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İÇİNDEKİLER

EDITOR'S NOTE

Turkish Journal of Middle East Studies presents our new issue in our 11th year. In this issue, we present six English and one Turkish research articles, and three book reviews. This issue includes innovative and analytical studies on different countries of the Middle East. Our first article is "Determinants of Leader Visits: A Review and Future Directions in Scholarship written by Ali Balcı. This study focuses on the existing scholarly literature on leader visits and offers innovative suggestions on developing this emerging field.

The second article of this issue is "Does Leadership Matter? Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and the Change in Iranian Foreign Policy written by Çağla Lüleci Sula. This study analyses the effects of the leadership styles and personality traits of Iran's two presidents, Ahmadinejad and Rouhani, on Iranian foreign policy decisions. The third article, "'Co-Radicalization': A Scientific Lens Proposal to Understand the Social Movements in Turkey by Metin Koca and Ayhan Kaya, examines the concept of co-radicalization in violent and non-violent terms and the potential effects of this term on Turkey and the Middle East.

In the fourth article of this issue, Fadi Zatari and Omar Fili, in their study "One Universal Civilization: Superiority and Eurocentric Conception of the Rest", are criticised for using Western civilisation as a synonym for the concept of contemporary human civilisation, the history of colonialism, portraying Western civilisation as singular and extraordinary and marginalising other civilisations. Our fifth article is "The Sudan's Incorporation into the Capitalist World-Economy through Modern Cultivation and Trade of Cotton" written by Abdullah Muhsin Yıldız. In this article, Yıldız evaluates the process of Sudan's integration into the capitalist world economy, especially in the context of the Gezira Project, which was established with a colonial mentality and based mainly on cotton production.

Our sixth article is titled "Türkiye's and the EU's Coordinated and Divergent Approaches to the 2011 Syrian Crisis" written by Yusuf Avar. In this research, Avar comparatively discusses the approaches of Türkiye and the European Union on the Syrian civil war and international crisis. The last research article of this issue is "The Emergence and Development of the Iranian Women's Movement" written by Rukiye Tınas and Esin Erginbaş Tok. This article investigates the historical emergence of the women's movement in Iran and its development towards a feminist movement. After the historical background, the struggle regarding the role and status of women during the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the leadership of Khomeini was examined by dividing it into four periods.

This issue also includes three book reviews. In the first book review, Ayşe Hazar reviewed the book titled "Challenging the US Hegemony: The Quest for Autonomy

in Turkish Foreign Policy (1964-75)". In the second book review, Ahmet Kayhan Yıldız evaluated the book "Politics of Change in Iran: The Struggle for Reform in the Khatami Era" and in the last book review, Emre Özgür analysed the book "Iraq: Power, Institutions and Identities".

I wish you a pleasant reading.

Associate Professor İ. Aytaç KADIOĞLU

EDİTÖRDEN

Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi olarak 11. yılımızda yeni sayımız ile karşınızdayız. Bu sayımızda altı İngilizce, bir Türkçe araştırma makalesi ve üç kitap kritiği ile sizlerle buluşuyoruz. Bu sayımızda Ortadoğu'nun farklı ülkelerine ilişkin yenilikçi ve analitik çalışmalar yer almaktadır. Birinci makalemiz Ali Balcı tarafından yazılan "Lider Ziyaretlerinin Belirleyicileri: Bir Değerlendirme ve Akademik Çalışmalarda Gelecek Yönler" makalesi. Bu çalışma, mevcut literatürde lider ziyaretlerinin eksik noktalarına odaklanarak bu gelişmekte olan alanın nasıl gelişeceğine ilişkin yenilikçi öneriler sunmaktadır.

Bu sayımızın ikinci makalesi Çağla Lüleci Sula tarafından yazılan "Liderlik Önemli mi? Ahmadinejad, Ruhani ve İran Dış Politikasının Değişimi" makalesidir. Bu çalışmada İran'ın iki cumhurbaşkanı, Ahmadinejad ve Rouhani'nin liderlik tarzları ve kişilik özelliklerinin İran dış politika kararlarına etkilerini analiz edilmektedir. Üçüncü makale olan Metin Koca ve Ayhan Kaya'nın "'Eş-Radikalleşme': Türkiye'deki Toplumsal Hareketleri Anlamak İçin Bilimsel Bir Mercek Önerisi" makalesinde şiddet içeren ve içermeyen terimlerle eş radikalleşme kavramı ve bu terimin Türkiye ve Ortadoğu'ya yönelik potansiyel etkileri incelenmektedir.

Bu sayımızın dördüncü makalesinde Fadi Zatari ve Omar Fili "Tek Medeniyet: Avrupa Merkezli Evrenselcilik ve Geri Kalanın Ötekileştirilmesi" çalışmasında Batı medeniyetinin çağdaş insan uygarlığı kavramıyla eşanlamlı olarak kullanılması, sömürgeciliğin tarihi, Batı medeniyetinin tekil ve olağanüstü olarak gösterilmesi ve diğer medeniyetleri ötekileştirmesi nedenleriyle eleştirilmektedir. Beşinci makalemiz Abdullah Muhsin Yıldız tarafından yazılan "Sudan Pamuğunun Modern Tekniklerle Yetiştirilmesi ve Ticareti Yoluyla Kapitalist Dünya-Ekonomisine Eklemlenmesi". Bu makalede Yıldız, Sudan'ın kapitalist dünya ekonomisine entegre olma sürecini, özellikle kolonyal zihniyetle kurulan ve ağırlıklı olarak pamuk üretimine dayanan Gezira Projesi özelinde değerlendirmektedir.

Altıncı makalemiz "Türkiye ve AB'nin 2011 Suriye Krizine Benzer ve Farklı Yaklaşımları" başlıklı Yusuf Avar tarafından yazılan çalışmadır. Bu araştırmada Avar, Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği'nin Suriye iç savaşına ve uluslararası krizine yaklaşımlarını karşılaştırmalı şekilde tartışmaktadır. Bu sayımızın son araştırma makalesi Rukiye Tınas ve Esin Erginbaş Tok tarafından yazılan "İran Kadın Hareketi'nin Ortaya Çıkışı ve Gelişimi"dir. Bu makale İran'da kadın hareketinin tarihsel düzlemde ortaya çıkışını ve feminist bir harekete doğru gelişimini araştırmaktadır. Tarihsel arka plandan sonra İran İslam Devrimi ve Humeyni liderliğindeki dönemde kadının rolü ve statüsüne ilişkin mücadele dört döneme ayrılarak incelenmiştir.

Bu sayımızda ayrıca üç kitap kritiği yer almaktadır. Birinci kitap incelemesinde Ayşe Hazar "ABD Hegemonyasına Meydan Okuma: Türk Dış Politikasında Otonomi Arayışı (1964-75)" adlı kitabın incelemesini yapmıştır. İkinci kitap incelemesinde Ahmet Kayhan Yıldız "İran'da Değişim Siyaseti: Hatemi Döneminde Reform Mücadelesi" adlı kitabın değerlendirmesini, son kitap kritiğinde ise Emre Özgür "Irak: Güç, Kurumlar ve Kimlikler" kitabının analizini yapmıştır.

Keyifli okumalar dilerim.

Doç. Dr. İ. Aytaç KADIOĞLU

Determinants of Leader Visits: A Review and Future Directions in Scholarship

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Abstract: A recent surge in studies on high-level leader diplomacy has the potential to evolve into a fruitful research field. While the current literature predominantly focuses on the leader visits of two great powers, the U.S. and China, this emerging field requires both broadening and deepening in its scope. We lack data on leader visits from the vast majority of countries, and many existing hypotheses do not adequately explain the determinants in various cases. The more countries that are covered and the more refined our hypotheses become, the more insightful this field will be in understanding interactions among states and international organizations. This article aims to present the current state of the literature on leader visits and suggests potential areas of interest for future research.

Keywords: Leader Visits, High-level Leader Diplomacy, Foreign Policy

Introduction

Since kings, presidents, and prime ministers replaced their envoys in conducting foreign relations by the Second World War, particularly with the advent of jet-engine planes, high-level leader diplomacy has seen an upward trend in frequency. While foreign ministers and diplomats are tasked with conducting foreign relations and possess an information advantage, leaders have increasingly chosen to travel abroad personally. The planning and execution of these trips by leaders and their teams consume considerable time, which can reduce the time available for other crucial matters. Despite its importance as a tool of statecraft and international politics, this practice has largely remained unexamined until recently. Scholars have long emphasized the importance of certain symbolic visits in their accounts of global politics but have generally refrained from collecting data and subjecting those visits to empirical tests. While earlier and modest attempts to collect leader visits on a global scale in the early 1970s disappeared from academic corridors (Brams, 1969; Modelski, 1970; Kegley and Wittkopf, 1976), renewed interest in the late 1980s and the recent renaissance of leader visit studies focused on single case studies, mostly the U.S. and China. Although studies focusing on the impact of leader visits on economic interactions such as trade and foreign investment have widened the scope of leader visit studies beyond China and the U.S. cases, available

assumptions on determinants of leader visits are still based on empirical evidence from these two great powers. Despite being historically overlooked and predominantly centered on China and the U.S., the study of leader visits holds considerable promise for advancing the field of international relations.

Foreign policy orientations of states, as well as shifts in those orientations, are paramount issues in the discipline of international relations. What is the position of a state in shifting global power balance? Is it moving away from its long-established alliance relations? What determines its foreign policy orientation and any subsequent shifts? What benefits arise from specific orientations or changes in these orientations? Do they result in regime survival, increased wealth, or security from rival powers? The most comprehensive data to answer these questions measurably is derived from countries' voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Trade relations also serve as indicators of orientations and shifts therein. Alliances and memberships in various international organizations provide valuable insights into these matters. However, the recent surge in academic investigations regarding high-level leader visits prompts the question: Can we consider high-level diplomatic interactions as another reliable metric to address these questions in a quantifiable way? While descriptive visualizations of such visits for a specific country offer insights into orientations and priorities in foreign relations, a deeper examination of the motivations behind these visits can shed light on why they occur as they do. Additionally, these visits offer valuable insights regarding what do states, or their leaders expect from maintaining their current orientation or shifting it.

This review article calls for further engagement with high-level leader visits and data collection, especially for countries that lack readily available data. The expanding body of literature on high-level leaders' foreign visits indicates a burgeoning area of research. Should the current research trajectory persist, culminating in a comprehensive dataset of global leadership visits, it could establish a novel index for assessing the nuances of inter-state relations. This appeal is not unprecedented but a call to revisit a neglected pursuit of amassing global visit data (Brams, 1969; Kegley and Wittkopf, 1976). While once considered a "nearly impossible" task to measure the outcomes and determinants of such visits (Brams, 1969, p. 266), the contemporary revival in leader visit studies beckons scholars to delve into this data to investigate causes and consequences of those visits. As evidenced by post-2010 scholarship, leader visits provide a potent framework for examining and understanding the forces that shape international relationships. These determinants can be broadly segmented into three categories: structural, domestic, and individual. Structural determinants examine the interplay between the visiting and host nations, while domestic determinants highlight the influence of the internal conditions of states in question. The individual dynamics focus on the motivations and objectives of the leaders embarking on these visits.

Before delving into the determinants of leader visits, this review article first debates the importance of leader visits for empirical studies and then provides a brief history of leader visit studies. After offering a comprehensive overview of potential determinants found in the literature, the review will discuss the benefits of expanding this body of work and will highlight promising areas for future investigations.

Why Leader Visits Are Important?

To measure relations among states, there are some well-established tools in the literature such as alliances, joint IGO membership, trade relations and voting patterns in the UN General Assembly (Maoz et al., 2006; Strüver, 2016). Alliances are long-term political choices, and therefore, the importance states attach to them varies from time to time. A state might lose the initial enthusiasm it had when it first entered a military alliance (Gowa, 1999, p. 70), and at certain periods, the alliance might be overshadowed by other political priorities. Even within the same alliance, a state can experience indirect conflicts with other member states (Krebs, 1999), or face military sanctions from the alliance's leading power (such as the arms embargo imposed by the U.S on Türkiye in the 1970s). Therefore, if we consider alliance relationships as a criterion to measure the priorities in a state's foreign policy, we overlook these temporal changes. More importantly, some countries, such as China, have a very limited number of alliances, which diminishes the utility of an alliance-based measure (Kastner and Saunders, 2012, p. 164). Similarity in UN General Assembly votes is a good criterion to indicate that two countries have a similar political perspective and how this has changed over time (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2017, p. 432). However, this measures the converging or diverging attitudes of the two states towards third-party issues rather than the relations between the two states themselves (Voeten, 2021, pp. 30-31). For instance, if a Middle Eastern country has a similar voting pattern in the UN General Assembly to a Latin American country, it doesn't necessarily mean that the relationship between the two countries is close and intense. It simply indicates that these two countries have similar perspectives on global political events. Trade relations are a significant indicator that provides clues about the intensity (high or low) and type (dependent or balanced) of interaction between two countries. However, they are not a reliable indicator of foreign policy priorities or changes in these priorities. When we measure closeness based on trade relations, we overlook many determinative factors outside of the economy that influence the intensity of the relationship between the two countries.

Data sets of leadership visits have the potential to significantly address the issues and shortcomings of available common measurement criteria (alliances, UN vote similarities, and trade relations). Firstly, unlike relatively stable alliance relations, leadership visits provide a measure sensitive to temporal changes. For instance, in situations such as the relationship between the United States and Israel after 1948,

relations between countries can be so clear that a formal alliance has no value added (Gowa, 1999, p. 70). Leadership visits can potentially capture these nuances that might be missing in alliance data. Secondly, data on leader travels focuses on the direct relationship itself rather than politically similar attitudes. As an illustration, comparing the number of visits between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. with those between Saudi Arabia and Iran offers more insight into the nature of relations than a mere comparison of their respective voting affinities in the UN (Voeten, 2021, pp. 30-31). Thirdly, because leadership visits are a practice that encompasses not just trade priorities but many dynamics such as political, societal, and security preferences, they provide a more comprehensive input regarding bilateral relations. For example, Flores-Macías and Kreps (2013) find that states engaging in substantial trade with China are more inclined to align with China on major foreign policy issues, although the evidence is often mixed (Chen, 2023, p. 160). While some research suggests a causal relationship where intense economic interaction fosters political interest convergence (Richardson and Kegley, 1980; Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013), other studies offer countering perspectives (Wang, Pearson, and Kastner, 2023). Even if we accept the possibility of intertwined relationships between economies and politics, it is not common for security considerations to align with trade interests.

Tracking leader visits offers a time-sensitive, direct, and comprehensive measure of a state's foreign policy orientation and its shifts, for several reasons. Firstly, it is time-sensitive. Leaders plan their travels based on the prevailing conditions at the time the decision is made. While this doesn't necessarily mean that leaders always react to sudden events like crises, they also plan their travels in accordance with more enduring dynamics, such as cultural ties and alliance relations. Consequently, leader visits encapsulate both the immediate and structural dynamics that influence a country's foreign policy orientation. Secondly, it's a direct measure. A leader's time is both finite and invaluable. Given the limited availability of leaders' time and the myriad of issues they must address, they cannot afford to dedicate attention to every matter. They must carefully select which issues warrant their focus, fully aware of the premium placed on their time. Allocating leader's time effectively can spell the difference between strategic success and missed opportunities. When a leader commits time to a foreign visit, it underscores the significance of that visit to the state. Lastly, it is comprehensive. Leader visits are prudently orchestrated weighing potential gains against risks. While leaders anticipate benefits from their foreign travels, these journeys can sometimes adversely affect economic and political relations with third countries (Goldstein 2008, pp. 164-167). Such visits even carry a risk of entrapment, potentially leading to shame and humiliation for the visitors and their country. In addition to these comparative advantages over common measurement tools, leader visits more accurately reveal a state's underlying preferences. Unlike official statements, which are key components of discourse analysis, high-level visits demonstrate the actual

commitments of foreign policy resources, akin to alliances (Kastner and Saunders, 2012, p. 165).

A Short History of Leader Visit Studies

In his pioneering work, which recent scholarship on leader visits has grossly overlooked, George Modelski (1968, pp. 383, 385; Brams, 1969) was the first to investigate "foreign visits and international travel by the world's leading political figures: the heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers." He expressed his data in visit-days, representing the unweighted number of days these political leaders spent outside their own countries. Using this data, he found that the total number of Communist interstate visits remained nearly the same between 1955 and 1965, indicating that Communist leaders were still significantly more likely to visit each other than to visit leaders of other governments in 1965. He also noted that the overall increase in visits outside the system was largely attributable to an increase in the number of states. The 1970s saw a surge of interest in leader visits aimed at delineating subsystems in global politics, such as those in Eastern Europe (Hughes and Volgy, 1970; Hempel, 1973, pp. 376-7) and the Middle East (Thompson, 1970; 1981). Thompson, for instance, closely examined intergovernmental visits to develop an alternative method for determining "the boundaries of the Middle East". He (1981, pp. 219, 231-232) posits that intergovernmental visits serve as a valid and accessible indicator of the relative significance of international relationships. His findings indicate that such visits not only reveal a significant portion of the Middle Eastern political network but also demonstrate that visit patterns are dynamic and subject to change. During that period, another line of research utilized visits between heads-of-state to illustrate the hierarchical structure of international influence (Brams, 1969; Kegley and Wittkopf, 1976). By assuming that a nation has influence over another to the extent that it receives rather than sends visits (Brams, 1969, p. 266), this small group of scholars provided a novel method for measuring states' international influence/status (Brams, 1969) and temporal changes in that influence/status (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1976).

Interest in regional dynamics and status among scholars diminished in the 1980s, shifting the research emphasis to studies that examine the domestic determinants of US presidents' foreign travel. These new studies viewed foreign trips as a means for presidents to bolster their approval ratings. While some research found that presidents could enhance their popularity through foreign visits (MacKuen 1983; Darcy and Richman, 1988), others argued that such trips had little impact on increasing popularity (Brace and Hinckley, 1992, pp. 56-7; Brace and Hinckley, 1992, p. 1993). Erik Goldstein's 1997 paper, "The Politics of State Visits," expanded the range of potential determinants beyond merely enhancing presidential approval. Goldstein (2008) posited that status, recognition, trade, and alliances could all drive leaders' decisions to travel abroad. However, his study didn't spark

an empirical research trend using robust statistical tools to explore the determinants of leader visits. Volker Nitsch's paper, which explored the impact of state visits on foreign trade, marked a significant shift in the study of leader visits. Though Nitsch's 2007 paper focused on the effects of leader visits rather than their causes, it introduced two notable innovations. First, it highlighted the Office of the Historian as a comprehensive data source on the foreign travels of US presidents and foreign ministers. Second, it convincingly demonstrated the value of regression models in studying high-level foreign visits. The 2010s saw an increase in studies focusing on the impact of foreign visits on international trade within the field of economics (e.g., Lin, Yan and Wang, 2017) under an umbrella term "economic diplomacy" (van Bergeijk and Moons, 2018). While Nitsch (2007) finds a positive impact of state visits on trade, he also shows that the impact of visits decays over time and that it may require frequent visits to a country in order to have a measurable impact on trade. Contrasting with Nitsch's findings, Head and Ries (2010) detected no significant effect of state visits on Canada's trade, a conclusion echoed by Moons and van Bergeijk (2017) in their meta-analysis.

Under the discipline of international relations, Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009), and Potter (2013) provided competent analysis of leader visits but the real impetus for wider interest in leader visits came in the first half of the 2010s. In 2012, Kastner and Saunders expanded the scope of leader visit data beyond the U.S. context, examining Chinese leader visits. Four years later, Lebovic and Saunders focused on the U.S. case to investigate the determinants of US leaders' travel destinations. Despite their focus on the frequently-studied cases of the U.S. and China, they marked a turning point in leader visit studies for several reasons. First, they were first studies aiming to explore the determinants of leader visits (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016, p. 108). Although previous studies looked at popularity concerns as the protentional motivation for foreign travels, these two studies not only expanded the determinants of presidential visits beyond electoral considerations but also incorporated non-presidential visits into their analysis. Second, they introduced foreign policy considerations as determinants of leaders' visit preferences. While earlier studies, such as Goldstein (2008), highlighted non-domestic motivations as determinants of foreign visits, these two studies were pioneering in their attempt to statistically investigate the influence of multiple motivations. Third, their research shifted the focus of leader visit studies away from solely domestic politics and political economy, promoting a greater emphasis on IR perspectives in the scholarly investigation of such visits.

Although the U.S. had been the primary focus of the majority of leader visit studies (Wang, and Stone, 2023, p. 201), the rise of China prompted many scholars to investigate the determinants and implications of Chinese leader visits. Earlier studies on the U.S. suffered from the unavailability of ready data; however, since the early 2000s, the Office of the Historian has provided a full record of visits by US

presidents and secretaries of state. This has spurred an increase in academic studies exploring the U.S. case. In contrast, researchers studying the Chinese case have sourced their data from various platforms like official publications and newspaper archives. This has resulted in a plethora of datasets, leading many scholars to forego relying on existing datasets in favor of collecting their own (Wang and Stone, 2023, p. 202). Recent efforts to gather comprehensive data on visits over an extended period (Wang and Stone, 2023; Chen, 2023) have yielded datasets that are ready-to-use for investigating various facets of Chinese foreign relations. Beyond the U.S. and China, datasets and studies on other countries are still in their infancy. McManus (2018) gathered data on leader visits from the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, and France to smaller client states, while Goldsmith et al. (2021) assembled selective leader visit data from the U.S., Russia, the UK, China, Germany, Canada, Brazil, India, and Japan to various countries. Efforts to gather comprehensive data for other nations are emerging but remain sparse. For instance, Mesquita and Chien (2021) compiled data on high-level leader visits from Brazil, South Africa, and Türkiye (Balci and Pulat, 2024), while Lavallée and Lochard (2022) did the same for French high-level visits abroad.

Structural Determinants

Distance, Population and Time

Studies on international trade suggest that distance negatively impacts trade, a factor that remains pertinent despite advances in globalization (Disdier and Head, 2008). Despite the advent of the jet engine, distance might still be a discouraging determinant of leader visits because cost of visiting nearer countries is lower in terms of money and time (Hoshiro, 2020, p. 217). Consequently, many studies have considered simple distance in terms of miles, having a shared land or sea border, and being in the same region or continent as potential determinants of travel preferences. Kastner and Saunders (2012, p. 171) found that, all else being equal, Chinese leaders were more likely to visit neighboring countries that share a land border with China. Extending the concept of neighborhood to include maritime borders, Yan and Zhou (2023, p. 395) found a significant influence of adjacency on the travel patterns of Chinese leaders. Ostrander and Rider (2019, p. 842) observed that US leaders focused their travel on European countries and within North America, highlighting the prominence of North American destinations due to the ease of visiting neighbors, particularly when travel technology was more limited. To account for leaders' flying time, Wang and Stone (2023: 217) controlled for geographical distance and found a significant influence of distance on Chinese leaders' travel preferences. However, Yan and Zhou (2023, p. 399) reported the opposite, finding no influence of geodesic distance. Li (2015: 496; Kastner and Saunders, 2012, p. 170) considered continental proximity by assuming that countries in Asia are closer to China, yet he (Li, 2015, p. 499) concluded that being on the same continent (Asia) was not a significant factor in Chinese travel decisions.

Large countries, in terms of population, are more likely to attract visits from leaders compared to less populated countries. This is not only because these countries offer substantial market opportunities but also because they exert a greater influence on global politics. Wang and Stone (2023, p. 217, 219; Li, 2015, p. 498; Chen, 2023, p. 174) use population as a proxy for market opportunities and find that larger populations are more likely to receive both presidential and premier visits from China. Kastner and Saunders (2012, p. 171) consider population size as one of the measures of power, along with GDP and defense spending. Consequently, they conclude that Chinese leaders are "much more likely to visit large, powerful countries" (Kastner and Saunders, 2012, p. 171). Instead of incorporating population size as a determinant, some studies exclude all countries with populations below 500,000 on the basis that such countries are not significant in international politics, at least for great powers (McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017, p. 716; McManus, 2018, p. 987). It is also observed that leader travels have been generally increasing since the Second World War. This indicates the influence of the passage of time on travel tendencies. Over time, transportation technology has improved, norms of travel have shifted, and international conferences have multiplied (Ostrander and Rider, 2019, p. 843). Compared against the baseline of Eisenhower, Ostrander and Rider (2019, p. 845) find that US presidents since the Reagan administration have been consistently and significantly more likely to spend time abroad.

International Status

The international status of a country determines its likelihood of being visited. It is a relatively old assumption that great powers, countries exercising asymmetrical influence over the other, receive the most visits (Brams, 1968, p. 470). Therefore, it is generally assumed that great powers attract more visits. Lebovic and Saunders (2016, p. 118; Goldsmith and Horiuchi, 2009, p. 871) find that both the President and the Secretary of the U.S. favored major powers (UNSC permanent members, as well as Japan and Germany) during the post-Cold War years. Wang and Stone (2013, p. 219) confirms this finding in the case of Chinese leader visits. Li (2015) offers a nuanced perspective on the influence of great powers on travel destinations. He argues that engagement with a great power can affect travels to third countries (Li, 2015, p. 494). By examining three mechanisms of engagement—the ratio of China's annual trade with the U.S. to China's GDP, the shared membership of China and the U.S. in international governmental organizations (IGOs), and US presidential visits to China—Li finds that Sino-American interactions within IGOs and US presidential visits to China have a significant restraining effect on China's travels to developing countries and fellow autocracies (Li, 2015, p. 498). Unlike the U.S., interactions with other developing states demonstrate no significant influence on China's travel decisions (Li, 2015, pp. 498-9, 501). Cohen (2022) proposes another causal mechanism linking the status of a

great power with the motivations behind state visits. According to him, meetings with the U.S. President are likely to increase the approval ratings of foreign leaders due to the perception that "the U.S. President is the most prestigious and powerful leader in the world" (Cohen, 2022, p. 493). Furthermore, an invitation to the U.S. bestows additional prestige on the visiting leader, given the competitive nature of securing a visit to the U.S. (Cohen, 2022, p. 494).

The dichotomy of great power versus small power is not the sole classification for states within the international system. Some states may occupy an 'excluded' status. Visits to these states are a significant indicator of the visiting country's revisionist intentions (Kastner and Saunders, 2012, p. 166). Using data on travels by top Chinese leaders abroad from 1998 to 2008, Kastner and Saunders (2012, p. 172) found that Jiang and Zhu were not more inclined to visit countries antagonistic to the U.S. In fact, they were somewhat less likely to visit countries that were the target of US sanctions. While this finding aligns with a status quo characterization of China, travel to rogue states was more indicative of China's challenger-type behavior (Kastner and Saunders, 2012, p. 172). Li (2015) uses the visits of Chinese leaders to the developing countries as an indicator of China's competitive status with the U.S. Therefore, he hypothesizes (Li, 2015, p. 492) that "the more powerful China becomes vis-à-vis America, the more likely its leaders will visit the developing world." Abstaining from visits to excluded states and instead engaging with well-regarded states within the dominant system may indicate a visiting state's endorsement of the status quo. Consequently, increasing leader visits to respected members of hegemonic order can signify recognition of visiting country as a fully-fledged member of this order (Goldstein, 2008, p. 170). Similarly, 'rising powers' constitute a separate category that deviates from the static classification of great and small powers. An increased frequency of visits to these rising powers suggests that the visiting nation may harbor underlying dissatisfaction with the dominant powers of the system (Kastner and Saunders, 2012, p. 166).

Additionally, leaders may focus on visiting neighboring countries to enhance their countries' regional influence and to solidify the status of those visited countries as a distinct region (Kegley and Howell, 1975, p. 1010; Thompson, 1981; Zakhirova, 2012; Mesquita and Chien, 2021; Goldstein, 2008, p. 170). Such regional powers can become focal points of attraction, influencing the diplomatic visit patterns of smaller states. Mesquita and Chien (2021, p. 1558) offer mixed evidence for the hypothesis that regional powers predominantly engage with their own regions in diplomatic interactions. For example, while Türkiye's focus on its region appeared to be transient, South Africa demonstrated a more sustained prioritization of its region. While Mesquita and Chien approach the Middle East and North Africa as the regions pertinent to Türkiye, Balcı and Pulat (2024) consider the Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus as Türkiye's regions. This redefinition results in the finding that the probability of a Turkish leader visiting a country

within these regions "is 22.2 percent, compared to 6.9 percent for countries outside of those regions" (Balcı and Pulat, 2024, p. 9). Consequently, they provide evidence that Türkiye is a regional power.

International Conflicts

During international crises, leaders may shift their usual priorities, increasingly relying on their Secretaries of State for direct diplomatic engagement due to presidential travel constraints and the specialized knowledge required (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016, p. 111). On the other hand, the necessity for allied consultations might prompt more frequent presidential trips abroad. For instance, Ostrander and Rider (2019, p. 843) view war as a primary factor necessitating presidential travel. However, they also note that the expectation of increased U.S. presidential travel during wartime is unfounded (Ostrander and Rider, 2019, p. 844). Lebovic and Saunders (2016, p. 119) find no significant impact of crisis-induced shocks on the travel patterns of either the U.S. Secretary of State or the President. Similarly, Cavari and Ables (2019, p. 322) observe that U.S. presidential travel does not significantly change in response to military involvements or opportunities for military action worldwide. In a different context, Li (2015) investigates how China's territorial disputes in a given year affect its leaders' travels, especially to developing nations. He concludes that China's focus on territorial disputes substantially reduces its leaders' likelihood of visiting the developing world or fellow autocracies (Li, 2015, p. 499).

Alliances, Wedge and Realignment

Leaders of countries within the same alliance are expected to visit each other more frequently given that they share similar security concerns. Lebovic and Saunders (2016, p. 118) found that, in the post-Cold War era, US war allies were frequent beneficiaries of Presidential visits but not those by the Secretary of State. However, alliance relations are targets of wedge strategies by rival powers (Crawford, 2021) and require continual investment from the leading state (Izumikawa, 2018). Therefore, high-level visits are typically aimed at either moving the host country away from its existing patron or realigning it with the country of the visiting leader. When a high-level leader travels to a foreign nation, they aim "to exert influence in a manner and to a degree which could not be done otherwise" (Brams, 1969, p. 265). Li (2015, pp. 482, 487), for example, argues that Chinese leaders' state visits "are part and parcel of Beijing's efforts to extend its strategic leeway against Washington". Goldsmith and his colleagues (2021) found that a leader's visit increases public approval of their country in the host state, leading to policy alignment between the two countries. Similarly, Custer et al. (2018, p. 14) argue that Beijing's elite-to-elite diplomacy resonates well in the East Asia and Pacific region, where several government executives view China's embrace of their top-down rule as a preferable alternative to complaints from the West. They (Custer et

al. 2018, p. 50) found that the more official visits there are between an East Asia and Pacific country and China, the more likely they are to vote with China in the UN General Assembly. Wang (2022) looks at the impact of UNSC membership on Chinese leader visits to African countries. He (Wang, 2022, pp. 5-6) finds that the estimated probability of a UNSC member receiving a visit from Chinese leaders stands at 23,0 percent and is over five times higher than visiting an African country that is not on the UNSC, which stands at 4,7 percent. However, this is not the case for the U.S. since there is no significant relation between US visits to Africa and UNSC membership (Wang, 2022, p. 8).

Deterrence

A visit from a great power to a weaker state reduces the likelihood of aggression towards the weaker entity and its leaders. Some research indicates that regional and global adversaries of the visited country temper their hostile intentions, interpreting the visit as a sign of support from a powerful ally (McManus, 2018, p. 986; Wang et al., 2023, p. 134; McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017, p. 706). McManus (2018) demonstrates that visits from great powers—including the US, Russia, China, the UK, and France—significantly reduce the chance that the visited smaller state becomes embroiled in a military dispute. Furthermore, she finds that a visit by a major power leader results in a decrease in the probability of violent militarized interstate disputes that is approximately 3.5 times greater than that caused by alliances. Specifically, in the case of the US, the deterrent effect of visits is enhanced when they are accompanied by supportive statements and alliances (McManus, 2018, p. 991). However, Bader (2015, pp. 23, 27) looks at the impact of Chinese leader visits and find that visits of Chinese leaders have no impact on the likelihood of regime survival for autocratic countries.

Similarly, other studies suggest that domestic opposition within the visited nation often abandons plans for revolutions or coups after visits from great powers (Malis and Smith, 2021). An in-person diplomatic visit acts as a credible and public signal of the leader's strength, potentially deterring opponents from taking actions. This signal is credible because the great power's participation in the visit demonstrates confidence that the leader on the weaker side will remain in office long enough to reap the benefits of the visit (Malis and Smith, 2021, p. 244). This display of confidence from the great power can lead potential opponents to view the incumbent's strength as unchallengeable. Malis and Smith (2021, p. 251) find that a visit (both hosting the U.S. president and traveling to the U.S.) is associated with a 51-70% reduction in the risk of removal from the office. Yet, other research finds no discernible impact of such great power visits on the host leader's popularity (Goldsmith et al., 2021, p. 1353). McManus and Yarhi-Milo (2017, p. 703) offer a more nuanced perspective by considering the effect of regime type. Visits from leaders of a democratic great power might deter external threats, but they could

amplify internal challenges against the regime or leader in the host undemocratic country.

Foreign Public

High-level visits to foreign countries serve as a form of public diplomacy. Leaders utilize these visits as opportunities to engage in public diplomacy, aiming to influence foreign public opinion, including shaping perceptions of the visitor's country and garnering support for its policies (Goldsmith and Horiuchi, 2009, p. 864). This effect might not be direct. Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009) find that leader visits have a conditional effect on foreign public opinion regarding the U.S. A high-level visit boosts positive responses from the foreign public about the U.S., but only when the U.S. and its leaders are viewed as credible actors. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as the U.S. foreign policy faced dwindling international credibility, the effect of its leaders' visits on foreign public opinion similarly decreased (Goldsmith and Horiuchi, 2009, p. 872). Thus, the credibility of US foreign policy acts as a mediator, determining the impact of international visits on foreign public opinion about the U.S. In a subsequent study with Kelly Matush, Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2021; Custer et al. 2018, p. 45) examined multiple nations, including the U.S., Russia, the UK, China, Germany, Canada, Brazil, India, and Japan. They found that visiting leaders could positively sway public approval among foreign citizens. When Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Matush (2021, pp. 1352-1354) investigated three conditional dynamics — power differentials between the visiting and host countries, the popularity of the host leader, and the tenure of the visiting leader — their initial conclusions about the relation between leader visits and foreign public approval remained consistent.

Looking at anti-Chinese protests in East Asian countries, Yang et al. (2023, p. 10) find that anti-China protests have a positive and significant impact on leader visits only in non-democracies. In contrast to the studies by Goldsmith and colleagues, which focus on the outcomes of leader visits, Yang et al. (2023, p. 4) examine anti-China protests as a factor motivating leader visits from China, assuming that Beijing is more attentive to the messages from protests in autocratic states. Leader visits are one of the policy tools employed to bolster positive sentiment towards China in foreign countries. Given that directly conceding to protestors' demands, such as cancelling or suspending Chinese investment projects, entails significant political and economic costs and may signal a Chinese withdrawal from the global competition for influence, Yang et al. (2023, p. 3) posit that China utilizes available policy instruments, such as leader visits and economic aid, to mitigate discontent and garner support from local populations. Leader visits are particularly effective in autocracies because, unlike in democracies where public protests are common, such dissent is risky and infrequent, increasing the importance of signal. Furthermore, autocracies are better positioned to leverage anti-China protests as a

way to demonstrate their political limitations, thus compelling China to invest more heavily in policy tools (Yang et al., 2023, p. 4-5).

Diplomatic Practice

Leaders are tended to travel repeatedly to the same countries independent of strategic and domestic interests. In other words, habits and past practices influence leaders in determining target countries to visit (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016, p. 112; Li, 2015, p. 500). In the U.S. case, Lebovic and Saunders (2016, pp. 120-1; Lebovic, 2018, p. 297) show that while the U.S. Secretary of State tends to visit the same country over successive years, presidential visits appear not to follow their own routine. More importantly Lebovic and Saunders (2016, p. 121) find that the President did not return to countries that he visited in prior four-year period. However, Li (2015, p. 500) introduces a novel 'year' variable, coding the inaugural year of each target country's diplomatic exchanges with China as '1' during the 1990–2012 period, to evaluate the consistency of diplomatic engagement. This methodology uncovers a pattern for China that differs from the expected diplomatic routine, indicating variations in visitation practices. Wang (2022, p. 4) posits that leaders generally do not visit the same country in consecutive years and includes a one-year lag term for leader visits, Visit(t − 1), to control for diplomatic habit/routine. In examining Chinese visits to African countries, he finds a strong and significant negative correlation between visits in consecutive years (Wang, 2022, p. 5). In a broader analysis of global Chinese leader visits, Wang and Stone (2023, p. 214) also determine that the likelihood of receiving a presidential visit, conditional on a visit in the preceding year, is 61% lower than the average probability, and that the likelihood of a premier's visit decreases by 14%.

Although studies focusing on two great powers, China and the U.S., substantiate the norm of not visiting countries visited in previous year, Koliev and Lundgren (2021, p. 4) supports the continuity norm in the case of countries visiting the U.S. In their model, they (Koliev and Lundgren, 2021, p. 4) include Prior Visits as lagged dependent variable and expect to see an independent effect of prior visits, as the U.S. and its counterparts employ visits to maintain diplomatic relationships. They find support for the practice-based explanations, as prior visits have significant and positive influence on current visits.

Domestic Determinants

Regime Type, Ideology and Identity

It is assumed that leaders of democratic regimes often visit countries with democratic rule and good human right records. Since such visits to authoritarian regimes expose the leaders of democratic regimes to charges of hypocrisy, cause public backlash among voters in visiting country, and even undermine the regime stability of visited country, democratic leaders prefer non-visible signal of support

to their autocratic allies (McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017, p. 701). For the same reasons, democratic leaders use diplomatic visit, a frontstage signal, to support their democratic clients. Some earlier studies find that US leaders tend to visit "developed European democracies" (Goldsmith and Horiuchi, 2009, p. 870). While McManus and Yarhi-Milo (2017, p. 720) find positive and significant effect of regime type, Lebovic and Saunders (2016, p. 116) find no discernible positive effect of level of democracy, and human rights observance, on the probability of US visits. In the case of Chinese visits, Wang and Stone (2013, pp. 219, 222) find no significant relation with regime type of the target countries. Similarly, Balcı and Pulat (2024, p. 8) also conclude that the regime type does not significantly influence Türkiye's choice of countries to visit.

Leaders are more likely to visit states with similar ethnic, religious and cultural identity and sharing similar ideology (Yan and Zhou, 2023). Yan and Zhou (2023, pp. 396-397) found that genetic distance between China and other countries negatively impacts the frequency of Chinese official visits. In other words, Chinese leaders visit countries with greater genetic distance less frequently. However, Yan and Zhou (2023, p. 399) found no significant impact of linguistic or religious distance on the frequency of these visits. Examining the effect of state identity on visit preferences, Balcı and Pulat (2024, pp. 8-9) identify positive and significant correlations between the visits of Turkish leaders and states with Turkic, European, or Muslim identities. In addition to those ancestral and ideational dynamics, similar standing in global politics can result in political alignment. Wang and Stone (2013, p. 222) find that the probability of Chinese president visiting countries with higher voting similarity is more likely than the probability of Chinese president visiting countries with lesser voting similarity. McManus and Yarhi-milo, (2017, p. 721; Malis and Smith, 2021, p. 250) find the similar result for the U.S. visits.

Trade Needs

One primary incentive for national leaders to engage in foreign travels is to explore new markets for domestic products. Lebovic and Saunders (2016, p. 116) find that US trade dependence most strongly affect the probability of a country visit by the President or Secretary of State. Related to this, it is also anticipated that there would be an increase in high-level foreign travels when there's a change in the balance of exports and imports (Cavari and Ables, 2019, p. 311). Although the effect is not very large, Cavari and Ables (2019, p. 322) find that the U.S. presidents travel abroad more when there is a decrease in exports versus imports. Malis and Smith (2021, p. 251) compare the influence of imports from the U.S. and exports to the U.S. on presidential visits abroad. They (Malis and Smith, 2021, p. 251) find that such visits are perceived as valuable offerings by the president in exchange for market access. Given that a visit by the U.S. president holds value for the host country, US presidents often seek greater market access in return. Although some studies use leader visits as an independent variable to measure the determinants

of a trade boost, they indirectly confirm the assumption that leaders arrange their visits to enhance the trade capacity of their countries. Estimating export flows from France, Germany and the United States for the 1948–2003 period, Nitsch (2007) finds that one additional visit is associated with an increase in exports of between eight and ten percent. Although some studies find no significant effect (Head and Ries, 2010; Moons and van Bergeijk, 2017), Beaulieu et al. (2020) determine that this effect is conditional. Beaulieu et al. (2020) suggest that countries under significant control of the Chinese government experience an increase in bilateral trade with China following state visits by Chinese leaders.

Resource Dependency

Leaders of resource-dependent countries are likely to visit resource-rich nations. Kastner and Saunders (2012, p. 170) examined the visits of Chinese leaders to countries abundant in oil and six key metals (bauxite, copper, iron, manganese, uranium, and nickel) to assess the influence of resource needs. Although they hypothesized that "rapid economic growth has made China's economy increasingly dependent on imported resources, particularly oil", they "surprisingly" found no correlation between the foreign visits of China's top leaders and nations with substantial oil reserves or those rich in strategic metals (Kastner and Saunders, 2012, pp. 168, 174; Li, 2015, p. 498). A subsequent study by Wang and Stone (2013, p. 219) also found no significant relationship between the resources of target countries and visits by Chinese leaders. However, Custer et al. (2018, p. 41) discovered that "Chinese leaders are more inclined to grant official visits to resource-rich countries where they presumably can persuade government officials (as the gatekeepers) to grant them access to resource rents". Specifically focusing on China's oil needs, Lee (2019, p. 583) also determined that Chinese presidents and premiers are more likely to travel to countries with higher levels of oil. These varied results might stem from different research designs. For instance, Kastner and Saunders (2012, pp. 174-5; Lee, 2019, p. 577) acknowledged that "some of China's efforts to secure resources might be reflected by other variables, such as the Africa regional variable, which consistently predicts travel by Chinese leaders." Similarly, Yang et al. (2023, p 11) found no significant relationship between visits by Chinese leaders and the natural resources of the target countries, possibly because their study focused on the East Asia region, which includes Central Asia but excludes the Middle East.

Economic Crisis and Parliament's Makeup

Economic crises and the strength of the opposition are two significant state-level structures that influence leaders' preferences regarding destinations for official visits. Primarily, the economic health of a nation is of utmost concern for ruling leaders. Scholars suggest that a faltering economy compels leaders to focus on domestic issues and reduce foreign engagements (Cavari and Ables, 2019, p. 312).

Unemployment serves as a key indicator of economic distress. While Brace and Hinckley (1993, p. 389) identify a positive correlation between foreign travel and high inflation rates, Cavari and Ables (2019, p. 322) observe that economic crises are inversely related to presidential travel abroad in the U.S. context. Ostrander and Rider (2019, pp. 844-5) find no evidence supporting that presidential travel abroad is related to unemployment. Nevertheless, this pattern might not hold for dependent and less-developed nations, which often seek international support to mitigate their economic problems. The strength of a government also affects travel preferences. Presidents encounter difficulties in advancing their domestic agendas when faced with a divided parliament. Consequently, leaders may turn their attention to foreign relations, where they encounter fewer obstacles (Cavari and Ables, 2019, p. 314; Ostrander and Rider, 2019, p. 843). Furthermore, leaders might leverage international issues to forge consensus within parliament (Cavari and Ables, 2019, p. 314; Smith, 1997, p. 222). Cavari and Ables (2019, p. 323; Ostrander and Rider, 2019, p. 844) report that US presidents tend to travel more when contending with a divided government and a polarized Congress. Ostrander and Rider (2019, p. 844) also find that as majority size increases in Congress, US presidents are predicted to spend more days abroad. This is the case because presidents may be less likely to lobby with Congress members when legislative majorities in Congress are large, lowering the cost of foreign travel (Ostrander and Rider, 2019, p. 843).

Leaders can strategically divert public's attention to foreign issue to escape from pressures stemming from domestic problems. Troop deployment and war literature show that presidents can declare war or send troops to foreign lands when they face insurmountable domestic problems (Tir and Jasinski, 2008). Since such endeavors are extremely costly, leaders can prefer less costly tools to divert the attention of the public away from domestic crisis. Moreover, leaders are "relatively unconstrained" in organizing their foreign trips (Potter, 2013, p. 506). Unlike war declaration and troop deployments in foreign lands, leaders do not require parliamentary approval for their travel plans. Bringing foreign policy issues on the agenda of the country is less costly and less constrained way to escape from domestic pressures (Andreada and Young, 1996). Therefore, some scholars suggest that presidents can divert the attention of the public by traveling abroad (Cavari and Ables, 2019, p. 312). Cavari and Ables (2019, p. 322) find that the U.S. presidents travel abroad more when public is concerned about the economy. Therefore, economic crisis not only motivates leaders to boost trade and investment, but it also forces leaders to escape from the public criticism. Especially when the opposition is strong, leaders are highly expected to divert the public attention through foreign travels.

