in aynısını yaratabilmesidir. İkinci tez ise "ikmān-ı kızb" olarak adlandırılır ve Allah'ın yalan söyleme veya gerçeğe aykırı şeyler söyleme olasılığını hakkındadır. Makale, iki güçlü düşünürün argümanlarını inceleyecektir. İlk olarak, tartışmayı başlatan Shah İsmail Dihlawi (ö. 1831), Allah'ın benzer bir Muhammed'i yaratabilme ve yalan söyleyebilme olasılığını savunan argümanlar sunar. İkinci olarak, karşıt görüşteki ve baş rakibi Fazl-e Haqq Khayrabadi (ö. 1861), her iki olasılığı da kesin bir şekilde reddeder. Makale, argümanların yapısının ve öncüllerinin yanı sıra tartışmada deruhte edilen temel modal kavramların ayrıntılı mantıksal analizine odaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kelâm, Mantık, İlahî kudret, İmkān-ı naẓīr, İkmān-ı kizb, Kuzey Hindistan.

Introduction

The divine attribute of God's omnipotence or 'power' (*qudra*) figured prominently in Muslim theological discussions and reflection within the first few centuries of Islam.[1] Its definition, scope and its relation to other attributes like 'will' (*irāda*) and 'justice' (*ʿadl*) brought about different perspectives from various theological persuasions and groups that emerged within those centuries like the Muʿtazila, Ibāḍīs, Shīʿa, Ashʿarīs, Māturīdīs and traditionalists.[2] The intricacies

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[1]   For a short outline of divine power in passages of the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth see Martin Nguyen, "The Contours of God's Power: An Introduction to Passages from the Qur'an and Hadith" in *Power: Divine and Human. Christian and Muslim Perspectives*, ed. Lucinder Mosher and David Marshall (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), 30-41. I use the English omnipotence and power interchangeably in the article

[2]   On discussions about divine power, see for example Ibn Ḥazm's extrnsive survey in *al-Faṣl fī-l-milal wa-l-ahwā' wa-l-niḥal* (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1996), 2/20-33 under the topic of miracles (*muʿjizāt*); al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2011), volume 6 as it relates to issues such as human free will, goodness and evil; al-Ghazālī's philosophical critique in the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* and Ibn Rushd's counter-refutations in *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), trans. Simon Van Den Bergh (Cambridge: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 1954), 323-333, sec. 528-542. Cf. as well al-Ghazālī's theological account of the attribute of power in *al-Iqtiṣād fī-l-iʿtiqād* (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2008), pp. 149-164. For discussions on divine power and both their logical and theological implications related to optimism, see al-Biqāʿī's *Tahdīm al-arkān min laysa fī-l-imkān abdaʿ min mā kān* (Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ, 2019). Finally, refer to al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1998), 8/57-74.

of these discussions on divine power resurfaced as a result of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's (d. 505/1111) optimism captured in his statement "there is nothing in possibility more wonderful than the actual" (*laysa fī-l-imkān abdaʿ mimmā kāna*), that subsequently generated a dividing line between those who on the one hand rejected outright the statement and its implications and those on the other who vindicated what they saw was a penetrative insight about reality and the goodness of God and His providence. These discussions and the ensuing polemics around the scope and nature of God's power took on a particular intensity among notable Muslim scholars within the Mamlūk period and beyond and is thoroughly documented by Eric L. Ormsby in his highly original study *Theodicy in Islamic Thought*.[3]

However, a second controversy occurred more eastwards several centuries later to al-Ghazālī in 19th century Colonial India among the Muslim scholarly figures, one that continued well into the post-partition period of Indian independence in 1947.[4] In this iteration of the omnipotence attribute, debates fixated on two central propositions. The first proposition is whether it is possible for God to create an identical Prophet Muḥammad, known as the 'possibility of creating an equal Prophet Muḥammad' (*imkān al-naẓīr*) and the second is whether it is 'possible for God to lie' (*imkān al-kidhb*). The truth of each proposition assumes specific ideas about the nature and scope of divine power. The inflamed theological and philosophical exchanges around both propositions later led to more pronounced discussions over the second one, that already had antecedent discussions recorded within classical and post-classical *kalām* works.[5] The earliest noted written exchange in Northern India took place between two formidable intellectuals. The first was an Indian reformist scholar and fighter Shah Muhammad Ismail Dihlawi (d. 1831), the grandson of the highly esteemed intellectual 'reviver' (*mujaddid*) of India Shah Waliullah Dihlawi (d. 1762).[6] The second was a jurist, philosopher, theologian, 'rationalist' (*maʿqūlī*), poet and political dissident of the British colonial administration Fazl-e Haqq Khayrabadi (d. 1861).[7] He vociferously

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3   Eric L. Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought. The Dispute over Al-Ghazālī's "Best of all Possible Worlds"* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). Specifically relevant for this paper is chapter 3 of Ormsby's book.

4   Borrowing from Asad Q. Ahmed's characterisation, I do not use 'Indian' in any sense implying nation-state boundaries; rather, "I use it interchangeably for South Asia and as a shorthand for those domains that were under direct or indirect Mughal suzerainty at some point in the history of the region. This, too, should not be interpreted as a connotative concession to contested categories, but only as a way to set up a vague regional referent". Ahmed, *Palimpsests of Themselves. Logic and Commentary in Postclassical Muslim South Asia* (Oakland: University of California Press).

5   This position of the possibility of God lying is attributed to the Muʿtazila, who are considered by the Sunnī theological schools as a broadly heterodox group. See Gibril F. Haddad, *The Maturidi School: From Abu Hanifa to al-Kawthari* (Oldham: Beacon Books, 2021), 14-17. See as well Khaled El-Rouayheb's discussion in "Must God Tell the Truth? A Problem in Ashʿarī Theology", *Islamic Cultures, Islamic Contexts: Essays in Honour of Professor Patricia Crone*, ed. Asad Q. Ahmed et al (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 411-429.

6   On a partisan account of Muhammad Ismail Dihlawi's life, works, doctrines and responses to accusations of heterodoxy levelled against him, refer to Khalid Mahmud, *Shah Ismail Muhaddith Dihlawi. Shahid Balakut* (Lahore: Maktabat Dār al-Maʿārif, 1982). For a broad overview of Dihlawi's life and impact, see SherAli Tareen, *Defending Muḥammad in Modernity* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2020), 52-84.

7   On Khayrabadi's life and impact, see Iqbal Husain, "Fazle Haq of Khairabad – A Scholarly Rebel of 1857", *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 48 (1987), 355-365 and Jamal Malik, "Letters, prison sketches and autobiographical literature: The case of Fadl-e Haqq Khairabadi in the Andaman Penal Colony". *The Indian Economic & Social History Review* 43/1 (2006), 77-100.

opposed Ismail Dihlawi and was in one arguable sense the latter's archnemesis. The present article will be a logical examination of the arguments for and against both propositions according to both these intellectuals and the broad structure will be as follows. Section 1 of the article contains an outline of the problematic statements found in Ismail Dihlawi's works that first detonated the controversy over God's ability to create an equal Muḥammad (*imkān-e naẓīr*) and indeed the possibility of God lying (*imkān-e kidhb*) as well as the supporting arguments for it. It will also include, where relevant, Khayrabadi's rebuttal of these arguments. Section 2 gives full explication of Khayrabadi's position of 'the impossibility of an identical Prophet Muḥammad' (*imtināʿ-e naẓīr*) and the impossibility of God lying from his own works with a presentation of his supporting arguments. Section 3 is the conclusion and offers my own remarks about divine 'wisdom' (*ḥikma*) and 'power' (*qudra*) in light of the logical analysis given of each theological position from sections 1 and 2. The points I raise in the conclusion focus on an undeveloped aspect of Ismail Dihlawi's arguments within the entire controversy and that is divine omnipotence being constrained by wisdom. I assess some implications of this wisdom constraint.

Although this theological controversy in India as highlighted began in the early decades of the 19th century, it was appropriated by various outstanding Indian Islamic scholars who continued the polemics through a hardened factionalism and in a more intensified and detailed form. This factionalism was represented mainly by senior scholarly figures of Dār al-ʿUlum Deoband, referred to as 'Deobandis' who consciously aligned with Ismail Dihlawi's position and Ahmad Reza Khan (d. 1921) and his followers, known as 'Barelwis', and who in many ways are the intellectual heirs of Khayrabadi, maintaining the latter's position.[8] In some references, the two factions were sometimes referred to as the 'Ismailis' and the 'Khayrabadis'.[9] Both propositions *imkān-e naẓīr* and *imkān-e kidhb* are still debated nearly two centuries later within not only the original towns from where the controversy began in India but within the various Deobandi and Barelwi diaspora in the west, notably the United Kingdom.[10] Although this sectarian drive is arguably a major factor in

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[8] Ahmad Reza Khan for example wrote half a dozen independent tracts on the intrinsic impossibility of God being able to lie against not only Khayrabadi's main interlocuter Ismail Dihlawi but against the 'Elders' (*buzurgān*, *akābir*) of the newly established Islamic seminary of Deoband, who embraced Ismail Dihlawi's work in broadly positive terms and defended the nature of his claims as being orthodox. See Khan's *Subḥān-e ṣubbūḥ* (1890), *Dāmān-e bāgh-e subḥān al-ṣubbūḥ* (1890) and *al-Qamʿ al-mubīn* (1911) that contain extensive discussion on this controversy, much of which has strong antecedents in Khayrabadi's own responses analysed in this article. On the official Deobandi doctrinal position on the issue of both the 'possibility of God lying' (*imkān-e kidhb*) and the 'actual occurrence of a lie from God' (*wuqūʿ-e kidhb*), refer to Khalil Ahmed Saharanpuri, *al-Muhannad ʿalā al-mufannad*, ed. Muhammad Ibn Adam al-Kawthari (Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ, 2004), 84-96. Incidentally, this topic is the given the most extensive response in *al-Muhannad*. For online English-speaking Deobandi partisan polemics around the topic of *imkān-e kidhb*, see https://barelwism.wordpress.com/. Accessed 13 December 2022.

[9] This is how it was referred to by Mehr Ali Shah (d. 1937), one of the pre-eminent intellectual and spiritual scholars of India during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, known famously for his polemics with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiyan; see his *Fatāwā-e mehriyya* (Lahore: Maktaba-e Mehriyya, 2010), 11. On specifically the historiography of this polemic between the 'Ismailis' and 'khayrabadis', refer to Mohammad Waqas Sajjad, "Writing History in Deobandi-Barelvi Polemics: Conflicting Views of Shah Ismail and Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi", *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 46/3 (2023), 612-627.

[10] On an account of the origins of the Deobandi-Barelwi conflict and challenges around its academic representation, see Mohammad Waqas Sajjad, *For the Love of the Prophet: Deobandi-Barelvi Polemics and the Ulama in Pakistan* (California: Graduate Theological Union, Ph.D. Dissertation, 2018), 23-303.

why the controversy persists within public and social media polemics, it is the philosophical merits of the controversy that has been entirely overlooked within the academic literature on Islamic theology and philosophy. At the time of writing this article, I have been unable to locate any catalogued written thesis, or formally published article or book in a south Asian or European language containing either a preliminary or thorough *logical* assessment of the controversy.[11] This is partly due to a larger regrettable neglect of South Asian contributions to the transmission, preservation and augmentation of classical Muslim theology and philosophy, reflected in a broader European scholarly disinterest in the region. Another reason is the inaccessibility of primary logical texts from Indian soil for logicians or historians of logic. A notable exception is the recent release of a monograph by Asad Q. Ahmed called *Palimpsests of Themselves*, which is a translation and thorough examination of *Sullam al-ʿulūm* ('The Ladder of the Sciences'), one of the most advanced logical texts in the Indian Islamic Niẓāmī curriculum written by Muhibullah al-Bihari (d. 1119/1707).[12] Hence, the present article is an attempt to introduce historians, philosophers as well as analytic theologians to the way logic and familiar logical ideas were applied by Indian scholars to matters of scriptural hermeneutics and major doctrines in often novel ways that predate what contemporary Muslim theologian and philosophers are doing.

It is necessary to mention something on approach and then on conventions used in this article. Firstly, on the approach taken in the article. I adopt logical analysis as the guiding method relying on the formal machinery of modern first-order logic. This means examining the arguments and then explicating the reasoning behind them. Inevitably, there will be limitations in such an approach in that I am utilising a logic with its symbolic apparatus that is entirely different from the largely categorical logic that was used by and familiar to Dihlawi and Khayrabadi. Moreover, in my analysis of the arguments, there is a degree of formal reconstruction and supplementation that involve making explicit suppressed premises or hidden assumptions, rephrasing source text syntax and linguistic expression, translating natural language (Urdu and Farsi in this case) into a semi-formal language and symbolisation. Hence, there is an inescapable element of logical 'intrusion' by me as an expositor of the issues and arguments. Nevertheless, the approach will aid with not only methodically tracing the steps in the reasoning underpinning the various arguments and to better examine the validity but to appreciate their originality and sophistication as well.

Secondly, regarding conventions, on diacritics, I follow the Arabic and Farsi transliteration system from the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (IJMES) with the following additions for Urdu letters: ٹ/ṭ, ڈ/ḍ, ڑ/ṛ, ض/z̤, و/v,ū,o,au, ے/y,e,ay and ن/n̄. For the *iẓāfat* (syntactical construct of two nouns denoting possession) I use -e. Often, I omit ه in the transliteration, e.g., یک روزہ is written as *Yak Roza* and not *Yak Rozah* but retain it for names, e.g., Muhibullah and not Muhibulla. In

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[11]   Tareen in *Defending Muḥammad in Modernity* excellently presents a descriptive analysis of this controversy but it is not a philosophical or logical one. Similarly, just released is a monograph by the Jordanian kalām theologian Saʿīd Fūda entitled *Baḥth fī mas'alat nisbat al-kidhb ilā Allāh* (Amman: Dār al-Aṣlayn, 2023), 213-257 that devotes over forty pages to specifically the possibility of God lying among the Deobandi and Barelwi groups; but again, it is not a logical analysis but a survey of the various arguments with their textual and rational evidences.

[12]   Ahmed, *Palimpsests of Themselves*. Remedial projects for the inaccessibility of logical works from the postclassical South Asian tradition is yet to earnestly begin.

addition, I have not transliterated any South Asian names and have also omitted the definite article before any attributions (*nisbat*), e.g., Saharanpuri instead of al-Sahāranpūrī, although I do retain it for all pre-modern Arabic and Persian authors, e.g., al-Ġazālī and not Ghazali. Furthermore, I follow all standard logical notations and provide all symbolisation keys where necessary in the footnotes in order to avoid clutter in the main body of the article. A table of all logical symbols can be found at the end. Finally, unless stated and acknowledged, all translations are mine.

1. The Problem Stated and Supported

In a complex construction of British colonial presence in 19ᵗʰ century India that negotiated hegemony with limited internal native autonomy, emergence of reactionary Islamic theological and reformist movements, contestations of different Muslim theological discourses and devotional sensibilities, variable religious allegiances, and competing visions of Muslim modalities of being and order based on divergent political theologies, there occurred fierce intra-Ḥanafī polemics around rarified matters of philosophical theology. Albeit highly important, this section will not include the historical development of how this complexity configured itself nor how it was conducive for incubating specific polemics because this paper is a logical examination of arguments and not an investigation into intellectual history. Others have carefully researched and provided the relevant historical surveys of the religious, social, cultural, political, and economic factors throughout the period.[13] The focus of this section is stating the core contentions that led to the theological controversy around the topic of divine omnipotence that continued intensely after the demise of Ismail Dihlawi and Khayrabadi, the main thinkers under consideration in the present article. This theological controversy was caused by a reassertion of an unrestricted notion of divine omnipotence by Ismail Dihlawi that is situated in, arguably, a larger reclamation of 'divine sovereignty'.[14] Ismail Dihlawi's claims were met with scorn and derision by Khayrabadi and according to Tareen, the chronology of the written polemical exchange between both scholars went as follows: Dihlawi composed *Taqwiyat-e īmān* around 1820s and in the same year elicited a short response of a few pages from Khayrabadi called *Taqrīr-e iˁtiraẓāt bar Taqwiyat-e īmān* ('A Statement of Objections against *Taqwiyat-e īmān*') denying the possibility of creating a second Prophet Muḥammad. This was followed by Dihlawi's philosophical rebuttal in the form of the pamphlet *Yak roza* around 1825. Subsequent to this, in 1826, Khayrabadi wrote his larger and more comprehensive rebuttal of Ismail's ideas in Farsi entitled *Taḥqīq-e fatwā fī ibṭāl-e ṭughwā* ('The True Verdict on Destroying Falsehood'). The arguments in this work will be the primary source from which I will reconstruct and analyse Khayrabadi's arguments.[15]

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[13] See the historical accounts by Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), 16-86; Usha Sanyal, *Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi: In the Path of the Prophet* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), 1-49 and Tareen, *Defending Muḥammad in Modernity*.

[14] I take this sense of divine sovereignty broadly characterised by Tareen that involves upholding God's exclusive prerogative over not only the legal order and moral realm but His absolute power and control over the causal structures of the world. No creature, however great, can be characterised in sharing such prerogative, power and control nor infringe on or curtail them. *Defending Muḥammad in Modernity*, 85-103.

[15] Khayrabadi also wrote a detailed 'theological refutation' (*tardīd*) in Farsi to another scholar and student of Ismail Dihlawi by the name of Haidar Ali Tonki of Rampur entitled *Imtināˁ-e naẓīr* ('The Impossibility of Creating an Identical

There are two of Dihlawi's comments that reignited the controversy over divine omnipotence: one was on God's power to create innumerable Prophet Muḥammads and another on God's power to produce an untrue or false statement (i.e., a lie); both comments will now be reproduced and explained.

Comment 1: This is from Ismail Dihlawi's text on divine 'oneness' or 'unity' (*tawḥīd*), and 'transcendence' (*tanzīh*) called *Taqwiyat-e īmān* ('Fortifying the Faith'), which was written in vernacular Urdu and explicitly aims to expunge accretions of unislamic ideas, beliefs and practices that encroach on divine sovereignty. Thus, it is a text underpinning Dihlawi's "reformist programmatic for ending heretical innovation in the practice of popular Islam in South Asia".[16] Dihlawi's controversial comment (underlined in the translation) is as follows:

> *Attaining God's (Most mighty and exalted) proximity via the intercession of someone enjoying a high-ranking status is impossible. Any person who takes such kind of intercessor other than God, is definitely a polytheist (mushrik) and undoubtedly an ignorant person because he has not truly understood the meaning of 'deity' (ilāh) and has not comprehended the proper status of the King of kings whatsoever. <u>The status of this King of kings (God Most High) is such that if He so wishes, then by merely uttering the word 'Be!' (kun), He can in an instance, bring into existence millions of Prophets, saints, jinn, angels, Jibra'īl and Muhammad (God bless him and grant him peace).</u> In addition, in one breath, He can annihilate every single thing in the entire universe and create a different world altogether. Everything comes into existence merely by His Will and He does not require matter and substance to create things. If all human beings and jinn from the time of Ādam (upon him be peace) until the Day of Judgment, become like Jibra'īl and the Prophets, it will not add anything to the greatness of God's kingdom (salṭanat). Conversely, if all of them turn into devils and antichrists, there will be no reduction in His authority. In all cases, He will still continue to be the Greatest of all and the King of all kings. No one can either harm or benefit Him.[17]*

The context of this passage is Dihlawi's discussion on the issue of 'intercession' (*shafāʿat*), especially the category of intercession known as 'intercession from regard' (*shafāʿat-e vajāhat*), where God must pardon an individual on account of an intervention of a person of high spiritual rank or piety. "For example, a criminal is placed before the king. The Vizier intercedes. The king, having regard to the rank of the Vizier, pardons the offender."[18] For Dihlawi, God was under no obligation to pardon anyone on account of a petition from a pious person – even that of God's

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Muḥammad'). This is often mistakenly referenced as a rebuttal of Ismail Dihlawi although it does include references to him and his ideas and arguments.

[16] Marcia K. Hermansen, *The Conclusive Argument from God. Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi's Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), xxxiv. An English translation of *Taqwiyat-e īmān* appeared as early as 1852 by Mir Shahamat Ali published as "Translation of the Takwiyat-ul-Imán, preceded by a notice of the author, Maulavi Ismaʿil Hajji", *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 13 (1852), 310-372.

[17] Dihlawi, *Taqwiyat-e īmān* (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Daʿwa wa-l-Tawʿiyyat al-Jāliyyāt, n.d), 86:

اللہ عز وجل کے حضور شفاعت وجاہت قطعی طور پر ناممکن ہے جو شخص کسی غیر اللہ کو اس قسم کا شفیع مان لے وہ قطعی مشرک ہے اور بڑا جاہل ہے اس نے اِلہ کے معنی سمجھے نہیں اور شہنشاہ کی قدر و منزلت پہچانی ہی نہیں۔ اس شہنشاہ (باری تعالیٰ) کی تو یہ شان ہے کہ اگر چاہے تواللہ لفظ کن سے کروڑوں نبی، ولی، جن، فرشتے، جبرئیل اور محمد صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم کے برابر ایک آن میں پیدا کر دے اور ایک دم سے عرش سے فرش تک ساری کائنات کو زیر و زبر کر دے اور دوسرا عالم پیدا کر دے۔ اس کے تو ارادے ہی سے ہر چیز پیدا ہو جاتی ہے اسے مادے کی اور سامان کی حاجت نہیں۔ اگر آدم سے لے کر قیامت تک کے تمام انسان اور جن جبرئیل و پیغمبر جیسے ہو جائیں تو ان کی وجہ سے اللہ تعالیٰ کی سلطنت میں کچھ بھی رونق نہ بڑھے گی اور اگر سب شیطان و دجال بن جائیں تو اس کی حکومت کی کچھ رونق بھی نہ گھٹے گی وہ ہر حال میں تمام بڑوں کا بڑا اور تمام بادشاہوں کا بادشاہ ہے نہ کوئی اس کا کچھ بگاڑ سکے اور نہ بنا سکے۔

[18] Edward Sell, *The Faith of Islam* (London, Trübner & Co., and Madras, Addison & Co. 1880), 158.

most beloved, the Prophet Muḥammad himself. If God were so obligated, then the Prophet (or any pious individual granted intercessory prerogatives) would exert a power over God to act, which is tantamount to 'idolatry' (shirk).[19] Dihlawi here in this passage that later incensed Khayrabadi due to its poor choice of words and breach of etiquette against the revered rank of the Prophet, claimed quite literally that God could create a 'million' (koroṛon) Prophet Muḥammads if He so wished because of His absolute power. For Khayrabadi, this statement is specifically problematic because it implies that God can create another identical 'essence' (māhiyyat) of the Prophet Muḥammad "in addition to all his unique and perfect properties" (tamām awṣāf-e kāmila), two of which are that He is the seal of all the Prophets and that he alone is granted the most expansive and magnanimous power of intercession in the hereafter. For Khayrabadi, this is what imkān-e naẓīr means – not God's creation of a mere likeness of the Prophet Muḥammad but an absolute identical creation.[20] The underlying logic of Dihlawi's passage will be explained below after comment 2.

Comment 2: This is from Ismail Dihlawi's highly interesting but short pamphlet Yak roza ('One Day'), written within a day (hence the title) in a central mosque courtyard after prayers as a direct response to an unnamed detractor[21] regarding modalities of divine power and the perceived problematic phraseology regarding the possible identical creation of the Prophet Muḥammad in Taqwiyat-e īmān. Dihlawi states in one place:

> He says: 'it is impossible [for God to lie] because it is an imperfection and all imperfections are impossible for Him'. I say: if by impossible (muḥāl) is meant intrinsic impossibility, in that it is not included within divine power, then we do not concede that the aforementioned [sense of] lie (kidhb) is impossible in that meaning given. A statement that does not accord with reality being put together and being delivered to angels or prophets is not [per se] excluded from divine power. Otherwise, it would entail that human capacity is greater than divine capacity, given that putting together a statement that does not accord with reality and delivering it to addressees is within the capacity of most individuals from humankind. The aforementioned lie is opposed to His wisdom (ḥikmat), and is thus extrinsically impossible. Therefore, the absence of lying is one of the many perfections of God (Glory be to Him!).[22]

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[19]   Dihlawi, Taqwiyat-e īmān (Maunath Bhanjan, U.P.: Maktaba-e Naʿīmiyya, n.d.), 43. For a discussion on the topic of intercession within Dihlawi's thought and Khayrabadi's rebuttal, refer to the latter's Imtināʿ-e nāẓīr li-ḥaḍrat khātim al-nabiyyīn (Bareilly: Imam Ahmed Reza Khan Academy, 2012), 72-74 and the examination by Tareen, Defending Muḥammad in Modernity, 122-148.

[20]   Fazle Haqq Khayrabadi, Taḥqīq-e fatwā fī ibṭāl al-tughwā (Lahore, 1979), 152 and 162:
"rather, what this statement means is an individual that shares in the blessed essence and all of the properties of perfection belonging to the leader of all creation and most noble of all possible creatures (Allah bless him and grant him peace)."

بلکہ اس قائل کی مراد کی وہ فرد ہے جو اس ذات اقدس کے ساتھ ماہیت اور ان تمام اوصاف کاملہ میں شریک ہو جو اس ذات قدسی صفات سرور کائنات مفخر ممکنات صلی اللہ تعالے علیہ وسلم میں موجودہے

[21]   This detractor is considered to be none other than Khayrabadi who initially evinced stern opposition to the phraseology in Ismail Dihlawi's Taqwiyat-e īmān, because of its implying the possibility of creating an identical Muḥammad. Khayrabadi's general objections are presented in section 2.

[22]   Ismail Dihlawi, Yak roza (Multan: Fārūqī Kutub Khāna, n.d.), 17:

قولہ ۔ وہو محال لانہ نقص والنقص علیہ تعالی محال ۔ اقول اگر مراد از محال ممتنع لذاتہ است کہ تحت قدرت الہیہ داخل نیست پس لانسلم کہ کذب مذکور محال معنی مسطور باشدچہ مقدمہ قضیہ غیر مطابق مواقع والقاۓ آن بر ملائکۃ وانبیاء خارج از قدرت الہیہ نیست والا لازم آید کہ قدرت انسانی از ید از قدرت ربانی باشد چہ عقد قضیہ غیر مطابق للواقع والقاۓ آن بہ مخاطبین در قدرت اکثر افراد انسانی ست۔ کذب مذکور اسے منافی حکمت اوست پس ممتنع بالغیرست۔ ولہذا عدم کذب را از کمالات حضرت حق سبحانہ بیشمار نداخٔ

For Dihlawi, the act of putting together a statement contrary to reality and transmitting that to supernatural intermediaries like angels or human agents like Prophets and Messengers is not something intrinsically impossible because it is an act that a terrestrial agent like humans can actualise and therefore *a fortiori* God can actualise it. It is also not a logical contradiction to affirm such a proposition. What Dihlawi appears to be claiming is the following:

$$◊A(θ,φ)$$

Read as: 'it is possible that God composes a statement contrary to fact.'

Although it is possible for God to do $φ$, it is never the case that He actualises $φ$. Hence,

$$¬∀w(A(θ,φ,w))$$

Read as: 'there is no possible world in which God composes a statement contrary to fact.'[23]

The crux of the contention is how Dihlawi makes the conjunction of < $◊A(θ,φ)$ > and < $¬∀w(A(θ,φ,w))$ > composable. Key to Dihlawi's solution is the modal concepts he utilises and they are: (a) the 'intrinsically impossible' (*mumtaniᶜ bi-l-dhāt*), also referred to as *essential* impossibility. This is a state of affairs that cannot ever be instantiated because it would entail an absurdity like a logical contradiction or something contrary to God's essence. For example, it cannot be the case that God actualise a proposition and its negation at the same time, i.e., < $¬◊A(θ,(p ∧ ¬p))$ >, and neither is it possible for God to actualise a rival deity identical to Himself, i.e., < $¬◊(G(x) ∧ C(x,y) ∧ G(y) ∧ (x=y))$ > or create His own attributes, < $¬◊(G(x) ∧ Π(y,x) ∧ C(x,y))$ >.[24] Dihlawi like Khayrabadi agrees on the theological principle that God's power does not connect to 'absurdities' or 'impossibilia' (*mustaḥīlāt, mumtaniᶜāt*) and this does not in any way imply 'inability' (*ᶜajz*) on God's part because they do not have any reality or literally 'thing-ness' (*shay'iyyat*) in the first place. However, Khayrabadi does differ with Dihlawi over what counts as absurd or impossible; a difference that is crucial to this debate as we shall see.[25] In any case, according to this principle of intrinsic impossibility, omnipotence would be defined as follows:

$$□∀φ(◊A(θ,φ)) ≡ (L(φ) ∧ E(φ, θ))$$

Read as: 'For any proposition, God can bring it about if and only if the proposition is consistent with the laws of logic and God's essence.'

This definition of omnipotence is assumed by Dihlawi and is one of the standard definitions in the Sunnī Islamic *kalām* theological literature.[26] (b) 'extrinsic impossibility' (*mumtaniᶜ bi-l-ghayr*), also

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[23]   The symbolisation key:
- *A* : is able to do
- *θ* : God
- *φ* : a statement contrary to fact
[24]   The symbolisation key:
- *C(x,y)* : *x* creates *y*
- *G(x)* : *x* is God
- *Π(y,x)* : *y* is an attribute of *x*
[25]   Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 162-164 and *Imtināᶜ-e naẓīr*, 50.
[26]   See for instance Mullā ᶜAlī al-Qārī's (d. 1014/1605) explanation of this restrictive scope of omnipotence in his *Sharḥ fiqh al-akbar* (Istanbul: Maṭbaᶜat al-ᶜUthmāniyya, 1885), 81-82:

known as *non-essential* or *indirect* impossibility. This is a state of affairs that also cannot ever be instantiated but only *by virtue of some other fact or state of affairs*. The *mumtaniᶜ bi-l-ghayr* modal category is equivalent to another one and that is (c) the 'intrinsically possible' (*mumkin bi-l-dhāt*). This is whatever is logically possible to enact. From this it would seem that according to Dihlawi the *mumtaniᶜ bi-l-ghayr* and the *mumkin bi-l-dhāt* are modally equivalent. Thus, for Dihlawi, whatever is extrinsically impossible is something *per se* actualisable by God although it never is actualised by Him due to some self-imposed constraint or condition such as His will, or in this case, His wisdom. On this distinction between intrinsic impossibility and extrinsic possibility, Tareen aptly summarises Dihlawi's core claim:

> On the basis of this principle, he launched the case that since the absence and impossibility of Muḥammad's replica were not essential but indirect, the presence of such a replica was essentially possible. And since God could obviously enact what was essentially possible, it was proved that God possessed the capacity to produce another Muḥammad, or, for that matter, to renege his own promise. That was all he had tried to say in Taqwīyat al-Īmān, Ismāᶜīl pleaded, like an author battling to control the reception history of his own text.[27]

Dihlawi furnished several supporting arguments to affirm it being both possible for God to create an identical Prophet Muḥammad and for Him to lie *in potentia*. Four saliant supporting arguments will be examined and they are as follows: **Supporting Argument #1**: *God can create likenesses of all things.* This is the case, Dihlawi argues, based on 'scriptural proof' (*dalīl naqlī*) and 'rational proof' (*burhān ᶜaqlī*).[28] The scriptural proof is that God has informed about His power to recreate the likenesses of all things on Resurrection Day, which is taken from "*Has He Who created the heavens and the earth no power to create the likes of them? Yes, indeed, He is the Superb Creator*"[29] and that He has the power to do anything, which is derived from "*to God you will return and He has power over all things.*"[30] Dihlawi writes:

> Every human person can be resurrected in the hereafter and hence fall under the power of God according to the requirements of the verse. So it seems that the combination of the mentioned reasoning is that the Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace) can also be brought alive in the resurrection. Therefore, according to the verse, the existence of his likeness falls under the power of God; hence, the existence of the likeness of the Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace) falls under the power of God and this is the whole point.[31]

> Moreover, it has been said: every general expression is specified and His statement (Most High), "God has power over all things..." [al-Baqara/284] is specified by whatever He wills. This is in order to exclude [from this scope of God's power] His essence, attributes, whatever He does not desire from His creation and impossibilities that occur in his creation. The point is that God's power is connected to what His Will is connected to. Otherwise, it is not said that He is capable of the impossible because of their non-occurrence and the necessity of their falsehood nor is it said that He is incapable of doing it out of utmost respect to one's Lord. Finally, this generality is specified with His statement (Most High), "And God knows all things..." [al-Baqara/282].

هذا و قد قيل: كل عام يخص لما خص قوله تعالى: (و الله على كل شئ قدير) مما شاء ليخرج ذاته و صفاته و ما لم يشأ من مخلوقاته وما يكون من المحال وقوعه في كائناته . والحاصل أن كل شيء تعلقت بمشيئته فعلقت به قدرته. و إلا فلا يقال هو قادر على المحال لعدم وقوعه و لزوم كذبه ولا يقال غير قادر عليه تعظيما لأدبه من ربه. ثم هذا العام مخصوص بقوله تعالى: (والله بكل شئ عليم).

27   Tareen, *Defending Muḥammad in Modernity*, 101.
28   Dihlawi, *Yak roza*, 2-4.
29   Yā-Sīn/81.
30   Hūd/4.
31   Dihlawi, *Yak roza*, 3-4:

If God has the power to create the 'likes of them' (*an yakhluqa mithlahum*) as mentioned in the Qur'ān Yā-Sīn/81, meaning the likeness of any created entity on Resurrection Day, and Prophet Muḥammad is among God's created entities that will be resurrected, then it follows that God can create the likeness of him again. The metaphysical principle at play here is that whatever object is possible for God to create, its 'likeness' (*mithl*) is also possible for Him to create. It seems that Dihlawi is using the term *mithl* in the sense of a replica, i.e. *exact likeness*. Formally: $\square \forall y \lozenge A(\theta,y) \rightarrow \lozenge A(\theta,y^*)$, where '$y^*$' is the (exact) likeness or replica of y.[32] Khayrabadi's rebuts this exegesis offered by Dihlawi. According to him, the context of the verse is about God's response to the obstinate Meccan unbelievers who denied the conceivability of a bodily resurrection, which was that if God indeed created vast objects like the heavens and the earth, then *a fortiori* it is an even easier matter that He bring back to life smaller objects like the very bones, bodies and organs of the dead.[33] For Khayrabadi, the phrase 'the likes of them' (*mithlahum*) refers to bringing back to life dead bodies in a resurrection and cannot be extended to mean creating another exact individual who possesses all the human perfections of the Prophet Muḥammad.[34]

Supporting Argument #2: *intrinsic vs. extrinsic impossibility*. The rational proof Dihlawi presents in conjunction with the scriptural proof just outlined under supporting argument #1 is explained as follows:

> *As for the rational proof, after its statement, the existence of the aforementioned example is extrinsically impossible, and everything that is extrinsically impossible is intrinsically possible, and whatever is intrinsically possible falls under divine power. Hence, the existence of the aforementioned example falls under the divine power, and that is my point.[35]*

پس ضمیر جمع مذکر راجع به سوئے جمیع بنی آدم است زیرا که به مذکور و مقام بیان معاد واقع گردید پس هر که در میان زنده خواهد شد آن داخل است در آیتہ کریمہ ظاہر است ۔ ہر فردی از افراد انسانی در معاد زنده شدنی است پس مثل او به مقتضائے کریمہ مذکورہ داخل تحت قدرت الہیہ باشد۔ پس گویا ترکیب دلیل مذکور بایں وجہ باشد کہ نبی صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم در معاد زندہ خواہد شد۔ پس وجود مثل او داخل است تحت قدرت الہیہ بمقتضائے کریمہ مذکورہ پس وجود مثل نبی صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم داخل باشد تحت قدرت الہیہ و ہو المطلوب

[32] "According to [the meaning of] the Qur'an's uttered speech, on the matter of being subservient to a form of power or of not being so, two like entities carry the same rule or principle", Dihlawi, *Yak roza*, 4 (Translation from Tareen, *Defending Muḥammad in Modernity*, 100):

لأن حكم المثلين في الدخول تحت القدرة وعدمه بمنطوق القرآن

We see this principle mentioned by for example Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī in *al-Iqtiṣād fī-l-iʿtiqād* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2015), 52, "the power to do something entails the power over doing its likeness":

فإن القدرة على الشيء قدرة على مثله

[33] 'A fortiori' is a Latin term that translates to 'from the stronger.' In Arabic it is referred to as 'arguing from what is greater' (*al-jadal bi-l-awlā*), or 'by greater reasoning' (*bāb awlā*). In reasoning and logic, an *a fortiori* argument is one that draws a stronger conclusion from an already accepted fact or proposition. See *Rosalind W.* Gwynne, *Logic, Rhetoric and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'ān: God's Arguments* (New York, Routledge, 2004), 126-129 for Qur'ānic examples such as al-Ḥajj/73; al-Aḥqāf/33; Qāf/36-37 and al-Nāziʿāt/27.

[34] Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 171-173.

[35] Dihlawi, *Yak roza*, 5:

و اما برہان عقلی پس بیانش آنکہ وجود مثل مذکور ممتنع بالغیر است و ہر ممتنع بالغیر ممکن بالذات و ہر ممکن بالذات داخل تحت قدرت الہیہ پس وجود مثل مذکور داخل است تحت قدرت الہیہ وہو المطلوب

This supporting argument is based on a hypothetical syllogism but is here stated semi-formally in conditional form as follows:

(1)   If something is extrinsically impossible then it is intrinsically possible.
(2)   If something is intrinsically possible then it falls under the divine power to actualise.
(3)   Therefore, if something is extrinsically impossible then it falls under the divine power to actualise.
(4)   Creating an identical Prophet Muḥammad is extrinsically impossible.
(5)   Therefore, an identical Prophet Muḥammad is intrinsically possible.
(6)   Therefore, an identical Prophet Muḥammad falls under the divine power to actualise.

This argument chains together multiple premises to draw a conclusion. A formal presentation of this supporting argument is as follows:[36]

1. $\forall x(E(x) \rightarrow I(x))$
2. $\forall x(I(x) \rightarrow D(x))$
3. $\forall x(E(x) \rightarrow D(x))$
4. $E(m)$
5. $I(m)$
6. $D(m)$

The argument reconstructed here is logically valid. From 1 & 4, we infer 5 via Modus Ponens.[37] Similarly, from 2 & 5 we infer 6 via Modus Ponens again. With the assumption of the modal distinction *mumtaniᶜ bi-l-dhāt* and *mumtaniᶜ bi-l-ghayr* already explained above, it would be inferable that God can produce another Prophet Muḥammad. Khayrabadi, as we will see in section 2, denies 3 & 4 holding in all cases and thus denies the logical equivalence between *mumtaniᶜ bi-l-ghayr* and *mumkin bi-l-dhāt*.

Supporting Argument #3: *God's scope of power must always exceed the scope of creaturely power*. If God is unable to lie and creatures like human beings are, then this implies God is unable to do something His created creatures can. This would imply He is not absolutely powerful. However, claiming that God is not absolutely powerful is a flaw and attributing a flaw to God is impossible and heretical.[38] For Dihlawi, attributing inability to God over something that is intrinsically

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[36]   The symbolisation key:
- $E(x)$: x is extrinsically impossible.
- $I(x)$: x is intrinsically possible.
- $D(x)$: x falls under the divine power to actualize.
- m : another (identical) Prophet Muḥammad.

[37]   Al-Fārābī gives this example of modus ponens:
Thus the first mood of the connected hypothetical [syllogism] is [the following]: 'If this visible thing is a human, then it is an animal; but it is a human'. This produces the conclusion that 'It is therefore an animal'.
Reproduced from Chatti and Hodges, *al-Fārābī: Syllogism*, 134.

[38]   Dihlawi, *Yak roza*, 17. This kind of argument echoes those of the Andalucian polymath Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1054) in his extensive discussion of miracles and divine power (*qudra*) in *al-Faṣl fī-l-milal wa-l-ahwāʾ wa-l-niḥal*, 2: 20-33. See as well the subsequent discussion on this topic in al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* and Ibn Rushd's counter-refutation *Tahāfut al-tahāfut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), trans. Simon Van Den Bergh (Cambridge: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 1954), 323-333, sec. 528-542.

possible to do like creating the exact likeness of an object or to generate untrue speech is to undermine God's essential attribute of omnipotence. For him, it is unwarranted to restrict the scope of divine omnipotence from the set of indeterminate 'possibilia' (mumkināt). As already mentioned above, only absurdities like logical contradictions and essential impossibilities are excluded from the scope of omnipotence. Khayrabadi's reply to Dihlawi's argument attempts to highlight problematic assumptions embedded in it. Khayrabadi states that there are two types of powers (1) 'perfect power' (qudrat-e kāmila), which is maximal power exclusive to God because it is one of His unique attributes and (2) 'imperfect power' (qudrat-e nāqiṣa), which is a limited power possessed by finite human creatures.[39] The latter category of power is vastly inferior and includes the capacity to do defective and improper acts like lying, cheating and oppressing. Hence, if defective and improper acts like lying are possible for human creatures but impossible for God, this does not make the scope of power of the former more than the scope of the latter, i.e., it does not necessitate that human beings are more powerful than God. For that to be possible, it would need to be shown how human power is inclusive of or consists of divine power. Therefore, Dihlawi would need to prove first how the former not surpasses but includes the latter, meaning how creaturely power consists of divine power and then compare both to see how it is that one is less than the other.[40]

Supporting Argument #4: *Potentiality vs. actuality.* God has the potential to create any number of identical Prophet Muḥammads and to contravene or renege His 'threats' (waʿīd) to punish the iniquitous; but this does not mean He will actualise these states of affairs. Only God's act of actualising them would necessitate its falsity, not the *potential* to do so.[41] Thus, for Dihlawi, there is a major difference between being able to do something (having the power to actualise it) and actually doing it. This allows Dihlawi to maintain the distinction between something being possible and it being actual, i.e., in reality. Thus, the possibility (imkān) of p, ◊p does not entail p, its occurrence (wuqūʿ). Khayrabadi dismisses this argument in somewhat ad hominem fashion but also invokes species of arguments from appeal to absurdity and appeal to incredulity in that the belief that God could possibly lie is unbefitting a true believer even if He does not. In addition, Khayrabadi highlights the implication of Dihlawi's potentiality argument, namely that it would imply it being logically possible to impute an imperfection to God, which is equally absurd as actually imputing it to Him. All imperfections must be negated of God in absolute terms. It cannot even be something conceivable for Him.[42]

2. The Objection Stated and Supported

In *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, Khayrabadi presents in summary form his objection to the possibility of God creating another person identical in 'perfection' (kamālāt) to the Prophet Muḥammad (imkān-e

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39   Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 159-160.

40   Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 160-161 and *Imtināʿ-e naẓīr*, 119-123.