Elections

During election years, leaders concentrate on campaign events and engage with their domestic rivals, often resulting in reduced attention to foreign affairs (Cavari and Ables, 2019, p. 315). This can be attributed to the fact that foreign travel consumes time that could be dedicated to campaigning. Doherty (2009, p. 326), as well as Cavari and Ables (2019, p. 323), have found that US presidents tend to visit fewer countries and travel abroad less frequently during election years. However, Doherty (2009, p. 326) recommends a more nuanced view. He notes that the three US presidents who traveled the least internationally during their reelection years—Jimmy Carter, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush—faced particularly challenging reelection campaigns. Conversely, both Reagan and Clinton's second-highest totals of international travel days during their first terms occurred in their reelection years. This nuanced view suggests that challenging reelection bids, rather than elections per se, influence the decision to travel abroad or not. This perspective might explain why Brace and Hinckley (1993, p. 389) observed the contrary, positing that foreign travel is significantly more likely to take place during presidential election years. Malis and Smith (2021, p. 251) examine the impact of elections in host countries, rather than in the countries of the visiting leader. They discover that elections in host countries reduce the likelihood of a visit from the U.S. president, as the incumbent's prospects of staying in power diminish.

Need for Aid and Foreign Investment

Political leaders of recipient countries undertake diplomatic visits to influence donors' decisions regarding bilateral and multilateral aid. A key motivation for leaders of smaller states visiting the U.S. may include seeking aid from both the U.S. and international institutions where the U.S. plays a significant role, such as the IMF and World Bank. Hoshiro (2020, p. 207) identifies three underlying mechanisms linking leader visits to aid allocation: diplomatic visits serve as a costly signal of the visitor's need for aid, direct aid requests create domestic political pressure in donor countries, and face-to-face interactions offer a clearer understanding of the recipient's needs. Malis and Smith (2021, p. 253) find that when leaders pay a visit to the U.S., material benefits the U.S. offer to the country of this leader increases. Similarly, Hoshiro (2020, p. 219) observes analogous outcomes with visits to Japan, providing more nuanced explanations. Although diplomatic visits to Japan correlate with an increase in aid from Japan, they do not play a role in initiating new aid agreements for countries that have not previously received aid from Japan. Leaders also travel abroad to seek foreign direct investment (FDI) for their countries, similar to their efforts in obtaining foreign aid. Adam and Tsarsitalidou (2023) report that a visit to the U.S. can increase a country's total FDI inflows by up to one percentage point annually, with the cumulative effect reaching 2.5 percentage points within six years after visit. However, this impact is short-term and fades in subsequent years. From another angle, Stone at al. (2022, p. 239)

observe that Chinese investments are more likely to occur—0.10 percent of firm-country-years following top Chinese leaders' visits, compared to 0.03 percent without such preceding visits.

Arms Trade

Smaller states require foreign arms and alliances to ensure their survival. While the literature predominantly examines the motivations of great powers, there are studies that also explore the arms needs of smaller states as a motivator for diplomatic travel. Koliev and Lundgren (2021, p. 4) examine the impact of US military aid on other countries' preferences for diplomatic visits to Washington. They find that a one-unit increase in US military aid is associated with an 18-percentage point increase in the likelihood of such visits. Lebovic (2018, p. 308) takes military sales as the proxy of a country's strategic importance to the US and finds a concentration of secretarial visits in countries of security value to the United States in the second terms of the Nixon–Ford, G. W. Bush, and Obama administrations.

Individual Determinants

Leader's Ideology and Preferences

While there is no systematic study specifically investigating the impact of leaders' personal ideologies on their visit preferences, with Modelski's 1968 work being a notable precursor, many studies use political parties as proxies for leader ideology. Consequently, it is posited that different parties in government can influence the choice of destinations for foreign travel. Lebovic and Saunders (2016, p. 118) find no significant differences in the travel destinations of U.S. leaders when comparing Republican and Democratic administrations. Conversely, Potter (2013, p. 512) provides some evidence suggesting that Democratic presidents may be less active in foreign policy. In examining the effect of party differences on hosting foreign leaders in the U.S., Koliev and Lundgren (2021, p. 4) find no systematic differences between Republican and Democratic administrations. Regardless of their ideological leanings, some leaders may possess a pronounced interest in foreign relations. Ostrander and Rider (2019, p. 843) propose using the proportion of a president's State of the Union Address dedicated to foreign policy as a proxy to measure their interest in international affairs. However, they find only weak support for the hypothesis that presidents who discuss foreign policy more in their speeches are more likely to travel abroad to advance their agendas (Ostrander and Rider, 2019, p. 845).

Leader's Legitimacy

MacKuen (1983, p. 188; Lee, 1977a), in his seminal study, posits that "presidents can improve their standing by wrapping themselves in the flag". He asserts that

"arranging an overseas tour or a summit meeting can be expected to yield an immediate rise" in presidential approval (MacKuen, 1983, p. 188). Subsequent studies also indicate that a president's involvement in foreign affairs might "enhance the public standing of the president" (Marra, Ostrom, and Simon, 1990; Potter, 2013; Matush, 2023). As a result, leaders are often inclined to travel internationally when their domestic legitimacy diminishes (Cavari and Ables, 2019, p. 313; Brace and Hinckley, 1993). From a different perspective, Potter (2013) reaches to the same conclusion. He (Potter, 2013, p. 508) suggests that smaller margin in electoral victory signals a decrease in political power of leaders. Therefore, an increase in political power leads to a decline in a less constrained policy, diplomacy. When leaders win the elections with a high margin, they are likely to engage with more constrained policies like war. Potter (2013, p. 513) finds that there is a strong, statistically significant negative relationship between the margin of electoral victory and the U.S. presidents' foreign travels. Contrary to domestic travels, which often convey a partisan image, foreign trips can portray presidents as symbolic representatives of the entire nation (Brace and Hinckley, 1993, p. 384). Furthermore, foreign visits tend to garner more media attention and present the president as a hardworking actor (Simon and Ostrom, 1989, p. 61; Cohen, 2008, pp. 81, 83). Brace and Hinckley (1993, p. 390) observe that foreign trips are "timed closely with conditions affecting a president's support at home" during their first term. However, Cavari and Ables (2019, p. 323; Potter, 2013, p. 514) found no correlation between presidential approval and foreign travels.

Leader's Age and Time in Office

Malis and Smith (2021, p. 251) find that US presidents are hesitant to visit incumbents whose tenure in office appears uncertain, as reflected by the incumbent's age. Older leaders tend to receive fewer visits from the U.S., as their age diminishes the likelihood of their continued hold on power. Focusing on visit preferences, Lebovic (2018, p. 299) suggests that learning, experience and adaptation lead the US leaders to focus on strategic interests in the second presidential term. Similarly, Lebovic and Saunders (2016, p. 118) note that US presidents increasingly engage in foreign policy during their second term. They also find a similar trend for secretarial visits, suggesting that visits in the final year are focused more on achieving foreign policy objectives than on public photo opportunities. Examining incoming visits to the U.S., Koliev and Lundgren (2021, p. 4) observe that US presidents are less likely to host foreign visitors during their second term. This pattern implies that US presidents tend to invite more foreign visitors at the beginning of their tenure, whereas they favor outgoing visits in the latter part of their presidency. Compared to a second term, a leader's final year in office may uniquely influence travel preferences, as leaders often possess increased freedom in arranging their foreign visits. The relative autonomy of presidents in foreign policy allows lame-duck incumbents to circumvent the impending loss of

power, pursue ambitious goals, and secure a legacy that transcends domestic political constraints (Brace and Hinckley, 1993, p. 394; Cavari and Ables, 2019, p. 315). Cavari and Ables (2019, p. 323) observe that US presidents undertake 50% more trips to 54% more countries and spend 50% more time traveling during their final lame-duck year.

Where to Head?

Despite its promising value for international relations literature, it is only recently that the focus on leader visits has garnered significant popularity. A bunch of studies take leader visits as a dependent variable to explain the determinants of leaders' preferences for travel destinations (Brace and Hinckley, 1993; Kastner and Saunders, 2012; Potter, 2013; Li, 2015; Lebovic and Saunders, 2016; McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017; Lebovic, 2018; Ostrander and Rider, 2019; Cavari and Ables, 2019; Lee, 2019; Koliev and Lundgren, 2021; Wang, 2022; Wang and Stone, 2023; Yan and Zhou, 2023; Yang et al., 2023). The vast majority of those studies focus on the U.S. and Chinese cases. Of those studies, only Koliev and Lundgren's study investigates the motivations of other countries in visiting the U.S. Studies approaching leader visits as an independent variable are much more diverse. Despite the dominance of the U.S. (Simon and Ostrom, 1989; Brace and Hinckley, 1993; Smith, 1997; Nitsch, 2007; Goldsmith and Horiuchi, 2009; Malis and Smith, 2021; Goldsmith et al., 2021; Eichenauer et al., 2021; Cohen, 2022) and China cases (Fuchs and Klann, 2013; Lin, Yan, and Wang, 2017; Hoshiro, 2020; Chen, 2023; Stone et al., 2022), other countries such as Türkiye (Kuşku-Sönmez, 2019; Tepeciklioğlu, Tepeciklioğlu, and Karabıyık, 2023), Brazil, South Africa (Mesquita and Chien, 2021), Slovakia (Šandor, Gurňák, and Bilka, 2023), Croatia (Peternel, and Grešš, 2021), Russia (Papageorgiou and Vieira, 2023) and Iran (Bazoobandi, Heibach, and Richter, 2023) have been investigated to understand the influence of foreign visits on trade, foreign investment, and legitimacy. Although studies taking leader visits as an independent variable do not provide global visit data of countries in question, they clearly prove the possibility of collecting data for smaller countries. Since leader visits are high-profile events, they are easy to track down (Wang, 2022, p. 3). Therefore, the primary task waiting for future scholars is to broaden leader visit studies by collecting data on smaller states and underexamined great powers such as Germany and Russia.

Leader visits serve as significant signals of diplomatic favor and political compliance. While major powers strategically deploy their preferences for state visits as a form of favor, or conversely, withhold them as a means of sanction, smaller states demonstrate their allegiance or express dissatisfaction with their patron states through their own travel itineraries. Current scholarship proficiently elucidates the manner in which major powers utilize visit preferences to convey favor (Yang et al., 2023), yet the implications of the absence of such visits as a punitive measure remain insufficiently examined. Drawing parallels with the

foreign aid literature, which illustrates how major powers curtail aid to penalize non-compliant behaviors in smaller states (Dreher et al., 2018), it is plausible to surmise that the absence of visits from major powers carries significant security, economic, and legitimacy costs for minor states. Consequently, it merits scholarly attention to explore how major powers may leverage the prospect of future visits as an instrument to coerce minor states into adopting preferred policy trajectories. Although the instrumentalization of foreign visits by great powers has drawn some interest from scholars, the strategic calculus of minor states in utilizing their own official visits as communicative tools to articulate their positions, express their demands, and demonstrate discontent remains an aspect that has not been thoroughly investigated. This line of inquiry is significant, given that smaller states possess limited means to signal favor or express displeasure. While great powers can employ a variety of proxies, such as foreign aid and troop deployments, smaller states primarily rely on their voting patterns in international organizations. Data on leader visits could serve as a vital proxy for evaluating the sentiments of smaller states within the realm of international politics.

Numerous studies have assessed leader visits at face value, neglecting a thorough analysis of the visits' quality and substantive content (Kastner and Saunders, 2012: 167; Thompson, 1981, p. 220). To address this gap, some researchers have refined their methodological approach by categorizing visits based on their primary focus, achieved by omitting multilateral visits and considering only bilateral official visits, under the assumption that such visits more accurately reflect the true nature of bilateral relations (Stone et al., 2022, p. 204; Brams, 1969, p. 268). However, leaders' goodwill visits—for instance, to coronations, funerals, and weddings—also signify the importance they place on the relationship with the host country. The rationale for leaders attending the funerals of their counterparts in nations where they have limited engagement with succeeding leadership may be questioned. Additionally, leaders often attend significant events such as ruling party congresses, coronations, and inaugural ceremonies in the host nation, even without scheduled meetings with incumbent leaders. Visiting leaders' willingness to dedicate substantial time to goodwill visits, despite their tight schedules, suggests they view such engagements as highly beneficial (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, Matush, 2021, p. 1344). Therefore, an exclusive focus on official visits can be misleading, and scholars may need to develop more nuanced categories with additional justifications (Lee, 1977b). Another point of contention among scholars is the method of distinguishing the significance of leaders' visits. While some studies focus solely on heads of state—arguing that their visits more accurately represent the interests of the state—others employ a weighted scale to differentiate among leaders' visits. Thompson (1981, p. 220), for instance, proposes a system of three visit points to gauge the importance of visiting leaders: three points for a head of state or government, two points for a foreign minister, and one point for any other cabinet-level minister.

In addition to collecting data on smaller powers and defining visits in more refined ways, another important area calling for further investigation is the individual dynamics influencing visit preferences. Compared to structural and domestic determinants, leader-based determinants for foreign visits have not been extensively investigated. Given the rising popularity of psychological studies within the IR discipline (Kertzer and Tingley, 2018), individual determinants hold considerable potential for further research. Ambitious leaders might follow a revisionist pattern in arranging their visits, while traumatic events may shift visiting patterns. For instance, Li (2015, pp. 490-491; Lebovic, 2018, p. 293) demonstrated that the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 significantly altered the pattern of Chinese leadership visits, with a pronounced pivot towards the developing world. Prior to the crisis, 58.8% of trips were to developing nations; however, from 1989–2012, this figure increased to 69.5%, corresponding with Beijing's post-Tiananmen foreign policy aimed at fostering solidarity against US hegemony. Although the Tiananmen crisis is not analyzed as a psychological trauma for a leader in Li's study, the presentation of the case could inspire research into how leaders' traumatic experiences influence their travel preferences. For instance, a leader who has experienced a military coup might be motivated to alter their country's foreign policy orientation through strategic visit planning. Studies that focus on the influence of ideology on official visits primarily examine democratic regimes. However, personal beliefs of leaders rather than party ideology may more accurately reflect the ideological determinants of visit preferences. Broadening the scope of research on leader visits to include non-democratic cases could enrich these studies.

Leader visits are complex interactions that extend beyond mere dyadic relations; their determinants and implications can be influenced by third parties (Singer, 1963, p. 421-422). For instance, the engagement of a rising state in a region may attract the attention of an incumbent great power, resulting in an uptick in state visits. Therefore, the nature of a region—as an arena of power struggle among great powers—can affect the frequency of leader visits. Related to this, various studies have evaluated the effects of the post-Cold War era on the diplomatic endeavors of US leaders, positing that freedom from superpower rivalry has given rise to novel diplomatic initiatives and priorities (Lebovic, 2018, p. 296; Lebovic and Saunders, 2016; Cavari and Ables, 2019). However, it may now be pertinent to evaluate the influence of the emerging multipolarity on leaders' visits since 2010. Additionally, leaders may orchestrate visits to send strategic messages to neighboring countries, using symbolic visits to a specific country for this purpose. This implies that while the primary motivation of a leader's visit is to strengthen bilateral relations with the host nation, the intended audience may include neighboring states, aiming to produce a demonstrative effect on the host country's neighbors (Chen, 2023, p. 165). While the research design for such complex studies might be more

challenging than that for dyadic relations, these studies undeniably offer a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics behind leader visits.

In closing, the imperative to broaden and deepen the literature on leader visits is evident. By extending our investigative scope to include smaller states, ministerial-level visits, and even travels of non-state actors (e.g., Choi et al., 2023) and refining our methodological tools, we can decipher the intricate web of inter-state relations and the multifaceted strategies and symbolism inherent in these prominent events. Ministerial-level visits, for instance, may often be driven by objectives such as negotiations and mediation in third countries, demanding more intricate research designs (Brams, 1969: 268; Kegley and Wittkopf, 1976, pp. 268-9). Since data on leader visits tends to be biased towards cooperative rather than conflictual relations—because visits are more likely to occur between friendly dyads than hostile ones (Thompson, 1981, p. 218)—research designs that are carefully crafted to account for the absence of visits (Lebovic, 2018, p. 294) are crucial for robust analysis. These more refined endeavors will not only deepen our understanding of international politics but will also illuminate the intricate ways in which leaders maneuver on the global stage—navigating between their personal ideologies and the strategic imperatives of their nations. Importantly, should this interest coalesce into a collective academic endeavor, we are stand to gain a valuable metric for analyzing relations among states.

Notes

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Does Leadership Matter? Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and the Change in Iranian Foreign Policy

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Abstract: Following Rouhani's victory in the 2013 presidential elections, Iran's foreign policy (IFP) underwent significant changes after more than a decade under Ahmadinejad. To date, only a few academic studies have attempted to incorporate a specific individual-level theory into their respective analyses, even though a large body of literature contends that leadership change is the decisive factor regarding the differences in Iran's policy toward the US and the EU. This study analyzes the leadership styles of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani to reveal the possible impact of decision-maker personalities on foreign policy, and to develop an account on the moderation in IFP. Accordingly, it asks, "How does leadership style influence IFP toward the 'Western world'?" Theoretically, the study benefits from Hermann's 'Leadership Trait Analysis' to investigate the impact of leaders' personalities on the foreign policy behavior of states. Empirically, it analyzes both presidents' spontaneously given responses to interviews and in press conferences, which were randomly selected. Methodologically, the study utilizes the Profiler Plus software to assess individual traits of leaders. Interpreting leadership trait scores of two presidents, the study concludes that certain leadership features allow the construction of foreign policies that are more moderate.

Keywords: Hassan Rouhani, Iranian Foreign Policy, Leadership, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Middle East.

Introduction

When the then-major of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, unexpectedly won the elections in 2005, many people wondered who he actually was. Even the then-supreme leader Khamenei allegedly supported him only after he passed the second round (Kozhanov, 2018). The Ahmadinejad period witnessed increased confrontation with the US and 'the Western world'[1] in general, mainly due to the president's bid to create a more independent Iran, securing the country's right to possess nuclear energy, and develop closer relations with the non-Western and non-European world. He also constructed his foreign policy discourse around the concept of justice, which he frequently referred to in Iran's relations with the US and Europe, accusing them of treating Iran and 'the non-Western world' in general unjustly. He had a nationalistic mindset that also wanted Iran to be the most influential regional power in the Middle East and wider Asia. He positioned himself as a member of the traditionalist camp in Iran (the so-called Imam Khomeini's line)

and was ready for struggle and confrontation inside and outside for his worldview, political agenda, and principles.

Following eight years with Ahmadinejad marked by tension including sanctions by the US and the EU, the 2013 presidential elections resulted in Hassan Rouhani's success, which significantly depended on positive outcomes in Iran-US relations. Enhanced relations with the Western world would allow the recovery of not only the country's image and position in world politics but also its economic situation at the time. Overall, Rouhani promised to put an end to Iran's regional and international isolation. His collegial and worldly approach to foreign policy and his moderate personality that is more open to information from other power centers and bodies in the country were sources of hope for the public. Obama's presidency in the first two years of Rouhani's term further helped the two states to develop more positive relations, at least compared to his predecessor, Ahmadinejad's period.

Built on this background, this study aims to investigate the possible impact of leadership traits and personalities on the change in Iranian foreign policy (IFP) after the 2013 presidential elections. Accordingly, it asks, "How did leadership style influence IFP toward the 'the Western world' in the immediate aftermath of the 2013 elections?" The study adopts the Leadership Trait Analysis model in foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature. To reveal their leadership traits, the study analyzes spontaneously delivered public speeches of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani, which have been selected randomly. This analysis then helps understand the shift in IFP following the leader change. The study argues that leadership matters even in political contexts in which foreign policy decisions are heavily circumscribed by higher authorities and power circles such as the Supreme Leader and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The study first presents a short overview of the foreign policy analysis literature. Second, it examines the leadership traits of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani to identify what type of leaders they are according to LTA. Third, the study utilizes two leaders' LTA scores to assess the impact of leaders on Iran's foreign policy toward the Western world. Finally, it concludes by presenting the findings on how the change in leadership in Iran in 2013 triggered a shift in the country's foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Analysis Literature

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) has multifactorial, multilevel, and multi/-interdisciplinary characteristics (Hudson 2007, p. 6; Hermann 1995, p. 251). However, what makes FPA more distinctive is its agent-oriented and actor-specific approach. Thus, what FPA aims to do, which is to analyze the impact of agents, is an even harder task than measuring various elements' impact on the foreign policy of states (See, Hudson 2007; Rosati 1995, among others). Analyzing the impact of

individual leaders in foreign policy-making processes seems to be a great deal due to various reasons. First, researchers generally do not have direct contact with the decision-maker. Second, decision-making is perceived to be a secret process, which only reveals outcomes rather than giving insights about how the decisions are taken. Third, even if a researcher can access direct channels, no leader is likely to reveal that for instance s/he is intolerant, closed to any external information, or s/he is very aggressive and taking decisions purely sensuously, and not rationally (Hudson 2007, pp. 53-54).

There are both rational and cognitive approaches to analyzing the role of individual agents in FPA literature. Rational theories (Graham, 1969; Hermann & Hermann, 1989; Stein & Welch, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita, 2010; Walker et al., 2011; Quackenbush, 2004; Fuhrmann & Early, 2008) as well as role theory (Holsti, 1970; Rosenau, 1987), poliheuristic theory (Mintz, 2003), prospect theory (Levy, 1992; 1997), operational code analysis (See Walker, 1983; Walker et al., 2011, pp. 153-204; Walker et al., 1998), and leadership trait analysis have taken important steps to decode the influence of individuals in decision-making process. LTA allows the researcher to apply quantitative methods, which are discussed to bring an objective look to research. Moreover, in the analysis of trait results of leaders, one may easily benefit from interpretation for a deeper understanding. By applying LTA, Dyson (2006) analyzes Blair's Iraq War decision with a focus on the importance of the individual level factors; Post and his colleagues (2005) decode Saddam and Clinton's leadership traits; Renfro compares father Bush and son Bush's traits to answer the question whether "human beings can be true agents of states" (2008). Kesgin reviews Türkiye PM Çiller's LTA and compares her results with the other post-Cold War leaders, concluding that Çiller's "high results in in-group bias and distrust mark her leadership and foreign policy behavior" (2012, p. 29). Görener and Ucal analyze Türkiye President Erdoğan's leadership traits, defining him as "the most controversial figure in recent Türkiye political history" (2011, p. 357). Yang (2010) compares Bill Clinton and George W. Bush looking at their scores in conceptual complexity to analyze their governments' changing attitudes toward China.

The case of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani's presidency in Iran is quite suitable for the analysis of leadership's effect on foreign policy decision-making. These leaders have significantly different perspectives about Iran's foreign policy, which can be understood by looking at their changing attitudes toward the US and nuclear energy negotiations. Both leaders have similarities in terms of their early life and were born into religious families. Besides, both hold a doctoral degree. Ahmadinejad earned his PhD degree in 1997 in transportation engineering and planning from the Iran University of Science and Technology, located in Tehran, when he was the mayor of Ardabil Province, located in the northwest of the country. Rouhani continued his studies at Glasgow Caledonian University in

Scotland, graduating in 1995 with an M.Phil. degree in law with his thesis titled "The Islamic legislative power with reference to the Iranian experience" and a Ph.D. degree in constitutional law in 1999 with the thesis titled "The Flexibility of Shariah with reference to the Iranian experience" (GCU University, 2013). Although both have similarities in terms of being well-educated and growing up in religious families, they have different perspectives regarding Iran's foreign relations with Western states, especially the US.

Utilizing Trait Analysis to Analyze Leadership Style

As widely discussed in the literature, it is not an easy task to measure an individual touch in the policy-making process. Analyzing the speeches of leaders is a frequently used method to understand how leaders attach meaning to the world they operate in. LTA is an individual-level approach to foreign policy analysis, which is introduced by Margaret G. Hermann (1999) aiming to analyze the impact of personalities of leaders in foreign policy-making. Admitting that it is an uphill task to develop a full understanding of the personality and perceptions of a leader, Hermann (2002, p. 1) argues that we can learn something about the images the leaders display in public by analyzing the content of what they say.

Theory, method, and data

LTA benefits from an at-a-distance method. Such a method claims that the public verbal output of a leader can provide information about their understanding of the world as well as their decision-making style, "when processed by content analysis schemes linked to psychological concepts" (Dyson 2006, p. 290). As Winter et al. state, the at-a-distance method utilizes the words of individuals as data for the aim of measuring their personality traits (1977).

LTA develops seven schemes - *belief in the ability to control events (BACE), need for power (PWR), conceptual complexity (CC), self-confidence (SC), task orientation (TASK), distrust of others (DIS), in-group bias (IGB)*- to assess the traits of leaders by analyzing their own words. LTA calculates a score between 0 and 1 based on the frequency of particular terms in a given text and how frequently they are present or absent. Words like "me, mine, I" for example, are frequently used, which indicates that the researcher who named the leader has a high level of self-confidence. The software Profiler Plus (PP), created by Dr. Michael D. Young to decode the utterances of leaders and quantify certain aspects of their personalities, is used in numerous research on LTA, including this one. Conceptual complexity and task focus variables are calculated by a simple frequency content analysis, while the others require the software to take into account the "types, positioning and relationships of words" (Görener et al., 2011, p. 363).

I gathered scripts (published in English) of spontaneously made speeches of both leaders and analyzed them to identify Ahmadinejad and Rouhani's personality

traits. The material consists of their answers in interviews and press conferences. In line with Hermann's recommendation, I avoided pre-prepared speeches such as election campaigns and annual addresses, because these materials are generally written not by the leader but for the leader by staff members or speech writers (Hermann, 2002, p. 2). Thus, random speeches between the years 2003 and 2014, consisting of 25.842 words in total, have been analyzed. It is important to note that I did not make any translations of speeches in Persian; instead, I collected translated material from reputable journals. Table 1 summarizes the LTA outputs of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani, and compares the results with one reference group named "world leaders". The data of world leaders is gathered and analyzed by Hermann and her colleagues by using the same software (PP) and was last updated in October 2012. The reference group consists of 284 leaders, from whose LTA outputs I measured Iranian leaders' levels according to seven schemes.[2]

Table 1. LTA scores of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani in comparison with world leaders

LTA Characteristics	Ahmadinejad	Rouhani	World Leaders (WL) (N=284)	Range (based on WL)
BACE (Belief in Ability to Control Events)	0.40 High	0.31 Average	0.35	Low < 0.30 High > 0.40
PWR (Need for Power)	0.19 Low	0.24 Average	0.26	Low < 0.21 High > 0.31
CC (Conceptual Complexity)	0.51 Low	0.55 Average	0.59	Low < 0.53 High > 0.65
SC (Self-Confidence)	0.42 Average	0.35 Average	0.36	Low < 0.26 High > 0.46
TASK (Task Orientation)	0.38 Low	0.55 Low	0.63	Low < 0.56 High > 0.70
DIS (Distrust of Others)	0.18 Average	0.34 High	0.13	Low < 0.07 High > 0.19
IGB (In-Group Bias)	0.10 Average	0.13 Average	0.15	Low < 0.10 High > 0.20

Hermann asks three questions to come up with a general result about the subject leader: *Does Leader Respect or Challenge Constraints? Is the Leader Open or Closed to Contextual Information? Is a Leader Motivated by Problems or Relationships?* Assessing their scores, Ahmadinejad is a leader who challenges constraints; and is open to information; and his motivation for action is relationships rather than problems. This makes Ahmadinejad an 'evangelistic leader,' whose "focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message" (Hermann, 2003, p. 185). Rouhani is an 'influential leader' whose "focus of attention is on building cooperative relationships with other governments and states to play a leadership role; by working with others, one can gain more than is possible on one's own" (Hermann, 2003, p. 185).

Table 3. Leadership styles of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani

	Ahmadinejad	**Rouhani**
Reactions to constraints	Challenge	Respect
Openness to information	Closed	Closed
Motivation for seeking office	Relationship oriented	Relationship oriented
Leadership style	**Evangelistic leader**	**Influential leader**

Whether a leader respects the constraints or challenges is measured by looking at the results in BACE and PWR traits. Taking two results into consideration, leaders who share Ahmadinejad's results seem to "challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens" (Hermann, 1999, p. 13). They tend to push the limits of what is possible. Leaders who are high in BACE and low in PWR are generally too open and direct in their use of power (Hermann, 2003, p. 187). Hermann indicates that leaders who have a high level of belief in their capacity to control events, such as Ahmadinejad, tend to be "more interested in and active in the policy-making process" (1999, p. 14). In a sense, this trait can be considered as having a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', since leaders who believe their ability to influence policies are more likely to initiate activities rather than waiting for others to take the lead. Moreover, their self-belief generally causes them to be less willing to compromise or work with others. Leaders who respect constraints, like Rouhani, tend to work within the contextual constraints toward their goals. Such leaders have political skills like building consensus and achieving compromise (Hermann, 2003, p. 187). Although they are average in both BACE and PWR, Rouhani's scores are closer to the low range. Such leaders are likely to wait for others to take responsibility and react based on the first move. In contrast to their counterparts, leaders who share

Rouhani's scores on these traits tend not to shoulder responsibility and move on, and they easily accuse others if something goes wrong (Hermann, 2003, p. 190).

Ziller et al. (1977) conclude that CC and SC are interrelated to form a leader's self-other orientation, which gives us hints about their openness to contextual information coming from other sources. Looking at Hermann's classification, leaders whose CC result is lower than their SC result, like both Ahmadinejad and Rouhani, are closed to contextual information (1999, p. 20). Such leaders are generally driven by causes and they are ideologues (Hermann, 2003, p. 192). They interpret the environment according to their worldview and are close to cues from others. When CC is low, as Ahmadinejad, the leader perceives situations as well as ideas and people as good or bad, and black or white (Hermann, 1999, p. 22). Leaders with a low score also tend to choose like-minded advisors. Rouhani's score on this trait is average. He seems to be more flexible in issues with a comparatively lower significance, while for instance in issues he links with security, he tends to perceive the world as black and white and makes strong distinctions between 'us' and 'them'. Both leaders have average scores on SC, but Ahmadinejad has a higher level of SC compared to Rouhani. Leaders like Ahmadinejad are more consistent in their decisions, and they filter and interpret the information based on their high sense of self-worth (Hermann, 2003, p. 195).

Leaders are generally driven by two factors: internal focus (a problem), or external cause (a relationship in their environment). In the first situation, the leaders tend to make decisions according to "a particular cause, an ideology, or a specific set of interests." In the second, they aim to get "acceptance, power, support, or acclaim" (Hermann, 1999, p. 24). Three traits are considered such motivations: TASK, DIS, and IGB. LTA indicates that leaders who have similar results to Ahmadinejad and Rouhani tend to perceive the world as conflict-prone, but because other countries are viewed as having constraints on what they can do, some flexibility in response is possible; leaders, however, must vigilantly monitor developments in the international arena and prudently prepare to contain an adversary's actions while still pursuing their countries' interests. (Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant) (Table 5 in Hermann, 1999, p. 28).

Moreover, leaders with a high level of DIS, such as Rouhani, are hypersensitive to criticism; they want their advisors to be very loyal (because of this, they tend to shuffle them frequently); and they tend to perceive the world as a zero-sum game. To Hermann, a high level of distrust toward others is generally related to past experiences.

Does Leadership Matter in Iran's US Policy?

This study argues that data on both the personal background and leadership style of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani are significant individual-level determinants of Iran's

policy toward 'the West'. However, it is important to note that it is never possible to make clear-cut definitions about leaders' perceptions and their ideas on a specific event. There might be several factors that have potentially been effective in understanding the international position of Iran in the eyes of these leaders. While Ahmadinejad pursued "the politics of confrontation" in his tenure, Rouhani has been pursuing a "reformist" and "moderate" attitude toward the US and 'the West' in general.

Since his CC is low, Ahmadinejad is expected to see the world as divided between good and evil. The US and other states in the West are the "great satan" and the "oppressor" which was part of Khomeini's point of view. The world consists of the "oppressor" and the "oppressed" (Beeman, 2013, p. 201; Roshandel, 2013, p. 44). Following Khomeini, Ahmadinejad also thinks that 'the Muslim world' represents the oppressed and 'the West' represents the oppressor. Accordingly, there cannot be a possibility to positively engage with the policies of the US. As indicated in Beeman's work, there have been myths in both the US and Iran's minds toward each other. From Ahmadinejad's perspective, the US is seen as a corrupter of life on earth and a bastion of immorality. He further thinks that the US is continually trying to "dominate Iranian politics and install a puppet regime" and that the US and Israel have a group of undercover spies who consistently work to weaken the Iranian state. (Beeman, 2013). Furthermore, "the politics of the US and Israel are inseparable" and they "want Iran to remain backward and dependent on the West for technology and modern civilizational aspects." Lastly, he thinks that "Western cultural forces target Iran and other Islamic nations in an attempt to erode traditional values" (Beeman, 2013, pp. 201-204).

Ahmadinejad may have certain motivations for preferring more hostile foreign policy initiatives. From a historical point of view, Iran has been subjected to isolation in the Middle East region and the international arena in general. For example, as mentioned in Juneau and Razavi's article, "Iran is not a member of any security arrangement and four regional powers surrounding Iran –India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia– enjoy the security guarantees provided by nuclear power" (2013, p. 1). Iran's backing of various regional factions like the Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas in the Palestinian territories does not substantially alter the situation, as these groups function more like allies of the Iranian government rather than mere proxies (Juneau & Razavi, 2013).

Historically, the Khomeini era can be called as "pursuit of universalist causes" and the post-Khomeini era until the Ahmadinejad period can be called as "pursuit of pragmatic foreign policy" through trying to get rid of international isolation and restructuring economy and domestic policy (Juneau & Razavi 2013, p. 3). Ahmadinejad criticized this reformation and structuring period as "the great betrayal of the revolution" and called his presidency the "third revolution" after the Islamic Revolution and the seizure of the US embassy (Ansari, 2007, p. 11). His

aggressive attitude toward the Western world is in line with Hermann's approach that leaders who share Ahmadinejad's scores tend to see the world as conflict-prone. Moreover, he is closed to contextual information, which supports the argument that Ahmadinejad is a neo-conservative leader who pursues an idealistic and ideological attitude towards what he identifies as the Western world, in other words, he sees the world through an ideology-based lens (Juneau & Razavi, 2013, p. 9).

Ansari claims that labeling 'the Western world' as the enemy in his discourse was closely related to the endurance of his legitimacy in the domestic sphere. In contrast with Rouhani, Ahmadinejad's scores make him less willing to compromise and pursue a more active role in policymaking. Moreover, Ansari defines Ahmadinejad's foreign policymaking as "principled" which refers to readiness for confrontation in Iran's foreign relations and adds that Ahmadinejad proposed the idea that "confrontation must be the norm" (Ansari, 2007, pp. 45-46). He tried to legitimize this discourse and attitude toward 'the Western world' by using "Hidden Imam"[3] claims, suggesting the idea that he could been informed by a hidden imam (Ansari, 2007, p. 42).

Apart from Ahmadinejad's personality and his understanding of where Iran should position itself in the international arena, structural conditions affected Ahmadinejad's formation of his discourse toward 'the Western world'. When he was elected as the sixth president in June 2005, the region witnessed the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan by the US. Besides, George Bush's "preemptive strikes" policy sparked the aggressive foreign policy of Ahmadinejad. This structural environment; namely the rise in the oil prices, the fall of rival regimes, and the continuous security threat of the US, gave birth to an aggressive foreign policy understanding of Ahmadinejad. According to Juneau and Razavi (2013, p. 5), the main objective was to counter-balance the power of the US and its Arab allies by developing closer ties with rising powers such as Russia, Brazil, China, India, and Türkiye, which had the potential to support Iran's challenge to Western hegemony in the region. It can be thought that structural features had an impact on the pursuit of aggressive foreign policy during the Ahmadinejad period apart from his foreign policy rationale. Thus, it can be argued that the personality and leadership style of Ahmadinejad and structural factors interacted throughout the process. As Beeman argues, the Bush Administration's attacks on Iran strengthened the power of the country's conservative ruling elite while harming the reformists (2013, pp. 198-199).

It seems that Rouhani took the differences between the US and Iran for granted and inherent. During the election campaign, Rouhani promised to bring moderation to Iran's foreign policy, especially toward the US or what has been identified as the Western world. Such discourse supports Hermann's LTA which considers Rouhani an influential leader who tends to build cooperative relations with other

states/governments. As Milani argues, the change in Iran's foreign policy is not only toward the West, but Rouhani is likely to start with a charm offensive, beginning with efforts to win over all neighboring countries of Iran, especially the Arab states in the Persian Gulf (Milani, 2013). Additionally, according to Milani (2013), Rouhani pledged to introduce a degree of rationality into Iran's tumultuous and uneven political landscape. He committed to enhancing Iran's declining economic situation, upholding human rights, freeing political detainees, and shifting from Ahmadinejad's adversarial foreign policy to one of renewed engagement with the global community. For instance, in a speech made in 2013, Rouhani said that if the US and other Western nations "accept the rights of Iranians, our nation will stand for peace, friendship, and cooperation, and together we can solve regional and even global problems." (Rezaian, 2013). This shows that Rouhani is a leader who tends to respect challenges coming from the international environment.

Fathi (2014) indicates that Rouhani criticized Ahmadinejad's vision on foreign policy, and especially his discourse during the election campaign. Besides, according to Rouhani, rapprochement with the Western world, handling international sanctions, nuclear issues, and political and social openness at home, are the most prioritized issues that need to be taken into consideration. Rouhani believes that the world has changed since the 1970s. He further argues that international politics is no longer "a zero-sum game" but it is a multi-dimensional arena where cooperation and competition often occur simultaneously. According to Rouhani "Gone is the age of blood feuds" and world leaders are expected to "lead in turning threats into opportunities" (Monshipouri & Dorraj, 2013, p. 136). Iran's foreign policy has become more compromising not only towards the US but also to other Western states. For instance, within weeks following Rouhani's election, Britain and Iran declared their plan to reestablish direct diplomatic ties, years after the British Embassy was stormed by ultra-conservative vigilantes in November 2011, days before speaking to Obama on the phone (Tabaar, 2014).

According to Monshipouri and Dorraj (2013, p. 133),

> Unlike Mohammad Khatami's liberal-pragmatic vision or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's ideological populist stance, newly elected Iranian president Hassan Rouhani is bent on pursuing a centrist-pragmatic agenda. His campaign platform reflected such a vision: Iran should engage in serious negotiations with the Western world, reduce regional conflict, and prioritize its economic recovery and the general well-being of its people above its nuclear program.

Although it is not quite clear that Iran's foreign policy under Rouhani will experience a paradigmatic change, softer rhetoric in foreign policy making under Rouhani compared to Ahmadinejad is observed. There have been some steps to reach a rapprochement with the West on nuclear issues under Rouhani's

leadership. However, despite the paradigmatic change in the foreign policy rhetoric during Rouhani's presidency, it is questionable to what extent US-Iran relations or rapprochement would be sustainable and turn into a strategic partnership in the long run. This question arises since both sides have experienced historical prejudices against each other. Moreover, international and domestic structural elements that have had an impact on the determination of foreign policy making in both countries, are other factors that shape relations of these countries apart from leadership. Thus, it is still unclear to what extent this rhetoric change can bring a real change in the foreign policy of Iran.

In the case of Iran's nuclear program, Entessar claims that "since late 2002, when the extent of Iran's nuclear program was revealed, no other issue has dominated her relations with the West as much as the nuclear issue" (2013, p. 70). Taking advantage of the rise in oil prices and the fall of rival regimes, Ahmadinejad became more willing to implement aggressive and assertive policies on nuclear issues by claiming Iran's right to improve nuclear energy peacefully and Iran's right to have a security guarantee against her rivals with nuclear power. It is essential to point out that Ahmadinejad criticized the policies of Rouhani when he was the chief negotiator of the Iranian nuclear program. Rouhani responded that "the prolonged nature of the talks had at least allowed Iran to further its nuclear program and had provided Iran with some diplomatic leverage" (Ansari, 2007, p. 50). This critique of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani's responses is one of the examples for the different perspectives of these leaders. While the former had an unrealistic and idealistic understanding of foreign policy, Rouhani seemed to be interested in accommodationist foreign policy objectives. This is in line with Hermann's classification deeming Ahmadinejad an evangelistic leader while labeling Rouhani as an influential leader. As indicated in Juneau and Razavi's work, during the Ahmadinejad period, Iran increased its power in the region. However, the question is to what extent this power rising fulfilled her potential and how much it was sustainable (2013, p. 18). From this point of view, the unrealized potential interests in the US-Iran engagement can be realized through realist and reformist leaders. According to Beeman "It must be hoped that the US and Iran will eventually come to realize that their differences stem largely from visceral cultural reactions to historical events that have long passed" (2013, p. 205).

Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's former foreign minister, indicated in June 2014 that Rouhani and he talked on the issue, and they were confident that Iran and the US could reach a comprehensive agreement. They assured the world that Iran's nuclear program would remain exclusively peaceful. He further criticized the past rhetoric that caused Iran to miss many opportunities and not be realistic in the environment Iran operated (Zarif, 2014).

Discussion and Conclusion

The role of leadership in foreign policymaking processes has been widely studied by the literature on Middle East politics. However, few studies focus on the impact of leadership on foreign policy change in Iran by adopting a specific theory or model in their respective analyses. Curious about the source of moderation in Iranian foreign policy after the 2013 elections, this study analyzes how the leadership styles of the presidents before and after the election influenced Iran's foreign policy toward the US. To do so, it analyzed the leadership styles of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani and their influence on the convergence in Iran-US relations after 2013, specifically on the nuclear issue. Following an analysis of Rouhani and Ahmadinejad's leadership styles, the study finds out that Ahmadinejad is an "evangelistic leader" and Rouhani is an "influential leader" according to the LTA model, first introduced by Hermann.

As their leadership traits and personalities, the foreign policies of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani, especially toward 'the Western world' had significant differences. First, the leaders had distinct tone and rhetoric in their speeches about foreign relations. While Ahmadinejad was known for his confrontational and provocative rhetoric that was marked by 'anti-Western' sentiments, Rouhani adopted a more moderate and diplomatic tone that emphasized the significance of dialogue and negotiation while addressing the conflictual issue areas with the West, especially the US. Another difference was in their policies of nuclear deal. The Ahmadinejad period witnessed increased sanctions and international isolation mainly as a reply to his ideas and attitude about Iran's nuclear power and limited progress in negotiations during his term. Rouhani's administration played a significant role in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015 that aimed to limit Iran's nuclear program in exchange for decreased or no sanctions as well as improvement in diplomatic relations with Western states. Ahmadinejad's administration also engaged in limited economic relations with Western economic institutions, which added another layer on top of the economic degradation resulting from international sanctions, while Rouhani adopted, albeit limited, economic reforms seeking to attract foreign trade partners and investments. Their approach to regional conflicts was another point of divergence in their leadership and foreign policymaking styles. Ahmadinejad's term was marked by his administration's support to governments and groups that had conflictual relations with the West. He also aimed to increase Iran's influence in regional politics, which 'concerned' the Western states. Rouhani adopted a more moderate and pragmatic approach in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region due to his administration's search for cooperation and dialogue with the West, which can be exemplified by his attempts to find a common ground on issues such as Syria and Yemen.

It is significant to note once again, that, presidents of Iran are not completely independent in their foreign policy rhetoric and actions due to the regime and

government type of the country. Along with several broader domestic forces and institutions, Iran's supreme leaders have always constituted the greatest influence on the president's decisions. Furthermore, the foreign policymaking process is never as simple as the leader working alone to shape the outcomes, since multiple domestic and international factors are always at play. However, this study made the case that, while it did not entirely rule out other factors, the leadership styles of the two leaders have been the main influence on how Iran and the West interact (specifically the US on the nuclear question). In all the above-mentioned issue areas that both leaders had different approaches to, leadership traits and personalities played a significant role. Ahmadinejad's scores according to LTA make him an evangelistic leader with a high level of belief in his ability to influence the political environment including making unilateral decisions. The implications of this on Iran's US policy yielded increased rigidity throughout his presidency. More specifically, his leadership style resulted in more assertive policies toward the Western world. Although both Ahmadinejad and Rouhani share certain traits according to LTA, Rouhani is an influential leader who is more open to cooperation and to be consulted by others in his political environment. This not only makes his discourse friendlier but also results in more friendly relations with the West, which goes beyond a policy of otherization.

Notes

[1] This study employs ambiguous and binary terms such as 'Western world/states' and 'non-Western world/states' due to their frequent usage in the speeches of Iranian leaders.

[2] Low and high scores for Rouhani and Ahmadinejad are measured based on their scores falling one standard deviation lower or higher than the mean of the reference group (WL).

[3] The term "hidden Imam" or "Imam in hiding" refers to a central figure in Shia Islam known as the Mahdi, who is believed to have disappeared from public view in the 9th century. Shia Muslims await his return, which they believe will coincide with the establishment of justice and peace in the world.

[4] The table is directly imported from Hermann's chapter in "The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders" (Table 8.1 in Hermann 2003:185).