41   Dihlawi, *Yak roza*, 14:

توضیح مقام لینک و وقوع چیزے کہ مخالف چیز مستلزم کذب آن چیز است . نہ امکان وقوع آن و مناط صحت تعلیق قدرت امکان مقدور است نہ وقوع آن ۔

42   Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 157-159.

naẓīr) because it entails God saying something false. I have translated the relevant passage from the Urdu and present it in full below:

> *According to logic, this syllogism (connected with categorical propositions)[43] takes the following form:*
>
> *(1) For another to exist identical to the Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace) in perfection implies an intrinsic impossibility (muḥāl bi-l-dhāt).*
>
> *(2) If something is intrinsically impossible, then it cannot be correctly linked to God's act of creating (according to the form of the conjunctive conditional syllogism).*
>
> *If the possibility of creating another person identical to the Prophet Muḥammad (God bless him and grant him peace) in perfection could be correctly linked to God's act of creating, then it implies that God would be able to lie. However, the consequent (tālī) 'God is able to lie' is invalid and so the antecedent (muqaddim) 'the possibility of creating another person identical to the Prophet Muḥammad (God bless him and grant him peace) in perfection could be correctly linked to God's act of creating' will also be invalid.*
>
> *For another to exist identical to the Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace) in perfection implies a lie on God's part. This is because there cannot be another individual identical to the honourable Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace) and if another (new) Prophet was to come after him (God bless him and grant him peace) then it would entail that the clear text of the Qur'ān is false. The Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace) is the seal of all the prophets and this is established by unequivocal Qur'ānic verses like God (Most High) declaring, "Muḥammad is not the father of any one of you but he is God's messenger and the seal of all the prophets" [al-Aḥzāb/40]. Therefore, if it is correct to say that creating another individual identical to the Prophet Muḥammad (God bless him and grant him peace) is indeed possible, then it implies that it is correct to say that this clear and unequivocal verse of the Qur'ān is false – and may God protect us from saying that!*
>
> *Finally, the reason why it is intrinsically impossible for God to lie is because lying is an attribute of deficiency and imperfection and it is intrinsically impossible to ascribe attributes of deficiency and imperfection to God.[44]*

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43   On the 'categorical connected syllogism' (*al-qiyās al-iqtirānī al-ḥamlī*), see Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī, *Isagoge: A Classical Primer on Logic* (*Isāghūjī risāla fī-l-manṭiq*), trans. Feryal Salem (Chicago: Blue Mountain Press, 2022), 24 (Arabic text) with the translator's notes on 110-114.

44   Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 156:

(منطقی انداز میں) اس قیاس (اقترانی حملی) کی ترتیب یوں ہوگی:

(1)   کمالات میں حضور صلی اللہ تعالی علیہ وسلم کے برابر کا موجود ہونا محال بالذات کومستلزم ہے ۔

(2)   اور جو محال بالذات کو مستلزم ہو اس سے تکوین کا تعلق صحیح نہیں ہے یا (بصورت قیاس استثنائی اتصالی) کہا جائے ۔

اگر کمالات میں حوصلی اللہ علہ علیہ وسلم کے برا بنتے تکوین کا تعلق صحیح ہوتا تو اللہ تعالئے کا کذب بھی صحیح ہوتا لیکن تالی (اللہ تعالے کا کذب باطل ہے) لہذا مقدم (کمالات میں حضور کے برابر سے تکوین کے تعلق کا صحیح ہونا) بھی باطل ہوگا ۔ حضورصلی اللہ تعالی علیہ سلم کے برابر کا موجود ہونا ذنب الہی کو سلام ہے اس کا بیان یہ ہے کہ نبی اکرم صلی اللہ تعالی علیہ وسلم کے برابر نبی کے سوا اور کوئی شخص نہیں ہوسکتا اور نور صلی اللہ تعالی علیہ وسلم کے بعد اسنے انمی کے موجود ہونے سے نص قرآنی کا کذب لازم آتا ہے، اسلئے نبی اکرم صلی اللہ علیہ عالی علیہ وسلم کا خاتم جمیع انبیاء ہونا نص قرآنی سے ثابت ہے، اللہ تعالی فرماتا ہے :

مَا كَانَ مُحَمَّدٌ أَبَا أَحَدٍ مِّن رِّجَالِكُمْ وَلَٰكِن رَّسُولَ اللَّهِ وَخَاتَمَ النَّبِيِّينَ

لہذا اگر حضور صلی اللہ تعالی علیہ وسلم کے برابر کاتکوین کے تحت داخل ہونا تو صحیح ہو تو اس نص صرّح کا کذب صحیح ہو جائےگا العیاذ باللہ تعالی من ذلک۔ رہا یہ امر کہ اللہ تعالی کا کذب محال بالذات ہے تو اس کا بیان یہ ہے کہ کذب صفت نقص اور عیب ہے اور اللہ تعالے کا صفات نقص و عیب سے متصف ہونا محال بالذات ہے ۔

In *Imtināʿ-e naẓīr*, 401, Khayrabadi states his thesis tersely as follows:

Khayrabadi's argument is a compound one and a classic example of Modus Tollens. Modus Tollens is a valid rule of inference in classical logic and takes the form:

$P \rightarrow Q$

$\neg Q$

$\therefore \neg P$

If P, implies Q and Q is not the case, then it follows that P cannot be the case. If P were true, then Q would also have to be true (because $P \rightarrow Q$). But since Q is not true, P must not be true either.[45] In informal terms, Khayrabadi's argument is:

(1) If the possibility of creating another person identical the Prophet Muḥammad in perfection could be correctly linked to God's act of creating then God is able to lie.

(2) God is not able to lie.

(3) Therefore, the possibility of creating another person identical to the Prophet Muḥammad (God bless him and grant him peace) in perfection cannot be correctly linked to God's act of creating.

In the remainder of the section, I will take up this version, explain it and unpack Khayrabadi's supporting arguments for each premise. Then, in the final section, there will be my concluding remarks on this debate on omnipotence.

I turn now to Khayrabadi's supporting arguments for his claim that it is intrinsically impossible for God to create an identical Prophet Muḥammad and for God to lie. These are quite extensive so I will only mention some pertinent ones. Let me first restate Khayrabadi's reconstructed argument:

(1) If the possibility of creating another person identical to the Prophet Muḥammad in perfection could be correctly linked to God's act of creating then God is able to lie.

(2) God is not able to lie.

(3) Therefore, the possibility of creating another person identical to the Prophet Muḥammad (God bless him and grant him peace) in perfection cannot be correctly linked to God's act of creating.

"*at this present time, my claim is the following: it is intrinsically impossible for there to be another person identical in perfection to the holy Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace) and whatever is intrinsically impossible does not fall under divine power.*"

حالا دعوی می کنم که شخصی که برابر آن حضرت صلی الله تعالی علیه وسلم در کمالات باشد ممتنع بالذات است و هر چه ممتنع بالذات است تحت قدرت الهی داخل نیست

45   Al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) under the hypothetical syllogism gives this example:

"*The second mood of the connected hypothetical [syllogism], in which the opposite of the consequent is detached, produces the opposite of the antecedent, as when we say 'If this visible thing is a human, then it is an animal; but it is not an animal'. This produces: 'it is therefore not a human'. But in this and similar cases, if we were to detach the opposite of the antecedent, or the unaltered consequent, then there would be no conclusion that this premise-pair necessarily produces.* "

Reproduced from Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Al-Fārābī, Syllogism: an Abridgement of Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, trans. Saloua Chatti and Wilfrid Hodges (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 134. See as well Saloua Chatti, *Arabic Logic From Al-Fārābī to Averroes: A Study of the Early Arabic Categorical, Modal, and Hypothetical Syllogistics* (Springer Verlag, 2019), 268.

Before presenting the supporting arguments, two phrases used in the reconstructed argument based on Khayrabadi's wording need explaining. The first phrase is 'creating another person identical to the Prophet Muḥammad in perfection'. This is Khayrabadi's definition of *imkān-e naẓīr*. In other words, God has the power to create another individual identical to Prophet Muḥammad in essence and unique properties exemplified by him and him alone. The second phrase 'correctly linked to God's act of creating' refers to the way *kalām* scholars describe the divine attribute of power connecting to its 'object' (*maqdūr*) and this connection or 'nexus' (*taʿalluq*) can be correct and proper or incorrect and improper. It is correct when the object of power is something doable or actualisable (e.g., *possibilia*) and incorrect when the object of power is something undoable and unactualisable (e.g., *impossiblia*).[46]

The Supporting Arguments for premise 1 include: **#1a**: *scripture cannot be made false*. Khayrabadi bluntly declares that affirming *imkān-e naẓīr* leads to causing the Qur'ān to state something false. Essentially, if the declaration in al-Aḥzāb/40 that '*Muḥammad is not the father of any one of you but he is God's messenger and the <u>seal of all the prophets</u>*' is true, then *imkān-e naẓīr* would entail it is possibly false and it is inconceivable that the Qur'ān contain a possibly false statement let alone an actually false one. **#1b**: *God cannot do the impossible.* In agreement with Ismail Dihlawi, Khayrabadi upholds that impossibilities do not fall within the scope of divine power, but in disagreement with him, emphatically insists creating an identical Muhammad *m** is something intrinsically impossible based on two general arguments. #1b1: The first argument is that *imkān-e naẓīr* would imply creating the same essence of Prophet Muḥammad with all the exclusive properties of perfection attributed to him. The reasoning is based on Khayrabadi's division of 'properties' (*awṣāf*) into 'shareable' and 'non-shareable'. "Shareable properties are those that can be exemplified by more than one object" and non-shareable properties are "those that cannot be exemplified by more than one object".[47] Being a Prophet of God for example is a sharable property between many individuals (hence there are many prophets) but being the *final* prophet of God is a non-shareable property because there cannot be anyone else exemplifying it. Two properties among many are unique and exclusive to the Prophet Muḥammad and hence non-shareable. Suppose 'F' refers to Prophet Muḥammad's exclusive property of being the final Prophet and 'G' to refer to his exclusive property of being the great and global intercessor for humanity on the Day of Judgment. If we affirm *imkān-e naẓīr* then it would imply *m** would also possess these exclusive properties, $\Diamond(Fm^* \wedge Gm^*)$. In other words, it would mean it is possible for another individual to be the final Prophet and possess the power of global intercession, $\Diamond((Fm \wedge Gm) \wedge (Fm^* \wedge Gm^*))$. For Khayrabadi, this is contradictory because stating that Prophet Muḥammad is the final prophet of God and the only global intercessor on the Day of Judgment but another can also be

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[46]   Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought*, 152-160. As a side note, Khayrabadi uses the Arabic word 'takwīn' when referring to God's act of creating. It is often translated as 'existentiation' in order to distinguish it from 'creation'. There is a deep disagreement among Sunnī *kalām* theologians over whether *takwīn* is taken as a distinct attribute of God through which God's acts take place or whether it is understood as a functional aspect of His attribute of power (*qudra*). These nuanced differences have no substantive bearing on the argument as I have presented it because the focus is not on explaining *how* God creates an identical Prophet Muḥammad but whether it is logically possible to do so. For more on this topic of *takwīn*, refer to Ramon Harvey, *Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 175-190.

[47]   Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 174.

God's final Prophet and humanity's global intercessor is tantamount to denying Muḥammad's finality and exclusive intercessory status.[48]

#1b2: The second argument is a strictly logical one and I will briefly mention two types. The first logical argument is based on the traditional *square of opposition*.[49] Khayrabadi presents his reasoning in this way. Take the universal negative proposition 'No possible entity at any time is identical to the Prophet Muḥammad' meaning in terms of his perfection)' (No S is P = **E**). Assume the proposition to be true. The 'converse' (*al-ᶜaks*) of No S is P would also be true, namely 'the Prophet Muḥammad is not identical to any possible entity at any time' (No P is S). This is because in medieval logic, following Aristotle, **E** and **I** propositions simply convert. However, as Khayrabadi notes, if 'No S is P' is false, i.e. it is not the case that no possible entity is identical to the Prophet Muḥammad, then its contradictory, an affirmative particular proposition, would be true, namely 'there is some possible entity at some time that is identical to the Prophet Muḥammad' (Some S are P = **I**) and this is clearly false as it would contravene clear Islamic doctrines regarding the nature and status of the Prophet, like the ones already mentioned by Khayrabadi. Hence, he concludes, "when the original proposition [No S is P] is true, its conversion is undoubtedly true. Therefore, it is demonstrated that there cannot be any possible entity identical to the Prophet Muḥammad in perfection".[50] In other words, the logical impossibility of an identical Muḥammad must mean it is intrinsically impossible and hence not possible to actualise.[51]

The second logical argument Khayrabadi presents is a *reductio ad absurdum* in order to show how the assumption of *imkān-e naẓīr* leads to a contradiction. Semi-formally, the argument is as follows:[52]

1. Assume: it is possible that m^* is identical with m.
2. Assume: Leibniz's Law of Identity of Indiscernibles (LII) - If two entities have all their properties in common, they are identical.
3. If it is possible that m^* is identical with m, then both are God's final Prophets.
4. It is not possible that both are God's final Prophet.
5. Therefore, it is not possible that m^* is identical with m.

Formally:

1. $\Diamond m^* = m$

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48 Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 174-175.

49 On a detailed analysis of the square of opposition in Arabic logic, refer to Chatti, "Logical Oppositions in Arabic Logic: Avicenna and Averroes", *Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition*, ed. J.-Y. Beziau and Dale Jacquette. (Basel: Springer Verlag, 2012), 21-40 and idem, *Arabic Logic from al-Fārābī to Averroes*, 25-62. See as well al-Abharī, *Īsāghūjī*, 23 (Arabic text) with the translator's explanatory notes on 73-80.

50 Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 164-165.

51 See Khayrabadi's presentation of the argument in Arabic with a long explanation and discussion in *Imtināᶜ-e naẓīr*, 131-147.

52 The symbolisation key:
   - m : Prophet Muḥammad.
   - m^* : a second Prophet Muḥammad that shares in his essence and qualities of perfection.
   - F : the property of being God's only final prophet and messenger (one of the unique qualities).

2. $\forall \Phi(\Phi x \leftrightarrow \Phi y) \rightarrow x = y$ (LII)
3. $\Diamond m^* = m \rightarrow (Fm^* \wedge Fm)$
4. $\neg \Diamond (Fm^* \wedge Fm)$
5. $\therefore \neg \Diamond m^* = m$ (MT)

The argument as reconstructed is deductively valid and uses modus tollens in its final step. Here, the possibility in the assumption (premise 1) is whether it is possible for God to bring about another individual who is identical in essence and qualities of perfection to the actual Prophet Muḥammad, $\Diamond A(\theta, m^* = m)$. The conditional statement is premise 3, and its consequent is negated in premise 4, leading to the negation of the antecedent (the initial assumption) in the conclusion. However, the key to Khayrabadi's reductio argument is the theological premise about the uniqueness of the property of being the final Prophet of God (premise 4). By asserting that it is not possible for there to be two final Prophets, he effectively negates the possibility of m^* being identical to m, given that such an identity would require them to share all properties, including being the final Prophet of God. For Khayrabadi, as already discussed above, the property of being the final prophet of God is a non-shareable property. In addition, he rejects the assumption on scriptural basis because for him, it would make the verse in al-Aḥzāb/40 false, which is impossible. Hence, it is possible for God to bring about another individual who is identical in essence and qualities of perfection to the actual Prophet Muḥammad, $\neg \Diamond A(\theta, m^* = m)$.[53]

Supporting Argument for premise 2: *imperfections are impossible for God.* Khayrabadi's argument that God cannot lie can be semi-formally stated:

(1) Whatever is an imperfection cannot be attributed to God.
(2) Lying is an imperfection.
(3) Therefore, lying cannot be attributed to God.

He finds it incredulous that Ismail Dihlawi explicitly rejects imperfections and flaws to God like lying and yet entertains the possibility of attributing such to Him.[54] God's nature is 'holy' (*pāk*) and pure and attributing the possibility of lying cannot in any conceivable way be compatible with that holiness and purity. In addition, lying can never be considered a 'praiseworthy quality' (*ṣifāt-e madḥ*) by which to identify and define someone and hence all the more unworthy of characterising and positively identifying God with.[55] In other words, if any property F is a deficiency when possessed by human creatures then F cannot be a property of perfection when possessed by God. Finally, elevation of God above any creaturely resemblance or imperfection is not a limitation or weakness but a "proper and perfect exaltation and hallowing of God" (*yahi kamāl-e tanzīh aur taqdīs hain*).[56]

Khayrabadi's conclusion that it is intrinsically impossible (*mumtaniʿ bi-l-dhāt*) that God create another Muḥammad may seem problematic as it appears to imply that the Prophet Muḥammad is a necessary being or 'essentially exists' (*wājib bi-l-dhāt*), i.e., he cannot fail to exist; but the

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53   Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 162-163.
54   Dihlawi, *Yak roza*, 12 and Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 158.
55   Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 160-161.
56   Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 161.

Prophet clearly cannot be such a being as that would infringe on God's aseity because He alone is the necessary being and exists self-sufficiently. Hence, *imkān-e naẓīr* is necessary to affirm in order to avoid this unwarranted implication infringing aseity.[57] Khayrabadi's reply is that something being intrinsically impossible does not entail that it exists necessarily. In other words, the category *mumtaniᶜ bi-l-dhāt* simply means the non-existence of something is necessary, i.e., there is no possible way it can be the case. It is a negation and not an affirmation of something particular being necessary. Khayrabadi explains:

> Also, to be unique and unparalleled in perfection does not refer to necessary existence because the quality (*khāṣṣa*) of necessary existence is that participation in its reality is inconceivable (*ḥaqīqat mein shirkat mutaṣawwar na ho*). This is because the reality of necessary existence just is the fact that its essence is not-shareable.[58]

To conclude this section, the evident strategy Khayrabadi adopts against Ismail Dihlawi is to diffuse the logical force of his statements. This is why he elaborates at length on the logical implications. The aim of this strategy is simple. If it can be shown how it is logically impossible for God to create an identical Prophet Muhammad or to say untruths, there is no omnipotence problem because divine power does not connect to logical impossibilities; they are not included within the range of the proper objects of power (*al-maqdūrāt*). Therefore, making it a logical impossibility is to reduce it to a non-problem.

Conclusion

This controversy over divine omnipotence is grounded in two different religious sensibilities, orientations and intellectual outlooks. On the one hand, Dihlawi cannot compromise God's sovereignty and rightfulness to be the object of total religious worship and that involves upholding God's inclusive and comprehensive power. On the other hand, for Khayrabadi, there is an extreme danger in what he sees as Dihlawi's fanatical endeavour of vindicating a kind of transcendence of God that results in diminishing God's holiness and perfection and, more importantly, diminishing the status of God's most beloved creation, the Prophet Muḥammad. These two sensibilities and attitudes broadly took on an entirely protracted trajectory beyond both Ismail Dihlawi and Khayrabadi among Indian scholars that involved additional theological assumptions, deep philosophical analysis and reciprocal accusations of heresy between proponents and opponents of both scholars. The nuances of such discussions will not be mentioned here as much of it will be treated extensively in another forthcoming paper that examines specifically the topic of whether lying falls within God's power from the two-volume work *Juhd al-Muqill fī Tanzīh al-Muᶜizz al-Mudhill* authored by Mahmud Hasan of Deoband (d. 1920). For this conclusion, I simply want to highlight one important consideration at play in this controversy regarding divine omnipotence. For Ismail Dihlawi, God is sovereign and with that

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[57] Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 175.

[58] Khayrabadi, *Taḥqīq-e fatwā*, 175:

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نیز کمالات میں بے نظیر و بے مثال ہونا وجوب ذاتی کا نام نہیں ہے، وجوب ذاتی کا خاصہ یہ ہے کہ حقیقت میں شرکت متصور نہ ہو کیونکہ وجوب ذاتی کا مصداق حقیقت احد یہ

بسیطہ بذاتہا متشخص ہے جو قابل اشتراک ہی نہیں ہے۔

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comes absolute power; but this power is nevertheless constrained by wisdom (*ḥikma*). The constraint can be stated as,

$$\lozenge A(\theta,\varphi) \equiv W(\varphi, \theta)$$

Read as: 'God can bring about some proposition if and only if it is consistent with His wisdom.'

Thus, while something might be intrinsically possible (i.e., there is nothing logically contradictory about it), God's wisdom could dictate that He will never actualise or perform it. Thus, due to God's wisdom, certain intrinsically possible acts or states of affairs become impossible for Him to actualise. It is highly interesting that Dihlawi insists on the sovereignty of divine omnipotence (which is a major cause of this entire controversy), yet it is subordinate to wisdom. It is also interesting how this wisdom constraint on omnipotence is entirely ignored by Khayrabadi in his counterarguments. His focus is more on the logical and scriptural weakness, as he understands it, inherent in Dihlawi's arguments. This attribute of wisdom in this debate though raises some questions. First, in what sense can Dihlawi's exaltation of God through an adamant insistence of His all-inclusive power be maintained if that power can never properly be executed because it is guided (checked?) by wisdom. It seems that what is being implied is the following: 'God can bring about *x* (creating an identical Prophet Muḥammad or lying) but He can never bring about *x* due to His wisdom'. No explanation is given as to why this constraint is something either rational or scriptural. In addition, how would this wisdom constraint make omnipotence meaningful for exalting God. It suggests that Dihlawi's entire thesis pivots on a technical matter that may appear ultimately theoretically redundant in that it does not allow any substantive merit over Khayrabadi's flat and outright rejection of God creating an identical Prophet Muḥammad or lying as intrinsically impossible acts. Both agree on the conclusion that an identical Prophet Muḥammad will never occur nor will an act of divine deception like lying. Second, what proof, if any, would Dihlawi need to offer in order to demonstrate that divine wisdom constrains divine power from ever actualising another identical Prophet Muḥammad or a string of words that mean something contrary to reality or what is true? This is especially the case when God's consummate wisdom and its workings in things is ultimately inscrutable. For example, what exactly is the reason, or what is most likely the reason, for God not actually producing a false statement? Dihlawi does not suggest any possible reason and neither does Khayrabadi press him on giving one. Finally, if divine wisdom is the grounds for the impossibility for both actualising another identical Prophet Muḥammad or lying, then to what extent is this controversy strictly a *logical* one? Is it perhaps more about God's wisdom then about what the logical limits of His power are. Although I do not fully share this last worry, I'm aware that such a question could arise. However, this controversy was explicitly conceived by both scholars through an interrelation of scripture, hermeneutics and logic that the contours of that was examined in the article.