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Appendix: *Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information, and Motivation*[4]

		Motivation	
Responsiveness to Constraints	**Openness to Information**	**Problem Focus**	**Relationship Focus**
Challenges constraints	**Closed to information**	*Expansionistic* (Focus of attention is on expanding the leader's, government's, and state's span of control)	*Evangelistic* (Focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message)
Challenges constraints	**Open to information**	*Actively Independent* (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both)	*Directive* (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others by engaging in actions on the world stage that enhance the state's reputation)
Respects constraints	**Closed to information**	*Incremental* (Focus of attention is on improving the state's economy and/or security in incremental steps while avoiding the obstacles that will	*Influential* (Focus of attention is on building cooperative relationships with other governments and states in order to play a leadership role; by working

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		inevitably arise along the way)	with others, one can gain more than is possible on one's own)
Respects constraints	**Open to information**	*Opportunistic* (Focus of attention is on assessing what is possible in the current situation and context given what one wants to achieve and considering what Important constituencies will allow)	*Collegial* (Focus of attention is on reconciling differences and building consensus- on gaining prestige and status through empowering others and sharing accountability)

"Co-Radicalization": A Scientific Lens Proposal to Understand the Social Movements in Turkey

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Abstract: The term co-radicalization refers to intergroup hostilities leading to conflicts through cycles of reciprocal threat. This article explores the concept of co-radicalization in violent and non-violent terms and its potential application particularly in Turkey and broadly in the Middle East, a region characterized by ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity, as well as socio-economic disparities. Drawing from the social fragmentations recently observed in Turkey, where scientific research on radicalism and co-radicalization is insufficient, the article offers several subjects of scrutiny, including (1) socio-economic co-radicalization between the native and migrant people in the fringes of the urban spaces, (2) the religious norm carriership led by the state institutions and the rise of "Deism" and atheism in response, and (3) the variety of non-violent radical expressions feeding each other, from music to satire. We conclude that the study of co-radicalization should be distinguished from the reductionist approaches to the concept, which tend to take terrorism and radicalism synonymously; the social scientific goal is to obtain a deeper understanding of the intricate dynamics behind societal divisions.

Keywords: Radicalization, Social movements, Türkiye politics, middle eastern politics, european politics

Introduction

Europe continues to face several problems revolving around the issues of deindustrialization, migration, and diversity. Civilizational and culturalist paradigms seem to have poisoned the image of migrant-origin people and the integration processes of self-identified Muslims into the majority societies. The same problem of misrepresentation is visible in the case of relatively deprived native youth groups who reside in remote, rural, and mountainous areas in Europe. Populism, Islamophobism, nativism, radicalization, extremism, Islamism, violence, and terrorism are among the issues that are being discussed, deliberated, and communicated in multilateral and transnational venues in contemporary Europe.[1] As a research group, we have contributed to these debates through the findings of extensive empirical research conducted between 2019 and 2024 within the framework of advanced grant funding provided by the European Research Council.[2] This article goes beyond our focus on Europe by arguing that the insights gained may prove valuable in understanding similar challenges in other regions.

In this article, we aim to explore the concept of co-radicalization in the context of Turkey and its potential insights for understanding radicalization in Muslim-majority contexts. The article intends to introduce a scientific lens to analyze some of the present forms of radicalization in Turkey where, we argue, scientific research on radicalism is insufficient. Hence, the article's main research question is whether we can apply the concept of co-radicalization to Turkey. The article first unpacks the main contours of our ongoing research in European cities and then revisits the scientific debates on the terms 'radicalization' and 'co-radicalization', considering multiple definitions of violent and non-violent radicalization. In doing so, our objective is to give a different spin to the term radicalization from a critical stance to reinterpret it through the teachings of the Social Movements literature that questions the prevalence of neo-liberal logic that denounces any kind of radical centrifugal movement—be it ethno-cultural, religious, societal, or political. Then, focusing on Turkey as a Muslim-majority context, the article offers new subjects of scrutiny, including (1) socio-economic co-radicalization between the native and migrant people in the fringes of the urban spaces, (2) the religious norm carriership led by the state institutions and the rise of "Deism" and atheism in response, and (3) the variety of non-violent radical expressions feeding each other, from music to satire.

A Contested Term: Radicalization

The term "radicalization" has evolved over its two-century history. Over the 19th century, it developed into an ideology promoting republicanism and emancipation against absolute monarchies in Europe, encompassing pro-democracy manifestos, universal citizenship, and equal rights demands. "Radicals" have often been depicted as violent actors by the defendants of the status quo (Sartori, 1984). In this context, "to radicalize" described adherence to an ideology against the order, while "radicalization" emerged in the 1930s, referring to becoming radicalized. The term's most popular meaning in the present time, as a process leading to violence, gained prominence in the context of Jihadism after 2000 (Khosrokhavar, 2014).

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the meaning of the phrase shifted towards atomism. Since then, radicalization has primarily been viewed as an individual process through which, on the one hand, "lone wolves" became active terrorists and, on the other, domestic terrorism and online radicalization grew increasingly prevalent. These emphases defined the US foreign policy of the 21st century: a global war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The so-called "refugee crisis," which broke out in 2015, has spurred discussions of "foreign fighters" to take the place of "homegrown terrorists." Those on the road to

becoming foreign fighters and their return home have been the focus of talks on radicalization in the public sphere, especially in Europe.

The co-radicalization of right-wing extremists and Muslim extremists, or in other words, between Islamophobists and Islamists, needs to be examined in addition to the escalating discussions on "homegrown terrorism" and "foreign fighters" since 9/11. The concept of co-radicalization refers to intergroup hostilities leading to conflicts through cycles of reciprocal threat (Kaya & Adam-Troian, 2021). Based on the ongoing PRIME Youth research data from four European countries (Germany, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands) supported by the European Research Council (Agreement No. 785934), we question how nativist right-wing populist local youths residing in remote towns and self-identified Muslim youths residing in metropolitan cities co-radicalize each other against one another. As will be shortly elaborated further, our ongoing studies suggest that one of the main drivers of co-radicalization between such groups, who experience similar socio-economic, political, and psychological deprivations, stems from a pervasive absence of effective communication and empathy, exacerbating the chasm between their worldviews, fueling animosity in several contexts (Kaya, 2021).

A question our research project in Europe asks is whether the "young radical" Muslims are politically active to foster social cohesion or dictate religious conviction. As a starting point, the project problematized the neoliberal political tendency to criminalize and pathologize radicalization by reducing the concept to extremism and terrorism. Contrary to this trend, we demonstrate that many youngsters are prone to radicalization but not necessarily violent extremism or terrorism. The nativists, right-wing populists, and white supremacists are on the opposing side of the co-radicalization process. While arguably opposing a neoliberal and elitist order, they take heart from widespread poverty and structural injustices exacerbated by conventional political parties supporting neoliberal governance (Mouffe, 2018). Votes cast by populists have been intensely concentrated in areas with long-term reductions and a widening urban/rural divide (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018).

After the two interview rounds scheduled in 2020 and 2021, our research team conducted 307 interviews in four European countries (Germany, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands). Native interlocutors were chosen from small towns away from metropolitan capital cities (Dresden, Aalst, Ghent, Lyon, and Rotterdam), while self-identified Muslim interlocutors from capital cities (Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels). While the natives were chosen from those cities and towns that are believed to be "left behind", youth with Muslim backgrounds were chosen from big cities using a snowball sampling technique.

Based on the interviews that our research team conducted in different European cities, we found that radicalization has been a prevalent experience among the disenfranchised European youth who live in cities, towns, and rural places that are socio-economically and/or socio-politically neglected by local/national governments as well as the mainstream political parties. Given the resentments of both self-identified Muslim youth and nativist-populist youth groups in Europe, we argue that radicalization, as a concept, should go beyond the connotations of violence, extremism, fundamentalism, and terrorism. We explored the connections between radicalization and economic disparities, feelings of discrimination, spatial deprivation, nostalgic deprivation, cultural alienation, and various individual and social-psychological factors. Extending this framework to regional literature beyond Europe, we expect that our research, in tandem with the Social Movements Theory,[3] can be enriching for the readers to understand the root causes of radicalization among various ethno-cultural, religious, and social groups in Turkey. While the present article does not aim to make a data-centric analysis of the empirical questions at hand, it builds on a series of previous research that addressed the empirical data through the glance of Social Movements Theory (Kaya, 2019b; Lüküslü, 2013; Neyzi, 2001; Oğuz, 2017; Tezcür, 2020; Uysal, 2017).

The dynamics of co-radicalization

The concept of "co-radicalization" refers to the belief that hostility between different groups can lead to or worsen conflicts due to extremist ideologies (Pyszczynski et al., 2008). According to psychological studies, intergroup co-radicalization cycles are produced by violent extremism and are caused by processes related to social identity and the human need to belong to a particular community based on shared sentiments and social identity (Verkuyten, 2018), in addition to existential motivations that are sparked by threat-regulation processes at the individual level. Understanding co-radicalization requires an exploration of the interplay between collective identity dynamics and individual psychological factors. The formation and reinforcement of social identity within distinct groups, along with the tendency to categorize others as part of an outgroup, contributes to the development of intergroup conflicts. At the individual level, the experience of threats to one's well-being, values, or group identity may trigger a radicalization process by activating existential concerns.

Within the scope of this article, we acknowledge several alternative definitions of the concept of radicalization. The most widely accepted way to define the concept is to focus on the likelihood of violence stemming from individuals. The prefix "co-" in this context means that some conflicting groups and their tendency towards violent political actions might be connected. Even if the two opposing factions do

not interact with each other, the situation can still escalate if they both feel threatened by each other. Our framework includes different types of conflicts and processes that occur at different levels between groups (Decety et al., 2018). To that effect, we propose that the term co-radicalization may provide researchers with a scientific lens to analyze the different forms of radicalization in Turkey, ranging from religious, ethnic, and societal forms of radicalism. While co-radicalization has not been tested as such in Turkey or other Muslim-majority contexts, the concept of radicalization itself has been explored only through the lens of moderation versus radicalization.

The alternative definition of radicalization is non-violent, emphasizing the transformative power of political ideologies in favor of social and political change. This approach fits into the schools of thought that aim to decouple "radicalism" from "extremism" and "terrorism." Even when its proponents do not make a solid demarcation between these concepts, they point out that a radicalization process is not necessarily towards exerting physical violence or forming opinions in favor of violence (Koca, 2022). Despite denoting a transformation like the previous definition, this process involves the development of new ideas, perspectives, and values, as well as the mobilization of individuals and groups in line with an ideology. This definition does not ignore co-radicalization in the form of intergroup conflicts, given that individuals radicalize using very different and often clashing ideologies. In other words, co-radicalization can be understood as the simultaneous development and mobilization of multiple, often conflicting, ideologies within distinct groups. This concept of co-radicalization acknowledges that the process is not inherently violent; rather, it can lead to intergroup conflicts and tensions due to contrasting objectives and methods.

Through cycles of reciprocal threat, intergroup conflicts often continue to exist (Kunst et al., 2016).[4] In the context of our research, one key example was the string of incidents that erupted in France after the killing of a school teacher in October 2020 (BBC News, 2020). Many other case studies suggest that one can research such dynamics of co-radicalization occurring amongst social groups by taking into account the factors surrounding threat perceptions and hostilities leading to violent extremism (Vallacher et al., 2013). For instance, such endeavors lead researchers to notice that young people who identify as natives may turn to right-wing extremism as a response to economic difficulties. Meanwhile, the same process may further fuel the already attractive Islamist youth extremism in marginalized areas, leading to anti-native sentiments as a form of compensation.

As a final illustration, the usage of this dynamic theory is growing in social psychology, and it has recently been incorporated into agent-based models to

forecast intergroup sentiments in the face of terrorist threats (Huet et al., 2019). This type of co-radicalization between the two groups is an instance of co-emergence and can occur in both an interactional and a correlative configuration. As a result, the processes of co-radicalization can be seen on a material and symbolic level. Such co-radicalization processes, for instance, can occur in online forums. A study of interactions in Dutch online forums, Marokko.NL, used predominantly by Moroccans, and NL.politiek, used predominantly by ethnic Dutch people, is conducted by Bert Klandermans (Klandermans, 2014). Figure I correlates the two forum participation with identity-related incidents between late 2003 and mid-2006, the study period. The number of words in the posts about immigration and integration serves as a proxy for the level of involvement in both forums. Theo van Gogh's murder in 2004, the Madrid train bombings in 2004, and the London bombings in 2005 all sparked significant online discussion during this time (Kaya & Adam-Troian, 2021).

Figure 1. Comparison of the discussions about immigration and integration on two different online forums with opposing viewpoints (Klandermans, 2014).

Intractable confrontations may result from such cycles which explain the concurrent emergence of adversarial factions. The processes of "intergroup co-radicalization" are unpredictable and dynamic (Decety et al., 2018). They are potentially systemically destructive due to their highly particular characteristics, which may induce gradual polarization and societal structure disintegration if left unchecked. Following September 11, such escalation cycles have been predicted in both the US and Europe.

Exploring the nexus between social movements, political polarization, and radicalization in Turkey

There is no substantial scholarship developed in Turkey to inquire about the links between social movements and radicalization processes. This article is an attempt to fill in this gap by trying to establish a link between our ongoing PRIME Youth research on youth radicalization in Europe and different forms of radicalization in Turkey. From a historical point of view, we shall start by underlining that Turkey has experienced different strands of youth radicalization since the 1960s. The mass mobilizations of the 1970s were assertive in the sense that they were the manifestations of the quest for liberty, equality, and justice expressed by working-class groups and leftist university students. These social movements could be viewed as demands for active citizenship. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, university students, employees, police, instructors, and administrators experienced political tension and violence, which prompted a military intervention in 1980. All types of nonprofit organizations, groups, and foundations were subject to severe regulation by the military council and succeeding governments in the 1980s, notably the leftist ones that had been quite engaged in politics before the coup. Turkey began tolerating NGOs with diverse cultural and ideological alignments in the late 1980s (Şimşek, 2004).

Several studies have conducted an in-depth examination of political protests during the 1990s and 2000s (Uysal, 2017). Despite the many continuities these studies identify, one example of change is youth mobilization during the 1999 Marmara earthquake and 2013 Gezi protests, which differed from that of the 1970s when public protests were also highly salient. The most remarkable difference is probably that the protests in 1999 and 2013 were mainly initiated by the young, post-1980-coup generations who were raised with a synthesis of Türkiye nationalist and Islamist ideologies and stigmatized by older generations as "apolitical youth." The insertion of Islamist rhetoric and symbols into the Türkiye national identity and everyday politics partly became pervasive after the 1980 military coup, which aimed to weaken the working-class and left-wing youth movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Kaya, 2020). The political system established after the 1980 military coup ensured the weakening of the working-class movements and left-wing political rhetoric in Turkey in a way that led to the rise of identity-based politics among pious Muslims, Islamists, Kurds, Alevis, Circassians, non-Muslim minorities, and other ethnocultural communities (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2004). Hence, the latest waves of youth movements in Turkey are more in line with new social movements, as they are not necessarily driven by class-based conflicts but rather by ecological, environmental, cultural, urban, and identity-related conflicts.

Since the Gezi protests in 2013, Turkey has been exposed to societal and political forms of polarization as a consequence of the right-wing populist political style employed by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Kaya, 2019a). In the meantime, Turkey has become the leading country in the world with the highest number of refugees, especially since 2015 (Kaya et al., 2021). Turkey was also exposed to ethno-cultural disputes in the 2010s when the so-called Kurdish peace process failed (Özbudun, 2014).

At least in terms of identity, the Türkiye state and society have also become more Islamized since the presidential election in 2007. Reactionary Islamist forces have become more prevalent since then under the AKP rule, leading to the growing prominence of Islam in all spheres of life, ranging from education to state bureaucracy and the fashion industry (Kaya, 2015). In this period, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) became more instrumental in the formation of pious religious generations through imams, mosques, clerical schools, and Friday sermons. The Gezi protests, in a way, symbolized the rejection of intolerant acts by then Prime Minister Erdoğan who pursued an increasingly populist political style based on Islamic references and a social engineering project aiming to raise a religious generation. He requested that mothers have three children if not five, offered criticisms of the content of Türkiye soap operas, ordered the banning of alcohol on university campuses, and pursued the building of mosques at Taksim Square and Çamlıca Hill (Kaya, 2015). However, these government priorities created a counter-reaction from pious Muslim youth, mostly educated in Imam Hatip Schools. Deism and atheism have become more visible among the students of Imam Hatip schools (Kardaş, 2023).

Urban spaces were also exposed to different forms of radicalization over the last two decades under the AKP rule. Metropolitan cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Adana, Bursa, Mersin, and Gaziantep have been endangered by growing tensions resulting from exclusion, alienation, humiliation, and discrimination of young citizens as well as the others residing in the outskirts of such cities. Rap, graffiti, and different forms of aestheticized radicalism became prevalent in these places as the voices of subaltern populations expressed their socio-economic, spatial, and political forms of deprivation (Uysal, 2017).

Borrowing from the findings of our empirical research on youth radicalization in Europe, we want to offer a scientific lens to the scholarship in Turkey to inquire about the processes of (a) socio-economic co-radicalization between the native and migrant people in the underdeveloped parts of cities; (b) religious co-radicalization between the Diyanet's religious governance and the rise of "Deism" and atheism; and (c) a variety of non-violent radical expressions feeding each other in music, art,

and satire through social media. While these case studies are not exhaustive, they are exemplary of fields where the co-radicalization framework can be applied. In conclusion, the study aims to provide a conceptual perspective on the complex dynamics in Turkey, exploring the interplay of these various factors and their impact on society. The use of this scientific lens could also be extended to the Middle East to analyze the root causes and trajectories of ethno-cultural, religious and spatial forms of radicalization.

Socio-economic co-radicalization between the native and migrant people in the underdeveloped parts of cities

The first and most crucial aspect of co-radicalization is the native population's reaction to the migrants due to economic hardships, whereas the migrants/refugees react against the host country for being treated as cheap labor. Although they have not yet been scrutinized on the same ground, some studies explored the two sides of the coin. According to a series of interviews Özden (2013) conducted with the Syrian migrants in Turkey, there is a widespread feeling among Syrians that the farm and factory owners take advantage of their vulnerable situation. One of the factory owners verifies it by saying, "Thanks to Bashar al Asad, we now have cheap labor" (Özden, 2013).

On the other hand, hosting the displaced Syrians has put pressure on the economy of all receiving countries (Ozcurumez, 2021). A panel data analysis on 26 regions in Turkey demonstrated that Syrian refugees increased unemployment (Esen & Oğuş Binatlı, 2017). Ceritoğlu et al. found that the employment outcomes of natives, especially those informally employed and, more so the disadvantaged groups, including women, younger and unqualified workers, have been negatively affected by the inflows (Ceritoglu et al., 2017). Welfare chauvinism is an area that has yet to be studied in depth in the Türkiye context (Svallfors, 2020). Although various forms of welfare have been recognized in the EU, such as aid for the elderly and sick instead of unemployment assistance and support for means-based programs rather than universal assistance (Goldschmidt, 2015), the nativist views of welfare in Turkey have been influenced by the increasing inflation rate and diminishing purchasing power. In summary, various sources suggest that many natives view migrants as competition for jobs and resources, leading to feelings of resentment and frustration. On the other hand, migrants and refugees may react against the host country for being treated as cheap labor. This creates a tense dynamic between the two groups.

In the context of Turkey, the concept of "turn-by-turn poverty" (nöbetleşe yoksulluk) holds relevance and sheds light on the dynamics at play. Pınarcıoğlu & Işık discuss this concept, referring to how urban poor populations develop

strategies to survive, often at the expense of those who come after them (Işık & Pınarcıoğlu, 2001). The cycle of poverty continues as these newcomers inherit the poverty of previous generations. When a shantytown manages to transfer its poverty to a newcomer, some semblance of upward mobility can be experienced.

In the case of newcomers from countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the toll of this process is evident. These individuals, already grappling with the challenges of displacement and vulnerability, are further affected by the burden of inherited poverty. Moreover, this continuous cycle of poverty alters perceptions and attitudes towards people experiencing poverty. They are no longer seen as individuals to empathize with but rather as objects of fear and securitization.

The migrant populations lack the cultural and economic capital to mobilize in the labor unions. Alongside several international organizations, some local civil society organizations, especially those relying on a religious vocabulary (e.g., ÖZGÜRDER), form protests on their behalf as the "Ansar" (Rottmann & Kaya, 2021) (i.e., people from Medina who helped immigrant Muslims who came from Mecca together with Prophet Mohammad) (Ulusal Kanal, 2019). Situating the migrants as such in the public debate renders them a part of the already tense ideological polarization within Turkey. For instance, amid the heat of the debates over young Afghan and Pakistani men entering Turkey, several social media accounts in Urdu, Punjabi, and Pashtun became the center of attention with their anti-secularist claims directed explicitly against Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Turkey and its laic political regime.[5]

A stream of research examined local communities' radicalization as an effect of exposure to the so-called Refugee Crisis. In this stream that focuses mainly on Europe, one research that is closest to Turkey is Hangartner et al., conducted in the Greek islands (Dinas et al., 2019). This study found that, in the islands close to the Türkiye coast, direct exposure to refugee arrivals induced an increase in native populations' hostility toward refugees and immigrants, with negative repercussions also on the image of local Muslim minorities. What appears as anti-Muslim radicalization in Greece turns out to be a particularist religious nationalist claim in the Türkiye context. For example, a study conducted in a poor province of Istanbul, Esenler, suggested that the natives regarded Syrian women as inadequately Muslim and nationalist—i.e., a series of themes revolving around honesty, acting as a decent wife, undertaking domestic tasks, and defending one's homeland (Metin Açer & Enelli Güçlüer, 2018).

Meanwhile, the relatively deprived neighborhoods of metropolitan cities witness high tension between the local population and refugees/migrants. Recently, footage from Istanbul Bağcılar included a Syrian shop owner putting a chair in the

middle of the road and cursing the passers-by. According to news coverage, the Syrian person threatened the citizens in the presence of the police by saying, "Come here and let us see who the man is." (Habertürk, 2022). Contrary to this narrative, his neighbors in the neighborhood called him a respectable shopkeeper with a peaceful family. Accordingly, the man lost his calm and became aggressive in reaction to some people who swore at him, his family, and his Syrian identity. The case is a micro-level illustration of co-radicalization.

Figure 2. According to anti-migration campaigner Ümit Özdağ, Syrians have begun to dominate the areas colored yellow

One of the critical arguments of the anti-migration campaign in Turkey is that Syrian migrants turned out to be the majority of southern cities, starting from Şanlıurfa and extending towards Mersin (see Figure 2). In these cities, campaigners address the local population, as well as the state authorities, against the perils of demographic change. The cities, such as Hatay, where Arabs and Turks have lived together for decades, have become the center of attention in these arguments. The recent earthquakes in Southeast Turkey further exacerbated the tensions between native populations and Syrian migrants in southern cities. Following the earthquake, which resulted in the displacement of thousands of people, including both Türkiye and Syrian residents, there were reports of discrimination and hostility revolving around petty crime (Tamga Türk, 2023). Particularly in the context of the Refugee Crisis, radicalization can be attributed to a combination of factors, including economic hardships, religious nationalism, political ideologies, and the absence of effective communication.

Religious co-radicalization: the attempts of moderation led by Diyanet and the rise of "Deism" and atheism in response

The High Board of Religious Affairs and Imam Hatip schools are the instruments of the government to define "piety" and manage the public sphere accordingly. Coming from predominantly working-class backgrounds, many parents reportedly argue that their children have limited options other than opting for the Imam Hatip schools in their neighborhoods (Hürriyet Daily News, 2012). If families cannot afford private schooling and their children did not pass the high school entrance exam, the neighborhood Imam Hatip school is often the most viable option. The number of religious schools increased especially in the mid-2010s, with relative gain compared to the other schools in the education system, due to the conversion of a group of secular middle and high schools. Concurrently, the number of students at such schools has soared from about one hundred thousand in 2008 to more than a million in 2020 (Karaman, 2022).

However, many adolescents do not embrace the religion that they see in these schools. Instead, they are reportedly interested in "deist" or "atheist" philosophical views;[6] they listen to Korean pop idols who push beyond traditionalist gender norms and use social media to engage with others who share their tastes and views. Professors of Islamic philosophy, such as İhsan Fazlıoğlu, Islamist politicians such as Erbakan, and seasoned Islamist thinkers such as Abdurrahman Dilipak claimed that in their consultations, even headscarved students and Imam Hatip students may confide that they consider themselves "atheists" or "deists". Ali Erbaş, the President of the High Board of Religious Affairs, aimed to launch a campaign as follows: "Deism is a very interesting trap. If you have friends who are at the point of falling into this trap, warn them." (Yılmaz, 2018). Though the broader trend does not necessarily imply a rejection of Islamic values or traditions, many individuals choose to interpret their heritage in relatively personal and individualistic ways.

A concomitant process is that the dormitories run by religious communities especially attract students who migrate to urban centers and large provinces with the hope of a better education. Given that many of them do not have the economic means to find a comfortable place, the well-organized Muslim communities step in to offer those students affordable accommodation in their dormitories. In line with the consideration of parents who want their children to stay not only in safe but also in conservative and disciplined environments, those children spend their years by the rules of a religious community. Those rules often include dress codes, travel bans, and compulsory attendance at conferences where Islamic community values are presented as normative. As a result, while many students become pious religious citizens, many others end up being explicitly disillusioned. The conditions

that push them to meet these communities' expectations also encourage them to question the power structures in their society.

Thirdly, young women who recently decided to remove their headscarves or veils represent the new phase of secularization. A group of these women have recently started a social media campaign, called Yalnız Yürümeyeceksin (en. "You will not walk alone"), to support others who try to follow the same path. In their common struggle against family and neighborhood pressure, however, these women do not necessarily rely on modernist arguments based on "the backwardness of religion". Instead, they want respect for women's personal stories concerning the religion as they construe it. While opposing the politics of piety led by the government, they have discovered the possibility that religious women might also share their concerns in an Islamic program of ethical self-cultivation (Koca, 2023, p. 137). Therefore, as opposed to the rationalization of the previous head-covering ban in certain public buildings, such as universities, they do not expect other women to remove their veils. However, many of them now embrace non-religious ethics more staunchly than their predecessors did in the feminist movement, reflecting a co-radicalization occurring alongside the state-led politics of piety. These women may become the ideology makers of a new Türkiye Secularism (Koca, 2023).

The variety of non-violent radical expressions feeding each other: music, art, and satire through social media

Meanwhile, conflicting expressions of non-violent radicalism developed in Turkey. First and foremost, laughing and resisting have become a key theme in the shrinking free political field. Back in 2013, the homegrown humor employed during the Gezi Park Protests became a starting point for the expression of many radical ideas through satire - e.g., the criticism of the AKP rule and its media censorship with a penguin (Kaptan, 2016). The Gezi satire (re)shaped a whole range of cultural fields, including cartoon magazines, Twitter channels, and the walls (graffiti).

As the Gezi movement triggered a mass debate over "cultural hegemony," the pro-government circles responded to it—and imitated its satirical techniques while doing so—with their satire. For example, representing the pro-AKP social classes and themselves in it as the periphery and the cultural others, the popular humor magazine Misvak was founded (Nas, 2018). Such initiatives not only put into question the oppositional nature of the humor discourse but also spread the message to the in-group that having the government does not suffice to govern a country. The use of satire by pro-government groups suggests that they recognize the need to address and engage with the concerns and criticisms raised by the opposition. By adopting and adapting the opposition's satirical techniques, pro-

government groups demonstrate that they understand the power of humor as a means of political communication and persuasion.

A noteworthy repercussion of the Gezi satire was that it brought together the youths with different ideological backgrounds together against the government authority (Kaya, 2017). Not necessarily standing on the left or right of the political spectrum, their mutuality was to open up a space for a new imaginary of systemic change. Some were the social reformers of established parties, whereas others were the grassroots members of social movements or radical revolutionaries with an activist orientation. Although the process did not lead to a clear-cut direction for the political, social, and economic spheres, this spirit of collaboration for a systemic change, which emerged during the Gezi protests, continues to inspire and drive the efforts of young activists in Turkey.

Another offshoot of this co-radicalization trend is the rise of non-violent but offensive satire, which includes attacking political correctness, and, while doing so, ignoring the red lines of courtesy against racism, Islamophobia, or somewhat untouchable personal historical figures with retrospective legitimacy. This trend coincides with the increasing popularity of the alt-right digital culture and the accompanying "memetic warfare" (Merrin, 2019). While offensive satire can contribute to openness and diversity, crossing the lines of courtesy often leads to the perpetuation of stereotypes, reinforces the perceived boundaries, and, hence, fuels co-radicalization. As such, it often turns against the already marginalized communities, particularly those who belong to the minority. Moreover, it is relatively difficult for members of a minority group to use offensive satire as a tool for social commentary without risking their security.

Beyond satire, the recent manifestations of popular, arabesque, rap, or metal music serve as a nostalgic commodity, subversive politics, revolutionary chants, or a protest against the perceived discrimination and urban decay in the inner cities. Under the influence of neoliberal consumer culture, even the most protest genres have been mainstreamed, and hence, lost their previous signification of deep discontent for specific groups. Interestingly, however, the post-Gezi medium of subversive politics has suggested that even popular music can articulate subversive politics—i.e., within arguable limits (Way, 2016). The power of music videos is being harnessed by activists to challenge popular stereotypes. By using "mash-up techniques," they offer an alternative perspective that promotes solidarity and resistance against what they consider the "dominant political discourse" (Jenzen et al., 2019).

Rap music provides an alternative political communication platform in Turkey, among other divided societies. Including Rapzan Belagat, Norm Ender, and Sagopa

Kajmer, a group of rappers problematize the national public debates on human rights and social inequalities by going beyond the traditional fault lines (Buhari-Gülmez, 2017). Also in the Middle East and North Africa, rap music appears as a subversive political expression. For instance, in Morocco, rappers like El Haqed and Don Bigg have used their music to address issues such as political corruption (Salime, 2015). In Tunisia, El Général, Balti, and Phenix have played a crucial role in representing the 2011 Tunisian Revolution (Ovshieva, 2013). In Egypt, Asfalt and Arabian Knightz criticized police brutality and government suppression during the Arab Uprising (Williams, 2010). By incorporating these themes into their music, they bring attention to pressing social issues and take a stance against the status quo.

Focusing on rap music as a medium for political expression would also lead to communication between Middle Eastern studies and that of other regional contexts. In France, rappers like Médine, Kery James, and IAM have used their music to explore similar themes related to immigration, racism, and national identity (Dotson-Renta, 2015). In the United States, rappers like Kendrick Lamar and Childish Gambino have addressed issues such as police brutality and racial injustice (Bonnette, 2015). In Latin America, artists like Residente, Ana Tijoux, and Calle 13 have instrumentalized their music to address issues of social inequality and political corruption (Pinchot, 2020).

Conclusion

The notion of co-radicalization has become an explanatory term since it helps social scientists understand the dynamics of current forms of radicalization among young groups who are mostly clustered in civilizational, ethno-cultural, and religious terms by the neoliberal forms of governance models. The term is explanatory because it demonstrates that individuals who are exposed to similar forms of socio-economic, political, spatial, and psychological deprivation tend to mutually radicalize each other with an emphasis on their ethno-cultural and religious differences. This kind of co-radicalization results from the lack of communication and dialogue among these young populations as they are clustered into distinct ethno-cultural and religious compartments, or communities, by neoliberal states that are no longer interested in reassembling the social.

Turkey has also been going through a similar kind of neoliberalism under the AKP rule, which is politically and socially polarizing society and fragmenting it into ethno-cultural and religious communities without communication and dialogue through the use of a populist political style. While the study offers preliminary insights into the issue, certain areas require further focus for a more in-depth analysis. "Nativist versus migrant", "Türkiye versus Syrian", "Islamist versus

nationalist", and "Kemalist versus Islamist" are just some of the societal divides that we have tried to analyze in the article using the notion of co-radicalization. The article employs the concept of co-radicalization to understand youth movements, political mobilization, and unconventional forms of political participation in Turkey and beyond.

While our framework represents an attempt to bring a concept to a new regional context, we acknowledge that the article would benefit from further focus on certain areas. One such area is the identification of a wide array of actors involved in co-radicalization, which requires different units of analysis to be employed simultaneously. In addition, our aim was not to provide comprehensive evidence and analysis in each section, but rather introductory discussions with a broad focus. With this objective at the onset, future research on co-radicalization in Turkey shall develop a structured analysis of the three areas we introduced.

We contend that the framework of co-radicalization can also be useful in the broader Middle East, a melting pot of diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious communities, and particularly susceptible to the forces that have contributed to the fragmentation observed in Turkey. Among these forces are neoliberal governmentality, colonialism, the state monopoly over religion, and the legacy of authoritarianism. That being said, it is crucial to distinguish the study of co-radicalization from the scapegoating and labeling of entire populations as radical. We aim to better understand the complex dynamics that lead to societal divisions, not to perpetuate the stigmatizing stereotypes. By doing so, we can develop more effective and inclusive policies to promote social cohesion and harmony in an alarmingly polarized world.

Notes

[1] For more detailed discussion on these issues in the European context see (Aeschbach, 2017; Cas, 2014; Kaya, 2019a; Maskaliūnaitė, 2015; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017).

[2] For the official website of the research, see the Istanbul Bilgi University PRIME Youth Website https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/

[3] Due to the lack of space, this article could not delve into a detailed depiction of Social Movements Theory that sheds light on the root causes of youth radicalization. Scholars like Charles Tilly, Craig Calhoun and Donatella della Porta underlined the relational aspects of radicalization, claiming that social groups that are excluded from legitimate political grounds are likely to become radicalized over time as a response to their perceived political, socio-economic, and cultural exclusion. Social Movement Theory draws our attention to the changes occurring in encounters between social movements and authorities in a series of

reciprocal adjustments. For further details, see (Calhoun, 2011; Della Porta, 2014; Tilly, 1977).

[4] See in the context of racial attitudes between Whites and Blacks, (Stephan et al., 2002). See in the context of the mutual hostilities between Americans and Russians, (Landry et al., 2022).

[5] The virtual spaces—e.g., social media, television, and online platforms—play a role in amplifying the fear of crime associated with foreigners in general, and migrants in particular. The media channels that amplify such fear often enter virtual clashes with the channels that migrant populations rely on. See (Filibeli & Ertuna, 2021; Jacobs et al., 2017).

[6] For a more nuanced discussion on this issue, see (Nişancı, 2023). The survey reveals that deism is higher in younger and more educated populations in Turkey (pp. 197-198).

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The Sudan's Incorporation into the Capitalist World-Economy through Modern Cultivation and Trade of Cotton

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Abstract: Before the 19th century, the Sudan had a distinctive social system in which decentralized kingdoms held the political power. The article assumes that this intersocietal system entered a process of incorporation into the capitalist world-economy in the 19th century. Early modernization policies pursued in the Sudan during the Turco-Egyptian administration between 1821-1885 period, known as the Turkiyya. This rule shifted to the Anglo-Egyptian administration in 1899, after British forces defeating the short-lived Mahdist rule. Upon establishment of the new condominium government, the Sudan became a peripheral supplier of the expanding world economy. Throughout the peripheralization, the British gained control of raw materials such as gum arabic and cotton from the Nile valley, which were then transported to factories located in the mainland England. This article investigates economic incorporation process of the Sudan, specifically focusing on the Gezira Scheme, established with a colonial mentality, and mainly based on cotton production. The effect of this process was evident during the 1930s, when the country had been seriously impacted by the global economic crisis of 1929.

Keywords: Sudan, Capitalism, World-Economy, Colonialism, Hegemony

Introduction

There were two kingdoms in the Sudan before the 19th century: The sultanates of the Keira in Darfur and the Funj in Sennar. Sultans played a major role in controlling and governing these kingdoms, despite also exploiting them. Sultans in both kingdoms administered trade with the outside world and controlled much of the supply within the sultanate until the introduction of coins, at the first half of the 18th century (O'Fahey & Spaulding, 2017, p. 56). The sultan also enjoyed a significant degree of control over subsistence production with his provincial magnates (Edwards, 1998, p. 180). On the other hand, Sultans maintained a relatively large army to protect themselves, their kingdoms, and their subjects. Within both Sultanates, military power was a key element in the maintenance of the state. Raiding and plundering in the periphery and taxation in the more productive core of state became a policy. Through raiding Sultans used slaves to reinforce royal possessions and incorporated them into their armies (Edwards,

1998, p. 181). Moreover, they controlled long-distance trade, which provided them excessive power. El Zain (1996) introduces the idea that the Funj Sultanate was established around 1504 through an alliance between the Funj and the Arabs. "The alliance formed a political and administrative system based on the division of power between the Funj kings in Sennar and the tribal leaders in their territories" (El Zain, 1996, p. 524). Consequently, the kingdom cannot be described as a centralized state in terms of power relations; according to El Zain (1996), it was a confederal state between ruler Africans and subaltern Arabs. For instance, the Funj Sultanate was founded by tribes that were non-Muslim, non-Arab and, originated from the south. The state they established followed traditional African patterns of kingship (Kramer et al. 2013, p. 63). Later Arabs from the north became shareholders in governance. Sufism became the main provider of a sense of unity among the people and stability throughout the region. It can be inferred from that there had been an "intersocietal system" with its unique features existed in Sudan until 1821. On the other hand, one recent study supposes autonomy of frontier polities were one of three characteristics of the "16-18th century-Ottoman international system", in which the Funj sultanate pursued independent policies having limited interaction with Ottoman capital, Istanbul (Balci and Kardaş, 2023, p. 4, 24).

Small scale trade had existed in Sudan, in which mainly based on barter under the Funj Sultanate (Warburg, 1989, pp. 778-779). Over time, the sultan's role of organising international trade was gradually taken over by profit-seeking merchants (Niblock, 1987, p. 4). Their influence and power grew as they became more involved in trade. Niblock describes that, by the end of the 17th century, a variety of foreign currencies were used in trade, with the Spanish dollar becoming the standard currency in the next century. Consequently, the Sultan was no longer able to control prices effectively. It became evident that foreign influence began to exert a significant impact on Sudan through merchant trade in "the long sixteenth century". The Turco-Egyptian regime, which lasted from 1821 to 1885, established a new political system that implemented centralized governance. Therefore, the Sudan split from its tradition of kingship during the Muhammad Ali regime of Egypt (1805-48), when modern form of centralized government was introduced. I argue that the Sudan's integration into the global capitalist system began under this centralized government and continued throughout the rule of his son Khedive Ismail (1863-79). The Sudan possessed abundant resources when the Egyptians arrived, but it was needed to improve its internal infrastructure through central administration and explore external markets to sell its raw materials. British merchants became the primary purchasers of Sudan's raw materials in the Turkiyya period. Ottoman domination of the Sudan persisted until the late 19th century when the British Empire began to exert its own influence in the region especially after the opening of Suez Canal in 1869.

Britain had previously been a hegemonic power in the mid-19th century, and its domination stemming from political, economic, and military power, continued worldwide, as it competed with other European colonial powers, such as France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy, particularly in Africa. Khedive Ismail was deposed by the Sultan in 1879 because of increasing pressures of the European Powers. Due to mismanagement administration of the Khedivate and outbreak of the Mahdist rebellion, Britain intervened into Egyptian affairs, suppressed Urabi revolt of 1882 and created dual government in Cairo. Moreover, Britain was not indifferent to events occurring in the Sudan secured its 'influence' over the country during the Berlin Conferences of 1884-85. The Mahdist forces, which had risen against the Ottoman administration in 1881, were defeated by the British and Egyptian forces in the Battle of Omdurman in 1898. This victory marked the beginning of the British control over the Sudan, a control that lasted until Sudan gained its independence in 1956. After the end of the Mahdist rule, British diplomats successfully persuaded Belgian and Italian negotiators and eventually 'convinced' the French after the Fashoda Crisis and left the Sudan to Egyptian governance under British guidance (Abdel Rahim, 1987, p. 28). Subsequently, Britain established their own colonial administration in the region. When the British agreed to the condominium agreement in 1899, the existing system persisted, and Sudan's level of incorporation into the world-system was further solidified through the establishment of large-scale long-staple cotton production schemes near the Nile River. This article argues that the intersocietal system of the Sudan was fully incorporated into the modern world-system as a peripheral unit, especially during the time of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Government. What particularly appealed to the British in the Sudan was cotton. It was determined that the climate along the Nile River was suitable for cotton cultivation. In this regard, the Gezira Scheme was initiated to harvest cotton in raw form, and it became one of the largest systems in Africa. Muslim nomads, semi-nomads and rain land farmer had already transformed into tenants, wage workers, seasonal immigrants in the commercialized territories of the region. In fact, when the global financial crisis occurred in 1929, Sudan's economy was severely affected. These serve as clear evidence of Sudan's level of incorporation into the modern world-economy.

How the intersocietal system in the pre-modern Sudan incorporated into expanding capitalism and its peripheralization in this process is the main concern of the research. The study delves into the incorporation and peripheralization of the country in the modern world-economy through the lens of world-systems theory. To understand degree of colonization during the condominium government and sufferings of the country hit by world wars and global economic crises, several statistical data and one map were used: Comparisons on world export numbers of gum arabic under different regimes and with different African states to illustrate integration of the raw into global markets, annual state revenue and government expenditure during the condominium government to show impacts of those war

and crises, the role of British loans for facilitating the scheme and managing director Arthur Gaitskell's map depicting the Gezira Scheme on the map of England for revealing colonial mentality and commercialization of the land, volumes on irrigated cotton areas and production between 1925-52 and financial returns to the government, the syndicate and tenants to demonstrate proletarianization of the labour, finally, Sudan's cotton export value and its proportion in total exports in 1920-38 to crystallize irreversible incorporation of the country as a peripheral country. Before the conclusion, structural issues of post-independent Sudanese economy, problems sourcing from monoculture production traditionally on cotton and recently oil after US hegemony will be briefly discussed.

World-Systems Theory, Economic Imperialism, and Peripheralization

World-Systems Analysis (WSA) emerged in the 1970s to explain the global political economy by examining historical development and ongoing interactions between the core and the periphery. The emergence of this analysis can be evaluated as a response to the dominance of modernization theory in the social sciences, offering a different perspective on the same phenomena. The theoretical foundations of the analysis can be traced back to Fernand Braudel and the Annales History School. Braudel aimed to create a new study discipline that encompasses all social sciences. He (2009, p. 171) emphasized this goal with a simple statement: "There is a general crisis in the human sciences... they now need to work collectively". The Annales School symbolizes the pursuit of a new human science, led by its most renowned scholar, Braudel. He criticizes narrow focus of each discipline on its specific area of expertise. For example, historians often focus solely on the narrative of the past, while geographers confine to studying mountains, rivers, lakes, and so on. Braudel argues that scholars should adopt a methodology that encompasses all disciplines, including sociology, history, geography, political science, anthropology, ethnography, mathematics and even statistics. This approach advocates for interdisciplinary studies that draw from neighbouring disciplines. In this context, Braudel criticizes episodic narrative of historians (of event history), which is a traditional teaching method in history at conventional schools. In contrast, the Annales School emphasizes the significance of the long duration (la long durée) rather than focusing solely on short-term events from a narrow perspective. Braudel introduces the concept of 'structural history', referring to the extended time frames of a dozen years and the underlying structures that shapes human societies and economies within a limited geographical space over extended periods. Scholars of World-System Analysis have been influenced by Braudel's innovative approach to the social sciences, using it to analyse the roots of inequalities within the world-system and develop their critical stance toward modernization theory. Chase-Dunn and Grimes' (1995, pp. 388-389) article on World-Systems Analysis defines the modern world-system:

> 'It is understood as a set of nested and overlapping interaction networks that link all units of social analysis – individuals, households, neighbourhoods, firms, towns and cities, classes and regions, national states and societies, transnational actors, international regions, and global structures.'

According to Wallerstein (1974a), the world-system concept encompasses culturally diverse societies interconnected through exchange of food and raw materials. Consequently, Europe-centred modern world-system is recognized as the first capitalist system in history. Wallerstein argues that previous systems evolved into 'world empires', where an empire absorbed both core and peripheral regions, as seen in the cases of Rome and China. However, the modern world-system has not experienced this type of empire-building. Instead, certain core countries establish hegemony over other regions, a phenomenon known as "hegemonic sequence", which has been achieved by only three states: The Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. Moreover, the modern world-system has started to incorporate other societal systems, including the Ottoman Empire and China. Additionally, the tributary mode of production has transitioned into the capitalist mode of production. Population growth, technological advancement, expansion of firms, state formation and commodification are all significant factors in this transition process, as described by Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995).

Wallerstein (1974b, p. 391) analyses the emergence of modern world-economy in the sixteenth-century Europe, a period that witnessed the development and economic predominance of market trade. Braudel refers to this century as the "long sixteenth century" spanning from 1450 to 1640. Wallerstein identifies a discontinuity in economic and political institutions during this century. In his essay (1997), "The inequalities of core and periphery", he examines the emergence of a world-system in Europe. In the northwest of Europe, referred as the core, Wallerstein observes existence of absolute monarchy, bureaucracy, and standing armies. In contrast, Poland is described as the periphery, where there was a lack of a strong state and existence of the second serfdom. He also analyses decline of state authority in Spanish America and Christian Mediterranean, which became semi-peripheral regions within the world-system. The modern world-system exhibits a power hierarchy between core, periphery, and semi-periphery. The concepts of core and periphery describe uneven distribution of wealth, power, and resources in the global economy. Core countries are characterized by high levels of economic development, advanced technological capabilities, and strong political influence. In contrast, periphery countries are less developed, possess limited technological capabilities, and have weaker political standing. "Core" societies tend to dominate and exploit weaker and less affluent "peripheral" societies (Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995, p. 389). Semi-periphery occupies an intermediary position between core and periphery. These are the fundamental features of world-system analysis as articulated by scholars as Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank,

Christopher Chase-Dunn and Peter Grimes. It is worth noting that Giovanni Arrighi, Perry Anderson, and Samir Amin have also contributed to this perspective.

The article is written in the perspective of World-Systems Analysis, and it aims to analyse Sudan's incorporation into the modern world-system as a periphery country and its integration into global markets. In this context, incorporation refers to "the outward expansion of the capitalist world economy" (Wallerstein, 1997, pp. 145-146) and Sudan's position within this framework will be examined. Sudan's integration into global markets occurred primarily through the export of its raw materials, especially cotton and gum arabic, which will be discussed. The article will examine the Gezira Scheme, a significant cotton production system established in the Sudan. It will draw upon interpretations from major works on the Sudan and include relevant statistical data about the country. The influence of the British Empire on Sudan's incorporation will also be studied because Britain was the hegemonic power in the 19th century and maintained its domination until the beginning of the Second World War. During their economic hegemony, each of these core states achieved a high level of productivity and capital accumulation relative to other regions (Chase-Dunn, 1978, p. 160). Hegemonic powers established a new set of rules and norms for the international system, based on their own values and interests. Capital accumulation reached its peak in the middle of 18th century for British traders, however, the country's high level of productivity persisted throughout the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. Arrighi (1999) primarily focused on the concept of the hegemonic sequence and analysed the establishment of the global market by Britain for these reasons.

Britain played a pivotal role in maintaining the balance of power system, which contributed to long periods of peace in Europe. Concurrently, the British promoted trade liberalization in the Western world and expanded their dominance in colonies while perpetuating their expansion into other regions. In the non-Western world, this expansion was often achieved through coercion and the British Empire's ability to forcibly extract resources from non-Western peoples (Arrighi, 1999, pp. 219-223). Cotton held significant resource for the British and after defeating the Mahdist forces, newly established Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Government explored that Sudan's climate was well-suited for cotton cultivation. Therefore, I will explain that there was no discontinuity with the condominium and the previous administrations. Before the Mahdist forces seized the power, Turco-Egyptian administration under the leadership of Muhammad Ali initiated the process of integrating the country into to the modern world-system. Although this process was interrupted during the Mahdist period, it was accelerated by the condominium government, which was established in 1899.

Chase-Dunn and Hall expand the world-systems concept even further. They (2018, p. 7) define world-systems as intersocietal networks in which interactions such as trade, warfare, intermarriage play a crucial role in reproducing the internal

structures of the composite units and significantly influence changes occurring in the local structures. The article argues that there was a world-system in the Sudan before the Egyptians and British invaded the region. Touched upon in the introduction part, the intersocietal system in the region had been existed through intersocietal hierarchies and the administration of the empires. When the Egyptian troops invaded the region and established a central administration, the Sudan began to be incorporated into the modern world-system hierarchically as periphery. The European core powers sought raw materials from undiscovered regions of the world, so-called terra incognita, by absorbing unknown world-systems. After the establishment of the British hegemony on the Sudan, a large scheme was established for cotton cultivation. The features of the Gezira Scheme as a great project on the Nile basin will serve as an example of how capitalist mode of production are embedded in its operation. The production within the scheme and the 'growth' of the Sudanese economy will be analysed, thus, the country's integration into capitalist world-economy can be assessed.

The Sudan in Modern Times: The Turco-Egyptian Rule and the British Colonization

The Ottomans first established a presence in the Sudan in the early 1820s through Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt, when they intervened in a local conflict between rival factions for control of the region. Initially intended to be temporary, the Ottoman intervention soon revealed that Sudan represented a valuable territory with access to resources and trade routes. Under Turco-Egyptian rule, the Sudan was organized as a province of the empire, with a local governor appointed to administer the region. The Ottomans implemented their own system of taxation and governance, resulting significant social and economic changes in the Sudan. The Turco-Egyptian rulers introduced various Egyptian and Ottoman coins; therefore, taxes were collected in cash (Warburg, 1989, pp. 779-780). Additionally, the Ottomans introduced new technologies and innovations, such as modern weapons and agricultural techniques, which contributed to the modernization of the region. According to Warburg (1991, p. 198), Muhammad Ali pursued imperial expansion primarily to secure a cheap labour force and warrior force, with his secondary goal being access to Sudan's natural resources.[1] Richard Hill (1959, p. 7), in his balanced study, clarifies those natural resources and includes "obtaining gold" among Muhammad Ali's objectives. However, regardless of his intentions, Muhammad Ali failed to achieve his goals (Warburg, 1991, p. 213). By accepting the misreading of the agricultural infrastructure as "pharaonic civilization" had trapped, he changed his policy near the end of his rule and began to decentralize control over water and land (Verhoeven, 2015, p. 47). However, outcome of the invasion was that transformation of the Sudan under centralized government, known as the "Turkiyya", and opening of the Sudan to global markets for the first time in its history. This transformation included establishment of a civil and

military administration with Khartoum as the strategically chosen capital in 1833. A bureaucratic structure emerged, featuring provincial and district officers responsible for land registration and tax collection, as well as central services for river steamers, postal services, and telegraphs (Kramer et al., 2013, p. 66). Other developments in the region included construction of a railway system by the Egyptians in a strategic area near Whadi Halfa, close to borders of Sudan and Egypt. This railway made it easier for goods from Sudan to reach the Egyptian delta. Harbour facilities were also improved, and new trade outlets was established for ocean-going vessels.

Additionally, the Egyptian state increased its influence in the Sudan, and established a monopoly over its external trade. However, after 1838, Egypt's economic domination declined, and European traders began to play a prominent role in the region. This shift could be attributed to the Treaty of Balta Liman signed between the Ottomans and the British. These European traders, particularly British, Austrian, and Italian traders, were mainly interested in acquiring ivory, gum arabic, and ostrich feathers (Niblock, 1987, p. 9). Their activities in the Sudan expanded in the following years, and to secure their economic interests, they established consulates in Khartoum. A chamber of commerce was founded, and there was an attempt to create the Banque du Soudan. Moreover, gum arabic emerged as a primary source in Sudan by 1880, as it was crucial producing confectionary and paper in Europe, with Britain being its largest user. Egyptian administrators recognized its importance and sought to establish it as a significant global market resource. Khedive Ismail pursued "civilizing mission" in the Sudan, on the belief that Egypt's superior civilization and adoption of modern technology by attributing the Sudan as the "southern province" during his rule (Warburg, 1989, p. 782). In the 1860s, a large quantity of gum arabic export had started from developing port Suakin in the Red Sea that created prosperity with the opening of the Suez Canal especially after 1869. However, the Egyptian general bankruptcy in the 1870s, failure of creating internal connections with the Port, and emergence of the Mahdist rebellion in 1881 halted those prospects. Finally, the Turco-Egyptian political power was overthrown by the Mahdist forces in 1885, leading to a further decline in promises related to gum arabic trade and the onset of economic deterioration for the Sudan.

El Tigani Mahmoud's (1981, p. 81) analysis on the Mahdist state provides information about authoritarian rule, a highly centralized administration, and the Khalifa's extensive political and executive powers. The centralization process was initiated by the Egyptian administrators and reached its peak under the Mahdist rulers. The short-lived Mahdist state in Sudan (1885-1898) fought against different internal and external forces. It fought with the Turco-Egyptian army after the siege of Khartoum in different times and places, Italian troops coming from Ethiopia, Belgian troops within southern regions and, finally, internal uprisings (Collins,

1976, p. 5). Britain decided to conquer the Sudan with Egyptian troops protecting her interests on the Nile waters and her investments in Africa. The Mahdist resistance took two years, and finally it was crushed. Although resistance movements emerged against Anglo-Egyptian troops, political control over the Sudan shifted to joint administration during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period started in 1899 and ended with Sudan's independence in 1956. During the condominium government rule, the Sudan was fully incorporated into the global world system as a peripheral unit. The British colonization of the Sudan can be viewed as an extension of 'Türkiye colonization' (El Zain, 1996, p. 525).[2]

Under the British rule, the Sudan was governed as a colony, with a governor appointed by the British government to oversee the region. The British implemented their own system of governance, which relied on indirect rule, enabling them to maintain control while reducing their direct involvement in local affairs. They also introduced new technologies and innovations, including modern transportation and communication infrastructure, contributing to the modernization of the region. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899, Article III:

> "The supreme military and civil command of the Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the 'Governor-General of the Sudan'. He shall be appointed by Khedivial Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government and shall be removed only by Khedivial Decree, with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government." (Abdel Rahim, 1987, p. 234)

The agreement designated Egypt as the sovereign decision-maker over the Sudan. However, Egypt had been under the British control since 1882, therefore, sovereignty over the Sudan was effectively constituted by Britain. Lord Cromer, a British agent and the consul-general in Egypt between 1883-1907, devised a hybrid form of government that was supervised from Egypt in alignment with British interests (Holt, 1961, pp. 110-111). According to the agreement, an officer was selected by the Egyptian administration to govern the country by taking desires of the British government into consideration. British soldiers such as Kitchener (1899), Wingate (1900-16), and Sir Lee Stack (1917-24) served as Governors-General in the Sudan between 1899 and 1924. In sum, the dual sovereignty of the administration could be summarized as the senior partner Britain and junior partner Egypt (Gaitskell, 1959, p. 30). On the other hand, the British hegemony over the Sudan was established and maintained through various means. The British Empire leveraged its superior military and economic power to quell local rebellions and maintain order across the region. Additionally, they forged robust trade connections with other nations in the area, ensuring a steady inflow of resources and wealth into British hands.

As mentioned before, the Muhammad Ali regime realized significance of gum arabic production in the Sudan. The regime's aim was to make it a global resource, but it failed due to the Mahdiyya revolt. The Sudan economy of 1898, at the end of the

Mahdist rule, was a subsistence economy with a little gum, ivory and ostrich feathers (Gaitskell, 1959, p. 32). The ultimate transformation of the subsistence economy into the capitalist economy and the integration of gum arabic into world markets were achieved successfully by the earlier condominium regime. Gaitskell (1959, pp. 36-37) notes that the lack of rail transport made a deadening effect on 'inexhaustible' and 'valuable' product of gum in Kordofan in the beginning of new century under the Wingate rule. Therefore, in 1900, its share in world markets was only 32 percent, however, as of 70 per cent in 1904 gave Sudanese gum dominance (Tignor, 1987, p. 186). In 1911, the construction of the railway line to Kordofan was finished, enabling convenient access from gum gardens of Kordofan to the Port Sudan (Mollan, 2020, p. 6). When the World War started in 1914, country's gum arabic export was 12,372 tons. Its production and export were increased due to its usage in making explosives and reached 15,490 tons in 1918 (Daly, 1987, p. 459). The Table 1 shows the distribution of gum arabic among producers, including Sudan, French West Africa, Nigeria, and Tanzania. In the 1926-29 period, Sudan had a 79.2 percent share of total gum arabic exports on a global scale. When the 1954-57 period is compared, Sudan increased its share to 85 percent, doubled the export amounts within thirty years. French West Africa had the similar world export numbers, but its share decreased to 9.9 percent, which was half of what it was thirty years before. Nigeria and Tanzania had a relatively small share of world gum arabic exports about 2 per cent. The Table 1 illustrates integration of gum arabic production in the Sudan into the world markets. It became a significant Sudanese resource in the global market, following cotton, during the time of the condominium government.

Table 1

World Exports of Gum Arabic (in tonnes with percentages in brackets; four-year averages)

Year	Sudan	French West Africa	Nigeria	Tanzania	Total
1926–29	20 890 (79.2)	4 850 (18.4)	75 (0.3)	575 (2.2)	26 390
1930–33	19 175 (76.8)	4 705 (18.9)	375 (1.5)	700 (2.8)	24 955
1934–37	21 485 (76.4)	5 330 (19.0)	525 (1.9)	775 (2.8)	28 115
1938–41	22 005 (72.0)	6 765 (22.1)	575 (1.9)	1 200 (3.9)	30 545
1942–45	14 980 (72.1)	3 035 (14.6)	1 450 (7.0)	1 300 (6.3)	20 765
1946–49	31 365 (78.2)	6 100 (15.2)	1 450 (3.6)	1 200 (3.0)	40 115
1950–53	37 950 (84.0)	3 990 (8.8)	1 760 (3.9)	1 485 (3.3)	45 185
1954–57	43 220 (85.0)	5 050 (9.9)	1 090 (2.1)	1 470 (2.9)	50 830

Source: A. A. Bishai, *Export Performance and Economic Development in Sudan* (Ithaca Press, London, 1976), p. 103.

Source: Niblock, 1987, p. 56.

In 1898, when the war was over, the annual revenue of the Sudan under ongoing embargo during the Mahdist period was only £E35,000 (Gaitskell, 1959, p. 32). When the rule of condominium government embarked on and releasing from economic embargo limiting exports by the Anglo-Egyptian administration, Sudan's annual revenue in 1899, was £E126,596 and its expenditure was £E230,238 (Niblock, 1987, pp. 337-338). By 1913, just before the outbreak of the First World War, the government revenue had increased to £E1,568,352 with the government expenditure reaching £E1,533,063, however, still showing characteristics of primitive economy without new sources of production. These numbers rose sharply to, after cotton integrated to world markets, £E6,981,590 in revenue and £E6,610,274 in expenditure by 1929 just before the world economic crisis struck the economy. Sudan's economy experienced its deepest decline in 1933, with revenue falling to £E3,693,570 and expenditure diminishing to £E3,521,957. These figures, especially for the period of 1929-33, provide evidence of the impact of world crises on the Sudan and underscore the country's level of integration into the capitalist world-economy. The numbers indicate that the Sudan had become a periphery under the Anglo-Egyptian rule, with revenue and expenditure remaining below £E6 million until the end of the Second World War. After the war, numbers began to rise again, particularly in 1950. This year marked nationalization of the scheme, with the syndicate yielding profits to the government. In the 1950/1 period, government revenue reached £E46,299,658, while expenditure was £E23,596,510 in the same period.

Peripheralization: The Function of the Gezira Scheme

"Africa's task, in the world of colonization, had been to produce the raw materials needed by machines and factories in the advanced (that is, industrialised) countries" (Davidson, 1994, p. 220). The Sudan, located in north-eastern Africa became the British colony, and its primary objective, rather than strategic considerations, was to supply discovered raw materials from the region to machines and factories established in Britain. Initially, the condominium government had to plan for greater integration of the country. In this regard, the railway system was expanded, and a new port, Port Sudan, near the Red Sea was constructed in 1909. The Gezira Scheme, a large agricultural project, began production of long-staple cotton. Gezira refers to the land between the White and the Blue Nile, and the scheme in Gezira cultivated cotton and sugar cane for textile factories in Lancashire.

The map depicted by Arthur Gaitskell (The Figure 1), who served as the managing director of the Gezira Scheme for many years, displays the scheme's layout on Great Britain, with the Sennar Dam representing London and Gezira in the place of Lancashire. As Gaitskell had developmentalist idea, it can be inferred from the map that the British 'civilization' permeated the Sudan and transferred its values to the

region. In this context, Sudan might have been considered a core country after planning of development and 'introduction to civilization' according to modernization theory. The values of rationality, discipline, and order are evident in the structure of the scheme. Additionally, this map can be interpreted as reflecting commercialization of land in the Sudan. Two law making attempts on the Sudanese territory, Title to Land Ordinance of 1899 and Land Settlement Ordinance of 1905, attempted to transform previously communally owned lands used by tribes converting into a commodity with a cash value based on labour power of peasants for lower wages (Collins, 1976, p. 10). Furthermore, Sudan had the potential to efficiently utilize its waters and farmlands through advanced organizational techniques, which could have propelled it to achieve economic development levels like core countries during the process of economic modernization. However, despite a century passed since the establishment of the scheme, the country remained a peripheral entity in the world-system.

Figure 1

The Gezira map depicted by Arthur Gaitskell

1. *The Gezira scheme superimposed on the map of England*

Source: Gaitskell, 1959, p. 5.

The outcome of Niblock's analysis on Sudan's economy during the colonial period indicates that the economy was shaped to meet Britain's needs. Furthermore, Britain's primary economic requirement at that time was cotton, and diversifying the longer and the finer cotton sources for Lancashire spinners. To boost cotton production throughout the country, the Sudan Experimental Plantation Syndicate was established in 1904 and registered in London. Later, it was discovered that the terrain and climate of the region were suitable for the cultivation of long-staple cotton. As an explorer and founder of the syndicate, entrepreneur Leigh Hunt searched for capital and investors (Mollan, 2020, pp. 84-86). When Hunt's interest waned as he was interested in other investments around the world, businessman Frederick Eckstein became Chairman of the renamed Company as the Sudan Plantations Syndicate in 1907. Moreover, the failure of American and Egyptian crops in 1909 increased the significance of irrigated cotton at Zeidab (Gaitskell, 1959, p. 54). The successful experience at Tayiba field in 1911 and 1912 attracted attention of the British government and investors. The assistance provided by colonial powers, in other words, the support of core countries to Africa, Davidson (1994, p. 58) argued that the continuity of aid for development signified the perpetuation of colonial exploitation. The condominium government borrowed £3 million from the British government in 1913, using it to finance the construction of a dam on the Blue Nile. However, development plans of facilities for great project to grow cotton was stalled because of the sudden start of the First World War. Eventually, the Gezira Scheme re-started to facilitate, became profitable investment at the end of the war and the British loan increased to £6 million in 1919. Confidence grown during the war years between the Sudan government and the Sudan Plantation Syndicate and two became ready to develop the scheme. By 1924, the British loan had increased to £14.92 million, and the dam construction (Sennar) on the Blue Nile was completed in 1925.[3] However, colonial relations between the two governments were deepened and the country became increasingly dependent on the London market, one of the centres of global capitalism.

"The Gezira Scheme represented the triumph of modern civilization over nature and ignorant traditions, which, in practice, meant the imposition of colonial order on the Sudanese landscape and society" (Bernal, 1997, p. 451). Although the process of integration into modern world-system began during the Muhammad Ali Regime, the Sudan was an economically underdeveloped country at the beginning of the 20th century and was on the verge of becoming a periphery. The Gezira project, as such a massive scheme, could only be planned by the British at that time, as they were the former hegemonic power with substantial financial resources. Moreover, construction of the largest scheme in the Gezira Plain can also be explained in the context of British imperial ambitions of controlling the Nile as insurance against Egypt (Young, 2018, p. 35). Furthermore, Britain required raw cotton for its textile industry in Lancashire and "aimed to save it from dependence on American cotton", prompted experimentation in the region and the idea of

constructing the scheme (Tvedt, 2004, p. 21). Britain had the necessary financial means to invest in the area, including the construction of dams, railways, roads, and other expenses. However, establishment of such a project involved reshaping the nature by human planners who applied techniques of the modern civilization.

Modern capitalist world in the beginning of the 20th century did not hold a deep respect for nature; instead pursued the policy of mastery over nature. This new mode of human domination realized with relevant technology overcoming natural challenges and cultivating land for economic purposes. In contrast, the local people inhabiting the area held mystic beliefs about the nature, which were disregarded by the 'civilizing' human. Prior to dam's construction in the 1920s, the people of the region comprised of nomads, semi-nomads, and rain land agriculturalists (MacLoughlin, 1963, p. 180). These local people were expected to work regularly and in a disciplined manner to provide the needed labour force. Local resistance to the British control was substantial, particularly among groups that felt marginalized or excluded from the benefits of colonialism. Additionally, the British administration was often perceived as oppressive and exploitative, leading to widespread dissatisfaction among the population. "The Gezira Scheme represented an attempt to create a (colonial) Sudanese society: a homogenous society of hardworking and disciplined peasants" (Bernal, 1997, p. 453). In fact, this implies the process of proletarianization of labour. Marx's approach to the capitalist system which causes alienation of man, overuse and degeneration of land, that prevents bioregional production meant only meeting the needs of the region (Ekmekcioglu & Dere, 2023, p. 150). Thus, the scheme served as a symbol of the transition from the tributary mode of production to the capitalist mode of production, as indicated with the features mentioned above. The process of commercializing the Sudanese land for 'supra-regional' objectives will be discussed and supported by statistics further below.

The Table 2 illustrates the increase of irrigated cotton areas and production between the years of 1925 and 1952, along with the financial returns to tenant, the government, and the manager. It is evident that both irrigated areas and production increased approximately fourfold, reaching significant figures. In 1925-26, irrigated areas covered 83,072 acres; and by 1950-51, they had expanded to 226,618 acres. Over the same period, cotton production grew from 38,096,790 in pounds to 137,605,311 in pounds. Regarding the financial returns, tenants earned £E936,246 in 1925-26 era, which rose to £E17,500,267 in 1950-51. The government also received £E17,500,267 in 1950-51, compared to £E713,417 in 1925-26. Meanwhile, for the manager, earnings increased from £E622,008 to £E8,750,134 over the twenty-five-year-period. However, 1930/31 cotton production data shows dramatic fall which created economic disaster for the incorporated Sudan into capitalist world-economy in the first half of the 1930s following the Great Depression. Manchester's consumption of cotton was also at its

lowest in 1931 between 1924-1938 (Mollan, 2020, p. 149). In the long term, the Table 2 suggests a significant increase in cotton irrigated areas and production. Financial returns also increased for both tenants and the government by a substantial amount. However, it is worth noting that tenants required more labour force as the area under irrigation and production expanded, which may explain why the total earnings for tenants did not show a significant change over the indicated years.

Table 2

Areas, Cotton Yields, and Financial Returns of the Gezira Scheme in Selected Years, 1925-1952

(Areas in acres. Production in pounds. Financial returns in £E.)

SEASON	TOTAL AREA COM-MANDED[a]	IRRIGATED AREAS[a] Cotton	Other crops	COTTON PRODUCTION Total	Per acre	FINANCIAL RETURNS[b] Tenants	Govern-ment	Manager
1925–26	311,400	83,072	42,834	38,096,790	459	936,246	713,347	622,008
1930–31	695,460	198,965	199,529	26,381,274	133	157,575	150,016	211,653
1935–36	695,460	192,817	117,342	68,112,723	353	831,143	790,104	556,506
1940–41	871,920	222,806	161,077	87,914,502	395	1,180,897	1,147,076	709,871
1946–47	871,920	222,895	217,090	82,053,425	368	2,715,870	2,696,510	1,465,512
1947–48	871,920	225,442	198,590	69,380,761	324	4,700,999	4,703,604	12,447,716
1948–49	871,920	225,358	201,309	87,164,594	406	5,527,932	5,527,932	2,763,967
1949–50	871,920	225,856	208,091	93,753,797	437	6,412,343	6,412,343	3,206,172
1950–51	882,300	226,618	195,774	137,605,311	648	17,500,267	17,500,267	8,750,134
1952	929,278							

Sources: E. Mackinnon: Blue Nile Province, in Agriculture in the Sudan [see text footnote 3], pp. 762–809, reference on p. 787; "The Gezira Scheme" [see text footnote 1], p. 3; J. S. R. Duncan: The Sudan: A Record of Achievement (Edinburgh and London, 1952), p. 224; Ferguson, *op. cit.* [see text footnote 9], p. 99; *Sudan Almanac 1952* [see text footnote 15], pp. 92 and 94; "Gezira Board's First Year" [see text footnote 41], p. 3.

[a] Approximate. In some bases figures include Abd el Magid area, administered separately from the main Gezira.

[b] One £E = $2.87 (1952).

Source: Hance, 1954, p. 262.

The administration of the scheme was consisted of three main entities: the government, the syndicate (referred to as the manager in Table 2), and the tenants. According to revised agreement in 1929, the Anglo-Egyptian government received 40 per cent of the total share and was responsible for constructing canals and dams (Daly, 1987, p. 425). The syndicate, responsible for the general administration of the scheme, received 20 percent of the share. The Sudan Plantation Syndication Ltd. and Kassala Cotton Company managed the scheme until its nationalization in 1950. There were approximately 30,000 tenants (with families 140,000 persons) in Gezira who received 40 percent of the share (MacLoughlin, 1963, p. 182).[4] Tenants owned the land, but the distribution of feddan (for example, 40 feddan per tenant) led to inequality among tenants, as those with more land received a larger share within unequal framework. "Large landowners were able to obtain a significantly larger share in the scheme than smaller landowners or those without land" (Niblock, 1987, p. 15). While there was already inequality in the Sudan under the sultan's rule, the establishment of the modern scheme in the region deepened this inequality.

This can be observed in the distribution of shares among the three partners. Furthermore, it can be argued that the distribution of land to tenants created additional inequality among landowners. The tenants employed nearly 450,000 workers on the cash crop lands, but these workers received a very low share in the scheme.

Sudan's cotton export value and its proportion in total exports of the country can be inferred from the Table 3. The year 1922 in the table demonstrates the minimum value of cotton exports as £E405,233. The same year signifies the least proportional value for cotton export in total exports of the country (18 per cent). Due to the opening of the Gezira Scheme, the value of cotton exports increased dramatically to £E4,981,732 nearly tenfold in the year 1929 as the percentage of total exports tripled and represented by cotton from 18 percent (1922) to 76 per cent (1929). The numbers on the value of cotton exports in the year 1929 were even higher the value of all exports during the years 1920-1928. While the year 1929 represents highest value and percentage, the year 1931 shows sharp decrease in both currents as the Sudanese economy hit by global economic crisis. The Table 3 clearly demonstrates Sudan's dependency on, vulnerability to cotton production, its export to world markets and the country's irreversible incorporation into the modern world-economy as a peripheral colony. The incorporation also influenced the producers in the field, they might use hedging system like manufacturers and traders, buying future contracts to cover unsold portions of their crop, and to tackle with floating market (Gaitskell, 1959, p. 184). Furthermore, Liverpool Cotton Association followed protective policy starting from mid-1930s and created several contracts for the Egyptian and Sudan crop that made the market, especially marketing of Gezira cotton, manipulative to speculators (Gaitskell, 1959, p. 187).

Table 3

Sudan Cotton Exports, 1920-1938

Year	Value of all exports (£E)	Value of cotton exports (£E)	Percentage of total exports represented by cotton (%)
1920	4,712,652	1,693,006	36
1921	2,057,230	444,892	22
1922	2,298,770	405,233	18
1923	2,562,000	529,423	21
1924	3,562,000	1,617,660	45
1925	2,801,000	1,756,053	63
1926	4,876,000	3,091,359	63
1927	4,965,000	3,549,704	71
1928	5,635,000	3,987,964	71
1929	6,526,000	4,981,732	76
1930	4,953,000	3,252,076	66
1931	1,734,000	641,718	37
1932	3,798,000	2,341,314	62
1933	2,605,000	1,576,716	61
1934	3,849,000	2,173,557	56
1935	4,567,000	2,736,579	60
1936	5,581,000	3,665,630	66
1937	8,130,000	5,906,675	73
1938	5,490,000	3,659,614	67

Source: Mollan, 2008, p. 97.

Hance (1954, p. 262) pointed out that Gezira supplied about one-quarter of the revenues before the Second World War, but later it contributed to close to three quarters. This change in the numbers demonstrates the government's increasing dependency on Gezira. Thus, in the end, the government not only became more dependent but also profited from the scheme as Britain prepared to withdraw from Sudan, and world domination shifted entirely to the United States after the Second World War. With Britain's withdrawal process, her share in Sudan's total foreign trade weight dropped from its peak of 66.52% in 1951 to 32.95% in the year of independence in 1956 and to 26.09% in 1959 (Mollan, 2020, p. 206). At the aftermath of the nationalization of the Gezira Scheme and the post-independence period, state of Sudan faced difficulties in marketing its cotton due to loss of its primary market, which was London. "Most of the cotton [was] marketed in the United Kingdom; small quantities went to India and other countries, particularly in Western Europe" (Hance, 1954, p. 263). Moreover, foreign trade became heavily dependent on core countries. "About 75 percent of its exports went to Western Europe and North America and more than 50 percent of imports came from those areas" (Niblock, 1987, p. 47). The core-periphery economic relations between developed countries and Sudan were fully established when it became an 'independent' state de jure. Barnett (2019, p. 19) stresses two structural issues on post-independent Sudanese economy: On the first glance, the Gezira Scheme could be viewed as success after fifty years, but Sudan stayed an exporter of primary products and an importer of manufactured products even basic foods. The other issue was that dependence upon "cotton monoculture" placed Sudan in an unstable economic position. External buyers could fix price for Sudanese cotton; therefore, its price was not determined by internal costs of production. AbdelRahman (1998, p. 95) indicates having "monoculture economy" dependent on cotton production, Sudan experienced acute balance of payments crises that allowed room for dependency syndrome in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the state suffered from its centralized political system, which derived from the Turkiyya and the British legacy. In fact, the country became increasingly dependent on cotton production as the population grew, satisfying need for labour force. The scheme also became more valuable because it provided food for the growing population and expanded with the Managil extension constructed from 1956 to 1969. Gaafar Nimeiry's top-down mechanized capital-intensive agriculture policy, "breadbasket strategy", followed he held power in 1969, shifted Sudan into agricultural superpower of Africa and the Middle East for a limited period in the 1970s and the 1980s, however, famine reverted to Sudan while food was exported to outside (Verhoeven, 2015, p. 63, 70). When famine occurred in the 1980s, the Sudanese people paid a heavy price for their dependency on capitalist modernization implemented in the first half of the century and socialist modernization strategy in the second half of the century on the scheme pursued by the condominium government and the Nimeiry regime.

The United States, the new hegemon from 1945 to 67, had searched for different raw materials in the region, primarily oil, as a valuable resource, especially after losing access to Iranian oil. This quest for oil became significant after the OPEC crisis in the 1970s. Sudan's eleven-year-peace period from Addis Ababa Agreement signed in 1972, which provided limited autonomy to southern Sudan, ended with oil discovery in these regions. The commercial exploitation shifted to Sudan's oil resources since the 1990s, at the same time, meant for a vast transformation of the country's economy. It should be noted that oil became the country's dominant export commodity instead of formerly mentioned raw materials. The OPEC crisis experience, and the rise of the centrifugal powers and quest for becoming a regional power in the multipower world resulted both diversification of discovery for oil resources and competition on these sources. Once again, Sudan became the focus of foreign investment flows on the increasing petroleum sector. The country was satisfied from considerable duration of peace between northern and southern groups in the first decade of the 21st century. As a result, oil in 2008 became accounted for 96 per cent of Sudan's total export revenue (James, 2008, p. 145). However, the economic downturn in 2008 and sharp drop in oil prices again demonstrated Sudan's vulnerability in a time of global economic crisis. As the former cotton example demonstrated, due to volatile prices of oil in global markets, Sudan has had high risks because of vulnerability sourcing from dependence upon a single commodity which had been completely incorporated into the capitalist world-economy.

Conclusion

Sudan has become a peripheral country in the modern world-system, which is essentially a capitalist world-economy according to World-Systems Analysis (WSA). The WSA provided the theoretical background in the writing process of this article, and as a result, the article was not intended to create a 'new' historical narrative for Sudan. Instead, it tried to analyse the structure and fixed relations within the country. In this context, I explained the existence of an earlier intersocietal system in the Sudan, which was subsequently incorporated into the modern world-system. The Turco-Egyptian Government had different characteristics compared to earlier times and introduced new features to the country. The most significant change was the establishment of a centralized system that aimed at the internal and external integration of the country. When the British defeated the Mahdist rulers, entire structure of the country underwent a complete transformation in preparation for colonization. The political relations were shaped by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement, which solidified British domination over the Sudan. In terms of economic relations, the Gezira Scheme serves a prime example, and both the numerical aspects and the underlying logic behind it was analysed as rooted in colonial mentality and the capitalist mode of production.

The concept of hegemonic sequence is instrumental in understanding the long duration. Although Britain held hegemonic power, particularly in the 19th century, its military and economic dominance persisted until the conclusion of the Second World War. Consequently, it was one of the foremost colonial powers when it entered the Sudan. It is essential to recall that Britain was the first industrialized nation and rose to the status on the hegemonic power within the international system. This context helps explain Britain's objectives for Sudan and its economy's need for raw materials. She possessed considerable military strength, enabling it to enforce its policies without consent from other countries. As mentioned, Britain legitimized its domination over the Sudan through the Egyptian administration via the condominium agreement. Thus, the 'infrastructure' of exploitation was laid through British loans. Establishing the Gezira Scheme, spearheaded by British efforts, facilitated cotton production, and subsequently led to the country's integration into global markets. The statistical data on irrigated areas, cotton production, and financial returns to tenants, government and managers provided evidence of land commercialization and transformation of labour into proletariat. Dependence upon cotton monoculture created instability for its inhabitants and placed Sudan in an unstable position in the world of trading countries and treated as an unequal partner.

For future studies, Sudan's extensive oil reserves present an intriguing avenue for exploration, particularly, in the realm of oil politics under post-colonial conditions. The ascent of the US hegemony, as delineated in Arrighi's research, began the Second World War aftermath. The US in the 1970s sought to fill the power vacuum stemming from British decline in the region. During this era of US hegemony, oil assumed a pivotal role, akin to the significance of cotton as a raw material for the British industry and their hegemonic endeavours. Consequently, it would be beneficial to investigate oil politics within Sudan after the US hegemony through the lenses of the multipolar world and its subsequent phases. The 2011 referendum, Sudan's separation process into two, Asia-Pacific and Gulf Region's increasing influence, and consortium agreements also offers a rich area of analysis within the context of core-periphery relations, including dimension of hegemony in the period of new colonialist conditions. The quest for oil in the Sudan coincided with US sanctions against Sudan in the multi-polar world in which China, India, Malaysia, and the Gulf States became influential in Sudanese politics and competitive in oil extraction in the new century.

Notes

1. In this study, Warburg clarifies conflicting Sudanese and Egyptian narratives of historians on the pre-independent Sudan.
2. Türkiye usage here by El Zain mainly refers to the Turco-Egyptian governance by Muhammad Ali Pasha and other hereditary rulers from his blood ties. I might say that it refers to foreign rule for the locals.

3. Another resource indicates the overall levels of debt reaching to £13 million (Mollan, 2020, p. 176).
4. Unofficial numbers estimate closer to 50,000 (MacLoughlin, 1963, 182).

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
One Universal Civilization: Superiority and Eurocentric Conception of the Rest

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Abstract: The prevailing notion suggests a universal or human civilization, positing all as subsets of a shared human experience. This article critiques this perspective, arguing that the contemporary concept of human civilization is predominantly synonymous with Western civilization. This article will elucidate its argument by drawing upon the insights of Western scholars in the field of civilizational studies. Subsequently, it will undertake a critical assessment and examination of the Western discourse, evaluating its outcomes as evidenced in contemporary foreign policy shaped by the historical backdrop of colonialism. The article uses direct quotations and historical narratives to not only scrutinize the inclination to depict Western civilization as singular, extraordinary, and unparalleled but also to highlight the persistent tendency to undervalue the importance of other civilizations, often termed as 'the rest.' The notion of Western civilization is depicted as a constructed political construct utilized to perpetuate Western hegemony, engender othering, and perpetuate colonialist agendas. This dynamic persists in the post-Cold War era, and ongoing Western hegemony perpetuates dominance over non-Western powers. Instances reflecting this neo-colonialist paradigm include the US intervention in Iraq, the conflict in Afghanistan, and the ongoing Israeli military campaign in Gaza as of late 2023.

Introduction

In contemporary times, thinking about civilization leads some to argue, deliberately and unwittingly, that we, as human beings, all live in one human or universal civilization. This comes from persistent post-enlightenment ideas of progress and the linear march of humanity towards modernity (Bell, 2002). So, there is no need to think of any role to be played by multiple civilizations, such as Christian, Chinese, or Muslim civilizations. In other words, through globalization, technology, and developments, humans are better able to connect and exchange their 'universal' ideas and values. This raises the question of whether the term civilization is a neutral and objective concept that all nations and groups of people would accept. This article demonstrates that the idea of civilization is used by a number of Western thinkers, philosophers, historians, and social scientists to rationalize colonialism and the superiority of the white race and for constructing a Eurocentric hegemonic discourse and conception of world politics, with the

implicit expectation of its universal acceptance. The argument posits that there exists a singular universal civilization, which is often defined within the parameters of Western conceptualizations, thereby leading to its interchangeability with terms such as 'human civilization' or 'universal civilization'.

This article defines civilization as an organized society grounded on a constructed set of values, religion, culture, and rationale. This set is supposed to offer insights into individual and collective behavior and develop the mechanisms for a better and more just society wherein a society can thrive freely and peacefully. Civilization also indicates the perception of the self, the other, and the system of ethics and how things ought to be or should not be. Thus, civilization is a political concept that indicates an imagination of the self and its relations with others. By delineating specific attributes as markers of 'civilization,' it inadvertently perpetuates a binary framework wherein 'others' are portrayed in contrast as 'barbaric,' 'uncivilized,' or 'savage.'

It is argued here that this notion of a standard, universal human civilization is a fallacy and a delusion to justify and impose a particular exclusive Western discourse and domination over all civilizations. The objective here is to unpack some aspects of the Eurocentric discourse, its sense of superiority, and the claim of universality and neutrality regarding the concept of Western civilization. The article aims to demonstrate how the concept of civilization is often used as a weaponized concept, highlighting Western dominion and imperialism. The article will initially reference influential Western intellectuals to elucidate the inherent intellectual challenges in the Western perspective of 'others.' Subsequently, it will analyze the post-Cold War history of the Middle East as contemporary illustrations of the perilous implications of the Western-centric discourse on civilization. This examination will underscore how the 'civilizing mission' concept has been employed to rationalize colonization and acts of violence.

The article will use primary sources in its methodology, citing Western thinkers to illustrate their ideas on civilization and hegemony, as well as supplementing them with secondary sources to ground their thoughts in contemporary anti-colonial studies. The article will also refer to speeches and official statements of Western politicians that still reflect ideas from Western thought that seemed to have disappeared after the end of European colonialism. In essence, civilization has been reduced to a mere channel for the projection of an Imperial structure and not an impartial order of justice and equity. If anything, the West, led by the United States, continues the same approach towards other civilizations, more specifically the Muslim civilization. Manifested previously in the War on Terror and now in the Israeli war on Gaza, the approach of the West is still wired towards domination and imperialist authority in the name of civilization and progress. Despite the presence of many works on the idea of the clash of civilizations, the idea of a universal

civilization has not been extensively examined in scholarly discourse since Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis (Huntington, 2011).

The role of Western scholarships in justifying western superiority

Most Western scholars of civilizations acknowledge, directly or indirectly, the existence of other civilizations (Toynbee, 1987). Despite its acknowledgment, the concept remains overshadowed by a hierarchical comprehension that effectively monopolizes the attributes of civilization for the West. For instance, the German philosopher of history, Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), claims that Western civilization is an exception in the history of humankind, and states that world history is the Western world's picture and not that of all people. Spengler is not the only one; other Western scholars such as François Guizot (1787-1874) and Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) make a distinction between Europe and 'the rest' or 'the Other' (Hall & Gieben, 1992). Moreover, some of them limit their definition of civilization to one nation, as in the case of Burckhardt, who sees the superiority of the Italian people over others (Burckhardt, 1999).

Historian Jacob Burckhardt attributes European civilization with superlative traits such as innovation and unrestrained self-expression. He depicts the European West as characterized by freedom in its institutions and individuals, driven by a desire to explore and advance knowledge across various domains. According to Burckhardt, this marks the West's superiority over all others who submitted themselves to absolute monarchies and theocracies, abandoning their free spirit and innovative strength. His analysis of civilization in Renaissance Italy (mainly between the twelfth and the sixteenth century) aims to illustrate different aspects of Italian civilization through Italian intellectual manuscripts, such as poems, biographies, and treaties. Through his arguments, he intends to show that the Italian personality has elements of greatness, making it the leading figure in Europe. Furthermore, he claims that the culture is incomplete outside of Italy, but inside Italy, the culture is harmonious. He states that:

> "Thus, culture outside Italy is, on the whole, a disharmonious one, albeit one with great incomplete and latent forces. Italy, however, is the country of a common culture, which is at the same time one of inner harmony. The form of intercourse was a higher sociability independent of class differences, and its content was intellect." (Burckhardt, 1999, p. 97)

However, these scholars accentuate the concept of universality within Western civilization. Burckhardt's emphasis on Italy's elevated status within the West tends to marginalize other civilizations, portraying them as unworthy of being considered equals to the West. This minimization of the contributions of other civilizations serves to grant the West a monopoly over notions of civility and humane existence. The consequence is a form of universalism where not only are all individuals expected to emulate the West to be deemed civilized, but they may

also face repercussions for failing to do so. This phenomenon primarily manifests in the emphasis on adhering to Western values, with cultures and states facing branding as backward or uncivilized if they fail to comply. This approach underscores the belief that humanity is inevitably destined to follow the trajectory laid out by the West. For instance, François Guizot states, 'I am convinced that there is, in reality, a general destiny of humanity, a transmission of the aggregate of civilization; and, consequently, a universal history of civilization to be written' (Guizot, 2013, p. 13). It is worth noting that he believes '[...] France has been the center, the focus of European civilization' (Guizot, 2013, p. 11). Guizot is not the only Western scholar to see European civilization as unique, where France and the French people are at the center of that uniqueness. So even though there is a difference on which European country serves as the peak of civilization, the consensus is that the West has total monopoly on all aspects of human civilization.

Again, it can be argued that the notion of civilization reflects the social construction of the self (Mazlish, 2004, p. 100). So, claiming particular and unique characteristics allows branding different civilizations as 'barbaric,' 'uncivilized,' or 'savage.' This narrative has been repeated in many Western texts on civilization, the imagination of the self [western civilization], and how great their civilization is compared to the rest. This occurrence is unsurprising, considering that these works emerged during the onset and zenith of Western power, fostering a genuine conviction in the West's superiority over diverse civilizations, which aligned with its political and economic triumphs over others. Consequently, there arose a sense of entitlement to greatness and superiority, whereby other civilizations were deemed incapable of competing. Guizot's arguments serve to illustrate this perspective. He speaks:

> "The civilization of our country has this peculiar character that it has never wanted intellectual greatness; it has always been rich in ideas; the power of the human mind has always been great in French society; greater, perhaps, than in any other. We must not lose this high privilege; we must not fall into the somewhat subordinate and material state that characterizes other societies." (Guizot, 2013, p. 73)

Emphasizing greatness is not only on the level of the political and cultural grounds. It goes beyond the biological superiority of the Western man over all others to show superiority as natural and just an accident of history. Thus, the West was destined for greatness by default, and the others were simply inferior all along. Other scholars, like the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), believed that the perfection of humanity incarnated in the race of the whites, and that is, of course, in Western civilization. He articulates, 'Humanity is at its greatest perfection in the race of the whites. The yellow Indians do have a meagre talent. The Negroes are far below them and at the lowest point are a part of the American peoples.' As explained above, the notion of civilization is to define and imagine the self and the rest. It is noted how Kant also underestimates the Indians, 'the

Negroes', and the Americans. For Kant, the justification for such perfection of white people is due to rationality as well as thanks to the 'capacity to be morally self-legislative [...] the development of our capacity to set and pursue ends through reason generally, and not just moral-practically' (McCarthy, 2009, p. 66). As explained before, the uniqueness of the West and the explanation of its dominance with the onset of modernity was seen as an inevitable natural force. Even if other civilizations were praised for some positive qualities, they remain dwarfed by the West and their own failures.

Different Western scholars elaborated on various reasons for the West's superiority over the rest. For instance, Kant justified it with rationality or for Burckhardt, with the Italian intellectual legacy. Guizot sums up the idea of the West's inevitable superiority and sees it as 'the intentions of God,' he plainly states that 'European civilization has entered, if we may so speak, into the eternal truth, into the plan of Providence; it progresses according to the intentions of God. This is the rational account of its superiority' (Guizot, 2013, p. 35). Guizot went further and argued that

> "[...] France has seen herself thus outstripped in the career of civilization, she has called up fresh vigor, has sprung forward with a new impulse, and has soon found herself abreast with, or in advance of all the rest [...] There is scarcely any great idea, any great principle of civilization, which, prior to its diffusion, has not passed in this way through France" (Guizot, 2013, p. 11).

This bizarre claim by Guizot is no surprise considering the collective words of different Western scholars regarding Western superiority. It is self-explanatory as to why a constructed image of all the previous civilizations as non-existent or minimal has become the end result. The collective ideas generated in the West regarding other civilizations often attribute human achievements primarily to Europe and its derivatives. Other civilizations are consequently relegated to a peripheral role in the continuous march of Western progress, implying that they are obligated to emulate Western models to become truly civilized agents within human history.