I'm inclined to think that if wisdom is a distinct divine attribute, then a systematic and logical presentation of it ought to be possible in the way other attributes are. How that logical exposition will look is something yet to be proposed but one tentative illustration in that direction at this preliminary stage can be made for our topic at hand. Whether it can be attributed to Dihlawi (or indeed Khayrabadi) is another matter. In any case, I'm tentatively proposing something I'll call

the 'wisdom closure principle'. This closure principle would emphasise that if certain things are deemed impossible due to divine wisdom, then their entailments (whatever they are derived to be) are also impossible due to the same wisdom. Similarly, if certain things are possible due to divine wisdom, then their entailments are also possible. Let me formalise this wisdom closure principle:

- θ: God
- *p,q*: Propositions.
- W_θ: Divine wisdom.

The closure principle can be represented by the following two aspects:

1) Implication for Exclusion:

$$\neg\Diamond W_\theta(p) \wedge (p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow \neg\Diamond W_\theta(q)$$

Read as: if *p* is not possible due to divine wisdom and *p* logically implies (entails) *q*, then *q* is also not possible due to divine wisdom.

2) Implication for Inclusion:

$$\Diamond W_\theta(p) \wedge (p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow \Diamond W_\theta(q)$$

Read as: if *p* is possible due to divine wisdom and *p* logically implies (entails) *q*, then *q* is also possible due to divine wisdom.

So, in essence, the wisdom closure principle based on divine wisdom ensures that logical entailments respect the dictates of divine wisdom. Anything ruled out or in by divine wisdom will have its logical entailments similarly ruled out (or in). Hence, in both cases under examination in this essay, namely, of God creating an identical Prophet Muḥammad or lying, we would be using the closure principle based on divine wisdom to determine the logical implications of both actions (within God's power) being ruled out due to God's wisdom.

Acknowledgements

Appendix

Abbreviation of Logical Symbols

¬	Negation
∧	Conjunction
∨	Disjunction
→	Conditional
≡	If and only if

∀	All
∃	Some
◊	Possible
□	Impossible

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The Discussions Regarding the Belonging of the Qur'ānic Words in the Tradition of Tafsir and the Critique of Them

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Article Information

Abstract

It's understood that God aimed to communicate with human beings and send messages to them by creating the first man as the first prophet. To exemplify, God desired to be understood by them while sending the Torah in Hebrew, the Bible in Syriac, and the Qur'ān in Arabic. However, his Hebrew speech has a different nature from his Syriac, and his Arabic word has a different essence from his Hebrew and Syriac. Based on this reality, when viewing the history of Islamic thought, it is seen that scholars have tried to understand the nature of the speech of God and make sense of it. Essentially, understanding and grasping the words of God are an effort to look from the physical realm to the metaphysical one. Despite this fact, the scholars, as the indomitable seekers of truth, are searching for clues to say about it. While some of them consider the "divine speech" as an attribute of God, many others view it a "divine act". It is also admitted by all of them that whether being attributive or an act of God, the reflection of the divine speech is the Qur'ān. In this sense, three approaches have been put forward to the question of the belonging of the Qur'ānic words. In compliance with the dominant and preferred point of view among these views, the Qur'ān belongs to God in terms of wording and meaning. Accordingly, the revelation of the Qur'ān, which was revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad, consists of both wording and meaning. Therefore, there is no intervention or contribution of Gabriel or Muḥammad in constituting the Qur'ān. According to the second approach, the meanings of the Qur'ānic text belong to God; however, its words pertain to Muḥammad. This perspective indicates that Gabriel revealed nothing more than the meanings of the Qur'ān. Muḥammad understood the meanings conveyed to him and then uttered them in Arabic expression patterns and phrases. In conformity with the third approach, the meanings of the Qur'ānic text belong to God, however, its words pertain to Gabriel. In other words, only the meanings of the text were given to Gabriel, and its words were formed by him. In the present study, the mentioned approaches, which are asserted by scholars about the belonging of Qur'ānic words, first will be explained in a descriptive style. Subsequently, they will be evaluated in terms of the integrity of the Qur'ān, its natural historical atmosphere, and the transmissions of the Qur'ānic exegesis (riwāyāt) of the classical period from an analytical point of view. To put it briefly, it can be said that there is no disagreement among scholars in the field of the belonging of the meanings of the Qur'ānic text to God. The main disagreement is whether the Qur'ānic words belong to God, Gabriel, or Muḥammad. Considering the integrity of the Qur'ān, its natural historical atmosphere, and tafsir transmissions regarding the circumstances of sending down the Qur'ānic revelation, it has been determined that the prevailing view is more coherent than the other two views.

Keywords: Tafsir (Qur'ānic Exegesis), Divine quotations, Wahy (revelation), Gabriel, al-Lafz (wording), al-Ma'nâ (meaning).

Öz

Allah'ın ilk insanı, ilk peygamber yapmak suretiyle, insanoğlu ile iletişim kurmayı ve ona hitap eden vahiyler göndermeyi amaçladığı anlaşılmaktadır. Söz gelimi Tevrât'ı İbranice, İncîl'i Süryanice ve Kur'ân'ı Arapça göndermek suretiyle insanlar tarafından anlaşılmak istemiştir. Bununla birlikte onun İbranice kelâmı, Süryanice sözünden ve Arapça kelâmı da diğer dillerdeki sözünden farklı bir tabiata sahiptir. Bu gerçeklikten hareketle İslâm düşünce-fikir tarihine bakıldığında ilim adamlarının ilâhî kelâmın mâhiyetini, tabiatını anlamak ve bunu anlamlandırmak konusunda bir çabanın içerisine girdikleri görülmektedir. Esasen Allah'ın nasıl bir kelâma sahip olduğunu anlamak ve kavramak, cismanî/fizik âleminden gayrı cismanî/fizikötesine doğru bir bakış çabasıdır. Buna rağmen hakikatin yılmaz arayıcısı insan, bu konuda söyleyecek bir söz bulabilme çabası içindedir. "İlâhî kelâmı", Allah'ın bir sıfatı olarak değerlendirenler olduğu gibi bunu "ilâhî bir fiil" olarak telakki edenler de bulunmaktadır. İlâhî kelâm sıfatının veya fiilinin tecellîsinin Kur'ân olduğu da ehlince müsellemdir. Kur'ân lafızlarının aidiyeti konusunda başlıca üç görüş ortaya konulmuştur. Bu görüşler içerisinde hâkim ve râcih bakış açısına göre Kur'ân metni, lafız ve mana itibariyle Allah'a aittir. Buna göre Hz. Muhammed'e nâzil olan Kur'ân vahyi hem lafız hem de manadan oluşmaktadır. Bu telakkîyi savunan müelliflere göre vahyin oluşumu ve iletimi konusunda ne Cebrâil'in ne de Hz. Muhammed'in herhangi bir müdahale veya katkısı olmuştur. Dolayısıyla peygamberin vahiy nüzûl sürecinde rolünün tamamen pasif olduğu söylenebilir. Cibrîl, Kur'ân'ı önceden yazılı olarak bulunan bir mekândan, yani levh-i mahfûzdan ezberleyerek veya Allah'tan işiterek ya da Allah'ın lafızları ona vahyetmesiyle Hz. Peygamber'e indirmiştir. İkinci yaklaşıma göre Kur'ân metninin manası Allah'a, lafızları Hz. Peygamber'e aittir. Bu yaklaşıma göre Cebrâil, sadece manaları Hz. Peygamber'e indirmiştir. Hz. Peygamber de kendisine bildirilen manaları kavramış ve onları Arapça ifade kalıplarında söylemiştir. Üçüncü yaklaşıma göre ise Kur'ân'ın manası Allah'a, lafızları Cebrâil'e ait olmaktadır. Yani Cebrâil'e yalnız mana ilkâ edildi ve o lafızları oluşturdu. Bu çalışmada İslâm düşünce tarihinde ilim adamlarının kelâmullâhın tabiatını anlamak ve bunu anlamlandırmak konusunda lafızların aidiyeti konusunda ortaya koydukları söz konusu yaklaşımlar öncelikle deskriptif (tasvîrî/betimleyici) bir üslupla

incelenmektedir. Akabinde bu doğrultuda serdedilen yaklaşımlar Kur'ân'ın bütünlüğü ve klasik dönem tefsir merviyyâtı açısından analitik (tahlîlî/istidlâlî) bir bakış açısıyla irdelenmektedir. Denilebilir ki Kur'ân'ın mana yönüyle Allah'a aidiyeti konusunda ilim ehli arasında herhangi bir ihtilâf yoktur. Temel ihtilâf Kur'ân lafızlarının Allah'a mı Cebrâil'e mi yoksa Hz. Muhammed'e mi ait olduğu hususudur. Kur'ân'ın bütünlüğü ve vahyin nüzûl keyfiyetine dair klasik dönem tefsir rivayetleri dikkate alındığında hâkim görüşün diğer iki görüşe göre daha tutarlı olduğu kanaatine ulaşılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tefsir, İlâhî nakiller, Vahiy, Cebrâil, Lafız, Mana.

Introduction*

Although the desire to understand and comprehend the nature of divine speech is an effort from the physical world to the metaphysical, scientists, as the indomitable seekers of the truth, are in search of something to say on this subject. In the history of Islamic thought, some consider the "divine speech" as an attribute of God, and there are also those who acknowledge it as a divine act (fi'l). Within the framework of this discussion, it is also acknowledged by scholars that the Qur'ān is the reflection of the attribute or action of divine speech. In this sense, three main approaches have been put forward regarding the belonging/ownership of the Qur'ānic words. Conforming to the dominant perspective among these views, the Qur'ān belongs to God in terms of wording and meaning. In agreement with this approach, the Qur'ānic revelation sent down to the Prophet Muḥammad consists of both wording and meaning. In compliance with the second approach, the meanings of the Qur'ānic text belong to God, and its words pertain to the Prophet Muḥammad. In line with this approach, Gabriel only sent down the meanings to the Prophet, and he pronounced the meanings in Arabic expression patterns. According to the third approach, the meanings of the Qur'ān belong to God, and its words belong to Gabriel. That is to say, only the meanings were given to Gabriel and then he created the words. In the present study, the relevant approaches asserted by scholars in the history of Islamic thought regarding the belonging of the Qur'ānic words to understanding the nature of the speech of God and making sense of it are examined. These are scrutinized in terms of the integrity of the Qur'ān, its natural historical atmosphere, and the exegesis of the classical period.

To whom do the words of the Qur'ānic text that the Prophet Muḥammad conveyed to people belong? I am inclined to think, this question is certainly important in the context of the belonging of the Qur'ānic words. Although it isn't known exactly when such a question was asked and how the debate started in Islamic thought, it can be said that the fact that Ahl al-Sunnah scholars differentiated the word (kalām) in two dimensions as "uttered speech" (kalām lafzī) and "interior speech" (kalām nafsī), brought about this debate to arise. When we look at the history of exegesis and kalām in the classical and contemporary periods, it is observed that there is no disagreement about the Qur'ān's belonging to God in terms of meaning, not in terms of wording. As Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) stated, "Even though the prophets, who communicated directly or indirectly

with God, had the authority to unquestionably understand the nature of the divine speech, they could not explain the nature of this speech that they were aware of."[1] For this reason, it should be considered natural the emergence of discussions about the nature of kalām and different approaches regarding the belonging of the Qurʾānic words.

When we look at the history of Islamic thought, it can be seen that scholars are trying to answer the following questions: Is what Gabriel sent down as the Qurʾān its wording or its meaning, or is it a text with its meaning and wording? Or does what is revealed consist only of meaning and content? Was it transferred to the Arabic language later by the Prophet? Is this communication between Gabriel and the Prophet revelation in the sense of "inspiration" or "verbal" revelation?[2] The existence of many divine quotations from the Meccan polytheists in the Qurʾān and the fact that many verses were sent down in accordance with the words of the companions make it necessary to examine how the revelation was revealed to the Prophet and how it was realized.

1. The Classification of the Approaches on the Belonging of the Qurʾānic Words

First of all, it should be noted that on the issue of the transmission of revelation to the Prophet Muḥammad, the majority of scholars arrive at a consensus that God gradually transmitted the Qurʾān in wording and meaning to Gabriel, and he conveyed it to the Prophet. In the analysis of the tradition of Islamic thought, it is understood that this is a generally accepted approach. On the other hand, among the possibilities narrated by Badr ad-Dīn az-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392) from Abū al-Layth al-Samarqandī (d. 373/983) and quoted by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) with the same phrase, the second possibility is that Gabriel sent down the Qurʾānic revelation to the Prophet's heart as meaning. In this sense, the third possibility is that the revelation of the Qurʾān came down to Gabriel as a meaning, and he expressed these meanings in Arabic and conveyed them to the Prophet in his own words.[3]

Therefore, there were both those who said that Gabriel revealed only the meanings to the Prophet Muḥammad, and he revealed these meanings in the Arabic language as per the occurrence of the facts and events, and those who said that the meanings were transmitted to Gabriel and after he translated these meanings into Arabic, he conveyed them to the Prophet.[4] The relevant possibilities, narrated by al-Samarqandī, were mentioned by many scholars, including az-Zarkashī, al-Suyūṭī, Tashkoprizada Aḥmad Afandī (d. 968/1561), Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Diyārbakrī (d. 990/1582), Kātib Jalabī (d. 1067/1657), and Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Ālūsī (d. 1270/1854). These have been asserted as three main approaches to the belonging of the Qurʾānic words. It is possible to classify these views in some detail as follows:

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[1]   "Inna al-nabīya al-mukallama nafsahu lā yastaṭiʿu an yufhimahu li-ghayrihi, li-annahu laysa lahu ʿibāratun tadullu ʿalayhi" see Muḥammad Rashid Ridā, *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-hakīm (Tafsīr al-Manār)* (Cairo: Dār al-Manār, 1947), 3/4.

[2]   For different approaches put forward in the context of the nature of revelation, see Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, *Mafhūm al-naṣṣ dirāsah fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān* (al-Maghrib: al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, 2014), 42.

[3]   Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth, 1984), 1/229-230; Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān*, ed. Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Qurʾānīyah (al-Madīnah: Mujammaʿu al-Malik Fahd li-Ṭibāʿat al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf, n.d.), 1/292.

[4]   Mustafa Altundağ, "Kelâmullâh Halku'l-Kur'ân Tartışmaları Çerçevesinde 'Kelâm-ı Nefsî - Kelâm-ı Lafzî' Ayırımı", *Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 18 (2000), 181.

1.1. Belonging the Wordings and the Meanings of the Qurʾānic Text to God

Pursuant to the dominant and preferred approach regarding the belonging of the words of the Qurʾān, the wordings, and the meanings appertain to God. Correspondingly, the Qurʾān consisted of both wording and meaning before it came to the Prophet Muḥammad. There is no intervention of the Prophet in transmitting the revelation of the Qurʾān to people in wording and meaning. Therefore, it can be said that the role of the Prophet in the process of revelation and the formation of it is completely passive. Gabriel sent down the Qurʾānic words to the Prophet by memorizing them from the preserved tablet, where it was previously written and perceived as a field of existence, or by hearing them from God, or by God revealing the Qurʾānic words to him. According to the approach that the words and meanings belong to God, neither Gabriel nor Muḥammad's intervention can be mentioned in the formation process of the revelation. There are even those who claim that every letter of the Qurʾān is fixed in the preserved tablet, and that each of the letters of the Qurʾān is the size of Mount Qāf. Therefore, there are infinite meanings in each of them that no one other than God can comprehend.[5]

1.2. Attributing the Meanings of the Qurʾānic Text to God and Its Wordings to the Prophet Muḥammad

Conforming to the second approach propounded regarding the belonging of the words of the Qurʾān, its meanings belong to God, and its words appertain to the Prophet Muḥammad. As per this approach, Gabriel only brings the meanings, and the Prophet comprehends these meanings and reveals them in Arabic expression patterns.[6] It is seen that the scholars who asserted this view tried to determine the place (al-mahall) where the revelation was sent down by referring to the following verses: (i) *"Say (O Muḥammad): Whoever is an enemy to Gabriel, for indeed he has brought it (this Qurʾān) down to your heart by Allāh's Permission, confirming what came before it [i.e. the Torah and the Gospel] and guidance and glad tidings for the believers."*[7] (ii) *"Which the trustworthy Rūḥ [Gabriel] has brought down. Upon your heart (O Muḥammad) that you may be (one) of the warners."*[8] According to them, the heart is the place of meaning, not wording.[9] Therefore, the mention of "brought down upon your heart" in these verses caused them to understand that the meanings of the Qurʾānic

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5   al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān*, 1/229-230; al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān*, 1/292-293; Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, *al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwā*, ed. ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2000), 1/322; Aḥmad b. Muṣṭafā b. Khalīl Ṭāshkubrī Zādah, *Miftāḥ al-saʿādah wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyādah fī mawḍūʿāt al-ʿulūm* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1985), 2/354; Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Diyārbakrī, *Tārīkh al-khamīs fī aḥwāl anfas al-nafīs* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat ʿUthmān ʿAbd al-Razzāq, 1302), 1/9-10; Mustafa b. ʿAbd Allāh Kātib Jalabī, *Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī al-Kutub wa-al-funūn*, ed. M. Şerefettin Yaltkaya - Rifat Bilge (Ankara: TTK Yayınevi, 2014), 2/1525-1526; Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Ālūsī, *Rūḥ al-maʿānī fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿAẓīm* (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 19/120-121.

6   al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān*, 1/229-230; al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān*, 1/292-293; al-Suyūṭī, *al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwā*, 1/322; Ṭashkubrī Zādah, *Miftāḥ al-saʿādah*, 2/354; al-Diyārbakrī, *Tārīkh al-khamīs fī aḥwāl anfas al-nafīs*, 1/9-10; Kātib Jalabī, *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, 2/1525-1526; al-Ālūsī, *Rūḥ al-maʿānī*, 19/120-121.

7   *The Noble Qurʾān English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary*, çev. Muḥammad Taqî-ud-Dîn al-Hilâlî - Muḥammad Muhsin Khân (al-Madīnah: Mujammaʿu al-Malik Fahd li-Ṭibāʿat al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf, 2013), al-Baqarah 2/97.

8   al-Shuʿarāʾ 26/193-194.

9   Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 974/1567) in his work called *al-Fatāwá al-ḥadīthīyah* criticizes the efforts to separate the unity of wording and meaning in the context of the Qurʾān. For detailed considerations on this subject, see Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Ḥajar al-Haytamī, *al-Fatāwā al-ḥadīthīyah* (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, n.d.), 210-213.

text were revealed to the heart of the Prophet Muḥammad. However, in these verses, it is unclear whether what is revealed to the heart is the wording or the meaning.

It is seen that there are some advocates and proponents in the history of Islamic thought for the argument that the meanings of the Qur'ānic text belong to God, and its words belong to the Prophet Muḥammad. In this context, as far as I can determine, Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) from the early period, al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) from the classical period, and Fazlur Rahman (1919-88) from modern time are among the advocates of this approach.

1.2.1. Sufyān al-Thawrī

As specified by Sufyān al-Thawrī, the language of revelation is essentially Arabic. Every prophet translated the revelation sent down to him according to the language of his tribe.[10] In conformity with this view, the prophets created the words of the holy books before the Qur'ān. Therefore, the meanings of the Torah pertain to God and its words belong to Moses. Moreover, this standpoint conveyed from him indicates that, in the context of the Qur'ān, its meanings may belong to God, and its words may be attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad.

1.2.2. al-Bāṭinīyah

When we look at the Islamic theological schools holistically, it is observed that at the level of a sect, only al-Bāṭinīyah claims that the Qur'ān was sent down to the heart of the Prophet Muḥammad as a whole.[11] The main argument of al-Bāṭinīyah, which alleges that the Prophet transformed the Qur'ān into Arabic, is the following verses: *"Nazala bihi al-rūḥu al-amīn ʿalā qalbika li-takūna mina al-mundhirīna/Which the trustworthy Rūḥ [Gabriel] has brought down. Upon your heart (O Muḥammad) that you may be (one) of the warners."[12]* In Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī's (d. 333/944) words, al-Bāṭinīyah enunciates the following view: "Allah sent down the Qur'ān to the Prophet Muḥammad quickly, in full meaning, without belonging to any language. Then, the Prophet depicted the Qur'ān in his mind and composed it in his own language, clear Arabic. He did it in such a way that others were incapable of doing the same."[13] It is clear that the main reason for reaching this view and their inferences on this subject is the apparent/explicit meaning (al-maʿnā al-ẓāhirī) of the relevant verses. They reach this conclusion based on the fact that the Qur'ān was

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[10]   "Lam yanzil waḥy illā bi-āl'arabīyati thumma yutarjimu kull nabīyin li-qawmihi bi-lisānihim", see Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Abī Ḥātim, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-ʿAẓīm*, ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib (Makkah: Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, 1997), 7/2234; Ṭāshkubrī Zādah, *Miftāḥ al-saʿādah*, 2/355.

[11]   For detailed explanations of some esoteric interpretations given by al-Shīʿah al-Imāmīyah to the verses of the Qur'ān, see Abdulalim Demir, "İmâmiyye Şîası Rivâyet Kaynaklarına Göre İmâmların Masumluğu Meselesi", *İslam Düşüncesi Araştırmaları III -Yaşadığımız Çağ* (Ankara: Araştırma Yayınları, 2021), 175-176. al-Durzīyah, which is a sub-branch of the al-Bāṭinīyah sect, believes that Qur'ānic text is not a divine speech in terms of both wording and meaning. They are of the opinion that the Qur'ān was changed by recitation scholars. For detailed information on this subject, see Mehmet Beşir Ergin, *Dürzîlikte Kur'ân Tasavvuru ve Tefsîr Yöntemi* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Basılmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2019), 28-37.

[12]   al-Shuʿarāʾ 26/193-194.