However, not all have acquiesced to the universal claims of Western hegemony. Samuel Huntington aptly denies the existence of a universal Western civilization and asserts that such universality will not materialize in the future (Huntington, 1993, p. 49). However, he believes that the West is unique compared to all other civilizations;

> "The West differs from other civilizations not in the way it has developed but in the distinctive character of its values and institutions. [...] Western civilization is valuable not because it is universal but because it is unique' (Huntington, 2011, p. 311).

Despite the uniqueness found in the Western civilization, Huntington finds three inherent challenges in the belief of Western universalism, the belief that people everywhere should embrace Western values, practices, and institutions. The three challenges are: it is false because of its logic; it is immoral since the West has no more the economic and demographic dynamism to impose its value and will on the rest; it is dangerous because that could, 'lead to a major inter-civilizational war between core states and it could lead to defeat of the West' (Huntington, 2011, pp. 311-311).

However, Huntington reports different reasons for the uniqueness and superiority of the Western civilization, such as the 'superiority of its organization,' 'discipline,' 'superior weapons,' 'transport,' 'logistics,' 'medical services,' and more importantly 'the superiority in applying organized violence' (Huntington, 2011, p. 311). The idea of Western civilization as a constructed image of the self with particular superiority and characteristics has consequences. The notion of civilization is used in the Western context as an instrument and pretext for colonization as well as domination over other civilizations. Colonial expansion became a moral duty to raise different people from their lower state of existence into a world of progress. Huntington openly asserted these consequences when critiquing Western universalism and rightfully pointed towards its dangers. This colonial discourse occurred in an environment of what Bruce Mazlish calls the 'expansionism and exploratory zeal' of European civilization (Mazlish, 2004, p. 27).

Civilizing mission and colonization

The civilizing mission is an effort done by the West as a 'moral duty' or 'the burden of the white man' to deliver, teach, and instruct the Eastern societies [the rest] on Western models of institutions and values to pave the way for them to progress and integrate into Western civilization. To some Westerners, the main reason for this Western responsibility is 'the burden of the white man' and the incapability of the rest to lead. It is worth noting that Western scholars show not only what they consider as the superiority of their moral system, practice, and institutions, but also assign themselves the responsibility to lead the rest. For many of them, the rest always need the West to accomplish their objectives. This position is expressed openly by the likes of Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965), who wrote exclusively on the foundational ethical aspect of all civilizations. He principally justifies the primacy of the colonizer for their "higher civilization." He claims that colonial powers are responsible for raising the level of what he calls 'non-civilized nations.' Even more, Schweitzer believes that no progress of civilization comes from any African counterpart, but from "enlightened" Western civilizations (Schweitzer, 1987).

Likewise, Samuel Huntington claims, 'Societies from other civilizations usually need Western help to achieve their goals and protect their interest' (Huntington, 2011, p. 81). Clearly, such kinds of statements pave the way for colonization and

invasion. This is due to the fact that civilization is a hardly neutral term when used in most contexts. It is important to note that civilization as a term goes hand-in-hand with the concept of modernity. The former being the objective, and the latter being the means to it (Mazlish, 2004, p. 103). It seems that, in the end, the way to be considered civilized is to be incorporated in the European-western definition due to its universal claims.

Civilizing mission indicates the superiority of Western rationalism, practice, manners, and (political and economic) institutions. I.e., the civilizing mission is bringing these unique Western qualities and values to the others. The 'other' indicates the rest and all the non-Western as inferior to the West as a result of conquests and subjection (Sayyid, 2022). The concepts of superior and inferior are used in this context to reflect the preeminence of superior as well as weak inferior, who cannot advance and develop without Western rationality, practice, and institutions. Since Western civilization is the superior one, it has given itself the right and legitimacy to interfere, and always to make the rest in its image and evaluate them based on the Western standard. This has opened the road for the superior race to justify and conquer the inferior race. These are the reasons why the West is imagined as the 'standard of civilization', still observed in the form of hierarchical judgment by states that adhere to international norms more than other states. States that adhere to the norms and values of the modern international community are tacitly recognized as civilized than those that are not (Mozaffari, 2002, p. 93).

The Construction of Binaries, The Muslim World as an Example

It is worth saying that 'civilization versus barbarism' indicates the contrasting relationship between the West and the rest. Nonetheless, more comparable sub-concepts are used to manipulate the discourse of Western hegemony, such as 'superior versus inferior,' 'core versus periphery,' 'rational versus irrational,' and 'modern versus tradition.' Such concepts are constructed to serve the political agenda of the West to subjugate the rest, followed by holding the rest – all civilizations accountable, according to Western standards. The West's universal claims regarding civilized life lead to a firm belief in a paternalistic position that the West is entitled to in relation to the other.

In other words, whoever does not follow the Western standards, or the model of Western civilization, will not become or be considered civilized, modern, rational, and developed. In his excellent work The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, John Hobson elaborates accurately on the imagined 'Self' and 'Others.' He asserts that;

> "[...] the West was imagined as being inherently blessed with unique virtues: it was rational, hard-working, productive, sacrificial and parsimonious, liberal-democratic, honest, paternal and mature, advanced, ingenious, proactive,

independent, progressive, and dynamic. The East was then cast as the West's opposite Other: as irrational and arbitrary, lazy, unproductive, indulgent, exotic as well as alluring and promiscuous, despotic, corrupt, childlike, and immature, backward, derivative, passive, dependent, stagnant and unchanging" (Hobson, 2004, p. 7).

Not only that, but the triumph of progress means that the inferior beliefs will disappear as the West continues its victorious march. Until the late 20th century, it was believed that Islam would fade away as secularization and progress continued to spread (Sayyid, 2022, p. 11). The Muslim world is still seen, until now by the believers in Western superiority, as an inferior civilization waiting for the grace of enlightenment.

Again, for some Western scholars, there are unique characters in Western civilization that do not exist in other civilizations. For instance, the uniqueness of the language, outstanding mind, exceptional manners, and ideas. For example, in the French context, Guizot articulates that '[...] perspicuity, sociability, sympathy, are the peculiar characteristics of France, of her civilization, and it is these qualities which rendered her eminently fit to march at the very head of European civilization' (Guizot, 2013, pp. 11-12). Separating the West from the rest constituted a belief in the inherent superiority of the self over the other, where the West, with its unique institutions and culture, stands on the top as the 'first world', while the rest are exiled to some category of barbarity. In addition, the West sees itself as the only pioneer of rationality, allowing it to lead the world economy, politics, and culture.

The West's belief in its own unparalleled uniqueness and superiority has led to a strong normative basis for imperialist wars of conquest, which have taken two forms: direct and indirect. Those who advocate for direct imperialism-like the example of European colonialism-argue that non-Western peoples are incapable of progressing economically and politically due to their irrational cultures and institutions. They believe that the only way for these societies to escape their self-imposed backwardness is through the West's paternalistic civilizing mission, which brings about rational institutions and culture. The second form of imperialism is indirect control, characterized by utilizing universalism as a way to push countries "peacefully" into imitating the West in order to become properly civilized (Layug & Hobson, 2022, pp. 55-56). However, this happens with ethical justification. Strictly speaking, the West is unique, and the rest must learn to be like them and follow their exceptional model. This has led the West to conduct what is known as a civilizing mission, which is an undercover for Western domination, colonization, and hegemony. In short, the Western discourse on civilization versus barbarity persists under American hegemony, albeit reconstituted to confront anti-democratic forces and their perceived inherent backwardness (Said, 1993).

This phenomenon is evident in the Eurocentric perception of the Muslim world. Since late Ottoman times, Turks have been branded as backward people who are deprived of progress and enlightenment. The Ottoman Empire was branded as a target of colonial control due to its barbarity, despotism, and its backwards religion (Hobson, 2012, pp. 38-42). This view extends to all the societies in the regions from Afghanistan to Türkiye. This still lives on to this day in some form. In the case of Türkiye, the European Parliament's criticism and the indefinite postponement of Turkey's accession to the European Union reflect the challenges and uncertainties surrounding Turkey's path to EU membership (Uras, 2023). Even now, after the Ottoman Empire's demise, the perception of some powerful figures of Türkiye still perceives it as backwards in some form. As seen in the French attitude towards Türkiye's accession into the European Union, Former French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing expressed the sheer difference between Türkiye and Europe. Giscard d'Estaing reflects the attitude towards Türkiye as too poor and Muslim to enter the EU (Richburg, 2002).

Meanwhile, Afghanistan faces criticism for its closure of schools for girls, while simultaneously being called upon to uphold and respect women's rights (Hakimi, 2022). Yet no critique on the same volume was ever made against America's entry into Afghanistan and its destructive war in the country. Not only that, but interviews with a Taliban spokesman reflect great arrogance, such as the case when Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban government spokesman, was questioned whether the Taliban is sorry for killing Canadian soldiers during the war (CTV News, 2022). If anything, this reflects the ridiculous paternalism with which the West still interacts with the rest of the world. The civilizing mission remains prevalent, influencing the West's approach to the world long after the dissolution of colonial empires. Analysis of examples such as Turkey's European Union accession and the situation in Afghanistan reveals that behind the ostensibly well-intended criticisms lies an implicit question: "Why are you not like us?" or, more pointedly, "How dare you attempt to act differently?"

At the height of the colonial era's civilizing mission, all means were justified, including the idea that weaker races must be subjugated to the superior races to survive; otherwise, extermination must be conducted against the weak races. That justifies the imposition of ideas and values, the employment of exploitation, colonialism, and the elimination of the inferior races. It is worth quoting at length, John A. Hobson (1858-1940), who states that 'It is desirable that the earth should be peopled, governed, and developed, as far as possible, by the races which can do this work best, i.e. by the races of highest "social efficiency"; these races must assert their right by conquering, ousting, subjugating, or extinguishing races of lower social efficiency. The good of the world, the true cause of humanity, demands that this struggle, physical, industrial, and political, continue until an ideal settlement is reached, whereby the most socially efficient nations rule the earth in accordance

with their several kinds and degrees of social efficiency' (Hobson, 1902/2005, pp. 154-155).

The civilizing mission is built upon a fundamental contradiction: while its aim is to civilize others by imparting Western values, practices, and institutions, it paradoxically employs various means, including violence and brutality, to fulfill this purported moral obligation. The consequences of the Western civilizing mission are known to everyone. John Hobson gives an example of the British civilizing mission; he states '[civilizing mission] is meant for imposing cultural conversion, which sought to 'raise the Eastern peoples up' to the level of true civilization. This required that Eastern institutional practices could be transformed along the British lines. On the other hand, cultural conversion went hand in hand with the strategy of containment, which sought to keep the Eastern peoples and economies down' (Hobson, 2004, p. 241).

In the contemporary era, the civilizing mission endures in an indirect guise within a post-colonial framework, relying on the preservation of the global order established in the wake of Western hegemony's zenith. The establishment of the United Nations, the codification of global laws and regulations, and the propagation of the vision of a peaceful world where progress benefits all have obscured the memory of the suffering inflicted by hegemonic powers. However, the old order of Western hegemony persists, demanding adherence to Western principles and values as the sole path to recognition on the world stage. Expansion and maintaining influence are based on violence and neutralizing threats, and nowhere is this truer than in Israel. Jeremy Boreing, the CEO and co-founder of the Daily Wire, explicitly mentions the importance of eradicating Palestinian resistance against Israel. Boreing articulates what he perceived as the exigencies of war, highlighting the devastation inflicted by the Allies on Germany to vanquish the Nazis.

Meanwhile, Yoav Gallant, the Israeli defense minister, openly marks how radical the Zionist war effort could be, by stating "We are fighting human animals" ("MEE staff," 2023). Likewise, Israel's prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, adds to this radical rhetoric by saying, "We are sons of light, they are sons of darkness" (Euronews, 2023). Israel's actions and rhetoric are an indication that the old Western spirit of expansion and domination is alive and prevalent. The existing international institutions are either helpless or simply part of the Western-made global order that is working for its well-being. Nowhere is this more obvious than the open and unquestionable support that President Biden has shown for Israel, emphasizing its right to self-defense against Hamas (Telhami, 2023). According to that rhetoric, President Biden defends the West's stance on Israel as a battle for a better world, essentially a world that caters to Western hegemonic powers. The current Gaza war reflects what happened at the height of colonialism, with its demeaning rhetoric of the "other," unrestricted use of violence, and believing that

the West is the sole owner of civilization and humanity. The colonial civilizational discourse did change over the years, but its bloody and dehumanizing roots remain visible to the observers.

Conclusion

This article has engaged with the presence of strong enlightenment ontology and epistemic coloniality of Western thought regarding the definition of civilization and civility. The main issue to be found in Western thought is the standardization of a Western conception of civilization and the subsequent universalization of the mentioned conception. This process entails simultaneously constructing a sense of self and otherness, ultimately depicting the other as barbaric and uncivilized compared to the civilized Western bastion of enlightenment. Ultimately, non-Western civilizations are often categorized as inferior in various aspects—cultural, religious, and even biological—resulting in a dynamic where they are expected to conform to Western standards. Anything diverging from Western values and institutions is often labeled as barbaric or, in contemporary terms, authoritarian, illiberal, or undemocratic. This critique highlights certain Western thinkers' dangerous and narrow perspective regarding the concept of civilization, as evidenced by numerous examples from nineteenth and twentieth-century Western writings, which prominently reflect a Eurocentric worldview that historically justified colonial domination under the guise of civilizing missions.

From the zenith of European colonial conquest to the aftermath of World War II, decolonization, the post-Cold War era, and the recent Israeli aggression against Gaza, the discourse on civilization persists, particularly when Western powers engage in conflict. Despite the world's transition to a multipolar order beyond Western hegemony, the same discourse resurfaces, often framed as defending democracy against illiberal forces akin to combating "barbarity." Examples include the US invasion of Iraq, Western propaganda during the conflict with Russia in Ukraine, and Israel's rhetoric in its actions against Gaza. Western civilization, conceived by colonial and imperial powers for dominance, is emblematic of a political construct; however, contemporary discourse treats it as an unquestionable truth, echoing debates on modernity and its Western-centric perception. John Hobson's assertion, "without the Rest there might be no West," underscores the interconnectedness of civilizations' (Hobson, 2012, p. 10).

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
Türkiye's and the EU's Coordinated and Divergent Approaches to the 2011 Syrian Crisis

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Abstract: This study examines Türkiye's and the EU's reactions to the Syrian civil war by using the concept of normative power. This conceptual framework is preferred to explain and evaluate whether Türkiye's and the EU's reactions to the Syrian crisis matched the value-based approach. The study argues that Türkiye and the EU have differences and similarities in their policies toward the Syrian crisis. It further posits that rather than taking an ally or value-based approach, Türkiye and the EU have decided to put their national interests in their reactions regarding the Syrian conflict in certain areas of war and some regions. Türkiye and the EU have suffered especially on security issues resulting from the Syrian crisis. Furthermore, the Syrian crisis led to economic difficulties, humanitarian traumas, and challenges for Türkiye and the EU in the social and political spheres. As a result, in certain areas of conflict and some issues, both Türkiye and the EU have attempted to prioritize their interest first. Therefore, these actors have not taken a value-based stance on some matters. Nonetheless, Türkiye and the EU offered massive humanitarian aid several times and desired the Syrian crisis to end.

Keywords: Syrian Civil War, Türkiye, The EU, The Responses of Türkiye and the EU to the Syrian Civil War

Introduction

Syria became independent in 1946 due to France's withdrawal from its territory. Syria had military takeovers throughout the 1950s and 60s, and instability characterized Syria. The country was run by the Baath Party, which supported Arab nationalism, for forty years, beginning in 1963. Hafez al-Assad became president in 1971 and maintained an "authoritarian structure masquerading as democratic" during that time (Yeltin, 2018, p. 203). In 2000, upon Hafez al-Assad's passing away, his son Bashar al-Assad (Assad) took his position as president. When he assumed office, Assad gave the impression that he would adopt an approach of global participation; nonetheless, his reforms were modest. His authoritarian regime experienced protests in 2011 and it shortly turned to civil war. The "Arab Spring" protests that originated in Egypt and Tunisia early in 2011 significantly affected Syria. Syria on March 16, 2011, experienced the beginning of the nationwide protests by the Syrian people in Daraa, and as a result of the security forces'

disproportionate use of force, Syria entered into a violent crisis (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022a).

Since 2011, the Syrian crisis has become a crucial issue of strategic concern for both Türkiye and the EU (Nas, 2019, p. 46). Because Türkiye and the EU were right next door to the chaos and violence caused by the Syrian Civil War, these actors are the ones most affected by the Syrian conflict from a humanitarian, security, and political standpoint. They face dangers to their safety from radicalism, illegal immigration, foreign fighters, terror attacks, and other issues (Kızılkan, 2019, p. 322). In this context, this study examines Türkiye's and the EU's perspectives on the Syrian crisis by employing normative power. The concept of normative power can be considered as simply being relevant to EU policy, but as this study demonstrates, it can also be used in determining whether a nation's actions against another nation are driven by norms or by interests. In this study, the concept of normative power was employed to evaluate whether Türkiye and the EU's response to the Syrian crisis matched the value-based approach.

There are parallels and divergences between Türkiye's and the EU's approaches to the Syrian crisis. Türkiye and the EU urged the Syrian government to reform at the outset of the crisis, but the Assad regime ignored their requests. Türkiye and the EU have sharply denounced the military actions of the Assad regime. Following the outbreak of the civil war, Türkiye and the EU began to shift their positions on Syria and provide support to the opposition groups. Furthermore, both parties strongly supported sanctions on the Assad regime. In addition, Türkiye and the EU faced security and migration challenges and attempted to establish a somewhat coordinated policy on these matters. Both, Türkiye and the EU have been active in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS).

Türkiye and the EU have also tried to support those fleeing the Syrian civil conflict. However, the EU wants to keep the migration crisis within Türkiye -in third countries- instead of experiencing migration movements. Furthermore, some EU's member states, such as Hungary and Poland, have securitized the migration issue. They consider immigrants as the most existential danger to their national and European identities, and these countries challenge the EU's mandatory quotas. Despite the EU's acceptance of a certain number of migrants and its global support for migrants, the EU's efforts to keep migrants in Türkiye contradict its normative power identity.

In addition, when looking at the several concerns about Türkiye and the EU's actions in Syria, it is found that the EU opposes two of thirds Türkiye's military operations in Syria (Operations of "Olive Branch" and "Operation Peace Spring"), and the EU supports organizations that Türkiye views as terrorists such as the Democratic Union Party (PYD). In addition, the EU denounced Türkiye for failing to secure its borders against foreign fighters and for opposing Türkiye's proposal to

establish a "safe zone" in northern Syria. These two issues highlight the divergent interests of the EU and Türkiye, but it's crucial to remember that Türkiye is subject to further challenges due to its closeness to Syria.

Conceptual Framework: Normative Power

A key component of the EU's strategy for demonstrating its power internationally is the political discourse on normative power (Laïdi, 2008, p. 42). Since Manners introduced the concept of normative power Europe, a significant amount of academic research in the fields of international affairs and European studies has been generated (Whitman, 2013, p. 171). When Manners (2008, p. 46) claims that the EU is a normative power in international politics, he emphasizes how the EU upholds a set of normative standards that are accepted as being universally applicable within the framework of the UN. Understanding normative practices and social diffusion is necessary to understand the theoretical concept of normative power (Manners & Diez, 2007, p. 179). The EU is described as a normative power using three different perspectives: normative (the EU should transfer its norms), positivist (the EU acts to change norms), and ontological (changing of norms in international politics) (Manners, 2011; Neuman & Stanković, 2019, p. 5).

One characteristic that seems to distinguish the EU's implementation of its normative agenda is the EU's endeavors to promote a multilateral, value-based global order (Metreveli, 2012, p. 9). Instead of relying on the hard power of its military presence, the EU has aimed for global soft leadership based on the strength of its norms and values (Ataç, 2008, p. 61). Europe has a major influence on international affairs as a normative and value-purveyor (Björkdahl et al., 2015, p. 11). Manners (2008, p. 45) states, "The creative efforts of the European integration process have changed what passes for 'normal' in world politics." The foundational principles of international relations could be upended by the EU's existence as a unique institution inside the world community of nation-states (Manners 2008a;2008b). Since the EU may influence international politics outside the boundaries of state-centricity, the EU is often regarded as a normative power (Manners, 2008).

Manners' normative power Europe approach has been revisited and criticized in light of recent advancements (Smith 2011, p. 128). The criticisms of the European normative power are not discussed in length in this section. Nonetheless, it outlines the "norm-based" and "interest-based" approaches to comprehending Türkiye's and the EU's responses to the Syrian crisis. According to Ataç (2012, p. 5), as long as "norm-based" and "interest-based" patterns of behavior continue to compete, the EU's normativity will remain complex and unreliable. Sjursen (2003) however, contends that the EU's preference for advancing rules over interests is not a distinctive quality that distinguishes it from other actors in the world. Furthermore, Pollack (2020) believes that it is imperative to transcend the

oversimplified and idealized view of the EU as a just normative organization to properly harness the potential of the EU's influence for positive outcomes in the future. Instead, to fully comprehend the EU's commendable but insufficient attempts to advance its values on the international scene, one must have a comprehensive awareness of the complex interactions between material and normative variables and power dynamics (Pollack, 2020, pp. 9–10). Further, according to Tocci (2008, p. 25), if normative foreign policy is defined as the pursuit of normative objectives by normatively deployed tactics that result in a measurable normative impact, then the EU cannot always be regarded as a normative international actor. For instance, Tocci argues that the EU has responded pragmatically to Syria ("realpolitik") (2008, pp. 66–67).

As is evident from the vast majority of studies on theories of regionalism, the application of the concept of normative power has remained Eurocentric (Futák-Campbell & Nolting, 2022, p. 3). However, the concept of normative power is not limited to the EU, despite its significant identification with the latter. Policy may vary on an individual basis owing to various conditions, but other actors can also pursue normative goals and means and, as a result, can accomplish normative results (Parlar Dal, 2013, p. 9). For example, Türkiye has been inspired to pursue a foreign policy based on ethical standards, framing the country's role as the protector of oppressed peoples in the Middle East (Oktav & Çelikaksoy, 2015, p. 411). In particular, Türkiye implemented several relatively normative policies toward Syria carefully and instrumentally (Parlar Dal, 2013, p. 723).

Türkiye has been trying to reassert its normativity in the past several years by posing a serious normative challenge to Europe and advancing its normative agenda, which has occasionally resulted in norms that conflict with those of the EU. But even while the EU and Türkiye differ on how to define and uphold certain norms like democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, a shared "normative" ground between Türkiye and the EU and the US has emerged as a result of the Arab Spring (Parlar Dal, 2013, p. 719). While the AKP governments have worked to introduce European values throughout the Middle East and so help transform the region normatively, Türkiye has also adopted a justice discourse that accuses the West of applying a double standard when it comes to the international crises in the Middle East (Oktav & Çelikaksoy, 2015, p. 418). Along with harshly criticizing the UN's current international conflict resolution framework and the West's "wavering" performance in Syria -doing virtually nothing despite labeling the Syrian regime as illegitimate- Türkiye's normative-intended foreign policy in Syria has also included these developments (Parlar Dal, 2013, p. 723).

A Brief Overview of the Syria Crisis

In December 2010, public protests started in Tunisia and swiftly spread throughout the Arab world, overthrowing the regimes of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen.

Remember that protesters in Middle Eastern and North African countries shared similar concerns with authoritarian governments, an undemocratic political system, grave human rights violations, income inequality, and unemployment (Kadıoğlu, 2020, p. 15). The fever entered Syria in March 2011 (Altundeğer & Yılmaz, 2016, p. 290). The Syrian crisis is one of the most devastating crises in the history of civil war. Syria's civil war is a complex, multifaceted struggle including militia opposition groups, proxies, regime forces, and evolving alliances (Levallois et al., 2023, p. 6). The opposition, influenced by the Arab Spring uprisings, began to demonstrate against the Assad regime in 2011. After receiving a severe military response from the regime, the initially nonviolent anti-regime protests in Syria escalated into an armed conflict (Levallois et al., 2023, p. 7). Put differently, the Assad administration turned weapons on its people in response to the democratic demands and aspirations that arose with the Arab Spring. This authoritarian attitude led to a crisis in Syria when protestors supporting and opposing the regime engaged in violent clashes (Altundeğer & Yılmaz, 2016, p. 216).

One of the two most notable effects of the ongoing civil war in Syria on the international system has been the rise in the number of civilians leaving the country to seek safety in neighboring countries in the region and Europe (Aşkar-Karakır, 2017, p. 135). The Syrian civil conflict has resulted in millions of people fleeing their homes, living through incredibly unpleasant experiences in different countries across the world, and countless deaths. The crisis has resulted in almost 500,000 Syrian deaths, 6.6 million internal displacements, and 5.6 million Syrians seeking asylum in neighboring and foreign countries. Today, almost 3.7 million Syrians are being hosted by Türkiye (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022a). The other most notable effects of the ongoing civil war in Syria are suicide attacks by radical groups that have targeted cities in the region and Europe, using Syria as a base for their operations (Aşkar-Karakır, 2017, p. 135).

As a result of indirect conflicts over Syria between the interests of regional and global powers like the US, Russia, China, Iran, Türkiye, France, and the UK, the crisis has become unmanageable (Altundeğer & Yılmaz, 2016, p. 216). The Syrian civil war is still ongoing because of its intricacy. The US Administration quickly assembled the 83-member Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS after the extremist group took control of a sizable section of Syrian and Iraqi territory in 2014 (Levallois et al., 2023, p. 9). Following a string of defeats on the battlefield, Russia decided to launch a direct military intervention in September 2015. In addition to saving Assad, Moscow's move allowed the regime to progressively reclaim lost territory, which altered the direction of the war (Levallois et al., 2023, p. 9). Russia has always been among the Assad regime's most ardent backers. Russia has long been a significant armaments supplier to the Syrian government, offering military hardware, including cutting-edge weapons, military training, and technical and military support (Havlová, 2015, p. 77). Another country that has historically

supported the Assad administration strongly is Iran. Iran also has a strong relationship with Hezbollah, a group located in Lebanon that is widely regarded as Iran's Middle East proxy. Iran has given Assad military support, including large-scale financial and business help, crowd control equipment, Internet surveillance technology, and consultants for managing protests (Havlová, 2015, p. 78). Nonetheless, the EU, Türkiye, and other Arab Gulf countries including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, oppose the Assad government and back opposition parties. There will not be a complete discussion of Türkiye's and the EU's policy on the Syrian crisis here, as they are outlined below.

The international community, which included the US, the EU, the Arab League, and the UN, worked to find a solution to Syria's ongoing civil war. Most of these attempts, however, failed; these included the UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan's six-point plan to cease the violence, which was published in February 2012, and the most significant attempt, the Geneva I Conference on Syria, which took place in June 2012 (Havlová, 2015, p. 70). To advance a political settlement that is acceptable to the Syrian people and put an end to the terrible cycle of violence, the European Parliament asks that the EU actively support attempts to convene the Geneva II negotiations (Parliament, 2013). To achieve a global political settlement to the Syrian conflict, the European Parliament is persistent that the territorial integrity, unity, and sovereignty of the Syrian state must be recognized, together with full respect for the rights of all the ethnic and religious groups that constitute Syrian society. The 2012 Geneva Communiqué, which was prepared by the Syrian parties as part of the UN-led Geneva process, and UNSC resolution 2254 both support this and lay the foundation for a genuine political transition (Parliament, 2019a).

Politically, the "Euphrates Shield" made way for the Astana process, in which Türkiye and Russia attempted to work out a settlement in Syria. Later, Iran joined this endeavor, and in October 2019, Iraq turned into an "observer." (Parliament, 2019b). At their international summit in Kazakhstan on January 23 and 24, 2017, Türkiye, Russia, and Iran could strike a deal establishing "safe zones" in Syria, which may lead to peace implementation. However, some members of the opposition delegation rejected this agreement as it may jeopardize Syria's territorial sovereignty (Zahra, 2017, p. 35). The Astana process has contributed to a decrease in localized violence. But ultimately, it has strengthened intra-Syrian disintegration and heightened geopolitical rivalry by eschewing the US and the EU (Levallois et al., 2023, p. 11). As understood, to find a non-military solution, Türkiye used a range of institutional and normative tools within the confines of existing international law. This was evident in its prior efforts at the Geneva I conference as well as in its diplomatic engagement policies in regional organizations like the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which it pushed to use all diplomatic means for transition in Syria (Parlar Dal, 2013, p. 723).

Türkiye's Approach to Syria

Relations between Türkiye and Syria can be described as "enemy-friendly" (Zahra, 2017, p. 38). Bilateral relations between these two actors have experienced ups and downs. Türkiye recognized Syria's independence in 1946 when relations between the two nations started to improve after some time (Korgun, 2020, p. 4). Nonetheless, their ties were not friendly during the Cold War. Due to its association with the Soviet Union during the Cold War's polarization, Syria had issues with its neighbor Türkiye, which was on the Western side (Gürler and Yavuz, 2023: p. 211). After the end of the Cold War, the goal of Türkiye policy toward Syria, in particular, from the early 2000s to the 2011 regional turmoil was to revitalize the historical heritage (Kasapoglu, 2020, p. 1). Furthermore, Türkiye's foreign policy toward the Syrian Civil War has evolved, changing both the tactics and the instruments employed through the process (Kiraz, 2020, p. 108). The following are the fundamental tenets of Türkiye's Syria policy: safeguarding Syria's territorial integrity and unity, putting an end to the conflict, peacefully completing the political transition process to satisfy the legitimate demands of the Syrian people, and ensuring security by removing terrorist elements from the border region (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022b). The bilateral relationship between Türkiye and Syria saw a significant uptick when their historical disagreements over water, land, and Syria's previous backing of Kurdish rebels were resolved (Phillips, 2012, p. 137). Relationships were elevated in 2000 when Ahmet Necdet Sezer, president at the time, attended Hafez al-Assad's funeral. The start of the Bashir al-Assad era in Syria in 2000 and the AK Party's "zero-problem policy" toward neighboring nations after taking office in Türkiye in 2002 brought about a significant shift in the two countries relations (Korgun, 2020, p. 9).

Türkiye and Syria started collaborating on the management of the water resources of the Euphrates. Along the Türkiye-Syrian border, they decided to build the Friendship Dam, a dam on the Asi/Orontes River (Altunışık, 2016, p. 57). Between 2006 and 2010, Türkiye exports to Syria increased fourfold, and joint cabinet sessions were held in place of visa restrictions (Phillips, 2012, p. 137). The families of Erdogan and Assad became good friends and even spent holidays. Türkiye made an effort to mediate a peace agreement between Israel and Syria (Altunışık, 2016, p. 57). Whether by sharing an anti-Israeli platform or acting as a trade channel to Arab states further south, Syria contributed to Türkiye's improved reputation among the Arab public (Phillips, 2012, p. 137).

As understood, before the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, relations between Türkiye and Syria had improved between 1998 and 2011. According to Altunışık (2016), after the assassination of the former prime minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri, relations with Türkiye played a major role in helping Syria overcome its isolation. Syria has traditionally avoided depending only on Iran as part of its many alliances' policies, but the Assad regime's positive connections with Türkiye

prevented it from taking that stance. Considering the Assad regime's controlled economic liberalization, Syria also anticipated financial gains from this partnership (Altunışık, 2016, p. 57). In contrast, Syria was considered by Türkiye as a potential market and a point of entry into the Arab world, which meant that there were also obvious economic advantages. Moreover, Türkiye was worried about the Bush Administration's conduct in Iraq and elsewhere, thus engagement with Syria was also a part of the strategy to soft balance the US (Altunışık, 2016, p. 57; Phillips, 2011, p. 39). Furthermore, according to Özcan, Türkiye considered Syria as its entry point into the Arab world and the Middle East, while the Assad government considered Türkiye as a go-between for mending relations with the West (2017, p. 3).

Türkiye-Syria relations have been negatively impacted by the Syrian crisis. There are several aspects of the Syrian crisis's impact on Türkiye, including social, economic, security, and humanitarian problems. Türkiye initially supported the Assad government and made efforts to convince it to implement reforms, with a particular emphasis on democracy and a call for Assad to desist from using violence against his people. However, the Assad regime did not carry out any of the reforms that Türkiye had envisioned, so it did not validate Türkiye's identity as a normative power (Futák-Campbell & Nolting, 2022, p. 15). Türkiye, along with other Arab Gulf nations including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, have provided support to the opposition. Over time, Türkiye has emerged as a hub for various forms of assistance, such as recruiting, financing, and arms delivery (Levallois et al., 2023, pp. 7–8). The Syrian troops targeted a Türkiye airliner on June 22, 2012. Türkiye abruptly and decisively changed its position toward the Syrian regime during this time, and it began to develop plans to bring an end to the Assad administration when five residents were killed by a bomb thrown on Akçakale by Assad forces (Yeltin, 2018, p. 205). A bomb assault occurred on February 11, 2013, near the border crossing of Bab al-Hawa and Cilvegözü, resulting in the deaths of seventeen people (Altunışık, 2016, p. 60). The Türkiye town of Reyhanli, which lies close to the borders, was the scene of a massive massacre and murder on May 11, 2013 (Zahra, 2017, p. 34). Türkiye aggressively exclaimed at a Syrian aircraft that had breached its airspace on May 16, 2015. At least thirty-two persons were killed on July 20, 2015, when a suicide bomber detonated himself in the town of Suruç, which is close to the borders of Syria and Türkiye (Zahra, 2017, p. 34).

In addition, Türkiye, is currently host to more than 3.7 million refugees, making it the most directly affected party in the Syrian conflict. Türkiye permitted refugees to gather inside its borders and welcomed them as they fled the Assad regime's persecution (Yeltin, 2018, p. 205). By utilizing its resources and enforcing an "open-door policy", Türkiye has been providing shelter to millions of Syrians since the onset of the conflict. There were 3.4 million Syrians registered in Türkiye as temporary residents as of 2023. The word "guest" was initially applied to Syrians

who migrated to Türkiye; they were seen as considered war victims. Later, in 2014, they were given temporary protected status due to their enormous population and lack of legal status (UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency). Türkiye made significant contributions to humanitarian relief efforts and successfully implemented a comprehensive policy to address the needs of Syrian refugees who have been forced to flee their homes as a result of the war (Ataman and Özdemir, 2018, pp. 29-30).

By 2015, Türkiye faced significant security challenges at its doorstep, including the Russian incursion into Syria, ISIS rockets striking nearby towns, the flood of refugees, and the PKK's spreading offshoots (Kasapoglu, 2020, p. 1). To create border security as well as internal security, Türkiye entered northern Syria. Türkiye initiated three significant military operations in Syria between the summer of 2016 and the fall of 2019. The first mission, "Operation Euphrates Shield," by a NATO member state involved the deployment of brigade-level conventional units to fight ISIS. The PKK-affiliated groups in Syria were the main targets of the second and third campaigns, "Peace Spring" and "Olive Branch", respectively (Kasapoglu, 2020, p. 3). As per Türkiye's perspective, the establishment of Kurdish autonomy within Syria may pose a significant risk to the country's territorial integrity by inciting separatism among Kurds domestically and providing the PKK with more bases to attack Türkiye targets, alongside those in northern Iraq and Iran. In the long run, it may even be feasible to create a "Greater Kurdistan" that includes Kurdish regions in Türkiye, Iraq, Iran, and Syria (Özer & Kaçar, 2018, p. 185).

The EU's Approach to Syria

The autocratic administration of the Baath Party, its harsh regime, and the security danger posed by its weaponry have made Syria a "problematic country" for the region, viewed with distrust by Western nations, particularly EU member states (Özcan, 2017, p. 1). The European Community member nations did not have positive relations with Syria during the Cold War since Syria was perceived as a regional ally of the Soviet Union and as a backer of terrorism, specifically the extreme Shia organization Hezbollah in Lebanon (Havlová, 2015, p. 78). However, the EU and Syria signed a cooperation agreement in 1977, and 2004, the EU developed an association agreement that the parties chose not to sign. Despite the EU's 2009 declaration that it intended to sign the Agreement, the Syrian government chose not to sign it, citing other considerations (Nas, 2019, p. 50). Syria was a part of the Union for the Mediterranean project, the 1995 Barcelona process, and the EU's growing Mediterranean policy. It was also a part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) until May 2011, when serious human rights breaches led to the suspension of all EU cooperation (Nas, 2019, p. 51).

As early as March 8, 2011, the EU adopted a strategic response to the Arab upheavals. High Representative Catherine Ashton sent out a joint communication,

and the European Commission suggested "a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean". In this letter, the EU underlined that the EU adheres to universal ideals and shared interests and that it supports these countries' claims for political participation, freedom, dignity, and employment opportunities. It emphasized the EU's "more for more" policy, which grants partner nations who have made the greatest progress toward consolidating reforms access to the EU Single Market and increased financial support (Özer & Kaçar, 2018, p. 181).

The 2011 Syrian crisis predominantly affected the EU as well. Regarding Syria, the EU has tried to implement its norm-based strategy. The EU and its member states are the main international suppliers of humanitarian aid to Syria (Levallois et al., 2023, p. 3). Since the start of the protests, the EU has fiercely denounced the abuses of human rights and the rule of law by the Damascus dictatorship (Şahin, 2022, p. 335). At the outset of the Syrian crisis, the EU's leaders and the member states requested that the Assad regime have greater reforms, and not use military actions toward its people. However, Assad ignored these requests and has tried to suppress protests harshly. As a result, the EU, and its member states publicly denounced and imposed sanctions in response to Assad's ruthless suppression of demonstrators calling for increased liberties (Levallois et al., 2023, p. 3). The Assad regime's earnings have decreased due to the sanctions, primarily from oil sales, although not significantly (Levallois et al., 2023, p. 18). However, the dynamics of the conflict on the ground and the actions of the Assad control have not been significantly impacted by the EU's approach (Asseburg, 2020, p. 5).

In the post-2014 era, the Syrian issue has become a zone where the EU "exports migrants," "destroys border security," "generates threats," and "threatens the security of its citizens." (Özcan, 2017, p. 8). The EU has primarily faced security concerns because of the Syrian crisis. Following the assassinations of American and British journalists by ISIS in 2014 and the subsequent attacks in Europe, this threat escalated the Syrian crisis to a serious security concern for the EU (Özcan, 2017, p. 8). The terrorist attacks that began in 2014 in West European nations, including those that targeted the Bataclan Theater in Paris, Charlie Hebdo magazine, airports in Brussels and Istanbul, and comparable targets in Germany and Britain, horrified EU member states. By 2016, the terrorist group ISIS had spread throughout a large portion of Iraq and Syria, and these assaults were associated with it (Nas, 2019, p. 55).

Security issues have been brought about by the large increase in refugees brought about by the severity of the crisis, which has also had negative effects on the economy and society (Aşkar-Karakır, 2017, p. 136). Known as Europe's worst humanitarian crisis since WWII, the "refugee crisis" in Syria forced the EU to act in 2015. By year's end, the EU had received over a million claims for asylum, putting member states' ability to manage a single asylum and immigration policy by both

international and European standards and regulations to the test (Saatçioğlu, 2022, p. 1). EU action was impeded by differences across member states. The conflict's aftermath and the ensuing refugee crisis for European nations made it much harder for the EU to formulate a political response, ultimately reducing it to little more than a humanitarian aid organization (Levallois et al., 2023, p. 3). The refugee crisis has demonstrated that EU members prioritize their strategically diverse national interests to guard their borders against the entry of refugees fleeing a serious external catastrophe (Saatçioğlu, 2017, p. 213). The principles of "solidarity, fair responsibility, and burden-sharing, freedom, equality, unity in diversity" outlined in the founding treaties of the EU were insufficient to keep the community united in the face of the refugee crisis (Keskin & Yanarışık, 2021, p. 67).

European Council adopted the EU strategy on Syria in 2017. This strategy outlined six responsibilities as part of a more detailed but generally generic framework for action. (1) Achieving a genuine political transition to end the conflict "in line with UNSCR 2254, negotiated by the parties to the conflict under the auspices of the UN Special Envoy for Syria and with the support of key international and regional actors; (2) Encouraging a meaningful and inclusive transition in Syria "in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and the Geneva Communiqué, through support for the strengthening of the political opposition."; (3) Save lives by ensuring the most vulnerable Syrians receive humanitarian aid; (4) Endorsing democracy, human rights, and free speech "by strengthening Syrian civil society organizations"; (5) Demanding that war criminals face consequences; and (6) Strengthening the resilience of the Syrian people and society (Eurupean, 2024; Levallois et al., 2023, pp. 15–16; Nas, 2019, p. 54). The council then goes on to outline the priorities that will guide EU policy in Syria and state that the EU will only be prepared to assist with post-conflict reconstruction in Syria "once a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition... based on UN Security Council resolution 2254 and the 2012 Geneva Communique" is put into action (Nas, 2019, p. 54).

Türkiye's and the EU's Reactions to the Syrian Crisis: Coordinated and Diverse Approaches

Türkiye and the EU have been severely impacted by the Syrian crisis in various aspects. Thus, Türkiye and the EU had to adjust their approaches to dealing with the Syrian crisis. However, it can be claimed that as actors in the Syrian war, Türkiye and the EU were unable to continue taking a united stance and coordinating their efforts (Kızılkan, 2019, pp. 332–333) to end the Syrian crisis. Firstly, the study argues that Türkiye and the EU are against the Assad regime in Syria, and they support the opposition groups. The European Council vehemently condemns the Syrian regime's ongoing use of heinous and inexcusable brutality against its citizens as well as its ongoing repression (Council, 2011). The European

Council, in its Conclusion of 2012 stated that "the European Union supports the Syrian opposition in its struggle for freedom, dignity, and democracy, recognizes the Syrian National Council as a legitimate representative of Syrians, and calls upon all members of the Syrian opposition to unite in its peaceful struggle for a new Syria, where all citizens enjoy equal rights…" (Council, 2012). Furthermore, Türkiye and the EU have imposed various sanctions on the Assad regime (Kızılkan, 2019, pp. 332–333). To project itself as a Middle East normative power, Türkiye-backed Western action to halt Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's persecution of people in Syria (Oktav & Çelikaksoy, 2015, p. 412). Without a doubt, Türkiye's involvement with the US and EU's sanctions measures against Syria is normative. At the risk of worsening its trade ties with this country, Türkiye's foreign policy was changed from "status quo-unintended" to "normative-intended." (Parlar Dal, 2013, p. 723). In this situation, one could argue that at the outset of the Syrian crisis, the value-based strategy -which is consistent with the normative power approach- was prioritized by both Türkiye and the EU.

Secondly, Türkiye and the EU face a serious security threat as a result of the rise of ISIS and its numerous acts in Syria, Türkiye, and the EU. In this sense, both Türkiye and the EU placed a high priority on security and worked to put themselves in a position of safety. It is important to acknowledge that Türkiye is Syria's neighbor, therefore, Türkiye perceives greater threats from the Syrian issue and must thus adopt an offensive approach to resolve it. Türkiye and the EU joined a coalition that was established to combat ISIS (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of National Defence) The anti-ISIL coalition countries criticized Türkiye for its initial resistance to joining the coalition and for its tardiness in enforcing border controls. Rather, Türkiye persisted in lending support to anti-Assad Arab and Turkmen opposition groups, which are today widely considered a component of Syria's radical Islamist landscape (Altunışık, 2016, p. 61). In the meantime, the PYD became more well-known because of its gains against ISIL and its ability to seize control of substantial areas of the country's north (Altunışık, 2016, p. 61). On August 24, 2016, Türkiye began "Operation Euphrates Shield" under the authority of the right to self-defense granted by Article 51 of the UN Charter. The goal of the operation was to secure Türkiye's borders and defeat terrorists operating in northern Syria, particularly ISIS, which posed a threat to the country's security (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of National Defense). Considered to support US national security objectives, the US supported "Operation Euphrates Shield" against ISIS in the northern Aleppo area (August 2016–March 2017). Germany and France concurred, but Russia expressed displeasure (Al-Hilu, 2021, p. 2).

Thirdly, there is doubt about the effectiveness of Türkiye's and the EU's attempts to develop a coordinated policy in response to the Syrian refugee issue. However, in the areas of humanitarian aid and migration management, Türkiye and the EU work closely together and have significant cooperation (Republic of Türkiye

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). The EU repeatedly praised Türkiye for taking in three and a half million Syrian refugees (Nas, 2019, p. 63). For example, the European Commission stated that "Türkiye is making commendable efforts to provide massive humanitarian aid and support to an unprecedented and continuously increasing influx of people seeking refuge from Syria" (Commission, 2015). European Parliament also welcomes Türkiye for "keeping the borders open for refugees" (Parliament, 2011). The Türkiye government opened its doors to a massive flood of Syrian refugees. The EU's de facto closed-door stance toward refugees was clearly at odds with Türkiye's open-door strategy (Oktav & Çelikaksoy, 2015, p. 412). Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel led a strategy in 2016 to hold refugees and migrants in Türkiye to prevent them from accessing the EU through bloc members Greece and Bulgaria. In exchange, the EU decided to provide Türkiye, €6 billion for their maintenance (Dempsey, 2020). By "keeping Türkiye as a gatekeeper and a buffer zone," the EU quickly became the strategic answer that brought the member states together that were previously divided. In response, Ankara agreed to stop transit migration to Europe via Türkiye in exchange for several concessions, which led to the EU-Türkiye "refugee deal" of March 18, 2016 (officially known as the "EU-Türkiye Statement") (Saatçioğlu, 2022, pp. 1–2). As with past Readmission Agreements, the EU views a transnational approach as the best way to solve problems outside its boundaries, yet it is still plausible to argue that this policy reflects an "orientalist" and "otherizing" mindset (Akkaya, 2019, p. 359). The deal lessened EU influence by granting Türkiye the authority to regulate Syrian migrant patterns, but it was successful in halting the influx of refugees into EU nations (Levallois et al., 2023, p. 20). Furthermore, there was mistrust and anxiety in EU circles due to the use of the refugee card as a negotiating chip against the EU (Nas, 2019, p. 63). However, it should be noted that decision-makers have turned the deal from a chance for cooperation into a negotiating chip, a question of winning and losing. It is no longer about a humanitarian disaster but rather a Türkiye-EU dispute. It is no longer about refugees, for Turks or other Europeans, since it is connected to the easing of visa requirements for Türkiye nationals (Şenyuva & Üstün, 2016, p. 3). The EU may have breached its normative power standards by implementing this policy. The EU's claim to be a democracy exporter is further called into question by its prioritization of security and halting illegal immigration from the south at the expense of human rights (Del Sarto, 2016, p. 218).

Fourthly, one of the main issues with relations between Türkiye and the EU has been the movement of foreign fighters from Europe and European nationals into Syria via various channels. At this time, EU representatives and the EU media asserted that Türkiye's failure to secure its borders was a significant contributing factor to the EU's growing security risks (Özcan, 2017, p. 8). The image was further exacerbated by claims that Türkiye was arming and supplying jihadist organizations with light weapons and ammunition, "and curing them at Türkiye

hospitals in Hatay (Oktav & Çelikaksoy, 2015, p. 413). Türkiye and the EU were at odds on the sharing of information and working together to expose and stop the flow of foreign fighters from Syria into EU nations (Nas, 2019, p. 63). Following 2013, the EU's opinion of Türkiye's involvement as a threat shifted due to the growth of the terrorist group ISIS in northern Syria and the emergence of Salafist factions within various Syrian rebel groups. In the Western media, the issue "Is Türkiye supporting extremist groups?" has been debated, particularly since the latter part of 2013 (Özcan, 2017, pp. 8–9). Oktav and Çelikaksoy (2015, p. 419) argue that;

> "Although Türkiye opened its doors to more Syrian refugees than all 28 EU member states combined, Ankara remained reluctant to collaborate with international bodies like the UNHCR. As a result, Türkiye's reputation in the West suffered, as did its capacity to exert normative power. Türkiye's humanitarian efforts were further undermined by Ankara's tilt toward the Sunnis, which led to allegations that it also supported jihadist groups such as Islamic State. The Türkiye government's welcoming attitude toward the Sunni Syrian opposition fighters and refugees has also created resentment among the Alawite-Arabs in southeastern Anatolia."

As understood, once more, security is a top priority for the EU, but criticizing Türkiye rather than working with it is not going to solve the issue. One significant feature in their pursuit of self-interest is the continued interaction between Türkiye and the EU.

Fifthly, while the EU focused on fighting ISIS and pushed Türkiye to intensify its efforts against the group, Türkiye focused on fighting the YPG (People's Defense Units). Türkiye called attention to its connections to the PKK, which is included on the EU's list of terrorist groups (Nas, 2019, p. 55). Ankara describes the PKK and all of its extends as terrorist organizations that, because of their existence and anti-Türkiye Kurdish nationalist actions in Iraq and Syria, represent an existential threat to Türkiye's national security. However, Brussels considers the PKK's allies, particularly the PYD, as vital allies in battling their main danger in Syria: ISIS (Palani et al., 2018, p. 21). Because they are concerned about offending Türkiye, some EU nations -especially Germany and Belgium- are hesitant to publicly interact with the PYD or give the YPG material support. But France has adopted a more encouraging stance, which has infuriated Türkiye. For example, Francois Hollande hosted the co-leader of the PYD and the commander of the YPG's women's battalion at the Élysée Palace in February 2015 (Özer & Kaçar, 2018, p. 186).

Türkiye and the West have significant differences particularly regarding "Operation Olive Branch" and "Operation Peace Spring" (Kasapoglu, 2020, p. 4). Washington, London, and Moscow supported "Operation Olive Branch", which was carried out from January to March 2018 against Kurdish fighters in the Afrin region. However, Paris and Berlin expressed concern about the operation's potential to undermine stabilization efforts in Syria and pointed to the Kurdish fighters'

achievements in fighting ISIS. Regarding the October–November 2019 "Operation Peace Spring" against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the border region between Tall Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, Russia accepted the operation, seeing it as a step toward weakening the SDF, which is allied with the West, while the US and EU both voiced opposition (Al-Hilu, 2021, p. 2). However, according to the EU, these operations are conducted to invade northern Syria (Parliament, 2019b). The European Parliament urges Türkiye to uphold the territorial integrity and sovereignty of every one of its neighbors (Parliament, 2017). Furthermore, the European Council strongly denounced Türkiye's military operations in a united statement on October 14, 2019, stating that it was substantially compromising regional stability and security. EU members decided to stop selling weapons to Ankara, but they couldn't agree on imposing an embargo on the entire EU (Del Torre, 2019, p. 1). In addition, in its official journal, the military operation by Türkiye in northeastern Syria is highly condemned by the EU. The EU claims that this is a serious breach of international law, threatening regional stability and security, inflicting more suffering on those already impacted by conflict, uprooting civilian populations in large numbers, and possibly fueling the resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat to security in Syria, Türkiye, the wider region, the EU, and the world. Additionally, it is impeding access to humanitarian aid (European Union, 2019). In addition, the EU urges Türkiye to promptly and completely cease its military operation in northeastern Syria and withdraw all of its forces from Syrian territory, stressing that the military operation would not resolve the nation's fundamental security concerns. Additionally, it calls for the utmost observance of humanitarian law, which includes safeguarding civilians and granting domestic and international humanitarian organizations unimpeded access (European Union, 2019).

The European Parliament demanded in 2019 that the European Commission and EU Council halt negotiations on Türkiye's EU membership. Türkiye's incursion into northeastern Syria may further harm its prospects of joining the EU, bring about a fresh wave of internally displaced people and refugees, and create security risks associated with ISIS foreign fighters operating in Syria, despite the positive cooperation on migration and the EU-Türkiye agreement, which allocates a total of €6 billion for approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees (Parliament, 2019b). However, the EU ignored that the escalating crisis in Syria and the rise of violent non-state entities, particularly ISIS and YPG, posed a more direct and immediate threat to Türkiye as a neighbor. The EU could manage this issue, which was more indirect, by working with transit countries like Türkiye (Nas, 2019, p. 63).

Sixthly, Türkiye has backed the notion of creating a safe zone for Syrian refugees. This stance has not been supported by the US or the EU (Kızılkan, 2019, pp. 332–333). According to the EU, Türkiye President Erdogan's goal to relocate Syrian refugees in Türkiye to the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East

Syria (also known as "Rojava") is improbable, as military activities are likely to increase the number of internally displaced people (Parliament, 2019b). The European Parliament is strongly against Türkiye's plans to create a "safe zone" along the border in northeastern Syria. The European Parliament points out that forcing Syrian refugees or internally displaced people to relocate to this area would violate international humanitarian law, conventional international refugee law, and the principle of nonrefoulement. The European Parliament also stresses that, given the current situation, it is strictly prohibited for refugees to return, and that any such movements must be safe, voluntary, and dignified (Parliament, 2019a).

To summarize, Türkiye and the EU are not acting in their restrained normative manner in the Syrian situation but rather are responding to the crisis in self-interests. Despite the parties' divergent policies, given that Türkiye serves as a major crossing point for both Syrian refugees escaping the conflict and ISIS fighters traveling to and from Europe, Türkiye's cooperation is essential for the EU to defeating ISIS and establishing peace in Syria (Özer & Kaçar, 2018, p. 186). To combat the threat of foreign fighters coming to Europe to incite terrorist activities and stop the flow of refugees towards Europe, the EU relied on Türkiye's assistance and commitment (Nas, 2019, p. 46). In short, Türkiye and the EU must collaborate to eliminate threats to their mutual security.

Conclusion

The Syrian crisis is one of many foreign policy issues Türkiye and the EU have dealt with in recent years. Türkiye and the EU have faced challenges as a result of the Syrian crisis, particularly in the areas of economics, security, and humanitarian. The crisis caused one million people to migrate to Europe and about 3.7 million people to migrate to Türkiye. Furthermore, through the migration, a great number of people also died. In terms of security, several explosions that have killed people in Türkiye and other EU countries have been caused by ISIS and other terrorist organizations.

Türkiye and the EU criticized Assad for its repressive actions on its people. Türkiye and the EU also initiated the imposition of sanctions on the Syrian regime and developed a more stringent, accusatory stance against it (Nas, 2019, p. 46). In this phase of the war, Türkiye and the EU have reacted to the crisis in alignment with the value-based approach.

Türkiye has taken a posture that seeks to overthrow the Syrian government and give the opposition groups more power (Nas, 2019, p. 46). Türkiye and the EU have supported different opposition groups in Syria. While the EU supported the YPG, Türkiye supported the Syrian National Army. Keep in mind that Türkiye considered the YPG as the extension of PKK, which is recognized as a terrorist group by the EU itself. However, although they have been operationally and historically connected,

Western countries consider the PYD and the PKK as two legally separate organizations (Parliament, 2019b). Therefore, a conflict of interest has arisen between Türkiye and the EU over their support for various parties. Türkiye and the EU have suffered because of the threat posed by ISIS. After the ISIS bombs, many innocent civilians in Türkiye and the EU have died. Türkiye and the EU have started working together to develop a strategy to battle ISIS and it demonstrates once more how they prioritize their security. However, Türkiye received criticism from the EU for delaying its entry into the coalition against ISIS. Furthermore, Türkiye rejected and denounced the EU's dependence on the YPG in the fight against ISIS.

In the field of refugee issues, both Türkiye and the EU have a humanitarian sense and tried to help Syrian refugees. However, the EU's member states' policies towards refugee issues vary and they mostly do not want to be the host countries of Syrian refugees. Furthermore, some of the EU's member states securitized the migration issue. In addition, they have tried to solve this crisis by keeping refugees in third countries. The EU worries that Türkiye would exploit the millions of refugees living in Türkiye as a political tool. EU "deems it unacceptable that the Türkiye President Erdogan is weaponizing refugees and using them to blackmail the EU" (European Union, 2019). However, refugees' circumstances are harmed when the refugee crisis is viewed through the lens of boosting Türkiye-EU relations. In this context, the study maintains the EU's approach to migration issues contradicts the EU's normative identity.

The Syrian crisis is more of a threat to Türkiye than it is to the EU, hence Türkiye must adopt an offensive stance to protect its national security. Due to its security concerns, Türkiye carried out two military operations against the YPG in northern Syria. The EU criticized these military actions of Türkiye. While acknowledging that Türkiye has valid security concerns, the EU maintains that these should be resolved peacefully and diplomatically rather than militarily in compliance with international law, particularly humanitarian law (European Union, 2019). Furthermore, the issue of foreign fighters has been discussed between Türkiye and the EU. The EU criticized Türkiye as it does not protect its borders and thus foreign fighters use Türkiye as a transit country between Syria and European countries. Lastly, Türkiye maintained to open a "safe zone" for Syrian refugees in Syria, however, the EU has not supported this idea. However, to resolve migration issues and to develop a successful strategy against the terrorist group, the EU needs Türkiye's collaboration and coordination as a regional country bordering northern Syria.

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
İran Kadın Hareketi'nin Ortaya Çıkışı ve Gelişimi

The Emergence and Development of the Iranian Women's Movement

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Öz: 1979 devrimi sonrasında doğan İranlı kadınlar, homojen ve örgütlü bir feminist harekete öncülük etmeseler de 1990'lı yıllardan itibaren farklı platformlarda bir araya gelerek resmî ideolojiye karşı antagonizma alanları inşa etmişlerdir. Buradan hareketle, bu makalede İran'da kadın hareketinin ortaya çıkışının ve feminist bir harekete doğru gelişiminin analizi amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaçla İran'da kökenleri 19. yüzyıla kadar uzanan kadın hareketi incelenirken öncelikle tarihsel bağlamı kaçırmamak adına Kaçar ve Pehlevi hanedanlıkları döneminde kadın sorunu ve kadınların hak mücadeleleri konusu ele alınmıştır. Ardından 1979 Devrimi sürecinde ve Humeyni liderliğindeki İslam Cumhuriyeti'nde kadının rolü ve statüsüne ilişkin mücadelesi incelenmiştir. Bu temel üzerine İran kadın hareketinin gelişimi birbirini takip eden dört dönemde analiz edilmiştir: 1) 1989-2005, İran'da kadınların eşit haklar mücadelesi ve İslami feminizm ortaya çıktığı dönem, 2) 2005 yılında başlayan ve özellikle kadınlar üzerindeki iktidar baskısının arttığı yaklaşık dokuz yıllık dönem, 3) Liberal bir havanın hissedildiği 2013 yılıyla başlayan ve 2022 yılında sona eren dönem, 4) Mehsa Emini'nin ölümü üzerine protestoların gerçekleştiği 2022 yılı. Analizi gerçekleştirmeyi sağlayacak materyal için İngilizce, Fransızca, Türkçe ve Farsça – ekseriyetle ilk iki dilde – akademik literatüre başvurulmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İran, 1979 Devrimi, İslami Feminizm, Kadın Hareketi.

Abstract: Although Iranian women born after the 1979 Revolution did not lead a homogeneous and organized feminist movement, since the 1990s, they have been gathering on different platforms and building zones of antagonism against the official ideology. Based on this observation, this article aims to analyze the emergence of the women's movement in Iran and its evolution towards a feminist movement. To this end, while examining the women's movement in Iran, whose origins date back to the 19th century, the issue of women and the struggles of women for their rights under the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties were discussed. Next, the struggle regarding the role and status of women during the 1979 Revolution and the Islamic Republic led by Khomeini was examined. On this basis, the movement's evolution was analyzed in four successive periods: 1) 1989-2005, the period during which women's struggle for equal rights and Islamic feminism emerged, 2) The period began in 2005, during which the pressure from power increased, particularly on women, 3) The period begins in 2013, where a liberal atmosphere was felt and ended in 2022, 4) In 2022, when the demonstrations took place following the death of Mahsa Amini, academic literature in English, French, Türkiye, and Persian – mainly in the first two languages – was consulted for the material necessary for the analysis.

Keywords: Iran, 1979 Revolution, Islamic Feminism, Women's Movement

Giriş

İran'da bir kadın hareketinin ortaya çıkış nüveleri, ülkenin sosyo-ekonomik değişimleri tecrübe ettiği 19. yüzyılın ortalarında aranmalıdır. Avrupalı güçlerin

ülkeye girmeleri ve Avrupa kapitalizminin etkisi, ülkedeki feodal yapıların dağılımını hızlandırmış; ülkeye yalnızca Avrupalı danışmanlar, diplomatlar ve ürünler girmekle kalmamıştır. Aynı zamanda toplum içerisindeki eğitimli kesimin kendi durumunu, özellikle de kadınlar üzerindeki baskıyı sorgulamaya başlamasına neden olan, kaynağında Fransız İhtilali'nden doğan birtakım Avrupa fikir ve yaşam stilleri de girmiştir (Behnam, 1991).[1]

Kaçar Hanedanlığı'nda (1794-1925) sosyal yaşamın dışında tutulan kadınların rolleri ev içi alan ile sınırlı kalmıştır. Kadınların politik eylemlerde bulunmaları 19. yüzyılın sonlarına tekabül etmektedir. Arap ülkelerinin ekseriyetinin aksine, İran'ın bir kolonizasyon tarihi olmaması nedeniyle bu ülkede kadın hareketi erken ortaya çıkmıştır. Kolonize olmuş ülkelerde siyasi eylemlerin merkezinde milliyetçi hedefler yer alırken ve bağımsız kadın örgütlerinin önü kapatılırken İranlı aktivist kadınlar, kadına özgü vatandaşlık taleplerini ifade ederek kendilerini milliyetçi/meşrutiyetçi hareket ile tanımlamışlardır (Kian, 2010).

Pehlevi Hanedanlığı'na gelindiğinde (1925-1979), dönemin genel hatlarıyla merkezileşme, modernleşme, Batılılaşma kavramlarıyla karakterize olduğu bilinmektedir. Örneğin Rıza Şah, kadının imajı üzerinden modern bir ulus tasavvuru hedeflemiştir. 1936 yılında uygulamaya koyduğu Keşf-i Hicap düzenlemesiyle örtünme yasağı gelmiş; saygın kadın statüsü örtünün çıkarılmasıyla temellendirilmiştir (Afary, 2009, s. 156). Muhammed Rıza Şah'ın uygulamalarında ise modern ulus inşasında bir dizi seçkin kadının topluma örnek olarak sunulduğu görülmektedir. Örneğin Eşref Pehlevi (kız kardeşi), birçok ulusal ve uluslararası örgütün başında bulunmasıyla ve modern kıyafetiyle öne çıkarılmıştır. Fakat bu düzenlemelerin aksine 1979 Devrimi'ne giden süreçte başörtüsü, Pehlevi karşıtlığında bir simge hâline gelmiştir. Başörtüsü kullanmanın yeni anlamı, Şah rejiminin ve bu rejimin temsil ettiği her şeyin reddi olmuş, başörtüsü hem devrim sembollerinden birine hem de halk hareketinin amblemine dönüşmüştür (Hoodfar, 2013). Toplumun yekvücut verdiği destek sonucu gerçekleşen monarşi karşıtı hareket İslam Devrimi'ne dönüşmüş, dönemin bireyleri ve sonraki kuşaklar, ekseriyetle de kadınlar, bu sefer Şia temelli bir devlet otoritarizmi altında yaşamak zorunda kalmışlar ve mücadele etmişlerdir. Delphine Minoui'nin(2010, s. 83) de ifade ettiği gibi "Çağdaş İran'ın tarihi, her zaman 'ikinci cinsiyetini' tarihinden ayrılamaz olmuştur."

Post-1979 jenerasyonu kadınlarda ataerkil toplum yapısının veya dinin doğurduğu toplumsal cinsiyet eşitsizliği ya da cinsiyet rollerinin reddi söz konusudur. Dindar olup olmamalarından bağımsız olarak topyekûn kadınlarda yeni bir duruş hâkimdir. Yeni anlayışta dindar kadın dahi cinsiyet temelli sosyal sorunların çözümünü dinde aramamaktadır. Genel olarak kadınların bir eşitlik talepleri ve onur/haysiyet mücadeleleri söz konusudur. Özellikle yüksek eğitim düzeyine sahip olan kadınların iş piyasasında öncelikle mesleki ve ekonomik bağımsızlık talepleri mevcuttur.

Bu çalışmanın amacı İran'da kadın hareketinin ortaya çıkışı ve feminist harekete doğru gelişiminin ortaya konulmasıdır. Bu amaçla öncelikle Kaçar ve Pehlevi hanedanlıklarında kadın sorunu ve haklar mücadelelerine değinilecek, ardından devrimde kadının rolü ve Humeyni liderliğindeki İslam Cumhuriyeti'nde kadının statü mücadelesi incelenecektir. Devrim sonrası gündelik hayatlarına dahi sirayet eden cinsiyet eşitsizliği barındıran politikaları sorgulama girişimlerine ise 1989-2005 döneminde yer verilecektir. Radikal muhafazakâr cumhurbaşkanının seçilmesiyle değişen siyasi atmosfer çerçevesinde 2005-2013 yılları, yönetim tarafından baskıcı ama kadınların politizasyonlarının arttığı bir dönem olarak ele alınmıştır. 2013 yılı ve sonrası, kadınların bireysel eylemlerinin görünürlük kazandığı bir dönem olarak değerlendirilmiş ve çalışma, 2022 yılında başlayan kitlesel mahiyetteki Mehsa Emini protestoları ve bu protestoların kadın hareketindeki yerinin incelenmesiyle tamamlanmıştır.

Hanedanlıklar Dönemlerinde Kadın Sorunu ve Haklar Mücadelesi: 1794-1979

Kaçar Hanedanlığı Dönemi'nde (1794-1925) kadınlar kamusal alanın dışında tutulmuşlardır. Avrupa'ya seyahatleri vesilesiyle Nasreddin Şah, Avrupa'da kadın özgürlüklerini ve kadınların kamusal alandaki varlıklarını gözlemlemiş olmasına rağmen bu gözlemlerinin yansıması ülkesinin kadınları üzerinde olmamıştır (NCRI Women Committee, 2018). Kadınların politik eylemlerde bulunmaları 19. yüzyılın sonlarına tekabül etmektedir. Burada özellikle 1872 tarihli Reuter tavizine karşı 1890'da gerçekleşen eylemler ve 1891-1892 tarihlerinde tütün tekelinin İngiliz şirketine devredilmesine karşı gerçekleşen tütün protestoları – İran tarihinin ilk başarılı kitlesel hareketidir – örnek verilebilir. Bu eylemler, ülkeyi 1905-1911 Meşrutiyet Devrimi'ne doğru götürmüştür.

Meşrutiyet Devrimi sürecinde kadınlar sokak eylemlerinde ve yabancı güçlere karşı yeraltı eylemlerde yer almışlardır. Öte yandan ulema tarafından başlatılan yabancı ürün (İngiliz ve Rus) ithalatı boykotuna katılmışlar (Shuster, 1912, ss. 183-84) ve Rus bankasının yıkımına iştirak ederek millî bankanın kuruluşu için de fon toplamışlardır (Mahdi, 2004, s. 427). W. Morgan Shuster[2], İranlı kadınların toplumun özgürlük ruhunu canlı tutmada büyük katkılarından ve anayasal hükûmet biçimleriyle Batı'nın siyasi, toplumsal, ticari ve etik kurallarının benimsenmesi için büyük milliyetçi hareketi kışkırtma arzularından bahseder (Shuster, 1912, ss. 191-93). Ayrıca devrim sürecinde kadınların özgürlük mücadelelerinin ve yüzyıllardır varlık gösteren kutsal geleneklerin en önemlilerinden bazılarını kırdıklarını belirtir. Shuster'a (1912, s. 191) göre 1907 yılı itibarıyla İranlı kadınlar, dünyanın en radikal denmese de en ilerici kadınlarıdır.

Evvelinde İranlı kadınların kritik durumlarını kaleme alan liberal erkek entelektüeller olsa da değişim ruhu taşıyan özellikle Anayasacılarda kızların eğitim hakları için çok eşliliğe (poligami) ve kadınların izolasyonlarına karşı yazı yazanlar

olmuştur. Meşruti yönetimi savunan kadınlar sosyal ve politik haklarını tartışmak üzere gizli cemiyet ve dernekler kurmuşlardır (Mahdi, 2004, s. 428). 1909 yılında milliyetçi motivasyonları olan anayasacı kadınlar mecliste sit-inler düzenleyerek siyasi hak talebinde bulunmuşlardır. O dönemde Tahran'da yayımlanan Daniş ve Şukufe gibi dergilerde kadınların siyasi hakları, eğitimleri, ev alanının dönüşümü ve çekirdek ailenin karı-koca merkezli Avrupa modeline dönüşümü ana taleplerine yer verilmiştir. Tartışmaların ortak paydasında kadının statüsüne ilişkin reform yer alsa da örtünmesine ilişkin bir görüş birliği yoktur. 1911 yılında Hamedan temsilcisi Hac Şeyh Muhammed Taki Vekil el-Ruaya, mecliste kadınlara oy kullanma ve kendi derneklerini kurma haklarını verecek bir yasa tasarısı önermiştir. Milletvekillerinin çoğunluğunun – özellikle ulema – kadına siyasi haklar tanınmasını İslam'a aykırı görmeleri, kadının siyasi ve hukuki kavrayış yeteneğine sahip olmadıklarını düşünmeleri nedenleriyle yasa tasarısı kabul görmemiştir. Anayasacı kadınlar, haklar eşitliğinin kazılmasının kültürel bir değişime ve eğitime bağlı olduğuna inanmışlardır (Sedghi, 2007, ss. 54-58). Aktivist kadınlar din karşıtı propaganda yapmakla suçlandıklarından ya tutuklanmışlar ya da iltica etmek durumunda kalmışlardır. Ancak tüm tehditlere rağmen kadınlar faaliyetlerini sürdürerek davalarına yeni kadın üyeler kazandırmayı başarmışlardır. Ayrıca Kurretü'l Ayn'ın Babi dinini benimsemesinin ardından Müslüman kadın aktivistler sık sık Babilere[3] bağlı olmakla ve yabancı çıkarlara ve kültürlere boyun eğmekle suçlanmışlardır (Afary, 2009, ss. 113-114).

Rıza Şah Dönemi'nde (1925-1941) güçlü merkezî bir devlet modelinin ortaya çıkmasıyla İran'da kadın söylemi millîleştirilmiştir. Sosyalist, komünist ve milliyetçi kadın dernekleri yasaklanmışlar, kurucuları tutuklanmışlardır (Paidar, 1995). Modern devletin inşasıyla kadınlar modernleşme ve millî gelişme programına dâhil edilmişlerdir. Eğitim ve çalışma hakları ile siyasi haklar da elde etmişlerdir. Şehirde kızların okullaşmasının hızlanmasına paralel olarak 1936 yılında ilkokulda karma eğitim uygulamasına geçilmiştir. İran'ın ilk üniversitesi olan Tahran Üniversitesi'nin 1936 yılında kurulmasıyla kızlar yükseköğrenim hakkını da elde etmişlerdir (Sedghi, 2007, s. 71). Ekonomi sektörüne de girebilen kadınlar, bazı meslekleri icra etme özellikle eğitim ve idari alanlarda çalışma olanağını bulmuşlardır. Kadın lehine bu gelişmeler olurken aile içi cinsiyet ilişkileri bu yönde değişimden nasibini alamamıştır.

Rıza Şah'ın 1941 yılında tahttan indirilmesinin ardından kadın hakları ve kadınların kılık kıyafetleri, muhafazakâr ve seküler kesimlerin başat tartışma konularından biri olmuştur. Önceki dönemin bağımsız kadın hareketinin gazileri ve yakın zamanda serbest bırakılan sol gruplar gazete çıkarmışlar ve çok sayıda örgüt, hayır ve meslek dernekleri kurmuşlardır. Seleflerine benzer şekilde, bu gruplar kadınların eğitimi ve okuryazarlığı, kadın aleyhine yasal eşitsizlikler ve oy hakkı sorunlarını dile getirmişlerdir. 1953 yılından Beyaz Devrim'e (1963-1979)[4] kadar olan dönemde bir dizi kadın yardım kuruluşu, mesleki dernek ve dergiler

faaliyetlerini sürdürmüşlerdir. Ayrıca 1955 yılında Mehrengiz Devletşahi tarafından kurulan Cemiyet-i Rah-ı Nu-i Banuvan dâhil olmak üzere yeni örgütler ortaya çıkmıştır. Aile Koruma Kanunu'nun (1967)[5] hazırlanmasında aktif rolü olan bu cemiyet, düşük gelirli gruplardaki kadınlara bazı refah ve eğitim hizmetleri de vermiştir (Paidar, 1995, s. 137). Tüm bunlar olurken Şah, 1957 yılında kurduğu İstihbarat ve Güvenlik Teşkilatı (SAVAK) aracılığıyla kadın aktivistler dâhil tüm muhalifleri izlemeye almıştır. Öyle ki muhalifleri zaman zaman işkenceye de başvurarak baskı altına alan SAVAK, Foucaultcu anlamda sanal bir panoptikon hâline gelmiştir (Afary, 2009, 202; Sotoudeh vd, 2023, ss. 329-43). Dolayısıyla Şah ve SAVAK'ın politikalarına karşı örgütlenen kadınlardan SAVAK tarafından gerçekleştirilen silahlı saldırılarda öldürülenler olmuştur (Baneinia ve Orhan, 2021, s. 1910).

Son olarak, dönemin ilk büyük olayı 1959'da Şûra-yı Ali-yi Cemiyetha-yi Zenan-i İran adlı bir konseyin 18 kadın örgütünü bir araya getirerek Şah'ın ikiz kardeşi Prenses Eşref Pehlevi başkanlığında kurulmasıdır. Federasyon bağımsız olmasına rağmen 1966 yılında Sazman-ı Zenan-ı İran'ın (WOI)[6] kraliyet himayesinde kurulmasıyla doruğa ulaşan devlet destekli kadın hareketinin başlangıcı olmuştur (Afkhami, 2012). 1963 yılından 1979 yılına kadar olan dönemin kadın hakları aktivistleri iki gruba ayrılmıştır: Birinci grup müesses nizamı destekleyip siyasi, bürokratik ve sosyal kurumlara katılarak kamusal alana girmiştir. Bu kadınlar, hükûmetin desteklediği WOI'de ve resmî olarak desteklenen iki siyasi partide aktifti. İkinci grup ise rejim karşıtı ve devlete meydan okuyan kadınlardan oluşmaktadır. Farklılıklarına rağmen bu iki grubun kadına ilişkin ortak kaygıları ve kadın sorununa yaklaşımları örtüşebilmiştir (Sedghi, 2012).

İslam Devrimi'nde ve Humeyni Dönemi'nde Kadının Rolü ve Statü Mücadelesi

Devrimin ardından şeriata aykırı olmaları gerekçesiyle önceki yönetimin düzenlediği aileye ve evliliğe ilişkin yasalar revizyona tabi tutulmuştur. Devrimden yaklaşık iki hafta sonra (26 Şubat), Devrim Lideri Humeyni, mahkemelerin kadın lehine olan Aile Koruma Kanunu'nun (1967) – ta ki bu kanunda sakıncalı görülen yasaların yürürlükten kaldırılmalarına kadar – uygulanmasını durdurmalarını emretmiştir. Bununla birlikte, erkek lehine olan boşanma konusunu hafifleten bu kanunla erkek, eşinden sağlam bir gerekçe olmaksızın boşanamamaktadır. Erkeğe çok eşlilik hakkı da düzenlemeye tabi tutulmuştur. Yani erkek yeni bir evlilik gerçekleştirmek için ilk eşinin iznini almak zorundadır. Bu kanun ayrıca örtülü şekilde velayet davaları gibi ailevi davaların görülmesini dinî mahkemelerden Aile Koruma Mahkemelerine devretmiştir. Geçici hükûmet (Şubat-Kasım 1979) öncelikle evlilik yaşını 1967 yılındaki hâline döndürmüştür.[7] Eylül 1979'da ise Devrim Konseyi'nin onayladığı kararnameyle hâkimlerin müçtehit olmak zorunda olduğu dinî mahkemeler yeniden kurulmuştur. Boşanmaya ilişkin olarak da

erkekler, eşlerini tek taraflı boşama ve çok eşlilik haklarını yeniden kazanmışlardır. Ayrıca Humeyni, İran'a döndükten bir ay sonra yine İslam geleneğine uygun olarak kadınların hâkim olmalarının yasaklanmış olduğunu ve iki kadın şahitliğinin tek bir erkek şahitliğine eşitliğini ilan etmiştir. Sonrasında kadınlara iş alanında başörtüsü takma zorunluluğu getirilmiş; plajlarda, sportif etkinliklerde ve kamusal alanda ayrım uygulaması ortaya çıkmıştır (Hoofar, 2013).

Devrimden kısa süre sonra meydana gelen bu beklenmedik değişiklikler haftalarca süren spontane eylemler doğurmuştur. 8 Mart Dünya (Emekçi) Kadınlar Günü'nde binlerce kadının katılımıyla bir toplantı gerçekleşmiştir. Adalet Bakanlığında seküler ve İslami kesimlerin kadınlarının destekleriyle kadın avukatlar birçok miting düzenlemişlerdir. Solun da dâhil olduğu birtakım siyasi partiler veya hükûmet kontrolü altında olan radyo ve televizyonun boykotuna rağmen kamuoyu kadınlara önemli destek vermiştir. Bu gelişmelere karşı mücadele etmek amacıyla seküler ve İslami kesimlerin aktivistleri bağımsız bir feminist örgüt kurmayı denemişlerdir. Fakat aktivistler farklı ideolojik aidiyetleri olan insanlarla ittifak kurma noktasında tecrübesizlerdir (Arjomand, 2009).[8] 1981 yılına gelindiğinde artık kadınlar yaklaşık seksen yılda, 1900-1979 yılları arasında elde etmiş oldukları hakların neredeyse tamamını yitirmiş vaziyettedirler (Hoofar, 2013). Kadınları "asıl yerleri olan" evlerinde tutmak amacıyla sistem çeşitli yollara başvurmuştur: Kreşlerin kapatılması, erken emeklilik hakkının sunulması, kadınların gelirlerinin eşlerine aktarımı gibi. Kadınların ellerinde yalnızca siyasi hakları kalmıştır.

Örgütlü direnişin sonu, kadın mücadelesinin sonu anlamına gelmemektedir. Seküler kesimin kadınları, gizli toplantılar düzenlemeye devam etmişlerdir. Yalnız tüm kadınları ortak bir paydada buluşturmak gerekmektedir. Bu ortak payda, tüm sınıf ve etnik grupların kadınlarını ilgilendiren aile hukuku sorunları olacaktır. Yüksek eğitimli orta sınıf mensubu seküler kesimin aktivistlerinin iltica etmiş sayısız kadınla bağlantıları, onların uluslararası medya aracılığıyla ülkedeki cinsiyet ayrımcılığını duyurmalarını sağlamıştır. Yine eski bir muhalefet aracı olan dergilerde aktivistler rumuz kullanıp adaletsizlik olarak gördükleri birtakım raporları yayınlamışlardır. Onlara göre İslam hem ataerkil hem de kadın düşmanı (mizojin) bir din olduğundan söz konusu aktivistler seküler/laik bir devlet ve hukuk sistemini savunmaktadırlar. Taleplerini, Kadına Karşı Her Türlü Ayrımcılığın Yok Edilmesi Sözleşmesi (CEDAW) gibi uluslararası anlaşmalara dayandırmışlardır.

Mücadelede iki kadın tipi söz konusudur: İlki sol ideolojilerden liberalizme kadarki siyasi yelpazeyi temsil eden seküler kesimin kadınları; ikincisi ise sağı temsil eden İslami kesimin kadınlarıdır. Bu mücadelede ikinci grup kadınları iki alt gruba ayırmak mümkündür: Birinci alt gruba göre sistemin uygulamaya koyduğu sözde şeriata uygun politikalar aslında uygun değildir. Otantik İslam anlayışının kadınlara karşı ayrımcı olmadığını savunmuşlardır. İslam dininin eşitlikçi yapısı konusunda hem konuşmuş hem de yazılar yazmışlardır. İkinci alt grup kadınları ise sistem ile

çalışmakta beis görmezlerken devlet mekanizması içinde bulunarak otantik İslam anlayışı ile ters düşen kadının aleyhine ayrımcı uygulamaların önüne geçmeyi planlamışlardır. Devlet otoriteleri bu kadınların ortaya attıkları iddiaları kulak arkası etseler de kadının maruz kaldığı adaletsizlikleri duyurmak için kadınlar büyük çaba göstermişlerdir.

1980'li yılların ortalarına gelindiğinde dönemin en etkili kadın dergilerinden Zen Roose yeni bir strateji uygulamaya koymuştur. En liberal dinî cemaat liderlerinden, dergide kendileri için oluşturulmuş köşede okuyucularının sorularını yanıtlamaları veya kadın sorununa dair konulara ilişkin mülakatlarda bulunmaları istenmiştir. Bu bir ilktir çünkü daha önce dinî önderler uzun bir dönem kadın sorununa dair söz almamışlardır. Tüm bu çabalar iki sonuç vermiştir: Biri, şehit dullarının tekrar evlenseler bile çocuklarının velayetini alabilecek olmalarıdır. Bu yenilik yalnızca şehit eşlerini ilgilendirse bile kadınlar açısından önemli bir kazanım olmuştur. Sistemin bazı uygulamalarının "Allah sözü olmadığı" gerekçesiyle tartışılıp değiştirilebileceğini göstermiştir. Diğeri ise kadınların boşanma talep edebilecekleri koşulların belirtildiği yeni bir evlilik sözleşmesinin oluşturulmasıdır. Aynı zamanda kadınların çalışma veya eğitimlerini devam ettirme hakları ile ilgili koşulların belirlenmesi için de bir hareket alanı bırakılmıştır (Hoofar, 2013).

Devrimden kısa süre sonra meydana gelen bu gelişmeler, sistemin aile kurumunu şeriata uygun hâle getirmeye niyetli olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu durumun, en başta kadınlar üzerine yansımaları olmuştur. Devrim sonrasında oluşturulan Anayasa'da (1979), devrime giden süreçte özellikle kadınların "büyük seferin (cihadın)" tüm aşamalarında görünür ve aktif oldukları açıkça belirtilmiştir. Ayrıca "despotik" olarak nitelendirilen Pehlevi yönetimi altında büyük baskılara katlandıkları ifade edilen kadınlara daha fazla hak verilmesinin doğallığı belirtildikten sonra, ailenin toplumun temel taşı ve erkeklerin büyümeleri ve ihtişamları için temel merkezi olduğu eklenmiştir. Aileye ilişkin bu bakış açısına uygun olarak kadın, tüketimin ve sömürünün yaygınlaştırılması hizmetinde bir "nesne" veya "araç" olmaktan kurtulmuştur. Anneliğin çok önemli olduğunun, kutsal sorumluluğunu geri aldığının ve ideolojik öncüler yetiştirdiğinin altı çizilmiştir. Kadınların aktif varoluş arenalarında erkeklerin yanında yürümelerinin gerekliliği ifade edildikten sonra da kadının daha kritik bir sorumluluğun altına gireceğinin ve İslam nazarında daha yüce ve değerli bir takdire mazhar olacağının müjdesi verilmiştir (Papan-Matin, 2014).

Anayasa'da (1979) belirtildiği gibi devrime iştirak eden bir grup olarak kadınlar, kaderlerini kendilerinin tayin edebilecekleri inancına sahip olmuşlardır. Marie Ladier-Fouladi'nin ifade ettiği gibi bu gerçeklik İran'ı "aşağıdan sekülerleşme" (Ladier-Fouladi, 2015) sürecine götürmüştür. Paradoksal olarak rejimin toplumu yukarıdan İslamileştirme çabalarının, kadınların özgürleşmesi için belirleyici sonuçları olan sosyo-demografik bir devrimle uyumu göze çarpmaktadır. İslam

Cumhuriyeti, Thierry Coville'in "görünmez devrim" olarak tanımladığı kadınların güçlendirilmesi sürecine istemeden katkı sağlamıştır (Rouach, 2019, s. 10). Özellikle 1980-1988 yılları arasında gerçekleşen İran-Irak Savaşı sürecinde yasalara ve geleneklere (ataerkil yapı) yani siyasi ve dinî otoritelerin bunları aleyhlerinde yorumlamalarına meydan okumuşlardır. İslam devletinin getirmiş olduğu eşitlikçi olmayan evlilik kurallarına da farklı şekillerde karşı gelmişlerdir. Örneğin üremedeki rollerini kadınların bizzat kendileri sorgulamışlardır. "Bedenimiz bizimdir!" diyerek çocuk doğurup doğurmayacaklarına, doğuracaklarsa kaç çocuk doğuracaklarına kendileri karar vermişlerdir. Dolayısıyla hem doğum kontrol hem de kürtaj uygulamalarına başvurmuşlardır. İslam Cumhuriyeti'ne geçişle aile kurumunun muhafazası adına kürtaj hakkı tanıyan yasaya ve aile planlama politikasına son verilmiştir. İlginç olan Eylül 1979'da Humeyni'nin bizzat kendisinin bir fetva ile doğum kontrol yöntemlerine açıkça izin vermiş olmasıdır. Yeni sistemin bu hamlesi beklenen sonucu doğurmamıştır (Ladier-Fouladi, 2015). Daha önce ifade edildiği gibi zorlu koşullarda "aşağıdan sekülerleşme" ve kadınların mevcut kısıtlayıcı normları kendi usullerince sorgulamaları ile 1986 yılı itibarıyla doğurganlıkta ciddi bir azalış meydana gelmiştir. Gerek evlilik yaşının kadınlarda artması gerekse doğum kontrol yöntemlerine başvurmaları, İran kadınlarının özgürleşme işaretleri olarak kabul görmektedir. Bununla birlikte evlilik dışı birlikte yaşama gibi yeni bir birliktelik tipi ortaya çıkmıştır. Kadınlar, yeni sistemin İslamileştirme politikasını, uygulamalarıyla baltalamış görünmektedirler. Bu durum da büyük ölçüde onların eğitim düzeylerinin artmasına bağlıdır. Devrimden sonraki yirmi yılda genel olarak okullaşma, özelde kızların okullaşması önemli ölçüde artmıştır. Aynı zamanda kızlar erkeklere nazaran eğitimlerini daha yüksek düzeylere çıkarmaktalardır. Dolayısıyla bilgiye erişimde cinsiyetler arası eşitsizlik durumu önemli ölçüde kalkmıştır. Böylelikle bu dönem, evvela kentlerde ardından kırsal kesimde İran'da zihniyetlerin değişime uğradığı bir dönemin başlangıcı olmuştur.

Kadınların Ortak Hak Arama Çabaları: 1989-2005

Küresel ekonomiye entegrasyon, liberalizm ve özelleştirme gibi programlarla karakterize olan bu dönem, Ali Ekber Haşimi Rafsancani'nin cumhurbaşkanlığında, savaş sonrası izlediği ekonomi programları sonucu yeniden inşa dönemi olarak kayıtlara geçmiştir. Hedeflenen ekonomik kalkınmanın yanı sıra Rafsancani, kadınların toplumdaki konumuna yönelik politikalar da izlemiştir. Devrimden sonra yönetimin üst kademelerinde yer almayan kadınların bu dönemde siyasal alanda kazanımları olmuştur. Rafsancani, 1992 yılında kadın işlerinde danışman olarak Şehla Habibi'yi atamıştır. Böylece ilk defa bir kadın, yönetim kademesinde bu pozisyonda yer almıştır. 1992 Meclis Seçimlerinde ise meclise 9 kadın girmiştir. Yine 1996 Meclis Seçimlerinde, meclise 13 kadın girmiş (Baneinia ve Orhan, 2021, s. 1912) ve bu seçimler kadınların seçimi olarak tarihte yerini almıştır.

1990'ların ortalarında genç nesil – Asef Bayat'ın ifadesiyle Post-İslamcı nesil – yukarıdan aşağı dayatılan İslami devlet ve toplum dizaynına yabancılaşarak "kendilerini boğan İslamcılıktan" ayrışmaya başlamıştır. Bu neslin içinde Post-İslamcı kadın da vardır. Örneğin kadınların kamusal alandaki varlıklarının artmasının yanında örtünme kurallarına uymama, yetersiz/uygunsuz örtünme gibi davranışlar ortaya çıkmış, modaya uygun renkli kıyafetler görünürlük kazanmıştır (Bayat, 2015, ss. 112-15). Kadınlar bu dönemde, devletin toplumsal cinsiyet ideolojisini ve bu ideolojinin çizdiği sınırları sorgulamaya başlamıştır. İran-Irak Savaşı'nın etkisiyle oluşan siyasi atmosfer, kadınların sesini bastırmıştır. Savaş faaliyetlerine katılmış ve sisteme karşı olmayan birçok Müslüman kadın, devrimin eşitlik vaatlerinin gerçekleşmediğini ve devletin "İslami giyimli ataerkilliği" temsil ettiğini görmüştür (Mahdi, 2004, s. 440). Fakat kadınlar yukarıdan aşağı uygulanan İslamileştirme politikalarına karşı eğitim, iş, sanat ve sporla ilgilenerek gündelik hayat pratiklerini sürdürmeye çalışmışlardır. Devletin hedeflediği "örnek Müslüman kadın" hakkında çekinceler ve sorgulamalar ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır. Bunu aşmak için ise soyut bir modeli temel almaktan ziyade kadınların gündelik yaşamlarından türeyen, feminizm kavramının kökeninden öte kadının ikincil konuma itilmesiyle ilgilenen, entelektüel kaynaklarını İslam ile sınırlamayan bir feminizm anlayışı ortaya çıkmıştır (Bayat, 2015, ss. 130-139). Söz konusu çekinceler; bir tarafta insan hakları temelinde Batılı seküler feminist çizgiyi izleyen diğer tarafta İslam adına geliştirilen ataerkillikle mücadele edebilmek için İslam'ı referans gösteren kadınları, dağınık görüntüden kurtararak birlik olmaya itecektir (Khosrokhavar ve Roy, 2013, s. 156). 1980'li yıllarda farklı sosyo-ekonomik, kültürel geçmiş ve siyasi tutumlara karşın edilgen/pasif yurttaşlığa indirgenen kadınlar, 1990'lı yıllarda kadın hakları konusunda toplumsal ve hukuksal alanda sonuç alabilmek için ortak zeminde buluşmuşlardır.