[13]   Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad al-Māturīdī, *Taʾwīlāt al-Qur'ān*, ed. Ahmed Vanlıoğlu - Bekir Topaloğlu (Istanbul: Dār al-Mīzān, 2005), 10/337, 16/297.

sent down to the heart of the Prophet.[14] However, in the next verse, it is stated that Gabriel sent it down to the Prophet *"Bi-lisānin ʿarabīyin mubīn/in the plain Arabic language."*[15] al-Māturīdī criticizes this perspective of the al-Bāṭinīyah as follows: "The Qurʾān was sent down to the Prophet Muḥammad in a written form (al-maʾalaf) and in sentences (al-manẓūm). The composition of the Qurʾān is not a result of the Prophet's action. The verse *"lâ tuharrik bihi lisanak/Move not your tongue"*[16], which is about moving one's tongue because of the rush to fully receive the revelation, is evidence of the correctness of our view. If the Qurʾān were written by the Prophet, he wouldn't have moved his tongue in haste while the revelation was conveyed to him. Because if the Qurʾān were like a dream, he would need to describe it in his mind. Then, after thinking, it would be written down, and it would be possible to express it in language. Moving the tongue is only possible in written and edited texts."[17]

1.2.3. al-Ghazālī

al-Ghazālī discusses the nature of divine speech in his treatise called *al-Maʿārif al-ʿaqliyah.* According to him, the Qurʾān was revealed to Muḥammad's heart directly and in meaning rather than with both words and meaning. His statements on this subject are as follows: "The second level is to leave the words of wisdom and the meanings of the words through revelation into the hearts of the prophets and through inspiration into the hearts of the saints *(Ilqāʾu laṭāʾifi al-ḥikmati wa al-maʿānī al-kalimati fī qulūbi al-anbiyāʾ bi-al-waḥyi).* Revelation and inspiration occur through explanation and teaching. God leaves the words of wisdom and the meanings of the words in the hearts of believers with light, opening them, making them successful, guiding and supporting them... Since the essence of the Prophet is better than anyone from the ummah in terms of rank and honor, his speech and words are more important than the words of other people in terms of honor. The letters in the Qurʾān aren't attributed to God to exalt him *(al-ḥurūfu al-wāqiʿatu fī al-Qurʾāni lam tunsab ilayhi tanzīhan la-hu).* We have no doubt that the letters in the Qurʾān were born from the soul of Muḥammad as al-Shāriʿ; they entered into his precious and pure word, and everything about the Prophet was illuminated with the light of Ḥayy, Qayyūm, and Qadīm."[18]

In line with al-Ghazālī, it is possible to find out the basis of this approach in many Qurʾānic verses and authentic hadiths.[19] The verses and hadiths he referred to on this subject can be listed as follows: (i) *"Al-Raḥmānu ʿallama al-Qurʾāna khalaqa al-insāna ʿallamahu al-bayān/The Most Gracious (Allāh) He has taught (you mankind) the Qurʾān (by His Mercy). He created man. He taught him eloquent speech."*[20] (ii) *"Kataba Alllāhu la-aghlibanna anā warusulī/God has decreed: "Verily, it is I and My Messengers who shall be the victorious."*[21] (iii) *"Ūlaʾika kataba fī qulūbihimu al-īmān wa-ayyadahum bi-*

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14   For al-Bursawī's evaluations of the argument put forward by al-Bāṭinīyah on this issue, see Ismail Haqqī al-Bursawī, *Rūḥ al-Bayān* (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 6/306-307.

15   al-Shuʿarāʾ 26/195.

16   al-Qiyāmah 75/16.

17   al-Māturīdī, *Taʾwīlāt al-Qurʾān*, 16/297.

18   Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *al-Maʿārif al-ʿaqliyah*, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-ʿUthmān (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1963), 81, 105.

19   al-Ghazālī, *al-Maʿārif al-ʿaqliyah*, 81.

20   ar-Raḥmān 55/1-4.

21   al-Mujādilah 58/21.

rūḥin minhu/He has written Faith in their hearts, and strengthened them with Rūḥ (proofs, light and true guidance) from Himself."[22] (iv) "Inna Alllāha qad kataba al-Tawrāta li-Mūsā bi-khaṭṭihi/Indeed, God wrote the Torah to Moses with his own hands."[23]

According to Ghazali, it is possible that what is meant by the word *"khalaqa al-insāna"*[24] in the ar-Raḥmān is the human species. Accordingly, God taught man knowledge through tongue and pen. It is also possible that the word *"khalaqa al-insāna"* in the mentioned verse refers to the Prophet Muḥammad. Because God taught him the Qur'ān and wrote its meanings on his heart. God revealed to him through Gabriel and ordered him to make a statement that was heard and known for his ummah and his friends in his own language.[25] His statements are as follows: "The speech of God (kalām Allāh) is a characteristic of His essence, without the order of phrases and fusion of letters. Because these occur over time and emerge as time varies. However, God is free from the symptoms of time and speaking with the throat and tongue. His speech is the quality of his essence, and the qualification is never separated from the qualified in any way and at any time. When God wants to speak, He reveals the meanings of His speech to His prophets and messengers. He leaves the light of revelation in their hearts through Gabriel. Until the Prophet expresses the speech of God with his own language and speaks about him with his own statement."[26]

1.2.4. Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī

Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī is one of those who say that the Qur'ān was sent down to the Prophet Muḥammad's heart in terms of meaning. In his terminology, *waḥy al-Qur'ān* means the sending down of the Qur'ānic revelation, that is, the aspect of its descending as a whole. *Waḥy al-Furqān* means the *tanzīl* dimension of the Qur'ān, that is, the circumstance of revelation descending gradually. As per him, the fact that it is not said "We sent down a part of the Qur'ān" in the following verse; *"Innā anzalnāhu fī laylatin mubārakatin"*[27] This fact shows that the Qur'ān was sent down to the Prophet Muḥammad as a whole. Likewise, according to him, in the revelation of the Qur'ān that came down to the heart of the Prophet, the verses and surahs weren't made clear and were included in a summary way *(Qur'ānan mujmalan)*. He names the "Qur'ān" phase of revelation as *al-waḥy al-awwal*.[28] However, pursuant to Ibn al-ʿArabī, neither the Prophet nor Gabriel had any involvement in the construction of the words. According to him, the Prophet conveyed each of the Qur'ānic words to people in the same way he received them. His statements are as follows:

"The servant to whom the Qur'ān was revealed is commanded to deliver it to those in charge and to explain to the people what was revealed to them. While some of the things are visible to them, others are absent from them. The Prophet wasn't commanded to distort words from their proper

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[22] al-Mujādilah 58/22.

[23] Abū ʿAbd Allāh Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, *al-Musnad*, thk. Abū Hājar Muḥammad al-Saʿīd b. Basyūnī (Beirut, 1985), 1/281, 2/248; Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī, *al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaḥīḥ*, ed. Muḥammad Zuhayr b. Nāṣir (Beirut: Dār Ṭawq al-Najāh, 2001), "Anbiyâʾ", 3.

[24] ar-Raḥmān 55/3.

[25] al-Ghazālī, *al-Maʿārif al-ʿaqliyah*, 82.

[26] al-Ghazālī, *al-Maʿārif al-ʿaqliyah*, 90-91.

[27] ad-Dukhan 44/3.

[28] Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah*, ed. Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 1999), 1/130, 6/277.

places. On the contrary, the Prophet relates the words from God, just as God conveys the words of those who speak to *him (yaḥkī ʿan Allāh kamā ḥakā Allāh la-hu qawl al-qāʾilīn)*. Their statement includes absence (ghaybah) and presence (ḥuḍūr). God does not add anything to their words when quoting from them. The Prophet is told: *"Yāʾayyuhā al-rasūlu balligh mā unzila ilayka min rabbika/ O Messenger (Muḥammad)! Proclaim (the Message) which has been sent down to you from your Lord"*[29] In this case, the prophet does not turn away from the truth of what has been revealed to him and says what is said. Because the meanings weren't revealed to Muḥammad's heart without composing these letters, arranging these words, listing these verses, and determining these surahs. This is all called the Qurʾān. When God established the Qurʾān as a form/image in his soul, he revealed himself as he saw it. Then the eyes see it in the al-Maṣāḥif, and the ears hear to it from the readers. There is nothing other than the words of God, which is heard and seen... The Prophet knows that what has been revealed to him is the words of God and preserves its form in the way it was sent down to him. If he changes anything or alters its structure, he would undoubtedly convey to us the image of his understanding, not what was revealed to him. Indeed, each of the people to whom the Qurʾān was sent down has a view of it. If the Prophet had conveyed the Qurʾān to us as per his understanding, it wouldn't have been Qurʾān, that is, the Qurʾān that was sent down to him. We can assume that the Prophet knew all the meanings of the Qurʾān and that nothing of its meanings remained outside his words. In response, we say: If the Prophet knew this and the words he said while conveying the meaning indicated those meanings, why would he try to use other words? And if he had used words of equal meaning that would correspond to them while conveying all these meanings, the words that he used, would have to belong to other beings other than the words that were sent down to him and which he turned away from. In such a case, the words used by the prophet will be different from the words sent down to him in terms of entities, even if they have the same meaning as the words sent down to the prophet."[30]

As can be seen in the above passage, Ibn al-ʿArabī, on the one hand, claims that the meanings of the revelation were sent down to the heart of the Prophet Muḥammad as a whole at once. On the other hand, he states that there is no human impact in the verbalization of the meanings and in the literal dimension of the revelation. al-Shaʿrānī (d. 973/1565), who largely adopted Ibn al-ʿArabī's views and examined the allegations made about him, also asks the following question in his work titled *al-Yawāqīt wa-al-jawāhir*: "Is it permissible for anyone to believe that the Prophet Muḥammad conveyed some of the Qurʾānic text to us in terms of meaning?" He makes an assessment on this issue. Pursuant to him, it isn't permissible for a Muslim to make such a claim and believe it. If it is assumed that the Prophet influenced Qurʾān sent down to him and narrated it with meaning, then it is understood that he explained to us the form that he understood, not the form that was revealed, that is, the unity of wording and meaning. However, Allah said: *"Waʾanzalnā ilayka aldhdhikra li-tubayyina li-nnāsi mā nuzzila ilayhim/We have also sent down unto you (O Muḥammad) the reminder and the advice (the Qurʾān), that you may explain clearly to men what is sent down to them"*[31] In this case, it is impossible for the Prophet to change the words and letters of the Qurʾān. According to him, if the Prophet had any influence on the form of the letters and words

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[29]   al-Māʾidah 5/67.
[30]   Ibn al-ʿArabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah*, 5/234-235.
[31]   al-Naḥl 16/44.

of Qurʾān, it would also be said that he conveyed what was revealed to people and what wasn't revealed, which no one has ever said.[32]

1.2.5. Fazlur Rahman

Conforming to Fazlur Rahman, a scholar of Pakistani origin who spent most of his life story in England, Canada, and America, Ahl al-Sunnah, which was established in the 2nd and 3rd centuries of hijrī, preferred to focus on the externality and literal nature of the Prophet's revelation in a defensive manner, in order to protect the otherness, objectivity and verbal character of revelation in the debates about the nature of revelation, which arose partly under the influence of the Christian doctrines. However, as specified by him, Ahl al-Sunnah did not emphasize its externality vis-à-vis the Prophet Muḥammad as much as necessary. Although revelation has an external reality and a literal character, it cannot be considered independent and separate from the Prophet. According to him, it is possible to trace this truth in the following verses in the Qurʾān: (i) *"Say (O Muḥammad): Whoever is an enemy to Gabriel, for indeed he has brought it (this Qurʾān) down to your heart by Allāh's Permission, confirming what came before it [i.e. the Torah and the Gospel] and guidance and glad tidings for the believers."*[33] (ii) *"And truly, this (the Qurʾān) is a revelation from the Lord of the ʿālamīn (mankind, jinns and all that exists), which the trustworthy Ruh [Gabriel] has brought down. Upon your heart (O Muḥammad) that you may be (one) of the warners."*[34] His statements are as follows: "But orthodoxy (indeed, all medieval thought) lacked the necessary intellectual tools to combine in its formulation of the dogma the otherness and verbal character of the revelation on the one hand, and its intimate connection with the work and the religious personality of the Prophet on the other, i.e. it lacked the intellectual capacity to say both that the Qurʾān is entirely the word of God and, in an ordinary sense, also entirely the word of Muḥammad. The Qurʾān obviously holds both, for if it insists that it has come to the 'heart' of the Prophet, how can it be external to him?"[35] As a result, according to Fazlur Rahman, the revelation of the Qurʾān filtered out of the heart of the Prophet. Therefore, it is understood that Rahman believes that the meaning of the revelation was given to the Prophet, and he transferred it to the Arabic language patterns.

Although Fazlur Rahman seems to be consistent within himself by making inferences from the mentioned verses, he is not seen to be in a justified and proving position in his criticisms of Ahl al-Sunnah. In fact, traces of the issue of wording and meaning can be found in the history of early Islamic thought, with some clues even before the Ahl al-Sunnah. This issue can be traced in the meanings given to the terms *sunnah, hadith,* and *al-ḥadīth al-qudsī* as well as in the discussions about the belonging of the recitations and the issue of khalq al-Qurʾān (the Createdness of Qurʾān).

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32 ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Sharānī, *al-Yawāqīt wa-al-jawāhir* (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 1/170.

33 al-Baqarah 2/97.

34 al-Shuʿarāʾ 26/192-194.

35 Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 31. See also Fazlur Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qurʾān* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994), 80-105. In another work, Fazlur Rahman describes al-Ashʿarīyah theology, an important branch of Ahl al-Sunnah, as follows: "It is to the credit of premodernist revivalism and modernism that they tried to undermine this thousand-year-old sacred folly and to invite Muslims back to the refreshing fountain of the Qurʾān." In this context, it is seen that he uses a pejorative style for this sect. See Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 152.

Moreover, the early projections of this issue can be elicited from Abū Ḥanīfah's (d. 150/767) differentiation of wording and meaning into origin/principal (al-aṣl) and branch/secondary (al-far'). Therefore, Ahl al-Sunnah does not need to be influenced by the Christian doctrines to assert a paradigm on this issue. On the other hand, as Rahman points out, there may be some clues about the belonging of the words in the Qur'ān.

As a result, in line with those who put forward this second view, which the meanings of the Qur'ānic text belong to God and the words pertain to the Prophet Muḥammad, the linguistic formation of the revelation was carried out by the Prophet himself, not Gabriel. Probably the starting point of those who put forward the perspective that the meanings of divine revelation belong to God and the words are attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad is that about a quarter or half of the Qur'ān consists of divine quotations from the words of human beings. I can elaborate a bit on what I mean like this; there are two categories of divine quotations in the integrity of the Qur'ān. The first type of quotations is from archaic times, and the second is from the interlocutors of the timeline of Qur'ānic revelation. Both types of Qur'ānic quotations are mostly revealed in the style of "qāla/he said" and its various derivatives. These make up about a half of the holy text between the two covers.[36] Therefore, those arguing the words of the Qur'ān are attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad may have thought that Muḥammad must have created the linguistic form of a book that contains extensive references to the words of human beings.

1.3. Pertaining the Meanings of the Qur'ānic Text to God and Its Wordings to Gabriel

In compliance with the third approach asserted regarding the belonging of the Qur'ānic words, the meanings belong to God and the words pertain to Gabriel. As per this view, only meanings were given to Gabriel. He transferred these meanings to Arabic expression patterns and revealed them to the Prophet Muḥammad. According to those who adopt this vantage point, those in the sky and heavens (ahl al-samā') recited this in the Arabic language. Then Gabriel sent them down to the Prophet as they were.[37] It is seen that there are some advocates in the history of Islamic thought for the approach that the meanings of the Qur'ānic text belong to God and the words pertain to Gabriel. In this context, al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) and al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025) from the classical period, and Süleyman Ateş from the modern period are prominent scholars on this subject.

1.3.1. al-Juwaynī

It is understood that while al-Juwaynī was making an evaluation about the revelation of the divine word, he opened the door to the possibility of attributing the words of the Qur'ān to Gabriel. His statement on the subject is as follows: "Gabriel, who is in his place above the seven layers of heaven, understood the speech of God. In the place called *Sidrah al-Muntahā*, he brought the speech

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[36] For detailed considerations about the Qur'ānic quotations, see Zakir Demir, *İlâhî Nakiller Bağlamında Kur'ân'daki İktibâsların Mâhiyeti* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Doktora Tezi, 2022), 20-327.

[37] al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān*, 1/229-230; al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān*, 1/292-293; al-Suyūṭī, *al-Ḥāwī lil-fatāwā*, 1/322; Ṭāshkubrī Zādah, *Miftāḥ al-saʿādah*, 2/354; al-Diyārbakrī, *Tārīkh al-khamīs fī aḥwāl anfas al-nafīs*, 1/9-10; Kātib Jalabī, *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, 2/1525-1526; al-Ālūsī, *Rūḥ al-maʿānī*, 19/120-121.

of God to the Prophet without narrating al-kalam itself *(min ghayri naqlin li-dhāti al-kalām)*"[38] Based on this citation, it can be thought that he believed that it was possible to attribute the words of the Qur'ān to Gabriel.[39]

1.3.2. al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār

Another scholar who opened the door to the possibility of attributing the words of the Qur'ān to Gabriel is al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Pursuant to him, saying that it was the Prophet Muḥammad or Gabriel who constructed the words of the Qur'ān does not prevent the Qur'ān from being a miracle. In other words, the fact that Muḥammad narrated the Qur'ān with Gabriel's words or his own words does not mean that this style of narration cannot be considered a miracle in the name of God. Because God gave the Prophet such knowledge that he could act in an extraordinary manner that was not found in the masters of eloquence, and he had the opportunity to reach the highest level of sophistication with this knowledge. Accordingly, in both cases, the Qur'ān must be a miracle of God. al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār associates this situation with God conveying the news from the unseen through the Prophet's tongue. According to him, just as the fact that God is the one who conveys such news and Muḥammad is the one who conveys it to the interlocutor does not prevent the word from being miraculous, it is also the same for the Qur'ān as a whole to be in his or Gabriel's words.[40]

1.3.3. Süleyman Ateş

Süleyman Ateş, one of the contemporary Turkish exegetes, says that the words of the Qur'ān pertain to Gabriel and its meanings belong to God by using the phrase *qawlu rasūl* in the following two verses as a basis: (i) *"Innahu la-qawlu rasūlin karīm/That this is verily the word of an honoured Messenger."*[41] (ii) *"Innahu la-qawlu rasūlin karīm dhī qūwatin ʿinda dhī alʿarshi makīn/Verily, this is the Word (this Qur'ān brought by) a most honourable Messenger. Owner of power, and high rank with (Allah) the Lord of the Throne."*[42] Pursuant to him, Gabriel transformed the meanings of the Qur'ān into his own phraseology and sent them down to the Prophet. In his words: "There are two possibilities about the honoured messenger. According to some, this honoured messenger is Gabriel, while for others, it is Muḥammad. But the first view is stronger. With this expression, it's explained that the Qur'ān was revealed to Muḥammad by a valuable messenger... The Qur'ān has been described as the word of the honoured messenger because Gabriel brought the meanings coming from God to the human level by putting them into verbal forms."[43]

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38 Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū al-Maʿālī ʿAbd al-Malik al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād ilā qawāṭiʿ al-adillah fī uṣūl al-iʿtiqād*, thk. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Sāyiḥ (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfah al-Dīnīyah, 2009), 120-121.

39 For detailed considerations about where and how Gabriel received the Qur'ān, see. Altundağ, "Kelâmullâh Halku'l-Kur'ân Tartışmaları", 174-175; Ömer Çelik, *Kur'an'ın Muhatapları* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2021), 37-39.

40 "Annahu lā farqa bayna an yakūna al-Qur'ān min qibali al-Rasūl aw min qibali Allāh fī kawnihi muʿjizan." see Abū al-Ḥasan Qāḍī al-Quḍāh ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Qāḍī Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-al-ʿadl*, thk. Amīn al-Khūlī (Cairo: al-Sharikah al-ʿArabīyah lil-Ṭibāʿah wa-al-Nashr, 1960), 16/231.

41 al-Haqqah 69/40.

42 at-Takwir 81/19-20.

43 Süleyman Ateş, *Yüce Kur'ân'ın Çağdaş Tefsiri* (İstanbul: Yeni Ufuklar Neşriyat, 1988), 10/47-48, 50, 349-350. Murat Sülün criticizes Ateş's assessment as follows: "If Gabriel translated the divine meanings into Arabic and everything

As a result, conforming to this third view, that is, its meanings belong to God and its words are attributed to Gabriel, the linguistic formulation of the revelation was carried out by Gabriel, not God or the Prophet Muḥammad. Probably the starting point of those who put forward this view was the intense use of indirect expressions such as *qāla*, *kallama*, and *awḥā* in the narrative style of the Qur'ān. Therefore, based on the use of verbs containing indirect transfer in the Qur'ān, they may have thought that Gabriel must have made the linguistic formation of the revelation.

2. The Critique of Debates Concerning the Belonging of Qur'ānic Words

Within the scope of the approaches mentioned by al-Samarqandī, az-Zarkashī, al-Suyūṭī, Tashkoprizada, Husayn b. Muḥammad al-Diyarbakrī, Kātib Jalabī, and al-Ālūsī regarding the nature of the divine speech, it is seen that there is no evaluation on the issue of whether the Qur'ān is created or uncreated, and it is reproduction (al-hikāya) or reproduced (al-mahkī). However, it can be said that the mentioned approaches that make sense of the nature of the divine word are seminal views. The opinion that we gave first above, namely, Qur'ānic words pertain to God in terms of wording and meaning, is the dominant and preferred opinion in the history of Islamic thought. However, it seems that the second and third views also have their defenders. The three approaches mentioned so far will be evaluated and criticized below in terms of the integrity of the Qur'ān and various tafsir rumors of the classical period.

2.1. Gabriel's Attitude and Place Regarding the Transmission of Revelation

The view that the Qur'ānic text, in terms of its meaning, was revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad's heart and from there to him again through Gabriel constitutes the contradictory point of the problem. This approach expressed in both classical and modern sources can be criticized in the following aspects: What is the wisdom behind the revelation of the Qur'ān, which was left to the heart of the Prophet Muḥammad through Gabriel, over a long period of twenty-three years, being transformed into words and meaning by the Gabriel and transferred back to Prophet? If the words of the Qur'ānic text belong to the Prophet Muḥammad, what will be Gabriel's duty towards the revelation? Since all the revelations came to the Prophet Muḥammad's heart as a whole, the function and importance of Gabriel is hardly ever understandable.[44] In summary, according to this approach, Gabriel's position towards revelation is dysfunctional. However, in various verses of many surahs such as al-Baqarah (2/97), Maryam (19/64), al-Shu'arā' (26/192-196), and al-Najm (53/3-6), it is clearly explained that Gabriel has an active role in sending down the revelation.

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ended with him, the Qur'ān should have been sent down to the ear (hearing organ) of the Prophet Muḥammad, not to his heart. Thus, the Prophet, who was a complete human being with a genius-level mind in terms of emotions, thoughts, fear, and anxiety, would have mechanically conveyed the verses written on the screen of his mind and fully prepared to humanity, like a lifeless, emotionless, mindless and unconscious tool. see Murat Sülün, *Kur'ân Kılavuzu Mutlak Gerçeğin Sesi* (İstanbul: Ensar Yayınevi, 2013), 57.

44   For detailed information about the meanings of the terms al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ and the Qur'ān, the transmission of the words of God to Gabriel, and the transmission of revelation to the Prophet, see Ibn al-'Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah*, 5/584; Muḥammad 'Abd al-'Aẓīm al-Zurqānī, *Manāhil al-'Irfān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān*, ed. Fawwāz Aḥmad Zamarlī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1995), 1/37-54; Zeki Duman, *Hakk'tan Halka Kelâmullâh (Levh-i Mahfûz'dan Mushaf-ı Şerif'e)* (Ankara: Fecr Yayınevi, 2016), 21-147.

Therefore, it is clear that Gabriel's role cannot be rendered dysfunctional by accepting it as an inner spirit.

God could transform the meanings that He placed in the Prophet Muḥammad's heart into words without the intermediary of Gabriel. Therefore, according to the view that is attributed the words of the Qur'ān to the prophet, Gabriel is in the position of a dysfunctional subject or an external entity. In addition, the approach that the Qur'ān was revealed to the Prophet gradually over twenty-three years through Gabriel and the view that the meanings of the entire Qur'ānic text were revealed to the heart of the Prophet as a whole are seen as irreconcilable with each other. There is a clear contradiction between the following verses and the perception that the Qur'ān descended to Muḥammad's heart as a whole in terms of its meanings: (i) *"Qul man kāna ʿadūwan li-jibrīla fa'innahu nazzalahu ʿalā qalbika bi'idhni Alllahi/Say (O Muḥammad): Whoever is an enemy to Gabriel, for indeed he has brought it (this Qur'ān) down to your heart by Allāh's Permission."*[45] (ii) *"Nazala bihi al-rūḥu al-amīn ʿalā qalbika li-takūna min al-mundhirīn bi-lisānin ʿarabīyin mubīn/Which the trustworthy Rūḥ [Jibrā'īl (Gabriel)] has brought down. Upon your heart (O Muḥammad) that you may be (one) of the warners. In the plain Arabic language."*[46] (iii) *"Mā yanṭiqu ʿani al-hawā in huwa illā waḥyun yūḥā ʿallamahu shadīdu alquwā/Nor does he speak of (his own) desire. It is only a Revelation revealed. He has been taught (this Qur'ān) by one mighty in power [Gabriel]."*[47] The approach that the Prophet or Gabriel played a role in the construction and arrangement of the Qur'ān also contradicts with many verses occurred in the integrity of the surahs al-Aʿrāf (7/203), Yūnus (10/15), al-Naml (27/6), and al-Haqqah (69/44-67).

In the following verses, which contradict the approach that the words of the Qur'ān pertain to the Prophet Muḥammad or Gabriel, it is clearly stated that the Qur'ān is the speech of God: *"Wa'in aḥadun mina al-mushrikīna astajāraka fa'ajirhu ḥattā yasmaʿa kalāma Allāh/And if anyone of the Mushrikun (polytheists, idolaters) seeks your protection then grant him protection, so that he may hear the word of Allāh (the Qur'ān)."*[48]; *"Yurīdūna an yubaddiluwā kalāma Allah/They want to change Allah's words."*[49] When the verses in question are examined in detail in terms of the belonging of the words, it is observed that the Qur'ān is not called the word of Muḥammad or the word of Gabriel. Considering all these verses, Gabriel had no other role other than conveying the revelation of the Qur'ān to the Prophet. Similarly, it is understood that the Prophet Muḥammad didn't have any function or power other than memorizing, interpreting, explaining, and practicing the revelation sent down to him.

2.2. The Challenge Phenomenon (al-Taḥaddī) of the Qur'ān

The reason behind the fact the Qur'ān challenged the unbelievers many times during the period of revelation and their failure to respond to this call strengthens the idea that the Qur'ān is the word of God in terms of wording and meaning, rather than the word of Muḥammad or the word of Gabriel. In other words, considering the verses in the surahs al-Baqarah (2/23), Yūnus (10/38),

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[45]   al-Baqarah 2/97.

[46]   al-Shuʿarā' 26/193-195.

[47]   al-Najm 53/3-5.

[48]   al-Tawbah 9/6.

[49]   al-Fatḥ 48/15.

Hūd (11/13), al-Isrā' (17/88) and al-Qasas (28/49), it is possible to conclude that each surah containing the words of the Qur'ān is miraculous as the minimum amount of invitation to challenge is to produce a single surah. In this case, claiming that the words of the Qur'ānic text are the word of Gabriel or the word of Muḥammad will mean that the words of the Qur'ān are not miraculous. It is known that although expression patterns alter regarding different languages, the meanings don't essentially change. In this context, it can be said that it's more accurate to argue that al-taḥaddī is in the unity of wording and meaning rather than only in meaning or wording. Moreover, as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) pointed out, claiming that the Qur'ānic text is the word of Gabriel in terms of its wording would completely invalidate the miracle of the Qur'ān. According to him, if it's defended that the Qur'ān is the word of Gabriel, the miraculousness of the Qur'ān can only be explained by the theory of turning away/incapacitation (al-ṣarfah). In other words, according to him, saying that the Qur'ān is the word of Gabriel in terms of its wording is not compatible with the miracle and challenge phenomenon of the Qur'ān. al-Rāzī details his approach as follows: "There is a strong problem here, which is that God has sworn that the Qur'ān is the word of Gabriel. So, we must believe Him in this way. Now, even if we do not definitively conclude that it's necessary to interpret these words of the relevant verse in their apparent meaning, there is at least such a possibility. If this is the case, it is proven that this Qur'ān may be the words of Gabriel, but not the words of God. In case it is the word of Gabriel, there is a possibility that Gabriel delivered it to Muḥammad as a means of misleading. In this case, the status of the Qur'ān as a miraculous book ceases. This problem cannot be answered on the grounds that "Gabriel is non-misleading and infallible". Because knowledge of the infallibility of Gabriel derives from the truthfulness of the Prophet. The knowledge that the Prophet is a true person is also based on the fact that the Qur'ān is a miracle. The fact that the Qur'ān is miraculous is based on the infallibility of Gabriel. Thus, a circular argument (al-dawr) occurs, which is also impossible. Those claiming that the Qur'ān is miraculous with only al-ṣarfah have adopted this doctrine to avoid this question, that is, to prevent such a question from being asked. Because, according to the theory of al-ṣarfah, the miraculousness of the Qur'ān isn't in its eloquence (al-faṣāḥah wa-al-balāghah); rather, it is about turning away those knowledge/sciences and reasons from the hearts. This is something that no one can do except God Almighty."[50]

There are also those claiming that it is not right to associate the Qur'ān's being the word of Gabriel with its miracle. In this context, as I have stated before, according to al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, whether the Prophet or Gabriel created the words of the Qur'ān does not prevent it from being a miracle.[51] Abū Hāshim al-Jubā'ī (d. 321/933) makes the following evaluation to express its miraculousness in the context of discussions about the belonging of the words of the Qur'ān: "Even if the Qur'ān had been created before the birth of Muḥammad, it would still prove his prophethood. However, in this case, the Qur'ān would have previously indicated that he would be a prophet. Later, when he became a prophet, the Qur'ān personally proved his prophethood. As a matter of fact, we think the same thing about other evidences that prove Muḥammad's prophethood before his birth. Such evidences aren't previously described as a sign or miracle.

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50   Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Umar al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1981), 31/73-74.
51   al-Qāḍī Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 16/231.

Because these were expressed as extraordinary events related to the Prophet Muḥammad due to his existence, and this was only possible after he was sent as a prophet."[52]

Despite all these points, many verses show the divinity of the words of the Qur'ān. The following verse can be given as an example in this regard: *"Idhā tutlā ʿalayhi āyātunā qāla asāṭīru al-awwalīn/When Our Verses (of the Qur'ān) are recited to him, he says: 'Tales of the men of old!'"*[53] As can be clearly understood from this verse, it isn't the Prophet Muḥammad who produces the words of the Qur'ān, but God. However, it can be said that explaining the relationship between the issue of the word being an ancient attribute or divine act of God, and man's deed and word constitutes the contradictory point of the problem. This problem is discussed in the context of al-hikāya-al-mahkī, as well as in the context of al-qirā'ah-al-maqrū. Contrary to al-Muʿtazilah theologians, Ahl al-Sunnah theologians evaluate the issue of the transmission of the divine word from one place to another in the context of the relationship between al-qirā'ah-al-maqrū, rather than in the context of the discussion of al-hikāya-al-mahkī. In the most general terms, according to them, kalām-al-lafẓī, i.e. recitation (al-qirā'ah), is created; the essence of the divine word which is called kalām al-nafsī, or al-maqrū is considered as the eternal word (qadīm). It is seen that Ahl al-Sunnah theologians, who consider al-qirā'ah as the opposite of al-maqrū, identify al-hikāya with al-mahkī. Because the fact that al-qirā'ah is the opposite of al-maqrū results in al-hikāya and al-mahkī being the same.[54] Therefore, while the expressions of al-qirā'ah and al-tilāwah are a matter of language and wording, al-maqrū and al-matlūw are a matter of meaning. In other words, al-tilāwah isn't related to the meaning, that is, there is no recitation without the words. In the mentioned verse, God counted the verses among the things that were recited and attributed them to Himself. In this case, it's understood that the things being recited are not only the meanings of the Qur'ān but also its words.

2.3. The Issue of al-Aḥruf al-Sabʿah

Based on the discussion of the seven aḥruf (al-aḥruf al-sabʿah) issue in the history of tafsir, it can be thought that the Prophet Muḥammad played a role in the construction of the words of the Qur'ān. However, when the narrations on this subject are examined holistically, it is seen that there was no direct intervention of the Prophet in the construction of the words of the Qur'ān. I think it is important to relate some of the narrations about the seven aḥruf here. (i) According to what al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) and Muslim (d. 261/875) narrate from Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 68/687-88), the Prophet said: "Jibrīl recited the Qur'ān to me in one ḥarf. Then I requested him [to read it in another ḥarf] and continued asking him to recite in other aḥruf until he ultimately recited it in seven aḥruf."[55] (ii) According to the hadith of Ubay b. Kaʿb (d. 33/654), included in Muslim's *as-Saḥīḥ*, the Prophet said: "A message was sent to me to recite the Qur'ān in one dialect, and I replied: 'Make (things) easy for my people.' It was conveyed to me for the second time that it should be

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52   al-Qāḍī Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 16/231.

53   al-Qalam 68/15.

54   Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Asharī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn wa-ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʿAṣrīyah, 1990), 2/267, 270-272; Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyah*, ed. ʿAlī Kamāl (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2014), 71.

55   al-Bukhārī, "Faḍāʾil al-Qur'ān", 5; Muslim, "Ṣalāt al-musāfirīn", 270.

recited in two dialects. I again replied to him: 'Make affairs easy for my people.' It was again conveyed to me for the third time to recite in seven dialects."[56]

It is understood that the Prophet's authority regarding the seven aḥruf was a temporary concession (al-rukhṣah) limited to the period of revelation to new Muslims in reading the Qur'ānic text literally while preserving its meanings (al-qirā'ah bi-al-ma'nā). As a matter of fact, according to the view adopted by most of the tafsir, fiqh and hadith scholars such as Sufyān b. 'Uyaynah (d. 198/814), Ibn Wahb (d. 197/813), Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) and al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933) regarding the seven aḥruf/dialects, it is the use of synonymous words interchangeably. Namely, what is meant by seven aḥruf is seven aspects that express a single meaning with various words. In other words, seven dialects are words with different pronunciations but the same meaning (alfāẓun mukhtalifun lafẓuhā muttafiqun ma'nāhā). For example, the words "هَلُمَّ", "عَجِّلْ", "أَسْرِعْ", "أَقْبِلْ", "تَعال" meaning "Come!" are suitable for this approach.[57] In addition, it is known that this concession does not cover all the surahs and verses of the Qur'ān, on the contrary, it is related to the reading of some words in a very small number of verses. Moreover, since these readings did not come from Muḥammad's mouth, they cannot be attributed to him. Based on this concession, it is clear that it cannot be claimed that the words of the Qur'ān belong entirely to the word of Muḥammad.[58]

2.4. The Historical Reality of al-'Arḍah/al-Muqābalah

The activity of Jibril coming to Muḥammad every night during Ramaḍān and mutually reading the verses and surahs revealed up to that moment (al-'arḍah/al-muqābalah)[59], which is included in the tafsir and hadith texts, also shows that the meanings and wordings of the Qur'ān belong to God. On the other hand, the historical reality of this activity contradicts the claim that the words of the Qur'ān are attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad. This comparative recitation of the Qur'ān, which was done once a year, happened twice in the year of the Prophet Muḥammad's demise (al-'arḍah al-akhīrah). Because if the words of the Qur'ān belonged to the Prophet, there would be no need for him to read the passages of the Qur'ān that had been revealed to him every year until his demise with Gabriel during Ramadan. In the final analysis, it is understood that this activity attempts to prevent possible errors. Therefore, the historical fact of this activity is seen as an important evidence in terms of showing the divinity of the words of the Qur'ān.

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56   Muslim, "Ṣalāt al-musāfirīn", 270.

57   For detailed considerations on the issue of al-aḥruf al-sab'ah, see Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn 'Aqīlah, *al-Ziyādah wa-al-Iḥsān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān* (al-Shāriqah: Markaz al-Buḥūth wa-al-Dirāsāt, 2006), 1/471-497.

58   For the rumors about the al-aḥruf al-sab'ah in the tafsir tradition, see al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān*, 1/211-227; al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān*, 1/306-355; Ibn 'Aqīlah, *al-Ziyādah wa-al-Iḥsān*, 1/471-497; al-Zurqānī, *Manāhil al-'Irfān*, 1/130-158.

59   al-Bukhārī, "Bad' al-Waḥy", 5; "Faḍā'il al-Qur'ān", 7; "Bad' al-Khalq", 6; "al-Manāqib", 25. Also see Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, ed. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risālah, 2006), 1/94.

2.5. The Expression of Qawlu Rasūl

It is my considered judgment that it is not an accurate approach to use the expression *qawlu rasūl*[60] in surahs al-Haqqah (69/40) and at-Takwir (81/19-20) as an evidence and claiming the words of the Qur'ān belong to Gabriel or Muḥammad, and their meanings belong to God. First of all, this expression of the Qur'ān is used in the context where it is stated that the Qur'ānic text isn't the word of a devil, a soothsayer, or a poet, but a word sent down by Gabriel, a respected, valuable, reputable, powerful and reliable messenger sent down from God.[61] Accordingly, the compound *qawlu rasūl* is a kind of iḍāfah tablīghiyah, not iḍāfah inshā'iyah. In other words, Gabriel or Muḥammad do not construct the speech by conveying the words of God, of which they are the messengers; they only convey the speech of God to people. However, while doing this, the words of the Qur'ān can be metaphorically attributed to them.

The expression of *qawlu rasūl* is important in terms of revealing the origin and genealogy of the Qur'ān sent down to the Prophet Muḥammad. This composition is mentioned in two places in the Qur'ān. Considering the integrity of the Qur'ān, it can be said that the word "rasūl" in the expression *qawlu rasūlin karīm* in the 40th verse of the al-Haqqah means Muḥammad. Similarly, this word in the 19th verse of the at-Takwir means Gabriel. Among the advocates of this most common approach are Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), al-Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī (d. early 5th/11th cent.), Muḥyī al-Sunnah al-Farrā' al-Baghawī (d. 516/1122), Ibn 'Aṭīyah al-Andalusī (d. 541/1147), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Rayyān (d. 770/1368), Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (1866-1914), Muḥammad Ṭāhir b. 'Āshūr (1879-1973), Elmalılı Muḥammad Hamdi (1878-1942) and Abū al-A'lā al-Mawdūdī (1903-1979).[62]

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[60]   The word "rasūl" in the compound *qawlu rasūl* is etymologically derived from the root r-s-l. The words risālat, rasūl, and mursal, which derive from the same root, mean "to send, emissary, deputation, letter, message, messenger". According to Ibn Manẓūr, the word "rasūl" is etymologically derived from the expression jā'at al-ibilu rasalan, meaning "the camels came in groups, one after the other". Accordingly, the lexical meaning of the word "rasūl" is "the person who conveys the news of the one who sent him, one after another". This root, 11 forms occur 524 times in the Qur'ān. When we look at the integrity of the Qur'ān, it is seen that the words nabī, rasūl, and mursal are used as equivalents to the word prophet. see Muḥammad b. Mukarram Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-'Arab* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.), 11/281-285. Both the terms nabī and rasūl mean "the messenger chosen by God to convey His commands and advice to the addressees" in the Qur'ān. See al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *al-Ta'rīfāt*, ed. Muḥammad Ṣiddīq al-Munshāwī (Cairo: Dār al-Faḍīlah, n.d.), 95-96; Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Peygamber", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2007), 34/257-262.

[61]   In the Qur'ān, the compound *qawlu rasūl* is mentioned in two surahs: al-Haqqah (69/40) and at-Takwir (81/19-20). According to Menzioğlu Ahmed Efendi (1888-1953), the reason why Jibrīl is described as "al-karīm" in the 19th verse of the at-Takwir is because he conveyed the Qur'ān, which is the greatest of things such as knowledge, guidance and an act of showing the true path to the servants of Allah. See Menzioğlu Ahmed Efendi, *Sûre Tefsirleri*, ed. Durmuş Arslan (İstanbul: Dila Filmcilik Yayınevi, 2012), 273.

[62]   Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl āy al-Qur'ān*, ed. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī (al-Riyāḍ: Dār 'Ālam al-Kutub, 2003), 23/242, 24/163; Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *Mufradāt alfāẓ al-Qur'ān*, ed. Ṣafwān 'Adnān al-Dāwūdī (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2002), 353, 689; Muḥyī al-Sunnah al-Ḥusayn al-Farrā' al-Baghawī, *Ma'ālim al-tanzīl fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh al-Nimr vd. (al-Riyāḍ: Dār Ṭaybah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzī', 1993), 8/214, 349; Abū Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥaqq Ibn 'Aṭīyah al-Andalusī, *al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz fī tafsīr al-Kitāb al-'Azīz*, ed. 'Abd al-Salām 'Abd al-Shāfī Muḥammad (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmīyah, 2001), 5/362, 444; al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, 30/117; 31/73-74; Sharaf al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn Ibn Rayyān, *al-Rawḍ al-Rayyān fī as'ilat al-Qur'ān*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad Naṣṣār al-Salafī (al-Madīnah: Maktabat al-'Ulūm wa-al-Ḥikam, 1994), 2/516-

In compliance with Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 150/767) and al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, only Gabriel is meant by the expression of *qawlu rasūl* in both surahs.[63] Pursuant to al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, God created the Qurʾān within the structure of Gabriel. In this context, al-Qāḍī answers the question, "How is it possible for *qawlu rasūl* to be expressed as divine speech?" as follows: "Since Gabriel heard the Qurʾān from God, it is possible to belong its words to him. Because he introduced the Qurʾān and it became known thanks to him. Moreover, it is Gabriel himself who reveals the divine word. Since the Qurʾān wouldn't be known without Gabriel, it is permissible to attribute the divine word to him. There are many similar uses in the Arabic language."[64]

As specified by Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 751/1350), the attribution of the divine word to the messenger in the Qurʾān as *qawlu rasūl* is not because the prophet creates the divine word literally, but because he conveys it to people and they hear the word from his mouth. In other words, the divine speech is attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad as he is the intermediary in the transmission of the divine word.[65] In this case, there is an *iḍāfah maʿnawīyah* (meaning-dimensional proportion) in the composition of *qawlu rasūl*. The underlying structure (*taqdīr*) of this composition is "qawlun makhṣūṣun li-rasūl", i.e., it is a special word to the prophet.[66] In this respect, this composition indicates that the Qurʾānic words belong entirely to the messenger.

While al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī explains the term *qawl* in the Qurʾān, he refers to the nature of attributing poems and orations (khuṭbat) to their creators as well as pertaining to their narrators (ar-ruwāt) in the context of *qawlu rasūl*. Thus, he implies that attributing the words of the Qurʾān to the Prophet Muḥammad or Gabriel is the same. According to him, while it is correct to say *qawl al-rāwī* for a poem or oration, it is not correct to say the narrator's own poem or oration. Because poetry is a figure of speech realized in a special style, the person who narrates it does not have a status in terms of belonging.[67] Therefore, al-Iṣfahānī indicates that the attribution of the divine speech to the Prophet Muḥammad and Gabriel, who are in the position of narrators, is also of this type in terms of narration and transmission. A similar evaluation can be seen in the statements of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 1182/1768). al-Rāzī makes the following evaluation on this issue: "The Qurʾān is the word of God the Almighty, meaning that it is He who revealed it in the preserved tablet and arranged and organized it. The Qurʾān is the word of Gabriel, meaning that he is the one who sent it down from the heavens to the earth. The Qurʾān is the word of

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517; Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī, *Maḥāsin al-taʾwīl*, ed. Muḥammad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī (Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabīyah, 1957), 16/5919, 6078; Muḥammad al-Tāhir Ibn ʿĀshūr, *al-Taḥrīr wa-al-tanwīr* (Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiyyah, 1984), 29/141, 30/154-155; Muhammed Hamdi Elmalılı, *Hak Dini Kurʾân Dili* (İstanbul: Yenda Yayınevi, 2001), 8/245, 447; Abū al-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī, *Tafhīm al-Qurʾān*, çev. Muhammed Han Kayani - Ali Ünal (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınevi, 2005), 6/451.