1990'lı yıllar boyunca aralarında Mehrangiz Kar ve Şirin Ebadi gibi hem seküler hem de İslami kadın hukukçuların yürüttüğü kampanyalar sonuç vermiş; meclisten kadınlar lehine yirmi yenilenmiş aile yasası çıkarılmıştır (Povey, 2015, s. 76). 1992 yılında daha önce dinî hükümler tarafından öngörülmediği düşünülen yasal bir tazmin biçimi olarak kadınlar için boşanma sonrası nafakayı sağlayan bir hüküm yer almıştır (Osanloo, 2009, s. 127). 1994 yılında boşanma yasasında yapılan değişikliklerle dava açmak isteyen erkeklerin, hukuk mahkemelerine başvurması zorunlu kılınarak kadınların boşanma davası açma hakları genişletilmiştir (Povey, 2015, s. 76). 1990'lı yılların ortalarında ortaya çıkan bir diğer önemli değişiklik, evlilik süresince edinilen malların çiftler arasında adil bir şekilde bölünmesi üzerinedir. Bir erkek eşini sebepsiz yere boşamaya karar verdiği takdirde erkeğin mal ve servetinin yarısı eşinin hakkı sayılmıştır. Kadın hakları aktivistlerinin çabalarıyla çıkan söz konusu bu reformlar özellikle yoksul kadınlara maddi güvence oluşturması ve erkeğin tek taraflı boşanma hakkına sınırlamalar getirmesi bakımından önemli değişiklikler sağlamıştır (Osanloo, 2009, s. 127). Söz konusu değişikliklerde görüldüğü üzere bu sürecin en büyük yeniliği, kadınların

yürürlükteki kanunların gözden geçirilmesi ve revize edilmesi amacıyla hukuksal tartışmalara katılım sağlaması olmuştur.

İranlı kadınların devlette ve toplumda kadın haklarında iyileşmeye yönelik çağrıları, toplumun üst kademelerinde yer alan kadınların çabaları olarak değerlendirilmemelidir. Onlar, İslam'ı öğrenerek kadınları geri planda tutan dinî uygulamaları tersine çevirmeyi hedeflemiş; Zehra Rehneverd ve Tahire Seffarzade gibi pek çok kadın, İslam'da kadının "gerçek" duruşunu keşfetmek için kalemi eline almıştır. Bu gibi isimler; Kuran'ın erkek egemen toplumlardaki ataerkil yorumlarını referans almak yerine İslami olarak görülen güncel uygulamaların yeniden yorumlanmasını talep etmişlerdir. Kadınlar tarafından kendileri hakkında yazılan kitapların çoğalmasıyla İran tarihinde emsali görülmemiş kadın edebiyatı ortaya çıkmıştır (Ramazani, 1993, ss. 424- 25). Bunula birlikte 1990'lı yıllarda kadın hareketinde sol seküler eğilimli ve dindar kadınların birlikte yer alması sonucu, terminolojik olarak İrani Feminizm ve İslami Feminizm ifadeleri kullanılmaya başlanmıştır (Başar, t.y.). 1992 yılında Şehla Şirket'in kurduğu meşruiyetini özellikle İslam'ın Şii söyleminin modern yorumundan alan ve kendini ilk defa İslami Feminist olarak tanımlayan Zenan dergisi, İslam'ın feminist bir okuması adına dinî düşüncenin reforme edilmesini talep etmiştir. Batılı feminizm ile İslami feminizmin birbirini dışladığı görüşünü, bu iki feminist yaklaşım arasındaki söylemsel bağları ortaya koyarak çürütmeye çalışmıştır (Sinkaya, 2010, ss. 59-60). Yani kadın erkek eşitliğine, cumhurbaşkanlığı ya da fakih gibi üst makamlara kadınların gelebilmesine olanak sağlayan toplumsal cinsiyet temelinde savlar sunarak kutsal metinlerin ataerkil çıkarımlarını dilsel çözümlemelerle sorgulamıştır (Bayat, 2015, s. 140). İslami feminizmin öncülüğünü Zenan'ın yanı sıra çok sayıda dergi ve gazete de üstlenerek kadınların birçok yazı yayımlamasına, yeni fikirler ve ifade biçimleri keşfetmesine yol açmıştır. Kadınlar kişisel meselelerin ötesinde yaşam ve toplumsal kültüre dair sorunları da irdelemişlerdir.

23 Mayıs 1997'de Muhammed Hatemi'nin cumhurbaşkanı seçilmesiyle[9] başlayan reform dönemi (Sayın ve Çırakoğlu, 2019), Hatemi'nin hukukun üstünlüğü, düşünce özgürlüğü, sivil toplum, medeniyetler arası diyalog söylemleriyle hak kavramını merkeze alarak konuşması ve kadınlar ile gençler tarafından destek görmesi bakımından önemlidir (Mir-Hosseini, 2002, p. 39). 1997 yılında reformist hareketin ortaya çıkmasıyla İran'da kadın hakları mücadelesi, Batı'dan devralınan bireycilik anlayışıyla da yeni bir aşamaya girmiştir. Bu dönemde, demokrasinin kitlesel olarak genişletilmesi hedefi doğrultusunda; sivil toplum kuruluşlarının, medyanın ve toplumsal hareket aktivizminin genişlemesine ve güçlenmesine tanık olunmuştur. Bunun yanında kadınlar siyasi kazanımlar elde etmişlerdir. İranlı kadınlar, reform hareketinde merkezî bir rol oynayan aktörlerden – kadınlar, öğrenciler ve entelektüeller – biri olarak öne çıkmıştır (Rostami-Povey, 2016, s. 29). Dönüşen bu rol, devrimde rolleri karizmatik ve geleneksel liderler tarafından belirlenen bir kitlenin parçası olmanın aksine hedeflerini ve bunlara nasıl

ulaşabileceklerini hesaplayarak hareket eden kadın kimliğiyle yer almalarıyla açıklanmaktadır (Mohammadi, 2007, s. 17).

Siyasi kazanımlara bakıldığında Masume İbtikar cumhurbaşkanı yardımcılığına getirilmiş, 1997-2005 yılları arasında bu görevi yürütmüştür. Kendisi devrimden sonra kabineye giren ilk kadındır. 1999 Yerel Seçimlerinde 297 kadın il belediye meclisi, 484 kadın da ilçe belediye meclis üyeliğine seçilmiştir. Yine bu dönem, ilk iki yıl boyunca neredeyse bin kadının yönetici pozisyonunda görevlere eriştiği belirtilmektedir. Aralarında bakanlara danışmanlık, bakanlıklarda genel müdür veya müdür yardımcılığı gibi pozisyonlar da yer almaktadır (Mohammadi, 2007, ss. 15-16). Bunların yanı sıra kadın milletvekilleri toplantılar düzenleyerek kadın ve kız çocuklarının haklarına ilişkin hazırladıkları bir dizi yasa tasarısını meclisten geçirmeyi başarmışlardır. Örneğin meclis, kızların yasal evlenme yaşını 9'dan 15'e çıkarmayı hedeflemiş ancak AKK'nin müdahalesiyle evlenme yaşı 13 olarak belirlenmiştir. Kadınlar boşanma konusunda bazı haklar kazanmış ve meclis, kadınların mehrini vergiden muaf tutmuştur. Bekâr kadınlar, devlet burslarıyla yanlarında erkek olmaksızın yurt dışında eğitim için izin almıştır. Ayrıca çocuklar ve lise öğrencileri için renkli üniformalara ve başörtülerine izin verilmiştir (Afary, 2009, s. 329).

Bu dönemde homojen bir kadın hareketi olmasa da toplumun çeşitli kesimlerinde kadın faaliyetlerinde artış olmuştur. Toplumsal alanda kadınlar, en büyük kazanımlarını ulusal ve yerel düzeylerde faaliyetler yürüten gazete ve edebiyat yayınlarında elde etmişlerdir. Hatemi'nin kabinesindeki Kültür ve İslami İrşad Bakanı Ataullah Muhacerani'nin liberal politikaları, özgür basın ortamı sağlayarak siyasal sisteme yönelik eleştiri dalgasının önünü açmıştır. Örneğin İran toplumunda kadın meseleleri üzerinde en fazla etkiye sahip olan Zenan, sistemin muhafazası yoluyla dinde reform tartışmalarına yer vermiştir. İslami feminizmin öncülüğünü yapan dergiler, seküler kadınların da yazılarıyla katkıda bulundukları platformlar olmuşlardır. Yani "İslami kadına karşı seküler kadın" ikiliği son bulmuştur (Bayat, 2015, s. 139). Yayınlarda, kadınların aile içindeki konumlarına, hukuka, istihdama ve eğitime erişime kadar uzanan sıkıntılarına yer verilmiş; cinsiyet eşitsizliklerinin Kuran'dan kaynaklanmadığı, İslam hukukunun yanlış yorumundan kaynaklandığını savunan birçok İranlı kadın aktivist İslam tarihinde kadının rolü hakkında yazarak dinin gerçek ruhunu yeniden yakalamaya çalışmıştır (Povey, 2015, s. 77). Ziba Mir- Hosseini, bu tartışmaların yanı sıra devletin kırmızı çizgilerinden biri olan ve devrimden sonra tartışmaya açılmayan örtünme uygulamasının 1997 yılından sonra basın yoluyla tartışmaya açıldığını, örtünmenin zorunlu kılınmasının gerekçelerini sorgulayan yazıların reformist basında yer aldığını ifade etmiştir (Mir-Hosseini, 2002, s. 42).

Hatemi'nin sivil toplum söylemleriyle, Rafsancani yönetiminde başlayan sivil toplum örgütlerindeki artış da bu dönem hız kazanan önemli gelişmeler arasındadır. Toplumsal açıdan bakıldığında 1997-2000 yılları arasında kadın

yönetimindeki hükûmet dışı organizasyonların sayısının %320 arttığı belirtilmektedir (Mohammadi, 2007, s. 16). Ülkenin birçok yerinde kadınlar bir araya gelerek İslam'da kadının yerini, kadın haklarını yani kadınların toplumdaki statüsünü ve hatta Ali Şeriati ve Murtaza Muttahari gibi devrim ideologlarının kadınlara bakışını tartışma fırsatı bulmuşlardır (Povey, 2015, s. 78). Örneğin 1999 yılında kurulan Merkez-i Ferheng-i Zenan, Şirin Ebadi, Pervin Ardalan ve Nuşin Ahmedi Horasani gibi kadın hakları için mücadele eden aktivistleri bir araya getirme işlevi görmüştür. Hükûmet dışı organizasyonların kurulması, söz konusu bu işlevlerin yanı sıra seküler kesimin kadınlarına da bir alan yaratmış, diğer feminist hareketler ile doğrudan iletişim ve iş birliği fırsatı doğmuştur. Bununla birlikte bir bütün olarak İranlı kadın hareketine ama özellikle seküler kadın hareketine tanınma ve dinamizm getiren olay, Şirin Ebadi'nin Nobel Barış Ödülü'nü alması olmuştur (Hoodfar ve Sadr, 2010, ss. 898-99). Böylelikle Nobel alan ilk İranlı ve ilk Müslüman kadın olmuştur. Bu ödül aynı zamanda dış dünyanın İranlı kadınların mücadelesinden haberdar olduğunun ve destek ile dayanışma sağlanabileceğinin farkına varılması açısından da kadınlara umut olmuştur (Hoodfar ve Sadeghi, 2009, s. 217).

Bunlara ek olarak Şirin Ebadi'nin girişimiyle 2003 yılında kurulan Hamandisi Zenan, farklı sosyal, siyasal ve kültürel aidiyetleri bulunan kadınları bir araya getiren koalisyonlardan biri olmuştur. 12 Haziran 2005 tarihinde çoklu gruplardan oluşan bu koalisyonun ilk kolektif eylemi, Tahran Üniversitesi mitingi olmuştur. Bu miting, kadın hareketi açısından bir dönüm noktasıdır. Mitingde öncelikle kadınların haklarını muğlak İslami ilkelere dayanan ya da kadın haklarını radikal ve muhafazakâr yorumlara dayandıran maddelerin kaldırılmasını içeren anayasal reform talebinde bulunulmuştur. Sonraki hedefler aile hukuku reformu ve daha başka kadını dışlayıcı yasalardır. Söz konusu miting, güvenlik güçlerinin sert müdahalesi ve engellemelerine rağmen her jenerasyondan ve ideolojik kesimden binlerce kadının bir araya gelmesiyle gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu miting, o zamana kadar kadın sorunun çözümü için angaje olmamış, her türlü eylemin dışında kalmayı tercih etmiş kadınların kadın hareketine katılımlarını sağlamıştır. Burada kadın hareketinin henüz merkezî bir otoriteye sahip olmaması, çok başlı olması ve yatay bir ağ olarak gelişmesinin sistemin bu harekete karşı mücadelesini zorlaştırdığı belirtilmelidir. Kadın hareketi açısından avantaj teşkil eden noktası hareketin siyaset arenasına yerleşmesine olanak sağlaması olmuştur.

Radikal Muhafazakâr Dönemde Kadın Aktivizmi: 2005-2013

17 Haziran 2005'te gerçekleşen cumhurbaşkanı seçimini özellikle başkentli birçok kadın boykot etme kararı alırken muhafazakâr güçler özellikle daha geleneksel ve muhafazakâr olan küçük şehirlerde ve taşrada, radikal muhafazakâr aday Mahmud Ahmedinejad'ın seçilmesi için çalışmalarda bulunmuşlardır. 24 Haziran'da gerçeklesen seçimin ikinci turunun neticesinde Rafsancani'ye karşı Ahmedinejad

seçimden galip çıkmıştır. Böylece devrim sonrası en çok kadınların muzdarip oldukları radikal bir dönem başlamıştır.

2006 yılı Nisan ayından itibaren kılık kıyafet kurallarına uyumu ya da daha geniş anlamda İslam'a uygun yaşam biçimini benimsetmek maksadıyla kurallar önceki yıllara göre ağırlaştırılmıştır. Sistem, resmî kılık kıyafete "İslam'a uygun olan" kılık kıyafet derken 1991 tarihli Ceza Kanunu incelendiğinde "Genel Ahlaka Karşı Suçlar" başlığı altındaki madde 638'e ek notta "Uygun bir başörtüsü takmadan toplum içine çıkan kadınlar on günden iki aya kadar hapis cezasına veya 50.000 riyalden 500.000 riyale kadar para cezasına çarptırılmalıdırlar." ifadesi yer almaktadır. Bunun dışında Ceza Kanunu'nda kılık kıyafete dair herhangi bir ifade yer almamaktadır (Refworld, t.y.). Kadınlar saçlarını, boyunlarını, ayak bileklerini tamamen örtmek ve vücut hatlarını belli etmeyecek kıyafetler giymek zorundadır. Renkli başörtüsü veya saçlarını tam örtmeyecek gevşek bir şekilde bol başörtüsü takmaları, dar pardösüler veya kısa pantolonlar giymeleri, makyaj yapmaları; yabancı basının dile getirmiş olduğu resmî kılık kıyafet ihlalleri arasındadır. Yine yabancı basına yansıyan haberlere göre İslam'a uygun kılık kıyafet kurallarını uygulatmaya yönelik olarak bir "baskı kampanyası" başlatılmıştır (Refworld, 2008).[10] Bunlara ek olarak gençler arasındaki İslami olmayan davranışlara ve toplumsal yozlaşmaya karşı mücadele etmek maksadıyla "özel birimlere" başvurulmuştur.

2005 yılında dönemin Cumhurbaşkanı Hatemi tarafından hazırlanan İffet ve Tesettürü Yayma Programı, Kültür Devrimi Yüksek Konseyi tarafından onaylanarak 2006 yılında Ahmedinejad yönetiminde kurulan İrşad Devriyeleri ile uygulamaya geçmiştir (Şafak, 2022). Temel varlık sebebi Batı kültürel işgaline karşı mücadele etmek olduğu ilan edilen ahlak polisi, hicabın kadınlar tarafından uygun şekilde örtünüldüğünü, İslam'a uygun kılık kıyafetin hem erkekler hem de kadınlar tarafından giyilmiş olduğunu denetlemekle görevlidir. Bu doğrultuda yolda "suçlu" vatandaşı durdurup onu kınayıp ona ceza kesebilmektedir. Ahmedinejad iktidarında vatandaşların özellikle de kadınların üzerlerinde hissettikleri baskı farklı tepki biçimleri yaratmıştır (Toor, 2016).[11] Yalnızca kadınlara kılık kıyafet konusunda baskı kurulmadığı, en parlak oldukları eğitim alanında kadınların önüne birtakım engeller konulduğu da belirtilmelidir (Baneinia ve Orhan, 2021, s. 1914).[12]

Radikal muhafazakâr cumhurbaşkanının yönetim anlayışının yükünü en çok çeken kadınlar, kendilerince baskılara tepki koymaya çalışmışlardır. Bu da kadınların politizasyonuna yol açmıştır. Daha önce 12 Haziran'daki Tahran Üniversitesi mitinginin yaratmış olduğu sonuç gibi sayısız genç kadının kadın hareketine dâhil olmasıyla kadınlar toplantılarda bir araya gelerek sisteme taleplerini yerine getirtmek için nasıl hareket etmeleri gerektiği üzerinde tartışmalar yürütmüşlerdir. 2006 yılı 8 Mart Dünya (Emekçi) Kadınlar Günü İran kadın hareketinin varlığını hatırlatmak ve canlandırmak için önemli bir vesile olmuştur.

Tahran ve birçok şehirde faaliyetler düzenlense de başkentin merkezinde bir parkta düzenlenen miting en önemlisidir. Miting başlamadan evvel parka gelen, aralarında aktivist şair Simin Behbehani'nin de bulunduğu yüzlerce kadın ve erkek, kolluk kuvvetlerince tutuklanmış; şiddetli saldırıya ve hakaretlere uğramışlardır. Bu olay barışçıl bir eyleme karşı uygulanan şiddetin uluslararası kamuoyu tarafından duyulmasını sağlamıştır.

Prensipte Hamandisi Zenan koalisyonu 2006 yılında yeni bir miting hazırlığı içerisinde olmuş ama Ahmedinejad'ın cumhurbaşkanı seçilmesiyle birlikte kolluk kuvvetlerinin eylemcilere karşı sert müdahalesi koalisyonun dağılmasına neden olmuştur. Dağılmaya rağmen eylemlerini sürdüren bazı kadınlar, 12 Haziran günü Tahran Haftom-e Tir meydanında kadına yönelik ayrımcı yasalara karşı protesto amaçlı bir miting gerçekleştirmişlerdir. Polis şiddeti ve çok sayıda aktivistin tutuklanmasına karşın kadın hareketinin kazanımı, sade vatandaşın kadın sorununa ilgisinin çekilmiş olmasıdır (Maddah, 2010, s. 201). Öte yandan, yasal reformların gerekliliği hususunda kadınlar arasında konsensüs söz konusuyken birçok kadın, kadınların neye karşı geldiklerinden çok ne istediklerine odaklanan, en acil taleplerinin yer aldığı ortak bir metnin, bir kadın şartının olması gerekliliğine inanmaktaydı. Buradan hareketle feminist internet sitesi Meydaan, Ekim 2006'da bir proje başlatmıştır (Hoodfar ve Sadr, 2012, s. 63). Birçok şehirde aylarca süren konuşma ve toplantılar neticesinde 9 Ocak 2007 tarihinde organizasyon komitesi bir araya gelerek bir sözleşmenin (Mensur-i Zenan-i İran) ortaya çıkışına katkı sağlayacak kadınlara bir davet mektubu göndermiştir (Hoodfar, 2013, s. 15).

Yukarıda yer verilen gelişmelerin ardından kadın hareketi içerisindeki farklı gruplar aylarca benimsenmesi gereken stratejilere ilişkin iç tartışmalar yürüterek yeni stratejiler ortaya koymuşlardır. Bu kapsamda resmî başlangıç tarihi 27 Ağustos 2006 olan "Bir Milyon İmza" kampanyası başlatılmıştır. İmza metninin içerisinde yer alan talepler arasında evlenme veya boşanma hâlinde kadınlara erkeklerle eşit haklar verilmesi, çok eşliliğin ve geçici evliliğin kaldırılması, cezai sorumluluk yaşının hem kız hem de erkek çocuklar için 18 yaşa çıkarılması, kadınların çocuklarına vatandaşlıklarını verebilmeleri, diyet ve miras haklarında cinsiyet eşitliği, namus cinayetlerinde suçlulara verilen cezaları azaltan yasalarda reform ve mahkemede eşit ifade hakları yer almaktadır (Maddah, 2010, s. 201). Kampanyanın kurucularından Mansure Şocayi'nin belirtmiş olduğu gibi kampanyanın amacı tamamen hukuki olup ideolojik mahiyet taşımamıştır. Kanun koyucunun kadın aleyhine ayrımcı yasaların kaldırılması yönünde anayasal reform gerçekleştirmesi ve geniş bir kadın ağının kurulması hedeflenmiştir. Bu hedef doğrultusunda mevcut yasalardaki cinsiyet eşitsizliğini gözler önüne seren ve pedagojik bir kitapçık hazırlayan Şirin Ebadi'nin bu kitapçığı, gizli olarak bastırılıp dağıtılmıştır. Böylece İslami, seküler, ateist, feminist vs. her kesimden kadınların bir araya geldikleri geniş bir koalisyon kurulabilmiştir. Ayrıca kadınları hukuki

konularda ve feminizm konusunda bilgilendirmek için gizli atölyeler düzenlenmiştir (Sarret, 2011). Neticede kampanya birtakım yasal değişiklikleri sağlamıştır.[13] Cinsiyet eşitliği söylemi 2009 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimi kampanya sürecinde ortaya çıkarak hem sivil toplumun hem de hükûmet organlarının lügatlerine girebilmiştir (Maddah, 2010, s. 201). Bunlara paralel şekilde kampanya sürecinde kadınların "Kadınların taleplerini oylayacağız." sloganını atmaları, iktidarın seferber olmaya hazır örgütlü bir kadın hareketinin varlığını anlamasını sağlayarak onu harekete geçirmeye yaramıştır.

12 Haziran 2009 tarihli cumhurbaşkanlığı seçiminin neticesinde dört adaydan biri olan Ahmedinejad, yeniden cumhurbaşkanı seçilmiştir. Seçimdeki usulsüzlük ve seçim hileleri iddiası sonucu adaylardan Mir Hüseyin Musevi'nin destekçilerinin sokaklara dökülmesiyle Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut'nun "devrimsiz bir ayaklanma" (Kian-Thiébaut , 2012, s. 190) olan Yeşil Hareket meydana gelmiştir. Aşağıdan yukarıya bir değişim sağlamak için sivil toplum içerisinden çıkarak Tahran'dan doğan ve diğer illere de yayılan Yeşil Hareket içerisinde yine toplumsal değişim aktörleri olarak kadınlar yeniden ortaya çıkmışlardır. Sayıları 28.000 olarak kaydedilen derneklerde veya STK'lerde – bunlar arasında hayırsever faaliyetlerde bulunan, kadın ve çocuk haklarını savunan veya çevreci 800 kadın STK'si mevcuttur – toplumun en aktif kesimleri (katılımcıların çoğunluğu yüksek diplomalara sahip 40 yaş altı gençler) organize olmuşlardır. Kadınların harekete yoğun katılımları Kian-Thiébaut'nun (2012, s. 189) ifadesiyle "(…) toplumsal değişimlerde oynadıkları rolü bir kez daha göstererek vatandaşlık ve demokrasi mücadelelerinin önemini vurgulamıştır."

2013 Yılından Mehsa Emini Protestolarına İran'da Kadın Aktivizmi

2013 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimlerinden birkaç gün önce, 11 Haziran'da aralarında Zehra Şocayi, Şehla Şirket, Nergis Muhammedi, Faize Haşimi Rafsancani, Nuşin Ahmedi Horasani gibi isimlerin bulunduğu kadınlar, cumhurbaşkanı adaylarına taleplerini duyurmak için bir toplantı organize etmişlerdir (Medrese-i Feministi, t.y.). Bu toplantı, ortak çıkarlar çerçevesinde değişim talep eden üç farklı grubu temsil etmesi bakımından önemlidir; Kadın haklarını savunan yönetici gruplar içindeki kadınlar, sivil toplum kuruluşlarında örgütlenen kadınlar ve toplumsal cinsiyet politikalarına meydan okuyarak günlük yaşamlarında direnen bireysel kadınlar. Cumhurbaşkanı adayları arasında bu organizasyona kadınların taleplerini dinlemeleri için temsilciler gönderen tek kişi Hasan Ruhani olmuştur (Tohidi, 2016, ss. 82-83). Sivil toplum kuruluşlarının güçlendirilmesi için yasal düzenlemelerin gerekliliği, yönetim kademelerinde kadın kotalarının oluşturulması, başta eğitim alanında olmak üzere cinsiyet ayrımcılığı içeren uygulamaların kaldırılması, kadınlara özgü platformlar aracılığıyla medyanın bağımsız ve aktif kullanımı söz konusu talepler arasında yer almıştır (Medrese-i Feministi, t.y.). Ruhani'nin cumhurbaşkanı seçilmesiyle, radikal muhafazakâr siyasetten sonra ılımlı bir yönetim anlayışına geçiş süreci başlamıştır. Kendisi

seçildikten sonra aralarında önde gelen kadın hakları savunucusu Avukat Nesrin Sutude'nin de bulunduğu bir dizi siyasi mahkûm serbest bırakılmıştır. Ayrıca *Zenan-i Emruz* gibi bazı dergiler yeniden faaliyete geçmiştir (Tohidi, 2016, s. 83).[14] Bu olumlu gelişmeler bir yana dönemin siyaset tarzı, kadın aktivizmini de etkilemiştir. Kadınların merkezsiz ve örgütsüz bireysel eylemlere yöneldiği görülmüştür.

İran içindeki veya "diasporadaki" İranlı kadınların sisteme yönelik eleştirileri bu dönem farklı direniş biçimleriyle görünürlük kazanmıştır. 2013 yılında, diasporadaki İranlı Gazeteci Mesih Alinejad'ın zorunlu örtünme yasalarını eleştirmek amacıyla "Benim Gizli Özgürlüğüm" başlığıyla açtığı Facebook sayfasında yaptığı paylaşımlar, Facebook'a erişimin engellenmesine rağmen büyük destek almıştır. İran'ın her yerinden kadınlar, kamusal alanlarda saçlarını özgürce gösteren fotoğraflarını, sosyal medyada paylaşmaya başlamıştır. Bu sürecin "Beyaz Çarşamba Hareketi" adını alan bir kampanyaya dönüşmesiyle kampanya İranlı kadınların başörtüsü takmayı veya takmamayı seçme haklarının olması gerektiği mesajını vermiştir.

İran'da farklı bir kadın aktivizmi dalgası ise 27 Aralık 2017'de meydana gelmiştir. Tahran'ın en işlek caddelerinden biri olan Devrim Caddesi'nde başörtüsünü bir sopaya bağlayan Vida Muvahhid, bir elektrik direğinin üzerinde bu sopayı beyaz bayrağı andıran biçimde sallayarak kadınlara yönelik başörtüsü mecburiyetini protesto etmiştir. Akabinde "İnkılap Caddesi Kızları" ismini alan bu eylem, sosyal medya aracılığıyla yayılarak ülke içinden ve dışından büyük destek görmüştür (Mahmoudi, 2019, s. 18). Söz konusu görüntülerin sembol hâline geldiği bu eylem, birçok kadın tarafından benimsenerek yalnızca Tahran'la sınırlı kalmamış, ülkenin farklı şehirlerinde de görülmüştür. Örgütlü olmayan kadınların bireysel olarak giriştikleri bu hareket, "toplumda düzeni/barışı bozmak" gibi gerekçeler sebebiyle olası tutuklanmanın önüne geçen bir form şeklindedir. Örgütsüz, sessiz, merkezsiz ve zorunlu örtünme uygulamasına karşı olan bu eylemler hem erkek hem kadınların katılımlarıyla toplumda yaygın memnuniyetsizliği gösteren organik sivil bir hareket niteliği taşır (Hoodfar, 2018). Eylem destek görmesine rağmen beklenilen etkiyi gösterememiştir. Bunun temel sebepleri şöyle özetlenebilir: 2009 Yeşil Hareket'in sert bir şekilde bastırılmasından sonra devletin bu gibi hareketlere karşı reflekslerinin katı olması; ekonomik gerilemenin tetiklemesi sonucu halkta özellikle alt gelir gruplarında ekonomik talepler içeren yaygın hoşnutsuzluğun bu dönem baskın olması ve en nihayetinde İran'daki gençlerin bağımsız bir aktör olarak sahneye çıkamaması (Horasani, 2018). Kısacası, İnkılap Caddesi'nin Kızları eylemleri kadınların kamusal alanlarda görünürlük kazanma çabasına dönük cesur bir girişim olmasına karşın hem ekonomik sorunların neden olduğu memnuniyetsizlikler hem de sistemin bu hareketlere 2009'dan sonra sert müdahalesi arasında sıkışmış ve eylem adeta seslendirilmeden boğulmuştur.

Bir başka bireysel eylem örneği, Seher Hüdayari'nin kendini yakması şeklinde 2019 yılında meydana gelmiştir. Kadınların stadyumda maç izlemelerinin devrimden beri yasak[15] olması nedeniyle stadyuma erkek kılığında girmeye çalışırken yakalanan ve gözaltına alınan Hüdayari "toplum içine başörtüsüz çıkmak" suçuyla yargılanmıştır. Davası ertelenerek şartlı serbest bırakılan genç kadın altı ay ila iki yıl kadar hapis cezasına çarptırılacağını duyması üzerine Tahran'daki mahkemenin önünde kendisini yakarak hayatını kaybetmiştir. Sosyal medyada bu olay İranlı kadınlar aracılığıyla #Bluegirl – Mavi Kız ismini Tahran'daki İstiklal takımının renginden alır – etiketiyle paylaşılmıştır. Söz konusu bu eylemler, sosyal medyanın bir farkındalık yaratma suretiyle kadınlar tarafından seslerini duyurma aracı olarak nasıl aktif kullandıklarını göstermektedir.

Kadınlar, dergiler yoluyla bu dönem de sorunlarını tartışmaya devam etmişlerdir. Örneğin Zenan-i Emruz, 2014 yılında beşinci sayısında beyaz evliliği eleştiren bir yazı yayımlayarak bu evlilik türünü uygulayan kadınlarla yapılan röportajlara yer vermiştir (Nakanishi, 2021, s. 88). Dergi, söz konusu yazısı nedeniyle altı ay kadar bir süre kapatılma cezasıyla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Kapatılmanın ardından yayınlarına devam eden dergi, 2017 yılında meydana gelen İnkılap Caddesi Kızları eylemleri üzerine "Başörtüsü Takmamakla Suçlananların Hakları ve Cezaları" başlıklı bir yazıya yer vererek bu yazıda başörtüsü mecburiyetinin açıkça yasal bir zemininin olup olmadığı ve kadınların internette yayımlanan başörtüsüz görüntülerinin toplum içinde başörtüsünü emreden yasanın ihlali olarak kabul edilip edilmemesi gerektiğini sorgulamıştır (Gordi, 2019). Zenan-i Emruz'un bir önceki dönemlerde olduğu gibi ülke içi meselelere odaklandığını gösteren bu örneklerin yanı sıra bu dönem özellikle feminist çizgide cinsiyet eşitliği, Batı tarzı birlikte yaşama ve uluslararası evlilik gibi konuları da ele aldığı ve mülteci krizi, su sorunları gibi uluslararası boyuttaki sorunlara da uzandığı ifade edilmektedir (Nakanishi, 2021, s. 92).

Yukarıda sunulan bilgilerden hareketle Ruhani yönetiminin kadınlara yönelik politikalar izleme konusunda başarılı olduğu söylenemez. Bir kadın bakanlığı kurma ve üç kadın atama sözünü vermesine rağmen bu sözler tutulmamıştır. Bunun yanı sıra kadınlara ait bazı yayın organları kapatılmış, Nesrin Sutude ve Nergis Muhammedi gibi kadın aktivistler tutuklanmıştır (Parsa, 2021). Bu dönem, yönetsel alanın yanı sıra kadınların hak arayışları yaptırımlar ve ekonomik sorunlar nedeniyle ekonomi temelli protesto dalgalarının (Aralık 2017-Ocak 2018 ve Kasım 2019) gölgesinde kalmıştır. Fakat her ne koşulda olursa olsun kadınlar, toplumda kendilerini değişimin temsilcisi olarak konumlandırmaktan vazgeçmemişlerdir. Onlar, hayatlarının "ev işlerinin ötesinde olduğu" bilincinde kamusal alanda tıpkı zorunlu örtünme yasalarına karşı geldikleri gibi kendi tercihlerini yapmayı isteyerek ani değişimler barındıran devrimden çok evrime inanmış ve küçük adımlarla kadın haklarında iyileştirme talebinde olduklarını ifade etmişlerdir (Salehi vd., 2020). Bu isteklerini ve hoşnutsuzluklarını özellikle eğitimli

genç kadınlar sosyal medyanın kamuoyu oluşturmadaki rolünü kullanarak ve farklı kadın ya da gruplarla temas kurarak dile getirmişlerdir. Kadınların örgütsüz, merkezsiz, köklü değişimden ziyade reform hedefleyen bireysel eylemleri, zincirleme eylemler meydana getirerek sistemin kırmızı çizgilerine meydan okuyan bir boyutta görünürlük kazanmıştır.

2021 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimleriyle, İbrahim Reisi'nin cumhurbaşkanı seçilmesiyle muhafazakâr bir yönetim iktidara gelmiştir. Reisi, değişim talebinde bulunan kadınlara daha fazla özgürlük ve eşitlik tanıyan detaylı bir vizyon ortaya koymamıştır. Öte yandan yönetimin muhafazakârlaşmasının, Ahmedinejad yönetiminde olduğu gibi kadınları daha da politize edebileceğini ifade etmek mümkündür. 2022 yılında meydana gelen Mehsa Emini olayları olarak bilinen ve uzun süre devam eden protestolar İran'da bu döneme değin yapılan protestolardan farklılaşmıştır. Gösteriler, Kürt asıllı 22 yaşındaki Mehsa Emini'nin 13 Eylül'de örtünme kurallarına uymadığı gerekçesiyle Tahran'da İrşat Devriyesi tarafından gözaltına alınması ve gördüğü kötü muamele sonucu – bu iddia yetkili makamlar tarafından reddedilmiştir – kaldırıldığı hastanede 16 Eylül'de hayatını kaybetmesi üzerine başlamıştır. Emini'nin memleketi Sakkız'da (Kürdistan vilayeti) başlayan ve önde kadınların yer aldığı protestolar ülke geneline yayılmış, genç kızın adı sembol hâle gelerek sosyal medya aracılığıyla "Kadın Yaşam Özgürlük (#Zan_Zendegi_Azadi/ #Woman_Life_Freedom/Jin_Jiyan_Azadi)" sloganıyla İran içinden ve dışından destek gören kitlesel bir harekete dönüşmüştür. Kadınlar bu olaya ve zorunlu örtünme yasasına karşı tepkilerini saçlarını keserek ve başörtülerini çıkararak/yakarak göstermişlerdir.

Buraya kadar İranlı kadınların toplumsal hareketlerde daima aktif rol aldıkları görülmüştür. Emini için adalet arayışının yanı sıra bir bütün olarak bakıldığında sistemin meşruiyetini de sorgulayan ("Diktatöre Ölüm!", "İslami Hükûmet İstemiyoruz!" gibi sloganların atılması) bu protestoları öncekilerden farklı kılan, kadınların başat aktör olmaları ve protestoların kadınların taleplerini merkeze alan bir form taşımalarıdır (Hoodfar, 2022). Bunun yanı sıra protesto tarzındaki değişikliğe de dikkat çekilmektedir. Protestocuların tek bir merkezde toplanmaktan ziyade dağınık olarak farklı yerlerde toplanmaları, Yeşil Hareket'teki gibi kolluk kuvvetleri tarafından hareketin hızlı bastırılmasının önüne geçmiştir (Ebadi, 2022). Nitekim olayların bastırılma çabalarına rağmen protestoların ülkenin her köşesine yayılarak uzun soluklu olmalarının nedeni, farklı aktörlerin çıkarlarının kesişiminin tezahürü ile açıklanmaktadır. Yani toplumsal öfkenin kitlesel dışavurumu; kadınlar, gençler, öğrenciler, Kürtler ve diasporanın etkisiyle geniş çaplı boyutlara ulaşmıştır (Nikfar, 2022). Ülkedeki ekonomik sorunlar ve halkın yaşam standartlarındaki düşüş göz önünde bulundurulduğunda; bu dönem, merkezinde kadınların olduğu protestoların bireysel ve düzensiz eylemler aracılığıyla değil, toplu eylem biçimi olarak görünürlük kazanması, kadın aktivizmde bir dönüm noktasını oluşturmuştur.

Sonuç

İran'da kadın hareketinin ortaya çıkışına ve gelişimine bakıldığında, ithal fikirlerden ziyade köklerini kendi içinde barındırdığı ve bu doğrultuda ilerleme kat ettiği görülmektedir. Homojen bir kadın hareketi İran'da gelişmemiş, devrimden sonra yukarıdan aşağıya dayatılan İslamileştirme politikalarına karşı dönemsel olarak farklı direniş biçimleri ortaya çıkmıştır. Devrimden sonra kadınlar, bir ideolojiye bağlı siyasi faaliyetlerde bulunmaktan ziyade devletin cinsiyet eşitsizliği getiren politikalarına karşı durmuşlardır. 1990'lı yıllara ve 2000'li yılların ilk on yılına bakıldığında, kadınların kendilerine yönelik ayrımcılık uygulamalarına farkındalıklarının arttığı; böylelikle ortaya kolektif, düşünülmüş ve etkili dişil bir eylem biçimi ile siyasi mücadelenin ortaya çıktığı görülmüştür. Kadınların mücadele alanları; dergiler, gazeteler ve kurdukları dernekler üzerinden şekillenmiştir. 2009 Yeşil Hareketi ile hız kazanan sosyal medyanın aktif kullanımı, kadınların taleplerini iletmede diğer geleneksel araçların yanında yer almıştır. Özellikle 2013 sonrası sosyal medya, kadınların taleplerini tüm dünyaya duyurma ve kadınlara zincirleme bireysel eylemler başlatma fırsatı sunmuş; dağınık, merkezsiz ve bireysel mahiyetteki eylemler yayılma imkânı bulmuştur. Fakat bu avantaj bir yana, kadın hareketinin bireysel eylemlere hapsolması, kitlesel gösterilerin önünü kapatmıştır. 2022 yılında cereyan eden Mehsa Emini protestoları ise bu noktada bir kırılma noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Merkezinde kadınların olduğu bu protestolar, farklı toplumsal kesimlerin de eklemlenmesiyle uzun soluklu ve kitlesel protestolar mahiyetinde görünürlük kazanmıştır.

Çalışmada vurgulandığı üzere kadın hareketi, farklı ideolojik temsillerden ve profillerden oluşan bir kompozisyon şeklindedir. İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin ideolojik özünü yansıtan ve ideal Müslüman kadın prototipi öngören ve devletin resmî ideolojisi gereği hiçbir zaman müzakere konusu olmayan zorunlu örtünme yasaları, kadınlar için eleştiri unsuru hâline gelmiş ve Mehsa Emini protestolarıyla eleştirinin ötesinde kitlesel gösterilere evrilmiştir. Değişim peşinde olan kadınlar hem zorunlu örtünme yasasına hem de toplumsal cinsiyet ayrımına karşı çıkmayı bırakmamışlardır. Kadınların bundan sonraki süreçte özel ve kamusal alanlarda erkeklerle eşit şartlarda olma talebinden asla vazgeçmeyecekleri aşikârdır. Elbette merkezî aktörler olarak kadınların başını çektikleri protesto döngüleri devam edecek ve tüm eylemlerinin neticesinde olduğu gibi kazanımları olacaktır. Son olarak, öncesinde siyasi sistemi yıkmaya çalışmadan, ataerkil düzene uygun olarak oluşturulan yasaları sorgulayarak hak arayışlarına başlayan başta kadınlar ve sonrasında tüm muhalifler; haklar, özgürlükler ve ülkedeki tüm olumsuzlukların sorumlusu olarak molla rejiminin yıkılmasını talep etseler de son protestolara dayanarak ülkede bir rejim değişikliği öngörmek hâlâ gerçekçi değildir.

Extended Abstract

This article aims to analyze the emergence of the women's movement in Iran and its evolution towards a feminist movement. To this end, while examining the women's movement in Iran, whose origins date back to the 19th century, the issue of women and women's struggle for their rights during the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties were first addressed so as not to miss the historical context. The role and struggle for the status of women during the 1979 Revolution and the Islamic Republic led by Khomeini were analyzed subsequently. On this basis, the evolution of the Iranian women's movement was examined in four successive periods: 1-) 1989 -2005, the period when women's efforts in favor of equal rights and Islamic feminism emerged in Iran 2-) the period approximately nine years which began in 2005 and during which the pressure of power increased particularly on women 3-) The period which begins with the year 2013 when a liberal air was felt and ended in 2022 4-) The year 2022 where the protests on Mahsa Amini's death took place.

At the end of the analysis, it turns out that the women's movement in Iran has its own roots, although it is influenced by ideas imported from the West. A homogeneous women's movement did not develop in this country. Different forms of resistance emerged periodically against the Islamization policies imposed from the top down after the Revolution. After the Revolution, women opposed state policies that created gender inequality rather than engaging in political activities based on ideology. During the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, women became more aware of discriminatory practices against them. This is how a collective, thoughtful, and effective form of women's political action and struggle emerged. The areas of women's struggle were shaped by magazines, newspapers, and associations created by women. Social media, which accelerated during the Green Movement in 2009, constitutes an effective tool for conveying women's demands. It was especially after 2013 that social media allowed women to announce their demands to the world and launch individual chain actions. Likewise, thanks to social media, dispersed, decentralized, and individual feminine actions have found the opportunity to spread. However, this advantage aside, the confinement of the women's movement to individual actions prevented mass protests. The protests on Mahsa Amini's death, which took place in 2022, constitute a breaking point at this stage. Women at the center of these protests have gained visibility and duration as mass protests by adding different social segments.

As highlighted in the study, the women's movement comprises different representations and ideological profiles. The laws on the compulsory wearing of the veil, which reflect the ideological essence of the Islamic Republic and define the ideal prototype of the Muslim woman, and which are never the subject of negotiations due to the official ideology of the State, have become an element of criticism by women. Furthermore, the contentment of criticism of the laws was

overtaken and replaced by mass protests with Mahsa Amini's death. Women seeking change have continued to oppose both the law on compulsory veiling and discrimination based on sex. Women will never give up their demand to be on an equal footing with men in the private and public spheres. The cycles of protests they lead as central actors will continue, and they will surely gain thanks for all their actions. Finally, although women started to seek their rights by questioning the laws established following the patriarchal order without trying to destroy the political system, all opponents demanded the overthrow of the mullah regime as responsible for the deficiencies in the realm of rights and all evils in the country, it is still unrealistic to foresee a regime change based on the latest protests.

Notlar

[1] İran, 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında Türk, Hint ve Rus devletleri gibi bazı aracı devletler sayesinde Aydınlanma Felsefesi ve Fransız İhtilali'nin öncü fikirleriyle tanışmıştır.

[2] Shuster, İran Meclisi tarafından hazinedar olarak (Mayıs-Aralık 1911) atanmıştır. Dolayısıyla Meşrutiyet Devrimi sürecinde İran'da meydana gelen olayları yakından izleyebilmiştir.

[3] Babilik, inkâr yoluyla boşanmanın yanı sıra çok eşliliği de caydırmıştır. Kurretü'l Ayn da bu yeni dinin savunucusu olmak için eşini terk etmiştir. Haziran 1948 tarihinde İslam ve Babilik'in ayrımını resmîleştiren Babi konferansında başörtüsünü tüm gözler önünde çıkarmıştır. Babilik, kadının sosyal yaşama katılımına ilişkin birçok sosyal tabuyu da reddetmiştir.

[4] 9 Ocak 1963'te açıklanan Beyaz Devrim'in programı, toprağın yeniden dağıtımını ve kadınların oy kullanma hakkını içermektedir.

[5] 1967 yılına kadar aile hukukunun temel referansı dindir. 1933 yılında kabul edilen Medeni Kanun geniş ölçüde din temelli hazırlanmış ve örfi birtakım kurallar (aile reisinin ve kamusal alanda otoritenin erkek olması gibi) değişmemiştir. Dinî mahkemeler 1936 yılına kadar kaldırılmamışlardır. Erkeğe eşini boşama hakkı ile çok eşlilik, muta nikâhı (geçici nikâh) yürürlükte kalmıştır. Ayrıca İslam'a aykırı olması nedeniyle gayrimüslim erkek ve Müslüman kadının birliktelik yasağı da mevcuttur.

[6] Amacı farklı kadın gruplarını bir şemsiye altında toplamak olan WOI'nin 1975 tarihli Aile Koruma Kanunu'nun oluşumunda etkisi olmuştur: Kadınlar için asgari evlilik yaşı 15'ten 18'e, erkekler içinse 18'den 20'ye çıkarılmıştır. Ayrıca kadınlara Aile Mahkemelerine geçerli boşanma talepleri sunma konusunda erkekler ile eşit haklar tanınmıştır. Ek olarak annelerin çocuklarının velayetini almasına izin verilmiş, bu konuda yargı yetkisi, Aile Koruma Mahkemelerine devredilmiştir.