63   Muqātil b. Sulaymān, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Maḥmūd Shaḥātah (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Tārīkh al-ʿArabī, 2002), 4/425, 602; Abū al-Ḥasan Qāḍī al-Quḍāh ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Qāḍī Abd al-Jabbār, *Tanzīh al-Qurʾān ʿan al-maṭāʿin* (Beirut: Dār al-Nahḍah al-Ḥadīthah, n.d.), 432, 452.

64   al-Qāḍī Abd al-Jabbār, *Tanzīh al-Qurʾān*, 432, 452.

65   Sharaf al-Dīn Dāwūd b. Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad al-Qayṣarī, "Kashf al-ḥijāb ʿan kalām Rabb al-arbāb", *Majmūʿah Rasāʾil maʿrifīyah: Rasāʾil al-Qayṣarī*, ed. ʿĀsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Kayyālī al-Ḥusaynī (Beirut: Books Publisher, 2015), 25. For detailed considerations regarding Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī's understanding of the Qurʾānic revelation, see Hasan Şahin, "Davud el-Kayseri'ye Göre Allah'ın Kelamı", *Temaşa: Erciyes Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Dergisi* 3 (2015), 30-43.

66   Necdet Çağıl, *İlahi Kelamın Tabiatı* (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınevi, 2003), 71.

67   al-Iṣfahānī, *Mufradāt*, 689.

Muḥammad, meaning that he is the one who revealed it to human beings, invited them to believe in it, and made it a proof for his prophecy." [68] According to al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī, the divine speech can also be metaphorically attributed to proclaimer (muballigh), that is, to Gabriel or the Prophet Muḥammad.[69]

2.6. The Issue of Translating the Qurʾān

It can be thought that in the history of Islamic thought, Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150/767) differentiated the wording and meaning in the context of the Qurʾān into origin/principal (al-aṣl) and branch/secondary (al-farʿ), gives rise to understand that the belongings of the Qurʾānic words are also different. According to him, since the meanings of the Qurʾān are primary/necessary components and its words are secondary/additional features, when the Qurʾān is translated to other languages, "the thing that is read" can be called the Qurʾān. In other words, God's own word is not related to the words of a specific language but has a nature that is entirely related to meaning. For this reason, there should be no difference between expressing the Qurʾān in Arabic or in other languages. Abū Ḥanīfah refers to the Qurʾānic quotations made by God in the Qurʾān to justify this view. According to Abū Ḥanīfah, since the meanings of the Qurʾān are essential, God translated everything He quoted, including the dialogues and prayers of other prophets with their tribes, into Arabic language. Therefore, it is valid to translate the words of the Qurʾān outside the Arabic language, just as God excerpted the expressions of the previous ummahs into Arabic.[70] Accordingly, while Abū Ḥanīfah allowed the translation of the Qurʾān into another language other than Arabic recitation, such as Persian, during the prayer, he ruled that the Qurʾān is the word of God, not in terms of its words, but in the meanings that the words indicate.[71]

Shams al-aʾimmah al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090), in his voluminous work called *al-Mabsūṭ*, excerpts from Abū Ḥanīfah about whether reciting passages from the Torah, the Bible or the Psalms during ṣalāh corrupts the validity of it. According to Abū Ḥanīfah, since the Qurʾān is found in previous holy books in terms of meaning, reciting the passages that are compatible with it in ṣalāh does not make the prayer invalid. However, when passages from previous books are read during the ṣalāh, and the recited passages are from passages that contradict the Qurʾān, the prayer will not be valid. Since it is permissible to read the Qurʾān in Persian or its translation from any other language, there should be no vengeance in reading the Syriac/Aramaic or Hebrew meanings of passages compatible with the Qurʾān in prayer. In this context, according to Abū Ḥanīfah, the miraculousness of the Qurʾān is related to the meaning, not to the arrangement or wording. In

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[68]   al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, 30/117.

[69]   Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Amīr al-Ṣanānī, *al-Īḍāḥ wa-al-bayān fī taḥqīq ʿIbārāt qaṣaṣ al-Qurʾān*, ed. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Luṭf al-Daylamī (al-Ṣanʿāʾ: Maktabat al-Irshād, 1992), 31-33. For detailed considerations on this treatise, see Zakir Demir, "Emîr es-Sanʿânî'nin İlâhî İktibâsların Mâhiyetine Dair el-Îzâh veʾl-beyân fî tahkîki ʿibârâti kasasiʾl-Kurʾân İsimli Risâlesi ve Ele Aldığı Konuların Kritiği", *Bilimname* 50/2 (2023), 207-239.

[70]   Sirāj al-Dīn Abī Ḥafṣ ʿUmar b. ʿAlī Ibn al-Mulaqqin, *al-Tawḍīḥ li-sharḥ al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaḥīḥ* (Beirut: Dār al-Nawādir, 2008), 33/543-544.

[71]   ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Masʿūd b. Aḥmad al-Kāsānī, *Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ fī tartīb al-sharāʾiʿ* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2003), 1/527-528.

compliance with his approach, the challenge of the Qurʾān is not with the wording of the text but with its meaning.[72]

Pursuant to Burhān al-Dīn al-Marghīnānī (d. 593/1197) and Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī (d. 855/1451), Abū Ḥanīfah's main basis on this issue are the following two verses: (i) *"Wa'innahu lafī zuburi al-awwalīn/And verily, it (the Qurʾān, and its revelation to the Prophet Muḥammad) is (announced) in the Scriptures [i.e. the Torah and the Gospel] of former people"*[73] (ii) *"Inna hadhā lafī al-ṣṣuḥufi al-ūlā ṣuḥufi Ibrāhīma wa-Mūsā/Verily! This is in the former Scriptures, the Scriptures of Abraham and Moses."*[74] In the verses in question, it is stated that some or most of the Qurʾān existed in previous books. It is known to everyone that the Qurʾān does not exist in Arabic words in the previous pages. Although the language of the Qurʾān is Arabic, the language of the books revealed to previous generations is not Arabic. According to this proposition put forward by Abū Ḥanīfah, although the expressions in the books of the past prophets are not in Arabic, they are called "Qurʾān" in the verses in question. In other words, the Torah, which was revealed to Moses, is called the Qurʾān, even though it is not Arabic in terms of its wording. Similarly, the Bible sent down to Jesus and the Psalms sent down to David are called the Qurʾān, even though they are not in Arabic. This means that the Qurʾān is the meaning expressed by the words rather than its words themselves. For this reason, when a person does not know anything about the Qurʾān and can't read it, he can read it in his native language like Persian. Because, as is known, meanings do not change much with the change of languages.[75] According to this approach attributed to Abū Ḥanīfah, the meanings put into the words between the two covers, starting with al-Fātiḥah and ending with the al-Nās, are called Qurʾān. Therefore, the substance called Qurʾān is not the words or the verses themselves, but its meanings.

I have previously stated that Abū Ḥanīfah deduced with the following two verses in his fatwa: *"Wa'innahu lafī zuburi al-awwalīn/And verily, it (the Qurʾān, and its revelation to the Prophet Muḥammad) is (announced) in the Scriptures [i.e. the Torah and the Gospel] of former people"*[76] *"Inna hadhā lafī al-ṣṣuḥufi al-ūlā ṣuḥufi Ibrāhīma wa-Mūsā/Verily! This is in the former Scriptures, the Scriptures of Abraham and Moses."*[77] In summary, according to his fatwa, the main principles of the Qurʾān are also found in the holy books that were revealed before it. However, in my conviction, it is not considered an accurate approach to use the mentioned verses as a basis and claim that the revelation of the Qurʾān was sent down to the Prophet in terms of meaning, and he put the revelation into his own words/patterns. Just as the Qurʾān invites everyone to produce a book like itself, it also challenges with the Prophet Muḥammad since he is a human being. Considering the principle of respecting the integrity of the Qurʾān[78], it is seen that there are didactic and instructive styles indicating

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[72] Shams al-aʾimmah Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūṭ* (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1989), 1/37, 234.

[73] al-Shuʿarāʾ 26/196.

[74] al-Aʿla 87/18-19.

[75] Burhān al-Dīn al-Marghīnānī, *al-Hidāyah sharḥ bidāyat al-mubtadī*, ed. Naʿīm Ashraf Nūr Aḥmad (Karachi: Idārat al-Qurʾān wa-al-ʿUlūm al-Islāmīyah, 1997), 1/312-313; Badr al-Dīn al-ʿ Aynī, *ʿUmdat al-Qārī sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad Maḥmūd ʿUmar (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2001), 6/29.

[76] al-Shuʿarāʾ 26/196.

[77] al-Aʿla 87/18-19.

[78] For considerations regarding understanding the Qurʾān in its entirety, see Halis Albayrak, *Kurʾân'ın Bütünlüğü Üzerine: Kurʾân'ın Kurʾân'la Tefsiri* (İstanbul: Şûle Yayınları, 2011), 43-92.

transfer, distance, inferiority, and superiority in many passages, such as "Anzala alllahu 'alayka al-kitāba wa al-ḥikmata wa'allamaka mā lam takun ta'lam/Allah has sent down to you the Qur'ān, and al-Hikmah (knowledge of legal and illegal things), and taught you that which you knew not.", "Yā'ayyuhā al-rrasūlu/O Messenger", "Yā'ayyuhā al-nabīyu/O Prophet!", "Qul mā yakūnu lī an ubaddilahu min tilqā'i nafsī/Say (O Muḥammad): 'It is not for me to change it on my own accord'", "Wakadhalika anzalnā ilayka al-kitāba/And thus We have sent down the Book (Qur'ān) to you (O Muḥammad)".[79] In this context, the following expressions are also within the scope of this style: "We reveal to you…", "we sent you…", "Declare this…", "Read this…", "Say…", "Do not do this…", "They will ask you…", "Answer them…" All these expressions and styles of expression show that the Prophet Muḥammad had no influence on the formation of Qur'ānic words and had no function beyond a human being.

Although Abū Ḥanīfah does not make reference in his fatwā to neither the Prophet nor Gabriel played a role in the construction of the words of the Qur'ān, his separation of wording and meaning into al-aṣl and al-far', may have led to different possibilities regarding the belonging of the Qur'ānic words. However, it appears that such a distinction is not a widely accepted understanding in Islamic thought. Therefore, there are many scholars emphasizing that wording and meaning should be identified and making the subject of this duo inseparable from each other. In this context, the names of Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymīyah (d. 728/1328) and Muḥammad 'Abd al-'Aẓīm al-Zurqānī (d. 1367/1948) can be given as examples. It is understood that Ibn Taymiyyah identified the wording with the meaning while defining the *kalām Allāh*, and in this context, he criticized the views that the essence of the Qur'ān consists only of meaning. His statements on this subject are as follows: "All Muslims arrive at a consensus that the Qur'ān is the word of God. The expression *kalām Allāh* covers not only the meaning of the Qur'ān but also its wording. The meaning of the Qur'ān cannot be attributed to God and its wording cannot be pertained to other beings. Since it is established that the *kalām* revealed in Arabic belongs to God, it cannot be said that Arabic verse is created. In short, the word of God is not created in any way. The term Qur'ān is a conception that covers both wording and meaning. Both the words and the entire meaning of the Qur'ān are the word of God, and according to the consensus of Muslims, it does not belong to anyone other than God. It is blasphemy to claim that the Qur'ān is the word of Gabriel, or Muḥammad, or any other created being. No one among the Muslim scholars has put forward such a claim. The Prophet conveyed both the wording and the meaning of the Qur'ān and not only the meaning of it revealed to him."[80]

Conforming to al-Zurqānī, the Qur'ān, which Gabriel sent down to the Prophet, starting with al-Fātiḥah and ending with the al-Nās, and consisting of miraculous words, is only the word of God. According to him, neither Gabriel nor the Prophet has a role in the construction and arrangement of these words. Pursuant to him, both ideas, i.e., the view claiming Gabriel revealed the meanings of the Qur'ān to the Prophet Muḥammad and he expressed them in the Arabic language and view putting forward the meanings of the Qur'ān belong to God and its words appertain to Gabriel are

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79   al-Nisā' 4/113; al-Mā'idah 5/67; al-Anfāl 8/64; Yūnus 10/15; al-'Ankabūt 29/47.

80   Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymīyah, *Majmū' Fatāwā*, ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Qāsim (al-Madīnah: Mujamma'u al-Malik Fahd li-Ṭibā'at al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf, 2004), 6/534; 12/535-538, 555-556.

contrary to the Qur'ān, aḥādīth ṣaḥīḥ and ijtimā'. His statements on this subject are as follows: "I believe that these views were inserted into the books of Muslims by fraud. How can the Qur'ān then be miraculous when the words of the Qur'ān belonged to the Prophet or Gabriel? How can it be correct to attribute Qur'ān to God when its words do not belong to Him?"[81] Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh Draz (1894-1958) and Yusuf Ziyaeddin Ersal (1879-1961) also have the same opinion as al-Zurqānī regarding accepting both wording and meaning as two pillars of the nature of the Qur'ān and make similar evaluations on this issue.[82]

Conclusion

In the tradition of Islamic science and thought, the dominant and preferred approach is that the Qur'ānic text as a whole, with its wording and meaning, belongs to God. However, it is observed that there are some explanations contrary to this view in the statements of classical period scholars such as Sufyān al-Thawrī, al-Juwaynī, al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, al-Ghazālī and Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-'Arabī, and modern period figures such as Fazlur Rahman and Süleyman Ateş. There is no disagreement among scholars that the Qur'ān belongs to God in terms of its meaning. The main disagreement is whether the words of the Qur'ān pertain to God, Gabriel, or Muḥammad. I am inclined to think, the words of the Qur'ān belong to God, not in terms of verses or verse fragments, but as the whole text that came out of Muḥammad's mouth. The Qur'ānic text, which is collected between two covers and called al-Muṣḥaf (Codex), that is, turned into a book, must belong to God in terms of both wording and meaning, as it is recorded on the pages as it was both heard and written by the Prophet Muḥammad. The paradigm that the meanings of the Qur'ānic text belong to God and the words belong to the Prophet or Gabriel does not comply with the integrity of the Qur'ān, the material of exegesis especially various tafsir rumors (riwâyât). In fact, it seems that building an understanding of revelation based on the distinction between wording and meaning was not a fundamental issue at the beginning of the history of Islamic science and thought.

In the final analysis, it can be said that the fact that the Holy Qur'ān is the divine word in terms of wording and meaning is one of its most basic characteristics and pillars. Therefore, wording and meaning are indispensable for each other. In other words, neither the wording nor the meaning has an independent value and importance. On the other hand, it is possible to claim that the Qur'ān, with its integrity of wording and meaning, is the word of God, as it is in the form that God has revealed in the preserved tablet. It can be said that the Qur'ān is the word of Gabriel in a figurative sense in that it descends from the preserved tablet to the heavens and from the heavens to the earth. It is also possible to argue that the Qur'ān is the word of Muḥammad in a figurative sense, as it conveys the message to humanity and recites it to them.

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[81]   al-Zurqānī, *Manāhil al-'Irfān*, 1/43-44.

[82]   Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh Draz, *al-Naba' al-'aẓīm naẓarāt jadīdah fī al-Qur'ān* (Dawḥa: Dār al-Saqāfah, 1405), 19-23; Mustafa Bektaşoğlu, *Düzceli Âlim Yusuf Ziyaeddin Ersal: Hayatı Ve Eserleri* (Ankara: İmaj A.Ş., 2005), 93-94.

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The Eudaimonist Ethics of al-Fārābī and Avicenna

"Matilla, Janne. *The Eudaimonist Ethics of al-Fārābī and Avicenna.* Leiden: Brill, 2022, 256 pages."

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Abstract

This paper is about the book which is written by Janne Matilla "(The Eudaimonist Ethics of al-Fārābī and Avicenna, Leiden: Brill, 2022, 256 pages)". This work written by Matilla revolves around the comparative analysis of two eminent philosophers of Islamic Philosophy. Matilla adopts partially the method that emerges in the literature about Islamic Philosophy. Therefore, the results that the author reaches are unique contributions to the literature. Because this method is not applied completely, some problems of interpretation are seen in the work.

Keywords: al-Fārābī, Avicenna, Ethical philosophy, Eudaimonism, Virtue, Practical philosophy.

Öz

Bu yazı, Janne Matilla tarafından kaleme alınan "(*The Eudaimonist Ethics of al-Fārābī and Avicenna*, Leiden: Brill, 2022, 256 sayfa)" isimli çalışmanın kritiğidir. Çalışmada yazarın bu iki İslam filozofunu mukayeseli bir şekilde incelemesi üzerinde durulmaktadır. Matilla'nın benimsediği yöntem son dönemde İslam felsefesi araştırmalarında öne çıkmakla birlikte henüz tam olarak oturmuş bir yöntem değildir. Bu nedenle araştırmacının İslam filozoflarını mukayeseli olarak irdeleyen bir yöntem benimsemesi literatüre özgün bir katkıdır. Fakat bu metodun tam olarak uygulanaması nedeniyle bazı yorum sorunları çalışmada görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Fârâbî, İbn Sinâ, Ahlak, Mutluluk, Erdem, Pratik felsefe.

The literature on ethical philosophy in Islamic Philosophy dominantly examines the early period of Islamic Philosophy. The book that J. Matille wrote published in Brill in 2022 covers al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's ethical theories and consists of two main parts focusing on the issue of virtue and happiness. This choice is highly justifiable when the two philosophers' theories about ethical philosophy are considered. The book is based on the author's dissertation; however, it is highly divergent from the structure of the dissertation.

The method used in the book is quite different from the works about Islamic philosophy produced in English literature. First, the major inclination in English literature about the topics of Islamic Philosophy is to analyze theories of Islamic philosophers concerning the ancient Greek sources. When al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's philosophies are taken into consideration, most of the seminal works are constructed on the idea that these peripatetic philosophers created a synthesis that is only understandable when referring to the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and ancient Greek commentators. In contrast to this situation, the method of analyzing Islamic Philosophers in their consistency develops in the literature. Matille's work might be categorized under this chance not completely but essentially.

In every chapter of the work, the author focuses on the background of al-Fārābī and Avicenna. This is a legitimate endeavor, but in terms of a philosophical interpretation of the two philosophers, there might be a different outlook. For instance, it is as valid as the historical method to analyze al-Fārābī in his own consistency and try to find Avicenna's theories regarding what al-Fārābī claims as background. The author selects the method of finding the historical similarities between the Islamic and Greek Philosophers but does not neglect the former aspect.

In that vein, the book's first part focuses on the issue of happiness according to al-Fārābī and Avicenna. The author claims that the general framework of the two Islamic philosophers about the problem of happiness takes Aristotle as a root and it diverges from the Stagirite at the same time. In terms of al-Fārābī's ethical philosophy, he blends the idea of happiness as a final end with a metaphysical flavor. This continues with Avicenna; however, his framework differentiates because of his theory of separation of the human soul from the body.

In the following chapter, the author systematically directs attention towards the examination of "the function argument (ergon)," a constituent that appears to assume a pivotal role in elucidating al-Farabi's conceptualization of happiness. In this part, the author focuses on al-Fārābī's *Exhortation to the Path of Happiness* (*Tanbīh 'alā sabīl al-sa'āda*) and claims that al-Fārābī employs function argument for an intellectualist understanding of happiness (Part 1-Chapter 2). The nature of this work is highly controversial, it is paramount to decide the place of it inside al-Fārābī's philosophy. The closest text to this book is *Attainment of Happiness* (*Taḥṣīl al-sa'āda*). Both works are meaningful in terms of the theory of perfection that is seen in other branches of al-Fārābī's ethical and political philosophy. While *The Attainment of Happiness* concerns the issue of epistemological perfection, *The Exhortation* focuses more on individual ethical perfection. In terms of Avicenna's philosophy final end of human perfection and happiness is more grounded on a psychological and metaphysical basis. The author elaborates on how and why the emanation scheme is crucial to understanding Avicenna's theory of human's perfection or final end. The emphasis on the metaphysical and psychological side is latent in al-Fārābī but more emergent in Avicenna. In the second chapter of the first part, the author translates the word contemplation as "ra'y" (lit. opinion) (p.29). This translation might be an interpretive one. If that is so, the logic behind it must be shown because the word contemplation (*naẓar*) is one of the central concepts, especially for al-Fārābī. The centrality of this concept comes from its being the crux of the relationship between metaphysics and ethics. For al-Fārābī, the end of philosophical research is to reach a point of *naẓar al-ilāhī* (divinely contemplation). This is not exactly like Avicenna's theory of imitation of God, but it is to reach the most abstract thinking act and contemplate existence through this action. Furthermore, the concept of opinion in al-Fārābī's philosophy might be investigated with the act of deliberation (rawiyya) and with the concept of commonly accepted opinions (mashūrāt). Still, it goes beyond the ethical aspects of his philosophy.

In chapter three of the book's first part, the author discusses one of the neglected topics in ethical studies of the philosophers of Islamic tradition i.e., the problem of pleasure. The author contrasts the theories of al-Fārābī and Avicenna against the hedonistic framework and investigates the hedonistic implications in their explanation. Naturally, these philosophers are not hedonists, but pleasure constitutes a very fundamental aspect of their theory of happiness. For al-Fārābī, pleasure is not an integral part of happiness unlike Avicenna, because of the metaphysical nature of Avicenna's theory of happiness. The author points out the fact that for al-Fārābī, the city of depravity, which is among the non-virtuous cities, aims for pleasure as the final end of life. However, for al-Fārābī and Avicenna, pleasure in completive life is paramount, Avicenna emphasizes the divine contemplation and the interrelation between happiness and pleasure more definitively.