[7] 1982 yılında birinci yasama dönemi milletvekilleri geçici hükûmetin belirlemiş olduğu asgari evlilik yaşını şeriata aykırılık gerekçesiyle yeniden görüşmüşlerdir. Yasanın yeni hâli şu şekildedir: "Buluğ (ergenlik) çağına gelmeden evvel evlenmek yasaktır." Buluğ çağı kızlarda 9 erkeklerde 15 yaşında başlamaktadır.

[8] Devrimin ilk yıllarından itibaren muhalif olarak görülen grupların tasfiye edilmelerinin kadınların örgütlenememelerindeki etkisi göz ardı edilmemelidir. 1980'li yıllar itibarıyla yaşanan iktidar mücadelesinde liberaller saf dışı bırakılırlarken solcu ve laik unsurlar şiddet kullanılarak bastırılmışlardır. Öte yandan, devlet ile devrimci kurumlar da din adamlarının kontrolüne girmişlerdir. Ayrıca tüm muhaliflerin "devlet düşmanları" olarak görüldüğü İran-Irak Savaşı kontekstinde kadın muhalefetinin de sesi kısılmış ve kadın statüsüne dair tartışmalar bastırılmıştır. Nihayetinde kadın, İslam'ın ve ulusun şanı için savaşa insan gücü üretecek anne ve eş rolüyle sunulmaya devam edilmiştir.

[9] Seçimlerde aday adayları arasında bir kadının da yer almıştır. İslamcı-feminist aktivist ve devrimci liderlerden Ayetullah Mahmud Talegani'nin kızı Azam Talegani'nin adaylığı, Anayasayı Koruyucular Konseyi (AKK) tarafından onaylanmasa da İran'da bu makama kadının gelmesini reddeden yasalara meydan okuma niteliğindedir.

[10] Kanada Göçmenlik ve Mülteci Komisyonu'nun raporuna göre otoritelerin uygun kılık kıyafet kuralını ihlal edenlere yönelik uygulamalarından bazıları şunlardır: İlgililere kılık kıyafet kurallarını ihlal etmeyeceklerini beyan ettikleri bir söz mektubu imzalatmaları, sözlü kınamada bulunma, onları kırbaçlama, para cezasına veya üç ay hapis cezasına çarptırılmaları, kurallara uyulması konulu derslere katılım zorunluluğu, toplum içerisinde davranış konusunda oryantasyon dersleri almamaları.

[11] 2016 yılında kurucuları arasında insan hakları aktivisti Firuzeh Mahmoudi'nin de bulunduğu Guershad isimli akıllı telefon haritalama uygulaması, ahlak polisinin başkent Tahran'daki konumunu kullanıcılarına bildirmek ve böylece polisten kaçışlarını sağlamak için tasarlanmıştır. Mehsa Emini'nin ölümünün ardından uygulama içeriği güncellenmiştir. Ayrıca kullanıcılarına polisin konumunu bildirmektedir.

[12] 2005 yılında kurulan yeni hükûmet kadınların yükseköğrenim görmelerinin önüne engel koymuştur. Üniversite giriş sınavının ilk aşamasını geçtikten sonra adaylar eğitim almak istedikleri alan tercihinde bulunmaktadırlar. Toplam 77 alanda kadınların eğitim almaları engellenmiştir.

[13] Miras ve diyet hakları yasalarında küçük reformlar gerçekleşmiştir; çok eşliliği erkekler için kolaylaştıracak yeni bir yasa tasarısına karşı oy kullanması için meclise baskı yapılmıştır; daha erken yaşta evlilikler yapıldığından kızlar için yasal evlilik yaşının 13 olduğu yeniden ilan edilmiştir; boşanmış kadınların çocuklarının velayetlerini alma hususunda görece olumlu değişim gerçekleşmiştir.

[14] Zenan dergisi 2008 yılında kapatılması nedeniyle 2014'te yayın hayatına Zenan-i Emruz adıyla devam etmiştir.

[15] İranlı kadınlar, devrimden sonra ilk defa 2018 FIFA Dünya Kupası vesilesiyle Azadi Stadyumu'nda maç izlemişlerdir. İran futbol liglerini izlemeleri için stadyuma girmelerine izin verilmesi ise 2022 yılını bulmuştur.

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
ABD Hegemonyasına Meydan Okuma: Türk Dış Politikasında Otonomi Arayışı (1964-75)

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Hüsna Taş Yetim tarafından yazılan ve 2023 yılında Lejand Kitap Yayın tarafından yayınlanan "ABD Hegemonyasına Meydan Okuma: Türk Dış Politikasında Otonomi Arayışı (1964-75)" başlıklı kitap, Türkiye-ABD arasında İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Sovyet tehdidi etrafında kurulan ve 1950'li yıllarda güçlü bir müttefiklik formu oluşturan ikili ilişkilerin, 1964-75 döneminde neden bir kriz evresine girdiğine ve Türkiye'nin bu kriz evresinde dış politikada otonomisini artırma yönündeki motivasyonlarının ne olduğuna yeni bir teorik bakış açısıyla açıklama sunar. 1950'lerde zirve yapan Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri, 1964 ve 1974'teki Kıbrıs Sorunu, 1967'deki haşhaş ekimi meselesi ve 1975'te ABD'nin silah ambargosu gibi olaylar nedeniyle 1964-75 döneminde bir dizi krizle karşı karşıya kaldı. Bu krizlerin hem bir nedeni hem de bir sonucu olarak Türkiye, 1975-78 yılları arasında ABD'nin üslerini kullanmasına kısıtlama getirdi ve dış politikasında otonomisini artıracak bazı kararlar aldı. Taş Yetim'in temel hedefi, ilgili tarih aralığında Türkiye-ABD ikili ilişkilerinde yaşanan krizlerin ve Türkiye'nin dış politika otonomisini arttırmaya yönelik girişimlerinin nedenlerini, hâkim literatüre göre yeni bir teorik bakış açısıyla analiz etmektir. Bu amaçla yazar, yakın zamanda uluslararası ilişkiler disiplinine dahil olan hiyerarşi teorisini temel alır ve bu teoriyi ittifak teorileri, dış politika analizi ve birey, devlet ve sistem düzeylerine odaklanan farklı teoriler ile destekler. Bu noktada odağına aldığı soru "Hiyerarşik bir düzenin muktedi devleti (subordinate state) neden dış politika otonomisini artırmaya yönelir?" (s.15) sorusudur. Soruyu Türkiye özelinde yeniden ifade etmek gerekirse, yazarın deyişiyle "1950'ler boyunca dış politika otonomisinin bir kısmını ABD'ye devreden Ankara, 1964-75 döneminde neden otonomisini artırmaya yöneldi? (s.25). Dolayısıyla Taş Yetim, teorileri harmanlayarak oluşturduğu üç ana hipotez

ve dokuz alt hipotezle, hem 1950'lerde sıkı bir müttefiklik ilişkisi sergileyen Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinin, 1960'lardan itibaren neden bir kriz döngüsüne girdiğini hem de Türkiye'nin dış politikada özerklik kazanmaya yönelik adımları neden attığını açıklar.

Kitapta söz konusu teorik çerçeve ve konu beş bölüm etrafında ele alınır. Birinci bölüm, hiyerarşi teorisine ve bu teorinin dünya politikası ile devletlerarası ilişkilere ilişkin argümanlarına odaklanarak üç alt başlık altında düzenlenmiştir. Hiyerarşi teorisinin temel argümanları aktarıldıktan sonra, "meydan okuma" kavramına teorik bir çerçeve sunulur. Bu bölüm, "Muktedi bir devlet hegemonik güce dış politika otonomisini artırmak için neden muhalefet eder?" sorusunun cevabı ile sona erer. Bu soru, hiyerarşi teorisinden türetilen argümanlarla geliştirilen üç ana hipotez (H1, H2, H3) üzerinden ele alınmaktadır. Her bir ana hipotez - patron devlet (H1), tabi devlet (H2) ve sistem (H3) - üçer alt hipotez ile desteklenerek detaylı bir şekilde incelenir. Yazar hegemon güç (patron) kaynaklı nedenlere ilişkin şu hipotezleri elde etmiştir (H1): H1a: Hegemon güç otoritesinin amacı ve sınırlarını aşarsa otoritesine karşı meydan okumalar yükselebilir. H1b: Hegemon güç tarafından ekonomik, askerî ve siyasi çıkarları aleyhine politik tercihlere zorlanan tabi devletlerin meydan okuma ihtimali yüksektir. H1c: Patron devletin tabi devletlerin temel ihtiyaçlarını (ekonomik, askerî vb.) karşılama isteği azalır ve yeteneği zayıflar ise otoritesine karşı meydan okumaların ortaya çıkma ihtimali yüksektir (ss.38-50). Tabi (muktedi) devlet kaynaklı nedenlere ilişkin elde ettiği hipotezler ise şunlardır (H2): H2a: Düşünce dünyası ve ideolojisi patrondan farklı olan tabi devlet liderinin hegemon güce muhalefet etmesi kuvvetle muhtemeldir. H2b: Patron devlete muhalif olan (lider dışı) aktörlerin dış politika üzerindeki etkisinin artması meydan okumaya yol açabilir. H2c: Materyal kapasitesi artan tabi devletin kendi tercihlerini yansıtan dış politikaya yönelmesi muhtemeldir (ss.50-59). Üçüncü ana hipotez sistem kaynaklı nedenleri (H3) açıklar ve yazar bu bağlamda şu hipotezleri sunar: H3a: Sıkı iki kutuplu sistemde bloklar arası rekabet, (nükleer) silahlanma yarışı ve düşmanlık tabi devletleri meydan okumadan alıkoyar. H3b: Sıkı kutuplu sistemin gevşemesi ikincil devlete otonomi artırma fırsatı tanır. H3c: Uluslararası sistemde yeni güçlerin yükselişi itaatkâr tabi devleti meydan okuyan tarafa yerleştirebilir (ss.59-74).

Taş Yetim, söz konusu teorik çerçeveden hareketle Türkiye-ABD ikili ilişkilerinin 1950'ler ve 1964-75 dönemlerindeki seyrine ilişkin iki temel argüman geliştirir. Birincisi, Türkiye ve ABD arasında ilk olarak 1947 Truman Doktrini ile kurulan ve 1950'lerde güçlenen müttefiklik ilişkilerinin hiyerarşik olduğudur. Taş Yetim, elde ettiği bu ilk argümanı toplamda beş bölümden oluşan kitabın ikinci bölümünde somut örneklere başvurarak destekler. Buna göre Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri, 1947 Truman Doktrini ile başlayan ve 1948 Marshall Anlaşması, IMF, NATO ve Dünya Bankası üyelikleri ile devam eden süreçte hiyerarşik bir yapıya evirilmiştir. Yazar bu bölümde ayrıca hiyerarşik ilişkilerin geliştirilmesinin temel motivasyonlarını

sistem, devlet ve lider düzeyleri üzerinden açıklarken ikili asimetrik ilişkilerin 1950'li yıllarda Türkiye dış politikasının otonomisini göreli olarak nasıl sınırlandırdığını detaylandırır. İlgili kurumlarla ve ABD'yle imzalanan anlaşmalar doğrultusunda Türkiye'ye verilen borç, kredi ve yardımların kullanım alanlarının tarım ve ulusal güvenlik meseleleriyle sınırlandırılması hususuna bu bağlamda dikkat çeker. Birinci argüman ile ilişkili olarak yazarın bu bölümde öne sürdüğü bir diğer argüman, Türkiye'nin hiyerarşik yapıda ilerleyen ilişkiler doğrultusunda Sovyet tehdidinden korunma sağlamak, önemli miktarda ABD askerî ve ekonomik yardımı almak ve Batılı devletler arasında bir statü kazanmak gibi önemli kazanımlar elde ettiği yönündedir. Taş Yetim'in ikinci temel argümanı ise, 1950'lerde imzalanan anlaşmalarla güçlenen Türkiye-ABD ikili ilişkilerinin, 1962'de yaşanan Küba Krizi, 1964'te Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'a müdahale isteği, 1967'den itibaren ABD'nin haşhaş ekiminin yasaklanması yönündeki taleplerinin Türkiye tarafından geri çevrilmesi ve 1974'te ABD'nin itirazlarına rağmen Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'a müdahale etmesi gibi olaylar nedeniyle krize girdiği ve bu dönemdeki eylemleri ile Türkiye'nin dış politikasındaki egemenlik yetkilerini genişlettiğidir. Yazar, Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinin krize girmesinin ve Türkiye'nin egemenlik yetkilerini genişleten eylemlerde bulunmasının temel nedenlerini sistem, devlet ve lider düzeylerinin hem ABD hem de Türkiye'nin dış politika davranışlarına yaptığı derin etkiye bağlar. Yazarın bu konudaki özgünlüğü, krizlerin ve dış politikadaki egemenlik arayışının altında yatan nedenleri, kendi oluşturduğu dokuz hipotezle açıklaması ve Türkiye bağlamına ilişkin üç ayrı argüman geliştirmesidir. Bunlar 1964-75 döneminde ABD'nin Türkiye'nin güvenlik çıkarlarını hesaba katmayan bir dizi politika girişimleri, 1960'lar ve 1970'lerde bir taraftan Türkiye iç siyasetinde diğer taraftan da uluslararası sistemde meydana gelen gelişmelerdir. Yazar, devlet düzeyinde iç siyaset konteksti, sistem düzeyinde ise detant dönemi ve alternatif güçlerin yükselmesi gibi başlıca gelişmelerin etkisini ele alır ve bu argümanları kitabın üçüncü, dördüncü ve beşinci bölümlerinde hiyerarşi teorisinden elde ettiği ve ittifak teorileri başta olmak üzere Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin diğer ana akım teorileriyle desteklediği hipotezlerle detaylandırır.

Taş Yetim, Türkiye bağlamına ilişkin geliştirdiği argümanlardan ilkini kitabın üçüncü bölümünde detaylandırır. Bu argümana göre 1964-75 döneminde ABD, Türkiye'nin çıkarlarını riske atan bir takım politika ve eylemleri benimseyerek hem ikili ilişkilerde krize yol açmış hem de Ankara'yı otonomi arayışına sevk etmiştir. Yazar, konu ile ilgili üç eylem üzerinde durur. Bunlardan ilki Türkiye'nin güvenlik çıkarlarını koruması karşılığında ABD'ye verilen otoritenin ABD tarafından istismar edilmesidir. ABD, 1962 Küba krizinin çözümü için Türkiye'deki Jüpiter füzelerini Sovyetler Birliği ile gerçekleştirdiği gizli pazarlık sonucu sökmeye karar vererek Türkiye üs ve tesislerini Ankara'nın belirlediği alanlar dışında kullanmış ve Türkiye'deki Amerikan askerî personeli 1952 SOFA Anlaşması'na (Status of Forces Agrement, Kuvvetler Statüsü Sözleşmesi) uygun olmayan eylemlerde

bulunarak otoritesinin sınırlarını aşmıştır. Yazara göre, tüm bu gelişmeler Türkiye'nin ABD'ye bir müttefik olarak ne kadar güvenebileceği konusunu tartışmaya açtığı gibi ABD'nin haşhaş ekiminin yasaklaması, Kıbrıs'a müdahale etmeme konusunda Johnson mektubuyla ve ambargo tehditleriyle Türkiye üzerinde baskı kurması ve Türkiye'ye yaptığı yardımları azaltması ikili ilişkilerdeki gerilimi yükseltmiş ve Türkiye'nin dış politikada otonomi arayışına ivme kazandırmıştır. 1974'te Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'a yaptığı askeri müdahaleye, ABD'nin 1975'te başlattığı ve üç yıl süren askeri ambargo ile yanıt vermesi ise, mevcut krizleri daha da şiddetlendirmiştir.

Kitabın dördüncü bölümünde Taş Yetim, ABD-Türkiye ilişkilerinde yaşanan krizlerde ve Türkiye'nin dış politika otonomisini arttırmaya yönelik girişimlerinde Türkiye iç siyasetindeki gelişmelerin etkisini analiz eder. Bu amaçla liderler ve devlet düzeyi başlıkları altında bu dönemde sırasıyla Türkiye siyasetine yön veren İsmet İnönü, Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit ve Necmettin Erbakan'ın dış politika yaklaşımlarını ele alır. Yazar, anılan liderlerin bu konudaki etkilerinin önemini vurgularken, aynı zamanda bu liderlerin dış politika kararlarının kamuoyu, ordu gibi aktörler ile mevcut askeri ve ekonomik imkanlar tarafından da etkilendiğine dikkat çeker. Ayrıca bu aktörlerin ve faktörlerin, özellikle Kıbrıs kararlarında, Johnson Mektubu'na kararlı bir yanıt verilmesinde, ABD'nin haşhaş ekimi üzerindeki yasaklama taleplerinin reddedilmesinde, 1974'te haşhaş ekiminin serbest bırakılmasında ve ülkedeki Amerikan varlığının ve üslerin kullanımının sınırlandırılmasında etkili olduklarını ileri sürer.

Taş Yetim, kitabının son bölümünde, 1960'lar ve 1970'lerde sistem düzeyinde gerçekleşen yeni gelişmelerin, krizlerin ortaya çıkışı ve Türkiye'nin otonomi arayışındaki etkisini inceler. Yazar, bu bölümde özellikle 1960'ların başında başlayan detant dönemi ve 1970'lerde siyasi ve ekonomik gücü göreli artan üçüncü Dünya ülkeleri, SSCB, Almanya ve AET ülkelerinin, 1950'lerdeki sıkı kutuplu sistemsel sınırlamaları (otonomi artırma imkanını kısıtlayan) ortadan kaldırarak, Ankara'nın dış politikasında ABD etkisini sınırlayıcı önlemler almasına olanak sağladığını vurgular. Yazar, bu dönüşümlerin her birini ayrıntılı olarak ele alırken, Türkiye'nin dış politikasının 1950'lerden farklı olarak Sovyetler Birliği'nden daha az tehdit algıladığı, bloklar arasındaki ilişkilerde bir yumuşama yaşandığı, ABD'nin yumuşama döneminin etkisiyle Türkiye'ye yönelik ekonomik ve askeri taahhütlerine daha az sadık kaldığı, üçüncü Dünyanın yükselişi ile alternatif ekonomik ve siyasi aktörlerin ortaya çıktığı ve ABD'nin askeri ve ekonomik gücünün göreli olarak azaldığı bir sistemik değişiklik döneminde Türkiye'nin dış politikasını bu yeni koşullara nasıl adapte ettiğini inceler.

Araştırmasının bulgularını kitabın sonuç bölümünde değerlendiren Taş Yetim, Türkiye'nin bahsi geçen dönemde ABD'ye karşı gösterdiği meydan okumaların, aslında dış politika otonomisini artırma çabasıyla sınırlı olduğuna vurgu yapar. Özellikle, Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği, Doğu Avrupa, Ortadoğu ve İslam Dünyası ile

geliştirdiği ikili ilişkiler, Batı'da "eksen kayması" tartışmalarını tetiklemiştir. Ancak yazar, Türkiye'nin Batı düzeninden kopmadığına ve ABD'ye yönelik meydan okumalarını, düzen içinde otonomisini genişletme taleplerIyle sınırladığına işaret ederek, bu tartışmaların rasyonelliğini sorgulamaktadır. Bu bağlamda Taş Yetim, dört temel bulguya dikkat çeker: İlk olarak, 1960'lar boyunca Türkiye'nin NATO üyeliğine yönelik kamuoyu eleştirileri ve 1970'lerdeki NATO'dan çıkma tartışmalarına rağmen Ankara, NATO ile ilişkilerin güçlendirileceğini açıkça belirtmiştir. İkinci olarak, Ankara NATO'dan ayrılmanın, Kıbrıs konusunda Batı desteğinin tamamen Yunanistan'a kaymasına neden olabileceğini düşünmüştür. Üçüncüsü, Türkiye'nin Sovyet tehdidi, 1960'lar ve 1970'lerde azalmış ancak tamamen sona ermemiştir. Örneğin, Sovyetler'in 1970'lerde Akdeniz ve Avrupa'daki askeri varlığını artırması, Ankara için bir endişe kaynağıydı. Son olarak, Türkiye 1964-75 döneminde Batı dışı ülkelerle ilişkilerini, özellikle Kıbrıs'a destek ve ekonomik yardım almanın ötesine taşımamıştır. Mesela Sovyetler Birliği ile olan ekonomik ilişkileri sınırlandırılmış ve herhangi bir silah alımı yapılmamıştır. Ekonomik zorluklar nedeniyle Ankara, 1970'lerin sonunda IMF ve Batı kaynaklarına yönelmiştir. Dolayısıyla, ABD ile yaşanan kriz döneminde gerçekleştirilen politikalar, NATO ve Batı düzenine bir alternatif olarak değil, dış politikada daha fazla egemenlik ve otonomi kazanma amacıyla hayata geçirilmiştir.

Hüsna Taş Yetim, Türkiye-ABD arasında İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında kurulan müttefiklik ilişkisinin, 1964-75 döneminde neden bir kriz evresine girdiğine ve Türkiye'nin bu süreçte dış politikada otonomisini artırma yönündeki motivasyonlarının ne olduğuna hiyerarşi teorisini temel alarak ve bu teoriyi ittifak teorileri, dış politika analizi ve lider, devlet ve sistem düzeylerine odaklanan farklı teoriler ile destekleyerek cevap aradığı bu kitap ile literatüre önemli katkılarda bulunur. Öncelikle Taş Yetim'in kitabı Türkiye dış politikasının 1964-1975 dönemini hiyerarşi teorisi ile analiz eden ilk çalışma olma özelliğini taşır. Bununla birlikte yazar, Türkiye'yi hiyerarşi literatürüne dahil ederek, Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerindeki krizleri hiyerarşi teorisi perspektifiyle analiz eden çalışmaların sayısının artırmış olur. Ayrıca Türkiye örneği, hiyerarşi teorisinin bazı argümanlarına karşı bir anti-tez oluşturarak, teorideki bazı varsayımları sorgulatır. Yazara göre, 1974'te Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın Kıbrıs'ta çatışmaya girmeleri, hiyerarşideki tarafların birbiriyle çatışmayacağı teorik argümanını sorgular. Ayrıca yazarın, Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerindeki kriz dönemini birden fazla analiz birimini bir araya getirerek açıklaması, lider, sistem ve devlet düzeylerinin etkileşiminin önemini vurgulamak açısından oldukça değerli bir çabadır. Ancak, her kapsamlı çalışma gibi, bu eser de eleştirel bir gözle incelendiğinde geliştirilebilecek bazı yönleri barındırmaktadır.

Öncelikle, eserin yoğun teorik çerçevesi bazı okurlar için erişilebilirliğini sınırlayabilir. Kitapta sunulan detaylı teorik tartışmalar ve hipotezler, konuya aşina olmayanlar için zaman zaman karmaşık ve ağır olabilir. Bu durum, eserin daha

geniş bir kitleye hitap etme potansiyelini kısıtlayabilir. Ayrıca, eserde ele alınan döneme ilişkin çok sayıda önemli olay ve gelişme bulunmasına rağmen, bazı önemli uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörlerin rolleri üzerinde daha fazla durulabilirdi. Örneğin, Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki diğer bölgesel güçlerin ve blokların, Türkiye'nin dış politika stratejileri üzerindeki etkileri daha detaylı bir şekilde incelenebilir. Bu, Türkiye'nin dış politikasındaki otonomi arayışının daha kapsamlı bir bağlamda değerlendirilmesine olanak sağlayabilir. Son olarak, kitapta Türkiye'nin dış politikada otonomi arayışı ve ABD ile ilişkileri temel alınmış olsa da iç politika dinamiklerinin dış politika üzerindeki etkilerine dair daha ayrıntılı analizler sunulabilirdi. Özellikle, dönemin Türkiye'sinde yaşanan siyasi ve sosyal değişimlerin, dış politika kararları üzerindeki etkisi ve bu değişimlerin uluslararası ilişkilerle nasıl etkileşime girdiği konularında daha fazla vurgu yapılabilir. Bu yaklaşım, eserin çok boyutluluğunu artırarak, Türkiye'nin dış politikasını şekillendiren iç ve dış dinamikler arasındaki karmaşık ilişkilerin daha iyi anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunabilir.

Kitap İncelemesi / Book Review

İran'da Değişim Siyaseti: Hatemi Döneminde Reform Mücadelesi

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Dr. Mustafa Caner'in İran'da Değişim Siyaseti: Hatemi Dönemi Reform Mücadelesi isimli kitap, esasen bir doktora tezi olarak kaleme alınmış ve sonrasında kitap haline getirilmiş bir eserdir. Bu bağlamda, eserin ele alınan konuya yaklaşımı tutarlı teorik bir dayanağa sahiptir ve belirli bir ekole dahildir. Bu çerçeve dahilinde eser, "İran reform döneminin ortaya çıkışında, yükselişinde ve düşüşünde etkili olan siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik dinamikleri ortaya koymayı" amaçlamaktadır (11). Eserde reform hareketinin niteliği sorunsallaştırılmış ve İran'da reform hareketinin ortaya çıkış sebebi, nasıl bir gelişim gösterdiği ve neden çöktüğü soruları temel araştırma çerçevesini oluşturmaktadır. Konu edinilen aktörlerin ve dönemin çok daha tutarlı ve bütüncül incelenebilmesi için eserde, yedi farklı alt araştırma sorusu daha sorulmakta ve cevaplandırılmaktadır. Bu sorular genel olarak; reform hareketini daha iyi tanımlayabilmek, siyasal yapı ve reformistler arasındaki dinamiklerde etkili olan faktörleri belirleyebilmek ve reform hareketinin tarihi süreçte nasıl güç kazandığını ve kaybettiğini saptayabilmek için sorulmuştur ve hepsi metin içerisinde reel kanıtlarıyla cevaplandırılmıştır.

Eserin en temel iddiası, İran'da 1997-2005 yılları arasında görülen reform hareketinin siyasi elitler arasındaki mücadeleyi merkeze alan bir bakış açısıyla incelenebileceğidir. Yazar reform hareketini incelemek için elit teorisinden yola çıkarak İran'daki ilgili kişilerin, kurumların, grupların vb. etkenlerin siyasal süreç analizini yapmıştır. Bu anlayışla, yazar reform hareketinin bir elit hareketi olduğunu ve İran'daki dini ve popüler kurumlar arasında meydana gelen uzlaşmaz ikiliklerden dolayı ortaya çıktığını söylemektedir. Çalışma, İran'da bulunan yapının ve aktörlerin ikilemine dayanmaktadır. Yazar bu ikilemi ele alırken tek taraflı değil, çift taraflı bir yaklaşım sergilemiştir ve bu yaklaşımı karşılıklı yapı-aktör ve aktör-

yapı etkileşimine tarihten örnekler vererek kullanmıştır. Yazar bu yaklaşımla reform hareketini yapısal sorunların etkilediği elit-içi bir çatışma olarak tanımlamaktadır.

Dr. Caner, çalışmada kurumsal yapıya ve siyasi aktörlere odaklı bir yöntem izlemiştir ve herhangi bir yanlış çıkarıma mahal vermemek için siyasi aktörleri incelerken Farsça-İngilizce-Türkçe birçok birincil kaynaktan yararlanmıştır. Yazar İran içerisindeki elitleri tespit edebilmek için çalışmasında Haffmann-Lange'in konumsal ve kararsal elit yaklaşımını tercih etmiştir. Lakin yazarın da kitapta belirttiği gibi, bu yaklaşımlar ışığında yapılan analizlerde bazı zayıflıklar/ön kabuller edinilebilmekte ve çalışma çıktıları bu zayıflıklardan olumsuz etkilenebilmektedir. Yazar, bu olumsuz etkilenimden kurtulabilmek için metnin birçok yerinde İran'ın o dönemki siyasi durumunu ele alan haberlere ve açıklamalara yer vermiştir. Örneğin, her ne kadar model görmezden gelse de bir grubun bir konumu işgal etmiş olması, bu konumun getirisi olan gücün kullanılabilirliğini tek başına sağlamamaktadır. Bu noktada eserde Hatemi yönetiminin her ne kadar iktidar olmuş olsa da nasıl muhafazakâr elitler ve dini lider tarafından dini kanallar ve siyasi hamleler ile sınırlandırıldığına büyük yer verilmiştir. Yazar, teori dışı bu yaklaşımını günlük bulgular ve birincil tanıkların geçmişte verdiği demeçler ile kanıtlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda yazar, Hatemi yönetimini hükümet olmuş ama iktidar olamamış bir yönetim olarak tanımlamıştır.

Yazar, İran'ın reform döneminde var olan elitleri incelemek için elit dolaşımı ve elit entegrasyonu modellerine de başvurmuş ve İran'a dönük sosyopolitik incelemesini derinleştirmiştir. Yazar bu modeller aracılığıyla İran'ın o dönemki muhafazakâr ve reformist elitlerinin ortak bir entegrasyon zeminine sahip olduğunu söylemektedir. Dönemin elitleri her ne kadar güç-etki üstünlüğü edinmek için birbiriyle çarpışmış olsa da ikisi de devrim sonrası inşa edilen nizamın devamlılığını her daim savunmuş ve nizama inanmıştır. Yazar bu durumu daha da derinleştirerek, bu karşıt iki grubun varlıklarını bu nizama borçlu olduğunu belirtmiş ve aslında ideolojik bir yapılanmanın sonucunda elitler arası bir uyumun oluştuğunu belirtmiştir. Yazar bu yaklaşımını, reformist kadronun başını çeken Muhammed Hatemi'nin kritik dönemlerde değişim için gerekli görülen adımları atmaması ve destekleri vermemesiyle örneklendirmiştir.

Dr. Caner, elit teorisi altında gelişmiş bu farklı modelleri Hatemi'nin reform mücadelesi döneminin incelenmesinde bir arada kullanabilmek için iki aşamalı bir analiz gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu bağlamda yazar, ilk olarak İran'ın anayasal kurumlarını ve düzenini incelemiş ve bu düzenin elitist karakterini ortaya koymayı amaçlamıştır. Analizin ilk aşamasında İran'daki kurumlar; müesses nizam/vesayet kurumları ve cumhuriyet/demokratik kurumlar olmak üzere ikiye ayrılmıştır ve toplamda altı temel anayasal kurum (Dini Liderlik [Veli-i Fakih], Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Muhafızlar Konseyi, İslami Şura Meclisi, Uzmanlar Meclisi, Düzenin Yararını Teşhis Konseyi) incelenmiştir. Kurumların anayasal yetki ve kabiliyetlerinin incelenmesi,

İran'ın siyasi yapısı hakkında bilgi sahibi olmayan okuyucuların da dönemi ve İran'daki güç paylaşımını daha iyi kavrayabilmesi için önemli bir temel bilgi havzası görevi görmüştür. Bu aşamada yazar kurumlar arası çelişkileri açıklamak için David E. Thaler ve arkadaşlarının üç faktörlü görüşünü sunmuştur. Yazar bu görüşü geliştirerek kurumlar arasında diğerlerine kıyasla teokratik kurumların daha avantajlı olduğunun altını çizerek kurumlar arası çatışmaların denetim ve denge ilişkisindense elit içi çatışmaların bir örneği olarak ele alınabileceğini belirtmiştir.

Analizinin ikinci aşaması olarak yazar, devrim sonrası gelişen siyasi aktörlere ve bu aktörlerin arasında var olan sosyal ağa odaklanmıştır. Yazar, bu aşamada o dönemin İran'ında dışarıya kapalı informal bir ağ sisteminin var olduğuna ulaşmıştır. Bu çıkarımın bir örneği olarak, İslami İran Katılım Cephesi Partisi'nin lideri Muhammed Rıza Hatemi'nin Cumhurbaşkanı Hatemi'nin kardeşi ve Humeyni ile yakından aile bağlarına sahip olması ve Cumhurbaşkanı'nın bu durumu söylemiyle desteklemesi gösterilmiştir. Yazar, İran'da dışarıya kapalı elitler arası sosyal bir ağın varlığını kanıtlamak için altı farklı ismi aile bağlarıyla incelemiş ve bu duruma örnek olarak göstermiştir. Eserde bu örneklerin zaman zaman siyasi görüş değişimleri yaşamasına rağmen elit özelliklerini kaybetmediğinin altı çizilmiş ve İran'da aile bağlarının "iktidarı mülk edinme ve diğer gruplarla paylaşma riskine karşı araçsallaştırıldığı" belirtilmiştir. Yazar bu gibi yaygın elitist kapalı sosyal ağlardan dolayı reform hareketinin dikey mobilizasyonunu sağlayamadığını belirtmektedir.

Yazar İran'daki Hatemi döneminin okuyucular tarafından çok-boyutlu ve kapsamlı bir şekilde anlaşılabilmesi için reform hareketinin tarihi sürecini üç ayrı bölüm dahilinde incelemiştir. Bu bağlamda söylenmelidir ki çalışma, diğer çalışmalarda görülebilen kronolojik sığ olay sıralamaları tuzağına düşmemiştir. Yazar tarihi olayları, başarılı bir şekilde birincil yerel kaynaklardan edinilen detaylarla beslenen berrak bir olay-etken-sonuç ilişkisi çerçevesiyle sunabilmiştir. Tarihi gelişim sürecinin okuyuculara verilmesi sonrası, yazar eserinin sonunda Hatemi'nin reform hareketinin başarısızlık nedenlerini net bir yaklaşımla ortaya koyabilmiştir. İran'ın o dönemki reform hareketinin başarısızlığı yazar tarafından beş temel sebeple özetlenmiştir. Bu sebepler; i) reformist elitlerin reformist toplumun taleplerini tam anlamıyla temsil etmemesi ve reformist kadronun yürüttüğü bu siyasetinin temel nedeninin geçmişte kaybettikleri siyasi gücü elde etme arzusu, ii) bazı kesimlerce Hatemi'nin fıtratı olarak lanse edilen ama aslında reformist kadroların sunduğu ideolojinin tutarsızlığı ve bu kadroların var olan nizama sadakatlerinden kaynaklanan nizamın salahiyetinin öncelenmesi, iii) reformistlerin kendi arasında yaşanan kopuşlar, iv) reform hareketinin vesayet kurumları tarafından baskı altında tutulması ve v) İran siyasetinin parti siyaseti yerine hizipsel dengelerin çerçevesinde işlemesidir.

İran'da Değişim Siyaseti: Hatemi Dönemi Reform Mücadelesi, İran'da 1997-2005 yılları arasında görülen reform hareketini ele alan literatür çalışmalarının, dönemi

teorik temelden yoksun ve makro gözlemler ışığında bir diğer demokratikleşme/modernleşme süreci olarak görmesinden kaynaklanan sığlığa alternatif bir yaklaşım sunmuştur. Eser, Hatemi dönemini dönemsel bir anlatıyla İran siyasi tarihi genelinde ele alan incelemelerin teorik eksikliğini gidermiş ve İran siyasi iç dinamiklerini siyasi hiziplerin yükseliş ve düşüşünü görmezden gelen çalışmaların kısıtlı tutumunu geliştirmiştir. Yaklaşımında bireyler ve gruplar arası ilişkileri net ve derinlemesine ele alması ve içerdiği sosyopolitik çıkarımlarıyla eser, İran çalışmaları alanına ilgi duyan araştırmacılar için literatüre katkıda bulunmuştur.

Book Review

Iraq: Power, Institutions, and Identities

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Book Information

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This book, published by Routledge Press in 2023 and authored by Andrew J. Flibbert, examines Iraqi politics from different dimensions. It starts with three key concepts that shape Iraqi politics: power, institutions and identities. Then, the book explains early Iraqi nation-building attempts after the First World War. At that time, Iraq was a state under British mandate and even though it formally gained its independence in 1932, it was not able to take decisions without the influence of Britain. Britain-installed King Faisal I realized the lack of Iraqi identity and put efforts to unite Iraqis as "one nation". However, because of his weakly empowered monarchy, he had very limited success in terms of the creation of state institutions and a national sense of community. After Faisal I, King Ghazi, who ruled Iraq between 1933-1939, had the same fate as his father regarding his failure to create state institutions and an Iraqi identity. Later, Faisal II replaced King Ghazi at the age of three. However, he had little influence in Iraqi politics because of his age. His government was heavily influenced by the eight-time Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id. Just like his predecessor, he had almost no success in terms of creating an Iraqi identity and democratic state institutions. However, attempts of these leaders paved the way to build an Iraqi identity in the future, as in modern Iraq, Iraqi identity is an important bond in the society (Yıldız, 2020).

The second chapter analyses key events between 1958-1968. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and Nasser's rise to power in 1954, nationalist ideas emerged in the Arab world. The monarch was overthrown in Iraq in 1958 and a very unstable reign of governments were witnessed between 1958-1968. Leaders in this period, Abd al-Karim Qasim and Arif brothers were constantly threatened by rival groups and they carried out autocratic measures to remain in power. The Ba'athist coup of

1968 installed a more durable regime relatively, firstly under Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr (1968-1979) and later under Saddam Hussein (1979-2003). This chapter underlines the unstable character of Iraqi politics and weak institutionalism which pushed its leaders to be more autocratic. Therefore, the author analyzes the root problems of Iraqi politics, which have been affecting Iraq even today.

The third chapter analyses the period between 1988-2022. The chapter covers various milestones in Iraqi history in that period: the 1990 Kuwait intervention, the 1991 Gulf War, political and economic isolation after the Gulf War, allegations of chemical weapons production, the 2003 Iraqi War, the post-war period, democracy attempts, Arab Spring and its effects in Iraq, DAESH insurgency and Iraq's response against terrorism. The chapter begins with the Kuwait intervention, caused by the dispute about oil fields between the two countries. The result of the war was unexpected for Iraq, which did not expect a coalition campaign against its forces. Iraqi forces were defeated and Saddam's regime had to face international sanctions because of its weapons of mass destruction. Following Kuwait's intervention, neoconservatives in the USA began pressuring policymakers to take action against Iraq. Finally, the Bush administration decided to intervene in Iraq by falsely trying to justify their action as an operation against al-Qaeda and to destroy Iraq's mass destruction weapons. The insurgency period of the war lasted for many years and the power vacuum caused by the occupation was filled by terrorist organizations such as PKK, DAESH, Al-Qaeda, which claimed the lives of thousands of innocent people especially since the Arab Spring (Hamasaeed & Nada, 2020).

The fourth chapter is focused on Iraq's foreign relations. Iraq's foreign relations had been dominated by Britain especially since the Monarch was overthrown. After that, relations with Iran and Kuwait played a key role in Iraq's foreign relations. Then, especially after Iran and Kuwait wars, Iraq was politically isolated; yet, Saddam's firm control of the state prevented him from being overthrown until the USA occupation in 2003.

The fifth chapter is devoted to the political economy of Iraq. The chapter focuses on issues such as Iraq's economy, income sources, demography, population growth, and gender inequality. An interesting fact about the Iraqi economy is that while it has almost 8% of all the proven oil reserves in the world, this huge number of assets also indirectly brought unusual costs to the country (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024). For example, during the 1970s, Iraq's oil revenues saw massive increases because of the global oil crisis that drove up the oil prices, but absurdly, Iraq went from having 35 billion dollars of hard currency and gold reserves to 80 billion dollars of debt at the same period (Kamran, 1990); because of the Iraq-Iran war between 1980 and 1988, along with factors like corruption, nepotism, inefficiency and patronage system.

In this book review, key assumptions of the author are also analysed. "Middle-state" is a term used by the author to describe Iraq. It is not a weak state by any means, but it is not a major power at the same time. When its relative power increased especially during the 20th century for various reasons like oil prices, oil field discoveries, weakening of its neighbors; policymakers felt the need to excessively use that power aggressively. This brings us to another key finding of the author: the effects of weak institutionalism. According to the author, when analysing Iraq's politics, it is unnecessary to put too much emphasis on the "names"; instead, weak institutionalism and poor nation-building efforts are the core reasons of Iraq's deep-rooted problems. Therefore, a well-known concept, "self-fulfilling theory" can be put into consideration. As Iraq's political story of the 20th is full of foreign involvements, assassinations, coups and military intervention in politics; each leader that took control of Iraq felt the need to "secure" himself and his government. That led to authoritarianism, assassinations, oppression against the opposition, and terrorizing civilians. Therefore, Iraq's problems lie in its structural flaws; not solely the leaders themselves.

Another important point of the author is the "fluidity" of new political ideas in the Middle East; where most people have similar cultural and historical backgrounds. Because of that, a political movement that emerged in one state can easily spread to other states. For the author, this is another reason for conflicts in the Middle East. For example, after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Arab nationalism spread in the region; which encouraged coups against monarchies. After the Iran Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran's new policymakers called for an Islamic Revolution in Iraq and Saddam Hussain was afraid that what happened in Iran may spread to Iraq as well. That, among other reasons like Iran's decades-long involvement with Iraqi Kurdish and Shi'i populations, the water problem and Iran's loss of U.S. arms and political support; encouraged Saddam Hussain to attack Iran in 1980 (Renfrew, 1987). The war lasted until 1988 and caused more than one million casualties. Apart from interstate conflicts, terrorism can spread easily in the region for numerous reasons like unemployment, poverty, foreign involvement, extremism, power vacuums, failed states, foreign interventions. For example, while the 2003 Iraq occupation lasted only about six weeks, its aftermath and process of building a new government was bloody; which caused tens of thousands of deaths (Doherty & Kiley, 2023). The occupation was a failure not only in terms of casualties, but also in terms of what it left behind. After the war, PKK and DAESH made use of the power vacuum in Iraq; which helped them to recruit members and become important actors both in Iraq and Syria. Most recently, during the Arab Spring, terrorist organizations such as PKK, DAESH, Al-Qaeda sought for more power and territory. In 2016, Donald Trump bluntly called Obama to be the "founder of DAESH", by "the way he got out of Iraq" (Hernandez, 2016).

As a conclusion, the aim of the book is to analyse the political history of Iraq structurally. Rather than the personal attitudes of the leaders, it is the structural reasons that shape the acts of the leaders. The author didn't aim to write a history book, but rather aimed to analyse his key assumptions to explain deep-rooted problems that lie in Iraqi politics. I believe that this is a thought-provoking book that encourages readers to brainstorm not only about Iraqi politics, but the politics of the Middle East as well; and it even helps to understand the autocratic states of the 21st century. Therefore, I recommend this book for those who study history of Iraq, Middle East politics and international relations that try to increase their perspective on the chronic problems of many autocratic states in the 21st century.

Aims and Scope

Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (TJMES) is a peer-reviewed academic journal published for the Middle East Institute of Sakarya University which is a well-known research institution in Türkiye and the Middle East. The journal was founded in 2014 to address the need for scholarly research on Middle Eastern studies. TJMES aims to analyze contemporary and historical issues of Middle East and North Africa.

Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies provides a forum for interdisciplinary scholarship based on solid empirical research and innovative critical readings of developments in the Middle East and North Africa region. Geographically, the journal focuses on the Middle East region, broadly defined as stretching across North Africa from the Atlantic coast of Morocco to Egypt and south to Sudan, to the Anatolian Peninsula (Türkiye), Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula.

TJMES welcomes academic contributions which analyse political, economic and social dynamics and developments of the Middle East region. The articles in the journal are mostly written in English and the journal prioritises contributions to the existing Middle Eastern studies literature. The journal prefers research written from multi-disciplinary perspectives and from a number of fields including but not limited to international relations, politics, sociology, history, geography, theology, philosophy, security and economics.The journal also has a book review section that covers reviews of the books on all issues of the Middle East. This helps readers of TJMES to understand current scholarly research of the field.

Amaç ve Kapsam

Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi (TOÇD), Sakarya Üniversitesi Ortadoğu Enstitüsü tarafından yayımlanan hakemli bir akademik dergidir. Ortadoğu çalışmaları üzerine bilimsel araştırma ihtiyacını karşılamak üzere 2014 yılında kurulan TOÇD, Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika'nın güncel ve tarihi konularını analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

TOÇD, Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgelerindeki gelişmelere ilişkin ampirik araştırmalara ve yenilikçi eleştirel okumalara dayalı disiplinler arası akademik bir forum imkanı sunar. Dergimiz, Fas'ın Atlantik kıyılarından Mısır'a ve güneyde Sudan'a kadar uzanan Kuzey Afrika bölgesinden Anadolu Yarımadası'na (Türkiye), Batı Asya'ya (İran ve Afganistan) ve Arap Yarımadası'na kadar geniş bir coğrafyaya odaklanmaktadır.

TOÇD, Ortadoğu bölgesinin siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal dinamiklerini ve gelişmelerini analiz eden akademik çalışmaları memnuniyetle kabul etmektedir. Dergimizdeki makaleler çoğunlukla İngilizcedir ve dergimiz, mevcut Ortadoğu çalışmaları literatürüne katkı sağlamaya öncelik vermektedir. TOÇD; uluslararası ilişkiler, siyaset, sosyoloji, tarih, coğrafya, ilahiyat, felsefe, güvenlik ve ekonomi alanlarında (ve bunların haricindeki diğer alanlarda) multidisipliner bir bakış açısıyla yazılmış araştırmaları tercih etmektedir. Dergide ayrıca Ortadoğu'nun tüm konularıyla ilgili kitap değerlendirmelerinin yer aldığı bir kitap inceleme bölümü de bulunmaktadır.