In the chapter four of the book, the author discusses theoretical perfection, which is the defining character of the ethical theories of two philosophers. The author starts with Aristotle's definition of happiness as virtuous ethical activity. The main difference between Aristotle, al-Fārābī and Avicenna, in the context of happiness as a theoretical perfection, is where Aristotle emphasizes the ethical side of the happiness, al-Fārābī and Avicenna focuses on the theoretical aspect of the issue. The author shows that for al-Fārābī existence has a normative structure and perfection in correspondence with this normative structure is one of the goals of happiness as theoretical perfection. Furthermore, this metaphysical aspect of theoretical perfection was developed by Avicenna and became the major topic of the latter's ethical philosophy. For Avicenna, happiness essentially consists of theoretical philosophy, and the good, in ethical terms, is an object of desire. The author claims, in this context, that the topics on the metaphysics of the rational soul, natural theology, and the nature of the First Principle constitute the background for Avicenna's ethical theory.

In the fifth chapter of the first part, the author discusses happiness as the ascent of the human soul (epistrophe). For the author, neither al-Fārābī nor Avicenna is strictly Plotinian concerning their idea of human ascent. This is because of their essential additions to the metaphysical scheme of Plotinian philosophy. For al-Fārābī and Avicenna, there is a strict hierarchy in existence, and contemplative activity is the most virtuous and crucial activity in the process of ascension. On page 95 of the book, the author claims that for al-Fārābī human being becomes divine by perfecting the intellect. This opinion is observed in other passages of the book. However, this is the basic framework of al-Fārābī's ethical philosophy. The practical side of happiness, perfection, and ascent is essential because for al-Fārābī perfection is not possible without the social and practical side of the human being. For Avicenna, the upward motion of the human soul and the downward motion of celestial intellects are more fundamental compared to al-Fārābī. In chapter 6, the author focuses on the problem of the afterlife, which is highly discussed by studies on al-Fārābī, and he points out the religious flavor of al-Fārābī's theory of the afterlife and he discusses the mysticism of Avicenna in that context.

After the seventh chapter of the book the second part starts. In the second part of the book, the main issue is the theory of virtue. In the seventh, eighth and ninth chapters of the book, the gist of the argument of the author here is the tension between the theory of moderation and the theory of purification of soul. In general terms, where al-Fārābī more follows Aristotle's definition of virtue in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Avicenna adopts a more platonic theory of virtue, which focuses on the purification of the soul. Despite these similarities, the author shows that, unlike Aristotle, two philosophers define virtue inside the intellectualist framework. In the last chapter of the second part, the author focuses on the topic of moral progression and implies the contextual (religious and philosophical) nature of moral progression for two philosophers. It means that the definition and actualization of moral actions depend on the philosophical and religious context.

As it is seen in the plan of the work, the author's method has three aspects. First, the author shows the ancient Greek background of the problems and topics and then he elaborates al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's position. Then he compares three philosophers and shows the contrasts between them. In terms of the issue of consistency, if we consider the literature about al-Fārābī, for

instance, we might categorize Matilla's work in the same vein as the study of Damien Janos who tries to find the consistency in al-Fārābī's philosophy about the problem of cosmology (Damien, Janos. *Method, Structure and Development in al-Fārābī's Cosmology.* Leiden: Brill, 2012). I think the main trend of the literature is this endeavor however, it is premature. Matilla's work might be considered as a beginning to find the philosophical interpretation of Islamic philosophers without neglecting the historical context. Because Avicenna explicitly claims his debt to al-Fārābī, it is natural to read and interpret these philosophers together.

Despite this emerging attitude that paves the way for a more objective interpretation of Islamic philosophers, some questions should be asked about the work of Matilla. First, the author claims that he tries to find the consistency in al-Fārābī and Avicenna. At the same time, the author tries to find this consistency inside the historical scheme. This situation creates, as the author shows, an inconsistency in understanding the theories of these two philosophers because all the material they use is a raw material on which they work. This raw material is essential to understanding the historical stance of the philosophers, but the main issue is to create the mindset that these philosophers aim to establish.

In this framework, the author asks a question about the omission of *Nicomachean Ethics* by al-Fārābī in his work *The Philosophy of Aristotle*. If this question is analyzed according to the presuppositions that al-Fārābī is a strict Aristotelian, it might create other problems. I think the issue here is related to the philosophical project of al-Fārābī that is seen in other branches of his philosophy (logic, metaphysics, politics).

Secondly, the author points out the question of the separation of ethics from other branches of philosophy. This is also a question that other authors discuss in the literature. I think if al-Fārābī's philosophy continues to be read according to the ancient sources, questions like this are very hard to answer. But if this philosophy is considered according to the philosophical project that al-Fārābī clearly states in his *Emergence of Philosophy*, it is possible to find more comprehensive answers. This is the ideal of al-Fārābī for the revivification of Aristotelian philosophy.

As the author points out al-Fārābī changes the meaning of entelechy and includes Neoplatonic feature to this main concept of Aristotelian philosophy. This is, I think, one of the most important findings of study concerning al-Fārābī's philosophy. To contextualize the separation of ethics from the other branches of philosophy al-Fārābī creates a theory of perfection which makes all the inconsistencies understandable in his system of philosophy.

What the author neglects here is the role of logic in the process of perfection. However, al-Fārābī did not repeat the role of logic in the process of the perfection of the power of logos, he claims that happiness is not possible without the proper use of logic. However, the author refers to this issue in another context (p.30), it might be formulated as a separate subject to discuss.

In addition to that, the theory of human which is asserted by al-Fārābī and Avicenna is highly different. Where Avicenna claims dualism in a very strict sense, al-Fārābī emphasizes the importance of the material side of human being. This differentiation is one of the main issues that the basis of their ethical theories differs.

When Avicenna's philosophy is considered, the author claims that the issues of pleasure and afterlife are the main points that Avicenna is diverted from al-Fārābī's conception of ethical philosophy. According to al-Fārābī, the aim of perfection is the ultimate happiness, it means that Avicenna might be interpreted in line with al-Fārābī on the question of afterlife inside the ethical theory.

As the author implies, the issue of religion and ethics are the major points that al-Fārābī and Avicenna works on. In terms of al-Fārābī's philosophy, the theory of "milla" has different ramifications compared to Avicenna's theory of religion. For al-Fārābī religion is the actualization of philosophical ideal and it is the manifestation of philosophical perfection inside the society. Al-Fārābī points to that issue in his seminal work "*Selected Aphorisms*". Therefore, I think, religion for al-Fārābī has social status, which has effects on the ethical life of the individual because of the general rule that the human being is a social animal.

Apart from all the interpretive issues that the author points out, I think the method of analyzing Islamic philosophers concerning each other and in comparison, is a valid method that should be developed by further research.

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The Formation Process of Ahmadiyya Movement

Zaman, Şenol. Kadıyaniliğin Teşekkül Süreci. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Doktora Tezi, 2023.

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Abstract

The Ahmadiyya movement is known as such due to its origin in the town of Qadian, which is why it is often referred to as Qadianism. Originally recorded as the Qadiani (Ahmadi) sect in the population census of Pakistan by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself, the community has continued its activities under the name of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, as later named by Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood Ahmad. The term Qadianism is used in the literature to describe this community as a sect, movement, or religion.

The late 18th century witnessed the emergence of the concept of modernity, which left its mark on social life, cultural perspectives, and art. During this time, it is possible to observe that Muslims were not keeping pace with these developments and were turning towards a more mystical worldview in the conservative movements led by Ghulam. The 19th century stands out as a pivotal period in terms of intellectual restlessness and tensions in the Muslim world. It was a century marked by invitation wars between Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity, leading to increasing tensions in society. In 1857, the Sepoy Mutiny resulted in adverse consequences for Muslims, further exacerbating these tensions.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad emerged as a savior figure among Muslims and developed his ideas in this context. He faced serious criticism from Islamic scholars of his time, and there were written exchanges of refutations. Not only did he receive criticism from Muslims, but also Arya Samajis criticized him by asserting that the Vedic texts were the last divine scriptures. He engaged in heated debates with Dayananda Saraswati, a prominent Arya Samaji leader. Additionally, he had debates with Christian priests and missionaries.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's bi-weekly columns in local newspapers won the hearts of the Muslim community and sparked interest. His courage was admired during a time when everyone else was being suppressed and silenced. Instead of confronting difficulties, humanity often chooses the easier path of seeking a savior. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's views developed and spread in the multicultural context of the Indian subcontinent, where different cultures interacted. Therefore, the impact of this context on his ideas is evident. He initially presented his claims as the Mujaddid (reformer) and later introduced claims of being the Messiah, Mahdi, Muhaddis (renewer), Krishna-avatar, and the concept of subordinate prophethood (Cüz-i Nübüvvet). His activities revolved around these claims, and it is possible to see clear influences from Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism in these claims.

Starting with his claim to Mujaddidship and elevating it to a shadowy prophethood dimension, he emphasized that he was chosen by Allah and that he was the second coming of Prophet Muhammad. All religions have the concept of a savior: Islam has the Mahdi, Judaism and Christianity have the Messiah, Hinduism has the Krishna-avatar, Buddhism has Maitreya, and Zoroastrianism has Saošyant. This fact paved the way for Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who could skillfully interpret the concept of revelation. He initially claimed to be the Mujaddid of the 14th Islamic century, then successively proclaimed himself as the Mahdi, Messiah, and believed that there would be no new prophet after him, asserting the title of Krishna-avatar.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's messianic claims, later harmonized with his messianic and prophetic claims, are seen to be influenced by the cultural heritage and religious structure of the Indian subcontinent. The messianic ideas found in many cultures and religious traditions in this region have led to mutual influences among these cultures. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's ideas seem to be a product of this process. He used the story of Jesus traveling to India as a basis for his claims, insisting that Jesus did not ascend to the heavens but died in India, and that he was the true Messiah. During this process, this understanding was turned into a discourse aimed at the Muslims in the region. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad compiled evidence from the divine scriptures, including the Quran and ancient religious texts, to argue that Jesus did not ascend to the heavens and that he died in India. He declared himself as the Messiah and Mahdi sent by Allah in 1890-1891.

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's continuous prophethood concept is one of the fundamental beliefs of the Ahmadiyya community, which emerged with the aim of continuing the tradition of prophethood. The Ahmadiyya community considers Ghulam Ahmad to be the inheritor of the final prophet, Muhammad, and a subordinate prophet.

In summary, this thesis examines the life and ideas of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and the formation process of Ahmadiyya. The thesis consists of an introduction and three chapters. In the introduction, information is provided about the political, social, religious, and cultural structure of the Indian subcontinent, where Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was born, lived, and died. The religions, Islamic sects, and movements in the Indian subcontinent, as well as the political and social situation, are examined. In the first chapter, information is provided about Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's birth, childhood, upbringing, marriages, education, and the content of his works. His charismatic leadership and the formation of the fundamental doctrines of the Ahmadiyya community, including his claims of being a Muhaddith, Mujaddid, Mahdi, Messiah, and the Seal of Prophethood, as well as the concept of Krishna-avatar, are studied. In the second chapter, it is explained that after the death of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Hakeem Noor-ud-Din assumed the leadership of the community in 1914. After his death, the Ahmadiyya community split into two factions, Qadiani and Lahori, and the reasons behind this division are elucidated. The third chapter focuses on Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's debates with Islamic scholars, Arya Samaj groups, and Christian missionaries and priests, as well as the reactions of these groups to Ahmadiyya. Ghulam Ahmad claimed that the Jihad should be conducted with the pen and knowledge, not the sword, and he asserted that the door of revelation had not been closed. His debates were marked by a language and style similar to those employed by Christian missionaries. In this context, his idea that Jihad should be conducted with words and knowledge rather than weapons and his calls for the abolition of slavery can be highlighted.

The Ahmadiyya community has been very active in publishing and disseminating its messages. The community prioritizes introducing itself in the content of these publications. They meticulously explain their views, always providing supporting evidence. Another means of communication for the Ahmadiyya community is magazines. They have a magazine called *Maneviyat.* Additionally, the magazine *The Review of Religions* has been published in English since 1900. This magazine is sent to libraries and relevant institutions, including faculties that offer

Islamic studies in many countries. Furthermore, *The Muslim Herald, The Muslim Sunrise* and *el-Fazl*, published in Urdu, are available. The Arabic magazine *el-Buşra* is sent to 30 countries. In general, each magazine includes a section with a Quranic verse and Hadith (sayings and actions of the Prophet), followed by content related to Islamic topics. The Ahmadiyya community has three television channels: MTA1, MTA2, and MTA3 (Muslim Television Ahmadiyya). These channels broadcast 24-hour religious and cultural programs. To list their services, after being declared illegal by the Pakistan government in 1974, they established their presence in around 100 countries. They have 1869 centers, 69 translations of the Quran, 36 hospitals, 650 dispensaries, and have established schools (primary, middle, and high schools) in 11 countries. The number of schools and educational institutions founded by the community is 505. Today, it is estimated that there are around 15 million members of the Ahmadiyya community living in India, Pakistan, Europe, Africa, and the United States.

Keywords: Kalām, Ahmadiyya, Reform, Messiah, Mahdi, Prophethood, Krishna-avatar, Jihad, Revelation.

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- Author(s) should document that they have the participants' consent and the necessary permissions related with the sharing and research/analysis of the data that are used.
- Author(s) bears the responsibility to inform the editor of the journal or publisher if they happen to notice a mistake in their study which is in early release or publication process and to cooperate with the editors during the correction or withdrawal process.
- Authors cannot submit their studies to multiple journals simultaneously. Each submission can be made only after the previous one is completed. A study published in another journal cannot be submitted to KADER.
- Author responsibilities given in a study (e.g., adding an author, reordering of author names) cannot be changed if the review process has begun.

2. Ethical Responsibilities of Editors

The editors of KADER should hold the following ethical responsibilities that are based on the guides "COPE Code of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors" and "COPE Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors" published as open Access by Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE).

General duties and responsibilities

Editors are responsible for each study published in KADER. In this respect, the editors have the following roles and responsibilities:

- Making efforts to meet the demand for knowledge from readers and authors,
- Ensuring the continuous development of the journal,
- Managing the procedures aimed to improve the quality of the studies published in the journal,
- Supporting intellectual freedom,
- Ensuring academic integrity,
- Following the procedures without making concessions on intellectual property rights and ethical standards,
- Being transparent and clear in issues that require correction or explanation.

Relationships with Readers

Editors must make decisions taking into consideration the knowledge, skills and expectations of all readers, researchers and practitioners that they need. Editors must also ensure that the published studies should contribute to literature and be original. Moreover, they must take notice of the feedback received from readers, researchers and practitioners and provide explanatory and informative feedback.

Relationships with Authors

Editors have the following duties and responsibilities in their relations with authors:

- Editors must make positive or negative decisions about the studies' importance, originality, validity, clarity in wording and suitability with the journal's aims and objectives.
- Editors must take the studies that are within the scope of publication into pre-review process unless there are serious problems with the study.
- Editors must not ignore positive suggestions made by reviewers unless there are serious problems with the study.
- New editors, unless there are serious issues, must not change the previous editor's decisions about the studies.

- "Blind Review and Review Process" must be published and editors must prevent possible diversions from the defined processes.
- Editors must publish an "Author's Guide" that is comprehensive enough in answering queries by authors. This guide must be updated regularly.
- Authors should be provided with explanatory and informative feedback.

Relationships with Reviewers

Editors have the following duties and responsibilities in their relations with reviewers:

Editors must

- respect that their own papers are evaluated by appropriate independent referees from the editorial board.
- choose reviewers according to the subject of the study.
- provide the information and guidance reviewers may need during the review process.
- observe whether there are conflicting interests between reviewers and authors.
- keep the identities of reviewers confidential in blind review.
- encourage the reviewers to review the manuscript in an unbiased, scientific and objective tone.
- evaluate reviewers regularly based on criteria like performance and timing.
- develop practices and policies that increase the performance of reviewers.
- take necessary steps to update the reviewer pool dynamically.
- prevent unkind and unscientific reviews.
- make effort to ensure the reviewer pool has a wide range.

Relationships with the Editorial Board

Editors must make sure that the members of the editorial board follow the procedures in accordance with the publication policies and guidelines, and must inform the members about the publication policies and developments. The editors must also train new members of the editorial board and provide the information they need.

Moreover, editors must

- ensure that the members of the editorial board review the manuscripts in an unbiased and independent manner.
- select the new members of the editorial board from those who can contribute to the journal and are qualified enough.
- send manuscripts for review based on the subject of expertise of the editorial board members.
- regularly communicate with the editorial board.

- arrange regular meetings with the editorial board for the development of publication policies and the journal.

Relationships with the Journal's Owner and Publisher

The relationship between the editors and publisher is based on the principle of the independency of editors.

Editorial and Blind Review Processes

Editors are obliged to comply with the policies of "Blind Review and Review Process" stated in the journal's publication policies. Therefore, the editors ensure that each manuscript is reviewed in an unbiased, fair and timely manner.

Quality Assurance

Editors must make sure that articles in the journal are published in accordance with the publication policies of the journal and international standards.

Protection of Personal Information

Editors are supposed to protect the personal information related with the subjects or visuals in the studies being reviewed, and to reject the study if there is no documentation of the subjects' consent. Furthermore, editors are supposed to protect the personal information of the authors, reviewers and readers.

Encouraging Ethical Rules and Protection of Human and Animal Rights

Editors are supposed to protect human and animal rights in the studies being reviewed and must reject the experimental studies which do not have ethical and related committee's approval about the population given in such studies.

Precautions against possible Abuse and Malpractice

Editors are supposed to take precautions against possible abuse and malpractice. They must conduct investigations meticulously and objectively in determining and evaluating complaints about such situations. They must also share the results of the investigation.

Ensuring Academic Integrity

Editors must make sure that the mistakes, inconsistencies or misdirections in studies are corrected quickly.

Protection of Intellectual Property Rights

Editors are responsible for protecting the intellectual property rights of all the articles published in the journal and the rights of the journal and author(s) in cases where these rights are violated. Also, editors must take the necessary precautions in order to prevent the content of all published articles from violating the intellectual property rights of other publications.

Constructiveness and Openness to Discussion

Editors must

- pay attention to the convincing criticism about studies published in the journal and must have a constructive attitude towards such criticism.
- grant the right of reply to the author(s) of the criticized study.
- not ignore or exclude the study that include negative results.

Complaints

Editors must examine the complaints from authors, reviewers or readers and respond to them in an explanatory and enlightening manner.

Political and Economic Apprehensions

Neither the owner of the journal, publisher or any other political or economical factor can influence the independent decision taking of the editors.

Conflicting Interests

Editors, acknowledging that there may be conflicting interests between reviewers and other editors, guarantee that the publication process of the manuscripts will be completed in an independent and unbiased manner.

3. Ethical Responsibilities of Reviewers

The fact that all manuscripts are reviewed through "Blind Review" has a direct influence on the publication quality. This process ensures confidentiality by objective and independent review. The review process at KADER is carried out on the principle of double blind review. Reviewers do not contact the authors directly, and the reviews and comments are conveyed through the journal management system. In this process, the reviewer comments on the evaluation forms and full texts are assigned to the author(s) by the editor. After the blind review process is completed, the accepted papers will be tested in that are subjected to plagiarism detection program, whether they contain plagiarism or not, and they have been previously published or not. In this context, the

reviewers doing review work for KADER are supposed to bear the following ethical responsibilities:

• Each paper submitted to the journal is evaluated by two referees at least.
• If one of the two referees rejects a paper while the other accepts it; the paper is sent to third referee or to the editor for making final decision.

Reviewers must

• agree to review only in their subject of expertise.
• review in an unbiased and confidential manner.
• inform the editor of the journal if they think that they encounter conflict of interests and decline to review the manuscript during the review process.
• dispose the manuscripts they have reviewed in accordance with the principle of confidentiality after the review process. Reviewers can use the final versions of the manuscripts they have reviewed only after publication.
• review the manuscript objectively and only in terms of its content and ensure that nationality, gender, religious and political beliefs, and economic apprehension do not influence the review.
• review the manuscript in a constructive and kind tone, avoid making personal comments including hostility, slander and insult.
• review the manuscript they have agreed to review on time and in accordance with the ethical rules stated above.

4. Ethical Responsibilities of Publisher

The Board of KADER is conscious of the fact that they must observe the ethical responsibilities below and act accordingly:

• KADER does not charge any article submission from authors.
• Editors are responsible for all the processes that the manuscripts submitted to KADER will go through. Within this framework, ignoring the economic or political interests, the decision-makers are the editors.
• The publisher undertakes to have an independent editorial decision made.
• However, the journal has left the database open on the internet.
• The publisher bears all the responsibility to take the precautions against scientific abuse, fraud and plagiarism.

5. Unethical Behavior

Should you encounter any unethical act or content in KADER apart from the ethical responsibilities listed above, please notify the journal by e-mail at kaderdergi@gmail.com.

FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY REFERENCING STYLE

Kader, uses ISNAD Citiation style 2nd edition. Articles that submitted to our journal should be written in accordance with this style. You can review ISNAD citiation style at http://www.isnadsistemi.org/guide/.

ABBREVIATIONS

abr.	abridged by
b.	born
ca.	about, approximately
cf.	compare
chap. /chaps	chapter/chapters
comp.	compiler/compiled by
d.	died
diss.	dissertation
ed.	edited by/edition/editor
eds.	editors
et al.	and others
fn.	footnote
n.d.	no date
no.	number/issue
n.p.	no place/no publisher
p./pp.	page/pages
par.	paragraph
pt.	part
rev. ed.	revised edition
sec.	section
trans.	translated by
vol.	volume